Opinion ID: 2258987
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the tenants' claims of error

Text: Before trial, the tenants sought class certification of all persons who lived in the Rittenhouse between July 31, 1988, and July 31, 1991. Upon certification, the tenants planned to assert their claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability (Count III of the complaint) on behalf of the entire class. Additionally, the tenants asked the court to certify as a subclass all tenants residing at the Rittenhouse when the Voluntary Agreement was approved in 1987. If certified, the subclass would have asserted all four of the claims set forth in the complaint. When seeking class certification, a plaintiff must meet each of the four requirements of Super. Ct. Civ. R. 23(a). [7] Moreover, since the tenants in this case sought certification under Rule 23(b)(3), they were required by that rule to demonstrate, first, that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the proposed class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and second, that a class action would be superior to other available methods for adjudication of the controversy. The party seeking certification has the burden of showing that the request for class certification complies with the requirements of the rule. Whether that burden has been met is a matter entrusted to the trial court's discretion, and its decision will not be reversed unless that discretion has been abused. Yarmolinsky v. Perpetual American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 451 A.2d 92, 94 (D.C.1982). Indeed, when the trial court conducts a thorough review of the request for class certification, as it did here, we will not reverse its decision even if we would have ruled differently. McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 239 U.S.App. D.C. 247, 251, 741 F.2d 1406, 1410 (1984). [8] The trial court agreed initially that the tenants had made a sufficient showing under Rule 23(a). Turning to the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), however, the court ruled that the issues in the case did not present questions of fact common to all members of the proposed class because applications of the law in all of the counts will turn largely on individual factual determinations concerning the individual heating and air-conditioning systems in each apartment. The court noted that questions regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of the units in each apartment were likely to depend on the individual needs and desires of each tenant. For the same reasons, the court found that the tenants had failed to establish that a class action would be superior to other methods of deciding the case. [9] On appeal, the tenants have offered no argument sufficient to refute the trial court's conclusion that neither requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) was met. In fact, the trial testimony of the nineteen tenant plaintiffs confirmed the court's prediction that the heating and cooling units presented problems specific to each apartment. For example, some tenants testified that the new units failed to heat or cool their apartments, or were noisy, and had no automatic temperature settings. Others testified that the installation of the units left spaces around the edges where cold air and water leaked in from the outside. Still others testified that the ventilation of the kitchens and bathrooms, promised in the Voluntary Agreement as an additional modification to the building, was inadequate or even non-existent. Given this record, and given the tenants' failure even on appeal to show that the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) were met, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for class certification.
At the close of all the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict for the landlords on Count IV of the tenants' complaint, alleging fraud in the performance of the Voluntary Agreement. [10] The court expressed some doubt about whether such a cause of action, sounding in tort, [11] was even recognized in the District of Columbia. See United States ex rel. DMI, Inc. v. Darwin Construction Co., 750 F.Supp. 536, 541 (D.D.C. 1990). But even assuming that such a claim was viable, the court ruled, inter alia, that the tenants had presented no evidence of the landlords' specific intent to defraud them, nor had they proved their reliance on any of the landlords' allegedly fraudulent assertions. The tenants contend that this ruling was erroneous because they presented evidence that the landlords' non-performance of the Voluntary Agreement was deliberate and motivated by a desire to enhance their financial status at the expense of the Rittenhouse tenants. Even assuming the correctness of their description of the evidence, that is not enough to prove fraud. Although there was plenty of evidence that the landlords had breached the Voluntary Agreement, there was none showing that this breach was motivated by a specific fraudulent intent. Fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence, which is not equally consistent with either honesty or deceit. Bennett v. Kiggins, 377 A.2d 57, 59 (D.C.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034, 98 S.Ct. 768, 54 L.Ed.2d 782 (1978). The evidence at trial, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the tenants, did not pass this test. The tenants offered testimony that the heating and cooling units were among the cheapest on the market, that they were improperly installed and were never maintained according to the manufacturer's specifications, and that the landlords realized an immediate saving of almost $250,000 a year after they were installed (which was, after all, one of the main purposes of the conversion to individual units). But simply being a cheapskate is not fraud. This evidence showed, at most, that the landlords were penny-pinchers who did not want to spend as much money on the new units as the tenants might have preferred. No reasonable trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence, as Bennett and other cases require, that these actions reflected an intent on the part of the landlords to defraud the tenants. Permitting the jury to consider the tenants' fraud claim on these facts would have been an invitation to cross the bounds of permissible inference and enter the forbidden territory of conjecture and speculation. Shelton v. United States, 505 A.2d 767, 771 (D.C.1986). We hold that the fraud claim was properly taken from the jury.
