Opinion ID: 6983256
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Findings of SHRO

Text: SHRO Sosnowsky, on the other hand, in his examination of the record, found neither procedural nor substantive violations of the IDEA and determined, in reversing the decision of the LHO, that defendants provided an adequate and lawful plan. The SHRO concluded, after examination of the record and listing the qualifications of those involved in the IEP, that “there [was] abundant nontestimonial and extrinsic evidence in the record to justify a contrary decision” from that reached by the LHO. The SHRO found that the LHO “did violence” on the whole to the views of defendant’s expert, Dr. Mesibov, as to the necessity of the “constant data collection of the specific trials” urged by plaintiffs and their expert. It was the opinion of the SHRO that the LHO mischaracterized the effect of the testimony of Marty’s teacher, Linda Singer, perhaps the person most familiar with him and his problems, other than his parents. 13 As to procedural requirements employed by the MET and the formulation of the IEP, the SHRO concluded that defendant’s “MET thoroughly fulfilled the requirements” of the law and the applicable rules, pointing out that the rule dealing with the make-up of the MET required only one “special education-approved teacher or other specialist with knowledge in the area of the suspected disability.” The SHRO also found that an adjustment in hours of DTT services for Marty did not constitute a program or plan revision, nor a change in placement requiring a new evaluation. The SHRO concluded that technical violations of IDEA, if any, did not render the applicable IEP inappropriate, particularly in light of the full participation by plaintiffs in its development. c. Findings of Magistrate Judge We find the magistrate judge’s recommendation and report generally not to be erroneous .in any material respect. The magistrate judge made the following basic finding: The Team, well familiar with Lovaas-style DTT, and what the parents were doing and Dr. Meinhold was proposing, chose to incorporate only part of that program. They were sufficiently familiar with Marty’s condition, aware of the options, and did not need to have any additional experts in either autism or DTT to validate their status. JA 1879. The availability of child psychiatrist Dr. Tsai’s report on Marty to the MET, the magistrate judge noted, was also an adequate resource for its work. The magistrate judge’s conclusion concerning Marty’s “unique needs” bears repetition: “[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate that there was anything ‘unique about Marty’s autism,’” and we find no error in his conclusion that his particular needs were addressed in the IEP. JA 1881 n. 5. The magistrate judge’s conclusion found that the IEP was sufficiently specific. See Chuhran v. Walled Lake Consol. Schools, 839 F.Supp. 465 (E.D.Mich.1993), aff'd, 1995 WL 138882, 51 F.3d 271 (6th Cir.1995) (unpublished per curiam). With respect to “special needs,” it appeared to the magistrate judge that Dr. Meinhold’s recommendation of 40 hours of one-on-one DTT per week was her usual and customary program for all young autistic children with general needs commensurate with this problem, and not geared to Marty specifically. The magistrate judge was persuaded that the IEP did provide for an appropriate educational opportunity taking into account Marty’s unique and particular needs. We believe that the magistrate judge gave appropriate deference to the opinion of the SHRO, who was required under IDEA to “make an independent decision upon completion of [his] review” of the local hearing and the LHO decision. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c). d. The District Court’s Decision The district court, after conducting a de novo review, adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge. Thus, the magistrate judge and the district judge reviewed the record and reached the same conclusion: that the LHO had reached an improper decision with undue emphasis on Dr. Meinhold’s opinion. e. Conclusions of This Court Section 1400(c) of the IDEA was intended to ensure that a child with a disability has “a free appropriate public education ... designed to meet [the] unique needs” of that child. The statute may not require public schools to maximize the potential of disabled students commensurate with the opportunities provided to other children, see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200, 102 S.Ct. 3034; and the potential financial burdens imposed on participating States may be relevant to arriving at a sensible construction of the IDEA, see [Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 892, 104 S.Ct. 3371, 82 L.Ed.2d 664 (1984) ]. Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. Garret F. ex rel. Charlene F., - U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 992, 999, 143 L.Ed.2d 154 (1999). 14 The differing programs or plans offered by the defendant and the plaintiffs are well-summarized by the magistrate judge, who gave detailed consideration to the contentions of the parties and the record in this case. He summarized the issue as follows: [A] court’s inquiry in suits brought under § 141(e)(2) [of IDEA] is twofold. First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act. And second, is the individualized educational program developed through the Act’s procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. [Rowley,] 458 U.S. 176, 206-207, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). JA 1872. Ultimately, we are compelled to answer in the affirmative on both accounts. We begin our analysis by examining the findings of the LHO. We are of the view, contrary to that of the LHO, that the defendant team, taken as a whole, did have adequate “background, experience, and training” to assess this particular disabled child’s condition and to formulate a program to meet his needs under both the federal and state statutes involved. We conclude that the AAPS MET, aided by expert testimony in the case, constituted a group which could make appropriate placement decisions, including an IEP, and included “persons knowledgeable about the child, the meaning of the evaluation data, and the placement options.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.533(a)(3). Unlike the LHO, we cannot find from the record that the failure of the team to consult with plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Meinhold, constituted a serious deficiency in the IEP. Likewise, the failure of the team to prescribe the number of hours of DTT recommended by Dr. Meinhold was not deficient. After a thorough review of the record, we also find ourselves in disagreement with the LHO’s conclusion that the proposed IEP was not “tailored to meet Marty’s ‘unique’ needs.” Dr. Mesi-bov, in our view, had lengthy experience in studying autism and had legitimate concerns about the effectiveness of the Lovaas methods. As to the SHRO’s findings, we first note that we find no error in the action by the SHRO declining to recuse himself in this matter upon the request of the plaintiffs. Furthermore, we agree with the SHRO that the record demonstrates the MET’s “substantial qualifications,” although we doubt “Singer’s qualifications exceed those of Dr. Meinhold.” 15 Moreover, we agree with the SHRO that during the formulation period of the IEPs in this case, there was no fundamental change in a basic element of the education program nor a significant change in program or services initiated by AAPS to Marty within the meaning of Sherri A.D. v. Kirby, 975 F.2d 193, 206 (5th Cir.1992), and Doe By Gonzales v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1487 (9th Cir.1986), modified on other grounds sub nom. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988). Ultimately, we agree with the SHRO’s determination that “there is abundant nontesti-monial and extrinsic evidence in the record to justify a contrary decision” to the LHO. Thus, we find the SHRO’s decision, based on the record, to be a correct one. Having discussed to some extent both the LHO decision and the SHRO decision, it is evident that we have concluded that in many respects the former is flawed. As mentioned, a particular mistake of the LHO was to disregard the IEP as invalid, because the LHO erroneously found the MET not to meet statutory and procedural standards. In that respect, we agree with the SHRO and give his opinion due deference. We hold that the defendants did provide a “free, appropriate, public education for Marty within the meaning of the statute,” to use the words of the magistrate judge. We conclude that under the applicable case law and federal standards that the magistrate judge and the district court were not in error in their treatment of this record and in the analysis of the controversy.