Opinion ID: 78569
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Contractual Relationship with WellStar

Text: To state a claim under § 1981 for interference with a right to contract, a plaintiff must identify an impaired contractual relationship under which the plaintiff has rights. Kinnon v. Arcoub, Gopman & Assocs., 490 F.3d 886, 890 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). Jimenez contends he had an implicit contract with WellStar, pursuant to which WellStar agreed to grant Jimenez medical staff privileges and, in turn, Jimenez agreed to treat patients at WellStar hospitals. Under such a theory, the staff privileges would serve as the consideration for the contract; they would not themselves create the contract. Thus, Jimenez concludes, WellStar's revocation of Jimenez's privileges amounted to a breach of contract, and, because the revocation was allegedly for discriminatory purposes, the revocation violated § 1981. WellStar's policies make clear that medical staff privileges do not confer upon a physician any contractual rights. [3] Georgia law agrees. Under Georgia law, medical staff bylaws, which govern medical staff privileges, do not create a contractual right to the continuation of those privileges. [4] St. Mary's Hosp. of Athens, Inc. v. Radiology Prof'l Corp., 205 Ga.App. 121, 421 S.E.2d 731, 736 (1992); see also Stein v. Tri-City Hosp. Auth., 192 Ga.App. 289, 384 S.E.2d 430, 432 (1989) (explaining hospitals have the power to create rules governing medical practice in their facilities to ensure competent care, so [i]t naturally follows that a hospital authority has the power to revoke the staff privileges of a physician whom it finds to be incompetent or who fails to comply with [its] reasonable rules and regulations (quotation and emphasis omitted)). Interpreting the bylaws governing staff privileges as a contract would run counter to [Georgia's] policy of allowing the hospital to grant or withhold staff privileges from doctors it believes are unqualified to serve on its staff. Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville, 785 F.Supp. 989, 1002 (N.D.Ga.1992). Jimenez's theory that his medical staff privileges constituted consideration for a broader contract is ultimately unpersuasive. Were that theory accurate, many of the Georgia cases holding that medical staff privileges do not create a contractual relationship would be rendered meaningless. In any case involving revocation of staff privileges, a plaintiff could argue that although the staff privileges themselves did not create a contract, the privileges were the consideration for the broader contractual relationship between the parties; the plaintiff could thereby circumvent Georgia's clear rule that medical staff privileges cannot create contractual liability. Thus, under Georgia law, alleging suspension of medical staff privileges does not implicate any contractual relationship, and, as such, cannot be the basis of § 1981 discrimination claim.