Opinion ID: 2585163
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hawai`i Law

Text: Nelson brought a sexual harassment claim pursuant to HRS § 378-2, which provides: It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice... [b]ecause of ... sex ... [f]or any employer to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or discharge from employment, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual in compensation or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment[.] Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by HRS § 378-2. See Hawai`i Administrative Rules (HAR) § 12-46-109(a) (1998). Generally, there are two different forms of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile environment. See Steinberg v. Hoshijo, 88 Hawai`i 10, 18 n. 11, 960 P.2d 1218, 1226 n. 11, reconsideration denied, 88 Hawai`i 10, 960 P.2d 1218 (1998); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir.1991); see also HAR § 12-46-109(a). Quid pro quo cases generally involve allegations that an employer conditioned employment benefits on sexual favors. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 875. Hostile environment sexual harassment (HESH) is defined as: Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or visual forms of harassment of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when ... [t]hat conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. HAR § 12-46-109(a)(3) (emphases added). The aforementioned definition of HESH is virtually identical to the corresponding federal regulations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, [8] adopted by the EEOC. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (2000). This court has held that a HESH claim exists when an employee can show: 1. that he or she was subjected to sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, 2. that this conduct was unwelcome; and 3. that the conduct had the purpose or effect of either: a. unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or b. creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. Steinberg, 88 Hawai`i at 18, 960 P.2d at 1226 (citing HAR § 12-46-109) (emphases added). The aforementioned holding in Steinberg tracks the language of HAR § 12-46-109(a)(3) and makes clear that a plaintiff can establish a claim by showing that the alleged sexual conduct had the purpose or effect of either (a) unreasonably interfering with work performance, or (b) creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. In addition to the foregoing elements, a plaintiff is also required to establish that the harassing conduct was severe or pervasive. See Steinberg, 88 Hawai`i at 18, 960 P.2d at 1226. However, in discussing this severe or pervasive requirement, state and federal courts and agencies have used somewhat inconsistent language. For example, based on federal case law interpreting Title VII, Steinberg discussed the perspectives to be used in evaluating a HESH claim as follows: [T]he perspective to be used is that of the victim. Thus, if the complainant is a woman, the objective standard is met if a reasonable woman would consider such conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and either [(a)] unreasonably interfere with work performance or [(b)] create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. Id. at 18, 960 P.2d at 1226 (emphases added) (citing, inter alia, Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878-79.) The language in Steinberg, setting forth the severe or pervasive requirement (see underscored text above), although not incorrect, is different from the standard discussed in Ellison. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879 (stating that a plaintiff must show that conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment). The required showing has also been described by the HCRC as follows: The conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment, such as having the purpose or effect of [(a)] unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or [(b)] by creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. Santos v. Niimi, No. 91-001-E-SH at 2 (HCRC Final Decision Jan. 25, 1993) (adopting conclusions of law from Proposed Decision Nov. 4, 1992 at 27) (citing, inter alia, HAR § 12-46-109(a)(3); Ellison, supra ). Nelson contends that instruction No. 9 was misleading and misstated Hawai`i law by, inter alia, stating that Nelson had to prove that the conduct had the purpose or effect of both altering the conditions of [Nelson's] employment and creating an intimidating, hostile, abusive, or offensive working environment. Nelson essentially argues that, inasmuch as the term alter the conditions of employment is similar to alternative (a) (unreasonably interfering with work performance), instruction No. 9 improperly suggested that Nelson was required to prove both (a) and (b). Defendants recognize that instruction No. 9 used language different from that used in Hawai`i courts and by the HCRC in describing the required showing, but maintain that the difference is immaterial. Defendants contend that the trial court correctly instructed the jury based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986), which requires the plaintiff to establish that the alleged conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive environment. See id. at 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (internal quotations and brackets omitted) (bold emphasis added); see also Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. Because the language used in both state and federal case law to describe the required showing is somewhat inconsistent, we believe that it is necessary to review the development of the severe or pervasive requirement found in the federal case law and relied upon by this court in Steinberg.