Opinion ID: 2276112
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voir dire: Range of penalties.

Text: The trial judge precluded Appellant from asking potential jurors whether they could consider imposing the minimum sentence for a lesser included offense of the murder charge. He asserts that (1) our opinion in Lawson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 53 S.W.3d 534 (2001), which limits penalty-range voir dire to indicted offenses, does not apply to capital cases, and (2) that a capital defendant has a constitutional right to a jury that could consider imposing the minimum sentence for a lesser included offense. He is mistaken in both respects. In support of his claim that Lawson authorizes penalty-range voir dire with respect to lesser included offenses in a capital case, Appellant cites that opinion's repeated references to non-capital cases. See, e.g., id. at 544 (that in all non-capital criminal cases where a party or the trial court wishes to voir dire the jury panel regarding its ability to consider the full range of penalties for each indicted offense, the questioner should define the penalty range in terms of possible minimum and maximum sentences for each class of offense.) (emphasis added); id. (setting forth twenty (20) years to life imprisonment for a Class A felony or a capital offense for which the death penalty is not authorized,  as the appropriate range of penalties for a Class A non-death penalty offense) (emphasis added). This reliance is misplaced. Lawson was not a capital case, and the quoted language does not hold that penalty-range voir dire is limited to indicted offenses only in non-capital cases. In Lawson, the Commonwealth unsuccessfully urged this Court to permit penalty-range voir dire only in capital cases, and to eliminate its use altogether in non-capital cases. Id. at 541. Of course, proper penalty-range voir dire for capital cases had already been established in Morris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 766 S.W.2d 58, 60 (1989), which did not authorize inquiry into the penalty ranges for possible lesser included offenses. Lawson merely extended this principle to non-capital cases where the scope of penalty-range voir dire had been previously unsettled. Lawson, at 544. Appellant's argument that capital defendants are constitutionally guaranteed the right to voir dire the jury regarding lesser included offenses in death penalty cases is also meritless. He contends that because Due Process rights become more critical in a capital trial, Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204-05, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), and because the United States Constitution requires the sentencer to give full consideration to lesser included non-capital offenses, Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980), the availability of penalty-range voir dire on lesser included offenses is elevated to the status of a constitutional right. No authority holds that the Constitution requires voir dire to include inquiry into penalty ranges for lesser included offenses. In fact, as noted in Caudill v. Commonwealth, Ky., 120 S.W.3d 635 (2003), no court except ours has ever held that a juror is disqualified simply because he or she cannot consider the minimum authorized sentence for the indicted offense. Id. at 654. In Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), the Court held that a juror who would automatically vote for the death penalty was disqualified, id. at 729, 112 S.Ct. at 2229-30, but also noted that [t]he Constitution, after all, does not dictate a catechism for voir dire, but only that the defendant be afforded an impartial jury. Id. at 729, 112 S.Ct. at 2230. See generally Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 1634, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981) (trial courts have broad discretion in conducting voir dire). Nor does Beck require that defendants be allowed to voir dire the jury on penalties for lesser offenses; Beck only requires that capital juries be instructed on lesser included offenses upon request. Id. at 638-43, 100 S.Ct. at 2390-92. Because Appellant was permitted to ask jurors whether they could consider penalties within the range set forth in Morris and was able to ensure that they would not automatically impose the death penalty per Morgan , he was provided the full protection of his constitutional right to an impartial jury.