Opinion ID: 4017899
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: disbarment is an appropriate sanction

Text: ¶41 Gilbert also contends that disbarment constitutes an inappropriate sanction for his conduct. In matters of attorney discipline, we have a responsibility to ensure that the correct discipline is imposed. We owe no deference to the district court’s 13 Discipline of DONALD D. GILBERT, JR. Opinion of the Court determination. See In re Discipline of Jardine, 2015 UT 51, ¶ 16, 353 P.3d 154. ¶42 Gilbert attacks the district court’s order on two fronts. First, Gilbert argues that his conduct does not give rise to the presumption of disbarment found in rule 14-605 of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice. ¶43 Rule 14-605 provides that disbarment is presumptively appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding. SUP. CT. R. PROF’L PRACTICE 14-605(a). ¶44 Gilbert argues that the district court erred in finding that he committed knowing violations of rule 8.4(d) and that the OPC failed to present first-hand evidence of his intent to benefit himself. Gilbert’s argument fails because a court is entitled to make findings based on circumstantial evidence. Cf. Salt Lake City v. Carrera, 2015 UT 73, ¶ 11, 358 P.3d 1067 (“‘[I]t is a well-settled rule that circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.’ Circumstantial evidence is particularly useful in establishing intent because direct evidence of intent is rarely available. . . . [C]ircumstantial evidence [may be used] to find intent on the basis of reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence.” (first alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Here sufficient circumstantial evidence exists to support the district court’s findings. ¶45 The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Gilbert knowingly violated rule 8.4(d) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, as required by rule 14-605(a). Gilbert knowingly ignored, and continues to knowingly ignore, the court’s disgorgement order. Gilbert was present and argued before the district court when the court first ordered him to return the attorney fees. Gilbert does not dispute that he was sent a copy of the court’s second order requiring him to disgorge the $30,000 in attorney fees. The district court did not need Gilbert’s testimony on the question of intent to properly 14 Cite as: 2016 UT 32 Opinion of the Court conclude that Gilbert made a conscious choice to disobey these court directives. 5 ¶46 Gilbert also contends that insufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support the district court’s findings that his conduct caused serious or potentially serious injury. The district court correctly noted that Gilbert’s actions caused injury to his clients, the public, the legal profession, and the legal system. It found that Gilbert’s conduct caused direct pecuniary harm to the Foundation. To this day, the Foundation has not been able to collect and use the $30,000 taken from its bank accounts to pay Gilbert. Further, the court found that Gilbert’s disregard of multiple court orders caused serious injury to the legal profession, legal system, and the public by creating a general mistrust of attorneys and the operation of the legal system. Last, the district court concluded that Gilbert’s representation in spite of multiple conflicts of interest “causes at least potential injury to the clients, and actual injury to the legal system and the profession, by creating distrust of the system and lawyers.” ¶47 We concur with the district court. The attorney, as an officer of the court, “has the right to set the judicial machinery in motion in behalf of another.” In re Integration & Governance of Utah State Bar, 632 P.2d 845, 847 (Utah 1981). “To function properly in the administration of justice the courts must retain control of their officers,” including those attorneys appearing before the court. Id. When attorneys knowingly ignore a court order, it promotes distrust of the legal system and attorneys. Simply stated, Gilbert has not demonstrated that his conduct should not trigger the presumption of disbarment under rule 14-605(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice. ¶48 Gilbert next argues that, even if the disbarment presumption were to attach, his conduct does not merit disbarment. He argues that we have generally ordered disbarment where attorneys have misappropriated client funds or acted in an otherwise fraudulent or dishonest manner. See, e.g., In re Discipline of Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 217 (Utah 1997) (imposing the sanction of disbarment against an attorney for his intentional misappropriation of client funds). Gilbert _____________________________________________________________ 5 Sufficient evidence also supports the district court’s conclusion that Gilbert acted with the intent to benefit himself. Indeed, Gilbert has offered no other justification for retaining the $30,000. 15 Discipline of DONALD D. GILBERT, JR. Opinion of the Court distinguishes his conduct from situations where attorneys have been disbarred for pilfering monies out of client trust accounts. Gilbert’s argument is, in essence, that because his conduct did not amount to outright theft, he cannot be disbarred. This is simply incorrect. Gilbert finds himself in the position he is in not because $30,000 found its way into his personal bank account. Gilbert faces discipline because he knew that the $30,000 his clients used to pay him came from bank accounts that the district court had ordered the Individual Defendants to refrain from accessing. He also faces discipline because he ignored the district court’s orders requiring him to return the wrongfully taken funds. ¶49 Although we are unaware of any case in which we have considered the sanction for an attorney who accepts and retains funds in violation of a court order, we have ordered disbarment when an attorney has willfully refused to comply with a court order. See In re Johnson, 830 P.2d 262, 263–64 (Utah 1992). In Johnson, a district court suspended an attorney from the practice of law. Id. at 263. We determined that the attorney’s “continued . . . practice [of] law in flagrant disregard” of the court’s suspension order violated the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, and we concluded that “[i]n the interest of protection of the public and the legal profession, this court must therefore order [the attorney’s] disbarment.” Id. at 263– 64. We came to this conclusion despite the attorney’s argument that disbarment was inappropriate because he possessed a good faith belief that he could show good cause for disregarding the suspension order. See id. at 263. ¶50 Other courts have ordered disbarment for conduct similar to Gilbert’s. In Cuyahoga County Bar Ass’n v. Wagner, 884 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio 2008), the Ohio Supreme Court permanently disbarred an attorney for his failure to comply with a district court’s order requiring him to return a client fee. See id. at 1055–56. The attorney represented a client before a United States Bankruptcy Court. After the attorney failed to respond to the bankruptcy court’s requests and failed to appear before the court, the court found the attorney in contempt “and ordered him to return the client’s fee.” Id. at 1054. The attorney did not. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court concluded, “[The attorney’s] conduct in this matter . . . reflects a lack of regard for the ethical and professional standards required of members of the bar.” Id. at 1055. The court therefore ordered that the attorney be permanently disbarred from the practice of law. See id. at 1055–56. 16 Cite as: 2016 UT 32 Opinion of the Court ¶51 Similarly, in Florida Bar v. Bailey, 803 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2001), F. Lee Bailey was disbarred for, among other things, his failure to obey two federal court orders, see id. at 695. Bailey was ordered by the district court to hold and not disburse assets related to an ongoing court case. Id. at 693. Another court order required Bailey to bring all designated assets to a court hearing. Id. Bailey subsequently “took no action to segregate or safeguard” the funds. Id. The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that “[e]ven if Bailey felt that he was entitled to the [funds] in his personal account, this does not permit him to act in contravention of two federal court orders.” Id. The court reasoned, “[A]n attorney is not permitted to ignore and refuse to follow a court order based upon his personal belief in the invalidity of that order. To countenance that course is to court pandemonium and a breakdown of the judicial system.” Id. (citation omitted). In imposing disbarment, the court concluded that Bailey’s “disregard of [the judge’s] orders demonstrate[d] a disturbing lack of respect for the justice system and how it operates.” Id. at 694; see also In re Nalls, 145 So. 3d 1011 (La. 2014) (disbarring an attorney for his “knowing[] and willful[] attempt[] to practice law in disregard of this court’s order of suspension” due to it manifesting a “conscious intent to flout the authority of” the court); In re Disciplinary Action Against Lundeen, 811 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Minn. 2012) (concluding that a “failure to comply with court orders is a ‘serious violation’ and that ‘repeated failure to comply with court orders’ is itself a ground for disbarment”); In re Klagsbrun, 717 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299 (App. Div. 2000) (“The respondent’s repeated disregard of court orders and rules constitutes misconduct that goes to the heart of the judicial system and warrants his disbarment.”); In re Rich, 559 A.2d 1251, 1257 (Del. 1989) (ordering the disbarment of an attorney for, among other things, his disregard of multiple orders of the Delaware Supreme Court, because the attorney’s actions “indicate[d] a lack of regard for the profession which he has damaged”). ¶52 Even though we agree with Gilbert that his conduct presents a different factual scenario from many cases in which we have ordered disbarment, we do not agree with his contention that a lesser sanction is therefore appropriate. We also agree with the district court that the aggravating and mitigating circumstances support the conclusion that disbarment is the appropriate sanction 17 Discipline of DONALD D. GILBERT, JR. Opinion of the Court for Gilbert’s conduct. 6 “[T]he distinction between disbarment . . . and suspension . . . lies, in part, in ‘the attorney’s motive and in the relative severity of the conduct.’” In re Discipline of Doncouse, 2004 UT 77, ¶ 16, 99 P.3d 837 (citation omitted). We have held that “[t]o justify a departure from the presumptive level of discipline set forth in the Standards, the aggravating and mitigating factors must be significant.” In re Discipline of Ince, 957 P.2d 1233, 1237–38 (Utah 1998). ¶53 The district court found as aggravators: (1) Gilbert’s selfish motive in disregarding the Injunction, (2) Gilbert’s violations of multiple rules of professional conduct, (3) Gilbert’s refusal to acknowledge any wrongdoing or demonstrate remorse for his conduct, (4) Gilbert’s substantial experience in the practice of law, and (5) Gilbert’s failure to comply with the district court’s order of disgorgement or otherwise “rectify the consequences of his misconduct.” The only mitigating circumstances the district court found were Gilbert’s absence of a prior disciplinary record and the testimony of family and friends relating to his good character. ¶54 Like the district court, we conclude that the aggravating and mitigating circumstances confirm disbarment as the appropriate sanction. Here, Gilbert concluded that his desire to keep the fees outweighed the court’s interest in resolving and bringing finality to the dispute. Indeed, Gilbert’s willingness to continually disregard the district court’s orders is extremely troubling conduct for an _____________________________________________________________ 6Gilbert’s disbarment is also consistent with the underlying goals of our rules of professional conduct. The purpose of imposing lawyer sanctions is to ensure and maintain the high standard of professional conduct required of those who undertake the discharge of professional responsibilities as lawyers, and to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have demonstrated by their conduct that they are unable or likely to be unable to discharge properly their professional responsibilities. SUP. CT. R. PROF’L PRACTICE 14-602(b). 18 Cite as: 2016 UT 32 Opinion of the Court officer of the court. Gilbert’s actions demonstrated a lack of respect for the district court and the legal system as a whole. 7 ¶55 But Gilbert’s lack of remorse and his unwillingness to recognize his actions’ consequences constitute the most powerful aggravating circumstances. At no point in the proceedings below, or in those before this court, has Gilbert acknowledged an attorney’s obligation to comply with court orders. At no time has he acknowledged that our system suffers when attorneys refuse to comply with court orders. Ultimately, it is this lack of respect for the rule of law and the legal process that warrants Gilbert’s disbarment. Otherwise, to paraphrase the Florida Supreme Court, “to countenance [this blatant disregard of the court’s authority] is to court pandemonium and a breakdown of the judicial system.” Bailey, 803 So. 2d at 693 (citation omitted).