Opinion ID: 2432531
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues in the event of retrial

Text: We discuss the other four points of appeal for the guidance of the trial court and counsel on remand, as it is likely that these issues will arise again at subsequent trials. Diffee v. State, 319 Ark. 669, 894 S.W.2d 564 (1995); Spring Creek v. Sarrett, 319 Ark. 259, 890 S.W.2d 598 (1995).
Bunn alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting his mug shot into evidence. During the State's case-in-chief, Detective Alan McCarty testified that upon Williams's return from Bunn's trailer, Williams told officers that the person who sold him the cocaine looked like Gregory Hines. It was Officer McCarty's testimony that, as he and other officers had been given this description before and figured it was Bunn, they returned to the police department, where another officer showed a department photograph of Bunn to Williams. After Officer McCarty testified that Williams identified Bunn from the picture as the person who had sold him the cocaine, the State sought and obtained introduction of the picture into evidence. We cannot consider the merits of Bunn's argument, as he failed to abstract the photograph as a part of his appeal. As we have stated many times, [t]he appellant in a felony criminal appeal has `the duty ... to abstract such parts of the record ... as are material to the points to be argued in the appellant's brief.' Wynn v. State, 316 Ark. 414, 871 S.W.2d 593 (1994); See also Ark. Sup.Ct.R. 4-3(g). Moreover, Ark.Sup.Ct.R. 4-2(a)(6) provides that Whenever a map, plat, photograph, or other similar exhibit, which cannot be abstracted in words, must be examined for a clear understanding of the testimony, the appellant shall reproduce the exhibit by photography or other process and attach it to the copies of the abstract filed in the Court and served upon the opposing counsel, unless this requirement is shown to be impracticable and is waived by the Court upon motion. (Emphasis added.) Bunn did not present such a motion asking that we waive the requirements of Rule 4-2(a)(6); therefore, his failure to abstract the mug shot precludes our review of his argument on this point. As we have stated many times, the reason for this rule is basicthere is only one transcript, there are seven judges on this court, and it is impossible for each of the seven judges to examine the one transcript. Franklin v. State, 318 Ark. 99, 884 S.W.2d 246 (1994); Dixon v. State, 314 Ark. 378, 863 S.W.2d 282 (1993).
Bunn next asserts that the trial court erroneously admitted transcripts of the recordings of the first and third transactions into evidence, asserting that the transcripts were not properly authenticated under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 901, and that they were unduly prejudicial under A.R.E. 403. At trial, tapes of both the October 21, 1993, Blackburn transactions, and the October 23, 1993, Williams transaction were admitted without objection. Officer McCarty then testified that he had transcripts of the tapes prepared, identifying State's Exhibit 4 as a transcript of Blackburn's first cocaine purchase, and State's Exhibit 5 as a transcript of Williams's cocaine purchase. Bunn then made a foundational objection, and the trial court asked that the tapes be played and that Bunn review the transcript. Officer McCarty testified that he listened to the tapes twenty or thirty times for approximately three hours, took notes, wrote down what he heard, had his secretary type what he had written, then compared what she had typed with his notes. Regarding State's Exhibit Four, Officer McCarty stated that he identified the persons on the transcript as the confidential informant and who I believe to be Richard Bunn, as he attributed Richard Bunn's name to the person selling the cocaine based on what the informant told me. He further testified that [t]he voice appeared to be the person selling crack cocaine or negotiating the transaction. While he testified that he kn[ew] what Richard Bunn's voice sounds like by having been around him and having heard him talk, he stated that he couldn't positively identify the voice on the tape as Bunn's. The trial court overruled Bunn's foundational objection, finding that Officer McCarty had clearly testified how the transcripts were prepared. We agree that the transcripts were properly authenticated under A.R.E. 901, as Officer McCarty's opinion that the voice on the tape was Bunn's was clearly based upon [his] hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker. See A.R.E. 901(b)(5). After allowing Bunn to voir dire Officer McCarty, the trial court overruled Bunn's Rule 403 objection, concluding that the jury could give whatever weight that it desires to the tapes and the transcripts. The thrust of Bunn's argument is that State's Exhibit 4 erroneously attributes his name to one of the voices with the use of his initials, RB. (State's Exhibit 5 attributes the voice on the tape to an unknown male, labeled UM.) However, the State asserts, and we agree, that because Bunn failed to ask that the objectionable part of the transcript, or the RB, be separated, the trial court was not required to sustain an objection to the entire transcript. See Vasquez v. State, 287 Ark. 468, 701 S.W.2d 357 (1985). Moreover, transcripts which are essentially accurate are admissible. See Leavy v. State, 314 Ark. 231, 862 S.W.2d 832 (1993). Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court's ruling that the jury could give whatever weight that it desired to the tapes and the transcripts was in error.
For his fourth assignment of error, Bunn maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a letter purportedly written by him to Sandra Williams into evidence, and in allowing her to testify about the letter at trial. Sandra, who had previously lived with Bunn, testified that she had received a letter from Bunn in late December of 1993, or early January of 1994, in which Bunn threatened her, stating that, If you let someone find this letter or you tell on me, I will hunt you down. The trial court admitted the letter over Bunn's objection. On appeal, he argues that the letter was more prejudicial than probative and was thus admitted in violation of A.R.E. 403. However, he failed to object to Sandra's earlier testimony concerning the letter as follows: PROSECUTOR: ... Ms. Williams, have you ever been threatened by Mr. Bunn with reference to your testimony today? WITNESS: Uh, I've been threatened. I have a letter saying that when he was in jail if I told anything on him, he would hunt me down. PROSECUTOR: Do you have that letter with you? WITNESS: Yes I do. Bunn did not object until the State actually sought and obtained admission of the letter. As stated in Gonzalez v. State, 306 Ark. 1, 811 S.W.2d 760 (1991), evidence that is merely cumulative or repetitious of other evidence admitted without objection cannot be claimed to be prejudicial. See also Williams v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 319 Ark. 626, 893 S.W.2d 770 (1995). As such, Bunn has not demonstrated prejudice on this point. We will not reverse in the absence of prejudice. See Caldwell v. State, 319 Ark. 243, 891 S.W.2d 42 (1995).
For his final point of error, Bunn asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to declare Act 535 of 1993, Arkansas's bifurcated sentencing procedures, unconstitutional. Due to his failure to abstract any part of the sentencing proceedings at trial, we will not consider his argument on this point. Wynn v. State, supra ; Franklin v. State, supra ; Dixon v. State, supra . Reversed and remanded.