Opinion ID: 4535109
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Probable Cause for Jones’ Arrest

Text: This Court has held that an officer “possesses probable cause when, at the moment the officer seeks the arrest, ‘the facts and circumstances within [the officer’s] knowledge and of which [she] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [plaintiff] had committed or was committing an offense.’” Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 429 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). The Supreme Court has observed that a “probable cause determination . . . does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975). Moreover, this No. 19-5143 Jones v. Clark Cty., Ky., et al. Page 9 Court has held that the “prudent person standard” in the tests for probable cause to search and probable cause to arrest are “the same.” Greene v. Reeves, 80 F.3d 1101, 1106 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that “[i]f it was reasonable to obtain a search warrant, it had to be equally reasonable to obtain the arrest warrant”). A probable cause determination is based upon the “totality of the circumstances” and must consider “both the inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.” Wesley, 779 F.3d at 429 (quoting Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 318 (6th Cir. 2000)). That means an officer cannot “‘simply turn a blind eye’ toward evidence favorable to the accused,” id. (quoting Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 372 (6th Cir. 1999)), nor “ignore information which becomes available in the course of routine investigations,” Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 873 (6th Cir. 2002). That said, “[o]nce probable cause is established, an officer is under no duty to investigate further or to look for additional evidence which may exculpate the accused.” Ahlers, 188 F.3d at 371. However, Jones need only make a “minimal showing of credibility . . . that the defendants did not have probable cause.” Yancey v. Carroll Cty., 876 F.2d 1238, 1243 (6th Cir. 1989). Unless “there is only one reasonable determination possible,” this is a jury question. Fridley, 291 F.3d at 872 (citations omitted). Jones was charged with promoting a sexual performance by a minor. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 531.320. “A person is guilty of promoting sexual performance by a minor when knowing the character and content thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct by a minor.” Id. “Promote” means “to prepare, publish, print, procure or manufacture, or to offer or agree to do the same.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 531.300(7). And under Kentucky law the “statute is violated when one either actively or passively prepares, agrees, or brings forth through their efforts the visual representation of a minor in a sexual performance before an audience.” Clark v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W.3d 668, 678 (Ky. 2008). Thus, if there was probable cause to believe that Jones promoted the sexual performance of a minor by uploading the unlawful video through his router, then there was probable cause to arrest him. Viewing the facts in Jones’ favor, Murray’s statement that he “arrested” Jones and his notation that Jones “was arrested and taken to the CCSO where he was interviewed,” shows that Jones was arrested at his home. R. 62-2, PageID # 630; R. 62-10, PageID # 1124. Because No. 19-5143 Jones v. Clark Cty., Ky., et al. Page 10 Murray had only secured a search warrant when he apprehended Jones, he needed probable cause for the arrest. At the point of arrest, Murray and his fellow officers knew that Jones owned the router associated with the illegal download. That Jones was alone the night of the download, that his router was password-protected, and that he had heard of the Ares program from a computer class he had taken was determined only after Jones was apprehended and then interrogated. The fact that Jones owned the router that LMPD records indicated was used to upload child pornography and that the router was located in Jones’ apartment could “warrant a prudent man in believing that the [Jones] had committed or was committing an offense.” Wesley, 779 F.3d at 429. In United States v. Hinojosa, we held that officers had probable cause to secure a search warrant to search the defendant’s residence because officers had established that an IP address used to transmit child pornography was registered to the defendant and that the defendant resided at the registered address. 606 F.3d 875, 885 (6th Cir. 2010). Then, in United States v. Gillman, we held that the possibility that someone could have accessed the defendant’s wireless network without his permission, “does not negate the fair probability that child pornography emanating from an IP address will be found on a computer at its registered residential address.” 