Opinion ID: 2087709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Validity of Eligibility Finding

Text: The defendant also contends that his death sentence must be reversed because his eligibility for that sentence, premised upon his conviction for the Doyle murder, was invalidated when this court reversed his conviction in the Doyle case. (See People v. Hope (1992), 147 Ill.2d 315, 168 Ill.Dec. 103, 589 N.E.2d 503.) We disagree. This court's reversal of the defendant's conviction for the Doyle murder directed that the defendant be retried for that offense. The record reveals, and the defendant concedes, that the defendant has been retried for that offense, under the same indictment, and has again been found guilty of the intentional or knowing murder of James Doyle. Under these particular facts, we hold that the defendant's eligibility finding remains valid. As noted, the defendant's eligibility was premised upon the multiple-murder aggravating factor set forth in section 9-1(b)(3) of the death penalty statute (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1992)). To establish eligibility under that factor the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant was at least 18 years old at the time he committed the murder for which he is being sentenced; (2) the defendant was convicted of another murder in addition to the one for which he is being sentenced; and (3) the defendant, in committing each of the murders, acted with the requisite intent or knowledge. (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1992); People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill.2d 1, 32-36, 69 Ill.Dec. 136, 447 N.E.2d 353.) Each of these three elements was undeniably proved at the defendant's eligibility hearing in this case. The defendant's birth certificate was introduced to establish that he was at least 18 years old at the time of the McDonalds murder. A certified statement of the defendant's conviction for the murder of Doyle proved the second element, that the defendant had been convicted of another murder. ( People v. Franklin (1990), 135 Ill.2d 78, 106-07, 142 Ill.Dec. 152, 552 N.E.2d 743.) Finally, the defendant's intent or knowledge in committing the murder of Doyle was established through the testimony of Heather Larkin, a passenger on the bus on which Doyle was shot. As noted, Larkin described watching the defendant pull a gun from his coat and shoot Officer Doyle in the chest, killing him. This testimony was more than sufficient to support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant acted with the requisite intent or knowledge in murdering Doyle. Davis, 95 Ill.2d at 36, 69 Ill.Dec. 136, 447 N.E.2d 353. The finding that the defendant was eligible under section 9-1(b)(3) was thus unquestionably valid at the time it was made. The defendant, however, contends that the later reversal of the Doyle conviction invalidates that finding. We note that the defendant makes no challenge to the findings that he was the proper age for eligibility or that he acted with the requisite mental state in committing the Doyle murder. Rather, the defendant seeks to invalidate his eligibility finding solely on the ground that the finding of a prior conviction for murder is now infirm because of the later proceedings in the Doyle case. We disagree. The defendant's conviction for the Doyle murder was reversed and remanded by this court based upon a violation of Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, during jury selection. Unlike the case of a reversal based upon insufficiency of the evidence, which would bar a retrial on double jeopardy principles, this was a reversal based upon trial error, and double jeopardy therefore did not preclude a retrial. ( People v. Olivera (1995), 164 Ill.2d 382, 393, 207 Ill.Dec. 433, 647 N.E.2d 926.) The reasoning allowing a retrial in a case such as this is that the reversal `implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant,' but is simply `a determination that [he] has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect.' (Emphasis in original.) ( Lockhart v. Nelson (1988), 488 U.S. 33, 40, 109 S.Ct. 285, 290, 102 L.Ed.2d 265, 273 quoting Burks v. United States (1978), 437 U.S. 1, 15, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1, 12.) Under these circumstances, we do not believe that it would be consistent with the intent of the legislature to interpret the death penalty statute to forbid this reconviction from relating back to satisfy the requirement of section 9-1(b)(3) that the defendant has been convicted of another murder. The purpose of the eligibility factors enumerated in section 9-1(b) is to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and    reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. ( Zant v. Stephens (1983), 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2742, 77 L.Ed.2d 235, 249-50.) Persons who have murdered more than once are in a smaller group than the class of all murderers, and it is reasonably justified to place a more severe punishment on those persons. Our legislature has further required that the other murder must have resulted in a conviction. (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1992).) In this way, the legislature has sought to guard against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty prohibited by the eighth amendment. We find that the eighth amendment concerns would not be any better served by requiring that the other murder conviction be treated as nonexistent simply because it is later reversed, where the defendant has been retried and reconvicted of the same charge and offense. The defendant remains a member of that narrower class of persons who have been convicted of murdering more than once, and the purpose of the eligibility determination is not frustrated. We emphasize that our holding is based upon the unique circumstances of this case. The defendant's reconviction is relating back only for the purpose of proving the existence of another murder conviction required by section 9-1(b)(3), not to prove the acts or mental state underlying that conviction. The conviction element of section 9-1(b)(3) is satisfied when there is proof that a trial judge has entered judgment on a verdict of guilty of murder. ( People v. Franklin (1990), 135 Ill.2d 78, 106, 142 Ill.Dec. 152, 552 N.E.2d 743.) Whether the defendant acted with the requisite mental state is a separate issue. At the defendant's eligibility hearing, his actions and mental state in committing the Doyle murder were proved, not through the certified copy of the Doyle murder conviction, but through the testimony of Heather Larkin. The defendant makes no challenge to the sufficiency or validity of that evidence, and thus makes no contention that the mental state element of section 9-1(b)(3) was not satisfied. Accordingly, we hold that, because the defendant has been reconvicted of the murder of Doyle under the same indictment, the defendant's conviction for that murder satisfies the requirement of section 9-1(b)(3) that the defendant has been convicted of another murder in addition to the one for which he is being sentenced. Because the defendant makes no other challenge to his eligibility finding, that finding will not be disturbed.