Opinion ID: 186678
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Congressional Fee Caps

Text: 5 In 1998, Congress expressed its dismay over the growth in legal expenses and litigation associated with special education in the District of Columbia. H.R. REP. No. 105-670, at 50 (1998). Due to the proliferation of suits brought against the District under IDEA, Congress believed that the District's sizeable annual legal bills began usurping . . . resources from education to pay attorney fees. Id. In an effort to address this issue, the House Committee on Appropriations added a rider to the D.C. Appropriations Act of 1999 (§ 130) which was intended to limit the District's ability to pay opposing parties' attorneys' fees for the 1999 fiscal year (FY 1999). This rider stated: 6 None of the funds contained in this Act may be made available to pay the fees of an attorney who represents a party who prevails in an action, including an administrative proceeding, brought against the District of Columbia Public Schools under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq.) if — 7 (1) the hourly rate of compensation of the attorney exceeds [$50]; or 8 (2) the maximum amount of compensation of the attorney exceeds [$1,300], except that compensation and reimbursement in excess of such maximum may be approved for extended or complex representation in accordance with section 11-2604(c), District of Columbia Code. 9 Section 130 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub.L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-138-39 (1998). This rider was enacted by Congress in 1998. Congress enacted similar provisions in 1999 and 2000 for the fiscal years of 2000 and 2001, respectively. See Section 129 of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub.L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1517 (1999); Section 122 of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub.L. No. 106-522, 114 Stat. 2440, 2464 (2000). 10 In early 1999, a group of disabled students and their parents challenged § 130's cap on attorneys' fees. They argued that § 130 violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and that it was preempted by IDEA. They also sought a declaratory ruling that § 130 limited only the District's ability to pay attorneys' fees, not the courts' authority to award them. In Calloway v. District of Columbia, this court rejected the group's constitutional and preemption claims, but agreed that § 130 limits only District authority to pay fees from FY 1999 appropriations, not court authority to award fees under IDEA. 216 F.3d at 9. In so finding, the court noted that there is a `very strong presumption' that appropriations acts do not amend substantive law, and that § 130 did not unambiguously express[] an intent to limit court authority to award fees under IDEA. Id. In direct response to Calloway, Congress sought to fortify its fee-cap regime in the D.C. Appropriations Act of 2002 (2002 Appropriations Act). Rather than simply incorporating another fee cap, Congress mandated: 11 Notwithstanding 20 U.S.C. 1415, 42 U.S.C.1988, 29 U.S.C. 794a, or any other law, none of the funds appropriated under this Act, or in appropriations Acts for subsequent fiscal years, may be made available to pay attorneys' fees accrued prior to the effective date of this Act that exceeds a cap imposed on attorneys' fees by prior appropriations Acts that were in effect during the fiscal year when the work was performed, or when payment was requested for work previously performed, in an action or proceeding brought against the District of Columbia Public Schools under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq.). 12 Section 140(a) of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-96, 115 Stat. 923, 958 (2001) (Section 140(a)). Congress subsequently returned to its pre-2002 fee-cap framework in the District's appropriations acts of 2003, 2004, and 2005. See Section 144 of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003, Pub.L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, 131-32 (2003); Section 432 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub.L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3, 141 (2004); Section 327 of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 108-335, 118 Stat. 1322, 1344 (2004). 13