Opinion ID: 1175565
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: testimony as plain error

Text: Robert Johnson was the principal of the elementary school attended by appellant's son. Johnson testified that he had been notified by an employee of the Wyoming Division of Public Assistance and Social Services (D-PASS) that the child had been taken into protective custody. Apparently, D-PASS feared that appellant would attempt to contact his son and remove him from school. Johnson testified further that on March 17, 1987, appellant came to the school and asked to see his son. When denied that opportunity, appellant allegedly stated, There's a nigger in the wood pile someplace, and if I find the son-of-a-bitch, I'll blow him away. I've got nothing to lose. With regard to Johnson's testimony, appellant takes issue only with the introduction of that alleged statement. Because appellant failed to raise a timely objection to the introduction of this testimony, we must employ the plain error analysis set forth above. The record is clear as to what occurred at trial. Appellant contends, however, that the contested portion of Johnson's testimony was totally lacking in relevancy and so prejudicial that it was inadmissible under any theory. The state asserts that the evidence was relevant to show the crime was committed and that appellant committed the crime. Such is the case, the state argues, because the conduct and demeanor of the accused after the crime tend to show a guilty mind. We disagree. Nothing in appellant's alleged outburst to Johnson is probative of any fact material to this prosecution. The admission of such testimony, therefore, violates a clear and unambiguous rule of law. See also W.R.E. 402 (irrelevant evidence is inadmissible). Such a violation does not require reversal, however, unless the violation seriously affects the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings. Jones v. State, 580 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Wyo. 1978). To warrant reversal under the plain error standard explained above there must be a reasonable possibility that, in the absence of the error, a defendant would receive a more favorable verdict. Nimmo v. State, 603 P.2d 386, 395 (Wyo. 1979); and Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342, 351 (Wyo. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S.Ct. 1602, 51 L.Ed.2d 806 (1977). Appellant put forth no evidence in his behalf. When balancing appellant's case against the unimpeached testimony of the prosecution's three eyewitnesses, it would be unreasonable to assume that the jury could have concluded otherwise. There was no plain error.