Opinion ID: 220657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: District court's failure to recuse

Text: In his fourth and final issue on appeal, Donald Bowers contends that the district judge should have recused pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 because her spouse was an attorney who had a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy as well as an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings.... [8] Aplt. Br. at 64. Generally speaking, we review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for recusal. United States v. Mendoza, 468 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir.2006). The issue of whether the district judge should have recused was first raised by defendant Lonny Bowers in his pro se motion for new trial. In that motion, Lonny Bowers argued that the district judge knew that her spouse, Gordon Campbell, had a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy as well as an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings within the meaning of § 455(b)(4), and in all likelihood knew that her husband had an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the litigation in th[e] case within the meaning of § 455(b)(5)(iii).... JA at D17108. In support, Lonny Bowers alleged that Campbell was a member of the law firm of Parsons, Behle & Latimer,... wh[ich] handle[d] a substantial portion of [ClearOne's] litigation caseload, and ha[d] procured patents pertaining to key electronic systems at issue in th[e] litigation. Id. Lonny Bowers argued that, had [the WideBand defendants] prevailed in th[e] litigation, Mr. Campbell's interest  and by extension [the district judge's] interest  in the company could have been substantially affected, particularly from an economic standpoint. Id. at D17108-09. ClearOne, in its brief in opposition to Lonny Bowers' motion for new trial, refuted Lonny Bowers' allegations regarding Mr. Campbell: First, [Parsons, Behle & Latimer] is not counsel of record for ClearOne in this case, and has not otherwise been involved in the litigation. Second, to the extent ClearOne has used, or currently uses, [Parsons, Behle & Latimer's] services for purposes outside of this litigation, [Mr.] Campbell has not worked, and does not work, for ClearOne. Third, according to the publicly-available Internet resources, such as martindale.com, Mr. Campbell is neither an associate nor shareholder of [Parsons, Behle & Latimer], but is of counsel. As such, his financial interest in the firm, if any, is likely limited. Moreover, there has been no evidence presented that would indicate that ClearOne's financial livelihood is in any way dependent on the outcome of this case. Therefore, any financial interest held by any person in the viability of [Parsons, Behle & Latimer], and any decision whether ClearOne would use [Parsons, Behle & Latimer] for transactional work in the future, would have nothing to do, whatsoever, with whether ClearOne prevailed in this case. Id. at D17430-31. Lonny Bowers did not file a reply to ClearOne's opposition brief. The district court ultimately rejected Lonny Bowers' arguments in an order and memorandum and decision issued on April 20, 2009. Id. at D17547. In doing so, the district court stated, in pertinent part: Mr. [Lonny] Bowers ... alleges that the court had an improper personal financial interest in the outcome of the trial. His allegations are not supported by the evidence or law. Id. at D17566. At the June 3, 2009 show cause hearing, Donald Bowers orally moved for the district judge to recuse, citing the same reasons asserted in Lonny Bowers' motion for new trial. The district court summarily denied Donald Bowers' oral motion. On appeal, Donald Bowers makes no attempt to explain how the district court abused its discretion in declining to recuse. Instead, Donald Bowers' opening brief simply repeats, in almost identically worded form, the arguments that were asserted by Lonny Bowers in his pro se motion for new trial, and that were directly refuted by ClearOne in its opposition to that motion. Moreover, Donald Bowers' counsel conceded at oral argument that, contrary to the assertions made below and in Donald Bowers' opening brief, Mr. Campbell was not a partner in the firm of Parsons, Behle & Latimer, but rather was of counsel to that firm. Donald Bowers' counsel likewise conceded that Donald Bowers had no evidentiary support for the allegations that Mr. Campbell, and in turn the district judge, had a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy, or an interest that could have been substantially affected by the outcome of this litigation. We conclude that these concessions effectively dispose of the question of whether there was an actual conflict of interest that would have required the district judge's recusal under § 455(b). We further conclude, based upon the combination of these concessions and the lack of any other factors suggesting partiality concerns arising from Mr. Campbell's employment, that recusal was not required under § 455(a). Thus, in sum, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the pro se motion of Donald Bowers. AFFIRMED.