Opinion ID: 110365
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Although it is clear that the District Judge and all Justices of this Court have an interest in the outcome of these cases, there is no doubt whatever as to this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 [9] or that of the District Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (a) (2) (1976 ed., Supp. III). [10] Section 455 of Title 28 [11] neither expressly nor by implication purports to deal with jurisdiction. On its face § 455 provides for disqualification of individual judges under specified circumstances; it does not affect the jurisdiction of a court. Nothing in the text or the history of § 455 suggests that Congress intended, by that section, to amend the vast array of statutes conferring jurisdiction over certain matters on various federal courts. B. Disqualification Jurisdiction being clear, our next inquiry is whether 28 U. S. C. § 455 or traditional judicial canons [12] operate to disqualify all United States judges, including the Justices of this Court, from deciding these issues. This threshold question reaches us with both the Government and the appellees in full agreement that § 455 did not require the District Judge, and does not now require each Justice of this Court, to disqualify himself. Rather, they agree the ancient Rule of Necessity prevails over the disqualification standards of § 455. Notwithstanding this concurrence of views resulting from the Government's concession, the sensitivity of the issues leads us to address the applicability of § 455 with the same degree of care and attention we would employ if the Government asserted that the District Court lacked jurisdiction or that § 455 mandates disqualification of all judges and Justices without exception. In federal courts generally, when an individual judge is disqualified from a particular case by reason of § 455, the disqualified judge simply steps aside and allows the normal administrative processes of the court to assign the case to another judge not disqualified. In the cases now before us, however, all Article III judges have an interest in the outcome; assignment of a substitute District Judge was not possible. And in this Court, when one or more Justices are recused but a statutory quorum of six Justices eligible to act remains available, see 28 U. S. C. § 1, the Court may continue to hear the case. Even if all Justices are disqualified in a particular case under § 455, 28 U. S. C. § 2109 authorizes the Chief Justice to remit a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals for final decision by judges not so disqualified. [13] However, in the highly unusual setting of these cases, even with the authority to assign other federal judges to sit temporarily under 28 U. S. C. §§ 291-296 (1976 ed. and Supp. III), it is not possible to convene a division of the Court of Appeals with judges who are not subject to the disqualification provisions of § 455. It was precisely considerations of this kind that gave rise to the Rule of Necessity, a well-settled principle at common law that, as Pollack put it, although a judge had better not, if it can be avoided, take part in the decision of a case in which he has any personal interest, yet he not only may but must do so if the case cannot be heard otherwise. F. Pollack, A First Book of Jurisprudence 270 (6th ed. 1929). C. Rule of Necessity The Rule of Necessity had its genesis at least five and a half centuries ago. Its earliest recorded invocation was in 1430, when it was held that the Chancellor of Oxford could act as judge of a case in which he was a party when there was no provision for appointment of another judge. Y. B. Hil. 8 Hen. VI, f. 19, pl. 6. [14] Early cases in this country confirmed the vitality of the Rule. [15] The Rule of Necessity has been consistently applied in this country in both state and federal courts. In State ex rel. Mitchell v. Sage Stores Co., 157 Kan. 622, 143 P. 2d 652 (1943), the Supreme Court of Kansas observed: [I]t is well established that actual disqualification of a member of a court of last resort will not excuse such member from performing his official duty if failure to do so would result in a denial of a litigant's constitutional right to have a question, properly presented to such court, adjudicated. Id., at 629, 143 P. 2d, at 656. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held: The true rule unquestionably is that wherever it becomes necessary for a judge to sit even where he has an interest where no provision is made for calling another in, or where no one else can take his placeit is his duty to hear and decide, however disagreeable it may be. Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169, 185 (1870). Other state [16] and federal [17] courts also have recognized the Rule. The concept of the absolute duty of judges to hear and decide cases within their jurisdiction revealed in Pollack, supra, and Philadelphia v. Fox, supra , is reflected in decisions of this Court. Our earlier cases dealing with the Compensation Clause did not directly involve the compensation of Justices or name them as parties, and no express reference to the Rule is found. See, e. g., O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U. S. 277 (1939); O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516 (1933); Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245 (1920). In Evans, however, an action brought by an individual judge in his own behalf, the Court by clear implication dealt with the Rule: Because of the individual relation of the members of this court to the question . . . , we cannot but regret that its solution falls to us . . . . But jurisdiction of the present case cannot be declined or renounced. The plaintiff was entitled by law to invoke our decision on the question as respects his own compensation, in which no other judge can have any direct personal interest; and there was no other appellate tribunal to which under the law he could go. Id., at 247-248. [18] It would appear, therefore, that this Court so took for granted the continuing validity of the Rule of Necessity that no express reference to it or extended discussion of it was needed. [19] D. Limited Purpose of Section 455 The objective of § 455 was to deal with the reality of a positive disqualification by reason of an interest or the appearance of possible bias. The House and Senate Reports on § 455 reflect a constant assumption that upon disqualification of a particular judge, another would be assigned to the case. For example: [I]f there is [any] reasonable factual basis for doubting the judge's impartiality, he should disqualify himself and let another judge preside over the case. S. Rep. No. 93-419, p. 5 (1973) (emphasis added); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1453, p. 5 (1973) (emphasis added). The Reports of the two Houses continued: The statutes contain ample authority for chief judges to assign other judges to replace either a circuit or district court judge who become disqualified [under § 455]. S. Rep. No. 93-419, supra, at 7 (emphasis added); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1453, supra, at 7 (emphasis added). The congressional purpose so clearly expressed in the Reports gives no hint of altering the ancient Rule of Necessity, a doctrine that had not been questioned under prior judicial disqualification statutes. [20] The declared purpose of § 455 is to guarantee litigants a fair forum in which they can pursue their claims. Far from promoting this purpose, failure to apply the Rule of Necessity would have a contrary effect, for without the Rule, some litigants would be denied their right to a forum. The availability of a forum becomes especially important in these cases. As this Court has observed elsewhere, the Compensation Clause is designed to benefit, not the judges as individuals, but the public interest in a competent and independent judiciary. Evans v. Gore, supra, at 253. The public might be denied resolution of this crucial matter if first the District Judge, and now all the Justices of this Court, were to ignore the mandate of the Rule of Necessity and decline to answer the questions presented. On balance, the public interest would not be served by requiring disqualification under § 455. We therefore hold that § 455 was not intended by Congress to alter the time-honored Rule of Necessity. And we would not casually infer that the Legislative and Executive Branches sought by the enactment of § 455 to foreclose federal courts from exercising the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).