Opinion ID: 3009810
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiff's Duty to Mitigate Damages

Text: A successful claimant's duty to mitigate damages is found in Title VII: Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1); see Ellis v. Ringgold Sch. Dist., 832 F.2d 27, 29 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1005 (1990). Although the statutory duty to mitigate damages is placed on a Title VII plaintiff, the employer has the burden of proving a failure to mitigate. See Robinson, 982 F.2d at 897; Anastasio v. Schering Corp., 838 F.2d 701, 707-08 (3d Cir. 1988). To meet its burden, an employer must demonstrate that 1) substantially equivalent work was available, and 2) the Title 6 VII claimant did not exercise reasonable diligence to obtain the employment. See id. at 708. Whether or not a claimant has met his duty to mitigate damages is a determination of fact, which is subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. See Robinson, 982 F.2d at 897; Ellis, 832 F.2d at 29. In this case, the district court found that Defendant had established Plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages by a preponderance of the evidence and reduced the back pay award by the amount it found Plaintiff could reasonably have earned during the relevant period. In support of its finding, the district court stated that Defendant's Exhibit 14 and other evidence establishes [sic] that minimum wage jobs were available in the relevant job market for which Plaintiff was qualified. Plaintiff did not apply and would have been hired if he did. Appendix at 91a. Defendant's Exhibit 14 covers thirty-three months of the Beaver County Times' (Times) Sunday help-wanted section following Plaintiff's discharge. The court did not specifically indicate what other evidence supported its conclusion. Although the record is somewhat sparse, it is clear that the district court found from the record that 1) Plaintiff was not reasonably diligent in an effort to secure employment, and 2) there were substantially equivalent positions available. We address these findings. a) Reasonable Diligence The reasonableness of a Title VII claimant's diligence should be evaluated in light of the individual characteristics of the claimant and the job market. See Tubari Ltd., Inc. v. NLRB, 7 959 F.2d 451, 454 (3d Cir. 1992). Generally, a plaintiff may satisfy the reasonable diligence requirement by demonstrating a continuing commitment to be a member of the work force and by remaining ready, willing, and available to accept employment. See Hutchison v. Amateur Elec. Supply, Inc., 42 F.3d 1037, 1044 (7th Cir. 1994); Ford v. Nicks, 866 F.2d 865, 873 (6th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff testified that he read the help-wanted ads in the Times every Sunday and constantly and continuously searched for employment. Appendix at 23a-2 to 23a-3, 25a. In addition, following his discharge, Plaintiff did earn approximately $2,000 a year doing odd jobs. Id. at 23a-1 (handyman, painting, putting up fences, whatever). Plaintiff also pointed out that he remained active with the Beaver Falls Job Service (Job Service), a local employment agency. However, Plaintiff testified that in the three and one-half years following his discharge, he had failed to submit any employment applications in response to the Times ads and had only one job interview. See id. at 23a-2, 27a-28a. Plaintiff has attempted, both during trial and on appeal, to explain his efforts. First, Plaintiff stated that most companies will not accept job applications unless they are sent through the Job Service. However, there is no evidence in the record to support Plaintiff's statement. Furthermore, Defendant produced a number of help-wanted ads, which seem to be soliciting applications directly without reference to the Job Service. In addition, Plaintiff argues that [a]n examination of the grouping of advertisements [in Exhibit 14] reveals that the 8 vast majority of the listings are those of employment agencies and temporary agencies. Plaintiff's Br. at 10. Because a number of agencies may list the same job and some list jobs so as to establish a file of available personnel, he maintains, merely counting the listings may serve to count the same job more than once. Although some of the listings are from agencies, Plaintiff did not point to any ads which posted the same position or which listed a position that was, in actuality, not available. Further, Plaintiff did not support his statements concerning the temporary agencies' policies. In fact, Plaintiff testified that in the past, he obtained employment through a temporary agency. Although a plaintiff's efforts need not be successful, he must exercise good faith in attempting to secure a position. See Reilly v. Cisneros, 835 F. Supp. 96, 99-100 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). Here, it appears that Plaintiff did little more than register with the Job Service and look through the help-wanted ads. See EEOC v. Service News Co., 898 F.2d 958, 963 (4th Cir. 1990) (Looking through want ads for an unskilled position, without more, is insufficient to show mitigation, and the back pay award should accordingly be reduced.); Truskoski v. ESPN, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1007, 1015 (D. Conn. 1993) (A ritualistic compliance with the unemployment administrator's work search requirement does not necessarily constitute a reasonably diligent search for suitable employment.). Under the circumstances, Plaintiff's conduct following the unlawful discharge does not appear to demonstrate his continuing commitment to be a member of the work force. Cf. Odima v. Westin Tucson Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484, 1497 (9th 9 Cir. 1995); Sellers v. Delgado College, 902 F.2d 1189, 1195 (5th Cir. 1990); Gallo v. John Powell Chevrolet, Inc., 779 F. Supp. 804, 814 (M.D. Pa. 1991). Thus, the district court's conclusion that Plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence does not appear to be clearly erroneous. However, Plaintiff maintains that the Times help-wanted listings include postings for laborers, assembly workers, and factory workers, which are not substantially equivalent to his former position. He argues that because they are not substantially equivalent he was under no duty to apply for these positions, and therefore, they should not be considered sufficient proof of his failure to mitigate damages. We address that argument. b) Substantially Equivalent Employment The duty of a successful Title VII claimant to mitigate damages is not met by using reasonable diligence to obtain any employment. Rather, the claimant must use reasonable diligence to obtain substantially equivalent employment. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982); Anastasio, 838 F.2d at 708. Substantially equivalent employment is that employment which affords virtually identical promotional opportunities, compensation, job responsibilities, and status as the position from which the Title VII claimant has been discriminatorily terminated. Sellers, 902 F.2d at 1193; see Mitchell v. Humana Hospital-Shoals, 942 F.2d 1581, 1583 n.2 (11th Cir. 1991); Ford, 866 F.2d at 873. 10 The record demonstrates that Defendant employed Plaintiff as a laborer and dock handler. In those positions, he was essentially an unskilled worker who loaded and unloaded trucks and coolers. Defendant's Exhibit 14 includes numerous postings for laborers, general laborers, light labor positions, and movers. Although most of the postings do not include information about specific job responsibilities, benefits, and promotional opportunities, but see, e.g., Appendix at 36a, 43a, 65a, it is clear that on the whole, the positions would not require Plaintiff to go into another line of work, accept a demotion, or take a demeaning position. Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 231. But see Tubari Ltd., Inc., 959 F.2d at 458-59 (stating that it is reasonable for an unskilled worker to have accepted a wide range of work); id. at 456-57 (explaining that as time wears on, plaintiff may be required to lower his sights). Furthermore, to the extent it is indicated, the compensation for the positions is substantially similar to Plaintiff's previous pay. Cf. Ellis, 832 F.2d at 30. The listings in Exhibit 14 appear to be substantially similar to Plaintiff's previous positions with Defendant. Therefore, the district court did not err in considering the exhibit as evidence of Plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages. We are bound to accept the findings of the district court unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. See In re Cohn, 54 F.3d 1108, 1113 (3d Cir. 1995). After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court's finding that Defendant had proven Plaintiff's 11 failure to mitigate damages by a preponderance of the evidence is not clearly erroneous. In its cross-appeal, Defendant argues that because Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages, he is not entitled to any back pay. We turn now to that issue.