Opinion ID: 1430305
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: - Issues relating to the verdict of first degree murder.

Text: Defendant contends that in the guilt phase of the trial the court committed prejudicial error in certain of its rulings on evidentiary and instructional matters. As will appear, we conclude in each instance that either the ruling was not erroneous or the error was waived or was harmless.
A group of defendant's contentions present a broad claim that the trial court allowed into evidence numerous items of irrelevant testimony. (1) We begin with the principles that except as otherwise provided by statute all relevant evidence is admissible (Evid. Code, § 351); that relevant evidence is all evidence including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action ( id., § 210); and that the trial court is vested with wide discretion in determining relevance under this standard ( People v. Warner (1969) 270 Cal. App.2d 900, 908 [76 Cal. Rptr. 160], and cases cited). (2) Defendant first points to testimony from which, he asserts, the jury could infer he had previously been incarcerated. On direct examination Don Sheehan testified he told the arresting officers he was afraid to go to prison on a pending parole violation charge; the district attorney asked why he was afraid, and Sheehan replied that defendant had a lot of friends there. Defendant's motion to strike this testimony on the ground of irrelevancy was correctly denied. To begin with, the remark referred only to unidentified friends of defendant; the case is obviously distinguishable from those in which the defendant himself was characterized as a former prisoner. (See, e.g., People v. Allen (1978) 77 Cal. App.3d 924, 934-935 [144 Cal. Rptr. 6], and cases cited.) More importantly, the testimony was not inadmissible as a matter of law. Among the evidence relevant to the issue of the credibility of a witness is The existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive for his testimony. (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (f).) Sheehan admitted the authorities promised him that he would not be sent to prison on his parole violation. It was apparent that defendant would attack Sheehan's credibility  as he did on cross-examination  by suggesting this promise was the motive for his testimony favorable to the prosecution. In anticipation thereof, the district attorney sought to show that the promise was given instead for the sole purpose of allaying Sheehan's justifiable fear of peer retaliation in prison. Also relevant to the issue of credibility is a witness' attitude toward the action or toward the giving of testimony. ( Id., subd. (j).) Here the principal prosecution witnesses made it clear their peer group does not give information to the police and that to do so invites ostracism or worse; all such witnesses, including Sheehan, were self-admitted ex-felons. In the circumstances, the fact that Sheehan was willing to testify against a former member of the group despite his fear of retaliation was supportive of the credibility of his testimony. For both these reasons the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence. [6] Second, defendant complains generally of several other instances in which prosecution witnesses spoke of their concern for their personal safety and of ensuing protective measures taken by the authorities. For the foregoing reasons, such testimony was relevant to the issue of their credibility. Defendant's contention that these threats must somehow be linked to him (see People v. Brooks (1979) 88 Cal. App.3d 180, 187 [151 Cal. Rptr. 606]) is misdirected, as the prosecution never claimed that the witnesses' fear was the result of any effort on defendant's part to procure false testimony. (3) Third, it is asserted that certain testimony of Larry Creech improperly disclosed other criminal activity by defendant. The witness testified that at midmorning of the day before the crime defendant and Karen visited him at his house; that after Karen left, defendant asked him to go to one Terry Sanders and pick up a quarter of a pound of crank (i.e., methedrine) and $800 in cash; and that the witness declined to do so for lack of time. Again defendant's motion to strike on the ground of irrelevancy was correctly denied. The testimony was relevant to an issue in the case, i.e., to defendant's theory that the murder was committed by David Khan for the purpose of stealing money or drugs from the victim. Defendant had already elicited from Khan the admission that he needed money at the time he and his brother picked Karen up at the Robison house, and that he knew or had reason to know she might be in possession of a large amount of cash. The challenged testimony of Creech would support an inference that Karen did not in fact have the $800 or the drug in question on her person when she entered Khan's car because defendant had not yet obtained them from Sanders. The testimony thus had a tendency in reason to ... disprove the proposed defense, and hence was relevant. (Evid. Code, § 210.) (4) Defendant also criticizes a later colloquy on redirect examination of Creech. The witness admitted he had been engaged in criminal activities such as theft and drug traffic with different types of people, and that he feared retaliation by them because he was cooperating with the police. There ensued a brief inquiry in which the district attorney sought to make more specific the witness' reference to different types of people. [7] The trial court correctly overruled defendant's repeated objection that the inquiry was leading, as none of the questions suggests to the witness the answer that the examining party desires. (Evid. Code, § 764.) Changing his ground of objection, defendant now contends the testimony should have been excluded because it put before the jury evidence of other crimes he allegedly committed that was relevant solely to show his general criminal disposition. ( Id., § 1101, subd. (b).) Because of defendant's failure to make a timely and specific objection on this ground, however, the point must be deemed waived. ( Id., § 353, subd. (a); People v. Welch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 106, 114-115 [104 Cal. Rptr. 217, 501 P.2d 225], and cases cited.) [8] (5) On cross-examination defendant asked David Khan if to his knowledge Karen had been dealing in drugs. The district attorney objected on the ground of irrelevancy; and at a subsequent conference in chambers the court sustained the objection, finding that the question had no probative value on the issues of the case. Defendant's claim of error in this ruling is not well taken. He argues that an affirmative answer to the question would have tended to support his theory that Khan was the real murderer by providing a motive for the latter to have committed the crime. Defendant reasons that if Khan knew Karen was dealing in drugs he might have assumed she had either drugs or money in her possession when he picked her up on the day of the murder, and hence might have killed her for the purpose of robbery. It is settled, however, that evidence that a third person had a motive to commit the crime with which the defendant is charged is inadmissible if it simply affords a possible ground of suspicion against such person; rather, it must be coupled with substantial evidence tending to directly connect that person with the actual commission of the offense. ( People v. Mendez (1924) 193 Cal. 39, 51-52 [223 P. 65], overruled on another point in People v. McCaughan (1957) 49 Cal.2d 409, 420 [317 P.2d 974]; accord, People v. Whitney (1978) 76 Cal. App.3d 863, 869 [143 Cal. Rptr. 301], and cases cited.) The rule is designed to place reasonable limits on the trial of collateral issues ( Mendez, 193 Cal. at p. 52) and to avoid undue prejudice to the People from unsupported jury speculation as to the guilt of other suspects ( People v. Arline (1970) 13 Cal. App.3d 200, 204-205 [91 Cal. Rptr. 520]). The record before us does not contain substantial evidence connecting Khan with Karen's murder, within the meaning of this rule. Defendant relies on testimony tending to show that Khan had an opportunity to kill Karen and was a man of violent propensities who used drugs. But such general proof of opportunity and criminal disposition raises at most a bare possibility that Khan might be the culprit. In Mendez this court approved of decisions holding that even evidence of threats made by the third person against the victim was insufficient for this purpose (193 Cal. at p. 51); a fortiori, evidence of mere opportunity and general disposition is inadequate. It follows that the court did not err in rejecting the testimony that defendant here sought to elicit.
