Opinion ID: 382310
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard of Review and Scope of Discretion

Text: 10 The Virgin Islands parole statute confers considerable latitude on the Board of Parole: 11 If it appears to the Board of Parole from a report by the proper officers of the penitentiary, prison or jail or upon application by a prisoner for release on parole that there is a reasonable probability that such applicant will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws and if in the opinion of the Board such release is not incompatible with the welfare of society, the Board may, in its discretion, authorize the release of such applicant on parole. 12 5 V.I.C. § 4604 (Supp.1978). When presented with such a discretionary scheme, the role of judicial review on application for a writ of habeas corpus is to insure that the Board followed criteria appropriate, rational and consistent with the statute and that its decision is not arbitrary and capricious nor based on impermissible considerations. In other words, the function of judicial review is to determine whether the Board abused its discretion. Zannino v. Arnold, 531 F.2d 687, 690 (3d Cir. 1976). 13 In order to assess whether the Virgin Islands Board of Parole abused its discretion so as to violate Block's right to due process of law, it is necessary to define the scope of their discretion. As a starting point, discretion is always curtailed by the commands of the Constitution. Clearly, the Board would violate due process if it bases a decision on constitutionally impermissible criteria such as race, religion, or the exercise of free speech rights. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). 14 The parole statute itself also defines the limits of the Board's discretion. Section 4604 directs the Board to consider whether a prisoner is a likely recidivist and whether release would serve the welfare of society. These criteria must be applied so as to effectuate the purpose and policies underlying the parole system, namely, reintegrating offenders into society and deterring future criminal conduct. See Greenholtz, supra, 442 U.S. at 8, 13 99 S.Ct. at 2104, 2106-2107; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2598, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). When the Parole Board bases its decision on factors that bear no rational relationship to rehabilitation or deterrence, it transgresses the legitimate bounds of its discretion. Cf. Winsett v. McGinnes, supra, at 1007 (discretion under prisoners' work release statute must be exercised consistently with the purpose and policy behind work release). 15 We turn then to an evaluation of the decision of the Virgin Islands Parole Board in light of these standards.