Opinion ID: 2270874
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Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Probable Cause Supporting a Warrantless Arrest

Text: We must now consider whether Officer Lewis's arrest of the petitioner was lawful. A warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place for a felony, or a misdemeanor committed in the officer's presence, is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the arrest is supported by probable cause. Longshore, 399 Md. at 501, 924 A.2d at 1137 (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418, 96 S.Ct. 820, 825, 46 L.Ed.2d 598, 606 (1976)); State v. Evans 352 Md. 496, 511, 723 A.2d 423, 429 (1999). Probable cause, we have frequently stated, is a nontechnical conception of a reasonable ground of a belief of guilt. A finding of probable cause requires less evidence than is necessary to sustain a conviction, but more evidence than would merely arouse suspicion. Our determination of whether probable cause exists requires a nontechnical, common sense evaluation of the totality of the circumstances in a given situation in light of the facts found to be credible by the trial judge.... Therefore, to justify a warrantless arrest the police must point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted the intrusion. State v. Wallace, 372 Md. 137, 148, 812 A.2d 291, 297-98 (2002) (quoting Collins v. State, 322 Md. 675, 680, 589 A.2d 479, 481 (1991)) (internal citations omitted); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-32, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328-29, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 543-45 (1983). In the case of a search incident to arrest, the State must show that probable cause supported a lawful arrest before the officer conducted the search. Bouldin, 276 Md. at 515, 350 A.2d at 132; see also Davids v. State, 208 Md. 377, 385, 118 A.2d 636, 639 (1955) (evidence seized following the arrest cannot be taken into consideration in determining whether the officer had probable cause to make the arrest). We shall consider only what the officer articulated as the basis for the seizure: the smell of ether emanated from the petitioner's person, the petitioner was standing next to a house in a high drug crime area, and the petitioner did not respond to Officer Lewis's questions. [11] We hold that, based on what Officer Lewis knew at the moment that he seized the petitioner, he did not have probable cause to believe that the petitioner had committed or was committing a crime. The petitioner argues that, considering the totality of the circumstances, the facts do not constitute probable cause to show that he was committing a crime on the night in question. Although the intermediate appellate court held that knowledge gained from the sense of smell alone may be of such character as to give rise to probable cause for a belief that a crime is being committed in Ford v. State, 37 Md. App. 373, 379, 377 A.2d 577, 580 (1977) (applying Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948)), the substance in question in Ford, marijuana, was contraband and had a distinctive identifying odor. In the present case, the substance in question, ether, is not contraband. Possession of ether is not a criminal act, nor did the surrounding circumstances provide a substantial basis for a suspicion that the petitioner possessed contraband. The petitioner also examines cases from a variety of jurisdictions that directly addressed the odor of ether or PCP as part of a probable cause analysis. The petitioner distinguishes the cases involving the odor of ether or other lawful substances on the basis that, in those cases, the odor of ether was accompanied by factors strongly suggesting the presence of contraband. Unlike in those cases, there are no significant corroborating factors here. The State argues that several courts in other jurisdictions have found that the smell of ether alone is sufficient to establish probable cause. The State maintains that, even if this were not the case, the other factors present, such as standing in the shadows in a known drug area and characteristics consistent with PCP intoxication, provide an additional basis for establishing probable cause. It is well-established that odor is a valid consideration in the probable cause analysis. