Opinion ID: 77698
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Filing Deadline Combined with Signature Requirement

Text: 53 Even if a three-percent signature requirement alone passes constitutional muster, plaintiffs also contend that Alabama's filing deadline on the first primary `election date, in combination with the three-percent signature requirement, violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 13 Specifically, plaintiffs assert that primary polling sites are critical locations for gathering signatures to meet the three-percent signature requirement, that Alabama's June filing deadline effectively precludes gathering signatures at primary polling sites, and that the filing deadline in tandem with the three-percent signature requirement severely burdens plaintiffs' constitutional rights to ballot access. Based on our review of binding precedent and the undisputed facts in this case, we conclude that Alabama's June filing deadline, in combination with the three-percent signature requirement, does not place a severe burden on the constitutional rights of independent candidates. 54 We begin our analysis with Jenness v. Fortson, wherein the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to Georgia's five-percent signature requirement and June filing deadline acting in concert. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 440-42, 91 S.Ct. at 1975-76. Despite having a similar June filing deadline, the election scheme upheld in Jenness was significantly more restrictive than Alabama's. Specifically, the Georgia statute in Jenness required the signatures of five percent of all registered voters, unlike the three percent of actual voters in Alabama. Id. at 432, 91 S.Ct. at 1971. Moreover, candidates had only 180 days to circulate signature petitions in Jenness, unlike the unlimited time allowed in Alabama. Id. at 433, 91 S.Ct. at 1972. Furthermore, in Jenness, the June filing deadline for independent candidates to appear on the November general election ballot was the same deadline for a major party candidate qualifying to appear on an August party primary election ballot. Id. at 433-34, 91 S.Ct. at 1972. The June deadline for independents thus precluded signature gathering not only on the primary election date but also two months before the primary election date in August. 55 In Jenness, the Supreme Court noted that this June filing deadline was not unreasonably early, distinguishing it from the February deadline invalidated in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33, 89 S.Ct. 5, 11, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). Id. at 438, 91 S.Ct. at 1974. Moreover, the Supreme Court concluded that the absence of suffocating restrictions on signature gathering minimized any burden posed by the deadline, and it upheld Georgia's five-percent signature requirement and June filing deadline. Id. at 438-40, 91 S.Ct. at 1974-75. As noted repeatedly by the district court in upholding the June filing deadline, the Alabama statute here also imposes none of the suffocating restrictions on the circulation of signature petitions outlined in Jenness. See Swanson III, 432 F.Supp.2d at 1263; Swanson II, 340 F.Supp.2d at 1299 (citing Jenness, 403 U.S. at 438-39, 91 S.Ct. at 1974); Swanson I, 219 F.Supp.2d at 1232. 56 Based on the reasoning in Jenness, other circuits have upheld statutes with filing deadlines on the primary election day (or even the day before) in combination with signature requirements, despite the deadline's effect on signature gathering. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Blackwell, 430 F.3d 368, 375 (6th Cir.2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2352, 165 L.Ed.2d 278 (2006) (upholding Ohio's filing deadline for independent candidates on the day before the primary election date, which is as early as March in presidential election years, with a one-percent signature requirement); Wood v. Meadows, 207 F.3d 708, 713-14 (4th Cir.2000) (analyzing Virginia's June filing deadline on the primary election date in conjunction with its signature requirement of 0.5% of registered voters and concluding that its election scheme taken as a whole is constitutional); Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64, 76-77 (3d Cir.1999) (concluding that the combination of New Jersey's deadline on the primary election date and signature requirement of up to 1,000 signatures imposed only a minimal burden); Rainbow Coal. of Okla. v. Okla. State Election Bd., 844 F.2d 740, 747 (10th Cir.1988) (holding that a May 31 filing deadline is not unconstitutional even in conjunction with the relatively high [five-percent] signature requirement). 14 While we recognize that Ohio, Virginia, and New Jersey chose a less restrictive signature requirement than Alabama's three-percent signature requirement, the five-percent signature requirement was upheld in Jenness along with an even earlier deadline. Accordingly, on this record, we have no basis to conclude that Alabama's statute falls outside the spectrum of constitutional legislative choices. 57 Plaintiffs do not cite, much less address, Jenness in their initial or reply briefs. Instead, plaintiffs rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Anderson v. Celebrezze and this Court's decision in New Alliance Party v. Hand, 933 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1991). However, the statutes in those cases are materially different from Alabama's statute at issue here. 58 Anderson is different in two material ways. First, Anderson involved a presidential election where the Supreme Court noted that the State has a less important interest in regulating Presidential elections than statewide or local elections. . . . Anderson, 460 U.S. at 795, 103 S.Ct. at 1573. In contrast, the Alabama statute, challenged by plaintiffs, addresses only statewide and local elections, and a separate Alabama statute not at issue on appeal governs independent presidential candidates. See Ala.Code § 17-19-2(a) (2005) (current version at Ala.Code § 17-14-31(a)). 