Opinion ID: 783483
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Residual Hearsay Exception

Text: 147 Federal Rule of Evidence 807 is an exception to the hearsay rule that provides for the admissibility of statements that have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness as the other hearsay exceptions. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Hernandez's statement under this exception because the statement did not have circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness-Hernandez was merely exculpating himself. It is clear that Larry Hernandez's words were so unreliable that there was a need to subject them to adversarial testing in a trial setting. 2. Gallardo 148 Gallardo argues that the district court erred by admitting audio recordings of statements Peters made to his mother, Paz Gutierrez, that Gallardo murdered Manuel Luna and Ricardo Gonzales. The district court admitted this evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), which excludes from the definition of hearsay those statements made by a coconspirator during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 149 Gallardo argues that the statements were mere idle conversation, and not in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Bibbero, 749 F.2d 581, 584 (9th Cir.1984) (holding that idle conversation is not in furtherance of the conspiracy). However, Gallardo has not pointed us to any facts on which we could find that the district court clearly erred. 150 Gallardo also argues that the district court improperly allowed the government to call Humberto Madrigal solely to impeach him with his prior identification as a guise to use the hearsay statement as substantive evidence against Gallardo. United States v. Crouch, 731 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.1984). The indictment charged Gallardo with the attempted murder of Madrigal. At trial, Madrigal testified that he was shot but could not identify his assailant or pick out the assailant from a photo lineup. Madrigal testified also that at Gallardo's parole revocation hearing he testified that Gallardo did not shoot him. On cross-examination, Madrigal again testified that he could not identify the assailant. Subsequently, the government called LAPD Detective Martinez who testified that Madrigal identified Gallardo as the assailant during an interview at the hospital, and when shown a later photo line-up at Madrigal's home. 151 Madrigal's prior identification of Gallardo was admissible nonhearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), which permits out-of-court statements of identification of a person if the declarant is subject to cross-examination. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence of Madrigal's prior identification. 152 V Motion to Unseal and the District Court's Discovery Rulings A. Motion to Unseal 153 On November 23, 1998, we entered an order remanding to the district court for the limited purpose of considering whether Appellants' request to unseal documents filed by the government under seal and in camera should be granted. Subsequently in response to a district court order, Appellants identified 583 sealed and in camera documents at issue, of which 145 were arguably filed under seal or in camera by the government. On May 29, 2000, the district court entered an order unsealing several documents and retaining others under seal. On January 24, 2001, Appellants filed with this court a renewed motion to unseal the filings. On April 13, 2001, we denied the motion without prejudice to raising the issue in the opening briefs. 154 Although Appellants creatively argue for a constitutional right of access, they are clearly challenging the district court's discovery rulings regarding sealed and in camera documents. We review a district court's discovery rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Chon, 210 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir.2000). We review for clear error the district court's decision to refuse a defendant access to information in a government document produced pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). United States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 1991). We review for an abuse of discretion the district court's denial of a motion to produce documents pursuant to the Jencks Act. United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 871 (9th Cir.2002). Because the district court has the inherent power to seal documents, we review for an abuse of discretion the district court's decision to retain filings under seal. United States v. Mann, 829 F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir.1987). 155 We have reviewed every document filed under seal or in camera, and conclude that the district court did not err. B. Discovery Rulings 156 We review for an abuse of discretion the district court's discovery rulings. Chon, 210 F.3d at 994. To reverse a conviction for a discovery violation, we must find not only that the district court abused its discretion, but that the error resulted in prejudice to substantial rights. United States v. Amlani, 111 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir.1997). We review de novo challenges to convictions based on alleged Brady violations. United States v. Smith, 282 F.3d 758, 770 (9th Cir.2002). 157 First, Appellants contend that the district court abused its discretion by issuing protective orders for certain discovery materials, whereby the government provided defense counsel with one copy of the covered documents to be kept in a secure location accessible only to defense counsel. The district court issued five protective orders encompassing: (1) twenty-five pages; (2) seven pages; (3) ten pages; (4) a copy of the transcript of the proceeding concerning the first wiretap; and (5) early production of certain witness statements. The covered documents were a minuscule portion of the entire discovery for an eight-month trial, and simply do not support Appellants' contention that they were crippled by these protective orders. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing the protective orders. 158 Appellants contend also that they were hampered by the government's late discovery responses to which the district court acquiesced. However, Appellants only cite a few isolated instances that do not rise to the level of discovery violations. The district court did not abuse its discretion. 159 Finally, Appellants maintain that the district court erred by ruling that the government did not have to produce an alleged CDC debriefing of E. Castro in the CDC's possession. Prosecutors must turn over Brady materials when the prosecutors have knowledge of and access to the documents sought by the defendant. United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 893 (9th Cir.1995). 160 The district court correctly ruled that the government did not have to turn over the alleged CDC debriefing of E. Castro. First, CDC is a state agency and the government in this case did not have access to its files. United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that federal prosecutors were not in possession of CDC materials). Second, assuming that the government did have access to the debriefing, the knowledge requirement is not satisfied. A government representative testified that the government did not know whether the debriefing took place, and Appellants do not cite any evidence to indicate otherwise. VI Jury Instructions 161 Appellants argue that the district court erred in several of its jury instructions. We address each disputed instruction. 