Opinion ID: 2775985
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Tolling Statute

Text: Klunder next argues that even if Appellees' answer was properly amended to include the statute of limitations defense, the defense did not bar his claims due to the tolling provision in Rhode Island General Laws section 9-1-18. We review the district court's decisions on this issue de novo. See Montalvo v. GonzálezAmparo, 587 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 2009); López-González v. Municipality of Comerío, 404 F.3d 548, 551 (1st Cir. 2005). Section 9-1-18 provides, in relevant part, that [i]f any person against whom there is or shall be cause for any action, as enumerated in this chapter, in favor of a resident of the state, shall at the time the cause accrues be outside the limits of the state, or being within the state at the time the cause accrues shall go out of the state before the action is barred by the provisions of this chapter, and does not have or leave property or estate in the state that can be attached by process of law, then the person entitled to the action may commence the action, within the time before limited, after the person has returned into the state in such a manner that an action may, with reasonable diligence, be commenced against him or her by the person entitled to the action . . . . R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-18. In support of his argument, Klunder relies on Cottrell v. Kenney, a 1903 Rhode Island Supreme Court case which holds that, if applicable, the effect of the tolling statute is that a new time is fixed at which the statute begins to discretion where district court permitted an amendment to include a statute of limitations defense after the case was reversed and remanded on appeal). -23- run . . . when the defendant comes or returns into the state. 54 A. 1010, 1012 (R.I. 1903). Cottrell, however, provides no guidance on the statute's applicability. For that, one must look to Rouse v. Connelly, 444 A.2d 850 (R.I. 1982). There, the Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the trial justice's finding that section 9-1-18 provides special protection to Rhode Island plaintiffs who were injured by defendants not amenable to process. Id. at 851. It explained that if a defendant is amendable to suit by substituted service, the statute does not apply and the limitations period is not tolled. Id. The court emphasized that any other interpretation would permit the unnecessary and indefinite postponement of lawsuits . . . , a result clearly contrary to sound principles of judicial administration. Id. at 851-52. Under this framework, Klunder's argument fails for numerous reasons. First, the statute only protects Rhode Island plaintiffs. See id. Though Klunder claims he was a resident of Rhode Island at the time the causes of action accrued (and indeed he very likely may have been one), there is no evidence in the record to support (or reject) this contention. The burden is on Klunder to establish the applicability of section 9-1-18, so his failure to support his claim of residency is fatal. See Kelly v. Marcantonio, 187 F.3d 192, 198 (1st Cir. 1999) ([P]laintiffappellants bear the burden of proving the applicability of the -24- tolling provisions contained in [R.I. Gen. Laws] §§ 9-1-19 and 9-1- 20.); Bonilla-Avilés v. Southmark San Juan, Inc., 992 F.2d 391, 393 (1st Cir. 1993) (Since the plaintiffs have the burden to support their claim that the statute was tolled, their failure to introduce into the record the letters upon which they based that claim was fatal to that claim.). Second, there is no evidence in the record that any Appellees were not amenable to process. See Rouse, 444 A.2d at 851. To the contrary, the record suggests that all Appellees were served and appeared before the district court without any difficulty. It was Klunder's obligation to establish otherwise, and, once again, he failed to do so. See Kelly, 187 F.3d at 198; Bonilla-Avilés, 992 F.2d at 393. Because section 9-1-18 does not toll Klunder's claims, he was required to file suit within three years of, at the latest, September 12, 2007, for the § 1983, civil conspiracy, and breach of the duty of confidentiality and loyalty claims, and September 13, 2007, for the false arrest and false imprisonment claims.9 He did not do so. Instead, Klunder waited until October 5, 2010, three weeks after the statute of limitations ran. Klunder's claims, therefore, are time barred, and the district court properly disposed of them on Appellees' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. 9 The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations for Klunder's claims is three years and that September 12 and 13, 2007, are the relevant dates. -25-