Opinion ID: 1979766
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Defendant: Bastard.

Text: The Court: Sir, you don't need The Defendant: Let me go, man, let me go. The Court: Mr. Jones, don't do that. The Defendant: He's still talking to me, man. The Court: Don't do that because you don't want me to have to start talking about contempt of court. You don't want that. The court thereafter continued the case for four weeks so that the defendant could decide, inter alia, whether he wanted to be tried by a jury or by the court. On May 12, 2003, McWhirter informed the trial court that, due to a grievance that the defendant had filed against him with the statewide grievance committee, he no longer would be representing the defendant. Lawrence Hopkins, a special public defender, subsequently was appointed to represent the defendant. [8] On January 27, 2004, the trial court, Hartmere, J., [9] held a hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress his confession to the Waterbury police. In an oral ruling on January 30, 2004, the trial court denied the defendant's motion. [10] After the court had concluded its ruling, the assistant state's attorney and defense counsel agreed that there was nothing further for the court to consider regarding the defendant's case. Defense counsel informed the court, however, that the defendant wished to speak. The court recognized the defendant, who proceeded to challenge the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law on his motion to suppress. After some discussion between the court and the defendant, the court stated to the defendant: I'm not going to argue with you. . . . I've made my ruling. [Defense counsel] has taken an exception, but your rights were not violated. . . . The defendant nevertheless continued to insist that the trial court improperly had denied his motion. Although the court again told the defendant that there would be no further argument on the matter, the defendant persisted in disputing the court's ruling. The trial court interrupted the defendant, however, and terminated the hearing, stating: All right. I've heard enough. I've made my ruling. That's it. You have the right to appeal it. Trial was scheduled to commence on the next court day. Prior to the commencement of evidence, on the first day of trial, defense counsel informed the court that the defendant had injured his hand while being transported back to jail after the hearing on the motion to suppress. A marshal later informed the court that the defendant had put his hand though a Plexiglas window in anger over the trial court's decision to deny his motion to suppress. Later that day, the state called Minnifield as a witness. Under questioning by the assistant state's attorney, Minnifield testified that the defendant had cut her with a knife after becoming angry and jealous when he saw her wearing a new outfit. During a recess, the court admonished the assistant state's attorney for eliciting that testimony from Minnifield in light of a pretrial order that allowed the state to introduce evidence that the defendant had used a knife to remove Minnifield's pants but that precluded the state from eliciting testimony that the defendant had cut Minnifield with a knife. The assistant state's attorney apologized, stating that she did not realize that Minnifield's testimony was barred by the order. When the court asked defense counsel if he had anything to say, he stated that he could not recall whether the assistant state's attorney had elicited testimony from Minnifield that the defendant intentionally had cut her with the knife and that, in any event, he had not objected to the testimony at the time because he did not want to focus the attention of the jury on that testimony. Defense counsel then objected outside the presence of the jury to any inference that [the defendant] cut [Minnifield] with a knife for the obvious reason that that's not the case that's on trial here. . . . Defense counsel also asked the trial court for a cautionary instruction either at the end of the case or at some time that the court deems appropriate during the . . . case. The trial court later instructed the jury that the defendant was not on trial for assaulting Minnifield and that they should disregard any testimony by Minnifield to that effect. At the commencement of proceedings the next day, however, defense counsel informed the court that the defendant wished to address the court for the purpose of seeking a mistrial due to Minnifield's testimony the previous day. According to defense counsel, the defendant believed that the testimony improperly had impugned his character by suggesting that he was abusive. The trial court responded that, because the issue that the defendant had raised involved a legal question, the court would consider the matter only if defense counsel wished to revisit the issue. Defense counsel responded that, in his view, the trial court adequately had instructed the jury the day before regarding Minnifield's testimony. Defense counsel subsequently informed the court that the defendant, as a result of what he consider[s] to be . . . the prejudicial impact of . . . Minnifield's testimony . . . would choose personally at this point not to go [forward] with the proceedings. Defense counsel further stated that he had explained to the defendant that the trial would proceed in his absence. Thereafter, the following colloquy between the court and the defendant occurred: The Defendant: Your Honor . . . I don't even want to be here then. The Court: Are you sure . . .? The Defendant: Yeah, I'm