Opinion ID: 1296917
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: remedial analysis

Text: Having determined that defendants violated the WCP in enacting the 2001 legislative redistricting plans, we must next consider the practical consequences of our holding and address any required remedial measures. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the power of the judiciary of a State to require valid reapportionment or to formulate a valid redistricting plan. Scott, 381 U.S. at 409, 85 S.Ct. 1525, 1526, 14 L.Ed.2d at 478. Indeed, both [r]eason and experience argue that courts empowered to invalidate an apportionment statute which transgresses constitutional mandates cannot be left without the means to order appropriate relief. Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829 S.W.2d 712, 718 (Tex.1991); see also Brooks v. Hobbie, 631 So.2d 883, 887-90 (Ala.1993). Plaintiffs contend that remedial compliance with the WCP requires the formation of multi-member legislative districts in which all legislators would be elected at-large. For instance, plaintiffs' suggested five percent whole-county plan for the North Carolina House would require, within Mecklenburg and Gaston Counties, the creation of a single multi-member House district having a contingent of ten Representatives along with the creation of three submerged single-member VRA districts. For the following reasons, we reject plaintiffs' proposed remedy. It is clear, as a practical matter in view of federal law, that application of the WCP in a strictly mechanical fashion would be inconsistent with other provisions of federal law and the State Constitution. Specifically, the WCP cannot be applied in isolation or in a manner that fails to comport with other requirements of the State Constitution. Consequently, as we reject plaintiffs' proposed remedy in the instant case, we recognize we cannot abdicate our duty of redressing the demonstrated constitutional violation which occurred in the present case. See generally Scott, 381 U.S. at 409, 85 S.Ct. 1525, 1527, 14 L.Ed.2d at 478. Although the United States Supreme Court has held that multi-member districts are not per se invalid under the federal Equal Protection Clause, Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 142, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 29 L.Ed.2d 363, 375 (1971), the Court has nonetheless instructed federal district courts to avoid the creation of multi-member districts in the remedial stage of an apportionment dispute, Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692, 91 S.Ct. 1760, 1762, 29 L.Ed.2d 268, 270-71 (1971). The Court has observed that ballots containing multi-member districts tend to become unwieldy, confusing, and too lengthy to allow thoughtful consideration. [5] Chapman, 420 U.S. at 15, 95 S.Ct. 751, 760, 42 L.Ed.2d at 778. The Court has also recognized that multi-member districts may well operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439, 85 S.Ct. 498, 501, 13 L.Ed.2d 401, 405 (1965), quoted in Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47, 106 S.Ct. at 2765, 92 L.Ed.2d at 44. Amicus asserts that the voting strength of minority voters will be unlawfully diluted by application of the WCP in a manner which permits the creation of multi-member legislative districts containing predominately nonminority voters adjacent to single-member VRA districts. At a minimum, by asserting this argument, amicus challenges the legal propriety of multi-member districts within North Carolina legislative redistricting plans. Accordingly, we turn to address the constitutional propriety of such districts, in the public interest, in order to effect a comprehensive remedy to the constitutional violation which occurred in the instant case. Article I, Section 19 of the State Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that [n]o person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. We observe, as amicus alleges, that voters in single-member legislative districts, surrounded by multi-member districts, suffer electoral disadvantage because, at a minimum, they are not permitted to vote for the same number of legislators and may not enjoy the same representational influence or clout as voters represented by a slate of legislators within a multi-member district. Conversely, voters in multi-member districts invariably suffer the adverse consequences described by the United States Supreme Court: unwieldy, confusing, and unreasonably lengthy ballots; and minimization of minority voting strength. