Opinion ID: 8414576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sexual Orientation Discrimination As Associational Sex Discrimination

Text: Next, sexual orientation discrimination is discrimination “because of ... sex” because it treats people differently due to the sex of their associates. The associational discrimination theory, which we articulated with respect to racial discrimination eight years after our decision in Simonton, provides that “an employer may violate Title YII if it takes action against an employee because'of the employee’s association with a person of another race.” Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2008). As we explained, “[t]he reason [for this holding] is simple: where an employee is subjected to adverse action because an employer disapproves of interracial association, the employee suffers discrimination because of the employee’s own race” in relation to the race of his or her associate. Id. at 139 (emphasis in original). As the Supreme Court has observed, Title VII “on its face treats each of the enumerated categories exactly the same,” 1 and for that reason “the principles ... announee[d]” with respect to sex discrimination “apply with equal force to discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin,” and vice versa. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 n.9, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). Thus, the associational theory of race discrimination applies also to sex discrimination. Putting aside romantic associations, this principle is not controversial. If a white employee fired or subjected to a hostile work environment after friendly association with black coworkers has a claim under Title VII, see Drake v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 881, 883-84 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding no categorical bar to the application of the associational theory of race discrimination to interracial friendships), then a female employee fired or subjected to a hostile work environment after friendly association with male coworkers should have a claim under Title VII. Once we accept this premise, it makes little sense to carve out same-sex relationships as an association to which these protections do not apply, particularly where, in the constitutional context, the Supreme Court has held that same-sex couples cannot be “lock[ed] ... out of a central institution of the Nation’s society.” Obergefell v. Hodges, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2602, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015); see also United States v. Windsor , — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2693-94, 186 L.Ed.2d 808 (2013) (explaining that differentiation between opposite-sex and same-sex couples in the Defense of Marriage Act “demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects, and whose relationship the State has sought to dignify” (citation omitted)). In sum, if it is race discrimination to discriminate against interracial couples, it is sex discrimination to discriminate against same-sex couples. Therefore, I conclude that if gay, lesbian, or bisexual plaintiffs can show that they would not have been discriminated against but for the sex of their associates, they have made out a cognizable sex discrimination claim. In such a case, the associational theory of sex discrimination would encompass discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Because Si-monton and Dawson were decided before Holcomb, we have had no opportunity to address the associational theory of sex discrimination as applied to sexual orientation discrimination.