Opinion ID: 2015846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Are the Defendants Vicariously Liable Under Section 703.5?

Text: We now consider the State's contention that the defendants can be held vicariously liable for the conduct of their employees under section 703.5(1). Section 703.5 provides for the vicarious liability of a corporation in two different situations: A ... private corporation ... shall have the same level of culpability as an individual committing the crime when any of the following are true: 1. The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty or an affirmative performance imposed on the accused by the law. 2. The conduct or act constituting the offense is committed by an agent, officer, director, or employee of the accused while acting within the scope of the authority of the agent, officer, director or employee and in behalf of the accused and when said act or conduct is authorized, requested, or tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent.... Iowa Code § 703.5 (emphasis added). We think the first subsection of this statute addresses crimes of omission, ones in which the criminal statute imposes an obligation on the corporation to do something, as opposed to criminal statutes prohibiting certain conduct. [2] See La Fave, Criminal Law § 3.3, at 202 (noting that some crimes are defined as an omission to act in the face of a legal duty to act, as opposed to more typical crimes that are committed by affirmative action, i.e., the performance of a prohibited act); Black's Law Dictionary 1086 (6th ed.1990) (defining omission as [t]he neglect to perform what the law requires). The second subsection of the statute addresses criminal conduct that consists of the commission of a prohibited act. See Black's Law Dictionary 276 (defining commission as the doing or perpetration of a criminal act). With this distinction in mind, we now consider the application of this statute to the case before us. The State does not rely on section 703.5(2) to support the defendants' convictions. Indeed, there is no evidence in the record that these sales of alcohol to minors were authorized, requested, or tolerated by the companies' boards of directors or any high managerial agents of the defendants. Therefore, we must focus on the requirements of section 703.5(1) and decide whether there is sufficient evidence of those requirements to support the application of this statute in this case. To determine whether section 703.5(1) applies, we must identify the conduct constituting the offense and then consider whether that conduct constitutes an omission to discharge a specific duty or an affirmative performance imposed on the accused by the law. Iowa Code § 703.5(1). The State argues that the conduct constituting the offense is the failure to use reasonable care to ascertain the purchaser's age. [3] But a defendant can be convicted of a violation of sections 123.47 and 123.49(2)(h) in the absence of such evidence, for example, where the defendant knew the purchaser was a minor. Thus, the requirement of reasonable care is merely a substitute for the mens rea or knowledge element of the crime. We think the conduct constituting the offense, as contemplated by section 703.5(1), is not the mens rea element of the crime, but rather is the core conduct of selling alcohol to a minor. We next consider whether this conduct is an omission to discharge a specific duty or an affirmative performance imposed on the accused by law within the meaning of section 703.5(1). The sale of alcohol to a minor is the commission of a prohibited act; it is not the omission of a specific duty or affirmative obligation. Therefore, section 703.5(1) does not apply.