Opinion ID: 2616242
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: initial and reopening claims against the fund are controlled by the same statute of limitations which governs the last employer's liability for compensation

Text: While claims against the Fund are not controlled by a specific statute of limitations, [13] our case law has come to recognize that the very same time period which governs claims against the last employer also applies to derivative or supplemental claims against the Fund. [14] Every timely claim against the employer, which timely identifies the claimant as a physically impaired person, is deemed timely brought against the Fund. [15] The limitation period that controls the reopening of a claim against an employer similarly applies to allow or to bar any additional liability of the Fund. The terms of 85 O.S. 1981 § 43, the statute in force at the time material to this reopening claim, provided:    The jurisdiction of the Court to reopen any cause upon an application based upon a change in condition shall extend for the maximum period of time measured by the number of weeks for which compensation could have been awarded by the Court had the condition of claimant existed at the time original award was made thereon and unless filed within said period of time, same shall be forever barred. [16] Although the Fund urges that the claim against it is barred by the quoted terms of § 43, its argument fails to press on us the correct legal norms governing its defense. The timeliness of the last adjudicated reopening claim against the employer determines the timeliness of the attempt to reopen further against the Fund. [17] If the former claim had not been timely brought, the derivative claim against the Fund must fail. Claimant attempted to establish increased liability of the employer by a reopening claim of March 3, 1983. She sought an award because of her changed condition for the worse. In its Form 10 (pretrial stipulation) the employer interposed a statute-of-limitations defense. The case, initially set for hearing in April 1983, was later rescheduled for August 1983. The joint-petition settlement was reached shortly thereafter and entered below on September 8, 1983. Although the employer apparently opted not to press the limitations defense initially asserted in the answer, its later strategy choice of abandoning it could not operate also to waive that defense for the Fund. The time bar, if applicable, remained available to the latter entity. Much like its liability, the Fund's limitations defense is derivative from the employer. The timeliness of the reopening claim against the employer is to be determined by adding the percentage adjudicated against it in the November 13, 1981 award (5% = 25 weeks) to the amount established by the joint-petition settlement. The latter award, computed at the applicable rate of $90.00 per week for permanent disability, represents 11 weeks plus an insignificant fraction of a day. The maximum time within which a timely reopening claim could have been filed against the employer was hence 36 weeks from the last award of November 13, 1981. [18] Because the reopening claim against the employer was filed one year and four months lateron March 3, 1983it was clearly untimely. Inasmuch as the case against the employer was time barred when brought, no derivative claim could be asserted against the Fund. The trial tribunal's decision denying compensation was hence correct in its result. We note additionally that in the joint-petition settlement proceeding with the employer the claimant failed to preserve any rights to proceed against the Fund. [19] Even if these rights had been preserved, the limitations period for a supplemental award against the Fund could not have been tolled. This is so because, as reflected by the quantum of the settlement award, the reopening claim against the employer clearly was time barred. The Fund timely interposed a limitations defense and now asserts it on certiorari. When resolving a public-law question, we are free to invoke sua sponte the correct applicable theory even though an aggrieved party's brief advanced a different reason for reversal. [20]