Opinion ID: 751346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prosecutor's Remarks During Summation

Text: 57 Tankleff's final claim is that the prosecution's bad faith summation references to Tankleff's half-sister's absence from the defense case violated his due process right to a fair trial. The state's comments, he argues, impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. 58 During closing argument, the prosecutor said, Where was the defendant's sister and brother-in-law from Port Jefferson, Shari and Ron Rother? ... Where were these folks who had regular contact with the Tankleffs and with the defendant? ... Maybe all was not so well in the paradise the defendant would have you believe was his home. Once a defendant comes forward with evidence, the prosecution generally may comment on his failure to call an available witness who is under his control and whose testimony may be material. See, e.g., United States v. Yuzary, 55 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 178, 139 L.Ed.2d 119 (1997). Tankleff argues that, because the Rothers were cooperating with the prosecution prior to trial, they were not within his control and that it was therefore improper for the prosecution to make this missing witness argument. 59 The prosecution also commented on Shari's failure to testify regarding Tankleff's phone call to her on the evening after the murders: You heard the defendant's version of his phone call to his sister at 6:37 in the evening. Yesterday you heard what Detective Rein heard. The two are not even close. Dr. Spiegel had even another version. But we'll get to that. Where's [Shari,] the other party to that conversation? The defense argues that this argument was made in bad faith because the prosecution knew that Shari had testified at the suppression hearing that Tankleff had told her that the police made him confess--which was consistent with Tankleff's testimony, and not with Detective Rein's. 60 Relying on jurors' testimony at a post-trial evidentiary hearing, Tankleff further argues that the prosecution's comments had a definite impact on the outcome of the case. During this hearing, a number of jurors acknowledged that the jury had discussed why Shari had not testified, and had even speculated that it was because she thought that Tankleff was guilty. 61 As a threshold matter, we reject the state's argument that Tankleff did not exhaust his state remedies on this issue. Prior to closing arguments at trial, defense counsel asked the trial judge to make sure that there would be no reference to any witness who's not called by the prosecution. The court rejected this motion, holding that it would not prohibit the prosecution from mentioning missing witnesses. In addition, the defense objected to both of the prosecutor's comments relating to Shari during closing argument--even moving for a mistrial--but the court overruled the objections. These issues were also litigated on direct appeal. Indeed, two judges of the Appellate Division would have granted a new trial based on this claim. See Tankleff, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 712-13 (O'Brien and Eiber, JJ., dissenting). The New York Court of Appeals also addressed the question, concluding that the statements were not improper and were not made in bad faith. See Tankleff, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 504, 646 N.E.2d 805. While the defense's explication of this argument may be somewhat more nuanced in the habeas petition, the argument was clearly raised in the state courts and is patently subject to review on habeas. 62 Our scope of review on habeas is, however, quite limited. In order to grant relief, we would have to find that the prosecutor's comments constituted more than mere trial error, and were instead so egregious as to violate the defendant's due process rights. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647-48, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1873-74, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974); Floyd v. Meachum, 907 F.2d 347, 353 (2d Cir.1990) (The appropriate standard of review for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct on a writ of habeas corpus is the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To be entitled to relief, Tankleff must show that he suffered actual prejudice because the prosecutor's comments during summation had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Bentley v. Scully, 41 F.3d 818, 823 (2d Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 63 In deciding whether a defendant has suffered actual prejudice as a result of the prosecutorial misconduct, we have considered the severity of the misconduct; the measures adopted to cure the misconduct; and the certainty of conviction absent the improper statements. Floyd, 907 F.2d at 355 (quoting United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1181 (2d Cir.1981) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 98 (2d Cir.1990). For example, in United States v. Parker, we looked to these factors and then upheld the defendant's conviction despite the prosecutor's improper reference to the defendant's failure to call (in a curious parallel to the case before us) his sister as a witness. We noted that the prosecution's conduct did not evidence bad faith, that the trial court's instructions had a substantial curative effect, and that the strong evidence of guilt made it highly probable that the jury would have convicted the defendant regardless of the prosecutor's comments. See Parker, 903 F.2d at 99. In Floyd v. Meachum, on the other hand, we granted habeas relief to the petitioner, observing that the prosecutorial misconduct was severe, the corrective measures taken by the trial court were inadequate, and