Opinion ID: 733284
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Eleventh Amendment Analysis

Text: 13 In order to determine whether Congress has properly abrogated the States' sovereign immunity in the Equal Pay Act, we must apply the two-part test articulated in Seminole Tribe: [F]irst, whether Congress has 'unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immunity' ... and second, whether Congress has acted 'pursuant to a valid exercise of power.'  --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1123 (citation omitted) (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68, 106 S.Ct. 423, 425-26, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985)). We consider each of these questions in turn. 14
15 We agree with the parties, and with the other courts of appeals which have expressly addressed this issue, that the definitional and enforcement provisions applicable to the Act contain the necessary clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Brinkman v. Department of Corrections, 21 F.3d 370, 372 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 927, 115 S.Ct. 315, 130 L.Ed.2d 277 (1994); Reich v. New York, 3 F.3d 581, 590-91 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1163, 114 S.Ct. 1187, 127 L.Ed.2d 537 (1994); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1391-92 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 946, 114 S.Ct. 386, 126 L.Ed.2d 335 (1993). 6 The term employer is defined in the FLSA to include[ ] a public agency, which in turn is defined as the government of a State or political subdivision thereof and any agency of a State. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), (x). The term employee is defined to include any individual employed by a State, political subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental agency. Id. § 203(e)(2)(C). Finally, the private enforcement provision provides that [a]n action to recover the liability prescribed ... may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. Id. § 216(b) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we find that Congress clearly intended through the Equal Pay Act to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit. 16
17 We must next determine whether the Act was enacted pursuant to a constitutional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate. See Seminole Tribe, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1125. The Seminole Tribe Court noted that it had previously found authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity under only two provisions of the Constitution: § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976), and the Interstate Commerce Clause, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2273, 105 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). Id. However, the Court overruled Union Gas and held that [t]he Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction. Id. at ---- - ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1131-32. 18 Nevertheless, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment remains a provision that vests Congress with the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1125; see also id. at ---- n. 15, 116 S.Ct. at 1131 n. 15 (criticizing Justice Stevens' dissent for ignoring the fact that many of the cases he used to support his argument arose in the context of a statute passed under the Fourteenth Amendment, where Congress' authority to abrogate is undisputed). As the Fitzpatrick Court explained, the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, expanded federal power at the expense of state autonomy, and thereby fundamentally altered the pre-existing balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment. 427 U.S. at 453-56, 96 S.Ct. at 2670-71. In Seminole Tribe, the Court reaffirmed this view of § 5. --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1128. 19 In Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hospital, 581 F.2d 116, 119 (6th Cir.1978), this Circuit held, in response to a Tenth Amendment challenge, that the extension of the Equal Pay Act to state employees was a valid exercise of Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accord Usery v. Charleston County Sch. Dist., 558 F.2d 1169, 1170-71 (4th Cir.1977); Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148, 155 (3d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946, 97 S.Ct. 1582, 51 L.Ed.2d 793 (1977). We acknowledged that Congress did not expressly state the constitutional basis of its extension of the FLSA to the States in 1974, 7 but we found such action with respect to the Equal Pay Act authorized by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 See 581 F.2d at 119. Moreover, we explained that [i]t was not necessary for Congress to expressly rely on § 5 in exercising its power because such power clearly existed. Id. at 120.  'In exercising the power of judicial review, as distinguished from the duty of statutory interpretation, we are concerned with the actual powers of the national government.'  Id. (quoting Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d at 155); see also Charleston County Sch. Dist., 558 F.2d at 1171 (Our duty in passing on the constitutionality of legislation is to determine whether Congress had the authority to adopt legislation, not whether it correctly guessed the source of that power.). 20 Owensboro-Daviess compels us to find that a federal court has jurisdiction to consider actions brought by employees against their state employers under the Equal Pay Act. We have long held that [a] panel of this Court cannot overrule the decision of another panel. The prior decision remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the prior decision. Salmi v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir.1985). Defendant asserts that we should overrule Owensboro-Daviess because (1) we only assumed that Congress was relying on the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) we relied on the legislative history of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, to support the view that Congress exercised its § 5 authority when it enacted the Equal Pay Act; and (3) Seminole Tribe calls that decision into question. 21 We reject defendant's arguments. First, [t]he ... constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144, 68 S.Ct. 421, 424, 92 L.Ed. 596 (1948); see also Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 698 (1st Cir.1983); EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 608 (7th Cir.1982). Moreover, we reject defendant's argument that if Congress must articulate a 'clear statement' of its intent to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, then a fortiori, Congress must articulate the basis or bases upon which its power is being exercised. Supplemental Brief for Appellees at 16. In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n. 18, 103 S.Ct. 1054, 1064 n. 18, 75 L.Ed.2d 18 (1983), the Supreme Court, albeit in dicta, 9 rejected this argument. The Court explained: [W]hatever else may be said about the § 5 question in this case, the District Court erred in reading Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 [101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694] (1981), as holding that congressional action could not be upheld on the basis of § 5 unless Congress 'expressly articulated its intent to legislate under § 5'.... 460 U.S. at 243 n. 18, 103 S.Ct. at 1064 n. 18 (quoting 514 F.Supp. at 600). Although a court must be able to discern support for the exercise of § 5 power, [t]hat does not mean ... that Congress need anywhere recite the words 'section 5' or 'Fourteenth Amendment' or 'equal protection.'  