Opinion ID: 427621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brown's Claim for Damages

Text: 14 Brown, however, in addition to declaratory and injunctive relief, also sought, and obviously had standing to seek, damages based on his claim that his arrest and the charges filed against him constituted an unconstitutional invasion of his rights in that, as the arresting and charging officer was subject to compensation for these actions under the fee system of section 25-7-27(a), Brown was deprived of the objective probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment and of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown sought actual damages consisting of the total amount of his fine and the mental anxiety he suffered on account of the arrest. Alternatively, he sought nominal damages. No punitive damages were sought.
15 As noted, the district court held that the collateral estoppel effects of Brown's guilty plea to the charges of public profanity and resisting arrest barred his section 1983 claim that his constitutional rights were violated by his being arrested and prosecuted for those offenses. Of course, Brown was also arrested for and charged with the concealed weapon offense, as to which there was no determination of his guilt, and hence no collateral estoppel or res judicata arose from the disposition of that charge, as the district court recognized. With respect to Brown's arrest claims, however, it might be argued that there was only one arrest for all offenses, and that collateral estoppel from the profanity offense plea and conviction establish that single, indivisible arrest to have been lawful, so that arrest-related claims as to all offenses, including the concealed weapon offense as to which there was no conviction, are barred. We do not decide that question, however, because we hold that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel bars Brown's making his arrest claims with respect to any of the offenses and that the district court erred insofar as it held to the contrary. 16 We do not doubt that under principles of collateral estoppel (and perhaps res judicata ) the outcome of or determinations made in state court criminal proceedings may, in a proper case, bar the state court defendant from subsequently relitigating the same matters in a section 1983 suit. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980); Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). We have several times so held. See decisions cited in Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 374 (5th Cir.1981). Nevertheless, it appears from Allen, Kremer, and, most recently, Haring v. Prosise, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983), that the application of collateral estoppel (or res judicata ) in such a setting is derived from 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738, pursuant to which the federal court will give no greater preclusive effect to the state court judgment than would the courts of the state rendering it. 17 The general rules of collateral estoppel and res judicata applicable in Mississippi are summarized in Dunaway v. W.H. Hopper & Associates, Inc., 422 So.2d 749 (Miss.1982). We think it evident that neither doctrine is applicable here to bar civil damage actions in respect to arrest for any of the offenses. The criminal and civil causes of action are different. The validity of the arrest was not actually litigated in the state court proceedings. And, there is nothing necessarily inconsistent between the arrest being illegal and each conviction being proper. This is the general rule. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119, 95 S.Ct. 854, 865, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952); Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 47 S.Ct. 250, 71 L.Ed. 505 (1927). It likewise appears to be the rule in Mississippi. See Smith v. State, 228 Miss. 476, 87 So.2d 917, 919 (1956). As there apparently was no search or extra-judicial confession incident to or resulting from the arrest, and certainly no such confession or fruits of search were offered in evidence, the legality of the arrest could not have been litigated in the state criminal proceedings. See Smith v. State, supra. Hence, the state criminal judgments do not operate, by res judicata or collateral estoppel, to bar civil complaints as to arrest in respect to any of the offenses. See Greer v. Turner, 603 F.2d 521 (5th Cir.1979). 18 It is perhaps a closer question whether collateral estoppel arising from the state convictions bars the section 1983 complaint as to being charged with, as opposed to being arrested for, the public profanity and resisting arrest offenses. Though res judicata is plainly inapplicable, since the causes of action are different, it might be argued that collateral estoppel is available on the theory that a conviction necessarily determines the propriety of the charge. But Haring and a literal application of the Mississippi test for collateral estoppel as stated in Dunaway, 422 So.2d at 751 (applies only to questions actually litigated in a prior suit) point in the other direction, as it is undisputed that Brown's present claims respecting these charges were not actually litigated, or even raised, in the state proceedings. In any event it is clear that Brown's wrongful charge claim respecting the concealed weapon offense must be reached, since there was no conviction of that offense. Although Brown has sought no actual damages respecting the alleged wrongful charging of the concealed weapon offense, he has sought nominal damages, and, should he prevail, would be entitled thereto. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1053-54, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). As we dispose of the merits of Brown's section 1983 claim respecting the concealed weapon charge and do so adversely to him on grounds equally applicable to his claims respecting the profanity and resisting arrest offenses, we pretermit further consideration of the collateral estoppel issue respecting the charging of the latter offenses. 19 Hence, we now turn to the merits of the damage claim. 8
