Opinion ID: 1940407
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial Court's Error in Finding Lapan Competent to Serve

Text: According to Busby, the trial court erred when it refused to grant Busby's challenge for cause against Kim Lapan, a former guard of death row inmates at Florida State Prison. He argues that Lapan's acknowledged biases against death row inmates and admitted willingness to execute persons who had committed premeditated murders presented reasonable doubts as to his impartiality. We agree. Lapan was not only a former correctional officer at Florida State Prison, he had worked directly on death row. He stated during voir dire that some of the correctional officers involved in the prison death of Frank Valdez [5] were friends of his. During voir dire, the following exchange occurred between Lapan and defense counsel: [6] [By the defense] Q Mr. Lapan, would you say that you oppose or you are in favor [of the death penalty]  A I am in favor of it. I worked in Florida state prisons. Q Did you work on death row? A Yes. . . . . Q Based upon your experiences as a correctional officer, if I told you that you would end up learning this homicide occurred inside a prison, do you think that would affect your ability to sit as a juror? A Possibly. Q Would that be something that knowing the position that you held before, you might consider something an aggravating circumstance beyond what the judge says, based on your own personal experiences? A Possibility. Q We talk about aggravating circumstances. You understand that's what the judge is going to read as far as the circumstances that are recognized by law to possibly warrant a death penalty? A Yes. Q And mitigating circumstances being those circumstances the law says you can consider as to whether a life imprisonment sentence might be appropriate. You understand that as well? A Yes. Q Knowing that you have worked on death row as well, you understand these days life means life? A Right. Q Knowing that, do you think that based on your experiences as a correctional officer that worked on death row, that there might be things in your mind that are aggravating circumstances that you would consider outside those that the judge read you, particularly once you learn that this homicide was  A No. I don't think so. I think I can determine what the judge wants and go by what they feel are the parameters we are supposed to stay within. Q So what you are saying, even though you worked as a correctional officer for eight years  A Yes, sir. Q  with part of that time spent on death row  A Yes, sir. Q  that you don't think that any of your own personal experiences would come into play as far as maybe you think something is an aggravating circumstance that could possibly warrant a death sentence that was not included in the judge's instructions? A I would like to think I could be openminded enough. . . . . Q Do you believe that life in prison is severe enough punishment for someone who is found guilty of premeditated murder? A No. Q If  understanding that you have to find Mr. Busby guilty of premeditated murder for us to make it to a second phase? A Yes. Q Would that fact be considered by you as an aggravating circumstance that might cause you to vote for death  the judge is not going to tell you that is an aggravating circumstance. But knowing that  to get to the second phase you would have to find Mr. Busby guilty of premeditated murder, do you think that would be something that would weigh in favor of the death sentence in your mind? A No, I don't think so. Q Are there any cases that you can think of particularly based upon you working on death row? Are there any cases that you think would automatically warrant the death penalty regardless of aggravating and mitigating circumstances? A Yes. Q What would that be? A Child molesters. Some of the heinous crimes that are committed, the way they murder or kill, what they have done to the victims. Their past history on  you know, can they, you know, what will happen when they have done their time  there isn't time. That's right. . . . . Q Are there any other circumstances that you can think of  A I can't think of any offhand. . . . . Q Now you had mentioned someone having been convicted prior of crimes. Might in your mind be something that would cause you to automatically vote for the death sentence? A Possibly. Q I think you are anticipating my next question. Is that a situation where no matter what mitigation circumstances are given, vote for death regardless of the mitigating circumstances? A Unless there is extremely  proof is proof. I am not understanding some of the questions. They are so hypothetical. That, you know  Q I am going to clarify this one question involving a situation where someone had previously been convicted of a crime. What I am asking is, is that one of those situations where no matter how much proof of mitigation  A No. Q  you would say, no, that crime is a death penalty every time in my mind? A No. Q While you were at F.S.P., were you ever the victim of any assaults? A Yes. Q Do you think that is something in your own mind if you learn that this had taken place in a correctional institution would factor in regardless of what the judge said as far as affecting your mind? THE COURT: You can answer that if that the going to affect your decision in this case. THE PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I don't know. BY MR. DOSS [The Defense]: Q If the judge instructs you to set your personal feelings aside, would that be something you can or can't set aside? A I believe I can. The defense moved to strike Lapan for cause after individual voir dire based on his experience as a correctional officer on Florida's death row. Defense counsel expressed doubt that Lapan could set aside those