Opinion ID: 624286
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judgment as a Matter of Law on Jones's Claim of Retaliation

Text: UPS alleges the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law and its motion for a new trial. We review de novo the district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Cummings v. Gen. Motors Corp., 365 F.3d 944, 949 (10th Cir. 2004). In diversity cases, the substantive law of the forum state governs the analysis of the underlying claims, including specification of the applicable standards of proof, but federal law controls the ultimate, procedural question whether [judgment as a matter of law] is appropriate. Wagner v. Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc., 586 F.3d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under federal law, [a] party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law only if all of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals no legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the nonmoving party. Burrell v. Armijo, 603 F.3d 825, 832 (10th Cir.2010). Judgment as a matter of law is warranted only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences to support the party opposing the motion. Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1241 (10th Cir.1999) (citation and quotation omitted). UPS argues it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Jones's claim for retaliatory discharge because (1) he failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation; and (2) he failed to prove that UPS's reason for discharging him was pretextual. The employer-employee relationship in Kansas is governed by the doctrine of employment-at-will. Goodman v. Wesley Med. Ctr., LLC, 276 Kan. 586, 78 P.3d 817, 821 (2003). Pursuant to this doctrine, an employer can terminate an employee for good cause, for no cause, or even for a wrong cause, without incurring liability to the employee for wrongful discharge. Bracken v. Dixon Indus., Inc., 272 Kan. 1272, 38 P.3d 679, 682 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). There are, however, several recognized exceptions to Kansas's employment-at-will doctrine. For example, an employer may not terminate an employee in retaliation for filing a workers compensation claim, or in anticipation of the employee filing [such a] claim. Id. (internal citations omitted). Kansas has adopted the McDonnell Douglas [ v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)] burden-shifting analysis for employment discrimination cases. [3] Rebarchek v. Farmers Coop. Elevator, 272 Kan. 546, 35 P.3d 892, 898 (2001) (citations omitted). Thus, when a plaintiff alleges he or she was terminated in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. Id. In order to establish a prima facie retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show: (1) he or she filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits; (2) the employer had knowledge of the plaintiff's workers' compensation claim; (3) the employer terminated the plaintiff's employment; and (4) a causal connection existed between the workers' compensation claim and his or her termination. Id. at 899. The burden of establishing these elements is not . . . onerous. Id. at 901. In Kansas, an employer may avoid liability by demonstrating that the discharge was motivated by the employee's [physical] inability to return to his duties, rather than because the employee exercised his rights under the Workers Compensation Act. Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc., 275 F.3d 1290, 1294 (10th Cir.2002). Nonetheless, [i]t does not follow . . . that retaliatory animus can never exist if the discharged employee is unable to perform his duties at the time he was fired. Id. Accordingly, in the final analysis, the court must ask what was the motivation for firing the plaintiff? Id. at 1295 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). UPS claims the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law because Jones failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Specifically, UPS asserts that there is no evidence that Ms. Sloan's contacts with Dr. Legler and Dr. Buck, even if inappropriate, were in retaliation for a workers' compensation claim, or that [Jones's] workers' compensation claim played any role in his initial discharge or in the decision by UPS not to reinstate him. Aplt. Br. at 23. In response, Jones argues the district court correctly denied UPS's motion because he brought forth evidence that there was a close temporal proximity between the filing of [his] workers' compensation claim. . . and the onset of UPS's retaliatory conduct against [him] Aple. Br. at 24. We agree with Jones and conclude that there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury to find that Jones presented a prima facie claim of retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim in October 2003. Immediately after Dr. Legler determined that Jones could return to work in February 2004, Sloan called Dr. Legler and asked if he would change his evaluation to correspond with work restrictions Dr. Stechschulte had placed on Jones. In addition, Sloan told Dr. Buck, the third-party doctor, that UPS would not pay for another FCE (which Dr. Buck had wanted to complete his evaluation of Jones) and that he should base his opinion solely on Jones's previous medical records. Finally, after the grievance panel ordered Jones to return to Dr. Buck for an examination in compliance with the CBA, Sloan made no effort to inform Dr. Buck that, contrary to what she had previously told him, the grievance panel wanted him to make an independent determination regarding whether Jones could return to work based on his present physical condition. We conclude that this evidence, taken together, indicates UPS may have retaliated against Jones for filing a workers' compensation claim. [4] UPS also claims that even if Jones did establish a prima facie case of retaliation, it is still entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Jones failed to prove that its reason for terminating his employment was pretextual. According to UPS, it decided not to reinstate Jones based solely upon Dr. Buck's second diagnosis. UPS further alleges that any evidence of Sloan's interference with Jones's medical treatment fails to establish that UPS's stated reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual. Having reviewed the record on appeal, we conclude that there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury to find that UPS terminated Jones for pretextual reasons. UPS alleges it terminated Jones based solely on Dr. Buck's second report, but this report was clearly incomplete. As with his first report, Dr. Buck stated that his second report was based only on Jones's previous medical reports and that he did not perform an independent medical evaluation. Dr. Buck testified that he did not know why Jones had come for a second examination, and that Jones never explained why he was there. [5] App. Vol. 8, at 1644-45. This fact is particularly important given that the grievance panel ordered Jones to return to Dr. Buck in order to comply with [its previous] decision to implement the third party procedure. App., at 217. Moreover, in addition to knowing the grievance panel was not satisfied with Dr. Buck's initial report, there is evidence that UPS knew one of its employees was responsible for Dr. Buck's confusion and chose not to remedy the situation. Don Lewick, the labor relations manager, testified that he spoke with Sloan about her conversation with Dr. Buck and then instructed her not to speak with Dr. Buck before the second evaluation because she might muddy the waters. Id. Vol. 5, at 1177-78. Given Dr. Buck's incomplete initial reports, which pursuant to Sloan's instructions were based on Jones' past evaluations and not his present condition; the grievance panel's order that Jones return to Dr. Buck for an evaluation of his present condition; and Lewick's instructions to Sloan to not speak with Dr. Buck before he conducted his second evaluation, [6] thereby leaving Dr. Buck with the impression that he was to again base his evaluation of Jones on his past evaluations, we conclude that a jury could have reasonably determined that UPS's stated reason for terminating Jones's employment was pretextual. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying UPS's motion for judgment as a matter of law on Jones's retaliation claim.