Opinion ID: 1972567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Toler's Sexually Explicit Remark

Text: At the trial the court excluded from evidence, pursuant to a motion in limine, the testimony of Michelle Gregoire and Sally Davies that, shortly before the fatal confrontation and in the presence of Lisa DePrez and Donna Colello, Toler approached them and explicitly described certain sexual conduct that he wanted to engage in with them. Bennett and Maldonado contend that the court erred when it refused to admit this testimony. They argue that these comments were properly admissible because they tend to show that Toler was volatile, aggressive and fearsome moments before the fight and tend to impeach two State witnesses. We disagree.
A person may justifiably use deadly force when that person reasonably believes it necessary and reasonably believes the other person is about to use unlawful, deadly force against him or another person. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 108(2)(A)(1) (Supp.1994). Evidence of a person's character or of a person's bad acts is not admissible to prove that that person acted in conformity therewith. M.R.Evid. 404. Thus, evidence of a victim's violent nature is clearly inadmissible. State v. Mitchell, 390 A.2d 495, 501 (Me. 1978). This rule, however, does not keep out the victim's reputation for violence, proved to have been known to the accused before the event, for the purpose of showing his reasonable apprehension of immediate danger. M.R.Evid. 404 advisor's note (emphasis added). Unless the accused is aware of the victim's reputation or past acts, the exclusion of such evidence is not erroneous. State v. Leone, 581 A.2d at 394, 400. Even if the accused is aware of a victim's reputation, evidence of that reputation may still be excluded pursuant to M.R.Evid. 403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing and misleading the jury. State v. Tanguay, 574 A.2d 1359, 1362 (Me.1990). The court determined that the statement by Toler should not be admitted in evidence pursuant to the exception to M.R.Evid. 404 because there was no evidence that the defendants were aware of the statement prior to engaging in the charged conduct. Indeed, the defendants did not argue then and do not argue now that they were aware of Toler's statement. They argue only that the statement is probative of mind set and mood changes capable in Randal Toler. The court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to admit this evidence in support of the defendants' claims of self-defense.
A criminal defendant has the right to introduce evidence tending to impeach the credibility of a State's witness. State v. Warren, 312 A.2d 535, 544 (Me.1973). The extent and scope of impeachment testimony lies within the limits of judicial discretion. State v. Cedre, 314 A.2d 790, 799 (Me.1974). [D]iscretion is considered abused ... if the ruling arises from a failure to apply principles of law applicable to a situation resulting in prejudice. Warren, 312 A.2d at 544. Bennett and Maldonado argued at the trial that Toler's sexually explicit statement impeached both Deprez and Colello because both denied hearing it even though they were in positions to do so. The court excluded only the content of the statement. It permitted the defendants to impeach Donna Colello by presenting the fact that Toler had contact with the two women and made a statement to them that should have been heard by Colello. Bennett agreed that this ruling permitted impeachment of Colello. With respect to the impeachment of DePrez, there was no evidence that DePrez was in a position to have heard the statement. Accordingly, the court's ruling to exclude the content of the statement was not an abuse of discretion.