Opinion ID: 670169
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-Conviction Counsel

Text: 10 DeVaughn argues further that his post-conviction counsel failed to investigate and raise issues of: (1) outrageous government conduct; (2) the validity of a prior felony conviction; (3) the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553 and Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(b); (4) sentencing; and (5) the effectiveness of DeVaughn's trial counsel. 11 DeVaughn cannot show that he was prejudiced by his appellate counsel's actions: DeVaughn personally submitted a motion to this court requesting that his direct appeal be voluntarily dismissed. Accordingly, he cannot show that the outcome of his appeal would have been different for his post-conviction counsel's actions. See Garcia, 997 F.2d at 1283. III Outrageous Government Conduct 12 DeVaughn contends that the government engaged in outrageous conduct that requires the reversal of his convictions. DeVaughn argues that the government's informant coerced DeVaughn into becoming involved in the drug conspiracy and that the informant initiated the investigation against DeVaughn as part of a scheme to collect fees from the Internal Revenue Service. This contention lacks merit. 2 13 A collateral challenge under section 2255 may not do service for an appeal. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982). In order to obtain collateral relief through section 2255, DeVaughn must show both (1) 'cause' excusing his double procedural default, and (2) 'actual prejudice' resulting from the errors of which he complains. See id.; United States v. Dunham, 767 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir.1985). DeVaughn fails the first prong of this test because he has not presented any justification for his failure to raise these issues at trial or on direct appeal. This procedural default bars DeVaughn from raising these issues now by way of section 2255. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 168. IV