Opinion ID: 524995
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Three Threads of First Amendment Jurisprudence: Generic

Text: 104 Overbreadth, Substantial Overbreadth Doctrine, and 105 Prior Restraints. 106 In one, short paragraph, 8 the district court's analysis of Moore's facial challenge to the Rule interweaves three different yet interrelated threads of First Amendment jurisprudence. The district court's language--[t]he rule on its face does not sweep beyond the constitutional barrier--evidences one thread which encompasses the descriptive, generic use of the word overbroad to mean something which stretches too far: in other words, a statute that is not narrowly tailored. A second thread, found in the district court's conclusion of law flowing from the one paragraph discussion, reads: Rule 4.2A(40) is not facially unconstitutional for overbreadth. The district court possibly used the word overbroad to mean the doctrine of substantial overbreadth, which is sometimes viewed as a third party standing notion. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). A third thread invokes the whole substantive area of prior restraints as evidenced by the district court's words [t]he regulation requires clearance through department channels before releasing information.... 107
108 Because of the linguistic overlap between thread one and thread two, 9 the district court's use of word overbroad introduces an ambiguity into the district court's opinion. One may read the opinion to be discussing either thread one--generic use of the word overbroad--or thread two--the legal doctrine of substantial overbreadth--or both notions. In Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 962, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2851-52 n. 13, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984), the Supreme Court discussed this sort of ambiguous use of the word overbroad: 109 The dissenters appear to overlook the fact that overbreadth is not used only to describe the doctrine that allows a litigant whose conduct is unprotected to assert the rights of third parties to challenge a statute, even though as applied to him the statute would be constitutional. E.g. New York v. Ferber, [458 U.S. 747, 768 n. 21, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3360, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) ]. Overbreadth has also been used to describe a challenge to a statute that in all its applications directly restricts protected First Amendment activity and does not employ means narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. [citations omitted; cf. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers For Vincent, [466 U.S. 789, 797, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2124, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) ] (recognizing the validity of a facial challenge but suggesting that it should not be called 'overbreadth') [citations omitted]. 110 Thus, the Supreme Court in Munson recognizes that the words overbroad and overbreadth have been confused but properly should be separated. In City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 797, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2124, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984), the Supreme Court articulates two quite different ways by which a court may declare a statute or rule facially invalid. The first reason, which has deep historical roots in constitutional adjudication, is because the statute is unconstitutional in every conceivable application. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2124, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984); see City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 2143-45, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (4-3 majority opinion; facial challenge lies whenever a licensing law gives a government official or agency substantial power to discriminate on the content or viewpoint of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked speakers). The second reason for a court to strike down a statute on its face is because the statute seeks to prohibit such a broad range of protected conduct that it is unconstitutionally 'overbroad.'  Vincent, 466 U.S. at 796, 104 S.Ct. at 2124. In Vincent, the Supreme Court also stated, 111 [t]he seminal cases in which the Court held state legislation unconstitutional 'on its face' did not involve any departure from the general rule that a litigant only has standing to vindicate his own constitutional rights. In Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 51 S.Ct. 532, 73 ALR 1484 (1931), and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 82 L.Ed. 949, 58 S.Ct. 666 (1938), the statutes were unconstitutional as applied to the defendants' conduct, but they were also unconstitutional on their face, because it was apparent, that any attempt to enforce such legislation would create an unacceptable risk of suppression of ideas. In cases of this character a holding of facial invalidity expresses the conclusion that the statute could never be applied in a valid manner. 112 Vincent, 466 U.S. at 797-98, 104 S.Ct. at 2124 (footnotes omitted); see City of Lakewood, 108 S.Ct. at 2145; Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987). 113 The Munson court, after pointing out the ambiguous use of the word overbroad, went on to state that it was on the basis of the latter failing [overbroad because in all applications a statute directly restricts protected First Amendment activity and does not serve a compelling governmental interest] that the Court in Schaumburg [v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980) ] struck down the Village ordinance as unconstitutional. Whether that challenge should be called 'overbreadth' or simply a 'facial' challenge, the point is that there is no reason to limit challenges to case-by-case 'as applied' challenges when the statute on its face and therefore in all its applications falls short of constitutional demands. Munson, 104 S.Ct. at 2852 n. 13 (1984). 114 Under Vincent, Munson and the string of cases they rely upon, if a rule is unconstitutional in all its applications, a plaintiff may challenge the rule as unconstitutional on its face. Under the substantial overbreadth doctrine, a person whose speech may be prohibited constitutionally may nevertheless prevail upon a facial challenge if the statute covers too much speech, and the statute's provisions are unseverable. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-13, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915-17, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). The extra coverage is determined by examining what hypothetical speakers might say, and determining whether constitutionally protected speech is included within the coverage of the statute. Because one looks at the speech of hypothetical third parties, the substantial overbreadth doctrine is often considered to be a third party standing notion. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 2801, 86 L.Ed.2d 394 (1985). 115 Others quite properly understand the substantial overbreadth doctrine in terms of first party standing. In first party terms, the doctrine is grounded on twin notions: that a litigant's conduct may be regulated only in accordance with a valid rule, Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 Colum.L.Rev. 277, 285 (1984); Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup.Ct.Rev. 1; and if the rule applies to hypothetically protected areas of speech, the rule must be declared facially unconstitutional if the permissible and impermissible parts of the statute are not severable. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221, 244 (1988); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613-14, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916-17, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (facial overbreadth not invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged statute). Severability is the key to understanding the overbreadth doctrine in first party terms. 10 Cases in which a court decides that the statute or rule is unseverable involve, most typically, the decision that, given the nature and range of the act's invalidity, the lawmaker--federal, state, or local--would not want the severed statute to stand, or for federalist reasons, a federal court should not sever the statute. See Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup.Ct.Rev. 1, 10-15. 116
