Opinion ID: 2543629
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ault and holden deeds

Text: ¶ 25 In making their claims to the disputed parcels, however, the Holdens do not rely solely on the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. In addition to their boundary by acquiescence claim, the Holdens also claim that (1) the Ault deed is defective in that the boundary description was incomplete (failed to close), (2) the Holdens recorded the Holden deed before the Aults recorded the Ault deed, and (3) the Holdens held rights in the disputed parcels to which the Ault deed was subject when the Holdens were in possession of those parcels. In granting the summary judgment, the trial court held, as a matter of law, that the Ault deed is insufficient to convey title, the description therein failing to close and is insufficient to convey title adverse to the interest of [the] Holdens, it being subject to the rights of parties in possession and [the] Holdens being in possession on August 22, 1975, when the Ault deed was recorded.
¶ 26 The trial court concluded that the Ault deed failed to convey title to the Aults when its legal description set forth therein was indefinite because it failed to close. In Utah, a warranty deed conveys title so long as the deed's description of the property is  sufficiently definite . . . to identify the property it conveys. Colman v. Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503, 505 (Utah 1976) (emphasis added). In other words: The fact that parts of the description given of the property are incorrect or incomprehensible will not destroy the operative effect of a conveyance, if a sufficient part of the description remains for purposes of identification. In such cases the misdescription will be ignored and the land held to be sufficiently described. The test is said to be whether a surveyor or engineer with the deed before him and with or without the aid of extrinsic evidence can locate the land and establish the boundaries. 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 54 (1983) (emphasis added). ¶ 27 In this case, surveyors prepared four different surveys based upon the Ault deed: the Rosenberg survey, the Bullen survey, the Jensen survey, and the survey prepared for the Aults' previous litigation. In each, the surveyors were able to identify the Ault property and establish the boundaries thereof pursuant to the legal description set forth in the Ault deed, including the boundary between the Ault and Holden properties. ¶ 28 While it is undisputed that the distance measurement of the final call of the legal description in the Ault deed does not extend to the point of beginning so as to close, the deed did not fail to convey the north lot to the Aults. In the construction of boundaries, we ... find that the intention of the parties is the controlling consideration. Losee v. Jones, 120 Utah 385, 395, 235 P.2d 132, 137 (1951); see also Cornish Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 919, 921 (Utah 1988). Indeed, we held in Losee that a deed sufficiently describing property conveys the property intended to be conveyed, although the description does not close according to the distance measurement articulated in the final call, so long as the intention is clear from the deed. 120 Utah at 394-96, 235 P.2d at 137. ¶ 29 In Losee, the final distance call of the property description failed to return to the point of beginning; that call concluded with thence east 2.5 chains more or less to place of beginning. 120 Utah at 395, 235 P.2d at 137. We held that such a description sufficiently described the property because the intention [of the grantor was for] the tract [to] close by extending the final call to place of beginning, and the words `more or less' constitute a tolerance factor which enables this extension of the final distance, beyond the 2.5 chains, in order that the tract close. Id. ¶ 30 The language of the legal description in the Ault deed parallels the language of the legal description at issue in Losee. Here, the description culminates with the phrase thence south 1.77 chains to the place of beginning, containing approximately 17 acres. As in Losee, this description concludes with to the place of beginning, manifesting the grantor's intent that the description close at the point where the legal description began. Id. Further, the property description in the Ault deed concluded with the phrase containing approximately 17 acres (emphasis added), which serves as a tolerance factor [that] enables the extension of the final distance so that the deed closes. 120 Utah at 395, 235 P.2d at 137. Therefore, surveyors were able to identify the Ault property although they had to extrapolate the final call to the place of beginning, closing the legal description and effectuating the intent of the grantors. Because surveyors can identify the Ault property according to the deed's legal description, the Ault deed is sufficient to convey the property described.
¶ 31 The Holdens contend that under Utah's race to the registry [10] system, the Holdens title is paramount to the Aults' title, and the Holdens are thus entitled to the property because they recorded their deed before the Aults recorded their deed. In Utah, between two purchasers of real property, the first to validly record a conveyance and take the property without notice of a prior interest in the property takes the property over a purchaser who subsequently records a deed. See Wilson v. Schneiter's Riverside Golf Course, 523 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Utah 1974). The Utah Code provides: Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: (1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable consideration; and (2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-103 (2000) (emphasis added). ¶ 32 While it is undisputed the Holdens duly recorded their deed before the Aults recorded their deed, the Ault deed is not void as against the Holdens with respect to the disputed parcels because the Holden deed does not describe the same real property as the Ault deed, or any portion of it. Id. ¶ 33 The legal description in the Ault deed explicitly encompasses both the western parcel and the strip. Conversely, the Holden deed describes neither the strip nor the western parcel because the northern boundary of the Holden property is defined in the Holden deed legal description as the South line of the A.M. Ross and C.M. Plant property, which the parties agree refers to the Ault property. The south line of the Ault property is not the fence, [11] see supra part I, but the boundary articulated in the Ault deed legal description. See Hancock v. Planned Dev. Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990) (noting that a specific description will control or limit a general description); Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah 1979) (The specific description in chains and degrees prevails over the general reference [to the location of a boundary].). Indeed, the Holden deed by its own terms excludes any property specifically included in the Ault deed. ¶ 34 We addressed a similar situation in Neeley, in which the defendants recorded their deed to a parcel of property before the plaintiff recorded. 600 P.2d at 980. However, the metes and bounds description in the defendants' deed did not include the disputed property. Id. Conversely, the plaintiff's deed included the disputed property and was recorded, although it was recorded after the defendants recorded their deed. Id. at 982. Thus, we concluded that under the recording act, [the defendants'] claim to the land [wa]s void. Id. ¶ 35 Similarly, in this case, where the Holden deed describes neither the strip nor the western parcel, the Holdens are precluded from claiming the disputed parcels by recording their deed before the Ault deed was recorded. Therefore, the Holdens cannot claim that the Ault deed is void as against them when first duly recorded because their deed does not cover the same real property. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-103.
