Opinion ID: 2035676
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Identification Evidence Was Properly Admitted

Text: James argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of photographic, lineup, and in-court identification of him by a witness, Amy Worek. Worek, who worked in an office next door to where the crime occurred, identified James as the person she observed going into the insurance office shortly before the victim was shot. She identified James from a photographic array, in a lineup, and in court. Approximately two hours after the crime, Worek was shown facial color photographs of males of African descent by a member of the Michigan City police department. She selected James' photograph, which was the second one shown to her. At that time, the officer instructed her to look at all of the photographs before making her final decision. After she had viewed all of the photographs and again selected the photograph of James, the officer told her that in his own mind, he thought James was the one who had committed the crime. James objects to this process as being impermissibly suggestive. It is well-established that due process of law requires suppression of testimony concerning an out-of-court identification when the procedure employed was unnecessarily suggestive. Stovall v. Denno (1967), 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1972, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199; Dillard v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 282, 286, 274 N.E.2d 387, 389. Whether the procedure employed was unnecessarily suggestive in a particular case is to be determined under the totality of the circumstances. Lyons v. State (1987), Ind., 506 N.E.2d 813, 815. Factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of a misidentification include (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the witness's degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the criminal, and (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness. Id. James asserts that the photographic array was impermissibly suggestive because immediately after the incident, Worek informed police investigators that she probably could not recognize the face of the man that she had observed, and was not sure whether he was of African descent or belonged to some other non-Caucasian racial group. James claims that the police should have shown her photographs of men of other races, and that James' distinctive hairstyle emphasized his photograph in the array. We do not agree. The record reveals that several males of African descent with varying degrees of skin darkness, most with mustaches, one without, were shown to Worek. It does not appear to us that the defendant's photograph was so unique as to be emphasized in any unduly suggestive manner. Although it is true that Worek identified James as the photographs were laid down one by one, she was immediately instructed to look at all of the photographs before making her final decision. Further, it was not until after she had selected James' photograph from the array that the officer indicated that in his own mind he thought that James was the one. We do not find this procedure unduly suggestive. See Head v. State (1982), Ind., 443 N.E.2d 44, 54. James also claims that the procedures used in the subsequent lineup were overly suggestive. Worek had described the suspect as having a mustache and bulging eyes. James was the only person in the lineup with facial hair and, thus, he argues, the only man matching the general description of the perpetrator. In addition, Worek testified that she expected the man whose photograph she had selected from the photo array to be included in the lineup. Even if we assume that the lineup was overly suggestive, if there is an independent basis for her in-court identification, then it is admissible. Stacks v. State (1978), 175 Ind. App. 525, 530, 372 N.E.2d 1201, 1206. The fact that a police officer informed Worek that she had chosen the person he thought had committed the crime did not necessarily taint the witness's in-court identification. Chapman v. State (1990), Ind., 556 N.E.2d 927, 932; Wethington v. State (1990), Ind., 560 N.E.2d 496, 502-503; French v. State (1987), Ind., 516 N.E.2d 40, 42. We conclude that Worek had a sufficient independent basis for her identification of James in court. She was able to observe him in daylight walking toward the office. She accurately described the clothing he was wearing and was quite certain of her identification during the photo array. Her pre-trial identifications were made the same evening as the crime occurred. We are assured, on this record, that the in-court identification was admissible.