Opinion ID: 2155853
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Facts Applied to the Standard for Summary Judgment

Text: As stated, supra, when considering the granting of summary judgment we examine the facts and the inferences derived from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, which in the case sub judice, is petitioners. Looking at the facts and applying them to the standard for summary judgment set forth by this Court in Brown v. Dermer , the motion for summary judgment in the case sub judice should have been denied. In its opinion, the Court of Special Appeals looked at the individual facts in isolation instead of in the totality of the circumstances and also failed to look at the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The respondents, in the case sub judice, contend that they did not receive adequate notice from petitioners. Petitioners, in their briefs to this Court and at oral argument, advanced three facts that were before the lower courts that they think, with reasonable inferences, if believed by that trier of fact, would sufficiently establish that respondents had notice of chipping or flaking paint conditions in the house. The facts are that: (1) Ms. Holmes testified that she called Consumer Management one month before her children tested positive for elevated levels of lead in their blood and requested paint, (2) Mr. Holmes testified that a man, who appeared to be drunk, showed up at the row house stating that he was from maintenance and was there to paint, and (3) Ms. Holmes testified that she called Consumer Management after her children tested positive for elevated lead poisoning and told Consumer Management about her children's tests. In addressing the two phone calls from Ms. Holmes to Consumer Management, the Court of Special Appeals looked at the phone calls individually and without applying the most favorable inference to petitioners. The Court of Special Appeals stated that: Appellants maintain that Carrie Holmes's call to the management company requesting paint was sufficient to alert the Consumer Management Corporation and the landlord of the defective condition. This argument is without merit. As Ms. Holmes described this call in her deposition, she could have been requesting paint for numerous reasons, none of which would lead the appellees to infer that the Premises contained deteriorated paint. For example, Ms. Holmes may have wanted to repaint her home in order to cover stains or to alter the color scheme. According to her deposition testimony, Ms. Holmes did not inform the agent of Consumer Management Corporation with whom she spoke that she needed new paint because her existing paint was either chipping, loose, flaking, or peeling. Without information in addition to a mere request for paint, the management company had no way of knowing that the existing paint (which, at most, was three years old) had deteriorated. Likewise, Consumer Management Corporation's knowledge that the children had developed lead poisoning did not give the management company reason to know of deteriorated paint at the Premises. Ms. Holmes did not accuse the landlord of having been the cause of the poisoning and Consumer Management Corporation could not be expected to infer that the Premises contained deteriorated paint from the fact that the children had been poisoned by lead paint. The children could have contracted lead paint poisoning from any number of locations other than the Premises: for example, from lead paint at their playground or in the homes of friends, neighbors, or relatives. The Court of Special Appeals then examined Mr. Holmes' testimony that a man had arrived at Ms. Holmes' house claiming to be from maintenance. The Court stated that: It is true that the drunk man did tell Holmes that he was from maintenance, but there was no evidence to corroborate that representation. More specifically, there was no testimony that either Ms. Holmes or her brother had requested that their home be painted prior to the time of the visit from the man from maintenance. In addition, there was no indication that any of the appellees had sent a painter to the Premises. Possibly the drunk stranger pretended to be from maintenance in order to gain entry into the home to later burglarize it, given Ms. Holmes's testimony that the Premises had been broken into on numerous occasions. Because agency was not proven, whatever knowledge the inebriated man may have gained concerning the condition of the paint at the Premises cannot be imputed to the appellees. In sum, appellants failed to produce evidence sufficient to prove that appellees knew or should have known of deteriorated paint at the Premises, and therefore, the trial judge was legally correct when he granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees. The Court of Special Appeals analysis and conclusion did not properly look at the facts in the totality of the circumstances and in a light, including all inferences, that is most favorable to the party responding to the motion for summary judgment. We find that when the three main facts put forth by petitioners are examined in their totality and