Opinion ID: 2827791
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Probable Cause Affidavit

Text: We next turn to Hart’s claim that Detective Mannina made false or misleading statements in her probable cause affidavit for his arrest. The probable cause affidavit relied on the four November 22, 2008 identifications to establish probable cause. As we have explained, these four identifications, if taken at face value, were more than sufficient to establish probable cause. But Hart argues that the identifications should not be taken at face value because the affidavit was false and misleading in two respects: (1) Mannina knew or should have known that the eyewitness identifications were unreliable, and (2) Mannina omitted exculpatory information that would, if included, have led the judge to deny her request for an arrest warrant. A “warrant request violates the Fourth Amendment if the requesting officer knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, makes false statements in requesting the warrant and the false statements were necessary to the determination that a warrant should issue.” Knox v. Smith, 342 F.3d 651, 658 (7th Cir. 2003); see also, e.g., Olson v. Champaign County, 784 F.3d 1093, 1100 (7th Cir. 2015) (police not entitled to qualified immunity for providing false information in probable cause affidavit for arrest). A “‘reckless disregard for the truth’ can be shown by demonstrating that the officer ‘entertained serious doubts as to the truth’ of the statements, had ‘obvious reasons to doubt their accuracy,’ or failed to disclose facts that he or she ‘knew would negate probable cause.’” Betker v. Gomez, 692 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. No. 14-1347 19 2012), quoting Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir. 2003). We agree with the district court that no reasonable trier of fact could find on this record that Mannina’s probable cause affidavit was false or misleading. There is no evidence that she knew or should have known that the November 22 identifications were unreliable. Hart relies on two facts: (1) all four witnesses said in their initial statements to police on November 3 and 4 that they did not see the attackers’ faces clearly, and (2) one of the witnesses (Glasscock) expressed uncertainty about whether she would be able to identify anyone involved in the crime. Neither fact makes the witnesses’ later identifications of a photograph so unreliable that the police could not rely on them to seek an arrest warrant. A police officer is permitted to rely on information provided by an eyewitness as long as the officer reasonably believes the witness is telling the truth. See Matthews v. City of East St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 2012); Pasiewicz v. Lake County Forest Preserve Dist., 270 F.3d 520, 524 (7th Cir. 2001); Jenkins v. Keating, 147 F.3d 577, 585 (7th Cir. 1998). In real-world investigations, police often confront the limits of human memory and facial recognition. A witness who initially expresses doubt about being able to identify a suspect but then later tells police she recognizes a familiar face need not be considered mistaken or dishonest. Nor do minor inconsistencies among witnesses’ statements necessarily imply that they are mistaken or dishonest. See Askew v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 894, 896–97 (7th Cir. 2006) (minor inconsistencies across eyewitness statements are “normal” and “do not disentitle police to rely on eyewitness statements”). The 20 No. 14-1347 question under the Fourth Amendment is whether the officer reasonably believed the witness was telling the truth. Here, nothing in the witnesses’ first statements would have made it unreasonable for police to rely on their later identifications of a photograph of a suspect. Each witness had close contact with the attackers and had an opportunity to view the man each later identified as Hart. In their first statements to the police, all of the witnesses provided specific descriptions of that man. The descriptions included details about what the man was wearing and his apparent age, race, height, and build. To be sure, the witnesses did not have a perfect view of Duane’s shooter because he was wearing a hooded sweatshirt pulled up over his head. But nothing else obscured his face. All four witnesses told police in their first statements that the gunman wore glasses or sunglasses. Not surprisingly, there are some minor differences among these initial descriptions. For example, Glasscock said the man was in his late twenties to early thirties while Bluiett said he was between eighteen and twenty-five years old. But none of these discrepancies detract from the fact that all four descriptions are largely consistent with one another and with Hart’s actual appearance. The witnesses’ encounters with the attackers were brief and stressful, but no evidence suggests that they could not offer reliable identifications. Cf. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (relevant factors for determining reliability of eyewitness identification include the witness’s opportunity to view the criminal at time of crime and the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972) (same); see also Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2012) (“When no improper law enforcement activiNo. 