Opinion ID: 2429047
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: constitutionality of resolution 34

Text: Appellant argues that Resolution 34 has the effect of unconstitutionally aiding private and parochial schools. He opines that if the Fiscal Court uses county funds to make it easier and cheaper to attend a private school than would otherwise be the case, the private and parochial schools' enrollment and tuition receipts will increase, and a larger audience will be exposed to the schools' religious message. Thus, the schools, and not just their students, will benefit from the Fiscal Court's subsidies. Appellant urges that under §§ 3, 5, 171, 184 and 189 of the Kentucky Constitution, the government has no power to financially assist religious institutions. The Appellees respond that the current plan is constitutional because the funds in question are not tax funds and are paid directly to the entities responsible for transporting the students rather than to the private or parochial schools themselves. Furthermore, Appellees argue that the Fiscal Court's decision to exclude public school children from the plan is not fatal because KRS 158.110 mandates that the Board of Education provide transportation to all public school children who do not live within a reasonable walking distance to the nearest school. Thus, Appellees conclude that public school children would never be the intended recipients under KRS 158.115. Finally, Appellees correctly point out that in Nichols v. Henry, supra , the Court did, in fact, uphold KRS 158.115 as constitutional on its face. Thus, the constitutionality of the statute having been previously established, the sole issue is whether the means adopted by Resolution 34 is a lawful route toward this legitimate and reasonable end. There is no question that the facts present in this case differ from those in Brady . Pursuant to Resolution 34, the transportation subsidy no longer provides that money shall be paid to any private or parochial school for transportation cost reimbursement. Rather, the transportation subsidies are paid directly to the individual local Board of Education operated transportation system of contracted bus and vehicle companies, with no funds passing into the hands of the private or parochial schools. This procedure is in direct accordance with KRS 158.115(2), which specifically states that the county may provide such transportation by means of local board of education operated transportation systems, transit authorities organized and operating pursuant to KRS Chapter 96A, local governmental mass transit systems, and individual contracted buses and vehicles. Further, the benefit provided under Resolution 34 goes directly toward the safety and welfare of elementary age school children and not into the accounts of non-public schools. We agree with the trial court that the present payment scheme is fundamentally different from that challenged in Brady . Also unlike the Brady plan, Resolution 34 no longer establishes a tuition ceiling as a requisite to eligibility for the transportation subsidy. As currently implemented, Resolution 34 merely requires that an application be submitted by the private or parochial school. We deem this to be a major distinction, in that a recipient school can no longer control the right to receive the subsidy solely by regulating the tuition charged. The recent decision of Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 138 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1997), liberalized the circumstances under which aid to parochial educational institutions is permitted under the United States Constitution. In Agostini , the United States Supreme Court lifted an injunction thereby allowing New York to use federal funds to provide educational services on the premises of parochial schools to those students who had difficulty achieving state student performance standards. The Court was swayed in large measure by the fact that the funds in question were available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a non-discriminatory basis. Id., 117 S. Ct. at 2014. A distinctive element to New York's program was that no funds designated for the program ever reach the coffers of religious schools. Id. at 2013. Resolution 34, similar to the program in Agostini , makes no specific reference to only parochial schools, and allocates no funds directly to any non-public schools. In Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 578 N.W.2d 602 (1998), the Wisconsin Supreme Court was asked to review the constitutionality of the amended Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) which permits fifteen percent of the student membership of the Milwaukee Public Schools to attend at no cost to the student any private school located in the City of Milwaukee, subject to certain eligibility requirements. Under the program, students are eligible if they reside in Milwaukee, attend public schools (or private schools in grades K-3) and meet certain income requirements (less than 1.75 times the Federal Poverty Level). Id. at 617. Beneficiaries are selected on a random basis from all students who apply and meet the criteria. Id. Under the plan, the state is required to pay the aid to each participating student's parent or guardian. Id. In upholding the constitutionality of the plan, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the amended MPCP does not violate the Establishment Clause because it has a secular purpose, it will not have the primary effect of advancing religion, and it will not lead to excessive entanglement between the State and participating sectarian private school. Id. at 611. The amended MPCP, therefore, places on equal footing options of public and private school choice, and vests power in the hands of parents to choose where to direct the funds allocated for their children's benefit. We are satisfied that the implementation of the provisions of the amended MPCP will not have the primary effect of advancing religion. Id. at 619. The Jackson Court further held that the amended MPCP did not violate the benefits clause of art. I, § 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution which provides, nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries. Id. at 620. The court opined that public funds may be placed at the disposal of third parties so long as the program on its face is neutral between sectarian and nonsectarian