Opinion ID: 2428959
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues other than damages cross-appeal

Text: WBF moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that it was exempt from providing odometer disclosures under the Federal Odometer Fraud Act. WBF relies on 49 C.F.R. § 580.6(a)(1) (1992), which exempts transferors of vehicles with gross vehicle weight ratings in excess of 16,000 pounds from the Act's disclosure requirements. Smith responds with two arguments. First, Smith claims there is a split of authority on whether the heavy truck exemption is valid due to the fact that it was created in regulations promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and not in part of the Act itself. Second, Smith claims even if this court finds the exemption to be valid, WBF waived its exemption by giving the disclosure statement to Smith. Smith is correct in pointing out the federal district courts' split of authority on the validity of the exemption. See e.g., Mitchell v. White Motor Credit Corp., 627 F.Supp. 1241 (M.D.Tenn.1986) (holding the exception valid); Davis v. Dils Motor Co., 566 F.Supp. 1360 (S.D.W.Va.1983) (holding the exemption void). However, this court need not decide the validity of the exemption because, as the trial court correctly ruled, WBF clearly waived any exemption when it issued the disclosure statement in this case. Waiver requires the voluntary relinquishment of a known right. This court has defined waiver as the voluntary abandonment or surrender by a capable person of a right known to him to exist, with the intent that he shall forever be deprived of its benefits, and it may occur when one, with full knowledge of the material facts, does something which is inconsistent with the right or his intention to rely upon it. Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 251 Ark. 1036, 479 S.W.2d 518, (1972). The trial court ruled that if WBF was not required to issue the odometer statement, it could not voluntarily do so and then claim it was not bound by its voluntary actions. We find no error in this ruling. W.C. Bennett of WBF stated in a deposition that he was aware of the heavy truck exemption and the split of authority on its validity. John Harrison, heavy truck sales manager for WBF at the time in question, stated in a deposition that he was aware of the exemptions from disclosure of odometer statements but that it was WBF's policy to issue a disclosure statement on every vehicle sold, including heavy trucks. Based on these testimonies and the fact that WBF gave Smith an odometer statement when the truck was sold, we conclude WBF made a valid waiver of any right to claim exemption from the Act.
This argument deals with 15 U.S.C. § 1984 which prohibits the resetting, disconnection or alteration of the odometer of any vehicle with intent to change the number of miles indicated thereon. WBF moved for a directed verdict on the grounds there was no evidence that WBF disconnected, altered, or reset the odometer on Smith's truck. WBF argues the only evidence that WBF could have altered Smith's odometer is a parts invoice issued by WBF for repairs to Smith's truck one week before the transfer from Ford Motor Credit to WBF. WBF contends this is purely speculative evidence and does not prove that WBF altered the odometer, therefore, the trial court erred in submitting this issue to the jury. In determining whether a directed verdict should have been granted, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict is sought and give it its highest probative value, taking into account all reasonable inferences deducible from it. Mankey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 314 Ark. 14, 858 S.W.2d 85 (1993). A motion for a directed verdict should be granted only if there is no substantial evidence to support a jury verdict. Id. Where the evidence is such that fair-minded persons might reach different conclusion, then a jury question is presented, and the directed verdict should be reversed. Id. With respect to 15 U.S.C. § 1984, Smith is required to prove that the odometer alteration occurred while the truck was in WBF's dominion and control. See Delay v. Hearn Ford, 373 F.Supp. 791 (D.S.C.1974). The invoice indicates the truck was in WBF's possession before Ford Motor Credit transferred the truck to WBF. Thus, the jury could have concluded the odometer was rolled back while the truck was in WBF's possession. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Smith, we conclude this evidence is substantial evidence to support the verdict of liability. The trial court did not err in denying WBF's motion.
This argument deals with liability under 15 U.S.C. § 1988 which requires a transferor to disclose either the actual mileage on a vehicle's odometer or that the actual mileage is unknown. This argument also concerns 15 U.S.C. § 1989, which provides for recovery of damages from any person who violates the Act with an intent to defraud. WBF moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that Smith had not proved WBF knowingly gave a false statement as to the odometer reading with the intent to defraud Smith. WBF contends that Smith is required to prove WBF had actual knowledge that the odometer had been altered. Actual knowledge is not a requirement under the Federal Odometer Fraud Act; constructive knowledge or reckless disregard is sufficient. Haynes v. Manning, 917 F.2d 450 (10th Cir.1990). That an odometer was tampered with or that a transferor knew or should have known the mileage was false can be inferred from the facts. Bryant v. Thomas, 461 F.Supp. 613 (D.Neb. 1978). Intent to defraud arises from proof of change in an odometer reading and the seller's failure to disclose such change, in absence of an explanation of the odometer change. Delay, 373 F.Supp. 791. Evidence was presented from which the jury could have concluded the odometer disclosure statement issued WBF was false and with an intent to defraud. A service company repaired the truck in November 1986 and noted the mileage at 84,274. In January 1987, Landis returned the truck to Ford Motor Credit, which then certified the mileage to WBF at 45,890. One week prior to that disclosure statement, WBF had possession of the truck and ordered repairs for it. WBF sold the truck to Smith in July 1987 and disclosed the mileage to be 45,974. The foregoing evidence is substantial evidence that the odometer was rolled back. In the absence of an explanation of how the alteration occurred, that is all that needs to be proved. Delay, 373 F.Supp. 791. We conclude the trial court did not err in denying WBF's motion for directed verdict.
At issue here is the admissibility of two sets of documents, a computer printout from J.A. Riggs Tractor Company and registration certificates from the Department of Finance and Administration (DF & A). WBF argues these two sets of documents are hearsay and not admissible under the business records exception or public records exception. Specifically, WBF contends the computer printout lacked a proper foundation in that no one at J.A. Riggs Tractor Company actually made the record. In other words, the information on the printout was entered by someone who worked for a business other than J.A. Riggs Tractor Company, and no one from that other company testified as to the accuracy and reliability of the information in the printout. WBF contends the DF & A registration certificates should not have been admitted under the public records exception because there is no law requiring the registration certificates to contain the odometer reading. The service manager at J.A. Riggs Tractor Company testified their computer is part of a system wherein all Caterpillar warranty repairs and service program repairs are entered when made across the country. He acknowledged there was room for error in the entry of information into the computer, but also stated the information contained in the computer system was reliable enough for him to make the decision not to do any service program repairs on Smith's truck because of the mileage discrepancy and because the same repairs had already been made. An employee from the Bald Knob DF & A office testified there was no written policy requiring them to put odometer readings on registration certificates, but that she was trained to do so, that it was the policy in her office to do so, and that she had followed that policy since she began work for DF & A in 1976. She also stated she followed that policy when she registered the truck in question in July 1986 and recorded the mileage at 31,022. Rulings on evidentiary matters are within the trial court's discretion. In re Estate of O'Donnell, 304 Ark. 460, 803 S.W.2d 530 (1991). Considering the foregoing testimonies and the foundations laid therein, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the questioned documents.