Opinion ID: 1925723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpretation of 1929 statute

Text: In 1929 the legislature enacted P.L.1929, ch. 263: Sec. 1. Right of eminent domain granted to electric power companies. Corporations organized under the provisions of section three of chapter sixty of the revised statutes and corporations chartered by special acts of the legislature for the purpose of making, generating, selling, distributing and supplying electricity for lighting, heating, or other public purposes are hereby authorized and empowered to take and hold by right of eminent domain such lands and easements as may be necessary for the proper location of their transmission lines which are designed to carry voltages of five thousand volts or more and of necessary appurtenances thereto, located within the territory in which said corporations are authorized to do a public utility business, in the same manner and under the same conditions as set forth in chapter sixty-one, sections eleven to twenty-two, of the revised statutes and amendments thereto. Sec. 2. Exceptions to application of rights. This right shall not apply to lands or easements located within three hundred feet of an inhabited dwelling, nor to lands and easements on or adjacent to any developed or undeveloped water power, nor to lands or easements so closely paralleling existing wire lines of other utility corporations that the proposed transmission lines would substantially interfere with service rendered over said existing lines except with the consent of the owners thereof, nor to lands and easements owned or used by railroad corporations. Sec. 3. Location to be approved by public utilities commission. Any location to be so taken for such transmission lines shall be approved by the public utilities commission. [5] Our problem lies in the interpretation of the language of this statute. It is obvious that it gave for the first time the authority to take by eminent domain to electric companies which had been organized under the general law and it placed new limitations on the power of such corporations which had been given this authority when chartered by special acts of the legislature. It is not contended by the Protestant that the statute gave the Commission new authority to determine the exigency for the taking of some land for public use. But we are concerned with the construction of the language necessary for the proper location and to the extent of the responsibility of the Public Utilities Commission as to proof before it that the location is the proper location. We are aided in our analysis of this issue by the forthright and carefully chosen language of the Commission's decision which makes it clear that it considers that the legislature granted electric companies full authority to determine public exigency (which is not disputed here) and that the Commission must also accept the utility's determination as to proper location subject only to the four specific statutory limitations as to location, in the absence of proof of bad faith, arbitrariness or abuse of power. [6] Thus, the Commission applies to takings under this statute the same principles that are controlling in takings by the legislature itself, by authorized administrative agencies and municipal and quasi-municipal governments and to takings by private corporations where no approval by a regulatory body is required by statute. The Commission has concluded that the legislature's 1929 determination that takings by an electric power company should for the first time be subject to approval by the Public Utilities Commission as to proper location was not intended to give that tribunal any of the responsibility, formerly exercised exclusively by the condemnor, as to the appropriateness of the location taken. We disagree with the Commission's interpretation of the legislature's intentions. We must first reconsider the rules of construction which we have held applicable to examination of statutes which authorize takings by eminent domain. Statutes authorizing the taking of private property against the will of the owner must be construed strictly against the donee of the right. The power so granted is not to be extended beyond the plain, unmistakable meaning of the language used. Words in the statute fairly susceptible of a meaning limiting the power are to be so construed if the facts will fairly permit. Clark v. Coburn, 108 Me. 26, 78 A. 1107 (1911); Hamor v. Bar Harbor Water Co., 78 Me. 127, 3 A. 40 (1886); Spofford v. Bucksport & Bangor R. R., 66 Me. 26 (1876). We must bear in mind that prior to 1929 there were many small, local companies manufacturing electric power. Most of them had been created by special acts of legislatures. In some cases the charters of these corporations had granted them the power to take property by eminent domain. E. g., Smith v. Western Maine Power Co., supra. In other cases the charters had not. E. g., Priv. & Sp.L.1905, ch. 314. While these electric corporations had not been authorized to take by eminent domain under the general law, all electric companies had been empowered to erect and maintain their lines along municipal streets and public highways, subject to the approval of municipal officers and, in plantations and unorganized areas, by the County Commissioners. R.S.1916, ch. 60, § 13. It is evident that the procedures by which electrical power reached the consumer during the first two decades of the twentieth century became inadequate and unsatisfactory during the third decade. Demands for rural electrification had increased, the services which could be performed electrically had multiplied and technical developments had made possible the transmission of higher voltages over greater distances to meet the new demands. Large producers of power serving great areas replaced the small local companies. Increased voltage was accompanied by enhanced public danger [7] and wider right-of-way clearance for transmission lines was required for safety. Village streets were no longer adequate locations for transmission lines and efficient service required the acquisition of rights of way more direct than the courses of public highways. Landowners were not always willing to give easements across their properties for the new heavy voltage lines. Thenas nowmost people demanded good electric service but wanted the transmission lines built somewhere other than on their land. It is evident from a study of legislative debate on section 2306 that the legislators were aware of the serious public annoyances and hazard which would be presented by the improper location of the new high voltage lines. [8] We consider that the legislature was unwilling to leave the choice of location to the judgment of the utilities, as it had earlier done in the charters of many local companies. The Maine Legislature had earlier made a similar decision as to railroads. In P.L. 1836, ch. 204 the legislature had granted railroad corporations the power to take private property by eminent domain for the location, construction and operation of their railroads, not to exceed four rods in width. By 1865 it had become apparent that the expanding railroad business required the building of depots and P.L.1865, ch. 321 extended the power of eminent domain to include land taken for this purpose. The Revised Statutes of 1871, ch. 51, § 2, further extended the power so that it included land for necessary tracks, side tracks, depots, wood sheds, repair shops, and car, engine and freight houses. In 1865 and 1871 the