Opinion ID: 4530543
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial Court’s Role as Gatekeeper

Text: This case presents the opportunity to further consider the role of a trial court as gatekeeper. We have recently reviewed related issues in State v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388 (Tenn. 2017), and State v. Cole-Pugh, 588 S.W.3d 254 (Tenn. 2019); however, it appears that the gatekeeping role of the trial court when assessing whether a defense has been fairly raised by the proof and thus should be charged to the jury needs additional clarification. 3 Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1322 provides a defense to prosecution for weapons violations under Part 13 when a person used a handgun in justifiable self-defense. 4 “Serious bodily injury” is defined as “bodily injury that involves: (A) A substantial risk of death; (B) Protracted unconsciousness; (C) Extreme physical pain; (D) Protracted or obvious disfigurement; (E) Protracted loss or substantial impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty; or (F) A broken bone of a child who is twelve (12) years of age or less.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(36)(A)-(F). 8 In State v. Perrier, this Court addressed the question of whether the trial court or the jury should make the threshold determination of whether or not a defendant was engaged in unlawful activity for purposes of the retreat component of the self-defense statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-611. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d at 394. We held that the trial court, not the jury, should determine whether the State’s proof established clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was engaged in unlawful activity when he used force in an alleged self-defense situation. Id. at 403. We held that the trial court’s jury instruction was, therefore, improper because the instructions left the determination of unlawful activity to the jury. Id. at 403-04. Subsequently, in State v. Cole-Pugh, this Court considered the proper role of the trial judge in instructing on the defense of necessity. Cole-Pugh, 588 S.W.3d at 259. We concluded that the trial court should make the decision as to when the defense is fairly raised by the evidence. If the defense is fairly raised, the trial court is obligated to instruct the jury accordingly, regardless of whether the defendant makes a written request. Id. at 263-64. We further concluded that a defendant need not testify that he reasonably feared imminent bodily harm. Id. at 263. The trial court may draw such an inference from the evidence as it is viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant. Id. Considering these precedents, we now conclude that it is the role of the trial court to make a threshold determination of whether self-defense has been fairly raised by the evidence and thus should be submitted to the jury. D. Proof Necessary to “Fairly Raise” Self-Defense Here, the State urges this Court to clarify the quantum of proof necessary to “fairly raise” self-defense. The State proposes that this Court adopt a standard that would require a judge to submit a general defense to the jury only if a “reasonable juror” could find in the defendant’s favor. Our Court of Criminal Appeals utilized a similar standard in State v. Bult, 989 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).5 To the contrary, the defendant proposes that this Court adopt an approach that would consider self-defense “fairly raised” if a defendant can point to even “the slightest evidence” of self-defense. According to the defendant, the question of whether a defendant acted in self-defense “should not be a judicial determination even if there is the slightest of evidence of selfdefense.” The defendant contends that this Court’s decisions in State v. Buggs, 995 5 The Bult court stated that “[a] defendant is entitled to the issue of the existence of a defense being submitted to a jury when it is fairly raised by the proof” and that a jury instruction was not required where “no rational juror could have a reasonable doubt based upon the claim.” Bult, 989 S.W.2d at 733. This measure of proof is similar to the standard employed by a trial judge when determining whether to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29(b) of the Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure and is also analogous to the amount of proof required for a trial court to instruct a jury on a lesser included offense. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-18-110(a) (stating that a “trial judge shall not instruct the jury as to any lesser included offense unless the judge determines that the record contains any evidence which reasonable minds could accept as to the lesser included offense”). 9 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. 1999), and Liakas v. State, 286 S.W.2d 856 (Tenn. 1956), support the “slightest of evidence” standard. However, neither Buggs nor Liakas discuss the level of proof required to “fairly raise” self-defense, nor do they otherwise support the defendant’s position. Regardless, we reject this minimal standard proposed by the defendant and find that more than the “slightest of evidence” is necessary to fairly raise self-defense. Although the phrase “fairly raised” is not defined by statute, it has been the standard relevant to raising a general defense in Tennessee for decades. In Hawkins, this Court held: A general defense . . . need not be submitted to the jury unless it is “fairly raised by the proof.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-203(c) (2010). The quantum of proof necessary to fairly raise a general defense6 is less than that required to establish a proposition by a preponderance of the evidence. To determine whether a general defense has been fairly raised by the proof, a court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant and draw all reasonable inferences in the defendant’s favor. Whenever admissible evidence fairly raises a general defense, the trial court is required to submit the general defense to the jury. From that point, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d at 129 (citing State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tenn. 2007)). Even before Hawkins, this Court stated that a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on duress “only if it is fairly raised by the proof. Because duress is a general rather than an affirmative defense, a criminal defendant need not establish the elements of duress by a preponderance of the evidence in order to merit a jury instruction.” State v. Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788, 816-17 (Tenn. 2010) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d at 355; State v. Culp, 900 S.W.2d 707, 709-10 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Furthermore, sixteen years before the 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act was adopted, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals stated as follows concerning an alibi defense: Finally, he contends the trial court erred in not charging the law on alibi. It is true, as urged by the state, no special request was submitted for the court to charge on alibi. However, if the issue is fairly raised by the evidence it is mandatory for the court to so charge. See Poe v. State, 212 Tenn. 413, 416, 370 S.W.2d 488. Here the defendant testified and denied breaking 6 “Conversely, affirmative defenses require pre-trial notice by the defense and, once fairly raised, must be proven by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.” Cole-Pugh, 588 S.W.3d at 260 (citation omitted). 