Opinion ID: 1707656
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due process was granted.

Text: On appeal Ibarra raises several challenges to her conviction and sentence. Her primary claim is that the phrase continued absence from the home is so vague and uncertain in its meaning and application that it violates due process of law when used to form a basis for criminal prosecution. The phrase continued absence from the home is explained in Minn.Stat. § 256.12, subd. 15 (1982) as follows: Continued absence from the home, as used in sections 256.72 to 256.87, means the absence from the home of the parent, whether or not entitled to the custody of the child, by reason of being an inmate of a penal institution or a fugitive after escape therefrom, or absence from the home by the parent for a period believed to be, and declared by applicant to be, of a continuous duration together with failure on the part of the absent parent to support the child, provided that prior to the granting of such aid all reasonable efforts have been made to secure support for such child. (emphasis added). This statutory definition is complimented and further elucidated by the continued absence standard contained in the formal rule promulgated by the State Department of Public Welfare, that is codified at Minn. Rule 9500.0070, subp. 9 (1983): A parent is continually absent from the home if he/she is physically absent from the home and if this absence interrupts or makes uncertain his/her ongoing parental support or care; there is no minimum time period used to establish continued absence. The agency shall obtain, and the applicant shall provide, all available facts serving to establish a continued absence. [4] The general due process standard demanded of criminal statutes is that they must not be so vague that persons of common intelligence must guess at their meanings. State v. Simmons, 280 Minn. 107, 158 N.W.2d 209 (1968). A criminal statute must be definite enough to give notice of the conduct required to anyone who desires to avoid its penalties. State v. Target Stores, Inc., 279 Minn. 447, 471, 156 N.W.2d 908, 923 (1968) (quoting State v. McCorvey, 262 Minn. 361, 365, 114 N.W.2d 703, 706 (1962)). In addition, a regulation used as a basis for criminal liability is subject to the same due process scrutiny as other criminal statutes. State v. Simmons, supra . Our examination of Ibarra's argument in the light of these due process considerations convinces us her challenge is meritless. Ibarra's argument that the continued absence standard is unconstitutionally vague hinges on an underlying assertion that an AFDC recipient must understand the precise scope of the technical definition of the phrase to avoid criminal liability. However, while understanding the intricacies of AFDC eligibility would certainly assist recipients in avoiding prosecution, the common ordinary meaning of continued absence is clear and lack of knowledge of the technical definition does not result in liability. The statute upon which Ibarra's conviction rests is Minn.Stat. § 256.98 (1982). Prosecutions are brought under this statute against individuals who misrepresent or conceal material facts with the intent of obtaining assistance for which they know they are ineligible. The gravamen of this prosecution is the defendant's concealment or misrepresentation. As long as the recipients of AFDC or other types of welfare respond honestly and truthfully to the agency's questions and demands for information, they remain within the confines of the law. Accordingly, due process is not violated as long as individuals are informed of their responsibility to be truthful and report any changes in their household conditions to the agency. The evidence in this case reveals that Ibarra had adequate notice that the information she provided the agency must be accurate. Her caseworker told her that if she did not answer the questions truthfully and report changes in her household, she could be charged with fraud, and Ibarra initialed statements to that effect on her initial application and six-month redetermination forms. In addition, while she denied that Jesus did live in her home, at trial Ibarra admitted that she knew she was required to inform the agency if Jesus was living with her and that she knew she would be ineligible if Jesus lived in her home. On the basis of these facts we are satisfied that Ibarra's due process rights were not violated.