Opinion ID: 2207595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proof of Age Discrimination.

Text: A person may prove age discrimination by either of two methods. One method is to present direct or circumstantial evidence that age was a determining factor in the employer's employment decision. The other method of proof is to utilize the indirect, burden-shifting method of proof as established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Oxman v. WLSTV, 846 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir.1988). See also United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 717-18, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1483, 75 L.Ed.2d 403, 412 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring). In the past, we have applied the McDonnell Douglas principles and analytical framework as refined in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), in our civil rights cases. See, e.g., Hulme v. Barrett, 449 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Iowa 1989); King v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 334 N.W.2d 598, 601-03 (Iowa 1983); Linn Coop. Oil Co. v. Quigley, 305 N.W.2d 729, 733 (Iowa 1981). However, the McDonnell Douglas framework is not well suited as a detailed instruction to the jury. Grebin v. Sioux Falls Indep. School Dist., 779 F.2d 18, 20 (8th Cir.1985). It add[s] little to the juror's understanding of the case and, even worse, may lead jurors to abandon their own judgment and to seize upon poorly understood legalisms to decide the ultimate question of discrimination. Id. at 20-21 (quoting Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir.1979)). Furthermore, a uniform instruction is of little value because application of the McDonnell Douglas framework will vary in different fact situations. See Hildebrand v. M-Tron Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 363, 368 (8th Cir.1987). Although the three-stage order of proof and the presumptions described in McDonnell Douglas are useful to the court in structuring proof while the trial is in progress, once the jury finds discrimination, and the resulting judgment is being evaluated on appeal, these presumptions fade away and the appellate court should simply study the record to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict and judgment. Barber v. American Airlines, Inc., 791 F.2d 658, 659-660 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885, 107 S.Ct. 278, 93 L.Ed.2d 254 (1986). Once an employer offers reasons for discharging the plaintiff, the presumption of discrimination recognized in the first stage of McDonnell Douglas loses its significance in the case. See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714-15, 103 S.Ct. at 1481-82, 75 L.Ed.2d at 409-10. The inference of discrimination, however, does not drop from the case. The jury also may rationally draw an inference of discrimination from proof that the reasons given by the employer for discharging the plaintiff were not the true reasons. Barber, 791 F.2d at 660. The ultimate question, however, is whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714-15, 103 S.Ct. at 1481-82, 75 L.Ed.2d at 409-10. When a case is fully tried on the merits, we focus our attention on the ultimate question presented and not on the adequacy of a party's showing at any particular stage of the analysis. Smith v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 895 F.2d 467, 471 (8th Cir.1990). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden of proving the ultimate question remains on the plaintiff. The McDonnell Douglas framework cannot be applied where the plaintiff uses the direct method of proof of discrimination. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S.Ct. 613, 621-22, 83 L.Ed.2d 523, 533 (1985). Where direct evidence is presented and the employer suggests other factors influenced the decision, the employer has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not considered the improper factor. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. ____, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1795, 104 L.Ed.2d 268, 293 (1989).