Opinion ID: 1499045
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Whether or not such an executory contract has been rescinded by mutual consent is a question of fact which need not be proved by express terms, but may be inferred from the attendant circumstances and the conduct of the parties. Lewis v. Marsters, 139 Me. 17, 22, 26 A.2d 649, 651 (1942). We have also recognized that while a rescission and substituted contract may be proved inferentially, nothing short of cogent proof will establish the fact of a change in that which originally was reciprocally done. Spaulding v. American Realty Co., 121 Me. 493, 494, 118 A. 322, 322 (1922). See also Lemieux & Co. v. Letourneau, 130 Me. 201, 208, 154 A. 454, 457 (1931). The District Court judge found as a fact that any building contract the parties may originally have had was rescinded early in the course of construction. In reviewing that finding on appeal the Superior Court justice was bound to apply the clearly erroneous test prescribed by Rule 73(a), D.C. Civ.R. We have repeatedly stated that findings of fact made by the trial court who heard the testimony of the witnesses are entitled to considerable respect. LaPointe Brothers, Inc. v. Farrell, Me., 363 A.2d 225, 228 (1976); Dehahn v. Innes, Me., 356 A.2d 711, 716-17 (1976); Jolicoeur v. Kennebec Water District, Me., 356 A.2d 193, 195 (1976); Atlantic Acoustical & Insulation Co. v. Moreira, Me., 348 A.2d 263, 266 (1976). In the case at bar, much turned upon the credibility of the witnesses testifying in person before the District Court judge. In that testimony the principal witness for the Church conceded that he was aware that a billing change had been made by Torrey and that the Church was being charged on a cost-plus-ten-percent basis instead of on a contract installment basis; yet he insisted that the Church never agreed to that change. He also acknowledged that the Church willingly made some payments to Torrey in excess of the original $40,000 contract price, and he did not contradict the testimony of plaintiff's wife that he told her over the phone that the Church fully intended to pay Torrey the entire sum which Torrey said the Church owed him, including sums exceeding $40,000. Plaintiff Torrey flatly testified that the Church agreed to abandon the original contract in favor of the cost-plus-ten-percent agreement. Defendant's witnesses denied this. Faced with a direct conflict in the testimony of witnesses appearing before him, the District Court judge chose to believe plaintiff's witnesses. We cannot say that his factual conclusion was clearly erroneous. In reviewing factfindings in civil cases tried in the District Court, both the Superior Court (which for that purpose is merely an intermediate appellate court) and the Law Court are placed in the position of scrutinizing a cold record. Long ago we observed that much passes before the eye of a trial judge that is not capable of being preserved in the record. Young v. Witham, 75 Me. 536, 537 (1884). The familiar rule that findings of fact will not be set aside if they are supported by competent evidence is based upon appreciation of the truth that the fact finder who hears and sees the witnesses, who observes their hesitations, inflections and emphases, is in a more favorable position to judge their credibility than the appellate court which only reads the printed testimony. Matthews v. R. T. Allen & Sons, Inc., Me., 266 A.2d 240, 244 (1970). See also Cunningham v. Cunningham, Me., 314 A.2d 834, 838 (1974). The outcome of the case at bar hinged upon the credibility of the witnesses. The District Court judge heard plaintiff's testimony, chose to believe him and his witnesses, and found that a rescission of the original contract had occurred. The Superior Court erred in concluding that the District Court's finding was clearly erroneous. The Church argues that even if the evidence was sufficient to prove a rescission of the original contract, Torrey failed to prove the amount of his damages with reasonable certainty, since he did not establish that he had performed the labor and furnished the materials for which the Church was charged. The issue thus raised by the Church was not reached by the Superior Court, and accordingly we must examine the District Court record to determine whether the District Court's finding of damages in the amount of $10,141.00 was clearly erroneous as now asserted by the Church. In support of his claim for damages, Torrey offered in evidence copies of 19 periodic bills he prepared and submitted to the Church between October 22, 1971 and June 28, 1972. At the time of their admission, the Church made only a generalized objection. In subsequent testimony, Torrey's bookkeeper laid an adequate foundation for admission of the bill copies as business records admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule provided by Rule 803(6), M.R. Evid. That rule provides that notwithstanding the availability of the declarant who prepared them, business records in the form of memoranda, reports, or data compilations made at or near the time of the events reflected in the records and kept in the course of a regular[ly] conducted business are admissible. [3] The bookkeeper testified that as part of his regular job he personally prepared the bills from information available to him of the amounts of labor and materials furnished the Church. The bills were routinely prepared as the labor and materials were furnished, thus satisfying the requirement that they be prepared near the time of the events reflected in the bills. We are satisfied that it was the regular practice of Torrey's business to prepare and keep copies of bills sent to customers on a periodic basis. The reliability of business records is thought to rest upon the systematic businesslike way in which they are kept. Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 803.6, p. 216 (1976). See also 4 J. Weinstein and M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 803(6)[01] (1977). There is nothing in this record to suggest that the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. On the facts of this case, the bills were properly admitted for the truth of the matter asserted; namely, the amounts of labor and materials which Torrey furnished the Church. The latter offered no evidence to show that those amounts were false or inflated. Standing alone, without contradiction, those business records provided adequate evidentiary support for the District Court's finding of Torrey's damages. An appellate court on this record cannot say that the District Court's finding was clearly erroneous. The entry must be: Appeal sustained. Superior Court judgment reversed. Remanded to the Superior Court for entry of judgment denying defendant's appeal from the District Court and affirming judgment of the District Court. POMEROY, J., did not sit.