Opinion ID: 180598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Psychological Harm

Text: Elizabeth argues that the district court made an error of law and asserts that the court only considered physical harm, sexual abuse, and spousal abuse, and overlooked the question of psychological harm, a term used in Article 13(b). The argument flatly ignores the fact that the district court made an express finding that Elizabeth had failed to meet her burden of showing psychological harm: Respondent has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that returning the Children to Cyprus will expose them to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation. Charalambous, 2010 WL 4115495, at  (emphasis added); cf. Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 460 (1st Cir.2000) (rejecting argument that the court overlooked psychological harm). There was no error of law in the district court's organization of the subsidiary discussions of Elizabeth's Article 13(b) claims under the subject-headings Sexual Abuse, Physical Abuse, and Spousal Abuse; these were the central arguments she advanced. This organization does not betray a failure to consider the risk that returning the children to Cyprus would cause them psychological harm. The district court was highly attuned to the psychological well-being of N.C. and A.C., and to the risks presented to the children's emotional well-being. The district court also explicitly considered the forms of psychological harm that Elizabeth identifies: the risks that returning N.C. and A.C. to Cyprus might force them to witness future spousal abuse (they had not witnessed any before), or force their separation from their mother should Elizabeth choose not to return to Cyprus. The finding that she had failed to meet her burden of showing grave risk of psychological harm to the children is amply supported. On appeal, Elizabeth also argues the district court failed to adequately consider the risk that, if returned to Cyprus, N.C. will be less likely to get the psychological treatment she believes he needs. She says that treatment is unavailable, citing that there are only three therapists specializing in the treatment of children in Limassol, [5] and that Savvas's extended family will prevent N.C. from obtaining the psychological services he requires. [6] The district court explicitly considered the ... evidence relating to the influence of the Charalambous family in Cyprus, and concluded that the total weight of the evidence does not present a clear and convincing case of grave risk. Charalambous, 2010 WL 4115495, at . The Article 13(b) defense may not be used `as a vehicle to litigate (or relitigate) the child's best interests.' Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 14 (quoting Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10,510). The Second Circuit's decision in Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2001), does not help Elizabeth. That decision was based on a diagnosis that the children's post-traumatic stress disorder would recur if they were returned to their home country, id. at 160-61, not the relative availability of resources in each country. The court expressly rejected the argument, made here by Elizabeth, that the grave risk exception prevents return to a home where money is in short supply, or where educational or other opportunities are more limited than in the requested State. [7] Id. at 162 (quoting 51 Fed.Reg. at 10,510).