Opinion ID: 165342
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Irrelevant and Prejudicial Evidence

Text: National States maintains that the district court erred when it admitted into evidence testimony about the number of claims nationwide it had rescinded over the previous few years, three files pertaining to other rescinded policies from other states, and a market report conducted by the State of Nebraska. We first consider whether National States preserved these alleged errors for review. If it did not, our review is only for plain error. United States v. Castorena-Jaime , 285 F.3d 916, 926 (10th Cir. 2002). National States filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of other claims. The district court denied the motion, directing the parties to the case of Vining ex rel. Vining v. Ent. Fin. Group, Inc. , 148 F.3d 1206, 1218 (10th Cir. 1998). “A pretrial motion in limine to exclude evidence will not always preserve an objection for appellate review.” United States v. Mejia-Alarcon, 10 995 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir. 1993). Such a motion may preserve the issue for review if it “(1) has been fairly presented to the trial court, (2) is the type of issue that can be finally decided in a pretrial hearing, and (3) is ruled upon without equivocation.” Phillips v. Hillcrest Med. Ctr., 244 F.3d 790, 799 (10th Cir. 2001). We hold that National States’ motion in limine did not preserve the issue for review because it did not meet these criteria. Assuming the first two factors were met, the district court’s ruling was not without equivocation because it did not rule on whether the challenged evidence would be admitted at trial. Consequently, we must consider whether an objection made at trial preserved the issue. During Ms. Rogers’ testimony, plaintiffs sought to introduce Exhibit 80 to show that National States had rescinded 1,232 policies in the previous four and one-half years. National States objected, and when the court asked the grounds for the objection, defense counsel simply responded, “401, 402, and 403.” R. Vol. III, at 179-80. We hold that the objection, though far from explicit, was sufficient to preserve the issue of admissibility. Therefore, we review the district court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. Unit Drilling Co. v. Enron Oil & Gas Co. , 108 F.3d 1186, 1194 (10th Cir. 1997). A valid objection to the admission of evidence must state the specific ground upon which it is based, unless the specific ground is apparent from the 11 context. Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1). In this case, National States’ counsel did not explain how “401, 402, and 403” applied to the exhibit in question. Consequently, opposing counsel had no opportunity to respond, and the district court could not evaluate the objection. Cf. Wilson v. Williams , 182 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 1999) (requiring specific ground for objection to evidence “else both judge and adversary are sandbagged (and preventable errors occur)”). As a result, our review of the district court’s exercise of discretion is moderated by the undeveloped objection. Based on the information before the district court, we find no abuse of discretion in admitting Exhibit 80 because National States made no showing that it was irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial. In addition, other evidence on the number of policies National States rescinded nationwide was received without objection. Ms. Rogers testified that National States rescinded about one-third of the claims available to be rescinded. R. Vol. III, at 138. Because National States did not interpose an objection at trial, under our plain-error standard, we evaluate whether “(1) the district court erred; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error affected [its] substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Castorena-Jaime , 285 F.3d at 926. We see no plain error in admitting this testimony. We also note that it diminished any possibly prejudicial 12 effect of Exhibit 80 because the jury had already received information about the percentage of policies National States had rescinded. Moreover, National States’ argument on appeal is less a challenge to the exhibit’s admissibility than a claim that it was lacking in weight and credibility. The weight and credibility due an exhibit are for the jury to decide. See Garrison v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. , 287 F.3d 955, 959 (10th Cir. 2002) (“The jury has the exclusive function of appraising credibility, determining the weight to be given to the testimony, drawing inferences from the facts established, resolving conflicts in evidence, and reaching ultimate conclusions of fact.”) (quotations omitted). Furthermore, the basic purpose of the rules of evidence is to make all evidence admissible, except under certain clear and strong circumstances. Fed. R. Evid. 402 (stating all relevant evidence is admissible, with some exceptions); id. Rule 403 (stating relevant evidence may be excluded if unfairly prejudicial, confusing, misleading, or cumulative). National States also complains that the rescission files and the market report, admitted to show National States’ knowledge and intent, were irrelevant and prejudicial. 1 National States objected to the introduction of only one of the 1 National States suggests that the lack of evidence that it rescinded Oklahoma life insurance policies means that there were no such files. This argument is highly disingenuous in light of the district court’s finding that National States willfully refused to produce any Oklahoma rescission files. 13 exhibits, the file from Florida. Therefore, we consider whether the district court committed plain error in admitting the other three challenged exhibits. We conclude that it did not, particularly because they were introduced to rebut the testimony of National States’ employees, and National States has not explained why the exhibits were inadmissible for that purpose. For the same reason, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling to admit the Florida file. It was offered to rebut Ms. Rogers’ testimony that National States would not sell a policy to an applicant who admitted having a prohibited health condition. Again, National States has not argued that the exhibit was improper rebuttal evidence, and we decline to construct an argument for it. See Perry v. Woodward , 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n.13 (10th Cir. 1999). National States next asserts that the evidence of its rescissions nationwide was inadmissible to support the award of punitive damages because a “defendant’s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell , 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003). The circumstances of this case are not similar to those in Campbell . There, the trial was bifurcated and the punitive-damages and liability phases were heard by different juries. Id. at 414. The evidence of State Farm’s fraudulent nationwide operations was extensive, going back more than twenty years, and it was presented by an expert witness. 14 Id. at 415. In contrast, here, the challenged evidence was not limited to the issue of punitive damages, and the same jury determined liability, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. Accordingly, we hold that Campbell does not require reversal. To the extent National States argues on appeal that the procedure for adjudicating a claim for punitive damages under Oklahoma law, see 12 Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 9.1, violates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, we decline to address it because the argument was not first presented to the district court. See Wilburn v. Mid-South Health Dev., Inc. , 343 F.3d 1274, 1280 (10th Cir. 2003).