Opinion ID: 1702843
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in overruling the state's batson objection to the exercise of the peremptory challenges by the defendant.

Text: ¶ 14. The State argues that the trial court incorrectly overruled its Batson objection and did not afford it an opportunity to provide authority to support a Batson objection. The State raised a Batson motion when Rogers exercised four (4) peremptory challenges excluding four Caucasian jurors. All of Rogers's peremptory challenges were made against Caucasian jurors, and out of the seven total Caucasians on the jury venire, four were challenged by Rogers. ¶ 15. Rogers contends that, although the State's assertion that Batson has been expanded by the Supreme Court to the use of peremptory challenges by the defendant is correct, the State did not meet the requirement of a prima facie case of race discrimination which would then have shifted the burden of providing a race-neutral explanation for the challenge to Rogers. ¶ 16. Where the State has challenged a defendant's peremptory strikes on the basis of race, regardless of whether the struck jurors were black or white, the court should use the same Batson analysis. McFarland v. State, 707 So.2d 166, 171 (Miss.1997). While Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), has predominately been a tool to deter discrimination against African Americans or other minorities, this is not the purpose of the ruling. The purpose is to afford a fair and impartial trial to defendants regardless of their race. The trial court should have allowed the State to make a Batson objection and gone forward with the analysis of whether the Batson objection was warranted. ¶ 17. Batson requires that when prosecutors exercise peremptory challenges against members of a distinct racial group, the State must articulate racially neutral reasons for doing so. The United States Supreme Court held in Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992), that Batson applies to both prosecutors and defendants. This Court has stated: Regardless of who invokes the discriminatory challenge, there can be no doubt that the harm is the samein all cases, the juror is subjected to open and public racial discrimination.... We therefore reaffirm today that the exercise of a peremptory challenge must not be based on either the race of the juror or the racial stereotypes held by the party. Griffin v. State, 610 So.2d 354, 356 (Miss. 1992). ¶ 18. This clearly establishes the right of the State to make a Batson objection. Once this is done, the objection should then be analyzed according to Batson. McFarland v. State, 707 So.2d 166, 171 (Miss.1997), states this procedure with ample clarity. Under Batson, the party objecting to the peremptory challenge must first make a prima facie showing that race was the criteria for the exercise of the peremptory strike. 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723; Stewart v. State, 662 So.2d 552, 557 (Miss.1995). The burden then shifts to the party exercising the challenge to offer a race-neutral explanation for striking the potential juror. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24; Stewart, 662 So.2d at 558. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the objecting party has met its burden to prove that there has been purposeful discrimination in the exercise of the peremptory. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724; Stewart, 662 So.2d at 558. ¶ 19. In light of these authorities, we conclude that the trial court erred in not allowing the Batson objection to be presented by the State.