Opinion ID: 110792
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Suit Is Against the State

Text: The case is directly traceable to Treasure Salvors' filing of a motion in District Court for an order commanding the United States Marshal to arrest and take custody of the contested artifacts and to bring them within the jurisdiction of the court. Record 318. The roots of the case, however, rest in the earlier in rem action brought by Treasure Salvors to establish its title to the wreck and its bounty. The District Court held that possession and title rested with Treasure Salvors. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 408 F. Supp. 907, 911 (SD Fla. 1976). The Court of Appeals affirmed Treasure Salvors' ownership of all objects within the District Court's jurisdiction and to those objects outside its territory with respect to the United States. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F. 2d 330 (CA5 1978) (Treasure Salvors I) . Treasure Salvors' subsequent request for an arrest warrant was predicated on this decision. [1] The warrant was to issue because it had already been decided that Treasure Salvors had sole title and right to possession of the Defendant vessel. App. 13. Notwithstanding the Court of Appeals' limitation of its opinion to artifacts within the District Court's jurisdiction and to rights in the treasure asserted by the United States, Treasure Salvors sought enforcement of the judgment against the State of Florida. It did so on grounds that this Court's decision in United States v. Florida, 420 U. S. 521 (1975), removed Florida's right to the artifacts, and that Florida was privy to and bound by Treasure Salvors I. Inasmuch as the State of Florida [and its officers] were privy to this litigation, it is clear that [the district court] confirmed to the Plaintiffs' . . . title to and right to immediate and sole possession of the vessel ... together with all her ... cargo, wherever the same may be found. App. 18 (emphasis deleted). In short, Treasure Salvors requested seizure of the artifacts in order to enforce an earlier judgment against the State. This is reason enough to conclude that the suit, and the accompanying warrant for arrest of the articles, were actions invoking federal judicial power against the State and not merely its agents. But even if this were not so, subsequent events reveal that the case is one against the State. After the State filed a motion to quash the warrant, Treasure Salvors filed a supplemental complaint requesting that the contract be held void; it also requested that the District Court rule [t]hat the State has no right, title or interest in any portions of the Atocha in its possession. Record 371. The District Court then entered an order to show cause addressed directly to the State of Florida. App. 63. The State then argued that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit. After rejecting all of the State's arguments, the District Court ordered that Treasure Salvors have full right and title to articles arrested and that they are entitled to possession. Id., at 85. The Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. I find the inescapable conclusion to be that this suit, as filed, litigated, and decided, was an action to determine the title of the State of Florida to the artifacts. [2] A suit of this type is at the heart of the Eleventh Amendment immunity. The line of cases culminating in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), are not to the contrary. In both United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882), and Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897), the suits were against individual agents and did not purport to conclude the rights of the Government. As the Court correctly notes, Tindal made plain that a judgment awarding possession to the plaintiff would not subsequently bind the Government. Here the entire point of the in rem proceeding is to apply the judgment in Treasure Salvors I to erase the State's claim to the treasure. This is the only basis for issuance of the arrest warrant; it was the relief expressly requested by the respondents, and the relief subsequently granted by the District Court and the Court of Appeals. My position is supported by the precedents closest to the instant case: the In re New York cases, 256 U. S. 490 (1921), and 256 U. S. 503 (1921). The first In re New York decision arose from an in rem libel against the private owners of tugboats that had been at fault in collisions while chartered and operated by the State. The owners sought to bring in the Superintendent of Public Works who had entered into the charters on the State's behalf. The issue before this Court was whether the State could, without its consent, be impleaded in admiralty process in an action against private parties. The Court held that the proceedings against which prohibition is here asked, i. e., the attempt to implead the State, have no element of a proceeding in rem and are in the nature of an action in personam  against a state officer. The purpose of this distinction was not to suggest that in rem actions could be brought against the State, or even that the original libel was not a true in rem cause, but rather to highlight that impleading of a state official, no less than a direct action against the official, constituted a suit against a state officer in his official capacity and might require satisfaction out of the property of New York. 256 U. S., at 501. The second In re New York decision, a sovereign immunity case, made clear that a State's immunity extended to admiralty actions in rem. The principle so uniformly held to exempt the property of municipal corporations employed for public and governmental purposes from seizure by admiralty process in rem, applies with even greater force to exempt public property of a State used and employed for public and governmental purposes. 256 U. S., at 511. The plurality's reading of In re New York (II) is that an action otherwise barred as an in personam action against the Statecannot be maintained through seizure of property owned by the State. Ante, at 699. [3] Nothing in the language of Justice Pitney's opinion supports this interpretation. Moreover, the libel brought before the Court in that case was a true in rem action; an action in admiralty to recover damages caused by a ship is a classic in rem action, although after the owners of the vessel are identified the libel often will be amended to include an in personam claim as well. G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admiralty 498 (2d ed. 1975) (Gilmore & Black). Therefore, In re New York (II) is as true an in rem action as the instant case. The grounds of similarity between the cases are clear: in both cases in rem libels were filed and process by arrest was requested; in both suits the State by its Attorney General responded and indicated to the District Court that the property to be arrested was in the possession and ownership of the State, and therefore immune from seizure and attachment. In both cases, the District Court overruled the suggestion and awarded process in rem, authorizing the arrest of the res. When the seizure of the Queen City finally reached this forum, the Court stated that the property was exempt from seizure by admiralty process in rem. [4] The plurality's distinction aside, the cases can be distinguished on but a single relevant point: the fact that ownership of the res is contested here. That, of course, is the grounds on which the Court of Appeals decided the casea resolution which the plurality apparently rejects. In re New York (I) indicates that the Eleventh Amendment will bar a suit that has the effect of proceeding against a state officer and involving the State's property. In re New York (II) squarely stands for the proposition that sovereign immunity bars process against a res in the hands of state officers. This is true even though an in rem action strictly proceeds against the vessel, and the owner of the vessel or artifacts is not an indispensable party. Significantly, In re New York (II) did not distinguish between the service of process to arrest the res and the thrust of the libel itself to determine the rights in the vessel. I follow that course in this case, and refuse to sever the attempt to arrest the artifacts from the attempt to decide their ownership. The In re New York cases are particularly forceful because they reflect the special concern in admiralty that maritime property of the sovereign is not to be seized. This principle dates back to the English [5] and has not been significantly altered in this country. [6] The In re New York cases are but the most apposite examples of the line of cases concerning in rem actions brought against vessels in which an official of the State, the Federal Government, or a foreign government has asserted ownership of the res. The Court's consistent interpretation of the respective but related immunity doctrines pertaining to such vessels has been, upon proper presentation that the sovereign entity claims ownership of a res in its possession, to dismiss the suit or modify the judgment accordingly. [7] Finally, the allowance of an in rem suit against arguably state-owned maritime property rests on the personification theory of the resthat the action runs against the Atocha and not the State of Florida. This distinction between in rem and in personam actions has been decisively rejected. As the fiction of the personality of the ship declined, Gilmore & Black 615, 804-805, in rem actions were given in personam effect, and in personam judgments barred subsequent in rem actions. Id., at 802, 613-614. See, e. g., Burns Bros. v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 202 F. 2d 910 (CA2 1953) (L. Hand, J.). In short, under long-established admiralty law, arrest of sovereign maritime property is not tolerated, and an in rem suit directed at government property is an action against the State.