Opinion ID: 1698030
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State-agent Immunity and the Cranman Restatement

Text: In Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000), this Court set out a new test for determining when a State employee is entitled to State-agent immunity: A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent's (1) formulating plans, policies or designs; or (2) exercising his or her judgment in the administration of a department or agency of government, including, but not limited to, examples such as: (a) making administrative adjudications; (b) allocating resources; (c) negotiating contracts; (d) hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising personnel; or (3) discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for performing the duties and the State agent performs the duties in that manner; or (4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to arrest persons; or (5) exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons of unsound mind, or educating students. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall not be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity (1) when the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws, rules, or regulations of this State enacted or promulgated for the purpose of regulating the activities of a governmental agency require otherwise; or (2) when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law. 792 So.2d at 405. Although Cranman was a plurality decision, the test for determining State-agent immunity as restated in Cranman was adopted by this Court in Butts, 775 So.2d at 177-78 (We today adopt this new test suggested in Cranman. ).
Under Alabama law, [e]very peace officer. . . shall have immunity from tort liability arising out of his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-338(a). Before the adoption of the test enumerated in Cranman, this Court determined whether a peace officer was entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338(a) by examining whether the officer was engaged in a discretionary function. Couch v. City of Sheffield, 708 So.2d 144, 153 (Ala.1998); Ex parte City of Montgomery, 758 So.2d 565, 569-70 (Ala.1999); Williams v. Crook, 741 So.2d 1074, 1076 (Ala.1999); and Montgomery v. City of Montgomery, 732 So.2d 305, 311 (Ala.Civ.App.1999). Discretionary acts are defined as `those acts to which there is no hard and fast rule as to the course of conduct that one must or must not take and those acts requiring exercise in judgment and choice and involving what is just and proper under the circumstances.' Wright v. Wynn, 682 So.2d 1, 2 (Ala.1996). Ex parte City of Montgomery, 758 So.2d at 569. However, discretionary-function immunity under § 6-5-338(a) did not apply when the officer's conduct was so egregious as to amount to willful or malicious conduct or conduct engaged in in bad faith. Ex parte City of Gadsden, 781 So.2d 936, 938 (Ala.2000). The restatement of State-agent immunity as set out in Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405, now governs the determination of whether a peace officer is entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338(a). Swan v. City of Hueytown, 920 So.2d 1075, 1078 (Ala. 2005); Hollis v. City of Brighton, 885 So.2d 135, 143 (Ala.2004) (Whether a qualified peace officer is due § 6-5-338(a) immunity is now judged by the restatement of State-agent immunity articulated by Ex parte Cranman . . . .); and Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So.2d 201, 203 (Ala.2003) (Thus, we will address the applicability of peace-officer immunity under the principles set forth in Cranman. ). Since Cranman, we analyze [§ 6-5-338(a)] immunity issues in terms of `State-agent' immunity, rather than `under the dichotomy of ministerial versus discretionary functions.' Howard, 887 So.2d at 203 (quoting Ex parte Hudson, 866 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Ala.2003)). This Court has also addressed the difference between the language of § 6-5-338(a) and the language of Cranman describing the conduct for which immunity is available. Section 6-5-338(a) states that an officer is immune from tort liability arising out of his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties (emphasis added). In contrast, category (4) of the Cranman standard refers to  exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State (emphasis added). The Court has addressed this difference and stated: We notice a difference between certain critical language in the statute, § 6-5-338(a), and certain critical language in the Cranman restatement describing the conduct immunized. That is, the statute refers to `conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties' while immune category (4) of the Cranman restatement refers to conduct `exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to arrest persons.' Hollis, 885 So.2d at 143-44. The Court had the opportunity to reconcile this conflict in Swan. In Swan, we stated that [i]mmunity from tort liability must arise out of the peace officer's performance of `any discretionary function within the line or scope of his or her' law-enforcement duties. 920 So.2d at 1078 (quoting § 6-5-338(a), Ala.Code 1975). The Court then set out the Cranman standard and explained that since the Cranman test was adopted we analyze immunity issues under § 6-5-338(a) in terms of the principles set forth in Cranman.  Swan, 920 So.2d at 1078. Explaining the Cranman standard, the Court stated: Thus, the Cranman standard answers in the affirmative the question whether arresting a person is an exercise of judgmenta `discretionary function'and therefore clothes the officer in State-agent immunity. 920 So.2d at 1079. Therefore, conduct involving the exercise of judgment in the enforcement of criminal laws under the Cranman standard is also a discretionary function under § 6-5-338(a), Ala.Code 1975. Swan, 920 So.2d at 1082. We also note that even before the Cranman standard was adopted, this Court defined a discretionary function as an act that requir[es] exercise in judgment. Ex parte City of Montgomery, 758 So.2d at 569. Category (4) of the Cranman standard lists one type of function that is discretionary within the meaning of § 6-5-338(a)arresting or attempting to arrest a person. In our analysis of peace-officer immunity under § 6-5-338(a), we must keep in mind that the Cranman standard is a restatement of the law of immunity, not a statute.  Howard, 887 So.2d at 206. In addition, the Cranman standard states categories, but does not purport to set forth an exhaustive list of activities falling within each category. Howard, 887 So.2d at 206.
