Opinion ID: 2993622
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Misstating the Law and Facts

Text: Flores contends that the government committed misconduct by erroneously telling the jury that it could convict her based on her admission to carrying marijuana to Mexico on the date of her arrest. We agree that the government misstated the law to the jury. See United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 200 (9th Cir. 1980) (“A prosecutor should not misstate the law in closing argument.”). The government also misstated Flores’s testimony, thereby making an unsupported factual claim. See United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1321 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Mageno, 762 F.3d 933, 943 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 786 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2015). Flores did not object to this misconduct below, however, so we review for plain error. We conclude that the misstatements did not substantially prejudice her, and so do not warrant reversal. See Ruiz, 710 F.3d at 1082. 8 UNITED STATES V. FLORES
The government crossed the line between permissible commentary on Flores’s testimony about her Facebook messages and that which we have long deemed impermissible. In a message dated June 21, 2012, Flores’s friend asked if she “carried some pot,” to which Flores responded, “yes.”5 In a second pair of June 21 messages, Flores says to a different friend, “come over and have a smoke” “of what I’m bringing.”6 Flores testified that these messages meant that she was bringing marijuana to Mexico and argued that they did not prove that she imported marijuana as charged. The government characterized these messages differently: You heard about some posts on [Flores’s] Facebook account from June 21st 2012 when she said she was carrying marijuana and bringing marijuana. You know what she was carrying on June 21st 2012. She was carrying and bringing marijuana from Mexico into the United States in her car. She tried to convince you. She tried to explain this away. She said, No. No. What I was doing was bringing marijuana from the United States of America into Mexico. 5 The Facebook postings are in Spanish, which the government translated for the jury. Flores translates the conversation differently, asserting that the question was, “Did you take weed.” 6 Flores also translates this conversation differently, asserting that the invitation was to “come so you can smoke out of what I have.” UNITED STATES V. FLORES 9 This argument reflects the government’s apparent strategy for using the Facebook messages to convince the jury that Flores (1) admitted to carrying drugs across the U.S.-Mexico border, and (2) was lying about the direction she carried the drugs. Both parts of this strategy are permissible. Prosecutors are free in argument to suggest that the jury draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial. United States v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Mageno, 762 F.3d at 943; United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that prosecutors may argue that a defendant is lying). Here, there was more than enough evidence to support a reasonable inference that the Facebook messages actually meant that Flores was carrying drugs into the United States, rather than to Mexico as she testified. She was, in fact, carrying more than 36 pounds of marijuana in her car as she entered the United States on the very day she sent those messages. She then attempted to delete postings on her Facebook account from jail after the border patrol discovered the marijuana in her car. Of course, the jury was free to believe Flores’s explanation that the messages actually referenced exportation rather than importation, but the evidence adequately supported the government’s characterization of them. Even if we were to accept that those messages conveyed a desire to smoke marijuana in Mexico, nothing in them rules out the possibility that Flores was offering her friends an opportunity to smoke some of the more than 36 pounds of marijuana she picked up in Mexico before she carried it back to the United States. The latter possibility is all the more plausible because when Flores was arrested, she was not carrying any marijuana other than that found hidden in her car. This evidence supports the permissible inference the government asked the 10 UNITED STATES V. FLORES jury to draw—namely, that the Facebook messages referenced the very marijuana found in Flores’s car. This prosecutorial argument also accurately characterized Flores’s insistence that she carried drugs to Mexico but not to the United States. So long as the government accurately recounted what Flores said—and in the statement quoted above, it did—the government was free to ask the jury to disbelieve Flores. Further, the argument accurately states the law by explaining that Flores is guilty because, regardless of her Facebook postings and what she testified about them, Flores brought drugs into the United States. However, the government also strayed beyond the boundaries of permissible questioning and argument. The prosecutor repeatedly asserted that Flores had admitted to “drug smuggling.” As a legal but irrelevant matter, Flores did admit to drug smuggling, see 21 U.S.C. § 960—just not the kind of drug