Opinion ID: 848572
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: the lead opinion's dictum regarding miller

Text: Part IV of Justice Corrigan's opinion concerns our decision in Miller, supra, and the Court of Appeals decision in People v. Schmitz, 231 Mich.App. 521, 586 N.W.2d 766 (1998). As Justice Weaver points out, the entire section is dictum. In Miller, the trial court diluted the defendant's peremptory challenge rights by using the struck jury method. [15] Miller, supra at 323, 307 N.W.2d 335. The case before us does not deal with the dilution of a defendant's right to peremptory challenges. It deals with the denial of his peremptory challenges. For this reason, Miller is clearly distinguishable from this case. The lead opinion concedes that its discussion of Miller is dictum by stating that we have concluded that the trial court did not err in denying defense counsel's peremptory challenges. Ante at 141. Because it concludes that Miller does not apply to its decision, any discussion of Miller must be obiter dictum. Part IV lacks the force of an adjudication and is not binding under the principles of stare decisis. People v. Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich. 278, 286 n. 4, 597 N.W.2d 1 (1999). Therefore, it is of no value. The issue raised in Miller is not before us, and the lead opinion has offered no legal basis to overrule this precedent or to support a conclusion that some former case overruled this precedent. Oddly enough, the lead opinion claims that I labor[] to avoid reference to Miller and Schmitz. Ante at 141 n. 22. Nothing can be further from the truth. Even a cursory reading of this section of my dissent indicates that I find Miller irrelevant. Miller deals with a struck-jury method, which is inapplicable to this case. Nor do I labor to avoid referencing Schmitz. I simply found other and more persuasive authority. Those on the lead opinion state that they may reach Miller because I reference it. As stated above, I would not reference either Miller or Schmitz if the lead opinion had not attempted to overrule them. Contrary to the lead opinion's statement, nothing in my opinion would prohibit the Court from revisiting Miller in the future. If a case actually raising a struck-jury method should come before the Court, the issue in Miller could be relevant and the Court could address it. There is nothing novel in my legal conclusion that it is inappropriate to overrule precedent in a case that addresses issues irrelevant to the precedent. But it is inappropriate, as a plurality of the Court does here, to attempt to signal the future demise of the precedent in dictum. No case has ever explicitly overruled Miller. And the lead opinion's attempt today amounts to nothing more than dictum. Therefore, Miller should remain valid law.