Opinion ID: 2322590
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Right to Appeal Final Judgments

Text: The State has filed a motion to dismiss both of the consolidated appeals on the ground that the denial of an order entered pursuant to C.P. § 8-301 is not appealable. For the reasons that follow, we hold that such rulings are appealable. We therefore deny the State's motion. In Maryland, criminal defendants do not have a constitutional right to appeal. Cubbage v. State, 304 Md. 237, 241, 498 A.2d 632, 634 (1985). Instead, the right to seek appellate review is statutory; the Legislature can provide for, or preclude, [it]. Fuller v. State, 397 Md. 372, 382, 918 A.2d 453, 459 (2007). C.P. § 8-301 is silent with regard to a right of appeal. The State, as we shall see, mounts several arguments in support of its view that there is no right of appeal from the denial of a petition brought under C.P. § 8-301. Appellants counter that the General Assembly had no need to address the right of appeal in C.P. § 8-301 because Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 12-301 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (C.J.) grants a general right to appeal final judgments. We shall address Appellants' argument first. Section 12-301 provides: Right of appeal from final judgmentsGenerally Except as provided in § 12-302[ [8] ] of this subtitle, a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court. The right of appeal exists from a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case the right of appeal is expressly denied by law. In a criminal case, the defendant may appeal even though imposition or execution of sentence has been suspended. In a civil case, a plaintiff who has accepted a remittitur may cross-appeal from the final judgment. [A] final judgment is one that either determine[s] and conclude[s] the rights of the parties involved or den[ies] a party the means to `prosecut[e] or defend[] his or her rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding.' In re Billy W., 386 Md. 675, 688, 874 A.2d 423, 431 (2005) (quoting Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41, 566 A.2d 767, 773 (1989)) (some alterations in original). Important is whether any further order is to be issued or whether any further action is to be taken in the case. Id. at 689, 874 A.2d at 431. We conclude that the denial of a petition for writ of actual innocence is a final judgment under C.J. § 12-301. The ruling concludes a petitioner's rights as to all claims based on the newly discovered evidence alleged in the petition. Once the court denies the petition, nothing remains pending in the case. A denial under C.P. § 8-301 also denies a petitioner the means to `prosecut[e] or defend[] his or her rights and interest in the subject matter of the proceeding,' id., 874 A.2d at 431 (quoting Rohrbeck, 318 Md. at 41, 566 A.2d at 773) (alterations in original), because C.P. § 8-301(b)(5) requires the petitioner to distinguish the newly discovered evidence claimed . . . from any claims made in prior petitions. The requirement prevents a petitioner from re-filing a petition on the basis of the same allegedly newly discovered evidence. Moreover, the final judgment requirement of C.J. § 12-301 aims to prevent piecemeal appeals and . . . the interruption of ongoing judicial proceedings. Stephens v. State, 420 Md. 495, 502, 24 A.3d 105, 109 (2011) (quoting Sigma Reprod. Health Ctr. v. State, 297 Md. 660, 665, 467 A.2d 483, 485 (1983)). Because a denial of a petition for writ of actual innocence leaves no matter pending with the trial court, our conclusion that it is a final judgment under C.J. § 12-301 comports with the purpose of the statute. The State asserts that a denial of a petition for writ of actual innocence is not a final judgment because [i]n criminal cases . . . the final judgment occurs after conviction, upon the imposition of sentence. The argument ignores the purpose of the final judgment rule set forth in C.J. § 12-301. An order is interlocutory, and therefore not final for purposes of C.J. § 12-301, if there are pending proceedings in which issues on the merits of the case remain to be decided. Sigma, 297 Md. at 666, 467 A.2d at 485-86 (Ordinarily. . . an appeal from a pretrial or trial order will not be heard where there are pending proceedings in which issues on the merits of the case remain to be decided. Such orders are interlocutory, not final, and nonappealable until after entry of a final judgment.). Sigma does not dictate that rulings on matters arising after sentencing do not come within the final judgment rule. Indeed, we have not hesitated to review denials of motions filed under Rule 4-331(c). See, e.g., State v. Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 999 A.2d 1050 (2010); Evans v. State, 382 Md. 248, 855 A.2d 291 (2004), Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 612, 751 A.2d 473 (2000). Neither has the Court of Special Appeals. See, e.g., Ramirez v. State, 178 Md.App. 257, 941 A.2d 1141 (2008); Mack v. State, 166 Md.App. 670, 891 A.2d 369 (2006); Jackson v. State, 164 Md.App. 679, 884 A.2d 694 (2005). The State, in further support of its argument that an order denying relief under C.P. § 8-301 is not appealable, urges us to consider its legislative history. In the State's view, the history reflects that the General Assembly did not intend such orders to be subject to appellate review. The State points in particular to action the legislature took in 2010 (after Appellant's filed their petitions) to amend C.P. § 8-301. Among the proposed amendments was one that would have included express language conferring the right to appeal. H.B. 128, 2010 Session, First Reading January 18, 2010. That appeal provision was stricken from the amendments. See H.B. 128, 2010 Session, Third Reading File Bill, Amendment No. 2. The State interprets this action as reflecting the General Assembly's purpose that there be no right of appeal from a denial of a petition filed pursuant to the statute. We are not so persuaded. We have explained why the denial of a petition filed pursuant to C.P. § 8-301 is a final judgment. Given that C.J. § 12-301 expressly authorizes the right of appeal from a final judgment, explicit language to that same effect in C.P. § 8-301 would be redundant, and thus unnecessary. We also reject, as misplaced, the State's reliance on our decision in Fuller for the proposition that, absent an express appeal provision in C.P. § 8-301, there is none. Fuller is inapposite because we concluded in that case that the ruling sought to be appealedthe denial of a petition for commitment for substance abuse treatment pursuant to Maryland Code (1982, 2005 Repl. Vol., 2006 Supp.), § 8-507 of the Health-General Article (H.G.) [9] is not a final judgment, and, therefore, C.J. § 12-301 does not apply. [10] 397 Md. at 394, 918 A.2d at 466. We rejected the argument that a denial of a motion under H.G. § 8-507 was a final judgment because a motion brought under that statute may be filed repeatedly and the denial of a single petition does not preclude [the defendant] from filing another. Id., 918 A.2d at 466. Because C.J. § 12-301 does not apply, whether H.G. § 8-507 itself provides an express right to appeal was essential to the analysis. Moreover, unlike petitions pursuant to H.G. § 8-507, a petitioner under C.P. § 8-301 has but one chance to assert a particular claim of newly discovered evidence. [11] For all these reasons, we hold that a denial of a petition for writ of actual innocence is a final judgment under C.J. § 12-301.