Opinion ID: 2974194
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Robinson’s Other Challenges

Text: Robinson advances several additional challenges pro se. First, he contends that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his trial because he did not commit the felony charged in the indictment. But, even if Robinson were correct that he did not commit the felony charged, he points to nothing that would deprive the district court of jurisdiction to hear his case. His argument is “really a dispute concerning whether the government proved all of the elements necessary to sustain a conviction under 922(g).” Settle, 394 F.3d at 431; see United States v. Wallace, 280 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2002). Robinson next complains that the Government unconstitutionally exercised its peremptory challenges. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race.”); United States v. Angel, 355 F.3d 462, 471 (6th Cir. 2004) (applying Batson under Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). -5- No. 03-5852 USA v. Robinson Robinson objected to the racial composition of the jury pool, but lodged no Batson challenge when the Government exercised a peremptory challenge to strike the only African American member of the jury pool. The Government was never given the opportunity to state its race-neutral justification and the district court never ruled on the Due Process issue. Consequently, we decline to consider Robinson’s argument. See United States v. Humphrey, 287 F.3d 422, 438-39 (6th Cir. 2002) (declining to consider Batson challenge not raised below), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Leachman, 309 F.3d 377, 383 (6th Cir. 2002). Robinson also asserts that the government knowingly presented perjured testimony. Robinson neglected to raise this claim below, and we review only for plain error. See United States v. Blood, 435 F.3d 612, 627 (6th Cir. 2006). Because Robinson fails to show that the prosecutor knew of any alleged perjury, we find no plain error. See United States v. Pierce, 62 F.3d 818, 834 (6th Cir. 1995) (“To prevail on a claim that the government presented perjured testimony, [a defendant] must show ‘(1) that the statements were actually false; (2) the statements made were material; and (3) [the] prosecution knew they were false.’” (citation omitted) (second alteration in original)). Finally, Robinson argues that the district court improperly considered the Milwaukee County conviction in calculating his sentence. Given our decision to remand the case for resentencing based on Booker, we find it unnecessary to address this argument. -6- No. 03-5852 USA v. Robinson