Opinion ID: 75739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Additional Duties Clause

Text: 19 This determination would resolve the matter were it not for the fact that § 636 also contains a general additional duties clause, which provides that [a] magistrate may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). Therefore, the next question becomes whether the additional duties clause authorizes a district court to delegate to a magistrate judge the evidentiary and fact-finding portion of a sentencing hearing in a felony case when a defendant does not consent. 10 While not addressing this precise issue, prior decisions of both the Supreme Court and this circuit have construed this additional duties clause and provide the clear lead we must follow. We first review the relevant Supreme Court precedents, and then our circuit's decisions, regarding the additional duties clause.
20 As stated above, a magistrate judge may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). In Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989), the district court delegated to the magistrate judge the task of selecting a jury and the defendant objected. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 860. The Supreme Court held in Gomez that the additional duties clause does not authorize a magistrate judge to conduct jury selection in a felony trial without a defendant's consent. Id. at 875-76. The Supreme Court noted that [r]ead literally and without reference to the context in which they appear, these words might encompass any assignment that is not explicitly prohibited by statute or by the Constitution. Id. at 863. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court proceeded to interpret § 636(b)(3) in the context of § 636's overall statutory scheme, purpose, and legislative history and concluded that the additional duties clause does not encompass jury selection. 21 In Gomez, the Supreme Court emphasized, among other things, that § 636's carefully defined grant of authority to conduct trials in civil matters and minor criminal cases should be construed as an implicit withholding of authority to preside at a felony trial, stating as follows: 22 The district court retains the power to assign to magistrates unspecified additional duties, subject only to conditions or review that the court may choose to impose. By a literal reading this additional duties clause would permit magistrates to conduct felony trials. But the carefully defined grant of authority to conduct trials of civil matters and of minor criminal cases should be construed as an implicit withholding of the authority to preside at a felony trial. The legislative history, with its repeated statements that magistrates should handle subsidiary matters to enable district judges to concentrate on trying cases, and its assurances that magistrates' adjudicatory jurisdiction had been circumscribed in the interests of policy as well as constitutional constraints, confirms this inference. Similar considerations lead us to conclude that Congress also did not contemplate inclusion of jury selection in felony trials among a magistrate's additional duties. 23 Id. at 871-72 (footnotes omitted). Additionally, the Supreme Court in Gomez stressed that [t]he absence of a specific reference to jury selection in [§ 636], or indeed, in the legislative history, persuades us that Congress did not intend the additional duties clause to embrace this function. Id. at 875-76 (footnote omitted). 24 Subsequently, in Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991), the Supreme Court decided that a defendant's consent to a magistrate judge presiding over jury selection in a felony trial warranted a different result under the additional duties clause. The Supreme Court held that the additional duties clause permits a magistrate to supervise jury selection in a felony trial provided the parties consent, Peretz, 501 U.S. at 933, and that [t]here is no constitutional infirmity in the delegation of felony trial jury selection to a magistrate when the litigants consent, Peretz, 501 U.S. at 936. In Peretz, the Supreme Court distinguished Gomez by suggesting that its holding in Gomez was narrow and carefully limited to the situation in which the parties had not acquiesced at trial to the magistrate's role. Id. at 927-28. 25 In explaining the reasons for its different conclusion in Gomez, the Supreme Court indicated that its chief concern in Gomez was to avoid the constitutional issue of whether a defendant has a constitutional right to demand that an Article III judge preside at every critical stage of a felony trial, stating: 26 Chief among our concerns [in Gomez] was this Court's 'settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues.' This policy was implicated in Gomez because of the substantial question whether a defendant has a constitutional right to demand that an Article III judge preside at every critical stage of a felony trial. 27 501 U.S. at 929 (internal citation and footnote omitted). In Peretz, the Supreme Court clarified that this constitutional question in Gomez had led it to demand clear evidence that Congress actually intended to permit magistrates to conduct jury selection during a felony trial absent a defendant's consent. Id. at 930. The Supreme Court also noted that in Gomez it focused on the fact that those specified duties that were comparable to jury selection in a felony trial could be performed only with the consent of the litigants. Id. at 931. 11 In addition to reaffirming its reasoning in Gomez, the Supreme Court added in Peretz that absent a defendant's consent, it would be reluctant to construe the additional duties clause to include responsibilities of far greater importance than the specified duties assigned to magistrates. Id. at 933. 