Opinion ID: 2630947
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: preservation of bac issue

Text: First, we consider the State's complaint that Shadden did not preserve or present on appeal an issue that the Court of Appeals considered i.e., the admissibility of the officer's testimony that Shadden's failure on the walk-and-turn test meant there was a 68 percent probability he had a BAC above.10. As the State contends, ordinarily an appellate court will not consider an issue on appeal not raised in the district court. Graham v. Dokter Trucking Group, 284 Kan. 547, 555, 161 P.3d 695 (2007); In re Tax Appeal of Alsop Sand Co., Inc., 265 Kan. 510, 521, 962 P.2d 435 (1998). This rule does not present an impediment to consideration of the issue in this case, however, because the issue of scientific validity or credibility, including the relationship between test failures and BAC, was raised in the district court and in Shadden's brief before the Court of Appeals. More specifically, before both the district court and the Court of Appeals, Shadden argued that field sobriety tests do not satisfy the Frye standard and that the accuracy of such tests is outside the common knowledge of laypersons. In his motion in limine, Shadden argued that [t]he testimony of Officer Weiler and Officer Goodnight shall be limited to only the description of their lay observations as to signs of impairment. Shadden made two related requests for an order. First, he sought to limit the use of terminology like `tests' or other related terms such as pass, fail, or points. Second, he sought to limit the officers' testimony to lay opinions. Shadden supported these requests by citing State v. Meador, 674 So.2d 826 (Fla. Dist.App.1996), rev. denied 686 So.2d 580 (Fla.1996). Meador supported Shadden's second request to limit testimony to lay opinions because the Florida Court of Appeals concluded the State could not admit any evidence of a scientific opinion that stated a relationship between a driver's performance during field sobriety tests and a certain level of intoxication. In addition, Shadden cited the following authorities and made the following parenthetical statements: See also State v. Ross, [147 Or.App. 634] 938 P.2d 797 (Or.App.1997) (arresting officer prohibited from rendering opinion that defendant's behavior was consistent with a blood alcohol level above the legal limit); State v. Lummus, 1997 Ariz.App. LEXIS 189 (officer's statement that `on a scale of 1 to 10 the defendant rated a 10 plus for intoxication' is inadmissible opinion testimony that implies the defendant was over the blood alcohol limit); State v. Ferrer, 2001 Hawaii App. LEXIS 116 (officer can't testify that defendant `failed' field sobriety exercises, he can only testify to personal observations). This discussion clearly raised the issue of whether the officers could testify about the relationship between a test failure and BAC. In addition, Shadden had a standing objection to the evidence at trial. See K.S.A. 60-404 (providing that a verdict shall not be set aside by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless there appears of record objection to the evidence timely interposed and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of objection). Then in his appellate brief submitted to the Court of Appeals, Shadden asserted that it is inappropriate for the officer to inform the jury that the NHTSA testsor any other tests for that matterare reliable scientifically. Although Shadden's appellate brief focused on the terminology argument, the arguments clearly reflected the overarching theme that the officers should have been prohibited from venturing beyond a recitation of their personal observations and should not have been allowed to state a scientific opinion. Hence, each of the issues addressed in the Court of Appeals' decision was raised and preserved before the district court and pursued in Shadden's brief before the Court of Appeals. The fact that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the law led it to a conclusion the State had not foreseen does not make the panel's action inappropriate. See Graham, 284 Kan. at 556, 161 P.3d 695 (finding the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the workers compensation statute, leading it a conclusion unforeseen by the claimant, did not render the panel's action inappropriate).