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111, 85 S.Ct. 741, 747, 13 L.Ed.2d 684, 690 (1965) (observation of 601b bags of sugar, empty tin cans, and odor of mash whisky provided sufficient probable cause for a search warrant); Ford, 37 Md.App. at 379, 377 A.2d at 580 ([K]nowledge gained from the sense of smell alone may be of such character as to give rise to probable cause for a belief that a crime is being committed in the presence of the officer.) Maryland courts have previously held that the odor of contraband alone is sufficient to establish probable cause for a belief that contraband is present. Ford, 37 Md.App. at 379, 377 A.2d at 580; see also Waugh v. State, 275 Md. 22, 30, 338 A.2d 268, 272 (1975) (noting in dicta that if Detective Schwartz had actually smelled what he believed to be the odor of marijuana coming from the suitcases, this would have constituted probable cause for him to have searched the suitcases). Maryland courts, however, have not held that the odor of a lawful substance that is allegedly associated with contraband constitutes probable cause for a belief that contraband is present. The Supreme Court of Kansas recently addressed the issue of whether the odor of ether constitutes probable cause for a warrantless search of a vehicle in State v. Ibarra, 282 Kan. 530, 147 P.3d 842 (2006). During a routine traffic stop, the officer smelled a strong odor of ether emanating from the vehicle. Ibarra, 147 P.3d at 844-45. Based on the odor of ether, the officer searched the vehicle. Ibarra, 147 P.3d at 845. The search uncovered at black bag containing a glass container of white powder. Id. Field tests confirmed that the powder was methamphetamine. Id. In considering whether the officer had probable cause to search Ibarra's vehicle based on the smell of ether, the Supreme Court of Kansas noted that the odor of contraband, including marijuana and alcohol, can constitute probable cause to support a warrantless search. Ibarra, 147 P.3d at 847-48 (citing State v. MacDonald, 253 Kan. 320, 856 P.2d 116, 120 (1993) (odor of marijuana constitutes probable cause to support a warrantless search); State v. Bickerstaff, 26 Kan.App.2d 423, 988 P.2d 285, 286 (1999) (odor of alcohol, breath test, and denial of drinking constitute probable cause for warrantless search of a vehicle)). After determining that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant clause did not apply, Ibarra, 147 P.3d at 849, the Court distinguished the odor of ether from the odor of marijuana or other contraband. [T]he odor of marijuana, an illegal substance, can provide probable cause standing alone.... It is not surprising then that the odor of marijuana combined with an anonymous tip can furnish probable cause. In the present case, the ether smelled by the officers is not an illegal substance and we decline to conclude that the odor of ether alone could establish probable cause for the search of Ibarra's vehicle. Where the odor alone does not furnish probable cause, this court should not use it to bootstrap insubstantial information in to establish probable cause. Ibarra, 147 P.3d at 856. The odor of ether is distinguishable from the odor of contraband like marijuana because [t]he strong odor of ether ... is as consistent with lawful activity as it is with criminal activity. Ibarra, 147 P.3d at 850. Thus, the smell of ether alone is justification for further investigation but not for a search. Id. We disagree with the State's interpretation of the cases it cites in support of the proposition that the odor of ether alone is sufficient to establish probable cause. The State cites United States v. Clayton, 210 F.3d 841, 842 (8th Cir.2000), in which police, acting on an anonymous tip about a methamphetamine laboratory and illegal guns, went to Clayton's home to execute an arrest warrant on an unrelated matter. Upon arriving at the home, the officers smelled odors related to the manufacture of methamphetamine and saw jars of liquid that the officers believed to be methamphetamine. Clayton, 210 F.3d at 842-43. Although the officers had no search warrant, Clayton consented to the search. Clayton, 210 F.3d at 843. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the validity of the search, holding that the officers validly entered Clayton's home to execute an unrelated arrest warrant, and that the odor and other items were in plain view upon entry. Clayton, 210 F.3d at 844-45. In that case, the police relied not only on the odor of chemicals associated with methamphetamine manufacture in seeking a search warrant, but also the corroborating tip about methamphetamine manufacture and the presence of liquids that appeared to be methamphetamine. Similarly, in State v. Kennedy, 953 So.2d 655, 656 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2007), police received information that Kennedy was involved in a feud over stolen anhydrous ammonia to be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Acting on this information, police went to Kennedy's home to investigate the possibility of methamphetamine manufacture. Id. From outside the home, police smelled the odors of anhydrous ammonia and ether, which the officer knew were consistent with the manufacture of methamphetamine. Based on these odors, the task force leader arrested [Kennedy] as soon as [Kennedy] opened the front door. Id. On a subsequent protective sweep of the home, officers found a methamphetamine laboratory. Id. The Court of Appeals of Florida, First District, reversed the lower court's decision to suppress the evidence recovered from the home, noting that [w]hen the lead officer smelled the odors of anhydrous ammonia and ether, which he