Opinion ID: 2164622
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Loss of future earnings.

Text: Plaintiff also contends the trial court erred in refusing to submit the issue of loss of future income. In his amended and substituted petition, he stated that as a result of his injury, plaintiff has suffered great pain and fear, loss of earnings and medical expenses . . . . Plaintiff testified he had difficulty using the tools of his electrical business; his doctor testified he was suffering a 15 to 20 percent disability of his body as a whole. Plaintiff proffered his own testimony of lost speed and efficiency and testimony of an economics professor upon the effect of the injury on his future earnings. These proffers were denied. The reasons given for exclusion by the court were that plaintiff had testified that he was back in full-time employment within a year of the injury, and further that no prayer for future loss of income was specifically made in his petition. No specific demand was made for future loss of income, only a general demand for loss of earnings. We have consistently recognized that claims for loss of past earnings and loss of future earning capacity (or loss of future earnings) are separate and distinct elements of recovery and should be submitted as such to the jury. See, e. g., Trushcheff v. Abell-Howe Co., 239 N.W.2d 116, 122 (Iowa 1976). The issue though is whether the words loss of earnings are sufficient to submit loss of future earning capacity where, as here, there is evidence to support it, or whether the recovery must be limited to loss of past earnings. We recognize that prudence, as well as prior procedural rules and cases indicate a better practice would be to state the bases separately, i. e., loss of earnings past and future (or perhaps more correctly loss of earnings and impairment of future earning capacity). The words used obviously do not include future but neither do they say past. By the use of this phrase, plaintiff has in effect, advised the defendant that my injury affects my ability to do my job. It is doubtful that a defendant's attorney could claim he has been surprised or misled by an attempt to submit loss of future earning capacity under that wording. That is especially so here, where plaintiff specifically alleged that his condition was permanent and discovery well in advance of trial indicated that this basis of recovery did in fact exist in this case. Our court in a similar case involving failure of the plaintiff to allege future pain and suffering stated that: We think plaintiff's pleadings and evidence were both sufficient to warrant recovery for future pain and suffering. An express allegation of future pain and suffering is not required where it is alleged the injury is permanent, it is such that future pain is reasonably certain to follow and there is a general allegation of damages. Arenson v. Butterworth, 243 Iowa 880, 890, 54 N.W.2d 557, 563 (1952). Our rules have been recently liberalized as to pleading requirements in general. See, e. g., Rule 67 which provides that the sufficiency of pleading shall be construed and enforced to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of all controversies on the merits and Rule 69, providing for a short and plain statement of the claim showing entitlement to relief, and judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Also see Rule 95 which indicates a relaxation as to the details required in the prayer of the petition by prohibiting any orders requiring separate valuations of the individual elements of recovery. We find under the facts of this case, and in light of the recent liberalization of our pleading practices, that the issue of loss of future earnings or loss of earning capacity should have been submitted under the petition as originally amended. Here plaintiff requested leave to amend the prayer to conform to the proof and the trial court refused. Because we hold the issue of future loss of income should have been submitted under the pleadings as they existed, without amendment, it is unnecessary to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing leave to amend under Rule of Civil Procedure 88. This case is reversed and remanded for new trial in compliance with these holdings. REVERSED AND REMANDED.