Opinion ID: 1959742
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Decision To Terminate

Text: On reviewing a case of employment discrimination where disparate treatment is alleged[,] this court generally adopts the approach of the Supreme Court with respect to allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof for a claim of disparate treatment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Shaw Project v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human Rights, 500 A.2d 251, 253 (D.C.1985) (per curiam). Here, in order to establish a prima facie case of sexual discrimination in the decision to terminate, appellant had to come forward with evidence that she was fired from a job for which she was qualified while men, similarly situated to her, were not terminated, but rather treated more leniently. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 179 (3rd Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1035, 106 S.Ct. 1244, 89 L.Ed.2d 353 (1986); Rowe v. Kidd, 731 F.Supp. 534, 536 (D.D.C.1990). As the Supreme Court has consistently noted, [t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093). Appellant did not produce any specific evidence, beyond mere allegations in her complaint, suggesting that the decision to terminate her was discriminatory. In her opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment, appellant simply stated that she could and would prove her prima facie case at trial. However, [c]onclusory allegations by the nonmoving party are insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact or to defeat the entry of summary judgment. Beard, supra, 587 A.2d at 198. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 56(e) provides, in relevant part, that: an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading[;] the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Appellee provided ample evidence establishing that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding appellant's claim of discriminatory termination. First, it was undisputed that appellant was the only female professional terminated at Associated General since 1985. According to the affidavit of John Gentille, Executive Director of Associated General, four professional men had been terminated in that period for reasons related to conduct. [2] Two of those terminated employees, like appellant, received four weeks severance pay, one received two weeks pay, and one received no severance pay at all. Second, Gentille stated in his sworn affidavit that appellant was terminated because of misconduct and not because she was a woman. According to appellee's affidavits, appellant verbally attacked two co-employees, Richard Chriss and Susan Loomis. This attack, in part, caused Loomis, who is Associated General's Executive Director for Congressional Relations, to tender her resignation. Gentille stated that he, along with the other executives of Associated General, wanted Loomis to remain at the company, and therefore decided that appellant should be terminated. Although appellant has consistently denied any wrongdoing, and thus argues that her firing was not for cause, as in the cases of the four discharged male employees, she has failed to produce any competent evidence indicating that the decision to terminate her was discriminatory. As Beard, supra, clearly states, appellant's conclusory allegations of discrimination are insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact or to defeat the entry of summary judgment. [3] Summary judgment for appellee was proper because appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination. See Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 49 (D.C. 1979); (a plaintiff opposing a motion for summary judgment in essence must produce enough evidence to make out a prima facie case in support of her claim), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078, 100 S.Ct. 1028, 62 L.Ed.2d 761 (1980). On appeal, appellant relies primarily on Proffitt v. Anacomp, Inc., 747 F.Supp. 421 (S.D.Ohio 1990), which states that a prima facie case of sex discrimination is established by producing evidence that: (1) [appellant] belongs to a protected class; (2) she was satisfactorily performing her job; (3) despite this performance she was terminated; and (4) she was replaced by a male worker. Alternatively, plaintiff may establish the last element by showing that the employer continued to solicit applications for the vacant position.       Plaintiff may also establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment by introducing evidence that defendant treated her less favorably than similarly situated male employees. Proffitt, supra, 747 F.Supp. at 425 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Although appellant alleged that she was replaced by a male worker in her claim of intentional interference with contract, [4] she did not make that argument in her opposition to Associated General's motion for summary judgment on her sex discrimination claim. Appellant's only argument made to the trial court in establishing her prima facie claim of discrimination was that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated male employees at Associated General. Appellant has not, however, introduced any competent evidence demonstrating that appellee treated her less favorably than similarly situated male employees. Associated General terminated four professional men during the relevant time period. All four men, like appellant, were asked to resign or were fired, and none received more severance pay than she upon termination. Those professional men who were treated differently from appellant were not similarly situated to her, see part B, infra. Accordingly, appellant has failed to establish a prima facie case of sexual discrimination. There appears to be some dispute regarding the reason given appellant for her termination on the date on which Associated General asked for her resignation and the reason given by them throughout this litigation. [5] The standard for summary judgment, however, provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.  Rowe, supra, 731 F.Supp. at 536. The substantive law defines which facts are material. Id. The substantive law, as stated in Rowe and Hughes v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., 583 F.Supp. 66 (D.D.C.1983), requires appellant, in making a prima facie case of employment discrimination where she has not alleged that someone replaced her when she was terminated, [6] to show that persons who were not members of the protected class and were similarly situated to appellant, were not terminated. Though appellant has demonstrated that she was a member of a protected class, that she was qualified and that she was terminated, she did not demonstrate that male employees of Associated General with comparable qualifications and work records were not terminated. Thus, we conclude, in view of our de novo review of the record, that no genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to appellant's claim of discrimination in the decision to terminate her.