Opinion ID: 895126
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Propriety of the Protective Order

Text: In the context of formal discovery under the Rules of Civil Procedure, we have established standards for the issuance of protective orders. While a trial judge may exercise some discretion in the granting of protective orders[,] . . . this discretion is not without bounds. Masinga v. Whittington, 792 S.W.2d 940, 940 (Tex.1990). A party seeking a protective order must show particular, specific and demonstrable injury by facts sufficient to justify a protective order. Id. (citing Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex.1987)). Here, the Regians did not seek an order protecting them from discovery authorized by the rules. Instead, they sought the order to place limits on Collins's ability to obtain information available under a release they provided in accordance with section 74.052(c). We believe, however, that health care liability claimants seeking to limit access to information released under the statute should face no less of a burden than parties seeking to limit ordinary discovery, particularly in light of the important objectives the Legislature sought to advance in enacting the law. In section 74.052(c), the Legislature provided a mechanism for claimants to exclude irrelevant and therefore privileged information from the scope of a release. As we have described, the legislatively prescribed form allows a claimant to identify health care providers whom they contend do not possess relevant information by listing them and providing the dates of treatment in section (C) of the form. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 74.052(c). In essence, the Legislature created a scheme that enables patients to act as gatekeepers of their own privileged health information. Although the Regians seek to limit access to the treating physicians they identified in the exhibit they attached under section (B) of the form, they did not list them in the exhibit they attached under section (C) or provide dates on which the physicians might have learned of irrelevant information. Neither did they provide equivalent information in their motion for a protective order; in fact, the Regians' motion did not even assert that any of Kelly's non-party treating physicians possessed both relevant and irrelevant information. The Regians complain that requiring health care claimants to identify health care providers who possess both relevant and irrelevant information along with the dates on which irrelevant information was obtained would be cumbersome and overly burdensome [and] impractical because it essentially would prohibit [Collins] from obtaining any healthcare information whatsoever on the dates specified under subsection C. They also argue that such a procedure would be unworkable because parties often disagree about whether information is relevant or not. We agree with Collins, however, that health care claimants, who are entitled to unrestricted access to their health information and to their non-party health care providers, are in the best position to identify what information they consider privileged. Because the Regians did not make the requisite showing of specific and demonstrable injury, [4] we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the protective order.