Opinion ID: 2320585
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Prong 2: Prejudice

Text: Even if counsel's performance has been deficient, to obtain relief appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In assessing the prejudice to defendant, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added). As we have already discussed, the record is not clear on how the trial court ultimately evaluated the prejudice prong. The court recognized that neither sufficiency of the evidence, nor a preponderance of a different outcome are the correct standard, see id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, but we do not have the benefit of the trial court's final evaluation of all of counsel's mistakes under the correct standard. [24] Nonetheless, our review of the prejudice prong is de novo. See Woodard v. United States, 738 A.2d 254, 257 (D.C.1999). We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that there was no Strickland prejudice. Had trial counsel not caused the introduction of Choi's identification, he could have argued that the government's case rested solely on the testimony of McGill, a confessed participant in the crime who had a significant incentive to lie about who did the actual shooting. The judge instructed the jury that the testimony of accomplices is to be received with caution and scrutinized with care. The trial court recognized the strength of this defense, noting at the post-trial hearing that without Choi's identification, defense counsel could isolate McGill as the only identifying witness. [A]ll [defense counsel] has to do is stand up in closing argument. You don't have to do anything else. That sound defense strategy was shattered once the jury heard that appellant had been identified by Choi, an unbiased eyewitness. Counsel's blunder not only introduced Choi's identification. Counsel further compounded his mistake when he sought to impeach Detective Wheeler with Choi's statement expressing some hesitation about his identification. All knew that the prosecutor had an effective response at hand: appellant's statement to the police about his haircut, which removed the basis for Choi's hesitation, strengthening his identification of appellant. The government argues that its case was very strong and that, even without trial counsel's errors, conviction was assured. It asserts that McGill's testimony was convincing and in substance unimpeached because he clearly identified appellant as the man who shot Kwang Ahn; he told police where to find the murder weapon, and it was found there; he claimed to have a partner in the robbery and to having driven away with appellant after the robbery; and that Walker confirmed there were two men and saw a car drive off in the direction McGill claimed. We do not share the government's assurance. The argument underscores that McGill was the heart of the government's case. As the trial court noted, the details of McGill's testimony that were confirmed by Walker were trivial, and government counsel conceded that his testimony was hesitant. [25] McGill's participation and, therefore, presumed first-hand knowledge of what transpired was not at issue. Thus, the fact that he was unimpeached with respect to these details was of little moment. [26] The only real question before the jury was the identity of the other participant. It was on this issue that isolating a biased McGill as the only witness who identified appellant was essential to the case, as defense counsel conceded. But this essential strategy was undone by the introduction of Choi's identification, an identification the reliability of which, for admissibility purposes, had never been determined. See supra note 12. The government contends that defense counsel was able to present the jury with flaws in the government's case, by arguing that Detective Wheeler was overzealous in focusing the investigation on appellant to the point of choosing a very suggestive photo array and, perhaps, even lying about appellant's haircut. These arguments, however, were not part of a defense strategy as much as they were necessary to contain the damage done by counsel's mistakes. Conversely, the government's case gained significantly from Choi's tentative identification, when coupled with appellant's statement about the haircut. Whereas before Choi's identification from the photo array was introduced, the government could present only an allegedly biased accomplice's testimony to identify the second robber, Choi's identification added corroborating testimony from a witness who had no reason to lie. The jury heard from Detective Wheeler that Choi had immediately selected Chatmon and McGill from the photo array and was shaken because he got [their] picture so soon and picked them out. As the trial court recognized, that's important stuff. He goes right to the two of them. He's shaken. I remember it. Moreover, Choi's tentativeness in identifying appellant from the photo array in all likelihood was perceived by the jury as a mark of his scrupulousness. Initially Choi was reluctant to confirm his identification of appellant, and in his Korean language statement said that he was not sure because the robber he saw had longer hair than the person in the picture he selected. See supra note 11. Choi's identification from the photo array may have been tentative, but appellant's statement about having his hair cut soon after the robbery provided a complete explanation for why Choi might not have been sure, because it showed that appellant did, in fact, have longer hair at the time of the robbery than in the photograph, which was taken after the robbery. This transformed a weak identification into a powerful one, corroborating McGill's story and his credibility. If McGill was at the heart of the government's case, Choi was its lynchpin. The government recognized this andas Judge Farrell notes in his concurrenceemphasized Choi's identification during its closing and rebuttal arguments to the jury. In considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, we review the evidence at trial and ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent [defense counsel's] errors. