Opinion ID: 2330508
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Mr. Fetner's Role in the Depositions

Text: Blodgett also appeals three orders of the trial court related to P. Jay Fetner's participation in this litigation. (Fetner is not a party to this appeal.) A law school graduate who has never been admitted to the District of Columbia Bar, Mr. Fetner previously was a pro se plaintiff in similar litigation against The University Club and its Board. He assisted Blodgett's legal team by reading and organizing documents, investigating facts, attending depositions, and suggesting lines of inquiry. During at least one deposition, Fetner purported to clarify statements of the witness, and the Club filed an emergency motion for a protective order to clarify and limit Fetner's involvement in the case. [D]ue to the Court's concerns that he [was] engag[ed] in the unauthorized practice of law, Judge Duncan-Peters ordered that until he obtains permission to appear pro hac vice, Mr. Fetner may not attend the depositions. Blodgett filed a motion for reconsideration, which Judge Long denied. Judge Long also denied Blodgett's motion to admit Fetner pro hac vice. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 26(c) provides that, [u]pon motion by a party . . ., and for good cause shown, [the Superior Court] may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including . . . that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the Court. A court has substantial discretion in deciding to grant a protective order, and its decision to do so will not ordinarily be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion has been abused. Mampe v. Ayerst Labs., 548 A.2d 798, 803-04 (D.C. 1988). Judicial discretion will not be reversed unless it appears that it was exercised on grounds, or for reasons, clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 363 (D.C.1979) (extensive discussion of abuse of discretion standard of appellate review). Judge Duncan-Peters made several factual findings to support her order barring Fetner from attending further depositions until he obtained permission to appear pro hac vice. For example, the court found that Fetner was an attorney but had never applied for admission to the D.C. Bar and did not fit within any of the exceptions under D.C.App. R. 49; that Fetner had already attended eleven depositions as a consultant on behalf of Blodgett; and that he had spoken on the record during at least one of those depositions, purportedly to clarify the testimony of a witness. Judge Duncan-Peters reasoned that representing a deponent or clarifying deposition testimony constituted the practice of law. Furthermore, Fetner had stated in writing that he was advising appellant on strategy, procedure, and tactics-functions that, during litigation, are normally performed by an attorney. There is ample support for the court's issuance of the protective order, and we will not disturb its ruling. See Johnson, 398 A.2d at 364. Similarly, Judge Long did not abuse her discretion in denying Blodgett's motion to reconsider that order. See Tobin v. John Grotta Co., 886 A.2d 87, 90 (D.C.2005) (abuse of discretion standard applies). The admission of attorneys pro hac vice is governed by the rules of this court, which provide, in relevant part: The court to which the relevant litigation matter is assigned may grant or deny applications, and withdraw admissions to participate pro hac vice in its discretion. D.C.App. R. 49(c)(7)(vii) (emphasis added). See also Super. Ct. Civ. R. 101(a)(3). The decision to deny Fetner admission pro hac vice is amply supported by the record. Furthermore, none of these decisions relating to Fetner has prejudiced Blodgett because he had ample legal representation below. See Johnson, 398 A.2d at 367 (we will not hold that the trial court has abused its discretion unless the impact of an error is sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal).