Opinion ID: 740495
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: departure rulings

Text: 38 Casiano's final argument is that the sentencing court erred in considering factors outside of the Sentencing Guidelines when it limited the extent of a downward departure granted pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. Although we review district court departure decisions for abuse of discretion, see Koon v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 2043, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996), whether a factor is a permissible basis for departure under any circumstances is a question of law, and the court of appeals need not defer to the district court's resolution of the point, id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2047. The abuse of discretion standard includes review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions. Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2048. Casiano's challenge to the authority of the district court to take into account certain factors in limiting its departure is a legal question. See id.; United States v. Romualdi, 101 F.3d 971, 973 (3d Cir.1996). 39 Section 5K1.1 provides that upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (1995). Significantly, the guideline does not end there. Instead, § 5K1.1 continues: 40 (a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the following: 41 (1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance, taking into consideration the government's evaluation of the assistance rendered; 42 (2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant; 43 (3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance. 44 (4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance; 45 (5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance. 46 Id. 47 In this case, the government filed a motion under § 5K1.1 because of Casiano's substantial assistance but it did not suggest a particular level of departure that it believed was warranted. The district court departed downward three offense levels and explained its decision not to depart downward further as follows: 48 If I had based my decision as to how far to depart solely on the factors enumerated under section 5K1.1, I would have departed further; however, because of other factors, primarily the extreme seriousness of the crime and the impact on the victim, I felt constrained to limit the departure as I did. It may be that the additional factors I took into account are appropriately considered under Guidelines section 5K1.1(a) .... If the additional factors I took into account may not be considered under this direction, then I have looked outside section 5K1.1 in determining how far to depart downward. The additional factors I considered are consistent with the general considerations of sentencing, i.e., punishment, rehabilitation, deterrence, and the protection of society. 49 United States v. Casiano, 923 F.Supp. 684, 688 (E.D.Pa.1996) (emphasis added). 50 Casiano argues that the district court erred in considering the seriousness of the crime and the impact on the victim in deciding to limit the extent of the departure for Casiano's substantial assistance. Casiano states that these factors are unrelated to the extent or kind of his cooperation and are not found in either § 5K1.1 or anywhere in the Sentencing Guidelines. He concludes that therefore those factors may not be used to limit the extent of the § 5K1.1 departure. We have not previously considered whether a district court may consider factors unrelated to those enumerated in § 5K1.1 when limiting the extent of its downward departure, and thus must examine the language of § 5K1.1, the commentary, and the part played by § 5K1.1 in the scheme of the Sentencing Guidelines. 51 We begin with the now established proposition that where a departure is legally authorized, 'the district courts are entitled to exercise a substantial amount of discretion in determining whether to depart from the guidelines.'  United States v. Medeiros, 884 F.2d 75, 78 (3d Cir.1989) (citations omitted). That discretion is as applicable to § 5K1.1 as it is to § 5K2.0, which covers other grounds for departure. The courts more frequently focus on the latter when emphasizing the discretion the sentencing court has in making departure decisions. See Koon, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2045. Although a government motion to depart is an essential predicate of § 5K1.1, once it files such a motion, the district court retains broad discretion in deciding whether or not to depart. This court, along with many others, has held that it is the district court's decision, not the prosecutor's, whether to depart and to what extent. See United States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155, 162-63 (3d Cir.1992). As the court stated in United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1155 (1st Cir.1993), the government's filing of a § 5K1.1 motion, does not bind a sentencing court to abdicate its responsibility [or] stifle its independent judgment .... 52 A district court's discretion not to depart in the face of a motion under § 5K1.1 should be as broad as its discretion not to depart under § 5K2.0, and therefore unless there has been legal error, it should be similarly immune from appellate review. Cf. United States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 272 (3d Cir.1989) (court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of a discretionary refusal to depart downward from the Sentencing Guidelines). 