Opinion ID: 1151125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: review of criteria

Text: In its order establishing the process which has led to this report, the California Supreme Court directed that we be guided by the procedures and criteria [contained in Reinecke IV ] as well as by the provisions of article XXI, section 1 of the state Constitution. In addition, the Masters will consider the application of federal law, including the Voting Rights Act.... ( Wilson v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 473.) The interaction of this act with the previous criteria has added considerable complexity to the redistricting process, as we discuss below. Before dealing with these interrelated criteria, it is necessary to acknowledge that the overriding criterion we must follow is the federal constitutional requirement of population equality as established in Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 533 [12 L.Ed.2d 506, 84 S.Ct. 1362] (state legislative districts) and Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (1969) 394 U.S. 526 [22 L.Ed.2d 519, 89 S.Ct. 1225] (congressional districts). Technical issues concerning the degree of equality required are discussed at a later section of this report.

The primary purpose of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq.) (the Act) is to protect the right to vote as guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. [6a] As amended in 1970, 1975, and 1982, the Act prohibits states and their political subdivisions from denying or abridging citizens' rights to vote on account of race or color (§§ 2(a), 5; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(a), 1973c) or membership in a language minority group (§ 4(f)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2)). As valid federal legislation (see Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966) 384 U.S. 641, 648-651 [16 L.Ed.2d 828, 834-835, 86 S.Ct. 1717]), the Act is the supreme law of the land (U.S. Const., art. VI, § 2) and supersedes any conflicting state laws or constitutional provisions. Two sections of the Act directly affect our task, but in different ways. Section 2, as amended in 1982, has two subsections. Subsection (a) is a substantive prohibition of any voting procedure that results in denial or abridgement of a racial or lingual minority's voting rights as provided in subsection (b). Subsection (b) states that a violation of subsection (a) is established by a showing, based on the totality of circumstances, that members of a protected class have less than an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The section expressly disavows establishing any right of proportional representation but permits consideration of the extent of minority candidates' success in getting elected. [7a] Section 2 has been the basis for scores of lawsuits, typically prosecuted in federal court by members of protected groups, claiming that methods of electing candidates to office, such as the demarcation of legislative district boundaries, unlawfully dilute minority votes. Though most of these suits are directed at voting procedures in Southern states, a substantial number have arisen in Northern or Western states, including California. (E.g., Garza v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir.1990) 918 F.2d 763; Romero v. City of Pomona (9th Cir.1989) 883 F.2d 1418; Gomez v. City of Watsonville (9th Cir.1988) 863 F.2d 1407.) In preparing our redistricting plans, we determined that it is important to eliminate, or at least minimize, any possibility of their being challenged under section 2. The ultimate success of any such challenge would depend not only on the composition of the new districts themselves but also on evidence, not now before us, of historic voting patterns or socioeconomic data, and probably also on resolution of open legal questions concerning interpretation or application of the Act. Rather than speculating on such evidence, or attempting to resolve all such legal issues, we have endeavored to draw boundaries that will withstand section 2 challenges under any foreseeable combination of factual circumstances and legal rulings. The other relevant section of the Act is section 5 (42 U.S.C. § 1973c). It applies only to states or counties in which fewer than half of the residents of voting age were registered to vote, or voted, in the Presidential Elections of 1964, 1968, or 1972. (See § 4(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) [voting registration determined by Director of the Census].) The section requires that any redistricting or other change of voting procedures in those jurisdictions be cleared in advance either by the federal district court in Washington, D.C., or by the United States Attorney General. The usual practice is to submit a proposed change to the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, after which the Attorney General has 60 days in which to interpose an objection. Four California counties  Kings, Merced, Monterey, and Yuba  are covered by section 5. All have relatively small populations that include the assigned personnel of large military bases, who are unlikely to register to vote. Because objection by the Attorney General could result in costly delays in the electoral process, we have taken special steps (which we shall describe) to avoid any possibility of disapproval with respect to the covered counties. Department of Justice regulations explain that a change affecting voting is subject to disapproval under section 5 if it will lead to a retrogression in the position of members of a racial or language minority group (i.e., will make members of such a group worse off than they had been before the change) with respect to their opportunity to exercise the electoral franchise effectively, citing Beer v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 130 [47 L.Ed.2d 629, 96 S.Ct. 1357] (see also Lockhart v. United States (1983) 460 U.S. 125 [74 L.Ed.2d 863, 103 S.Ct. 998]). (28 C.F.R. § 51.54(a) (1991).) Particular attention is paid to whether the proposed change would comply with section 2. (28 C.F.R. § 51.55 (1991).) Thus, with respect to the four counties covered by section 5, our obligations are to avoid any worsening of the voting positions of racial or language minorities and to comply with section 2 itself.
