Opinion ID: 766509
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Liberty or property interest

Text: 36 The district court in the instant case correctly stated that First Amendment rights may constitute a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. See Adkins v. Board of Educ. of Magoffin County, Ky., 982 F.2d 952, 955 (6th Cir. 1993) (Although [the plaintiff] had no property right to continued employment she had a liberty interest in not being denied employment for exercising her First Amendment right[s] ....). Because we find that Jackson has stated a claim for a violation of his First Amendment right of freedom of speech with respect to the gag order, we hold that he has sufficiently alleged the deprivation of a liberty interest. 37 Jackson also argues that he has pled a constitutionally protected property interest with respect to his alleged suspension. He argues that his membership in the classified civil service gives rise to a property interest in his continued employment. In support of this claim, he cites Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), which held that public employees have a property interest in continued employment. The holding in Loudermill, however, only extended to the termination of public employees. Indeed, the Supreme Court stated in Loudermill that the suspension of a tenured public employee with pay would avoid due process problems entirely. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 544-55; see also Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 929 (1997) (expressly acknowledging that the Court has not decided whether the Due Process Clause extends to discipline of tenured public employees short of termination). Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1985), another case cited by Jackson, is also distinguishable because Boals's suspension was apparently without pay. Because Jackson was neither terminated nor lost any pay or benefits, we find that he was not deprived of a constitutionally protected property interest. 38