Opinion ID: 6341114
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Woods’s Photo Identiﬁcation

Text: Edwards next argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress Woods’s photo identiﬁcation. A photo identiﬁcation procedure violates a defendant’s due process rights when (1) it was “impermissibly suggestive” and (2) “under all the circumstances, that suggestive procedure gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentiﬁcation.” United States v. Gonzalez, 863 F.3d 576, 584 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107 (1977)). We review de novo the lower court’s decision to deny a defendant’s motion to suppress a photo identiﬁcation, “with due deference to the court’s ﬁndings of historical fact.” Id. (citing United States v. Harris, 281 F.3d 667, 669–70 (7th Cir. 2002)). Presenting a witness with only one suspect for an identiﬁcation is inherently suggestive but may be permissible in certain circumstances. Id. at 584–85 (showing state identiﬁcation photos within minutes of robbery would be suggestive lacking exigent circumstances); United States v. Brown, 471 F.3d 802, 804 (7th Cir. 2006) (reviewing Supreme Court precedent and scholarship regarding single-suspect presentations and attempts to mitigate suggestibility); but see United States v. Vines, 9 F.4th 500, 506–07 (7th Cir. 2021) (holding that it was not suggestive to show a Facebook proﬁle picture after witness volunteered the suspect had a Facebook page). Because the government does not dispute the ﬁnding that the photo procedure was impermissibly suggestive, we proceed straight to the second prong. An impermissibly suggestive photo identiﬁcation may nonetheless survive a suppression motion where the totality of the circumstances demonstrates the reliability of the identiﬁcation. See Gonzalez, 863 F.3d at 585–86 (citing Perry v. New No. 20-3297 13 Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 232 (2012)). In assessing reliability, we consider the Biggers factors: (1) the witness’s opportunity to view the defendant during the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of attention paid to the defendant; (3) the accuracy of any prior descriptions of the defendant; (4) the level of the witness’s certainty at the time of the identiﬁcation; and (5) the time that has passed between the crime and the identiﬁcation. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199–200; Gonzalez, 863 F.3d at 586. All ﬁve Biggers factors support the reliability of the photo identiﬁcation and indicate the process did not give rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentiﬁcation. First, Woods knew Edwards and spent hours with him that night. Second, Woods paid signiﬁcant attention to Edwards over this period as he drove her, pulled a gun on her, committed a robbery with her, and ﬂed from the police with her in a highspeed car chase. Third, Woods correctly observed that, while Edwards had hair in the booking photo Detective Johnson showed her, he was currently bald. Fourth, Woods immediately recognized “Moe” in the booking photo and has not wavered in her identiﬁcation. Fifth, Woods identiﬁed Edwards within hours of the robbery. Additionally, Edwards argues that Woods’s identiﬁcation was unreliable because she was intoxicated and under great stress. The magistrate judge heard live testimony from Woods and Detective Johnson, and was in the best position to evaluate Woods’s credibility and how Detective Johnson’s actions may have impacted her photo identiﬁcation. See Thurman, 889 F.3d at 366. Edwards fails to present evidence suﬃcient to challenge these ﬁndings. The district court did not err when it denied Edwards’s motion to suppress Woods’s photo identiﬁcation. 14 No. 20-3297 C. Detective Johnson’s Second Entry into the Outlander Edwards next argues the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained from Detective Johnson’s January 1, 2019, warrantless entry into the impounded Outlander. When reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review ﬁndings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. See United States v. Cole, 21 F.4th 421, 427 (7th Cir. 2021) (en banc). Edwards considers Detective Johnson’s account of the January 2019 entry incredible, but points to nothing beyond those plausibility concerns rejected below. Here, again, the magistrate judge enjoyed the beneﬁt of observing Detective Johnson’s live testimony and evaluating his credibility. Nothing on the record leaves us with the deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction the lower court erred in crediting Detective Johnson’s version of events. See Hammond, 996 F.3d at 383. We decline to disturb the district court’s factual ﬁndings and accept Detective Johnson’s account: Detective Johnson entered the Outlander for the sole purpose of retrieving Woods’s purse. Once in the Outlander, he did not stray beyond this objective. In reaching for the purse, Detective Johnson inadvertently dislodged the sunglasses holder and revealed a hidden compartment concealing what he immediately recognized to be a Glock handgun. Edwards argues that law enforcement needed to obtain a new warrant before searching the impounded Outlander a second time. See United States v. Keszthelyi, 308 F.3d 557, 568 (6th Cir. 2002) (articulating the “reasonable continuation rule” that the government needs a new warrant if the