The leading United States Supreme Court decision construing section 2 is Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) 478 U.S. 30 [92 L.Ed.2d 25, 106 S.Ct. 2752] ( Thornburg ), where the court upheld an African-American voter challenge to five multimember districts, from each of which the voters were to elect three to eight members of the North Carolina Legislature. The court pointed out that the 1982 amendment to section 2, newly prohibiting any voting procedure that results in abridgement of voting rights, was largely a response to this court's plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), which had declared that, in order to establish a violation either of § 2 or of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, minority voters must prove that a contested mechanism was intentionally adopted or maintained by state officials for a discriminatory purpose (478 U.S. at p. 35 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 37], italics added). Referring to section 2(b)'s requirement that proof of a violation be based on the totality of circumstances, the court quoted, from a Senate Judiciary Committee Report approving the amendment, a list of typical factors that might be probative. [8a] These factors were derived principally from two cases arising in Texas and Louisiana respectively ( Thornburg, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 37, fn. 4 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 38]) and pertain largely to historical aspects of discrimination and racial polarization. The Report stresses, says the court, that this list of typical factors is neither comprehensive nor exclusive, and that `the question whether the political processes are equally open depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality' [citation] and on a `functional' view of the political process. [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 45 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 43].) The court then turned to the African-American plaintiffs' claim that the use of multimember, rather than single-member, districts in the contested jurisdictions diluted their votes by submerging them in a white majority, thus impairing their ability to elect representatives of their choice. ( Thornburg, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 46 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 44], fns. omitted.) The court listed three necessary preconditions to the sustaining of such a claim: First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district. ( Thornburg, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 50 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 46], italics added.) Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive.  ( Thornburg, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 51 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 47], italics added.) Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. ( Thornburg, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 51 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 47].) Despite the court's formal reservation of the question whether these prerequisites are fully pertinent to a claim of vote dilution caused by the splitting of a large and geographically cohesive minority between two or more multimember or single-member districts ( Thornburg, supra, 478 U.S. at pp. 46-47, fn. 12 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 44]; cf. id. at p. 50, fn. 16 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 46]), lower courts have assumed their applicability to claims of vote dilution by single-member districts (see Jeffers v. Clinton (E.D.Ark. 1989) 730 F. Supp. 196, 205; Neal v. Coleburn (E.D.Va. 1988) 689 F. Supp. 1426, 1435), and we likewise assume their applicability to the single-member districts that we propose. We can avoid section 2 challenges to our new districts by eliminating the possibility of a minority group's proving any one of the three Thornburg prerequisites. The information from which our districts are drawn is furnished by the 1990 federal census, which tells us, as to each census tract, the total number of persons together with the numbers in particular categories of age, race, and Latino origin. [9] From that data, we can judge whether minority groups are sufficiently large and geographically compact to satisfy the first Thornburg prerequisite. The second and third prerequisites, however, depend on what analyses of election results would show about a minority's political cohesiveness and about White majority bloc voting. In this area, the federal census is of little help. We have therefore drawn district lines so as to avoid either (1) unnecessary fragmentation of any sufficiently large, geographically compact protected minority group [10] into two or more districts, or (2) overconcentration of such a group in a single district. By thus preventing the dilution of the votes of any minority group that could qualify under the first Thornburg prerequisite, we can eliminate the possibility of section 2 challenges regardless of whether a group could fulfill the second or third prerequisite. Accordingly, we turn to an examination of the first prerequisite.
