Opinion ID: 173408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: procedural objections raised on appeal

Text: On appeal, Mr. Christensen argues that the district court erred in (1) failing to order the defendants to prepare an investigative report pursuant to Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317, 318-19 (10th Cir. 1978); (2) ruling on defendants’ motions 2 The district court did not address Mr. Christensen’s claim that his pretrial confinement in the county jail violated his right to equal protection. Given his perfunctory presentation of the claim below, the oversight is not surprising (and Mr. Christensen does not even mention it on appeal). In any event, the claim rests on a supposition–supported by no legal authority–that all persons in federal custody, wherever they are housed, must be held under the same conditions and, therefore, confinement at a county jail where conditions unavoidably (and quite reasonably) deviate from what an inmate in a federal facility might typically encounter is constitutionally impermissible. This position, which would in effect deny federal (and state) prison authorities the ability to temporarily relinquish physical custody of prisoners to local facilities, is meritless. See, e.g., Biliski v. Harborth, 55 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1995); Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1389 (4th Cir. 1993); Joost v. Cornell Corr., Inc., No. 99-1496, 2000 WL 627652, at  (1st Cir. May 9, 2000) (unpub.). The district court also did not specifically address Mr. Christensen’s claim regarding the lack of full-time medical staff. Again, he makes no objection to the omission on appeal, and in any event our de novo review of the pleadings reveals that this claim is facially deficient as well. There is no plausible factual basis to causally connect the asserted constitutional deficiency to the alleged inadequacy of the care Mr. Christensen received: he was in fact examined and treated by medical personnel, at the jail and emergency room. As we will discuss, any inadequacy in his care was a result of decisions made by these professionals, not the lack of medical personnel to make such decisions. -6- without a report and recommendation from a magistrate judge; (3) failing to give him notice of the requirements for responding to a summary judgment motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (4) not allowing him to amend his complaint. 3 We reject the first three objections immediately below, and address the last in connection with our review of the merits of the district court’s dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).
This court’s precedent permitting the use of Martinez reports from prison authorities does not somehow create a procedural entitlement on behalf of prisoners seeking to avoid dismissal of deficient pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6). Indeed, Martinez reports often provide the basis for summary dismissal of frivolous prisoner filings under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, see, e.g., Schlicher v. Thomas, 111 F.3d 777, 779 (10th Cir. 1997); Olson v. Stotts, 9 F.3d 1475, 1476-77 (10th Cir. 1993); Johnson v. Stephan, 6 F.3d 691, 691-92 (10th Cir. 1993); or the grant of summary judgment on behalf of prison defendants, see, e.g., Smith v. Cummings, 445 F.3d 1254, 1257-59 (10th Cir. 2006); Schlicher, 111 F.3d at 779-80; Ledoux v. Davies, 961 F.2d 1536, 1537-38 (10th Cir. 1992). Moreover, the usefulness of Martinez reports, even for the defendant prison 3 He also complains that insufficient efforts were made to serve Sheriff Blackburn and Nurse Eva, but the lack of service on these defendants plays no role in our disposition. -7- officials, is inherently limited in the context of Rule 12(b)(6): “The court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim,” and thus, “[i]n determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim, the district court may not look to the Martinez report, or any other pleading outside the complaint itself, to refute facts specifically pled by a plaintiff, or to resolve factual disputes.” Swoboda v. Dubach, 992 F.2d 286, 290 (10th Cir. 1993). Where, as here, the complaint clearly fails to state a claim, the district court does not commit reversible error in forgoing a Martinez report. B. Decision without Magistrate Judge Report and Recommendation The district court also did not err in declining to refer defendants’ motions to dismiss to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation. The governing statute provides that the district court “may . . . designate a magistrate judge . . . to submit . . . proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition of [such a] motion.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). “The statute permits, but does not require, a district judge to designate a magistrate judge to submit proposed findings or recommendations for the disposition of a case.” Dawson v. Marshall, 561 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 2009). In short, “reference to a magistrate judge is entirely discretionary . . . [and] [t]he litigant has no right to a magistrate judge.” Id. at 933. -8- C. Lack of Notice Regarding Rule 56 Requirements “[W]hen a district court relies on material from outside the pleadings, the court converts the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment . . . , [a]nd when such a conversion occurs, the district court must provide the parties with notice so that all factual allegations may be met with countervailing evidence.” Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1167 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). As the above quote reflects, the conversion process and notice requirement are not triggered by the mere presence of outside materials, but by the court’s reliance on such materials–which are inapposite to a proper Rule 12(b)(6) disposition. See Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that even where court’s receipt of outside materials was undisputed, “to convert the District Court’s Rule 12(b)(6) order to one for summary judgment, we must find that the District Court relied on this material in rendering its decision”). And, for the same reason, even when a district court has erroneously considered extraneous materials on an unconverted motion to dismiss, we may still affirm “if the dismissal can be justified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standards without consideration of the matters outside the pleadings.” Lowe v. Town of Fairland, 143 F.3d 1378, 1381 (10th Cir. 1998) (following Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1566 (10th Cir. 1991)). While the district court briefly mentioned some extraneous materials, in particular relating to the claims involving the Marshal’s responsibility for the -9- conditions of confinement for federal prisoners, our reading of its orders does not indicate a material reliance on this evidence for the court’s determination that the complaint failed to state a constitutional claim against the parties involved. In any event, our own review of the complaint, explained in the next section, does not rely on any material outside the complaint and, thus, properly permits us to affirm under the authorities cited above.