Opinion ID: 1525843
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Assertion of Improper Instructions Concerning Comparative Penalties

Text: Appellee next contends that he was denied due process and the effective assistance of counsel when the trial court advised the jurors, prior to their guiltphase deliberations, concerning the specific punishments Appellee could receive for each degree of criminal homicide for which he was charged. [18] According to Appellee, the instruction infused the deliberative process with extraneous and prejudicial concerns, thus creating an unacceptably high risk that the jurors would return a verdict based, not on the facts, but rather, on their visceral sense of what the appropriate punishment should be. Appellee contends that the impact the instruction had on the sentencing deliberations was just as harmful, since, having learned that a lesser offense (second-degree murder) carried a life sentence, there was an unacceptable risk that the jury would feel pressured to return a death verdict so as to reflect the greater culpability attendant to a premeditated murder. Appellee claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the instructions or insist upon a limiting instruction that the jury was not to consider these punishments in deliberating guilt or innocence. In support of these arguments, Appellee develops that information as to the consequences of a particular verdict is irrelevant to the jury's task of determining guilt or innocence. See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579, 114 S.Ct. 2419, 2424, 129 L.Ed.2d 459 (1994) (explaining that providing jurors with sentencing information invites [jurors] to ponder matters that are not within their province, distracts them from their factfinding responsibilities, and creates a strong possibility of confusion). [19] Further, Appellee invokes his right to a verdict based solely upon the evidence and the relevant law. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574, 101 S.Ct. 802, 809, 66 L.Ed.2d 740 (1981). Appellee distinguishes the decision in Commonwealth v. Yarris, 519 Pa. 571, 549 A.2d 513 (1988), relied upon by the PCRA court and the Commonwealth, on the basis that the trial court in Yarris had issued a limiting instruction, see id. at 597, 549 A.2d at 526, whereas, none was given here. See generally Commonwealth v. Covil, 474 Pa. 375, 383, 378 A.2d 841, 845 (1977) (explaining that, whenever potentially prejudicial information is admissible for a limited purpose, a defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction.). Although Appellee is correct that a limiting instruction was issued in Yarris, the Court's disposition centered on the absence of prejudice. See Yarris, 519 Pa. at 598, 549 A.2d at 526 (Since there is no indication that informing the jury of the various murder conviction penalties was unduly prejudicial, and because, to the contrary, knowledge of the severity of the penalties could serve only to caution a jury as to the seriousness of a conviction, the instruction was permissible.). We recognize that the logic of Shannon would be in tension with the application of Yarris's holding to a non-capital case. Invocation of Shannon would have been to little avail in Appellee's case, however, since the general federal rule discussed there disfavoring the dissemination of sentencing information to jurors is expressly limited to circumstances in which a jury has no sentencing function. Shannon, 512 U.S. at 579, 114 S.Ct. at 2424; see also id. n. 4 (noting that, particularly in capital trials, juries may be given sentencing responsibilities). Thus the High Court implicitly recognized the realities associated with capital trials, for example, that the process of selecting jurors qualified to discharge the sentencing function will necessarily entail some frank discussion of penalty. Indeed, the specific association between the offense of first-degree murder and the availability of capital punishment was discussed with individual jurors on voir dire at Appellee's trial, see, e.g., N.T., January 12, 1999, at 89, and Appellee has made no claim of trial court error or deficient stewardship associated with such discussion. Finally, for the jurors to have acted along the lines of any of Appellee's theories, they would have been proceeding contrary to the trial court's explicit instructions concerning the elements of the various offenses and the jurors' duty to find Appellee not guilty of each offense upon a finding that any element was not established beyond a reasonable doubt by the Commonwealth. See, e.g., N.T., January 21, 1999, at 526 (reflecting the trial court's admonition that, [i]f you do not find that the Commonwealth has proven this offense beyond a reasonable doubt, your verdict then on the first degree murder is not guilty.). Thus in addition to there being an absence of deficient stewardship, we also find a lack of material prejudice.