Opinion ID: 171479
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Punishment for Prior Acts

Text: Mr. Hinckley first argues that his indictment for failure to register under § 2250 punishes him for acts committed prior to SORNA's effective date, and therefore violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Because we view the failure to register as a continuing offense, we find no merit in Mr. Hinckley's claim. The Supreme Court, in Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115, 90 S.Ct. 858, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970), found that an offense is continuing when indicated by the explicit language of the substantive criminal statute, or when the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one. An interpretation of the sex offender registration requirement that defines it in any way other than as a continuing offense would result in absurdity. As the Western District of Virginia points out, It would be illogical for members of Congress to express concern that thousands of sex offenders who were required to register under state law were evading those registration requirements and then exempt those same offenders from SORNA. Hinen, 487 F.Supp.2d at 753. Because subsection (d) applies only to initial registration issues, the application of SORNA to Mr. Hinckley does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. SORNA's failure to register provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 2250, impose registration requirements on any sex offender who travels in interstate or foreign commerce and knowingly fails to register or update a registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. Mr. Hinckley's indictment covers the time period spanning from SORNA's enactment in July 2006 up to the date he finally registered as a sex offender in Oklahoma as required by state and federal law on January 24, 2007. During this period, Mr. Hinckley continued to travel in interstate commerce daily between Oklahoma and Arkansas for work purposes. Therefore, Mr. Hinckley violated SORNA's registration requirements as outlined in 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) and (c) by failing to keep his registration current in Oklahoma after a change of residence or employment, and the Ex Post Facto Clause does not bar punishment.