Opinion ID: 2576427
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: New Remedy for Restoring a Denied Criminal Appeal

Text: ¶ 26 Although we have determined that the remedy laid out in Johnson, which requires resentencing to restore a denied appeal, is no longer available, we conclude that we must provide a readily accessible and procedurally simple method by which persons improperly denied their right to appeal can promptly exercise this right. Virtually all jurisdictions provide some procedural mechanism for restoring a denied right to appeal, and we have a particular interest in doing so because of our constitutional mandate to provide a criminal appeal in all cases. Utah Const. art. I, § 12. Further, failure to provide a direct appeal from a criminal case implicates the guarantee of due process under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution, State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 705 n. 1 (Utah 1985), when a defendant has been prevented in some meaningful way from proceeding with a first appeal of right, Penman, 964 P.2d at 1166. ¶ 27 Since we have no remedy currently in place under the PCRA or our rules of appellate procedure for reinstating an unconstitutionally denied criminal appeal, we must again fashion such a remedy, as we did in Johnson. A survey of procedures used in other jurisdictions reveals that many provide a mechanism through their postconviction remedy acts or rules of criminal or appellate procedure. [9] Others have established court rules that assert jurisdiction over appeals by leave at the court's discretion, People v. Goecke, 215 Mich.App. 623, 547 N.W.2d 338, 341 (1996), or grant a new appeal time frame through habeas corpus petitions for out-of-time appeals, see, e.g., Odneal v. State, 161 S.W.3d 692, 694 (Tex.App.2005); Bowman v. Washington, 269 Va. 1, 605 S.E.2d 585 (Va. 2004). ¶ 28 While some jurisdictions continue the practice of resentencing as a means of reinstating the time period for filing an appeal, see, e.g., Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280, 32 P.3d 672, 678 (Idaho Ct.App.2001); State ex. rel . Hahn v. Stubblefield, 996 S.W.2d 103 (Mo.Ct.App.1999); State v. Tweed, 312 Mont. 482, 59 P.3d 1105, 1109 (2002), others have found that such resentencing tends to create more problems than it resolves, Boyd v. State, 282 A.2d 169, 171 (Me.1971). We agree that resentencing is no longer a preferred remedy. For one thing, our rules governing amended judgments generally disfavor enlarg[ing] the time for appeal by means of a nunc pro tunc entry which does not chang[e] the substance or character of the judgment. State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, ¶ 11, 106 P.3d 729. As the Johnson remedy was ultimately designed to restore a denied right to appeal, we find it appropriate to focus not on resentencing but on a more direct mechanism to reinstate this right. ¶ 29 Having reviewed the differing procedural solutions among jurisdictions, we conclude that Kansas's approach is the most useful. In Kansas, where the filing of a timely notice of appeal is [also] jurisdictional, State v. Ortiz, 230 Kan. 733, 640 P.2d 1255, 1257 (1982), the courts have developed a procedure, in the interest of fundamental fairness, that provides for narrow exceptions to the thirty-day jurisdictional rule that may open the door to a new appeal time frame. Id. at 1258. ¶ 30 The Ortiz jurisdictional exceptions permit a defendant to claim denial of the right to appeal in the trial court and to establish the facts in support of this claimed denial by hearing if necessary. Once the denial is established, Ortiz authorizes courts to reinstate the appeal time frame, similar to the operation of our Johnson remedy. [10] While we do not adopt Kansas's specific procedures and relief (which are broader and more complex than those we espouse), we view its approach of establishing narrow exceptions by case law as serving the interest of fundamental fairness and as an appropriate mechanism to provide the relief granted in Johnson. The Maine Supreme Court helpfully notes that restoring a right to appeal by direct petition is appropriate because `[i]f the District Court has the power to set aside the judgment and resentence, it certainly would have the power to grant the right of appeal since it accomplishes the results intended.' Boyd, 282 A.2d at 172 (quoting Everett v. United States, 303 F.Supp. 1170 (C.D.Cal.1969)); see also Thompson v. Commonwealth, 736 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Ky.1987). ¶ 31 Accordingly, we hold that, upon a defendant's motion, the trial or sentencing court may reinstate the time frame for filing a direct appeal where the defendant can prove, based on facts in the record or determined through additional evidentiary hearings, that he has been unconstitutionally deprived, through no fault of his own, of his right to appeal. Such circumstances would include: (1) the defendant asked his or her attorney to file an appeal but the attorney, after agreeing to file, failed to do so, see Johnson, 635 P.2d 36; (2) the defendant diligently but futilely attempted to appeal within the statutory time frame without fault on defendant's part, see id.; or (3) the court or the defendant's attorney failed to properly advise defendant of the right to appeal, see State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060, 1061 (Utah 1993). [11] ¶ 32 Our resolution of this issue allows us to address the second question before us on certiorari  namely, whether a defendant's request for resentencing must be granted unless the record demonstrates that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to appeal. We clarify that the State does not bear this burden of proof. Rather, in a criminal case where a defendant has failed to appeal within the required thirty-day time period, the defendant bears the burden of proving she has not knowingly or voluntarily waived the right to appeal. As was required by the Johnson remedy, the defendant must demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that she qualifies for any of the exceptions listed above. See Sullivan, 448 P.2d at 910. Only if she succeeds in doing so will a court determine that she has been unconstitutionally denied this right. In such a case, the trial or sentencing court is directed to reinstate the appeal time frame if doing so is in the interest of fundamental fairness. The defendant must then file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the date the trial court issues its order. ¶ 33 We expressly state that the procedure set forth here is not available to a defendant properly informed of his appellate rights who simply let[s] the matter rest, and then claim[s] that he did not waive his right to appeal. Ortiz, 640 P.2d at 1258. Thus, in the vast majority of cases where a defendant fails to comply with the rule 4(a) thirty-day requirement for filing a timely appeal, or with the rule 4(e) provision for requesting an extension of the time to appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, the defendant will be held to have waived his right to appeal and the claim will properly be dismissed. State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ¶ 5, 57 P.3d 1065; State v. Palmer, 777 P.2d 521, 522 (Utah App. 1989).