Opinion ID: 211579
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Categorical Takings Claim

Text: 26 A categorical taking is a regulatory taking in which government action deprives the landowner of all beneficial use of his property, such that the government action is the functional equivalent of a physical invasion. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). The Court of Federal Claims concluded that there has been no deprivation of all economically viable use of the 2280-acre parcel as a whole by virtue of the alleged taking of 220.85 acres of wetlands, and that even if there was absolutely no use remaining for those acres, the percentage decrease in viable use would be insufficient to constitute a categorical taking. Norman II, 63 Fed.Cl. at 261. 27 Assuming, arguendo, that the Normans intend to challenge the terms of the 1999 Permit despite their disavowal of such intent, the question here is whether the 1999 Permit in fact effected a deprivation of all beneficial use. The case law on categorical takings, and indeed Lucas itself, is clear that only a complete deprivation will constitute a categorical or per se taking. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 2886; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324, 330, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d 517 (describing categorical taking as an extraordinary circumstance and a narrow exception to regulatory takings principles). Appellants' lumping together of their physical and categorical takings claims obscures, perhaps willfully, the critical difference between those claims: a physical taking of any portion of private property will ordinarily result in compensation, while a regulatory taking becomes categorical, and therefore requires compensation, only if the owner is deprived of all beneficial use of the parcel as a whole. If the government action does not deprive the owner of all beneficial use of the entire relevant parcel, then no categorical taking can be shown. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330-31, 122 S.Ct. 1465; Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed.Cir.2004). 28 Here, the trial court identified the parcel as a whole as the 2280-acre Development, comprising the properties designated for development in Phases I, II, and III of the development plan, exclusive of property conveyed to the state for rights-of-way. Norman II, 63 Fed.Cl. at 259-61. Its analysis is consistent with our precedent in this area, which states that the critical issue is the economic expectations of the claimant with regard to the property, and that [w]here the developer treats legally separate parcels as a single economic unit, together they may constitute the relevant parcel. Forest Props., 177 F.3d at 1365 (citing cases). Here, the record is clear that the appellants themselves regarded the 2280-acre parcel as a single economic unit. 4 In any case, appellants have not challenged the trial court's analysis of the parcel as a whole. 5 Without an effective challenge to the trial court's identification of the parcel as a whole, appellants cannot dispute that court's conclusion that the facts here do not sustain a categorical takings claim.