Opinion ID: 1095462
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: On Reading Section 109

Text: Section 109 reads: No public officer or member of the legislature shall be interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with the state, or any district, county, city, or town thereof, authorized by any law passed or order made by any board of which he may be or may have been a member, during the term for which he shall have been chosen, or within one year after the expiration of such term. [Emphasis supplied] On our oaths we must apply these words as best fits their common and ordinary meaning, our referents being the work of Noah Webster and Henry Campbell Black more than 1890's constitutional draftsmen. We have no interest in what the constitution makers intended, except insofar as that intent may be divined from the words employed, because in substantial part there is no other method of the remotest reliability of ascertaining the makers' intent. [1] Moreover, our state has changed since 1890. As it is a constitution we expound, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 4 L.Ed. 579, 610 (1819), we should read and apply Section 109 in the manner which best fits its language and best serves our state today. See Alexander v. Allain, 441 So.2d 1329, 1334 (Miss. 1983); Stepp v. State, 202 Miss. 725, 729-30, 735-36, 32 So.2d 447, 447-48, 33 So.2d 307, 309 (1948); Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 102-03, 178 So. 799, 806 (1938).
Our reading of Section 109 today is in a special context. Our constituent assembly has enacted implementing legislation which we are told exceeds its constitutional authority. Today's case is wholly unlike Cassibry v. State, 404 So.2d 1360 (Miss. 1981), relied upon so heavily by the majority, for nothing regarding the Section 109 question in Cassibry asked the Court to declare legislation unconstitutional and thus void. The majority recites at the outset of its opinion the legislative enactments which standing alone undoubtedly render legal the actions of the majority of the Appellants here. Inexplicably the majority then proceeds to analyze the conduct and activities of these Appellants wholly ignoring that judicial review of legislative action calls to bear wholly different ground rules. Specifically, the majority asks the question whether Sen. Anderson, Reps. Frazier and Nunnally, et al., have engaged in conduct which offends Section 109 of the Constitution. The correct method of analysis, however, is to consider first whether the conduct of these legislators violates the statute and, upon the inescapable determination that there is no statutory violation, we should ask whether in whole or in part the statutory scheme, not the conduct of individuals, offends Section 109. Without doubt, our constitutional scheme contemplates the power of judicial review of legislative enactments. Alexander v. State ex rel. Allain, 441 So.2d 1329, 1333 (Miss. 1983). That power may be exercised affirmatively, however, only where the legislation under review be found in palpable conflict with some plain provision of the... constitution. [2] Hart v. State, 87 Miss. 171, 176, 39 So. 523, 524 (1905). The unconstitutionality of a statute must be made to appear beyond all reasonable doubt before this Court has authority to hold the statute, in whole or in part, of no force or effect. See, e.g., Mississippi Power Co. v. Goudy, 459 So.2d 257, 263, 274 (Miss. 1984); Anderson v. Fred Wagner & Roy Anderson, Jr., Inc., 402 So.2d 320, 321 (Miss. 1981); Clark v. State ex rel. Mississippi State Medical Association, 381 So.2d 1046, 1048 (Miss. 1980); Russell Investment Corp. v. Russell, 182 Miss. 385, 419, 182 So. 102, 107 (1938); Miller v. State, 130 Miss. 564, 585, 94 So. 706, 709 (1923). To state that there is doubt regarding the constitutionality of an act is per force to declare it constitutionally valid. Ivy v. Robertson, 220 Miss. 364, 370, 70 So.2d 862, 865 (1954); Russell Investment Corp. v. Russell, 182 Miss. 