Opinion ID: 2823186
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Probable Cause and DUI Arrest

Text: On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the officer had probable cause to arrest him for DUI. He also contends that there was no evidence that a valid arrest for DUI occurred, and that without such an arrest, the implied consent statute did not apply. He maintains, therefore, that the court should have excluded the ALS form as well as the results from the field sobriety test and the breath test. We begin by addressing whether the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for DUI. An officer has probable cause to arrest when he or she has “knowledge and trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution and prudence in believing that the arrestee has committed an offense.” State v. Maga, 166 N.H. 279, 286 (2014) (quotation omitted). “In determining whether the police had probable cause, we review reasonable probabilities and not the amount of evidence required to sustain a conviction or to make out a prima facie case.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We are not bound by mathematical calculations in making this determination,” but instead “must 4 approach the issue with a concern for the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Id. at 286-87 (quotations and brackets omitted). In assessing whether an officer had probable cause, we do not view each item of evidence separately, but rather as a whole, and from the arresting officer’s point of view at the time the arrest was made. State v. Vandebogart, 139 N.H. 145, 164 (1994). “We will not overturn a trial court’s determination of probable cause unless, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” Maga, 166 N.H. at 287 (quotation omitted). The defendant argues that the officer had no knowledge regarding whether and when the defendant had been driving or how long he had been back at the bar before the officer made contact with him. However, it was not necessary for the officer to have actually observed the defendant driving to have probable cause to arrest him for DUI. See State v. Farah, No. A13-2017, 2014 WL 1875904, at  (Minn. Ct. App. May 12, 2014) (finding that trooper had probable cause to arrest defendant for driving while intoxicated based upon witness’s identification of him as driver and trooper’s observations of defendant); McCabe v. Director of Revenue, 7 S.W.3d 12, 13-14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that officer had probable cause to arrest driver for driving while intoxicated because witness informed officer that he had seen driver operating vehicle and officer then smelled alcohol on driver’s breath). Nor was it necessary for the officer to know the exact time the defendant drove or precisely how long he had been back at the bar. As explained above, in assessing whether an officer has probable cause, we are not bound by “mathematical calculations,” but instead “must approach the issue with a concern for the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Maga, 166 N.H. at 286-87 (quotations and brackets omitted). We conclude that the officer had sufficient evidence suggesting that the defendant had committed a DUI offense. When the officer first escorted the defendant to his cruiser, he observed that the defendant’s “eyes were bloodshot and red.” He also noticed “a distinctive odor of alcohol coming from [the defendant’s] breath” and that the defendant “was having trouble with his balance.” After the officer arrested the defendant for simple assault, he “detected a distinct odor of alcohol” in the cruiser that had not been there before he placed the defendant in the cruiser. Before the officer transported the defendant to the police station, the bouncer told him that he had observed the defendant drive into the parking lot. The officer responded affirmatively to the prosecutor’s question as to whether, based upon the bouncer’s statements, “it was a continuous event, [the defendant] driving back and then [the officer] making contact.” These facts, taken as a whole, provided the officer with probable cause to arrest the defendant for DUI before he read the ALS form to the defendant. 5 Nonetheless, the defendant argues that he was never actually arrested for DUI and, therefore, the implied consent statute did not apply. Relying upon our interpretation of the implied consent statute in Saviano v. Director, New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles, 151 N.H. 315 (2004), the defendant contends that, in order for the State to invoke the implied consent statute, a driver must “be arrested for an offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence.” The defendant argues that the trial court erroneously ruled that, by reading the first line of the ALS form, the officer arrested him for DUI. The defendant maintains that he was arrested only for simple assault, and, therefore, the implied consent statute did not apply. Accordingly, he contends that the court should have excluded the ALS form as well as the results from the field sobriety test and the breath test. The trial court found that the defendant was arrested for DUI when the officer read him the first line of the ALS form stating: “You have been arrested for an offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while you were driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.” It is undisputed that when the officer read the first line of the ALS form to him, the defendant was already under arrest for simple assault. Thus, the issue is whether the officer’s reading of the first line of the ALS form effectuated an arrest for DUI as a matter of law. See State v. Underwood, 661 S.E.2d 529, 531-32 (Ga. 2008) (applying de novo standard of review to determine whether officer’s reading of implied consent law to defendant who was under arrest for an offense other than driving under influence constituted a second arrest for a violation of driving under influence statute). We review questions of law de novo. In re 1994 Chevrolet Cavalier, 142 N.H. 705, 707 (1998). As discussed above, the officer had probable cause, at the time he read the ALS form to the defendant, to arrest him for DUI. RSA 594:1 (2001) defines an “arrest” as “the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be forthcoming to answer for the commission of a crime.” Here, the defendant was in custody by virtue of his arrest for simple assault. We conclude that, because the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for DUI, and because the defendant was already in custody as a result of his arrest for simple assault, the officer’s reading of the first line of the ALS form constituted arrest of the defendant for DUI. See Underwood, 661 S.E.2d at 532, 530-31 (holding that “coincidence of probable cause to arrest” defendant for violating DUI statute and defendant’s “actual arrest” meant that defendant was arrested for DUI when officer read statutory warning, even though officer mentioned two potential charges other than DUI at time of initial arrest and did not tell defendant that he was under arrest for DUI before reading statutory warning); see also Appeal of Dungan, 681 P.2d 750, 753 (Okla. 1984) (finding appellant’s arrest for driving under the influence effected by officer “at the station when in the course of reading her rights he advised her she had been arrested” and officer had probable cause to make warrantless arrest); State v. Nelson, No. 04- 6 1546-CR, 2004 WL 2984829, at  (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2004) (concluding that phrase “‘you have been arrested’” on “Informing the Accused form specifically advised [defendant] that he was under arrest” and “was sufficient to meet the arrest requirement” of state’s implied consent law). Thus, although the better practice would have been for the officer to clearly inform the defendant that, in addition to his arrest on the assault charge, he was also being arrested for DUI, we conclude that, under the facts of this case, when the officer read the defendant the first line of the implied consent form, he effectively arrested the defendant for DUI. We, therefore, hold that the trial court did not err in its determination that the implied consent statute applied in this case.