Opinion ID: 1809124
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the punishment was arbitrary and capricious

Text: In this issue lies the principal battle between the litigants. The Board of Trustees submits the youth court erred in holding the Board's automatic 65/F policy for seven or more absences denied T.H. his fundamental right to an education. T.H. replies that the trial court was correct. As a starting point we agree that T.H. has a fundamental right to an education as guaranteed by Article 3, Section 14 of the Mississippi Constitution. Clinton Municipal Separate School District v. Byrd, 477 So.2d 237, 240 (Miss. 1985). Two cases in our state comprise the entire body of case law on the subject of arbitrary and capricious policies regarding student discipline. Warren County Board of Education v. Wilkinson, 500 So.2d 455 (1986); Clinton Municipal Separate School District v. Byrd, 477 So.2d 237 (Miss. 1985). In both cases, we excoriated local Boards of Trustees for handing out punishment we thought unmerited, but this Court has never reversed on the grounds that a punishment was arbitrary and capricious. In Wilkinson, we opined that the punishment of expulsion might violate state constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishments. Wilkinson, 500 So.2d at 461. Nevertheless, we reversed for failure to provide procedural due process. Id. at 461. In Byrd, we upheld the punishment inflicted, even though we urged the local school officials to learn that `earthly power doth ... show likest God's when mercy seasons justice.' Byrd, 477 So.2d at 242. In Byrd, two female students were suspended for a semester for defacing a school building by painting a large numeral one on the wall of a school building. Id. at 237. We stated that the appropriate test for determining whether the policy violated a student's substantive due process rights is: As a matter of state substantive due process, a school board's disciplinary rule or scheme is constitutionally enforceable where fairly viewed it furthers a substantial legitimate interest of the school district. The authority vested in school boards consistent with this constitutional limitation includes substantial discretion with respect to the administration of punishments to students who violate school rules. Byrd, 477 So.2d at 240-41. This Court issued a warning that the mandatory wording of the punishment inflicted does not deprive school boards and their subordinates of the authority to administer the rule with flexibility and leniency. The Board of Trustees may choose not to exercise its power of leniency. In doing so, however, it may not hide behind the notion that the law prohibits leniency for there is no such law. Id. at 241. The Court upheld the suspension of the two female students stating [w]hat the board has done and proposes to do here violates no rule of law which has been called to our attention, nor any right secured to these girls by any such rule. Id. at 242 (emphasis added). Before considering the constitutional question, the Court seizes upon this basic concept, noted in Byrd, that the power of the local Board of Trustees may be limited by statutory law. The Mississippi Legislature has promulgated the Mississippi Compulsory School Attendance Law which influences local school board's authority regarding absences and discipline. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 37-13-91 to -107 (Supp. 1995). The reason our attention is drawn to these statutes is that the parties have called our attention to § 43-21-621 in their dispute over whether jurisdiction vests in youth court. The Legislature has, over the past seven years, significantly amended § 43-21-621 along with §§ 37-13-91 and 37-13-92 to work in unison. Our holding above, that the youth court is vested with jurisdiction in the matter, is confirmed by these recent amendments. Likewise here, the fact that these statutes, by their own terms, incorporate one another, compel us to the intractable conclusion that the Mississippi Legislature has spoken to the specific problem that occurred here. These amendments, and this case, are important in several aspects. One, the Mississippi Compulsory School Attendance Law sets forth the public policy of this state as to the attendance of students in schools. These statutes limit the power of boards of trustees to kick students out of the schoolhouse door in disciplinary proceedings. Second, they place power in the youth court, a court which knows all too well the problems involving truants. Third, this legislation offers this Court an attractive alternative to avoid delving into school discipline cases on a constitutional level. The legislation, instead, demands that the students continue to receive an education after disciplinary problems. [1] A statutory solution to the problem of discipline is simpler to adjudicate and provides more certainty for interested segments of our society to base its decisions on than any difficult balancing of intangible protected interests could achieve. [2] We begin by considering the School Handbook. The no-credit provision and the absences provision contemplate different goals. Simply put, the no-credit provision is intended to deter general student disciplinary problems. Distinguish this from the specific problem of truancy. The absences policy deters truancy. While the behavior leading to suspension is unexcused in a moral sense, the distinction between absences due to truancy and days missed due to suspension is meaningful to the current case. More importantly, the Mississippi Compulsory School Attendance Law makes this distinction. The Mississippi Compulsory School Attendance Law compels us to the conclusion that the Board of Trustees' position in this case contravenes public policy. The Mississippi Legislature provided for alternate school programs in conjunction with the Mississippi Compulsory School Attendance Law. Section 37-13-92, in effect at that time stated: Beginning with the school year 1991-1992, the school boards of all school districts are authorized to establish, maintain, and operate, in connection with the regular programs of said school district, an alternative program for, but not limited to, the following categories of compulsory-school-age students: (b) Any compulsory school-age-child who has ... (ii) has been suspended or expelled from school. .. . 