Opinion ID: 112173
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Presidential Control

Text: The Act empowers the President to appoint all seven members of the Commission with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Act further provides that the President shall make his choice of judicial appointees to the Commission after considering a list of six judges recommended by the Judicial Conference of the United States. The Act also grants the President authority to remove members of the Commission, although only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other good cause shown. 28 U. S. C. § 991(a). Mistretta argues that this power of Presidential appointment and removal prevents the Judicial Branch from performing its constitutionally assigned functions. [30] See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S., at 443. Although we agree with petitioner that the independence of the Judicial Branch must be jealously guarded against outside interference, see Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S., at 60, and that, as Madison admonished at the founding, neither of [the Branches] ought to possess directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the administration of their respective powers, The Federalist No. 48, p. 332 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), we do not believe that the President's appointment and removal powers over the Commission afford him influence over the functions of the Judicial Branch or undue sway over its members. The notion that the President's power to appoint federal judges to the Commission somehow gives him influence over the Judicial Branch or prevents, even potentially, the Judicial Branch from performing its constitutionally assigned functions is fanciful. We have never considered it incompatible with the functioning of the Judicial Branch that the President has the power to elevate federal judges from one level to another or to tempt judges away from the bench with Executive Branch positions. The mere fact that the President within his appointment portfolio has positions that may be attractive to federal judges does not, of itself, corrupt the integrity of the Judiciary. Were the impartiality of the Judicial Branch so easily subverted, our constitutional system of tripartite Government would have failed long ago. We simply cannot imagine that federal judges will comport their actions to the wishes of the President for the purpose of receiving an appointment to the Sentencing Commission. [31] The President's removal power over Commission members poses a similarly negligible threat to judicial independence. The Act does not, and could not under the Constitution, authorize the President to remove, or in any way diminish the status of Article III judges, as judges. Even if removed from the Commission, a federal judge appointed to the Commission would continue, absent impeachment, to enjoy tenure during good Behavior and a full judicial salary. U. S. Const., Art. III, § 1. [32] Also, the President's removal power under the Act is limited. In order to safeguard the independence of the Commission from executive control, Congress specified in the Act that the President may remove the Commission members only for good cause. [33] Such congressional limitation on the President's removal power, like the removal provisions upheld in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654 (1988), and Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935), is specifically crafted to prevent the President from exercising coercive influence over independent agencies. See Morrison, 487 U. S., at 688; Humphrey's Executor, 295 U. S., at 630. In other words, since the President has no power to affect the tenure or compensation of Article III judges, even if the Act authorized him to remove judges from the Commission at will, he would have no power to coerce the judges in the exercise of their judicial duties. [34] In any case, Congress did not grant the President unfettered authority to remove Commission members. Instead, precisely to ensure that they would not be subject to coercion even in the exercise of their nonjudicial duties, Congress insulated the members from Presidential removal except for good cause. Under these circumstances, we see no risk that the President's limited removal power will compromise the impartiality of Article III judges serving on the Commission and, consequently, no risk that the Act's removal provision will prevent the Judicial Branch from performing its constitutionally assigned function of fairly adjudicating cases and controversies. [35]