Opinion ID: 2056099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dwyer's Motion to Compel Comparative DNA Analysis

Text: [¶ 11] Dwyer contends that the court abused its discretion by denying his motion seeking an order to require the State to perform a comparative search of its convicted felon DNA database known as CODIS (Combined DNA Index System) to see if any of the database's approximately 9000 records matched each other at nine or more loci. [5] When a law enforcement agency attempts to connect a DNA sample to a particular person, it does not compare entire DNA sequences, but rather the DNA at thirteen specific places, or loci. A person's DNA characteristics at those thirteen loci make up their DNA profile. A match between an unknown sample and the profile of a particular person can occur at all thirteen or fewer loci. As more loci match, the probability increases that the DNA in the unknown sample comes from that person. [¶ 12] The comparative search sought by Dwyer is known as an Arizona search because when it was first run by a DNA analyst in that state, it produced a nineloci match between two unrelated individuals in the Arizona CODIS. A Maryland state court decision found that the random match probability for that occurrence was between 1 in 561 million and 1 in 754 million, yet the Arizona database contained only some 22,000 records. See also United States v. Davis, 602 F.Supp.2d 658, 681 (D.Md.2009) (describing matches of unrelated individuals found during Maryland CODIS search). A subsequent search in Arizona apparently yielded more matches, and in his motion Dwyer asserted similar results in Maryland and Illinois. Dwyer sought to obtain an Arizona search of Maine's CODIS database, to determine whether the results could be used to attack the probability statistics supporting the DNA evidence he anticipated the State would introduce at trial. [¶ 13] At the hearing on the motion, the State called one witness: Catharine MacMillan, a DNA analyst with the Maine State Police Crime Laboratory. Dwyer called none. No exhibits were offered. Consequently, the record before the Superior Court consisted of the testimony of the single witness, a Los Angeles Times article attached to Dwyer's motion, and a Maryland state trial court opinion attached to his memorandum in support of the motion. [¶ 14] MacMillan testified at the hearing that she had never been asked to perform an Arizona search, and that such a search on the CODIS in Maine would be problematic, stating, We are aware that we have twins within that database, we have relatives within the database and we have duplicate samples within the database, so we would expect profiles to match based on those three reasons. [6] She pointed out that the database search in Arizona did not utilize the appropriate racial databases, nor would the proposed Maine search. [¶ 15] The Superior Court denied Dwyer's motion, finding that: The State maintains, and the court agrees, that such a comparison is not reliable due to the known existence of twins, other relatives and duplicate samples already entered into the database. The results of DNA comparison in this case are produced, as in other cases, by using FBI population studies, not only the limited information from the Maine database. The court noted that it was not denying the motion based on any undue burden to the State, and pointed out that Dwyer might be able to use his argument to impeach the State's DNA evidence through cross-examination at trial, which in fact occurred. [¶ 16] When deciding whether to order a forensic test involving expert evaluation, a court must consider whether the test might produce results or lead to evidence that will be admissible at trial. This requires the court to make a preliminary finding that the testimony will meet a threshold level of reliability. State v. Bickart, 2009 ME 7, ¶ 14, 963 A.2d 183, 187. The court must be satisfied that the proffered evidence is sufficiently reliable to be held relevant. [7] Id. ¶ 15, 963 A.2d at 187 (quotation marks omitted). We review the Superior Court's ruling that the results of an Arizona search on the Maine CODIS would be unreliable, and thus not relevant, for an abuse of discretion. [8] Id. ¶ 15 n. 3, 963 A.2d at 188. [¶ 17] In view of the limited evidence available to the court on the question of reliability, the court acted well within its discretion in denying Dwyer's motion. As was the case with the novel palm print analysis considered in Bickart, the results of an Arizona search have evidently never been recognized as a basis for an expert opinion in a published decision by any appellate court. See id. ¶ 12, 963 A.2d at 187. In deciding the admissibility of this novel scientific approach, the only evidence the court had before it was the testimony of the State's DNA expert witness stating that the results Dwyer sought would be unreliable. The expert witness gave logical reasons for her opinion that a comparative analysis would not produce scientifically reliable results, which the court accepted. [¶ 18] In applying the abuse of discretion standard of appellate review in Bickart, we emphasized the significant role that the evidentiary record plays in defining the parameters of the court's discretion in determining admissibility: We need not and do not decide whether [the proffered] expert opinion testimony... is generally admissible. Because our review in this case focuses on the trial court's discretionary call, our conclusion is much more narrow. On the record before him, the judge acted within his discretion in weighing the relevant factors and concluding that the threshold requirement of reliability had been met. Id. ¶ 27, 963 A.2d at 191. As in Bickart, our review here focuses on the specific discretionary call made by the trial judge in this case. Without passing on the general admissibility of the results of a so-called Arizona search in all circumstances, we conclude based on the evidentiary record before him that the trial judge's decision was reasonable and well within the bounds of his discretion.