Opinion ID: 1772334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Steptoe

Text: Byrd also contends that the trial court erred when it entered a summary judgment in favor of Dr. Steptoe on Byrd's promissory-fraud claim. In his complaint, Byrd states a promissory-fraud claim against Dr. Steptoe, alleging that Dr. Steptoe promised that Byrd would be able to complete a degree in music media at ASU in a timely manner, that the music media courses listed in the catalog would be taught in the near future, and that Dr. Steptoe, when those statements were made, had no intention of carrying out those promises. Byrd alleges that Dr. Steptoe's position afforded him access to course information, access to ASU's music facilities, and access to knowledge regarding the recruitment and hiring of instructors for the music media program. Byrd argues that, at the very least, Dr. Steptoe acted recklessly when he promised that the courses Byrd needed to complete a major in music media would be offered in the near future. Unlike basic fraud claims that may be based upon reckless conduct, promissory fraud requires proof of intent to deceive. See Padgett, 535 So.2d at 142. See also Hillcrest Ctr., Inc. v. Rone, 711 So.2d 901, 906 (Ala.1997) (quoting Russellville Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Frost, 484 So.2d 1084, 1087 (Ala.1986) (`[A] reckless misrepresentation cannot constitute fraud where the alleged misrepresentation relates to some future event. Where the misrepresentation relates to some future event, it must be shown that the person making the representation intended not to do the act promised at the time the misrepresentation was made.')). A plaintiff alleging promissory fraud has the burden of proving that, at the time the promise was made, the defendant intended to deceive the plaintiff. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Washington, 719 So.2d 774, 776 (Ala.1998). Byrd's affidavit submitted in opposition to the motion for a summary judgment states: Roughly four weeks into the semester [which began in January 1999], the instructors for the promised courses had yet to appear, prompting me to write Dr. Lamar, Dr. Roosevelt Steptoe, Vice President of Academic Affairs at Alabama State University, [and others], explaining my concerns and asking for help. On April 6, 1999, Dr. Steptoe responded by sending a copy of correspondence between himself and Dr. Lamar expressing regret about the instructor, but promising that ... I would still be able to complete the program in a `timely manner. ' Later in the semester during the month of April 1999, an instructor named Ralph Chapman talked to me and other Music Media students and offered to give a grade for the courses without actually teaching the Class. Erin Caudill and I went to Dr. Steptoe to report Mr. Chapman's statement and to explain that a meaningless grade would not help us land a recording studio job if we couldn't operate the equipment. Dr. Steptoe apologized and made more promises about offering the classes in the near future.  (Emphasis added.) Byrd wrote Dr. Steptoe on November 2, 1999, accusing him of falsely staging a show of displeasure with Dr. Lamar over the status of the music media program. Byrd wrote: You should receive an acting award. When asked about this letter in his deposition, Byrd testified, And I knew it [Dr. Steptoe's display of displeasure] was unreal because finding out what I found out before I wrote this letter, that he knew something about it, was just an act like he was making me believe that he was mad at Dr. Lamar. (Emphasis added.) Byrd also testified as to a meeting he had with Dr. Steptoe in April 2000, shortly before he withdrew from ASU. When asked to tell everything you recall about the meeting, Byrd testified that, among other things, he told Dr. Steptoe, The problem wasn't fixed and you knew about the problem all along.  (Emphasis added.) He said that he told Dr. Steptoe,  You knew that that program wasn't there. You knew that someone was writing that grant up to the federal government to receive funds for it. And, he told me in the meeting, he was talking about, No, I didn't know. I didn't know that that program wasn't receiving funds. He didn't know that someone was still writing a grant up, which were all lies I found out that very next day. (Emphasis added.) Then, according to Byrd, Dr. Steptoe stated that he was scared and admitted to him that the program was not actually offered by ASU and that other schools were also offering nonexistent programs in their catalogs. Dr. Steptoe, according to Byrd, offered him transportation, somewhere to stay, free schooling, and free room and board if Byrd would drop his lawyer and strike a deal, and also offered to provide the cost of tuition for Byrd to complete a music media program at another school. Byrd refused, saying the damage was already done to him and what he wanted was for the program actually to be taught at ASU and for ASU to stop misleading students. Dr. Steptoe responded, according to Byrd, Give me one more chance. If I can't get it done right, I'll take it from the catalog. Byrd said, I have already given you all your chances. Byrd clearly testified in his affidavit that Dr. Steptoe promised him in early 1999 that he would be able to complete the music media program at ASU in a timely manner and that the music media courses would be taught in the near future. The evidence before us regarding Dr. Steptoe's intent to deceive Byrd at the time he made the promises to perform an act in the future consists of Byrd's accusations, made when he was voicing his complaints, that Dr. Steptoe knew he would be unable to perform. Byrd testified that he knew by November 2, 1999, Dr. Steptoe knew something about it. Dr. Steptoe's counsel did not challenge this statement or request elaboration of the basis upon which it was made. Dr. Steptoe offered Byrd's deposition in support of his motion for a summary judgment. Byrd did more than merely state a belief or express an opinion as to Dr. Steptoe's knowledge. Byrd stated as a matter of fact that Dr. Steptoe knew the program was nonexistent at the time the promises were being made. We measure the sufficiency of evidence on a motion for a summary judgment by the same standard that would apply to a motion for a judgment as a matter of law. Fast Phones, Inc. v. City of Montgomery, 842 So.2d 617 (Ala.2002). Circumstantial evidence is appropriate proof of a present intent not to perform in a promissory-fraud case. Ex parte Grand Manor, Inc., 778 So.2d 173 (Ala.2000). We do not here face evidence that, if believed, would constitute evidence of only recklessness. We have substantial circumstantial evidence of Dr. Steptoe's involvement in ASU's curriculum by reason of his position as vice president of academic affairs. We have Byrd's testimony that Dr. Steptoe promised him that he could complete the music media program in a timely manner and that the music media courses listed in the ASU catalog would be taught in the near future. Furthermore, we have Byrd's statement that Dr. Steptoe knew that ASU did not offer a music media program. Byrd's testimony that Dr. Steptoe made the promises, coupled with Byrd's testimony that Dr. Steptoe knew at that time that those promises could not be fulfilled, are sufficient to create a jury question as to the promissory-fraud claim. The evidence of a similar assertion by Byrd of prior knowledge on a later occasion followed by Dr. Steptoe's denial does nothing more than support the necessity for a jury determination on this issue. We hold that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Dr. Steptoe as to Byrd's promissory-fraud claim.