Opinion ID: 2587723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Hard 50 Sentence

Text: The district court imposed the hard 50 sentence after finding: (1) Engelhardt was previously convicted of a felony in which he inflicted great bodily harm, K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 21-4636(a); and (2) the murder was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner, K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 21-4636(f). Engelhardt challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the second aggravator. He also contends mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors. K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 21-4636 sets forth circumstances that can lead to a finding a defendant committed a crime in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner: (f) . . . A finding that the victim was aware of such victim's fate or had conscious pain and suffering as a result of the physical trauma that resulted in the victim's death is not necessary to find that the manner in which the defendant killed the victim was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. In making a determination that the crime was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner, any of the following conduct by the defendant may be considered sufficient: . . . . (3) infliction of mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim's death; [and] (4) torture of the victim. Our standard of review is whether, after review of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational factfinder could have found the existence of the aggravating circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Robertson, 279 Kan. 291, 307, 109 P.3d 1174 (2005). When the evidence in this case is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it supports the district judge's finding that Michael's murder was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. Engelhardt and Brian stood over Michael and stabbed him approximately 55 times. The attack lasted about 20 minutes, and several witnesses heard Michael's anguished screams. Engelhardt bragged to his friends about hearing a hissing sound when he stabbed Michael in the chest and said callously that it seemed each of Michael's final heartbeats caused more blood to just squirt out. The coroner testified that there was evidence of two defensive injuries to Michael's right arm and possible defense wounds on his right shoulder. These facts demonstrate the existence of the aggravating factors set forth in K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 21-4636(f)(3) and (4). Our standard of review on the district court's weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is abuse of discretion. See Boldridge, 274 Kan. at 809. Weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not a numbers game. `One aggravating circumstance can be so compelling as to outweigh several mitigating circumstances' or vice versa. State v. Bedford, 269 Kan. 315, 331-32, 7 P.3d 224 (2000) (quoting State v. Phillips, 252 Kan. 937, Syl. ¶ 3, 850 P.2d 877 [1993]). Judicial discretion is abused when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the district judge. State v. Beard, 273 Kan. 789, 807-08, 46 P.3d 1185 (2002). The sentencing hearing record reveals the district judge explicitly considered the support of Engelhardt's family, the weak sentence of 22 years given to Brian, Engelhardt's intoxication at the time of the murder, and the length of sentence Engelhardt would serve even without the imposition of a hard 50 sentence. Without the imposition of a hard 50, Engelhardt still would not have been eligible for parole for 25 years. Although the district judge was troubled by Brian's lower sentence, his ultimate conclusion that it would be unfair to undersentence Engelhardt for his role in the murder was reasonable. Given the grisly facts of this case, we see no abuse of discretion in the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances  particularly that the crime was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner  outweighed any mitigating factors. We are similarly unpersuaded by Engelhardt's complaint that the district judge failed to consider whether he was an accomplice to the murder. See K.S.A. 21-4637(d). The record shows the district court considered this contention and rejected it. There also was no abuse of discretion in this respect. Affirmed. LOCKETT, J., Retired, assigned. [1]