in the light most favorable to petitioners, the nonmoving party, the facts might satisfy a trier of fact that the reason to know test was met and that petitioners had provided sufficient notice to the respondents. We distinguished the reason to know test in Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 676-77, 645 A.2d 1147, 1154 (1994), when we stated that: Finally, this Court has distinguished between reason to know, which is required by § 358 [of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ], and should know, which is utilized in other sections, in the following manner: `Both the expression reason to know and should know are used with respect to existent facts. These two phrases, however, differ in that reason to know implies no duty of knowledge on the part of the actor whereas should know implies that the actor owes another the duty of ascertaining the fact in question. Reason to know means that the actor has knowledge of facts from which a reasonable man of ordinary intelligence or one of the superior intelligence of the actor would either infer the existence of the fact in question or would regard its existence as so highly probable that his conduct would be predicated upon the assumption that the fact did exist. Should know indicates that the actor is under a duty to another to use reasonable diligence to ascertain the existence or non-existence of the fact in question and that he would ascertain the existence thereof in the proper performance of that duty.' [ State v.] Feldstein, [207 Md. 20, 33, 113 A.2d 100, 106 (1955)] (quoting Restatement of Torts § 12 cmt. a (1934)); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 12. See Landlord's Liability for Injury or Death of Tenant's Child from Lead Paint Poisoning, 19 A.L.R.5th at 418-24. As stated, supra, in Brown v. Dermer , the reason to know test is the first test that a plaintiff alleging lead poisoning caused by a landlord's failure to correct a defective condition in a leased dwelling must meet. We stated in Brown, 357 Md. at 362, 744 A.2d at 57, that [u]nder this test, a plaintiff must present evidence that establishes that the landlord knew or had reason to know of a condition on the premises posing an unreasonable risk of physical harm to persons in the premises. We also stated that all that a plaintiff must show in order to satisfy the reason to know element is that there was flaking, loose or peeling paint and that the defendant had notice of that condition. Id. Looking at the facts, in a light most favorable to petitioners, in the case sub judice, petitioners have satisfied the reason to know test. It was established in the deposition of Sidney C. Caplan [22] that Mr. Caplan first became aware of the hazards of lead-based paint in approximately 1980, when he received a violation notice from the Baltimore City Health Department for a different property that was being managed by Consumer Management. Mr. Caplan stated in a deposition that he learned that lead paint was hazardous when it was flaking, chipping, and peeling. Consumer Management, pursuant to contracts with landlords, on behalf of landlords, provides various services, including handling all leasing arrangements with tenants and arranging for repairs to the properties it manages. Consumer Management was managing the property at 1229 North Central Avenue when it, on behalf of the landlords, leased the premises to petitioners and they moved in and Consumer Management continued to manage the property after it was obtained by Mr. Hanson. [23] Mr. Caplan also testified, in his deposition, that if tenants of properties managed by Consumer Management called a phone number located on the rental application, the person who answered the phone, an employee of Consumer Management, was authorized to accept complaints and authorize repairs. Ms. Holmes testified in her deposition that the first time she called Consumer Management was approximately one month prior to her childrens' testing positive for elevated levels of lead in their blood. [24] Her deposition testimony was: Q. The time that you asked for paint, that was after your kids had tested for lead paint poisoning? A. No. I asked for that before my children were tested for lead. Q. You mentioned that that was about a month before, is that correct? A. Yes. Ms. Holmes also testified in her deposition that she later called Consumer Management after her children tested positive for lead poisoning. She testified that [w]hen I called her, I told her my children had lead. She said she don't know how the children got it. I said they get tested from the clinic. That is how I knew my children had it. That is when I called the Health Department. Mr. Holmes testified at his deposition that he resided with Ms. Holmes in 1985-87, when Ms. Holmes was making the calls to the landlord and her children first tested positive for lead poisoning. Mr. Holmes testified that a man came to the row house to paint during this time. Mr. Holmes testified: Q. Where were you when you were talking to him? A. At the door. Q. Why was he there? A. Why was he coming there? Q. Yes. A. He was coming there to paint, he said. Q. Did he identify