Opinion ID: 2199744
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: second the issue of negligence.

Text: The appellant asserts that his suit is brought under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. Section 688, which provides: Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply. The statutes applying to railway employees referred to above are contained in the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C., Sections 51 et seq. The Jones Act does not permit a longshoreman to sue a vessel owner, because that Act applies only to suits by an employee against his employer and a longshoreman is ordinarily not an employee of the vessel owner. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783; Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1; Continental Casualty Co. v. Thorden Line, 186 F.2d 992 (U.S.Ct. of Appeals, 4th Circuit). The plaintiff was a longshoreman and there is no evidence to show that he was an employee of the owner of the ship. Hence the Jones Act appears inapplicable to this suit, and in view of our conclusions stated below, it does not appear that, if applicable, the Jones Act would have aided the plaintiff in this case. Prior to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C., Section 901 et seq., which was passed in 1927, a longshoreman could sue his employer under the Jones Act ( International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50; Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635); but since the passage of the Harbor Workers Act, he no longer can do so. (See the Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., Swanson and Continental Casualty Co. cases above cited.) Since the accident occurred on navigable waters of the United States, a tort action based upon it is governed by the Federal maritime law. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52; Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406. The plaintiff, though erroneously basing his claim on the Jones Act, does allege negligence on the part of the defendant. The Federal maritime law recognizes negligence and unseaworthiness as bases for liability on the part of a ship owner, and a very recent pronouncement on the subject by a majority of the Supreme Court indicates that a longshoreman may sue a ship owner on either ground, and also that liability for unseaworthiness may be established by much less proof than would be required to establish negligence. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn , above cited. In this case the plaintiff relies on his own testimony and that of Harris to establish that there was grease on the shelter deck hatch coaming and that it dripped from the wheels at the ends of the beams supporting the hatch covers on the deck above. There was no testimony that anyone had seen grease drip from one deck to the other. There was also no testimony to show how long the grease had been there or to show that the ship's officers or crew knew of its presence. (All of the witnesses who testified on the subject, other than Harris and the plaintiff, said that there was no grease on the shelter deck hatch cover or coaming.) There was no claim of inadquate lighting. On this state of the proof (and without regard to the denials of the presence of grease by the defendant's witnesses), we are inclined to the view that the trial judge was correct in directing a verdict for the defendant on the issue of negligence. Daniels v. Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co., 120 F. Supp. 96; Adamowski v. Gulf Oil Corp., 93 F. Supp. 115; Cookingham v. U.S., 184 F.2d 213 ( cert. den., 340 U.S. 935); Guerrini v. U.S., 167 F.2d 352. Since the plaintiff elected to sue in a State court in Maryland (See 28 U.S.C., Section 1333), the law of this State with regard to what must be shown to establish negligence also appears pertinent; and this, too, tends to support the action of the lower court on this issue. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Hairston, 196 Md. 595, 78 A.2d 190; Lusby v. Baltimore Transit Co., 195 Md. 118, 72 A.2d 754, both of which emphasize the need of proof that the defendant knew or ought to have known of the existence or presence of a dangerous condition. Cf. Grzboski v. Bernheimer-Leader Stores, 156 Md. 146, 143 A. 706. See also Smith v. Hercules Co., et al., 204 Md. 379, 104 A.2d 590, which is the most recent decision of this Court dealing with a suit by a longshoreman to recover damages for injuries received while working on board a ship in nevigable waters. In that case ( inter alia ) it was held that a steamship owner had not failed in the duty to furnish a safe place to work, and it was pointed out that this duty was not an absolute one, but was only to use reasonable care to furnish a reasonably safe place to work. In other words, the ship owner was not held to the liability of an insurer. A decision on the direction of a verdict for the defendant on the issue of negligence is not, however, really necessary. This is because of the instruction which the trial judge gave on the subject of seaworthiness. The appellee contends that it was also entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of seaworthiness and that the instruction given on this question was more favorable to the plaintiff than it should have been. This question, too, need not be decided. The trial judge instructed the jury in part as follows:    if you find that there was grease on the hatch cover or hatch coaming or the shelter deck, and find that the plaintiff slipped on the grease and that the grease came from the hatch beams of the main deck, you could find the ship was thereby unseaworthy and the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The above quotation is taken almost word for word from an instruction requested by the plaintiff and given by the trial judge, and constitutes the concluding part of that instruction. The trial judge next pointed out to the jury that if the act which caused the unseaworthiness was committed by a member of the crew, this would not absolve the owner of the vessel. He then instructed the jury that the owner owes the same protection against unseaworthiness to stevedores as to seamen, that the term seaworthy is a relative term, but that the basic thought is that the vessel shall be equipped to perform the duty or [of ?] safety that it owes to human beings aboard and the cargo which it carries, and the equipment must be maintained in a safe condition in order to make the vessel seaworthy. Then followed this paragraph: You are instructed if you find that the ship, the La Salle, was unseaworthy by virtue of grease falling from the hatch beams of the main deck thereby causing the plaintiff to slip and fall and that the ship was unseaworthy thereby, and you so find, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover without proving negligence. This instruction is taken practically verbatim from a prayer submitted by the plaintiff. It will be noted that under these instructions, all that the plaintiff had to establish in order to be entitled to recover was as follows: (1) that there was grease on the shelter deck at the place where he slipped; (2) that it came from the hatch beams or rollers on the deck above; and (3) that the grease caused the plaintiff to slip and fall. Whether the plaintiff sought to recover for negligence or unseaworthiness, proof of these facts was essential to his case. The instructions permitted the jury to find for him on the basis of unseaworthiness by the establishment of these facts and specifically dispensed with any obligation on his part to prove, in addition, negligence on the part of the defendant. (Compare Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, supra . ) Under these instructions the jury found against the plaintiff, which means that his proof must have failed to satisfy the jury on one or more of the facts which would have been equally essential to his success on a claim based upon negligence. Under such circumstances, the withdrawal of the issue of negligence, even if it had been erroneous (which we do not hold), was not prejudicial to the plaintiff. We have carefully examined the whole charge, the exceptions to it and the modification of the original charge which the trial judge made to eliminate any consideration by the jury of either primary negligence or contributory negligence, and we find nothing which would warrant a reversal of the judgment because of the manner in which those matters were dealt with. Because of the views above expressed it is unnecessary to go into the effect of contributory negligence under maritime law upon liability for either negligence or unseaworthiness.