(6) The next contention relates to an incident occurring during the direct testimony of Pamela Robison. According to police reports, the witness was prepared to testify that Karen stated to her she had a telephone conversation with defendant on the morning of October 11 in which she told defendant she intended to get an annulment and he replied he would kill her if she left him. Prior to the giving of such testimony, and outside the presence of the jury, defendant moved to exclude the evidence of Karen's statement reporting his threat to her life. He conceded the statement was not subject to a hearsay objection because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., to prove that he actually uttered the threat; rather, it was offered as circumstantial evidence of the fact that Karen was in fear of him on the morning of the crime. [9] Evidence of Karen's fear, in turn, was relevant to an issue in the case, i.e., to the question whether she accompanied defendant later that day against her will and without her consent, within the meaning of the law of kidnaping. On its face, therefore, Karen's statement was admissible. Defendant's objection, however, was that because of the nature of the statement any probative value is greatly outweighed by its prejudicial effect. He thereby specifically invoked the discretion vested in the court by Evidence Code section 352 to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will ... create substantial danger of undue prejudice.... After arguing the point at some length, defendant reiterated that this statement is the essence of what the case is all about, and called on the court to exercise its jurisdiction, its authority to guarantee the fairness of the proceeding and exclude it. As defendant correctly points out, the record does not show that the court did in fact discharge its statutory duty in these circumstances by weighing the statement's potential for prejudice against its probative value and concluding that the latter was not substantially outweighed by the former. Instead, the court simply ruled that it would deny defendant's motion and would admit the statement with a limiting admonition to the jury. The witness Robison was then permitted to recount Karen's statement relating defendant's threat. At the close of her direct testimony the court admonished the jurors that they could not consider the statement as proof of its truth, i.e., as proof that defendant actually made such a threat, but could consider it only for the limited purpose of showing Karen's state of mind at the time she related the statement to Robison. Defendant contends the ruling was error under People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772 [36 Cal. Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892]. In that case the defendant urged that the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting six assertedly gruesome photographs of the murder victim's body; as to several of the photographs the court had expressly ruled that as long as it is material it can go in. Reversing on another ground, we addressed the issue for purposes of retrial: In the circumstances we need neither view these photographs nor determine whether their admission was prejudicial, for it appears on the face of the record that the trial court prima facie abused its discretion as a matter of law in failing to weigh the probative value of the photographs in resolving a material issue as against the danger of prejudice to the defendant through needless arousal of the passions of the jurors. ( Id. at p. 801; accord, People v. Davis (1965) 62 Cal.2d 791, 797-798 [44 Cal. Rptr. 454, 402 P.2d 129].) [10] The Attorney General responds that the record in the case at bar does not contain a similar affirmative showing that the trial court misunderstood its duty to weigh prejudice against probative value; here the record is simply silent on the point, and the Attorney General implies that in such event it should be assumed the court knew and performed its duty. The argument is untenable: in Ford (60 Cal.2d at p. 801) we expressly directed that If these photographs are offered on retrial it will be the duty of the court to determine their admissibility in accordance with the above stated rule of law, and to make the fact apparent in the record. (Italics added.) It is true the case predated the adoption of the Evidence Code, but section 352 was merely a recodification of the existing statutory and decisional law applied in Ford. Moreover, since the enactment of section 352 the Ford requirement  i.e., that on a motion invoking this ground the record must affirmatively show that the trial judge did in fact weigh prejudice against probative value  has been reiterated both by the courts ( People v. Holt (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 343, 353 [104 Cal. Rptr. 572] [disapproved on a different ground in Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617, 625, fn. 6 [114 Cal. Rptr. 121, 522 P.2d 681]) and by the writers (e.g., Jefferson, op. cit. supra, § 22.1, pp. 289-290). [11] The cited authorities explain that the reason for the rule is to furnish the appellate courts with the record necessary for meaningful review of any ensuing claim of abuse of discretion; an additional reason is to ensure that the ruling on the motion be the product of a mature and careful reflection on the part of the judge, i.e., to promote judicial deliberation before judicial action ( Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104, 113 [65 Cal. Rptr. 315, 436 P.2d 315] [requirement of written reasons for order granting new trial]). The Attorney General next contends that the foregoing requirement was satisfied by the trial court's admonition to the jury (and later instruction to the same general effect) limiting consideration of Karen's statement to its nonhearsay use as circumstantial evidence of her state of mind. Again the argument is untenable. When evidence is admissible for one purpose but not for another, the decision of the trial court to give such an instruction is merely a prerequisite to admitting the evidence at all. (Evid. Code, § 355.) The party opponent is still entitled to have it excluded on motion under section 352 if the nature of the evidence is such that despite a cautionary instruction its limited probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice from the jury's misuse thereof for an inadmissible purpose. (See, e.g., Hrnjack v. Graymar, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 725, 729, 732-733 [94 Cal. Rptr. 623, 484 P.2d 599, 47 A.L.R.3d 224] [error to admit evidence that tort plaintiff received collateral source insurance payments, even though limited by instruction to plaintiff's motive in seeking medical help and his credibility as a witness]; People v. Gibson (1976) 56 Cal. App.3d 119, 127, 129-131 [128 Cal. Rptr. 302] [error to admit evidence that murder defendant committed prior violent assaults, even though limited by instruction to defendant's state of mind  i.e., his intent and motive  at time of charged offense]; Cal. Law Revision Com., com. foll. Evid. Code, § 355; Jefferson, op.cit. supra, § 21.1, p. 255, caveat.) That rule is applicable here. Testimony that a defendant threatened his victim prior to committing the crime charged is a particularly sensitive form of evidence of the victim's state of mind. In the case at bar it created a substantial danger that despite the limiting instruction, the jury  consciously or otherwise  might consider Karen's statement as evidence not only of her mental state but also of that of defendant, i.e., of the fact that defendant actually threatened to kill her if she left him and inferentially harbored an intent to do so; and the relevance of that intent to the crime charged should have been obvious. Accordingly, under the foregoing authorities the court erred in admitting Robison's testimony of Karen's statement without making an explicit determination that this risk of undue prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. (7) Defendant nevertheless fails to demonstrate that the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) Subsequent to the challenged testimony of Pamela Robison, David Khan took the stand and described in detail the events at the murder scene, including the conversation between defendant and Karen that he overheard while sitting on the front fender of his car. In that connection Khan testified, inter alia, that defendant demanded of his wife an explanation about the annulment, then reminded her he had told her once before that if she ever tried to leave him he would kill her. Because it was an admission of a party, this statement was not subject to a hearsay objection. (Evid. Code, § 1220.) It was therefore admitted for all purposes, including as proof of the fact asserted  i.e., that defendant had indeed threatened to kill his wife. Thus the jury properly had before it in Khan's testimony the very statement that was erroneously admitted on an insufficient ruling in Robison's testimony. It has been held that an apparent Ford error is not prejudicial when the evidence in question is cumulative of other properly admitted evidence to the same effect. ( People v. Bowen (1971) 22 Cal. App.3d 267, 292-293 [99 Cal. Rptr. 498].) Defendant claims the testimony of Robison is not merely cumulative because she was a more credible witness than Khan and her testimony thus corroborated his. [12] Nevertheless, after a review of the entire record we are of the opinion that it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have occurred in the absence of this error. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].)
