Opinion ID: 2451442
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to learn, and advise, of LCCC admission criteria

Text: Bricker first analogizes his case to State v. Davis, 277 Kan. 309, 85 P.3d 1164 (2004), to support his claim that the court should allow withdrawal of his plea to correct manifest injustice because of Furney's deficiencies regarding LCCC admission criteria. There, Davis' counsel based the defense on the ground that Davis was not able to understand the nature and quality of his acts and therefore was legally insane at the time of the crime. Davis, 277 Kan. at 325, 85 P.3d 1164. Unfortunately, the defense of insanity or diminished capacity had already been abolished in K.S.A. 22-3220. Additionally, the defense's own expert witness eventually aided the State by opining that Davis did possess the mental capacity to form the requisite intent to commit the crime. As the Davis court stated, Had counsel understood the correct legal standard to be applied, counsel would have attempted to secure an expert witness whose testimony would not destroy the very defense he was attempting to establish. 277 Kan. at 328, 85 P.3d 1164. The court concluded that defense counsel's actions were both deficient and prejudicial under Strickland entitling Davis to a new trial. In a letter Bricker submitted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 6.09 (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 48), he argues withdrawal of his plea to correct manifest injustice is also required by Wilkinson v. State, 40 Kan.App.2d 741, 195 P.3d 278 (2008). Wilkinson was charged with possession of cocaine. While out on felony bond, he was arrested again and received a second charge of cocaine possession. Wilkinson pleaded guilty to the first charge and received probation with an underlying sentence of 28 months. Before his second charge proceeded to a plea, Wilkinson was picked up on a probation violation for failing a drug test. Wilkinson eventually admitted his probation violation and agreed to plead guilty to the second charge of cocaine possession. In exchange, the State agreed to recommend that Wilkinson's sentences for both charges run concurrent. However, concurrent sentences were impeded by an obstacle that was nearly insurmountable. 40 Kan.App.2d at 745, 195 P.3d 278. Specifically, Wilkinson committed his second offense while he was out on felony bond for the first offense, and Kansas statutes require consecutive sentences in such situations unless that disposition would result in a manifest injustice. See K.S.A. 21-4608(d) and K.S.A. 21-4720(a). The Wilkinson court acknowledged that a sentence results in manifest injustice only when it is obviously unfair and shocks the conscience of the court. 40 Kan.App.2d at 742, 195 P.3d 278 (citing State v. Medina, 256 Kan. 695, Syl. ¶ 1, 887 P.2d 105 [1994]). The district court ultimately imposed consecutive sentences. Wilkinson filed a motion to withdraw plea that the district court denied without an evidentiary hearing. He essentially alleged his attorney was ineffective for failing to advise him of the manifest injustice requirement for the court to order concurrent sentences. The Court of Appeals panel held that Wilkinson could not make an informed decision without being advised of the requirements of K.S.A. 21-4608(d) and K.S.A. 21-4720(a): [I]n Wilkinson's case, a concurrent sentence could be given only if consecutive sentences would shock the conscience of the court, and that's more than a tilted playing fieldthe test is nearly insurmountable. Yet Wilkinson had every reason to believe that the odds were spread out evenly, not rising to the peak of a mountain. Wilkinson pled guilty in exchange for the State's recommendation of a concurrent sentence, but the manifest-injustice standard substantially undercut the value of that bargain. Wilkinson could not make an informed decision about that plea bargain without knowledge of this standard. Wilkinson, 40 Kan.App.2d at 745, 195 P.3d 278. The panel reversed the district court and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Wilkinson's attorney, as alleged, did not tell him about the manifest injustice standard. If not, then the attorney's performance fell below the standard of reasonableness. 40 Kan.App.2d at 746, 195 P.3d 278. We disagree with Bricker that his situation is sufficiently similar to those of the defendants in Wilkinson and Davis to require withdrawal of his plea to correct manifest injustice. In both those cases, defense counsel took positions that were clearly barred by statute or else contained statutory obstacles that were nearly insurmountable. In Davis, counsel was ineffective for advocating an insanity defense abolished by statute. Accordingly, we held counsel did not adequately prepare for trial because, by his own admission, he was unaware of the proper legal standard for a defense of mental disease or defect. (Emphasis added.) 