Opinion ID: 1001802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standard of review

Text: We review a grant of summary judgment de novo . See Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 196 (4th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is appropriate if `there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). In determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the record is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). With regard to the discovery rulings and the decision to strike the testimony of Alalfey, we assess whether the district court abused its discretion. See United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 731 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Curry, 993 F.2d 43, 45 (4th Cir. 1993); Erdmann v. Preferred Research, Inc., 852 F.2d 788, 792 (4th Cir. 1988). 8 The Alienage Claim 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72, states as follows: (a) Statement of equal rights All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. (b) Make and enforce contracts defined For purposes of this section, the term make and enforce contracts includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship. (c) Protection against impairment The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law. In 1994, we interpreted the meaning of Section 1981 in the alienage context in Duane v. GEICO, 37 F.3d 1036 (4th Cir. 1994). Duane was a lawfully admitted, permanent resident alien of the United States and a citizen of Australia. As in our case, the plaintiff had sought insurance -- home insurance in that case -- and had been denied coverage. GEICO's sales agent had informed Duane that the company would not issue him a homeowner's policy because he was not a United States citizen. Thereafter, Duane confirmed that information 9 with a GEICO supervisor and filed suit. On appeal from a district court decision dismissing his claim, we found the 1991 amendments to Section 1981 inapplicable to the defendant's conduct, since the conduct occurred before passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Accordingly, we looked only to what is currently codified as Section 1981(a). See id. at 1038. After detailing the history of Section 1981 and the Supreme Court caselaw surrounding its application, we noted that the Supreme Court had found Section 1981 applicable to government discrimination against aliens in Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). We then found that the relevant Supreme Court caselaw, legislative history, and construction of the Act indicated that Congress intended the Act to reach private discrimination against aliens. We concluded that Section 1981 prohibited private discrimination on the basis of alienage. See id. at 1042-43. In the present case, the district court's own discussion of the evidence presented by Soozangar and Saad demonstrated that these two plaintiffs met their burden of producing direct evidence of discrimination on the basis of alienage. The rejection letters that both received from Baltimore Life stated that they were being denied insurance because it is company policy not to issue coverage on non-United States citizens. These letters followed telephone calls inquiring into citizenship status. Additionally, Soozangar and Saad presented Vigliotte's own testimony that he instituted a policy of rejecting applications from certain non-United States citizens. Nevertheless, the court discounted the importance of this evidence, drawing a distinction between discrimination based on the place or nation of origin, which it found permissible, and discrimination on the basis of noncitizenship. Finding that the discrimination here was really based on the plaintiffs' place or nation of origin, the court concluded that no rational juror could find for the plaintiffs. However, the court inappropriately weighed the evidence and failed to recognize that once it found direct evidence of alienage discrimination, a quantum of evidence as the court put it, that there was presented a genuine issue of material fact that required resolution by a jury.2 It is on this basis that we vacate and remand so much of _________________________________________________________________ 2 We recognize that the defendants contend that they only denied life insurance policies based on applicants' place of citizenship, not applicants' non-citizenship. Yet, these are arguments properly resolved by a trier of fact, not a district court or appellate court on summary judgment. 10 the district court's decision as rendered summary judgment for the defendants on the alienage claims made by Saad and Soozangar. As for the alienage claims advanced by Nagy and Azad, we agree with the district court that they failed to show that they were ever denied life insurance by Baltimore Life. The Racial Discrimination Claims Plaintiffs also dispute the district court's summary judgment against them on the race discrimination claims. We affirm the district court's ruling on this issue for substantially the same reasons given by that court. The plaintiffs failed to make the required showing either by direct or indirect evidence supporting a claim for discrimination on the basis of race so as to preclude summary judgment. The District Court's Discovery and Motion in Limine Rulings We also affirm the district court on these points, as the appellants' contentions lack merit. First, contrary to the appellants' assertions, the record supports the district court's decision to strike Alalfey's testimony on the basis of its finding of bad faith -- the sanction was reasonable in relation to the harm occasioned. Second, the district court's discovery rulings with regard to the motion to compel and consequent motion for reconsideration were reasonable. In any event, there is no evidence that the district court abused its discretion in these rulings. See Erdmann, 852 F.2d at 792.