We examine first the requirement that the minority be geographically compact ( Thornburg, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 50 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 46]). There is little case law interpreting this phrase. We believe that the key to its meaning lies in the view, expressed in Thornburg, that Congress intended the determination of a section 2 violation to `depend[] upon a searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality... and on a functional view of the political process (478 U.S. at p. 45 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 43], quoting from the Senate report). The court in Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ. (M.D.Ala. 1988) 686 F. Supp. 1459, seized upon this passage from Thornburg in holding that the prerequisite of geographical compactness was met by a minority group who lived within an irregular strip of land, just inland from Mobile Bay, which appears to be approximately 20 miles long and, at some points, less than a mile wide. As the Dillard court explained, [t]he degree of geographical symmetry or attractiveness is ... a desirable consideration for districting, but only to the extent it aids or facilitates the political process.... [¶] ... For example, a district would not be sufficiently compact if it was so spread out that there was no sense of community, that is, if its members and its representatives could not effectively and efficiently stay in touch with each other; or if it was so convoluted that there was no sense of community, that is, if its members and its representative could not easily tell who actually lived in the district.... [B]ecause compactness is a functional concept, the number and kinds of factors a court should consider may vary with each case, depending on the local geographical, political, and socioeconomic characteristics of the jurisdiction being sued. ( Id. at p. 1466.) We fully agree with this functional view of geographical compactness. Accordingly, in the context of statewide redistricting in California, particularly in rural areas where considerations of communication and access are of considerable importance, section 2 need not control formulation of plans where minority voters are not, functionally, geographically compact.
Under Thornburg 's first prerequisite, the minority group complaining of vote dilution must be not only geographically compact but also sufficiently large ... to constitute a majority in a single-member district ( Thornburg, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 50 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 46]). The majority referred to has been widely interpreted to mean a majority of persons of voting age, rather than a majority of the entire population. ( Dickinson v. Indiana State Elections Bd. (7th Cir.1991) 933 F.2d 497, 503 ( Dickinson ); Romero v. City of Pomona, supra, 883 F.2d 1418, 1425; Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida (11th Cir.1990) 899 F.2d 1012, 1018 [rehg. en banc] ( Solomon ); McDaniels v. Mehfoud (E.D.Va. 1988) 702 F. Supp. 588, 592 ( McDaniels ).) That interpretation is consistent with Thornburg 's repeated references to minority voters (e.g., 478 U.S. at p. 50, fn. 17 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 46-47]) and appears correct. A majority of registered voters, on the other hand, is not a prerequisite to a section 2 claim. ( Dickinson, supra, 933 F.2d at p. 503; Solomon, supra, 899 F.2d 1012; McDaniels, supra, 702 F. Supp. at p. 592.) As pointed out at an earlier stage of the Solomon case: Minority voter registration figures are inherently unreliable measures in vote dilution cases because the very lack of minority political power responsible for the bringing of the section 2 action also may act to depress voter registration. ( Solomon v. Liberty County, Fla. (11th Cir.1988) 865 F.2d 1566, 1574 [vacated on grant of rehg. en banc].) But though not part of any threshold requirement, voter registration or turnout may be considered in fashioning a remedy that will enhance the minority group's opportunity to elect the candidate of its choice. ( Dickinson, supra, 933 F.2d at p. 503.) However, we would note that there are difficulties in developing reliable minority registration data. [11] At least one court has considered not only age but citizenship in determining whether the minority group would constitute a majority of eligible voters within a district. (See Romero v. City of Pomona, supra, 883 F.2d 1418, 1425.) For several reasons we have assumed that citizenship would not be a factor in determining fulfillment of Thornburg 's first prerequisite. Since an application for naturalization resembles voter registration in that both require individual initiative, lack of citizenship is arguably more akin to nonregistration than to underage as a measure of ineligibility to vote. Moreover, rejection of the dubious citizenship test theoretically results in conferring Thornburg standing on more minority groups than if the test were accepted. Thus, district lines based on such rejection will more effectively preclude possibilities of section 2 claims. Though we have not relied on voter registration or citizenship statistics in determining what groups are entitled to voter protection under Thornburg, we have occasionally considered such data in determining how best to divide up a minority group which cannot be accommodated in a single district in a way that will maximize the group's voting potential.
The second Thornburg prerequisite to a section 2 claim is that the minority group seeking protection show that it is politically cohesive. ( Thornburg, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 51 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 47].) In an abundance of caution we are assuming, as already explained, the political cohesiveness of any single minority group that meets the first prerequisite, i.e., that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact. The question of cohesiveness also arises, however, where two or three minority groups claim that together they could constitute the geographically compact majority of a district even though none is large enough to qualify separately. If the groups are politically cohesive, i.e., if they vote the same way, they are likely to be treated as a combined single group so long as the combined group fulfills the other Thornburg prerequisites. ( Campos v. City of Baytown, Tex. (5th Cir.1988) 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 [African-Americans and Hispanics treated as one minority group if cohesive as a whole]; see Romero v. City of Pomona, supra, 883 F.2d 1418, 1426-1427 [African-Americans and Latinos not combined because found not to be politically cohesive].) Accordingly, in areas containing substantial numbers of more than one of the state's principal minority groups (African-American, Asian, and Latino) of which two or three combined, but no one group alone, would be large and compact enough to qualify under Thornburg, we have assumed political cohesiveness and endeavored to protect the combined group's voting potential in accordance with section 2.
