Opinion ID: 2457177
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Riceland Foods disability benefits

Text: Mrs. Mason subdivides her first argument into three subpoints.
According to Mrs. Mason, the Riceland Foods disability benefits do not fit within the exceptions to the definition of marital property set forth in Ark.Code Ann. § 9-12-315(b)(6) (Repl.1993). Under Ark.Code Ann. § 9-12-315(a), at the time a divorce decree is entered, the chancery court must distribute all martial property one-half (½) to each party unless the court finds such a division to be inequitable. The term marital property is defined in § 9-12-315(b) as all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage with certain specified exceptions. Among those are the exceptions presently in question, listed in subsection (b)(6): Benefits received or to be received from a workers' compensation claim, personal injury claim, or social security claim when those benefits are for any degree of permanent disability or future medical expenses.... This statutory subsection, on which the chancellor relied in his February 1993 letter opinion, incorporates two amendments. Act 676 of 1987 excepted workers' compensation and personal injury claims when those benefits are for any degree of permanent disability or future medical expenses. Act 1167 of 1991 added an exception for Social Security claims. As noted earlier, Mr. Mason began receiving disability payments from Riceland Foods in 1980. Dr. Stephen D. Holt characterized Mr. Mason's condition as chronic pain syndrome due to arthritis, hypothyroidism, and nerve damage from scar tissue. The benefits were derived from a disability policy purchased by Riceland, with contributions from Mr. Mason, during the marriage of the parties. As previously indicated, at the time of the separation, Mr. Mason received, for his own use, monthly disability payments amounting to $3,401.21. Mr. Mason turned sixty-five during the course of the divorce proceedings, and most of the disability benefits were then converted into retirement benefits. Mrs. Mason contends that the chancellor erred in failing to find that the Rice land disability payments made to Mr. Mason, up to retirement age and that portion remaining since constitute marital property subject to equal distribution. Mr. Mason counters that his physical problems had their origins in his World War II injuries, which were aggravated in the 1970s during his tenure at Riceland by his loss of the use of his left arm and a work-related fall. He asserts that the disability payments resulted from these injuries, sustained prior to and during his employment with Riceland, and insists that the benefits fall squarely within the exception set forth in Ark.Code Ann. § 9-12-315(b)(6). The implication is that the disability benefits were based on a personal injury claim. This court held, in Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261, 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984), that retirement benefits were marital property. In Morrison v. Morrison, 286 Ark. 353, 692 S.W.2d 601 (1985), we recognized that disability benefits also constituted marital property, analogizing them to the pension benefits in the Day case. There is no meaningful distinction, we noted, between an annuity payable upon disability and one payable upon longevity. 286 Ark. at 355, 692 S.W.2d at 602-3. The court of appeals, in Dunn v. Dunn, 35 Ark.App. 89, 811 S.W.2d 336 (1991), reversed a chancellor's finding that a divorced husband's disability income was not marital property. Summarizing its view of the matter, the appellate court declared: Under the circumstances, where the appellee's employer during the marriage provided a long-term disability insurance plan for its executives; where these benefits were in lieu of workers' compensation, and were not awarded as benefits for a permanent disability or for future medical costs; and where the disability entitling the appellee to collect the benefits provided by the plan occurred during the marriage; we hold that the property was acquired during the marriage and furthermore, is marital property as defined by the statute [Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315(b)]. 35 Ark.App. at 93, 811 S.W.2d at 339. In Clayton v. Clayton, 297 Ark. 342, 760 S.W.2d 875 (1988), this court reversed a chancellor's finding that an unliquidated personal injury claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) was not marital property under § 9-12-315(b)(6). We emphasized that Act 676 of 1987 excepted from marital property only those benefits from an unliquidated personal injury claim that would be for any degree of permanent disability or future medical expenses. 297 Ark. at 344, 760 S.W.2d at 877. Apart from those specific benefits, we continued, the remaining benefits or elements of damage from one's personal injury claim are subject to division as marital property pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 9-12-315(a)(1)(A). Id. The case was remanded for a determination of which benefits from the FELA claim were to be considered marital property. Clearly, then, the mere labeling of a claim as personal injury does not satisfy the requirement for exemption from marital property. It is necessary that the claim be for a degree of permanent disability or future medical expenses. At first glance, Mr. Mason's claim would seem to fit the category. His physician, Dr. Holt, wrote in 1983 that Mr. Mason was permanently impaired from any type of gainful employment at present or any time in the future. He had not changed his opinion by the time he testified in 1992. Thus, it might be possible to distinguish