Opinion ID: 4566841
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cruz’s Sentencing

Text: The district court found that Cruz was subject to an increased mandatory minimum and maximum sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) on the ground that Cruz had a previous conviction for a felony drug offense. Cruz advances three challenges to this determination on appeal. First, Cruz argues that the term “felony drug offense” in the version of § 841(b)(1)(B) in effect at the time of his sentencing is unconstitutionally vague. At the time of Cruz’s sentencing, § 841(b)(1)(B) provided for an enhanced penalty if the defendant committed his offense “after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2012). 3 The statute defines “felony drug offense” as “an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States . . . that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs.” Id. § 802(44) (2012). As Cruz did not raise this challenge below, we review it for plain error. See United States v. Gasperini, 894 F.3d 482, 486–87 (2d Cir. 2018). “For an error to be plain, it must, at a minimum, be clear under current law. We typically will not find such error where the operative legal question is unsettled, including where there is no binding precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court.” United States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2004). Cruz points to no decision that has held § 802(44) or the term “felony drug offense” to be unconstitutionally vague. Rather, he relies primarily on the Supreme Court’s decisions holding the terms “violent felony” and “crime of violence” as used in other statutes to be void for vagueness. See United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018); Johnson v. United 3 Section 841(b)(1)(B)’s prior drug felony enhancement was subsequently amended to provide for an enhanced penalty if the defendant was previously convicted of either a “serious drug felony” or a “serious violent felony.” First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 401(a)(2)(B), 132 Stat. 5194, 5220–21 (2018). 5 States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015). These cases are inapposite, and they do not suggest that the separate provision concerned here is “so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” Johnson, 576 U.S. at 595; see also United States v. Gonzalez, 949 F.3d 30, 38–39 (1st Cir. 2020); United States v. Mattler, 751 F. App’x 86, 89 (2d Cir. 2018). Accordingly, we find no plain error. Second, Cruz contends that he should be resentenced because the district court failed to follow the procedures set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 851 for imposing an enhanced sentence based on a prior felony drug conviction under § 841(b)(1)(B). Specifically, Cruz alleges, and the government concedes, that the district court failed to comply with § 851(b)’s requirement that the court ascertain whether the defendant affirms or denies the previous conviction, and “inform him that any challenge to a prior conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.” 21 U.S.C. § 851(b). However, we have previously held that “[f]ailure to adhere to the letter of § 851’s procedures does not automatically invalidate the resulting sentence” and that “there is no reason why non-prejudicial errors in complying with the procedural requirements of § 851 should require reversal.” United States v. Espinal, 634 F.3d 655, 665 (2d Cir. 2011). While we have not decided whether plain error or harmless error review applies to unpreserved § 851 challenges, see id. at 665 n.7, we need not do so here as Cruz’s claim fails under harmless error review. Cruz was precluded from challenging the validity of his prior conviction because the conviction occurred more than five years before the date of the information filed in this case. 21 U.S.C. § 851(e). Cruz concedes on appeal that he is barred from challenging the validity of the conviction but argues that he could have mounted unspecified other challenges to it had the district court conducted a proper § 851(b) colloquy. This bare 6 hypothetical is insufficient to establish prejudice. We note that Cruz received proper notice of the government’s intention to rely on the prior conviction in support of an increased sentence as required by § 851(a), and that Cruz has not disputed, either in the district court or on appeal, that he was convicted of the felony drug offense concerned. We also note that Cruz failed to dispute any facts contained in the presentence report, which included the fact of his prior conviction, and he did not contest the calculation of a Guidelines criminal history category of III, which was based in part on that conviction. Accordingly, we find that the district court’s failure to comply with the procedures set forth in § 851(b) was harmless error. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 648 F. App’x 9, 13–14 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Gabriel, 599 F. App’x 407, 408 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Jones, 571 F. App’x 16, 19 (2d Cir. 2014). Third, Cruz argues that the district court violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by increasing his mandatory minimum because of a prior conviction without submitting the question of whether Cruz had a qualifying prior conviction to a jury. However, as Cruz acknowledges, we are bound by Supreme Court precedent holding that a court may increase a defendant’s sentencing range based on the fact of a prior conviction, even where that fact was not charged in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 111 & n.1 (2013); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 247 (1998); see also United States v. Arline, 835 F.3d 277, 280–81 (2d Cir. 2016) (per curiam). Therefore, we identify no error on this basis. 7