Opinion ID: 2191418
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: II-B The Nature and Scope of Our Appellate Review.

Text: Before we address the merits of the contentions of the respective parties as to constitutionally protected commercial speech, we must first clarify several factors bearing upon the nature, and scope, of our appellate scrutiny of the issues raised. We emphasize, first, that our appellate analysis will be strictly confined within the particular framework fixed by all of the parties, as well as by the adjudication of the Superior Court. One bound of that framework is that the mode of speech regulated by the Maine Act is commercial speech. Our appellate review thus proceeds on the basis that in this particular case a ground rule has been established confining our analysis to the First-Fourteenth Amendment protection of commercial speech. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, ___ U.S. ___, ___, n. 5, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2349, n. 5, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). For this reason, our decision of this case neither states nor intimates any opinion whatever regarding whether all the parties and the Superior Court were correct in classifying as commercial speech any, or all, of the modes of speech the Maine Act regulates. Second, we regard Sections 1314 and 1321, the particular statutes held by the Superior Court to be violative of the First-Fourteenth Amendments, as direct restrictions upon speech based upon the content of that speech; we do not look upon them as mere time, place, or manner restrictions. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of New York, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1830, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-16, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2302-2303, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). The analysis will be somewhat extended to establish this point in relation to the restraint imposed by Section 1314(1), particularly as it affects the business of the plaintiff Equifax. Without need of extended discussion, however, we find it plain that Section 1321 puts a direct content-based restraint on speech. It prohibits outright the preparation, use, or reporting of specifically defined categories of information: in (1)(A) information [r]elative to . . . race, religion, color, ancestry, ethnic origin, and so forth, and in (1)(B) information [r]elative to an arrest or criminal charge; in (2) information not relevant to the purpose for which it is sought; in (4) certain more particularly delineated information. All of these provisions of Section 1321 prohibit the reporting of the information solely because of the nature of its content. In fuller elucidation of the nature of the restraint imposed by Section 1314(1), it might appear at first blush that its requirement that a user obtain prior written authorization from a consumer before procuring an investigative consumer report has only a remote relationship to the commercial speech of Equifax, which is a supplier of consumer reports. On the surface, the requirement seems to burden, or inconvenience, users rather than suppliers. Were this indeed the only practical effect of the statute, we would be reluctant to adjudicate the constitutional challenge being made here by a supplier  particularly in light of the United States Supreme Court's warnings that the full-blown overbreadth approach applied to other modes of speech may not be applicable to commercial speech. As the Supreme Court stated most recently in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, supra, in distinguishing the overbreadth doctrine from the requirement that restrictions on commercial speech be narrowly drawn: The . . . [overbreadth doctrine] permits the invalidation or regulations on First Amendment grounds even when the litigant challenging the regulation has engaged in no constitutionally protected activity. . . . The overbreadth doctrine derives from the recognition that unconstitutional restriction of expression may deter protected speech by parties not before the court and thereby escape judicial review. . . . This restraint is less likely where the expression is linked to `commercial well-being' and therefore is not easily deterred by `overbroad regulation.' Id., n. 8. See also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 379-82, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 2706-2708, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977); Virginia Pharmacy Board, supra, 425 U.S. at 771, n. 24, 96 S.Ct. at 1830, n. 24; Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10-11, n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 887, 894-895, n. 9, 59 L.Ed.2d 100 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447, 462, n. 20, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 1922, n. 20, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978). However, because of what the instant record shows is the effect of Section 1314(1) on the business of Equifax, we think it sufficiently evident that the speech restraints it imposes are not remote as against Equifax. Equifax operations in Maine are part of a nationwide consumer reporting enterprise. The record discloses that a substantial volume of Equifax's business in Maine involves users not located in Maine. Plaintiff Paul Weeks, Manager of the office maintained by Equifax in the Portland area, testified that the bulk of our reports do go to customers out of the State of Maine. Most of our customers are domiciled in other states, our major life companies, major casualty companies, all types of customers. He further testified that 25 to 30 percent of the reports made each year relate to non-residents of Maine. Whereas Maine users of consumer reports would be subject to the requirement of prior consumer consent, out-of-state users may not be thus subject to such a requirement under their own state laws. If an out-of-state user were not subject to such a restriction, and ordered either the preparation and transmission of a report or the communication of information already on file and ready to be reported by the consumer reporting agency, Equifax would be unable to respond unless and until it had first required the user to supply the requisite written consent. If Equifax did not do this, being a Maine consumer reporting service, it would be subject to potential criminal penalties under Section 1326 of the Maine Act. The restraint could therefore translate into costly delay, and even a loss of business; indeed, the record reflects that after the Maine Act became effective, Equifax incurred some loss of business that was related to the stringency of the Act's requirements. As brought in play in this case, then, the prior consumer consent requirement of Section 1314(1) impairs the ability of Equifax to respond effectively and promptly to requests from out-of-state users of reports. So viewed, Section 1314(1) operates as at least a prior restraint [8] and at most a total restraint on commercial speech of Equifax that may qualify for protection under the First-Fourteenth Amendments. Cf. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 99 S.Ct. 2667, 61 L.Ed.2d 399 (1979) (law criminalizing newspaper's publication, without prior written approval of juvenile court lawfully obtained, of truthful information concerning name of youth charged as a juvenile offender held an impermissible prior restraint.) Thus, Sections 1314 and 1321 are not time, place, or manner restrictions. A constitutionally permissible time, place, or manner restriction may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech. Consolidated Edison Co., supra, ___ U.S. ___, at ___, 100 S.Ct. 2326, at 2332, 65 L.Ed.2d 319. Neither Section 1314 nor Section 1321 operates totally apart from the content of the consumer report, and under these sections it cannot be said with reasonable certainty that alternative channels for communication are left open. See Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 1618, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977); Virginia Pharmacy Board, supra, 425 U.S. at 771, 96 S.Ct. at 1830.