Opinion ID: 1419202
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Testimony of Larry Linton

Text: (23) At trial, the testimony of Larry Linton was taken outside the presence of the jury and then read to the jury. Redmon contends that use of this procedure deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to confront and contemporaneously cross-examine witnesses in the jury's presence. (See California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149, 157-158 [26 L.Ed.2d 489, 496-497, 90 S.Ct. 1930]; Barber v. Page (1968) 390 U.S. 719, 725 [20 L.Ed.2d 255, 260, 88 S.Ct. 1318].) The trial court employed the challenged procedure in order to prevent the jury from hearing about an admission made by Redmon to Linton which inculpated Redmon's codefendants. [19] (See Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [20 L.Ed.2d 476, 88 S.Ct. 1620].) Based on its assessment of Linton's intelligence and demeanor, the court determined that, irrespective of admonitory instructions, Linton might refer to this inadmissible and highly prejudicial admission. The court concluded that this danger outweighed the advantages of contemporaneous examination before the jury and ruled that Linton should testify outside the jury's presence. The record indicates that Redmon's counsel initially objected to this procedure, primarily because he believed that cross-examination outside the jury's presence would be inadequate. When counsel requested permission to cross-examine Linton before the jury, the court advised counsel of the danger. The court warned that any testimony concerning Redmon's alleged admission could not be stricken and informed counsel of the possible prejudice to Redmon's codefendants. Counsel withdrew his request and stated: We are agreed, your Honor. The defendant understands and consents. Given this concession, we conclude that Redmon waived any right he might have had to cross-examine Linton in front of the jury.