Opinion ID: 704006
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the conflict between attorney and client

Text: 169 The Second Circuit's decision in Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1407, 128 L.Ed.2d 79 (1994), is particularly instructive in this case because, unlike the many cases addressing the actual conflict issue in the multiple representation context, Winkler addresses a conflict between the interest of the lawyer and the interest of his client. The issue presented by Winkler was whether a contingency fee agreement between a criminal defendant and his attorney created a conflict of interest for the attorney resulting in a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The court began by noting that an attorney has an actual, as opposed to a potential, conflict of interest when, during the course of the representation, the attorney's and defendant's interests diverge with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action. Id. at 307 (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted). Having defined when an actual conflict of interest exists between an attorney and his client, the court went on to analyze the alleged conflict at issue: 170 Winkler argues that the contingency fee created an actual conflict of interest for trial counsel because Winkler's interests in effective representation were pitted against trial counsel's monetary interest. We agree. The contingency fee agreement in this case provided trial counsel with an extra $25,000 only if Winkler was acquitted or otherwise not found guilty. Thus, trial counsel had a disincentive to seek a plea agreement, or to put forth mitigating defenses that would result in conviction of a lesser included offense. Plainly the contingency fee agreement created an actual conflict of interest. 171 Id. at 307-08. It is important to note that the Winkler court focused only on the objective divergence of interests between the lawyer and his client to determine whether an actual conflict existed. Having found such a conflict, the court went on to reject Winkler's argument that proof of adverse effect was not needed to grant relief under the Sixth Amendment. The court held that to prove a Sixth Amendment violation, Winkler must meet the Cuyler standard, and that standard required proof of an adverse effect. See id. at 308. 172 Winkler argued that he was adversely affected by his counsel's failure to initiate or to engage in plea bargaining and by his counsel's failure to develop an intoxication defense to Winkler's second degree murder charge. According to Winkler, both of these alleged failures were motivated by his counsel's pecuniary interest in total acquittal, which was the only outcome that would entitle counsel to payment of the $25,000 bonus under the contingency fee agreement. See id. at 309. 173 To address these adverse effect arguments, the court laid out a test for prov[ing] adverse effect on the basis of what an attorney failed to do: 174 [a defendant first] must demonstrate that some plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic might have been pursued. He need not show that the defense would necessarily have been successful if it had been used, but that it possessed sufficient substance to be a viable alternative. Second, he must establish that the alternative defense was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to the attorney's other loyalties or interests. 175 Id. (quoting United States v. Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064, 1070 (3d Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 836 (1st Cir.1985)), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906, 109 S.Ct. 3215, 106 L.Ed.2d 566 (1989)). 176 In applying the test, the court looked first at the failure to initiate plea bargaining. The court noted that the state court (which had held a hearing on the defendant's attorney-conflict claim) had found that in an alleged contract murder case, the prosecution would have been highly unlikely to accept a plea agreement. The court held, however, that: 177 Winkler need not show that a strategy would have been successful, only that it possessed sufficient substance to be a viable alternative. Even if it is likely to be unsuccessful, the negotiation of a plea bargain in a case in which the evidence is strongly against a defendant is a viable alternative. 178 Id. (citation omitted). The court's determination that a viable alternative had not been pursued did not end the adverse effect inquiry. The court noted that the state court had found that plea bargain possibilities were not pursued because Winkler had advised his counsel that he was totally innocent and that he was not interested in pleading to a lesser charge even if the opportunity to do so were offered. See id. Thus, the Winkler court concluded that trial counsel did not pursue a plea bargain because Winkler rejected this path, not because of trial counsel's monetary interest in the outcome. Id. (emphasis added). 179 The court made the same kind of inquiry into the failure to develop an intoxication defense. Because Winkler had snorted cocaine and smoked marijuana before the fatal event, the court found that an intoxication defense also had sufficient substance to be a viable alternative. See id. at 310. Nevertheless, the court found that Winkler's counsel had discussed the possibility of a conviction of lesser charges on the basis of intoxication, but Winkler had rejected this alternative, again asserting his innocence. See id. The court accepted the state court's factual conclusion that Winkler failed to establish that the fee arrangement caused trial counsel not to seek a conviction for lesser charges. Id. (emphasis added). The court ended by concluding that Winkler had failed to prove that trial counsel's representation was adversely affected by the conflict of interest. Thus, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated. Id. 180 In summary, the Winkler court made three distinct inquiries in its Sixth Amendment analysis. First, the court determined whether an actual conflict of interest existed between the lawyer and his client by asking whether the attorney's and defendant's interests diverged with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action. Second, in addressing whether there had been an adverse effect, the court inquired as to whether a viable alternative might have been pursued. Third, the court made a proximate cause inquiry, asking whether the viable alternative was not pursued because of the conflict. A Sixth Amendment violation was made out only if all three inquiries were affirmatively answered--i.e., the interests of the lawyer and his client diverged, a viable alternative was not pursued, and the failure to pursue the viable alternative was caused by the divergent interests. Using this threshold framework, I proceed to Beets's case. 181
182 As described above, the district court found that Beets demonstrated two actual conflicts of interest in this case, the media rights conflict and the witness/advocate conflict. I will address these two conflicts separately, turning first to the media rights conflict.
