Opinion ID: 773067
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Grounds for Affirmance

Text: 54 While the petition for rehearing did not raise the issue of an unconstitutional application of the ordinance, it was briefed in the plaintiffs' initial brief and argued briefly to the en banc court. Plaintiffs-appellees contend that the City should be responsible for any arrests made by police officers who, plaintiffs say, arrested them outside the parameters set out in Frisby. In short, plaintiffs claim that they did not violate the ordinance and they maintain that the arrests occurred pursuant to city policy, and, thus, the ordinance was unconstitutionally applied to them. 55 In our view, the as-applied issues were previously decided against plaintiffs by the district court after remand from Veneklase I and the contentions advanced on these issues do not justify an affirmance here on these alternative grounds. The as- applied argument fails because this court held in the first appeal, Veneklase I, that the arrest of plaintiffs by the defendant officers was objectively reasonable in light of the legal rules in existence at the time the action occurred. Veneklase I, 78 F.3d at 1269. 1 This ruling became the law of the case. 56 Further, assuming, arguendo, that the arrests were unconstitutionally made, it would be necessary to show that the City had (a) a policy or custom directly authorizing conduct contravening federal and state constitutions and law; or (b) deficient police training. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (determining that municipality may be held liable only for constitutional violations which result from municipal policy or custom). However, the district court rejected any liability against the City on this ground. 57 Regarding policy or custom, no evidence exists in the record that the City followed a custom of having its police officers arrest picketers who were not in violation of the law. The magistrate judge determined that the City did not have a policy or custom of unconstitutionally applying the ordinance. See Veneklase, 904 F. Supp. at 1056 & n.16. The magistrate judge did observe that the City police chief had admitted during discovery that the arresting police officers acted pursuant to existing policies and training, none of which specifically addressed the enforcement of the antipicketing ordinance or the implications of Frisby. Id. at n.16. However, since admissions are not the equivalent of an affirmative decision, cast in the form of a policy statement, . . . the district court concluded that municipal liability premised on a ratification theory does not flow from the City's admissions. Id. 58 Regarding deficient police training, no liability can flow from the alleged failure to train the Fargo police officers. This issue has been adequately laid to rest in the district court's opinion in this case: 59 In light of the Eighth Circuit's ruling [Veneklase I] that the law regarding the parameters of the First Amendment right to protest against abortion in a residential area was not clearly established at the time of plaintiffs' arrest, the City's failure to its train [sic] police officers could not serve as the moving force behind the violation of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. Since the parameters of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights were still in question, any training of the City's police officers would necessarily leave those parameters in doubt. Consequently, the lack of training by the City cannot be the moving force behind the violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 60 J.A. at 252, Dist. Ct. Mem. and Order, April 10, 1997. 61 Moreover, where arresting police officers are absolved of liability to arrestees, the City ordinarily is not liable. We have addressed this issue in two cases. In Abbott v. City of Crocker, Mo., 30 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 1994), we held that a judgment as a matter of law could not be sustained against a municipality where the judgment against the arresting officer had been reversed on a fact basis. The court stated: 62 The City cannot be liable in connection with either the excessive force claim or the invalid arrest claim, whether on a failure to train theory or a municipal custom or policy theory, unless Officer Stone is found liable on the underlying substantive claim. See Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004, 1007 (8th Cir. 1990), quoting City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). For this reason, where appellee was not entitled to JAML against the police officer, the grant of JAML against the City was also erroneous. 63 Id. at 998. 64 More recently, we reaffirmed Abbott in Olinger v. Larson, 134 F.3d 1362 (8th Cir. 1998). There the plaintiff filed a civil rights action against the arresting officer, the chief of police, and the City of Sioux Falls claiming a violation of constitutional rights stemming from the plaintiff's arrest. The district court initially granted summary judgment dismissing the case against the arresting officer but not dismissing the chief of police and the City because of evidence suggesting a failure to train. Later, the district court entered a new order granting a summary judgment of dismissal on all claims. We affirmed, stating: 65 In light of our rulings that Detective Larson and Chief Satterlee did not violate Olinger's fourth amendment rights, Olinger's claims against the City based on its alleged inadequate training and supervision of Detective Larson and Chief Satterlee, must also fail. See Abbott v. City of Crocker, 30 F.3d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 1994) (The City cannot be liable . . . whether on a failure to train theory or a municipal custom or policy theory, unless [an officer] is found liable on the underlying substantive claim). 66 Id. at 1367. 67 In the absence of a record establishing an illegal arrest, in the circumstances as here where the arresting officers have been absolved of fault, the plaintiffs- appellees cannot present a tenable basis for affirmance of the judgment against the City on alternative grounds that the arresting officers unconstitutionally applied the ordinance in question. 68 No basis exists for affirmance on alternative grounds argued by plaintiffs- appellees.