it was by no means clear or even probable that appellant would have been convicted absent the prosecutor's misconduct. Floyd, 907 F.2d at 356 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 64 With respect to the severity of the prosecutorial misconduct, we find that the two statements to which Tankleff objects were clearly improper. The prosecutor's second improper comment is particularly troubling. The prosecutor remarked on Shari's failure to testify regarding Tankleff's phone call to her on the evening after the murders, suggesting that, if Shari had testified regarding the phone call, her testimony would have conflicted with Tankleff's account of the phone call and supported Detective Rein's version. In fact, Shari's testimony under oath at the pretrial suppression hearing--of which the prosecution was fully aware--corroborated Tankleff's description of the phone call. 65 Relying on Parker, the government contends that it was not improper for the prosecutor to disregard Shari's testimony at the suppression hearing in making this argument. In Parker, we held that the government did not act in bad faith in refusing to credit the story given by a witness in an unsworn interview with the police. But we emphasized that the Parker witness' pretrial statement was unsworn, and noted that the government was not required to believe that she would have repeated it under oath. 903 F.2d at 99. In contrast, Shari's testimony at the suppression hearing was given under oath, and we have held that the prosecution is not allowed to ignore sworn testimony. We have stated, for example, that [t]he government cannot properly, either explicitly or implicitly, mischaracterize the substance of grand jury testimony, which is given under oath. United States v. Valentine, 820 F.2d 565, 570 (2d Cir.1987). And in Valentine, we held that it was a due process violation for the prosecutor to suggest that certain witnesses, who had not testified at trial but who had testified before the grand jury, supported the government's theory of the case, when in fact their testimony before the grand jury did not. We stated that this violated the due process prohibition against a prosecutor's making 'knowing use of false evidence,' including by misrepresenting the nature of nontestimonial evidence. Id. (citation omitted); cf. United States v. Rosa, 17 F.3d 1531, 1548-49 (2d Cir.1994) (It is clear, of course, that it is improper for a prosecutor to mischaracterize the evidence or refer in summation to facts not in evidence.). It is at least arguable that, in the case before us, the prosecution did precisely what we prohibited in Valentine; that is, that its mischaracterization went well beyond any missing witness problem. 66 Nevertheless, we are also mindful that the prosecutor's comments were short and fleeting, and thus much less likely to have had a substantial effect on the jury's verdict. Cf. Bentley, 41 F.3d at 825 (denying habeas relief where prosecutor's summation comments were both brief and isolated.). By contrast, the prosecutor in Floyd made improper comments literally dozens of times throughout her opening and closing summations. 907 F.2d at 348. In granting habeas relief in that case, we noted that it was one of those rare cases where the improper comments in a prosecutor's summation were so numerous and, in combination, so prejudicial that a new trial is required. Id. With respect to the first factor, therefore, we conclude that the severity of the prosecutor's misconduct in Tankleff's case was mitigated by the brevity and fleeting nature of the improper comments. 67 In addition, the trial judge instructed the jury that the burden of proof always rests with the prosecution and that the attorneys' arguments on summation are not evidence and, therefore, that the jury should not base its verdict on them. The defense requested a more specific curative instruction, and it was error for the trial court to refuse to give one. Cf. Floyd, 907 F.2d at 355 ([T]he only arguably curative measure adopted by the trial judge--the normal instruction in the course of his charge that argument of counsel is not evidence--was inadequate.); Modica, 663 F.2d at 1182 (The court's pattern instruction to the jury--that the arguments of counsel are not to be considered evidence--was proper, but was an insufficient response to the prosecutor's conduct.). However, looking at all the circumstances, we conclude that the standard instructions given by the trial court were probably sufficient to cure any harm that the prosecutor's misstatements may have caused. 68 Finally, we are not prepared to say that this is a case in which the evidence was so closely balanced that the prosecutor's comments were likely to have had a substantial effect on the jury. Cf. United States v. Saa, 859 F.2d 1067, 1077 (2d Cir.1988) ([B]ased on the other evidence against [the defendants], we find ... that any adverse inference improperly drawn by the jury would not have tilted the scales from not guilty to guilty.). The fact that the jurors discussed Shari's non-appearance does not convince us otherwise. Her failure to testify in regard to the phone conversation with the defendant--a conversation about which two other parties, including the defendant, had testified--was bound to be a source of some interest to the jurors regardless of the prosecutor's comments. Moreover, the jurors indicated that their discussion of Shari's absence was brief, and that they knew that the state could also have called her as a witness, but failed to do so. Finally, they did not suggest that it in any way influenced their verdict. 69 Accordingly, we conclude that Tankleff has not met his burden of showing that he was substantially prejudiced by these, admittedly improper, comments.