Opinion ID: 1435553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The permit requirement of ORS 487.815(1).

Text: Defendant's second assignment of error is that [t]he circuit court erred in admitting evidence of defendant's blood-alcohol results, where no evidence was presented that the lab technician performing the test had a valid permit as required by ORS 487.815. Although it now appears that both defendant's objections to such evidence at the time of trial and his assignment of error on this appeal are defective, [5] we will nevertheless consider the merits of this assignment. One of the reasons we accepted review in this case was to determine whether the Court of Appeals was correct in its decision on this question. ORS 487.815(1) [6] provides: Chemical analyses of the person's breath, blood, urine or saliva, to be valid under ORS 487.545, shall be performed according to methods approved by the Health Division and by an individual possessing a valid permit to perform such analyses issued by the Health Division. ORS 487.820, however, provides: The provisions of the implied consent law, ORS 487.805 to 487.815, 487.825 to 487.835, except 487.545 and subsection (3) of ORS 487.805, shall not be construed by any court to limit the introduction of otherwise competent, relevant evidence in any civil action, suit or proceedings or in any criminal action other than a violation of ORS 487.540 or a similar municipal ordinance in proceeding under ORS 482.540 to 482.560. (Emphasis added) The Court of Appeals held that [t]he clear import of the latter statute [ORS 487.820] is that the statutory rules concerning the introduction of evidence contained in the implied consent law, including ORS 487.815, apply only in driving while under the influence (DUII) proceedings, ORS 487.540, and have no application to this prosecution for manslaughter. (34 Or. App. at 178-79, 578 P.2d at 448) The lab technician in this case was a college graduate with a bachelor of science degree and one year of medical technology training at the University of Oregon Medical School. She was nationally certified as a medical laboratory technician, and had worked for two years in a medical laboratory prior to becoming a criminologist for the Oregon State Police. She had worked in that capacity for over four years and had performed by her testimony over 200 blood alcohol analyses. She used a gaschromatograph procedure approved by the Health Division. [7] There was no evidence, however, that she possessed a valid permit from the Health Division to perform such analyses. From this evidence, the Court of Appeals concluded that the technician's testimony in this case concerning the blood test was certainly competent. (34 Or. App. at 181, 578 P.2d 447). We agree. Defendant seeks to avoid this result by relying upon a footnote in State v. Stover, 271 Or. 132, 531 P.2d 258 (1975). In Stover, which was decided under the law as it existed prior to the enactment of the predecessor to ORS 487.820, we concluded that test results obtained without compliance with a provision of the implied consent law which required that a driver expressly consent to a blood test were inadmissible in a prosecution for criminally negligent homicide. In a footnote (n. 10 at 147, 531 P.2d 258, 266 n. 10), we recognized that since the trial of that case the legislature had enacted the predecessor to ORS 487.820. We then stated in a further footnote, by way of dictum, that: 11. In State v. Annen, 12 Or. App. 203, 207, 504 P.2d 1400 (1973), as in the instant case, the violation of the Implied Consent Law involved the consent provisions of the law. `However, in State v. Fogle, 254 Or. 268, 459 P.2d 873 (1969), this court dealt with the situation where the state failed to introduce any evidence that the equipment used to conduct the breath test had been tested for accuracy by the State Board of Health as required by ORS 483.664(2)(c) [sic, 483.644(2)(c), now 487.815(2)(c)]. Thus our decision in Fogle was aimed at the very trustworthiness and competency of the test results. The ruling in Fogle would not be affected by the passage of ORS 483.648 [Now 487.820]: `The provisions of the implied consent law shall not be construed by any court to limit the introduction of otherwise competent, relevant evidence.   ' (Emphasis added) We now hold, however, that ORS 487.820, as enacted after our decision in Fogle, provides, by its express terms, that in a criminal action other than a violation of ORS 487.540 (DUII), including an action for manslaughter under ORS 163.125, the court may not limit the evidence to the introduction of blood tests performed by an individual with a valid permit from the Health Division, but that otherwise competent, relevant evidence relating to the alcohol content of the defendant's blood is also admissible in such a proceeding. We also hold that the evidence offered by the state and now objected to by the defendant in this case was competent, relevant evidence. To the extent that the dictum in footnote 11 of State v. Stover, supra , would appear to suggest a different result, that dictum is disapproved. For these reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals and the conviction of the defendant are both affirmed.