Opinion ID: 6348736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: mental health commitments, appellate review,

Text: AND HARMLESS ERROR ¶49 It has been the law in Wisconsin for over a century that, when a circuit court enters a final judgment or order in a civil case, it must state its findings of facts and conclusions of law. See Wallis v. First Nat'l Bank, 155 Wis. 533, 535, 145 2 The majority unambiguously agrees with the court of appeals' decision to reverse the recommitment order. The majority repeatedly asserts in its opinion that reversal is the appropriate remedy in this case. Majority op., ¶¶4, 34, 38. Undoubtedly, the court of appeals' decision to reverse the recommitment order is not reversed by the majority opinion. Therefore, the majority mislabels its mandate as a reversal of the court of appeals' decision in full. In reality, the majority affirms the court of appeals' decision to reverse the recommitment order, and the majority reverses the decision to remand the case for rehearing. I disagree with the majority's reasoning, the lack of deference it provides to circuit court decision making, and the mischaracterized mandate. To be clear, the circuit court order should stand. 4 No. 2021AP6.akz N.W. 195 (1914) (explaining that a trial court must issue a decision embodying its findings of fact and conclusions of law before judgment is entered). This is embodied in Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2), which states that for all civil actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the ultimate facts and state separately its conclusions of law thereon. We have long required lower courts to articulate their reasoning in decisions in order to protect the rights of the litigants and to facilitate review of the record by an appellate court. Hochgurtel v. San Felippo, 78 Wis. 2d 70, 85, 253 N.W.2d 526 (1977). ¶50 However, for just as long as we have required circuit courts to explain their reasoning, we have also refused to reverse valid judgments outright when such reasoning is not provided. Wallis, 155 Wis. at 536 (The failure to make either findings of fact or conclusions of law is not reversible error, where the judgment shows that the necessary facts and conclusions must have been found in favor of the prevailing party and the evidence supports the judgment.). We have understood that outright reversal of a decision well supported by the record on the lack of circuit court findings would be draconian and would effect a miscarriage of justice. It would also undermine the respect due to circuit court judgments. Therefore, we have established three possible alternatives when reviewing a circuit court decision with incomplete findings. Appellate courts may (1) affirm the judgment if clearly supported by the . . . evidence, (2) reverse if not so 5 No. 2021AP6.akz supported, or (3) remand for the making of findings and conclusions. Kraemer v. Kraemer, 67 Wis. 2d 319, 320, 227 N.W.2d 61 (1975) (collecting cases); accord State v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶37, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475; Wallis, 155 Wis. at 535-36. ¶51 This is in line with an equally storied principle in civil jurisprudence: harmless error. See Wis. Stat. § 805.18(1) (explaining that civil judgments cannot be reversed absent a finding of an error that affect[s] the substantial rights of the adverse party); Harran v. Klaus, 79 Wis. 383, 387, 48 N.W. 479 (1891) ([T]he court [shall], in every stage of an action, [] disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which shall not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party, and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect.); Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶30, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698 (The appellate court must conduct a harmless error analysis to determine whether the error affected the substantial rights of the party. (quotations omitted)); 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 982 (2022) ([I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a party cannot assign as error that which is not prejudicial to him or her.). The harmless error doctrine ensures finality, respect for judicial decisions, and fairness for all litigants. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986) (Reversal for error, regardless of its effect on the judgment, encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule it. (quotations omitted)); 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error, supra 6 No. 2021AP6.akz (explaining that the harmless error doctrine ensures the orderly administration of justice and . . . the avoidance of useless expense to litigants). In all, appellate courts do not reverse civil judgments in favor of one party simply because the circuit court failed to follow proper procedure. ¶52 These basic principles of appellate review in civil cases are applicable to Chapter 51 recommitments. See Milwaukee County v. Mary F.