Opinion ID: 2543852
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Statutory Mental Health Mitigation

Text: We first review the trial court's rejection of two statutory mental health mitigating circumstances. Prior to sentencing, Ault proposed the following statutory mitigation: (1) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law was substantially impaired, see § 921.141(6)(f), Fla. Stat. (2007); and (2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, see § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007). The trial court rejected both mitigators, finding that neither was warranted in Ault's case. [4] We agree with the trial court's rejection of these two mitigators. In its sentencing order, the trial court evaluated the two statutory mitigating circumstances together, explaining that both proposed factors relied upon the same sources of information, namely, the testimony of Drs. Kramer, Ross, and Carter. The court first evaluated Dr. Kramer's testimony, noting that Dr. Kramer had concluded that Ault suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), pedophilia, and polysubstance abuse. However, the court questioned the sufficiency of Dr. Kramer's preparation. It noted that Dr. Kramer had only conducted a single two-hour interview with Ault and that, aside from this meeting, his only sources of information came from the reports of other doctors. Further, the court found that Dr. Kramer had reviewed no documentation of the crime itself. In direct contrast to Dr. Kramer, Dr. Carter testified that Ault did not suffer from PTSD and that he was a severe psychopath seeking to exaggerate mental illness. The court noted that her testimony was based on established, standardized tests within the field of psychology. In addition to these tests, Dr. Carter conducted interviews with Ault in which she found that he neither manifested nor reported any symptoms of PTSD. Based on Dr. Carter's testimony, the court determined that the conclusions of Dr. Kramer were less than reliable. The court also evaluated the testimony of the neurologist, Dr. Ross. Based on EEG and PET scan testing, Dr. Ross testified that Ault had an abnormal brain, with deficits primarily in the right frontal area and temporal lobes. He stated that the former is the analytical portion of the brain, while the latter relate to the integration of memory and emotions. Dr. Ross testified that deficits in these areas are consistent with individuals diagnosed with pedophilia. However, the court found it significant that Dr. Ross had not provided an opinion as to whether Ault qualified for either statutory mental health mitigator. In evaluating the importance of Dr. Ross's testimony, the court reviewed Ault's behavior surrounding the offenses. The court determined that none of Ault's actions in terms of the planning or executing of the crimes leading up to the murders of the victims suggested that Ault's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired, or that he was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Accordingly, the trial court found that neither mitigator was appropriate in Ault's case. Based on a review of the trial judge's sentencing order, the trial court appears to have considered all evidence relating to the proposed statutory mitigating circumstances and properly exercised its discretion in rejecting both. See Provenzano v. State, 497 So.2d 1177, 1184 (Fla.1986) (As long as the court considered all of the evidence, the trial judge's determination of lack of mitigation will stand absent a palpable abuse of discretion.). Only three experts testified regarding mental health mitigation. The first, Dr. Kramer, testified that he believed both statutory mental health mitigators applied to Ault. The second, Dr. Ross, did not offer an opinion. The third, Dr. Carter, testified that neither statutory mitigator applied. The court evaluated the evidence relied on by each expert and determined that Dr. Carter's conclusion was more reliable and credible than that of Dr. Kramer. This review is consistent with our precedent on the evaluation of mitigating factors. Further, there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's rejection of both factors. First, the record demonstrates that Ault was not substantially impaired in his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. We have upheld a trial court's rejection of this mitigating circumstance when a defendant's actions during and after the crime has indicated that he was aware of the criminality of his conduct. In Nelson v. State, 850 So.2d 514, 531 (Fla.2003), for example, we upheld the trial court's ruling where the defendant removed the victim from her home after sexually assaulting her, drove to two separate orange groves before killing her, and lied to police about the crime. We found that the defendant's purposeful actions [were] indicative of someone who knew those acts were wrong and who could conform his conduct to the law if he so desired. Id. Similarly, in Hoskins v. State, 965 So.2d 1, 18 (Fla.2007), we found that the trial court properly rejected the defendant's inability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct as mitigation where, after raping the victim, Hoskins's purposeful actions in binding and gagging [the victim] before placing her in the trunk, driving to his parents' home six hours away, borrowing a shovel, driving to a remote area where he killed [the victim], and then telling his brother he hit a possum when blood was noticed dripping from the rear wheel well [were] indicative of someone who knows his conduct is wrong. Here, Ault's conduct demonstrates that he was aware of the criminality of his actions. Indeed, he stated during his pretrial interrogation that he murdered the victims specifically because he was afraid of being sent back to prison. He also re-dressed Deanne Mu'min, placed the victims in his attic, and lied to both the victims' mother and the police regarding his knowledge of the girls' disappearance. As the trial court observed, no part of Ault's conduct suggests that he was unaware that his actions were criminal or that he was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law had he chosen to do so. Second, the record supports the trial court's rejection of Ault's claim that he was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the offenses. In Philmore v. State, 820 So.2d 919, 936 (Fla.2002), the defendant and his co-conspirator agreed to steal a car and kill the driver in order to carry out their plan to rob a bank. We upheld the trial court's rejection of the extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigating factor where [t]he facts and circumstances of the homicide indicate[d] a coherent and well thought out plan which spanned over the course of two days, and the factor was not supported by the testimony of the defendant's expert witnesses. Id. (quoting sentencing order). We also upheld the trial court's rejection of this factor in Hoskins based in part on our observation that the crime involved an element of planning. 965 So.2d at 17. In this case, Ault's admission that he planned the abduction and assault of the victims in advance, as well as the steps taken to conceal his actions, negates a finding that he was under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the offense. The trial court's conclusion is also supported by the testimony of Dr. Carter. A trial court may properly reject a proposed mitigating circumstance where there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support its rejection. See Lebron, 982 So.2d at 660. As we noted in Coday, [e]ven expert opinion evidence may be rejected if that evidence cannot be reconciled with other evidence in the case. 946 So.2d at 1003. In the present case, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the rejection of both mitigating factors. We therefore affirm the trial court's decision to reject this mitigation.