Opinion ID: 173408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: motion for sequential payment of filing fees

Text: Mr. Christensen has filed a “Motion for Order from the Court Regarding Payments,” requesting that filing fees for the two separate appeals resolved here be collected sequentially rather than cumulatively. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis in a civil action or appeal must still pay the full filing fee, but is allowed to do so in installments, beginning with an initial partial payment upon filing, section 1915(b)(1), followed by monthly installments fixed at “20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account . . . each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid,” section 1915(b)(2). The thrust of Mr. Christensen’s motion is that he wants the twenty percent deduction made for only one appeal at a time, freeing up the remainder of his account for other expenditures while his fee obligation for the second appeal is effectively suspended. We deny the motion. We agree with the majority of circuits that have considered this question and held that the limited deduction for fees specified in § 1915(b)(2) is triggered by each action or appeal pursued, allowing here for the cumulative deduction of forty percent of -16- Mr. Christensen’s monthly income to satisfy the fee obligations incurred for the instant appeals. The pertinent language of § 1915(b)(2), considered in isolation, does not provide a clear directive regarding application of the twenty-percent limitation: “After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account.” The majority “cumulative payment” or “per case” position with which we agree has been adopted based on standard interpretive principles (construing § 1915(b)(2) in light of other provisions in § 1915) and/or a recognition that the overarching purpose of the statute, to restrain runaway prison litigation with some pay-as-you-go constraint, would be diluted if not defeated by permitting prisoners with one ongoing case to postpone all successive filing fee obligations. 7 See Atchison v. Collins, 288 F.3d 177, 179-81 (5th Cir. 2002); Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds, Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir. 2000); see Lefkowitz v. Citi-Equity Group, Inc., 146 F.3d 609, 612 (8th Cir. 1998) (dealing with similar limitation on payment of initial filing fee in § 1915(b)(1) and following Newlin to broadly hold 7 In this regard we note that several circuits have held that once a prisoner is released, any § 1915 partial payment obligations cease altogether (several circuits disagree). See Carson v. Tulsa Police Dep’t, 266 F. App’x 763, 766 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting circuit split and declining to take a side, as issue was moot under the circumstances). -17- that “PLRA fee provisions were designed to require prisoners to bear financial responsibility for each action they take, [and thus] the twenty-percent rule should be applied per case”). The minority “sequential payment” or “per prisoner” position that Mr. Christensen espouses was adopted by the Second Circuit to avoid potential constitutional concerns over the burden simultaneous collection of multiple fee obligations could place on a prisoner’s right of access to the courts. See Whitfield v. Scully, 241 F.3d 264, 277 (2d Cir. 2001). A thoughtful discussion of the competing circuit positions is included in Hendon v. Ramsey, 478 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1216-20 (S.D. Cal. 2007), which sets out a fairly thorough textual analysis supporting the cumulative-payment/per-case approach. The analysis rests on the “‘fundamental cannon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” Id. at 1219 (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). Hendon cites several instances in § 1915 where prisoner fee/fee-related obligations are clearly meant to apply on a per-case basis, in particular: (1) the requirement in § 1915(a)(2) that “[a] prisoner seeking to bring a civil action or appeal a judgment . . . shall submit a certified copy of [his] trust fund account statement . . . for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or the notice of appeal”; and (2) the requirement in § 1915(b)(1) that “if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal . . . [t]he court shall assess and, when funds exist, collect . . . an initial -18- partial filing fee.” Regarding the trust fund statement, Hendon notes that “[t]he plain language of [ § 1915(a)(2)] provides that a prisoner is required to submit a copy . . . each time he files a complaint or notice of appeal, because the statement must reflect the prisoner’s income for the six months preceding the filing date.” 478 F. Supp. 2d at 1219 (emphasis added). Similarly, regarding the initial filing fee, Hendon notes that “[t]he plain language of [§ 1915(b)(1)] indicates that each time a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal, an initial partial filing fee is assessed.” Id. (quotation omitted and emphasis added). Read in light of these related provisions, the court concludes that § 1915(b)(2) was also meant to apply on a per-case basis: Given that the other provisions of § 1915 require a prisoner to submit documents and pay initial filing fees for each civil action or appeal he files, § 1915(b)(2) lends itself to a reading that the 20 percent monthly payments must also be collected for each civil action or appeal filed. In other words, the overall statutory scheme is written in a manner that requires prisoners to complete procedures and pay fees on a per case basis, rather than a per prisoner basis. Further, § 1915(b)(2) references “the initial partial filing fee” discussed in § 1915(b)(1), suggesting that the subsections of the statute are intended to be read as an overall statutory scheme. The Court thus FINDS that when read in the context of the entire statute, § 1915(b)(2) mandates that after payment of the initial partial filing fee for each action or appeal filed, prisoners are also required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of their income for each civil action or appeal filed. Id. (emphasis added); see Atchison, 288 F.3d at 180-81 (reading § 1915(b)(2) as applying on per-case basis because “the initial payment required by § 1915(b)[1] -19- is imposed in each case, not once per prison[er] irrespective of the number of suits initiated”). We find this textual analysis persuasive, particularly its consistent reading of the similar provisions in §§ 1915(b)(1) and (b)(2). This court has previously construed other aspects of § 1915(b)(2) to maintain consistency with an intent evident in § 1915(b)(1). See Cosby v. Meadors, 351 F.3d 1324, 1326-27 (10th Cir. 2003) (construing