-R., 2013 WI 92, ¶¶11-13, 351 Wis. 2d 273, 839 N.W.2d 581 (explaining that Chapter 51 commitments are civil proceedings); Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(c) (stating that Chapter 51 proceedings are governed by the rules of evidence and procedure in civil cases). Under § 51.20(13), absent a jury demand, the circuit court overseeing a Chapter 51 commitment proceeding must make factual findings and determine whether as a matter of law an individual is mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous. § 51.20(1)(a). This is in kind with all civil cases tried and decided by a judge. Accordingly, we recognized in Marathon County v. D.K. that it is best practice for circuit courts to state and explain their factual and legal conclusions. 2020 WI 8, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901. Every member of the court in D.K. agreed that the circuit court in the first instance must provide explicit and cogent analysis to facilitate appellate review. Id., ¶55 (Ziegler, J., joined by Roggensack, C.J., and Hagedorn, J.) ([T]he circuit court could have made more detailed and thorough factual findings and clarified its legal conclusions.); id., ¶68 n.4 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring, joined by 7 No. 2021AP6.akz Kelly, J.) ([C]ircuit courts must expressly make independent factual findings on the record, separate from any legal conclusions.); id., ¶86 (Dallet, J., dissenting, joined by Ann Walsh Bradley, J.) ([Chapter 51 proceedings] cannot be perfunctory under the law.). ¶53 It was in this legal environment that the court in D.J.W. held that circuit courts must state their recommitment findings on the record. Under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am), an individual already subject to commitment can be recommitted if there is a finding that the individual would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn. Prior to D.J.W., there was confusion as to whether this was a standalone basis for recommitment, or if a circuit court was required to cite back to one of the initial bases for committing mentally ill individuals along with § 51.20(1)(am). See § 51.20(1)(a)2. This confusion was in no small part due to the language used in our prior opinions to describe recommitment and subsection (am). See Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶19, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509 ([T]he County may, as an alternative to the options outlined in § 51.20(1)(a)2.a-e, prove dangerousness under the recommitment pathway of § 51.20(1)(am)). D.J.W. clarified that, when an individual is recommitted, the circuit court must state its factual findings with reference to one of the initial commitment pathways, in addition to § 51.20(1)(am). D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶40 ([W]e determine that going forward circuit courts in recommitment proceedings are to make specific 8 No. 2021AP6.akz factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based.). ¶54 In D.J.W., the circuit court did not cite one of the five pathways for initial commitment when it recommitted the individual at issue. Id., ¶45. Further, in oral arguments before the court, the county cited a different dangerousness pathway for recommitment than what was used to obtain the committee's initial commitment six months prior. Id., ¶¶38-39. Nonetheless, we examined the record to determine if recommitment was appropriate, and it was apparent that the county had failed to present the requisite proof. The strongest evidence in favor of commitment was testimony that without treatment the individual would be unable to maintain a job, hav[e] to rely on disability for income, and liv[e] with family. Id., ¶51. We noted that this was a far cry from a 'substantial probability' that 'death, serious physical injury, serious physical debilitation, or serious physical disease' would ensue if treatment were withdrawn under the fourth pathway, Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.d. Id., ¶53. Under the third pathway, § 51.20(1)(a)2.c., we explained that schizophrenia, by itself, does not demonstrate the requisite 'substantial probability of physical impairment.' Id., ¶57. ¶55 Thus, D.J.W. stands for the well-accepted proposition that circuit courts, as in all civil proceedings, must explain their factual findings and legal conclusions to facilitate effective appellate review. D.J.W. clarified that, in recommitment proceedings, these circuit court statements must be 9 No. 2021AP6.akz made in reference to both an initial commitment pathway and Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am). Nowhere in D.J.W. did we state that appellate courts would reverse any and all recommitment orders that, on a cursory review, lack citation to an initial commitment pathway. And nowhere in D.J.W. did the court indicate that traditional appellate review of lower court decisions would be amended or abrogated. In fact, D.J.W. stands for the proposition that any error is not reversible error if the record supports the recommitment or if the error is harmless. ¶56 When there are inadequate lower court findings in civil proceedings, we must (1) affirm the judgment if clearly supported by the . . . evidence, (2) reverse if not so supported, or (3) remand for the making of findings and conclusions. Kraemer, 67 Wis. 2d at 320; Margaret H., 234 Wis. 2d 606, ¶37. D.J.W. did not change this law when the civil proceeding happens to be under Chapter 51. Here, the majority concludes that the court of appeals cannot remand the case for further findings and conclusions, citing the lack of competence. Majority op., ¶4. That leaves either affirming the judgment on the available evidence or reversing if the evidence is not available or apparent. Id. The majority conspicuously does not discuss this issue; it simply concludes reversal is the appropriate remedy. Id. Although the majority provides no reasoning on the topic, the apparent result is an outright reversal without any discussion of the record. But no such 10 No. 2021AP6.akz remedy has ever been recognized in Wisconsin for civil proceedings. ¶57 In addition to this conflict with law and precedent, the majority fails to even mention harmless error in its analysis. In line with standard civil procedure, harmless error applies to Chapter 51 proceedings. Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(10)(c) unambiguously states that in every stage of an action, [the court shall] disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings that does not affect the substantial rights of either party. This language is regularly interpreted as requiring harmless error review. See Martindale, 246 Wis. 2d 67, ¶30; 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error, supra ¶51, (The reviewing court must disregard error, in every stage of the action, which does not affect the substantial rights of the party complaining.). Both this court and the court of appeals have recognized that harmless error applies to Chapter 51 proceedings. See S.Y. v. Eau Claire County, 162 Wis. 2d 320, 338-39, 469 N.W.2d 836 (1991) (noting that an admission of evidence on dangerousness was harmless); D.S. v. Racine County, 142 Wis. 2d 129, 135-36, 416 N.W.2d 292 (1987) (reviewing a Chapter 51 commitment, holding that the petition failed to comply with procedural drafting requirements, and explaining that [t]here must be a further showing that this defect misled or caused prejudice before noncompliance with procedural statutory requirements may result in reversal (citing Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(c) (1987-88)); see, e.g., Rock County v. J.J.K., No. 2020AP2105, unpublished slip op., 2021 WL 1803745, 11 No. 2021AP6.akz at -9 (Wis. Ct. App. May 6, 2021) (reviewing a circuit court transcript that failed to identify or cite the correct dangerousness pathway, concluding that any D.J.W. error was harmless because the record and the circuit court's analysis fit well within the fourth pathway, and reasoning that D.J.W. was not intended to put form over substance in a manner that would require reversal on this record). ¶58 D.J.W. in no way implied that harmless error review was inapplicable to circuit courts' explanations of fact and law. To do so would mark a stark departure from established civil procedure (Wis. Stat. § 805.18; Harran, 79 Wis. at 387, Martindale, 246 Wis. 2d 67, ¶30; 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error, supra ¶51) from statutes governing mental health commitments (Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(c)), and from our Chapter 51 precedents (S.Y., 162 Wis. 2d at 338-39, D.S., 142 Wis. 2d at 135-36). Moreover, it would place transcript clarity above some of our most cherished constitutional rights. ¶59 Criminal proceedings experience the same, if not greater constitutional scrutiny than civil commitments. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427-31 (1979) (comparing the due process implications of criminal prosecutions and civil commitments; stating that civil commitments are not punitive,; they rely on medical expert opinion not the judgments of laypeople; the costs imposed on committees if they are wrongfully released can be substantial; and civil commitments by their nature involve less certainty). Nonetheless, in criminal cases, we have routinely applied harmless error to uphold valid 12 No. 2021AP6.akz circuit court judgments, even where the defendant's fundamental rights were abridged. As we stated in State v. Nelson, even in the most flagrant cases of error, Wisconsin accords a 'strong presumption' that an error is subject to a harmless-error review. 2014 WI 70, ¶29, 355 Wis. 2d 722, 849 N.W.2d 317 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999)). Accordingly, most constitutional errors can be harmless, and only a very limited class of cases require automatic reversal. Id. (quotations omitted). ¶60 We have applied harmless error to jury instructions that violated a criminal defendant's due process rights, State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶47, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189; violations of criminal defendant's right to testify to her own behalf, State v. Anthony, 2015 WI 20, ¶101, 361 Wis. 2d 116, 860 N.W.2d 10; Miranda violations, State v. Martin, 2012 WI 96, ¶44, 343 Wis. 2d 278, 816 N.W.2d 270; and breaches of a criminal defendant's right to confrontation, State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶59, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637; to name a few.3 Only a limited number of circuit court errors are subject to automatic 3Any argument that applying harmless error to D.J.W. would make nonexistent D.J.W.'s holding is completely at odds with harmless error jurisprudence. No reasonable jurist actually contends that the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments cease to exist simply because judgments are affirmed despite violations of those amendments. A circuit court or litigant who intentionally and knowingly violates the law, relying on the fact that harmless error applies on appeal, would be engaging in the unethical practice of law. See SCR 20:3.1(a)(1) (an attorney cannot knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law); SCR 60.04(1)(hm) (A judge shall uphold and apply the law and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.). 