Opinion ID: 2249080
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count IV: Structural Work Act

Text: In count IV of its complaint, the Bank contended that National violated the Act by, inter alia, failing to provide safe scaffolds and supports. National argued that the Act does not contemplate risks of injuries due to workers' contact with power lines. The trial court granted summary judgment on count IV in National's favor, relying on a line of appellate court cases which have held that the Act does not encompass the hazards of high-voltage electrical wires. ( O'Rourke v. Oehler (1989), 187 Ill.App.3d 572, 135 Ill.Dec. 163, 543 N.E.2d 546 (painter electrocuted when his aluminum ladder came into contact with electrical wires); Overbeck v. Jon Construction, Inc. (1989), 184 Ill.App.3d 918, 133 Ill.Dec. 103, 540 N.E.2d 969 (electrician thrown off ladder due to explosion caused by contact with hot wire); Barrera v. Windy City Exteriors, Inc. (1989), 182 Ill. App.3d 936, 131 Ill.Dec. 398, 538 N.E.2d 773 (worker on scaffold electrocuted when aluminum siding he was installing came into contact with power line); Smyrniotis v. Brockob Construction Co. (1986), 142 Ill.App.3d 340, 96 Ill.Dec. 786, 491 N.E.2d 1246 (worker installing flashing on roof contacted overhead power lines); Kochan v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1984), 123 Ill.App.3d 844, 79 Ill.Dec. 367, 463 N.E.2d 921 (electrician on ladder injured through contact with electrical wires).) However, the appellate court in the present case was not persuaded by the reasoning in the cases cited, relying instead upon Brazier v. Kontos (1987), 160 Ill.App.3d 177, 111 Ill. Dec. 906, 513 N.E.2d 152, and Burke v. Illinois Power Co. (1978), 57 Ill.App.3d 498, 15 Ill.Dec. 670, 373 N.E.2d 1354, in reaching its decision to reverse summary judgment on count IV. In Burke, the plaintiff was severely injured when a steel pipe being lifted by the crane he was directing came into contact with a power line which sent a surge of electricity down the pipe and through his body. ( Burke, 57 Ill.App.3d 498, 15 Ill.Dec. 670, 373 N.E.2d 1354.) The structural device at issue became a conduit for the electricity rather than, as in the other appellate court cases, a support by means of which the injured worker made contact with an electric line. Evidence was also brought out in Burke that installation of a safety device on the crane could have prevented the accident. Although the Burke court stated broadly that the purpose of the Act is to provide a safe area in which persons covered by the Act will be working ( Burke, 57 Ill.App.3d at 509, 15 Ill.Dec. 670, 373 N.E.2d 1354), the court's primary concern was not with the scope of the Act, but rather with the defendant's liability. In Brazier, the plaintiff's decedent was electrocuted while descending a hydraulic ladder attached to a truck parked between a power line and the sign on which decedent was working. ( Brazier, 160 Ill. App.3d at 180, 111 Ill.Dec. 906, 513 N.E.2d 152.) Although the Brazier court mentioned the defendant's argument that decedent's injuries were caused by contact with electrical wires and not by failure of the support device, the court did not address the specific issue that was raised, and did not refer to the line of appellate court cases which dealt with the question of applicability of the Act to injuries caused by electricity. Rather, to support its conclusion that the Act is violated where ladders are not erected in a safe manner and are not placed and operated so as to give proper protection to construction workers, the court cited Smith v. Georgia Pacific Corp. (1980), 86 Ill.App.3d 570, 41 Ill.Dec. 771, 408 N.E.2d 117. Smith, however, concerned a claim for injuries sustained by a painter who fell from a ladder which he had tried to move while still standing on it. The Smith court found that whether the ladder was placed on a safe base and whether it was properly braced were questions for the jury under the Structural Work Act. The painter in Smith did not come into contact with electricity, and the court did not consider the hazards of electricity in relation to the Act. Thus, neither Brazier, Burke, nor their supporting cases persuade us that the danger of electricity must be considered among the hazards envisaged by the Act. The Bank contends that improper placement of the ladder gave rise to a cause of action under the Act because the ladder's placement in close proximity to the power line caused decedent to come into contact with the wire which caused his death. National urges that, because the Bank did not raise the issue of improper placement of the ladder in its pleadings or in its appellate court briefs, the issue has been waived. However, in count IV, paragraph 11(d), of its second-amended complaint, the Bank alleged that National: [f]ailed to supply adequate ladders or staging, in lieu of scaffolding erected in a safe, suitable and proper manner and placed and operated so as to give proper and adequate protection to the life and limb of any person engaged on said structure being used as a stay or support. (Emphasis added.) Thus, we find the Bank's pleadings to be sufficient in raising the issue of the ladder's placement. Moreover, an appellee may defend a judgment on review by raising an issue not previously ruled upon by the trial court if the necessary factual basis for the determination was contained in the record. ( Kravis v. Smith Marine, Inc. (1975), 60 Ill.2d 141, 324 N.E.2d 417.) For these reasons, we consider that the Bank did not waive the issue of placement. However, National argues that the Act contemplates coverage for accidents arising from improper placement of a ladder only when such placement results in the ladder's providing inadequate support. Thus, according to National's argument, if a wobbly ladder caused a worker to fall onto a power line, the Act might provide coverage, but where, as in this case, the ladder remained stable, it does not. Consequently, National contends that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in its favor on count IV. Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Ill. Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 110, par. 2-1005(c); Vuletich v. United States Steel Corp. (1987), 117 Ill.2d 417, 421, 111 Ill.Dec. 586, 512 N.E.2d 1223.) Such judgment is proper when the parties agree upon the facts, but dispute the correct construction of the Act and whether the facts sustain a cause of action. ( Kochan, 123 Ill.App.3d at 848, 79 Ill.Dec. 367, 463 N.E.2d 921.) Whether the Act covers injuries caused by contact with a power line is a matter of statutory construction and therefore a question of law for the court to determine. Vuletich, 117 Ill.2d at 421, 111 Ill.Dec. 586, 512 N.E.2d 1223. This court has previously interpreted the Act, and has determined: (1) whether the structural device concerned was a support within the Act ( Lafata v. Village of Lisle (1990), 137 Ill.2d 347, 148 Ill.Dec. 732, 561 N.E.2d 38; Vuletich, 117 Ill.2d 417, 111 Ill.Dec. 586, 512 N.E.2d 1223; Tenenbaum v. City of Chicago (1975), 60 Ill.2d 363, 325 N.E.2d 607); (2) whether the Act contemplated the use to which a structural device was put ( Innis v. Elmhurst Dodge, Inc. (1985), 107 Ill.2d 151, 89 Ill.Dec. 866, 481 N.E.2d 709); and (3) whether the work activity involved was within the required employment classification ( Halberstadt v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank (1973), 55 Ill.2d 121, 302 N.E.2d 64). However, the question of whether coverage under the Act extends to improper placement of a structural device which, although providing adequate support, brings the worker into dangerous proximity with a power line is one of first impression for this court. The Act states in relevant part: All scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other mechanical contrivances, erected or constructed by any person, firm or corporation in this State for the use in the erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any house, building, bridge, viaduct, or other structure, shall be so erected and constructed, in a safe, suitable and proper manner, and shall be so erected and constructed, placed and operated as to give proper and adequate protection to the life and limb of any person or persons employed or engaged thereon, or passing under or by the same, and in such manner as to prevent the falling of any material that may be used or deposited thereon. Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 48, par. 60. It is undisputed that the ladder, walkrail, and staging used by Lukas constitute support devices within the purview of the Act. Nor is there any doubt that the Act is concerned with the proper construction and placement of those devices. However, a careful reading of the Act fails to answer the essential question of whether the proper placement of a device is meant to ensure only that it provides proper support, or whether the Act also mandates placement in a location where the worker will be free from ambient hazards. Since a statute is passed as a whole, and animated by one general purpose, each part should be construed with every other part so as to produce a harmonious whole. (2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 46.05 (Sands 4th ed. 1984).) Subsequent sections of the Act address the manner in which adequate support should be provided, e.g., by limiting loads on a structure. The required protective measures are directed towards preventing hazards such as those of workers falling from a structure or being struck or crushed by materials due to insufficient support. There is no mention of potential injuries due to other causes. Thus, we can find no specific support in any part of the Act for plaintiff's contention that it was intended to provide protection from electrical hazards. Legislative intent should be determined from the language used in the statute and from the evil to be remedied and the object obtained by the provision. ( Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Ry. Co. (1961), 22 Ill.2d 305, 317, 175 N.E.2d 785.) Thus, having examined the wording of the Act, we look next to the reasons for its enactment. The appellate court has traced the history of the Act in order to determine its purpose. (See Rayfield v. Homart Development Co. (1981), 100 Ill.App.3d 620, 56 Ill.Dec. 113, 427 N.E.2d 193.) In 1907, when the Act was promulgated, Illinois did not yet have a workers' compensation act. Construction workers who were injured due to their ultrahazardous working conditions were often unable to succeed in their claims for damages because of the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. The purpose of the Structural Work Act `was to prevent injuries to persons employed in this dangerous and extrahazardous occupation, so that negligence on their part in the manner of doing their work might not prove fatal.' ( Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co. (1914), 264 Ill. 156, 164, 106 N.E. 236, 239.) As a result, the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk were held not to be applicable to the Act. Rayfield, 100 Ill.App.3d at 622, 56 Ill.Dec. 113, 427 N.E.2d 193. In Meyer v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1990), 135 Ill.2d 1, 142 Ill.Dec. 128, 552 N.E.2d 719, this court adopted the reasoning of Rayfield, concluding that the intention of the Act was to provide injured workers in the construction trades a remedy where none existed, rather than to provide an additional remedy where other reasonable and satisfactory remedies were available. Although the Act should be liberally interpreted when necessary to afford relief to injured workers, it should not be `extended unnecessarily to cover neoteric theories of liability where the existing workmen's compensation and tort remedies protect and give reasonable and satisfactory relief to construction workers.' ( Meyer, 135 Ill.2d at 16, 142 Ill.Dec. 128, 552 N.E.2d 719, quoting Rayfield, 100 Ill. App.3d at 622-23, 56 Ill.Dec. 113, 427 N.E.2d 193.) Thus, although this court has reiterated that the Act should be given a liberal interpretation in order to achieve its purpose of protecting persons in extrahazardous occupations, it has repeatedly refused to interpret the Act to cover any and all construction activities. Innis, 107 Ill.2d at 155, 89 Ill.Dec. 866, 481 N.E.2d 709. This court has previously stated that [i]t is only when an injury has some connection with the hazardous nature of one of the devices named in section 1 of the Act that a cause of action may be maintained under that section of the Act. ( Tenenbaum, 60 Ill.2d at 371, 325 N.E.2d 607.) Because we interpret the purpose of the Structural Work Act to be that of ensuring stable support to the structural worker and of providing him with a remedy when no other remedy is available, we hold that the Act has no application to this case. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court on count IV.