Opinion ID: 2823203
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Negligence Claims: Counts 2, 6, and 7

Text: 1. The Failure to Raise the Statute of Limitations Defense The plaintiffs alleged three negligence-based claims: negligent misrepresentation against all defendants (count 2); negligence against all defendants (count 6); and breach of fiduciary duty against Pinelli (count 7). 7 At the outset, plaintiffs argue that defendants failed to plead the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense; therefore, it was waived. Although the statute of limitations was not raised in the answer, we have “unequivocally held that the expiration of a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be raised at or before trial or it is waived.” Brown v. State, 32 A.3d 901, 913 (R.I. 2011) (citing State v. Lambrechts, 585 A.2d 7 It is undisputed that the negligence claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See G.L. 1956 §§ 9-1-14 and 9-1-14.1. - 10 - 645, 648 (R.I. 1991) (emphasis added)); see also Industrial National Bank v. Peloso, 121 R.I. 305, 308, 397 A.2d 1312, 1313-14 (1979) (allowing an affirmative defense to be raised by way of summary judgment). Here, defendants raised the statute of limitations defense well in advance of trial, by way of their motions for summary judgment. Further, it does not escape us that almost a year passed between the filing of the motion for summary judgment and the day that it was argued. In addition, at the time of the summary judgment hearing, there was a pending motion to amend defendants’ answer to include the statute of limitations defense, which was rendered moot by the first hearing justice’s decision to grant summary judgment to Pinelli and RPZ. Accordingly, there was no surprise to plaintiffs and defendants were not precluded from arguing the statute of limitations defense. 2. Application of the Discovery Rule Next, plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations should be tolled because they did not know, nor in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that they were injured as a result of defendants’ negligence until March 2010. The plaintiffs contend that it was reasonable that they did not discover their injuries until 2010 because they were justified in relying upon the representations of their fiduciary, Pinelli. However, a review of the record belies plaintiffs’ contentions. This Court has explained that “[s]tatutes of limitation ‘are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.’” Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174, 181 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)). “Generally, a cause of action accrues and the applicable statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the - 11 - injury to the aggrieved party.” Martin v. Howard, 784 A.2d 291, 299 (R.I. 2001) (citing Plouffe v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 118 R.I. 288, 293, 373 A.2d 492, 495 (1977)). However, in certain “narrowly circumscribed factual situations,” this Court has explained that “when the fact of the injury is unknown to the plaintiff when it occurs, the applicable statute of limitations will be tolled and will not begin to run until, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the plaintiff should have discovered the injury or some injury-causing wrongful conduct.” Id. (citing and quoting Renaud v. Sigma-Aldrich Corp., 662 A.2d 711, 714 (R.I. 1995)). “The reasonable diligence standard is based upon the perception of a reasonable person placed in circumstances similar to the plaintiff’s, and also upon an objective assessment of whether such a person should have discovered that the defendant’s wrongful conduct had caused him or her to be injured.” Id. at 300. In Lee v. Morin, 469 A.2d 358, 359 (R.I. 1983), the plaintiffs filed a negligence action more than six years after purchasing a house, seeking to recover for undiscovered latent defects in the property. This Court was asked to determine when the statute of limitations began to run in a case involving improvements to real property. Id. After considering three different tolling theories, we held that the limitations period “begins to run when the evidence of injury to property, resulting from the negligent act upon which the action is based, is sufficiently significant to alert the injured party to the possibility of a defect.” Id. at 360. That holding was consistent with prior decisions of this Court that “have consistently held that in situations in which a reasonable person would not have discovered the legal action prior to the time of injury, the statute begins to run at the time the injury manifests itself.” Id. In the present case, even before executing the purchase and sales agreement, plaintiffs had inspected the property and had been informed about water issues relating to the basement - 12 - and that corrective action should be taken. Then, almost immediately after purchasing the property, indeed, even before they moved into it, plaintiffs experienced significant flooding that resulted in two to three feet of water accumulating in the basement. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs were informed by the developer’s son that, since 1968, the area was susceptible to significant flooding because of increased water flow. This certainly proved true because, over the next several years, they experienced multiple instances of flooding or water penetration. Finally, in March 2010, plaintiffs experienced another major flood, comparable to the October 2005 flood, that Elizabeth testified caused two feet of water to enter the basement. Despite the repeated flooding of the property, plaintiffs argue that it was not until they had a conversation with their neighbors, the Blaises, after the March 2010 flood, that they were put on notice of defendants’ alleged misstatements. The plaintiffs contend that the Blaises informed them that, in their opinion, Chip had to have known about previous flooding at the property. Therefore, plaintiffs conclude that the statute of limitations applicable to their negligence claims should be tolled because, until their conversation with the Blaises, they had no reason to believe that they had suffered an injury. However, in light of the repeated instances of flooding and water penetration, we cannot agree. Our case law makes clear that the pertinent inquiry is “whether, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, [the] plaintiff should have discovered the alleged [misconduct].” Canavan v. Lovett, Schefrin and Harnett, 862 A.2d 778, 784 (R.I. 2004) (citing Richmond Square Capital Corp. v. Mittleman, 689 A.2d 1067, 1069 (R.I. 1997) (mem.)). When confronted with numerous instances of flooding and water problems during the years that followed the purchase of the property, as well as information that the area has been flood-prone since 1968, a reasonable person would have been put on notice more than three years before suit was filed that a potential - 13 - claim existed. Therefore, plaintiffs are not entitled to avail themselves of the protection of the discovery rule. 8