Opinion ID: 1366844
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Termination Order

Text: Concerning the termination order, Doug makes two points. First, he argues that Judge Carlson's order giving effect to his voluntary relinquishment of parental rights was lawful. Second, he argues that even if Judge Carlson's order approving the stipulation under which he voluntarily relinquished his parental rights was unlawful, it had become unchallengeable by 1991, as a matter of procedure. We now turn to the first of these contentions.
In 1986 the Alaska Statutes provided for the termination of parental rights only in the context of child in need of aid proceedings under AS 47.10.080 and adoption proceedings under AS 25.23.180. [1] Our focus in the present case is on AS 25.23.180. The language of subsection (c) is dispositive of the present issue. Courts may terminate the parent and child relationship either in connection with an adoption proceeding under this chapter or in a proceeding under AS 47.10, the child in need of aid chapter. Since this was neither an adoption proceeding nor a child in need of aid proceeding, the termination order was not authorized by statute. [2] Parental termination proceedings were unknown at common law. Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J.Fam.L. 443 (1972). This means that in the absence of statutory authorization there can be no termination of parental rights and obligations. [3] It follows that the 1986 termination order was erroneously entered since it was not authorized by statute.
a. Kelli argues that the termination order was not only invalid but void as beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court. She contends that therefore the trial court was authorized to set aside the order under Civil Rule 60(b)(4), noting that void judgments may be attacked independent of the one-year and the reasonable time requirements of the final paragraph of Civil Rule 60(b). [4] As authority for the proposition that the judgment is void, Kelli relies on the case of Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275 (Utah App. 1990). In Fauver, unmarried parents agreed to a stipulation under which the father's parental rights and obligations were terminated. The stipulation was approved by court order. Some two years later, the child through a guardian ad litem filed an action seeking child support from the father, contending that the order approving the stipulation for termination of parental rights and obligations was void. The trial court found that the original order was not void. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction which it defined as the power and authority of the court to determine a controversy and without which it cannot proceed. Id. at 1276 n. 3. The court held that termination jurisdiction existed under Utah law only in proceedings in juvenile court or in the context of an adoption. Doug acknowledges in his reply brief that a judgment may be considered void under Civil Rule 60(b)(4) if the court that rendered it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. [5] He argues, however, that the trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction as the superior court is the court of general jurisdiction in this state with authority in all civil and criminal matters. AS 22.10.020(a). Doug also specifically relies on the case of Carroll County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150, 577 A.2d 14 (1990). Edelmann is another case involving unmarried parents where the father was initially permitted, with the consent of the mother, to relinquish his parental rights and responsibilities. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding, as we do today, that [a]bsent specific statutory authorization which does not now exist in this State the trial court of general jurisdiction lacked authority to terminate the parental relationship. Id. 577 A.2d at 26. The Maryland court also observed that this lack of authority did not amount to a failure of subject matter jurisdiction, which it defined as the power to render a judgment over that class of cases within which a particular one falls... . Id. at 169, 577 A.2d at 23. Observing that application of this principle depends on how one defines the generic `class of cases,' the Maryland court concluded that the trial court's lack of statutory authority did not rise to a failure of subject matter jurisdiction. [6] Id. Two additional cases support the proposition that the judgment is void. In Fleming v. Brown, 581 So.2d 202, 203 (Fla.App. 1991), a decree terminating parental rights based on a stipulation entered in child support enforcement proceedings was held to be unauthorized by statute and therefore void for lack of jurisdiction. Similarly, in Patrick v. Patrick, 59 Ill. App.3d 11, 16 Ill.Dec. 309, 374 N.E.2d 1084 (1978), an order terminating parental rights entered in post-divorce decree litigation based on a stipulation was held to be beyond the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. The court went on to hold that the order should be construed to be an order prohibiting visitation  a lesser-included characteristic of an order terminating parental rights. Id. 16 Ill.Dec. at 310, 374 N.E.2d at 1085. As so limited the order was not invalid but was subject to modification at any time based on a material change in circumstances. See also In re Marriage of Goodarzirad, 185 Cal. App.3d 1020, 230 Cal. Rptr. 203 (5th Dist. 1986) (holding that court acted in excess of jurisdiction when it approved agreement absolving father of duty to pay child support in exchange for his agreement to terminate parental rights). b. Our view is that a statutorily unauthorized decree terminating parental rights and obligations is beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. Our reasons follow. Regarding subject matter jurisdiction, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments states: A judgment may properly be rendered against a party only if the court has authority to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the action. