Opinion ID: 2679478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the political-question doctrine

Text: 7 ¶10. Our standard of review of summary judgment and jurisdictional issues is de novo. Stringer v. Trapp, 30 So. 3d 339, 341 (Miss. 2010); Jones v. Billy, 798 So. 2d 1238, 1239 (Miss. 2001). ¶11. The political-question doctrine is a function of the constitutional separation of powers and was famously first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803): The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court. “The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.” Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S. Ct 2860, 92 L. Ed 2d 166 (1986). Mississippi adopted the political question doctrine in In re Hooker, 87 So. 3d 401 (Miss. 2012). ¶12. In Baker v. Carr, the United States Supreme Court provided six independent factors, any of which, if present, indicate the existence of a nonjusticiable political question: 1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or 2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or 3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or 8 4) the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or 5) an unusual need for unquestionable adherence to a political decision already made; or 6) the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962). “Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a political question’s presence.” Id. at 217 (emphasis added). In order to determine whether a case will implicate a political question, a court “must analyze appellant’s claim as it would be tried, to determine whether a political question will emerge.” Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum Laden Aboard Tanker Dauntless Colocotronis, 577 F. 2d 1196, 1202 (5th Cir. 1978). “The Constitution emphatically confers authority over the military upon the executive and legislative branches of government.” Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292, 101 S. Ct. 2766, 2744, 69 L. Ed 2d 640 (1981). However, “not all cases involving the military are automatically foreclosed by the political-question doctrine.” Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc., 572 F. 3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2009). ¶13. Private contractors are a significant step removed from the separation-of-powers concerns targeted by the political-question doctrine and the Baker factors. They “do not have independent constitutional authority and are not coordinate branches of government to which we owe deference.” Taylor v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F. 3d 402, 409 (4th Cir. 2011). Private contractors therefore must meet a “double burden” in order to receive the 9 protection of the political-question doctrine. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F. 3d 1331, 1359 (11th Cir. 2007). “First, [they] must demonstrate that the claims against [them] will require reexamination of a decision by the military. . . . [t]hen, [they] must demonstrate that the military decision at issue is . . . . insulated from judicial review.” Id. at 1359-1360. In negligence actions against private contractors, the question of causation is particularly relevant in evaluating whether a political question will be implicated: “[i]f we must examine the [military’s] contribution to causation, ‘political question’ will loom large.” Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F. 3d 548, 561 (5th Cir. 2008). ¶14. Here, we find that the defendants have failed to demonstrate that adjudication of the ballistic wall’s failure would implicate a political question. On the facts before us, this case does not require reexamination of decisions made by the military and can be tried under the “judicially discoverable and manageable standards” of well-established state tort law. ¶15. The question of causation comes down to the design, construction, and maintenance of a ballistic wall at a rented training facility–conditions which were in place before the military took “operational control” of the facility. Before the training exercise occurred, MidSouth independently had designed, constructed, and tested the shoothouse walls, representing them to be capable of withstanding the ammunition used and the training tactics employed. The Navy investigation found: 5. Mid South comments concerning [redacted] training included representations that all walls in both shoot houses were ballistic, that paper targets were sufficient without bullet traps, and that target placement was unrestricted. 10 (Emphasis added.) Based on these representations, the “military operational control” that provides the context for this case is irrelevant to adjudication of the claim against Mid-South. ¶16. In McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F. 3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007), the Eleventh Circuit found no political question implicated 4 where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant contractor “negligently staffed, equipped, and otherwise operated [a flight transporting three soldiers that crashed into a mountain]. These allegations relate to areas of responsibility reserved to [the defendant contractor] by [the defendant’s contract with the military].” Id. at 1360. Here, the allegations relate to Mid-South’s contractual obligation to provide a training facility that would perform as represented. Again from the Navy report: 3. . . . Mid South knew that NSW units required ballistic protection sufficient for [green-tip ammunition]. This opinion is supported by Mid South General Manager’s statement acknowledging testing with [green tip ammunition], the website representation that the shoot house walls were ballistic, and years of instruction for NSW trainees using [redacted]. (Emphasis added.) ¶17. This case is distinguishable from Aktepe v. United States, 105 F. 3d 1400 (11th Cir. 1997), where a political question was implicated in a suit against the military where, during a joint training exercise, a U.S. ship accidentally fired a live missile at a Turkish ship. The court accurately stated that “[t]he Supreme Court has generally declined to reach the merits of cases requiring review of military decisions, particularly when those cases challenged the institutional functioning of the military in areas such as personnel, discipline, and training.” 