Opinion ID: 2599854
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Inconsistent Verdicts

Text: Although defendant and Vieyra were charged with the same crimes and tried jointly, the jury convicted Vieyra of only second degree murder, while it convicted defendant of first degree murder with three special circumstances. Both defendant and Vieyra were convicted of robbery, two counts of burglary and grand theft auto, but Vieyra was acquitted of forcible sodomy. Vieyra was sentenced to a term of 15 years to life in prison, which was doubled under the Three Strikes law, creating a principal term of 30 years to life. He was also sentenced to various terms for his other felonies and enhancements, bringing his aggregate term to 52 years to life in prison. Defendant was sentenced to death. Defendant contends these verdicts are fatally inconsistent and thus violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, requiring we reduce his murder conviction to the second degree and vacate the penalty judgment. The contention is meritless. The jury could reasonably have discerned a difference between defendant's and Vieyra's relative culpability. Defendant many times expressed his hatred of his mother, but Vieyra had no apparent dispute with her and in fact described his relationship with her as very close. Although he accompanied defendant to the victim's home, Vieyra testified he was scared of defendant, suggesting some degree of duress. Vieyra expressed remorse, had volunteered to take a blood or saliva test to clear himself of the sodomy charge and told police about the attempt to sell the stolen goods to Leonard Mercado. The jury could thus have believed Vieyra's culpability was less than defendant's. Notwithstanding the foregoing, we agree with defendant that Vieyra's conviction for second degree murder is puzzling. Having convicted him of participating in the death of Loza and also of robbery and burglary, the jury should have returned a verdict of first degree murder by application of the felony-murder rule. But even assuming that the verdicts are inconsistent, defendant is not entitled to relief on that basis. `It is ... settled that an inherently inconsistent verdict is allowed to stand; if an acquittal of one count is factually irreconcilable with a conviction on another, or if a not true finding of an enhancement allegation is inconsistent with a conviction of a substantive offense, effect is given to both.' ( People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 490, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790; People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 600, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076.) The United States Supreme Court applies the same rule in the federal courts. ( United States v. Powell (1984) 469 U.S. 57, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461.) Defendant argues it is clear from the verdicts that the jury chose to disregard the law and that it exercise[d] some form of leniency towards Vieyra, and consequently did not follow the law. But, [a]n inconsistency may show no more than jury lenity, compromise, or mistake, none of which undermines the validity of a verdict. ( People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 656, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.) Defendant cites no authority establishing that a state's tolerance of inconsistent verdicts violates a defendant's constitutional rights. Although he cites People v. Klingenberg (1996) 172 Ill.2d 270, 216 Ill. Dec. 813, 665 N.E.2d 1370, 1373-1376 for that proposition, the Illinois Supreme Court later overruled Klingenberg ( People v. Jones (2003) 207 Ill.2d 122, 133, 278 Ill.Dec. 45, 797 N.E.2d 640, 647) to bring Illinois in line with the majority of states that have concluded that inconsistent verdicts do not require relief. We conclude the verdicts, even if inconsistent, do not require that we reduce defendant's conviction for first degree murder to second degree murder or vacate the sentence of death. We also reject his argument that failure to do so will violate his constitutional rights.