Opinion ID: 1197056
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Foreseeability of drug quantity

Text: Flores argues that he should not have been held responsible for the 3500-kilogram quantity, even if the testimony of Martínez-Medina is accepted, because this drug quantity was not within the scope of his agreement. Flores argues that his participation was limited to moving bags through the airport, and asserts that 3500 kilograms of cocaine would have been physically difficult to move in that manner. He argues that no evidence shows he agreed to move that much. Flores argues that the evidence showed that he soon became no longer able to assist, and the conspiracy turned to another individual to get drugs through the airport. The government does not respond to this argument. [A] defendant may be held responsible for drug quantities involved in his `relevant conduct.' Laboy, 351 F.3d at 582 (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3). Such conduct may include a defendant's own acts or the acts of others: the sentencing guidelines provide responsibility for the acts of others in the case of `jointly undertaken criminal activity', which includes any `criminal plan, scheme, endeavor or enterprise undertaken by defendant in concert with others.' Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)). In a drug conspiracy, this includes, `all reasonably foreseeable quantities of contraband that were within the scope of the criminal activity that he jointly undertook.' Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n. 2). But, mere knowledge of another's activity is not enough to show liability. Id. at 582-83. Rather, [t]he defendant is only responsible for foreseeable conduct within the scope of his own explicit or implicit agreement. Id. at 583. Thus, the scope of relevant conduct is `not necessarily the same as the scope of the entire conspiracy.' Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n. 2). Flores argues that his situation resembles an illustration in the guideline commentary, which states that a defendant who agrees to assist in a single shipment of contraband is not liable for other shipments made by his co-conspirators. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n. 2, illus. (c)(3). Another illustration explains that when a girlfriend of a drug dealer agrees to make a single delivery for him, but knows about his ongoing activity, the girlfriend is liable only for the single delivery. Id. at illus. (c)(5). Flores argues that he similarly was only involved in moving certain suitcases through the airport in San Juan, and did not undertake any broader criminal activity. Flores says that the testimony regarding the remaining 3,500 kilograms shows, at most, mere knowledge. But, it is not entirely clear that Flores's involvement was limited to simply assisting on certain shipments. The district court did not directly address this issue, but did suggest that Flores's role was more involved when it suggested a high drug quantity could be attributed to him because of his relationship with people who were important players in the conspiracy. As we have explained above, we cannot affirm on the basis of this broad statement, since its factual underpinnings are unclear. Rather, the district court should have determined the scope of Flores's specific agreement. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n. 2 (In order to determine the defendant's accountability ..., the court must first determine the scope of the criminal activity the particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake....). While the above-quoted testimony suggests Flores did not ultimately assist in moving the 3500 kilograms, it is not clear as to whether Flores had agreed to assist in the broader conspiracy. Considering that we are remanding for further fact-finding, we need not categorically rule whether the 3500 kilogram quantity may be imputed to Flores simply on the basis of the relevant testimony from Martínez-Medina. See United States v. Valencia-Lucena, 988 F.2d 228, 235 (1st Cir.1993) (stating that [t]he district court's failure to more fully state the evidence upon which it based its finding of foreseeability ... at the sentencing stage has frustrated this court's appellate task and concluding [w]e make no comment on whether the record supports a finding of foreseeability on the preponderance of the evidence; this task is for the district court.); United States v. García, 954 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir.1992) (stating a sentencing court's determination that drug transactions did, or did not, form part of the same course of conduct as the counts of conviction is a predominantly factual finding). On remand, the district court must determine not only whether the testimony implicating Flores for 3500 kilograms is credible, but also whether, based on the entire record, Flores's involvement was limited to bypassing airport security in certain narrow instances, or rather whether he had undertaken or agreed to the broader conspiracy's goals of transporting large quantities of cocaine through Puerto Rico.