Opinion ID: 2570347
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Free Alienation of Property

Text: ¶ 47 By statute and by law, conveyances of fee simple absolute, the largest estates, are favored. Richardson, 44 Wash.2d 760, 270 P.2d 802; 17 STOEBUCK & WEAVER, supra, § 1.3, at 5. Accordingly, in order to make an estate conditional, the words used in the deed must clearly indicate such an intent. King County v. Hanson Inv. Co., 34 Wash.2d 112, 119, 208 P.2d 113 (1949). It is well settled that [b]efore a trust will be found to exist, there must be a clear manifestation thereof. Hoffman v. Tieton View Cmty. Methodist Episcopal Church, 33 Wash.2d 716, 726, 207 P.2d 699 (1949). The evidence to establish a trust must be clear and satisfactory. Id. (citing Kinney v. McCall, 57 Wash. 545, 107 P. 385 (1910); Lanigan v. Miles, 102 Wash. 82, 172 P. 894 (1918)). This means that the instrument manifests an intention to create a trust. Id. ¶ 48 In Hoffman, a local church argued that a trust relationship was created by a lease of property on which a church had built a parsonage. In analyzing the lease to ascertain whether a trust relationship was created, the court set out the following principles: The entire instrument and its general purpose and scope may, and where necessary should, be considered, and its various parts compared. The instrument should be construed in the light of the situation and circumstances surrounding its execution. Id. at 726, 207 P.2d 699 (citing 54 Am.Jur. 63, 64, § 53). ¶ 49 In language similar to that of the deed in this case, under the terms of the lease in Hoffman, the property at issue was `never [to] be used for any other than church, charity, literary or community purposes.' Id. at 724, 207 P.2d 699. The court rejected the church's theory that this language created a trust, finding that the instrument was an ordinary short-form lease, for a term of years with a nominal rental. It contained the usual covenants for use and occupancy, with a provision for re-entry on breach of the covenants. Id. at 727, 207 P.2d 699. The court concluded that the instrument was a lease and not a trust instrument, entered into primarily for the purpose of providing ground for the erection of a parsonage for a minister of the Methodist Episcopal Church, thereafter to be assigned to the local church. Id. ¶ 50 In this case, taking all of the provisions of the deed into consideration, as well as the circumstances surrounding the conveyance of the church property in 1956, there is nothing to suggest that the parties intended to convey this property subject to a trust. As in Hoffman, the instrument contains no language common in trust agreements. Rather, evaluating the language of the deed in this case there can be no doubt that, similar to the earlier 1914 deed, the 1956 deed conveyed to VCC all property interests held by ECC  a fee simple absolute. ¶ 51 The granting clause provides: NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, the Party of the First Part does, by these presents, convey and quit claim to Vaughn Community Church, a Washington corporation, all its interest in the following described real estate, situate in Pierce County, Washington, to-wit: [legal description of the property] Ex. 92 (emphasis added). Significantly, the granting clause did not convey and quit claim the property in trust to VCC. Rather, it conveyed and quit claimed the property directly to VCC. When transferring property by quit claim, the conveyance is affected by a quit claim deed. See, e.g., 17 STOEBUCK & WEAVER, supra, § 7.2, at 472 (a quit claim deed transfers all legal and equitable rights the grantor may have in the described land). It is also undisputed that prior to the conveyance, ECC, like all prior churches in custody of the property, held the property in fee simple absolute, free of any trust, restriction, or limitation. See, e.g., Exs. 88-93. ¶ 52 The only possible language that could potentially indicate a trust, to have and to hold for the perpetual use of Protestant Evangelical Churches of the Community of Vaughn, Washington in the habendum clause must be read in the context of the rest of the document. The recitals provided that ECC, a Protestant Evangelical Church in Vaughn, voted to merge with the Christian Church of Vaughn, the other Protestant Evangelical Church in Vaughn. The church property was to be used (and in fact was used for over six years prior to the conveyance in 1956) by two formerly independent Protestant Evangelical Churches operating in Vaughn. When entities combine and merge, all property interests held by the prior entities are transferred to the new entity, a successor in interest to the prior entity or entities. See, e.g., RCW 24.03.210(4) (providing in part that a surviving or new corporation shall possess all property of each merging or consolidating corporation, without further act or deed); Wilkeson v. Rector, Wardens & Vestry of St. Luke's Parish of Tacoma, 176 Wash. 377, 29 P.2d 748 (1934) (determining that it was proper for the lower court to direct a conveyance of property to a new church that resulted from the merger of two churches). ¶ 53 It is well settled that courts do not reach to find trusts when circumstances do not justify the need for a trust. For example, in Young Women's Christian Association of Asheville, North Carolina, Inc. v. Morgan, 281 N.C. 485, 189 S.E.2d 169 (1972), a testator conveyed property to the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA), a charitable corporation, by will for the purpose of maintaining the Moorhead House, a facility supported by the YWCA. In reaching its conclusion that the will did not create a trust, the court noted that a trust was not necessary because the bequest was for the principal purpose set forth in the YWCA's charter. Thus, the YWCA, as a charitable organization governed by state law, was already obligated to carry out the purpose of the bequest. As a result, the YWCA held the bequest in fee without a