Opinion ID: 1128861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: actual cause

Text: Having considered whether respondents were contributorially negligent by misusing the herbicide, we turn to the issue of actual cause. Actual cause has often been confused with proximate causation. The significance of proximate cause focuses upon legal policy in terms of whether responsibility will be extended to the consequences of conduct which has occurred. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts, §§ 41, 42 (4th ed. 1971). Actual cause, however, is a factual question focusing on the antecedent factors producing a particular consequence. See, generally, Malone, W.S., Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stanford L.Rev. 60 (1956); Green, L., The Causal Relational Issue in Negligence Law, 60 Mich.L.Rev. 543 (1962). In this case there is a question whether the Sinox PE, in fact, caused the respondents' crop damage. The respondents rely on circumstantial evidence to prove Sinox PE as the actual cause of their loss. The appellants contend that respondents' proof is insufficient to establish Sinox PE as the causative agent. In reviewing the record on the issue of actual cause our inquiry will be into the competence of the evidence. Conflicts in the evidence and conflicts in the conclusions to be reached from the evidence remain questions for the trier of facts. Ripatti v. Ripatti, 94 Idaho 581, 494 P.2d 1025 (1972); Cargill v. Hancock, 92 Idaho 460, 444 P.2d 421 (1968); Tippets v. Gem State Mut. Life Ass'n, Inc., 91 Idaho 91, 416 P.2d 38 (1966). In view of the appellants' motions for an involuntary dismissal, directed verdict and judgment n.o.v., made at the appropriate stages in the trial contesting the respondents' proof of causation, we must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences most favorably for the parties against whom the motion is made. See, Curtis v. Dewey, 93 Idaho 847, 475 P.2d 808 (1970); Fawcett v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48, 346 P.2d 714 (1968). See also, Dent v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 86 Idaho 427, 388 P.2d 89 (1963); 9 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2494, p. 299 (3d ed.); See generally, Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts, § 41, p. 241-244 (4th ed. 1971). As in all such cases questioning the sufficiency of the evidence, the record must be reviewed to determine whether there is competent evidence to sustain the verdict; and if the litigant's case is one based on circumstantial evidence, whether such circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences to be derived from the circumstantial evidence sustain the verdict. In Splinter v. City of Nampa, 74 Idaho 1, 256 P.2d 215 (1953), this Court stated: Circumstantial evidence is competent to establish negligence and proximate cause. Facts, which are essential to a liability for negligence, may be inferred from circumstances which are established by evidence. But, where circumstantial evidence is relied upon, the circumstances must be proved, and not themselves be left to presumption or inference (citations).   . The underlying principle applicable here is that a verdict cannot rest on conjecture; that where a party seeks to establish a liability by circumstantial evidence, he must establish circumstances of such nature and so related to each other that his theory of liability is the more reasonable conclusion to be drawn therefrom; and that where the proven facts are equally consistent with the absence, as with the existence, of negligence on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff has not carried the burden of proof and cannot recover. 74 Idaho at 10, 256 P.2d at 221. Whether a cause of action is based on warranty, negligence, or strict products liability, the plaintiff has the burden of alleging and proving that (1) he was injured by the product, (2) the injury was the result of a defective or unsafe product, and (3) the defect existed when the product left the control of the manufacturer. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 103 at pp. 671-672 (4th ed. 1971). See, Note: Products Liability: Methods of Pleading and Proof for the Plaintiff, 49 N.Dak.L.Rev. 105, 106 (1972). In this appeal causation in fact is relevant both to the implied and express warranty counts against Cominco and the negligence count for failing to test the product against FMC. Appellants FMC and Cominco first claim respondents' testimony concerning causation was incompetent. This claim challenges the competency of any testimony from respondents Henderson and Olsen concerning causation by contesting the validity or, alternatively, the applicability of Bean v. Diamond Alkali Co., 93 Idaho 32, 454 P.2d 69 (1969). However, the respondents contend that there is sufficient evidence in the record to establish causation without relying on expert testimony from respondents as farmer experts under the Bean rationale. In Bean v. Diamond Alkali Co., supra, farmers with long experience in onion growing, over objection, were allowed to express their opinion that damage to onion crops was caused by chemical action of the herbicide employed. The majority of the court held that the trial court had wide discretion in determining whether witnesses were qualified to testify on such matters, and whether under the facts of that case there was no error in allowing such testimony. The appellants urge that the Bean holding is incorrect or alternatively that the respondents in this case do not qualify as farmer-experts. The appellants' point, that the respondents do not qualify as farmer-experts in this case, is well taken. It is clear that the respondents were novices in the application