Opinion ID: 1831963
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: abuse of discretion in certifying final judgment on other claims

Text: The contribution and indemnification claims assigned by Hawkins and the State present more difficult issues. Contribution is defined as a sharing of the cost of an injury as opposed to a complete shifting of the cost from one to another, which is indemnification. [15] Under Nebraska law, indemnification is available when one party is compelled to pay money which in justice another ought to pay, or has agreed to pay, unless the party making the payment is barred by the wrongful nature of his or her conduct. [16] Indemnification is distinguishable from the closely related remedy of contribution in that the latter involves a sharing of the loss between parties jointly liable. [17] It is questionable whether contribution and indemnity are separate causes of action, as opposed to theories of recovery, [18] and our research has revealed no authority helpful to deciding whether similar claims that had previously belonged to separate parties remain separate claims for relief' when they are assigned to one party. But we do not find it necessary to decide these issues in this proceeding, because we conclude that even if the district court's partial summary judgment could be designated as a final judgment pursuant to § 25-1315(1), the court abused its discretion in doing so. [19] Although Todco has not challenged the certification on appeal, we address the issue because our ability to review the merits of the appeal depends on whether it was properly certified. [20] In deciding whether to grant § 25-1315(1) certification, a trial court must address two distinct issues. A trial court must first determine that it is dealing with a final judgment. It must be a judgment in the sense that it is a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be final in the sense that it is an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action. [21] Once having found finality, the trial court must go on to determine whether there is any just reason for delay. Not all final judgments on individual claims should be immediately appealable, even if they are in some sense separable from the remaining unresolved claims. [22] It is left to the trial court's discretion, to be exercised in the interest of sound judicial administration, to determine the appropriate time when each final decision in a multiple claims action is ready for appeal. [23] We have not previously considered a trial court's determination that there is no just reason to delay the entry of a final judgment. Because § 25-1315(1) is substantially similar to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), we look to federal cases applying rule 54(b), and state cases arising under similar rules, for guidance in applying § 25-1315(1). [24] Prior to the enactment of § 25-1315, an order that effected a dismissal with respect to one of multiple parties was a final, appealable order, and the complete dismissal with prejudice of one of multiple causes of action was a final, appealable order, but an order dismissing one of multiple theories of recovery, all of which arose from the same set of operative facts, was not a final order for appellate purposes. [25] Section 25-1315 was an evident attempt by the Legislature to simplify the issue and clarify many of the questions regarding final orders when there are multiple parties and claims. [26] In other words, § 25-1315(1) was intended to prevent interlocutory appeals, not make them easier. [27] It attempts to strike a balance between the undesirability of piecemeal appeals and the potential need for making review available at a time that best serves the needs of the parties. [28] Therefore, it is well established in every other jurisdiction to have considered a similar rule that certification of a final judgment must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some claims or parties. [29] The power § 25-1315(1) confers upon the trial judge should only be used `in the infrequent harsh case' as an instrument for the improved administration of justice, based on the likelihood of injustice or hardship to the parties of a delay in entering a final judgment as to part of the case. [30] As a general principle, in deciding whether there are no just reasons to delay the appeal of individual final judgments, a trial court must take into account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved. [31] Consideration of the former is necessary to ensure that application of § 25-1315(1) effectively preserves the general policy against piecemeal appeals. [32] Plainly, sound judicial administration does not require that certification requests be granted routinely. [33] Therefore, entry of judgment under § 25-1315(1) should not be indulged as a matter of routine. [34] Section 25-1315(1) was simply not meant to be employed in the absence of sufficiently compelling circumstances. [35] But there is nothing in the record in this case supporting a conclusion that this is a special case deserving of certification as a final judgment. [36] Nothing in the record suggests a pressing, exceptional need for immediate appellate intervention, or grave injustice of the sort remediable only by allowing an appeal to be taken forthwith, or dire hardship of a unique kind. [37] There is no evidence, or even argument, establishing any injustice or hardship to the parties from a delay in entering final judgment, and as will be explained more fully below, the interrelationship of the issues remaining for trial weighs heavily against certification. We note, however, that our review of the district court's certification would have been greatly assisted had the district court explained its reasoning for concluding that there was no just reason to delay the entry of final judgment. When a trial court concludes that entry of judgment under § 25-1315(1) is appropriate, it should ordinarily make specific findings setting forth the reasons for its order. [38] The reason for this is twofold: it helps the trial judge to sort out and weigh the competing considerations in his or her own mind, and it permits an appellate court to effectively review the ruling. [39] Here, the district court's order simply quoted the statutory language, but did not explain why, on the facts of this case, the court concluded certification was appropriate. It is difficult to review the trial court's exercise of discretion when the court does not explain its reasoning. [40] The record does contain Cerny's motion requesting certification, and in the absence of any other explanation, we assume that the trial court adopted Cerny's reasoning. But the grounds for Cerny's motion not only fail to show that certification was appropriate, they affirmatively demonstrate that it was not. Cerny contended that the remaining claims pending pursuant to [Coffman's] assignment arise out of the same incident, and would be predicated on the same witnesses and testimony, including expert witness testimony, as the claims assigned by the State . . . and Hawkins. Courts have uniformly held that the presence of such overlapping claims counsels against certification, not in favor of it. [41] As previously explained, certification of a final judgment requires a court to determine whether the case is the unusual case in which potential hardship to the litigants outweighs the strong policy against piecemeal appeals. [42] Courts considering certification of a final judgment have weighed factors