Opinion ID: 821517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excusal of a juror for cause

Text: Defendant asserts the trial court improperly excused a prospective juror, J.A., for cause based on her opposition to the death penalty. A juror may be challenged for cause based on his or her views concerning capital punishment only if those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of the juror‟s duties as defined by the court‟s instructions and the juror‟s oath. (Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 790; People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 440-441 (Stewart), citing Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 (Witt).) As we recently explained, “[e]ven if the prospective juror has not expressed his or her views with absolute clarity, the juror may be excused if „the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be 15 unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.‟ [Citation.] If, after reasonable examination, the prospective juror has given conflicting or equivocal answers, and the trial court has had the opportunity to observe the juror‟s demeanor, we accept the court‟s determination of the juror‟s state of mind.” (Thomas, supra, at p. 790; see People v. Pearson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 306, 327-328, and cases cited.) The instructions to the questionnaire given to all prospective jurors directed: “If you do not understand a question, please place a large question mark (?) in the space provided for an answer.” Prospective Juror J.A. responded to relatively few questions in the 27-page juror questionnaire.5 She responded to almost none of the questions concerning the death penalty. For example, she left question marks, or no response, concerning the following questions: “Would you please tell us how you feel about the death penalty?”; “Does the death penalty help society?”; “What kind of murders come to mind when you think of the death 5 Prospective Juror J.A. answered a number of basic questions — indicating, for example, that she was 60 years of age, had six children, had completed school through eighth grade, and was employed in “food service” at public school. Unlike most other prospective jurors, however, J.A. placed many question marks throughout her form, including to questions such as “What do you feel is the most important contribution you can make to your children‟s lives?”; “Do you feel that your family and social experiences as a child affect your later adult behavior?”; “If the judge gives you an instruction in law and it differs with your beliefs or opinions, how will you deal with that conflict?”; “You have had an opportunity to briefly observe the defendants in this case. How would you describe them?”; “Do you feel you can be completely unbiased in this case?” To further questions, Prospective Juror J.A. gave the following answers: “What thoughts or feelings do you have at the prospect of being called upon to judge the conduct of another?” Her answer: “I can‟t & don‟t want to hear problems. Too Nerves.” When asked, “Were you ever interviewed by the police?” she checked “Yes.” In response to the followup question “How did you feel about that experience and what were your reasons for those feelings?” she wrote: “I keep him away from our home.” 16 penalty and someone „deserving it‟?”; “Are there any murders that do not deserve the death penalty?”; “Do you feel that life in prison without the possibility of parole is a severe punishment?” The single death-penalty-related question that she answered was the last one listed on the questionnaire: “Do you feel that life in prison without the possibility of parole is more severe than the death penalty?” Given the options of “Yes,” “No,” and “Uncertain,” she checked the last. During oral voir dire by the court, after being advised that the case might require the jurors to determine whether to impose the death penalty, Prospective Juror J.A. conceded that she felt “scared” and that imposing a death sentence would make her feel that “I am the one who is going to be prosecuted.” The court asked, “if you were a juror on a capital case, and if you had heard the evidence in the guilt phase, found an individual guilty of first degree murder with special circumstances and you considered the manner in which the crime was committed, the extent of the participation of that individual, you heard evidence about his background, about his upbringing, and after that you felt that the death penalty was appropriate, could you vote for the death penalty?” J.A. stated, somewhat unresponsively, “I‟m not sure I would.” (Italics added.) The trial court then followed up with numerous questions attempting to determine J.A‟s views concerning the death penalty and whether she could in fact vote to impose death in an appropriate case. J.A. denied having any moral or religious belief concerning the issue, but added that she was “not the one to judge anybody.” After the court asked why J.A. wrote question marks to various inquiries addressing the death penalty on her written juror questionnaire, she responded that she did not understand most of those questions. The court asked, “Can you think of any case where you felt that the death sentence was correct?” J.A. answered “yes,” but on further questioning could not name any such case. The court asked, “In all honesty, could you ever vote for the death penalty?” Prospective Juror J.A. 17 replied, again somewhat unresponsively, “Yes, I — yes, I would.” The court clarified, “You could?” She replied, “I could.” Thereafter, the prosecutor asked: “If you were called upon to actually make the decision, that is, that you have heard the evidence, and you[‟re] instructed by the court with a law and told to render a decision and that decision is life without possibility of parole or death. Could you vote for the death sentence for somebody?” Prospective Juror J.A. answered, “It would be hard for me.” The prosecutor