Opinion ID: 2545785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defense Counsel's Failure to Request Special Instructions

Text: According to defendant, counsel was incompetent for failing to request special instructions on a variety of subjects. We discuss each in turn. As previously discussed, the trial court gave a standard instruction, CALJIC No. 8.85, describing the factors the jury could consider in its penalty deliberations, including the following: Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other aspect of defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial. Defendant contends his counsel should have asked for a pinpoint instruction to explain to the jury the scope of this part of CALJIC No. 8.85. Defendant suggests an instruction such as the one given in People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 647, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160, where the trial court told the jury that the mitigating factors listed in CALJIC No. 8.85 were only examples and the jury could consider other circumstances as reasons for not imposing the death penalty, or an instruction drawing the jury's attention to defendant's background, history, and character, his capabilities or lack of same, and his accomplishments or lack of same, as was given by the court in People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97, 114, 249 Cal.Rptr. 630, 757 P.2d 569. The trial court was under no obligation to give such an instruction, which would have been essentially duplicative of CALJIC No. 8.85, and counsel need not request unnecessary and duplicative instructions. Defendant faults his counsel for not requesting an instruction drawing the jury's attention to categories of mitigating evidence offered by the defense, such as defendant's deprived childhood, his military service, his artistic abilities, his role as a father, and his behavior in prison. As we have held in the past, instructions of this type are argumentative, and therefore should not be given, because they `invite the jury to draw inferences favorable to one of the parties from specified items of evidence.' ( People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1067-1068, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) Defendant asserts that in the absence of special instructions of the kind described above, CALJIC No. 8.85 was misleading, confusing and likely to lead to an arbitrary verdict of death. To the contrary. We have held that this instruction correctly describes the jury's role in evaluating evidence presented at the penalty phase. ( People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1266-1268, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475.) Counsel was not ineffective for not requesting additional instructions elaborating upon CALJIC No. 8.85. Defendant argues defense counsel should have sought an instruction that the jury could consider in mitigation the fact, if true, that the killings of the two young girls were not premeditated. According to defendant, we approved such an instruction in People v. Bonillas (1989) 48 Cal.3d 757, 792, 257 Cal.Rptr. 895, 771 P.2d 844. We did not. The trial court in Bonillas gave such an instruction, but we expressed no view as to whether the court should have given it. Moreover in Bonillas, unlike this case, the jury made no determination at the guilt phase that the murder the defendant had committed was premeditated, because the murder conviction there was based on the felony-murder rule. Here, by contrast, the guilt phase jury necessarily found premeditation when it convicted defendant of first degree murder. Assuming for the sake of argument that the instruction the trial court gave in Bonillas was appropriate there, it would have been improper here. Defendant also makes the closely related claim that counsel should have requested an instruction that if the jury had lingering doubts about premeditation, these doubts could be the basis for sentencing defendant to life in prison without possibility of parole. Even if such an instruction would have been proper, defense counsel may have had tactical reasons not to request it, as we explain in part III.D., post. Defendant faults counsel for failing to request an instruction that the jury could consider his lack of a history of violence and his lack of prior felony convictions as factors in mitigation. The trial court, however, gave the jury a standard instruction, CALJIC No. 8.85, stating that it could consider the presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant ... which involved the express or implied threat to use force or violence, and the presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.... (Italics added.) This instruction told the jury that if it found an absence of evidence that defendant had a history of violent criminal activity or prior felony convictions, it could consider that fact in mitigation. Defense counsel cannot be faulted for not requesting an instruction that would duplicate the one given by the court. Defendant argues the trial court's instruction mentioned in the preceding paragraph was inadequate because it merely stated that the jury shall consider, take into account and be guided by the presence or absence of a violent criminal history and prior felony convictions, and that counsel should have asked for an instruction that the jury must consider those factors. To the extent there is a difference between the instruction given by the trial court and that proposed by defendant, the trial court's instruction more accurately describes the jury's role in evaluating the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. (See § 190.3 [In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any of the [relevant] factors....].) The trial court told the jury to determine ... which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. Defendant notes that this instruction did not expressly say that one mitigating factor is sufficient to outweigh all aggravating factors, and he faults counsel for not requesting a clarifying instruction. But such a clarifying instruction would have been argumentative unless it also told the jury that one aggravating factor is sufficient to outweigh all mitigating factors. Counsel may reasonably have concluded that not only was such clarification unnecessary, but it would have done more harm than good, because it would have supported the prosecutor's argument that one aggravating factor (the circumstances of the crime) outweighed all of the factors in mitigation.