Opinion ID: 2719055
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Excessive Fines Clause

Text: As a starting point, we note that the Commonwealth does not dispute that the fine imposed here is a penalty, and therefore an Article I, Section 13 claim is cognizable. The remaining question is whether the mandatory fine is excessive. See Commonwealth v. 5444 Spruce St., 832 A.2d 396, 399 (Pa. 2003).12 Whether a fine is excessive under our Constitution is a question of law, therefore our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 78 A.3d 1044, 1047 & n.3 (Pa. 2013). The constitutional provision at issue is both brief and plain: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted.” By its 12 The Commonwealth also acknowledges that prior decisions have stated that the Pennsylvania prohibition against excessive fines is co-extensive with the Eighth Amendment, see 5444 Spruce St., 832 A.2d at 399, and thus, appellant was not required to support his state constitutional claim in conformance with Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) (suggesting briefing and analysis of several factors regarding claims alleging the distinctiveness of a Pennsylvania constitutional provision which has a federal analog). [J-21-2013] - 17 plain language, the middle clause employs a concept of proportionality; the difficulty is articulating a principle by which to measure excessiveness or proportionality. Pennsylvania’s prohibition against excessive fines dates back to the Constitution of 1776. A convention of representatives under the chairmanship of Benjamin Franklin began drafting the Pennsylvania Constitution less than two weeks after the colonies declared their independence from Great Britain.13 Section 29 of the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution provided: “Excessive bail shall not be exacted for bailable offences: And all fines shall be moderate.” PA. CONST. of 1776, Plan or Frame of Gov’t, § 29. Eleven years later, in September 1787, following the successful conclusion of the Revolutionary War, and in response to perceived failures in the Articles of Confederation, the U.S. Constitution was drafted and submitted to the states for approval. On December 12, 1787, Pennsylvania delegates ratified the U.S. Constitution, but that document did not contain any such protection against excessive federal fines. In response to ratification of the U.S. Constitution, Pennsylvania’s anti-federalist delegates penned “The Address and reasons of dissent of the minority of the convention, of the state of Pennsylvania, to their constituents” in which they explained that they had offered several proposed amendments, including adding a provision: “That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel nor unusual punishments inflicted.”14 It has been suggested that “[t]he amendments thus unofficially offered were the 13 “This constitution was framed by a convention (called in accordance with the expressed wish of the Continental Congress) which assembled at Philadelphia July 15, 1776, and completed its labors September 28, 1776.” PA. CONST. of 1776 (epilogue). 14 This language mirrors a provision of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 created following the reign of King James II, who, the drafters claimed, “by the assistance of divers evil counsellors, judges and ministers employed by him, did endeavour to subvert and extirpate the Protestant religion and the laws and liberties of [the] kingdom[.]” See English Bill of Rights of 1689. [J-21-2013] - 18 forerunners of those of Massachusetts and Virginia, and undoubtedly formed the basis of what Mr. Madison laid before the House of Representatives in 1789” – a reference to what would become the Bill of Rights. HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA, PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788 (1888). Meanwhile, Pennsylvania held a second state constitutional convention, adopting in 1790 the above wording of the excessive fines clause, which is nearly identical to its current form. See PA. CONST. of 1790 art. IX, § 13.15 A coordinate prohibition against excessive fines was eventually enshrined in the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and adopted along with the other federal Bill of Rights on December 15, 1791. This Court has rarely had occasion to interpret the excessive fines proscription, and many of the cases which did interpret the term lack developed reasoning. See Respublica v. Donagan, 2 Yeates 437 (Pa. 1799) ($10,000 bond after and despite acquittal did not violate excessive fines clause because trial court acted within its discretion and “[u]nsafe would the community be, if such characters could prowl at large through the country, without a sufficient tie on them.”); Mastrangelo v. Buckley, 250 A.2d 447, 464 (Pa. 1969) (finding, sua sponte and without elaboration, that $6.00 fine for parking violation not excessive); Commonwealth v. Smith, 187 A.2d 267 (Pa. 1963) (graduated fines for overweight vehicles not irrational or unreasonable, and therefore not excessive).16 15 The provision was later moved to its current location in Article I (formerly the plan of government for the legislative branch), which became home to the Declaration of Rights in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874. See PA. CONST. of 1874 art. I, § 13. 