13 No. 2021AP6.akz reversal. These structural errors are constitutional in nature, affect the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end, and on appeal, the impact of the error on the trial cannot be readily determined. State v. Pinno, 2014 WI 74, ¶49, 356 Wis. 2d 106, 850 N.W.2d 207. Certainly, the failure of a circuit court to state factual conclusions upon review of an established record and the failure to cite a statutory subsection are not structural errors in line with the complete denial of the right to counsel. Id., ¶50. Appellate courts are more than capable of reviewing a record, party arguments, and circuit court reasoning to determine if a dangerousness pathway has been met. In addition, the failure of a circuit court to be precise in its reasoning does not infect the entire recommitment proceeding with a constitutional violation.4 ¶61 Our precedents in the criminal sentencing context also support the conclusion that automatic reversal for D.J.W. violations would be improper. When sentencing criminal 4The fact that Wisconsin appellate courts have, for over a century, examined the record when the circuit court's findings are inadequate and have applied harmless error analyses is proof positive that review of the record when there is a D.J.W. violation is both practical and administrable. Kraemer v. Kraemer, 67 Wis. 2d 319, 320, 227 N.W.2d 61 (1975); State v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶37, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475; Harran v. Klaus, 79 Wis. 383, 387, 48 N.W. 479 (1891); Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶30, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698. If the record and the circuit court findings do not allow the appellate court to reasonably determine what pathway of dangerousness is supported by the record, the appellate court can reverse the recommitment order. This result would align with D.J.W.'s purpose in ensuring clarity and factual support in recommitment orders while also protecting the finality of valid circuit court judgments. 14 No. 2021AP6.akz defendants, we have held that circuit courts must, by reference to the relevant facts and factors, explain how the sentence's component parts promote the [statutorily required] sentencing objectives. State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶46, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197. This standard is very similar to D.J.W.'s requirement that circuit courts link their factual findings to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.'s dangerousness pathways. However, unlike determinations of dangerousness for Chapter 51 proceedings, sentencing determinations are largely left to the discretion of circuit courts. Compare D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶18 ([O]ur review of statutory dangerousness requires us to apply the facts to the statutory standard and presents a question of law that we review independently.), with Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶18 ([Appellate courts] follow[] a consistent and strong policy against interference with the discretion of the trial court in passing sentence. (quotations omitted)). It is therefore of special import that sentencing courts explain their reasoning so litigants, the public, and appellate courts can have confidence that the circuit court properly exercised its wide discretion. ¶62 Nonetheless, even in the sentencing context, we have made clear that circuit courts are not required to use magic words. Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶49. We do not reverse convictions simply because a circuit court failed to explicitly quote or reference sentencing factors, even if that method would facilitate appellate review. McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 280-81, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971). Instead, [i]f the facts are 15 No. 2021AP6.akz fairly inferable from the record, and the reasons indicate the consideration of legally relevant factors, the sentence should ordinarily be affirmed. State v. Grady, 2007 WI 81, ¶33, 302 Wis. 2d 80, 734 N.W.2d 364. ¶63 If D.J.W. errors result in automatic reversal, without any consideration of the record as a whole or harmless error, we will transform Chapter 51 appeals into contests over magic words. Appellate courts would put aside any consideration of the merits. Instead, the driving focus would become whether the circuit court cited or quoted a subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. This would create horrible incentives for litigants. If a commitment can be overturned on mere citations and labels, the opportunities for gamesmanship would substantially increase. Specifically, committees and their representatives will have no incentive to assist circuit courts in complying with D.J.W. Even in cases where the record overwhelmingly supports commitment and the individual desperately needs treatment, if a circuit court mistakenly fails to cite a subdivision paragraph of § 51.20(1)(a)2., the 16 No. 2021AP6.akz committee can remain silent and overturn his or her commitment on appeal.5 ¶64 D.J.W. reiterated the long-established principle that circuit courts must explain their reasoning and legal conclusions when they decide civil cases. 