Opinion ID: 1773004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: vagueness challenge to a criminal statute

Text: Burkhart challenges Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 39-17-505 and 39-17-501 as unconstitutionally vague. Section 39-17-505 reads in pertinent part: [A] person commits an offense who knowingly owns, manufactures, possesses, buys, sells, rents, leases, stores, repairs, transports, prints or makes any gambling device or record. However, it is not an offense for a person to own or possess in this state a lottery ticket originating from a state in which a lottery is lawful, if such ticket is not owned or possessed for the purpose of resale. (1989) (amended effective July 1, 2001). Section 39-17-501 provides the following definitions for application in § 39-17-505: (1) Gambling means risking anything of value for a profit whose return is to any degree contingent on chance, but does not include a lawful business transaction; ... .... (3) Gambling device or record means anything designed for use in gambling, intended for use in gambling, or used for gambling; (4) Lawful business transaction, as used in subdivision (1) includes any futures or commodities trading.... (1989). Burkhart contends (1) that the definitions of gambling device and gambling are unconstitutionally vague as applied to her because they fail to provide sufficient notice that video slot machines are gambling devices; and (2) that the statutes are facially vague.