Opinion ID: 776376
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the first supplemental unanimity instruction

Text: 27 Normally, the foregoing conclusion might well lead us to simply instruct the district court to reinstate the first jury verdict. However, the record indicates that the first supplemental instruction ultimately may have created as much jury confusion as it dispelled. We therefore have no confidence in the first verdict, even though the district court's first supplemental instruction was legally correct. Accordingly, we remand the case for further proceedings. 28 After the jury requested clarification, the district court had an obligation to clear away the confusion `with concrete accuracy.' 25 The jury's confusion was in regard to how the unanimity requirement applied to the affirmative defense of arson. As previously discussed, in terms of the liability determination, an affirmative defense is analogous to an element. Ordinarily, a general unanimity instruction is sufficient to instruct the jury that its verdict must be unanimous as to each element[.] 26 In most cases, therefore, an element-specific unanimity instruction is not necessary. Indeed, this court has held that such an instruction should be given only when it appears that there is a genuine possibility of jury confusion or that [liability] may occur as the result of different jurors concluding that the defendant committed different acts. 27 29 This case is not one where the jurors could have based liability upon different acts. To the contrary, the liability determination here was factually straightforward: the jury plainly understood that liability hinged on whether Jazzabi had started the fire on a particular day, at a particular time, and in a particular place. Furthermore, the jury confusion here probably did not warrant a specific unanimity instruction, because jury confusion refers to confusion over the factual basis for liability, not confusion over a legal standard such as the unanimity requirement. 28 Thus, this case does not present the type of circumstances we normally require to justify a specific unanimity instruction. 30 Nonetheless, the district court could hardly have avoided giving an element-specific unanimity instruction in this case. The only issue for the jury was whether the element of arson had been satisfied. We therefore find no error in the giving of an element-specific unanimity instruction. However, the district court's instruction went beyond the element level and took the unanimity requirement to the next level of specificity and, in doing so, created jury confusion rather than dispelling it. 31 In its first supplemental instruction, the district court told the jury that you first have to decide liability one way or another before you consider the issue of damages. This instruction was correct and, probably, adequate. The district court could have been more specific, and instructed the jury that it was required to unanimously decide the arson question one way or another before considering the issue of damages. 32 The district went even further, however, and attempted to specifically explain to the jury the two different ways in which the unanimity requirement applied to the arson defense, i.e., that the jury had to unanimously agree that Jazzabi was the arsonist in order to find for Allstate, and that the jury had to unanimously agree that Jazzabi was not the arsonist in order to find for Jazzabi. A review of the transcript of the instruction session shows that taking the unanimity instruction to this next level of specificity created confusion. 33 Despite our (hopefully) clear formulation of the two ways in which the unanimity requirement applies to an affirmative defense, 29 the legal distinction between the two, and their application to the questions facing the jury in this case, does not readily reduce to succinct and concise non-legal terminology. 30 Indeed, the transcript reveals that the district court struggled to find non-legal language to clearly and concisely instruct the jury. The slipperiness of the distinction the court attempted to draw for the jury is also illustrated by the fact that the court's instruction was punctuated by questions from the jury demonstrating that the jurors had difficulty following the court's explanation. 31 34 Other aspects of the instruction session also indicate that the session engendered juror confusion. For instance, at several points during the instruction, the court discussed the substance of the instruction with a law clerk in a way that seemed to add to the jurors' uncertainty. In addition, questions regarding the relationship of the unanimity requirement to the burden of proof and the preponderance of the evidence standard arose simultaneously, further complicating the issue. 35 In sum, this case shows that over-instructing the jury carries its own risks, 32 even when the court is attempting to squarely answer the question that the jury has asked. Here, the district court's well-meaning attempts to answer the jury's unanimity question with a legally correct explanation does not seem to have clear[ed] away the confusion with concrete accuracy. 33 Indeed, the instruction seems to have had the opposite effect. We therefore have no confidence in the first verdict, and we remand to the district court rather than reinstating the first verdict.