knew were consistent with the manufacture of methamphetamine, probable cause existed to arrest [Kennedy]. [12] Kennedy, 953 So.2d at 657. Not unlike Clayton, 210 F.3d at 844-45, Kennedy is distinguishable from the present facts because the corroborating tip about methamphetamine manufacturing in the home provided a context that supported the officer's belief that the odor of lawful substances was associated with criminal activity. The State also relies on Minnick v. United States, 607 A.2d 519 (D.C.1992). In Minnick, police officers stopped Minnick's car for a traffic violation in an area known for PCP trafficking. Minnick, 607 A.2d at 521. During the stop, the officers smelled a strong odor of PCP emanating from inside the car. Id. A search of Minnick's purse uncovered two vials of PCP. Id. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the search ... was justified by the strong, distinctive odor of PCP which both detectives smelled as they approached Minnick's car, and accordingly held that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Minnick, 607 A.2d at 525. Unlike marijuana, which has a readily identifiable, distinctive odor, it is unclear from the case law or the record in the present case whether PCP has its own distinctive odor when it is transported or consumed, or whether the odor is that of other substances allegedly associated with the drug, such as ether. We cannot determine whether the odor discussed in Minnick is the same odor of ether that Officer Lewis detected when he encountered the petitioner. The court's conclusion in Minnick, however, was not only supported by the odor of PCP, but also on the officer's knowledge that the area in question was specifically known for PCP trafficking. [13] Moreover, the record in the present case is barren of information about the qualities of PCP odors. There is no information in the record indicating whether the odor of PCP may have different qualities, similar to the distinction between the odor of burning marijuana and raw marijuana. See Wilson v. State, 174 Md.App. 434, 454-55, 921 A.2d 881, 892 (2007) (discussing the distinction between raw and burnt marijuana odors in a probable cause analysis). We are unaware of any cases in which a court held that the smell of ether or another lawful substance associated with contraband, on its own, constituted probable cause for a belief that contraband was present or a crime was committed. [14] To the contrary, several courts have take the same position as the Supreme Court of Kansas in Ibarra, 282 Kan. 530, 147 P.3d 842, discussed supra, holding that the odor of a lawful substance, on its own, does not constitute probable cause for a belief that contraband is present or a crime has been committed, even if the lawful substance is allegedly associated with contraband. United States v. Matteucci, 842 F.Supp. 442, 447 (D.Or.1994) (holding that smell of items used in methamphetamine manufacture does not constitute probable cause on its own for a warrantless search under the automobile exception); People v. Dickson, 144 Cal.App.3d 1046, 192 Cal.Rptr. 897, 903-04 (1983) (holding that the odor of ether, one of many chemical ingredients required in the manufacture of methamphetamine, will not constitute probable cause for a warrantless entry); Ibarra, 147 P.3d at 850 (holding that the strong odor of ether alone, even without an explanation, does not constitute probable cause for a warrantless vehicle search because the odor of ether is as consistent with lawful activity as it is with criminal activity); cf. State v. Mahsman, 157 S.W.3d 245, 253 (Mo.App.2004) (holding that odd behavior while in lawful possession of guns and ether does not, without more, suggest drug use or provide probable cause to support a search warrant for drugs); see also United States v. Tate, 694 F.2d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir.1982), vacated, 468 U.S. 1206, 104 S.Ct. 3575, 82 L.Ed.2d 873 (1984) (smell of a non-contraband substance having a number of legitimate uses, standing alone, does not establish probable cause to search a residence). As this Court recently noted in Crosby, 408 Md. at 512, 970 A.2d at 907, it is `impossible for wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious conglomeration unless there are concrete reasons for such an interpretation.' Id. (quoting United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 948 (10th Cir.1997) (internal citations omitted)). The odor of ether is an innocent factor without context, but the totality of the circumstances may lead to a conclusion that the lawful substance is associated with a criminal purpose. See Crosby, 408 Md. at 508, 970 A.2d at 904 ([C]ontext matters: actions that may appear innocuous at a certain time or in a certain place might very well serve as a harbinger of criminal activity under different circumstances. (quoting United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir.2008))). In the cases in which courts held that the odor of ether or another