Opinion ID: 738324
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Trilogy's Expert's Evidence

Text: 29 Trilogy argues that the district court impermissibly excluded crucial expert testimony that supported its definition of fusion bonding and that as a result, it was unable to prove infringement. 30 Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2), Trilogy's expert witness submitted a report within the time period established by the district court. However, the report lacked certain information required under the rule, including the identity of exhibits to be used in summary of or in support of his opinions. The court granted Trilogy an extension of time to supplement the report with the missing information so that the report would be in compliance with the rule. Trilogy thereafter submitted a second expert's report, a rebuttal report, and an affidavit by the expert. These submissions were made after the due date for expert's reports had passed. The documents contained new opinions and information and did not merely supplement the original report. The court ruled that to the extent the supplemental reports contained new opinions not found in the original report, they should be stricken from the record. The court further ruled that the expert's affidavit which incorporated the new opinions should likewise be stricken as inadmissible. 31 When reviewing the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this court generally applies the law of the applicable regional circuit, which in this case is the Fifth Circuit. See Wexell v. Komar Indus., Inc., 18 F.3d 916, 919, 29 USPQ2d 2017, 2019 (Fed.Cir.1994). The Fifth Circuit in turn reviews the exclusion of expert testimony for failure to comply with a scheduling order under an abuse of discretion standard. See Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 790-91 (5th Cir.1990). In determining whether the court abused its discretion in striking expert testimony from the record, the following four factors are to be considered: 32 (1) the importance of the excluded testimony, (2) the explanation of the party for its failure to comply with the court's order, (3) the potential prejudice that would arise from allowing the testimony, (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice. 33 E.E.O.C. v. General Dynamics Corp., 999 F.2d 113, 115 (5th Cir.1993). 34 Trilogy maintains that the first factor weighs in its favor because the expert's supplemental opinions were crucial to Trilogy's proof of infringement. However, Trilogy concedes that the opinions in question did not relate to the accused devices, but only to the interpretation of the claim terms fusion-bonded and fusion-bonding. As noted by the district court, extrinsic evidence may be relied on when needed to interpret claims, but only when it does not contradict the intrinsic record consisting of the claims themselves, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1583, 39 USPQ2d at 1577. When, as here, the district court has concluded that the patent specification and the prosecution history adequately elucidate the proper meaning of the claims, expert testimony is not necessary and certainly not crucial. 35 The second factor weighs heavily against Trilogy. Trilogy contends that its delay in completing the expert's report resulted directly from Times Fiber's obstructionist tactics. However, the opinions at issue relate to claim construction. Trilogy has not adequately explained why its expert needed information from an accused infringer in order to properly construe the claims. 36 Nor do the third and fourth factors assist Trilogy. When scheduling orders are violated, an opposing party is often prejudiced by the ensuing delay and resultant expense. See Geiserman, 893 F.2d at 792. Furthermore, grant of a continuance would not deter future dilatory behavior, nor serve to enforce local rules or court imposed scheduling orders. Id. Even if Times Fiber would not have been prejudiced by allowing the testimony, Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a district court to control and expedite pretrial discovery through a scheduling order, and may prohibit a party that violates a scheduling order from introducing designated matters in evidence. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(f), 37(b)(2)(B). As stated by the Fifth Circuit, [a]dherence to reasonable court deadlines is critical to restoring integrity in court proceedings. We will not lightly disturb a court's enforcement of those deadlines and find no reason for doing so here. Geiserman, 893 F.2d at 792. Similarly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by striking from the record the expert's reports and affidavit that were submitted after the due date.