Brown states in his complaint: 20 Plaintiff's arrest was unconstitutional because constables in Mississippi are compensated for each arrest they make, provided conviction results.... Since constables are compensated on 'fee' basis and since they may earn a fee only if they make arrests, collecting no fee when they decide not to make an arrest, their own financial interest in an arrest precludes an objective determination of whether a person should be arrested or charges made against him. The fair play requirement of the United States Constitution Amendment Fourteen and the probable cause requirement of United States Constitution Amendment Four are violated by the Mississippi statute under which constables have a financial incentive to make arrests and to charge citizens with crimes. 21 The Mississippi fee system of compensation for constables is also unconstitutional because it gives the constables a financial incentive to 'stack' or multiply charges against arrestees. The more charges made, the more fees the constable stands to earn from a case. This violates the fair play and due process requirements of the United [States] Constitution Amendment Fourteen. (Emphasis added.) 22 The complaint also alleges that [u]nder the circumstances of this case, a salaried officer, uninfluenced by the fee system of compensation, would not have arrested plaintiff or, at least, would not have charged plaintiff with three separate offenses.In general terms the right asserted by Brown is the right to be free, even where probable cause exists, from arrests and charges by an officer who has a financial interest in performing these actions. He argues that this right is supported by the Supreme Court decisions in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927), Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972), and Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 97 S.Ct. 546, 50 L.Ed.2d 444 (1977). He also analogizes his claim to one based on abuse of process, arguing that the wrong in this case entitles him to recovery under section 1983 because it is a constitutional tort. 23 It is important to understand that Brown's complaint never alleges that his arrest, or charging, was without probable cause. 9 Nor did he otherwise prosecute his case in the district court on the basis of any asserted lack of probable cause. Brown has consistently treated this case exactly as he describes it in the opening sentence of his complaint: [t]his is an action for damages brought for the purpose of obtaining a judgment that the Mississippi system of compensation for constables is unconstitutional.... As noted, the district court, on cross-motions for summary judgment, reached the merits of Brown's claims respecting arrest and prosecution for the concealed weapon offense and ruled against him, noting that no material disputed facts were present. Brown did not seek relief from this ruling in the district court on the basis that there was a fact issue as to existence of probable cause. Nor has Brown claimed on appeal that the summary judgment against him was erroneous because an issue of fact was present with respect to the existence of probable cause. His sole complaint here as to the merits ruling below is that the district court erred in failing to hold that the system of compensating constables on a fee per-charge basis is unconstitutional, and the only relief he seeks from this Court is our ruling that the district court did err in failing to so hold. 10 24 We find Brown's arguments unpersuasive and hold, assuming, as he himself does, that probable cause existed for his arrest, he suffered no constitutional deprivation and is thus not entitled to damages under section 1983. 25 We begin by examining the Supreme Court decisions on which he relies. In Tumey v. Ohio a procedure existed by which violators of the state's prohibition laws were tried without a jury before a village mayor. If the mayor convicted a defendant, he received the fees and costs in the suit in addition to his salary. If he acquitted, he received no additional compensation. The Supreme Court held that this procedure was unconstitutional in that it subjected a defendant to a judge having a direct, personal, pecuniary interest in convicting, 273 U.S. at 523, 47 S.Ct. at 441, which violated the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Id. at 532, 47 S.Ct. at 444. Ward v. Village of Monroeville involved a system in Ohio in which mayors sat as judges in certain traffic violation cases. Fines, fees, and costs arising out of convictions were not paid to the mayor but to the village treasury, which received a major portion of its income from the proceeds of these cases. In judging the constitutionality of this system, the Court used the same test which it had formulated in Tumey: 26 [W]hether the mayor's situation is one 'which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused ....'  409 U.S. at 60, 93 S.Ct. at 83. 