Opinion ID: 1351560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Factual Basis Claim.

Text: Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)( b ) provides that a court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily and intelligently and has a factual basis. Myers contends that the court failed to establish a factual basis for her plea, and her counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issue. She claims the remedy is to vacate the sentence and remand for a determination of a factual basis. Establishing ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis a guilty plea lacks a factual basis does not require a separate showing of prejudice. See State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785 (Iowa 1999). Where a factual basis for a charge does not exist, and trial counsel allows the defendant to plead guilty anyway, counsel has failed to perform an essential duty. Prejudice in such a case is inherent. Therefore, our first and only inquiry is whether the record shows a factual basis for Schminkey's guilty plea to the charge of theft of a motor vehicle. Id. at 788 (citations omitted). Accordingly, we look only to the question of whether a factual basis was established for the plea without regard to the prejudice element of the traditional test for ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant contends the record failed to show a factual basis for the element of malice aforethought, which is required for both first- and second-degree murder. See Iowa Code § 707.1 (1999) (A person who kills another with malice aforethought either express or implied commits murder.); State v. Reeves, 636 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 2001) (malice aforethought required for both first- and second-degree murder). Malice aforethought is a fixed purpose or design to do physical harm to another that exists before the act is committed. It does not have to exist for any particular length of time. State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Iowa 1993). The record on which we assess a showing of a factual basis may include statements by the defendant, minutes of testimony, facts related by the prosecutor, and any presentence investigation report. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d at 788. During the plea proceedings, the defendant acknowledged she had reviewed the minutes of testimony with her attorney, and this colloquy followed: THE COURT: Is there anything in the amended trial information or minutes of testimony you do not agree with as it relates to this charge of murder in the second degree? MS. TIFANY MYERS: No. The minutes attached to the trial information summarized the autopsy findings by Dr. Francis Garrity, a Polk County medical examiner: He will testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to the cause and manner of Joel Diego Vasquez's death. That it is his opinion to a reasonable degree medical certainty that Joel died as a result of anoxic encephalopathy due to cerebral edema as a consequence of acute subdural and subroachnoid hemorrhages approximately 26 hours following a cranio cerebral trauma. That a contributing factor was a hemoperitoneum due to blunt force intra abdominal trauma. In particular, Dr. Garrity will testify that this child was shaken, slammed and that the manner of death is homicide. According to other minutes of testimony, [t]he defendant looked at Sgt. Arnold and Officer Rowley and said I didn't want to baby-sit for him no more, I shook him, I pushed him, he fell to the floor..... The defendant further stated that she might have grabbed him in the stomach area, she wasn't really sure. The defendant stated, He hit the floor really hard. I've never touched a kid like that before. Sgt. Arnold then asked her on a scale of one to ten, with one being the least amount of force and ten being the most amount of force, how hard did you toss him onto the floor. The defendant responded, I tossed him with a number 9 force under your scale. The court questioned the defendant about the factual basis for the plea: THE COURT: In order to prove you guilty of murder in the second degree, the State would be required to prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt: That on or about January 20th or 21st of this year, ... you shook, pushed, or slammed Joel Vasquez. The State would also have to prove that Joel Vasquez died as a result of being shaken, pushed, or slammed. The State would also have to prove that you acted with malice aforethought. I'm going to ask you some specific questions about these elements to make sure that I understand and am confident that you are in fact guilty of this offense. . . . . THE COURT: And can you tell me in your own words what you did. [THE DEFENDANT]: Yes. When Joel was crying, I just remember shaking him and slamming him down to the floor, and I was very angry at the time when it happened. THE COURT: Would you say that when you acted on Mr. Vasquez, that you did so intending to do some physical harm to him? [THE DEFENDANT]: I don't know. THE COURT: Were you holding him when you decided to slam him to the floor? [THE DEFENDANT]: I remember him crying, and I went up to him and I shook him and slammed him down. THE COURT: All right. When you slammed him down, did you slam him down on the floor? [THE DEFENDANT]: Yes. THE COURT: And would it be fair to say that you knew when you were slamming him down that some injury would occur to him? [THE DEFENDANT]: Yes. THE COURT: Would it be fair to say that you knew that some physical harm would occur to him? [THE DEFENDANT]: Yes. Based on the minutes of testimony and the in-court colloquy, we believe a sufficient factual basis for the plea was established, and we therefore reject the defendant's argument on this issue.