Opinion ID: 3032694
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis of the california child dependency

Text: STATUTE AS A CRIMINAL STATUTE Although the Ninth Circuit and numerous other courts have applied the Cabazon test to state gaming, driving, fireworks, and boxing laws, to name just a few, reconciling the many distinctions and finding a common, consistent thread of analysis is neither an easy task nor a productive one. In particular, applying the criminal versus regulatory test to Mary Doe’s case is unwieldy because it is problematic to compare a state’s child dependency statutory scheme to a criminal prosecution or to state gaming laws. Overall, California’s child dependency law and proceedings are aimed at promoting the best interests of the child, not at prohibiting conduct. As a result, the dependency proceedings do not fall within California’s broad Public Law 280 criminal jurisdiction over Indians. First and foremost, the statute does not prohibit specific conduct. Rather, the child dependency statute gives the state broad authority to remove children and terminate parental rights under specific circumstances. Granted, the state’s authority under the statute is often triggered if a child is a victim or at substantial risk of harm, abuse, or neglect. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 300(a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (j). Indeed, Jane was made a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to §§ 300 (b) and (d) because her mother had failed to adequately supervise and protect her from physical harm and because Jane was the alleged victim of sexual abuse from which her mother failed to protect her. But the statute is also triggered where abuse is not an issue, such as where the child is suffering from mental illness and the parents cannot address this special need. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 300(c). Likewise, subsection (h) makes a child a dependent of the juvenile court if “[t]he child has been freed for adoption by one or both parents for 12 months by either relinquishment or termination of parental rights or an adoption petition has not been granted.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code DOE v. MANN 8451 § 300(h). Both of these provisions demonstrate that abusive conduct or neglect is not necessarily a predicate to trigger California’s child dependency statute. While some of the circumstances that trigger the statute, such as child abuse, may constitute criminal violations under different parts of the California code, the statute itself does not require proof of a criminal violation nor does it prohibit such conduct.25 Moreover, the statute provides that it is not designed to infringe on the permitted activity of parenting, suggesting that the state law regulates but a small facet of the generally permitted activity of parenting.26 It is also important to underscore that the statute is geared toward protecting the best interests of the child rather than controlling behavior. For that reason, our precedent that looks to categorization of the conduct at issue does not easily fit this statute. Of course, one could say that the statute regulates parenting, which is a permitted activity. Or one could argue that the statute prohibits abuse. But this framework is not particularly transferable because the well-being of the child, not conduct of the parent, is the focus of the statute and no specific conduct is prohibited. 25 Unlike the Wisconsin civil statute at issue in In re Burgess that was found to be criminal for Public Law 280 purposes and permitted involuntary civil commitment of sexually violent people only if they had been convicted of a criminal offense, 665 N.W.2d 124, 132 (Wis. 2003), child dependency proceedings in California may be triggered regardless of whether the state pursues any criminal prosecution of a parent or a guardian for abuse or neglect. 26 “It is the intent of the Legislature that nothing in this section disrupt the family unnecessarily or intrude inappropriately into family life, prohibit the use of reasonable methods of parental discipline, or prescribe a particular method of parenting. Further, nothing in this section is intended to limit the offering of voluntary services to those families in need of assistance but who do not come within the description of this section.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 300. 8452 DOE v. MANN Although the criminal versus civil inquiry is “one of the statute’s intent and not simply its label,” Quechan Indian Tribe, 984 F.2d at 307, the fact that California’s child dependency statute is codified in the civil code is telling. More importantly, the California Supreme Court has affirmed that child dependency proceedings are civil in nature. See In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d 368, 384 (Cal. 1990) (quoting In re Mary S., 186 Cal. App. 3d 414, 418 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)).27 Just as significant, the proceedings are not punitive. “Dependency proceedings are civil in nature, designed not to prosecute the parent, but to protect the child.” In re Mary S., 186 Cal. App. 3d at 418; see also In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d at 384 (same); Collins v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d 47, 52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (“The purpose of these dependency proceedings is to protect and promote the welfare of the child, not to punish the parent.”). Consistent with the notion that the proceedings are neither criminal nor punitive, the procedural protections available in California’s child dependency proceedings lie somewhere between criminal and civil in nature. See Confederated Tribes of Colville, 938 F.2d at 148 (considering procedural elements in assessing whether the state scheme was criminal or civil). Although indigent parents have a statutory right to counsel similar to that afforded criminal defendants, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 317, the standard of proof required to remove a child from the parents’ custody is “clear and convincing evi27 “For many years, the courts characterized the nature of the dependency system inconsistently. Some viewed it as civil in nature. . . . Others viewed it as quasi-criminal in nature . . . . In 1990, however, the California Supreme Court described dependency proceedings as civil in nature, designed not to punish the parent but to protect the child . . . . While they may be civil in nature, these proceedings are significantly different from ordinary civil actions by reason of the way they affect the fundamental rights of parents and children.” Gary C. Seiser & Kurt Kumli, California Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure § 2.10[2] (2004). DOE v. MANN 8453 dence,” § 361(c),28 something more akin to the civil standard of preponderance of the evidence than to the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. Many other procedural protections associated with criminal proceedings are likewise unavailable: A parent at a dependency hearing cannot assert the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, since ‘the potential harm to children in allowing them to remain in an unhealthy environment outweighs any deterrent effect which would result from suppressing evidence’ unlawfully seized. Nor can the parent seek reversal on the grounds of incompetency of counsel. In re Malinda S., 51 Cal. 3d at 384-85 (quoting In re Mary S., 186 Cal. App. 3d at 418-19); see also Lois R. v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. App. 3d 895, 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (“[D]ependency proceedings are civil and have been conducted without strict adherence to all the formalities of a criminal trial.”). [12] Finally, we address Cabazon’s “shorthand test” for whether a law is prohibitory or regulatory, that is “whether the conduct at issue violates the State’s public policy.” 480 U.S. at 209. California’s public policy “to provide maximum safety and protection for children who are currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm,” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 300.2, is not undermined simply because the law is not classified as criminal in nature. As in Confederated Tribes of Colville, “look[ing] to the Tribes rather than the state” for protection of children 28 In ICWA cases, state courts can terminate parental rights only when the determination is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f). This provision does not alter our analysis of whether California’s child dependency statute is criminal for Public Law 280 purposes. 8454 DOE v. MANN against abuse and neglect does not violate the state’s public policy. See 938 F.2d at 149. Taken as a whole and considering the multiple factors used for analyzing whether a law is criminal/prohibitory, we conclude that the California child dependency statute is not prohibitory. Therefore, California may not enforce its involuntary child dependency statute in Indian country through its criminal Public Law 280 jurisdiction.