Opinion ID: 41878
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Re-structured Nurse Manager Positions

Text: Johnson initially contends that she presented direct evidence of Morales’ discriminatory bias and points to Morales’ comment that Orientals do not look people in the eye when they talk to them. Morales’ comment does not constitute direct evidence. Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, proves the existence of a fact without inference. Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 641-42 (11 th Cir. 1998). In the Title VII context, for a statement to be direct evidence, it must reflect “a discriminatory or retaliatory attitude correlating to the in her appeal brief to the delayed and changed performance evaluation, but does not challenge on appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim. Therefore, we do not address this claim. See Access Now, Inc., v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that an appellant must clearly and specifically identify issues on appeal in the brief). 8 discrimination or retaliation complained of by the employee.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, to be direct evidence, the remark must indicate that the employment decision in question was motivated by an impermissible factor. Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (11 th Cir. 1999). Morales’ comment was made months before the panel interviews and hiring decisions for the new Nurse Manager positions and did not relate to the decision not to select Johnson for one of those positions. See, e.g., Scott v. Suncoast Beverage Sales, Ltd., 295 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (11 th Cir. 2002) (holding that decisionmaker’s comment made before and not directly related to plaintiff’s termination was not direct evidence of discrimination). Johnson alternatively contends that she presented evidence that Morales’ reasons for not selecting her for one of the new Nurse Manager positions were pretextual.9 Morales offered several reasons for his decision, including Johnson’s lower interview scores, her lack of an advanced degree and her lesser experience in 9 Because Johnson attempts to prove her claims through circumstantial evidence, we evaluate her claims using the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). With regard to Johnson’s discrimination claims, the parties do not dispute that Johnson established her prima facie case and that BVAMC articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its employment decisions. However, with regard to Johnson’s retaliation claims, BVAMC argues on appeal that Johnson did not make out a prima facie case because she failed to show she suffered an adverse employment action. The district court assumed Johnson had suffered an adverse employment action, but concluded that BVAMC was entitled to summary judgment because Johnson failed to show that BVAMC’s reasons for its actions were pretext. Because we affirm the district court’s pretext ruling, we need not address BVAMC’s argument that Johnson did not suffer an adverse employment action. 9 particular areas of ambulatory care. Johnson’s evidence does not rebut any of these reasons. A plaintiff may overcome the employer’s asserted legitimate reasons and avoid summary judgment “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Taylor v. Runyon, 175 F.3d 861, 867 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To establish pretext, the plaintiff must demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find [each of those reasons] unworthy of credence.” Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 (11 th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, No. 05-88 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2005); see also Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012,1024-25 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). In doing so, the plaintiff “must meet [the proffered legitimate] reason head on and rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed simply by quarreling with the wisdom of that reason.” Chapman, 220 F.3d at 1030 (citation omitted). With regard to Johnson’s lack of a Master’s degree, Johnson presented evidence that in the past Morales had placed people who did not have Master’s degrees in Nurse Manager positions. However, Johnson did not provide the 10 contextual information needed to make evidence of these hiring decisions meaningful for purposes of her pretext claim. See Lee v. GTE Fla., Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1255 n.2 (11 th Cir. 2000) (rejecting as meaningless plaintiff’s evidence that decisionmaker had promoted only four women into management and only two women into staff positions because plaintiff provided no “specific context against which to measure these brief facts”). For example, Morales testified that sometimes the person with the Bachelor’s degree has different skill levels and background, which would affect his decision. Johnson did not present evidence of the duties or type of Nurse Manager positions that were filled with someone without a Master’s degree or when these positions were filled. Without more information, this evidence does not call into question Morales’ claim that Johnson’s lack of a Master’s degree was a factor in his decision not to select her for the two particular new, combined Nurse Manager positions. With regard to Johnson’s lower interview scores, she complains that they were subjective and highly suspect in light of Morales’ dramatically lower score for Johnson and his past derogatory comment about Orientals not making eye contact. However, subjective evaluations, including interviews, are permissible bases for making a selection or non-selection, so long as the defendant’s explanation of its reasons are clear and reasonably specific. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 11 1033-34.10 Here, a panel of three consistently gave Johnson the lowest score of the three applicants, and Johnson agreed that the other two panel members were free of bias. Furthermore, Morales consistently graded the hardest of the three panelists. Johnson also contends she presented evidence from which a jury could infer that Morales had already made up his mind to eliminate Johnson months before the panel interviews. Specifically, Johnson points to the following: (1) Johnson’s office being moved; (2) her loss of duties; (3) her being passed over for appointments as Acting NCMS and Call Center Supervisor; and (4) Morales’ decision to eliminate two rather than one Nurse Manager position after McCree decided to retire early. None of this evidence demonstrates “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that BVAMC’s proffered reasons were unworthy of belief. See Cooper, 390 F.3d at 725. Johnson also points to certain organizational charts, but these charts were presented as drafts for discussion, with possible mistakes and omissions. Notably, the only organization chart in the record has one employee’s name crossed out and another employee’s name handwritten in the margin. It also omits mention of 10 Johnson does not argue that Morales failed to give clear and reasonably specific reasons for his interview scores. Moreover, Morales explained that he gave Johnson low scores because she did not stay focused on the questions when she gave her answers, instead going off on tangents, and therefore did not give the answers Morales was looking for. 12 Morales, Moore and Fields. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Morales prepared or helped prepare these particular charts. In addition, it is undisputed that Morales played no role in the selection of the Acting NCMS and that the decision to relocate Johnson’s office due to construction was made by a construction committee of which Morales was only one member. Although Johnson began to lose some of her duties in March 1998, by this time the restructuring of the nursing units had begun. Johnson’s claim that Morales changed the number of Nurse Manager positions to be eliminated from one to two when he realized McCree was going to retire is not supported by the record. First, the record does not establish that Morales initially decided to eliminate only one position and then changed his mind. Moore, not Morales, asked the Nurse Managers to brainstorm solutions if one position was eliminated. Furthermore, Johnson testified that Morales was not present at this brainstorming meeting in which McCree announced her decision to retire early, and Johnson presented no other evidence that Morales was aware of McCree’s early retirement when he announced a couple of weeks later that two Nurse Manager positions would be eliminated. Johnson emphasizes that she had more overall nursing experience and more years of management experience than either of the other candidates. She points out 13 that she interviewed, hired and trained one of the successful candidates ten years before. These arguments do not address head on the reasons for Morales’ decision. Morales testified that seniority was not a factor in his decision and that the three candidates were comparable in their nursing and management experience. Rather, in making his decision, Morales focused on the particular areas of Ambulatory Care in which each candidate had experience, something Johnson’s evidence does not address. By arguing that she has more nursing and nurse management experience than the other candidates, Johnson is merely quarreling with the wisdom of Morales’ decision, which is insufficient to establish pretext.11