Opinion ID: 2037020
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: failure to provide medical attention

Text: ¶ 61. The defendant-officers also moved for summary judgment on Robinson's claim that they denied him medical assistance. Robinson's claim in this regard exists only as to the individual officers. The circuit court granted summary judgment on Robinson's claim against the City, and Robinson did not appeal this ruling. Robinson claims that given what the officers knew at the time of his arrest and subsequent confinement, they should have transported him to a hospital. [18] ¶ 62. The defendants' summary judgment challenge to Robinson's claim requires us to identify the right allegedly violated. Both parties suggest that our focus should be on the Eighth Amendment and the deliberate indifference standard. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). [11] However, the Eighth Amendment protection applies to convicted prisoners. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n.40 (1977). Because Robinson had not yet been convicted at the time he was allegedly denied medical assistance, he should be properly considered a pretrial detainee. ¶ 63. In City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983), the Supreme Court established that a pretrial detainee who has been injured is entitled to receive medical attention. While the scope of this due process protection was not defined with specificity in City of Revere, the Court did state that such a pretrial detainee's rights are as least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner. Id. (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has not further explored the issue of the due process right of a pretrial detainee to receive medical care, [12] and no Wisconsin court has yet addressed the issue. [19] ¶ 64. We do not attempt to define the scope of that right in its entirety today, but we do follow many of the courts that have addressed the issue and require that for there to be a constitutional violation the officers must have been inattentive to an injury or the signs of an injury that was more than merely a minor injury. See, e.g., Brownell v. Figel, 950 F.2d 1285, 1291 (7th Cir. 1991) ([T]he due process clause does not require hospital care for minor injuries.). [13] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Robinson, he is not entitled to proceed past summary judgment with this claim because he presents no evidence that the officers were inattentive to an injury or the signs thereof that is anything more than a minor injury. ¶ 65. The only injuries of which the officers knew or had reason to know were the effects of the pepper spray and the cuts or scrapes to Robinson's face. Robinson does not deny that the rescue squad provided medical attention for the effects of the pepper spray. Minutes later Robinson claims to have requested to go the hospital because of the effects of the pepper spray. However, despite Robinson's claims, the effects of the pepper spray proved to be nothing more than minor and temporary. Robinson remained ambulatory and did not complain further of the injury in the initial few hours of confinement before the effects of the spray subsided. ¶ 66. Robinson has presented no facts that suggest the injuries to his face were causing him pain or were the source of the complaints to the officers. Indeed, he recalls that several hours after the incident only the pepper spray was causing him pain. As such, we can find no evidence that suggests these injuries were anything other than minor. ¶ 67. The focus of Robinson's argument is his contention that upon informing the officers of his kidney condition and high blood pressure, the officers should have sought medical attention. However, the summary judgment materials do not demonstrate that Robinson was suffering from or complaining of the effects of these conditions at any point during the arrest or his subsequent confinement. In his deposition he describes no pain or problems caused by or associated with either condition. Robinson's statement merely informed the officers of a preexisting condition. There was no injury related to these conditions. Merely stating that one has a preexisting medical condition does not warrant medical care absent some indication that those conditions require treatment at that time. ¶ 68. Robinson alleges that a boot-print shaped bruise developed on his back from the placement of Schumitsch's foot. Yet, nothing in the summary judgment materials demonstrates that the officers had reason to know of this injury, and therefore they cannot be said to have been inattentive to it. Similarly, Robinson has neither argued nor presented any evidence suggesting that the officers were aware of his alleged unconsciousness. ¶ 69. Finally, Robinson contends in his brief that he requested that he be transported to a hospital due to a shoulder injury. There is no mention of any such request in Robinson's deposition or elsewhere in the summary judgment materials. Nor can we find any indication that Robinson complained of a shoulder injury or exhibited the signs of such an injury at the time when the defendant-officers would have been required to obtain medical assistance. Again, Robinson testified that by the time he was at the police station, only the effects of the pepper spray were causing him pain. [20] ¶ 70. In sum, we have construed the inferences drawn from the evidence in Robinson's favor and conclude that he has presented no evidence suggesting that the officers were inattentive to an injury or the signs of an injury, other than minor injuries. His claim, therefore, cannot survive the defendants' motion for summary judgment.