Opinion ID: 1073
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Second TrialJury Selection (2007)

Text: On December 3, 2007, Charlton's second trial began, and jury selection commenced. Because this was a non-capital felony case, the government possessed six peremptory challenges to prospective jurors and Charlton had ten. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(b)(2). Each side also possessed one additional peremptory challenge for the two prospective alternate jurors. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(c)(4)(A). The district court qualified the venire, which consisted of fifty-five potential jurors. The district court and defense counsel argued about the precise number of African-Americans in the jury pool, which defense counsel stated was seven and the district court at one point estimated was twelve. [4]
The district court proceeded by seating the first twelve potential jurors, which the defense noted included two African-Americans. The government then exercised three of its peremptory challenges, striking Juror No. 23, one of the two African-Americans. Next, the defense exercised five of its peremptory challenges, after which the defense objected to the government's peremptory challenge of Juror No. 23, stating: she's one of the two black jurors seated in the jury, and I think one of the few black jurors in the jury pool. The government attorney, when asked by the district court if he want[ed] to give a reason for the record, responded: It has nothing to do with the race, just she's an attorney, and I do not want an attorney on the jury. The district court accepted this explanation and excused Juror No. 23.
The district court then seated eight new potential jurors, including one African-American. The defense then exercised two of its five remaining peremptory challenges. The government followed by exercising one of its three remaining peremptory challenges, striking Juror No. 37, the newly called African-American. The defense again objected, stating: This is the second African-American that's being challenged. Our client is entitled to a fair jury. If she's off, there will be one African-American on the jury, and I'm pressing that. The government, when asked by the district court why he was striking the prospective juror, responded: [S]he's a member of the clergy. It has nothing to do with race.... Whether she was black, white, Hispanic, Asian, male or female, I'd be challenging her because I think members of the clergy tend to be more sympathetic towards people and less likely to judge them, and I note for the record the first two that I challenged last time happened to be white males. The district court accepted this explanation, stating: I do know that, typically speaking, prosecutors challenge clergy. I mean, that's the way they do it, so I'm not going to call this a black challenge. After then determining that there was a maximum of two African-Americans in the remaining jury pool, [5] the district court, referring to one of those prospective jurors, asked the government: She is African-American, and I'm not striking three, so will you withdraw [your peremptory challenge]? The government agreed to withdraw its peremptory challenge against Juror No. 37.
In the third round, the district court seated two new potential jurors, one of which the defense struck. In the fourth round, the district court seated one new potential juror, which the defense struck. At this point, the defense had one remaining peremptory challenge and, because it had withdrawn its previous peremptory challenge, the government had three. In the fifth round, the district court seated one new potential juror, which the defense struck, exhausting its peremptory challenges. In the sixth round, the district court seated one new potential juror, Juror No. 43, an African-American. The government exercised one of its three remaining peremptory challenges, striking Juror No. 43. The government, without prompting from the district court, provided the following explanation, to which the defense did not object: Your Honor, this is a juror who indicated that she's got a son who went to prison for possession of a firearm. Therefore I'm going to exercise a peremptory as to her. And I just do want to make a record that I understand the Court's position, but for whatever it's worth, I do think it's unfair that the government is precluded, for reasons that have absolutely nothing to do with race, from challenging people that under any other circumstance would be unremarkable anyway. That's why I'm challenging this juror. At this point, the defense had no remaining peremptory challenges and the government had two.
The district court then seated the final juror, after which the district court called the first two candidates for the alternate slots. The government exercised its sole peremptory challenge for the two prospective alternate jurors, striking Juror No. 47, who was not African-American. The government, without prompting from the district court, provided the following explanation, to which the defense did not object: This is the other individual who indicated in this case [that] a[] cousin[,] I believe, is in jail for possession [of a firearm]. Afterwards, the district court seated one new potential alternative juror, to which neither party objected. Of the twelve jurors who were ultimately empaneled, twoone of the first twelve prospective jurors to be called from the jury pool and Juror No. 37were African-American.