Opinion ID: 1890026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Scope of the Privilege

Text: The Supreme Court has recognized the attorney client privilege as the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 682, 66 L.Ed.2d 584, 591 (1981). The attorney-client privilege dates back in the common law to the reign of Elizabeth I (1558-1603) and probably originated in the compulsion of witnesses to testify. Harrison, 276 Md. at 131, 345 A.2d at 836. Until 1776, it was not deemed to be a right of the client but rather was that of the attorney as a point of honor as an element of professional behavior. Id. In that year, the House of Lords in the Duchess of Kingston's Trial (20 Howell, State Trials 355, 386 (1776)) ruled that her attorney, whom she had exempted from secrecy, was required to respond to questions about his conversations with her some three decades earlier, even though the attorney had demurred, raising the point of honor. Id. This development effectively ended the use of the point of honor. During the latter half of the eighteenth century another theory evolved which recognized that the client held a privilege which prohibited the disclosure of client secrets by the attorney, rather than simply permitting the attorney to keep the client's confidences as a professional prerogative. Id. This theory rose to the forefront as the point of honor receded and soon was in use throughout the United States. Id., citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 2290-91 (McNaughton Rev.1961); C. MCCORMACK, EVIDENCE, § 78 (2d ed.1972). In 1862, in Fulton v. MacCracken, 18 Md. 528 (1862), this Court stated that [n]o rule is better established than `that communication which a client makes to his legal adviser for the purpose of professional advice or aid shall not be disclosed, unless by the consent of the client for whose protection the rule was established.' Id. at 542-43. We have stated that the privilege is an accommodation of the competing public interests of the need to promote candor in communications between attorneys and their clients and the general testimonial compulsion to divulge relevant evidence in the pursuit of truth and justice. See Harrison, 276 Md. at 133, 345 A.2d at 837. It is so basic to the relationship of trust between an attorney and client that, although it is not given express constitutional protection, it is essential to a defendant's exercise of the constitutional guarantees of counsel and freedom from self-incrimination. Id. The privilege is understood to be a rule of evidence that prevents the disclosure of a confidential communication made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Forma-Pack, Inc., 351 Md. 396, 414, 718 A.2d 1129, 1138 (1998), citing Levitsky v. Prince George's County, 50 Md.App. 484, 491, 439 A.2d 600, 604 (1982). In Harrison v. State, supra , we adopted Professor Wigmore's definition of the attorney-client privilege: (1) Where legal advice of [any] kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his insistence permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by his legal adviser, (8) except the protection [may] be waived. 276 Md. at 135, 345 A.2d at 838, quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed.1961) (footnote omitted). The common law privilege is codified in Section 9-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code, which states, A person may not be compelled to testify in violation of the attorney-client privilege. Md.Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 9-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The privilege, although essential to an effective attorney-client relationship, is not absolute. In re Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. 1, 11, 602 A.2d 1220, 1225 (1992). We have observed that [o]nly those attorney-client communications pertaining to legal assistance and made with the intention of confidentiality are within the ambit of the privilege. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 Md. at 416, 718 A.2d at 1138. This Court in Lanasa v. State, 109 Md. 602, 71 A. 1058 (1909), observed, [T]o make the communications privileged, they ... must relate to professional advice and to the subject-matter about which the advice is sought. Id. at 617, 71 A. at 1064. See also Morris v. State, 4 Md.App. 252, 255, 242 A.2d 559, 561 (1968), quoting Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637, cert. denied 371 U.S. 951, 83 S.Ct. 505, 9 L.Ed.2d 499 (1963) ([T]he privilege extends essentially only to the substance of matters communicated to an attorney in professional confidence.). For a communication to be considered privileged, it cannot be intended for disclosure to third parties. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 Md. at 416, 718 A.2d at 1139. We have recognized, however, that disclosure to third parties, or the presence of third parties during a communication, does not automatically destroy the privilege. See State v. Pratt, 284 Md. 516, 520, 398 A.2d 421, 425-26 (1979) (holding that communications made to a psychiatrist in preparation for an insanity defense are protected by attorney-client privilege); Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 568, 602 A.2d 677, 683-84 (1992) (declining to apply attorney-client privilege to communications to a private detective in attorney's employ where personal relationship with the detective motivated the communication).