Opinion ID: 1600242
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State's Use of Psychiatric Evidence

Text: Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), the defendant sought the assistance of a psychiatrist in the preparation of his defense. The State argued that if the defendant presented expert psychiatric testimony, it was entitled to have the defendant examined by its own experts. Following a hearing on the defendant's Ake motion, the trial court ordered that the defendant be transferred to the Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility for examination by State experts. The records generated by the Taylor Hardin staff were made available to the defendant's State-paid expert. During the guilt phase of the trial, the defendant offered no psychiatric evidence. However, at the sentencing phase, the defendant informed the court that he intended to prove that the offense was committed at a time when the defendant was under extreme mental or emotional distress, in an attempt to prove a mitigating circumstance under Code 1975, § 13A-5-51(2). (We note also that from the outset the defendant had pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity.) The defendant produced a number of witnesses at this phase of the trial, including Dr. Edward Benson, a psychiatrist, who was provided to the defendant at the State's expense. Dr. Benson testified that the defendant suffered from paranoid personality disorder, underlying generalized anxiety disorder, and intermittent explosive disorder. In rebuttal, the State called Dr. Kamal Nagi, a Taylor Hardin psychiatrist who had examined the defendant. Dr. Nagi testified that the defendant was not suffering from any mental disease or defect at the time the crime was committed. The defendant complains that the trial court erred in requiring that he be examined first by the State in order to receive State funds to pay his expert's expenses, and that his Fifth Amendment rights and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel were violated in this respect. However, it is clear that a trial court may compel the defendant, when he pleads insanity, to undergo psychiatric examination, without infringing on the defendant's constitutional rights. Isley v. Dugger, 877 F.2d 47, 49 (11th Cir.1989). In this regard, one court has stated: Several other circuits have rejected this unconstitutionality-per-se argument on various grounds, while one has indicated approval of it. Relying on a balancing test, we choose to follow the former line of cases and permit compelled psychiatric examinations when a defendant has raised the insanity defense. Since any statement about the offense itself could be suppressed, a rule forbidding compelled examinations would prevent no threatened evil, and the government will seldom have a satisfactory method of meeting defendant's proof on the issue of sanity except by the testimony of a psychiatrist it selectsincluding, perhaps, the testimony of psychiatric experts offered by himwho has had the opportunity to form a reliable opinion by examining the accused. To hold that compelled psychiatric examinations are forbidden because sanity is an element of the offense and that the privilege against self-incrimination prohibits compulsory elicitation of statements going to an element of the offense would be confining ourselves within an analytical prison. Given the defendant's power to have any incriminating factual statements resulting from the examination suppressed, we think the proper analogy is to the required furnishing of handwriting exemplars by the defendant and similar procedures. Likewise, we reject appellant's claim of a constitutional right to have an attorney present at the psychiatric examination since that might defeat the purpose of the examination and since the examination is not the kind of critical stage at which the assistance of counsel is needed or even useful. There would be no need for counsel to instruct the accused not to answer questions for fear of factual self-incrimination, for any such matter is subject to suppression; and interference with the examination by counsel on other grounds would be improper. United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 47-48 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855, 97 S.Ct. 149, 50 L.Ed.2d 130 (1976) (footnotes omitted). Under the analyses of the Isley and Cohen cases, any defendant who raises the insanity issue may be compelled to undergo a psychiatric examination. Thus, the defendant's claim that he was denied equal protection of the laws under the decision in Ake, supra, is not well taken. We agree with the contention of the State that the defendant would have been subject to State examination in any case. Therefore, we hold that there was no error with regard to the defendant's right of equal protection of the laws. We are mindful that the defendant offered the psychiatric testimony in this case in order to establish mitigating circumstances under Code 1975, § 13A-5-51(2). The defendant clearly bears the burden of proving mitigation under § 13A-5-45(g). However, § 13A-5-45(g) states that once the defendant interjects the issue of mitigation the State shall have the burden of disproving the factual existence of that circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, the State was justified in producing its own expert to rebut the evidence of mitigation offered by the defendant's expert. Moreover, we note that the defendant and his counsel were advised that the examination at Taylor Hardin would include any mitigating circumstances. In that regard, the defendant claims that the testimony of the state's expert violated his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The defendant relies heavily on the case of Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981). We find Estelle distinguishable. In Estelle, the appellate court was required to make a finding of future dangerousness in order to impose the death penalty, while in the present case no such requirement exists. The Estelle court held that the examination was improper because the defendant was not informed of his Miranda rights before he was examined by the State's expert and his attorneys were not informed that the scope of the examination would include the issue of future dangerousness. In this case, the defendant's counsel was informed that the examination would encompass matters of mitigation and the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights prior to the examination. In Estelle, the Supreme Court stated: Respondent, however, introduced no psychiatric evidence, nor had he indicated that he might do so. Instead, the State offered information obtained from the court-ordered competency examination as affirmative evidence to persuade the jury to return a sentence of death. Respondent's future dangerousness was a critical issue at the sentencing hearing, and one on which the State had the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet its burden the State used respondent's own statements, unwittingly made without awareness that he was assisting the State's efforts to obtain the death penalty. In these distinct circumstances, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the Fifth Amendment privilege was implicated. Estelle, supra, at 466, 101 S.Ct. at 1874-75. In this case, the defendant did enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Thus, the trial court was justified in compelling the defendant to undergo psychiatric evaluation. In addition, the defendant and his counsel were informed of the State's intention to examine the defendant on matters of mitigation and it appears that, prior to the examination, the defendant was informed of his Fifth Amendment rights. Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that a different situation arises where a defendant intends to introduce psychiatric evidence at the penalty phase as opposed to the case where the defendant intends to offer no such evidence. [1] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the defendant's claims regarding the admission of the State's psychiatric evidence are without merit. Because we reverse on the issue addressed below regarding the comment made during the closing argument by the district attorney, we need not consider the remaining issues raised by the defendant.