Opinion ID: 782078
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Rejection of Substantially Similar Claims

Text: 31 The final piece of information relied upon by the district court when granting summary judgment of unenforceability was the existence of an outstanding rejection of claims in the '196 application that were substantially similar in content and scope to claims pending in the applications that issued as the patents-in-suit. The district court relied upon the multiple rejections of claims with identical subject matter in the '196 application and its progeny in view of the Wilson '981 patent. Id. at 1135. 32 This court has never addressed whether the prior rejection of a substantially similar claim in a copending United States application is material under the reasonable examiner standard. The District Court for the Northern District of Indiana addressed this issue, find[ing] that it was important for [an examiner] to know that another knowledgeable Patent Examiner had carefully examined and rejected all claims of [another] application, including claims that were directly related to claims in the [present] application, on the grounds that the claims were obvious in light of prior art patents. Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 837 F.Supp. 1444, 1474 (N.D.Ind.1992). Without such a disclosure requirement applicants [may] surreptitiously file repeated or multiple applications in an attempt to find a `friendly' Examiner. ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law, Annual Report 1993-1994 (1994). 33 We hold that a contrary decision of another examiner reviewing a substantially similar claim meets the Akron Polymer reasonable examiner threshold materiality test of  any information that a reasonable examiner would substantially likely consider important in deciding whether to allow an application to issue as a patent. 148 F.3d at 1382, 47 USPQ2d at 1534 (emphasis in original). Patent disclosures are often very complicated, and different examiners with different technical backgrounds and levels of understanding may often differ when interpreting such documents. Although examiners are not bound to follow other examiners' interpretations, knowledge of a potentially different interpretation is clearly information that an examiner could consider important when examining an application. 34 We also hold that the information meets the threshold level of materiality under new Rule 56, in that [i]t refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in ... [a]sserting an argument of patentability. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(2) (2002). When prosecuting claims before the Patent Office, a patent applicant is, at least implicitly, asserting that those claims are patentable. A prior rejection of a substantially similar claim refutes, or is inconsistent with the position that those claims are patentable. An adverse decision by another examiner, therefore, meets the materiality standard under the amended Rule 56. However, the district court did not address intent to deceive related to the failure to disclose the examiner's adverse decision. A trial on this issue is, therefore, necessary. II Invalidity 35 We next address the district court's holding of invalidity. On appeal, TCI seeks to support the holding of invalidity of all of the claims over the Lusher and Titeflex prior art primarily with reference to claim 1 of the '050 patent. (Appellee's Br. at 39.) Additionally, TCI supports the holding of invalidity of the claims of the '822 patent over the Scovill prior art, which we will address separately. We conclude that the district court's grant of summary judgment of invalidity must also be set aside. A. Lusher 36 The first prior art reference addressed by the district court was the Lusher patent. The district court concluded that [t]here are no genuine factual disputes and described its interpretation of the teachings of Lusher. Dayco, 218 F.Supp.2d at 1137-38. In particular, the district court described Figure 2 of Lusher (reproduced below) as anticipating the asserted claims of the patents-in-suit. 37 NOTE: OPINION CONTAINING TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE 38 As this court has stated, the dispositive question regarding anticipation [i]s whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the [prior art reference's] teaching that every claim element was disclosed in that single reference. In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 390, 21 USPQ2d 1281, 1284 (Fed. Cir.1991) (emphasis added); see also Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1315, 64 USPQ2d 1832, 1841 (Fed.Cir.2002) (Typically, testimony concerning anticipation must be testimony from one skilled in the art and must identify each claim element, state the witnesses' interpretation of the claim element, and explain in detail how each claim element is disclosed in the prior art reference.). Dayco filed an expert declaration in the district court urging that the asserted claims of the patents-in-suit were not anticipated because of the failure of the prior art to disclose specific claim limitations. TCI submitted no responsive expert declaration. The district court improperly dismissed Dayco's expert report because [t]he reference and the claimed invention are easily understandable without the need for expert testimony. Dayco, 218 F.Supp.2d at 1137. 39 One issue related to anticipation is whether Lusher teaches a polymeric hose as required by claim 1 of the '050 patent. Dayco's expert urged that Lusher failed to disclose a polymeric hose. In granting summary judgment, the district court did not address this issue. On appeal, TCI admits that the reference fails to expressly state that the hose 18 of Lusher is a polymeric hose. Instead, TCI asserts that [i]t is inherent from Figure 2 that the inner corrugated hose was made from a synthetic ( i.e. polymeric) material. (Appellee's Br. at 44.) There is no support on the record before us for the proposition that Lusher (filed September 27, 1939), necessarily disclosed the use of a polymeric material. To serve as an anticipation when the reference is silent about the asserted inherent characteristic, such gap in the reference may be filled with recourse to extrinsic evidence[; however, s]uch evidence must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference.  Cont'l Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268, 20 USPQ2d 1746, 1749 (Fed.Cir.1991) (emphasis added). TCI has cited to no evidence that this missing element was necessarily present. 40 Thus, the district court erred in concluding that Lusher teaches each and every limitation of claim 1. We, therefore, set aside the grant of summary judgment of invalidity as to claim 1 of the '050 patent based on Lusher. B. The Titeflex Publication 41 With respect to the Titeflex Publication, the court concluded: every element of each of the asserted claims is found in the 1976 publication for the Titeflex Chemical Transfer Hose No. R292 (`Titeflex'). Dayco, 218 F.Supp.2d at 1137. Dayco's expert urged that the Titeflex publication failed to teach an insert means that is radially outwardly expandable. (J.A. at 1572-73.) The district court, however, did not address the asserted distinction. 