Opinion ID: 900573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: Admission of the belated report

Text: [¶ 76.] In State v. Sahlie, 90 S.D. 682, 687, 245 N.W.2d 476, 478-79 (1976), we stated that [d]ue process cannot be satisfied unless the defendant is provided some opportunity to examine possible exculpatory evidence long enough before trial so as to have at least an opportunity to determine if such evidence is or is not exculpatory. The Sahlie holding was later modified to the extent that omission or belated disclosure was no longer, without exception, prejudicial error. State v. Reiman, 284 N.W.2d 860, 870 (S.D.1979). Now, in order to find error, the defendant must establish that the belated disclosure of evidence was material to the issue of guilt, Reiman, 284 N.W.2d at 869, because if it was not material, it could not be violative of due process. Id. (citations omitted). This rule applies to both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. [¶ 77.] Both parties are in agreement about the rarity of gahnite; Wehrenberg characterized it as a very rare mineral, and Perry Rahn, Moeller's soil expert, described it as extremely rare.... Gold is more common than gahnite. Therefore whether gahnite was indeed found in both the wheel well of Moeller's pickup and at the crime scene was a strong piece of circumstantial evidence and material to the issue of guilt. [¶ 78.] The issue of materiality aside, Moeller's claim, that the late disclosure of the April 1997 report prohibited testing by his soil expert to determine whether the mineral in question was indeed gahnite, is unfounded. Gahnite was mentioned in the May 1991 report at least twice, [10] and it was also characterized at the first trial as being a mineral of substantial interest to Wehrenberg when he testified in State's case-in-chief. [11] Both the 1991 report and Wehrenberg's testimony at the first trial placed Moeller on notice that gahnite had been identified as a possible piece of evidence linking him to the crime scene. [¶ 79.] `[W]e do not equate late disclosure with suppression, especially where, as here the trial record indicates that defense counsel made use of the information at trial.' State v. Knecht, 1997 SD 53, ¶ 21, 563 N.W.2d 413, 421 (quoting State v. Fox, 313 N.W.2d 38, 40 (S.D.1981) (citation omitted)). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the April 1997 report. ii. Allowing Wehrenberg to testify without first conducting a Daubert hearing. [¶ 80.] Moeller also contends that a Daubert hearing was necessary to determine whether the reasoning or methodology underlying Wehrenberg's testimony was scientifically valid and admissible, and that the failure to conduct such a hearing violated his due process rights. Specifically, Moeller challenges the soil sample collection methodology and the visual inspection method of analysis used by Wehrenberg to identify the mineral in question as gahnite. [¶ 81.] Prior to Wehrenberg's testimony, defense counsel orally requested a Daubert hearing. The court denied the motion, stating that in its view the Daubert standard was somewhat more liberal than the Frye standard. The court further found Wehrenberg's testimony and report admissible based upon the qualifications that he's shown and the ruling of the Supreme Court already in regard to the evidence tendered by him. [12] However, the court did grant Moeller a continuing objection. [¶ 82.] SDCL 19-9-7 and Rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provide in pertinent part: Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness ... shall be determined by the court.... In Daubert, the Supreme Court mandated that judges, when faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, conduct a gatekeeping preliminary evaluation to determine whether the proffered testimony is allowable. 509 U.S. at 597, 113 S.Ct. at 2798-99, 125 L.Ed.2d at 485. [¶ 83.] Complementing SDCL 19-9-7 and Rule 104(a) are SDCL 19-9-9 and Rule 104(c), which further provide that [h]earings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require or, when an accused is a witness, if he so requests. See also, United States v. McVeigh, 955 F.Supp. 1278, 1279 (D.Colo. 1997), aff'd, United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255 (10thCir.1999), cert. denied, Nichols v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 336, 145 L.Ed.2d 262 (1999); 60 Am.Jur.Trials The Daubert Challenge to the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence § 25 (1996) [hereinafter The Daubert Challenge] (stating that whether a hearing is required outside the presence of a jury depends upon whether it is required in the interests of justice). [¶ 84.] We have never had occasion to interpret SDCL 19-9-9, but in federal courts, full evidentiary hearings for preliminary Rule 104 assessments are not routinely used. The Daubert Challenge, supra, § 27. In United States v. Quinn, 18 F.3d 1461, 1465 (9thCir.1994), the court rejected the defendant's argument that he was entitled to a full evidentiary hearing on the reliability of an expert's scientific process. Citing Daubert, the court stated, [w]e cannot conclude that the court abused the discretion trial courts must exercise in choosing the best manner in which to determine whether scientific evidence will assist a jury. Id. Relying on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Quinn, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey recently held that the opponent of the proposed expert testimony must demonstrate a prima facie case of unreliability before an evidentiary hearing is required. Lanni v. State of New Jersey, 177 F.R.D. 295, 303 (D.N.J.1998). It reasoned that such a hearing was not required under Daubert and would cause unnecessary expense and delay. Id. [13] [¶ 85.] Recently the United States Supreme Court, in ruling that the Daubert reliability factors [14] are non-exclusive, granted a trial court wide latitude in determining how to test an expert's reliability. It stated: The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an expert's reliability, and to decide whether or when special briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides whether that expert's relevant testimony is reliable. Our opinion in Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997) makes clear that a court of appeals is to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when it review[s] a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony. 522 U.S. at 138-139, 118 S.Ct. 512. That standard applies as much to the trial court's decisions about how to determine reliability as to its ultimate conclusion. Otherwise, the trial judge would lack the discretionary authority needed both to avoid unnecessary reliability proceedings in ordinary cases where the reliability of an expert's methods is properly taken for granted, and to require appropriate proceedings in the less usual or more complex cases where cause for questioning the expert's reliability arises. Indeed, the Rules seek to avoid unjustifiable expense and delay as part of their search for truth and the jus[t] determin[ation] of proceedings. Fed. Rule Evid. 102. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd., v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152-53, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1176, 143 L.Ed.2d 238, 252-53 (1999) (emphasis in original). [¶ 86.] We therefore disagree with Moeller's contention that a Daubert hearing for Wehrenberg's testimony was necessary. First, we note that the challenged evidence did not present any new scientific theory, and the methodologies were neither complex nor unusual. McVeigh, 955 F.Supp. at 1279. It is a well-established principle in the field of mineralogy that a visual analysis is an accepted method of identifying minerals. A mineralogist first uses visual inspection in studying minerals. Only when that method fails to identify a mineral should other tests be made. Edward Salisbury Dana, Minerals and How to Study Them 7-8, (Cornelius S. Hurlbut, Jr. rev., 3rdEd. 1962) See also, Richard M. Pearl, Gems, Minerals, Crystals and Ores 32, 49-50 (1964) (stating that there are many ways to identify minerals, depending on the observer's degree of skill; one begins by analyzing key properties such as luster, color, streak, cleavage, fracture, hardness, magnetism, and specific gravity). [¶ 87.] Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that Wehrenberg's methodology or analysis was so skewed as to alter the otherwise reliable scientific method. An allegation of failure to properly apply a scientific principle should provide the basis for exclusion of an expert opinion only if `a reliable methodology was so altered ... as to skew the methodology itself.' Beasley, 102 F.3d at 1448 (quoting Martinez, 3 F.3d at 1198) (other citations omitted). [¶ 88.] Because the trial court could have properly concluded that a reliability proceeding outside the presence of a jury was unnecessary, we find no abuse of discretion in denying Moeller's motion for a Daubert hearing as to the admissibility of Wehrenberg's testimony.