Opinion ID: 2365094
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper Introduction of Evidence of Similarity of Prior Murder

Text: Defendant argues that the prosecutor's introduction of inadmissible evidence of the similarity between the circumstances of defendant's prior murder conviction and the present matter improperly encouraged the imposition of the death sentence. Defendant contends that the prosecutor elicited testimony during the penalty phase that defendant and his prior murder victim worked together in a large marijuana distribution network, a fact that, in the minds of the jurors, would have linked that murder to the present offenses. Moreover, he says the details of the prior murder, including diagrams of the locations of the wounds, were inflammatory and should not have been admitted. Defendant's point of error includes an argument that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to accept defendant's offer to stipulate to the prior murder conviction. The trial court believed that it could not require the stipulation and, therefore, the State proceeded to call both the New York Assistant District Attorney who prosecuted the prior murder case and the medical examiner who examined the victim. Our jurisprudence reflects an abiding effort to guard against jury prejudice in the penalty phase of a capital case. State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 638-39, 562 A. 2d 1320 (1989). Other-crimes evidence is of special concern because of its capacity to prejudice the capital-sentencing deliberations. State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 586, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990). The prejudicial effect of prior-conviction evidence is particularly high when the prior conviction is for a similar crime. State v. Brunson, 132 N.J. 377, 386, 625 A. 2d 1085 (1993). In proving the aggravating factor of prior murder, the State may offer evidence of a prior homicide in the form of the identity and age of the victim, the manner of death and the relationship, if any, of the victim to the defendant. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f). Ordinarily, the existence of a prior murder conviction is established simply by the introduction into evidence of the judgment of conviction. Simon, supra, 161 N.J. at 460, 737 A. 2d 1. Because the conviction itself constitutes the statutory aggravating factor, Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 276, 524 A. 2d 188, the judgment is introduced for the limited purpose of aiding the jury's determination whether to impose a life or death sentence. Thus, although the State may offer evidence of a prior conviction to prove the aggravating factor of prior murder, the purpose of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f) is `to avoid turning the sentencing proceeding into a second trial of the previous case and at the same time to provide the jury with some information about the prior conviction.' State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 136, 594 A. 2d 232 (1991) (quoting Senate Judiciary Committee Statement to Senate No. 950, at 2, concerning purpose of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f)). In Erazo, supra, this Court considered thoroughly the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f) and the policy considerations that support it. Rejecting the claim that N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f) violated the prohibition against double jeopardy, the Court stated that the statute makes evidence of a prior murder admissible not for the purpose of punishing defendant for that murder, but to enable the jury to determine the appropriate sentence for the present murder. Id. at 134, 594 A. 2d 232. The Court noted that [t]he history of c(2)(f) reflects the Legislature's concern about the amount of evidence of prior murders that is admissible on the penalty phase. Id. at 136, 594 A. 2d 232. Reiterating the need to guard against `jury prejudice,' the Court held that in addition to complying with the statutory restrictions on evidence used to prove a prior murder, a trial court also must instruct the jury on the limited relevance of prior-murder evidence. Id. at 135-36, 594 A. 2d 232. Case law has examined the parameters of various aspects of prior murder that are admissible in a capital penalty trial. See generally, State v. Bey, 129 N.J. 557, 595-97, 610 A. 2d 814 (1992) ( Bey III ) (stating that medical evidence presented in clinical terminology does not eliminate potentially prejudicial effect and instructing that manner of death should be described in general terms); Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 574-75, 575 A. 2d 816 (citing prosecutor's conduct as improper and an attempt to inflame penalty jury in case decided prior to Erazo when prosecutor exceeded defense stipulation and court instruction on prior murder by telling jury that defendant `blew away half of the victim's face' and `crippled another human being'). The amount of prior murder information that should be disclosed concerning a victim's relationship to the defendant has not been addressed by this Court. Here, the State called the New York Assistant District Attorney who prosecuted the prior murder case. After testifying to the charges against defendant in that case and the age of the prior victim, the witness was asked about the relationship between defendant and the prior victim. He replied: I learned through the trial testimony that [defendant] and the victim as well as Mr. Nicholas [a co-defendant in the prior murder] were not only close friends but also involved in a major drug distribution network involving marijuana. Defendant objected to the irrelevant and highly prejudicial nature of the testimony. The trial court sustained the objection on the ground that the prosecutor was allowed only to show that defendant and the victim were friends and [a]nything beyond that such as involving a major drug distribution is irrelevant. We concur with the trial court's ruling. That defendant and the victim were friends is admissible under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f). However, the further circumstances surrounding the nature of the relationship exceeded permissible limits under the statute. The evidence had the ability to prejudice defendant given the similarity between the circumstances surrounding the prior murder and that of the current murders. Due to the potentially prejudicial effect of the testimony, the trial court gave the jury a curative instruction immediately after the prosecutor elicited the testimony about the New York drug operation. In no uncertain terms, the court instructed the jury not to consider that information in its deliberations: Ladies and gentlemen, I instruct you that under our law when the State intends to prove that one of the aggravating factors is a prior murder, there's certain limitations that are in place upon it insofar as the proofs are concerned. When evidence is admitted concerning prior murders, nothing of the facts of the murders beyond name and age of [sic] victim, the manner of death and the victim's relationship to the defendant should be allowed. Anything else is irrelevant. Therefore, I instruct you that anything you heard about these people being involved in a major drug distribution business, although you heard it, I can tell you to disregard it but I'm also going to tell you that it's not to be considered at all during your deliberations. Consistent with this Court's direction in Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 135-36, 594 A. 2d 232, the court also charged the jury that defendant already had been punished for the prior murder and that they were not to consider the offense for that purpose. We note defendant's argument that the prosecutor raised the issue of defendant's New York drug distribution activities during cross-examination of the mitigation expert and during summation. However, because the mitigation expert's testimony on defendant's New York drug activities was admissible testimony and not stricken from the record, the prosecutor was permitted to discuss that testimony in her summation. Defendant further contends that the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to prove the manner of death in the prior murder with diagrams illustrating the location of the victim's wounds. Specifically, the prosecutor called the medical examiner who performed the autopsy on the victim in the New York case. When the medical examiner took the stand, the prosecutor inquired as to his name, position, and qualifications. The following ensued concerning the autopsy: Q. Now after completing the autopsy, did you reach a conclusion as to the cause of Philip Rowe's death? A. Yes, I did. Q. And did he sustain a gunshot wound to the hand? A. Yes, he did. Q. That was a through and through wound? A. From the back of the left hand through the palm side through and through, correct. Q. Did he sustain two gunshot wounds to the head? A. Yes, he did. Q. Did one enter through the left temple and exit through the ear? A. That's correct. Q. And did the other enter through the back of the head and exit through the parietal orbit? A. On the right side. Yes. True. Q. Did he sustain any injuries that were consistent with what are known as defensive wounds? A. Yeah .... [T]here was no such cluster of [defensive] wounds in this case except for an abraded mark that was circular on the back of the left hand but isn't what we would typically call a cluster of defense wounds. The prosecutor then had the medical examiner identify photographs and diagrams of the wounds that were either taken during the autopsy or prepared by the witness. The diagrams were later admitted over the defense's objection that they were inflammatory. Defendant's objection is similar to the one raised by the defendant in Erazo. At issue in Erazo was the admissibility of three pages from the autopsy report from the defendant's prior murder conviction. Erazo, supra, 126 N.J. at 131, 594 A. 2d 232. The selected pages described in detail the multiple stab wounds to the victim and contained a diagram showing the location of the wounds. Ibid. Noting that the evidence was admitted pursuant to a stipulation by both parties, the Court declined to find plain error. Id. at 136, 594 A. 2d 232. However, because the case was being remanded on other grounds, the Court held that the defendant should not be bound by his prior stipulation in his new trial, reasoning: We believe that the statutory purpose can be served with less than the stipulated evidence. The prejudicial effect of a graphic and detailed account of the victim's death might exceed its probative value. On remand, the purposes of the statute will be served if the evidence of the manner of [the former victim's] death is described as multiple stab wounds to the chest, lungs, and heart.