Opinion ID: 3181879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Handgun Incident

Text: Green-Bowman first argues the district court should not have let the jury hear about the events leading to his 2011 firearm conviction. We review the district court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Halk, 634 F.3d 482, 487 (8th Cir. 2011). Evidence of past bad acts may be admissible to prove, among other things, someone knew something or intended a certain result, but not to prove someone has a bad character or a propensity to act a certain way. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). And like other evidence, it must be relevant and may be excluded if it is unfairly prejudicial. See Fed. R. Evid. 402, 403. From these rules and related case law, we have derived a four-part test: “Evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) if it is: (1) relevant to a material issue; (2) similar in kind and not overly remote in time to the crime charged; (3) supported by sufficient evidence; and (4) higher in probative value than in prejudicial effect.” United States v. Strong, 415 F.3d 902, 905 (8th Cir. 2005). Green-Bowman focuses on the overlap between the second and fourth factors, contending that because the incident with the handgun was not similar to the facts of this case, the evidence had minimal probative value, which was outweighed by unfair prejudice.3 3 Though we ultimately reject Green-Bowman’s challenge, we reiterate the need for “careful analysis” of how evidence of past bad acts is relevant to a particular issue at trial and whether it is unfairly prejudicial, see United States v. Turner, 781 F.3d 374, 391 (8th Cir. 2015). As we have recently emphasized, the government “[s]imply asserting—without explanation—that [a past] conviction is relevant to a material issue such as intent or knowledge is not enough to establish its admissibility.” Id. at 390 -5- Green-Bowman identifies several differences between what he did in 2011 and what he was charged with in this case: in 2011 he had a handgun, not a shotgun; he had just received the gun from someone else; he first tried to flee the police; and he actually carried the gun, so the prosecution did not depend on a theory of constructive possession. All true, but not significant enough and not complete. Past bad acts “need not be duplicates” of the charged crime for evidence of them to be admissible under Rule 404(b). United States v. Burkett, 821 F.2d 1306, 1309 (8th Cir. 1987). They need only be “sufficiently similar,” and in such a way, to support whatever permissible inference makes the evidence relevant.4 Id.; cf. United States v. Cook, 454 F.3d 938, 941 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding the exclusion of evidence of past convictions for crimes that superficially resembled the charged offense but were “functionally dissimilar”). The evidence about the 2011 handgun incident was relevant to prove GreenBowman knew about the shotgun next to him in the car and intended to possess it. See United States v. Walker, 470 F.3d 1271, 1274-75 (8th Cir. 2006); Strong, 415 F.3d at 905-06; cf. United States v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 794-95 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“A prior history of intentionally possessing guns . . . is certainly relevant to the determination of whether a person in proximity to such a [gun] on the occasion under litigation knew what he was possessing and intended to do so. If [the defendant] had been standing in an apartment close to a gun and never possessed one before, a jury might find it less likely that his proximity evidenced knowing and intentional possession.”). Though Green-Bowman did not specifically deny knowing about the shotgun, the government still needed to prove knowledge because Green-Bowman’s (warning against “passive treatment of the Federal Rules of Evidence”). 4 Green-Bowman asserts the handgun incident is not automatically similar enough for admission under Rule 404(b) just because it also concerned possession of a gun. We need not consider that broad proposition, because, as explained hereafter, gun possession was in fact not the sole relevant similarity here. -6- general not-guilty plea put every element of the charged offenses at issue. See Walker, 470 F.3d at 1274. Further, without any direct evidence of Green-Bowman actually holding the shotgun, the government presented the jury with a theory of constructive possession, and knowledge is often a key element of constructive possession. See United States v. Johnson, 18 F.3d 641, 647 (8th Cir. 1994). So proving possession itself also depended, in part, on proving Green-Bowman knew the shotgun was in the car. This evidence also helped prove Green-Bowman knew about the shotgun because it made an innocent explanation for his behavior less likely. See Fed. R. Evid. 401(a). Consider what happened in the parking lot: Green-Bowman was sitting in a car, talking on the phone. A police officer initiated a conversation with him. Without responding, Green-Bowman got up and walked away. Standing alone, a natural interpretation of that reaction might be that his walking away from the police had nothing to do with the shotgun in the car, he just did not want to interrupt his call. The evidence about the 2011 handgun incident, however, showed that on another recent occasion, when Green-Bowman had a gun he was not supposed to possess