Opinion ID: 1189000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: unavoidably unsafe?

Text: Merck claims that it is free from strict manufacturer's liability by virtue of the dictum stated in comment k to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. [7] This comment suggests that a drug manufacturer should not be held liable for the unfortunate consequences attending the use of its drugs if: (1) the manufacturer supplies the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended by a known but apparently reasonable risk, (2) the drug is properly prepared and marketed, and (3) proper warning is given. It is not easy to divine just why the framers of the comment thought that a drug manufacturer should be excused in cases in which it manufactured a drug that was known to be dangerous. The whole idea behind strict tort liability is that the manufacturer, not the consumer, should bear the responsibility for injuries, even when the product is ostensibly properly prepared and marketed and when the plaintiff is not in a position to prove the origin of the defect. [8] See Stackiewicz, 100 Nev. at 443, 686 P.2d at 925. What the question in this case really gets down to is whether an exception should be made in a case in which a drug manufacturer injures a consumer with a drug that it knows is dangerous, but not too (unreasonably) dangerous. That is to say, should a drug manufacturer be allowed to profit with impunity from the distribution of a drug that it knows is capable of resulting in physical injury, so long as the drug can somehow be certified as not being unreasonably dangerous? We answer that question in the negative and say that a drug manufacturer should, under the strict liability jurisprudence of this state, be held liable in tort even when the drug is properly prepared and marketed (that is to say, non-negligently ) and even when the known danger inherent in the drug may be what the comment calls reasonable. The apparent rationale of comment k in relieving drug manufacturers from liability is that where the manufacturer is free from fault, that is to say it produces a product that is unsafe because of a claim by the manufacturer that it is incapable of being made safe, the manufacturer should not be responsible for injuries resulting from use of the drug. The comment itself gives as an example of such an unavoidably unsafe drug the Pasteur treatment of rabies which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. We would note, however, that the reason why serious and damaging consequences of the Pasteur rabies treatment do not result in tort liability is not because of the unreasonably dangerous doctrine proposed by comment k, but, rather, because the victim chooses to be injected with a drug having known damaging consequences rather than to die from rabies. It is the voluntary choice to take the antirabies serum that eliminates tort liability and not the serum's being said to be unavoidably or reasonably dangerous. There is no need to make an exception to the rules of strict liability such as that suggested by comment k in the rabies example because the rabies victim waives tort claims by accepting what the victim knows to be the necessary risk involved in the treatment. [9] Speaking of unavoidable danger or fault-free infliction of harm, or speaking of reasonable (and therefore acceptable) risk of harm, is very much alien to strict liability theory and should have no place in the Restatement provisions relating to strict liability. Mixing concepts of fault-free (unavoidable) manufacture and reasonable risk into the context of non-negligent, strict liability is entirely inconsistent with our products liability cases and with the law established in this state for almost thirty years. The well-accepted principle supporting our products liability cases is expressed in comment c of section 402 A of the Restatement: [P]ublic policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the products. It could not be said any more clearly than this. Merck, not Thomas Allison, must, if the Merck product did in fact cause Thomas' overwhelming misfortune, bear the burden of the accidental [intended] injuries caused by products intended for consumption. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402 A, cmt. c (1965). The Dissent and Merck urge that the imposition of liability on Merck for Thomas' injuries in this case would act as a deterrent to necessary and beneficial research and development of new drugs. The Dissent and Merck appear to be arguing that if Merck were to be held liable for statistically infrequent injuries such as the one at bar, society would be the worse because Merck and other drug manufacturers would be fearful and retarded in the development of new and greatly needed immunological products. If Merck were to have to pay for what its vaccine has done to Thomas, this would, Merck says, necessarily inhibit the development and marketing of immunological products which are helpful to many and unfortunately devastating to others. Although, on policy grounds, Merck might talk some legislative body into immunizing it from liability, it would be certainly inappropriate for the court to make such a radical change in our well-established products liability law. Further, one would think that if a legislature were going to give such special benefits to drug manufacturers, most certainly the resultant legislation, to be just, would have to afford some kind of compensation or relief to the victims of unavoidably unsafe drugs. If, for example, a legislature provided that automobile manufacturers would be held to a standard of strict liability for manufacturing defects, even if injuries caused by a given defect are statistically infrequent and perhaps unavoidable, and at the same time immunized drug manufacturers from liability for injuries caused by their vaccines, the legislature would, as mentioned, very probably and properly include in such discriminatory legislation some kind of no-fault victim compensation plan to set off the advantage given to drug manufacturers over other kinds of manufacturers. [10] In summary, this court cannot, under our law, read comment k as giving immunity to liability in cases such as the present one. It would be in harmony with our cases if comment k were read to mean that when drug consumers know of a danger and decide to accept the risk because of hoped-for benefits, strict tort liability cannot fairly attach to the dispenser of such a drug; however, insofar as comment k might be read as justifying release from liability of manufacturers and distributors of reasonably dangerous vaccines that are administered throughout our population and read as placing the burden of loss on the consumer, we must reject any such interpretation. It must be remembered that these inoculation programs are nationwide and that those who are required to take the vaccines have little or no choice as to whether to take them or not. We see no public policy need for changing our law or for shifting from the drug manufacturers to the consumer/victim the responsibility for all of the unfortunate consequences suffered by the Allisons of the world. If this kind of reallocation of resources is to be made, it is properly a legislative rather than a judicial function to do so. Considerable research and legislative committee activity would be necessary before an intelligent and informed judgment could be made as to whether we should leave unfortunate victims of drug injury to their own resources and free drug manufacturers from tort liability, on the unsubstantiated pretext that such a drastic measure is necessary in order to encourage drug research and development.