positive, because my life is on the line right here, right? Now, I'm the defendant. He's counsel. For one, I don't agree with his . . . misrepresentation and his performance that he gave yesterday also, because I had asked him personally to The Court: . . . I'll let you leave in a moment, but let me just be sure you know what you're doing. The Defendant: I know what I'm doing, Your Honor. The Court: The case is going to proceed, you know, without you. The Defendant: Well, it doesn't matter because I'm not going to sit here while my defamation of character is being presented in the case as evidence. Basically, it was presented as evidence, Your Honor. The Court: I've ruled on that. . . . It's a legal ruling by the court. The Defendant: It's out already, Your Honor. The Court: You don't have to agree with me. The Defendant: It's out already. It doesn't matter how you [are] going to see it. It's out. The Court: All right. Do you wish . . . to . . . absent yourself today? The Defendant: Yeah, `cause . . . I'm not going to sit here The Court: All right. The Defendant:but The Court: That's what you want to do? The Defendant: But, also, I would like you to know that, personally, I'm objecting to counselor's representation and to [his] performance. The Court: All right. The Defendant: So, basically, I want that to be noted on the record. The Court: All right. Just as long as you know we're going to proceed. The state has its witnesses here. I'm not going to argue with you about every legal ruling that I do, as I have been The Defendant: That's just fair. The Court: And we're going to proceed. Now, you're going to be prejudiced by this, you understand that? The Defendant: It was prejudice to me already. The Court: When you're not here, I'm talking about. The jury's going to notice you're not here when we're proceeding with this trial. The Defendant: If that'sif that's The Court: I'm sure [defense counsel] The Defendant:how I got to go forward with this because the fact that I'm sitting here, I'm on trial for murder, not assault. The Court: Do you understand what I just said to you? The Defendant: Your Honor, yes, but please hear me out. The Court: Go ahead. The Defendant: Please hear me out. The Court: Very briefly. We've been keeping the jury out there for almost an hour now. . . . The Defendant: Now, we . . . sat down last week, and the state knows that. You gave them an order. Not only did she . . . [bypass it] once but twice. . . . The Court: I've addressed that. The Defendant: And thenno, and then she [brought] another victim . . . to another charge onto the stand and . . . put me out there as an abusive person, which ha[s] nothing to do with the murder at all. The Court: Part of it does have something to do with the murder. . . . The Defendant: No it doesn't. No, it doesn't. The Court: I'm not going to argue with you about this. The Defendant: It doesn't have [any]thing to do with the murder, Your Honor. The Court: I mean, I've made my ruling. The Defendant: I'm not on trial for assault. The Court: . . . [Y]ou understand you're going to be prejudicing yourself by leaving today. You understand that? Do you understand that? The Defendant: Well, I want toI'm going to put a motion in to dismiss counsel, then. . . . And I'll take my case myself. . . . I'll take the case myself, Your Honor. The Court: That's denied. . . . The Defendant: I have a right, Your Honor. That's my constitutional right. The Court: All right. The Defendant: You're laughing, but I'm serious. The Court: Marshals, remove [the defendant]. [Marshal]: Let's go. . . . The Defendant: I'm not going nowhere, man. [Marshal]: Come on. The Defendant: Don't touch me. A scuffle ensued. After the defendant was removed from the courtroom, the trial court noted, for purposes of the record, that the defendant had to be physically restrained by a number of marshals. I guess to say [the defendant] is a violent man is understating the obvious. The trial court then asked defense counsel if he wished to address the court. Defense counsel responded that, in conjunction with [the defendant's] outburst, [the defendant] expressed a desire to represent himself, which probably is his right if he were able to conduct himself appropriately in the courtroom. The trial court responded, That's the problem. He's still screaming now. Defense counsel then suggested that the court recess for the day to give the defendant time to calm down and to decide whether he wished to absent himself from the trial or to proceed pro se. The trial court responded: [The defendant] has . . . a history of violence just in this case. . . . I still don't know the answer to yesterday's violence where he was unhappy with my ruling from last Friday and smashed, apparently, a Plexiglas window, injuring his hand, and was going to be seen by a doctor last night. We have corrections here. Was he seen last night? A correction officer indicated that the defendant had been examined by a physician and that he had broken a bone in his hand. The trial court then stated: I'm not optimistic, to say the . . . least, that [the defendant]I don't know that he'll last through another objection overruled if heI think it would be foolhardy to allow him to represent himself given his history of violence and, as I say, just in this courtroom. Today's episodeit took eight to ten marshals to get him out of the courtroom. I mean . . . he just refuses to listen or to be bound by any ruling of the court as everyone in the courtroom recognizes, I think. He just won't take an answer which goes against him, and his reaction to all of this