Opinion ID: 871615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The family court erred in denying Kiese's request to stay his sentence.

Text: Lastly, both the State and Kiese agree that the family court erred in denying Kiese's request to stay the execution of his sentence pending appeal. Because we ultimately affirm Kiese's conviction, and since during the pendency of this appeal, Kiese's six-month probationary sentence has been satisfied, the determination of whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to stay his sentence pending appeal is now moot. Appellate courts generally do not decide moot questions. See Wong v. Bd. of Regents, 62 Haw. 391, 395, 616 P.2d 201, 204 (1980). This court has, however, recognized three exceptions to the mootness doctrine: matters capable of repetition yet evading review, [10] matters affecting the public interest, and matters posing collateral consequences [11] for the defendant. [12] Kiese argues applicability of only the second exception; therefore, we analyze only whether that exception applies.
This court recognized the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine in Johnston v. Ing, 50 Haw. 379, 441 P.2d 138 (1968). In that case, we held: There is a well settled exception to the rule that appellate courts will not consider moot questions. When the question involved affects the public interest, and it is likely in the nature of things that similar questions arising in the future would likewise become moot before a needed authoritative determination by an appellate court can be made, the exception is invoked. 50 Haw. at 381, 441 P.2d at 140. We look to (1) the public or private nature of the question presented, (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination for future guidance of public officers, and (3) the likelihood of future recurrence of the question. Doe v. Doe, 116 Hawai`i 323, 327, 172 P.3d 1067, 1071 (2007) (citations omitted). In this case, the appellate record refers to multiple cases in which a stay has been denied to petty misdemeanants pending appeal. As such, the first and third prongs of the public interest exception test are met, in that the denial of a request for a stay of sentence appears to be an issue that could potentially affect many petty misdemeanor defendants (that is, it is not an issue unique to Kiese as a private individual), and is likely to recur in the future. As to the second prong, because there is no definitive case law on when the issuance of a stay after a petty misdemeanor conviction is appropriate, an authoritative determination is desirable to guide trial courts. As such, the denial of Kiese's request for a stay meets the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Existing case law also supports the general application of the public interest exception in the context of stays. See State v. Cullen, 86 Hawai`i 1, 13, 946 P.2d 955, 967 (1997) (Our affirmance of [Appellant's] conviction moots the prosecution's [challenge to the sentencing court's application of HRS § 804-4]. However, this court has long recognized the exception to the mootness doctrine that arises with respect to matters affecting the public interest.) (citations omitted). Therefore, the ICA erred in not addressing the merits of the stay issue based on the mootness doctrine. Cf. State v. Durham, 125 Hawai`i 114, 126-27, 254 P.3d 425, 437-38 (2011) (concluding that the mootness doctrine did not preclude this court from reviewing whether the trial court erred in considering improper facts in revoking the defendant's probation, although the defendant had completed the special probation condition of a one-year term of imprisonment).
Proceeding to the merits of the issue, we conclude that the family court erred by denying Kiese's request for a stay. Under HRAP Rule 8(c) (1984), Stays in criminal cases shall be had according to law. HRS § 641-14(a) (1993) provides, The filing of a notice of appeal or the giving of oral notice in open court at the time of sentence by the defendant or the defendant's counsel of intention to take an appeal may operate as a stay of execution and may suspend the operation of any sentence or order of probation, in the discretion of the trial court. Although stays are discretionary under HRS § 641-14, HRS § 804-4(a) provides, The right to bail shall continue after conviction of a ... petty misdemeanor[.] See also HRS § 804-4(b)(No defendant entitled to bail, ... shall be subject, without the defendant's written consent, to the operation of any sentenced passed upon the defendant, while any proceedings to procure a review of any action of the trial court ... are pending and undetermined, except as provided in section 641-14(a)[.]). In State v. Ortiz , we held, An accused misdemeanant, petty misdemeanant, or law violator on bail is entitled to bail as a matter of right after conviction and pending appellate review. 74 Haw. 343, 356, 845 P.2d 547, 553 (1993). Furthermore, pursuant to State v. Miller, 79 Hawai`i 194, 200-01, 900 P.2d 770, 776-77 (1995), once release on bail pending appeal is secured, a trial court is without jurisdiction under the sentence of probation that is the subject of the defendant's appeal. Therefore, we hold that Kiese, as a petty misdemeanant on bail after conviction, was entitled to a continuance of bail pending appellate review, during which time the trial court was without jurisdiction to execute his probationary sentence; accordingly, the family court erred by denying Kiese a stay of his petty misdemeanor sentence pending appeal.