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2765, 92 L.Ed.2d at 44; Chapman, 420 U.S. at 15, 95 S.Ct. 751, 760, 42 L.Ed.2d at 778; see also Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439, 85 S.Ct. 498, 501, 13 L.Ed.2d at 405. The Equal Protection Clause of Article I, Section 19 of the State Constitution prohibits the State from denying any person the equal protection of the laws. Before embarking upon an equal protection analysis, we must first determine the level of scrutiny to apply. Department of Transp. v. Rowe, 353 N.C. 671, 675, 549 S.E.2d 203, 207 (2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1070, 151 L.Ed.2d 972 (2002). Strict scrutiny, this Court's highest tier of review, applies when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class. White, 308 N.C. at 766, 304 S.E.2d at 204; see also Texfi Indus., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 11, 269 S.E.2d 142, 149 (1980). Under strict scrutiny, a challenged governmental action is unconstitutional if the State cannot establish that it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest. Northampton Cty. Drainage Dist. No. One v. Bailey, 326 N.C. 742, 746, 392 S.E.2d 352, 355 (1990). It is well settled in this State that the right to vote on equal terms is a fundamental right. Id. at 747, 392 S.E.2d at 356; see also Preston, 325 N.C. at 454, 385 S.E.2d at 481; Texfi Indus., Inc., 301 N.C. at 12, 269 S.E.2d at 149. The classification of voters into both single-member and multi-member districts within plaintiffs' proposed remedial plans necessarily implicates the fundamental right to vote on equal terms, and thus strict scrutiny is the applicable standard. In applying such standard, we note, for instance, that under plaintiffs' proposed five percent House Plan, voters in multi-member District 36 (Buncombe, McDowell, and Burke Counties) may vote for a contingent of five Representatives, while voters in neighboring District 38 (Haywood and Swain Counties) elect only one Representative. Likewise, in plaintiffs' proposed five percent Senate Plan, multi-member District 13 (Caswell, Rockingham, Guilford, Randolph, Davidson, and Forsyth Counties) voters elect a contingent of five Senators, while in neighboring District 19 (Rowan and Davie Counties), voters elect only one Senator. These classifications, as used within plaintiffs' proposed remedial plans, create an impermissible distinction among similarly situated citizens based upon the population density of the area in which they reside. In this context, we examine the provisions of Article II, Sections 3(1) and 5(1) of the State Constitution to determine whether the use of both single-member and multi-member districts within the same redistricting plan violates the Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution. See N.C. Const. art. I, § 19. We recognize that a constitution cannot be in violation of itself, Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 352, 488 S.E.2d 249, 258 (1997), and that all constitutional provisions must be read in pari materia, In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 159, 250 S.E.2d 890, 919 (1978) (citing Williamson v. City of High Point, 213 N.C. 96, 103, 195 S.E. 90, 94 (1938), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 99 S.Ct. 2859, 61 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979), and Parvin v. Board of Comm'rs of Beaufort Cty., 177 N.C. 508, 511, 99 S.E. 432, 434 (1919)). These rules of construction require us to construe Article II, Sections 3(1) and 5(1) in conjunction with Article I, Section 19 in such a manner as to avoid internal textual conflict. Article II, Sections 3(1) and 5(1) begin by stating that [e]ach Senator [or Representative] shall represent, as nearly as may be, an equal number of inhabitants. These words embody the principle of one-person, one-vote. The proviso that follows in each section adds the number of inhabitants that each Senator [or Representative] represents being determined for this purpose by dividing the population of the district that he [or she] represents by the number of Senators [or Representatives] apportioned to that district. These provisos arguably contemplate multi-member districts by stating that, for apportionment purposes, each member of the General Assembly from such a district represents a fraction of the voters in that district. The principle of one-person, one-vote is preserved because the number of voters in each member's fraction of the multi-member district is the same as the number of voters in a single-member district. However, in practice, these theoretical divisions within such districts do not work because every Representative or Senator from such a district represents and is supported by every resident in the district, not just those voters making up the fraction of the district comprising the theoretical constituency. Members do not divide the population of the district that he [or she] represents to determine their true constituency. As a consequence, those living in such districts may call upon a contingent of responsive Senators and Representatives to press their interests, while those in a single-member district may rely upon only one Senator or Representative. Thus, although the people have mandated in their Constitution that all North Carolinians enjoy substantially equal voting power, Northampton Cty. Drainage Dist. No. One, 326 N.C. at 746, 392 S.E.2d at 355, the same Constitution contains language which appears to deny voters in single-member districts their right to substantially equal legislative representation. Accordingly, and consistent with the analysis found elsewhere in this opinion, we hold that the language quoted above purporting to allow multi-member districts is effective only within a limited context. We conclude that, while instructive as to how multi-member districts may be used compatibly with one-person, one-vote principles, Article II, Sections 3(1) and 5(1) are not affirmative constitutional mandates and do not authorize