Opinion ID: 2493631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in prohibiting Dedeaux from cross-examining Stokes regarding his testimony at the first trial, deemed unreliable in Dedeaux I, and other prior related opinions.

Text: ¶ 64. In Dedeaux I, this Court held that Stokes's testimony was not based on sufficient facts and data and was therefore unreliable. Therefore, the trial court erred in admitting that testimony. Dedeaux I, 938 So.2d at 843. On November 29, 2007, Stokes authored a valuation report of the Dedeaux utility system which provided that the fair-market value of operating assets, as of December 3, 1996, was $3,500,000. This figure was based upon three separate calculations using discounted cash flow rates of 8.71% and 6.44%, resulting in figures of $2,375,968 and $3,408,463; and a depreciated replacement cost of $3,691,328. Prior to trial, the trial court determined that Stokes's valuations based upon the discounted cash-flow method were inadmissible, as that method of valuation was deemed unreliable in Dedeaux I. [19] But the trial court further determined that Stokes's depreciated replacement-cost valuation ($3,691,328) was admissible because it had some combination of what Bear Creek talks about. ¶ 65. At trial, the trial court prohibited Dedeaux from cross-examining Stokes on his testimony from the first trial or his opinions that the [c]ourt struck in the motion in limine hearing or the Daubert hearing. While general reference to prior testimony was permitted, the trial court precluded Dedeaux from offering any testimony or argument or in any other manner mentioning or implying that this case was previously tried, appealed or reversed. ¶ 66. Dedeaux argues that under the law of the case doctrine, Stokes should not have been permitted to testify at retrial, based upon Dedeaux I. Alternatively, Dedeaux contends that it should have been permitted to impeach [Stokes] and attack his qualifications with Dedeaux I. According to Dedeaux, by precluding this form of impeachment, Gulfport was allowed to present [Stokes] to the jury as an undisputed expert in public utilities valuation[,] i.e., the jury was not allowed to hear the whole story. ¶ 67. Gulfport responds that the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable, as Stokes used [a] different methodology to come to different conclusions in the new trial. Moreover, Gulfport maintains the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding such evidence because [t]he danger of allowing such `impeachment' evidence is that it puts into evidence the very testimony that the impeaching party moved to exclude. ¶ 68. As previously stated, the trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is governed by an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. See Watts, 990 So.2d at 145-46. In making this determination, even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.... Miss. R. Evid. 403. ¶ 69. Preliminarily, this Court finds the law of the case doctrine inapplicable to the issue of whether Stokes should have been permitted to testify. That doctrine provides that [w]hatever is once established as the controlling legal rule of decision, between the same parties in the same case, continues to be the law of the case, so long as there is a similarity of facts. Moeller v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 812 So.2d 953, 960 (Miss.2002) (citation omitted). In Dedeaux I, this Court did not foreclose subsequent testimony by Stokes, but simply held that Stokes's testimony at the first trial was unreliable as it was not based on sufficient facts and data.... Dedeaux I, 938 So.2d at 843. A new trial provides a clean slate. The issues must be retried, and the parties may thus present evidence differently. White v. Stewman, 932 So.2d 27, 33 (Miss. 2006). As Stokes's testimony on retrial included the use of the depreciated replacement-cost methodology, the law of the case doctrine has no application thereto. ¶ 70. As to the trial court's decision to prohibit cross-examination specifically referencing Stokes's testimony from the first trial or those opinions which were stricken pretrial, this Court finds no abuse of discretion. Undoubtedly, the jury could have been prejudiced, confused, or misled by impeachment evidence which implicated otherwise-excluded subject matter. To avoid that risk was not arbitrary and clearly erroneous. Watts, 990 So.2d at 145-46.