trust. Accord Zabel v. Stewart, 153 Kan. 272, 109 P.2d 177-78, 181 (1941) (the provisions of a bequest to a religious corporation for the purpose of building a church building and for the purpose of furnishing said church did not create a trust in any legal sense because the gift was to aid the religious corporation in carrying out the purposes for which it was founded); Williams v. Thompson, 216 N.C. 292, 4 S.E.2d 609 (1939) (the language in the will indicating that the property was to be used as a parsonage for the minister of the church and to keeping and care, cannot be held to have the effect of impressing upon a trust upon the legal title). ¶ 54 In this case, taking all of the provisions of the deed into consideration, it is clear that the deed did not create a trust, and there is no reason whatsoever for the court to reach to find a trust. As discussed above, the conveyance of this property was pursuant to a merger of two churches. ECC did not convey the property under a will in which failure to find a trust would result in intestacy or the property not being conveyed to a charity. VCC is a charitable organization created and organized for the very purpose of providing church services in the community of Vaughn. See, e.g., Ex. 5 (containing VCC's articles of incorporation). ¶ 55 As I conclude that the deed did not create a charitable trust, the next step is to determine the type of property interest conveyed. The construction of deeds is a matter of law for the courts. Martin v. City of Seattle, 111 Wash.2d 727, 765 P.2d 257 (1988). If the words and provisions in the deed are doubtful, they are to be taken most strongly against the grantor. Cook v. Hensler, 57 Wash. 392, 107 P. 178 (1910). If the words and provisions are susceptible of different constructions, the court may take into consideration the circumstances attending the transaction, the particular situation of the parties, and the state of the thing granted at the time of making the grant, for the purpose of ascertaining the probable intent. Cook, 57 Wash. at 399, 107 P. 178. ¶ 56 Turning to this deed, the granting clause provides that ECC does convey and quit claim to [VCC] all its interest in the following described real estate, situate in Pierce County, Washington, the church property. Exs. 10, 92. As discussed above, this deed conveys all legal and equitable rights and interests the grantor may have in the described land. 17 STOEBUCK & WEAVER, supra, § 7.2, at 472. The granting clause does not contain any limitation or condition indicating that ECC retains any rights in the property. Read alone, the granting clause indicates that VCC received all of ECC's interest (a fee simple absolute interest) in the property. As mentioned earlier, it is undisputed that prior to the transfer, ECC owned the property in fee simple absolute. See, e.g., Exs. 88-93. ¶ 57 The recital clauses and the habendum clause are consistent with the granting clause's conveyance of a fee simple absolute interest in the property. One recital clause provided that ECC voted to merge with the Christian Church of Vaughn and form a new church. When an entity merges into another entity or two entities create a new entity, all property interests owned by the prior corporations are conveyed in full. See, e.g., RCW 24.03.210(4); Wilkeson, 176 Wash. 377, 29 P.2d 748. ¶ 58 The habendum clause provides VCC has the property [to have and to hold] said property for the perpetual use of Protestant Evangelical Churches of the Community of Vaughn, Washington. Exs. 10, 92. A separate recital clause provides that on April 5, 1949, the Board of Trustees of ECC passed a resolution that [ECC] transfer the church property to [VCC], with the stipulation that said property shall forever remain for the perpetual use of Protestant Evangelical Churches of the Community of Vaughn. Id. The term perpetual indicates permanent ownership. Neither the habendum clause nor the recital provide for a right of reversion in the event VCC does not use the property for Protestant Evangelical Churches of the Community of Vaughn, Washington. Indeed, in the context of a merger, a reversion makes no sense. After the merger, ECC no longer exists. Its members have all become members of the new church. Most of its trustees have become trustees in the new church. ¶ 59 The deed is a standard quit claim deed in which ECC transferred all of its property interest, a fee simple absolute property interest, in the property to VCC, the successor entity to ECC. This conclusion effectuates the intent of the deed in its entirety. It also accords with the principle that free alienation of property is favored and that unless a deed clearly indicates conveyance of a conditional estate, a fee simple absolute is conveyed. ¶ 60 Furthermore, the deed does not create a restrictive covenant limiting VCC's use of the property. Early in the litigation, Niemann argued that the habendum clause created a running covenant limiting VCC's use of the property. Niemann later abandoned this reasoning, conceding that it would be legally impossible for ECC to create a restrictive covenant. CP at 97 (citing 17 STOEBUCK & WEAVER, supra, § 3.2, at 125). I agree. In this case, ECC could not have created a restrictive covenant on its own land. See, e.g., 17 STOEBUCK & WEAVER, supra, § 3.2 (A landowner cannot by himself place a running covenant on his own land, for the same reason that one cannot make a contract with himself or create an easement on his own land.); § 3.3, at 131; § 3.12, at 151 (restrictive covenants must touch and concern the land, needing both a benefited and a burdened parcel); accord WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.15, at 475-80; § 8.24, at 495-97 (3d ed.2000); 1515-1519 Lakeview Blvd. Condo. Ass'n v. Apartment Sales Corp., 146 Wash.2d 194, 43 P.3d 1233 (2002). Accordingly, the deed conveyed a fee simple absolute interest in the property to VCC. ¶ 61 I would remand this case to the trial court for entry of judgment for VCC.