Opinion ID: 1873679
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: are volunteer firemen subject to the fourth amendment of the united states constitution and article iii, section 23 of the mississippi constitution?

Text: This issue squarely presents a question of law. Does Fourth Amendment [3] search and seizure law as well as Article III, Section 23 of the Mississippi constitution, [4] extend to the activities of volunteer firemen? The standard of review for questions of law is de novo. Harrison County v. City of Gulfport, 557 So.2d 780, 784 (Miss. 1990); Cole v. National Life Ins. Co., 549 So.2d 1301, 1303 (Miss. 1989); Boggs v. Eaton, 379 So.2d 520, 522 (Miss. 1980). The Fourth Amendment safeguards the privacy interests of individuals against arbitrary invasion by governmental authorities. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). The Fourth Amendment does not apply to private individuals. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S.Ct. 574, 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921); Lucas v. State, 381 So.2d 140, 144 (Miss. 1980). We begin by noting that a fireman cloaked with governmental authority who is present at fire-damaged premises for the purpose of ascertaining the origin of a fire or looking for evidence of a crime is subject to Fourth Amendment standards. [T]here is no diminution in a person's reasonable expectation of privacy nor in the protection of the Fourth Amendment simply because the official conducting the search wears the uniform of a firefighter rather than a policeman... . Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1948, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). Are volunteer firemen characteristically governmental authorities or private persons not subject to the Fourth Amendment and Article III, Section 23 of the Mississippi constitution? Our venture into this area begins with a clean slate, for very few courts in other jurisdictions have ever considered the question. Appellate courts in Michigan and Missouri have applied Fourth Amendment standards to volunteer firemen who also happened to be off duty police officers. See People v. Chapman, 73 Mich. App. 547, 252 N.W.2d 511, 512 (1977) (volunteer fireman who was also police officer seized illegal game discovered while on premises fighting fire); State v. Dawson, 675 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. App. 1984) (volunteer fireman who was also deputy sheriff seized marijuana discovered while on premises to fight fire). Notably, there is one case from a Louisiana appellate court which did, in fact, routinely apply search and seizure constitutional law to a search by volunteer firemen without any inquiry into the private v. governmental distinction of volunteer firefighters. See State v. Burge, 449 So.2d 196-200 (Ct.App. 3d Dist. La. 1984). The record in this case establishes that the volunteer firefighters receive state sponsored training from the state fire academy. It is common knowledge that rural volunteer associations typically depend upon a local taxing district for their source of financial support. The water trucks and other equipment used in firefighting are obviously not privately owned. In this case, the Batesville Fire Department also responded to the call as well as the local volunteer force. Unquestionably, the salaried, city sponsored firefighters of the City of Batesville are subject to the Fourth Amendment. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 104 S.Ct. 641, 78 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). However, no members of the City of Batesville Fire Department testified at trial. In many instances, firefighting activities involve joint ventures between volunteer associations and paid, government sponsored forces, as was the situation in this case. Their experiences, observations and firefighting practices and procedures at the fire scene should be identical. We find no logic in a result wherein the volunteers would have free rein with their search of the premises and collection of evidence while the governmental, paid forces would be restricted under well settled principles of constitutional search and seizure law. In short, we find no compelling reason to exempt volunteer firefighters in Mississippi from the requirements and standards of the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution and Article III, Section 23 of our state constitution. Having determined that volunteer firefighters are subject to the Fourth Amendment, we turn now to the specific facts at bar and the applicable constitutional standards governing searches of fire-damaged premises. Each warrantless, investigatory fire search must be evaluated on a case by case basis. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1948, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). Absent consent or some recognized exception or exigency for which a warrant is not required, warrantless entries are illegal. Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509, 98 S.Ct. at 1950. First and foremost, a burning building presents an exigency of compelling gravity making a warrantless entry reasonable. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1950, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). Once in the building, firefighters may seize evidence of arson which is in plain view. Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509, 98 S.Ct. at 1950. Firefighters are charged with the responsibility of determining a fire's origin in addition to extinguishing the blaze itself. Id. at 510, 98 S.Ct. at 1950. Once inside a building to fight a fire, officials may remain on the premises for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the fire. Id. at 511, 98 S.Ct. at 1951. Prompt action in determining the fire's origin is essential in ensuring there will be no rekindling of the blaze. Therefore, it follows that if a warrantless entry to extinguish a fire and determine its origin is constitutional, then the warrantless seizure of evidence while inspecting the premises for these purposes is likewise constitutional. Id. at 510, 98 S.Ct. at 1950. Constitutional searches of fire-damaged premises was revisited by the United States Supreme Court in another Michigan case in 1984. In Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 291, 104 S.Ct. 641, 645, 78 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984), Detroit firefighters suspected arson in a house fire which they battled in the early morning hours. Their suspicion was related to investigators in the arson division of the Detroit Fire Department, and arson investigators arrived on the scene at 1:00 p.m., approximately six hours after all firefighters and police had left the scene. Clifford, 464 U.S. at 290, 104 S.Ct. at 645. The arson investigators entered the house and conducted an extensive warrantless search which included a search of drawers and closets. Id. at 291, 104 S.Ct. at 645. In Clifford, the Court noted that privacy expectations in fire-damaged premises will vary in each case. Id. at 292, 104 S.Ct. at 646. The character and use of the property, [5] the amount of fire damage and the owner's attempt to secure the site should be considered. Id. Some fire may be so devastating that no reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, regardless of the owner's subjective expectations. The test essentially is an objective one: whether the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as `reasonable.' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 292, 104 S.Ct. 641, 646, 78 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984). The aftermath of a fire is itself an exigency which will not, tolerate the delay necessary to obtain a warrant or to secure the owner's consent to inspect fire-damaged premises. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293, 104 S.Ct. 641, 647, 78 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984). Because determining the cause and origin of a fire serves a compelling public interest, the warrant requirement does not apply in such cases. Clifford, 464 U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. at 647. The threat that a blaze might rekindle presents an exigency justifying warrantless and nonconsensual postfire investigation. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293 n. 4, 104 S.Ct. 641, 647 n. 4, 78 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984). However, the scope of the search must be limited to its objective. Clifford, 464 U.S. at 294-95, 104 S.Ct. at 647-48. Justification for a warrantless search to determine the cause and origin of a fire and to guard against rekindling ends when the cause is determined and the danger of reflame ceases. Id. at 294, 297, 104 S.Ct. at 647, 648. In other words, such a search cannot grow into a fishing expedition or curiosity adventure with its object being the discovery of criminal activity. We turn to the facts of the case sub judice, and we begin with the testimony of firemen Sanders and Willard. Both Sanders and Willard testified that once the blaze in the child's bedroom was extinguished, they began checking other rooms in the house for hot spots when they noticed that there were no personal items in the bathroom, and the medicine cabinet was empty. The bathroom door and the medicine cabinet were both standing open. These observations were clearly plain view observations well within legitimate constitutional parameters. If firefighters may seize evidence of arson which they find in plain view, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1950, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978), then certainly testimony of plain view observations would be fair game as well. Likewise, we find that the testimony regarding the closet in the master bedroom passes muster. It will be recalled from the facts that the closet door had to be opened, and the testimony was that the closet contained very few items of clothing. The facts reveal that at this stage of the post-fire investigation, the firemen were checking each room of the house for clues for the cause of the fire, and the firemen were conducting standard operations to ensure that the blaze would not rekindle. [6] The uncontradicted testimony was that it was standard procedure to check each room of the house until the cause of the fire is ascertained. Without question, a prompt cause and origin investigation and reflame operations present exigencies justifying a warrantless postfire search. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293, 104 S.Ct. 641, 646, 78 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984). However, regarding the testimony concerning the chest of drawers and the contents of the dishwasher, we cross a new barrier. [T]he scope of the search may be no broader than reasonably necessary to achieve its end. A search to gather evidence of criminal activity not in plain view must be made pursuant to a criminal warrant upon a traditional showing of probable cause. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294-95, 104 S.Ct. 641, 647-48, 78 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984). Here, the legitimate scope of cause and origin and reflame operations had been exceeded. At this point, the purpose of the search had clearly turned into a curiosity adventure which might lead to the discovery of criminal activity. As illustrated by the testimony of fireman Sanders, the legitimate and necessary scope of the search was exceeded when the search was extended to the chest of drawers located in another room. Q. (By Mrs. Lamar) Anything else that you observed that you thought was unusual about the premises? A. After seeing no make-up, no toothpaste, or towels or any of that type thing in the bathroom, we kind of started looking around. And at that time we found one of the chest of drawers had no clothes in it... . Such a search requires a warrant upon a showing of probable cause to an independent judicial officer. Clifford, 464 U.S. at 295, 104 S.Ct. at 648. It follows then that upon remand of this case to the Panola County Circuit Court, testimony regarding the contents, or lack thereof, of the chest of drawers and dishwasher will be excluded. After the first fire, one bedroom was destroyed and there was smoke and water damage to the rest of the house. The home was not habitable, but personal furnishings remained intact. Therefore, strong privacy interests remained in the dwelling thereby subjecting post fire investigations to warrant requirements. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 295, 104 S.Ct. 641, 648, 78 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984). Fire Chief Troy Darby did not arrive on the scene until approximately 5:30 p.m., some four hours after the fire had been extinguished. By this time, the house had been drenched with water, and firemen Sanders and Willard had made several passes through the house checking for any rekindling of the blaze. The exigency had long since lapsed by the time Fire Chief Darby arrived on the scene, and the reasonable time allowed for investigation of the cause had passed. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1951, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). Hence, just as the trial judge suppressed the testimony of deputy sheriff Cosby's search of the premises following the first fire, the same testimony by Chief Darby should be suppressed on remand of the case to the circuit court. [7] Debbie Darby falls into yet another category. Debbie Darby accompanied her husband Troy Darby, deputy sheriff Cosby and the other firemen who conducted a search of the premises at approximately 5:30 p.m. on the day in question. Ms. Darby is a private citizen who merely tagged along with her husband during his trip to Ms. Rose's house. She was a bystander in the true sense of the word. Debbie Darby testified to observations which were similar to those already offered by firemen Sanders, Willard and Darby, but her testimony was far more damaging than that of the firemen. For Ms. Darby was familiar with the contents of the house prior to the fire. Her testimony presented a comparative observation of the house's contents, before the fire and after. However, the law in this state is that a private bystander to an illegal search cannot do that which the government is forbidden to do. 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 1.8(b) at 178 (1987). In Mississippi, if a governmental agent is incompetent to testify to the fruits of an illegal search, then so is a disinterested, private bystander who observed the search. Our seminal case is Lancaster v. State, 188 Miss. 374, 195 So. 320 (1940). While the search was being made, Miss Moore, whose home was only a short distance from the Lancaster home and on an adjoining lot, stood on her premises and saw the search made by the sheriff and the axe drawn out of the well. Over appellant's objection, she was permitted to testify to those facts. We are of the opinion that the court erred in admitting her testimony. It is true that it was not based on any search that she made, but on one made by the sheriff, which was illegal. Her incompetency is upon the same ground as that of the sheriff. To hold otherwise would mean that bystanders off of the premises being illegally searched would be competent to testify to what the search revealed, although the officer making the search would be incompetent. Lancaster v. State, 188 Miss. 374, 381, 195 So. 320, 321 (1940). To like effect is Holder v. State, 230 Miss. 792, 93 So.2d 841 (1957). An officer can not obviate the necessity of obtaining a search warrant before invading the private premises of a citizen, merely by carrying with him other persons who are not officers to make the find. Such would deprive the citizen of the protection provided by the constitution, § 23, against having his premises searched without a search warrant therefor. We do not mean by this that where private citizens are acting alone in searching for their stolen property they are required to have a search warrant. Holder v. State, 230 Miss. 792, 797-98, 93 So.2d 841, 843 (1957). See Martin v. State, 217 Miss. 506, 510-11, 64 So.2d 629, 630-31 (1953) (bystander rule of Lancaster followed); Cochran v. State, 191 Miss. 273, 276, 2 So.2d 822, 823 (1941) ([B]ystanders will not be allowed to give in evidence what was revealed by the illegal action of the sheriff.). Compare Lucas v. State, 381 So.2d 140, 144 (Miss. 1980) (police view subsequent to search by private person does not constitute search within meaning of Fourth Amendment so long as view is confined to scope and product of initial search). Finally, we note that at the trial of this case, the defendant's attorney objected that the state had failed to comply with a discovery request when the existence of an insurance investigative report was made known to the defendant for the first time. Now that the defense has learned of the report's existence, there should be no problem with its discovery upon remand to the circuit court. However, we pause to inject a strong word of caution as a reminder of the state's obligation to comply with Uniform Criminal Rule of Circuit Court Practice, 4.06. See Barnes v. State, 471 So.2d 1218, 1221 (Miss. 1985).