Opinion ID: 3175087
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Other Bad Acts Evidence under W.R.E. 404(b)

Text: [¶127] Wyoming has a well-developed process for determining the admissibility of other bad acts evidence under Wyoming Rule of Evidence 404(b): (b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. – Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 41 preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. [¶128] When a defendant files a pretrial demand for notice from the State of its intent to introduce evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), the demand is treated as a timely objection to the introduction of the evidence. Howard v. State, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 23, 42 P.3d 483, 491 (Wyo. 2002). Prior misconduct evidence carries an inherent danger for prejudice; consequently, we require district courts to follow a mandatory procedure for testing its admissibility: (1) the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be relevant; (3) the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) upon request, the trial court must instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted. Vigil, 926 P.2d at 357 (quoting United States v. Herndon, 982 F.2d 1411, 1414 (10th Cir.1992)). Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d 332, 340 (Wyo. 2002). The Gleason/Vigil test is intended to be conducted by the trial court; consequently, we do not apply it de novo on appeal. Our role is to determine whether admission of the evidence was error. Hodge v. State, 2015 WY 103, ¶ 8, 355 P.3d 368, 370 (Wyo. 2015). [¶129] We review the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. “A trial court abuses its discretion when it could not have reasonably concluded as it did.” Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 8, 150 P.3d 1202, 1206–07 (Wyo. 2007). Under that standard, “as long as there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court’s ruling, that ruling will not be disturbed on appeal.” Cardenas, 2014 WY 92, ¶ 7, 330 P.3d 808, 810 (Wyo. 2014), quoting Gonzalez–Ochoa v. State, 2014 WY 14, ¶ 11, 317 P.3d 599, 603 (Wyo. 2014) (other citations omitted). [¶130] The State filed notice that it intended to introduce several of Mr. Griggs’ prior bad acts at trial. The district court held a Gleason hearing and ruled evidence about Mr. Grigg’s prior conviction for attempted second degree sexual assault of a minor was admissible under W.R.E. 404(b). At trial, a former DCI agent testified that, in 2003, he posed in an on-line chat room as a mother who was willing to “share” her two daughters, 42 ages seven and ten, for sexual acts. Mr. Griggs contacted the detective and they made arrangements to meet so he could have sex with the two young girls. He specifically described the sexual acts he wanted to perform on the two girls. Mr. Griggs traveled from Rock Springs to Cheyenne, where law enforcement arrested him. [¶131] The district court admitted the evidence of Mr. Griggs’ prior bad act for the purpose of showing his motive to sexually abuse children. He does not contest that aspect of the district court’s decision and our precedent supports use of such evidence for that purpose. See, e.g., Gleason, supra; Snyder v. State, 2015 WY 91, ¶ 15, 353 P.3d 693, 695-96 (Wyo. 2015); Brower v. State, 1 P.3d 1210, 1214 (Wyo. 2000). Mr. Griggs’ argument on appeal focuses on the prejudicial effect of the evidence of his prior conviction. One of the elements of our mandatory test is “the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.” Gleason, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d at 340. In Gleason, we required trial courts to consider specific factors when balancing probative value versus unfair prejudice. In determining the probative value of prior bad acts evidence, the trial court should consider the following factors:
prior bad act? 2. Does the defendant dispute the issue on which the state is offering the prior bad acts evidence? 3. Is other evidence available? 4. Is the evidence unnecessarily cumulative? 5. How much time has elapsed between the charged crime and the prior bad act? . . .The trial court should [then] weigh [the following] factors against the probative value of the evidence: 1. The reprehensible nature of the prior bad act. The more reprehensible the act, the more likely the jury will be tempted to punish the defendant for the prior act. 2. The sympathetic character of the alleged victim of the prior bad act. Again, the jury will be tempted to punish the defendant for the prior act if the victim was especially vulnerable. 3. The similarity between the charged crime and the prior bad act. The more similar the acts, the greater is the 43 likelihood that the jury will draw the improper inference that if the defendant did it once, he probably did it again. 4. The comparative enormity of the charged crime and the prior bad act. When the prior act is a more serious offense than the charged crime, the introduction of that act will tend to place the defendant in a different and unfavorable light. 