Opinion ID: 777319
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Affirmative Defense of Abandonment

Text: 34 Finally, Laduca contends he abandoned any effort made to shoot a Hell's Angel that night in September 1997. He points out the hunt was called off without any shot having been fired and that no proof suggests he ever resumed tracking down these particular Hell's Angels. Under New York law, abandonment is an affirmative defense to the crime of attempted assault. See N.Y. Penal Law § 40.10(3) (McKinney 1998). But the renunciation of criminal purpose must be voluntary and complete, id., meaning it cannot be motivated by (a) a belief that circumstances exist which increase the probability of detection or apprehension of the defendant or another participant in the criminal enterprise, or which render more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose, or (b) a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another time. Id. § 40.10(5). 35 Here, it was Richter, not Laduca, who called off the hunt, so that the jury could have concluded Laduca never renounced his criminal purpose. Further, there was proof that Laduca refrained from shooting at the gas station because the Hell's Angels drove away from him rather than toward him, and that he did not shoot at the last bar because a vehicle interfered with his line of sight. Moreover, Rosenthal testified that the run was not called off permanently, but only suspended. This evidence would have allowed the jury to find that any renunciation, if it existed, was not voluntary and complete. Consequently, in our view of this record, sufficient evidence exists to support Laduca's conviction for attempted assault. 36 III Using or Carrying a Firearm During a Violent Crime: § 924(c) 37 In connection with both the September 1997 and October 1996 incidents, the government also charged Laduca under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). This statute imposes a mandatory sentence on a defendant who during and in relation to any crime of violence[,] uses or carries a firearm. It is considered a separate violation of federal law. See United States v. Mohammed, 27 F.3d 815, 820 (2d Cir.1994) (A review of the plain language of section 924(c) and its legislative history leads us to conclude that the section was intended to impose an additional, consecutive sentence upon a defendant who commits any federal crime of violence while using or carrying a firearm.). 38 There are three elements to a § 924(c) violation. First, the defendant must have used or carried a firearm. The terms use and carry are not synonymous. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995); United States v. Cruz-Rojas, 101 F.3d 283, 285 (2d Cir.1996). A defendant uses a firearm by actively employing it. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 143, 116 S.Ct. 501; United States v. Santos, 84 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), modified on reh'g by 95 F.3d 116 (2d Cir.1996). Active employment can mean, among other things, brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and, most obviously, firing or attempting to fire a firearm. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 148, 116 S.Ct. 501. By contrast, a defendant carries a firearm by either bearing it on his person or knowingly possess[ing] and convey[ing it] in a vehicle, including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126-27, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998). A defendant may therefore be found guilty of carrying a firearm, even though not found to have actively employed it. 39 Second, the government must prove the defendant used or carried the firearm knowingly. See, e.g., United States v. Santeramo, 45 F.3d 622, 623 (2d Cir.1995) (per curiam). Third and finally, there must be an underlying crime of violence, defined by the statute as an offense that is a felony and (A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). Further, the firearm must have been used or carried during and in relation to  the underlying offense. Id. § 924(c)(1) (emphasis added). 40 With respect to the September 1997 hunt for Hell's Angels, Laduca concedes he carried a loaded gun that night. Nor does he dispute that an attempted assault constitutes a crime of violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). The only challenge he raises is whether he committed an attempted assault in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(6). Since we have now affirmed defendant's conviction on that charge, we can also affirm the weapons conviction. 41 With respect to the October 1996 search for Cycle Lords, the government presents two distinct theories of liability related to § 924(c). First, it argues that Laduca personally carried a gun in relation to the conspiracy to assault the Cycle Lords, which would be in direct violation of § 924(c). Second, the government posits that Laduca aided and abetted the use of weapons during the raid. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1994) (providing that any person who aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures [the] commission [of a federal crime], is punishable as a principal). We must affirm the conviction if the evidence is sufficient to prove either theory. United States v. Masotto, 73 F.3d 1233, 1241 (2d Cir.1996). Because we find sufficient evidence for the jury to have convicted Laduca as a principal under § 924(c), we need not decide whether Laduca was guilty of aiding and abetting under § 2(a). 42 Starting with the third element of a § 924(c) violation, we have established that a conspiracy to commit a crime of violence is a sufficient predicate crime of violence for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). United States v. Persico, 164 F.3d 796, 802 (2d Cir.1999); see also United States v. Patino, 962 F.2d 263, 267 (2d Cir.1992) (Thus, when a conspiracy exists to commit a crime of violence, such as kidnapping, the conspiracy itself poses a `substantial risk' of violence, which qualifies it under Section 924(c)(1) and Section 924(c)(3)(B) as a crime of violence.). Laduca neither disputes that the conspiracy to commit assault qualifies as a crime of violence, nor challenges his conviction for participating in that conspiracy. 43 With respect to the element that the weapon was carried knowingly, the evidence produced at trial established that at some point Laduca was aware guns were being used by other members of the conspiracy. He was present at the second bar when Estep fired the shotgun. Moreover, the jury could have inferred that Laduca knew the two shotguns were in his van at the time he drove from Long Island to the Catskills. The weapons were large and located just behind the front passenger's seat, a couple of feet from him. Laduca's knowledge of the guns in his van is consistent with the testimony of Ragni, who like Laduca was a diamond, that the Pagans were told to bring themselves and weapons upstate on that October weekend. 44 Finally, the defense argues that Laduca did not perform any affirmative act with respect to any weapons in connection with the October 1996 conspiracy to assault Cycle Lords. To the contrary, the evidence shows Laduca drove his van, loaded with two shotguns, from Long Island to the Catskills. This suffices to demonstrate that, at least during the drive to the Catskills, Laduca carried weapons. See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 126-27, 118 S.Ct. 1911; see also Persico, 164 F.3d at 802-03 (moving firearms from one place to another qualifies as carrying for the purposes of § 924(c)). 45 Hence, the only question is whether, at the time Laduca drove from Long Island to the Catskills, he knew or had reason to know that the trip was for the purpose of assaulting rival bikers. If so, then Laduca carried weapons during and in relation to the course of the conspiracy to commit assault, and the § 924(c) conviction is proper. Essentially, by arguing that he did not know of the conspiracy to assault the Cycle Lords until after he arrived in the Catskills, Laduca contends the government failed to produce sufficient evidence of the coincidence of the mens rea and actus reus elements of the offense. 46 We think a rational jury could have determined that, at the time he drove from Long Island, Laduca knew, or at least had reason to know, of the plan to hunt down and assault Cycle Lords. Significantly, Ragni, who held the same leadership position as Laduca, testified that the Pagans had been told to travel to the Catskills with weapons in order to assault the troublesome Cycle Lords. Even though two rank-and-file members of the Pagans testified that they did not know of the purpose of the trip until after they arrived, it was rational for the jury to conclude that Laduca was privy to the same prior information as Ragni because of his position of leadership and because Laduca in fact had weapons in his vehicle when he drove to the Catskills. In addition, Laduca announced he was returning to Long Island immediately after the raid, revealing he had no other purpose for being in the Catskills. 47 From this evidence, we believe a rational finder of fact could have found Laduca knowingly carried weapons in furtherance of the conspiracy to assault the Cycle Lords. Consequently, his § 924(c) conviction and sentence must be affirmed.