Opinion ID: 118008
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: by a participant or beneficiary

Text: (A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section [providing for liquidated damages for failure to provide certain information on request], or (B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan; (2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 409 [entitled Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty]; (3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms of the plan; (4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate relief in the case of a violation of 105(c) [requiring disclosure of certain tax registration statements]; (5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), by the Secretary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of this title; or (6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection (i). ERISA § 502(a), 88 Stat. 891, 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a) (1988 ed.) (emphasis added). The District Court held that the third subsection, which we have italicized, authorized this suit and the relief awarded. Varity concedes that the plaintiffs satisfy most of this provision's requirements, namely, that the plaintiffs are plan participants or beneficiaries, and that they are suing for equitable relief to redress a violation of § 404(a), which is a provision of this title. Varity does not agree, however, that this lawsuit seeks equitable relief that is  appropriate.  In support of this conclusion, Varity makes a complicated, four-step argument: Step One: Section 502(a)'s second subsection says that a plaintiff may bring a civil action for appropriate relief under section 409. Step Two: Section 409(a), in turn, reads: Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Sec. 409. (a) Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equi- table or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary. . . . (Emphasis added.) Step Three: In Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134 (1985), this Court pointed to the aboveitalicized language in § 409 and concluded that this section (and its companion remedial provision, subsection (2)) did not authorize the plaintiff's suit for compensatory and punitive damages against an administrator who had wrongfully delayed payment of her benefit claim. The first two italicized phrases, the Court said, show that § 409's draftsmen were primarily concerned with the possible misuse of plan assets, and with remedies that would protect the entire plan, rather than with the rights of an individual beneficiary. Id., at 142 (emphasis added). The Court added that, in this context, the last italicized phrase (other equitable or remedial relief) does not authorize any relief except for the plan itself. Id., at 144. Step Four: In light of Russell, as well as ERISA's language, structure, and purposes, one cannot read the third subsection (the subsection before us) as including (as appropriate) the very kind of actionan action for individual, rather than plan, reliefthat this Court found Congress excluded in subsection (2). It is at this point, however, that we must disagree with Varity. We have reexamined Russell, as well as the relevant statutory language, structure, and purpose. And, in our view, they support the beneficiaries' view of the statute, not Varity's. First, Russell discusses § 502(a)'s second subsection, not its third subsection, and the language that the Court found limiting appears in a statutory section (§ 409) that the second subsection, not the third, cross-references. Russell `s plaintiff expressly disavowed reliance on the third subsection, id., at 139, n. 5, perhaps because she was seeking compensatory and punitive damages and subsection (3) authorizes only equitable relief. See Mertens, 508 U. S., at 255, 256-258, and n. 8 (compensatory and punitive damages are not equitable relief within the meaning of subsection (3)); ERISA § 409(a) (authorizing other equitable or remedial relief) (emphasis added). Further, Russell involved a complicating factor not present here, in that another remedial provision (subsection (1) ) already provided specific relief for the sort of injury the plaintiff had suffered (wrongful denial of benefits), but said nothing about the recovery of extracontractual damages, or about the possible consequences of delay in the plan administrators' processing of a disputed claim. Russell, supra, at 144. These differences lead us to conclude that Russell does not control, either implicitly or explicitly, the outcome of the case before us. Second, subsection (3)'s language does not favor Varity. The words of subsection (3)appropriate equitable relief to redress any act or practice which violates any provision of this titleare broad enough to cover individual relief for breach of a fiduciary obligation. Varity argues that the title of § 409Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Dutymeans that § 409 (and its companion, subsection (2)) cover all such liability. But that is not what the title or the provision says. And other language in the statute suggests the contrary. Section 502(l), added in 1989, calculates a certain civil penalty as a percentage of the sum ordered by a court to