Opinion ID: 448248
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sec. 1983 claim based on false arrest of Bernard

Text: 25 This claim is an effort to assert a Sec. 1983 cause of action against Carpenter for his alleged omissions or alleged improper state of mind relating to his procuring the warrant on the basis of which he arrested Bernard. The validity of the warrant is not otherwise questioned. 3 The matters complained of seem to be these: (1) Carpenter knew or should have known that the complaints by the Whites were not credible; 4 (2) Carpenter should have obtained the offense report on the complaint filed by LeSavage; (3) Carpenter should have spoken with Vaughn, the investigating officer, and should have abided by the recommendation of a referral; (4) Carpenter had threatened White and LeSavage with arrest; (5) Carpenter attempted to procure a warrant for aggravated assault; and (6) there were inaccuracies in Carpenter's affidavit. 26 This circuit has not squarely decided whether an officer who procures the issuance of an otherwise valid warrant may be subject to Sec. 1983 liability for some omission or for some improper state of mind in the procurement process. 5 Assuming arguendo that there can be such a cause of action, under Boeing v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir.1969) (en banc), standards Carpenter was entitled to a directed verdict. 27 With respect to (1), above, Carpenter was not required to reject out of hand the complaint by White as frivolous or not credible, and in fact he proceeded to investigate it by going to the scene and talking to witnesses. His own incident report, filed after he went to the scene, described the long-running neighborhood battle between the two families. His affidavit in support of the arrest warrant noted that the altercation had been going on for the past year and had been escalating. 6 He set out that he had investigated a minimum of 20 documented complaints. 7 Apart from what was said in the affidavit, Carpenter had access to reported complaints by the Whites and other community members that Bernard possessed weapons, that he kept them in his car, and that he had walked around with a weapon in his hand and had raised it. 8 28 As to (2), Carpenter's failure to have in his possession the second offense report filed by Vaughn, which listed Bernard as the complainant, was at most negligence not of type or sufficiency to form the basis of a Sec. 1983 claim in investigating an offense or procuring a warrant. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 139-40, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2692, 61 L.Ed.2d 435 (1979); Stadium Films, Inc. v. Baillargeon, 542 F.2d 577, 578 (1st Cir.1976). 29 As to (3), there was no reason for Carpenter to speak with Vaughn. He had Vaughn's report in his hand. The report said aggravated assault: referral. In context this meant referred to the state's attorney's office. Carpenter, however, had been assigned by the sheriff the task of handling matters between the two feuding families. He proceeded to talk with White and then with Van Dyke and another witness, Mrs. Kinsella. No inference of impropriety may be drawn from his doing so. The referral to the state's attorney's office did not exclude further inquiry by Carpenter. Moreover, after going to the scene, Carpenter conferred with state's attorneys. They prepared Carpenter's affidavit to be presented to the judge. Thus, Carpenter conferred with the very office to which the matter had been referred and abided by the decision of that office that battery charges should be pressed. 30 With respect to (4) there was evidence that Carpenter had told both White and LeSavage that whoever got out of line was going to jail, or that if anybody violated the law enforcement action would be taken. These statements imply little, if any, more than that Carpenter would arrest either of them were they to break the law. They could not by themselves constitute a basis for liability for securing a warrant for the arrest of one of them supported by probable cause. Law enforcement officers may not be constrained, in the manner suggested by plaintiffs, from warning violators or putative violators that if they break the law they will be arrested. 31 As to (5), Vaughn's report referred to aggravated assault, and Carpenter attempted to procure a warrant for aggravated assault. The state's attorney recommended a warrant for battery and Carpenter secured a warrant for that charge. This in itself states no wrong. 32 As to inaccuracies, (6) above, no inaccuracies were shown. 33 Possibly what plaintiffs are urging is that (3), (4) and (5) are evidence of a bad state of mind by Carpenter that could alone support a jury verdict even though the warrant is supported by probable cause. Assuming there is a Sec. 1983 cause of action based on improper intent in procuring a warrant, the alleged deficiencies in this case--to the extent they are even arguably deficiencies--are not, taken together, sufficient to permit a jury to infer any actionable wrong by Carpenter. 