Opinion ID: 2072468
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: N.J.S.A. 19:37-1 provides:

Text: When the governing body of any municipality or of any county desires to ascertain the sentiment of the legal voters of the municipality or county upon any question or policy pertaining to the government or internal affairs thereof, and there is no other statute by which the sentiment can be ascertained by the submission of such question to a vote of the electors in the municipality or county at any election to be held therein, the governing body may adopt at any regular meeting an ordinance or a resolution requesting the clerk of the county to print upon the official ballots to be used at the next ensuing general election a certain proposition to be formulated and expressed in the ordinance or resolution in concise form. Such request shall be filed with the clerk of the county not later than 74 days previous to the election. (Emphasis added.) The parties acknowledge that the validity of the referendum question depends on whether it is one pertaining to the government or internal affairs of the county. Our analysis of this critical statutory phrase is illuminated by cases that have considered its application in different but related contexts. In Botkin v. Mayor and Borough Council of Westwood, 52 N.J. Super. 416 (App.Div.), appeal dismissed, 28 N.J. 218 (1958), the Borough of Westwood sought to include on the general-election ballot the following non-binding question: Should any action be considered to effect a deconsolidation of the Consolidated School District of Westwood and Washington Township? 52 N.J. Super. at 422. The referendum was challenged under N.J.S.A. 19:37-1 on the basis that the consolidated school district was a completely independent local government unit, and hence the subject matter of the resolution did not pertain to the government or internal affairs of Westwood. The consolidated school district had been created in 1951 by action of the respective boards of education and by a special election involving the voters of both municipalities. Several years later there was significant dissatisfaction within Westwood concerning the operation of the consolidated districts, and the Borough council pursued the possibility of deconsolidation. A senator from Bergen County informed Borough officials that he would not introduce enabling legislation to permit the deconsolidation unless the desire to deconsolidate was clearly expressed by the voters of Westwood. Reversing the Law Division's denial of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the Appellate Division held that the proposed referendum question constituted a prohibited intrusion    in school district affairs by a body which has no business intermeddling with them in the slightest degree   . [T]he local governing body is not empowered in any way to seek or take any such action in the field of school affairs. [52 N.J. Super. at 431.] Addressing the question whether the referendum concerned a matter pertaining to the government or internal affairs of Westwood, the court observed: We are convinced that the quoted section can only be interpreted to mean a question of policy relating to matters in that sphere of government committed by law to and within or related to the powers of the body permitted to call for the referendum. In other words, sentiment can only be asked for with respect to matters concerning or as to which the particular body has the power to act. Any broader interpretation would open the doors without any restriction and would lead to nothing but confusion and turmoil. It would go far beyond the obvious purpose of the device, i.e., to assist the body calling for the vote in determining the course of action it should pursue on a problem or issue before it and within its jurisdiction. Since here the matter of school district deconsolidation is outside the governing body's sphere and it could not act in the matter in any way, the language of the referendum statute itself furnishes no support to the borough's position. [ Id. at 432-33.] [1] The critical statutory language was again construed in Santoro v. Mayor and Council of South Plainfield, 57 N.J. Super. 307 (Law Div.), aff'd, 57 N.J. Super. 498 (App.Div. 1959). The Borough of South Plainfield proposed the following non-binding referendum questions: 1. Shall the Sewerage Authority of the Borough of South Plainfield proceed with its plans for financing and installing sanitary sewers in the Borough of South Plainfield? 2. Shall the Mayor and Council of the Borough of South Plainfield undertake the planning, financing, and installing of sanitary sewers in the Borough of South Plainfield? [57 N.J. Super. at 309.] Noting that the Borough had created its own sewerage authority several years earlier, the Law Division observed that all of the municipality's powers over sewerage disposal had been transferred to the sewerage authority. Accordingly, the Law Division invalidated the proposed referendum on the basis that the sewerage authority had full and exclusive power over the planning, financing, and installing of sanitary sewers, and that the governing body had no power to act with respect to the subject matter of the referendum question. Id. at 312-14. The Appellate Division affirmed, citing Botkin for the proposition that referendum questions must relate to action which the municipality has the authority to take   . If the municipality has no power to act it has no right to seek the voters' advice whether to do so. 57 N.J. Super. at 501-02. In Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Camden County Clerk, 193 N.J. Super. 