Opinion ID: 1762576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of Affidavit for Search Warrant

Text: Hester argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant for his residence. First, Hester alleges a Franks violation. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). He contends that the affidavit for the search warrant contained a false statement concerning the reliability of the confidential informant. This court has recognized that under Franks , a warrant should be invalidated if a defendant shows by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the affidavit contained a false statement that was made knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly by the affiant; and (2) the false statement was necessary to a finding of probable cause. Langford v. State, 332 Ark. 54, 962 S.W.2d 358 (1998); Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 950, 936 S.W.2d 509, 525 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1244, 117 S.Ct. 1853, 137 L.Ed.2d 1055 (1997) (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674). We have further recognized that, if such findings are made, the Franks test requires that the false material should be excised and the remainder of the warrant examined to determine if probable cause still exists. Langford, supra ; Echols, supra . If the truthful portion of the warrant makes a sufficient showing of probable cause, the warrant will not be invalidated. Langford, supra ; Echols, supra . Rule 13.1(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that [i]f an affidavit or testimony is based in whole or in part on hearsay, the affiant or witness shall set forth particular facts bearing on the informant's reliability and shall disclose, as far as practicable, the means by which the information was obtained. Rule 13.1(b) further provides that failure to establish the bases of knowledge of the confidential informant is not a fatal defect `if the affidavit viewed as a whole provides a substantial basis for a finding of reasonable cause to believe that things subject to seizure will be found in particular places.' Langford, 332 Ark. at 61, 962 S.W.2d at 362; Heard v. State, 316 Ark. 731, 736-37, 876 S.W.2d 231, 234 (1994), (quoting State v. Mosley, 313 Ark. 616, 622, 856 S.W.2d 623, 626 (1993)). In this case, Hester claims that the affidavit falsely states that the confidential informant has provided information pertaining to the manufacture of methamphetamine on at least one other occasion that has been proven true and correct by other means. Hester claims that Siegler's statement was false because Siegler admitted that the information given by an informant on a previous occasion did not result in an arrest or conviction. Hester reasons that without proof of an arrest or conviction, Siegler could not truthfully state that the informant had provided accurate information about methamphetamine manufacturing in the past. We disagree. In Franks , the United States Supreme Court discussed the meaning of truthfulness in an affidavit, stating: This does not mean truthful in the sense that every fact recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct, for probable cause may be founded upon hearsay and upon information received from informants, as well as information within the affiant's own knowledge that sometimes must be garnered hastily. But surely it is to be truthful in the sense that the information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true. 438 U.S. at 165, 98 S.Ct. 2674. At the suppression hearing, Siegler testified that he had confirmed the reliability of the informant when other information supplied by him had been verified by another police agency. The State contends that while Siegler's statement concerning the reliability of the informant may be somewhat conclusory, the statement accurately portrays Siegler's belief regarding the informant's reliability, and Siegler's belief was not shown to be false. We agree. Hester has failed to show that Siegler made a false statement knowingly and intentionally or in reckless disregard of the truth. Langford, 332 Ark. at 62, 962 S.W.2d at 363 (quoting Heritage v. State, 326 Ark. 839, 846, 936 S.W.2d 499, 503 (1996)). We do agree that Siegler failed to set forth particular facts bearing on the informant's reliability. However, we do not believe this defect is fatal because the affidavit viewed as a whole provides a substantial basis for a finding of reasonable cause to believe that methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia would be found in Hester's residence and the two vacant apartments. Hester next claims that the affidavit's reference to Moore's statement that she smoked methamphetamine and saw approximately one-half gram of methamphetamine and numerous pieces of drug paraphernalia inside the residence did not support an inference that Hester was manufacturing methamphetamine. We disagree, and we are unpersuaded by Hester's contention that Moore's statement could support only an inference of methamphetamine possession and use. Siegler stated in the affidavit that based on his experience, he believed the items described to him by the confidential informant and Moore were used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. We believe that the information contained in the affidavit could support an inference that Hester was manufacturing methamphetamine. Finally, Hester contends that the statement in the affidavit about the chemical smell is a false statement in violation of Franks because Siegler could not identify who told him of the smell. In the affidavit, Siegler stated that officers could smell a strong chemical odor omitting [sic] from the residence and the two small vacant apartments at the rear of the house. At the suppression hearing, Siegler testified that he remembered that other officers told him they smelled a strong chemical odor; however, he said that he did not smell it. Officer Michael Terry testified that he noticed a heavy smell coming from one of the apartments located at the rear of the house. Hester has failed to show that Siegler knowingly made a false statement about the chemical smell. In fact, Terry's testimony supports Siegler's testimony that the presence of a chemical smell was detected. We do note that the presence of a heavy chemical odor, by itself, does not constitute probable cause. See, e.g., Walley, supra ; Bennett v. State, 345 Ark. 48, 44 S.W.3d 310 (2001). However, this fact, along with the information from Moore and the confidential informant provided a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that probable cause existed when he issued the search warrant. See, e.g., State v. Rufus, 338 Ark. 305, 993 S.W.2d 490 (1999).