Opinion ID: 2625741
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Medellin to This Petition

Text: Insofar as petitioner seeks to justify his successive petition on the grounds that Avena and/or the Presidential Memorandum constitute binding federal law that overrides state procedural defaults, Medellin is a complete and negative response to his argument. Nonetheless, petitioner purports to discern within the Medellin decision elements that support a finding that Petitioner's present petition is based on previously unavailable facts and law. First, petitioner refers to the court's discussion in Medellin of its earlier Vienna Convention claim decision, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon (2006) 548 U.S. 331 [165 L.Ed.2d 557, 126 S.Ct. 2669] for the proposition that a petitioner may request `appropriate accommodations' from the trial court to secure `the benefits of consular assistance.' From this language, petitioner argues he was deprived of such accommodation when the trial court denied his request for a continuance at trial to contact the Mexican consulate. Petitioner is wrong. Sanchez-Llamas consolidated the cases of two foreign nationals, Moises Sanchez-Llamas, a Mexican, and Mario A. Bustillo, a Honduran, both of whom sought review of their convictionsSanchez-Llamas for attempted murder, among other counts, and Bustillo for first degree murder based on the asserted failure of law enforcement authorities to comply with article 36. Sanchez-Llamas sought to suppress incriminating statements he had made to the police, notwithstanding that he had waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602], as a penalty for violation of his article 36 rights. Bustillo attempted to raise his article 36 claim for the first time in his petition for habeas corpus but the claim was dismissed as procedurally barred because he had failed to raise it at trial or on direct appeal. ( Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, supra, 548 U.S. at pp. 339-342.) Neither man was one of the 51 individuals named in the Avena decision. The issues in Sanchez-Llamas were identified as (1) whether Article 36 of the Vienna Convention grants rights that may be invoked by individuals in a judicial proceeding; (2) whether suppression of evidence is a proper remedy for a violation of Article 36; and (3) whether an Article 36 claim may be deemed forfeited under state procedural rules because a defendant failed to raise the claim at trial. ( Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, supra, 548 U.S. at p. 342.) In order to respond to the petitioners' claims, the court answered the first question by assuming, without deciding, that such rights could be individually invoked ( id. at p. 343); held, as to the second question, that neither the Vienna Convention nor the court's own precedents supported application of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a violation of article 36 rights (548 U.S. at pp. 343-350); and, as to the third question, in an answer that foreshadowed its decision in Medellin, held that state procedural defaults did apply to such claim (548 U.S. at p. 360). Petitioner contends that certain language in Sanchez-Llamas was subsequently cited by the Supreme Court in Medellin as a basis to create procedural rules requiring states to accommodate defendants who may be foreign nationals with respect to their Vienna Convention rights. But nowhere in Sanchez-Llamas itself does the court address this issue, nor do the court's references to Sanchez-Llamas in Medellin even advert to this issue. To the contrary, the pages in Medellin to which petitioner refers us for their discussion of Sanchez-Llamas simply reinforce Medellin 's conclusion that ICJ decisions are not binding federal law and do not override state procedural rules. ( Medellin v. Texas, supra, 552 U.S. at pp. ___, fn. 8 ___, ___ [128 S.Ct. at pp. 1361, fn. 8, 1364, 1367].) We are at a loss to perceive in either decision support for petitioner's claim that the trial court in this case was required to have granted his request for a continuance to contact the Mexican consulate. Moreover, this is one of the same claims petitioner raised in his first habeas corpus petition. He provides no justification for revisiting our denial of that petition on this ground. Second, petitioner asserts that Medellin now establishes a three-day rule within which notice to a foreign national of his consular rights must be given to avoid violating the Vienna Convention. Again, petitioner misconstrues the language. The Supreme Court noted that, in denying Medellin 's first application for state postconviction relief, the Texas trial court ruled that the claim was both procedurally barred because Medellin had not raised it at trial and also without merit finding that Medellin had `fail[ed] to show that any non-notification of the Mexican authorities impacted on the validity of his conviction or punishment.' [Citation]. ( Medellin v. Texas, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at pp. 1354-1355].) In a footnote explaining the trial court's ruling, the Supreme Court observed that the ICJ in Avena had concluded that the Vienna Convention's requirement of consular notification `without delay' is