Opinion ID: 149612
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonable Suspicion and Standard of Review

Text: The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. One type of seizure is an investigatory stop, which is reasonable only if justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). Unlike an arrest, which requires probable cause, these brief detentions are constitutional based on the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion: the officer must have reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). The government bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the officer's suspicion. United States v. Nichols, 374 F.3d 959, 965 (10th Cir.2004). In evaluating whether the district court correctly found that the trooper here had reasonable suspicion for his continued detention of Mr. Simpson, we must view the evidence presented at the suppression hearing in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935, 944 (10th Cir.2009), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1721, 176 L.Ed.2d 202 (2010). Moreover, this court defers to the district court's finding of facts and reviews them solely for clear error, even when, as here, there is video tape of the stop and detention. United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1128 (10th Cir.2005) (The increasing availability of videotapes of traffic stops due to cameras mounted on patrol cars does not deprive district courts of their expertise as finders of fact, or alter our precedent to the effect that appellate courts owe deference to the factual findings of district courts.). Although we defer to the district court's factual findings, we review de novo the district court's legal conclusions, specifically, that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity at the time of the seizure. See United States v. Carhee, 27 F.3d 1493, 1496-97 (10th Cir. 1994). As courts have often repeated, the existence of objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal activity does not depend upon any one factor, but on the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1555 (10th Cir.1993). In deciding whether the government has met its burden of showing reasonable suspicion, we judge the officer's conduct in light of common sense and ordinary human experience, United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1431 (10th Cir.1997), and we accord deference to an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions. Wood, 106 F.3d at 946; see also United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d 1481, 1484 (10th Cir.1994) (observing that deference is owed to police officer's ability to assess suspiciousness of seemingly innocent conduct). Thus, [t]he evaluation is made from the perspective of the reasonable officer, not the reasonable person. United States v. Guerrero, 472 F.3d 784, 787 (10th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). The deference owed to the officer's judgment, however, is not unlimited. Even though reasonable suspicion may be founded upon factors consistent with innocent travel, see United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), [s]ome facts must be outrightly dismissed as so innocent or susceptible to varying interpretations as to be innocuous. United States v. Lee, 73 F.3d 1034, 1039 (10th Cir.1996), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1226 n. 6 (10th Cir.2001) (en banc). Moreover, the officer must point to specific, articulable facts. United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1994). Inchoate suspicions and unparticularized hunches do not provide reasonable suspicion. Id.