smuggling with which she was charged, which the prosecutor had to know. Labeling Flores an “admitted drug smuggler” when she actually admitted to exportation required the government to walk a very fine line. It was “definitely improper” for the prosecutor to suggest that Flores admitted to “drug smuggling” when the prosecutor used the term as a synonym for importation because that misstated Flores’s testimony. See United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d at 1321; see also Mageno, 762 F.3d at 943. At the same time, when loosely referencing “drug smuggling” to encompass exportation, the government could, without misstating testimony, assert that Flores admitted to drug smuggling. However, it was improper to use the “admission to drug smuggling” lingo in this loose manner when suggesting that such an admission was sufficient to warrant a conviction for the crime charged. Doing so misstates the law, because UNITED STATES V. FLORES 11 Flores was not charged with exportation—the only form of drug smuggling to which she actually admitted. The prosecutor improperly used the phrase “drug smuggling” as a synonym for importation frequently, from her opening statement through her last closing line to the jury. The government’s arguments that Flores admitted to drug smuggling at trial were therefore misleading, if not outright false. These misstatements became flat falsehoods with the prosecutor’s coup de grace: “She knows she was smuggling drugs on June 21st, 2012. You heard her say that repeatedly and that’s why she’s guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” The jurors knew this was an importation case, so the only way Flores’s admission to “drug smuggling” would be a basis for finding her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is if she had admitted to importation. Because she never made such an admission at trial, this statement falsely characterized Flores’s testimony. Moreover, to the extent that the prosecutor did not misrepresent Flores’s testimony, she misstated the law. Flores admitted at trial to exportation. She therefore could be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on this admission only if exportation were adequate to support a conviction. Because Flores was on trial for importation, however, the argument that knowingly exporting marijuana was sufficient to support a guilty verdict misstated the law. The prosecutor also improperly invited the jury to convict Flores based on exportation rather than importation during cross-examination. After Flores admitted to carrying drugs into Mexico, the prosecutor asked, “That was illegal, wasn’t it?” Similarly, in closing, the prosecutor acknowledged that Flores “claimed she had smuggled drugs from the United 12 UNITED STATES V. FLORES States to Mexico,” then asserted, “[t]hat’s still smuggling drugs.” These statements are not technically untrue, as exportation is drug smuggling and is illegal. By specifically emphasizing the illegality of exportation, however, the government suggested that even if the jury believed that Flores only exported drugs, she “still” acted illegally. In doing so, the prosecutor overstepped by inviting the jury to improperly convict Flores based on exportation. The prosecutor made this worse by purposefully blurring and minimizing the distinction between importation and exportation. During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked whether Flores carried drugs “between” the United States and Mexico and “across” the border, without specifying a direction. In closing, the prosecutor then characterized a dispute over which direction the drugs traveled as a mere “quibble[],” minimizing the significance of that disputed fact. These statements, while again not untrue as an abstract legal matter, furthered the misimpression that the jury could convict Flores based on exportation. The government should have been much more cautious in brandishing the potentially misleading label of “admitted drug smuggler.” Had the government carefully and accurately used the term, it may have been able to avoid misstating the law or the facts. But the government was unable to do so, and in any event should not have tried to “push the envelope” in this manner. Ruiz, 710 F.3d at 1087 (Pregerson, J., concurring). As the Supreme Court has said, “[t]he United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose . . . interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). UNITED STATES V. FLORES 13
Flores failed to object to any of these improper statements, and must therefore show that the government’s actions amounted to plain error. See Ruiz, 710 F.3d at 1082. Although there was error, and it was plain, Flores fails to demonstrate the prosecutor’s improper statements affected her substantial rights or the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). In the context of the entire trial, the prosecution’s misconduct was not likely to have affected the jury’s ability to weigh the evidence fairly. See United States v. Sanchez, 659 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 2011). Despite the prosecutor’s best efforts, it was unlikely that the jury was actually confused about Flores’s testimony or the elements of the charge of importation. On multiple occasions, during both cross-examination and closing arguments, the government did accurately, directly, and explicitly re-state Flores’s testimony.7 The defense also accurately reiterated Flores’s testimony in closing.8 The chorus of accurate characterizations of Flores’s testimony 7 For example, during cross-examination, the prosecutor asked: “So your testimony is you brought drugs from the United States to Mexico but not from Mexico into the United States?” In closing, the prosecutor noted that Flores “quibbled with the direction” in which the government argued the drugs traveled. Similarly, the prosecutor reminded the jury that Flores said, she “was bringing marijuana from the United States of America into Mexico,” and “claimed she had smuggled drugs from the United States to Mexico.” 8 Defense counsel conceded that Flores “would sometimes bring marijuana to Mexico to smoke with her cousin.” 14 UNITED STATES V. FLORES likely drowned out the government’s infrequent, indirect, and implicit misstatements of that testimony. Moreover, Flores’s testimony was simple, unambiguous, and unmistakable.9 Jury confusion was therefore unlikely. It is also unlikely that the prosecution’s misstatements of the law confused the jury about the elements of the charged offense. The prosecution did, on multiple occasions, clearly and directly state that importation was required to support a conviction. In closing, the prosecutor also correctly stated: You don’t have to write this down, two elements. Defendant knew she brought marijuana from a place outside into a place inside the United States and second, she knew the substance she was bringing into the United States was marijuana or some other prohibited drug. Basically, the United States has to prove to you or has proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Flores [acted] knowingly—she wasn’t dragged over the border, nobody dragged her over the border. She voluntarily drove her car from Mexico into the United States. 9 The prosecutor asked Flores: “[O]n the day of your arrest, you were bringing marijuana between the United States and Mexico?” Flores responded: “Into Mexico.” The prosecutor then asked: “[Y]ou definitely brought drugs between the United States and Mexico?” Flores again responded: “Not between. Into Mexico.” UNITED STATES V. FLORES 15 During closing, the prosecutor argued at least sixteen times that Flores brought drugs into the United States.10 In other words, the government built its entire argument around a correct statement of a very simple law and repeatedly informed the jury in which direction Flores had to carry drugs to be found guilty. Accordingly, it is unlikely that a rational jury would have concluded, based on a few misstatements of the law, that it could convict Flores regardless of which direction she carried drugs. Further, the evidence against Flores was overwhelming. See Berry, 627 F.2d at 201. Flores was found with more than 36 pounds of drugs in her car. The government explained various ways in which Flores would have become aware that her car was loaded with marijuana. Flores acted suspiciously at the border, drawing Officer Brown’s attention to the drugs. 10 The prosecutor said: “she brought drugs in;” “[s]he was completely surrounded by marijuana and coming into the United States;” “[s]he knew she had smuggled drugs into the United States;” “[d]efendant knew she brought marijuana from a place outside into a place inside the United States;” “[w]e also have proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt she knew there were drugs in her car [as she was entering the United States;]” “[s]he was carrying and bringing marijuana from Mexico into the United States in her car;” “[y]ou know the direction she was smuggling those drugs. She was smuggling them from Mexico into the United States;” “[s]he was nervous . . . because she was surrounded by marijuana she was smuggling into the United States;” “[s]he did what anyone would do when they are nervous because of smuggling drugs into the United States;” “[s]he knew she was smuggling[] drugs into the United States;” “[she was] arrested . . . after smuggling[] drugs into the United States;” “[she was] hire[d] to bring the drugs into the United States;” “[s]he knew she smuggled drugs into the United States;” “[s]he was ashamed . . . in that jail call because she knew she smuggled drugs into the United States;” “[she] smuggled drugs into the United States;” “[s]he is a drug smuggler who had someone put [the drugs] in [her car] for her so she could bring drugs into the United States.” 16 UNITED STATES V. FLORES In a recorded phone call from jail played for the jury, Flores expressed regret, not frustration or confusion, as one would expect if Juan had planted the drugs in Flores’s car without her knowledge.11 She further implicated herself by asking Jose Manuel to destroy evidence from Facebook—evidence that was apparently so incriminating that Flores asked someone to delete it even though she knew her call was being recorded.12 Flores’s story about Juan the mechanic—the only innocent explanation for the drugs found in Flores’s car—was entirely uncorroborated and highly suspect, as the government pointed out to the jury. Flores mentioned her visit to the dermatologist to Officer Brown at the border, and presented a host of evidence at trial to corroborate that aspect of her trip to Mexico.13 Yet she failed to mention her interaction with Juan to Officer Brown at the border and offered no evidence to prove that Juan did any repair work on 11 In this call, Flores said to her boyfriend: “If you keep fucking around, that’s not proving anything to me. Do you want to be with me? Do you want to change? I fucking stepped foot in here and I asked myself, what the fuck? Why would I do this to my family? . . . I’m not going to fucking set foot in here again.” 