Opinion ID: 170621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Suspect's Freedom to Leave

Text: The first factor weighs against a finding of custody. Shortly after Bridge initiated the encounter, he informed Jones she was not under arrest, did not have to talk to him, and could leave if she wanted. He specifically motioned to the door on Jones's side of the car and made sure it was unlocked. A bit later in the encounter, Bridge again told Jones she was free to leave. That a person is told repeatedly that he is free to terminate an interview is powerful evidence that a reasonable person would have understood that he was free to terminate the interview. United States v. Czichray, 378 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir.2004); United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1347-48 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting Czichray, 378 F.3d at 826). Our cases likewise establish the importance of telling suspects they are not under arrest and can terminate the encounter at will. For example, our recent decision in Chee, 514 F.3d at 1106, is instructive. In that case, the police asked Chee to visit the police station for questioning about a firearm Chee found in a car he had purchased at a government auction. Id. at 1110. The officers, however, intended to question Chee as a suspect of a sexual assault. Id. Chee was interrogated in a police-station office, with two officers in the room. Id. at 1111. But despite the location of the interview, we found the totality of the circumstances supported a finding of no custody when, during the interview, the suspect was told, among other things, that he was not under arrest and was free to leave. Id. at 1114; cf. Griffin, 7 F.3d at 1519 (concluding suspect to be in custody when she was not told that she could refuse to answer the officer's questions or terminate the interview at any time and leave the . . . room). Jones seeks to undercut the importance of Agent Bridge's statementsinforming her she did not have to talk to himby focusing on Bridge's comment he could arrest her based on the iodine package. She argues a reasonable person would not feel at liberty to terminate the encounter in light of two seemingly contradictory statements: (1) not under arrest, but (2) could be arrested. Although the question is a close one, we ultimately cannot agree that, on the totality of the facts here, the second statement undercuts the objective force of the first one. In support of her argument, Jones relies on the fact pattern set forth in United States v. DiGiacomo, 579 F.2d 1211 (10th Cir.1978). But DiGiacomo is quite different. There, in addition to being told he could be arrested and jailed that evening, the suspect was given an explicit choice. Id. at 1214. The officers told DiGiacomo he could choose between immediate arrest and `voluntary' appearance at the Secret Service office the following morning. Id. Presented with a Hobson's choice, DiGiacomo, we concluded, was in custody and should have been given a Miranda warning. Id. The facts here suggest a far less coercive environment. When Bridge told Jones he had enough to arrest her, he did not follow it up by saying anything to indicate Jones had to cooperate, or else. Bridge did not, for example, say to Jones, We can do this the easy way or the hard way. I think we have enough to arrest you now and let the courts figure it out, or you can talk to us and tell us what's going on and, you know, it might be better for you in the long run. United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal ellipsis omitted). Construing Bridge's statement in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude Bridge was simply describing to Jones the seriousness of the encounter. To be sure, in saying he could arrest her, Bridge might have reminded Jones of the police's coercive powers. But [a]ny interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). An unstated threat of coercion inherent in the officers' power to arrest is, taken alone, not enough. Agent Bridge, in other words, was merely laying the groundwork by explaining to Jones why the agents were focusing their investigation on her purchase of iodine. Focus, however, does not mean custody. 2 Criminal Procedure, supra, § 6.6(a) (The 'focus' approach [to deciding whether a suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes] was expressly rejected by the Court in Beckwith v. United States [, 425 U.S. 341, 347, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976)].). Even a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue, for some suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an arrest. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994). Bridge's statement is in relevant respects very similar to telling a sexual assault suspect the police had obtained DNA evidence, Chee, 514 F.3d at 1111 (no custody), or informing a burglary suspect his fingerprints were found at the scene, Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 493, 97 S.Ct. 711 (no custody). A reasonable person in Jones's situation, we conclude, would understand the agents were not there to arrest her.