Opinion ID: 845584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the adb can decide constitutional questions

Text: The issues presented in this case are questions of law involving attorney discipline, which we review de novo. Grievance Administrator v. Lopatin, 462 Mich. 235, 247, 612 N.W.2d 120 (2000). Our responsibility to regulate and discipline members of the State Bar of Michigan is found in our state constitution at Const 1963, art 6, § 5, [1] and in our statutes at MCL 600.904. [2] To fulfill this responsibility, we created by court rule the Attorney Grievance Commission and the Attorney Disciplinary Board. MCR 9.108 [3] and MCR 9.110. [4] Through these rules, we have delegated the initial phases of our constitutional responsibility to supervise and discipline Michigan attorneys. Just as no one contests that the Court has the power to hear constitutional questions, no one cites authority that limits the Court's power to delegate this power to the ADB. The majority holds that the ADB cannot answer constitutional questions because of its mere quasi-judicial status. It bases that decision on Wikman v. Novi , [5] Lewis v. Michigan , [6] and Const. 1963, art. 3, § 2. But, none of these authorities answers the question. Neither Wikman nor Lewis involved a delegation of judicial power to a judicially created entity. Wikman dealt with a legislative delegation of power to the Michigan Tax Tribunal. Lewis dealt with the constitutional power of the Legislature to implement equal protection provisions. [7] Article 3, § 2 of the state constitution is the Separation of Powers Clause. [8] Lewis had nothing to do with the delegation of authority to decide constitutional questions. Wikman discussed the authority of the Legislature to delegate to one of its agencies the power to determine a constitutional question. It inferred that the Legislature cannot make this delegation because the authority to answer a constitutional question resides in the judicial branch. By contrast, this case involves the power of the Supreme Court to delegate authority to opine on a constitutional question to one of its own agencies. It does not follow that, because a legislatively created quasi-judicial agency may not decide a constitutional question, a quasi-judicial agency of the Supreme Court cannot do so. Rather, the opposite result should obtain. If this Court makes a broad delegation of authority to its own quasi-judicial agency and does not expressly exempt from it the determination of constitutional questions, the agency has that power. There being no restriction on the Court's power to delegate constitutional power and none on the ADB's delegated authority, I would hold that the ADB may answer constitutional questions involving attorney discipline.