Opinion ID: 1829412
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: barker factors applied to spencer

Text: This first step under Barker, the length of the delay, operates as a triggering mechanism. Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss. 1989). If the delay is not presumptively prejudicial, then there is no need for further inquiry. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). For Spencer, the time between arrest and trial was 536 days, slightly over seventeen (17) months. This Court has recognized that a delay of eight (8) months or more is presumptively prejudicial. Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss. 1989) (citing 2 W. LeFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 18.2 (1984), quoting Joseph, Speedy Trial Rights in Application, 48 Fordham L.Rev. 611, 623 n. 71 (1980)). See also United States v. Greer, 655 F.2d 51, 53 (5th Cir.1981) (357 days is prejudicial); Beavers v. State, 498 So.2d 788, 790 (Miss. 1986) (423 days is presumptively prejudicial); Bailey v. State, 463 So.2d 1059, 1062 (Miss. 1985) (298 days requires Barker balancing test). For Spencer, a 536 day delay is presumptively prejudicial, and inquiry into other Barker factors is required.
No reason for this delay appears in the record, a fact conceded by the State. However, there is one fact which sheds a little light on this question. Spencer asked for a continuance, which was granted on June 8, 1989. Delays attributable to the defendant toll the running of time. Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371, 1375 (Miss. 1988); Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194, 199 (Miss. 1982). Thus, Spencer should be charged with all time between June 8, 1989, and the commencement of trial, October 12, 1989. This leaves us with a total of 410 days (536 days minus 126 days equals 410 days). Where the prosecution fails to show good cause for the delay, this factor is weighed against the prosecution. Handley, 574 So.2d at 676; Perry, 419 So.2d at 199. Here, 410 days worth of delay is weighed against the State.
The third factor in the equation is afforded strong evidentiary weight. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. See Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165, 169 (Miss. 1991) (failure of defendant to request trial is important part in speedy trial analysis). Spencer's first and only assertion of his right to a speedy trial came only one day prior to trial, October 11, 1989. This was 535 days following arrest. Beavers v. State recognizes that a defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial. Beavers v. State, 498 So.2d 788, 791 (Miss. 1986); Nations v. State, 481 So.2d 760, 761 (Miss. 1985); Turner v. State, 383 So.2d 489, 491 (Miss. 1980). Further, the right to a speedy trial is not waived by silence. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 526, 527, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2189, 2190, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). HOWEVER, this does not mean that the defendant has no responsibility to assert his right. Barker, 407 U.S. at 528, 92 S.Ct. at 2191. See Bailey v. State, 463 So.2d 1059, 1063 (Miss. 1985) Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194, 199 (Miss. 1982). The third Barker factor weighs against Spencer.
Barker identified three elements of prejudice to be considered: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The first two elements are not applicable to Spencer. First, there was no risk of oppressive pretrial incarceration since Spencer was already in the State's custody for other, wholly unrelated reasons. Second, Spencer could hardly wage a credible argument that he experienced any significant anxiety given his already existing predicament of serving time in the penitentiary. However, what about the impairment to Spencer's defense? At the pretrial hearing, the following exchange occurred between Spencer; his attorney, Mr. Briscoe; the prosecutor, Miss Bridges; and the trial judge: BY THE COURT: I don't see any merit in your Motion. I have considered it and read it and take as confessed everything you say in it is true. The Motion will be denied. BY MR. BRISCOE: Yes, Your Honor. BY THE COURT: All right. I just don't see he suffered anything and I'm going to deny the Motion. All right. BY MR. SPENCER: Well ... well my witness was available at the time. BY THE COURT: Yes, sir, I understand that, but the Court has ruled and that's the ruling of the Court. BY MISS BRIDGES: The State would be happy to try to locate any witnesses you may need to call. BY THE COURT: If you can name them and give the ... the Court will have them brought here. BY MR. SPENCER: Some are discharged and I have no way of getting in touch with them. It has been a year and a half since I was originally charged, arrested and charged. BY THE COURT: Well have you given your attorney a list of them? BY MR. SPENCER: No, I haven't. I gave him the ones .. . a list of the ones that I know. One was down in Greene County. BY THE COURT: Well the State ... the State can find them. Y'all should have done that earlier, too. While Spencer makes a veiled reference to the unavailability of some witnesses, he is unresponsive to the court's insistence that the State can procure any witness that he might need. We also think that it is significant that from the time Spencer obtained counsel until the trial itself, over five (5) months had passed. This was more than sufficient time for him to procure attendance of his witnesses. It is also helpful to examine the defense which Spencer waged at trial. Obviously, the jury rejected Spencer's defense. His only witness, inmate Randy Green, seemed to impeach his own testimony. Green first stated that Officer