Opinion ID: 2111897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Coleman's Objection.

Text: This brings us to the objection during trial to Lang's testimony about Coleman's incarceration in the penitentiary shortly before Coleman's arrest. In an effort to exclude Lang's testimony, Coleman's lawyer stated: I object to any testimony regarding where Mr. Coleman was earlier in the fall prior to his arrest in November of 1989. Bearing in mind that Coleman's motion in limine was based on Neb.Evid.R. 403 and contained Coleman's apparent concession that his penitentiary confinement may be relevant, was the objection during trial based on Rule 403? The objection, however, made no reference to Rule 403 or to the previously overruled motion in limine. Had Coleman withdrawn from his concession of relevancy, expressed in conjunction with his motion in limine, and at trial contended that testimony concerning his incarceration was irrelevant? Was Coleman's opposition to Lang's testimony a veiled invocation of the Nebraska Evidence Rules other than the rules concerning irrelevancy or the exclusion of relevant evidence pursuant to Neb.EvkLR. 403? Coleman's objection lacked not only a specified ground for inadmissibility of Lang's testimony, but also, in the objection's context at trial, provided no readily discernible basis for exclusion of Lang's testimony. Consequently, any ground or basis for Coleman's objection is open to reasonable and serious question. Neb.Evid.R. 103(lXa), Neb.Rev. Stat. § 27-103(l)(a) (Reissue 1989), provides that an appellant claiming reversible error as the result of admission of evidence must have made a timely objection ... stating the specific ground of objection, if a specific ground was not apparent from the context.... See, also, Havlicek v. State, 101 Neb. 782, 784, 165 N.W. 251 (1917) ([i]t is the duty of counsel to make his [or her] objections so specific that the court may understand the point intended to be raised); State v. Todd, 226 Neb. 906, 416 N.W.2d 13 (1987); State v. Roggenkamp, 224 Neb. 914, 402 N.W.2d 682 (1987). One function of a proper objection is to direct the court's attention to questioned admissibility of particular evidence so that the court may intelligently, quickly, and correctly rule on the reception or exclusion of evidence. See, State v. Bmonette, 145 Vt. 381, 488 A.2d 1231 (1985); Langenheim v. City of Seward, 200 Neb. 740, 265 N.W.2d 446 (1978); Fowler v. Bachus, 179 Neb. 558, 139 N.W.2d 213 (1966); M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 103.1 (3d ed. 1991); 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5032 (1977). Thus, a true objection does not wander among the Nebraska Evidence Rules in the hope of eventually ending its odyssey at the doorstep of a particular rule of evidence. In seeking to exclude evidence, counsel must adhere to a basic and straightforward approach: Tell the court the reason why the evidence is inadmissible! At best, Coleman's lawyer expressed general opposition to Lang's testimony, but failed to express that opposition based on any of the Nebraska Evidence Rules, either by reference to the numerical identification of a particular rule within the Nebraska Evidence Rules or through use of language contained in an evidential rule which rendered Lang's testimony inadmissible. Notwithstanding Coleman's objection and its unspecified exclusionary ground and cryptic basis for inadmissibility of Lang's testimony about Coleman's incarceration, the State tilts at windmills built in Coleman's brief and embarks on various considerations for admissibility of Lang's testimony. Nevertheless, at the risk of condoning, or even inviting, slipshod practice and procedure for objections to evidence, but aware of Coleman's possible ineffective assistance of counsel claim on account of his lawyer's failure to specify a basis for excluding Lang's testimony, we treat Coleman's objection as one based on the ground that Lang's testimony was irrelevant, [e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible. Neb.Evid.R. 402, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-402 (Reissue 1989). Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Neb.Evid.R. 401, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-401 (Reissue 1989). There are two components to relevant evidence: materiality and probative value. Materiality looks to the relation between the propositions for which the evidence is offered and the issues in the case. If the evidence is offered to help prove a proposition which is not a matter in issue, the evidence is immaterial. What is `in issue,' that is, within the range of the litigated controversy, is determined mainly by the pleadings, read in the light of the rules of pleading and controlled by the substantive law.... The second aspect of relevance is probative value, the tendency of evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove.... State v. Baltimore, 236 Neb. 736, 740, 463 N.W.2d 808, 812 (1990) (quoting McCormick on Evidence § 185 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984)). Accord State v. Messersmith, 238 Neb. 924, 473 N.W.2d 83 (1991). To be relevant, evidence must be rationally related to an issue by a likelihood, not a mere possibility, of proving or disproving an issue to be decided. State v. Lonnecker, 237 Neb. 207, 210, 465 N.W.2d 737, 740-41 (1991). Accord, State v. Lomack, 239 Neb. 368, 368, 476 N.W.2d 237 (1991); State v. Baltimore, supra . Coleman's imprisonment shortly before his arrest was neither material nor probative concerning the charge that Coleman possessed cocaine when he was arrested after the traffic stop. First, the fact of imprisonment is not an element of the possession charge against Coleman, see § 28-416(1), and, hence, was immaterial to the prosecution of Coleman. Second, we find nothing in the fact of incarceration which, by itself, makes it more likely that the individual, previously incarcerated and later found in proximity to a controlled substance, possessed the controlled substance. Moreover, the adverse effect of Lang's testimony is found in the reasonable possibility that a jury might somehow consider Coleman's recent incarceration as an indication of his guilt. Consequently, evidence of Coleman's previous incarceration was irrelevant and should have been excluded.