Opinion ID: 2959785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ownership of the Restored Copyright

Text: Uneeda contends preliminarily that the District Court erred in determining that Troll Co. owns the restored copyright.4 We conclude 4 Although this argument was advanced in the District Court, Judge -6- that Troll Co. is likely to succeed in proving ownership because evidence submitted to the District Court supports a determination that Troll Co. owns the restored copyright. Troll Co.’s president testified that, after Dam’s death in 1989, Dam’s heirs transferred Dam’s rights to the troll dolls to Troll Co. In addition, the 2000 copyright registration lists Troll Co. as the owner.5 According to Uneeda, Troll Co.’s trial court evidence contradicts evidence submitted to the Copyright Office and the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. First, Uneeda points out, the original 1965 registration certificate listed Dam Things Establishment, not Dam himself, as the “author” of the Good Luck Trolls. Consequently, Uneeda argues, Troll Co. must establish a chain of ownership from Dam Things Establishment, not from Dam through his heirs, as Troll Co. argued in the District Court. But the URAA specifies that authorship is to be determined by reference to the source country’s law, not by reference to U.S. copyright registration. Owen did not explicitly discuss Uneeda’s ownership argument in his opinion. However, a determination that Troll Co. owns the restored copyright is implicit in the District Court’s opinion. 5 We recognize that the registration is not prima facie evidence of ownership because it was made more than five years after the first publication. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). Nevertheless, it may carry some evidentiary weight. See id. (“The evidentiary weight to be accorded the certificate of a registration made thereafter shall be within the discretion of the court.”). -7- See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(b); see, e.g., Alameda Films S A v. Authors Rights Restoration Corp., 331 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 2003) (applying Mexican law). Neither party submitted evidence of Danish law to the District Court. In any event, to obtain a preliminary injunction, Troll Co. needed to show only that it was likely to prove ownership, and it seems likely that Danish law would consider Dam to be the “author” of the troll dolls since he created the dolls several years before he established Dam Things Establishment.6 Second, Uneeda contends that Troll Co. is estopped from arguing that it acquired rights to the troll dolls from Dam’s heirs because it 6 Section 104A(b) does not explicitly state that ownership vests in an author’s heirs if the author is deceased. Nor does it explain what, if any, effect should be given to an author’s pre-restoration transfer of his ownership rights. Cf. 6 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 24:31 (2007) (stating that “where the author is dead on the date of restoration, ownership of the restored copyright will be determined by the law of successorship of the source country,” but that transferees of an initial author must pursue a state court contract action to secure rights to a restored copyright); 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 9A.04[B][2][b] (2006) (discussing the ambiguity of this provision). Because the parties have not raised these issues, we will assume, as the District Court apparently did, that the restored copyright vests in the author’s heirs and that courts can give effect to heirs’ pre-restoration transfer of rights. -8- represented to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey in another action that it acquired those rights from Dam Things Establishment. See Dam Things from Denmark, 290 F.3d at 553 n.3. The doctrine of judicial estoppel does not prevent Troll Co. from asserting a different theory of ownership in this case.7 In any event, even if it is unclear whether Troll Co. obtained ownership of the copyright from Dam Things Establishment, as the Third Circuit stated, or from Dam’s heirs, as Troll Co. claims here, Troll Co. is likely to prove ownership one way or the other. 7 “The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a factual position in one legal proceeding that is contrary to a position that it successfully advanced in another proceeding.” Rodal v. Anesthesia Group of Onondaga, P.C., 369 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 2004). A party invoking judicial estoppel must show that (1) another party advanced an inconsistent position in another proceeding and (2) the first tribunal adopted that position in some manner. See id. Even if Troll Co.’s theories of ownership are factual positions, and even if the Third Circuit or the New Jersey district court adopted Troll Co.’s theory of ownership, the two theories of ownership are not necessarily contrary to one another. The district court in Dam Things from Denmark also mentioned a 1989 agreement between Dam’s heirs and Troll Co. confirming Troll Co.’s exclusive rights to the Good Luck Troll designs. See Dam Things from Denmark v. Russ Berrie & Co., 173 F. Supp. 2d 277, 280 (D.N.J. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 290 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2002). -9-