Opinion ID: 2302690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Alleged Lack of Jurisdiction of the Superior Court

Text: In its brief to this Court and at oral argument, the city has contended that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over defendant's appeal. The city bases that contention on the underlying contention that defendant was convicted of a violation that was not criminal in nature and that, therefore, he did not have a right to appeal to the Superior Court. The city argues that, instead of seeking review in the Superior Court, defendant should have petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari so as to seek review of the disposition of his case by the Municipal Court. General Laws 1956 § 12-22-9 governs appeals from municipal courts. Pursuant to chapter 22 of title 12, every person aggrieved by a judgment of a municipal court for any offense other than a violation may appeal to the Superior Court. See § 12-22-1; § 12-22-9. In contrast, if an individual is aggrieved by the imposition of a fine by the [D]istrict [C]ourt upon the finding of a violation, he or she may petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review any alleged errors involved in that imposition of a fine. Section 12-22-1.1. In deciding whether the Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over defendant's appeal, we must determine whether defendant was convicted of an offense for which he had a right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Aptt v. City of Warwick Building Department, 463 A.2d 1377, 1378 (R.I.1983) (stating that the sole issue before the Court was whether or not [the] defendant, who ha[d] been convicted of a zoning violation, ha[d] a right to a de novo trial by jury in the Superior Court); State v. Vinagro, 433 A.2d 945, 945-46 (R.I.1981) (stating that one of the defendant's arguments on appeal was that the statute authorizing direct review of the District Court's judgment by way of certiorari, in the context of an animal cruelty charge, violated the defendant's right to a jury trial). It is well established that a jury trial is required for those defendants who have been convicted of a violation that is `criminal in nature.' Aptt, 463 A.2d at 1378 (quoting Vinagro, 433 A.2d at 949). In determining whether a particular charge triggers the right to a jury trial, [7] we consider whether the offense at issue or an analogous offense was triable by jury at the time of the adoption of the Rhode Island Constitution or at common law. See FUD's, Inc. v. State, 727 A.2d 692, 695 (R.I.1999); see also Calore Freight Systems, Inc. v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Transportation, 576 A.2d 1214, 1215 (R.I.1990); Aptt, 463 A.2d at 1378; Vinagro, 433 A.2d at 946-47. See generally Colleen P. Murphy, The Narrowing of the Entitlement to Criminal Jury Trial, 1997 Wisconsin L.Rev. 133, 173 & n. 180 (noting that Rhode Island is one of the [f]our states [that] guarantee jury trial of offenses that were triable at the time of the adoption of the relevant state constitutional provisions). In our previous analyses concerning the right to a jury trial, we have determined some violations to be of a criminal nature and others to be of a civil nature. See Aptt, 463 A.2d at 1379; Vinagro, 433 A.2d at 947. In Aptt, 463 A.2d at 1379, we concluded that the zoning violation at issue was not commensurate with a finding of `criminal in nature' for purposes of determining whether or not a jury trial is warranted. We distinguished the zoning violation at issue in Aptt from the animal cruelty conviction that had been at issue in the earlier Vinagro case. Id. at 1378-79 (discussing the analysis employed in the Vinagro opinion). We noted in Aptt, inter alia, that the defendant in the Vinagro case was arrested and his property seized pursuant to a search warrant. See id. at 1379. We then stated in Aptt that no such indicia of criminality were present in the latter case; consequently, we held that the defendant had no constitutional right to a de novo jury trial in Superior Court. See id. The instant case presents indicia of criminality similar to those that we determined were present in Vinagro. For example, defendant in this case appeared in Municipal Court pursuant to a summons issued by a Providence police officer. Moreover, the patrolman who pulled over defendant's vehicle was required to have probable cause that a traffic violation had occurred. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable [as required by the Fourth Amendment] where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.); State v. Quinlan, 921 A.2d 96, 106 (R.I.2007) (It is well established that a traffic stop, regardless of how brief and limited, constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, and thus must be reasonable under the circumstances.    A stop is reasonable if the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. (internal quotation marks omitted)). See generally William E. Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 11:13 at 11-60 (2d ed. 2012) (When an officer has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred or a vehicle or licensing provision is being violated, he has the right to stop the vehicle. Some courts have indicated that a traffic stop is permissible even when the officer has only a reasonable suspicion that a violation of the traffic or motor vehicle regulations has occurred. (footnote omitted)). The circumstances in the instant case are plainly distinguishable from those surrounding the zoning violation in Aptt, in which the defendant was charged with using land zoned for residential use as a base for a tree-service business, in view of the fact that that case contained none of the indicia of criminality present in the case at bar. See Aptt, 463 A.2d at 1377. It is noteworthy that, in title 11 of the General Laws, entitled Criminal Offenses, the General Assembly has similarly prohibited disturbances of another person by making loud and unreasonable noise which under the circumstances would disturb a person of average sensibilities in a public place or near a private residence that [the person causing the disturbance] has no right to occupy. G.L.1956 § 11-45-1(a)(2). If a person is convicted under that statute, he or she shall be imprisoned for a term of not more than six (6) months, or fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both. Section 11-45-1(c). The just-referenced Rhode Island statute by no means reflects a modern or post-modern novel desire to criminalize the making of loud and unreasonable noise. Indeed, the evolution of the law with respect to nuisances is evidenced by the compilers' notes which accompanied the statute when it was enacted by the General Assembly in 1979. Those notes explain that a distant antecedent of the statute was English legislation of the feudal era when vagrancy laws served both to deter serfs from leaving their lords as well as to control scarce labor in the aftermath of the plagues that swept England in the fourteenth century. See EXPLANATION, (accompanying) P.L.1979, ch. 304. The explanation further indicates that [s]ubsequently, [those] statues were expanded and used to control wandering bands of robbers as well as beggars. Id. The compilers' notes go on to state that the original version of § 11-45-1which covered vagrancy, drunkard[ness], disorderly conduct and a plethora of minor offenses, in addition to status crimeswas similar to statutes which the United States Supreme Court had held to be unconstitutionally vague as well as to infringe rights of free speech and assembly. Explanation to P.L.1979, ch. 304. The General Assembly accordingly redrafted the statute so as to explicitly define the prohibited conduct while not intruding upon constitutionally protected activities. Id. The statute, however, is still designed to prescribe types of conduct which are considered to be breaches of the peace or which create serious nuisances. See id. As a result of both Rhode Island's present criminalization of the undue amplification of sound and the common law history of such criminalization, it is clear to us that the violation of which defendant was accused was one for which he had a right to a jury trial. See generally State v. Russell, 447 A.2d 1139, 1139 (R.I.1982) (mem.) (stating that, pursuant to the Court's holding in Vinagro, a conviction on a charge of loitering for indecent purposes was appealable de novo to the Superior Court). Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the Superior Court, as a matter of law, did have jurisdiction over defendant's appeal.