In Swan, a police officer for the City of Hueytown stopped a vehicle in which the plaintiff, Michael Swan, was a passenger. During the stop, the officer radioed a police dispatcher and asked the dispatcher to check the National Crime Information Center database to determine whether the driver or Swan had any outstanding warrants. The dispatcher informed the officer that the City of Birmingham had a possible outstanding warrant on Swan. The officer then instructed the dispatcher to contact the City of Birmingham to confirm the existence of the warrant. The officer was informed by the dispatcher that the City of Birmingham had confirmed the existence of two outstanding warrants for Swan's arrest. The evidence later indicated that the outstanding warrants were for a Michael Swann rather than the plaintiff, Michael Swan. Swan was arrested, and when it was determined that he had no outstanding warrants for his arrest, he was released. Swan sued the City of Hueytown claiming that he had suffered harm as a result of the officer's failure to determine his true identity. The City of Hueytown argued that it was entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338. In affirming the summary judgment for the City of Hueytown, this Court held that under both § 6-5-338 and the standard set out in Cranman, the officer was engaged in a discretionary function requiring an exercise in judgment when he arrested Swan and, therefore, was entitled to immunity. Swan, 920 So.2d at 1079. The Court also held that arrests and attempted arrests are generally classified as actions requiring an officer to exercise judgment. Swan, 920 So.2d at 1079. Arnold alleges that she was falsely imprisoned and falsely arrested as the result of the negligence, carelessness, and unskillfulness of John Moon and Theodore Moon. The petitioners, on the other hand, argue that John Moon and Theodore Moon are entitled to immunity under 6-5-338(a). [5] The facts of this case are similar to the facts of Swan. John Moon and Theodore Moon were arresting or attempting to arrest Arnold when they confirmed the existence of a warrant for her arrest. Therefore, under Cranman and Swan, this action is a discretionary function involving the exercise of judgment. See Swan, 920 So.2d at 1079 (Thus, the Cranman standard answers in the affirmative the question whether arresting a person is an exercise of judgmenta `discretionary function'and therefore clothes the officer in State-agent immunity.). Once the existence of the outstanding warrant was confirmed, based on the information provided by Theodore Moon John Moon decided to pick up a copy of the warrant and to arrest Arnold. Under Swan, the arrest involved an exercise of judgment within the meaning of the Cranman test. Swan, 920 So.2d at 1079. Therefore, John Moon and Theodore Moon are entitled to immunity because they were engaged in an arrest or attempted arrest, which is a discretionary function requiring the exercise of judgment. See City of Birmingham v. Sutherland, 834 So.2d 755, 762 (Ala.2002) (Allegations of negligence are not sufficient to remove the immunity the City is provided for [an officer's] performance of a discretionary function.) (citing Ex parte City of Montgomery, 758 So.2d at 570). Therefore, as to the claims alleging negligence, carelessness, and unskillfulness that were brought against John Moon and Theodore Moon, we grant the petition for the writ of mandamus and order the trial court to stay discovery and direct the trial court to conduct a hearing on the summary-judgment motion as to the claims against them based on carelessness, negligence, and unskillfulness. [6]
Peace officers are not entitled to absolute immunity under § 6-5-338(a); rather, immunity from tort liability under § 6-5-338(a) is withheld if an officer acts with willful or malicious intent or in bad faith. Borders v. City of Huntsville, 875 So.2d 1168, 1178 (Ala.2003). See also Gary v. Crouch, 867 So.2d 310, 313 (Ala. 2003) ([W]here a municipal police officer is engaged in a discretionary function with respect to the conduct complained of, he or she would be immune under § 6-5-338, `unless his [or her] actions were conducted with willful or malicious intent or in bad faith.') (quoting Ex parte City of Montgomery, 758 So.2d at 570). Cf. Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405 (holding that a State agent is not entitled to immunity when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law). Arnold alleges that John Moon and Theodore Moon acted in bad faith in arresting her in that they may have fabricated or concocted the warrant after she was arrested. The petitioners argue that John Moon and Theodore Moon are immune from liability as to this claim under § 6-5-338(a). If John Moon and Theodore Moon acted in bad faith, with malice, or with willfulness in arresting Arnold, however, they are not entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338(a). See Borders, 875 So.2d at 1178. Cf. Swan, 920 So.2d at 1081 (holding that a municipal police officer was entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338(a) although he arrested the wrong person, because the plaintiff did not allege that his arrest was made in bad faith, with malice, or willfully). John Moon stated that Arnold was present at the municipal court complex when the employee in the clerk's office notified him that there was an outstanding warrant for Arnold's arrest. In contrast, Arnold claims John Moon could not have verified the existence of the warrant as he claimed he did in his affidavit because she was arrested immediately upon entering the foyer of the municipal court complex. Arnold also alleges that John Moon refused to let her see the warrant when he arrested her. In addition, Arnold alleges that after she was released from jail she returned to the municipal court complex to obtain a copy. However, Arnold states that no one in the municipal court clerk's office could provide her with a copy. Arnold further states that she did not actually receive a copy of the warrant until after she filed her initial complaint in the state court. Lastly, Arnold alleges that her arrest may have been made in bad faith or that the warrant may have been fabricated or concocted by John Moon or Theodore Moon because of a previous dispute Arnold had had with Theodore Moon. In 1996, Arnold's granddaughter was severely injured and suffered permanent brain damage while she was in the care of a babysitter, and Theodore Moon was assigned to investigate the case. No arrests were made, and Arnold believed that Theodore Moon had failed to properly investigate the cause of her granddaughter's injuries. Arnold complained to the district attorney and the attorney general's office about Theodore Moon's work on the case. Therefore, Arnold alleges, her arrest may have been made in bad faith by Theodore Moon because of their previous dispute. The petitioners have no clear legal right to the order sought as to Arnold's claims that John Moon and Theodore Moon acted with malice and bad faith in arresting her because it is possible that Arnold could prove facts showing that the officers are not entitled to immunity. See Butts, 775 So.2d at 178 (`[i]t is not for this court to determine, based on the complaint, whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only if he may possibly prevail.' . . . It is conceivable that [the plaintiffs] could prove facts that would show that [the petitioners]. . . acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, [or] in bad faith . . . .) (quoting Patton v. Black, 646 So.2d 8, 10 (Ala.1994)). See also Burdeshaw v. Snell, 350 F.Supp.2d 944, 952-53 (M.D.Ala.2004) (holding that on the basis of the complaint there isor can bea factual basis which divests [the defendant police officer] of his statutory immunity because the officer arrested the plaintiff for possession of drugs but failed to investigate the plaintiff's claim that he had a valid prescription for the drugs); and Walker v. Briley, 140 F.Supp.2d 1249, 1263 (N.D.Ala.2001) (denying summary-judgment motion filed by a police officer who argued that he was immune under § 6-5-338(a) from a claim of false arrest because the evidence suggested that the officer had no grounds to believe [the plaintiff] had committed any offense whatsoever and a reasonable jury could determine that the arrest was in bad faith). The determination whether John Moon and Theodore Moon are entitled to immunity as to Arnold's claim that the officers acted willfully, maliciously, or in bad faith is dependent upon the specific facts of this case. After discovery, the trial court can determine whether Arnold can produce sufficient evidence showing that the officers acted in bad faith, with malice, or willfully so that a summary judgment on the basis of immunity under § 6-5-338 should not be entered. See Department of Mental Health, 837 So.2d at 814 (After the parties have had the opportunity to conduct discovery, [the petitioner] will have the opportunity to seek a summary judgment on the ground that she is entitled to State-agent immunity.). Because there is no clear legal right to an order directing the trial court to stay discovery and conduct a hearing on the summary-judgment motion as to the claim that John Moon and Theodore Moon acted in bad faith or with malice when they arrested Arnold, the petition for the writ of mandamus is due to be denied as to this claim.