59 Second, the Ohio statute in Anderson placed independent candidates at a relative disadvantage to major party candidates. Specifically, the Ohio statute invalidated in Anderson required major party candidates to declare their candidacies by late March in order to be on the primary election ballot, which was seventy-five days later in mid-June. Independent presidential candidates had to file a nominating petition with 5,000 signatures by the same date in late March in order to appear on the general election ballot, which was over seven months later in November. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782-83 & n.1, 103 S.Ct. at 1566-67 & n.1. In requiring independent candidates to file signature petitions by late March, the Ohio statute thus placed independent candidates at a relative disadvantage to major party candidates because (1) major party candidates alone had the flexibility to respond to intervening events between the March filing deadline and the national nominating conventions five months later, and (2) the early deadline burdened signature gathering when the general election was far in the future. Id. at 790-92, 103 S.Ct. at 1570-72. This discrimination against independent candidates constituted a severe burden because [a] burden that falls unequally on new or small political parties or on independent candidates impinges, by its very nature, on associational choices protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 793-94, 103 S.Ct. at 1572 (emphasis added). 60 In Anderson, although major party candidates had to declare their candidacies on the same date as the filing deadline for independent candidates, the Supreme Court noted that the burdens and the benefits of the respective requirements are materially different. . . . Id. at 799, 103 S.Ct. at 1575. Specifically, although major party candidates had to declare their candidacies in late March before the party primary to allow reasonable time to prepare the primary election ballots, there was no similar administrative justification for requiring independent candidates to register in late March before the major party primary in June. Id. at 800, 103 S.Ct. at 1576. Additionally, while the major party candidates would benefit from the added publicity and organizational support tied to the party primary elections, independent candidates would gain no corresponding benefit from the lead up to the primary elections. Id. at 800-01, 103 S.Ct. at 1576. Accordingly, as demonstrated in Anderson, courts subject filing deadlines that are well prior to the primary election to more exacting scrutiny. See id. at 805-06, 103 S.Ct. at 1578-79; Wood, 207 F.3d at 711 (noting that courts subject to searching scrutiny election schemes requiring both independent and major party candidates to declare their candidacies on the same date prior to the major party's primary election date). 61 In contrast, Alabama's statute does not discriminate against independent candidates relative to major party candidates when the filing deadline for independent candidates is set on Alabama's primary election date, which is sixty days after major party candidates must declare their candidacies. 15 Although major party candidates enjoy the benefits of the publicity and automatic support of an experienced party organization, major party candidates in Alabama have the additional burden of filing earlier, thus placing independent and major party candidates in comparable positions. See Lawrence, 430 F.3d at 373; Wood, 207 F.3d at 712. Although the Constitution bars states from discriminating against independent and minor party candidates, it does not mandate that states give independent and minor party candidates preferential treatment over major party candidates. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 367, 117 S.Ct. at 1374 (concluding that states have no obligation to remove all hurdles facing independent and minor party candidates and that an election scheme may, in practice, favor the traditional two-party system); Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 198, 107 S.Ct. 533, 539, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (States are not burdened with a constitutional imperative to reduce voter apathy or to `handicap' an unpopular candidate to increase the likelihood that the candidate will gain access to the general election ballot.). By extending the filing deadline for independent and minor party candidates to the primary election date, sixty days after major party candidates must declare their candidacies, Alabama imposes no discriminatory burden on independent and minor party candidates. 62 Similarly, New Alliance Party v. Hand is distinguishable because the old Alabama statute invalidated in that case was like the Ohio statute in Anderson and placed independent and minor party candidates at a relative disadvantage to major party candidates. In New Alliance Party, this Court addressed Alabama's old election statute, which required local and statewide independent candidates to file their signature petitions in April, sixty days before the primary election. See New Alliance Party, 933 F.2d at 1570 & n.3 (citing Ala.Code § 17-8-2.1 (2005)). This Court concluded that the early deadline make[s] it moderately difficult for a minor party candidate to qualify to be on the ballot. . . . Id. at 1575-76. This Court struck down the election scheme under a strict scrutiny framework, noting that the State failed to adopt the least drastic means to achieve its ends. Id. at 1576 (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). 