¶ 36 The trial court concluded, The warranty deed to [the] Aults alleged in the complaint is insufficient to convey title adverse to the interest of [the] Holdens, it being subject to the rights of parties in possession and [the] Holdens being in possession on August 22, 1975, when the Ault deed was recorded. To determine whether the trial court was correct in concluding that the Ault deed was amenable to the Holdens' rights in the property, we must review the Ault deed. ¶ 37 Deeds are construed like other written legal instruments. Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979). In the absence of ambiguity, construction of a deed is a question of law, Terry v. Price Mun. Corp., 784 P.2d 146, 149 (Utah 1989), that we review for correctness, Jones v. ERA Brokers Consol., 2000 UT 61, ¶ 12, 6 P.3d 1129. When we construe a deed, we are not bound by the trial court's conclusions regarding the meaning of the deed. Cornish Town, 758 P.2d at 921; Hartman, 596 P.2d at 656. ¶ 38 The paramount rule of construction of [a] deed[] is to give effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in the deed . . . . Hancock, 791 P.2d at 185; see also Cornish Town, 758 P.2d at 921; Creason v. Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305, 309, 470 P.2d 403, 405 (1970). Specifically, we determine the parties' intent from the plain language of the four corners of the deed. Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, ¶ 12, 40 P.3d 599; see also Cornish Town, 758 P.2d at 921; Wood v. Ashby, 122 Utah 580, 585, 253 P.2d 351, 353 (1952). ¶ 39 The Ault deed provides that it is subject to the rights of parties in possession.  (Emphasis added.) This language is unambiguous. This clause in the Ault deed does not create any rights in the Holdens, but rather was only a recognition that parties in possession of the property may have rights in the property against which the grantor did not warrant title. Johnson v. Peck, 90 Utah 544, 550, 63 P.2d 251, 254 (1936). The words `subject to' used here are commonly associated with attempts by grantors to give notice of encumbrances .... Hancock, 791 P.2d at 186. ¶ 40 In Hancock, the trial court determined that language in a deed that stated the deed was subject to a fence line encroachment along the east line reserved in the grantor the property east of the fence line, which otherwise would have passed under the metes and bounds description. 791 P.2d at 185. However, we determined that the clause did not reserve the property to the grantor, but rather placed the grantee on notice that another may attempt to acquire the property by boundary by acquiescence in order to insulate herself from a suit by ... grantee ... in the event [that a] claim of title to the strip of land by acquiescence proved to be valid. Id. at 185-86. Thus, we concluded that the defendant could obtain title to the property only by boundary by acquiescence, not under the subject to clause of the deed. Id. at 187. ¶ 41 Here, the trial court concluded that the Ault deed did not convey title to the disputed parcels to the Aults where that deed was adverse to the right or interest of the Holdens as a party in possession. It is undisputed that the Holdens were in possession of the strip when the Aults recorded their deed on August 22, 1975. The Holdens contend that their possession of the disputed parcels placed the Aults on notice of their claim of title. ¶ 42 However, possession requires only inquiry into any rights in the property the possessor may hold. Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 1984). Traditionally, in race-notice states like Utah, a purchaser takes subject to rights of parties in possession that are open and visible. See, e.g., Mathis v. Madsen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 57, 261 P.2d 952, 959 (1953); Neponset Land & Live-Stock Co. v. Dixon, 10 Utah 334, 336-37, 37 P. 573, 574 (1894); Ayers v. Jack, 7 Utah 249, 252-53, 26 P. 300, 300 (1891). In other words, possession by someone other than the seller engenders a duty to inquire on the part of the purchaser into the rights of the party in possession. See Webster v. Knop, 6 Utah 2d 273, 278, 312 P.2d 557, 560 (1957); Salt Lake, Garfield & W. Ry. Co. v. Allied Materials Co., 4 Utah 2d 218, 222, 291 P.2d 883, 886 (1955); Williams v. Barney, 119 Utah 61, 84-85, 224 P.2d 1042, 1053 (1950); Meagher v. Dean, 97 Utah 173, 179, 91 P.2d 454, 456 (1939). However, where a party in possession has no rights adverse to the purchaser, the property is conveyed to the purchaser free of any alleged right of the possessor. ¶ 43 Proper inquiry by the purchaser would [only] lead to actual knowledge as to the state of title. Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 1983). In this case, inquiry into the state of the Holdens' title would have informed the Aults that the Holdens did not hold an ownership right in the disputed land contrary to the Aults' ownership under the Ault deed. The Holden deed covered neither the strip nor the western parcel, and the deeds do not conflict. ¶ 44 The only right the Holdens held in the property at the time the Aults recorded their deed was a leasehold from an agreement with the Aults, which is not contrary to the Ault deed. Between 1972 and 1977, the Holdens leased the Ault property from the Aults and were entitled to possession of the Ault property as lessees. Thus, the only rights the Holdens held as a party in possession in this case were limited to the Holdens' rights set forth in the lease agreement, and therefore, the Ault deed was, at most, subject to the rights and interests the Holdens held in connection with the lease agreement. See 66 Am.Jur.2d Records and Recording Laws § 188 (1973). Therefore, the trial court erred by concluding that the Ault deed was subject to any ownership rights in the property although the Holdens were a party in possession.