(8) Defendant assigns as prejudicial misconduct some nine remarks by the district attorney in the course of his closing argument to the jury. At trial, however, defendant failed to object to any of these remarks except the last. As to each of the first eight instances, therefore, defendant is deemed to have waived the objection and the point cannot be raised on appeal. ( People v. Reyes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 486, 505 [116 Cal. Rptr. 217, 526 P.2d 225]; People v. Brice (1957) 49 Cal.2d 434, 437 [317 P.2d 961]; People v. Adamson (1946) 27 Cal.2d 478, 494 [165 P.2d 3], affd. sub nom. Adamson v. California (1947) 332 U.S. 46 [91 L.Ed. 1903, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 171 A.L.R. 1223]; People v. Fleming (1913) 166 Cal. 357, 376-377 [136 P. 291]; People v. Simon (1927) 80 Cal. App. 675, 678-679 [252 P. 758], and cases cited.) The reason for this rule, of course, is that the trial court should be given an opportunity to correct the abuse and thus, if possible, prevent by suitable instructions the harmful effect upon the minds of the jury. ( Simon, at p. 679 of 80 Cal. App.; accord, People v. MacDonald (1914) 167 Cal. 545, 551 [140 P. 256].) Seeking to surmount this barrier, defendant invokes a line of cases reciting that there are two exceptions to the general requirement of a timely objection to prosecutorial misconduct: first, when the case is closely balanced, the defendant's guilt is in grave doubt, and the misconduct contributed materially to the verdict; second, when an objection would be futile because in the circumstances a retraction by the prosecutor or an admonition by the court could not obviate the prejudicial effect of the misconduct on the jury. ( People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 723-724 [135 Cal. Rptr. 392, 557 P.2d 976]; People v. Chojnacky (1973) 8 Cal.3d 759, 765-766 [106 Cal. Rptr. 106, 505 P.2d 530]; People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 790-791 [103 Cal. Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129].) Defendant claims that both these exceptions apply in the case at bar; we conclude on the contrary that the first is not properly an exception to the objection requirement, and that the second is unsupported by the record. The belief that a failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct is excused when the misconduct contributed materially to the verdict can be traced back to misleading language in the opinion of this court in People v. Berryman (1936) 6 Cal.2d 331, 337 [57 P.2d 136]. Prior to that time, the cases had established two distinct rules of law on this topic. First, it was settled that a defendant cannot complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct at trial unless he made a timely objection thereto and requested that the jury be instructed to disregard the improper remark. ( People v. Nakis (1920) 184 Cal. 105, 116 [193 P. 92]; People v. Beggs (1918) 178 Cal. 79, 92 [172 P. 152]; People v. Kromphold (1916) 172 Cal. 512, 522 [157 P. 599]; People v. Kizer (1913) 22 Cal. App. 10, 20 [133 P. 516, 521, 134 P. 346], and cases cited.) It was also clear that There is, however, a well-recognized exception to this general rule, and the exception is simply this: Where an examination of the entire record fairly shows that the acts complained of are of such a character as to have produced an effect which, as a reasonable probability, could not have been obviated by any instructions to the jury, then the absence of such assignment and request will not preclude the defendant from raising the point in this court. ( Simon, at p. 679 of 80 Cal. App.; accord, People v. West (1932) 215 Cal. 87, 96 [8 P.2d 463].) The exception flowed logically from the purpose of the objection rule: if as noted above the requirement of an objection is intended to give the trial court the opportunity to cure the harm by an appropriate instruction, objection is an idle act when it is reasonably probable that no such cure will follow. The second rule provided that if the defendant did object and the court gave the requested instruction, it would ordinarily be presumed that the jury heeded the admonition and the error was cured. ( People v. Perry (1904) 144 Cal. 748, 752-753 [78 P. 284]; People v. Mathews (1903) 139 Cal. 527, 528 [73 P. 416]; People v. Ho Kim You (1914) 24 Cal. App. 451, 467 [141 P. 950], and cases cited.) Because he had preserved his record, however, the defendant in such a case was nevertheless entitled to raise the error on appeal and contend that despite the admonition the misconduct required reversal of his conviction. If he did so, the appellate court was bound to resolve his contention by application of the constitutional standard for review of a claim of prejudicial error (art. VI, § 4-1/2, now § 13), i.e., that the judgment will not be reversed unless the court is of the opinion on the whole record that the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (See, e.g., People v. Loomis (1915) 170 Cal. 347, 351 [149 P. 581] [judgment affirmed]; People v. Fleming (1913) supra, 166 Cal. 357, 381 [judgment reversed].) And in determining whether there was a miscarriage of justice, the court considered such factors as whether the evidence was close and the defendant's guilt in doubt, whether the misconduct was deliberate and repeated, and whether it was likely to have contributed materially to the verdict. ( People v. Fleming, supra, 166 Cal. at p. 381; People v. Ho Kim You, supra, 24 Cal. App. at pp. 467-469; accord, People v. Anthony (1921) 185 Cal. 152, 159 [196 P. 47].) It is apparent that this inquiry is not so much an exception to the second rule as its corollary: if the defendant is permitted to complain on appeal that the misconduct requires reversal despite the admonition, the court must weigh that claim by settled standards of appellate review. In People v. Berryman, however, this court adopted a method of analyzing such a claim that was both confused and confusing. In his closing argument in that case the district attorney exhorted the jury that this whole county, this whole state is watching what you do today upon this case. The defendant promptly assigned the remark as misconduct; the court agreed the argument was improper, directed counsel to refrain from such argument, and instructed the jury to disregard it. (6 Cal.2d at pp. 336-337.) On appeal to this court, the defendant contended inter alia that the prosecutor's remark constituted such serious misconduct as to prejudice his right to a fair trial. Because the defendant had made a timely objection to the remark and obtained a cautionary instruction, there was no occasion for this court to invoke either the rule requiring such an objection or the exception thereto applicable when such an instruction would be futile; the defendant was manifestly entitled to complain of the remark on appeal, and the only true issue was whether despite the admonition the misconduct resulted in a miscarriage of justice when the evidence was viewed as a whole. Nevertheless, the