Opinion ID: 2321631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Application of Laches

Text: [¶ 23] The Spicklers' fundamental argument is that laches cannot run against them unless the Van Dams made an offer to them in recognition of their right of first refusal. They further argue that any prejudice suffered by the Van Dams is the result of their decision to purchase the property with the knowledge that it contained a right of first refusal in favor of another party. Based on the foregoing analysis, however, the Superior Court did not err in concluding that the Spicklers delayed enforcing their right of first refusal for an unreasonable period of time. [¶ 24] The Spicklers were first apprised of the sale to the Van Dams in March 1999. Despite having an enforceable option, and despite a clear threat to their right, the Spicklers failed to initiate proceedings for specific performance against the Van Dams. Instead, the Spicklers only sought to assert their right in response to the complaint filed by the Van Dams in 2004. The Superior Court could reasonably conclude that the delay occasioned by the Spicklers' failure to make any inquires or take any action for a period of approximately five years was unreasonable. Cf. Glew v. Glew, 1999 ME 114, ¶ 14, 734 A.2d 676, 681-82 (concluding that a party's seven-year delay in bringing suit was not unreasonable where the party had made over a hundred inquiries during that period seeking information needed to determine whether it was in that party's interest to bring suit). [¶ 25] As the Superior Court found, the second component of laches was also established because the Van Dams would be prejudiced by a decree of specific performance. In finding prejudice, factors that may be considered include changes in value of the property or rights at issue, see Gildersleeve v. N.M. Mining Co., 161 U.S. 573, 578, 16 S.Ct. 663, 40 L.Ed. 812 (1896), and the current owners' payment of the costs of maintaining the property, see Philippine Am. Lace Corp. v. 236 W. 40th St. Corp., 32 A.D.3d 782, 822 N.Y.S.2d 25, 27 (2006). [¶ 26] The court found that Lot 25 has appreciated steadily and significantly in value and in today's market would be worth at least $100,000. The court also found that the Van Dams' recent real estate taxes on Lot 25 had been in the five to six hundred dollar range. Based on those findings, the court concluded that a decree of specific performance would prejudice the Van Dams because of their payment of taxes in the years since the Spicklers discovered the sale, and by virtue of not only the loss of greatly appreciated value but also in the loss of opportunity to have put their purchase price funds to other uses including simply making a bank deposit at interest. [¶ 27] In the absence of a request for findings of fact, we will infer that the court made all the necessary findings of fact to support the judgment, if those findings are supported by evidence in the record. Lyons v. Baptist Sch. Of Christian Training, 2002 ME 137, ¶ 13, 804 A.2d 364, 369. In this case, although the record prevented the court from determining with specificity the amount by which Lot 25 had increased in value, the evidence would have supported a finding that Lot 25 had appreciated steadily and significantly in value since the Spicklers first learned of the sale to the Van Dams. Similarly, the evidence would have supported a finding that, had the Spicklers exercised their right upon discovering the sale, the Van Dams would have had the opportunity to direct the purchase price funds towards other investment opportunities. In short, the record supports the view that a decree of specific performance would have prejudiced the Van Dams because of their payment of taxes on Lot 25, the change in value in the property, and their loss of other investment opportunities. Therefore, the Spicklers' claim for specific performance against the Van Dams is barred by laches. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.