Opinion ID: 2090001
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statute of Limitations under DCHRA

Text: Appellees' answer to ESS's complaint below asserted an affirmative defense that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(c) (2000). The DCHRA provides in relevant part: A private cause of action pursuant to this chapter shall be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction within one year of the unlawful discriminatory act, or the discovery thereof, except that the limitation shall be within 2 years of the unlawful discriminatory act, or the discovery thereof, for complaints of unlawful discrimination in real estate transactions brought pursuant to this chapter or the FHA. The timely filing of a complaint with the [District of Columbia] Office [of Human Rights] shall toll the running of the statute of limitations while the complaint is pending before the Office. D.C.Code § 1-2556(a) (emphasis added). Because these counts of ESS's complaint were brought under D.C.Code § 1-2515(a) and (b), alleging unlawful discrimination in real estate transactions, the DCHRA claims must have been brought within 2 years of the unlawful discriminatory act, or the discovery thereof. D.C.Code § 1-2556. ESS argues that we should not reach appellees' statute of limitations defense because appellees have either waived the defense or are estopped from raising the statute of limitations because it was not pursued in the motion to dismiss below. We reject these arguments. The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which ... must be set forth affirmatively in a responsive pleading and may be waived if not promptly pleaded. Feldman v. Gogos, 628 A.2d 103, 104 (D.C.1993) (quoting Whitener v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 505 A.2d 457, 458 (D.C. 1986)) (internal quotes omitted); Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(c). Although the defense of statute of limitations is not listed in the rule, the defense also may be raised by a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Jones v. Rogers Mem. Hosp., 143 U.S.App.D.C. 51, 53, 442 F.2d 773, 775 (1971). Under such a circumstance the defense acts to bar the claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.34[4][b] (3d ed. 1998) (Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may also be appropriate when a successful affirmative defense or other bar to relief appears on the face of the complaint, such as ... the statute of limitations.); Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6). As one court has noted however, the fact that the [statute of limitations] may be raised in a pre-answer motion does not necessarily mean that it must be. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 992 F.Supp. 1218, 1225 (D.Nev.1998). Under Rule 8(c) the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense to be asserted in a responsive pleading. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(c). The express terms of Superior Court Rule 12(h)(2) provide that a 12(b)(6) defense may be made in any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 7(a), [11] or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits, [12] and Rule 12(g) expressly provides that such a claim is not waived by a failure to include it in a Rule 12 motion raising other defenses. [13] See Santos v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 619 F.2d 963, 967 n. 4. (2d Cir.1980); Tahoe-Sierra, 992 F.Supp. at 1225. Accordingly, the assertion of the limitations defense has not been waived. Santos, 619 F.2d at 967; Kulzer v. Pittsburgh-Corning Corp., 942 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir.1991); Tahoe-Sierra, 992 F.Supp. at 1225. ESS further argues that, because the trial court dismissed the DCHRA counts on standing grounds, neither party focused on the issue of whether the statute of limitations had run and thus appellees should be estopped from asserting it further. Although there are situations in which a court may preclude a party from asserting a statute of limitations defense when to allow the defense would be prejudicial to the plaintiff, see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Tinker, 691 A.2d 57, 61 (D.C. 1997) (holding it was incumbent on [plaintiff] to make a showing of prejudice resulting from the [defendant's] failure to raise the defense earlier); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F.Supp. 283, 285 (D.D.C.1995) (substantial prejudice would adhere to plaintiff which had incurred substantial legal costs in conducting discovery and preparing for trial if defendant were allowed to assert a statute of limitations defense which had been pleaded in original answer but not in answer to the amended complaint and had not thereafter been asserted); McGraw v. Matthaei, 388 F.Supp. 84, 88 (E.D.Mich. 1972) (refusing to allow amendment of pleading to assert statute of limitations defense on the last day of trial), this is not such a case. Appellees did not delay raising the statute of limitations defense, as they properly asserted it in their first responsive pleading to ESS's complaint. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(c). Nor has ESS incurred needless litigation expenses in pursuing a claim that would otherwise have been barred by the period of limitations having run. The DCHRA statute of limitations has no effect on the claims which survived the trial court's original dismissal and were pursued through trial. Rather, section 1-2556 presents a time bar only to those claims which were originally dismissed and thus not further pursued until this appeal. Likewise, ESS was on notice that running of the statute of limitations had been raised as a defense against its claims. Under these circumstances we see no reason that appellees should be estopped from maintaining their properly asserted defense. We turn, therefore, to appellees' argument that, even if ESS has standing to bring claims under the DCHRA, the trial court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals of those claims should be affirmed on the alternative ground that the DCHRA claims are time-barred by the Act's statute of limitations. [14] The trial court did not rule on this alternative ground for dismissal because the statute of limitations defense was not raised in appellees' Motion to Dismiss, but rather in their answer to the complaint. [15] What constitutes the accrual of a cause of action is a question of law; the actual date of accrual, however, is a question of fact. Cevenini v. Archbishop of Washington, 707 A.2d 768, 770-71 (D.C.1998). Because the trial court had no further opportunity to consider the limitations defense once it had dismissed the DCHRA counts for lack of standing, the parties had no reason to develop the record on the question of accrual. Although it appears from the facts before us that ESS's DCHRA claims may be time-barred, we are cognizant that there has been no fact-finding on the issue of accrual and that the record may be incomplete on this issue. [16] See Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31, 40 (D.C.1989) (en banc) (noting general principle that appellate courts should defer to the trier of fact because, as a functional matter, the trier of fact is better positioned to make such findings). Just as we conclude that the dismissal of the DCHRA claims for lack of standing at an early procedural juncture should not preclude appellees from pursuing their statute of limitations defense to those claims, so we conclude that the appellant should have an opportunity, not presented in the trial court, to respond to appellees' defense. [17]