Opinion ID: 2781579
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Points III and IV

Text: Barkley’s third and fourth points challenge the admission and exclusion of certain items of evidence. The trial court has broad discretion in admitting or excluding evidence. Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 332 S.W.3d 749, 756 (Mo. banc 2011). A trial 21 court abuses its discretion only when its ruling is “clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration.” In re Care & Treatment of Donaldson, 214 S.W. 3d 331, 334 (Mo. banc 2007). Even when an evidentiary ruling is in error, this Court will not set aside the jury’s verdict unless that error likely changed the outcome of the case. Rule 84.13(b). First, Barkley argues that the trial court erred in admitting, over her timely and specific objection, letters written by her physician that detail her physical condition in 2007 and 2011. Barkley asked her doctor to write these letters in support of her requests to be excused from jury duty. She claims that they are improper character evidence and are not relevant to any issue in the case. Even if the letters are relevant, Barkley contends they served only to “alienate and foster resentment by the Jurors who were serving” and, therefore, their prejudicial effect outweighed whatever probative value they may have had. Accordingly, Barkley claims the admission of this evidence was reversible error and a new trial is required. At trial, Barkley argued that the letters and related testimony were “not probative to any issue” and were “highly prejudicial.” The trial court ruled that, given the nature of the damages Barkley was seeking, evidence of her physical condition both before and after the incident at Price Chopper was relevant and the letters would be admitted on that basis. Barkley insisted that she already had conceded substantial preexisting health problems and, therefore, there was no need for the 2007 and 2011 letters. The trial court overruled her objections on the ground that Price Chopper was not limited to Barkley’s 22 evidence of her prior conditions, and it found that the letters were not unduly prejudicial. 7 This ruling was not an abuse of discretion. In personal injury claims, evidence concerning the plaintiff’s health and physical condition that tends to prove or disprove the nature or extent of plaintiff’s alleged injuries is admissible. Eickmann v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 323 S.W.2d 802, 806 (Mo. 1959). Accordingly, the letters detailing Barkley’s physical condition both two years before and two years after the 2009 incident at Price Chopper were logically relevant. State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751, 760 (Mo. banc 2002) (evidence is logically relevant if it tends to make any fact of consequence more or less likely than it would be without the evidence). A plaintiff does not get to decide which evidence will (and will not) be used to prove or disprove particular facts, nor is a defendant prohibited from presenting relevant evidence merely because the plaintiff already has done so. Legal relevance, on the other hand, “weighs the evidence’s probative value against unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or cumulativeness.” Johnson v. State, 406 S.W.3d 892, 902 (Mo. banc 2013) (quotation marks omitted). Here, the probative value of these letters is clear because they detail Barkley’s conditions both before and after she allegedly was injured at Price Chopper. And, despite her protestations to the contrary, it does not appear there was any unfair prejudice in admitting them. If the statements in these letters are true, and no one argued 7 The trial court ordered Price Chopper not to use these letters to challenge Barkley’s veracity (e.g., by suggesting Barkley had fabricated or exaggerated her conditions to get out of jury service), and Barkley does not claim that this limitation was violated. 23 they were not, there is no reason to assume that the jury would have held Barkley’s requests to be excused from jury duty against her. Even if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would misuse this evidence in that way, the proper remedy would be a limiting instruction, not exclusion. Barkley requested no such instruction. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the letters (and the physician’s testimony concerning them) were admissible. This point is denied. Finally, Barkley argues that the trial court erred in excluding: (1) personnel records showing that one of Price Chopper’s employees had received reprimands for similar conduct both before and after Barkley’s incident; and (2) court records showing that a different plaintiff brought a similar claim against Price Chopper in the past. Because Barkley argues that these records were relevant solely to her claim for punitive damages, this claim cannot succeed. Even if this Court assumes for the sake of argument that the trial court erred in excluding these records, that error cannot have been prejudicial to Barkley. The jury never reached the question of punitive damages, or had occasion to consider the evidence relevant to that claim, because the jury found for Price Chopper on both Barkley’s battery and false imprisonment claims. Accordingly, any error by the trial court regarding the evidence for or against such damages was harmless. This point is denied. 24