63 In New Alliance Party, the April filing deadline placed unequal burdens on independent and minor party candidates (again similar to the late-March filing deadline seventy-five days before the primary election invalidated in Anderson ). Just as in Anderson, Alabama's old scheme required independent and minor party candidates to file their petitions on the same day that major party candidates simply declared their candidacies without any of the administrative justifications or corresponding benefits of the major party primary elections. See id. at 1570 & n.3; see also Anderson, 460 U.S. at 800-01, 103 S.Ct. at 1576. 64 In contrast, as discussed above, Alabama's new June filing deadline on the primary election date does not place independent and minor party candidates at a relative disadvantage to major party candidates. Indeed, major party candidates have the additional burden of declaring their candidacies sixty days before independent and minor party candidates must file their signature petitions in June, and independent and major party candidates thus are in roughly comparable positions. Accordingly, unlike the April filing deadline invalidated in New Alliance Party, Alabama's new filing deadline is a nondiscriminatory restriction, and the strict scrutiny analysis applied in New Alliance Party is not appropriate for Alabama's filing deadline on the primary election date for independent and minor party candidates. 65 More importantly in this case, the burden posed by Alabama's filing deadline is significantly lessened by the statute's alleviating factors. In particular, Alabama sets no limit on the time period for conducting the petitioning effort, a far more permissive scheme than filing deadlines that have been upheld in the past. 16 See, e.g., Am. Party of Tex., 415 U.S. at 786-87, 94 S.Ct. at 1309 (upholding a statute requiring minor party candidates to gather roughly 400 signatures a day within a 55-day petitioning period); Jenness, 403 U.S. at 433, 442, 91 S.Ct. at 1971-72, 1976 (upholding a five-percent signature requirement with a 180-day petitioning period); Libertarian Party, 710 F.2d at 794 (upholding a three-percent signature requirement with a 188-day petitioning period). Given the unlimited petitioning window, a diligent independent or minor party candidate could meet the filing deadline by collecting signatures many months before the June primary deadline. 66 Plaintiffs attempt to sidestep the clear precedent in Jenness by pointing to evidence that few independent and minor party candidates have been able to obtain access to Alabama's ballot since both the three-percent signature requirement and June filing deadline have been in place. Since the signature filing deadline was moved to the primary election date in the 2002 election cycle, two independent candidates obtained ballot access in 2002 despite the short notice of the deadline change, two independent candidates obtained ballot access in 2004, and six independent and minor party candidates obtained ballot access in 2006. 67 Although plaintiffs note that these candidates were running for only local races and that no independent or minor party candidate has obtained ballot access in a statewide race since 2002, there is no evidence in this particular record that an independent or minor party candidate has even sought ballot access in a statewide race since plaintiff Swanson in 2002. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record in this case that any independent or minor party candidate sought and failed to gain ballot access in any Alabama races since plaintiffs in 2002. All we say here is that the evidence in this particular record does not establish any severe burden on rights; instead, the successes of several independent and minor party candidates demonstrate that Alabama's election scheme does not completely insulate the two-party system from minor parties' or independent candidates' competition and influence. . . . Timmons, 520 U.S. at 367, 117 S.Ct. at 1374; see also Cartwright, 304 F.3d at 1141 (upholding Georgia's signature requirement even though no Libertarian Party candidate had ever satisfied it); Libertarian Party, 710 F.2d at 794 (concluding that Florida law does not freeze the status quo but provides a realistic means of access based on one minor party's success in qualifying a slate of candidates in two election cycles). 68 Plaintiffs also point to Winger's testimony that Alabama had the second toughest ballot access restrictions among all states in the 2002 election. This Court in Libertarian Party instructed that the legislative choices of other states are irrelevant, however, because a court is no more free to impose the legislative judgments of other states on a sister state than it is free to substitute its own judgment for that of the state legislature. Libertarian Party, 710 F.2d at 794. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has upheld a broad array of election schemes, and we confine our inquiry to whether Alabama's election scheme is constitutional, not whether Alabama's scheme is the best relative to other states. See Green, 155 F.3d at 1339 (There is a range of fees and signature requirements that are constitutional, and [a state] legislature is free to choose its ballot access requirements from that constitutional spectrum.). 69 Further, plaintiffs point to no case in which a court has invalidated a filing deadline on the primary election day combined with a signature requirement similar to Alabama's laws. Because Alabama does not discriminate against independent and minor party candidates, and because there are significant alleviating factors in Alabama's statute, such as the unlimited time to gather signatures, we conclude that Alabama's filing deadline on the primary election date, in tandem with the three-percent signature requirement, is a reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulation.