Opinion ID: 2544268
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Insufficiency of Borrero's Information

Text: I agree a substantial step is an essential element of an attempt crime which must be included in Borrero's information to pass constitutional muster. I also agree since Borrero challenged the sufficiency of the information preverdict we must strictly construe his charging document to determine whether the substantial step element has in fact been included. I however disagree with the majority because it fails to apply the strict construction standard properly. The verbatim text of the pertinent charging document in this case states: That the defendants KYLE LAWRENCE ANDERSON and AARON EDWARD BORRERO, and each of them, in King County, Washington on or about March 19, 1997, with premeditated intent to cause the death of another person did attempt to cause the death of Leslie Lemieux, a human being; Contrary to RCW 9A.28.030, 9A.32.030(1)(a), and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 24 (Second Am. Information) (emphasis added). As more fully discussed below, the emphasized portions of the charge illustrate three problems: (1) by only using the word attempt, the State did not inform Borrero of the substantial step requirement, an essential element of an attempt crime in this state; (2) the State failed to allege sufficient facts to support the substantial step element; and (3) by citing to RCW 9A.28.030, the State erroneously referred to the solicitation statute, not the attempt statute which is RCW 9A.28.020. [1] Precedent provides considerable guidance on how to strictly construe an information for insufficiency determinations. In 1992, for example, we stated charging documents strictly construed are not to be examined to determine whether the missing elements appear in any form, or by fair construction can be found, and the language must not be `inartful or vague' with respect to the elements of the crime. State v. Johnson, 119 Wash.2d 143, 149-50, 829 P.2d 1078 (1992) (quoting State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d 93, 106, 812 P.2d 86 (1991)). Johnson held by strict construction an information charging unlawful delivery is constitutionally insufficient when it generally alleges the defendant unlawfully delivered instead of alleging the essential element that he knowingly delivered. Id. at 150, 829 P.2d 1078. In 1995 the Court of Appeals provided other pertinent rules in State v. Bacani, 79 Wash.App. 701, 902 P.2d 184 (1995). The court conveyed that dictionary definitions and common understanding are not relevant for strict construction. Id. at 704-05. Bacani held a strict construction of intent to steal did not suffice to incorporate the essential element of attempted first degree robbery that someone other than the defendant had an ownership or possessory interest in the property taken, even though steal is defined in dictionaries and is commonly understood to mean the taking of another's property. Id. The court concluded: The State charged Bacani with unlawfully attempt[ing] to take [money], with intent to steal from the victims. We are at a loss to understand what this could mean except that he tried to take their money from them. However, ... we are constrained to rule that, under Johnson's [ State v. Johnson, 119 Wash.2d 143, 829 P.2d 1078 (1992)] strict construction test, the information charging Bacani with attempted first degree robbery was constitutionally deficient. Id. at 705, 902 P.2d 184 (first and second alteration in original). Strict construction was also applied by the appellate court in State v. Ralph, 85 Wash. App. 82, 930 P.2d 1235 (1997). The issue there was whether an information charging the defendant with theft of a firearm was insufficient under a strict construction because it did not include the essential ownership element but instead only the word steal. Following our case in Johnson, Ralph held: The information need not use the exact words of a statute so long as the words used adequately convey the same meaning. Under the rule set forth in Johnson, the language in the information is strictly construed and facial deficiencies are not upheld. Id. at 85, 930 P.2d 1235 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). While the court acknowledged a dictionary definition of steal appeared to convey the ownership element, a strict construction nonetheless rendered the information insufficient. Id. at 85-86, 930 P.2d 1235; see also State v. Phillips, 98 Wash.App. 936, 944, 991 P.2d 1195 (2000) (considering dictionary definition of steal when performing liberal, not strict, construction). In 1999 the Court of Appeals again chimed in on how to strictly construe an information in the case of State v. Johnstone, 96 Wash. App. 839, 982 P.2d 119 (1999). [W]e do not attempt to find the missing elements by construing the wording of the document. Id. at 844, 982 P.2d 119. [T]he language must not be `inartful or vague' in setting out the elements of the crime. Id. (quoting Johnson, 119 Wash.2d at 149-50, 829 P.2d 1078). Again the court did not rely upon dictionaries or its common understanding to conclude the information was sufficient. Notwithstanding this precedent we complicated matters considerably in State v. Taylor , a five to four decision. 