1992 Miss. Laws ch. 524, § 9 (current version at Miss. Code Ann. § 37-13-92 (Supp. 1995)). Beginning with the 1993-94 school year, the Legislature mandated that all school districts shall maintain such a program. 1994 Miss. Laws ch. 555, § 1; 1994 Miss. Laws ch. 607, § 12 (current version codified at Miss. Code Ann. § 37-13-92 (Supp. 1995)). The Legislature's intent is to keep children in the school environment so that they continue to learn in a more structured environment. Alternative programs prevent the suspended or expelled student from disrupting the regular school program. Simultaneously these programs provide an alternative preferable to allowing the suspended or expelled student to run free on the streets. An unsupervised environment greatly increases the risk of the student's dropping out of school or turning to drugs and crime instead of becoming a part of orderly society. In the statute, the Legislature makes no exceptions for particular categories of offenses. Suspended or expelled students are eligible for the alternate programs where they exist. The Pascagoula Municipal Separate School District maintained such a program. However, students suspended for violations of the school's alcohol policy were not eligible. [3] The Student Handbook states that [s]econdary students are eligible for attendance at an in school suspension program in lieu of suspension from school. This option is offered with the exception of suspensions for serious infractions such as violations of the drug/alcohol policy... . Section 37-13-91 dovetails into the intent of the Legislature to provide alternate schools for children. The provision in effect then, § 37-13-91 of the Mississippi Code (Mississippi Compulsory School Attendance Law) stated that: A parent, guardian or custodian of a compulsory-school-age child in this state shall cause such child to enroll in and attend a public school or legitimate nonpublic school for the period of time that such child is of compulsory school age... . 1992 Miss. Laws chapter 524, § 8 (current version at Miss. Code Ann. § 37-13-91(3) (Supp. 1995)). T.H. was a compulsory-school-age child, as defined by the Code, at the time of his offense. 1992 Miss. Laws chapter 524, § 8(2)(f) (current version at Miss. Code Ann. § 37-13-91(2)(f) (1972)). The Compulsory Attendance Law defined an unlawful absence as: (4) An unlawful absence is an absence during a school day by a compulsory-school-age child, which absence is not due to a valid excuse for temporary nonattendance. Days missed from school due to disciplinary suspension shall not be considered an excused absence under the provisions of this section. (f) An absence is excused when it results from the attendance of a compulsory-school-age child at the proceedings of a court or an administrative tribunal if such child is a party to the action or under subpoena as a witness. 1992 Miss. Laws chapter 524, § 8 (current version at Miss. Code Ann. § 37-13-91(4) and (4)(f) (Supp. 1995)). Reading these statutes in pari materia, the Legislature allowed school boards to maintain an alternate program for suspended children. Today these alternate programs are mandated. When these children attend the programs, they are not absent from school. It is only when these children do not attend the alternate program provided for them that the absence is unexcused. In this case, the Board of Trustees provided for an alternate program, but refused to allow T.H. to attend. The Legislature has mandated that the absence be excused. Returning to our starting point, the Legislature has drawn a distinction between a student's absence due to punishment and a student's absence as a truant. The Legislature has made public policy crystal clear that a suspended or expelled student should stay in school. Here, the Board of Trustees formed an alternate program for suspended students, but refused to allow T.H. to attend. We hold that the Board of Trustees may not use its absences policy to fail the student. Such a result runs contrary to the purpose and intent of the Mississippi Compulsory School Attendance Law. This is not to say that the punishment for an infraction of a school's disciplinary policy cannot be the lowering of a semester grade. The Legislature has given school boards this power to use in their discretion. See Clinton Municipal Separate School District v. Byrd, 477 So.2d 237 (Miss. 1985). But where the Boards of Trustees created an authorized alternate program to out-of-school suspension, a school may not force a student to be absent, then count those absences against him to lower his grade. Such a policy violates the purpose of our state's compulsory attendance law. As the discipline imposed on T.H. is contrary to legislative policy, the 65/F provision of the Pascagoula Municipal Separate School District is arbitrary and capricious as applied to T.H. Thus, the trial court ruled correctly that the action of the Board of Trustees was arbitrary and capricious, not on constitutional grounds, but on statutory ones. We do not reach the constitutional question. We find it proper to make a slight modification to the trial court's injunction. Where the Student Handbook clearly states that the punishment during an expulsion is no credit for the days suspended, the youth court could send T.H. back to school thereby avoiding the absences policy, but it should not have enjoined the effect of the no-credit provision. The injunction should be modified to allow the Board of Trustees to give T.H. no credit for his class work for the final five days of his suspension to calculate his final grades.