Opinion ID: 1149985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: bifurcation motion

Text: At the beginning of McMahan's trial, his attorney requested that the trial be bifurcated. The reason for this request was that there would be a potential conflict between (a) McMahan's defense of self-defense, and (b) his defense of diminished capacity due to large amounts of alcohol he had consumed in the hours preceding the shooting of Steven Gribble. The trial judge denied the motion, stating that there is no statutory right to a bifurcated trial. It is true that there is no statute governing this matter. [17] But apart from statute, the trial court, in its discretion, may grant a bifurcated trial under its common law power to control the submission of issues to a jury. [18] Indeed, it must do so where a defendant shows that he has a substantial insanity defense and a substantial defense on the merits, such as self-defense, and it is evident that either defense would be prejudiced by simultaneous presentation with the other. Thus, in Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 787-88 (Alaska 1979), we held that, because Houston had a substantial insanity defense, denial of a bifurcated trial substantially prejudiced him in the presentation of his theory of self-defense. We need not decide at this time whether the bifurcation principle of Houston applies when the defense of diminished capacity is raised rather than insanity. Assuming that there could be a conflict between the defenses of diminished capacity and self-defense, McMahan was not entitled to bifurcation unless he presented substantial evidence to support a valid self-defense theory. This he did not do. McMahan and Sheila Robicheaux lived together for a couple of months. McMahan moved out of the apartment they had shared after an argument between them. A few days later, on October 12, 1976, Robicheaux introduced McMahan to Gribble and told McMahan that she and Gribble planned to share an apartment. McMahan testified that he talked further with Gribble on October 13. According to McMahan, Gribble told him not to go back to Sheila Robicheaux's apartment and threatened him by saying, I have a new rifle and I wouldn't want to use it  have to use it on you. Some time after parting company with Gribble, McMahan decided to go to Robicheaux's apartment. He testified that he took his rifle with him because he believed, I'd be foolish to go back up there if I wasn't able to defend myself. McMahan claimed that he shot Gribble because, when he entered the apartment, Gribble came at him with a knife. This testimony by McMahan does not substantially support a theory of self-defense. In Bangs v. State, 608 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1980), we held that a defendant in a similar factual situation was not entitled to a self-defense instruction. We reasoned that, when a defendant has a prior grievance with the deceased and takes a deadly weapon to an encounter with the deceased, the defendant should be deemed to have provoked the violence which resulted in the death of the deceased. This is because the defendant in such a situation `knows or reasonably should know that the encounter will result in mortal combat.' Bangs, 608 P.2d at 5, quoting State v. Millett, 273 A.2d 504, 510 (Me. 1971). See also Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897, 908 (Alaska 1970). Under that reasoning, McMahan did not present a valid theory of self-defense. McMahan has raised several other points on appeal. However, after careful consideration, we have determined them to be unpersuasive and not to merit discussion in this opinion. [19] The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. RABINOWITZ, C.J., not participating.