Opinion ID: 848764
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: application of strict scrutiny to the statute

Text: In order to meet strict scrutiny, a statute must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. In the realm of fundamental rights, this test takes on substantial weight. The very concept of a liberty interest presumes that there are few, if any, governmental interests that will meet this burden. Moreover, a court's application of an otherwise valid statute is invalid if it extends beyond the limits of constitutional authority. The majority holds that our grandparent visitation statute cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. Specifically, it rules that the unconstitutionality lies in its failure to accord deference to the decisions of fit parents regarding grandparent visitation. Ante at 643. It is apparent to me that this conclusion rests on an unnecessarily strict interpretation of the statute. It violates the principle that `[a] text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably to contain all that it fairly means.' Corrigan & Thomas, Dice Loading Rules of statutory interpretation, 59 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 231, 231-232 (2003), quoting Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 23.

A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens.... Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944). Accordingly, [i]t is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's interest in `safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is `compelling.' New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-757, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982), quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982). Therefore, we may sustain legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the legislation impinges on constitutionally protected rights. Ferber, supra at 757, 102 S.Ct. 3348. Our grandparent visitation statute is meant to protect children's well-being by providing for visitation when it is in their best interests. Thus, the statute must be upheld if it is narrowly tailored to address this compelling interest.
By its terms, the Michigan grandparent visitation statute is substantially more narrow than the Washington statute. For instance, the Washington statute allowed any person the ability to bring a petition for visitation at any time. By contrast, the Michigan statute allows only grandparents to petition for visitation and only under circumstances where a prior disturbance in the parent-child relationship limits the effect of the intrusion. The Legislature allows court-ordered nonparental visitation only where (1) the relationship between the child and the petitioner is that of grandchild-grandparent, and (2) the petition for visitation is made during the pendency of a child custody dispute or the natural parent of the unmarried child is deceased. The crucial fact in this case is that the Michigan statute, like the Washington statute, employs a best-interests-of-the-child standard to determine whether a court should issue a visitation order. The inclusion of this standard constituted the ultimate flaw in the Washington statute; once a petition was properly before a Washington court, the act gave the judge unfettered discretion to determine whether to award visitation. [6] Thus, I would agree with the majority that, unless our Legislature has otherwise limited our trial courts' discretion in awarding visitation to grandparents, we must hold the statute unconstitutional. The majority is apparently persuaded by the argument that the statute includes a presumption in favor of awarding grandparent visitation. Ante, at 643, n. 10. However, this interpretation runs afoul of the basic tenet that a statute is presumed constitutional. The majority incorrectly states that the statute does not require a trial court to justify its decision to award grandparent visitation with any factual findings or analysis. To the contrary, the statute forbids a court from entering a grandparent visitation order unless it finds that it is in the best interests of the child.... M.C.L. § 722.27b(3). Under our court rules, the court must place its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. MCR 3.210(D) and 2.517(A)(1). The Michigan statute does not include the most restrictive terms possible, but it need not do so to pass constitutional muster. Indeed, a statute may be constitutional even though it lacks provisions that meet constitutional requirements. As long as it has terms not excluding such requirements, a court is justified in finding that constitutional requirements are embodied in the statute. Council of Organizations, 455 Mich. at 569, 566 N.W.2d 208, quoting 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 225, p. 659. Moreover, the grandparent visitation statute does not exist in a vacuum. It is part of an extensive statutory scheme, the Child Custody Act of 1970, [7] that guides the resolution of disputes regarding custody and visitation rights. The grandparent visitation statute cannot properly be interpreted without reference to applicable provisions of the Child Custody Act. Cf. Arrowhead Dev. Co. v. Livingston Co. Rd. Comm., 413 Mich. 505, 516, 322 N.W.2d 702 (1982). Specifically, the grandparent visitation statute must be read in conjunction with M.C.L. § 722.23 and M.C.L. § 722.25, which contain the state's best interests standard. Of particular importance is M.C.L. § 722.23( l ), which requires that courts take into account any unnamed factor relevant to a dispute. One such factor always present in grandparent visitation disputes must be the constitutional rights of the parents. [8] Additionally, M.C.L. § 722.25 works collectively with M.C.L. § 722.23 to protect parents' constitutional rights. MCL 722.25(1) provides that [i]f a child custody dispute is between the parents, between agencies, or between third persons, the best interests of the child control. If the child custody dispute is between the parent or parents and an agency or a third person, the court shall presume that the best interests of the child are served by awarding custody to the parent or parents, unless the contrary is established by clear and convincing evidence. This analysis supports the conclusion that our grandparent visitation statute is drawn more narrowly than the statute at issue in Troxel. It also demonstrates that, in drafting the statute, our Legislature was concerned with protecting parents' fundamental interest in raising their children. Accordingly, when the Legislature enacted the grandparent visitation statute, it saw fit to explicitly require that trial courts give deference to a fit parent's decisions regarding grandparent visitation. The majority's argument that the provisions requiring deference are inapplicable in the context of grandparent visitation are untenable. The Legislature resolved this issue by including grandparent visitation within the gamut of custody disputes. [9] Therefore, because it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, the statute is constitutional.
Although I believe that the grandparent visitation statute is valid, the visitation order must be overturned because it unduly infringes Mrs. Seymour's constitutionally protected interest in raising her children. The record indicates that the order far exceeded the discretion that the Legislature gave the trial court. The basis for the order was the court's conclusion that grandmothers are very important. This statement shows that the trial court's decision involved nothing more than a simple disagreement between the [trial court and Theresa DeRose] concerning her children's best interests. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (opinion of O'Connor, J.); Parham, 442 U.S. at 603, 99 S.Ct. 2493. [10] Moreover, this case is less difficult than was Troxel. Here, Mrs. Seymour not only made a legitimate decision concerning her child, she demonstrated that she made the decision to protect the integrity of her family. Had Mrs. DeRose been allowed to continue visitation with Mrs. Seymour's daughter, she could have continued to tell the child that Mrs. Seymour's ex-husband was not guilty of sexually abusing the child's sister. The potential harm to both children is a legitimate concern. Mrs. DeRose has failed to demonstrate that Mrs. Seymour's decision was not in the best interests of her children. The evidence demonstrated that Mrs. Seymour's concern for the integrity of her family motivated her decision. This concern is the basis of the liberty interest at stake in this case. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260-261, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989). Accordingly, I would hold that the visitation order is an unconstitutional abuse of the discretion granted it by the Michigan grandparent visitation statute.