27 Applying this standard, the Court held that the system in Ward was also unconstitutional. Plainly that 'possible temptation' may ... exist when the mayor's executive responsibilities for village finances may make him partisan to maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor's court. Id. 11 28 This standard was also applied in a slightly different context in Connally v. Georgia. There the Court considered the fee system for the issuance of search warrants by justices of the peace in Georgia. They received five dollars for each warrant issued, but nothing if they denied the issuance of a warrant. The Court held, relying on Tumey and Ward, that this fee system was unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments: It is ... another situation where the defendant is subjected to what surely is judicial action by an officer of the court who has 'a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest' in his conclusion to issue or to deny the warrant. 429 U.S. at 250, 97 S.Ct. at 548 (emphasis added). 29 These cases are fundamentally distinct from the case before us in that each involved a form of judicial action. In Tumey and Ward the mayors were acting as judges in town or village courts. The right to a judge unbiased by direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of a case is unquestionable. It is at the heart of the right to a fair trial by an impartial judge or jury. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). Likewise, the magistrate's issuance of a warrant in Connally v. Georgia was surely judicial action governed by the requirement that a magistrate be neutral and detached. See Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350, 92 S.Ct. 2119, 2123, 32 L.Ed.2d 783 (1972). In Connally the magistrate's financial incentive to issue warrants prevented him from satisfying this requirement. 30 By contrast, however, an arrest by a constable is not judicial action, but action under executive or legislative authority. Peace officers are not held to the same standards of impartiality applicable to judges, nor are they in the performance of their duties held to the neutral and detached requirement applicable to magistrates who issue warrants. Indeed, to hold peace officers to such a standard would render the warrant requirement largely superfluous. 31 In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948), Justice Jackson noted the importance of having the inference of probable cause drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Id. at 14, 68 S.Ct. at 369. This statement, quoted so many times by the Court, 12 emphasizes the difference between the roles of magistrate and peace officer. In those circumstances in which the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless arrests, however, a peace officer does assume the function of determining probable cause. Satisfaction of this standard remains a prerequisite to police action, but the requirement of a neutral and detached determination of its existence is foregone. Indeed, warrants are required because it is realized that peace officers will not be neutral and detached. 13 As the Court said in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2029, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), ... policemen simply cannot be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality with regard to their own investigations ..., and, in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2136, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972), [t]he Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested magistrates. 14 Our opinion in Brown v. Vance, 637 F.2d 272 (5th Cir.1981), reflects the same awareness. Id. at 282 (... law enforcement officers have an interest in the outcome of criminal cases in which they participate. Arresting officers naturally seek convictions). 32 In United States v. Matthews, 173 U.S. 381, 19 S.Ct. 413, 43 L.Ed. 738 (1899), it was held that arresting peace officers could properly be entitled to a previously authorized governmental award for the arrest. The Court observed that the expediency of offering to public officers a reward as an incentive or stimulus for the energetic performance of public duty has often been resorted to. Id. at 386. Tumey, on which Ward, Connally and Vance all rest, plainly recognized the validity of this same principle in its statement that: 33 It is further said with truth that the legislature of a state may and often ought to stimulate prosecutions for crime by offering to those who shall initiate and carry on such prosecution rewards for thus acting in the interest of the state and the people. The legislature may offer rewards or a percentage of recovery to informers. United States v. Murphy, 16 Pet. 203, 10 L.Ed. , 938. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 535, 47 S.Ct. at 445 (emphasis added). 34 Moreover, we have held that an arrest which is valid under state law and is otherwise constitutional is not rendered unconstitutional, or contrary to the Fourth Amendment, so as to subject the arresting officer to suit under section 1983, simply on account of the officer's motives in making the arrest. Thus, in Hunter v. Clardy, 558 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir.1977), we stated: 35 Once probable cause is established, the arresting officer's collateral bad faith motive is immaterial since the guilt of the arrestee is determined by a judicial officer, not by the law enforcement officer. 36 More recently, we stated in Smith v. Gonzales, 670 F.2d 522, 527 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 361, 74 L.Ed.2d 397 (1982): 37 ... a bad faith motive to 'get' a suspect is irrelevant if the arrest is supported ... by the existence of probable cause. Hunter v. Clardy, 558 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir.1977).... Once ... probable cause comes into existence, it becomes an officer's duty to arrest the suspect regardless of his personal feelings, good or ill, towards the suspect. 