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶40; D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶¶55, 68 n.4, 86; Wallis, 155 Wis. at 53536. When circuit courts fail to do so, we must examine the record and determine whether their decision should be affirmed or reversed. Kraemer, 67 Wis. 2d at 320; Margaret H., 234 Wis. 2d 606, ¶37. In all legal proceedings, civil and criminal, Even if we create a new rule mandating automatic reversal 5 of Chapter 51 commitments, for sake of basic judicial integrity, we must apply the forfeiture doctrine to D.J.W. violations. See Waukesha County v. S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, ¶42, 387 Wis. 2d 333, 929 N.W.2d 140 (reasoning that a Chapter 51 committee did not object to the sufficiency of the evidence and had thus forfeited the issue on appeal); Wis. Stat. § 805.11(1), (3) (stating that [a]ny party who has fair opportunity to object before a ruling or order is made must do so in order to avoid waiving error and reiterating that [e]xceptions shall never be made). Committees and their counsel must have some incentive to encourage D.J.W. compliance. See State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶30, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (The purpose of the 'forfeiture' rule is to enable the circuit court to avoid or correct any error with minimal disruption of the judicial process, eliminating the need for appeal.). Otherwise, D.J.W. will become nothing more than a tripwire to easily overturn commitments, not a means to ensure effective court administration. Notably, there is no record here that M.W. objected to any lack of clarity on which statutory basis the recommitment was supported, nor at the time of the recommitment was she left unaware of possible dangerousness pathways under which she could be recommitted. At the hearing, M.W.'s counsel objected to an alleged lack of pre-hearing notice on the part of the County, but then directly addressed and opposed application of the fifth dangerousness pathway before the circuit court. After the circuit court provided its reasoning in favor of recommitment, the circuit court gave M.W.'s counsel an opportunity to comment or object. 17 No. 2021AP6.akz appellate courts apply harmless error. Wis. Stat. § 805.18; Harran, 79 Wis. at 387; Martindale, 246 Wis. 2d 67, ¶30; 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error, supra ¶51; Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d 722, ¶29; Pinno, 356 Wis. 2d 106, ¶49. And the harmless error doctrine extends to Chapter 51 commitments. See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(c); S.Y., 162 Wis. 2d at 338-39; D.S., 142 Wis. 2d at 135-36. ¶65 D.J.W. correctly reversed a Chapter 51 commitment that was woefully lacking in factual support or a clear connection to a dangerousness pathway under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶¶38-39, 51, 53, 57. The case did not remake appellate practice and procedure in this state. It did not create a judge-made structural error standard, nor did it mandate the use of magic words. In line with our historical practice, precedents, and statutes, we cannot reverse wholesale any and all Chapter 51 commitments when there is a D.J.W. error. If the commitment is supported by the evidence and the law, it must be affirmed. In addition, the County must be given the opportunity to argue for harmless error. ¶66 The stakes are high in Chapter 51 commitments. Although we hold the County to rigorous standards and safeguard committees' rights to fair and honest treatment, civil commitment ultimately ensures that mentally ill individuals receive the treatment they need before someone gets hurt. Automatic reversal of commitment orders solely due to the lack of precise wording on the part of a judge ignores substance and makes form paramount. And the potential costs would 18 No. 2021AP6.akz significantly outweigh any intended benefits. Even the most suicidal or homicidal individuals may have their commitments overturned on the basis of a circuit court's procedural error. This would be a grave disservice to the fair and proper administration of justice. More significantly, it would symbolize a failure of the judiciary to the many victims of severe mental illness, who rely on Chapter 51 for safety and protection. In cruel irony, unjustified reversal will harm civil committees the most. Addington, 441 U.S. at 430 (Such 'freedom' for a mentally ill person would be purchased at a high price.). II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION AND THE MAJORITY OPINION ¶67 Here, the court of appeals examined the circuit court transcript and determined that the circuit court did not quote or cite a dangerousness pathway under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. Shebogyan County v. M.W., No. 2021AP6, unpublished slip op., ¶¶10, 12 (Wis. Ct. App. May 12, 2021). The court of appeals reversed M.W.'s commitment, but remanded the case for the circuit court to clarify its findings. Id., ¶14. This is in line with established practice for reviewing circuit court findings in civil cases. Kraemer, 67 Wis. 2d at 320 (explaining that appellate courts may remand for the making of