Opinion ID: 2979235
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Goff’s Absence at Pretrial Hearing

Text: Goff’s fourth argument on appeal is that his constitutional rights were violated when the district court held a pre-trial hearing without his being physically present in the courtroom, although his attorney was present. This claim fails because Goff has not shown that the hearing was critical to the outcome of his case nor that his presence would have contributed to the fairness of the hearing.
The parties agree that we review this claim for plain error because Goff did not raise it at trial. See United States v. Paul, 57 F. App’x 597, 602, 604-05 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying plain-error review to claim based on judge’s ex parte communications with jurors); see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 732.
Goff argues that his conviction should be overturned because he was not physically present at his final pre-trial conference, in violation of his Sixth Amendment and Speedy Trial rights. “[A] defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.” Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987). Indeed, “[a] defendant’s right to be physically present at every stage of his trial has a longstanding tradition in this country’s criminal jurisprudence, with roots in both the Due Process Clause and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.” Gray v. Moore, 520 F.3d 616, 622 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). “[E]ven in situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him, he has a due process right ‘to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the - 29 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.’” Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934)). On September 18, 2006, the district court held a hearing to consider the Government’s motion to continue Goff’s trial, which had been scheduled to commence that day. Goff’s counsel and an Assistant U.S. Attorney were present, but Goff was not. At the hearing, the court noted that it had dispatched U.S. Marshals to retrieve Goff, but he apparently “was refusing to attend.” (R.E. 721, at 2.) Goff’s counsel stated that he did not realize that the court wanted Goff to attend the hearing and that, when he had spoken with Goff on the phone earlier that morning, he told Goff that he did not know of any reason for Goff to attend the hearing. The court stated that it had wanted Goff to attend the hearing, but that it would not require him to be present. Goff’s counsel did not object to the motion, stating only that Goff “want[ed] the case to go to trial.” (Id. at 4.) The court granted the Government’s motion and rescheduled the trial to begin ten days later. At the beginning of Goff’s trial on the scheduled date, Goff’s counsel raised the issue of Goff’s absence at the previous hearing. Goff’s counsel explained that Goff’s absence was not due to a refusal to attend, but because of a misunderstanding between Goff and the U.S. Marshal dispatched to pick him up over whether Goff was the prisoner needed in court. Goff never objected to the court proceeding conducted in his absence or to the court’s rescheduling of the trial. Rather, Goff’s counsel apparently raised the issue only to ensure that the court understood that Goff’s absence was not based on a refusal to attend, which the court acknowledged. Although Goff characterizes the hearing as being “at the beginning of the trial process,” (Goff Br. 22), it was not part of the trial, which did not start until ten days later. Thus, this does not - 30 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff implicate Goff’s right “to be physically present at every stage of his trial.” Gray, 520 F.3d at 622. Rather, the question to be determined is whether the hearing was “critical” to the outcome of Goff’s criminal case and whether his presence would have “contribute[d] to the fairness of the procedure.” Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745. Goff has not made such a showing. Goff chiefly relies upon United States v. Barnwell, 477 F.3d 844 (6th Cir. 2007), where this Court found that the defendant’s constitutional right to be present had been violated. Id. at 852-53. However, the due process violations in Barnwell are not at all comparable to the alleged violation here. The Barnwell defendant’s convictions were reversed because the trial court had multiple ex parte conversations with prosecutors and multiple in camera meetings with the jury foreperson during the jury’s deliberations, without notifying the defendant or his counsel. Id. The other cases cited by Goff are no more helpful to his position. See Gray, 520 F.3d at 627-29 (holding that a state court’s failure to warn a defendant of possible consequences of continued misbehavior prior to removing him from the courtroom while adverse witnesses were testifying entitled him to habeas relief on one of his convictions); Paul, 57 F. App’x at 604-05 (holding that ex parte communications between the judge and jurors during the trial did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights); United States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 533-35 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that there is no need for an on-therecord colloquy with a defendant to ensure that the waiver of his or her right to be present during voir dire is knowing and intelligent). Goff has not set forth any substantive reason for why this hearing was critical to the outcome of his case nor how he was prejudiced by not attending. Indeed, he does not even allege that he would have objected to the continuance of the trial had he been present. See Stincer, 482 U.S. at 747 - 31 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff (determining that defendant’s constitutional claim failed because there was “no indication that respondent could have done anything had he been at the hearing nor would he have gained anything by attending” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Moreover, he provides no explanation or support for his allegation that his Speedy Trial rights were violated. