Opinion ID: 2204600
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Doubleday was required to exhaust his administrative remedies before the agency prior to raising this challenge.

Text: The CFEC argues that Doubleday may not raise a challenge to its method of setting permits because he did not raise this claim before the agency, and therefore has not exhausted his remedies with regard to this claim. Doubleday argues that exhaustion should not be required because it is obvious that CFEC's use of the number of vessels as equivalent to the number of units of gear violates the Limited Entry Act. A claimant must generally exhaust administrative remedies before making a claim in court challenging the agency's decision-making procedures. We have observed that [t]he basic purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to allow an administrative agency to perform functions within its special competenceto make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies. [22] On the other hand, certain pure issues of law, most notably constitutional issues but also certain questions of statutory validity, are within the special expertise of the court, rather than the administrative agency. [23] However, our cases make clear that only the purest legal questions, requiring no factual context, are exempt from the exhaustion requirement: If a procedural challenge to agency decisionmaking has simply been dressed in constitutional clothing, or if the action is an attempt to substitute a damage claim in tort for an unperfected administrative remedy, the complainant must first exhaust administrative remedies. On the other hand, if the claim does not challenge any particular decision by an agency and instead calls upon the superior court to review only the validity of a statute, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required.[ [24] ] We have suggested that accusations that an agency has violated a statute are generally subject to the requirement of exhaustion. [25] Under the Limited Entry Act, the CFEC must base the maximum number of permits on the maximum number of units of gear fished in that fishery during any one of the four years immediately preceding [limitation]. [26] The CFEC freely admits that it considers vessels equivalent to units of gear and claims that they are equivalent for this type of fishery. Although Doubleday states that this is obviously in violation of the Limited Entry Act, he does not explain how or why another definition would be more appropriate to this fishery. Neither party addresses the definition of unit of gear in the Limited Entry Act or its application to sablefish longline fisheries. The term unit of gear is defined by statute for limited entry fisheries. Alaska Statute 16.43.990(11) states that a unit of gear means the maximum amount of a specific type of gear that can be fished by a person under regulations established by the Board of Fisheries defining the legal requirements for that type of gear. By its terms, the implementation of this statutory definition requires application of expertise about the fishing industry. Definitions for unit of gear for some distressed fisheriesusing types of gear other than longlineshave been provided by regulation: `unit of gear' means the aggregate amount of gear operated from a single vessel. [27] We have previously noted the commission's use of the number of vessels to set the maximum number of units of gear in the Northern fishery, without explicitly ruling on whether the number of unit[s] of gear is equivalent to number of vessels. [28] No definition for unit of gear is provided for the sablefish fisheries in the definition section of the regulations, no definition of unit of gear is specific to the Northern and Southern fisheries, [29] and neither side has pointed to any additional regulations providing further details on the appropriate procedures for setting the maximum number of units of gear in the sablefish longlining context. We cannot agree with Doubleday's assertion that the CFEC has committed obvious error in using a vessel count to calculate the maximum unit of gear. In the absence of regulatory clarification of the definition of units of gear, no basis exists for evaluating the allegation that the CFEC has improperly found units of gear to be equivalent to number of vessels. Doubleday apparently believes the maximum number of units of gear should be the same as the number of permit-holders fishing, but does not explain why that more clearly equates with the statutory definition. It is unclear from the record how many longlines or operators are on a typical sablefish vessel or how one would go about determining the maximum number of longlines that could be operated by one person in accordance with the legislature's directive in AS 16.43.990(11). In summary, this term cannot be defined without factual context and expertise regarding the fishing industry. This question clearly falls within the agency's expertise. For that reason, we apply our rule that it is axiomatic to our system of justice that we have a factual context within which to review a case. [30] This agency decision has been made in a factual context we are ill-equipped to understand without a record developed at the agency level. We therefore conclude that Doubleday was required to exhaust this claim within the agency appeal process. [31]