Berryman opinion began its analysis of the point ( id. at p. 337) by reiterating the requirement of a timely objection and, what is worse, combining that requirement into a single so-called general rule with the above-discussed principle of cure by admonition. To compound the confusion, the opinion also combined the foregoing corollaries to each of these separate principles, characterizing them merely as two exceptions to this general rule. The paragraph that emerged is set forth in the margin. [13] On closer inspection this passage of Berryman turns out to be largely a paraphrase of one of the authorities it cites, section 603 of 8 California Jurisprudence, Criminal Law, and it demonstrates the pitfalls of uncritical reliance on such a secondary source. Section 603 states, correctly enough, the rule that prosecutorial misconduct is ordinarily presumed to be cured by a proper admonition. ( Id. at p. 623.) It also correctly states the above-discussed corollary thereto, i.e., that despite such an admonition a miscarriage of justice requiring reversal may be found if there is grave doubt of guilt and the misconduct contributes materially to the verdict. ( Id. at p. 625.) [14] But the section also asserts There may be cases in which the misconduct is of such a character that a harmful result cannot be obviated by a cautionary instruction, and In such cases the misconduct will furnish ground for reversal despite the giving of that instruction. ( Id. at pp. 623-624.) It was the latter assertion that ultimately misled the courts. Upon analysis it appears that all the cases cited in section 603 that actually reversed a judgment on the latter ground predated the 1911 constitutional requirement of a miscarriage of justice. [15] They were therefore decided under a very different rule of prejudice  i.e., that every conviction after a trial in which prosecutorial misconduct occurred must be reversed unless it is clear that the verdict was not affected thereby. (Italics added.) ( People v. Ah Len (1891) 92 Cal. 282, 285 [28 P. 286].) Under that test it was inevitable that any instance of misconduct of such a character that a harmful result cannot be obviated by instruction would be deemed reversible, regardless of the state of the record as a whole. Yet if there ever was such a separate ground of reversal in misconduct cases, it was superseded in 1911 by the new constitutional test of prejudice: thereafter an instance of misconduct not curable by instruction was not reversible unless the appellate court found on the whole record that it resulted in a miscarriage of justice. By ignoring this distinction section 603 was at best incomplete and at worst misleading; and by copying the language of section 603 and flatly declaring it to constitute an exception separate and distinct from the miscarriage of justice test, the Berryman court fell into the trap thus laid for it. For our purposes, however, another consequence of this error was even more serious. Apparently because the exception for misconduct not curable by instruction was also a settled exception to the requirement of timely objection, the Berryman court decided to add the latter to the rule it was attempting to state. Thus the first sentence of the paragraph in question (fn. 13, ante ), purporting to set forth the general rule governing appellate review of claims of prosecutorial misconduct, was a paraphrase of the first sentence of section 603; but whereas the latter was limited to a statement that such misconduct will ordinarily not result in reversal if the court gave a proper admonition (8 Cal.Jur. at p. 623), the Berryman version of that statement inserted as an alternative ground of affirmance, where no objection is made to such misconduct by the defendant.... The addition of this dictum was ill-advised. Without the dictum the sentence would have been wordy but correct; with the dictum it defies useful application. The reason that misconduct occurring without objection does not furnish ground for reversal is because the defendant is not allowed to raise the point on appeal; on the other hand, misconduct followed by a successful objection does not furnish ground for reversal for the very different reason that the ensuing admonition is presumed to cure the harm. To join these wholly distinct principles into a single rule is to make the rule so general as to be of virtually no practical value; it is as if a zoologist were to announce that an elephant resembles a mouse in that both are animals. But the sentence was not only uninformative, it was also mischievous: it unwittingly set a second trap into which this court soon fell. In Berryman, as we have seen, the defendant voiced a prompt objection to the claimed misconduct and obtained a cautionary instruction; but by extending its general rule to include in dictum cases in which such an objection was not made, Berryman created the risk that when one of the latter cases arose the court would invoke the rule and apply to that situation both of these exceptions. And that is precisely what happened. In People v. Sampsell (1950) 34 Cal.2d 757, 762-764 [214 P.2d 813], the defendant failed to object to misconduct at trial yet attempted to raise the claim on appeal. In rejecting the claim this court correctly held the omission was not excused on the ground that an objection would have been futile. But the court went on to hold, Nor does the case fall within another exception as stated in People v. Berryman, 6 Cal.2d 331, 337 [57 P.2d 136]: `... where the case is closely balanced and there is grave doubt of defendant's guilt, and the acts of misconduct are such as to contribute materially to the verdict, a miscarriage of justice results requiring a reversal. ( People v. Fleming, 166 Cal. 357....)' Similar opinions followed (e.g., People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245, 261-262 [324 P.2d 556]; People v. Wein (1958) 50 Cal.2d 383, 396 [326 P.2d 457] [overruled on another ground in People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1140 (80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225, 43 A.L.R.3d 677)]; People v. Perez (1962) 58 Cal.2d 229, 247 [23 Cal. Rptr. 569, 373 P.2d 617, 3 A.L.R.3d 946]), until the now-truncated rule with its dual exceptions became reduced to a brief formula: Misconduct in argument may not be assigned on the appeal if it is not assigned at the trial, unless the misconduct contributed to the verdict or was so unredeemable that nothing whatever would have cured it. ( People v. Berryman, 6 Cal.2d 331, 337 [57 P.2d 136].) (Italics added.) ( People v. Rosoto (1962) 58 Cal.2d 304, 357 [23 Cal. Rptr. 779, 373 P.2d 867]; accord, People v. Golston (1962) 58 Cal.2d 535, 541 [25 Cal. Rptr. 83, 375 P.2d 51]; People v. Mitchell (1966) 63 Cal.2d 805, 809 [48 Cal. Rptr. 371, 409 P.2d 211]; People v. Beivelman (1968) 70 Cal.2d 60, 75 [73 Cal. Rptr. 521, 447 P.2d 913].) [16] Such formulas tend to discourage inquiry into their validity, and acquire the air of impregnability that surrounds black-letter law. Finally, in its