Opinion ID: 2802634
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Dismiss: Nine-Year Delay

Text: For his next point on appeal, Conte asserts that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss based on prosecutorial delay. Because charges were not filed against Conte for the 2002 murders until August 26, 2011, Conte moved to dismiss the charges prior to trial. In his motion, Conte argued that a key alibi witness, William Pringle, had died in 2008 and that the prosecutorial delay in filing charges gave the State a “distinct advantage” in this case in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Arkansas and United States Constitutions. Conte asserted that Pringle, a neighbor at his Duck Creek residence, was interviewed in July 2002 and that Pringle told Investigator Brown that Conte could not have been involved in the murders because he had seen Conte driving his truck three or four times on May 19, 2001, the day before the murders. Conte asserted that because he was prejudiced by the nine-year delay in filing charges, the State had the burden to show a satisfactory reason for the delay. Conte noted that two prior prosecutors had declined to file charges against him and asserted that no new evidence was discovered after the case had been reviewed by these 17 Cite as 2015 Ark. 220 prior prosecutors. The State responded that the case had been under investigation since 2002 and that, the Conway Police Department had presented the case file to the prosecuting attorney’s office on several occasions and, while the prior prosecutors had refused to file charges, the current prosecutor filed the charges after reviewing the case file. At the hearing on Conte’s motion to dismiss, Barrett testified that he was the primary investigator on the case and that it had remained an active and open investigation since the day of the murders. Barrett testified that there had been continuous strategy meetings to determine whether different angles or leads needed to be pursued. Barrett denied that he had intentionally caused a delay to procure the unavailable witness and claimed that he had not learned of Pringle’s death until he was flying back to Arkansas with Conte following Conte’s arrest on the murder charges. After the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the circuit court took the matter under advisement and then entered a letter order on April 27, 2012, denying the motion. The order provides: The circuit court’s April 27, 2012 order denying Conte’s motion to dismiss. Following the hearing on [Conte’s] . . . motion to dismiss which was held this past Tuesday I have had the opportunity to review the exhibits which were introduced and the motions and briefs which were provided by the parties. Based upon this review you may accept this letter as the Court’s ruling with regard to the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the charges currently pending. Mr. Lassiter contends that the delay in filing charges against the defendant has resulted in a prejudice to his ability to defend himself. Specifically that a potential alibi witness, one Mr. Pringle, passed away in 2008. The State on the other hand contends that the delay was not the result of any effort by the state to obtain an advantage but simply caused by circumstances which they could not control. Specifically, Detective Barrett testified that this matter has been an ongoing investigation since the events occurred in May, 2002 and that from time to time he would obtain additional information and 18 Cite as 2015 Ark. 220 approach the Office of the Prosecuting Attorney without charges being filed. Eventually this matter was presented to this prosecutor's office in August, 2011 and the charges were filed. The testimony clearly indicates that Detective Barrett was unaware that Mr. Pringle had passed away. Therefore, under the language of Scott v. State, 263 Ark. 669 (1978) at page 674, “Since Scott was able to show prejudice to his defense unless the state can come forward with a satisfactory reason for the delay the charges should be dismissed.” It is the Court’s conclusion that the state has presented a satisfactory reason for the delay. Conte asserts that he was prejudiced by Pringle’s intervening death and the State’s failure to show a satisfactory reason for the delay. Conte contends that law enforcement “shopped” the case to three different elected prosecutors, and the circuit court condoned this “shopping” as a “satisfactory reason for the delay.” Conte also contends that the State conceded in its pleadings to the circuit court that “no new credible evidence” was ever developed and the State had the same case the day the felony information was filed, August 26, 2011, as it did on June 26, 2002, the day law enforcement interviewed Conte at the Douglas County, Nevada Sheriff’s Office regarding the homicides. Further, Conte asserts that Elliott’s daughter, Ashley, actively campaigned for the current prosecutor so that charges would be brought against Conte. Finally, Conte contends that the circumstances surrounding the charges being filed against him were fundamentally unfair under our constitution and his motion to dismiss should have been granted. The State responds that Conte has changed his argument on appeal. The State contends that, on appeal, Conte does not even mention the death of his alibi witness, 19 Cite as 2015 Ark. 220 Pringle, but instead now argues that he was prejudiced by the delay because two prior