Opinion ID: 108479
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the state as parens patriae

Text: The concept of parens patriae is derived from the English constitutional system. As the system developed from its feudal beginnings, the King retained certain duties and powers, which were referred to as the royal prerogative. Malina & Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. U. L. Rev. 193, 197 (1970) (hereinafter Malina & Blechman); State Protection of its Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 Col. J. L. & Soc. Prob. 411, 412 (1970) (hereinafter State Protection). These powers and duties were said to be exercised by the King in his capacity as father of the country. [8] Traditionally, the term was used to refer to the King's power as guardian of persons under legal disabilities to act for themselves. [9] For example, Blackstone refers to the sovereign or his representative as the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics, [10] and as the superintendent of all charitable uses in the kingdom. [11] In the United States, the royal prerogative and the parens patriae function of the King passed to the States. The nature of the parens patriae suit has been greatly expanded in the United States beyond that which existed in England. This expansion was first evidenced in Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1 (1900), a case in which the State of Louisiana brought suit to enjoin officials of the State of Texas from so administering the Texas quarantine regulations as to prevent Louisiana merchants from sending goods into Texas. This Court recognized that Louisiana was attempting to sue, not because of any particular injury to a business of the State, but as parens patriae for all her citizens. 176 U. S., at 19. While the Court found that parens patriae could not properly be invoked in that case, the propriety and utility of parens patriae suits were clearly recognized. This Court's acceptance of the notion of parens patriae suits in Louisiana v. Texas was followed in a series of cases: Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208 (1901) (holding that Missouri was permitted to sue Illinois and a Chicago sanitation district on behalf of Missouri citizens to enjoin the discharge of sewage into the Mississippi River); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907) (holding that Kansas was permitted to sue as parens patriae to enjoin the diversion of water from an interstate stream); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230 (1907) (holding that Georgia was entitled to sue to enjoin fumes from a copper plant across the state border from injuring land in five Georgia counties); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296 (1921) (holding that New York could sue to enjoin the discharge of sewage into the New York harbor); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923) (holding that Pennsylvania might sue to enjoin restraints on the commercial flow of natural gas); and North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365 (1923) (holding that Minnesota could sue to enjoin changes in drainage which increase the flow of water in an interstate stream). These cases establish the right of a State to sue as parens patriae to prevent or repair harm to its quasisovereign interests. [12] They deal primarily with original suits brought directly in this Court pursuant to Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution under common-law rights of action. The question in this case is not whether Hawaii may maintain its lawsuit on behalf of its citizens, but rather whether the injury for which it seeks to recover is compensable under § 4 of the Clayton Act. Hence, Hawaii's claim cannot be resolved simply by reference to any general principles governing parens patriae actions. The only time this Court has ever faced the question of what relief, if any, the antitrust laws offer a State suing as parens patriae was in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439 (1945), the case relied on most heavily by the parties herein. In that case, Georgia sought to invoke the original jurisdiction of this Court by filing an amended bill of complaint against 20 railroads, alleging, in essence, that the railroads had conspired to restrain trade and to fix prices in a manner that would favor shippers in other States (particularly Northern States) to the detriment of Georgia shippers. Like this suit, Georgia arose under the federal antitrust laws. It is plain from the face of the complaint that [t]he prayer [was] for damages and for injunctive relief. 324 U. S., at 445. See id., at 446-447, 450-451. [13] Georgia claimed that the conspiracy had severely damaged its economy and sought to recover damages on behalf of its citizens. The Court upheld Georgia's claim as parens patriae with respect to injunctive relief, but had no occasion to consider whether the antitrust laws also authorized damages for an injury to the State's economy, since approval of the challenged rates by the Interstate Commerce Commission barred a damage recovery on the ground that such a remedy would have given Georgia shippers an unfair advantage over shippers from other States. See Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 260 U. S. 156 (1922). Nowhere in Georgia did the Court address itself to the question whether § 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes damages for an injury to the general economy of a State. Thus, the question presented here is open.