Opinion ID: 2428070
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: automobile search

Text: The defendant next contends that the search of the automobile was an unconstitutional inventory search which violated the Fourth Amendment and, as a result, the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search. Officer Maxwell testified that he arrested the defendant and informed him that the vehicle would have to be towed. Because it is against departmental procedure, Officer Maxwell denied the defendant's request to have his mother come and pick up her car. After placing the defendant in the back seat of the police car, Officer Maxwell said he and his partner started inventorying his vehicle. Since warrantless searches and seizures are presumed to be unreasonable, the prosecution has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the search and resulting seizure were justified pursuant to one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 576 (1971); Hughes v. State, 588 S.W.2d 296, 301 (Tenn. 1979). One such exception to the warrant requirement is the inventory search. Under this exception, it is constitutionally permissible for police officers to inventory the contents of a lawfully impounded automobile without a search warrant as long as it is in accordance with routine administrative procedures. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3098-99, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 1007 (1976). Although the rule has been followed in Tennessee, this Court has never held that the inventory search exception gives a police officer carte blanche to impound and inventory the contents of an arrested person's car. In Drinkard v. State, 584 S.W.2d 650 (Tenn. 1979), we agreed with a number of other jurisdictions that the facts of each case should be scrutinized to determine if the asserted need of the police to impound and search a car outweighs the constitutionally protected interest of the citizen in the privacy of his or her automobile and the personal possessions contained therein. Id., 584 S.W.2d at 653. The guideline established in Drinkard is that: [I]f the circumstances ... are such that the driver, even though arrested, is able to make his or her own arrangements for the custody of the vehicle, or if the vehicle can be parked and locked without obstructing traffic or endangering the public, the police should permit the action to be taken rather than impound the car against the will of the driver and then search it. Just cause to arrest the driver is not, alone, enough; there must also be reasonable cause to take his vehicle into custody. Id. The defendant argues that the Drinkard rule applies, that there was no reasonable cause to impound the vehicle, and that the search was constitutionally unreasonable. We would agree that under these facts the search was unreasonable, in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Tennessee, if the inventory search exception was the only basis upon which to analyze this search. In addition to an inventory search, however, a warrantless search may take place incident to a lawful arrest. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981). [W]hen a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. Id. 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d at 775 (footnotes omitted). In addition, a police officer may conduct a search of the passenger compartment of an automobile incident to an arrest even when the arrested person is neutralized in the back seat of a squad car. U.S. v. White, 871 F.2d 41, 44 (6th Cir.1989); State v. Reed, 634 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982). Under the facts of this case, we conclude that the stereo equalizer and the marijuana were discovered by the police officers in the automobile passenger compartment in the course of conducting a valid search incident to the defendant's lawful arrest. The fact that Officer Maxwell said he and his partner began inventorying the defendant's vehicle after his arrest, does not invalidate the search. Here, the search occurred on the scene immediately after the arrest and placement of the defendant in the police car. The search was of the automobile passenger compartment. Accordingly, it was not an inventory search but a search incident to a lawful arrest, and the police officers' characterization of their action is not controlling of the type of search conducted. Accordingly, because both the stop and search of the vehicle driven by the defendant were constitutionally permissible, we hold that the trial court correctly overruled the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search. Finally, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court erred in its response to questions from the jury during deliberations. We concur in the conclusion of the Court of Criminal Appeals that these issues are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in all respects. The costs of this appeal are adjudged against the defendant. REID, C.J., and DROWOTA, O'BRIEN and DAUGHTREY, JJ., concur.