Opinion ID: 1770982
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: opinion of guilt testimony

Text: The State called the lead investigator, Detective Conigliaro, to testify as to his investigation of the homicides. During the investigation, Detective Conigliaro, with Sloane Martinez's permission, listened to Sloane's telephone conversation with Martinez on January 27. The following day, he also monitored the audio-visual surveillance of the subsequent conversation between Sloane and Martinez that ultimately led to his arrest. During the State's redirect examination of Detective Conigliaro, the prosecutor asked the following: Q. Corporal, when you were listening to that tape live, when you were listening to what was going on live on January 28th, right after that you said that you were authorized to arrest? A. Absolutely. Q. Was there any question, not based on your memory, not based on the transcript, was there any question in your mind that at that time that the Defendant had murdered Douglas Lawson? The trial court overruled defense counsel's objection and the prosecutor continued to inquire about Detective Conigliaro's opinion of the defendant's guilt: Q. Was there any doubt in your mind based on what he said then that he was responsible for the murder of Douglas Lawson? A. There was no doubt that he did it. The prosecutor highlighted this opinion testimony during closing argument: You see, after the video tape was done, as Corporal Conigliaro told you, and as he told you, Baker and another Assistant State Attorney, Ms. Cox, no one had a doubt. He was arrested because nobody had a doubt that he was guilty.  (Emphasis supplied.) We begin our analysis with the basic proposition that a witness's opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused is not admissible. See Glendening v. State, 536 So.2d 212, 221 (Fla.1988) (citing Lambrix v. State, 494 So.2d 1143, 1148 (Fla. 1986)); Henry v. State, 700 So.2d 797, 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Zecchino v. State, 691 So.2d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Spradley v. State, 442 So.2d 1039, 1043 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Gibbs v. State, 193 So.2d 460, 463 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). Section 90.703, Florida Statutes (1997), which provides that [t]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it includes an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact, would appear to allow opinion testimony of the defendant's guilt. However, such testimony is precluded on the authority of section 90.403, Florida Statutes (1997), which excludes relevant evidence on the grounds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice to the defendant. See Glendening, 536 So.2d at 221. Any probative value such an opinion may possess is clearly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. We find [i]t is clear that error is occasioned where a witness, including a lay witness, is permitted to offer her opinion about the guilt of the defendant. Zecchino, 691 So.2d at 1198. In Henry, the Fourth District addressed the effect of improper testimony giving an opinion of guilt. 700 So.2d at 798. The defendant in Henry was charged and convicted of robbery after being identified by a high school student who claimed that the defendant had stolen a gold chain from the student at school. Following the incident, the student victim ran to his mother's vehicle in the school parking lot and informed her of the theft. After describing the perpetrator to his mother, the mother recalled seeing a person who matched the perpetrator's description near her vehicle just moments before the theft. See id. At trial, the prosecutor asked the mother, Do you have any doubt that this [defendant] is the person who robbed your son? and the witness answered, No. Id. Defense counsel objected to the question as calling for a legal conclusion concerning the guilt of the accused and the prosecutor subsequently apologized. See id. However, on redirect examination of the mother, the prosecutor again asked, over the defense's objection, whether the witness had any doubts that we are here charging the wrong person. Id. The witness responded that she had no doubt at all. See Henry, 700 So.2d at 798. The Fourth District concluded that the mother's improper opinion testimony could not have been harmless because it may have impermissibly bolstered the other evidence of identification. See id.; see also Zecchino, 691 So.2d at 1198 (reasoning that improper opinion testimony of the defendant's guilt was not harmless in a circumstantial evidence case where identity was at issue). Reversing the defendant's conviction, the Fourth District in Henry held that the mother's opinion of guilt testimony was improper because it invaded the province of the jury. See Henry, 700 So.2d at 798. Further, there is an increased danger of prejudice when the investigating officer is allowed to express his or her opinion about the defendant's guilt. In this situation, an opinion about the ultimate issue of guilt could convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the investigating officer, supports the charges against the defendant. