Opinion ID: 746887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Harmful Error Affecting Substantial Rights

Text: 113 Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) provides: Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected.... This Rule indicates that courts of appeals should not reverse on the basis of erroneous evidentiary rulings unless a party's substantial right is affected. Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568, 573 (5th Cir.1991). 114 Having determined that Dr. Jenkins' testimony as to the cause of Moore's injury was improperly excluded, we must address whether the exclusion affected Moore's substantial rights. EEOC v. Manville Sales Corp., 27 F.3d 1089, 1094 (5th Cir.1994). This question is not susceptible to mechanical analysis. Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d at 573(quoting 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 103 at 103-6 (1990))(Rule 103 is silent as to what factors a court must consider in determining whether substantial rights have been affected, indicating that the court must proceed on a case to case basis rather than apply a mechanical rule.) We have stated repeatedly, however, that an error is harmless if the court is sure, after reviewing the entire record, that the error did not influence the jury or had but a very slight effect on its verdict. E.E.O.C. v. Manville Sales Corp., 27 F.3d 1089, 1095 (5th Cir.1994); Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d at 573; Pregeant v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 762 F.2d 1245, 1249 (5th Cir.1985); United States v. Underwood, 588 F.2d 1073, 1076 (5th Cir.1979). 115 After reviewing the record, we cannot be sure that the erroneous exclusion of Dr. Jenkins' causation testimony did not influence the jury. In fact, we are convinced that it had more than a very slight effect on the jury's verdict. It is highly likely that the jury's verdict was based on a finding that Moore's exposure to the chemical gases did not cause his disease. The exclusion of Dr. Jenkins' testimony on cause of disease eliminated the plaintiffs' most probative evidence that Moore had contracted reactive airways disease as the result of his exposure to the mixture of chemical gases at Ashland. Further, it undermined the effectiveness of Dr. Alvarez, the plaintiffs' lesser qualified and only remaining witness on causation, who relied on Dr. Jenkins' work and analysis but was unable to explain the data and the inference of causation as accurately and persuasively. Also, the exclusion of Dr. Jenkins' testimony on causation created a mismatch between Dr. Alvarez and Dr. Jones, the defendant's more qualified, articulate, and forensically experienced board certified expert causation witness; Dr. Jones did not examine Moore but interpreted the medical records and data compiled by Dr. Jenkins to indicate that Moore did not have RADS or any disease caused by his inhalation of the gases at Ashland. Moreover, because Dr. Jenkins was called by the plaintiffs to testify as to his evaluation and diagnosis of Moore's condition but was not asked what caused it, there is a substantial possibility that the jury concluded that Dr. Jenkins' opinion would have been unfavorable to the plaintiffs on that subject. 116 Dr. Alvarez was forced to admit on cross examination that he relied heavily on the work of Dr. Jenkins, his former teacher, especially for the medical history, earlier examinations and testing of Moore. Dr. Alvarez was unable to explain, as Dr. Jenkins had in his excluded testimony, that early mistaken notes in the medical history as to the type of toluene involved were later corrected and did not affect the doctors' causation analysis. After the plaintiffs' rested their case, the defendants presented only the testimony of Dr. Jones who effectively contradicted Dr. Alvarez's testimony on causation. The defendants' attorney took full advantage of the erroneous exclusion of Dr. Jenkins' causation testimony, pointed out that only Dr. Alvarez had testified that Moore's RADS resulted from his chemical inhalation, that Dr. Alvarez was not board certified like Dr. Jones and Dr. Jenkins, and argued that Dr. Alvarez had accepted Dr. Jenkins' medical history and diagnosis without independently evaluating Moore's condition. In its verdict, the jury answered No to the question asking whether the negligence, if any, of the defendants had proximately caused Moore's injury. 117 The defendants-appellees and the dissenting opinion argue that the exclusion of Dr. Jenkins' causation testimony was harmless because it was cumulative to that of Dr. Alvarez. The argument is without merit. The testimony about disease and causation by a doctor who has done the original history taking, examinations, testing, diagnosis and etiology of a patient cannot be cumulative to that of a subsequent treating physician who essentially adopts and relies on the original doctor's work, analysis and opinions. To so contend would be as untenable as arguing that testimony by the author of a medical treatise is merely cumulative to that of anyone qualified to read and explain the text. Dr. Jenkins was the only expert witness who had made a thorough, comprehensive clinical medical evaluation of Moore; his work was the essential foundation for the opinion and testimony of the other expert witnesses. See Johnson v. United States, 780 F.2d 902, 906 (11th Cir.1986)(wrongly excluded expert's testimony was more comprehensive than that of other experts admitted and was, therefore, at least partially non-cumulative.); See also 22 Wright & Graham, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5220 at 306 (1978)([T]he question to be asked is whether the evidence on one side is so full that no jury that rejected it would be likely to change its mind because of the introduction of the proffered evidence.). Dr. Jenkins' qualifications were more impressive and his experience was broader and more extensive than that of Dr. Alvarez. Id. Moreover, Dr. Jenkins' explanation of the knowledge, principles, methodology, and reasoning underlying his causation opinion was significantly more lucid and articulate than that of Dr. Alvarez. 118 The cases relied on by the dissenting opinion are distinguishable as instances in which the excluded expert testimony was truly cumulative because it was interchangeable with and not foundational or seminal to that of the experts whose testimony was admitted. See Kendra Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Homco, Ltd., 879 F.2d 240, 243 (7th Cir.1989)(court stated that a gaggle of experts had been allowed to testify to the exact same issue such that the exclusion of one of the defendants' three experts was harmless error); Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 782-83 (5th Cir.1980)(the plaintiffs had already been allowed to place into evidence, through two other witnesses, the points they sought to prove by putting the defendant's expert's deposition testimony into evidence so that the exclusion of the expert's deposition was harmless error); Miley v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 473 F.2d 856, 858 (5th Cir.1973)(appellant was allowed two experts at trial to testify to the same issue such that the exclusion of a third was harmless error). In the present case Dr. Alvarez's testimony was heavily dependent upon and not fungible with that of Dr. Jenkins. Moreover, the erroneous exclusion of Dr. Jenkins' testimony caused additional prejudicial effects to plaintiffs' case, such as undermining and confusing Dr. Alvarez's testimony, mismatching Dr. Alvarez against Dr. Jones, and possibly creating the false impression that Dr. Jenkins, the more qualified and experienced of plaintiffs' experts, did not support Dr. Alvarez's causation testimony. 119 Because we cannot say with conviction that the erroneous exclusion of the testimony of Dr. Jenkins on the issue of cause of disease did not influence the jury or had but a slight effect upon its verdict, we conclude that the plaintiffs' substantial rights were affected and that the error was not harmless.