Opinion ID: 4560791
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: facts

Text: After a night of heavy drinking, Gerlach fell from the second-story balcony of her then-boyfriend’s apartment. The railing of the balcony fell with her. Nobody saw exactly what happened, and Gerlach does not remember the fall. At trial, the parties presented the jury with two opposing theories. Gerlach argued that she entered her boyfriend’s apartment, went out onto the balcony, and leaned against the railing—which snapped and sent her plummeting to the ground. 1 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (July 10, 2017) at 356975. According to this theory, alcohol had nothing to do with the fall, and Gerlach was not at fault. Cove Apartments, on the other hand, argued that Gerlach never made it inside the apartment. Instead, Gerlach fell while attempting to climb over the second-story balcony’s railing and onto the balcony, from the outside. Id. at 362024. According to Cove, Gerlach made the poor decision to climb because she was extremely drunk, and she was unable to successfully scale the balcony for the same reason. Id. at 3638-43. According to this theory, alcohol played a major role in the accident, and Gerlach was at fault. 2 Gerlach v. Cove Apartments, LLC, et al., No. 97325-3 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) As mentioned above, intoxication can be a “complete defense to an action for damages for personal injury.” RCW 5.40.060(1). To succeed on this defense, Cove had to prove that (1) Gerlach “was under the influence of intoxicating liquor” at the time of the accident, (2) the intoxication “was a proximate cause of the injury,” and (3) she was more than 50 percent at fault. Id. This statutory defense reflects a legislative determination that “[w]hen the intoxicated party is at fault for a majority of his or her injuries, . . . the intoxicated party is responsible for the entire amount of damages.” Estate of Kelly v. Falin, 127 Wn.2d 31, 49, 896 P.2d 1245 (1995). Thus, whether Gerlach was intoxicated and how that intoxication affected her ability to function were major issues for trial. Cove had evidence that Gerlach was not simply intoxicated, but was severely intoxicated. A blood draw performed at the hospital after the accident revealed that Gerlach’s BAC at the time of the fall was 0.238, or “essentially three times the legal limit for operation of a motor vehicle.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 511. Dr. Frank F. Vincenzi, an emeritus professor of pharmacology at the University of Washington, estimated that based on this BAC, Gerlach had consumed around 14 drinks on the night of the accident and had approximately “9 drinks[’] worth of alcohol present in her body at the time of the incident.” Id. As a result of this calculation, Dr. Vincenzi opined that 3 Gerlach v. Cove Apartments, LLC, et al., No. 97325-3 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) “alcohol-induced impairment of both judgment and psychomotor function were proximate causes of the tragic outcome.” Id. His conclusion, if accepted by the jury, would have satisfied the first two prongs of Cove’s statutory defense: (1) that Gerlach was intoxicated at the time of the accident and (2) that the intoxication “was a proximate cause of the injury.” RCW 5.40.060(1). And it would have allowed the jury to evaluate the third element, whether Gerlach was more than 50 percent at fault. Id. But the trial court barred that evidence from ever reaching the jury, thwarting Cove’s ability to prove its statutory defense. I believe this was error, and I would affirm the Court of Appeals on this point. Separately, I concur in the majority’s interpretation of the RLTA. But I decline to endorse the majority’s dicta regarding the implied warranty of habitability. Thus, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.