Opinion ID: 524995
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior Restraints: Generically Overbroad Because

Text: Invalid in all Applications 117 A prior restraint is sometimes generically referred to as overbroad because there is no valid application of the restraint. Such a conclusion prompts the question, what is a prior restraint? As I shall discuss in Part D(1) infra, the majority does not delve into the content of prior restraints, but relies instead on its attempted distinction between prior restraints and after-the-fact sanctions. The majority, however, fails to recognize that a sanction may or may not be a reflection of an unconstitutional prior restraint, and that a prior restraint is no less invalid because a speaker has ignored the government's unconstitutional command. 118 There are different types of sanctions with quite different consequences for a constitutional inquiry. The sanction which flows from a failure to receive prior clearance is a sanction which attempts to enforce a prior restraint. In contrast, the type of sanction which flows from the content of speaking forbidden words is in constitutional terms referred to as an after-the-fact (of speaking the forbidden words) sanction. An illustration may be helpful to delineate the differences I discuss. The ordinance in Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 447, 58 S.Ct. 666, 667, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938) stated: 119 Section 1. That the practice of distributing, either by hand or otherwise, circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind ... within the limits of the City of Griffin, without first obtaining written permission from the City Manager of the City of Griffin, such practice shall be deemed a nuisance, and punishable as an offense against the City of Griffin. 120 Ms. Alma Lovell did not seek permission to distribute her pamphlets or magazines because she regarded herself as sent 'by Jehovah to do His work' and that such an application would have been 'an act of disobedience to His Commandment.'  Lovell at 448, 58 S.Ct. at 667. She was found guilty of violating the above quoted statute and sanctioned accordingly. 121 The Supreme Court reversed her conviction because the ordinance was a prior restraint, void on its face. The character of the ordinance is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship.... While this freedom from previous restraint upon publication cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty of liberty, the prevention of that restraint was a leading purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision. [citations omitted]. Legislation of this type of the ordinance in question would restore the system of license and censorship in its boldest form. Lovell at 451-52, 58 S.Ct. at 669. The sanction Ms. Lovell received was not an after-the-fact sanction. Ms. Lovell's receipt of a sanction did not change the character of the prior restraint into something else. Her punishment was a sanction flowing from an unconstitutional prior restraint. 122 To decide whether a rule is a prior restraint, one should examine the rule from the viewpoint of the speaker. Constitutional jurisprudence envisions two basic types of prior restraint. For the first type, one should ask, does the speaker have to obtain clearance or permission to speak? If so, then the rule constitutes the classic prior restraint--a restraint which subjects a speaker to a pre-clearance censor. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52, 58 S.Ct. 666, 668-69, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938). There is also another kind of prior restraint: the injunction which has the effect of gagging a speaker. This second type of prior restraint, which does not encompass the entire scope of prior restraints, is also treated as a prior restraint because of its effect. The type of prior restraint primarily involved in this case is the first type--a restraint which screens a speaker's speech before the words are spoken. As I discuss below in Part D(1), the sanction a speaker receives for disobeying the strictures of the system of censorship does not transform the restraint into an after-the-fact sanction. 123 As an example, imagine that the Kilgore Rule reads: 124 Refrain from furnishing information relative to department policy, practices, or business affairs. 125 The removal of the concluding phrase except as authorized by the Chief of the Department transforms this prior restraint into a total blackout of nearly all speech. This blanket prohibition, while it suffers from other constitutional infirmities, 11 would not be a prior restraint. No censor screens the proposed speech. See also City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 2142, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (newspaper had not yet placed its proposed racks on city sidewalks, but instead sought an order from the court enjoining the utilization of the ordinance before requesting a permit). If the City of Kilgore went to court and received an injunction to stop an employee from speaking at an upcoming event, then the injunction enforcing the rule would be the second type of prior restraint--the gagged speaker restraint. The success ratio of the government in restraining speech is not, however, a crucial distinction, only a mere reminder that prior restraints do succeed in preventing speech from flowing. 126 Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 558-60, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 1148-50, 92 L.Ed. 1574 (1945), is another example of a screening-type prior restraint. The speaker, a minister, was a Jehovah's Witness. The City of Lockport, New York, had an ordinance which forbade the use of sound amplification devices except with the permission of the Chief of Police. The speaker obtained permission to use sound trucks to amplify lectures on religious subjects. When this permit expired, the speaker applied for another one but was refused on the grounds that complaints had been made. [The speaker] nevertheless used his equipment as planned on four occassions, but without a permit. Saia at 559, 68 S.Ct. at 1149. The speaker was tried and convicted for his violation of the ordinance. 127 The Supreme Court held the ordinance unconstitutional on its face because it established a prior restraint on the right of free speech.... Saia, 334 U.S. at 560, 68 S.Ct. at 1149. To use a loud-speaker or amplifier one has to get a permit from the Chief of Police. Id. The fact that one's speech is actually disseminated does not turn a prior restraint into an after-the-fact sanction. 128 The crucial examination focuses on what the speaker must do or cannot do as viewed from the speaker's viewpoint. 12 If the speaker must seek permission or review before speaking, then the system is a screening-type prior restraint. Of course, the fact that a rule is a prior restraint does not mean that the rule is per se unconstitutional. However, understanding how the rule functions is a very important threshold step for navigating the swirling waters surrounding any discussion of the First Amendment. 129