Opinion ID: 1179820
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: admissibility of plea agreement

Text: Defendant assigns as error the admission of portions of a plea agreement between a state's witness, Marvin Al Tai-Juan Smith, and the state. During the guilt phase of the trial, Smith testified in the state's case-in-chief. On direct examination, Smith testified that he was one of the people who found Largo under the Marquam Bridge on July 25, 1992, and forced her back to defendant's house. Smith was one of the two people responsible for making sure that Largo did not leave the house the next day. Smith saw Largo being beaten and interrogated. He watched defendant and Wilson kill Largo; he held her legs down while defendant and Wilson strangled her. When defendant and Wilson went to dispose of Largo's body, Smith remained at the house to clean it up in an effort to remove traces of the crime. Smith also testified that he was arrested for his participation in the murder of Largo and that he had entered a plea agreement with the state in exchange for his testimony at defendant's trial. Defense counsel cross-examined Smith about the plea agreement to demonstrate Smith's motive to testify favorably for the state. Smith testified that, originally, he was charged with three counts of aggravated murder, three counts of felony murder, two counts of kidnapping in the first degree, and one count of kidnapping in the second degree. In exchange for his testimony at defendant's trial, Smith testified, he pleaded guilty to one count of felony murder for which the state would recommend a sentence of no more than 121 months in prison. On redirect examination, the state offered Smith's plea agreement as evidence. The state's purpose was to rehabilitate Smith by showing that he had a motive to testify truthfully; the plea agreement provided that, if he did not, the agreement would be null and void. Defendant objected to the admission of the following emphasized portions of that plea agreement (among others): The primary reason for this agreement is that, based on Smith's statements and on its investigation, the State believes this charge accurately reflects the role Smith played in the death of Misty Largo.      Smith's representation that Misty Largo's death was primarily accomplished by other persons is a basic premise for this agreement. Although the state has reason to believe this is true, if that premise is demonstrated to be incorrect, this agreement is null and void and shall have no effect except that any statements by Smith pursuant to this agreement and any evidence derived from them shall be admissible in court. (Emphasis added.) Defendant's lawyer asserted, among other things, that those portions were inadmissible because they stated what the State's belief is about it. It's like me sending some statement to the jury about what my belief is.      These are    statements    on the part of the state to bolster [Smith's] testimony[.]       I mean, they can put a whole bunch of things in there about we believe he's telling us the truth and he's sworn under a stack of Bibles, it's irrelevant.    I don't think this can be used to rehabilitate him or argue for his truthfulness. It's merely a recitation of what the State believes.      We're objecting on the grounds that it's    a comment on Mr. Smith's truthfulness. We feel that it's a showing by the State that they believe in his truthfulness which    is not at issue, what the State believes. The trial court overruled defendant's objections to the foregoing paragraphs, on the ground that the plea agreement was relevant and that any unfair prejudice was outweighed by probative value. The trial court observed: It used to be, of course, that a party vouched for the credibility of their witnesses. That's an archaic thing. That's been taken out. But I don't think that in itself makes it inadmissible, the fact that the State believes in its witnesses. The trial court redacted the words honestly and truthfully, in a paragraph stating that Smith agrees to testify fully, honestly, truthfully, and completely at defendant's trial, and then admitted the agreement. Defendant assigns error to the overruling of his objections. The trial court was correct when it observed that the old rule concerning a party's vouching for the credibility of its witnesses has been rejected. See State v. Eby, 296 Or. 63, 71 n. 4, 673 P.2d 522 (1983) (discussing the development and rejection of the now discredited `voucher rule'). The voucher rule was the name given to a doctrine which had been used to justify restrictions against impeaching one's own witness. Ibid. In Eby, the court held that [a]ny remaining remnants of [the voucher rule] died with the adoption of OEC 607, which provides: `The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness.' Ibid. That rule, however, is not the theory that defendant raised in his objections to the trial court. In this case, defendant objected to the state's attempts to bolster Smith's credibility by offering the challenged portions of the plea agreement. This court confronted a somewhat similar situation in Eby and concluded that such evidence was inadmissible. In Eby, the defendant was convicted of felony murder and first degree robbery. At the defendant's trial, a witness, McVae, testified that the defendant had proposed a plan to her to rob the victim. McVae also testified as to the details of the robbery and the murder. 