Opinion ID: 2623203
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Burden-Shifting Analysis To Determine the Number of Overtime Hours for Which Hutka Should Receive Compensation

Text: We next turn to Hutka's contention that the superior court erred in its computation of Hutka's overtime compensation because it did not follow a burden-shifting framework. Under the FLSA, an employee ordinarily has the burden of proving that he performed work for which he was not properly compensated. [19] In Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co ., however, the Supreme Court instructed that when an employer fails to maintain adequate records concerning the employee's hours, as required by the FLSA, the employee may meet this burden by producing sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference. [20] If the employee meets this minimum threshold, the burden shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or with evidence to [negate] the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee's evidence. [21] We adopted the Mt. Clemens burden-shifting framework in Barios v. Brooks Range Supply, Inc. [22] We recognized that the law requires an employer to keep records of all hours worked by an employee entitled to overtime, and we held that when the employer fails to keep adequate records, the Mt. Clemens standard applies. [23] In the present case, the superior court did not expressly apply the Barios and Mt. Clemens burden-shifting analysis. Rather, it discussed the conflicting evidence presented by Providence and Hutka without reference to the evidentiary burdens that apply when an employer fails to keep records. The trial court found: The record is divergent in many ways concerning the hours worked. Time cards were kept but several witnesses said that the employer directed they not be kept accurately. The employer needed accurate breakdown of the time worked to properly allocate time to different funding programs. Ms. Hutka told the Department of Labor her time cards were accurate, at least after a certain point and then testified differently at trial. Ms. Hutka put time on the time cards when she was out on sick leave  medical leave. There were other inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence presented. Considering all of the conflicting evidence, it is found by the court that it is more likely than not that Ms. Hutka worked an average of 2.71 hours per week of overtime. Providence argues that the trial court was not required to apply the burden-shifting analysis because Providence did not fail to keep records. But as the trial court pointed out, time cards were kept but several witnesses said that the employer directed they not be kept accurately. By ordering employees to refrain from accurately recording their time worked, Providence failed to keep adequate records in accordance with the FLSA. Thus, the trial court was required to apply the burden-shifting framework. But while the trial court did not refer to or discuss Barios in its decision, its reasoning paralleled the Barios burden-shifting approach. Under the proper approach, the first question is whether Hutka presented sufficient evidence from which the court could draw a just and reasonable inference of the amount and extent of her overtime work. Hutka testified that she worked an average of 11.16 overtime hours per week. She claimed that she computed this average based on accurate time records that she had tracked in her personal diary in 1993. Hutka presented testimony from two witnesses, her former supervisor and a co-worker, who corroborated this estimate. Joan Hamilton, who held the same position as Hutka and shared responsibilities with her from January 1993 to August 1994, testified that she and Hutka consistently worked ten hours a day but more heavily on payroll weeks, which were every other weekend. Hutka's former supervisor, Michelle Lorenzen Iverslie, testified that she personally worked ninety hours a week for a period of eleven weeks in 1992 and that Hutka's workload must also have increased with the advent of a new contract that year. In light of the testimony provided by Hamilton and Iverslie, we determine that Hutka did provide sufficient evidence for the court to draw a just and reasonable inference that she worked overtime and was not correctly compensated. Because Hutka met this threshold requirement, the burden shifted to Providence to provide evidence of the precise amount of work performed or to negate the reasonableness of the inference drawn from Hutka's evidence. In addressing the question whether Providence carried out this burden, it is helpful to examine separately the two periods for which Hutka claims overtime. We first consider the evidence presented by Providence pertaining to Hutka's work from January 1994 to May 1995, and second the evidence presented by Providence regarding the period from July 1992 to December 1993.
