Opinion ID: 1718207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Federal Statutory Policy

Text: 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides that, in actions under certain civil rights statutes including 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which the federal suit was brought the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as a part of the costs. This statute has the purpose of assisting persons who have claim of violation of constitutional rights to advance their claims through litigation. Congress was aware that people often lack the means for obtaining legal assistance to vindicate their rights in court, and it responded by permitting fee awards to successful litigants. The fee award statute represents a national policy which we should respect. [6] One of the purposes of ACLU/EM is to sponsor statutory actions to establish civil rights. [7] By providing the services of a salaried staff attorney, ACLU/EM may make it possible for agreeable but impecunious litigants to commence suit without a monetary advance. This arrangement serves the policy of the underlying federal statutes and is perfectly consistent with every ethical standard of the legal profession. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides that fee awards are to be made to the prevailing party. It is manifest, however, that the purpose of the award is to permit the prevailing party to fulfill express or implied obligations for legal services. Courts construing this section have never hesitated to make awards in favor of organizations such as ACLU/EM, which sponsor litigation for the enforcement of constitutional rights. [8] Cases are legion in which awards have been made for the services of salaried attorneys when all concerned clearly understand that the award will be paid over to the employer. I have seen no case in which the court awarding the fees has suggested that there is the least impropriety in so doing. However the decree awarding fees is phrased, ACLU/EM is an eligible recipient for a fee award under the federal statute. There is absolutely no support in the cases for the statement in the principal opinion that the statute was intended to compensate the attorney representing him without regard to the attorney's contractual obligations. ACLU/EM's connection with the federal case was manifest in the pleadings. I am sure that the court awarding the fees fully expected that the portion awarded on account of the defendant's services would be paid over to his employer, and considered that such payments would be consistent both with the governing law and with established ethical standards. Such an understanding would accord with the uniform course of decision. I am confident that the federal judge would be as shocked as I am at the defendant's having converted the proceeds to his own use. He necessarily assumed that all involved would comply with their contractual obligations, and that he did not have to police the distribution of the proceeds.