Opinion ID: 1188053
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: summary judgment in this case

Text: We have often said that if the trial court's judgment is sustainable on any theory, it will not be disturbed on appeal. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 632 P.2d 925, 935 (1981). With this in mind, we affirm the district court's entry of summary judgment. This court has stated that: The propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness of a court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Reno Livestock Corporation v. Sun Oil Company (Delaware), Wyo., 638 P.2d 147, 150 (1981). Summary judgment will not often be proper in a negligence case. Keller v. Anderson, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1253 (1976). The question of negligence will be taken from the jury in only the most exceptional cases. 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 252. However, where the record fails to establish an issue of material fact, the entry of summary judgment is proper, even in a negligence case. Keller v. Anderson, supra. Viewing the record before us in the light most favorable to the appellant, as we are required to do, Reno Livestock Corporation v. Sun Oil Company (Delaware), supra, we conclude that appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Appellant contends that the record establishes questions of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Specifically, appellant asserts that the reasonableness of the officers' decision to pursue the Maddox vehicle once it became apparent that he intended to outrun them is a question for the jury. We cannot agree. Officer Keigley began his pursuit in response to a citizen report of a drunk driver. Police officers are expected to respond to such reports by observing, pursuing, and, where reasonable cause exists, stopping the suspect. Based upon the citizen report and his own observations, Officer Keigley had reason to believe that Harold Maddox was drunk and, therefore, had a duty to attempt to stop him. In doing so, Officers Keigley and Baltimore were met with unusual resistance and were forced to make a choice  to pursue Maddox and attempt to stop him forthwith or to drop back and allow him to proceed through downtown Laramie. Clearly, either choice posed a risk to the citizens of Laramie. Faced with circumstances requiring a quick decision without time for reflection, the officers chose to pursue Harold Maddox and attempt to stop him before he reached the more congested downtown area. It was broad daylight, the weather conditions were clear, Third Street was a straight, level, wide four-lane street and was paved and dry. The intersection of Third and Clark streets was clearly marked by traffic lights. Officers Keigley and Baltimore's speed at one point reached approximately 55 m.p.h.; they ceased the pursuit sometime before the collision; and they were not involved in the collision. Their conduct was not extreme or outrageous. To find that there would have been no collision if they had stopped sooner is conjecture. They had no control over Harold Maddox. There is no explanation for Maddox colliding with the DeWald vehicle under the circumstances present here. In order to recover, appellant must show that the officers' actions were the proximate cause of the accident. Apperson v. Kay, Wyo., 546 P.2d 995 (1976). Proximate cause means that the accident or injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the act of negligence. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, Wyo., 666 P.2d 408 (1983). The law does not charge a person with all the consequences of a wrongful act, but ignores remote causes and looks only to the proximate cause. Caterpillar Tractor Company v. Donahue, Wyo., 674 P.2d 1276 (1983). Where the causal connection between defendant's acts and plaintiff's damage is almost entirely subject to conjecture and speculation, summary judgment may be proper. Hoyle v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, 474 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D.N.C. 1979). In Hoyle the plaintiff claimed that the defendant negligently failed to repair a customer's telephone and as a result the customer was delayed in getting to the hospital and died. The court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment finding that the case hinged on many facts which could never be determined. The court based its judgment primarily upon the fact that it was impossible to show that, absent the delay, the deceased would have lived. The principle stated in Hoyle and our pronouncements in this case clearly show that the officers' actions were not a proximate cause of this accident. No matter what course of action they chose to take, the accident still might have happened. To say that Maddox would have slowed down or stopped had the officers dropped the pursuit is sheer speculation. What might have happened had they dropped back and allowed Maddox to proceed into downtown Laramie is totally unclear. He might have hit the DeWald vehicle anyway. Or he might have run over a child or a pedestrian. The possibilities are endless. Furthermore, had the officers allowed Maddox to continue to drive in a drunken condition, as appellant suggests should have been allowed, and had someone been injured, they in all probability would have been subject to suit for failing to stop him. The officers' actions were not extreme or outrageous as a matter of law and were, therefore, too remote to be the proximate cause of the accident. We have said that negligence must be determined based upon the facts as they appeared at the time  not by a judgment from actual consequences which were not then to be apprehended by a prudent and competent man. Endresen v. Allen, Wyo., 574 P.2d 1219 (1978). We will not unfairly use hindsight in assessing official actions challenged in litigation. Blake v. Rupe, supra, 651 P.2d 1096. The record indicates that Officers Keigley and Baltimore acted pursuant to a duty arising from their employment requiring that they attempt to apprehend and stop drunk drivers. There is necessarily some risk in that undertaking, and we will not subject them to liability on the theory that some other possible action might have led to a less tragic result. Negligence and proximate cause are never presumed from the happening of an accident, and mere conjecture cannot form the basis of liability. Apperson v. Kay, supra, 546 P.2d 995. The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, under which this suit was brought, was intended to mitigate the harsh results of the strict application of governmental immunity. It was enacted so that governmental entities and employees, like everyone else, could be held liable for their negligent acts. Had the officers negligently operated their vehicles and become involved in an accident which would have resulted in liability in ordinary circumstances, we would have no hesitancy about the case. But, where the officers are performing a duty required of them by law and the course of action they must choose is about evenly balanced, more is required than speculation as to the result from choosing either course. Having held the patrolmen not liable, we must also hold that the appellee, State of Wyoming, cannot be held liable, the reason being that if the conduct of the patrolmen did not amount to negligence that caused the accident, then neither could their training by the State nor could rules have been a cause of the accident. Stated another way, it would have had to appear that, because of inadequate training or failure to follow departmental rules, the officers acted in a negligent manner and caused this accident. We have held that did not occur.