Opinion ID: 2135461
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the State introduce evidence sufficient to sustain the sexual contact charges?

Text: The other issue raised by W.Y.B. is that the State failed to show that W.Y.B.'s conduct was undertaken with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of either party as required by the statute. SDCL 22-22-7.1. We find this contention without merit. First, we note that circumstantial evidence may often be the only way to prove intent. North Dakota v. Lovejoy, 464 N.W.2d 386, 389 (N.D.1990) (citing North Dakota v. Huwe, 413 N.W.2d 350, 355 (N.D. 1987)). See Nebraska v. Morrow, 237 Neb. 653, 467 N.W.2d 63, 71 (1991) ([I]ndependent evidence of specific intent is not required. The intent with which an act is committed is a mental process and may be inferred from the words and acts of the defendant and from the circumstances surrounding the incident.) (quoting Nebraska v. Costanzo, 227 Neb. 616, 419 N.W.2d 156, 162 (1988)); Minnesota v. Obasi, 427 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Minn.App.1988) (Intent is a subjective state of mind and is established by reasonable inferences drawn from surrounding circumstances.) (citation omitted); Bustamante v. Indiana, 557 N.E.2d 1313, 1317-18 (Ind.1990) (stating that elements of offenses may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence and logical inferences drawn therefrom); Phillips v. Texas, 597 S.W.2d 929, 936 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (One's acts are generally reliable circumstantial evidence of his intent.) (citation omitted). Because the nature of intent is such that it is rarely susceptible to direct proof, the factfinder may determine intent by such reasonable inferences and deductions as may be drawn from facts proved by evidence in accordance with common experience and observation. Iowa v. Hilpipre, 395 N.W.2d 899, 903 (Iowa App.1986) (citing Iowa v. Serr, 322 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Iowa App.1982)). On review, this court need only determine whether such inferences regarding intent support the judgment of the court beyond a reasonable doubt. Bustamante, 557 N.E.2d at 1318; Lovejoy, 464 N.W.2d at 389. In matters of juvenile delinquency, we have previously stated that our standard of review is whether the State proved each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re A.W., 438 N.W.2d 557, 559 (S.D.1989) (citing In re T.J.E., 426 N.W.2d 23, 23 (S.D.1988); In re S.F.H.R., 292 N.W.2d 802, 803 (S.D.1980)). On review, we accept the evidence and the most favorable inferences which can be fairly drawn therefrom in support of the judgment. Id. See In re T.K., 462 N.W.2d 893, 895 (S.D.1990) (holding that we will apply the clearly erroneous standard in cases dealing with children in need of supervision). Reviewing the facts of this case, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. That W.Y.B. had the necessary intent to support the adjudication that he engaged in sexual contact could be reasonably inferred from his conduct, as well as the surrounding circumstances. The testimony was that on more than one occasion W.Y.B. engaged in poking T.T. in the buttocks with a stick, in addition to the incident where he grabbed her breasts. Although W.Y.B. urges that he only did these acts to embarrass T.T., the court could also reasonably infer that W.Y.B. engaged in these acts for the purposes of sexual gratification or arousal. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. MILLER, C.J., and SABERS, J., concur. HENDERSON, J., concurs with a writing. AMUNDSON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.