4 We note that the court found no political question implicated on the record before it, and left open the possibility that further development of the case might implicate a political question. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F. 3d at 1360. 11 Id. at 1403. Unlike the case at hand, Aktepe was brought directly against a coordinate branch of government and directly challenged a military decision. Further, while SO2 Ghane’s death occurred during the course of a training exercise, there is no claim that negligent military execution of the exercise caused his death. ¶18. This same logic distinguishes this case from several recent circuit cases Mid-South cites for the proposition that military operational control over contractors implicates a political question. “Military control over a contractor’s actions is one common way that evaluation of military decisions becomes necessary.” Harris v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 724 F. 3d 458, 458 (3rd Cir. 2013). In Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F. 3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2009), the Eleventh Circuit dismissed a case against a military contractor where a vehicle driven by a KBR employee rolled over while transporting fuel on a dangerous route in a military convoy. There, “military judgments governed the planning and execution of virtually every aspect of the convoy in which [the sergeant] was injured.” Id. at 1281. But there is no logical parallel between military control of a live convoy mission and the condition of a ballistic wall at a rented facility. ¶19. A district court in Pennsylvania recently concluded that “[a]djudicating whether [defendant contractors] were required to warn of the dangers of asbestos in connection with the supply of propulsion turbines to the Navy for use in Navy warships does not implicate a political question:” Defendants contend that the court will necessarily have to rule on the prudence of the Navy’s use of asbestos . . . [but] [p]laintiff’s claims do not challenge the Navy’s wisdom in deciding to use asbestos, nor do they seek to second guess the Navy’s judgment as to the wisdom or propriety of its warning policy. Moreover, if successful, the claims will not make the Navy liable for any injury 12 . . . .To be sure, a judicial inquiry into what Navy policy was . . . at the time Plaintiff served on a Navy vessel may be required. Yet, this inquiry does not implicate the wisdom and soundness of the Navy’s policies or procedures. The issue here is what the policy was with respect to warnings, not what it might (or should) have been . . . . Donn v. A.W. Chesterton Co., Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 803, 815-16 (E.D. Penn. 2012) (emphasis added). The court went on to distinguish Carmichael and related cases the way we distinguish them here: These cases . . . . traverse a common thread different from this case. They require the courts to second guess military operational judgment, whether that be the speed and timing by which to send a military convoy through Iraq, or the wisdom of the military’s procedures for electrical repairs . . . . Indeed, adjudicating the claims in Carmichael and Taylor would require the Court to determine in hindsight whether the military policy was correct . . . . Thus, those cases present the type of claims the political question doctrine seeks to preclude from judicial review–claims that require courts to determine the wisdom of military policy. Id. at 817-18 (emphasis added). Mrs. Ghane does not ask the trial court to question the wisdom of the training tactics used by the military on the day SO2 Ghane died. Rather, the focus of this case is on the “defendants’ performance of its contractual obligations to the government . . . rather than the advisability of any governmental policy-related decision.” Bixby v. KBR, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (D. Or. 2010) (refusing dismissal of negligence suit against contractor). The Navy’s extremely thorough internal report demonstrates that the Navy felt free to “practice like we will fight” because Mid-South had first represented that its training facility was designed to handle such practice safely. ¶20. The defendants also fail to demonstrate that they will put forward a viable contributory negligence defense. Mississippi tort law allows for determination of percentage of fault in 13 civil cases.5 A jury would inevitably be required to reexamine military decisions if tasked with apportioning percentage of fault between the Navy and the defendants.6 But Mrs. Ghane’s claim that the ballistic wall failed can “stand alone without implicating any decision committed to the discretion of the military.” McMahon v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., et al., 933 F. Supp. 2d 682, 695 (D.N.J. 2013). A New Jersey district court rejected a contractor’s argument that the manner in which it intended to defend itself would implicate a political question: [The defendant] states that it will defend itself in a manner that will drag the Court into exacting evaluations of the Army’s policies and the actions of