Opinion ID: 3215867
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Denial of Freeman’s Motion to Reopen

Text: The district court concluded that judicial review of a denial of a motion to reopen under the EEOICPA is precluded. Here, the DOL argues that the decision to deny a motion to reopen under Part B is not reviewable because 1) it is not a “final agency action” subject to review under the APA, and 2) it is a decision “committed to agency discretion by law,” and thus is unreviewable pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). See Appellee Br. at 22-29. Neither this court nor any court of appeals has decided this precise judicial review question. However, we need not decide this question today. unclear, the DOL should have sought clarification from the treating physician. This argument is waived. Sanborn v. Parker, 629 F.3d 554, 579 (6th Cir. 2010) (“We have consistently held . . . that arguments made to us for the first time in a reply brief are waived.”). Even if we were to consider the argument, it would fail. Freeman’s argument ignores the section of the procedure manual that provides, regarding referrals to medical consultants, that although “[claims examiners] should refer claims to a [medical consultant] for a medical review after all means of obtaining the evidence from the treating physician is exhausted,” they “may also refer cases to a [medical consultant] when the medical reports and/or tests do not include a clear interpretation and/or if there is a specific question(s) about the medical evidence.” EEOICPA Procedure Manual, ch. 2-1000.8 (emphasis added). Further, despite Freeman’s insinuations, the DOL did not fail to send relevant medical records to Dr. Beckett—the first medical consultant to review Ezra’s file. Rather, Dr. Beckett reviewed the file before Freeman submitted the additional medical records, and once they were submitted, the DOL reopened the claim and referred the new records to another medical consultant. 3 Freeman’s argument that she is entitled to benefits for her father’s alleged CBD based on his alleged membership in the “special exposure cohort” is without merit. As the district court properly determined, this argument is irrelevant to the claim before the court, which encompasses the denial of benefits under Part B based on a diagnosis of CBD. By contrast, inclusion in the “special exposure cohort” entitles members who contracted specified cancers to compensation under Part B. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7384l(9)(A), 7384l(14). The Final Decision of which Freeman seeks review denied her survivor claim under Part B “for the condition of [CBD],” not cancer. 9 No. 15-6189, Freeman v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor As we have done under similar circumstances, “we assume without deciding, for purposes of argument, that the issue is reviewable[.]” See Amezola-Garcia v. Lynch, No. 153328, 2016 WL 1399347,  n.2 (6th Cir. April 11, 2016) (collecting cases). “Such an assumption does not run afoul of” the Supreme Court’s “prohibition against ‘hypothetical jurisdiction,’” because “arguments that a court may not review agency action that is ‘committed to agency discretion by law’ under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) do not go to the jurisdiction of the court.” Id.; see also Jama, 760 F.3d at 494 n.4 (noting that the APA does not confer jurisdiction). In support of her request to reopen, Freeman submitted additional evidence of her father’s exposure to beryllium. But as stated above, additional evidence of his exposure to beryllium was of no consequence to Freeman’s claim because the DOL had already presumed that her father had been exposed to beryllium. Accordingly, even assuming judicial review of the denial of her request to reopen is proper, Freeman still loses. Cf. Vasha v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 863, 876 (6th Cir. 2005) (assuming without deciding that judicial review was proper, and concluding that the claimant was not entitled to have her claim reviewed by a three-member panel of the BIA because her claim nonetheless lacked merit).