Opinion ID: 2512108
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Mamie Jackson.

Text: Mamie Jackson, defendant's aunt, testified as a prosecution witness. Among other things, Jackson indicated that she and other members of defendant's family lived only a few houses away from Sarah LaChapelle's home, that defendant sometimes lived there also, and that he arrived there in the late afternoon or early evening of April 18, 1988, wearing a red leather suit. The prosecutor asked whether, when defendant entered the house, everyone left. Jackson responded simply that when he entered, he went to see his mother in her room. When the prosecutor asked how long defendant was in the house, Jackson said she was busy ironing a dress for her daughter and did not time his stay. [30] The prosecutor then asked, Did you tell the police back in April 19th of 1988 that when [defendant] entered the house that everyone ran out because [defendant] is very violent? Defense counsel asserted, Objection, Your Honor. That's speculation, it's prejudicial, and that's The court interrupted to disagree, stating that the witness said she can't remember, so he's refreshing her memory. Counsel argued that the proper way to refresh Jackson's recollection was to have her read her statement to the police. The court responded, He can ask her if that refreshes her recollection that that's what she told the police. [¶] Is that what you told the police . . . Ms. Jackson? Jackson answered, I can't remember what I said now. In response to the prosecutor's further questions, Jackson confirmed that, earlier that morning, she had looked over a signed and initialed copy of her police statement. The following colloquy then occurred: [The Prosecutor]: As a matter of fact, [defendant] has kicked in the door in your house [¶] [Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. Objection, Your Honor. [¶] [The Prosecutor]:on three occasions? The court interrupted to ask the basis of the defense objection, and counsel responded Irrelevant. The court sustained the objection, admonished the jury to disregard the question, and cautioned the prosecutor to keep it in the ballpark. Defendant argues the prosecutor improperly attempted to use the device of refreshing Jackson's recollection to inject inadmissible and prejudicial bad character evidence of defendant's violent nature and uncharged violent acts into the guilt trial. He asserts the prosecutor's questions also violated the court's in limine decision to exclude evidence about defendant's violence against family members from both the guilt and penalty trials. As the People assert, defendant forfeited the latter argument by failing to object on that basis at trial. (E.g., People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2]; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40].) In any event, though we are persuaded the prosecutor committed misconduct, we see nothing serious enough to constitute, or contribute to, grounds for reversal. Though its reaction was delayed, the court ultimately made an appropriate response to the prosecutor's tactic. Under the circumstances, we conclude, its actions were adequate to obviate any prejudicial effect. At first, the court apparently thought the prosecutor was just trying to demonstrate that Jackson's vague trial testimony about defendant's presence at his grandmother's home in the hours before Sarah LaChapelle's nearby murder was inconsistent with her more contemporaneous police statement, and that she might be shading her testimony on the stand so as not to damage her nephew's case. In fact, the prosecutor's query whether the family had fled when defendant arrived did not ultimately produce a damaging answer from Jackson. Once the prosecutor made clear his true purpose by asking Jackson whether defendant had thrice kicked in the door of his grandmother's residencethus clearly attempting to inject extraneous evidence of defendant's propensity for violencethe court responded immediately. It prevented Jackson from answering, sustained the defense objection, instructed the jury to disregard the question, and admonished the prosecutor in front of the jury. Moreover, the court later instructed the jury that [i]f an objection was sustained to a question, do not guess what the answer might have been. Do not speculate as to the reason for the objection. Do not assume to be true any insinuation suggested by a question asked a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it enables you to understand the answer. We do not condone the prosecutor's improper tactics, but they produced no damaging evidence. Under the circumstances, we are confident the court's response was sufficient to cure any possible prejudice. In any event, in view of the very strong evidence of defendant's guilt, we are persuaded, by any standard, that this relatively brief incident did not contribute to the guilt verdict.