Opinion ID: 2977905
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The sign ordinances

Text: The City further argues that the plaintiffs (a) have no standing to challenge those portions of the sign ordinances that do not relate to business signs, and (b) suffered no injury-in-fact related to the business-sign ordinances. Its argument is based on the premise that the plaintiffs withdrew their application for a sign permit and failed to provide the City with the additional information it requested. The plaintiffs respond that their challenge Nos. 08-1329/1361 H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC, et al. Page 10 v. City of Detroit relates to the constitutionality of the application process, which applies to all signs, and that the district court correctly found that they had suffered an injury-in-fact. As the district court noted, the City’s standing arguments regarding the plaintiffs’ challenges to inapplicable portions of the sign ordinances may be more accurately characterized as a severability argument. The City’s argument boils down to a claim that, even if the plaintiffs have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the business-signrelated ordinances, the constitutionality of other sign ordinances relating to political or advertising signs, for example, would not be implicated. Because we hold in Part II.C.3. below that the sign ordinances are not facially unconstitutional, we need not reach the City’s severability argument. Focusing now on the City’s argument pertaining to the business-sign ordinances—that the plaintiffs suffered no injury in fact due to the City’s inaction on their application—we conclude that the argument is without merit. As a direct parallel to the adult-use zoning ordinances, the plaintiffs argued both below and on appeal that the sign ordinances amount to licensing schemes. Facial challenges to such alleged licensing schemes, for the reasons discussed above, do not require a showing that the plaintiffs were denied a permit. See Prime Media, 485 F.3d at 351. The City further contends that the plaintiffs suffered no injury in fact because they withdrew their sign-permit application in 2006 or 2007. Specifically, the City cites an acknowledgment in a sworn declaration by Mark Zoltowski, an MLS Signs employee, that he had received a telephone call on September 11, 2006 from a representative of the B&SE who was inquiring about the status of the K&P’s revised application regarding the proposed “Hustler” signs. Zoltowski, noting that the permit application was nearly two years old, “assumed that the client did not wish to pursue the application further” and advised the B&SE representative that the application should be withdrawn. The City also points out that the plaintiffs never responded to a July 2007 B&SE letter stating that the B&SE had been informed that the plaintiffs wished to withdraw their application, but leaving open the possibility of processing the application conditioned upon receipt of additional information. Nos. 08-1329/1361 H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC, et al. Page 11 v. City of Detroit These contentions by the City are arguably contrary to its representations before the district court. For instance, in a response in opposition to the plaintiffs’ motion for a pageand time-limit extension for briefing on the issue, the City stated that “[t]he [plaintiffs’] proposed supplemental exhibits [which pertained to the application-withdrawal issue] have nothing to do with the City’s legal arguments with respect to standing . . . .” These seemingly inconsistent positions implicate the doctrine of judicial estoppel. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (“The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a claim in a legal proceeding that is inconsistent with a claim taken by that party in a previous proceeding.”) And even if the City’s is not estopped on this issue, the district court correctly noted that the plaintiffs never received the B&SE’s July 2007 letter. Moreover, by the time the B&SE sent the letter, more than two and a half years had already passed since the date of the original application. We thus reject the City’s application-withdrawal argument. B. The propriety of injunctive relief in light of the district court’s holding that the adult-use zoning provisions are facially unconstitutional When examining a district court’s denial of an injunction, we review its factual findings under the clear-error standard and its legal conclusions de novo. ACLU v. Taft, 385 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 2004). But the district court’s ultimate decision regarding injunctive relief is reviewed under the “highly deferential”abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court held in its order on the plaintiffs’ first motion for partial summary judgment that the adult-use provisions of the City’s zoning ordinances were unconstitutional prior restraints on speech. It accordingly ordered the City to revise the zoning ordinances to bring them into compliance with the First Amendment. Despite its holding that the challenged provisions were unconstitutional, however, the court declined to grant the plaintiffs’ request to permanently enjoin the enforcement of the provisions by the City or to declare the adult cabaret a lawful existing use. The plaintiffs now appeal the court’s denial of their requested injunctive relief. Nos. 08-1329/1361 H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC, et