Opinion ID: 1801680
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Defendant's Prior Acts

Text: Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his 1976 assaults on Frances M., Marjorie Mitchell, Hazel Frost, and Josephine Kreiger, and his 1976 burglary of a garage on Linden Street in Napa, including statements he made regarding these crimes to court-appointed psychiatrists in 1977 and 1978. The court admitted this evidence at the guilt phase over defendant's objection that these crimes were dissimilar to the crimes involving Polly, they were too remote in time, and they were more prejudicial than probative of any relevant issue. Also over defendant's objection, the court admitted expert testimony concerning defendant's motive for the 1976 assaults and the crimes involving Polly. The trial court admitted the evidence of the prior crimes against Frances M. and Frost to prove defendant's intent to commit sexual assault and a lewd act, his motive to commit a sexual offense, and the existence of a common scheme or plan to commit sexual assault and to steal. Evidence of the prior crimes against Mitchell was admitted for these same purposes (except to prove intent to commit sexual assault), as well as to prove intent to commit burglary and a common scheme or plan to commit burglary. Evidence of the prior burglary of the Linden Street garage was admitted to prove intent to commit burglary, motive to commit a sexual offense, and a common scheme or plan to commit burglary. The crimes against Kreiger were admitted for these same purposes and to prove a common scheme or plan to steal. The trial court instructed the jury that none of this evidence could be considered in this case to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit crimes.
(26) Generally, the prosecution may not use a defendant's prior criminal act as evidence of a disposition to commit a charged criminal act. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) But evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge . . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) To be admissible to show intent, `the prior conduct and the charged offense need only be sufficiently similar to support the inference that defendant probably harbored the same intent in each instance.' ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1194 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811], quoting People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 121 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166]; accord, People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757].) To be admissible to show a common scheme or plan, a greater degree of similarity is required than to show intent, and the common features must indicate the existence of a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan thus revealed need not be distinctive or unusual. ( Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 403.) (27) Because evidence of other crimes may be highly inflammatory, the admission of such evidence `must not contravene other policies limiting admission, such as those contained in Evidence Code section 352.' ( People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 637 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392], quoting People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 404.) Under Evidence Code section 352, the probative value of a defendant's prior acts must not be substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. ( People v. Ewoldt, supra, at p. 404; Evid. Code, § 352.) We review for abuse of discretion a trial court's rulings on relevance and admission or exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352. ( People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1195.) Here, although the prior acts occurred 17 years before the crimes against Polly, they were not so remote as to warrant their exclusion, as defendant had only remained free from incarceration for a total of three years during the intervening period. (See People v. Peete (1946) 28 Cal.2d 306, 308-309, 318-319 [169 P.2d 924] [24-year lapse since prior conviction was not significant when the defendant had been incarcerated for 18 of those years].) The prior crimes against Frances M. and Frost were sufficiently similar to this case to provide evidence of a common scheme or plan and intent to commit a sexual assault or a lewd act. [6] In those offenses, as in this case, defendant abducted a stranger, a female; used a weapon; assured the victim that he would not harm her; took her to a remote location; and carried bindings with him, indicating that the behavior was planned. The sexual nature of the prior crimes against Frances M. and Frost was obvious from his attempt to force Frances M. to sexually gratify him and his statements to court-referred psychiatrists that he assumed he would have some fun with Frost, and that he masturbated twice daily thinking about these victims and tying them up. Defendant emphasizes the age difference between Polly and adult victims Frances M. and Frost in arguing the dissimilarity of the present crime. But when Sergeant Meese asked defendant if Polly looked like she was 12 years old, defendant responded, I never even think about her like that. Defendant repeatedly referred to Polly as a broad, a slang term generally used to describe an adult woman, thus implying that he did not regard Polly's adolescence as significant. The prior crimes against Mitchell and Kreiger and the burglary of the Linden Street garage were sufficiently similar to this case to provide evidence of a common scheme or plan and intent to commit burglary. In each case, defendant targeted the home of a stranger, was armed, focused on a female resident, and entered the residence with an intent to tie up or assault the victim under circumstances indicating that he lay in wait outside before executing his plan. Defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider the prior crimes against Frances M., Mitchell, Kreiger and Frost as evidence of a common scheme or plan to steal, and that it erred in allowing the jury to consider defendant's prior assault against Mitchell as evidence of a motive and a common scheme or plan to commit a sexual assault or lewd act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the court erred in allowing the jury to consider these offenses for the described purposes, the error was harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt and because the trial court properly admitted the evidence of these offenses for the other purposes previously described in this part.