Opinion ID: 858279
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Subsequent Search

Text: Our conclusion that the initial protective sweep of Mr. Scott’s house was unconstitutional does not end our inquiry. Because the evidence admitted at trial against Mr. Scott was not seized during the protective sweep, but during the second warrantless search of Mr. Scott’s home, we must determine whether this latter search was tainted by the initial constitutional violation. Where a search is made pursuant to consent following prior illegal police activity, we conduct a two-step inquiry to evaluate the constitutionality of the subsequent search. “First, a court must determine whether the consent was voluntary. Second, the court must determine whether the consent, even if voluntary, requires exclusion of the evidence found during the search because it was the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’— the product of an illegal entry.” United States v. Delancy, 502 F.3d 1297, 1308 (11th Cir. 2007). 6 Case: 12-13677 Date Filed: 04/17/2013 Page: 7 of 9 First, we consider whether Mr. Scott’s consent was given voluntarily. Whether a defendant’s consent to search was voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from all of the circumstance. United States v. Garcia, 890 F.2d 355, 358 (11th Cir. 1989). The district court did not clearly err in finding that Mr. Scott’s consent to the search of his home was voluntarily given. Although Mr. Scott was handcuffed and under arrest when he consented to the search, these circumstances alone do not mandate a finding of involuntariness. See id. at 362. The evidence at the suppression hearing showed that Mr. Scott’s consent was not obtained through coercive or deceptive conduct. Rather, officers obtained Mr. Scott’s consent after merely asking him to read the consent form a second time. The fact that Mr. Scott initially refused to consent to the search does not render his subsequent consent voluntary, particularly in the absence of any coercive conduct by the police beyond the coercion inherent in any arrest made pursuant to probable cause. Because we conclude that Mr. Scott voluntarily gave consent to have his home searched, we consider whether his consent was tainted by the investigating officer’s illegal protective sweep of his home. Delancy, 502 F.3d at 1308. We consider three factors when determining whether a voluntary consent was tainted by an initial search: “the temporal proximity of the seizure and the consent, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy 7 Case: 12-13677 Date Filed: 04/17/2013 Page: 8 of 9 of the official misconduct.” United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 677 (11th Cir. 2000). “The proper inquiry is not simply whether [Mr. Scott’s] will was overborne by the agents' illegal entry, but also whether his consent was a “product” of that illegality.” Id. Considering these factors, we conclude that Mr. Scott’s consent was not tainted by the illegal protective sweep of his home. To be sure, Mr. Scott’s consent was obtained minutes after the illegal protective sweep was completed. And we recognize that the fact that Mr. Scott was apprised of his right to refuse the search does not constitute an intervening factor sufficient to dissipate the taint of the illegal sweep. Id. at 678 (holding that the reading of Miranda warnings and the signing of a waiver of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights are not sufficient intervening factors sufficient to dissipate the taint of an unlawful entry into a home). However, the officers’ conduct in this case, while illegal, was not flagrant. The district court found that the officers conducted the protective sweep for the purposes of officer safety and not for the purposes of uncovering contraband. The officers’ search was limited to spaces that were big enough to conceal a dangerous person and did not extend into smaller drawers, containers, or storage spaces. Arresting officers did not seize any items during their protective search and did not bring any of the illegal items they saw during that search to Mr. Scott’s attention. Thus, the arresting officers did not use the fruits of the illegal protective sweep as 8 Case: 12-13677 Date Filed: 04/17/2013 Page: 9 of 9 leverage or as a tool of psychological coercion to persuade Mr. Scott to consent to the search. Instead, the officers only discussed with Mr. Scott the marijuana in plain view of the doorway prior to obtaining his consent to the search of the full house. Given these circumstances, we cannot conclude that Mr. Scott’s consent was a product of the officer’s illegal protective sweep.