Opinion ID: 182739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rush-Richardson

Text: In Rush-Richardson, 574 F.3d at 906, we adhered to Kent and Brown and reversed another § 924(c) conviction on plain-error grounds. In so holding, we explicitly relied on the facts that (1) the government presented no definitive evidence of Rush-Richardson's fingerprints on, or physical evidence connecting Rush-Richardson to, the firearms, (2) [o]ne fingerprint was discovered on one firearm, and that fingerprint was not Rush-Richardson's, and (3) the prosecutor's closing argument emphasized the erroneous definition of in furtherance of in the jury instructions. Id. at 912. [12] The majority ignores or labels as immaterial these three important parts of Rush-Richardson's holding, which all militate in favor of reversal of the Vanovers' convictions. Ante at 1121. In the Vanovers' case, forensic analysis revealed fingerprints on the High Point's magazine, but those fingerprints did not belong to either Butch or Barb. In her closing argument, the prosecutor stated: [P]art of the instruction that the judge has given you is that the government need only prove that the firearm had the potential to facilitate. We don't have to prove that either [of the defendants] pointed that gun at Debra Dale on December 19th, but what we do have to show you is that the firearm was present, both of them knew that the firearm was present and that they had control over that firearm. In not weighing the absence of the Vanovers' fingerprints, the presence of unidentified fingerprints, or the prosecutor's closing argument, the majority ignores Rush-Richardson's holding that these three facts are relevant and weigh in favor of reversal. In effect, the majority today lends precedential force, not to the Rush-Richardson majority's opinion, but to the concurrence in Rush-Richardson, which disapproved of the majority's reliance on fingerprint evidence. See Rush-Richardson, 574 F.3d at 914-15 (Colloton, J., concurring) (arguing the absence of fingerprints and physical evidence does not in my view materially advance Rush-Richardson's showing that the mistaken jury instruction affected his substantial rights on the `in furtherance' element). II. What to Do