Opinion ID: 2159212
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion for Cause of Death-Scrupled Jurors

Text: Defendant challenges the trial court's exclusion for cause of two death-scrupled jurors, Frances Kolen and Mark Erich. Ms. Kolen indicated to the trial court, on voir dire, that she could not serve as a juror because it would be upsetting to have to deliberate in a case with gory details, and because her family had only one car. The court then asked for [a]ny other reason that comes to ... mind; she answered: Whether I felt it was deserved or not I could not bring myself to say someone should be put to death. Q: You could not? A: I could not. Q: Under any circumstances, regardless of the facts you couldn't vote for the death penalty? A: I don't think so. Q: You have pretty strong feelings about that to the extent that you just couldn't vote the death penalty regardless of what the facts were in the case? A: I believe so. Q: You believe what? A: That I couldn't vote that way. The trial court found: I don't see how I could permit her to sit as I understand the Witherspoon case. I think I pressed that as far as I can and [have] taken her through all the ramifications that I reasonably could for the type of responses she gave.... Mrs. Kolen ... maintains she could not vote for the death penalty no matter what the circumstances.... I'm going to have to excuse her. Defendant challenges this exclusion because the court made no attempt to conform to the then-existing requirements of Witherspoon.... The court made no attempt to inquire whether she understood the two-stage process; whether she could weigh and evaluate aggravating and mitigating factors; or, whether she could consider the death penalty under certain exceptional circumstances.... The State, on the other hand, points to this Court's adoption, in State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 256, of the Supreme Court's modification of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed. 2d 776 (1968), in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed. 2d 841 (1985). Under Witt and Ramseur, to justify exclusion it is no longer necessary that a juror's opposition to the death penalty be automatic. Rather, those cases hold that the quest is for jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts, id. at 423, 105 S.Ct. at 852, 83 L.Ed. 2d at 851 and any juror whose death penalty scruples would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath' is excludable. Id. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852, 83 L.Ed. 2d at 851-52. Furthermore, in Darden v. Wainwright, supra, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed. 2d 144, the Supreme Court, applying the Witt standard, upheld the exclusion of a juror who had merely answered yes to the question Do you have any moral or religious, conscientious moral or religious principles in opposition to the death penalty so strong that you would be unable ... to vote to recommend a death penalty regardless of the facts? Although, as the defendant points out, there were facts that distinguish this case from Darden v. Wainwright ( e.g., more extensive explanation in Darden v. Wainwright of the meaning of the Wainwright v. Witt inquiry, and the absence of objection by defense counsel in Darden v. Wainwright ), it is clear that jurors' bias need not be shown with unmistakable clarity. State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 256. We find that Ms. Kolen's answers established, at a minimum, that her death-penalty scruples would have prevented or substantially impaired her performance of her duties in accordance with her oath. The court's excusal for cause was proper. A closer case is presented by prospective juror Mark Erich. Mr. Erich indicated to the court that he generally could apply the fact as to the law ... even if you don't like the principles of law or any principle.... The inquiry then turned to capital punishment. THE COURT: Do you have any beliefs one way or the other about capital punishment? MR. ERICH: Yes. THE COURT: What are your beliefs? MR. ERICH: I have trouble believing in capital punishment. THE COURT: Do you have any fixed view about whether you have trouble or not? MR. ERICH: No. THE COURT: Would you be willing to listen to the facts of the case and consider all of the circumstances before you would come to a conclusion as to whether or not a person convicted of murder is to receive the death penalty? MR. ERICH: Yes. THE COURT: Are you telling me that there are circumstances under which you would vote for the death penalty or are you telling me that under no circumstances, whatever the facts, would you never vote for the death penalty? MR. ERICH: Probably the latter. THE COURT: Are you so fixed in that view that you couldn't vote for the death penalty under any circumstances?         MR. ERICH: I would say if there was any mitigating factors, I would not look for the death penalty. THE COURT: Any at all? MR. ERICH: Any at all. THE COURT: And even if you find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances? MR. ERICH: Yes, correct. THE COURT: If there were no mitigating circumstances, you would, however, vote for the death penalty? MR. ERICH: Yes.         THE COURT: The law is this. First of all, I indicated to you if I give you the law, you have to follow it? MR. ERICH: Right. THE COURT: You understand that, right? You say you can do that? MR. ERICH: Right. THE COURT: Now, we're in a more explicit area of that question. If the aggravating factors on a scale qualitatively outweigh the mitigating factors, the penalty is death. Do you understand that? MR. ERICH: Yes. THE COURT: Would you nevertheless vote against the death penalty if the aggravating factors, in fact, outweigh the mitigating factors? MR. ERICH: I would vote against the death penalty if there are any mitigating factors. THE COURT: Any? MR. ERICH: Any. The prosecutor then argued that the juror should have been excused under Witherspoon, because he used every word except automatically vote against the death penalty. The trial court deferred ruling on Mr. Erich so that the parties could research the case law. When the court did rule, it relied on the modification of Witherspoon in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed. 2d 581 (1980), the modification adopted explicitly in Witt: We reach the second level which I think comes into play in Adams which is that whatever side of the proposition a juror is on, the juror is not qualified if those views about capital punishment would lead him or her to ignore the law or to violate the oath to follow the law and apply the facts to the law as is charged by the Judge.         I have gone around and around with that juror and that juror has said if there is a single mitigating circumstance, then I would not impose  I would not vote for the death penalty. I realize that they're really findings as compared to an actual vote, but that juror seems to be troubled with the concept of capital punishment except in the most limiting circumstances. Counsel for the State just alluded to what if the converse existed, give me one aggravating factor and I'll vote to put the person to death. I certainly wouldn't want to qualify anyone like that and this is what we're dealing with in the converse.         He just can't follow the law. It's not just one question by me. I went around it, over it and through it and he has to be disqualified. Defense counsel argues that the trial court's analysis was flawed because the juror simply indicated what the result of his weighing process would have been, not that he could not perform that weighing process: There are no standards set forth in the statute as to how jurors should weigh aggravating and mitigating factors; all they must do is weigh them. The fact that a juror might have a notion of how those factors should be weighed is not a violation of the law, except that, constitutionally, mitigating factors must be considered. What the juror indicated repeatedly, however, is that if there were any mitigating factors, he could not perform the weighing process. While such a juror would not have been excludable under Witherspoon, since he did indicate that he could return a death sentence if there were no mitigating factors, under the Adams-Witt standard the test is whether his views would have prevented or substantially impaired his ability to perform his duties in accordance with his oath. The juror's responses indicated an inability to do in this case precisely what the law requires, i.e., to perform a weighing process. Since his scruples substantially impaired his ability to do what the capital punishment statute requires, the trial court's decision to exclude him was proper. Other issues raised by the defendant's other jury selection claims were addressed and decided in State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. 123. Specifically, defendant moved before trial for implementation of the so-called Arizona or struck jury system in the exercise of his peremptory challenges. In State v. Ramseur , we held that the defendant's similar constitutional claim for a struck jury was without merit and failed also as a suggested statement of desirable state policy. Our reasoning is equally applicable to defendant's claim. Id. 106 N.J. at 239-43. Defendant also relies on the defendant's brief in State v. Ramseur to support his claim that New Jersey's process of death qualification of jurors deprives capital defendants of the right to an impartial jury under the federal and state Constitutions. In State v. Ramseur , we held that the death qualification of jurors prior to the guilt phase of a capital trial was constitutional under both the federal and state constitutions and did not offend notions of fundamental fairness. 106 N.J. at 248-54.