Opinion ID: 3065942
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Randall has a majority opinion

Text: Marks v. United States held that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that in some cases “[t]his test is more easily stated than applied,” and that under certain circumstances it may not be “useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility.” Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1994) (recognizing that where the application of the Marks test to a prior splintered decision “ha[d] so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts that ha[d] considered it,” there is reason to reexamine that prior decision). Likewise, we have also held that the Marks standard is not always helpful, and should only be applied “where one opinion can be meaningfully regarded as narrower than another and can represent a common denominator of the Court’s reasoning.” United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1140 (9th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing other circuits that have held similarly), amended by 416 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2005). This standard requires that the narrowest opinion is actually the “logical subset of other, broader opinions,” such that it “embod[ies] a position implicitly approved by at least five Justices who support the judgment.” Id. (quoting King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc)); see also United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that Marks requires us to find a “legal standard which, when applied, will necessarily produce results with which a majority of the Court from that case would agree”). If there is no such narrow opinion, “the LAIR v. BULLOCK 12681 only binding aspect of a splintered decision is its specific result.” Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d at 1140. Randall is the epitome of a splintered decision. Although six Justices ultimately concurred in the judgment, the case generated six opinions, four of which were required for the six Justices to concur in the judgment. Since the opinions of both Justices Kennedy and Thomas would revisit—or, as preferred by Justices Thomas and Scalia, overrule Buckley, Justice Breyer’s plurality decision offers the narrowest rationale in support of the judgment. See Randall, 548 U.S. at 265 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Viewed within the legal universe we have ratified and helped create, the result the plurality reaches is correct; given my own skepticism regarding that system and its operation, however, it seems to me appropriate to concur only in the judgment.”); id. at 265-66 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Although I agree with the plurality that [the Vermont contribution limit statute] is unconstitutional, I disagree with its rationale for striking down that statute. . . . I continue to believe that Buckley provides insufficient protection to political speech, the core of the First Amendment. . . . [S]tare decisis should pose no bar to overruling Buckley and replacing it with a standard faithful to the First Amendment.”). It cannot be said, however, that Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion represents a “common denominator of the Court’s reasoning,” enjoying the assent of five Justices. Justices Thomas and Scalia would “overrule Buckley and subject both the contribution and expenditure restrictions of [the Vermont statute] to strict scrutiny, which they would fail.” Id. at 267 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Thus, further consideration of Justice Kennedy’s position is irrelevant for our purposes, since at most Justice Breyer’s rationale could only garner the assent of four Justices. If Justice Kennedy’s position were relevant to this inquiry, however, his “skepticism regarding that system and its operation,” coupled with his previously asserted criticism of Buckley, strongly suggests that 12682 LAIR v. BULLOCK only three Justices assented to Justice Breyer’s rationale. Id. at 265 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 409-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“I would overrule Buckley . . . . The First Amendment ought to be allowed to take its own course without further obstruction from the artificial system we have imposed. It suffices here to say that the law in question does not come even close to passing any serious scrutiny.”). This analysis is consistent with our previous recognition— a holding binding upon this Court, see Miller, 335 F.3d at 892-93—that no position in Randall garnered the support of more than three Justices. Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1127 & n.5 (explaining that “Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion announced the judgment of the Court,” so “we follow the plurality opinion as persuasive authority, though not a binding precedent” since “Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion was [only] joined by two justices, one in full and one in part” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The only binding aspect of Randall, then, is its judgment, striking down the Vermont contribution limit statute as unconstitutional. Since Randall is otherwise only persuasive, in this context it could not have altered the law as previously dictated by such cases as Buckley and Shrink Missouri, the law we expressly relied upon in Eddleman. 