Opinion ID: 771005
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title VII Applies to the CBEST.3

Text: 12 Defendants appeal from the district court's summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on the issue of the applicability of Titles VI and VII. We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. See Robi v. Reed, 173 F.3d 736, 739 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 375 (1999). 13 As a threshold matter, we note that, because we ultimately hold that the CBEST was validated properly (see Part I.B., below), we could decline to decide whether Titles VI and VII apply. Were we to do so, we simply would assume for the sake of argument that the statutes apply and move immediately to the question of validation. Although that might appear to be an expedient approach, we decline to follow it for three reasons. First, as a matter of logic, the applicability of Title VI or Title VII is a predicate to any discussion of validation. Validation would not be required, and indeed would not even be relevant, if neither Title VI nor Title VII applies. Second, as a matter of fairness, these parties deserve an answer not only to the bare question of who wins this case, but also to the underlying question of the applicability of federal civil rights law to the CBEST. The state, in particular, has proceeded for years on the assumption that those laws apply to its administration of the CBEST and has expended considerable effort and expense in attempting to comply with federal law in this area. If that effort was unnecessary, the state deserves to know, so that it may act accordingly in the future. Third, as a matter of judicial economy, our answer to the statutory question can avoid future litigation by other parties. We turn, then, to a discussion of Title VII's application. 14 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: 15 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.] 16 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII applies to governmental and private employers alike. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977). 17 Plaintiffs and Defendants do not have a direct employment relationship. Rather, Plaintiffs are employees and potential employees of individual school districts in California. That fact does not end our inquiry, however. A direct employment relationship is not a prerequisite to Title VII liability. Although there must be some connection with an employment relationship for Title VII protections to apply, that connection with employment need not necessarily be direct. Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1980). 18 Among other things, we have held that an entity that is not the direct employer of a Title VII plaintiff nevertheless may be liable if it  `interferes with an individual's employment opportunities with another employer.'  Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Lutcher, 633 F.2d at 883 n.3). In Gomez, we held that the defendant hospital could be held liable under Title VII for its discriminatory treatment of the plaintiff, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff was employed by a third party, if the defendant had interfered with the plaintiff's employment by that third party. See id. at 1021. 19 In so holding, we followed the opinion of the District of Columbia Circuit in Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1340-41 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 4 In Sibley, the plaintiff was a male private-duty nurse. When a patient in the defendant hospital requested a private nurse, the hospital arranged through a registry service to have a private nurse provided. That nurse attended the patient at the hospital, but was paid directly by the patient. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant allowed male nurses like him to attend male patients only, but allowed female nurses to attend both male and female patients. See id. at 1339-40. 20 The D.C. Circuit concluded that the defendant could be held liable under Title VII even though it was not the plaintiff's direct employer. The court reasoned that, although the defendant did not employ the plaintiff, it exercised considerable power over his ability to form employment relationships with third parties. The court noted that Congress intended, through Title VII, to prohibit entities that possessed such power from foreclos[ing], on invidious grounds, access by any individual to employment opportunities otherwise available to him. Id. at 1341. The court further stated: 21 To permit a covered employer to exploit circumstances particularly affording it the capability of discriminatorily interfering with an individual's employment opportunities with another employer, while it could not do so with respect to employment in its own service, would be to condone continued use of the very criteria for employment that Congress has prohibited. 22 Id. Finally, the court held that the defendant's control over the premises on which the plaintiff provided his services, as well as its control over the plaintiff's access to patients, created a highly visible nexus with the creation and continuance of direct employment relationships between third parties that brought the defendant's actions within the scope of Title VII. Id. at 1342. 