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting his prior 1976 crimes as evidence of his motive to sexually assault Polly. We disagree. (28) Although motive is not an element of any of defendant's crimes, the absence of apparent motive may make proof of the essential elements less persuasive.... ( People v. Phillips (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 69, 84 [175 Cal.Rptr. 703].) Evidence of a defendant's prior criminal acts is admissible when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive . . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) Here, defendant's kidnapping of Polly, his failure to take items of significant value, the evidence of planning, and his use of the silky bindings and the intricately knotted hood device raised but did not fully answer questions about defendant's motive. Defendant's prior 1976 crimes were relevant and admissible to prove his motive to sexually assault Polly, as defendant admitted to having sexual fantasies about assaulting and binding his prior female victims. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to introduce expert testimony concerning paraphilia as an explanation of his motive in both this case and his prior crimes. He relies on People v. McFarland (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 489 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 884] ( McFarland ). At issue in McFarland was whether the defendant, who twice previously had been convicted of lewd conduct with a child under 14 years of age, had an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in children, for purposes of section 647.6 (annoying or molesting a minor), when he stroked a four-year-old girl's arm and face. A psychiatrist called by the prosecution who had not examined the defendant testified, based on court documents and psychiatric reports from the defendant's prior convictions, that the defendant had such an interest. ( McFarland, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 492.) The Court of Appeal in McFarland concluded that the psychiatrist's testimony was inadmissible and reversed. A prosecutor, it held, may not present an expert's opinion about a defendant's predisposition to commit sexual offenses unless the defendant places his character regarding such matters at issue, as such evidence constitutes inadmissible character evidence. (See Evid. Code, §§ 1100, 1101, 1102.) The court noted that Evidence Code section sections 1101, which allows the introduction of prior criminal acts in certain circumstances, and 1108, which allows propensity evidence to be used in certain sexual offense cases, only permit the prosecution to present evidence of specific acts, not expert testimony. ( McFarland, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 495.) The court also held that the admission of the expert's opinion of the defendant's propensity to commit sexual offenses also violated Penal Code section 29, which prohibits an expert from offering an opinion on the ultimate question of whether the defendant had or did not have a particular mental state at the time he committed the offense. ( Id. at p. 496.) Here, the prosecution's expert, Dr. Park Elliott Dietz, defined the sexual disorder known as paraphilia, and he described the characteristics typical of persons who have those disorders. (See p. 562, ante. ) Although he did not give a medical opinion or diagnosis that defendant was a paraphiliac, he testified that certain of defendant's prior crimes, in which he used weapons and prepared bindings for use on lone female victims, were consistent with the stages of a sexual assault by a paraphiliac, and that defendant's statement that he fantasized about tied-up crime victims while masturbating indicated that he was a paraphiliac. He also testified that defendant's behavior in the kidnapping and murder of Polly was consistent with paraphilia. Defendant argues that under the reasoning of McFarland, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th 489, the trial court should have excluded this testimony. (29) The trial court properly allowed Dr. Dietz to give a general description of paraphilia and the behavior typical of persons who have this disorder. Expert testimony of this nature is admissible on any subject `sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.' ( People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 905 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 447, 94 P.3d 574] [prosecution may present expert testimony regarding battered women's syndrome]; see also Evid. Code, § 805.) It is a closer question whether the trial court erred when it permitted Dr. Dietz to testify that when defendant committed his prior assaults and when he kidnapped and murdered Polly, his behavior was consistent with paraphilia. But even if the court should have excluded this testimony, the error was harmless under any standard. As we have explained, the court properly admitted the evidence that defendant had repeatedly stalked, bound, and assaulted other women, as well as defendant's admission that he found his attacks sexually stimulating. Dr. Dietz's brief testimony that defendant's conduct was consistent with paraphilia drew a conclusion that the jury could easily have drawn by itself, without Dr. Dietz's help. Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury not to consider Dr. Dietz's testimony as evidence that the defendant is a person of bad character or that he had the requisite intent or mental state at the time of the commission of the crimes or that he has a disposition to commit crimes, and that his testimony could be used only for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show motive. Under these circumstances, any error could not have prejudiced defendant.