alternatives and transmission of funds is guided by the independent decisions of third parties. Id. at 621. In Brady, supra , we suggested a plan such as is set forth in Resolution 34 as an alternative to the impermissible direct payment to private schools. There is a fundamental difference between providing school transportation to nonpublic school children along with public school children through Fiscal Court appropriation to the board of education, and providing direct payment to selected eligible schools. Brady, supra, at 685. We are of the opinion that Resolution 34 is a legal means of providing safe transportation of children who attend non-public schools. This Court has previously adopted a child benefit rationale in which aid to parochial schools is constitutional as long as the aid provided flows directly and exclusively to the child and only indirectly, if at all, to the parochial school. Id. at 685. The holding in Nichols, supra , clearly recognizes that: [W]ith the hazards and dangers of the highway ..., and with our compulsory school attendance laws, applying to all children and being rigidly enforced, as they are, it cannot be said with any reason or consistency that ... legislation to provide our school children with safe transportation is not ... legislation for a public purpose. Neither can it be said that such legislation ... is in aid of a church, or of a private, sectarian, or parochial school, nor that it is other than what it is designed and purports to be ... legislation for the health and safety of our children, the future citizens of our state. Nichols, supra at 934-935. Resolution 34 in its intended and practical application provides safe transportation for elementary school children attending non-public schools. The children are clearly the primary beneficiaries of this subsidy. Any incidental benefit to private institutions educating the recipients of the transportation subsidy does not make the ordinance illegal. The fact that in a strained and technical sense the school might derive an indirect benefit from the enactment, is not sufficient to defeat the declared purpose and the practical and wholesome effect of the law. Id. 935. Under Resolution 34 any benefit to private and parochial schools is only incidental and, therefore, not unconstitutional. In Agostini, supra , the United States Supreme Court quoted the earlier decision of School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 393, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3228, 87 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1985), holding that aid which resulted in an effect that was `indirect, remote, or incidental' would be upheld, and would only be invalidated when the aid resulted in a direct and substantial advancement of the sectarian enterprise'. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2009. The funds allocated under Resolution 34 flow directly to the providers of transportation, providing only an indirect, remote or incidental effect on the nonpublic schools. The main effect is greater protection for the safety and welfare of the children that attend the schools. Furthermore, contrary to Appellant's assertions, nothing in the statutes or case law suggests that a fiscal court's subsidy must be allocated evenly between transportation for both public and non-public students or that it must necessarily include all children. The Fiscal Court under KRS 158.115 has the authority to provide school bus transportation subsidies for all students it deems by its discretion are in need of safer transportation. As explained in Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801 (1956) the clear history of KRS 158.115 and its supporting case law demonstrates the General Assembly's intent to allow the fiscal courts to subsidize the transportation of private school students, precisely because the local boards of education could not. Id. at 807. The Rawlings decision clearly supports the means adopted by Resolution 34 to partially subsidize the transportation of private school students by funds set aside by the Fiscal Court. In Brady, supra , this Court acknowledged that the use of fiscal funds for the transportation of non-public school children was constitutional. While we respect the reasons behind the decision of the Jefferson County Fiscal Court to selectively fund the budget of certain specified non-public schools to assist them in the payment of their transportation expense, we agree with the trial court that the funding here is fundamentally different from Nichols v. Henry , and Rawlings v. Butler, supra . These cases involved payment to the local board of education, a public institution, supplementing the local boards transportation system so that the transportation needs of students attending sectarian schools would be addressed within the concept of protecting `all' students `against the inclemency of the weather and from the hazards of present-day highway traffic'. Nichols v. Henry , as quoted supra. Brady, supra at 684. Further, the transportation of public school children is fully funded by the local school board. The funds available for public school transportation amount to over 24 million dollars. Resolution 34 only funds approximately 65 percent of the transportation expenses of children who attend non-public schools. Therefore, even with Resolution 34 allocating $480,000 to subsidize non-public school transportation, the level of safety is higher for those attending public schools than non-public schools. The purpose of Resolution 34 is to provide safety for non-public school children, since transportation for public school children is already fully provided by the local school board. Resolution 34 works toward the safety and welfare of all elementary school children of Jefferson County by providing supplementary funding of bus transportation for non-public elementary school students who would not otherwise have such protection. The transportation subsidy procedure of Resolution 34 clearly complies with the holding in Brady and is consistent with the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes. The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed. LAMBERT, C.J., COOPER, GRAVES, and WINTERSHEIMER, J.J., concur. JOHNSTONE, J., dissents by separate opinion in which STEPHENS, and STUMBO, J.J., join. STEPHENS, J., dissents by separate opinion in which JOHNSTONE, and STUMBO, J.J., join.