23 The D.C. Circuit's holding in Sibley was rooted in the text of Title VII. The Court reasoned that, although Title VII applies to employees, Congress extended the protections of the statute to any individual who suffers discrimination: nowhere are there words of limitation that restrict references in the Act to `any individual' as comprehending only an employee of an employer. Id. at 1341. As we did in Gomez, we agree that the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the statutory text is the proper one in view of Congress' directive to read Title VII broadly so as to best effectuate its remedial purposes. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co. , 144 F.3d 1182, 1192 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 982 (1998). 24 We also note, as did the Sibley court, see 488 F.2d at 1342, that Congress explicitly made Title VII applicable outside thedirect employment context by including employment agencies and labor organizations in the statute's coverage. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(b), (c). In particular, employment agencies -defined as parties regularly undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e(c) -may not refuse to refer . . . or otherwise discriminate against any individual under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(b). This provision of Title VII, like the others, applies to states. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332 n.14; Dumas v. Town of Mt. Vernon, 612 F.2d 974, 980 (5th Cir. 1980), overruled on other grounds by Larkin v. Pullman Standard Div., Pullman Inc., 854 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Pullman-Standard, Inc. v. Swint, 493 U.S. 929 (1989). We do not suggest that Defendants are, strictly speaking, an employment agency under Title VII, although they perform an analogous function. Rather, we mention this statutory provision as evidence that Congress intended to close any loopholes in Title VII's coverage and to extend the statute's coverage to entities with actual [c]ontrol over access to the job market, Sibley, 488 F.2d at 1341, whether or not they are direct employers. 25 In concluding that Title VII applies in this case, the district court held that Defendants interfere[d]  with Plaintiffs' employment opportunities with local school districts in California by requiring, implementing, and administering the CBEST. See AMAE I, 836 F. Supp. at 1551. We agree. 26 Our conclusion is dictated by the peculiar degree of control that the State of California exercises over local school districts. In California, public schools are a matter of statewide rather than local or municipal concern; their establishment, regulation and operation are covered by the[state] constitution and the state Legislature is given comprehensive powers in relation thereto. Hall v. City of Taft, 302 P.2d 574, 576 (Cal. 1956). The California legislature has plenary authority over the education of California's youth.  San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 484 F. Supp. 657, 662 (N.D. Cal. 1979). It is well settled that the California Constitution makes public education uniquely a fundamental concern of the state and that the degree of supervision . . . retained by the State over the common school system is high indeed. Butt v. California , 842 P.2d 1240, 1251, 1254 (Cal. 1992). 27 The state's involvement is not limited to general legislative oversight but, rather, affects the day-to-day operations of local public schools. Unlike most states, California school districts have budgets that are controlled and funded by the state government rather than the local districts.  Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1992). As the California Supreme Court noted in Butt , California statutes regulate district organization, elections, and governance; educational programs, instructional materials, and proficiency testing; sex discrimination and affirmative action; admission standards; compulsory attendance; school facilities; rights and responsibilities of students and parents; holidays; school health, safety, and nutrition; teacher credentialing and certification; rights and duties of public school employees; and the pension system for public school teachers.  Butt, 842 P.2d at 1254 (citations omitted). The state also dictates when students may be expelled or suspended, and . . . exerts control over the textbooks that are used in public schools.  Belanger, 963 F.2d at 253 (citations omitted). 28 Indeed, the state is so entangled with the operation of California's local school districts that individual districts are treated as state agencies for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 846 (9th Cir. 1999). The fact that the districts are entitled to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity underscores the state's unusually high degree of involvement in the operation of local schools. 29 Against that background of plenary state control, we have no difficulty concluding that the State of California is in a theoretical and practical position to interfere with the employment decisions of local school districts. And by requiring, formulating, and administering the CBEST, the state has interfered to a degree sufficient to bring it within the reach of Title VII. Through the CBEST, the state has created a limited list of candidates from which local public school districts may hire. Private schools may hire candidates who have not passed the CBEST; but California's public schools, which are under the state's control in almost every aspect of their operations, may not. Thus, in addition to controlling local districts' budgets and textbooks and regulating the duties of public school employees, the state dictates whom the districts may and may not hire. That degree of control over districts' hiring decisions subjects Defendants to the coverage of Title VII in this