Opinion ID: 779423
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Issues Properly Before Us

Text: 11 As noted, the issues Donato raises on appeal are: (1) through counsel, (a) whether the district court was required to hold a hearing to determine whether he was competent to be resentenced, (b) whether the district court was required to order a new PSR before resentencing him, (c) whether the district court improperly failed to consider the required factors before ordering restitution and a fine, and (d) whether the amount of the fine was in error; and (2) pro se, (a) whether the district court improperly failed to consider his motion for a downward departure, and (b) whether his sentence violates the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, or U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4. The threshold question is which of these arguments, if any, are properly before us and not barred by the law of the case doctrine. 12 The law of the case doctrine has two branches. The first requires a trial court to follow an appellate court's previous ruling on an issue in the same case. United States v. Uccio, 940 F.2d 753, 757 (2d Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26, 32 (2d Cir.1977)). This is the so-called mandate rule. 5 United States v. Tenzer, 213 F.3d 34, 39-40 (2d Cir.2000). The second and more flexible branch is implicated when a court reconsiders its own ruling on an issue in the absence of an intervening ruling on the issue by a higher court. It holds that when a court has ruled on an issue, that decision should generally be adhered to by that court in subsequent stages in the same case, Uccio, 940 F.2d at 758, unless cogent and compelling reasons militate otherwise, Tenzer, 213 F.3d at 39. 13 The mandate rule ordinarily forecloses relitigation of all issues previously waived by the defendant or decided by the appellate court. But when a case is remanded for de novo resentencing, the defendant may raise in the district court and, if properly preserved there, on appeal to the court of appeals, issues that he or she had previously waived by failing to raise them. See United States v. Stanley, 54 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir.) ( Stanley II ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 891, 116 S.Ct. 238, 133 L.Ed.2d 166 (1995). 14 Donato seeks to raise some issues that he waived by not raising them during his initial sentencing proceedings or on his previous appeal. We must therefore determine at the outset whether Donato's case was remanded for de novo or for limited resentencing. We conclude that in this case, because we identified a particular sentencing issue necessitating remand — whether Donato's total offense level on the conspiracy count was improperly enhanced as a result of double counting — the remand was limited, not de novo. Because the remand was limited, Donato may not now raise arguments that he had an incentive and an opportunity to raise previously but did not raise, absent a cogent and compelling reason for permitting him to do so. 15
16 When Donato's case was last before us, we remanded it to the district court for resentencing because we had identified a possible sentencing error — double counting. Donato II, 2000 WL 268593, at , 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 3788, at -. Specifically, we stated: 17 [T]here may have been improper double counting if the district court increased the offense level for the conspiracy count because of the firearm possession charged as an overt act in Count One, and then sentenced Donato to a five-year consecutive sentence under section 924(c) for the use and possession of a firearm during the commission of the carjacking charged in Count Two. We therefore remand to the district court for resentencing in light of this order, without prejudice to the government submitting an argument to the district court explaining why this was not double-counting. 18 We have considered Donato's other claims and find them to be without merit. 19 The judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED in part. 20 Id. (emphasis added). This remand order neither explicitly stated that the sole issue on remand was whether double counting affected Donato's sentence on the conspiracy count, nor indicated that we intended a de novo resentencing or were leaving any issues open for the district court's further consideration other than whether double counting improperly affected Donato's total offense level. 21 In Stanley II, we held that a similar mandate did not allow for de novo resentencing. 54 F.3d at 108. On a preceding appeal in that case, United States v. Stanley, 12 F.3d 17 (2d Cir.1993) ( Stanley I ), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1044, 114 S.Ct. 1572, 128 L.Ed.2d 216 (1994), we had remanded for resentencing because the district court had failed to make sufficient factual findings to support its loss calculation and thereby may have improperly increased the offense level. Id. at 21. In explaining our mandate, we said: 22 In sum, because the district court failed to indicate whether its loss calculation was based on actual or intended loss, and failed to make sufficient factual findings supporting either calculation, we remand for resentencing. If upon reconsideration, the district court's sentencing calculation results in a determination of loss different from that originally found, the district court may wish to also recalculate the amount of restitution and make findings as to that issue. We have examined Stanley's remaining contentions regarding his sentence and find them to be without merit.