Opinion ID: 2771203
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Rational Basis Review Is Satisfied

Text: ¶49 Our analysis applying rational basis review is the same for Knipfer's substantive due process claim as for Alger's 18 Knipfer asserts that this court in State v. Post held, rather than assumed without deciding, that strict scrutiny applied to a substantive due process claim challenging ch. 980 commitment in general. See State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 302, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995). However, even if that interpretation of Post is correct, strict scrutiny does not apply in the present cases because the failure to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard to a Chapter 980 discharge petition does not directly impact a fundamental right. 29 Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578 and Knipfer's equal protection claims. See Smith, 323 Wis. 2d 377, ¶¶12, 16. To resolve the substantive due process and equal protection claims, we must determine whether a legitimate governmental interest is rationally furthered by the failure to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard to Alger's and Knipfer's Chapter 980 discharge petitions. See id., ¶12. ¶50 Rational basis review is deferential to the legislature. Id., ¶17. A legislative classification satisfies rational basis review if 'any reasonably conceivable state of facts . . . could provide a rational basis for the classification.' Mary F.-R., 351 Wis. 2d 273, ¶52 (quoting F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). The legislature need not have actually based its decision on the reason conceived by a reviewing court. Id. (citing Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. at 315). Alger and Knipfer bear the high burden of proving that the failure to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard to expert testimony in their Chapter 980 discharge petition trials is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Smith, 323 Wis. 2d 377, ¶18. ¶51 Alger and Knipfer19 argue that the failure to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard to expert testimony in their Chapter 980 discharge petition trials violates equal protection because it arbitrarily differentiates between discharge 19 Although Knipfer argues that we should apply strict scrutiny, he also argues that he should prevail even if we apply rational basis review. 30 Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578 proceedings based upon when their underlying commitment proceedings began. Alger and Knipfer provide a hypothetical scenario in which the State files a Wis. Stat. ch. 980 commitment petition against Person A in January 2011 and files one against Person B in February 2011. Under this hypothetical scenario, both of these persons are committed and have discharge proceedings at the same time as each other. Alger and Knipfer argue that it would be unconstitutionally arbitrary to apply the Daubert standard to the discharge proceedings of Person B while applying the pre-Daubert standard to the discharge proceedings of Person A. ¶52 In his brief, Alger concedes the state did have a legitimate interest in seeking to prevent the revision of [Wis. Stat. §] 907.02 from applying 'midstream' to litigation that was already pending (or even concluded) at the time this legislation was enacted. Alger argues that, in such litigation, attorneys would have prepared expert testimony in reliance on the preDaubert standard that was then in place. Because applying the Daubert standard to such litigation would be unfair and disruptive and would waste judicial resources, Alger concedes that the legislature lawfully prohibited application of the Daubert standard to such litigation. Similarly, Knipfer admits that the legislature might have had a valid reason not to extend the Daubert standard to pending litigation insofar as litigants may have already relied upon the [pre-Daubert] standard in filing pleadings and preparing for trial. 31 Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578 ¶53 However, Alger and Knipfer contend, the reasons for refusing to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard midstream to pending litigation do not apply to their Chapter 980 discharge petition trials. Alger and Knipfer reason that, because they filed their discharge petitions after the Daubert standard's first date of applicability, they and the State did not prepare any expert testimony for their discharge petition trials in reliance on the pre-Daubert standard. Alger and Knipfer therefore argue that the failure to apply the Daubert standard to expert testimony in their discharge petition trials is not rationally related to achieving a legitimate governmental interest. ¶54 The State argues that the failure to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard to expert testimony in Alger's and Knipfer's Chapter 980 discharge petition trials satisfies rational basis review and is therefore constitutional. The State argues that the legislature had to draw the line somewhere and the line it drew has a rational basis. The State reasons that the legislature's application of the Daubert standard to actions and special proceedings commenced on or after February 1, 2011, promoted efficiency and predictability and avoided difficulties involved with a rule that allows for retroactive application of the Daubert standard. ¶55 We hold that the legislature's decision to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard to actions or special proceedings commenced on or after February 1, 2011, satisfies rational basis review and therefore is constitutional. Alger 32 Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578 correctly concedes that ensuring the fair treatment of litigants, avoiding the disruption of pending litigation, and preserving judicial resources are legitimate governmental interests. See State ex rel. Schatz v. McCaughtry, 2003 WI 80, ¶43, 263 Wis. 2d 83, 664 N.W.2d 596 (The State has a legitimate interest in . . . preserving judicial resources.) (citing State ex rel. Khan v. Sullivan, 2000 WI App 109, ¶10, 235 Wis. 2d 260, 613 N.W.2d 203). See also supra ¶¶36-37 (noting that applying the Daubert standard to Alger's and Knipfer's Chapter 980 discharge