Opinion ID: 2529828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: People v Rodriguez

Text: On June 17, 2002, a jury convicted Rodriguez of gang assault in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.07). Supreme Court sentenced Rodriguez to a determinate prison term of 25 years. Although the court sheet initialed by the trial judge and the commitment sheet prepared by the court clerk indicated a five-year period of PRS, Supreme Court made no mention of PRS during the sentencing proceeding. Rodriguez pursued his direct appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of his conviction and sentence ( People v Rodriguez, 33 AD3d 543 [1st Dept 2006]). On appeal to this Court, Rodriguez argued that the PRS component to his case was unlawful because Supreme Court failed to pronounce it orally at sentencing. A Judge of this Court granted Rodriguez leave to appeal (9 NY3d 881 [2007]). We consolidated his case with People v Sparber (10 NY3d 457 [2008]) wherein we agreed with Rodriguez that his PRS had been unlawfully imposed and remitted his case to Supreme Court for resentencing. Upon remittal to Supreme Court, Rodriguez requested a reduction of his 25-year prison term. Supreme Court denied the request and resentenced defendant to the originally imposed 25 years followed by three years PRS. Initially, on May 18, 2010, the Appellate Division modified the judgment of resentence, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by reducing the sentence to a term of 20 years, and, as so modified, affirmed ( see People v Rodriguez, 73 AD3d 541, 541 [1st Dept 2010]). The court concluded that a Sparber resentencing was not a plenary proceeding that present[ed] the sentencing court with an occasion to revisit the original prison sentence ( id. ). Nonetheless, finding the prison term to be excessive, the court exercised its interest of justice discretion to modify the sentence as noted ( see id. at 542). The People moved for reargument at the Appellate Division. While that application remained pending, a Judge of this Court granted both Rodriguez and the People leave to appeal (15 NY3d 855 [2010]). Subsequently, on March 3, 2011, the Appellate Division granted the People's reargument motion and recalled its May 18, 2010 decision. ( People v Rodriguez, 82 AD3d 418 [1st Dept 2011].) Although the court adhered to its prior conclusion that a Sparber resentencing is not a plenary proceeding that gives occasion to revisit the original prison sentence ( id. at 418), the court now held that it was without authority to reduce Rodriguez's term of imprisonment as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice ( id. at 419). In light of the Appellate Division's holding, the People's appeal to this Court became moot. However, a Judge of this Court once again granted Rodriguez leave to appeal (16 NY3d 836 [2011]). The majority now affirms the order of the Appellate Division and I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority's conclusion that, pursuant to our holding in Sparber, a resentencing court is not empowered to revisit the incarceratory component of a defendant's sentence ( see majority op at 634-635). In Sparber, we found that the lower courts intended to impose a sentence ... that consisted of a determinate sentence and a period of PRS (10 NY3d at 472). Absent any evidence to the contrary, we held the error in failing to pronounce PRS in those cases was a procedural error, akin to a misstatement or clerical error ( id. ). However, in concluding that vacatur of a defendant's sentence was the appropriate remedy in these cases, we never sought to limit the trial court's inherent power to revisit the incarceratory period of a sentence, if warranted. [1] The majority's assertion that a holding which allows a resentencing court to reconsider the incarceratory component of a defendant's sentence would creat[e] a situation where thousands of Sparber resentencings might have to be repeated (majority op at 634) is purely speculative and assumes that resentencing courts, following our decision in Sparber, did not believe they had such authority in the first instance. I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that the Appellate Division is without authority to modify a defendant's resentence upon appeal to that court ( see majority op at 635). It is axiomatic that [a]n appeal to an intermediate appellate court may be taken as of right by [a] defendant from a judgment of sentencing (CPL 450.10 [2]). An appeal from a sentence ... means an appeal from either the sentence originally imposed or from a resentence following an order vacating the original sentence  (CPL 450.30 [3] [emphasis added]). The appeal from a sentence may be based upon the ground that such sentence either was (a) invalid as a matter of law, or (b) harsh or excessive (CPL 450.30 [1]). Here, Rodriguez does not assert that the sentence imposed by Supreme Court at the resentencing proceeding was invalid as a matter of law. Rather, he maintains that the Appellate Division may consider whether the sentence imposed by the lower court at resentencing was unduly harsh or excessive in its interest of justice discretion. I agree. Indeed, CPL 470.15 (3) (c) specifically permits the Appellate Division to modify a sentence [a]s a matter of discretion in the interest of justice. Moreover, CPL 470.15 (6) (b) defines [t]he kinds of ... modification[s] deemed to be made as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice to include a modification of a sentence [that], though legal, was unduly harsh or severe. Thus, contrary to the conclusion drawn by the majority, the Appellate Division's authority to modify a judgment of resentence is not limited to a resentencing where it has been established that an error or defect has occurred ( see People v Delgado, 80 NY2d 780, 783 [1992] [even though a sentence may be lawful, (a)n intermediate appellate court has broad, plenary power to modify a sentence that is unduly harsh or severe]). The majority decision here has the effect of stripping the Appellate Division of the broad discretionary authority it enjoys to reduce a sentence in the interest of justice upon an appeal from a resentencing to that court as a matter of right. Thus, I would reverse the order of the Appellate Division and remit the case to that court for the exercise of its interest of justice discretion. [2] Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the Appellate Division in People v Sharlow and reverse in People v Rodriguez. In People v Lingle, People v Parisi, People v Murrell, People v Prendergast : Order affirmed. Judges GRAFFEO, SMITH and PIGOTT concur with Judge READ; Judge CIPARICK dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion in which Chief Judge LIPPMAN and Judge JONES concur. In People v Rodriguez: Order affirmed. Judges GRAFFEO, SMITH and PIGOTT concur with Judge READ; Judge CIPARICK dissents and votes to affirm in another opinion in which Chief Judge LIPPMAN and Judge JONES concur. In People v Sharlow : Order reversed, etc.