Opinion ID: 2513985
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kay had an actual conflict.

Text: A lawyer's duty to former clients is codified in Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(a). Where the previous representation and current litigation cover the same or substantially related matters and the current client's interests are materially adverse to those of the former client, the lawyer shall not represent the current client unless the former client consents. [17]
Richard argues that the subject matter underlying his attempted SAM conviction and the termination proceeding are substantially related to one another. As Richard reasons, Kay represented Richard at the change of plea and sentencing in the attempted SAM prosecution. Subsequently, the alleged conduct underlying his conviction was used as a central allegation in the petition to terminate his parental rights. Directing us to Daniels v. State [18] and Aleut Corp. v. McGarvey, [19] Richard concludes that, under any possible test, the issues in these two cases were substantially related. The state argues that the CINA case and the criminal case were not substantially related because the elements the state was required to prove in the criminal and CINA cases were different. The state characterizes Cynthia's sexual abuse as being a minor factor in the termination proceeding and disagrees with Richard's claim that Daniels and Aleut Corp. establish a standard for determining when two issues are substantially related. During the pretrial proceedings, however, the state conceded that the two matters were related. At the pretrial conference, the state asserted: The crux of the matter is what was the subject matter.... [T]he subject matter is directly related to this case. [Richard] in that case sexually assaulted his daughter, and his rights as a father are being implicated here, so I don't think the fact that sentencing took place in February or maybe it was March is relevant, really. And I also don't think it's particularly relevant that it was the result of a plea bargain. I'd say the majority of cases resolve in plea bargain, but that doesn't mean there aren't substantive negotiations and thought processes that go into that. Where a party concedes a fact at trial, that fact cannot later be contested on appeal. [20] Though the parties were not yet at trial when the state made its concession, the matter had to be decided before trial since it involved trial counsel. The state's concession at the conference, therefore, bars its contention of this point on appeal. Even if this argument was not waived at trial, we find that the matters are substantially related. In Aleut Corp., we held that an attorney may not represent a third party against a former client where there exists a substantial possibility that knowledge gained by him in the earlier professional relationship can be used against the former client, or where the subject matter of his present undertaking has a substantial relationship to that of his prior representation. [21] In its petition to terminate parental rights, DFYS contended that Richard had not remedied his conduct or the conditions in his home since the children were first adjudicated to be in need of aid and that, as a result of his behavior, he had been sentenced to three years in prison for the sexual abuse of his daughter. Further, in its pretrial memorandum, the state referred to Richard's SAM conviction and concluded that the cycle has not been broken, the issues that brought the children into state custody persist. DFYS also alleged that the treatment and counseling offered to Richard had not had any effect. In its decision, the trial court found that based upon his no contest plea in 4BE-S99-752 CR for Attempted Sexual Abuse of a Minor in the 2nd Degree, clear and convincing evidence exists that [Richard], at the least, placed [Cynthia] at the risk of sexual abuse. The court went on to say that, [n]onetheless, and notwithstanding the above, both Richard and Leslie placed the children at substantial risk of sexual assault. This paragraph indicates that, although there was other evidence supporting termination under other subsections of AS 47.10.011, Richard's attempted SAM conviction clearly exerted some influence over the court's decision to terminate Richard's parental rights. While the trial court found reasons other than the sexual abuse supporting termination, that result could not have been known to the court at the time it decided the conflict of interest issue. Brian Kay represented Richard in his sexual assault case. The conviction resulting from Richard's no contest plea in that case played a role in the termination of his parental rights. As such, we find that Kay's prior representation was substantially related to the termination proceeding.
Richard next argues that his interests were materially adverse to Leslie's in the termination proceedings. On appeal, the state claims that Richard and Leslie's positions were aligned, as neither wanted the state to terminate their parental rights. Further, the state now maintains that it would not advance Leslie's case to show that Richard was an abusive father because under AS 47.10.011 the state could terminate Leslie's parental rights based on Richard's conduct alone. This argument stands in direct contrast to DFYS's position at trial. As discussed earlier, at the pretrial conference, the state declared that it's clear that Mr. Kay would have a conflict to continued representation of [Leslie], when he represented Richard at the criminal matter as Richard and Leslie obviously... have separate interests. [Leslie] wants her child back, [Richard] wants his child back, he's in jail, they're separated, they don't, you know, have much contact together.... [T]hat's a clear conflict. Again, where a party concedes a fact at trial, that fact can not be challenged on appeal. [22] Even if the state had not conceded at trial that there was a conflict, we find its current argument to be without merit and its reliance on AS 47.10.011 to be misplaced. First, AS 47.10.011 governs an initial finding that a child is in need of aid. Alaska Statute 47.10.088 governs termination and, while section.011 is incorporated into section .088, more than a finding that a child is in need of aid is required to terminate parental rights. Given this statutory scheme, the state is simply inferring too much from the language of section .011. While certain subsections of AS 47.10.011 implicate the conduct of both parents, once a child has been found to be in need of aid, the state must then prove that the parent whose rights the state wishes to terminate has failed to remedy the conduct underlying the petition and that returning the child to the home would place the child at a substantial risk of physical or mental injury. [23] Contrary to the state's argument, none of these findings could be made against Leslie based on Richard's conduct alone. We conclude that Richard and Leslie's positions were materially adverse. At the time of termination, Leslie had married another man. Leslie testified that she didn't want Richard to have contact with the children because Richard had abused Leslie and sexually assaulted Cynthia. Leslie also testified that she didn't want Richard to have any contact with the children because Richard hit his children and masturbated in front of Cynthia and touched her inappropriately. In her closing argument, Leslie argued for the termination of Richard's rights based on the sexual abuse. Richard, on the other hand, testified that he had never touched Cynthia in a sexual manner. He stated that he was confused when he entered his plea of no contest to the attempted SAM charge. Though he was represented by counsel at those proceedings, Richard testified that he didn't understand what he was pleading to. As Richard maintained that he had not sexually assaulted Cynthia, while Leslie argued that the sexual assault was the main reason in support of the termination of Richard's parental rights, Leslie's interests were materially adverse to Richard's.