Opinion ID: 727620
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppression of the Cocaine Found in the Express Mail Packages

Text: 12
13 Defendants first argue that the cocaine found in the Express Mail packages delivered to Earsery and Gerald should have been suppressed because the original detention of those packages by the Postal Service constituted an illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has held, however, that mail may be detained so long as there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252 (1970). Reasonable suspicion results from specific and articulable facts, and rational inferences therefrom, that reasonably justify an intrusion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Defendants argue that reasonable suspicion did not exist in this case. We disagree. 14 In combating the transportation of narcotics through the mails, the Postal Service has developed a drug package profile, which targets packages based on certain traits encountered in the vast majority of mailings discovered to contain drugs. These characteristics include: (1) the size and shape of the mailing; (2) whether the package is taped to seal all openings; (3) whether the mailing labels are handwritten; (4) whether the return address is suspicious (e.g., the return addressee and the return address do not match, or the return address is fictitious); (5) unusual odors coming from the package; (6) whether the city of origin and/or city of destination of the package are common drug source locales; and (7) whether there have been repeated mailings involving the same sender and addressee. United States v. Daniel, 982 F.2d 146, 150 n. 5 (5th Cir.1993); United States v. Lux, 905 F.2d 1379, 1380 n. 1 (10th Cir.1990). 15 This court has not yet decided whether reasonable suspicion can be aroused by a mailing's conformity to the drug package profile. Other courts, however, have held that the presence of an aggregate of profile factors satisfies the Terry doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 990 F.2d 667, 671 (1st Cir.1993) (three factors present); Daniel, 982 F.2d at 150 (six factors present); Lux, 905 F.2d at 1381 (three factors present); United States v. Cantrall, 762 F.Supp. 875, 879 (D.Kan.1991) (three factors present); United States v. Sklar, 721 F.Supp. 7, 10 (D.Mass.1989) (three factors present). 16 In the present case, Postal Inspector Arnold initially suspected that the packages in question contained narcotics because they were from Long Beach, California, a known drug source city; the destination of the parcels--to individuals--was unusual in that most Express Mail packages are sent to businesses; the labels on the packages were handwritten; and the packages had some volume to them. A cursory investigation of the packages enhanced Arnold's suspicions by revealing that: (1) the recipient phone number listed on the 2318 Hale Avenue package was nonexistent; (2) the person known to be living at 2318 Hale was Frankie Lee Baker, not Frankie Lee Taylor, as the package indicated; (3) Gerald Underwood, the recipient of the other package, had a criminal record; (4) the return addresses on the packages were fictitious; (5) three other suspicious Express Mail packages had been sent to Louisville from Long Beach in the previous eight months: the first two, addressed to Gerald Underwood, bore fictitious return addresses and recipient phone numbers, and the third, addressed to Frankie Baker, also bore a fictitious return address and recipient phone number; and (6) although all of the packages purported to be from different persons and different locations, the labels appeared to have been prepared by the same person. Considering this evidence, we conclude that the Postal Service was justified in detaining the packages in question until a search warrant could be obtained. 1 17
18 Defendants next argue that the cocaine from the packages should have been suppressed because the search warrants were not supported by probable cause. We address this issue by asking whether the Magistrate had a substantial basis for finding that the affidavit established probable case to believe that the evidence would be found at the place cited. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); accord United States v. Lawson, 999 F.2d 985, 987 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 574 (1993). Probable cause exists when  'there is a fair probability, given the totality of the circumstances, that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'  Lawson, 985 F.2d at 987 (quoting United States v. Loggins, 777 F.2d 336, 338 (6th Cir.1985)); accord Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. Such a determination by the issuing judge is to be accorded 'great deference' by the reviewing court. Lawson, 985 F.2d at 987 (quoting United States v. Algie, 721 F.2d 1039, 1041 (6th Cir.1983)). 19 In issuing the search warrants in question, the magistrate relied solely upon Arnold's affidavit. Defendants maintain that the facts set forth therein do not give rise to the level of certainty required to establish probable cause. The government contends, on the other hand, that Arnold's drug interdiction experience plus the averred facts were sufficient to support the warrants. 20 It appears that the Postal Service usually subjects mailings found to be suspicious under the drug package profile to a canine sniff before seeking a search warrant. See, e.g., Daniel, 982 F.2d at 150; Lux, 905 F.2d at 1382. For some reason, however, a sniff was not conducted in this case. Although this omission makes the question of probable cause much closer, we do not believe that it is fatal. Arnold's affidavit sets forth a plethora of facts, detailed previously in connection with our Terry analysis, establishing in convincing fashion that someone from a drug source city was engaged in a regular schedule of mailings to Louisville and that this person felt the need, for some reason, to conceal both his identity and the identities of the addressees. Additionally, Arnold's affidavit informed the magistrate that the Postal Service has, over a number of years, identified many common traits among packages found to contain narcotics and that the packages in question exhibited a substantial number of those traits. See Lawson, 999 F.2d at 987 (A judicial officer may give considerable weight to  'the conclusion of experienced law enforcement officers regarding where evidence of a crime is likely to be found.'  (quoting United States v. Fannin, 817 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir.1987)). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the magistrate had a substantial basis to believe that drugs would probably be found in the packages. 21