Opinion ID: 2633651
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Asserted errors in the standard instructions

Text: Defendant challenges the standard penalty phase jury instructions, CALJIC Nos. 8.84.1 and 8.84.2, on several grounds. As defendant acknowledges, we have rejected many of the precise arguments he raises here. Thus, we have held the trial court need not identify which particular factors are aggravating and which are mitigating. ( People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 641, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 160, 115 P.3d 472; People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 402, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244.) It follows the trial court need not instruct that background evidence may be considered only in mitigation. Further, the instructions need not explicitly label a factor such as extreme mental or emotional disturbance as mitigating, provided there is no reasonable likelihood jurors misunderstood the instruction in a way that violated the defendant's rights. ( People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 924, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23, 116 P.3d 494; see also People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1191, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) Here, defense counsel strenuously argued defendant's mental and emotional problems were factors in mitigation. The prosecutor did not argue those same factors were aggravating; rather she argued that the evidence suggesting defendant suffered from such problems was unconvincing. Under these circumstances, we find no reasonable likelihood the jury considered evidence of defendant's mental illness as aggravating. ( People v. Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 924-925, 32 Cal. Rptr.3d 23, 116 P.3d 494 [no reasonable likelihood jury misconstrued section 190.3, factor (d) to allow it to consider defendant's mental illness in aggravation, where nothing in the prosecutor's argument suggested such a conclusion and some of the evidence identified by defendant as potentially aggravating was elicited by the defense].) The trial court need not instruct that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and the requirement of jury unanimity do not apply to mitigating factors. (See People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 314-315, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585 [jury unanimity].) The trial court also need not instruct that the absence of a mitigating factor is not aggravating. ( People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1193-1194, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353.) The trial court is not obligated to define the terms aggravating and mitigating, even upon request, because they are commonly understood. ( People v. Hawkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 965, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574; People v. Malone, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 54-55, 252 Cal.Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249.) The trial court is not required to instruct on its own motion that the only aggravating factors the jury may consider are those specified in section 190.3. (E.g., People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1180, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 34 P.3d 937; cf. People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 899, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15 [refusal to so instruct did not violate Eighth Amendment's narrowing requirement].) Although the trial court should have instructed that section 190.3, factors (b) (other criminal activity involving force or violence) and (c) (prior felony convictions) pertain only to criminal activity other than that for which defendant was convicted in the present proceeding ( People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 78, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129; People v. Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1125, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36; People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 938, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277 People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 105-106 & fn. 28, 241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127), the error in the present case was harmless (see People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 205, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781). As we have stated, absent an invitation to do so by the prosecutor, `jurors are unlikely to give the circumstances of the current crime greater weight in the penalty determination simply because they appear to be included in two separate categories of statutory aggravation.' ( People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 453, 285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273 see also People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 205, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781.) Here, the prosecutor did not exploit the potential ambiguity in factor (b); rather, the only matter she argued as relevant to factor (b) was the assault on Tambri Butler. Thus, there is no reasonable possibility the instructional error affected the verdict. [33] ( People v. Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1126, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36; People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 205, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781.) The trial court was not required to tell the jury it could consider defendant's mental and emotional problems under section 190.3, factors (d) and (h) even though it had rejected his guilt phase defenses. Defendant contends that absent such an instruction, the jury would have concluded those factors were not applicable under the trial court's instruction to consider each of the listed factors if applicable. We disagree. In argument, the parties extensively discussed the evidence relevant to factors (d) and (h). No one suggested this evidence could not be considered simply because it did not establish a defense to the charges. (See People v. Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 359-360, 253 Cal.Rptr. 199, 763 P.2d 1289 [prosecutor's argument did not suggest jury could not consider mitigating evidence if such evidence did not establish insanity or other legal defense].) Accordingly, the jury would not have been misled to believe factors (d) and (h) were inapplicable. Moreover, even if the jury determined those factors were inapplicable, it still could consider evidence of defendant's mental illness under the expansive language of section 190.3, factor (k), which allowed it to consider any aspect of defendant's character or record or background offered by the defense as a reason to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Under these circumstances, neither error nor prejudice appears. The trial court was not required to define the terms mental or emotional disturbance in section 190.3, factor (d). ( People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 699, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) Defendant argues the court was obligated to instruct that evidence of mental or emotional disturbance could be considered in mitigation even if there was no reasonable explanation or excuse for such disturbance. Although we agree the scope of factor (d) is broad (see People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 695, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213), defendant cites no authority supporting such a clarifying instruction, and we are unaware of any. The trial court was not required to tell the jury it had discretion to impose the punishment of life imprisonment without possibility of parole even in the absence of any mitigating factors. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 600, fn. 20, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; cf. People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 979, 281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 819 P.2d 131 [jury may return such a verdict even in the complete absence of mitigating evidence].) The federal Constitution does not compel a trial court to instruct that a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole actually signifies the defendant never will be paroled. ( People v. Kennedy, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 641, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 160, 115 P.3d 472.) The failure to instruct the jury to disregard the guilt phase instruction to reach a verdict regardless of the consequences did not prejudice defendant. (See People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 379-380, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169; People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 171, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) At the penalty phase, the court did not repeat the instruction; the jury was instructed to consider the statutory sentencing factors  including the expansive section 190.3, factor (k)  and to disregard any conflicting guilt phase instructions, and the prosecutor's argument did not seek to exploit the notion that the regardless of the consequences instruction applied at the penalty phase. The jury was not misled. ( People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 379-380, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169; People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 171, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) The trial court was not obligated to instruct that the jury had to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole if it found the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances. ( People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 381; 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169; People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1176-1177, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384; People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 109, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23.) The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.84.2: To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. The trial court was not required to provide a standard for comparing mitigating and aggravating circumstances other than the so substantial standard. (See People v. Millwee, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 162-163, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990; People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 170-171, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) The phrase so substantial is not unconstitutionally vague. ( People v. Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 81, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129; People v. Breaux, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 315-316, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585.) Further, CALJIC No. 8.84.2 is not unconstitutional due to its failure to instruct that the central penalty phase determination is whether the death penalty is appropriate. ( People v. Breaux, supra , Cal.4th at pp. 315-316, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585.) To the extent our previous cases have not addressed defendant's constitutional arguments, we note that the Eighth Amendment places no constraints on a jury's discretion in choosing the appropriate sentence between life imprisonment without possibility of parole and the death penalty, as long as the special circumstances have narrowed suitably the class of death-eligible defendants and the sentencing jury is permitted to make an individualized determination based upon the defendant's character and record, guided by specific and relevant factors. ( People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1267-1268, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475, citing Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 875, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235; see also People v. Bacigalupo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 457, 477-478, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 808, 862 P.2d 808.) As we have explained, the California death penalty law and accompanying jury instructions fulfill those purposes. Moreover, to the extent defendant argues the instructions denied him due process of law by arbitrarily depriving him of a benefit provided under state law (see Hicks v. Oklahoma, supra, 447 U.S. 343, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 65 L.Ed.2d 175), his argument fails because, as we have explained, state law does not mandate the instructions he seeks.