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not plainly err in conducting the continuance hearing in Goff’s absence. Cf. Coleman v. Ohio Rehab. Servs. Comm’n, 42 F. App’x 733, 733-34 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming denial of habeas petition because a state court’s determination that a continuance hearing was not a critical stage of the proceedings was not contrary to clearly established federal law). E. Sufficiency of Evidence on Money-Laundering Conspiracy Charge Goff’s fifth argument on appeal is that the Government did not present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for conspiring to launder money. A review of the evidence presented at trial—specifically the evidence concerning the purchase and sale of the Plymouth Prowler and the related purchase of the Diamond Mill Road property—reveals that there was sufficient evidence to convict Goff on this charge. 1. Standard of Review We review de novo claims that there was insufficient evidence presented to sustain a conviction. United States v. Gunter, 551 F.3d 472, 482 (6th Cir. 2009). In evaluating such a claim, “[t]he relevant question on appeal is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Warman, 578 F.3d at 332 (quoting United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 330 (6th Cir. 2005)); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In making this - 32 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff determination, we do not weigh the evidence presented at trial, make credibility determinations, or substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Warman, 578 F.3d at 332. Further, “circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a guilty verdict, and it need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” United States v. Martinez, 588 F.3d 301, 314 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). “This standard is a great obstacle to overcome and presents the appellant in a criminal case with a very heavy burden.” Hughes, 505 F.3d at 592 (citation omitted). 2. Elements of Conspiracy to Launder Money Count Two of the second superseding indictment charged Goff with conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and (h). A violation of § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) consists of three elements: “(1) use of funds that are proceeds of unlawful activity; (2) knowledge that the funds are proceeds of unlawful activity; and (3) conduct[ing] or [an] attempt to conduct a financial transaction, knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part to disguise the . . . source, ownership or control of the proceeds.” United States v. Marshall, 248 F.3d 525, 538 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 747 (6th Cir. 2000)). Section 1956(h) criminalizes conspiracies to commit any moneylaundering offense under § 1956. In order to convict a defendant of conspiracy to commit money laundering under § 1956, the Government is required to prove “(1) that two or more persons conspired to commit the crime of money laundering, and (2) that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy.” United States v. Garcia, 259 F. App’x 747, 750 (6th Cir. 2008). In doing so, the Government is not required to prove that Goff committed an overt act in furtherance - 33 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff of the conspiracy. See Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 214 (2005) (holding that “the Government need not prove an overt act to obtain a conviction” under § 1956(h)); United States v. Musick, 291 F. App’x 706, 715 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that no overt act must be proved under Whitfield); United States v. Hynes, 467 F.3d 951, 964 (6th Cir. 2006) (same). But see United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 397 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting an over-act requirement). Rather, the Government needed only to prove that Goff “agreed with another person to violate the substantive provisions of the money-laundering statute during the period alleged in the indictment.” Hynes, 467 F.3d at 964.