10 into the garage and further denied ever being with Neal and Qualls when they broke into any premises. Although the record is not too clear, his testimony indicates he was not in the county at the time but was in Nashville. Further, his mother related that every night that he was in Rhea County he was home with her and stayed there all night. We feel this testimony fairly raised the issue, placing the duty upon the trial court to affirmatively charge this jury the law on alibi under the holdings of Poe v. State, supra. This was prejudicial error requiring reversal of this conviction. The assignment is accordingly sustained with the result that the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the record remanded for a new trial. Sneed v. State, 498 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973) (emphasis added). With the statute and Hawkins in mind, we turn to the case at hand, in which the trial court determined that a punch in the nose was not serious bodily injury within the meaning of the self-defense statute and that nothing in the record showed that the victim used or attempted to use deadly force against the defendant or threatened to cause serious bodily injury to the defendant. While the Court of Criminal Appeals did not clearly articulate the standard it employed, the intermediate court disagreed with the trial court’s assessment that the defense had not been fairly raised by the proof and determined that the question of whether the victim’s actions caused the defendant to have a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury was for the jury to decide. Benson, 2018 WL 5810004, at . On appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the defendant shows that the victim was “high on drugs, seeking more drugs, was the first aggressor in 11 a violent and sudden attack, with enough force to disfigure the defendant’s face,7 was unfazed by initial shots, and continued the fight from inside the house to outside the house.” We note, however, that there was nothing in the defendant’s own statement to the police to fairly raise the issue that he feared imminent death or serious bodily injury. Further, the defendant’s position conflates the ability to use force generally with the use of deadly force. This distinction is crucial to determining whether self-defense has been “fairly raised” in a murder case such as this. The bar is substantially higher for one trying to fairly raise the issue of the valid use of deadly force: (b)(2) Notwithstanding § 39-17-1322, a person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and is in a place where the person has a right to be has no duty to retreat before threatening or using force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, if: (A) The person has a reasonable belief that there is an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury; (B) The danger creating the belief of imminent death or serious bodily injury is real, or honestly believed to be real at the time; and (C) The belief of danger is founded upon reasonable grounds. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(b)(2) (emphasis added). At most, the defense proof fairly raised the issue of whether the defendant was justified in using non-lethal force to protect himself from the victim. The defendant here, however, is not attempting to justify a simple assault against the victim. Instead, he chose to respond to a punch in the nose by pulling out a gun and shooting a small, unarmed woman five times, including twice in the 7 In an attempt to justify his use of deadly force, the defendant asserts that he did in fact sustain “serious bodily injury” as a result of the victim’s punch. To that end, the defendant argues that his “displaced nose” constitutes “disfigurement,” which falls within the definition of “serious bodily injury.” However, as the trial court aptly noted, there was no evidence at trial to show that the victim’s punch was the cause of the defendant’s displaced nose. The only proof of the nature of the defendant’s injury is that the punch caused his nose to bleed. This fact is insufficient to support defendant’s claim of “disfigurement” or “serious bodily injury” that would justify responding with deadly force. Furthermore, the statutory definition of “serious bodily injury” includes “bodily injury that involves . . . [p]rotracted or obvious disfigurement.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(36)(D) (emphasis added); see also State v. Sims, 909 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Ms. Lady Jordan’s testimony that the defendant’s nose was different than she remembered or “messed up” was simply not enough to allow the question of “serious bodily injury” to be submitted to jury. See, e.g., State v. Farmer, 380 S.W.3d 96, 100-03 (Tenn. 2012) (holding that a gunshot wound that passed through a robbery victim’s leg did not constitute “serious bodily injury” within the scope of the statutory definition of especially aggravated robbery). 12 back. As the trial court recognized, “[t]here’s absolutely nothing . . . that would allow a jury to conclude that this defendant had a [sic] reasonable grounds to fear imminent bodily injury – serious bodily injury or death.”8 Finally, the defendant relied on the State’s mention of self-defense during closing arguments as an indication that even the State believed that the issue of self-defense had been fairly raised by the proof. We find this speculation unwarranted by the State’s assertion to the jury that “this is not a self-defense case” because “[i]f it were a selfdefense case, you’d have an instruction on that.” The State’s comment could just as easily be viewed as rebuttal to defense counsel’s references during opening statement to the defendant’s need to defend himself against the victim, including an assertion that the “evidence will show [the victim] was the perpetrator of a violent attack against [the defendant], making him react, making him defend himself.” By the time closing arguments were made, the trial court had already twice refused to charge the jury on selfdefense. The warning for the jury to not consider self-defense could just as easily have been the State’s attempt to dispel any notion of self-defense that was mentioned by defense counsel but not fairly raised by the proof. The trial court correctly concluded that the evidence in this case, when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant including all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, does not fairly raise as an issue that the defendant reasonably feared imminent death or serious bodily injury to justify his use of deadly force. Accordingly, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury regarding self-defense. However, we note that even if the trial court had erred in not instructing the jury on self-defense in this case, such an error would have been “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because no reasonable jury would have accepted the defendant’s self-defense theory.” Perrier, 536 S.W.3d at 404-05.