Opinion ID: 1233938
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motivation to Serve.

Text: A number of courts holding that motivation to serve is a prerequisite to any recovery in respondeat superior have held that employers cannot be held liable for the sexual acts of their employed therapists or doctors, since sexual acts, though perhaps motivated by desire, are not motivated by a desire to serve the employer. E.g., Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366, 370 (4th Cir.1984) (under South Carolina law, employer not liable for acts of therapist in inducing patient to have sex because therapist acted on own, and not in furtherance of employer's interest); Hoover v. University of Chicago Hospitals, 51 Ill. App.3d 263, 9 Ill.Dec. 414, 366 N.E.2d 925, 929 (1977) (hospital not liable under theory of respondeat superior because doctor's act of raping patient was not committed in furtherance of hospital's interests); Cosgrove v. Lawrence, 214 N.J. Super. 670, 520 A.2d 844, 846-48 (1986) (therapist's act of sex with patient was not motivated by desire to serve hospital), aff'd 215 N.J. Super. 561, 522 A.2d 483, 484-85 (1987) (affirmed on ground that act not of the type therapist was employed to perform). In contrast, other courts employing the motivation to serve analysis have concluded that employers may be held liable for the sexual behavior of their therapist employees towards their patients. One line of authority, exemplified by Judge Friendly's opinion in Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United States, holds that an employer may be held liable for employee acts that are foreseeable in light of the nature of the employment. 398 F.2d 167, 171-72 (2d Cir.1968) (motivation to serve test discarded in favor of foreseeability approach). [5] These courts reason that while the sexual acts themselves are purely self-serving, or caused by an unjustifiable loss of control by the aggressor, they have nonetheless been precipitated by the employee's performance of assigned duties. [6] In Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir.1986), a case factually similar to the instant litigation, the Ninth Circuit held that an employer could be liable on grounds of respondeat superior for the tortious sexual conduct of a therapist. Id. at 1371. The patient had sought mental health counseling from a social worker. Id. at 1364. A transference phenomenon similar to the one which is alleged to have occurred in the case at bar caused the patient to feel dependent upon the social worker. Id. at 1364-65. The social worker then began a sexual relationship with the patient, and this relationship was found to have caused the patient emotional problems so devastating that years later she attempted to commit suicide. Id. at 1364-65. The Simmons court held the social worker's employer liable in respondeat superior for its employee's misfeasance. Id. at 1371. The Ninth Circuit's analysis turned on whether the sexual conduct was actuated to further[] ... the employer's interest..., or benefit the employer. Id. at 1369. The court explained: In the instant case, Mr. Kammers was employed to provide mental health counseling and although he was not authorized to become sexually involved with his clients, that contact occurred in conjunction with his legitimate counseling activities... . .... ... The centrality of transference to therapy renders it impossible to separate an abuse of transference from the treatment itself. The district court correctly found that the abuse of transference occurred within the scope of Mr. Kammers' employment. Id. at 1369-70. Thus, the Simmons court rejected the employer's contention that the social worker's conduct was not performed in furtherance of the employer's interests. This reasoning persuades us that where tortious conduct arises out of and is reasonably incidental to the employee's legitimate work activities, the motivation to serve test will have been satisfied. Given the transference phenomenon that is alleged to have occurred in this case, we hold that it could reasonably be concluded that the resulting sexual conduct was incidental to the therapy. [7] We are not unmindful of the force of those authorities which hold that an employee's tortious sexual behavior is impelled by motivations other than a desire to further the interests of the employer. [8] However, we are of the view that the motivation to serve test, so construed, would too significantly undercut the enterprise liability basis of the respondeat superior doctrine we have previously articulated. In Fruit, we discussed this basis for the doctrine, saying, Scope of employment as a test for application of respondeat superior would be insufficient if it failed to encompass the duty of every enterprise to the social community which gives it life and contributes to its prosperity... . The basis of respondeat superior has been correctly stated as the desire to include in the costs of operation inevitable losses to third persons incident to carrying on an enterprise, and thus distribute the burden among those benefited by the enterprise. .... Although not usually enunciated as a basis for liability, in essence the enterprise may be regarded as a unit for tort as opposed to contract liability purposes. Employees' acts sufficiently connected with the enterprise are in effect considered as deeds of the enterprise itself. Where through negligence such acts cause injury to others it is appropriate that the enterprise bear the loss incurred. 502 P.2d at 140-41.