Opinion ID: 1298434
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: point at which continued detention began

Text: The record shows that Lee was not given a citation as a result of her vehicle's being found in an unauthorized location within the recreation area. As such, the event which frequently determines the point after which reasonable suspicion must be found is not present. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, supra ; State v. Gutierrez, 9 Neb.App. 325, 611 N.W.2d 853 (2000); State v. McGinnis, 8 Neb.App. 1014, 608 N.W.2d 605 (2000). The record does establish, however, that shortly after Uher advised Mulbery that Lee had prior drug arrests, the officers requested permission to search the vehicle, which request was denied. Thereafter, Lee and her vehicle were detained at the scene until the arrival of Uher and the drug dog. That such continued detention constituted a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment is not contested by the State in its brief. The State acknowledges that [f]ollowing the completion of the initial traffic stop and after consent to search had been denied, Sgt. Mulbery continued to detain Lee until such time as the drug dog arrived. Brief for appellee at 9. Based on our de novo review of the record, we determine that Lee's continued detention by the officers after consent to search was denied constituted a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Anderson, supra . We further determine it was at this point that the reasonable scope of the initial traffic stop ended. Once Lee denied permission to search, she had a right to proceed, unless during the period of lawful detention, Mulbery and Lytle developed a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Lee was involved in illegal activity beyond that which justified the interference in the first place. See, State v. Anderson, supra ; State v. McGinnis, supra . See, also, Terry v. Ohio, supra .