Opinion ID: 1504564
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Venue in Missouri Human Rights Act Cases

Text: Although Igoe received a right-to-sue letter, he filed suit in the wrong venue. The basic question posed by the judgment of the circuit court  whether and to what extent the executive branch appointment authority over these administrative law judge positions is subject to the constraints of chapter 213  need not be addressed at this time. Reversal is warranted because venue was not proper in the circuit court of St. Louis City. Igoe chose to assert claims under chapter 213 and to file those claims in state court. His action is subject to Missouri venue provisions. The fact that Igoe asserts a federal claim under Title VII does not make the federal venue statute, 42 U.S.C. sec.2000e-5(f)(3), applicable. Where a federal claim is brought in state court, venue is determined by reference to the laws of the state, not the federal statute. Bainbridge v. Merchants' & Miners' Transportation Co., 287 U.S. 278, 280-81, 53 S.Ct. 159, 77 L.Ed. 302 (1932). Section 213.111.1 provides that an action may be brought in any circuit court in any county in which the unlawful discriminatory practice is alleged to have occurred.... This is a specific venue provision; it supersedes the general venue statute, section 508.010. State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Kinder, 698 S.W.2d 4,6 (Mo. banc 1985). Section 213.111 was interpreted in State ex rel. Diehl v. O'Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 91, fn. 18 (Mo. banc 2003) as limiting venue to a county in which the unlawful discriminatory practice is alleged to have occurred and not subjecting a defendant to the range of plaintiff's venue options in chapter 508 available for civil cases generally. Id. Igoe, in his petition, was not required to plead facts establishing venue. When the state defendants challenged venue in St. Louis, however, Igoe had the burden of showing that the city of St. Louis is a county in which the unlawful discriminatory practice is alleged to have occurred. The procedure for challenging venue is now expressed in Rule 51.045, but the burden of showing that venue is proper always has been with the plaintiff when venue is challenged. Where venue is an issue, the plaintiff carries the burden of proof to show an honest belief that there is a justiciable claim against a resident party. Raskas Foods, Inc. v. Southwest Whey, Inc., 978 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Mo.App.1998). The only connection of this case to the city of St. Louis is that some of the vacant positions were in the city. [6] It appears that all of the acts  the receipt and review of applications, the interviews, and the decision making  all occurred in Cole County. Igoe has not shown that any act occurred in the city of St. Louis; thus, he has not alleged that any discriminatory practice occurred, in whole or in part, in St. Louis. Venue in Missouri is determined by statute. State ex rel. SSM Health Care v. Neill, 78 S.W.3d 140, 142 (Mo. banc 2002). A plaintiff who faces a challenge to venue must make allegations that bring his claim within an appropriate statutory venue provision. There is no support for Igoe's contention that venue is proper in the city of St. Louis under section 213.111.