Opinion ID: 1196638
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unwritten Complaints

Text: The next question pertinent to this appeal is whether unwritten, purely verbal complaints are protected activity under the statute. Again, we start with the language of the statute. Sapperstein, 188 F.3d at 857. The FLSA's retaliation provision prohibits discharg[ing] ... any employee because such employee has filed any complaint.... 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (emphasis added). The district court reasoned: Expressing an oral complaint is not the same as filing a complaint. By definition, the word file refers to a collection of papers, records, etc., arranged in a convenient order, Random House Webster's College Dictionary 489 (2d ed.1999), or, when used in verb form as it is in the statute, [t]o deliver (a paper or instrument) to the proper officer so that it is received by him to kept on file, or among the records of his office, Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language 945 (2d ed.1958). One cannot file an oral complaint; there is no document, such as a paper or record, to deliver to someone who can put it in its proper place. Plaintiff disagrees with this interpretation. He argues that to file is a broad term that has several meanings, including, generally, to submit. Looking only at the language of the statute, we believe that the district court correctly concluded that unwritten, purely verbal complaints are not protected activity. The use of the verb to file connotes the use of a writing. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines the verb to file as 1. to arrange in order for preservation and reference 2. a: to place among official records as prescribed by law b: to perform the first act of (as a lawsuit) This definition accords with what we believe to be the common understanding of the verb to file. Although Kasten and the Secretary of Labor claim that to file can mean, generally, to submit, this seems to us overbroad. [2] If an individual told a friend that she filed a complaint with her employer, we doubt the friend would understand her to possibly mean that she merely voiced displeasure to a supervisor. Rather, the natural understanding of the phrase file any complaint requires the submission of some writing to an employer, court, or administrative body. See United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 860 (7th Cir.1999) (Words in a statute are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning.) (citing United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 604, 106 S.Ct. 3116, 92 L.Ed.2d 483 (1986)). Other circuit courts that have tackled this issue are split. The Fourth Circuit found that verbal complaints were not protected activity in Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., Inc., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000). The court recognized that the FLSA's statutory language clearly places limits on the range of retaliation proscribed by the act. Specifically, in interpreting the testimony clause of the FLSA's retaliation provision, the Fourth Circuit held that the FLSA prohibits retaliation for testimony given or about to be given but not for an employee's voicing of a position on working conditions in opposition to an employer. Id. (emphasis added). Although the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the retaliation in that casewhich followed an employee's statement to the company president that, if he were deposed in a lawsuit, he would not testify to the president's suggested version of eventswas morally unacceptable, the court concluded that a faithful interpretation of the statute did not recognize mere statements to a supervisor as a protected activity. Id.; see also Lambert v. Genesee Hospital, 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993) (The plain language of this provision limits the cause of action to retaliation for filing formal complaints, instituting a proceeding, or testifying, but does not encompass complaints made to a supervisor.) (citations omitted). Other courts have found oral complaints to be protected activity, but it is difficult to draw guidance from these decisions because many of them do not specifically state whether the complaint in question was written or purely verbal, and none discusses the statute's use of the verb to file and whether it requires a writing. See EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools, 976 F.2d 985, 989-90 (6th Cir.1992) (holding, without discussion of the verbal/written distinction, that plaintiff's apparently oral complaints to supervisors were protected activity); EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding, without discussion of the verbal/written distinction, that plaintiffs' oral complaints were protected activity); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 125 (8th Cir.1987) (holding, without discussion of the verbal/written distinction, that defendant's mistaken belief that plaintiff had made apparently oral complaints to supervisors was grounds for suit); Brennan v. Maxey's Yamaha, 513 F.2d 179, 183 (8th Cir.1975) (holding, without discussion of the verbal/written distinction, that employee's voicing of concern was protected activity). [3] Despite these contrary findings by some other circuits, our interpretation of the phrase file any complaint is confirmed by the fact that Congress could have, but did not, use broader language in the FLSA's retaliation provision. For example, analogous provisions in other statutes, including Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, forbid employers from retaliating against any employee who has opposed any practice that is unlawful under the statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). This broader phrase, opposed any practice, does not require a fil[ing], and has been interpreted to protect verbal complaints. See, e.g., Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 65 (2d Cir.1992). Congress's selection of the narrower file any complaint language in the FLSA thus appears to be significant. See Ball, 228 F.3d at 364 (noting that Congress has crafted ... broader anti-retaliation provisions elsewhere but the cause of action for retaliation under the FLSA is much more circumscribed); Genesee Hospital, 10 F.3d at 55 (noting that the FLSA uses narrower language in its retaliation provision than Title VII). Finally, we are aware that `the remedial nature of the [FLSA] ... warrants an expansive interpretation of its provisions. ...' Sapperstein, 188 F.3d at 857 (quoting Herman v. RSR Security Services, 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir.1999)). But expansive interpretation is one thing; reading words out of a statute is quite another. Because we believe that the FLSA's use of the phrase file any complaint requires a plaintiff employee to submit some sort of writing, we agree with the district court's conclusion that Kasten's alleged complaints were not protected activity under the statute.