Opinion ID: 2763460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Des Moines Shooting Evidence

Text: Battle argues the district court erred in admitting evidence of the Des Moines shooting because it was too remote to be considered direct evidence and thus was evidence of crimes, wrongs, or other acts, improperly offered to suggest his propensity to commit the charged crime. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). He also argues the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to his defense. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Brandon, 521 F.3d 1019, 1025-26 (8th Cir. 2008). When “evidence of other crimes . . . tends logically to prove any element of the crime charged . . . it is admissible as an integral part of the immediate context of the crime charged . . . [and] is not extrinsic and therefore is not governed by Rule 404(b).” United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d 1305, 1312 (8th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To convict Battle under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Battle had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year; (2) Battle knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) the firearm had -6- been in or affected interstate commerce. United States v. Walker, 393 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2005). The parties stipulated to the first and third elements, so the government only had to prove that Battle knowingly possessed the firearm. The government can prove knowing possession by showing actual or constructive possession, and possession can be sole or joint. Id. at 846-47. Constructive possession “‘is established if the person has dominion over the premises where the firearm is located, or control, ownership, or dominion over the firearm itself.’” Id. at 847 (quoting United States v. Boykin, 986 F.2d 270, 274 (8th Cir. 1993)). “Mere physical proximity to a firearm is not enough to show constructive possession, but knowledge of [a firearm’s] presence, combined with control is constructive possession.” United States v. Mann, 701 F.3d 274, 304-05 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 470 (2013). As “a jury rarely has direct evidence of a defendant’s knowledge of a firearm’s presence . . . knowledge is generally established through circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 305 (internal quotation marks omitted). Prior possession of a firearm is directly relevant to proving later possession of that same weapon because it helps establish ownership or control of the weapon. United States v. Adams, 604 F.3d 596, 599 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rock, 282 F.3d 548, 551 (8th Cir. 2002). Limited evidence of a prior crime committed by the defendant with the same firearm may be admitted in a felonin-possession case because it is highly probative of the defendant’s possession of that weapon. United States v. Flenoid, 415 F.3d 974, 976-77 (8th Cir. 2005). The firearm police found in the vehicle in Waterloo was the same handgun used in the prior Des Moines shooting. As there were three individuals in the vehicle in which the handgun was found and no one was in actual possession of the firearm, the government had to prove constructive possession. Evidence that Battle used the firearm previously is highly probative of his ownership or subsequent control over it, which supports a finding of constructive possession. See Adams, 604 F.3d at 599; Flenoid, 415 F.3d at 977. Since this evidence “‘tend[ed] logically to prove [an] -7- element of the crime charged,’” it was direct evidence and was not subject to Rule 404(b). Adams, 604 F.3d at 599 (quoting Moore v. United States, 178 F.3d 994, 1000 (8th Cir. 1999)). Battle also argues the evidence was unduly prejudicial because it created a “trial within a trial,” diverting significant time and attention to proving he committed an uncharged crime. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. We disagree. Evidence demonstrating Battle previously possessed the firearm was directly relevant to the crime charged. The government told the jury that Battle was not being prosecuted for the shooting and that the Des Moines evidence was to be used only in determining whether he knowingly possessed the firearm in Waterloo. The testimony elicited focused on the identity of the shooter and the handgun, not on the injury to the victim or other facts surrounding that crime. The court also issued a limiting instruction to the jury on use of the evidence, which “‘diminishes the danger of any unfair prejudice.’” Rock, 282 F.3d at 551 (quoting United States v. Franklin, 250 F.3d 653, 659 (8th Cir. 2001)). The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.