At trial, the Government presented substantial evidence regarding the purchase and sale of the Plymouth Prowler and the related purchase of the Diamond Mill Road property. Jerry Manka, a former car dealer, testified that he bought the Prowler for Goff in 1998 at an auction. Goff then paid Manka the $44,000 purchase price in cash installments, including one payment of $25,000. On April 22, 1999, at Marshall’s request, Manka sold the Prowler at an auction for $41,588, and then several days later gave Marshall a $41,000 check made out to Marshall’s title company. Throughout this time, the title to the Plymouth Prowler remained in Manka’s company’s name. Patricia Uihlein, the operations manager at Manka’s bank, testified about three cash deposits totaling $44,000 deposited into Manka’s account in December 1998, around the time the Prowler was purchased. She also testified about a deposit of $41,588 into his account on April 22, 1999, and a $41,000 check drawn from the account from Manka to West End Auto Sales five days later. These transactions - 34 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff coincide with when Manka allegedly sold the Prowler for Marshall. The Government also presented corroborating testimony from employees of the auctions where Manka bought and sold the Prowler. Brown testified that, while Goff was on home confinement, he stored the Prowler for Goff at his house for about three weeks “because [Goff] wanted to keep it away from the eyes of the Feds. He didn’t want them to know the car was there, you know at, the house or that he purchased the car . . . [b]ecause it was purchased with drug money and he was on house arrest.” (R.E. 601, at 125.) Similarly, Marshall testified that he stored the Prowler for Goff for a couple of months. Brown also testified that it was common practice for the conspirators “to transfer [a] car to someone else[’]s name so the authorities wouldn’t find out the true owner. It was also a common practice that we used to leave the car in the dealership’s name . . . .” (Id. at 134.) Marshall testified at trial that he obtained the property on Diamond Mill Road as a new location to receive drug shipments. He further testified that he instructed Manka to sell Goff’s Prowler in order to provide part of the down payment on the property. According to Marshall, he did not tell Goff about the sale, but Goff found out about the sale from Manka. (In contrast, Brown testified that Goff instructed Marshall to sell the Prowler.) Marshall testified that Goff confronted him about the sale of the car while he was visiting Goff in jail, and he explained to Goff why he sold the car and “assured [Goff] [he] was going to pay [Goff] his money back.” (R.E. 607, at 78.) Although the two originally contemplated Marshall’s repaying Goff by fraudulently helping Goff’s mother purchase a house, instead Marshall simply paid Goff $25,000 in cash through Dave Scott. Further, Marshall testified that the title to the Diamond Mill Road property originally was placed in Tico Hill’s name because Hill could secure a loan, but later was transferred to Clarence Parker’s - 35 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff name in order to “conceal the identity of the owner of the property.” (Id. at 40.) Finally, Hill testified that “[a]ll of the money” used to purchase the Diamond Mill Road property “was drug proceeds.” (R.E. 610, at 147.) Based on this testimony, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Goff purchased the Prowler with proceeds that he knew came from illegal drug activity. Further, because Goff conducted the transaction in cash and never transferred the title to his name, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that at least one of the purposes of the transaction was to disguise the source of the proceeds. Further, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Goff was one of a number of people who conspired to use drug proceeds (including drug proceeds by way of the sale of the Prowler) to purchase the Diamond Mill Road property and attempted to conceal the source or ownership of the property by placing the title in Parker’s name. Even if Marshall’s testimony that Goff did not know about the sale of the Prowler before it happened is credited over Brown’s testimony to the contrary, there is still evidence that Goff used drug money to purchase the Prowler through Manka, entrusted the car to Marshall and Brown to store for him, and received proceeds of the Prowler sale with knowledge that the sale was conducted to purchase the Diamond Mill Road property. Together, this evidence is sufficient to sustain Goff’s conviction. Moreover, in addition to the testimony about the Prowler and the Diamond Mill Road property, there was additional, if somewhat tangential, testimony from both Marshall and Brown about other transactions carried out by Goff that support a conclusion that he conspired to launder money. Brown testified that Goff “often said he had [o]ne [m]illion [d]ollars that he needed to spend [while he was] on house arrest.” (R.E. 601, at 141.) According to Brown, Goff purchased a number - 36 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff of real-estate properties while he was on house arrest through straw purchasers, including a used car lot and a duplex. In addition to the Prowler, Brown testified that Goff purchased several other cars while he was on house arrest, including a Dodge Viper, a Lincoln limousine, a 1998 Corvette convertible that cost $50,000, and a custom Excalibur “kit” car that Brown estimated cost $35,000. Brown also stated that Goff purchased several cars from him, including a 1990 or 1991 Corvette convertible for $13,000, a 1990 BMW for $7500, a Cadillac Seville for $4000, and a red sports utility vehicle for $6000. Further, Brown testified that Goff bought a large amount of jewelry while he was on house arrest, including a Rolex watch that Goff said cost $60,000 and a diamond ring that Goff stated cost $40,000 or $50,000. Brown stated that Goff also had between forty and fifty tailored suits made for himself while he was on house arrest, for $1000 each. Similarly, Marshall testified that at one point while Goff was on house arrest, he brought