be paid by such fiduciary . . . to a plan or its participants and beneficiaries  under subsection (5). Subsection (5) is identical to subsection (3), except that it authorizes suits by the Secretary, rather than the participants and beneficiaries. Compare § 502(a)(3) with § 502(a)(5). This new provision, therefore, seems to foresee instances in which the sort of relief provided by both subsection (5) and, by implication, subsection (3), would include an award to participants and beneficiaries, rather than to the plan, for breach of fiduciary obligation. Third, the statute's structure offers Varity little support. Varity notes that the second subsection refers specifically (through its § 409 cross-reference) to breaches of fiduciary duty, while the third subsection refers, as a kind of catchall, to all ERISA Title One violations. And it argues that a canon of statutory construction, namely the specific governs over the general, means that the more specific second (fiduciary breach) subsection makes the more general third (catchall) subsection inapplicable to claims of fiduciary breach. Canons of construction, however, are simply rules of thumb which will sometimes help courts determine the meaning of legislation. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992). To apply a canon properly one must understand its rationale. This Court has understood the present canon (the specific governs the general) as a warning against applying a general provision when doing so would undermine limitations created by a more specific provision. See, e. g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 384-385 (1992); HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U. S. 1, 6, 8 (1981); Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 228-229 (1957). Yet, in this case, why should one believe that Congress intended the specific remedies in § 409 as a limitation? To the contrary, one can read § 409 as reflecting a special congressional concern about plan asset management without also finding that Congress intended that section to contain the exclusive set of remedies for every kind of fiduciary breach. After all, ERISA makes clear that a fiduciary has obligations other than, and in addition to, managing plan assets. See § 3(21)(A) (defining fiduciary as one who exercises any discretionary authority . . . respecting management of such plan or . . . respecting management or disposition of its assets) (emphasis added). For example, as the dissent concedes, post, at 530, a plan administrator engages in a fiduciary act when making a discretionary determination about whether a claimant is entitled to benefits under the terms of the plan documents. See § 404(a)(1)(D); Dept. of Labor, Interpretive Bulletin 75-8, 29 CFR § 2509.75-8 (1995) ([A] plan employee who has the final authority to authorize or disallow benefit payments in cases where a dispute exists as to the interpretation of plan provisions . . . would be a fiduciary); Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retirement Program, 740 F. 2d 454, 457 (CA6 1984); Birmingham v. SogenSwiss Intern. Corp. Retirement Plan, 718 F. 2d 515, 521-522 (CA2 1983). And, as the Court pointed out in Russell, 473 U. S., at 144, ERISA specifically provides a remedy for breaches of fiduciary duty with respect to the interpretation of plan documents and the payment of claims, one that is outside the framework of the second subsection and crossreferenced § 409, and one that runs directly to the injured beneficiary. § 502(a)(1)(B). See also Firestone, 489 U. S., at 108. Why should we not conclude that Congress provided yet other remedies for yet other breaches of other sorts of fiduciary obligation in another, catchall remedial section? Such a reading is consistent with § 502's overall structure. Four of that section's six subsections focus upon specific areas, i. e., the first (wrongful denial of benefits and information), the second (fiduciary obligations related to the plan's financial integrity), the fourth (tax registration), and the sixth (civil penalties). The language of the other two subsections, the third and the fifth, creates two catchalls, providing appropriate equitable relief for any statutory violation. This structure suggests that these catchall provisions act as a safety net, offering appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations that § 502 does not elsewhere adequately remedy. And, contrary to Varity's argument, there is nothing in the legislative history that conflicts with this interpretation. See S. Rep. No. 93-127, p. 35 (1973), 1 Leg. Hist. 621 (describing Senate version of enforcement provisions as intended to provide both the Secretary and participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing violations of [ERISA]); H. R. Rep. No. 93-533, at 17, 2 Leg. Hist. 2364 (describing House version in identical terms). Fourth, ERISA's basic purposes favor a reading of the third subsection that provides the plaintiffs with a remedy. The statute itself says that it seeks to protect . . . the interests of participants . . . and . . . beneficiaries . . . by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries . . . and . . . providing for appropriate remedies . . . and ready access to the Federal