432 F. App’x 513, 515 (6th Cir. 2011). While both of these cases involved search warrants, our holding in Greene that probable cause for a search and arrest turn on the same evidence is instructive. If the nexus between an IP address and a suspect’s residence connecting him to the upload or transfer of child pornography justifies a search of that residence, then, depending upon the nature and existence of additional information turned up by the search, it might also justify an arrest of the residence’s occupant. Jones does not point to any cases in which a court has distinguished between probable cause for a search and an arrest under analogous facts. He instead emphasizes that Murray did not name Jones as a suspect in his affidavit for a search warrant, that Jones’ router could have been hacked, and that there was no physical evidence establishing that Jones possessed the unlawful video. But probable cause is an objective standard, and both the facts in this case and the principles in the relevant case law point towards a finding that Murray had probable cause to arrest Jones. Jones’ claim that Murray needed to have Jones’ devices forensically examined No. 19-5143 Jones v. Clark Cty., Ky., et al. Page 11 before arresting Jones goes too far. This position conflates the probable cause standard with the reasonable doubt standard and would impose an untenable requirement on police officers to exhaustively eliminate exculpatory possibilities presented by their investigations before arresting someone, despite having probable cause to do so.4 Notwithstanding that the charges against Jones were eventually dismissed, it is reasonable to think that because an individual owns a router that was indisputably used to upload child pornography, that individual may have been the one to have uploaded the unlawful material. This may not constitute enough evidence to secure a conviction, and the possibility of hacking should certainly be considered, but probable cause allows for such contingencies. Probable cause inquiries do “not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands.” Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 121. Therefore, Jones has not demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue regarding probable cause for his initial arrest. ii. Probable Cause for Jones’ Continued Detention This Court has also held that a malicious prosecution claim can involve “continued detention” without probable cause. Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1006 (6th Cir. 1999); Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 750 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizing the “subset of malicious prosecution claims which allege continued detention without probable cause”). This principle was affirmed in the recent case of Mills v. Barnard, 869 F.3d 473, 480 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that “the § 1983 version of malicious prosecution is not limited to the institution of proceedings; it can also support a claim for continued detention without probable cause”) (citations omitted). 4 Jones also repeatedly asserts that Murray misrepresented material facts or outright lied during his grand jury testimony. Whether this is accurate or not, grand jury testimony is entitled to absolute immunity and a grand jury indictment establishes a rebuttable presumption of probable cause for a prosecution. King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 587–88 (6th Cir. 2017). This presumption can be rebutted through a showing that an officer made false statements or fabricated evidence “prior to and independent” of their grand jury testimony. Id. It is unclear what statements or evidence provided by Murray “prior to and independent” of his testimony could be characterized as false. Even if Jones could rebut the presumption of probable cause created by the grand jury indictment, his arrest and prosecution (at least until the forensic tests on his devices were performed) were independently supported by probable cause. No. 19-5143 Jones v. Clark Cty., Ky., et al. Page 12 In the present case, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether probable cause for Jones’ continued detention dissolved once Murray received the results of the forensic examination on January 11, 2014. It could be reasonably inferred that the Commonwealth lacked the evidence it needed to continue its prosecution of Jones once the forensic examination failed to connect Jones’ devices with the video. In fact, the prosecutors admitted that it was the weakness of the forensic report relative to Daniel’s report that justified the dismissal of charges. The ambiguity surrounding what the prosecutors knew regarding the forensic examination is important to this point. It is unclear from the record whether and when Johnson and Engel were fully informed of the forensic examination results by Murray or someone else at the Sheriff’s Office. Thus, a jury must decide whether probable cause existed after January 11, 2014, and, if so, whether Murray delayed a further probable cause determination by avoiding or neglecting to inform prosecutors of the test results. While Murray had no obligation “to investigate further or to look for additional evidence which may exculpate the accused,” Ahlers, 188 F.3d at 371, he could not ignore the forensics results that became “available in the course of routine investigations,” Fridley, 291 F.3d at 873. As noted above, it was Murray himself who sent the devices to Lexington for testing. And, while Murray contends that it was not “[his] job” to seek Jones’ release from jail after receiving the forensics results, it was also not his job to withhold material information from prosecutors or otherwise mislead them into pursuing an unsupported prosecution. R. 62-2, PageID # 113. See also Gregory, 444 F.3d at 750 (reversing grant of summary judgment for defendant-forensic examiner when plaintiff presented “evidence from which a jury could infer that [defendant] knew that none of Plaintiff’s hair matched that found [on sexual assault victim], and thus that