Opinion ID: 473005
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: RICO and Predicate Acts--Sentencing

Text: 35 As noted earlier, Congress intended to permit the imposition of cumulative sentences for both RICO offenses and the underlying predicate offenses. Id. at 1009 n. 55; Rone, 598 F.2d at 571; Hawkins, 658 F.2d at 287; Aleman, 609 F.2d at 306; Boylan, 620 F.2d at 361. Accordingly, it was not improper for the district court to make the sentences on the RICO counts consecutive to the sentence Grayson was already serving for the prior conspiracy conviction in the District of Maryland.3. CCE and Predicate Acts--Sentencing 36 Until recently the courts of appeals were divided on the issue whether consecutive sentencing for CCE and its predicate offenses violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Compare United States v. Gomberg, 715 F.2d 843, 851 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1078, 104 S.Ct. 1440, 79 L.Ed.2d 760 (1984) (double jeopardy bars cumulative sentencing); United States v. Jefferson, 714 F.2d 689, 703 (7th Cir.1983) (same); United States v. Samuelson, 697 F.2d 255, 260 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038, 104 S.Ct. 1314, 79 L.Ed.2d 711 (1984) (same); and United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 261-62 (5th Cir.), cert. denied., 459 U.S. 846, 103 S.Ct. 102, 74 L.Ed.2d 92 (1982) (same), with United States v. Brantley, 733 F.2d 1429, 1436-37 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1362, 84 L.Ed.2d 383 (1985), (sentencing under Sec. 848 and for a predicate offense not a double jeopardy violation); and United States v. Mourad, 729 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 180, 83 L.Ed.2d 114 (1984) (same). 37 The Supreme Court, however, resolved the issue in Garrett v. United States. The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar cumulative punishments for CCE and underlying substantive predicate offenses. 8 Garrett, --- U.S. at ----, 105 S.Ct. at 2420. In addressing the cumulative punishments issue, the Court stressed that it did not address conspiracy charges and that Jeffers remains the law in that area: 38 The focus of the analysis in Jeffers was the permissibility of cumulative punishments for conspiracy under Sec. 846 and for CCE under Sec. 848, and the plurality reasonably concluded that the dangers posed by a conspiracy and a CCE were similar and thus there would be little purpose in cumulating the penalties. The same is not true of the substantive offenses created by the [Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control] Act [of 1970] and conspiracy, and by the same logic, it is not true of the substantive offenses and CCE. 39 Id. Jeffers, therefore, stands for the proposition that cumulative punishments for conspiracy under Sec. 846 and for CCE under Sec. 848 violate the double jeopardy clause. 40 Because the CCE and conspiracy charges are not subject to cumulative punishment, Grayson may not be subjected to sentences for both the CCE and conspiracy conviction. Thus, we must now consider the appropriate remedial measures to be taken. In United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940, 950 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918, 101 S.Ct. 918, 69 L.Ed.2d 422 (1981), we held that the Constitution does not forbid a district court from resentencing a defendant de novo and imposing a more severe sentence if it so chooses. See Gomberg, 715 F.2d at 852; and Government of Virgin Islands v. Soto, 718 F.2d 72, 75-76 (3d Cir.1983). In light of Busic, Grayson's sentences may be vacated on all counts and the district court may exercise its discretion in resentencing. It is noted that since it is the cumulation of sentence which is illegal, we are not required to vacate Grayson's convictions. Cf. United States v. Gomez, 593 F.2d 210, 217 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 948, 99 S.Ct. 2172, 60 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1979); United States v. Corson, 449 F.2d 544, 551 (3d Cir.1971). 41 In this case, the appropriate course would be to vacate Grayson's sentence on all counts and impose sentences on the non-CCE counts consecutive, if the court continued to consider it appropriate, to Grayson's District of Maryland sentence. 9 Given that Grayson's conspiracy conviction is in the District of Maryland, the district court here cannot impose a general sentence on the CCE count and the Maryland conspiracy conviction. Nor can the court vacate the Maryland conspiracy conviction. Moreover, the district court cannot allow the CCE sentence to run concurrently with the conspiracy sentence. In Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 1673, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985), the Court held that once it is determined that Congress did not intend to punish two offenses cumulatively: 42 The only remedy consistent with the Congressional intent is for the district court, where the sentencing responsibility resides, to exercise its discretion to vacate ... the underlying convictions [or sentences]. The remedy of ordering one of the sentences to be served concurrently with the other cannot be squared with Congress' intention. 43 Accordingly, we remand the case with instructions to the district court to vacate Grayson's sentence and, in the exercise of its discretion, to impose appropriate sentences to cover the convictions under Counts one, two, four, six and seven.