Opinion ID: 2389751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: testimony concerning the victim's departure from his job

Text: During the course of the trial, Cooper's attorney asked the victim the following question on cross-examination: Did you actually retire from the University of Maine at Presque Isle, or did you resign? The state objected on the ground that the testimony would be irrelevant. The court sustained the state's objection. Cooper's attorney argued at trial, and reasserts on appeal, that the testimony was relevant for two reasons. First, he asserts that the victim lied on direct examination when he stated that he retired from the University. In particular, Cooper believes that the victim resigned because his sexual orientation had become known and that he was involved in an unspecified incident involving one of his students at the University. Second, Cooper contends that, during discovery, information was revealed indicating that the victim was in a distraught frame of mind at the time this incident occurred. Therefore, Cooper apparently believes that the possibility exists that the victim inflicted the wounds on himself through a botched suicide attempt. Although the court did not permit an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the victim's departure from the University, it did allow Cooper's attorney to ask a brief question concerning his mental state in September of 1990. The entire exchange regarding this issue is set forth below: Q: Now, [victim], we've been talking about the period of around September of 1990, do you recall being in a distraught mental state at that time? A: Not particularly, no. Q: So you believe that your life was generally going fairly well at that time? A: I think so, yes, not perfect, but. The court offered two grounds in support of its decision to support the state's objection: (1) lack of relevance, and (2) Rule 403 of the Maine Rules of Evidence. [1] The court noted I'm not convinced that it is relevant. And if it is, it seems to me thatthat it's extremely tenuous. It seems to me that opens up things that are not called for here, so even on 403 grounds, I would exclude it. Even if this court were to assume, without deciding, that the proffered testimony is relevant, the Superior Court's decision to nevertheless exclude it on Rule 403 grounds was not an abuse of discretion. A trial justice enjoys broad discretion in determining the scope and manner of cross-examination. State v. White, 456 A.2d 13, 15 (Me.1983); M.R.Evid. 611(a), 611(b). The exercise of that discretion will be upheld on appeal unless it interferes with the rights of the parties to a fair trial. State v. Rolls, 599 A.2d 421, 422 (Me.1991). We emphasized the breadth of that discretion in State v. Mylon, 462 A.2d 1184, 1187 (Me.1983), by stating: On sets of facts that appear identical for all that the appellate records can reveal, one judge may admit the proffered evidence, while another judge may exclude it; and yet it may well be that neither will have committed any reversible error. An appellate court will find no error on the part of either, in absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Id.