Opinion ID: 1809453
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the special chancellor erred in denying to award prejudgment interest.

Text: ¶ 62. On cross-appeal, O'Quinn further seeks to recover prejudgment interest from USF & G and Tolliver which was denied by the special chancellor. The special chancellor did not award the prejudgment interest and attorney's fees to O'Quinn. In the bench opinion, the trial court stated that the court awards no interest except on the judgment entered herein, and there are not attorney's fees awarded any of the attorneys by this court. The special chancellor further stated in the court's written opinion that, the court further finds that it does not allow any prejudgment interest, nor does this court award any attorney's fees to any of the attorneys in this matter. ¶ 63. O'Quinn argues that the appropriate interest rate is 8%, and that this interest should be added to the $108,166.03 which was disbursed from the conservatorship from the date of filing the motion to set aside Tolliver's accounting, August 4, 1994, through the date of the judgment, January 18, 2000. O'Quinn submits that applying 8% simple interest without compounding amounts to $43,266.41. ¶ 64. O'Quinn's claim for prejudgment interest is based on Miss.Code Ann. § 93-13-57 (1994), which provides that: Any guardian who fails to report to the court the fact that he has money of the ward not needed or allowed to be used for current expenditure and to ask the order of the court as to the disposition of such money, may be chargeable with interest on the same at the rate of 8% per annum during the time of failure. (emphasis added). ¶ 65. O'Quinn argues that in the interest of justice and equity the word may in § 93-13-57 should become the word shall, citing Welch v. Childers, 195 Miss. 415, 15 So.2d 690, 691 (1943) as authority. In Welch, this Court allowed the award of both prejudgment interest and post-judgment interest. However, the Court in Welch, did not state that the award of prejudgment interest was mandatory. ¶ 66. O'Quinn further relies upon Miss. Code Ann. § 75-17-7 (2000) which provides that prejudgment interest may be awarded in an amount to be set by the court for all liquidated amounts. Whether to award prejudgment interest under both Miss.Code Ann. §§ 93-13-57 and 75-17-7 remains absolutely within the discretion of the chancellor. This Court in Fred's Stores of Miss., Inc. v. M & H Drugs, Inc., 725 So.2d 902, 921 (1998) held that, an award of prejudgment interest is normally left in the discretion of the trial judge. (citing Warwick v. Matheney, 603 So.2d 330, 342 (Miss.1992)). ¶ 67. It is the well-settled law in this State regardless of the statute under which prejudgment interest is sought, the award of such interest is entirely within the discretion of the trial court. An award of prejudgment interest rests in the discretion of the awarding judge. Murphree v. Aberdeen-Monroe County Hosp., 671 So.2d 1300, 1304 (Miss.1996). See also Sentinel Indus. Contracting Corp. v. Kimmins Indus. Serv. Corp., 743 So.2d 954, 971 (Miss.1999); Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 730 So.2d 574, 577 (Miss.1998). Therefore, we find that no proof was submitted to support that the special chancellor erred in denying to award prejudgment interest. This issue is without merit.