had this information been made known, probable cause for Plaintiff’s continued detention would have dissolved”); Mills, 869 F.3d at 481 (reversing motion to dismiss malicious prosecution action where plaintiff sufficiently pleaded facts showing that DNA analyst’s “withholding of exculpatory evidence propped up the independent determination of probable cause for Mills’s ongoing detention”). Defendants’ response that “[u]nlike Mills, the forensic testing of Jones’ devices, which was inconclusive, did not contradict the undisputed facts establishing probable cause to arrest and prosecute Jones,” but simply “made it more difficult to achieve a conviction,” is unavailing. No. 19-5143 Jones v. Clark Cty., Ky., et al. Page 13 Br. of Appellees at 27. This is because, “[t]he existence of an indictment is . . . not a talisman that always wards off a malicious-prosecution claim. Instead, ‘even if independent evidence establishes probable cause against a suspect, it would still be unlawful for lawenforcement officers to fabricate evidence in order to strengthen the case against that suspect.’” Mills, 869 F.3d at 480 (citing Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 670 (6th Cir. 2015)). Thus, even though there was probable cause for Jones’ arrest and the grand jury indictment creates a presumption of probable cause for his prosecution, the forensics test results vitiated probable cause for Jones’ ongoing detention. The record is clear that Murray knew by January 11, 2014, that there was no evidence of child pornography on Jones’ devices. But because there is a factual dispute as to whether Murray informed the prosecutors of these results, a genuine issue exists as to whether Murray “knowingly or recklessly” withheld this exculpatory evidence. See Mills, 869 F.3d at 480. Ultimately, at the summary judgment stage, it is not for this Court or the district court to “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter.” Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 249. There is a genuine dispute as to whether Murray falsely maintained probable cause for Jones’ continued detention by not informing the prosecutors that there was no forensic evidence connecting Jones to the illegal video. Thus, a fact-finder should decide whether, “had this information been made known, probable cause for Plaintiff’s continued detention would have dissolved.” Gregory, 444 F.3d at 750; see also, id., at 751 (“Because there exists a genuine issue of material fact about whether Katz intentionally withheld exculpatory information in order to continue Plaintiff’s detention without probable cause, this Court reverses the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this [malicious prosecution] claim.”) With respect to Plaintiff’s state-law claim of malicious prosecution, Kentucky law requires the same four elements as Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308–09 (6th Cir. 2010), with the addition of a fifth element: “the defendant acted with malice, which, in the criminal context, means seeking to achieve a purpose other than bringing an offender to justice.” Martin v. O’Daniel, 507 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Ky. 2016). “[M]alice can be inferred from [a] lack of probable cause.” Massey v. McKinley, 690 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); see also, No. 19-5143 Jones v. Clark Cty., Ky., et al. Page 14 Sweeney v. Howard, 447 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (acknowledging “the wellrecognized rule that the jury can presume malice from want of probable cause”).5 The district court found only that because its conclusion “as to the lack-of-probable cause element also decides” the state-law claim “[t]he Court, accordingly, dismisses the state malicious prosecution claim against Perdue and Murray.” R. 92, PageID # 1299. Because we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Murray on the probable cause element with respect to his continued detention, we reverse on the associated state-law claim as well. And because “malice can be inferred from [a] lack of probable cause,” a reasonable jury could find malice in Murray’s actions if it also found that he lacked probable cause for the continued detention of Jones. Massey, 690 S.W.2d at 134. Thus, there is no basis under Kentucky law to affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Jones’ state-law claim. 3. Summary Judgment for Defendants Perdue and Clark County, Kentucky Jones must establish supervisory liability to hold Perdue and Clark County, Kentucky accountable for Murray’s actions. A “prerequisite of supervisory liability under § 1983 is unconstitutional conduct by a subordinate of the supervisor.” S.L. ex rel. K.L. v. Pierce Tp. Bd. of Trs., 771 F.3d 956, 963 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch., 433 F.3d 460, 470 (6th Cir. 2006)). “Supervisory liability under § 1983 cannot attach where the allegation of liability is based upon a mere failure to act.” Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Leach v. Shelby Cty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (1989)). Rather, the supervisors must have actively engaged in unconstitutional behavior. Gregory, 444 F.3d at 751 (citing Bass, 167 F.3d at 1048). “Therefore, liability must lie upon more than a mere right to control employees and cannot rely on simple negligence.” Id. “A supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor ‘either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.’” Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hays v. Jefferson Cty., 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982)). In Gregory, the plaintiff showed only that the supervisors had failed 5 Jones did not oppose the district court’s dismissal of his state-law claim against Clark County because, as the district court observed, “sovereign immunity acts a shield.” R. 92, PageID # 1299. The state-law claim is therefore only being appealed as it applies to Murray and Perdue. No. 19-5143 Jones v. Clark Cty., Ky., et al. Page 15 to review the work of their subordinates. 444 F.3d at 751. Thus, while this Court found “a genuine issue of material fact about whether [defendant officer] intentionally withheld exculpatory information in order to continue Plaintiff’s detention without probable cause,” the district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to the officer’s supervisors was affirmed. Id. “At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Hays, 668 F.2d at 874. Similarly, a county may not be sued under § 1983 solely because an injury was inflicted by one of its employees or agents. Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005). Instead, “a plaintiff must show that the alleged federal right violation occurred because of a municipal policy or custom.” Id. (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).6 Such a policy can be shown via “(1) the municipality’s legislative enactments or official agency policies; (2) actions taken by officials with final decision-making authority; (3) a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal violations.” Id. Additionally, “[t]o succeed on a failure to train or supervise claim, the plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the training or supervision was inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) the inadequacy was the result of the municipality’s deliberate indifference; and (3) the inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury.” Ellis v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006). In City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988), the Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff alleges that an unconstitutional municipal policy is evinced by a single decision by a municipal official, “only those municipal officials who have ‘final policymaking authority’ may by their actions subject the government to § 1983 liability” and that state law determines whether a municipal official has “final policymaking authority.” Id. at 123. This Court has distinguished “between ‘policymaking’ authority, which entails a certain amount of discretion to choose 6 Monell includes a longer list of conduct for which municipalities may be sued under § 1983: “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Because of “[t]he length of this list of types of municipal action,” we use the “shorthand term ‘policy or custom,’ but when we do so, we mean to refer to the entire list.” Los Angeles Cty., Cal. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 36 (2010). No. 19-5143 Jones v. Clark Cty., Ky., et al. Page 16 among various plausible alternatives, and ‘factfinding’ authority, which involves assessing the fixed realities of a situation” and held as a result that a coroner’s authority to make factual findings regarding a person’s cause of death was not policy-making. Jorg v. City of Cincinnati, 145 F. App’x 143, 147 (6th Cir. 2005). Jones has established a genuine issue as to the “prerequisite . . . unconstitutional conduct” by a subordinate—Murray—to support a claim of supervisory liability against Sheriff Perdue. S.L. ex rel. K.L., 771 F.3d at 963. However, no genuine dispute of material fact remains over whether Perdue, through municipal policy, custom or official action, acted unconstitutionally. Jones has not set forth any facts indicating that Perdue authorized or participated in Murray’s arguably unlawful conduct. As in Gregory, the record, at the most, indicates that Perdue failed to review Murray’s work, not that Perdue lacked “a reasonable system” to review subordinates work generally. 444 F.3d at 751. Similarly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding Clark County’s liability in this matter. On appeal, Jones argues only that “a county can be liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 when it tolerates a custom or practice which causes a constitutional violation” and that “Murray’s power was so absolute, and he was given such free rein over the lives and liberty of people like Jones, that his acts and omissions could fairly be characterized as those of a person to whom the County and its Sheriff had delegated final decision-making authority, and for which they can be properly held liable.” Br. of Appellant at 46–47. His first argument fails because Jones has failed to allege the existence of a “custom or practice” in Clark County that would warrant a claim of supervisory liability in this suit. He vaguely references “the lives and liberty of people like Jones,” but his brief provides no further argument or evidence of repeated violations akin to the one against Jones—be they malicious prosecutions generally or those involving child pornography. Even looking at the facts in the light most favorable to Jones, there is nothing in the record or raised in his brief that defeats summary judgment for the County. No. 19-5143 Jones v. Clark Cty., Ky., et al. Page 17 His second argument, that the County vested Murray with the authority to make municipal policy, fails because Jones has not demonstrated with any argument or facts present in the record that state or local law vested Murray with the authority to make county policy. Arguably Perdue granted Murray significant discretion in his investigations, but that cannot be considered “policy” for the purposes of § 1983. There is no evidence that Murray attempted to institutionalize any of his allegedly unconstitutional actions as policy or undertook them in conformity with a pre-existing policy. Like the coroner in Jorg, Murray was “assessing the fixed realities of a situation” and finding facts in the course of his police work, not setting policy. 