Opinion ID: 2679782
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: procedural reasonableness of the sentences

Text: All three Defendants objected to the district court’s guidelines calculations below. However, only Lee and Stanley have properly raised those objections in their appeals. Although Ryan’s brief makes some reference to his disagreement with the district judge’s guidelines calculations, he does not cite to any legal authority, does not devote a section of the brief to this issue, and, more significantly, his attorney specifically acknowledged, both in his brief and at oral argument, that Ryan is challenging only the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. This Court will not review claims that a party has abandoned. See United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003). In Jernigan, the appellant made four passing references to the district court’s ruling on an evidentiary issue under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), each reference embedded under different topical headings. Id. This Court held that he abandoned the argument that the district court erred in its ruling because he did not “devote[] a discrete section of his argument to [the] claim[].” Id. Similarly, this Court finds that Ryan has abandoned his arguments as to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. 9 Case: 12-16540 Date Filed: 06/20/2014 Page: 10 of 24 We now address the procedural reasonableness issues as they relate to Lee and Stanley. A sentencing court must consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, and impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to account for the need for a sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, and to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1)–(2), (6). A sentence can be procedurally unreasonable if the district court makes errors such as (1) failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the guideline range, (2) treating the Guidelines as mandatory, (3) failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, (4) selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or (5) failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the guideline range. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597, 169 L.Ed.2d at 457–58. Nothing requires the district court to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors, and an acknowledgment that it has considered each will suffice. United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir. 2007). 10 Case: 12-16540 Date Filed: 06/20/2014 Page: 11 of 24 In this case, Lee and Stanley claim that their sentences were procedurally unreasonable based upon the district court’s improper calculation of the guideline range. A. The district court erred in applying the six-level enhancement for assault during immediate flight. A defendant is subject to a six-level enhancement if she or a person for whose conduct she is accountable assaulted a law enforcement officer during “the course of the offense or an immediate flight therefrom” in a manner creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c)(1) (emphasis added). The Guidelines do not define “immediate flight.” See U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2. The district court determined that continuous flight was equivalent to immediate flight and, since the Defendants were continuously fleeing from the bank robbery for eight days, the enhancement for immediate flight should apply. Lee and Stanley argue that the district court improperly applied this enhancement. They argue that “immediate flight” cannot include an assault in Colorado more than a week after the bank robbery in Georgia. This Court has not previously interpreted the term “immediate flight.” Since “immediate flight” is not defined by the Guidelines, we are bound to give the term its ordinary meaning. See United States v. Digiorgio, 193 F.3d 1175, 1178 (11th Cir. 1999) (using Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “ransom” where the Guidelines did not define that term). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “immediate” 11 Case: 12-16540 Date Filed: 06/20/2014 Page: 12 of 24 as “occurring without delay; instant.” Black’s Law Dictionary 751 (7th ed. 1999). Another frequently cited dictionary defines “immediate” as “occurring, acting or accomplished without loss of time; made or done at once; instant.” Webter’s Third New International Dictionary 1129 (Unabridged ed. 1986); 7 Oxford English Dictionary 681 (2d ed. 1989) (“occurring, accomplished, or taking effect without delay or lapse of time; done at once; instant”). Under each definition, the Defendants’ assaults against the police officers in this case, occurring eight days after, and thousands of miles and several states away from the Georgia robbery, no matter how disturbing or egregious, do not meet the ordinary meaning of the term “immediate.” We find that the district court improperly applied the six-level enhancement under § 3A1.2(c). We therefore vacate the sentences of Lee and Stanley and remand for resentencing without the application of this enhancement. B. The district court correctly applied the enhancement for recklessly creating substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer. Under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, a defendant is subject to a two-level enhancement if she recklessly creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. Unlike the enhancement for assaulting a police officer during immediate flight under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(c), there is no requirement of immediacy in the § 3C1.2 enhancement. And, “during flight” is construed broadly and is applicable 12 Case: 12-16540 Date Filed: 06/20/2014 Page: 13 of 24 where the conduct occurs in the course of resisting arrest. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 cmt. n.3 (2012). The facts of this case establish that Lee and Stanley fled from a law enforcement officer during the chase in Colorado. A defendant sentenced under this section is accountable for her own conduct as well as conduct that she aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused. Id. cmt. n.5 (2012). But a defendant cannot be held responsible for another’s conduct under § 3C1.2 without some form of direct or active participation. See United States v. Cook, 181 F.3d 1232, 1235 (11th Cir. 1999). Mere foreseeability of the conduct is insufficient. See id. This Court requires “a specific finding [] that the defendant actively caused or procured the reckless behavior at issue.” United States v. Johnson, 694 F.3d 1192, 1196–97 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Cook, 181 F.3d at 1235). Lee and Stanley each argue that they cannot be held responsible for the danger created by Ryan’s reckless driving because the evidence is insufficient to establish that either Lee or Stanley actively caused or procured Ryan’s reckless behavior. But we need not decide that issue in this case because both Lee and Stanley personally engaged in conduct that recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer. Stanley fired the shots at the police officers during the car 13 Case: 12-16540 Date Filed: 06/20/2014 Page: 14 of 24 chase, and Lee pointed a machine pistol at a police officer after the car crashed. Each of these acts falls within the purview of § 3C1.2. Lee and Stanley also argue that their convictions for violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) preclude further enhancements based upon the possession, brandishing, use or discharge of a firearm. However, the § 924(c) conviction and the § 3C1.2 adjustment are based upon different conduct. The § 924(c) convictions were based upon their discharge of a firearm at the bank in Georgia while the district court applied a § 3C1.2 enhancement because Stanley fired shots at police officers in Colorado, and Lee raised her gun at a police officer in Colorado. Defendants rely on Comment 4 to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, which provides that where a sentence includes a conviction and enhancement for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the Court may not “apply any specific offense characteristic for possession, brandishing, use or discharge of any explosive or firearm when determining the sentence for the underlying offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 cmt. n.4 (2012). The Comment goes on to state that “[a] sentence under this guideline accounts for any explosive or weapon enhancement for the underlying offense of conviction, including any such enhancement that would apply based on conduct for which the defendant is accountable under 1.3 (Relevant Conduct).” Id. The Defendants’ reliance on Comment 4 to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 is misplaced. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 provides that where a sentence includes a conviction and 14 Case: 12-16540 Date Filed: 06/20/2014 Page: 15 of 24 enhancement for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the Court may not “apply any specific offense characteristic for possession, brandishing, use or discharge of any explosive or firearm when determining the sentence for the underlying offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 cmt. n.4 (2012) (emphasis added). However, “specific offense characteristics” are delineated in Chapter Two. See U.S.S.G. §1B1.1(a)(2) (instructing that the base offense level and any appropriate specific offense characteristics are to be applied in Chapter Two). The two-level adjustment under § 3C1.2 is an obstruction adjustment; it is not a specific offense characteristic that might be in conflict with U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, and it is, therefore, not prohibited by Comment 4. The district court properly applied the two-level adjustment under § 3C1.2 to both Lee and Stanley. C. The district court properly applied the sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice for Stanley’s attempt to flee county jail. Stanley argues that his attempt to flee the county jail in Colorado several months after his arrest did not warrant a two-level enhancement under § 3C1.1. He claims that his attempt to flee related only to the Colorado state charges and not the Georgia bank robbery. Under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, a defendant’s offense level is increased by two if he willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or 15 Case: 12-16540 Date Filed: 06/20/2014 Page: 16 of 24 sentencing of the offense of conviction. The application notes cite as an example of covered conduct “escaping or attempting to escape from custody before trial or sentencing.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(E) (2012). Avoiding or fleeing from arrest, however, is typically not covered. Id. cmt. n.5(D) (2012). In United States v. Alpert, 28 F.3d 1104, 1106–07 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), relied on by Stanley, this Court considered a § 3C1.1 enhancement applied when the defendants left town during plea negotiations without notifying the government. The government in that case had withheld indictment, intending to proceed later by information. Id. at 1106. This Court concluded that the enhancement did not apply to persons engaged in criminal activity who learn of an investigation and simply disappear to avoid arrest. Id. at 1107. That case was remanded for further consideration because the enhancement could apply if the district court made findings to support its inference that the defendants’ conduct obstructed justice. Id. at 1108. Alpert is inapplicable here. That case involved flight before indictment when the defendants were not incarcerated. See id. at 1106–07. Here, Stanley was incarcerated and indicted before his escape attempt. Under the plain language of the application note, Stanley is properly subject to this enhancement because he was attempting to escape from custody before trial or sentencing. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(E) (2012). 16 Case: 12-16540 Date Filed: 06/20/2014 Page: 17 of 24