Opinion ID: 2544987
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Borderline Retardation as Mitigating Evidence

Text: We note that Clemons did not present in his Rule 32 petition the issue whether his sentence of death should be reversed on the basis that the trial court failed to consider his borderline intellectual capacity as a mitigating factor, independent of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. However, in his brief to the Court of Criminal Appeals on his appeal from the denial of his Rule 32 petition, he argued that, under Atkins, supra , Dr. [Charles] Golden[, a clinical neuropsychologist whose testimony the trial court excluded,] could have provided evidence that would have established `a reasonable probability that the jury would have found that [Clemons] suffered from mild or borderline mental retardation or that a non-statutory mitigating circumstances existed.' Further, in his petition and briefs to this Court, Clemons argues that, under cases decided subsequent to Atkins, supra , such as Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287, 124 S.Ct. 2562, 159 L.Ed.2d 384 (2004), and Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 125 S.Ct. 400, 160 L.Ed.2d 303 (2004), evidence of borderline mental retardation [1] is inherently mitigating. See Tennard, 542 U.S. at 287, 124 S.Ct. 2562. See also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (noting that where the defendant had an IQ of 79, his diminished mental capacities . . . augment his mitigation case). We cannot, however, consider the issue whether the trial court erred in failing to consider Clemons's borderline intellectual capacity as a mitigating factor in the sentencing phase of his trial because the issue was not presented to the trial court in Clemons's Rule 32 petition. See Ex parte Linnell, 484 So.2d 455, 457 (Ala. 1986) ([T]he rule against raising an issue for the first time at the appellate level applies even if the issue raised would present constitutional questions.). As to the claims based on Tennard and Smith, Clemons could not have raised such claims under Tennard before the trial court or the Court of Criminal Appeals, because that line of cases had not yet been decided when Clemons's case was pending in those courts. We are not at liberty to consider claims in a Rule 32 petition that are raised for the first time on appeal. Ex parte Linnell, supra . Whether Clemons may raise any of these issues in a successive Rule 32 petition is not before us. See Rule 32.2(b)(2) (A successive petition on different grounds shall be denied unless. . . . the petitioner shows both that good cause exists why the new ground or grounds were not known or could not have been ascertained through reasonable diligence when the first petition was heard, and that failure to entertain the petition will result in a miscarriage of justice.). We therefore quash the writ as improvidently granted as to this issue.