Opinion ID: 219322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Remaining Grounds for Relief Asserted by Crystal Are Without Merit.

Text: The remaining grounds for relief asserted by Crystal are without merit and warrant little discussion. First, the claim of Crystal under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq., fails because the legal standards we apply to that claim are the same as those we have applied under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, see Custom, 508 F.3d at 652-53. Crystal also seeks relief under the Anti Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), which provides a cause of action for a trademark owner against a person who `has a bad faith intent to profit from [the owner's] mark' and who `registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name' that is identical or confusingly similar to the owner's distinctive mark or that is identical, confusingly similar to or dilutive of the owner's famous mark, S. Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Co., 575 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir.2009) (footnote omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i)-(ii)). The district court determined that Crystal had failed to prove that it owns the Exposé mark, and Crystal has provided us with no reason to disturb that finding. Crystal finally argues that the district court violated its right to procedural due process when it awarded exclusive use of the Exposé mark to Jurado, Curless, Bruno, and Walking Distance even though they had not requested a declaration that they owned the mark, but we disagree. Trademark law ordinarily does not permit two entities to share a mark due to the consumer confusion that would ensue, see 2 McCarthy, supra, § 16:40, pp. 16-76.1 to -77, and the complaint filed by Crystal invited the district court to determine ownership of the mark as between these parties.