Opinion ID: 6344867
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The KRPC 8.4(d) violation

Text: KRPC 8.4(d) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 434) provides, It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. The panel found Huffman violated this rule by repeatedly relitigating previously decided issues and making false statements impugning Judge Marten's integrity. Conduct requiring a court to unnecessarily consider frivolous issues obviously delays the proceedings and causes the lawyers' clients to incur unnecessary legal fees and other expenses. Such conduct can support finding that the lawyer violated KRPC 8.4(d). See In re Shepherd, 310 Kan. 739, 746, 752, 448 P.3d 1049 (2019) (failure to file brief on behalf of client, resulting in 'unnecessary consideration by the court, the dismissal of the appeal, and delay with the appellate process' deemed clear and convincing evidence that attorney violated KRPC 8.4[d]); In re Gordon, 258 Kan. 784, 791, 793, 908 P.2d 169 (1995) (concluding violation of 8.4[d] supported by clear and convincing evidence when attorney failed to timely respond to discovery request resulting in sanctions and 69 mishandled bankruptcy case resulting in unnecessary legal fees and other expenses to clients); Blume, 309 Kan. at 1323 (concluding clear and convincing evidence supported conclusion respondent violated 8.4[d] by filing a frivolous motion to alter or amend judgment); In re Grillot, 309 Kan. 253, 259, 263, 433 P.3d 671 (2019) (concluding the respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice when he filed incomplete, inaccurate, and false accountings in a probate case). Here, the conduct cited by the panel reflects Huffman wasted judicial resources by pursuing multiple frivolous motions and a frivolous lawsuit barred by res judicata. And she filed pleadings impugning Judge Marten's integrity. That conduct also resulted in her clients being ordered to pay attorney fees exceeding the mortgage loan principal, along with the clients' home being foreclosed. Huffman challenges KRPC 8.4's constitutionality by incorporating her arguments against KRPC 3.5 and 8.2, discussed above. She asserts the KRPC 8.4 violation is founded on the same conduct forming the violations of those two rules, but does not argue what effect, if any, this assessment should have. She then argues: The administration of justice was over, no false evidence was provided by Respondent. She suggests her conduct could not have prejudiced the administration of justice because Wells [Fargo] continued to move forward. She also argues there was no pattern of misconduct because the litigation went on for years. And under headings styled CHILLING ADVOCACY & INTEGRITY, RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WRITING WAS ACKNOWLEDGED, and COUNSEL'S ETHICAL CONSTRUCT IN PRACTICE, she argues she has good character, and that she both acknowledged responsibility for the writings containing the comments about Judge Marten and apologized to him. 70 We hold the KRPC 8.4(d) violation is established by clear and convincing evidence. The panel's findings demonstrate Huffman serially relitigated claims that were either frivolous at their outset or made frivolous by prior decisions resolving them against her clients. The panel's findings also demonstrate her statements about Judge Marten tended to impugn his integrity, and by extension, that of the courts. Huffman's arguments about chilling advocacy, like many of her other arguments, incorrectly assume her conduct violated the rules only because she did not win. And her constitutional challenge to the rule as it applies to her commentary about Judge Marten is waived, as discussed above. Moreover, her apology and accepting responsibility for the comments does not negate the fact she made them. APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINE The question remaining is the appropriate discipline. The Disciplinary Administrator's office, panel majority, and dissenting panel member disagree about the recommended discipline. The panel majority recommended a public censure, and the dissenting panel member recommended a 90-day suspension. Although Huffman did not raise the discipline to be imposed as a separate issue in her brief, she argues in its closing paragraph, [T]his Court should reject the panel's report and handle anything else necessary in private. The Disciplinary Administrator continues, as it did before the panel, to recommend indefinite suspension. In any given case, this court is not bound by the recommendations from the hearing panel or the Disciplinary Administrator. 'Each disciplinary sanction is based on the specific facts and circumstances of the violations and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented in the case.' 'Because each case is unique, past sanctions provide little guidance.' [Citations omitted.] Hodge, 307 Kan. at 230. 71 The court generally looks to the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions to aid in determining discipline. That framework considers four factors in determining punishment: (1) the ethical duty violated by the lawyer; (2) the lawyer's mental state; (3) the actual or potential injury resulting from the lawyer's misconduct; and (4) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 307 Kan. at 231. Here, the panel found Huffman knowingly violated ethical duties owed to her clients, to the public, and to the legal profession. Her inadequate representation resulted in judgment against R.B. and S.B. for nearly $290,000 in Wells Fargo's legal fees. This amount was larger than the expected value of the underlying mortgage interest. And it was amassed due to Huffman's extensive and needless discovery requests and other improper tactics which caused the . . . action to metastasize beyond any reason. These tactics included seeking court review of the same issues over and over again resulting in the waste of judicial time and resources. The panel also found several aggravating and mitigating factors. For aggravating factors, it concluded Huffman engaged in a pattern of misconduct throughout the R.B. and S.B. litigation and, in doing so, committed multiple offenses. In addition, the panel found R.B. and S.B. were vulnerable to Huffman's misconduct, noting they relied on Huffman and believed they had sued Wells Fargo when they had not, that Huffman drove the litigation approach, and that R.B. and S.B. were ultimately ordered to pay nearly $300,000 in attorneys fees and expenses. Equally troubling, the panel found Huffman refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct, arguing before the panel that she did not violate any rules. The hearing panel was 72 concerned, that at this late date, the