Opinion ID: 182595
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exigent Circumstances of Officer Safety

Text: Because the Officer Defendants had no warrant to search the Huff home, and were not given consent to enter the residence by either Maria or Vincent, their entry into the house is constitutionally impermissible unless exigent circumstances are present. See id. There are exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry by police officers into a home if the officers have a reasonable belief that their entry is necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts. Fisher v. City of San Jose, 558 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir.2009). We have stated that the exigent circumstance does not, however, relieve the police of the need to have probable cause. United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 905 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc). In Johnson, we stated that when the government relies on the exigent circumstances exception, it ... must satisfy two requirements: first, the government must prove that the officer had probable cause to search the house; and second, the government must prove that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless intrusion. Id.; see also United States v. Ojeda, 276 F.3d 486, 488 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam). The Supreme Court has stated that the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984); see also Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) ([I]n the absence of hot pursuit there must be at least probable cause to believe that one or more of the other factors justifying the entry were present....). We have further explained that police officers can meet their heavy burden only by showing specific and articulable facts that justify a finding of exigent circumstances. LaLonde v. Cnty. of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Shephard, 21 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir.1994)). Mere speculation is not enough to establish exigent circumstances. See United States v. Suarez, 902 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.1990) (finding that speculation about the presence of drugs on the premises and the danger of their destruction is not sufficient to show exigent circumstances); United States v. Driver, 776 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir.1985) ([T]his burden is not satisfied by leading a court to speculate about what may or might have been the circumstances.). The Supreme Court has recognized only a few such conditions that constitute exigent circumstances. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (ongoing fire); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (same); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (destruction of evidence). In addition to exigency, officers must have probable cause. Officers have probable cause for a search when `the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.' United States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 648 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). Probable cause is determined based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time. United States v. Alaimalo, 313 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir.2002). Here, the police did not have, nor did the district court find, probable cause to believe that an offense had been or was being committed. [2] See United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir.2007) (outlining the probable cause standard requiring that officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested). And Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit cases unequivocally hold that probable cause is a precondition for any warrantless entry to seize a person in his home. LaLonde, 204 F.3d at 954. Indeed, the police testified that they did not think a crime had been or was being committed and that they had no reason to detain Maria or Vincent. The only arguable way we could find exigent circumstances would be to find that Maria's behavior would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry ... was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir.1984). Additionally, there were no exigent circumstances. The Officer Defendants were not pursuing a fleeing felon. The Officer Defendants were not trying to prevent the destruction of contraband or evidence. No crime had been committed. No crime was in progress. Here, the district court held: [T]he officers testified that a number of factors led them to be concerned for their own safety and for the safety of other persons in the residence: the unusual behavior of the parents in not answering the door or the telephone; the fact that Mrs. Huff did not inquire about the reason for their visit or express concern that they were investigating her son; the fact that they hung up the telephone on the officer; the fact that she refused to tell them whether there were guns in the house; and finally that she ran back into the house while being questioned. That behavior, combined with the information obtained at the schoolthat Vincent was a student who was a victim of bullying, who had been absent from school for two days, and who had threatened to shoot up the schoolled the officers to believe that there could be weapons inside the house, and that family members or the officers themselves were in danger. (ER 81:4-15.) These facts relied upon by the district court in its legal conclusions amount to mere speculation. They do not satisfy the heavy burden required for a finding of exigent circumstances. That the Huffs did not answer their door or telephone may be unusual, but it did not create exigent circumstances. Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 765 (9th Cir.2009) ([N]othing requires an individual to answer the door in response to a police officer's knocking.). The district court was incorrect in finding that Maria Huff's failure to inquire about the reason for the officers' visit, or her reluctance to speak with the officers and answer questions, were exigent circumstances. [T]o the extent that the officers reasonably perceived [Maria] to be antagonistic, they were still not at liberty to enter [her home] under these circumstances. LaLonde, 204 F.3d at 957 n. 16. Nothing in the district court's findings of fact states that Maria did not inquire about the reason for the officers' visit or express concern that they were investigating her son. Nothing in the district court's findings of fact indicates that Maria was not free to leave and return to her home, or that any of the officers had indicated that she was either required to answer their questions or restricted from returning to the inside of her house. Additionally, Maria did answer her cell phone when Ryburn called, spoke to him on the telephone, and went outside with her son Vincent upon learning they were present at her residence. She was under no obligation to invite the officers into her home. Indeed, our Constitution protects her decision to refuse the police entry into her home when they did not possess a warrant. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) (At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.). Further, the officers' assertion of a potential threat to their safety must be viewed in the context of the underlying offense. LaLonde, 204 F.3d at 957 n. 16. Here, there was no underlying offense; the officers were investigating rumors of threats. We have stated that: [t]he mere fact that a person owns a rifle and does not like law enforcement officials does not in itself allow police officers to enter the person's home and seize him simply because he is unwilling to step into the public domain for questioning, even if probable cause exists to believe that some offense has been committed. Id. In LaLonde, we found no exigent circumstances where probable cause existed; a fortiori, we should not find exigent circumstances where it is undisputed that no probable cause existed. It is also significant that Munoz and Roberts, two officers fully briefed on the background information preceding the officers' visit to the Huff home and present at the residence during the entire incident, entered the house because they believed they had been given consent, and not because of any perceived exigency. Nor did Ryburn or Zepeda communicate any exigency to Munoz and Roberts. When the officers entered the Huff home, they committed a Fourth Amendment violation. The district court was incorrect in finding that exigent circumstances existed. Finally, we note that although the officers do not specifically argue that their warrantless entry was justified by emergency circumstances, we would reject such a claim. The emergency doctrine applies when police officers reasonably believe entry is necessary to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). This exception may appear to fit better the facts of this case because the officers need not have probable cause to show a crime has been or is about to be committed; instead, [t]here must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched. Hopkins, 573 F.3d at 764 n. 5. Here, however, there was no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there [wa]s an immediate need to protect others or themselves from serious harm. United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 951-52 (9th Cir.2008). Maria merely asserted her right to end her conversation with the officers and returned to her home. Therefore, as discussed above, any belief that the officers or other family members were in serious, imminent harm would have been objectively unreasonable.