Opinion ID: 786794
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Court's Factual Findings as to Objective Reasonableness

Text: 97 In concluding that Crossan's conduct was objectively reasonable, the district court made a number of factual statements that were not findings by the jury and that impermissibly took the evidence in the light most favorable to Crossan, rather than, as required, to Kerman as the party in whose favor the jury found on the seizure and imprisonment claims and as the party against whom judgment was sought as a matter of law. See generally Piesco v. Koch, 12 F.3d at 343 (court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law only if it can conclude that, with credibility assessments made against the moving party and all inferences drawn against the moving party, a reasonable juror would have been compelled to accept the view of the moving party). As we have recognized, 98 in most trials, and especially in one where participants are giving their accounts of events occurring rapidly and in a highly charged atmosphere, the jurors [a]re not required to accept the entirety of either side's account, but [a]re free to accept bits of testimony from several witnesses and to make reasonable inferences from whatever testimony they credit[]. 99 Haywood v. Koehler, 78 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir.1996). In determining whether to grant judgment as a matter of law, the court must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. at 151. The district court in Kerman III did not limit its consideration to factual propositions that the jury in this case accepted or would have been compelled to accept. 100 For example, the court suggested that Crossan had directly obtained medical information from one of Kerman's doctors, stating that [t]wo officers testified that they heard Defendant Crossan or another officer on the telephone with a doctor. Kerman III, 2003 WL 328297, at . Although officer Steve Kaminski said he saw Crossan on the telephone and believed Crossan addressed the person on the other end as Doctor ( see Tr. 401-02), and officer Thomas Loomis said he saw either Crossan or Hume on the telephone and heard the person on the other end addressed as Doc (Tr. 452-53), neither of these officers could give any information whatever as to the substance of such a telephone conversation. Neither of them professed to have heard any questions being asked as to Kerman's medical history or condition. Moreover, even if the court could permissibly have inferred that Crossan had in fact spoken to one of Kerman's psychiatrists on the telephone, there was no evidence from which it could infer that either doctor had communicated to Crossan a belief that Kerman was then dangerous. Dr. Malone testified that Kerman, speaking with him on the telephone until they were cut off, sounded like his normal self, coherent, insightful, and witty. (Tr. 662-63.) And Kerman's hospital record (which the jury specifically asked to review during deliberations, Kerman III, 2003 WL 328297, at ) showed that Dr. Brozovsky, who was contacted by the hospital no more than 1 ½ hours after Kerman's arrival, stated that Kerman's homicidal ideation is `infin[i]tesimal' and a `minute' risk (Trial Exhibit 1). 101 The jury surely was not required to credit the officers' testimony suggesting that Crossan spoke to a doctor, and their testimony was wholly insufficient to permit any inference as to the content or substance of any such conversation. The court, in crediting the officers' testimony and intimating that Crossan or another officer obtained medical information by speaking with a doctor on the telephone, plainly did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to Kerman, especially given (a) the inability of Crossan to recall speaking to any doctor, (b) the absence of any evidence that Dr. Brozovsky called the apartment, and (c) the testimony of Dr. Malone that he did not speak to a policeman. 102 Nor did the district court view the evidence in the light most favorable to Kerman in finding that Kerman was conducting himself in a manner that was likely to result in serious harm to himself and others. Kerman III, 2003 WL 328297, at . The court having stated that it would disregard the defense testimony that Kerman was screaming and yelling, was incoherent, and would not calm down, see id., the only supposedly dangerous conduct to which the court pointed was Kerman's refusal to respond to questions or to allow a complete physical examination to be taken by EMS paramedic, Pontrelli, id. at . Yet the record contains evidence that Kerman did not refuse examination by Pontrelli and did not refuse to respond promptly and cogently to important questions. For example, Kerman testified that Pontrelli asked him whether he was taking any medication, and that he responded he was not. Further, when Hume asked Kerman whether he had a doctor, Kerman responded affirmatively and gave Hume Dr. Brozovsky's name and telephone number; and when Hume got no answer and hung up, it was Kerman who thought to have Hume call again and leave a message. In addition, Kerman testified that he allowed Pontrelli to take his pulse. When Pontrelli asked to take his blood pressure, Kerman didn't refuse to allow him. (Tr. 477.) He simply responded, you don't need to take my blood pressure. My blood pressure is one of the healthy things I have. (Tr. 132.) According to Kerman, Pontrelli did not pursue the matter. ( See Tr. 477 (If he had insisted I would have let him. But he didn't insist.).) 103 The court also concluded that Crossan's conduct was reasonable in part because Crossan observed that Kerman was naked. The jury, had it been asked, would not have been compelled to so conclude, given, inter alia, testimony by other officers that when they arrived at the apartment Kerman was wet and wearing a towel ( see, e.g., Tr. 382, 270), as well as Crossan's own testimony (a) that he would not have regarded nakedness in and of itself as an indication that Kerman was dangerous to himself or others, and (b) that he did not recall whether he asked Kerman why he was naked. 104 In addition, the court must have discredited testimony by Kerman when it found that Kerman's apartment was filthy with feces and urine and stunk, Kerman III, 2003 WL 328297, at , and that  [t]he filthy conditions ... [were] admitted by Plaintiff,  id. at  (emphasis added). Although Kerman indicated that his apartment had been filthy in the past, he testified, as discussed above, that when the officers were there his apartment, though messy, was not dirty, that the kitchen was clean and that the bathroom was immaculate (Tr. 505). In finding that Kerman's apartment was filthy, the court improperly resolved a credibility issue in favor of Crossan; in finding that the condition of the apartment was sufficient to warrant a belief that Kerman posed a danger to himself or others, the court improperly drew inferences adverse to Kerman. 