Opinion ID: 220473
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Child Exploitation Enterprise (Count I)

Text: On July 27, 2006, the President signed H.R. 4472, the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Pub.L. No. 109-248), which enhanced punishments for the sexual trafficking of minors. The act created a new crime of engaging in a CEE, which carries a mandatory minimum of twenty years in prison. The CEE statute provides: A person engages in a child exploitation enterprise for the purposes of this section if the person violates section 1591, section 1201 if the victim is a minor, or chapter 109A (involving a minor victim), 110 (except for sections 2257 and 2257A), or 117 (involving a minor victim), as a part of a series of felony violations constituting three or more separate incidents and involving more than one victim, and commits those offenses in concert with three or more other persons. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g). The statute thus requires that the government prove: (1) the defendant committed at least three separate predicate offenses that constitute a series of at least three incidents; (2) more than one underage victim was involved; and (3) at least three other people acted in concert with the defendant to commit the predicate offenses. The federal courts have had little opportunity to consider the elements required for a conviction under § 2252A(g). [4] Similar language appears, however, in 21 U.S.C. § 848, the provision of the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act that punishes participation in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE). That statute states that [a] person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if  (1) he violates any provision of [the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act] the punishment for which is a felony, and (2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of [the Act]  (A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management, and (B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources. Id. § 848(c). Given the similar language  series of ... violations and in concert with ... other persons  we believe that interpretations of § 848 should guide our interpretation of § 2252A(g). The first element of the CEE  a series of three separate predicate offenses  is easily established in this case. In Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 119 S.Ct. 1707, 143 L.Ed.2d 985 (1999), the Supreme Court held that a conviction under § 848 requires a jury to agree on which crimes committed by the defendant made up the required series of violations. Id. at 824, 119 S.Ct. 1707. Following Richardson, the jury must have unanimously found that Daniels committed three specific predicate offenses. In this case, Counts II-V are predicate felony violations for the purposes of § 2252A(g). The jury found that Daniels committed each of these offenses, and  as discussed above  Daniels's challenge to those convictions fails. The four counts involved at least three separate incidents that were all related to Daniels's prostitution business and may thus be considered a series. The second element of the CEE is also established, because the government presented evidence that more than one minor victim was involved in the series of violations. SD, HH, ReH, and RaH were all victims of the charged counts. The Richardson Court explained that, other than the predicate offenses, the statutory requirements of § 848(c) need not be satisfied with respect to each underlying crime, but may instead be met with respect to the series, which, at a minimum, permits the jury to look at all of the agreed-on violations in combination. Id. at 823, 119 S.Ct. 1707. [5] We apply this interpretation to § 2252A(g) and hold that, when the predicate counts are considered in combination, the jury could easily have found that more than one victim was involved. The final element of the CEE requires that the defendant have committed those offenses in concert with three or more other persons. Although Daniels proposes an interpretation that would require each predicate offense to have been committed in concert with three or more other persons, we read those offenses to refer to the  series of felony violations. We conclude that the required total of three other persons may be tallied by considering the predicate counts together. [6] The government therefore needed to present sufficient evidence that a total of at least three other persons acted in concert with Daniels to commit one or more of the counts. To determine whether the government met its burden, we must decide what it means to act in concert for purposes of § 2252A(g). The Eleventh Circuit held in Wayerski that conspiracy is a lesser-included offense of a CEE charge, because the latter requires ... proof of an agreement that would also violate [sic] [a] conspiracy offense. 624 F.3d at 1350-51. The Eleventh Circuit based this conclusion on the Supreme Court's holding that the use of the same in concert language in § 848 meant that conspiracy, under 21 U.S.C. § 846, [7] is a lesser included offense of § 848. See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 300, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996). The Court explained that because the plain meaning of the phrase `in concert' signifies mutual agreement in a common plan or enterprise, ... this element of the CCE offense requires proof of a conspiracy that would also violate § 846. Ibid. It is clear to us that, in order for someone to have acted in concert with Daniels to commit one of the predicate felonies, he or she must have had the mens rea required to conspire with him to commit that offense. Although this court has long held that the essence of conspiracy is agreement, ... `a tacit or material understanding among the parties' will suffice. United States v. Avery, 128 F.3d 966, 970-71 (6th Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Pearce, 912 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir.1990)). Still, some type of agreement must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 971. Daniels concedes that Head acted in concert with him to commit all of the charged counts. Thus, his conviction of Count I will stand if the government presented evidence that two other persons conspired with him on any of the counts. We examine each count to determine if any co-conspirators participated in the offenses. Counts II and III, manufacturing and distributing child pornography, involved no participants other than Daniels, Head, and HH. As the victim, HH cannot be deemed a co-conspirator. When a crime inherently requires two to tango, but the statute is not intended to punish the victim of the crime  as is the case in prostitution or the manufacture of pornography  federal courts regularly apply a common-law exception to conspiratorial or accomplice liability. See generally Model Penal Code § 2.06(6) (stating that a person is not an accomplice in an offense if he is a victim or the offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission); Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 53 S.Ct. 35, 77 L.Ed. 206 (1932) (woman who acquiesced to being transported interstate could not be guilty of conspiracy to violate the Mann Act). That exception applies here. Count IV, transporting a minor for purposes of prostitution, was based on the transportation of SD from Maryland to Detroit. In addition to Daniels, Head, and SD herself, one other person was along for this ride: an adult prostitute named Trouble. The government presented evidence that Trouble spoke with SD about her work, went with SD to purchase items at a sex shop and mall, and rode back to Detroit with SD, Head, and Daniels. This was sufficient to allow the jury to infer that Trouble conspired with Head and Daniels to transport SD across state lines. Although no evidence was presented that Trouble knew that SD was a minor, we have just clarified that § 2423(a) does not require knowledge of the victim's age. Thus, with Head and Trouble, the total of other persons now stands at two. Count V, sex trafficking of children, required proof that the perpetrator knew the victims  RaH, ReH, HH, and KC  were underage. The government presented no evidence that anyone but Head and Daniels knew this was the case. Prostitute Brittany Ayers testified that she did not know, until she was arrested by police while on a date with KC, that KC was underage. Although the government argues that Daniels's mother, brother, several adult prostitutes who worked for Daniels, and Daniels's fellow pimps all aided Daniels's prostitution enterprise, it presented no evidence that any of these people knew Daniels was sex trafficking minors. The tally of other persons thus remains at two. We conclude that the government failed to present evidence that three or more other persons acted in concert with Daniels to commit the series of predicate felonies. Daniels's conviction on Count I is reversed.