Opinion ID: 1386250
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prosecutor's Argument About the Absence of Mitigating Factors

Text: At the close of the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecutor used the aggravating and mitigating factors set out in section 190.3 as a framework for her argument to the jury. She first urged the jury to consider the facts of the double murder of the Guerrero brothers and the robbery of the jewelry store under factor (a), which allows the jury in deciding penalty to consider the aggravating circumstances of the present crimes. She emphasized that defendant had planned the robbery in advance, and that the murders were a calculated part of that plan. The prosecutor also referred to factor (d), which permits the jury to consider whether a defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when the crimes were committed. According to the prosecutor, the evidence did not show that defendant had acted under extreme mental or emotional disturbance, but rather that he had coldly calculated what he was going to do, a circumstance in aggravation. The prosecutor then turned to factor (g), which provides for the jury to consider whether a defendant acted under extreme duress. The prosecutor argued: The only duress was [defendant's] greed. The only domination was his total indifference to human life. [ถ] You may find that this factor is neither aggravated or [ sic ] mitigated. Obviously you're going to be the ones to decide what weight to give all of these factors. But in my opinion, based upon the evidence, the defendant's greed, and total indifference do show that not only was there no extreme duress and that he was not under the substantial domination of another person, but that they are aggravating factors. Defense counsel objected to this argument, stating: [I]t's improper to argue that these factors [(d) and (g) of section 190.3] can be aggravating. The court overruled the objection. (28) Defendant now contends that the prosecutor's argument improperly invited the jury to consider the absence of mitigating evidence as evidence in aggravation ( People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861), and that, because this case was tried after Davenport, the prosecutor acted in bad faith in making the argument. We disagree. In People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290, we cautioned prosecutors against arguing that the absence of a particular mitigating factor was itself a factor in aggravation. This proscription is not violated, however, by pointing out to the jury that there has been no evidence to support a particular mitigating factor. ( People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 83 [246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1].) Here, the prosecutor noted that defendant had failed to prove, as evidence in mitigation, that he committed the crimes under extreme mental or emotional disturbance (factor (d)) or under duress (factor (g)). The prosecutor then argued that the circumstances under which the crimes were committed not only disproved these theories, but were themselves aggravating. This argument, that the circumstances of the crimes were aggravating, was proper under factor (a). Moreover, when she first argued the issue of aggravating and mitigating evidence, the prosecutor told the jury: It may be that you will find that some of the possible factors mentioned don't apply in this case, in either a mitigating or aggravating fashion. Remember, if there is not a mitigating factor present, that does not automatically mean that the factor is aggravating. (Italics added.) This was consistent with our statement in People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at page 289, that the absence of mitigation would not automatically render the crime more offensive.... Accordingly, we reject defendant's contention that the prosecutor improperly urged the jury to consider the absence of mitigating evidence as evidence in aggravation. (29) We have also held, however, that a prosecutor's argument that certain otherwise mitigating factors, should ... be considered aggravating, although not directly contrary to our holding in People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290, nonetheless violates its spirit. ( People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1034 [248 Cal. Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017]; accord People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 683 [280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351].) As discussed above, factors (d) and (g) of section 190.3 allow the jury to consider whether a defendant committed the crimes under extreme emotional distress or duress. To the extent that the prosecutor's argument can be understood to suggest incorrectly that the aggravating circumstances of the present crimes could also be considered under the additional categories provided by factors (d) and (g), defendant was not prejudiced. Factor (a) of section 190.3 allows prosecutors to describe the totality of the aggravating circumstances of defendant's current offenses. Here, the prosecutor did not specifically invite the jurors to count the categories of aggravating factors and the court expressly instructed the jury not to do so: The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale.... Defendant also challenges the prosecutor's argument on Eighth Amendment grounds as having placed invalid aggravating circumstances before the jury. We reject this challenge as meritless. The Eighth Amendment does not preclude jury consideration of the aggravating circumstances of a defendant's current offenses in deciding penalty.