Opinion ID: 2368117
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of RSA 637:5, II(i)

Text: The defendant next argues that, even if RSA 637:5, II(i) prohibits his conduct, we must vacate his conviction because the statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied to him under both the United States and New Hampshire Constitutions. In addition, the defendant argues that RSA 637:5, II(i) is unconstitutionally overbroad, both on its face and as applied. We review questions of constitutional law de novo. State v. MacElman, 154 N.H. 304, 307, 910 A.2d 1267 (2006). We first address the defendant's claims under the State Constitution, and cite federal opinions for guidance only. Id. In reviewing a legislative act, we presume it to be constitutional and will not declare it invalid except upon inescapable grounds. State v. Gubitosi, 157 N.H. 720, 727, 958 A.2d 962 (2008). In other words, we will not hold a statute to be unconstitutional unless a clear and substantial conflict exists between it and the constitution. Id.
Where a defendant's vagueness claim does not involve a fundamental right, a facial attack on the challenged statutory scheme is unwarranted. MacElman, 154 N.H. at 307, 910 A.2d 1267. Here, the defendant argues that his claim involves fundamental rights because the statute implicates his rights to free speech and access to the courts under Part I, Articles 14 and 22 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. We assume, without deciding, that the defendant has articulated a fundamental or First Amendment challenge. We will therefore first review his facial challenge, and then consider his as-applied challenge. See id. A statute can be impermissibly vague for either of two independent reasons: (1) it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand the conduct it prohibits; or (2) it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Id. A statute is not unconstitutionally vague as long as its prohibitions are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with. State v. Lamarche, 157 N.H. 337, 340, 950 A.2d 172 (2008) (quotation omitted). In addition, mathematical exactness is not required in a penal statute, nor is a law invalid merely because it could have been drafted with greater precision. MacElman, 154 N.H. at 307, 910 A.2d 1267 (quotation and brackets omitted). A party challenging a statute as void for vagueness bears a heavy burden of proof in view of the strong presumption favoring a statute's constitutionality. Id. The defendant argues that RSA 637:5, II(i) is void on its face because the phrase substantially benefit is vague. Specifically, the defendant notes that the statute does not specify a required mental state or attach an objective measure in defining that phrase. He further notes that the phrase is not of the type that needs to be expressed in general terms. He argues it is the absence of all of these saving characteristics that makes RSA 637:5, II(i) vague on its face. We conclude that RSA 637:5, II(i) provides a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand the conduct it prohibits. It is well established that the necessary specificity required to uphold a statute need not be contained in the statute itself, but rather, in the context of related statutes, prior decisions, or generally accepted usage. State v. Porelle, 149 N.H. 420, 423, 822 A.2d 562 (2003) (quotation omitted). Here, read in the context of generally accepted usage, the phrase substantially benefit is plain, unambiguous, and easily understandable. The term substantial is defined as something having substance or actual existence...: something having good substance or actual value. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (unabridged ed. 2002). Webster's defines benefit as to be useful or profitable ...: become protected, aided, or advanced. Id. at 204. Taken together, the terms give clear notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that the statute prohibits a threat that would not provide him or her with some actual advantage that is real and definite. Moreover, although a scienter requirement in a statute ameliorates a vagueness concern, MacElman, 154 N.H. at 308, 910 A.2d 1267, the lack of such a requirement does not necessitate invalidating the statute as unconstitutionally vague. The defendant argues that the legislature could have provided an illustrative list to help demonstrate the type of interests encompassed in benefit, or at least used a more specific phrase than substantially benefit. A law is not invalid, however, merely because it could have been drafted with greater precision. Id. at 307, 910 A.2d 1267. We conclude that the phrase substantially benefit is sufficiently clear, and it therefore is not unconstitutionally vague on its face. Turning to the defendant's as-applied challenge, we conclude that the statute provided him with a reasonable opportunity to know that his conduct was proscribed by the statute. See Porelle, 149 N.H. at 424, 822 A.2d 562. The defendant asserts that it fails to give adequate notice that a threat to sue falls within the scope of extortion, arguing that the