Opinion ID: 1155479
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: order granting partial summary judgment in part and order dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in part

Text: This case originated with a petition for declaratory judgment filed by Reiman Corp., Plaintiff, against the City of Cheyenne, Defendant. This petition is the basis for the motion for summary judgment filed by the City and the cross-motion for summary judgment filed by Reiman. The petition sought a declaratory judgment allowing Reiman to withdraw its bid in the amount of $1,910,000.00, submitted pursuant to the City's invitation for bids for the construction of a new Headquarters Fire Station, or, in the alternative, to allow a reformation of the bid to correct an error made in calculating the bid price, which should have been $71,000.00 more, or a price of $1,981,000.00. Additionally, the petition requested that a bid bond, submitted with the bid, in the amount of five percent (5%) of Reiman's total bid, be returned to Reiman. The City refused to allow Reiman to withdraw its bid unless Reiman forfeited its bond, relying on the competitive bidding statute at W.S. § 15-1-113 (1991 Cum.Supp.): (f) . . . The bid guarantee shall be forfeited as liquidated damages if the bidder, upon the letting of the contract to him, fails to enter into the contract within thirty (30) days after it is presented to him. . . . Pending the resolution of the petition for declaratory judgment, Reiman moved to have the City temporarily enjoined from taking any action to cause a forfeiture of its bid bond and also enjoined from requiring Reiman to sign a construction contract. Prior to the hearing seeking temporary relief, Reiman entered into a stipulated agreement with the City. The parties agreed to the following relevant provisions: b. The Declaratory Judgment action currently pending in Laramie County District Court will remain pending. c. Reiman will execute the contract presented by the City and will perform the work specified in the contract. The price Reiman Corp. will be paid for the work will be either the original bid price of $1,910,000.00 or the amended bid price of $1,981,000.00 or such other price as the parties agree upon in writing. d. If the parties cannot agree in writing as to a contract price, the price shall be determined as set forth in this Agreement based upon the decision of the District Court in the action currently pending in Laramie County District Court. e. Although this Agreement will be binding between the parties, such litigation shall be determined without reference to this Agreement, i.e., the parties agree that this Agreement shall not be relevant evidence in determining whether Reiman was entitled to rescind its bid. f. If Reiman prevails, and the District Court finds that Reiman is entitled to rescind its bid, Reiman shall be entitled to a contract price of $1,981,000.00. g. If the City of Cheyenne prevails in such litigation, and the District Court finds that Reiman is not entitled to rescind its bid, the City shall be entitled to a contract price as stated in Reiman's original bid, $1,910,000.00. This agreement allowed Reiman to commence work under the contract, while at the same time seeking to reserve for judicial determination the question of whether Reiman would be entitled to receive the additional amount of $71,000.00 due to its mistake in preparing the bid. By their respective motions for summary judgment, both the City and Reiman now seek to have the court resolve the question of additional compensation. This court is concerned about whether a justiciable controversy now exists within the meaning of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, W.S. § 1-37-101 through § 1-37-115. The elements of a justiciable controversy under the Act are as follows:    First, a justiciable controversy requires parties having existing and genuine, as distinguished from theoretical, rights or interests. Second, the controversy must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate, as distinguished from a debate or argument evoking a purely political, administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion. Third, it must be a controversy the judicial determination of which will have the force and effect of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, status or other legal relationships of one or more of the real parties in interest, or, wanting these qualities be of such great and overriding public moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of them. Finally, the proceedings must be genuinely adversary in character and not a mere disputation, but advanced with sufficient militancy to engender a thorough research and analysis of the major issues. Any controversy lacking these elements becomes an exercise in academics and is not properly before the courts for solution.    Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo.1974); Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hallmark Insurance Co., 561 P.2d 706, 710 (Wyo. 1977). If the court were to determine that the bid could be rescinded, it could not order its rescission because Reiman is performing under that bid. Any order which would issue from this court would not serve to allow Reiman to withdraw its bid. Thus, a judgment regarding rescission would not effectively operate. The method by which the parties seek to resolve their dispute presents an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. (See, Mountain West, at 710. A justiciable controversy is a jurisdictional requirement.) The court is not being asked to rescind the bid. Rather it is being asked to decide whether the bid could have been rescinded. The parties have agreed that if the court rules that the bid could have been rescinded, [1] then Reiman by agreement gets the additional $71,000.00. If the court determines that the bid could not have been rescinded, Reiman is paid the original bid quoted. The actions of the City and Reiman, subsequent to Reiman's petition for declaratory judgment, have rendered the issue of rescission moot. This is not to say that a controversy does not exist as to the contract price. Indeed a very real controversy regarding the price does exist. But as to the specific question of rescission, subsequent conduct by the City and Reiman have rendered the issue moot. Reiman has executed the contract presented to it by the City and Reiman has proceeded to perform under the contract. What was once a very real and actual controversy over whether or not Reiman could withdraw its bid without bond forfeiture, is now moot. Assuming the court were to grant Reiman rescission, the contract would no longer stand; the City would have to award the construction project to the next lowest bidder. This is no longer possible, and thus what the parties ask of this court simply does not make sense. Undoubtedly, a dispute does still remain between the City and Reiman over the contract price amount. However, this dispute is not properly decided based upon a determination regarding rescission. A decision regarding rescission cannot determine the price except only as the parties have agreed. The court may refuse to render a declaratory judgment where the judgment would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding. W.S. § 1-37-108. Moreover, the issue presented seeks an advisory opinion. It is advisory because it seeks a declaration of what could have been had the parties proceeded with the temporary relief sought, not what is. (See, Brimmer, at 579. It is axiomatic that the Declaratory Judgments Act cannot be relied upon to secure an advisory opinion.    An advisory opinion is one which adjudicates nothing and binds no one [citations omitted].) Even though this court has determined that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the prayer seeking rescission, it may yet exercise subject matter jurisdiction over that portion of the prayer seeking reformation. The issue of reformation is based on the substantive and real controversy over the price amount which constitutes a justiciable controversy needing resolution. The law on reformation, however, applies only to those matters which involve a mutual mistake. This is not a case of mutual mistake. This is case involving a unilateral mistake. A unilateral mistake does not provide grounds for reformation. See, Svalina v. Big Horn National Life Insurance Co., 466 P.2d 1018 (Wyo.1970); City of Baltimore v. DeLuca-Davis Construction Co., 210 Md. 518, 124 A.2d 557 (1956); Department of Transportation v. Ronlee, Inc., 518 So.2d 1326 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987). Moreover, to order reformation would be incompatible with the statutory scheme concerning public contracts. Accordingly, as to reformation, partial summary judgment is granted in favor of the City. As to rescission, the court determines that it has not been presented a justiciable issue within the meaning of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. DATED this 24 day of October, 1991. /s/ Nicholas G. Kalokathis NICHOLAS G. KALOKATHIS DISTRICT JUDGE cc: Alexander Davison James Burke