Opinion ID: 614400
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court Correctly Found Defense Counsel's Actions To Have Triggered the Proffer Agreement's Waiver Provision

Text: On this record, we identify no merit in Roberts's contention that the district court abused its discretion in finding that his attorney's actions triggered the waiver provision of his proffer agreement. To the extent defense counsel used argument and cross-examination to imply facts contradicted by Roberts's proffer statements, the district court was prepared to address such conduct simply through jury instructions advising that attorney statements were not evidence. Defense counsel, however, went further, insisting that documentary evidence be put before the jury that strongly implied that Beckford could not have been at the gate on November 5 when the Barbados flight was offloaded. Passenger-list documents showed that Beckford's flight from Miami to New York did not land at JFK until 9:38 p.m., while swipe-card records showed, in defense counsel's own characterization, that Beckford did not swipe into work until November 6th at three minutes after midnight. Trial Tr. at 464 (emphasis added). Had counsel limited his proffer to the flight information, his argument that the proof impeached only Beckford's testimony that he had been working at JFK on the afternoon of November 5 might have been more convincing. But that representation is undermined by counsel's simultaneous proffer of the swipe-card evidence. Roberts had no reason to offer those documents except to suggest that Beckford did not report for work at JFK until just after midnight on November 6, by which time it would have been too late to witness events occurring more than an hour earlier with respect to the offloading of the Barbados flight. Indeed, in his closing argument to the jury, defense counsel used the documentary evidence to urge just such a factual inference: [4] American Airlines Flight 1384 from Barbados arrived at JFK at 10:41 p.m. on November 5th, 2005. That's about one hour and three minutes after Clive Beckford's flight from Miami landed at JFK.... [D]id Clive Beckford sneak out on to the ramp and meet Victor Bourne after he got off that flight from Miami that night? ... [B]efore you even say maybe he did, you first have to ask how would that have been possible? Charles Schmidt, an American Airlines senior security representative and witness for the Government, said that it is not possible for someone to go from the terminal when a flight arrives out to the ramp area without swiping his employee ID to gain access to the secure ramp area.... Now, Mr. Schmidt did say that a person could walk from a jet bridge ... to the ramp without swiping your ID card by walking down the stairs connected to the jet bridge. But Clive Beckford said that he did not walk from a jet bridge to the ramp on November 5th, 2005. Mr. Schmidt did say that an employee can engage in the practice of piggybacking and enter a secure area without swiping his own employee ID card by following directly behind another employee who does swipe. But once again, Clive Beckford said he did not engage in the practice of piggybacking on November 5th, 2005. Mr. Schmidt further testified that Government Exhibit Number 904 shows that Clive Beckford did swipe his employee ID card at the east baggage area [of] ... the American Airline terminal... at 12:03 a.m., three minutes after midnight on November 6th, 2005. The problem for Clive Beckford and the Government is that it's not November 5th, 2005 and it's one hour and 22 minutes after the flight from Barbados landed at JFK. So not only do you have to consider the fact that this face-to-face conversation with Mr. Roberts at the beginning of the shift in the afternoon of November 5th, 2005 did not happen, you now have to ask the question how did Clive Beckford get to the ramp on November 5th, 2005 to see what he claims to have seen and do what he claims to have done? Id. at 720-22. The factual assertion thus being urged from the documents was that Beckford could not have been on the ramp for the offloading of the Barbados flight. Because that fact was rebutted by Roberts's proffer statements, the district court properly admitted excerpts from those statements into evidence. [5] United States v. Oluwanisola, 605 F.3d 124, relied on by Roberts, warrants no different conclusion. In that case, the defense did not put documentary evidence before the jury to imply facts that contradicted the defendant's proffer statements. Rather, counsel cross-examined a government agent in a way that cast doubt on his credibility. See id. at 129-30 (noting that defense counsel asked agent if his supervisor had memorialized agent's account of events in a report). Reversing the district court's finding that such questioning was, by itself, sufficient to trigger the waiver provision of the proffer agreement, this court observed that the query could not be construed as an implicit factual assertion that events testified to by the agent had not occurred when the defendant ha[d] not directly or indirectly contradicted the facts he admitted in his proffer. Id. at 132-33; see also United States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d at 119 (noting that challenging a witness's perception or recollection of an event does not necessarily imply that the event did not occur). In this case, however, defense counsel did more than use cross-examination to question Beckford's credibility. As already noted, the district court acknowledged that such credibility challenges would not trigger the proffer agreement's waiver provision under our case law. Instead, counsel went further, proffering documentary evidence that implied a particular fact, i.e., that Beckford could not have been present for the offloading of the 10:41 p.m. Barbados flight because his flight from Miami did not arrive in New York until 9:48 p.m. on November 5, and Beckford did not swipe into work at JFK until 12:03 a.m. on November 6. Unlike the cross-examination in Oluwanisola, this proffer did not simply impugn Beckford's credibility. It also put documentary evidence before the jury that implied a fact that was contradicted by Roberts's proffer statements expressly placing Beckford at the gate during the offloading of the Barbados flight, i.e., sometime after 10:41 p.m. but before 12:03 a.m. Accordingly, we identify no error in the district court's determination that defense counsel triggered the proffer agreement's waiver provision or in its admission of excerpts from Roberts's proffer statements.
