Opinion ID: 766768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Otten's Claims

Text: 38 Less than two months after being fired from his job, Dr. Otten joined Massey's lawsuit and asserted that defendants retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment by terminating his employment at FCI Pekin because he openly opposed the medical treatment of certain prisoners. 6 In addition to his charge that prison officials violated his constitutional rights, Dr. Otten also levied two claims on behalf of inmates at FCI Pekin. Specifically, Dr. Otten said that the prison officials (1) deprived prisoners of their First Amendment right to have unimpeded access to the courts; and (2) administered medical treatment to FCI Pekin inmates that violated the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed Dr. Otten's First Amendment claim under Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) because the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) provides Dr. Otten's exclusive remedy for an alleged constitutional violation arising out of his federal employment. Massey v. Helman, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115-16 (C.D. Ill. 1999). As for the two claims that Dr. Otten brought on behalf of inmates at FCI Pekin, the district judge dismissed those on the basis that Dr. Otten had no standing to assert claims on behalf of prisoners. Id. at 1116-17. 39
40 In his appeal, Dr. Otten argues that the district court should not have dismissed his First Amendment claim under Bush v. Lucas. In Bush, a federal employee brought a First Amendment retaliation claim under sec. 1983 and Bivens against the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Bush, 462 U.S. at 369. In both administrative and federal court proceedings, Bush alleged that he had been demoted because he made public statements that were critical of his supervisors and of NASA policies. Id. at 369-70. The Supreme Court concluded that Bush could not maintain his First Amendment Bivens claim against NASA because Congress had established an elaborate remedial scheme through which federal employees could seek redress for constitutional wrongs related to their federal employment. Id. at 388-90. The Court reasoned that Congress is in a better position than courts to decide whether federal employees should have a Bivens cause of action when those federal workers have such an extensive administrative remedy available. Id. at 390. The Court found that the comprehensive administrative remedy available to Bush constituted a special factor which required the Court to refrain from creating a judicially-fashioned Bivens remedy. Id. at 389-90. 41 Our cases interpreting Bush make it abundantly clear that Dr. Otten has no Bivens remedy in federal court for the claimed retaliation. For example, in Robbins v. Bentsen, 41 F.3d 1195, 1202 (7th Cir. 1994), we held that an employee of the Internal Revenue Service could not maintain a First Amendment retaliation claim because we were clearly presented with a situation in which Congress has provided an elaborate remedial scheme, the CSRA, for the protection of . . . constitutional rights in the employment context. Similarly, in Feit v. Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 851-56 (7th Cir. 1989) we expressly found that the CSRA's extensive remedial scheme precluded a First Amendment retaliation claim by a former employee of the United States Forest Service. In Moon v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 147, 150 (7th Cir. 1988), we observed that subject to narrow exceptions, a federal employee cannot file a suit for damages against his supervisor for an unconstitutional adverse personnel action when Congress has provided an adequate administrative remedy. Citing the provisions of the CSRA, we held that a federal employee could not maintain a First Amendment retaliation claim. Id. at 152. Finally, in Ellis v. United States Postal Service, 784 F.2d 835, 839-40 (7th Cir. 1986), we affirmed the dismissal of political discrimination claims under Bush because postal employees have an extensive remedy under the collective bargaining agreement established by federal law. 42 Here, Dr. Otten was a federal employee who could have used the CSRA to complain about the alleged retaliation which he asserted violated his First Amendment rights. As we explained in great detail in Feit, the CSRA creates an elaborate remedial scheme through which federal employees can seek review of allegedly unconstitutional employment actions. See Feit, 886 F.2d 852. Where, as in this case, Congress has fashioned such a detailed and comprehensive administrative process for federal workers to lodge complaints, 'Bush does not permit us to apply a separate constitutional cause of action.' Robbins, 41 F.3d at 1202 (quoting Ellis, 784 F.2d at 840). Dr. Otten fails to offer any principled reason for this court to hold that Bush v. Lucas does not doom his First Amendment claim; nor has Dr. Otten even attempted to distinguish the facts of his case from our precedent concluding that the CSRA constitutes his only remedy for the alleged retaliation. 