140 Wash.2d 229, 996 P.2d 571 (2000). Attempting to charge fourth degree assault, the information in Taylor explicitly alleged the defendant assaulted the victim by pushing, kicking, and punching the victim in the face. Id. at 233, 996 P.2d 571. At issue was whether this language, strictly construed, sufficiently set forth the essential element of intent. Id. at 235, 996 P.2d 571. The majority concluded it was: The charging document in this case contained language indicating intentional conduct. The complaint alleged that [Taylor] committed assault ... by pushing, kicking and punching the victim in the face. Under either the strict standard of construction or the liberal standard of construction, the words of a charging document are viewed as a whole and construed according to common sense. Id. at 243, 996 P.2d 571. Accordingly to the majority, [o]ne does not, without intent, push, kick or punch another. Id. at 245, 996 P.2d 571. Our most recent case analyzing the insufficiency of an information is State v. McCarty, 140 Wash.2d 420, 998 P.2d 296 (2000). [2] The issue in McCarty was whether an information alleging the defendant did unlawfully conspire to deliver methamphetamine, when liberally construed, sufficiently alleged the essential element that the purported agreement involved more than two people. Id. at 424, 998 P.2d 296. We held it did not because the information fail[ed] on its face to set forth [this] essential ... element. Id. at 428, 998 P.2d 296 (emphasis added). [A] document charging conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance must allege that persons involved outside the act of delivery took part in the conspiracy agreement. Id. at 426, 998 P.2d 296. In response to the dissenters' arguments, the majority noted a constitutionally sufficient charging document must expressly state all essential elements of a crime, both statutory and nonstatutory to pass muster. Id. at 426 n. 1, 998 P.2d 296 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The information failed to do so in McCarty and thus we dismissed the conviction without prejudice. Id. at 428, 998 P.2d 296. [3] The fact McCarty was a liberal construction case does not make it irrelevant to our analysis today; on the contrary, it becomes all the more relevant given its reasoning and result. Even though we were engaging in a liberal construction analysis, we still focused on the express language in the information and did not resort to dictionary definitions or our notion of the common understanding of the words used. Moreover, we found the information facially defective. Clearly we would have reached the same result had we been strictly construing the information. [4] The last case deserving mention is the most recent Court of Appeals opinion in State v. Khlee, 106 Wash.App. 21, 22 P.3d 1264 (2001). In Khlee the defendant was charged with possession of a stolen firearm, an essential element of which includes the defendant's knowledge the firearm was stolen. Id. at 22-23, 22 P.3d 1264. The information, however, only alleged the defendant did knowingly possess a .380 caliber pistol, a stolen firearm. Id. at 22, 22 P.3d 1264. After discussing Johnson, Ralph, and Bacani, the court held this language was not sufficient when strictly construed: Applying the strict construction standard, the information is defective for failing to allege that Khlee knew the gun was stolen. The information simply alleges that Khlee knowingly possessed the firearm. This is not the same as saying that he possessed the gun knowing it to be stolen. One can knowingly possess a gun without knowing it to be stolen. Id. at 25, 22 P.3d 1264.
I posit the majority's application of the strict construction standard is inconsistent with the above cited precedent. Use of dictionary definitions (and synonyms from a thesaurus) to strictly construe an otherwise vague and inartful information lacks support from the overwhelming weight of authority. See, e.g., McCarty, 140 Wash.2d at 426-28, 998 P.2d 296; Taylor, 140 Wash.2d at 247-50, 996 P.2d 571 (Johnson, J., dissenting); Johnson, 119 Wash.2d at 149-50, 829 P.2d 1078; Khlee, 106 Wash.App. at 25, 22 P.3d 1264; Johnstone, 96 Wash.App. at 844, 982 P.2d 119; Ralph, 85 Wash.App. at 85-86, 930 P.2d 1235; Bacani, 79 Wash.App. at 704-05, 902 P.2d 184. In any event, resorting to such external sources cannot cure the fundamental flaw in the charging document  the essential element of a substantial step was omitted whereas the constitution requires it not be. On this basis alone we should reverse Borrero's conviction. [5] Even if we were to ignore our most recent opinion in McCarty and other case law, as our majority does today, the majority must nonetheless come to grips with a principle discernible from the Taylor majority and Khlee. Those opinions indicate that if it is at all possible to imagine a scenario where behavior described in the information does not constitute a violation of the law sought to be enforced, then the information is insufficient. See Taylor, 140 Wash.2d at 245, 996 P.2d 571 (One does not, without intent, push, kick or punch another.); Khlee, 106 Wash.App. at 25, 22 P.3d 1264 (One can knowingly possess a gun without knowing it to be stolen.). Under this approach the question here would be whether it is possible to imagine a scenario where one is attempting to murder another but has not yet taken a substantial step toward doing so. I submit the answer is yes. To attempt to commit the crime, for example, one may solicit the services of another. However, solicitation alone does not constitute a substantial step. State v. Gay, 4 Wash.App. 834, 839-40, 486 P.2d 341 (1971). Similarly, when attempting to carry out the criminal act, a person may first purchase a map to find the route to the victim's house. However, such an act  merely preparatory as it is  does not amount to a substantial step. See State v. Workman, 90 Wash.2d 443, 449, 584 P.2d 382 (1978); see also 11A Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 100.05 (2d ed. 1994) (WPIC). The term attempt fails to reveal the key element of a substantial step. If dictionary definitions are the majority's answer, I would direct it to Black's Law Dictionary: Attempt ... is the most common of the preliminary crimes. It consists of steps taken in furtherance of an indictable offence which the person attempting intends to carry out if he can. As we have seen there can be a long chain of such steps and it is necessary to have some test by which to decide that the particular link in the chain has been reached at which the crime of attempt has been achieved; that link will represent the actus reus of attempt .... Black's Law Dictionary 123-24 (7th ed.1999) (emphasis added) (quoting J.W. Cecil Turner, Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law 79 (16th ed.1952)). In Washington, the essential element of a substantial step is crucial to understand the test to determine the actus reus for an attempt. This is underscored by the fact other jurisdictions use different tests. Criminal law commentators have deduced numerous different formulations, the substantial step test used in Washington being just one of them. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 27.06[B] (1995) (categorizing eight different tests); 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 6.2(d) (1986) (categorizing four different tests). By merely using the word attempt, any of these formulations could apply. Every act done with [the requisite] intent is not an attempt, for it may be too remote from the completed offence to give rise to criminal liability, notwithstanding the criminal purpose of the doer. I may buy matches with intent to burn a haystack, and yet be clear of attempted arson; but if I go to the stack and there light one of the matches, my intent has developed into a criminal attempt. Black's Law Dictionary, supra, at 123 (quoting John Salmond, Jurisprudence 387 (Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed.1947)). Simply using the word attempt only identifies the actus reus problem; it does not identify the essential substantial step test used in this state to resolve it.
The problem is further compounded by the State's failure to allege facts to support the substantial step element of the crime. [A] charging document must allege sufficient facts to support every element of the crime charged. State v. Leach, 113 Wash.2d 679, 688, 782 P.2d 552 (1989). A statement of the acts constituting the offense is just as important and essential as the other requirements of the information, such as the title of the action and the names of the parties. State v. Royse, 66 Wash.2d 552, 557, 403 P.2d 838 (1965). The failure to do so is ground for reversal. Leach, 113 Wash.2d at 688, 782 P.2d 552; Royse, 66 Wash.2d at 557, 403 P.2d 838; State v. Unosawa, 29 Wash.2d 578, 188 P.2d 104 (1948); Leonard v. Territory, 2 Wash. Terr. 381, 391, 7 P. 872 (1885). In Leach the charging document notified the defendant he was accused of committing public indecency under former RCW 9A.88.010 (1975). 113 Wash.2d at 684, 782 P.2d 552. The cited statute defines both misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor offenses, but the complaint did not specify whether the State sought a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor conviction and it omitted the year of birth of one of the alleged victims. Id. Thus, the defendant was not put on notice that one of his victims was under the age of 14. Had he been provided with that information, he would have been able to determine that he was charged with a gross misdemeanor. The defendant appealed on the grounds that his information was constitutionally defective for failure to allege the essential elements of the charged crime. Id. Reviewing the case law supporting the essential elements rule, Leach determined that in addition to adequately identifying the crime charged, a charging document also must allege facts supporting each element of the offense. Id. at 687-89, 782 P.2d 552. Thus, the court held the district court complaint was constitutionally defective and affirmed dismissal of the defendant's public indecency conviction. Id. at 691, 782 P.2d 552. Similarly in Royse, this court reversed the conviction of a defendant accused of second degree assault with the intent to commit a felony, where the information did not specify the felony he allegedly intended to commit, did not list its necessary elements, and did not allege sufficient facts to put the defendant on notice of the attempt charge. 66 Wash.2d at 553, 403 P.2d 838. The defendant had moved repeatedly to require the State to elect which felony or felonies the defendant was charged with having intent to commit, but the trial court had denied the motion. Id. at 554, 403 P.2d 838. On appeal, the defendant argued it was prejudicial error for the trial court to deny the defendant's motion because it was impossible to prepare a defense when he did not know what felony he was defending against. Id. at 555, 403 P.2d 838. This court agreed, emphasizing the lack of factual allegations that would have enabled the defendant to prepare his defense, stating: This court has many times approved the statement by Judge Dunbar to the effect that the information must state the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise language, not the name of the offense, but the statement of the acts constituting the offense is just as important and essential as the other requirements of the information, such as the title of the action and the names of the parties. Id. at 557, 403 P.2d 838. In Unosawa this court reversed a manslaughter conviction, where the information failed to inform the defendant of one of the essential elements of manslaughter even though the defendant was charged additionally with committing an illegal abortion and the omitted element was alleged as one of the necessary elements of the abortion charge. 