Opinion ID: 1836026
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure To Present Adequate Mitigation

Text: Rutherford's remaining issues on appeal relate to trial counsel's alleged failure to present adequate mitigation evidence. In determining ineffectiveness in this regard, and whether the penalty phase proceedings were reliable, [t]he failure to investigate and present available mitigating evidence is a relevant concern along with the reasons for not doing so. Rose, 675 So.2d at 571; see also Hildwin, 654 So.2d at 109-10. Rutherford here claims ineffectiveness as a result of trial counsel's failure to procure and present expert mental health testimony and trial counsel's failure to investigate, develop and present substantial mitigating evidence regarding Rutherford's harsh childhood and Vietnam war experience.
At the 3.850 hearing, Rutherford presented the opinion testimony of two psychologists regarding Rutherford's mental health during the time frame in which the crime occurred. They opined that Rutherford suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and was alcohol dependent. It is uncontroverted that at Rutherford's retrial no mental health expert testimony was offered, and Rutherford made no claim of posttraumatic stress disorder. Rutherford, 545 So.2d at 856 n. 3. However, at Rutherford's first trial, competency evaluations were prepared by two separate mental health professionals, both of whom found Rutherford competent to stand trial. [3] The competency evaluations indicated that Rutherford had a fairly well documented history of alcoholism and displayed symptoms which are indicative of an anxiety disorder resulting from his combat experiences in Vietnam. Dr. James Larson, one of Rutherford's experts at the 3.850 hearing, acknowledged that the use of the phrase anxiety disorder associated with Vietnam is a slightly different phrase than PTSD, but that the evaluations were not inconsistent with his opinion; the focus is simply different. Thus, there is no indication that the two available competency evaluations ignored any `clear indications' of mental health problems. See Rose v. State, 617 So.2d 291, 295 (Fla.1993) (quoting State v. Sireci, 502 So.2d 1221, 1224 (Fla.1987)). At Rutherford's retrial, trial counsel presented these competency evaluations to the trial court judge, but not to the jury. Instead, the jury heard only the lay testimony previously discussed from a friend, family members, and Rutherford himself regarding his positive character traits, his meager upbringing, and the consequences of his involvement in Vietnam. At the 3.850 hearing, trial counsel testified that there was no indication from his discussions with Rutherford or his family, friends, and co-workers that Rutherford suffered any significant mental impairment. As to the competency evaluations, trial counsel testified that he intentionally did not introduce them in evidence before the jury. The evaluations reflected that Rutherford had episodes of violence (he had previously assaulted his father and his brother, and broken his hand when he hit a wall) and had spent time in jail and on probation for an assault and battery charge. Trial counsel testified that it was his strategic decision to present the competency evaluations to the trial court judge, but not to the jury, as mitigating evidence of Rutherford's mental health. Trial counsel also testified that he was aware of similar counseling and Veteran's Administration records reflecting Rutherford's alcoholism and PTSD, but that the mitigation strategy focused on the humanization of Rutherford: The theory on mitigation was to make [Rutherford] look as human as possible. Knowing the jury has convicted him and he is now a convicted person try to humanize him ... as a good fellow, good father, a good citizen, loyal Marine, ... loyal church member. Loyal and trustworthy, friendly.... [T]he strategy was the humanization and the goodness ... of A.D. Rutherford. The trial court found that [t]his strategy was reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to pursue mental mitigation. As found by the trial court: Counsel made the decision to focus on the solid, Boy Scout character traits of Mr. Rutherford. The theory was that Mr. Rutherford was a good ol' fellow who must have just lost it. That he was really a good guy. The attempt was to make him look as human as possible, to focus on his positive traits. As for the information contained in the competency reports, the trial court also found that trial counsel determined the contents of these reports would be detrimental, especially in view of the strategy dictated by Mr. Rutherford's insistence of innocence. But, to assure the ultimate sentencer had the benefit of these evaluations, counsel did submit them (despite the apparent objection of Mr. Rutherford) to the trial judge for his consideration. Based on the record in this case, we find no error in the trial court's finding that trial counsel was aware of possible mental mitigation, but made a strategic decision under the circumstances of this case to instead focus on the humanization of Rutherford through lay testimony. Strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance if alternative courses of action have been considered and rejected. State v. Bolender, 503 So.2d 1247, 1250 (Fla.1987); see also Bryan v. Dugger, 641 So.2d 61, 64 (Fla. 1994) (affirming denial of 3.850 relief where mitigation strategy was to humanize the defendant and trial counsel made a tactical decision not to call mental health expert; noting that [t]his is not a case which defense counsel failed to prepare). The fact that trial counsel here was aware of, but rejected, possible mental mitigation in favor of a humanization strategy distinguishes cases such as Rose where this Court remanded for a new resentencing proceeding because it was apparent from the record that counsel never attempted to meaningfully investigate mitigation. 