Opinion ID: 2447003
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Trial Court's Evidentiary Rulings

Text: Ms. Oh next argues that the trial court erroneously granted the District's motion in limine to exclude evidence of post-taking comparable sales and evidence of the sales prices NCRC paid for three other properties within the Skyland site. We address each type of evidence in turn. [21] Ms. Oh's appraiser valued her property on two different dates: November 18, 2005, the date of the taking, and a date in 2008, when the appraiser inspected the Property. The appraiser used a different set of comparable sales to conduct each valuation. At a hearing in March 2009, the trial court said to Ms. Oh's counsel, [W]e're not going to use the 2008 [comparable sales evidence]. You agree with that, don't you? Ms. Oh's counsel replied: That's fine. I have no problem with that. Counsel for the District responded that the appraisal report needed to be redacted to remove all reference to opinion and the factual basis for that opinion for the value in 2008. Ms. Oh's counsel again said, [t]hat's not a problem. Now, however, Ms. Oh assigns as error the court's exclusion of this evidence. We reject this claim because, as we have repeatedly held[,] ... a defendant may not take one position at trial and a contradictory position on appeal. Brown v. United States, 627 A.2d 499, 508 (D.C.1993). The second exclusion at issue is the evidence of sales prices that NCRC paid to owners of three other properties at Skyland located on the same street as and close to Ms. Oh's property. The prices for those three properties were $624,000 for the sale of a 1,598 square foot property (paid in anticipation of condemnation); $828,000 for the sale of a 1,594 square foot property; and $700,000 for the settlement price of a 2,116 square foot property. The District filed a motion in limine objecting to the introduction of this evidence at trial, arguing that the prices were the result of compromise, and that Hannan v. United States, 131 F.2d 441 (D.C.Cir.1942), barred its introduction. Landowner Hannan sought to introduce evidence showing the price the government paid for parcels of land, similarly situated with Hannan's property, on a site being taken under eminent domain. Hannan, 131 F.2d at 442. The trial court excluded the evidence, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the court's ruling, holding that the burden is upon the party who offers such evidence to establish as a preliminary fact that the purchase, concerning which evidence is offered, was made without compulsion, coercion or compromise. Id.; see also District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency v. 61 Parcels of Land, 235 F.2d 864 (D.C.Cir.1956) (explaining that a comparable sale is not under compulsion, coercion, or compromise if it is shown that the public records do not disclose that the sale was at foreclosure, under deed of trust securing an indebtedness, at execution or attachment, at auction, under pressure of the exercise of the power of eminent domain, or [under] other coercion). Here, Ms. Oh's counsel acknowledged that the sales prices of the other Skyland properties in question reflected settlement[s] at a price 20 percent above the appraised value of the properties, and the trial court also observed that the prices reflected compromise. Notwithstanding this, Ms. Oh argues that the D.C. Circuit's subsequent holding in Nash v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 395 F.2d 571 (D.C.Cir.1967), required the court to admit evidence of the sales prices as offered by Ms. Oh, the landowner. In Nash, the district court admitted evidence of a condemnation settlement offered into evidence by the owner of the property at issue. Id. at 572. The D.C. Circuit upheld the court's ruling, stating that [t]he reasons which disable a condemnor from putting in evidence of purchases it has made in settlement of condemnation suits have no application to a landowner who offers such evidence himself. Id. at 572 n. 6. We conclude that the record permits us to resolve the issue raised without attempting to reconcile the holdings in Hannan and Nash. In granting the District's motion to exclude the settlement sales-price evidence, the trial judge explicitly stated that he was mak[ing] a discretionary call and concluded that the evidence would be excluded as too prejudicial. The court reasoned that introduction of the evidence would bias the District by requiring it to explain its compromise decision and what's going on with the government and would occasion a frolic and detour that would bias the District. [22] As recognized in Hannan, the trial court is vested with large discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence and has discretion to exclude. . . evidence when it . . . involve[s] a confusion of issues. 131 F.2d at 443. Further, as this court has recognized, [t]he weighing of probative value versus prejudice must always be part of the trial judge's consideration, and the trial judge has the discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Plummer v. United States, 813 A.2d 182, 189 (D.C.2002); see also Johnson v. United States, 960 A.2d 281, 300 n. 18 (D.C.2008) ([A] trial court must always consider the extent to which a party may be prejudiced by the admission of any evidence[.]). Having found that the evidence of settlement sales prices would be prejudicial, the court did not err in excluding the evidence, even if the evidence was otherwise admissible.