Opinion ID: 4525400
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prayner, Todd, and Gatlin

Text: {¶ 19} The cases cited by the Tenth District in support of its erroneous conclusion have their root in a 1962 liquor-control-board case, Diltz v. Crouch, 173 Ohio St. 367, 182 N.E.2d 315 (1962). In Diltz, this court held that the liquor-control board had jurisdiction over its decisions until the institution of an appeal or the expiration of the time for an appeal. Id. at 369. In so holding, this court distinguished orders of the commission from orders of the liquor-control board, stating: Undoubtedly the General Assembly can confer on the Board of Liquor Control a continuing jurisdiction over its orders as it has done in the case of the Industrial Commission. Section 4123.52, Revised Code. But until that action is taken by the General Assembly, this court is not disposed to find in the legislative enactment something that the legislative authority has not provided for. 3. We have generally held that the last requirement means a reasonable amount of time after the discovery of the facts justifying the exercise of continuing jurisdiction, see State ex rel. Smith v. Indus. Comm., 98 Ohio St.3d 16, 2002-Ohio-7035, 780 N.E.2d 1012, ¶ 14; State ex rel. Baker Material Handling Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 69 Ohio St.3d 202, 207, 631 N.E.2d 138 (1994); State ex rel. Gordon v. Indus Comm., 63 Ohio St.3d 469, 472, 588 N.E.2d 852 (1992), citing Gatlin, 18 Ohio St.3d 246, 480 N.E.2d 487. Neitzelt does not argue that the time was unreasonable, and Vitas acted within ten days of Dr. Rozen’s report. 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO (Emphasis added.) Id. at 370. {¶ 20} The cases that the Tenth District cited, however, overlooked this distinction and restated Diltz’s holding in cases involving the commission. This court’s opinion in Prayner, 2 Ohio St.2d 120, 206 N.E.2d 911, consisted of one sentence: “The Industrial Commission has control over its orders until the actual institution of an appeal therefrom or until the expiration of the time for such an appeal.” And this court’s opinion in Todd, 65 Ohio St.2d at 19, 417 N.E.2d 1017, repeated Prayner’s mistake. And in Gatlin, this court held, “Regardless of the existence of a legislatively prescribed court appeal, the Industrial Commission has inherent power to reconsider its order for a reasonable period of time absent statutory or administrative regulations restricting the exercise of reconsideration.” (Emphasis added.) 18 Ohio St.3d at syllabus, 480 N.E.2d 487, citing Todd. Thus, each of these cases overlooked Diltz’s distinction between an administrative agency’s inherent power and the commission’s express statutory power. {¶ 21} Moreover, in Prayner, Todd, and Gatlin, the statements implying that the commission would lack control over its order after the time for filing an appeal were unnecessary to those decisions. Prayner and Todd both involved exercises of continuing jurisdiction that occurred within the 60-day appeal period. Prayner at 120 (affirming the denial of a request for writ vacating the exercise of continuing jurisdiction); Todd at 20. And Gatlin involved an exercise of continuing jurisdiction over an issue that was not appealable to the court of common pleas. Id. at 247-249. {¶ 22} We distinguish as dicta and disapprove the statements in Prayner, Todd, and Gatlin regarding the commission’s ability to exercise its continuing jurisdiction over appealable issues after the time for an appeal to the court of common pleas has expired. See Denison Univ. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 2 Ohio St.2d 17, 28, 205 N.E.2d 896 (1965) (distinguishing and disapproving dicta, while overruling holdings in other cases). 10 January Term, 2020