case. 30 The relationship between the State of California and California's local school districts is analogous to the relationship between a corporate parent and its wholly owned subsidiaries. In the absence of special circumstances, a parent corporation is not liable for the Title VII violations of its wholly owned subsidiary. Watson v. Gulf & W. Indus., 650 F.2d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 1981). In Watson, this court held that the parent corporation was not subject to Title VII because the case presented no special circumstances. Id. But the court went on to explain that, [i]f there was any evidence that [the parent] participated in or influenced the employment policies of [the subsidiary], . . . then we would be presented with a very different case. Id. Ours is that very different case. The parent state has participated extensively in, and influenced, the employment policies and practices of the subsidiary local school districts; therefore, the state is covered by Title VII. 31 Defendants contend, however, that they are not subject to Title VII because the CBEST is merely a licensing examination. The administration of such examinations, they argue, is not covered by Title VII. As support for that argument, they cite several cases that have held that governmental agencies are not subject to Title VII with regard to their licensing activities. See Haddock v. Board of Dental Exam'rs , 777 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1985); Fields v. Hallsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 906 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1990); George v. New Jersey Bd. of Veterinary Med. Exam'rs, 794 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1986). 5 32 The cases on which Defendants rely are not controlling for two reasons. First, the state's high level of involvement in the operation of local public schools distinguishes this case from those that Defendants cite. In those cases, licensing was the entire connection between the plaintiffs and the defendants; here, the CBEST is but one aspect of pervasive state control. Second, the CBEST is not merely an ordinary licensing examination; it applies only to public school employees. In other words, the State of California is acting pursuant to its proprietary, as well as its police, power. 33 There is no overarching licensing exception to Title VII. The cases that Defendants cite stand for a related but narrower proposition -that Title VII does not apply when the only connection among the licensing agency, the plaintiff, and the universe of prospective employers is the agency's implementation of a general licensing examination. In such cases, to borrow the words of the Sibley court, the agency does not have a highly visible nexus with the creation and continuance of direct employment relationships between third parties, such as would subject it to Title VII under an interference theory. Sibley, 488 F.2d at 1342. 34 In Haddock, the plaintiff conceded that his only connection to the defendant Board of Dental Examiners was that the Board had given him an examination that he failed. This court concluded that such a connection, by itself, was insufficient to subject the Board to Title VII liability. See 777 F.2d at 464. The plaintiff apparently did not argue that the Board had interfered with his employment under the principle adopted in Gomez and Sibley; if he did, the opinion does not mention it. 35 In Fields, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants had violated Title VII through their administration of the Texas Examination for Current Administrators and Teachers (TECAT), a compulsory certification examination. See 906 F.2d at 1019. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the state defendants, concluding that they did not have an employment relationship with the plaintiffs. On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged that conclusion, arguing that the state defendants actually controlled their employment even though the plaintiffs nominally were employed by local districts. In rejecting that argument, the Fifth Circuit noted that [t]he only evidence presented by [the plaintiffs] suggesting control is the Texas State Board of Education's administration of the TECAT exam and its ability to decertify teachers who fail the exam. Id. (emphasis in original). Of particular relevance to this case is footnote three of the opinion, which reads: 36 In a footnote in [the plaintiffs'] brief on appeal, they present evidence regarding state funding of facilities, payment of salaries and selection of text books. As this evidence was not before the district court, it is not part of the summary judgment record on appeal. 37 Id. at 1019 n.3. The court suggested that the outcome might be different if there were such evidence of the state's right to control the work of the teachers. See id. at 1019-20. 38 Finally, in George, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners had violated Title VII by administering a licensing examination that discriminated against him on the basis of national origin. See 794 F.2d at 114. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's action. The court distinguished Sibley, on which the plaintiff had relied, stating: 39 In the Sibley Memorial Hospital case the relationship of the hospital to the employment by its patients of private duty nurses secured for them by the hospital was very close, whereas in the present case there was nothing even remotely resembling an employer employee relationship between the Board and the plaintiff. 