Opinion ID: 482049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bankruptcy-Related Fees.

Text: 32 McEwen argues that, under the facts of this case, his prepetition mortgage did not disqualify him from employment as a disinterested person. Additionally, McEwen argues that he should be awarded his fees nunc pro tunc prior to his order of appointment because he was under the mistaken impression that an order had been filed, and because he worked for the debtors during this period without objection from any of the parties involved. Because of our conclusions as to the first claim, however, it will become evident that the second claim is essentially moot. 33 The bankruptcy court, with the district court affirming, held that McEwen was not entitled to compensation for his post-petition work because he was not a disinterested person. Under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 327(a), the trustee could employ, 17 with the court's approval, an attorney who did not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and [was a] disinterested person   . 11 U.S.C. Sec. 327(a). Although framed conjunctively, the conditions are applied disjunctively; failure to meet either will result in disqualification. See In re Leisure Dynamics, Inc., 32 B.R. 753, 754 (Bankr.D.Minn.) (supplemental opinion to 32 B.R. 751), aff'd, 33 B.R. 121 (D.Minn.1983). 34 The bankruptcy court found that McEwen failed to meet two parts of the definition of a disinterested person: 35 (13) disinterested person means person that-- 36 (A) is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider; 37