Opinion ID: 768715
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Plea Bargaining and the Guidelines

Text: 82 At the outset of the Guidelines, the Commission made clear that it had focused directly on the effects of prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining on sentencing and departures from the Guidelines. In Chapter 1, Part A, Subpart 4, entitled The Guidelines' Resolution of Major Issues (Policy Statement), the first three sections are (a) Real Offense vs. Charge Offense Sentencing, (b) Departures, and (c) Plea Agreements. 83 Recognizing the role of prosecutorial discretion, the Commission stated that one of the most fundamental questions with which it had grappled was whether to base prescribed sentences on 84 the actual conduct in which the defendant engaged regardless of the charges for which he was indicted or convicted (real offense sentencing), or upon the conduct that constitutes the elements of the offense for which the defendant was charged and of which he was convicted (charge offense sentencing). 85 Guidelines Ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 4(a). Finding a pure real offense system unduly complex and hence unworkable, the Commission moved closer to a charge offense system. Id. Although noting that a major drawback of a charge-offense system is the prosecutor's ability to manipulate the number of counts in an indictment, the Commission dealt with that possibility principally by including rules for the treatment of multicount convictions with an eye toward eliminating unfair treatment that might flow from count manipulation, Guidelines Ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 4(a); see also id. subpt. 4(e) (The guidelines have been written in order to minimize the possibility that an arbitrary casting of a single transaction into several counts will produce a longer sentence.); Guidelines Ch. 3, pt. D Introductory Commentary (In order to limit the significance of the formal charging decision and to prevent multiple punishment for substantially identical offense conduct, this Part provides rules for grouping offenses together.). In addition, the Commission stated that the sentencing court may control any inappropriate manipulation of the indictment through use of its departure power. Guidelines Ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 4(a). 86 The Commission further recognized that in the great majority of cases, the Guidelines would be applied in prosecutions resolved by guilty pleas, for the Guidelines were designed to apply to more than 90 percent of all felony and Class A misdemeanor cases, Guidelines Ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 5, and [n]early ninety percent of all federal criminal cases involve guilty pleas, id. subpt. 4(c). As to the interaction between the Guidelines and the plea-bargaining process, which in many cases ends in some form of plea agreement, id., the Commission noted that 87 [s]ome commentators on early Commission guideline drafts urged the Commission not to attempt any major reforms of the plea agreement process on the grounds that any set of guidelines that threatened to change pre-guidelines practice radically also threatened to make the federal system unmanageable. Others argued that guidelines that failed to control and limit plea agreements would leave untouched a loophole large enough to undo the good that sentencing guidelines would bring. 88 The Commission decided not to make major changes in plea agreement practices in the initial guidelines, but rather to provide guidance by issuing general policy statements concerning the acceptance of plea agreements in Chapter Six, Part B (Plea Agreements).... [I]f the policy statements relating to plea agreements are followed, circumvention of the Sentencing Reform Act and the guidelines should not occur, 89 Guidelines Ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 4(c) (emphasis added). 90 The Chapter Six policy statements are intended to ensure that plea negotiation practices promote the §3553 purposes of sentencing and do not perpetuate unwarranted sentencing disparity. Guidelines Ch. 6, pt. B Introductory Commentary. The policy statement governing the courts' acceptance of plea agreements states that: 91 In the case of a plea agreement that includes the dismissal of any charges or an agreement not to pursue potential charges [Rule 11(e)(1)(A)], the court may accept the agreement if the court determines, for reasons stated on the record, that the remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior and that accepting the agreement will not undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing or the sentencing guidelines. 92 Provided, that a plea agreement that includes the dismissal of a charge or a plea agreement not to pursue a potential charge shall not preclude the conduct underlying such charge from being considered under the provisions of §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) in connection with the count(s) of which the defendant is convicted. 93 Guidelines §6B1.2(a) (Policy Statement) (brackets and emphasis in original). Directly addressing plea agreements affected by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the commentary following this guideline states, in pertinent part, as follows: 94 The court may accept an agreement calling for dismissal of charges or an agreement not to pursue potential charges if the remaining charges reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior. This requirement does not authorize judges to intrude upon the charging discretion of the prosecutor. 95 Guidelines §6B1.2 Commentary (emphases added). 96 This Court discussed these policy statements in reviewing the departure granted by the district court in United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575. There, the defendant had been indicted on a count of narcotics trafficking that would have exposed him to a prison term of up to 40 years; the government offered him a plea agreement pursuant to which he would plead guilty to a narcotics charge for which the maximum prison term was 20 years. The defendant was informed that if he did not accept but chose instead to proceed to trial, a superseding indictment would be filed against him reiterating the more severe narcotics count and adding a charge of using a firearm in connection with narcotics trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c), which would expose him to an additional, consecutive, prison term. See 928 F.2d at 578-79. The defendant chose to go to trial, was reindicted as threatened, and was convicted on both counts. The district court granted a downward departure from the Guidelines range on the ground that the government's routine use of the threat of a §924(c) charge 'as a chip in plea bargaining' created an unwarranted disparity between those defendants who pleaded guilty and those who exercised their rights to go to trial. Id. at 579. 97 We reversed the departure, noting that the prosecutor has discretion as to what charges to bring, and reasoning that [u]nless we c[ould] conclude that Congress did not intend to require additional punishment for conviction under §924(c) when that charge was used as a threat in plea-bargaining,... we [could not] conclude that the downward departure rectified a 'disparity' that was 'unwarranted.' United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d at 582. We saw no indication of such congressional intent. We also noted the Commission's express recognition that the overwhelming majority of cases are disposed of by way of plea, along with its disavowal ofan intent to 'make major changes in plea agreement practices,' id. (quoting Guidelines Ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. (4)(c)), and its cautionary note that a court's power to determine whether a plea agreement adequately reflects the seriousness of the offense 'does not authorize judges to intrude upon the charging discretion of the prosecutor,' 928 F.2d at 582 (quoting Guidelines §6B1.2 Commentary). We concluded that where the sole rationale for the departure from the Guidelines was that defendants who engaged in similar conduct but agreed to plead guilty to lesser charges received less punishment, 928 F.2d at 582-83, a departure is not warranted: 98 No ground for departure pertaining specifically to this individual defendant, his conduct or his offense was identified.... We are left, then, with no remaining basis for departure except the judge's disapproval of the manner in which the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York generally exercises his discretion in negotiating plea agreements in narcotics cases involving use of a firearm. We do not believe that substituting the judge's view of the proper general prosecutorial policy for that of the prosecutor constitutes a valid ground for departure from the guideline range. 99 Id. at 583. 100