Opinion ID: 40549
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Whitaker Road Taking Claim: Ripeness

Text: The district court resolved the Whitaker Road Taking claim on the ground that federal litigation of the claim is prohibited by the Rooker/Feldman doctrine. We need not address Rooker/Feldman’s effect on this case, however, because the Whitaker Road taking claim is not yet ripe for federal adjudication. Consequently, the federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain this claim. Under the Takings Clause, a taking does not occur —— and, thus, a taking claim is not ripe —— “until (1) the relevant governmental unit has reached a final decision as to what will be First, the Whitakers’ assertion is simply wrong: They were not “forced” to bring their breach of contract claim through the bill of exceptions process. Under Mississippi law, when a municipality’s legislative action allegedly breaches a contract to which the municipality is a party, the aggrieved party may eschew the bill of exceptions process and bring a common law contract action against the municipality. Cf. Bd. of Trs. of States Insts. of Higher Learning v. Brewer, 732 So. 2d 934, 936-37 (Miss. 1999) (permitting a breach of contract claim to be brought against a state administrative agency outside of the limited administrative review process); cf. Gulfside Casino P’ship v. Miss. State Port Auth., 757 So. 2d 250, 255 (Miss. 2000). Second, as made clear by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, California, even if the Whitakers were forced to litigate the heart of their taking claim in state court, that is not a reason to find that the Lange I decision is non-preclusive: As [the Supreme Court has] repeatedly held, . . . issues actually decided in valid state-court judgments may well deprive plaintiffs of the ‘right’ to have their federal claims relitigated in federal court. This is so even when the plaintiff would have preferred not to litigate in state court, but was required to do so by statute or prudential rules. 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2504 (2005) (citations omitted); see also id. at 2507. 12 done with the property and (2) the plaintiff has sought compensation through whatever adequate procedures the state provides.”26 The first ripeness prong was obviously satisfied: By building Whitaker Road as it did, the relevant governmental unit —— the City —— rendered a final decision regarding the Whitakers’ asserted property interest. But it is equally obvious that the second prong has not been satisfied: The Whitakers have yet to seek compensation through Mississippi’s procedures for this alleged taking.27 The only takings claim for which the Whitakers have sought compensation through state procedures —— and thus the only takings claim in this case that is ripe —— is the House-Carlson Drive taking claim.28 As the Whitaker Road Taking claim is premised on an alleged breach of the Agreement that is wholly separate and distinct from the breach alleged to underlie the House-Carlson 26 Sandy Creek Investors, Ltd. v. City of Jonestown, Texas, 325 F.3d 623, 626 (5th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added); see also Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195-96 (1985). 27 The Whitakers have admitted that Mississippi’s procedures are “adequate.” In their brief to us, the Whitakers discuss Mississippi’s recognition of claims for inverse condemnation —— the procedure by which “a land owner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted.” Alternatively, the Whitakers could file a traditional breach of contract action against the City, seeking as damages the value of the land they deeded to the City and for which they claim to have not been compensated. 28 The Whitakers’ filing of a bill of exceptions to challenge the City’s authorization of House-Carlson Drive and their subsequent litigation of that challenge up the Mississippi judicial system rendered that claim ripe. 13 Drive claim, however, the Whitaker Road Taking claim alleges a completely different taking of the Whitakers’ land. The ripening of the House-Carlson Drive taking claim, therefore, did not ripen the Whitaker Road Taking claim. Consequently, we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City on the Whitaker Road Taking claim and dismiss it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Our judgment is rendered without prejudice, however, to the Whitakers’ right to seek compensation through Mississippi’s adequate procedures for this purported taking.