Opinion ID: 1463027
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The government approved specifications for a uniquely tailored product

Text: The plaintiffs contend that the defendants cannot demonstrate that the government exercised its discretionary authority to create the Agent Orange specifications that are contained in the contracts. The government contractor defense protects federal contractors solely as a means of protecting the government's discretionary authority over areas of significant federal interest such as military procurement. Defendants asserting the defense must demonstrate that the government made a discretionary determination about the material it obtained that relates to the defective design feature at issue. Where the government merely rubber stamps a design,... or where the [g]overnment merely orders a product from stock without a significant interest in the alleged design defect, the government has not made a discretionary decision in need of protection, and the defense is therefore inapplicable. Lewis v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 985 F.2d 83, 87 (2d Cir.) (citing Trevino v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 865 F,2d 1474, 1480, 1486 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935, 110 S.Ct. 327, 107 L.Ed.2d 317 (1989), and Boyle, 487 U.S. at 509, 108 S.Ct. 2510) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 924 (1993). If the government buys a product off-the-shelf-as-isthe seller of that product cannot be heard to assert that it is protected from the tort-law consequences of the product's defects. Where the government is merely an incidental purchaser, the seller was not following the government's discretionary procurement decisions. Here, the plaintiffs contend that the government rubber-stamped its approval of the defendants' suggested specifications, which, in turn, were simply combinations of off-the-shelf, commercially available herbicides. They say that Dow Chemical owned the patents for certain aspects of the herbicides' component parts and that many different defendants manufactured and sold 2, 4, 5-T and 2, 4-D in various combinations as early as 1948, with some of the formulations including the same 50% mixture as Agent Orange. As a result, the plaintiffs assert, there are at least triable issues of fact as to whether (1) Agent Orange and related herbicides were stock products, rather than products tailored to the government's needs; and (2) even if the herbicides were not commercially available products, Agent Orange's components were devised by the defendants without the significant government input necessary to meet the first Boyle requirement. As to the former, the plaintiffs do not dispute the defendants' assertions that 2, 4, 5-T and 2, 4-D were not commercially available at the same high concentrations as that contained in Agent Orange. The Stephensons, for example, concede that 2, 4, 5-T was not commercially available in concentrations greater than 55%. See Final Reply Br. for Pl.-Appellants, 05-1760-cv, at 67-68. Agent Orange, by contrast, contained 2, 4, 5-T at greater than 90% purity levels. See, e.g., Aff. of William A. Krohley, counsel for defendant Hercules Inc., Oct. 27, 2004 (Krohley Aff.), Exh. 11 (July 19, 1963 military specification). Moreover, as the Fifth Circuit aptly noted in unrelated Agent Orange litigation, the fact that a product supplied to the government comprises commercially available component parts says nothing about whether the finished product resulted from the exercise of governmental discretion as to its design. [A]11 products can eventually be broken down into various off-the-shelf components. Miller v. Diamond Shamrock Co., 275 F.3d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 2001); see also In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. New York Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626, 638 (2d Cir.1990) (Grispo) (Miner, J., concurring) ([T]he [g]overnment prescription of how [stock] items should be combined and packaged [is] the key to the military contractor defense....). As to the latter argumentthe plaintiffs' contention that there was no significant government inputthe plaintiffs misperceive the nature of the government involvement necessary to invoke the contractor defense. That the component chemicals were not developed for military use in the first instance, that some aspects of their composition were patented, and that the defendants may have proposed certain specifications to the government, are not determinative. Boyle explicitly contemplated government reliance on manufacturers' expertise in making a fully informed decision as to what to order. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513, 108 S.Ct. 2510. [I]t is necessary only that the government approve, rather than create, the specifications. . . . Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1125 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 868, 114 S.Ct. 191, 126 L.Ed.2d 150 (1993); see also Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513, 108 S.Ct. 2510 (The design ultimately selected may well reflect a significant policy judgment by [g]overnment officials whether or not the contractor rather than those officials developed the design.). The extent of the defendants' involvement in suggesting specifications or the defendants' reliance on previously attained industry expertise in doing so is thus not conclusive. The government exercises adequate discretion over the contract specifications to invoke the defense if it independently and meaningfully reviews the specifications such that the government remains the agent[ ] of decision. Grispo, 897 F.2d at 630; see also Stout v. Borg-Warner Corp., 933 F.2d 331, 336 (5th Cir.) (government issued reasonably precise specifications when it reviewed contractor's detailed drawings several times and evaluated test models), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 981, 112 S.Ct. 584, 116 L.Ed.2d 609 (1991); Harduvel v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311, 1320 (11th Cir.1989) (government issued reasonably precise specifications for F-16 fighter aircraft having approved its design following continuous back and forth with contractor), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1030, 110 S.Ct. 1479, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990). With respect to Agent Orange, the record contains, for example, a memorandum dated February 22, 1963, regarding Ester Specifications for U.S. Army Biological Laboratories, written by an employee of one of the defendants, that discussed a February 8, 1963, meeting called to satisfy the U.S. Army about specifications and typical physical properties on the next type of blend they [sic] will be purchasing. Mem. from I.F. Hortman to, inter alios, S.D. Daniels and W.A. Kuhn (Feb. 22, 1963), at 1. It indicated that an effort to permit use of a different n-butyl ester from 2, 4, 5-T was impossible at this time because the Army had studied only the normal esters, and that, therefore, the chemical company would have to present the proposed change directly to the commanding officer, U.S. Army Biological Laboratories and Dr. Charles Minarick, Chief of Crops Division for approval. Id. And notes from a 1968 meeting between government officials and representatives of several of the defendants indicate that the government insisted on a test for chemical composition despite much resistance to this added requirement on the part of the Industry [sic) as well as on a 98% purity level for the 2, 4, 5-T ester. Memorandum of R.A. Guidi, Diamond Alkali Co. (Feb. 20, 1968), at 1-2. We conclude, based on the evidence in the extensive record that has been brought to our attention, [14] that no reasonable jury could find that the government did not exercise sufficient discretion for it to have been said to have approved specifications for the herbicides. The government was plainly the agent[ ] of decision, Grispo, 897 F.2d at 630, with respect to Agent Orange's contractually specified composition.