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052. If we exclude Choi's identification from the evidence presented to the jury, we think there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have had a reasonable doubt as to appellant's guilt, and, thus, that the outcome of his trial would have been different. [27] Reversed and remanded. FARRELL, Associate Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment: I agree that this conviction must be reversed for ineffective assistance of counsel. What the experienced trial judge described as a grievous misjudgmentor, as a practical matter, failure to exercise judgmentby defense counsel in opening the door to the photographic identification by Choi still warrants that description despite the government's effort on appeal to rehabilitate it. So, although ordinarily a single misstep by counsel should not be enough to make out deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), I concur with Judge Ruiz that counsel's performance in inviting an identification that contradicted the defense's own strategy of misidentification fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. [1] The issue of whether counsel's error creates a reasonable probability that, but for [that] error[], the result of the proceeding would have been different, id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, is much closer. The Chief Judge is right that (as the trial judge recalled) the defense scored no knock-out blows in cross-examining McGill, the government's primary witness. But the truth is that we cannot know what impeachment weight the jury gave to his motive, as one awaiting sentence for the same murder, to furnish testimony acceptable to the prosecution; in a case such as this corroboration may be all-important. What gives me substantial pause on the issue of prejudice is the successive statements appellant himself gave the police which ended up putting him on the scene (outside the store), and could reasonably be taken by the jury as falsely exculpatory. Nevertheless, it is plausible for me to imagine the jury, or individual members of it, poised on the edge of reasonable doubt if that evidenceMcGill's testimony and appellant's statementswere all the proof of guilt it had before it. [2] And the Choi identification provided a potentially clinching piece of corroboration by a witness with no motive other than to convict the actual killer of his friend. Choi's identification was uncertain, as the Chief Judge points out, but the prosecutor made much of it in both opening and rebuttal summationin particular, exploiting appellant's admission to the police that he had later cut his hair, thus helping explain Choi's uncertainty. Besides spending two transcript pages of his initial closing on the identification, [3] the prosecutor returned immediately to it at the start of rebuttal, emphasizing that Choi was a very careful man who could not be one hundred percent sure of the photo of Mr. Chatm[o]n because the subject he observed commit the robbery had more hairsomething explained by the visit to the barber. The prosecutor went on to connect the identifications by Choi and McGill, as he had before, as mutually supporting: And, ladies and gentlemen, the photo spread may not be the greatest but it included the two people who committed this robbery, Mr. McGill tells you that. He is in that photo spread, and remember Mr. Cho[i] picked Mr. McGill's photo saying he looked familiar, and he was right, he was right. And when he said the same thing about Mr. Chatm[o]n looking familiar he was right because Mr. McGill told you Mr. Chatm[o]n was the second person. It therefore cannot be saidand the prosecutor did not arguethat the government's case came down to the credibility of McGill unsubstantiated by Choi's identification. If the test for prejudice under Strickland were whether it is more likely than not that Choi's identification made the difference between conviction and a jury conclusion of reasonable doubt, I would not vote to reverse. But, as the Court stated there, The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome. 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. For me, the prosecutor's own recognition of the importance of Choi's identification confirms the required reasonable probability, id., that a different result would have occurred had defense counsel not opened the door to that evidence. The prejudice he thereby created is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. [4] Because we reverse on this ground, I do not associate myself with Judge Ruiz's treatment of the issue of the prosecutor's use of the photographs of the victim in closing argument, which has the character of lengthy dictum. It is enough to admonish, as the judge effectively did when he instructed the jury sua sponte not to be inflamed by the gruesome aspects of the case, that a prosecutor jeopardizes a conviction by excessive zeal in brandishing photographs of this sort while asking the jury to make a decision that you can live with. WAGNER, Chief Judge, dissenting: Assuming that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective, as the majority concludes, in my view, the trial court properly denied the motion for new trial on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice under the Strickland standard. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). [1] That standard requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is unreliable. Id. The case against Chatmon was strong. First, Chatmon was identified as the killer by a codefendant, Kevin McGill, whose testimony, in the apt words of the trial court, was not significantly impeached. The court factored in that the jury had before it evidence of McGill's plea agreement which allowed him to enter a plea to a reduced charge of second degree murder, however, as the trial court noted: McGill is not really tripped up. His story doesn't fall apart. There are no inconsistencies in it . . . . the defense didn't really lay a glove on Mr. McGill. . . so we have a co-participant who says that [Chatmon] . . . is the man who did this with me. And he says it to him face to face in an American courtroom in front of the jury and never backs off, and never wavers. And, as I say, I don't think he was significantly impeached. Second, as the trial court also noted, the jury heard Chatmon's two abruptly different versions about his whereabouts and knowledge of the crime that he gave to the police. In the first statement, Chatmon provided an elaborate exculpatory story distancing himself from the crime scene and from McGill at the critical time. [2] In the second statement, which was videotaped, Chatmon claimed innocent presence at the scene of the crime where he only witnessed, from outside the store, McGill shooting the decedent. [3] Chatmon's inconsistent statements were strong evidence which could be considered by the jury as tending to prove consciousness of guilt. See Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 2.29 (4th Ed.1996). Further, they provide evidence of Chatmon's familiarity and association with a weapon which McGill said Chatmon used in the crime, his discussion of the intended robbery with McGill, his association with McGill and his presence at the scene of the crime. [4] Third, contrary to Chatmon's second and version of events at the store, a witness, Michael Walker, testified that he saw only one person standing in front of the store, who captured his attention by the way he was looking around, and that the person went around the corner, returned with a rifle and entered the store just before the witness heard the fatal shot. Walker, the citizen who called the police when he saw what was happening, dispels in his testimony any statement by Chatmon that he was outside of the store, but simply an innocent observer. Fourth, Henry Choi, the store owner, provided a general description of both men, including their relative sizes and the roles they played in the robbery and shooting. Both describe the heavier person as leaving with the gun. McGill testified that he weighed only 132 pounds and that Chatmon is the larger of the two. [5] Thus, the testimony of Choi and Walker in this regard tends to dovetail into the testimony of McGill. Considering the strength of the evidence, including Chatmon's own damaging statements, it cannot be said that there exists `a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' Frederick v. United States, 741 A.2d 427, 437 (D.C.1999) (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). I am mindful that in Frederick, we recognized Strickland's teaching that `[t]he result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.' Frederick, supra, 741 A.2d at 439 (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Nevertheless, what we have here is a showing that defense counsel, opened the door for the admission of a tentative out-of-court identification of Chatmon by a witness (Choi), who made no in-court identification. Choi testified that he could not identify the persons who robbed him and shot his friend. The evidence showed that when Choi selected Chatmon's photograph, he said, The face looks familiar. I don't know for sure that he was the one who came in and robbed the store, but the face looks familiar. The robber's hair seemed a little longer than the one's in the picture. [6] Defense counsel argued in closing the uncertainty of the identification. [7] The uncertainty of Choi's out-of-court identification weakens its value. This fact, and the strength of the evidence presented by the government, precludes the conclusion that Chatmon was prejudiced by trial counsel's claimed deficiency. The likelihood . . . that a strong case would be affected by deficiencies in representation is significantly less than it would be if the conviction were only weakly supported by the evidence. Lane v. United States, 737 A.2d 541, 551 (D.C. 1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052). On this record, it cannot be said that the result of the trial is unreliable and that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different, as required to show prejudice under Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 394-95, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.