Opinion ID: 1248491
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: New Trials Granted, Prior to the 1933 Amendment, for Insufficiency of the Evidence to Sustain the Verdict or Because the Weight of the Evidence Was Against the Verdict

Text: Because the cases construing the 1933 amendment and determining its effect usually refer to the changes in both the fifth and the seventh grounds for new trial, we should direct our attention to the seventh ground before we begin a consideration of the 1933 amendment of Rem. Rev. Stat., § 399, with reference to the fifth ground for a new trial. The seventh ground for a new trial was changed by the 1933 amendment from: Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or the decision, or that it is against the law, to: That there is no evidence or reasonable inference from the evidence to justify the verdict or the decision, or that it is contrary to law. It is apparent that the phrases, Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict and The verdict is against the weight of the evidence, lead inevitably in our thinking to the conclusion that substantial justice has not been done. Sylvester v. Olson, 63 Wash. 285, 115 Pac. 175. This is illustrated by three quotations which might be multiplied many times over: These courts [trial courts] should take due care not to invade the legitimate province of the jury, but if, after giving full consideration to the testimony in the light of the verdict, the trial judge is still satisfied that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, and that substantial justice has not been done between the parties, it is his duty to set the verdict aside. Clark v. Great Northern R. Co., 37 Wash. 537, 540, 79 Pac. 1108. The power to grant a new trial in a cause tried by a jury on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence is a power that rests solely in the trial court. It is given it in the interests of justice; it is given to prevent the perpetuation into judgments of exaggerated and unfounded verdicts that juries are sometimes unaccountably wont to return. Independent Brewing Co. v. McCrimmon, 85 Wash. 610, 611, 148 Pac. 787. Such statements [reflecting on credibility of plaintiff] deliberately incorporated in a written opinion unmistakably demonstrate that the trial court did not believe the respondent's testimony, and that testimony being disbelieved, there was no substantial evidence to support the verdict and the verdict can not be other than unjust, and hence substantial justice has not been done between the parties. Scribner v. National Refining Co., 169 Wash. 44, 48, 13 P. (2d) 61. We will not here discuss in detail the holdings with reference to the seventh ground for new trial prior to the 1933 amendment, because there is an analysis of those holdings in State v. Brant, 30 Wn. (2d) 286, 191 P. (2d) 682, and it is unnecessary to repeat it here. In substance, we there stated that, prior to the 1933 amendment, the rule was that except for an abuse of discretion an order granting a new trial would not be disturbed on appeal where the ground on which the new trial had been granted was that the verdict was contrary to the evidence or against the weight of the evidence, or that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict; and that, where there was a case for the jury and the evidence was in substantial conflict on a controlling issue, there could be no abuse of discretion in granting a new trial upon any of those grounds. For an extreme case, see Funk v. Horrocks, 99 Wash. 397, 169 Pac. 805.