Opinion ID: 1167064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: ellis

Text: In Ellis the commission concluded that petitioner committed (1) wilful misconduct in abusing the contempt power by invoking it to enforce an order he made after being disqualified (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6), and (2) prejudicial conduct in deciding contested issues after the disqualification. The master concluded that failure to disqualify was wilful misconduct but that petitioner's only abuse of the contempt power was negligent failure to follow correct procedures, amounting to prejudicial conduct. Ellis, represented by Keller, was arraigned on burglary charges before petitioner on October 6, 1978. He pleaded not guilty, and preliminary hearing was set for October 16. Immediately after arraignment Keller, against whom petitioner had sought to exercise the contempt power in Renfro and Lee, filed a section 170.6 motion to disqualify petitioner. Petitioner instructed his clerk to arrange for Judge Smith to sit at the preliminary hearing. The Ellis charges relate to the scheduling of that hearing. [9] Judge Smith returned from vacation on October 16. Petitioner's clerk called him at 9 a.m.; he said he could conduct the hearing on either October 19 (a.m.) or October 20 (p.m.). They agreed on October 19. The clerk called Keller's office; his secretary said that on October 19 he had an all day engagement in the San Francisco area. The clerk said Keller should appear in court at 11 a.m. that day (Oct. 16) and take the matter up with petitioner. At Keller's direction his secretary then called Judge Smith and asked if the hearing could be held on a day other than October 19. Smith said October 20 was better for him anyway and asked the secretary to call petitioner's court and set the hearing for October 20. About 9:30 the secretary told petitioner's clerk that Keller's office had been in touch with Judge Smith and that he had set the hearing for October 20. The clerk again replied that Keller should take up the matter in court that morning (October 16). At 11:15 Keller was in court, and petitioner opened the proceeding by scolding Keller for not giving notice of the section 170.6 disqualification at the time of arraignment. He then stated he understood Judge Smith would be available at 9 a.m. on the 19th. Keller said his office had been in touch with Smith who, Keller understood, would be available at 1:30 on Friday (the 20th). Petitioner replied that Keller's office is in touch with far too many judges such as Hamilton (an apparent reference to Renfro ) and now Smith, who has no standing in this case until such time that he is arranged for and confirmed by this court. He charged Keller with twist[ing] the procedures and asked if Keller was prepared at this time to file a formal time waiver so that the matter may go over to the 19th for Judge Smith. Keller said he had not prepared a written waiver but would file one; petitioner demanded it before noon. He then launched into a long lecture, excoriating Keller for disrespect, manipulation, and dishonesty, and for filing a disqualification while knowing that it is extremely difficult to find a substitute judge. He refused Keller's request to respond, [10] finally told him to leave, and ordered Ellis back at 9 a.m. on the 19th for a preliminary hearing at which Judge Smith would preside. Petitioner contends his setting the hearing for October 19 was justified by Keller's failure to disclose his calendar conflict. The commission found that Keller had no opportunity to do so, and the finding is supported by testimony of the deputy district attorney and the transcript. The master did not decide the point. In any event, petitioner's clerk acknowledged being informed of the conflict more than an hour before the hearing. On the 17th Smith had conversations with both Keller and petitioner that left him with the impression that the hearing would be held on the 20th. On the 18th petitioner informed Smith that, because of the number of witnesses subpoenaed and the inconvenience to all parties, he would prefer that the hearing be held the next morning. Later, Keller called Smith to say he still could not make it on the 19th. Smith told Keller to send Ellis to court so that Smith could take a waiver of time for the purpose of continuing the case. On the 19th Smith was in petitioner's chambers, prepared to don his robe, call the case, take a waiver of counsel and of right to speedy preliminary hearing, and continue the case. He was a little dumbfounded when petitioner took the bench instead. The transcript shows that petitioner interrogated his clerk, Ellis, Judge Smith, and the district attorney at length about the scheduling of the hearing and particularly any communications with Keller about his absence. Petitioner then turned to the purportedly unlimited waiver of time for preliminary hearing that Ellis, through Keller, had filed on the 16th. Petitioner construed that waiver as effective only until the 19th and ordered a