Opinion ID: 2069678
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Alleged Error in Alibi Instruction

Text: Appellant next claims that he is entitled to a new trial based on an alleged error in the trial court's instruction concerning alibi evidence. The trial court gave the following instruction concerning Appellant's alibi evidence: I charge you now on alibi. Even though there is no burden whatsoever on the defendant to offer or prove a defense, the defendant has offered a defense of alibi. Alibi is a defense that places a defendant, at the relevant time, in a different place from the scene involved, and so removed therefrom as to render it impossible for him to be the guilty party. Obviously the defendant cannot be guilty unless he was at the scene of the crime. The defendant has offered evidence to show that he was not present at the scene, but that he was at a relative's house in the vicinity at the time the crime was committed. If you believe that testimony, obviously the defendant is not guilty, because the Commonwealth must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the elements of the crime and, in addition, it must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was present and did, in fact, do the acts charged in the complaint. The defendant's evidence that he was not present, either by itself or together with other evidence, may be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt in your minds. The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their identification is exclusively for you, the jury. Now, even though the defense has presented witnesses who testified as to alibi, you may choose to disbelieve or disregard the testimony concerning alibi, and you may accept as true the testimony that the defendant was present and did commit the crime. For the law states that a positive, unqualified identification by one witness is sufficient for conviction, even though other witnesses testified as to alibi. N.T. 2/24/95 pp. 75-76. Appellant argues that the trial court's alibi instruction was incorrect because it did not tell the jury that an alibi defense could raise a reasonable doubt even if not wholly believed. Appellant relies on this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Pounds, 490 Pa. 621, 417 A.2d 597 (1980). In Pounds, the defendant introduced alibi evidence through his own testimony and the trial court did not give the jury any instruction on alibi. This Court granted the defendant a new trial and stated that: the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it should acquit if Pounds' alibi evidence, even if not wholly believed, raised a reasonable doubt of his presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and, thus, of his guilt. 490 Pa. at 633, 417 A.2d at 603 (footnote omitted). However, in Commonwealth v. Saunders, 529 Pa. 140, 602 A.2d 816 (1992), the defendant argued that the trial court's alibi instruction was erroneous because the trial court did not include the words even if not wholly believed when explaining the jury's consideration of alibi evidence. Our decision in Saunders plainly held that these words were not necessary in an alibi instruction, and emphasized that an appellate court's inquiry into the adequacy of a jury charge must not focus on the presence of magic words. In Saunders, as in the present case, the trial court closely patterned its alibi instruction after Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instruction § 3.11, [8] which does not contain the words even if not wholly believed. The present case is squarely controlled by our Saunders decision and accordingly, this claim must fail.