Opinion ID: 896360
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is incarcerated or is on probation or parole on August 1, 1995, for a crime against a child or as a sexual offender;

Text: b. Has pled guilty or nolo contendere to, or been found guilty of, an offense in a court of another state or the federal government equivalent to those offenses set forth in subdivisions a and c of subsection 1; or c. Has pled guilty to or been found guilty of a crime against a child or as a sexual offender within ten years prior to August 1, 1995. N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15(3). (footnote: 3) Burr argues requiring him to register under this section violates due process and is an ex post facto law. See U.S. Const. art. 1, sec. 10; N.D. Const. art. I, sec. 18. This Court has defined an ex post facto law: 1. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. State v. Jensen , 333 N.W.2d 686, 693-94 (N.D. 1983) (quoting State v. Pleason , 218 N.W. 154, 155 (N.D. 1928) (quoting Calder v. Bull , 1 U.S. 269, 273 (1798))). No statute can be an ex post facto law prohibited by the United States Constitution unless it makes previously legal conduct criminal or increases the punishment for an existing crime. Dobbert v. Florida , 432 U.S. 282, 293 (1977) (citing Hopt v. Utah , 110 U.S. 574 (1884)). [¶11] The legislature is free to apply statutes retroactively unless doing so would result in ex post facto application. State v. Cummings , 386 N.W.2d 468, 471 (N.D. 1986). A law imposing a collateral consequence of a conviction may be applied retroactively if the purpose is not to punish the offender but to protect some other legitimate interest. See State v. Ward , 869 P.2d 1062, 1068 (Wash. 1994) (sex offender registration statute is retrospective, but it does not alter the standard of punishment that existed under prior law); State v. Noble , 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992) (the retrospective application of the sex offender registration statute does not punish and is not unconstitutional). North Dakota Century Code, section 12.1-32- 15(3), is retroactive, but the important question becomes whether it is regulatory or punitive. See United States v. Ward , 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) (finding the ex post facto clause applies only to criminal punishment and not to remedial regulations). We first determine whether the legislature intended to punish an offender for a past act “or whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation.” De Veau v. Braisted , 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960). [¶12] “In ascertaining legislative intent, we look first at the words used in the statute, giving them their ordinary, plain-language meaning.” Estate of Thompson , 1998 ND 226, ¶ 7, 586 N.W.2d 847 (citing Shiek v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau , 1998 ND 139, ¶ 16, 582 N.W.2d 639). If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the legislative intent is presumed clear from the face of the statute. Id. (quoting Medcenter One, Inc. v. North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy , 1997 ND 54, ¶ 13, 561 N.W.2d 634). If the statutory language is unclear or ambiguous, we often use extrinsic aids to interpret the statute. Id. (citing Hassan v. Brooks , 1997 ND 150, ¶ 5, 566 N.W.2d 822). When interpreting an ambiguous statute, and “a public interest is affected, an interpretation is preferred which favors the public. A narrow construction should not be permitted to undermine the public policy sought to be served.” Id. (quoting 2B Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Stat. Constr. § 56.01 (5th ed.1992)). [¶13] The language of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15(3) is clear—the registration requirement is applied to anyone convicted of a sexual offense as defined by the statute, and by anyone who was convicted within ten years prior to August 1, 1995. The statutory language gives no indication, however, whether the legislature intended the statute to punish. In that regard, the legislative history is helpful. Assistant Attorney General Robert Bennet testified: These amendments to the registration law are a reaffirmance of the underlying purpose of the registration requirement. The registration law is not imposed for punishment purposes, but, rather, for regulation of the offenders required to register. The registration information provided by the listed offenders is necessary to aid in the investigation and apprehension of offenders and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the members of the local community and citizens of this state. Hearing on H.B. 1152 Before the House Judiciary Committee , 54th N.D. Legis. Sess. (Jan. 9, 1995). (footnote: 4) Based on the legislative history, we conclude the intent was not to punish, and nothing in the language of the registration statute indicates the registration requirement is punishment or an additional penalty for the crime. See N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15(3).