Clerks of court and magistrates like Ware and Baker are afforded judicial immunity for their discretionary judicial acts. City of Bayou La Batre v. Robinson, 785 So.2d 1128, 1133 (Ala.2000) (citing Almon v. Gibbs, 545 So.2d 18, 20 (Ala.1989)). Judicial-immunity cases decided both before and after the Cranman restatement was adopted provide guidance in this case. Before the adoption of the Cranman restatement, this Court determined whether clerks and magistrates were entitled to judicial immunity by first analyzing whether the clerk or magistrate was acting within his or her official capacity, and secondly, whether the act was discretionary or administrative in nature. Almon, 545 So.2d at 20. In Almon, a district court clerk was sued for failing to issue a warrant. The clerk decided not to issue the warrant after determining that there was a lack of probable cause for arrest. This Court has held that where a clerk of court is performing a duty that requires the exercise of judgment and discretion in its performance, it is considered a judicial act entitling the clerk to judicial immunity. This absolute immunity for acts within the jurisdiction of the judicial officer is extended even where the officer acts in error, maliciously, or in excess of his authority. 545 So.2d at 20. We held that the court clerk was entitled to immunity because the determination whether probable cause to issue a warrant existed involved an exercise of discretion. Almon, 545 So.2d at 20. Since the adoption of the Cranman restatement, this Court analyzes whether a magistrate or court clerk is entitled to judicial immunity for official acts by determining whether the magistrate or clerk was required to `exercise judgment' in the execution of the task. Bayou La Batre, 785 So.2d at 1133 (quoting Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405). In Bayou La Batre, a city court magistrate attempted to fax a warrant-recall order to the city police department. The magistrate placed the recall order upside down in the fax machine so that she in fact transmitted the back of the ordera blank pagerather than the recall order itself. Bayou La Batre, 785 So.2d at 1130. The police never received the recall order, and the plaintiff was arrested because the police believed that there was an outstanding warrant for the plaintiff's arrest. The plaintiff sued the City of Bayou La Batre, alleging false arrest and false imprisonment. The city argued that because the magistrate enjoyed judicial immunity the city was also immune from liability as to claims based on the magistrate's conduct. This Court held that magistrates and clerks are officials with a blend of judicial and administrative duties and that, under Cranman, they are entitled to judicial immunity when they are required to `exercise judgment' in the execution of a task. Bayou La Batre, 785 So.2d at 1133 (citing Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405). We held that, under the Cranman restatement, the magistrate was not entitled to judicial immunity because she was performing an administrative duty that did not involve the exercise of judgment when she faxed the warrant-recall order to the police department. Bayou La Batre, 785 So.2d at 1133. In addition, this Court distinguished the acts of the court magistrate in faxing the warrant-recall order upside down from the acts of the court clerk in Almon. We stated: This Court held [in Almon ] that the determination of whether probable cause existed to issue a warrant is a judicial act, an act that properly affords judicial immunity. [545 So.2d at 20.] The situation with which we are confronted today is whether a magistrate should be protected by judicial immunity for failure to recall a warrant. Bayou La Batre, 785 So.2d at 1133. The petitioners argue that their petition is due to be granted because, they say, Ware and Baker have judicial immunity. [7] Baker, in her affidavit, stated that Ware instructed her to clean up any pending or unresolved files. In doing so, Baker apparently made an error in issuing the capias warrant for Arnold's arrest for failure to appear. Under the holding in Bayou La Batre, the Cranman test is applied to determine whether Baker and Ware are entitled to judicial immunity. 785 So.2d at 1133. The petitioners state that Baker and Ware's decision to issue the warrant for Arnold's arrest required the exercise of judgment and discretion in issuing a warrant to resolve a pending file. Despite this argument, the evidence before us does not indicate what steps Baker and Ware took before issuing the warrant for Arnold's arrest. Baker's and Ware's affidavits do not describe how they made the decisions to clean up the court files and to issue the warrant for Arnold's arrest. At this point in the proceeding, it is unclear whether Ware's instruction to clean up the files and Baker's actions in cleaning up the files were discretionary-type actions that involved the exercise of judgment required for immunity under Cranman. [8] We are unable to determine whether Baker's and Ware's actions are like the administrative act of the magistrate in Bayou La Batre, 785 So.2d at 1129 (faxing the warrant-recall order upside down) or the discretionary-type action of the court clerk in Almon, 545 So.2d at 20 (determining whether probable cause existed to issue a warrant). Therefore, at this point in the proceeding, Baker and Ware have not established a clear legal right to an order directing the trial court to stay discovery and conduct a hearing on the summary-judgment motion on the basis of judicial immunity.