183 A conflict of interest between Beets and Andrews existed not later than the point at which the formal contract giving Andrews's son the media rights to the Betty Lou Beets story was executed, and perhaps earlier. The majority joins other courts, scholars and organizations of the bar who have uniformly denounced the execution of literary and media rights fee arrangements between attorneys and their clients during the pendency of a representation. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1273. What the majority fails to acknowledge is the reason for such uniform condemnation--the extraordinarily high probability that a media rights contract between counsel and client will create a conflict of interest. When Andrews began his representation of Beets on her murder charge, Texas's rules of ethics provided that [p]rior to conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to his employment, a lawyer shall not enter into any arrangement or understanding with a client ... by which he acquires an interest in publication rights with respect to the subject matter of his employment. State Bar Rules, art. X, Sec. 9, DR 5-104(B) (Texas Code of Professional Responsibility) (1984). 5 184 The reason for the rule is clear. Despite the majority's assertions, media rights contracts are not prohibited primarily because they encourage counsel to misuse the judicial process for the sake of his [own] enrichment and publicity seeking or because they necessarily trade[ ] on the misery of the victim and his family. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1273. While ensuring that the judicial process is not misused and discouraging manipulation of the suffering of others for profit are important goals, commentators uniformly agree that the reason media contracts are frowned upon is because [a]n agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the conduct of the representation creates a conflict between the interests of the client and the personal interests of the lawyer. Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 51:702 (1984) (emphasis added); see also John Wesley Hall, Jr., Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Lawyer Sec. 12.13, at 414 (1987) (A grave conflict of interest can arise from a [media rights contract].... (internal quotation omitted)); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Susan P. Koniak, The Law and Ethics of Lawyering 498 (1990) (The reason for prohibiting such arrangements is that what makes 'good copy' does not necessarily make a good defense.); Robert P. Schuwerk & John F. Sutton, Jr., A Guide to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, 27A Hous.L.Rev. 133 (1990) (The lawyer's acquisition from a client of publication rights to portrayals or accounts of the subject of the representation will probably create a conflict of interests.); Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics Sec. 9.3.3, at 525 (1986) (The problems [with media rights contracts] are two--conflict of interests and the revelation of client information....). 185 The rules against media rights contracts are designed to prevent the specific conflict resonating in this case; simply put, a lawyer in a criminal case who obtains from his client television, radio, motion picture, newspaper, magazine, book, or other publication rights with respect to the case may be influenced, consciously or unconsciously, to a course of conduct that will enhance the value of his publication rights to the prejudice of his client. State Bar Rules, art. X, Sec. 9, EC 5-4 (Texas Code of Professional Responsibility) (1984) (emphasis added). Plainly, a media rights contract  'may place the lawyer under temptation to conduct the defense with an eye on the literary aspects and its dramatic potential. If such an arrangement or contract is part of the fee, in lieu of the fee, or a condition of accepting the employment, it is especially reprehensible.'  Hall, supra, Sec. 12.12, at 414 n. 19 (quoting ABA Standards, The Defense Function Std 4-3.4, Commentary). 6 In fact, a media rights contract is so rife with conflict that under Texas's rules client consent will not cure a violation of [the prohibitions of media contracts]. Schuwerk & Sutton, supra, at 134. 186 In the instant case, the media contract weighed on Andrews's mind from the beginning of his representation. At the very least, the contract placed him in a situation of divided interests. Before the advent of the media rights contract, Beets's interest lay in having Andrews withdraw as her counsel and testify at her trial that he had initiated the idea of searching for Jimmy Don's insurance and pension benefits. As her attorney, this was also Andrews's interest because he was obligated to see to it that his client's best defense was put forward. After the media rights contract was confected, the interests of Beets and Andrews sharply diverged. While Beets's interest remained in having Andrews withdraw and testify, Andrews's interest now squarely lay in remaining as her counsel because only then would he be entitled to the potentially lucrative media rights. The record makes clear that the district court did not err in finding that Beets demonstrated that Andrews had an actual conflict of interest in regard to the media rights contract.
