Opinion ID: 698694
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Subject to Arbitration

Text: 25 BF argues that the dispute about the meaning of section (g) of the 1993 Memorandum of Agreement is not subject to arbitration.  '[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.'  AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986) (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1353, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960)). 26 Where the collective bargaining agreement contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption in favor of arbitrability. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 4 v. KTVI-TV, Inc., 985 F.2d 415, 416 (8th Cir.1993) (citing AT & T, 475 U.S. at 650, 106 S.Ct. at 1419). Under the presumption, arbitration ' should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. '  Id. (quoting AT & T, 475 U.S. at 650, 106 S.Ct. at 1419 (quoting Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83, 80 S.Ct. at 1353)). 27 While there is no arbitration clause in the 1993 Memorandum of Agreement, there is an arbitration provision in the grievance procedure of the now expired 1991 Master Agreement. A grievance that arises after a contract expires is subject to the expired contract's arbitration provision only in limited circumstances. One of those circumstances is where, under normal principles of contract interpretation, the disputed contractual right survives expiration of the remainder of the agreement. Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 206, 111 S.Ct. 2215, 2225, 115 L.Ed.2d 177 (1991). The disputed right survives when a collective bargaining agreement provides in explicit terms that certain benefits continue after the agreement's expiration [and, therefore,] disputes as to such continuing benefits may be found to arise under the agreement, and so become subject to the contract's arbitration provisions. Id. at 207-08, 111 S.Ct. at 2226. That is precisely the situation in this case. 28 Section (g) of the 1993 Memorandum of Agreement provides that the terms and conditions of the 1991 Master Agreement, which include the grievance and arbitration procedures, remain in effect until new terms are implemented as a result of the 1994 Master and Supplementary negotiations to replace them. BF does not argue that it implemented a new grievance procedure to replace the arbitration requirement in the grievance procedure of the 1991 Master Agreement. Thus, the grievance procedure and arbitration requirements of the 1991 Master Agreement remain in effect. 29 The 1991 Master Agreement's arbitration provision states that BF and the Union will arbitrate disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement or any local plant Supplementary Agreements. (Article XI, Procedure for Adjustment of Grievances, Sec. 2(2), BF's Adden. at 13A.) BF argues that the 1993 Memorandum of Agreement is not a Supplementary Agreement and, therefore, is not subject to the arbitration clause of the 1991 Master Agreement. We disagree. As counsel for BF stated in oral argument, a Supplementary Agreement is not defined in any of the contracts between the parties nor does it carry special meaning as a term of art. Rather, BF's counsel stated that the phrase should be given a plain meaning reading. Under such a reading, we conclude that a Supplementary Agreement is simply a specific agreement for a particular BF plant which supplements the Master Agreement, providing for those features or circumstances which are unique to that particular plant. While it may or may not be true, as BF suggests, that normally there is only one Supplementary Agreement for each plant, it is abundantly clear to us that the 1993 Memorandum of Agreement is a second Supplementary Agreement at the Russellville plant, because it supplements the 1991 Master Agreement (as well as the 1991 Local Supplementary Agreement) by further defining and clarifying the relationship between BF and Local 884 at Russellville. Thus, we reject BF's argument that section (g) of the 1993 Memorandum of Agreement is not part of a Supplementary Agreement. 30 Because there is an applicable arbitration clause in the 1991 agreements between BF and Local 884, we give effect to the presumption in favor of arbitration. After reviewing the clause, it cannot be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. KTVI-TV, Inc., 985 F.2d at 416 (internal quotations omitted). Quite to the contrary, we believe it can be said with positive assurance that there is an agreement to arbitrate this dispute. It is undisputed that Local 884 bargained away its right to strike. It is very doubtful to us that Local 884 would have then also bargained away its other dispute resolution vehicle, i.e., arbitration. Thus, absent a clear indication to the contrary, we will presume that the fact that Local 884 has foregone its ability to strike is a further indication that the parties intended the arbitration clause in the 1991 Master Agreement to remain in effect at Russellville until a new arbitration clause or new grievance procedure is implemented. 31 BF also argues that the dispute is not arbitrable because, as we have previously held, contract termination issues should be decided by the courts, not the arbitrator, unless the parties have explicitly agreed otherwise. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. ITT Corp., Thermotech Div., 508 F.2d 1309, 1313 (8th Cir.1975). BF asserts that because Local 884 is arguing that section (g) of the 1993 Memorandum of Agreement requires parts of the 1991 Master Agreement to remain in effect, even after the Master Agreement's termination date, the question before the arbitrator necessarily would be whether the 1991 Master Agreement has expired. Thus, BF contends that the issue should not be subject to arbitration. 32 We disagree. Even if the arbitrator is required to decide indirectly if the 1991 Master Agreement has expired, the parties have agreed to arbitrate the issue of expiration. As we observed in Thermotech, a broadly worded arbitration clause in which the parties agree to arbitrate the interpretation and application of the terms of the collective bargaining agreements between them indicates an intent to arbitrate disputes relating to a purported termination or expiration of the bargaining agreement. 508 F.2d at 1314. Here, the arbitration clause in the 1991 Master Agreement specifies that the Union will arbitrate disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement or any local plant Supplementary Agreements. (BF's Adden. at 13A (emphasis added).) Thus, we conclude that the arbitration clause indicates the intent of the parties to arbitrate the issues of termination of the 1991 Master Agreement or any other Supplementary Agreements, including the 1993 Memorandum of Agreement. 1 2. Frustration of Arbitration 33 BF next argues that Local 884 failed to establish that the preliminary injunction was necessary to avoid frustration of the arbitration process. [T]he union may obtain a status quo injunction against an employer when the employer's action has the effect of frustrating the arbitral process, or rendering it a 'hollow formality.'  Niagara Hooker, 935 F.2d at 1377 (quoting Lever Bros. v. Int'l Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 123 (4th Cir.1976)). Stated another way, the injunction must be necessary to prevent arbitration from being rendered a meaningless ritual. Niagara Hooker, 935 F.2d at 1377 (quoting Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d at 283). 34 The arbitration process is rendered meaningless only if any arbitral award in favor of the union would substantially fail to undo the harm occasioned by the lack of a status quo injunction. Id. at 1378. The fact that the arbitration decision will not be able to restore perfectly the status quo ante is not enough; the injury must be irreparable and must threaten the integrity of the arbitration process itself. Id. 35 We conclude that Local 884 has failed to demonstrate that a decision favorable to it in arbitration would not be able to remedy the harms about which Local 884 complains. If the arbitrator agrees with Local 884 that the health benefits under the 1991 Master Agreement remained in effect pursuant to section (g) of the 1993 Memorandum of Agreement, then the arbitrator can order BF to repay all monthly premium payments and deductibles that the employees were wrongly deprived of and require reinstatement of the levels of medical and dental coverages for which the 1991 Master Agreement provided. 36 Local 884 makes only a very slight attempt to argue irreparable harm. That argument is based on testimony by a union employee that it is possible that some hospitals might refuse coverage to BF hourly employees because many of those employees live paycheck to paycheck, and the hospitals might conclude that the employees are not able to cover their increased deductibles. We are not persuaded by that argument. The possible harm identified is wholly speculative and because it is, it cannot be called irreparable harm. Moreover, additional financial hardship in and of itself is not enough to establish the irreparable harm and frustration of arbitration that would justify a preliminary injunction. See Niagara Hooker, 935 F.2d at 1378 (citing cases to that extent). 2 3. Equitable Relief Test 37 We also conclude that the district court erred in finding that Local 884 satisfied the Dataphase test for a preliminary injunction. Under that test, courts should consider: 38 (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant; (3) the probability that movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest. 39 Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 114. As we found above, Local 884 has failed to show that without the injunction it would suffer irreparable harm in this case. See Amoco Oil, 885 F.2d at 704 (irreparable injury inquiry and frustration of arbitration inquiry coincide and most courts simply merge into a single inquiry). The absence of irreparable harm is sufficient grounds for vacating a preliminary injunction. Modern Computer Sys., 871 F.2d at 738. 40 For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the district court erred in entering the injunction because Local 884 failed to demonstrate that without the injunction the arbitration proceeding would be frustrated or rendered a nullity. The Norris-LaGuardia Act is clear that injunctions are not generally permitted in labor disputes and the Boys Markets exception should be applied narrowly. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order entering a preliminary injunction preventing BF from instituting revised health care benefits pending the arbitration of BF's claimed right to do so.