Opinion ID: 450722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of the Prior Drug Conviction

Text: 31 Martino did not deny his presence in the Bay Terrace Shopping Center but he did deny that he had knowledge or intent regarding the drug transaction. He squarely placed in issue whether he possessed the requisite knowledge or intent to demonstrate his participation in the conspiracy charged. See United States v. Williams, 577 F.2d 188, 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 868, 99 S.Ct. 196, 58 L.Ed.2d 179 (1978). Over objection by defendant's counsel, the government offered, pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), and the court admitted, evidence of an eleven-year-old prior conviction of Martino for federal narcotics offenses; when sentenced thereon Martino was adjudicated a youthful offender--although, as noted, the sentencing judge subsequently declined to expunge the conviction. 32 Judge Lasker carefully assessed the probative value of this prior conviction evidence against its danger of unfair prejudice and concluded that its probative value was not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. He thereupon received the evidence but in doing so he specifically charged the jury as to the limited use they could make of this evidence. Later, during his instruction to the jury he reiterated the specific limited purpose and use of this evidence. Joint Appendix at 263 (emphasis in original). 33 Martino, by his defense, placed in issue the question of knowledge and intent as to his association with alleged co-conspirators on at least three separate occasions, including his presence at the shopping center, and argued in summation that it amounted to mere association and that his presence was mere presence and nothing more. Thus, the government in an effort to meet its burden of proof was certainly entitled to offer this prior similar act evidence to aid the jury in assessing Martino's intentions during his presence on at least three separate occasions during ongoing drug transactions. See United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 239 n. 12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857, 102 S.Ct. 307, 70 L.Ed.2d 152 (1981); United States v. Deaton, 381 F.2d 114, 117 (2d Cir.1967). 34 It is clear that the trial judge carefully weighed the competing factors of probative value versus unfair prejudice before ruling that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the prejudice to the defendant and that the eleven-year-old judgment of conviction would be received in evidence; we note that he did exclude the indictment on which it was based. A trial court's ruling, following a conscientious assessment of the Rule 403 factors, will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir.1983); Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d 1147, 1153 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Williams, 596 F.2d 44, 51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 946, 99 S.Ct. 2893, 61 L.Ed.2d 317 (1979); United States v. Albergo, 539 F.2d 860, 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000, 97 S.Ct. 529, 50 L.Ed.2d 611 (1976). 35 Since a showing of knowledge and intent were essential in order for the government to meet its burden of proof in this case, and since the prior conviction of federal narcotics offenses was evidence which could be interpreted by the fact-finders as shedding light on these key issues, the evidence was both relevant and probative and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by his ruling, despite the vintage of the conviction. See United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 316 (2d Cir.) (20-year-old drug conviction would have been admissible as bearing on knowledge and intent), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931, 103 S.Ct. 2095, 77 L.Ed.2d 304 (1983); United States v. Alessi, 638 F.2d 466, 476 (2d Cir.1980) (1972 conviction for similar offense admitted as bearing on intent). 36