Opinion ID: 2355408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Errors in Ruling on Motion to Suppress

Text: Prior to the trial a motion to suppress was filed. This motion was directed at the suppression of evidence taken from the automobile and the several statements made by the appellant to the police officers. The Justice below refused to suppress any of the physical evidence. He held that the officers had probable cause for the arrest, that the seizure of the automobile was not only incident to a lawful arrest but necessary to preserve evidence and incidentally to protect defendant's property. In any event, he held that the search warrant was validly issued and executed. With reference to the oral statements made in the police car immediately following the arrest, the Justice below said, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that they were voluntary and admissible even though no prior warnings were given. He also ruled that the defendant's written statement and his oral explanation thereof were admissible because he was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Miranda rule had been complied with and that the statements were entirely voluntary. We consider first those issues generated by the denial of the motion to suppress. Initially, we concern ourselves with the question of whether the arrest itself was valid. The argument is advanced that the subsequent seizure of the contents of the automobile, the statement made en route to the police station, and the signed confession were all the products of an unlawful arrest and, therefore, this entire block of evidence should have been suppressed. The resolution of this issue rests, not necessarily upon the knowledge of those police officers who physically arrested the appellant, but rather upon the collective police knowledge extant at that time. We must consider whether within the gamut of general police knowledge focused at shortly after midnight on April 30, 1971, there was probable cause to believe that the appellant was guilty of felonious conduct. Otherwise stated, if the totality of police knowledge then in existence had been presented to a magistrate in a request for a warrant of arrest, would it have been obtained? When the appellant was arrested the record indicates composite police knowledge which, omitting numerous but less important details, includes the following: (1) Mrs. Lafferty was the victim of a potentially fatal stabbing, a hunting knife being the weapon involved. (2) She had made a statement (admissible either as a dying declaration or under the res gestae rule; see infra ) which indicated that her husband was the assailant. (3) The vehicle beside which the appellant was arrested matched the vehicle described as the appellant's. (4) From the testimony of Wendell Beaulieu, the actual occupant of the apartment at 17 Elliot Street, the inference is clear that the police knew of the appellant's presence in this apartment. (5) Mr. Lafferty's statement prior to his arrest, I give up. I'm not armed, was, in terms of this police knowledge, tantamount to an admission of complicity on his part. This Court has recently given complete consideration to the rules defining the circumstances under which probable cause may be found in making a warrantless arrest. Probable cause must be judged on the basis of the composite information in possession of the police and if that knowledge in its totality shows probable cause, a policeman who makes the arrest upon an order to do so under such circumstances, acts upon probable cause.. . . (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Smith, 277 A.2d 481, 489 (Me. 1971); see also State v. Mimmovich, 284 A.2d 282 (Me.1971). We have no hesitancy in ruling that the arrest of the appellant was valid. The appellant, however, urges that the Justice below was in error in failing to suppress the articles of clothing and the blood scrapings taken from the vehicle in the execution of the search warrant. We note that the automobile was not actually searched nor were its contents seized until some hours had elapsed after it was taken into police custody. In the interim a police officer, with the aid of a flashlight, had observed relevant evidence in plain view. This type of observation is not an intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. State v. Stone, 294 A.2d 683, 688 (Me.1972). Without necessarily having to deal with the problem of whether the police acted properly in, first, locking the car and, secondly, removing it from the driveway to the Sheriff's garage, [1] it was at the garage that it was ultimately photographed and searched and the bloody clothing and blood scrapings were there seized. At this point in time the police were in possession of and were executing a validly issued search warrant. We see no useful purpose in repeating the contents of the affidavit filed in support of the request for the search warrant. Suffice it to say, that on its face it recited adequate and obviously reliable facts sufficient to underlie the issuance of a search warrant. [2] State v. Cadigan, 249 A.2d 750 (Me.1969). The appellant was in no way prejudiced by the security taken of his automobile by the police pending the issuance of the search warrant. So far as the generation of the evidence is concerned, the car could have as well been searched at 17 Elliot Street as in the Sheriff's garage. The appellant made four inculpatory statements which were not suppressed, the first prior to his arrest, the next en route to the police station, the written statement, and the verbal explanation thereof. [3] It will be recalled that after his arrest and while in the police car, Mr. Lafferty first inquired about his wife's condition and then said, without being questioned, I know I got her twice with knife, once on the stomach good, and once when she fell down. The Justice below found beyond a reasonable doubt that this statement was voluntary. The decisions seem uniform that spontaneous or voluntary statements which are not the product of custodial interrogation are admissible without prior Miranda warnings, even though made while under arrest. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the majority of the Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), limited the impact of the decision by stating: Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today. 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. In situations factually similar to those before us, voluntary statements made to police officers either without prior Miranda warnings, or with ineffective or incomplete warnings, have been held admissible in many jurisdictions. We have found no precedent holding otherwise. In a pre-Miranda trial, a voluntary but inculpatory statement to a coroner was admitted. State v. Hymore, 9 Ohio St.2d 122, 224 N.E.2d 126 (Ohio 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1024, 88 S.Ct. 1409, 20 L. Ed.2d 281; see also State v. Small, 219 A. 2d 263, 267-268 (Me.1966). Subsequent to the date when the Miranda rule was made applicable to criminal prosecutions (June 13, 1966) in allowing the testimony of a police officer reciting a voluntary statement made to him by a juvenile under arrest for a felony, the Illinois Court said: All agree that Miranda does not require police to interrupt a suspect in the process of making a spontaneous statement in order to warn him of his constitutional rights, and that a statement made in the absence of any questioning is not inadmissible by virtue of the failure to give such warning. In Re Orr, 38 Ill.2d 417, 231 N.E.2d 424, 427 (Ill.1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 924, 88 S.Ct. 1821, 20 L.Ed.2d 663. In a case almost on all fours with the one before us, the Oklahoma Court reached the same conclusion. Andrews v. State, 455 P.2d 741 (Okl.Cr.1969). While a suspect was under arrest and before the Miranda warning had been completed, the defendant interjected a damaging admission. Since it was not the result of police interrogation, and was volunteered, it was held admissible. Richardson v. State, 6 Md.App. 448, 251 A.2d 924 (1969); see also Campbell v. State, 4 Md. App. 448, 243 A.2d 642 (Md.1968). Louisiana has held that a spontaneous and voluntary statement made without solicitation, even though while under arrest, is not made inadmissible because of the lack of a prior Miranda warning. State v. Richey, 258 La. 1094, 249 So.2d 143 (1971). Two Federal Circuits, on facts remarkably similar to those before us, have reached the same conclusion. United States v. Littlejohn, 441 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1971); Klamert v. Cupp, 437 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1970). In holding that the statement made to the Lewiston police by the appellant after his arrest and while en route to the police station was properly admitted by the Justice below, we quote the language of the Arkansas Court: We do not take Miranda to mean that a man cannot voluntarily open his mouth. Hammond v. State, 244 Ark. 1113, 428 S. W.2d 639, 645 (1968). Our holding on this point has obvious bearing on the appellant's statement to the police prior to his arrest, namely, I give up. I'm not armed. The Justice below correctly ruled it admissible. See Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 676, § 29, for illustrative cases. Appellant bottoms his attack on the admissibility of both the signed confession and his subsequent explanatory oral statement on three decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Garrity v. State of New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967); Clewis v. State of Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338 (1967); and Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 88 S.Ct. 1152, 20 L.Ed.2d 77 (1968). These cases address themselves to the issues of voluntariness, ruling in each case that the inculpatory statements taken were not products of the free wills of any of those being interrogated. In Garrity, police officers were questioned concerning irregularities in the handling of cases in municipal courts. Noting that these officers were given the choice of forfeiting their jobs or incriminating themselves and, likening it to a choice between the rock and the whirlpool, the Court held that the waivers of Fifth Amendment rights were the results of duress. After finding that the prisoner had never been fully advised of his Fifth Amendment rights during nine days of incarceration, that his original arrest was not supported by probable cause and that the record inspires considerable concern over his physical and mental well-being, the Clewis court concluded that the statement ultimately obtained was not voluntary. In Greenwald the Supreme Court, after finding that the prisoner's request for counsel was ignored, that his needs for food, sleep and medication were not met and, finally, noting a lack or inadequacy of warning as to constitutional rights, the Court concluded: Considering the totality of these circumstances, we do not think it credible that petitioner's statements were the product of his free and rational choice. (Emphasis supplied.) 390 U.S. at 521, 88 S.Ct. at 1154. Mr. Lafferty's situation when he personally wrote the statement and then explained its meaning to the officer was hardly comparable to the facts in either Garrity, Clewis or Greenwald. The Justice below had evidence from which he could find that appellant had been lawfully arrested; prior to any questioning he had been informed of his constitutional rights and had acknowledged to the officer his understanding thereof; the questioning began at 2:35 a. m. (only two hours subsequent to his arrest) and lasted only thirty minutes; there was no evidence of force or duress; at his request he was allowed to place a long distance phone call to his mother; he then wrote the confession; he showed no evidence of any incapacity; the only emotion he demonstrated was a brief period of crying when told that his wife was dead, which preceded the police interrogation. Applying the totality of the circumstances rule to these facts, it is clear that the record fully supports the conclusion of the Justice below that the statements were voluntary.