Opinion ID: 4566408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally

Text: It is an entrenched principle that pro se filings “‘however inartfully pleaded’ are held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (per curiam) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)); Hamilton v. United States, 67 F.3d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1995). We are specifically directed to “construe pro se pleadings liberally.” 2 Hamilton, 67 F.3d at 764. This duty applies equally to pro se motions and with special force to filings from pro se inmates. See, e.g., Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010); Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). In Zichko, we explained what liberal construction demands in a situation like Qazi’s. There, we considered a pro se habeas petition where the defendant made a broad ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument to the district court and then specified on appeal that his counsel was ineffective because counsel had failed to file an appeal. 247 F.3d at 1020–21. The government argued we could not consider Zichko’s more focused appellate argument because he did not raise it before the district court. Id. at 1020. We agreed that Zichko did not “specifically identify” the failureto-appeal theory in the district court, but, citing our duty to construe pro se motions liberally, we held that the general statements in his motion to the district court sufficed to raise the issue. Id. at 1020–21. We explained: “The district court could have looked to the entire petition to see if the 2 Although the Supreme Court has described our duty regarding pro se pleadings as “settled law,” it has not clearly articulated its purpose. See generally Rory K. Schneider, Illiberal Construction of Pro Se Pleadings, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 585, 604 (2011). But whatever its purpose, it has deep roots. See, e.g., Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (affording pro se litigant “the benefit of any doubt”). 8 UNITED STATES V. QAZI ineffective assistance of counsel claim had any merit; had it done so, the court would have found the allegation that [counsel] failed to appeal.” Id. at 1021.