is always the same, it's violence. So I don't think it would be in anyone's interest to allow him to represent himself. He does have a right to absent himself. Of course, he can, by his conduct, waive his presence in the courtroom, which is what he's done right now, and that's the reason we're proceeding without him, because we obviously don't have any choice, when someone reacts the way he does with such extreme violence, but to remove him from the courtroom. . . . So that's where we are now. . . . [The defendant] has, by his actions, voluntarily absented himself from the courtroom. . . . [T]here aren't options available to the court other than to recess and see whether he can calm down. The trial court then called a three hour recess to give the defendant time to calm down and to consult with defense counsel. After the recess, the trial court excused the jury for the remainder of the day. At that time, Anthony Candido, the chief marshal in the judicial district of Waterbury, informed the court that, after the defendant had been removed from the courtroom, he refused a marshal's request to place his hands behind his back and yelled, I will continue to fight, and . . . I will bring you people down. One marshal was injured trying to subdue the defendant and had to be taken to the hospital. Candido asked the court if, in the future, the defendant could be kept in full restraints, that is, belly chains and leg irons, [11] when he was in the courtroom in order to ensure the safety of everyone in the courtroom. After expressing the concern that the jury might learn about the defendant's violent courtroom behavior from media reports, [12] the trial court stated: I'm very concerned, having observed . . . the defendant over the course of jury selection, especially after ruling on his motions, his reaction thereto, and it just appears every time the defendant gets an adverse ruling, he reacts and reacts violently at times, including breaking his hand after . . . what he viewed as losing on the motion to suppress. And then, today, of course, it took about eight marshals to get him out of the courtroom, and he just refused to stop arguing his points, and he just . . . will not take direction. . . . But I am very concerned . . . about the violent nature of his behavior. And before I hear from counsel on this, I have thought about it for the remainder of the morning after we broke. And I'm not at all sure that this trial could proceed in an orderly fashion with [the defendant] in the courtroom. He just . . . refuses to accept any ruling that doesn't go in his favor. And I am concerned, as is Marshal Candido, about the safety of people in the courtroom. That includes the prosecutors, the other court personnel, the jury and his own counsel. He just . . . lashes out at adverse rulings. I think before [the defendant] was removed . . . he was fully advised that the trial would continue in his absence. And I believe I told him it was not in his interest to do that. But, even in doing that, he just refusesand he had time to calm down is what really concerns the court. He had time to calm down during this morning's proceedings, and he just will not listen or will not even attempt to behave from what the court can see. So, I think it'sthe record as it stands, I think he's forfeited his right to . . . be in the courtroom by his engaging in this disruptive and volatile, disorderly, disrespectful conduct. And . . . I'm not optimistic that, despite what he says or may say down the roadand I haven't heard anything yetbut even if he were to promise to try to behave, based on having observed him over the course of the last two weeks or so, I am very concerned for the court personnel, who will be closer to him than I, for their safety because he just does not control himself and does not appear to want to control himself, more importantly. So, the only way for him to be in the courtroom would be in severe restraints so that . . . he could not hurt any personnel. And I'm not sure, frankly, in the interest of justice, that that should happen. He, I think is better off, given his course of conduct, not being in the courtroom. But, again, I'm going to listen to counsel about all of this. Defense counsel responded that he had had an opportunity to speak to the defendant after the removal of the defendant from the courtroom and that the defendant had stated that he simply wanted no part of the trial and that he didn't even want to be brought into the building anymore. Defense counsel requested, however, that, each day, the defendant be given the option of being transported to the courthouse or remaining at the correctional facility. The trial court agreed with defense counsel's proposal and instructed the responsible court personnel and department of correction personnel accordingly. [13] Thereafter, Candido informed the court that there was a holding cell adjacent to the courtroom that was equipped with a monitor and speaker system, from which the occupant could observe and listen to the trial proceedings. After acknowledging the possibility of allowing the defendant to monitor the trial from that cell if he agreed to desist from any further violent conduct, the trial court stated: If [the defendant] does not want to come to [the courthouse], we won't force him. And . . . if he decides to come . . . my inclination is to have the defendant next door [so that he will] be able to view and listen to the proceedings and have [defense counsel] confer with him. But I'll listen. If that's what happens, if the defendant decides to come to court, I'll listen