Opinion ID: 1957633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the trial court err by granting instructions P-6 and P-10?

Text: ¶ 89. The Dealership says the trial judge committed reversible error by granting instructions P-6 and P-10. As submitted by the Dorseys, P-6 instructed: The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that Mrs. Dorsey became so worried and upset as a result of the actions of Kim's Toyota that she sought medical attention from her doctor, and was required to take prescription medication for her nerves, then, in that event, you may award her damages in an amount that you believe will compensate her for her ailments. (emphasis added). Instruction P-10, as submitted, provided: The Court instructs the jury, that as a matter of law, once the title to a vehicle is signed and delivered to an individual, that individual owns the vehicle. The Court instructs you that the vehicle may be subject to a financing agreement, and that in that event, the vehicle would be subject to a lien in favor of the lender, but the title of the vehicle, would be the owner. (emphasis added). Following objections by the Dealership, both instructions P-6 and P-10 were modified prior to being submitted to the jury. P-6 was amended substituting the cost of the prescription medicine for ailment. During the trial, the Dealership argued that P-6 covered mental anguish and that because there was another instruction (P-3) covering mental anguish P-6 was duplicative. The trial court believed the instruction addressed actual damages, but amended the instruction to clarify the issue. ¶ 90. The Dealership argues that there was no proof of proximate cause and the instruction was peremptory in nature. Because its argument on appeal differs from the that which was made before the trial court, the issue is without merit. Grounds for objections which are different from those advanced at trial cannot be presented on appeal for the first time. Russell v. State, 607 So.2d 1107 (Miss.1992); Collins v. State, 594 So.2d 29 (Miss.1992); Parker v. State, 367 So.2d 456 (Miss.1979). ¶ 91. The Dealership objected to instruction P-10, and argued there was insufficient proof in the record of delivery of title. Following the objection, the trial court removed the second sentence from the instruction. However, the Dealership argues the entire instruction was erroneous because of the conditional language in the contract. As already noted, however, the Dealership's position regarding delivery of title is without merit. The three primary indicia of ownership: title, possession, and control, suggest the Dorseys owned the Mountaineer. Because the Dorseys owned the vehicle, the non-binding language in the purchase order was of no effect. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.