Opinion ID: 2134398
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Applicability of Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act

Text: The District argues that the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act applies to Skinner's injuries because the injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. The trial court found that there was no dispute in the evidence that Skinner was acting in the status of the wife of Rockney D. Skinner and not as an employee of the [District]. The trial court found that as a result, the injury did not arise out of or in the course of her employment. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-101 (Reissue 1998): When personal injury is caused to an employee by accident or occupational disease, arising out of and in the course of his or her employment, such employee shall receive compensation therefor from his or her employer if the employee was not willfully negligent at the time of receiving such injury. The two phrases arising out of and in the course of in § 48-101 are conjunctive; thus, both must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Logsdon v. ISCO Co., 260 Neb. 624, 618 N.W.2d 667 (2000). The phrase arising out of, as used in § 48-101, describes the accident and its origin, cause, and character, i.e., whether it resulted from the risks arising within the scope of the employee's job; the phrase in the course of refers to the time, place, and circumstances surrounding the accident. Id. The in the course of requirement has been defined as testing the work connection as to time, place, and activity; that is, it demands that the injury be shown to have arisen within the time and space boundaries of the employment, and in the course of an activity whose purpose is related to the employment. Cox v. Fagen Inc., 249 Neb. 677, 545 N.W.2d 80 (1996). See 1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 12.01 (2001). The general rule is: An injury is said to arise in the course of the employment when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while the employee is fulfilling work duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto. Id., § 12.00 at 12-1. A compensable injury must arise not only within the time and space limits of the employment, but also in the course of an activity related to the employment. 2 Larson & Larson, supra, § 20.00 at 20-1. We need only consider whether Skinner was engaged in an employment-related activity at the time of the injury, because our determination in that regard is dispositive of the issue concerning the applicability of the act. An activity is related to the employment if it carries out the employer's purposes or advances its interests directly or indirectly. Id. at 20-1. [W]ork-connected activity goes beyond the direct services performed for the employer and includes at least some ministration to the personal comfort and human wants of the employee. Id., § 20.01 at 20-2. The difficulty is in drawing the line. Id. In the specific context regarding acts that benefit coworkers, Larson states, An act outside an employee's regular duties which is undertaken in good faith to advance the employer's interests, whether or not the employee's own assigned work is thereby furthered, is within the course of employment. Id., § 27.00 at 27-1. The reason for the rule is that it would be contrary to human nature as well as the employer's interest to forbid employees from helping each other at pain of losing benefits should an injury occur. Id., § 27.01[2]. By contrast, if the employee's activity aids a coemployee in a matter entirely personal to the coemployee, then it is outside the course of employment, unless the deviation is insubstantial. Id., § 27.01[5]. The question is most difficult where the employee helps a coemployee and simultaneously advances the employer's work, but does so not primarily to help the employer, but to accommodate the coemployee. Id., § 27.01[5]. The case at bar can be characterized as such a case. In resolving the question we are guided by our prior cases, particularly Brown v. Leavitt Lane Farm, 215 Neb. 522, 340 N.W.2d 4 (1983), and Levander v. Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, 257 Neb. 283, 596 N.W.2d 705 (1999). In Brown v. Leavitt Lane Farm, supra , the claimant was employed as a farmworker. On the day of the accident, the claimant went to the residence of one of the partners in the business to see if there was any work. Id. He was told there was no work, so he asked if he could get his paycheck. Id. He then told the partner that he was going over to help some of his coworkers while the check was being drawn. Id. He tried to assist his coworkers in digging some postholes for a corral, but was injured almost immediately when his arm got caught in the auger of a posthole digger. Id. Because the case was on appeal from a Workers' Compensation Court determination in favor of the claimant, we resolved the dispute in the evidence regarding the employer's authorization of the claimant's actions in favor of the claimant. Id. We declared: We affirm the finding of the Workmen's Compensation Court that appellee was within the course of his employment because, although he was a volunteer, he was in the process of helping coemployees perform work for appellant, and the labor done by plaintiff in his good faith attempt to assist fellow employees was being done with the authorization of appellant. Id. at 524, 340 N.W.2d at 6-7. In Levander v. Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, supra , the plaintiff was employed at the Elks lodge, and her duties included opening the clubhouse, bartending, accepting green fees from golfers, and cleaning. Id. She, as a member of the lodge, also performed various volunteer activities for the lodge, as did other members, including grilling hamburgers for golf tournaments (a common volunteer activity for lodge members), working during `beer and burger nights,' and cleaning up after the mens' meetings. Id. at 285, 596 N.W.2d at 708. Neither she nor anyone else had been paid to grill hamburgers at the lodge's tournaments. Id. On the day of the accident, the plaintiff opened the clubhouse and tended bar. Id. Sometime after 12:30 p.m. the plaintiff went outside and started grilling hamburgers for a tournament, filling in for another lodge employee who did not come to work that day. Id. The grill somehow caught fire, and she was injured. Id. The plaintiff did not receive any workers' compensation benefits as a result of the accident. Id. We noted that the plaintiff was grilling hamburgers after her shift was over; the grilling was not part of her duties as an employee; the grilling took place on the golf course, outside her regular place of work in the clubhouse; and the grilling of hamburgers had always been a part of her volunteer activities. Id. We distinguished Brown v. Leavitt Lane Farm, supra , because of three facts: (1) Levander was not physically assisting a coworker, but, apparently, filling in for someone who was not there; (2) grilling hamburgers had never been a part of the scope of Levander's employment with the Elks; and (3) there is evidence to indicate that the job Levander was doing was strictly understood to be part of her volunteer work as a member of the Elks lodge, as opposed to the assistance of coworkers. Levander v. Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, 257 Neb. 283, 289, 596 N.W.2d 705, 710 (1999). We concluded that there existed an issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff was an employee acting in the scope of employment. Id. The facts we used in Levander to distinguish Brown v. Leavitt Lane Farm, 215 Neb. 522, 340 N.W.2d 4 (1983), show that our paramount consideration was that the plaintiff in Levander was not acting in her capacity as an employee, but, rather, as a member of the lodge volunteering her time and efforts. In other words, the plaintiff's activity in Levander was related to her membership at the lodge, not her employment. In contrast, the claimant in Brown was acting in his capacity as an employee, despite the fact that he was not on the clock at the time of the injury, because he had no other involvement with the company or its employees. In the case at bar, Skinner's duties concern only special education and have nothing to do with the band program. She does, however, as a part of her employment, assist coworkers in doing other tasks on occasion. Despite this fact, her assistance of coworkers has historically been confined to helping them during regular working hours during the school year. The injury in question occurred late in the evening in the middle of the summer when school was not in session. Skinner testified that she would not have made such a special trip to the school to assist a coworker but for the fact that the coworker was her husband. Helping her husband in such circumstances would not be considered a part of her employment because giving help in those circumstances was not the general custom of Skinner or the employees at the school. The instant case is therefore more analogous to Levander and is distinguishable from Brown. In Levander, we stated, acts that are nothing more than the discharge of a person's duties as a good citizen or member of the community are not within the course of employment. 257 Neb. at 288-89, 596 N.W.2d at 710. In the instant case, Skinner was assisting her husband for a purely personal reason, namely, that she wanted to expedite their departure for a vacation, so the injuries she sustained while giving such assistance did not arise in the course of employment. As stated above, the phrases arising out of and in the course of in § 48-101 are not synonymous and must both be established in order for the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act to apply. See Logsdon v. ISCO Co., 260 Neb. 624, 618 N.W.2d 667 (2000). Because we have concluded that the injury in this case did not arise in the course of employment, we need not address whether the injury arose out of employment.