Opinion ID: 1436568
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Principles and Standard of Review

Text: We review [the granting of] a motion for judgment as a matter of law by applying the same standard as the trial court. Majeska v. District of Columbia, 812 A.2d 948, 950 (D.C.2002) (citing Pazmino v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 638 A.2d 677, 678 (D.C.1994)). A [judgment as a matter of law] is proper only if there is no evidentiary foundation, including all rational inferences from the evidence, by which a reasonable juror could find for the party opposing the motion, considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to that party. Id. (quoting Pazmino, 638 A.2d at 678). When viewing the evidence, the court must take care to avoid weighing the evidence, passing on the credibility of witnesses or substituting its judgment for that of the jury. If it is possible to derive conflicting inferences from the evidence, the trial judge should allow the case to go to the jury. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The jury, however, may not be allowed to engage in idle speculation. Speculation is not the province of a jury, for the courts of this jurisdiction have emphasized the distinction between the logical deduction and mere conjecture. Id. (quoting Jones v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 314 A.2d 459, 460-61 (D.C.1974)). Under the DCHRA, it is an unlawful discriminatory practice to . . . retaliate against . . . any person . . . on account of having exercised . . . any right granted or protected under this chapter. D.C.Code § 2-1402.61(a) (2001). To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must establish: (1)[he] was engaged in a protected activity, or that [he] opposed practices made unlawful by the DCHRA; (2) the employer took an adverse personnel action against [him]; and (3) a causal connection existed between the two. Howard University v. Green, 652 A.2d 41, 45 (D.C.1994). Mr. McFarland asserts that he was denied promotion and was terminated in retaliation for filing the August 14, 1997, grievance with the EEA; he also claims that his termination was in retaliation for sending the April 14, 1999, letter to the Human Resources department requesting information about the process used to select the new CEEP Director. Whether actions by an employee constitute protected activity is a question of law, and we therefore review the trial courts' conclusions de novo.  Carter-Obayuwana v. Howard University, 764 A.2d 779, 790 (D.C.2001) (citing Green, 652 A.2d at 45-47). Protected activity need not take the form of a lawsuit or of a formal complaint to an enforcement agency. . . . [It] extend[s] to an employee's informal complaints of discrimination to his or her superiors within the organization. Carter-Obayuwana, 764 A.2d at 790-91.