Opinion ID: 2598178
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Candia

Text: ¶ 40 The State argues the Court of Appeals also incorrectly held the testimony of Dr. Stirling and Detective Greer amounted to improper opinion on the victim's credibility. We agree with the State.
¶ 41 Dr. Stirling testified about findings from a physical examination conducted on C.M.D. in October 2003 and an earlier examination in May 2001. He testified about statements of C.M.D. during those examinations about abuse. After establishing that there was no physical evidence of sexual contact, the State asked Dr. Stirling, Do you have an opinion with medical certainty whether the findings you observed are consistent with the history of abuse you were given? 2B RP at 251. Dr. Stirling stated, I would say the findingsto have no findings after receiving a history like that is actually the norm rather than the exception. Id. at 252. He went on to say, I would be very surprised if her assailant were able to actually insert his penis into her vagina. Id. at 255. ¶ 42 The Court of Appeals held that Dr. Stirling's testimony improperly bolstered C.M.D.'s credibility. Specifically, the Court of Appeals took exception to the State's line of questioning about the consistency of Dr. Stirling's findings and the history of abuse he was given: Essentially, the physician was asked to reconcile the negative physical findings with the victim's statement. Candia, 2005 WL 1753622, at , 2005 Wash.App. LEXIS 1871, at . ¶ 43 The Court of Appeals held that this question was similar to one they had disapproved of in Kirkman. Further, the Court of Appeals asserted that Dr. Stirling's testimony concerning C.M.D.'s statement about penetration was improper because [t]he focus of the State's questions was the victim's statement, no the physician's examination, and concluded that [t]his is clearly a comment on credibility, albeit favorable to Candia. Id., 2005 WL 1753622, at , at -4. The Court of Appeals nonetheless concluded that the physician's testimony bolstered the statements of the alleged victim. It, in essence, was to give the jury the opinion of the physician as to the credibility of the girl. Id., 2005 WL 3485971, at , at . [2] The Court of Appeals held the doctor's testimony improper under Kirkman. ¶ 44 In response, the State contends that Dr. Stirling merely testified that his examination of C.M.D. neither corroborated nor contradicted C.M.D.'s allegations. Dr. Stirling never commented on whether he believed C.M.D. nor did he opine on Candia's credibility or guilt. ¶ 45 In an alternative argument, the State contends that Kirkman is distinguishable because in that case the Court of Appeals found improper the doctor's testimony relating to the child's verbal account of abuse (as clear and consistent), not the results of the physical examination. Here, by contrast, the State argues that Dr. Stirling simply testified that he was able to speak and communicate with her in a clear manner. ¶ 46 We also agree with the State on this issue. Dr. Stirling's testimony was particularly relevant because Candia's jury was presented with what might appear to be a discrepancy: C.M.D. alleged that she had been raped numerous times by an adult, but there was no medical evidence to support these allegations. In cross-examination, Candia's counsel focused on C.M.D.'s allegations in order to argue that the medical examination showed that C.M.D. had not been raped as she claimed. Cases involving alleged child sex abuse make the child's credibility an inevitable, central issue. Petrich, 101 Wash.2d at 575, 683 P.2d 173. Where the child's credibility is thus put in issue, a court has broad discretion to admit evidence corroborating the child's testimony. Id. at 575, 683 P.2d 173. ¶ 47 Dr. Stirling did not come close to testifying on any ultimate fact. He never opined that Candia was guilty nor did he opine that C.M.D. was molested or that he believed C.M.D.'s account to be true. Dr. Stirling testified only that he was able to communicate with C.M.D. because she had good language skills for her age, she spoke clearly, 2B RP at 244. His testimony was content neutral, focusing upon the clear communication, rather than the substance of matters discussed. The doctor's testimony did not constitute manifest error.
¶ 48 Greer described a competency protocol she administered before interviewing C.M.D. Id. at 310. Greer tested C.M.D.'s ability to distinguish between a truth and a lie and asked the child to promise to tell the truth. Detective Greer then related what C.M.D. had told her about her sexual encounters with Candia. ¶ 49 The Court of Appeals held that, as in Kirkman, the detective told the jury that she tested both the child's competency and her truthfulness and further, that the child was telling the truth when she talked to the detective, thereby finding Detective Greer's testimony improper. Candia, 2005 WL 1753622, at , 2005 Wash.App. LEXIS 1871, at . Inconsistently, the Court of Appeals' majority noted, the detective did not affirmatively state that she believed or disbelieved the victim's allegations. Id. ¶ 50 The State contends that both Court of Appeals' decisions erroneously hold that testimony in which an officer describes the competency protocol constitutes constitutionally improper opinion of guilt or witness credibility. A detective's testimony as to the protocol utilized in interviews only provides context for the interview of a child victim and does not improperly comment of the truthfulness of the victim. ¶ 51 This interview protocol, including that the child promised to tell the truth, does not impermissibly infringe on the jury's province given that the same child takes the witness stand in front of the jury and swears under oath that the testimony given will be truthful. See RCW 5.28.020; ER 603. Thus, we do not find the testimony constitutes a manifest error of constitutional magnitude.