385, 419, 182 So. 102, 107 (1938); State ex rel. Greaves v. Henry, 87 Miss. 125, 143, 40 So. 152, 154 (1906). The point is put otherwise. We have dozens of cases stating, often without citation of authority because the point is so clear, that statutes are presumed constitutional, albeit rebuttably so. See, e.g., Mississippi Power Co. v. Goudy, 459 So.2d 257, 263 (Miss. 1984); Hart v. State, 87 Miss. 171, 176-77, 39 So. 523, 524 (1905). This presumption is not idly accorded. It is based in the fact that a statute such as Section 25-4-105 comes before this Court sustained and authenticated by the sanction and approval of two of the three great departments of state government. Russell Investment Corp. v. Russell, 182 Miss. 385, 419, 182 So. 102, 107 (1938). See also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 2772, 65 L.Ed.2d 902, 920-21 (1980). The legislators who have enacted the statute here under review have taken the same oath as have we to uphold and support the Constitution. See Alexander v. State ex rel. Allain, 441 So.2d 1329, 1347 (Miss. 1983); see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64, 101 S.Ct. 2646, 2651, 69 L.Ed.2d 478, 486 (1981). It has long been settled in this state that, when the constitutionality of a statute is drawn into question, a construction will be placed upon it, if reasonably possible, to enable it to withstand the constitutional attack and to carry out the purpose embedded in the legislative language. Chassanoil v. City of Greenwood, 166 Miss. 848, 860, 148 So. 781, 783 (1933); see also State ex rel. Greaves v. Henry, 87 Miss. 125, 143-44, 40 So. 152, 154 (1906); Hart v. State, 87 Miss. 171, 176-77, 39 So. 523, 524 (1905); Burnham v. Sumner, 50 Miss. 517, 520-21 (1874). A like approach applies to the construction of the open-textured language of constitutional provisions such as Section 109; that is, out of deference to the authority and prerogatives of the legislature, we will ordinarily afford the gray areas of the constitution any reasonable construction that will avoid unconstitutionality of the statute. Miller v. State, 130 Miss. 564, 585, 94 So. 706, 709 (1923). [3] This is for the obvious reason that the propriety, wisdom and expediency of a statutory enactment is a question for the legislature, not this Court. Anderson v. Fred Wagner & Roy Anderson, Jr., Inc., 402 So.2d 320, 321 (Miss. 1981); Russell Investment Corp. v. Russell, 182 Miss. 385, 419, 182 So. 102, 107 (1938). In the final analysis we recognize that in cases such as those presented today we confront the exercise of our authority in a context which requires the utmost delicacy. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148, 48 S.Ct. 105, 107, 72 L.Ed. 206, 210 (1927) (Holmes, J.). We should proceed with caution, Russell Investment Corp. v. Russell, 182 Miss. 385, 419, 182 So. 102, 107 (1938); State ex rel. Greaves v. Henry, 87 Miss. 125, 144, 40 So. 152, 154 (1906), and accord all weight due the decisions of the legislature by virtue of the existence of that body as a co-equal branch of the government. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64, 101 S.Ct. 2646, 2651, 69 L.Ed.2d 478, 486 (1981); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 102, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2086, 36 L.Ed.2d 772 (1973). We exercise our authority of judicial review remembering that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270, 24 S.Ct. 638, 639, 48 L.Ed. 971, 973 (1904). When enactments of a legislature relate to matters of general interest, and can be vindicated under express or justly implied powers, .. ., disposition in the judiciary should be strong to upheld them. Planters' Bank of Mississippi v. Sharp, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 301, 319, 12 L.Ed. 447, 455 (1848). Put otherwise, we are obliged to proceed with sympathetic regard for the work of the lawmaking department of our government. State ex rel. Forman v. Wheatley, 113 Miss. 555, 589, 74 So. 427, 429 (1917).
