Opinion ID: 3011278
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Extent of the Departure

Text: Finally, Queensborough argues that even if an upward departure was permissible the District Court abused its discretion by ordering an excessive departure equivalent to an increase of five or six levels. He contends that even if he had inflicted permanent or life-threatening bodily injury, the increase in his offense level would have been only four levels. Appellant's Br. at 28 (citing U.S.S.G.S 2A3.1(b)(4)). He relies on our statement that analogy to the guidelines is also a useful and appropriate tool for determining what offense level a defendant's conduct most closely approximates. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1112. However, [a]t this stage, the question is no longer whether the district court has substituted its judgment for that of the Sentencing Commission, but whether the court of appeals should substitute its judgment for that of the district court. Id. at 1110. Our dissenting colleague, who agrees that an upward departure was appropriate, nonetheless would remand because he believes that the District Court gaveno clue as to why it decided that a five-level departure was warranted, dissenting op. at 33, and that the reasonableness of the degree of departure in this case is not apparent from the record. Dissenting op. at 34. He would follow the process that we used in United States v. Jacobs, 167 F.3d 792 (3d Cir. 1999). Unlike our colleague, we believe that both the justification for an upward departure of the extent given and the District Court's reasons are fully set forth on the record. 19 The PSR, which was available to both the defense and the District Court, contains a Victim Impact Statement from each of the two victims. Lest there be any question about the extent of the psychological injury to the victims, a brief review of the written statement of the female victim, who said that she knew bad things did happen, but did not know that evil like this existed, which was included in the PSR, fully sets forth the devastating effect on her of the brutality of the multiple rapes. She related that, inter alia, she had cried every day for months; continuing nightmares; continuing months of counseling; loss of the ability to focus on meditation or prayer without becoming distracted by reliving the horror of that night; waiting in terror for [AIDS] and pregnancy testing; the horror, shame, and embarrassment, when news of this appeared in newspapers and on t.v. programs;the difficulty of trying to handle the everyday events of life while dealing with this; much of what made my life happy and worth living was not available to me for many months. . . and in some ways may never return. The written statement of the male victim included in the PSR was similar. He related that [t]he hatred, brutality, and violence that we were subjected to . . . has permanently changed my life; he became incredibly fragile; experienced repeated and uncontrollable panic . . . directly related to the violent crimes; becauseduring much of the violence, I was held down from behind, with a gun in the back of my head or in the side of my face. . . [in the months that followed] I frequently panicked, fearing that someone was about to attack me from behind, only to turn and find no one; could no longer walk alone [in the forest] without panic and extreme anxiety;sought and received weekly counseling; had not fully healedmore than one and one-half years after that violent night; I still find myself lying awake thinking about the horrors of that night. Both victims commented in their written statements about the length of the sentence that the District Court had to set. The female victim wrote, I know you can not return [my happy spirit] to me, but you can make certain that others don't lose theirs as well. It is my belief, backed by 20 many studies, that if freedom is given to this person before he reaches middle age he will repeat the violent crimes he has committed. That price for his freedom is too high. You stand between this man and the brutality with which he will treat other people. The male victim also wrote, I sincerely believe that if he is not sentenced to many years in jail, he will again commit horrific crimes, and in the future, he may not allow the victims to live. I feel a deep responsibility to call the attention of the legal system to this danger, and the court has a deep responsibility to ensure that others are not endangered by this man. Andfinally, he wrote, there is no doubt that each of these men is capable of murder. Please do not allow these men to hurt or to kill others. The PSR, of course, is available and part of the record. But if the written statements of the victims did not sufficiently set forth the circumstances and effect of Queensborough's crime, these victims felt so strongly about the sentencing that, unlike most victims of rape who shun further contact with the case once the trial is over, they both returned for the sentencing hearing and gave their statements in person and in the presence of the court. Those statements are included as an Appendix to this opinion. We find nothing in the Jacobs opinion that is comparable. The District Court was not unaware of the need to articulate the reasons for the upward departure to the extent it chose, but apparently believed, with good reason, that it was apparent from the record that had just been made. Thus, in sentencing Queensborough, the District Court, having just heard the moving and explicit statements of both victims, made in open court, stated at the outset: THE COURT: Mr. Queensborough, I don't know that there's a whole lot I can say to you, other than what [the female victim] and [the male victim] have very eloquently told you right now. . . . The cases alluded to by your counsel earlier are different, they are distinguishable from this, while they 21 were certainly very bad and dangerous and brutal, but they do not reach the level of brutality that you did to these two people. Not only do I think that it is, that sentencing you on the high . . . end of the guidelines is appropriate, I think that it does warrant departure upward. The court stated that this case is totally senseless . . . . So I think that this is one of those instances where the Court is justified in departing upward. After confirming with the U.S. Attorney that the maximum sentence for this is life, the court imposed the sentence of 20 years on Count 1 and the mandatory 5 years on Count 2. The Supreme Court has made it clear that we are to afford substantial deference to a District Court's sentencing decision: A district court's decision to depart from the Guidelines . . . will in most cases be due substantial deference, for it embodies the traditional exercise of discretion by a sentencing court. Before a departure is permitted, certain aspects of the case must be found unusual enough for it to fall outside the heartland of cases in the Guideline. . . . Whether a given factor is present to a degree not adequately considered by the Commission, or whether a discouraged factor nonetheless justifies departure because it is present in some unusual or exceptional way, are matters determined in large part by comparison with the facts of other Guideline cases. District courts have an institutional advantage over appellate courts in making these sorts of determinations. . . . Koon, 518 U.S. at 98 (citation omitted). Applying this substantial deference, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in departing upwards to the degree it did in this case. In setting Queensborough's sentence, the court compared his conduct to that of other criminal defendants referred to by defense counsel during argument, and stated: [t]he cases alluded to by your counsel earlier are different . . . while they were certainly very bad and dangerous and brutal . . . they do 22 not reach the level of brutality that you did to these two people. App. at 94. The court then identified the maximum possible sentence for Queensborough's crime, life imprisonment, and imposed a sentence of twenty years. The District Court heard the allocution by both attorneys, by the two victims, and by Queensborough himself. It was in the best position to determine whether a departure was warranted and, if so, the extent of the departure, and we are not inclined to replace its judgment with our own.