Opinion ID: 1225502
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal to Instruct on Specific Mitigation Evidence

Text: (21) Defendant claims that the trial court erred when, at the close of the penalty phase of his trial, it refused to give the jury a defense-proposed instruction on specific evidence to be considered in mitigation. The proposed instruction comprised over 40 specific factors ranging from whether defendant has a low sense of self-esteem and self-worth to the defendant's inability to meet the expectations of society which he perceived to the defendant's artistic potential. In his argument here, defendant characterizes his proposed instruction as a pinpoint instruction and relies on our holdings in People v. Rincon-Pineda, supra, 14 Cal.3d 864, and People v. Sears, supra, 2 Cal.3d 180. Using language that is appropriate in this case, we rejected a similar argument in People v. Noguera, supra, 4 Cal.4th at page 648: We upheld the trial court's refusal to give a similar, so-called `pinpoint' penalty determination instruction  also urged on the authority of Sears  in People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d 754. We pointed out that `Under Sears [a criminal defendant] ha[s] a right to an instruction that `pinpoint[s] the theory of the defense.' [Citation.] Here, as in People v. Benson, supra , the proffered special instruction for the most part in effect argued the evidence by `highlight[ing] certain aspects ... without further illuminating the legal standards at issue [citations].' [Citation.] Other instructions given by the trial court and summarized above adequately covered the defense theory in the penalty phase. Those elements of defendant's special instruction that were not argumentative were thus duplicative, and the trial court did not err in declining to give them. [Citation.] There was no error. (Italics in original.)