Opinion ID: 1125086
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was consent vitiated by seizure?

Text: Because Armenta and Cruz did not cross-appeal the trial court's finding that Armenta freely and voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle, we do not address that issue. Nevertheless, we must determine whether the prior illegal detention vitiated that consent. Several factors are relevant in determining whether consent to a search is tainted by a prior illegal seizure: (1) temporal proximity of the illegality and the subsequent consent, (2) the presence of significant intervening circumstances, (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct, and (4) the giving of Miranda warnings. State v. Soto-Garcia, 68 Wash.App. 20, 27, 841 P.2d 1271 (1992) (citing Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 2667, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982); accord State v. Gonzales, 46 Wash.App. 388, 398, 731 P.2d 1101 (1986)). Here, Armenta consented to the search immediately after Officer Randles placed Armenta and Cruz's money in his patrol car. Furthermore, there were essentially no intervening circumstances, and Armenta and Cruz had not been read their Miranda rights. Although we feel certain that Randles was not acting maliciously, it is apparent that he was fishing for evidence of illegal drug trafficking. See, e.g., RP at 18 (Q: [Y]ou had your suspicions and you wanted to get in the car? A[Randles]: If they allowed me to, yes.). In our view, Armenta's consent, although voluntary, was tainted by the prior illegal detention. Likewise, Armenta and Cruz's statements to Detective Suarez were fruit of petitioners' illegal, detention. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (confession following issuance of Miranda warnings nevertheless tainted by illegal arrest and therefore inadmissible).