Opinion ID: 2635388
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Public Trial Right

Text: ¶ 9 Whether the right to a public trial has been violated is a question of law subject to de novo review. State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d 254, 256, 906 P.2d 325 (1995). ¶ 10 Article I, section 10 provides that [j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a public trial by an impartial jury. These provisions have a commonality: they protect the right to a public proceeding. ¶ 11 Our cases have recognized the importance of open proceedings and have emphasized that article I, section 10 secures the public's free and open access to judicial proceedings. We have also stressed that openness of courts is essential to the court's ability to maintain public confidence in the fairness and honesty of the judicial branch of government. But these principles do not exist in isolation of other constitutional rights and principles. ¶ 12 Article I, sections 10 and 22 serve complementary and interdependent functions in assuring fairness of our judicial system, particularly in the context of a criminal proceeding. Indeed, the central aim of any criminal proceeding must be to try the accused fairly. Thus, the requirement of a public trial is primarily for the benefit of the accused: that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned and that the presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of the responsibility and to the importance of their functions. For these reasons, under article I, sections 10 and 22, a strong presumption exists that courts are to be open at all trial stages. ¶ 13 This presumption of openness extends to voir dire because `[t]he process of juror selection ... is itself a matter of importance, not simply to the adversaries but to the criminal justice system.' In re Pers. Restraint of Orange, 152 Wash.2d 795, 804, 100 P.3d 291 (2004) (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 505, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984)). While the right to a public trial applies to all judicial proceedings, including jury selection, the right is not absolute. The presumption in favor of openness may be overcome by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Thus, the court may close a courtroom under certain circumstances. ¶ 14 To protect the defendant's public trial right under article I, section 22, this court adopted the same standard for closing the court that applies to cases under article I, section 10. Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d at 259, 906 P.2d 325. The decisions employing this closure standard for both sections 10 and 22 cases are similar to the analysis applied under the Sixth Amendment and the United States Supreme Court decision in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 47, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). To determine if closure is appropriate, we apply closure guidelines drawn from Waller's approach. Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d at 259-61, 906 P.2d 325; Orange, 152 Wash.2d at 805-08, 100 P.3d 291. These five guidelines are as follows: 1. The proponent of closure ... must make some showing [of a compelling interest], and where that need is based on a right other than an accused's right to a fair trial, the proponent must show a serious and imminent threat to that right. 2. Anyone present when the closure motion is made must be given an opportunity to object to the closure. 3. The proposed method for curtailing open access must be the least restrictive means available for protecting the threatened interests. 4. The court must weigh the competing interests of the proponent of closure and the public. 5. The order must be no broader in its application or duration than necessary to serve its purpose. Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d at 258-59, 906 P.2d 325 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Allied Daily Newspapers of Wash. v. Eikenberry, 121 Wash.2d 205, 210-11, 848 P.2d 1258 (1993)). After applying these guidelines, the court should enter specific findings on the record to justify the closure. ¶ 15 If, on appeal, the court determines that the defendant's right to a fair public trial has been violated, it devises a remedy appropriate to that violation. If the error is structural in nature, it warrants automatic reversal of conviction and remand for a new trial. An error is structural when it `necessarily render[s] a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.' Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218-19, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006) (alterations in original) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999)). Waller itself establishes that not all courtroom closure errors are fundamentally unfair and thus not all are structural errors; our cases applying Waller also support that proposition. ¶ 16 In Waller, the trial court closed the courtroom for a suppression hearing over the objections of the defendant, and, on review, the Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to a new suppression hearing, but not automatically a new trial. The Court reasoned that the remedy should be appropriate to the violation, and if it were to automatically grant a new trial without requiring a new hearing, the result would be a windfall for the defendant and would thus not be in the public interest. Waller, 467 U.S. at 50, 104 S.Ct. 2210. The Court did not conclusively presume prejudice and grant automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction and a new trial. Rather, in Waller, the Court required a showing that the defendant's case was actually rendered unfair by the closure. ¶ 17 Similarly, in our cases following Waller, we have held that the remedy must be appropriate to the violation and have found a new trial required in cases where a closure rendered a trial fundamentally unfair. For instance, in State v. Easterling, 157 Wash.2d 167, 137 P.3d 825 (2006), we remanded a case for a new trial where the court closed the courtroom, excluding the defendant from a portion of his own trial, while his codefendant made a motion to sever and struck a deal with the State to testify against him. In that case, the closure affected the fairness of Easterling's trial because the court did not seek or receive input or objection from Easterling, and it prevented him from being present during a portion of his own proceedings. ¶ 18 Likewise, in Orange, we ordered a new trial because the trial court excluded the defendant's family and friends from voir dire, though defense counsel twice requested that they be present. The closure compromised Orange's right to a fair trial by excluding his family and friends from `contribut[ing] their knowledge or insight to the jury selection and the inability of venirepersons to see the interested individuals.' Orange, 152 Wash.2d at 812, 100 P.3d 291 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Watters v. State, 328 Md. 38, 48, 612 A.2d 1288 (1992)); see also Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d 254, 906 P.2d 325 (without seeking objection or receiving assent from defendant, court excluded defendant from closed pretrial suppression hearing to protect undercover activities of State's witness); State v. Brightman, 155 Wash.2d 506, 122 P.3d 150 (2005) (court ordered sua sponte closure, without seeking objection or receiving assent from defendant and excluded defendant's family and friends from courtroom due to concerns over space and security). ¶ 19 In the aforementioned cases, the closure errors were held to be structural in nature. Prejudice to the defendant in those cases was sufficiently clear and required the remedy of a new trial. In each case, the trial court closed the courtroom based on interests other than the defendant's; the closures impacted the fairness of the defendant's proceedings; the court closed the courtroom without seeking objection, input, or assent from the defendant; and in the majority of cases, the record lacked any hint that the trial court considered the defendant's right to a public trial when it closed the courtroom. Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d at 260, 906 P.2d 325 (court held closure a structural error, reasoning in part that the record lacks any hint the trial court considered Defendant's public trial right); Brightman, 155 Wash.2d at 518, 122 P.3d 150 (same); Orange, 152 Wash.2d at 811-12, 100 P.3d 291 (same). Accordingly, we reversed the convictions and remanded the cases for a new trial. ¶ 20 Applying these principles to this case, we find the facts distinguishable from our previous closure cases. Here, Momah affirmatively assented to the closure, argued for its expansion, had the opportunity to object but did not, actively participated in it, and benefited from it. Moreover, the trial judge in this case not only sought input from the defendant, but he closed the courtroom after consultation with the defense and the prosecution. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the trial judge closed the courtroom to safeguard Momah's constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury, not to protect any other interests. Where, as here, a defendant's other constitutional rights are implicated, the trial court is required to give due consideration to those rights in determining whether closure is appropriate. [2]