Opinion ID: 2582487
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Allegations of Misconduct in Guilt Phase

Text: ¶ 86 Yates first complains that the prosecutor committed misconduct by questioning witness Scott Carlson, the purchaser of Yates's Ford van, about Yates's ownership of guns and his interest in target shooting. Carlson testified that he and Yates discuss[ed] a mutual hobby of target shooting and that Yates said he had taught his daughters how to shoot a .22 because that's a quite easy gun for young people. 58 VRP at 5884-85, 5889-93. Yates seems to argue that, by questioning Carlson about Yates's enjoyment of target shooting and his use of the .22 caliber firearm, the prosecutor was improperly commenting on Yates's constitutional right to possess a legal firearm. The argument is meritless. As stated in State v. Hancock, 109 Wash.2d 760, 748 P.2d 611 (1988), [w]here a defendant's ownership of a gun is relevant to an issue at stake in the trial, we recognize no special rule that would prevent that evidence from being admitted. Id. at 767-68, 748 P.2d 611. Here, the trial court determined that Yates's ownership of a .22 caliber handgun was relevant and admissible, and the defense has not challenged that evidentiary ruling. The prosecutor's questioning of Carlson was not improper. ¶ 87 Yates next contends that the prosecutor made an improper, prejudicial comment during cross-examination of defense witness Danielle Gorder, a woman who worked as a prostitute in Spokane. On direct examination, Gorder testified that Yates had used her services four to seven times in 1999 and that he was a good date who paid well. 66 VRP at 7067, 7071. The following exchange occurred on cross-examination: Q And your gut feeling was that that man over there, Robert Yates, was a good guy to go with? A Yeah. Q And you went with him? A Yes, ma'am, I did. Q You are lucky to be alive, aren't you? Id. at 7093. Defense counsel objected immediately, asking the court to strike the comment as argumentative, and the court responded: That question and response will be stricken from the record, counsel. Id. The defense requested a mistrial, but after taking the matter under advisement, the court denied the motion, concluding that its instruction had cured the improper remark. ¶ 88 We find no error in the trial court's determination that the prosecutor's remark was improper though not prejudicial. The improper remark was promptly and clearly stricken from the record, and the court later instructed the jurors that they must disregard any evidence . . . that was stricken by the court. CP at 4086, Jury Instruction 1. Moreover, to declare the improper remark prejudicial, we would have to conclude that there [was] a substantial likelihood the misconduct affected the jury's verdict. Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 561, 940 P.2d 546. When measured against the overwhelming evidence in the case and, in particular, defense counsel's concession in opening statement that Yates had killed a number of women working in prostitution, the prosecutor's remark likely had little or no effect on the jury's verdict. ¶ 89 Yates contends that the prosecutor made two improper, prejudicial comments in rebuttal closing argument. First, Yates maintains that in the following remarks the prosecutor misstated the law regarding the crime of robbery: And it can be done with  even though it's without their knowledge, provided the force prevented them from knowing it. One way to do that is if a person goes into a market and pulls what appears to be a gun on the clerk[,] scares the dickens out of them and they run away and then the robber helps themselves to the till, well, that's still robbery, even though the person who ran didn't know that they actually took the money. It's still robbery. So, too, you can rob someone you just murdered. You prevented their knowledge of it by killing them, and it's still robbery. 70 VRP at 7576-77. Defense counsel object[ed] to the last statement that you can  robbery is just taking from the dead. Id. at 7577. Overruling the objection, the trial court stated that it had instructed the jury on the law and that [t]his is argument. Id. We likewise conclude that the remark was not improper. The prosecutor's argument comported with jury instruction 15, which provided, in part, that [t]he taking constitutes robbery whenever it appears that, although the taking was fully completed without the knowledge of the person from whom it was taken, such knowledge was prevented by the use of force or fear. CP at 4101; see also State v. Craig, 82 Wash.2d 777, 782-83, 514 P.2d 151 (1973). ¶ 90 Yates also argues that, at the end of rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor committed misconduct by disparaging defense counsel: The lawyers have had their say, and now you'll have your say. We thank you for your patience during this lengthy trial. On behalf of all of the decent and law-abiding citizens of the state whom we are honored to represent  . . . . . . . we thank you for your service. And on our behalf, we now ask you please return verdicts of guilty as charged. Thank you. 70 VRP at 7587-88. Defense counsel interposed an objection, but the trial court permitted the prosecutor to complete the remark. Defense counsel moved immediately for a mistrial or a curative instruction, but finding in the remarks no adverse implication about the defense attorneys, the court ruled that neither a mistrial nor a curative instruction was warranted. ¶ 91 Yates's reliance on State v. Gonzales, 111 Wash.App. 276, 45 P.3d 205 (2002), review denied, 148 Wash.2d 1012, 62 P.3d 890 (2003), is unpersuasive. There, the court held that the prosecutor disparaged defense counsel by drawing the following sharp contrast: `I have a very different job than the defense attorney. I do not have a client, and I do not have a responsibility to convict. I have an oath and an obligation to see that justice is served.' Id. at 283, 45 P.3d 205. Unlike the prosecutor in Gonzales, the prosecutor in the present case did not refer to defense counsel's role and drew no direct contrast between the roles of prosecutors and defense attorneys. Here, the trial court reasonably determined that the remark was not improper. Even if we were to declare the comment improper, the criticism of defense counsel was far too attenuated to have been prejudicial; little likelihood  certainly not a substantial likelihood  exists that the comment affected the jury's verdict. Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 561, 940 P.2d 546.