Opinion ID: 2136626
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impeachment testimony of Nancy Bernier.

Text: Nancy Bernier testified for the state and placed Irby in the saloon near the jukebox when she heard a loud noise and saw a flash from the area of the jukebox, but did not see Irby shoot Frosch. On the preliminary hearing, she had testified she saw Irby shoot Frosch. The prosecutor was allowed to read into the record her prior inconsistent statement after the court held her to be a hostile witness. This, the court may do. See sec. 972.09, Stats.; Bullock v. State (1972), 53 Wis. 2d 809, 193 N. W. 2d 889. However, previous inconsistent statements used to impeach one's own witness even though hostile may not be used as substantive evidence. State v. Major (1956), 274 Wis. 110, 79 N. W. 2d 75; Gelhaar v. State (1969), 41 Wis. 2d 230, 163 N. W. 2d 609. Irby claims the impeachment testimony of Bernier was used substantively by the jury. This argument is based on the assumption the court did not instruct the jury on the limited use of the evidence. The prior inconsistent statements of Bernier were of three kinds: A statement made to the police about two hours after the shooting; a statement made to the district attorney two days after the shooting, and her testimony at the preliminary hearing. In respect to the first two statements, the court asked defense trial counsel whether he had any objection to their admission in evidence and he had none. Counsel also did not specifically object to the receipt of Bernier's testimony at the preliminary hearing as an exhibit which would go to the jury. Trial counsel did not ask for any instruction on the limitation of the use of these statements. Therefore under the usual rules, counsel waived any objection to the use of the evidence if, in fact, the jury considered it substantive evidence. State v. Cassel (1970), 48 Wis. 2d 619, 180 N. W. 2d 607; Price v. State (1967), 37 Wis. 2d 117, 154 N. W. 2d 222, certiorari denied (1968), 391 U. S. 908, 88 Sup. Ct. 1662, 20 L. Ed. 2d 423; State v. Cartagena (1968), 40 Wis. 2d 213, 161 N. W. 2d 392; Whitty v. State (1967), 34 Wis. 2d 278, 149 N. W. 2d 557, certiorari denied (1965), 390 U. S. 959, 88 Sup. Ct. 1056, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1155. However, it is argued the use of impeachment evidence as substantive evidence is a plain error and so fundamental as to taint the trial and make it unfair or biased. It is claimed such an error is an exception to the waiver rule. McCormick, Evidence (2d ed.), p. 120, sec. 52. A plain error has been recognized on appeal where it involved issues of constitutional dimensions, but we see no constitutional issue here. California v. Green (1970), 399 U. S. 149, 90 Sup. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489. It is argued that sec. 972.09, Stats., [1] forbids the use of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. The statute expressly states a hostile witness may be impeached by the party producing him by evidence of his prior contradictory statements. State v. Major, supra . The Major Case involves the question of construing sec. 325.35, the predecessor section of 972.09, but not the question of granting authority to use inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. We do not think sec. 972.09 by implication forbids the use of prior inconsistent statements of a witness as substantive evidence where no objection is made by counsel. Generally, all probative evidence is admissible unless objected to on proper grounds. It follows that a trial court, although it may, is not required sua sponte to reject prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence when counsel has made no objection. Neither is the trial court in such a situation required sua sponte to instruct the jury that the evidence was admitted for only the limited purpose of impeachment when there was no such understanding upon its admission.