Opinion ID: 1195377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Circuit Court Erred In Failing To Instruct The Jury Regarding One Of The Material Elements Of Place To Keep Pistol Or Revolver.

Text: Jenkins argues that, inasmuch as the circuit court's jury instructions failed to address the lack of a license or permit pursuant to HRS § 134-5, see supra note 11, the instructions omitted an essential element of place to keep pistol or revolver, pursuant to HRS § 134-6. As noted above, the lack of a hunting license is not a material element of HRS § 134-6. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in failing to instruct the jury regarding hunting licenses under HRS § 134-5. [15] Jenkins next argues that the circuit court's failure to instruct the jury that the prosecution bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Jenkins was away from his place of business, residence or sojourn, pursuant to HRS § 134-6(c), resulted in the omission of a material and essential element from the jury instructions. We agree, in light of this omission, that the circuit court's insufficient jury instruction constituted error. HRS § 134-6(e) provides in relevant part that [a]ny person violating this section... by carrying or possessing a loaded or unloaded pistol or revolver without a license issued as provided in section 134-9 shall be guilty of a class B felony. The mere possession, without more, of a pistol or revolver without a license issued as provided in HRS § 134-9 is not illegal, however. See, e.g., HRS § 134-3 (Supp.1997) (prescribing the mechanism for the lawful registration of firearms including, inter alia, pistols and revolvers). Accordingly, HRS § 134-6(e) cannot be read alone, but, rather, must be read in conjunction with HRS § 134-6(c). We read statutory language in the context of the entire statute, and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose. State v. Mahoe, 89 Hawai`i 284, 288, 972 P.2d 287, 291 (1998) (quoting Bautista, 86 Hawai`i at 209, 948 P.2d at 1050) (emphasis added). HRS § 134-6(c) provides in relevant part that all firearms and ammunition shall be confined to the possessor's place of business, residence, or sojourn. Accordingly, HRS § 134-6(e) provides that it is a criminal offense if firearms are not confined to the possessor's place of business, residence, or sojourn. This court adheres to the proposition that an essential or material element of a crime [i]s one whose specification with precise accuracy is necessary to establish the very illegality of the behavior and thus the court's jurisdiction. State v. Vanstory, 91 Hawai`i 33, 44, 979 P.2d 1059, 1070 (1999) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 152 F.3d 618, 630 (7th Cir.1998)) (brackets in original). Unless a firearm is possessed or carried away from the possessor's place of business, residence, or sojourn, there can be no illegal behavior in the carrying or possessing [of] a loaded firearm or the carrying or possessing [of] a loaded or unloaded pistol or revolver without a license as provided in section 134-9, pursuant to HRS § 134-6(e). Accordingly, it is a material element of place to keep pistol or revolver that the firearm at issue be away from the possessor's place of business, residence, or sojourn. `It is well established, as a precept of constitutional as well as statutory law, that an accused in a criminal case can only be convicted upon proof by the prosecution of every [material] element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.' Wallace, 80 Hawai`i at 406, 910 P.2d at 719 (quoting State v. Puaoi, 78 Hawai`i 185, 191, 891 P.2d 272, 278 (1995) (quoting State v. Lima, 64 Haw. 470, 474, 643 P.2d 536, 539 (1982))) (brackets and emphasis in original). Indeed, HRS § 701-114 (1993) provides in relevant part that no person may be convicted of an offense unless the following are proved beyond a reasonable doubt: ... each element of the offense[.] A defendant may not be convicted except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. State v. Perez, 90 Hawai`i 113, 128, 976 P.2d 427, 442 (App.1998), reversed in part on other grounds, 90 Hawai`i 65, 976 P.2d 379, reconsideration denied (1999) (quoting State v. Iosefa, 77 Hawai`i 177, 183, 880 P.2d 1224, 1230 (1994) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970))) (emphasis added) (internal quotation signals omitted). It is a grave error to submit a [criminal] case to a jury without accurately defining the offense charged and its elements. [16] Pinero I, 70 Haw. at 527, 778 P.2d at 715 (quoting 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 487, at 723) (1982) (brackets in original); cf. Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 32-33, 928 P.2d at 874-75 (holding that trial court committed plain error in failing to give a specific unanimity instruction where separate and distinct culpable acts are subsumed within a single count ... [,] any one of which could support a conviction thereunder). Accordingly, the jury may not be instructed in a manner that would relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving every element of the offense charged. Cf. State v. Soares, 72 Haw. 278, 282, 815 P.2d 428, 430 (1991) (holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury such that the prosecution was relieved from its burden of proving that appellants acted with the requisite intent). Furthermore, [m]erely informing the jury that it should consider the court's instructions as a whole cannot obviate an error of omission where the remaining instructions fail to provide the crucial information. State v. Tabigne, 88 Hawai`i 296, 305, 966 P.2d 608, 617 (1998) (emphasis in original). In the instant matter, by omitting an element of the crime of place to keep pistol or revolver, the jury was precluded from considering whether Jenkins possessed the firearms in his place of business, residence, or sojourn precisely because it was never instructed that it must find whether the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Jenkins possessed or carried firearms away from his place of business, residence, or sojourn; therefore, the jurors were unable to find Jenkins guilty of all of the material elements of place to keep pistol or revolver, pursuant to HRS § 134-6. Accordingly, the prosecution was relieved of its burden of proving every essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. Jenkins may well be guilty of the offenses charged against him, but he is entitled to a fair trial according to established principles of law, with a jury finding on each and every element of the offenses charged. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding all of the material elements of the offense.