Opinion ID: 4568309
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The verdict and sentencing

Text: The jury convicted Valentino of all counts: robbery, Va. Code § 18.2-58, malicious wounding, § 18.2-51, and the use of a firearm while committing those offenses, §§ 18.2- 11 Neither the state nor the defense formally sought forensic testing of Valentino’s sock. The socks, which Valentino claims were the ones he was wearing, were allegedly given to Valentino’s attorney by one of Valentino’s friends. J.A. 601–02 (defense motion for testing). The defense attorney then gave the socks to the prosecution at a preliminary hearing. At the time, Valentino’s counsel told the detective “to do as you wish.” J.A. 332. The detective did not interpret this statement as a request by the defense to test the bloody sock. Rather, he interpreted defense counsel’s action as simply turning over evidence. 15 53, -53.1. 12 Valentino moved for a new trial on the grounds that the Commonwealth should have conducted DNA testing on his bloody sock. He asserted that, if Islam’s DNA was on Valentino’s sock as he claimed, it would have definitively proved his version of events (that Islam was between Valentino and an assailant when the gun went off) rather than one of the Commonwealth’s theories (that bullet fragments ricocheted after hitting Islam, that Valentino shot himself later, that Valentino was never really injured, or that the injury was caused by something else entirely). 13 Although defense counsel claimed that he believed the DNA testing would be done, he acknowledged that he never filed a motion to have the evidence tested. Moreover, when the defense realized that testing had not been performed, counsel admitted to reaching a 12 The defense requested a poll of the jury, see Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:17(d), and the record shows that all twelve jurors affirmed their verdicts. The trial judge then affirmed the unanimity of the verdict. J.A. 521; see Va. CONST. art. I, § 8 (guaranteeing the accused in a “criminal prosecution[] . . . the right to . . . an impartial jury of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty”); cf. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1397 (2020). No one objected. But two days later, one juror phoned defense counsel claiming that she did not, in fact, affirm the verdict in open court. According to defense counsel, “[b]ecause the defendant and his mother were crying loudly while the jury polling process was being conducted, neither the defendant nor counsel realized at the time the jury was polled that a juror did not answer.” J.A. 523. At a motions hearing, the judge rejected Valentino’s motion for a new trial on this basis. 13 As the Commonwealth explained at oral argument, the jury did not need to definitively resolve this question to convict Valentino. And the Commonwealth declined to bind itself to any single theory. See Oral Arg. 16:20–17:35; see also J.A. 506 (“What about the bullet? [Defense counsel] says it must be that the bullet traveled through [Islam’s] leg and then into the Defendant’s shoe. If you guys want to go back there and try to play jury twister and figure out how that happened, by all means try but I don’t think you’re going to figure out that is how it happened.”). 16 “tactical decision” about how to use that fact—to argue that the investigation was unfair and rushed—instead of asking for a continuance. J.A. 571. Citing these reasons, the court rejected Valentino’s motion for a new trial. The trial judge sentenced Valentino to twenty years in prison. J.A. 582–83. His conviction was affirmed in the Virginia Court of Appeals. See Valentino v. Commonwealth of Virginia, Va. Ct. App. Rec. No. 2005-12-4 (Va. Ct. App. June 4, 2013). The Virginia Supreme Court declined to review his case.