Opinion ID: 4414343
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: The commission is empowered to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the Nebraska Liquor Control Act,11 including provisions covering any and all details which 6 Leon V. v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 302 Neb. 81, 921 N.W.2d 584 (2019). 7 Id. 8 Id. 9 Betty L. Green Living Trust v. Morrill Cty. Bd. of Equal., 299 Neb. 933, 911 N.W.2d 551 (2018). 10 Leon V., supra note 6. 11 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 53-101 to 53-1,122 (Reissue 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2018). - 63 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 303 Nebraska R eports McMANUS ENTERS. v. NEBRASKA LIQUOR CONTROL COMM. Cite as 303 Neb. 56 are necessary or convenient to the enforcement of the intent, purpose, and requirements of the act.12 McManus does not dispute that as a licensee, it is subject to the rules and regulations of the act, including the disturbance rule. McManus instead contends that the district court erred when it agreed with the commission that the disturbance occurred when McManus hosted the event. It argues this is contrary to the plain reading of the regulation, because the regulation is designed to terminate disturbances that are occurring from continuing. It argues that nothing in the regulation places a duty on a licensee to take action against something that might or could happen. We agree. [6,7] For purposes of construction, a rule or regulation of an administrative agency is generally treated like a statute.13 Indeed, we have often said that properly adopted and filed regulations have the effect of statutory law.14 [8,9] Absent a statutory or regulatory indication to the contrary, language contained in a rule or regulation is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning.15 A rule is open for construction only when the language used requires interpretation or may reasonably be considered ambiguous.16 Neither party argued that the disturbance rule is ambiguous. We agree that its plain and ordinary meaning controls our decision. [10] A court will construe regulations relating to the same subject matter together to maintain a consistent and sensible scheme.17 Consequently, we read § 019.01F, which includes its subparagraphs, §§ 019.01F1 to 019.01F4, to determine the 12 See DLH, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., 266 Neb. 361, 665 N.W.2d 629 (2003). 13 Melanie M. v. Winterer, 290 Neb. 764, 862 N.W.2d 76 (2015). 14 See, e.g., Leon V., supra note 6. 15 In re Petition of Golden Plains Servs. Transp., 297 Neb. 105, 898 N.W.2d 670 (2017). 16 Prokop v. Lower Loup NRD, 302 Neb. 10, 921 N.W.2d 375 (2019). 17 Utelcom, Inc. v. Egr, 264 Neb. 1004, 653 N.W.2d 846 (2002). - 64 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 303 Nebraska R eports McMANUS ENTERS. v. NEBRASKA LIQUOR CONTROL COMM. Cite as 303 Neb. 56 meaning of the disturbance rule as a whole. In discussing the rule, reference to § 019.01F will generally refer to the entire rule. But when quoting the rule, we will use a specific paragraph to enable a reader to easily locate our quotation. By its plain language, § 019.01F dictates that no licensee shall allow any unreasonable disturbance to continue. The commission argues that the regulation also prohibits a licensee from allowing a disturbance to occur. Logically, in order for a disturbance to continue, it must first occur. But as we explain, under the plain language of the regulation, a licensee does not violate the disturbance rule until a disturb­ ance has occurred. [11] First and foremost, the first section of the disturbance rule compels this reading. It states that “[n]o licensee . . . shall allow any unreasonable disturbance; as such term is defined hereunder, to continue without taking the steps, as set forth hereunder, within a licensed premise or in adjacent related outdoor areas.”18 When quoting from this language, the district court decision simply omitted the words “to continue.” Given that we treat a regulation like a statute,19 a settled principle of statutory interpretation20 dictates this rule: A court must attempt to give effect to all parts of a regulation, and if it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected as superfluous or meaningless. The district court’s reading disregarded this principle. A plain reading of § 019.01F2 supports our conclusion. It requires the licensee and those who act for the licensee to “take such action as is reasonably necessary to terminate the disturbance.”21 “Terminate” means “[t]o bring to an end, put 18 § 019.01F. 19 See Melanie M., supra note 13. 20 See Patterson v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 302 Neb. 442, 923 N.W.2d 717 (2019). 21 § 019.01F2 (emphasis supplied). - 65 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 303 Nebraska R eports McMANUS ENTERS. v. NEBRASKA LIQUOR CONTROL COMM. Cite as 303 Neb. 56 an end to, cause to cease.”22 It seems evident that one cannot “terminate” something that has not occurred. Section 019.01F3 reinforces this understanding. “In the event efforts taken in accordance with [§ 019.01F2] are not successful . . . , th[e]n in such event, such person shall immediately contact law enforcement personnel to assist in properly handling the disturbance.”23 Efforts cannot be either successful or unsuccessful until a disturbance has occurred and the licensee or its representative has attempted some “action . . . to terminate the disturbance.”24 And how, a reader of the regulation might reasonably ask, is one to request assistance from law enforcement in “properly handling the disturbance” until after a disturbance has commenced.25 [12] Finally, § 019.01F4 provides a safe harbor for licensees which have “conformed” to the disturbance rule. It states in part, “A licensee who has conformed with the procedure as set forth in this section shall be deemed to have not permitted a disturbance to occur and continue.”26 Another rule of statutory construction27 leads to this rule: In determining the meaning of regulatory language, its ordinary and grammatical construction is to be followed, unless an intent appears to the contrary or unless, by following such construction, the intended effect of the provisions would apparently be impaired. Under the interpretation urged by the commission, one would expect § 019.01F4 to read “occur or continue,” but it does not. The plain and ordinary meaning of “and,” in this context, means that a disturbance has both “occur[red]” and “continue[d].” 