Opinion ID: 1834428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: QualifiedSufficiency of the Evidence.

Text: A. Definition of qualified. We define a qualified person for purposes of chapter 601A the same as it is defined under section 504: one who can perform the essential functions of the job in spite of his or her disability. Miller, 497 N.W.2d at 841. Thus, under both chapter 601A and section 504 Boelman's disability-related performance problems were properly considered by the court in determining whether Boelman was qualified for his position. Teahan, 951 F.2d at 515-16. If Boelman's personality and emotional problems resulting from his MS were such that he was not qualified for his job, then his termination is not discriminatory, even though the defendants fired him because of his disability. Id. at 516. B. Proof of ability to perform. Boelman does not claim that the ability to deal with coemployees and customers was unnecessary to the performance of the essential responsibilities of his position. Therefore, we only examine whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the symptoms and consequences of Boelman's MS interfered with his ability to work effectively with the staff and customers of the bank. In discussing Boelman's performance problems, the court concluded that Boelman was not qualified for his job because he suffered from a mental condition caused by his MS. Boelman contends that there was no expert testimony to support a finding that he suffered from a mental condition. [9] We reject this argument. Boelman obtained therapy from a psychologist for his personality and emotional problems. Additionally, the physician who treated him for his MS testified Boelman suffered from anxiety and depression. We believe that there was substantial evidence that Boelman suffered from a mental condition. Moreover, when the court's references to mental condition are read in context, it is clear that the court used this term as a way of labeling the set of personality traits and emotional problems Boelman exhibited which prevented him from competently performing the functions of a bank vice president. The court explained that Boelman's job required him to rely almost exclusively on his personality and on his ability to handle stressful situations. The district court found that Boelman's deteriorating job performance was based upon his inability to mentally and emotionally handle the job. The court also found that Boelman's relationship with the [bank's] customers and fellow employees had deteriorated over the years to the point where he was no longer an effective employee. We conclude there was substantial evidence that Boelman had personality and emotional problems and that these problems prevented him from competently performing this job. Therefore, Boelman failed to prove he could perform the essential functions of his position. C. Reasonable accommodation. We now consider whether the district court correctly decided that there were no reasonable accommodations that would have allowed Boelman to handle his job. The district court concluded that due to the nature of Boelman's job duties and his performance deficiencies, no accommodation would enable him to perform his job adequately. Boelman argues that he established a prima facie case and that the defendants failed to prove the bank could not accommodate Boelman's disability. Boelman did introduce evidence that the physical manifestations of his MS could be accommodated. However, the performance problems resulting in his termination were caused by the emotional consequences of his condition, not the physical consequences. Our review of the record reveals no evidence that Boelman's personality and emotional problems could be accommodated short of totally changing his job responsibilities. Neither Iowa nor federal law requires the defendants to change the essential nature of the job in order to accommodate Boelman's deficiencies. Chiari, 920 F.2d at 318; Henkel Corp., 471 N.W.2d at 811; Smith, 456 N.W.2d at 386; see Davis, 442 U.S. at 409-10, 99 S.Ct. at 2368-69, 60 L.Ed.2d at 990. Boelman failed to make a prima facie showing that reasonable accommodation was possible. Consequently, there was no error in the trial court's conclusion that no accommodation would make Boelman qualified for his position.