Opinion ID: 2072259
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure by State to Disclose Fingerprint Evidence

Text: Defendant contends that the State withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, and our Rule 412 (134 Ill.2d R. 412). Defendant requested the State to supply any report and results of any and all scientific test,    including such tests as    fingerprints. The State did not provide defendant with any fingerprint reports. At trial, Detective Paladino, a witness for the State, testified that the gasoline can he found in apartment 206 was sent to the crime lab for fingerprint analysis. Additionally, Paladino testified that he believed the black powder visible on the can at trial was fingerprint powder. Based on Paladino's testimony, defendant moved for a mistrial. The prosecutor denied the existence of a fingerprint report, and opened his file to defendant. No fingerprint report was found, and the trial court denied defendant's motion for a mistrial. In Brady, the Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d at 218. In the present case, the contents of the fingerprint report, assuming a fingerprint report ever existed, are unknown. In order to determine materiality under Brady, it is necessary to consider the content of the undisclosed evidence and its effect upon defendant's guilt or punishment. The Brady analysis is ill-suited for situations where evidence has been lost or destroyed and its contents are unknown. Additionally, the sanction normally imposed under Brady, a remand for a new trial, would be ineffective in this type of situation. The undisclosed evidence would not be available at a second trial. We do not believe, therefore, that Brady controls here. The present case is similar to Arizona v. Youngblood (1988), 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337, 102 L.Ed.2d 281, 289, where the Court held that unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. The underlying policy concerns of Youngblood are analogous to those in the present case. In order to promote the preservation of exculpatory evidence, there must be the possibility of a sanction where evidence is lost or destroyed. On the other hand, a defendant should not be rewarded for the inadvertent loss of a piece of evidence where other evidence sufficient to support his conviction remains. The proper balance between these competing interest can be accomplished through careful consideration of (1) the degree of negligence or bad faith by the State in losing the evidence, and (2) the importance of the lost evidence relative to the evidence presented against the defendant at trial. We believe that imposing sanctions against the State here would be inappropriate. First, defendant has failed to show any bad faith on the part of the State. More importantly, there was independent evidence tying defendant to the gasoline can. Two witnesses identified defendant as filing a gasoline can prior to the fire, and a can similar to that described by the witnesses was discovered as a result of information gained from defendant's confession. There is also overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt separate from the gasoline can. Defendant next claims that the State's withholding of the fingerprint report violated our Supreme Court Rule 412 (134 Ill.2d R. 412). Rule 412 deals with material or information that is within the possession or control of the State. As discussed above, it is not clear that a fingerprint report ever existed. However, even if we assume that a fingerprint report did exist at one time, it has now been lost. The prosecutor stated that he had never seen a fingerprint report. The State opened its entire file to defendant, and the fingerprint report was never found. Defendant has not shown that the fingerprint report was in the possession or control of the State, or available to it. The State, therefore, could not have an obligation to disclose the report under rule 412.