Opinion ID: 1956109
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: MOLL v ABBOTT LABORATORIES

Text: Plaintiff Jean Moll [8] became aware of the irregularities in her cervix during a gynecological examination by Dr. Ulmer in April of 1975. Because of the condition of her cervix, Dr. Ulmer asked Jean if she had had an abortion. In August of 1976, Jean visited another gynecologist, Dr. O'Campo, who informed her that she had a hood over her cervix. Dr. O'Campo indicated that Jean's condition could have resulted from exposure to DES in utero. Dr. O'Campo requested the medical records of Jean's mother. Jean's mother, Shirley Petroff, recalled being hospitalized for a month during her pregnancy with Jean. She also recalled that her doctor, Dr. Brownell, had administered medication to prevent her unborn child from aborting. Mrs. Petroff, however, could not recall the name of the prescribed drug. Attempting to ascertain what drug Dr. Brownell had administered, Jean and her mother contacted Dr. Brownell's office to inquire about the needed medical records. Dr. Brownell's receptionist informed Mrs. Petroff that the records had been sent elsewhere. Further attempts to locate the records were unsuccessful. In 1977, Dr. O'Campo advised Jean that her cervix didn't look good and that the problem might be due to the DES that [her] mother had taken.... Following the doctor's recommendation, Jean submitted to another test, a colposcopy, which took place in January of 1978. Following the test, the doctor told Jean that the results ... were ... fine and there was no cause for real concern at that time, but that she had an incompetent cervix and this type of problem could have been caused by exposure to DES. The doctor also told the plaintiff that exposure to DES could lead to cancer. The plaintiff attempted to conceive a child in 1978. After approximately a year, she grew concerned over her inability to conceive and consulted Dr. O'Campo. In February of 1979, Dr. O'Campo told the plaintiff that the hood over her cervix could be preventing conception. Furthermore, the doctor informed Jean that her exposure to DES in utero possibly could have caused the hood on her cervix. In May of 1980, Dr. O'Campo suggested that the Molls undergo a series of fertility tests because of their continued inability to conceive. These tests were never performed, however, because Jean did not consult Dr. O'Campo again until 1985. Jean was once again informed that the hood on her cervix was the probable cause of her infertility. The plaintiff also learned at the time that her incompetent cervix could cause difficulties in carrying a child to term. [9] Jean Moll filed suit against the defendants, manufacturers of DES, on December 30, 1986. [10] On July 8, 1988, Judge Mies granted Eli Lilly's [11] motion for summary judgment pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), because of the plaintiff's inability to prove that her mother ingested DES, a requirement for alternative liability. [12] The court delayed entry of the order, however, until September 9, 1988, to allow Jean additional time to locate Mrs. Petroff's medical records. With the aid of a court order, Jean located Mrs. Petroff's medical records at the Highland Park City Clerk's office. The records confirmed that Dr. Brownell had administered DES to Mrs. Petroff. In December of 1988, the defendant Eli Lilly [13] moved for summary judgment pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). The defendant claimed that Jean Moll's suit was barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations [14] because she knew of a possible cause of action for more than three years before filing suit. On the basis of the pleadings, interrogatory responses, and the sworn deposition testimony of plaintiff Moll and her mother, Mrs. Petroff, Judge Mies denied the defendant's motion, finding that the plaintiff's claim did not accrue until she had proof that her mother ingested DES. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Eli Lilly's motion for summary disposition on different grounds. It rejected the trial court's contention that a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff could prove each element of her claim. The panel also rejected the line of cases holding that a plaintiff's cause of action accrues when she discovers or should have discovered the existence of a possible cause of action. 192 Mich App 724, 731; 482 NW2d 197 (1992). Instead, the Court held that a plaintiff's cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered that the plaintiff has been injured and what a likely cause of the injury was. The panel determined that a factual dispute existed regarding when Jean discovered that DES was the likely cause of her injuries. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of Lilly's motion was affirmed. We granted the defendants' application for leave to appeal on November 2, 1992. 441 Mich 878. We reverse.