Opinion ID: 1166817
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The court properly dismissed Appellants' counterclaim for negligent/intentional infliction of emotional distress for failure to state a claim.

Text: Appellants' second count alleged a counterclaim for negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The counterclaim alleged that: 9. The allegations against Mrs. Wheelwright are entirely meritless . . . . 10. Notwithstanding Mrs. Wheelwright's innocence, [HCRC] forwarded by certified mail a letter to Mrs. Wheelwright demanding that she pay to the Claimants thousands of dollars in damages and that Mrs. Wheelwright pay for an advertisement in a general circulation newspaper in Honolulu stating that she was an unlawful discriminator, thus demeaning, humiliating and embarrassing herself in the community. 11. The allegations against Mrs. Wheelwright are abusive, frivolous, unreasonable and intentionally calculated to intimidate and coerce Mrs. Wheelwright into accepting an unwarranted settlement or public conciliation agreement and expanding the fair housing law and the powers of the [HCRC] beyond that intended by the legislature. 12. The above acts were intentional, outrageous, unreasonable and calculated to intimidate, coerce, embarrass and hurt Mrs. Wheelwright. [HCRC] knew or should have known that such said acts would cause Mrs. Wheelwright severe emotional distress. Mrs. Wheelwright suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
The independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress exists under circumstances where a reasonable man [or woman], normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case. Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 17, 780 P.2d 566, 579, reconsideration denied, 71 Haw. 664, 833 P.2d 899 (1989) (quoting Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 173-74, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970)). See also Tabieros v. Clark Equip. Co., 85 Hawai`i 336, 361, 944 P.2d 1279, 1304 (1997). [R]ecovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress by one not physically injured is generally permitted only when there is `some physical injury to property or a person' resulting from the defendant's conduct.' Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 76 Hawai`i 454, 465-66, 879 P.2d 1037, 1048-49 (1994) (quoting Chedester v. Stecker, 64 Haw. 464, 468, 643 P.2d 532, 535 (1982)). In the instant case, Wheelwright's counterclaim is devoid of any allegation of physical injury to herself or another as a result of the conduct of the HCRC. Moreover, over, the conduct complained of does not, as a matter of law, meet the standard for maintaining an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress as set out in Masaki. Wheelwright's counterclaim is based on (1) an allegation that the suit was unwarranted and (2) that the contents of the letter proposing a conciliation settlement were distressing. Neither of these allegations can form the predicate basis for a suit for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress is permitted only if the alleged tortfeasor's acts were unreasonable. An act is unreasonable if it is `without just cause or excuse and beyond all bounds of decency[.]' In other words, the act complained of must be outrageous, as that term is employed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965). Dunlea v. Dappen, 83 Hawai`i 28, 38, 924 P.2d 196, 206 (1996) (quoting Ross, 76 Hawai`i at 465, 879 P.2d at 1048) (citations omitted) (brackets in original). Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment d sets forth the standard for finding liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress, in pertinent part, as: Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. The HCRC's act in sending an official letter offering to settle the complaint if Wheelwright paid monetary damages and took out an advertisement in the newspaper is not outrageous. The HCRC's obvious purpose in doing so, namely, to recompense an alleged victim of unlawful discrimination and deter further conduct, wasin itselflegitimate. It therefore cannot be considered outrageous conduct. There is no set of facts under which the allegations in Count 2 of the counterclaim could support a finding of liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore the circuit court properly dismissed it.