lawful substance constituted probable cause for a belief that contraband or criminal activity were present, the surrounding circumstances strongly suggested that the odor was associated with criminal activity. In the cases discussed infra, courts have held that the odor of ether or other non-contraband substances constituted probable cause when the suspicion of criminal activity was corroborated by other circumstantial evidence of criminal activity, such as a tip providing specific information about drug manufacture, or specific knowledge that an area is known for the distribution of the contraband associated with the odor. See Clayton, 210 F.3d at 844-45 (odor of ether, tip about methamphetamine manufacture); Minnick, 607 A.2d at 524-25 (odor of PCP, area known for PCP distribution); Kennedy, 953 So.2d at 656-57 (odor of ether and ammonia, tip about methamphetamine manufacture). Other courts have relied on similar factors in determining that the odor of ether, combined with other factors, constituted probable cause. See Fouse v. State, 73 Ark. App. 134, 43 S.W.3d 158, 166 (2001) (odor of ether, informant information, counter-surveillance measures taken while home was under surveillance). The other factors cited by courts include the presence of drug paraphernalia, the presence of other items used in the manufacture of contraband, and suspicious statements of the suspects. See State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 555 (Iowa 2006) (odor of ether, shuffling inside a garage, suspect denied an obvious chemical odor); State v. Ulrey, 41 Kan.App.2d 1052, 208 P.3d 317, 324 (2009) (jug, box of salt, and kitchen strainer, all items used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, combined with odor of anhydrous ammonia); Hollis v. State, 219 S.W.3d 446, 460 (Tex.App.2007) (odor of ether emanating from abandoned building, scale, tubing, drug paraphernalia, jars of liquid, white powder). In all of the aforementioned cases, the surrounding circumstances provided other factors, in addition to the odor of ether, that led to a reasonable conclusion that the defendant was involved in criminal activity. In the present case, the totality of the circumstances do not provide a concrete reason to associate the odor of ether with criminal activity or contraband. In reaching its decision that Officer Lewis had reasonable articulable suspicion to approach the petitioner, a lesser standard than probable cause, the Circuit Court relied on the odor of ether, the fact that the petitioner was in a high drug crime area and standing well in the shadows, and the petitioner's failure to respond to Officer Lewis's questions. The Circuit Court did not rely on the petitioner's glossy eyes, nor did the court make a factual finding as to whether Officer Lewis observed the petitioner's eyes before he seized the petitioner. Moreover, Officer Lewis's testimony did not indicate whether he observed the petitioner's glossy eyes before or after initially seizing the petitioner. Further, Officer Lewis did not elaborate on the definition of glossy or how glossiness would tend to show intoxication. Thus, we shall not consider the petitioner's allegedly glossy eyes in our probable cause analysis. The Circuit Court gave great weight to the fact that the petitioner was standing in a high drug crime area, where the police had received a number of complaints from citizens. Certainly, the fact that activity is taking place in a high drug crime area can inform the police officer's analysis about the nature of activity taking place. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 744, 751, 151 L.Ed.2d 740, 750 (2002) (conduct that might be innocent in its own way may be suspicious under other circumstances). In the present case, however, the petitioner's presence in a high drug crime area does not provide a suspicious context for his otherwise innocuous actions, mainly because the petitioner was not engaged in any particular activity. According to Officer Lewis's testimony, the petitioner was not crouching behind anything, standing behind an object, or peering through windows, he was merely standing along the side of a house next to a parking lot. Further, there is no indication that the petitioner was engaging in any behavior that would suggest that he was ingesting PCP, such as smoking what appeared to be a cigarette or attempting to extinguish or hide a smoking device. Additionally, the testimony about the high drug crime area did not provide any specific information that would support a conclusion that the petitioner was involved in criminal activity. Unlike in Minnick, 607 A.2d at 520, where the area in question was known for PCP trafficking, in the present case there were no specific complaints about PCP, the petitioner, or about drug activity in the area on the night in question. Rather, the testimony indicated that there were general complaints about criminal or drug activity in the area, of unknown frequency, made at unknown points in time. We are