Opinion ID: 1436592
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Amount of Sanctions

Text: Rule 11 specifies that [a] sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11(c)(2) (1995 Supp.). If the sanction is imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, the court may direct payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation. Id. Being thoroughly familiar with the record, the trial court recognized that the claims made against Paley Rothman infected the entire litigation . . . [and] had a huge impact . . . in terms of time and expense. . . . Mr. Mark and Paley Rothman, although thoroughly vindicated on the merits, were badly hurt by this litigation . . . a case they should never have had to defend. Nevertheless, the court did not attempt to make them whole. Instead, it focused on the deterrent purpose of Rule 11 and the resources of Kahn and Goldschmidt. The court noted that the total sanction it imposed was less than 14% of Paley Rothman's bill. . . . Mr. Goldschmidt had initiated the litigation, but [g]iven the history of the case  including Mr. Kahn's filing of a new Count IV and his failure to take advantage of the 21-day `safe harbor' in Rule 11  the court [saw] no basis for finding either lawyer more or less culpable than the other. This record reflects a careful exercise of the trial court's discretion. Although Messrs. Kahn and Goldschmidt view the evidence differently, they have not demonstrated that the trial court based its decision on a clearly erroneous evaluation of the evidence. . . . Kleiman, 633 A.2d at 1383. Nor did the court abuse its discretion in setting the amount of the sanctions. See Cunningham, 719 A.2d at 502. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments imposing sanctions.