Opinion ID: 1404080
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the inventory search exception

Text: Inventory searches made pursuant to standard police procedures have been held to be reasonable and not violative of the fourth amendment. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3100, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). In South Dakota v. Opperman the United States Supreme Court made it clear that there [was] no suggestion whatever that this standard procedure, essentially like that followed throughout the country, was a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive. 428 U.S. at 376, 96 S.Ct. at 3100. Inventory searches are not reasonable if they are employed in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372, 107 S.Ct. 738, 741, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1978). In the present case the defendant asserts that the inventory search was a pretext for an investigative search, and supports his contention with ample evidence from the record. The evidence of bad faith in conducting the inventory search begins with the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) search. After the defendant was stopped, arrested, and a cursory search of the car was made, the police requested information on the ownership of the car. A check of the registration and title showed that Victor Smith and Carl Cook had a joint ownership in the car. The VIN numbers on the registration form from the car matched those VIN numbers on the door post and above the fire wall. The officers ran a check on the car, but there was no indication from this check that the car was stolen. Tr. Vol. I, 91. Nevertheless, Officer Cain began an extensive VIN search. Officer Piche testified to Officer Cain's VIN search as follows: A. He raised the hood, he opened the air cleaner, he checked around the lower parts of the engine, face plates on anything that would be  indicate any VIN numbers or any type of serial numbers on the dash or the fire  fire panel of the car. Q. Did he tap the fenders? A. Yes, he did. Q. Do you tap fenders when you're searching for a VIN number? A. Not normally. Q. Do you open an air filter, air cleaner when you're looking for VIN numbers? A. Not normally. ... . Q. While you were present did officer Cain enter the interior of the car? A. He did enter the interior of the car... . Q. Did anyone while  did either you or Officer Cain open the trunk of this car? A. I believe Officer Cain may have. I'm not sure. Q. Is opening the trunk of a car part of a VIN search? A. Not normally. Tr. Vol. I, 82-83. A VIN is not going to be found by looking in the air cleaner, tapping the fenders or looking in the trunk. It is painfully obvious that the VIN search was a subterfuge for an investigative search. This VIN search suffices in and of itself to establish that the police were not acting in good faith when they then indulged in further searching and snooping, the purported inventory search. Conceded, an inventory search of a properly impounded vehicle is permissible. The majority states: [t]he initial decision to impound a vehicle that poses a traffic hazard or following the operator's arrest is left to the discretion of the officer involved. At 80, 813 P.2d at 891. While an officer may have some discretion in this decision, an inventory search cannot be viewed as having been reasonably conducted when the purported reasons for impounding the vehicle are wholly barren of any realistic basis. The majority naively accepts Officer Cain's reasons for impounding the defendant's vehicle, to wit, traffic safety and facilitation of an investigation for possible theft  this absurdity notwithstanding that defendant was the registered owner. However, Cain's testimony on the impoundment issue, along with that of Officer Piche, discloses that the traffic safety reason for impoundment was fabricated to justify the inventory search. The appellant's brief reviews the testimony on impoundment: The evidence regarding the reason for impoundment changed as time passed in this case. The location of the appellant's car suddenly became important to the State after it received defendant's brief in support of the motion to suppress. Officer Piche described at the Preliminary Hearing where defendant parked. He stated, A: He proceeded on U.S. 12 towards the Lewiston Hill as if he was attempting to find a place to pull over on the side of the roadway which would be out of the traffic.       Q: Did he pull over? A: Yes, he did. Transcript of Preliminary Hearing at pp. 15. (Emphasis added). There is no discussion that the car's location was a hazard. However, this suddenly changed. The State, in its brief, first argues the point of location of the vehicle. Officer Piche testified at the Motion Hearing that Mr. Smith pulled off the highway `not on the dirt. He was still on the asphalt.' Transcript Vol. 1 at p. 73. The testimony from the Preliminary Hearing was in August, just a month after the arrest. Clearly Officer Piche's memory would have been more reliable when he testified that Mr. Smith pulled `over on the side of the roadway which would be out of traffic.' This testimony would also be pure of any possible taint caused by discussion with the State's Prosecutor. Officer Cain testified that Mr. Smith stopped at an area on the highway with `no shoulder.' Transcript Vol. 1 at p. 22. This comment regarding `shoulder' of the road is inconsistent with Officer Piche's testimony. Recall that Officer Piche stated that there was not only a shoulder but that there was an extension of asphalt and dirt. Officer Cain's testimony in November of 1989 not only contradicts officer Piche's testimony, it contradicts his own August, 1989, Preliminary Hearing testimony. The State at the Preliminary Hearing asked Officer Cain where the car was located. Officer Cain stated `off on the shoulder of the road.' Transcript of Preliminary Hearing at p. 35. The point regarding the hazardous location can be further disregarded when a review of the reasons for impoundment are cited. Officer Cain testified at the Preliminary Hearing that he was impounding the car pending an `auto theft investigation.' Transcript of Preliminary Hearing at p. 41. At the Motion Hearing the State, in its attempt to get the officer to testify that the Smith car was a road hazard, asked Officer Cain, `Was that the only basis upon which you impounded the car?' He responded, `As far  yes, yes, yes.' Transcript Vol. I at p. 22. `Yes, yes, yes.' Auto theft investigation was his reason. Officer Cain did not impound the vehicle because of a supposed road hazard. This was manufactured by the State as an `objective' reason to save its case regarding this suppression issue. The point can be laid to rest by the review of the officer's impound sheet and police report, which were prepared prior to the State's recognition of its need to manufacture a valid warrant exception. Officer Cain admitted during cross-examination that there was no mention of a road hazard in his police report or the impound sheet. Transcript Vol. I at pp. 38-39. If the position of the car was so important, why was it not listed in these documents. The `reason' listed in Officer Cain's impound sheet is Idaho Code Section 37-2744(a)(4), the forfeiture section. Appellant's Brief, 43-45. The auto theft justification for impoundment is similarly baseless. The district court found: Officer Cain testified that his reason for impounding the vehicle was because he suspected it of being stolen. The evidence that the vehicle was stolen is very weak, and was very weak at the time. Tr. Vol. II, 219. Finally, the inventory search itself shows that the search was conducted for investigative rather than inventory purposes. The impound sheet on which the inventory is recorded listed only cassette tapes. Tr. Vol. I, 25. It did not state how many tapes were in the car. The impound sheet did not list any of the other items that were in the car at the time of the arrest, such as the jack equipment, the hubcap, the shoes or any of the other smaller items. Tr. Vol. I, 67. It appears that Officer Cain ended his inventory search once he discovered the drugs: Well, as I was searching the car, looking or inventorying its contents, rather, or looking for items of value I believe I was looking in the glove box [where the cassettes were found] when I looked over on the seat, I had my hand on the seat and I could see a bulge [the cocaine] underneath the seat cover. Tr. Vol. I., 23. The evidence in the record supports the conclusion that the inventory search was a pretext for an investigative search.