its soldiers . . . . That argument is too broad; it would give defendants too much power to define the issues. Indeed, it would bar virtually any claim in which the contractor posited that the military, not itself, was at fault. In the great majority of cases dismissing claims on political question grounds, the allegedly faulty exercise of military judgment was the basis of the complaint, not of a hypothetical defense. [The plaintiff] does not challenge any order he was given, or indeed anything that occurred in Afghanistan. His allegation of a manufacturing defect could stand alone without implicating any decision committed to the discretion of the military. Id. (emphasis added). ¶21. Sufficient evidence has been presented to allow this wrongful death action to proceed based on the allegation that the bullet penetrated the shoothouse wall because the wall’s design, construction, and maintenance was other than what it was represented to be by the defendant–ballistic–without contributory negligence by the Navy. Mid-South was acting independent of military control when it responded to the SEALS’ informal request for a more 5 See Miss. Code Ann. § 85-5-7 (Rev. 2011); Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-15 (Rev. 2004); Fielder v. Magnolia Beverage Co., 757 So. 2d 925, 933 (Miss. 1999). A jury can apportion a percentage of fault even to an immune nonparty. 6 See Harris v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 724 F. 3d 458 (3rd Cir. 2013). 14 realistic ballistic wall by designing a wall “ad hoc,” without consulting an engineer or following any established specifications, military or otherwise.7 The defendants have failed to demonstrate that the military’s training tactics–such as SO2 Ghane’s position in the shoothouse, the placement of targets, and the choice of ammunition–exceeded the scope of what Mid-South represented its facility could handle.8 Military policy and training tactics are therefore irrelevant for purposes of causation. ¶22. Mid-South’s liability for the defective wall would not be lessened by the Navy’s conclusion that different Navy oversight policies could have prevented this tragedy. The “collective responsibility” assumed by the Navy does not translate into apportioned tort liability. That “admission” addresses additional safety policies beyond and distinct from MidSouth’s liability for failing to provide a facility that performed as represented to the Navy. On the record before us, adjudication of the claim under state tort law will not implicate a political question. We therefore reverse the trial court’s grant of summary to the defendants. II. THE RELEASE SO2 GHANE SIGNED DID NOT RELIEVE MIDSOUTH FROM LIABILITY. ¶23. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s first motion for summary judgment arguing that SO2 Ghane signed a release prior to training exculpating defendants from liability. Mississippi law “does not look with favor on contracts intended to exculpate a party from the liability of his or her own negligence although, with some exceptions, they are 7 This distinguishes this case from Boyle v. United Technologies, 487 U.S. 500, 108 S. Ct. 2510, 101 L. Ed 442 (1988), where a claim against a private jet manufacturer was nonjusticiable where the military had particularly requested a certain type of jet engine. 8 The defense’s argument may be analogized to a mother saying that, if she had not asked her son to go to the store, he would not have been killed by a drunk driver. 15 enforceable.” Turnbough v. Ladner, 754 So. 2d 467, 469 (Miss. 1999) (citations omitted). “[W]e do not sanction broad, general ‘waiver of negligence’ provisions, and strictly construe them against the party asserting them as a defense.” Id. In Turnbough, a scuba diving student brought suit against his instructor after he because ill with decompression sickness after participating in her scuba certification classes, alleging that the instructor was negligent in planning the depths of the dives and in failing to make necessary safety stops during the dive. Id. at 468. We reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant (based on the plaintiff’s signing a waiver of liability): Assuming [the student] was aware of the inherent risks in scuba diving, it does not reasonably follow that he, a student, intended to waive his right to recover from [the instructor] for failing to follow . . . basic industry safety standards. We found that the student “did not knowingly waive his right to seek recovery for injuries caused by the instructor’s failure to follow basic safety guidelines that should be common knowledge to any instructor of novice students.” Id. at 470. We further found that “contracts attempting to limit the liabilities of one of the parties would not ‘be enforced unless the limitation is fairly and honestly negotiated and understood by both parties’” and that, because the contract was preprinted and not negotiated, the terms should be “strictly construed against the party seeking to enforce such a provision.” Id. (citations omitted). ¶24. We find that the trial court correctly denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment at this stage. The release SO2 Ghane signed was a preprinted, general release. As in Turnbough, it is not reasonable that SO2 Ghane, an experienced Navy SEAL, intended to release the defendants from following even basic safety standards in the design of the ballistic wall or the failure of the wall to perform as advertised. We further find merit to the plaintiff’s 16 argument that SO2 Ghane does not fall within the scope of the release because he was not a “student” being taught or instructed by Mid-South at the time of his death, as he was under orders from the military to train at the facility.