Opinion ID: 2624590
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did the District Court abuse its discretion in refusing to allow attorney J. Richard Orizotti to offer expert opinions?

Text: ¶ 27 Shortly before trial, Sullivan and Eide moved to prohibit a witness for the Bank, attorney J. Richard Orizotti, from offering any expert opinions, based on the Bank's failure to timely disclose Orizotti as an expert witness. Sullivan and Eide stated they had served discovery requests on the Bank in August of 2004, including a request for identification of the Bank's expert witnesses, and the Bank had responded that it had retained no expert witnesses but that Orizotti would be called as a witness to render opinions as to the reasonableness of steps he took in liquidating the collateral. Then, in its September 2005 scheduling order, the District Court established October 21, 2005, as the deadline for naming expert witnesses, but the Bank did not name Orizotti as an expert witness by that deadline. Finally, the Bank did not identify Orizotti as an expert witness in the final pretrial order, although it identified several other expert witnesses. The District Court granted the motion in limine. ¶ 28 The Bank argues exclusion of expert testimony by Orizotti was inexplicable because it had fully disclosed that Orizotti would be a witness and the testimony he would present. The Bank further argues that, because of repeated objections during Orizotti's testimony, his testimony was greatly limited and lacked flow. The Bank asserts Orizotti should have been allowed to give his opinion under either M.R. Evid. 701, which allows a lay witness to give opinions which are rationally based on his own perceptions and are helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or for determination of a fact at issue, or under M.R. Evid. 702, which provides for testimony by experts. ¶ 29 Failure to disclose an expert witness will usually prejudice the opposing party. Superior Enterprises, LLC v. Montana Power Co., 2002 MT 139, ¶ 18, 310 Mont. 198, ¶ 18, 49 P.3d 565, ¶ 18. We have, on a number of occasions, affirmed the authority of a district court to exclude expert testimony as a result of failure to properly disclose the expert witness. Nelson v. Nelson, 2005 MT 263, ¶ 32, 329 Mont. 85, ¶ 32, 122 P.3d 1196, ¶ 32. Here, the Bank did not disclose Orizotti as an expert witness despite three requests to do so. ¶ 30 The Bank discusses three occasions during trial in which it feels Orizotti should have been allowed to give opinion testimony. On two of those occasions, Orizotti's opinions would clearly have constituted expert opinion. In the first, the Bank's counsel asked Orizotti what he did with the invitation for bids for the collateral. Orizotti responded, I prepared it and advised the Bank that it is commercially reasonable to.... At that point, counsel for Sullivan and Eide objected that this was opinion testimony, and the court advised Orizotti that he could tell what advice he gave, but could not give an opinion. The next objection referenced by the Bank came while Orizotti was testifying about the bids received for the collateral. Orizotti testified the fact that the defendants did not submit a bid signified to me that that was the market value of this property. The court ordered that remark stricken from the record on grounds that it was opinion testimony. ¶ 31 Finally, the Bank points to an objection made when Orizotti testified about something Sullivan told him. Because that objection was sustained on hearsay grounds, not on expert testimony grounds, it is not pertinent to this issue on appeal. ¶ 32 We hold the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Orizotti to testify as an expert witness.