Opinion ID: 4401994
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Competency versus Insanity

Text: ¶10. In his petition, Parker echoes the criticism made in the dissenting Court of Appeals opinion that “the trial court was focused on Parker’s ability to stand trial rather than his sanity at the time of the incident.” Parker v. State, No. 2016-KA-01502-COA, 2018 WL 1602585, at  (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2018) (Tindell, J., dissenting). The dissent to this opinion lodges the same complaint. 5 ¶11. We recognize, without question, that competency and sanity are two distinct concepts. Sanders v. State, 9 So. 3d 1132, 1137 (Miss. 2009). Competency to stand trial is measured at the time of trial. And its standard is “whether the defendant has ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and ‘has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’” Martin v. State, 871 So. 2d 693, 698 (Miss. 2004) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960)). By contrast, insanity—or, more precisely, a defendant’s affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity—is measured at the time of the criminal offense. And its standard is the “M’Naghten rule.” Davis v. State, 551 So. 2d 165, 173 (Miss. 1989). Under this rule: To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing of the act the accused was laboring under such defect of reason from disease of the mind as (1) not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or (2) if he did know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong. Id. (citing Hunter v. State, 489 So. 2d 1086, 1090 (Miss. 1986); Laney v. State, 486 So. 2d 1242, 1245 (Miss. 1986)). ¶12. First, we point out that just because Parker advanced his motion for mental evaluation on his claim that he may have been legally insane when he shot Eric does not put the trial court in error for also making an on-the-record ruling on Parker’s competency. In fact, then-applicable Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 9.06 mandated the trial judge sua sponte order a mental evaluation and conduct a competency hearing if the judge 6 had “reasonable ground to believe that [Parker was] incompetent to stand trial[.]”2 Parker’s actions leading up to the motion hearing at least raised the specter of his potential inability to consult with his court-appointed attorneys or understand the proceedings against him.3 So we certainly do not fault the trial court for using the hearing to ensure no reasonable ground existed to believe Parker was incompetent to stand trial and face a jury seventy-two hours later. ¶13. Further, that the court assessed Parker’s competency does not mean it failed to consider his potential insanity defense as a basis for granting a mental evaluation. The record shows the court permitted Parker to file his pro se motion out of time,4 despite Parker’s counsel informing the court she could not ethically file a motion for mental evaluation because she did not believe Parker met the conditions to receive one. The court was in fact 2 Cf. House v. State, 754 So. 2d 1147, 1151 (Miss. 1999) (“[T]rial courts are [constitutionally] obligated to conduct a competency hearing, either on the defendant’s motion or sua sponte, if there is sufficient doubt about a defendant’s competence.” (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180, 95 S. Ct. 896, 908, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S. Ct. 836, 838, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1966))). 3 Parker had filed numerous pro se motions, including a “Motion to Be and Allow Shannon Craig Parker to Be Co-counsel Beside One Candance Rickmon Public Defender,” “Motion of Release And/or Fire Public Defender Filed by Defendant,” and “Motion for Preliminary Injunction/Transfer.” And at the prior hearing, Parker had openly disagreed with his appointed counsel’s assessment of Parker’s potential insanity defense. 4 Under the authority granted in then-applicable Rule 8.02, the trial court had set a due date of August 30, 2016, to file a motion for mental examination. See URCCC 8.02. Under then-applicable Rule 9.07, this was also the deadline to inform the State and the court that Parker intended to rely on an insanity defense. See URCCC 9.07. Parker did not inform the court he had wanted to file his motion for mental evaluation based on a potential insanity defense until two weeks later, on September 15, 2016, exactly one week before the scheduled trial. 7 cautious and set the motion for a pretrial hearing, telling Parker the court “intend[ed] to take testimony” and advising him he may have to call witnesses in support. ¶14. At the hearing, when Parker directed the court’s attention to his claim that he was insane at the time of the crime, the court patiently responded, “All right, well, I’m here, and I’ll sit here as long as we need to sit here to let you offer me proof that you have a mental problem or disease that would—that had some effect on why you don’t remember what happened.” Still, Parker failed to produce any proof. And the trial judge again reassured him, “I’ll let you go and say whatever you wanted to say, and then I’m going to go through this and do what I want to do, and you be thinking, if there’s any other proof you want me to consider, any medical records, any witnesses, anything of that nature, I’ll sit here . . . till [five o’clock]. If we need to reconvene in the morning, we’ll do that.” (Emphasis added.) Despite the opportunity, guidance, and reassurance by the trial court, Parker made no attempt to call any witness. Nor did he attempt to submit any records. ¶15. After Parker failed to present any proof, the trial judge expressly concluded: [T]here’s nothing in anything, that information or the demeanor I’ve seen, the motions that have been filed, the court file itself, my interactions with Mr. Parker to lead me to believe that there’s any rational basis for appointing a psychiatrist or psychologist to examine him for the purpose of determining either his competency or sanity.” (Emphasis added.) Our review of the record demonstrates the trial judge thoroughly considered Parker’s request for a mental evaluation to assist a potential insanity defense.