Opinion ID: 2670974
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consideration of Acquitted Conduct

Text: Petitioner asserts that the district court erred in considering conduct for which he was acquitted when calculating the applicable Guidelines range. Had the district court only considered the conduct for which he was convicted (conspiracy to distribute between 500 grams and 5 kilograms of cocaine), his Guidelines range would have been 121 to 151 months. Instead, 3 The United States asserts that even if this Court were to find that the obstruction of justice enhancement was improperly applied, this Court can affirm the district court=s sentence by applying a two-level firearm enhancement in accordance with U.S.S.G. ' 2D1.1(b)(1). The United States poses this enhancement as an alternative method for affirming the district court=s sentence, rather than asserting a cross-appeal. Because this Court affirms the district court=s application of an obstruction of justice enhancement, this Court need not decide whether the district court erred by denying the firearm enhancement. -19- No. 12-4016 by considering conduct for which he was acquitted (conspiracy to distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine), the district court calculated a Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months. Petitioner alleges that the Sentencing Reform Act does not authorize sentencing courts to use acquitted conduct when making Guidelines range determinations. However, this Court=s en banc opinion in United States v. White clearly decided this issue: A[T]he Sixth Amendment [does not] prevent[] a district court from relying on acquitted conduct in applying an advisory guidelines system.@ 551 F.3d 381, 384 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Therefore, Petitioner=s argument is meritless. Petitioner asserts an additional argument in his reply brief to demonstrate that the district court erroneously considered conduct for which he was acquitted. Petitioner argues that the Supreme Court=s recent decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), prohibits the district court=s use of conduct that was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury. In Alleyne, the Court held that Aany fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an >element= [of the crime] that must be submitted to the jury [and found beyond a reasonable doubt].@ Id. at 2155. Unfortunately for Petitioner, Alleyne does not apply to this case. The district court did not apply a mandatory minimum when it determined Petitioner=s sentence. In fact, no mandatory minimum was ever at issue in this case. Instead, the district court determined a Guidelines range, which is not mandatory, and then used its discretion to vary downward. Alleyne does not stand for the proposition that any conduct used to determine a sentence must be proved beyond a reasonable -20- No. 12-4016 doubt.4 Therefore, the district court did not err in considering conduct for which Petitioner was acquitted by the jury. III. Conduct Proved by a Preponderance of the Evidence Petitioner asserts that even if Alleyne doesn=t apply to his case, the district court still erred by considering conduct that was not proved by a preponderance of the evidence. See White, 551 F.3d at 385.
As stated above, the district court=s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Thomas, 49 F.3d 253, 259 (6th Cir. 1995) (AA district court=s determination of the quantity of drugs used to compute a defendant=s sentence is a finding of fact that should not be rejected unless clearly erroneous.@). AA factual finding is clearly erroneous where, although there is evidence to support that finding, >the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.=@ United States v. Ware, 282 F.3d 902, 907 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
Although a jury=s conviction must be based on evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecution bears a lesser burden at the sentencing stage. The prosecution need only prove the amount of drugs for sentencing purposes by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. 4 In fact, the Court stated in its opinion that A[o]ur ruling today does not mean that any fact that influences judicial discretion must be found by a jury. We have long recognized that broad sentencing discretion, informed by judicial factfinding, does not violate the Sixth Amendment.@ Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2163. -21- No. 12-4016 Russell, 595 F.3d 633, 646 (6th Cir. 2010). Where the exact quantity of drugs is unclear, the sentencing court may estimate that quantity based on Acompetent evidence in the record. In other words, the court finding must have >some minimum indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation.=@ United States v. Ward, 68 F.3d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Smith, 887 F.2d 104, 108 (6th Cir. 1989)). A court may find that A[t]estimonial evidence from a coconspirator may be sufficient to determine the amount of drugs for which another coconspirator should be held accountable.@ United States v. Hernandez, 227 F.3d 686, 697 (6th Cir. 2000). However, where the drug quantity is unknown, Athe district court is encouraged to >err on the side of caution= and only hold the defendant responsible for that quantity of drugs for which >the defendant is more likely than not actually responsible.=@ United States v. Baro, 15 F.3d 563, 569 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1302 (6th Cir. 1990)). In Baro, after the district court failed to make factual findings to support a drug quantity increase, this Court remanded the case for resentencing, explaining that A[g]iven the marked impact of this single kilogram increase on the defendants= sentences, the district court should explicitly set forth the evidence on which it relies if it finds [the defendants] accountable for distribution of at least fifty kilograms of cocaine.@ Id. Therefore, where a district court sentences a defendant based on acquitted conduct, the court must identify the evidence on which it relied to make the drug quantity calculation. Id.; see also United States v. Walker, 399 F. App=x 75, 82B83 (6th Cir. 2010). In the instant case, the district court based its drug quantity calculation on a number of factors, including the testimony of many of Petitioner=s co-conspirators. The district court -22- No. 12-4016 acknowledged that the testimony of these co-conspirators alone Awould not satisfy proof by a preponderance of the evidence@ because the credibility of the co-conspirators was successfully challenged on cross-examination. However, the court also cited to phone records and surveillance, finding that Athe corroboration that the government also presented, particularly with regard to the phone records and the surveillance@ convinced the court Athat there [was] a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the other acquitted conduct should be used in computing the sentencing guideline range.@ Considered together, the trial testimony, phone records, and surveillance were sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner was accountable for more than 150 kilograms of cocaine. Because Athe district court interpret[ed] the evidence in a manner consistent with the record, we are required to uphold its decision even if we would have reached the opposite conclusion.@ United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573B74 (1985)).