Opinion ID: 2326824
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Ms. Vilche has moved this court to dismiss DOES's petition for lack of jurisdiction. She asserts that the petition for review is ineffective because it was filed prematurely on January 11, 2005, after DOES had moved for reconsideration on December 20, 2004. As a general matter, this court has jurisdiction to review only agency orders or decisions that are final, Warner v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 587 A.2d 1091, 1093 (D.C.1991); see D.C.Code §§ 2-510 and 11-722 (2001), and OAH Rules provide that when a motion for reconsideration is timely filed, the previous order shall not be deemed final for purposes of judicial review until the motion is ruled upon by [the ALJ] or is denied. 1 DCMR § 2832.3 (2004). The motion for reconsideration was denied on January 19, 2005, only days after DOES filed its petition to this court. DOES did not file a new petition for review on or after January 19. Ms. Vilche relies on two cases to support her contention that DOES was obliged to file a separate petition for review after the January 19, 2005, decision. Natural Motion by Sandra, Inc. v. District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights, 726 A.2d 194, 197 (D.C.1999), recognized that an agency decision is not final for purpose of appeal to this court until all motions for reconsideration have been acted upon by the agency. However, this court held in Natural Motion that the Commission on Human Rights properly had considered a fee petition that was filed before the pending motions for reconsideration were denied. Id. Natural Motion clearly did not overrule a previous decision where we exercised jurisdiction although the petition had been filed before a motion for reconsideration had been denied. See Kenmore Joint Venture v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 391 A.2d 269, 274 (D.C.1978) ([C]onsiderations of finality do not require us to withhold our jurisdiction to review [an] administrative order, where, as here, the Motion for Reconsideration was ultimately denied. . . .); see also Robinson v. Howard Univ., 455 A.2d 1363, 1365-66 n. 1 (D.C. 1983) (although notice of appeal in civil case had been filed prematurely, this court exercised jurisdiction where order had become final by the time the appeal was submitted to the panel). DOES's petition for review may have been filed prematurely, but it became effective when the ALJ denied the motion for reconsideration on January 19. Ms. Vilche principally relies upon TeleSTAR, Inc., v. Federal Communications Commission, 281 U.S.App.D.C. 119, 121, 888 F.2d 132, 134 (1989), which held that the filing of a challenge to agency action before the agency has issued its decision on reconsideration is incurably premature and that the challenging party must file a new notice of appeal or petition for review from the now-final agency order. In other words, a prematurely-filed petition does not ripen. . . . Id. Interestingly, however, the court gave this rule only prospective effect, denied the motion to dismiss, and permitted consideration of the originally-premature petition for review. Id. TeleSTAR clearly supports Ms. Vilche's position, but we are not bound by this decision of the United States Court of Appeals rendered after February 1, 1971. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971). On the other hand, we are bound by the decision in Kenmore, which was decided by another division of this court. Id. We likely would have dismissed the petition if the jurisdictional issue had been brought to our attention while the motion for reconsideration was still pending. See Carter v. Cathedral Ave. Coop., Inc., 532 A.2d 681, 683 (D.C.1987). At this stage, [however,] the order from which review is sought is clearly final. Petitioner's intent to appeal was made manifest and the respondent can show no prejudice resulting from any prematurity of the petition. Kenmore Joint Venture, 391 A.2d at 274. We have jurisdiction to consider the petition for review and now turn to the merits.