187 The district court also recognized a second conflict of interest, Andrews's advocate/witness conflict. The district court and the majority treat this conflict separately from the media rights conflict. In a situation where a lawyer can provide favorable testimony material to his client's case, his failure to withdraw and testify may or may not stem from an actual conflict--i.e., from a divergence of interests between the lawyer and his client. If the failure to withdraw is caused, for example, by a desire to stay in the case for the fee involved, a conflict of interest may exist. As one commentator has suggested, when a lawyer has a duty to withdraw and testify in favor of his client, but does not do so, [s]uch a decision would raise serious questions about either the lawyer's competence or about the effect of a conflict of interest. Wolfram, supra, Sec. 7.5.2, at 381 (emphasis added). According to this commentator: 188 The conflict is between the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client, which urges the lawyer to give the needed testimony, and the lawyer's economic instincts, which may lead the lawyer to remain in the case as advocate in order to continue earning a fee that otherwise would have to be abandoned. 189 Id. (emphasis added). In my view, while Andrews's role as both an advocate and a potential witness may well have violated the applicable ethical rules, 7 its significance for this case lies not in its possible status as an independent conflict, but rather in its relationship to the media rights conflict. That is, as the district court recognized but did not explicitly resolve, the question remaining in this case is whether the media rights contract is what caused Andrews to remain in the case as counsel. 8 190
191 Under Cuyler, a defendant does not have the burden of showing actual prejudice--i.e., the defendant does not have to show that the result of the trial probably would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-96, 104 S.Ct. at 2066-69; United States v. Greig, 967 F.2d 1018, 1024 (5th Cir.1992). Instead, the defendant needs to demonstrate an adverse effect upon his representation, and Cuyler's adverse effect element establishes a relatively low threshold for a petitioner to cross. Beets, 986 F.2d at 1490 (Higginbotham, J., specially concurring). A limited presumption of prejudice arises from a showing of adverse effect because, as the Supreme Court has noted, it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. To establish an adverse effect on the basis of what an attorney failed to do, a defendant must demonstrate that some plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic--a viable alternative--might have been pursued. See, e.g., Winkler, 7 F.3d at 309. 192 In Beets's case, Andrews's failure to testify had an adverse effect on her defense, as Andrews's testimony was clearly a viable alternative. Throughout the trial, Beets attacked the remuneration element of the State's case on which her capital murder conviction rested. Andrews had significant testimony to offer bearing on the critical issue of whether the killing of Jimmy Don was for a remunerative purpose, specifically to obtain Jimmy Don's life insurance proceeds and pension benefits. If the jury reasonably doubted that Beets killed her husband for the insurance money, the murder was not a capital offense. 193 The majority downplays the importance of Andrews's testimony by referring to it as cumulative. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1276, 1277. Of course, as mentioned, Beets does not need to show that Andrews's testimony would have been successful, but only that it possessed sufficient substance to be a viable alternative. See Winkler, 7 F.3d at 309. Andrews's testimony clearly meets this standard, and the suggestion that his testimony is cumulative is simply based upon an erroneous reading of the record. As evidence of the cumulative nature of Andrews's testimony, the majority points to Beets's own testimony that she was unaware of Jimmy Don's death benefits before she visited Andrews. But the jury may well have discounted Beets's testimony because of its self-serving nature. 