Opinion ID: 1156065
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: interpretation of the decree of divorce

Text: La Iad argues that the magistrate who entered the Decree of Divorce intended La Iad to have a car. After the accident, she had neither a car nor money to pay for a new one, which in her view violated the intent underlying the decree. To resolve this issue we must interpret the Decree of Divorce. The same rules of construction applicable to contracts and written documents in general apply to our interpretation of the decree. Evans v. City of American Falls, Idaho, 52 Idaho 7, 18, 11 P.2d 363, 367 (1932). Our standard of review of the lower courts' interpretation of the decree depends upon whether the decree is ambiguous. Interpretation of an ambiguous document presents a question of fact. Cf. Roberts v. Hollandsworth, 582 F.2d 496, 499 (9th Cir.1978) (contract case); Pollard Oil Co. v. Christensen, 103 Idaho 110, 115, 645 P.2d 344, 349 (1982) (contract case). On the other hand, interpretation of an unambiguous document is a question of law. Cf. Suchan v. Suchan, 106 Idaho 654, 660, 682 P.2d 607, 613 (1984) (contract case); Beal v. Mars Larsen Ranch Corporation, Inc., 99 Idaho 662, 668, 586 P.2d 1378, 1384 (1978). Determination of whether a document is ambiguous is itself a question of law. See, Pocatello Industrial Park, Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 789, 621 P.2d 399, 405 (1980) (contract case). We turn to the decree's relevant provisions to determine whether the decree is ambiguous. If a document is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation, then it is ambiguous. Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 293, 612 P.2d 135, 136 (1980). Certain provisions in the decree distribute one vehicle to each party: a pickup truck to Earl and a Ford Mustang automobile to La Iad. A subsequent provision states: IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED That the defendant shall pay the community indebtedness of the parties including the following: ... . Pioneer Federal Credit Union, encumbrance on 1981 Ford Mustang  Amount: $6,300.00. Monthly payment: $197.00. (Emphasis added.) These provisions unambiguously distribute the car to La Iad and obligate Earl to pay the specified debt thereon owed to the specified lienholder. The decree is not reasonably subject to any other interpretation. La Iad argues the trial court's interpretation of the decree violated its underlying intent. The trial court held Earl's obligation under the decree was discharged upon his payment of the lien on the car with the insurance proceeds. Under this determination La Iad would have neither a car nor the money to obtain one, which La Iad asserts violates the intent underlying the decree; that each party have a vehicle. However, a court should construe judgments to give effect to every word and part. Boundary County, Idaho v. Woldson, 144 F.2d 17, 20 (9th Cir.1944) cert. denied, 324 U.S. 843, 65 S.Ct. 678, 89 L.Ed. 1405 (1945). The decree directs Earl to pay the indebtedness of the parties owed to Pioneer Federal Credit Union for its encumbrance on the car. This language conditions Earl's obligation to La Iad upon the existence of a debt on the car. Since the insurance proceeds discharge the debt, the obligation of Earl based on that debt was also discharged. For this court to find Earl still obligated to La Iad for payments on the car, as La Iad urges, would require us to ignore the plain language of the decree or supply additional terminology. We cannot interpret the decree to place on Earl an obligation not required by the decree. Cf. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chambers, 82 Idaho 104, 110, 350 P.2d 211, 214 (1960) (contract case).