Opinion ID: 1792208
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issue: Whether Violation of the Sequestration Order Should Have Resulted in a Mistrial?

Text: Pursuant to Judge Carlson's sequestration order, the jurors along with the bailiffs stayed at a Holiday Inn each night of the four-day trial. On two occasions, three of the jurors visited the Inn's Tadpole Lounge. Upon learning of the jurors' visits, James and Hattie filed a post-trial Motion to Set Aside Verdict, Declare Mistrial, and Grant a New Trial. During a hearing on the motion, the three jurors testified that they did not discuss the case with each other nor with anyone else. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Carlson denied the motion and reasoned: It is admittedly regrettable and disturbing that 3 of the younger male jurors took it upon themselves to consume alcohol at the motel lounge and in their rooms during the overnight recesses, and the Court is disappointed in their conduct. But disappointment does not bring about vitiation of the guilty verdicts. The record is clear that any consumption of alcohol in no way affected their ability to perform their duties as jurors, and there was at no time discussion with any one about the case during this period of time. ... . Based on the facts and circumstances peculiar to this particular case, as revealed in the record of the post trial motion hearing, and based on the entire record in this case, the Court is satisfied that a fair and impartial jury reached verdicts based on the evidence and the law. This is true of the guilty verdicts returned, and this is true of the not guilty verdicts returned. This Court is satisfied that, except for the aforementioned consumption of alcohol, the jurors followed the instructions of the Court regarding their conduct. This Court will admit that it could not, and did not, give these Defendants a perfect trial; but they did receive a constitutionally fair trial. Record Vol. III, at 198 & 201-03. James and Hattie appealed this decision. In Weaver v. State , this Court held that a presumption [exists] that jurors follow the instructions of the court relative to their conduct during the course of the trial. 272 So.2d 636, 638 (Miss. 1973), quoted in Stringer v. State, 279 So.2d 156, 160 (Miss. 1973). The Court added that it will not conclude that prejudice resulted by separation of the jury in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. Id. Separation of jurors, under proper instructions by the court in a criminal case less than capital, is not error. Id. (emphasis supplied by this Court in Stringer v. State ). In Schwarzauer v. State, 339 So.2d 980, 981 (Miss. 1976), this Court concluded that a determination of whether an improper separation of sequestered jurors resulted in prejudice must be made on an ad hoc basis. Restated, the rule is that such cases must be decided upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case and considerable discretion is vested in trial judges when confronted with [such an issue]. Id. (citing United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824)); see also Lampley v. State, 291 So.2d 707 (Miss. 1974) (case in which this Court held that separation of jurors did not vitiate the verdict of guilty); White v. State, 566 So.2d 1256, 1260-61 (Miss. 1990) (In this case involving juror misconduct, this Court held: Applying our standard of review to the findings of fact made by the court, we are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial.) (citing Carter v. State, 493 So.2d 327 (Miss. 1986); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 753 (Miss. 1984); Anderson v. State, 231 Miss. 352, 95 So.2d 465 (1957)); cf. Carter, 493 So.2d at 329 ([A]ny presumption of prejudice may be rebutted by an affirmative showing that no such prejudice exists.) (citing Anderson, 231 Miss. at 352, 95 So.2d at 465; Pepper v. State, 200 Miss. 891, 27 So.2d 842 (1946)). In sum, James and Hattie failed to present even a scintilla of evidence evincing influence of a juror and resultant prejudice; thus, Judge Carlson did not abuse his discretion by denying their motion. This Court affirms.