Opinion ID: 852519
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Denial of a Full and Fair Post-Conviction Hearing

Text: Ritchie contends that he was denied a full and fair post-conviction hearing. This contention is based on the following facts. At the hearing, Ritchie called as an expert witness a lawyer with extensive experience in capital litigation. The witness provided lengthy testimony concerning what is expected of counsel in the preparation and trial of a capital case, the prevailing professional norms for a capital defense attorney, and, on a wide variety of issues, what he would have done differently than Ritchie's lawyers. P-Cr. at 640-76. However, on at least three occasions during the witness' testimony, Ritchie asked  sometimes worded slightly differently  whether the witness had an opinion regarding the reasonableness of trial and appellate counsel's conduct. Id. at 655, 664, 671. Sustaining the State's objection, the post-conviction court would not permit the witness to give testimony on such an opinion. Ritchie made an offer of proof, which essentially recounted many of the allegations raised in this appeal which Ritchie contends amount to ineffective assistance. According to Ritchie, the witness would have testified that the conduct of Ritchie's trial and appellate counsel fell below prevailing professional norms and was unreasonable under the standards of the conduct of counsel in capital defense cases in Indiana and nationally. Id. at 684. The decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse only for abuse of that discretion. Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 163 (Ind.1999). Although expert witnesses may testify concerning their opinions generally, see Ind. Evidence Rule 702, experts may not testify to opinions concerning intent, guilt, or innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of allegations; whether a witness has testified truthfully; or legal conclusions.  Evid. R. 704(b) (emphasis added); see also Carter v. State, 754 N.E.2d 877, 881-82 (Ind.2001). And this is so because: (1) legal conclusions are not helpful to the trier of fact, (2) legal conclusions are reserved solely for the court's determination, and (3) it is the function of the court, not the expert witness, to instruct on the law. See generally 13 Robert Lowell Miller, Jr., Indiana Practice, Indiana Evidence § 704.206, 460 (2d ed.1995). Apparently contending that an opinion about the reasonableness of counsel's conduct is not a legal conclusion, Ritchie cites Strickland for the proposition that [t]he reasonableness of performances is a `mixed question of law and fact.' Br. of Appellant at 27. We first observe that Strickland actually declares,  Ineffectiveness is not a question of basic, primary, or historical fact. Rather, . . . it is a mixed question of law and fact. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Coleman, 741 N.E.2d at 699 ([B]oth the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact.) (citation omitted). In any event, even assuming for argument's sake that Ritchie's basic premise is correct, this contention does not advance his claim. When facts sufficient to demonstrate deficient performance are undisputed, then whether those facts show ineffective assistance becomes a question of law. See, e.g., Moffitt v. State, 817 N.E.2d 239, 246 (Ind. Ct.App.2004) (declaring that where facts sufficient to create probable cause are undisputed probable cause is a question of law). In this case, the facts upon which Ritchie relies are not in dispute. The question is whether those facts demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. This is a question of law for the post-conviction court to resolve. We find no abuse.