al. Page 12 v. City of Detroit In response, the City advances two arguments. It first contends that the plaintiffs were not entitled to an injunction because they cannot show that they would suffer irreparable harm without its issuance. This argument echoes the City’s standing argument that the plaintiffs suffered no injury-in-fact because they were not actually affected by the application of the adult-use provisions at issue. Second, the City argues—and stresses most heavily—that the district court erred in concluding that the provisions in question were unconstitutional. But the City’s arguments on the underlying constitutionality of the challenged provisions are not properly before us in light of the procedural posture of the plaintiffs’ appeal. The district court’s order on the plaintiffs’ first motion for partial summary judgment was not a final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. So the only avenue for an immediate appeal of the order would have been an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(A)(1), which addresses decisions granting or denying injunctive relief. As the City conceded in its response to the plaintiffs’ motion to strike portions of its appellate response brief, “this section [§ 1292(A)(1)] does not apply to the District Court’s finding on the constitutionality of the adult use regulations.” The City, in sum, reserved the right to appeal this finding of the district court, but only after the district court has issued a final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The question of whether the district court abused its discretion by declining to grant the requested injunctive relief yields a straightforward answer. As the Supreme Court has declared, a state law may not be enforced if it conflicts with federal law. Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970, 1986 (2008) (citing U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.). And this court has repeatedly held that facially unconstitutional laws will not be enforced. See Amelkin v. McClure, 205 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir. 2000) (“If a facial challenge is upheld, then the state cannot enforce the statute against anyone.”); 37712, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control, 113 F.3d 614, 618 n.7 (6th Cir. 1997) (“A state statute or local ordinance which by its terms compels unconstitutional results is ‘facially’ unconstitutional and hence is incapable of any valid application.”). The district court’s refusal to enjoin the City from enforcing the challenged provisions of its zoning ordinances was thus clearly an abuse of discretion, assuming that the ordinance is indeed unconstitutional. Nos. 08-1329/1361 H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC, et al. Page 13 v. City of Detroit Turning now to the plaintiffs’ argument that K&P’s operation on the Premises should be declared a lawful conforming use, we agree that the district court abused its discretion by declining to grant that relief pending entry of a final judgment. Once the adult-use zoning ordinances were declared facially unconstitutional, K&P became entitled to use its property for any lawful purpose. The Tenth Circuit has explained the governing principle as follows: If the zoning ordinance is void for want of the procedural safeguards of notice and hearing, etc., the properties intended to be affected thereby are unzoned and the property owners may proceed with any other lawfully intended use. In such cases, the court is limited to the remedy of declaring the zoning ordinance void and finding that the property owner affected is entitled to use his property for any lawful purpose without regard to the void zoning ordinance. Carter v. Salina, 773 F.2d 251, 255 (10th Cir. 1985). We accordingly conclude that, so long as the district court continues to hold the ordinances unconstitutional, its failure to declare K&P’s use of the Premises lawful constitutes an abuse of discretion. C. The facial constitutionality of the sign ordinances The next set of issues on appeal arise from the plaintiffs’ second motion for partial summary judgment pertaining to the sign-permit application process. Although the district court concluded that the City’s sign ordinances were not unconstitutional on their face, it did hold that the sign-permit application process was unconstitutional as it had been applied to K&P. The court accordingly declined to enjoin all enforcement of the sign ordinances by the City, but declared that K&P was legally entitled to erect its signs and enjoined the City from preventing it from doing so. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the sign ordinances did, in fact, amount to a facially unconstitutional prior restraint and that the City should therefore be enjoined against enforcing the ordinances. We will review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo, while reviewing its factual findings under the clear-error standard. Taft, 385 F.3d at 685. Nos. 08-1329/1361 H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC, et al. Page 14 v. City of Detroit
The district court summarized the applicable provisions of the sign ordinances in its February 14, 2008 summary judgment order. See H.D.V. - Greektown, LLC v. City of Detroit, No. 06-11282, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10940, at -13 ( E.D. Mich. Feb. 14, 2008). To avoid a lengthy redundancy, we refer the reader to the district court’s order for the details of the sign-ordinances.
