Opinion ID: 2790697
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instructions under Collins

Text: Rangel bases his claim of jury instruction error on this Court’s decision in United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2005). In that case, we considered on direct appeal the district court’s failure to give an instruction “that, for purposes of setting a specific threshold drug quantity under § 841(b), the jury must determine what amount of cocaine base was attributable to [a drug conspiracy defendant] using Pinkerton principles.” Id. at 314. 12 We concluded the failure to give such an instruction was error, but because the error concerned only the statute’s penalty provision, the conspiracy conviction was “sound” under § 846. 1 Id. Further, we recognized that without the instruction the sentence given “effectively attributed to [the defendant], an individual member of the conspiracy, the quantity of cocaine base distributed by the entire conspiracy.” Id. As a consequence, “[b]ecause the district court adopted the jury’s drug quantity determination in its application of the sentencing guidelines, the error affected both the threshold statutory range under § 841(b) and the district court’s application of the guidelines.” Id. Because the district court’s sentence in Collins was based on the jury’s invalid drug quantity determination, it “c[ould ]not stand.” Id. The government concedes that the district court’s failure to instruct the jury to find a drug weight properly attributable to Rangel based on Pinkerton principles was error under Collins.
Rangel first argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he did not request an instruction stating that the jury must determine drug weight using Pinkerton 1 As in Collins, Rangel’s underlying conviction is “sound” and there is no issue in this appeal as to his conviction, but only as to the sentence he received. 13 principles. The district court rejected this argument, reasoning that even if trial counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland, the error resulted in no prejudice. 2 The district court observed that Rangel “would nonetheless face a maximum term of twenty years imprisonment on Counts One, Four, and Seven” under the default penalty provision for marijuana. J.A. 409 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)). Regarding the guideline range, the district court found that the probation officer had “more than a sufficient basis” from evidence presented at trial to determine by a preponderance of the evidence that Rangel was accountable for over 1,000 kg of marijuana. Id.; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3; United States v. Carter, 300 F.3d 415, 425 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussing the preponderance standard at sentencing). Thus, the base offense level –- which derived from the drug weight -- would remain the same, and the guideline range would remain at 121 to 151 months. The district court concluded that because Rangel’s 121-month sentence was within “the statutory range of zero to twenty years,” he “suffered no prejudice as a result of the alleged 2 On appeal, the government also argues that Rangel’s trial counsel’s failure to request the instruction was not deficient performance under Strickland’s first prong. The government reasons that the decision was a matter of trial strategy because Rangel’s defense focused on actual innocence, not drug weight. Given that the request would have taken place outside of the jury’s presence, the government’s argument has no merit, and in any event, was not raised below and appears to have been waived. 14 failure of his counsel to object to the Court’s jury instructions.” J.A. 409. We agree with the district court in part. In finding that the statutory range would be 0 to 20 years under the default penalty provision for marijuana, the district court misidentified 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) as the controlling subsection. While that would be correct for most drugs, the default sentencing provision for marijuana is found in § 841(b)(1)(D), which specifies that “[i]n the case of less than 50 kilograms of marihuana . . . such person shall . . . be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 5 years.” The default statutory term for marijuana is thus 0 to 5 years rather than 0 to 20 years as the district court stated. That mistake is without consequence here, however, as the district court was not constrained to review its sentence under only the default provision. Although resentencing under the default provision is a potential remedy for a successful direct appeal of a Collins error, a court’s review of a Collins error for prejudice in the § 2255 context is not so constrained. Under Strickland, Rangel must show a reasonable probability of a different result, “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” of the trial. 466 U.S. at 694. We do not find that Rangel meets that standard. 15 Our review of the record shows that Rangel’s sentence would have been the same even with a proper jury instruction. First, there is no reasonable probability that a proper jury finding would have resulted in a statutory range that precluded Rangel’s 121-month sentence. The jury would have needed to find Rangel responsible for only 50 kg of marijuana to push the statutory range from the 5-year maximum of § 841(b)(1)(D) to the 20-year maximum under § 841(b)(1)(C). In light of the overwhelming evidence that Rangel was responsible for substantially more than 50 kg of marijuana –- in particular, the multiple drug purchases in Texas -- there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have attributed less than 50 kg to Rangel. Rangel’s statutory sentence range, then, would have had a maximum of at least 20-years, far exceeding his ultimate 121-month sentence. Having concluded that the district court could have imposed a 121-month sentence had the Collins error not occurred, the question then becomes whether the district court would have imposed that sentence. Collins recognizes that if the district court “adopted the jury’s drug quantity determination in its application of the sentencing guidelines,” then that error will have “affected both the threshold statutory range under § 841(b) and the district court’s application of the guidelines.” 