Opinion ID: 1224859
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: dr 1-102(a)(3); ors 9.527(4); dr 5-101(a); dr 5-101(b)

Text: The Bar argues that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) [13] and ORS 9.527(4) [14] by dishonestly transferring the van, first to his professional corporation and then to his daughter, and that he violated DR 5-101(A) and (B) by engaging in conflicts of interest with respect to the transfer. The Bar's claims with respect to DR 1-102(A)(3) and ORS 9.527(4) are not well taken. The Bar has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that the accused engaged in fraud, dishonesty, or misrepresentation concerning the transfer. The accused discussed the initial transfer of the van to his professional corporation with Benston, and had her sign a Department of Motor Vehicles power of attorney in his favor. The purpose of the transfer was to enable the accused to purchase insurance on the vehicle, because Benston was unable to obtain insurance. In the light of the fact that the accused and his family drove Benston in her van when she visited their home, this effort to acquire insurance was both reasonable and prudent. Neither did the subsequent transfer of title from the accused's professional corporation to the accused's daughter involve fraud, dishonesty, or misrepresentation. The record indicates that Benston willingly agreed to the sale of her vanalthough, technically, it then was owned by the accused's professional corporationto the accused's daughter for $1,000. Benston received $1,000 as payment for the van. [15] The accused did not violate DR 1-102(A)(3) or ORS 9.527(4) concerning this matter. On the other hand, the Bar's claims with respect to DR 5-101(A) leads to an analysis and a result like that reached with respect to the assignment of the trust deed. The Bar proved by clear and convincing evidence that the accused violated DR 5-101(A) by failing to obtain consent from Benston after full disclosure of the conflict of interest involved in transferring title to Benston's van to the accused's professional corporation. The fact that the accused's professional corporation paid the insurance on the vehicle, and that Benston ultimately was paid $1,000 for it, did not eliminate the conflict of interest. Finally, we hold that the accused did not violate DR 5-101(B), because we find that the transfer of the van, first to the professional corporation and then to the daughter, did not constitute a gift. Although the professional corporation did not pay consideration for the transfer, the van essentially was held in trust for Benston and was operated for her benefit. Moreover, upon selling the vehicle to the daughter, the professional corporation did not receive the $1,000 payment for the vehicle; the money went to Benston. In summary, we hold that the trial panel correctly concluded that the accused did not violate DR 1-103(A), ORS 9.527(4), or DR 5-101(B), but we find that, in addition, the Bar proved by clear and convincing evidence that the accused violated DR 5-101(A).