Opinion ID: 2625111
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Bar on Undisclosed Electronic Recording

Text: The undisclosed recording by one party to a conversation is lawful in the state of Alaska. Nationally, the ethics of undisclosed recording by lawyers have been the subject of debate and conflicting rulings. But there is now a consensus that undisclosed recording is not unethical. [67] The American Bar Association issued an opinion in 1974 ruling that a lawyer may not ethically electronically record a conversation without prior knowledge of all parties to the conversation. [68] After much comment and criticism, this opinion was withdrawn, and a new opinion was issued in 2001. The following excerpt from the 2001 opinion explains not only the rationale of the 1974 opinion but also the reasons why it was withdrawn: Criticism of Opinion 337 has occurred in three areas. First, the belief that nonconsensual taping of conversations is inherently deceitful, embraced by this Committee in 1974, is not universally accepted today. The overwhelming majority of states permit recording by consent of only one party to the conversation. Surreptitious recording of conversations is a widespread practice by law enforcement, private investigators and journalists, and the courts universally accept evidence acquired by such techniques. Devices for the recording of telephone conversations on one's own phone readily are available and widely are used. Thus, even though recording of a conversation without disclosure may to many people offend a sense of honor and fair play, it is questionable whether anyone today justifiably relies on an expectation that a conversation is not being recorded by the other party, absent a special relationship with or conduct by that party inducing a belief that the conversation will not be recorded. Second, there are circumstances in which requiring disclosure of the recording of a conversation may defeat a legitimate and even necessary activity. For that reason, even those authorities that have agreed with the basic proposition of Opinion 337 have tended to recognize numerous exceptions. The State Bar of Arizona, for example, listed four exceptions to the ethical prohibition for such things as documenting criminal utterances (threats, obscene calls, etc.); documenting conversations with potential witnesses to protect against later perjury; documenting conversations for self-protection of the lawyer; and recording when specifically authorized by statute, court rule or court order. Other ethics committees have excepted recordings by criminal defense lawyers, reasoning that the commonly accepted law enforcement exception otherwise would give prosecutors an unfair advantage. Exceptions also have been recognized for testers in investigations of housing discrimination and trademark infringement. And the Ohio Supreme Court, although finding nonconsensual recordings by lawyers generally impermissible, has noted an exception for extraordinary circumstances as well as for investigations by prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers. A degree of uncertainty is common in the application of rules of ethics, but an ethical prohibition that is qualified by so many varying exceptions and such frequent disagreement as to the viability of the rule as a basis for professional discipline, is highly troubling. We think the proper approach to the question of legal but nonconsensual recordings by lawyers is not a general prohibition with certain exceptions, but a prohibition of the conduct only where it is accompanied by other circumstances that make it unethical.[ [69] ] The Ethics Committee of the Alaska Bar Association, which had previously adopted the American Bar Association's 1974 opinion, followed the lead of the American Bar Association and in 2003 issued a new ethics opinion reflecting the current views of the American Bar Association. [70] The superior court recognized that recording an interview is of considerable value both in preparing and presenting a case. The court also recognized that the right to conduct an undisclosed electronic recording is important because some witnesses refuse to be interviewed if an interview is recorded. We quote here the court's findings with respect to the interests served by the electronic recording of interviews and the effect of requiring a witness to consent in advance to recording. 39. Tape recording interviews is an important investigative tool. A recording captures the exact words and tone of the speaker and [eliminates] any error in interpretation of notes or of memory. 40. Taping also enables the defense investigator to make a record to protect himself or herself against false accusations of misconduct. Again there are no statistics, but false accusations have been made against defense investigators. 41. Defense representatives consider the ability to conduct secret taping an important investigative tool, because some victims and witnesses are willing to talk but not willing to talk on tape, or not willing to talk as candidly. Witnesses from the criminal milieu and people connected with the prosecution are especially unlikely to agree to talk on tape. These are the people most likely either to deny what they said or to make a false claim against the defense investigator. Another category of people unlikely to agree to talk on tape are those whose statements are self-incriminatory. 