Opinion ID: 2709205
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kidd’s subjective understanding

Text: Kidd argues that the trial court did not sufficiently de‐ termine whether Kidd subjectively understood its warnings. Even if a person of ordinary intelligence would have real‐ ized the import of the court’s warnings, Kidd contends, the court did not do enough to confirm that Kidd himself took any meaning from them. We first note that the defendant’s competence to waive counsel is a separate inquiry from whether the defendant’s waiver is knowing and voluntary. “The focus of a competen‐ cy inquiry is the defendant’s mental capacity; the question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n.12 (1993). “The purpose of the ‘knowing and voluntary’ inquiry, by contrast, is to de‐ termine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.” Id. Kidd has already lost on his competency claim. The Illi‐ nois Appellate Court held that the trial court had no reason to doubt his fitness to waive counsel; accordingly, the court committed no error by failing to order a competency hear‐ ing. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n.13 (“[A] competency de‐ termination is necessary only when a court has reason to doubt the defendant’s competence.”). The state courts also found that Kidd was, in fact, competent at the time of his waiver and throughout trial, and our review does not extend to that determination. But even accepting that Kidd had the ability to under‐ stand the significance and consequences of his waiver, the question remains whether he actually understood the gravi‐ 18 No. 12‐2614 ty of his decision. Kidd argues that the trial court did not sufficiently ascertain this fact. He suggests that if the trial court had conducted a meaningful inquiry into his medical history, current health, and mental capabilities, it might have learned that he had serious cognitive disabilities and was taking potentially mind‐altering medications. The Supreme Court was clear in Godinez that a court is not required to make a competency determination in every case in which a defendant seeks to waive counsel. 509 U.S. at 401 n.13. However, Kidd seems to be calling for something less than a full‐fledged competency hearing. He suggests that the trial court should have asked him some questions de‐ signed to ascertain his ability to comprehend information— questions about his education, mental health background, current medical conditions, or whether he was on medica‐ tion. The trial court did not ask any of these more targeted questions in either waiver hearing. Instead, it explained the significance of the waiver and Kidd’s right to counsel, and at various times paused and asked Kidd whether he under‐ stood. Kidd responded in the affirmative each time. In Kidd’s view, the trial court “solely relied on Kidd’s word.” Kidd faces a substantial hurdle in arguing that the trial court should have done more: the combination of (1) the standard in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and (2) the Supreme Court’s somewhat indeterminate guidance in this area. Under AEDPA, a court conducting reasonableness review focuses on “whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, not whether it applied clearly estab‐ lished federal law correctly.” McCarthy v. Pollard, 656 F.3d 478, 483 (7th Cir. 2011). Although the Supreme Court has No. 12‐2614 19 called for a trial court’s pre‐waiver procedures to be “rigor‐ ous,” Patterson, 487 U.S. at 298, the Court “has not provided extensive direction on the nature of the rigorous restrictions … and procedures that a court must observe.” Smith v. Grams, 565 F.3d 1037, 1046 (7th Cir. 2009) (brackets and in‐ ternal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we have said that a trial court’s failure to formally inquire into a defend‐ ant’s background and subjective understanding is “not fatal” to finding a valid waiver. United States v. Todd, 424 F.3d 525, 533 (7th Cir. 2005). Instead, we look to the specific facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether the trial court was justified in concluding that the defendant’s waiver was knowing. See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (“The determina‐ tion of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”). Under this approach, the trial court’s evaluation of Kidd’s subjective understanding was sufficiently thorough. Kidd cannot identify one specific fact that should have alert‐ ed the court to his allegedly impaired faculties. There simply were no red flags, before or after the waiver. As the state courts repeatedly noted, Kidd never displayed any erratic behavior. The trial court found him lucid and responsive at all times. Moreover, Kidd does not allege that he or Strunck told the trial court that he was on medication until the post‐ trial stage, at which point the trial court did not believe Kidd. Kidd insists that because the court “was dealing with an epileptic, brain damaged, mentally retarded and mentally ill defendant,” it should have done more. But the court had no reason to know that there was any possibility that Kidd did not understand the significance of his actions. 20 No. 12‐2614 Several considerations support the trial judge’s conclu‐ sion. First, Kidd represented his waiver as a strategic deci‐ sion. He told the judge on multiple occasions that it was in his “best interest” to represent himself because, in his view, witnesses had committed perjury during his first trial. When a defendant’s choice appears to be “a strategic decision … made so that he could pursue the case as he desired,” it tends to show that the choice was intelligently made. United States v. Volpentesta, 727 F.3d 666, 678 (7th Cir. 2013). Second, throughout his pretrial hearings, Kidd demonstrated that he was lucid and had some awareness of what conducting a de‐ fense required. He took steps—unprompted—to prepare for trial. During the August 23rd hearing, he asked the court for the transcript and a pass to the law library. He paid attention during the court’s discussion of the government’s witness list, and interrupted to ask whether he would need to pre‐ pare a witness list, too. He expressed dismay at a deadline the court gave him, but said he would try his best to meet it. All of these statements tended to show that Kidd understood what was going on and what he was agreeing to. Finally, Kidd had already been through two capital murder trials; in fact, he had been through this exact trial before. A “defend‐ ant’s prior experience with the judicial system tends to show that he understood that the charge against him was serious and that he was accepting a risk by representing himself.” Todd, 424 F.3d at 533. We have said that Johnson v. Zerbst’s waiver standard “can be met without a demonstration that the accused has a deep understanding of how counsel could assist him.” Unit‐ ed States v. Hill, 252 F.3d 919, 925 (7th Cir. 2001). This is not to discount the “serious and weighty responsibility” that tri‐ al courts have in determining whether a defendant knowing‐ No. 12‐2614 21 ly waived a constitutional right. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723 (1948). This responsibility requires “a penetrat‐ ing and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a [waiver] is tendered.” Id. at 724. But the Constitution only requires the court to investigate as thor‐ oughly as the particular circumstances of the case require. Id. Here, the trial court’s investigation was as thorough as the circumstances called for—and in any event, it was not objec‐ tively unreasonable for the Illinois Appellate Court to find the trial court’s investigation sufficient.4 C. Whether Kidd’s condition prevented him from making a knowing and intelligent choice Kidd also argues that his condition did, in fact, prevent him from making a knowing and intelligent choice. He states that “[c]learly, the drugs prescribed and taken had an effect on whether or not [he] knowingly and voluntarily waived … his right to counsel in his capital murder trial.” He also points to the expert opinions regarding his low IQ, the possibility that he is mentally retarded, and his severe learning disabili‐ ties—all of which establish, he claims, that he lacked the requisite mental capacity to waive counsel. Kidd is precluded from arguing that he was not compe‐ tent to waive counsel; he can only argue that although he had the ability to understand his choice, his IQ and medica‐ 4 Indeed, if we held that the trial court was required to inquire into Kidd’s mental and medical history on the facts of this case, we would arguably be mandating that trial judges always ask these kinds of ques‐ tions when a defendant seeks to represent himself. That would be the kind of one‐size‐fits‐all script that the Supreme Court explicitly es‐ chewed in Tovar. See 541 U.S. at 92. 22 No. 12‐2614 tion prevented him from actually understanding the choice at the time of his waiver. The factors discussed above—the strategic nature of Kidd’s decision, his presence of mind dur‐ ing both waiver hearings, and the fact that the trial court never had a reason to doubt his lucidity—indicate that it was not objectively unreasonable for the Illinois Appellate Court to discount Kidd’s expert testimony in light of what oc‐ curred on the record. Even Kidd’s strongest experts could only speculate as to Kidd’s state of mind at the time of the waiver. As such, Kidd has not put forth “clear and convinc‐ ing evidence” to rebut the state court’s factual finding that during the two weeks in which he persisted in his request to proceed pro se, Kidd understood the nature of his decision. Kidd also argues that he was unable to serve as an ade‐ quate substitute for an attorney, stating that he cannot read or write, has the vocabulary of a five year old, and has poor memory and communication skills. These deficiencies, he argues, would have severely hindered him in his ability to complete basic trial tasks, let alone try a capital case. Yet when it comes to the right to represent oneself, these argu‐ ments are “not relevant.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836 (“[T]echnical legal knowledge, as such, [is] not relevant to an assessment of [the defendant’s] knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”); id. at 834 (“It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts.”). Whether Kidd could effectively represent himself is unrelat‐ ed to whether his waiver was knowing and voluntary. D. Voluntariness of Kidd’s waiver Kidd also claims that his waiver was not voluntary be‐ cause he “felt pressured into representing himself.” Kidd felt No. 12‐2614 23 that he had “no choice” but to represent himself because Strunck suggested that he would not provide help and showed outright hostility toward Kidd. The Supreme Court has said that a waiver is voluntary if it uncoerced. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n.12. The Illinois Ap‐ pellate Court found that “the record does not support de‐ fendant’s contention that he was abandoned and forced to proceed pro se.” This conclusion was not objectively unrea‐ sonable. As the trial court noted, it had observed Strunck and Kidd for over two years, throughout the first trial and after the remand. The court never had reason to doubt their viable working relationship. It is true that before Kidd requested to go pro se, he had asked for private counsel instead of Strunck. He said that he would rather that “anyone outside” of the public defender’s office handle his case. But when the court asked for his reasons, Kidd never suggested that he and Strunck had a difficult relationship or that Strunck had abdicated his responsibilities. In fact, during the hearing on Kidd’s motion for private counsel, he acknowledged that Strunck “did a well good job on this case.” Kidd said that he thought he would have a better chance of acquittal with someone other than a public defender—not that he felt Strunck had abandoned the case. Moreover, Kidd did not mention Strunck during the two August hearings on his re‐ quest to waive counsel. Finally, Kidd invited Strunck to re‐ turn as his counsel for sentencing and post‐trial motions. Kidd put forth affidavits relaying off‐record interactions between him and Strunck. He also introduced his postcon‐ viction attorney’s observations of Strunck’s hostile attitude toward Kidd. But the Illinois Appellate Court was not un‐ 24 No. 12‐2614 reasonable in finding that the assertions in the affidavits did not outweigh what the trial court observed on record before and around the time of the waiver. This is especially true be‐ cause several allegations in the affidavits occurred at indis‐ tinct times or several years before or after Kidd’s waiver. The allegations in these affidavits are certainly troubling, if accu‐ rate; but on this mixed record, we cannot conclude that it was unreasonable for the state court to discount the affida‐ vits in favor of the record evidence.