40 Id. 41 To summarize, the circumstances here demonstrate a level of control and interference far greater than that in the mere licensing cases on which Defendants rely. The State of California exerts a high degree of control over the operation of local public school districts. That control is evidenced both by the record and by California law. 42 Defendants cite George for the further proposition that state licensing examinations are acts of state police power, to which Title VII does not apply. But in George , the Board was acting only pursuant to the state's police power to protect the public from incompetent veterinarians and was not attempting to control the hiring practices of, or the performance of work for, any specific employer. By contrast, the CBEST does not apply across-the-board to all who wish to teach in California, as (for example) a veterinary licensing examination applies to all who wish to practice the profession of veterinary medicine within the state's borders. Rather, the CBEST applies only to those who wish to teach for the public school system -a system over which the State of California exerts plenary control, including regulation of employees' duties. 43 We conclude, therefore, that administration of the CBEST is not solely an exercise of the state's police power. Rather, it is an exercise of both the state's police power and its proprietary power; and it is the exercise of proprietary power that subjects the state to the coverage of Title VII in this case. 44 We hold that the CBEST examination is subject to the provisions of Title VII. We turn next to the question whether the CBEST violates the provisions of that Act. 45 B. The District Court Did Not Clearly Err in Concluding that the CBEST Was Properly Validated. 6 46 [D]iscriminatory tests are impermissible unless shown, by professionally acceptable methods, to be predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975). In evaluating employment tests that are alleged to have a racially disparate impact, we first consider whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case by demonstrating that the test causes a disparate impact on the basis of race. Here, the district court concluded that Plaintiffs had established a prima facie case. See AMAE II, 937 F. Supp. at 1403. Defendants do not challenge that conclusion on appeal. 47 Because Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Defendants to demonstrate that the CBEST was validated properly. 7 See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425. In its detailed and careful opinion, the district court concluded that Defendants had met their burden and that the test had been validated properly based on three studies: (1) the 1982 Wheeler and Elias study; (2) the 1985 Practitioners' Review; and (3) the 1995 Lundquist study. See AMAE II, 937 F. Supp. at 1411. Plaintiffs challenge that conclusion. 48 Although this court has not discussed in detail the appropriate standard of review for a district court's ruling on test validation, we have applied the clearly erroneous  standard. Clady v. County of Los Angeles, 770 F.2d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1985). The other circuits that have addressed this issue likewise have applied the clearly erroneous standard. See, e.g., Melendez v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 79 F.3d 661, 669 (7th Cir. 1996); Bernard v. Gulf Oil Corp., 890 F.2d 735, 743 (5th Cir. 1989); Hamer v. City of Atlanta, 872 F.2d 1521, 1526 (11th Cir. 1989). The question whether a test has been validated properly is primarily a factual question, which depends on underlying factual determinations regarding the content and reliability of the validation studies that a defendant utilized. Consistent with Clady, we review for clear error the district court's determination in this case that the CBEST was validated properly. 49 To demonstrate that the CBEST was validated properly, Defendants are required to show that it has `a manifest relationship to the employment in question.'  Clady, 770 F.2d at 1427 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co. , 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)). In cases in which a scored test, like this one, is challenged, we require that the test be job related -that is, that it actually measures skills, knowledge, or ability required for successful performance of the job. Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1981). In making a determination about job-relatedness, we follow a three-step approach: 50 The employer must first specify the particular trait or characteristic which the selection device is being used to identify or measure. The employer must then determine that the particular trait or characteristic is an important element of work behavior. Finally, the employer must demonstrate by professionally acceptable methods that the selection device is predictive of or significantly correlated with the element of work behavior identified in the second step. 51 Craig v. County of Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 431). 8 52 We will analyze each of those three steps in turn. In addition, we will consider Plaintiffs' argument that the passing score on the writing component of the CBEST is set too high. 9
53 The first step of our inquiry is to identify the trait or characteristic that the test is designed to measure. See Craig, 626 F.2d at 662. Here, the district court found that the test was being used to measure basic skills in reading, writing, and mathematics, AMAE II, 937 F. Supp. at 1411, and Plaintiffs do not dispute that finding.
