Opinion ID: 203644
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prohibited person

Text: Alternatively, Marceau argues that he is not a prohibited person within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(ii)(I). The Guidelines define prohibited person as any person described in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) or 922(n). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n. 3 (2007). The district court found that Marceau fit within § 922(g)(3), which bars firearm possession by a person who is an unlawful user of ... any controlled substance. We agree. In order to avoid unconstitutional vagueness, courts have held that the critical term unlawful user requires a temporal nexus between the gun possession and regular drug use. United States v. Edwards, 540 F.3d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir.2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 964, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2009). Refined further, an unlawful user is one who engages in regular use over a long period of time proximate to or contemporaneous with the possession of the firearm. United States v. McCowan, 469 F.3d 386, 392 n. 4 (5th Cir.2006). The district court was presented with ample evidence to support its finding that Marceau was a prohibited person. For example, the PSR noted that Marceau explained that even after his stay at a drug treatment facility, he was unable to remain drug-free, and that the MMS robbery was the first step in a plan to sell the stolen firearms to get money for drugs. In addition, an FBI agent testified that Tamiso told him that Marceau had smoked marijuana daily in the days before the robbery, stopping only when he exhausted his supply. Finally, the record shows that Vermont officials recognized Marceau's name from two marijuana-related arrestsone before and one after the instant robbery. Marceau makes three arguments in response to this record evidence. First, he states that the record did not establish regular drug use after he completed the treatment program. The record includes, however, his admissions that he was unable to remain drug-free after his treatment and that he stole the weapons to raise money to buy drugs. Next, Marceau argues that the two arreststhe first for illegal alcohol consumption during which he was found in possession of marijuana, and the other for possession of marijuana and scales should be discounted because neither instance resulted in a probation revocation or positive urinalysis. At most, he claims, this evidence creates an inference of possession, and not use. The district court was free to rely upon Marceau's marijuana possession, in combination with the other evidence, to draw an inference of use. See e.g., United States v. Mack, 343 F.3d 929, 933-34 (8th Cir.2003) (evidence of defendant's possession of small, user quantity of marijuana, where arresting officer smelled marijuana and where defendant had previously been in a dispute over marijuana, is sufficient to support conviction for unlawful use). Finally, the district court was not required to reject the FBI agent's testimony as hearsay, as urged by Marceau, because the Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings; a district court may consider any relevant evidence so long as the evidence `has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.' United States v. Green, 426 F.3d 64, 66 (1st Cir.2005)( quoting U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)). Whether any particular evidence is sufficiently reliable is within the broad discretion of the district court. Id. We detect no abuse of that discretion here. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court's finding that Marceau was a prohibited person within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(ii)(I), and therefore the eight-level enhancement under section 2K2.1(4) was properly applied to him.