petitions could have caused confusion and difficulty). ¶56 Further, the legislature's decision to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard to actions or special proceedings commenced on or after February 1, 2011, is rationally related to achieving those legitimate governmental interests. The legislature could have rationally believed that retroactively applying a new rule of evidence to pending litigation would be unfair to litigants, waste judicial resources, and disrupt that litigation by resulting in motions, appeals, and retrials. See Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 201, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995) (explaining that retroactive legislation presents unique constitutional problems in that it often unsettles important rights and may result in unfairness). ¶57 When determining which cases will be subject to a new rule of evidence, the legislature is not constitutionally required to differentiate between various types of cases and retroactively apply the new rule to some types of cases and not 33 Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578 others. Instead, the legislature may differentiate between cases that were commenced before and after a particular date and may apply the new rule of evidence to only cases that were commenced after that date. See Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Rhodes, 220 U.S. 502, 505 (1911) ([T]he 14th Amendment does not forbid statutes and statutory changes to have a beginning, and thus to discriminate between the rights of an earlier and later time.); Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wis. Tax Comm'n, 198 Wis. 368, 373, 224 N.W. 121 (1929) (upholding a law that applied a higher interest rate to tax deficiencies that were assessed before 1927 than to those assessed in or after 1927); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. DOR, 142 Wis. 2d 772, 778-82, 419 N.W.2d 348 (Ct. App. 1987) (upholding a law that applied a higher interest rate to tax deficiencies that were assessed on or after August 1, 1981, than to tax deficiencies that were assessed before that date). Therefore, in the present cases, the legislature's decision to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard to actions and special proceedings that were commenced on or after February 1, 2011, survives constitutional scrutiny. See Banas v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 468, 473, 149 N.W.2d 571 (1967) (The legislature has the power to make reasonable rules for limiting the admission of evidence and to make valid classifications of people for that purpose.). ¶58 We also conclude that application of the Daubert evidentiary standard to these Chapter 980 discharge petition trials is a midstream application of that standard to pending litigation. Alger's and Knipfer's contrary conclusion is based 34 Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578 on the mistaken premise that the only expert testimony relevant to their Chapter 980 discharge petitions is the expert testimony proffered at their discharge petition trials. But we have already concluded that a Chapter 980 discharge petition is part of a pending commitment action. As we explained earlier, when reviewing a Chapter 980 discharge petition, a court often considers expert testimony from a prior discharge proceeding or the initial commitment trial. See Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1), (2). The State's experts at Alger's and Knipfer's original Chapter 980 commitment trials were not subject to the Daubert evidentiary standard. The Daubert standard did not apply to any previous proceeding in Alger's and Knipfer's cases. However, a Chapter 980 discharge petition requires that an expert render an opinion based in part upon the previous determination of continued commitment. The fact that a petition for discharge requires an expert to evaluate and review prior expert opinions and whether commitment is still warranted, militates in favor of, not against, having the same legal standard apply. Thus, we reject Alger's and Knipfer's contention that their Chapter 980 discharge petitions were not part of a pending action that could be disrupted by midstream application of a new rule of evidence.20 Moreover, as was previously discussed, this kind of 20 Even if a Chapter 980 commitment is unlike other types of pending litigation that could be disrupted by midstream application of a new rule of evidence, the legislature's decision to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard to actions or special proceedings commenced on or after February 1, 2011, is still constitutional under rational basis review. A (continued) 35 Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578 expert testimony in a Chapter 980 case will often meet the Daubert standard even though it was admitted under the preDaubert standard. See supra ¶37. ¶59 Our rejection of Alger's and Knipfer's equal protection challenges and Knipfer's substantive due process challenge is even supported by cases in which Wisconsin courts upheld changes to Chapter 980 procedures under strict scrutiny. See West, 336 Wis. 2d 578, ¶¶98-99 (upholding a statute that placed the burden of proof on a Chapter 980 committed person who petitions for supervised release); Williams, 249 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20 (upholding an 18-month waiting period for petitioning for supervised release). We conclude that the failure to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard to expert testimony at Alger's and Knipfer's Chapter 980 discharge petition trials satisfies rational basis review. Further, the petitioners in Williams and West challenged unique procedures applicable to Chapter 980, whereas Alger's and Knipfer's challenges center on a generally applicable rule of evidence. ¶60 In sum, we hold that the failure to apply the Daubert evidentiary standard to expert testimony in Alger's and Knipfer's Chapter 980 discharge petition trials satisfies rational basis review, and therefore survives constitutional scrutiny. legislative enactment can be rationally related to achieving a legitimate governmental interest even if it is overinclusive. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979). 36 Nos. 2013AP225 & 2013AP578