Opinion ID: 902206
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: [¶8.] Robinson contends that the circuit court erred in granting Ewalt’s summary judgment motion. Robinson argues that Ewalt “usually resided” in Yankton County because Ewalt lived with her parents in Yankton County during portions of the statutory period. Robinson also argues that Ewalt used a Yankton County address as her “home address” for her driver’s license, tax filings, and -3- #25912 banking documents.3 Thus, Robinson argues that the sixty-day extension for service of process provided by SDCL 15-2-31 applies in this case because Robinson delivered the summons to the Yankton County Sheriff, the sheriff of the county where Ewalt “usually or last resided,” before the statute of limitations expired. [¶9.] Ewalt responds that she “usually and last resided” in Codington County rather than Yankton County. Ewalt argues that an address and a residence are two separate concepts and what address she used is not indicative of where she “usually or last resided.” Ewalt contends that the standard for determining an individual’s voting residence provides guidance to this issue. Ewalt further notes that she had not lived in Yankton County for eight months when Robinson delivered the summons to the Yankton County Sheriff. Thus, Ewalt argues that the circuit court correctly held that the sixty-day extension for service of process does not apply in this case because Robinson delivered the summons to a sheriff in the wrong county. Ewalt concludes that without the sixty-day extension, Robinson failed to serve Ewalt within the statute of limitations and for that reason, the circuit court did not err in granting Ewalt’s summary judgment motion. [¶10.] Summary judgment must be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 3. Robinson notes that Ewalt applied for a new driver’s license in September 2010 and used a Codington County address at that time. Robinson emphasizes that Ewalt’s original license with a Yankton County address was not to expire until 2011. Robinson contends that Ewalt’s early application for a new license shortly after service of process was an attempt to establish a Codington County residence solely for purposes of a favorable ruling on Ewalt’s summary judgment motion. Ewalt responds that she renewed her license at that time because it had been revoked in January 2010. -4- #25912 any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” SDCL 15-6-56(c). “A disputed fact is not ‘material’ unless it would affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law in that a ‘reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Gul v. Ctr. for Family Med., 2009 S.D. 12, ¶ 8, 762 N.W.2d 629, 633 (quoting Weitzel v. Sioux Valley Heart Partners, 2006 S.D. 45, ¶ 17, 714 N.W.2d 884, 891). Statute of limitations questions are generally for a jury to decide. Murray, 2010 S.D. 18, ¶ 5, 779 N.W.2d at 382. Therefore, “summary judgment is proper on statute of limitations issues only when the application of the law is in question, and not when there are remaining issues of material fact.” Id. “All reasonable inferences drawn from the facts must be viewed in favor of the nonmoving party.” Danielson v. Hess, 2011 S.D. 82, ¶ 8, __ N.W.2d __, __ (quoting Gail M. Benson Living Trust v. Physicians Office Bldg., Inc., 2011 S.D. 30, ¶ 9, 800 N.W.2d 340, 342-43). [¶11.] Personal injury actions must be commenced within the applicable three-year statute of limitations. SDCL 15-2-1, -14. An action is commenced when a plaintiff serves a defendant with a summons. SDCL 15-2-30. “The summons may be served by the sheriff . . . where the defendant may be found[.]” SDCL 15-6-4(c). [¶12.] South Dakota law provides a sixty-day extension for accomplishing service of process under certain circumstances. See SDCL 15-2-31. “An attempt to commence an action is deemed equivalent to the commencement thereof when the summons is delivered, with the intent that it shall be actually served, to the sheriff . . . of the county in which the defendants or one of them, usually or last resided[.]” -5- #25912 Id. (emphasis added). “Such an attempt must be followed by the first publication of the summons, or the service thereof, within sixty days.” Id. [¶13.] In this case, the accident occurred on April 28, 2007 and the threeyear statute of limitations for Robinson’s personal injury action ran on April 29, 2010. See SDCL 15-6-6(a) (providing that the day of the event is not included when computing the statute of limitations period). Ewalt was served on May 25, 2010. Therefore, Ewalt was not served within the statute of limitations. [¶14.] However, a question of fact remains regarding whether Ewalt “usually or last resided” in Codington County or Yankton County. Ewalt moved several times throughout the three-year period. As the record indicates, Ewalt lived with her mother in Gayville for the first year, worked in Sioux Falls for about four months, then lived with her father in Volin for just under a year, attended school in Sioux City for four months, and attended school in Watertown for the remaining portion of the statutory period. In addition, Robinson notes Ewalt’s use of a Yankton County address for banking, tax, and other documents. Thus, although the parties do not dispute the facts in this case, the parties dispute the inferences drawn from the facts. [¶15.] A jury’s determination regarding the county where Ewalt “usually or last resided” would control the applicability of SDCL 15-2-31 and the sixty-day extension period, which would determine whether the statute of limitations barred Robinson’s claim. Thus, the factual question of Ewalt’s residence is material because it would affect the outcome of the litigation. Therefore, because a material question of fact remains, the circuit court’s granting of summary judgment in this -6- #25912 case was improper. We reverse and remand this case for a trial on the question of Ewalt’s usual place of residence. [¶16.] Reversed and remanded. [¶17.] KONENKAMP, ZINTER, SEVERSON, and WILBUR, Justices, concur. -7-