Opinion ID: 782278
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: SLUSA Remand Orders are Governed by Section 1447

Text: 23 SLUSA requires a district court to remand an action previously removed under SLUSA's removal provision, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(2), if it determines that the state action does not fall within SLUSA's preemptive scope. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(3)(D). To state the obvious, federal question jurisdiction to proceed under SLUSA is dependent on SLUSA's applicability. SLUSA's applicability is triggered if and only if a claim, on its face, falls within SLUSA's preemptive scope. If a claim falls within SLUSA's preemptive scope, by definition, it satisfies SLUSA's substantive requirements necessary to sustain removal, see 15 U.S.C. 78bb(f)(1)-(2). One such substantive requirement is that the alleged securities fraud must have occurred in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security. Id. Finding the fraud did not occur in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security produces three indisputable conclusions: the claim does not fall within SLUSA's preemptive scope, SLUSA does not apply, and most importantly, federal question jurisdiction to proceed under SLUSA is lacking. 24 Although SLUSA contains its own removal provision, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(2), and remand provision, id. § 78bb(f)(3)(D), it contains no language expressly prohibiting appellate review of remand orders. Merrill Lynch construes this Congressional silence as a clear statutory command preserving appellate review. We, on the other hand, do not think Congress' silence was intended to impart such import and decline to do so in Congress' stead. Conspicuously absent from SLUSA is any express language suggesting that it operates to override the appealability exclusion of Section 1447(d). Moreover, in contrast to Section 1447(d)'s express exception for remand orders issued in previously-removed civil rights cases, we find no such exception in SLUSA's remand provision or in Section 1447(d) for remand orders issued in SLUSA removal cases. It is not our place as jurists to supply that which is omitted by the legislature. See West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991) (in statutory construction case, [t]o supply omissions transcends the judicial function.) (quotation omitted). In this same vein, we do not believe, as Merrill Lynch seems to imply, that Congressional silence should reasonably be construed as a clear statutory command to trump Section 1447(d)'s jurisdictional bar and create, by implication, appellate jurisdiction. See Abada, 300 F.3d at 1119 (finding omission in SLUSA to any bar of appellate review does not create appellate jurisdiction because Section 1447(d)'s bar applies regardless of whether the case was removed pursuant to the general removal statute or the removal provisions of SLUSA.). 25 Finding no contrary statutory command in SLUSA, we hold that reviewability of a remand order based on the perceived lack of subject matter jurisdiction in a case previously removed under SLUSA's preemption provision is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447(c) and (d). Thus, a remand order based on a finding that the state law claim evades SLUSA preemption is merely an alternative, and not incorrect, way of stating that subject matter jurisdiction under SLUSA is lacking. Accordingly, the remand order issued in such a case is not reviewable on appeal. This is true even if the district court's determination regarding subject matter jurisdiction is ill-founded or poorly reasoned. See Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 343, 96 S.Ct. 584 (Section 1447(d) prohibits review of all remand orders issued pursuant to Section 1447(c) whether erroneous or not ....). We are convinced that this approach aligns with Congress' intent and its `aware[ness] of the universality of' ... denying appellate review of remand orders.... 9 Things Remembered, 516 U.S. at 124, 116 S.Ct. 494 (quoting Rice, 327 U.S. at 752, 66 S.Ct. 835).