16 The federal analog also lay effectively dormant for nearly two centuries. See Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CAL. L. REV. 277, 297 (2014) (“Though the Excessive Fines Clause was ratified in 1791, nearly two centuries passed (continuedM) [J-21-2013] - 19 In the mid-1990s, this Court began to more critically analyze the Excessive Fines Clause in the context of forfeiture matters; in those cases, we followed the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal clause in Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) and United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998). See, e.g., 5444 Spruce St., 832 A.2d at 402-03; Commonwealth v. Wingait Farms, 690 A.2d 222, 22527 (Pa. 1997); In re King Properties, 635 A.2d 128, 131-33 & n.10 (Pa. 1993) (explaining Excessive Fines Clause in relation to forfeiture matters) (relying on Austin, 509 U.S. at 623-28 (Scalia, J., concurring)).17 In Bajakajian, the High Court reiterated that “at the time the Constitution was adopted, the word ‘fine’ was understood to mean a payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense. The Excessive Fines Clause thus limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense.” 524 U.S. at 327-28 (quoting Austin; Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989)) (some quotation marks omitted). Without a viable test apparent from the plain text or history of the Clause, the High Court found precedent regarding the companion Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to be relevant, and ultimately adopted a standard whereby a fine “violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” Bajakajian at 334-36 (citing, inter alia, Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (involving challenge raised under Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause)). (Mcontinued) before the [United States] Supreme Court undertook its first meaningful foray into analyzing the Clause.”). 17 That much of the existing decisional law in this area involves forfeiture matters does not diminish its relevance, as the cases required a predicate finding that a punitive forfeiture is a fine under the meaning of the excessive fines clauses. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 344; 5444 Spruce St., 832 A.2d at 399. [J-21-2013] - 20 With respect to the Excessive Fines Clause under Article I, Section 13, this Court has looked to the gross disproportionality standard from Bajakajian, which includes a threshold comparison between the amount of the fine and the gravity of the offense triggering the fine. See 5444 Spruce St., 832 A.2d at 398-403 (remanding for trial court to determine value of subject property and weigh against seriousness of offense). Notably, in determining whether a fine is so excessive as to constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law, this Court and the Commonwealth Court have rejected the notion that there must be strict proportionality between the harm resulting from the offense and the penalty imposed. Church, 522 A.2d at 34 (“[T]he amount of a fine need not be limited to the cost incurred by the Commonwealth for each violation.”); CSX Transp., Inc., 653 A.2d at 1332 (same). Bajakajian and 5444 Spruce Street teach that a proportionality analysis requires a comparison of the amount of the fine to the gravity of the offense; but, the additional factors employed in those cases to evaluate excessiveness (e.g., how the forfeiture compares with the maximum criminal penalty imposable for the offense) are of little use here, where the challenge involves a mandatory fine/penalty. The next logical place to seek practical guidance is from cases arising under the companion clauses under which the excessive fines jurisprudence developed (i.e., federal or state cruel punishments clauses, due process clauses, or the federal excessive fines clause). And, in fact, this Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Baker, 78 A.3d 1044 (Pa. 2013), a case involving a challenge to a mandatory sentence as cruel (and unusual) affords some guidance. In Baker, the appellant challenged as constitutionally disproportionate the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years for his second conviction of possessing child pornography. Baker’s disproportion claim adverted to both the Eighth [J-21-2013] - 21 Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishments” clause as well as the “cruel punishments” proscription found in Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Baker Court noted at the outset that we were not necessarily holding that the approach to such a claim should be coterminous under the federal and state charters, but that we would analyze the claim “purely under the federal standard” because the appellant deemed that standard to be controlling and did not provide a distinct argument under the Pennsylvania Constitution. 78 A.3d at 1048 & n.5; accord id. at 1053 (Castille, C.J., concurring, joined by Saylor & Todd, JJ.). In rejecting the claim on the merits, the Court explained that the federal proportionality test, which derives from Solem v. Helm, examines: “(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” 78 A.3d at 1047 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 292). Ultimately, the Court did not reach the latter two Solem prongs because the threshold comparison of the sentence imposed and the gravity of the offense did not yield an inference of gross disproportionality. Id. at 1047-48, 1052 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) (controlling