Opinion ID: 1577053
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Avoiding Statutory Duplication

Text: Any remaining doubt as to the correctness of the foregoing interpretation is removed upon consideration of the fact that the legislature separately enacted the act that is codified at § 11-42-5. Section 11-42-5 provides: Every annexation undertaken prior to May 1, 1998, under any statutory procedure for annexation by any municipality and which the annexation procedure has been completed, notwithstanding any irregularity or defect in the procedure, is ratified and confirmed and given effect in all respects as if all provisions of law relating to the annexation proceeding had been duly and legally complied with. This section shall not apply to any annexation or attempted annexation which, prior to May 1, 1998, has been held invalid by the Supreme Court of Alabama or by the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama or by a final judgment of the circuit court in the county in which the annexation was completed and from which judgment an appeal was not taken to the Supreme Court of Alabama or the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama within the time provided by law for taking appeals, or to any annexation the validity of which is an issue in a pending action commenced prior to May 1, 1998. It is apparent that § 11-42-5 is for annexation elections what § 11-41-8(a) is for incorporation elections, i.e., it serves to retroactively ratify annexation elections that might otherwise be deemed invalid because of irregularities in the procedures in those elections. Yet, if § 11-41-8(b) is applied according to the interpretation adopted by the trial court, then it is a virtual duplication of § 11-42-5, except that § 11-42-5 does have built into it the expected exceptions for annexations whose validity in relation to their own procedural irregularities is being questioned in litigation and annexations that have been invalidated by a final judgment of a circuit courtthus avoiding any potential constitutional separation-of-powers conflict. `There is a presumption that every word, sentence, or provision [of a statute] was intended for some useful purpose, has some force and effect, and that some effect is to be given to each, and also that no superfluous words or provisions were used.' Ex parte Children's Hosp. of Alabama, 721 So.2d 184, 191 (Ala. 1998) (quoting Sheffield v. State, 708 So.2d 899, 909 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), quoting in turn 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 316 (1953)). Moreover, [c]ourts will attempt to give meaning to a legislative enactment and it is presumed that the Legislature did not do a vain and useless thing, Alidor v. Mobile County Comm'n, 291 Ala. 552, 558, 284 So.2d 257, 261 (1973), and the Legislature, in enacting new legislation, is presumed to know the existing law. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc. v. Nielsen, 714 So.2d 293, 297 (Ala.1998). We presume the legislature was aware of the existence of § 11-42-5 when it amended § 11-41-8 by adding subsection (b) and that it did not intend to repeat an existing provision of the Code through its enactment. The presence of § 11-42-5 in our Code easily corroborates the conclusion that § 11-41-8(b) pertains only to the validation of annexations by towns or cities whose incorporations require the validation provided by § 11-41-8(a). [8]