Opinion ID: 2343654
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Circuit Court's Order Granting Petitioner a New Trial

Text: First, we point to the issues that are not before this Court and were not properly before the Court of Special Appeals. Neither this Court nor the intermediate appellate court obtained jurisdiction to rule on the propriety of the Circuit Court's post-trial order granting Petitioner a new trial, because that order was not the subject matter of the initial appeal. In addition, whether the grant of the new trial interfered with the subject matter on appeal is not an issue before the appellate courts because that issue, likewise, was not the subject matter of the initial appeal. Because these two matters are not issues on appeal, neither the Court of Special Appeals nor this Court has jurisdiction to vacate, reverse, or affirm the order granting Petitioner a new trial. [6] Notwithstanding these facts, we will discuss the issues to address the contentions of both parties and to help elucidate, and provide background information for, the main issue before this Court: whether the Court of Special Appeals erred when it failed to dismiss the appeal and withdraw its reported opinion, after Petitioner notified the intermediate appellate court that he had been granted a new trial. Petitioner contends that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction [7] to grant the new trial motion, despite his pending appeal. He relies on the proposition that, as we first stated in Pulley v. State, 287 Md. 406, 412 A.2d 1244 (1980), a circuit court is not divested of fundamental jurisdiction [8] to take post-judgment action in a case merely because an appeal is pending from the judgment. Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 612, 620, 751 A.2d 473, 477 (2000). The State concedes that the Circuit Court retained jurisdiction to entertain post-trial matters under the general rule in Pulley, even after an appeal is filed. The State also cites Jackson, however, to convey that, because of a limitation to the general rule, the Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction to grant Petitioner a new trial. The State relies on this Court's statement in Jackson that [w]hat the court may not do is to exercise that jurisdiction in a manner that affects either the subject matter of the appeal or the appellate proceeding itself  that, in effect, precludes or hampers the appellate court from acting on the matter before it. Jackson, 358 Md. at 620, 751 A.2d at 477. [9] The State contends that the Circuit Court's order granting Petitioner a new trial while the appeal was pending frustrated the actions of the appellate court, and that the Circuit Court's order should therefore be vacated or rendered null and void. [10] We disagree with the State's contention, as it applies to this case. As Petitioner points out, we have held since Pulley v. State , that trial courts are not stripped of their jurisdiction to take post-judgment action simply because an appeal is pending from that judgment. We have said that `[i]f the trial court does . . . decide to proceed during the pendency of the appeal, it, absent a stay required by law, or one obtained from an appellate court, has the authority to exercise the `fundamental jurisdiction' which it possesses.' Peterson, 315 Md. at 81, 553 A.2d at 676 (quoting Pulley, 287 Md. at 419, 412 A.2d at 1251). The issue of whether the grant of a new trial interfered with the subject matter on appeal is not properly before us, nor was it before the Court of Special Appeals. Even if that issue were a proper subject of this appeal, we are not persuaded that the Circuit Court's grant of a new trial interfered with the subject matter of the appeal. We reach this conclusion because the trial court did not re-decide the merits of the case or rule upon the issues pending before the appellate court; it simply eliminated the need for an appeal, ipso facto. We have consistently taken the view that, when an appeal is taken, the trial court may continue to act with reference to matters not relating to the subject matter of, or matters not affecting, the appellate proceeding. . . . Peterson, 315 Md. at 80, 553 A.2d at 676. Had the trial court revisited the substantive issues of the case, or had the subject matter on appeal been whether the trial court should have granted Petitioner a new trial, our answer might be different. This distinction is consistent with prior opinions of this Court and the Court of Special Appeals where a circuit court's actions did not interfere with the subject matter on appeal. See, e.g., Pulley, 287 Md. at 414, 412 A.2d at 1248-49 (holding that Petitioner's immediate appeal of the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss did not deprive the trial court of its `fundamental jurisdiction' to adjudicate the controversy relating to the subject matter of th[e] criminal cause); Jackson, 358 Md. at 621, 751 A.2d at 477-78 (concluding that the Circuit Court's denial of Petitioner's motion for a new trial while her appeal from her convictions was pending did not interfere with the subject matter on appeal); Folk v. State, 142 Md.App. 590, 791 A.2d 152 (2002) (holding that a circuit court retains the fundamental jurisdiction to rule on a defendant's motion for a new trial even when an appeal is pending in the Court of Special Appeals). Cf. In re Emileigh F., 355 Md. 198, 733 A.2d 1103 (1999) (holding that the Circuit Court interfered with the subject matter on appeal in a CINA proceeding by closing the case and terminating jurisdiction over the minor, because the question of custody and fairness of the procedure used to determine custody was still pending in the Court of Special Appeals and the issue was properly raised in the appellate court because there was a second order from which an appeal was taken). Furthermore, if the issue were properly before the appellate courts and the State's contention were correct, our observation in Jackson dictates that if a post-judgment trial court's decision affected the subject matter of a pending appeal, it may be subject to reversal on appeal, but it is not void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction to enter it. Jackson, 358 Md. at 620, 751 A.2d at 477. See also County Comm'rs of Carroll County v. Carroll Craft Retail, Inc., 384 Md. 23, 45, 862 A.2d 404, 418 (2004) (stating that any ruling by a circuit court that interferes with the subject matter on appeal is reversible on appeal, not void for lack of jurisdiction). Under this reasoning, the Circuit Court's grant of a new trial would not be rendered void, automatically, even if we determined that it was not proper to grant a new trial. Moreover, the State has not presented us any other reasons as to why the Circuit Court did not have the authority to grant Petitioner a new trial. Thus, we conclude that the Circuit Court had fundamental jurisdiction to grant a new trial and the propriety of that order and the effect on the subject matter of the pending appeal were neither then nor now subject to appellate review.