194 The majority also points to the testimony of Bruce Roberts, who stated that more than a year after Jimmy Don's murder, Beets seemed ignorant of his insurance and benefits. Roberts's testimony, however, was damaging in certain respects to Beets's defense. Although Roberts did testify that Beets's primary concern was ... with the fire insurance company and that Beets never pressured him to collect money from the City of Dallas, Roberts was also asked what Beets knew about benefits when she first came to him. In response, Roberts stated: 195 At the time I talked to her, she had one--well, it looked like part of a policy, as I recall, from the credit union in Dallas. She also knew that she had or was asking me to check into pension benefits. Basically, that's all the information she could give me. 196 Thus, Roberts did not definitively testify that Beets was ignorant about the possibility of collecting benefits. Further, Roberts did not, and could not have, testified that Andrews suggested to Beets that they pursue Jimmy Don's insurance and pension benefits because Roberts was not present at the meeting between Beets and Andrews at which that suggestion was made. 197 Other than Beets, only Andrews could have told the jury that he initiated the discussion regarding Jimmy Don's death benefits with Beets, and only Andrews could have testified that she appeared to lack knowledge of any such benefits. Further, only Andrews could have testified that it was at his suggestion that those death benefits were pursued. Any later interest or inquiry into benefits by or on behalf of Beets could have been attributable to this meeting between Beets and Andrews that took place long after Jimmy Don's murder. 198 Similarly, the majority's invocation of Denny Burris's testimony to downplay any adverse effect from the absence of Andrews's testimony is erroneous. Burris, a disinterested witness, stated that Beets inquired about Jimmy Don's insurance soon after the murder. The suggestion is that because Beets discussed insurance with Burris, a chaplain, the biased testimony of Andrews was unlikely to have swayed the jury and its absence was unimportant. First of all, it is again worth mentioning that any suggestion that Andrews's testimony would not have been successful to Beets's defense is irrelevant. Second, although Burris was a chaplain, his assignment was to discuss with Beets the benefits due to the widow of a fireman. [I]t was not a mission to console a widow with prayer where the widow's interest was insurance not intercession. Beets, 986 F.2d at 1491 (Higginbotham, J., specially concurring). Thus, the evidence of Beets's early focus on insurance, as the State would have it, is not so compelling. Finally, Burris's specific testimony did not show that Beets already knew about Jimmy Don's insurance and pension benefits. Rather, Burris testified that, several days after Jimmy Don's disappearance, Beets asked about insurance, if she would be covered and things like that. 199 In short, it is all too clear that Andrews's testimony was a viable alternative, and his failure to testify had an adverse effect on Beets's defense. I agree with the assessment of Judge Higginbotham in his special concurrence to the panel opinion: 200 Andrews's testimony was not merely cumulative. I cannot conclude that it would not have been helpful to Beets at trial. It certainly would have been in Beets's best interest for Andrews to have testified. Given the low threshold established by Cuyler, I would not reject [the district court's] conclusion that Andrews's failure to give this evidence at trial adversely affected the conduct of her defense. 201 Id. at 1491-92 (Higginbotham, J., specially concurring). 202 Our task is not yet complete, however, as the third Winkler inquiry still remains on the table: whether Andrews's withdrawal and testimony--the viable alternative--was not pursued because of the media rights conflict. This is a fact-bound question that the district court did not directly answer. 9 After hearing evidence, the district court found that Andrews obviously should have known of his dual status as witness and advocate prior to trial. The district court also concluded that Andrews pursued a course of conduct inconsistent with his client's best interest when he accepted employment or failed to withdraw and testify as a witness on Petitioner's behalf. 203 On the other hand, the court concluded that the media rights contract did not affect Andrews's performance at any conscious level. The court noted, however, that [t]he possibility exists that the media rights contract motivated Andrews at a subconscious level to remain in the case when he should have withdrawn and testified for Petitioner. To that limited extent, the two conflicts are intertwined. These statements suggest that the district court did not definitively resolve whether Andrews's failure to withdraw and testify was attributable in some fashion to his actual conflict of interest arising from the media rights contract. 