second entry is not a reasonable continuation of the ﬁrst); Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697, 703 (6th Cir. 1992) (diﬀerentiating between entry No. 20-3297 15 for the purposes outlined in the warrant and entry for a different purpose). Edwards suggests that after the oﬃcers returned the initial search warrant, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy against further searches without a new warrant or identiﬁable exception to the warrant requirement. The record indicates the government assumed the same—a prosecutor instructed Detective Johnson to seek a warrant before recovering new evidence. Today, we need not consider when an additional warrant was necessary because Edwards had no privacy interest in the Outlander after he abandoned the vehicle. The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and eﬀects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]” U.S. Const. Amend. IV. This protects a defendant from unreasonable searches in places where the defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy. See Hammond, 996 F.3d at 384 (citing United States v. Sawyer, 929 F.3d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 2019). The Amendment does not apply to abandoned property. United States v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 449, 455–56 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960)). “[N]o person can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an item that he has abandoned.” Id. at 456 (quoting United States v. Basinski, 226 F.3d 829, 836 (7th Cir. 2000)). Abandonment turns upon an objective test of “the external manifestations of the defendant’s intent as judged by a rea- sonable person possessing the same knowledge available to the government agents involved in the search.” Id. (citing Basinski, 226 F.3d at 836). We have stated on multiple occasions that a driver relinquishes any privacy interest when he ﬂees a vehicle. See United States v. Vasquez, 635 F.3d 889, 894 (7th Cir. 16 No. 20-3297 2011) (questioning how a defendant “could argue with a straight face that he maintained an expectation of privacy in [the vehicle] after he ditched it and bolted oﬀ on the run”); United States v. Pittman, 411 F.3d 813, 817 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that when a driver ﬂees from police, that “is pretty good evidence that he’s abandoned the car—that he doesn’t want to be associated with it and therefore isn’t going to reclaim it”). After the government declined to challenge Edwards’s privacy interest, the magistrate judge sua sponte raised aban- donment in its report and recommendation. The magistrate judge explained that, but for the government’s concession, it would have found Edwards abandoned the Outlander. We agree. Edwards ditched the Outlander (which was not registered in his name) after a high-speed car chase the night of the O’Reilly Auto Parts robbery when he ﬂed on foot, and he was a fugitive at the time Detective Johnson entered the vehicle. A reasonable person would conclude that Edwards abandoned the vehicle. See Pitts, 322 F.3d at 455–56. Although both parties assumed Edwards had a Fourth Amendment right to privacy in the Outlander, we are not bound by the parties’ view. Likewise, we may aﬃrm the district court’s decision on “‘any ground supported by the record.’” United States v. Harden, 893 F.3d 434, 451 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Boyd v. Ill. State Police, 384 F.3d 888, 897 (7th Cir. 2004)). The government’s failure to raise abandonment forfeits that issue on appeal. Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 786 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-35 (1993)); see United States v. Rahman, 805 F.3d 822, 831 (7th Cir. 2015) (determining forfeiture when “the argument was available to [the defendant] at the time of the No. 20-3297 17 search”); United States v. Combs, 657 F.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “[t]he government can forego a defense—whether by design or neglect—but we are not obligated to accept the government’s waiver”). But we may “base our decision on a forfeited ground” when the record presents “an ‘exceptional case.’” See Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d 644, 647 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 473 (2012)). As our sister circuit recently articulated, “courts do have the ability to ‘resurrect’ forfeited issues sua sponte in ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 872 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (quoting Wood, 566 U.S. at 471 n.5). “The degree to which we adhere to the prudential practice of forfeiture and the conditions under which we will excuse it are up to us as an appellate court.” Id. at 873 (citation omitted). The court considered the forfeited issue because it had “all the ﬁndings of fact necessary … and that purely legal conclusion jumps oﬀ the page.” Id. at 877. We are in similar territory. Under any standard of review, the record shows Edwards abandoned the Outlander. It also qualiﬁes as an exceptional case to forgive the forfeiture. In Wood v. Milyard, the Supreme Court stated that a court may consider a forfeited ground “founded on concerns broader than those of the parties.” 