Opinion ID: 1362345
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attorney's Fees Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act

Text: Plaintiffs-Appellees contend that the portion of the district court's Rule 7 bond that included security for appellate attorney's fees was proper because the fee-shifting provision in Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), includes attorney's fees as recoverable costs. We agree that Section 4 includes attorney's fees as costs, but conclude that attorney's fees would not be recoverable under Section 4 against Appellant Wilkinson. We therefore hold that the district court erred when it included anticipated appellate attorney's fees in its calculation of the amount of the Rule 7 bond. Section 4 provides that any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Id.; see Marek, 473 U.S. at 8, 105 S.Ct. 3012 (noting that Clayton Act Section 4 include[s] attorney's fees as part of awardable `costs'); Perkins, 399 U.S. at 223, 90 S.Ct. 1989 (holding that Section 4 of the Clayton Act covers costs on appeal). Inclusion of security for appellate attorney's fees in a Rule 7 bond may thus be appropriate in cases where the appellee is eligible to collect costs on appeal under Section 4. However, unlike some other fee-shifting provisions, Section 4 is asymmetrical. Compare, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), with 17 U.S.C. § 505, and 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 730 F.2d 905, 908 (2d Cir.1984). Clayton Act attorney's fees awards are available only to plaintiffs who prove an antitrust injury. Gulfstream III Assocs., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 414, 418 (3d Cir.1993); see also In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 130 n. 12 (9th Cir.1973); MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1281 n. 21 (11th Cir.1999); Sciambra v. Graham News, 892 F.2d 411, 415-16 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1990). Section 4 is intended not only to encourage private enforcement of the antitrust laws and to insulate the treble damages award from the costs of obtaining recovery, but also to deter violations of the antitrust laws by requiring the payment of that fee by a losing defendant. Image Tech. Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 136 F.3d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir.1998). We have gone so far as to describe a Section 4 fee award as a part of the penalty for violating the antitrust laws. Id. at 1358. Thus, a district court can order only a losing defendant  the party that has violated antitrust laws  to pay attorney's fees under Section 4. See Byram Concretanks, Inc. v. Warren Concrete Prods. Co., 374 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir.1967) (as amended); see also J.T. Gibbons, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 790 F.2d 1193, 1194-95 (5th Cir.1986); cf. Olympia Co. v. Celotex Corp., 771 F.2d 888, 892-93 (5th Cir.1985) (awarding fees to prevailing defendants based not on Section 4 but rather to sanction plaintiff and his attorney). The asymmetry of Section 4 is consistent with the purpose of the Clayton Act as well as settled precedent. While the interests of an antitrust settlement class member who challenges the settlement on appeal may well be adverse to the interests of a class member who supports it, both remain the alleged victims, rather than perpetrators, of the claimed antitrust injury. Ordering one class member to pay other class members' appellate attorney's fees because of a disagreement about the propriety of settlement would not serve the purpose of Section 4 to penalize and deter those who have violated the antitrust laws. Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiffs-Appellees are otherwise eligible to collect fees under Section 4, they could not collect them from Wilkinson. Cf. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 468-69 (2d Cir.1974) (holding that Section 4 does not authorize award of attorney's fees to a plaintiff who settles his claim with the defendant), overruled on other grounds, as recognized by Chambless v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 885 F.2d 1053, 1058 (2d Cir.1989).