himself? A. He just said that he was from maintenance, that is all. He was going to paint. Q. He said that he was from maintenance and he was going to paint? A. Yes, that is all. Q. What year did he come and have this conversation with you? A. I don't know, about `80 something, `86, `87. Looking at the facts in their totality, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and in the light most favorable to petitioners, the reason to know test might be satisfied. Consumer Management, as the landlord's agent, managed the property at 1229 North Central Avenue for both the Ben-Ezras and Mr. Hanson. Consumer Management had general knowledge of the hazards of lead-based paint and was authorized to arrange for repairs for the landlords. The employees of Consumer Management who answered the phone were authorized to accept complaints and to authorize repairs. Ms. Holmes called, on two occasions, once to request paint and then to report to the landlord that her children had tested positive for lead poisoning. Mr. Holmes testified that around this time, a man appeared at the row house stating that he was from maintenance and was there to paint. The man from maintenance then proceeded to scrape a wall with peeling paint before leaving. In Brown, 357 Md. at 367, 744 A.2d at 60, we held that petitioners' allegations that they had made a complaint to the landlords about the deteriorating condition of the paint and the respondents denying receiving the notice of the condition, was a genuine dispute of material fact and satisfied the reason to know test. Examining the facts and the inferences in the present case in the light most favorable to petitioners, the man from maintenance was sent to the row house by Consumer Management because Ms. Holmes two phone calls had notified Consumer Management that there was a problem with the paint at 1229 North Central Avenue. An inference could be made by a trier of fact that the man from maintenance saw the paint peeling on the wall; of course, a trier of fact could also decide not to make such an inference. [25] Regardless, whether to make such an inference, under the circumstances of the case, was for the trier of fact, not the court. Consumer Management, with its knowledge of the dangers of lead-based paint, would have been on notice that if there was a problem with the paint, it might pose a risk of physical harm to the children on the premises. Consumer Management's notice is attributable to the landlords, as Consumer Management was apparently authorized to act for the landlords when it came to making repairs. [26] As we have said, inferences might be made by a jury that petitioners had peeling paint in their row house and Consumer Management had notice of the condition through Ms. Holmes' phone calls and the man from maintenance seeing the peeling paint. Consumer Management, with their knowledge of lead-based paint, might have known the reasonable risk of physical harm to the petitioners. Petitioners may have passed the reason to know test. Whether they passed the test, under these circumstances, was for the trier of fact, not the court. There was a genuine dispute of material facts as to whether Consumer Management had notice. The second part of the test, that we enunciated in Brown v. Dermer , is for petitioners to present facts that establish that a landlord of ordinary intelligence with the same knowledge, should realize the risk of lead poisoning. In Brown, 357 Md. at 367-68, 744 A.2d at 60-61, in finding that the second part of the test was satisfied, we stated that: The lead poisoning injury alleged here is within the range of reasonable anticipation and probability.... Under these circumstances, we hold that a jury could find that a reasonably prudent landlord would realize, after receiving notice, that flaking, loose or peeling paint presents an unsafe or dangerous condition and thus would investigate and correct the condition. In Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 645 A.2d 1147 (1994), we stated that: Based on the evidence presented, however, the jury in the instant case could have found that Scoken [27] received actual notice of peeling paint on the premises and also, because of Chodak's knowledge about older homes often containing lead-based paint, knew or had reason to know that the peeling paint in this house was lead-based. Upon obtaining that knowledge, the landlords knew the risk peeling lead-based paint represented to the tenant's children. Id. at 679, 645 A.2d at 1156. In the case sub judice, based on the facts that, at least inferentially, provided respondents with notice and Consumer Management's expertise and knowledge of the dangers of lead-based paint, stated, supra, an inference could have, although not necessarily would have, been made by the trier of fact that it was reasonably foreseeable and probable that once Consumer Management received the notification, it would have realized the risk of lead poisoning in Ms. Holmes' children. This would satisfy the second part of the Brown v. Dermer test. The inferences to be made were for the trier of fact. The respondents' motions for summary judgment should have been denied.