Opinion ID: 457796
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the propriety of sentencing

Text: 60 All defendants except Santa Cruz argue that their sentences are excessive because the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a fifteen year sentence upon each defendant without considering individual mitigating circumstances. They also contend that comments made by the trial judge at the sentencing hearing indicated the sole reason for sentencing defendants to the same term of imprisonment was to penalize them improperly for exercising their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by not explaining their degree of involvement in the offenses. 26 61 The sentences imposed here fall within the maximum fifteen year terms permitted under 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841 and 846 on each count. 27 We therefore begin with the general proposition that when a sentence is imposed within statutory limits, it is not ordinarily subject to appellate review. United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 597-98 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 957, 83 L.Ed.2d 964 (1985); United States v. Prazak, 623 F.2d 152, 155 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 880, 101 S.Ct. 229, 66 L.Ed.2d 104 (1980). We will review the sentences only if the trial judge based them on misinformation of constitutional magnitude or failed to exercise any discretion in the sentencing process. United States v. LeMon, 622 F.2d 1022, 1024-25 (10th Cir.1980). Appellate review is appropriate when a trial court fails to afford individual treatment, imposes a sentence mechanically, or refuses to consider all the mitigating circumstances. United States v. Davis, 573 F.2d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930, 98 S.Ct. 2829, 56 L.Ed.2d 775 (1978). However, a sentencing judge has considerable discretion and leeway in determining, from the totality of the circumstances, the extent of the individual punishment to be meted out for each offense committed. Id. at 1181; see also United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507, 513 (10th Cir.1979). 62 We concluded in United States v. LeMon, 622 F.2d at 1025, that a trial judge did not act improperly in pronouncing sentence where sentencing proceedings were held and the defendant was given a full opportunity to argue his case, the court was furnished with a presentencing report, and the evidence disclosed that defendant was involved in an illegal scheme. Cf. United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 462 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 204, 83 L.Ed.2d 135 (1984) (no abuse of discretion because the trial judge observed appellants throughout trial, thoroughly reviewed presentence reports, listened to defense counsel's arguments for mitigation, and afforded appellants the right to present arguments in their defense); United States v. Brubaker, 663 F.2d 764, 769 (7th Cir.1981) (no abuse of discretion partly because the district judge stated he had read the presentence report, allowed defendants to present witnesses, and heard statements of counsel). It has also been held that an appellate court will not review or modify a sentence imposed within statutory limits merely because the defendant received the same sentence as an allegedly guiltier co-defendant; the court further will not review a sentence merely because statements were presented to the trial court referring to defendant's unblemished character and background and likelihood of rehabilitation. United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir.1971). 63 Here the trial judge had the opportunity to hear evidence concerning the defendants throughout the trial. He held a sentencing hearing where defendants and defense counsel were individually invited to present arguments in mitigation. At various times the judge referred to having read individual presentence reports. (E.g., Tr. 1799-80, 1828-29, 1832). He further indicated that he took individual factors into consideration, 28 but was constrained to find each defendant equally culpable due to the lack of evidence concerning their relative involvement in the marijuana operation. As noted in Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1350 (9th Cir.1978),  '[a] sentence can be tailored to fit an individual defendant only to the extent that the judge is aware of the major facts relevant to needed correction.'  Here we cannot conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion in sentencing the defendants to the same term of imprisonment. Various defendants' arguments that they were less culpable than other defendants, had unblemished character and background, and were likely to be rehabilitated do not persuade us to hold otherwise. 64 Moreover, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not violated during this sentencing process. The judge's remarks concerning the defendants' silence were not made in an attempt to deny them that privilege; in fact, he expressly recognized the defendants' right to remain silent. Instead, the comments were made to explain why he decided to sentence defendants to the same term of imprisonment. Such comments are proper and do not penalize defendants for exercising their Fifth Amendment rights. See United States v. Washington, 586 F.2d 1147, 1156 (7th Cir.1978) (district court's remark that it would have to conclude that defendants [in a conspiracy case] acted for themselves since defendants had refused to tell the court anything about their [minimal] involvement in a larger scheme did not penalize defendants for remaining silent, but rather set forth the framework in which it viewed the defendants' involvement in the crimes for which they stood convicted). 29 65 We hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in sentencing all defendants to fifteen year terms of imprisonment.