Opinion ID: 2590190
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Weber Fire District's Liability to Suit under Section 63-30-10 of the Governmental Immunity Act

Text: ¶ 12 The District contends that the trial court erred in ruling that it was not immune from suit. Generally, it is appropriate to address liability issues, particularly the issue of whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of due care, prior to addressing the affirmative defense of the defendant's immunity from suit. See, e.g., Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1163-64 (Utah 1993); Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1162 (Utah 1991). Here, however, defendants in effect admit that Chief Burton owed a duty of care to plaintiffs and that that duty was breached. For that reason, we proceed directly to the issue of governmental immunity. ¶ 13 Ledfors established a three-step analysis for determining whether a governmental entity is entitled to immunity under the Act. First, was the activity the entity performed a governmental function and therefore immunized from suit by the general grant of immunity contained in section 63-30-3? [Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1).] Second, if the activity was a governmental function, has some other section of the Act waived that blanket immunity? Third, if the blanket immunity has been waived, does the Act also contain an exception to that waiver which results in a retention of immunity against the particular claim asserted in this case? Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1164. ¶ 14 The first question, therefore, is whether driving an emergency vehicle to a fire is a governmental function. This inquiry is mandated by section 63-30-3(1), which establishes the general principle of governmental immunity subject to certain exceptions. Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities are immune from any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental function.  Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1) (emphasis added). The District qualifies for this blanket grant of immunity if Chief Burton was engaged in a governmental function at the time of the accident. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a). Under this statutory definition, we conclude that driving an emergency vehicle to the scene of a fire is a governmental function and is therefore presumptively cloaked with immunity by section 63-30-3 of the Act. [3] Cf. Rollow v. Ogden City, 66 Utah 475, 243 P. 791 (1926) (stating that doctrine of respondeat superior will not apply to municipality acting in governmental capacity like fighting fires). ¶ 15 The second issue under Ledfors is whether the Act provides an exception to that immunity. Section 63-30-10 provides a broad waiver of governmental immunity for negligent acts of an employee committed in the course and scope of employment. Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment . . . . Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10. Given the jury verdict, this waiver applies in this case. ¶ 16 The next question is whether the Act contains an exception to that waiver. Section 63-30-10 has several subsections that exclude certain activities from the waiver and thereby retain immunity. Subsections 15 and 18(b) are two exceptions that are arguably applicable here. Section 10 states: Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of: . . .; (15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14; . . . ; or (18) the activities of: . . . ; (b) fighting fire . . . . Id. (emphasis added). These exceptions to the general waiver of immunity are in the alternative. Therefore, the District is immune from liability if either exception is satisfied. Although we have construed several of the exceptions in section 63-30-10 as to the waiver of immunity, [4] we have not previously addressed either subsection (15) or subsection (18). ¶ 17 In construing these subsections, we apply long-standing rules of statutory construction. This court's primary objective in construing enactments is to give effect to the legislature's intent. Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). The plain language of a statute is generally the best indication of that intent. See Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996). Therefore, where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the language's plain meaning to divine legislative intent. Horton v. Royal Order of the Sun, 821 P.2d 1167, 1168 (Utah 1991) (citation omitted). The plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under the same and related chapters. Roberts v. Erickson, 851 P.2d 643, 644 (Utah 1993) (per curiam) (citation omitted); see also Silver v. Auditing Div., 820 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1991); Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980). Furthermore, where possible we . . . construe statutory provisions so as to give full effect to all their terms. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991). Most pertinent here is the rule that a statute dealing specifically with a particular issue prevails over a more general statute that arguably also deals with the same issue. See Madsen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086, 1090 (Utah 1985). ¶ 18 Giving full effect to the language of subsections (15) and (18) and reading them in harmony with related statutes, it is apparent that only subsection (15) applies to the facts of this case. Subsection (15) applies to the operation of an emergency vehicle, and that is precisely the activity in which Chief Burton was engaged at the time of the accident. Subsection (18)(b), on the other hand, is more general; it provides an exception to the waiver of immunity for activities of . . . fighting fire. Standing alone, this provision could arguably apply to this case, but we conclude that because subsection (15) applies with greater specificity, it should govern. See Madsen, 701 P.2d at 1090. ¶ 19 This conclusion is bolstered by a detailed reading of subsection (15) and its reference to a provision of the Motor Vehicle Code. Subsection 63-30-10(15) provides that liability shall not attach for negligence if the injury arises out of the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(15). At the time of the accident, section 41-6-14 provided: (1) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call or when in pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges under this section, subject to Subsection (2). (2) The operator of an authorized vehicle may: (a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter; (b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation; (c) exceed the maximum speed limits if the operator does not endanger life or property; or (d) disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning in specified directions. (3) Privileges granted under this section to an authorized emergency vehicle apply only when the vehicle sounds an audible signal under Section 41-6-146, or uses a visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-132, which is visible from in front of the vehicle. (a) The privileges under this section do not relieve the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to operate the vehicle with regard for the safety of all persons, or protect the operator from the consequences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges. Id. § 41-6-14 (1988) (emphasis added). This section specifically refers to the privilege of driving an emergency vehicle through a red light when responding to a fire alarm. Because those are precisely the circumstances of this case, subsection 63-30-10(15), which incorporates section 41-6-14, is the more specific provision and therefore controls over subsection 63-30-10(18)(b). [5] ¶ 20 But whether subsection (15) in fact provides an exception to the waiver depends on whether Chief Burton's conduct complied with the requirements of that section. For the District to be immune under subsection 63-30-10(15), it must show that plaintiffs' injuries arose out of the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14.  Id. § 63-30-10(15) (emphasis added). At the time of the accident, section 41-6-14 provided in pertinent part: The operator of an authorized vehicle may . . . proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation . . . . Id. § 41-6-14(2)(b) (1988) (emphasis added). Chief Burton, therefore, had the privilege of running the red light only if he slowed down as necessary for safe operation. This plainly presented a factual question for the jury.