14-1347 21 ty is involved, … it suffices to test reliability through the rights and opportunities generally designed for that purpose, notably, the presence of counsel at postindictment lineups, vigorous cross-examination, protective rules of evidence, and jury instructions on both the fallibility of eyewitness identification and the requirement that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Nothing about the witnesses’ first statements to police made later identifications of Hart’s photograph so untrustworthy that police could not rely on them to seek Hart’s arrest. Hart also argues that Mannina should have known that the November 22 identifications were unreliable because there was evidence that the MySpace video was circulating among members of the Miller family. According to Hart, this evidence should have alerted Mannina to the possibility that the four witnesses were colluding to identify Hart—that they had been exposed to the MySpace video and knew Hart was a suspect in the crime before they were presented with the photo array. This is plausible in theory, but the record does not support it. Although there is evidence that the video circulated within the Miller family, there is no evidence of collusion among the witnesses, only two of whom were actually members of the Miller family. Duane Miller of course saw the MySpace video before he saw the photo array, but there is no evidence that he told the other witnesses of the video’s existence. To the contrary, he told Mannina during his November 22 interview that he never showed the MySpace video to Bluiett, Glasscock, or Daniels. Bluiett, Glasscock, and Daniels all testified that they had never seen the MySpace 22 No. 14-1347 video before identifying Hart in the photo array on November 22. Hart cannot rebut that testimony with speculation. Hart also argues that Mannina omitted material exculpatory information from the probable cause affidavit. “The materiality of an omitted … fact depends on its relative importance to the evaluation of probable cause; an omitted fact is material if its inclusion would have negated probable cause.” Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 411 (7th Cir. 2010). If the omitted fact would not have negated probable cause, its omission was immaterial and there was no Fourth Amendment violation. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171–72 (1978); accord, United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 604 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying Franks to omissions). To assess materiality, “we examine whether a hypothetical affidavit that included the omitted material would still establish probable cause.” United States v. Robinson, 546 F.3d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 2008). Hart identifies two sets of omissions. First, he lists a slew of facts about the witnesses’ initial descriptions from November 3 and 4 that were not included in the probable cause affidavit—for example, it was dark during the incident and the witnesses had only a limited time to view Duane’s shooter. None of these facts, if included, would have negated the probable cause determination, which was based on the witnesses’ November 22 identifications of Hart’s photograph, not their initial descriptions. The second set of omissions relate to the later identifications. Detective Mannina did not disclose that she failed to record the first part of each of the November 22 interviews. She also failed to disclose that Bluiett told her he was only “pretty sure” that Hart was the person who was involved in No. 14-1347 23 the home invasion. Neither of these omitted facts would have negated probable cause if they had been included. As noted above, there is no evidence that any of the witnesses said anything to Mannina during the unrecorded part of each interview that would have exculpated Hart or undermined the credibility of the witnesses or their identifications of Hart. The record establishes beyond reasonable dispute that during the unrecorded parts of the interviews, the witnesses merely confirmed that they recognized someone in the photo array. Adding to the affidavit the fact that Mannina had failed to record her initial exchanges with each witness would not have negated probable cause. The same is true for Mannina’s failure to include Bluiett’s “pretty sure” qualification. Although we believe she should have included this qualification in the affidavit, in the end its omission was not material. Three other witnesses identified Hart, and none of them expressed such uncertainty. Adding Bluiett’s qualification would not have negated probable cause. See Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 996 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Applying this standard, we have consistently held that an identification or a report from a single, credible victim or eyewitness can provide the basis for probable cause.”). In sum, the summary judgment record would not permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that Mannina made false or misleading statements that were necessary to the probable cause determination. Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Count I. 24 No. 14-1347