Roberts submits that his sentence is unreasonable because it is infected by procedural error in the calculation of his Sentencing Guidelines range. See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189-90 (2d Cir.2008) ( en banc ). Specifically, he faults the district court for applying a two-point enhancement to his offense level for abuse of a position of trust. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. The argument fails on the merits. An abuse of trust enhancement is warranted if the defendant abused a position of public or private trust ... in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense. Id.; see United States v. Friedberg, 558 F.3d 131, 133 (2d Cir.2009). We have held that the professional or managerial discretion required to establish a position of trust, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n. 1, must be entrusted to the defendant by the victim of the offense, United States v. Broderson, 67 F.3d 452, 455-56 (2d Cir.1995); see also United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 643, 647 (2d Cir.1999) (noting that victim's perspective is utilized in applying abuse of trust enhancement). Victim status depends upon the circumstances of the case. United States v. Cusack, 229 F.3d 344, 349 (2d Cir.2000). Thus, crimes may have more than one victim, and a § 3B1.3 enhancement may apply whether the person whose trust a defendant abused was the primary or a secondary victim of the crime. Id.; see United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d at 647. On appeal, Roberts asserts that to the extent he abused a position of private trust conferred on him by his employer, American Airlines, to commit the crimes of conviction, no § 3B1.3 enhancement was warranted because American Airlines was not a victim of those crimes. Rather, the only victim was the United States. At the outset, we note that Roberts did not make this argument in the district court. There, he argued only that the government failed to establish that he used his crew chief position at American Airlines to facilitate the commission or concealment of his crimes. In these circumstances, we review his victim challenge only for plain error, which requires `(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.' United States v. Paul, 634 F.3d 668, 674 (2d Cir.2011) (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)). If those conditions are satisfied, we may then exercise our discretion to notice a forfeited error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). We identify no such plain error in the district court's identification of American Airlines as one victim of Roberts's drug trafficking. American Airlines entrusted Roberts with discretion to assign crews to load and unload its airplanes. Roberts abused that trust by exercising his discretion in such a way as to facilitate a drug smuggling operation. He assigned co-conspirators to offload airplanes used to bring drugs into the United States, while at the same time diverting crews unconnected to the conspiracy to other aircraft, thereby ensuring that they did not discover the secreted contraband. As a consequence, Roberts's abuse of his position of trust exposed his employer to harm, for example, public criticism for its employee's criminal conduct, with possible adverse consequences to the airline's business operations. This, by itself, permitted the district court to identify American Airlines as a victim of Roberts's crimes. See United States v. Cusack, 229 F.3d at 349 (holding party a victim where defendant's abuse of trust cast party in extremely unfavorable light (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also CNN, 2 Former Airline Workers at JFK Indicted on Drug Smuggling Charges (Oct. 14, 2010), http:// articles.cnn.com/2010-10-14/justice/new. york.airport.cocaine_1_baggage-handlers-airline-employees-airline-workers?_s=PM: CRIME (describing indictment of Bourne and co-conspirator); U.S. DEA, Former American Airlines Employee Sentenced to 240 Months in Prison for Smuggling Drugs into the United States (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/states/ newsrel/2010/nyc031510.html. That conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Roberts's abuse of trust further exposed his employer to criminal scrutiny and the possibility of fines or forfeiture. See 19 U.S.C. § 1584(a)(2) (imposing on master or owner of vessel $1,000 per ounce fine for cocaine found on board and not appearing in manifest); 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (subjecting to forfeiture [a]ll conveyances, including aircraft used in the unlawful transport of controlled substances). In these circumstances, Roberts cannot identify error, much less plain error, in the application of a § 3B1.3 enhancement to his Guidelines calculation based on his abuse of the position of trust he held at American Airlines. [6] Accordingly, we identify no procedural error in his sentence.
