Opinion ID: 2619978
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: contributory negligence of favored drivers

Text: The foregoing discussion and conclusions are largely predicated upon the assumption that this court is still following its established rules concerning the standard of care which a favored driver must meet. Since deciding the case of Mondor v. Rhoades, 63 Wn.2d 159, 385 P.2d 722 (1963), this court has held that a disfavored driver who fails to yield the right of way is negligent as a matter of law unless he is deceived by the actions of the favored driver. Accord, Archibald v. Gossard, 65 Wn.2d 486, 397 P.2d 851 (1965). On the other hand, we have held that a favored driver is negligent if he fails to exercise the care a reasonably prudent man would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. Bauman v. Complita, supra, at 498, 403 P.2d at 348-49. See Tobias v. Rainwater, 71 Wn.2d 845, 431 P.2d 156 (1967). It is clear, however, that at least the concurring opinion written by Donworth, J., and signed by Hale, J., departs from these rules by extending the rule of Mondor v. Rhoades, supra , to make a disfavored driver not only negligent but liable if he fails to yield the right of way. This is apparent from the following statement in the concurring opinion: There is no equivocation in the duties imposed by the legislature upon the disfavored driver at a controlled intersection.... His failure to comply with these duties renders him negligent as a matter of law, and liable for all damages proximately caused by his wrongful action. (Italics mine.) Unless a favored driver is deceptive in his actions (which is not the same thing as being negligent), [6] or fails to exercise a last clear chance of avoiding an accident, the concurring judges would hold the disfavored driver liable, regardless of the favored driver's negligence. I simply must disagree with this position. In Mondor v. Rhoades, supra , this court explicitly stated that absolute liability will not be imposed on a disfavored driver in an intersection collision without legislative sanction. See also Bennett v. Karnowsky, 24 Wn.2d 487, 166 P.2d 192 (1946). Yet, in effect, this is now proposed by the concurring opinion. It would remove the element of a favored driver's negligence from intersection-collision cases altogether. This is contrary to every Washington decision which has considered the issue. E.g., Harris v. Fiore, 70 Wn.2d 357, 423 P.2d 63 (1967); Ward v. Zeugner, 64 Wn.2d 570, 392 P.2d 811 (1964). It would be both illogical and dangerous to adopt a rule that, if no last clear chance is available, a favored driver, regardless of his negligence, may recover from a disfavored driver whenever the disfavored driver is undeceived and fails to yield the right of way. I agree with the concurring judges that the rule of Martin v. Hadenfeldt, 157 Wash. 563, 289 Pac. 533 (1930), [7] may not provide adequate protection for favored drivers unless their favored status is emphasized. Nonetheless, I do not believe a solution to this problem lies in crystallization of a rule which practically guarantees their recovery. In the first place, such a rule would inflict too much hardship on disfavored drivers. In the second place, it is always dangerous to attempt to establish a fixed and mechanistic standard of conduct which is to be applied in every case arising within a given category, such as intersection collisions. As pointed out by Dean Prosser, whenever such a standard has been established it almost invariably ... has broken down in the face of the obvious necessity of basing the standard upon the particular circumstances, the apparent risk and the actor's opportunity to deal with it. W. Prosser, Torts § 37, at 210 (3d ed. 1964). Despite views and efforts of the concurring judges, contributory negligence still should be a factor when deciding whether a favored driver may recover from a disfavored driver. However, the likelihood of finding contributory negligence in any given case has been sharply decreased because of additional preferment extended to favored drivers by the majority. As pointed out previously, contributory negligence of favored drivers has traditionally been measured by the reasonably prudent man test. Bauman v. Complita, 66 Wn.2d 496, 403 P.2d 347 (1965). See Robison v. Simard, 57 Wn.2d 850, 360 P.2d 153 (1961). Under this test, one element to be considered is the right of way of favored drivers. This test does not, however, regulate the weight to be placed upon, or degree of importance of, this right of way. We have used an additional rule for this. In the instant case, the majority has radically departed from what has heretofore been the rule of this court as to the importance of favored driver status in cases in which a favored driver, who has not been looking for traffic ahead, seeks to rely on his favored position after colliding with a disfavored driver. The earlier rule, briefly stated, is that a favored driver who does not look for approaching traffic may not be heard to say that he assumed disfavored drivers would yield to his right of way. In Owens v. Kuro, 56 Wn.2d 564, 572, 354 P.2d 696, 701 (1960), we stated: Appellants urge, however, they had a right to rely on the fact that, since the light had turned amber, any oncoming vehicle would not proceed through the end of an amber light. Such contention would be meritorious had appellant driver seen the car approaching and from its actions reasonably relied upon it to stop. But the facts are not so. Appellant driver did not see the oncoming car, and therefore, could not have relied upon it to stop. One cannot merely depend on another's obeying a traffic signal without observing the situation. (Italics mine.) In Owens, we also quoted with approval, at 573 n. 5, 354 P.2d at 701 n. 4, the following passage from 2 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law & Practice § 1028, at 303 (perm. ed. 1951): The rule that a motorist has a right to assume that other users of the highway will not drive negligently and will obey stop signs applies only in favor of those whose conduct measures up to a standard of due care. If a driver does not notice a motorist approaching an intersection from the left, he cannot assert that he thought the motorist from the left would give him the right of way. (Italics mine.) It would appear that it is the intention of the majority to now overrule sub silentio the rule of Owens v. Kuro . Even though plaintiff, by his own statements, established that he did not look for