Opinion ID: 218749
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Powers' Contentions

Text: Powers contends that the district court abused its discretion in various rulings on his objections and motions relating to evidentiary matters. First, Powers contends that the court abused its discretion in preventing him from attacking the credibility of one of the government's witnesses. Elizabeth Rusciano, a straw borrower, had testified that she applied for loans using Powers and Wayne Jenkins as her loan officers on separate occasions but that she was completely unaware that the applications they filled out for her contained fraudulent information. During his cross-examination of Wayne Jenkins, Powers' counsel sought to elicit testimony that in reality Rusciano was complicit in concocting the fraudulent lease used in the loan she obtained through Jenkins. The district court cut short this line of questioning, explaining that it was remote, inconsequential, and a needless expenditure of time because whether or not Rusciano had conspired with Jenkins was irrelevant to whether Powers had prepared fraudulent loan applications for her. That was not an abuse of discretion. Powers also argues that the court's comments when ruling on that matter so prejudiced him that the court should have granted a mistrial. Even improper comments by a judge warrant reversal only if they had such a prejudicial effect on the jury that they denied the defendant a fair trial. United States v. Tampas, 493 F.3d 1291, 1303 (11th Cir.2007). The comments that Powers complains about could not have had any effect on the jury because they were made outside its presence. Although the court did ask Powers' attorney in the presence of the jury about the relevance of his line of questioning, that was an entirely proper question and could not have unfairly prejudiced the jury. See Tampas, 493 F.3d at 1303 ([T]he brief question to defense counsel in the context of an evidentiary objection had no clear effect on the jury.). And, as we have mentioned before, the court instructed the jury to disregard any comments by it or the attorneys. Powers also contends that he was prejudiced by three statements or comments one of the prosecutors made at the trial: a question about Powers being terminated from his job at First Realty Mortgage; the prosecutor's statement to the court about a question she wanted to ask a witness about Powers' income; and the prosecutor's mention of evidence related to a dismissed count during closing arguments. Prosecutorial misconduct requires a new trial only if we find the remarks (1) were improper and (2) prejudiced the defendant's substantive rights. In order to assess the prejudicial impact of a prosecutor's statements, we must evaluate them in the context of the trial as a whole and assess their probable impact on the jury. United States v. Hernandez, 145 F.3d 1433, 1438 (11th Cir.1998). For a prosecutor's prejudicial comments to affect a defendant's substantial rights, there must be a reasonable probability that, but for the remarks, the outcome would have been different. United States v. Hall, 47 F.3d 1091, 1098 (11th Cir.1995). Considering the pile of evidence proving the prosecutor's case against Powers, even if we were to assume that her remarks or questions were improper, Powers has not demonstrated that his substantial rights were prejudiced, particularly in light of the court's instructions to the jury to disregard any comments made by the attorneys during the trial. See Hall, 47 F.3d at 1098. Finally, Powers contends that the district court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's reference to evidence about Count 33, a charge that had already been dismissed (on the government's motion because it listed the wrong lender). Powers failed to object to the prosecutor's statement, and that statement did not rise (or sink) to the level of plain error. [22]