Opinion ID: 1535551
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The failure to join Smith as a defendant

Text: Summit Floors and the Town of Scarborough contend that Smith was an indispensable party to Nemon's action, M.R.Civ.P. 19(b), and that Nemon's failure to name Smith as a defendant by itself justified the summary judgment. That highly formalistic argument is completely without merit. Smith was the sole principal of Summit Floors. Summit Floors, which may fairly be called Smith's corporate alter ego and which is actively participating as a named party defendant, cannot be heard to argue that Nemon's failure to join Smith justified summary judgment. Even assuming that Smith should have been joined, the Superior Court failed to fulfill its duty to order that he be made a party. M.R.Civ.P. 19(a). A litigant's failure to join a necessary party does not result in a dismissal if that person can be made a party to the action. If joinder is feasible, the court must order it; the court has no discretion at this point because of the mandatory language of the rule. 7 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1611, at 161-66 (1986) (discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a), which is substantially the same as M.R.Civ.P. 19(a)). In the circumstances of this case, Summit Floors and the other defendants gain nothing from the Superior Court's failure to order Smith to be formally named as a party defendant.