145 F. App’x at 147. As such, liability for the County cannot attach. Jones’ argument that Murray lacked sufficient training to investigate internet crimes such that Perdue and Clark County “can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need” for greater training fails as well. Br. of Appellant at 45–46 (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390). Jones simply asserts that a lack of training made it likely enough for a constitutional violation to occur that the supervisory Defendants can be held liable. Id. But he does not identify any evidence regarding Murray’s training. And the record shows that Murray had at least been trained on the fact that an IP address could be hacked. 4. The Remaining Sykes Factors The district court expressly granted summary judgment for Defendants because it found Jones failed to establish that the government lacked probable cause for its prosecution of him. However, we now address the other factors required by Sykes to make out a malicious prosecution claim and explain why they do not present alternative grounds for affirming the district court.7 Defendants do not seriously contest that Murray’s actions fulfilled the first element: that the plaintiff must show that the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute him. This is unsurprising inasmuch as Murray clearly influenced and participated in the proceedings against Jones by arresting him and collaborating with prosecutors 7 Specifically, the district court stated that it “elects to process the summary judgment motion without analyzing Defendants’ element 1 arguments.” R. 92, PageID # 1287 n.5. It further noted that its decision was based on a finding that “Sykes element 2 disposes of the federal claim.” Id. The district court opinion then engaged in a lengthy discussion of the fourth Sykes element, but qualified its comments in stating that it “does not issue a decision on this basis but notes its concern over the claim element.” Id. at PageID # 1297. No. 19-5143 Jones v. Clark Cty., Ky., et al. Page 18 to build the case against him. It was Murray’s arrest report of Jones and grand jury testimony that formed the core of the prosecution’s case. See, e.g., Arnold v. Wilder, 657 F.3d 353, 366 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that the first element was satisfied when an officer “did not have to arrest” the plaintiff but “insisted on doing so” and because “the charges were initiated at the instance of the officer by his making an arrest and filling out a uniform citation”). The third element—requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that the legal proceedings caused a deprivation of liberty—was not disputed by either party, nor mentioned in the district court order. Because Jones spent some fourteen months imprisoned as a result of Defendants’ actions, we find that this element is easily satisfied. The fourth element required by Sykes—that the criminal proceeding was resolved in favor of the plaintiff—presents a closer question. This Court has not addressed the narrow issue presented in this case: whether a dismissal without prejudice constitutes a favorable termination for the purposes of a malicious prosecution action. However, the district court and Defendants in the present case appear to have ignored our decision in Ohnemus v. Thompson, which, while unpublished, most directly speaks to this question. 594 F. App’x 864 (6th Cir. 2014). In Ohnemus, we stated that, “[t]he termination [of proceedings] must go to the merits of the accused’s professed innocence for the dismissal to be ‘favorable’ to him.” Id. at 867 (citing Alcorn v. Gordon, 762 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988)). And “[o]nly where dismissal indicates that the accused may be innocent of the charges, have Kentucky courts found that the termination of the proceedings were favorable to the party bringing a malicious prosecution claim.” Id. We held that the proceedings against the plaintiff did not terminate in his favor because he paid restitution in exchange for a dismissal of the theft charge brought against him. Id. at 868; see also, id. at 867 (“In order for a termination of proceedings to be favorable to the accused, the dismissal must be one-sided and not the result of any settlement or compromise.”). Instead of addressing this case law, Defendants and the district court relied on decisions from a few district courts in this circuit that have found that a dismissal without prejudice is not a favorable termination. Such decisions do not bind us. Each decision, moreover, is inapposite. See e.g., Mobley v. City of Detroit, 938 F. Supp. 2d 669, 687 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (relying on a mistaken citation to an unpublished decision, Cheolas v. City of Harper Woods, 467 F. App’x No. 19-5143 Jones v. Clark Cty., Ky., et al. Page 19 374 (6th Cir. 2012));8 Thornton v. City of Columbus, 171 F. Supp. 3d 702, 710 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (involving dismissal following a hung jury). Ohnemus and the state law cases it cites rely on the Restatement (Second) of Torts which clearly supports finding that the proceedings against Jones terminated in his favor. Commentary to the Restatement provision on the termination of proceedings that give rise to private malicious prosecution actions provides in relevant part that “[t]he abandonment of the proceedings because the accuser believes that the accused is innocent or that a conviction has, in the natural course of events, become impossible or improbable, is a sufficient termination in favor [of] the accused.