Opinion ID: 1535336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The (i)(8) Standard

Text: In respect to the (i)(8) standard, appellee contends that this violation was established merely by the uncontroverted evidence that at the time of the accident, the two employees were not wearing the safety belts. Under this view, the fact that they had been provided and were attached to a lifeline secured to the superstructure did not establish compliance. In short, the requirement of the safety standard that the employee be protected by an approved safety life belt attached to a lifeline means that they must be worn, not simply furnished. The employer, though not disputing the evidence, challenges the construction placed upon the standard by appellee. It contends that the employees were protected within the contemplation of (i)(8), but simply refused to wear the safety belts. The employer maintains that it would have been virtually impossible for it to have been aware that the employees  being fearful of becoming ensnarled in the lines while lowering the scaffold  would unhook their belts moments before the incident. The employer argues with considerable logic that compliance with this standard, as interpreted by the Commissioner, would impose a requirement incapable of being met  constant surveillance by at least one monitor for each pair of workmen. Finally, the employer claims that scaffold workers are an unusual breed of men who traditionally resist the use of safety belts. Prior to this occurrence, nevertheless, it had taken the following steps in an effort to obtain compliance with the safety belt standards. It had: 1) Conducted weekly safety classes. 2) Provided each employee with a safety belt attached to independent lines. 3) Empowered the Shop Steward with authority to discharge any employee not wearing a safety belt tied off, an authorization which was uncommonly broad for this field. 4) Instructed all supervisors to observe the men, and to report any employee not wearing a safety belt properly tied. 5) Fired two employees for refusing to wear their safety belts properly tied. Thus, the employer maintains that it was not in violation of (i)(8) on September 6, 1973. Additionally, it contends that if there was such a violation, it was not of a serious and repeated nature, and that the penalty was improper because the Commissioner did not consider all the statutory criteria applicable to the assessment of penalties. [7] Since the Maryland Act is patterned on the Federal Act  this being our first encounter with either  we look to the federal cases for guidance. The major authority in this area is National Rlty. & C. Co., Inc. v. Occupational S. & H.R. Com'n, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir.1973). There, National Realty was charged with a violation of the general duty clause, § 654 (a)(1), when an employee was injured while riding, contrary to the instructions of his employer, on the front of a loader. In construing the phrase free from recognized hazards in (a)(1) the court said: Construing the term in the present context presents a dilemma. On the one hand, the adjective is unqualified and absolute: A workplace cannot be just `reasonably free' of a hazard, or merely as free as the average workplace in the industry. On the other hand, Congress quite clearly did not intend the general duty clause to impose strict liability: The duty was to be an achievable one. Congress' language is consonant with its intent only where the `recognized' hazard in question can be totally eliminated from a workplace. A hazard consisting of conduct by employees, such as equipment riding, cannot, however, be totally eliminated. A demented, suicidal, or willfully reckless employee may on occasion circumvent the best conceived and most vigorously enforced safety regime. This seeming dilemma is, however, soluble within the literal structure of the general duty clause. Congress intended to require elimination only of preventable hazards. It follows, we think, that Congress did not intend unpreventable hazards to be considered `recognized' under the clause. Though a generic form of hazardous conduct, such as equipment riding, may be `recognized,' unpreventable instances of it are not, and thus the possibility of their occurrence at a workplace is not inconsistent with the workplace being `free' of recognized hazards. 489 F.2d at 1265-66 (emphasis in original). The court then went on to conclude: ... To establish a violation of the general duty clause, hazardous conduct need not actually have occurred, for a safety program's feasibly curable inadequacies may sometimes be demonstrated before employees have acted dangerously. At the same time, however, actual occurrence of hazardous conduct is not, by itself, sufficient evidence of a violation, even when the conduct has led to injury. The record must additionally indicate that demonstrably feasible measures would have materially reduced the likelihood that such misconduct would have occurred.  489 F.2d at 1267 (emphasis added). This rationale has been followed by a series of federal appellate cases and by several decisions of the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission: Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Com'n, 502 F.2d 946 (3rd Cir.1974) (upholding, as supported by substantial evidence, rejection by the Commission of Secretary's contention that would have required closer supervision); Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Com'n, 501 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir.1974) (instruction to employee to stay away from unloading truck satisfied employer's burden); Secretary of Labor v. Richmond Block, Inc., OSHRC Docket No. 82, 1973-74 CCH-OSHD, ¶ 17,137 (January 11, 1974); Secretary of Labor v. Canrad Precision Industries, Inc., Hanovia Lamp Division, OSHRC Docket No. 89, 1971-73 CCH-OSHD, ¶ 15,355 (December 13, 1972), aff'd, Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Com'n, supra, 502 F.2d 946; Secretary of Labor v. Standard Glass Co., Inc., OSHRC Docket No. 259, 1971-73 CCH-OSHD, ¶ 15,146 (June 26, 1972); see REA Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822, 826 (2d Cir.1974). In the Canrad case, the Review Commission said: ... While close supervision may be required in some cases to avoid accidents, it is unrealistic to expect an experienced and well-qualified laboratory technician to be under constant scrutiny. Such a holding by the Commission, requiring that each employee be constantly watched by a supervisor, would be totally impractical and, in all but the most unusual circumstances, an unnecessary burden. Similarly, in Standard Glass, the Commission explained: An employer cannot in all circumstances be held to the strict standard of being an absolute guarantor or insurer that his employees will observe all the Secretary's standards at all times. An isolated brief violation of a standard by an employee which is unknown to the employer and is contrary to both the employer's instructions and a company work rule which the employer has uniformly enforced does not necessarily constitute a violation of section [654 (a) (2)] of the Act by the employer. Although many of these cases have dealt with the general duty clause, the same principles apply to a violation of a specific standard. Since the purpose of the State Act is to assure as far as possible every working man and woman in the State of Maryland safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources, Art. 89, § 28 (c), and not to impose strict liability on employers, the effort made by the employer to prevent hazards is the focal point, not the happening of the accident. The common thread running through the cases, therefore, is that the employer cannot be charged with being an insurer, or be held accountable to a standard of strict liability. As we have indicated, acceptance of the argument advanced by appellee would have the effect of imposing such a standard in this case. Here, the employer undertook all reasonable means to compel its employees to wear their properly attached safety belts. The evidence further shows that two of them were fired for failing to observe this procedure. In short, the Commissioner has failed to indicate that demonstrably feasible measures would have materially reduced the likelihood that such misconduct would have occurred. For these reasons, the determination respecting standard (i)(8) and the $9,000 penalty assessed against appellant must be reversed. In light of our disposition of these issues, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether the violations were serious and repeated, or whether, in fixing the penalty, the Commissioner took proper account of the statutory criteria.