legislature apparently concluded that an independent agency should have the responsibility for determining the necessity and extent as to this newly authorized taking. In 1871 it was provided that as to the taking for side tracks and buildings, the Railroad Commissioners shall determine how much, if any, of such real estate is necessary for the reasonable accommodation of the traffic and appropriate business of the corporation. R.S.1871, ch. 51, § 3. In construing that statute in Spofford v. Bucksport & Bangor R. R., supra, 66 Me. at 40-41, this Court said: But the legislature was not willing to grant to railroad corporations this great right of eminent domain to be exercised at their discretion, but carefully guarded it by providing in section three, that, `if the parties do not agree as to the necessity and extent of the real estate to be taken for said side tracks and buildings, the corporation may make written application to the railroad commissioners. . . [who] shall then view the premises, hear the parties, and determine how much, if any, of such real estate is necessary for the reasonable accommodation of the traffic and appropriate business of the corporation. Substantially the same language controlled the taking of such additional land in 1929 (R.S.1916, ch. 56, § 26, P.L.1925, ch. 154) except that the Public Utilities Commission had supplanted the Railroad Commissioners as the approving administrative body and the standard of approval of the taking had become the Commissioner's finding that the land is reasonably required in the safe, economical and efficient operation of the railroad and in rendering of adequate common carrier service to the public. Similar language continues today in 35 M.R.S.A. § 652. As this Court pointed out in Roberts, supra note 3, the legislature can delegate to the donee of the power the full determination as to the necessity of the taking (subject to judicial scrutiny for bad faith and arbitrariness) or the legislature may see fit to empower an administrative tribunal or a court to make that determination. Our examination of these statutes demonstrates that other Maine legislatures have considered it inadvisable to give complete discretion as to exigency to various other corporate utilities and, in varying language, have delegated specific responsibility to the Public Utilities Commission. Undoubtedly the accepted rule is that a large discretion is necessarily vested in the donee of the power of eminent domain and will not be interfered with unless the donee is guilty of bad faith or arbitrary or capricious action. 26 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain § 114 (1966). The same rule is apparently applied, in the absence of statutory limitations, to the selection of the location of the land and the amount of it needed. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 9 (1965). However, the language of the statute now under consideration appears to be unique and we find little precedential value in the decisions of other states which have statutes requiring that corporate takings be approved by an administrative tribunal. Several of these have been called to our attention by the parties' briefs. The Pennsylvania statute under consideration in the latest Pennsylvania Supreme Court's study of the issue which has come to our attention (Stellwagon v. Pyle, 390 Pa. 17, 133 A.2d 819 (1957)) permitted a taking by an electric company for location of its facilities, including transmission lines, but required that the Public Utility Commission shall have found and determined, after public hearing, that the service to be furnished by said company through the exercise of said power is necessary or proper for the service, accommodation, convenience, or safety of the public.. . . 15 P.S. § 1182 (now 15 P.S. § 3272). The Court adopted the language of Byers v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n, 176 Pa.Super. 620, 626, 109 A.2d 232, 234 (1954) and ruled: `The selection of a route for transmission lines is a matter for the public utility in the first instance and unless it is shown that it proposes to exercise the powers conferred upon it wantonly or capriciously the law does not intend that the Commission should withhold its approval merely because another route might have been adopted, which would damage the owners less or lessen the inconvenience to them in the operation of their farm.' 390 Pa. at 23, 133 A.2d at 822. It seems to us that the Pennsylvania statute is significantly lacking in language such as is found in our own specifically requiring the Commission's approval as to the proper location which involves factors not necessarily contained in a determination of whether the Pennsylvania service to be furnished [through the taking] . . . is necessary or proper for the service, accommodation, convenience or safety of the public. [9] The Louisiana courts have repeatedly held that the courts will not disturb or interfere with the exercise [of eminent domain in taking rights of way] . . . in the absence of fraud, bad faith or conduct or practices amounting to an abuse of the privilege. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 156 So.2d 297, 302 (La.Ct.App.1963), cert. denied, 245 La. 567, 159 So.2d 284 (1964), quoting from Central Louisiana Electric Co. v. Covington & St. Tammany Land & Improvement Co., 131 So.2d 369, 375 (La.Ct.App.1961). However, the statute which controlled the Louisiana taking required only that the facilities shall be so located, constructed, operated, and maintained as not to be dangerous to persons or property nor interfere with the use of the wires of other wire-using companies or, more than is necessary, with the convenience of the landowner. Central Louisiana Electric Co. v. Covington & St. Tammany Land & Improvement Co., supra, at 374. In California a general statute has required that a taking by eminent domain be located in a manner most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. We find that a District Court of Appeal in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Lux Land Co., 194 Cal.App.2d 472, 476, 14 Cal.Rptr. 899, 902 (1961) applied the principle announced by the Supreme Court in City of Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 255, 27 P. 604, 608 (1891): `The selection of a particular route is committed in the first instance to the person in charge of the use, and unless there is something to show an abuse of the discretion, the propriety of his selection ought not to be questioned, for certainly it must be presumed that the state or its agent has made the best choice for the public; and if this occasions peculiar and unnecessary damage to the owners of the property affected the proof of such damage should come from them.' We note, however, that in 1959 the California legislature saw fit to amend an earlier statute concerning taking land for public parks which had made conclusive the agency determination of necessity and location, and chose instead to make this particular determination only prima facie evidencesomewhat as our own legislatures have decided that certain proposed takings should be examined on a different basis from others. The District Court of Appeal said: After 12 years of experience, the Legislature apparently decided that it would be better to allow the courts the right to judicially review the proposed taking where it was for the purpose of a public park . . . . People ex rel. Department of Natural Resources v. O'Connell Bros., 204 Cal.App.2d 34, 41, 21 Cal. Rptr. 890, 894 (1962).