38 See also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136-39, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1722-24, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (indicating that Fourth Amendment determinations are made under a standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved). 39 Brown's complaint is in essence that his procedural, rather than substantive, rights were violated. An arrestee's substantive right is not to be arrested except on probable cause. His procedural right is that furnished by the requirement for a warrant. 15 But a warrant is not required for an offense committed in the presence of the arresting peace officer. Hunter v. Clardy, 558 F.2d at 291-92. 16 In that situation, if there is probable cause, the officer's motives are generally irrelevant. At least, the motive furnished by the Mississippi fee statute is not sufficiently offensive to itself constitute a deprivation of constitutional rights where the arrest is otherwise validly made without a warrant and on probable cause. We do not suggest that where substantive constitutional rights, apart from those pertaining to the arrest or charging itself, are implicated, the arresting officer's motive may not be determinative. For example, where an otherwise valid arrest is performed because of the officer's intent to discriminate against the arrestee on account of his race, the arrestee's equal protection rights would be implicated; similarly, the arrestee's First Amendment rights are called into question where the officer's otherwise valid arrest is motivated by his desire to retaliate against the arrestee for making a particular political speech. See Smith v. Hightower, 693 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.1982). Such an arrestee's rights, under section 1983 or otherwise, are not before us in this case, for no such substantive constitutional rights are implicated here. 40 In light of the common law antecedents of the Fourth Amendment, see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 111, 114-15, 95 S.Ct. at 861, 863-64, it is pertinent to note that the above-referenced rule of Hunter v. Clardy, supra, and Smith v. Gonzales, supra, accords with the common law doctrine that, where an otherwise valid arrest is made for the purpose of bringing the arrestee before a court or otherwise securing the administration of the law, an ulterior motive in making it does not make the arrest unprivileged. Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 127, comment a. See also 32 Am.Jur.2d, False Imprisonment Sec. 6 (An imprisonment which is lawful does not become unlawful because it was prompted by malicious motives ...). Similarly, in an action for malicious prosecution: 41 ... the plaintiff must sustain the burden of proof that the criminal proceeding was initiated or continued by the defendant without 'probable cause.' This is true even though the defendant is found to have acted with 'malice,' for an improper purpose, since it is the part of a good citizen to bring about the prosecution of those who are reasonably suspected of crime, and the addition of a personal motive should not result in liability for performing a public obligation. The existence of such 'malice' does not create even an inference that probable cause was lacking. Prosser, supra at 841 (footnotes omitted). 42 The same rules are stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 662, comment b, Sec. 668, comments b and g, Sec. 669A; 1 Harper & James, supra, 311; 52 Am.Jur.2d, Malicious Prosecution Sec. 50. 17 43 Brown relies on our decision in Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.1962), where, on direct appeal and in the exercise of our supervisory power over federal criminal prosecutions (id. at 444), we refused to sanction the government's employment of private informers on contingent fee contracts to make illegal whiskey purchases from particularly targeted defendants. 18 Williamson has long since been limited to situations in which  'the specific defendant was picked out for the informer's efforts by a government agent.'  See United States v. Lane, 693 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.1982). Assuming, without deciding, that the rule of Williamson is constitutionally mandated, and as such may form the basis of a section 1983 recovery, it is nevertheless evident that the Mississippi fee system is wholly without the scope of Williamson. Most obviously, the Mississippi fee system totally lacks the crucial element of targeting specific defendants. It does not even target specific offenses or situations. Its application is not ad hoc, but rather general and prospective. Moreover, it is a regular, publicly known method of compensating peace officers, adopted by the Mississippi Legislature, not a secret arrangement made on an individual basis with private parties. See United States v. Matthews, supra. 19 44 We further observe that the Mississippi fee statute does not purport to authorize arrest (or prosecution) under any condition, or for any purpose, apart from those otherwise authorized and provided by law. Moreover, as fees are only paid if conviction results, such arrest or prosecution incentive as the system may have is plainly diminished in respect to conduct not constituting an offense (and is similarly diminished respecting offenders unable to pay costs). 