Goff $22,000 in cash to pay for custom suits. Marshall stated that Goff called him and told him that he needed his share of the money to pay for the suits, and Marshall brought him the money that came from the drug sales to buy the suits. Finally, Brown testified that it was “common knowledge” that all of Goff’s money was from drug proceeds, and that the only legitimate job that Goff had ever held was working at a Wendy’s restaurant while he was in high school. (Id. at 143.) Goff’s attempt to liken his case to Marshall, where this Court set aside the defendant’s convictions on three counts of money laundering under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), see Marshall, 248 F.3d at 538-42, is unavailing. In that case, the defendant was convicted of money laundering based on his purchase of a Rolex watch, a tennis bracelet, and expensive wine from proceeds that he stole from a bank. Id. at 538. The case turned on whether the evidence satisfied the third element of the - 37 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) test—conducting the transactions with the purpose of disguising the source of the proceeds. Id. This Court noted that “[t]he ‘most obvious type’ of evidence that would support a finding of intent to disguise the proceeds of unlawful activity is ‘that of employing a third party in order to conceal the defendant’s identity from others.’” Id. at 539 (quoting United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1034 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992)). Other types of evidence that could support such a finding include: statements by a defendant probative of intent to conceal; unusual secrecy surrounding the transaction; structuring the transaction in a way to avoid attention; depositing illegal profits in the bank account of a legitimate business; highly irregular features of the transaction; using third parties to conceal the real owner; a series of unusual financial moves cumulating in the transaction, or expert testimony on practices of criminals. Id. (quoting United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1475-76 (10th Cir. 1994)). The Marshall defendant’s convictions were set aside because the only direct evidence to support the allegation that he made these purchases in order to disguise the source of the money was a false statement he made to someone unrelated to the purchase that he had received the watch as a gift. Id. at 539, 542. This Court rejected the argument that the nature of the items themselves—as potential investments—was evidence of money laundering, and noted that the purchases were made by the defendant in person using credit cards in his own name. Id. at 541. In contrast to Marshall, Goff’s transactions bear numerous indications of concealment: the Prowler title was never transferred into Goff’s name, which Brown testified was a common practice amongst the conspirators to conceal the identity of the owner; Goff asked Brown to store the vehicle to hide it from law enforcement officials; the vehicle was bought and sold through a third party and - 38 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff paid for in cash; and the proceeds of the sale were used to purchase real estate in someone else’s name. Goff’s comparison to Marshall would be more apt if the only support for his conviction were his purchases of expensive clothes, jewelry, and cars. However, the circumstances surrounding the purchase and sale of the Prowler and the purchase of the Diamond Mill Road property distinguish this case from Marshall. Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to convict Goff of conspiracy to launder money. F. Vindictive Prosecution In his final argument challenging his convictions, Goff contends that the Government chose to prosecute him based solely on his decision not to assist the Government following his initial arrest and conviction and his refusal to testify before the grand jury investigating Marshall in July 2004. This claim fails because Goff has not shown that he exercised a protected right which led to the alleged vindictive prosecution. 1. Standard of Review Generally, we review the denial of a motion to dismiss based upon allegations of vindictive prosecution for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 534 (6th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Poole, 407 F.3d 767, 772 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard but noting that this Court also has reviewed findings that there was no vindictiveness under the clearly-erroneous standard). However, while Goff raised a grand-jury-misuse argument before the district court, he did not raise the vindictive-prosecution argument he presents on appeal. Therefore, we review this claim only for plain error. See United States v. Walls, 293 F.3d 959, 970 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Wade, 266 F.3d 574, 584 (6th Cir. 2001)). - 39 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff 2. Standard for Vindictive-Prosecution Claims “It is well established that due process protects against prosecutorial retaliation for a defendant’s exercise of a statutory or constitutional right.” Moon, 513 F.3d at 535. In order to succeed on a claim of vindictive prosecution, a defendant must demonstrate “‘actual vindictiveness,’ by producing ‘objective evidence that a prosecutor acted in order to punish the defendant for standing on his legal rights,’” or, alternatively, “‘a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness[.]’” United