54 Next, we consider whether basic skills in reading, writing, and mathematics are important element[s] of work behavior, Craig, 626 F.2d at 662, for the public school jobs for which the test is required. The district court found that the tested skills were important to the jobs at issue. See AMAE II, 937 F. Supp. at 1419. Plaintiffs challenge that finding on three grounds. First, they argue that the 1985 Practitioners' Review failed to identify any particular work behaviors or job duties and thus could not be used to assess whether the CBEST measured important elements of work behavior. Second, they argue that Lundquist's 1995 study failed to distinguish important skills from skills that are less important. Third, they argue that Defendants failed to demonstrate that the CBEST is job-related for the particular positions for which it is required. We address each of those arguments in turn. 55 Plaintiffs first argue that the 1985 Practitioners' Review, conducted by Dr. Richard Watkins, was inadequate because it failed to identify specific job duties to which the CBEST skills could be correlated. We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the 1985 study adequately identified the element[s] of work behavior, Craig, 626 F.2d at 662, that the CBEST is designed to measure. 56 The district court found that the Review comprised the pooled judgments of knowledgeable persons, such as incumbents in the jobs, about the relevance of the skills tested on the CBEST to the jobs for which it is required, an appropriate form of a job analysis under the professional standards of the time. AMAE II, 937 F. Supp. at 1419. Specifically, the Practitioners' Review consulted 234 teachers, administrators, and other public school employees, 36 percent of whom were members of minority groups. See id. at 1413. The participants took part in nine review panels, in which they judged the relevance of both the skills assessed by the CBEST and the test items themselves. Id. They were asked to rate how relevant each of the CBEST skills would be to the work of four groups: (1) elementary school teachers; (2) secondary school teachers; (3) librarians, counselors, and attendance officers; and (4) school administrators. See id. The possible ratings ranged from not relevant to very relevant. Id. 57 Thus, the Practitioners' Review was designed to learn from teachers, administrators, and other school employees the categories of skills that they considered relevant to their own jobs. The skills measured by the study tracked the categories of skills measured by the CBEST, and the skills were described in some detail on the rating forms used by the panel members. For example, the broad skill category Mathematical concepts and relationships was further described as follows: 58 Questions in this category test the understanding of basic concepts, such as the meaning of certain terms (area, for example), order among numbers, relation ships shown by graphs, elementary probability, and the like. Questions in this category may be from arithmetic, algebra, or elementary geometry. 59 The study's participants were guided by detailed instructions relating to each skill category and were told to rank the importance of each skill for both teaching and nonteaching jobs. The study therefore satisfies the requirement from Craig that the employer determine whether a specific trait or characteristic is an important element of work behavior.  Craig, 626 F.2d at 662. The district court did not clearly err in concluding that the 1985 Practitioners' Review was an appropriate form of a job analysis under the professional standards of the time. AMAE II, 937 F. Supp. at 1419. 60 We next consider Plaintiff's second challenge under the important elements prong of Craig. Plaintiffs do not challenge the 1995 Lundquist study's methodology for identifying job-related skills. They do, however, challenge that study's method for determining which skills are important to particular jobs. 61 Dr. Lundquist polled experts and interviewed and observed educators in order to develop a list of activities and skills used by educators. See AMAE II, 937 F. Supp. at 1414. She then polled 1,330 teachers and administrators, asking them to rate the importance of those activities and skills on a four-point scale from 0 (not applicable) to 3 (critical). Activities and skills were retained only if at least 80 percent of the survey respondents rated the activity or skill as applicable to the job and the mean importance rating was 1.5 or higher. Id. at 1414 (emphasis in original). Applying those standards led to elimination of a number of the activities and skills from Dr. Lundquist's list. After conducting additional studies, which are described in detail in the district court's opinion, see id. at 1415-17, Dr. Lundquist then formulated new specifications for all three sections of the test. In response to those specifications, Defendants revised the CBEST before they administered the August 1995 test. 62 Plaintiffs focus on the fact that Dr. Lundquist retained activities and skills on her list if they received a mean importance rating of 1.5 on a scale that designated 2 as important and 1 as minor. By using a mean rating of 1.5, Plaintiffs argue, Dr. Lundquist retained skills and activities that were rated as less than important by the study's partici-pants. Therefore, their argument proceeds, the study violated the requirement from Craig that only important work skills be measured. 