2. Whether Justice Breyer’s opinion alters Buckley Even if Justice Breyer’s plurality did represent a majority opinion under Marks, however, Randall is not irreconcilable with the principles of Buckley and Shrink Missouri. In Miller v. Gammie, sitting en banc, we considered the question of “when a three-judge panel may reexamine normally control- ling circuit precedent in the face of an intervening United States Supreme Court decision.” Miller, 335 F.3d at 892. We held that “where the reasoning or theory of our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority, a three-judge panel should consider itself bound by the later and controlling authority, LAIR v. BULLOCK 12683 and should reject the prior circuit opinion as having been effectively overruled.” Id. at 893. We further held that “the issues decided by the higher court need not be identical in order to be controlling.” Id. at 900. We made it clear that this standard applies not only to three-judge panels but also to dis- trict courts within this circuit. Id. at 899 (describing prior circuit decisions effectively overruled based on higher intervening authority as “no longer binding on district judges and three-judge panels of this court”); see also Day v. Apo- liona, 496 F.3d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The Miller standard is thus not met, and we (and the district court) are bound by our earlier precedent.”). Since Miller, we have elaborated on this standard. Recently, in In re Flores, we explained that “we are bound by our prior precedent if it can be reasonably harmonized with the intervening authority.” In re Flores, 692 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2012). In that case, we explained that under Miller, we were compelled to defer to prior circuit precedent because (1) the “overall analytical framework” of the intervening Supreme Court case was “consistent with our overall analytical approach” in prior circuit precedent, id. at 1030-31, and (2) the specific application of that framework in the intervening Supreme Court case did not mandate a result in the prior case in conflict with the decision rendered by this Court in that case. Id. at 1030-38. As Flores’ first consideration suggests, “Miller v. Gammie . . . instructs us to focus on the reasoning and analysis in support of a holding, rather than the holding alone.” United States v. Lindsey, 634 F.3d 541, 550 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Miller, 335 F.3d at 900 (citing Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1177 (1989)) (favorably discussing Justice Scalia’s assertion in a law review essay that lower courts are bound by higher courts’ “mode of analysis,” not just their holdings). Although we should consider the intervening authority’s reasoning and analysis, as long as we can apply our prior cir12684 LAIR v. BULLOCK cuit precedent without “running afoul” of the intervening authority, we must do so. United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012). It is not enough for there to be “some tension” between the intervening higher authority and prior circuit precedent, id. at 1140-41, or for the intervening higher authority to “cast doubt” on the prior circuit precedent, United States v. Delgado-Ramos, 635 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2011). The intervening higher precedent must be “clearly inconsistent” with the prior circuit precedent. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1141. This is a “high standard.” DelgadoRamos, 635 F.3d at 1239. [3] Applying these principles here, it is obvious that even if Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion were binding on this court, Randall is not “clearly irreconcilable” with Eddleman. Miller, 335 F.3d at 893. On its face, Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion does not purport to change the state of the law but expressly looked to Buckley and its progeny: “Over the last 30 years, in considering the constitutionality of a host of different campaign finance statutes, this Court has repeatedly adhered to Buckley’s constraints . . . .” Randall, 548 U.S. at 242 (opinion of Breyer, J.); see id. at 246 (“[W]e begin with Buckley.”). Indeed, the Breyer opinion specifically found that “[s]ince Buckley, the Court has consistently upheld contribution limits.” Id. at 247. Although the Court ultimately struck down Vermont’s contribution limits, it did so consistent with the principles announced in Buckley. If anything, Randall’s plurality only clarified and reinforced Buckley and its progeny. In Randall, Justice Breyer observed that Buckley “general[ly] approv[ed] of statutes that limit campaign contributions,” as long as the statute could demonstrate a “sufficiently important interest.” Id. at 246-47. The importance of Randall, then, was that the plurality affirmed Buckley, while at the same time showing that Buckley was not a rubberstamp. Other courts and scholars have LAIR v. BULLOCK 12685 concluded that Randall is an application of Buckley, not a repudiation.3 As Justice Breyer wrote, Buckley requires that contribution limits not “prevent candidates from ‘amassing the resources necessary for effective [campaign] advocacy.’ ” Id. at 248 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21) (alteration in Randall). He also emphasized that contribution limits cannot “magnify the advantages of incumbency to the point where they put challengers to a significant disadvantage.” Id.; see also Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 403-04 (Breyer, J., concurring). But, as Justice Breyer said, “we have ‘no scalpel to probe’ each possible contribution level,” so the Court “cannot determine with any degree of exactitude the precise restriction necessary to carry out the statute’s legitimate objectives.” Randall, 548 U.S. at 248 (opinion of Breyer, J.) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30). Accordingly, “the legislature is better equipped to make such empirical judgments.” Id. Randall reaffirmed Buckley’s recognition that such deference to the legislature has a limit, that after Buckley there is a “lower bound.” Id. at 248-49. 3 See, e.g., McNeilly v. Land, 684 F.3d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that Randall “[a]ppl[ied] Buckley” in analyzing Vermont’s contribution limit); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 291 (4th Cir. 2008) (describing Randall as affirming principles laid out in Buckley in discussing a North Carolina contribution limit); Allison R. Hayward, The Per Curiam Opinion of Steel: Buckley v. Valeo as Superprecedent? Clues from Wisconsin and Vermont, 2006 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 195, 196 (describing Randall as “declin[ing] to rework Buckley v. Valeo’s holding”); Jason B. Frasco, Note, Full Public Funding: An Effective and Legally Viable Model for Campaign Finance Reform in the States, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 733, 742 (2007) (“[W]ith respect to the contribution limits, the plurality again found the principles in Buckley to be controlling.”); Aimee Priya Ghosh, Comment, Disrobing Judicial Campaign Contributions: A Case for Using the Buckley Framework to Analyze the Constitutionality of Judicial Solicitation Bans, 61 Am. U. L. Rev. 125, 140 (2011) (“[T]he Court recognized that Buckley established the existence of a ‘lower bound’ under which a regulation would be so restrictive as to violate the First Amendment.”). 12686 LAIR v. BULLOCK Randall’s discussion of “danger signs” and the plurality’s subsequent analysis of “five sets of considerations” did not present a new test for analyzing contribution limits; rather, this discussion only explained a mode for determining whether the limits were “narrowly tailored” under Buckley. Id. at 249-262. Randall stands as a warning to lower courts that Buckley does not license them to approve any contribution limitation that professes an anti-corruption rationale; instead, lower courts must carefully analyze statutes to ensure that they are narrowly tailored. Id. at 249-50. We took such a careful approach in Eddleman. As such, the “overall analytical framework” in Eddleman is in harmony with Randall. In Eddleman, we began with Buckley’s premise that contribution limits are constitutional as long as they do not prevent candidates from “amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1091 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21). We noted that such restrictions “are subject to the ‘closest scrutiny’ ” and must be “closely drawn.” Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25). We reviewed the Court’s post-Buckley opinions and summarized the principles to be derived therefrom.4 3. Whether Eddleman’s analysis is consistent with Randall’s analysis Even if we thought Randall altered Buckley in some way, our decision in Eddleman considered the same issues that 4 We wrote: The bottom line is this: After Buckley and Shrink Missouri, state campaign contribution limits will be upheld if (1) there is adequate evidence that the limitation furthers a sufficiently important state interest, and (2) if the limits are “closely drawn”—i.e., if they (a) focus narrowly on the state’s interest, (b) leave the contributor free to affiliate with a candidate, and (c) allow the candidate to amass sufficient resources to wage an effective campaign. Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092. LAIR v. BULLOCK 12687 were important in Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion. The State of Montana has made a strong showing that Randall would not have mandated a different result in Eddleman.
Justice Breyer’s opinion in Randall identified four “danger signs” to look for in a campaign contribution statute: “(1) The limits are set per election cycle, rather than divided between primary and general elections; (2) the limits apply to contributions from political parties; (3) the limits are the lowest in the Nation; and (4) the limits are below those we have previously upheld.” Id. at 268 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (listing Justice Breyer’s “danger signs”). We considered, in some form, each of these “danger signs” in Eddleman. First, we found that the Montana contribution limits “apply to ‘each election in a campaign,’ [so,] the amount an individual may contribute to a candidate doubles when the candidate participates in a contested primary.” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1088. By comparison, Vermont’s limits applied to a “twoyear general election cycle.” Randall, 548 U.S. at 238. Second, although Eddleman did not specifically deal with the limit on campaign contributions by political parties, there was no need to do so, because in Montana the aggregate contribution limits for political parties is much higher than the individual and political committee contribution limits. See Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094 (“[W]hile decreasing PAC and individual contributions, [Montana’s contribution limit statute] simultaneously increased the amount of money political parties may contribute to a candidate, almost doubling the amount that may be contributed in some races.”); see also Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-216(3). In this regard, Montana’s statute stands in stark contrast with Vermont’s, which applied the same low contribution limit to individuals, PACs, and political parties alike. Randall, 548 U.S. at 238-39. 12688 LAIR v. BULLOCK Third, we acknowledged that Montana’s limits were “some of the lowest in the country,” but also observed that this was “unsurprising in light of the fact that Montana is one of the least expensive states in the nation in which to mount a political campaign.” