Opinion ID: 2087709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Failure to Remove Juror Turchen

Text: The defendant next claims that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because of the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to excuse juror Jamie Turchen for cause. The defendant again relies on Morgan v. Illinois (1992), 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492, and argues that Turchen should have been removed for cause because of her answers to voir dire questions concerning her willingness to impose the death penalty. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling on the defendant's motion to remove for cause. The trial court is granted wide discretion in ruling on a motion to excuse a potential juror for cause based upon the juror's voir dire. ( Seuffer, 144 Ill.2d at 502, 163 Ill.Dec. 805, 582 N.E.2d 71.) In reviewing such a ruling, the entire voir dire of the juror must be considered, rather than selected answers. ( Peeples, 155 Ill.2d at 462-63, 186 Ill.Dec. 341, 616 N.E.2d 294; People v. Stewart (1984), 104 Ill.2d 463, 486, 85 Ill.Dec. 422, 473 N.E.2d 1227.) The trial judge's ruling is entitled to substantial deference because the trial judge is in the best position to determine the meaning of the juror's remarks. People v. Steidl (1991), 142 Ill.2d 204, 244, 154 Ill.Dec. 616, 568 N.E.2d 837; Stewart, 104 Ill.2d at 486, 85 Ill.Dec. 422, 473 N.E.2d 1227. The defendant claims that juror Turchen should have been removed for cause under Morgan, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492. In Morgan, the Supreme Court held that a juror who would automatically vote to impose the death penalty for every murder conviction, without regard to the aggravating or mitigating evidence presented, is properly removed for cause. ( Morgan, 504 U.S. at 728-29, 112 S.Ct. at 2229, 119 L.Ed.2d at 502-03.) We find that juror Turchen did not fall into the category of persons contemplated in Morgan. The defendant points to the following voir dire of Turchen as support for his argument. During questioning by defense counsel, the following exchange took place: Q. Is there anything about the nature of the offense, armed robbery and murder, that sets you off one way or the other? A. No. Q. You mentioned, counsel asked you about the death penalty, I would like to ask you a question related to that. Would you automatically impose the death penalty if you found Edgar Hope guilty of armed robbery and murder? A. If the evidence showed or the, as he had put it, you know the evidence was there, yes, I would. Q. And would you do that just because you found him guilty without regard to his background or circumstances of the crime? A. Yes. It is upon this last answer by Turchen that the defendant bases his contention that her removal for cause was required under Morgan. We disagree. We find that, when the entire voir dire of Turchen is reviewed, she was not revealed to be a person who would automatically vote for the death penalty upon a finding of guilt. The yes answer relied upon by the defendant was not a statement by Turchen that she would automatically vote for the death penalty, when viewed, as it must be, in conjunction with the statements that surround it. Prior to this answer, Turchen had just stated that she could vote for the death penalty if the evidence was there to support it. Further, in response to subsequent questioning in this area, Turchen clarified that she did not have views about the death penalty which would impair the performance of her duties as a juror. During the State's subsequent voir dire of Turchen, she stated as follows: Q. Do you understand that there would be a second part to the trial if there is a termination [sic] of guilt? A. Yes. Q. And under that second part of the trial, you'll be instructed as to the law to follow to determine whether death is appropriate. Do you understand that? A. Yes. Q. And could you follow that law? A. Yes. The trial court went further in this line of questioning as follows: Q. In other words, in that second hearing, okay, this is assuming that there was a finding of guilty, now? A. Right. Q. Assuming that there was a finding of guilty at the hearing, the first thing would be whether or not a person, you know, fits into certain categories, that is whether they would be eligible to receive capital punishment? A. Right. Q. And assuming that that occurred, here, then, the next question is, should they be put to death, okay. Now, both sides would have the opportunity to present evidence and reasons why the person under those circumstances should be or should not be sentenced to death, now, would you be able to listen to those reasons and that evidence, that type of evidence in coming to your determination? A. Yes, I would. Q. Okay, would you promise me that you would listen to both sides during that? A. Yes. Q. Now, if you thought that the death penalty was appropriate, you would impose capital punishment? A. Yes, I would. Q. And if it was not appropriate, you would not? A. No, I would not. Q. Okay, so you would listen to the hearings all the way through with a view towards making a determination and following the law, is that it? A. Yes. We determine that this subsequent voir dire of Turchen reveals that she was not a juror whose removal for cause was mandated under Morgan. Turchen clarified her position on her willingness to consider the evidence in determining whether to impose the death penalty. Her answers made clear that she would not be a juror for whom the presence or absence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances is entirely irrelevant. ( Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729, 112 S.Ct. at 2229, 119 L.Ed.2d at 502-03.) We have held that a potential juror's views on the death penalty will warrant removal for cause only if they substantially impair the performance of his or her duties as a juror. ( People v. Mahaffey (1989), 128 Ill.2d 388, 416, 132 Ill.Dec. 366, 539 N.E.2d 1172.) Turchen's voir dire answers did not reveal her to be a person for whom that would be the case. In light of the foregoing, we find that the trial court's denial of the motion to excuse Turchen for cause was therefore not an abuse of discretion.