Opinion ID: 1551205
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Crawford Issues with Respect to Gomes and Thornton

Text: The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence the complainant's statements made via telephone to Gomes and on the scene to Thornton. The defendant claims specifically that these statements are inadmissible under the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Davis v. Washington, supra, 126 S. Ct. 2266, which provides greater explication of the application of that court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. 36, in these contexts. [14] We first note the standard of review applicable to the trial court's determination of whether a statement is testimonial and, therefore, subject to the admissibility restrictions of Crawford. Because this is a question of constitutional law, we agree with the parties that the trial court's determination is subject to plenary review. Cf. State v. Merriam, 264 Conn. 617, 640-41 n. 27, 826 A.2d 1021 (2003) (following plurality opinion in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 144 L. Ed. 2d 117 [1999], and conduct[ing] an independent review of the circumstances surrounding the victim's statements in determining whether those statements possess the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness that are necessary to satisfy the requirements of the confrontation clause); see also Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (Although we defer to a trial court's determination of historical facts and credibility, we review a constitutional legal ruling, i.e. whether a statement is testimonial or non-testimonial, de novo. This is particularly so because the legal ruling of whether a statement is testimonial under Crawford is determined by the standard of an objectively reasonable declarant standing in the shoes of the actual declarant. On that question trial judges are no better equipped than are appellate judges, and the ruling itself does not depend upon demeanor, credibility, or other criteria peculiar to personal observation.). Traditionally, for purposes of the confrontation clause, all hearsay statements were admissible [under Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980)] if (1) the declarant was unavailable to testify, and (2) the statement bore adequate indicia of reliability. . . . [In Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. 68], the United States Supreme Court overruled Roberts to the extent that it applied to testimonial hearsay statements. . . . In Crawford, the court concluded that the reliability standard set forth in the second prong of the Roberts test is too amorphous to prevent adequately the improper admission of core testimonial statements that the [c]onfrontation [c]lause plainly meant to exclude. . . . The court held, therefore, that such testimonial hearsay statements may be admitted as evidence against an accused at a criminal trial only when (1) the declarant is unavailable to testify, and (2) the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. . . . In so concluding, the court drew a distinction between testimonial hearsay statements and those deemed nontestimonial. Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the [f]ramers' design to afford the [s]tates flexibility in their development of hearsay lawas does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements from [c]onfrontation [c]lause scrutiny altogether. . . . In other words, nontestimonial hearsay statements may still be admitted as evidence against an accused in a criminal trial if it satisfies both prongs of the Roberts test, irrespective of whether the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Although the court declined to define the terms testimonial and nontestimonial, it considered three formulations of th[e] core class of testimonial statements. . . . The first formulation consists of ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalentthat is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially. . . . The second formulation consists of extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. . . . Finally, the third formulation consists of statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. . . . The court did not adopt any one particular formulation, noting that, [t]hese formulations all share a common nucleus and then define the [c]lause's coverage at various levels of abstraction around it. Regardless of the precise articulation, some statements qualify under any definitionfor example, ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing. . . . Similarly, [s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial under even a narrow standard. . . . Therefore, [w]hatever else the term [testimonial] covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. These are the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the [c]onfrontation [c]lause was directed. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rivera, 268 Conn. 351, 362-64, 844 A.2d 191 (2004). The Supreme Court recently considered the applicability of Crawford to more informal statements made to police dispatchers in the context of 911 calls, and to police officers on the scene of a crime. In Davis v. Washington, supra, 126 S. Ct. 2266, the court articulated the following test for determining whether such statements are testimonial and, therefore, inadmissible under Crawford in the absence of a prior opportunity for cross-examination by the defendant: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Id., 2273-74. The court then applied this test to the facts of the two cases before it. [15] The court first assumed that 911 operators are agents of the police, and concluded that the recording of the 911 call in that case was not testimonial hearsay because the declarant, a domestic violence victim calling to report that her former boyfriend was at her house beating her, was speaking about events as they were actually happening, rather than `describ[ing] past events. . . .' Moreover, any reasonable listener would recognize that [the caller] . . . was facing an ongoing emergency. Although one might call 911 to provide a narrative report of a crime absent any imminent danger, [the victim's] call was plainly a call for help against bona fide physical threat. Third, the nature of what was asked and answered . . . objectively, was such that the elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to learn . . . what had happened in the past. This is true even of the operator's effort to establish the identity of the assailant, so that the dispatched officers might know whether they would be encountering a violent felon. (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id., 2276. Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that, the circumstances of the [caller's] interrogation objectively indicate its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. (Emphasis added.) Id., 2277. The court did, however, note that a call for help could evolve into testimonial statements once the purpose of the emergency call has been achieved, such as after the emergency has been averted by, for example, the departure of the perpetrator from the scene. It left to trial courts, through in limine procedure, to redact or exclude the portions of any statement that have become testimonial. . . . Id. With respect to the on-scene statements by a domestic violence victim to a police officer, the Supreme Court concluded that the statements before it were testimonial, despite the fact that they were not the formal police station interviews with Miranda warnings initially contemplated in Crawford. Id., 2278. The court used its primary purpose test to hold that these statements were testimonial because it is entirely clear from the circumstances that the interrogation was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct. . . . There was no emergency in progress; the interrogating officer testified that he had heard no arguments or crashing and saw no one throw or break anything. . . . (Citation omitted.) Id. The court noted that the officer's questioning was directed not at seeking to determine . . . `what is happening,' but rather `what happened.' Objectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible crimewhich is, of course, precisely what the officer should have done. [16] Id. The court did, however, state that it is not impossible that questions at the scene will yield nontestimonial answers, as officers might need to make initial inquiries to assess the danger level of the situation. Id., 2279. The court also emphasized that, in cases like this one, where [the victim's] statements were neither a cry for help nor the provision of information enabling officers immediately to end a threatening situation, the fact that they were given at an alleged crime scene and were `initial inquiries' is immaterial. Id. 1 Applying the Davis test to the facts of the present case, we first conclude that the complainant's statements by telephone to Gomes were testimonial and, therefore, inadmissible under Crawford. A review of Gomes' conversation with the complainant makes clear that the primary purpose of the call was to investigate and apprehend a suspect from a prior crime, rather than to solve an ongoing emergency or crime in progress at the time of the call. [17] The defendant properly points out that the call at issue was made after the emergency had been averted and the complainant no longer was under any threat from the defendant because she already had escaped and had left him stranded on the side of the road. Thus, although the complainant might have needed emergency medical assistance at the time she made the call, the bulk of her conversation with Gomes nevertheless consisted of her account of a crime that had happened to her in the recent past, rather than one that was happening to her at the time of the call. This renders the call, viewed as a whole, [18] distinct from the telephone call that was held nontestimonial in Davis, in which the declarant, a domestic violence victim calling to report that her former boyfriend was at her house beating her, was speaking about events as they were actually happening, rather than `describ[ing] past events. . . .'  (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id., 2276. Put differently, at the time of her telephone conversation with Gomes, the complainant in the present case was not under a bona fide physical threat at the hands of the defendant. Id. Her call was made for the purpose of reporting a past criminal act, rather than to avert a presently occurring one. This renders the telephone call recording testimonial and, therefore, inadmissible under Crawford in the absence of an opportunity for prior cross-examination by the defendant. Cf. United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying Davis and concluding that 911 call was nontestimonial when anonymous caller reported there had just been shooting and shooter had immediately fled scene); Jackson v. State, 931 So. 2d 1062, 1063 (Fla. App. 2006) (applying Davis and concluding that 911 tape was nontestimonial when victim described events as they were actually happening); Cook v. State, Court of Appeals, Docket No. 01-05-00107-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 6431, -7 (Tex. App. July 20, 2006) (immediate call to 911 to report intoxicated motorist who had just thrown beer bottle at caller's vehicle and gestured obscenely at him was nontestimonial because it reported potential crime in progress). We, therefore, conclude that the trial court improperly admitted the recording of the call into evidence. [19] 2 We conclude similarly as to the complainant's statements to Thornton at her home, which also were testimonial and, therefore, inadmissible under Crawford because the defendant lacked a prior opportunity for cross-examination. The facts and circumstances of this case indicate that, as in Davis, the officer's questioning was directed not at seeking to determine . . . `what is happening,' but rather `what happened.' Objectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime which is, of course, precisely what the officer should have done. Davis v. Washington, supra, 126 S. Ct. 2278. In the present case, just as in Davis, any emergency with respect to the complainant had ceased because the alleged crimes no longer were in progress and she was rendered protected by Thornton's presence at her home, which constituted part of the alleged crime scene in this case. Id., 2279. In this respect, we find instructive State v. Mechling, W. Va. , 633 S.E.2d 311, 323 (2006), a recent case in which the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals applied Davis and concluded that a trial court had improperly permitted sheriffs' deputies to testify about statements by a domestic violence victim because [i]t is clear from the circumstances that the deputies' interrogation of [the victim] was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct. In so holding, the court emphasized that the perpetrator had departed the scene and there was no emergency in progress when [they] arrived. . . . Id.; cf. State v. Reardon, Court of Appeals, Docket No. CR-2005-1177, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 3960, -8 (Ohio App. August 4, 2006) (statements to police officers responding to home invasion nontestimonial and concerned ongoing emergency when suspects were still fleeing scene upon officers' arrival). In the present case, Thornton's presence and the fact that the defendant, the alleged perpetrator, was located some distance away, rendered the primary purpose of Thornton's interaction with the complainant investigatory, and her answers to his questions testimonial statements. Accordingly, the trial court improperly permitted Thornton to testify about the complainant's statements to him. [20] Moreover, the state does not argue in its primary or supplemental briefs that the admission of the statements to Gomes or Thornton, in violation of the defendant's confrontation clause rights, constituted harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we must reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial. This case does, however, present us with a variety of issues that are likely to arise again on remand. We turn to them now, beginning with the defendant's third Crawford claim. C