Opinion ID: 1965068
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: may-nielsen contract

Text: Nielsen also claims that the trial court erred in refusing to receive the January 1996 contract between May and Nielsen (May-Nielsen contract) into evidence, thus preventing Nielsen from asserting the contractual exclusions of warranty and limitation-of-damages provisions as defenses against Streeks' fraud claim. The court excluded the contract as irrelevant and did not allow Nielsen to assert his contract defenses. The May-Nielsen contract included exclusion of warranty provisions and limited damages to the price of the seed. Nielsen claims that Streeks should have no better rights against him than May would have had under the contract. However, Nielsen overlooks the fact that had May sued Nielsen, the May-Nielsen contract would not have prohibited May from bringing a separate claim for fraudulent concealment. We have held that a purchaser is not limited to the contract when bringing claims against a seller, but may also bring claims for fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligence. In Gibb v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 246 Neb. 355, 518 N.W.2d 910 (1994), the purchaser of a house brought an action against the seller for fraudulent concealment of termite damage. The selling agent showed the purchaser one area of termite damage, but failed to disclose the fact that other areas of the house contained termite damage. The purchaser sued the seller for fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligence, and breach of contract. The seller attempted to assert an as is clause contained in the sales contract as a defense against the purchaser's fraudulent concealment claim. We held that the as is clause contained in the contract did not bar the purchaser's fraud-based claim and that thus, the purchaser was allowed to proceed on all four theories of recovery. Although Gibb involved a sale of realty rather than a sale of goods governed by the Nebraska Uniform Commercial Code, the reasoning applied in Gibb is applicable to the situation in the present case. Nebraska's U.C.C. does not preclude an action for fraud. Neb. U.C.C. § 1-103 (Reissue 1992) provides: Unless displaced by the particular provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the principles of law and equity, including ... fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions. (Emphasis supplied.) A similar result was reached in Murray v. D & J Motor Co., Inc., 958 P.2d 823, 831 (Okl.Civ.App.1998), where the Oklahoma Court of Appeals stated, Fraud and deceit provide a ground for recovery that is independent of contract or UCC. Furthermore, disclaimer of warranties is not material to a fraud action. Id. Thus, the May-Nielsen contract provisions do not insulate Nielsen from a claim of fraud. Additionally, the disclaimer in the May-Nielsen contract provided that there were no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof. However, the face of the contract stated, and Nielsen expressly warranted, that the seed was classified as Generation II. Thus, had May sued Nielsen, the disclaimer of warranties would have had no effect and Nielsen would also be liable to May under the U.C.C. for supplying May with Generation V seed, which was not the seed for which May had contracted. Streeks' cause of action is a tort claim based on fraud perpetrated by Nielsen. Streeks is not asserting any additional or better claim than that which would have been available to May. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the May-Nielsen contract as irrelevant. We find that based on the circumstances of this case, Nielsen's contract defenses were inapplicable against Streeks' fraud claim. We find that Nielsen has asserted no error requiring reversal in this case. We now turn to Streeks' cross-appeal.