42. Asking to tape an interview causes some people who had agreed to an interview to change their minds and to refuse to proceed, even after the investigator says she will put the recorder away. 43. Former Commissioner of Public Safety Del Smith concurred with the defense investigators that some people will not talk on tape, and some suffer mike fright and find it harder to talk if a recorder is on. 44. Police investigators use tapes secretly and openly. Police officers use secret tape recordings to protect their reputation and to protect themselves against civil liability. 45. Civil investigators also conduct secret tape recordings. Domestic violence victims have made secret tapes of their batterers and have used such tapes in court. 46. In the expert opinion of Joe Austin, the prohibition on secret taping by the defense has a severe impact on the ability to conduct an investigation.[ [71] ] The court in its conclusions of law made the following further observations: Taping interviews is a valuable investigative tool. Tapes preserve the exact words and tone of both questions and answers, eliminating any error in recollection or interpretation. The right to engage in undisclosed tape recording is an important investigative tool, because some people will agree to be interviewed but will not agree to a tape recorded interview. Asking for permission to tape record results in some witnesses refusing to continue the interview and changes the character of other interviews. Law enforcement officers use secret tape recordings, as do civil investigators. In our view the court's findings and conclusions concerning the value of electronically recording interviews, including undisclosed recording, are both well considered and correct. They are also consistent with our case law, as we discuss below.
The State argues that the bar on undisclosed recording, as applied to victims, is justified by the constitutional guarantee of the right to be treated with dignity, respect, and fairness during all phases of the criminal . . . justice process. [72] As to victims and witnesses, the State argues that undisclosed recording violates privacy rights recognized under article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution. [73] The State also argues that the bar is justified by the need to protect victims and witnesses from harassment and intimidation. The superior court in its conclusions of law discussed these interests and concluded that only subjective dignity interests are compromised by undisclosed recording and only sometimes does this occur: Once a person consents to an interview, objectively, there is no measurable increase in invasion of privacy, harassment, or intimidation in the fact that the interview is secretly recorded. Being secret, the tape recording cannot harass or intimidate. Allowing secret tape recording reduces the risk of harassment, intimidation, and loss of privacy. Because the investigator is aware that the conversation is being taped, the investigator will be especially careful to be polite and not harassing or intimidating. Far from finding secret taping by an investigator to be an invasion of privacy, harassment, intimidation, or lacking in respect and dignity, the Alaska Supreme Court has held repeatedly that secret taping by a known person is proper and preferable to no taping.9 Significantly, the American Bar Association and Alaska Bar Association no longer regard secret tape recording by lawyers as unethical or deceitful. (Citation omitted.) Subjectively, some witnesses suffer a greater affront to their sense of dignity and respect if they learn they were secretly tape recorded. It is difficult to quantify, but most people view an accurate record of a statement without knowledge that it is being made, as something threatening and deceitful. Memories are imperfect, and recollection of what was said precisely is impossible for most people. Thus, not knowing that a tape-recording is made presents a potential future threat. In addition, how a person may say something if there is a tape recording is different, as a statement for posterity may generally be more circumscribed. The State's proffered justifications for prohibiting secret tape recording all involve the way the tape might be used to embarrass a witness at trial. This may be true, but the tape will be used at trial only if it is inconsistent with the witness's trial testimony, and cross-examination is an important part of the adversarial process. 9 See, e.g., Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1159-60, 1162 n. 20 (Alaska 1985); City & Borough of Juneau v. Quinto, 684 P.2d 127, 129 (Alaska 1984). . . . Concerning privacy interests, the court found that interviews with disclosed investigators were not private and thus recording them did not compromise privacy interests: In evaluating the privacy prong, if the statement is voluntary in the first place, as it must be, given this court's decision as to informed consent, objectively, there is no additional privacy interest in a recorded statement. An unrecorded statement may be taken down in the interview as notes or a summary. They may also be reconstructed and added to from the memory of the listener. Just because a recorded statement may be more accurate does not increase the level of privacy of the speaker. Subjectively, a speaker may feel that a secret tape recording further affected the right to privacy. It may be viewed as a further invasion of the sense of trust, that the tape recording may be used against