Invalid in all Applications 117 A prior restraint is sometimes generically referred to as overbroad because there is no valid application of the restraint. Such a conclusion prompts the question, what is a prior restraint? As I shall discuss in Part D(1) infra, the majority does not delve into the content of prior restraints, but relies instead on its attempted distinction between prior restraints and after-the-fact sanctions. The majority, however, fails to recognize that a sanction may or may not be a reflection of an unconstitutional prior restraint, and that a prior restraint is no less invalid because a speaker has ignored the government's unconstitutional command. 118 There are different types of sanctions with quite different consequences for a constitutional inquiry. The sanction which flows from a failure to receive prior clearance is a sanction which attempts to enforce a prior restraint. In contrast, the type of sanction which flows from the content of speaking forbidden words is in constitutional terms referred to as an after-the-fact (of speaking the forbidden words) sanction. An illustration may be helpful to delineate the differences I discuss. The ordinance in Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 447, 58 S.Ct. 666, 667, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938) stated: 119 Section 1. That the practice of distributing, either by hand or otherwise, circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind ... within the limits of the City of Griffin, without first obtaining written permission from the City Manager of the City of Griffin, such practice shall be deemed a nuisance, and punishable as an offense against the City of Griffin. 120 Ms. Alma Lovell did not seek permission to distribute her pamphlets or magazines because she regarded herself as sent 'by Jehovah to do His work' and that such an application would have been 'an act of disobedience to His Commandment.'  Lovell at 448, 58 S.Ct. at 667. She was found guilty of violating the above quoted statute and sanctioned accordingly. 121 The Supreme Court reversed her conviction because the ordinance was a prior restraint, void on its face. The character of the ordinance is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship.... While this freedom from previous restraint upon publication cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that restraint was a leading purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision. [citations omitted]. Legislation of this type of the ordinance in question would restore the system of license and censorship in its boldest form. Lovell at 451-52, 58 S.Ct. at 669. The sanction Ms. Lovell received was not an after-the-fact sanction. Ms. Lovell's receipt of a sanction did not change the character of the prior restraint into something else. Her punishment was a sanction flowing from an unconstitutional prior restraint. 122 To decide whether a rule is a prior restraint, one should examine the rule from the viewpoint of the speaker. Constitutional jurisprudence envisions two basic types of prior restraint. For the first type, one should ask, does the speaker have to obtain clearance or permission to speak? If so, then the rule constitutes the classic prior restraint--a restraint which subjects a speaker to a pre-clearance censor. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52, 58 S.Ct. 666, 668-69, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938). There is also another kind of prior restraint: the injunction which has the effect of gagging a speaker. This second type of prior restraint, which does not encompass the entire scope of prior restraints, is also treated as a prior restraint because of its effect. The type of prior restraint primarily involved in this case is the first type--a restraint which screens a speaker's speech before the words are spoken. As I discuss below in Part D(1), the sanction a speaker receives for disobeying the strictures of the system of censorship does not transform the restraint into an after-the-fact sanction. 123 As an example, imagine that the Kilgore Rule reads: 124 Refrain from furnishing information relative to department policy, practices, or business affairs. 125 The removal of the concluding phrase except as authorized by the Chief of the Department transforms this prior restraint into a total blackout of nearly all speech. This blanket prohibition, while it suffers from other constitutional infirmities, 11 would not be a prior restraint. No censor screens the proposed speech. See also City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 2142, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (newspaper had not yet placed its proposed racks on city sidewalks, but instead sought an order from the court enjoining the utilization of the ordinance before requesting a permit). If the City of Kilgore went to court and received an injunction to stop an employee from speaking at an upcoming event, then the injunction enforcing the rule would be the second type of prior restraint--the gagged speaker restraint. The success ratio of the government in restraining speech is not, however, a crucial distinction, only a mere reminder that prior restraints do succeed in preventing speech from flowing. 126 Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 558-60, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 1148-50, 92 L.Ed. 1574 (1945), is another example of a screening-type prior restraint. The speaker, a minister, was a Jehovah's Witness. The City of Lockport, New York, had an ordinance which forbade the use of sound amplification devices except with the permission of the Chief of Police. The speaker obtained permission to use sound trucks to amplify lectures on religious subjects. When this permit expired, the speaker applied for another one but was refused on the grounds that complaints had been made. [The speaker] nevertheless used his equipment as planned on four occassions, but without a permit. Saia at 559, 68 S.Ct. at 1149. The speaker was tried and convicted for his violation of the ordinance. 127 The Supreme Court held the ordinance unconstitutional on its face because it established a prior restraint on the right of free speech.... Saia, 334 U.S. at 560, 68 S.Ct. at 1149. To use a loud-speaker or amplifier one has to get a permit from the Chief of Police. Id. The fact that one's speech is actually disseminated does not turn a prior restraint into an after-the-fact sanction. 128 The crucial examination focuses on what the speaker must do or cannot do as viewed from the speaker's viewpoint. 12 If the speaker must seek permission or review before speaking, then the system is a screening-type prior restraint. Of course, the fact that a rule is a prior restraint does not mean that the rule is per se unconstitutional. However, understanding how the rule functions is a very important threshold step for navigating the swirling waters surrounding any discussion of the First Amendment. 129