Opinion ID: 196927
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statements Objected to at Trial

Text: 38 (1) During trial, a lease application filled out by Loredo in November, 1991, which stated that he had worked for Carrier for six years--well before the time the defense argued Carrier began to exist--was admitted for the limited purpose of showing that Loredo claimed he worked for Carrier, not for the truth of the matters in the document. Fernandez now contends that the prosecutor went beyond that limited purpose in his closing argument. Referring to the application, the prosecutor stated: 39 You remember, as you look at it here, there is a part ... where he's supposed to or he has to list his employer. His list what [sic]? Carrier Transportation. Just Carrier Transportation as his employer.... 40 And most importantly, he said he was working for that company for six years. Six years. The phone numbers are right. The address is right. Working for the company, he says, for six years. This is proof that there was a Carrier Transportation that operated before the date that counsel-- 41 Tr. at 2472. The prosecutor was cut off by the defense's objection. 42 We agree with Fernandez that the prosecutor was moving beyond the stipulation to assert that the lease application was proof that there was a Carrier Transportation that operated before the date the defense alleged it began business. Thus, we turn to our four-factor test. We note that the misconduct, though disingenuous, was not severe, and occurred only once, in relative isolation. More importantly, the court gave immediate curative instructions, admonishing the jury that the lease did not come in as anything more than a claim by Loredo to have worked for Carrier, and reminding them of its earlier instruction, made when the lease application was entered. Indeed, in its closing, the defense also reminded the jury of the limited use of the lease. On balance, we find that the curative instruction sufficed to dispel any prejudice from the improper comment. United States v. Boldt, 929 F.2d 35, 41 (1st Cir.1991); see United States v. Savarese, 649 F.2d 83, 88 (1st Cir.1981). 43 (2) Fernandez objects to other references the prosecution made to Gulf on the basis that they encouraged speculation and attempted to argue facts not presented in the evidence. 5 First, the prosecutor stated: 44 we had to wait for cross-examination by [co-counsel for the government] to find out that there was a previous company before 1992, in fact from 1986 it had started, which did the exact same type of job. It had--it was a shipping company that did transportation in the same manner, through the containers and Mr. Juan Fernandez was also one of the owners or partners in the operation. 45 Tr. at 2475. Like Fernandez, we can find no evidence in the record stating that Gulf began in 1986. The offer of this fact is harmless, however, since the pertinent time period is 1991, and Sanjurjo testified that Gulf was in operation in 1990. The reference leaves open the crucial question, which is, when Gulf ceased operation. As for the form in which the prosecutor made his statement, it is consistent with the framework the government used for its argument, discussed in (1), above. 46 Fernandez objects to the cited passage and four others for asserting that Carrier and Gulf were essentially the same thing, doing the exact same job: 47 [O]ur argument is that before, when the company was operating as Gulf Carrier Transportation he used another warehouse in New Jersey. 48 ... [It] was known as Gulf Carrier, also. Gulf Carrier just like--the same name, just slightly different wording and same owners, same business, same thing. 49 Tr. at 2476. These statements, he contends, urged the jury to speculate in a manner unsupported and contradicted by the actual evidence regarding Gulf. There was evidence that they were both transportation companies, but not that they did the exact same job. Indeed, the owners were not the same: Fernandez was part owner of Gulf, and the sole owner of Carrier. Finally, there was no evidence that Gulf was actually in business in 1991. 50 On balance, we cannot find that this line of argument so poisoned the trial well that a new trial is required. See Manning, 23 F.3d at 574. The government made an argument based on the limited evidence regarding Gulf. The defense was able to argue the counter position, pointing out the lack of evidence, and did so.