Opinion ID: 2108798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Veto Power in Iowa.

Text: We have described the general and pocket veto powers of Iowa's governor at length in two prior cases. Redmond, 268 N.W.2d at 851-52; Darling v. Boesch, 67 Iowa 702, 706-07, 25 N.W. 887, 889 (1885). These descriptions reveal that the nature of these powers arising from the Iowa Constitution is consistent with the provisions of other constitutions: Under [article III, section 16 of the Iowa Constitution] a governor ordinarily has three days after a bill is presented to him, not counting Sunday, within which to veto it. If he does not veto it in those three days the bill becomes law without his signature. If he wishes to veto it, he must endorse his disapproval upon the bill and return it before the deadline to the house in which it originated so the legislature may reconsider it and possibly pass it by sufficient votes to override the veto. One exception is made. A bill does not become law through the governor's failure to sign or veto it within the regular period if the general assembly by adjournment prevent such return. Bills presented during the last three days of a session come within this exception because final adjournment shortens the available period for returning them. Adjournment would thus prevent the return of bills held by the governor for the full period of consideration. Therefore, instead of becoming law automatically if not approved within that period, bills submitted in the last three days of a session do not become law unless the governor endorses his approval on them. [Article] III [section] 16 gives him [thirty] days after adjournment within which to decide whether to do so. Redmond, 268 N.W.2d at 851; see also Darling, 67 Iowa at 706-07, 25 N.W. at 889. Iowa citizens provided Iowa's governor the item veto power by ratifying an amendment to our constitution in 1968. See Turner, 186 N.W.2d at 150 (Prior to that time the Governor of Iowa had no power under the Iowa Constitution to veto any portion of a bill.). One need only look to the jurisprudential development of this power in Iowa for proof of the knotty legal and conceptual difficulties it presents. Briffault, Separation of Powers , 2 Emerging Issues in St. Const. L. at 86. Nevertheless, several definitions and principles from our prior cases guide the coordinate branches in the consideration of whether the item veto power may be permissibly exercised. This analysis launches, of course, from the language of our constitution. See Redmond, 268 N.W.2d at 853. The item veto power is derived from article three, section sixteen of the Iowa Constitution, which provides, in part: The Governor may approve appropriation bills in whole or in part, and may disapprove any item of an appropriation bill; and the part approved shall become a law. Any item of an appropriation bill disapproved by the Governor shall be returned, with his objections, to the house in which it originated, or shall be deposited by him in the office of the Secretary of State in the case of an appropriation bill submitted to the Governor for his approval during the last three days of a session of the General Assembly, and the procedure in each case shall be the same as provided for other bills. Any such item of an appropriation bill may be enacted into law notwithstanding the Governor's objections, in the same manner as provided for other bills. This constitutional language creates two core considerations that must be part of every analysis of an exercise of the item veto power.