Opinion ID: 2061534
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Temporary Substitute Clause

Text: The temporary substitute clause is found in the portion of the policy defining who is an insured for purposes of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. The Joffers are clearly insureds under paragraphs B(1) and B(2). The Joffers contend they are also insureds under paragraph B(3) and therefore the temporary substitute clause applies to them. Paragraph B(3) extends uninsured and underinsured coverage to anyone else `occupying' a covered `auto' or a temporary substitute for a covered `auto'. The term anyone else is not defined in the policy. The insurer and insureds offer different meanings for the term. LeMars contends the term anyone else is intended to exclude those categories of insureds previously described, while the Joffers argue that anyone else is intended to be inclusive, making the temporary substitute clause applicable to all categories of insureds previously named. When words or phrases are undefined in a policy we do not give them a technical or legal meaning. Rather, undefined words are given their ordinary meaning. If the words are susceptible to two reasonable interpretations, the interpretation favoring the insured is adopted. However, a mere disagreement between the parties regarding the meaning of undefined terms does not automatically establish an ambiguity. A.Y. McDonald, 475 N.W.2d at 619. In determining the ordinary meaning of undefined terms in a policy, we commonly refer to dictionaries. See, e.g., id. at 619-20 (meaning of damages); Witcraft v. Sundstrand Health & Disability Group Benefit Plan, 420 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1988) (meaning of illness); North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. Holty, 402 N.W.2d 452, 455 (Iowa 1987) (meaning of apparatus). As noted previously, the interpretation of insurance policy terms is a matter of law for the court unless extrinsic evidence exists as to the meaning of the terms. Ferguson, 512 N.W.2d at 299. The Joffers contend that representations made by their insurance agent constitute extrinsic evidence and should be considered by the court in determining the meaning of the contested terms. The Joffers note that when questioning their agent about their automobile coverage, she always stated they were fully covered. We find that such a generic statement, considered alone, is insufficient to raise a question of fact with regard to the parties' intent as to the terms at issue which would render summary judgment inappropriate in this instance. The district court examined a standard dictionary in determining the meaning of the term anyone else. The court found the meaning of anyone to be any person at all. It found else to be an adjective defined as being different in identity. The district court concluded that the qualifying language in paragraph B(3), `anyone else,' indicates that paragraph B(3) applies only to any person at all who is different in identity from those already listed. Thus, the district court found that the Joffers were not included within that meaning because they were considered insureds under paragraphs B(1) and B(2). The Joffers argue that the district court erred in its interpretation of the term anyone else. They contend that because more than one meaning for the term anyone else exists, the meaning most favorable to the insured must be used. The Joffers posit that an alternative definition of else is the more favorable interpretation and urge us to adopt that definition. The alternative definition for else offered by the Joffers is: In addition; additional; more. `Would you like anything else?' The Joffers argue that under this definition, the temporary substitute clause applies to the preceding classes of insureds as well. While our prior case law does require us to utilize the meaning most favorable to the insured, we also note that this rule of interpretation applies only when the language is susceptible to two different meanings. As we have previously stated, a mere disagreement on the part of the parties as to the meaning of terms does not automatically establish an ambiguity. A. Y. McDonald, 475 N.W.2d at 619. We must ask objectively: Is the language fairly susceptible to two interpretations? Id. In this case, we find that it is not. Utilizing the definition of else proposed by the Joffersadditional or more requires a strained reading of the policy and a strained usage of the English language. Had LeMars intended for the temporary substitute clause to apply to the Joffers it had several options: it could have left out the word else, making the temporary substitute clause applicable to anyone; included the clause in every paragraph; or separated the paragraphs by commas, indicating that the clause should apply to each paragraph. The terms anyone and else must be read together and in the context of the policy to ascertain the correct meaning. The district court appropriately applied the dictionary meaning consistent with ordinary speech in finding that the temporary substitute clause did not apply to the Joffers. We conclude, as did the district court, that the term anyone else, as used in this insurance policy, was intended to mean anyone not previously named and thus did not include the Joffers. Therefore, we conclude that the temporary substitute clause is not applicable to the Joffers.