most recent manifestation the Berryman language was restated as follows: Such misconduct must be assigned as error at trial with a request that the jury be instructed to disregard its effect, unless (1) in a closely balanced case presenting grave doubt as to the defendant's guilt the misconduct contributed materially to the verdict or (2) the harmful results could not have been obviated by a timely admonition to the jury. [Citations, including Berryman. ] The alleged misconduct was not assigned as error at trial and neither exception to the general rule is shown to be applicable in the instant case. (Italics added.) ( People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) supra, 18 Cal.3d 698, 723-724.) We have thus come full circle: the general rule stated in the source that Berryman paraphrased (8 Cal.Jur. at p. 623) was the presumption of cure by admonition; the general rule stated in Berryman was that presumption or a waiver by failure to object; and the general rule now stated in the cases is the latter alone. The dictum, in short, has swallowed the rule, and at the end of this convoluted evolution two principles that originally were wholly unrelated  the objection requirement and the constitutional test of a miscarriage of justice  have not only become linked but the latter is now said to be an exception to the former. [17] Seen in this light, it seems plain that the proposition that the miscarriage of justice test is an exception to the objection requirement has no historical legitimacy. Nor did it acquire that dignity through repetition: in virtually every case in which the court reiterated this exception to the objection requirement and actually excused a failure to object, the excusal was in fact premised on the other  and correct  exception to the requirement, i.e., that the misconduct was not curable by instruction. Moreover, throughout this same evolution of the Berryman rule, a parallel line of cases in this court ignored Berryman and discussed only the correct exception to the objection requirement. [18] Finally, the Berryman exception will not withstand analysis: it is not difficult to conceive of prosecutorial misconduct that if uncorrected would contribute materially to the verdict, yet remains easily curable by a prompt instruction to the jury; a misstatement by counsel of a controlling rule of law comes immediately to mind. On the point here in issue, therefore, Berryman and its progeny should no longer be followed. Rather, the initial question to be decided in all cases in which a defendant complains of prosecutorial misconduct for the first time on appeal is whether a timely objection and admonition would have cured the harm. If it would, the contention must be rejected (see, e.g., People v. Nicolaus (1967) supra, 65 Cal.2d 866, 881); if it would not, the court must then and only then reach the issue whether on the whole record the harm resulted in a miscarriage of justice within the meaning of the Constitution. (See, e.g., People v. Kirkes (1952) supra, 39 Cal.2d 719, 726-727 [judgment reversed]; People v. Kizer (1913) supra, 22 Cal. App. 10, 20-21 [judgment affirmed].) Turning to the facts of the case at bar, we apply the foregoing analysis to the eight instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct as to which defendant made no objection at trial. They include remarks in which the district attorney expressed his disbelief of defendant's alibi, his denial of a conspiracy between his office and the prosecution witnesses, and his reason for not calling certain persons to testify, together with his partial misstatement of the law of reasonable doubt. Without deciding whether those remarks constituted misconduct, we have examined each in context and are of the view that any harm flowing therefrom could have been cured by appropriate admonition. There is accordingly no ground to excuse defendant from the general requirement of a timely objection, and the point must be deemed waived. (9) The sole remark to which defendant did object occurred when the district attorney concluded his argument by saying to the jurors, I appreciate your attention, your being here, and I ask you to consider carefully all of that evidence, the instructions, and reach a fair, just, honest conclusion. I'm convinced in my mind it will be the same conclusion I reached several months ago. Defendant objected this was improper argument because the prosecutor expressed his opinion and his conclusion, but the objection was overruled. [19] Defendant now contends the prosecutor's reference to the same conclusion I reached several months ago caused a miscarriage of justice and requires that the judgment be reversed. A review of the prosecutor's entire argument to the jury persuades us that defendant exaggerates the effect of this remark. In contrast to the cases relied on by defendant, the district attorney did not expressly tell the jury that he would not have prosecuted defendant unless he personally believed him guilty. (See, e.g., People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 848 [97 Cal. Rptr. 684, 489 P.2d 564]; People v. Kirkes (1952) supra, 39 Cal.2d 719, 723; People v. Edgar (1917) supra, 34 Cal. App. 459, 468.) It is true that the remark, when viewed in isolation, implied that the district attorney believed in defendant's guilt prior to trial, and the cases just cited disapprove such an argument. But they do so because of the risk that the jury will infer that the prosecutor's belief is based at least in part on proof of guilt that was not  and perhaps could not have been  introduced at the trial. The record shows no such risk here. Throughout his argument, the district attorney repeatedly emphasized to the jurors that any opinion he expressed to them concerning defendant's guilt was based on the evidence and legitimate inferences therefrom, [20] and he reminded them again and again that they were the sole judges of the facts and their verdict must be based on their own conclusion as to the evidence. Thus just before making the statement now criticized, the district attorney told the jurors: Ladies and gentlemen, I would submit to you that a review, conscientious one, which I know you would do [of] all the evidence will leave you of the opinion the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, not only of the first degree murder, but of robbery and kidnap in the commission of the offenses he engaged in that day. Finally, immediately after the challenged reference to his own conclusion, the district attorney added by way of explanation: If indeed that's your conclusion as I stated, I ask you to return a guilty verdict against the defendant as charged.... In these circumstances the remark in question cannot have misled the jury into believing the prosecutor was asking for a verdict based on his opinion and on evidence not introduced at trial. While assertions of this nature are fraught with risks and should be avoided, in the case at bar we conclude from the whole record that the remark did not result in a miscarriage of justice.