Providence presented evidence that Hutka worked an average of 2.71 hours of overtime per week during the period from January 1994 to May 1995. Providence obtained this measurement by extrapolating from a statement Hutka made in her written complaint to the Department of Labor. On March 29, 1994, Hutka reported the following information to the Department of Labor: [24] I had some overtime from 7/11/92 until 12/26/92 but no work records were kept. I began keeping track of how much time I actually worked in pay period 1 of 1993 (12/27/92 began p.p.) through the end of 12/93. I was told I could balance out the extra hours in a week by leaving early on days since the start of 1994. I do not need to collect any wages from 1/94 to the present, I have tried to work only 40 hours each week, and just record any overtime. Providence directed the trial court's attention to Hutka's statements that she did not need to collect any wages from 1/94 to the present (March 29, 1994) because she tried to work only forty hours and just record any overtime. Based upon Hutka's indication that she accurately recorded her overtime in 1994, Providence's program director, Kathy Lum, added the total number of recorded overtime hours on Hutka's time cards from 12/26/93 to 5/20/95, divided by the number of work weeks, and used this derived figure of 2.71 hours as the average estimate of Hutka's weekly overtime. [25] Because Hutka's testimony that she tried to work only 40 hours each week and just record any overtime could be viewed as a concession of the accuracy of her time records kept after January 1994, it is arguable that the evidence of recorded overtime presented by Providence provided a precise calculation of Hutka's overtime during this period. And even if these calculations are not precise, the trial court's implicit finding that Providence negated the reasonableness of Hutka's inference of 11.16 hours is supported by the record. As the superior court concluded, Ms. Hutka told the Department of Labor her time cards were accurate, at least after a certain point and then testified differently at trial. We therefore determine that Providence satisfied its burden as to the period from January 1994 to May 1995 by presenting evidence that Hutka's time records were accurate, and we cannot conclude that the superior court's finding of a weekly average of 2.71 hours of overtime was erroneous when applied to this period.
The remaining question, therefore, is whether Providence met its burden as to the period between July 1992 and December 1993. Although the superior court also applied Providence's average of 2.71 overtime hours a week to Hutka's work during this period, that average was computed based on Hutka's time records for 1994 and 1995 and thus is not a precise calculation for Hutka's work during 1992 and 1993. But Providence argues that it negated the reasonableness of Hutka's estimate of hours worked during this period. The superior court found that there were inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence presented by Hutka at trial. As Providence points out, Hutka conceded at trial that she failed to recalculate her overtime when she converted her claim from an AWHA to an FLSA claim. [26] The superior court also found that Hutka included annual leave and sick leave in her estimates of average hours worked. [27] Hutka claimed that she had computed her average of 11.16 overtime hours by calculating the average overtime worked each week during 1993 when she kept a personal calendar or diary in which she tracked her actual hours for that year. But during cross-examination, Providence compared the diary with Hutka's reports of overtime to the Department of Labor and pointed out at least six specific vacation and sick days that Hutka had included in her computation of overtime hours during 1993. [28] Providence also demonstrated discrepancies between Hutka's diary and the reported calculations, particularly during six weeks in 1993 in which Hutka claimed up to nine hours per week more in overtime than she had recorded in her diary. [29] In Barios, we determined that the fact that the employer did not keep records means only that the burden-shifting standard of Mt. Clemens applies. But the employer may still meet its burden of proof through other forms of evidence. [30] Witness credibility determinations are left to the trial court and there is no reason the judge cannot find the testimony of other witnesses to be more credible in the absence of employer records. [31] Given the contradictions in Hutka's testimony and evidence, the trial court could find that the defense witness, Kathy Lum, was a more credible witness than Hutka. And the court had discretion to find that the defense effectively refuted Hutka's account of the nature and extent of her employment. Thus, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Providence negated the reasonableness of Hutka's assertion that she worked 11.16 hours of overtime a week during this period. Once Providence met its burden, the trial court did not err in favoring Providence's estimate of 2.71 hours per week. We conclude that the trial court's analysis of the evidence was consistent with that required by Barios and therefore affirm the trial court's computation of overtime.