Williams had no need or business to contact Spencer with the smuggled cocaine, and he could not understand why Officer Williams involved Spencer in the plan. Then Green stated that it was his idea to use Spencer as a conduit for smuggling in the drugs. Additionally, either Spencer or the arresting officers had to be untruthful concerning Spencer's possession of the cocaine. At trial, Spencer adamantly denied that he ever touched the cocaine. The testimony offered by the State and Spencer can not be reconciled, thereby creating a classic jury question which was resolved against Spencer. Therefore, considering all relevant factors which might bear on the fourth inquiry of prejudice to the defendant, only one logical conclusion can be drawn. Spencer experienced no prejudice. Balancing the four factors in light of all of the circumstances, Spencer was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. While the first two factors would weigh in Spencer's favor, the third and fourth factors are substantially compelling to the contrary. As noted in the recent case of Folk v. State, 576 So.2d 1243 (Miss. 1991), our legislature has enacted what is known as the 270 day rule. The problem of delays in the processing and prosecution of criminal charges has plagued this nation for many years. Society, as well as the accused, suffer when indictments lie idle on the docket. Constitutional speedy trial guarantees, so elastic in their language and judicially encrusted balancing tests, are difficult of principled and effective enforcement. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, the several states began adopting specific, fixed cut-off dates within which criminal cases must be brought to trial. In the wake of this nationwide activity, our legislature enacted the 270 day rule, one of the more lenient in the country. Folk v. State, 576 So.2d 1243, 1245 (Miss. 1991). Our 270 day rule provides as follows: Unless good cause be shown, and a continuance duly granted by the court, all offenses for which indictments are presented to the court shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy days (270) days after the accused has been arraigned. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). Simply put, the state has 270 days after the date of arraignment to bring the defendant to trial. Like the constitutional speedy trial analysis, any delay attributable to the defendant tolls the running of time. Handley v. State, 574 So.2d 671, 674 (Miss. 1990). Also, continuances duly granted toll the running of time unless the record is silent concerning the reason for delay. Handley, 574 So.2d at 674. Where the record is silent, the time is counted against the State. Handley, 574 So.2d at 674 (citing Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371, 1375, 1377 (Miss. 1988)). The day of arraignment is not counted, but the trial date is included as well as intervening weekends unless the 270th day falls on a Sunday or a holiday. Handley v. State, 574 So.2d 671, 674; Ransom v. State, 435 So.2d 1169 (Miss. 1983); Parkman v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 250 So.2d 637, 639 (Miss. 1971). Spencer was arraigned on April 24, 1989, and trial commenced on October 11, 1989. The time between arraignment and trial is 171 days. However, Spencer's motion for a continuance was granted on June 8, 1989. The lapse of time between June 8, 1989 and the date of trial, time attributed to Spencer, is 126 days. Thus, after this time is deducted, [5] Spencer is left with a delay of only 45 days between the time of arraignment and trial. Consequently, Spencer falls well within the statutory speedy trial rule of 270 days, and we view the State's compliance with § 99-17-1 as significant when applying the four factors under Barker. We hasten to add that our jurisprudence acknowledges that long delays between the time of arrest and arraignment have the potential to violate the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial as analyzed by the Barker factors even though the 270 day mandate of § 99-17-1 has been met. See Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194, 198 (Miss. 1982) (where § 99-17-1 proves inadequate, Court must protect constitutional guarantees); Davis v. State, 406 So.2d 795, 798-99 (Miss. 1981) (emphasized importance of early arraignment). However, such is not the result in the case at bar wherein the defendant suffered no prejudice and did not make his demand for a speedy trial until the eve of trial itself. Finally, we take this opportunity to note a proliferation of appeals in the past year and a half which have raised violation of the right to a speedy trial as error in the court below. [6] While the courts of this State are always open to its citizenry for the redress of all wrongs, [7] we find the following quote from Barker is helpful to distinguish the right to a speedy trial from other fundamental constitutional rights of the accused: A second difference between the right to a speedy trial and the accused's other constitutional rights is that deprivation of the right may work to the accused's advantage. Delay is not an uncommon defense tactic. As the time between the commission of the crime and trial lengthens, witnesses may become unavailable or their memories may fade. If the witnesses support the prosecution, its case will be weakened, sometimes seriously so. And it is the prosecution which carries the burden of proof. Thus, unlike the right to counsel or the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination, deprivation of the right to a speedy trial does not per se prejudice the accused's ability to defend himself. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2187, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).