A footnote in Thornburg warned that the court there had no occasion to consider whether § 2 permits, and if it does, what standards should pertain to, a claim brought by a minority group that is not sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district, alleging that the use of a multimember district impairs its ability to influence elections. (478 U.S. at pp. 46-47, fn. 12 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 44], italics in original.) Disregarding this suggestion that section 2 might require less than intradistrict majority status for protection of a minority voter group, some courts have insisted on the majority requirement of the first Thornburg prerequisite as a brightline test that should be adhered to in the interests of clarity and uniformity. ( McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist. (7th Cir.1988) 851 F.2d 937, 944; accord, Brewer v. Ham (5th Cir.1989) 876 F.2d 448, 455-456; Skorepa v. City of Chula Vista (S.D.Cal. 1989) 723 F. Supp. 1384, 1391; see Garza v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 918 F.2d 763, 770, fn. 2; Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting Rights Act (1991) 77 Va.L.Rev. 1, 31-32.) The high court's recent decision in Chisom v. Roemer (1991) 501 U.S. ___ [115 L.Ed.2d 348, 111 S.Ct. 2354], however, contains a stronger recognition of the possibility of an influence vote-dilution claim by a minority voter group too small to constitute an intradistrict majority. In Chisom, the court sustained the right to challenge elections of state judges under section 2. The majority opinion, joined in by six justices, reasoned that the right to an equal opportunity `to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice' (§ 2(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)) is a unitary right, and that judges are representatives within the meaning of section 2(b). (501 U.S. at p. ___ [115 L.Ed.2d at p. 364, 111 S.Ct. at p. 2365], italics added by the court.) The Chisom dissent argues that judges are not representatives and that section 2(b) confers two separate rights. Otherwise, says the dissent, minorities who form such a small part of the electorate in a particular jurisdiction that they could on no conceivable basis `elect representatives of their choice' would be entirely without section 2 protection. ( Chisom v. Roemer, supra, 501 U.S. at p. ___ [115 L.Ed.2d at p. 372, 111 S.Ct. at p. 2371] (dis. opn. of Scalia, J.).) The majority replies in a footnote: The dissent argues that our literal reading of the word `and' [in section 2(b)] leads to the conclusion that a small minority has no protection against infringements of its right `to participate in the political process' because it will always lack the numbers necessary `to elect its candidate,' post, at [page] ___ [115 L.Ed.2d at page 372, 111 S.Ct. at page 2371]. This argument, however rests on the erroneous assumption that a small group of voters can never influence the outcome of an election. ( Id. at p. ___, fn. 24 [115 L.Ed.2d at p. 364, 111 S.Ct. at p. 2365.) In Armour v. State of Ohio (N.D.Ohio 1991) 775 F. Supp. 1044, the majority of a three-judge district court (28 U.S.C. § 2284), over a vigorous dissent, sustained a section 2 claim that the boundary between two single-member districts for election to the lower house of the Ohio Legislature diluted the vote of the plaintiff minority group regardless of whether the group would be large enough to form a majority in either district. In reaching this result, the majority relied on the foregoing footnotes in Thornburg and Chisom. Without undertaking a definitive resolution of the validity of section 2 influence claims, we recognize that their legal grounding is sufficiently strong to call for our using every reasonable effort to avoid their being asserted against our redistricting proposals. Accordingly, we have aimed to maximize the voting potential of a geographically compact minority group of any appreciable size even where it would not constitute a majority in the particular district.
As noted at the outset of our report, the United States Supreme Court has required population equality of electoral districts as a matter of constitutional law. Separate tests are set out for state legislative districts and congressional districts.