277 Kan. at 327, 85 P.3d 1164. Similarly, in Wilkinson, counsel plea bargained for concurrent sentences despite statutes requiring consecutive sentences unless that disposition would result in a manifest injustice. Consequently, we held counsel was ineffective because his client needed to know the applicable legal standard so he could intelligently evaluate this plea agreement. (Emphasis added.) 40 Kan.App.2d at 746, 195 P.3d 278. By contrast, Bricker's plea bargain was not statutorily barred. Nor did it contain an obstacle that was almost statutorily insurmountable. More specifically, his counsel did not fail to advise him of an applicable statutory or other legal standard. Furney's failure to familiarize himself with the factual admission criteria of the LCCC and his failure to advise Bricker of those facts before Bricker's plea bargain simply do not approach that level. Bricker's witness, Billam, did testify that the type of LCCC-related facts he discussed with his clients included whether they are mentally ill, have asthma or anything that you are going to require medication, and whether they can meet the physical challenges such as sit-ups, push-ups, running, and those types of things. However, the hearing transcript discloses that Billam was never offered as an expert witness, much less qualified as one by the defense, a designation which might authorize him to establish standards of performance for criminal defense attorneys. His personal practices, however exemplary, are insufficient for measuring Furney's performance under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, reh. denied 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S.Ct. 3562, 82 L.Ed.2d 864 (1984) (When criminal defendant complains of ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.); cf. Bowman v. Doherty, 235 Kan. 870, 879, 686 P.2d 112 (1984) (Expert testimony is generally required to establish the appropriate standard of care by which professional actions of attorney are measured in malpractice claim because such matter is outside knowledge of the average person.). Additionally, the record reveals Bricker understood at all material times (1) his admission into LCCC was not guaranteed but depended upon LCCC's favorable screening; and (2) even if admitted to LCCC, he still was not entitled to have the court order him there. Bricker was clearly advised of these substantial risks when he affirmed his plea bargain with the court and, unlike the defendant in Wilkinson, was able to make an informed decision about it. As mentioned, the judge stated at Bricker's plea acceptance hearing: [Court]: ... I know there is a recommendation to screen your case for possible placement at Labette. You understand the court does not have to place you at Labette? You understand that? [Bricker]: Yes, sir. (Emphasis added.) During the colloquy at the later plea withdrawal hearing, Bricker was asked about this earlier judicial reference to screening: [State Attorney]: What did you think it meant when the judge said, `We're going to screen your case as a possible placement for Labette?' [Bricker]: I just would have said basically that I had a chance to go. [State Attorney]: A chance to go? [Bricker]: Yes, ma'am. I would be screened to go. [State Attorney]: You knew it wasn't a done deal ? [Bricker]: Somewhat, yes.  (Emphasis added.) The judge confirmed this understanding with Bricker at the same hearing: You were screened for it [LCCC]. Screening by implication means you may or may not pass through. There is a possibility you don't go through. Indeed, Bricker's own witness testified that because many times defendants are not screened for LCCC until after they plead, he will, if possible, negotiate alternatives in case they do not get into boot camp.  (Emphasis added.) Under all of these circumstances, we cannot conclude that Furney's performance was constitutionally deficient. As a result, Bricker fails to meet the first prong of the Strickland test. Consequently, we need not consider the second Strickland prong: prejudice. See State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624, 649, 88 P.3d 218 (2004). Therefore we need not reach Bricker's frustration of purpose argument contending that without Furney's deficient performance, Bricker would never have entered into a plea agreement of which placement at LCCC was the primary benefit. Because Bricker has not met the high burden required under the 6th Amendment to show ineffective assistance of counsel, he has concomitantly failed to show the manifest injustice pursuant to K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 22-3210(d)(2) to justify withdrawal of his plea based upon Furney's deficiencies regarding LCCC admission criteria.