emphasized that “we need to know” and “I understand it is going to be hard for you . . . . I am trying to find out is it so hard that you don‟t really think it is appropriate for you to do that?” J.A. explained, “I would feel guilt that a person would die because I said yes. I would carry that guilt.” The prosecutor continued to probe: “What you are expressing to me is your feelings are such that you probably really couldn‟t with a clear consci[ence] make that decision, could you?” To this question, J.A. answered, “No.” The prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror J.A. for cause. The court stated in full: “On the last round of questions [J.A.] indicated that she would feel guilty if she were to impose a death sentence. And that based on that guilt she couldn’t. So I am going to grant the challenge as to [J.A.]” Defendant stresses that reluctance to impose death is a normal and expected response from many prospective jurors, and is not itself an adequate ground for exclusion for cause. As we observed in Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th 425, 446, “a prospective juror who simply would find it „very difficult‟ ever to impose the death penalty, is entitled — indeed, duty bound — to sit on a capital jury, unless his or her personal views actually would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties as a juror.” Moreover, “the circumstance that a juror‟s conscientious opinions or beliefs concerning the death penalty would make it very difficult for the juror ever to impose the death penalty is not equivalent to a 18 determination that such beliefs will „substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror‟ . . . . A juror might find it very difficult to vote to impose the death penalty, and yet such a juror‟s performance still would not be substantially impaired under Witt, unless he or she were unwilling or unable to follow the trial court‟s instructions by weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the case and determining whether death is the appropriate penalty under the law.” (Id., at p. 447, quoting Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424.) In addition, defendant stresses, J.A. asserted, first in response to questioning by the court, and then in response to a followup question by the prosecutor, that she “could” indeed vote to impose the death penalty.6 Defendant concludes that Prospective Juror J.A.‟s responses were neither conflicting nor ambiguous, and instead that she was consistent on two key points: she could return a death sentence, and it would be “hard” for her to do so — it would make her feel “guilty.” Defendant asserts that the record fails to support the trial court‟s conclusion that J.A. could not impose a death sentence, and that the record “at most establishes that [she] could not return a death sentence with a clear conscience.” Defendant argues that J.A. never retracted nor contradicted her previous statements that she could impose a death sentence, and he asserts that her sense of guilt surrounding that prospect did not render her substantially impaired under the governing high court standard. The People, focusing on Prospective Juror J.A.‟s initial statement to the court that she was “not sure I would” vote for the death penalty, and her assertions 6 Defendant asserts that J.A.‟s negative response to the prosecutor‟s “clear conscience” question indicated that she could after all follow the law and impose the death penalty if that was warranted. As noted below, the People view that response otherwise, and we agree with the People in this regard. 19 that she would feel “guilt” if she voted to impose death, argue that taken as a whole, her statements were conflicting or ambiguous — and therefore we must grant normal deference to the trial court‟s assessment of the prospective juror‟s ability to follow the law. The People also argue that J.A.‟s understanding of the issues surrounding death qualification appeared to be limited, and hence “when she asserted she „could‟ vote for the death penalty, it is impossible to know whether she understood the distinction the court was making or whether she merely acknowledged that she could do something she believed was morally wrong.”7 The People further assert that although Prospective Juror J.A. responded to the prosecutor‟s closing question — asking “you probably really couldn‟t with a clear consci[ence] make that decision, could you?” — by answering “No,” viewing the record as a whole reveals that J.A. did not in fact mean to indicate that she could follow the law and impose the death penalty with a clear conscience. Instead, the People insist, when J.A. said “No,” she intended to express agreement with the prosecutor‟s characterization — that she could not, with a clear conscience, make a decision whether to impose death. Although the People complain that defense counsel made no effort to resolve this alleged ambiguity, because the burden of proof in challenging a juror for anti-death-penalty views rests with the prosecution, it was up to the prosecutor, not defense counsel, to 7 Defendant responds: “Neither the prosecutor nor the trial judge apparently perceived a problem with [J.A.‟s] comprehension; neither mentioned it as a reason for disqualifying her. There certainly is no support for the State‟s post-hoc insinuation that the exclusion was based on any reason other than her death penalty views.” As shown ante, footnote 5, the responses made by J.A. on her questionnaire do seem to indicate a problem with comprehension, and indeed, J.A. told the court that she did not understand many of those death penalty questions. 