Opinion ID: 2537389
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sanders's Constitutional Claims

Text: Constitutional challenges to a statute are reviewed de novo. Rentschler v. Nixon, 311 S.W.3d 783, 786 (Mo. banc 2010). A statute is presumed to be constitutional and will not be held unconstitutional unless it clearly and undoubtedly contravenes the constitution. Lester v. Sayles, 850 S.W.2d 858, 872 (Mo. banc 1993). The courts will enforce a statute unless it plainly and palpably affronts fundamental law embodied in the constitution. Id. The party claiming that the statute is unconstitutional bears the burden of proof. Id.
Article I, section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution provides [t]hat the right of a trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate. This constitutional guaranty means that all the substantial incidents and consequences, which pertained to the right of trial by jury, are beyond the reach of hostile legislation and are preserved in their ancient substantial extent as existed at common law. State ex rel. St. Louis, K. & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Withrow, 133 Mo. 500, 36 S.W. 43, 48 (1896). The Missouri Constitution itself creates a cutoff at which point the right is evaluated. Particularly, the phrase `as heretofore enjoyed' has been interpreted to mean that the constitution protects the right as it existed when the constitution was adopted and does not provide a jury trial for proceedings subsequently created. Hammons v. Ehney, 924 S.W.2d 843, at 848 (1996). As heretofore enjoyed refers to the right as it existed before the constitution's first adoption in 1820. Adams v. Children's Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 907 (Mo. banc 1992) (citation omitted). This Court has already considered whether the legislature could limit non-economic damages in a common-law personal injury claim relative to article I, section 22(a). Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 907. In Adams, this Court held that the legislature has the right to abrogate a cause of action cognizable under common law completely. Id. at 907 (citing DeMay v. Liberty Foundry Co., 327 Mo. 495, 37 S.W.2d 640, 649 (1931)). Adams then held, If the legislature has the constitutional power to create and abolish causes of action, the legislature also has the power to limit recovery in those causes of action. Id. We need not decide whether Sanders is correct that Adams incorrectly stated the law as to common law causes of action. Missouri does not recognize a common-law claim for wrongful death. This Court has reaffirmed time and time again that a claim for damages for wrongful death is statutory; it has no common-law antecedent. State ex rel. Diehl v. O'Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Mo. banc 2003). [6] In its present form, the action for wrongful death is provided by section 537.080.1, RSMo 2000. [7] The legislature has the power to define the remedy available if it creates the cause of action. The Court's recent opinion in Overbey affirms: [T]he legislature has the authority to choose what remedies will be permitted under a statutorily created cause of action. . . . The legislature in so doing, at least in regard to a statutorily created cause of action . . . limited the substance of the claims themselves, as it has a right to do in setting out the parameters of a statutory cause of action. Estate of Overbey v. Chad Franklin Nat'l Auto Sales N., LLC, 361 S.W.3d 364 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting Scott v. Blue Springs Ford Sales, Inc., 176 S.W.3d 140, 141-42 (Mo. banc 2005)). Sanders attempts to avoid this result through three arguments that wrongful death is a common law cause of action rather than statutory: first, that the original proscription of the cause of action at common law was dicta; second, that Missouri did not adopt the common law bar on wrongful death recovery; and third, that wrongful death should be considered a continuation of the predicate tort causing death. This Court has already rejected the dictum argument related to Lord Ellenborough's pronouncement in Baker v. Bolton, (1808) 1 Camp. 493; 170 Eng. Rep. 1033, which stated that one could not recover in court for the death of another. See Glick v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609, 614 (Mo.1965), overruled on other grounds by Bennett v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 896 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. banc 1995); see also Osborn v. Gillett, L.R. 8 Ex. 88 (1873) (reaffirming Baker ). This Court has also rejected Sanders's second argument. Glick, 396 S.W.2d at 614. 396 S.W.2d at 614 (emphasis in original), overruled on other grounds by Bennett, 896 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. banc 1995). Sanders asserts, in the alternative, that his claim arises out of the underlying tort of medical negligence and, therefore, existed at common law. This incorrectly states the law. Wrongful death was, and is, a new statutory cause of action independent of the predicate tort. Sullivan v. Carlisle, 851 S.W.2d 510, 515 (Mo. banc 1993) ([A] wrongful death claim . . . is neither a transmitted right nor a survival right, but is created and vests in the survivors at the moment of death.) (citations omitted); see also Lawrence v. Beverly Manor, 273 S.W.3d 525, 528-29 (Mo. banc 2009) (Wrongful death . . . is a cause of action separate from the underlying torts, although it is treated differently for the purposes of venue). Here, the General Assembly merely placed limits on the amount of non-economic damages recoverable under a statutorily created cause of action. [8] The provisions within section 538.210 limiting non-economic damages in wrongful death suits do not violate article I, section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution.
Sanders next contends that the damages limitation interferes with the judiciary's performance of its constitutionally assigned power to render judgments in conformity with the jury's verdict and to enforce judgments upon the verdict because it prevents the collection of the amount of damages that the jury found to be fair and appropriate. [9] Article II, section 1 of the Missouri Constitution reads: The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments the legislative, executive and judicial each of which shall be confided to a separate magistracy, and no person, or collection of persons, charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances in this constitution expressly directed or permitted. It is difficult to point out the precise boundary which separates legislative from judicial duties. . . . The authority that makes the laws has large discretion in determining the means through which they shall be executed. DeMay, 37 S.W.2d at 650 (citation omitted). In adopting this statute, the General Assembly created the law through which the wrongful death cause of action operates. The fact-finderwhether judge or jurymakes a factual determination when returning its verdict. The judge then enters judgment by applying the law to the fact-finder's determination. The limit on damages within section 539.210 interferes neither with the jury's ability to render a verdict nor with the judge's task of entering judgment; rather, it informs those duties. Compare Overbey, 361 S.W.3d at 383 (holding that limits on punitive damages placed on statutory causes of action do not violate separation of powers), with Fust v. Attorney General, 947 S.W.2d 424, 430-31 (Mo. banc 1997) (holding that limits on punitive damages in common law causes of action do not violate separation of powers). The remedy available in a statutorily created cause of action is a matter of law, not fact, and not within the purview of the jury. Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 907. To hold otherwise would be to tell the legislature it could not legislate; it could neither create nor negate causes of action, and in doing so could not prescribe the measure of damages for the same. This Court never has so held and declines to do so now. The General Assembly has the right to create causes of action and to prescribe their remedies. The General Assembly may negate causes of action or their remedies that did not exist prior to 1820. The judiciary has the duty to prescribe the trial process and to protect those rights to jury trial as existed prior to 1820. Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 22(a); art. II, sec. 1.