Opinion ID: 6332559
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Supplemental State-Law Claim

Text: As a final matter, Leek argues that if we reinstate any of his federal claims, his supplemental breach-of-contract claim under Kansas law against IC Solutions and Kroeker should be reinstated. We agree. Since we partially reinstate Leek’s accessto-court claim, “the district court should reconsider,” at the proper procedural juncture, whether “to decline supplemental jurisdiction over [Leek’s] state-law claim[].” Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210, 1222 n.4 (10th Cir. 2005). As to the specifics of Leek’s state-law claim, we observe that the district court, in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, noted that “none of the individual defendants are alleged to be parties to the contract with IC Solutions and therefore are not liable for breach of contract.” R. 214. Yet Leek’s second amended complaint alleges that he is a third-party beneficiary to the contract between IC Solutions and the Kansas Department of Corrections. And when “a plaintiff and defendant lack privity, Kansas law allows a qualified third-party beneficiary plaintiff to enforce a contract expressly made for his or her benefit even though he or she was not a party to the transaction.” Kansas ex rel. Stovall v. Reliance Ins. Co., 107 P.3d 1219, 1230– 31 (Kan. 2005). So although we express no opinion as to the overall merit of Leek’s state-law claim, we urge the district court, when reconsidering whether to exercise 9 Given this conclusion, we need not decide whether Leek’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Hutchinson defendants are moot. 15 Appellate Case: 21-3165 Document: 010110672389 Date Filed: 04/18/2022 Page: 16 supplemental jurisdiction over that claim, not to overlook whether Leek has plausibly alleged a breach-of-contract claim under a third-party-beneficiary theory.