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 660 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1977); see also, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484–86 (1994) (applying principles governing the tort of malicious prosecution to explain why § 1983 malicious prosecution claims must also include a demonstration that the prior criminal proceeding terminated in favor of the accused); Hoskins v. Knox Cty., No. 17-84DLB-HAI, 2018 WL 1352163, at  (E.D. Ky. Mar. 15, 2018) (observing that this Court has looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts “for guidance on whether a proceeding was terminated in the accused’s favor” and finding a dismissal without prejudice could meet this standard if it indicates the innocence of the accused). We have good reason independent of state or tort law principles to find that a showing that the government abandoned the prosecution because acquittal became “improbable” is enough to meet this element of § 1983 malicious prosecution actions. The fact that the government recognized its error and moved to dismiss charges before a trial could be conducted or completed should not bar a subsequent malicious prosecution claim. A contrary holding would punish would-be plaintiffs for having a weak case brought against them. The Supreme Court made clear in Heck that the purpose of the favorable termination element is to prevent a collateral attack by a “convicted criminal defendant” on the conviction itself. 512 U.S. at 484. That logic is inapplicable to a case such as this, where there is no conviction and the malicious prosecution claim itself is founded on the dearth of evidence substantiating the institution and 8 In Cheolas, the fact that charges against one of the plaintiffs were “voluntarily dismissed” was only relevant to our finding that the plaintiff could not demonstrate that he suffered a deprivation of liberty as a result of the alleged malicious prosecution (i.e., the second Sykes element), not whether the proceedings terminated in his favor. 467 F. App’x at 378. No. 19-5143 Jones v. Clark Cty., Ky., et al. Page 20 continuation of proceedings in the first place. Categorically construing the favorable termination requirement to exclude plaintiffs whose cases were dismissed without prejudice would undermine the ability of malicious prosecution claims to hold officials accountable for baseless legal proceedings simply because those proceedings ended prior to a verdict. This would weaken the protections and deterrence provided by § 1983 and effectively deny an entire class of plaintiffs a remedy for their constitutional violations. That said, Jones must still demonstrate that his “dismissal indicates that [he] may be innocent of the charges,” Ohnemus, 594 F. App’x at 867, or that a conviction has become “improbable,” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 660. And “the determination of whether a termination is sufficiently favorable ultimately rests with the trial court as a matter of law, absent a factual dispute relative to the circumstances of the dismissal.” Ohnemus, 594 F. App’x at 866 (citing Davidson v. Castner-Knott Dry Goods Co., Inc., 202 S.W.3d 597, 606 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006)). Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Jones, he has established a sufficient factual dispute to overcome summary judgment. Prosecutors Engel and Johnson testified that they moved to dismiss the charges against Jones because they had no evidence connecting him to the illegal video. Johnson specifically noted that Lars Daniel’s report indicating that there was no evidence of an Ares download on Jones’ devices meant he could no longer impeach Jones’ credibility insofar as Jones consistently denied downloading the illegal video, possessing the video, or even using the Ares peer-to-peer file sharing network. These statements suggest, at a minimum, that there is a genuine dispute as to whether the prosecutors’ decision to voluntarily dismiss the charges against Jones was indicative of his innocence or show that his conviction was improbable. See also, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 659 cmt. e (Am. Law. Inst. 1977) (noting that favorable termination can be established via “formal abandonment of criminal proceedings” as evidenced by “a motion to dismiss the complaint”). Moreover, no new charges have been brought against Jones and no additional evidence has been discovered. These facts only reinforce this Court’s conclusion that Jones has met his burden, at the summary judgment stage, to show a genuine issue as to whether the proceedings against him terminated in his favor. No. 19-5143 Jones v. Clark Cty., Ky., et al. Page 21