Opinion ID: 438686
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Charles Pershing

Text: 14 Charles Pershing worked for H & W as a welder from March 21, 1977 until December 16, 1980. The ALJ found that he was only remotely connected with the Union (App. 22). Pershing characterized himself as a passive Union supporter: he paid his dues but he refused appointment to Union office because it would be a hassle. (App. 234). Pershing accumulated at least nine unexcused absences as of November 17, 1980. 7 On December 16, 1980 Pershing was terminated for excessive absenteeism. Pershing claimed that his September 23, 1980 absence should have been excused, explaining that he accompanied his son to Children's Hospital in Pittsburgh for thyroid testing, that he forgot to get an excuse, and that his supervisor (Giannotti) had said that it would be all right if he didn't turn one in (App. 223-24). Pershing did obtain an excuse for his September 23rd absence on December 17, the day after he was discharged, but when he tried to turn it in he was told that it was too late. (App. 228). Pershing also claimed that at the time of this discharge, his supervisor said I hate to see this happen to you, but there is nothing I can do about it. It is the way the Company wants it. (App. 222). 15 The ALJ accepted the General Counsel's argument that H & W discharged Pershing to legitimize its discharges of union activists. In support of that conclusion, the ALJ relied on evidence of Pershing's 12 unexcused absences as of November 17, 1980, for which he was not discharged until December 16, 1980, and then only after a Board agent had asked supervisor Barron on December 11 about Pershing's absenteeism record. (App. 22). The inference which the ALJ sought to draw from that incident was that Pershing would not have been discharged had the Board agent made no inquiry. Ostensibly, by inquiring as to Pershing's absences, H & W was then alerted to the fact that Pershing was not being treated in the same fashion as the other employees who were discharged for excessive absenteeism. In order to justify the discharges of those such as Rugito and Krivakuca, Pershing too was then discharged. We point out later, however, that the factual basis needed to support this rather tortured reasoning and inference is faulty. 16 The ALJ also relied on its finding that H & W had never rejected a written excuse as untimely prior to the time that it rejected a co-worker's (Rugito's) 8 excuse on November 17, 1980, reasoning that [b]ut for [H & W's] effort to be consistent with its discriminating treatment of Rugito, Pershing would have been permitted to justify his absence with the statement from the hospital. (App. 22-23). We find that there is not substantial evidence in the record to support this reasoning. 17 First, the slip notifying Pershing of his suspension pending discharge was prepared on December 10, 1980, approximately three weeks after his last unexcused absence. According to unrebutted testimony at trial, a time lag of three weeks such as this is normal at H & W. As explained by Barron, the fact that this was a holiday period may have accounted in part for the time lag in this case (App. 589). Second, as we have earlier observed, the suspension slip was prepared on December 10, one day prior to the Board agent's inquiry about Pershing, rendering highly questionable the reliance placed on that circumstance by the ALJ. Third, although H & W had in the past accepted excuses several weeks after the absence, there was no evidence in the record of the company having accepted an excuse eight weeks after the absence. Fourth, supervisor Giannotti explained that his remark at the time he gave Pershing his suspension slip--that he was sorry but the Company wanted it that way--was similar to the remark he usually made when handing an employee a disciplinary slip (App. 666). 18 More important perhaps is what the ALJ himself found as to Pershing's Union involvement. Section 8(a)(1) and (3) are designed to support an employee's protected activities, and no evidence exists in the record that Pershing ever participated in any protected, i.e., Union, activities. On the contrary, the ALJ admitted that Pershing was only remotely connected with the Union. The ALJ found instead that Pershing was discharged so that H & W could appear consistent with its discriminatory discharge of Rugito. However, as we have previously observed, the General Counsel cannot establish its prima facie case by relying on mere speculation, which itself is dependent on a flawed factual basis. Since protected activities were not found to have been a motivating factor in the discharge of Pershing and since there is no evidence in the record to support the ALJ's speculation as to the reason for his discharge, we conclude that the ALJ's finding that H & W violated section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act in discharging Pershing is not supported by substantial evidence. We therefore will not enforce the Board's order as to Pershing.