12 In this call, Flores asked Manuel, her cousin, to login to Flores’s Facebook account, change the password, and “take off whatever you feel needs to be taken off.” Flores also warned Manuel that the call was being recorded. 13 Flores identified her dermatologist as Dr. Juan R. Martinez Najera, produced a picture of his office, and introduced prescriptions written by Dr. Martinez for Flores on June 21, 2012. UNITED STATES V. FLORES 17 her car, or that he even existed.14 The government’s expert also testified that the air conditioner in Flores’s car was not working in June of 2012, obviously suggesting that it had not been repaired by Juan in Tijuana.15 Further, Flores’s cousin in Tijuana, whom Flores visited on the day of her arrest, was supposedly friends with Juan and presumably could have provided details about Juan to corroborate Flores’s testimony. No such evidence was presented. Nor did Flores attempt to explain why she had not taken even basic steps to locate Juan or corroborate her story after having gone to such lengths to confirm her trip to the dermatologist. All of these facts are inconsistent with Flores’s story that Juan the mechanic planted drugs in Flores’s car without her knowledge, and no other innocent explanation was offered for how they got there. Flores is correct that the evidence of her knowledge was circumstantial, but that circumstantial evidence was overwhelming.16 14 Flores did not provide a last name, phone number, address, or business name for Juan the mechanic. Unlike the dermatologist, she did not call Juan in advance to arrange for the repair work to be done on her car. Flores testified that she paid Juan $40, but she did not have a receipt for any repair work done by Juan in Tijuana. She did, however, have multiple invoices from an auto body shop located in Garden Grove, California. 15 The government’s expert explained that the compressor in Flores’s car—an essential component of an air conditioning system—was inoperable when he inspected it. He further explained that if the compressor had been functional when Flores’s car was impounded, it would have remained functional through the date of the inspection, as compressors do not “fail from just sitting” in an impound lot. 16 In evaluating the strength of the evidence against her, Flores notes that the jury in her first trial could not reach a unanimous verdict. But a jury’s inability to reach a verdict could be attributed to many factors other than the closeness of the evidence. That is particularly so in cases, like this, 18 UNITED STATES V. FLORES Further mitigating the risk of prejudice, jury instructions correctly stating the law were read shortly after closing arguments, and thus shortly after the government’s key misstatements. As to the elements of the charge, the district court correctly instructed: In order for the defendant to be found guilty . . . , the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, the defendant knowingly brought marijuana into the United States from a place outside the United States; and Second, the defendant knew the substance she was bringing into the United States was marijuana . . . . This instruction mirrored the prosecution’s earlier correct statement of the law and again made the importance of importation abundantly clear. The instructions also reiterated that “the defendant is charged in the indictment with unlawful importation of a controlled substance.” If the jury was at all misled by the prosecution’s statements, which is doubtful, the where the defendant seems sympathetic and lacked the wherewithal to act alone given the drug quantity and means of transport, and the charge involves a substance that has been legalized in some states. Because we can only speculate about why the jury hung at the first trial, we place little weight on the first jury’s inability to reach a verdict. In evaluating the strength of the evidence, we look first and foremost to the evidence itself, rather than to the first jury’s reaction to that evidence. For the same reason, we place little stock in the fact that the second jury returned a guilty verdict shortly after deliberations began. UNITED STATES V. FLORES 19 court’s instructions very likely put the jury back on course. We presume the jury followed these instructions when determining whether Flores was guilty as charged. See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000). In sum, while the government misrepresented Flores’s testimony and misstated the law on multiple occasions, in the context of the trial as a whole, it is unlikely that the jury was misled about the law or the facts. See Berry, 627 F.2d at 200. The evidence against Flores was overwhelming, see id. at 201, and the jury was correctly instructed. Accordingly, Flores cannot show that the government’s misconduct rose to the level of plain error. See Sanchez, 659 F.3d at 1257.