Opinion ID: 1780710
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Presumption of Unfitness in the Event of Adulterous Conduct by a Parent in a Child-Custody Case

Text: A trial court applies the best-interests-of-the-child standard in making an initial child-custody decision. This standard is extremely general in nature, and courts are called upon to give it more particular content in specific situations. In Ex parte Devine, supra , our Court attempted to clarify the standard by formulating a list of factors that trial courts could use in making custody decisions. [6] The holding in Ex parte Devine did not remove from the equation the conclusive presumption of unfitness of an adulterous parent, because that presumption has a direct bearing on the factors listed in Ex parte Devine, which include, among others, 1) the character of those seeking custody, and 2) the capacity of a parent to provide for the emotional, moral, social, and educational needs of the child. Moreover, a problem has developed with the way courts have applied the best-interests-of-the-child standard [7] in child-custody decisions. This case is illustrative of those problems. Rather than deciding custody matters by applying a firm rule of law, the trial court weighs factors in a process that is akin to political decision-making. It is a difficult, if not impossible, balancing act that courts by nature are ill-equipped to perform. Simply wading through the factors listed in Ex parte Devine and weighing them to determine which parent should have custody, absent any definitive presumptions, produces inconsistent results. Different trial courts (and appellate courts) will assign different weights to various factors. Presumptions, on the other hand, serve as benchmarks or rules of law that provide courts with more definitive standards for their rulings. Presumptions in child-custody disputes keep courts focused on the tasks they must perform by concentrating on what has happened in the past rather than predicting what might happen in the future. [8] In the ordinary case, once a court makes the necessary factual determinations, the controversy is resolved by applying a rule of law that determines whether a legal wrong has been committed. The court then fashions an appropriate remedy. The injured party may be entitled to damages or to specific performance or reformation or to a divorce, depending on the type of wrong alleged and proved. The presumption of unfitness of an adulterous parent is well established in Alabama law. In Beasley v. Beasley, 276 Ala. at 249, 160 So.2d at 865, this Court recognized a rule that [adulterous] misconduct is an adjudication of [the adulterous parent's] relative unfitness to have custody. In Beasley, this Court also cautioned that, even though [a parent] has been guilty of adultery, such conduct does not, in and of itself, serve as an absolute bar to an award of custody. 276 Ala. at 249, 160 So.2d at 865. Beasley did not destroy the conclusive presumption of unfitness; it simply allowed an adulterous parent to gain custody of a minor child upon a showing that the other party was more unfit than the adulterous party. See the following cases for a historic trail of the precedent: Vinson v. Vinson, supra ; Hanby v. Hanby, 229 Ala. 527, 158 So. 727 (1935); and Johnson v. Johnson, 215 Ala. 487, 111 So. 207 (1927). Therefore, I must disagree with an attempt by the courts to apply a standard that is neutral as to morality and fault in determining who will be the custodial parent for the divorcing couple's children. It is unworkable in practice and nonjudicial in nature. Contrary to the mistaken belief of some, the no-fault-divorce laws, which gained ascendancy about 30 years ago, did not effect a corresponding change in the rules for custody; therefore, with regard to custody, fault is still relevant. Even those commentators who support the concept of no-fault divorce recognize this fact. Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America 223 (The Free Press 1985). Prior to no-fault divorce, [9] fault provided the justification for divorce and typically settled the child-custody issue in favor of the party without fault. Today, the issue of fault is often treated as just one morally neutral factor among many in determining custody according to the best-interests-of-the-child standard. Those acts and courses of conduct that historically provided grounds for fault-based divorce were per se rules, that is, presumptions disqualifying the parent who was at fault in the divorce from gaining custody of any the children of the marriage for two possible reasons. One reason is that the actions establishing the fault would endanger the child. This would apply to such fault grounds as insanity, conviction of murder, or addiction to drugs. The other reason is that the actions establishing the fault strike at the heart of the marriage and consequently at the heart of the family. The archetypes of those grounds are adultery and desertion. One who commits an act so destructive to the family unit as to justify the spouse's seeking a divorce cannot normally be fit to head what remains of that family after the divorce. The party at fault has effectively divorced himself or herself from that family. Even though the Legislature has adopted no-fault divorce, Alabama law still provides certain grounds for divorce that also provide a rationale for child-custody determinations. The child's best interest is to remain with the parent who did not commit the acts that destroyed the family or that endanger the child. In my concurring opinion in Ex parte H.H., 830 So.2d 21, 26 (Ala.2002), I wrote that there is a presumption that a parent who engages in open and notorious homosexual activity is unfit as a parent and should not be given custody of a minor child. That same presumption applies to acts of adultery, as Beasley v. Beasley makes clear. It is usually not in a child's best interest to be placed in the custody of a parent who has committed the adultery that has led to the destruction of a marriage and a family. Recognizing the importance of presumptions in general and the Beasley rule in particular makes the custody determination in this case relatively simple. It is uncontested that the mother has committed several acts of