use of both single-member and multi-member districts in a manner violative of the fundamental right of each North Carolinian to substantially equal voting power. The proposition that use of both single-member and multi-member districts within the same redistricting plan violates equal protection principles is not novel. In Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 258 Iowa 1121, 142 N.W.2d 355, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 851, 87 S.Ct. 79, 17 L.Ed.2d 80 (1966), the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that legislative redistricting schemes, in which there were multi-member districts and single-member districts in the same house plan, unconstitutionally impaired the rights of residents within single-member districts. The Court observed the following example from the apportionment scheme at issue there: The resident of Warren County can vote for 1/61 of the senate and 1/124 of the house. The resident of Polk County can vote for 1/12 of the senate and 1/11 of the house. Id. at 1147, 142 N.W.2d at 370. The Court concluded that the mere statement of this example disclose[d] the basic unfairness, inequality and lack of uniformity inherent in such a scheme of legislative apportionment and stated: Equal voting power for all citizens is the goal. Proposed legislation requires a majority vote of the members of each house to become a law. It is a political reality that legislators are much more inclined to listen to and support a constituent than an outsider with the same problem. It is equally basic that much legislative work is done by committees and there is a distinct advantage in having one's own representative sitting as a member of a committee considering legislation in which one has an interest.... Particularly in personal interest legislation the resident of [the multi-member district] has an unfair and unequal advantage over the resident of ... any other single-member district. He has a much greater opportunity to find legislators to espouse his cause and a much greater chance that one or more of his representatives will be on the committee to which his legislation is assigned. His voting power is much greater. Id. at 1147-48, 142 N.W.2d at 370-71 (emphasis added). The Iowa Supreme Court concluded that any legislative apportionment scheme containing both multi-member and single-member legislative districts unlawfully impaired the right of a resident within a single-member district under both the Iowa Constitution and the Constitution of the United States. Id. at 1148, 1156, 142 N.W.2d at 371, 375. The Iowa Supreme Court qualified its holding by stating that, to the extent a rational plan of apportionment could not be achieved by using all single-member districts, the possibility existed that use of some multi-member districts could be constitutionally permissible. Id. In our view, use of both single-member and multi-member districts within the same redistricting plan violates the Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution [6] unless it is established that inclusion of multi-member districts advances a compelling state interest. Therefore, the trial court is directed on remand to afford the opportunity to establish, at an evidentiary hearing, that the use of such districts advances a compelling state interest within the context of a specific, proposed remedial plan. [7] With respect to redistricting plans, undoubtedly, federal law impacts the functional application of the WCP but does not, as suggested by defendants, totally void it. To accept defendants' logic would necessarily imply that any time Congress enacted a law which even superficially touched upon an area of primary state responsibility, all related state provisions within the challenged area of state jurisprudence would be immediately and entirely nullified. Such a presumption reflects a misunderstanding of federal preemption analysis. As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno and by the USDOJ in its previous correspondence and administrative regulations, operation of federal law does not preclude states from recognizing traditional political subdivisions when drawing their legislative districts. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2827, 125 L.Ed.2d at 528; see also 66 Fed.Reg. 5413; Growe, 507 U.S. at 34, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 1081, 122 L.Ed.2d at 400; 1981 USDOJ letter. Although we discern no congressional intent, either express or implied, to preempt the WCP through the operation of the VRA, we also recognize that the WCP may not be interpreted literally because of the VRA and one-person, one-vote principles. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683, 689, 93 L.Ed.2d at 623; 1981 USDOJ letter. Federal law, therefore, preempts the State Constitution only to the extent that the WCP actually conflicts with the VRA and other federal requirements relating to state legislative redistricting and reapportionment. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683, 689, 93 L.Ed.2d at 623. It remains possible, therefore, to comply with both the VRA and the WCP as reconciled with other provisions of state law. See Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 142, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217, 10 L.Ed.2d at 256-57. Our interpretation of the WCP does not create a conflict with the VRA, nor does it frustrate the objectives and purposes of federal law. See id. Accordingly, the contention that the WCP is wholly unenforceable as a matter of federal preemption analysis is untenable. In addition to our obligation to ensure that the WCP complies with federal law, it must also be reconciled with other legal requirements of the State Constitution. In this respect, an application of the WCP that abrogates the equal right to vote, a fundamental right under the State Constitution, must be avoided in order to uphold the principles of substantially equal voting power and substantially equal legislative representation arising from that same Constitution. Without question, the intent of the WCP is to limit the General Assembly's ability to draw legislative districts without according county lines a reasonable measure of respect. Prior to the imposition of one-person, one-vote and VRA requirements, implementation of the provision was simple and straightforward. However, despite the advent of the VRA and one-person, one-vote principles, we are not permitted to construe the WCP mandate as now being in some fashion unmanageable, or to limit its application to only a handful of counties. Any attempt to do so would be an abrogation of the Court's duty to follow a reasonable, workable, and effective interpretation that maintains the people's express wishes to contain legislative district boundaries within county lines whenever possible. As we stated in State ex rel Martin v. Preston , Progress demands that government should be further refined in order to best respond to changing conditions. Several provisions of our Constitution provide the elasticity which ensures the responsive operation of government. Preston, 325 N.C. at 458, 385 S.E.2d at 484. To accomplish this task, we accept the obvious: that in the absence of large multi-member districts, the ability to substantially preserve external county boundaries while complying with the VRA, one-person, one-vote, and State equal protection requirements, would be impossible without the ability to draw single-member districts within counties or aggregated groups of counties. As a result, the WCP is interpreted consistent with federal law and reconciled with equal protection requirements under the State Constitution by requiring the formation of single-member districts in North Carolina legislative redistricting plans. The boundaries of such single-member districts, however, may not cross county lines except as outlined below. Consistent with the legal analysis set forth above, we direct the trial court, during the remedial stage of the instant proceeding, to ensure that redistricting plans for the North Carolina Senate and North Carolina House of Representatives comply with the following requirements. On remand, to ensure full compliance with federal law, legislative districts required by the VRA shall be formed prior to creation of non-VRA districts. The USDOJ precleared the 2001 legislative redistricting plans, and the VRA districts contained therein, on 11 February 2002. This administrative determination signified that, in the opinion of the USDOJ, the 2001 legislative redistricting plans had no retrogressive effect upon minority voters. In the formation of VRA districts within the revised redistricting plans on remand, we likewise direct the trial court to ensure that VRA districts are formed consistent with federal law and in a manner having no retrogressive effect upon minority voters. To the maximum extent practicable, such VRA districts shall also comply with the legal requirements of the WCP, as herein established for all redistricting plans and districts throughout the State. In forming new legislative districts, any deviation from the ideal population for a legislative district shall be at or within plus or minus five percent for purposes of compliance with federal one-person, one-vote requirements. In counties having a 2000 census population sufficient to support the formation of one non-VRA legislative district falling at or within plus or minus five percent deviation from the ideal population consistent with one-person, one-vote requirements, the WCP requires that the physical boundaries of any such non-VRA legislative district not cross or traverse the exterior geographic line of any such county. When two or more non-VRA legislative districts may be created within a single county, which districts fall at or within plus or minus five percent deviation from the ideal population consistent with one-person, one-vote requirements, single-member non-VRA districts shall be formed within said county. Such non-VRA districts shall be compact and shall not traverse the exterior geographic boundary of any such county. In counties having a non-VRA population pool which cannot support at least one legislative district at or within plus or minus five percent of the ideal population for a legislative district or, alternatively, counties having a non-VRA population pool which, if divided into districts, would not comply with the at or within plus or minus five percent one-person, one-vote standard, the requirements of the WCP are met by combining or grouping the