Opinion ID: 1567336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Whether McNeel should receive interest on the back pay owed to her by the MDHS.

Text: ¶ 31. The back pay which McNeel received from the MDHS did not include the interest which accrued during the period of her wrongful termination and post-judgment. In McNeel's 1999 Notice of Appeal Before the Mississippi Employee Appeals Board, her statement of relief requested did not include a demand for interest. Throughout that entire original appeal, before the hearing officer, the full board of the EAB, the circuit court, and this Court, McNeel never requested interest. Neither the original order of the hearing officer, nor the affirming opinions of the full board of the EAB, the circuit court, or this Court, referred to interest. Among the exhibits offered and admitted during Bill McNeel's testimony in McNeel's second appeal, presently before this Court, was the Calculation of Interest on Back Pay Award. The calculations therein provide that McNeel's interest totaled $29,762.12. According to Bill McNeel, the MDHS lost every appeal process from all the way last time. They... had no incentive whatsoever to resolve the issues from 1999. And this thing did drag on until April of 2004 and, also, the [s]tate law I think provides that they should pay interest. [20] ¶ 32. The EAB found that McNeel is not entitled to interest on her back pay; the payment of interest as set out in Section 75-17-1 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, Annotated, does not apply to the State o[r] political subdivisions.  (Emphasis added.) The circuit court disagreed, finding that this Court has held that absent statutory authority ... prohibiting the State of Mississippi and its political subdivisions from paying interest, the State and its political subdivisions shall be liable for such payment. See City of Jackson v. Williamson, 740 So.2d 818, 820-23 (Miss.1999). Concluding that the MDHS failed to cite any such prohibitory statutory authority or case law, the circuit court found that the EAB had erred as a matter of law. The circuit court then determined that Mississippi Code Annotated Section 75-17-7 seems clear ... that the Legislature intended for the judge who hears the complaint to be the one that decides interest issues. Deeming hearing officers to be administrative law judges, the circuit court found they would qualify as judges for purposes of Miss.Code Ann. Section 75-17-7. Therefore, regarding prejudgment interest, the circuit court reversed and remanded for a determination by the hearing officer of whether such an award was proper and, if so, the appropriate rate. The circuit court further decided that post-judgment interest is a statutory right under Mississippi Code Annotated Section 75-17-7, and reversed and remanded for a determination of the post-judgment interest rate which McNeel shall receive on her back pay award. ¶ 33. The MDHS now argues that interest is not a benefit cited in either Mississippi Employee Appeals Board Administrative Rule 24(A) or the Mississippi State Employee Handbook. Therefore, according to the MDHS, the imposition of interest on the back pay award is impermissible because the EAB may not alter compensation paid to an employee if the agency followed rules and regulations of the State Personnel Board. See Miss. Employee Appeals Board Administrative Rule 24(B). Reiterating the position of the circuit court, McNeel responds that absent particular statutory authority from the Legislature prohibiting the State ... and its political subdivisions from paying interest, the State and its political subdivisions shall be liable for such payment. See Williamson, 740 So.2d at 820-23. McNeel adds that [t]he State and its political subdivisions are not excluded in the wording of [Mississippi Code Section 75-17-7]. If a party is not specifically excluded, it must be included. ¶ 34. This Court finds that the EAB erred in stating that the payment of interest as set out in Section 75-17-1 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, Annotated, does not apply to the State o[r] political subdivisions. In Williamson, this Court stated that: the specific language of Rule 37 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure shifts the burden to the State and its political subdivision to provide explicit statutory exceptions to the new general rule that the State and [its] political subdivisions must pay the same costs and interest as individual or corporate appellants who lose their appeals. Williamson, 740 So.2d at 822-23. The EAB was authorized to impose interest on the back-pay award against the MDHS. Furthermore, this Court agrees with the circuit court that post-judgment interest in the case sub judice is mandated by Mississippi Code Annotated Section 75-17-7. That section provides: [a]ll judgments or decrees founded on any sale or contract shall bear interest at the same rate as the contract evidencing the debt on which the judgment or decree was rendered. All other judgments shall bear interest at a per annum rate set by the judge hearing the complaint from a date determined by such judge to be fair but in no event prior to the filing of the complaint. Miss.Code Ann. § 75-17-7 (Rev.2000) (emphasis added). This Court has stated that post-judgment interest is a statutory right. ... Miss. Dep't of Mental Health v. Hall, 936 So.2d 917, 929 (Miss.2006) (quoting U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Estate of Francis ex rel. Francis, 825 So.2d 38, 50 (Miss.2002)). Therefore, [d]ue to the mandatory nature of § 75-17-7 and because public policy heavily favors post-judgment interest, Hall, 936 So.2d at 930, this Court concludes that McNeel is entitled to post-judgment interest. ¶ 35. However, McNeel never requested prejudgment interest at any point in the original appeal, and neither the original order of the hearing officer, nor the affirming opinions of the full board of the EAB, the circuit court, or this Court, referred to interest. For prejudgment interest to be awarded, the party must make a proper demand for the interest in the pleadings. ... Moeller v. Am. Guar. and Liab. Ins. Co., 812 So.2d 953, 958 (Miss.2002) (quoting Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 730 So.2d 574, 577 (Miss.1998)). Additionally, this Court has stated that: [a]ccording to the mandate rule, ... a mandate issued by this Court `is binding on the trial court on remand, unless the case comes under one of the exceptions to the law of the case doctrine.' [ Moeller, 812 So.2d at 960 (quoting Simpson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 564 So.2d 1374, 1377 (Miss.1990))]. These exceptions include `material changes in evidence, pleadings or findings,' Moeller, 812 So.2d at 960 (quoting Cont'l Turpentine & Rosin Co. v. Gulf Naval Stores Co., 244 Miss. 465, 480, 142 So.2d 200, 207 (1962)), and the need for the Court to `depart from its former decision' `after mature consideration' so that `unjust results' will not occur. Moeller, 812 So.2d at 961 (quoting Brewer v. Browning, 115 Miss. 358, 364, 76 So. 267, 269 (1917)). Pub. Empl. Ret. Sys. v. Freeman, 868 So.2d 327, 330 (Miss.2004). As the basis for the EAB's denial of interest on McNeel's back pay was legally erroneous, this Court remands for further consideration. On remand, the EAB, acting pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 75-17-7, shall determine the post-judgment interest rate to which McNeel is entitled. As to prejudgment interest, however, this Court finds that any such award by the EAB is foreclosed by both McNeel's waiver of such claim and the mandate rule. [21] See id.; Moeller, 812 So.2d at 958.