Opinion ID: 765540
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Preemptive Effect of The Federal Orders and Regulations

Text: 56 As we noted above, the record shows that there are three different kinds of one-person crew operations: hostling movements, helper movements, and over-the-road movements. As we discuss in detail below, on this record, we conclude that the FRA has issued final dispositions-- regulations and orders under sec. 20106-- permitting one-person crews to perform hostling and helper movements, but has not done so for one-person over-the-road operations. Thus, sec. 192.25(2)'s two-person crew requirement is and helper movements. 57 As we discussed above, between 1993 and 1995, the FRA considered and promulgated regulations governing when blue signal protection had to be used when a lone engineer performed hostling or helper service. In response to a petition for reconsideration, it suspended the regulation placing additional requirements on one-person crews (49 C.F.R. sec. 218.24). As our description of the rule-making process shows, the FRA considered the issue of safety for one-person crews conducting these two types of operations and whether additional precautions were needed. It ultimately decided not to impose any. When the FRA examines a safety concern regarding an activity and affirmatively decides that no regulation is needed, this has the effect of being an order that the activity is permitted. See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 926 F.2d 567, 570 (6th Cir. 1991) (FRA decision not to impose requirement of walkways on railroad bridges preempted state requirement of such walkways); Burlington N. R.R., 880 F.2d at 1106- 07 (FRA's considering adopting rule requiring caboose but declining to do so reinforced conclusion that telemetry regulation preempted state requirement for caboose); Missouri & P. R.R. v. Texas R.R. Comm'n, 850 F.2d 264, 267-68 (5th Cir. 1988) (same). The district court was therefore incorrect to conclude that because 49 C.F.R. sec. 218.24 was suspended it is irrelevant to the issue of preemption. The decision to impose the added safety requirements for certain one-person operations and the decision to suspend it were final dispositions of the FRA's position on the matter, and were thus orders under sec. 20106. 58 Wisconsin argues that the subject matter of the FRA's orders and regulations was blue signal protection, not the minimum safe crew size. That argument too finely slices the subject matter of the federal regulations. The FRA considered whether a lone engineer could safely conduct hostling and helper service without blue signal or some other additional protection; it concluded that he could. Wisconsin argues that in deciding that these lone engineer operations were safe without blue signal protection, the FRA did not decide the more basic issue of whether the operations were safe at all. This argument is too narrow. So also is Wisconsin's argument that the conduct hostling and helper operations without blue signal protection merely touches upon rather than substantially subsumes the subject of whether one-person crews were safe for these operations. The FRA's more specific conclusion that the operations were safe without added precautions encompasses the more general one that they are safe. Wisconsin's requirement that two persons conduct these operations directly contradicts the FRA's decision that one person may do them safely. Under sec. 20106, Wisconsin's requirement must give way. To the extent sec. 192.25(2)'s two-person crew requirement applies to hostling and helper operations, it is preempted. 59 We do not reach the same conclusion regarding one-person crews on over-the-road operations, however. The plaintiffs argue that the FRA has affirmatively approved all one-person operations, but the record does not support this argument. As we just discussed, the FRA's decisions regarding blue signal protection for one-person crews showed that the agency considered and decided the issue with regard to hostling and helper operations only. The FRA's regulations and its discussion of them in the Federal Register do not show that the agency considered the issue of one- person crews in other types of operations. The plaintiffs rely on the FRA's test program of remote control devices and the statements it made to Wisconsin Central about other railroads conducting one-person operations as evidence that the FRA approves one-person operations generally. The plaintiffs seem to argue that because the FRA is aware of one-person operations and has not proscribed them, it must necessarily approve them as safe. This does not follow. Such a position gives too much weight to agency inaction. The record shows unequivocally that the FRA is aware that the railroad industry uses one-person crews for some over-the-road operations. And it shows that the FRA has not prohibited this practice, although it currently has the matter under consideration. But what the record does not show is that the FRA has considered the issue and affirmatively decided not to regulate such operations. Only this sort of affirmative decision preempts state requirements. As the Supreme Court held in applying a different statute, 'where failure of . . . federal officials affirmatively to exercise their authority takes on the character of a ruling that pursuant to the policy of the statute,' states are not permitted to use their police power to enact such a regulation. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 178 (1978) (quoting Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 774 (1947)) (omission in original). As the Fifth Circuit put it, the difference is between an agency saying 'we haven't looked at [the issue] yet,' rather than, as Ray requires, 'we haven't done anything because we have determined it is appropriate to do nothing.' Missouri P. R.R. v. Texas R.R. Comm'n, 833 F.2d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 1987). The record does not show that the FRA's consideration of one-person crews on over-the-road operations has taken on the character of an affirmative decision to do nothing; if and when it does, that decision will preempt sec. 192.25. But until it does, Wisconsin is free to require two-person crews on over-the-road operations. 60 There are a few more aspects of this case that require further discussion. The first is the preemptive effect of the FRA's Safety Compliance Agreements with Wisconsin Central. The plaintiffs relied on these agreements to show that the FRA had generally approved one-person crews. As discussed above, the agreements show the FRA was aware that some railroads used one-person crews for over-the-road movements, but they do not show that the FRA had considered the issue of their safety and affirmatively approved these operations. This does not mean, however, that the agreements are totally without effect, as Wisconsin argues and as the district court seemed to think. The agreements showed that the FRA had taken jurisdiction over Wisconsin Central's operations in Wisconsin and had set out things the railroad could and could not do. These agreements, then, showed that the FRA had considered Wisconsin Central's operations and approved various aspects of it--including some one-person operations. Under Wisconsin's theory that these agreements had no preemptive effect, Wisconsin could prevent Wisconsin Central from doing precisely what the FRA had told the railroad it could do. The FRA, not Wisconsin, has the whip hand in railroad safety regulations, Shots, 38 F.3d at 307. The fact that the agreements were temporary and that the FRA was evaluating and revising its position does not mean the agreements are not final dispositions of the FRA's position on the operations expressly prohibit a railroad from doing that which the FRA expressly approved merely because the FRA was permitting the activity as part of an ongoing study of the matter, then the FRA's ability to make informed decisions would be severely curtailed. The FRA's affirmative decision that a specific activity should be permitted, even if just so that it can be studied, is a final disposition approving the activity. While the Safety Compliance Agreements don't have the broad preemptive effect that the plaintiffs argue for, they do cover the subject matter of all operations that they specifically permit. 61 We have the same view of the preemptive effect of the FRA's 1994 test program for remote control devices. To the extent the FRA approved the use of a remote control device in a particular operation with a one-person crew-- apparently the only type of crew that uses such devices-- necessarily the FRA had to have approved a one- person crew for that operation. Again, the FRA's more specific conclusion necessarily had to encompass the more general conclusion. Wisconsin argues, and the district court seemed to agree, that because the test program did not apply to all railroads it had no preemptive effect. It did not have the broad preemptive effect the plaintiffs argue for. But the FRA's decision to permit the use of remote control devices by railroads participating in the test program was an affirmative decision to allow those operations specifically covered by the program, and any state requirement prohibiting them would have been preempted. But an affirmative decision to permit specific operations is not, as the plaintiffs argue, necessarily an affirmative decision to permit all similar operations conducted by railroads not part of the test program. We cannot definitively state what preemptive effect the remote control test program--which is apparently no longer being conducted--would have had on a two-person crew requirement because the record is unclear as to exactly what types of operations were involved. To the extent they were hostling or helper operations, its preemptive effect on a two-person crew requirement is irrelevant because other regulations specifically approved those operations. All that is certain is that to the extent the FRA decided to permit a particular activity as part of the test program, that decision preempted any state requirements on that same subject matter. But as noted, this record does not demonstrate exactly what that extent was. 62 In response to Wheeling & Lake Erie's request for waivers of certain regulations to conduct remote control operations, the UTU filed a petition for an emergency order banning all remote control operations and the FRA denied that petition. The amici argue that this denial was an affirmative decision that remote control operations were generally permitted and, necessarily, that one-person crews were as well. But the record does not give any details about the FRA's deliberations leading to its conclusion to deny the UTU's petition. It is unclear what conclusions the FRA reached in making that decision. Thus, as this record stands the denial of the petition does not necessarily mean that no regulation was appropriate. 63 In sum, sec. 192.25's two-person crew requirement is preempted for hostling and helper operations. It is also preempted to the extent the FRA through agreements with Wisconsin Central expressly permits that railroad to conduct one- person crew operations.