Opinion ID: 196628
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Duplicative Judgment

Text: 71 In support of its request for a new trial, CAPECO argues that the damages awards constituted an impermissible double recovery. CAPECO contends that both Coastal's antitrust and tort claims were grounded in the same set of acts. Because we vacate and remand the antitrust damages for further findings on price discrimination damages, we construe CAPECO's argument that price discrimination and tort damages would constitute duplicative damage recoveries, see Borden v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 370, 382 (1st Cir.1991) (recovery against a defendant under one tort theory precludes any duplicative recovery for the same damages under some other tort theory), and so a new trial or remittitur is required, see Dopp v. HTP Corp., 947 F.2d 506, 516 (1st Cir.1991). 72 We reject this argument for three reasons. First, CAPECO failed to object to the form or content of the special interrogatories to which the jury answered. Second, CAPECO may well have waived its right to raise this issue here, since it failed to raise the issue in a timely manner with the trial court. Previously, we have held that a defendant may not argue verdict inconsistency if he or she failed to object after the verdict was read and before the jury was discharged. See McIsaac v. Didriksen Fishing Corp., 809 F.2d 129, 134 (1st Cir.1987). This rule is grounded in the realization that to decide otherwise would countenance 'agreeable acquiescence to perceivable error as a weapon of appellate advocacy.'  Id. (quoting Merchant v. Ruhle, 740 F.2d 86, 92 (1st Cir.1984)). The same concern should make us hesitate to consider arguments about verdict redundancy that were similarly not put forth below. 73 Finally, [a] special verdict will be upheld if there is a view of the case which makes the jury's answers consistent. McIsaac, 809 F.2d at 133. As we have noted above, Coastal may have had a legitimate Article 1802 claim apart from any overlap with antitrust law. Had CAPECO chosen to object to the district court's instructions, the district court may have corrected this problem. Accordingly, giving the district court the benefit of the doubt, had it responded to a timely objection by CAPECO and given an Article 1802 instruction that did not overlap with antitrust claims, the jury's damages verdicts on tort and antitrust claims could have been consistent. Even assuming, arguendo, that CAPECO correctly asserts that such overlap occurred, to grant CAPECO a new trial now on the basis of duplicative recovery would allow it to avoid the result of its own failure to object to the Article 1802 instruction.