Opinion ID: 1954226
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Judge Tisdale's Finding of Waiver by Broadwater of Her Right to Counsel

Text: Broadwater alleges that, even if a piecemeal approach to the 4-215(a) advisements is considered sufficient in her case, the Circuit Court nevertheless abused its discretion when it rejected her explanation for being without counsel on 14 February 2005, finding that she waived, through inaction, her right to be represented by counsel pursuant to Rule 4-215(d), and requiring that she represent herself at trial. In order to persuade us that the trial judge abused his discretion, Broadwater must demonstrate that the court ignored information relevant to whether her inaction constituted waiver or failed to meet its obligation to make such inquiry as is required to permit it to exercise discretion required by the rule. Mitchell v. State, 337 Md. 509, 516, 654 A.2d 1309, 1313 (1995); see also Felder, 106 Md.App. at 650-51, 666 A.2d at 876 (explaining that waiver decisions must generally be entrusted to the wide discretion of the trial judge). Broadwater's explanation on 14 February 2005 for why she appeared for trial without counsel was that certain perceived discrepancies revealed by discovery responses provided to her by the State convinced her, only days before trial, that she needed to retain an attorney, and that she could not proceed pro se as she had planned. Judge Tisdale determined that this was not a meritorious excuse, found waiver, and proceeded to trial, requiring that Broadwater represent herself. She now alleges that Judge Tisdale abused his discretion because only a two-week postponement was required in order for her to obtain representation from the Public Defender. She argues that, because the case required only a few witnesses and jurors, postponement would not have been a serious inconvenience to the court or the State. There is no prescribed or set form of inquiry that must precede a trial judge's finding of waiver under Rule 4-215(b)-(e). Before the Circuit Court judge may find waiver pursuant to 4-215(d), however, he or she must allow the defendant to explain his or her appearance without counsel and, through inquiry, determine whether the defendant's reason is meritorious. As the Court of Special Appeals has observed, [i]n determining whether the defendant's reason is meritorious, the court's inquiry (1) must be sufficient to permit it to exercise its discretion . . . (2) must not ignore information relevant to whether the defendant's inaction constitutes waiver . . . and (3) must reflect that the court actually considered the defendant's reasons for appearing without counsel before making a decision. McCracken, 150 Md.App. at 356-57, 820 A.2d at 609; see also Gray v. State, 338 Md. 106, 112, 656 A.2d 766, 769 (1995) (explaining that [i]t is not enough that a defendant is allowed to make an explanation `sufficient to allow the court to determine whether the reason is meritorious'; rather, `the record must also be sufficient to reflect that the court actually considered those reasons') (quoting Moore, 331 Md. at 186, 626 A.2d at 971). We have concluded that a trial court abused its discretion in finding a waiver of the right to counsel: by not inquiring into the merits of a defendant's reason for appearing before the court without counsel, Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 113, 532 A.2d 1066, 1080 (1987); by not inquiring further when a defendant explained that he had just become employed and, therefore, did not qualify for the Public Defender's Service, Moore, 331 Md. at 182, 626 A.2d at 970; and where the trial court found waiver after a defendant explained that his lawyer, who also was representing a co-defendant, suffered from a conflict of interest and was forced to withdraw his appearance. Crowder v. State, 305 Md. 654, 664, 506 A.2d 240, 245 (1986). On the other hand, we have declined to find abuse of discretion in finding waiver where a defendant discharged counsel, without justification, shortly before trial, and requested the court to appoint new counsel. Fowlkes v. State, 311 Md. 586, 604, 536 A.2d 1149, 1158 (1988). In the instant case, the record shows that the Circuit Court complied with the requirements of Rule 4-215(d) in finding waiver by inaction. The trial court examined Broadwater's offered explanations as to why she had appeared numerous times in court without counsel, asked her about the problems she perceived with the State's particular discovery responses, and determined that, in light of the fact that she had approximately five months in which to retain an attorney after being told the first time of the importance of counsel, she effectively waived her right to counsel by inaction. Our perusal of the record also leads us inevitably to the conclusion that Broadwater was in no way confused about this right or the peril of inaction by the manner in which she received the advisements under Rule 4-215(a). Her contention on 14 February 2005 that she would have been able to secure representation from the Public Defender's Office had a two-week postponement been granted does not suggest remotely that Judge Tisdale abused his discretion in denying that relief and finding waiver. From the time of her first hearing in the Circuit Court, where she was informed of the importance of retaining counsel, and of her right to free representation by the Public Defender, if she qualified, Broadwater had four months to ascertain whether she so qualified or, failing that, to find private counsel. She vacillated in her reasons from her 21 September 2004 representation to Judge Ambrose in the District Court, where she claimed to have selected a private counsel to represent her, to the 8 October 2004 hearing where she failed to explain adequately why, having contacted the Public Defender, she neglected to follow up to determine whether she qualified for assigned legal counsel. Instead, she iterated that she did not know if the Public Defender tried to reach her as she had not picked up her mail at her residence address for three months (or apparently made other arrangements to receive mail). She alluded to suffering from fibromyalgia, but never explained how that condition prevented her from securing counsel. Finally, she stated she did not seek to engage counsel earlier because she was afraid a Public Defender would plead [her case] out. Judge Tisdale again explained to her the importance of counsel and the potential for a future finding of waiver by inaction: THE COURT: An attorney can assist you by evaluating the charges and the facts of the case and advising you how to proceed in connected court proceedings on your behalf. As I told you, if you come to court on the 8th of November without an attorney, you likely won't be granted a continuance to retain one. Now, I know you've heard this same advice on a number of occasions, and a judge is going to look at this file and say, well, we've told her and told her, okay? One month later, Broadwater again was advised of her rights and the risk of waiver by inaction if she appeared yet again without counsel: THE COURT: Now, I'm going to tell you again what the judge already told you in October . . . So I'm telling you that one more time so that when this case comes back here, the record is going to reflect you were advised of your right to a lawyer once again, and if you come back without a lawyer, the judge could find that you have waived your right to be represented by counsel, by a lawyer. Do you understand that, Ms. Broadwater? BROADWATER: Yes, ma'am. After reviewing these numerous admonitions on the record, Judge Tisdale ultimately determined that Broadwater, unjustifiably and without meritorious reason, refused or failed to secure counsel after having ample opportunity to do so. On this record, we are unwilling to conclude that that ruling constituted an abuse of discretion.