20 follow up with questions that would resolve any ambiguity.8 Nevertheless, the People insist, when viewed in context, it is apparent that Prospective Juror J.A. intended to convey that she could not make the decision whether to impose death with a clear conscience. The People‟s view of the record is evidently the one implicitly embraced by the trial court, which as noted above concluded that in light of the “last round of questions [J.A.] indicated that she would feel guilty if she were to impose a death sentence. And that based on that guilt she couldn’t.” (Italics added.) Defendant argues that it would not be proper for this court to construe Prospective Juror J.A.‟s final response of “No” as signifying that she agreed with the prosecutor — that she “probably really couldn’t with a clear consci[ence]” follow the law and vote to impose the death penalty if warranted. This construction, however, reflects common colloquial speech — many people, if asked, “you couldn‟t do that, could you?” would answer “No” if they meant to convey “No, I couldn‟t.” Accordingly, we reject defendant‟s contention that J.A.‟s responses concerning whether she could vote to apply the death penalty were consistent from beginning to end; the record supports a conclusion that her responses were in fact conflicting or ambiguous. Furthermore, although the trial court did not state that it had considered J.A.‟s demeanor when arriving at the court‟s conclusion (that because of her feelings of guilt “she couldn‟t” vote for death), we reasonably infer that the trial court reached this conclusion based on both J.A.‟s demeanor and her prior responses. Accordingly, under the 8 Moreover, defendant observes, his counsel could reasonably have concluded that because the record appeared to show that Prospective Juror J.A. was qualified to sit as a juror, “there was no reason for [defendant‟s] attorney to pursue voir dire.” 21 circumstances, we grant deference to the trial court‟s interpretation of J.A.‟s statements and to its assessment of her state of mind that she could not impose a death sentence based on her feelings of guilt. But was Prospective Juror J.A.‟s state of mind such that it would substantially impair her ability to serve as a juror? Defendant argues that a prospective juror‟s stated “probable” inability to undertake the death penalty determination process with a “clear conscience” by itself would not constitute “substantial impairment” justifying excusal for cause. As defendant observes, we have stressed in Stewart that a juror‟s “conscientious opinions or beliefs concerning the death penalty” that would make it “very difficult for the juror ever to impose the death penalty” does not mean that “such beliefs will „substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror.‟ ” (Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 447.) By the same token, defendant asserts, a juror who, as the trial court concluded here, cannot vote for death with a clear conscience, nevertheless should be deemed qualified to sit in judgment at the penalty trial so long as he or she still agrees to follow the law and vote to impose the death penalty if warranted. We find Stewart distinguishable in two key respects. First, Prospective Juror J.A. expressed more than just a difficulty with imposing the death penalty. She said she felt “scared” at the prospect of sitting on a capital jury, and that she would carry “guilt that a person would die because I said yes.” When the prosecutor probed those comments, J.A. agreed that she “probably really couldn‟t with a clear consci[ence] make that decision” to vote for a death sentence. Considering this record as a whole, the trial court was within its discretion to conclude that J.A. would be substantially impaired in her ability to serve on a capital case. Second, the trial court in Stewart excused prospective jurors based solely on their answers to a written question concerning whether their death penalty views would “ „prevent or make it very difficult‟ ” to determine the appropriate penalty, and 22 without engaging in oral voir dire. (Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 444, 446-447.) Our decision emphasized that “a trial judge who observes and speaks with a prospective juror and hears that person‟s responses (noting, among other things, the person‟s tone of voice, apparent level of confidence, and demeanor), gleans valuable information that simply does not appear on the record” (id. at p. 451), and we observed: “Had the trial court conducted a follow-up examination of each prospective juror and thereafter determined (in light of the questionnaire responses, oral responses, and its own assessment of demeanor and credibility) that the prospective juror‟s views would substantially impair the performance of his or her duties as a juror in this case, the court‟s determination would have been entitled to deference.” (Ibid.; see People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 529 [trial court has opportunity to assess prospective juror‟s demeanor and tone of voice].) Here there was such a followup examination. The court and the prosecutor extensively questioned Prospective Juror J.A. orally, and the court considered both her answers and her demeanor in excusing her for cause. We distinguished Stewart on this same basis in People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, in which the defendant argued that a juror‟s mere difficulty in imposing the death penalty is not a valid basis for excusal. We observed that the trial court had engaged the juror in oral voir dire, and held: “Under such circumstances, a juror‟s conflicting or ambiguous answers may indeed give rise to the court‟s definite impression about the juror‟s qualifications, and its decision to excuse the juror deserves deference on appeal.” (Id. at p. 674, fn. 22; see People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 360 [distinguishing Stewart]; People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 80 [same].) For these reasons, we conclude that the record supports a conclusion that Prospective Juror J.A. was indeed substantially impaired because, based on her feelings of guilt, she could not impose a death sentence, and hence the trial court did not err in granting the excusal for cause. 23