Opinion ID: 2204777
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: An Unidentified Assailant

Text: The conclusion that Shagnasty's sold and served Doe alcohol when it knew or should have known Smith was intoxicated or would become intoxicated is bolstered when one also considers the evidence in the record that tends to show Shagnasty's intentionally let Doe abscond after agreeing to hold her. Although the court of appeals framed this second supporting inference as a matter of spoliation, at this stage in the proceedings we need not entangle ourselves in that thorny doctrine. [3] See State v. Hartsfield, 681 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Iowa 2004) ([T]he general principle [is] that when evidence is intentionally destroyed, `the fact finder may draw the inference that the evidence destroyed was unfavorable to the party responsible for its spoliation.' (Citation omitted.)); see, e.g., The Bermuda, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 514, 550, 18 L.Ed. 200, 204 (1865) (burning letters and throwing boxes overboard warrant[ed] the most unfavorable inferences as to [ship's] ownership, employment, and destination); Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 360 F.3d 446, 450-51 (4th Cir.2004) (discussing applicability of spoliation inference where employee of corporation allowed witness to leave scene of personal injury accident unidentified). Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Smith, we simply think that one could infer that Shagnasty's sold and served Doe alcohol when it knew or should have known Doe was or would become intoxicated from the fact that Doe was allowed to leave before she was identified. Doe's condition  let alone her potential testimony  would clearly have been admissible evidence at trial. In fact, there is evidence the bouncers intentionally let Doe abscond; Doe was permitted to leave after the bouncers assured Smith they would detain Doe until police arrived. Even if the bouncers did not have the authority to detain Doe, they could have, at the very least, obtained identifying information from Doe in lieu of the promised detention of Doe, so Smith could ascertain the identity of her assailant. In short, one could conclude Shagnasty's gave Smith the run-around. Cf. Hartsfield, 681 N.W.2d at 631-33 (evidence of spoliation in criminal case where jailhouse video tape destroyed). As a result, this potential evidence was lost when Doe was permitted to leave the bar before police arrived. For this reason, a jury could infer an admission by conduct of the weakness of Shagnasty's case, i.e., that Shagnasty's sold and served Doe alcohol when it knew or should have known Doe was or would become intoxicated. [4] In sum, we hold that two inferences, taken together, lead us to the conclusion that a reasonable jury could find a genuine issue of material fact on the scienter requirement of Smith's dramshop claim. The first inference arises from Doe's intoxicated condition shortly after the presumed time of service, the second from the bouncers' actions that resulted in Doe's unknown identity. Summary judgment on the issue of scienter was not proper.