Opinion ID: 159242
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Question of Structural Error

Text: 93 Mr. Pearson characterizes the prosecution's alleged manipulation of the case assignment system as a structural error--a defect[] in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which def[ies] analysis by harmless error standards. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991). Such errors affect [t]he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end and deprive the defendant of basic protections, without which 'a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.' Id. at 310 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)). Errors of this type are so intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal . . . without regard to their effect on the outcome. Neder v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1833 (1999). If a criminal proceeding includes such an error, the resulting punishment may [not] be regarded as fundamentally fair. Rose, 478 U.S. at 577-78. 94 Supreme Court decisions have found structural error only in a 'very limited class of cases,' Neder, 119 S.Ct. at 1833. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997)), including those involving: (1) the total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); (2) a biased presiding judge, see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); (3) the systematic exclusion of members of the defendant's own race from a grand jury, see Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1986); (4) the denial of the right to self-representation at trial, see McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 (1984); (5) the denial of the right to a public trial, see Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49-50 (1984); (6) the denial of the right to have a district judge (rather than a magistrate judge) preside over jury selection, see Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876 (1989); and (7) a defective reasonable doubt instruction, see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993). In Rose, the Supreme Court described these kinds of errors as the exception rather than the rule. [I]f the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis. Rose, 478 U.S. at 579. 95 In a helpful review of the concept of structural error, the Second Circuit has noted, We do not understand [the Supreme Court's] list of examples of violations that have been held exempt from harmless error review to mean that any violation of the same constitutional right is a 'structural defect,' regardless whether the error is significant or trivial. Yarborough v. Keane, 101 F.3d 894, 897 (2d Cir. 1996). Conversely, the fact that the Supreme Court has applied harmless error analysis to one level of violation of a particular right does not necessarily mean that an egregious violation of that same right may never constitute structural error. See id. 96 Thus, the determination of whether an error is structural depends on not only the right violated, but also the nature, context, and significance of the violation. Id. For example, the total deprivation of the right to counsel constitutes structural error, while the denial of the right to counsel at a preliminary hearing is subject to harmless error review. See id. (contrasting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) with Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970)). Similarly, although the unjustified exclusion of a defendant from the entire trial would constitute structural error, a defendant's absence when the judge engaged in two conversations with a juror has been subjected to harmless error analysis. See id. (citing Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117 n.2, 120-21 (1983)). 97 In our view, the due process violation alleged here--one that resulted from allowing the prosecutor to select the judge--should be placed on an analogous continuum. Although the District of Kansas's case assignment system arguably allowed the prosecutor to perform a kind of quasi-judicial function, there are important distinctions between allowing a prosecutor perform judicial functions after the judge has been selected and the case proceeds to trial and final decision (i.e., functions like ruling on motions and objections, issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and sentencing defendants) and allowing the prosecutor to perform the quasi-judicial function of selecting the judge. Although a prosecutor's performance of such post-selection judicial functions necessarily deprives the defendant of an impartial adjudicator, we conclude for several reasons that prosecutorial involvement in the selection of the judge does not necessarily result in the same degree of deprivation. 98 First, a prosecutor's choice of judges is limited. Even if a case assignment system allows the prosecutor to select the judge, the prosecutor must still choose from a group who have undergone the process of selection and appointment, who have sworn to uphold the law and defend the Constitution, and whose conduct can be scrutinized through appellate review. There is a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators, Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975), and, as a result, we cannot presume that a federal judge selected by the prosecutor will be his agent or henchman. Additionally, we note that a prosecutor may want the case assigned to a particular judge for a variety of reasons, some of which may not involve any disadvantage to the defendant at all: a prosecutor may simply make a random selection or he or she may seek out the most intelligent or the most experienced judge, or the one most familiar with a particular area of law. 99 Moreover, a defendant who must proceed to trial before a judge selected by the prosecutor is not without remedies. If the judge appears biased, a defendant may file a motion for recusal. See 28 U.S.C. § 455; Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d at 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995). If the judge denies that request, the defendant may challenge that decision prior to trial by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition with this court. See Nichols, 71 F.3d at 350. In certain instances, by invoking this court's supervisory powers, a defendant may also, prior to trial, challenge the case assignment procedure itself. See Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritter, 461 F.2d 1100, 1104 (10th Cir. 1972) (granting a petition for a writ of prohibition and mandamus barring a judge from assigning a case to himself and requiring reassignment). Additionally, a defendant may contest the government's prosecution of the case by filing pretrial motions, making objections at trial, and introducing evidence; he may also challenge the trial judge's rulings on appeal. For all these reasons, a defendant in a case in which the prosecutor has selected the judge does not necessarily receive a trial that cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence and consequently renders any resulting punishment fundamentally unfair. Rose, 478 U.S. at 577-78. 100 Finally, we have unearthed no decision finding structural error in analogous circumstances. As stated above, the Seventh Circuit has expressly rejected the argument that allowing a prosecutor to select the judge constitutes structural error. See Tyson II, 50 F.3d at 442 (characterizing structural error as involving a denial of the most fundamental constituents of due process). The Louisiana courts, although following Simpson's holding that the prosecutor's selection of the judge violates due process, have nevertheless applied harmless error analysis. See Jonathan L. Entin, The Sign of the Four: Judicial Assignment and the Rule of Law, 68 Miss. L.J. 369 (1998) (Even in post-Simpson Louisiana, the courts have rejected numerous claims on harmless error grounds because the aggrieved party could not show how the defective assignment prejudiced the case.); State v. Huls, 676 So.2d 160, 167-68 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (applying harmless error analysis and affirming conviction even though case assignment system violated due process); State v. Romero, 552 So.2d 45, 49 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (same). 101 Accordingly, even assuming that the Due Process Clause entitles Mr. Pearson to a neutral method of selecting a judge and that the prosecution deprived Mr. Pearson of that right by manipulating the judicial assignment system here, this assumed error is not structural. We therefore turn to the question of harmless error. 102