Opinion ID: 2352178
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was appellant seized?

Text: According to Ware, an unreasonable seizure occurred when Officer Jones (1) approached him on his motorcycle and in uniform, (2) ordered him to get off his bicycle, put the purse down, and keep his hands where he could see them, and (3) radioed for backup assistance. The government argues, in response, that Ware was not seized until much later, well after probable cause had been established by the discovery of the cocaine in the toothbrush holder. Under the government's theory, Ware was not seized at first because he was free to leave, and because he initiated the voluntary search. We disagree with the government and hold that Ware was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. [5] In In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497 (D.C.1992) (en banc), we stated: The crucial test for determining whether a person has been seized is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business. Id. at 499-500 (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2387, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added in J.M. )). Thus the case law makes clear that [a] seizure does not occur simply because police officers approach an individual and ask a few questions. Oliver v. United States, 618 A.2d 705, 708 (D.C.1993). [6] More is required, as we explained in Kelly v. United States, 580 A.2d 1282 (D.C.1990): Factors which might indicate a seizure would include, for example, the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled. Id. at 1286 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.)); [7] see also In re J.M., supra, 619 A.2d at 502. Applying these factors in the present case, we conclude that the police encounter with Mr. Ware constituted a seizure. The government emphasizes that Ware initiated the conversation and that he was free to walk away because the encounter took place on a public street. See, e.g., Oliver, supra, 618 A.2d at 708 (no seizure occurred when officers approached appellant and asked questions; [h]e involved himself in a consensual discussion, from which he was free to extricate himself at any moment). However, Ware began the conversation only after he was approached by an officer [8] who told him in an authoritative manner to get off his bicycle, put the purse down, and keep his hands out in the open. This, in our view, was a show of authority of the sort discussed by the Supreme Court in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626-629, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1550-1552, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), and Ware's submission to it resulted in a seizure of his person. Id. at 626, 111 S.Ct. at 1550-1551. The totality of these events would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business. Florida v. Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at 437, 111 S.Ct. at 2387 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).