Opinion ID: 196263
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count 4, the M-16 Firearm Count.

Text: 23 Appellants' principal focus is on the denial of their Rule 29 motions at trial for acquittal on Count 4, the M-16 firearm count. Each appellant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction under Count 4 for carrying, or aiding and abetting the carrying of, the M-16 during and in relation to the drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2(a). Section 924(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part: 24 Whoever, during and in relation to any ... drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such ... drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years, ... and if the firearm is a machine gun ... to imprisonment for thirty years.... 25 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1). Section 2(a) provides: Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2(a). 26 The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is familiar. Our task is to review the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, taken as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, would allow a rational jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants were guilty as charged. United States v. Mena-Robles, 4 F.3d 1026, 1031 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied sub nom. Rivera v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1550, 128 L.Ed.2d 199 (1994). 27 The facts of this case do not require us to define the precise contours of the meaning Congress intended the phrase carries to have, and we note the variety of views on both that issue and the meaning of its companion term use in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1). See generally United States v. Joseph, 892 F.2d 118, 126 (D.C.Cir.1989) (to prove carrying, the government must show that the defendant had the ability to exercise dominion and control over the firearm and that the firearm was within easy reach to protect the defendant during the drug trafficking offense); United States v. Evans, 888 F.2d 891, 895 (D.C.Cir.1989) (carrying comprehends more than actually physically wearing or bearing a gun on one's person), cert. denied sub nom. Curren v. United States, 494 U.S. 1019, 110 S.Ct. 1325, 108 L.Ed.2d 500 (1990); see also United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 125 (D.C.Cir.1994) (Williams, J., dissenting) (stating that carrying included situations (1) where a weapon was within easy reach of the defendant, (2) where a defendant had sufficient control over confederates carrying weapons to establish constructive possession, or (3) where a defendant had transported a weapon by motor vehicle and had ready access to the weapon as if it were in his pocket), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1689, 131 L.Ed.2d 554 (1995); Bailey, 36 F.3d 106 at 114-15 & n. 1 (stating that what constitutes use depends upon the nature of the underlying substantive offense); United States v. Paulino, 13 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir.1994) (focussing on whether the firearm was available for use in connection with the narcotics trade). Suffice it to say that actual physical carrying of the gun comes within the scope of the statute. See Joseph, 892 F.2d at 126. 28 The conclusion is reasonable that at least one Puerto Rico based participant in the drug conspiracy physically carried the M-16 to the beach. The M-16 had been at Gonzalez-Valentin's house a few days before the beach landing. It was then found in the undercarriage of the jeep in a carport near the beach, next to a building entryway where bales of cocaine had been brought. Someone brought it from Gonzalez-Valentin's house to the jeep. The fact that the jeep was not otherwise connected to the defendants suggests that sometime before the arrest, the gun was somewhere on the beach and was then brought from the beach and placed under the jeep to avoid detection. That the bullets for the machine gun were found behind Pagan-San-Miguel's house near the bales of cocaine further supports the inference that the gun was either carried onto the beach during the offloading or was nearby as part of the operation. Still, the gun was not found in the hands of anyone at the beach and there is no direct evidence as to who carried the gun. None of the agents watching the offloading saw anyone with a weapon of any kind. 29 Our initial focus then is on the sufficiency of the evidence on the aiding and abetting charge. Aiding and abetting requires that the defendant [have] associated himself with the venture, participated in it as in something he wished to bring about, and sought by his actions to make it succeed. United States v. Alvarez, 987 F.2d 77, 83 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 147, 126 L.Ed.2d 109 (1993). Mere association with the principal, or mere presence at the scene of a crime, even when combined with knowledge that a crime will be committed, is not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting liability. Id.; see also United States v. de la Cruz-Paulino, 61 F.3d 986 (1st Cir.1995). The defendant must have taken some affirmative action that facilitated violation of Sec. 924(c)(1). 3 Of course, knowledge that a gun would be carried is also required. See United States v. Torres-Maldonado, 14 F.3d 95, 103 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 193, 130 L.Ed.2d 125 (1994); see also United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1316 (1st Cir.1994) (knowledge that co-conspirators would be using a gun may be inferred from defendant's activity in planning and attempting to rob a Brink's armored truck guarded by two armed guards), cert. denied sub nom. Bonasia v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 947, 130 L.Ed.2d 890 (1995). 