Opinion ID: 2612511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the right to statutory immunity

Text: ORS 471.770 grants transactional immunity for compelled testimony in an OLCC proceeding. See State v. Soriano, 68 Or. App. 642, 659, n. 17, 684 P.2d 1220, adopted and affirmed per curiam, 298 Or. 392, 693 P.2d 26 (1984) (under Oregon Constitution, only transactional immunity is permissible and statutory immunity of use and derivative use fails to meet constitutional requirements). Transactional immunity, at least as to criminal consequences, means that the witness is immune from prosecution for any offense to which the immunized testimony relates. Id. 68 Or. App. at 644 n. 3, 684 P.2d 1220. Transactional immunity, at least as to criminal consequences, is required when a witness is compelled to testify notwithstanding the constitutional right against self-incrimination contained in Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution. Id. at 662-65, 684 P.2d 1220. [6] Although a number of statutes grant testimonial immunity, this court rarely has ventured into the arena and never has reviewed the statutes in an administrative rather than a criminal context. See State v. Soriano, supra, 68 Or. App. at 659-60, 684 P.2d 1220. The contextual distinction is crucial in analyzing whether ORS 471.770 requires a witness to assert the right to an immunity before she is entitled to the corresponding statutory immunity. This court has held that a witness is entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution if the prosecution subpoenas the witness to testify before the grand jury or at trial concerning criminal gambling offenses; the witness need not first invoke the constitutional right against self-incrimination and be ordered to testify before being entitled to the immunity provided by the statute. State v. Hennessey, 195 Or. 355, 245 P.2d 875 (1952). The Oregon Court of Appeals has applied the holding of Hennessey to ORS 471.770 and immunized an OLCC-certified operator from criminal prosecution relating to falsification of records. The immunity was based on the operator's contemporaneous testimony at deposition, pursuant to subpoena, in an administrative proceeding to cancel the operator's certification for falsifying records. State v. Strance, 95 Or. App. 488, 769 P.2d 793 (1989). Hennessey remains good law within its context and it is useful to analyze what it brings to the problem at hand. The Hennessey court applied OCLA § 23-932, which provides immunity only in cases involving gambling transactions, and is in no sense general.  195 Or. at 365, 245 P.2d 875. (Emphasis added.) [7] The statute traced to Oregon's earliest grant of immunity, see State v. Soriano, supra, 68 Or. App. at 658-59, 684 P.2d 1220, and applied by its terms only to criminal consequences (no indictment or prosecution shall afterwards be brought) for testimony compelled by the prosecution in a criminal proceeding. State v. Hennessey, supra, 195 Or. at 372, 245 P.2d 875. In Hennessey, this court recognized that a prosecutor's subpoena to testify before a grand jury concerning criminal gambling offenses is sufficient to trigger the statutory immunity for compelled testimony, without the necessity of the witness asserting the right before actually testifying. 195 Or. at 366-67, 245 P.2d 875. The acts under investigation were criminal by definition; the witness' testimony sought in a gambling case most likely would implicate the witness in the offense under investigation; the penalty for refusal to testify was contempt; and the decision to subpoena the witness was made by the prosecutor, who is charged with general enforcement of the criminal laws. State v. Hennessey, supra, 195 Or. at 367-71, 245 P.2d 875; State v. Soriano, supra, 68 Or. App. at 648, 684 P.2d 1220. Consider by contrast the administrative arena within which ORS 471.770 operates. The acts under investigation in an administrative proceeding may or may not be criminal, in addition to being regulatory. See ORS 471.990 (making criminal certain violations of alcoholic liquor statutes). A witness in an administrative hearing well may be someone who already has voluntarily established a relationship with the agency, a relationship that includes obligations to provide truthful statements, applications, and supporting documentation. [8] The Commission has authority under the statute to immunize testimony (by ordering it) from criminal consequences, but the Commission does not possess the corresponding authority to enforce the criminal laws. See ORS 471.730(4). The administrative agency investigating a licensing matter, for example, is thus in a materially different position than the prosecutor in a gambling case, at the point when a subpoena issues. [9] The criminal lawbased rationales for the holding in Hennessey, that the gambling immunity statute is self-executing once a subpoena issues, either do not apply or are contra-indicated in the context of ORS 471.770 as applied to a licensing proceeding. [10] There is also a structural difference between the statute applied in Hennessey and ORS 471.770. Unlike the statute in Hennessey, ORS 471.770 expressly requires that, to be immunized, the testimony must be given pursuant to an order of the Commission. ORS 471.760 separately authorizes Commission orders to appear as a witness and Commission orders to compel testimony, suggesting an opportunity for Commission deliberation after a witness appears, perhaps occasioned by a witness' invocation of the right to immunity. There is little or no justification for a rule of automatic immunity in the context of ORS 471.770 as applied to a licensing proceeding and the statute, by its terms, requires no such rule. In the absence of a statutory grant of immunity for self-incriminatory testimony, a witness ordinarily is required to assert the witness' constitutional right to be free from compelled self-incrimination before further compelled testimony will be immunized. Such a rule places no special burden on a witness in the administrative licensing context and it frees the administrative process to hear such testimony as may be offered until a claim of right is made. At that point, the Commission can evaluate its need for the specific testimony it seeks and this may be done in consultation with the district attorney when appropriate. See ORS 471.730(4) (Commission obligation to investigate and aid in prosecution of violations of alcoholic liquor statutes). We hold, therefore, that before a witness becomes entitled to an immunity under ORS 471.770, the witness must invoke the right not to testify under oath without that immunity. The Commission must then decide whether to immunize the testimony by order or to proceed without it. ORS 471.770 does not provide for an automatic right to the immunities listed in the statute based on the issuance of a Commission subpoena. Only a post-invocation order to testify is an order sufficient to trigger an immunity under ORS 471.770. In this case, Coppedge first asserted her right to statutory immunity after the completion of her deposition and hearing testimony and, accordingly, waived her right to claim any immunity as a result of her testimony. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The order of the Commission is affirmed.