Opinion ID: 724858
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: remedy regarding flawed assimilation.

Text: 28 The infirmity discussed above is not fatal to the indictment in this case. We find the infirmity to be an apparent rather than a real defect. Accordingly, though we find error in the indictment, we will uphold the Lewises' convictions unless they establish reversible error on another ground. This court has previously adopted the maxim that [w]here the government wrongfully secures a conviction under a state statute pursuant to the Assimilative Crimes Act, rather than under the relevant federal statute, the appropriate remedy is not reversal of the conviction, but rather a vacating of the sentence and a remand to the district court for resentencing[,] provided that the basic elements of the crime as defined in the federal statute were proven at trial and provided that no trial errors warrant reversal of the convictions. See United States v. Olvera, 488 F.2d 607, 608 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 917, 94 S.Ct. 1625, 40 L.Ed.2d 119 (1974) (citing United States v. Chaussee, 536 F.2d 637, 644 (7th Cir.1976) (citing United States v. Word, 519 F.2d 612, 618 (8th Cir.1975)). Compare United States v. Butler, 541 F.2d 730, 737 (8th Cir.1976) (the court discussed the applicable remedy of remanding for sentencing, but instead vacated the convictions because the government did not prove at trial the interstate commerce nexus, which was not an element of the state crime). 9 29 In Olvera, the government conceded on appeal that the federal statute was controlling rather than the ACA and the Texas statute. 488 F.2d at 608. This court held that the sentence must be vacated and the cause remanded for entry of a new judgment imposing sentence under the federal statute. The Ninth Circuit took a similar position in Hockenberry v. United States, 422 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir.1970). In Hockenberry, although the government conceded that the existence of an applicable act of Congress precluded assimilation of the California statute through the ACA, the court refused to dismiss the indictment. The indictment stated a crime against the United States even though the language of the California statute differed from the applicable federal statute. 422 F.2d at 173-74. The court reasoned that rules 7(c) and 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure instruct that 30 error in the citation of the statute or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment    or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice and ... any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. 31 Id. at 174 (internal brackets omitted). After noting that the defendant did not allege prejudice or defects affecting substantial rights and then finding that the record would not support either claim, the court rejected the argument that the court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute the defendant. The Hockenberry court affirmed the defendant's conviction but remanded the case for resentencing. 10 32 Likewise, we find that remand for reindictment and retrial is not required under the circumstances of this case. The basic elements are the same for second degree murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) and first degree murder under La.Rev.Stat. § 14:30A(5). Both statutes require proof of specific intent 11 and the killing of a human being. Regarding intent, 18 U.S.C. § 1111 requires proof of specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury, and La.Rev.Stat. § 14:30A(5) requires proof of specific intent to inflict great bodily harm. The dissimilar phrasing does not destroy the compatibility existing between the statutes. This court has already acknowledged that the intent element under the federal murder statute is comparable to the intent required under the Louisiana murder statutes. See United States v. Tolliver, 61 F.3d 1189, 1221 (5th Cir.1995), vacated on other grounds, Sterling v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 900, 133 L.Ed.2d 834 (1996). In Tolliver, when analyzing a sentencing issue, the court agreed with the district court that the Louisiana second degree statute, under which the defendants were convicted, was most akin to the federal crime of first degree murder. 33 [T]he language of the guidelines instructs the court to compare the conduct, not the titles of the statutes cited. As pointed out by the district court, different states have different labels for the same crime, 34 [t]herefore, depending upon which state murder statute is charged as the underlying offense of premeditated murder or killing with specific intent, inconsistent sentences for identical illegal conduct would be imposed in different states if the base offense level was computed merely by looking at the label of such statute and having that label be determinative of the most analogous federal offense, rather than looking at the actual substance of the underlying state statute to determine the most analogous federal offense. 35 The Tolliver court concluded that the district court had correctly compared the substance of the underlying offense and correctly found that first degree murder was the most analogous federal offense. Though labeled somewhat differently, intent to inflict serious bodily injury and intent to inflict great bodily harm represent parallel intents for purposes of evaluating these murder statutes. Accordingly, the elements under the federal and Louisiana murder statutes are analogous enough for us to conclude that the two statutes share the same essential elements. 36 In the present case, the government proved the elements for federal murder at trial. The district judge instructed the jury as follows: 37 in order to convict either of the defendants of First Degree Murder, you must find: 38 1. That said defendant killed Jadasha D. Lowery on or about December 20, 1993; and 39 2. That said defendant acted with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.... 40 The jury's finding that both Lewises were guilty of this crime indicates that the intent and death elements were satisfied. Accordingly, the elements for second degree murder, which mirror the elements contained in the jury charge, were proven below. 41 Provided that we find below that the Lewises' convictions are not reversible due to trial error, remand for resentencing is not warranted in this case. Resentencing is only required where the district court has imposed a sentence that exceeded the maximum sentence that the defendant would have received if sentenced under the applicable federal statute. In Hockenberry, the court explained that resentencing was necessary because the indictment could not support the ten-year sentence Hockenberry received. 422 F.2d at 174. Though the maximum sentence under the California statute was ten years, the maximum sentence available under the federal statute was only five years. Accordingly, the court instructed the district court on remand to reduce the sentence to comport with the federal penalty. 42 In United States v. Hall, 979 F.2d 320, 323 (3d Cir.1992), the Third Circuit refused to remand for sentencing because the sentence imposed on Hall was not higher than that which could have been convicted under the CFR. The CFR provided punishment consisting of a fine not exceeding $500, or six months imprisonment, or both, plus costs. The district court sentenced Hall to 45 days imprisonment and a fine of $300. The Hall court found no prejudice and no need for remand. 43 Here, the Lewises did not receive a sentence exceeding the maximum sentence allowed under the federal murder statute. The United States Code makes second degree murder punishable by imprisonment for any term of years or for life. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (emphasis added). Mr. and Mrs. Lewis both received life sentences. Unlike Hockenberry, the Lewises' sentences are supported by their joint indictment. Therefore, we need not remand for resentencing. 44