Opinion ID: 483628
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Private Attorneys' General Theory

Text: 31 The primary legislative purpose underlying the Clayton Act was to make private attorneys general out of the private parties who sought damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 2074, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977). Therefore, [t]he existence of an identifiable class of persons whose self interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement diminishes the justification for allowing a more remote party such as the [plaintiffs] to perform the office of a private attorney general. Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 542, 103 S.Ct. at 910. We find that the vessel owners are such an identifiable class with the requisite motivation to vindicate the public interest. 2 The justification for allowing the crewmembers and the union to bring the action is thereby diminished because they are more remote parties. 32 But Sec. 4 has another purpose in addition to deterring violators and depriving them of 'fruits of their illegality' [citation omitted]; it is also designed to compensate victims of antitrust violations for their injuries. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746, 97 S.Ct. at 2075. The class members contend that this purpose would be fulfilled if they were allowed to bring suit. However, this purpose will also be achieved by allowing the more directly injured party, the vessel owners, to bring suit. Denying the class members standing in this case is not likely to leave a significant antitrust violation undetected or unremedied. Lucas, 800 F.2d at 846 (quoting Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 542, 103 S.Ct. at 911).