mindful of this Court's warning in Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 111, 816 A.2d 901, 908 (2003): If the police can stop and frisk any man found on the street at night in a high-crime area merely because he has a bulge in his pocket, stops to look at an unmarked car containing three un-uniformed men, and then, when those men alight suddenly from the car and approach the citizen, acts nervously, there would, indeed, be little Fourth Amendment protection left for those men who live in or have occasion to visit high-crime areas. Id. (holding that there was no reasonable basis for a frisk because petitioner had done nothing to attract police attention other than being on the street with a bulge in his pocket). We are equally hesitant to determine that the petitioner's failure to answer Officer Lewis's questions has any significance, in a probable cause determination, in the absence of further facts suggesting a suspicious or criminal element to his silence. Officer Lewis testified that he interpreted the defendant's silence as evidence of intoxication: Q [State's Attorney]: ... What are some of the general characteristics of an individual under the influence of phencyclidine? A [Officer Lewis]: Normally, they possess various strengths, sometimes they could be incoherent in reference to trying to understand if someone is saying something to them .... ... Q: Other than the defendant having glassy eyes, are there any other characteristics that the defendant had on the night that you came into contact with him that would be reminiscent of someone under the influence of phencyclidine? A: No response once I was asking him questions.... When I asked the defendant a question, I got no response from him. (Emphasis added.) Although Officer Lewis does not say so directly, the inference appears to be that when the petitioner did not answer the question twice posed to him, his failure to respond was due to incoherence or an inability to comprehend the question due to intoxication. The Circuit Court did not make a factual finding about whether the court interpreted the petitioner's silence as evidence of intoxication. Rather, the court noted that the petitioner's failure to respond [gave] Officer Lewis reason to approach the defendant and the right to determine the individual's name and address. Although the State is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable inferences from the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, in our view, it is not reasonable to infer that the petitioner's silence suggested intoxication. In a probable cause determination, `the experience and special knowledge of the police officers who are [attempting to establish probable cause] are among the facts which may be considered.' The observations of the police, however, must be based on something factual. Longshore, 399 Md. at 534, 924 A.2d at 1157 (quoting Wood v. State, 185 Md. 280, 286, 44 A.2d 859, 861 (1945)) (noting that while the police did see two men enter a car and one man stand outside the car, the videotape did not reveal any actual hand to hand transfer, money transfer, or drug paraphernalia transfer when holding that the behavior on the videotape did not reflect drug activity). Here, no facts were presented to distinguish the petitioner's supposedly intoxication-based silence from a decision by the petitioner to invoke his Constitutional right to ignore Officer Lewis's questions. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 34, 88 S.Ct. at 1886, 20 L.Ed.2d at 913 (White, J. concurring). This Court has previously held that [the] petitioner's silence when the officer accosted him ... [did not provide] the officer with sufficient probable cause to arrest him. Wilson v. State, 409 Md. at 441-42, 975 A.2d at 892 (no probable cause to seize an individual who was lying on the side of a roadway at 5:00 A.M., had abrasions on his face and knuckles, and failed to respond to police inquiries); see also Grier, 351 Md. at 252, 718 A.2d at 217 ([I]n most circumstances silence is so ambiguous that it is of little probative force.) (quoting United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 2136, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975)). Essentially, the petitioner was standing next to a house in a residential area, not doing anything in particular, with the odor of ether emanating from his person, when he failed to respond to police questioning for reasons unknown to the officer. Based on these facts, the totality of the circumstances does not support the conclusion that Officer Lewis had probable cause to arrest the petitioner. [A] search conducted without a warrant supported by probable cause is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to only a few exceptions. Belote, 411 Md. at 112, 981 A.2d at 1252 (quoting Cherry v. State, 86 Md.App. 234, 240, 586 A.2d 70, 73 (1991)). A search incident to a lawful arrest is a well-established exception to the warrant requirement. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224, 94 S.Ct. 467, 471, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 434 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 759, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2038, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 692 (1969). It is axiomatic that when the State seeks to justify a warrantless search incident to arrest, it must show that the arrest was lawfully made prior to the search. Bouldin, 276 Md. at 515, 350 A.2d at 132-33 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964)). Thus, because Officer Lewis did not make a lawful arrest when he seized the petitioner, the subsequent warrantless search of the petitioner was not within an exception to the warrant requirement and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS IS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY TO PAY THE COSTS. HARRELL, J., files a dissenting opinion in which BARBERA, J., joins. Dissenting Opinion by HARRELL, Judge, which BARBERA, J., Joins. I doubt that anyone who sat on this case, whether on this Court or any court through which it passed, could identify the smell of ether before now, if at all. [1] , [2] To his credit and training, [3] Officer Lewis at least appreciated the odor of ether present and emanating from Bailey [4] and associated it with a role in the life cycle of a specific illicit drug, PCP. [5] The smell of ether has been described as a unique and pungent aroma ... associated with PCP, People v. Luna, 140 Cal. App.3d 788, 790, 189 Cal.Rptr. 792 (2nd Dist., 1983), a sweet, chemical ... smell, U.S. v. Rivera, 867 F.2d 1261, 1262 (10th Cir.1989), and a distinct, if not `peculiar' smell, State v. Fisher, 283 Kan. 272, 154 P.3d 455, 480 (2007). Confronting that recognizable odor and drug association emanating from Bailey as he stood, glassy-eyed [6] and unresponsive, at 11:35 p.m. in the shadows alongside a townhouse in a known high drug activity area, Officer Lewis, in my opinion, had probable cause to support a warrantless arrest of Bailey and the resultant search incident of his person. The only things that could have undermined that probable cause might have been had Bailey been dressed in a hospital gown (suggesting the smell of ether may have been incident to the administration of an archaic form of anesthesia to facilitate medical treatment) [7] or a maid's outfit (suggesting that he had been or was in the act of applying household aerosol cleaners or solvents to the interior or exterior of the townhouse). Neither hypothetical appears to be apt to the actual circumstances attested by Officer Lewis. The Majority opinion attempts to bolster its unrealistic analysis by characterizing Bailey's condition and circumstances as merely a series of innocuous coincidences, all benign in and of themselves (when considered separately or in isolation), amounting to no reason(s) for Officer Lewis to think something illicit was afoot. Although paying lip service to a totality of the circumstances analysis, the Majority opinion actually employs a divide-and-conquer consideration of some, but not all, of the factors available to Officer Lewis on the night in question. That is an incorrect analytical approach. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 744, 751, 151 L.Ed.2d 740, 750 (2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968)). In a similar vein, the Majority opinion attempts, by mis-characterizing the State's case here as solely premised on the odor of ether, to distinguish the many cases where the smell of ether, coupled with other indicia of suspicious activity or circumstances, was found to supply probable cause. The record here, however, reviewed in a light most favorable to the State as the prevailing party below, revealed much more than the mere smell of ether:  prior citizen complaints about the particular area experiencing high illegal drug activity;  Bailey was standing in the shadows of the side of the townhouse at 11:35 p.m.;  he did not respond at all to Officer Lewis' questions whether Bailey lived in the townhouse;  his eyes were glassy; and  he reeked of ether. These factors, coupled with Lewis' training that enabled him to discern the singular smell of ether and his knowledge regarding a relationship between ether and PCP, were ample cause to arrest Bailey and search his person. To conclude otherwise is to overlook the relevant principle that courts should respect an officer's ability to draw on his or her own experience and training to draw inferences and deductions from the cumulative information available to him or her that might well elude an untrained person. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, 122 S.Ct. at 750-51, 151 L.Ed.2d at 749-50 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 629 (1981)). I have no problem affirming the judgments of the Court of Special Appeals and the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. Judge BARBERA has authorized me to state that she joins in this dissenting opinion.