Opinion ID: 2642598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Division of Post-9/11 GI Bill Benefits

Text: ¶9. We previously have considered distribution of military disability benefits and military retirement pay in domestic relations cases. See Mallard v. Burkart, 95 So. 3d 1264, 1272 (¶ 21) (Miss. 2012); Rennie v. Rennie, 718 So. 2d 1091, 1095 (¶ 13) (Miss. 1998); Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 913 (Miss. 1994); Newman v. Newman, 558 So. 2d 821, 823 (Miss. 1990). But those cases dealt with the application of other federal laws pertaining to military benefits, such as the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, not the Post-9/11 GI Bill. The instant issue is one of first impression for the Court, and we have not found any cases from any jurisdiction directly addressing the specific issue at hand. ¶10. In the instant case, the chancellor held that Joyce’s college expenses should be reduced by her scholarships and the $1,200 monthly housing stipend; then Tina and George were to split the remaining amount equally, with George taking full credit for all Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits except the housing stipend. George asserts that the chancellor’s treatment of the monthly housing stipend violated Section 3319, which provides that benefits transferred to a spouse or child “may not be treated as marital property, or the asset of a 5 marital estate, subject to division in a divorce or other civil proceeding.” 38 U.S.C. § 3319(f)(3) (2011). Tina maintains that the prohibition on treating transferred benefits as marital property is inapplicable, because the chancellor did not classify the stipend as marital property; thus, she maintains that the chancellor’s decision did not constitute a division of the benefits. Tina also argues that, because George transferred the benefits to Joyce, the benefits belong to Joyce much like her scholarships; therefore, Tina asserts that taking the benefits off the top before dividing the remainder between the parents was appropriate. ¶11. George earned the benefits at issue here long after the parties divorced, and neither party claims that the benefits are marital property. We agree that George’s Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits were not marital property because they were not earned during the marriage; thus, they were not subject to division. See Wheat v. Wheat, 37 So. 3d 632, 637 (¶¶ 14-15) (Miss. 2010); Hemsley, 639 So. 2d at 915 (Miss. 1994). While the chancellor did not label the benefits as marital property, his instruction to take the benefits off the top of Joyce’s expenses gave Tina a credit that she otherwise would not have had and resulted in George not getting full credit for all of the Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits. We find that the chancellor’s decision effectively acted as a “division” of the benefits. Although the proceeding was not an original divorce proceeding, it was a “civil proceeding” pertaining to modification of a divorce decree. Therefore, we conclude that the chancellor’s allocation of the housing stipend amounted to a division of the benefits in a civil proceeding, which is prohibited by Section 3319(f)(3). ¶12. Tina’s argument that the GI Bill benefits belonged to Joyce lacks merit. When benefits are transferred, the service member has the option to revoke the transfer at anytime. 38 6 U.S.C. § 3319(f)(2) (2011). Thus, the service member remains in control of the transferred benefits, and they still belong to him. The chancellor held that George was entitled to credit for the rest of the benefits – the payments for tuition, fees, and books – but the $1,200 monthly stipend was taken off the top of the expenses and not credited to George. All of the benefits should be treated equally. Because the GI Bill benefits still belong to George, he should be credited with all of them, and none of the benefits should be divided between George and Tina. ¶13. We act in concert with the purpose of the Post-9/11 GI Bill by giving George credit for all of the benefits. In enacting the bill, Congress stated that service in the “Armed Forces ha[d] been especially arduous” since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and Congress explained the need for the bill as follows: (3) The United States has a proud history of offering educational assistance to millions of veterans, as demonstrated by the many G.I. Bills enacted since World War II. Educational assistance for veterans helps reduce the costs of war, assist veterans in readjusting to civilian life after wartime service, and boost the United States economy, and has a positive effect on recruitment for the Armed Forces. ... (5) The people of the United States greatly value military service and recognize the difficult challenges involved in readjusting to civilian life after wartime service in the Armed Forces. (6) It is in the national interest for the United States to provide veterans who serve on active duty in the Armed Forces after September 11, 2001, with enhanced educational assistance benefits that are worthy of such service and are commensurate with the educational assistance benefits provided by a grateful Nation to veterans of World War II. Pub. L. No. 110-252, Title V, § 5002 (June 30, 2008). The educational benefits provided by the Post-9/11 GI Bill aid in recruitment and rewarding service members for active duty. The 7 ability to transfer the benefits is an additional incentive meant “to promote recruitment and retention of members of the uniformed services.” 38 U.S.C. § 3319(a)(2) (2011). Further, a service member who transfers the benefits must generally agree to continued years of service. See 38 U.S.C. § 3319(b)(1) (2011). The chancellor’s allocation of the housing stipend failed to accord with the spirit and purpose of the Post-9/11 GI Bill. ¶14. George earned the GI Bill educational benefits through active-duty service in the Army Reserve, which occurred long after he and Tina divorced. The chancellor’s allocation of the monthly housing stipend violated 38 U.S.C. § 3319(f)(3), because it constituted a division of the benefit between parties in a civil proceeding.