Opinion ID: 1919495
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Curtilage in Florida

Text: As noted previously, in England a person's house with its cluster of outbuildings was usually enclosed by a wall or fence, and this enclosed area was referred to as the curtilage. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 225 (1769). This concept of curtilage was part of the common law. Florida, of course, has incorporated the common law into its own body of law. However, as the law of burglary has changed, Florida courts have been somewhat inconsistent and imprecise in defining curtilage. This lack of precision may be based, in part, upon the differing contexts in which the issue arises and the different purposes for which the term is used. Specifically, the use of the common law concept of curtilage, which was used to identify those buildings intimately connected with the privacy of the home, makes good sense in search and seizure cases where expectations of privacy are paramount. On the other hand, utilizing the imprecise concept of curtilage to define the physical parameters of the premises protected by the burglary statute, which finds its theoretical basis and origin in the protection of a person's right of habitation, is awkward and invites inconsistency. See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 8.13(c), at 796 (2d ed. 1986); 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 223 (1769). In Phillips v. State, 177 So.2d 243 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965), the district court, in a search and seizure case, observed that curtilage has a distinctive meaning in legal parlance and has been described as the yard, courtyard, or piece of ground lying around or near to a dwelling house, included within the same fence. Id. at 244 (citing State v. Taylor, 45 Me. 322 (1858)). The court then defined curtilage as the yard or court for the protection and security of the mansion house; an enclosure belonging to a dwelling house. Id. (citing State v. Shaw, 31 Me. 523 (1850)). [10] The court noted that at common law the word curtilage denoted only the enclosure surrounding a dwelling house. Id. The same court has stated that the curtilage is the space of ground adjoining the dwelling house, used in connection therewith in the conduct of family affairs and for carrying on domestic purposes. It need not necessarily be separated from other lands by a fence, nor does the intersection of a divisional fence necessarily affect the relation of a building thus separated from it. Joyner v. State, 303 So.2d 60, 63 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (emphasis added), cert. discharged, 325 So.2d 404 (Fla. 1976). The Joyner court held that the parking area of an apartment house was part of the apartment house's curtilage for purposes of executing a search warrant of an apartment and the curtilage thereof. Id. at 64; cf. Menendez v. State, 521 So.2d 210, 213 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (holding that car parked in motel parking lot was within curtilage of motel room). Similarly, in DeMontmorency v. State, 401 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), approved, 464 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 1985), the First District, consistent with the decision in United States v. Dunn , noted that the presence of a fence or enclosure may not be determinative of a structure's curtilage under search and seizure law. The court held that a crop of marijuana and the defendant's house trailer, which were located on a fenced parcel of land, were not part of the curtilage of the defendant's home because of their lack of proximity to the home. Id. at 862-63. The court reasoned that the marijuana was not located in an area falling within the `curtilage' as traditionally defined for the reason that the marijuana was `disassociated from any purpose reasonably connected with the conduct of affairs incident to the normal use and occupancy of the dwelling.' Id. at 863 (citation omitted). In a search and seizure context, the Second District has also defined curtilage without any reference to an enclosure or fenced-in area in holding that curtilage is the ground and buildings immediately surrounding a dwelling and customarily used in connection with it. A.E.R. v. State, 464 So.2d 152, 153 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Cf. State v. Sarantopoulos, 604 So.2d 551 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1992) (defendant's fenced yard is within curtilage of home), approved, 629 So.2d 121 (Fla. 1993). In a burglary context, however, the First District has quoted with approval the current jury instruction for structure which interprets curtilage to mean the enclosed grounds immediately surrounding the building. Baker v. State, 622 So.2d 1333, 1335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), approved, 636 So.2d 1342 (Fla. 1994). The backyard curtilage alleged to have been violated in Baker was surrounded by a chain link fence, and the jury that convicted Baker was given the standard jury instruction providing for an enclosure. [11] Further, as noted in the opinion under review, other Florida decisions also support the enclosure requirement: This conclusion that proof of enclosure is necessary is also consistent with the facts of prior Florida cases upholding burglary convictions premised on the theory that the curtilage was entered. See State v. Rolle, 577 So.2d 997 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (defendant's truck went through gate and backed in through garage door); T.J.T. v. State, 460 So.2d 508 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984) (defendant attempted to remove window from home with fenced-in yard); Tobler v. State, 371 So.2d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1979) (defendant entered premises after cutting lock off gate to a fence surrounding business); DeGeorge v. State, 358 So.2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (defendant removed motors from boats parked on paved area of premises partially enclosed by a fence and a brick wall); Greer v. State, 354 So.2d 952 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1978) (defendant climbed over a six-foot wall into enclosed parking area surrounding business structure.) But see J.E.S. v. State, 453 So.2d 168 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (defendant stole bicycle from driveway, which was determined to be within the curtilage, but opinion does not indicate whether driveway enclosed). Hamilton, 645 So.2d at 559 (footnote omitted); see also State v. Musselwhite, 402 So.2d 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA) (holding that driveway to one's residence is within curtilage of that property), review dismissed, 408 So.2d 1094 (Fla. 1981). In a recent case the Fourth District reversed a defendant's burglary conviction because [t]here was no proof that the defendant entered the school cafeteria nor any curtilage, the building not having been enclosed in any manner. Bain v. State, 650 So.2d 83, 84 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), review granted, 659 So.2d 272 (Fla. 1995). For support the court cited, inter alia, the standard jury instructions and the district court decision in the case sub judice.