Opinion ID: 1670832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Probable Cause to Stop the Van

Text: Draganescu concedes that we have held traffic violations, no matter how minor, create probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle. [3] But he contends that the standard for determining that a driver is following a vehicle too closely is subjective. He also contends that the State failed to prove Truesdale violated the governing statute. He argues that because the standard is subjective, law enforcement officers could always rely on it to stop drivers for inarticulate hunches. He further argues that Bigsby admitted at trial that the real reason for the stop was his hunch that the passengers were involved in transporting contraband. He asks us to hold that under these circumstances, an officer's stop of a vehicle for this offense violates an individual's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Neb. Const. art. I, § 7, guarantee [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.... Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a `seizure' of `persons' within the meaning of this provision. [4] Further, `[a]n individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to government regulation.' [5] But in determining whether the government's intrusion into a motorist's Fourth Amendment interests was reasonable, [6] the question is not whether the officer issued a citation for a traffic violation or whether the State ultimately proved the violation. Instead, a stop of a vehicle is objectively reasonable when the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. [7] Draganescu argues that the rule he advocates is consistent with our holding in State v. Childs. [8] But he ignores a critical distinction. There, a police officer stopped the motorist to check his vehicle registration because of his in-transit tags. The motorist was not driving suspiciously and had not violated a statute. His vehicle's in-transit tags were in compliance with the governing statutes. We held that a constitutional investigatory stop cannot be made solely to check a motorist's documentation when the vehicle is properly displaying in-transit tags. [9] In Childs, the officer lacked outward observable signs that would support probable cause to believe that the driver was violating any traffic regulation. [10] In contrast, Bigsby had probable cause to stop the vehicle for a traffic violationfollowing too closely. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6,140(1) (Reissue 2004) provides: The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, and such driver shall have due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the roadway. But we need not analyze Draganescu's argument that the reasonable and prudent standard is too indefinite or subjective because he has not challenged the statute for vagueness. Moreover, Bigsby testified that he used an objective standard for determining whether the van was following the truck too closely: one car length for every 10 m.p.h. of speed. Bigsby further stated that he observed the van following one car length behind the semi-truck while both vehicles were traveling over 70 m.p.h. in the rain. Because this evidence showed Bigsby had probable cause to believe a traffic violation had occurred, the stop was objectively reasonable. Although Draganescu disputes Bigsby's motivation for stopping the van, the issue is irrelevant. Both the U.S. Supreme Court and this court have rejected pretextual arguments regarding routine traffic stops. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis. [11] If an officer has probable cause to stop a violator, the stop is objectively reasonable and any ulterior motivation is irrelevant. [12] Draganescu's argument that the initial stop was unsupported by probable cause is without merit.