Opinion ID: 2634685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hangartner's PDA Requests

Text: The City argues that the trial court erred in determining that the controversy exemption does not apply to the light rail documents. The trial court determined that applying the controversy exemption was unnecessary because the City failed to establish that litigation was reasonably likely. The controversy exemption is contained within the PDA and exempts from disclosure those [r]ecords which are relevant to a controversy to which an agency is a party but which records would not be available to another party under the rules of pretrial discovery for causes pending in the superior courts. RCW 42.17.310(1)(j). In Dawson v. Daly, 120 Wash.2d 782, 791, 845 P.2d 995 (1993), we defined the phrase relevant to a controversy as completed, existing, or reasonably anticipated litigation. We declined to define this phrase as a `prolonged public dispute, debate or contention' concluding that such a definition would violate the PDA's requirement that exemptions are construed narrowly. Id. at 790, 845 P.2d 995; see RCW 42.17.251 (The public records subdivision of this chapter shall be liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly construed....). The City contends that the light rail documents were created in reasonable anticipation of litigation because there was a litigation-charged atmosphere at the time they were created. City's Opening Br. at 43. The City has, however, failed to establish that there was any threat or reasonable anticipation of litigation concerning the enactment of CB 113100. Indeed, a litigation-charged atmosphere is more analogous to the definition of relevant to a controversy that we rejected in Dawson than it is to the definition we adopted in that case. We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not err in determining that the light rail documents were not exempt under RCW 42.17.310(1)(j).
The PDA generally requires all agencies to disclose requested documents unless a specific statutory exemption is applicable. Dawson, 120 Wash.2d at 789, 845 P.2d 995. The purpose of the act is to allow the people to retain their sovereignty and effectively control their government by remaining informed about its actions. RCW 42.17.251. In order to promote its purposes, the [PDA's] provisions are to be liberally construed to promote full access to public records; its exemptions are to be narrowly interpreted. Confederated Tribes v. Johnson, 135 Wash.2d 734, 745-46, 958 P.2d 260 (1998). At the trial court, Hangartner contended that the attorney-client privilege provides an exemption for documents only when the documents relate to a controversy as defined in RCW 42.17.310(1)(j). The trial court agreed, reasoning that the PDA's other statute exemption, contained at RCW 42.17.260(1), does not include the attorney-client privilege. RCW 42.17.260(1) is a provision of the PDA. It provides, in pertinent part, that [e]ach agency ... shall make available for public inspection and copying all public records, unless the record falls within the specific exemptions of subsection (6) of this section, RCW 42.17.310, 42.17.315, or other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records. (Emphasis added.) An agency, therefore, must establish that its record is exempt through one of the specific exemptions listed within the PDA or another statute, incorporated by RCW 42.17.260(1), that exempts or prohibits disclosing the record. As noted above, RCW 42.17.310(1)(j) protects only documents that are relevant to a controversy... [and] would not be available to another party under the rules of pretrial discovery for causes pending in the superior courts. The City asserts that the attorney-client privilege as codified at RCW 5.60.060(2)(a) is an other statute that prohibits disclosing certain records through the PDA. RCW 5.60.060(2)(a) provides that [a]n attorney or counselor shall not, without the consent of his or her client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him or her, or his or her advice given thereon in the course of professional employment. Hangartner argues that interpreting the attorney-client privilege as an other statute as provided in RCW 42.17.260(1) would render the controversy [exemption] meaningless and superfluous. Hangartner's Br. of Resp't at 19. We agree that [s]tatutes are construed wherever possible so that no portion is superfluous. In re Marriage of Gimlett, 95 Wash.2d 699, 703, 629 P.2d 450 (1981). Nevertheless, a determination that documents that fall within the statutory attorney-client privilege are exempt from the PDA does not render the controversy exemption meaningless. Indeed, in this case, even though Hangartner made requests that he referred to as voluminous, the City claimed that only six documents, three of the light rail documents and three AIA documents, fell within the attorney-client privilege. HCP at 27; see HCP at 417. The controversy exemption exempts documents that are relevant to a controversy and unobtainable through pretrial discovery, which will include some documents also covered by the attorney-client privilege and some documents that are not covered by the attorney-client privilege. Additionally, the attorney-client privilege protects documents and records that fall within the privilege regardless of whether they are relevant to a controversy. Thus, an exemption for documents falling within the statutory attorney-client privilege merely complements the controversy exemption. Recognizing an exemption for documents protected by the attorney-client privilege will not, as the dissent contends, swallow[ ] the PDA's purpose of allowing citizens a right to public records. Dissent at 36. The attorney-client privilege is a narrow privilege and protects only communications and advice between attorney and client; it does not protect documents that are prepared for some other purpose than communicating with an attorney. Kammerer v. W. Gear Corp., 96 Wash.2d 416, 421, 635 P.2d 708 (1981). Thus, should an agency prepare a document for a purpose other than communicating with its attorney, and then claim that the document is protected by the attorney-client privilege, the requesting party might well claim that the agency has acted in bad faith. A finding of bad faith could cost the agency dearly since a requesting party is entitled to an award of between $5 and $100 for each day that it was wrongfully denied the `right to inspect or copy [the requested] public record.' Amren v. City of Kalama, 131 Wash.2d 25, 35, 37, 929 P.2d 389 (1997) (quoting RCW 42.17.340(4)). When deciding where, between $5 and $100 per day, the appropriate per day award should rest, the court must consider whether the agency claimed an exemption in bad faith. Id. at 38, 929 P.2d 389. When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the statute's meaning must be derived from the wording of the statute itself. State v. Johnson, 104 Wash.2d 179, 181, 703 P.2d 1052 (1985). This rule holds true, even if the Legislature intended something else but failed to express it adequately. State v. Chester, 133 Wash.2d 15, 21, 940 P.2d 1374 (1997). In our view, RCW 42.17.260(1) is clear in including the statutory attorney-client privilege as an exemption. When the legislature amended the PDA to include the other statute exemption, it could have easily trumped the attorney-client privilege by excluding it from consideration as an other statute. LAWS of 1987, ch. 403, § 3. It did not do so. Although the dissent would have us rewrite the statute to include a requirement that the other statute mesh[ ] with the PDA, we will not look past the clear language of that statute. Dissent at 35. Instead, we consider both the PDA's mandate that exemptions are interpreted narrowly and the statutory language used in creating the exemptions. Because RCW 5.60.060(2)(a) is unquestionably a statute other than RCW 42.17.260(6), 42.17.310, or 42.17.315 that prohibits the disclosure of certain records, documents that fall under RCW 5.60.060(2)(a) are exempt from the public disclosure act. Consequently, the trial court erred in ordering the City to produce its documents because the trial court never determined whether the documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege. [8]