Opinion ID: 1255321
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: irregularity in obtaining the substitution order

Text: Jernigan argues that FDIC's failure to serve him with notice of the motion to substitute before August 16, 1988 contravened §§ 2025(A), (C) and 2005 of the Oklahoma Pleading Code. [28] He urges the holding of an ex parte hearing on that contested motion, without either notice to him or evidence in its support, is an irregularity within the meaning of § 1031(3). [29] CSM counters that there is no proof in the record to establish an irregularity in obtaining the substitution order that would bring the case within the parameters of § 1031(3) relief. Section 1031(3) authorizes vacation or modification of an order on grounds of irregularity in obtaining a judgment or order. [30] Jernigan's § 1031(3) vacation quest relies on the same facts urged by his extrinsic fraud plea  i.e., that the parties' substitution was effected in an ex parte hearing without the notice being served upon him. Two critical elements of this argument are: (1) Jernigan opposed the plan to remove InterFirst and CSM as parties plaintiff and (2) he had no notice of the impending action. The record is clear that Jernigan was aware of and agreed with FDIC's substitution quest. Nothing in the record indicates that during these pre-order communications Jernigan's counsel had opposed this quest for relief. Because the record demonstrates the substitution was approved by Jernigan's counsel, FDIC's failure to mail Jernigan a copy of the motion and to set it for an evidentiary hearing (before August 16, 1988) fails to establish an irregularity in obtaining the order. We hold Jernigan has failed to meet his burden for the relief of the substitution order's vacation on grounds of a § 1031(3) irregularity.