Mr. Mason's position from that of the appellee in Dunn v. Dunn, supra , where the court of appeals noted, in holding that disability payments were marital property, that the payments at issue were not for a permanent disability. But the crux of the matter here lies in the antecedent term personal injury, which has been defined, in relevant part, as a hurt or damage done to a man's person, such as a cut or bruise, a broken limb, or the like, as distinguished from an injury to his property or his reputation. The phrase is chiefly used in this connection with actions of tort for negligence and under worker's compensation statutes. Black's Law Dictionary 786 (6th ed. 1990). (Emphasis in original.) The Clayton case involved an on-the-job injury for which the party had made a claim under FELA. In the present case, as Mr. Mason acknowledges, the ultimate source of his disability can be traced back to the wounds he suffered in World War II rather than to a specific personal injury sustained while in the employ of Riceland Foods or in consequence of a tortious act. Although he did experience a work-related fall at Riceland, that injury merely exacerbated the pain he already suffered and admittedly was not the principal cause of the permanent disability. The workers' compensation exception in § 9-12-315(b)(6) addresses the aggravation of pre-existing conditions. To equate Mr. Mason's long-term physical condition with a personal injury would be to stretch the concept to the point of meaninglessness. Instead, the accounts given of his problems suggest the term bodily injury, which is defined as [p]hysical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition. Black's Law Dictionary 786 (6th ed. 1990). For these reasons, we hold that Mr. Mason's claim for his physical condition does not constitute a claim for personal injury as contemplated by Ark.Code Ann. § 9-12-315(b)(6) and therefore does not fall within the statutory marital-property exemption. We reverse and remand the matter to the chancellor for an equal division of Mr. Mason's Riceland Foods disability benefits. b. Whether the chancery court erred in finding that Mr. Mason's disability benefits were for a permanent disability The second subsection under Mrs. Mason's first point for reversal is an argument in the alternative. She urges that, even if the Riceland Foods disability plan comes within the exceptions of Ark.Code Ann. § 9-12-315(b)(6), the chancellor erred in finding that Mr. Mason's Riceland disability benefits were for a permanent disability. In his 1988 letter opinion, the chancellor found that Mr. Mason had not provided any evidence that the Riceland and Social Security benefits were for permanent disability or future medical expenses. After reopening the case and receiving the deposition of Dr. Holt, the chancellor found, in his 1993 letter opinion and decree, that the benefits were for a permanent disability. Mrs. Mason urges that the record shows that neither her former husband's condition nor his treatment had undergone a major change since Dr. Holt's first deposition in 1986 and that Mr. Mason continued to work (as Chairman of the Board of the Department of Correction) until 1992. These factors, she contends, indicate that Mr. Mason did not suffer from a permanent disability. On the other hand, in the 1992 deposition, Dr. Holt described Mr. Mason's neurological problems as permanent in nature. The purpose of treatment at this point, Dr. Holt opined, would be limited to assisting Mr. Mason in learning how to deal with a permanent injury. Given the emphatic tone of the physician's 1992 deposition and the chancellor's position as finder of fact, it cannot be said that the chancery court erred in finding that Mr. Mason's Riceland Foods benefits were for a permanent disability. c. Whether the chancery court erred in reopening the case four years after a final decision strictly for the narrow purpose of allowing Mr. Mason to submit a second evidentiary deposition of his physician. As recited earlier, on November 7, 1988, the chancellor entered his findings of fact and conclusions of law in the present case. No final decree was filed. Later, on August 24, 1992, the chancellor reopened the matter, in the light of the statutory changes, to allow Mr. Mason to introduce the deposition of his physician, Dr. Holt, concerning the permanency of the disability. Mrs. Mason contends that the chancellor erred in reopening the case because the chancellor's decision in 1988 was final, despite the absence of a formal entry of a divorce decree, which, she insists, was delayed by her former husband's actions. Yet, as this court has explained: The decisions, opinions, and findings of a court do not constitute a judgment or decree. They merely form the bases upon which the judgment or decree is subsequently to be rendered and are not conclusive unless incorporated in a judgment or a judgment be entered thereon.... They are more in the nature of the verdict of a jury and no more a judgment than such a verdict. Thomas v. McElroy, 243 Ark. 465, 469-70, 420 S.W.2d 530, 533 (1967). We have held that a chancellor is vested with the discretion to reopen a case before the entry of a final decree upon the record. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 243 Ark. 773, 421 S.W.2d 611 (1967). Before doing so, however, the court must afford both parties the opportunity to be heard on the matter. Tackett v. First Savings of Arkansas, 306 Ark. 15, 810 S.W.2d 927 (1991). Here, both parties briefed the issue. The chancellor, not having entered a final decree pursuant to Ark.R.Civ.P. 58, did not err in reopening the case to permit introduction of Dr. Holt's deposition.