Opinion ID: 2161601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 39

Heading: Use of Expunged Conviction for Purposes of Sentence

Text: After the jury retired to deliberate on the appropriate sentence for Grandison's murder convictions, the trial judge proceeded to sentence him for his convictions on the conspiracy and handgun counts. During the course of making his sentencing statement the trial judge explained why he was imposing maximum sentences. In doing so he made reference to an expunged 1970 conviction, as well as other convictions, to explain that had Grandison had to serve those sentences he would have been in prison and the present murders would not have occurred. Grandison, of course, objects to the court referring to or considering the 1970 conviction. He contends that the trial judge disregarded Maryland law and the expungement order of the United States District Court. In our view we do not believe the trial judge was basing his sentences on the fact that Grandison had been sentenced to twenty years in 1970 and therefore should be given maximum sentences. Furthermore, while Grandison does not invoke the Maryland expungement statute, Art. 27, § 739, we observe that § 735(b)(2) of Art. 27 makes clear that the statute does not apply to court records where written opinions have been published. Indeed, the expungement order here, by its terms, was applicable to the Warden, the Commissioner of the Baltimore City Police Department, and the Clerk of the Criminal Court of Baltimore. See Grandison v. Warden, 423 F. Supp. 112 (D.Md. 1976). We also observe that this order did not prevent the Fourth Circuit from publishing an opinion on Grandison's later conviction for sodomy despite the use of the 1970 conviction for impeachment purposes. See Grandison v. Warden, 580 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 918, 99 S.Ct. 1239, 59 L.Ed.2d 469 (1979). In short, we see no error here.