Opinion ID: 1998556
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proceedings in this Lawsuit

Text: In December 1995, Lovold filed a complaint under the Act to recover its cleanup costs from Shell and three other defendants. A second refiner was added as a defendant in September 1996. The complaint asserted that Shell owned, operated or exercised operational control of the station and was liable for the cost of removing contamination from the site. Shell moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was not an operator of the tanks at the station and accordingly had no liability under the Act. After a hearing, the trial court denied Shell's motion stating: the Court finds that there are genuine issues of fact precluding the granting of summary judgment. Specifically, the issue of whether or not, Shell Oil Company was in control of or having responsibility for the underground storage tank(s) bringing Shell Oil Company within the meaning of an operator under I.C. XX-XX-X-XXX(d). Shell appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court erred in denying Shell's Motion for Summary Judgment because Shell was not an operator under the Act. Shell Oil Co. v. Lovold Co., 687 N.E.2d 383 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997), reh'g granted 691 N.E.2d 521 (Ind.Ct. App.1998), trans. granted 698 N.E.2d 1194 (Ind.1998). We granted transfer to resolve the conflict in the Court of Appeals between this case and Shell v. Meyer, 684 N.E.2d 504 (Ind.Ct. App.1997), trans. granted 698 N.E.2d 1183 (Ind.1998). We conclude that the trial court properly denied Shell's Motion for Summary Judgment on the record before it, although not for primarily the same reasons given by the trial court.