Penal Code section 1127c provides that when the prosecution relies on evidence of flight by the defendant after a crime is committed as tending to show his consciousness of guilt, the jury shall be instructed that it may consider that evidence in deciding guilt or innocence and shall give it such weight as it deserves. (10) Urging in effect that the opposite rule should also prevail, defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to give his proferred instruction that the absence of flight by a suspect may be considered by the jury as circumstantial evidence that he had an innocent frame of mind. [21] The Attorney General first responds that the instruction was properly refused in this case for lack of evidentiary support. ( People v. Terry (1970) 2 Cal.3d 362, 402 [85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961].) Following a suggestion of the trial court, he asserts there is in fact evidence of flight by defendant, to wit, that after attempting to obliterate all identifying marks on Karen's body defendant said to David Khan, we better get the hell out of here, and the two then drove back to Sacramento. The argument is unpersuasive. The homicide was committed in a remote area and at night; it can hardly be expected that defendant would wait in that location until the victim was reported missing, a search was organized, and the crime was discovered, a process that might have taken days or longer. In these circumstances the fact that he and Khan left the scene and returned to their homes is of no sinister significance whatever. In urging otherwise, the Attorney General ignores the warning of the courts not to confuse a mere departure from the scene of the crime with a deliberate flight from the area in which the suspect is normally to be found. (See, e.g., People v. Brecker (1912) 20 Cal. App. 205, 216 [127 P. 666]; State v. Lincoln (1969) 183 Neb. 770 [164 N.W.2d 470, 472]; State v. Sullivan (1964) 43 N.J. 209 [203 A.2d 177, 192-193].) In the case at bar that area was Sacramento, and the evidence showed that defendant remained in his home surroundings for some two weeks after the crime. He did not go into hiding, but continued to visit his friends as before; indeed, during that period he even contacted the police and volunteered statements about his wife's movements on the day of the murder. It is this evidence upon which defendant based his request for an instruction on absence of flight. Defendant relies on the rule that he has a right to an instruction that directs attention to evidence from a consideration of which a reasonable doubt of his guilt could be engendered. ( People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190 [84 Cal. Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847].) But the problem is not so much his right to an instruction on absence of flight as the admissibility of the evidence to support it. A century ago this court held such evidence inadmissible in People v. Montgomery (1879) 53 Cal. 576. There the defendant sought to prove, as circumstantial evidence of innocence, that while confined in jail awaiting trial he had an opportunity to escape but declined to do so. The evidence was excluded, and this court approved the ruling. The court held in effect that evidence that a suspect did not flee when he had the chance was of little value as tending to prove innocence because there are plausible reasons why a guilty person might also refrain from flight: He may very naturally have been deterred from making an effort to escape from a fear that he would be recaptured, and that his fruitless attempt to escape would be evidence of guilt; or he may have felt so strong a confidence of his acquittal, for want of the requisite proof of his guilt, that he deemed it unnecessary to flee. ( Id. at pp. 577-578.) [22] Defendant seeks first to limit the holding of Montgomery to its facts, drawing a distinction between a postarrest refusal to escape from jail and a prearrest absence of flight to avoid such incarceration. But no such distinction appears tenable, as the significance of the latter is, if anything, even more speculative than the former. Although an accused awaiting trial may be concerned that an attempt at evasion will be used against him in court, a person not in custody may even more plausibly fear that his sudden departure from the jurisdiction will call police attention to him in the first place; and while a suspect in jail may not try to escape because he is confident of acquittal, a person still at large may refrain from fleeing because he is even more convinced that he will never be identified as the culprit. For these reasons the courts have uniformly declined to draw the line now proposed by defendant. [23] It is next contended that even if absence of flight thus gives rise to several inferences, the evidence is admissible if at least one of such inferences  i.e., defendant's innocent state of mind  is relevant. The real issue here, however, is not whether this evidence is relevant but whether it should be excluded despite its relevance. As noted earlier, Evidence Code section 352 codifies the long-standing rule that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice. The rule also applies if that value is outweighed by the probability that admission of the evidence will create a substantial danger of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. ( Ibid. ) Each of the latter consequences would be threatened by the introduction of evidence of absence of flight. [24] Against this manifest risk of confusion and delay is to be weighed the probative value of the evidence in question: for the reasons given above the absence of flight is so ambiguous, so laden with conflicting interpretations, that its probative value on the issue of innocence is slight. Although such a weighing process is ordinarily performed by the trial court as a question of fact, the Montgomery rule thus embodies the view of this court that in all cases the scales tip so heavily against admission of evidence of absence of flight that it must be excluded as a matter of law. [25] We recognize that in the case at bar the evidence upon which defendant relies to show absence of flight was already in the case, having been introduced by prosecution witnesses as part of their narrative of the events following the crimes and leading to defendant's arrest. From the fact that such evidence may properly be admitted for one purpose, however, it does not follow that defendant is entitled to an instruction thereon for an entirely different purpose: the risk of confusing the issues or misleading the jury remains unabated. The trial court ruled on the request during the presentation of defendant's case; thus if the court had agreed to give the instruction, the prosecution could well have put on rebuttal evidence on the issue. (See fn. 24, ante. ) And even without such evidence, the instruction would have injected a new issue into the jury's deliberations and invited the kind of speculation that the Montgomery rule seeks to avoid. We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the proferred instruction. [26]
