Opinion ID: 2551
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: El-Hage

Text: Following trial, El-Hage moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts on which he was convicted, pursuant to Rule 29(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.16 The District Court rejected El-Hage’s motion in all respects. See United States v. Bin Laden, No. 98 Cr. 1023, 2001 WL 1160604, at  (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2001). On appeal, El-Hage limits his sufficiency challenges to the conspiracy convictions,17 alleging that the government failed to present any evidence establishing that he knew about these conspiracies, much less intended to participate in them. Specifically, he argues that his alleged perjury cannot establish that he was a member of the charged conspiracies. We review the District Court’s denial of a Rule 29(c) motion de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2006). To establish the existence of a criminal conspiracy, the government must prove that the conspirators agreed “on the ‘essence of the underlying illegal objective[s],’ and the ‘kind of criminal conduct . . . in fact contemplated.’” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 151 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 690 (2d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted)). “[T]he government need not present evidence of an explicit agreement; proof of a tacit understanding will suffice.” Gordon, 987 F.2d at 906 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he evidence necessary to link a particular defendant to [a criminal] scheme . . . may be circumstantial in nature.” Gaskin, 364 F.3d at 460. “A defendant’s knowing and willing participation in a conspiracy may be inferred from . . . her presence at critical stages of the conspiracy that could not be explained by happenstance, or a lack of surprise when discussing the conspiracy with others.” United States v. 16 Rule 29(c) permits a defendant to “move for a judgment of acquittal, or renew such a motion, within seven days after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury, whichever is later.” Fed. R. Cr. P. 29(c)(1). 17 As noted above, the jury found El-Hage guilty of: conspiracy to kill United States nationals in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332(b) (Count 1); conspiracy to murder internationally protected persons, United States officers, and employees engaging in official duties, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1117 (Count 2); and conspiracy to destroy buildings and property of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(n) (Count 4). El-Hage was also convicted of multiple counts of perjury before a grand jury (Counts 285-302). 21 Aleskerova, 300 F.3d 286, 293 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). It may also be established by “evidence that the defendant participated in conversations directly related to the substance of the conspiracy[,] possessed items important to the conspiracy,” id., or engaged in acts “exhibit[ing] a consciousness of guilt, such as [making] false exculpatory statements,” Gordon, 987 F.2d at 907 (citations omitted). We have observed that “[w]here conspirators are charged with pursuing multiple criminal objectives, the government is not required to prove that the defendant agreed to all of the objectives. Rather, the government must show that the defendant shared ‘some knowledge of the conspiracy’s unlawful aims and objectives.’” Salameh, 152 F.3d at 151 (quoting United States v. Heinemann, 801 F.2d 86, 93 (2d Cir. 1986)) (internal brackets and citation omitted); accord Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d at 690 (“The policies underlying conspiratorial liability could easily be thwarted by the careful compartmentalization of information, and ‘conspirators would go free by their very ingenuity,’ if it were required that they agree on all details of the scheme.” (quoting Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947))). At trial, the government offered evidence—including physical documents and testimony from other al Qaeda members—to establish that El-Hage: (1) had been present at private meetings where Bin Laden and other al Qaeda officials discussed their program of attacks against the United States, Tr. 259-70, 280-81, 517-18, 960-62; (2) served as a financial controller or “paymaster” of sorts for Bin Laden’s enterprises—a position that involved reviewing al Qaeda personnel files to ascertain which Bin Laden employees were to receive extra pay for their work pursuing activities on al Qaeda’s behalf, Tr. 258-59, 908-12; (3) played a key role in procuring fraudulent travel documents for al Qaeda members and associates, Tr. 214-15; Supplemental App. 2255, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2268; (4) was a member of the Nairobi al Qaeda cell during a time when al Qaeda members were traveling to Nairobi to conduct surveillance of the American Embassy, train in al Qaeda-run military camps, and plan the attack on the 22 Embassy, Tr. 1258-63, 1193-1212; (5) served as the head of the Nairobi al Qaeda cell during a period post-dating Bin Laden’s 1996 public declaration of holy war against the United States, Tr. 1210, 125152; (6) traveled to Afghanistan in February 1997 to meet with Bin Laden and Mohamed Atef, al Qaeda’s military commander, and returned to Nairobi with a message from Bin Laden directing the Nairobi cell to prepare for military activity, Supplemental App. 1997-2005; and (7) appeared before a federal grand jury in September 1997, one month after he met again with Bin Laden and Atef, Supplemental App. 1974, and testified falsely as to al Qaeda’s agenda as well as to the nature and extent of his contacts with Bin Laden and Atef, Tr. 807-10.18 Based on the government’s evidence, it is clear that a rational fact-finder could have concluded that El-Hage (1) knew about the aims and objectives of the charged criminal conspiracies, (2) agreed to the essence of these objectives, and (3) performed acts, including committing perjury, intended to further these objectives. Accordingly, we see no basis to question, much less overturn, El-Hage’s convictions for the criminal conspiracies charged in Counts One, Two, and Four of the Indictment.