Opinion ID: 2356724
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the interest conveyed by the 1870 railroad grant is irrelevant in this case

Text: ¶ 29 Weiser alternatively argues that even if the 1870 Railroad Grant was valid, it conveyed merely a right of way or easement over the Property, not an interest in fee simple as the district court concluded. Thus he argues that his predecessor-in-interest was able to receive the remaining fee interest by patent. We review the district court's conclusions of law, including interpretations of statute, for correctness. See Reese v. Tingey Constr., 2008 UT 7, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 605. ¶ 30 The character of the 1870 Railroad Grant has not previously been determined. However, similar railroad land grants have received much attention by the United States Supreme Court and many other state and federal jurisdictions. Interpreting nearly identical language as that of the 1870 Railroad Grant, the Supreme Court explained that the term right of way as used in federal railroad grants prior to 1871 is `used to describe that strip of land which railroad companies take upon which to construct their roadbed.' That is, the land itselfnot a right of passage over it. New Mexico v. U.S. Trust Co., 172 U.S. 171, 182, 19 S.Ct. 128, 43 L.Ed. 407 (1898) (quoting Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U.S. 1, 44, 11 S.Ct. 243, 34 L.Ed. 843 (1891)) (emphasis omitted). Five years later, the Supreme Court determined that an 1864 railroad right-of-way grant was of a limited fee, made on an implied condition of reverter in the event that the company ceased to use or retain the land for the purpose for which it was granted. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267, 271, 23 S.Ct. 671, 47 L.Ed. 1044 (1903). It is upon this language that the district court relied in concluding that Union Pacific's interest was of a limited fee. However, in United States v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., the Court clarified its interpretation, holding that because the federal government reserved the subsurface mineral rights unto itself in the grants at issue, [t]he most that the `limited fee' cases decided was that the railroads received all surface rights to the right of way and all rights incident to a use for railroad purposes. 353 U.S. 112, 119, 77 S.Ct. 685, 1 L.Ed.2d 693 (1957). ¶ 31 Whether the 1870 Grant should receive similar treatment is unclear. Neither of the parties cited to Union Pacific Railroad Co., nor many of the subsequent cases. Further, the 1870 Grant does not explicitly exclude the subsurface mineral rights as did the grants at issue in Union Pacific Railroad Co. Id. at 113-14, 77 S.Ct. 685. However, we need not make the determination regarding the exact character of the 1870 Grant here. The subsurface rights in the Property are not at issue in this case; only the surface rights are affected by the parties' use of the Property. Based on the Supreme Court precedent discussed, it is clear that Union Pacific owns at the very least the surface rights to the right of way and all rights incident to a use for railroad purposes, Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. at 119, 77 S.Ct. 685, and at most a limited fee, Townsend, 190 U.S. at 271, 23 S.Ct. 671. Exactly where that interest lies along the spectrum is a question best answered in a case where that interest is at issue and the court may benefit from greater depth of briefing. ¶ 32 Further, even if Utah Central was granted less than the limited fee, the remaining interest would not have been conveyed to Tomlinson. Referring to right-of-way grants to railroad companies, the Supreme Court has said that the land forming [a] right of way ... [is] taken out of the category of public lands subject to pre-emption and sale, and the land department [is] therefore without authority to convey rights therein such that subsequent homesteaders (or pre-emptioners) acquire[] no interest in land within the right of way. Townsend, 190 U.S. at 270, 23 S.Ct. 671 (emphasis added). Accordingly, where Utah Central perfected its grant before Tomlinson perfected his claim, Tomlinson's patent was incapable of conveying any interest in the Property. Thus, whether the Grant was of a limited fee or something less is irrelevant. Weiser's claim of ownership fails.