Opinion ID: 1308043
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: materially untrue foundation

Text: Having established the jurisdictional threshold of the district court's authority to correct or modify a sentence  that the sentence was based upon a materially untrue foundation  we turn to the second issue presented in this case: Did the district court err in finding that respondent Husney's sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole had been based on a materially untrue foundation? In addressing this question, it is important to emphasize that the jurisdictionally required materially untrue foundation can result either from the district court's reliance upon untrue information, or from the court's subjective misapprehension of otherwise true information. In either case, if the resulting sentence foundation is materially untrue, the court has the power to correct or modify the sentence. Given this analytic framework, we now examine the record to determine if the district court correctly found that the sentence imposed in the instant case was based on a materially untrue foundation, either because the district court relied upon untrue information or misapprehended true information. We initially note that the district court's decision may be read as indicating that the modification of sentence was based both upon a finding that the court had been presented with untrue information during the sentencing hearing, and on a finding that the court had subjectively misapprehended otherwise true material. In its oral decision, the court addressed specific points upon which the judge felt he had been misinformed, and then concluded that, I think there was a misstatement of facts before the court. Therefore, I think that under the mistaken belief of facts, the court has jurisdiction to entertain this motion to modify sentence. (Emphasis added.) The court's written order modifying sentence states that the Court, at the time of imposition of sentence ... was proceeding under mistake of fact that [Husney] had sexual relations with [name deleted], then eleven years of age and other possible victims and was further mistaken as to factual matters as more fully set forth in the Court's oral decision... . (Emphasis added.) The district court's decision to modify sentence thus was evidently based in part on the court's conclusion that it had been misled by the prosecutor at the time of sentencing because some of the information and argument presented by the prosecutor was untrue. In its oral decision, the court stated, inter alia, that it had been unintentionally misled by the prosecutor's statements into believing that Husney was really involved in illicit activities with a Don Lucas, the individual responsible for the initial sexual corruption and procurement of the young girls involved. [6] The court also found that, despite the representations of the prosecutor, an eleven-year-old girl was not really involved with Husney, as Husney had not taken nude photographs of the girl or been present when such photographs were taken by others. Further, the court found that there was no evidence that Husney had supplied drugs to the victims. If the court was misled at sentencing into believing that Husney was closely associated with Lucas in his procuring activities, that Husney had sexual relations with an eleven-year-old girl, and that Husney had supplied drugs to the victims, it is difficult to envision a clearer example of a materially untrue sentence foundation. Yet when the transcript of the sentencing hearing is compared with the grand jury transcript, it appears that the grand jury testimony does not support the prosecutor's argument and representations to the sentencing judge. For example, at sentencing the prosecutor did inaccurately cite the degree of Husney's involvement with Lucas. The grand jury transcript indicates that although Husney was a paying customer and to a degree an associate of Lucas, there was no evidence that Husney was involved in the initial procurement or economic exploitation of the victims. At sentencing the prosecutor nonetheless vehemently argued that Husney and Lucas were virtually partners and equally culpable  almost a team in this endeavor  and that, although others were involved, Husney stands alone with Mr. Don Lucas and apart from others involved in the case. This hyperbolic characterization is simply not supported by the record. [7] While Husney's conduct is certainly indefensible, the district court would have been within its discretion in distinguishing between the lesser responsibility of a patron such as Husney and the greater culpability of an initiator and procurer who exploited the victims for economic gain. The court also found that Husney was not really involved with the eleven-year-old girl, as Husney had not taken nude photographs of the girl nor was present when nude photographs of the girl were taken by others. Husney's lack of involvement with the eleven-year-old is supported by the grand jury transcript. However, a fair reading of the prosecutor's comments at sentencing would indicate that the prosecutor did allege that Husney had taken nude photographs of the eleven-year-old girl. Again, this allegation is simply not supported by any evidence before the sentencing court. The district court further found that the prosecutor unintentionally misrepresented to the court that Husney had dispensed drugs to the victims. The district court is correct. Although the grand jury transcript contained testimony to the effect that on two occasions Husney had served two of the victims a mixture of vodka and orange juice, there was no evidence that Husney had supplied the victims with any drugs. The prosecutor, however, argued that [i]n the sexual scenario which is the subject matter of the indictment before the Court, the same thing occurred preceding the sexual acts, photographs, qualudes [sic] and vodka. The prosecutor thus intimated to the court that Husney had furnished controlled pharmaceuticals to the victims. As with the other two allegations, the prosecutor's comments are totally without evidentiary support. Given these misrepresentations, it is clear that the record supports the district court's evident determination that Husney's sentence rested on a foundation which was materially untrue. In the alternative, the record equally supports the court's finding that it had subjectively misapprehended that Husney had sexual relations with the eleven-year-old girl, and had supplied drugs to the eleven-year-old girl and other victims. With this subjective misapprehension forming a part of the foundation of respondent's sentence, the court was clearly justified in determining that the sentence rested on a materially untrue foundation. Although Husney's guilty plea was based on sexual misconduct with a fourteen-year-old girl, as previously noted there is absolutely no basis in the record which would support an inference that Husney also had sexual relations with the younger girl. Further, although the grand jury transcript indicates that several of the young girls involved were supplied drugs by other participants  in the form of quaaludes  there is absolutely no indication that Husney supplied quaaludes to the eleven-year-old or any other of the girls. The district court's misapprehension as to these facts would thus clearly create a sentence foundation which was materially untrue. Given this defective foundation, the court would have jurisdiction to correct the defective sentence.