Opinion ID: 738505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the district court abuse its discretion in deciding

Text: 58 TO DEPART? 59 We now must determine whether, given the information before it, the district court abused its discretion by departing from the applicable guideline range. Unlike our discussion heretofore, the legal standard is relatively clear, and our focus will be on the particular factual circumstances presented by this case.
60 Section 5K2.0, Grounds for Departure, provides a roadmap for a decision to depart from the applicable Guideline range. In the usual case, a sentencing court must impose a sentence within the Guideline range. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). For the most part, a court can treat each guideline as carving out a 'heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes. See 1994 U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, intro. comment. 4(b). However, the Sentencing Commission recognizes that it is difficult to prescribe a single set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision. Id. Therefore, a court may depart from the range if it finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration ... in formulating the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); see 1995 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. It is only in the unusual case, one outside the heartland, in which a departure is authorized. See Koon, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2044. Except for a limited number of prohibited factors, the Guidelines do not limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case. 1995 U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, intro. comment. 4(b). 16 61 Sentencing courts are not left adrift, however. Koon, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2045. The Guidelines list factors that are encouraged as bases for departure and those that are discouraged. Section 5K2.0 introduces the subject. As § 5K2.0 explains, the Commission seeks to aid the [sentencing] court by identifying some of the factors that [it] has not been able to take into account fully in formulating the guidelines. 1995 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. Those factors are included in §§ 5K2.1-5K2.18, and cover issues such as the death or injury of a victim, the harm to property or government interests, the purpose or cause of the offense, the particular conduct of the defendant, and the like. In Chapter 5, Part H, the Guidelines list a number of discouraged factors. These are factors [that] are not ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range. 1995 U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. H, intro. comment. They include, but are not limited to, a defendant's age (§ 5H1.1), education or vocational skills (§ 5H1.2), or employment history (§ 5H1.5). 62 In Koon, the Supreme Court explained how a sentencing court is to factor prohibited, encouraged, and discouraged factors into the sentencing decision. If the unusual or special factors presented by a case are prohibited factors, a court may not depart on that basis alone. See Koon, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2045. If the unusual or special factors are encouraged factors, a court is merely authorized to depart. See id. A departure employing encouraged factors is commonly referred to as a guided departure. If the unusual or special factors are discouraged, or if they are encouraged factors that have been taken into account by the relevant guideline, then a court may depart only if the factor[§ are] present to an exceptional degree or in some other way make[ ] the case different from the ordinary case where the factor[§ are] present. Id. Finally, a sentencing court may depart even if the unusual or special factors have not been mentioned in the Guidelines, but only in rare circumstances. See id. Such a departure would be unguided. 63
64 Basis for Departure in this Case? 65 Disruption of governmental function is included among the encouraged upward departure factors. See 1994 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.7. If the defendant's conduct resulted in a significant disruption of governmental function, the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range to reflect the nature and extent of the disruption and the importance of the governmental function affected. Id. Although an encouraged factor, the disruption in this case was, at least in part, arguably taken into account when determining the applicable sentencing range. For example, as part of the calculation of his total offense level, Baird received a two-level increase because, as a police officer, he abused his position of trust. See id § 3B1.3. He also received a four-level increase because, again as a police officer, he was a public official at the time of the offenses. See id. § 2H1.1(b)(1). In other words, Baird's sentence reflected the fact that he was a rogue government official, one who affected government operations by acting outside of the law. Therefore, as stated in Koon, the sentencing court could have departed in this case only if the disruption was present to an exceptional degree or in some other way [made] the case different from the ordinary case where the [disruption] is present. 66 We believe that it is clear that the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion by implicitly concluding that the disruption of governmental function caused by Baird's conduct is present to an exceptional degree. The full impact of Baird's conduct is not yet known. However, based upon information supplied by the City of Philadelphia and by Baird himself, we know that the city has reopened innumerable criminal cases, originating from the 39th District, to determine whether it obtained convictions based on illegally obtained evidence. 67 The city has already set aside more than one hundred and fifty such convictions, leading to the release of innocent persons from prison. As a result of these wrongful convictions, many individuals have instituted civil lawsuits seeking damages from the city. The city stands to be liable for enormous sums of money. In other words, the disruption Baird caused is not only by no means ordinary, but also is, as far as we can tell, as colossal as it is unprecedented. The city must invest considerable time, vast energy, and enormous resources in making right the wrongs Baird has caused. Therefore, the departure in this case to reflect a disruption in government functions was appropriate. 68 Baird submits that the disruption occurred as a result of his truthful cooperation with the investigation into the 39th District and not as a result of his unlawful conduct. Therefore, the argument continues, he should not be subject to a departure because § 5K2.7 only allows departures [i]f the defendant's conduct resulted in a significant disruption.... Id. § 5K2.7 (emphasis added). In a sense, Baird is correct. Without his cooperation, the full extent of the 39th District corruption might never have come to light. We are not unsympathetic, but there is a flaw in Baird's argument: his conduct in fact caused the disruption. But for Baird's illegal activities, the city would not have reopened criminal convictions originating in the 39th District and innocent people would have no cause to sue the city. 69 In other words, if Baird had been an honest police officer, the city would not need to invest considerable time, energy, or resources in making anything right because nothing was wrong. At all events, we have made clear that the literal language of an encouraged departure factor is not controlling. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1116 ([F]itting a case within the literal language of a § 5K2 provision is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for making an offense-related departure.). That the disruption in this case might have been caused by Baird's cooperation as opposed to Baird's conduct is therefore of little consequence. We hold that a departure in this case for a significant disruption of government functions was not an abuse of discretion. 70