Opinion ID: 1190112
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: District's School Uniform Policies Are Viewpoint- and Content-Neutral

Text: Before turning to precisely what level of scrutiny that should be, we pause to explain why we find the school uniform policies at issue in this case to be both viewpoint- and content-neutral [29] and, thus, deserving of a different level of scrutiny than that applied to the viewpoint-based policy in Tinker. On its face, the portion of the Regulation authorizing schools to implement mandatory uniform policies is aimed at increasing student achievement, promoting safety, and enhancing a positive school environment. Nothing in the Regulation's language suggests it was directed at the type of messages or specific viewpoints previously conveyed by students' wardrobe choices; indeed, the record evidence unambiguously indicates that the District's purpose in enacting the Regulation was to further the Regulation's stated goals, not to suppress the expression of particular ideas. [30] For example, the referendum sent to parents listing the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed uniform policy included as potential advantages: (1) Promot[ing] safety by reducing the ability to hide weapons, drugs or alcohol; (2) Allow[ing] students and staff to focus more attention to increasing student achievement; (3) Eliminat[ing] dress differences that emphasize different income levels; and (4) Simplif[ying] daily school preparation and maintenance for families. None of the proposed advantages related to the benefits of preventing students from expressing unpopular views or communicating about particular subjects via their clothing choices. Of course, while evidence of a viewpoint-and content-neutral purpose strongly suggests that a regulation is, in fact, content-neutral, mere assertion of a benign purpose is insufficient to conclusively establish a regulation's content-neutrality. Turner, 512 U.S. at 642, 114 S.Ct. 2445. Here, Plaintiffs argue that, despite the District's stated purposes, the Regulation is not content-neutral because it allows student clothing to contain the school logo  an allowance that, in Plaintiffs' view, sanctions expression of messages touting the District's schools, but not messages relating to any other topic or viewpoint. At first blush, Plaintiffs' argument seems viable. Indeed, if the Regulation allowed for school uniforms that consisted only of plain-colored clothing without any words, logos, or printed material whatsoever, Plaintiffs' argument against the Regulation's content-neutrality would almost certainly fall flat. As it stands, however, Plaintiffs have at least a colorable claim that, by allowing student clothing to contain school logos, the Regulation reflects an impermissible content-based (and, indeed, viewpoint-based) preference for expressions of school pride. While the District could have steered far clear of the First Amendment's boundaries by foregoing the logo provision entirely, we nevertheless conclude that allowing students' otherwise solid-colored clothing to contain a school logo  an item expressing little, if any, genuine communicative message  does not convert a content-neutral school uniform policy into a content-based one. Indeed, the District's very narrow exception to its otherwise content-neutral school uniform policy is a far cry from those regulations previously found by the Supreme Court to be content-based. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000) (statute restricting cable companies' dissemination of sexual programming); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993) (ordinance banning commercial handbills on news racks but allowing newspapers); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988) (statute prohibiting display of signs critical of a foreign government near a foreign embassy); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980) (statute prohibiting all picketing in residential neighborhoods except labor picketing tied to a place of employment); Police Dep't of City of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) (similar); see also ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784 (9th Cir.2006) (ordinance prohibiting speech soliciting donations, charity, business or patronage). Moreover, [w]hatever marginal expression wearing [a school] logo implicates, it does not rise to the level of expression to implicate concerns of viewpoint [non] neutrality. Long v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson County, Ky., 121 F.Supp.2d 621, 625 n. 5 (W.D.Ky.2000). The content-based/content-neutral dichotomy is not grounded in the text of the First Amendment itself, but was created by the Supreme Court as a tool for distinguishing those regulations that seek to advance legitimate regulatory goals from those that seek to suppress unpopular ideas or information or to manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion. Turner, 512 U.S. at 641, 114 S.Ct. 2445. Here, Plaintiffs put forth no evidence that the Regulation's logo allowance was an attempt by the District to inundate the marketplace of ideas with pro-school messages or to starve that marketplace of contrary opinions; rather, all evidence suggests that the District considered the logo to be an identifying mark, not a communicative device. We thus decline Plaintiffs' invitation to take the term content-based to its literal extreme, and we hold that the District's school uniform policies are content-neutral despite their allowances for clothing containing school logos. [31]