(11) At the request of the People the trial court gave CALJIC No. 2.03, which states that the jury may consider as evidence tending to prove consciousness of guilt any false or deliberately misleading statements the defendant made prior to trial concerning the crimes charged against him; the instruction adds that such evidence is not sufficient in itself to prove guilt, however, and its weight and significance remain for the jury to determine. Defendant contends it was error to give this instruction because it lacked evidentiary support. He claims the instruction was predicated solely on the pretrial oral and written statements he gave to Sutter County Sheriff's Detective Davis, in which he recounted that at 5 p.m. on the day of the murder he received a telephone call from Karen telling him she needed transportation to the Stickey Wicket bar and that he sent Dave Khan to pick her up for this purpose. Reliance is then placed on People v. Rubio (1977) 71 Cal. App.3d 757, 769 [139 Cal. Rptr. 750] (disapproved on another ground in People v. Freeman (1978) 22 Cal.3d 434, 438 [149 Cal. Rptr. 396]) for the proposition that it is error to give CALJIC No. 2.03 when the sole evidence that the defendant's pretrial statements are false is their inconsistency with the prosecution's case at trial. The contention is both legally and factually untenable. Rubio does not stand for the broad proposition asserted, but rather for the more modest view that when a defendant testifies in a manner consistent with his pretrial statements to the police but inconsistent with the prosecution's case at trial, CALJIC No. 2.03 should not be given because in that event it necessarily casts specific doubt on a defendant's credibility as a witness and singles out defendant's testimony as subject to more particular scrutiny than that attached to prosecution witnesses. (71 Cal. App.3d at p. 769.) Inasmuch as defendant did not testify in the case at bar, the harm identified in Rubio could not have flowed from the giving of the instruction. Nor is it true, as defendant asserts, that the instruction was based solely on his statements to Detective Davis. As we have seen, the record is replete with testimony by other witnesses relating different versions of the critical events told to them by defendant shortly after the murder. [27] In one instance the witness (David Khan) actually described the fabrication of an alibi by defendant; while defendant's stories related by the other witnesses, including Detective Davis, were for the most part inconsistent with each other. In these circumstances the jury could reasonably infer they were all false and were deliberately invented by defendant to shift suspicion away from him. Such evidence supports an inference of consciousness of guilt ( People v. Showers (1968) 68 Cal.2d 639, 643 [68 Cal. Rptr. 459, 440 P.2d 939]; People v. Osslo (1958) 50 Cal.2d 75, 93 [323 P.2d 397]; People v. Albertson (1944) 23 Cal.2d 550, 581-582 [145 P.2d 7] (conc. opn. of Traynor, J.)) and hence warrants the giving of CALJIC No. 2.03.
On February 15, 1978, prior to the start of trial, defendant subpoenaed Donnie Khan to testify in his behalf. Khan did not appear, and on March 2, during presentation of the People's case in chief, defendant obtained a bench warrant for his arrest. The next day the People rested and defendant began putting on his case while efforts to serve the warrant continued. On March 7 defendant advised the court he had no further witnesses to call and Khan had not yet been found; the court adjourned the proceedings and requested an offer of proof. On March 8 defendant made the offer, informing the court that prior to trial Khan told defense counsel in a tape-recorded statement that on the day of the murder he saw Karen and his brother David drive away from the Scott-Reeves house without defendant, and that he did not see defendant at the house at that time. The court granted a continuance until Monday, March 13, to locate Khan and another missing witness. On the latter date the second witness appeared and testified, but Khan could still not be found. Defendant rested without requesting a further continuance, and after a brief rebuttal the parties made their closing arguments to the jury. On March 14 the court gave its instructions and the jury began deliberating. On the morning of March 15 defendant advised the court he had learned that Khan had reported to the Sacramento County jail on the previous day to begin serving a sentence. Defendant then moved to reopen the proceedings to take Khan's testimony. The prosecutor objected on two grounds, to wit, that the court has no authority to reopen after deliberations have begun and that in any event Khan's proposed testimony had already been put before the jury by other witnesses. The court denied the motion on the former ground, ruling that it lacked authority to reopen under the circumstances. Defendant now contends the ruling was both erroneous and prejudicial. (12) The Attorney General concedes it was erroneous. The trial court has authority to order a case reopened for good cause even after jury deliberations have begun. (Pen. Code, § 1094; People v. Christensen (1890) 85 Cal. 568, 578 [24 P. 888]; People v. Frohner (1976) 65 Cal. App.3d 94, 109-111 [135 Cal. Rptr. 153]; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal. App.3d 359, 383 [87 Cal. Rptr. 394]; see generally Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 849, 851 et seq.) Although the decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen remains in the discretion of the trial court, there is no issue here, contrary to the cited cases, as to whether the court abused that discretion. Rather, the court simply did not exercise its discretion upon defendant's motion, and the error lay in its failure to do so. For this reason the Attorney General's contention that defendant did not use due diligence to secure Khan's attendance at trial (by requesting one more continuance on Mar. 13) wholly misses the point. Whether a defendant exercised due diligence to locate a missing witness or discover new evidence is relevant to the issue of abuse of the court's discretion in denying a motion to reopen ( People v. Newton, supra, at p. 383 of 8 Cal. App.3d); it is irrelevant, however, to the only question before us when the court errs in failing to exercise that discretion, i.e., whether the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice under article VI, section 13, of the Constitution. [28] On the record of the case at bar we find the error to be nonprejudicial. In his cross-examination of Larry Creech defendant established that after the preliminary hearing this witness arranged a meeting between Donnie Khan and defense counsel at the latter's request and in the latter's office; that Khan attended the meeting voluntarily, saying he wanted to talk with defendant's counsel about the events of the day of the murder (Oct. 11); and that Creech did not direct Khan to lie or in any way tell him what to say. Creech then testified that in his presence defense counsel questioned Khan and tape-recorded his answers; and that in the course of listening to the exchange he heard Khan state to defense counsel that on October 11 he and his brother David brought Karen to the Scott-Reeves house, he got out of the car, and David and Karen drove away alone, and that he did not see defendant anywhere at the house at that time. Creech's testimony thus put before the jury the very statement that defendant offered to elicit from Donnie Khan if the proceedings were reopened. Defendant argues the latter testimony would not be merely cumulative because it would have a greater impact if presented by Khan. Nevertheless, after a review of the entire record we are of the opinion that it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have occurred in the absence of the court's error in ruling on the motion to reopen. ( People v. Watson (1956) supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