43 Dr. Otten does, however, creatively attempt to resurrect his First Amendment claim by emphasizing that the district court dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. According to Dr. Otten, if the viability of his First Amendment claim depends on whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction, then we should reverse because the district court had supplemental jurisdiction over his claim under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1367(a). Dr. Otten's novel theory begins with the premise that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Massey's Eighth Amendment claim. Dr. Otten then points out that his First Amendment retaliation claim is related to Massey's Eighth Amendment claim because they are both based on the same allegedly unconstitutional medical policies. Dr. Otten concludes that the trial court had supplemental jurisdiction over his First Amendment claim because it forms part of the same case or controversy as Massey's Eighth Amendment claim over which the district court had original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 1367(a). 44 There is a fundamental flaw in this theory. Although the district court dismissed Dr. Otten's retaliation claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1116, this was not the correct basis for the dismissal. Instead, the district judge should have dismissed the claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Federal courts do have jurisdiction to hear a First Amendment retaliation claim by a federal employee. The Supreme Court made this clear in Bush by stating: 45 [t]he federal courts' power to grant relief not expressly authorized by Congress is firmly established. Under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1331, the federal courts have jurisdiction to decide all cases aris[ing] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. This jurisdictional grant provides not only the authority to decide whether a cause of action is stated by a plaintiff's claim that he has been injured by a violation of the Constitution, Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946), but also the authority to choose among available judicial remedies in order to vindicate constitutional rights. 46 Bush, 462 U.S. at 374. It is clear that 28 U.S.C. sec. 1331 gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims such as Dr. Otten's First Amendment claim. 47 After declaring that federal courts have jurisdiction over such claims, the Court explained that the extent to which courts should exercise this power must be tempered by policy considerations. Id. at 376. The Court summarized the interplay between jurisdiction and the responsibility to refrain from creating new causes of action by stating: 48 [t]he federal courts' statutory jurisdiction to decide federal questions confers adequate power to award damages to the victim of a constitutional violation. When Congress provides an alternative remedy, it may, of course, indicate its intent, by statutory language, by clear legislative history, or perhaps even by the statutory remedy itself, that the Court's power should not be exercised. In the absence of such a congressional directive, the federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counseling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation. 49 Id. at 378. The Supreme Court's cases have unequivocally established the power to grant relief that is not expressly authorized by statute, but they also remind us that such power is to be exercised in light of relevant policy determinations made by the Congress. Id. at 373. Based on these competing principles, the Court concluded that Congress, not the judiciary, must decide whether 'to create new substantive legal liability' for federal employees who claim constitutional deprivations. Bush, 462 U.S. at 390 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 302 (1947)). 50 Bush therefore teaches that the rule precluding constitutional claims by federal employees who have adequate administrative remedies stems from the absence of substantive legal rights rather than the courts' lack of subject matter jurisdiction. These substantive rights do not exist because Congress has not created such a cause of action and the Supreme Court has recognized that courts must defer to congressional judgment on the issue. Accordingly, the appropriate basis for dismissing a Bivens claim under Bush v. Lucas is failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, not lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 7 51 In this case, the district court dismissed Dr. Otten's First Amendment claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In doing so, the court applied analysis which shows that Dr. Otten's First Amendment claim should have been dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In these circumstances, we have previously held that if remanding a case dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction would be futile because appellant has also failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we will affirm the district court, even though the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was improper. Gammon v. GC Services Ltd. Partnership, 27 F.3d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1073 (7th Cir. 1987); White v. Elrod, 816 F.2d 1172, 1176 (7th Cir. 1987)). Because the analysis employed by the district court shows that Dr. Otten's First Amendment claim was legally insufficient under Rule 12(b)(6), we affirm the dismissal of Dr. Otten's First Amendment claim. 52