42 TCI supports the district court holding by arguing on appeal that [b]ased on the Titeflex illustration, one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it is inherent that the insert would be radially outwardly expanded. (Appellee's Br. at 48.) In support of this statement, TCI cites the report of its expert, which simply asserts that the Titeflex Publication discloses [a] cutaway of the hose [which] shows a coupling with an insert means disposed in one end of the tubular hose and inherently being radially outwardly expanded or the hose being radially inwardly compressed into sealing relation with said inner corrugated hose. (J.A. at 1385) (emphasis added). The statement provided in TCI's expert's report does not provide any evidence to support the position that the structure disclosed is necessarily outwardly expanded. Quite to the contrary, the expert notes that instead the hose may be inwardly compressed. The unsupported and equivocal statement of TCI's expert cannot support the district court's grant of summary judgment, which must, therefore, be set aside. C. The Scovill Coupling 43 The final piece of prior art relied upon by the district court when granting summary judgment was the Scovill Model 520-H coupling, which was applied solely to the claims of the '822 patent. The reason the Scovill 520-H coupling was applied solely to the claim of the '822 patent was the district court's claim construction, which provided that [t]he claims of the '822 patent do not include a hose. Dayco, 218 F.Supp.2d at 1137 (emphasis in original). This claim construction was purportedly based on this court's opinion in Dayco I. Id. at 13 (citing Dayco I, 258 F.3d at 1322, 59 USPQ2d at 1493). In the Background section of Dayco I, this court discussed the differences in language between the independent claims of the patents-in-suit, noting: 44 The '822 patent is different in that instead of claiming a hose construction, it claims  a coupling for a hose construction with projections of said insert means being adapted to be respectively received in said recesses of said inner hose and said projections of said inner hose being adapted to be respectively received in said recesses of said insert means. 45 258 F.3d at 1322, 59 USPQ2d at 1493 (emphasis in original). The court was not purporting to determine whether specific claim language would not be part of the claim as properly construed. The body of claim 1 recites said inner peripheral surface means of said hose comprises an inner corrugated hose made of polymeric material having inwardly directed projections with recesses therebetween and extending from said one end of said tubular hose to the other end thereof. '822 patent, claim 1 (emphasis added). Thus, the hose is expressly recited in the body of the claim and was improperly read out of the claim by the district court. The district court's claim construction was in error, as was its summary judgment grant of anticipation based thereon. III. Impermissible Grouping of Claims 46 Finally, we hold that the district court committed error by not addressing claim validity on an individual basis. In granting summary judgment, the district court stated that: 47 The Court finds that every element of the asserted claims in the '752, '822, '050, and '023 patents is found in the 1941 prior art U.S. Patent 2,268,142 (Lusher '142). Similarly, every element of each of the asserted claims is found in the 1976 publication for the Titeflex Chemical Transfer Hose No. R292 (Titeflex).... Every element of the claimed '822 coupling is shown in the prior art, namely the Scovill 520-H coupling. 48 Dayco, 218 F.Supp.2d at 1137. This grouping of claims is contrary to law, which requires that [e]ach claim of a patent (whether in independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims; [and] dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid claim. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000). The burden of proving the invalidity of the claims was on the defendant. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1318, 51 USPQ2d 1307, 1309 (Fed.Cir.1999). To be sure, it is permissible to group claims together for disposition where resolution involves the same issues of validity; however, the justification for such grouping is possible only where those issues are substantially materially identical. Where claims differ in scope in an aspect material to the analysis, those claims must be addressed individually. 49 On appeal, TCI argues that all of the asserted independent claims are invalid for the same reason that claim 1 of the '050 patent is invalid. (Appellee's Br. at 39.) We have held that the finding of anticipation of claim 1 on summary judgment was erroneous. Even if claim 1 were invalid, TCI's theory would not be sustainable. TCI cites for its theory the court's decision in Dayco I, 258 F.3d at 1321, 59 USPQ2d at 1492, in which we stated that [i]ndependent claim 1 of the '050 patent is representative of the claims in suit in most respects. (Appellee's Br. at 39.) This statement in the Background section of our prior opinion did not absolve TCI from the statutory requirement to prove the invalidity of each claim independently. Dayco I was decided in the context of claim construction, wherein identical language in different claims is grouped together in view of the rule that if a claim term appears in more than one claim it should be construed the same in each. CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1159, 42 USPQ2d 1577, 1586 (Fed.Cir.1997) cert. denied, Marchon Eyewear v. Tura LP, 522 U.S. 1109, 118 S.Ct. 1039, 140 L.Ed.2d 105 (1998). The grouping of recitations in different claims for the purpose of claim construction does not permit the grouping of claims, each independently possessing a presumption of validity, for disposition of their validity. 50 Here, there are seven independent and twenty-six dependent claims in four separate patents. These claims are not materially identical for the purpose of determining their validity. For example, Dayco's expert urged that: claim 2 of the '050 patent was materially different because it required that the projections of the hose be annular; claim 10 of the '050 was materially different because it required a rotatable nut means; and all of the asserted claims of the '752 patent were materially different because they required inwardly convex projections. 51 For these reasons, the grant of summary judgment of invalidity as to claims not individually addressed by the district court must be set aside. IV. Remand 52 This is the second time that we have reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The time has come when this case must be set for trial. In that connection, we note that this case is complex, involving as it does multiple patents, multiple claims, and defenses and counterclaims of unenforceability and invalidity. On remand counsel for both parties have an obligation to cooperate in narrowing the issues, and avoiding untenable arguments, which serve only to confuse the real issues before the district court. On the present record there is no basis for a claim of unenforceability concerning the failure to disclose the copendency of the '196 application or the Wilson patent, nor is there any basis for a claim of invalidity of the asserted claims as being anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102 given the presumption of validity that applies to all patents. Absent the discovery of material new evidence the court should entertain summary judgment motions by plaintiff to dispose of these claims.