Opinion ID: 2820192
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Affidavit of Former Huntington Employee

Text: Plaintiffs also supported their Second Amended Complaint with an affidavit from Hussein Dabaja, a former employee who attested that Huntington engaged in a bank-wide practice of closing accounts held by Arab or Middle Eastern people.56 Dabaja’s affidavit says that from 2008 to 2009, Huntington’s headquarters sent quarterly lists of Arab-owned business accounts to close.57 It further states that Huntington closed associated personal accounts including those held by family members of business owners when the business accounts were closed.58 Dabaja estimates that from 2008 to 2009, Huntington closed over 200 business accounts.59 Furthermore, Dabaja attests that the Huntington branch he worked at “had many non-Middle Eastern bank account holders that were similar in many respects, only differing by the Arab, [or] Middle Eastern . . . characteristics, which were not closed during this period.”60 The district court discounted Dabaja’s declaration for two reasons. First, because Dabaja left Huntington in 2009, the district court found his experiences could not explain why Plaintiffs’ accounts were closed in 2013.61 Second, the district court viewed Dabaja’s attestation that 56 See R.23, Second Amended Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 33–35 (citing R. 23-4, Ex. C to Second Amended Class Action Complaint (Affidavit of Hussein Dabaja)). 57 R. 23-4, Ex. C to Second Amended Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 6–9 (Affidavit of Hussein Dabaja). 58 Id. ¶¶ 6–9. 59 Id. ¶ 10. 60 Id. ¶ 15. 61 El-Hallani, 2014 WL 988957, at . - 11 - No. 14-1827, El-Hallani, et al. v. Huntington Nat’l Bank similarly situated non-Arab account holders had not had their accounts closed as “merely a label and conclusion under Twombly.”62 Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, Dabaja’s affidavit offers some support for Plaintiffs’ claims and pushes them toward plausibility. Although Dabaja was not working at Huntington at the time Plaintiffs’ accounts were closed, when taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, his testimony supports an inference that race may have been a factor in these account closings. The four-year gap lessens the weight of this inference, but it does not make it irrelevant. The district court’s conclusion that Dabaja’s testimony regarding Huntington’s treatment of similarly situated non-Arab or Middle Eastern people was “merely a label” was also incorrect. Dabaja’s testimony was based on his first-hand observations. Although the language used in the affidavit is short on details, it is a factual assertion of what Dabaja observed, not just a conclusion.63 This testimony in Dabaja’s affidavit, when taken as true, goes beyond the type of “naked assertions” and “conclusory allegations” that this court has previously criticized. In 16630 Southfield Limited Partnership v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., we concluded the complaint’s allegations that the defendant had treated non-minority customers better than the minority plaintiff were insufficient because the plaintiff had no supporting facts, only his own beliefs.64 Here, by contrast, Dabaja’s first-hand observations contained in his affidavit supply the “further factual enhancement” required to survive a motion to dismiss.65 62 Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 63 See Rhodes, 491 F. App’x at 583–84. 64 727 F.3d 502, 506 (6th Cir. 2013). 65 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This difference also distinguishes a third case that the district court primarily relied on. The plaintiff in Life for Relief & Dev. v. Charter One Bank, - 12 - No. 14-1827, El-Hallani, et al. v. Huntington Nat’l Bank