53 In addition to his own First Amendment claim, Dr. Otten also brought two claims on behalf of inmates at FCI Pekin. Dr. Otten alleged that the prison officials (1) deprived prisoners of their First Amendment right to have unimpeded access to the courts when they fired him; and (2) administered medical treatment to FCI Pekin inmates that violated the Eighth Amendment. Finding that Dr. Otten had no standing to assert the constitutional rights of these prisoners, the district judge dismissed both of these claims. 54 In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues. This inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). When considering whether a party satisfies the constitutional requirement of standing, the court must determine that the plaintiff himself has suffered 'some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action.' Id. (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973)). In other words, to meet the constitutional element of standing, the plaintiff must allege an actual case or controversy within the meaning of Article III. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498. 55 In addition to the constitutional limitation on standing, courts also impose prudential limitations on the class of persons who may invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. Among these prudential restrictions is the general rule that a litigant must assert his own legal rights and cannot assert the legal rights of a third party. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1960); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943); Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 76 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir. 1996). This rule flows from a concern that third parties will not adequately represent the individuals whose rights they seek to vindicate. Retired Chicago Police, 76 F.3d at 862. The Supreme Court has, however, recognized third party standing on rare occasions when the plaintiff can show a sufficiently significant personal interest in the outcome of the case to satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirement. Indemnified Capital Investments, S.A. v. R.J. O'Brien & Assocs., Inc., 12 F.3d 1406, 1409 (7th Cir. 1993). 56 Thus, [w]hen a person or entity seeks standing to advance the constitutional rights of others, we ask two questions. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 n.3 (1989). First, has the litigant suffered some injury in fact sufficient to create a case or controversy in the Article III sense? And second, as a prudential matter, is the plaintiff the proper proponent of the particular legal rights he is asserting? Id.; Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 (1976) (majority opinion). When a litigant attempts to assert the rights of a third party, the standing question . . . is whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500. 57 Here, Dr. Otten's third party claims allege that prison officials deprived inmates of their First Amendment right to have unimpeded access to the courts and administered medical treatment that violated the Eighth Amendment. We find that Dr. Otten has no standing to assert these claims because he does not satisfy the constitutional case or controversy requirement. Neither of these borrowed claims shows that Dr. Otten had a personal stake in the outcome of the prisoners' case. Rather, both claims pertain exclusively to the rights and interests of the inmates. Dr. Otten does not allege that his own constitutional rights or other interests correlated to or were affected by the prisoners' First and Eighth Amendment rights that he sought to assert. 58 Dr. Otten apparently seeks to establish that his rights were connected to the prisoners' First Amendment right of access to the courts because his termination hampered the prisoners' ability to obtain evidence in support of any claims they may assert. This contention does not survive close scrutiny because it directly contradicts allegations in the Fourth Amended Complaint. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Dr. Otten was suspended from his job just one day before he was scheduled to give a deposition in support of Massey's claim that FCI Pekin and BOP medical policies are unconstitutional. Nevertheless, even after his suspension, Dr. Otten continued with his deposition in Massey's case and gave extensive testimony in support of Massey's Eighth Amendment claim. Dr. Otten cannot seriously contend that his termination interfered with other prisoners' access to the courts by confining their ability to gather evidence in support of their cases. 59 Dr. Otten also fails to show that he has a stake of constitutional magnitude in the prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights. Dr. Otten has no Eighth Amendment interest in the medical treatment the prisoners receive; rather, the medical treatment afforded (or withheld) from prisoners is an issue in which only those individual prisoners have an actionable right. As the Supreme Court has held, when a party attempts to assert the rights of another not before the court, the standing question . . . is whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500. Here, the prisoners' rights are based in the Eighth Amendment--a constitutional provision that confers no rights on Dr. Otten. See supra, at note 6. Because Dr. Otten has no rights under the Eighth Amendment, he cannot possibly have a personal stake in the outcome of the Eighth Amendment claim he seeks to advance on behalf of the inmates. 60 Dr. Otten relies heavily on Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) in support of his argument that he has standing to assert the rights of his inmate-patients. Singleton involved physicians who suffer[ed] concrete injury from the operation of the challenged statute. Id. at 112- 13 (majority opinion). The doctors in Singleton had a pecuniary interest in their patients' case because the statute at issue precluded the doctors from collecting payment for medical abortion services they provided for their patients. Id. at 113. Thus, the Supreme Court observed that if the physicians prevail in their suit to remove this limitation, they will benefit, for they will then receive payment for the abortions. Id. Under those circumstances, a majority of the Court found the parties' positions classically adverse and held that under those circumstances there clearly exists between them a case or controversy in the constitutional sense. Id. In stark contrast, Dr. Otten has no pecuniary interest in the prisoners' medical treatment and stands to gain nothing by advocating the third party rights of inmates at FCI Pekin. Dr. Otten fails to allege the existence of a case or controversy between himself and defendants. 