Opinion ID: 3003585
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Estate Seeks a Retroactive Interpretation

Text: The Estate’s most ambitious argument is that application of the 2003 Amendment to this case would not be retroactive at all because there was no final judgment at the time that the 2003 Amendment took effect.5 The final judgment cut-off rule that the Estate proposes, however, is not one that Indiana courts have adopted as a bright line rule in their retroactivity analysis. Rather the retroactivity inquiry centers on whether application of a new rule will “attach[] new legal consequences to events completed before [the law’s] enactment.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269-70; Stewart v. Marson Constr. Co., 191 N.E.2d 320, 321 (Ind. 1963). Plainly, that is what the Estate seeks to do in this case. Prior to the enactment of the 2003 Amendment, a governmental entity was required to “pay all costs and fees incurred by or on behalf of a public employee in defense of [a] claim or suit” (Ind. Code § 34-13-4-1 (2001 supp.)), but the governmental entity did not have to pay a judgment unless it decided that payment was in its best interest. Id. Thus, under the 5 As noted above, while the jury returned a verdict against Dieter and Sawdon in May 2002, a final judgment was not entered until after Moffa’s second trial in September 2003. 10 No. 08-1478 law as it existed at the time that the County elected to defend Dieter and Sawdon, the County had the option not to pay the ensuing judgment. The 2003 Amendment changed the calculus for the governmental entity. Under the Amendment, once the governmental entity defends (or has the opportunity to do so), it is at least partially on the hook for any subsequent judgment. Had the 2003 Amendment been in effect prior to the trials of Dieter and Sawdon, the County at least could have urged the two to settle. It is no answer to say that the County had the opportunity to defend Dieter and Sawdon on appeal. The point is that the 2003 Amendment “attache[d] new legal consequences to” an event—the trial—that was “completed before [the Amendment’s] enactment.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269-70. After all, there are only limited bases for reversing a jury verdict at the appellate stage, in large part because the facts are construed in favor of the prevailing party. Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Svcs., Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e will overturn a jury only if we conclude that no rational jury could have found for the [prevailing party].”) (quotation marks omitted); McRoberts Software, Inc. v. Media 100, Inc., 329 F.3d 557, 564 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Latino v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d 310, 314 (7th Cir. 1995) (even greater deference for a jury-tried case with “simple issues but highly disputed facts”). Even the cases cited by the Estate to prop up its proposed final judgment rule do not support its argument. For instance, in Int’l Fidelity Ins. Co. v. State, 567 N.E.2d 1161, 1164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), the Indiana Court No. 08-1478 11 of Appeals held merely that a statute that was amended after a final judgment could not be applied retroactively to the pre-amendment judgment. Similarly in Speidel v. State, 386 N.E.2d 180, 181-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979), the court held that a 1974 amendment to a statute governing interest owed on judgments was applicable to a judgment obtained in 1975, even though the underlying cause of action accrued before the amendment took effect. Neither case supports the argument that final judgments qua final judgments play a special role in the retroactivity analysis. In Int’l Fidelity, the fact that the judgment was final seems merely to have made the retroactivity analysis easier. In Speidel, the statute in question dealt only with interest on final judgments. And while in that case the critical moment for purposes of determining retroactivity was the final judgment, the court’s reasoning revealed that it was not adopting a one-size-fits-all approach to retroactivity.6 386 N.E.2d at 182-83. Indeed, the cases cited by the Estate do a better job of demonstrating the disutility of bright line rules in the retroactivity analysis than they do of advancing the Estate’s case. See also Peacock v. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 433 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (N.D. Miss. 1977) (application of attorney fees provision would be impermissibly retroactive where the 6 Notably, the Speidel court distinguished the facts of that case from an earlier case in which the court of appeals concluded that a date related to the filing of an action was key for purposes of the retroactivity analysis. Speidel, 386 N.E.2d at 182-83 (discussing Palmer v. State, 363 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977)). 12 No. 08-1478 district court “already . . . acted . . . in the first instance” on the substantive claims in the case).