States v. Dupree, 323 F.3d 480, 489 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Bragan v. Poindexter, 249 F.3d 476, 481-82 (6th Cir. 2001)). To prevail on a claim via this second approach, a defendant must demonstrate: “(1) [the] exercise of a protected right; (2) a prosecutorial stake in the exercise of that right; (3) unreasonableness of the prosecutor’s conduct; [and] (4) the intent to punish the defendant for exercise of the protected right.” United States v. Suarez, 263 F.3d 468, 479 (6th Cir. 2001). Also, “prosecutorial vindictiveness can potentially be found in the pre-trial addition of charges following pre-trial assertions of protected rights.” Id. 3. Discussion In support of his vindictive-prosecution claim, Goff relies specifically on the fact that he was listed as a previously convicted conspirator in the original 2004 indictment, but was listed as a co-defendant in the subsequent superseding indictments. The Government does not deny that it had a “stake” in Goff’s refusal to cooperate or testify before the grand jury, but argues that Goff cannot satisfy the other three prongs of our test. Goff does not state whether he is attempting to make out a claim of actual vindictiveness or a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness. We analyze the claim under the reasonable-likelihood framework because he has not put forth any objective evidence that - 40 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff the prosecutors were acting to punish him for exercising his rights, and a showing of actual vindictiveness is “‘exceedingly difficult to make.’” Bragan, 249 F.3d at 481 (quoting United States v. Meyer, 810 F.2d 1242, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Goff’s vindictive-prosecution claim fails because he cannot demonstrate that he was exercising a protected right by refusing to testify before the grand jury. This Court previously considered Goff’s refusal to testify, and determined that this refusal was not protected by his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See In re Goff, 112 F. App’x at 423 n.1. After his initial refusal to answer questions, the district court issued an order directing Goff to testify. Id. at 423. When Goff again refused to answer questions, asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the district court issued an order compelling, and granting him immunity for, his testimony: “Such testimony compelled under this Order may not be used against Charles Goff, Jr. in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with this Order.” Id. When Goff refused yet again to testify, the district court found him in civil contempt and ordered him to a period of confinement not credited to the federal sentence he already was serving pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a). Id. at 423-24. This Court upheld the finding of contempt and the period of confinement because Goff’s fear that his family might be harmed based on his testimony did not qualify as just cause to excuse his obligation to testify under § 1826(a). Id. at 424 (citing Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 (1961), and In re Grand Jury Investigation, 922 F.2d 1266, 1273 (6th Cir. 1991)). In doing so, the panel determined that the district court’s grant of immunity “eviscerate[d] any Fifth Amendment claim.” Id. at 423 n.1. - 41 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination “is grounded on a reasonable fear of danger of prosecution.” United States v. Damiano, 579 F.2d 1001, 1003 (6th Cir. 1978). Because Goff was granted immunity to testify, it was not reasonable for him to fear prosecution based on his testimony. Therefore, as the previous panel determined, his refusal to testify was not protected by the Fifth Amendment. Consequently, his refusal to testify cannot satisfy the first prong of the vindictive-prosecution test. Goff also asserts a “constitutional right not to testify against . . . others,” (Goff Br. 29), but provides no legal basis for such a right. To the extent that Goff argues that the Government acted vindictively by prosecuting him based on his general refusal to cooperate with authorities (presumably by refusing to cooperate against his co-conspirators in exchange for a plea deal), his claim still fails to satisfy this prong of the test. Cf. United States v. DeJohn, 368 F.3d 533, 545 (6th Cir. 2004) (“This circuit has consistently indicated that when the right asserted by the defendant is simply the right to go to trial, an additional charge entered after a failed plea bargain cannot . . . form the substance of a viable vindictive prosecution claim.”); Walls, 293 F.3d at 970 (“When the pretrial addition of more serious charges results merely from the failure of the plea bargaining process, it is not vindictive prosecution.”). Finally, as the Government notes, Goff’s theory of retaliation does not explain why he was not listed as a co-defendant in the original indictment, since that indictment was issued in October 2004, three months after his refusal to testify. If the Government truly was retaliating against him for refusing to testify, it seems more likely that he would have been charged in the first indictment, just months after his refusal. Based on this analysis, we reject Goff’s claim of vindictive prosecution. - 42 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff G. Ex Post Facto Clause We now turn to Goff’s sentencing arguments. He first alleges that the district court violated his Ex Post Facto Clause rights by using the 2007 edition of the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines Manual (“the Manual”) in calculating his advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) range. This claim fails because calculating his sentence using the edition of the Manual in effect at the time of the commission of his offense would not result in a shorter advisory Guidelines range. 