Opinion ID: 742482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Koons' testimony

Text: 4 It is an established tenet of the due process clause that 'the deliberate deception of the court by the presentation of false evidence is incompatible with the rudimentary demands of justice.'  United States v. Rewald, 889 F.2d 836, 860 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Endicott, 869 F.2d 452, 455 (9th Cir.1989)), amended by 902 F.2d 18 (9th Cir.1990). A conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the outcome of the trial. United States v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543, 1549 (9th Cir.1986). 5 Wronko's claim that his trial was tainted by perjured testimony fails for several reasons. First, Wronko has not established that Koons' testimony was false. Wronko claims that Koons lied when he testified that Frazier asked him to bring a gun to the transaction at Blockbuster Video. Koons testified that the reason he took a gun with him was because before [he and Frazier] drove to [Blockbuster Video], [Frazier] said, I feel better if you have a gun or something, because I feel better when someone has a gun and I am carrying this much money. Wronko assumes that this cannot be true because Koons must have had a gun in his possession before entering Frazier's vehicle. 6 Even if Wronko's assumption were accepted, this does not demonstrate that Koons committed perjury. Koons might have had the gun with him from the moment he exited his car but decided to take the gun to the transaction only after Frazier made that request. This interpretation of Koons' testimony is consistent with Frazier's testimony. Frazier testified that his coconspirators would always have a gun, when they come in the car [they] would always carry a gun. Read together, Koons' and Frazier's testimony could support the conclusion that Koons had a gun with him before he met Frazier, but that he decided to take the gun to the transaction at Blockbuster Video only upon Frazier's request. This plausible reading of Koons' testimony defeats Wronko's claim that Koons must have committed perjury. 3 7 Even if Koons lied on the stand, Wronko has not offered any evidence that the government knowingly presented false testimony. See Polizzi, 801 F.2d at 1549 (due process violation exists where prosecution obtains a conviction with knowing use of perjured testimony). 8 Finally, Wronko has not established that there was a reasonable likelihood that Koons' allegedly false testimony affected the outcome of his trial. Both Koons and Frazier testified that members of their conspiracy had been armed during previous transactions. Frazier's professed disapproval of this practice does not change the fact that his coconspirators would always carry a gun and Frazier did not check them for it. Furthermore, Koons specifically testified that Fonseca had been armed during a transaction in April 1990 involving Wronko. This testimony provides an independent basis for concluding that the use of a firearm in this transaction was reasonably foreseeable to Wronko. Consequently, there is no reasonable likelihood that Koons' allegedly false testimony affected the outcome of Wronko's trial.