Opinion ID: 895824
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: mary's cross-appeal

Text: [¶ 23] Mary challenges the placement of joint custody and the visitation schedule. She also seeks attorney fees for this appeal.
[¶ 24] Mary contests the trial court's finding that the presumption against awarding custody to a parent who has engaged in domestic violence was rebutted in this case. Accordingly, she contends joint custody is inappropriate. [¶ 25] A trial court's custody decision is a finding of fact that will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. Kluck v. Kluck, 1997 ND 41, ¶ 14, 561 N.W.2d 263; Huesers v. Huesers, 1997 ND 33, ¶ 6, 560 N.W.2d 219. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support it, or if the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. [¶ 26] NDCC 14-09-06.2(1)(j) requires a court to consider evidence of domestic violence to determine custody: In awarding custody or granting rights of visitation, the court shall consider evidence of domestic violence. If the court finds credible evidence that domestic violence has occurred, this evidence creates a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has perpetrated domestic violence may not be awarded sole or joint custody of a child. This presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the child require that parent's participation as a custodial parent. (Our emphasis). By its terms, the statutory presumption applies to joint custody with an abusive parent. [¶ 27] The effect of this presumption was explained in Engh v. Jensen, 547 N.W.2d 922, 924 (N.D.1996): When credible evidence of domestic violence is presented in a child custody dispute, such evidence creates a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has perpetrated domestic violence may not be awarded sole or joint custody of a child. N.D. Cent.Code § 14-09-06.2(1)(j). We have interpreted the statutory presumption, in essence, to make domestic violence the paramount factor to consider in a custody decision.... The rebuttable presumption outweighs other factors and prevents the abusive parent from obtaining custody of the child, unless, in the case of two fit parents, the violent parent proves by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the child require that the perpetrator receive custody. N.D. Cent.Code § 14-09-06.2(1)(j).... [¶ 28] In Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 162 (N.D.1995), we described the formidable burden upon a violent parent to overcome this presumption: In amending subsection (j), the legislature placed the burden of proof on the perpetrator to prove that the best interests of the children require that the perpetrator be a custodial parent. NDCC § 14-09-06.2(1)(j). The use of the word require is a clear legislative signal that the presumption against awarding custody to a domestic violence perpetrator is not overcome merely by balancing the other factors slightly in the perpetrator's favor. The word require is a word denoting compulsion; it means to insist upon or demand. Webster's New World Dictionary, 1208 (2d College Ed.1980). The legislature intended not only that domestic violence committed by a parent weigh heavily against that parent's claim for child custody, but that it be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the children demand that the perpetrator of domestic violence serve as custodial parent. ... In a real sense, it takes compelling or exceptional circumstances under NDCC § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) to award custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence, and certainly something more than the customary weighing and reciting of the factors found in NDCC § 14-09-06.2(1)(a) through (i), (k), ( l ). [¶ 29] The trial court in this case found that Bill's domestic violence triggered the statutory presumption against his custody. The court found, however, that the presumption was overcome, citing numerous factors that the court believed established joint custody was in the best interests of the children. The factors listed by the court were: 1) Bill's violence was not directed at the children; 2) The children are old enough that there is minimal risk of harm to them from Bill's temper; 3) The violence was related to the marital relationship and is unlikely to continue after the divorce; 4) Bill is on medication to control his stress and alleviate depression; 5) Mary is very over-protective of the children; 6) Bill and Mary live close to each other, so the children could go to the other parent for protection if necessary; 7) The risk of further violence is minimal because of the ages of the children and the proximity of Bill's and Mary's homes; and 8) Bill and Mary each have great contributions available for the children. Under our prior opinions on the effect of the statutory presumption, most of these factors are irrelevant or insufficient to overcome the presumption. [¶ 30] Evidence that the violence will not occur again because the marriage has ended or these parents will have little contact with each other does not rebut the presumption. See Engh, 547 N.W.2d at 925-926; Heck, 529 N.W.2d at 164-165. Nor is it relevant that the violence was not directed