Opinion ID: 1613434
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unjust Enrichment/Money Had and Received

Text: [An action for money had and received] is founded upon the equitable principle that no one ought justly to enrich himself at the expense of another, and is maintainable in all cases where one has received money under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it because in justness and fairness it belongs to another. Marsh & Gamble, § 34:2. [A] cause of action for money had and received is ` less restricted and fettered by technical rules and formalities than any other form of action. It aims at the abstract justice of the case, and looks solely to the inquiry, whether the defendant holds money, which. . . belongs to the plaintiff.' Staats v. Miller, 150 Tex. 581, 584-85, 243 S.W.2d 686, 687-88 (1951)(quoting United States v. Jefferson Elec. Mfg. Co., 291 U.S. 386, 402-03, 54 S.Ct. 443, 78 L.Ed. 859 (1934) (emphasis added)). According to Jewett, the judgment for Boihem is plainly and palpably wrong, because, he insists, Jewett does not hold money paid by Boihem. Jewett contends that the money Boihem paid was paid to the company; therefore, he says, he is not the proper defendant in this case. We disagree. Whenever one person adds to the other's advantage in any form, whether by increasing his holdings or saving him from expense or loss, he has conferred a benefit upon the other. Opelika Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Lamb, 361 So.2d 95, 99 (Ala.1978). Moreover, [i]t is not necessary . . . to prove that money belonging to the plaintiff was actually and physically given to, and received by the defendant, as it is sufficient to show that . . . the defendant has received the benefit indirectly.  42 C.J.S. Implied Contracts § 19, at 27 (2007) (emphasis added). `Often a person owes restitution for a benefit he received through entirely innocent behavior, and even through a transaction in which he took no part. ' Pratt v. Watkins, 946 F.2d 907, 909 (Temp.Emer.Ct.App.1991) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Restitution § 1(b), at 10 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983) (emphasis added)). Cf. Weakley v. Brahan, 2 Stew. 500, 501 (Ala.1830) ([T]he rule [that one cannot make another his debtor without his consent] extends to all payments made to another's use, where the action is brought in the name of him who advances the money.); Oliver v. Camp, 9 Ala.App. 232, 234, 62 So. 469, 470 (1913) (An action for money paid does not lie except upon a request on the part of the defendant or his authorized agent. The request may be either express or implied. One's request of another to make a payment for him may be implied from his subsequent ratification of the payment.). Boihem paid a total of $1,315,000 toward acquiring a 50% interest in the company. Under the evidence, the trial court was authorized to find (1) that, while Jewett was requesting $685,000 from Boihem to complete the purchase, he was actively and secretlynegotiating with Delta to strip the company of a substantial portion of the assets Boihem expected to receive for his payments; (2) that it was only after the Delta deal was concluded that Jewett declared Boihem in default of the letter agreement; (3) that Jewett initially signaled an intention to refund Boihem's consideration; (4) that Boihem has received nothing for his consideration; (5) that the company, as bargained for, has been substantially compromised through no fault of Boihem's; and (6) that the consideration Boihem paid belongs, in justness and fairness, to him. It is no answer to say, as Jewett does, that he owes no obligation simply because Boihem made payments to the company, rather than to him personally. Indeed, $375,000 was paid directly to Jewett. Thus, to that extent, Jewett holds money directly that in justness and fairness belongs to Boihem. As for the rest of the money, it was paid to the company at the instance of Jewett. To the extent that the company is in Jewett's hands, the money is in his hands. As the sole owner and manager of the company, Jewett had absolute authority over its assets and accounts payable as evidenced by the sale of company assets to Delta. In other words, Boihem's payments enriched the company. The enrichment of the company in turn enriched Jewett as of the time, and to the extent, of his choosing. Jewett cannot avoid restitutionary principles by mere form, that is, by arbitrarily directing payment to one of two bank accounts, both of which were under his ultimate control. In short, the trial court's judgment is not, as Jewett contends, so unsupported by the evidence as to be plainly and palpably wrong.