Opinion ID: 853972
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reconsidering Ailes

Text: The Court of Appeals drew guidance from our opinion in Ailes v. Decatur County Area Planning Comm'n, 448 N.E.2d 1057 (Ind.1983), in which this Court held certain zoning provisions to be per se violations of the federal constitution. The Court of Appeals inferred from Ailes that Indiana's vigorous[ ] protection of] vested interests in nonconforming uses is greater than that of other states. Leisz, 686 N.E.2d at 939. The federal constitution does not vary from state to state. Although we are free to find greater restrictions on regulatory takings in our state constitution, this Court in Ailes was not interpreting the state constitution. Rather, the Court there, like the Court of Appeals and the Leiszs, referred to the taking of property without due process of law[.] Ailes, 448 N.E.2d at 1060. For the reasons discussed above and because it cited no Indiana constitutional provision or precedent, Ailes rested solely on federal constitutional grounds. Accordingly, we now re-examine our holding in Ailes, which clearly represents a minority view and is inconsistent with decisions in other jurisdictions interpreting the federal constitution. Most states allow local zoning authorities to phase out nonconforming uses with amortization provisions that require the owner to discontinue the nonconforming use after a certain period of time. Leisz, 686 N.E.2d at 939 (citing DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 5.70 (3d ed. 1993)). Under an amortization provision, an owner's property right is absolutely extinguished at some point in time. Our decision in Ailes found this to be an unconstitutional taking of property without due process of law, not specifically a violation of the Takings Clause but inferentially implicating the Fifth Amendment. See Ailes, 448 N.E.2d at 1060. As noted in Ailes and conceded by the Leiszs, however, property rights are not absolute, and many zoning provisions other than amortization are permitted in Indiana. Examples include prohibiting the expansion or increase of a nonconforming use and disallowing reinstatement after abandonment of the nonconforming use. Id. at 1059. Because Ailes turns on the federal constitution, it is correct only to the extent consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has never directly considered the constitutionality of amortization provisions. However, most other courts that have considered the issue have held that amortization provisions are not unconstitutional per se. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity of Provisions for Amortization of Nonconforming Uses, 8 A.L.R.5th 391, 412-22, 1992 WL 767609 (1992) (listing three federal circuits and twenty-four states as supporting the [v]iew that amortization provisions are valid if they are reasonable, and no federal circuits and only four states adhering to the [v]iew that all amortization provisions are invalid in general). Although each state is free to find amortization provisions to be in violation of its state constitution, no state court can uphold amortization provisions if they are in violation of the federal constitution. With the sole exception of this Court's decision in Ailes, state courts that have found amortization provisions unconstitutional have done so on the basis of their state constitution. Id. at 419; see also Hoffmann v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo.1965); Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (Ohio 1953) (citing both state and federal constitutional provisions); PA Northwestern Distribs., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 526 Pa. 186, 584 A.2d 1372 (Pa.1991). We can only conclude that Ailes, in holding that amortization provisions are unconstitutional per se, incorrectly decided an issue of federal constitutional law. No issue has been raised and we express no opinion as to any state constitutional point.