Opinion ID: 2714946
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ishikawa Analysis

Text: The right embodied in article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitutionthat justice be administered openly-is not absolute. Dreiling v. Jain, 151 Wn.2d 900, 909, 93 P.3d 861 (2004). [W]hile we presume court records will be made open and available for public inspection, court records may be sealed 'to protect other significant and fundamental rights.' Rufer v. Abbott Labs., 154 Wn.2d 530, 540, 114 P .3d 1182 (2005) (quoting Dreiling, 151 Wn.2d at 909). To balance the constitutional requirement of the open administration of justice against potentially conflicting rights, we directed courts to apply the five Ishikawa factors. 4 !d. at 544 (citing Dreiling, 151 Wn.2d at 908, 913). Here, the lower court properly applied the Ishikawa factors. Encarnacion and Farias have shown the need for redaction as a result of a compelling interest in securing housing for themselves and their young children. The trial judge allowed objection by present parties. The trial judge analyzed the proposed redaction to ensure that it was both the least restrictive means available and effective in protecting the interests at stake. The trial judge weighed the interests of Encarnacion and Farias 4 See lead opinion at 7. 6 Hundtofte v. Encarnacion, No. 88036~1 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) and their children against those of the public. And finally, the trial judge ensured that the order applied for a limited and specific time period that is justified by the private interest. All of the Ishikawa factors were faithfully considered. Even if it were appropriate for us to reevaluate the careful factual findings made by the trial court, the lead opinion misstates and misapplies the standard that Encarnacion and Farias must meet to prevail. The lead opinion finds that an exception to the presumption of openness is appropriate only in the most unusual of circumstances. Lead opinion at 6 (citing In re Det. ofD.F.F., 172 Wn.2d 37, 41,256 P.3d 357 (2011)). And, in conclusion, the lead opinion proclaims that [t]hese are not the most unusual of circumstances. Lead opinion at 10. This is not the controlling standard. Though the D. F. F. lead opinion does use the most unusual circumstances language, 172 Wn.2d at 41, that opinion only received four signatures and does not articulate our established legal standard. No other case applying the Ishikawa factors requires litigants to make such a stringent showing. Indeed, in Rufer, we established that 'documents may not be kept from public view without some overriding interest requiring secrecy.' 154 Wn.2d at 542 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dreiling, 151 Wn.2d at 91 0). Requiring some overriding interest from a party seeking to redact a public record is not requiring the most unusual of circumstances. Overriding interest here means the private interest outweighs the competing interest of 7 Hundtofle v. Encarnacion, No. 88036-1 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) public access to the redacted information. The majority fails to articulate and apply the proper standard. When the correct law is applied to established facts, Encarnacion and Farias have demonstrated the existence of an overriding interest. Having access to acceptable housing is not just a compelling interest on its own, but, practically speaking, it is also necessary to secure other fundamental rights and interests. Access to employment, education, voting, health care, and most other public and private interests is greatly diminished, if not eliminated, when stable, suitable housing is unavailable. For Encarnacion and Farias, this interest was threatened by the existence of the public record. The trial court weighed the evidence presented and found that Mr. Encarnacion and Ms. Farias have already attempted to obtain rental housing and were denied by reason of this [unlawful detainer] action having been filed against them, and [that they] have good reason to expect that other rental applications will also be rejected so long as the record of this unlawful detainer suit remains available through SCOMIS [Superior Court Management Information System]. CP at 730. Further, the trial judge established that Mr. Encarnacion and Ms. Farias currently live in a home that is not suitable for their needs and is facing a bank foreclosure, and [they] have a good faith expectation that they will need to change residences in the near future. Id. To the trial court, this is a compelling circumstance that requires sealing 8 Hundtofte v. Encarnacion, No. 88036-1 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) or redaction. Id. (citing GR 15(c)(2)(F)). My colleagues who signed the lead opinion believe that no reasonable person would so conclude. They are wrong. It is the majority's reasoning that fails. The majority found that because Encarnacion and Farias do not have any [rental] applications pending, they have failed to show a serious and imminent threat to their interest.'' Lead opinion at 9. The lead opinion adds that they found housing elsewhere ... thus, it is not impossible for them to obtain housing. Lead opinion at 10. The implication ofthis sentiment is perhaps even more alarming than the blatant disregard of our limits under abuse of discretion review. If an unsuitable and unstable housing situation and a prior rejection of a housing application as a result of the SCOMIS record is insufficient to establish their compelling interest in housing, it seems that Encarnacion and Farias could satisfy the justices of the lead opinion only if they and their children were, in fact, homeless. And while the lead opinion finds that [p]ure speculation about the future inability to obtain housing in a desired location is not a serious and imminent threat to a compelling interest, lead opinion at 10, it has, without any evidence or factual basis, suggested that the threat of future rejection is not imminent because Encarnacion and Farias can explain that the unlawful detainer was wrongfully filed and can provide a favorable reference from their previous landlords, id. Not only does the record contradict both of these assertions and establish Encarnacion and Farias's compelling interest in suitable, stable housing, but the lead opinion also overstates the public's interest in having access to these court records. 9 Hundto.fie v. Encarnacion, No. 88036-1 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) The lead opinion is correct that the public has an interest in the open administration of justice and that [ o]ur open courts jurisprudence has always stressed the importance of transparency and access to court records. Lead opinion at 11-12. But, this right is not absolute. And so the trial court could reasonably conclude that the public's interest is not diminished by the redaction of Encarnacion's and Farias's full names from the case caption because doing so will not materially impair members of the public from utilizing the records of this action for ... public purposes, such as evaluating the Court's performance or conducting financial audits on court records, particularly as the Defendants' names will remain on other court documents within the case file. CP at 730-31. After all, it is important to remember just how measured and narrowly tailored the ordered redaction is here. The redaction concerns only the case name and lasts no longer than necessary to prevent harm to Encarnacion and Farias's interest. Finally, that [p]roperty owners in this state have an interest in being able to discover unlawful detainer actions that settle, lead opinion at 12, is not commensurate with the public's interest guaranteed by article I, section 10. We need not balance the private business interests of landlords against the privacy interest of Encarnacion and Farias as part of the Ishikawa analysis. But, even if we did, the privacy interest prevails. Though I respect the lead opinion's desire to protect the public's interest in the open administration of justice, the level of review and reasoning applied by the lead 10 Hundto.fte v. Encarnacion, No. 88036-1 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) opinion threatens to make the command contained in article I, section ·1 0 absolute at the expense of compelling private interests. This is not a wise direction to take settled law. Because we must give the trial court due deference and because Encarnacion and Farias's interest in suitable, stable housing far outweighs the public's interest in immediately accessing a record that should have never·been created, I respectfully dissent. 11 Hundtofte v. Encarnacion, No. 88036-1 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) 12 Hundto.fte, et al. v. Encarnacion, et al. No. 88036-1 STEPHENS, J. (concurring in dissent)-This case presents valid, competing concerns. The public has an interest in open court proceedings and records. Ignacio Encarnacion and Norma Karla Farias have an interest in obtaining housing without having their status as defendants in a dismissed unlawful detainer action used against them. While most of the attention in this case has focused on comparing these concerns, of equal concern to me is whether we should entertain the merits of an appeal brought by a court clerk who disagrees with a judge's order under GR 15. By quickly stepping over this issue to address the merits of the action taken by the trial court, I believe we set a dangerous precedent. I would dismiss this appeal on the ground that the court clerk lacks standing to appeal and concur in that portion of