Opinion ID: 1890026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Communications Made with Landry in the Presence of Friedman

Text: The parties do not dispute that two statements made by Newman in the presence of Landry, about which Friedman testified, occurred during the existence of Newman's attorney-client relationship with Friedman or that the statements were related to Newman's divorce and custody dispute. They also do not dispute that Newman retained Friedman to act in his capacity as an attorney on her behalf. Rather, they diverge about the effect of Landry's presence at sessions with Friedman during which she and Newman discussed kill[ing] Lars, Arlen [Slobodow] would be blamed, and then he would go to jail ... planting evidence [of pornography] in [Slobodow's] house. As we have observed, generally the presence of a third party will destroy the attorney-client privilege. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 Md. at 416, 718 A.2d at 1139. The mere presence of a third party, however, does not constitute a waiver of the privilege per se. Because the attorney-client privilege is held and waived by the client, our essential inquiry is `whether the client reasonably understood the conference to be confidential' notwithstanding the presence of third parties. Rosati v. Kuzman, 660 A.2d 263, 266-67 (R.I.1995), quoting Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 849 (1st Cir.1984) (emphasis in original). See also MCCORMACK, EVIDENCE, § 91 at 189 (2d ed.1972) (explaining that a mere showing that the communication was from client to attorney does not suffice, but the circumstances indicating the intention of secrecy must appear); Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 579 (E.D.Wash.1975) (noting that [t]he attorney-client privilege is limited to communications between the attorney and the client which are expressly intended to be confidential); State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995, 1005 (R.I.1984) (stating that the communication is privileged if expressly intended to be confidential). We find the analysis of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Rosati v. Kuzman, 660 A.2d 263 (R.I.1995), to be persuasive on this point. In that case, the court analyzed whether the presence of a defendant's parents during communications between the attorney and their son destroyed any attorney-client privilege. Id. at 266. Examining whether the son reasonably understood the communications to be confidential, the court observed that his parents occupied a vital role in his defense. Id. at 267. They facilitated the son's relationship with the attorney, accepted other offers of assistance on their son's behalf, and acted as his confidants through a tense legal proceeding. Id. The court relied upon those facts to determine that the son unequivocally intended that the communications in question remain confidential. Id. The fact that the third parties were the defendant's parents played no part in the court's conclusion. The record in the case at bar indicates Newman's clear understanding that the communications made in the presence of Landry would remain confidential. Landry, as one of Newman's oldest and closest friends, accompanied Newman to Friedman's office in an attempt to keep things more ... focused, ... to ease the relationship between Friedman and Newman. Friedman testified that Newman was distraught over the possibility of losing custody of her children to their father. He further testified that he invited Margery [Landry] into the conversations [with Newman] because [he] wanted what [he] thought would be a cool head in the room. Later, due to the content of the conversations in his presence between Landry and Newman, Friedman stated, [T]hat is why I had to bar Margery from coming into my office. Thus, Friedman exerted his control over Landry's presence through his ability to invite her and also exclude her from the meetings. Newman's acquiescence in Friedman's suggestion that Landry facilitate his meetings with her by providing a cool head cannot reasonably be interpreted as amounting to a waiver of her privilege, as the State suggests. Although Landry accompanied Newman to Friedman's office, there is nothing in the record to show that Newman suggested that Landry participate in her meeting with Friedman, and Friedman's testimony indicates that the opposite is true. We have held that [o]nly the client has [the] power to waive the attorney-client privilege. Parler & Wobber, 359 Md. at 691, 756 A.2d at 537; see City of College Park v. Cotter, 309 Md. 573, 591, 525 A.2d 1059, 1067 (1987). Where the third party is acting at the attorney's behest, as Landry did in the present case, the client's consent to the third party's continued presence does not constitute waiver of the privilege because the decision to include the third party was not made by the client, but rather by the attorney. Therefore, Newman reasonably understood the communications in question to be confidential, and subject to the attorney-client privilege, because of Friedman's control over Landry's presence during their meetings. Also, like Rosati's parents in Rosati v. Kuzman, supra , Landry acted as a source of support for Newman during divorce and custody proceedings which, according to all parties involved, were extremely contentious. She accompanied Newman to court proceedings, communicated directly with Friedman at Newman's direction, and assisted Newman in pursuing investigations of Newman's sons' allegations of sexual abuse with the proper authorities. Thus, we can discern no significant distinction between the circumstances of Rosati and the present case. Consequently, we find that Landry's presence during Newman's meetings with Friedman does not destroy Newman's attorney-client privilege.