Opinion ID: 4298207
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidentiary Rulings on Blackwell’s Testimony

Text: On appeal, Thomas argues first that the district court erred under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b) by admitting three statements from Blackwell that referred to other, uncharged allegedly criminal acts by Thomas. First, he points to Blackwell’s first meeting with Thomas where, she testified, she “asked him if he wanted his d sucked.” This, Thomas claims, created an inference that he engaged in improper sexual conduct, including prostitution. Second, Thomas objects to Blackwell’s statement that one of his henchmen would do No. 17-1002 7 “whatever Jay told him to do,” specifically to “[g]o out and sell drugs, shoot people, steal something.” Third, he points to Blackwell’s statement that Thomas “beat me up on Valentine’s Day,” which led to her decision to leave Thomas a few days later. The first statement drew no objections from the defense. The second and third drew objections. The prosecutor responded to the objections by offering to rephrase the question and to instruct Blackwell to tailor her answers more narrowly. The district judge sustained only the second objection, but his response to both objections was the same: he allowed the prosecution to proceed on its proposed, modified questions. We ordinarily review a district court’s evidentiary rulings on Rule 404(b) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Curtis, 781 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2015). If a party never objected to the admission of evidence in the district court, we review only for plain error. United States v. Adams, 628 F.3d 407, 414 (7th Cir. 2010). To succeed on plain error review, Thomas must show: (1) an error that he has not intentionally waived; (2) that the error was “plain—that is to say, clear or obvious;” (3) that the error affected his substantial rights; and (4) that the error “‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016), citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993). Where an appellant’s objection was sustained at trial, with a prosecutor’s agreement to rephrase the question, and where the appellant did not promptly ask the district court for a stronger response, we review whether it was plain error for the district court not to provide a stronger remedy on its own initiative. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52; cf. Adams, 628 F.3d at 414. 8 No. 17-1002 On appeal, Thomas argues that the district court erred under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which provides that evidence “of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). The rule is designed to prevent juries from drawing the improper inference from a prior act that the defendant has a propensity to act in a certain way and acted in that way on the particular occasion that is the subject of the trial. United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 860 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). The rule, however, does not impose a categorical bar to evidence of other acts. If the evidence serves another purpose, such as “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident,” then the evidence may be admitted. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Even if a piece of evidence is not barred by Rule 404(b), however, courts still must determine that the evidence meets Rule 402’s requirement that the evidence be relevant and Rule 403’s requirement that its “probative value” not be “substantially outweighed by … unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. In United States v. Gomez, sitting en banc, we laid out the two-step process mandated by the Rules. Upon objection to the introduction to other-act evidence, the proponent must show under Rule 404(b) that the evidence serves another purpose and establish that purpose “through a chain of reasoning that does not rely on the forbidden inference that the person has a certain character and acted in accordance with that character on the occasion charged in the case.” 763 F.3d at 860. If the proponent can do this, the district court must then under Rule 403 “assess whether the probative value of the other-act evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair No. 17-1002 9 prejudice” and “take account of the extent to which the nonpropensity fact for which the evidence is offered actually is at issue in the case.” Id. In this case, the defense never objected to the first contested statement, though Thomas’s attorney did object to the last two statements, arguing that Blackwell was “nonresponsive” and “offering much more than the answer requires.” In those instances the court either sustained the objection or the prosecutor willingly rephrased the question to evade the inflammatory statement. At no time, however, did the defense ask the district court to provide a curative or limiting instruction to the jury to ignore statements made by Blackwell that might run afoul of the Rules. On appeal, Thomas argues that the district court erred by not providing a limiting jury instruction sua sponte.1 This argument runs contrary to our decision in Gomez, where we expressed “caution against judicial freelancing in this area” because “sua sponte limiting instructions … may preempt a defense preference to let the evidence come in without the added emphasis of a limiting instruction.” Gomez, 763 F.3d at 860. The district court in this case rightly heeded that caution and refrained from judicial freelancing absent specific requests from the defense. Instead, the court responded in the limited way requested, by sustaining objections to evidence when necessary but drawing no additional attention to the matter. By following our approach in Gomez, 1 Thomas has not argued that the judge should have declared a mis- trial sua sponte, and it is doubtful he could have met the high bar for plainerror review for failure to declare a mistrial. See United States v. Tanner, 628 F.3d 890, 898–99 (7th Cir. 2010). 