Opinion ID: 1916424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: w. fontaine trucking co. inc.

Text: Fontaine likewise asserts as reversible error the failure of the trial justice to grant it a directed verdict. We hold as a matter of law that the failure of the VFW, for a period of nine days, to seal off the area subject to the dangerous condition or, at minimum, to post warning signs constitutes an independent intervening cause that relieves Fontaine of liability for plaintiff's injury. Thus, the trial justice committed reversible error in failing to direct a verdict for Fontaine. Uncontradicted evidence shows that the VFW had knowledge on Friday, August 29, 1980, of the fact that earlier that day a truck owned by Fontaine had dislodged a post supporting the railing that collapsed, causing plaintiff's injuries. The existence of the defective condition was generally known to members of the VFW. An employee of the VFW called Fontaine on August 29, 1980, and asked that a representative of Fontaine call plaintiff on Tuesday, September 2, 1980. Leo Fontaine called the VFW on the day specified and asked for plaintiff. Fontaine spoke with an unnamed person and authorized repairs. He further directed that the bill for said repairs be sent to Fontaine. Fontaine paid the bill. The accident occurred on September 7, 1980, nine days after the VFW had become aware of the damage to its premises. During that nine-day period the VFW did nothing to repair, to post warnings at, or to close off access to the damaged area. This court has long held that when a second actor has become aware of the existence of a potential danger caused by the negligence of a first actor and the second actor acts negligently with regard to the dangerous condition, thereby bringing about an accident with injurious consequences to others, the first actor is relieved of liability. This is so because the condition created by the first actor is merely a circumstance and not the proximate cause of the accident. Drazen v. Otis Elevator Co., 96 R.I. 114, 119, 189 A.2d 693, 695 (1963) (citing 38 Am.Jur. Negligence § 72 at 731). The plaintiff correctly points out that an intervening act of negligence will not insulate an original tortfeasor if it appears that such intervening act is a natural and probable consequence of the initial tortfeasor's act. Nolan v. Bacon, 100 R.I. 360, 365, 216 A.2d 126, 129 (1966). If, however, the intervening cause was not reasonably foreseeable, the intervening or secondary act becomes the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Almeida v. Town of North Providence, 468 A.2d 915, 917 (R.I. 1983). We hold as a matter of law that the failure by the VFW, a responsible third party, Nolan v. Bacon, 100 R.I. at 365, 216 A.2d at 129, either to repair, to post warnings at, or to close access to a dangerous condition for a period of nine days was not foreseeable and thus constitutes an independent intervening cause. The plaintiff attempts to make much of the fact that Fontaine did not inspect the damage done by its truck or see to it that repairs were made, signs posted, or access blocked. We merely note that such acts would render Fontaine a trespasser. In the factual circumstances presented here, Fontaine could do no more than to bring notice of the damage done to the premises to the attention of the VFW. [2] The total lack of activity by the VFW relative to the dangerous condition on the premises over which it had sole control for a period of nine days serves as an independent intervening cause, sufficient to relieve Fontaine of all liability for plaintiff's injury. As a result, the trial justice committed reversible error in failing to direct a verdict on behalf of Fontaine.