Opinion ID: 672340
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Strike of Venireperson

Text: 43 At trial, the prosecutor exercised peremptory strikes to remove three black persons from the jury. Appellants assert that one of these challenges, that of venireperson Portis, violated the Constitution's equal protection guarantee because it was racially motivated. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Without finding that Appellants had established a prima facie case of discrimination, the district court asked the prosecutor to articulate the reasons underpinning the strikes. The prosecutor responded that she struck Portis because (1) she believed that Portis may have been related to a defendant whom she had formerly prosecuted and (2) Portis was generally inattentive during the voir dire, focusing on the defense table during jury selection. The court upheld the strike of Portis. 44 We give great deference to a district court's finding that the government rebutted a prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection and reverse only if that finding is clearly erroneous. United States v. Cure, 996 F.2d 1136, 1138 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1075, 127 L.Ed.2d 393 (1994). Given that the court asked the prosecutor to explain her strikes of the black venirepersons, we shall assume that Appellants met the requirements of a prima facie case and therefore proceed directly to determining whether the prosecutor's reasons for striking Portis were race-neutral. The prosecutor's belief that the venireperson may have been related to a defendant in an earlier case did not justify the challenge. The record suggests that the venireperson was unrelated to that defendant as Portis did not affirmatively respond to the court's inquiry to the venire whether any family member had ever been involved in a criminal matter in court. Nonetheless, a venireperson's inability to pay attention is a proper race-neutral reason for using a peremptory strike. See United States v. Hendrieth, 922 F.2d 748, 749-50 (11th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (upholding trial court's decision to allow a strike based upon a juror's inattentiveness and her rolling and rubbing her eyes during voir dire). 45 Explanations based upon a juror's demeanor are, however, difficult to confirm on appeal because the transcripts that comprise the record before the Court do not portray the unacceptable behavior. Moreover, such explanations are particularly susceptible to the kind of abuse prohibited by Batson. Consequently, to allow meaningful appellate review, trial judges should fully develop the record regarding the specific behavior by a venireperson that leads to a peremptory strike and should verify that the stricken venireperson's conduct was conspicuously different from that of the other venirepersons. See United States v. Cooper, 19 F.3d 1154, 1161 (7th Cir.1994) (upholding demeanor-based strikes in part because trial judge noted on record that, based on his own observations, the prosecutor's interpretations were reasonable); Michael J. Raphael & Edward J. Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Explanations Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U.MICH.J.L.REF. 229, 246-50, 266-67 (1993) (arguing that courts should reject demeanor-based explanations that cannot be confirmed by the record). 46 In this case, Appellants do not dispute that Portis directed her attention toward the defendants, away from the prosecution, during jury selection, allowing us to infer that Portis' behavior was different from the other venirepersons. Cf. Cure, 996 F.2d at 1138-39 (defense counsel's failure to offer contrary description of venireperson's demeanor militates against reversal). Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err by finding that the prosecutor offered a race-neutral reason for striking Portis from the jury.