Opinion ID: 1666128
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Challenge to Closed Meetings.

Text: Botsko claims that the commission improperly deliberated in closed meetings. According to Botsko, the commission has no statutory authority under the Iowa Open Meetings Law, Iowa Code chapter 21, to conduct its deliberations behind closed doors. Botsko concludes that in light of the lack of statutory authorization, his due process rights were violated because the process was fundamentally unfair. He further presses the argument by seeking disclosure of the tapes of the illegal closed sessions. Nabb counters that the closed sessions were authorized by Iowa Code section 21.5(1)( f ). This section of the Open Meetings Law provides that closed deliberations may be utilized [t]o discuss the decision to be rendered in a contested case conducted according to the provisions of chapter 17A. Iowa Code § 21.5(1)( f ). It is true, of course, that a local civil rights commission is not an agency under the IAPA and thus the IAPA is not directly applicable. Iowa Code § 17A.2(1). The fact that a local civil rights commission is not explicitly subject to chapter 17A, however, is not determinative on the issue here. The precise question is whether the proceedings in this case before the commission were conducted according to the provisions of chapter 17A, even if chapter 17A did not expressly govern the matter. One of the common meanings of accordance is agreement or conformity. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 7 (10th ed. 2002). Courts interpreting the phrase in accordance with have relied upon this common definition in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Love v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 108 Idaho 728, 701 P.2d 1293, 1295 (1985) (finding the phrase in accordance did not require a zoning ordinance to be an exact copy of the master plan, but rather required the ordinance to reflect the goals of the plan in light of all the facts and circumstances); Holmgren v. City of Lincoln, 199 Neb. 178, 256 N.W.2d 686, 690 (1977) (same); Thomas Group, Inc. v. Wharton Senior Citizen Hous., Inc., 163 N.J. 507, 750 A.2d 743, 748 (2000) (finding that the phrase in accordance with the contract in construction lien statute must be read sensibly and consistent with the statute's overall intent and thus requires parties to perform work under the contract in order to be entitled to a lien, but does not require that a party satisfy all the contract's terms and conditions). Utilizing this common definition, we determine that section 21.5(1)( f ) requires a contested case hearing to be conducted under procedures consistent with, but not an exact replica of, chapter 17A in order for its deliberations to meet the open meetings exception. Whether the commission's proceedings were conducted in accordance with chapter 17A must be determined in light of all the relevant circumstances. Mathew v. Mathew, 209 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Iowa 1973). As noted previously, Iowa Code section 216.19 requires cities to maintain an independent local civil rights agency or commission consistent with commission rules adopted pursuant to chapter 17A. Iowa Code § 216.19. Local civil rights commissions cooperate with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission in the investigation and prosecution of civil rights actions. These commissions, therefore, largely pattern their procedures after the state commission and chapter 17A. For example, under the Davenport ordinance, a litigant has rights and responsibilities that are parallel to those provided by the contested case provisions of chapter 17A, including the right to notice, to counsel, and to an evidentiary hearing. Davenport Mun.Code § 2.58.170. The parties, moreover, concede that on appeal, the standards of review established by chapter 17A are applicable. As a result, we conclude that this local proceeding amounts to a contested case conducted according to the provisions of chapter 17A. Under Iowa Code section 21.5(1)( f ), the commission acted lawfully when it conducted closed meetings to deliberate in this matter. We next turn to the question of whether the otherwise lawful closed deliberations violate Botsko's right to procedural due process of law. We conclude statutorily-authorized closed meetings to conduct deliberations do not violate procedural due process rights. Juries, executive agency boards and commissions, and appellate courts engage in closed deliberations every day. The law is fiercely protective of the deliberative process of multi-member bodies in order to promote candid and uninhibited discussion which produces the give-and-take that is the hallmark of effective collective decisionmaking. See Kholeif v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 497 N.W.2d 804, 806-07 (Iowa 1993) (noting the strong public policy reasons to avoid inquiry into mental processes of administrative decisionmakers). We find no procedural due process infirmity as a result of the closed deliberations in this case.