of herbicides to mint. In fact, Henderson had employed nonchemical methods of weed control until 1967. Also, Henderson had grown mint for only six years while Olsen planted his first crop in 1967. Finally, it is clear in the record that neither Henderson nor Olsen knew or understood precisely its chemical properties or the effect of Sinox PE upon application. However, the appellants have not referred the court to any of the respondents' testimony concerning causation of the crop damage. A perusal of the record with one exception reveals no testimony of respondents about causation. First, during their case the respondents testified in detail only about plainting peppermint and applying the Sinox PE to their crop. They described the appearance of the dying mint plants. They also stated explicitly the extent of their crop failure. Respondents never attempted at any time to elicit any testimony concerning causation. While inferences about causation of respondents' injury may be drawn from this testimony, there are no direct statements concerning causation prompted by respondents. Second, nowhere in the record are there objections to the alleged testimony raising the Bean v. Diamond Alkali Co. case. Third, the appellants themselves explicitly raised the issue of causation during the cross-examination of the respondents. [2] Quite interestingly, respondents during this cross-examination admitted having no knowledge of the cause of injury. These admissions, it appears, actually aided the appellants. Finally, appellants emphasize that the trial court would have granted their motion for involuntary dismissal had the trial court not been obligated to follow the Bean v. Diamond Alkali Co. case. This contention is neither useful nor entirely correct. Again there are no references to testimony about cause in fact. Also the trial court stated that there were sufficient inferences of causation independent of the phantom Bean testimony, for the case to go to the jury. Because of the preceding examination of the record we now turn to the one instance of respondents' testimony related to the issue of causation. At the outset of their case respondent Henderson testified that he had applied a test herbicide, Sinbar to one and one-third acres of peppermint. This test plot was in the middle of the thirty-seven acre field which had been sprayed twice with Sinox PE. Appellants objected to the materiality and relevancy of this testimony. After counsel argued, outside the jury's presence, on the admissibility of the testimony, the district court admitted it on the issue of causation. Then respondent Henderson testified about the bountiful crop yield and the effectiveness of the weed control on the Sinbar plot. He also stated that the Sinbar had no effect on the mint plants or roots. Immediately following these statements respondent Henderson testified about the effects of Sinox PE on the thirty-seven acre field: [Respondents' counsel]    What did you see after that first application? [Henderson] Well, we seen the weeds, was still emerging from the ground and we see the peppermint was dying down. As it was emerging it was dying out.       [Respondents' counsel] And when did you make the second application? A. It would be the latter part of April after we found out the first application was not going to be effective to us. Q. During this period of time, did you buy any more Sinox PE from Crop-Serv? A. We bought some for the second application and then we bought some later on for the rest of the place. Q. Did you apply Sinox PE to the remainder of your field? A. Yes. Q. Did you notice any results during this application that concerned you? A. Very much so. We didn't get much results. Q. Describe what happened, after the application to your entire field, what it looked like? A. Well, the peppermint was dying and the weeds was still growing. Q. What about the peppermint roots? A. The roots was turning brown and they were dying out. The testimony about Sinbar appears in a context in which there is an irresistible inference that Sinox PE caused the damage. That is, the field on which Sinbar had been sprayed produced an excellent yield of mint with good weed control and the fields sprayed with Sinox PE produced diminished yields, therefore Sinox PE was the cause of the injury. This syllogism is dubious. The chemical nature and properties of Sinbar are unknown. The respondent failed to lay any foundation identifying the propensities of Sinbar, its method of application, or its time of application. Also, the record indicates that Sinbar was a test product in 1967 when respondent applied it. Although Sinbar became marketable in 1968, there is no evidence that it was chemically identical or even related to the product used in 1967. Notwithstanding that Henderson is a novice with mint herbicides, there is no foundation of facts necessary to qualify Sinbar as relevant to this case. The district court erred in allowing this testimony without a proper foundation; in light of the preceding discussion there is no reason to consider the farmer-expert issue in Bean v. Diamond Alkali Co., supra. The primary issue is whether the respondents adduced sufficient circumstantial proof of causation in fact for the case to go to the jury. Appellants contend that there is neither proof of causation nor proof of any defect with Sinox PE. Respondents insist that the absence of injury to other mint crops not sprayed with Sinox PE proves that Sinox PE was, in fact, the causative agent, and they exclusively rely on this as proof of causation. A summary of respondents' evidence concerning the absence of injury to other mint crops is useful. First, Laverne Larsen, one of the original plaintiffs, applied Sinox PE to all his mint crop except one-half acre. The one-half acre flourished while the rest died. Second, Ed Schwisow, respondents' neighbor, harvested a good yield of mint except for five barren acres. Schwisow did not use Sinox PE. Third, Robert Friday, Appellants' witness, grew a good crop of mint in 1967, but he did not use Sinox PE either. In reviewing this evidence the first question for consideration is whether the non-occurrence of other injuries is competent proof of causation in this case. Second, we must consider in this case whether proof of injury alone allows a permissible inference of causation, and third, whether there is proof of a defect in the Sinox PE. In both negligence cases and warranty actions reasonable inferences may be drawn in connection with causation from circumstantial evidence. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts, § 39 (4th ed. 1971). See, 1 Hursh, American Law of Products Liability, § 1.21 et seq. (1961); Note: Circumstantial Evidence in Strict Products Liability Actions, Wash.Univ.L.Q., 804 (1972); 1 Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability, § 11.01 et seq. (1972). Also, causation may be proved by the occurrence or nonoccurrence of injury in similar circumstances. 2 Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability, § 16.03[4] ii, iii (1972); 1 Hursh, American Law of Products Liability, §§ 1.23, 1.24 (1961). In cases using non-occurrence of injury as a mode of proof, the product alleged to be the causative agent had been used or consumed in those instances evidencing the presence or absence of injury. Here, the converse is true: Sinox PE was never applied to the fields which produced good mint yields. To infer Sinox PE was the causative agent because other crops not sprayed with Sinox PE flourished is speculative. There are too many variables in agricultural practices among the respondents and their witnesses to conclude that differences in crop yields were due solely to the application of Sinox PE. Except for cursory statements by Ed Schwisow about the similarity between his farming practices and the respondents' and Larsen's there is scant evidence concerning the method and frequency of watering, soil characteristics, age of peppermint and type and frequency of cultivation. Robert Friday never testified about any of these variables. On the basis of these variables the crop yields suggest an equally probable inference that it was the nature of the farming methods, soil and water conditions, or even disease which caused the injury rather than Sinox PE. Next we must consider whether from proof of injury causation may be inferred. Several questions arise concerning the uniformity of damage which are equally applicable to the succeeding discussion concerning proof of a defect. Respondent Henderson sprayed one 37 acre field twice with Sinox PE, yet that field produced a harvestable, although diminished, quantity of mint while other fields sprayed once were ravished. Respondents would have the Court believe that Sinox PE selectively killed portions of the respondents' crops, while on the other hand, it failed to control the infestation of weeds. For example, respondent Henderson harvested 95 acres out of 170, while respondent Olsen harvested 5 acres out of 13 without any explanation why some mint escaped the alleged devastating effect of Sinox PE. Although portions of the respondents' mint crops perished, there is no rational explanation for the difference between the amount of mint acreage sprayed with Sinox PE and the amount which actually died. To infer that Sinox PE was the cause of the injury on the basis of this evidence would be speculative and unreasonable. At best, it is as equally probable as not that the devastated mint crops resulted from the application of Sinox PE. Next we must consider whether the injury occurred because Sinox PE was defective and whether the defect existed when it left the hands of the manufacturer. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 103, p. 672 et seq. (4th ed. 1971). In this record the only evidence of a defective product is by inference from the fact of injury. However, this inference is unreasonable, since Sinox PE cannot be identified as the causative agent. There is no competent evidence in the record that the Sinox PE was defective. In fact, the respondents never attempted to discover the cause of their injury or to identify a defect in the Sinox PE. At no time subsequent to their injury did the respondents ever have their damaged crops analyzed or tested. Finally, there is no direct evidence in the record that the Sinox PE was defective when it left the appellants' control. The respondents had the burden of proving the elements of their warranty and negligence action with a preponderance of evidence. Like many negligence cases the respondents relied on circumstantial evidence to establish those elements. See, Dent v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 86 Idaho 427, 388 P.2d 89 (1963). In this case the element of actual cause was an element common to both warranty and negligence actions. The appellants moved for involuntary dismissals, directed verdicts, and judgment n.o.v. at the appropriate times throughout the trial. In each motion the appellants raised the issue of causation stating that the respondents had not sustained their burden of proof. We agree. After reviewing the evidence, inferences, and conclusions we hold that there is no rational, competent, basis in the record showing that: (1) Sinox PE was the cause of the injury, (2) it was defective, or (3) it was defective when it left the control of the appellant. The judgment is reversed. Costs to appellants. DONALDSON, C.J., and McQUADE and SHEPARD, JJ., concur. BAKES, J., dissents.