Opinion ID: 1058774
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: chesapeake's prima facie case

Text: We first address the question of whether the Sinclair Property was a corporate opportunity for Chesapeake, because if there was no corporate opportunity, then there was no fiduciary duty to breach in that regard. Contrary to the Defendants' assertion on appeal, the trial court did conclude that the Sinclair Property was a corporate opportunity for Chesapeake: [I]t's clear to the Court that these lots, any lots, were important to [Chesapeake], that they were, in fact, seeking other business opportunities. No reasonable reading of the trial court's determination could lead to a conclusion other than that it found the Sinclair Property to be a corporate opportunity for Chesapeake. The Defendants contend, nonetheless, that there could be no corporate opportunity under the facts of this case. However, the Defendants did not assign cross-error to the trial court's finding that the Sinclair Property was a corporate opportunity for Chesapeake. Thus, they cannot now raise that argument on appeal. Rule 5:18(b); Monahan v. Obici Med. Mgmt. Servs., 271 Va. 621, 637, 628 S.E.2d 330, 339-40 (2006); see also Advanced Marine Enters. v. PRC, Inc., 256 Va. 106, 126, 501 S.E.2d 148, 160 (1998). The unchallenged finding of the trial court is now the law of the case and binding on the parties for purposes of appeal. Board of Supervisors v. Stickley, 263 Va. 1, 6, 556 S.E.2d 748, 751 (2002). The trial court specifically found Williams to be an officer of [Chesapeake]. While the trial court did not use the same words regarding Woodhouse, it found he was the vice president involving production of Chesapeake, a fact Woodhouse admitted in his Answer. The Defendants do not contest on appeal that they were officers of Chesapeake, and in that capacity, had a fiduciary relationship to Chesapeake. Trayer v. Bristol Parking, Inc., 198 Va. 595, 604, 95 S.E.2d 224, 230 (1956) (citation omitted). Neither is there any dispute that Woodhouse or Williams did not disclose the Sinclair Property to Chesapeake or seek Chesapeake's consent to take the Sinclair Property. Accordingly, Chesapeake did prove its prima facie case as to the Defendants in that the Sinclair Property was a corporate opportunity for Chesapeake, which Williams and Woodhouse, as corporate officers of Chesapeake, did not disclose to Chesapeake or seek Chesapeake's consent to take for their direct benefit.