Opinion ID: 852752
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 1998 Recodification

Text: As a result of the 1998 Recodification, the Privilege Statute became section 1 of a newly created chapter entitled Privileges of Attorneys, Physicians, Clergymen, and Spouses in a new Privileged Communications article. As before recodification, the marital privilege was included as a subsection of this section that addressed all forms of privileged communications. As explained below, in recognition of the settled law that this section provided for privileges, not disqualifications to testify, the recodified version adopted privilege language, abandoning the pre-recodification competency terminology: Except as otherwise provided by statute, the following persons shall not be required to testify regarding the following communications: ... (4) Husband and wife, as to communications made to each other. I.C. § 34-46-3-1(4) (italics supplied). The recodification placed the Competency Statute, without any change of language, in the chapter entitled Competent and Incompetent Witnesses. I.C. § 34-45-2-9. Recodification also mysteriously generated a second version of the Competency Statute translated into privilege terminology. The recodification thus retained both of the former sections and also introduced a new third provision. This third provision is similar to the former Competency Statute, but adopted the same language change that was properly done in the Privilege Statute, i.e. substituting not required to testify for not a competent witness. This new provision appeared as section 2 in the Privileges of Attorneys, Physicians, Clergymen, and Spouses chapter. Indiana Code section 34-46-3-2 thus now provides: When the husband or wife is a party, and not required to testify in his or her own behalf, the person's spouse shall also be excluded. The trial court held that, pursuant to this third provision, because Dow is not required to testify in his criminal trial, Heidi was also excluded. The State argues that this new statute, Indiana Code section 34-46-3-2, is merely a recodification of the Competency Statute, former Indiana Code section 34-1-14-9 (Burns 1986). Dow responds that current Indiana Code section 34-45-2-9 is a verbatim recodification of the former Competency Statute. There is therefore logic to Dow's claim that the new section 2 of the Privilege chapter must be something other than a restatement of the old Competency Statute. And Dow argues persuasively that the language of this third provision is clear and susceptible to only one interpretation: if a party in a lawsuit is not required to testify, that person's spouse is not allowed to testify. On its face this new statute does just what Dow claims. As a defendant in a criminal case, Dow is not required to testify in his own behalf. And it is hard to give any meaning to the term shall be excluded other than a declaration that Dow's wife cannot testify. Ordinarily the clear meaning of the language of a statutory provision is the end of the analysis. Bolin v. Wingert, 764 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ind.2002). We nevertheless conclude that this new section effected a substantial change in the law and is in conflict with other provisions of the 1998 Recodification Act. Dow's interpretation of section 34-46-3-2 would permit the defendant in many domestic abuse cases to prevent the only witness  his wife, the victim in the case  from testifying. We think it highly unlikely the legislature would have intended such a result. But we do not rely on our supposition as to the aim of the legislature. This provision popped up for the first time in a recodification and would effect a substantial and irrational change in the law. This new section 2 is not simply a recodification of the old Competency Statute. As already explained, the language now appearing in XX-XX-X-X was newly minted in the recodification process, and the Competency Statute was recodified elsewhere. Before 1998 there were two statutes addressing the role of a spouse as a witness, and now we have three. Thus, the question is whether recodification created a new separate privilege which would grant defendant spouses the ability to keep their spouses from testifying as to anything if the defendant spouse was not required to testify in his or her own behalf. The history of this provision confirms that it was, to put it simply, a mistake in recodification. At least under these unusual circumstances, the new section must be rejected as in conflict with provisions in the 1998 Recodification Act that no new law was created. Cf. Burd Mgmt., LLC v. State, 831 N.E.2d 104, 108 (Ind.2005). In 1997 the Indiana Code Revision Commission was considering a proposal to consolidate and update statutory provisions relating to witnesses. The Commission focused on the point we have already noted that the Privilege Statute in Indiana was couched, incorrectly in modern usage, in terms of the competence of the witness. The Commission correctly concluded, that substitution of the term required to testify for competent would not change the law under the Privilege Statute. The change would simply reflect the doctrine the courts had long embraced: communications between attorney/client, physician/patient, clergyman/penitent and husband/wife were privileged. So far, so good. The Commission's staff was then directed to consolidate the provisions from the Witness chapter in a new article to be entitled Privileged Communications. At that point, for reasons not visible to the naked eye, the Competency Statute was retained in its original form in the Competent and Incompetent Witnesses chapter, and not only the 1881 Privilege Statute (now I.C. § 34-46-3-1), but also a revised version of the Competency Statute (now I.C. § 34-46-3-2) appeared in the new Privileged Communications article. The entire debate of the issue by the Commission, and the Discussion memo of the Indiana privilege law furnished to the Commission, seem to have focused solely on the Privilege Statute and its incorrect usage of competency terminology. The Commission was apparently unaware that translating the Competency Statute into privilege language would effect a substantial change in the law. It thus appears that the insertion of a new statute, highly unusual in a recodification act, was the result of an overly enthusiastic adoption of the principle that the marital Privilege Statute should be rephrased in terms of privilege rather than competency. The legislature has told us how to handle this apparently bizarre result. Indiana Code section 34-7-1-1 sets out the Purpose of the 1998 Recodification Act. It provides that the Act is intended to recodify existing law, not to change it. Specifically, with an exception not relevant here, [3] this section provides that the substantive operation and effect of prior civil law and procedure continue uninterrupted. [4] Dow argues that this Purpose provision in the 1998 Recodification Act should be of no effect in this case because it conflicts with the language of the statute. Dow contends that when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the body of an act and a Purpose provision, the Purpose provision should be rejected. In this case we think the reverse is true  the aberration is ineffective because it conflicts with the Purpose provision of the Recodification Act. The Recodification Bill, P.L. 1-1998, was 534 pages long and included hundreds of provisions on a wide variety of subjects. Recodifications are passed by the legislature in reliance on the technical skills of the Commission on Recodification and its staff, and on the provision in the first section of the Recodification that it will do no harm. The legislature was explicit in providing that no change in substantive or procedural law was intended, and we think this provision should be honored. Because the preexisting law was accurately preserved in other provisions, Indiana Code section 34-46-3-2 is an invalid extension of pre-recodification law and is of no effect.