Opinion ID: 1968563
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Constitutionality of the Statutory Provision Requiring the Defendant to Prove Consent

Text: Because we reverse appellant's conviction for the reasons stated in Part IV., we would ordinarily not decide the other issue presented, i.e., the constitutionality of the requirement that the defense establish consent by a preponderance of the evidence. We do so in this case, however, in order to provide guidance to the parties and the court upon retrial. In light of our conclusion that the legislature did not exclude consent evidence as relevant to the government's burden of proof on the elements of the offense, we have no difficulty in deciding that the affirmative defense provision, D.C.Code § 22-4107 (1996 Repl.), does not offend the requirements of due process. [13] The Supreme Court held in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072-73, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), that the government must prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. However, in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2327, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), the Court held that state legislatures may, within the limits of due process, exclude an element of an offense from the definition of that offense and make that element an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. Ten years later in Martin, supra, the Supreme Court upheld on Ohio statute requiring self-defense to be raised as an affirmative defense to a charge of aggravated murder and to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. In both Patterson and Martin, the Court noted that the affirmative defense in the case was a separate issue that did not require the defendant to disprove any element of the offense as defined in the statute. The Court emphasized. the preeminent role of the States in preventing and dealing with crime and the reluctance of the Court to disturb a State's decision with respect to the definition of criminal conduct and the procedures by which the criminal laws are to be enforced in the courts, including the burden of producing evidence and allocating the burden of persuasion. Martin, supra, 480 U.S. at 232, 107 S.Ct. at 1101. The Martin Court added that it was not moved by assertions that the elements of aggravated murder and self-defense overlap in the sense that evidence to prove the latter will often tend to negate the former. Id. at 234, 107 S.Ct. at 1102. The Supreme Court has declined to set forth a single test or specific guidelines for measuring the limits of due process, i.e., for determining when a legislature has exceeded its constitutional authority in defining the elements of an offense and allocating the burdens of proof. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 637, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 2499-2500, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (plurality opinion of J. Souter). However, in light of the Court's holding in Martin, supra, its admonition that the courts should not lightly construe the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual States, see Patterson, supra, 432 U.S. at 201, 97 S.Ct. at 2322; see also Schad, supra, 501 U.S. at 637, 111 S.Ct. at 2499-2500, our conclusion that the affirmative defense provision does not preclude the jury from considering the defendant's consent evidence as relevant to the government's burden to prove the elements of the offense, and the fact that the affirmative defense of consent focuses on something within the knowledge of the accused that he may fairly be required to prove  that the words or overt actions of the complainant reasonably indicated that the complainant freely agreed to engage in the sexual act  we are satisfied that the legislative determinations that are reflected in the new statute do not offend the requirements of due process.