296 Or. at 65-66, 673 P.2d 522. After that testimony, the following exchange occurred: `[Prosecutor:] It was promised you would not be prosecuted if you gave truthful testimony, isn't that correct? `[McVae:] Yes. `     `[Prosecutor:] You would have to testify truthfully and not have been involved in the actual killing itself? `[McVae:] I couldn't have a gun, I couldn't have got out of the car, and I couldn't have shot [the victim]. `[Prosucutor:] Did you do any of those things? `[McVae:] No.' Id. at 66, 673 P.2d 522. The defendant did not object to that testimony. After McVae testified, the prosecutor offered testimony from a Deputy District Attorney, Lenzer. Id. at 67, 673 P.2d 522. Lenzer had arranged for a limited grant of immunity for another witness, Bigornia. Id. at 68, 673 P.2d 522. Bigornia had helped the defendant to conceal the murder weapon after the crime had been committed. Over the defendant's objection, Lenzer testified that, in exchange for that grant of immunity, Bigornia agreed to testify truthfully and completely at all hearings regarding the homicide. Id. at 70, 673 P.2d 522. The defendant argued that Lenzer's testimony about the foregoing condition in the immunity agreementthat the witness would testify truthfullywas improper. This court agreed and held that admission of the agreement was not relevant: The condition of a plea agreement that the witness will testify truthfully does not tend to prove a witness's credibility. It should have been excluded on relevancy grounds. Id. at 77, 673 P.2d 522. In Eby, the court held that the error in that case was not prejudicial. Ibid. McVae also had testified concerning an identical provision in her immunity agreement, and the defendant had not objected. Accordingly, the only pertinent alleged error in Eby was whether [d]isclosure of the irrelevant condition as to the state's second witness [Bigornia] was    so prejudicial as to require reversal. Ibid. It was not, because of the fact that Lenzer's testimony concerning the immunity agreement with Bigornia happened after a more culpable prosecution witness had previously testified to exactly the same condition of a similar immunity agreement before the same jury without objection. Id. at 73, 673 P.2d 522. As Eby suggests, there are limits to the ways in which a party may bolster the credibility of its witnesses. Three other lines of cases sound similar themes and are relevant to our analysis today. In State v. Snider, 296 Or. 168, 674 P.2d 585 (1983), the defendant was convicted of felony murder. One of his codefendants, Walker, had entered into a plea agreement with the state that provided, in part, that Walker will take a polygraph examination as to the truthfulness of his statement to the police and as to his testimony at trial. 296 Or. at 170, 674 P.2d 585. If the polygraph results demonstrated that Walker had testified truthfully, he would be permitted to plead to a lesser-included offense of manslaughter in the first degree. Id. at 170-71, 674 P.2d 585. Walker testified at the defendant's trial. On cross-examination, he was questioned about his plea agreement. On redirect, the state introduced the plea agreement. Id. at 171, 674 P.2d 585. This court held that introduction of that plea agreement constituted improper bolstering of [Walker's] credibility and was reversible error. Id. at 173, 674 P.2d 585. The specific holding in Snider was limited to the inadmissibility of a term in the witness's plea agreement concerning a polygraph examination. In that regard, Snider is factually distinguishable from the present case. However, the underlying concerns that the court expressed in Snider about the effects of impermissible bolstering apply more generally: The vice of such evidence is that a jury might give special credence to the testimony of the state's witness because of the binding force of the plea bargain, implying a guarantee of the witness's veracity. Id. at 172, 674 P.2d 585. That same kind of concern is the basis for this court's rule, recently restated in State v. Keller, 315 Or. 273, 285, 844 P.2d 195 (1993), that a witness may not testify about the credibility of another witness. See also State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 438, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983) ( Middleton I ) ([w]e expressly hold that in Oregon a witness, expert or otherwise, may not give an opinion on whether he believes a witness is telling the truth); State v. Odoms, 313 Or. 76, 82, 829 P.2d 690 (1992) (the Middleton I rule precludes testimony by one trial witness about whether another trial witness is telling the truth). In Keller, the defendant was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree. One of the state's witnesses was a medical doctor who had extensive experience in treating young victims of sexual abuse. 315 Or. at 286, 844 P.2d 195. The doctor testified, on direct examination, that the child was credible. Id. at 285, 844 P.2d 195. This court held that that the trial court erred by admitting that testimony and that the error was prejudicial. Id. at 285-86, 844 P.2d 195. The doctor had invaded the jury's role as the sole judge of the credibility of another witness. Id. at 286, 844 P.2d 195. The rule stated in Keller and Middleton I is not applicable directly to the facts in this case. In this case, no trial witness gave an opinion as to Smith's credibility. Nonetheless, what happened here through the plea agreement is analogous. The state could not have called the investigating detective to testify: Based on Smith's statements and on my investigation, I believe that the charge of felony murder accurately reflects the role Smith played in the crime. Moreover, I believe Smith's representation that Largo's death was primarily accomplished by others. Finally, this court has said that a lawyer may not assert the lawyer's personal opinion as to the credibility of a witness at trial. See State v. Parker, 235 Or. 366, 377-78, 384 P.2d 986 (1963) ([i]t is improper for counsel to    comment    upon the credibility of his witnesses), reversed on other grounds, 385 U.S. 363, 87 S.Ct. 468, 17 L.Ed.2d 420 (1966). [3] Again, that rule is not applicable directly to this case. In this case, the prosecutor did not argue to the jury: I believe Smith; so should you. Nonetheless, admission of the challenged portions of the plea agreement in this case allowed the state to do something similar: the statements of belief in Smith's veracity appeared in a document signed by two assistant district attorneys. It is, of course, true that parties often bolster the credibility of their witnesses indirectly and implicitly through the presentation of corroborating evidence. In Middleton I, this court recognized that the presentation of evidence that indirectly and implicitly bolsters the credibility of a witness is permissible. It is true that if the jurors believed the [witnesses'] testimony, they would be more likely to believe the victim's account. Neither of the [witnesses] directly expressed an opinion on the truth of the victim's testimony. Much    testimony will tend to show that another witness either is or is not telling the truth. This, by itself, will not render evidence inadmissible. 