hearing on the 23d to establish whether the time waiver will be forthcoming or whether we'll have to dismiss the complaint and refile and proceed with the arraignment again. He told Judge Smith he need not be present on the 23d. Fearful of being jailed if he appeared before petitioner, Keller presented a petition to Superior Court Judge Byrne, who declined to issue a writ but telephoned petitioner. On October 23, in place of Keller, Stambaugh appeared before petitioner as counsel for Ellis. Petitioner asked him if he were prepared to file a waiver. Stambaugh said his and Keller's position was that the previously filed waiver was sufficient and, since the court disagreed, asked for a hearing on that issue before another judge, petitioner having been disqualified. Petitioner suggested that since the basis of disqualification was his prejudice against Keller, not Ellis, we can now proceed to determine the question of fact. Stambaugh replied that in associating with Keller he joined all Keller's prior positions. Petitioner then ordered that the complaint be dismissed and that, on Ellis' rearrest on a new complaint, he be released on his own recognizance. Concededly the basis of that order was a ruling that the previously filed waiver was invalid. The hearing was markedly prolonged by petitioner's tirades against Keller and his senseless manipulation. Keller wrote petitioner on October 24 that he was shocked and surprised by the dismissal, which he considered void in view of petitioner's disqualification. On November 6 petitioner sent Keller an order to show cause re contempt, to be heard November 13. Attached was petitioner's affidavit grounding the contempt charge on Keller's failure to appear on October 19. Petitioner declared: That at no time during the proceedings on October 16th, or during the interim period of time between October 16th and October 19th, did Attorney Keller protest the date set for the preliminary hearing. Yet the October 19 transcript reports Judge Smith as stating that between the 16th and the 19th he had had two or three contacts with Keller, who said he could not attend on the 19th because of a calendar conflict and whom Smith then instructed to have Ellis appear on the 19th anyway, so that Smith could get a time waiver. Judge Fogerty issued an alternative writ of prohibition against the contempt hearing. [11] The writ proceeding was terminated by a settlement providing for (1) dismissal of contempt charges against Keller and (in Anderson ) Cline, and (2) procedures enabling Keller and Cline to obtain on request a transfer of any matter in which they were attorneys from petitioner's courtroom to that of Judge Hamilton in Placerville. Testifying before the master, petitioner said his reason for citing Keller for contempt was disobedience of petitioner's order not to engage in calendaring with a judge that had no involvement with the court. Failure to appear on October 19 (the only ground given in the contempt affidavit) was just the end result. Asked when he made such an order, petitioner pointed only to his statement at the October 16 proceeding that Keller's office is in touch with far too many judges who have no particular standing in this case such as Judges Hamilton and Smith. The commission founded its conclusion of wilful misconduct for abuse of the contempt power on two grounds: (1) error in ordering the matter heard by himself almost a month after the event, and (2) error in an attempt to use the contempt power to enforce an order entered by him in a case where he had been disqualified and the judge assigned to hear the matter was present in the courtroom on the date of the hearing but was prevented by [petitioner] from taking the bench. The first ground is insufficient. Petitioner does appear to have been personally embroiled enough to have been required to recuse himself. ( Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, supra, 400 U.S. 455, 465 [27 L.Ed.2d 532, 540]; In re Martin (1977) 71 Cal. App.3d 472, 480 [139 Cal. Rptr. 451].) Yet, there is no clear and convincing evidence that he intended to hear the contempt matter himself rather than calling in another judge. (11) The second ground of wilful abuse must be sustained. Keller's reason for absence on October 19 had been fully explained to Judge Smith. It was proper for Keller to deal directly with Smith in making scheduling arrangements, which both understood to be subject to the availability of petitioner's courtroom and to the convenience of other counsel, parties, and witnesses. The contempt charge appears to have been made because of petitioner's animosity toward Keller rather than his good faith perception of any contemptuous conduct. Making it was wilful misconduct. The commission found prejudicial conduct in petitioner's action in continuing to preside and to decide contested issues in a case where a 170.6 disqualification had been filed. Petitioner must have known and now admits that he had no power to decide the validity of Ellis's time waiver. The charge is sustained.