Opinion ID: 2382064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Common-Law Duties

Text: The Grinnells allege that cigarettes are both defective and unreasonably dangerous under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Specifically, they assert that American's cigarettes are (1) defectively designed because ingredients found in cigarettes cause cancer, addiction, and disease, (2) defectively marketed, because the cigarette packages contain inadequate warnings, and (3) defectively manufactured because cigarettes contain pesticide residue. In his deposition taken one month before his death, Grinnell testified that had he known of the dangers inherent in cigarettes he would never have started smoking in the first place. In Texas, section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts governs claims for strict liability in tort. Firestone Steel Prods. Co. v. Barajas, 927 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Tex. 1996); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 788-89 (Tex.1967). Section 402A provides: (1) one who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). A product may be unreasonably dangerous because of a defect in marketing, design, or manufacturing. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tex.1995); Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 604-05 (Tex.1972). The Grinnells allege that the cigarettes sold by American were unreasonably dangerous due to each of the three types of defect. We address each of the Grinnells' claims in turn.
A defendant's failure to warn of a product's potential dangers when warnings are required is a type of marketing defect. Caterpillar, Inc., 911 S.W.2d at 382; Lucas v. Texas Indus., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 372, 377 (Tex.1984). The existence of a duty to warn of dangers or instruct as to the proper use of a product is a question of law. Firestone Steel, 927 S.W.2d at 613; General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tex. 1993). Generally, a manufacturer has a duty to warn if it knows or should know of the potential harm to a user because of the nature of its product. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex.1978). Nevertheless, this Court has recognized that there is no duty to warn when the risks associated with a particular product are matters within the ordinary knowledge common to the community. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex.1991) (holding that no legal duty exists to warn of the health risks of alcohol consumption because such risks are common knowledge). American argues that it had no duty to warn Grinnell of the risks associated with smoking its cigarettes because the dangers of smoking were common knowledge when Grinnell began smoking in 1952. Comments i and j to Restatement section 402A incorporate common knowledge into the analysis of whether a product is unreasonably dangerous under that section. [1] Comment i, which defines unreasonably dangerous, forecloses liability against manufacturers unless a product is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer with knowledge common to the community: Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from over-consumption.... That is not what is meant by unreasonably dangerous in this Section. The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.... Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965)(emphasis added). Comment j excuses a seller from the duty to warn about dangers that are generally known and recognized: In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use.... But a seller is not required to warn with respect to products, or ingredients in them, which are only dangerous, or potentially so, when consumed in excess quantity, or over a long period of time, when the danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally known and recognized. ... [T]he dangers of alcoholic beverages are an example.... Id. § 402A cmt. j (1965)(emphasis added). [2] Common knowledge, in the context of comments i and j, connotes a general societal understanding of the risks inherent in a specific product or class of products. Seagram, 814 S.W.2d at 388. In Seagram we also emphasized that the standard for finding common knowledge as a matter of law is a strict one. First holding that the term common knowledge encompasses those facts that are so well known to the community as to be beyond dispute, id., we then noted: Because Seagram is asking this court to determine common knowledge as a matter of law, we find the judicial notice rule helpful in providing a standard. Compare 33 S. Goode, O. Wellborn, III & M. Sharlot, Guide to Texas Rules of Evidence § 201.2 (Tex.Prac.1988)(requiring high degree of indisputability as prerequisite to judicial notice) with Brune v. Brown Forman Corp., 758 S.W.2d 827, 830-31 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied)(common knowledge is information known by the public generally based upon indisputable facts). Id. at 388 n. 6. Thus, common knowledge is an extraordinary defense [3] that applies only in limited circumstances. As the court in Brune noted, common knowledge encompasses only those things so patently obvious and so well known to the community generally, that there can be no question or dispute concerning their existence. Brune, 758 S.W.2d at 830-31. We will find common knowledge as a matter of law only when the standard set out in Seagram is met. It is not met in all respects here. For example, we do not find the dangers of alcohol and cigarettes, or the public's awareness of those respective dangers, to be commensurate. Unlike Seagram & Sons, which did not dispute the health dangers of prolonged alcohol use, Seagram, 814 S.W.2d at 387, the tobacco industry, including American, actively disputed that cigarettes posed any health risk at the time Grinnell began smoking in 1952. Indeed, the industry continues to dispute the health risks of smoking and the addictive nature of cigarettes, before Congress, in the national press, [4] and even at oral argument before the Court in this case. [5] Despite this ongoing dispute, we are bound to apply the rule that whether knowledge has become common to the community is an objective determination. