Opinion ID: 2515784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Spring J. Rape Evidence

Text: Before and separately from the trial involving the Medina and Sanchez murders, seven individuals, including defendant, Richard Avila, and Ray Juarez, were charged with the rape of Spring J. Juarez pleaded guilty to the rape in exchange for dismissal of the murder charges and his truthful testimony in this case. Richard was convicted of the lesser included offense of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5), and defendant's case ended in a mistrial. [49] At a pretrial hearing in this case, Richard asked the trial court to exclude any evidence of his involvement in the Spring J. incident. Although the prosecutor stated he did not intend to rehash who did what, defendant argued that he wanted to call Spring as a witness to demonstrate that Rojas and Juarez were present during the rape, which, in turn, would be relevant to their credibility, character, and motives as prosecution witnesses. The court prohibited the prosecution from introducing evidence during the guilt phase that Richard was convicted of unlawful intercourse or that he raped, or aided and abetted another in the rape of, Spring J. At trial, Rojas testified for the prosecution. The prosecutor asked him: While you were in the group of men that were there that evening, did you hear any member of the group make any plans with respect to what might be done to Spring J[.]? Defendant objected on the ground that the question assumed a fact not in evidence. Following a discussion outside the presence of the jury, the court sustained the objection. It also precluded further questioning about the Spring J. incident pending future hearings on the matter. Defendant now contends that the trial court made several errors in admitting and excluding certain evidence regarding the Spring J. incident.
Out of the presence of the jury, the parties and the trial court discussed the evidence that would be admitted about the Spring J. incident. Defendant stated that he planned to cross-examine Rojas extensively about that incident to show that Rojas was most likely the murderer or one of the murderers, and thus raise a reasonable doubt about defendant's guilt. Defendant argued that, because Rojas was involved in Spring's rape, which was executed in a manner similar to Medina's rape, and because the earlier incident occurred close in time and place to the incident for which he was currently on trial, Rojas must be guilty of Medina's rape and the murders. The court ruled the evidence that Rojas had raped and threatened Spring, as well as the evidence that he knew, when he signed a contract with the prosecution, that she had identified him as one of the men who had raped her, was admissible to impeach Rojas's credibility. Finding insufficient connection between Rojas's involvement in Spring's rape and the charged crimes, however, it ruled the evidence inadmissible to show Rojas's guilt of Medina's rape and the murders. (Evid. Code, §§ 250, 352.) The court also excluded generally any evidence on the Spring J. incident unless it was offered to rebut evidence admitted for limited purposes. Defendant now contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Rojas's involvement in the Spring J. incident on grounds that it was insufficient to support defendant's third party culpability theory, and was more prejudicial than probative. Any relevant evidence that raises a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt, including evidence tending to show that a party other than the defendant committed the offense charged, is admissible. ( People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 829, 226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99; see also People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 372, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34; Evid.Code, §§ 210, 350, 351.) But evidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt: there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime. ( People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 833, 226 Cal. Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99.) Relevant evidence may be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 if it creates a substantial danger of undue consumption of time or of prejudicing, confusing, or misleading the jury. ( Hall, at p. 829, 226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99.) We review for abuse of discretion a trial court's rulings on relevance and the exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code section 352. ( People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1195, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Evidence that Rojas raped Spring on the same night and in the same location where Medina was later raped might have shown Rojas had the motive or opportunity to rape Medina, but it was insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about defendant's guilt inasmuch as the evidence in this case showed that more than one individual was responsible for the rape and murders. Moreover, defendant's argument that Rojas's involvement in the earlier rape of Spring raised an inference that he (Rojas) killed Medina and Sanchez is too speculative to raise a reasonable doubt about defendant's guilt of the murders.