On one point there seems no doubt. The clear wording of Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-105(2) and (3) (Supp. 1986) renders lawful the public service of Sen. Anderson, of Reps. Frazier and Nunnally, and of Supervisor Killebrew. The case for affirmance must proceed on the premise that this statute is in relevant part unconstitutional. And, indeed, on page 46 the majority concludes that in part the statute is so defective. Its methodology en route is unusual. To begin with, the majority provides a discussion entitled Interpretation Guidelines. See pp. 694-695. I have described what is missing that ought be there in Part B above. I am as much disturbed by what I find there as by what is missing. I suppose the majority's sidestep of the accepted canons of construction applicable in cases of judicial review is to be found in its declaration that Section 109 is self-executing. (p. 694) What follows belies that declaration as the majority labels gray areas the two key parts of Section 109: interested, directly or indirectly and authorized, and proceeds with its alternately formalistic and realistic construction, depending upon who is the Appellant at risk, demonstrating quite convincingly that Section 109 is anything but self-executing. The majority does something else odd. Much is made of the failed 1984 and 1986 amendments to Section 109, (pp. 684-685, 695, 697, 698) as though somehow meaning has been accorded the wording that remains. I know of no legal doctrine or principle that accords weight to an unsuccessful effort to amend a law, and the majority cites none. I could as well argue that the voters have expressly ratified the circumstances of Sen. Anderson and Rep. Nunnally, for the fact that each was a teacher was well known to the voters at the time each last stood for reelection. [4] I make no such argument, of course, for I know it legally as specious as the majority's point. In the majority opinion, page 695, the interpretive process is turned on its head. We are admonished to construe Section 109 in accordance with the plain meaning of its words... . Page 695. So far so good. But the sentence ends ... so long as it bears some relationship to this purpose. Think about this. The majority says, follow the words of Section 109  so long as they bear some relationship to this purpose, and, presumably, then abandon (or expand) the section's wording. But to what purpose? Whence gathered? The error here  and it is quite fundamental  is in the premise that the purpose has some independent, prior extra-legal existence which modifies the plain meaning of the words of Section 109. What the majority is saying is that it accepts certain value judgments as having the power to modify the constitution, notwithstanding its inability to find those value judgments in that constitution. The majority drives home the point by its amazing injunction that the wording of Section 109 should not be given some abstractly valid meaning where this would cause grave risks to be imposed on the sound government of the people. This Court has authority to construe the constitution to proscribe the grave risks proscribed by the constitution and none other. What the majority does in the end is act upon its subjective perception of grave risks which (a) are not identified or proscribed by the plain wording of Section 109, (b) are not identified by reference to any authoritative source regarding the history of the wording of Section 109  not one word in the majority opinion points to any legitimate source of constitutional history suggesting that so much as a single delegate to the 1890 constitutional convention entertained the thought Section 109 means what we today say it means, and (c) are not supported by one word in the record before us. The majority's reading of Section 109 is based in quicksand. My point is simple. We begin the enterprise of interpreting the constitution with its ratified meaning. We give that wording the most enlightened and coherent reading it may be given. That reading must not only fit the wording, it should provide the best fit. And that fit must be tailored today. But we dishonor the constitution qua law when we resort to subjective value judgments and ephemeral notions of grave risks which may not be found contemplated or incorporated within a fair reading of the constitution. This is particularly so when identification of and proof of the reality of those risks is found in no authoritative historical source nor in the evidence before us or within our judicial knowledge. Finally, one of the great and seemingly eternal wars among legal scholars has been fought between so-called formalists or objectivists, on the one side, and realists or criticalists, on the other. Admittedly oversimplified, the central issue in that war has been whether law should be seen as a mass of hard edged, case decider rules which once identified and applied, produce automatic (self-executing) results, or is law a sociological phenomenon practiced through identification of and balancing of interests and the exercise of judgment and discretion. Legal scholars on each side have expended passion and risked careers and professional reputations in this war. For the most part the two camps have found themselves on common turf about as often as Arab and Israeli, and about as congenially, although over a lifetime an occasional ambivalent jurist has waivered between the magnetic tensions of the two poles. All of which is to provide context for my thought that the majority's opinion is striking in its formalistic march up the hill to affirm the cases of Appellants Anderson, Frazier, Nunnally, followed by a march back down to realism in the case of Nunnally's wife, then back up the hill to formalism to nail Killebrew and, back down to realism for Logan. I don't think I've ever seen such in a single opinion, nor as much.