45 Brown also analogizes his section 1983 claim to the tort action for abuse of process. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 682, describes this cause of action as follows: 46 One who uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil, against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed, is subject to liability to the other for harm caused by the abuse of process. 47 As the Restatement explains, the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is not relevant to an action for abuse of process: 48 The gravamen of the misconduct for which the liability stated in this Section is imposed is not the wrongful procurement of legal process or the wrongful initiation of criminal or civil proceedings; it is the misuse of process, no matter how properly obtained, for any purpose other than that which it was designed to accomplish. Therefore, it is immaterial that the process was properly issued, that it was obtained in the course of proceedings that were brought with probable cause and for a proper purpose, or even that the proceedings terminated in favor of the person instituting or initiating them. The subsequent misuse of the process ... constitutes the misconduct for which the liability is imposed.... Section 682, comment a (emphasis added). 49 Brown argues that his case is precisely like a common law suit for abuse of process, except that the abuse of process is the constitutional tort of utilizing the Constable's office for financial gain. He relies upon Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1220 (3d Cir.1977), in which the Third Circuit held that [a]n abuse of process is by definition a denial of procedural due process, and that injuries therefrom may be actionable under section 1983. We conclude, however, that Constable Edwards' arrest of and charges against Brown did not constitute abuse of process depriving him of his Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights. 20 50 Prosser, supra, provides a helpful overview of abuse of process: 51 The essential elements of abuse of process, as the tort has developed, have been stated to be: first, an ulterior purpose, and second, a wilful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. Some definite act or threat not authorized by the process, or aimed at an objective not legitimate in the use of the process, is required; and there is no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions. The improper purpose usually takes the form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the surrender of property or the payment of money, by the use of the process as a threat or a club. There is, in other words, a form of extortion, and it is what is done in the course of negotiation, rather than the issuance or any formal use of the process itself, which constitutes the tort. Id. at 857 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). 52 Similarly, 1 Am.Jur.2d, Abuse of Process Sec. 4, states that, to make out a case of abuse of process, the process must have been put to a use neither warranted nor authorized by the process and: 53 ... the test as to whether there is an abuse of process is whether the process has been used to accomplish some end which is without the regular purview of the process, or which compels the party against whom it is used to do some collateral thing which he could not legally and regularly be compelled to do. (Footnote omitted.) 54 Unless this test is met, the motive, ulterior or otherwise, is immaterial. Id. 21 55 Assuming, as we do, that Constable Edwards, in arresting and charging Brown, acted on probable cause, the arrest and charging were regular under Mississippi law. It is clear, therefore, that, even assuming Edwards' motivation was to afford himself the opportunity to collect a ten-dollar fee, the criminal process was used exactly as it was intended to be: Brown was regularly arrested and charged in probable cause, and duly tried. That he was exposed to the payment of, and as to two offenses required to pay, court costs, did not compel him to do some collateral thing which he could not legally and regularly be compelled to do, nor was it a result without the regular purview of the process. 22 There is nothing unusual about a criminal defendant being exposed to court costs in the event of conviction. That the court costs were to be paid to Edwards was likewise contemplated by the Mississippi law, and was not in any sense outside of the purview of the criminal process. Moreover, as Brown has prosecuted his suit, he makes no complaint that Edwards did or threatened to do anything more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion or other than formal use of the process itself. Brown's suit is not founded on any conduct or definite act or threat, on the part of Edwards, not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. There were no negotiations. Edwards is not alleged to have done, attempted or threatened, expressly or by implication, anything in or related to the arrest and charging process which would not have been done in carrying out an arrest and charging wholly unmotivated by the opportunity to collect the authorized fee. Thus Brown's complaint is purely of Edwards' motive. Lack of probable cause is not claimed. As the motive relates solely to what is generally authorized and contemplated by Mississippi law and is not related to the personal or class characteristics of the arrestee or to his conduct apart from that giving rise to probable cause for the arrest and charging, there is no abuse of process such as to give rise to a damage action against Edwards under section 1983.