Opinion ID: 2634656
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Abood and Keller

Text: Abood and Keller are the cornerstones of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding government-compelled funding of private speech. In Abood, supra, 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, dissident teachers objected to being charged mandatory union dues, pursuant to a state statute, claiming this charge violated their First Amendment rights. The court recognized that these mandatory assessments did indeed have an impact upon the dissident employees' First Amendment interests, but would nonetheless be constitutional under some circumstances. An employee may very well have ideological objections to a wide variety of activities undertaken by the union in its role as exclusive representative. His moral or religious views about the desirability of abortion may not square with the union's policy in negotiating a medical benefits plan. One individual might disagree with a union policy of negotiating limits on the right to strike . . . while another might have economic or political objections to unionism itself. . . . The examples could be multiplied. To be required to help finance the union as a collective-bargaining agent might well be thought, therefore, to interfere in some way with an employee's freedom to associate for the advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as he sees fit. But . . . such interference as exists is constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations established by Congress. . . . `As long as [the union] act[s] to promote the cause which justified bringing the group together, the individual cannot withdraw his financial support merely because he disagrees with the group's strategy.' ( Abood, supra, at pp. 222-223, 97 S.Ct. 1782, fn. omitted.) On the other hand, the balance between First Amendment right, and a government interest tips the other way when the government would compel an employee to fund union activity devoted to an ideological cause not directly related to the union's primary, collective bargaining function. ( Abood, supra, 431 U.S. at p. 235, 97 S.Ct. 1782.) We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds for the expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining representative. Rather, the Constitution requires only that such expenditures be financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so against their will by the threat of loss of governmental employment. ( Id. at pp. 235-236, 97 S.Ct. 1782, fn. omitted.) In Keller, supra, 496 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2228, the court extended Abood's rationale to mandatory fees charged by the State Bar of California:  Abood held that a union could not expend a dissenting individual's dues for ideological activities not `germane' to the purpose for which compelled association was justified: collective bargaining. Here the compelled association and integrated bar are justified by the State's interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services. The State Bar may therefore constitutionally fund activities germane to those goals out of the mandatory dues of all members. It may not, however, in such manner fund activities of an ideological nature which fall outside of those areas of activity. ( Keller, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 13-14, 110 S.Ct. 2228.)