Opinion ID: 1262875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the landlord

Text: The question of whether a landlord owes a duty of reasonable care to the tenants of the property was settled by our recent decision in Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984). There, Justice Donaldson, with three judges agreeing, wrote: [W]e today decide to leave the common-law rule and its exceptions behind, and we adopt the rule that a landlord is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in light of all the circumstances. We stress that adoption of this rule is not tantamount to making the landlord an insurer for all injury occurring on the premises, but merely constitutes our removal of the landlord's common-law cloak of immunity... . We hold that defendant Stearns did owe a duty to plaintiff Stephens to exercise reasonable care in light of all the circumstances, and that it is for a jury to decide whether that duty was breached. 106 Idaho at 258, 678 P.2d at 50 (emphasis added). In addition to the clear rule of Stephens, other legal principles favor the recognition of a requirement of due care in the circumstances present here. One is the familiar proposition that one who voluntarily assumes a duty also assumes the obligation of due care in performance of that duty. A landlord, having voluntarily provided a security system, is potentially subject to liability if the security system fails as a result of the landlord's negligence. Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518 (Del. 1987) (having provided security, owner must anticipate conduct of third persons); Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984); accord Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 125 Ill.2d 203, 126 Ill.Dec. 519, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988); Lay v. Dworman, 732 P.2d 455 (Okla. 1987) (landlord's control over security creates potential liability where tenants rely on security). While the landlord/tenant relationship does not in and of itself establish a duty to keep doors locked, once Moore and Security Investments had initiated a locked door policy and had employed a security service with the intent of keeping the doors locked, they undertook such a duty and are subject to liability if they failed to perform that duty with a reasonable standard of care. Another reason for finding a duty of care to exist in this case is the general rule that each person has a duty of care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others. Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980); Harper v. Hoffmann, 95 Idaho 933, 523 P.2d 536 (1974). Every person has a general duty to use due or ordinary care not to injure others, to avoid injury to others by any agency set in operation by him, and to do his work, render services or use his property as to avoid such injury. [Citations omitted.] The degree of care to be exercised must be commensurate with the danger or hazard connected with the activity. [Citations omitted.] Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181, 188, 418 P.2d 278, 285 (1966). Whether the duty attaches is largely a question for the trier of fact as to the foreseeability of the risk. Foreseeability is a flexible concept which varies with the circumstances of each case. Where the degree of result or harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively low degree of foreseeability is required. Conversely, where the threatened injury is minor but the burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher degree of foreseeability may be required. See U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.1947) (Judge Learned Hand); Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal.3d 112, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653, 658 (1985). Thus, foreseeability is not to be measured by just what is more probable than not, but also includes whatever result is likely enough in the setting of modern life that a reasonably prudent person would take such into account in guiding reasonable conduct. Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 34 Cal.3d 49, 192 Cal. Rptr. 857, 665 P.2d 947 (1983); Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 449 N.E.2d 331 (1983). Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the issue of foreseeability because the plaintiff failed to come forward with any evidence that prior similar incidents of criminal activity had occurred in the building or in its vicinity. However, the prior similar incidents rule was rejected recently by a leading case upon which the trial court purported to rely to the contrary. In Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal.3d 112, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653 (1985), the California high court rejected a strong line of cases from California's intermediate appellate courts that held to the position espoused here by the defendants. The California court ruled that while prior similar incidents are relevant evidence of foreseeability, they are not the sine qua non on the issue of foreseeability. Id. at 362, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 659. See also Sharpe v. Peter Pan Bus Lines, 401 Mass. 788, 519 N.E.2d 1341 (1988); Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 449 N.E.2d 331 (1983);. The solid and growing national trend has been toward the rejection of the prior similar incidents rule. See, e.g., Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 125 Ill.2d 203, 126 Ill.Dec. 519, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (1988) (simply because no violent crimes had been committed at the office parking area does not render criminal actions unforeseeable as a matter of law); Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg. Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975); Aaron v. Havens, 758 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1988) (no need for past similar crimes); Small v. McKennan Hosp. (Small II), 437 N.W.2d 194 (S.D. 1989) (failure to prove any criminal activity in the area is not fatal to the submission of the foreseeability issue to the jury because criminal assaults occur in all neighborhoods); Paterson v. Deeb, 472 So.2d 1210, 1218-19 (Fla.App. 1985) ([w]e are not willing to give the landlord one free ride, as it were, and sacrifice the first victim's right to safety upon the altar of foreseeability by slavishly adhering to the now-discredited notion that at least one criminal assault must have occurred on the premises before the landlord can be held liable). Reduced to its essence, the prior similar incidents requirement translates into the familiar but fallacious saying in negligence law that every dog gets one free bite before its owner can be held to be negligent for failing to control the dog. That license which is refused to a dog's owner should be withheld from a building's owner and the owner's agents as well. There is no one free rape rule in Idaho. The prior similar incidents requirement is not only too demanding, it violates the cardinal negligence law principle that only the general risk of harm need be foreseen, not the specific mechanism of injury. Taco Bell v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43 (Colo. 1987); Galloway v. Bankers Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437 (Iowa 1988); Duncavage v. Allen, 147 Ill. App.3d 88, 100 Ill.Dec. 455, 497 N.E.2d 433 (1986); Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts § 43 at 299 (5th ed. 1984). See also Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 69 Haw. 376, 742 P.2d 377 (1987); Small v. McKennan Hosp. (Small I), 403 N.W.2d 410 (S.D. 1987). Such a requirement would remove far too many issues from the jury's consideration. Foreseeability is ordinarily a question of fact. Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal.3d 112, 126, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 362, 695 P.2d 653, 659 (1985). Defendants argue that security was provided to protect only the building and its contents, not the persons within. Otherwise put, property is entitled to protection, but not so with persons. In reality the question is whether it is foreseeable that an intruder might commit a violent act after gaining entry to the building where security was employed to protect against prowlers, vandals or unauthorized intruders. Service Agreement between Security Police and Security Investments, R. Vol. 1 at 26. The risk to be prevented was that of criminal activity. Unfortunately criminals do not tidily confine their crimes to property only. Even a shoplifting may turn violent. Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 525 (Del. 1987); Galloway v. Bankers Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437, 439 (Iowa 1988). Accord Aaron v. Havens, 758 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Mo. 1988) ([i]f a burglar may enter so may a rapist); Small v. McKennan Hospital (Small II), 437 N.W.2d 194 (S.D. 1989). The question is one of foreseeability. It is therefore an issue for the jury or other trier of fact to decide. K.S.R. v. Novak & Sons, Inc., 225 Neb. 498, 406 N.W.2d 636 (1987); Isaacs, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 362, 695 P.2d at 659. Defendants also argue that the occurrence of criminal activity is an intervening, superseding force that breaks the chain of causation potentially binding defendants to liability. While this is a superficially pleasing statement of a general rule, it has no applicability under the circumstances of this case. Here the precise hazard to be guarded against was criminal activity. If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby. b. The happening of the very event the likelihood of which makes the actor's conduct negligent and so subjects the actor to liability cannot relieve him from liability. The duty to refrain from the act committed or to do the act omitted is imposed to protect the other from this very danger. To deny recovery because the other's exposure to the very risk from which it was the purpose of the duty to protect him resulted in harm to him, would be to deprive the other of all protection and to make the duty a nullity. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 449 and comment b (1965). Accord Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc., 382 So.2d 98, 101 (Fla.App. 1980) (rejecting the superseding argument as entirely fallacious). See also Massie v. Godfather's Pizza, Inc., 844 F.2d 1414 (10th Cir.1988); Meyers v. Ramada Hotel Operating Co., 833 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir.1987); Duncavage v. Allen, 147 Ill. App.3d 88, 100 Ill.Dec. 455, 459-60, 497 N.E.2d 433, 437-38 (1986). Thus, in addition to the rule of Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho at 249, 678 P.2d at 41, imposing a duty of reasonable care, under the circumstances, running from landlords or owners to their tenants as a matter of law, there are ample additional reasons for imposing such a duty on the landlord in this case. It remains for a jury to determine whether there was any breach of that duty. Therefore the summary judgment as to Moore is reversed and remanded.