Opinion ID: 1583791
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Section 533D.9 is Unconstitutional Under our State and Federal Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.

Text: In this case, there is no fundamental right or protected class involved. Therefore, our analysis of Richey's substantive due process and equal protection claims is ultimately similar to our evaluation of the inalienable rights clause. [6] The reasonableness of section 533D.9 is at issue again, and we must specifically determine whether it passes constitutional muster under a rational basis review. See Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 662 (noting when no fundamental right is involved, a statute need only survive a rational basis analysis to meet the requirements of substantive due process); Grovijohn, 643 N.W.2d at 204 (If the claimed dissimilar treatment does not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right, any classification made by the statute need only have a rational basis [to meet the requirements of equal protection].). Moreover, although Richey bases her claims on both the Iowa and Federal constitutions, we need not interpret them differently in this case. See Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 817, 819 (Iowa 2005) (noting we would not apply different analyses under the Iowa and Federal constitutions when the parties have not articulated a reason for doing so); State v. Davis, 304 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Iowa 1981) (The Supreme Court of Iowa is the final arbiter of the meaning of the Iowa Constitution, but when the federal and state constitutions contain similar provisions, they are usually deemed to be identical in scope, import, and purpose. Special respect and deference is accorded United States Supreme Court interpretations of similar language in the federal constitution.). Rational basis review requires only that the law `be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.' State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264, 277 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Sanchez, 692 N.W.2d at 817-18); see Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 662 (noting rational basis review requires us to consider whether there is a `reasonable fit between the government interest and the means utilized to advance that interest' (quoting State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 238 (Iowa 2002))). We have also recognized `[w]hen social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude, and the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.' Sanchez, 692 N.W.2d at 817 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313, 320 (1985)). While rational basis review is deferential to the legislature, `it is not a toothless one.' Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Iowa 2004) (citation omitted). The State has a legitimate interest in protecting borrowers or limiting the fee delayed deposit lenders can charge. Section 533D.9 is certainly rationally related to this purpose. Section 533D.9(1) specifically limits the amount lenders can charge, and subsection (2) requires disclosure of all important terms. Iowa Code § 533D.9(1), (2). Moreover, Chapter 533D imposes important restraints on delayed deposit lenders that would otherwise not be imposed or complied with. See, e.g., id. § 533D.10( f ) (prohibiting a lender from imposing any other fees than those allowed in section 533D.9(1) and (2)). While some, and certainly Richey in this case, believe the limits and protections in section 533D.9 authorize usurious terms, this is a concern that should be taken to the legislature, not the courts. See Sanchez, 692 N.W.2d at 817. We hold section 533D.9 passes rational basis review, and is therefore not a violation of equal protection or substantive due process.