Opinion ID: 2815883
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of “very lethal” comment

Text: Defendant claims the trial court erred by admitting a prosecution witness‟s prior statement that she had heard defendant was “very lethal” and not someone to “mess with.” He argues that the statement should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 and that its admission violated his constitutional rights to due process and a reliable penalty verdict. The court properly admitted the prior statement. At the penalty phase retrial, Chaka Coleman, testified that she had assisted defendant in setting up several three-way telephone calls between herself, defendant, and his wife‟s boyfriend, Jarah Smith. During her testimony, Coleman denied previously telling a police detective that defendant said “harsh things” to Smith, that Smith sounded 49 scared, or that she was afraid of defendant. Because it appeared that Coleman was minimizing defendant‟s conduct concerning Smith, the prosecutor sought to impeach her with her prior statements to the detective, including her comments about defendant having a “very lethal” reputation and being someone not “to mess with.” Defendant objected, contending that the prejudicial effect of the prior statement outweighed its probative value, but the trial court overruled the objection and permitted the prosecutor to ask Coleman about the prior statement. As previously described (ante, p. 35), a trial court‟s decision to admit or exclude impeachment evidence under Evidence Code section 352 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion (People v. Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 705); a witness‟s fear is relevant to his or her credibility and to explain conflicting statements by the same witness. (People v. Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 869; see also People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 145-146 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting impeachment evidence over the defendant‟s Evid. Code, § 352 objection].) Coleman‟s perceived fear of defendant tended to show that her testimony, which apparently minimized the threatening nature of defendant‟s telephone calls to Smith, was influenced by her fear of defendant. Moreover, possible prejudice was minimal given the admission of defendant‟s numerous prior acts of violence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Coleman‟s prior statements.