63 The district court rejected Plaintiffs' argument, finding that Dr. Lundquist's decisions reflect manifestly reasonable professional judgments . . . . With respect to the 1.5 mean, as Dr. Lundquist testified at trial, a 1.5 rounds up to 2.0. It must be remembered that the mean rating of 1.5 was coupled with an 80 percent endorsement criterion, which is quite stringent. AMAE II, 937 F. Supp. at 1418 n. 35. 64 We agree that it is theoretically possible to imagine a circumstance that illustrates Plaintiffs' concerns on this point. For example, suppose that 80 percent of the study's participants agreed that a particular skill was relevant, but 75 percent of them rated that skill's importance as minor. If the remaining 25 percent rated the skill as critical, then the skill would be retained despite the fact that a majority of the study's participants rated its importance as minor. Although that scenario is possible, such a skewed distribution of responses is unlikely. Plaintiffs present only a theoretical possibility that such highly relevant but unimportant skills remained on Dr. Lundquist's list. Further, as the district court noted, Dr. Lundquist conducted additional importance reviews of the mathematics section of the test. 65 Validation studies are by their nature difficult, expensive, time consuming and rarely, if ever, free of error.  Cleghorn v. Herrington, 813 F.2d 992, 996 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiffs' argument demonstrates, at most, that Dr. Lundquist's study may not be totally free of error. But the argument does not persuade us that the district court clearly erred in relying on Dr. Lundquist's study. 66 Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants failed to conduct job-specific studies to determine that the CBEST is job related for the position[s] in question. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e2(k)(1)(A)(i). The CBEST is not intended to measure all the skills that are relevant to all the jobs for which it is required. (Indeed, it does not purport to measure all the skills of any of the jobs for which it is required.) Rather, the CBEST is intended to establish only a minimum level of competence in three areas of basic educational skills. The question is whether the validation studies in this case have satisfied the requirement that those skills be job related for all the positions in question. The district court found that the validation studies adequately analyzed the CBEST in terms of both the teaching and nonteaching jobs for which the test is required. See AMAE II, 937 F. Supp. at 1418-19. The district court did not clearly err in so finding. 67 Both the 1985 and the 1995 validation studies containedadequate consideration of the specific positions for which the CBEST is required. The 1985 Practitioners' Review defined the positions that it analyzed as (1) elementary school teachers, (2) secondary school teachers, (3) librarians, counselors, and attendance officers, and (4) school administrators. All participants in the study were asked to judge the relevance of the CBEST skills by category for those jobs. Because the study's participants were asked to determine the relevance of the basic skills measured by the CBEST to the disparate groups of positions for which the test is required, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in finding the job analysis in the Practitioners' Review to be sufficiently specific and particularized. 68 The 1995 Lundquist study, as noted, identified job activities through observation, interviews, and reviews of specialized literature. See id. at 1414. Dr. Lundquist then pared her list of job skills and activities through surveys of educators and arrived at a list of common skill requirements that were relevant for both teachers and administrators. See id. at 141415. Her study reports: 69 Basic skill ratings were examined for administrators to determine if the same skill sets applied to both teacher and administrator jobs. Results showed all but one skill item (a math item) retained for teachers also applied to the administrator group. Thus, the basic skill requirements identified for teachers were found to be job-related for administrators as well, and the same test specifications may be used to test basic skills for teachers and administrators. 70 Dr. Lundquist's study classified jobs for which the CBEST is required as either teacher or administrator and determined that the CBEST was valid for both groups of positions. Accordingly, the 1995 study considered the validity of the CBEST across the range of jobs for which the test is required. The district court accepted the study's conclusions and found that the CBEST had been validated adequately with respect to teaching and non-teaching jobs. Id. at 1418. On this record, that finding is not clearly erroneous. 71 In sum, we hold that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the skills measured by the CBEST are important element[s] of work behavior with regard to the jobs for which the test is required. Craig, 626 F.2d at 662.