28 The dissents in Peretz countered that Gomez was based on the language in § 636 and statutory interpretation, not lack of consent, and that Congress in the additional duties clause did not authorize delegation of jury selection to a magistrate judge. We briefly mention the statutory analysis in these dissents because, as outlined later, while the result we reach is based largely on lack of consent, the statutory language also informs our analysis. 29 In one dissent in Peretz, three justices argued that [i]n Gomez, we held that '[t]he absence of a specific reference to jury selection in the statute, or indeed, in the legislative history, persuades us that Congress did not intend the additional duties clause to embrace this function.' Peretz, 501 U.S. at 941 (Marshall, White & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Gomez, 490 U.S. at 875-76). This dissent's view was that the existence of a defendant's consent has absolutely no effect on that conclusion. Id. The three justices further noted that, in Gomez, [w]e concluded that 'th[is] carefully defined grant of authority to conduct trials of civil matters and of minor criminal cases [in § 636]' constituted 'an implicit withholding of the authority to preside at a felony trial.' Id. at 943 (quoting Gomez, 490 U.S. at 872). 30 The dissent of a fourth justice agreed that Gomez was driven by ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. Id. at 955. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The view of this dissent was that [b]y specifically authorizing magistrates to perform duties in civil and misdemeanor trials, and specifying the manner in which parties were to express their consent in those situations, the statute suggested absence of authority to preside over felony trials through some (unspecified) mode of consent. The canon of ejusdem generis keeps the 'additional duties' clause from swallowing up the rest of the statute. Id. 31 Despite these dissents, the majority in Peretz concluded that jury selection in a felony case is an additional duty that may be delegated to a magistrate under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) if the litigants consent. Id. at 935. The majority further emphasized that [t]he Act evinces a congressional belief that magistrates are well qualified to handle matters of similar importance to jury selection but conditions their authority to accept such responsibilities on the consent of the parties. Id. (emphasis added).
32 This Court recently examined the import of Gomez and Peretz in Thomas v. Whitworth, 136 F.3d 756 (11th Cir. 1998), United States v. Maragh, 174 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Desir, 257 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2001). In Thomas, we joined other circuits in holding that [s]ection 636 does not permit magistrate judges, under the guise of the 'additional duties' clause, to conduct the jury selection portion of a civil trial unless the parties have given their consent. 136 F.3d at 759 (citing and discussing Stockler v. Garratt, 974 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1992), and Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson Wax Dev. Corp., 908 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1990)). Even in a civil case, we emphasized in Thomas that where consent is lacking, courts should be reluctant 'to construe the additional duties clause to include responsibilities of far greater importance than the specified duties assigned to magistrates.' Id. (quoting Peretz, 501 U.S. at 933). 33 Our Maragh decision involved a criminal case but the dispute was mainly over whether the defendant actually had consented to the magistrate judge's presiding over jury selection. 174 F.3d at 1203. In discussing the additional duties clause, we stated that [t]he Supreme Court's interpretation of section 636(b)(3) establishes the presence or absence of consent as the crucial factor in determining what duties the section encompasses. 12 Id. at 1204 (citing Peretz, 501 U.S. at 934-36). 34 This Court likewise emphasized the importance of consent in Desir and reversed a felony conviction because the magistrate judge responded to a jury question without the defendant's express consent. 257 F.3d at 1238. The magistrate judge denied the jury's request for a read back of certain trial testimony and instructed the jury to rely on their collective memories. Id. at 1235. The jury trial was before the district court, the jury question was handled solely by the magistrate judge, and the district court judge was not present and in fact was not informed that a question was even asked by the jurors, let alone the content of the question. Id. at 1238. Thus, in Desir, this Court concluded that [w]hen a matter conducted solely by a magistrate judge constitutes a critical stage of the criminal proceeding, such as instructing the jury, the absence of express consent from all parties, particularly the defendant, mandates reversal. Id. We pointed out that according to Gomez the authority granted to magistrate judges under [§ 636] is to be construed narrowly. Id. at 1236. In Desir, we further opined that the Supreme Court and this court [have] established a bright line rule that a magistrate judge exceeds his or her jurisdiction by presiding at a felony trial during a critical stage of the proceeding without the defendant's consent. Id. Therefore, we concluded that the magistrate judge inappropriately exercised the authority of an Article III judge at a critical stage of the proceeding by responding to a jury's question that went beyond the simple performance of a ministerial task. Id. at 1238. 35 We now turn to the defendants' claims that their sentences must be vacated because the district court improperly delegated a critical portion of their sentencing hearing to the magistrate judge.