204 The majority holds that there is no need to remand this case to the district court for an explicit finding on whether the media rights contract caused Andrews to fail to withdraw for two reasons. First, the majority invokes, for the first time in the five years that this case has been in federal court, the presumption of correctness afforded by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d) to the findings of fact made by the state trial court judge on Beets's state habeas petition. The state trial court found as a fact that [p]etitioner's grant of 'book rights' to the son of her counsel had no effect on the strategy of defense counsel. This finding was based on the trial court's own personal recollection of the trial and on Andrews's affidavit which stated that: 205 defense attorney had no conflict of interest throughout the proceedings by agreeing that book rights would be his entire fee, said defense attorney has no book rights, these rights were given to said attorney's son and were only given after the trial was into its third or fourth day, the State Bar of Texas has found said defense attorney committed no improprieties with regard to this matter. 206 At no point during the course of Beets's federal habeas proceedings has the State sought to invoke the presumption of correctness afforded by Sec. 2254(d). Beets filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing along with her federal habeas petition. When the State filed its response (and an amended response) to Beets's petition, it did not object to the hearing and, in responding to Beets's claim of an actual conflict of interest, the State asserted: 207 Respondent denies that there was any conflict of interest in this case. However, because the Court has scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the issue, rather than argue the claim at this time, Respondent will rely on the facts developed at that hearing. 208 (emphasis added). Finally, the State (appellant in this court) did not raise the preclusive effect of the state court's habeas findings in any of the many briefs it has filed with this court. Neither the panel opinion nor Judge Higginbotham's special concurrence mentions Sec. 2254(d) or Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981), or any of its progeny. In a last ditch effort to avoid dealing with the ambiguities in the federal district court's fact findings, the presumption of correctness has been resurrected despite the State's unwillingness to invoke it. Because no party has addressed the presumption of correctness, we cannot determine whether any of its exceptions applies. For example, we do not know the position of the State or Beets on whether the factfinding procedure employed by the state court was adequate to afford a full and fair hearing or whether the material facts were adequately developed at the state court hearing. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d)(3) and (4). This case should not be decided at this late date on a basis not raised by the parties. 209 The majority asserts as its second reason why, applying Cuyler, there is no need to remand for an explicit finding on causation the district court's statement that the court simply does not believe that the media rights contract affected Andrews'[s] performance at any conscious level. The majority ignores the district court's recognition of a possible connection between the media rights contract and what it termed the witness/advocate conflict and its failure to resolve the ultimate question whether they were related. The majority also ignores the contradiction inherent in the district court's opinion in finding the witness/advocate ethical problem to be an actual conflict (thereby implying that it stemmed from a divergence of interests between Andrews and Beets) while finding at the same time that the media rights contract (the likely source of the divergence) had no conscious effect on Andrews's performance. 210 In my view, because the district court did not explicitly decide whether Andrews's failure to withdraw and testify was caused by the actual conflict engendered by the media rights contract, the wiser course is to vacate the district court's judgment granting the writ and to remand the case so that the district court may consider the question in the first instance. If the district court determines on remand that Andrews's failure to withdraw and testify was caused by the actual conflict of interest arising from the execution of the media rights contract, with its powerful incentive to remain in the case, then Beets will have successfully demonstrated that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected [her] lawyer's performance, Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct. at 1719, and she will be entitled to habeas relief. The judgment granting the writ should then be reinstated. If, on the other hand, the district court concludes that Andrews's failure to withdraw and testify was not caused by the actual conflict stemming from the media rights contract, then that failure should be analyzed under Strickland. On this record, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of Beets's trial would have been different, and Beets has failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. The writ should then be denied.