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Tex.1995). The party asserting the common-knowledge defense must establish that the dangers attributable to alcohol, tobacco, or other products were a matter of common knowledge when the consumer began using the product. Based on the summary judgment record, we hold American established that the general ill-effects of smoking were commonly known when Grinnell started smoking in 1952. However, we also hold that American did not establish that the addictive quality of cigarettes was commonly known when Grinnell began smoking in 1952. Regarding the general health risks associated with smoking, the Tennessee Supreme Court held as early as 1898 that these risks were generally known. Austin v. State, 101 Tenn. 563, 48 S.W. 305, 306 (1898), aff'd as modified sub nom. Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343, 21 S.Ct. 132, 45 L.Ed. 224 (1900). On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court observed: [W]e should be shutting our eyes to what is constantly passing before them were we to affect an ignorance of the fact that a belief in [cigarettes'] deleterious effects, particularly upon young people, has become very general, and that communications are constantly finding their way into the public press denouncing their use as fraught with great danger.... 179 U.S. at 348, 21 S.Ct. at 134 (emphasis added). Other early courts also recognized the harmful effects of smoking cigarettes. Gundling v. City of Chicago, 176 Ill. 340, 52 N.E. 44, 45 (1898) (cigarettes are deleterious and injurious), aff'd, 177 U.S. 183, 20 S.Ct. 633, 44 L.Ed. 725 (1900); State v. Nossaman, 107 Kan. 715, 193 P. 347, 348 (1920) (dangers of smoking and deleterious effects of cigarettes are common knowledge); Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon, 132 Tenn. 419, 178 S.W. 1009, 1010 (1915) (cigarettes are possessed of no virtue, being bad inherently). More recently, courts have similarly acknowledged that the inherent dangers of smoking cigarettes are within the community's common knowledge. Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 80 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, ___U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 300, 136 L.Ed.2d 218 (1996) ([T]he dangers of cigarette smoking have long been known to the community.); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 236 (6th Cir.1988) (`[T]obacco has been used for over 400 years and ... its characteristics have also been fully explored. Knowledge that cigarette smoking is harmful to health is widespread and can be considered part of the common knowledge of the community.'); Paugh v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 834 F.Supp. 228, 231 (N.D.Ohio 1993) (Much as in the case of alcohol, users of tobacco products... made a consumer choice in the face of health risks that [have been] common to ordinary knowledge [since well before 1966].). Moreover, by 1962, when the Surgeon General's advisory committee began examining the health risks associated with smoking, there were already more than seven thousand publications of professional and general circulation examining the relationship between smoking and health. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PUB. No. 89-8411, REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 2 (1989). Of these publications, articles published in nationally circulated magazines dating back to the early 1900s informed readers about the deleterious effects of smoking. Brown, Is a Tobacco Crusade Coming?, Atlantic Monthly, Oct. 1920, at 447 (adverse medical science findings on smoking have been brought before the public for the past thirty years); Does Tobacco Make One Tired?, The Literary Digest, Apr. 15, 1922, at 27 (noting the effect of heavy smoking, light smoking, and nonsmoking on workers' efficiency); Hirshberg, Truth About Tobacco, Harper's Weekly, Jan. 4, 1913 (consumer awareness of claims linking smoking to cancer, health disease, and bronchitis is pervasive); Norr, Cancer by the Carton, READER'S DIGEST, Dec. 1952, at 7 (examining data and projecting the number of future lung cancer deaths from smoking). During this same period, many books examined the health risks associated with smoking and argued against the use of cigarettes. See generally COLES, THE BEAUTIES AND DEFORMITIES OF TOBACCO-USING (1851); GOFF, PETITION TO CONGRESS: PROHIBIT GROWING AND IMPORTATION OF TOBACCO (1913); GRISCOM, THE USE OF TOBACCO, AND THE EVILS (1868); PACK, TOBACCO AND HUMAN EFFICIENCY (1918); SCHRUMPF-PIERRON, TOBACCO AND PHYSICAL EFFICIENCY (1927); SLOCUM, ABOUT TOBACCO AND ITS DELETERIOUS EFFECTS (1909); TAYLOR, DON'T SMOKE (1944); WALSH, THE BURNING SHAME OF AMERICA: OUTLINE AGAINST NICOTINE (1924). These books and articles published before 1952 indicate that the general dangers of smoking were common knowledge even before Grinnell began smoking. See, e.g., Crist & Majoras, The New Wave in Smoking and Health LitigationIs Anything Really So New?, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 551, 553 (1987) (Even prior to the beginning of this century, ... the public [was] constantly exposed to innumerable reports associating smoking with health risks.); Henderson & Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1325 (1991) (The amount of information available to American consumers about the dangers of smoking is, and for some while has been, staggering.). Not only does historical evidence illustrate the public's pre-1952 awareness of smoking's dangerous effects, but the Grinnells' experts also confirmed that the health hazards of smoking were common knowledge when Grinnell began smoking. Dr. Ravenholt, an expert on cancer and its causes, testified that the dangers of smoking were well known by the 1950s: I think the majority [of people] would have been aware, you know, an adult, reasonably intelligent. He also testified that, in 1950, evidence emerged of the lung cancer producing capability of smoking and that the dangers attributable to smoking were extensively published and frequently front-page news stories in the 1950s. Dr. Greenberg likewise testified that the decision to smoke or refrain from smoking cigarettes is a matter of individual personal responsibility in light of the health risks. We conclude that the general health dangers attributable to cigarettes were commonly known as a matter of law by the community when Grinnell began smoking. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d at 383 (common knowledge is usually determined as a matter of law). We cannot conclude, however, that the specific danger of nicotine addiction was common knowledge when Grinnell began smoking. Addiction is a danger apart from the direct physical dangers of smoking because the addictive nature of cigarettes multiplies the likelihood of and contributes to the smoker's ultimate injury, in Grinnell's case, lung cancer. See Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. Cal. L.Rev. 1423, 1430 (1980) ([D]ependency adds a new dimension to smoking, for it greatly increases the likelihood of high volume, long term use which leads to disease, disability, and early death.). This Court has also recognized the seriousness of addiction and the need for manufacturers to warn of this danger in the context of prescription drugs. Crocker v. Winthrop Labs., 514 S.W.2d 429, 432-33 (Tex.1974) (holding drug manufacturer liable under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402B for misrepresenting that drug was free and safe from all dangers of addiction); see also Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 516 (Tex.App.-Austin 1991, writ denied) (Indeed, the failure to warn of cigarettes' addictive nature could be the essence of a plaintiff's complaint.). We acknowledge that some authorities support the proposition that some members of the community associated addiction with smoking cigarettes earlier in this century. Ploch v. City of St. Louis, 345 Mo. 1069, 138 S.W.2d 1020, 1023 (1940) (cigarettes have harmful properties and it is common knowledge that nicotine produces tobacco addicts); Wiley, The Little White Slaver, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Jan. 1916, at 91 (people can become slaves to the cigarette habit and cigarette smoking can shorten their lives). The Surgeon General spoke to the addictive nature of tobacco in the most recent and comprehensive report on the subject in 1988. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PUB. NO. 8406, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1988) (hereafter Nicotine Addiction). In that report, the Surgeon General concluded that: (1) cigarettes and other forms of tobacco are addicting, (2) nicotine is the drug in tobacco that causes addiction, and (3) the pharmacologic and behavioral processes that determine tobacco addiction are similar to those that determine addiction to drugs such as heroin and cocaine. Id. at iii. [6] More recently, the Food and Drug Administration has concluded that tobacco products are addictive. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44396, 44555-56 (1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, and 897) ([T]he evidence shows that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are highly addictive, cause other psychoactive effects ... and that these effects are widely accepted in the scientific community.); see Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. United States Food and Drug Admin., 958 F.Supp. 1060 (M.D.N.C.1997) (upholding FDA's jurisdiction to impose access restrictions and labeling requirements on tobacco products). But we cannot simply assume that common knowledge of the general health risks of tobacco use naturally includes common knowledge of tobacco's addictive quality. Indeed, as David Kessler, former head of the FDA, has pointed out: Before 1980, when FDA last considered its jurisdiction over tobacco products, no major public health organization had determined that nicotine was an addictive drug. Today, however, all major public health organizations in the United States and abroad with expertise in tobacco or drug addiction recognize that the nicotine delivered by cigarettes and smokeless tobacco is addictive. Kessler et al., The Legal and Scientific Basis for FDA's Assertion of Jurisdiction over Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco, 277 Jama 405, 406 (1997) (emphasis added). The FDA based its 1996 assertion of jurisdiction on a wealth of epidemiologic and laboratory data establishing that tobacco users display the clinical symptoms of addiction and that nicotine has the characteristics of other addictive drugs. Id. Thus, unlike the general dangers associated with smoking, as late as 1988 and certainly in 1952, the danger of addiction from smoking cigarettes was not widely known and recognized in the community in general, or, particularly, by children or adolescents. Nicotine Addiction at vi. The FDA has explained that because of tobacco's addictive effects, the only way to prevent the ensuing disease and death is to prevent children and adolescents from starting to use tobacco: Most people who suffer the adverse health consequences of using cigarettes and smokeless tobacco begin their use before they reach the age of 18, an age when they are not prepared for, or equipped to, make a decision that, for many, will have lifelong consequences. Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44398. Because the community's knowledge concerning the danger of nicotine addiction associated with cigarettes was not beyond dispute in 1952, the Seagram standard for finding common knowledge as a matter of law has not been met. We agree with the court in Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.: There is no basis for our judicially noticing what the ordinary consumer's knowledge concerning the addictive qualities of cigarettes may have been when [the plaintiff] began smoking in 1940. The state of knowledge attributable to the community of individuals consuming cigarettes has changed over time and will continue to do so. It was not until 1988 that the Surgeon General published a report informing of the addictive nature of cigarettes. 557 N.E.2d 1045, 1054 (Ind.Ct.App.1990). [7] Accordingly, we hold that American did not establish as a matter of law that the danger of addiction associated with cigarettes was commonly known in 1952. Because we conclude that American did not conclusively establish that the danger of addiction to nicotine was common knowledge, the Grinnells may maintain their strict liability marketing defect claims to the extent they are based on the addictive qualities of cigarettes, if no other defenses defeat those claims. The Grinnells assert that American breached its duty to warn users about it product's addictive nature because before January 1, 1966, the product's packages contained no warnings. A manufacturer is required to give an adequate warning if it knows or should know that potential harm may result from use of the product. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex.1978). In the absence of a warning, a rebuttable presumption arises that the user would have read and heeded such warnings and instructions. Magro v. Ragsdale Bros., Inc., 721 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex.1986) (citing Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex.1972)). A manufacturer may rebut the presumption with evidence that the plaintiff did not heed whatever warnings were given, or would not have heeded any proposed warnings. See Magro, 721 S.W.2d at 834; see also General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 358-59 (Tex.1993). The Grinnells assert that when Grinnell started smoking in 1952 he did not know and had heard nothing about any risk of addiction associated with smoking. The Grinnells further assert that American's failure to warn of the addictive nature of cigarettes caused Grinnell's eventual death because Grinnell testified that had he known what he later learned, he would never have started smoking. In rebuttal, American cites testimony that in the late 1950s and the 1960s, Grinnell continued smoking despite warnings from his father, coaches, and friends. At most, the evidence relied on by American establishes that some people warned Grinnell about the general dangers of smoking. It does not conclusively establish that had Grinnell been warned that cigarettes were addictive before he began smoking he would have refused to follow the warnings. Grinnell testified at his deposition that if he had known of the dangers associated with smoking, including addiction, he never would have started smoking. At the very least, this testimony creates a fact issue regarding whether Grinnell would have heeded warnings had they been given to him before he began smoking. Dr. Grabowski, an expert on addiction, testified that Grinnell was addicted to cigarettes by the late 1950s and early 1960s and could not have stopped smoking without intensive intervention. In short, American's summary judgment evidence does not conclusively establish that adequate warnings would not have been followed and thus would not have made a difference in the outcome. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d at 357. Summary judgment on the Grinnells' marketing defect theory related to the addictive nature of cigarettes was therefore improper. Thus, to the extent we hold that the general health risks of smoking were within the knowledge common to the community even before Grinnell began smoking in 1952, American has established that its cigarettes were not unreasonably dangerous. Summary judgment was, therefore, proper to the extent the Grinnells' strict liability claims relate to the general health risks associated with smoking. However, we also hold that American did not establish as a matter of law that the specific danger of addiction from smoking was knowledge common to the community. Therefore, we hold that the Grinnells' marketing defect claim survives to the extent it is based on the allegation that the addictive nature of cigarettes rendered American's products unreasonably dangerous, and to the extent it is not preempted by federal law. [8]
The duty to design a safe product is an obligation imposed by law. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex.1967). Whether a seller has breached this duty, that is, whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, is a question of fact for the jury. See Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Tex. 1979). In determining whether a product is defectively designed, the jury must conclude that the product is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its use. Id. at 847 n. 1. In Turner we held that evidence of the following factors of risk and utility were admissible in design defect cases: (1) the utility of the product to the user and to the public as a whole weighed against the gravity and likelihood of injury from its use; (2) the availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be unsafe or unreasonably expensive; (3) the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without seriously impairing its usefulness or significantly increasing its costs; (4) the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions; and (5) the expectations of the ordinary consumer. Id. at 846, 847. See also Caterpillar, Inc., 911 S.W.2d at 384; Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 746 n. 2 (Tex.1980). American argues that the commonknowledge defense bars the Grinnells' design defect claims as a matter of law. But, as we stated in Turner, the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, and