Opinion ID: 1298680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: wyoming's theoretical departure by buckley v. bell

Text: The starting point for analysis requires a revisit to Buckley, 703 P.2d 1089 from which this majority extrudes its present conclusion that defectiveness is confined to deviation in character and not failure in performance in assigned purpose. I would reject Buckley as authority for this decision on five bases. First, that three-to-two decision lacks logic in applied analysis in any regard. Second, the decision in fact can be distinguished in ratio decidendi and the wrong-product concept was only dictum in broad analysis. Third, the precedent cited in Buckley to support the conclusion will not support the conclusion made in factual analysis. Fourth, Wyoming's more recent cases in first adopting strict liability in essence supercede Buckley. Finally, the special order status of this present case is fundamental in differentiating analysis. In Buckley, 703 P.2d at 1090, the issue stated by the court was whether the foreseeability of negligent conduct by a plaintiff occurring subsequent to the negligent acts of a defendant is a question of law or a question of fact. That portion of the case addressed proximate cause. Buyer had ordered gas for his gas motor hay baler and was furnished diesel fuel. In purging the diesel fuel from the machine after removal, the engine backfired, ignited available gas on the ground and burned up the baler. The second issue was contention that the trial court erroneously concluded that diesel fuel could not be a defective product under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). The opinion considered that the restatement had not been adopted and the court was foreclosed from adoption because as there stated: First, our conclusion that the district court accurately resolved the causation factor prevents any application of the concept of strict liability. Second, even in view of the appellant's argument that if an adulterated product is to be considered defective and lead to liability when unreasonably dangerous then a wrong product is one which should be considered as totally adulterated for purposes of determining whether it is defective, the authorities we have discovered seem to say that a wrong product is not a defective product for purposes of strict liability. Baptista v. St. Barnabas Medical Center, 109 N.J. Super. 217, 262 A.2d 902 (1970), affirmed 57 N.J. 167, 270 A.2d 409 (1970). See also Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983); Montez v. Ford Motor Company, 101 Cal. App.3d 315, 161 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1980); and Dambacher by Dambacher v. Mallis, [336] Pa.Super. [22], 485 A.2d 408 (1984). Finally, it does not seem that a strict products liability theory is recognized as an appropriate vehicle for recovery of an economic loss, which is the only injury in this instance in light of the resolution of the causation factor. Hart Engineering Company v. FMC Corporation, 593 F. Supp. 1471 (D.R.I. 1984). Singularly or collectively these concepts foreclose any reliance upon the doctrine of strict liability as articulated in Restatement (Second) of Tort, § 402(A), in this case. Buckley, 703 P.2d at 1094-95. Consequently, the trial court resolution came on independent cause proximately causing the damage and failure of proof of defective product. The decision in first discussing proximate cause and the reasoning and logic employed has no application here. Cf. England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137 (Wyo. 1986) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting). A fair analysis of the case is found in Note, Torts  Should a Plaintiff's Intervening Act Be An Absolute Defense Under Comparative Negligence? Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089 (Wyo. 1985), XXI Land & Water L.Rev. 591 (1986). It is the second two-paragraph disposition of the defective product definition under Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 402A that Buckley presents relevance here. In Buckley, the two dissents analyzed the proximate cause concept to have been improperly applied and did not pursue the gratuitous address in the opinion regarding the nature of defect and question of economic damage, which peripheral problem now also comes to this court in yet another appeal. Continental Insurance Company v. Page Engineering, No. 87-295 (Wyo. 1989), now pending in this court. There are four cases upon which the Wyoming law is now hung as derived from precedential inclusion in Buckley. In Baptista v. St. Barnabas Medical Center, 109 N.J. Super. 217, 262 A.2d 902, aff'd 57 N.J. 167, 270 A.2d 409 (1970), a blood transfusion operation may have caused the death. Improper cross-matching may have caused the blood problem. On the record, the blood was wholesome and free from internal defects and the hospital followed recognized standard practices and testing. The appellate court refused to adopt a rule that would make a hospital an insurer of what are in essence medical services and opinions,   . The obligation of hospitals in cross-matching and typing blood in cases of blood transfusions should continue to be as it is now, grounded and expressed in a duty to exercise reasonable competence and care. Id. 262 A.2d at 907. The factual difference between the reasoning employed and the decision made and any principle that defectiveness is not a wrong product is self-evident. The area of inquiry was reasonable effort to determine the kind of blood required and furnished. Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983) involved capacity designated irrigation water pumps. Performance was not achieved in quantity produced. The user was sued by the dealer for purchase price. The user counterclaimed for damages resulting from insufficient production and the dealer third-partied in the manufacturer whose performance curve statistics had been used to complete the sale. User recovered about $680,000 and the dealer was indemnified by the manufacturer and also awarded litigative costs. The dealer was given judgment for pump purchase price. On appeal, the manufacturer argued that strict liability was not applicable in contention: (1) where the product, in spite of any defective condition, does not constitute an unreasonable danger to person or property, or (2) in the absence of injury to persons, such defect causes purely economic loss. That appellate court found no evidence that the defectiveness of Berkeley's pumps rendered them dangerous  inadequate and dysfunctional, to be sure, but not dangerous. Berkeley Pump Co., 653 S.W.2d at 132. That decision also has no relevance to the present review since the issue considered was unreasonable dangerousness as found not to be presented. It was determined on appeal that the pumps were not dangerous. Id. 653 S.W.2d at 132. Furthermore, the additional decision of breach of warranty of fitness for purpose intended requiring knowledge by the supplier/manufacturer brought that case into accord with all positions now advanced by this dissent. The third case cited is from California, Montez v. Ford Motor Co., 101 Cal. App.3d 315, 161 Cal. Rptr. 578, 579 (1980), where that court first said: A plaintiff in an action for personal injuries in a products liability case is not required to elect whether to proceed on a theory of strict liability in tort or on a theory of negligence where the instructions on the two theories will not be confusing to the jury. ( Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 379, 387, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769, 482 P.2d 681.) At issue in this appeal is whether the court's rejection of plaintiff's negligence instructions and its decision to instruct the jury solely on strict liability was prejudicial error. Factually, the injury resulted from missing a curve in driving at perhaps a 59 mile per hour speed where safe operation extended only from 17 to 27 miles per hour and [p]laintiff's case was limited to a manufacturing defect. She did not rely on either a defect in design or the failure to warn. Montez, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 582. An adverse jury verdict was sustained, although that appellate court said a definitional instruction for defect should have been given but the jury was not confused in its absence since the jury was capable of determining whether a defect in fact existed based upon the evidence. Their conclusion that one did not exist is amply supported by the record. Id. at 583. That case is not relevant for the Buckley citation. The last case cited, Dambacher By Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa.Super. 22, 485 A.2d 408 (1984), appeal dismissed 508 Pa. 643, 500 A.2d 428 (1985), is one of a line of Pennsylvania cases providing a comprehensive analysis of products liability. Dambacher was a case which interestingly involved a radial tire. The simple issue, but very comprehensively pursued, was that the tire was defective because it was not embossed with a warning not to mix it with other non-radial tires, and that the accident occurred because the tire was mixed with non-radial tires. Id. 485 A.2d at 411. The decision rested on the qualification of expert witnesses which had been used for the successful plaintiff's verdict and further analysis considered the proper instruction for retrial. The technical question was what happens when a radial tire is mixed with non-radial tires on a passenger vehicle as a mixed fitment. Id. at 414. The appellate court in Dambacher first denied the dealer's motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict and reversed for retrial instead. That court then determined that qualified expert testimony was required that the mixed fitment was a proximate cause of the accident. Suppose, for example, that A sells a bottled drink to B, and B pours the drink into a glass filled with ice-cubes, becomes ill, and sues A for selling a product defective because the bottle's label failed to include a warning not to mix the drink with ice-cubes. B will not make out a case for the jury unless he proves that mixing ice-cubes with the drink did in fact make him ill. If the mixing did not make B ill, there was no need to warn against the mixing, and therefore no defect in the bottle's label. Assuming, however, that appellees are able to present competent evidence of proximate cause at a new trial, that is, that they do offer the testimony of qualified experts, the issue will then arise whether appellant's radial tire was defective because it was not embossed with a warning not to mix it with non-radial tires. In that event, what will be the trial court's responsibility? Id. at 420. Dambacher was an inadequate warning case as a concept not presented here, but that court clearly recognized in opinion text that intended use was a direct constituent