Opinion ID: 4513537
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counsel’s Failure to Pursue an Appeal

Text: Mr. Orozco further alleges that Ms. Strickland was ineffective (1) in failing to fulfill Mr. Orozco’s request to appeal, and (2) in failing to consult with him about an appeal.
If Ms. Strickland heard Mr. Orozco’s request for an appeal, it would be professionally unreasonable for her not to file a notice of appeal. See Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 746; Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477. The district court, however, made 18 a factual finding that Mr. Orozco did not adequately communicate a request for an appeal. That finding is reviewable only for clear error, see Orange, 447 F.3d at 796, and “[a] district court’s factual finding is clear error only if it is simply not plausible or permissible in light of the entire record on appeal,” United States v. Gould, 672 F.3d 930, 935 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). During the hearing, Mr. Orozco acknowledged that Ms. Strickland might not have heard him ask about an appeal, as she was taking off his interpreter headphones. Further, he testified that he made no effort to communicate with her after the sentencing. In light of this evidence, we cannot conclude the district court clearly erred in finding that Mr. Orozco did not adequately convey a request to appeal to Ms. Strickland. Because Mr. Orozco has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as required by Strickland, we affirm the denial of relief on this portion of this claim.
“Reject[ing] a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal,” Flores-Ortega held that counsel must consult “when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing.” 528 U.S. at 480. “In making this determination, courts must take into account all the information counsel knew or should have known.” Id. “Although not determinative, a highly relevant factor in this inquiry will be whether the conviction 19 follows a trial or a guilty plea, both because a guilty plea reduces the scope of potentially appealable issues and because such a plea may indicate that the defendant seeks an end to judicial proceedings.” Id. Mr. Orozco argues that a rational defendant would want to appeal based on a nonfrivolous issue (here, whether the plea was unknowing and involuntary). The district court, however, agreed with the magistrate judge that “the risk of receiving a higher sentence [if the plea agreement were overturned on appeal] outweighed the slim chance of receiving a more favorable result through resentencing.” R. at 641. “Given that the Plea Agreement reduced sentencing exposure, the Court cannot say that a rational defendant would have sought to invalidate it on appeal.” Id. Given his original understanding that he would serve no more than 37 months, Mr. Orozco understandably was unhappy with a 72-month sentence. See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480 (“the court must consider such factors as whether the defendant received the sentence bargained for as part of the plea”). Nevertheless, we agree with the district court that he failed to establish that a rational defendant would want to appeal in the circumstances of this case. If the plea agreement were overturned on appeal and Mr. Orozco permitted to enter an open guilty plea, he would almost certainly have received a higher sentence. Mr. Orozco further argues that he reasonably demonstrated to Ms. Strickland that he was interested in appealing. The district rejected this premise because Mr. Orozco had rejected Ms. Strickland’s offer to try to withdraw the plea, telling her that he just wanted to finish the proceedings; his sentence was within the terms of the 20 plea agreement, even though it was higher than he originally anticipated; and “he did not communicate any desire to appeal his sentence following sentencing so far as [Ms.] Strickland knew.” R. at 640. We cannot conclude that any of these factual findings is clearly erroneous, and thus we agree with the district court that Ms. Strickland did not have a duty to consult on the ground that Mr. Orozco had reasonably demonstrated he was interested in appealing. Because Mr. Orozco has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as required by Strickland, we affirm the denial of relief on this portion of this claim.