Opinion ID: 844231
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Majority's Application of the Some Evidence Standard

Text: (2) As we have explained, in Lawrence we resolved a conflict among the appellate courts regarding the proper scope of the deferential `some evidence' standard of review we set forth in Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616 . . . . We clarified that in evaluating a parole-suitability determination by either the Board or the Governor, a reviewing court focuses upon `some evidence' supporting the core statutory determination that a prisoner remains a current threat to public safetynot merely `some evidence' supporting the Board's or the Governor's characterization of facts contained in the record. Specifically, we explained that, because the paramount consideration for both the Board and the Governor under the governing statutes is whether the inmate currently poses a threat to public safety, and because the inmate's due process interest in parole mandates a meaningful review of a decision denying parole, the proper articulation of the standard of review is whether there exists `some evidence' demonstrating that an inmate poses a current threat to public safety, rather than merely some evidence suggesting the existence of a statutory factor of unsuitability. ( Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1191.) ( In re Prather, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 251-252.) [6] (3) Here, the Court of Appeal majority appears to have misconstrued the some evidence standard by stating that the factors relied upon to find an inmate unsuitable for parole must be demonstrably shown by evidence in the record. To the extent the adverb demonstrably suggests a reviewing court is free to determine whether the evidence establishes the existence of a particular factor, or that anything other than some evidence is required to support a finding by the Board or the Governor, this formulation was erroneous. We have never used such terminology in connection with review of parole decisions. In another context we have adopted a demonstrable reality standard, governing review of the grounds for removing a sitting juror. ( People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 82, 162 P.3d 596].) There we made it plain that such a standard is less deferential than the substantial evidence standard, and requires a greater evidentiary showing. [7] Conversely, review under the some evidence standard is more deferential than substantial evidence review, and may be satisfied by a lesser evidentiary showing. ( Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 656, 665.) (4) It is settled that under the some evidence standard, [o]nly a modicum of evidence is required. Resolution of any conflicts in the evidence and the weight to be given the evidence are matters within the authority of [the Board or] the Governor. . . . [T]he precise manner in which the specified factors relevant to parole suitability are considered and balanced lies within the discretion of [the Board or] the Governor . . . . It is irrelevant that a court might determine that evidence in the record tending to establish suitability for parole far outweighs evidence demonstrating unsuitability for parole. As long as the . . . decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the court's review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the record that supports the . . . decision. ( Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677; see also Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1204; Shaputis I, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1260-1261.) The majority below lost sight of these cardinal considerations. It reasoned that the only evidence of petitioner's risk to public safety pertained to his dangerousness in the past, including the evidence we found sufficient to support the denial of parole in Shaputis I, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pages 1259-1260. It declared that this evidence had evaporated considering the only current evidence as to his insight into and remorse for his conduct. The majority noted that in Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pages 1223-1224, In re Gaul (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 20, 38-39 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 736] ( Gaul ), and In re Aguilar (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1479, 1490 [86 Cal.Rptr.3d 498] ( Aguilar ), the Board's reliance on outdated psychological evaluations had been deemed insufficient to supply some evidence of the inmate's threat to public safety. (5) This analysis is incompatible with the some evidence standard, and misapplies the holdings of Lawrence, Gaul, and Aguilar. While the evidence supporting a parole unsuitability finding must be probative of the inmate's current dangerousness, it is not for the reviewing court to decide which evidence in the record is convincing. ( Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1204, 1212.) Only when the evidence reflecting the inmate's present risk to public safety leads to but one conclusion may a court overturn a contrary decision by the Board or the Governor. In that circumstance the denial of parole is arbitrary and capricious, and amounts to a denial of due process. ( Id. at pp. 1204-1205.) It is true that often the most recent evidence as to the inmate's level of insight will be particularly probative on the question of the inmate's present dangerousness, but that is not necessarily the case. If the newest evidence is unreliable or insubstantial, the parole authority is not bound to accept it. Usually