Before Juarez testified, the trial court admonished him not to discuss or mention the names of Jeffrey Spradlin or Richard Avila or Johnny Avila in connection with the rape or assault of Spring J[.] Later, on cross-examination by defendant, Juarez testified that he saw Rojas in the Wilderness trailer with a belt around Spring's neck and a gun pointed to her head, that Rojas told her he would kill her if she did not shut up, and that he did not see defendant there. He also testified that, when he was smoking KJ with Spring, defendant was not present. The prosecutor requested a sidebar and expressed concern that defendant was opening the door to prior inconsistent statements by Juarez that defendant was, indeed, involved in Spring's rape. Defendant stated he did not have a problem with that. Although the court reiterated that there should be no questions inquiring whether defendant, or the other two codefendants for that matter, were inside the trailer while Spring was being raped, it did not strike the testimony defendant elicited from Juarez on cross-examination. Later, the prosecution questioned Detective Jose Flores on direct examination about any interviews he may have had with Juarez about Spring J.'s rape. Although defendant objected on the ground of relevance, citing the court's earlier ruling, he acknowledged that the evidence would be admissible as a prior inconsistent statement of Juarez to Flores. The court overruled the objection. Detective Flores then testified that, on August 2, 1991, he had interviewed Juarez and questioned him about Spring J.'s rape. At that interview, Juarez said that while Spring was being raped, defendant put a .357-caliber gun to her head and told her to shut up because they were not finished with her yet. Before Spring testified for defendant's case-in-chief, the trial court also admonished her not to mention the names of those who were in the trailer while she was being raped, other than Juarez, Rojas, and De Anda. Defendant now contends that the trial court erred in precluding him from presenting evidence by Spring that defendant was not present during Spring's rape, and compounded the error by allowing the prosecution to present evidence by Detective Flores that defendant was involved in that rape. Defendant also contends the prosecutor improperly invited the jury to speculate about his possible involvement in the Spring J. incident. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence by Spring. Defendant was not on trial in this case for Spring's rape, and his presence at or absence from that rape was not relevant to prove or disprove his involvement in the crimes against Medina and Sanchez. Moreover, defendant's involvement in Spring's rape, if any, had no bearing on his motive to kill Medina and Sanchez. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion by admitting Juarez's prior inconsistent statement to Detective Flores. Evidence Code sections 770 and 1235 except from the general rule against hearsay a witness's prior statement that is inconsistent with the witness's testimony in the present hearing, provided the witness is given the opportunity to explain or deny the statement or the witness has not been excused from giving further testimony in the action. (See People v. Coffman & Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 78, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30; see also Evid. Code, §§ 770, 1235.) [50] Here, Juarez's prior statement that he saw defendant put a gun to Spring's head while she was being raped was inconsistent with his trial testimony that he did not see defendant there. Moreover, when Detective Flores testified about Juarez's prior statement, Juarez had been excused but was subject to recall. Accordingly, Juarez's prior statement was properly admitted under Evidence Code sections 770 and 1235. Defendant does not acknowledge the applicability of Evidence Code sections 770 and 1235. Rather, he simply argues that the jury was left with a misleading and unfavorable picture of defendant's involvement in the Spring J. incident because the trial court admitted prosecution evidence by Detective Flores that defendant was present during and involved in Spring's rape but excluded defense evidence by Spring that defendant was not present. We disagree, for Juarez's trial testimony that defendant was not present during Spring's rape remained on the record and constituted evidence that the jury could consider. It was precisely because Juarez's trial testimony remained on the record that the prosecution had the right to rebut it with Juarez's prior inconsistent statement to Detective Flores under Evidence Code sections 770 and 1235. In a related argument, defendant contends the trial court erred when it sustained the prosecutor's objection to his closing argument to the jury that defendant was not present during Spring's rape, and that the prosecutor compounded the error by improperly inviting speculation, during his own closing argument, that defendant was involved. Because we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of defendant's involvement in Spring's rape, we conclude the court did not err in sustaining the prosecutor's objection to defendant's argument to the jury. And, as will appear, the prosecutor's argument did not invite speculation about defendant's involvement in Spring's rape. During his closing argument, defense counsel noted that Rojas testified he never saw defendant go inside the Wilderness trailer when Spring was on the property. He also argued that [n]ot one person has put [defendant] in either Richard Avila's Wilderness trailer or ... any other trailer on [the North Hayes] property. That's because [defendant] was never there. Following defendant's closing argument, out of the presence of the jury, the prosecutor observed that on two occasions during his argument defense counsel had asserted there had been no evidence connecting defendant to Spring's rape. The court agreed that defense counsel had violated the spirit of its earlier ruling by suggesting defendant's noninvolvement in the Spring J. incident. The prosecutor suggested an admonition to the jury might be a possible remedy, but ultimately withdrew the suggestion. Later, during rebuttal, the prosecutor argued: No witness was asked and no information was offered for the truth of the matter one way or another as to any contact between Spring J[.] and [defendant]. Either eventuality is irrelevant to this case. It appears the prosecutor did not correctly summarize the state of the evidence on this matter, for Juarez testified that defendant was not present at Spring's rape, and Detective Flores testified that Juarez told him that defendant was not only present but involved in that rape. But neither did the prosecutor's argument invite the jury to speculate, in violation of either state law or the federal Constitution, that defendant was present during the Spring J. incident. (See People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 108, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 507, 105 P.3d 1099 [a prosecutor's conduct violates California law if it involves `the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury']; People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44, 104 Cal. Rptr.2d 582, 18 P.3d 11 [a prosecutor's misconduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process].) Moreover, the prosecutor properly argued that defendant's involvement or noninvolvement in the Spring J. incident was irrelevant to the murders of Medina and Sanchez. We find that, by any applicable standard, the prosecutor committed no prejudicial misconduct.
