Opinion ID: 329209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of the Action

Text: 14 Act 1205 was submitted for the Attorney General's approval on May 12, 1972. Appellants contend that by the terms of Section 5 the Attorney General had to act upon the submission within 60 days of that date, 52 with the result that his refusal to object became final on July 11. On this premise they further contend that appellees' complaint in the District Court, filed on August 10, was not timely. Appellees respond that the 60-day period did not begin to run until South Carolina's submission was deemed complete on June 19, 53 and that in any event the District Court's jurisdiction did not depend upon the filing of suit within the period limiting action by the Attorney General. 15 We find it unnecessary to decide when the 60-day period specified by Section 5 began to run in this case. On its face, the specification is directed solely to the Attorney General's disapproval of proposals submitted pursuant to Section 5. Nothing in the text nor in the legislative history of that section suggests that this language has a longer reach. Without manifest distortion of the provision it is impossible to say that, simply because the Attorney General must act within 60 days after submission, a litigant opposing the Attorney General must do likewise. Aside from these considerations, the logical extension of appellants' argument is that judicial review of agency action must invariably be sought during the period within which the agency itself must act. Such an unprecedented holding would signal a deterioration in the wholesome process by which administrative agencies are subjected to a measure of judicial oversight. Courts are empowered to rectify agency action erroneously taken or to compel agency action erroneously withheld, 54 and continuing agency authority to act independently is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to such relief. 55 Fairly recently, in a case in which a petition for review of agency action was filed after the time for initial agency action had expired, we saw no jurisdictional problem and remanded the case for further agency proceedings. 56 Moreover, the Administrative Procedure Act authorizes judicial review after petitions for reconsideration are presented to the agency 57 petitions that obviously can be disposed of after the time for initial agency action has expired. In the countless situations of that sort, appellants' thesis would foreclose judicial review merely because a party avails himself of his fullest opportunity to seek relief within the agency before invoking his remedies in court. 16 An equally basic difficulty with appellants' theory is that judicial review would be a practical impossibility were the Attorney General to delay his action until the last day upon which he could act. 58 Since only final agency action is subject to judicial scrutiny, 59 the review process cannot be instituted until after the Attorney General has acted, 60 and the Attorney General would in effect acquire the power to make unreviewable decisions under Section 5. It is clear enough that the Voting Rights Act did not grant the Attorney General unfettered discretion in the performance of his duties under Section 5. 61 17 In sum appellants are asking us to fabricate a principle of administrative law that would warp Section 5, would conflict with precedent, and would grant the Attorney General, and as well all other administrators, decisional leeway that would not and should not otherwise exist. We hold that the 60-day limitation specified in Section 5 is applicable only to action by the Attorney General prior to judicial review, and that it did not render appellees' lawsuit untimely.