Opinion ID: 2995486
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Continuing Effect of Order

Text: Rinaldi next contended that the contempt order could no longer be coercive because at the time of his appellate argument, he had been imprisoned and fined for more than two months. According to Rinaldi, even if the contempt order was a civil sanction on July 10, 2001, it had become punitive and criminal in nature. A civil contempt order that starts out as coercive can become punitive and therefore criminal. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings of December, 1989, 903 F.2d 1167, 1170 (7th Cir. 1990). For instance, a continued contempt order could lose its coercive force if there were simply no reasonable possibility that the contemnor would ever comply with the court’s demands. See Lippitt, 180 F.3d at 877. However, [i]n the absence of unusual circumstances, a reviewing court should be reluctant to conclude . . . that a civil contempt sanction has lost its coercive impact at some point prior to the eighteen-month period prescribed as a maximum by Congress [in 28 U.S.C. sec. 1826]. The district court’s conclusion in this regard is virtually unreviewable. In re Grand Jury Proceedings of December, 1989, 903 F.2d at 1170 (quotations omitted); see also Lippitt, 180 F.3d at 878. Rinaldi contended that it is obvious that his imprisonment had lost its coercive effect. However, Rinaldi offered no evidence in support of his bare assertion. Keran testified that Rinaldi [a]bsolutely [would] not destroy the documents and that Rinaldi removed the sign-in sheets and appointment books from the Springfield closet several months after being served with the subpoena. The district court relied on this testimony to conclude that it did not believe [that Rinaldi was] ever going to furnish these records voluntarily, and thus the contempt order was necessary to coerce Rinaldi into complying with the June 15 order. Barely two months into Rinaldi’s incarceration, we were unable to conclude that unusual circumstances existed that warranted a different conclusion. Additionally, if Rinaldi was unable to pay the fine, additional fines would obviously have lost their effect because Rinaldi would no longer carry the keys of his prison in his own pocket. However, Rinaldi failed to present any evidence that the imposition of the fine had lost its coercive effect, and therefore we also rejected this argument.