Opinion ID: 1657019
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The bloody thumbprint

Text: There was evidence from which the jury could conclude that the substance on the outside of the wallet was Ms. Bradford's blood. Expert testimony established that substance as blood, as human blood and as containing chemical properties found only in approximately seventeen percent of the Black population in St. Louis. Expert testimony also established that Ms. Bradford's blood contained these same chemical properties. The fact that the human whose blood was on the outside of the wallet and Ms. Bradford were both members of a relatively small demographic group, coupled with the nature and extent of Ms. Bradford's wounds, provided a sufficient basis from which a reasonable juror could have inferred that the blood on the outside of the wallet came from Ms. Bradford. As to the print-bearing substance on the inside of the wallet, however, there is much less to go on. There was no objective evidence that the substance was blood, or that it was human blood, or that it was of the same type as Ms. Bradford's blood. The only evidence offered by the State as to the nature of this substance was criminologist Margaret Owens' testimony that the substance looked like the blood on the outside of the wallet. She did not testify, nor could she have, that it looked like human blood or that it looked like blood of any specific type. Rather, the juryand now this Courtis left to determine as to the nature of this substance by deduction. Given that the jury could reasonably infer that the blood on the outside of the wallet belonged to Ms. Bradford, should we allow the jury to use that inference as a basis from which to infer that the substance inside the wallet was also her blood? An inference is a logical and reasonable conclusion of a fact not presented by direct evidence but which by the process of logic and reason, a trier of fact may conclude exists from the established facts. State v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Mo.App. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1056, 105 S.Ct. 2120, 85 L.Ed.2d 484 (1985). As this Court has said: An inference is a conclusion drawn by reason from facts established by proof; a deduction or conclusion from facts or propositions known to be true.... A supposition is a conjecture based on the possibility that a thing could have happened. It is an idea or a notion founded on the probability that a thing may have occurred, but without proof that it did occur. [Emphasis added and quotation marks omitted.] Draper v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 348 Mo. 886, 156 S.W.2d 626, 630 (1941). This Court has long been skeptical of convictions that depend upon inferences drawn from other inferences, i.e., inference stacking. See State v. Rector, 328 Mo. 669, 40 S.W.2d 639, 643 (1931); State v. Knight, 296 S.W. 367, 369 (Mo.1927). However, when a court reverses such a conviction, it is important to realize that the ground of decision is not the so-called rule against inference stacking but rather that the evidence is not sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The [inference stacking] rule is essentially based on the fact that an inference cannot be based on insufficient evidence. It has been said to be not a rule of general application but a rule of reason governing only when the proved facts and their reasonable implications furnish no basis for agreement or disagreement by persons of average intelligence as to whether the factum probandum has been established, or where there is some doubt as to the first inference. It has been said to be at most a convenient way of guarding against what is regarded as attenuated reasoning on the part of the jury or evidence thought to be too remote or uncertain or lacking in probative force. However, there is in fact no absolute rule of law that forbids the resting of one inference on facts whose determination is the result of other inferences. On the contrary, inferences may be based on facts whose determination is the result of other inferences, so long as the first inference is based on such evidence as to be regarded as a proved fact and the conclusion reached is not too remote or conjectural. [Emphasis added.] 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 116 (1964). See also Wills v. Berberich's Delivery Co., 345 Mo. 616, 134 S.W.2d 125, 129 (1939) (same). Applying this reasoning, it appears that the jury could reasonably conclude that the substance inside the wallet was Ms. Bradford's blood. The inference that it was Ms. Bradford's blood on the outside of the wallet is sufficiently free from doubt that the secondary inference, i.e., that it was her blood inside the wallet, is not too remote or conjectural.