The United States Supreme Court has allowed substantial leeway in population equality as to state legislative districts. In Gaffney v. Cummings (1973) 412 U.S. 735 [37 L.Ed.2d 298, 93 S.Ct. 2321], a total variation of 7.83 percent (in districts for the Connecticut Legislature) was held constitutional on its face, with no need for state justification. When substantial justification is shown, the Supreme Court has allowed even greater variation. (See, e.g. Mahon v. Howell (1972) 410 U.S. 315 [35 L.Ed.2d 320, 93 S.Ct. 979].) Aside from the federal constitutional limitations, Article XXI requires that the population of all districts of a particular type shall be reasonably equal. This section, enacted after Reinecke IV, has been interpreted by the Attorney General of California as incorporating the more restrictive population requirements contained in Reinecke IV that the population of senate and assembly districts should be within 1 percent of the ideal except in unusual circumstances, and in no event should a deviation greater than 2 percent be permitted. ( Reinecke IV, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 411; see 64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 597, 613-615 (1981).) Since we have been directed by the Supreme Court to follow the Reinecke IV criteria, we have no occasion to determine whether this higher standard is also required by Article XXI. [12]
The federal constitutional standard for population equality among a state's congressional districts is far stricter than that applicable to districts for electing a state legislature. The populations of congressional districts must be equal as nearly as is practicable. ( Wesberry v. Sanders (1964) 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 [11 L.Ed.2d 481, 486, 84 S.Ct. 526].) That standard requires that the State make a good faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality. [Citation.] Unless population variances among congressional districts are shown to have resulted despite such effort, the State must justify each variance, no matter how small. ( Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, supra, 394 U.S. 526, 530-531 [22 L.Ed.2d at pp. 524-525].) In Kirkpatrick, the high court invalidated an apportionment of Missouri's congressional districts with a maximum deviation of 5.97 percent. [13] he court rejected Missouri's attempted justifications as being ad hoc and haphazard, and not applied in a systematic, uniform manner throughout the state. ( Id. at p. 535 [22 L.Ed.2d at p. 527].) In Karcher, supra, 462 U.S. 725, these principles were the basis for invalidating New Jersey congressional districts with a maximum deviation of 0.6984 percent. The court first held, principally because of evidence of other plans with lower deviations, that the districts did not come as nearly as practicable to population equality, and therefore, the burden shifted to the State to prove that the population deviations in its plan were necessary to achieve some legitimate state objective. ( Id. at p. 740 [77 L.Ed.2d at p. 147].) The court described how the state's shifted burden could be met. Any number of consistently applied legislative policies might justify some variance, including, for instance, making the districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent Representatives. As long as the criteria are nondiscriminatory [citation], these are all legitimate objectives that on a proper showing could justify minor population deviations. See, e.g., West Virginia Civil Liberties Union v. Rockefeller, 336 F.Supp 395, 398-400 (S.D.W. Va. 1972) (approving plan with 0.78% maximum deviation as justified by compactness provision in State Constitution). ( Karcher, supra, 462 U.S. at pp. 740-741 [77 L.Ed.2d at p. 147].) The court stressed the necessity for specificity and consistency: The State must ... show with some specificity that a particular objective required the specific deviations in its plan, rather than simply relying on general assertions. The showing required to justify population variations is flexible, depending on the size of the deviations, the importance of the State's interests, the consistency with which the plan as a whole reflects those interests, and the availability of alternatives that might substantially vindicate those interests yet approximate population equality more closely. ( Karcher, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 741 [77 L.Ed.2d at p. 147].) New Jersey's attempted justification of the challenged redistricting was held clearly inadequate. The only justification seriously advanced was preservation of minority voting strength, but that explanation applied to only two of the state's fourteen districts and could not justify the deviations of others. ( Karcher, supra, 462 U.S. at pp. 742-745 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 148-151].) We are satisfied that our proposed congressional districts comply with these Karcher guidelines. Our maximum deviation is only 0.49 percent, compared with almost 0.70 percent in Karcher itself, and 0.78 percent in the West Virginia reapportionment case that Karcher describes as justified by compactness provision in [the] State Constitution (462 U.S. at p. 741 [77 L.Ed.2d at p. 147]). All of our proposed districts are fully, specifically, and consistently justified by the state policies expressed in the California Constitution (art. XXI) and in Reinecke IV, supra, 10 Cal.3d 402, 410-414, or by the overriding federal policies implemented by sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act. We note Karcher 's examples of possible nondiscriminatory state justifications, for instance, making districts compact [and] respecting municipal boundaries (462 U.S. at p. 740 [77 L.Ed.2d at p. 147]) reflect our own Reinecke IV criteria (10 Cal.3d at pp. 411-412). The Democratic Congressional Delegation contends that their plan should be chosen over any rival plan because it achieves almost perfect population equality (a deviation of no more than 9 persons from the ideal district population of 572,308). We reject that contention. As Justice Stevens, who joined in the majority Karcher opinion, observed in his separate concurring opinion in that case, the goal of perfect population equality is an inadequate method of judging the constitutionality of an apportionment plan. ( Karcher, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 750 [77 L.Ed.2d at p. 155] (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.).) Karcher clearly permits the congressional districts that we propose, with a maximum deviation of less than 0.5 percent and specifically justified by legitimate, consistently applied state and federal policies. Moreover, there is an affirmative policy reason