Opinion ID: 1215965
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior Offenses

Text: Defendant next contends that reversal of the guilt verdict is required because the trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant's prior acts of child abuse. Over defense objections based on lack of relevance and undue prejudice (Evid. Code, § 352), the trial court permitted Carol Amos, defendant's former girlfriend, to testify on prosecution rebuttal about prior acts of child abuse committed by defendant against his twin sons. Ms. Amos related that defendant had initially been nice to the children, but that after he hurt his hand in an industrial accident, he became moody and would frequently beat the boys with his fists and a belt. He would also shove them against the wall, kick them, make them take cold showers and hold their heads under water while giving them a bath. Ms. Amos said that defendant acted nicely to her and the children when other people were around. She stated that she heard the name Othello only once, shortly after she first met defendant, when he told her that his army buddies called him Othello Mulet Metheen. The trial court ruled the proffered evidence admissible because it was important enough in this case, since it is one of the primary issues as to what this defendant was or was not prior to this date of incident of 4-10, 4-11, 1980 [ sic ], whether or not it was or was not Melvin and/or Othello, I think that it is sufficiently important that if there is in fact any prejudicial effect, it's greatly outweighed by the probative value. In People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 315 [165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883], we held, [a]s with other types of circumstantial evidence, ... admissibility [of other crimes evidence] depends upon three principal factors: (1) the materiality of the fact sought to be proved or disproved; (2) the tendency of the uncharged crime to prove or disprove the material fact; and (3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring the exclusion of relevant evidence. (4) To be relevant, an uncharged offense must tend logically, naturally and by reasonable inference to prove the issue(s) on which it is offered. ( People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 631 [205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126]; People v. Guerrero (1976) 16 Cal.3d 719, 724 [129 Cal. Rptr. 166, 548 P.2d 366], and cases cited; Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 316.) We have long recognized that if a person acts similarly in similar situations, he probably harbors the same intent in each instance ( Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 319; People v. Pendleton (1979) 25 Cal.3d 371, 376-378 [158 Cal. Rptr. 343, 599 P.2d 649]; People v. Schader (1959) 71 Cal.2d 761, 777 [80 Cal. Rptr. 1, 457 P.2d 841]; People v. Kelley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 232, 242-243 [57 Cal. Rptr. 363, 424 P.2d 947]), and that such prior conduct may be relevant circumstantial evidence of the actor's most recent intent. The inference to be drawn is not that the actor is disposed to commit such acts; instead, the inference to be drawn is that, in light of the first event, the actor, at the time of the second event, must have had the intent attributed to him by the prosecution. (See Schader, supra, 71 Cal.2d 761, 777.) The first question to be answered is whether the prior acts were relevant to any material fact in dispute. To place defendant's relevancy argument in context, it is necessary to review the prosecution's two theories of murder. Each theory required a different type of intent. The first  that the murder was premeditated  required proof of a specific intent to kill as well as premeditation and deliberation. (See CALJIC No. 8.20 (4th ed. 1979).) The second  murder by torture  required no proof of premeditation or specific intent to kill but proof of a specific intent to cause cruel pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion or for any sadistic purpose. (See CALJIC No. 8.24 (4th ed. 1979); People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162 [133 Cal. Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881].) (5) Defendant argues that the rebuttal evidence was, at most, relevant to prove defendant's intent to cause cruel pain and suffering but was not relevant to prove the intent required for premeditated murder. He reasons that the prior nonfatal beating of his twin sons did not logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference tend to prove that he intended to kill Joyce or that he acted with premeditation. Defendant's argument misses the point. The multiple personality theory proffered by the defense attempted to demonstrate that Othello, not Melvin, assaulted and killed Joyce. The defense reasoned that since Melvin was suffering from a dissociative disorder, he was insane and could not have entertained the requisite intents to kill and torture Joyce. Thus, the principal question for the jury presented by the defense was whether Othello existed as a separate personality and whether he, rather than Melvin, killed Joyce. Although the legal theory underlying the defense was somewhat unclear, presumably, if the defense had prevailed, the jury would have either acquitted him as insane or convicted him of a lesser degree of homicide. The prosecution presented the prior acts of child abuse evidence to rebut this theory. Ms. Amos testified that it was Melvin who became moody and irritable during their relationship and who hit the children with his fists and a belt. During their entire relationship, Ms. Amos had only heard the name Othello once when Melvin informed her that his army buddies had given him that name. Further, she testified that Melvin did not have different sets of names for different personalities. This evidence tended logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference to overcome a material matter sought to be proved by the defense. ( Guerrero, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 724.) It rebutted the assertion that it was Othello, not Melvin, who assaulted and killed Joyce, since it tended to show that Melvin, not Othello, had assaulted his children in the past. [9] It also helped establish that Melvin entertained the intent to kill and torture Joyce. The evidence was substantially relevant. [10] (6) Defendant next argues that the evidence of prior acts of child abuse was cumulative. ( Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 631-632; Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 318.) He points to testimony by defendant's wife, Cookie, and two of her children, Alexis and Penny, to the effect that defendant acted in a rational, deliberate manner during the killing. The record shows precisely the contrary. Cookie characterized defendant as crazy and acting like a madman at the time of the killing. She also testified that during the beating, defendant shouted that he was Michael the Archangel and that he would kill Joyce because she was a devil. Penny opined that defendant acted strange on the day of the killing and appeared to be drunk that evening. This testimony hardly portrayed defendant as acting in a rational and deliberate manner. Defendant also contends that the child abuse evidence was cumulative in light of the testimony by the three prosecution psychiatrists who testified that defendant had the capacity to form the specific intent to kill and torture Joyce. A court, however, is not necessarily required to exclude a lay witness's testimony simply because there is expert testimony on the same issue, for the nature of a lay witness's testimony is manifestly different from expert testimony. The child abuse evidence was not merely cumulative. (7a) Finally, defendant claims that the evidence should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352. (8) It is well settled that the trial court is vested with discretion in admitting or rejecting proffered evidence and its decision will not be reversed on appeal unless there is a manifest abuse of that discretion resulting in a miscarriage of justice. ( People v. Wein (1977) 69 Cal. App.3d 79, 90 [137 Cal. Rptr. 814]; People v. Northrop (1982) 132 Cal. App.3d 1027, 1042 [182 Cal. Rptr. 197], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 807-808 [201 Cal. Rptr. 311, 678 P.2d 886].) (7b) The trial court, as required, weighed the prejudicial effect against the probative value of the proffered evidence. (See People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 24-26 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) It found the balance in favor of admissibility. In light of the substantial relevancy of the evidence, it is clear that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of prior acts of child abuse.