1. Standard of Review Ex Post Facto challenges raise questions of law that this Court reviews de novo. United States v. Duane, 533 F.3d 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Lacefield, 146 F. App’x 15, 21 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Determining the appropriate version of the guidelines [to apply] is a matter of law that we review de novo.”). However, to the extent that sentencing issues turn on factual issues, this Court reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Shafer, 573 F.3d 267, 272 (6th Cir. 2009). 2. Standards for Ex Post Facto Sentencing Claims “The purpose of the [Ex Post Facto Clause] is to protect citizens against a ‘lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated.’” Duane, 533 F.3d at 445 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30 (1981)). “‘The Ex Post Facto Clause is implicated where a law punishes retrospectively; a law is retrospective if it changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.’” United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 462 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Davis, 397 - 43 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff F.3d 340, 347 (6th Cir. 2005)). In the Guidelines context, a defendant has an Ex Post Facto claim when the retroactive application of an edition of the Manual exposes the defendant to a harsher advisory Guidelines range than the defendant would have been exposed to under the edition of the Manual in effect at the time the defendant committed the crime. See Davis, 397 F.3d at 347-48 (finding an Ex Post Facto violation occurred where the defendant was sentenced to 33 months in prison under a Guidelines range of 33 to 41 months and the earlier edition of the Manual would have resulted in a Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months). “Generally, the district court is instructed to apply the version of the Sentencing Guidelines that were in place at the time of a defendant’s sentencing, unless applying the current Guidelines would amount to a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Gardiner, 463 F.3d at 462 (citing Davis, 397 F.3d at 346); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a)-(b)(1). Further, under the so-called “one book rule,” the Guidelines advise against using more than one edition of the Manual in a single case, except when the court is applying an earlier edition of the Manual, in which event “the court shall consider subsequent amendments [to the Guidelines], to the extent that such amendments are clarifying rather than substantive changes.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(2); see Duane, 533 F.3d at 447. Finally, the Guidelines state that “[i]f the defendant is convicted of two offenses, the first committed before, and the second after, a revised edition of the Guidelines Manual became effective, the revised edition of the Guidelines Manual is to be applied to both offenses.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(3). 3. Discussion Goff contends that the district court violated his Ex Post Facto Clause rights by using the 2007 edition of the Manual—the edition in effect at the time of his sentencing—rather than the - 44 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff edition of the Manual in effect on the date of the commission of his offenses, which he argues would have resulted in a shorter advisory Guidelines range. Goff’s Ex Post Facto claim fails for two reasons. First, he misidentifies the date of the commission of his offense as 1999, rather than 2004, and there is no difference in the Guidelines provisions applicable to him between the edition of the Manual in effect in 2004 and the 2007 edition. Second, even if the 1998 edition of the Manual were the relevant edition for comparison, there would be no Ex Post Facto violation because Goff is subject to the same advisory Guidelines range under that edition, 360 months to life.4 Goff’s first misstep is that he makes his Ex Post Facto Guidelines comparison using the incorrect edition of the Manual. He argues that the 2007 edition—which was used at his sentencing—should be compared to the edition of the Manual in effect in 1999,5 when his last, overt money-laundering conduct took place. This Court rejected a similar argument in Gardiner, concluding that, for sentencing purposes, the date of commission of a conspiracy is established by when the conspiracy was terminated, not the date when the defendant last carried out an act in 4 The Government briefly suggests that such Ex Post Facto Clause challenges may no longer be available to defendants because, after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Guidelines are now advisory. However, in Duane, we refused to hold that such claims are no longer cognizable, noting that we have continued to consider such claims post-Booker; that, in an analogous context, discretionary parole guidelines can give rise to Ex Post Facto claims; and that a number of other circuits have continued to analyze such claims post-Booker. Duane, 533 F.3d at 446 n.1, 447. We find the Government’s argument unpersuasive. Although Goff’s Ex Post Facto claim fails, we continue to recognize the viability of such claims in the Guidelines context. 