294 Or. at 435, 657 P.2d 1215 (citation omitted). Moreover, when a lawyer presents a witness and argues to the jury that it should find facts in accordance with that witness's testimony, the jury may infer that the lawyer believes the witness. That circumstance, which usually is present, also is permissible. From the three lines of cases just discussed, as well as from this court's decision in Eby, the following principle emerges. A witness's testimony or an exhibit may not, explicitly and directly, contain an opinion as to a trial witness's credibility. [4] That principle was violated in this case. Our holding today is limited to the in admissibility of the portions of the plea agreement containing the state's opinion that it finds Smith to be credible. Nothing in this opinion should be read to suggest that other portions of a plea agreement are necessarily inadmissible. Nor should this opinion be read to suggest that a witness may not be rehabilitated by asking about the substantive terms of a plea agreement, including a provision that the agreement is void if the witness commits perjury. The state argues that admission of the challenged portions of the plea agreement was proper in this case, because they were introduced to rehabilitate Smith only after defense counsel attacked his credibility. That, the state was entitled to do. In general, of course, the state is entitled to rehabilitate its witness after that witness has been impeached on cross-examination. That right, however, is not unlimited. In Snider, which is discussed above, 323 Or. at 45-46, 913 P.2d at 312-313, the state introduced the challenged portions of Walker's plea agreement on redirect examination, only after the defendant had impeached Walker's testimony by cross-examining him about that agreement. 296 Or. at 171, 674 P.2d 585. Even though the state did so for the purpose of rehabilitating the witness, the court held that introduction of those portions of the plea agreement was erroneous. Ibid.; see also State v. Middleton, 295 Or. 485, 491, 668 P.2d 371 (1983) ( Middleton II ) (rejecting the argument that the state had the right on redirect examination to offer the remainder of the plea agreement in an attempt to rehabilitate the witness who had been impeached on cross-examination). This case is factually indistinguishable from Snider on this point. The state also argues that, under OEC 106, it was entitled to introduce the entire plea agreement in response to defendant's cross-examination. OEC 106 provides in part: When part of    [a] writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject, where otherwise admissible, may at that time be inquired into by the other. (Emphasis added.) The portions of the agreement to which defendant objected were not otherwise admissible as that phrase is used in OEC 106. In Middleton II, this court explicitly rejected the argument that the state's impermissible bolstering of its own witness was otherwise admissible under a general rule of evidence that, if the defendant is entitled to introduce into evidence part of a writing, the state is entitled to introduce the remainder of that writing. 295 Or. at 490-91 & n. 4, 668 P.2d 371. The reasoning of Middleton II disposes of the state's argument in that regard. [5] In summary, we conclude that the trial court erred when it permitted the state to introduce the above-emphasized parts of Smith's plea agreement. In Snider, this court held that the improper bolstering that occurred in that case was prejudicial error: In this case, the testimony of [the witness] provided critical evidence about the alleged conspiracy to kidnap and kill the victim. The error in allowing improper bolstering of this witness's credibility was prejudicial. 296 Or. at 173, 674 P.2d 585. See also Keller, 315 Or. at 286, 844 P.2d 195 (holding that a trial witness's testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error). In this case, Smith was the only witness who testified to the details of defendant's personal participation in Largo's murder. He thus provided the crucial evidence that tied defendant to the commission of the murder. In the circumstances, the error was prejudicial with respect to defendant's convictions of aggravated murder, murder, and felony murder. Those convictions must be reversed. However, the error concerning the improper admission of parts of the plea agreement between Smith and the state was harmless as to defendant's convictions for two counts of kidnapping in the first degree and one count each of kidnapping in the second degree, assault in the third degree, and abuse of a corpse. Numerous witnesses other than Smith testified to defendant's involvement in those other crimes. The evidence concerning defendant's guilt of those crimes is extensive and compelling, and it does not depend on Smith's credibility. We conclude that there is little likelihood that the erroneous admission of part of Smith's plea agreement with the state affected the verdict as to defendant's convictions for kidnapping, assault, and abuse of a corpse. See State v. Pinnell, 319 Or. 438, 446 n. 9, 877 P.2d 635 (1994) ([u]nder state law, an error is harmless if there is `little likelihood that the error affected the verdict'). We also conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the erroneous admission of part of Smith's plea agreement did not contribute to those convictions. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (stating that federal constitutional error is deemed harmless if the appellate court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction).