Opinion ID: 4183670
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Karin Dingle

Text: Karin’s primary argument on appeal is that the evidence did not show that she intentionally committed the crimes of which she was accused. It is exceedingly difficult to win on this basis, once a jury has weighed the evidence and has found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As the Supreme Court put it in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), at this stage of the proceedings “the relevant question is whether, after view‐ ing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecu‐ tion, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Recall that Karin was charged with conspiracy to commit mail fraud, several substantive counts of mail fraud, and one count of money laundering. For the conspiracy charge, the 12 Nos. 15‐3871 & 16‐1002 government had to prove: (1) that there was a conspiracy to commit mail fraud, (2) that Karin joined that conspiracy with the intent to further it, and (3) that at least one conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the agreement. United States v. Sims, 329 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 2003). For the mail fraud charges, the government had to show: (1) a scheme to defraud, (2) use of the mails, and (3) Karin’s participation in the scheme with the intent to defraud. United States v. McClellan, 794 F.3d 743, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2015). Lastly, for the money laundering charge, the government had to prove that “the defendant knew the transaction involved criminally de‐ rived property that was derived from an unlawful activity, here, [mail] fraud.” United States v. Ajayi, 808 F.3d 1113, 1119 (7th Cir. 2015). Karin’s focus on intent makes our job relatively easy. A rea‐ sonable juror could conclude that Karin intended to further the conspiracy, intended to participate in the scheme to de‐ fraud, and intended to launder the money, if she knew what Advance was really up to. This was certainly a jury question, and the jury might have concluded (as Karin urges) that her work at the firm was limited to light and non‐substantive ad‐ ministrative tasks, and that she played no part in either ob‐ taining the grants or diverting them to Advance. But that is not the conclusion the jury drew. Instead, it found her lack of knowledge about some details of the arrangements to be out‐ weighed by what she did know. We already have reviewed the significant ways in which Karin participated in the scheme to fleece the Department, and how she personally benefited from that scheme. She con‐ fronted Leon about taking “too much” grant money, she signed over $1.7 million in Advance checks, she used that Nos. 15‐3871 & 16‐1002 13 money to purchase a Mercedes‐Benz, and she personally di‐ verted $15,000 in grant funds to help her son with his mort‐ gage. She expressly agreed with another person not to pay state taxes that were due. And with all that, just to be safe, the court gave the jury both the basic intent instruction and an ostrich instruction. We are satisfied that, viewing the evidence favorably to the government, a reasonable jury could find that Karin’s ac‐ tions were intentional, and that she otherwise committed the crimes of which she was accused. She is not in the same posi‐ tion as the defendant in United States v. Price, 623 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1980), overruled on other grounds by United States v. De Bright, 730 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc). In Price, the defendant truly was minimally involved; she worked at her fraudster husband’s company for only three months. Karin worked at Advance for decades. And unlike Price, there were specific incidents that revealed Karin’s awareness of the broader scheme. As we noted, the court sentenced Karin to a prison term of 36 months, based on an advisory range of 41 to 51 months (of‐ fense level 22, criminal history category I). As with Leon, the offense level was based on a loss of more than $1.5 million and less than $3 million. The court gave her a four‐level down‐ ward adjustment in offense level to account for her minimal role in the offense. It rejected her request for a sentence of pro‐ bation, for which she had argued based on her lack of a prior criminal record, her minimal participation, and her age. Karin urges that the loss amount that the court used in computing the “anchor” guidelines range greatly overstated her culpability. But by granting her the minimal‐participant 14 Nos. 15‐3871 & 16‐1002 adjustment provided by U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a), the court ex‐ pressly took account of her lesser role in the offense. Although it had the discretion under section 3553(a) to add to that dis‐ count, it arguably did so by dropping below the guidelines range for her sentence. It was under no obligation to do more. With respect to substantive reasonableness (a point that we conclude Karin did not waive), Karin argues that because she was a passive recipient of the lucre from the fraud, it is unreasonable to hold her accountable for the full amount sto‐ len. The district court was entitled, however, to take into ac‐ count the fact that she and Leon shared the ill‐gotten gains. As the judge put it, Karin had a “direct connection” to the loss because even though she “was not the leader … [she was] cer‐ tainly part of the scheme.” There was nothing unreasonable about the court’s conclusion that in the end “there simply has to be” a consequence for her criminal conduct.