61 The lack of an Article III case or controversy is not the only reason that Dr. Otten does not have standing to assert claims on behalf of the FCI prisoners; standing is also improper in this case because prudential considerations show that Dr. Otten is not a proper individual to represent the prisoners' interests. These prudential factors require federal courts to hesitate before resolving a controversy, even one within their constitutional power to resolve, on the basis of the rights of third persons not parties to the litigation. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 113 (plurality opinion). Thus, courts recognize a general rule against allowing a litigant to seek vindication of the rights of a third party not before the court. Id. at 114. When determining whether to fashion an exception to this general rule, courts consider two facts: (1) the relationship of the litigant to the person whose right he seeks to assert; and (2) the ability of the third party to assert his own right. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114-116 (plurality opinion). 62 Dr. Otten seeks to pursue the rights of his inmate-patients at FCI Pekin and emphasizes the doctor-patient relationship between himself and the individuals he seeks to represent. In support of his argument that he has standing to assert these third-party rights, Dr. Otten again relies on Singleton, where the Supreme Court recognized a physician's standing to assert the rights of a patient seeking abortion services. See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 118 (plurality opinion). According to Dr. Otten, there is no difference between the physician-patient relationship in Singleton and the relationship between himself and the inmates at FCI Pekin whose rights he seeks to litigate. We disagree with Dr. Otten's argument that the Supreme Court painted with so broad a brush when the Court recognized the physicians' standing in Singleton. 63 At least two important facts distinguish Dr. Otten's alleged physician-patient relationship with the FCI Pekin inmates from the doctor- patient relationship at issue in Singleton. First and foremost, the doctors in Singleton enjoyed an ongoing physician-patient relationship with their patients at the time they filed suit. Dr. Otten, on the other hand, had been fired from his job as a staff physician at FCI Pekin six weeks before he filed suit. Therefore, unlike the physicians in Singleton, Dr. Otten did not have doctor- patient relationship with the prisoners when he brought the lawsuit and attempted to assert third party standing. Without the existence of this relationship, Dr. Otten does not establish the closeness between the litigant and the third party that existed in Singleton and that led the Supreme Court to recognize the doctors' standing. Since he was not the prisoners' physician when he filed suit, Dr. Otten is not a proper proponent of the prisoners' rights. 64 Another crucial difference between this case and the physician-patient relationship in Singleton is the nature of the medical treatment the patients sought to receive. In Singleton, the patients sought to obtain abortions--a time- sensitive medical decision that involves a potential human life and one which many women do not make without first obtaining counseling from their physician. The unique nature of the abortion services at issue in Singleton prompted the Supreme Court to remark that the constitutionally protected abortion decision is one in which the physician is intimately involved. Aside from the woman herself, therefore, the physician is uniquely qualified to litigate the constitutionality of the State's interference with, or discrimination against, that decision. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117 (plurality opinion). Unlike the physicians in Singleton, Dr. Otten is not seeking to provide time-sensitive medical services which involve a potential human life or that require intense counseling before deciding to administer. Rather, Dr. Otten focuses his claim on run-of-the-mill ailments for which he believes the prisoners should receive treatment. Dr. Otten fails to allege that the inmates at FCI Pekin are in need of medical treatment as unique as an abortion. 65 The second prudential consideration--the ability of the third party to assert his own rights--also counsels against recognizing Dr. Otten's request for standing. There is no allegation in the Fourth Amended Complaint which suggests that the inmates have any obstacle preventing them from properly asserting their own rights. Unlike Singleton where the Court found that the abortion patients' privacy considerations and imminent mootness of their claims interfered with their ability to pursue their own rights, Dr. Otten has alleged no such facts. 8 The complaint in this case contains no hint that the prisoners' privacy could be unconstitutionally compromised if they brought their own lawsuits. Similarly, because Dr. Otten has not identified any specific prisoners with health problems that will become moot, he fails to illustrate that imminent mootness interferes with the prisoners' ability to advocate their own rights.