566 U.S. at 471 (citing Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133–35 (1987)). A case may be exceptional once “third-party costs are taken into account, [and] reversal may be an excessive sanction for the government’s [forfeiture].” United States v. Ford, 683 F.3d 761, 769 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Giovannetti, 928 F.2d 225, 227 (7th Cir. 1991). “[T]he facts of individual cases” inform when we should use our discretion to decide a case on the forfeited 18 No. 20-3297 ground, Singleton v. Wulﬀ, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976), including when the facts indicate “broader interests are at stake,” Bourgeois v. Watson, 977 F.3d 620, 632 (7th Cir. 2020). Based on the facts of this case, it qualiﬁes as exceptional. In failing to challenge Edwards’s privacy interest in the Outlander, the government presents alternate reasons for aﬃrmance that would require us to examine unresolved nuances to the Fourth Amendment constitutional doctrine. Yet, the record provides a clear disposition under our established constitutional precedent. As such, we exercise our discretion to forgive the forfeiture and avoid the needless exploration of unchartered constitutional matters which could bring unintended consequences for future litigants. Presented with the magistrate judge’s well-reasoned re- port, we agree with its recommendation regarding abandonment. Law enforcement was wise to seek a search warrant for the Outlander in the ﬁrst instance. It is best practice to rely on a warrant instead of gamble on a court’s evidentiary determination. But the record here shows Edwards had no expectation of privacy in the abandoned Outlander. Handed a peculiar set of facts, the district court did not err when it denied Edwards’s motion to suppress, albeit on diﬀerent grounds than we aﬃrm on today. D. The Government’s Motion to Reconsider Additionally, Edwards claims the district court erred when it granted the government’s motion to reconsider its opinion and order adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. Edwards argues because the government never objected to the report and recommendation, the government waived the issue. We review the district court’s ruling No. 20-3297 19 on a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. Jaburek v. Foxx, 813 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2016). A party may object to a magistrate judge’s report and rec- ommendation “[w]ithin 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, or at some other time the court sets.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2). Failure to object “waives a party’s right to review.” Id. Waiver is not jurisdictional, however, and a district court may review a recommendation on its own initiative. United States v. Street, 917 F.3d 586, 597–98 (7th Cir. 2019). Furthermore, “we have recognized exceptions when enforcing [the deadline] would ‘defeat the ends of justice.’” Id. at 597–98 (quoting Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 797 F.2d 538, 540 (7th Cir. 1986)). Waiver does not apply here. The magistrate judge entered a well-reasoned and unambiguous report and recommendation. Nowhere in the report did the magistrate judge include that Detective Johnson lied or gave false testimony. Instead, the district court erroneously concluded that the magistrate judge had made such a ﬁnding, and the government objected to the district court’s error. The district court acted well within its discretion in correcting its mistake. E. Trial & Juror No. 11 Edwards next claims the district court made numerous errors at trial: failing to sequester Detective Keith from the court room, denying Edwards’s motion for a mistrial, and dismissing Juror No. 11. We review these rulings for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Olofson, 563 F.3d 652, 660 (7th Cir. 2009) (witness sequestration exemption); United States v. Lowe, 2 F.4th 652, 658 (7th Cir. 2021) (mistrial); United States v. Loreﬁce, 192 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 1999) (juror dismissal). We 20 No. 20-3297 review the district court’s factual ﬁndings in connection with a mistrial motion for clear error. See United States v. Mannie, 509 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Shakman v. City of Chicago, 426 F.3d 925, 932 (7th Cir. 2005)).
Federal Rule of Evidence 615 directs a court to exclude witnesses from the courtroom during trial so they do not inﬂuence, and are not inﬂuenced by, the testimony of other witnesses. Rule 615 exempts several categories of witness from exclusion, including a government’s investigative case agent. See Fed. R. Evid. 615(b) & (c); United States v. Berry, 133 F.3d 1020, 1024 (7th Cir. 1998). The district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting both Agent Boxwell and Detective Keith (after her testimony) in the courtroom. Agent Boxwell was the lead investigator for the case and squarely fell under the Rule 615(b) case agent exemption. Similarly, Detective Keith’s presence was essential to the government’s case pursuant to Rule 615(c). Detective Keith’s role was separate from Agent Boxwell’s, the case was multi-jurisdictional, Detective Keith worked for a diﬀerent law enforcement body, and she had independent knowledge of other aspects of the case. Moreover, the district court sequestered Detective Keith until she had completed her testimony, thereby eliminating the risk that the testimony of other trial witnesses would impact hers.
