Opinion ID: 772626
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Wrong Legal Standard to Finding on Good Faith

Text: 71 As discussed previously, the district judge had two interrelated areas of concern which precluded, in her view, a finding of good faith: Appellants' apathy and the lack of an effective MTM program. See supra Part I.B.3.b. The district judge's reliance on Lockett I undoubtedly infected her finding with regard to Appellants' alleged apathy. The district judge, as noted above, expected Appellants to desegregate the public schools in Hillsborough County to the maximum extent practicable. E.g., Manning, 24 F.Supp.2d at 1287; supra Part I.B.3.b. Such an expectation was erroneous, for the law does not require a defendant school board to take every conceivable step in attempting to desegregate. See, e.g., Freeman, 503 U.S. at 493, 112 S.Ct. at 1447 (expressly rejecting premise that heroic measures must be taken to ensure racial balance). Thus, the district judge's concern about Appellants' alleged apathy was an error of law directly traceable to her reliance upon Lockett I. 72 Further, Appellants' lack of an effective MTM program does not necessarily amount to a finding of bad faith. For instance, in Lockett, the school board did not implement its MTM program until years after the desegregation decree was entered and ignored other requirements of the desegregation decree. See Lockett II, 111 F.3d at 844; Lockett I, 92 F.3d at 1100, 1101. Nonetheless, we affirmed a finding of good faith based in part on the district court's finding that the school board had never violated a court order, had never been enjoined or sanctioned, and had consulted with African-American members of community before modifying the student assignment plan. See Lockett II, 111 F.3d at 843-44; contra Lockett I, 92 F.3d at 1100, 1101. Likewise, in the case sub judice, Appellants never violated a court order, never were sanctioned, and consulted extensively with the African-American community, including Appellees, prior to implementing new student assignments under the 1991 Task Force Report. See supra Parts I.B.2 & I.B.3.b. Therefore, based on Lockett II, the district judge clearly could have found the Appellants acted in good faith, notwithstanding the lack of a viable MTM program. 73 Additionally, we are persuaded that, if the district judge had followed the law as set forth in Lockett II, she would have concluded that Appellants have acted in good faith. As we explained in Lockett II, in determining whether a school board has acted in good faith, a court should not dwell on isolated discrepancies, but rather should consider whether the school board's policies form a consistent pattern of lawful conduct directed to eliminating earlier violations. 33 Lockett II, 111 F.3d at 843 (internal quotations omitted); see also Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491, 112 S.Ct. at 1446 (holding that a court should give particular attention to the school system's record of compliance). Repeatedly in the October 26, 1998, opinion, the district judge commended Appellants for their desegregation efforts. See, e.g., Manning, 24 F.Supp.2d at 1287, 1311, 1312, 1325; supra Part I.B.3.b. At the end of the opinion, the district judge further commented: 74 After evaluating the voluminous record in this case, the Court is convinced that [Appellants] have a short road to travel [to attain unitary status]. Essentially, Defendants need to demonstrate that they are willing to aggressively desegregate the school district to the maximum extent practicable. 34 75 Manning, 24 F.Supp.2d at 1335. Based on the foregoing statement, we are convinced that, if the district judge had applied the correct standard, she would have found (as the magistrate judge did) that Appellants acted in good faith, notwithstanding the absence of an effective MTM program and other possible discrepancies. 76 Our conclusion is buttressed by two other points. First, the MTM program, as conceded by Appellees' expert, would have been ineffective in desegregating the 17 challenged schools. 35 As such, the MTM program should have had only marginal relevance in analyzing whether Appellants' policies form[ed] a consistent pattern of lawful conduct directed to eliminating earlier violations. Lockett II, 111 F.3d at 843 (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 77 Second, discerning a school board's good faith is in some respects a subjective finding. Thus, such a finding depends in part on the judge's personal observation of the witnesses. The magistrate judge, not the district judge, observed all of the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing. Granted, the district judge was free under 28 U.S.C. 636 to make a de novo determination of the magistrate judge's findings. In other contexts, however, we have cautioned district judges from overruling a magistrate judge's finding where credibility determinations are dispositive. See, e.g., Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir.1982) (noting that, in criminal or habeas corpus cases, a district judge's reasons for rejecting a report and recommendation must be consistent with the credibility choices made by a magistrate). In addition, the rationale for deferring to a district court's finding of fact is that a trial judge is aware of the variations in demeanor which bear so heavily in making a subjective determination. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575, 105 S.Ct. at 1512. Where, as here, a district judge does not personally observe the witnesses in making a subjective finding of fact, we view such a finding with skepticism, especially where, as here, the finding is contrary to the one recommended by the judicial official who observed the witnesses.