Opinion ID: 2552096
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Burden Of Persuasion/Burden Of Production

Text: Closely intertwined with her assertion that the juvenile court lacked sufficient evidence to find parental unfitness, Ms. F. also contends that the juvenile court inappropriately shifted to her the burden of proving her sobriety, employment, and home ownership, rather than requiring the Department to prove its allegations through clear and convincing evidence. Ms. F.'s argument, however, fails to apprehend the distinction between the two components of burden of proof: the burden of persuasion and the burden of production. See Montgomery County Fire Bd. v. Fisher, 298 Md. 245, 256, 468 A.2d 625, 630-31 (1983) (discussing the two components). See generally Joseph F. Murphy, Jr., Maryland Evidence Handbook § 400-02 (4th ed. 2010). The burden of persuasion establishes the degree of evidence that must be presentedin this case, clear and convincingin order for any given issue to be proven to the trier of fact. See Wills v. State, 329 Md. 370, 373-74, 620 A.2d 295, 296 (1993) (describing the different standards of proof, including clear and convincing). A party that bears the burden of production on any issue, however, merely bears the burden of going forward with the evidence . . . [which] is usually cast first upon the party who has pleaded the existence of the fact, but . . . may shift to the adversary when the pleader has discharged his initial duty. Kassap v. Seitz, 315 Md. 155, 162, 553 A.2d 714, 717 (1989) ( quoting Commodities Reserve Corp. v. Belt's Wharf, 310 Md. 365, 368 n. 2, 529 A.2d 822, 823 n. 2 (1987)). The distinction between these two concepts is critical. To be sure, the Department bore the burden of persuading the juvenile court of Ms. F.'s unfitness as a parent, through the presentation of clear and convincing evidence, and any component of that unfitness was subject to that same standard. See FL § 5-323(b). Once the Department had presented evidence on this issue to the juvenile court, however, the judge could decide that burden of producing relevant evidence shifted to Ms. F. Quoting evidence scholar Dean McCormick, this Court explained in Commodities Reserve, One burden is that of producing evidence, satisfactory to the judge, of a particular fact in issue. The second is the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the alleged fact is true. The burden of producing evidence on an issue means the liability to an adverse ruling (generally a finding or directed verdict) if evidence on the issue has not been produced Commodities Reserve, 310 Md. at 368 n. 2, 529 A.2d at 823 n. 2. In this case, the Department had the burden of producing evidence that Ms. F. was addicted to illegal drugs. To meet that burden, it offered proof of her undisputed history of addiction. The trial judge was satisfied that this evidence showing a history of addiction was sufficiently strong to infer that, in the absence of credible evidence to the contrary, the addiction problem continued. This is a classic example of how the burden of production can operate. The Department met the burden of production in a way satisfactory to the judge, thereby shifting the burden of production to Ms. F., which meant that she risked the liability to an adverse ruling (generally a finding or directed verdict) if evidence on the issue has not been produced. Id. The trial court's finding that the Department's evidence was sufficient to meet its burden of production on the issue of Ms. F's addition was reasonable. Unquestionably, parental drug use can negatively impact a child. [14] See In the Interest of J.A., 286 Ga.App. 704, 649 S.E.2d 882, 885 (2007) ([I]t is a fair inference that use of controlled substances by a parent has an adverse effect on a minor child.); see also Steve Baron, Issue Facing Family Courts: The Scope of Family Court Intervention, 4 J. Center for Fam. Child. & Cts. 115, 121 (2003) (Several studies indicate that past, as well as current, parental substance abuse increases the risk of child abuse.). Moreover, given the well-known difficulty of overcoming drug addiction, and the likelihood that addiction will persist if untreated, a court can infer that a parent will continue to abuse drugs unless he or she seeks treatment. See Adoption of Scott, 59 Mass. App.Ct. 274, 795 N.E.2d 588, 589 n. 3 (2003) (mother deemed unfit, in part, because she demonstrated a history of drug addiction which [was] reasonably likely to continue . . . given her resistance to cooperate with needed treatment[.]); Adoption of Elena, 446 Mass. 24, 841 N.E.2d 252, 258 (2006) (A condition which is reasonably likely to continue for a prolonged indeterminate period, such as . . . drug addiction[,] . . . is not a temporary condition.). This inference can shift to the parent the burden to produce evidence of sobriety, and if no such evidence is produced, the inference may satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard. Cf. In the Interest of J.A., 649 S.E.2d at 885 ([E]vidence of the father's continued failure to seek drug treatment, [along with other factors,] is sufficient clear and convincing evidence to support . . . the conclusion that . . . parental rights [should be] terminated[.]). Although the burden of production may have shifted to Ms. F., the burden of persuasion remained with the Department. That is, Ms. F. would not have been required to generate enough evidence demonstrating her sobriety, employment, or home ownership to meet the clear and convincing standard, or indeed any standard of persuasion at all. With respect to her sobrietythe key issueMs. F. was uniquely situated to produce this evidence. Without hourly monitoring of her comings and goings, the Department could not prove the negative fact that she had not abstained from substance abuse, or had not been through the necessary rehabilitation to conquer the addiction. Yet, Ms. F. would not furnish the Department or the court with any evidence that she had attended drug treatment or had submitted to drug testing. [15] The court found that Ms. F.'s unwillingness to share her self-proclaimed drug successes with the Department defie[d] understanding. We see no error in this assessment. See May v. May, 829 S.W.2d 373, 378 (Tex.App.1992) (father denied custody of his children because [a]side from his testimony that he had been `clean and straight for the last two years,' there was no evidence that [he] had rehabilitated or that future drug use is unlikely.). Further, the only documentation supporting Ms. F.'s assertion that she had fulfilled her housing requirement was an unsigned copy of a settlement statement that did not even contain her name. Regarding Ms. F.'s employment, the girlfriend of her nephew testified that she had helped Ms. F. write stuff down for Cathy's Spic & Span Cleaning Services, but admitted that she had never traveled with Ms. F. to a job site. The only physical evidence to corroborate the testimony was one type-written invoice dated October 3, 2008, that ha[d] no verification except for [Ms. F.'s] testimony that that [was] a bill she submitted. [16] Once again, there was no error in the court's unwillingness to credit this evidence.