Opinion ID: 2095080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The protective search

Text: If an officer reasonably believes that the suspect is armed and dangerous, that officer may conduct a search for weapons sufficient in scope to protect the officers and others present. This theme, the protection of the officer making the stop and of innocent bystanders, is of paramount importance. United States v. Mason, 450 A.2d 464, 466 (D.C.1982). Such a search, however, is a limited one, and should not go beyond what is necessary to determine whether the suspect is armed. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). During the frisk, Officer Campbell felt an object in the pocket of appellant's jacket. At first he testified that in and of itself it did not feel like a gun, knife, or other kind of weapon, but later clarified that he didn't know whether or not it was a weapon. Officer Campbell then removed the object and discovered that it was an ammunition clip. The issue here is whether Officer Campbell lawfully removed the clip from appellant's pocket, or whether under Terry and its progeny he had no right to remove it because its identity as a weapon was not instantly apparent to him. This court has yet to address this specific issue. However, in United States v. Swann, 149 F.3d 271 (4th Cir.1998), there was a very similar set of facts. In Swann an officer felt something hard and unusual, which turned out to be a group of credit cards, in the suspect's sock. Id. at 272. Instead of testifying that he could immediately tell that the object was a weapon, the officer said that he did not know what it was. Characterizing the evidence as entirely ambiguous as to whether the officer suspected a weapon, id. at 275, the Fourth Circuit nevertheless rejected the exact argument made here by appellant and upheld the search. Its rationale was twofold. First, [t]he purpose of a frisk is to allow an officer `to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.' Id. at 275 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 23, 88 S.Ct. 1868). Because the officer could not rule out the possibility that the object might be a weapon, he could not be assured that it was not a weapon. Id. Second, noting that it also had to determine whether a reasonable officer in such circumstances would have believed that the object could likely be a weapon, the court held that [g]iven all the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that this particular hard object could likely be a weapon .... Swann, 149 F.3d at 276. We find the Fourth Circuit's rationale to be quite sound. Following it here, we hold that Officer Campbell was justified in removing the object from the pocket of appellant's jacket. Upon frisking appellant, he was unable to discern immediately the nature of the object, and thus he could not be sure that it was not a weapon. [20] Moreover, Officer Campbell had just heard a broadcast about a shooting, and soon thereafter he saw two men, who matched the description of the shooters, in close proximity to the place where it occurred. Thus it was not unreasonable for him to believe that the object might have been a weapon, and he was entitled to take the precautionary step of removing it just to be safe. Even assuming arguendo that the frisk exceeded its lawful scope, which it did not, the evidence would still have been admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. This doctrine provides that ... the evidence still may be admitted `[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.' Hicks v. United States, 730 A.2d 657, 659 (D.C.1999) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)); see also, e.g., McFerguson v. United States, 770 A.2d 66, 75 (D.C.2001). Here appellant was not yet under arrest when the clip was found, but had only been stopped pursuant to Terry. An eyewitness to the crime was then brought to the place where appellant was being held and there identified him as one of the assailants. This identification, coupled with appellant's proximity to and flight from the crime scene, established probable cause to arrest, and the clip would have been inevitably discovered in the course of a search incident to such an arrest. For these reasons we find no error in the denial of appellant's motion to suppress the ammunition clip.