In deciding whether the sign ordinances are facially unconstitutional, we must first determine which of two possible analytical frameworks to apply. The first framework is that announced by the Supreme Court in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965), and elaborated upon in later cases. Under the Freedman framework, “a facial challenge lies whenever a licensing law gives a government official or agency substantial power to discriminate based on the content or viewpoint of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked speakers.” City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1998). The first way that an ordinance can vest “substantial power” in local officials to engage in content-based discrimination is by placing “unbridled discretion in the hands of a government official or agency.” FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225 (1990). To avoid granting such unbridled discretion, ordinances “must contain precise and objective criteria on which they must make their decisions; an ordinance that gives too much discretion to public officials is invalid.” Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969)). Second, licensing ordinances must require prompt decisionmaking by the officials reviewing applications. “An ordinance that permits public officials to effectively deny an application by sitting on it indefinitely is also invalid.” Lady J, 176 F.3d at 1361 (citing Freedman, 380 U.S. at 56-57). Ordinances that do not set reasonable time limits on the decisionmaker create the risk of indefinitely suppressing permissible speech and are therefore facially unconstitutional under Freedman. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227. Nos. 08-1329/1361 H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC, et al. Page 15 v. City of Detroit The plaintiffs argued before the district court—and continue to argue on appeal—that the City’s sign ordinances are facially unconstitutional under Freedman. They reason that the ordinances vest unbridled discretion in the City to grant or deny permits because the ordinances do not contain specific grounds for the denial of sign-permit applications. The plaintiffs also note that the sign ordinances fail to place any time limits on the City for acting on sign-permit applications. But the district court agreed with the City that the Freedman framework did not apply. The court instead held that the correct standard was contained in Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316 (2002). There, the Supreme Court determined that the Freedman framework did not apply to content-neutral, “time, place, and manner” restrictions. Id. at 322. Rather, the Court held that the parkland-use ordinance before it was subject to the requirement that it contain “adequate standards to guide the [licensing] official’s discretion and render it subject to effective judicial review.” Id. at 323. The Thomas Court also determined that a content-neutral permit scheme (a) “must not be based on the content of the message,” (b) “must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,” and (c) “must leave open ample alternatives for communication.” Id. at n.3 (citing Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992)). In order to decide which precedent to apply, we must determine whether the City’s sign ordinances are content based or content neutral. See Thomas, 534 U.S. at 322; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (stating that the constitutional scrutiny applied to a regulation depends upon whether it is content based or content neutral). “Government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791(1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). An ordinance is not a content-based regulation of speech if (1) the regulation controls only the places where the speech may occur, (2) the regulation was not adopted because of disagreement with the message that the speech conveys, or (3) the government’s interests in the regulation are unrelated to the content of the affected speech. Covenant Media of S.C., LLC v. City of N. Charleston, 493 F.3d 421, 432 (4th Cir. 2007) (paraphrasing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719-20 (2000)) (internal punctuation omitted). Nos. 08-1329/1361 H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC, et al. Page 16 v. City of Detroit The plaintiffs argue that the ordinances at issue are content based because they distinguish between various types of signs—and thus various types of protected speech—by content. For instance, the “Signs” chapter of the DZO contains separate definitions for “advertising signs,” § 61-6-3, “business signs,” § 61-6-7, and “political signs,” § 61-6-18. The same chapter imposes different height requirements on business and identification signs, § 61-6-35, than it does for real estate, construction, and political signs, § 61-6-41, or advertising signs, § 61-6-57. Finally, the plaintiffs note that sign-permit applications require that the content of the proposed signage be identified. The plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the supposed distinctions between the various types of speech in the sign ordinances are unpersuasive. There is simply nothing in the record to indicate that the distinctions between the various types of signs reflect a meaningful preference for one type of speech over another. As the district court noted, this court held in Wheeler v. Commissioner of Highways, 822 F.2d 586, 591 (6th Cir. 1987), that “the onpremises [e.g., business]/off-premises [e.g., advertising] distinction does not constitute an impermissible regulation of content just because the determination of whether a sign is permitted at a given location is a function of the sign’s message.” We see no reason why the rationale in Wheeler regarding the on-premises/off-premises distinction would not extend to the types of technical distinctions in the City’s sign ordinances cited by the plaintiffs. Worth noting, however, is the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1266 (11th Cir. 2005), where it held that Neptune Beach’s sign code was content-based because of its varying treatments for different sorts of signs. An example cited in Solantic is arguably relevant to this case as well: [M]any of the sign code’s exemptions are plainly content based. For example, exemption (3) applies to flags and insignia only of a “government, religious, charitable, fraternal, or other organization.” Thus, a government or religious organization seeking to fly its flag may do so freely, whereas an individual seeking to fly a flag bearing an emblem of his or her own choosing would have to apply for a permit to do so, and would have to abide by all of the restrictions enumerated in § 27-581. For example, the government tax collector's office could display a flag reading, “Stop Tax Evasion,” whereas an individual homeowner could not display a flag saying, “Stop Domestic Violence,” since § 27-581(13) prohibits the use of the word “stop” in any nonexempt, nongovernmental sign. Nos. 08-1329/1361 H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC, et al. Page 17 v. City of Detroit Id. at 1263. The court concluded that, “because some types of signs are extensively regulated while others are exempt from regulation based on the nature of the messages they seek to convey, the sign code is undeniably a content-based restriction on speech.” Id. at 1266. The Solantic court’s classification of the sign regulations before it as content-based appears to us to reflect an overly narrow conception of the definition of content-neutral speech. The ordinances at issue in Solantic seem to satisfy all three of the possible independent bases for content neutrality listed by the Supreme Court in Hill (i.e., (1) the regulation is not a regulation of speech, but controls only the places where the speech may occur; (2) the regulation was not adopted because of disagreement with the message that the speech conveys; or (3) the government’s interests in the regulation are unrelated to the content of the affected speech). Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-20. Indeed, we doubt that there are many municipal sign ordinances around the country that would not be classified as contentbased prior restraints under Solantic. Because Solantic appears to employ an analysis that is inconsistent with Hill and Thomas, we shall not rely on its rationale. The plaintiffs’ argument regarding the necessity of listing a sign’s content on a permit application also fails. Although they are correct in pointing out that the sign-permit application contains an item labeled “Wording,” they can point to no provision in any of the sign ordinances that allows the City to reject an application due to the message it contains. The sign-permit application, taken as a whole, properly focuses on the physical characteristics and placement of proposed signs, which are entirely legitimate governmental concerns in this context. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 509-10 (1981) (holding that safety and aesthetics are legitimate government interests to further through sign ordinances). In sum, there is no evidence that the City’s sign ordinances discriminate based upon content. We will thus apply the Thomas standard for content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. Nos. 08-1329/1361 H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC, et al. Page 18 v. City of Detroit
As described above, the Supreme Court held in Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 323 & n.3 (2002), that an ordinance (1) must contain adequate standards to guide the official’s decision, (2) must not be based on the content of the message, (3) must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and (4) must leave open ample alternatives for communication. The sign ordinances in question satisfy all four of these factors. First, the sign ordinances contain narrow, objective, and definite nondiscretionary criteria. The ordinances contain very particular requirements for signs, including limitations on size, height, location, area, and setback conditions. Numerous other cases involving sign ordinances have found similar criteria to be sufficient to withstand constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Covenant Media of S.C., LLC v. City of N. Charleston, 493 F.3d 421, 435 (4th Cir. 2007); Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of St. Petersburg, 348 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003). On their face, the sign ordinances contain enough specificity to render the decision of whether to grant or deny an application virtually ministerial. The first Thomas element—that the ordinances contain adequate standards to guide the City’s decision—is therefore satisfied. Second, as discussed above, nothing in the text of the sign ordinances indicates that content is a factor in the approval process. The only distinctions drawn between various types of speech in the ordinances are the classifications of different types of signs, such as “business” or “advertising,” primarily for purposes of organization. Third, goals such as aesthetics and safety are legitimate governmental interests. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 509-10. Business signs hold the potential to distract or impede the view of drivers. Excessive signage can also diminish the beauty of the surrounding area. A sign’s size and structure can also affect the safety of its construction. The sign ordinances in question reflect the City’s justified concern over these interests. According to the plaintiffs, however, the ordinances are not narrowly tailored to serve those interests because they do not specifically identify the grounds on which the B&SE may deny an application. The City responds that the ordinances permit the denial of Nos. 08-1329/1361 H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC, et al. Page 19 v. City of Detroit a permit only on the grounds outlined therein. In Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988), the Supreme Court cautioned that “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” Thus, “in evaluating a facial challenge to a state law, a federal court must . . . consider any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered.” Ward v. Rock Against Racisim, 491 U.S. 781, 795-96 (1989) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The “Business Signs” section of the Detroit Code states that its purpose is to regulate business signs within the City of Detroit; to limit the abundance of signs in order to reduce motorist distraction and loss of safe sight distance; to promote public convenience; to preserve property values; to support and complement land use objectives as set forth in the city’s master plan and ordinances; and to enhance the aesthetic appearance and quality of life within the city. Detroit Code § 3-7-1. We are thus bound by DeBartolo and Ward to accept the construction of the ordinances offered by the City. Pursuant to that construction—that the ordinances permit the denial of a permit only on the grounds outlined therein—the sign ordinances satisfy the third, “narrowly tailored” Thomas element. Finally, we must consider whether the restrictions imposed by the sign ordinances “leave open ample alternatives for communication.” Thomas, 354 U.S. at 323 n.3. The ordinances permit the erection of signs that meet the City’s stated criteria for height, size, and other factors. Businesses are also free to use any of the myriad other forms of available communication (e.g., print, television, radio, etc.) to advertise. The ordinances therefore satisfy the fourth Thomas element. Application of the four Thomas elements discussed above would generally conclude our analysis in favor of the constitutionality of the ordinances. But the plaintiffs contend, as they did below, that Thomas also requires that content-neutral licensing ordinances (1) contain a brief, specified time limit, and (2) require the decisionmaker to specify the grounds for denying an application. The district court correctly declined to apply these additional elements. Nos. 08-1329/1361 H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC, et al. Page 20 v. City of Detroit In Thomas, the Supreme Court noted approvingly that the Chicago ordinance at issue, which governed the use of city parks by large groups, contained a 28-day deadline for processing applications and also provided that the Park District must clearly explain its reasons for denial. Thomas, 354 U.S. at 324. But the Court never stated that these additional factors were requirements to prevent a content-neutral regulation from being declared unconstitutional. Chicago’s decision-deadline and rejection-basis provisions are more accurately understood as a sort of “icing on the cake,” demonstrating that the challenged ordinance well exceeded the Court’s newly enunciated standard. To read the Court’s language otherwise would negate its earlier holding that content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions need not contain Freedman safeguards. Id. at 322; see S. Or. Barter Fair v. Jackson County, 372 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2004) (“To read [Thomas as requiring a time limit] would flatly contradict the decision’s clear holding that time, place, and manner regulations need not contain the Freedman safeguards.”); Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of St. Petersburg, 348 F.3d 1278, 1281-83 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that the absence of time limits for the municipality to process permit applications did not render a content-neutral sign ordinance unconstitutional); Griffin v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (limiting Freedman’s procedural safeguards requirement to “explicit censorship schemes[,] which by definition [are] not content-neutral”). Because the City’s sign ordinances—and the sign-permit application process derived from them—are content-neutral regulations that satisfy all four Thomas requirements, they are facially constitutional. We will therefore not disturb the district court’s order holding to that effect. The plaintiffs were thus properly denied injunctive relief against the general enforcement of the sign ordinances. D. Scope of injunctive relief on the plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge to the sign ordinances We note, before concluding, that the injunctive and declaratory relief that the district court did grant to the plaintiffs may at this point be technically insufficient. The court’s order provided as follows: [T]he Plaintiffs are legally entitled to erect the signs that were described on their sign permit application, and, in so doing, permanently enjoins the City of Detroit from preventing them from erecting and publishing these signs; Nos. 08-1329/1361 H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC, et al. Page 21 v. City of Detroit provided, however, that the Plaintiffs’ publication of the signs must fully conform with the existing ordinances, codes and related regulations. H.D.V. - Greektown, LLC v. City of Detroit, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10940 at . At oral argument, the plaintiffs indicated that they are no longer using the “Hustler” name previously listed on the sign applications and that they will accordingly need to erect signs bearing another name. Under the existing terms of the order, the plaintiffs would arguably be required to submit another sign application reflecting the new name, which the City could conceivably ignore again until the plaintiffs brought a new round of litigation. We therefore modify the district court’s order to declare that the plaintiffs may legally erect signs on the Premises bearing whatever non-obscene business name they choose, as long as the signs otherwise conform with the most recent application on file regarding dimensions, lighting, and other characteristics governed by the sign ordinances. The City is enjoined from preventing the plaintiffs from doing so.