Opinion ID: 614400
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Beckford's Cross-Examination

Text: The government did renew its application to admit when, on cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to impeach Beckford's testimony that he was working at JFK on November 5, 2005, the date drugs were seized from the Barbados flight, with questions suggesting that he was, in fact, in Miami. Defense counsel opposed the application, insisting that he questioned Beckford only about being in Miami at a certain time on November 5, which did not necessarily mean he was never in New York or never in JFK on that date. Id. at 444-46. In fact, counsel first asked Beckford simply if he was actually in Miami on November 5. Id. at 415. Upon receiving a negative answer, counsel showed Beckford a document not in evidence, identified as a Passenger Activity Report, and asked if Beckford now recall[ed] being in Miami on November 5th, 2005. Id. at 416. When Beckford said he did not remember this, counsel asked if the document refresh[ed] [his] recollection as to where [he] might have been on that date. Id. Only after Beckford stated that he did not recall what was shown in the document did counsel repeat his question by reference to a particular time, asking Beckford if he recalled being in Miami on November 5, 2005 at about 2:52 p.m. Id. at 417. Beckford said he did not remember because, like I said, I was there [ i.e., JFK], I was working when the seizure went down. I was right there. Id. This response indicates that Beckford plainly understood the line of questions to be challenging his testimony that he was at JFK on November 5 at the time drugs were seized. The district court was of the same view, rejecting counsel's argument that he was only seeking to impeach that part of Beckford's testimony reporting that he had arrived for work at JFK on November 5 in the mid-afternoon without insinuating that Beckford was not there later in the day to witness events leading to the cocaine seizure. Once again, we need not decide whether counsel's actions triggered the waiver provision of the proffer agreement because the district court continued to exercise its discretion in favor of Roberts and denied the government's motion to admit the proffer statements. It explained that if counsel would strictly adhere to his representation that he was only questioning Beckford's presence at JFK in the mid-afternoon on November 5, Roberts's proffer statements would not be admissible to contradict that limited assertion because there [was] that window of opportunity where Mr. Beckford, even if he had been in Miami [at 2:52 p.m.] could have returned back to JFK and could have been at the airport when the Barbados flight arrived at 10:41 p.m., as Roberts acknowledged. Id. at 451. Nevertheless, the district court cautioned defense counsel that he was walking a fine line and should watch very carefully that he stayed on the side that was prompting the court to deny the government's application. Id. at 451-52. Further, the court advised that it would instruct the jury that counsel's questions were not evidence. See United States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d at 119 (observing that, where assertion is implied by counsel's questions, district court might instruct[] the jury to ignore the factual assertion stated or implied, rather than admit defendant's proffer statements in rebuttal).