30 The question here, then, is whether the evidence was sufficient to show that each appellant knew that a firearm would be involved in the drug trafficking offense and took some action in relation to the M-16 that was intended to cause the firearm to be carried during and in relation to the drug trafficking offense. We believe that the evidence was sufficient to convict Pagan-San-Miguel, Luciano-Mosquera and Gonzalez-Valentin under this standard, but was not sufficient to convict Pava-Buelba and Lugo-Maya as to the M-16. 31 As to Pagan-San-Miguel, there was sufficient evidence that he knowingly assisted the carrying of the weapon. He was the ringleader of the importation operation in Puerto Rico. He was a key participant in the meeting at Gonzalez-Valentin's house during which he and Perez-Perez showed Fontalvo the M-16. He showed Fontalvo the weapon at the meeting and said they had brought it. The jury could certainly infer that he, or Perez-Perez at his direction or with his assistance, procured the M-16 for purposes of using it to protect the operation. 32 The evidence is also sufficient to show that Gonzalez-Valentin knowingly assisted the carrying of the weapon. Gonzalez-Valentin is chargeable with knowledge of the M-16, since the M-16 was displayed in his presence during one of the meetings at his house and the jury could infer that he was present. Moreover, by providing his house for the meeting at which the guns were displayed and discussed, Gonzalez-Valentin assisted the substantive Sec. 924(c)(1) offense. 33 As for Luciano-Mosquera, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer that he either carried or aided in carrying the weapon to or from the beach and hid the M-16 under the jeep at the time he hid or had placed it there sometime before the arrests. The weapon was directly above him in the undercarriage, no more than an arm's span away. It was also placed up in the undercarriage between the chassis and the springs, so clearly someone took some effort to place the weapon there. He was at the beach with Pagan-San-Miguel to meet the yawls; he arrived at the beach with Pagan-San-Miguel, who supplied the weapon; magazines from the M-16 were nearby; beepers were found near the gun (suggesting a connection between the gun and the drug offense); and the call tipping the conspirators off that the police were watching came into a car phone in his car. This evidence supports the reasonable inference that his proximity to the weapon was more than a mere fortuity. A jury could conclude from these circumstances that Luciano-Mosquera either placed the weapon in the jeep before the arrest signals were given or that he carried the weapon from the beach and hid it underneath the jeep as he was hiding from the police. From these circumstances, a jury could reasonably conclude that Luciano-Mosquera had carried the weapon sometime during and in relation to the offense or at least that he aided in the carrying of the weapon during and in relation to the drug offense. See United States v. Olbres, 61 F.3d 967, 974 (1st Cir.1995) (evidence must be taken as a whole, in cumulation). 34 All of the appellants have argued that, regardless of whether the evidence was sufficient to show aiding and abetting carrying, it was insufficient to show that any carrying was done during and in relation to the drug importation offense. They argue that, because their importation efforts ended the moment the flares went up, the subsequently found M-16 machine gun could not have related to the drug trafficking. That argument is inventive, but wrong. The jury could easily infer from the discovery of the weapon in close proximity to the offloading operation after the arrest signals were given that it had been carried at a time when the offense was in progress, particularly in light of the evidence that it was brought by the conspirators to a planning meeting and shown off, ammunition for it was found nearby, and it was found close to the bales of cocaine. Further, the legislative history of the 1984 amendment to Sec. 924(c) is explicit that where the defendant had a gun during the underlying offense (even if the gun had not been displayed), the section is violated if from the circumstances or otherwise it could be found that the defendant intended to use the gun if a contingency arose or to make his escape. S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 314 n. 10 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3492 n. 10; see also United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d 250, 254 (2d Cir.1988). 35 In sum, the evidence was sufficient to convict Pagan-San-Miguel, Gonzalez-Valentin and Luciano-Mosquera of carrying the M-16 on an aiding and abetting theory. Their convictions on Count 4 are, therefore, affirmed. 36 The evidence as to Lugo-Maya and Pava-Buelba, however, was insufficient to sustain a conviction on Count 4. The only evidence the government presented linking Lugo-Maya to the M-16 was the evidence that 50 rounds of .9mm ammunition for the Intratec pistol were found in the yawls. Evidence of his involvement with the Intratec pistol might have been enough to show knowledge of the M-16 on the inference that the two firearms were together when the Puerto Rico-based participants met to launch the yawls to the F/V Marlyn, and that knowledge of one supports the inference of knowledge of the other. There was no evidence, however, showing that he took any step to assist the carrying of the M-16 in relation to the drug offense. Lugo-Maya was not at the meeting where the M-16 was shown. The government presented no evidence that Lugo-Maya took any steps to procure or otherwise supply the weapons or ammunition. He was also nowhere near the weapon at the time of his arrest. There was simply insufficient evidence to show beyond a reasonable doubt that he either carried or aided and abetted the carrying of the M-16. 