Opinion ID: 780522
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Probable Cause Requirement

Text: 24 The Fourth Amendment states in pertinent part that no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Today it is well established that any arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. See Klein, 275 F.3d at 550; Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 315 (6th Cir.2000); Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir.1999); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142-43, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) (By virtue of its `incorporation' into the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment requires the States to provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty.) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975)). 25 For a police officer to have probable cause for arrest, there must be facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offense. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979); see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 872 (6th Cir.2002); Klein, 275 F.3d at 550; Donovan, 105 F.3d at 298. Probable cause requires only the probability of criminal activity not some type of `prima facie' showing. Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 262 (6th Cir.1988); see also United States v. Strickland, 144 F.3d 412, 415 (6th Cir.1998) (The Fourth Amendment, after all, necessitates an inquiry into probabilities, not certainty.). 26 The probability of criminal activity is assessed under a reasonableness standard based on an examination of all facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge at the time of an arrest.  Estate of Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir.1999); see also Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) ([T]he court should ask whether the agents acted reasonably under settled law in the circumstances, not whether another reasonable, or more reasonable, interpretation of the events can be constructed ... after the fact.); Klein, 275 F.3d at 550 (Probable cause is assessed `from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight[.]'); Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 315; Strickland, 144 F.3d at 415 ([T]he Fourth Amendment does not require that a police officer know a crime occurred at the time the officer arrests or searches a suspect.). 27 Once an officer establishes probable cause, he or she is under no obligation to continue investigating and may instead pursue the arrest of a suspect. See Klein, 275 F.3d at 551 (But once a police officer has sufficient probable cause to arrest, he need not investigate further.); Ahlers, 188 F.3d at 371 (Once probable cause is established, an officer is under no duty to investigate further or to look for additional evidence which may exculpate the accused.); Criss, 867 F.2d at 263 (A policeman, however, is under no obligation to give any credence to a suspect's story nor should a plausible explanation in any sense require the officer to forego arrest pending further investigation if the facts as initially discovered provide probable cause.). 28 In the § 1983 context, the question of whether probable cause existed is left for the jury, unless there is only one reasonable determination possible. Pyles, 60 F.3d at 1215; see also Fridley, 291 F.3d at 872; Klein, 275 F.3d at 550; Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 315. 29