Opinion ID: 2602047
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Cross-examination of James Waltz

Text: James Waltz, an attorney and a Jehovah's Witness, was called by the defense and testified on direct examination that he had been asked by defendant's wife's grandmother to speak with defendant in jail regarding a disagreement between defendant and his attorneys over whether defendant should plead guilty. Waltz testified that he advised defendant of the legal and religious aspects of going to trial, ultimately recommending that defendant cooperate with his attorneys. On cross-examination, Waltz acknowledged that he knew defendant had been charged with a capital crime when he went to meet with him. He also testified that he was a devout member of the Jehovah's Witness church. The prosecutor then asked a series of questions about whether Waltz was personally opposed to the death penalty. Defense counsel objected on relevance grounds, but the objection was overruled. In response to a question asking whether he would ever vote for the death penalty?, Waltz answered No. The prosecutor continued, And isn't that, in part, your Jehovah Witness connection with the defendant and your opposition to the death penalty, aren't those really the reasons why, to which Waltz responded, I'm not opposed to the death penalty. The prosecutor followed up, You just personally would never vote for it. Is that right? and Waltz answered, Correct. Defendant contends the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to ask these questions, arguing that the testimony was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative. We disagree. The witness's personal philosophical opposition to the death penalty is relevant to his credibility. (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (f); see People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 196 [284 Cal.Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290] [expert's philosophical views on capital punishment might disclose bias].) Defendant's claim that the testimony was more prejudicial than probative is forfeited by his failure to object on that ground at trial. ( People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 972, fn. 10 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214].) Even were the claim not forfeited, it is without merit. The value of giving the jury a full and accurate view of Waltz's credibility was not substantially outweighed by the probability of a substantial danger of undue prejudice. (Evid. Code, § 352.) Defendant claims the above evidentiary rulings, singly and cumulatively, violated his constitutional rights. We disagree. The trial court's exclusion of Wentworth's statement was the only error and it does not require reversal.