5 Despite both parties’ references to the 1999 edition of the Manual, the 1998 edition of the Manual, issued November 1, 1998, remained in effect throughout 1999. The 1998 edition was supplemented on May 1, 2000, and replaced with a new edition on November 1, 2000. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guide to Publications & Resources 2007-2008, at 8-9 (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/cat2005.pdf. - 45 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff furtherance of the conspiracy. See Gardiner, 463 F.3d at 462-64. In doing so, we noted that “‘where a conspiracy contemplates a continuity of purpose and continued performance of acts, it is presumed to exist until there has been an affirmative showing that it has terminated; and its members continue to be conspirators until there has been an affirmative showing that they have withdrawn.’” Id. at 463 (quoting United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 642 (6th Cir. 1975)). Further, we concluded that “[h]aving proved the existence of the criminal enterprise and the conspiracy, . . . the government was entitled to a presumption that the conspiracy continued absent an affirmative showing that the conspiracy was terminated or that [the defendant] withdrew.” Id. at 464. Because the defendant was not able to rebut this presumption, we found that the district court correctly employed the later edition of the Manual, eliminating any Ex Post Facto problems. Id. Under Gardiner, the fact that Goff’s direct money-laundering activities ended in 1999 does not control the date of the commission of his offenses for Ex Post Facto sentencing considerations. Goff is correct that the specific transactions in which he was involved took place in 1998 and 1999. Indeed, many of the alleged money-laundering activities consisted of mortgage-fraud schemes in which, according to Marshall’s testimony, Goff did not participate. However, Marshall also testified about other transactions included in the money-laundering conspiracy that occurred as late as 2003. Moreover, the indictment alleged that the money-laundering conspiracy lasted until March 10, 2004. Goff does not contend that the money-laundering conspiracy ended before 2004 or that he affirmatively withdrew from the money-laundering conspiracy, only that his “conduct as to money laundering occurred in 1999.” (Goff Br. 31.) Once the Government proved that the moneylaundering conspiracy “contemplate[d] a continuity of purpose and continued performance of - 46 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff acts”—namely, ongoing financial transactions, at least one purpose of which was to conceal proceeds from the ongoing drug conspiracy—it was entitled to a presumption that the conspiracy continued and Goff remained a party to the conspiracy until and unless he showed that the conspiracy was terminated or he affirmatively withdrew. Gardiner, 463 F.3d at 463. Goff makes no such showing. Significantly, even if we were to find that the date of commission for the money-laundering conspiracy was in 1999, the date of the commission of the drug conspiracy would determine which edition of the Manual applied for both conspiracies under the “one book rule” because, according to the indictment, the drug conspiracy lasted until October 12, 2004. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(3). As in Duane, the two conspiracy counts were grouped together under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 and Goff does not challenge this grouping. See Duane, 533 F.3d at 449. Because the two counts were grouped together properly, and none of the other unique circumstances that existed in Lacefield is present here, the use of the “one book rule” does not support an Ex Post Facto claim. See id. Therefore, for Ex Post Facto purposes, the correct issue to resolve is whether Goff was exposed to a harsher advisory range under the 2007 edition of the Manual than he would have been under the 2003 edition of the Manual, the edition in effect at the end of both conspiracies. Goff does not calculate his sentence under the 2003 edition nor claim that a comparison between the 2003 and 2007 editions would evince an Ex Post Facto violation. Indeed, the Guidelines provisions applicable to Goff appear to be identical in both editions. Therefore, the use of the 2007 edition did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Moreover, even if it were appropriate to calculate Goff’s advisory Guidelines range using the edition of the Manual in effect in 1999, he would not have a valid Ex Post Facto claim because his - 47 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff advisory Guidelines range is the same under this edition of the Manual. Goff is correct to note that the money-laundering Guideline applicable to Goff, U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1, appears in a considerably different form in the 1998 edition of the Manual than it does in the 2003 and 2007 editions. If used to calculate his sentence, the 1998 version of this Guideline would result in a lower total offense level and a shorter advisory Guidelines range. However, precisely because this Guideline would result in a lower total offense level, Goff’s range instead would be calculated using the drug Guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3(a) (requiring