Opinion ID: 3015470
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Additional Challenges to the Convictions6

Text: Lauderdale argues (for the first time on appeal) that the Government has failed to show the requisite effect on interstate commerce as required by the Hobbs Act. When the nexus to interstate commerce is not challenged in the District Court, we review the sufficiency of this evidence under a plain error standard. See, e.g., United States v. Zolicoffer, 869 F.2d 771, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (“Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”). The Hobbs Act requires that commerce be affected “in any way or degree.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Even a de minimis connection is sufficient. See United States v. 5 Like other defendants, Pietrak points out that Fafalios did not clearly testify when he made payments to, for example, Pietrak. In this regard, we agree with the District Court and the Government that the date stated on the invoices is sufficient to establish the timing of the offense. 6 Defendants’ briefs incorporate by reference certain arguments raised by other defendants. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to these arguments as if they were raised only by the defendant that makes the argument in his brief. 11 Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 424 (3d Cir. 1979) (explaining that only a “reasonably probable effect on commerce, however minimal,” is required). However, under the Act, satisfying the effect on interstate commerce requires an individualized showing. See United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 733 (3d Cir. 1993). That is, “Congress chose to satisfy the Commerce Clause by requiring an individualized interstate commerce effect in each application of the law.” Id. At trial, evidence was presented indicating that AAA did business with out-of-state companies. For example, it purchased ball bearings from an out-of-state company. By expending money on illegal payments that otherwise would have gone to purchase goods in interstate commerce, there was a probable effect on interstate commerce. Cf. United States v. Janotti, 673 F.2d 578, 592 (3d Cir. 1982) (“In substantive Hobbs Act convictions, the requisite nexus to interstate commerce has been found in the depletion of assets theory, because the payment of an extortion demand may reduce the assets available for the purchase of goods originating in other states.”). Given this low threshold, Lauderdale’s argument fails.
Lauderdale also contends that the District Court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever the trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14, which provides: If the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment, an information, or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants’ trials, or 12 provide any other relief that justice requires. Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). Whether to sever a trial is left to the sound discretion of the District Court and will not be reversed absent “clear and manifest prejudice” resulting in an unfair trial. United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 370 (3d Cir. 2001). Specifically, Lauderdale contends that the spill-over effect of the evidence against the other defendants led the jury to convict him. Following argument on the severance motion, the District Court ruled that severance was not warranted under Rule 14. It reasoned that “a jury can very easily distinguish among various employees and make a determination as to the guilt or innocence of each [one]. . . . [I]t will be rather easy for the jury to compartmentalize the facts as to . . . Lauderdale.” Because the District Court reasonably balanced the competing interests, and in light of the speculative nature of Lauderdale’s argument—essentially that the jury could not compartmentalize a set of facts—we fail to perceive that an abuse of discretion occurred in denying the severance motion.
Lauderdale attacks as well the trial court’s use of the word “event” in a jury instruction on the statute of limitations. We review a jury instruction for abuse of discretion, “considering whether, in light of the evidence, the charge as a whole fairly and adequately submitted the issues in the case to the jury.” United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc). “We must reverse if the instruction was 13 capable of confusing and thereby misleading the jury.” Id.7 Because we believe that the District Court fairly and adequately instructed the jury and that the instruction was not capable of misleading the jurors, we conclude that Lauderdale’s argument fails. In its initial charge to the jury, the District Court did not address the statute of limitations issue. Defense counsel then requested that the Court instruct the jury on this issue. The Court subsequently supplemented its instructions to the jury, telling them “you have to agree on at least one event before defendant—unanimously on one event before a defendant can be found guilty. And that event must be subsequent to January 24, 1997. You may consider the other things in your evaluation of whether they are guilty of that event. . . .” (Lauderdale App. 417a-18a.) Lauderdale claims that the Court’s use of the word “event” in the charge caused confusion. The charge proposed by Lauderdale’s trial counsel, however, was itself problematic insofar as it defined “event” too narrowly. Moreover, we disagree that the District Court’s charge was ambiguous or confusing. Though the Court later used “event” in its instructions without defining that term, it initially charged that the Government had to prove a “particular corrupt payment within the charged time frame.” Viewing the instructions as a whole, the charge was neither misleading, ambiguous nor confusing. It thus was not in error. 7 The parties disagree about whether Lauderdale (or the other defendants) waived his challenge to the statute of limitations charge by failing to make a specific, timely objection. Because the District Court concluded that this challenge was not waived and because there is not a precise standard for deciding whether the objection was timely, we assume non-waiver of the challenge and consider its merits. 14
Pietrak contends that the District Court erred by denying his motion for a new trial based on “newly-discovered” evidence. We review such a motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. DiSalvo, 34 F.3d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 1994). For a court to order a new trial on the basis of newly-discovered evidence, five requirements must be met: (a) the evidence must be in fact, newly discovered, i.e., discovered since the trial; (b) facts must be alleged from which the court may infer diligence on the part of the movant; (c) the evidence relied on[] must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (d) it must be material to the issues involved; and (e) it must be such, and of such nature, as that, on a new trial, the newly discovered evidence would probably produce an acquittal. Id.; see also United States v. Buss, 461 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (denying new trial where evidence was neither “unknown nor unavailable” to the defendant prior to trial), aff’d, 601 F.2d 576 (3d Cir. 1979). Pietrak’s argument that there is in fact new evidence discovered since the trial is untenable. Though the documents at issue were located by Pietrak after the trial, those documents were, by Pietrak’s own admission, available for his counsel’s review prior to trial. Because the evidence was neither unknown nor unavailable, Pietrak cannot satisfy the first requirement, and we reject his claim that he was entitled to a new trial.