Opinion ID: 2297501
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Bases for Duty to Warn

Text: The plaintiff argues that notwithstanding Trull, the Town had a statutory duty imposed by RSA 507-B:2 (2010), RSA 231:90 to :93 (2009), and/or by RSA 21-P:44 (Supp.2011) to warn motorists about the inoperable lights. He is mistaken on all three counts. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. Billewicz v. Ransmeier, 161 N.H. 145, 151, 13 A.3d 116 (2010). We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. Appeal of Wilson, 161 N.H. 659, 662, 20 A.3d 1006 (2011). We first examine the language of the statute and ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used. Id. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. Furthermore, we interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Id. In so doing, we are better able to discern the legislature's intent, and therefore better able to understand the statutory language in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory scheme. Id. (quotation omitted).
RSA 507-B:2 provides: A governmental unit may be held liable for damages in an action to recover for bodily injury, personal injury or property damage caused by its fault or by fault attributable to it, arising out of ownership, occupation, maintenance or operation of all motor vehicles, and all premises; provided, however, that the liability of any governmental unit with respect to its sidewalks, streets, and highways shall be limited as provided in RSA 231 and the liability of any governmental unit with respect to publicly owned airport runways and taxiways shall be limited as set forth in RSA 422. (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff contends that the Town ... owed him a duty under RSA 507-B:2 ... for operating and occupying the intersection in question. He argues that [i]n policing the intersection and the roads, [the Town] both occupied and operated them. By its express terms, however, RSA 507-B:2 does not, alone, govern the Town's liability with respect to its sidewalks, streets, and highways; rather, RSA 507-B:2 must be read in conjunction with the limits on governmental liability set forth in RSA chapter 231. See Richard v. Pembroke Sch. Dist., 151 N.H. 455, 859 A.2d 1157 (2004). Accordingly, RSA 507-B:2 does not, as the plaintiff contends, in and of itself, impose any duty upon the Town with respect to Routes 111 and 28.
Nothing in RSA chapter 231 imposes such a duty upon the Town, either. The liability of municipalities with respect to sidewalks, streets, and highways is set forth in RSA 231:90 through RSA 231:93. RSA 231:93 expressly provides that municipalities do not have any duty of care whatsoever with respect to the construction, maintenance or repair of class I, III, III-a or VI highways, or state maintained portions of class II highways. A municipality's duty of care with respect to the construction, maintenance or repair of class IV and V highways is set forth in RSA 231:90, :91, :92, and :92-a. However, even with respect to class IV and V highways: a municipality or school district shall not be held liable for damages arising from insufficiencies or hazards on public highways, bridges, or sidewalks, even if it has actual notice or knowledge of them, when such hazards are caused solely by snow, ice, or other inclement weather, and the municipality's or school district's failure or delay in removing or mitigating such hazards is the result of its implementation, absent gross negligence or reckless disregard of the hazard, of a winter or inclement weather maintenance policy or set of priorities adopted in good faith by the officials responsible for such policy; and all municipal or school district employees and officials shall be presumed to be acting pursuant to such a policy or set of priorities, in the absence of proof to the contrary. RSA 231:92-a. The plaintiff argues that RSA 231:91 and RSA 231:92 impose a duty upon the Town with respect to Routes 111 and 28 because RSA 231:91 and RSA 231:92, unlike RSA 231:90, do not refer explicitly to class IV and V highways. RSA 231:90, I, begins, Whenever any class IV or class v. highway or bridge or sidewalk thereon in any municipality shall be insufficient, any person may give written notice of such insufficiency to one of the selectmen or highway agents of the town, or the mayor or street commissioners of the city, and a copy of said notice to the town or city clerk. (Emphasis added.) RSA 231:91, I, then provides: Upon receipt of such notice of insufficiency, and unless the highway agents or street commissioners determine in good faith that no such insufficiency exists, the municipality shall immediately cause proper danger signals to be placed to warn persons by day or night of such insufficiency, and shall, within 72 hours thereafter, develop a plan for repairing such highway, bridge, or sidewalk and shall implement such plan in good faith and with reasonable dispatch until the highway, bridge, or sidewalk is no longer insufficient, as defined by RSA 231:90, II. (Emphases added.) RSA 231:92 likewise does not expressly refer to class IV and V highways. Rather, it provides, in pertinent part, that [a] municipality shall not be held liable for damages in an action to recover for personal injury or property damage arising out of its construction, maintenance, or repair of public highways and sidewalks constructed thereupon unless such injury or damage was caused by an insufficiency, as defined by RSA 231:90, and certain conditions are met. RSA 231:92, I. The plaintiff argues that because RSA 231:91 and RSA 231:92 do not refer to class IV and V highways, they, unlike RSA 231:90, apply to all highways in [a] municipality. However, we cannot read these statutes in isolation, but must read them in context. See Appeal of Wilson, 161 N.H. at 662, 20 A.3d 1006. Thus, in RSA 231:91, the reference to such insufficiency and, in RSA 231:92, to an insufficiency are references to the insufficiencies described in RSA 231:90, which, by the plaintiff's own admission, apply only to insufficiencies in class IV and V highways. Similarly, the reference in RSA 231:91 to such highway is a reference to the highways, which are insufficient, as defined by RSA 231:90, II. Moreover, the plaintiff's interpretation runs afoul of RSA 231:93, which provides that a municipality has no duty of care whatsoever with respect to highway classes other than classes IV and V and town-maintained portions of class II highways.
The plaintiff contends that under RSA 21-P:44, the Town had a duty to respond to the emergency situation created by the ice storm of December 2008 by warning motorists of the inoperable traffic lights. RSA 21-P:44 provides: In carrying out the provisions [related to Homeland Security and Emergency Management], the governor, executive heads of state agencies, and local executive officers of the political subdivisions of the state shall utilize the services, equipment, supplies, and facilities of existing departments, offices, and agencies of the state and its political subdivisions to the maximum extent practicable, and the officers and personnel of all such departments, offices, and agencies are directed to cooperate with and extend such services and facilities to the governor and to the emergency management organizations of the state upon request. The plaintiff observes that RSA 21-P:44 is part of a statutory scheme that create[s] structures to enable response to an emergency situation. He argues: The statute [RSA 21-P:44] uses the mandatory phrase `shall' and imposes the broadest requirements of acting `to the maximum extent practicable.' He contends that because [i]t was practicable for the Town to earlier address the inoperable signal[s], RSA 21-P:44 required it do so. In his reply brief, the plaintiff changes this argument somewhat by asserting that the Town violated RSA 21-P:44 by failing to use the State's services, equipment, supplies and facilities to warn motorists about the inoperable traffic lights. We need not decide whether the plaintiff's interpretation of RSA 21-P:44 is correct, for even if it is, it is a well-settled rule that to the extent two statutes conflict, the more specific statute, here RSA 231:93, controls over the general statute, RSA 21-P:44. See In the Matter of Heinrich & Curotto, 160 N.H. 650, 654-55, 7 A.3d 1158 (2010). Although RSA 21-P:44 and other provisions in RSA chapter 21-P governing Homeland Security and Emergency Management refer generally to the power, duty and authority of political subdivisions when the State has experienced certain natural and human-caused disasters, RSA 21-P:34 (Supp.2011), RSA 231:93 specifically provides that a municipality owes no duty of care with respect to class I and State-maintained portions of class II state highways.