Opinion ID: 1331668
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: As Amended)

Text: The Court instructs the jury that under the indictment in this case, you may find one of three verdicts if the evidence so warrants: (1) Guilty of armed robbery; (2) Guilty of unarmed robbery; and (3) Not guilty. Armed robbery is when a person feloniously and forcibly takes from the person of another the goods or money of any value of such person by violence or by putting the person in fear. Unarmed robbery is when there is a felonious taking of another's property from her person and against her will but without violence or bodily force. At common law, the definition of robbery was (1) the unlawful taking and carrying away, (2) of money or goods, (3) from the person of another or in his presence, (4) by force or putting him in fear, (5) with intent to steal the money or goods. State v. Fulks, 114 W.Va. 785, 173 S.E. 888 (1934); State v. Worthington, 109 W.Va. 449, 155 S.E. 313 (1930); State v. McAllister, 65 W.Va. 97, 63 S.E. 758 (1909); LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law 697 (1972); 67 Am.Jur.2d Robbery § 1 (1973). Thus, at common law, robbery could be accomplished either by actual physical force or violence inflicted on the victim or by intimidating the victim by placing him in fear of bodily injury. State v. Alvis, 116 W.Va. 326, 180 S.E. 257 (1935). See also, Watkins v. Commonwealth, 287 S.W.2d 416 (Ky.1956); Gray v. State, 10 Md.App. 478, 271 A.2d 390 (1970); State v. Hawkins, 418 S.W.2d 921 (Mo.1967); State v. Sawyer, 224 N.C. 61, 29 S.E.2d 34 (1944); LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law p. 698 (1972); 67 Am.Jur.2d Robbery § 20 (1973); Note, RobberyPutting In Fear, 24 Minn. L.Rev. 708 (1940). There were no degrees or grades of common law robbery. W.Va.Code, 61-2-12, enacted in 1931, divides robbery into two separate classes and calls for different penalties: (1) robbery by violence or by the use of a dangerous weapon, and (2) all other robberies. [2] By dividing robbery into these two categories, our legislature joined a number of other legislatures in recognizing a greater culpability and more severe punishment for a robbery committed by violent means than for a robbery committed by nonviolent means. [3] 67 Am. Jur.2d Robbery §§ 3 and 4 (1973). Prior to the 1931 revision of our Code, our robbery statute made the distinction between committing a robbery being armed with a dangerous weapon and any other robbery. The penalty for a robbery with a dangerous weapon was not less than ten years. The penalty for robbery committed by other means was not less than five years. [4] Because our pre-1931 statute made only one exception to the common law crime of robbery, that of being armed with a dangerous weapon, most of our cases continued to define robbery in common law terms. E.g., Franklin and Ponto v. Brown, Warden, 73 W.Va. 727, 81 S.E. 405 (1914); State v. McAllister, 65 W.Va. 97, 63 S.E. 758 (1909); State v. McCoy, 63 W.Va. 69, 59 S.E. 758 (1907). Furthermore, prior to 1931, the use of the terms armed and unarmed to define the categories of robbery may have been justified since armed with a deadly weapon was the sole statutory distinction between the two classes of robbery. However, it is clear that after the 1931 amendment to our robbery statute, the terms armed and unarmed are no longer accurate. This point has been made in some of our post-1931 cases but there has been no serious attempt to abandon this terminology. E.g., State v. Cunningham, W.Va., 236 S.E.2d 459, 461 (1977); State ex rel. Vandal v. Adams, 145 W.Va. 566, 569, 115 S.E.2d 489, 490 (1960). [5] The 1931 change to our robbery statute clearly broadened the acts which the statute categorized as aggravated. [6] We believe that these acts should be called aggravated robbery since they do not relate solely to whether the defendant is armed. Such acts include robbery by partial strangulation or suffocation or by striking or beating or by other violence to the person, or by the threat or presenting of firearms or other deadly weapon or instrumentality, whatsoever. W.Va.Code, 61-2-12. The question which we must address is what type of acts make up the second category of acts which our statute defines as robbery in any other mode, and which we now identify as nonaggravated robbery. It does not appear that we have had an occasion to discuss this question in any depth. The purpose of our robbery statute is to identify those means of committing robbery which are more aggravated in the sense that they are likely to produce bodily injury to the victim. These more aggravated acts carry a potentially heavier penalty. In analyzing the statutory acts which constitute aggravated robbery, all of them involve actual violence to the person except the act involving the threat or presenting of firearms or other deadly weapon or instrumentality. We previously noted that under the common law definition robbery could be committed by two general means. The first was by force and violence to the person, in which event there is no necessity to prove that the victim was placed in fear of bodily injury, since the actual force on the victim can be presumed to have engendered fear. Thomas v. State, 183 So.2d 297 (Fla.1966); State v. Ray, 354 S.W.2d 840 (Mo.1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 868, 83 S.Ct. 129, 9 L.Ed.2d 104; State v. Ball, 339 S.W.2d 783 (Mo.1960); Tones v. State, 48 Tex.Crim. App. 