Opinion ID: 2670174
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Counsel at Sentencing

Text: First, Mr. Knittel contends the trial court improperly denied him counsel at the critical stage of sentencing. Specifically, Mr. Knittel argues that because his courtappointed counsel was ineffective, the trial court should have “substituted” counsel for him. Pet. Br. at 2. He also argues the trial court should have inquired under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), as to whether his waiver of counsel at the sentencing stage was knowing and intelligent. In its order denying Mr. Knittel’s § 2255 petition, the district court decided that Mr. Knittel “was not denied assistance of counsel at his sentencing. Rather, he repeatedly refused the assistance of counsel, despite being warned of the potential consequences.” Dist. Ct. Order at 2. The district court pointed to several instances in which the trial court cautioned Mr. Knittel against proceeding pro se, but Mr. Knittel insisted he was “done with” his counsel and did not “want him anywhere around” him. Id. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel may only be waived “knowingly and intelligently.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quotations omitted). However, “a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation.” Id. Instead, the defendant must “be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation” and nonetheless affirmatively choose to proceed pro se. Id. -6- In this instance, the trial court repeatedly warned Mr. Knittel of these dangers, and Mr. Knittel refused to work with his court-appointed counsel. Crucially, the court again cautioned Mr. Knittel at sentencing, saying “I’ve urged you many times to consult [counsel],” and again asked whether Mr. Knittel wanted to proceed pro se. Dist. Ct. Order at 2. Mr. Knittel responded: “I don’t want [counsel] anywhere around me.” Id. The record thus belies Mr. Knittel’s assertion that the court should have conducted an additional Faretta inquiry at sentencing. Mr. Knittel’s argument that the trial court should have substituted counsel for him is also unavailing. “[T]he right to assistance of counsel does not imply the absolute right to counsel of one’s choice.” United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 166 (10th Cir. 1980). Reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s conclusion that, in these circumstances, the trial court did not deny Mr. Knittel his right to counsel. Accordingly, we deny COA on this claim.