Opinion ID: 1912622
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Testimony Regarding Ruddy's Son's Rent Payments

Text: Bar Counsel's MRPC 3.3 exception points to Ruddy's testimony at the Orphans' Court hearing on March 24, 2006 regarding his son James' rent payments. In response to opposing counsel Meng's questions about the current status of James' rent and whether he owed additional money, Ruddy responded, [H]e caught up once he got employed. [23] Bar Counsel contends that the testimony was material to the issues under consideration at that hearing.... The fact that [the judge] held the matter in abeyance to permit attempts at informal resolution did not make the testimony any less material. Bar Counsel insists that Ruddy's failure to inform the Orphans' Court of the error constitutes MRPC 3.3 misconduct. It is clear from the hearing judge's findings that Ruddy's testimony cannot support a MRPC 3.3 violation. First, Ruddy was unprepared for the line of questioning regarding the Fitzsimmons estate's utility bills and James' rental payments, and he warned Meng and the court of that fact: [Meng:] Is there a reason why having received Mrs. Dwyer's letter questioning those, specifically questioning those utilities and asking that you itemize those, that you didn't bring that information with you? [Ruddy:] Well that information is calculated by my bookkeeper and she's ill. She's just had major surgery.    [Meng:] And are you telling me that without your bookkeeper you can't retrieve these kinds of documents? [Ruddy:] I'm saying that I did not retrieve them because of two factors. One is I felt the exceptions were filed three and a half months after the deadline (a) and (b) I normally don't do this. I mean my bookkeeper has a system and I rely on her. Indeed, Ruddy objected to the line of questioning regarding the issue of rent, arguing that it had already been ruled on and was therefore not appropriate for the hearing. We do not question that Ruddy's testimony was inaccurate. His own records indicate that as of the hearing, his son had only paid approximately $2,760  approximately eight months of rent out of the twenty-three months owed. MRPC 3.3, however, only requires correction when the misrepresentation is material, and we defer to the hearing judge's finding that it was not. Bar Counsel excepts to that finding and argues that it is not up to the lawyer who offered the false evidence to determine its materiality. See Holden v. Blevins, 154 Md.App. 1, 6, 837 A.2d 1053, 1056 (2003) (holding that it is for the trial judge to decide whether the false evidence is material, rather than the lawyer). Yet here, it was the hearing judge, and not Ruddy, who determined that the testimony was not material in any event in light of the fact that no ruling was made and that the Orphan's Court instead directed the parties to work out the details between them. This is supported by the record, which reveals two noteworthy points. First, the Orphans' Court continued the hearing so that the parties could resolve the exceptions informally, outside of its adjudicative authority. [24] See MRPC 3.3 cmt. 1 (This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal ... [or] in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal's adjudicative authority, such as a deposition.). Second, the disputed testimony occurred when Meng asked if Ruddy's son paid all the back payments about six months ago, and Ruddy responded with the statement, Yes, he caught up once he got employed. But six months ago would have been September 2005, and Ruddy's son lived in the house until November, two months later. Even if Ruddy's son had paid the entire balance in September, he might still owe two months of rent. Both Meng and the Orphans' Court were on notice that Ruddy's son may yet be in arrears. Thus, Ruddy's statement that his son had, at one point, paid the full balance of rent was immaterial because it had no bearing on whether the son presently owed money. Moreover, Ruddy answered both questions by providing the accurate documentation a little over one month later. Bar Counsel does not explain how even a month's lag affected proceedings in front of a tribunal when the Orphans' Court never dealt with the issue. Furthermore, Ruddy informed Meng about the inaccuracy immediately after the hearing. Meng testified to that fact: Q: Do you recall any of your discussions that day after the hearing?    A: Well, we were outside the courtroom and it had been my understanding from the testimony that there was no rent owed at that point. Outside the courtroom Mr. Ruddy indicated that there was still rent owed. From that point forward, Meng had plenty of opportunity to bring the matter to the court's attention, yet he did not, insisting that Ruddy do so. Regarding correcting a misrepresentation, two Comments to MRPC 3.3 are instructive. One advises disclosure to the court, and the other advises disclosure of the client's deception to the court or other party. See MRPC 3.3 cmts. 7 and 12. Given the adversarial nature of our legal system and the Orphans' Court's continuance of the hearing so that the parties could resolve the dispute informally, Ruddy met his burden by disclosing the information to Meng. Bar Counsel's MRPC 3.3 exception is overruled.