Opinion ID: 1920277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Ownership La. Civ.Code art. 493

Text: In finding liability of the State in the present case, both the district court and the court of appeal relied upon Melerine v. State, 00-0162 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/8/00), 773 So.2d 831, writs denied, 01-0382, 01-0480 (La.4/12/01), 789 So.2d 595, 599, and Anderson v. Tenneco Oil Co., 01-0295 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/22/02), 826 So.2d 1143, writ denied, 02-2035 (La.11/1/02), 828 So.2d 585. [22] In both cases, the Fourth Circuit relied upon La. Civ.Code art. 493 to establish State ownership and in turn custody of abandoned oil well casings and wood pilings adjacent to an abandoned oilfield platform, respectively. In Melerine, the Fourth Circuit found: Thus, the general rule governing ownership of buildings permanently attached to land with the landowner's permission by someone other than the landowner arising from La. C.C. art. 493, as interpreted by Guzzetta, is that ownership reverts by operation of law to the landowner when the maker of the building fails to remove it after he no longer has permission to keep it on the landowner's land. Once the permission to keep the building on the land terminates, the failure to remove the building is considered as a matter of law an indication that the maker of the building intends to surrender ownership to the landowner. Thus, reversion of the ownership of the building to the landowner is controlled, not by the landowner's issuance of the 90-day notice to remove, but by the actions of the maker of the building. 773 So.2d at 838-39. It is upon this conclusion of law that the Fourth Circuit again found the State liable in Anderson and the present case. We find this conclusion of law, however, is flawed. The court of appeal committed legal error in their statutory interpretation by reading out the 90-day written notice requirement. La. Civ.Code art. 493 provided in 1997: Buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground, and plantings made on the land of another with his consent belong to him who made them. They belong to the owner of the ground when they are made without his consent. When the owner of buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground, or plantings no longer has the right to keep them on the land of another, he may remove them subject to his obligation to restore the property to its former condition. If he does not remove them within 90 days after written demand, the owner of the land acquires ownership of the improvements and owes nothing to their former owner. In Guzzetta v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 485 So.2d 508, 511 (La.1986), this Court interpreted La. Civ.Code art. 493 to resolve a dispute regarding the removal of a pipeline on leased property, finding: Comment (b) to C.C. 493 points out that the second paragraph in this article fills a gap in the code, which previously had neglected to specify the rights and obligations between the owner of the improvements and the owner of the ground when their legal relationship terminated. This paragraph may apply when a lease expires, when a predial or personal servitude is extinguished, or when a precarious possessor is given notice to vacate. It gives the owner of the improvements the right to remove them, but if he does not do so ninety days after written demand, the owner of the land acquires ownership of the improvements. It does not give the new owner of the improvements the right to compel removal by the old owner, nor to recover payment for the costs of removal. The Melerine court did rely on Guzzetta in reaching its conclusion, citing: Again, after the failure to remove the pipeline within ninety days of written notice, the ownership of the pipeline would revert to the plaintiffs. Melerine, 773 So.2d at 838. (Emphasis in original). The court erred in failing to emphasize the necessary prerequisite for the legal transfer of ownership  within ninety days of written notice. Rather, the court interpreted the holding in Guzzetta to mean ownership reverts by operation of law to the landowner when the maker of the building fails to remove it after he no longer has permission to keep it on the landowner's land. 773 So.2d at 838-39. Therefore, the Melerine court concluded the reversion of ownership is controlled not by the landowner's issuance of the 90-day notice to remove, but by the actions of the maker of the building. Id. Because the lessee in Melerine failed to remove the well casing after it no longer had the right to keep the casing on state property, the court found ownership of the casing reverted to the State, even in the absence of a 90-day demand notice. [23] Contrarily, we find the clear and unambiguous language of La. Civ.Code art. 493 as written in 1997 specifically required written notice or demand prior to the transfer of ownership. La. Civ.Code art. 9. In the present case, the platform and pilings attached to the land subject to State Lease 8342 were made on the land with the consent of the State. Therefore, upon the termination and release of all rights to the water bottom under State Lease 8342, all the rights in and to the water bottom reverted back to the owner, the State of Louisiana, and according to article 493 as written in 1997, the ownership of the platform and pilings as constructions permanently attached to the ground remained with him who made them, the lessee. The ownership so remains until failure of the lessee to remove the platform and pilings within ninety days of written notice. In the present case, the record contains no evidence of written notice of removal, and accordingly, the ownership of the constructions belongs to him who made them. Ownership has not reverted to the State. [24]