Opinion ID: 178296
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: VETS Complaint

Text: Vega contends that in response to the complaint he filed with VETS, Wyeth discriminated against him and took adverse employment action in violation of USERRA. See 38 U.S.C. § 4311(b). This court has defined an adverse employment action under Title VII as one that `affect[s] employment or alter[s] the conditions of the workplace.' Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 605 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir.2010)(quoting Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 61-62, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006)) (alteration in original). The Seventh Circuit has applied a similar definition in a USERRA action. See Crews v. City of Mt. Vernon, 567 F.3d 860, 869 (7th Cir.2009)(An adverse employment action is one that significantly alters the terms and conditions of the employee's job.) (internal citation omitted). In the context of Title VII, the Supreme Court has held that the term `discriminate against' refers to distinctions or differences in treatment that injure protected individuals. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 59, 126 S.Ct. 2405. Vega filed a VETS complaint in March 2007. However, Wyeth presented evidence, including an affidavit from its human resources director and the entire VETS file, which established that it did not become aware of Vega's VETS complaint until September 2007. Vega has offered no contradictory evidence. Thus any retaliatory actions necessarily had to take place after this date. As such, the only actionable events alleged by Vega based on his theory of retaliation are: (1) extension of the PIP; (2) his not being awarded salary increases in 2008 and 2009; and (3) continued name calling. As discussed above, Vega put forth evidence on which a jury could determine that the PIP was improperly extended due to his military service; however, he has presented no evidence that it was extended in response to his VETS complaint. He has significantly failed to demonstrate whether the person or persons involved in the decision to extend the PIP were even aware of the complaint. Similarly, with regards to potential salary increases in 2008 and 2009, Vega has presented no evidence of Wyeth's process or criteria for evaluating and awarding raises, or evidence of the persons responsible for making such salary determinations. In the absence of such evidence, this court cannot simply assume that Vega was entitled to a salary increase in 2008 and 2009. Nor can we assume that the persons making these compensation decisions were aware of the VETS complaint. As a result, Vega has not met his burden of demonstrating that his filing of the VETS complaint was a motivating factor in Wyeth's extension of the PIP or decision not to increase his salary, or that it generated any adverse employment action against him. With respect to the name calling, we question whether such conduct constituted an adverse employment action or discrimination in light of the meaning that courts have applied to these terms. See Morales-Vallellanes, 605 F.3d at 35 (An adverse employment action `affect[s] employment or alter[s] the conditions of the workplace.'); Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 59, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (`[D]iscriminate against' refers to distinction or differences in treatment that injure protected individuals.) However, assuming that such comments are actionable, Vega has also failed to satisfy his burden on this issue. First, the name calling took place both before and after Vega filed the VETS complaint, with no escalation alleged after September 2007. This is a fatal flaw in Vega's argument. See, e.g., Frazier v. Fairhaven School Committee, 276 F.3d 52, 67 (1st Cir.2002). Further, we are persuaded by the Seventh Circuit's holding that with respect to USERRA retaliation actions, negative employer comments will support a retaliation claim only if they are `severe and pervasive.' Crews, 567 F.3d at 870 (internal citation omitted). Objectively viewed, the name calling directed at Vega was not, in our opinion, severe. Therefore he has failed to establish that Wyeth retaliated against him in violation of USERRA. [10] Wyeth is thus entitled to summary judgment on this claim.