72 The final step in this court's three-step analysis from Craigis to determine whether Defendants have demonstrated by professionally acceptable methods that the selection device is predictive of or significantly correlated with the element of work behavior that it is designed to measure. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court concluded that the CBEST actually measures . . . basic skills[in reading, writing, and mathematics]. AMAE II, 937 F. Supp. at 1411. Plaintiffs claim that the district court simply accepted the facial validity of the CBEST without any evidence that it actually measures the basic skills that it purports to test. 73 This court held in Contreras that a key requirement of [the] third step [from Craig], a requirement essential to proof of job relatedness generally, is that the validation method be professionally acceptable. 656 F.2d at 1282. Here, there is evidence in the record from an expert, Dr. William A. Mehrens, that supports the district court's findings on this issue. Dr. Mehrens reported: 74 ETS [Educational Testing Service] personnel wrote some of the original items and assisted the test development committees in writing other items. ETS is well known and respected as a developer of stan dardized tests. They have well trained item writers and an impressive internal set of guidelines they fol low with respect to item writing. 75 When asked whether the CBEST development [was ] appropriate with respect to writing and evaluating the items, he reported:It has been. Many of the items came from an existing ETS pool. Others were written specifically for CBEST by members of the test development com mittee in concert with ETS test development special ists. The individuals on the committees worked with specialists from ETS to further develop and define the content specifications, to review an existing ETS pool test item, to write new test items, and to review the items submitted by fellow committee members. In addition, the committees studied all of the data from the field testing, made recommendations for revisions as they felt necessary, and reviewed all final test results. 76 There also is additional evidence in the record that the test questions were matched to the skills that they were intended to measure. The district court referred to the Curriculum Matching Project, in which two ETS employees . . . matched CBEST test specifications to material found in textbooks purportedly used in the California public schools. AMAE II, 937 F. Supp. at 1412 n.21. The district court was somewhat critical of this study, but noted that the study did support theoverall conclusion that the kinds of skills tested on the CBEST can be found in elementary and secondary school textbooks. Id. 77 In short, there is evidence -even if not overwhelming evidence -that the development and evaluation of the CBEST were appropriate and that the test measures the types of skills that it was designed to measure. We therefore hold that the district court did not clearly err in concluding that the test questions had been shown by professionally acceptable methods to be predictive of or significantly correlated with the element of work behavior that they were designed to measure. Craig, 626 F.2d at 662 (internal quotation marks omitted). 78 In sum, we hold that the district court did not clearly err in concluding that the CBEST was validated properly. 10
79 Plaintiffs also argue that the 12-out-of-16 passing score on the writing section of the CBEST is too high. According to Plaintiffs, the 1982 Wheeler and Elias study demonstrates that the proper passing score is 9 or 10 out of 16. 80 An employer is not required to validate separately the selection of particular passing scores on an employment test. See id. at 665. Rather, the EEOC's Guidelines more generally provide: Where cutoff scores are used, they should normally be set so as to be reasonable and consistent with normal expectations of acceptable proficiency within the work force. 29 C.F.R. S 1607.5(H). This court previously has applied that standard. See, e.g., Craig, 626 F.2d at 665. In analyzing the Guidelines' scoring requirement, the Second Circuit has stated that an employer might establish a valid cutoff score by using a professional estimate of the requisite ability levels, or, at the very least, by analyzing the test results to locate a logical `break-point' in the distribution of scores. Guardians Ass'n of New York City Police Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 630 F.2d 79, 105 (2d Cir. 1980). 81 Here, the district court found that the passing scores on the CBEST reflect reasonable judgments about the minimum level of basic skills competence that should be required of teachers. AMAE II, 937 F. Supp. at 1420. The evidence before the court revealed that the California Superintendent of Public Instruction, who was responsible for establishing the cutoff scores, relied on polling data created as part of the Wheeler and Elias study in setting the cutoff for the writing section of the test. As part of that study, 44 readers reviewed approximately 6,800 CBEST essays and made recommendations regarding the cutoff between passing and failing scores. The readers unanimously agreed that a raw score of 12 out of 16 was a passing score. Approximately 80 percent of the readers agreed that a score of 11 out of 16 could be a passing score. On that basis, the Superintendent established a passing score of 12 out of 16, with an absolute minimum of 11 out of 16 under the compensatory scoring system. 82 Those cutoff scores represent a logical breakpoint between passing and failing scores. Plaintiffs argue that the breakpoint should have been set at 9 or 10 out of 16, because a majority of the readers opined that 10 out of 16 was a passing score. But the Superintendent was not required to set the score at the lowest level that a majority of the readers considered to be passing. Rather, he was required to set a cutoff that was logical, reasonable, and consistent with the data before him. He chose to set the cutoff at a level that all the readers agreed was passing, and to set an absolute minimum at a level that 80 percent of the readers thought was passing. The district court found that the Superintendent's decision to set the cutoff score at that level was consistent with the EEOC's Guidelines. We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in so finding.