Opinion ID: 867478
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Dismiss the Indictment

Text: ¶ 30 Moody argues that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss his indictment because it was based in part on evidence that the State knew or should have known was at least partly false. At the grand jury hearing, Tucson Police Detective Karen Wright testified that after Carlos Logan was arrested for driving Mary DeForest's stolen Suburban, he told police officers that he received the vehicle in a trade for cocaine with a man named Bob who bragged about killing two people in Tucson. Moody claims that this evidence was false and requests that we reverse his convictions because false evidence was used to procure his indictment. ¶ 31 Because Moody did not seek relief by special action from the trial court's denial of his motion, our scope of review on direct appeal is limited. Arizona case law is clear that, with one exception, all challenges to a grand jury's findings of probable cause must be made by motion followed by special action before trial; they are not reviewable on appeal. State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 32, 906 P.2d 542, 565 (1995). That one exception to the rule occurs when a defendant has had to stand trial on an indictment which the government knew was based partially on perjured, material testimony. State v. Gortarez, 141 Ariz. 254, 258, 686 P.2d 1224, 1228 (1984) (citing United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.1974)). Thus, on appeal we will review the indictment only to determine whether it was based on perjured, material testimony. [3] ¶ 32 In Basurto, the Ninth Circuit held that due process is violated if the government bases an indictment partially on perjured testimony, when the perjured testimony is material, and when jeopardy has not attached. 497 F.2d at 785 (emphasis added). Perjury is a false sworn statement [a witness makes regarding] a material issue, believing [the statement] to be false. A.R.S. § 13-2702(A)(1) (2001). To determine whether Basurto is implicated, we review each of Detective Wright's statements to determine whether she committed perjury. ¶ 33 Detective Wright's first statement to the grand jury was that Carlos Logan told the arresting officer that he received the Suburban in a trade for cocaine. Moody concedes that Detective Wright accurately reported to the grand jury what Logan told the arresting officer. Thus, while the information that Carlos Logan gave to the arresting officer might have been false, Detective Wright's reporting to the grand jury of that exchange between Logan and the arresting officer was not. Consequently, it was not perjurious and does not fall within the purview of Basurto, 497 F.2d at 784-86, and Gortarez, 141 Ariz. at 258, 686 P.2d at 1228. ¶ 34 Regarding her second statement, Detective Wright conceded at a pretrial hearing that Carlos Logan never told either the arresting or interviewing officer that Moody identified himself to Logan as Bob. Detective Wright also admitted that the police reports did not specify Tucson as the location of the murders Moody allegedly bragged about committing. Thus, Detective Wright's grand jury testimony was false on these two points. However, our inquiry does not end there. To constitute perjury, the false sworn statement must relate to a material issue and the witness must know of its falsity. A.R.S. § 13-2702(A)(1). ¶ 35 A statement is material if it could have affected the course or outcome of [a] proceeding. A.R.S. § 13-2701(1) (2001). The unchallenged evidence offered at the grand jury proceeding was overwhelming: In addition to the Bob and Tucson information, the grand jury also heard that Moody knew Michelle Malone and may have purchased cocaine from her in the past; that a bullet found at the Malone murder scene came from a rifle found at Moody's residence; that after the murder, Moody pawned two guns taken from the Malone residence; that Moody lived next door to Patricia Magda and knew her; that Moody's wallet was found in Magda's car; that Magda's car was found at DeForest's Yuma, Arizona home; that Moody used Magda's credit card and bank card; and that Carlos Logan was arrested for driving Mary DeForest's stolen Suburban. ¶ 36 Because substantial evidence supports the finding of probable cause, neither false statement could reasonably have affected the grand jury's determination of probable cause. Thus, the requirement of materiality is not met as to the Bob and Tucson evidence. As such, these two statements by Detective Wright, although false in the sense that they do not appear in the arresting officer's reports, do not constitute perjury. Consequently, Moody's claim of a Basurto violation fails. ¶ 37 In the alternative, Moody argues that his convictions should be reversed because the prosecutor allowed Moody's trials to proceed knowing that the indictment was based in part on false evidence that had been presented to the grand jury. Citing Basurto, he asserts that the prosecutor should have disclosed this evidence to the court and to him upon discovery. See 497 F.2d at 785-86 (Whenever the prosecutor learns of any perjury committed before the grand jury, he is under a duty to immediately inform the court....). However, because no perjury was committed, the prosecutor violated no duty under Basurto. While a prosecutor must advise the court of false evidence presented at trial, cf. Ariz. R. Sup.Ct. 42, ER 3.3(a)(3) and 3.8 cmt. 1, Moody has cited no authority suggesting that presentation of false testimony to the grand jury on non-material issues requires reversal after guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.