415 F.3d at 314. Consequently, Rangel must show a reasonable probability that, but for the Collins error, the district court 16 would have found him responsible for less than 1,000 kg, the amount that placed him in the 121- to 151-month guideline range. The record demonstrates that in all likelihood, even without the Collins error, the district court would have found by a preponderance of the evidence that Rangel was responsible for 1,000 kg of marijuana. First, the jury established beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy involved at least 1,000 kg, and there is no basis to conclude that Rangel would not have reasonably foreseen the conspiracy’s full scope. Further, the trial testimony established that Rangel was a management figure in the conspiracy and helped coordinate multiple large-scale drug purchases. The record thus supports the district court’s conclusion by a preponderance of the evidence that Rangel would have foreseen the full scope of the conspiracy, with its accompanying 1,000 kg of marijuana. Moreover, independent of the jury finding, our review of the record shows that the district court would have attributed 1,000 kg of marijuana to Rangel. He was a management figure in a conspiracy that lasted several years, crossing half the country, and even extending into Mexico. More than that, Rangel was the point-man for numerous trips to Texas, where 50 pound (22.7 kg) quantities of marijuana were regularly obtained. In addition, Hillman testified as to the “hundreds” of times he bought pound quantities at the trailer, often with Rangel 17 present, and taken from a multi-pound stash (0.45 kg per pound). We thus conclude that the district court’s finding that Rangel was responsible for 1,000 kg of marijuana was not the mere adoption of the Collins-error jury finding. Nor does the record support Rangel’s contention that the 10-year (120-month) statutory minimum affected his sentence. The district court’s independent 1,000 kg finding resulted in a 121- to 151-month guideline range, and Rangel was sentenced at the bottom of that range. As the district court explained in denying Rangel’s habeas petition, “[e]ven without the jury’s finding, the base offense level would have been 32 based on the evidence presented at trial and the information contained in the Presentence Report.” J.A. 411. Rangel emphasizes the judge’s statement at sentencing that considering the § 3553 sentencing factors was “sort of a useless endeavor in this case because there’s a mandatory” minimum sentence, but that statement addressed only the availability of a below-guideline sentence. Id. at 215. It is clear from the sentencing transcript that the district court considered Rangel undeserving of a belowguideline sentence: the judge “simply [could not] think of any kind of a factor that would weigh in [Rangel’s] favor.” Id. In sum, the record supports the conclusion that a properly instructed jury would have attributed at least 50 kg of marijuana to Rangel, with a resulting statutory range of 0 to 20 18 years. That statutory range would have included the 121- to 151-month guideline range from the court’s independent 1,000 kg finding at sentencing. In all likelihood, then, Rangel still would have received the same guideline range and the same 121month sentence. Having failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome, Rangel does not satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong on this issue. Rangel’s trial counsel, therefore, did not render constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to request an instruction to determine drug weight based on Pinkerton principles under Collins.
For similar reasons, we conclude that Rangel was not prejudiced by his appellate counsel’s failure to raise the Collins error as an issue on direct appeal. 3 To show prejudice in the context of appellate representation, a petitioner must establish a “reasonable probability . . . he would have prevailed on his appeal” but for his counsel’s unreasonable failure to raise an issue. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 28586 (2000); see also United States v. Mannino, 212 F.3d 835, 84546 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The test for prejudice under Strickland is not whether petitioners would likely prevail upon remand, but 3 Because we resolve the claim under Strickland’s prejudice prong, it is unnecessary to decide whether appellate counsel’s omission of the Collins issue constituted deficient performance. 19 whether we would have likely reversed and ordered a remand had the issue been raised on direct appeal.”). Having reviewed the record in this case, we conclude that Rangel’s Collins claim would not have had a reasonable probability of success had it been raised on direct appeal. Because Rangel did not raise the issue at trial, the standard of review on appeal would have been plain error. To prevail, then, he would have had to show that 1) an error occurred, 2) the error was plain, and 3) the error affected his substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52. Affecting substantial rights, “in most cases,” means that “the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceeding.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. This outcome-based standard is similar to Strickland’s prejudice inquiry. Compare United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) (prejudice, to prove an effect on “substantial rights” for plain error review, means “a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial”), with Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (prejudice, to establish ineffective assistance, means “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different”). Finally, even with those three requirements met, we need not correct a plain error that “did not seriously affect 20 the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Jeffers, 570 F.3d 557, 570 (4th Cir. 2009) (declining to notice a Collins error that did not seriously affect the trial’s fairness); see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 736. We have established that Collins errors satisfy the first two requirements: an error occurred and the error was plain. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 251 (4th Cir. 2007). We conclude, however, that if there was error here, it did not affect Rangel’s substantial rights because it did not affect the ultimate outcome of the sentencing phase of his trial. As explained above regarding Rangel’s trial counsel claim, a properly instructed jury would have attributed in excess of 50 kg to Rangel, which would authorize a statutory maximum sentence of 20 years. Similarly, the district court would have then found Rangel responsible for 1,000 kg of marijuana by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing, thus setting the 121- to 151- month guideline range. Because that finding would have resulted in the same 121-month sentence at the low end of the guidelines that Rangel received, the outcome would have been the same with or without a Collins error. Again, the district court stated this plainly: “Even without the jury’s finding, the base offense level would have been 32 based on the evidence presented at trial and the information contained 21 in the Presentence Report.” J.A. 411. Rangel provides no viable basis for his contention that the district court, despite its express statement, would have found him responsible for some lesser weight. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (observing that on plain error review, the petitioner bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice). Because the record before us demonstrates that any Collins error would not have affected Rangel’s substantial rights, a direct appeal on that issue would have had limited chance of success. Accordingly, Rangel does not demonstrate prejudice and therefore did not receive constitutionally ineffective assistance from his appellate counsel.