When instructing the jury on the calculation of damages for breach of the Voluntary Agreement, the trial court said that the jury should quantify the damages award as a percentage of the rent paid by each tenant. The tenants also assert that the court gave the jury an erroneous and highly prejudicial special verdict form. Instead of providing a blank space followed by a percentage sign, the verdict form allegedly contained instead a blank space preceded by a dollar sign ( i.e., $___ rather than ___%). This error, the tenants maintain, confused the jury and ultimately led to an award of damages inconsistent with the trial court's instructions. Initially, we note that the verdict form is not in the record, a fact which would normally prompt us to reject the tenants' argument out of hand. [I]t is appellant's duty to present this court with a record sufficient to show affirmatively that error occurred. Cobb v. Standard Drug Co., 453 A.2d 110, 111 (D.C.1982) (citations omitted). [W]e cannot base our review of errors upon statements of counsel which are unsupported by [the] record. D.C. Transit System, Inc. v. Milton, 250 A.2d 549, 550 (citations omitted). Moreover, since the tenants raise this issue for the first time on appeal, this court can reverse only upon a finding of plain error. E.g., District of Columbia v. Wical Limited Partnership, 630 A.2d 174, 182 (D.C.1993). From the limited record before us, we can find no error at all in the court's instructions on damages, let alone plain error. The evidence established the exact amount of rent paid by each tenant plaintiff, and the judge carefully instructed the jury how to calculate the damages as a percentage of that rent. The jury never told the court that it was confused or in need of further instructions; on the contrary, the jury followed the court's instructions exactly. There is nothing in the record to suggest any confusion on the part of the jury or any instructional error on the part of the trial court.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the landlords on the second count of the complaint, alleging a violation of the implied warranty of habitability in the tenants' leases. The tenants now urge us to reverse the judgment on the second count and to enter a judgment in their favor because they presented uncontroverted evidence that, in breaching the Voluntary Agreement, the landlords also violated the District of Columbia housing regulations. The implied warranty of habitability entered our jurisprudence in Javins v. First National Realty Corp., supra , which extended to tenants contractual remedies for a landlord's breach of the lease. Javins held that by signing the lease the landlord [assumes] a continuing obligation to the tenant to maintain the premises in accordance with all applicable law. 138 U.S.App. D.C. at 379, 428 F.2d at 1081. In fulfilling this duty, a landlord must remain in substantial compliance with the housing regulations, which, as they pertain to the warranty of habitability, require that a rented residence be maintained so as to provide decent living conditions for its occupants. Id. This duty, the court concluded, allowed tenants to assert the breach of this particular warranty as a defense to a landlord's suit for possession based on non-payment of rent. Id. at 380, 428 F.2d at 1082. In George Washington University v. Weintraub, 458 A.2d 43 (D.C.1983), we extended the Javins holding, ruling that the implied warranty of habitability `may be used as a sword (to collect damages) as well as a shield (to contest the obligation to pay rent).' Id. at 46 (quoting the trial court's memorandum opinion). We held accordingly that a tenant could rely on the landlord's breach of the implied warranty of habitability as the basis of an affirmative action for damages. Id. at 47. In so ruling, however, we recalled the warning of Javins that reliance on this warranty could not provide a basis for relief if the tenant failed to show more than a de minimis violation of the housing regulations. Id. at 47 n. 5 (citing Javins, 138 U.S.App. D.C. at 380 n. 63, 428 F.2d at 1082 n. 63). Thus we limited our holding in Weintraub by stating that a landlord must exercise reasonable care to maintain rental premises in compliance with the housing code in order to fulfill the implied warranty of habitability. 458 A.2d at 49 (emphasis added). In the case at bar, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, as we must, [12] we conclude that the tenants' claim of error is without merit. At trial, both Mr. Cowan and maintenance personnel testified that whenever they were notified of any problems caused by the installation of climate control units, Ritten-house employees were promptly dispatched to investigate and make necessary repairs. Further, at no point during the conversion process, or thereafter, were the tenants hindered from using their apartments because of the failure of the new units to operate or any problems arising from their allegedly poor installation. From this and similar evidence, the jury could reasonably find that the landlords had exercised reasonable care to maintain the building in compliance with the housing regulations, and that any arguable violations of the regulations were de minimis and hence, under Weintraub and Javins, provided no basis for a finding of a breach of the warranty of habitability.