Opinion ID: 1133622
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Instruction on Deliberation and Premeditation

Text: The trial court instructed the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 8.20, the standard instruction regarding deliberate and premeditated murder. At the prosecutor's request, however, the court modified the instruction by adding the following statement: To prove the killing was deliberate and premeditated, it shall not be necessary to prove the defendant maturely and meaningfully reflected upon the gravity of his act. [10] This statement was taken verbatim from section 189, which defines first degree murder. The statute's elimination of the need to prove mature and meaningful reflection was a legislative abrogation of People v. Wolff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 795, 819-822, 40 Cal.Rptr. 271, 394 P.2d 959, which had imposed such a requirement. (See People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 616, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994 [the 1981 amendment to section 189 overruled Wolff]. ) Defendant objected to the modification on the ground that at least one unidentified Court of Appeal decision had questioned the meaning of the phrase maturely and meaningfully reflected. Defendant requested that, if the court gave the modified version of CALJIC No. 8.20 requested by the prosecutor, it also read the following language at the end of the instruction: However, an intentional killing is not first degree murder, when based on a theory of a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, unless it is shown that the accused harbored not only an intent to kill but that such intent was the result of forethought and reflection, and demonstrated careful thought and a weighing of considerations. In denying defendant's requested instruction, the court observed that the proposed language came from a decision in which the appellate court did not intend to devise an instruction to be given in all cases. ( People v. Martinez (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 364, 369, 238 Cal.Rptr. 265.) The prosecutor's modification, on the other hand, was taken directly from the Penal Code. Defendant contends that the modified version of CALJIC No. 8.20 read to the jury was reasonably likely to have confused the jury regarding the mental state required for deliberate and premeditated murder. According to defendant, instructing the jurors that defendant need not have reflected maturely and meaningfully upon the gravity of his act essentially informed them that they could convict him of first degree murder even if they found that he had immaturely and frivolously reflected on the gravity of his act, with little thought or regard for the consequences. Defendant contends that section 189's reference to mature and meaningful reflection can be understood only in the context of Wolff and its progeny, which he asserts required a showing that the defendant must have been mentally well and have acted despite a realization of the enormity of the evil associated with the act. (See People v. Wolff, supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 822, 40 Cal.Rptr. 271, 394 P.2d 959.) Because the trial court did not provide a definition of the phrase that included these concepts, defendant maintains that the jurors were misled into believing that they could find premeditation and deliberation if there was evidence that defendant simply committed the killing. He further contends that the instruction undermined the specific intent instructions applicable to the charged crimes of attempted rape, robbery, and burglary, because the phrase was likely to have caused the jury to believe that defendant need not have been aware of what was happening. He claims that the error lowered the prosecution's burden of proof and denied him the right to a jury determination on the mental state elements of all the charged crimes and special circumstance allegations, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the corresponding provisions in the California Constitution. `[T]he language of a statute defining a crime or defense is generally an appropriate and desirable basis for an instruction, and is ordinarily sufficient when the defendant fails to request amplification....' [Citations.] [¶] The rule to be applied in determining whether the meaning of a statute is adequately conveyed by its express terms is well established. When a word or phrase `is commonly understood by those familiar with the English language and is not used in a technical sense peculiar to the law, the court is not required to give an instruction as to its meaning in the absence of a request.' [Citations.] A word or phrase having a technical, legal meaning requiring clarification by the court is one that has a definition that differs from its nonlegal meaning. [Citations.] ... [T]erms are held to require clarification by the trial court when their statutory definition differs from the meaning that might be ascribed to the same terms in common parlance. [Citation.] ( People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 574-575, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 904 P.2d 1197, original italics.) The words in the phrase maturely and meaningfully reflected are commonly understood terms that convey the same meaning in both section 189 and our decision in People v. Wolff, supra, 61 Cal.2d at page 821, 40 Cal.Rptr. 271, 394 P.2d 959. Therefore, the trial court had no obligation to provide further clarification of the statutory language. ( People v. Estrada, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 581, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 904 P.2d 1197.) In any event, the substance of the clarification requested by defendant already was included in CALJIC No. 8.20. Defendant's proposed addition would have told the jury it must find that the intent to kill was the result of forethought and reflection, and demonstrated careful thought and a weighing of considerations. The instruction given to the jury, however, defined deliberate as requiring careful thought and weighing and consideration for and against the proposed course of action, and defined premeditated as considered beforehand. Furthermore, it required that the intent to kill be formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat [of] passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation.... The instruction excepted a mere unconsidered and rash impulse from the definition of deliberation, and stated that defendant must weigh and consider the question of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice and, having in mind the consequences, he decides to and does kill. Considering the instruction as a whole, we find no reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood the phrase maturely and meaningfully reflected in the manner suggested by defendant. The instruction made clear that reflection must have preceded commission of the crime and could not have been unconsidered or rash, but rather must have resulted from careful thought and a weighing for and against the chosen course of action. There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury believed it could find deliberation and premeditation solely from evidence that defendant intended to kill, or solely from evidence that he committed the act, as defendant contends. We conclude that the trial court did not err in giving only the modification proposed by the prosecutor, and that the instruction did not mislead the jury regarding the requisite mental states for first degree murder or any of the other charged crimes. [11]