Opinion ID: 426344
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Certified parts

Text: 61 Petitioners further challenge that aspect of the replacement parts regulations that prohibits vehicle manufacturers from denying a performance warranty claim on the basis that a certified part was defective, decertified, or otherwise not equivalent to the original equipment part. Joint brief of petitioners and intervenor at 21; see 40 C.F.R. Sec. 85.2105(a) (1982); 45 Fed.Reg. 34840, JA 420; 40 C.F.R. Sec. 85.2121(f) (1982); 45 Fed.Reg. 78462 (Nov. 25, 1980), JA 519. 64 We must reject this challenge because EPA's regulations track the clear language of the statute 65 and fulfill the overriding purpose of the parts certification program. 66 62 Section 207(b) flatly prohibits invalidation of any performance warranty on the basis of any part used in the maintenance or repair of a vehicle or engine if such part was certified   . 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7541(b). By its very terms, this provision covers any part that is certified, and there is no indication whatever that Congress meant to create any exception for defective, decertified, or nonequivalent parts. 67 To the contrary, Congress wanted to protect consumers from being caught in the middle of disputes between vehicle and parts manufacturers and to make it less risky for them to buy less expensive, nonoriginal equipment parts. 68 Consumers would be spared such disputes and encouraged to use independent manufacturers' parts only if the vehicle manufacturers were required to honor all consumers' claims on parts that were certified when bought. 69 For that reason Congress enacted Section 207(b) requiring vehicle manufacturers to honor any claim based on a certified part, whether equivalent or not. 70 63 Petitioners contend that two other pieces of legislative history--a 1976 House Report 71 and a 1977 House Committee Report 72 --demonstrate that Congress did not intend for the warranty obligation to apply so broadly and that EPA's regulations are contrary to congressional intent. Both of these reports explained that use of a certified part could not be considered as a basis for voiding the performance warranty, unless the actual part in question [was] proven by the vehicle manufacturer to be defective in workmanship or materials. But neither of the bills these reports accompanied was enacted into law. H.R. 10498 (which the 1976 report accompanied) died in the 1976 Congress. 73 H.R. 6161 (which the 1977 report accompanied) was a starting point for the legislation ultimately enacted, but contained language very different from that actually included in the final bill. 74 In the final version Congress chose the wording offered in S.252, 75 and this Senate bill (and its language) 76 contained no such exception for defective, decertified, or nonequivalent parts. 77 64 In describing the final compromise, the Conference Committee concluded that no warranty shall be invalidated by the use of any part certified under regulations promulgated by the Administrator not to result in failure of an engine to comply with emission standards. H.R.Rep. No. 95-564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 548 (1977), JA 557. The Committee understood that a certified parts warranty could be invalidated in only one circumstance: where the manufacturer showed that the owner had not performed the required maintenance or repair as set forth in the owner's manual or had abused the vehicle in its operation. Id. Thus the Conference Committee could not have intended that vehicle manufacturers escape initial responsibility for allegedly defective, but certified, parts. Nor could the Committee have intended that vehicle manufacturers escape initial responsibility for nonequivalent or decertified parts, since the very purpose of creating a certification program was to allow consumers to insure against such charges. Thus, EPA's program seems entirely consistent with the Committee's understanding of the final compromise. 65 Petitioners object to EPA's reading of the statute (and the legislative history) because it imposes what they term vicarious liability on the vehicle manufacturers. 78 But EPA's interpretation does no such thing. Rather, it merely commands vehicle manufacturers to make or authorize repairs and then to obtain reimbursement from the parts manufacturers. Contrary to petitioners' intimations, 79 this is the only interpretation of the statute that the agency has suggested: 66 [T]he Agency believes that Congress intended that the vehicle manufacturer honor claims involving certified parts, even if the parts are defective, provided the vehicle manufacturer may be reimbursed for the expenses of such activities by the aftermarket part manufacturer. 67 45 Fed.Reg. 34835 (May 22, 1980), JA 415. Furthermore, this interpretation is entirely consistent with Congress' desire to protect consumers from excessive prices and to minimize the difficulties that consumers might face in obtaining their warranted repairs, provided an acceptable reimbursement scheme is in place. 80 Thus we can find no basis for describing EPA's scheme as one that imposes vicarious liability or for finding the interpretation inconsistent with congressional intent. 68 Because we find EPA's interpretation of the statute to be a reasonable one, our decisions in Chrysler Corp. v. EPA, 600 F.2d 904 (D.C.Cir.1979), 81 and Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270 (D.C.Cir.1976), 82 are completely inapposite. Both of these cases involved regulations that imposed liability (without reimbursement) on one party for the acts of another. In each case the court found that EPA lacked statutory authority to do so. See 600 F.2d at 916-917; 543 F.2d at 275-276. By contrast, this case involves a statute that fully authorizes EPA to shift primary liability from one party to another, provided an acceptable reimbursement scheme accompanies the shift. 83