and was approached by the police with no way to get away, he did something similar—he distanced himself from the gun while acting like he was unaware of it. Knowing that historical context, a jury might see Green-Bowman’s behavior in the parking lot differently. Maybe he walked away not so he could talk in peace, but so the police would not find him next to the shotgun in the car. The differences Green-Bowman emphasizes, by contrast, go to details—the type of gun, where it came from, what Green-Bowman was doing with the weapon, what happened before and after the interaction in which the police found it—that play no significant role in the rationale making the evidence relevant. Those differences do not make the evidence inadmissible. Neither do they undermine its probative value. The handgun incident was similar enough to the facts of this case for the -7- evidence to be relevant to Green-Bowman’s mental state, a material element the government needed to prove. See Burkett, 821 F.2d at 1309. As for the other side of the scale under Rule 403, Green-Bowman does not identify what unfair prejudice allegedly outweighed the probative value of the evidence. Presumably, the prejudice was the risk of the jury improperly reasoning that possessing a gun before showed Green-Bowman had a bad character and therefore was more likely to have a gun again. But the district court twice instructed the jury it was not allowed to draw such an inference,5 and “the presence of a limiting instruction diminishes the danger of any unfair prejudice from the admission of other acts,” United States v. Franklin, 250 F.3d 653, 659 (8th Cir. 2001). We “normally defer” to the district court’s judgment in balancing between the probative value of evidence and the risk it poses of unfair prejudice. Id. We see no reason to overturn its conclusion here.
Green-Bowman also challenges how the government used the evidence of the 2011 handgun incident in its closing argument, which he claims improperly suggested he possessed the shotgun because of his criminal propensities. Because he raised his 5 The district court’s first instruction was: Remember, even if you find that the defendant may have committed a similar act in the past, this is not evidence that he committed such an act in this case. You may not convict a person simply because you believe he may have committed similar acts in the past. The defendant is on trial only for the crimes charged, and you may consider the evidence of prior acts only on the issue of intent, knowledge, and . . . absence of mistake or accident. The second was virtually identical. -8- challenge in timely objections at trial, he is entitled to relief if the government acted improperly and “deprive[d] him of a fair trial.” United States v. Thomas, 664 F.3d 217, 224 (8th Cir. 2011). The district court, for its part, overruled his objections and denied his motion for a new trial. We afford trial courts “broad discretion in controlling closing arguments” and reverse “only on a showing of abuse of discretion.” United States v. Eldridge, 984 F.2d 943, 946 (8th Cir. 1993). Green-Bowman does not identify any specific instances of the government telling the jury he was guilty because he had a bad character or criminal propensities. Instead, he reasons the government implicitly invited that inference by reciting the facts of the handgun incident at length and repeatedly even though, he claims, it had at most minimal probative value. We disagree. At the outset, we note, in addition to the district court’s two limiting instructions, the government expressly told the jury to “consider th[e] evidence as to the knowledge, the intent, and the absence of mistake or fact [sic] as the judge instructed you” and explained the permissible inference it hoped the jury would draw from it. As discussed above, the 2011 incident evidence went to prove GreenBowman knew about the shotgun in the car. The government needed to prove knowledge both because of Green-Bowman’s general not-guilty plea and because it was a key element in proving Green-Bowman constructively possessed the shotgun. The logic by which the evidence about the 2011 handgun incident was relevant to Green-Bowman’s knowledge depended in part on certain specific facts about what happened. That is, this was not a trial where the relevant past-bad-act evidence was simply the bare fact of a conviction, in which case there might be little to be gained (permissibly) from reminding the jury what the defendant did to earn the conviction. Cf. United States v. Burk, 912 F.2d 225, 229 (8th Cir. 1990). To the contrary, here the government had good reason to take the time to compare the details of the two incidents thoroughly to highlight the similarities supporting an analogy and inference about what was going through Green-Bowman’s head, notwithstanding the dissent’s -9- suggestion the government’s comparison took too long.6 Cf. United States v. Shoffner, 71 F.3d 1429, 1433 (8th Cir. 1995) (concluding unfair prejudice did not outweigh probative value of admitting details of a defendant’s prior crime). In sum, the government did not expressly argue Green-Bowman was guilty because he was the sort of person who would be likely to have a gun, and we decline to view its description of the 2011 handgun incident as an attempt to do so surreptitiously. The district court was within its broad discretion to allow the government’s closing argument.