5. The comparable relevance of the prior bad act to the proper and forbidden inferences. Evidence of the prior bad act may be much more probative of bad character than it is of any legitimate inference permitted by Rule 404(b). 6. Whether the prior act resulted in a conviction. The jury may be tempted to punish the defendant if they believe he escaped punishment for the prior bad act. Id. at ¶ 27, 57 P.3d at 342–43. The trial court is not required to make express findings on each factor; however, it must provide an adequate record for this Court’s review. Id. at ¶ 28, 57 P.3d at 343. [¶132] The district court in the case at bar did a full Gleason analysis, including scrutinizing the factors for comparing the probative value and the prejudicial effect of the evidence. It concluded that, while prejudicial, the probative value of the evidence—to show Mr. Griggs’ motive to have sex with young girls—outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice. Mr. Griggs does not point out any specific error in the district court’s analysis. Instead, he focuses on the prosecutor’s use of the prior conviction evidence in her rebuttal closing argument. In order to fully understand Mr. Grigg’s argument, we need to provide some context. Prior to the closing arguments, the district court specifically instructed the jury regarding the prior bad acts evidence in Instruction No. 14: You heard a certain category of evidence called “other acts evidence.” In this case, the evidence was that in 2003, the [D]efendant was investigated for and pleaded guilty to the charge of attempted sexual assault in the second degree. You may not convict a person simply because you believe he committed other acts in the past. The Defendant is on trial only for the crimes charged, and you may consider the evidence of prior acts only on the issue of motive. [¶133] After defense counsel finished his closing argument, the prosecutor indicated that she wanted to use a power point presentation in her rebuttal argument. Defense counsel objected and expressed concern about the State bringing up the evidence of the 2003 conviction when it was not mentioned in either of the parties’ initial closing arguments. 44 The prosecutor stated that she intended to discuss the evidence in rebuttal because defense counsel had opened the door. The district court reviewed the transcript and found two instances where defense counsel mentioned Mr. Grigg’s lack of motive to abuse children. Consequently, the district court ruled that the State could discuss the 2003 conviction in rebuttal but stated that defense counsel could address the jury on the matter. [¶134] Prior to the State’s rebuttal argument, defense counsel was allowed to reopen his closing argument to address the prior bad acts evidence. He explained to the jury that Mr. Griggs was only eighteen years old at the time of the prior bad act and that it had occurred nearly ten years before. Defense counsel reminded the jury it could not convict Mr. Griggs of the current charges simply because he had committed the earlier crime and the evidence of the earlier conviction could only be used for the purpose of showing motive. [¶135] The prosecutor then addressed the 2003 conviction in her rebuttal argument as follows: I want to talk to you about motive. [Defense counsel] was talking to you about the 2003 case. Byron Griggs had motive. I will agree with [defense counsel], we cannot use the 2003 evidence to prove that it – Mr. Griggs did something similar in 2003, it proves that he did it this time. That’s not what the State is using the evidence for. What we are using it for is to show what Mr. Griggs’ motive is. To show you, there is evidence, in addition to what the children have told you, why would Mr. Griggs do this? This is his motive. This is actually what he has told you from the 2003 chat, what [the DCI agent] was talking about. The prosecutor went on to describe Mr. Griggs statements in the chat, which included that he wanted to have various types of sex with “little preteen girls.” [¶136] Although Mr. Griggs argues the evidence was very prejudicial, he does not challenge the district court’s findings on the various Gleason factors. He also does not argue specifically that the district court erred by allowing the State to discuss the 2003 conviction in its rebuttal closing argument. He simply claims the State’s argument prejudiced him because the jury may have used the 404(b) evidence improperly. Given the district court instructed the jury on the proper use of the evidence, gave Mr. Griggs the opportunity to specifically address the evidence prior to the State’s rebuttal, both defense counsel and the prosecutor emphasized the proper use of the evidence, and 45 defense counsel specifically referred the jury to Instruction No. 14 which warned against using the evidence improperly, Mr. Griggs has failed to show any error under W.R.E. 404(b). [¶137] Affirmed. 46