the record that develops over successive parole hearings has components of the same kind: CDCR reports, psychological evaluations, and the inmate's statements at the hearings. In such cases, the Board or the Governor may not arbitrarily dismiss more recent evidence in favor of older records when assessing the inmate's current dangerousness. That is what Lawrence, Gaul, and Aguilar stand for. ( Lawrence, at pp. 1223-1224; Gaul, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 38-39; Aguilar, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1490.) (6) This is not such a case. Petitioner decided to limit the evidence available to the Board by refusing to participate in an evaluation by a CDCR psychologist and declining to speak to the Board on any matter of substance at his parole hearing. The Board was unable to ask petitioner about the offense. It was also unable to question him about his psychologist's report, the statement he prepared with counsel, or his current state of mind. An inmate cannot make evidence in the record evaporate[], as the Court of Appeal majority curiously phrased it, by pursuing such a strategy. Competent evidence does not evaporate. Its context may change in light of subsequent developments, but it does not disappear. The inmate is free to limit his participation in the process, but that choice cannot restrict the scope of the Board's review of the evidence. (7) Here, the Board noted that petitioner had the right not to participate in the hearing, but that as a consequence it was required to base its determination on other evidence in the record. The parole regulations specify that [a] prisoner may refuse to discuss the facts of the crime in which instance a decision shall be made based on the other information available and the refusal shall not be held against the prisoner. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2236, italics added.) [8] The Board's consideration of other information is not limited to recent information the inmate has chosen to present. Nor does the Board hold a refusal to discuss the crime against the inmate when it weighs the credibility of such information against other evidence in the record. In determining whether an inmate may safely be paroled, it is legitimate for the Board to take into account that the record pertaining to the inmate's current state of mind is incomplete, and to rely on other sources of information. An inmate who refuses to interact with the Board at a parole hearing deprives the Board of a critical means of evaluating the risk to public safety that a grant of parole would entail. In such a case, the Board must take the record as it finds it. (8) Under the some evidence standard of review, the parole authority's interpretation of the evidence must be upheld if it is reasonable, in the sense that it is not arbitrary, and reflects due consideration of the relevant factors. ( Shaputis I, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1258; see Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1204-1205.) Here, there is no claim that the Board neglected to consider any relevant factor. Nor was it arbitrary for the Board to doubt the credibility of the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner. The majority's attempts below to construe this evidence favorably to petitioner reflect a fundamental failure to accord the Board's decision the deference that the some evidence standard was designed to provide. ( Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 664-665.) With regard to Dr. Stark's report, the Court of Appeal majority accepted her conclusion that petitioner had no history of `unstable tumultuous relationships,' because the sum of his relationships was the relationship with his wife and misconduct with his daughter while under the influence of alcohol. [9] The majority also accepted Dr. Stark's conclusions that petitioner's account of the crime, and his previous failure to demonstrate insight and remorse to the Board's satisfaction, were attributable to inconsistencies in the investigative and judicial proceedings that followed Erma's murder. However, as the Board noted, Dr. Stark's assessment failed to acknowledge petitioner's substantial history of abusing his first wife and his other three daughters. Furthermore, Dr. Stark failed to identify any particular inconsistencies except in regard to the logistics regarding the firing of the gun during the index offense. There is nothing inconsistent in the record on that point. The evidence at petitioner's trial established that the revolver had safety features preventing an accidental firing. The hammer had to be manually cocked, and the trigger firmly pulled. In any event, petitioner has never claimed that he did not mean to pull the trigger. He has claimed that he thought the gun was unloaded, without explaining the open box of ammunition nearby. He has insisted he did not know his wife was in the way, without explaining how he could have overlooked her presence only a foot or two away. The some evidence standard requires only a modicum of support for the Board's rejection of Dr. Stark's conclusions. This record amply provides such support. In addition to the points noted above, we observe that on the question of petitioner's understanding of the crime, Dr. Stark concluded: He has developed over the years a consistent reality based view of his extremely destructive choices due to unmet needs and being substance dependent. . . . He related his past behavior was a need to make himself feel good and he behaved in a self-centered manner to obtain those feelings that resulted in a tragedy that took his wife's life. He spoke about