for not insisting on virtually exact equality. The districts that we recommend are composed of entire census tracts. These tracts normally range from 2,000 to 6,000 persons in size and, as explained in Reinecke IV, an effort has been made by the Census Bureau to make them homogeneous as to social characteristics and to use prominent natural or manmade geographical features as boundaries. Thus, following, rather than disregarding, census tracts will aid in establishing natural, well defined legislative districts and will aid in obtaining valid pertinent socioeconomic data about such districts. ( Reinecke IV, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 413, fns. omitted.) [14] The plans submitted to us with near-zero population deviations are based on census blocks instead of tracts. Formulating districts on a block basis is enormously expensive. A block, as used by the Census Bureau, is just that  a block in a city or suburb. The approximately 6,000 census tracts in California are made up of about 400,000 blocks. The cost of computers, software, and experts to deal efficiently with this greater amount of data is exponentially higher than a comparable system in which the bulk of the redistricting work is done by census tracts. Indeed, the cost would be prohibitive for any private person or group having resources short of those available to the Legislature. [15] Thus, the result of insisting on an exactitude that requires formulation of districts by census blocks, instead of tracts, would be to limit the ability of many groups, including those representing minority voters, to participate meaningfully in the reapportionment process by presenting alternate redistricting plans, such as the one offered to us by the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund (hereafter MALDEF). Such limitation on community participation would undercut our duty to `afford all interested parties the opportunity to be heard' so that `[t]he court [will] be fully informed with respect to all of the possible criteria that might be adopted for reapportionment and with respect to all of the specific implementations of such criteria that might be ordered into effect.' ([ Legislature v. Reinecke (1972)] 6 Cal.3d [595,] 601-602.) ( Reinecke III, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 167, cited in Wilson v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d 471, 473, as the basis for the court's direction that we hold public hearings.) This policy of maximum community input for any court-ordered plan, followed in 1973 as well as in 1991, clearly justifies, under Karcher, supra, 462 U.S. 725, the minor deviations necessary to enable redistricting to be done on a reasonably exact census tract basis instead of a census block basis that would be prohibitively expensive for most interested persons and groups. Widespread participation in the redistricting process is also an important policy to be furthered under the Act. The United States Attorney General has recognized this in the regulations for preclearance under section 5. Among the factors the Attorney General considers in determining whether to preclear a voting procedural change, such as redistricting, are the extent to which the jurisdiction afforded members of racial and language minority groups an opportunity to participate in the decision to make the change (28 C.F.R. § 51.57(c)) and the extent to which the jurisdiction took the concerns of members of racial and language minority groups into account in making the change (28 C.F.R. § 51.57(d)). The participation called for by these provisions should not be restricted for those unable to afford the enormous cost of unnecessarily exact redistricting. [16]
Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (art. VI, § 2), the Act ( supra, 42 U.S.C. § 1471 et seq.) takes precedence over any state guidelines with which the Act conflicts. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the directions given to the Masters require that, to the extent possible, we be guided by ... the provisions of article XXI, section 1 of the state Constitution and the guidelines of Reinecke IV. ( Wilson v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 473.) These three sets of requirements constitute the foundation on which the redistricting plan is built. We have previously described the Act, the federal imperative. Here, we discuss the commands of the state, as expressed in the Constitution and by our Supreme Court, and their interrelationship with overriding national policy. Further, while the state criteria which we are directed to follow come from two sources  Article XXI of the Constitution and Reinecke IV, supra, 10 Cal.3d 396, several of the Reinecke IV criteria, on close examination, simply express in different words the basic criteria contained in Article XXI. [17]
Article XXI, section 1, an amendment to the state Constitution adopted by the people as Proposition 6 in June 1980, requires that each member of the Senate, the Assembly, Congress, and the State Board of Equalization be elected from a single-member district (Art. XXI, subd. (a)), that districts of each type be numbered consecutively from the northern boundary of the state to the southern boundary (Art. XXI, subd. (d)), and that the population of all districts of a particular type be reasonably equal (Art. XXI, subd. (b)). The first two of these provisions require no further discussion. We have previously dealt with the federal constitutional requirements of population equality. The remaining two requirements of California's Article XXI are central to our redistricting responsibility and require further discussion: (c) Every district shall be contiguous. (e) The geographical integrity of any city, county, or city and county, or of any geographical region shall be respected to the extent possible without violating the requirements of any other subdivision of this section [i.e., contiguity and population equality]. To determine more specifically what was intended by these two provisions, we turn to the Ballot Pamphlet analysis and arguments to the voters for the Primary Election of June 3, 1980. Such material is often relied upon in construing constitutional provisions. (See Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 802-803 [268 Cal. Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934] [ballot arguments are accepted sources from which to ascertain voters intent and intent of voters governs interpretation of constitutional provisions enacted by them]); White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 775 [120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222] [ballot argument identifies the principal mischiefs at which the constitutional amendment is directed].)
