Opinion ID: 163551
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of the conditions

Text: 12 Next, Defendant argues that the district court erred in imposing the two conditions because they are not reasonably related to his crime of conviction. Because Defendant failed to raise this objection below, we review for plain error, United States v. Fabiano, 169 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir.1999). We find no such error here. 13 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) a court may impose a nonmandatory condition of supervised release to the extent that the condition: 14 (1) is reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); 15 (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); and 16 (3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 944(a)[.] 17 Section 3553(a), referenced in § 3583(d), is entitled Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, and states: 18 (a) The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider — 19 (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; 20 (2) the need for the sentence imposed — 21 . . . . 22 (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 23 (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 24 (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner[.] 25 This language in § 3553(a) is repeated in § 5D1.3(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines. For convenience, we will cite only to the statute. 26 Only the first of the three requirements of § 3583(d) is at issue here. Defendant does not contend that the conditions imposed deprive him of greater ... liberty than is reasonably necessary, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2), or that they are inconsistent with policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.... Id. § 3583(d)(3). 27 As for the requirement of § 3583(d)(1) — that the condition must be reasonably related to the factors set forth in § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D) — Defendant complains only that the two conditions imposed here are not reasonably related to the first listed factor, the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). In fact, he focuses only on the first portion of that factor — the nature and circumstances of the offense. Implicit in his argument is the assumption that a condition of supervised release must be reasonably related to every item set forth in the list of factors. 28 We disagree with this premise. True, § 3583(d)(1) states that a condition of supervised release must be reasonably related to the factors set forth in § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D). (emphasis added). Yet every circuit to have decided the issue has held that a condition of supervised release may be imposed despite not being related to every enumerated factor, so long as it is reasonably related to one or more of the factors. See United States v. Brown, 235 F.3d 2, 6 (1st Cir.2000); United States v. Abrar, 58 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir.1995) ([D]espite the continuous use of the ... conjunctive `and[,]' ... a condition may be imposed if it is reasonably related to any one or more of the specified factors.); United States v. Sicher, 239 F.3d 289, 291 (3d Cir.2000); United States v. Kent, 209 F.3d 1073, 1076 n. 3 (8th Cir.2000) (The special condition imposed need not be related to each and every one of the factors.); United States v. Johnson, 998 F.2d 696, 698 (9th Cir.1993) (§ 3553(a) contains a list of factors to guide the district court's discretion rather than a checklist of requisites, each of which must be found before any condition of supervised release may be prescribed); United States v. Bull, 214 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir.2000) (As a matter of law, the special condition imposed need not be related to each factor listed.... Instead, each factor is an independent consideration to be weighed.). 29 We agree with these decisions. As noted by the Ninth Circuit in Johnson, the statute describes the items as factors. Ordinarily, factors are thought of as items for consideration, not as prerequisites to be satisfied. Johnson, 998 F.2d at 698. To construe § 3553(a) as requiring every condition to be reasonably related to all the listed factors would lead to results that certainly were not intended. A number of routinely imposed conditions would be invalidated. For example, it is difficult to see how the standard conditions requiring a defendant to notify the probation officer at least ten days prior to any change of residence or employment, USSG § 5D1.3(c)(6), and prohibiting a defendant from enter[ing] into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency without the permission of the court, id. § 5D1.3(c)(12), would ever be reasonably related to provid[ing] the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.... 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). We therefore hold that although the district court should consider each enumerated factor when deciding whether to impose a condition of supervised release, and that none of them, whenever applicable, should be ignored altogether, United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted), it is not necessary for a condition to be reasonably related to all the factors identified in § 3553(a). 30 Having resolved this issue, we can quickly dispose of Defendant's claims that the district court erred when it imposed the conditions requiring him to pay child support and undergo mental health counseling. As Defendant appears to concede, the two conditions bear a reasonable relationship to his history and characteristics. Defendant's long record of violent incidents supports the district court's conclusion that Defendant needed mental health counseling. See Bull, 214 F.3d at 1278 (condition requiring defendant to undergo mental health counseling affirmed where PSR reflected defendant's history of incidents involving threats and violence). Likewise, Defendant's $7,890 debt for child support validates the district court's imposition of the condition that he make child support payments. The conditions imposed also reasonably relate to other factors listed in § 3553(a), including the needs to deter future criminal conduct, to protect the public from future crimes, and to provide Defendant with needed medical care. See United States v. Lakatos, 241 F.3d 690, 693 (9th Cir.2001) (requiring child-support payments is related to several statutory factors). District courts have broad discretion to fashion conditions of supervised release. Fabiano, 169 F.3d at 1307. We conclude that the district court did not plainly err in imposing the conditions.