100 (Law Div.), aff'd, 193 N.J. Super. 111 (App.Div. 1983), the Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders attempted to place on the general election ballot a non-binding referendum question addressing whether the Board should be bound by a budget directive issued by the Chief Justice of this Court, establishing procedures to be followed in each county by assignment judges and trial court administrators. Because the resolution proposing the referendum was submitted to the county clerk after the statutory deadline, the clerk refused to include the referendum on the ballot. The County sued to compel its inclusion. The Law Division observed that the budget directive is an independent judicial action affecting only matters within the judicial sphere. It does not require any action by the counties. It does not deal with county procedures, does not require counties to approve any judicial budget or to appropriate any money or to impose any taxes.    Consequently, matters covered by the directive, a subject of county power only by judicial allowance, are not matters pertaining to the government or internal affairs of the counties. Any other conclusion would permit county intrusion into judicial affairs contrary to the constitutional insistence upon the separation of the powers of the three branches of government. [193 N.J. Super. at 107-08 (footnote omitted).] Accordingly, the court held that the proposed referendum question was invalid because it did not pertain to the government or internal affairs of the County. The Legislature cannot have intended to authorize hollow referenda, i.e., questions for voter consideration involving undertakings which counties have no power to control. Id. at 106. In Gamrin v. Mayor and Council of Englewood, 76 N.J. Super. 555 (1962), the Law Division upheld the validity of a referendum question proposed by the governing body that solicited voter sentiment concerning the transfer of certain elementary school grades from their present schools into a single school. Id. at 557. Citing Santoro for the principle that referendum questions must relate to action which the municipality has the authority to take, the court observed that the funds for the proposed school reorganization required action by the board of school estimate. Id. at 557-58 (citing 57 N.J. Super. at 501-02). Because members of the governing body served on the board of school estimate, the court concluded that the governing body is necessarily involved in a field of potential action if there is a preference for the proposal. Id. at 558. Finally, in Rowson v. Township Committee of Mantua, 171 N.J. Super. 129 (App.Div. 1979), the municipal governing body proposed a referendum question concerning a proposal by the Township utilities authority to acquire five other utility companies and to construct additional storage and distribution facilities, both projects to be financed by long-term loans. The Appellate Division acknowledged that the subject matter of the referendum concerned actions to be taken by the Authority, but noted that the controlling statute, N.J.S.A. 40:14B-24, authorized cooperative efforts between municipalities and utilities authorities relating to construction and enlargement of facilities. Id. at 133. In addition, the court observed that the Township had recently guaranteed notes of the utilities authority totaling $515,000, thereby enhancing the authority's borrowing capacity. Ibid. Accordingly, the court concluded that the proposed referendum was sufficiently related to the government or internal affairs of the municipality. Id. at 134. We are fully in accord with the guiding principle of the reported cases construing N.J.S.A. 19:37-1 as limiting the scope of the referenda authorized by statute to subjects actually encompassed within the specific jurisdictional powers of the county or municipality. Extended to its logical limits, this principle may generate close questions concerning the statute's application in specific instances. But we are confident that the legislature never intended the non-binding-referendum procedure to be used to test public opinion in the abstract or to ascertain the public's views on controversial or timely issues outside the province of the governing body soliciting them. As Justice [then Judge] Hall aptly stated in Botkin: [S]entiment can only be asked for with respect to matters concerning or as to which the particular body has the power to act. Any broader interpretation would open the doors without any restriction and would lead to nothing but confusion and turmoil. [52 N.J. Super. at 432-33 (emphasis added).]