Opinion ID: 839193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: application of the new interpretation of the privacy exemption

Text: I differ in two respects with the majority's application of the law to the facts of this case. First, defendant has already given plaintiff the home addresses and telephone numbers of those employees who consented to the publication of that information in the faculty and staff directory. Thus, to resolve this case, the majority need not decide whether the home addresses and telephone numbers of all of defendant's employees constitute information of a personal nature. It need only decide whether the home addresses and telephone numbers of employees who refused to allow publication of this information in the school directory are exempt from disclosure. The majority overreaches by unnecessarily deciding the case on a broader basis. Second, I disagree with the majority's decision insofar as it holds that the home addresses and telephone numbers of all defendant's employees are exempt. Merely because some of defendant's employees keep their addresses and telephone numbers private does not mean that the addresses and telephone numbers of all the employees is information of a personal nature. Employees whose addresses and home telephone numbers are unlisted and who refused to allow defendant to publish them in the school directory have done everything possible keep that information private. And, by taking action to protect their addresses and telephone numbers from mass dissemination, these individuals have indicated that they consider the information private. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the home addresses and telephone numbers of those employees is information of a personal nature. Under the privacy exemption, information that is of a personal nature is exempt if disclosure of it would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual's privacy. [21] The disclosure of the addresses and telephone numbers of employees who have made efforts to keep this information private would constitute an unwarranted invasion of their privacy. Therefore, I would hold that this information is exempt from disclosure. But it does not follow that the home addresses and telephone numbers of all defendant's employees is information of a personal nature. [22] Employees who either have a listed telephone number or who have given defendant permission to publish their information have released their information for mass viewing. By so doing, they have allowed the information to become public. Individuals who have allowed their information to be made public cannot be heard to argue that the information is private. It is illogical to decide that information pertaining to an individual is private information if the individual himself or herself does not treat it that way. Therefore, the home addresses and telephone numbers of those employees who either have a listed telephone number or who have allowed defendant to publish their information is generally not of a personal nature. If information is not of a personal nature, the privacy exemption does not apply to it. Of course, public information could be of a personal nature if disclosure of it reveals something intimate or embarrassing about an individual. For instance, in Mager v. Dep't of State Police , [23] plaintiff requested the addresses of persons who owned registered handguns. The information sought in Mager is an example of information that is of a personal nature regardless of whether the individual allows it to be made publicly available. Disclosing that information would reveal something intimate about the individual: that he or she owns a handgun. The information requested in the case on appeal would reveal that the employee works for defendant, not an intimate or embarrassing fact. Thus, I would hold that defendant must turn over the home addresses and telephone numbers of employees who have not taken steps to keep that information private.