Opinion ID: 3011219
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: FLSA presumes remuneration is to be included

Text: in the regular pay rate We make a final observation. RHD ar gues Christensen stands for the proposition that unless a r elevant FLSA provision expressly or implicitly pr ohibits the employer's policy, an employee cannot demonstrate a statutory violation. That argument stretches Christensen in unconvincing fashion. The Court in Christensen was concerned with whether the FLSA prohibited municipal employers from compelling the use of compensatory time. See Christensen, 529 U.S. 576, 120 S.Ct. at 1658. The Court read the applicable provisions of the FLSA only to guarantee that an employee will be able to make some use of compensatory time when he requests to use it. Id. at 1662. The Court found the provision silent with respect to the employer's requiring employees to use compensatory 18 time. See id. ([T]hat provision says nothing about restricting an employer's efforts to r equire employees to use compensatory time.). But here, the FLSA expressly provides the regular rate of pay shall be deemed to include all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee unless it falls under a specific exemption. See 29 U.S.C. S 207(e). Unlike in Christensen, there is a statutory presumption here that remuneration in any form is included in the regular rate calculation. The burden is on the employer to establish that the remuneration in question falls under an exemption. Unlike in Christensen, the statutory silence in Section 207(e)(4) relied on by RHD cuts against it rather than in its favor. In short, Christensen does not compel summary judgment for RHD.