Opinion ID: 3171468
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fama’s Sentence

Text: Fama next argues that the above-Guidelines sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). When considering the procedural reasonableness of a sentence, we “take a deferential approach and refrain from imposing any rigorous requirement of specific articulation by the sentencing judge.” United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 2005). We will, however, set aside a sentence as procedurally unreasonable if the district court “‘fails to calculate (or improperly calculates) the Sentencing Guidelines range, treats the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails adequately to explain the chosen sentence.’” United States v. Chu, 714 F.3d 742, 746 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 38 (2d Cir. 2012)). Fama challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, inter alia, because the district court did not adequately explain its reasons for imposing a 420-month-long sentence of imprisonment—a sentence substantially above the advisory Guidelines range of 147 to 162 months’ imprisonment. A district court is required, under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), to “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of [a] particular sentence.” When a district court sentences outside the Guidelines range, moreover, it must also state, both in open court and in a written order, the specific reason for imposing a sentence different from that prescribed by the Guidelines. See United States v. Sindima, 488 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2007). Critically, when a district court deviates from an advisory Guidelines range, it “‘must consider the extent of the 6 deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.’” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). An appellate court, in turn, “may ‘take the degree of variance into account and consider the extent of a deviation from the Guidelines.’” Id. at 190 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 47). A significant variance from the Guidelines “‘should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one.’” Id. at 193 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). For a major variance, the district court bears a “higher descriptive obligation.” United States v. Cassesse, 685 F.3d 186, 193 (2d Cir. 2012). Because Fama did not lodge an objection on this basis at sentencing, we review only for plain error. Id. at 188. We conclude, however, that the district court plainly did not meet its higher descriptive obligation in the circumstances here. There is no question that the district court sentenced significantly outside the Guidelines range: even assuming a sentence at the top of the Guidelines, the district court varied upwards from the advisory 162 months’ incarceration to the 420 months’ incarceration that it actually imposed. Upon the Government’s prompting at sentencing, the district court provided some oral explanation for this variance (though it did not ultimately do so in the Statement of Reasons beyond checking the boxes that list the § 3553(a) factors). But the district court simply recited Fama’s criminal history, as provided in the Presentence Report (“PSR”), without explaining why the Guidelines range itself did not already adequately account for what the district court characterized—not inaptly—as “a lifetime of crime.” A94. Beyond Fama’s criminal history, moreover, the district court stated that it had “seen no shred of evidence of remorse,” A94, and only briefly noted the statement about the uncharged bank robbery, without explaining any findings, A93-94. We conclude that the explanation was inadequate in light of the magnitude of the variance. 7 It is not improper for a district court to rely on uncharged conduct in fashioning a sentence for convicted conduct if it makes appropriate factual findings by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Aldeen, 792 F.3d 247, 254 (2d Cir. 2015). But there is a lack of clarity about how, or to what extent, the district court relied on the uncharged bank robbery. On the one hand, the district court stated “that we don’t punish people in this country for crimes with which they were not charged and crimes for which they were not convicted by a jury of their peers beyond a reasonable doubt.” A91. On the other hand, the district court then went on to reference the Mannino testimony without making any explicit findings of fact or explaining for what purpose it considered it. A93-94 (“[T]here is obviously . . . the testimony of Mannino in this case with respect to the prior bank robbery at Capital One, and the fact that Mr. Mannino and the defendant conspired to rob the bank when they got out of jail with the statements, according to Mr. Mannino, that Mr. Fama had said he had . . . [‘]gotten away[’] with the previous robbery and the physical attachments to evidence from that robbery that was never charged nor was he ever convicted of.”). From that statement, the extent to which the district court relied on the nature of the first robbery, as detailed in the PSR, is similarly unclear. Given that Fama objected to this portion of the PSR, the district court apparently overruled the objection but did not explain its basis for doing so. We have explained that when a district court’s statements at sentencing “provide[] ‘an insufficient basis . . . for us to determine why the district court did what it did,’ that is an error that affects a defendant’s ‘substantial rights.’” United States v. Ware, 577 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 2009) (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 247 n.5 (2d Cir. 2005)). While a brief explanation such as the present one may have sufficed for a more limited upward variance from the Guidelines, we conclude that it does not afford an adequate 8 basis for a reviewing court to understand “why the considerations used as justifications for the sentence are ‘sufficiently compelling []or present to the degree necessary to support the sentence imposed.’” Sindima, 488 F.3d at 86 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d 127, 137 (2d Cir. 2006)). In such circumstances, the district court plainly erred, and it is appropriate for us to seek additional explanation “‘to support the degree of the variance’” from the Guidelines range. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). The district court was also required to state its reasons “with specificity” in the written judgment of conviction as required by § 3553(c)(2). In its non-public statement of reasons, the district court checked the box for a sentence “above the advisory guidelines range,” and then checked five boxes in Part VI(C), but left blank Part VI(D), which asked for an explanation of “the facts justifying a sentence outside the advisory guidelines system.” This statutory obligation should be remedied on remand. See Aldeen, 792 F.3d at 254-55. Accordingly, we remand with instructions to vacate Fama’s sentence and to conduct resentencing proceedings. Because we are remanding the case for resentencing, we do not consider here Fama’s additional sentencing arguments. In the interest of judicial economy, however, this panel will retain jurisdiction over any subsequent appeal. See United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1994).