Opinion ID: 2063629
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Uncharged Criminal Activity

Text: Generally, evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible to prove the guilt of the accused. Pharms v. State (1985), Ind., 476 N.E.2d 120. However, our cases recognize the common scheme or plan exception which permits proof of identify by showing the defendant committed other crimes with identical modus operandi: The State may prove identity by showing that the similarities between the two crimes are so strong and the method so clearly unique that it is highly probable that the perpetrator of both is the same person.    We require a strong showing that the different criminal actions were so similarly conducted that the method of conduct can be considered akin to the accused's signature.    The acts or methods employed must be so similar, unusual and distinctive as to earmark them as the acts of the accused. Penley v. State (1987), Ind., 506 N.E.2d 806, 809. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing M.M. to testify as to other crimes evidence to establish common scheme or plan. He argues the admission of the evidence served to prejudice him because: 1) his identity was not at issue; and 2) the circumstances surrounding the instant offense and the circumstances surrounding the other crime as testified to by M.M. are so dissimilar that M.M. should not have been allowed to testify. At trial, the State urged the admission of the other crimes evidence because the identity of the defendant was not so firmly established that th[e] additional identification testimony [was] unnecessary. The State pointed out that while T.D. and G.B. had each positively identified defendant in court, G.B. had not been able to correctly identify defendant at a line-up prior to trial. Defendant did not concede the identification issue but rather offered several witnesses to support an alibi defense. Thus, defendant's identity as the victims' attacker was at issue. The similarity between the charged offense and the criminal activity described by M.M. presents a much closer question, particularly in view of the caution expressed in Penley: Mere repetition of similar crimes does not by itself warrant admission of the evidence of those crimes under the modus operandi rule. In order for the modus operandi rule to serve its intended purpose, the inquiry must be, Are these crimes so strikingly similar that one can say with reasonable certainty that one and the same person committed them? Not only must the methodology of the two crimes be strikingly similar, but the method must be unique in ways which attribute the crimes to one person. 506 N.E.2d at 810. The circumstances of the charged offense were similar to that described by M.M. in the following ways: the crimes occurred at the same shopping center parking lot, at approximately the same time of night, on a week night, as the victims walked either to or from their car, and within approximately one month of each other. In both cases, the assailant approached the victims from behind, employed a knife as the weapon, robbed young women of their purses, and forced the women into their automobiles and either drove away or attempted to drive away from the shopping center parking lot with them. We find it unnecessary, however, to evaluate whether the present similarities comply with the strikingly similar standard enunciated in Penley. Even if erroneously admitted, evidence may be found to be harmless error where a determination of guilt is supported by substantial independent evidence. Bates v. State (1986), Ind., 495 N.E.2d 176. When a reviewing court can be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such error did not contribute to the conviction, reversal is not required. Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.E.2d 705. From our review of the record, we conclude that the evidence of defendant's guilt was so overwhelming that the testimony of M.M., even if erroneously admitted, did not contribute to the conviction. The trial testimony clearly established that both of the victims, G.B. and T.D., clearly observed their assailant during their ordeal, and were unequivocal during their in-court identification of defendant as the assailant. The testimony of both victims was detailed and consistent. We find such evidence was so convincing that a jury could not properly find otherwise. Judgment affirmed. SHEPARD, C.J., and DeBRULER, GIVAN and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur.