Opinion ID: 2633286
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Asserted Trial Court Error in Accepting the Prosecutor's Reasons for Challenging Prospective Hispanic and African-American Jurors

Text: Although the court initially found no prima facie showing as to either the first Hispanic or African-American challenged, it later found, at least impliedly, that defendant had made such a showing as to both groups and asked the prosecutor to justify his challenges to two prospective jurors of each group. Defendant contends the trial court erred by accepting the prosecutor's reasons for challenging these prospective jurors and ultimately finding he did not establish purposeful discrimination. We disagree. A trial court's ruling on this issue is reviewed for substantial evidence. ( People v. McDermott, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 971, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874.) We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court's ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal. [Citation.] ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 864, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1.) In this case, based on our review of the record, we conclude substantial evidence supports the following findings of the trial court that the prosecutor's peremptory challenges were based on genuine nondiscriminatory reasons and not group bias. ( People v. McDermott, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 970, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874.) The prosecutor stated numerous grounds for challenging Prospective Juror E.A., who was Hispanic. This juror had a sister who was in prison for second degree murder and three counts of armed robbery. The prosecutor believed E.A. likely would be offended by his argument that defendant is a monstrous person and should be put to death, because her sister is a convicted murderer. The prosecutor also was concerned that this juror worked for the City of Santa Monica as a park ranger but had applied to the Santa Monica Police Department and failed a written test. Because E.A. was not hired as a police officer, the prosecutor had the same concern that he would regarding a prospective juror who was an ex-police officer. He believed she would be overly critical of the police investigation that was conducted in this case and have difficulty evaluating the evidence objectively. Also, this juror previously served on a jury that resulted in a hung jury. The trial court accepted the prosecutor's reasons, noting that it could not fault him for being uncomfortable with respect to all of the matters that he has raised. The prosecutor stated he excused Prospective Juror O.B., another Hispanic, because he was a traveling actor who was presently unemployed, believed minorities are treated unfairly in the criminal justice system, and had strong opinions against the death penalty. When asked to state his general feelings about the death penalty on his questionnaire, O.B. responded, Don't like the thought of death. He also stated that even though convicted criminals of gruesome crimes should be punished harshly, he believed death should be an act of nature or fate. The trial court stated it was satisfied that the prosecutor's reason for excusing O.B. was not because of his race. The prosecutor stated he believed Prospective Juror B.B., an African-American, was biased against the death penalty. B.B. stated that although the death penalty was appropriate in some cases, she felt life is a precious gift and the death penalty should be used very carefully. In addition, this juror witnessed a murder at the age of 12 and learned that everyone's life is important. The prosecutor further explained that the composition of the jury had changed after defense counsel exercised his last two peremptory challenges. He believed there were more potential jurors in the audience who would be favorable to the prosecution than there were in the jury box at that time. The trial court acknowledged the prosecutor twice accepted the jury as constituted when it included Prospective Juror B.B. and stated it was convinced the prosecutor's reasons for excusing B.B. were not based on race. While selecting alternate jurors, the prosecutor challenged H.W., an African-American. He said he did so based on his belief that she was biased against the death penalty. In her questionnaire, H.W. stated she was against the death penalty but that her feelings could change if the victim were someone close or a child. She believed a sentence of life without possibility of parole was worse than a death sentence. Also, the religious denomination to which H.W. belonged did not support the death penalty. The trial court accepted these race-neutral explanations for challenging H.W. and further observed the prosecutor was legitimately attempting to reduce the number of alternate jurors who had strong opinions against the death penalty. For the first time on appeal, defendant requests that we perform a comparative juror analysis to evaluate the genuineness of the prosecutor's reasons for peremptorily challenging the prospective jurors in question. Our long standing practice has been that a reviewing court must consider evidence of comparative juror analysis when a defendant has presented such evidence at the trial court but need not conduct such an analysis for the first time on appeal. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 1324-1325, 1 Cal. Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270 [review of trial court's finding regarding whether defendant established a prima facie showing of group bias]; [9] People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1220-1222, 255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047 [review of trial court's finding regarding the genuineness of a prosecutor's race-neutral reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge].) The high court recently conducted such a comparative juror analysis in Miller-El, supra, ___ U.S. at pp. ____ _ ___, 125 S.Ct. at pp. 2325-2332, to evaluate the state trial court's findings as to the plausibility of the prosecutor's explanations for excusing 10 of 11 African-American prospective jurors and ultimately concluded the trial court's findings were erroneous. ( Id. at pp. ___ _ ___, 125 S.Ct. at pp. 2325-2338.) In this case, assuming without deciding that we should perform the requested comparative juror analysis under the circumstances presented, we conclude that defendant fails to demonstrate purposeful discrimination and that substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings that the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons for excusing Jurors E.A., O.B., B.B., and H.W. were genuine. (See People v. Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 270, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 118 P.3d 451.) As to E.A., defendant argues that the prosecutor's concern that her sister was convicted of second degree murder and armed robbery applied to other White jurors who had close relatives who had been charged with various crimes. The other crimes, however, were much less serious than murder. Additionally, the prosecutor worried that if he referred to defendant as a monster who deserved to die for killing the victim, he might offend E.A. because of her sister's murder conviction. The other prospective jurors probably would not take offense at such an argument. Moreover, unlike E.A.'s sister, none of the relatives had expressed the belief that he or she was treated unfairly by the justice system, nor did the jurors. As to the prosecutor's concern that E.A. had failed to pass the test for employment with the Santa Monica Police Department and now works as a park ranger, defendant points out that Juror M.L. investigated occupational safety and fire accidents, had taken administrative law courses, and worked for the Veterans Affairs Police Department. M.L., however, is not a former police officer and did not perform criminal investigations. Contrary to defendant's claim, he worked with, not for, the Veterans Affairs Police Department in his capacity as an occupational safety and health specialist. The prosecutor would not likely be as concerned with M.L. second-guessing or being overly critical of the investigation in this case as he would with E.A., given she was actually denied employment as a police officer, a position to which she aspired. The other jurors whom defendant identifies are not similarly situated in this respect. Finally, defendant emphasizes that E.A. showed more support for the death penalty than non-Hispanic jurors. While it may be true that E.A. had certain strong views that showed more support for the death penalty than certain non-Hispanic jurors, the prosecutor stated he had too many reasons to be concerned about this prospective juror. He was not required to accept E.A. as a juror if reasons apart from group bias supported his challenge. ( People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 72, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622.) Defendant, further, does not point to any other non-Hispanic juror who had similar experiences in each area with which the prosecutor was concerned. In view of the totality of the evidence, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the prosecutor's reasons were genuine. With regard to Hispanic Prospective Juror O.B., defendant claims that O.B.'s perception about racial groups did not distinguish him from other jurors or warrant a challenge by the prosecutor. O.B. stated most minori[ties] are viewed as different by mainstream American and therefore [are] not usually given equal merit [ sic ] in the justice system. None of the jurors defendant identifies share O.B.'s view that most minorities are not treated equally in our system of justice. African-American Alternate Juror L.S., however, did share O.B.'s opinion that police officers often make mistakes when testifying; others cited by defendant did not. Contrary to his assertion, O.B.'s views on what should be done about the crime problem in Los Angeles County were somewhat different when compared with the non-Hispanic jurors who were more pro-police. As the prosecutor remarked, O.B. was not pro-police. Regarding his view on the death penalty, O.B. did strongly disagree with the statement that anyone who intentionally kills another should never receive the death penalty whereas other jurors did not hold such a strong view. Nonetheless, the prosecutor was concerned with O.B.'s apparent strong opposition to the death penalty, as shown by his statement that even though convicted criminal[s] of gru[esome] crimes should be punished harshly, death should be an act of nature or fate. Although defendant has shown some similarities between O.B. and non-Hispanic jurors and alternate jurors, none of these individuals were similar to O.B. in all the areas in which the prosecutor expressed concern. In sum, the record supports the trial court's findings that the prosecutor's stated reasons for challenging O.B. were genuine and race neutral. With respect to Prospective Juror B.B., an African-American woman, defendant does establish this juror supported the death penalty as much as some jurors. Still, the prosecutorwho had twice accepted the jury as constituted before excusing B.B.expressed concern that B.B. had witnessed a murder as a young child and learned that life is precious. He believed she leaned toward life and felt that prospective jurors with stronger views in favor of the death penalty remained in the venire. The prosecutor also stated if this were a White juror under the same exact circumstances, he would challenge the juror for the same tactical reason. Defendant fails to establish the existence of a juror who was similarly situated. Finally, `[w]hile the fact that the jury included members of a group allegedly discriminated against is not conclusive, it is an indication of good faith in exercising peremptories, and an appropriate factor for the trial judge to consider in ruling on a Wheeler objection.' ( People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 203, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717, quoting People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 168, 32 Cal. Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521.) Two African-American women remained on the final jury. Under the totality of the circumstances, the record supports the trial court's findings that the prosecutor's challenge as to Prospective Juror B.B. was not race-based or otherwise implausible. As for H.W., an African-American woman, defendant argues a comparative analysis reveals the prosecutor's statement that he excused her because her religious denomination did not believe in the death penalty was pretextual. Not so. As discussed above, the prosecutor stated he excused H.W. because he believed she was pro-life. H.W. stated she was against the death penalty but could change her mind if the victim was someone close. As the prosecutor noted, H.W. was not close to Powell. Also, H.W. indicated in her questionnaire that her religious denomination did not believe in the death penalty. During voir dire, the trial court pointed out that in response to the question whether she felt obligated to accept the position of her religious denomination, H.W. responded yes and no and then marked out yes and wrote no, I make my own choices. Ultimately, H.W. stated she could make her own decision about imposing the death penalty based on the circumstances. Defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly assumed that an African-American juror would be more led by their religion than White jurors who were members of churches opposed to the death penalty. The prosecutor did not express such a view. The prosecutor merely mentioned H.W.'s religious denomination did not support the death penalty, suggesting he did not find her credible. Such a finding was reasonable under the circumstances. Also, neither of the jurors identified by defendant equivocated on the issue of the death penalty as did H.W. on her questionnaire and during voir dire. Further, even though she indicated life without parole was the worst punishment, defendant argues that H.W.'s views on the death penalty did not go beyond other jurors who sat on the jury. Not true. Although some jurors also may have believed that the punishment of life without parole was worse than the penalty of death, as stated, none expressed reservations about the death penalty as did H.W. In sum, defendant's comparisons fail to establish that the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons were pretextual. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings that the prosecutor's reasons were genuine and not based on race.