22 “Terminate,” Oxford English Dictionary Online, http://www.oed.com/ view/Entry/199426 (last visited Apr. 19, 2019). 23 § 019.01F3. 24 § 019.01F2. 25 See § 019.01F3. 26 § 019.01F4 (emphasis supplied). 27 See Patterson, supra note 20. - 66 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 303 Nebraska R eports McMANUS ENTERS. v. NEBRASKA LIQUOR CONTROL COMM. Cite as 303 Neb. 56 [13] Within the disturbance rule, the word “occur” appears only in § 019.01F4. Under the commission’s interpretation, one would expect it to appear in § 019.01F. But it does not. As used in § 019.01F4, we understand it to support the ordinary and plain language of § 019.01F. Similarly, §§ 019.01F2 and 019.01F3 support the plain language of § 019.01F by requiring licensees to take reasonable action to terminate a disturbance. Again, logically, in order to terminate a disturbance, it must occur and continue. We hold that under § 019.01F, a licensee cannot be sanctioned for a violation unless the licensee has allowed an unreasonable disturbance to continue. The State agreed with McManus that merely hosting an event is not a violation of § 019.01F. However, it contends that McManus violated the disturbance rule when [McManus] agree[d] to host the event by opening its doors to a third party promotor and the promotor’s security team over which [McManus] had no control, with knowledge that prior events by the same promotor had resulted in an “all call” for LPD, with no clear plan and adequate security tailored to the nature of the event and size of the expected “standing room only” crowd.28 The district court reasoned that McManus “violated the dis­ turbance rule when it disregarded the security concerns expressed to it by law enforcement and proceeded with the event that placed the safety of the public at risk.” Both interpretations relied upon the phrase “other activity which may endanger”29 to craft a preventative interpretation of “other activity.” This interpretation inconsistently read into the regulation a preventative consideration that does not appear within the explicit language of the regulation. Under the plain language, a “disturbance” applies a present temporal meaning.30 The rule utilizes the present tense 28 Brief for appellee at 10. 29 § 019.01F1. 30 See id. - 67 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 303 Nebraska R eports McMANUS ENTERS. v. NEBRASKA LIQUOR CONTROL COMM. Cite as 303 Neb. 56 when defining disturbance and does not place any conditional language on the existence of the disturbance. For example, a disturbance shall mean any brawl which may endanger others or any fight which may endanger others. It would fly in the face of the plain and ordinary language to read all other disturbances as occurring in the present and “other activity which may endanger” as preventative or precognitive. Effectively, the district court’s interpretation placed the proverbial cart before the horse when it placed the conditional language on the dis­ turbance and not the consequences. Moreover, the nonexhaustive list of examples of a “disturb­ ance” in § 019.01F1—such as drug dealing, intoxicated individuals, soliciting prostitution, and physical contact between customers and employees or agents—further illustrates dis­ turbances happening in the present. The list utilizes the present, present participle, and past tense to define disturbance. It does not place any conditional language on the existence of the disturbance. [14] A licensee’s hosting an event with awareness of a potential disturbance will not be considered a disturbance. Unlike the several other examples of disturbances listed above, hosting an event, in and of itself (at least under the disturb­ ance rule as now written), does not put others in potential danger. Some other activity must occur, like the brawl that broke out, to place others in danger for it to be considered a disturbance under the existing language. In this case, the disturbance did not occur until 1:55 a.m., when the brawl took place. At that point, LPD officers were immediately involved. Therefore, under § 019.01F, in order for “other activity” to be a dis­turbance, the dangerous activity itself must arise and be of such a nature that may place others in danger. Under the plain and ordinary meaning of the disturbance rule, McManus did not have to take reasonable action to terminate the disturbance until 1:55 a.m., when it occurred, at which point the duty under § 019.01F to “[not] allow any unreasonable disturbance . . . to continue” sprang into effect. - 68 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 303 Nebraska R eports McMANUS ENTERS. v. NEBRASKA LIQUOR CONTROL COMM. Cite as 303 Neb. 56 Because the district court found that McManus did not take reasonable action before the disturbance occurred, its interpretation was inconsistent with the plain language of § 019.01F. Accordingly, the district court’s interpretation did not conform to the law, and we reverse. Our holding does not preclude the commission from promulgating a preventative rule for disturbances. The problem is, the current rule simply does not do so.