minimum number of whole, contiguous counties necessary to comply with the at or within plus or minus five percent one-person, one-vote standard. Within any such contiguous multi-county grouping, compact districts shall be formed, consistent with the at or within plus or minus five percent standard, whose boundary lines do not cross or traverse the exterior line of the multi-county grouping; provided, however, that the resulting interior county lines created by any such groupings may be crossed or traversed in the creation of districts within said multi-county grouping but only to the extent necessary to comply with the at or within plus or minus five percent one-person, one-vote standard. The intent underlying the WCP must be enforced to the maximum extent possible; thus, only the smallest number of counties necessary to comply with the at or within plus or minus five percent one-person, one-vote standard shall be combined, and communities of interest should be considered in the formation of compact and contiguous electoral districts. Because multi-member legislative districts, at least when used in conjunction with single-member legislative districts in the same redistricting plan, are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution, multi-member districts shall not be used in the formation of legislative districts unless it is established that such districts are necessary to advance a compelling governmental interest. Finally, we direct that any new redistricting plans, including any proposed on remand in this case, shall depart from strict compliance with the legal requirements set forth herein only to the extent necessary to comply with federal law. This Court has verified independently that the above requirements of the State Constitution, including the WCP and the Equal Protection Clause, can in fact be reconciled and applied in a manner consistent therewith, as well as with federal requirements, including the VRA and one-person, one-vote principles. This verification was achieved through use of a software program which is used by the General Assembly during the redistricting process and which the General Assembly makes generally available to members of the public. The General Assembly optimally should be afforded the first opportunity to enact new redistricting plans for the North Carolina Senate and North Carolina House of Representatives based on the 2000 census and the constitutional requirements which we have upheld in this opinion. Defendants have represented, however, that there is insufficient time for the General Assembly to enact new plans for use in the 2002 election cycle. Accordingly, we direct the trial court to conduct a hearing, on an expedited basis, on the question of the feasibility of allowing the General Assembly the first opportunity to develop new redistricting plans. The General Assembly should be accorded the first opportunity to draw the new plans if so doing will not disrupt the timing of the 2002 general election. In the event defendants are unable to demonstrate that the General Assembly is able to develop new redistricting plans in accordance with the timetable established by the trial court, the trial court is authorized and directed to seek proposed remedial plans, [8] review and adopt temporary or interim remedial plans for the North Carolina Senate and North Carolina House of Representatives, and seek preclearance thereof, for use in the 2002 election cycle. [9] Based upon our thorough review of the extensive materials filed in this Court in this case, we believe that the people's insertion of a whole-county requirement within their Constitution was not an historical accident. Rather, we believe that this provision was inserted by the people of North Carolina as an objective limitation upon the authority of incumbent legislators to redistrict and reapportion in a manner inconsistent with the importance that North Carolinians traditionally have placed upon their respective county units in terms of their relationship to State government. Enforcement of the WCP will, in all likelihood, foster improved voter morale, voter turnout, and public respect for State government, and specifically, the General Assembly as an institution; will assist election officials in conducting elections at lower cost to the taxpayers of this State; and will instill a renewed sense of community and regional cooperation within the respective countywide or regionally formed legislative delegations mandated by the WCP. For instance, there will again be countywide delegations and, in rural areas, contiguous multi-county delegations in the General Assembly, which, in working with legislative delegations from other regions of the State, can more effectively work together in a positive manner on matters of mutual concern to citizens of our State. Accordingly, the orders of the trial court below are affirmed as modified, [10] the stay issued by this Court is lifted, and the trial court is authorized to enter such further orders as necessary to implement our holdings in this opinion. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. Pursuant to Rule 32 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, the mandate of this opinion is expedited and shall issue at 12:00 o'clock noon on 3 May 2002.