Opinion ID: 211579
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Physical Takings Claim

Text: 21 In general, this court has analyzed takings claims arising from section 404 permit issues using the regulatory takings analysis set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). See, e.g., Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed.Cir.1999) (citing cases). Here, however, the Normans insist that, by its terms, the 1999 Permit effected a physical taking because it required that they transfer title to the 220.85 acres to a third party. It is axiomatic that [w]here the government authorizes a physical occupation of property (or actually takes title) the Takings Clause generally requires compensation. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153 (1992). Here, although the Normans did transfer title in the wetland acreage to a nonprofit association, the record is clear that the title transfer was voluntary, and not a condition required under the 1999 Permit. According to the parties' joint stipulation, the Normans transferred title in the wetland acreage to the South Meadows Association in order to comply with Condition 9.a of the 1999 Permit, which required that the appellants [r]ecord[] the formation of a Corps approved funding mechanism for the long term maintenance of the mitigation and preserve areas. Neither the 1999 Permit nor the Deed of Restrictions contained any requirement that title to the affected acreage be transferred; testimony offered at trial indicated that the funding mechanism requirement may be satisfied by several methods, and that although conveyance of title to a conservation group or nonprofit was one such method, the Corps did not require it. 3 22 Neither did the Permit exact possession of the land. Appellants argue that the Normans' loss of exclusive possession ... constitutes a categorical taking under the Fifth Amendment, relying for that proposition on Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987). We note as an initial matter that is not at all clear that appellants have, in fact, lost exclusive possession of the land at issue. Nollan involved the use of a permit process to exact from a landowner an easement allowing public access across his land. No such physical intrusion—by government or the public—occurred here. Appellants have directed us to nothing in the 1999 Permit or in the Deed of Restrictions that deprives the owners of the land of the right to exclude others from the 220.85 acres. To the extent that appellants' claim of loss of possession is predicated on the transfer of title, we have already concluded that that transfer was voluntary and therefore not a proper basis on which to premise a takings claim. 23 Because we conclude that no physical invasion occurred here, the Normans' reliance on cases like United States v. Pueblo of Taos, 207 Ct.Cl. 53, 515 F.2d 1404 (1975), and Yuba Natural Resources, Inc. v. United States, 821 F.2d 638 (Fed.Cir.1987), is misplaced. Those cases involved government surveys and found takings where, for example, the United States misidentified a boundary line and took property actually belonging to a landowner and sold it to a third party. In those cases the survey error led to an actual transfer of property from its rightful owner to another, or to the outright physical invasion of the plaintiff's property by the government—events that would constitute classic takings regardless of the survey error. They stand for nothing more expansive than the obvious principle that the government cannot, by way of a simple survey error, take title to or physically invade private properties in ways that would otherwise be takings, without payment of just compensation. They are not relevant here. 24 Even if the government's action could reasonably be characterized as a physical invasion, the Normans' claim for compensation would fail under the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Nollan and in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994). Those cases involved efforts by government authorities to exact from landowners easements across their property in exchange for the issuance of otherwise legitimate development permits. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 829, 107 S.Ct. 3141; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. 2309. The Supreme Court framed the question at issue as whether, given ... that requiring uncompensated conveyance of the easement outright would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring it to be conveyed as a condition for issuing a land-use permit alters the outcome. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834, 107 S.Ct. 3141. The Court held that the permit issue did not alter the outcome. Drawing on existing precedent in the land-use regulation area, the Court stated the general rule that a land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it substantially advances legitimate state interests and does not deny an owner economically viable use of his land. Id. It further provided that in order to avoid effecting a taking, there must be a nexus between the condition imposed and the original purpose of the regulation at issue. Id. at 837, 107 S.Ct. 3141; see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386, 114 S.Ct. 2309 (phrasing the issue as whether [an] essential nexus exists between the legitimate state interest and the permit condition exacted by the government) (internal quotations omitted). The condition must be related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391, 114 S.Ct. 2309. 25 Even if the nexus requirement of the Nollan and Dolan line of exaction cases were applicable here—and we think it clear that it is not—we would agree with the trial court's conclusion that an appropriate nexus exists between the set-aside of the 220.85 acres and the regulatory purpose. In the words of the trial court, [t]he public interest served by requiring the preservation of wetlands in exchange for the filling and dredging of other [wet]lands relates directly to the condition imposed. There is no disconnect. Norman II, 63 Fed.Cl. at 251.