Opinion ID: 2318317
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: instructions respecting accomplice testimony

Text: The defendant contends that it was prejudicial error for the Justice below to fail to give the jury a cautionary instruction regarding the testimony of an accomplice whose credibility had to be accepted to sustain a conviction. Such an instruction was not requested by the attorney who represented the defendant at trial at the close of the evidence, nor were there any objections to the charge as given before the jury retired to consider its verdict, all as required by Rule 30(b), Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure. The appellant relies in his quest for relief upon Rule 52(b) M.R. Crim.P., which provides that obvious errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court. Except where the statutes or constitution provide otherwise, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a conviction may be sustained in a criminal case on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, but such testimony is always received with caution. The testimony of the accomplice-witness is for the jury, and, if his testimony convinces beyond a reasonable doubt, they are authorized to find guilt. State v. Hume, 1951, 146 Me. 129, 78 A.2d 496; State v. Morey, 1927, 126 Me. 323, 138 A. 474. In State v. James, 1965, 161 Me. 17, 206 A.2d 410, this Court saw no occasion to depart from the rule, and added: The problem is essentially one of weight and credibility and we are satisfied that a jury, acting under proper instructions, can exercise that care and caution in evaluating the testimony of the accomplice which insure a fair trial to the respondent. (Emphasis supplied.) Ordinarily the problem of the credibility of an accomplice arises where he testifies for the State. Such testimony has inherent weaknesses because of its proclivity for untrustworthiness. Accomplices confessing their criminal activity with a defendant oftentimes are influenced in their testimony by such motives as malice toward the accused, fear, threats, promises or hopes of leniency or benefits from the prosecution. The cautionary charge to the jury, viewed by some courts as the better practice, in most instances is for the benefit of the defendant. But the usual specific instruction, that the evidence of an accomplice is to be carefully scrutinized, received with caution and assessed in the context of his interest, may be, to some degree, to the defendant's disadvantage because the very use of the term accomplice characterizing as it does the association between the witness and the accused has an opprobrious and detrimental connotation. The use of that word where the witness admits his guilt gives rise to the natural suggestion that the defendant whom he has implicated is likewise a guilty participant in the crime. At common law it was not required that the Court give a cautionary instruction respecting accomplice testimony that it should be examined with great care and caution, but the practice of giving such instructions or advice to the jury rested in the Court, and the refusal to do so was not assignable as error. State v. Douglas, 1944, 70 S.D. 203, 16 N.W.2d 489. See also, Gordon v. State, 1940, 188 Miss. 708, 196 So. 507; Holmes v. State, 1961, 242 Miss. 407, 134 So.2d 485; State v. Montifoire, 1922, 95 Vt. 508, 116 A. 77. While a defendant may be entitled to the cautionary charge when he requests that it be given, (see, Commonwealth v. Sisak, 1969, 436 Pa. 262, 259 A.2d 428), it is not error, let alone obvious error, for a trial judge to fail to give the warning comment where it has not been requested. State v. Artis, 1970, 57 N.J. 24, 269 A.2d 1. The charge of the presiding Justice respecting the factors to be considered by the jury in evaluating the testimony of the accomplice was extremely fair to the accused and, absent a request for the cautionary warning, was a correct exposition of the law. No showing of manifest error has been made. The evidence discloses nothing in the testimony of the accomplice to make the same inherently incredible, improbable, unreasonable or unsubstantial. His testimony was accepted as true by the jury and formed a sufficient basis for conviction of the defendant. The alibi evidence tended to raise a conflict with the accomplice's testimony. In this posture of the case, it was the jury's province to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be accorded to their testimony, and the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence of the defendant. The appellant further contends that the Justice below, in his narration of the facts to the jury and in his reference to them that a criminal statute of the State had been violated, committed prejudicial error; he argues the presiding Justice thereby indicated to the jury that he had himself concluded the defendant was guilty. We have carefully reviewed the charge and find that no reasonable jury could properly infer from its language any such expression of opinion in violation of 14 M.R.S.A., § 1105. The record affirmatively shows that the defendant received the fair trial to which he was entitled under the law and the constitution and that the jury, in view of all of the evidence, was warranted in believing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty. There was no error below and the entry will be Appeal denied.