Opinion ID: 217673
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ex Post Facto/Due Process Problem

Text: This argument also depends on Mr. Thornburgh’s contention that he withdrew from the conspiracy no later than July 23, 2002. Because one of the statutes of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, did not go into effect until July 30, 2002, Mr. Thornburgh argues it is a violation of the Ex Post Facto clause to convict him on the basis of conduct which occurred before the statute went into effect. No party asked for a limiting instruction to the jury about this unusual situation and none was given. This issue was not otherwise raised in the district -24- court, so we review only for plain error. As indicated above, an error is plain if it affects substantial rights and seriously undermines the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. “[I]t is the defendant rather than the government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). We begin by noting that the Supreme Court has recently clarified the nature of this claimed constitutional violation. In United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159 (2010), there was a situation similar to our case, in that the defendant had been convicted of conduct (violation of the sex trafficking and forced labor statutes) occurring both before and after the effective date of the statutes making that conduct illegal. The defendant had not objected to the district court’s failure to address this issue, by means of a jury instruction or some other means, so appellate review by the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court was for plain error. The Second Circuit, as well as the defendant, had characterized this issue as an Ex Post Facto Clause violation. The Supreme Court disagreed with that characterization, stating that it actually presents a due process question: “[I]f the jury, which was not instructed about the [statute’s] enactment date, erroneously convicted [defendant] based exclusively on noncriminal, preenactment conduct, [defendant] would have a valid due process claim.” Id. at 2165. 8 8 The Court explained why the Ex Post Facto Clause is not involved: “‘The Ex Post Facto Clause is a limitation upon the powers of the Legislature, and does (continued...) -25- Examining the familiar plain error standard, the Supreme Court stated there was “no reason why this kind of error would automatically ‘affect substantial rights’ without a showing of individual prejudice.” Id. The Court therefore remanded the case back to the Second Circuit, where it could apply the plain error standard to the facts of that case, following the Supreme Court’s guidance. On remand, the Second Circuit applied the plain error test and, at the third step of the analysis (whether the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights), the court required the appellant to “demonstrate that the error was prejudicial,” noting that ordinarily, an error is prejudicial “where there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial.” United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 42 (2nd Cir. 2010) (further quotation omitted). The Second Circuit found, with respect to the forced labor statute, that there was “no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted [defendant] absent the error.” Id. There were two reasons for that conclusion. First, “the Government presented post-enactment evidence sufficient to satisfy the elements of the forced labor statute.” Id. Second, the court found “no reasoned basis to differentiate between [defendant’s] pre- and post-enactment conduct, and [it] f[ou]nd no reason to presume that the jury did so.” Id. at 43. Additionally, the defendant himself offered no explanation of how his pre- and post-enactment 8 (...continued) not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of government.’” Marcus, 130 S. Ct. at 2165 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977)). -26- conduct differed in such a way as to create a reasonable probability that the jury would not have convicted him without the due process error. The Second Circuit vacated the sex trafficking conviction, however, stating: Unlike with the forced labor charge, the conduct supporting the sex trafficking charge differed materially before and after [the date of enactment], such that there is a reasonable probability that the erroneous jury charge affected the outcome of the trial and affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceedings. Id. at 44. We apply that analysis to Mr. Thornburgh’s due process argument. Mr. Thornburgh’s argument is spartan when it comes to identifying what acts occurred pre- and post-enactment. He simply states, “[t]he volume and frequency of the mention of pre-enactment conduct combine to make very likely the jury found guilt based on such conduct. Almost all of the Government’s witnesses testified about pre-enactment conduct.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 18. The government concedes it was error for the district court to fail to instruct the jury on the fact that § 1349 did not come into effect until July 30, 2002. We agree that is an error, which is plain. We must next determine, as did the Second Circuit in Marcus, whether that error was prejudicial because there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial. As in Marcus, so too in this case, the government presented “post-enactment evidence sufficient to satisfy the elements of” the conspiracy-to-commit-wire/mail-fraud statute. Marcus, 628 F.3d at 42. -27- Additionally, we consider whether there is a “reasoned basis to differentiate between [Mr. Thornburgh’s] pre- and post-enactment conduct.” Id. at 43. The evidence outlined above provides no such basis. Nor does Mr. Thornburgh provide us with such a basis except for a reference as to the volume of his activities. But we have no reason to presume that the jury differentiated between the two and convicted him on the basis of the volume of pre-enactment conduct only. In short, while it may have been an error for the district court to have failed to specifically instruct the jury that § 1349 was not effective until part way through the conspiracy, perhaps even a plain error, that error did not affect Mr. Thornburgh’s substantial rights, nor did it affect the fairness of the proceedings. There was substantial evidence that the conspiracy continued long after § 1349 went into affect. There was therefore no due process violation in Mr. Thornburgh’s trial.