at the children. Id. [¶ 31] The factors used by the trial court focused almost exclusively upon Bill's conduct and the likelihood he would commit more violence in the future. Once the presumption arises, sole custody with the non-abusive parent is presumed unless the abuser can show by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the children somehow require the abusive parent to participate in or have custody. To marshal that clear and convincing evidence, often it will be necessary to detail the failings of the abused rather than the virtues, if they exist, of the abuser. Heck, 529 N.W.2d at 166 (VandeWalle, J., concurring). Thus, to rebut the presumption, Bill needed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence why sole custody with Mary was not in the children's best interests. [¶ 32] Bill concedes on appeal that [h]e has never questioned Mary as a parent and he does not dispute that Mary is a `fit parent.'  When questioned at trial whether he had problems with Mary's parenting abilities, Bill responded: No. And II have taken that position both by repeated affidavits to this Court and otherwise from the very beginning of this. Mary is a good mother. She loves the kids; the kids love her. The only factor cited by the trial court on Mary's parental abilities was that Mary was over-protective of the children. The court added that Bill is more inclined to foster independence on the part of the boys. There is no evidence, however, that Mary is so abnormally over-protective that harm or psychological difficulty for the children will result. As cases like Engh, 547 N.W.2d at 926, Bruner v. Hager, 534 N.W.2d 825, 828 (N.D.1995), and Heck, 529 N.W.2d at 162, exemplify, absent some showing of unusual harm to the children from Mary's more protective nature, this finding is simply one of the customary factors used for a custody decision, so it does not rebut the presumption. [¶ 33] We conclude the trial court's placement of joint custody is clearly erroneous. We therefore reverse and remand for entry of a decree placing sole physical custody with Mary. [¶ 34] We also reverse that part of the divorce decree giving Bill ultimate authority over medical decisions affecting the children. Under the circumstances of this case, splitting authority over critical decisions affecting the children can only continue the animosity and conflict between Mary and Bill. Shared decisionmaking authority can be successful only where the parties have demonstrated an ability and willingness to cooperate in the children's best interests. See Olson v. Olson, 361 N.W.2d 249, 251 (N.D.1985). The evidence in this case demonstrates diametrically opposed views on parenting by Bill and Mary and continuous conflict over parental decisions. Rather than extend that conflict and cause further judicial intervention to mediate any future conflict, we conclude it is important to keep all decision-making authority with the sole custodial parent, Mary.
[¶ 35] The trial court ordered that Bill would have visitation each Wednesday evening, each weekend except one every month, and nearly seven weeks during the summer. Mary challenges the frequency of weekend visitations, contending Bill should get only a single weekend per month. [¶ 36] The trial court's decision on visitation is a finding of fact that will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. Kluck, 1997 ND 41, ¶ 24, 561 N.W.2d 263. In cases involving domestic violence, NDCC 14-05-22(3) governs visitation: If the court finds that a parent has perpetrated domestic violence and that parent does not have custody, the court shall allow only supervised child visitation with that parent unless there is a showing by clear and convincing evidence that unsupervised visitation would not endanger the child's physical or emotional health. See also Kluck, 1997 ND 41, ¶ 21, 561 N.W.2d 263. However, Mary did not seek supervised visitation in the trial court. Nor does she challenge on appeal the unsupervised visitation with Bill on Wednesdays and during the summer weeks. Mary has thus effectively conceded that unsupervised visitation will not endanger the children's physical or emotional health. Therefore, supervised visitation is not required. [¶ 37] Mary argues the weekend visitation schedule should be altered to limit Bill's visitation to only one weekend per month. She contends this is necessary for her to assure the boys do their homework, because Bill is less assertive about making the boys do their school work. We have reviewed the record and conclude the trial court's findings on visitation are not clearly erroneous.
[¶ 38] Mary seeks an award of attorney fees for this appeal. Under NDCC 14-05-23, we have concurrent jurisdiction with the trial court to award attorney fees for an appeal in a divorce. Martin v. Martin, 450 N.W.2d 768, 771 (N.D.1990). We have often expressed our preference to have this issue addressed initially by the trial court because it is generally in a better position to weigh the relevant factors. See, e.g., Hager v. Hager, 539 N.W.2d 304, 306 (N.D.1995); Wiege v. Wiege, 518 N.W.2d 708, 712 (N.D.1994). We therefore direct the trial court on remand to consider awarding attorney fees to Mary for this appeal.