Opinion ID: 4533599
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Character for Untruthfulness

Text: [¶27] The factors that guide a trial court’s analysis of proffered evidence under Rule 608(b), which governs the admissibility of specific instances of a witness’s conduct to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness, do not compel a conclusion that the evidence at issue should have been admitted, and do not support a conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion. M.R. Evid. 608(b); Haji-Hassan, 2018 ME 42, ¶ 14, 182 A.3d 145. We have noted that the decision to admit evidence of Dr. Flomenbaum’s prior removal is to be made based on the individual factors present in each case: 6 We have considered several appeals regarding the extent to which criminal defendants may be permitted to impeach Dr. Flomenbaum regarding his prior removal from employment. See State v. Haji-Hassan, 2018 ME 42, ¶¶ 13-24, 182 A.3d 145; State v. Coleman, 2018 ME 41, ¶¶ 22-26, 181 A.3d 689. We have also considered whether a criminal defendant may cross-examine Dr. Flomenbaum regarding a Connecticut matter in which a trial judge found Dr. Flomenbaum’s expert testimony not to be credible. See Coleman, 2018 ME 41, ¶¶ 16-21, 181 A.3d 689. Gatto did not seek to introduce evidence or to cross-examine Dr. Flomenbaum regarding the Connecticut matter. Gatto argues for the first time on appeal that evidence of Flomenbaum’s firing in Massachusetts 7 was also relevant to challenge his credentials as an expert witness, pointing in particular to Coleman, 2018 ME 41, ¶ 24, 181 A.3d 689. However, the trial court correctly distinguished the facts of this case from those of Coleman, at least with regard to the issue of the foundation for Flomenbaum’s qualification as an expert witness. The trial court did not commit obvious error in not admitting this evidence on these grounds. See State v. Fahnley, 2015 ME 82, ¶ 15, 119 A.3d 727 (stating that unpreserved claims of error are reviewed for obvious error). 15 This is properly a case-by-case determination, and we announce no blanket rule on the admissibility of this evidence in other cases. The trial courts must exercise their discretion in the particularized context of each case to admit or exclude such evidence after evaluating the extent of any relevance it may have, and, if it is deemed relevant, weighing its probative value against the dangers listed in Rule 403. Haji-Hassan, 2018 ME 42, ¶ 24, 182 A.3d 145. Although Gatto’s offer of proof put forth a colorable argument that the line of questioning could be probative of truthfulness, the trial court properly considered the countervailing factors that pointed toward exclusion. The trial court expressed concern that the cross-examination would not actually elicit evidence of specific instances of conduct. Id. ¶ 21 (“[L]ack of candor and failure to communicate fully and frankly are not specific instances of untruthful conduct, but are more akin to extrinsic opinions of a third party . . . .” (quotation marks omitted)). The trial court also worried that this line of questioning would devolve into a “retrial of the removal case” that would waste significant time with no attendant benefit. Because the proffered evidence did not fit within Rule 608(b)’s definition of specific instances of conduct, risked wasting time, and was arguably of limited probative value, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit this evidence pursuant to Rule 608(b). 16