adultery and presently lives in an adulterous situation, having had a child with the man with whom she cohabits. The trial court even stated that it granted the divorce in part on the grounds of adultery. The Beasley rule, relying upon Vinson and Johnson, supra, provides us with a conclusive presumption that the mother is unfit as a parent and that she should not have custody of the minor child. Nothing in the record indicates any unfitness on the part of the father. In fact, all of the evidence indicates that the father should have custody. In reaching this conclusion I am in no way ignoring the ore tenus presumption that favors the trial court's findings of fact. Rather, I find that the trial court misapplied the law to those facts and in doing so committed reversible error. In principle, there are good reasons expressed in both Alabama and United States Supreme Court precedent for considering adultery as a justification for divorce and for presuming that the adulterous parent is unfit to have custody of a minor child. First, we must understand that marriage is sacred. What shall we do with marriage, which is a contract, the most solemn and sacred of all, by its very terms indissoluble and eternal .... Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 163, 4 L.Ed. 529 (1819). The present age is wonderfully demoralized on the subject of marriage and divorce. It seems to be forgotten, that marriage is a divine institution, and, therefore, imposes upon parties higher moral and religious obligations than those imposed by any mere human institution or government. Hughes v. Hughes, 44 Ala. 698, 703 (1870). `Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is, nevertheless, in most civilized nations a civil contract, and usually regulated by law. Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and social obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily required to deal.' Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 343-44, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878)). The institution of marriage, established by divine, and perpetuated and guarded by human, authority, constitutes the foundation of organized society, protects private and public morality and virtue, and moulds the character of the citizens of the commonwealth. While an agreement to marry is regarded generally as a civil contract, by its consummation contractual relations of a special kind are formed, and the status of the parties and their duties to each other and to the public, are ascertained and fixed. Extraordinary and exclusive personal relations are created to continue so long as both parties may live, and public interests are involved in the strict and complete observance of the marital vows and covenants. The marriage relation can not be rescinded or annulled by the mere volition of the contracting parties. Its preservation is deemed so essential to the public weal, that it can not be dissolved except by the sovereign power, or by a court of competent jurisdiction for causes prescribed by law on sufficient allegations and satisfactory proof. Powell v. Powell, 80 Ala. 595, 597, 1 So. 549, 549-50 (1887). It will be conceded that marriage creates the most important relation in life, and has more to do with the morals and the civilization of a people than any other institution. It has been held to be the subject of control by Parliament in England, and by the state Legislatures in the United States. Such Legislatures have prescribed the reasonable conditions under which parties may contract marriage, the procedure, form, or acts, essential to consummate it, the duties and obligations assumed thereby, and its present and prospective effect upon the property rights of the contracting parties; and have specified the failures of duty which shall constitute grounds for the dissolution of the union. . . . . The contractual relation or status of marriage is one of the most important and sacred, provided for and protected by the `social compact.' Barrington v. Barrington, 200 Ala. 315, 326-27, 76 So. 81, 92-93 (1917) (Thomas, J., concurring). Concomitant with the above, any act that destroys the sacred marriage contract carries serious consequences. Courts have presumed evidence of acts of adultery by one parent to be conclusive as to the question of that parent's unfitness to have custody. One of the pertinent inquiries in cases involving controversies between parties over the custody of children is which party was at fault in terminating the marital relation. Piner v. Piner, 255 Ala. 104, 50 So.2d 269 [(1951)]; Hammac v. Hammac, 246 Ala. 111, 19 So.2d 392 [(1944)]. In the case at bar the decree of January 8, 1952, is conclusive as between the parties of Vinson's marital misconduct. Johnson v. Johnson, 215 Ala. 487, 111 So. 207 [(1927)]; Hanby v. Hanby, 229 Ala. 527, 158 So. 727 [(1935)]. And we said in the cases just cited that a decree granting a divorce to the husband on the ground of the wife's adulterous acts is conclusive of her relative unfitness to have the custody of the children. Vinson, 263 Ala. at 640, 83 So.2d at 219-20 (emphasis on relative original; other emphasis added). An Adulterous Parent,whether father or mother, divorced for the proven offence, should only in the rarest circumstances be intrusted with the custody of a child. In the modern English practice, this rule is nearly or quite without exception. In an American court it was said, as to the wife, that `a woman who has been guilty of adultery is unfit to have the care and education of children, and more especially of female children.' 2 J. Bishop, New Commentaries on Marriage, Divorce, and Separation § 1198 (T.H. Flood and Company 1891)(footnotes omitted). Not only does adultery carry serious consequences under the civil law, but under Alabama law adultery remains a criminal offense: (a) A person commits adultery when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person who is not his spouse and lives in cohabitation with that person when he or that other person is married. . . . . (c) Adultery is a Class B misdemeanor. § 13A-13-2, Ala.Code 1975. The Commentary to this Code section indicates that for the adultery to meet the elements of the offense, it must be open and notorious, which is exactly what we have in this case.