Opinion ID: 6927142
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: - Count IV

Text: The magistrate judge found that all of the incidents alleged to support the § 1983 claim contained in Count IV, which pertain to physical abuse and mistreatment of Kost during his confinement in the DHU, took place prior to July 18, 1989. Therefore, the magistrate judge concluded that Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 5524, barred the claim in its entirety. Appellants argue on appeal that this two-year limitations period should not apply and, instead, that Pennsylvania’s four- or six-year statutes of limitations for contracts should govern because Kost was a federal pretrial detainee housed at the ACJ pursuant to a contract between the United States Marshal’s Service and Allegheny County and his claims constitute. violations of that contract. This argument actually raises two separate issues: We must first determine the appropriate limitations period for the § 1983 claim alleged in Count IV; second, we must determine whether the plaintiffs’ complaint made out a contract claim.
There is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 actions. Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp.1993), however, contains a borrowing provision under which this gap shall be filled by reference to “the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil ... cause is held.” In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), the Supreme Court determined after extensive discussion that all § 1983 actions, should be classified as claims for personal injury for the purpose of determining the limitations period under the applicable state law. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 272-76, 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1944-47, 1949. In the face of this precedent, appellants’ argument for application of the longer Pennsylvania limitations period for breach of contract is plainly frivolous. As already set forth, the Pennsylvania limitations period for personal injury actions is two years. The complaint was filed in 1991. All events related to Kost’s confinement in the DHU occurred in 1988. The Count IV § 1983 claim based on these events is therefore entirely time-barred. Thus, although it was error to have entered summary judgment on this claim, see supra section III.B., it would not have been error to have dismissed this portion of the complaint pursuant to the ACJ defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The district court’s order granting summary judgment on plaintiffs’ Count IV § 1983 claim will therefore be vacated and the claim remanded with instructions to dismiss it.
As to the contract claim, appellants raise an issue on'objections to the magistrate judge’s report and on appeal that has no predicate in their complaint. Count IV of the complaint alleges that certain ACJ defendants, “by their acts of deliberate indifference towards the care and welfare of the Plaintiff George Kost infliced [sic] the following torts upon him.” This allegation is then followed by a statement of the misconduct alleged of these defendants. Kost makes no allegation, explicit or implicit, that this activity constituted violations of any contract between United States and Allegheny County or that he had standing to sue under such a contract. The contract is neither attached as an exhibit to the complaint nor are its pertinent provisions incorporated into the complaint. Moreover, in his comprehensive statement in the complaint of the legal bases for his claim, Kost alleges a denial of federal due process and other federal constitutional violations; statutory violations under §§ 1983, 1985(2) and (3), and 1986; and breach of “the tort laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” Appellants do not here appeal the §§ 1985 and 1986 claims or the state tort claim. We therefore can perceive no error in the magistrate judge’s application of Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury to the remaining § 1983 claim. 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 5524, Garcia, 471 U.S. at 272-76, 280,105 S.Ct. at 1944-47, 1949. Count IV of the complaint fails to make out a contract claim, to which a longer limitations period would apply, because the factual allegations contained therein are simply not sufficient, even if true, to support such a claim. Ditri, 954 F.2d at 871; Ransom, 848 F.2d at 401. Therefore, although it was error to grant summary judgment on this phase of the case, see section III.B., it would not have been error to dismiss it pursuant to the ACJ defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. As already stated above, the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Count IV of the complaint will thus be vacated and this portion of the ease remanded with instructions to dismiss it. 11