Opinion ID: 1526646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the in-trial publicity issue

Text: The defendant challenges instructions given by the trial justice during the course of trial concerning the obligation of jurors in respect to the reading of and listening to media accounts of the trial. The defendant further argues that on 3 occasions the trial justice declined to poll the jurors in respect to allegedly prejudicial statements in the press. Although this case was one in which the possibility of imposition of sentence of death was involved, the press and media exercised commendable restraint in purporting to publish during the course of trial only matters which had been presented in court before the jury. Thus, the only allegation presented by defendant of prejudicial publicity in the course of this lengthy trial is an assertion that defendant was referred to in news accounts as an escapee, and the further assertion that The Providence Journal and Evening Bulletin erroneously reported that the death penalty was mandatory for anyone who committed murder while serving a sentence of imprisonment. The thrust of the assertions is that defendant was prejudiced by these accounts because a juror might infer therefrom that defendant had committed some prior crime in order to be in prison. We have recently noted that when a claim is made of exposure by jurors to newspaper articles during the course of a trial, it is necessary to make a showing that defendant was prejudiced thereby. Palmigiano v. State, R.I., 387 A.2d 1382 (1978). In that case we quoted the general rule as expressed in United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1972): `Newspaper and television publicity surrounding a trial represent the most common threats to the integrity of the proceedings. This is not to suggest, however, that juror exposure to any publicity vitiates the fairness of the trial. The severity of the threat depends upon both the nature of the information so publicized and the degree of juror exposure to it.' R.I., 387 A.2d at 1385. In Palmigiano, supra, we further observed that in cases in which substantial prejudicial publicity has been found to have reached the jury during trial, the publicity has generally involved `information about the defendant that would not be admissible before the jury or that was not in fact put before the jury in court.' Id., 387 A.2d at 1386, citing United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 195 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922, 96 S.Ct. 2629, 49 L.Ed.2d 375 (1976), quoting United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 849 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058, 92 S.Ct. 736, 30 L.Ed.2d 745 (1972). See also State v. Holmes, 110 Ariz. 494, 520 P.2d 1118 (1974); Quintana v. People, 158 Colo. 189, 405 P.2d 740 (1965). Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, we find that nothing in the asserted newspaper articles set forth any matter which had not already been presented before the jurors. There was evidence in the case, as was required by the nature of the charges, that defendant had been lawfully committed to the ACI and that he had escaped therefrom. In connection with the nature of the charge of murder, under R. I. 1203 § 11-23-2, as amended by P.L. 1973, ch. 280, § 1, the jury was exhaustively instructed concerning the nature and elements of this crime during the voir dire examination of jurors prior to empanelling, as well as in the final instructions given by the trial justice. The statute purported to make the death penalty applicable to [e]very person who shall commit murder while committed to confinement to the adult correctional institutions    . Although a purist in statutory interpretation might disagree with the newspaper summary of the charge, such a subtle distinction would be imperceptible to the average intelligent lay person. We believe that the newspaper accounts of which complaint is made might well be characterized in the words of Judge Russell in United States v. Jones, supra : With hardly an exception, the cases in which substantial prejudicial publicity during the trial was found, the publicity involved `information about the defendant that would not be admissible before the jury or that was not in fact put before the jury in court.'    We have none of that in this case. The newspaper publicity of which the defendants complained was    an accurate condensed statement of testimony actually admitted into evidence and heard by the jury. The news accounts did not attempt    to evaluate the testimony to the prejudice of the defendants. They included no inadmissible evidence or evidence that was not available to the jury or evidence that either then or later was not fully developed in evidence heard by the jury. 542 F.2d at 195-96. The foregoing comments are equally applicable to the case at bar. Since no publicity which could remotely be termed prejudicial has been pointed out by defendant, we do not reach the question of the adequacy or correctness of the trial justice's response. It is only under circumstances where the jury has been exposed to prejudicial information that the trial court is obliged, in its sound discretion, to take appropriate measures to assure a fair trial. United States v. Jones, supra at 194; United States v. Pomponio, 517 F.2d 460 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015, 96 S.Ct. 448; 46 L.Ed.2d 386 (1975); United States v. Hankish, 502 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. 1974). Therefore, since defendant has not shown any reasonable possibility of prejudice from the publicity upon which his challenge is based, his argument on this issue is unavailing.