Opinion ID: 1387356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Advisory Guidelines

Text: One of the sentencing factors that the district court must consider is the applicable Guidelines range. United States v. Gale, 468 F.3d 929, 934 (6th Cir.2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 3065, 168 L.Ed.2d 758 (2007). Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) requires than that the district court consider the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission. The Supreme Court explained in Gall that the Guidelines are the starting point and the initial benchmark for federal sentencing. 128 S.Ct. at 596. When considering the Guidelines, the district court must calculate the correct sentencing range. Id.; Gale, 468 F.3d at 934. In practice, this means that the court must begin at the proper base-offense level, apply any applicable enhancements or reductions to arrive at the adjusted-offense level, and use the resulting offense level with the appropriate criminal-history category to arrive at a sentencing range. This is what the district court did in the recent Supreme Court case of Kimbrough United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007). The district court began with a base-offense level of 32 and a criminal history of II for Kimbrough. Id. at 565. The district court then found that Kimbrough had testified falsely at his codefendant's trial and added 2 levels, resulting in an adjusted offense level of 34. Id. The Supreme Court favorably noted that the district court began by properly calculating and considering the advisory Guidelines range. Id. at 575. Using the Guidelines range (as adjusted with any judge-found facts) as the applicable Guidelines range for purposes of § 3553(a)(4) has been the consistent practice of this court. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 503 F.3d 522, 529 (6th Cir.2007) (applying a presumption of reasonableness to a within-Guidelines sentence where the Guidelines calculation was enhanced based on judge-found facts and the resulting sentence would have been outside a non-enhanced Guidelines range); United States v. Cook, 453 F.3d 775, 777 (6th Cir.2006) (explaining that  Booker . . . has no bearing on advisory guideline calculations); United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that the district court's fact-finding with respect to an obstruction of justice enhancement did not violate the Sixth Amendment and stating that  Booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 129, 166 L.Ed.2d 35 (2006); cf. Booker, 543 U.S. at 257-58, 125 S.Ct. 738 (expressly rejecting the dissent's, approach that would have left a sentencing judge free to consider facts or circumstances not found by a jury or admitted in a plea agreement for the purpose of adjusting a base-offense level down, but not up, within the applicable guidelines range). When engaging in this fact-finding, district courts employ the same preponderance-of-the-evidence standard that governed prior to Booker. United States v. Ferguson, 456 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cfr.2006). Once the district court has calculated the appropriate Guidelines range, it then considers that range in light of the other relevant § 3553(a) factors in fashioning the sentence. United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir.2006). We accord a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence that lies within the advisory Guidelines range. Gale, 468 F.3d at 937; see Rita v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2462, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (permitting circuit courts to apply a presumption of reasonableness to a within-Guidelines sentence).
Thompson first contends that the district court erred by enhancing his offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2 for assaulting an officer. He argues that he did not know that the purported drug dealer in the hotel room was actually an undercover officer. He also argues that the district court found that only Jones fired on the officers who were in pursuit of the two as they fled the hotel room. We find no error by the district court. Section 3A1.2 provides in relevant part: (c) If, in a manner creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury, the defendant or a person for whose conduct the defendant is otherwise accountable (1) knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that a person was a law enforcement officer, assaulted such officer during the course of the offense or immediate flight therefrom; . . . increase [the offense level] by 6 levels. The district court made clear that the enhancement went to Thompson's conduct after the robbery, not his conduct in the hotel room. Both Thompson and Jones brandished their firearms as they fled the room. The evidence presented during the sentencing hearing also confirmed that the two defendants were on sufficient notice that the pursuing officers were, in fact, police officers. Even assuming arguendo that there was insufficient evidence that Thompson himself shot at the officers, there was sufficient evidence that a person for whose conduct Thompson was otherwise accountable created a substantial risk of serious bodily injury. There is little dispute that Jones fired at the officers during the flight. In discussing Thompson's leadership role in the conspiracy, the district court found that Thompson was the man in charge because: (a) he was the man with whom the CI negotiated to try to arrange to buy 20 kilograms of cocaine, JA 133; (b) the negotiations continued with Thompson, id.; (c) he was the man that was doing all the talking and wanted to see the cocaine, id.; (d) [h]e's the one that went out and brought in Jones to try to complete the deal with his additional money, JA 134; and (e) `The was also giving directions to Jones, who attempted to turn left down the hall. And he directed him, no, to go right down the hall and down the stairs at the end of the hall, id. Finding Thompson to be the man in charge, it was not unreasonable for the district court also to conclude that he should be held accountable . . . for the shots being fired by Jones. JA 131. Under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c), this was sufficient to apply the six-level enhancement.
Thompson also challenges the four-level increase he received for his leadership role in the conspiracy. The Guidelines call for a four-level enhancement if a defendant is an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Thompson argues that the evidence points to Jones, not Thompson, as the leader. The district court recognized that Jones also played a significant role in the conspiracy and robbery. More than one person can, however, hold a leadership role in the conspiracy for purposes of the Guidelines enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 4 (There can, of course, be more than one person who qualifies as a leader or organizer of a criminal association or conspiracy.). Given that Thompson negotiated the details of the drug sale, had the money, and checked the cocaine for quality, the district court properly concluded that he had a leadership role.
Thompson next alleges that the district court enhanced his Guidelines offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c) for the same activity it sentenced him under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). He argues that by doing so, the district court punished him twice for the same criminal activity. [T]he `established rule' in this circuit is that `impermissible double counting occurs when precisely the same aspect of a defendant's conduct factors into his sentence in two separate ways.' United States v. Sabino, 307. F.3d 446, 450 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Farrow, 198 F.3d 179, 193 (6th Cir. 1999)). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4(b) provides that if a defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the term of imprisonment is that required by the statute. Thus, the question is whether the same aspect of Thompson's conduct factors into 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2 in two separate ways. The district court did not engage in impermissible double counting. A key aspect of Thompson's conduct that enhanced his Guidelines range under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2the fact that the people Jones was shooting at were police officers and not simply private citizensis not a factor of the crime set forth under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). Thus, this is not a case where precisely the same aspect of a defendant's conduct impacted his sentence in two separate ways. United States v. Sloley, 19 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir.1994) (By their terms, there is no inherent or necessary overlap between § 924(c)(1) and § 3A1.2(b)indeed most § 924(c) violations do not involve an `official victim.' The mere fact that the drug trafficker in this particular case used a law enforcement officer's gun against the officer should not preclude a court from applying both the firearm statute and the `official victim' adjustment.); cf. United States v. Cousins, 469 F.3d 572, 575 (6th Cir.2006) (upholding the district court's enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2 even though the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 871(a) and 879(a)(2) for threatening the President of the United States and his family). Accordingly, we reject Thompson's claim that the district court erred by applying the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2.