the count with the highest offense level to determine the offense level assigned to a U.S.S.G. § 3D12(b) group). Under the drug Guideline, Goff’s base offense level would be 38, with the two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement raising it to 40. While this is lower than his total offense level of 42 under the 2007 edition of the Manual, with his unchanged Criminal History Category of IV, it still results in an advisory Guidelines range of 360 months to life in prison. Accordingly, Goff would not have an Ex Post Facto claim even if the 1998 edition of the Manual were the correct point of comparison. Based on this analysis, we reject Goff’s Ex Post Facto Clause challenge. H. Obstruction-of-Justice Enhancement Goff’s second sentencing argument is that the district court erred in applying the obstructionof-justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 in calculating his advisory Guidelines range because it violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and because “silence can never amount to obstruction of justice.” (Goff Br. 35.) This argument fails because Goff was granted immunity for his grand-jury testimony. - 48 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff 1. Standard of Review This Court’s past decisions are somewhat inconsistent in describing the standard of review we employ in evaluating claims that a district court improperly applied the obstruction-of-justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Compare, e.g., United States v. Jackson-Randolph, 282 F.3d 369, 389-90 (6th Cir. 2002), with United States v. Carter, 510 F.3d 593, 597 (6th Cir. 2007). The most comprehensive approach, which we apply here, follows a three-step inquiry. First, we review the factual findings made by the district court in applying the enhancement for clear error. United States v. Vasquez, 560 F.3d 461, 473 (6th Cir. 2009). Second, we review de novo the district court’s determination as to whether the facts constitute an obstruction of justice, which is a mixed question of law and fact. Id. Third, we review de novo the actual imposition of the enhancement. Id.; see also United States v. Ellison, 336 F. App’x 483, 486 (6th Cir. 2009). 2. Discussion The Guidelines’ obstruction-of-justice enhancement provision states: If (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense or conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The Guideline’s application notes provide a non-exhaustive list of examples of conduct intended to be covered by the provision, which includes “destroying or concealing . . . evidence that is material to an official investigation or judicial proceeding” and “wilfully failing to appear, as ordered, for a judicial proceeding.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(d)-(e). The application - 49 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff notes also state that the “provision is not intended to punish a defendant for the exercise of a constitutional right.” Id. § 3C1.1 cmt n.2. The district court applied the enhancement to Goff’s offense level calculation based on his “refus[al] to testify before the grand jury even after the Government filed a compulsion order.” (R.E. 729, at 18.) Goff does not challenge this factual basis. Instead, he contends that the application of the enhancement violates his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because it is based solely on his refusal to testify before the grand jury. This argument fails because, as this Court previously held, the district court’s grant of immunity “eviscerate[d] any Fifth Amendment claim.” In re Goff, 112 F. App’x at 423 n.1. Goff provides no legal support for his argument that “silence can never amount to obstruction of justice” under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 nor any factual support for his contention that his refusal to testify was not willful. Indeed, this Court has held that “when a defendant has provided no adequate justification as to why he was unable to comply with a grand jury subpoena, the defendant’s failure to appear is, by itself, sufficient to satisfy the government’s burden that [the] defendant willfully obstructed or impeded the administration of justice.” United States v. Dunham, 295 F.3d 605, 609 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 enhancement was applied properly for a defendant who failed to appear before a grand jury after being subpoenaed to appear to provide handwriting exemplars and have his tattoos photographed). Similarly, this Court has held that the enhancement applied where the defendant “asked [a witness] to ‘take the fifth’ before the grand jury.” United States v. Kimball, 194 F. App’x 373, 379 (6th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Gray, 521 F.3d 514, 543 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming application of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 enhancement for a defendant who withheld - 50 - No. 08-4296 United States v. Goff documents responsive to grand jury subpoena and introduced perjured testimony); Carter, 510 F.3d at 598-600 (holding that a defendant’s failure to appear pursuant to an IRS-issued summons requiring him to provide fingerprint and handwriting samples warranted a U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 enhancement). Similarly here, we conclude that the district court was correct in applying the obstruction-of-justice enhancement based on Goff’s refusal to testify after being granted immunity.