reference to monthly “income” in § 1915(b)(2) broadly “to include all deposits to the prisoner’s inmate account,” because similar provision in § 1915(b)(1) refers to “deposits” and “this interpretation of the word [income] produces consistency between § 1915(b)(2) . . . and § 1915(b)(1)”). Bolstering this conclusion from textual analysis is a recognition that the cumulative-payment/per-case approach furthers the overarching purpose of imposing the installment-payment obligations uniquely on prisoners, which, as this court has explained, is “to reduce frivolous prisoner litigation by making all prisoners seeking to bring lawsuits or appeals feel the deterrent effect created by liability for filing fees.” Cosby, 351 F.3d at 1327 (quotation omitted). The Seventh Circuit relied heavily on this legislative goal in adopting the cumulative-payment/per-case approach: Otherwise a prisoner could file multiple suits for the price of one, postponing payment of the fees for later-filed suits until after the end of imprisonment (and likely avoiding them altogether). The PLRA is designed to require the prisoner to bear some marginal cost for each legal activity. Unless payment begins soon after the event that -20- creates the liability, this will not happen. A prisoner who files one suit remits 20 percent of income to his prison trust account; a suit and an appeal then must commit 40 percent, and so on. Newlin, 123 F.3d at 436. On the other hand, we acknowledge the Second Circuit’s concern in Whitfield about burdening prisoners’ access to courts, but we do not think that concern controls here. First of all, the “canon of constitutional avoidance” invoked by the Second Circuit properly comes into play only when a statute is found to be ambiguous “after the application of ordinary textual analysis.” Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1245 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (2009). In light of our conclusion that the meaning of § 1915(b)(2) is fully intelligible once it is construed in light of the statute as a whole, there is no occasion to apply the canon. See Atchison, 288 F.3d at 181 (noting that “the duty to avoid constitutional questions is not a license to rewrite the statute,” and declining to follow Whitfield because “[e]ven if [the Second Circuit’s] constitutional arguments had merit, we would be bound by the unambiguous meaning of the text”). Secondly, we are not convinced that the cumulative-payment/per-case position necessarily raises serious constitutional concerns. Hendon does a good job of pointing out the unsubstantiated nature of the presuppositions underlying the Second Circuit’s position on this point: -21- The Court must also examine whether requiring Plaintiff to pay 20 percent of his monthly income for each action filed would place an unreasonable burden on his constitutional right of meaningful access to the courts. In Whitfield, the Second Circuit declined to hold that mandatory recoupment of 100 percent of a prisoner’s monthly income would be unconstitutional, but the panel did find that “such recoupment could raise serious concerns.” See 241 F.3d at 277. Similarly, in Lafauci [v. Cunningham, 139 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D. Mass. 2001)], the district court found that recoupment of 100 percent of a prisoner’s monthly income would raise serious constitutional concerns because it would leave a prisoner with “no income for postage, copying, paper, envelopes, writing utensils, etc.-potentially leaving him/her without means of court communication.” See 139 F. Supp. 2d at 147. However, the Supreme Court has stated that “[i]t is indisputable that indigent inmates must be provided at state expense with paper and pen to draft legal documents, with notarial services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824-25, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). Thus, even if 100 percent of Plaintiff’s income is recouped for filing fees, he will not be denied access to paper, writing instruments, or postage because the government is required to provide these materials to indigent inmates. Similarly, as noted by the Ninth Circuit, “[b]ecause prisoners are in the custody of the state and accordingly have the ‘essentials of life’ provided by the government,” even the most indigent prisoner subject to the cumulative collection of filing fees required by § 1915(b) will not be “required to make choices between his lawsuit and the necessities of life.” See Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 849 (2002) (citations omitted). Further, § 1915(b)(4) expressly provides that a prisoner cannot “be prohibited from bringing a civil action” simply because he is impoverished. Id. at 848. As a result, Plaintiff will still be permitted to initiate actions even if 100 percent of his monthly income is collected for filing fees. Hendon, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 1219-20; see Atchison, 288 F.3d at 181. In the same vein, some time ago this court upheld § 1915(b) against the general constitutional objection that, under its fee provisions, the prisoner “is forced to choose between spending his limited prison account on the small amenities of life available to him -22- in prison and pursing an appeal [or civil action].” Shabazz v. Parsons, 127 F.3d 1246, 1248 (10th Cir. 1997). We quoted with express approval the following passage, which reinforces the passage from Hendon above by adding the point that the prisoner’s partial-payment obligations do not even apply to the first ten dollars in his account: “To further ensure that prisoners need not totally deprive themselves of those small amenities of life which they are permitted to acquire in a prison or mental hospital beyond the food, clothing, and lodging already furnished by the state,” section 1915 allows payment to be taken from the prisoner’s account only where “the amount in the account exceeds $10 . . . .” Id. (quoting Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1997)) (further quotation omitted). For the above reasons, we hold that § 1915(b)(2) authorizes cumulative deductions of twenty percent for each civil action or appellate filing fee incurred by a prisoner. We therefore deny Mr. Christensen’s motion to order sequential payment of his appellate filing fees and thereby limit the monthly deduction for his multiple appeals to a total of twenty percent of his income. -23- The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Mr. Christensen’s motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis is GRANTED, but his motion for sequential payment of his fee obligations under § 1915(b) is DENIED. Sheriff Blackburn’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. Entered for the Court Michael R. Murphy