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). In the context of an improper prosecutorial argument to the jury, the United States Supreme Court in Young explained why it is improper for a representative of the government to express his or her personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused: [S]uch comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant's right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence. Id. (emphasis supplied); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88-89, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935) (finding prosecutorial argument to be improper because it suggested to the jury that the prosecution had personal knowledge of the defendant's guilt). Although in a different context, this Court has expressed its concern that error in admitting improper testimony may be exacerbated where the testimony comes from a police officer. See Rodriguez v. State, 609 So.2d 493, 500 (Fla.1992). In Rodriguez, a police officer corroborated a story told by a testifying witness by discussing the witness's prior consistent statements, which were not properly admissible. See id. We cautioned that [w]hen a police officer, who is generally regarded by the jury as disinterested and objective and therefore highly credible, is the corroborating witness, the danger of improperly influencing the jury becomes particularly grave. Id. (quoting Carroll v. State, 497 So.2d 253, 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)). In this case, it was ultimately for the jury to decide whether the statements made by Martinez to Sloane established his guilt. The jury heard the audio-video taped conversation and, as the trier of fact, was charged with the responsibility of determining the weight to be given to that evidence. It was an impermissible invasion of the province of the jury for Detective Conigliaro, the lead investigating officer in this case, to express his opinion that after he listened to the conversation as it was occurring he had no doubt that Martinez committed the murders. Further, the clear and equally impermissible implication in this case was that Detective Conigliaro obtained some additional knowledge from monitoring the surveillance live that was unavailable to the jury. However, there was no evidence presented to the jury that Detective Conigliaro had heard some other statement by Martinez, not recorded on the video tape, that would lead him to have no doubt of Martinez's guilt. Thus, the admission of this opinion of guilt testimony was error. Having found preserved error in the admission of Detective Conigliaro's opinion of Martinez's guilt, we must assess whether the error is harmless. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986). Although in some cases opinion of guilt testimony may be harmless, see Zecchino, 691 So.2d at 1197-98, this is not such a case. A harmless error analysis requires an examination of the entire record. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d at 1135. In this case, no physical evidence linked Martinez to the crime. By far, the most potentially damaging piece of evidence was the surveillance audio-videotape that was monitored by Detective Conigliaro and other State agents. In light of the lack of physical evidence in this case, the audio-videotape was a critical piece of evidence. The prosecution, in seeking a conviction and death sentence, relied heavily upon the interpretation to be drawn from a series of potentially incriminating remarks made during this conversation. We find that the prejudice flowing from the erroneous admission of this testimony was compounded by the State's closing argument. The assistant state attorney told the jury: You see, after the video tape was done, as Corporal Conigliaro told you, and as he told you, Baker and another Assistant State Attorney, Ms. Cox, no one had a doubt. He was arrested because nobody had a doubt that he was guilty.  (Emphasis supplied.) Because no one other than Detective Congliaro had testified to his or her opinion of guilt, this argument was not even based on evidence in the record. Further, this argument was improper because prosecutors may not directly or indirectly express their opinions as to the credibility of witnesses or the guilt of the defendant. See Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19, 105 S.Ct. 1038; D'Ambrosio v. State, 736 So.2d 44, 45-49 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Moreover, as we recently expressed: It is particularly improper, even pernicious, for the prosecutor to seek to invoke his personal status as the government's attorney or the sanction of the government itself as a basis for conviction of a criminal defendant. The power and force of the government tend to impart an implicit stamp of believability to what the prosecutor says. That same power and force allow him ... to impress on the jury that the government's vast investigatory network, apart from the orderly machinery of the trial, knows that the accused is guilty or has non-judicially reached conclusions on relevant facts which tend to show he is guilty. Ruiz v. State, 743 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1999) (quoting United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir.1979)). By arguing that Martinez was arrested because the State's agents who listened to the videotape had no doubt of his guilt, the prosecutor engaged in impermissible bolstering of the State's case by asserting the superior knowledge and certainty of the government's agents. Therefore, based on an examination of the record as a whole, we cannot find the improper opinion of guilt testimony to be harmless beyond reasonable doubt, especially when it was again highlighted in closing argument. See DiGuilio, 491 So.2d at 1138-39. In making this determination, we further examine the other errors claimed in closing argument because the harmless error test requires an examination of the entire record. The reviewing court must examine both the permissible evidence on which the jury could have legitimately relied and the impermissible evidence which might have influenced the jury's verdict. Whitton v. State, 649 So.2d 861, 865 (Fla.1994).