Opinion ID: 184751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Merits of the Procedural Claim

Text: 28 The heart of WOC's procedural claim is that the subject to language of § 228.102(e) imposes a requirement concerning the timing of the three findings mandated under the regulation, which the Forest Service has ignored. Relying upon both the text of the regulation itself and statements in the preamble, WOC asserts that the Forest Service must make the three required findings before the BLM identifies specific parcels for leasing. In contrast, the Forest Service argues that the regulation imposes no such temporal requirement and that it is free to make the required findings after the BLM has identified specific parcels, as long as it does so before any leases are actually issued. Both WOC and the Forest Service have presented credible arguments indicating that the regulation is susceptible to either interpretation. Confronted with strong arguments on both sides and having determined that the regulation is ambiguous on its face, we must defer to the Forest Service's interpretation of its own regulations. 29 An agency's interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994); National Trust for Historic Preservation v. Dole, 828 F.2d 776, 782 (D.C.Cir.1987). Our review in such cases is more deferential ... than that afforded under Chevron. National Medical Enter. v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 691, 697 (D.C.Cir.1995). The agency's construction of its own regulation is controlling unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872, 97 S.Ct. 2150, 53 L.Ed.2d 48 (1977) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945)); see also Thomas Jefferson, 512 U.S. at 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381; CSX Transp., Inc. v. STB, 75 F.3d 696, 702 (D.C.Cir.1996). That broad deference is all the more warranted when ... the regulation concerns 'a complex and highly technical regulatory program.'  Thomas Jefferson, 512 U.S. at 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381 (quoting Pauley v. Beth Energy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697, 111 S.Ct. 2524, 115 L.Ed.2d 604 (1991)). 30 A court need not find that the agency's construction is the only possible one, or even the one that the court would have adopted in the first instance. Belco Petroleum Corp. v. FERC, 589 F.2d 680, 685 (D.C.Cir.1978); Cold Spring Granite Co. v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 98 F.3d 1376, 1378 (D.C.Cir.1996) (The Secretary's plausible and sensible reading of his own regulation would prevail even if the company had presented an equally plausible alternative construction, which it has not.). So long as an agency's interpretation of ambiguous regulatory language is reasonable, it should be given effect. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 150, 111 S.Ct. 1171, 113 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991). Thus, in a competition between possible meanings of a regulation, the agency's choice receives substantial deference. Rollins Envtl. Servs. (NJ), Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2d 649, 652 (D.C.Cir.1991). 31 WOC argues that the Forest Service's interpretation of its oil and gas leasing regulations is contrary to the plain language of the regulatory text because it allows the Forest Service to authorize leasing of specific lands without first making the three findings required under 36 C.F.R. § 228.102(e). WOC relies on the language of 36 C.F.R. § 228.102(e), which states that [a]t such time as specific lands are being considered for leasing, the Forest Service shall authorize the BLM to offer specific lands for lease subject to the requirements enumerated in the regulation. WOC interprets the subject to language as meaning that the requirements laid out in the regulation must be met before authorization is given. It further argues that the Forest Service's interpretation cannot be correct because the regulation provides for additional NEPA compliance before a leasing decision for specific lands will be made. Id. (emphasis added). Finally, WOC argues that the preamble of the regulations is evidence of the Forest Service's contemporaneous intent. WOC notes that the preamble states that the Forest Service will make a decision as to whether to authorize leasing [o]nce a conclusion is made with respect to each of the three required determinations and that [t]he only lease(s) that the Bureau of Land Management shall be authorized to offer are those for which the Forest Service has [made the required findings]. 55 Fed.Reg. 10,423, 10,430 (Mar. 21, 1990). WOC further observes that the preamble indicates that specific tracts will be identified before authorization is given, stating: When those tracts are identified, the Forest Service will decide whether to authorize the Bureau of Land Management to offer the lease(s). Id. at 10,429. 32 WOC is correct that the regulation at issue is ambiguous. Clearly it is subject to an interpretation different than that offered by the Forest Service. But WOC has not established that the Forest Service's interpretation of its own regulation is plainly erroneous. The regulation states that the specific lands decision is subject to three requirements. While the most natural reading of the subject to phrase may be that the three requirements will be met before the specific lands decision is made, the alternative reading--that the three requirements may be verified after the specific lands decision is made, but before the decision is implemented and leases for specific parcels are approved--is not plainly erroneous. The subject to phrase does not necessarily indicate when the required determinations will be made. The language of the regulation therefore is consistent with an interpretation under which the verification process follows a determination to authorize the BLM to offer specific lands for leasing. 