of the zone of responsibility within strict liability concepts. In a products liability case, such as this case, in contrast, the defendant  the manufacturer or supplier of the product  is not an insurer but effectively the guarantor of his product's safety. Salvador v. Atlantic Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 32, 319 A.2d 903, 907 (1974). The plaintiff must therefore prove that the product that caused his injury was defective, or unsafe for its intended use. Id. If the defendant were the insurer of its product, liability would follow upon a finding that the plaintiff was injured while using the product: the fact that injury occurred would lead to the conclusion that the product was unsafe in some way. But the jury is not to find liability when the product is unsafe in some way; liability may be imposed only on proof that the product lacked an element necessary to make it safe for its intended use.          Finally, in a negligence case the plaintiff must prove, not only that the product was defective and that the defect caused his injury, but in addition, that in manufacturing or supplying the product the defendant failed to exercise due care. Id. at 424 (emphasis in original). That court then announced as part of the proposed instruction: This means that you must decide whether, as the plaintiffs contend, the radial tire supplied by the defendant was unsafe for its intended use because it lacked a warning that it should not be mixed with non-radial tires. If you find that because it lacked such a warning, the tire was unsafe for its intended use, then you should find it defective. Id. at 430. Consequently, Dambacher stands for the proposition that defectiveness can be established by being unsafe for its intended use and has nothing to do with wrong product absolution which would have been directly contrary to its remand result. See also Justice Wieand's concurring and dissenting opinion where he stated: A product may also be deemed defective even though it comports in all respects to its intended design. It may be defective because of a defect in the design of the product. In Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., supra [480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978)], the Supreme Court held that a supplier must provide a product which is designed to make it safe for the intended use. Under this standard, the jury may find a defect where the product left the supplier's control lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its intended use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for its intended use. Id. at 433-34. This reference brings into focus the course of earlier Pennsylvania cases including Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978) and Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975). Those cases recognized that defect was not limited to a flaw, fault or blemish in manufacture or fabrication, but rather addressed status of danger in usage. The court in Azzarello, 391 A.2d at 1026 further said that we must look to whether the product is safe for its intended use. Intended use is consequently intrinsic in consideration of dangerousness and this becomes particularly pertinent as here when we have a special order product supplied for a narrowly confined, known, explicit use. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.L.J. 825, 830 (1973), where Professor Wade stated: The something wrong may have come about quite unintentionally because of a miscarriage in the manufacturing process, so that the product was not what it was intended to be; it may, on the other hand, have come about, even though the product was exactly as it was intended to be, because of a poor design or the failure to attach a warning or suitable instructions. The author further recognized: [I]t is only when something has gone wrong with the manufacturing process and the product is not in the condition in which it was intended to be that there is any significant difference. In the case of the improper design which makes the product dangerous, whatever is enough to show that it is so dangerous that strict liability should apply    will also be enough to show negligence on the part of the manufacturer. Even if the manufacturer is not aware of the danger created by the bad design, he is negligent in not learning of it. Id. at 836-37 (footnote omitted). The more recent history of Buckley lends no strength to its defectiveness definition credibility. Strict liability has since been adopted in Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986). The only reference to Buckley in that case was: First, they [manufacturer] argue that strict liability in tort is not available as a cause of action in Wyoming since this court has declined to adopt the doctrine on several occasions. See e.g., Buckley v. Bell, Wyo., 703 P.2d 1089 (1985). Ogle, 716 P.2d at 341. In Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, Inc., 735 P.2d 722 (Wyo. 1987), the case was cited to a proximate cause rule. In a dissent in Mostert v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1987), it was cited for an intervening cause discussion. In this court's last case, Sims v. General Motors Corp., 751 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988), which was the second case to apply strict liability, no Buckley citation was included at all. Furthermore, no other state has found cause to cite the opinion as authority. [3]