Edwards argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial after Juror No. 11 raised concerns of potential witness coaching. “[A] trial judge is in the best posi- tion to weigh the circumstances peculiar to each trial.” Lowe, No. 20-3297 21 2 F.4th at 658 (quoting United States v. Wrensford, 866 F.3d 76, 89 (3d Cir. 2017)). In considering the context of the district court’s decision, we must “determine whether the defendant was deprived of a fair trial.” Mannie, 509 F.3d at 856 (citing United States v. Clarke, 227 F.3d 874, 881 (7th Cir. 2000)). The district court did not abuse its discretion. Though Edwards disagrees with the result, he does not explain how the district court’s factual ﬁndings were clearly erroneous. Instead, he asks us to reweigh the evidence. The record indicates that the district court took great care to ensure that it did not allow a tainted trial to move forward. It took testimony from Juror No. 11 and the detectives, allowed the parties to question the detectives, and heard arguments from both sides. The district court carefully considered the evidence and the circumstances, recognizing it was in the best position to weigh the situation. It then made clear factual ﬁndings that Keith did not coach Johnson, Johnson credibly testiﬁed that Keith’s behavior did not impact his testimony, and there was no prejudice to warrant a mistrial. It also admonished Detective Keith for her conduct. The district court could not declare a mistrial for witness coaching when no witness coaching took place.
Edwards next argues that the district court abused its discretion when it excused Juror No. 11. A district court may remove and replace sitting jurors “who are unable to perform or who are disqualiﬁed from performing their duties.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(1). The district court is in the best position to consider a juror’s potential bias and weigh that against the juror’s claims that he can still be fair and impartial. See Loreﬁce, 192 F.3d at 654. A district court abuses its discretion when “no legitimate basis for the court’s decision can be found in the 22 No. 20-3297 record, and the appellant shows that the juror’s dismissal prejudiced his case.” United States v. Pineda, 743 F.3d 213, 217 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Vega, 72 F.3d 507, 512 (7th Cir. 1995)). Edwards challenges the district court’s basis for excusing Juror No. 11, claiming that a juror is entitled to consider what takes place in the courtroom. He suggests that Detective Keith’s actions in the gallery were fair game for the jury, and the district court abused its discretion when it excused a juror who was merely weighing witness credibility. The district court took a methodical approach to protect the sanctity of the jury and the fairness of Edwards’s trial. It found, after careful consideration, that Detective Keith’s actions did not impact Detective Johnson’s testimony. After questioning Juror No. 11 twice, however, the district court observed that Juror No. 11 believed Detective Keith may have coached Detective Johnson’s testimony. Indeed, Juror No. 11 felt so strongly about the behavior that he voiced his concerns. The district court recognized that Juror No. 11 initially stated he would consider Detective Keith’s actions when weighing Detective Johnson’s credibility. Despite Juror No. 11’s agreement to follow its instructions, the district court believed the cloud of bias remained. Based upon its evaluation of Juror No. 11’s demeanor and credibility, the district court concluded that the juror’s continued service on the jury risked tainting the trial and deliberations. The district court’s detailed ﬁnding supports its conclusion. It did not abuse its discretion in excusing Juror No. 11. No. 20-3297 23 F. Motion for a New Trial Next, Edwards appeals the district court’s decision to deny his motion for new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 and Brady v. Maryland. We review the district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion, including when the defendant alleges there was a Brady violation. United States v. Ballard, 885 F.3d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 2018). Because “Brady violations often implicate both issues of fact and law; we review the district court’s factual ﬁndings for clear error, and legal conclusions de novo.” Ballard, 885 F.3d at 504 (citing United States v. Griﬃn, 652 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 2011)). “To succeed on a Brady claim, a defendant ‘bears the burden of proving that the evidence is (1) favorable, (2) suppressed, and (3) material to the defense.” United States v. Walter, 870 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Walker, 746 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 2014)). Edwards has failed to satisfy these elements. 