prosecutors felt there needed to be more evidence, law enforcement shopped the case, and Ashley appeared in campaign ads for the current prosecutor. Thus, the State asserts that the issue is not preserved for review. We agree that Conte may not change his argument on appeal and is bound by the arguments made below. Therefore, we will not address allegations concerning Ashley’s campaign ads for the current prosecutor because that argument was not made to the circuit court. See Buford v. State, 368 Ark. 87, 243 S.W.3d 300 (2006). Conte argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on the delay. Conte argues that he suffered severe prejudice and that the State did not present a satisfactory reason for the delay in filing charges. Conte relies on the State’s admission that “no new credible evidence” had been discovered during the nine-year delay and asserts that the court “essentially signed off on Barrett shopping the same case to three different elected prosecutors.” Turning to the merits of Conte’s remaining argument, in United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a delay due to an ongoing investigation of the case does not deprive the defendant of due process, even if the defense was prejudiced by the lapse of time. Id. at 795-96. As the Court noted, “[t]he determination of when the evidence available to the prosecution is sufficient to obtain a conviction is seldom clear cut, and reasonable persons often will reach conflicting conclusions.” Id. at 793. The Court held: Proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of the due process claim, and that the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay 20 Cite as 2015 Ark. 220 as well as the prejudice to the accused. . . . It requires no extended argument to establish that prosecutors do not deviate from fundamental conceptions of justice when they defer seeking indictments until they have probable cause to believe an accused is guilty; indeed it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to recommend an indictment on less than probable cause. It should be equally obvious that prosecutors are under no duty to file charges as soon as probable cause exists but before they are satisfied they will be able to establish the suspect’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. With regard to investigative delay, the Court held: In our view, investigative delay is fundamentally unlike delay undertaken by the Government solely “to gain tactical advantage over the accused,” United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. at 324, . . . precisely because investigative delay is not so one-sided. Rather than deviating from elementary standards of “fair play and decency,” a prosecutor abides by them if he refuses to seek indictments until he is completely satisfied that he should prosecute and will be able promptly to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Penalizing prosecutors who defer action for these reasons would subordinate the goal of “orderly expedition” to that of “mere speed,” Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10 . . . (1959). This the Due Process Clause does not require. We therefore hold that to prosecute a defendant following investigative delay does not deprive him of due process, even if his defense might have been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time. Here, Conte asserts that he suffered severe prejudice and that the prosecution used the delay to gain a tactical advantage. The record demonstrates that Lieutenant Barrett testified that he approached two different prosecutors with the evidence against Conte in an attempt to bring charges against him, and he stated that the case was under continual investigation until the current prosecutor chose to file charges. Barrett stated that they continuously held strategy meetings to come up with different investigative angles. He also testified that he did not intentionally delay the case to procure the unavailability of a witness. Barrett stated that he first learned that Pringle had died when he was transporting Conte back to Arkansas following Conte’s arrest. In addition to the testimony, the circuit court reviewed Conte’s 21 Cite as 2015 Ark. 220 statement, as well as a summary of Sergeant Brown’s summary of his July 2002 interview with Pringle, which stated: On 7-02-02 at 2115 hrs., while Inv. Coverley completed an inventory of seized items, I conducted a brief interview with Mr. Pringle. Mr. Pringle informed me that he had been a friend with Dr. Conte for several years and he has sold him six pieces of property, to include the parcel where his cabin is. Mr. Pringle had heard that Dr. Conte was a possible suspect in homicides in Arkansas, through the local media. He informed me that he knew that Dr. Conte could not have been involved because he had seen him that weekend in May. Mr. Pringle explained that Dr. Conte had his truck towed from the cabin on or about May 20th of this year. He said that he had seen Dr. Conte driving his truck three or four times the day before the truck was towed. Mr. Pringle said that he did not talk with Dr. Conte that weekend, but talked to him, about that weekend, on June 19th, 2002. Mr. Pringle stated that Dr. Conte came back up to the cabin during the week of the 19th and stopped by the house. He said that Dr. Conte told him that he had not stopped by to talk in May, because he did not have his monthly mortgage payment and he was embarrassed. Mr. Pringle asked