Opinion ID: 2001698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: opinion of florence r. king

Text: I concur in the findings of the Hearing Committee and the majority opinion, but dissent on the recommended sanction of suspension for ninety days, and would prefer either a public censure or a thirty-day suspension. In Bar Docket No. 276-82, the Hearing Committee found that Respondent was guilty of practicing law without a license in violation of DR 3-101(B), and neglect in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3), and for these violations the Hearing Committee recommended a public censure. [1] In Bar Docket No. 57-83, the Hearing Committee found that Respondent was guilty of neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him, in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3), and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5), and for these violations the Hearing Committee recommended a suspension of three months. (Hearing Committee Report and Recommendation at 14.) The majority has adopted the findings of the Hearing Committee in both cases, as well as the recommended sanctions. I am unable to fathom how the Hearing Committee and the majority arrive at the conclusion that a public censure added on to a violation which standing alone would have warranted at most a public reprimand, add up to a ninety-day suspension. Respondent's conduct which forms the basis of the violation in Bar Docket No. 57-83 consisted of his failure to respond to communications from the Auditor Master, and his failure to respond to communications from Bar Counsel, conduct, which in my opinion, does not rise to the level of a ninety-day suspension. Respondent's conduct in this case is no more egregious than respondents in comparable situations. In In the Matter of Brown (D.N. 222-76-8/4/78), respondent was found to have violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and DR 6-101(A)(3) because he was held in contempt of Court by the D.C. Court of Appeals for failure to file timely briefs in four criminal cases. For this conduct respondent was publicly reprimanded. In In the Matter of Marshall (D.N. 81-80), respondent, who was appointed by the Court in a child neglect case, failed to appear at three scheduled hearings despite notices from the court, and was found to have violated DR 6-101(A)(3) and DR 1-102(A)(5). For these violations respondent was publicly reprimanded. In In the Matter of Mailloux (D.N. 66-79), respondent was publicly reprimanded because he failed to take any action in his client's case despite urgings of the trial judge, which resulted in a dismissal of the suit, and failed to respond to communications from his client over a considerable period of time, all in violation of DR 6-101(A)(3). The majority tries to bolster its recommendation for a ninety-day suspension by referring to Respondent's repeated violations of the Disciplinary Code together with Respondent's apparently disdainful attitude toward the disciplinary system. (p. 2 of the majority Opinion.) The fact is, however, that Respondent has practiced law for 16 years and has had an unblemished record until the advent of these two cases which arose from circumstances occurring at about the same period of time. All of the cases relied upon by the majority in support of the ninety-day suspension had some aggravating factors. The cases which I think are more analogous to Respondent's conduct, taken cumulatively, are In re Banks, 461 A.2d 1038 (D.C.1983), and In re Gavin, No. M-138-82 (D.C. March 30, 1983), although the fact situations are not directly on point. In Banks, respondent was found to have violated DR 6-101(A)(3) because of repeated acts of neglect in that he (1) failed to file answers to interrogatories, (2) failed to respond to a motion to compel, (3) filed inadequate answers to interrogatories, and (4) waited a month to file a motion to reinstate his clients' case after it had been dismissed. For this conduct the Board recommended, and the Court of Appeals adopted, the recommended sanction of a public censure, although respondent had had one prior informal admonition and one prior private reprimand. In Gavin, respondent, having been held in contempt of Court for failure to appear in a timely manner, in violation of DR 6-101(A)(5), was publicly censured although he had four prior informal admonitions for similar conduct. If consideration is given to Respondent's unblemished record, his pro bono work in the community, see In re Cope, 455 A.2d 1357 (D.C.1983), and his sustained contributions in the local bar associations, then I think the appropriate sanction should be a public censure, or at the utmost, a thirty-day suspension. /s/ Florence R. King FLORENCE R. KING Date: October 10, 1984