Opinion ID: 659996
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: damages for providing a sham defense after april, 1985

Text: 19 The district court also erred in granting Allstate's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Harvey's claim that Allstate provided a sham defense after April, 1985. A JNOV is appropriate only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible of no reasonable inferences supporting the party for whom the jury found. Royal College Shop v. North Insurance Co. of N.Y., 895 F.2d 670 (10th Cir.1990). Courts must construe the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, Meyers v. Ideal Basic Industries, 940 F.2d 1379, 1383 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 935 (1991), and should not grant the motion unless the evidence so conclusively favors [the moving party] that reasonable jurors could not arrive at a contrary verdict. Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co, 861 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir.1988). 20 Allstate has not met these stringent requirements. There was ample evidence to support a finding that Allstate acted in bad faith in defending Harvey after April, 1985. Evidence presented at trial showed that Allstate hired an attorney who had no intention of jeopardizing his continuing employment with Allstate. Moreover, this lawyer worked on the coverage issue while he was supposedly defending Harvey, did not even enter an appearance for two months after he was retained, never met his client and did not attend any depositions despite Harvey's lawyer's requests for help. The jury could well have concluded, on the basis of this evidence, that Allstate acted in bad faith in hiring a lawyer who would help them avoid liability rather than a lawyer who would provide an adequate defense, and breached its fiduciary duty to defend Harvey by enlisting this lawyer's help in contesting coverage. 21 The district court justified its contrary conclusion by noting that Harvey presented no expert testimony and did not prove she was dissatisfied with the settlement of the case. Neither of these facts justify a JNOV in favor of Allstate. 22 Expert testimony is not necessary where the breach of duty ... is so clear and so obvious that the trier of fact may find a deviation from the appropriate standard ... from its common knowledge. Bowman v. Doherty, 686 P.2d 112, 120 (1984). Harvey was not asserting a malpractice claim and did not need to prove that McMaster violated professional norms by failing to attend depositions or meet his client. Rather, Harvey was arguing that Allstate did not fulfill its fiduciary duty to provide her with an adequate defense. Whether an insurance company exercised due care or acted in bad faith are matters are within a jury's common knowledge. 23 Harvey also did not have to prove that Allstate's failure to provide her with an adequate defense necessarily prejudiced the outcome. Harvey could have obtained a satisfactory defense by enlisting Egan's help and by attending depositions herself. Allstate's efforts may nonetheless have been inadequate. They never paid Egan for any of her efforts, even during the time when McMaster was getting up to speed on the case, and they did not compensate Harvey for the time she spent working on the case. The district court erred in concluding that Harvey could not be satisfied with her settlement and still have received an inadequate defense from Allstate.