The Legislative Analyst's analysis of Proposition 6, by which Article XXI was adopted, described the measure as providing that [a]ll districts shall be adjoining. The ballot argument in favor of Proposition 6 added: Contiguous districts. Proposition 6 would require that districts be composed of adjacent territory and not widely separated areas. It would also help deter odd-shaped districts which join distant communities only by corridors along beaches, highways and waterways. (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Primary Elec. (June 3, 1980).)
The Legislative Analyst's Analysis stated that the measure provided that [w]here possible, the geographical region of a city or county shall not be divided among different districts. The ballot argument favoring the proposition stated: [Proposition 6] requires preservation of the integrity of cities, counties, and geographic regions.... [P]roposition 6 would reduce abuses by requiring the Legislature to follow these rules: Respect city and county boundaries. This rule would prevent the irrational division of cities for purely partisan purposes. It would help protect minority communities from being carved up just to dilute their votes. And it would help maintain local control by giving cities and counties effective representation in the Legislature. (Ballot Pamp. analysis of Prop. 6 by Legis. Analyst as presented to voters, Primary Elec. (June 3, 1980), italics in original.) The ballot arguments opposing the proposition asked, Why is not `geographic regions' defined? and questioned whether the provision concerning the geographic integrity of city and county boundaries would water down the provision concerning equal population: [W]ill protecting the integrity of cities and counties elasticize the meaning of `reasonably equal'? (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Primary Elec. (June 3, 1980).) The proponents responded: City and county boundaries can be ignored only if necessary to comply with the equal population requirement. That is how Proposition 6 will prevent cities and minority communities from being arbitrarily divided to gain partisan advantage or to draw `safe' districts for incumbents. ( Ibid. )
As noted, the Masters have also been instructed by the Supreme Court to consider the following criteria used by the Special Masters and accepted by the court in 1973: 1. As required by the federal Constitution, the districts in each plan should be numerically equal in population as nearly as practicable, with strict equality in the case of congressional districts [citation].... The population of senate and assembly districts should be within 1 percent of the ideal except in unusual circumstances, and in no event should a deviation greater than 2 percent be permitted. .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 2. The territory included within a district should be contiguous and compact, taking into account the availability and facility of transportation and communication between the people in a proposed district, between the people and candidates in the district, and between the people and their elected representatives.

5. The social and economic interests common to the population of an area which are probable subjects of legislative action, generally termed a `community of interests' [citation] should be considered in determining whether the area should be included within or excluded from a proposed district in order that all of the citizens of the district might be represented reasonably, fairly and effectively. Examples of such interests, among others, are those common to an urban area, a rural area, an industrial area or an agricultural area, and those common to areas in which people share similar living standards, use the same transportation facilities, have similar work opportunities, or have access to the same media of communication relevant to the election process. ... It is clear that in many situations county and city boundaries define political, economic and social boundaries of population groups. Furthermore, organizations with legitimate political concerns are constituted along political subdivision lines. Therefore, unnecessary division of counties and cities in reapportionment districting should be avoided. ( Reinecke IV, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 411-412, fn. omitted.) As to all of the recommended criteria, their applicability, priority and scope, other than population equality, depend on circumstances indigenous to the area under consideration. To the extent required by the federal Constitution, population equality controls. ( Reinecke IV, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 414.)