Opinion ID: 1797981
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Authority to Appoint a Receiver.

Text: Finally, Appellant contests the authority of the trial court to appoint a temporary receiver for the preservation of the records within the office of tax assessor. This action, in our opinion, was not improper. The power of a court to appoint a receiver in a pending action is statutorily recognized (§ 6-6-620, Code 1975); and, generally, the exercise of such power rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. C. E. Development Co. v. Kitchens, 288 Ala. 660, 264 So.2d 510 (1972); 75 C.J.S. Receivers § 16 (1952). This extraordinary remedy, however, should not be granted unless there is a clear legal right to be protected, no other adequate remedy, and a showing that the complainants will otherwise sustain irreparable damage. 75 C.J.S. Receivers § 9 (1952); Henry v. Ide, 209 Ala. 367, 96 So. 698 (1923); Grand Lodge, K. P. v. Shorter, 219 Ala. 293, 122 So. 36 (1929). Receiverships are equitable in nature. Once equity assumes jurisdiction of a cause, it may afford complete relief when it has jurisdiction on any ground. Billingsly v. Billingsly, 285 Ala. 239, 231 So.2d 111 (1970); Lamar v. Lamar, 263 Ala. 391, 82 So.2d 558 (1955). Our reading of the record persuades us that the trial judge's finding of the requisite conditions for appointment of a receiver is amply supported by credible evidence, and his rulings based thereon do not constitute an abuse of discretion. AFFIRMED. TORBERT, C. J., and FAULKNER, ALMON and EMBRY, JJ., concur. SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., dissent. MADDOX and ADAMS, JJ., not sitting.