courts. ERISA § 2(b). Section 404(a), in furtherance of this general objective, requires fiduciaries to discharge their duties solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries. Given these objectives, it is hard to imagine why Congress would want to immunize breaches of fiduciary obligation that harm individuals by denying injured beneficiaries a remedy. Amici supporting Varity find a strong contrary argument in an important, subsidiary congressional purposethe need for a sensible administrative system. They say that holding that the Act permits individuals to enforce fiduciary obligations owed directly to them as individuals threatens to increase the cost of welfare benefit plans and thereby discourage employers from offering them. Consider a plan administrator's decision not to pay for surgery on the ground that it falls outside the plan's coverage. At present, courts review such decisions with a degree of deference to the administrator, provided that the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan. Firestone, supra, at 115. But what will happen, ask amici, if a beneficiary can repackage his or her denial of benefits claim as a claim for breach of fiduciary duty? Wouldn't a court, they ask, then have to forgo deference and hold the administrator to the rigid level of conduct expected of fiduciaries? And, as a consequence, would there not then be two incompatible legal standards for courts hearing benefit claim disputes depending upon whether the beneficiary claimed simply denial of benefits, or a virtually identical breach of fiduciary duty? See Brief for Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae 10. Consider, too, they add, a medical review board trying to decide whether certain proposed surgery is medically necessary. Will the board's awareness of a duty of loyalty to the surgery-seeking beneficiary not risk inadequate attention to the countervailing, but important, need to constrain costs in order to preserve the plan's funds? Id., at 11. Thus, amici warn that a legally enforceable duty of loyalty that extends beyond plan asset management to individual beneficiaries will risk these and other adverse consequences. Administrators will tend to interpret plan documents as requiring payments to individuals instead of trying to preserve plan assets; nonexpert courts will try to supervise too closely, and second guess, the often technical decisions of plan administrators; and, lawyers will complicate ordinary benefit claims by dressing them up in fiduciary duty clothing. The need to avoid these consequences, they conclude, requires us to accept Varity's position. The concerns that amici raise seem to us unlikely to materialize, however, for several reasons. First, a fiduciary obligation, enforceable by beneficiaries seeking relief for themselves, does not necessarily favor payment over nonpayment. The common law of trusts recognizes the need to preserve assets to satisfy future, as well as present, claims and requires a trustee to take impartial account of the interests of all beneficiaries. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 183 (discussing duty of impartiality); id., § 232 (same). Second, characterizing a denial of benefits as a breach of fiduciary duty does not necessarily change the standard a court would apply when reviewing the administrator's decision to deny benefits. After all, Firestone, which authorized deferential court review when the plan itself gives the administrator discretionary authority, based its decision upon the same common-law trust doctrines that govern standards of fiduciary conduct. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 187 (Where discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court, except to prevent an abuse by the trustee of his discretion) (as quoted in Firestone, 489 U. S., at 111). Third, the statute authorizes  appropriate  equitable relief. We should expect that courts, in fashioning appropriate equitable relief, will keep in mind the special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans, and will respect the policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U. S., at 54. See also Russell, 473 U. S., at 147; Mertens, 508 U. S., at 263-264. Thus, we should expect that where Congress elsewhere provided adequate relief for a beneficiary's injury, there will likely be no need for further equitable relief, in which case such relief normally would not be appropriate. Cf. Russell, supra, at 144. But that is not the case here. The plaintiffs in this case could not proceed under the first subsection because they were no longer members of the Massey-Ferguson plan and, therefore, had no benefits due [them] under the terms of [the] plan. § 502(a)(1)(B). They could not proceed under the second subsection because that provision, tied to § 409, does not provide a remedy for individual beneficiaries. Russell, supra, at 144. They must rely on the third subsection or they have no remedy at all. We are not aware of any ERISA-related purpose that denial of a remedy would serve. Rather, we believe that granting a remedy is consistent with the literal language of the statute, the Act's purposes, and pre-existing trust law. For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.