satisfied where notice is provided within three working days, but that in Medellin's case he had confessed within three hours of his arrest, before there could be a violation of his Vienna Convention right to consulate notification. ( Medellin v. Texas, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___, fn. 1 [128 S.Ct. at p. 1355, fn. 1].) Thus, the Supreme Court did not approve or disapprove the ICJ's three-day ruleindeed, the court's reference to this rule occurred in that portion of its decision describing the procedural history of Medellin's case, not within its analysis of his claims. Moreover, the purpose of this reference was simply to explain the basis of the state trial court's denial of Medellin's application for postconviction relief, not to announce any procedural rule with respect to when consular notification must be made. Finally, it is clear that in this case petitioner was aware of his right of consular notification by the time of his trialwhen he requested a continuance to consult with the Mexican consul. He failed to demonstrate in his first petition and he fails to demonstrate here that he suffered any prejudice because he was not notified of those rights at the time of his arrest. Third, petitioner contends:  Medellin establishes for the first time that the requirements of Breard v. Greene [, supra, 523 U.S. 371] apply to cases addressed under Avena. That finding necessarily includes Breard 's recognition that the denial of an evidentiary hearing `prevents [petitioner] from establishing that the violation of his Vienna Convention rights prejudiced him.' In other words, petitioner maintains that Breard requires an evidentiary hearing to resolve the merits of a Vienna Convention claim, and that Medellin adopted this holding with respect to the 51 individuals subject to the Avena decision. Petitioner fails to provide a citation to the page in Medellin where, according to him, the Supreme Court adopted Breard 's requirement of an evidentiary hearing. Our review of Medellin 's several citations to Breard fails to support his claim. (See Medellin v. Texas, supra, 552 U.S. at pp. ___, fn. 9, ___, ___, fn. 14 [128 S.Ct. at pp. 1361, fn. 9, 1363, 1370, fn. 14].) In any event, the premise of petitioner's argumentthat Breard requires such hearingsis utterly inaccurate. Petitioner cites a portion of Breard that concluded a federal habeas corpus petition was barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's provision that an evidentiary hearing shall not be provided with respect to a federal habeas corpus petition based upon a violation of treaties of the United States, if the petitioner `has failed to develop the factual basis of [the] claim in State court proceedings.' ( Breard v. Greene, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 376.) Breard concluded that this provision prevents Breard from establishing that the violation of his Vienna Convention rights prejudiced him. Without a hearing, Breard cannot establish how the Consul could have advised him, how the advice of his attorneys differed from the advice the Consul would have provided, and what factors he considered in electing to reject the plea bargain that the State offered him. ( Ibid. ) Accordingly, Breard held only that the petitioner could not prevail on his habeas corpus claim because federal law precluded an evidentiary hearing when the petitioner had failed to develop his claim in state court. To the extent it is relevant to this case it reinforces the Supreme Court's subsequent ruling in Medellin that procedural defaults apply to Vienna Convention claims. It certainly does not stand for the proposition for which petitioner advances itthat determination of the merits of such claims requires an evidentiary hearing. Finally, petitioner argues that he is not required to establish absolute proof of a different outcome but only a prima facie showing of prejudice. But we determined, in reviewing his first habeas corpus petition, that he had not done so when we denied it on the merits. Again, however, petitioner's factual showing of entitlement to relief has not significantly changed from his original petition to this one. Next, seizing upon the possibility that either the United States Congress might yet authorize compliance with the Avena decision or the Mexican government may continue to press its case through diplomatic channels, petitioner urges us to stay proceedings in this case to see whether either of these efforts bears fruit. [9] Although he initially requests a 90-day stay, there is, of course, no guarantee that any action will have taken place at either the legislative or diplomatic level and he would undoubtedly request a further stay once the initial 90-day stay has expired. Such a course of action would ill serve the importance of finality of judgments [citation], and the interest of the state in the prompt implementation of its laws. ( In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 764.) We decline to issue such a stay at this juncture. [10] Finally, we observe that petitioner makes no attempt to bring himself within the miscarriage of justice exception to successiveness as outlined in Clark. ( In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 797-798.)