Opinion ID: 884022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: applicability of the pkpa

Text: All fifty states have adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) in some form to address interstate custody disputes. See Meade v. Meade (4th Cir.1987), 812 F.2d 1473, 1475. However, the UCCJA was found to be inadequate in addressing the problems of forum shopping and child snatching because it operated at the state level. Erler v. Erler (1993), 261 Mont. 65, 69, 862 P.2d 12, 15. Moreover, as the Utah Court of Appeals observed in Curtis v. Curtis (Utah Ct.App.1990), 789 P.2d 717, 721 n. 9, the UCCJA creates the possibility of several states having concurrent jurisdiction over child custody determinations. Congress enacted the PKPA in 1980 to establish national standards under which the courts of various states could determine whether they had jurisdiction in a child custody proceeding and what effect to give custody determinations by courts of other jurisdictions. Erler, 862 P.2d at 15. Under the PKPA, full faith and credit ordinarily must be given to a custody determination made by a court of another state if that court appropriately exercised jurisdiction under PKPA standards. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a); Erler, 862 P.2d at 15. Two underlying purposes of the PKPA are to discourage continuing interstate controversies over child custody and to facilitate the enforcement of custody determinations of sister states. Erler, 862 P.2d at 15 (citation omitted). In this regard, the PKPA prevents the issuance of competing decrees of sister states. Erler, 862 P.2d at 16 (citing Nielsen v. Nielsen (La. 1985), 472 So.2d 133, 136). Thus, the PKPA sets forth standards for determining the one state with jurisdiction to modify an existing custody order. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738A(d) and (f); Curtis, 789 P.2d at 721. The purposes of the PKPA are achieved through both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738A(d) and (f). 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) provides for continuing jurisdiction in the state in which the original child custody determination was made so long as certain enumerated requirements are satisfied ( see Erler, 862 P.2d at 15), while 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f) allows a court of a different state to modify a custody determination only when it has jurisdiction to make such a determination under its own laws and the court which made the original custody determination no longer has jurisdiction or has declined to exercise such jurisdiction ( see Meade, 812 F.2d at 1476-77). Thus, Congress' enactment of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738A(d) and (f) remedied the problem of possible concurrent jurisdiction present in the UCCJA. Accordingly, where the PKPA applies, necessary jurisdictional determinations must be made thereunder. Yancy argues that, pursuant to Erler, the PKPA does not apply to his petition for modification of custody. His reliance on Erler, however, is misplaced. In Erler, the parties' marriage was dissolved by a Montana district court in Missoula County and the mother was granted sole custody of the parties' minor children. The mother and children subsequently moved to Seattle, Washington and, thereafter, the father moved to modify custody in the district court in Missoula County. Erler, 862 P.2d at 13. On appeal, we affirmed the district court's determination that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction under the PKPA, concluding that the PKPA did not apply because Montana was the only state involved in the custody dispute. Erler, 862 P.2d at 16. Here, Yancy petitioned a Montana court for modification of the Utah court's child custody determination regarding Megan. Thus, unlike in Erler, two states are involved in this custody dispute. The PKPA was enacted by Congress to address such a situation and to prevent the issuance of conflicting and competing custody decrees in sister states. Erler, 862 P.2d at 16. We conclude, therefore, that the PKPA is applicable here. Accordingly, we turn to the issue of whether the District Court erred in concluding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to modify custody under the PKPA.