his early need to be accepted and ended up in a death of his wife. It would be an understatement to say that Dr. Stark's report leaves an analytical gap between petitioner's self-centered behavior and early emotional needs, on the one hand, and his shooting of Erma at close range, on the other. The majority below also found that the written statement petitioner submitted to the Board provided affirmative evidence that he had grown to understand how his underlying character flaws, exacerbated by his alcohol abuse, had produced his criminal conduct. This generous reading of the statement would have satisfied the some evidence standard if the Board had found petitioner suitable for parole. It fails to comport with the standard of review, however, given the Board's finding of unsuitability. In his written statement, petitioner did not discuss the murder at all. Indeed, nowhere in the record is there a coherent account by petitioner of the shooting and how or why it happened. Nowhere is his claim of accident reconciled with the evidence found at the scene. Nowhere does he plausibly explain why he waited at least an hour after the shooting before calling for help. [10] Petitioner's statement also failed to address the charge that he had molested his daughter, acknowledging only that he had abused . . . at least one of my daughters. In the statement, petitioner discussed his alcoholism, his low morality, his deep regret, and his determination not to again engage in such terrible conduct. However, the Board was left with no indication that petitioner understood why he shot his wife, what he had done in the incidents of molestation, or how his behavior affected his other daughters. A general recognition of moral deficiency and alcohol abuse is insufficient to explain an entrenched pattern of domestic abuse, child molestation, and a point-blank shooting. Indeed, the statement petitioner prepared with the assistance of counsel is so vague about the nature of his violent conduct that it might reasonably be deemed evasive. (9) Thus, just as the Board had grounds to doubt the reliability of Dr. Stark's psychological report, it was also reasonable for the Board to be unpersuaded by petitioner's written statement when it considered whether he had gained the insight that was found to be lacking in the Shaputis I proceedings. ( Shaputis I, supra, 44 Cal.4th 1241.) Indeed, the same evidence that we found sufficient in Shaputis I was sufficient here to meet the some evidence standard, given the lack of a reliable record of his current psychological state. When there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the most recent evidence of an inmate's current dangerousness is less trustworthy than other evidence, a reviewing court must defer to the parole authority's evaluation of the record. (10) As noted in Rosencrantz, the `some evidence' standard is extremely deferential . . ., and cannot be equated with the substantial evidence standard of review. ( Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 665.) Nevertheless, it may be stated in terms parallel to that more familiar standard: When reviewing a parole unsuitability determination by the Board or the Governor, a court must consider the whole record in the light most favorable to the determination before it, to determine whether it discloses some evidencea modicum of evidencesupporting the determination that the inmate would pose a danger to the public if released on parole. (Cf. Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-320 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 99 S.Ct. 2781]; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578 [162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738].) The court may not, as the Court of Appeal majority did here, substitute its own credibility determination for that of the parole authority. (Cf. Jackson, supra, at pp. 318-319; Johnson, supra, at p. 576.) Any relevant evidence that supports the parole authority's determination is sufficient to satisfy the some evidence standard. (See Jackson, supra, at p. 320.) [11] (11) We urge the Courts of Appeal to bear in mind that while the some evidence standard certainly is not toothless ( Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1210), and must be sufficiently robust to reveal and remedy any evident deprivation of constitutional rights ( id. at p. 1211), it must not operate so as to impermissibly shift the ultimate discretionary decision of parole suitability from the executive branch to the judicial branch ( id. at p. 1212). Under the framework established by legislation and initiative measure, the Board is given initial responsibility to determine whether a life prisoner may safely be paroled. (Pen. Code, § 3040.) The Governor is granted de novo review of the Board's decision, and is free to make his or her own determination, based on the same factors the Board must consider. (Cal. Const., art. V, § 8, subd. (b).) Although, as we made clear in Lawrence, the ultimate conclusion on parole suitability is subject to judicial review, that review is limited, and narrower in scope than appellate review of a lower court's judgment. The some evidence standard is intended to guard against arbitrary parole decisions, without encroaching on the broad authority granted to the Board and the Governor. ( Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1204-1205, 1212; Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 664-665.) When, as in this case, the parole authority declines to give credence to certain evidence, a reviewing court may not interfere unless that determination lacks any rational basis and is merely arbitrary.