Opinion ID: 1236953
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does Section 85300 Qualify as a Matter of Statewide Concern?

Text: (3a) Petitioners assert four grounds (and various subpoints) on which to base their claim that section 85300 addresses a statewide concern. In the Court of Appeal, and to a lesser extent in this court, petitioners assert that because the drafters of Proposition 73 and those who voted for the measure intended to create a statewide rule barring public funding of all election campaigns, section 85300 addresses a matter of statewide concern. In support, they cite dictum in Bishop v. City of San Jose, supra, 1 Cal.3d 56, 61-62, which, when read in isolation, suggests that intent of drafters or voters to treat a matter as a statewide concern renders the matter a statewide concern. [16] This point need not detain us long. (4) The assertion that a legislative body may define what is, and is not, a matter of statewide concern was rejected in Bishop v. City of San Jose itself: [T]he fact, standing alone, that the Legislature has attempted to deal with a particular subject on a statewide basis is not determinative of the issue as between state and municipal affairs ...; stated otherwise, the Legislature is empowered neither to determine what constitutes a municipal affair nor to change such an affair into a matter of statewide concern. (1 Cal.3d at p. 63; see also id., at p. 63, fn. 6 [disapproving contrary cases]; Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma (1979) 23 Cal.3d 296, 317 [152 Cal. Rptr. 903, 591 P.2d 1].) As we explained in CalFed, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1, our inquiry regarding statewide concern focuses not on the legislative body's intent, but on the identification of a convincing basis for legislative action originating in extramunicipal concerns, one justifying legislative supersession based on sensible, pragmatic considerations. ( Id., at p. 18.) In other words, we must be satisfied that there are good reasons, grounded on statewide interests, to label a given matter a statewide concern. (3b) Petitioners next cite County of Sacramento v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1990) 222 Cal. App.3d 687 [271 Cal. Rptr. 802] ( County of Sacramento ) for the proposition that campaign financing, and public financing of political campaigns in particular, is a matter of statewide concern. In County of Sacramento, supra, the court addressed a conflict between section 85300 and a charter county's regulation that, like charter section 313, provided for partial public funding of county election campaigns, and for corresponding spending limits on such campaigns. After noting that the constitutional provisions relating to charter counties (art. XI, §§ 3, 4) are less expansive than those relating to charter cities (art. XI, § 5) the court expressed doubt that charter counties have any authority over financing of county election campaigns. It concluded, it is self-evident that campaign financing of election contests, both state and local, is a matter of statewide concern and thus beyond the proper purview of [charter] county regulation. (222 Cal. App.3d at p. 690.) County of Sacramento, supra, is plainly distinguishable. There, the court construed constitutional provisions (relating to charter counties) that, in contrast to article XI, section 5, contain no general reservation of local autonomy, and no grant of plenary authority over local election matters. [17] The court's quoted conclusion is also highly questionable. It offered no convincing basis for its determination that public financing of election campaigns, and partial public funding of local election campaigns in particular, is necessarily a matter of statewide concern. Instead, the court simply asserted that public funding might, for some unarticulated reason, adversely affect the integrity of election contests by contributing to corruption or undue influence caused by financial interests. (222 Cal. App.3d at p. 692.) (5)(See fn. 18.) As explained below, we discern no basis for the conclusion that partial public funding of election campaigns would exacerbate those problems; indeed, the available evidence, and logic, suggest the opposite. [18] In essence, the County of Sacramento decision appears to rest almost exclusively on the ground that the drafters and voters intended to establish a single body of law pertaining to the financing of election campaigns. (222 Cal. App.3d at p. 692, italics added.) As we explained above, however, the voters' intent that a matter be treated on a statewide basis does not make that matter a statewide concern. Furthermore, the bare interest of uniformity in the manner of electing officials is no justification for treating public funding of municipal elections as a statewide concern, because, standing alone, it reveals no convincing basis for legislative action originating in extramunicipal concerns. ( CalFed, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 18.) (3c) Accordingly, we decline to accept County of Sacramento's holding that campaign financing, and in particular, partial public funding of local election campaigns, is a statewide concern, because neither the County of Sacramento court, nor petitioners or their amicus curiae herein, have established any convincing reason, grounded on statewide interests, supporting Proposition 73's attempt to treat public funding of election campaigns as a statewide concern. In their effort to identify a statewide concern, petitioners advance various arguments relating to fiscal matters. First, they point to ballot arguments advising the voters that too much money is being spent on political campaigns today. From these and other ballot statements, petitioners conclude the electorate was clearly informed Proposition 73's aim was reducing the costs of political campaigns through a system of contribution limitations and prohibition on public funding. In other words, they identify as a statewide concern the protection of the public fisc. We do not doubt that conservation of the state's limited funds is a statewide concern. But petitioners, understandably, do not attempt to justify the public funding ban on the ground that it is designed to protect state revenues, because a local public funding law