Opinion ID: 2361672
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Fraudulent Misrepresentation

Text: Any person may introduce parol evidence to evidence the fact [of] a false and fraudulent representation made for the purpose of inducing [that person] to execute [a contract]. Nelson v. Leo's Auto Sales, Inc., 158 Me. 368, 370, 185 A.2d 121, 122 (1962). Fraud vitiates all contracts into which it enters.... Dubie v. Branz, 145 Me. 170, 173, 73 A.2d 217, 220 (1950). In their depositions the Harrimans testify that they were fraudulently induced to sign the release agreement and to cash the check; regardless of the parol evidence rule, their testimony is admissible on the issue of fact whether the release was vitiated by fraud. The Harrimans' action in cashing the $7,500 check was part and parcel of their action in signing the release on the preceding Friday and could well be found by the factfinder to have been induced by the same fraudulent misrepresentations. Cf. Bryson v. Kenney, 430 A.2d 1102 (Me.1981) (circumstances of delivery of check raised genuine issue of material fact whether check was intended as full accord and satisfaction). Our decision in LeClair v. Wells, 395 A.2d 452 (Me.1978), is squarely on point and controlling here. In LeClair, on facts closely similar to those in the case at bar, we stated: While it is true that a valid release will extinguish a cause of action ... the release will nevertheless be set aside if shown to be the product of fraud, misrepresentation, or overreaching. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original). Here, as in LeClair, the specific factual assertions set forth in [the depositions], if believed by the trier of fact, are sufficient to justify setting aside the release on grounds either of misrepresentation or overreaching. Id. Because the Harrimans' depositions created a `genuine issue' regarding a `material fact'the validity of the releasewithin the meaning of Rule 56, the grant of summary judgment was improper. Id.