675 So.2d at 572. The evidence that would have been available in Rose if counsel had conducted a reasonable investigation included the defendant's abuse as a child, an IQ of 84, previous head trauma, chronic alcoholism and a previous diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder. See id. at 571. We found under the facts of that case that trial counsel's mitigation decisions were neither informed nor strategic, and that there was no investigation of options or meaningful choice. Id. at 572-73. Likewise, in Heiney v. State, 620 So.2d 171, 173 (Fla.1993), this Court rejected the State's argument that trial counsel's decision not to present any mitigation was strategic, holding that counsel did not make decisions regarding mitigation for tactical reasons. [Counsel] did not even know that mitigating evidence existed. See also Hildwin, 654 So.2d at 109 (remanding for new sentencing proceeding where [t]rial counsel's sentencing investigation was woefully inadequate, as evidenced by the fact that he was not even aware of [the defendant's] psychiatric hospitalizations and suicide attempts); Phillips v. State, 608 So.2d 778, 782-83 (Fla.1992) (remanding for new sentencing proceeding where trial counsel did virtually no preparation for the penalty phase). In evaluating the Strickland prongs of deficiency and prejudice, it is important to focus on the nature of the mental mitigation Rutherford now claims should have been presented. This focus is of assistance when determining whether trial counsel's choice was a reasonable and informed strategic decision, as well as whether the failure to present such testimony (assuming that the failure amounted to a deficiency in performance) deprived the defendant of a reliable penalty phase proceeding. For example, in Middleton v. State, 465 So.2d 1218, 1224 (Fla.1985), we affirmed the denial of 3.850 relief where the urged mitigating factors involving a psychiatric report and the defendant's childhood were relatively minimal compared to the aggravators at issue: prior violent felony, under sentence of imprisonment, pecuniary gain, and CCP. In contrast, in Rose, 675 So.2d at 571, in addition to failing to present evidence that the defendant was a slow learner with an IQ of 84, the psychological testimony at the 3.850 hearing included the fact that Rose suffered from organic brain damage and his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired at the time of the offense. See also Phillips, 608 So.2d at 782-83 (new sentencing hearing where strong mental mitigation included lifelong deficits in adaptive functioning, a schizoid personality, borderline intelligence range with an IQ between 73 and 75, and an inability to form the requisite intent for CCP and HAC); accord Mason v. State, 489 So.2d 734, 736 (Fla. 1986)(new competency hearing ordered where significant evidence of an extensive history of mental retardation, drug abuse and psychotic behavior were not uncovered by defense counsel). In this case, Dr. James Larson, a psychologist, testified that, in the time frame in which the crime occurred, Rutherford was suffering from PTSD, was alcohol dependent, and was under a lot of stressors in his marital and family life. Dr. Larson testified that, at the time of the offense, Rutherford was likely under [an] extreme emotional disturbance, but based his conclusion upon the fact that Rutherford had an alcohol problem and problems with his wife. Dr. Robert Baker, also a psychologist, similarly testified that Rutherford had post traumatic disorder, chronic, and severe. However, Dr. Baker's testimony was even less specific than Dr. Larson's, and he never explicitly connected Rutherford's emotional state to the murder. The trial court discounted this testimony as the result of a defendant who was now compliant and of psychological examinations occurring years after the 1985 murder at issue. [4] The trial court further found that neither expert connected Mr. Rutherford's personality disorder with the crime itself, and that [t]he facts of the case do not establish that when the crime occurred Mr. Rutherford was intoxicated or was having an episodic event or other debilitating symptom of his PTSD. There is no evidence Mr. Rutherford's disorder contributed to his actions in effecting the murder. The trial court concluded that [n]o statutory mitigators were proven through the testimony of Dr. Larson and Dr. Baker. As further found by the trial court in this case: Mr. Rutherford has a personality disorder associated with anxiety. His PTSD is classified as severe, not chronic. There is no indication he has a mental illness, is mentally retarded, or has any organic brain damage. There is no thought disorder or grossly disturbed thinking. In other words, his PTSD is not so severe that it involves serious secondary symptoms such as neurosis or psychosis. The trial court acknowledged that [d]espite not reaching the level of statutory mitigation, the collateral proceeding evidence made it clear that Mr. Rutherford's personality disorder and purported alcoholism were available non-statutory mitigators. But so did the pre-trial evidence in the hands of trial counsel. Though not as extensively, both trial counsel were aware of these same non-statutory mental health mitigators through the information in the two competency/sanity evaluations as supplemented by the other witnesses and the evidence. The additional evidence of mitigation brought forward in the 3.850 does not approach the level of mitigation found in cases such as Rose, Middleton, and Phillips. We find no error in the trial court's assessment of the mental mitigation evidence presented at the 3.850 hearing or its assessment of trial counsel's trial strategy.
