Opinion ID: 1197771
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Both Incidents

Text: 17. David argues that evidence of both incidents is impermissible evidence of bad character under SCRA 1986, 11-404(A). Character evidence is generally inadmissible to prove action in conformity with such character, SCRA 11-404(A), but such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, SCRA 11-404(B). As discussed below in connection with Richard Kelley's testimony, David's behavior toward his wife and others with regard to his marriage and his wife's murder was probative evidence of motive, intent, plan, or knowledge. Indeed, such evidence was important to establish the requisite mental state for first-degree murder. See Hernandez, 115 N.M. at 19, 846 P.2d at 325. 18. Lastly, David argues that the statements' prejudicial impact substantially outweighed their probative value such that the trial court should have excluded them under SCRA 1986, 11-403. The purpose of SCRA 11-403 is not to guard against the danger of any prejudice whatever, but only against the danger of unfair prejudice. A statement is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it inculpates the defendant. 1 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 185, at 780 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) ([P]rejudice does not simply mean damage to the opponent's cause.). 19. Because a determination of unfair prejudice is fact sensitive, much leeway is given trial judges who must fairly weigh probative value against probable dangers. Id. at 783 (footnotes omitted). See State v. Chamberlain, 112 N.M. 723, 726-27, 819 P.2d 673, 676-77 (1991) (affirming admission of tape recording of fatally injured police officer's moans). The trial court in this case carefully weighed these factors and did not abuse its discretion in admitting Steve's testimony.