Opinion ID: 1925518
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's Appearance in Prison Attire

Text: After the jury was selected and sworn, but before opening statements, the trial justice gave preliminary instructions to the jury. In discussing the state's burden of proving defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, he advised: You may have observed that the defendant in this case is in the custody of the State marshal. I specifically caution you that this fact is not at all germane or important to your task in determining the defendant's guilt or innocence. Also in no way does this defendant's detention diminish or effect his guaranteed presumption of innocence. The mere fact that the defendant is being detained must not prejudice you against him in any way nor should it generate any sympathy for him. It should be regarded by you as a neutral fact and you should give it no weight whatsoever. Arguing that this cautionary instruction was not sufficient, defendant moved to pass the case because the clothing he was wearing, prison attire with his name being emblazoned on a tag on a T-shirt and jeans, was inherently prejudicial and could deny him a fair trial. The trial justice denied the motion, noting that defendant had ample notice of the trial date and could have made arrangements to obtain civilian garb. The trial justice also opined that members of defendant's family, who not only were in court, but also were in a position to retain private counsel for defendant, had the means to provide non-prison clothing for him. Although we are asked to review the denial of a motion to pass the case, we will not employ the regular deferential standard of review. See State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1033 (R.I.2004) (A trial justice's decision to deny a motion for a mistrial is accorded great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly wrong.). Instead, with respect to questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact involving constitutional issues, such as the issue at hand, this Court engages in a de novo review. State v. Campbell, 691 A.2d 564, 569 (R.I.1997); accord Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). We therefore review this matter de novo. The right to a fair trial by an impartial jury is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and by article 1, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution. State v. Ordway, 619 A.2d 819, 826 (R.I.1992); see U.S. Const. Amend. VI, XIV; R.I. Const. art. 1, sec. 10. As noted above, [t]he presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691. Thus, courts are under a duty to apply close judicial scrutiny to evaluate the likely effects of particular procedures that may diminish a defendant's presumption of innocence. Id. at 504, 96 S.Ct. 1691. This Court previously has recognized that knowledge of a defendant's incarceration may have a serious prejudicial effect on the presumption of innocence. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 624 A.2d 291, 294 (R.I.1993); State v. Burke, 529 A.2d 621, 628 (R.I.1987). The prejudicial effect that may arise from the jury's knowledge of a defendant's incarceration results from the likelihood that the jury will infer that the defendant is incarcerated as a result of previous criminal activity and is thus possessed of a general criminal disposition. Burke, 529 A.2d at 628. Consequently, the state may not compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothing. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512, 96 S.Ct. 1691. To do so may impinge upon the defendant's presumption of innocence and, therefore, constitute a violation of his or her constitutional right to a fair trial. See id. at 503-04, 96 S.Ct. 1691. In determining whether a defendant's appearance in prison attire before a jury was a constitutional violation, the focus is on whether the defendant was truly compelled to wear the prison clothing. The United States Supreme Court has held that the failure to make an objection to the court as to being tried in such clothes, for whatever reason, is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512-13, 96 S.Ct. 1691. The reason for the focus on compulsion is that instances often may arise when a defendant prefers to stand trial before the jury in prison clothes in an effort to elicit sympathy. Id. at 507-08, 96 S.Ct. 1691. Thus, a criminal defendant dressed in prison attire who does not object so as to invoke that right waives it, just as he must invoke or abandon other rights. Id. at 508, 96 S.Ct. 1691. Although we have not spoken directly on the issue of a defendant standing trial in prison clothing, this Court has addressed claims of error when trial justices verbally have informed the jury of a defendant's incarceration. For instance, in Burke, 529 A.2d at 626-27, one of the defendants alleged that the trial justice erred in denying his motion in limine to preclude reference to the fact that he was incarcerated at the ACI. The defendant made the motion to preclude the testimony of a witness, also incarcerated at the ACI, who would testify about certain statements that the defendant allegedly made to him while in the ACI. Id. at 627. Although the trial justice failed to issue the cautionary instruction that the defendant requested, we held that the issue had been waived because the defendant's counsel failed to object at trial. Id. Similarly, in State v. Fenner, 503 A.2d 518, 522 (R.I.1986), this Court acknowledged that it is the obligation of defense counsel to raise an objection at the appropriate time. In Fenner, before jury selection, the trial justice informed counsel that she would disclose to the jury that the defendant was in custody, to which defense counsel raised no objection. Id. at 521. Nor did counsel object when the trial justice gave the jury a cautionary instruction similar to the one given in the present case. Id. Later in the Fenner trial, following an afternoon recess, defense counsel did raise an objection to the trial justice's earlier statement and requested that she pass the case based on prejudicial error. Id. The trial justice refused and we affirmed. Id. at 521-22. Although the situation in Fenner differs from the situation in the present case, this Court's words in Fenner are informative with regard to the timing of the necessary objection. We said that in the future, when defense counsel wishes to object to the trial justice's intention to inform the jury of the defendant's incarceration, he or she must do so before the trial justice so informs the jury, not afterward. Fenner, 503 A.2d at 522. In addition, we recognized that a trial justice's reference to a defendant's incarceration may not be reversible error when a cautionary instruction is sufficient to negate any potential prejudice. Id. In so holding, we acknowledged that our criminal justice system necessarily depends upon the proposition that jurors will obey cautionary instructions and apply the law as given to them by the trial justice. Id. Although this Court previously has not had occasion to address the precise issue of prison clothing, we infer from the holdings in both Burke and Fenner that an objection is timely if made before any prejudice can emanate from a defendant's appearance in prison garb. Such a conclusion also comports with the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Estelle: [A]lthough the State cannot, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes, the failure to make an objection to the court as to being tried in such clothes, for whatever reason, is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512-13, 96 S.Ct. 1691. As Chief Justice Burger noted, a defendant's silence precludes any suggestion of compulsion. Id. at 512 n.9, 96 S.Ct. 1691. We are of the opinion, therefore, that Mr. Snell's objection to his prison attire was untimely. Defense counsel did not raise the objection to Mr. Snell's clothing until after the jury was selected and sworn, and after the trial justice gave preliminary instructions. The request to procure alternative clothing was made clearly beyond such time as defendant reasonably became aware of the possible prejudice. The jury panel, including those jurors selected, already had observed defendant in his so-called prison garb for quite some time when the objection was finally made. In the case under review, knowledge of defendant's incarceration was not initially imparted by the trial justice in his preliminary instructions. Rather, the jurors first were made aware of his incarceration by their observation of him in prison clothing throughout the voir dire process and during the trial justice's introductory remarks. It is clear from the record that defendant had addressed several motions to the trial justice before a jury panel was brought into the courtroom. If he had any concerns about the jurors seeing him in prison clothing, he could have presented them to the court at that time. In these circumstances, we cannot say that defendant was compelled to be tried in prison clothes in violation of his constitutional rights pursuant to Estelle. Moreover, we are satisfied under these circumstances that the trial justice's cautionary instruction that the jury was not to give any weight to the fact that defendant was in custody was not only appropriate, but also sufficient to negate any potential prejudice.