10 No. 17-1002 the district court did not abuse its discretion, let alone commit plain error. There is no doubt that Blackwell was a difficult witness for both lawyers and for the judge. The prosecutor prepared Blackwell to testify and warned her against mentioning other acts committed by the defendant. She highlighted for Blackwell those specific acts that should not be repeated in court, namely, instances of domestic violence, including one incident that caused her to suffer a miscarriage, as well as Thomas’s violent acts against others, including breaking someone’s kneecaps in a drug dispute. In addition to telling Blackwell orally not to mention these other acts, the government had her sign a letter acknowledging these instructions. Blackwell herself remembered the letter and refrained from mentioning a second time the Valentine’s Day beating when defense counsel asked the risky question, what “was the deciding factor” in her decision to steal Thomas’s property? Blackwell responded, “Gosh. So they made me sign this piece of paper that said I wouldn’t talk about that.” Before presenting its case, the government had taken the unusual step of advising the court and defense counsel of its efforts to try to ensure that Blackwell’s testimony would comply with the Federal Rules of Evidence, to say nothing of courtroom decorum. The prosecutor frankly admitted her inability to get Blackwell to comply but recounted her many efforts. Here was the prosecutor’s unusual statement: She is not a cooperating witness. She has abso- lutely no agreement with the federal authorities. And on top of that, Your Honor, she is not under our control. No. 17-1002 11 The reason I say that, Your Honor, is—Ms. Blackwell is—is someone who, through my preparation of her, I have seen she doesn’t mince words. She says whatever she is thinking at that moment. And I have tried, through my preparation, to admonish her on many, many, many subject matters that she is not allowed to bring out in her testimony. I have told her on nu- merous occasions that she is to only answer the question that either I or the defense attorney asks. Now, some of the things that Ms. Blackwell has said in her preparation that I have admonished her that she is absolutely not allowed … to say fall into a couple different categories. The first of those categories are prior acts of domestic vi- olence between Ms. Blackwell and the defend- ant. … The reason I’m making that clear, Your Honor, is because Ms. Blackwell is certainly not under my control. I have taken as many steps as I can think of to control her before this jury. Not only have I admonished her orally but prior to her testimony, we will be presenting her with a writ- ten letter that I’ve signed … and then we will ask Ms. Blackwell to sign that memorializes in writing that we have told her she is not allowed to bring up those instances. And I just wanted to put all that on the record, Judge, because I have to tell you, if I can speak plainly, I’ve been doing this eight or nine years. 12 No. 17-1002 I’ve put so many different kinds of witnesses on the stand. She is a first for me. She is someone as unwieldy as it gets. So I wanted to make it absolutely clear to this Court the steps I have taken to control her. Despite these precautions, Blackwell did not comply with the prosecutor’s instructions. The government does not choose the principal players involved in serious crimes like this, and it must make its best effort to present its evidence according to law. It is hard to imagine what else the government could have done with Blackwell. She and her relationship with Thomas were at the heart of the kidnapping case. Blackwell’s refusal to comply with warnings and instructions, and her colloquial and often obscene language, presented a serious challenge for the government to present its case without unfair prejudice to Thomas. Much of the testimony was graphic because of the nature of the events and Thomas’s crimes. The government took reasonable measures to minimize the risks of unfair prejudice. Despite those efforts, Blackwell strayed a few times. When she did, the judge took appropriate action, and the defense did not ask him to do more. We do not see any error, let alone plain error. Further restrictions could have made the trial of these events too stilted and artificial—the judicial equivalent of editing a Quentin Tarantino movie to air on the Disney Channel. Federal law and the Rules of Evidence do not require that. And given the mountain of evidence against Thomas, we cannot imagine that the three incidents Thomas challenges on appeal had any effect on the ultimate verdicts. No. 17-1002 13