Opinion ID: 2594892
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Veasley's Penalty Phase Claims

Text: Veasley's mother, Tressie Williams, testified on his behalf that Amelia Gonzalez, the mother of one of his children, lived in northern California. Defense counsel asked whether Gonzalez had wanted to testify at the trial, and she answered, Yes. The court sustained the prosecutor's hearsay objection, and instructed the jury to disregard the response. Williams then testified that Gonzalez was going to travel with her from northern California, but she was pregnant and went into labor at the airport. Her water broke and she was taken to a hospital. She also testified that Gonzalez and Veasley had a good relationship and they were best friends. She also testified about Veasley's relationship with his children and their other mothers. Veasley claims the court violated his federal constitutional right to present mitigating evidence by sustaining the hearsay objection. However, he never asserted any constitutional right or, indeed, any other basis for admitting the excluded evidence. Instead, he simply elicited other evidence regarding the relationship between Gonzalez and Veasley. Accordingly, the issue is not cognizable. ( People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 795-796, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192; People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 265, fn. 4, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897.) We also see no error. The evidence was hearsay and Veasley does not suggest it comes within an exception to the general rule that hearsay is inadmissible. (Evid.Code, § 1200.) Veasley argues that his right to present mitigating evidence mandated its admission. However, the rule permitting a defendant to admit all relevant mitigating evidence has not abrogated the California Evidence Code. ( People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 837, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) The United States Constitution compels the admission of hearsay evidence only if the proponent shows the evidence is highly relevant to a critical issue and is sufficiently reliable. ( People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 629, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) Veasley made no attempt to meet these requirements at trial. The hearsay was not highly relevant to a critical issue. The relationship between Veasley and Gonzalez was not a critical issue, and Veasley could, and did, present evidence of that relationship by other means.
The district attorney argued to the jury that it may not relish the idea of having ... to sit in judgment on somebody else's life, but that Veasley was responsible for bringing the jury to this courtroom ... to face this task, and that the jury should only blame ... [Veasley] for putting you in a position that you're now in. She concluded her argument, You'll see that death ... is the appropriate vote in this case. It's a punishment that this defendant has imposed upon himself ... as a consequence of his conduct, his behavior. Veasley claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by attempting to shift responsibility for the requested death verdict from the jury to [himself]. (See Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633.) He did not object to any of these remarks. Nevertheless, we have stated, without explanation or citation to authority, that [w]e have never required an objection to raise claims of error based upon Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320 [105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231].... ( People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1104, 259 Cal.Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659; see also People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1238, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254 [citing Bittaker without further explanation]; People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1035, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099 [same]; cf. People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 180, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980 [claim of similar error found forfeited but also lacking in merit].) On reflection, we see no reason to carve out an exception to the general rule that a defendant must object to misconduct at trial to raise the claim on appeal. ( People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1212, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) If the prosecutor improperly suggests the responsibility for a death verdict rests elsewhere, an admonition could normally cure any harm. ( Ibid. ) We believe, therefore, that a defendant should be required to object to this type of misconduct just as to any other type of misconduct. (See generally People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27-34, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) Accordingly, in all trials held after this decision becomes final, a defendant will be required to object to prosecutorial misconduct on this basis in order to raise the issue on appeal. However, at this trial, Veasley was not on notice that he had to object on this basis. So we consider the issue on the merits as to him. (See People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1220, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969; People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 358, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627, 885 P.2d 1040.) The claim lacks merit. [I]t is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. ( Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, 472 U.S. at pp. 328-329, 105 S.Ct. 2633 [prosecutor argued the jury would not determine whether the defendant would die because a higher court would review a death sentence].) The prosecutor did not violate this mandate. She made clear the jury alone had to make this determination and merely placed the blame for this circumstance on Veasley. She did not suggest that Veasley would determine whether his own death was appropriate. Nor did she try to shift the responsibility for the decision to anyone else, such as a higher court. Indeed, she told the jury, You decide what penalty to impose. The prosecutor sought only to emphasize `that the moral blame for the crimes and their consequences rests with defendant, not with the jurors,' and this is not improper.' ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 180, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.)
At the district attorney's request, and over Veasley's objection, the trial court ordered the jury's verdict as to Veasley sealed until after the jury had also rendered its verdict as to Cleveland and Charan. It believed that sealing the first verdict so that both verdicts could be announced simultaneously at the end of the trial would best ensure that the jury would hear the evidence and deliberate at the second penalty trial as comfortably as possible, as openly as possible. It was also concerned to protect defendants' rights while sealing the verdict. Accordingly, and following the procedure the court established, when the jury announced that it had reached a verdict as to Veasley, the court examined the verdict to make sure it had been properly signed and dated. It then explained to the jury that the verdict would be sealed and not disclosed to anybody else until the jury had reached its verdicts as to Cleveland and Charan. The court also had each juror individually examine the verdict to make sure each agreed with it. It then polled the jurors as to whether the verdicts that you've examined are your true and correct verdicts. Each juror individually affirmed that the verdict was his or her true and correct verdict. The court then sealed the verdict until after the second penalty trial. After the jury reached its verdict as to Cleveland and Charan, and in the presence of all defendants and the jury, the court announced each of the verdicts, including the death verdict as to Veasley. The court again polled the jury, and each juror individually affirmed that the verdicts, including the death verdict as to Veasley, were his or her own. Veasley argues this procedure violated his rights to a unanimous verdict, jury polling, due process, and a reliable penalty determination. Specifically, he argues this procedure violated the jurors' rights to reconsider their verdict until the decision was complete and resulted in no true polling of the individual jurors. (See §§ 1163, 1164.) We disagree. Regarding the verdict as to Veasley, the jury was polled twice in open court in Veasley's presence: first when it reached its verdict, and again when the verdict was unsealed and announced. Both times any juror could have expressed any disagreement or other dissatisfaction with the verdict. Both times each juror assented that the verdict was, in fact, that juror's true verdict. For this reason, we need not decide whether the jury had the right to reconsider its verdict at the time it was unsealed. Sealing the first verdict to announce all verdicts at the same time did not violate any of Veasley's rights. [10]