Opinion ID: 2357750
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Use of the Suppressed Portion of Durepo's Statement to Impeach Credibility

Text: On appeal, the defendant contends for the first time he was deprived of a fair trial by the prosecution's use of the suppressed portions of his statement for purposes of impeachment. Defendant did not object in any way to the use of the suppressed statements at trial and our review is confined to obvious error. In his brief and argument before this Court he does not raise any issue under the Maine Constitution but, rather, he argues solely that the state's cross-examination was not reasonably suggested by the direct examination of defendant. The only function to perform on this appeal is an application of the settled law of Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), and United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980), to the facts presented. [5] In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), the Supreme Court declared that Miranda did not stand for the proposition that statements obtained in violation of the Miranda rule were inadmissible at trial for all purposes. Id. at 224, 91 S.Ct. at 645. Rather, the Harris Court held, Miranda mandated only that the prosecution be barred from the use of illegally obtained statements in its case-in-chief. As long as the statements elicited in violation of Miranda satisfied traditional legal standards of trustworthiness, the prosecution was free to use such statements to impeach a criminal defendant's direct testimony. [6] Id. at 224-26, 91 S.Ct. at 645-646. The Court explained that the right of a criminal defendant to take the stand in his own defense cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. Id. at 225, 91 S.Ct. at 645. The Court observed: [T]he shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. Id. at 226, 91 S.Ct. at 646. Finally, the Court postulated that sufficient deterrence of unlawful police activity flowed from the exclusion of Miranda violative statements from the prosecution's case-in-chief. The benefits of the impeachment process should not be lost, proclaimed the court, because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged thereby. [7] Id. at 225, 91 S.Ct. at 645. In United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980), airport customs officials illegally seized from the defendant's luggage a T-shirt which implicated the defendant in smuggling cocaine into the United States. During direct examination, the defendant denied any involvement in the smuggling operation. Id. at 622, 100 S.Ct. at 1914. Although the defendant did not refer to the T-shirt during direct examination, the prosecutor inquired during cross-examination whether the defendant possessed the T-shirt at the time he went through customs. Id. at 623, 100 S.Ct. at 1914. After Havens denied possession, the prosecution called in rebuttal the customs official who had seized the T-shirt. Therefore, the Supreme Court was confronted with a question left unanswered in Harris the permissibility of the use of evidence obtained in an unlawful search and seizure to impeach statements made by a defendant for the first time during cross-examination. Stressing the importance of arriving at the truth in criminal proceedings and the need to discourage perjury, the Havens Court observed, [w]e see no difference of constitutional magnitude between the defendant's statement on direct examination and his answers to questions put to him on cross-examination that are plainly within the scope of the defendant's direct examination. Id. at 627, 100 S.Ct. at 1916. Accordingly, the Court held: [A] defendant's statements made in response to proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct examination are subject to otherwise proper impeachment by the government, albeit by evidence that has been illegally obtained that is inadmissible on the government's direct case, or otherwise, as substantive evidence of guilt. Id. at 627-28, 100 S.Ct. at 1916-1917. [8] (emphasis added) The benefits of the Harris-Havens rule are clear. Allowing the use of suppressed evidence for the limited purpose of impeachment prevents a situation in which a criminal defendant may take the stand, willfully commit perjury, and be free from fear that the perjured testimony will be exposed. As a result, an important objective of the criminal justice system, the search for truth, is facilitated. Applying the Harris-Havens analysis to the present case, defendant argues that the state's cross-examination was not reasonably suggested by defendant's direct testimony. On direct examination, in apparent anticipation of the state's use of the suppressed statements, defendant stated that he lied to the officer concerning his involvement in the incident and that he was able to answer the officer's questions only because the officer furnished him all the necessary details. During cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited the following testimony: Q. He [the officer] led you around? A. Yes, sir. Q. He told you the answers? A. Yes, sir. Q. And you just agreed with him? A. Mostly, yes. Q. Mostly? A. Right. Q. You just agreed with him. So you wouldn't be able to tell Detective Paul things about that crime which were not known to anybody else by the police and the person who did it, could you? A. Right, right. (emphasis added). The cross-examination was reasonably suggested by defendant's direct testimony. He confirmed his direct testimony that he did not provide details of the crime beyond those suggested to him by the officer. The prosecutor then questioned defendant with respect to portions of his suppressed statement to the officer which tended to contradict his testimony that he provided no details of the crime on his own. Because the cross-examination was reasonably suggested by defendant's direct testimony and was relevant, his response was subject to impeachment and no error was committed in admitting the suppressed statements for that purpose. The entry must be: Judgments of conviction affirmed. McKUSICK, C.J., and VIOLETTE, J., concurring.