211 Before explaining why Cuyler, as distinguished from Strickland, applies to this case, I turn to an examination of the problems in the majority's approach to the existence of a conflict in this case. 212 The majority is squarely faced with the district court's fact-bound conclusion that Beets demonstrated two actual conflicts of interest in this case, the media rights conflict and the witness/advocate conflict. The majority holds, however, that only a potential and not an actual conflict arose between Beets and her lawyer. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1260. 213 The majority discounts the district court's conclusion that an actual conflict existed by reason of the media rights contract, noting that: 214 [T]he media rights contract posed a serious potential conflict of interest, [but] Beets failed to show how it hindered Andrews's presentation of her defense or prejudiced her by rendering the result of her criminal prosecution fundamentally unreliable. Beets has not asserted that Andrews manipulated the case to enhance publicity or that the contract generally clouded his good judgment. Beets has shown no actual influence of the media rights contract on the conduct of her defense. 215 Beets, 65 F.3d at 1274. Moreover, the majority later seems to resurrect the vacated panel opinion, noting that two judges held in that opinion [a]s to the media rights contract, there was no 'actual conflict' ... because ... [t]he record does not demonstrate that the contract induced Andrews to compromise his zealous representation of Beets in favor of his own pecuniary interest. Id. at 1277. 216 Similarly, in discussing whether there was a conflict in Andrews's failure to withdraw and testify, the majority states that [b]ecause Andrews's potential testimony for Beets was cumulative, he was not a necessary witness for her defense and did not face a substantial advocate/witness conflict. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1276-77. Again, the majority seems to resurrect the conclusion of the panel opinion that Beets alleged, at most, a merely hypothetical or speculative witness/advocate conflict, which did not materialize into an actual conflict that forced Andrews to choose between his self-interest and his duty to Beets. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1277. 217 The majority's conclusions fail on two levels. First, the majority suggests that an actual conflict does not exist until an attorney makes a choice between his interest and the interest of his client. Building on the requirement of a choice, the majority seems to add (as did the panel) a scienter element to conflict analysis, inserting a requirement, heretofore alien to the law, that an attorney must consciously recognize that he is operating under a conflict before that conflict can be said to exist in fact. Second and most noticeably, the majority conflates the existence and effect elements of the analysis by concluding that a conflict did not exist because Beets failed to demonstrate an effect. 218
219 The majority looks to statements by the Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits to support the panel's contention that an actual conflict does not exist until an attorney makes a choice between his interest and the interest of his client. See Beets, 65 F.3d at 1277 (citing Stevenson v. Newsome, 774 F.2d 1558, 1561-62 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1089, 106 S.Ct. 1476, 89 L.Ed.2d 731 (1986); United States v. Litchfield, 959 F.2d 1514, 1518 (10th Cir.1992); United States v. Acevedo, 891 F.2d 607, 610 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Horton, 845 F.2d 1414, 1419 (7th Cir.1988)). The concept of making a choice is typically used in cases where an attorney has a potential conflict (frequently between two clients)--i.e., a situation where interests have not yet diverged but could do so in the future. The courts look to whether a choice has been made only to signal that a divergence of interests has occurred--i.e., only to signal that a potential conflict has become an actual conflict. The central question is whether the interests have diverged, and the concept of making a choice is an analytical tool used to answer this question. 220 The cases cited by the majority support this proposition. See Stevenson, 774 F.2d at 1562 (noting that [t]here is no evidence in this case that [the attorney] was subject to divided loyalties sufficient to establish an actual conflict of interest, thus, rejecting Stevenson's allegations upon a determination that divergent interests were absent from the case) (emphasis added); Horton, 845 F.2d at 1420 (focusing on the absence of divergent interests in finding no conflict was created by counsel's application for a position as a United States Attorney by stating that [i]n any event, a candidate for a high federal position in his professional field would not advance his own interest by demonstrating that he is a weak or unskilled attorney on behalf of his client's interests.); Acevedo, 891 F.2d at 610 (failing to find conflict, but noting that if Acevedo had alleged in her affidavit that her attorney was involved with her in the criminal activity, he would have an obvious interest in preventing Acevedo from testifying and thus implicating him in the illegal scheme); Litchfield, 959 F.2d at 1518 (rejecting defendant's claim that a conflict of interest arose because trial counsel, concerned that defendant was going to commit perjury, held an ex parte conference with judge, noting that [t]he situation presented counsel with a difficult dilemma, and we cannot say that his ex parte discussion with the district court was a violation of his ethical duty or evidence of a conflict of interest.) 221 This focus on divergent interests to determine whether an actual conflict of interest exists is also the focus in our circuit:  '[a] conflict exists when defense counsel places himself in a position conducive to divided loyalties.'  