disagreement [among courts] ... evidences an ambiguity in the statute as to whether it would apply under these circumstances. We find this argument unavailing. The plain language of the statute makes clear that it applies to a threat to [d]o any act which would not in itself substantially benefit him but which would harm substantially another person. RSA 637:5, II(i) (emphasis added). Thus, the statute neither explicitly, nor by implication, excludes a baseless threat to sue. The defendant also argues that the statute failed to provide him with adequate notice that his antipathy towards gender discrimination was insufficient to satisfy the substantially benefit requirement. For the reasons set forth more fully above, we find this argument equally unavailing. Reading the statute as a whole, the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to know that the term benefit would require, at the very least, standing to bring the threatened suit. Further, the defendant was not a client of the salon, nor did he represent one. Thus, he had not sustained even a nominal injury as a result of the salon's alleged discrimination to support his claim. We conclude that a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that RSA 637:5, II(i) applies to his conduct, and reject his as-applied claim. Because the defendant does not argue that the statute may be subject to arbitrary enforcement, we do not address it. Cf. Lamarche, 157 N.H. at 340, 950 A.2d 172. Further, because the Federal Constitution offers no greater protection than does the State Constitution under these circumstances, compare Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 148-49, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 167 L.Ed.2d 480 (2007), with MacElman, 154 N.H. at 307, 910 A.2d 1267, we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution as we do under the State Constitution.
The purpose of the overbreadth doctrine is to protect those persons who, although their speech or conduct is constitutionally protected, may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression. Gubitosi, 157 N.H. at 726-27, 958 A.2d 962 (quotation omitted). In other words, [a] statute is void for overbreadth if it attempts to control conduct by means which invade areas of protected freedom. MacElman, 154 N.H. at 310, 910 A.2d 1267 (quotation omitted). While the Constitution gives significant protection from overbroad laws that chill speech within the First Amendment's vast and privileged sphere, the application of the overbreadth doctrine is strong medicine to be employed only as a last resort. Gubitosi, 157 N.H. at 727, 958 A.2d 962 (quotation omitted) If a statute is found to be substantially overbroad, the statute must be invalidated unless the court can supply a limiting construction or partial invalidation that narrows the scope of the statute to constitutionally acceptable applications. If, on the other hand, a statute is not substantially overbroad, then whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied. Id. at 727, 958 A.2d 962 (quotation omitted). The defendant argues that RSA 637:5, II(i) is overbroad as it applies to him because his conduct is constitutionally protected. Specifically, the defendant argues that RSA 637:5, II(i) infringes upon both his freedom of speech, see U.S. CONST. amend. I; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 22, and his right to petition the government for redress of his grievances, see U.S. CONST. amend. I; N.H. CONST. pt. I, arts. 14, 32. He further argues that his prosecution under RSA 637:5, II(i) is not permissible as a reasonable time, place and manner restriction. We first address the defendant's arguments under the State Constitution, and cite federal opinions for guidance only. State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33, 471 A.2d 347 (1983). The defendant's arguments can be collectively disposed of by simply recognizing that, although we have never addressed this issue, we are not inclined to find the defendant's action protected under the State Constitution. It is well established that the First Amendment does not immunize a person's pursuit of baseless litigation. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743, 103 S.Ct. 2161, 76 L.Ed.2d 277 (1983); Wolfe v. George, 385 F.Supp.2d 1004, 1010 (N.D.Cal.2005), aff'd, 486 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir.2007); People v. Richardson, 181 P.3d 340, 345 (Colo.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 2008 WL 1850965 (Colo.2008). The United States Supreme Court has noted: The first amendment interests involved in private litigationcompensation for violated rights and interests, the psychological benefits of vindication, public airing of disputed factsare not advanced when the litigation is based on intentional falsehoods or on knowingly frivolous claims. Furthermore, since sham litigation by definition does not involve a bona fide grievance, it does not come within the first amendment right to petition. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 743, 103 S.Ct. 2161 (quotation omitted). Litigation is objectively baseless if no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60, 113 S.Ct. 1920, 123 L.Ed.2d 611 (1993). As discussed, the defendant could not have realistically expected success on the merits of the threatened suit where he had neither standing nor a good faith argument to pursue the threatened claim. Not only was the threatened litigation objectively baseless, but in threatening such litigation the defendant was motivated by an unlawful purpose. BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 531, 122 S.Ct. 2390, 153 L.Ed.2d 499 (2002). The jury concluded that the defendant obtain[ed] or exercise[d] control over the property of another by extortion and with a purpose to deprive him thereof, RSA 637:5, I, where he sought out the salon; sent a demand letter identifying himself as an attorney and threatening baseless litigation; and ultimately used the threat as leverage to obtain a settlement for his personal gain. Cf. R. Rotunda & J. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure § 20.54(e)(ii), at 632-33 (4th ed. 2008) (The line between protected and unprotected litigation is crossed when the party's purpose is not to win a favorable judgment against a competitor but to harass him, and deter others, by the process itselfregardless of outcomeof litigating.). The insidious nature of these circumstances distinguishes the defendant's threat to institute suit from the typical, valid demand letter and removes the constitutional protection it otherwise would have enjoyed. Because application of RSA 637:5, II(i) to the defendant's actions does not impermissibly infringe upon activity protected by the State Constitution, we conclude that such application is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Thus, we do not reach the defendant's argument concerning whether his prosecution constitutes a reasonable time, place and manner restriction upon protected speech. Because the Federal Constitution offers the defendant no greater protection, see Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 743, 103 S.Ct. 2161, we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution. The defendant next argues RSA 637:5, II(i) is unconstitutionally broad on its face. We first address the defendant's arguments under the State Constitution, and cite federal opinions for guidance only. Ball, 124 N.H. at 231-33, 471 A.2d 347. The defendant argues that RSA 637:5, II(i) is facially overbroad because it could cover several otherwise legitimate scenarios, such as an expert who threatens not to testify until his fee is paid, or a consumer who threatens to complain to the Better Business Bureau if he does not receive a refund for a defective product. The defendant asserts that, under either scenario, the prospective defendant is not benefited by the threatened act, but substantial harm could be caused to the person threatened, thus falling within the scope of RSA 637:5, II(i). We disagree. RSA 637:5, II(i) is a catch-all definition of extortion following eight particularized examples of the crime. The lack of particularization in RSA 637:5, II(i) does not sweep all conceivable fact-scenarios within its proscription, but only the same type as the enumerated acts. See State v. Sideris, 157 N.H. 258, 262, 951 A.2d 164 (2008) (construing CPA). The common thread between the eight particularized examples, as we recognized in O'Flynn, is the  unlawful acquisition[] of property by means of threats. O'Flynn, 126 N.H. at 709, 496 A.2d 348 (emphasis added). Similarly, in United States v. Jackson, 180 F.3d 55 (2d Cir.1999) (reversing), reh'g granted, 196 F.3d 383 (1999) (affirming on basis of harmless error), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1267, 120 S.Ct. 2731, 147 L.Ed.2d 993 (2000), the Second Circuit concluded that the term extort, although undefined within 18 U.S.C. § 875(d) (2000), nevertheless proscribed acts within the traditional concept of extortion, which includes an element of wrongfulness. Jackson, 180 F.3d at 70. This implicit concept of wrongfulness was evident, in part, because extortion appeared within other statutes relating to acts such as threats to kidnap. Id. at 67. Simply put, the term extortion, as illustrated by the eight particular examples and the language within O'Flynn, impliedly excludes legitimate claims to property through threats. See State v. Pauling, 149 Wash.2d 381, 69 P.3d 331, 336 (adopting limiting construction of certain provisions within extortion statute based upon Jackson ), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 986, 124 S.Ct. 470, 157 L.Ed.2d 379 (2003). Thus, whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis. State v. Brobst, 151 N.H. 420, 422, 857 A.2d 1253 (2004) (quotation omitted). Because the Federal Constitution offers the defendant no greater protection under these circumstances, compare Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (setting out substantial overbreadth doctrine), with Brobst, 151 N.H. at 422-25, 857 A.2d 1253 (applying substantial overbreadth doctrine under State Constitution), we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution as we do under the State Constitution.