the speaker. The State disagrees with the court's conclusions expressed in the excerpts quoted above, arguing that the court's observations amounted to over-extending the holdings of Stephan v. State and City & Borough of Juneau v. Quinto ,  while ignoring the chilling effect that undisclosed tape recording may have on conversations as recognized by this court in State v. Glass [74] and Quinto. [75] We believe that these arguments are unfounded for the reasons that follow. This court has recognized that electronic recording of interviews advances the search for truth. In Mallott v. State we advised Alaska law enforcement officers that it is incumbent upon them to tape record, where feasible, any questioning and particularly that which occurs in a place of detention. [76] We based this admonition on the due process based duty to preserve evidence. [77] After it became apparent that the Mallott admonition was not being followed, we held in Stephan v. State that the recording of stationhouse interviews should be mandatory. [78] We observed in Stephan that recording is a reasonable and necessary safeguard, essential to the adequate protection of the accused's right to counsel, his right against self incrimination and, ultimately, his right to a fair trial. [79] We also decried the frequent swearing match[es] between interrogating officers and defendants as to what actually had taken place during an interrogation. [80] We concluded that not only does electronic recording provide a defendant an objective means to corroborate [the defendant's] testimony concerning the circumstances of the confession, it also protects the public's interest in honest and effective law enforcement and protects the interests of police officers wrongfully accused of improper tactics. [81] A recording, in many cases, will aid law enforcement efforts, by confirming the content and the voluntariness of a confession, when a defendant changes his testimony or claims falsely that his constitutional rights were violated. In any case, a recording will help trial and appellate courts to ascertain the truth.[ [82] ] The upshot of these observations was that recording was thought to be so essential that interviews that were not recorded, in violation of the Stephan rule, would be subject to exclusion at trial. [83] In Stephan we recognized that one problem with electronic recording is that, as the State claimed, recordings tend to have a `chilling effect' on a suspect's willingness to talk. [84] We suggested as a response to this point that undisclosed recording could be conducted: [W]hen the . . . suspect knows or has reason to know he is speaking to a police officer, there is no constitutional requirement that the suspect be informed that the interview is being recorded. [85] Given the strong endorsement of electronic recording of interviews in Stephan, the State's contention that the superior court over-extended Stephan's endorsement of electronic recording of interviews is incorrect. The same may be said regarding the State's argument that the superior court misinterpreted City & Borough of Juneau v. Quinto [86] and State v. Glass . [87] In Quinto this court held that an individual's right to privacy under the Alaska Constitution was not violated when a recording of the individual's conversation with a police officer was admitted where the individual knew that he was talking to a police officer but did not know that the officer was recording the conversation. [88] In Quinto we reversed the decision of the court of appeals which had been, in turn, based on a reading of our decision in Glass. [89] We explained the Glass holding and the court of appeals's reliance on it as follows: In that case we held that it was a violation of a defendant's right to privacy, under article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution, for the police to surreptitiously monitor the defendant's conversation with an undercover police informant, without a warrant or other court order, by means of a radio transmitter worn by the informant. Interpreting our decision, the court of appeals conclude[d] that the warrant requirement of Glass must be read to include situations involving routine nonconsensual recording of pre-arrest conversations between citizens and uniformed officers.[ [90] ] We held that the court of appeals had read Glass too broadly and that a person in Quinto's position, knowing that he is speaking to a police officer, has no reasonable expectation that the conversation will be private: The test for determining whether a person's right to privacy has been invaded under article I, section 22 is two-fold: (1) did the person harbor an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and, if so, (2) is that expectation one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable? For the reasons stated earlier in this opinion we assume, for purposes of our decision, that Quinto harbored an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy. Thus, we must determine only whether Quinto's expectation of privacy in these circumstances is one which society is willing to recognize as reasonable. Glass requires nothing more. Article I, section 22 fosters and protects those values and characteristics typical of and necessary for a free society. Some of these are the sharing of thoughts and ideas, personal trust between individuals, free expression, and individuality. While it is certainly true that surreptitious recording of conversations between citizens can have a chilling effect on such forms of freedom, this effect is rendered de minimis when one is aware, or reasonably should be aware, that he or she is speaking to a police officer who is in the process of executing either a lawful arrest or a lawful investigative stop. In such case, one's candor and willingness to share personal confidences are unlikely to be any more effectively chilled than they already are by the added possibility that what is being said may be electronically recorded.