Opinion ID: 3052561
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hill’s Testimony

Text: King’s theory regarding the prosecutor’s “she’s scared to death” remark about Ms. Hill is that it implied facts not in evidence, showing that King or King’s family had threatened to kill her if she testified. But defense counsel did not object when the prosecutor made the remark. Even when moving for a mistrial at the end of the prosecutor’s opening statement because of the “if he testifies truthfully” statement about Jones, the defense did not move for a mistrial or otherwise object to the “scared to death” language about Ms. Hill. King did raise the matter, finally, after Ms. Hill had completed her testimony and left the witness stand, in another motion for mistrial. [3] The Arizona Supreme Court rejected King’s argument on alternative grounds.21 First, under Arizona law, “the defendant must voice his objection to arguments that are objectionable, and failure to do so constitutes a waiver of any right to review.”22 The court cited a well established body of Arizona law to that effect.23 Second, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected the argument on the merits because Ms. Hill’s fear was obvious from her demeanor, and her “unwillingness to testify goes directly to her credibility.”24 The court explained that the prosecutor 20 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006). 21 State v. King, 883 P.2d 1024, 1033-34 (Ariz. 1994). 22 Id. at 1033. 23 See id. (citing State v. Holmes, 520 P.2d 1118, 1120 (Ariz. 1974)). 24 Id. at 1033-34. KING v. SCHRIRO 10309 rightly wanted to prepare the jury for Ms. Hill’s demeanor, and even if the prosecutor’s remarks were “improper but colorful hyperbole,”25 they had no significant effect: Hill testified that she called the police after seeing the surveillance pictures broadcast on television. She admitted that she identified defendant as the person in the picture. When asked whether defendant was the person depicted in the surveillance photograph, however, she repeatedly stated that the person in the picture did not look like defendant. Her fear and anxiety over testifying certainly served to bolster her earlier identifications over her trial testimony.26 The court concluded that there was no plain error and no prejudice in King’s case. Ms. Hill testified that “I don’t want to testify. I am being held against my will, something I don’t want to do. . . . I got my own troubles and worries.” The Arizona Supreme Court thus agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that Ms. Hill’s fear was obvious from her testimony, so the prosecutor’s remark did not have the effect of denying King a fair trial. The Arizona Supreme Court also evaluated the statement in context and concluded that “the prosecutor had no idea what Ms. Hill would say once she was on the stand,” but “rightly anticipated that he would have to provide the jury some explanation for Hill’s eventual refusal to identify defendant.”27 In fact, after trying to get off the witness stand before direct was even completed, Ms. Hill testified that the surveillance photograph shown on television, which had prompted her to call the police, did not look like King after all. 25 Id. at 1034. 26 Id. 27 Id. at 1033. 10310 KING v. SCHRIRO On appeal to us, King argues that the failure to object arose because defense counsel expected there to be evidence of a threat and saw no prejudice until it was clear no such evidence would be presented. But there is no evidence or authority before us showing how that speculation would bear on the question of whether the Arizona Supreme Court acted contrary to or unreasonably applied Supreme Court holdings. [4] We have no supervisory authority over Arizona court proceedings,28 and it is plain from Ms. Hill’s own testimony that she was scared of something. The state trial judge’s finding that her demeanor showed fear is not “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” so we cannot reject it.29 It is clear that she was scared, though neither the prosecutor’s statement nor Ms. Hill’s testimony says who or what was the cause. She could have been scared of a threat, or a reputation as a “snitch,” or social ostracism from King’s friends, or something unrelated to this case that might be exposed on cross examination, or merely involvement with the police and the judicial system. In evaluating a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, “a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations.”30 Appellant has not brought to our attention any Supreme Court holding that would have required the Arizona Supreme Court to follow another course in this case. Since the Arizona Supreme Court did not act contrary to or misapply Supreme Court holdings, we must deny relief.31 28 See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647-48 (1974). 29 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 30 Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974). 31 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006). KING v. SCHRIRO 10311