Opinion ID: 187096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The New York State Division of Human Rights

Text: Schuler argues that even if we were to find the D.C. worksharing agreement ambiguous or otherwise inadequate, his suit may proceed on an alternate ground. Specifically, Schuler argues that he satisfied ADEA section 633(b)'s deferral state filing requirement when the EEOC cross-filed his charge with the NYSDHR, assuring him that he need do nothing further at this time. Letter from Araujo to Schuler. PwC disagrees, pointing out that in Murphy Schuler's previous and still pending casethe district court held that New York's Human Rights Law requires plaintiffs to allege that the actual impact of the discriminatory act was felt in New York. Murphy, 357 F.Supp.2d at 244. Because Schuler's alleged injury occurred in Washington, D.C., PwC argues, the NYSDHR lacks authority to grant or seek relief from [the alleged] discriminatory practice, rendering it an inappropriate deferral state. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b). We disagree. Relying on a plain reading of both the state law and Schuler's EEOC charge, we hold that New York's Human Rights Law covers this case, thereby granting the NYSDHR jurisdiction over Schuler's charge. Like his complaint in the district court, see supra at 1371, Schuler's February 2005 EEOC charge clearly alleges a pattern and practice of discrimination resulting from PwC's mandatory retirement and promotion policies. On the charge's cover page, Schuler wrote, The Employer, PwC, has followed and continues to follow age discriminatory practices for promotion to partnership that favor employees younger than 40 years old and harm me and other older employees. EEOC Charge of Discrimination. In the declaration attached to the charge, Schuler stated that he lives in Virginia, that PwC is headquartered in New York City, and that he and other employees have failed to make partner because of policies and procedures adopted and maintained by [PwC]'s Senior Partner and Chief Executive Officer Dennis Nally and the 14 other members of its Board of Partners and Principals. Decl. of Schuler 1. Schuler further asserted that PwC has promoted over 200 older employees to Managing Director while younger employees have become partners. Id. at 3. PwC argues that Schuler never explicitly alleged that PwC's board and CEO meet in New York, or that the allegedly discriminatory policy was adopted there, but we think that a reasonable inference given Schuler's assertion that the company is headquartered in New York City. See Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 595 F.2d 711, 727 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (noting that EEOC complaints are to be construed liberally). Thus, the precise question we face is this: does the NYHRL apply to a New York-based company's decision to adopt, maintain, and implement an allegedly discriminatory promotion policy that injures an out-of-state resident? We begin, as we must, with the statute's text. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438, 119 S.Ct. 755, 142 L.Ed.2d 881 (1999) ([I]n any case of statutory construction, our analysis begins with the language of the statute.' And where the statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well. (quoting Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992))). NYHRL section 296 lays out the law's substantive provisions, making it an unlawful discriminatory practice for employers, licensing agencies, employment agencies, or labor organizations to discriminate against any individual on the basis of age, race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, or marital status. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. As PwC's counsel conceded at oral argument, this provision contains no requirement that the unlawful discriminatory impact occur in New York. See Oral Arg. Tr. 26 (agreeing with the Court that there's no exception in the statute for discriminatory acts committed inside the state that affect non-residents). Rather, the law forbids all employers in the state from engaging in discriminatory acts. Thus, absent some exception or limitation, section 296, on its face, applies to PwC's adoption, maintenance, and implementation of an allegedly discriminatory promotion policy. Significantly, the NYHRL does include a section extending the law to certain acts committed outside the state of New York, N.Y. Exec. Law § 298-a, but, as PwC's counsel again conceded at oral argument, neither of that provision's two subsections has any bearing on this case. The first, subsection 298-a(1), applies the law with equal force to an act committed outside [New York] against a resident of [New York] or against a New York corporation. Id. § 298-a(1). That isn't this case. The other, subsection 298-a(2) applies the law to New York residents who violate the law outside the state. Id. § 298-a(2). That isn't this case either. Here, Schuler alleges that a New York company has committed a discriminatory act in New York, namely adopting, maintaining, and implementing a retirement and promotion policy that disadvantages a class of employees on the basis of age. Thus, nothing in the statute's plain text removes Schuler's charge from the NYHRL's reach or the NYSDHR's jurisdiction. PwC nonetheless urges us to set the plain terms of the statute aside and follow a