Opinion ID: 77755
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Grady Counts

Text: 30 Walker, joined by the CWW Group and Georgia Personnel, next challenge the sufficiency of the indictment and the evidence used to convict them on the Grady counts. We review de novo whether an indictment sufficiently alleges a statutorily proscribed offense. United States v. Woodruff, 296 F.3d 1041, 1045 (11th Cir.2002). We also review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction. United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1327 (11th Cir.2005). In doing so, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all reasonable inferences and making all credibility choices in the government's favor. Id. We will reverse a conviction based on insufficient evidence only if no reasonable trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Gunn, 369 F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir.2004). 31 The indictment must contain a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c). An indictment is sufficient if [i]t (1) presents the essential elements of the charged offense, (2) notifies the accused of the charges to be defended against, and (3) enables the accused to rely upon a judgment under the indictment as a bar against double jeopardy for any subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Woodruff, 296 F.3d at 1046. An indictment's sufficiency is determined from its face. United States v. Sharpe, 438 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir.2006). An indictment that tracks the language of the relevant statute is sufficient, as long as it also provides a statement of facts and circumstances that give notice of the offense to the accused. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 765, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 1048, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962). 32 With regard to the Grady counts, the indictment tracked the language of the mail fraud statute and alleged several facts supporting an overall scheme to misuse Walker's office for private gain and therefore deprive his constituents of their right to his honest services as a legislator. It alleged that Walker attempted to influence legislation affecting the hospital and that, in exchange, his temp agency, Georgia Personnel, received business favors from Grady. The indictment alleged that Walker obtained the financially lucrative Georgia Personnel contract from Grady through a bid-rigging process, which ensured that Walker was allowed to make changes in his bid when necessary, and guaranteed that he was the lowest bidder. Additionally, it alleged that Grady catered to Walker's demands that Grady hire more Georgia Personnel workers. Finally, it alleged that Walker failed to properly disclose his financial dealings with Grady in his annual financial disclosure statements. Taken together, these facts are sufficient to create an overall picture of the fraudulent scheme at issue, to put Walker on notice of the charged conduct, and to enable him to defend himself at trial. Id. at 765, 82 S.Ct. at 1048. We find no merit to his claim that the language of the indictment was insufficient to charge him with honest services mail fraud. 33 We also find that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a conviction for honest services mail fraud. The mail fraud statute prohibits the use of the mails in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1341. To prove mail fraud, the prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant (1) participated in a scheme or artifice to defraud and (2) used the United States mails to carry out that scheme. United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725, 731 (11th Cir.1991). The honest services provision of the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, allows the United States to predicate a mail fraud prosecution on a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right to honest services. United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564, 568 (11th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). 16 The term honest services is not defined in the statute, but we have found that when a political official uses his office for personal gain, he deprives his constituents of their right to have him perform his official duties in their best interest. United States v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 1169 (11th Cir. 1997). Public officials inherently owe a fiduciary duty to the public to make governmental decisions in the public's best interest. United States v. deVegter, 198 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir.1999). If an official instead secretly makes his decision based on his own personal interests—as when an official accepts a bribe or personally benefits from an undisclosed conflict of interest, the official has deprived the public of his honest services. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d at 1169. 34 The scope of conduct covered by the honest services mail fraud statute is extremely broad. See United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 725 (1st Cir.1996). Nevertheless, even if a public official engages in reprehensible misconduct related to an official position, his conviction for honest-services fraud cannot stand where the conduct does not actually deprive the public of its right to [his] honest services, and it is not shown to intend the result. Id. (emphasis added). Conversely, once the government establishes a scheme formed with the intent to defraud, the honest services fraud is complete regardless of how that intent manifests itself in execution. United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 264 (3d Cir.2001); deVegter, 198 F.3d at 1328 (A public official's undisclosed conflict of interest . . . does by itself harm the constituents' interest in the end for which the official serve—honest government in the public's best interest. (emphasis added)); United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 441 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that for a successful prosecution following the showing of intent, [t]he scheme to defraud need not have been successful or complete (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 308 (7th Cir.) (finding that judge's systematic receipt of bribes and loans to influence official actions constituted mail fraud regardless of whether or not he ruled differently on any cases), vacated, 484 U.S. 807, 108 S.Ct. 53, 98 L.Ed.2d 18 (1987) (ordering reconsideration in light of McNally ); United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512 (7th Cir.1973) (finding that when there was a scheme formed with the intent to deprive a company of its employee's honest services it was irrelevant that the employee did not actually exert special influence in favor of the supplier providing the bribe). 35 Defendants argue that there is insufficient evidence of Walker's agreement to any scheme through which Walker received benefits in exchange for his official services. They allege that while Grady officials may have hired Georgia Personnel workers in the hope of receiving legislative benefits from Walker, there was no evidence that Walker was personally a party to this scheme. Further, they argue that the government failed to prove the existence of a quid pro quo arrangement, in that there was no evidence that Walker did anything in particular as a legislator to benefit Grady. 36 At trial, the government presented evidence that prior to a legislative session where measures affecting Grady would be debated, Walker began meeting with Grady's Chief Executive Officer, Ed Renford. During a meeting at the state capitol, when Renford was meeting with Walker in his legislative capacity, Walker suggested that Grady hire workers through his temp agency. A Grady employee, Joyce Harris, testified that Renford, in Walker's presence, introduced Walker to her as someone who would be doing business with Grady and would help with certain legislation. Renford instructed Harris to do business with Walker, which she interpreted as an order to ensure that Walker's temp employees were hired. Grady employees then solicited a bid from Georgia Personnel, encouraged him to resolve any deficiencies, allowed him to submit the bid out of time, and ultimately awarded the contract to Georgia Personnel. Grady employees testified that Walker repeatedly requested that Grady hire additional Georgia Personnel workers, and that Georgia Personnel hires were cost-ineffective to Grady. They also testified that Renford sought weekly reports on the hires, which was an unusual level of involvement on his behalf. Yet, the government did not come forward with any evidence that Walker improperly influenced any legislation benefitting Grady. 37 Drawing all inferences in favor of the government, as we must, we find the evidence sufficient to support an honest services mail fraud conviction. 17 The jury could have inferred that by raising the issue of Georgia Personnel workers at a meeting at the state capitol, Walker let Grady know that his legislative influence would be forthcoming in exchange for Grady hiring his temp workers. Renford's comment about Walker's legislative assistance could also be interpreted as evidence of Walker's participation in the scheme. Finally, the jury could have concluded that by repeatedly requesting that Grady hire additional Georgia Personnel employees, Walker was communicating his belief that he was entitled to the business in exchange for legislative assistance. See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 274, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 1892, 119 L.Ed.2d 57 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding that under the Hobbs Act, a quid pro quo with the attendant corrupt motive can be inferred from an ongoing course of conduct). These inferences support a finding that Walker intended to participate in a scheme to personally gain from his position as a legislator and thus, regardless of the ultimate course of legislation, deprive the public of his honest services. Antico, 275 F.3d at 264; Jain, 93 F.3d at 441.