Opinion ID: 166641
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of a Prior, Specific Judicial Order

Text: 6 We first consider Pentrack's argument that the district court erroneously imposed USSG § 2B1.1(b)(7)(C). While we review legal questions regarding the application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, a district court's factual findings are reviewed only for clear error, giving due deference to the district court's application of the Guidelines to the facts. United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210, 1217-18 (10th Cir.2004) (internal citations omitted). 7 We begin with the legal question. Section 2B1.1(b)(7)(C) required pre- Booker a district court to increase a defendant's offense level if the convicted offense involved a violation of any prior, specific judicial or administrative order, injunction, decree, or process not addressed elsewhere in the guidelines. (emphasis added). Pentrack argues that the Idaho injunction was not specific within the meaning of this provision since it merely obligated him to do what he had always been required to do, namely obey the law of the State of Idaho. 2 8 In analyzing this claim, we start with the term specific as used in § 2B1.1(b)(7)(C). We interpret the Sentencing Guidelines by following ordinary rules of statutory construction. United States v. Robertson, 350 F.3d 1109, 1112 (10th Cir.2003). First, we look to the language of the Guideline, respectful of the accompanying commentary provided by the Sentencing Commission. Id. According to Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004), specific is defined as [o]f, relating to, or designating a particular or defined thing; explicit. Consequently, since the term specific modifies the term injunction, the injunction must be explicit. However, this explanation provides us with little insight into exactly how the injunction must satisfy this definition, so we turn next to the Commentary provided by the Commission. 9 The Sentencing Commission added the phrase prior, specific to the Guidelines provision in 2000. Before 2000, a defendant's offense level was enhanced if it involved a violation of any judicial or administrative order, injunction, decree, or process not addressed elsewhere in the guidelines. USSG § 2F1.1(b)(4)(B) (Nov.1999). The broad language of this provision led to a circuit split regarding the provision's application in cases of bankruptcy fraud, with the majority of circuits holding that a defendant who conceals assets during the course of a bankruptcy proceeding is subject to a sentence enhancement. Compare United States v. Saacks, 131 F.3d 540 (5th Cir.1997) (holding that a debtor who conceals assets during the course of a bankruptcy proceeding is subject to conviction for bankruptcy fraud as well as a sentence enhancement for violation of a judicial order or process), and United States v. Messner, 107 F.3d 1448 (10th Cir.1997) (same), with United States v. Shadduck, 112 F.3d 523, 530 (1st Cir.1997) (holding that a debtor who conceals assets during the course of a bankruptcy proceeding, while subject to conviction for bankruptcy fraud, is not subject to a sentence enhancement for violation of a judicial order). These courts reasoned that even when the fraudulent debtor takes the very first act by filing his petition in bankruptcy, he is acting subsequently to the previously adopted . . . standing orders and standard forms, thus rejecting the contention that the enhancement applies only if the defendant violated a pre-existing, particular order. Saacks, 131 F.3d at 546. 10 The Sentencing Commission resolved this split by adding the phrase prior, specific to the existing provision and creating a new category for misrepresentation or other fraudulent action during the course of a bankruptcy proceeding. USSG App. C. amend. 597; see id. § 2F1.1(4)(B)-(C) (Nov.2000). The Commission explained the modification as follows: 11 [The modification and accompanying commentary] make[s] clear that, in order for the enhancement to apply in a fraud case not involving a bankruptcy proceeding, there must be a false statement in violation of a specific, prior order. Therefore, any case involving a bankruptcy fraud will result in a two-level enhancement, but in the case of a non-bankruptcy fraud, the enhancement will apply only if a defendant was given prior notice of a particular action. 12 Id. App. C amend. 597 (emphasis added). 13 As the Commission explains, prior refers to notice and specific or particular refers to the action or conduct of the defendant. Thus, as the Commission notes, this language provides an enhancement if the defendant commits a fraud in contravention of a prior, official judicial or administrative warning, in the form of an order, injunction, decree, or process, to take or not to take a specified action.  Id. § 2B1.1 comment. (n. 6(C)) (emphasis added). The additional phrasing, then, merely clarifies the distinction between enhancements for bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy fraud, effectively leaving unaltered the application of the enhancement in non-bankruptcy proceedings. See United States v. Howard, 350 F.3d 125, 126 (D.C.Cir.2003) (noting that this change appears not to affect the section's substance). 14 Nevertheless, Pentrack argues we should interpret the modifier specific in relation to the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d). Pursuant to this rule, Every order granting an injunction. . . shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d). We have interpreted the rule to 15 require[] that an injunction be reasonably specific in identifying what acts are prohibited or required, both to give notice to the defendant of what is prohibited, and to guide an appellate court in reviewing the defendant's compliance or noncompliance with the injunction. An injunction too vague to be understood violates the rule and, generally, injunctions simply requiring the defendant to obey the law are too vague. 16 Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 895 F.2d 659, 668 (10th Cir.1990) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). However, Rule 65 and our cases construing it stand for the unremarkable proposition that an injunction must describe the prohibited conduct with reasonable specificity. In this sense, Pentrack's legal argument merely reiterates the Commission's explanation: the court may apply § 2B1.1(b)(7)(C) only if the injunction is specific enough to provide the defendant with adequate notice of the prohibited conduct. 17 Turning to the factual background here, we cannot agree with Pentrack that the Idaho injunction lacks specificity within the plain meaning of § 2B1.1(b)(7)(C). The consent judgment by its terms (1) prohibits three types of specified conduct in line with Pentrack's prior frauds and (2) provides Pentrack with prior adequate notice of the type of conduct prohibited. Because the order was designed to prohibit prior misconduct of the very same nature as his federal crimes (deception of consumers) and gives specific notice as to prohibited conduct, it satisfies the requirements of § 2B1.1(b)(7)(C). 3 18 Accordingly, the district court properly applied the enhancement to increase Pentrack's sentence.