162 A. RICO's Interstate Commerce Jurisdictional Element 163 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (RICO) contains the following jurisdiction element: It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.... Appellants argue that the district court erroneously instructed the jury that this element could be satisfied if the the activities of the enterprise affect interstate commerce in some minimal way. According to Appellants, the correct standard requires the jury to find that the enterprise had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Appellants also argue that the district court's supplemental jury instruction defining a de minimis effect did not accurately capture that standard. We disagree. 164 Whether a jury instruction misstates elements of a statutory crime is a question of law, which we review de novo. United States v. Patterson, 292 F.3d 615, 629-30 (9th Cir.2002). We review de novo claims of insufficient evidence. United States v. Carranza, 289 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir.2002). There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 641-42. 165 In United States v. Juvenile Male, we held that all that is required to establish federal jurisdiction in a RICO prosecution is a showing that the individual predicate racketeering acts have a de minimis impact on interstate commerce. 118 F.3d 1344, 1347-49 (9th Cir.1997). The district court, therefore, correctly instructed the jury that a de minimis affect on interstate commerce was sufficient to establish jurisdiction under RICO. 6 166 Appellants allege also that (1) the district court erred by giving the following supplemental instruction: the jurisdiction requirement is met if the enterprise or its activities engaged in or involved interstate or international drug trafficking, use of interstate communication devices, or possession or use of weapons which traveled in interstate commerce, and (2) insufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that the jurisdictional requirement was met. The district court did not err because this instruction adequately reflected the jurisdiction requirement. Moreover, sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that the crimes charged had at least a de minimis affect on interstate commerce, including evidence offered by the government that: (1) Appellants engaged in extensive drug trafficking; (2) firearms manufactured outside California were found at J. Hernandez's residence; (3) several Appellants sold narcotics grown outside California; (4) Barela and Mendez had discussions with Mexican drug traffickers regarding their possible involvement in an impending narcotics transaction; (5) R. Castro was involved in a telephone call from Oregon to California that discussed illegal activities; and (6) Moreno made a comment regarding a future letter he might receive from out of state. B. Other RICO Elements 167 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), provides in relevant part: It shall be unlawful for any person... associated with any enterprise ... to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.... Appellants contend that the district court's jury instructions improperly defined the elements of (1) to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs; and (2) pattern of racketeering activity. 168 Whether a jury instruction misstates elements of a statutory crime is a question of law that we review de novo. Patterson, 292 F.3d at 629-30. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court's formulation of jury instructions. United States v. Stapleton, 293 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir.2002). 169 1. [T]o conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs 170 The district court gave the following instruction with respect to the to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs element: 171 The phrase to conduct or participate in the affairs of the enterprise relates to the performance of the acts, functions, or duties which are necessary or helpful in the operation of the enterprise. 172 A defendant conducts or participates in the affairs of the enterprise when that defendant participates, in some degree, in the operation, direction or management of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. 173 In Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Supreme Court held `to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs,' one must participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself. 507 U.S. 170, 185, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993) (citation omitted). The Court concluded that the word conduct indicated some degree of direction over the affairs of the enterprise. Id. at 178, 113 S.Ct. 1163. The Court concluded also that the term participate meant to take part in, and not to aid and abet. Id. at 178-79, 113 S.Ct. 1163. Appellants contend that to capture Reves's operation and management test, the district court should have replaced the underlined language with have some part in the operation or management of the enterprise. 7 174 The district court improperly defined to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs because the instruction did not clarify that Appellants had to be involved in the operation or management of the Mexican Mafia. We conclude, however, that the error was harmless. The district court's failure to instruct the jury on an element of a crime is harmless if we conclude that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error. United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (internal quotation omitted). Here, the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that each Appellant met Reves's operation and management test. For example, the evidence showed that during meetings Appellants voted on membership and authorization to assault or kill opponents, divided territory for the purpose of taxing drug dealers and street gangs, planned several crimes including murders, coordinated their drug trafficking activities, resolved disputes among members, and made other important decisions concerning the Mexican Mafia's affairs. The Appellants, except J. Hernandez, were not only involved in the operation and management of the Mexican Mafia, they were the members/leaders of the enterprise. J. Hernandez, on the other hand, clearly participated in the operation and management of the Mexican Mafia because he served as a messenger between incarcerated members and members on the street, and helped organize criminal activities on behalf of the organization. 175 2. Pattern of Racketeering Activity 176 The district court gave the following instruction with respect to the pattern element: 177 A person engages in a pattern of racketeering activity if he commits at least two related acts of racketeering within ten years. The two racketeering acts may not be isolated or disconnected, but must be related to each other by a common scheme, plan, or motive. The two racketeering acts must also amount to, or pose a threat of, continued criminal activity. 178 In determining whether the racketeering acts constitute a pattern, you may consider, among other things, whether the acts were closely related in time and whether they shared a similarity of purpose or method. 179 Appellants contend that this instruction is deficient because it failed to define isolated. 180 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to define isolated. In reviewing jury instructions, the relevant inquiry is whether the instructions as a whole are misleading or inadequate to guide the jury's deliberation. United States v. Dixon, 201 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir.2000). Accordingly, the district court need not define common terms that are readily understandable to the jury. United States v. Hicks, 217 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that false and statement were common terms that the district court need not define). Here, Appellants have not cited any case law for the proposition that the district court had to define isolated, nor is there any. The term isolated is simply a common term that is readily understandable to the jury.