Opinion ID: 1133407
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Retroactive Application of Lethal Injection

Text: Sims raises several arguments [10] pertaining to the recent legislative amendments to the method of execution statute. [11] First, he claims that the amended law cannot be retroactively applied to him because he was expressly sentenced to be executed by electrocution; he was not sentenced to die by lethal injection and he was not sentenced to be executed by a choice of methods. [12] He claims therefore, that under the Ex Post Facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions and under article X, section 9 of Florida's constitution, the new law may not be applied to him for a crime that was committed prior to the law's enactment. We disagree. The United States Supreme Court has held that changes in criminal statutes which do not alter the definition of the crime of which the defendant was convicted or make the punishment more burdensome are not ex post facto. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 52, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990). In Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 35 S.Ct. 507, 59 L.Ed. 905 (1915), the United States Supreme Court held that procedural changes in the method of execution did not constitute an ex post facto law even if applied to offenses committed prior to such law's enactment. See id. at 185, 35 S.Ct. 507. [13] The Court reasoned that: The statute under consideration did not change the penaltydeathfor murder, but only the mode of producing this together with certain non-essential details in respect of surroundings. The punishment was not increased and some of the odious features incident to the old method were abated. Id. at 185, 35 S.Ct. 507. Accordingly, the Court held that the amended law would not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, even though the defendant committed the crime prior to the passage of the new law. See id. at 185, 35 S.Ct. 507. [14] In this case, we find that the Legislature intended to apply the new law retroactively to persons already under sentence of death. However, we do not believe that retroactive application of the new law would violate Sims' constitutional rights under the Ex Post Facto clause. The new law does not affect the penalty for first-degree murder, which has remained the same (i.e., death). Further, the legislative switch to lethal injection merely changes the manner of imposing the sentence of death to a method that is arguably more humane. The fact that the new law gives inmates the option of choosing the method of execution does not, we believe, violate any constitutional rights of the prisoner under sentence of death. See Poland, 117 F.3d at 1105. Thus, we conclude that the retroactive application of the legislative changes to the statute to persons already under sentence of death does not violate the Ex Post Facto clauses of the state and federal constitution. Sims' argument that our decision in Washington v. Dowling, 92 Fla. 601, 109 So. 588 (1926), prohibits retroactive application of a change in the method of execution is misplaced. [15] Dowling is factually distinguishable from the instant case. There, the Legislature altered the method of execution by repealing hanging and replacing it with electrocution. The new law did not preserve a method of execution for those prisoners who had been sentenced under the former law and the new law did not give prisoners the option of electing a method of execution. The new law involved herein, on the other hand, does retain for prisoners like Sims the option of death by electrocution. In short, this Court in Dowling was not presented with the type of legislative changes at issue in the instant case. Dowling, therefore, is inapposite.