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 11 (1982). This definition is not especially helpful, for much depends on how the term type of controversy is defined. If the term applies to orders terminating parental rights and obligations in general, then subject matter jurisdiction in the superior court would be found to exist. If, on the other hand, greater detail is employed and the type of controversy is defined as orders terminating parental rights and obligations in divorce, custody and child support proceedings, then subject matter jurisdiction does not exist. The commentary to the Restatement suggests that this is not an area where a verbal formulation is likely to be of much use and that case matching may be a more valuable tool. The commentary states, after giving a number of illustrations: In all such situations, the matter in question can plausibly be characterized either as going to subject matter jurisdiction or as being one of merits or procedure. The line between the categories is not established through refinement of terminology but through the cumulation of categorizing decisions into a pattern. Id. § 11 cmt. e. The commentary also suggests that there is a policy choice involved in how far to go in the direction of policing the boundaries of a court's subject matter jurisdiction when the cost is to allow a belated attack after [a case] has gone to judgment. Id. In making this choice, the commentary refers to section 12 of the Restatement, which deals generally with the subject of when the question of whether one forum lacked subject matter jurisdiction can be contested in another forum. The commentary to section 12 states, relevant to the present case, that interests of society external to the parties may play an important role: The interests primarily at stake in resolving this question are governmental and societal, not those of the parties. By hypothesis the parties had earlier opportunity to litigate the question of jurisdiction and thereby to protect their interests in the observance of the rules governing competency. They also had their day on the merits, even if before a body whose authority is now in doubt. To allow one of them to raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction after judgment is in the effect to make him a public agent for enforcing the rules of jurisdiction... . The question therefore is whether the public interest in observance of the particular jurisdictional rule is sufficiently strong to permit a possibly superfluous vindication of the rule by a litigant who is undeserving of the accompanying benefit that will redound to him. The public interest is of that strength only if the tribunal's excess of authority was plain or has seriously disturbed the distribution of governmental powers or has infringed a fundamental constitutional protection. Id. § 12 cmt. d. The strong public interest in having parents support and nurture their children, and the third-party interest which children have in receiving support and nurture from their parents are reasons for enforcing the rules of jurisdiction in the present case. [7] Further, as noted above, most courts which have been presented with cases like this have found that a parental termination order as a solution to a custody or child support dispute is a remedy beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and therefore void. The categorization approach advocated in the Restatement commentary suggests that we should align our court with those authorities. Thus we hold that the superior court's order purporting to terminate Doug's parental rights and obligations is void for want of subject matter jurisdiction and therefore subject to attack under Civil Rule 60(b)(4). c. Shorn of its parental termination aspect the order may be seen as an order relieving Doug of his responsibility to support his child and his right to visit her. See Patrick, 16 Ill.Dec. at 310, 374 N.E.2d at 1085. As such, the order would not be void for want of jurisdiction. With respect to the question of support, we held in Malekos v. Yin, 655 P.2d 728 (Alaska 1982), that agreements between divorced parents to waive the child support obligation of one of the parents were valid and enforceable, but retractable prospectively at the option of the custodial parent. In Cox v. Cox, 776 P.2d 1045 (Alaska 1989), we held that the parties' freedom to waive child support as reflected in Malekos had been superseded by the promulgation of the child support guidelines rule, Alaska Civil Rule 90.3, in 1987. Considering the 1986 order to be an order reflecting the parties' agreement that Doug would not have to pay child support, the agreement was retractable at the option of Kelli. It was also reviewable by the court at any time upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances. AS 25.24.170. Adoption of the child support guidelines rule was itself a substantial change in circumstances. AS 25.24.170(b); Charlesworth v. Child Support Enforcement Div., 779 P.2d 792 (Alaska 1989); see Alaska R.Civ.P. 90.3(h)(1). Thus, the question of child support was properly reopened by Kelli's motion of June 3, 1991, either under a retraction theory, following Malekos, or based on the substantial change in circumstances reflected by the promulgation of the child support guidelines. We turn now to the question of whether the child support award entered by Judge Andrews should be upheld.