Opinion ID: 2595305
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Verdict And Shinyama's Appeal

Text: On March 29, 2000, the jury returned a guilty verdict as to the charged offense. On June 6, 2000, the circuit court sentenced Shinyama as a repeat offender to an indeterminate five-year term of imprisonment, subject to a mandatory minimum term of one year and eight months. On July 3, 2000, newly-appointed defense counsel filed an ex parte motion to extend the time within which to file a notice of appeal, on the basis that Shinyama was not sure whether he wanted to pursue an appeal of his conviction and sentence; the circuit court granted defense counsel's motion and extended the time within which to file a notice of appeal from July 6, 2000 to August 7, 2000. On August 16, 2000, defense counsel filed a second ex parte motion to extend the time within which to file a notice of appeal, on the basis that, in the interim, Shinyama had been transferred from the Maui Community Correctional Center to the Halawa Correctional Facility on O'ahu and, due to a miscommunication, Shinyama's case file had not been sent to the O'ahu Office of the Public Defender in time to file a timely notice of appeal. The circuit court granted defense counsel's second ex parte motion, and, on August 17, 2000, Shinyama filed a notice of appeal. [6] On appeal, Shinyama asserted, inter alia, that the circuit court plainly erred in instructing the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proving that Shinyama acted either intentionally or knowingly with respect to the valuation element of the offense of second degree theft by shoplifting. Specifically, Shinyama argued (1) that, based on this court's decision in Cabrera and the plain language of the intent-to-defraud component of theft by shoplifting, as set forth in HRS § 708-830(8)(a), see supra note 1, intentionally was the only state of mind applicable to the elements of the charged offense and (2) that, therefore, the circuit court erred in instructing the jury that it could find that Shinyama acted either intentionally or knowingly as to the valuation element of second degree theft by shoplifting. Shinyama also argued (3) that the circuit court plainly erred in failing separately to instruct the jury that, in addition to the valuation element set forth in HRS § 708-831(1)(b), see supra note 2, the language any store or retail establishment, set forth in HRS § 708-830(8)(a), describes a circumstance attendant to the charged conduct and (4) that the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Shinyama acted intentionally with respect to concealing or taking possession of the display case of jewelry from any store or retail establishment. The prosecution countered that HRS § 708-800, see supra note 3, prescribes alternative states of mind applicable to the intent-to-defraud component of theft by shoplifting and that the particular state of mind applicable in any given case turns on the factual circumstances of the particular case. With respect to the present matter, the prosecution argued that, inasmuch as there was no evidence adduced at trial that Shinyama utilized deception in taking the display case of jewelry, the knowing state of mind set forth in subsection (2) of the definition of intent to defraud, see HRS § 708-800, supra at note 3, applied to each of the elements of the charged offense. In other words, the prosecution contended that the intent-to-defraud component, as applied to the present facts, was [k]nowledge by the defendant that the defendant is facilitating an injury to another's interest which has value. The prosecution further assertedcontrary to Shinyama's position that, for purposes of HRS § 708-830(8)(a), any store or retail establishment constituted a distinct circumstance attendant to the charged conductthat the circuit court had permissibly incorporated the construct into its instruction regarding the conduct element of the offense i.e., the concealment or taking possession of the goods or merchandise of any store or retail establishment. The ICA, relying solely on this court's decision in Cabrera, vacated the circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that the circuit court had plainly erred (1) in instructing the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Shinyama acted intentionally or knowingly  with respect to the valuation element of the offense of second degree theft by shoplifting and (2) in failing separately to instruct the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proving that Shinyama acted intentionally with respect to the attendant circumstance element that required the goods or merchandise to be taken from any store or retail establishment. ICA's decision at 2 (emphasis in original). Moreover, the ICA tersely rejected the prosecution's argument regarding the alternative states of mind applicable to the intent-to-defraud component of second degree theft by shoplifting, set forth in HRS § 708-800, opining that it was bound by the supreme court's decision in State v. Cabrera .  ICA's decision at 3 n. 4. We granted the prosecution's timely application for a writ of certiorari.