such as (1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the trial court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result in setoff against the judgment sought to be made final; and (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like. [43] The U.S. Supreme Court has observed that as a starting point, it is appropriate for the trial court to consider whether the claims under review are separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated and whether the nature of the claims already determined was such that no appellate court would ever have to decide the same issues more than once even if there were subsequent appeals. [44] The trial court should carefully compare the dismissed and unadjudicated claims for indications of substantial overlap to ensure that the appellate court is not confronted in successive appeals with common issues of law or fact, to the detriment of judicial efficiency. [45] An appellate court must then scrutinize the trial court's evaluation of such factors as the interrelationship of the claims so as to prevent piecemeal appeals in cases which should be reviewed only as single units. [46] A court should be particularly cautious in certifying as final a judgment on a claim which is not truly distinct from the claims on remaining issues, for even if the certified judgment is inherently final, the facts underlying the claim resulting in that judgment may be intertwined with the remaining issues. [47] In a case in which the issues are intertwined, the trial court might wish to reconsider its dismissal of certain claims on the complete fact record developed at trialan option permanently foreclosed by certification of a final judgment. [48] A complete factual record will also assist in final appellate review and decrease the likelihood of inconsistent decisions. [49] When the dismissed and surviving claims are factually and legally overlapping or closely related, fragmentation of the case is to be avoided except in `unusual and compelling circumstances.' [50] Furthermore, judicial administrative interests may not be served if the possibility exists that the need to review the issues appealed may be mooted by future developments in the trial court. [51] The potential that claims remaining in the trial court could obviate claims in the appellate court is a consideration against immediate appealability. [52] Another factor that has been considered is whether, notwithstanding the entry of partial judgment, the action remains pending for trial below as to all of the parties. This alone counsels hesitation in the use of § 25-1315(1). It will be a rare case where § 25-1315(1) can appropriately be applied when the contestants on appeal remain, at the same time, contestants below. [53] When these principles are applied to the instant case, it appears that the district court did not fully consider the interrelationship between the claims when it certified its partial summary judgment. When Cerny explains that the disposition of the claims assigned by Hawkins and the State would effect [sic] the trial and the manner in which the Coffman claim is adjudicated, Cerny is confirming an interrelationship among the claims that militates against certification of a final judgment. [54] It does not strike us as betokening sound judicial administration for an appellate court and a trial court to be simultaneously passing upon different legal theories in a situation involving the same parties and, basically, the same facts. [55] Relying on such considerations would lead to requests of appellate courts to render advisory opinions in order to facilitate settlement or speed the process in trial courts. [56] This is beyond the scope of § 25-1315(1), and trial courts should resist the temptation to certify difficult issues for interlocutory review. [57] Cerny also contended that certification of a final judgment would potentially resolve one of Todco's defenses to the Coffman contribution claim and would likely give guidance to the question as to whether or not the matter should be tried as one in equity or at law to a jury. This is incorrect. As previously explained, the Coffman contribution claim could not be certified as a final judgment, even if a summary judgment as to other claims could be properly certified. As we have stated, § 25-1315(1) does not . . . provide `magic words,' the invocation of which transforms any order into a final judgment for purposes of appeal. [58] Cerny also contended that permitting an interlocutory appeal would prevent the need for a retrial, should a reversal result from an appeal of a judgment disposing of all the claims alleged. But such a potential is rarely, if ever, a sufficient basis for a § 25-1315(1) certification, because virtually any interlocutory appeal from a dispositive ruling said to be erroneous contains the potential for requiring a retrial. [59] Every party seeking certification may eventually appeal the judgment in question. If the promise of an appeal were seriously considered in analyzing every request for certification, then virtually every party seeking certification would be successful. But the benefit of potentially avoiding a retrial is generally outweighed by the certainty of fracturing the case's appellate review with an interlocutory appeal. Simply stated, while there are variations among the assigned claims that Cerny alleges, the underlying issues are basically the same: Did Todco act wrongfully and did Todco's actions cause damages to Cerny that other parties were compelled to pay? The court's findings with respect to Todco's negligence could, conceivably, moot the issues raised in this appeal, and render our judgment advisory. Furthermore, where multiple tort-feasors are alleged, apportionment issues are presented that make it difficult, if not impossible, to separate the claims with respect to the different alleged tort-feasors. [60] That situation is even more pronounced in this case, because it seems clear that Todco's defense, even to the Coffman contribution claim, will involve the extent to which it could justifiably rely on instructions it claims to have received from Hawkins or the State. The questions we are asked to decide now, on a summary judgment record, are in effect still pending for a trial that will, presumably, further illuminate the issues, both for the trial court and this court. The interlocking factual relationship of the various counts leading to the likelihood that a subsequent appeal would again seek review of the issues presented here also suggests that it was not in the interests of sound judicial administration for the district court to certify this judgment as final. [61] Because the claims have so much factual overlap, for the purpose of requiring their adjudication prior to an appeal, they should be treated as the functional equivalent of nonseverable claims. [62] In short, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in certifying its partial summary judgment as final under § 25-1315(1). There is nothing in the record suggesting unusual hardship for the parties in the absence of an immediate appeal, and the interrelationship of the factual and legal issues presented in the adjudicated and pending claims is too pronounced for this to be the unusual case in which the general policy against piecemeal appeals is outweighed. [63] Since § 25-1315(1) was erroneously applied, there is no final order present in this case. We vacate the court's order certifying a final judgment and, lacking jurisdiction, dismiss this appeal.