Opinion ID: 2355739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sebesta and Pursell's Costs and Attorney Fees under Section 13-17-102(4) Associated with the Motion to Enforce

Text: The water court denied Anderson's Motion to Enforce the injunction and Water Agreement and awarded Sebesta and Pursell costs and attorney fees under section 13-17-102(4), C.R.S. (2010) because it determined that the motion was without merit and substantially frivolous. Anderson argues that, in light of subsequent findings in this case and an order in a related case brought by the State Engineer against Pursell, the water court erred in holding that the motion was substantially frivolous and awarding attorney fees. We disagree. First, the Final Decree took precedence over the injunction order. Second, Anderson cannot use subsequent decisions to argue that his earlier motion was not substantially frivolous. [6] Section 13-17-102(4) states that a court shall assess attorney fees if, upon the motion of any party or the court itself, it finds that an attorney or party brought or defended an action, or any part thereof, that lacked substantial justification. An action lacks substantial justification when it is substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious. Id. A claim is substantially frivolous if the proponent cannot present a rational argument based on the evidence or law in support of that claim. Stepanek v. Delta Cnty., 940 P.2d 364, 369 (Colo.1997).
In his briefs, Anderson attempts to persuade us that the injunction was still valid and enforceable against both Pursell and Sebesta. With regard to Sebesta, the Stipulation Agreement clearly dismissed the injunction. Thus, there was no way that Anderson could enforce it against Sebesta. See USI Props. E., Inc. v. Simpson, 938 P.2d 168, 173 (Colo.1997) (A party's participation in a stipulation incorporated into a decree precludes that party from advancing legal contentions contrary to the plain and unambiguous terms contained therein.). Against Pursell, the result is the same because the Final Decree takes precedence over the injunction. A preliminary injunction is a remedy that is designed to preserve the status quo and protect a plaintiff from sustaining irreparable injury and to preserve the power of the district court to render a meaningful decision following a trial on the merits. Rathke v. MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648, 651 (Colo.1982). When a trial court grants or denies a preliminary injunction, it is not adjudicating the ultimate rights of the parties. Phoenix Capital, Inc. v. Dowell, 176 P.3d 835, 839 (Colo.App.2007). [F]indings made by a trial court after a preliminary injunction hearing are not determinative of the ultimate merits of the case. Id. (citing Carroll v. Stancato, 144 Colo. 18, 19-20, 354 P.2d 1018, 1019 (1960)). Instead, the trial court preserves its ability to render a decision after a full trial on the merits. Id. In Ireland v. Wynkoop, the court of appeals held that an injunction that pertained to matters that had subsequently proceeded to a final judgment was no longer in effect. 36 Colo.App. 205, 224-25, 539 P.2d 1349, 1361 (1975). The same situation is present here; the same matters in the injunction ultimately proceeded to a final judgment in the Final Decree. Therefore, because the injunction was no longer binding on either Sebesta or Pursell, we hold that Anderson's Motion to Enforce the injunction was substantially frivolous.
Anderson attempts to justify his Motion to Enforce with two subsequent water court decisions. The first is a an order from a separate case, In re Pursell, 09CW05, dated September 14, 2009, ordering Pursell to drain the ponds on his property and to cease diversion and storage until he obtained a storage right. The second is an order in this case, dated November 30, 2009, confirming that Anderson complied with the requirement in the Final Decree that he conduct a ditch loss analysis of the Eureka Ditch. Those orders, however, were not and are not at issue in relation to the determination of whether Anderson's Motion to Enforce was substantially frivolous. The order requiring Pursell to drain his ponds and cease storing and diverting water involved general principles of water law, not the Water Agreement, which was at issue in the injunction and Motion to Enforce. It was a result of the State, not Anderson, filing a complaint against Pursell. Therefore, that order is not applicable as justification for the validity of the Motion to Enforce. The order confirming that Anderson complied with the Final Decree is also inapplicable. The Motion to Enforce did not pertain to the Final Decree; it was attempting to enforce the injunction. Anderson's adherence to certain requirements in the decree has no bearing on whether or not the Motion to Enforce lacked substantial justification. Therefore, Anderson's argument that the subsequent orders showed that his Motion to Enforce did not lack substantial justification is unfounded.