Opinion ID: 1656455
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did Wright's inability to discover the cause of her child's death toll the MTCA one-year period of limitations?

Text: ¶ 29. The majority holds that Wright should have known that there was some causal connection between Dr. Quesnel's negligence and the death of her child. The majority's rational in this finding is totally erroneous. It escapes me how the majority can link a causal connection between Wright's child dying in the womb and the actions of Dr. Quesnel. The doctor ordered Wright bed rest on her first visit, on her second visit she did not receive treatment, and on her third treatment she complained of severe pain resulting in her child dying in the womb. This is clearly not enough information to form a causal connection between the child's death and the doctor's negligence. ¶ 30. Wright's child died in the womb on August 26, 1999. It was not until March, 2001, however, that she claims to have discovered the cause of death, after which time she immediately filed suit against Dr. Quesnel and later against SPCH asserting medical negligence as that cause. Neither suit was filed within the MTCA's limitations period. Wright claims, however, that the discovery rule should toll that period because she was not able to discover the cause of her child's death until she received a medical expert opinion provided through her attorney. The circuit court ruled against Wright on this issue, finding that Wright made no claim as to latent injuries, nor had she offered evidence that she could not have discovered the injury within the applicable statute of limitations. The court further indicated that it could not say that Wright used reasonable diligence in determining the causal relationship between the alleged negligence and the death of the child. ¶ 31. The MTCA allows one year from the date of injury during which a plaintiff must file a complaint against a physician or hospital thereunder covered. Miss.Code. Ann. § 11-46-1-23 (2002). However, in Barnes v. Singing River Hospital Sys., 733 So.2d 199 (Miss.1999), this Court held that the discovery rule applies to the statute of limitations governing MTCA actions against state agencies. Id. at 205. Specifically, we held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run in that case until the medical expert notified the Barneses' attorney of possible negligence. Id. at 206. Specifically, although the Barneses were aware of the injuries before the one year time limit was up, we found that they could not have reasonably known that the hospital was responsible until their medical expert notified them of the possible negligence. Id. We concluded: Because we find that the Barnes promptly filed their claim within one year of discovery of Singing River's alleged negligence in this case, we must reverse the trial court's award of summary judgment and remand this case.... Id. at 201 (emphasis added). We relied on Smith v. Sanders, 485 So.2d 1051 (Miss.1986), in Barnes to justify our holding, citing that portion of Sanders which reads as follows: There may be rare cases where the patient is aware of his injury prior to the [expiration of the limitations period], but does not discover with reasonable diligence the act or omission which caused the injury. In such cases, the action does not accrue until the latter discovery is made. Sanders, 485 So.2d at 1052-53. As mentioned, here Wright claimed that although she was aware of the death of her child on the date of death, she was not able to discover the cause thereof until she was so informed by her attorney's medical expert. This was the identical basis for holding that the limitations period in Barnes was tolled. Barnes, 733 So.2d at 206. ¶ 32. The circuit court considered Wright's argument in light of both Barnes and Sanders, but concluded that this is not one of those rare cases our court has referenced to in Barnes.  Based on Barnes, however, I disagree with the majority's holding and find that this is an issue of fact as to this matter as well. Whether a case is rare or whether the plaintiff has exercised reasonable diligence are not matters of law. Id. Accordingly, as was the result in Barnes, I cannot agree with the majority's finding that summary judgment was proper. ¶ 33. The majority's holding and reasoning in the case at bar are misplaced. Having found that genuine issues of material fact exist as to (1) Dr. Quesnel's employment status, based on explicit conflicts between his employment contract and SPCH's statement in its Conditions of Admission Form that he is not its employee, and (2) whether the MTCA's statute of limitations was tolled due to Wright's inability to discover the cause of the death of her unborn child within that period, I would reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this case for further proceedings. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.