Arnold alleges that the City of Tuskegee is vicariously liable for the negligence, carelessness, and unskillfulness of John Moon and Theodore Moon. The petitioners argue that because the officers are immune from liability under § 6-5-338(a) the City is immune from liability under § 6-5-338(b). Section § 6-5-338(b) provides: This section is intended to extend immunity only to peace officers and governmental units or agencies authorized to appoint peace officers. No immunity is extended hereby to any private non-governmental person or entity, including any private employer of a peace officer during that officer's off-duty hours. It is well established that, if a municipal police officer is immune pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), then, pursuant to § 6-5-338(b), the city by which he is employed is also immune. Howard, 887 So.2d at 211. Because we have held that John Moon and Theodore Moon are immune from Arnold's claim alleging negligence, unskillfulness, or carelessness, the City is also immune from liability as to this claim by virtue of § 6-5-338(b). Therefore, the petition for a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to stay discovery is due to be granted as to the claims against the City based upon the negligence, carelessness, and unskillfulness of John Moon and Theodore Moon, and we direct the trial court to conduct a hearing on the City's motion for a summary judgment as to these claims. Arnold also claims that the City of Tuskegee is vicariously liable for the bad faith of John Moon and Theodore Moon in allegedly concocting the warrant. The City argues that it is immune from liability as to these claims under Ala.Code 1975, § 11-47-190. Section 11-47-190 provides that a municipality is immune from tort liability unless such injury or wrong was done or suffered through the neglect, carelessness or unskillfulness of some agent, officer or employee of the municipality engaged in work therefor and while acting in the line of his or her duty. This statute limits a municipality's liability for the acts of its agents to those acts that are negligent, careless, or unskillful. Section 11-47-190 provides a municipality immunity from liability for the acts of its agents that are carried out in bad faith or with malice. Borders, 875 So.2d at 1183 (quoting Ex parte City of Gadsden, 718 So.2d 716, 721 (Ala.1998)). The City has a clear legal right to an order directing the trial court to stay discovery as to Arnold's claims that are based upon the intentional conduct of John Moon and Theodore Moon because a municipality cannot be held liable for the intentional torts of its agents. Therefore, we grant the petition for the writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to stay discovery as to the claims based upon the bad faith or malicious acts of John Moon and Theodore Moon, and we direct the trial court to hold a hearing on the City's motion for a summary judgment as to these claims. Arnold also alleges that the City of Tuskegee is vicariously liable for the actions of Baker and Ware. Because we have held that, at this point in the proceeding, Baker and Ware were not entitled to judicial immunity as to Arnold's claims of negligence, unskillfulness, or carelessness against them, Arnold has stated a cause of action against the City of Tuskegee under § 11-47-190. See Franklin, 670 So.2d at 852 ([W]here a plaintiff alleges a factual pattern that demonstrates `neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness' the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under Ala.Code 1975, § 11-47-190.). The City of Tuskegee does not have a clear legal right to an order instructing the trial court to stay discovery and conduct a hearing on the summary-judgment motion as to this claim because it is possible that Arnold could discover facts demonstrating that Baker and Ware are not immune from liability by virtue of judicial immunity. Accordingly, we deny the petition for the writ of mandamus as to this claim. The City of Tuskegee does have a clear legal right to an order directing the trial court to stay discovery and conduct a hearing on the motion for a summary judgment as to the claim that it is vicariously liable for the acts of Baker and Ware that were allegedly carried out with bad faith or malice. As stated earlier in this opinion, under § 11-47-190, a municipality is immune from liability for the intentional torts of its agents. Borders, 875 So.2d at 1183 (quoting City of Gadsden, 718 So.2d at 721). The City cannot be held liable for any intentional torts on the part of Baker and Ware. Therefore, the City's petition for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to stay discovery as to the claim that it is vicariously liable for the alleged intentional torts of Baker and Ware is due to be granted, and we direct the trial court to conduct a hearing on the summary-judgment motion as to this claim.