Id. Furthermore, consistent with what we said in Owensboro-Daviess, 581 F.2d at 120, the Court distinguished between statutory construction, for which the clear statement rule is a tool, and the question of whether Congress has acted pursuant to § 5 where it clearly intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity, for which the clear statement rule ha[s] no relevance. 460 U.S. at 243 n. 18, 103 S.Ct. at 1064 n. 18. 22 Contrary to the dissent's contention, Pennhurst does not call into question our analysis in Owensboro-Daviess and, in fact, it supports our adhering to precedent here. The issue in Pennhurst was whether Congress, in enacting the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010, intended to place an obligation on the States to provide certain kinds of treatment to the disabled. See 451 U.S. at 15, 101 S.Ct. at 1538-39. The Court held that it did not. Id. at 11, 101 S.Ct. at 1536-37. In making this determination, the Court looked to possible sources of Congress' power to legislate and, in so doing, considered the appropriate test for determining when Congress intends to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 15-16, 101 S.Ct. at 1538-39. The Court explained that [b]ecause such legislation imposes congressional policy on a State involuntarily, and because it often intrudes on traditional state authority, we should not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent to act under its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 16, 101 S.Ct. at 1539. 23 While Pennhurst does limit a court's ability to find that Congress intended to act pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, the dissent would have us believe that Pennhurst prohibits any such determination where Congress has not expressly stated its intent or has stated its intent to legislate under a constitutional provision other than § 5. We interpret Pennhurst differently. First, the so-called Pennhurst rule says only that a court should not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent to act pursuant to § 5. Id. (emphasis added). This suggests only that a court should carefully consider the propriety and effect of concluding that Congress has acted pursuant to § 5. Second, the Court went on to distinguish between two kinds of cases: those where statutes ... simply prohibited certain kinds of state conduct and those like the one before the Court in Pennhurst, where the case for inferring intent is at its weakest where ... the rights asserted impose affirmative obligations on the States to fund certain services, since we may assume that Congress will not implicitly attempt to impose massive financial obligations on the States. Id. at 16-17, 101 S.Ct. at 1539-40. In other words, the Court did not suggest that a court should never infer a congressional intent to legislate pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather that it should first consider a number of factors before making such an inference. In addition, while the cases cited by the Court involved statutes in which Congress had expressly stated an intent to legislate pursuant to § 5, and as such were consistent with the Pennhurst rule, see id. at 16, 101 S.Ct. at 1539, the Court did not suggest that these cases excluded the possibility of inferring intent in appropriate circumstances. Indeed, the Pennhurst Court's discussion serves to provide a court with guidelines for undertaking such an analysis. Finally, Pennhurst does not address whether a court can infer an intent to legislate under a particular provision of the Constitution when Congress has expressly stated that it is legislating under a different constitutional provision, the scenario that the dissent believes exists in this case. 24 We do not hold, as the dissent suggests, see infra pp. 844-845, that a court can always assume that Congress legislated under its § 5 Fourteenth Amendment power if such action would be constitutional. Pennhurst clearly restrains our power to do so. Nor do we hold that a clear statement by Congress that it is acting pursuant to a particular constitutional provision should always be ignored. Indeed, we believe that, in this case, Congress has not in fact expressly stated an intent to act pursuant to any particular constitutional provision. See supra note 7. We hold only that here, where the Equal Pay Act does not fall into that category of statutes where the case for inferring intent is at its weakest but rather simply prohibit[s] certain kinds of state conduct, Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 16, 101 S.Ct. at 1539, and where Congress clearly intended to impose congressional policy on the States, see supra part II.A.3.a, but did not expressly state the constitutional provision pursuant to which it was legislating, see supra note 7, the Owensboro-Daviess court appropriately inferred a congressional intent to act pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 25 In terms of defendant's second assertion regarding the continuing validity of Owensboro-Daviess, we find that we did not rely on the legislative history of Title VII in Owensboro-Daviess. Rather, we relied on the Fitzpatrick Court's holding that Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was sufficient to support the application to state employment of the sex discrimination provisions of Title VII. 581 F.2d at 119-20; see also Charleston County Sch. Dist., 558 F.2d at 1171; Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d at 155; cf. Korte v. Diemer, 909 F.2d 954, 957-59 (6th Cir.1990) (discussing the close relationship between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act). Given the similarity between the purposes of Title VII and those of the Equal Pay Act, compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) with 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), we not surprisingly found that [t]he reasoning of the Court in Fitzpatrick applies with equal force to the extension of the Equal Pay Act to the States. Owensboro-Daviess, 581 F.2d at 120. 10 26 Finally, Seminole Tribe does not overrule Owensboro-Daviess nor is it inconsistent with that case. To the contrary, the Court's decision does not question the holding of Fitzpatrick, see --- U.S. at ----, ---- n. 15, 116 S.Ct. at 1125, 1131 n. 15, upon which we relied, and it in fact emphasizes the distinction between the Interstate Commerce Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in terms of the Eleventh Amendment, id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1128. Seminole Tribe says nothing about the situation presented here where there is a question about whether Congress legislated pursuant to an unstated constitutional provision. 11 Furthermore, Pennhurst does not proscribe judicial inferring of congressional intent, but rather warns that it should be done with care. Thus, neither case suggests that we should not adhere to this Circuit's precedent in Owensboro-Daviess. When Congress extended the Equal Pay Act to the States in 1974, it clearly intended to prohibit the States from establishing sex-based wage differentials. See supra part II.A.3.a. It had the power to do so under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Owensboro-Daviess, 581 F.2d at 119. We discerned no persuasive reasons in Owensboro-Daviess, and we discern none now, why the courts should frustrate that intent simply because the legislative history does not contain the words  § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In sum, we find no grounds for overruling this precedent of our Circuit.