Opinion ID: 28441
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Civil Service Commission

Text: 2 Connell’s argument rests on a misreading of the Supreme Court’s decision in Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980). In Ricks, the plaintiff alleged that the college unlawfully discriminated against him when it denied him tenure. After denying him tenure, however, the college offered Ricks a “terminal” employment contract; both parties understood that Ricks had to leave at the end of the year. The Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations began to run when the college reached a final decision denying tenure, rather than when Ricks’s employment ultimately ceased. The result hinged on the fact that Ricks complained about a single adverse employment action: the denial of tenure. As the Court clearly explained, “If Ricks intended to complain of a discriminatory discharge, he should have identified the alleged discriminatory acts that continued until, or occurred at the time of, the actual termination of his employment. But the complaint alleges no such facts.” Ricks, 449 U.S. at 255-58, 101 S.Ct. at 503-04. 9 The second (and most difficult) question in this case is the legal effect of the Bexar County Civil Service Commission’s decision upholding the termination of Hitt’s employment. Connell recognized the importance of this fact, but he vacillated between characterizing the commission, on one hand, as a quasi-judicial body whose findings of fact were entitled to preclusive effect in this § 1983 action; and, on the other, as an executive board, which has the final decision-making power with respect to all personnel matters in Bexar County. In his motion for summary judgment, Connell urged the court to give issue or claim preclusive effect to the commission’s finding that Hitt made a credible bomb threat that warranted dismissal. As Connell pointed out, the Supreme Court has “long favored application of the common-law doctrines of collateral estoppel (as to issues) and res judicata (as to claims) to those determinations of administrative bodies that have attained finality.” Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 2169 (1991). Further, federal courts must ordinarily give a state agency’s decision “the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the state’s courts.” Univ. of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 3226 (1986). This court has implied, however, that federal rules of claim preclusion may apply to determine whether § 1983 claims are barred from litigation in federal court by the outcome of prior 10 unreviewed state administrative adjudications. Frazier v. King, 873 F.2d 820, 823-25 (5th Cir. 1989).3 The magistrate judge found, in a ruling adopted by the district court, that the civil service commission’s decision was entitled neither to claim nor issue preclusive effect on Hitt’s subsequent § 1983 action. Whether those conclusions were correct or not is of no moment, since Connell has not appealed them. Instead, the argument Connell ultimately adopted at trial and now pursues on appeal is that the Bexar County Civil Service Commission -- rather than Constable Connell -- is the final decision-maker with respect to employment decisions in the constables’ offices. It is beyond dispute that the commissioners conducted an independent inquiry into Hitt’s discharge and were not motivated by any improper motive. Consequently, if the commission is the final decision-maker, then the causal connection between 3 Frazier opined, over a dissent and before Astoria was decided, that federal preclusion law, if applicable, would not prevent a plaintiff’s filing a § 1983 claim following state administrative proceedings. 873 F.2d at 824-25. But the court specifically declined to decide whether federal or state claim preclusion applied. Since Frazier and Astoria, the circuits, curiously in light of Astoria’s unequivocal statement, have split over whether to follow state claim preclusion principles in regard to § 1983 claims that are filed in federal court after unreviewed state administrative proceedings. Compare Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1037-38 and n.7 (9th Cir. 1994) (state claim preclusion rules generally apply), with Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square, 4 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 1993) (no preclusion for non-attorney state administrative tribunals), and Dionne v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 40 F.3d 677, 682-84 (3d Cir. 1994) (federal claim preclusion governs). To her credit, the magistrate judge applied a state law claim preclusion rule. The applicability of the state law of issue preclusion, also applied, is not in doubt. See Univ. of Tennessee v. Elliott, supra; United States v. State of Texas, 158 F.3d 209, 304 (5th Cir. 1998). 11 Hitt’s constitutionally protected activity and the adverse employment action is broken, and Connell may not be held liable. See Mato v. Baldauf, 267 F.3d 444, 450 (5th Cir. 2001); Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1996). In most “causal connection” cases, the determinative question is whether the discriminatory or retaliatory motive of a subordinate employee may be imputed to the titular decision-maker. Id. A decision-maker may serve as the conduit of the subordinate’s improper motive, for example, if he merely “rubber-stamps” the recommendation of a subordinate. This case, however, poses the logically antecedent question how to identify the official decision-maker. The official or formal decision-maker may often be identified by a rule, e.g., an employee handbook or a company organizational chart. For public entity employers, it is appropriate to look to the statutory authority of the official or board that is alleged to have made the decision. Unlike a Texas school board, for example,4 a county civil service commission does not have express statutory responsibility to act as the final decision-maker with respect to individual employment decisions. The relevant statute requires only that each civil service 4 See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 21.211 (authorizing school boards to “terminate a term contract and discharge a teacher at any time for . . . good cause as determined by the board”). 12 commission “adopt, publish, and enforce rules” regarding the selection of county employees; promotions, seniority, and tenure; layoffs and dismissals; disciplinary actions; grievance procedures; and similar matters. TEX. LOCAL GOVT. CODE § 158.009(a). But the statute imposes no superintending responsibility over individual employment decisions. While it is conceivable that a commission could promulgate a rule that no employment decision becomes final until approved by the commission, no such rule is present here. Under its governing rules, the commission is authorized to review and approve, reverse or modify an adverse employment decision if an employee elects to appeal it. But the mere authority to review an employment decision is not decisive. The commission became involved as an adjudicative tribunal after Hitt chose to appeal his notice of termination. Its task was to review Constable Connell’s decision for conformity with applicable law and regulations, not to initiate Connell’s action or generally superintend Connell’s employment practices. In light of these procedures, Connell’s reliance on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 1999), is misplaced. In that Title VII retaliation case, Stimpson, a police officer, alleged that the City of Tuscaloosa was motivated unlawfully when it fired her. The Eleventh Circuit emphasized three times in its brief opinion that Alabama law unequivocally deprives the city of power to discharge 13 a police officer and that the authority to terminate employment rests solely with a statutorily-created civil service board. Id. at 1330, 1331, 1332. Stimpson thus held that the City of Tuscaloosa could not be liable for retaliation because the civil service board was, as a matter of law, the actual decision-maker, and there was no evidence that the board was a mere conduit for the city’s supposed discriminatory motive. Just as clearly, the Bexar County Civil Service Commission did not assume final decisionmaking authority. The commission did not finalize a decision that Constable Connell had merely recommended or proposed. Although the commission did conduct its own review of Hitt’s termination, it did so in a quasijudicial capacity.