37 The government's only evidence connecting Pava-Buelba to the M-16 was the fact that he was found under the jeep in which the M-16 had been hidden. Unlike Luciano-Mosquera, however, Pava-Buelba was on the opposite side of the jeep from where the M-16 was found. Given the darkness and the fact that the gun was stuck up between the chassis and the springs it is not reasonable to infer that Pava-Buelba saw the weapon when he was under the jeep. And also unlike Luciano-Mosquera, there was no evidence linking him to the activities in Puerto Rico, specifically the activities on the beach on the evening of the arrest from which it would be reasonable to infer the requisite knowledge of the weapon before he hid under the jeep. Indeed, Fontalvo's testimony never associated Pava-Buelba with any weapons. Pava-Buelba was simply a load watcher whose job it was to observe and report back to the Colombian supplier about whether the cocaine was successfully delivered. His interests were not the same as the interests of the Puerto Rico-based importers. The first time he set foot in Puerto Rico in connection with this case was when he arrived at the offloading site in one of the yawls. There was no evidence linking him to the Puerto Rico end of the operation where he would have been in a position to know about the specific weapon. Therefore, the inference that he knew about the weapon is much weaker than the inference with respect to Luciano-Mosquera. Moreover, even if there were evidence sufficient to infer that he saw the hidden weapon in the darkness once he crawled under the jeep, given his disconnection with the Puerto Rico side of the operation, such knowledge would have been a mere fortuity. Unlike Luciano-Mosquera, who was found directly beneath the weapon and had substantial dealings with Pagan-San-Miguel during the hours before the arrest, there is insufficient evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Pava-Buelba hid under the jeep to be next to the M-16 with the idea that he would carry it. In short, the government did not present evidence that Pava-Buelba knew about the weapon sufficient to support a Sec. 924(c) conviction, even on an aiding and abetting theory. 38 Furthermore, there was no evidence that Pava-Buelba ever had actual possession of the weapon. With Luciano-Mosquera lying underneath the gun, it is far from clear that Pava-Buelba was in a position to exercise dominion and control over the weapon. Even if his proximity to the M-16 under the jeep gave him sufficient possession, at most, a theory of constructive possession might have been argued. In this case, however, the district court specifically instructed the jury that a conviction for carrying a firearm could not be based on constructive possession of the firearm. Such an instruction sets the benchmark against which the sufficiency of the evidence must be measured. United States v. Gomes, 969 F.2d 1290, 1294 (1st Cir.1992); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1196-97 (1st Cir.) (appellate determination of sufficiency must be constrained by trial court's instructions; otherwise ... we would be sustaining a conviction on appeal on a theory upon which the jury was not instructed below), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845, 111 S.Ct. 130, 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). While the correctness of that instruction might otherwise be open to question, the government did not object to the instruction at trial nor does it argue on appeal that the instruction was error. See Saylor v. Cornelius, 845 F.2d 1401, 1408 (6th Cir.1988) (although reversal due to a trial error normally does not raise double jeopardy concerns, double jeopardy bar would be triggered where government had failed to object to the error). 39 Issues of the sufficiency of the evidence necessarily involve the tension between deference to the jury's role under the Sixth Amendment as the finder of fact, see Olbres, 61 F.3d at 974-75, and the appellate court's role in providing meaningful review of whether the government has indeed met its burden of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That burden is constitutionally mandated. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The Supreme Court has said that the relevant question is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis removed). The difficulty of these questions of sufficiency of the evidence to draw reasonable inferences is illustrated in the case law. See, e.g., Stewart v. Coalter, 48 F.3d 610 (1st Cir.) (each of four courts reviewing a conviction reach different conclusions as to sufficiency, culminating in a split decision by a panel of this court upholding the conviction), petition for cert. filed, No. 94-9742 (U.S. June 19, 1995). 40 In sum, we believe there was insufficient evidence, in light of the government's burden of proof, to convict either Lugo-Maya or Pava-Buelba of carrying or aiding and abetting the carrying of the M-16 and so reverse their convictions on Count 4. There is no direct evidence as to either and an insufficient basis to draw inferences of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 41