Roberts challenges the $3,160,000 forfeiture order in his case, asserting that the record evidence does not support a finding that the conspiracy obtained this amount in proceeds from its drug trafficking activities. The district court arrived at the challenged amount by finding that the conspiracy smuggled at least seventy-nine kilograms ( i.e., 79,000 grams) of cocaine into the United States and then multiplying that weight by its estimated street value of $40 per gram. We review the district court's factual findings regarding forfeiture for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 261 (2d Cir.2010), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S.Ct. 1000, 178 L.Ed.2d 854, 855 (2011). Title 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) states that a defendant convicted of a drug crime shall forfeit ... any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of the crime of conviction. In the case of a narcotics conspiracy, this mandatory liability is joint and several among all conspirators. See United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 129, 130 (2d Cir. 1988); cf. United States v. Fruchter, 411 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir.2005) (applying joint and several liability for criminal proceeds from racketeering enterprise). The procedures applicable to a forfeiture determination are detailed in Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2. The government's burden of proof with respect to forfeiture is a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Kalish, 626 F.3d 165, 168 (2d Cir.2010). In this case, the government sought to carry its burden by proving the quantity of cocaine dealt by the conspiracy and then urging that the amount be multiplied by the price it could have commanded. We identify no error in the district court's use of this approach. See United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32, 47-48 (2d Cir.2011) (stating that district court's forfeiture calculations may be based on reasonable estimate in light of available information). Specifically, we reject Roberts's argument that the evidence in this case was insufficient to permit a preponderance finding as to the quantity of cocaine smuggled into the United States by the charged conspiracy. Clive Beckford testified that in the period from 2003 to 2009, the conspiracy imported between four and fifteen kilograms of cocaine on at least seventeen occasions, not including one test trip, one trip importing marijuana, and the November 5, 2005 trip from Barbados resulting in a seizure of drugs. Roberts's proffer statementsthe use of which Roberts did not dispute at sentencingcorroborated Beckford's accounts and suggested that his estimates may have been low. Roberts admitted personally unloading fifteen bricks of cocaine on one occasion and estimated that the conspiracy imported thirty to forty kilograms of cocaine several times a week. This evidence supports the district court's conservative estimate that the conspiracy imported fifteen kilograms of cocaine on at least one occasion and four kilograms of cocaine on each of sixteen occasions, for a total of seventy-nine kilograms, or 79,000 grams, of cocaine. See United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d at 47-48; cf. United States v. Kalish, 626 F.3d at 168 (affirming forfeiture calculation based on defendant's routine fraudulent activity). Similarly, the evidence was sufficient to permit the district court to find by a preponderance that the conspiracy distributed this quantity of cocaine. Agent McAlpin offered expert testimony that this quantity of cocaine, possessing a purity level comparable to that seized on November 5, 2005, was consistent with distribution rather than personal use. This was supported by Beckford's testimony that, on at least one occasion, he and Roberts sent money representing drug profits to Jamaica to purchase more drugs. Trial Tr. at 404-05. The conspirators' successful distribution of the smuggled drugs could also be inferred from Beckford's testimony that Bourne and Roberts paid him between $2,000 and $10,000 each time he participated in an importation. Roberts's objection to the district court's valuation for the cocaine merits more discussion. Contrary to Roberts's assertion, the government was not obliged to adduce drug records or evidence of specific monetary transactions to support a preponderance finding as to the dollar amount realized from the conspirators' distribution of the smuggled cocaine. Def.'s Br. at 81-82. Conspiracies are, by their nature, shrouded in secrecy and, thus, such evidence may not always be available. Consequently, the law does not demand mathematical exactitude in calculating the proceeds subject to forfeiture. Indeed, because the purpose of forfeiture is punitive rather than restitutive, see Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 41, 116 S.Ct. 356, 133 L.Ed.2d 271 (1995), district courts are not required to conduct an investigative audit to ensure that a defendant is not deprived of a single farthing more than his criminal acts produced, United States v. Lizza Indus., Inc., 775 F.2d 492, 498 (2d Cir.1985) (making observation in context of forfeiture of racketeering proceeds). Rather, district courts may use general points of reference as a starting point for a forfeiture