Opinion ID: 2206435
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Defendant challenges his conviction on the charge of terrorism on the ground there was insufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury. He argues his motion for directed verdict should have been sustained. Terrorism is defined in section 708.6, The Code, as follows: A person commits a class D felony when the person does any of the following with the intent to injure or provoke fear or anger in another: 1. Shoots, throws, launches, or discharges a dangerous weapon at or into any building, vehicle, airplane, railroad engine or railroad car, or boat occupied by another person, and thereby places the occupants thereof in reasonable apprehension of serious injury. 2. Threatens to commit a forcible felony under circumstances raising a reasonable expectation that the threat will be carried out. Defendant was prosecuted under subdivision 1 of this statute. The Information stated that defendant committed terrorism by shooting or discharging a dangerous weapon . . . at or into a vehicle with intent to injure the occupants of said vehicle, to-wit: Johnny Pritchett and Ricky Pritchett, placing said occupants in reasonable apprehension of serious injury. . . . The question upon which the State and defendant disagree is the meaning we should place on that part of the statute which provides the victim must be placed in reasonable apprehension of serious injury. The State argues the test to be applied is objective and that the victim need not actually experience apprehension if the circumstances would have induced that reaction in a reasonable person. The defendant takes the opposite view, insisting there can be no violation of this subsection unless the person subjected to the assault is subjectively placed in apprehension of serious injury. We have not heretofore considered this problem. In State v. Jackson, 305 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1981) we reviewed a conviction under subsection 2 of section 708.6, The Code, and pointed out the significant difference in the language of that subsection as compared to subsection 1. We said: [T]he terrorism statute does not state clearly whose reasonable expectation is addressed. But, because the only act mentioned . . . is the act which is intended to place another in fear, the reasonable expectation must be that of the actor. Like the other sections of the assault chapter, use of the objective standard of reasonableness [in prosecutions under subsection 2] indicates the issue is not whether the victim actually believed the threat would be carried out, but whether the actor so intended, and whether the actor's belief was reasonable. . . . We also note that while subsection (1) of the terrorism statute explicitly requires the accused's act must place the victims of the act in reasonable apprehension of serious injury, subsection (2) contains no similar language. This disparity suggests the victim's state of mind was not intended to be a factor in subsection (2), under which this defendant was charged. 305 N.W.2d at 423. In construing statutes, we ascribe to statutory terms their ordinary meaning unless the legislature otherwise defines them. Jackson, 305 N.W.2d at 422. In the present case, we find the state of mind of both the actor and the victim is made an element of terrorism under subsection (1). The actor must intend to injure or to provoke fear or anger in another. In addition the victimhere the occupant of the carmust experience apprehension of serious injury. Furthermore this apprehension must be reasonable under the circumstances. In other words, an unjustified apprehension, one for which a jury might find no basis in fact, will not suffice. We believe these matters were properly presented to the jury by instructions 10 and 11, when those instructions are read together, even though the instructions are not models of clarity. But this does not answer defendant's argument. Even conceding the instructions were adequate, we must still find evidence to support submission of the issue to the jury. There is no evidence from which the jury could find that the alleged victim experienced apprehension of serious injury. The jury could find a reasonable person in the position of the victim would have been frightened, but no evidence was adduced to show the actual effect of the shooting on this particular victim. This cannot be left to conjecture. The State's failure to produce any evidence on this point is fatal. The court of appeals found that the necessary element of apprehension could be inferred from the circumstances. We do not disagree that this could be true in some cases, but not under this record. We reverse but do not remand because defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on this charge and therefore cannot be tried again.