the expectations of the ordinary consumer, are but two factors for the jury to consider when determining whether a product was defectively designed. American's attempt to invoke the common-knowledge defense is actually an attempt to invoke the open and obvious defense or patent danger rule, which this Court has rejected in design defect cases: A number of courts are of the view that obvious risks are not design defects which must be remedied. See, e.g., Gray, 771 F.2d at 870 (applying Mississippi law); Delvaux v. Ford Motor Co., 764 F.2d 469, 474 (7th Cir.1985) (applying Wisconsin law); Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671, 680 (1978). However, our Court has held that liability for a design defect may attach even if the defect is apparent. Turner, 584 S.W.2d at 850. Determining if a design is unreasonably dangerous requires balancing the utility of the product against the risks involved in its use. Id. at 847 & n. 1 Caterpillar, Inc., 911 S.W.2d at 383-84. Accordingly, American's attempt to invoke the common-knowledge defense in the context of an alleged design defect is without merit. Alternatively, American argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because no safer alternative cigarette design exists. In Turner, we held that the availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be unsafe or unreasonably expensive, was one factor for juries to consider when determining whether a product was defectively designed. We reaffirmed this holding in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears by stating that if there are no safer alternatives, a product is not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law. 911 S.W.2d at 384. [9] Accordingly, if there is no safer alternative to the cigarette manufactured by American, then its cigarettes are not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law. The Grinnells assert that American's cigarettes could have been made reasonably safer by filtration, and by reducing the amount of tobacco, tar, nicotine, and toxins in them. In making its argument that no reasonably safer alternative design exists, American relies on the testimony of the Grinnells' experts, Drs. Greenberg, Stevens, and Ginzel. These experts testified that Grinnell would have developed cancer and died regardless of whether filters, lower tar, or less tobacco had been used. Specifically, Dr. Greenberg testified: Q: It didn't matter to you and your opinion would not have changed as to the cause of the lung cancer, regardless of the brand, whether it was filtered or nonfiltered, short or long cigarette. Is that right? A: That's correct. Dr. Ginzel testified similarly: Q: Doctor, is there any safe cigarette with respect to lung cancer? A: Not that I know of. Q: Is there any design for a cigarette that Mr. Grinnell could have smoked that would have avoided his claimed lung cancer? A: Not during his lifetime, no. Ultimately, the Grinnells essentially concede that no reasonably safer alternatives exist, but argue that all cigarettes are defective and unreasonably dangerous nonetheless. [10] Because American conclusively proved that no reasonably safer alternative design exists for its cigarettes, we hold that summary judgment was proper on all of the Grinnells' design defect claims, including those based on the addictive quality of cigarettes.
We turn next to the Grinnells' strict liability claim based on a manufacturing defect. The Grinnells assert that American's products were defectively manufactured because they contained carcinogens and other toxic chemicals, including pesticide residue. During discovery, the Grinnells obtained internal documents showing that American fumigated its Turkish tobacco with Acritet 34, a chemical composed of acrylonitrile and carbon tetrachloride. American uses Turkish tobacco in all of its cigarettes. In 1978, American circulated a memorandum noting new government regulations requiring all materials containing acrylonitrile to be affixed with a Cancer Hazard warning label. Likewise, the Grinnells allege that American knew that methyl bromide pesticide residue remained in its tobacco after fumigation. The Grinnells alleged that this potentially cancerous pesticide residue contributed to Grinnell's cancer and resulting death. Under Texas law, a plaintiff has a manufacturing defect claim when a finished product deviates, in terms of its construction or quality, from the specifications or planned output in a manner that renders it unreasonably dangerous. See Ford Motor Co. v. Pool, 688 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.1986); see also Lucas v. Texas Indus., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 372, 377-78 (Tex.1984); Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, 732-33 (Tex.1984); Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex.1969). The common-knowledge defense does not apply to this type of claim because a user does not anticipate a manufacturing defect. This type of defect is a deviation from the planned output. See Pool, 688 S.W.2d at 881; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 82.004(b). American, conceding that its cigarettes contain pesticide residue, argues that summary judgment was proper because all cigarette manufacturers fumigate their tobacco with some type of pesticide, and residue inevitably remains after fumigation. Thus, American concludes that the Grinnells' claims based on the presence of pesticide residue are actually design defect claims masquerading as manufacturing defect claims. According to the undisputed facts, pesticide residue is incidentally, yet normally, found in tobacco after it is fumigated. The presence of pesticide residue is not an anomaly attributable only to the cigarettes Grinnell smoked. Nevertheless, the fact that all cigarettes potentially contain pesticide residue does not transform the Grinnells' manufacturing defect claim into a design defect claim subject to the common-knowledge defense. Simply because