string of New York federal district court cases construing the NYHRL to include an in-state impact requirement. See, e.g., Pearce v. Manhattan Ensemble Theater, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 1535(KMW), 2007 WL 707068, at  (S.D.N.Y. Mar.6, 2007) (recognizing a split of authority regarding whether the NYHRL, like the New York City Human Rights Law, includes an instate impact requirement and holding that it does); Lucas v. Pathfinder's Personnel, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 2252(BSJ), 2002 WL 986641, at  (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2002) ([T]he fact that the decision to terminate Plaintiff was made in New York State is not sufficient to establish a violation of the NYSHRL.); Duffy v. Drake Beam Morin, No. 96 Civ. 5606(MBM), 1998 WL 252063, at  (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1998) ([T]he State Human Rights Law affords no remedy to a non-New York resident who suffers discrimination outside New York State.). For his part, Schuler responds with his own list of Southern District of New York cases holding there is no New York authority to suggest that the impact of a discriminatory act must be felt within New York for the NYHRL to apply. Hart v. Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein Sec., LLC, No. 06 Civ. 0134(DAB), 2006 WL 2356157, at  (S.D.N.Y. Aug.9, 2006); see also, e.g., Tebbenhoff v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., No. 02 Civ. 2932(TPG), 2005 WL 3182952, at  (S.D.N.Y. Nov.29, 2005) (The fact that a decision to discriminatorily terminate a non-resident was made in New York can alone suffice to state a claim under NY[ ]HRL.); Torrico v. IBM Corp., 319 F.Supp.2d 390, 399 n. 5 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (disagreeing with Lucas, 2002 WL 986641, and rejecting an in-state impact requirement). Although none of these federal district court decisions binds us, we think it worth noting that the decisions PwC cites are unpersuasive. Take for example Duffy v. Drake Beam Morin , the case cited by most of the other decisions on PwC's side of the ledger. There, the court held that the State Human Rights Law affords no remedy to a non-New. York resident who suffers discrimination outside New York State.  1998 WL 252063, at  (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion, the court cites two cases, neither of which supports its holding. The first case, Iwankow v. Mobil Corp., 150 A.D.2d 272, 541 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1989), is the only New York state court decision addressing the NYHRL's extraterritorial scope. There, the Appellate Division held, absent an allegation that a discriminatory act was committed in New York or that a New York State resident was discriminated against, New York's courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over the alleged wrong. Id. at 429. Thus, contrary to the Duffy court's interpretation, Iwankow says nothing about where plaintiffs may suffer[ ] discrimination, Duffy, 1998 WL 252063, at ; it merely requires them to allege an in-state discriminatory act. In Iwankow, [t]he only jurisdictional nexus asserted in the complaint, apart from the fact that defendants [we]re domestic corporations, [was] that plaintiff's termination was part of a world-wide reduction in force which was decided upon at corporate headquarters in New York. 541 N.Y.S.2d at 429. The court dismissed that claim because the plaintiff had failed to allege that the decision to implement this reduction in an age-discriminatory manner originated at corporate headquarters. Id. Schuler, of course, alleges just that regarding PwC's promotion policy. Like Iwankow, the second case Duffy cites, Beckett v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 893 F.Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y.1995), holds that [t]he NYHRL does not provide a nonresident with a private cause of action for discriminatory conduct committed outside of New York by a New York corporation. Id. at 238. And also like Iwankow, Beckett provides no support for Duffy 's broad holding that a non-New York resident who suffers discrimination outside New York State  may find no recourse in the NYHRL. Duffy, 1998 WL 252063, at  (emphasis added); see also Rice v. Wartsila NSD Power Dev., Inc., 183 Fed.Appx. 147, 148 (2d Cir.2006) (unpublished summary order) (finding the NYHRL inapplicable when plaintiff failed to allege a discriminatory act occurring in New York), aff'g Rice v. Scudder Kemper Invs., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 7078(RLC), 2003 WL 21961010 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.14, 2003). More to the point, given that Schuler has alleged discriminatory conduct committed in New York, neither Iwankow nor Beckett has any bearing on this case. In sum, the New York Human Rights Law, by its terms, applies to this case, and no New York authority . . . suggests] that the impact of a discriminatory act must be felt within New York for the NYHRL to apply. Hart, 2006 WL 2356157, at . Absent a contrary interpretation by the New York. Court of Appeals or the Second Circuit, we conclude that in addition to satisfying ADEA section 633(b)'s deferral state filing requirement via the D.C. worksharing agreement, Schuler adequately sought a state administrative remedy in New York by having his charge cross-filed with the NYSDHR.