As stated, at various points throughout the trial, the court indicated that evidence of the Spring J. incident was irrelevant to the current case except on limited issues, such as the credibility of certain prosecution witnesses. Juarez testified on cross-examination by defendant that he had pleaded guilty to raping Spring J. in exchange for his truthful testimony in this case and dismissal of charges that he had murdered Medina and Sanchez. He nevertheless maintained at trial that he had consensual sex with Spring. Later, Spring testified on behalf of defendant that Juarez was one of the men who raped her in the Wilderness trailer. Defendant now contends the trial court erred in precluding counsel from eliciting testimony from Spring about the details of Juarez's involvement in her rape to further impeach his credibility. For the same reason, defendant contends the court erred in precluding counsel from eliciting testimony that, while Juarez and De Anda were driving Spring home, Juarez asked her if she had seen him do anything wrong while she was being raped. Defendant argues such evidence showed Juarez's consciousness of guilt. We see no abuse of discretion. As discussed previously, with the exception of certain evidence involving Rojas in the Spring J. incident, the trial court excluded evidence regarding that incident under Evidence Code section 352 unless it was offered to rebut the evidence admitted for limited purposes. Detailed evidence by Spring about Juarez's involvement in her rape would, as the court concluded, have created a substantial danger of undue consumption of time or of confusing the issues. Likewise, evidence that Juarez asked Spring, after she was raped, whether she saw him do anything inappropriate to her in the Wilderness trailer, was properly excluded as irrelevant to the current case. Even if relevant, it was properly excluded under Evidence Code section 352.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in excluding evidence that Rodriguez was involved in the rape of Spring J. Specifically, he contends that the court erroneously precluded Detective Ybarra from testifying to a prior statement by Juarez that Rodriguez had raped Spring, and counsel from questioning Spring about Rodriguez. Defendant's contention flows from his claim that the trial court erred in limiting evidence of the Spring J. incident. As discussed above ( ante, pt. III.C.1.3.), the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting this evidence. In particular, the court did not abuse its discretion in precluding evidence tending to connect Rodriguez to Spring's rape. Any evidence linking Rodriguez to a crime for which the three defendants were not on trial would have been collateral in nature, and would have created a substantial danger of confusing the issues. As for the contention that the trial court erroneously precluded him from questioning Spring about Rodriguez, we note that Spradlin, not defendant, sought permission to engage in that line of questioning. Defendant thus has forfeited his claim. But even assuming defendant impliedly joined in Spradlin's request, the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting examination of Spring on this issue. Again, testimony in this case about Rodriguez's involvement in Spring's rape would have been collateral to defendant's guilt.