certain precautions or improvements in manufacturing technology, which could eliminate pesticide residue from cigarettes, are universally disregarded by an entire industry does not excuse their omission. See T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662, 53 S.Ct. 220, 77 L.Ed. 571 (1932). Although pesticide residue may be found in many if not all cigarettes, it is not an ingredient American intended to incorporate into its cigarettes. Analyzed in this light, the presence of pesticide residue could be a manufacturing defect, not a design defect. Therefore, American did not conclusively negate the existence of a defect in its cigarettes. Alternatively, American contends that any alleged manufacturing defect rendering its product unreasonably dangerous did not cause Grinnell's injuries. A plaintiff must establish a causal connection between [the defective] condition and the plaintiff's injuries or damages. Lucas, 696 S.W.2d at 377 (quoting Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Urquidez, 570 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex.1978)); see Morgan, 675 S.W.2d at 732-33. In support of this point, American argues that the Grinnells presented no evidence of causation on their manufacturing defect claim. American correctly asserts that none of the Grinnells' experts testified that the presence of pesticide residue caused or contributed to Grinnell's development of lung cancer. The Grinnells' experts testified that: (1) they were unaware of any pesticide residue in American's cigarettes; (2) their opinions that Grinnell developed lung cancer from smoking cigarettes were based on generic smoking studies that did not isolate individual brands of cigarettes and their individual effects; and (3) their opinions would be the same regardless of whether pesticide residue was present in American's cigarettes. American mistakes its summary judgment burden. On summary judgment it is not incumbent upon a plaintiff nonmovant to produce evidence supporting the allegations made in her pleadings; rather, the defendant movant must conclusively negate at least one element of the plaintiff's cause of action. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, 907 S.W.2d at 476. Here, without proving that pesticide residue in cigarettes does not cause cancer in humans, American attempts to meet its burden by focusing on what the Grinnells failed to prove. This does not conclusively negate the element of causation. The Grinnells' experts' testimony merely illustrates that the experts' conclusions that smoking caused Grinnell's cancer were not dependent on the presence of pesticide residue, not that pesticide residue could not have contributed to or caused Grinnell's cancer. We hold that summary judgment was improper on the manufacturing defect claim.
Next, we consider the Grinnells' implied warranty claims. We hold that the common-knowledge defense applies and bars these claims to the extent they relate to the general health risks of cigarettes. The Grinnells' implied warranty claims stem from the allegation that American impliedly warranted that its cigarettes were merchantable and fit for their intended purpose. See TEX. BUS. & COM.CODE § 2.314. The Grinnells allege that American's cigarettes are neither merchantable nor fit for their intended purpose because they are not safe for human consumption, cause injury to the user, and are addictive. An implied warranty is a representation about the implied quality or suitability of a product that the law implies and imports into a contract, in view of all facts and circumstances attending the transaction, including the nature of the property, terms of the agreement, and trade usages. Donelson v. Fairmont Foods Co., 252 S.W.2d 796, 799 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Knowledge common to the community about a certain product is also a factor that must be considered when deciding whether an implied warranty exists. See Allgood, 80 F.3d at 172. An implied warranty contrary to the community's common knowledge cannot exist. Cf. TEX. BUS. & COM.CODE § 2.313 cmt. 1. Because the general health dangers of cigarettes are commonly known by the community, no expectation of safety arises with respect to cigarettes when they are purchased. As American established the common-knowledge defense for the general health risks associated with cigarettes as a matter of law, it also conclusively negated the claims asserting that it impliedly warranted that its cigarettes were safe for consumption. To the extent this claim relates to the general health risks of cigarettes, summary judgment was proper. However, as we explained above, American did not conclusively establish that the danger of nicotine addiction was common knowledge in 1952. The commonknowledge defense does not preclude the Grinnells' implied warranty claims to the extent they relate to the addictive quality of cigarettes. American further alleges that all of the Grinnells' remaining implied warranty claims are barred by limitations. Section 2.725(b) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code provides a four-year limitations period for all warranty claims. TEX. BUS. & COM.CODE § 2.725(b). Regarding the time of accrual, [i]mplied warranties relate to the condition, kind, characteristics, suitability, etc. of sold goods at the time of sale; thus, the statute of limitations on implied warranties runs from the date of the sale. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Certainteed Corp., 710 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tex.1986). The four-year statute of limitations on implied warranties began to run at the time of delivery, not when Grinnell discovered he had cancer. Accordingly, the implied warranty claims predicated upon the addictive nature of cigarettes and that arose within four years before Grinnell filed suit are not barred by limitations and may be maintained. Accordingly, we remand these surviving implied warranty claims.