363, 88 S.W. 217 (1905). Cf, State v. Alvis, 116 W.Va. 326, 180 S.E. 257 (1935). The second common law means of committing robbery was through intimidation, that is, by placing the victim in fear, usually of bodily injury. It is this second category under the common law definition which encompasses our nonaggravated form of statutory robbery. Therefore, the distinguishing feature of a nonaggravated robbery is that it is accomplished, not through violence to the victim or the threat or presentation of firearms or other deadly weapon or instrumentality, but through intimidation that induces fear of bodily injury in the victim. [7] In the case of an aggravated robbery, fear of bodily injury is not an essential element of the crime, since the actual physical force or violence or threat or presentation of firearms or other deadly weapon or instrumentality can be presumed to have created fear of bodily injury. [8] We accept the fact that the terminology of armed and unarmed robbery has become deeply ingrained in our law. It may take time to abandon the use of these terms and substitute aggravated and nonaggravated robbery. We do not hold today that the mere use of the terms armed and unarmed robbery in an instruction will result in reversible error. Moreover, we recognize that in the past this Court has accepted instructions which have defined aggravated or armed robbery in common law terms, that is, by use of the phrase by force and violence or by putting the victim in fear.  (Emphasis added) E.g., State v. Hudson, 157 W.Va. 939, 943, 206 S.E.2d 415, 419 (1974); State v. Davis, 153 W.Va. 742, 757, 172 S.E.2d 569, 578 (1970). This definition is incorrect under our robbery statute classifications which have changed the common law rule. The defendant at common law received the same punishment whether he committed the robbery by violence on the victim or by putting him in fear since at common law there were no degrees of robbery. However, as we recognized earlier, the distinguishing feature between aggravated and nonaggravated robbery under our current robbery statute is that the former requires the utilization of physical force or the use of a deadly weapon against the victim; the latter crime requires only that the victim be placed in fear of bodily injury. To instruct the jury on aggravated robbery by telling them, as in the Davis case, supra, that such a robbery can be committed by use of force and violence or by placing the victim in fear of bodily injury may result in confusing the jury and may lead to reversible error. Where the evidence clearly demonstrates that the defendant only threatened the victim with bodily injury and thereby placed him in fear, and no firearm or other deadly weapon is involved, [9] the giving of a Davis -type instruction is not warranted. If such instruction is given and the defendant is convicted on aggravated or armed robbery, reversal is called for. The reason is that the Davis instruction states that the defendant can be convicted of armed robbery if he places the victim in fear of bodily injury. This is incorrect law under our robbery statute which makes this act nonaggravated or unarmed robbery. Where the evidence is clear, as in the present case, however, that the robbery was committed by the use of physical violence on the victim or the presentation of a deadly weapon, we will treat the phrase by placing the victim in fear, in a Davis -type instruction, as surplusage and not reversible error since fear is not a necessary element of aggravated robbery. Finally, in cases where the evidence is in substantial conflict concerning whether the defendant used violence or a dangerous weapon on the victim, and a Davis -type instruction is given permitting the jury to find aggravated robbery if the victim is merely placed in fear of bodily injury, such instruction will be held to constitute reversible error. The reason for reversal is that with the evidence in substantial conflict on whether physical force or a dangerous weapon was used, which are the acts constituting aggravated robbery, the jury might well determine to convict on aggravated robbery even though they believe that no force was used upon the victim because the Davis -type instruction defines aggravated or armed robbery by the use of force or by placing the victim in fear. It is impossible to state with any certainty under these circumstances that the confusion in the Davis -type instruction did not contribute to a jury verdict of aggravated robbery. In State v. Romine, W.Va., 272 S.E.2d 680 (1980), we held that the inability to determine if an error in an instruction did not contribute to the conviction requires a reversal of the case. Cf. State v. Atkins, W.Va., 261 S.E.2d 55, 59-63 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904, 100 S.Ct. 1081, 63 L.Ed.2d 320 (1980). In the present case, there is no dispute that the robbery was committed by violence to the person of the victim. In the course of grabbing the victim's purse, the defendant knocked the victim backwards and she fell onto an iron post. The defendant and his witnesses did not deny this version of how the crime was committed. Instead, the defendant relied upon the defense alibi and testified he purchased the ring from someone at a bar. While the challenged instruction does contain the confusing Davis -type language for armed robbery (or by putting the person in fear,) this will not, under our foregoing test, constitute reversible error.