As stated, Michael De Anda testified for codefendant Spradlin. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked De Anda: During the ride home from 1604 North Hayes to the trailer park, did Spring [] tell you in so many words that she had stripped and willingly engaged in a sexual act with multiple participants at the party? Defendant objected the question lacked foundation and assumed a fact not in evidence. The trial court overruled the objection, and De Anda answered: I stated that while I was taking her home she was mumbling about  something about she  this was like the other night and something to that effect that her friend Crissell or Jissell or something, they were at a party and they were doing that. The prosecutor next asked: Did she say something to the effect, sir, she said it was like the other night and some guys had paid her to strip or something, more than one person? De Anda answered: That's basically what I said, without the part about payment. She never told me anything about payment, I don't believe. When the prosecutor attempted to continue this line of questioning, Richard objected on grounds of hearsay and relevance. Out of the presence of the jury, the parties and the trial court discussed at length the relevance of this testimony. Also out of the presence of the jury, the parties questioned De Anda on Spring's exact statement to him. The court found the prosecutor's line of questioning relevant to De Anda's credibility and ultimately overruled Richard's objection. [51] In the presence of the jury, the prosecutor asked De Anda: [D]id Spring [] basically tell you that tonight she had stripped for money and willingly engaged in group sex? De Anda replied: Yes. Later, testifying for defendant, Spring denied making such a statement. Defendant now contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting De Anda's testimony that Spring told him she had stripped for money and willingly engaged in group sex. He argues such testimony was collateral in nature, distorted De Anda's original testimony on the issue, and unfairly depicted De Anda as absurd for insinuating that Spring was not raped. We see no abuse of discretion, for De Anda's testimony on this subject was relevant to his credibility.
Rojas testified, inter alia, that: (1) he remembered taking a trip to Santa Cruz with some women; (2) he did not recall bringing a firearm to North Hayes and did not have a habit of carrying a .357-caliber magnum; and (3) he had smoked KJ once, a week or two before the gathering at North Hayes, and did not like it. After the prosecution rested its case, out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel told the court he had given the prosecutor a report involving Melissa Bonillas and Jessica Trujillo, two potential witnesses for defendant. These individuals would testify that, on July 7, 1991, approximately three weeks before the gathering at North Hayes, Rojas was in Santa Cruz and assaulted Bonillas, defendant's niece. Bonillas would also testify that she saw Rojas with a firearm and saw him smoke KJ. Defendant wanted to present this testimony to show he would not have offered to kill Medina and Sanchez at Rojas's request and to impeach Rojas's testimony about his usage of KJ and handling of firearms. The trial court ruled that, to the extent the evidence was being offered to show that Rojas had a bias against defendant, it was an extremely tenuous connection. Accordingly, the court excluded the evidence under Evidence Code section 352. The court also precluded counsel from eliciting testimony that Bonillas saw Rojas with a gun and saw him smoking KJ, ruling they were collateral, insignificant matters under Evidence Code section 352. Defendant now contends that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence that Rojas assaulted his niece three weeks before the events at issue here. Defendant concedes such evidence was unrelated to the Spring J. incident, but argues the court's ruling was inconsistent with its ruling on the admissibility of De Anda's testimony about Spring's statement to him ( ante, pt. III.C.5.). Defendant further contends that the court's error in excluding the evidence that Rojas assaulted his niece violated his rights to a fair jury, to due process of law, to a reliable guilt verdict, and to confrontation and cross-examination, under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We see no abuse of discretion. Evidence that Rojas assaulted Bonillas weeks before Medina and Sanchez were killed was irrelevant to the current crimes. To the extent it could be considered evidence of bias on the part of Rojas against defendant, it was, at best, weak. Any bias would stem from the fact that Bonillas was related to defendant. But defendant did not proffer evidence that defendant knew Rojas had previously assaulted his niece, or that Rojas knew that Bonillas was his niece. Accordingly, the probative value of Rojas's prior assault on Bonillas, if any, was substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would necessitate undue consumption of time or create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues, as the court below noted. [52] We similarly see no abuse of discretion or federal constitutional error in the exclusion of evidence that Bonillas saw Rojas smoke KJ or saw him with a weapon on a previous occasion. The court reasonably concluded such evidence was insignificant and collateral. Defendant argues that, even assuming that the evidence of a prior assault by Rojas on Bonillas was collateral, the trial court nevertheless abused its discretion in excluding it, in light of its admission of similarly collateral evidence  a purported statement by Spring that she had stripped for money  to attack De Anda's credibility. We reject the notion that the admission of collateral evidence in one instance necessitates admission of similarly collateral evidence in another instance.
Defendant contends that the asserted errors involving the exclusion or admission of certain evidence involving the Spring J. incident and exclusion of evidence involving Rojas's assault on Bonillas, considered separately or cumulatively, impaired his ability to present a defense and to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him. Defendant additionally invokes his federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and to a reliable judgment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We reject the claim of cumulative error.