Opinion ID: 556562
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Much Extant (but ultimately inconclusive) Case Law

Text: 33 Though the religion clauses are implicated because of the indisputably religious character of Dr. Bishop's remarks, the primary analysis that must be made here ascends from the cases that discuss the free speech rights of public teachers. 5 While neither teachers nor students shed their constitutional rights to [free speech] at the schoolhouse gate[,] Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 736, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). 34 the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. 35 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734-35, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). Teachers cannot suffer reprisal for speaking on a matter of public concern by speech which they would be entitled to make as private persons unless that speech impeded [their] proper performance of ... daily duties in the classroom or ... interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally. Id. at 572-73, 88 S.Ct. at 1737, (footnote omitted). Though Pickering addresses only out-of-school speech by teachers, we take it as our starting point because of the balancing it suggests. In and out of school, some balance must be reached. 6 36 The following term, the Supreme Court decided Tinker. The Court encountered the free expression rights (exercised by wearing black armbands) claimed by students. The case describes a standard by which to gauge restriction of in-class expression: 37 In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school, the prohibition cannot be sustained. Burnside v. Byars, [363 F.2d 744], 749 [ (5th Cir.1966) ]. 38 In the present case, the District Court made no such finding, and our independent examination of the record fails to yield evidence that the school authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students. 39 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 89 S.Ct. at 738. While Tinker deals with in-class conduct, and reiterates the belief that such conduct cannot be entirely unfettered, the case involves students, not teachers. We do not believe that the material and substantial interference test applied to student expression can control this case. 40 The Tenth Circuit has recently decided a more factually similar case that instructively relies on Tinker to evaluate a school's decision to require a fifth-grade teacher to remove certain texts from his classroom library and to refrain from silently reading the Bible during an in-class reading time. Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1056-57 (10th Cir.1990). However, the real foundation for our Sister Circuit's conclusion seems to be Kuhlmeier. Thereunder, the Tenth Circuit found support for restriction of a teacher's activity where the [teacher's] conduct endorses a particular religion and is an activity 'that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school[.]'  Id. at 1057 (quoting Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. at 569). 41 The key difference between Roberts and Tinker lies in the actor. While a student's expression can be more readily identified as a thing independent of the school, a teacher's speech can be taken as directly and deliberately representative of the school. Hence, where the in-class speech of a teacher is concerned, the school has an interest not only in preventing interference with the day-to-day operation of its classrooms as in Tinker, but also in scrutinizing expressions that the public might reasonably perceive to bear [its] imprimatur[.] Id. 42 This Court has also indicated how Tinker can be distinguished from Kuhlmeier. In Alabama Student Party v. Student Government Association, 867 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir.1989), then-Chief Judge Roney wrote: 43 The [Supreme] Court recognized there is a difference between speech a school must tolerate and speech a school must affirmatively promote. In [Kuhlmeier ], the school could determine what was appropriate in a school-sponsored student newspaper when that newspaper was legitimately part of the learning experience, the curriculum, of the school. 44 .... 45 The University should be entitled to place reasonable restrictions on this learning experience. 46 Id. at 1347 (emphasis in original). 47 The question becomes to what degree a school may control classroom instruction before touching the First Amendment rights of a teacher. Courts agree ... that the school's administration may at least establish the parameters of focus and general subject matter of curriculum. Mahoney v. Hankin, 593 F.Supp. 1171, 1174 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (citing Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972, 93 S.Ct. 2148, 36 L.Ed.2d 695 (1973)). Mahoney goes on to discuss two circuit court decisions that weigh the interests of the school against the teacher's pedagogical choices. Id. at 1175 (citing Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir.1971) (per curiam) and East Hartford Educ. Association v. Board of Ed. of Town of East Hartford, 562 F.2d 838, 843-44, vacated on rehearing en banc, 562 F.2d 856 (2d Cir.1977)) (footnote omitted). 48 The Second Circuit case dealt with a faculty dress code that was upheld on summary judgment by the district court and ultimately upheld by the Second Circuit sitting en banc. Judge Meskill wrote the opinion for the en banc majority. His dissent from the panel opinion included the following salient remark: the First Amendment leaves undisturbed the power of local officials to prescribe the curriculum and teaching techniques of the schools in their care. East Hartford, 562 F.2d at 851 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). The First Circuit case dealt with the dismissal of a public school teacher for an alleged violation of a Code of Ethics. Though a brief per curiam, the opinion remarks astutely that: 49 free speech does not grant teachers a license to say or write in class whatever they may feel like, and ... the propriety of regulations or sanctions must depend on such circumstances as the age and sophistication of the students, the closeness of the relation between the specific technique used and some concededly valid educational objective, and the context and manner of presentation. 50 Mailloux, 448 F.2d at 1243. Yet, neither of these cases precisely matches the facts of our case. Thus, as the First Circuit further noted, we see no substitute for a case-by-case inquiry into whether the legitimate interests of the authorities are demonstrably sufficient to circumscribe a teacher's speech. Id.