29 Wash.2d at 586, 188 P.2d 104. The dissent argued that in view of the abortion charge the defendant had notice of the omitted element of the manslaughter charge. Id. at 594, 188 P.2d 104 (Hill, J., dissenting in part). The majority disagreed, holding: [T]he common understanding rule cannot be applied in any case, unless and until it is first determined that the information itself does charge a crime. The facts stated in count No. 2 of the information, as amended, do not charge the crime of manslaughter, and appellant's motion in arrest of judgment, as to this count, should have been granted. Id. at 589, 188 P.2d 104. Finally, Leonard reversed a first degree murder conviction where the indictment which charged the assault and shooting to have been done purposely and of deliberate and premeditated malice but did not aver the killing itself to have been done purposely and of deliberate and premeditated malice and therefore did not charge the crime conformably to the definition of the statute. 2 Wash. Terr. at 391, 7 P. 872 In the current case the charging document suffered from deficiencies similar to those in the above cited cases. Not only did the State fail to allege an essential element of the attempt charge against Borrero, but it also failed to provide factual allegations that would support this element. Thus, the appropriate remedy is a reversal of Borrero's conviction for attempted murder. Leach, 113 Wash.2d at 688, 782 P.2d 552; Royse, 66 Wash.2d at 557, 403 P.2d 838; Unosawa, 29 Wash.2d at 589, 188 P.2d 104; and Leonard, 2 Wash. Terr. at 391, 7 P. 872.
Although the above reasons should be adequate to conclude the information is insufficient, there's more. After failing to expressly set forth the essential elements of the attempt crime and failing to provide factual allegations to support the attempt charge, the State mistakenly cited the solicitation statute, not the attempt statute. While an error in citation alone may not be grounds for reversing a conviction without a showing of prejudice, see CrR 2.1(a)(1), when combined with the other errors, the citation error here has more than mere technical significance. As mentioned above, the actus reus for purposes of solicitation by itself does not amount to a substantial step for attempt. See Gay, 4 Wash.App. at 839-40, 486 P.2d 341.
Finally, we must recall that to prevail on this issue, Borrero need not prove any prejudice (actual or otherwise) resulting from the State's omission. Whether a defendant was prejudiced by a defective information is only to be considered if the information is challenged for the first time after a verdict. Johnson, 119 Wash.2d at 149, 829 P.2d 1078 (emphasis added) (citing Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d at 106, 812 P.2d 86; State v. Hopper, 118 Wash.2d 151, 155-56, 822 P.2d 775 (1992)). The reason we do not require a showing of prejudice is to encourage defendants not to raise the issue for the first time on appeal. Id. This incentive is appropriate because the State can freely amend an information anytime before verdict to make it constitutionally sufficient. Id.; see also CrR 2.1(d). This point is best made in Johnson, where we reversed even though we clearly believed the defendants suffered absolutely no prejudice whatsoever. 119 Wash.2d at 149, 829 P.2d 1078. But Borrero made his motion to dismiss before verdict. Notwithstanding the trial court erroneously denied the motion, ruling: The motions to dismiss the attempted murder in the first degree counts will be denied. I think the Rhodes [sic] case from the Court of Appeals does essentially control this decision.... In the Rhodes [sic] decision the court in its opinion makes reference to prejudice really being the key-stone of this analysis, and they don't use those words but that is implicit, and here there really isn't any prejudice at all. Everybody knows since the amended information this was an attempted murder charge. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Mar. 9, 1998) at 9. This is plain error. Rhode pertained to a postverdict motion and therefore applied the liberal construction standard, which includes a prejudice requirement. State v. Rhode, 63 Wash.App. 630, 633-37, 821 P.2d 492 (1991). Under the Johnson preverdict standard applied in this case, Borrero is not required to prove prejudice. While our majority does not clearly demand Borrero prove prejudice, it appears to imply as much. For example, it concludes its analysis with the statement: [t]he information sufficiently informed Borrero of the nature of the accusation against him so that he was able to prepare his defense to the crime charged. Majority at 250. Unless the majority is considering whether Borrero was prejudiced by the information, why does Borrero's actual ability to prepare a defense even matter? Under Johnson, Borrero is entitled to relief even if he was an expert in criminal attempt law. Borrero thoroughly argued a motion to dismiss before verdict. This motion put the State on notice of its failure to include the essential statutory element of a substantial step in the information. VRP (Mar. 5, 1998) at 105-06. Nevertheless, the State maintained the charging document was good enough as is and chose not to amend it to remove any constitutional suspicion. The State therefore risked strict construction review which does not require any showing of prejudice on Borrero's part. For these reasons the conviction for attempted murder must be reversed.