to any other requests. But, as of now, based on everything the court has observed and stated today and heard today, my inclination is not to bring him into the courtroom unless he is highly restrained. And I'll leave that to [defense counsel] and the defendant as to which . . . of those two courses they want to choose, if and when we reach that point. The next morning, defense counsel informed the trial court that the defendant had elected to come to court that day and had expressed the desire to be present in the courtroom, but had not agreed to wear any restraints other than the leg irons that he ordinarily wore. The trial court asked the deputy chief marshal, Gino DiMauro, whether he was comfortable allowing the defendant back into the courtroom. [14] DiMauro responded that he would like an opportunity to assess the defendant before answering the court's question. After DiMauro had left to speak to the defendant, the trial court explained that it had reviewed the federal and state authority relevant to the issue of whether the defendant should be permitted to return to the courtroom under the circumstances. The court then stated: [T]his court is still very concerned about . . . allowing the defendant to remain in this courtroom during these proceedings. Given his track record and outbursts here, this court has no reason to believe the defendant will be able to comport himself and that he won't react violently again the next time a ruling goes against him. . . . I'm particularly concerned about many of the court personnel and, for that matter, the jury, and any effect [the defendant's behavior] may have on the jury. . . . I personally . . . think having the defendant severely restricted in terms of movement in the courtroom is much more prejudicial than having him absent and directing the jury to draw no adverse inference [from] his absence. [15] When DiMauro returned, he informed the court that the defendant had agreed to attend the trial in full restraints and that he had promised that there would be no further outbursts. DiMauro further indicated that he believed that, under the circumstances, his personnel, with the assistance of department of correction personnel, could maintain security in the courtroom. After inquiring about the availability of additional security personnel, the trial court reluctantly agreed to the plan and called a recess so that the marshals could bring the defendant into the courtroom. A short time later, however, DiMauro returned to the courtroom and informed the court that the defendant had been somewhat confrontational toward the marshals when they had gone to get him, that he was visibly agitated and that he was still talking about yesterday. DiMauro further stated that the defendant did not think that he had done anything wrong the day before and believed that he had been treated unjustly. The court stated, Well, now we're back to it sounding like there's going to be real trouble if he's brought into the courtroom. DiMauro responded: Yes, sir . . . that's my assessment. My feeling [is] he just wants to get in the courtroom to cause further discomfort. DiMauro added that, in light of the defendant's threats the day before to bring [the marshals] down with him, he was not comfortable bringing the defendant back into the courtroom at that time. When the court asked defense counsel if he had any comment, he stated that he did not. Upon reconsideration, the trial court ruled that, by virtue of the defendant's disruptive behavior, the defendant had waived any right to be present during the proceedings. The trial court further stated: I'll also find that, based on the [marshal's] assessment . . . were [the defendant] allowed into the courtroom, it is very likely that he will cause additional disruptions before the jury . . . possibly result[ing] in further injuries to either court personnel, the jury, witnesses or spectators for that matter. The court concluded that the wisest and safest course of action at this point is to have the defendant remain in one of the outer holding rooms here where he will be able to listen to the proceedings, and counsel will be available to consult with him at appropriate times. And I'll leave that to you, [defense counsel], as to when you wish to consult with him, and we will accommodate that. But I just feel, again, based on everything that's transpired, based on all of the authority which I've cited previously yesterday and today, that the situation is just too volatile, remains too volatile, to allow the defendant to further disrupt these proceedings. [16] Soon thereafter, defense counsel informed the court that he had consulted with the defendant, who stated that he wanted a new attorney, and that, if he could not be present in the courtroom, he preferred to be taken back to the correctional facility at which he was incarcerated. The trial court responded that, after the defendant had been removed from the courtroom the previous day, he could be heard screaming and pounding on the walls of his holding cell and that, in light of the defendant's prior behavior, it probably was best to allow him to return to his prison cell. The court reiterated that, for the duration of the trial, the defendant would be asked every morning whether he wished to be transported to the courthouse but that he would not be forced to come against his wishes. The defendant did not return to the courtroom until his sentencing. With these facts in mind, we summarize the legal principles that govern our review of the defendant's claim. We begin with a fundamental tenet of criminal jurisprudence: a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of his or her prosecution. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (the right to personal presence at all critical stages of the trial and the right to counsel are fundamental rights of each criminal defendant). Indeed, [a] defendant's right to be present . . . is scarcely less important to the accused than the right of trial itself. . . . State v. Simino, 200 Conn. 113, 127, 509 A.2d 1039 (1986). Although the constitutional right to be present is rooted to a large extent in the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment, courts have recognized that this right is protected by the due process clause in situations [in which] the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-106, 108, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934); see State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 691-92, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987) (recognizing that right to be present similarly is guaranteed by article first, § 8, of our state constitution), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061, 108 S.Ct. 1017, 98 L.Ed.2d 982 (1988). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lopez, 271 Conn. 724, 732, 859 A.2d 898 (2004). Notwithstanding the fundamental nature of the right of confrontation, it is well established that [a criminal] defendant may waive [the] right . . . in a number of ways, such as by his voluntary and deliberate absence from trial; Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 94 S.Ct. 194, 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973); by disruptive conduct which requires his removal from the courtroom; Illinois v. Allen, [397 U.S. 337, 342-43, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970)]; State v. Drakeford, [202 Conn. 75, 79, 519 A.2d 1194 (1987)]; State v. Simino, supra [200 Conn. at 129, 509 A.2d 1039]; see State v. Johnson, 185 Conn. 163, 178-79, 440 A.2d 858 (1981), aff'd, 460 U.S. 73, 103 S.Ct. 969, 74 L.Ed.2d 823 (1983); or by causing a witness to be unavailable for trial for the purpose of preventing that witness from testifying. State v. Jarzbek, supra, 204 Conn. at 698, 529 A.2d 1245. With respect to waiver of the right of confrontation by disruptive conduct, a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. Once lost, the right to be present can, of course, be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings. Illinois v. Allen, supra, at 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057. Finally, the trial court has broad discretion in determining whether the removal of an accused from the courtroom is an appropriate measure in light of the nature and severity of the improper conduct. See, e.g., Norde v. Keane, 294 F.3d 401, 413 (2d Cir.2002). We now turn to the merits of the defendant's claims. A The defendant first claims that he was forcibly removed from the courtroom on February 3, 2004, without warning and for insufficient cause, in contravention of the general rule that before an unruly defendant may be removed from the courtroom, he first must be given a warning and an opportunity to agree to comport himself properly. We reject this claim because it is predicated on a faulty factual premise. The record reflects that the trial court did not warn the defendant that he would be removed from the courtroom if he persisted in misbehaving for the simple reason that it was not the defendant's conduct that precipitated his removal. Rather, the trial court ordered the defendant's removal because the defendant had requested that he be permitted to leave the courtroom, which, although inadvisable, was the defendant's right. See, e.g., State v. Drakeford, supra, 202 Conn. at 78-79, 519 A.2d 1194 (accused waived right to be present at trial after court warned that trial would continue in absence of accused and accused nevertheless chose to leave); Talton v. Warden, 171 Conn. 378, 384, 370 A.2d 965 (1976) (accused may waive right to be present at trial). Specifically, after the trial court denied the defendant's request for a mistrial on the basis of Minnifield's testimony that the defendant had cut her with a knife, defense counsel informed the court that the defendant no longer wished to participate in the trial proceedings. At that time, the court asked the defendant whether he was certain of his decision, and the defendant responded that he was. On several occasions, the court explained to the defendant that the case would proceed without him and that he might be prejudiced because the jury would note his absence. The defendant responded that it did not matter because he already had been prejudiced by Minnifield's testimony. Although the defendant subsequently did express displeasure with his attorney and a desire to represent himself, he did so during a discussion in which he repeatedly assured the court that he no longer wanted to participate in the trial, and he never explicitly stated that he had changed his mind about absenting himself from the courtroom. [17] Although the record is replete with conduct by the defendant that posed a challenge to the patience of the court, there is nothing about the defendant's behavior immediately prior to his removal from the courtroom to suggest that the court ordered him removed for a reason other than his own request that he be permitted to leave. Indeed, in his brief to this court, the defendant asserts that his behavior in the moments leading up to his violent outburst had been courteous and respectful. In such circumstances, we can perceive of no