[ [91] ] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State's criticism of the superior court's interpretation of our case law is unwarranted. We agree with the superior court that undisclosed recording cannot be characterized as harassment or intimidation of witnesses, nor does it invade their privacy. With respect to the latter, what we said in Quinto concerning the absence of a reasonable expectation of privacy of a person speaking with a known police officer investigating a crime applies equally to a person speaking to a known defense representative conducting an investigation. A person's privacy interests are no more violated when a defense representative records such a conversation without disclosing that he is recording it than in the case of an undisclosed recording by a police officer. Quinto also answers the chilling effect argument offered by the State to the effect that the interests advanced by Glass avoidance of the chilling effect that surreptitious recording of conversations between citizens can have on freedom of expressionapplies to interviews between citizens and defense investigators. Just as the possibility of secret tape recording in a police-citizen interaction is unlikely to have a significant effect on what a citizen says, the same is true in a defense investigatorcitizen interaction. The important point is that Glass was designed to promote free discourse between citizens in their everyday conversations. The free-speech values that Glass protects do not arise in the guarded context of a criminal investigation where citizens are aware that they are speaking to an investigator. We also agree with the superior court that the only interest likely to be advanced by the bar on undisclosed recording is the avoidance of the sense of affront, insult, or embarrassment that might be experienced by a witness upon learning that an interview was recorded. Although such feelings are understandable, they are also likely to be temporary. Further, as suggested by the superior court, the feelings become strongest where the recording has the most valuewhere there are inconsistencies between the witness's interview and the testimony given by the witness at trial. A recorded interview is of great value in demonstrating such inconsistencies and in facilitating cross-examination designed to probe them. [92] A witness's sense of affront or embarrassment is not a detriment of such importance that avoiding it justifies the suppression of evidence that can be preserved by undisclosed electronic recording. [93] We acknowledge that feelings of affront may be greater upon discovering that one has been tape recorded by a defense investigator in plain clothes than when discovering that one has been tape recorded by a uniformed police officer. The revelation that one has been secretly recorded in a more casual setting may sting, and may compound for a victim her already-existing feelings of victimization. We could wish that investigations and trials were painless affairs, but they are not; and the no-doubt genuine feelings of affront faced by victims and witnesses deserve recognition, however they may be caused. But in the end, such feelings must be balanced against the interests of all in having a fair trial. We emphasize that AS 12.61.120(c)(1) and AS 12.61.120(d)(1) insofar as it incorporates (c)(1), which we today uphold, require that defense representatives identify themselves and their specific association with the defendant when they seek to interview crime victims and witnesses, putting them on notice of the representative's purpose and role in the same way a police officer's uniform would tend to put them on notice. [94] If defense representatives fail to make these disclosures, or engage in deceptive or misleading tactics, they are subject to sanctions by the trial court. Relatedly, the fact that our decision permits defense representatives to record interviews without disclosing that they are doing so does not mean that trial courts lack authority to take appropriate measures to protect the privacy rights of victims or witnesses when case-specific circumstances indicate a need for protective action. We stress that courts should be alert to the possibility of such circumstances and take action when they exist. In summary, we conclude that undisclosed recording is as valuable for defense representatives as it is for the police and that the objections to it are of little weight when compared to its benefits. It would be paradoxical to uphold a law that bars defense representatives from pursuing the practice, while leaving the police and virtually everyone else in the state free to electronically record their conversations without disclosure. We therefore agree with the conclusion of the superior court that the requirements of the act precluding defense representatives from undisclosed electronic recording unduly interfere with a defendant's right to prepare and present a defense.