(13a) In his petition for habeas corpus defendant contends he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to move for a change of venue. The material factual allegations on this point are not in dispute, and we may therefore resolve the issue without resort to an evidentiary hearing. ( People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 160 [158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587].) (14) There is no doubt that upon a proper showing a defendant is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus setting aside his judgment of conviction on the ground that his trial attorney's failure to make or support a motion for change of venue denied him effective assistance of counsel. ( In re Miller (1973) 33 Cal. App.3d 1005, 1011-1014 [109 Cal. Rptr. 648].) As in cases raising this issue on appeal, however, the burden is on the petitioner for the writ to demonstrate that a motion for change of venue would have been made in the circumstances by a reasonably competent attorney acting as a diligent, conscientious advocate. ( People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 423-425 [152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859] [appeal]; People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 158-166 [habeas corpus].) (13b) Defendant fails to sustain that burden. Appended to the petition for habeas corpus is a declaration under penalty of perjury by defendant's trial counsel, David Weiner. On the present issue he states that he was aware of and read the pretrial newspaper publicity about the case and discussed it with Mr. Green [defendant] several times in considering filing a change of venue motion. Other factors discussed were increased costs of defense and my unavailability if the case were tried in a distant county. He concludes that it was Mr. Green's decision to proceed with a trial in Sutter County rather than seek a change of venue. Defendant contends the affidavit discloses two reasons for his counsel's inaction that support the claim of ineffective assistance. First, defendant attempts to bring the case within the rule that counsel's ignorance of easily discoverable case law is evidence of incompetent representation. ( People v. Ibarra (1963) 60 Cal.2d 460, 464-466 [34 Cal. Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d 487]; In re Greenfield (1970) 11 Cal. App.3d 536, 544 [89 Cal. Rptr. 847].) In his affidavit, Mr. Weiner states he was not aware of the decision in McGown v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal. App.3d 648 [142 Cal. Rptr. 262], which holds that after a motion for change of venue is granted the movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine the county to which the case will be transferred. Defendant argues that if Mr. Weiner had known of McGown he could have advised him that a change of venue might not in fact increase the costs of defense or affect their attorney-client relationship. The short answer is that the McGown decision was not rendered until December 5, 1977, and did not even appear in the advance sheets of the California Official Reports until December 20, 1977  i.e., one month after the newspaper coverage of the events herein ended and three weeks after defendant was formally charged with the crime. At the time when it might have been relevant, therefore, the McGown rule was manifestly not easily discoverable case law within the meaning of Ibarra. [29] Secondly, defendant relies on the rule recently reiterated in People v. Corona (1978) 80 Cal. App.3d 684, 720 [145 Cal. Rptr. 894], that effective assistance includes not only professional competence but also the requirement that the services of the attorney be devoted solely to the interest of his client undiminished by conflicting considerations.... Stressing Mr. Weiner's reference in his affidavit to his unavailability if the case were tried in a distant county, defendant implies that his counsel's advice on the question of change of venue was tainted by his aversion to conducting a trial in such a county. Defendant again overstates the case. Of course it would be impermissible for an attorney to refrain from moving for a change of venue, or to advise against such a motion, simply because of an undisclosed desire to avoid any personal inconvenience resulting from a new place of trial. But there is nothing improper in a privately retained attorney discussing with his client, among other factors for the latter to weigh in making his decision, the fact that a change of venue to a distant county might make it difficult for counsel to continue with the representation. From the affidavit as a whole it fairly appears that defendant's decision to stand trial in Sutter County was reached voluntarily and on the basis of Mr. Weiner's full disclosure of the competing considerations. This is a far cry from Corona, in which defense counsel took a position virtually adverse to his allegedly mentally disturbed client while exploiting a sweeping grant of literary rights to the case extracted from the client as the price of his defense. In the alternative, defendant in effect disregards the affidavit and contends that a competent attorney acting as a diligent advocate would have filed  presumably over defendant's objection  a motion for change of venue in this case. The record does not support the claim. Such a motion will lie when it appears there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county in which the action is pending. (Pen. Code, § 1033, subd. (a); Maine v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 375, 383-384 [66 Cal. Rptr. 724, 438 P.2d 372].) Adverting to the factors identified in our decisions as bearing on this issue, we observe first that although the offense here in issue was doubtless very serious  as indeed is every murder  it did not have the sensational overtones of other killings that have been held to require a change of venue, such as an ongoing crime spree, multiple victims often related or acquainted, or sexual motivation. It is true the place of trial was not a large metropolitan center, but neither was it a rural outback. [30] Defendant was admittedly a stranger to the community; but so also was the victim, and her death did not trigger tangible manifestations of public sympathy and support. The local newspaper accounts of the crime were frequent during the few weeks following the event; yet the accounts were predominantly factual, and contained little potentially inflammatory matter [31] and no revelations of incriminating evidence that was not properly admitted at the trial. Moreover, the newspaper accounts ceased after defendant was arrested and charged with the crime, and there was virtually no publicity about the case during the ensuing three months until trial. At that time the voir dire disclosed that few prospective jurors had any significant recollection of the media coverage, and each of the jurors selected was either unfamiliar with the case or had formed no opinion as to defendant's guilt or innocence. Finally, defendant used only half of his allotted number of peremptory challenges, and accepted the jury as thus constituted. We have recently held that a similar set of facts does not require a change of venue prior to trial ( Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 608-609 [119 Cal. Rptr. 302, 531 P.2d 1086]), nor does it justify reversal of a conviction on appeal because of the trial court's refusal to order such a change. ( People v. Sommerhalder (1973) 9 Cal.3d 290, 301-304 [107 Cal. Rptr. 289, 508 P.2d 289]; People v. Hathcock (1973) supra, 8 Cal.3d 599, 618-620; People v. Welch (1972) supra, 8 Cal.3d 106, 112-114; People v. Salas (1972) 7 Cal.3d 812, 817-819 [103 Cal. Rptr. 431, 500 P.2d 7, 58 A.L.R.3d 832].) It follows a fortiori that in the case at bar counsel's decision not to make such a motion, in light of all the circumstances and after consultation with defendant, does not reflect any failure on his part to act as a competent, diligent advocate of his client's cause.