Opinion ID: 2514968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Heggland's second challenge concerns the standard by which evidence of prior convictions should be measured. Specifically, Heggland contends that because the circuit court, when presented with the ICON document, explicitly stated that it did not know what it is, likened it to court minutes, and ultimately found that there was insufficient evidence that [Heggland] was convicted of a class four felony in Colorado, the ICA erred in considering Exhibit 2 in its decision. As discussed above, Exhibit 2, and specifically the ICON document, forms the primary evidence upon which the prosecution relies to establish the sentence date of Heggland's Colorado conviction. [18] Although the HRE do not apply, the admissibility of prior conviction evidence is governed by a specific statute. HRS § 706-666(2) (1993) provides that [p]rior conviction may be proved by any evidence, including fingerprint records made in connection with arrest, conviction, or imprisonment, that reasonably satisfies the court that the defendant was convicted. In several cases, Hawai`i appellate courts have upheld the imposition of mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment based on this standard. In Freitas, this court concluded that [c]ertified copies of both the indictment and the judgment of the prior conviction of one of the defendants, and testimony of the probation officer assigned to prepare the presentence report for the prior offense constituted evidence ... sufficient to prove the fact of the defendant's prior conviction under HRS § 706-666(2) such that the mandatory minimum sentencing statute would apply. Freitas, 61 Haw. at 278, 602 P.2d at 926. In Drozdowski, the ICA applied HRS § 706-666(2) to the evidence of a prior conviction from another state as the basis for allowing the imposition of a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. The defendant had argued that the circuit court's finding that he had a prior felony conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. 9 Haw.App. at 588, 854 P.2d at 241. At the trial court, the senior probation officer of the fifth circuit testified that he had utilized the National Crime Information System communication network to gather information relevant to the prior conviction, and the prosecution also submitted into evidence a copy of a document titled CRIMINAL MINUTESSENTENCE that was certified by the deputy clerk of a California Superior Court. Id. at 589, 854 P.2d at 241. The ICA affirmed the trial court, stating that [b]ased on the record, we conclude that the evidence reasonably satisfied the court. Id. The Drozdowski case shows that evidence other than a certified copy of an indictment and judgment can suffice to establish prior convictions from foreign jurisdictions. However, the evidentiary challenge in the instant case differs from Drozdowski and Freitas in several key respects. First, unlike the cases reviewed above, the trial court in this case did not accept the prosecution's evidence of Heggland's prior Colorado conviction, in part because the court misinterpreted the prosecution's burden of proof. See supra Section III.B. Second, in this case Heggland has stipulated to the existence of his prior Colorado conviction. As such, he does not deny the fact of his conviction, but only objects to the appellate court's gleaning of information about that conviction from the evidence in the record. In light of these special circumstances, it is helpful to elaborate certain principles concerning the evidentiary standard for proof of prior convictions. First, although the standard laid out in HRS § 706-666(2) is based on reasonable satisfaction of the court, it does not vest the trial court with unlimited discretion. Rather, because this standard asks the trial court to make a judgment call, on appeal its decision will be reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Kealoha, 74 Haw. at 319-20, 844 P.2d at 676. Second, although the cases concern evidence of the fact of conviction, the statute's reasonable satisfaction standard logically applies as well to facts about the conviction, such as the conviction date. Third, although certified copies of judgments and/or indictments may be the preferred evidentiary basis to establish a prior conviction, especially with regards to convictions in foreign jurisdictions, cf. State v. Buffalo, 4 Haw.App. 646, 649, 674 P.2d 1014, 1017 (1983) (A long established rule of evidence is that a judgment or decree itself is the highest and best evidence of its content. Consequently, the best evidence to prove a conviction is the judgment of conviction itself or a properly authenticated copy thereof. (Citations omitted.)), the statute allows and our courts have accepted other methods of proof. See Drozdowski, 9 Haw. App. 583, 854 P.2d 238. [19] The most critical factor in this case, however, and what most sets it apart from prior cases, is the fact that Heggland does not contest the fact that he has a prior conviction (in fact he stipulated to it) and does not specifically challenge the date of sentencing apparent from the prosecution's evidence. That date was argued by the prosecution in its sentencing motion, was apparent from the ICON document the prosecution attached in support, and was also established in the presentence report narrative. Heggland does not suggest any different sentence date for his conviction and did not avail himself of the opportunity to controvert the presentence report's identification of November 14, 1997 as the relevant date, even though he did request other corrections. [20] See HRS § 706-604 (1993) (The court shall furnish to the defendant or the defendant's counsel and to the prosecuting attorney a copy of the report of any pre-sentence diagnosis ... and afford fair opportunity, if the defendant or the prosecuting attorney so requests, to controvert or supplement them.); State v. Kamae, 56 Haw. 628, 637, 548 P.2d 632, 638 (1976) (In an ordinary term sentencing proceeding, a sentencing judge customarily relies upon information furnished to him in a presentence diagnosis and report.). Cf. People v. Matthews, 362 Ill.App.3d 953, 299 Ill.Dec. 411, 842 N.E.2d 150, 161-62 (2005) (holding that by failing to object to his presentence report, the defendant conceded the accuracy of the report with respect to his prior convictions); United States v. Bennett, 472 F.3d 825, 833-34 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that by failing to object to the facts of his prior convictions contained in his presentence report, the defendant was deemed to have admitted those facts); United States v. Fagans, 406 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that because the defendant made no objection to the facts contained in his presentence report, the fact of his prior conviction referenced in the report could be taken as admitted). Under these circumstances, there is no basis to question the sentence date for Heggland's conviction. The trial court is statutorily required to accord due consideration to a written report of the diagnosis [the presentence report] before imposing sentence.... HRS § 706-601 (Supp.2003). In light of Heggland's stipulation, the combined evidence should have reasonably satisfied the court as to the prior conviction and its sentence date. [21] Accordingly, the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to accord the evidence its proper weight. [22] See Kahapea, 111 Hawai`i at 278, 141 P.3d at 451 ([T]o constitute an abuse it must appear that the court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.). Therefore, because Heggland committed the PDD offense within the maximum term of imprisonment possible after his Colorado conviction, which was six years, application of the mandatory minimum statute is appropriate.