Opinion ID: 2735676
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District Court’s Forfeiture Orders as to Prat

Text: On appeal, Prat primarily argues that the properties listed in his plea agreement were never lawfully forfeited because the district court’s oral pronouncement of Prat’s sentence at the sentencing hearing failed to include the forfeiture of his properties. In response, the government points out that the record belies Prat’s claim because at sentencing the district court agreed to the government’s request that the preliminary orders of forfeiture be incorporated into the judgment. In any event, to the extent Prat attacks the propriety or legality of the forfeiture of his properties, his appeal is untimely under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(a). “[C]riminal forfeiture is part of a defendant’s sentence.” United States v. Gilbert, 244 F.3d 888, 924 (11th Cir. 2001). With respect to the defendant (as opposed to third-party claimants), the district court’s preliminary forfeiture orders become final at his sentencing. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(4)(A); United States v. Petrie, 302 F.3d 1280, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002) (“At sentencing, the order of November preliminary forfeiture order, but the remaining properties were forfeited to the United States. 6 Case: 13-13960 Date Filed: 09/22/2014 Page: 7 of 11 forfeiture becomes final as to the defendant and is made a part of the sentence and included in the judgment.” (quotation marks omitted)). A defendant’s time to file an appeal from a criminal forfeiture order begins to run when the judgment is entered. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(4)(C). Therefore, Prat had fourteen days from December 26, 2012—the date the district court entered the amended judgment on the docket—or until January 9, 2013, to file a timely appeal of the forfeiture orders. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). Prat, however, did not appeal his convictions or sentences, including the district court’s forfeiture orders. Instead, on August 13, 2013, Prat filed a Rule 41(g) motion and then filed a notice of appeal of the denial of his Rule 41(g) motion on August 27, 2013. Thus, as the government contends in its appeal brief, Prat’s attempt to attack the forfeiture orders in this appeal is untimely. See United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that, although Rule 4(b)’s ninety-day filing deadline is not jurisdictional, we must apply Rule 4(b)’s time limits upon objection by the government, which may be raised for the first time in its brief on appeal). Accordingly, to the extent Prat seeks review of the district court’s forfeiture orders, we dismiss his appeal. B. District Court Denial of Prat’s Rule 41(g) Motion 7 Case: 13-13960 Date Filed: 09/22/2014 Page: 8 of 11 Under Rule 41(g), “[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property . . . may move for the property’s return.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g). When the property owner “invokes Rule 41(g) after the close of all criminal proceedings, the court treats the motion for return of property as a civil action in equity.” United States v. Howell, 425 F.3d 971, 974 (11th Cir. 2005). “In order for an owner of property to invoke Rule 41(g), he must show that he had a possessory interest in the property seized by the government,” and that he has “clean hands” with respect to the property. Id. 3 Here, the district court properly denied Prat’s Rule 41(g) motion. The undisputed facts in the record demonstrate that, at the time of his Rule 41(g) motion, Prat no longer had a possessory interest in the forfeited properties. As part of his plea agreement, Prat agreed that the listed properties were subject to forfeiture and agreed to give up all interest in them. At his plea hearing, Prat voluntarily pled guilty and explicitly affirmed that he was relinquishing any interest in the properties. And, finally, Prat did not appeal his sentence and raise a challenge to the forfeiture. Given that Prat already had voluntarily forfeited the properties at the time of this Rule 41(g) motion, he no longer had a possessory interest. 3 We review questions of law relating to a Rule 41(g) motion de novo, but review “the equitable equation of the district court’s decision to deny a Rule 41(g) motion only for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Machado, 465 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 208-13, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2363-66 (2007). 8 Case: 13-13960 Date Filed: 09/22/2014 Page: 9 of 11 In addition, Prat undisputedly had “unclean hands.” As part of his guilty plea, Pratt admitted that he had used funds obtained from his fraud scheme to purchase the property he had agreed to forfeit. Given these undisputed facts, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying him equitable relief under Rule 41(g). Furthermore, because the undisputed facts showed that Prat was not entitled to relief under Rule 41(g), the district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing before denying his Rule 41(g) motion. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) (requiring the district court to “receive evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion”); see also Howell, 425 F.3d at 974 (concluding that the “uncontradicted facts” showed the defendant did not have a possessory interest in the $140,000 the government gave a cooperating source to purchase cocaine from the defendant). For these reasons, Prat has shown no error in the district court’s denial of his Rule 41(g) motion. C. District Court’s Final Order of Forfeiture as to Third Party Claimants When the district court enters a preliminary order of forfeiture against the defendant, it does so “without regard to any third party’s interest in the property,” and “[d]etermining whether a third party has such an interest” is deferred until the third party “files a claim in an ancillary proceeding . . . .” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(2)(A). As such, the preliminary forfeiture order “remains preliminary as to 9 Case: 13-13960 Date Filed: 09/22/2014 Page: 10 of 11 third parties until the ancillary proceeding is concluded.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(4)(A). After entry of the criminal forfeiture order against the defendant, “[a]ny person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest” in the forfeited property may “petition the court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in the property.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2) (emphasis added); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(1) (“If, as prescribed by statute, a third party files a petition asserting an interest in the property to be forfeited, the court must conduct an ancillary proceeding . . . .”). After the ancillary proceeding has ended, “the court must enter a final order of forfeiture by amending the preliminary order as necessary to account for any third-party rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(2). “Because the final order of forfeiture has no bearing on the defendant’s rights, the defendant has no right to appeal that order.” United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317, 1343 (11th Cir. 2014) (dismissing defendant’s appeal of a post-ancillary proceeding final order of forfeiture for lack of standing). Here, as already discussed, the preliminary orders of forfeiture became final as to Prat at his sentencing. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(4)(A). Thus, Prat no longer had any interest in the properties at issue in the ancillary proceeding. The district court’s final order of forfeiture determining third-party rights to the forfeited properties “ha[d] no bearing on” Prat’s rights, and Prat lacked standing to 10 Case: 13-13960 Date Filed: 09/22/2014 Page: 11 of 11 appeal that order. See Flanders 752 F.3d at 1343. Accordingly, we dismiss Prat’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction to the extent he challenges the district court’s September 17, 2013 final order of forfeiture regarding the third-party claimants. AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART. 11