Opinion ID: 519270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: inflammatory closing argument.

Text: 48 As a final ground of error, appellant contends that appellee's counsel's improper, inflammatory closing arguments, left uncorrected by the trial court, deprived appellants of a fair trial. In his closing argument, appellee's counsel first discussed appellant's prior back condition (a hotly contested issue in this case) and then argued that the inconsistent testimony of the rehabilitation expert concerning whether appellant was competitively employable indicated that perhaps appellant had been manipulated in this litigation. 11 Appellant argues that there was no factual basis for appellee's counsel's inflammatory argument and it had no purpose other than to arouse resentment and prejudice in the jury. Appellant argues that the closing argument of appellee's counsel is a natural outgrowth of the district court's error of allowing inadmissible hearsay testimony, the letter, over objection. This issue was dealt with previously, above. 49 The standard of review in assessing whether the district court abused its discretion in overruling appellants' objection to defense counsel's closing argument was set forth in Vanskike v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 725 F.2d 1146, 1149 (8th Cir.1984) wherein this court held that: 50 Closing arguments are made under the direct control of the trial court. Argument of counsel is a procedural question to be determined by federal law (citations omitted). Under federal law, considerable discretion is given to the trial court to control arguments (citations omitted). The standard of review on appeal is clear. The district court is in a better position to determine whether prejudice has resulted from closing argument, and the appellate court will not disturb the district court's ruling unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Vanskike v. ACF Industries, Inc., 665 F.2d 188 (8th Cir.1981) (quoting McDonald v. United Airlines, Inc., 365 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.1966)). 51 Further, to constitute reversible error, statements made in oral arguments must be plainly unwarranted and clearly injurious. Vanskike v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 725 F.2d at 1149 (emphasis added). In this case, appellee's counsel's closing argument was supported by the evidence and the district court's overruling of appellants' objection thereto was not an abuse of discretion. 12 52 A fair and proper inference from the testimony of Mr. Kutchback regarding Mr. Nelson's statements, is that in 1983, two years after the occurrence, appellant, by and through his agent, Mr. Nelson, was thwarting any effort to secure employment for himself. Appellants' own expert testified that Mr. Nelson stated to him: We really don't want to set aside what we've been fortunate enough to obtain for this man. (Tr. 499-503). The inference from this statement is that appellant was not going to risk a finding of employability even if he were in fact employable. This inference is supported by the fact that appellant did not report to two of his treating physicians that he fell at appellee's premises and reported to Dr. Cole that he fell at another location. Indeed, there is ample evidence in the record to support appellee's counsel's characterization of these events during closing argument. 53 This court has held that argument describing the appellants' case as false and fraudulent is proper if facts supporting that conclusion are developed at trial. Sanden v. Mayo Clinic, 495 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.1974). Such closing argument is proper if supporting facts were developed at trial and the conclusions, if such evidence was believed, was at least a permissible one. Sanden v. Mayo Clinic, 495 F.2d at 227. Further, it is significant that appellants' counsel has not argued another interpretation of the evidence. 54 A careful examination of the closing argument in the instant case reflects that counsel for appellee merely summarized the facts and drew proper inferences therefrom. The evidence of possible fraud with regard to the circumstances of Mr. Kutchback's involvement with appellants' prior counsel is reinforced by the medical evidence developed during trial which clearly indicate there was some doubt as to whether appellant was ever injured on appellee's property. Indeed, the credibility of Mr. Kutchback was properly called into question during appellee's counsel's cross-examination. Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion to overrule appellants' objection to appellee's closing argument as ample supporting facts were developed at trial to support appellee's counsel's argument and the conclusion to be drawn therefrom, referenced in appellee's closing argument, is permissible. 55 Finally, appellants argue that it was improper for counsel for appellee to state to the jury that they should set the standard for the community when they return a verdict of no liability in the instant case. Specifically, appellee's counsel stated: 56 It's a difficult thing to do, but I'm asking you to do that, write no, and you send the message, I'm not only talking about this little courtroom with these people, I'm telling you that if this goes out, you set the standards for our community. You six people will set the standards in this case and the next case that's tried. These are the standards that are set, and I'm asking you to do the difficult thing, ladies and gentlemen, write down simply no on that verdict form (Tr. 747). 57 Appellant argues that the extreme resulting prejudice to appellant is plain as appellee's counsel linked this send a message argument to the jury's no answer to the special verdict controlling liability in the case. Appellant argues that this defeated the special verdict's purpose of focusing the jury's decision exclusively on the material facts of the case. Appellant argues that although appellant's counsel made no objection, the inexcusability of the plea and the resulting prejudice to appellants is so egregious as to constitute fundamental error and require reversal. 58 When considering alleged prejudicial effects of argument, this court has held: 59 It is fundamental that, this court will refuse to consider a question which is raised for the first time on appeal and which was never presented to nor passed upon by the district court. 60 Harris v. Zurich Insurance Co., 527 F.2d 528, 532 (8th Cir.1975) (citing to and quoting from Ludwig v. Marion Laboratories, Inc., 465 F.2d 114, 117 (8th Cir.1972)). 61 Appellants concede that no objection was made to appellee's closing argument and in an attempt to avoid this fundamental rule of trial and appellate procedure, have cited case law for the proposition that defense counsel's argument constitutes fundamental error. 13 Appellant's contention is without merit and the case law relied upon is inapplicable. At any rate, appellants failed to raise this alleged point of error at trial and have, therefore, waived any objection thereto. Harris v. Zurich Insurance Co., 527 F.2d at 532. 62 CONCLUSION. 63 In accord with this opinion, the judgment and the order of the district court are hereby affirmed.