We turn next to the Grinnells' claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and express warranty. These claims are based on alleged misrepresentations in American's advertisements. The Grinnells allege that if American had revealed the health risks of smoking cigarettes, and had not deceived Grinnell by making false representations to the contrary, Grinnell never would have started smoking. The documents the Grinnells claim contained misrepresentations include (1) a 1953 press release by Paul Hahn, then American's president, (2) a promotional item entitled  A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers  released by the Tobacco Industry Research Committee, of which American was a member, and (3) an advertisement entitled  Why We're Dropping The New York Times.  All three of these documents stated that American and the tobacco industry still believed that smoking was not injurious to health and that no one had yet proved that lung cancer in any human being was directly traceable to smoking tobacco. These materials also implied that cigarettes were safe, fit for human consumption, free of contaminants, and not addictive. A fourth document the Grinnells allege contained affirmative misrepresentations is an advertisement stating that the longer Pall Mall cigarette naturally filters the smoke but does not filter out the Pall Mall flavor. This advertisement also stated that Pall Malls were friendly to a smoker's taste and that for flavor and mildness fine tobacco filters best. The Grinnells also contend that American intended consumers of its products to see and rely on the statements in its advertisements. They bolster this contention with the deposition testimony of Robert Heimann, one of American's former chief executive officers, who testified: There is no reason why [consumers] could not accept our position stated here and elsewhere that the products we make are not injurious to health. Similarly, Preston Leake, American's research and development officer, testified in his deposition that these are safe products. At the outset, we recognize that the fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and express warranty claims all share the common element of reliance. In Texas, a plaintiff establishes actionable fraud if the defendant makes a material representation, that is false, either known to be false when made or is asserted without knowledge of its truth, that is intended to be and is relied upon, and that causes injury. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Meadows, 877 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Tex.1994); T.O. Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Tex.1992). Similarly, when circumstances impose upon a party a duty to speak and the party remains silent, the silence itself can be a false representation. Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Tex.1986); Smith v. National Resort Communities, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 1979). Just as with affirmative misrepresentations, the allegedly defrauded party must have reasonably relied on the silence to his detriment. See Allgood, 80 F.3d at 171; Spoljaric, 708 S.W.2d at 435. Likewise, negligent misrepresentation claims require reasonable reliance on the representation. See Federal Land Bank Ass'n v. Sloane, 825 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex.1991). Though not a fraud-based claim, an express warranty claim also requires a form of reliance. The Uniform Commercial Code provides that an express warranty is created when [a]ny affirmation of fact or promise [is] made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain.  TEX. BUS. & COM.CODE § 2.313(a)(1) (emphasis added). Basis of the bargain loosely reflects the common-law express warranty requirement [11] of reliance. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FDP Corp., 811 S.W.2d 572, 575 & n. 2 (Tex.1991); see Morris v. Adolph Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578, 587 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Because all four of the representational claims asserted by the Grinnells require some form of reliance, summary judgment was proper on each if American negated reliance as a matter of law. We hold that American conclusively negated the element of reliance. The summary judgment record establishes a complete absence of reliance. Grinnell testified in his deposition that he specifically remembered seeing only R.J. Reynolds's advertisements, but that he might have also seen American's advertisements. The first time he remembered seeing any advertisements disputing the alleged link between smoking and lung cancer was in the early `80's and maybe late `70's, approximately thirty years after he began smoking. These advertisements from the 1970s and 1980s have not been produced, were not reviewed by Grinnell during his deposition, and were not included in the record. The materials on which the Grinnells actually base their claims, however, were all released in the 1950s and 1960s. Grinnell never testified that he relied on these advertisements and his own deposition testimony establishes that he began smoking because his friends smoked, and that he later changed brands from Lucky Strikes to Pall Malls to Pall Mall Golds based on taste, not because of advertisements. Of the various advertisements Grinnell remembered seeing and claimed to have relied on, only advertisements for Old Golds and Camels directly equated smoking with health. The Old Golds advertisements stated, For a Treat Instead of a Treatment ... Smoke Old Golds. The Camel advertisements stated More Doctors Smoke Camels Than Any Other Cigarette! Grinnell never smoked Camels or Old Golds and American never manufactured these brands of cigarettes. Reliance on these advertisements does not raise a fact issue in this case. Moreover, the parties do not dispute that neither Robert Heimann's nor Preston Leake's statements concerning American's intent or the safety of its products were included in advertisements or other materials disseminated to the public. In short, American's summary judgment evidence proves that Grinnell did not rely on any of American's advertisements from the 1950s and 1960s, and that, although he could have conceivably relied on the advertisements from the 1970s and 1980s, these advertisements were not included in the record and their content is subject to speculation. Speculation cannot create a fact issue. Duff v. Yelin, 751 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1988). Based on this record, we hold that American conclusively negated the element of reliance. Summary judgment was proper on the fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and express warranty claims.