53 Once the district court decides to grant a § 5K1.1 motion, however, there are some parameters to the exercise of the court's discretion. Although by the terms of the guidelines the bases for substantial assistance departures listed in § 5K1.1 are not meant to be exhaustive, they are instructive. The enumerated factors all concern the degree, efficacy, timeliness, and circumstances of a defendant's cooperation. See U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1(a); see also Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1156; cf. United States v. King, 53 F.3d 589, 591 (3d Cir.1995) (individualized qualitative examination required). There is a growing body of precedent that holds that only factors relating to a defendant's cooperation may be used as the basis of a departure under § 5K1.1. See, e.g., United States v. Aponte, 36 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir.1994); United States v. Campbell, 995 F.2d 173, 175 (10th Cir.1993); United States v. Hall, 977 F.2d 861, 865 (4th Cir.1992); United States v. Valente, 961 F.2d 133, 134-35 (9th Cir.1992). A similar holding was made in the context of substantial assistance departures from the statutory minimum on motion of the government, which is governed by similar language in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). See United States v. Rudolph, 970 F.2d 467 (8th Cir.1992). 54 For example, in United States v. Chestna, 962 F.2d 103, 106-07 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 920, 113 S.Ct. 334, 121 L.Ed.2d 251 (1992), the court stated that the family circumstances of the defendant should not be considered in determining the amount of downward departure to be granted under § 5K1.1. Accord United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 857, 112 S.Ct. 171, 116 L.Ed.2d 134 (1991). In Chestna, the court of appeals rejected the defendant's argument that once the district court decided to depart, it opened the door to consideration of factors unrelated to assistance to the government in determining the appropriateness of a departure. As the court stated, We ... find no support in the language of § 5K1.1 for defendant's argument that, once animated, § 5K1.1 does not cabin the grounds presented to the court to support a downward departure. Chestna, 962 F.2d at 106; see also Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1156. 55 The limitation of the grounds for departures under § 5K1.1 to factors relating to the defendant's substantial assistance to the authorities finds support in the language of the guideline and its commentary. The guideline itself is entitled Substantial Assistance to Authorities. The background commentary states, inter alia, that [l]atitude is ... afforded the sentencing judge to reduce a sentence based upon variable relevant factors, including those listed above. U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, backg'd. comment. (1995) (emphasis added). It follows that had the district court decided to depart downward on a § 5K1.1 motion because it determined that the crime was not serious or the victim was only injured insignificantly, it would have been error. 56 Casiano's contention raises the obverse of that situation. He argues that because a district court may not consider factors wholly unrelated to substantial assistance when it decides to depart from the guideline sentencing range pursuant to § 5K1.1, the court also may not consider factors unrelated to substantial assistance when it chooses not to depart from the guideline sentencing range. Notwithstanding the facial appeal of symmetry, it does not follow that limiting the district court's basis for departure to the type of considerations outlined in § 5K1.1(a) means that the court should be similarly limited in its decision not to depart at all or to limit the extent of the departure. See Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1156-57; see also United States v. Mittelstadt, 969 F.2d 335, 336-37 (7th Cir.1992) (consideration of defendant's chronic alcoholism on a § 5K1.1 motion not abuse of discretion); United States v. Carnes, 945 F.2d 1013, 1014 (8th Cir.1991) (benefit defendant received from prosecution's decision not to press an additional weapons charge permissible ground for limiting extent of downward departure). 57 A departure for substantial assistance is a narrow, albeit authorized, exception to the established guideline sentencing range. Therefore, the discretion exercised by the district court when making such a departure is channeled by the Sentencing Guidelines. Determinations made pursuant to the guidelines are the norm. Departures, by contrast, are exceptions and are therefore circumscribed. Indeed, there is no general, unconstrained departure provision. The closest such provision, § 5K2.0, also includes certain express restrictions. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (1995) (applicable only if there is an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission). Similarly, departures provided for acceptance of responsibility are not within the district court's discretion. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. 