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1095. As Randall shows, Montana retains some of the lowest contribution limits in the nation, but it is not the lowest, a distinction that belonged to Vermont. See Randall, 548 U.S. at 250-51.5 Fourth, while Eddleman did not specifically compare Montana’s contribution limits with other instances where the Court has upheld a contribution limit as constitutional, we did compare the change in Montana’s total campaign spending with other instances where the Court had upheld limits that involved greater decreases in total campaign spending. Eddleman, 434 F.3d at 1094 (“Indeed, the Shrink Missouri Court upheld contributions limits despite a decrease of more than 50% in total spending in Missouri elections, nearly twice the decrease present here.”). We also considered that there are “provision[s] preventing incumbents from using excess funds from one campaign in future campaigns. Such provision[s] keep incumbents from building campaign war chests and gaining a fundraising head start over challengers.” Id. at 1095. We stressed that, in the end analysis, it is not the dollar amount that is critical, it is 5 The district court appears to read Randall’s “danger signs” as condemning Montana’s contribution limits. Opinion and Order at 28 (concluding without analysis that Montana’s limits violate Randall’s “danger signs” merely because “the U.S. Supreme Court has previously observed that Montana’s limits, like Vermont’s former limits, are among the lowest in the country”). This reading of Randall is flawed. Randall referred to Montana’s contribution limits—along with those of Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, and South Dakota—only as a method for illustrating that Vermont’s limits raised one “danger sign” and solidifying Vermont’s status as an outlier among other states with regards to contribution limits. Randall, 548 U.S. at 250-51. Nothing in Randall even hints that Montana’s limits are unconstitutional. LAIR v. BULLOCK 12689 whether a candidate can amass the resources necessary to mount an effective campaign, id., a position in harmony with Randall, see 548 U.S. at 248-49. Thus, all of Randall’s “danger signs” were considered in one form or another. Most importantly, and consistent with Randall, our decision in Eddleman “review[ed] the record independently and carefully with an eye toward assessing the statute’s ‘tailoring.’ ” Id. at 249. We think Eddleman took ample account of the “danger signs” identified in Randall.
Aside from the four “danger signs,” our decision in Eddleman addressed broadly what Justice Breyer called “five sets of considerations.” Id. at 261. The five considerations were: (1) Whether the “contribution limits will significantly restrict the amount of funding available for challengers to run competitive campaigns”; (2) whether “political parties [must] abide by exactly the same low contribution limits that apply to other contributors”; (3) how “volunteer services” are treated; (4) whether “contribution limits are . . . adjusted for inflation”; and (5) whether there exists “any special justification that might warrant a contribution limit so low or so restrictive.” Id. at 253-61. In Eddleman, we addressed each of these considerations in some way. (1). With respect to the first consideration, whether the limits restrict challengers, the Court in Randall considered statistical analyses relevant to discerning “the critical question . . . [, i.e., whether] a candidate running against an incumbent officeholder [can] mount an effective challenge.” Id. at 255. The Court noted that it emphasized the competitiveness of races because it was a proxy for the relative ability of a challenger to overcome the advantages of incumbency. Id. In Eddleman, we recognized the importance of considering “all dollars likely to be forthcoming in a campaign, rather 12690 LAIR v. BULLOCK than the isolated contribution, and . . . consider[ed] factors such as whether the candidate can look elsewhere for money, the percentage of contributions that are affected, the total cost of a campaign, and how much money each candidate would lose.” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094 (internal citations omitted). We repeatedly emphasized that the mere fact that a candidate could have raised more money without the limits was not the relevant inquiry; rather, the issue was whether the limit prevented a campaign from being effective. Id. at 1095 (“[A]part from bald, conclusory allegations that their campaigns would have been more effective had they been able to raise more money, none of the witnesses offered any specifics as to why their campaigns were not effective.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). We found that “Montana candidates remain able to mount effective campaigns.” Id. (describing candidates who claimed the limits prevented effective campaigns but some of which raised more money after the limits were in place and another who won with a large surplus of campaign funds). Additionally, even though the contribution limits restrict the total amount of funds raised, candidates were still able to raise funds “well within the range of money needed to run an effective . . . campaign.” Id. at 1094-95. Specific to the Court’s concern with challengers to incumbency, we discussed provisions that increased the ability of challengers to overcome the effects of incumbency. First, we pointed out that “§ 13-37-216 also contains a provision preventing incumbents from using excess funds from one campaign in future campaigns.” Id. at 1095. Second, we found that “the average gap between the total amount of money raised by incumbents and challengers for all legislative races was only $65.00 per race,” so there was almost no difference between incumbents and challengers in the amount of money they raised. Id. Third, relying on Buckley and Shrink Missouri, we suggested that there was no evidence that Montana’s limitations allowed incumbents to leverage their incumbency unfairly against their challengers. Id. at 1095-96. LAIR v. BULLOCK 12691 The district court did not look to our opinion in Eddleman. Instead, it conducted its own inquiry. For example, it compared the Vermont limits for state senate and house with those of Montana and concluded that Montana’s were lower. Opinion and Order at 29. We think the district court did not account for one key difference between Vermont and Montana. While Vermont’s contribution limits apply to a “twoyear general election cycle,” Randall, 548 U.S. at 238-39, Montana’s limits apply to “each election,” Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-216(1)(a), meaning that if there is a contested primary, the district court has understated Montana’s limits by half. See Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1088 (“[T]he amount an individual may contribute to a candidate doubles when the candidate participates in a contested primary.”). In other words, if there is a primary, Montana’s limit for the state legislature is $320, which is greater than Vermont’s limit for state senate ($300) and much higher than its limit for state house ($200). Additionally, we are concerned that the evidence the district court received and credited—which because of our time constraints, the parties have not briefed and we have not examined as thoroughly as we ordinarily would like—does not adequately account for the revenues actually available to candidates. For example, Montana only requires that the identity of donors contributing $35 or more, and their aggregate amount of contributions, be disclosed. Mont. Code Ann. § 1337-229(2)-(3). While a candidate is required to disclose an “itemized account of proceeds that total less than $35 from a person,” the donor’s identity is not disclosed and therefore does not count against an individual’s aggregate contribution limit. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-229(8). Thus, it is likely that Montana’s limits understate the actual contributions made to the candidates. These are matters that, undoubtedly, would benefit from briefing and oral argument but raise serious concerns in our minds whether there is sufficient evidence to overrule Eddleman.6 6 Neither the State of Montana, nor the appellees, had access to the district court’s Opinion and Order when the motion and opposition were filed. The State of Montana, however, had the benefit of the district court’s Opinion and Order before filing its reply the next day. 12692 LAIR v. BULLOCK (2). With respect to the second consideration, the limits on political parties, the Court was concerned that Vermont’s statute required “that political parties abide by exactly the same low contribution limits that apply to other contributors.” Randall, 548 U.S. at 256. The cumulative restrictions imposed by the Vermont statute “severely inhibit[ed] collective political activity by preventing a political party from using contributions by small donors to provide meaningful assistance to any individual candidate,” including a party’s ability to engage in “coordinated spending on advertising, candidate events, voter lists, mass mailings, even yard signs.” Randall, 548 U.S. at 256-58. In contrast to Vermont’s statute, we noted, in Eddleman, that in Montana political parties were not subject to the same low contribution limit as individuals. Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094 (discussing the increase in amount that can be contributed by political parties, “almost doubling the amount that may be contributed in some races”). Despite the obvious differences between Vermont and Montana, the district court concluded that the Montana statute was inconsistent with this factor because “political committees [were held] to the same contribution limits as individuals” and this “inhibit[s] the associational rights of political committees and, consequently, a full and robust exchange of views.” Opinion and Order at 32 (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead of addressing Randall’s concern with limits on political parties, the district court focused on limits on political committees under § 13-37-216. Political committees are not political parties. Political committees—including PACs and local party affiliates—are subject to the same limits as individuals. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-216(3). “Political party organizations,” however, are exempted from this restriction under the statute and subject to a much higher cap. For example, individuals and political committees may not contribute more than $630 to a gubernatorial candidate, but a political party organization can contribute up to $22,600. Id. LAIR v. BULLOCK 12693 § 13-37-216(1)(a), (3)(a), as adjusted by Admin. R. Mont. § 44.10.338(1)(a), (2)(a). Furthermore, the district court’s opinion fails to acknowledge that even political committees remain free to spend as much money as they desire promoting a candidate. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012). As we pointed out, the PACs have many other ways “to convey their support.” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094. They just cannot give the money directly to the candidate. Thus, the district court’s analysis on this point is inapposite; under the Montana statute political committees remain free to participate in a “full and robust exchange of views.” (3). The third consideration is the treatment of volunteer services. Montana’s scheme, however, is far more permissive than Vermont’s statute. In Randall, Vermont counted expenses incurred during the provision of volunteer services as contributions. Randall, 548 U.S. at 259-60. As we explained, “the [Montana] statute in no way prevents PACs[, and individuals,] from affiliating with their chosen candidates in ways other than direct contributions, such as donating money to a candidate’s political party, volunteering individual members’ services, sending direct mail to their supporters, or taking out independent newspaper, radio, or television ads to convey their support.” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094. Moreover, we noted that nothing prevents “individuals and PACs [from] . . . engag[ing] in independent political expression, to associate actively through volunteering their services, and to assist in a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting the candidates and committees with financial resources.” Id. at 1096. The district court concluded that Montana treats volunteer services in the same manner as Vermont, “not exclud[ing] the expenses . . . volunteers incur, such as travel expenses, in the course of campaign activities.” Opinion and Order at 34 12694 LAIR v. BULLOCK (internal quotation marks omitted). This conclusion appears to be error. Testimony provided by the plaintiff ’s own witnesses —as well as a stipulation of the parties—established that expenses incurred by volunteers are not considered contributions under Montana law. Tr. at 50-54, 74-76, 154-56 (Sept. 12, 2012). Even more importantly, other testimony established that an individual, political party, or political committee can actually hire staff for a candidate, and that would not be considered a contribution. Id. (4). The fourth consideration is whether the limits are adjusted for inflation. Vermont’s limits were not. Randall, 548 U.S. at 261. As we noted in Eddleman, the Montana contribution limits are regularly adjusted for inflation. Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1089. The district court recognized that Montana adjusts its limits for inflation, but suggested that the Consumer Price Index (“CPI”) is a flawed method of accounting for inflation. Opinion and Order at 35-36. The district court made that determination on the basis of near anecdotal testimony that the cost of pencils, yard signs, postage, and fuel have increased faster than the CPI. Id. at 13. The district court also noted that the CPI does not account for certain inputs that an effective campaign requires. Id. at 35. This is too thin a reed to cling to in order to overturn our decision in Eddleman. We do not doubt that the CPI fails to capture all changes in campaign costs. It is, however, a wellrecognized mechanism for adjusting for inflation, and we have no indication that the Supreme Court intended that states do anything else to “index limits.” Randall, 548 U.S. at 261. We continue to believe that Montana’s statute will survive the Court’s analysis in Randall. If we were to examine the district court’s findings, its methodology would raise a number of questions. For example, the district court apparently did not consider whether pencils, yard signs, postage, and fuel fall within the underlying basket of goods used to calculate the LAIR v. BULLOCK 12695 CPI, nor did it question whether other campaign costs—such as office space—may have gone down during the same period. Further, even as we acknowledge that campaign costs have gone up over time, so have contribution limits risen since their inception in 1994, yet the district court made no attempt to compare the overall increase in the contribution limits with the overall increases in campaign inputs that were the subject of testimony at trial. (5). The fifth and final consideration is a catchall: Whether there are any “special justification[s]” for the limits that “bring about . . . serious associational and expressive problems.” Randall, 548 U.S. at 261. We identified at least one justification for why Montana’s contribution limits are among the lowest in the nation: “[T]he State of Montana remains one of the least expensive states in the nation in which to run a political campaign.” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094. Thus, unlike Randall, where Vermont’s justification was based solely upon the prevention of corruption, Montana specifically justified the low limits based on the relative inexpense of campaigning in Montana, a state where, for many offices, “campaign[ing] primarily [takes place] door-to-door, and only occasionally [through] advertis[ing] on radio and television.” Id. [4] Most importantly, in Eddleman, after considering all of the factors deemed important by Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion in Randall, we held that the Montana contribution limit does not prevent candidates from amassing the resources necessary to run an effective, competitive campaign. Id. at 1094-95, 1098. We cannot conclude that Randall is, in any material way, inconsistent with our analysis in Eddleman. Therefore, under Miller, we remain bound by Eddleman.7 7 We also note that the district court failed to perform a careful severability analysis. Instead, it relied on the Court’s severability analysis of a quite different Vermont statute—leveraging what might be the only offensive part of this statute to strike down the entire statute, the majority of which has not even been effectively challenged. See Opinion and Order at 36-37. 12696 LAIR v. BULLOCK