33 Similarly, the surrounding regulatory text does not indicate that the Forest Service's construction is plainly erroneous. The regulation states that any additional environmental analysis shall be conducted before a leasing decision for specific lands will be made. 36 C.F.R. § 228.102(e)(1). This language may be interpreted as dictating that additional environmental analysis occur before (1) the Forest Service authorizes the BLM to identify specific parcels for leasing (as WOC contends) or (2) the Forest Service consents to the sale of leases after completing its verification procedures (as the Forest Service contends). Although WOC's interpretation may be the most reasonable, and indeed may even be the interpretation this Court would adopt were it reviewing the regulation de novo, it is not the only reasonable interpretation available. Consequently, we cannot invalidate the procedures established by the Forest Service since they are consistent with one of the reasonable interpretations flowing from the admittedly ambiguous regulatory text. 34 WOC's appeal to the language in the preamble of the regulation is equally unavailing. While language in the preamble of a regulation is not controlling over the language of the regulation itself, Jurgensen v. Fairfax County, Va., 745 F.2d 868, 885 (4th Cir.1984), we have often recognized that the preamble to a regulation is evidence of an agency's contemporaneous understanding of its proposed rules. See, e.g., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. DOT, 105 F.3d 702, 708 (D.C.Cir.1997); Booker v. Edwards, 99 F.3d 1165, 1168 (D.C.Cir.1996). Indeed, in the analogous context of statutory construction, we have noted that, although the language in the preamble of a statute is not an operative part of the statute, it may aid in achieving a general understanding of the statute: 35 [The] preamble no doubt contributes to a general understanding of a statute, but it is not an operative part of the statute and it does not enlarge or confer powers on administrative agencies or officers. Where the enacting or operative parts of a statute are unambiguous, the meaning of the statute cannot be controlled by the language in the preamble. The operative provisions of statutes are those which prescribe rights and duties and otherwise declare the legislative will. 36 Association of Am. Railroads v. Costle, 562 F.2d 1310, 1316 (D.C.Cir.1977). The principles governing interpretation of the preamble of a regulation are no different. Although the preamble does not control the meaning of the regulation, it may serve as a source of evidence concerning contemporaneous agency intent. 37 The preamble language at issue here is as ambiguous as the regulatory text. For example, the preamble states that the decision as to whether to authorize the [BLM] to offer lease(s) for the specified [NFS] lands will be made [o]nce a conclusion is made with respect to each of the three required determinations. 55 Fed.Reg. 10,423, 10,430 (Mar. 21, 1990). On its face, this language seems to indicate that the three factual determinations specified in 36 C.F.R. § 228.102(e) must be made at the time the specific lands decision is made, and not after. Nevertheless, this passage can also be read as stating that the three factual determinations will be made before the Forest Service gives its consent to issuing leases for specific parcels of land. The term lands as used in this passage is ambiguous. At times, the preamble uses it to refer generally to the lands under review during the leasing analysis stage. At other times, however, the preamble uses this phrase to refer to the specific parcels for which leases are issued by the BLM. Generally, when the Forest Service intends to convey this latter meaning, it couples the term lands with the modifier specified. Thus, in the above passage, the phrase specified [NFS] lands can be read as referring to specific parcels. Under this interpretation, the passage merely states that the three factual determinations will be made by the Forest Service before it consents to the BLM's issuance of any leases on specific parcels. The verification procedure followed by the Forest Service is therefore consistent with this interpretation of the preamble language. The other passages cited by WOC are similarly ambiguous and susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Forest Service procedures. 38 In sum, we agree with the district court's conclusion that WOC has presented a reasonable alternative reading of the regulations at issue. Wyoming Outdoor Council, 981 F.Supp. at 19. Nonetheless, we also conclude, as did the district court, that the agency's interpretation is not at odds with either the overall structure or the specific language of the regulation. Id. Therefore, given the deference normally accorded such agency interpretations, we must uphold the Forest Service's reading of its admittedly ambiguous regulations.