that draws its revenues exclusively from local taxes would obviously not implicate a concern for protecting the state fisc. Instead, petitioners suggest there is a legitimate statewide concern in how local tax proceeds are expended. On this point, we agree with the Court of Appeal below, which observed, [W]e can think of nothing that is of greater municipal concern than how a city's tax dollars will be spent; nor anything which could be of less interest to taxpayers of other jurisdictions. [Charter section 313, subdivision (C)4] expressly limit[s] the monies to be utilized for campaign financing to city funds. Thus, payments received by the city from state or federal governmental agencies may not be used. These are the city taxpayers' own dollars and those taxpayers, together with their city council, have voted to utilize those dollars to help finance political campaigns for city elective offices as a central if not critical part of major political campaign and ethics reform. That Proposition 73 expressly dealt with this subject and intended that its prohibition extend to campaigns and candidates for local office does not convert the decision of the City of Los Angeles, to follow a different path with its own money, into a matter of statewide concern. Petitioners also advance two variations on the fiscal concern described above in their attempt to establish a statewide concern. They focus on ballot arguments by the proponents of Proposition 73 to the effect that public funding might: (i) divert scarce tax funds from local needs such as police protection, fire protection, or schools; and (ii) be made available to extremist candidates such as communists or members of the Ku Klux Klan with whom many voters disagree. We reject the first claim because it is merely a variation on the argument presented and rejected above, i.e., that the manner in which local tax proceeds are expended is a legitimate statewide concern. Moreover, it proves too much, by effectively negating the authority of charter cities to regulate any municipal affair that involves expenditure of funds. The second claim was not raised in petitioners' briefs in the Court of Appeal, and in their briefs before this court they devote merely two undeveloped paragraphs to it. Their treatment of this issue consists of the following: In their opening brief they state, The federal experience in matching Presidential campaign funds amply supports the fears expressed in the ballot arguments that extremist candidates could receive state and local... taxpayers' dollars to press their political agenda. On September 27, 1989, the Federal Election Commission reported that Lyndon H. LaRouche received $825,576.99 for the 1988 election cycle. In their reply brief petitioners complain that Respondents offer no rebuttal to the statewide concern expressed by the voters that candidates expressing extremist messages should be required to raise their own campaign contributions and not rely on public financing. (Italics added.) In other words, petitioners appear to assert there is a legitimate statewide concern regarding the funding of political campaigns of candidates who are extremists  i.e., outside the mainstream of political thinking. They fail, however, to explain what legitimate interest the state might have in discriminating against non-mainstream candidates who otherwise qualify for matching funds under the objective eligibility criteria for receiving such funds. [19] Accordingly, we reject this ground of alleged statewide concern. [20] Finally, petitioners assert: (i) the integrity of the electoral process is itself a statewide concern; (ii) section 85300's ban on public funding of election campaigns is reasonably calculated to resolve that statewide concern; and (iii) therefore section 85300 addresses a statewide concern. We have no reason to doubt petitioners' major premise; the integrity of the electoral process, at both the state and local level, is undoubtedly a statewide concern. The basis for this conclusion was well stated in an Attorney General opinion in 1960, in support of a conclusion that a charter city candidate is obligated to comply with statewide campaign financial disclosure provisions: Purity of all elections is a matter of statewide concern, not just a municipal affair.... The Legislature ... has found that it is in the public interest that full and detailed disclosure be made of all contributions and expenditures in election campaigns. It was pointed out that such disclosure had a strong tendency to discourage excessive contributions and corrupt contributions.... [¶] So important is the independence and integrity of all elected officials that the reporting of campaign receipts and disbursements is the concern of the entire state as well as of the local communities [citations]. Elected officials of the various municipalities chartered and non-chartered throughout the state of California exercise a substantial amount of executive and legislative power over the people of the state of California, and this legislation aimed at obtaining the election of persons free from domination by self-seeking individuals or pressure groups is a matter of statewide concern. (35 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 230, 231-232 (1960).) Although we accept petitioners' major premise, we question their minor premise, that section 85300's ban on public financing of election campaigns is reasonably calculated to address the statewide concern regarding the integrity of the electoral process. We will consider that point in part IV, B,2b, below. In conclusion, we reject petitioners' attempt to establish a statewide concern by pointing to: (i) the drafters' and voters' intent to establish a uniform rule pertaining to the financing of election campaigns; (ii) the asserted statewide interest in how local tax proceeds are spent; and (iii) an asserted legitimate statewide concern regarding the funding of political campaigns of candidates who are outside the mainstream of political thinking. We agree with petitioners however, that Proposition 73 may be read to identify the integrity of the electoral process as a legitimate statewide concern. We now address whether section 85300 is reasonably related and narrowly tailored to resolution of that statewide concern.