Opinion ID: 561304
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Failure to Give Roberto Gonzalez' Proposed Jury Instruction

Text: 155 Roberto Gonzalez' lawyer proposed that the jury be instructed that they could not find Roberto Gonzalez guilty of the substantive counts of possession with intent to distribute if they found only that he aided and abetted the conspiracy. In United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306, 310 (7th Cir.1984), we held that one can ... aid and abet a conspiracy, which is a separate chargeable offense in and of itself. We have held that: In order to aid and abet the evidence must demonstrate that the defendant 'was associated with a criminal venture, participated in it as something he wished to bring about, and sought by his actions to make it succeed.'  Galiffa, 734 F.2d at 311 (quoting United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir.1938)). Gonzalez argues that a conviction as an aider and abettor to the conspiracy would have precluded the imposition of Pinkerton liability as to Counts II and III [possession with intent to distribute]. 156 In United States v. Grier, 866 F.2d 908, 932 (7th Cir.1989), we set forth the case law applicable to our review of a district court's determinations regarding jury instructions: 157 Turning to the substantive law applicable to review of the jury instructions given in both defendants' cases, in United States v. Douglas, 818 F.2d 1317, 1320-21 (7th Cir.1987), we held that 158 '[a] defendant is entitled to an instruction on his or her theory of defense if: the defendant proposed a correct statement of the law; the defendant's theory is supported by the evidence; the defendant's theory of defense is not part of the charge; and the failure to include an instruction on the defendant's theory of defense in the jury charge would deny the defendant a fair trial.' 159 (Emphasis added) (citations omitted). We have repeatedly emphasized that when reviewing instructions we consider them as a whole in determining whether or not a court erred in refusing to give a particular instruction. 160 Gonzalez' claim is that aiding and abetting a conspiracy differs from membership in a conspiracy and is an insufficient basis to support vicarious liability under Pinkerton for the substantive crimes that a jury determines beyond a reasonable doubt other conspirators have committed in furtherance or as a natural consequence of a conspiracy. But, Gonzalez' proposed jury instruction must be viewed in light of the other instructions the court provided the jury and the trial court's Pinkerton instruction provided: 161 A conspirator is responsible for offenses committed by his fellow conspirators if he was a member of the conspiracy when the offense was committed and if the offense was committed in furtherance of or as a natural consequence of the conspiracy. Therefore, if you find a defendant guilty of the conspiracy charged in Count I of the indictment, and if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that while he was a member of the conspiracy, his fellow conspirators committed the offenses charged in Counts II and III of the indictment [possession of cocaine with intent to distribute] in furtherance of or as a natural consequence of that conspiracy, then you should find that defendant guilty as charged in Counts II and III of the indictment. 162 (Emphasis added). The language in the court's Pinkerton instruction clearly required that there be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of Gonzalez' membership in the conspiracy in order to convict him of the possession of cocaine with intent to distribute counts of other conspirators under a vicarious liability theory. Gonzalez' proposed instruction sought only to require the jury to find him to be a member of a conspiracy before it found him vicariously liable for the substantive acts of other conspirators. Thus, the Pinkerton instruction the court furnished the jury and Gonzalez' proposed instruction are in effect the same insofar as they require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of membership in the conspiracy in order to find guilt for the offenses of co-conspirators committed in furtherance or as a natural consequence of the conspiracy. 163 Furthermore, the last paragraph of Roberto Gonzalez' proposed instruction, where he stated if you find [Gonzalez] guilty only of aiding and abetting the conspiracy in Count I, then you must, as a matter of law, find him not guilty of Counts II and III, was legally improper. This instruction was obviously drafted to benefit Gonzalez and to prevent his conviction on the two possession with intent to distribute counts. Not only would this instruction have prohibited conviction under a vicarious liability theory, it would also have necessarily precluded the jury from finding that Gonzalez aided or abetted the substantive crimes of his co-conspirators. Even if a jury had found only that Gonzalez aided or abetted the conspiracy, there is nothing that would have prevented it from also determining that Gonzalez aided or abetted the substantive crimes of his co-conspirators. 19 Thus, the trial court's action in refusing to give Gonzalez' proposed instruction was proper. 164