Opinion ID: 3051516
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: reasonableness of sentence and application of

Text: § 3553(a) FACTORS
[2] Crawford argues that the district court erred in imposing a sentence within the Guidelines after declaring its view that such sentences are presumptively reasonable. Though the Supreme Court in Rita held that appellate courts may presume that a sentence is reasonable when a district court judge’s dis- cretionary decision accords with the sentence the Sentencing Commission deems appropriate in most cases, the Court emphasized that such a presumption was limited to the standard on appeal. See Rita, 551 U.S. at ___, 127 S. Ct. at 2465 (“We repeat that the presumption before us is an appellate court presumption. Given our explanation in Booker that appellate ‘reasonableness’ review merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion, the presumption applies only on appellate review.” (emphasis in original) (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-60)); Gall, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 59697; Carty, ___ F.3d at ___ (the district court may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable). [3] The district court here did not presume the reasonableness of a Guidelines sentence with respect to Crawford’s case but, rather, presciently forecasted Rita’s holding, while citing to Booker and acknowledging other circuits that had already adopted the rule Rita would eventually espouse: [W]e all recognize that now, the sentencing guidelines are advisory. They’re not mandated. We are required to consult them, calculate—the career offender provision under Chapter 4 of the guidelines is advisory. . . . But as I’ve said before and I’ll say now, in view of the Booker/Fan Fan cases, which require us to look at the guidelines, consult them, calculate the appropriate guideline sentence, that the standard of review on appeal is reasonable if the UNITED STATES v. CRAWFORD 3207 court feels that—and some of the circuits have said —specifically held that a guideline sentence, unless there’s some real reason to vary from it, is presumptively reasonable; and I think that that makes sense. This statement must be viewed in the context of the entire sentencing hearing. We must distinguish the district court’s comment on some circuits’ adoption of the presumption for appellate review, a statement made in passing, from the thorough process the court went through in determining the appropriateness of Crawford’s sentence, which was done within the framework established by Booker and reinforced by Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough. See Kimbrough, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 574 (the Guidelines are “the ‘starting point and the initial benchmark’ ” (quoting Gall, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 596)); Gall, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 59697 n.6 (the Guidelines are to be kept in mind throughout the process); Carty, ___ F.3d at ___ (all sentencing proceedings are to begin by determining the applicable Guidelines range, which must be calculated correctly, and the Guidelines should be kept in mind throughout the process). The district court neither misapprehended the sentencing framework nor adopted a presumption of reasonableness.
[4] To comply with the requirements of Booker, a district court must sufficiently consider the Guidelines, as well as the other factors listed in § 3553(a). The district court here more than met Booker’s requirements. The sentencing colloquy and explanation were detailed and thoughtful. The district court then properly applied the § 3553(a) factors alongside the Guidelines, noting that it must look “not only [at] the recommendations contained in the advisory guidelines, but . . . at the whole picture. And the criteria that we do look at are set forth in 18 USC 3553(a).” [5] The judge first analyzed § 3553(a)(3) (“kinds of sen- tences available”) and § 3553(a)(4)(A) (“kinds of sentence 3208 UNITED STATES v. CRAWFORD and the sentencing range established for—the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines”) and discussed how, in previously considering Crawford’s sentence, he had felt that a potential maximum life sentence was too high and had adjusted it accordingly, taking into account Crawford’s acceptance of responsibility. The judge then considered § 3553(a)(1) (“the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”) and found drug trafficking to be “probably one of the most serious crimes that confronts society at this time,” commenting that there was “good reason to believe” that Crawford had been affiliated with gangs and may even have been a participant in a drive-by shooting. Considering § 3553(a)(2)(A) and § 3553(a)(2)(C) (“the need for the sentence imposed—to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense” and “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”), the judge also reflected on the need for the sentence imposed as promoting “[r]espect for the law,” and protecting the public, observing the necessary reliance of the distribution schemes of “high-level dealers” on “street dealers,” such as Crawford. [6] With regard to § 3553(a)(2)(B) (the need for the sentence “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”), the court observed that Congress has created harsh penalties in order to deter such activity because of its ruinous effects on individuals and communities. Finally, with respect to § 3553(a)(2)(D) (“to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner”), the court then took into account the need for rehabilitation, remarking to Crawford that he was “encouraged” that Crawford felt he was changing his life, and that he hoped Crawford would continue “to act appropriately while . . . incarcerated, earn maximum good time, and participate in the 500-hour drug treatment program” once eligible to do so. UNITED STATES v. CRAWFORD 3209 After reviewing these factors, the judge concluded, in view of all the factors taken into account—your criminal history background, your long use and selling of drugs—and I emphasize long period of time selling drugs here in this community—your associations and your other activities—they all indicate that a reasonable sentence, taking into account not only the advisory guidelines of 3553, is the sentence that was imposed; and that’s the 210 months. And I’m not going to change anything. In light of the advisory Guidelines and the relevant sentencing factors in § 3553, the district court committed no error in its thorough and sympathetic consideration of Crawford’s case.