United States v. Vaquero, 997 F.2d 78, 89 (5th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Carpenter, 769 F.2d 258, 263 (5th Cir.1985)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 614, 126 L.Ed.2d 578 (1993); accord Mitchell v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 912, 103 S.Ct. 222, 74 L.Ed.2d 176 (1982). 222 In Beets's case, divergent interests existed, at the latest, when Andrews executed the media rights contract. At that point, it was in Beets's interest for Andrews to withdraw and testify, while it was in Andrews's interest to remain as counsel so that he would receive the value of the media rights. 223 The majority recognizes that disagreements between the majority and this dissent exist not only on whether there was an actual (as opposed to a potential) conflict but also on whether the conflict should be judged from an objective standpoint. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1278. In my view, it is important to be clear that determining whether divergent interests are present such that an actual conflict exists contemplates an objective evaluation of the situation in which counsel is placed. 10 As the Ninth Circuit recently noted, [t]he existence of an actual conflict cannot be governed solely by the perceptions of the attorney; rather, the court itself must examine the record to discern whether the attorney's behavior seems to have been influenced by the suggested conflict. Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir.1994). 224 This objective evaluation makes perfect sense, for if the rule were as the majority suggests, counsel's actions benefiting himself and harming his client would not be actual conflicts, irrespective of their effect on the proceedings, as long as counsel was too obtuse, insensitive, or selfish to recognize that the pursuit of his own goals was coming at the expense of his client's defense. As the Supreme Court commented in an analogous context, [i]t is unlikely that [an attorney] would concede that he continued improperly to act as counsel. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 265 n. 5, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 1100 n. 5, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (describing how the conflict of interest was properly presented when the lawyer who allegedly had the conflict of interest had prepared the brief and the petition for certiorari). The fact that Andrews arguably chose to continue his representation thoughtlessly as opposed to deliberately does not obviate the fact that given the possible decisions he could have made as an attorney, he undertook a course of action that benefited himself while hindering Beets's defense. Simply put, an actual conflict is demonstrated when a defendant objectively shows that his interest and his attorney's interest diverged with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action, and such a divergence occurred in this case. 11 225
226 a Conflict 227 The majority also contends that there was no actual conflict in the context of the media rights contract because ... [t]he record does not demonstrate that the contract induced Andrews to compromise his zealous representation of Beets in favor of his own pecuniary interest. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1277. Similarly, in the lawyer as witness context, the majority contends that there was no actual conflict [b]ecause Andrews's potential testimony for Beets was cumulative, [and] he was not a necessary witness for her defense. Id. at 1277. As I have pointed out above, this conclusion has no factual support in the record. As a legal conclusion, it has no support in the case law surrounding Cuyler; determining whether there was an actual conflict (as distinguished from determining whether the Sixth Amendment has been violated) does not require a showing of an adverse effect. 228 As the majority concedes, Cuyler incorporates a standard less rigorous than Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067 (noting that unlike general ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the criminal justice system maintain[s] a fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice in the conflict of interest context). The reason for this lighter burden in conflict cases is clear. As the Supreme Court has noted, it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067, and accordingly, the Court has refused to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice attributable to the conflict. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349, 100 S.Ct. at 1719 (internal quotation omitted). The majority, however, engages in such a calculation to determine whether a conflict even existed. 229 The question of whether there actually was a conflict plays an important role in separating cases where interests diverge--i.e., where the attorney places his own or another's interest above the client's interest--from those situations where the conflict remains potential. Whether the conflict actually affected the representation is a separate inquiry from the question of whether there was an actual conflict. Even when addressing whether a conflict had an adverse effect, the degree of prejudice caused by the conflict is not material once any real effect is shown. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349, 100 S.Ct. at 1719 ([A] defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice.). 12 230 The rule that the majority espouses goes even further than that prohibited in evaluating actual effect. The majority collapses the question of effect into the question of actual conflict. Just as it is improper to evaluate a foregone strategy's potential for success when determining whether there is an adverse effect, it is also improper to evaluate that strategy's potential for success when determining whether there is an actual conflict of interest. 13 231