Opinion ID: 2632907
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: False answers on voir dire

Text: Defendant contends that Juror 7 committed misconduct because he failed to disclose that he would automatically vote for the death penalty for any defendant convicted of first degree murder or of killing more than one person. On the juror questionnaire, in response to the question whether his feelings about the death penalty were so strong that he would always  vote to impose it on a defendant convicted of first degree murder or would never vote to do so, Juror 7 checked the line stating neither of the above, and wrote, Never say Always Never say Never. In response to the question, Do you think anyone convicted of murdering more than one person should receive the death penalty?, Juror 7 checked yes, and wrote, Prevention of their ever killing again. Questioned later on voir dire regarding these responses, he explained: I would come [to the penalty phase] with a Zen mind. I would come with a blank slate, saying `okay, talk me into it or out of it.' Defendant's motion for new trial included a declaration from Juror 3 stating: During penalty phase deliberations, juror number 7 refused to consider any of the mitigating evidence which was raised by other jurors. Juror # 7 response to each and every piece of evidence presented was 'it doesn't matter, he killed six people.' I asked Juror # 7 if he would always vote for the death penalty when someone was convicted of killing six people, regardless of the mitigating circumstances. Juror # 7 responded that he would; and added that he would also always vote for the death penalty even if there was only one victim. Juror # 7 said that anyone who kills another person should get the death penalty. Also attached to the new trial motion was a questionnaire the defense had sent to Juror 7 after the trial. When asked whether he had decided on defendant's punishment after hearing the evidence and arguments, but before deliberations began, Juror 7 answered yes. The most important factor leading to his penalty decision, Juror 7 stated, was six dead people. Asked to name the dispositive aggravating factors, Juror 7 responded, corpus delicti. Juror 7's answers to the last five questions on the postconviction questionnaire were written in Latin. When he was asked his opinion of the prosecutor, he responded macte virtute. His opinion of lead defense counsel was quare verum/bonis nocet quisquis pepercerit malis, his opinion of backup counsel was ad meliora vertamur, and his opinion of defendant was hoc habet. In response to the question whether there was anything else defense counsel should know, he wrote, hominis est errare insipientis perseverare[;] hie fumis nihil attraxit. [10] The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the allegations pertaining to Juror 7. At the hearing, Juror 3's testimony was similar to, though slightly different from, his declaration. He said that three or four times Juror 7 said defendant's mitigating evidence doesn't matter much because defendant killed six people. He said he had asked Juror 7 if he would always vote for death if the defendant was convicted of killing six people, and that Juror 7 had replied: No, not six people. He would do it for just one, even if one person was murdered. Juror 7 testified that his voir dire answers were accurate. In his initial testimony pertaining to the allegations of misconduct, on Friday, May 3,1996, he denied making the statements attributed to him by Juror 3. The next Monday, Juror 7 called the trial court and said he had some additional information pertaining to the new trial motion. The court told him that any information should be given on the witness stand, and asked him to return that afternoon. He then testified that during deliberations he had an argument with another juror. During the argument, the question arose whether Juror 7 would vote to impose the death penalty on a defendant who killed only once. Juror 7 said he could give someone the death penalty if they only had cold-bloodedly, premeditatedly killed one person (italics added), but he did not say he would automatically do so. The trial court found no misconduct by Juror 7. Although the court described the juror as very offensive and characterized some of his testimony at the hearing on defendant's new trial motion as appalling, it concluded that Juror 7 fully, honestly, and accurately disclosed his basic support for the death penalty in his original questionnaire, and that it was not reasonably probable that Juror Number Seven had prejudged the penalty phase in this case. Defendant argues strenuously that Juror 7 lied when he testified on voir dire that he had an open mind and would not vote automatically to impose the death penalty, regardless of the mitigating evidence. In reviewing the trial court's ruling on this matter, [w]e accept the trial court's credibility determinations and findings on questions of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 582, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454, 941 P.2d 87.) Here, Juror 7 credibly testified at the posttrial hearing that his answers on voir dire were truthful. Based on that testimony, substantial evidence supports the trial court's ruling that Juror 7 did not prejudge the case. Defendant faults the trial court for its refusal to decide whether Juror 7 or Juror 3 had accurately described the argument between them, contending that if the court had any doubt on the matter it should have summoned other jurors to testify. He relies on a federal decision holding that when, in the middle of trial a question arises about the partiality of one of the jurors, the trial court has an independent responsibility to satisfy himself that the allegation of bias is unfounded. ( Dyer v. Calderon (9th Cir.1998) 151 F.3d 970, 978.) Here, however, the allegation of juror bias occurred not in the middle of trial, but at a hearing after trial. We need not decide here whether, as a general rule, a trial court has an independent responsibility to investigate allegations of juror misconduct at a posttrial hearing, because here no further investigation was warranted. The pertinent issue at the hearing was not what Juror 7 and Juror 3 said in the heat of deliberations, but whether Juror 7 had lied at voir dire and was biased against defendant. The trial court believed Juror 7's posttrial testimony that he had testified truthfully on voir dire and that he had not prejudged the case, and the court added that its view would not be affected by ascertaining what exactly Jurors 3 and 7 had said to each other. We agree with this assessment.