Opinion ID: 163283
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Promotion under the CBA

Text: Having removed the rideout element from the equation, we now turn to the requirements under the CBA for promotion to the position of district chief in suppression. Under the CBA, to be eligible for the promotion, a firefighter must hold the rank of major, have 15 years’ experience in the Department, and (1) take a 100-question written examination; (2) score in the top 12 on the written examination, which qualifies the applicant to advance to the assessment center for evaluation by a panel of interviewers; and (3) perform well enough at the -23- assessment center to be among the small number of candidates who proceed to the final stage of the competition, an interview with the fire chief. With this background, we can readily dispose of the claims by Majors Henson and Weaver that their failure to be promoted was retaliation for their union activity. Major Henson took the written test on two occasions but never scored high enough to advance to the assessment center. Major Weaver advanced to the assessment center once on four attempts, but did not perform well enough to advance to the interview stage. Thus, neither Major Henson nor Major Weaver was eligible to be promoted to district chief in suppression. We note that they make no allegation that they were given improperly low scores on the written examination or at the assessment center in retaliation for their union activity. Accordingly, their union activity could not have been a motivating factor in Chief Marrs’ failure to promote them, and the district court properly granted summary judgment on their freedom-of-association claims. Major Lunow presents a slightly different situation. On four occasions he failed to progress beyond the assessment-center stage. Like Majors Henson and Weaver, he makes no allegation that the scoring of the preliminary examinations was retaliatory. Thus, Major Lunow’s failure to be promoted on these four occasions was the result of his ineligibility for the position under the CBA, not his union activity. -24- Unlike Majors Henson and Weaver, however, Major Lunow did advance to the final stage on one occasion—in 1998, when he competed for the position of Special Teams Coordinator, a district chief position in the suppression division. Finishing third at the assessment center, he was one of four candidates whose names were submitted to Chief Marrs for consideration. Major Lunow does not contend that the scoring was retaliatory. Chief Marrs selected Cecil Meeks, who tied for the highest score at the assessment center, had been a rideout, and was not active in the union. Major Lunow testified that he believed that Mr. Meeks was as qualified as he was for the promotion, but that Chief Marrs’ failure to select him was retaliation for his union activity. To overcome a motion for summary judgment, however, Major Lunow must support that belief with competent evidence. One potential source is direct evidence. See Quinn v. Vill. of Elk Grove Bd. of Fire & Police Comm’rs, No. 01- C-8504, 2002 WL 31875464, at  5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 24, 2002) (denying summary judgment on plaintiffs’ freedom-of-association claim because fire chief’s written evaluation demonstrated that he took plaintiffs’ union leadership into account when he interviewed them for a promotion). But there is no direct evidence that Chief Marrs considered Major Lunow’s union activity when he declined to promote him. -25- Instead, Plaintiffs point to the previously mentioned affidavits of other union activists, and to the fact that no union activist had been promoted to district chief in suppression during Chief Marrs’ tenure. The affidavits, however, merely express the union activists’ “belie[f]” and “opinion” that Chief Marrs has denied Major Lunow, Major Hanson, and other union leaders promotions because of their union activity. Aplt’s App. 544, 548. Once again, these statements are entitled to no weight because they are merely conclusory expressions of personal belief, without reference to supporting evidence. See Murray, 45 F.3d at 1422; Tavery, 32 F.3d at 1427 n.4. As for the assertion that no union activist had been selected district chief in suppression by Chief Marrs, Plaintiffs would need to provide more context before this “statistical” fact would be probative. We have no idea, for example, how often a union activist (however defined) advanced to the final stage of the promotion process and lost out to a non-activist with lower test scores. All the record shows in this regard is what we have already stated: three of the Plaintiffs sought promotion on 11 occasions, were disqualified on 10 of those occasions by testing that is not challenged as discriminatory, and failed on the 11th occasion because Chief Marrs selected an equally qualified person who scored higher on the unchallenged testing. This is hardly evidence of anti-union retaliation. -26- We hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment on Major Lunow’s claim that he was denied promotion to the position of Special Teams Coordinator in retaliation for his union activity. 3. Major Hanson’s non-promotion claims Finally, Major Hanson alleges that Chief Marrs refused to promote him to the position of district chief in the Department’s support division because of his union activity. Major Hanson progressed beyond the assessment center and had his name submitted to Chief Marrs for selection on the two occasions he sought promotion: in 1994, when he applied for the position of Chief Training Officer, and in 1997, when he applied to become Chief Safety Officer. In 1994 Chief Marrs promoted James Reynolds rather than Major Hanson to the Chief Training Officer position. Major Hanson testified that Mr. Reynolds was as qualified as he was but that Chief Marrs should have selected him, and that “[t]he denial of that promotion I have no doubts stemmed from the many controversial things that I did as a union officer and when I condemned Chief Marrs in writing as no one else had ever done before in my capacity as editor of the Bugle and Dispatch.” Aplts’ App. 457. Yet Plaintiffs point to no direct evidence regarding what factors Chief Marrs actually considered when he made his decision, and their only circumstantial evidence of anti-union bias is the same evidence discussed above -27- with respect to the other Plaintiffs. Thus, Major Hanson has failed to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether his union activity was a motivating factor behind his failure to be promoted to Chief Training Officer, and his claim must fail. Likewise, Major Hanson has failed to present evidence that anti-union bias was the reason he was not selected Chief Safety Officer in 1997. The final stage of the promotion process for that position was a scored interview before a panel of three firefighters from the Department. Major Hanson had the lowest interview score of the five candidates whose names were forwarded to Chief Marrs for selection; Bryan Heirston had the highest score, and the interviewers recommended that Chief Marrs select Mr. Heirston. (Again, Plaintiffs make no allegation in their briefs that Major Hanson improperly was given a low score because of his union activity.) Chief Marrs selected Mr. Heirston, who at the time was active in union affairs at the national level. Major Hanson testified that he was never told that his union activity was the reason that he did not get the promotion, but stated that he knows his union activity was the reason, because “[i]t’s as plain as the nose on your face, it’s an accepted fact, past practices ha[ve] proven it out.” Aplts’ App. at 452. Such an assertion is not evidence. -28- Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Major Hanson’s union activity was a motivating factor behind his failure to be promoted. His claim fails.