105 The district court also linked its finding that Crossan's conduct in sending Kerman to the hospital was objectively reasonable — and indeed was virtually required — to the New York statute that provides that `any ... police officer... may take into custody any person who appears to be mentally ill and is conducting himself in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to himself or others.' Kerman III, 2003 WL 328297, at  (quoting N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 9.41). However, whether a person is conducting himself in a manner that is likely to result in serious harm to himself or others is a question of fact, and the court's instructions to the jury had repeatedly indicated that if the jury found that Kerman posed such a threat, whether overtly or as evidenced circumstantially by behavior, neglect, or refusal to care for himself ( see Tr. 750, 755), it should find that Crossan had probable cause to detain Kerman and hospitalize him. Although the issues of probable cause and qualified immunity are not congruent, in that the latter requires consideration of the reasonableness of the defendant official's perception of the law, see, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. at 205-06, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272; Stephenson v. Doe, 332 F.3d at 78-79, most of the factual components here, such as what actions were taken, what information the officers possessed as to Kerman's mental condition, and whether the officers' perceptions of the circumstances were reasonable in light of the information that was available to them, were common to both issues. The jury's finding that Crossan failed to show the existence of probable cause indicated its rejection of the proposition, embraced by the court, that Crossan and his fellow police officers ascertained that Plaintiff... was conducting himself in a manner that was likely to result in serious harm to himself and others, Kerman III, 2003 WL 328297, at . In light of the jury's interrogatory answers, the court was not free to make this finding. 106 Nor can we uphold the district court's dismissal of Kerman's false imprisonment claims on the basis of the state-law provision granting police officers immunity from damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by [a] person [taken into custody and transported to a hospital] ... unless it is established that such injuries ... [were] caused by gross negligence. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 9.59. See generally Napolitano v. Flynn, 949 F.2d 617, 620-21 (2d Cir.1991) (entitlement to immunity on state-law claims is a question of state substantive law). Citing Woody v. Astoria General Hospital, Inc., 264 A.D.2d 318, 319, 694 N.Y.S.2d 41, 42 (1st Dep't 1999), for the proposition that gross negligence in § 9.59 means reckless disregard for the plaintiff's rights or intentional wrongdoing, the district court held that Crossan's actions do not rise to the level of gross negligence, i.e. reckless disregard or intentional wrongdoing. Kerman III, 2003 WL 328297, at . But questions as to whether there was gross negligence, intent, or reckless disregard are questions of fact to be answered by the jury. See, e.g., Food Pageant, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., Inc., 54 N.Y.2d 167, 172-73, 445 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62, 429 N.E.2d 738 (1981) (the existence or nonexistence of gross negligence ... [is] a matter for jury determination.); see also Rand & Paseka Manufacturing Co. v. Holmes Protection, Inc., 130 A.D.2d 429, 431, 515 N.Y.S.2d 468, 470 (1st Dep't 1987) (approving jury charge that gross negligence occurs when a party proceeds in reckless disregard of the consequences of its acts), appeal denied, 70 N.Y.2d 615, 524 N.Y.S.2d 677, 519 N.E.2d 623 (1988). In finding in favor of Crossan on these issues, the district court stated that, [a]s regards acts of reckless or intentional wrongdoing, the jury had found that Kerman failed to prove that Crossan intentionally or recklessly subjected Plaintiff to excess force after he was placed in handcuffs or that Crossan's conduct amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress,  or that Crossan  was motivated ... by Plaintiff's exercise of his free speech rights  in keeping Kerman naked, refusing to allow him to medicate his cat, sending Kerman to the hospital, or sending him to Bellevue rather than a more convenient hospital. Kerman III, 2003 WL 328297, at  n. 6 (emphases added). Those jury findings, however, while pertinent to Kerman's claims of excessive force and retaliation, did not address the issue of whether Crossan's orders for Kerman's detention and hospitalization were grossly negligent with respect to, or in reckless disregard of, Kerman's right not to be detained or hospitalized without probable cause. As detailed in Part I.E. above, the only questions submitted to the jury on the issue of Crossan's conduct with respect to the claims of unlawful detention and false imprisonment were whether Crossan acted with probable cause. There was no jury finding as to whether Crossan acted with gross negligence as to, or in reckless disregard of, Kerman's right to liberty; and on the evidence taken in the light most favorable to Kerman (including the evidence that after the police search found no gun at Kerman's home, Crossan nonetheless ordered Kerman involuntarily hospitalized without availing himself of the opportunity to discuss Kerman's condition with Kerman's doctors), the jury would not have been compelled to find that Crossan was not reckless or grossly negligent. Thus, the court was not entitled to make that finding. 107 In sum, we agree with Kerman's contentions that the district court's ruling that Crossan was entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law was contrary to the law of this case as established in Kerman II. And to the extent that the court's immunity rulings were based on the court's own factual findings that the jury neither made nor would have been compelled to make, the rulings infringed Kerman's Seventh Amendment right to have the facts found by a jury. 108