Opinion ID: 474563
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did Plaintiffs' State a Claim Under the Dual Capacity

Text: 15 Doctrine? 16 We must next consider whether plaintiffs stated a claim for relief within the dual capacity exception. Paragraph 10 of plaintiffs' complaints states: 17 Such exposure to defendants' asbestos products occurred at the Manheim Plant, in and around their homes, on their way to and from their employment, before and after they began work for Raybestos-Manhattan. Paragraph 12(a) states: 18 The aforesaid exposures occurred both during work in the work environment and outside work in the general atmosphere from ambient air.... 19 (emphasis added). The crux of plaintiffs' dual capacity argument, then, is that they were injured not only during their employment, but also in their role as part of the general public. They point out that, while defendant may be protected by the comp-bar from being sued in its capacity as an employer, it is obviously susceptible to suit by members of the general public who were injured by its polluting of the environment. In the latter case, Raymark is sued not in its capacity as an employer, but in its capacity as a private party. Plaintiffs contend that they are bringing suit as members of the public, alleging that they were injured by the asbestos dust that defendants released into the ambient air. They argue that the fact that they are also employees of Raymark is purely coincidental and should not deprive them of a cause of action. 6 See Anastasi v. Pacor, Inc., 7 Phil. County Rptr. 488, 515 (1982) (dual capacity exception applies where those injured are by coincidence employees but at the time of injury are not engaged in the business of the employer and are in their independent capacities as members of the general public.). 20 In our view, plaintiffs' claims fall squarely within the dual capacity exception to the comp-bar as enunciated in the Tatrai concurrence. If plaintiffs were injured by exposure away from the workplace, it is unreasonable to deprive them of a cause of action that is available to the general public. Plaintiffs' allegations with respect to defendant's polluting the environment, which must be taken as true for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, stand entirely apart from plaintiffs' employment; under the pleadings, the environmental exposure would have occurred exactly as it did even if plaintiffs had never worked for defendant. These allegations concern defendant's violations of its duty to the general public, not its specific duty to its employees. 21 Defendants cite several cases refusing to apply Tatrai to permit employees recovery from their employer. Koslop v. Cabot Corporation, 622 F.Supp. 222 (M.D.Pa.1985); Oyster v. Johns Manville Corp., 568 F.Supp. 83 (E.D.Pa.1983); Kohr v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 522 F.Supp. 1070 (E.D.Pa.1981) (pre-Tatrai decision); Kosowan v. MDC Industries, Inc., 319 Pa.Super. 91, 465 A.2d 1069 (1983) (non-asbestos case); Silvestri v. Strescon Industries, 312 Pa.Super. 82, 458 A.2d 246 (1983) (same). However, in all but one of these cases, 7 the plaintiff's injury was entirely work-related and the plaintiff tried to avoid the comp-bar simply by citing the fact that the employer manufactured or sold goods to the public, as well as employed the plaintiff. In the present case, by contrast, to the extent plaintiffs alleged exposure away from the workplace, they alleged violations that were entirely unrelated to their employment. Thus, as noted, the instant case genuinely resembles Tatrai in that plaintiffs allege violations that affected them as members of the general public, simply living in the neighborhood. 22 It is likely that most of plaintiffs' exposure to asbestos occurred at the workplace. This circumstance does not mean that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the dual capacity exception. It does suggest, however, that plaintiffs may have a difficult time establishing a relationship between their injuries and their exposure away from the workplace that is sufficient to justify recovery. 8 That issue, however, is beyond the scope of this appeal. 23 Plaintiffs indisputably alleged that their injuries stemmed, in part, from exposure away from the workplace. Thus, they stated a cause of action outside of the comp-bar.