Opinion ID: 749094
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Tabada's Testimony

Text: 15 Sonny raises only one issue on appeal. He argues the district court erred by refusing to strike Tabada's testimony after Tabada invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence during cross-examination. We disagree. 16 As a witness for the prosecution, Tabada testified on direct examination that he had met with Sonny on several occasions and had purchased methamphetamine from him. He testified he contacted the narcotics department for the following reason: 17 Because I just wanted to straighten out--my life, because my family was--I seen plenty guys that get drug addicts, or something, they get too much problems already, so I just decided to turn in these guys, you know, was dealing drugs. 18 During cross-examination, Tabada testified that he made money gambling and sometimes worked at the gambling place. He testified he did not report on his 1994 federal income tax return the money he made gambling or the money he earned from a side job. He also testified he received money from the DEA for providing information on Sonny on almost every occasion that he met with the DEA. Tabada also testified he went to the DEA because his wife had caught him with his girlfriend and his girlfriend's friends had begun to threaten him. He testified he went to the DEA for protection. 19 Tabada also testified he sold small quantities of methamphetamine in 1994. Outside the presence of the jury, the district court then advised Tabada of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. Tabada invoked these rights and chose to remain silent unless the prosecution provided him with immunity. The prosecution refused to do so. 20 Tabada then invoked his right to silence when, during cross-examination, he was asked: (1) whether he had used ice or methamphetamine in 1994; (2) whether he bought methamphetamine from Polly Fajardo in 1995; (3) whether he used methamphetamine with Fajardo in 1995; (4) beyond Sonny, the names of other people from whom he purchased methamphetamine in 1995; (5) beyond the three purchases, how many other times he purchased or was involved in the sale of methamphetamine in 1995; (6) whether he went to the DEA because he was in way over [his] head in dealing drugs; and (7) whether his girlfriend's friends were threatening him based on his drug dealing activities. The district court denied Sonny's motion to strike Tabada's entire testimony. 21 We review for abuse of discretion the district court's refusal to strike testimony after the witness refuses to answer questions during cross-examination. United States v. Montgomery, 998 F.2d 1468, 1478 (9th Cir.1993). The district court has wide discretion in making this determination. United States v. Seifert, 648 F.2d 557, 562 (9th Cir.1980) (quotations and citation omitted). The district court abuses its discretion by refusing to strike the witness's testimony if invocation of the privilege blocks inquiry into matters which are 'direct' and are not merely 'collateral.'  Id. at: 561. Even if the district court errs by refusing to strike the testimony,. however, we review for harmless error. United States v. Williams, 626 F.2d 697, 702 (9th Cir.1980). 22 Assuming, without deciding, that the district court erred, any error was harmless. Tabada's refusal to answer the specific questions clearly would not have undermined the government's case. See id. The evidence against Sonny was overwhelming. Also, Sonny's counsel had ample opportunity to test Tabada's credibility and did elicit evidence damaging to Tabada's credibility. Tabada admitted he had engaged in illegal and deceitful conduct and had sold methamphetamine. His testimony also contradicted his earlier testimony that he provided information against Sonny because he felt it was the right thing to do. Tabada testified that he received regular payments from the DEA for providing the information and that he went to the DEA for protection after being threatened by his girlfriend's friends. Finally, had Tabada answered the particular questions, the answers would not have related to the details of the methamphetamine purchases from Sonny. In these circumstances, any error was harmless. See id. 23 AFFIRMED. 24 REINHARDT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 25 I believe the district court erred in refusing to strike Tabada § testimony. I would, therefore, reverse with respect to the conspiracy convictions of both Sonny and Donald. 26 Sonny and Donald were entitled as a matter of constitutional right under the Confrontation Clause to explore Tabada's bias. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). They were, however, denied the crucial opportunity to expose how and why Tabada's past drug dealings may have been responsible for his decision to cooperate with the government and to testify against Sonny and Donald. Furthermore, on direct examination, the government elicited from Tabada a favorable account of his reasons for cooperating with law enforcement and on re-direct attempted to rehabilitate him by eliciting a different, but again favorable, account of his reasons for testifying adversely to the defendants. Under these circumstances, cross-examination as to Tabada's motives was neither cumulative nor collateral, and his repeated fifth amendment refusals to answer questions put to him for the purpose of exposing those motives required the district court to strike his testimony. Because Tabada's testimony was the only direct evidence on the conspiracy counts, those convictions must be reversed. 27 The majority assumes that the failure to strike Tabada's testimony was error, but concludes that it was harmless. In explaining this conclusion, the majority first states that the evidence against Sonny was overwhelming. As to the conspiracy counts, this is clearly incorrect. The majority fails to isolate or even discuss the evidence with respect to the conspiracy convictions. Instead, in explaining why the error was harmless, it next launches into a discussion of how Sonny's counsel adequately explored certain areas involving Tabada's credibility. While this discussion might be relevant to whether the trial judge committed error by refusing to strike Tabada's testimony, an error the majority has already assumed, it does not pertain to the question whether the error was harmless. There is, indeed, no further explanation for its wholly unsupported conclusion with respect to the conspiracy convictions. 28 The district court's failure to strike Tabada's testimony was clearly not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt--the standard required for constitutional error--with respect to either conspiracy conviction. In fact, both those convictions were based almost exclusively on Tabada's testimony. Tabada's testimony that on one occasion Donald handed Sonny an envelope containing methamphetamine when asked to [g]ive me the ice was the only direct evidence of Donald's participation in a conspiracy and the only direct evidence that Donald even knew of his brother's drug dealings or sought to assist him. 1 Accordingly, the failure to strike Tabada's testimony was not harmless error with respect to Donald, and I would reverse his conspiracy conviction. 2 29 For similar reasons, the failure to strike did not constitute harmless error with respect to Sonny's conspiracy conviction. The elimination of Tabada's testimony would have left the jury with no evidence on which to conclude that Sonny had conspired with anyone at all, known or unknown. The government neither alleged nor presented evidence that Sonny had any co-conspirators other than Donald. Accordingly, I would reverse Sonny's conspiracy conviction as well. 30 With respect to the remaining convictions--Sonny's convictions on the substantive counts --- I would affirm.