Opinion ID: 2221364
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claim of Public Policy to Provide Truthful Testimony in a Legal Proceeding.

Text: We next address the claim by Fitzgerald that he was terminated because he intended to provide truthful testimony, adverse to his employer, in a threatened future lawsuit of a co-employee against Salsbury. Our first task is to decide whether a public policy exists in this state against discharge of an employee for giving or intending to give truthful testimony in a legal proceeding. Before considering our statutes, we observe other jurisdictions have recognized a public policy against firing an employee for giving testimony in court proceedings. The case that broke the ground for this exception was Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal.App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). In Petermann, the California Court of Appeals first recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge when an employee was terminated for refusing to perjure himself at his employer's request. 344 P.2d at 27. The court found a clear public policy against perjury was reflected in those penal statutes making the commission and subornation of perjury unlawful. Id. The court stated: In order to more fully effectuate the state's declared policy against perjury, the civil law, too, must deny the employer his generally unlimited right to discharge an employee whose employment is for an unspecified duration, when the reason for the dismissal is the employee's refusal to commit perjury.... The public policy of this state as reflected in the penal code ... would be seriously impaired if it were to be held that one could be discharged by reason of his refusal to commit perjury. Id. This same reasoning has appealed to other courts when faced with actions by employees who were discharged either for refusing to perjure themselves or for testifying truthfully against their employers. See Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F.Supp. 133, 140 (S.D.Ohio 1983), overruled in part (on factual basis) by 787 F.2d 174, 178 (6th Cir.1986) (employee fired for refusing to commit perjury); see also Bishop v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 908 F.2d 658, 662 (10th Cir.1990) (employee fired after truthful testimony at a congressional hearing); Freeman v. McKellar, 795 F.Supp. 733, 742 (E.D.Pa.1992) (employee fired after truthful testimony before grand jury); Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal.App.3d 69, 86 Cal.Rptr. 401, 404 (1970) (employees fired because employer believed they intended to testify in a minimum wage action); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 110 (Colo.1992) (employee fired for refusing to misrepresent quality control deficiencies, an illegal act); DeRose v. Putnam Management Corp., 398 Mass. 205, 496 N.E.2d 428, 431 (1986) (employee fired for failure to testify as employer wanted); Williams v. Hillhaven Corp., 91 N.C.App. 35, 370 S.E.2d 423, 426 (1988) (employee fired for testifying at another employee's unemployment compensation hearing); Ressler v. Humane Soc'y, 480 N.W.2d 429, 431 (N.D.1992) (employee discharged for testifying truthfully). Similarly, we find ample statutory support for a public policy in Iowa in favor of refusing to commit perjury. See Iowa Code §§ 720.2, .3, .4. Our statutes make it a crime to commit perjury, suborn perjury, or tamper with a witness. Id. Moreover, this public policy is not simply confined to the refusal to commit perjury but clearly embraces a broader public policy to provide truthful testimony in legal proceedings. Page v. Columbia Natural Resources, Inc., 198 W.Va. 378, 480 S.E.2d 817, 825-26 (1996). A policy in favor of refusing to commit perjury necessarily implies an inverse corresponding public policy to provide truthful testimony. Additionally, the integrity of the judicial system, its fundamental ability to dispense justice, depends upon truthful testimony. This principle forms the basis for our perjury and related statutes. Furthermore, a reasonable employer should be aware that attempts to interfere with the process of obtaining truthful testimony, whether through intimidation or retaliation, is a violation of this public policy. Id. ; Stevenson, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d at 1161. Thus, we conclude the public policy derived from our statutes against perjury and suborning perjury also supports a public policy to provide truthful testimony. We next consider whether this public policy is undermined when an employee is discharged from employment for engaging in the conduct claimed by Fitzgerald. Salsbury first argues that discharging Fitzgerald cannot jeopardize public policy in favor of truthful testimony in legal proceedings because Fitzgerald never testified in a legal proceeding, was never requested to testify in a legal proceeding, and never expressed an intent to testify. Thus, Salsbury claims the conduct engaged in by Fitzgerald did not match the conduct protected by the public policy. We agree a dismissed employee must engage in conduct related to public policy before the discharge can undermine that public policy. However, we view the good faith intent to engage in a protected activity the same as performing the protected activity. Teachout, 584 N.W.2d at 301. This is because employees would be discouraged from engaging in the public policy if they were discharged for their intent to engage in the public policy the same as if they actually engaged in the conduct. See id.; Niblo, 445 N.W.2d at 351 (public policy in favor of filing workers' compensation claim for work-related injuries was jeopardized by discharge for threat of filing). Thus, Fitzgerald must only show he had a good faith intent to truthfully testify. An essential element of proof to establish the discharge undermines or jeopardizes the public policy necessarily involves a showing the dismissed employee engaged in conduct covered by the public policy. See Barela v. C.R. England & Sons, Inc., 197 F.3d 1313, 1316 (10th Cir. 1999) (must show employee conduct brought public policy into play). Although proof the employee engaged in the conduct is also a part of the causation element of the tort, we must review Fitzgerald's conduct in this case to determine if it sufficiently matched the public policy of providing truthful testimony. [5] Fitzgerald did not directly express an intention to testify truthfully in the lawsuit threatened by Koresh. Furthermore, he never told any company officials he possessed any particular damaging information about the threatened lawsuit. These facts suggest Fitzgerald did not contemplate testifying in a threatened lawsuit by Koresh prior to his discharge. Thus, we must review the summary judgment record to determine if a reasonable inference can be drawn that Fitzgerald maintained a good faith intent to testify truthfully in a lawsuit action prior to the discharge. Courts are generally reluctant to rely on summary judgment to resolve cases when intent is a substantive element of the action. Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3rd Cir.1981). This is because inferences used to determine intent are fact-based. Thus, if two reasonable inferences can be drawn, summary judgment is inappropriate. An inference, however, must not be based on speculation or conjecture. See Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 382 n. 12 (3rd Cir.1990). The conduct engaged in by Fitzgerald prior to his discharge amounted to internal opposition to the termination of a co-employee. Generally, mere internal opposition by an employee to the employer's decision to discharge a co-employee would not suggest an inference the employee intended to give truthful testimony in future litigation brought by the discharged co-employee. The internal expression of support for a co-employee under these circumstances is far removed from the external concepts of perjury and truthful testimony in court proceedings. However, there are additional facts which must be considered in our analysis at this stage of the proceedings. This case is not simply about Fitzgerald expressing support for Koresh. Salsbury not only admonished Fitzgerald for failing to support his employer, but warned him that the matter could result in litigation and he must decide which side he would support. Thus, Salsbury placed Fitzgerald's support for Koresh in the context of litigation and transformed the conversation into choosing sides in a lawsuit. There was no evidence to suggest Fitzgerald backed down from his support for Koresh after the conversation turned to litigation. These facts permit a reasonable inference to be drawn that Fitzgerald, prior to his discharge, developed an intent to testify in threatened future litigation against his employer. There are, of course, other inferences that could be drawn from the evidence. However, at this stage we are required to draw those reasonable inferences in favor of Fitzgerald as the nonmoving party to the summary judgment proceedings. In light of these inferences, we conclude that there is evidence to support the claim Fitzgerald engaged in policy-based conduct. Nevertheless, Salsbury argues the jeopardy element of the tort cannot be satisfied as a matter of law because it never requested Fitzgerald to testify inconsistent with the public policy. Without a request to testify inconsistent with public policy, Salsbury asserts the discharge cannot undermine any public policy. In fact, Salsbury points out that the dismissal based on an inference that Fitzgerald would testify contrary to the interest of the employer would actually give Fitzgerald a greater incentive to freely and openly testify in conformance to public policy. Some jurisdictions require the employer to actually make a request to the employee to commit perjury before finding the public policy against perjury is implicated. Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 134 Wis.2d 136, 396 N.W.2d 167, 170 (1986); see Meehan v. Amax Oil & Gas, Inc., 796 F.Supp. 461, 468 (D.Colo.1992) (employer never directed employee to act in certain way and never specifically prohibited employee from exercising privilege). Thus, a discharge based on an employer's concern that the employee will testify truthfully if asked to testify or that the employee intends to testify contrary to the interests of the employer is insufficient to support a cause of action under the public policy exception. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis.2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (1983) (public policy must be clearly identifiable, [n]o employer should be subject to suit merely because a discharged employee's conduct was praiseworthy or because the public may have derived some benefit from it). Other jurisdictions limit the action by requiring an unmistakable threat to the public policy. See Daniel v. Carolina Sunrock Corp., 335 N.C. 233, 436 S.E.2d 835, 836 (1993) (statement by employer reminding employee for whom she worked and to say as little as possible prior to providing testimony was insufficient to implicate the public policy against the perjury). We believe the dismissal of an employee can jeopardize public policy when the employee has engaged in conduct consistent with public policy without a request by the employer to violate public policy just as it can when the employee refuses to engage in conduct which is inconsistent with public policy when requested by the employer. The focus is on the adverse actions of the employer in response to the protected actions of the employee, not the actions of the employer which may give rise to the protected actions of the employee. Furthermore, in considering whether the dismissal undermines public policy, we not only look to the impact of the discharge on the dismissed employee, but the impact of the dismissal on other employees as well. Public policy applies to all employees. If the dismissal of one employee for engaging in public policy conduct will discourage other employees from engaging in the public policy conduct, public policy is undermined. In this case, if Salsbury was motivated to dismiss Fitzgerald because he intended to testify truthfully in a future lawsuit, a dismissal would have a chilling effect on other employees by discouraging them from engaging in similar conduct. See Lara, 512 N.W.2d at 782. Thus, it makes no difference that a dismissal in this particular case may give the employee an enhanced incentive to testify after a dismissal. The action by the employer could inhibit other employees from truthfully testifying in the future out of fear of dismissal. Salsbury further argues that interpreting the tort to include conduct alleged by Fitzgerald will open the floodgates to litigation for wrongful discharge on public policy grounds whenever an employee internally expresses reservations over the termination of a co-employee and then is later dismissed for some valid reason unrelated to the prior termination of the co-employee. This argument, however, can be made to practically every public policy claim which serves as the basis for a wrongful discharge action. See Page, 480 S.E.2d at 826. Yet, it is up to the fact finder, in most instances, to determine whether any particular case has merit. We simply recognize a tort for discharge in violation of a public policy to provide truthful testimony, and leave it to the jury to determine if the facts support the claim. The action in this case is based in part upon an internal complaint by the employee, but is enough to withstand summary judgment because the context of the internal complaint justifies an inference of an intent to testify against the employer which may have caused the employer to dismiss the employee.