findings and conclusions); accord Margaret H., 234 Wis. 2d 606, ¶37. However, the court of appeals did not consider whether the record supported M.W.'s recommitment notwithstanding any D.J.W. error. The court of appeals also did not review M.W.'s recommitment under the harmless error doctrine, despite the 19 No. 2021AP6.akz County arguing explicitly in its court of appeals brief that harmless error applied: Since the Court's ruling can easily be determined upon review, M.W. is not substantially prejudiced by the lack of specific statute number (citing Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(c)). ¶68 If the court of appeals examined the record or applied harmless error, it would not have reversed the recommitment order in this case. There was substantial evidence to support the fifth pathway on dangerousness, and both medical experts and the County argued for application of that pathway before the circuit court. ¶69 The record strongly favored recommitment. M.W. was initially committed in 2006 after attempting suicide at least 20 times. She was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, with acute psychotic symptoms, and has since received treatment in a stable environment. A registered psychiatrist with over 25 years of experience attempted to interview M.W. telephonically to determine the need for recommitment. M.W. hung up on the doctor during the examination, but the doctor observed in that time that M.W. was manic, paranoid, angry, dysphoric, not rational, [and] making delusional comments. The doctor noted that M.W. eloped from her outpatient facility during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic (March 2020) without medication, money, or any sort of plan. Reviewing M.W.'s complete treatment record and applying his professional judgment, the doctor explained that M.W. has shown a complete disregard for the need to get . . . help. The doctor stated standard five for mental 20 No. 2021AP6.akz health commitment was exactly how [M.W.] would be dangerous if she were not recommitted. A trained behavior health manager who had worked directly with M.W. for months, provided testimony supporting the doctor's account. The manager described M.W. as erratic, unable to receive care outside commitment, and hostile to medication and non-pharmaceutical treatment. The only evidence presented against recommitment was testimony from M.W. herself, who described herself as independent, stable, and medication compliant. During the hearing, M.W. also became agitated and interrupted witnesses and the circuit court in unsolicited outbursts. In closing arguments, the County argued for application of the fifth dangerousness pathway. ¶70 The circuit court findings further supported recommitment. The circuit court quoted the recommitment pathway (D.J.W. had been decided only six months prior) and cited in detail the doctor's testimony. The court stated that M.W. can become so psychotic . . . she doesn't take care of herself and that endangers her and explained that, without treatment, she is going to lack the services necessary for her health and safety. Finally, the circuit court reasoned that the advantages of medication had been explained to M.W., but she was not competent to understand those advantages to make informed decisions. The court clearly did not find M.W.'s testimony credible. See State v. Anson, 2005 WI 96, ¶32, 282 Wis. 2d 629, 698 N.W.2d 776 (When . . . the trial court acts as the finder of fact it is the ultimate arbiter of both the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to each witness' 21 No. 2021AP6.akz testimony. (quotations omitted)); Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2) (stating that findings of fact from a trial court are reviewed with due regard . . . to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses). In all, if the court of appeals examined the record as a whole and the circuit court's statements, M.W.'s recommitment would have been affirmed under the fifth dangerousness pathway. ¶71 After the court of appeals reversed the recommitment order and remanded for further proceedings, M.W. appealed to this court challenging the court of appeals' chosen remedy for a D.J.W. violation. In the process, the County did not appeal the determination that D.J.W. was not adequately followed. The majority states that remand is not possible in this case because the circuit court lost competency. Majority op., ¶4. That is not true of all cases, and the majority opinion does not state that it is applying a categorical rule. See id., ¶4 (As a consequence, reversal is the appropriate remedy in this case due to the lack of competency). As members of a competent and well-trained judiciary, appellate courts should prudently analyze each case and determine the proper remedy case-by-case, as is done in all civil cases with inadequate circuit court findings. In cases where the circuit court still retains competency and can efficiently correct any D.J.W. errors, appellate courts must be permitted to consider remand to correct any D.J.W.-specification errors. The concern in D.J.W. was the lack of clarity in circuit court decisions; if a circuit court 22 No. 2021AP6.akz can effectively resolve the uncertainty on remand, appellate courts should facilitate that result. ¶72 In holding that remand is not an available remedy in this case, the majority makes no effort to describe if, when, or how appellate courts can review whether the record supports commitment and affirm a circuit court's judgment even where there is a D.J.W. violation. The majority simply concludes reversal is the appropriate remedy in this case. Majority op., ¶4. Harmless error is not mentioned once in the analysis. This is all despite the fact that the County thoroughly examined the evidence in support of M.W.'s commitment, asserted that M.W. should be recommitted under the fifth dangerousness pathway, and claimed that the only error in this case was a procedural violation whereby the circuit court did not make its findings clear enough as to what standard it was basing its decision on. It was abundantly clear in its arguments that the County believed reversal in this case solely on the basis of a D.J.W. violation would be inappropriate given that the merits so strongly supported recommitment. Furthermore, M.W. argued action in the court of appeals, in which the court of appeals would affirm the recommitment notwithstanding a D.J.W. violation, could be a possible remedy in this case. We have been asked to determine what the appropriate remedy is when a D.J.W. violation has been found; the issue is squarely before us. Affirming a recommitment on appeal upon review of the record is a remedy that can and should be used. And if that remedy were applied in this case, M.W.'s recommitment would be 23 No. 2021AP6.akz affirmed. The failure of the majority to address the record and the circuit court's reasoning deprives the circuit court decision of the deference it is due. ¶73 This is a profound and extraordinarily important legal issue for this state. If D.J.W. requires automatic reversal of civil commitments for the lack of correct wording on the part of the circuit court, without any showing of structural error or prejudice, the court will be creating a remedy never before recognized in this state. It would cast aside over a century of appellate practice and precedents, and it would ignore explicit and on-point statutory language in favor of novel, judicially devised law. Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(c) ([I]n every stage of an action, [the court shall] disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings that does not affect the substantial rights of either party.); Kraemer, 67 Wis. 2d at 320; Margaret H., 234 Wis. 2d 606, ¶37; Wis. Stat. § 805.18; Harran, 79 Wis. at 387; Martindale, 246 Wis. 2d 67, ¶30; 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error, supra ¶51; Nelson, 355 Wis. 2d 722, ¶29; Pinno, 356 Wis. 2d 106, ¶49; S.Y., 162 Wis. 2d at 338-39; D.S., 142 Wis. 2d at 135-36. ¶74 While bearing the appearance of a limited decision, the majority opinion in this case has potentially significant consequences. The majority refuses to provide guidance to future courts as to how they should actually deal with D.J.W. errors. Can appellate courts review the record to determine if commitment is supported, despite a circuit court's failure to cite or reference a subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. 24 No. 2021AP6.akz § 51.20(1)(a)2.? Can appellate courts apply harmless error, or must they reverse as a matter of course all mental commitments, even those with overwhelming support in the record and in circuit court findings? The majority opinion leaves lower courts and Chapter 51 litigants in the dark. In so doing, today's decision practically guarantees further litigation and confusion. It may very well be that in the process, valid and necessary commitments are reversed for the lack of magic references to subdivision paragraphs of § 51.20(1)(a)2. Appellate courts can cite the majority's rejection of remand procedures in this case, its conclusion that reversal is the appropriate remedy, and its conspicuous silence on other methods of review. Majority op. ¶4. They can observe that M.W.'s recommitment was reversed without any examination of the record. Other appellate courts, by contrast, may look to how every other civil and criminal appeal operates, and how every other Chapter 51 error is reviewed, and affirm valid commitments supported by the record and the circuit court's findings. Inconsistent standards and legal uncertainty work only to the detriment of those subject to Chapter 51 commitment proceedings. ¶75 By relying on a procedural error, and conducting no other analysis, the majority's decision avoids significant determinations that are due the state of Wisconsin and M.W. There is a time and place for avoiding extraneous legal issues, and there is a time and place for this court to provide clarity for Wisconsin's legal system. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (The purpose of the 25 No. 2021AP6.akz supreme court is to oversee and implement the statewide development of the law. (quotations omitted)). By taking this case, but refusing to fully address the issues presented, the most consequential result of the majority's decision is increased legal uncertainty. If this court believes any and all Chapter 51 commitments should be reversed if the circuit court fails to reference a subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2., the court should make that clear. If the court does so, the legislature would at least have the opportunity to consider legislation to avoid the manifest injustice such a decision would engender.