Opinion ID: 710067
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Late Filing of the Amended PSR

Text: 94 Initially, we address Demski's claim that the filing of the amended PSR within ten days of her sentencing hearing prejudiced her ability to prepare adequately for the hearing. The amended report was filed four days after Demski made her objections to the original PSR, and just one day before the sentencing hearing. This, according to Demski, violated 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3552(d), which requires that a presentence report be disclosed to the defendant, the counsel for the defendant, and the attorney for the Government at least ten days prior to the date set for sentencing, unless this minimum period is waived by the defendant. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3552(d). 95 It is true that Demski had a right to have the PSR disclosed to her at least ten days before the sentencing hearing, and that she did not waive this right by failing to object to the late-filing at the sentencing hearing. 19 See United States v. Blythe, 944 F.2d 356 (7th Cir.1991) (a defendant waives rights under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3552(d) if he makes no objection at the appropriate time). However, we do not believe that the probation office's eleventh-hour filing of the amended PSR significantly affected Ms. Demski's right to a fair sentencing hearing. We do not believe that this procedural misstep warrants disturbing the sentence of the district court, which, as discussed elsewhere in this opinion, was well-founded and not clearly erroneous. 96 We note that when Demski's attorney raised the issue of the amended PSR at the hearing, the sentencing judge stated very directly I'm not taking it into account so you don't need to respond to it. Counsel for Demski did not request an adjournment or express any dissatisfaction with the judge's statement that she would not take the amended PSR into account. Moreover, the law is clear that a sentencing judge is not bound by the PSR's recommendations concerning sentence. United States v. Heilprin, 910 F.2d 471, 475 (7th Cir.1990). We also observe that Demski's counsel was either lucky, clairvoyant, or extremely quick on her feet, for she did present cogent arguments in favor of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, despite the lack of time in which to prepare. Demski thus had an opportunity to comment upon the probation officer's determination and on other matters relating to the appropriate sentence, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.