approaching traffic until an instant before the accident, the majority takes the position that plaintiff had a right to assume that others, including defendant, would yield the right of way. It may be that the rule in Owens is too denigrating as to the right of way of favored drivers to be permitted to stand. If so, it should be expressly overruled. No good purpose is served by leaving in effect at the same time two contrary and irreconcilable rules of law. This is particularly pertinent because the rule adopted in Owens has been recently cited with approval by this court. Tobias v. Rainwater, 71 Wn.2d 845, 431 P.2d 156 (1967); Bauman v. Complita, supra . It seems important to note parenthetically what to me is the basis upon which the majority and concurring judges formulated their decision concerning the weight to be placed on the status of favored drivers. In Mondor v. Rhoades, 63 Wn.2d 159, 385 P.2d 722 (1963), we recognized that a favored driver's right of way is not absolute. Consequently, the majority could not adopt such a rule in the instant case without overruling Mondor. On the other hand, it is clear the majority are not satisfied with the status of favored drivers under the Owens v. Kuro rule, and indeed wish to make a favored driver's right of way as strong as possible. As a result of the conflict between the desires of the majority and the limits of Mondor, this court seems to have now adopted a rule which states that the right of way of favored drivers is absolute except when one or two particularized circumstances are present (deception and last clear chance). In short, we seem to be saying that the right of way is almost absolute. Some examples may serve to illustrate my point. The majority opinion states: The favored driver on an arterial protected by a stop sign has one of the strongest rights of way which the law allows. Certainly as strong as the one discussed in Mondor v. Rhoades . ... (Italics mine.) Regarding the reference to Mondor by the majority, we there said, at 63 Wn.2d at 167, 385 P.2d at 727, that the principal reason we did not make a favored driver's right of way absolute in an uncontrolled intersection was that [r]oom must be left for the extreme case, the case where the driver on the left is able to demonstrate that the favored driver so wrongfully and negligently operated his car as to create a deception tantamount to an entrapment. ... (Italics mine.) The concurring opinion in the instant case is even more direct when it says I would abandon rules of relative rights of way which have developed from Martin v. Hadenfeldt, supra , and, instead, bar recovery by the favored driver in only two circumstances; [deception and last clear chance].... (Italics mine.) I, too, wish to see a favored driver's right of way given substantial protection. My quarrel is with the way in which this court has framed the rule protecting this right. A rule which focuses attention on the absoluteness of a right which is not absolute necessarily presents conceptual difficulties. Either a right is absolute or it is not absolute; it cannot be almost absolute any more than an individual can be almost married. If a right is not absolute, then in fact it is really relative. If a majority of the members of this court wish to make a favored driver's right of way absolute, they should say so and overrule Mondor v. Rhoades, supra . If they do not, they should recognize explicitly that the right of way is relative and phrase the opinion governing this right in terms which reflect its relativity. Judging from the phrases quoted above, I do not believe this has been done. One final point must be mentioned. In the majority opinion, the statement is made, as mentioned above, that [t]he favored driver on an arterial protected by a stop sign has one of the strongest rights of way which the law allows. Two distinct meanings may be attached to this sentence. First, this sentence may mean that, in exercising due care under the circumstances, a favored driver has a right to rely heavily on his right of way. Second, it may mean that a favored driver need not exercise ordinary care under the circumstances but in fact may exercise less than ordinary care. The distinction between the two is that the former construction reflects an application of the normal rule used to determine the existence of negligence, namely, the reasonably prudent man rule (although, as I have said, the application seems to be phrased in a manner which fails to accurately reflect the relativity of the right of way), while the latter construction implies that a special rule has been created for favored drivers, one not tied to the reasonably prudent man rule. If the second interpretation is correct, then I also must dissent from this aspect of the majority opinion. Creation of special rules to govern the basic standard of care in particular classes of cases is contrary to a fundamental tenet of this court. We have consistently adhered to the view that there is but one standard of care which individuals are required to exercise, that of a reasonably prudent man under the same or similar circumstances. Anderson v. Beagle, 71 Wn.2d 641, 430 P.2d 539 (1967); Ulve v. Raymond, 51 Wn.2d 241, 317 P.2d 908 (1957). The reason for this view is obvious. Creation of different standards of care for different situations would ultimately lead to a chaotic overabundance of rules. Furthermore, and this is crucial in the instant case, additional rules are unnecessary to fully protect the rights of favored drivers. The reasonable man test by definition considers the circumstances under which an individual acts, and a favored driver is more than adequately protected if his right to rely on his right of way is stressed as a surrounding circumstance. Cf. Huber v. Hemrich Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 235, 62 P.2d 451 (1936). I am firmly convinced that by limiting ourselves to a general test  that of a reasonably prudent man  this court could retain the flexibility necessary to sit in judgment in future intersection-collision cases. As Mr. Justice Cardozo so aptly phrased it, Extraordinary situations may not wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or regulations that are fitting for the commonplace or normal. Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 105, 91 A.L.R. 1049 (1934). Until we are better able to predict the course of future litigation, establishment of rigid and special rules seems improvident at best. With these principles in mind, and for the reasons stated, I dissent.