Opinion ID: 3011150
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mooney

Text: Hurley next argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Mooney.29 Mooney argued, and the district court agreed, that he was entitled to summary judgment on Hurley's LAD claim because, as a non-supervisory co-employee, he was not an employer for purposes of N.J. Stat. Ann.S 10:5-5(e).30 See Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dept., 1995 WL 854478, at  (D.N.J. Aug. 4, 1995). The court reached this conclusion, in part, because non-supervisory co-employees cannot be held liable under Title VII, and New Jersey courts have often looked to that statute to resolve questions under the NJLAD. Id. (citing Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 452). Although Mooney may have had considerable unofficial power because of his well-known promotion prospects and highranking relatives, he was not an employer. _________________________________________________________________ 29. We review the district court's decision granting summary judgment de novo, and we apply the same test the district court should have applied in the first instance. See Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1995). We must determine, therefore, whether the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to Hurley, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that Mooney was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 24950 (1986). 30. The Act provides that an employer includes all persons as defined in subsection a. of this section unless otherwise specifically exempt under another section of this act, and includes the State, any political or civil subdivision thereof, and all public officers, agencies, boards or bodies. N.J. Stat. Ann. S 10:5-5(e). Subsection (a) provides that the term [p]erson includes one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, organizations, labor organizations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers, and fiduciaries. N.J. Stat. Ann. S 10:5-5(a). 52 Hurley argues that S 10:5-5(e) is not relevant because Mooney was individually liable under the LAD as an aider and abettor. We predict that, under New Jersey law, a nonsupervisory employee cannot be held liable as an aider and abettor for his own affirmative acts of harassment, because such affirmative acts do not substantially assist the employer in its wrong, which is its failure to prevent and redress harassment by individual employees. 31 Rather, a nonsupervisory employee's harassment takes advantage of the employer's wrongful conduct; it is the employee who seems to be aided and abetted by the employer.32 A supervisor, by contrast, may be liable as an aider and abettor for active harassment or knowing and willful inaction, because in either case the supervisor violates his or her duty as a supervisor to prevent and halt harassment.33 _________________________________________________________________ 31. The dissent argues that the employer's wrong can also consist of the wrongs of its supervisors who commit willful harassment. This is a thorny question of agency law; usually, the employer is said to be vicariously liable for certain acts of its agents, as in Ellerth and Faragher, and directly liable for its own negligence, if any, in allowing its agents to behave badly. Query whether vicarious liability means that a person who aids and abets an agent also aids and abets the principal? We need not resolve this nice question, however, because the dissent's argument presupposes that Madamba can be held individually liable as a harasser under N.J.S.A. S 10:5-5(a), a proposition we have already predicted that New Jersey courts would reject. Moreover, if the claim were that Mooney substantially assisted Madamba's harassment, no reasonable jury could find that Mooney's conduct rose to the level of substantial assistance based only on the two incidents recited by the dissent. 32. Mooney claims that a nonsupervisor cannot aid and abet because only supervisors can create liability for an employer. As cases imposing liability for coworker harassment demonstrate, that statement of the law is erroneous. We also note that, under the LAD, any person may aid and abet; no ability to bind the employer is necessary. New Jersey may ultimately decide, contrary to our prediction, that harassment by a nonsupervisory employee can constitute aiding and abetting, in which case we would of course follow its interpretation of state law. 33. We note that the claims against the individual defendants are largely symbolic. Hurley's monetary recovery will come from the ACPD, and in practical terms the liability of the individual defendants is not that significant. 53