We next consider the Grinnells' claims for negligent design, manufacture, testing, and failure to warn. The Grinnells' negligent design and manufacturing claims are conceptually distinguishable from the strict liability claims. While strict liability focuses on the condition of the product, [n]egligence looks at the acts of the manufacturer and determines if it exercised ordinary care in design and production. Caterpillar, Inc., 911 S.W.2d at 384. Negligent design and manufacturing claims are predicated on the existence of a safer alternative design for the product. Id. at 384-85; Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d 867, 871-72 (Tex.1978). Absent an alternative design, a claim for negligent design or manufacturing fails as a matter of law. As we previously discussed, American conclusively proved that no reasonably safer alternative design exists for its cigarettes. Accordingly, the Grinnells cannot maintain their claims for negligent manufacturing and design as a matter of law. Additionally, as we held above, American conclusively established the common-knowledge defense with regard to the general health risks associated with smoking. Therefore, summary judgment was proper on the Grinnells' negligent failure to warn claim to the extent it relates to the general health risks of smoking. The Grinnells' negligent testing claim is predicated on American's duty to test and ascertain the dangers inherent in its products about which it must warn consumers. Because the negligent testing claim is inextricably intertwined with the Grinnells' negligent failure to warn claim, we hold that summary judgment was also proper on this claim to the extent it relates to the general health risks of cigarettes. However, American did not conclusively establish that the specific danger of addiction was knowledge common to the community in 1952. Accordingly, the common-knowledge defense does not preclude the Grinnells' pre-1969 negligent failure to warn and negligent testing claims to the extent these claims relate to the addictive qualities of cigarettes and are not preempted by federal law.
The Grinnells contend that American, other cigarette manufacturers, and tobacco trade groups conspired to counter and suppress evidence about the alleged harmful effects of cigarettes. Allegations of conspiracy are not actionable absent an underlying overt unlawful act or purpose. Firestone Steel Prods. Co. v. Barajas, 927 S.W.2d 608, 614 (Tex.1996); Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.1983). In light of our conclusion that the trial court properly granted summary judgment on all of the Grinnells' other claims related to fraud or concealment, summary judgment on the conspiracy claim was proper.
The Grinnells allege that American violated sections 321, 389, 519, and 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts by (1) failing to take remedial measures to prevent harm caused by its products after the cigarettes were placed in the stream of commerce, (2) wrongfully assuming that consumers would heed adequate warnings on cigarette packages, and (3) engaging in an ultra hazardous activity by designing, manufacturing, and selling cigarettes that were inherently dangerous. We hold that summary judgment was proper on these claims. This Court has not recognized claims based on Restatement sections 321 (duty to act to prevent risk once prior conduct is found to be dangerous) or 389 (liability for supplying a known dangerous product if injury results even if a warning has been given). These sections are particularly illsuited for application to what are essentially products liability claims because they impose liability even when the manufacturer provides adequate warnings. See Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565, 568-72 (Iowa 1986). Moreover, whether a product is dangerous is determined when it leaves the manufacturer's hands and enters the stream of commerce; subsequent acts have no bearing on the issue. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Tex.1979). The Grinnells also assert claims based on sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement and allege that American should be liable for [carrying] on an abnormally dangerous activity. Although several courts of appeals have discussed sections 519 and 520, no court has recognized these sections as creating viable claims in Texas. See Ellsworth v. Bishop Jewelry & Loan Co., 742 S.W.2d 533, 535-36 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied); Robertson v. Grogan Inv. Co., 710 S.W.2d 678, 679 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, no writ). Moreover, claims for products liability and actions implicating consumer marketing are not within the logical purview of the abnormally dangerous activity standard. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1265 & n. 43 (5th Cir.1985); Maguire, 387 N.W.2d at 568-69; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 519 cmt. d. We decline to adopt sections 321, 389, 519, and 520 of the Restatement in this case. Accordingly, summary judgment on these claims was proper.