Opinion ID: 2994178
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Amount of Drugs Attributable to Jones for

Text: Sentencing Purposes
We review a district court’s determination of the amount of narcotics attributable to a defendant for sentencing purposes under the clear error standard. See United States v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 529, 537 (7th Cir. 2000). ’The factual findings of the district court will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous . . . . Thus, we will reverse the district court’s conclusion as to quantity of cocaine attributable to [a] defendant[ ] only if we have a definite and firm conviction that the district court made a clear error in sentencing.’ United States v. Taylor, 72 F.3d 533, 542 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Mumford, 25 F.3d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 1994)). That is, clear error can occur with respect to the amount of drugs attributed to a defendant when the calculation of the amount of drugs he is held accountable for is based on unreliable or insufficient information and, therefore, lacks an adequate evidentiary basis. See United States v. Span, 170 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 153 (1999). As an initial matter, the government argues that Jones has waived the issue of the judge’s drug calculation by failing to raise it before the trial court and that we should, therefore, review his claim only for plain error. See United States v. Robinson, 20 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1994). We disagree. In spite of the government’s argument to the contrary, it is clear to us that Jones did raise an objection as to the amount of crack cocaine recommended in the PSR that he be held accountable for. At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the judge stated to defense counsel, you are arguing the amount . . . , if I understand. (emphasis added). To which counsel replied, [y]es I am, Judge. (emphasis added). Defense counsel then proceeded to argue that Jones should not be held accountable for 1.5 kilograms, but rather a much lesser amount. The government, at the court’s request, proceeded to give a detailed account of why Jones should be held accountable for more than 1.5 kilograms of crack, pointing out that each of the five separate drug organizations Jones assisted distributed well in excess of 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine. Furthermore, the plea agreement, as we noted earlier, states that Jones takes issue with basing his offense level on 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine. Given that Jones raised the argument concerning the amount of drugs he would be held accountable for before the district court, we disagree with the government’s contention that the defendant waived his right to challenge the judge’s calculation as to the amount of crack cocaine he was responsible for and, therefore, we review under the clear error standard.
Even though Jones has preserved the issue for review, he still faces an uphill struggle in convincing us that the court committed clear error. In attempting to do just that, Jones argues that the judge relied upon insufficient and unreliable evidence in concluding that he was responsible for at least 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine. Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) explains what can be considered as relevant conduct when determining a defendant’s base offense level. The Guideline states that relevant conduct is all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense. U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); see also United States v. Lezine, 166 F.3d 895, 905-06 (7th Cir. 1999). When calculating the amount of drugs a defendant is liable for, the judge may consider a wide range of information so long as it has a ’sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.’ United States v. Robinson, 164 F.3d 1068, 1070 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 122 (1999) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 72 F.3d 533, 543 (7th Cir. 1995)). Furthermore, it is the sentencing judge alone who, based upon the evidence received, decides the identity and quantity of the drug distributed in an offense. United States v. Branch, 195 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Edwards, 105 F.3d 1179, 1180 (7th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). In this case, not only did the U.S. Attorney’s Office submit a letter detailing its position concerning Jones’s accountability for more than 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine, but the PSR, in relevant part, states that, [a]ccording to the FBI, although a specific amount of cocaine could not be determined, there is evidence that the drug establishments of each of the aforementioned [drug organizations] sold over 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base during the time period in question. (emphasis added). Additionally, the trial court also received statements from the government introduced at Jones’s sentencing hearing which established the scope of the Holmes drug operation; an operation Jones admitted assisting for more than a year. The government informed the judge, without objection from defense counsel, that testimony at the trial of Jack Davis, the former FHPD police chief, established that the Holmes drug operation was a 24-hour a day operation with shifts of workers. The government further informed the judge that the drug activity in the Ford Heights area was so vast that it interfered with the free and unimpaired flow of traffic, to the extent that buses were unable to operate on the street because of the constant drug activity. According to the government’s recitation of facts, again received without objection, the Holmes drug operation sold easily in excess of 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine each week or two, let alone in the course of a couple of years. (emphasis added). At Jones’s sentencing hearing, defense counsel acknowledged that his client was responsible for all reasonably foreseeable quantities of drugs within the scope of the criminal activity that Jones jointly undertook, but nevertheless still argued that: I would ask the court to consider, particularly in light of my [prior] argument . . . , and this man’s background, I would ask you to consider, Judge, a reduction of [the amount of drugs attributed to Jones] in the interests of justice and fairness. I think he’s eligible for it. I think it’s a comfortable reduction [23 grams instead of 1.5 kilograms] that even the government should be comfortable with. Here, in stating that Jones should be held accountable for less than 1.5 kilograms, Jones’s counsel argued only that I think the evidence will reflect it. (emphasis added). We have held that a defendant cannot show that a PSR is inaccurate by simply denying the PSR’s truth. Instead, . . . he must produce some evidence that ’calls the reliability or correctness of the alleged facts into question.’ United States v. Mustread, 42 F.3d 1097, 1102 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Isirov, 986 F.2d 183, 186 (7th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). We are of the opinion that Jones has failed to meet his burden because he has failed to present any evidence demonstrating that the facts set forth in the PSR, the information contained in the U.S. Attorney’s letter, or any of the other information presented to the sentencing court was unreliable or inaccurate. Jones’s argument that the evidence will reflect it amounts to no more than a bare denial and is thus insufficient to call the reliability of the drug quantity calculation of the PSR, or any other source the judge relied upon, into question. See Mustread, 42 F.3d at 1101. Accordingly, we conclude that the judge did not commit clear error in holding Jones accountable for more than 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine.