Opinion ID: 2543856
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court's Rejection of Proposed Instructions

Text: Defendant faults the trial court for rejecting three penalty phase instructions the defense had proposed. As a result, defendant argues, he was deprived of the rights enunciated in People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 885, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247, and in People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190, 84 Cal.Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847, and of his state and federal constitutional rights to a jury trial and a fair penalty determination. Defendant refers first to a defense-proposed jury instruction stating that the absence of a statutory mitigating factor does not constitute an aggravating factor. The proposed instruction read: Only those factors which are applicable on the evidence adduced at trial are to be taken into account in the penalty determination. All factors may not be relevant and a factor which is not relevant to the evidence in a particular case should be disregarded. The absence of a statutory mitigating factor does not constitute an aggravating factor. As we have held in the past, it is not error for a trial court not to give a jury instruction that a lack of mitigating evidence does not constitute aggravation. ( People v. Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 912, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 149, 126 P.3d 981; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1041, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.) It was not error for the trial court to refuse the instruction even though the court instructed the jury, under another defense-drafted instruction, that: The factors in the above list which you determine to be aggravating circumstances are the only ones which the law permits you to consider. You are not allowed to consider any other factors or circumstances as the basis for deciding that the death penalty would be an appropriate punishment in this case. Although we have suggested that a trial court should instruct the jury that the absence of mitigating evidence does not constitute aggravating evidence when the court or parties improperly suggest the contrary ( People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 784, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297 [a specific instruction to that effect is not required, at least not unless the court or parties make an improper contrary suggestion]), the defense instruction given the jury here did not suggest a contrary rule. The instruction given, along with CALJIC No. 8.88, correctly told the jury of its discretion in deciding which of the statutory sentencing factors were applicable to the facts of defendant's case. A jury properly advised about the broad scope of its sentencing discretion is unlikely to conclude that the absence of [mitigating] factors ... is entitled to significant aggravating weight. ( People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 769, 244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) The other jury instruction proposed by the defense and refused by the trial court read: Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing the specific harm caused by the defendant's crime. Such evidence, if believed, was not received and may not be considered by you to divert your attention from your proper role of deciding whether defendant should live or die. You must face this obligation soberly and rationally, and you may not impose the ultimate sanction as a result of an irrational, purely subjective response to emotional evidence and argument. On the other hand, evidence and argument on emotional though relevant subjects may provide legitimate reasons to sway the jury to show mercy. We have in the past rejected the argument that a trial court must instruct the jury not to be influenced by emotion resulting from victim impact evidence. ( People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 591, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344 [trial court need not give duplicative instructions]; People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 455, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78 [proposed instruction that jury may not impose death penalty as a result of an irrational, subjective response to emotional evidence is duplicative of CALJIC No. 8.84.1].) Moreover, in People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 358, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545, we upheld the rejection of a jury instruction identical to the one proposed by defendant here. In Harris, the trial court concluded the instruction was confusing because it cautioned the jury against a subjective response to emotional evidence and argument without specifying whether the subjective reaction was that of the victim's family or that of the jurors themselves. ( Id. at p. 359, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545.) The trial court here also expressed concerns about the propriety of the proposed instruction before rejecting it, although the court never articulated on the record what its concerns were. Finally, defendant faults the trial court for rejecting the following proposed jury instruction: The permissible aggravating factors are limited to those aggravating factors upon which you have been specifically instructed. Therefore, the defendant's background may only be considered by you as mitigating evidence. We have in the past upheld the refusal to give materially indistinguishable instructions. ( People v. Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 912, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 149, 126 P.3d 981; People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 457, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.) A defendant's criminal history, which is part of his background, may be considered in aggravation. (§ 190.3, factors (b), (c).) In sum, the trial court here did not err in rejecting the above discussed jury instructions that defendant requested at the penalty phase.