Opinion ID: 2294067
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Contractual Relationship

Text: The defendant contends that the trial justice erred in determining the existence of an implied-in-fact contract between plaintiff and Brown University because insufficient evidence was presented to establish an enforceable promise of what Brown characterizes as de facto tenure for the untenured position of Senior Lecturer. The trial justice determined that an integrated document does not exist, but he found, based on the evidence before him, that an implied-in-fact contract arose from the dealings of the parties. An implied-in-fact contract is a form of express contract wherein the elements of the contract are found in and determined from the relations of, and communications between the parties, rather than from a single clearly expressed written document. Marshall Contractors, Inc. v. Brown University, 692 A.2d 665, 669 (R.I.1997). Based on the various letters, cover pages, assurances, and discussions between plaintiff and the University Dean, Provost, and Interim President, the trial justice determined that there was a meeting of the minds on the terms of the offer in that it corresponded to the three criteria of title, benefits, and job security referred to by Armstrong as conditions of Haviland's appointment that were required for him to accept the Deanship. The trial justice also noted that both sides acted in ways that confused, rather than clarified, the relationship. The determination of whether a contract exists is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. Nonnenmacher v. City of Warwick, 722 A.2d 1199, 1202 (R.I.1999). The trial justice found that an implied-in-fact contract arose in this case. However, we are of the opinion that, although the terms of the agreement are not set forth in a single document, an enforceable, express employment contract was entered into in this case. In determining the existence of an enforceable contract, we employ the principles of contract law. Under traditional contract theory, an offer and acceptance are indispensable to contract formation, and without such assent a contract is not formed. Smith v. Boyd, 553 A.2d 131, 133 (R.I.1989). This Court has established that for parties to form a valid contract, each must have the intent to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Weaver v. American Power Conversion Corp., 863 A.2d 193, 198 (R.I. 2004) (citing Rhode Island Five v. Medical Associates of Bristol County, Inc., 668 A.2d 1250, 1253 (R.I.1996)). In an expressed contract the terms and conditions of the contract are assented to orally or in writing by the parties. J. Koury Steel Erectors, Inc. of Massachusetts v. San-Vel Concrete Corp., 120 R.I. 360, 365, 387 A.2d 694, 697 (1978). In this case, the terms of the contract are contained within the several communications and letters exchanged between Brown University and Haviland, and accepted by Haviland on November 19, 2000. The defendant, in fact, concedes that the relevant manifestation of defendant's objective intention was contained in the series of four letters it sent to Haviland in 2000: October 18, November 6, November 8, and November 17. The University considers the third letter, dated November 8, 2000, to be the formal offer extended to Haviland. The November 8, 2000 letter described the positions and titles Haviland would assume, and it set forth her salary and the various policies with which she would be expected to comply. However, not all the contract terms were set forth in that letter  the letter was silent as to a contract renewal standard. When Haviland signed the November 8 offer letter, she did so only after receiving assurance from Dean Fennell that the letter of October 18 had not been superseded by subsequent writings and that it was not null and void. Although the contractual elements of offer and acceptance were satisfied, giving rise to an express contract between Haviland and Brown University, the terms assented to were those contained in the November 8, 2000 letter, supplemented by the terms of the October 18 letter  which were still operative according to the November 17 letter. Thus, we conclude, the terms of the employment contract relating to contract renewal and reappointment are ambiguous.