Opinion ID: 2085235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Text: This Court is confronted with a divorce case in which both sides have engaged in active, protracted, and unseemly motion practice before the Family Court. The filing and docketing of an appeal with this Court has done nothing to stem the tide. Although we recognize that conflicts in need of judicial intervention may arise while an appeal is pending in the Supreme Court, this fact must be reconciled with settled law: when an appeal has been docketed in this Court, the lower court is divested of jurisdiction. Otherwise, the parties and the Family Court will venture into a procedural quagmire that unnecessarily consumes both personal and judicial resources. It is well established that once an appeal has been docketed in this Court, the lower court no longer has jurisdiction. Nichola v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 471 A.2d 945, 947 & n. 1 (R.I.1984); Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 119 R.I. 479, 485-86, 380 A.2d 964, 968 (1977). This rule applies to motions that are pending before the lower court at the time the case is docketed. See Devereaux v. McGarry's, Inc., 107 R.I. 325, 329, 266 A.2d 908, 910 (1970) (holding that the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction to rule on motions to dismiss that had been filed before the appeals were docketed in this Court). To avoid the harsh consequences of this rule, a party may seek to remand the case temporarily for the resolution of motions for relief that are necessary and appropriate. See Nichola, 471 A.2d at 947 & n. 1 (holding that the Superior Court properly denied the plaintiffs' motion to vacate a judgment after an appeal was docketed in this Court because the plaintiffs failed to seek a remand to the Superior Court); Cavanagh, 119 R.I. at 485-86, 380 A.2d at 968 (holding that once a case has been docketed [in the Supreme Court] it is no longer before the trial court and that court can take no action on it until the papers are remanded there); Hurvitz v. Hurvitz, 44 R.I. 243, 246, 116 A. 661, 662 (1922) (recognizing that a trial court has jurisdiction to award counsel fees while the appeal is pending if an application is made to the Supreme Court to remand the papers temporarily to the Superior Court). This Court will entertain a motion to remand with a view toward protecting the rights of litigants while an appeal is pending. Because the original appeal in this case was docketed on February 15, 2007, and the Family Court was divested of jurisdiction at that time, John argues that absent a remand, the hearing justice lacked the requisite jurisdiction to issue the order of June 29, 2007. Giselda, on the other hand, cites Article I, Rule 7(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides that a justice may make orders as are needed for the protection of the rights of the parties until the appeal or petition for review shall be heard and determined by the Supreme Court, in support of her contention that the Family Court was vested with jurisdiction and properly exercised that authority to protect the minor children. This Court has recognized that Rule 7 expressly authorizes a Family Court justice to make such orders as are necessary for the protection of the rights of the parties pending the appeal. Centazzo v. Centazzo, 556 A.2d 560, 563 (R.I.1989). Specific examples of orders that this Court has deemed necessary are (1) an order to allow relocation pending an appeal when it has been determined that relocation is in the best interests of the children, McDonough v. McDonough, 962 A.2d 47, 55 (R.I. 2009); (2) the entry of a final judgment of divorce when issues other than the divorce itself are on appeal, Cardinale, 889 A.2d at 227, and Koziol v. Koziol, 720 A.2d 230, 232 (R.I.1998); and (3) an award of attorneys' fees, Hurvitz, 44 R.I. at 246, 116 A. at 662. Notwithstanding this limited jurisdiction, a party seeking relief for the protection of the parties is not excused from seeking a remand to the Family Court. We have discussed this requirement before: [S]ome matters do remain within the original jurisdiction of the trial court even while a case is here on appeal,    and Rule 7 of the rules of this [C]ourt recognizes that the trial court can make orders for the protection of the rights of the parties while a case is on appeal. Again, however, once a case has been docketed here it is no longer before the trial court and that court can take no action on it until the papers are remanded there. Cavanagh, 119 R.I. at 485-86, 380 A.2d at 968 (citing Hurvitz, 44 R.I. at 246, 116 A. at 662). The only instance in which a request for a remand is not required is for entry of a final judgment of divorce when the divorce itself is not contested on appeal. [13] Cardinale, 889 A.2d at 227; Koziol, 720 A.2d at 232. In all other instances, once an appeal has been docketed in this Court, the party seeking entry of an order pursuant to Rule 7 must request a remand to the lower court. The morass in which the parties now find themselves is a perfect illustration of the dangers inherent in failing to comply with this settled law. Because we hold that absent a remand by this Court, the hearing justice was without subject-matter jurisdiction, we need not address the order of June 29, 2007, save to declare it void. Nevertheless, in order to achieve a complete resolution, we shall address the $1,500 payment that was the subject of the hearing justice's finding of contempt. Upon review, we are satisfied that the February 10, 2006 order, which directed John to pay $1,500 per month from one of three marital assets   [,] required that John make these payments until those specified assets were exhausted or divided. Once the accounts were depleted or distributed between the parties, John had no further obligation to continue making this undesignated payment. [14] However, we decline to order the disgorgement of money that has been paid to Giselda and do so mindful that there is no alimony award in this case. Accordingly, John is no longer required to make the monthly payment of $750 and is relieved of any alimony obligation.