1. Favorable Evidence Evidence is “favorable” if it is exculpatory or impeaching. Ballard, 885 F.3d at 504 (citing Turner v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 1893 (2017)). The district court noted that Edwards knew of the existence, but not the details, of the January 19 statement. Edwards claims the details in the report are favorable because they reﬂect Burrell denouncing her prior statements, which were detrimental to Edwards’s case. We cannot see how the January 19 report is favorable, particularly when Burrell called Agent Boxwell again on February 6, 2020, to contradict her January 19 statement. If anything, it further undermines Burrell’s credibility. 24 No. 20-3297 2. Suppression Evidence is suppressed when the government “fail[s] to disclose evidence not otherwise available to a reasonably diligent defendant.” Bryant v. Brown, 873 F.3d 988, 998 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Jardine v. Dittmann, 658 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2011)). Evidence is not suppressed when a defendant is aware a witness recanted a prior statement and the defendant has access to question the witness further. See United States v. Lockhart, 956 F.2d 1418 (7th Cir. 1992). Edwards claims that the government suppressed the January 19, 2020, report’s contents. Even if he had asked her about the statement, Edwards contends, only the report could verify whether Burrell’s recollection of her statement was reliable. We agree with Edwards that, as a practical matter, the government should have turned over the report. But the nature of this report falls outside the scope of Brady. Though the government did not produce the report, anything Edwards would have gained from it was available to him through reasonable diligence because Burrell was his witness. See Lockhart, 956 F.2d at 1426 (noting that the government is not required to “transcribe the recantation of a witness available to the defendant”). Edwards points to Boss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2001), arguing that Burrell could not have relayed the exact contents contained in the report. Boss does not apply here. In Boss, we explained that reasonable diligence does not extend to everything a defense witness might have told the government, such as additional information about the crime unrelated to his alibi testimony. Boss, 263 F.3d at 740–42. Conversely, Burrell’s statement goes directly to her role as an alibi witness. When Edwards’s counsel learned about the January 19, 2020, statement, reasonable diligence required counsel to No. 20-3297 25 follow up with Burrell to determine what she did or did not say. If Burrell recanted her recantation on January 19, she could easily have told Edwards. 3. Materiality Evidence is “material” when “there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that the result would have been diﬀerent had the suppressed evidence been put before the jury.” Goudy v. Cummings (Goudy II), 922 F.3d 834, 842 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 422 (1995)). This standard “is less rigorous than a preponderance of the evidence … [the defendant] must show only that ‘the cumulative eﬀect of all of the suppressed information is to undermine conﬁdence in the verdict.’” Id. (quoting Goudy v. Basinger (Goudy I), 604 F.3d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 2010)). Cumulative eﬀect is considered “in the context of the entire record.” Id. (quoting Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 507 (7th Cir. 2015)). Edwards argues the report is material because he could have used it to rehabilitate Burrell’s alibi testimony had she taken the stand. Edwards fails to show how the contents of the January 19, 2020 report could possibly rehabilitate Burrell’s credibility had she testiﬁed, let alone how it would present a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different. As the district court correctly observed, the evidence against Edwards was strong. See United States v. Asher, 178 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 1999) (aﬃrming when the suppressed FBI interview summaries would not have undermined conﬁdence in the jury’s verdict given the weight of additional evidence). Woods, Edwards’s codefendant, testiﬁed against him, the two used his Outlander during the O’Reilly Auto Parts robbery, the surveillance video captured him, and his DNA was on the gun Detective Johnson found in the Outlander. Moreover, 26 No. 20-3297 Burrell’s account of the events was a moving target. She told multiple versions of the events. The report would not have created a reasonable probability of a diﬀerent outcome in Edwards’s case. G. Cumulative Error Edwards concludes by asking us to reverse on cumulative error. “Cumulative errors, while individually harmless, when taken together can prejudice a defendant as much as a single reversible error and violate a defendant’s right to due process of law.” United States v Marchan, 935 F.3d 540, 549 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Allen, 269 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir. 2001)). “To establish cumulative error a defendant must show that ‘(1) at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial; (2) considered together along with the entire record, the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied the petitioner a fundamentally fair trial.’” Id. (quoting Allen, 269 F.3d at 847). As explained above, Edwards fails to establish a single error, let alone two.