Opinion ID: 1233059
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is Iowa Code section 709.15 unconstitutionally vague and overbroad as applied to Gonzalez?

Text: Gonzalez argues Iowa Code section 709.15 is constitutionally infirm because it is void for vagueness. Vague statutes are proscribed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Iowa 2006). In order to avoid a vagueness problem, a penal statute must `define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' Allen, 565 N.W.2d at 337 (citations omitted). If a statute lacks clearly defined prohibitions, then it is void for vagueness. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d at 542. The void-for-vagueness doctrine protects the following values: First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. . . . Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them.... Third, but related, where a vague statute `abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,' it `operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.' Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted). Due process requires a standard of conduct be reasonably ascertainable `by reference to prior judicial decisions, similar statutes, the dictionary, or common generally accepted usage.' State v. Baker, 688 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Iowa 2004) (citation omitted). In Allen, we rejected a constitutional challenge to Iowa Code section 709.15 on vagueness and overbreadth grounds because we concluded the language of section 709.15(1)( f ) (now section 709.15(2)) clearly applied to the conduct ascribed to the defendant and that section did not reach a substantial amount of First Amendment conduct. 565 N.W.2d at 336-38 & n. 1. Although the section at issue dealt with what conduct constitutes sexual exploitation by a counselor or therapist, we relied on the definitions of counselor or therapist as well as `[m]ental health service' in arriving at our rejection of the constitutional claim. Id. at 337-38. Here, we must determine what people the statute prohibits from engaging in such conduct. The any other person, whether or not licensed or registered by the state, who provides or purports to provide mental health services designation listed in the counselor or therapist definition clearly identifies the individuals who come within the statute's prohibitions. Iowa Code § 709.15(1)( a ). Any person who renders treatment, assessment, or counseling of another person for a cognitive, behavioral, emotional, mental, or social dysfunction, including an intrapersonal or interpersonal dysfunction provides `[m]ental health service.' Id. § 709.15(1)( d ). There is no doubt the language of section 709.15 applies to the services Gonzalez is alleged to have provided to the female patient under the facts in the trial information and attached minutes. Therefore, we conclude Gonzalez's vagueness claim is without merit. In his motion to dismiss, Gonzalez also asserted Iowa Code section 709.15 is unconstitutionally overbroad. A statute is overbroad in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution if it seeks to control or prevent activities subject to regulation in a manner that is unnecessarily broad, thereby invading protected freedoms. State v. Reed, 618 N.W.2d 327, 331 (Iowa 2000). Gonzalez did not identify a protected freedom in his motion to dismiss or in his argument on appeal. Gonzalez's failure to do so causes us to find his overbreadth argument is waived. See id. at 331-32. Accordingly, Gonzalez's constitutional challenges to Iowa Code section 709.15 fail.