experiences, despite his assertions that he could. The trial court denied the motion. After group voir dire, the defense again moved to strike Lapan for cause, this time citing Lapan's friendship with officers in the Valdez case, and the different biases and prejudices he had. The motion was again denied. It is within a trial court's province to determine whether a challenge for cause is proper, and the trial court's determination of juror competency will not be overturned absent manifest error. Fernandez v. State, 730 So.2d 277, 281 (Fla.1999). The decision to deny a challenge for cause will be upheld on appeal if there is support in the record for the decision. See Gore v. State, 706 So.2d 1328, 1332 (Fla.1997); see also Mendoza v. State, 700 So.2d 670, 675 (Fla.1997) (A trial court has latitude in ruling upon a challenge for cause because the court has a better vantage point from which to evaluate prospective jurors' answers than does this Court in our review of the cold record.); Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 635-36 (Fla.1997) (In reviewing a claim of error such as this, we have recognized that the trial court has a unique vantage point in the determination of juror bias. The trial court is able to see the jurors' voir dire responses and make observations which simply cannot be discerned from an appellate record.). The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render a verdict solely on the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given by the court. See Lusk v. State, 446 So.2d 1038, 1041 (Fla.1984). A juror must be excused for cause if any reasonable doubt exists as to whether the juror possesses an impartial state of mind. See Bryant v. State, 656 So.2d 426, 428 (Fla.1995); see also Hill v. State, 477 So.2d 553, 556 (Fla.1985) (providing that if any reasonable doubt exists as to whether a juror possesses the state of mind necessary to render an impartial recommendation as to punishment, the juror must be excused for cause). In this case, all three prospective jurors who were working as correctional officers at the time of the voir dire were dismissed for cause. Neither of the two potential jurors with prior experience as correctional officers was dismissed for cause. This Court has consistently held that the mere fact that someone is a correctional officer is not per se grounds for a cause challenge. See State v. Williams, 465 So.2d 1229, 1230 (Fla.1985) (holding that the court did not err when it denied challenge for cause against two correctional officers in a prosecution for battery against a correctional officer in a correctional institution); Lusk, 446 So.2d at 1041; Morgan v. State, 415 So.2d 6, 10 (Fla.1982). Therefore, the fact that Lapan was a former correctional officer was not, in and of itself, grounds for a cause challenge. The question for this Court is whether the trial court should have granted a cause challenge based on Lapan's responses when he was asked if he could be impartial in serving on Busby's jury. Lapan gave very equivocal responses to several critical questions regarding his ability to serve as an impartial juror in this type of case. The mere fact that a juror gives equivocal responses does not disqualify that juror for service. The question is whether the responses voiced by Lapan were equivocal enough to generate a reasonable doubt about his fitness as a juror. In evaluating a juror's qualifications, the trial judge should evaluate all of the questions and answers posed to or received from the juror. Parker v. State, 641 So.2d 369, 373 (Fla.1994). The trial court must excuse a prospective juror for cause if any reasonable doubt exists regarding his ability to render an impartial judgment and recommendation as to punishment. See Bryant, 656 So.2d at 428; Hill, 477 So.2d at 556. Lapan's equivocation on multiple sensitive and material questions regarding his ability to be impartial raise reasonable doubt about his fitness to serve as a juror in this type of case, and should have resulted in his being excused from the panel for cause. Importantly, Lapan responded that the fact that the accused had been convicted of prior crimes (as Busby had) might cause him to automatically vote for the death penalty. When asked whether he believed life imprisonment was severe enough punishment for a person convicted of premeditated murder, he answered, No. Lapan also stated that because the homicide occurred inside a prison, his ability to serve as an impartial juror might be compromised. In a further response, Lapan indicated that he might construe such a fact as an aggravating circumstance, even beyond those aggravating circumstances as might be instructed by the trial judge. When specifically asked whether learning that the crime had taken place in a correctional institution would factor in his consideration of the case regardless of what the judge said, he voiced a highly suspect response of I don't know. When asked whether he could comply with the trial court's instructions to set his personal feelings aside, Lapan could only muster a very weak I believe I can. The nature of the case and the sentencing possibilities elevate our concern. We recognize that although we are assessing Lapan's voir dire responses from a cold record, [7] the sequence of the questions and plainness of Lapan's responses leaves little doubt that, as a former death row prison guard, he was understandably unable to set aside his beliefs and experiences to serve as an impartial juror in a case involving a prison murder. Lapan equivocated on the very issue most crucial to his ability to deliberate in an unbiased manner to reach the appropriate verdict and sentencing recommendation. In our view, the record can support no other conclusion than that Lapan should have been excused for cause.