Opinion ID: 3133564
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reasonable Time Filing Requirement

Text: Father next contends that Mother is not entitled to relief from the void default judgment because she failed to file her petition to set it aside within a reasonable time as required by Tennessee Rule 60.02. Mother responds that her petition to set aside the void judgment is not subject to the reasonable time filing requirement of Tennessee Rule 60.02. -20- The Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure became effective on January 1, 1971. See Hunter v. Bowman, 535 S.W.2d 853, 854 (Tenn. 1976). The text of Tennessee Rule 60.02 relevant to the issue in this appeal has remained unchanged since its adoption 16 and provides as follows: On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party‘s legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of the adverse party; (3) the judgment is void; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that a judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1) and (2) not more than a year after judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 (emphasis added). The plain language of Tennessee Rule 60.02 indicates that the ―reasonable time‖ filing requirement applies to all motions for relief from judgment, including motions attacking a judgment as void based upon Tennessee Rule 60.02(3). This Court has stated that the reasonable time filing requirement applies to all motions filed under Tennessee Rule 60.02, but we were not at that time considering a motion based on Tennessee Rule 60.02(3). See Furlough, 397 S.W.3d at 128 (―All motions for relief based on Rule 60.02 ‗shall be made within a reasonable time.‘‖ (quoting Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02.)). With respect to void judgments, Tennessee courts have held, both before and after the adoption of Tennessee Rule 60.02, that such judgments are subject to attack at any time. See, e.g., Acuff v. Daniel, 387 S.W.2d 796, 798 (Tenn. 1965); Tennessee Marble & Brick Co. v. Young, 163 S.W.2d 71, 75 (Tenn. 1942); Barbash v. Bruell, No. E2005-00387-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 568230, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2006); Team Design v. Gottlieb, 104 S.W.3d 512, 525 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Tuetken v. Tuetken, 320 S.W.3d 262 (Tenn. 2010); West v. Jackson, 186 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944). Although this Court has not addressed whether the reasonable time filing requirement of Tennessee Rule 60.02 applies to motions under Tennessee Rule 60.02(3), the Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Pittman v. Pittman, No. 01-A-01-9301CH00014, 1994 WL 456348, at -3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1994). 16 The text of Rule 60.02 at the time of its adoption is available at In Re: Rules of Civil Procedure, 223 Tenn. 655, 780-81 (1970). -21- In Pittman, the intermediate appellate court first emphasized, correctly, that Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(3) is ―identical‖ to Rule 60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and as a result, the Court of Appeals looked to federal precedents ―for helpful guidance.‖ Id. at . The Pittman court determined that a majority of federal courts had held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) ―does not impose a time limit on post-judgment motions challenging a void judgment, although some text writers envision that exceptional circumstances may exist wherein the reasonable time limitation would require a showing of diligence on the part of the movant.‖ Id. (citation omitted) (citing 7 James W. Moore & Jo Desha Lucas, Moore‘s Federal Practice ¶ 60.25[4], at 60-242 (2d ed. 1993)). Accordingly, the Pittman court held ―that the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure do not supplant the prior precedents concerning the time for challenging a void judgment,‖ and absent ―exceptional circumstances,‖ Tennessee Rule 60.02 ―does not place a time limit on the right to challenge a judgment on the ground that it is void.‖ Id. (footnote omitted). The Court of Appeals has recited the Pittman holding with approval in subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Kelso v. Decker, 262 S.W.3d 307, 311 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008); In re Estate of Taylor, No. M2012-00596-COA-R3CV, 2013 WL 336001, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2013). However, neither Pittman, nor any subsequent decision, has articulated the exceptional circumstances that would justify denying relief from a void judgment. The legal landscape has changed little in the twenty years since the Court of Appeals decided Pittman. The text of Federal Rule 6017 and Tennessee Rule 60.02 is still identical in all relevant respects. Similarly, a majority of federal courts interpreting Federal Rule 60 and a majority of state courts interpreting comparable procedural rules continue to hold that the reasonable time filing requirement does not apply to motions seeking relief from void judgments. See, e.g., Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 734 F.3d 1175, 1180 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (rejecting the argument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) imposes a reasonable time limitation on motions seeking relief from void judgments and stating that ―almost every other circuit court of appeals‖ had also ―reject[ed] a time limit that would bar [such] motions‖); U.S. v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that ―nearly overwhelming authority exists for the proposition that there are no time limits with regards to a challenge to a void judgment‖); Hertz Corp. v. Alamo Rent–A–Car, Inc., 16 F.3d 1126, 1130 (11th Cir. 1994) (observing that the First, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth and D.C. Circuits hold that Rule 60(b)(4) motions are not subject to a reasonable-time limitation); Ex Parte Full Circle Distribution, L.L.C., 883 So.2d 638, 642–43 (Ala. 2003) (collecting federal and state cases that impose no time limit); In re Harrison Living Trust, 112 P.3d 17 The relevant text of Federal Rule 60 provides: ―On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (4) the judgment is void . . . .‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). ―A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). -22- 1058, 1060 (Nev. 2005) (stating that most state and federal jurisdictions impose no time limit on motions challenging void judgments); Eggl v. Fleetguard, Inc., 583 N.W.2d 812, 814 (N.D. 1998) (interpreting the North Dakota rule consistently with federal decisions construing the corresponding federal rule as imposing no time limit on motions attacking a void judgment); Estate of Hutchins v. Fargo, 72 P.3d 638, 643 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (―In short, the reasonable time to move to set aside a void judgment is forever[.]‖); 11 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862, at 431 & n.3 (3d ed. 2005) (collecting cases). The rationale most often relied upon by courts in the majority is that void judgments are a nullity from their inception and cannot be validated by the passage of time. See, e.g., Farm Credit Bank of Baltimore v. Ferrera-Goitia, 316 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 2003) (―Since a void judgment is a legal nullity, there is ordinarily no need to request relief from it (and, thus, no time limit within which to request relief).‖); Austin v. Smith, 312 F.2d 337, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (stating that a void judgment cannot ―acquire validity because of laches on the part of him who applies for relief from it‖); Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 501-02 (N.C. 2010) (―[A] void judgment has no legal effect; it is a legal nullity that may be challenged at any time.‖). Courts departing from the majority rule have held either that the reasonable time filing requirement functions as a bar to motions challenging judgments as void or that it serves as a factor for courts to consider when deciding whether to grant relief from void judgments. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Smith, 714 F.3d 932, 942-43 (6th Cir. 2013) (―A motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b)(4)-(6) must be brought within a reasonable time. The reasonableness of the delay depends on the facts of a given case including the length and circumstances of the delay, the prejudice to the opposing party by reason of the delay, and the circumstances compelling equitable relief.‖ (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); U.S. v. Dailide, 316 F.3d 611, 618 (6th Cir. 2003) (―Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) permits a collateral motion challenging a court‘s subject matter jurisdiction, but only if such lack of subject matter jurisdiction makes the judgment ―void.‖ However, we have held that such an attack is only cognizable if brought within a reasonable time.‖); McGrew v. McGrew, 82 P.3d 833, 841 (Idaho 2003) (―To obtain relief from a void judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a party must bring a motion for such relief within a reasonable time. Where judgment is entered without the party‘s knowledge, what constitutes a reasonable time is judged from the time that the party learned of the judgment.‖ (citation omitted)); In re Harrison Living Trust, 112 P.3d 1058, 1060 (Nev. 2005) (―We recognize that judgments, once found to be void, should generally be set aside. But we see no reason to ignore the express language of a rule that requires the district courts to consider the timeliness of a motion to set aside a void judgment when determining whether exceptional circumstances, such as lack of diligence or equitable estoppel, exist to justify denying the motion. The reasonableness of the time taken to set aside such judgments is an important factor in such cases.‖). Courts in the minority have based their decisions upon the plain language of their own procedural rules, which, like that of Tennessee Rule 60.02(4), literally apply the reasonable time filing requirement to motions seeking relief from void judgments. See, -23- e.g., In re Harrison Living Trust, 112 P.3d at 1060; McDaniel v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 478 S.E.2d 868, 871 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996). Having thoroughly considered the authorities on both sides of the issue, we reaffirm Pittman, which adopted the majority rule, and hold that Tennessee Rule 60.02 does not abrogate the longstanding rule that void judgments may be attacked at any time. The reasonable time filing requirement thus may not be applied to bar motions seeking relief from void judgments pursuant to Tennessee Rule 60.02(3). Nevertheless, we also conclude, as did the Court of Appeals in Pittman, that relief from a void judgment may be denied if certain exceptional circumstances exist.