Opinion ID: 2052142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Application of Actual Malice Standard.

Text: After New York Times, public officials in an action for defamation must demonstrate actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Actual malice means that the statement is made with knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. See McCarney v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 239 N.W.2d 152, 156 (Iowa 1976). Reckless disregard has been held to mean a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 85 S.Ct. 209, 216, 13 L.Ed.2d 125, 133 (1964). [R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262, 267 (1968). To show malice, there must be an intent to inflict harm through falsehood. Actual antagonism or contempt has been held insufficient to show malice. McCarney, 239 N.W.2d at 156. A. Actual Malice Necessary for False Light. Palmer argues that Jones must show actual malice to prevail on the claim of false light invasion of privacy. Palmer fails to recognize that the false light cases are subject to the same constitutional restraints as defamation cases. See Berry v. National Broadcasting Co., 480 F.2d 428, 431 (8th Cir.1973), cert. dismissed, 418 U.S. 911, 94 S.Ct. 3203, 41 L.Ed.2d 1157 (1974). It is unreasonable to allow a party to evade the standards surrounding defamation law because the plaintiff has pled an alternative theory. Id. In an action such as this, both parties are subject to the restraints of the law of defamation, even if a false light action has been pled. B. Public Official. Palmer asserts that as a fireman, Jones was a public official, therefore, he must demonstrate actual malice on the part of Palmer. Determining whether a plaintiff is a public official is a matter of federal constitutional law; state law standards are not determinative. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84, 86 S.Ct. 669, 675, 15 L.Ed.2d 597, 604-05 (1966). This question is properly one for the court, not the jury. Id. at 88, 86 S.Ct. at 677, 15 L.Ed.2d at 606. New York Times did not establish guidelines for making the determination of who qualifies as a public official. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283 n. 23, 84 S.Ct. at 727 n. 23, 11 L.Ed.2d at 708 n. 23 ([w]e have no occasion here to determine how far down into the lower ranks of government employees the `public official' designation would extend for purposes of this rule). In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85, 86 S.Ct. 669, 676, 15 L.Ed.2d 597, 605 (1966) (emphasis added), the Court provided guidance by stating: the `public official' designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs. In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n. 8, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 2680 n. 8, 61 L.Ed.2d 411, 421 n. 8 (1979), the Court further cautioned that the category of `public official'... cannot be thought to include all public employees ... Some state courts have adopted an expansive view of this test. Virtually all government employees may be classified as public officials in cases where courts employ a government affiliation test. See Comment, The Constitutional Law of Defamation: Are All Speakers Protected Equally? 44 Ohio St.L.J. 149, 157-58 (1983). We reject this expansive view of public officials as being inconsistent with the plain meaning of the standards articulated in Rosenblatt and Proxmire. It strains credibility to say that Jones, as a low-ranking fire fighter, had substantial responsibility over the conduct of governmental affairs. Our holding does not modify McCarney v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 239 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1976), where a police captain was recognized as a public official without discussion of who could be considered a public official. Jones did not have responsibility or influence comparable to that of a captain of a police force. C. Public Figure. Palmer argues that Jones is a public figure. As a public figure, Jones would be required to demonstrate actual malice in order to prevail in this defamation action. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342, 94 S.Ct. at 3008, 41 L.Ed.2d at 807. As with the public official determination, this question is one of federal constitutional law. See Bagley v. Iowa Beef Processors, 797 F.2d 632, 643 (8th Cir.1986). State law standards are not determinative. The Supreme Court has recognized certain types of public figures, including the all purpose public figure, the limited purpose public figure, and the involuntary public figure. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 94 S.Ct. at 3009, 41 L.Ed.2d at 808. All purpose public figures are individuals who achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety or occupy positions of such pervasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. Id. at 345, 351, 94 S.Ct. at 3009, 3013, 41 L.Ed.2d at 808, 812. Limited purpose public figures are individuals who thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. Id. at 345, 94 S.Ct. at 3009, 41 L.Ed.2d at 808. Little guidance is provided in the category of involuntary public figures, and the Court has acknowledged that instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare. Id. at 354, 94 S.Ct. at 3009, 41 L.Ed.2d at 808. [1] Our analysis will focus on whether Jones was a limited purpose public figure. Palmer offers two theories to claim that Jones was a limited purpose public figure. First, Palmer argues that Jones' seeking and accepting employment with the Des Moines Fire Department at a time the department was under a federal court order to increase the hiring of minority persons makes Jones a limited purpose public figure. We reject this argument. This record reflects that Jones sought employment to satisfy his need for work, not in order to influence the resolution of issues of public concern. Palmer also claims that by appealing his dismissal to the Civil Service Board, Jones became a limited purpose public figure. The Supreme Court has found that initiation of litigation, by itself, does not create a limited purpose public figure. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454, 96 S.Ct. 958, 965, 47 L.Ed.2d 154, 163 (1976) (resort to the judicial process ... is no more voluntary in a realistic sense than [use of the courts by a] defendant called upon to defend his interest in court.). At the time of his appeal to the Civil Service Board, Jones was not interviewed by the press and did not publicly promote his version of the dispute. Jones is not a limited purpose public figure. This holding is consistent with Anderson v. Low Rent Housing Commission, 304 N.W.2d 239, 246-47 (Iowa), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086, 102 S.Ct. 645, 70 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981), where the plaintiff initiated numerous contacts with the press and invited attention and influenced that controversy.