58 In light of the overall scheme of the Sentencing Guidelines, it was not inconsistent for the Sentencing Commission to have circumscribed the district court's discretion for departures for substantial assistance in only one direction, i.e., when a district court does, in fact, depart. As the court noted in Mariano: The limitations on the variety of considerations that a court may mull in withholding or curtailing a substantial assistance departure are not nearly so stringent as those which pertain when a court in fact departs downward. Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1157. 59 The cases disclose a variety of factors that have influenced a district court's decision not to follow the government's recommendation in a § 5K1.1 motion or to limit the extent of departure. See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 54 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1995) (limiting extent of § 5K1.1 departure so as not to offset impact of mandatory 60-day month consecutive sentence); United States v. Alvarez, 51 F.3d 36, 39-40 & n.5 (5th Cir.1995) (limiting departure to avoid disparity in sentences with less culpable co-conspirators); Carnes, 945 F.2d at 1014 (limiting departure in light of benefit to defendant of failure of prosecutor to press weapon charges). 60 The factors relied on by the district court not to depart more than three levels because of the extreme seriousness of the crime and the impact on the victim were well within its discretion. In fact, the seriousness of the offense is one of the factors that the underlying statute expressly refers to as a relevant consideration for sentencing decisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Accordingly, we find no error of law by the district court in its choice to take into account the nature and circumstances of the offense in limiting the extent of the § 5K1.1 departure for Casiano.
61 DeJesus also poses an objection to his sentence. He claims that the district court's decision to deny him a § 5K2.0 downward departure is reviewable as an error of law. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 states, in relevant part: 62 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) the sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the range established by the applicable guideline, if the court finds 'that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission ...'. 63 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (policy statement) (1995). 64 After the attorney for DeJesus offered details of his deprived and dysfunctional childhood and the conclusion of the psychiatrist who had evaluated him that he was a dependent personality, App. at 69, the district court declined to grant a departure based on § 5K2.0, stating I want you to know that as of the record I do not believe I have the power to depart under the provisions that you recommended that I can depart. App. at 71 (emphasis added). 65 DeJesus argues that this statement indicates that the district court entertained an incorrect understanding of its discretionary authority under the Sentencing Guidelines, and he asks us to remand for resentencing. See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992) (remand appropriate if the guidelines were incorrectly applied by the sentencing court). 66 To the extent that the district court's statement reflects its understanding that some of the factors to which counsel alluded were inappropriate bases for departure, the district court was correct. As the Supreme Court noted in Koon, there are some factors which the Sentencing Commission has made forbidden bases for departure. See --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2044. Relevant here is the Sentencing Commission's statement that [l]ack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating a disadvantaged upbringing are not relevant grounds for imposing a sentence outside the applicable guideline range. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.12 (policy statement) (1995); see also Koon, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2044. DeJesus sought a departure based on his troubled childhood: his mother died from a drug overdose and his father committed suicide after contracting AIDS. These are factors that may not be considered by a district court when deciding whether to depart under § 5K2.0. 67 Moreover, to the extent that the district court chose not to depart based on factors that have not been forbidden by the Sentencing Commission, we interpret the district court's statement that as of the record it had no power to depart as indicating that even if DeJesus had presented evidence of factors that were not forbidden, that evidence was not of a sufficient magnitude to warrant departure under § 5K2.0. 68 We thus reject DeJesus's claim that the district court misunderstood its discretionary power under the guidelines and that is improperly refused to depart because it felt constrained by a limited grant of authority. Furthermore, to the extent that Casiano is attacking the district court's exercise of discretion in refusing to reduce the sentence below the applicable guideline range, it will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals does not have jurisdiction to review the discretionary decision by a judge not to depart downward from the Sentencing Guidelines. See Denardi, 892 F.2d at 272. Accordingly, the district court properly denied a departure, and we will affirm the judgment of sentence.IV.