reason  and the defendant has not suggested one  why the trial court should have deemed it necessary to warn him that he could be removed from the courtroom unless he refrained from engaging in disruptive conduct. [18] State v. Drakeford, supra, 202 Conn. at 75, 519 A.2d 1194, supports our conclusion. In that case, the defendant, Teddy A. Drakeford, informed the trial court during jury selection that he wished to return to his jail cell. Id., at 78, 519 A.2d 1194. The court attempted to explain to him that the case would continue in his absence, but Drakeford refused to listen and continued to speak over the trial court's warnings. Id. Drakeford ultimately was removed from the courtroom. Id. Before jury selection resumed, however, the trial court sent a sheriff to inform Drakeford that he was welcome to return to the courtroom if he conducted himself appropriately. Id., at 78-79, 519 A.2d 1194. Drakeford declined the invitation to return. Id., at 79, 519 A.2d 1194. On appeal from his murder conviction, Drakeford claimed that the trial court improperly had permitted jury selection to proceed without him. Id., at 78, 519 A.2d 1194. Specifically, Drakeford asserted that before resuming jury selection, the trial court should have applied the balancing test set forth in United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Santoro v. United States, 409 U.S. 1063, 93 S.Ct. 554, 34 L.Ed.2d 516 (1972), for determining whether to suspend a trial in the event that a defendant, having been released on bail, fails to appear for a scheduled trial date. [19] State v. Drakeford, supra, at 80, 519 A.2d 1194. In rejecting this claim, we noted that, unlike the defendant in Tortora, whose failure to appear might have been attributable to any number of causes, Drake-ford, by his conduct, voluntarily had opted to absent himself from the proceedings despite the trial court's warnings. See id. We stated that an accused cannot be permitted to elect to pursue one course at trial and then . . . to insist on appeal that the course which he rejected at the trial be reopened to him. . . . [T]he protection which could have been obtained was plainly waived. . . . The court only followed the course which [the defendant] himself helped to chart. . . . Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 201, 63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed. 704 (1943). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Drakeford, supra, at 81, 519 A.2d 1194. As in Drakeford, the trial court in the present case simply followed the course that the defendant himself initiated when he asked to be allowed to leave the courtroom. At no time preceding his outburst did the defendant expressly state that he had changed his mind and wished to stay. The trial court had every reason, therefore, to take the defendant at his word and order the marshals to remove him. Moreover, even after the defendant had been removed from the courtroom, but before the trial had resumed, the defendant, through his attorney, informed the court that he simply wanted no part of the trial and didn't even want to be brought into the building anymore. The defendant, therefore, cannot prevail on his claim that he was removed from the courtroom on February 3, 2004, without warning or for insufficient cause. The defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be present on that day, and he is bound by that decision for purposes of this appeal. B The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly declined to allow him to return to the courtroom in accordance with his request on February 4, 2004, the day following his violent outburst. According to the defendant, the trial court's decision not to allow him back into the courtroom is inconsistent with the principle that an unruly defendant may reclaim his right to be present after he has been removed from the courtroom as soon as [he] is willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings. Illinois v. Allen, supra, 397 U.S. at 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057. The defendant also contends that the trial court improperly relied on the opinion of Deputy Chief Marshal DiMauro that the defendant was a serious safety and security risk who, despite his representation to the contrary, was likely to disrupt the trial proceedings if permitted to return to the courtroom. We are not persuaded by the defendant's contention. As we have indicated, the trial court initially granted the defendant's request to return to the courtroom on the morning of February 4, 2004, following his violent altercation with the marshals the day before, primarily on the basis of the defendant's apparent willingness to wear full body restraints and his promise, conveyed through DiMauro, to refrain from any further misconduct. Thereafter, however, DiMauro reported to the court that the defendant was behaving somewhat confrontationally toward the marshals, that he appeared agitated and that he was unapologetic about his behavior of the day before. DiMauro further stated that, in his opinion, the defendant wished to return to the courtroom only to cause further discomfort and to disrupt the proceedings. DiMauro also expressed concern for the safety of the marshals in light of the defendant's attitude and his threats against them the previous day. When the court asked defense counsel if he had anything to say, defense counsel replied that he did not. The court then denied the defendant's request, concluding that, on the basis of all that had transpired to that point, the defendant was very likely to continue to disrupt the trial proceedings if he were permitted to return to the courtroom and, further, that the defendant's presence at trial posed a security risk to everyone else in attendance. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's request for permission to return to the courtroom. As we have explained, the defendant originally had refused to return to court in full body restraints but thereafter agreed to do so. [20] In other words, as between banishment from the courtroom and returning to the courtroom fully restrained, the defendant expressed a preference for the latter. [21] Although it may be true that a court normally should defer to the preference of the accused in this regard, we are not persuaded that the court was required to do so in the present case. First, the court understandably was concerned that, due to the defendant's demonstrated propensity for violence, he posed a particular danger to the personnel responsible for transporting him to and from the courtroom. For those persons, even attempting to outfit the defendant with body restraints gave rise to a safety risk. Second, the court reasonably concluded that, under all of the circumstances, including the defendant's volatile temper, his habitual unwillingness to accept adverse court rulings, his confrontational attitude toward the marshals and his lack of contrition for his prior violent behavior, the defendant was very likely to engage in disruptive and obstreperous conduct if permitted to return to the courtroom. Finally, as the trial court observed, the need for and use of visible restraints undoubtedly would have prejudiced the defendant in the eyes of the jurors. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has noted the serious shortcomings of the use of such restraints. [22] Illinois v. Allen, supra, 397 U.S. at 345, 90 S.Ct. 1057. In light of the relevant considerations, in particular, the nature and severity of the defendant's misconduct, his refusal to acknowledge the impropriety of that misconduct and his stubbornly antagonistic attitude, we cannot say that the trial court acted unreasonably in concluding that the defendant should not be allowed to return to the courtroom. We further conclude that the trial court's reliance on DiMauro in reaching its decision to exclude the defendant from the courtroom was not improper under the circumstances. Although it generally may be preferable for the court to question an accused personally to ascertain the sincerity of his or her willingness to refrain from any further disruptive conduct, in the present case, we cannot say that the court abused its broad discretion in dealing with the difficult situation that the defendant himself had created. First, it is readily apparent that the trial court's decision to deny the defendant permission to return to the courtroom was predicated largely on the court's own substantial dealings with and observations of the defendant. By virtue of the defendant's conduct in the courtroom itself, the trial court had firsthand knowledge of how difficult, explosive and violent the defendant could be. Moreover, as we explained in Sekou v. Warden, 216 Conn. 678, 693, 583 A.2d 1277 (1990), it is not improper for a court to rely on a judicial marshal's advice in matters pertaining to courtroom security. In Sekou, the petitioner, Tshambi Sekou, claimed that the trial court improperly had delegated the decision to restrain him to a sheriff. Id., at 691, 583 A.2d 1277. In rejecting this claim, we stated that [t]he court decided to restrain Sekou after consulting with the sheriff. Since it was presumably the sheriff, rather than the court, that ha[d] the experience in the keeping of prisoners and who must provide the guards and bear the major responsibility if untoward incidents occur, the court was entitled to rely heavily upon the sheriff's advice. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 693, 583 A.2d 1277. This reasoning applies equally to the trial court's reliance on the opinion of DiMauro, who, in addition to his responsibility for guarding the defendant and securing the courtroom, also was familiar with the defendant's violent predisposition, which his personnel had experienced firsthand on each of the two preceding court days. [23] Accordingly, under the circumstances, the trial court reasonably relied on DiMauro's advice as to whether it was prudent and safe to bring the defendant back into the courtroom. Moreover, at no time did defense counsel object to the fact that the court had obtained certain information from DiMauro rather than from the defendant himself or to the fact that the court had solicited and relied on DiMauro's advice. It also is significant that defense counsel did not take exception either to the substance of DiMauro's statements regarding the defendant's state of mind or to DiMauro's opinion that the defendant was intent on disrupting the trial if permitted to return to the courtroom. Indeed, the fact that defense counsel interposed no objection to the procedure followed by the court  or, for that matter, to the court's ultimate decision to deny the defendant permission to return to the courtroom  strongly suggests that defense counsel did not believe that there was persuasive reason to quarrel with the information and advice that DiMauro had provided to the court. Under the circumstances, the absence of such objection, although, alone, not dispositive of the defendant's claim, provides additional support for our conclusion that the trial court acted reasonably in denying the defendant permission to return to the courtroom.