Rutherford further argues as a basis for ineffective assistance of counsel that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to investigate, develop, and present substantial available mitigating evidence regarding his harsh childhood and Vietnam war experience. At trial, the mitigating evidence consisted of testimony from Rutherford's friends and family members about his background and his nonviolent nature and from Rutherford himself about his experiences as a Marine infantryman in Vietnam. Rutherford, 545 So.2d at 856 n. 3. At the 3.850 hearing, Rutherford presented additional lay testimony that he increased his consumption of alcohol and had headaches upon returning from Vietnam; that his father had a drinking problem and was physically abusive; and that Rutherford had a troubled relationship with his wife. In many other respects, the 3.850 testimony was essentially cumulative to the lay character testimony presented by trial counsel in the original penalty phase. See Woods v. State, 531 So.2d 79, 82 (Fla. 1988) ([T]he testimony now advanced, while possibly more detailed than that presented at sentencing, is, essentially, just cumulative to the prior testimony. More is not necessarily better.) As to the drinking problem and troubled relationship with his wife, these aspects were contained in the competency evaluations and were known to trial counsel. Trial counsel elected not to present this negative evidence in favor of depicting Rutherford as a decent family man. As to his claim that counsel should have elicited more testimony about his harsh, abusive, and impoverished childhood, the trial court found: The evidence presented at the hearing was not conclusive of an abusive situation. In fact, except for the testimony of his brother William, the other family members portrayed an essentially healthy family life quite distinct from the seriously dysfunctional family portrayed in the motion. Times were hard, and his father had a problem with alcohol, but, given the time and circumstances of Mr. Rutherford's childhood and conflicting stories from within his own family, it is difficult to say that his childhood was in fact abusive. Additionally, evoking images of an abusive childhood and debilitating war experience would have been inconsistent with the reasonable penalty phase strategy [to humanize Rutherford] developed by counsel. In further denying relief on this claim, the trial court found no deficiency because any failure to present additional mitigating testimony [in this regard was] more the responsibility of Mr. Rutherford than his counsel. He refused to help his counsel develop mitigation... [and] insisted on pursuing the defense of innocence. Moreover, he not only refused to cooperate, but actually encouraged his parents not to speak with defense investigators. The trial court concluded that [g]iven the limitations created by Mr. Rutherford's refusal to assist in a viable defense, counsel made reasonable tactical decisions with respect to the presentation of mitigating evidence about Mr. Rutherford's entire background inclusive of his childhood and war record. We find additional support for counsel's testimony about his difficulties with Rutherford, based on the fact that Rutherford was placed in restraints before closing arguments in the penalty phase because of his threatening conduct. Rutherford, 545 So.2d at 857 n. 4. We find no error in the trial court's determination that Rutherford's lack of cooperation was a hindrance to presenting additional mitigation evidence regarding his military background. Trial counsel testified to himself having a military background and being otherwise familiar with how to effectively use military decorations in mitigation, but that Rutherford did not want me to use any military background or record, and would not discuss Vietnam service or his Marine Corps service in general until he unexpectedly did so on the stand during the penalty phase. Trial counsel similarly testified that Rutherford discouraged his parents from talking to or cooperating with trial counsel. As found by the trial court, Rutherford's uncooperativeness at trial belies his present claim that his trial counsel was deficient for not investigating and presenting mitigation regarding his harsh childhood and military history. Furthermore, neither his harsh childhood nor his military history are statutory mitigators, although both are potential nonstatutory mitigators. As we held in Rutherford's direct appeal, [t]he evidence that Rutherford had served in the armed forces in Vietnam may be considered by a trial judge as a mitigating factor, but need not be. Rutherford, 545 So.2d at 856. Compare Masterson v. State, 516 So.2d 256, 258 (Fla.1987) (evidence that defendant was wounded, honorably discharged from Vietnam, introduced to drugs in Vietnam, suffered post-traumatic stress disorder, and consumed substantial amounts of drugs and alcohol on day of the murder, together with other matters presented in penalty phase, was sufficient to establish a reasonable basis for the jury to find mitigating circumstances sufficient to recommend life).
Even if the additional mitigation evidence Rutherford presented at the 3.850 hearing had been heard and considered by the jury and original judge, it is not reasonably probable, given the nature of the mitigation offered, that this altered picture would have led to the imposition of a life sentence, outweighing the multiple substantial aggravators at issue in this case (HAC, CCP, and robbery/ pecuniary gain). Rutherford was not deprived of a reliable penalty proceeding. See Rose, 675 So.2d at 571. In Haliburton v. Singletary, 691 So.2d 466, 471 (Fla.1997), we held that [i]n light of the substantial, compelling aggravation found by the trial court [i.e., under sentence of imprisonment, prior violent felonies, committed during a burglary, and CCP [5] ], there is no reasonable probability that had the mental health expert testified, the outcome would have been different. Similarly, as we held in Lusk v. State, 498 So.2d 902, 906 (Fla. 1986): The evidence now claimed by appellant that should have been admitted in mitigation is largely evidence of appellant's troubled family background. Appellant testified about his background and personal problems during the penalty phase. We must agree with the trial court below in its order denying relief, that this new evidence is largely cumulative and would not have affected the ultimate sentence imposed in view of the aggravating factors [i.e., HAC, under sentence of imprisonment, and previous felony conviction [6] ] affirmed by this Court in appellant's direct appeal. See also Breedlove v. State, 692 So.2d 874, 878 (Fla.1997) (affirming denial of 3.850 relief where the three aggravating factors we have previously affirmed [prior violent felony, during course of burglary, and HAC [7] ] overwhelm whatever mitigation the [3.850] testimony of [the defendant's] friends and family members could provide).