Opinion ID: 767408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Test-firing Evidence and the Shotgun Replica

Text: 20 Aldaco next argues that the trial judge erred in allowing the government to present evidence of the 1993 test-firing of the firearm as well as a replica of the destroyed shotgun. Aldaco contends that he was severely prejudiced by the admission of this evidence at trial. 21 We review a district court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion, affording great deference to the trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence because of the trial judge's first-hand exposure to the witnesses and the evidence as a whole, and because of the judge's familiarity with the case and ability to gauge the impact of the evidence in the context of the entire proceeding. United States v. Van Dreel, 155 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1998). Compare United States v. Mancillas, 183 F.3d 682, 701 n. 22 (7th Cir. 1999) (We do not second-guess the [trial] judge's credibility determinations because he or she has had the best opportunity to observe the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the witnesses focusing on the subject's reactions and responses to the interrogatories, their facial expressions, attitudes, tone of voice, eye contact, posture and body movements, as well as confused or nervous speech patterns in contrast with merely looking at the cold pages of an appellate record. (citation omitted) (brackets in original)), petition for cert. filed, No. 99-6626 (Oct. 18, 1999). Accordingly, we will find reversible error only if the district court's decision is not within the range of options from which one would expect a reasonable trial judge to select. VanDreel, 155 F.3d at 905. 22 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence, which is defined as evidence which tends to make the existence or non-existence of a material fact more likely than not, is admissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. In order to properly exclude otherwise relevant evidence, a trial court must be satisfied that the prejudice to the defendant substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
23 Aldaco also argues that the test-firing evidence should have been deemed inadmissible because it was unduly prejudicial to him. Alternatively, the defendant-appellant argues that the evidence should have been excluded as a sanction for the destruction of the shotgun. 7 24 The court concluded that the results of the test-firing conducted by the police which demonstrated that the shotgun fired as designed were relevant and admissible evidence and furthermore that it was not unduly prejudicial to Aldaco. However, in an attempt to protect Aldaco's rights, the trial judge stressed to the parties that defense counsel would be given latitude to fully explore the gun firing and testing issue on cross-examination, advising thatthis may be fully explored by the defendant in cross-examining the witnesses who are called regarding the gun, the shotgun, and its testing and also any other circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the weapon, the testing of it, and ultimately that it was destroyed. 25 We refuse to hold that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying Aldaco's motion to suppress the evidence regarding the test-firing of the long-barreled shotgun. The indictment charged Aldaco, a convicted felon, with possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 921(a)(3). The statute defines a firearm as any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive . . . . Id. Obviously, the government was required to introduce the test-firing results in order to satisfy their burden of establishing that the shotgun was a firearm. Proof that the shotgun properly fired during the test-firing conducted by Chicago police demonstrates that the weapon is a firearm as charged in the indictment. The test results were relevant. Given the fact that Aldaco pled guilty in Illinois state court to charges of unlawful use of a weapon in violation of 720 ILCS sec. 5/24-1, offered no defense in his federal trial, and twice made the admission to Officer Sanchez that the gun was his and not to put it on any of the other guys, and because Aldaco also had more than ample opportunity to challenge the testing evidence at trial, we hold that the court did not erroneously conclude that the relevance of the gun-testing issue outweighs any potential prejudice to Aldaco. The trial court's conclusion that the test-firing evidence was admissible was proper.
26 Applying the abuse of discretion standard as is proper when reviewing a trial court's determination dealing with the admissibility of demonstrative evidence, see United States v. Salerno, 108 F.3d 730, 742 (7th Cir. 1997), we are convinced that the court did not err in allowing the government to use a replica of the destroyed shotgun as demonstrative evidence. We agree with the trial judge's determination that the probative value of the replica shotgun outweighed the prejudice to Aldaco. 27 The government introduced the replica to illustrate what Officer Sanchez saw when he observed Aldaco holding the shotgun in order that the jury might properly determine whether the events happened as Officer Sanchez testified. This Court has frequently approved the use of this type of demonstrative evidence to establish that objects of this nature were actually used in the commission of a crime. See, e.g., United States v. Towns, 913 F.2d 434, 446 (7th Cir. 1990) (district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing admission of a gun and ski mask identified by eyewitnesses as being similar to those possessed by the robbers for the limited demonstrative purpose of providing examples of the gun and ski mask used in the robbery); United States v. Salerno, 108 F.3d at 742-43 (no abuse of discretion when the district judge allowed the use of a scale model of a crime scene as demonstrative evidence); Roland v. Langlois, 945 F.2d 956, 963 (7th Cir. 1991) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing into evidence a life-sized model of an amusement park ride for demonstrative purposes). Courts in our sister circuits have also frequently approved of the admission of replica evidence, more specifically guns, for demonstrative purposes. See United States v. McIntosh, 23 F.3d 1454, 1456 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1105 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Ferreira, 821 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1987); Banning v. United States, 130 F.2d 330, 335-36 (6th Cir. 1942). 28 The only potential prejudice Aldaco has attempted to identify that might have resulted from allowing the replica shotgun into evidence is jury confusion over whether the gun displayed in court was actually the shotgun in the defendant's hand on the night of the arrest. To reduce the risk that the replica might in some unknownway prejudice Aldaco, the judge cautioned the government to make clear to the jury that the shotgun it displayed at trial was not the actual shotgun possessed by Aldaco. The government made this clear both in its opening statement (the thing to remember as we go through the trial is that [the Mossberg shotgun presented at trial] will not be the same. It will not be the same firearm), and during its direct examination of Officer Sanchez by asking him to describe how the firearm at trial differs from that found on July 2, 1993. Finally, the judge assisted in minimizing prejudice by prohibiting the government from keeping the replica shotgun in the court room in plain view of the jury during the trial. 29 Because the use of replica evidence for demonstrative purposes is a widely-accepted practice, and because the court took steps to minimize potential prejudice to Aldaco, we refuse to hold that the court abused its discretion in allowing the use of a replica shotgun in this case.