calculation and make reasonable extrapolations supported by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d at 48. Here, Agent McAlpin, testifying as an expert witness with respect to drug values, provided the district court with two possible starting points for calculating the value of the distributed drugs when he stated, without contradiction, that at the time of the charged distribution conspiracy, a kilogram of high quality cocaine would have sold for a wholesale price of $24,000. Meanwhile, if such cocaine were cut or diluted to a strength consistent with street sales, it could command a retail price of $40 per gram. See generally United States v. Quiroz, 13 F.3d 505, 514 (2d Cir.1993) (noting that matters such as the price of a kilogram of cocaine in New York City ... are appropriate areas for expert testimony). Roberts now faults the district court for using the retail rather than wholesale price for cocaine as the multiplier in calculating proceeds realized from the crimes of conviction in his case. No such objection was raised in the district court. There, Roberts argued more generally that any reliance on an estimated value of the seized cocaine to extrapolate total proceeds was overly speculative and that no evidence showed the wholesale or retail price negotiation regarding these alleged shipments. Def.'s Mem. of Law in Opp. to Gov't's Forfeiture Request at 6. Accordingly, we review the district court's use of a retail-value multiplier to estimate drug proceeds under the rigorous plain error standard. See United States v. Paul, 634 F.3d at 674. The government argues that no error can be identified here because it is always permissible and in fact the most reliable method to use a retail-value multiplier in calculating drug proceeds. Gov't's Br. at 65. In support, it cites United States v. Awad, 598 F.3d 76 (2d Cir.), cert denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 613, 178 L.Ed.2d 453 (2010). In that case, involving the importation of khat plants, whose constituent cathinone is a controlled substance, the forfeiture amount was calculated by multiplying drug quantities by street value. See id. at 78. That use of retail value, however, was not at issue on appeal and, thus, we had no occasion to consider whether a retail-value multiplier was properly supported by the evidence in that case. See id. at 78 n. 4. In Awad, we ruled only that a defendant was subject to a forfeiture order under 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) even if he possesses no assets at the time of sentencing. Id. at 78. Thus, Awad cannot decide this case. More relevant to the identification of possible error is law that affords a district court considerable discretion in estimating the proceeds realized from drug trafficking provided those estimates find support in a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d at 47-48. Thus, if the evidence indicates that it is more likely than not that a conspiracy that imported drugs then distributed the contraband through to the street level, the use of a retail multiplier would certainly be warranted. But where there is no evidence of such a conspiracy engaging in more than wholesale distribution, then application of a retail-value multiplier would be error. Further, such a possible error would affect substantial rights. If the seventy-nine kilograms of cocaine here at issue were sold wholesale for $24,000 per kilogram, the realized proceeds would be $1,896,000, more than $1 million less than the proceeds calculated by using the $40 per gram retail multiplier. Cf. United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 669 (2d Cir.2001) ( en banc ) (concluding that imposition of imprisonment term higher than maximum term established by Congress affected defendant's substantial rights). Here, the district court did not state its reasons for employing a retail rather than wholesale multiplier to calculate the conspiracy's drug proceeds. This is not surprising given that the government proposed this calculation, [7] and the defense did not urge that use of the wholesale value would be more appropriate. In short, there was no dispute to resolve. That is not the case on appeal where we consider a plain error challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support use of a retail multiplier. The record before us, however, does not permit us to decide conclusively whether evidence before the district courtwhether at trial, in pre-trial proceedings, at sentencing, or in forfeiture discussionscould support a preponderance finding that this particular conspiracy distributed at the retail as well as the wholesale level. Thus, we do not here decide the question of plain error. Rather, we vacate the forfeiture order and remand the case to the district court for clarification of this matter. See United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 118-19 (2d Cir.2005); United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 21-22 (2d Cir.1994); see also United States v. Varrone, 554 F.3d 327, 333 (2d Cir.2009) (vacating and remanding forfeiture order for further factual development regarding Eighth Amendment claim). On remand, the district court may expand the record as necessary to make factual findings on this question, and may modify the forfeiture order as warranted by the evidence.