34 The trial court was required to grant a directed verdict. We need not rule upon whether a state action could be maintained for the way in which a warrant is obtained. See e.g. Gallucci v. Melavic, 100 So.2d 375, 377 (Fla.1958) (Florida cause of action for false arrest or false imprisonment for procuring warrant by fraud or other improper means). 35 It is not necessary to discuss Carpenter's claim to both absolute and qualified immunity. 36 The LeSavages contend that even if they did not make out a Sec. 1983 claim for false arrest, the jury verdict should stand as an implicit finding of false arrest under state law. This is untenable. No such basis was pleaded, tried, or submitted to the jury on instructions.II. The judgment against Carpenter under Sec. 1983 for 37 violation of Baker Act and for taking Audrey into 38 custody in violation of due process 39 Audrey has not challenged the facial constitutionality of any portion of the Baker Act. Rather she complains that Carpenter's taking her into custody under the Baker Act violated her constitutional rights, giving her a cause of action under Sec. 1983. 40 The special verdict asked the jury: Have plaintiffs Bernard LeSavage and Audrey LeSavage proved that defendant James Carpenter falsely took her into custody in violation of the Baker Act and her due process rights? 41 We overleap problems in the case of whether a due process claim was properly asserted and, if asserted, whether it was any broader than the violation of the Baker Act. We do so because under the objective standards of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), Carpenter enjoyed qualified immunity as a matter of law. The Court in Harlow said that where an official's duties legitimately require action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better served by action taken, 'with independence and without fear of consequences.'  Harlow at 819, 102 S.Ct. at 2739, citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). As one court has recently noted, [t]his is a practical answer to a difficult question. Benavidez v. Gunnell, 722 F.2d 615, 618 (10th Cir.1983). The question of qualified immunity under Harlow is one of reasonableness--would a reasonable person in Carpenter's shoes have known he was violating Audrey's constitutional rights? Cf. B.C.R. Transport Co., Inc. v. Fontaine, 727 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir.1984). 42 Carpenter knew of Audrey's past behavior in the long-simmering dispute with the Whites. See text preceding note 1, supra. He knew of the publicity surrounding the neighborhood dispute. He knew that Audrey had been committed once before under the Baker Act for several days following bizarre public behavior. He knew that there had been an affray between Bernard and Gerald, he had taken the sprinkler as evidence, and Audrey had attempted to take it away from him. He testified that she screamed at him to get out of her house and said other nonsensical things during Bernard's arrest. Tr. vol. 6 at 41. Audrey had slammed the door on his arm and shoulder. Carpenter testified that the combination of the yelling and screaming, the incoherent talk, the past events with the tricycle and the use of force in slamming the door on him led to his decision to commit her under the Baker Act. Tr. vol. 6 at 49. Carpenter's decision to commit Audrey has to be based, of course, on his judgment that she satisfied the criteria for involuntary examination at the time of commitment. See Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 394.463(1) (1984). His knowledge of Audrey's prior behavior and her prior examination was necessarily part of the overall set of facts calling his attention to her later unusual behavior that posed a threat to herself or others, but it would not serve as an additional ground for his determination that an involuntary examination was required. 43 There is no substantial evidence to support a conclusion that Carpenter acted in bad faith under Harlow when he carried out the provision of the Baker Act that: A law enforcement officer may take a person who appears to meet the criteria for involuntary examination into custody and deliver him or have him delivered to the nearest receiving facility for examination. Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 394.463(2)(a)(2). See Sebastian v. United States, 531 F.2d 900, 903 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 856, 97 S.Ct. 153, 50 L.Ed.2d 133 (1976), (deputies who committed plaintiff in good faith reliance on Arkansas law immune from liability). 44 This does not foreclose the possibility that Carpenter would not have immunity in a state action under the particular liability and immunity provisions of the Baker Act. 9 45