respondent just does not seem to 'get it.' She is either unwilling or unable to acknowledge that what she did [in] this case—repeatedly filing lawsuits when the issues had already been resolved and by making false and disparaging statements about a judge—violates the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. This perspective carried through to Huffman's briefings to this court. Her arguments, particularly concerning the Rule 1.1 and 3.1 violations, indicate she is under the misapprehension that discipline is being imposed simply because she was not successful in the litigation. And in arguing [p]unishment is not warranted in this matter, Huffman contends her conduct was beneficial to the public at large, by stating: The public has been helped by moving the law towards consumer protection and even advancing changes with the legislature to achieve more consistent results with the Courts. For mitigating factors, the panel found Huffman lacked a prior disciplinary record; a serious car accident resulting in a traumatic brain injury and depression contributed to the misconduct; she was inexperienced in the practice of law when the misconduct occurred; she presented evidence in support of her good character from several witnesses; and she had already paid $5,000 in federal court sanctions for some of the misconduct at issue. Clear and convincing evidence supports the findings of violations of the professional rules of conduct as we note above. Huffman's multiple violations, pattern of misconduct, and injury to her clients are plainly demonstrated by the pleadings and orders filed in the underlying cases. The mitigating factors are likewise supported by the panel's cited evidence. In making its discipline recommendation, the panel quoted the pertinent sections of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions for each of these types of 73 misconduct. See ABA Standards 4.5 (lack of competence); 5.1 (failure to maintain personal integrity); 6.1 (false statements, fraud, and misrepresentation); 6.2 (abuse of the legal process); 7.0 (violations of duties owed as a professional). But one ABA Standards provision the panel did not cite was from Standard 4.51, discussing when disbarment is appropriate when attorney shows lack of competence: 4.51 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer's course of conduct demonstrates that the lawyer does not understand the most fundamental legal doctrines or procedures, and the lawyer's conduct causes injury or potential injury to a client. And for misconduct involving abuse of legal process, the ABA standards provide, Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving failure to expedite litigation or bring a meritorious claim, or failure to obey any obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists. ABA Standards 6.2. With regard to this, ABA Standards note: Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that he or she is violating a court order or rule, and causes injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding. ABA Standard 6.22. In addition, the court itself observes, as the Disciplinary Administrator did, that Huffman's brief here demonstrates continued professional failings. As the Disciplinary Administrator commented: Respondent's brief to this Court demonstrates she still lacks the competence required for appellate litigation—a factor this Court may consider in determining whether 74 to impose discipline that provides more protection of the public and legal system than published censure. Cf., In re Anderson, 247 Kan. 208, 213, 795 P.2d 64 (1990) (in sanctions section of the opinion, the Court noted respondent's exceptions, brief, and oral argument did not comply with appellate rules). Respondent's brief fails to comply with virtually every rule of appellate briefing. It lacks coherent structure and is largely incomprehensible. Additionally, much of the brief is devoted to irrelevant arguments about the caveat, whether Wells Fargo owned the note, and the legal issue of whether the KCPA applied to financial communication, which demonstrates Respondent is still unable to identify and make pertinent legal arguments. A majority of the court concludes suspension with a two-year term is the appropriate discipline. In arriving at this, the majority has considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances described above, as well as the clear and convincing evidence supporting the panel's findings and conclusions. That said, the majority is amenable to staying the suspension after the first 90 days so long as Huffman adheres to a practice supervision plan approved by the Disciplinary Administrator's office that extends for the remaining suspension period. If Huffman and the Disciplinary Administrator's office cannot agree on an appropriate plan of supervision either may file a motion with this court to resolve the dispute about this or compliance with the plan. The majority further holds that after successfully completing probation, or at the end of the suspension term, a reinstatement hearing will be necessary to ensure Huffman is capable of practicing law without further supervision. A minority of the court would have imposed a harsher discipline. CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Donna L. Huffman be and she is hereby suspended from the practice of law in the state of Kansas in accordance with Supreme 75 Court Rule 225(a)(3) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 281) for two years as of the date of this opinion. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above suspension will be stayed after the first 90 days provided respondent enters into a practice supervision plan approved by the Disciplinary Administrator's office that extends for the remaining suspension period. Approval of a probation plan by that office is required before any stay can commence. Any dispute between respondent and the Disciplinary Administrator's office over the practice supervision plan or compliance with it will be resolved by this court. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall comply with Supreme Court Rule 231 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 292) (notice to clients, opposing counsel, and courts of record following suspension). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent comply with Supreme Court Rule 232 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 293), including undergoing a reinstatement hearing after the twoyear suspension term ends. Additional conditions for reinstatement may be explored by the Disciplinary Administrator's office, a reinstatement panel, or the court during any reinstatement process. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports. 76