him about his truck and Dr. Conte told him that he thought that local kids had done something to his clutch while attempting to steal it. He told Mr. Pringle that on 06-19-02 Dr. Conte brought him two newspapers and seemed to be acting a bit strange. He said that he would not look him in the eye. Dr. Conte told him that he was leaving the area the next day, but he said he was in a hurry to get up to the cabin to talk with Lark on the Internet. Mr. Pringle said that on 06-20-02, at approximately 1030 hours, he saw Dr. Conte at the neighborhood garage dumpsters, but Dr. Conte would not look at him. I asked Mr. Pringle if Dr. Conte had ever talked to him about the military or doing work for the government and he said that he had not. Also, we note that during his testimony at trial, Sergeant Brown testified that Pringle said that Conte could not have been in Conway the weekend of the crimes because Pringle had seen him in Duck Creek. Specifically, Brown testified that Pringle told him that he saw Conte driving his truck three or four times that weekend. In Scott, supra, there was a three-year delay between the crime and the date on which charges were filed. The State did not respond to Scott’s motion to dismiss, and no reason was provided for the delay or whether the State had good cause for the delay. We held that, 22 Cite as 2015 Ark. 220 where the accused was prevented from using two alibi witnesses, one whose whereabouts were not known and the other who had died a year and a half after the crime, the State should have been required to provide a satisfactory reason for the delay. The case was remanded with directions that, unless the State demonstrated that the reason for the delay was other than to gain a tactical advantage against the accused, the charges should be dismissed. In Bliss v. State, 282 Ark. 315, 668 S.W.2d 936 (1984), we addressed a five-year delay. In that case, minor children were removed from the parents’ custody in 1978 based on allegations of sexual abuse. However, the mother and stepfather were not charged with rape of the children until 1983. We held that, although the delay was unusually long, it could not be said that the prosecution was intentionally delayed in order to gain a tactical advantage over the parents, and we found no prejudicial error. Additionally, other jurisdictions have recognized that mere speculation about the loss of favorable evidence is insufficient to support a claim of prejudice. State v. Hales, 152 P.3d 321, 334 (Utah 2007). If a defendant claims prejudice because a previously available witness is now missing or unavailable, the defendant must provide the expected content of the witness’s testimony and indicate how that document or witness would have aided the defense. Id. The defendant must also show causation by establishing that he could not have obtained the crucial evidence from another source and that the evidence would have been available if it were not for the government’s delay in filing the charges. Id. Courts are uniformly in agreement that actual prejudice must be proven to advance a due-process claim 23 Cite as 2015 Ark. 220 for pre-indictment delay. State ex rel. Knotts v. Facemire, 678 S.E.2d 847, 854 (W. Va. 2009). Applying our law to the present case, based on the record before us, Conte has failed to demonstrate that he suffered substantial and actual prejudice resulting from the delay. The alleged prejudice, the loss of Pringle’s testimony, was before the jury. In opening statement and closing argument, Conte’s counsel, brought out the fact that Pringle placed Conte in Duck Creek during the weekend in question. Additionally, the expected content of Pringle’s statement and that the statement would have aided Conte’s defense by providing Conte with an alibi were before the jury. Further, Conte has not shown that the evidence could not be obtained from another source as Dr. Clark testified that Conte called him from Duck Creek the day after the murders, and Barrett testified that Pringle had told him Conte could not have committed the murders because he was in Duck Creek that weekend and that Pringle had seen Conte driving his truck “a couple of times” that weekend. Moreover, the record demonstrates that there was no evidence that the State intentionally delayed bringing charges to obtain a tactical advantage over Conte. The record demonstrates that the investigation remained ongoing throughout the years, law enforcement was unaware of Pringle’s death until Conte’s arrest, that law enforcement made contact with previous prosecutors, and that a decision was made to resubmit the case to the new prosecutor, which resulted in the charges being filed. There is no evidence of delay to gain a tactical advantage. As the court in Lovasco explained, “[T]he decision to file criminal charges, with the awesome consequences it entails, requires consideration of a wide range of factors in addition to the strength of the Government’s case, in order to determine 24 Cite as 2015 Ark. 220 whether prosecution would be in the public interest. Prosecutors often need more information than proof of a suspect’s guilt, therefore, before deciding whether to seek an indictment.” Here, based on the record before us, the delay in filing charges while continuing to investigate the crimes, did not create the improper tactical advantage that violates due process. In sum, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion on this point, and we affirm the circuit court.