Opinion ID: 3049619
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Garcia’s Convictions on Counts IV, V and VI

Text: Garcia challenges his convictions on Counts IV through VI of the indictment, which charged Edwin Santiago in combination with various alleged co-conspirators (not Garcia) with possession with intent to distribute over 50 grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine in July 2003. Garcia timely moved for acquittal on these counts, arguing there was insufficient evidence that he joined the conspiracy as early as July. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c); United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370, 379 (9th Cir. 1996). We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for acquittal de novo. See United States v. Neill, 166 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 1999). When a defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether “the jury reasonably could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Lothian, 976 F.2d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). [1] “[A] conspirator [is] criminally liable for the substantive offenses committed by a co-conspirator when they are reasonably foreseeable and committed in furtherance of the UNITED STATES v. GARCIA 9687 conspiracy.” United States v. Long, 301 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citing Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 64548). The government and Garcia agree that he cannot be held responsible for crimes committed before he joined the conspiracy. See Lothian, 976 F.2d at 1262 (holding that “a defendant cannot be held liable for substantive offenses committed before joining or after withdrawing from a conspiracy”) (citing Levine v. United States, 383 U.S. 265, 266 (1966) (per curiam)). We agree with Garcia that there was insufficient evidence that he entered the conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine as of July 2003. [2] The government argues that circumstantial evidence, especially the testimony of one of Garcia’s admitted customers for cocaine, a young woman named Gwynne Black, supports the inference that Garcia was supplying her and Edwin Santiago with methamphetamine as early as April 2003. Black testified that in March or April 2003, she and Santiago were selling cocaine supplied by Garcia. But these cocaine sales do not establish that Garcia supplied Black, Santiago or anyone else with methamphetamine, the specific drug charged in Counts IV through VI. Nor does Black’s testimony that at the “very beginning of June” 2003, she was getting “drugs” from Garcia for her own use — and that he supplied “drugs” to his girlfriend, who then shared them with Black — prove that he was supplying them with methamphetamine. She did not specify the kind of drugs supplied, and the quantities appear to be consistent with only personal use, not amounts approaching 50 grams as charged. [3] The government contends, however, that the jury could have inferred that Garcia was indeed supplying methamphetamine, and that he began doing so to Black as well as to Santiago by May 2003. There was testimony that a different supplier stopped supplying Santiago at this time and yet Santiago still had — and was selling — methamphetamine. The government links Garcia to this evidence by pointing to testimony that he negotiated to sell one pound (a “notebook”) of 9688 UNITED STATES v. GARCIA methamphetamine to Black and Santiago. However, Black’s testimony clearly indicates that these negotiations occurred sometime during or after August 2003. Thus, the government’s argument notwithstanding, there is no evidence directly or circumstantially establishing Garcia as the methamphetamine supplier to Black, Santiago or any of the other defendants before August 2003. Without any such evidence, we conclude that no reasonable jury “could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” of conspiring to distribute over 50 grams of methamphetamine in July 2003. Lothian, 976 F.2d at 1261 (internal quotation marks omitted).1 1 We are troubled that it appears the prosecutor brought charges against Garcia on Counts IV through VI — and the district court allowed those charges to go to the jury — based on the prosecutor’s misstatement at trial about the extent of conspirator liability. On appeal, the government conceded that the prosecutor “persuaded the judge of an incorrect proposition of law,” specifically that “under the general law of conspiracy, if you join an ongoing conspiracy, you’re responsible for everything that went on before it.” This proposition is correct only in the context of establishing vicarious liability for acts establishing the crime of conspiracy itself rather than vicarious liability for other substantive offenses committed in the course of a conspiracy. Compare United States v. Saavedra, 684 F.2d 1293, 1301 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Further[,] a conspirator who joins a preexisting conspiracy is bound by all that has gone on before in the conspiracy.”), with Levine, 383 U.S. at 266 (reversing convictions in light of government’s concession that “an individual cannot be held criminally liable for substantive offenses committed by members of the conspiracy before that individual had joined or after he had withdrawn from the conspiracy”) (emphasis added); see also Robert R. Arreola et al., Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 617, 628-29 (1997) (“In establishing liability for the conspiracy charge, the circuit courts generally find conspirator liability for acts committed by co-conspirators both prior to, as well as during the defendant’s participation. However, a defendant cannot be held criminally liable for substantive offenses committed by others involved in the conspiracy before joining it or after ending participation in the conspiracy.”) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). It is thus unclear whether Garcia would have been charged with Counts IV through VI if the prosecutor had not misunderstood conspiracy liability, but in any event, we conclude that the government did not present sufficient evidence that Garcia had joined the conspiracy in July 2003, and we reverse Garcia’s conviction on that basis. UNITED STATES v. GARCIA 9689