Opinion ID: 2632228
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Purported Excited Utterance

Text: At issue is the following testimony from prosecution witness Burks, who was told the following by codefendant Wilson approximately five or six minutes after Davis began to perpetrate the crime: [Davis] went over there to rip the lady off, but [he] just kicked in the door and started beating on her and rubbing [her] all over. Report of Proceedings (RP) (1/27/98) at 1508-09. Furthermore Wilson told Burks the victim was coming down the stairs, and that Davis rubbed her breasts. He identified the victim to Burks as the old woman across the street, RP at 1508, and told Burks that as soon as he realized what Davis was doing to the woman he left the Couch residence. These statements formed the centerpiece of the state's case against Davis because they provided an eyewitness account of him inside the Couch residence attacking the victim. The defense moved to exclude these statements as hearsay, but the trial court allowed them as excited utterance exceptions to hearsay. The three elements of the excited utterance exception are (1) a startling event or condition, (2) the declarant is under the stress of the startling event or condition, and (3) the declaration is related to the startling event or condition. ER 803(a)(2); Chapin, 118 Wash.2d at 686, 826 P.2d 194. Spontaneity is crucial to the determination. Williamson, 100 Wash.App. at 258, 996 P.2d 1097. The passage of time between event and utterance is relevant but not dispositive. Strauss, 119 Wash.2d at 416-17, 832 P.2d 78. Other considerations include the declarant's emotional state and whether the declarant had an opportunity to reflect on the event and fabricate a story. State v. Briscoeray, 95 Wash.App. 167, 173-74, 974 P.2d 912, review denied, 139 Wash.2d 1011, 994 P.2d 848 (1999). [T]he `key determination is whether the statement was made while the declarant was still under the influence of the event to the extent that [the] statement could not be the result of fabrication, intervening actions, or the exercise of choice or judgment.' Brown, 127 Wash.2d at 759, 903 P.2d 459 (second alteration in original) (quoting Strauss, 119 Wash.2d at 416, 832 P.2d 78 (quoting Johnston v. Ohls, 76 Wash.2d 398, 406, 457 P.2d 194 (1969))). In this case, five to six minutes passed between Wilson's witness of Davis's alleged attack on the victim and speaking to Burks about it. It apparently took Wilson five to six minutes to cross the street, as we know the house Burks occupied was across the street from the Couch home. Five minutes' time is ample and sufficient time to reflect and develop a self-serving story. See 5B Karl B. Tegland, Washington Practice: Evidence Law and Practice § 803.6, at 419-20 (4th ed. 1999) (Although the statement need not be contemporaneous with the startling event, a number of decisions have excluded statements offered as excited utterances on the basis that the passage of time allowed the declarant to reflect. (footnote omitted)). In fact later events further demonstrate Wilson's self-serving story was unreliable. Two days after speaking to Burks, Wilson spoke with another prosecution witness, Davis's 16-year-old nephew Asil Hubley. Wilson told Hubley three different versions of his involvement in the crime. First Wilson told Hubley he had been inside the upstairs bathroom of the Couch residence (where the victim's body was found). After that Wilson changed his story to say he stayed on the couch in the Couch home and heard noises coming from the bedroom upstairs. Thereafter Wilson changed his story still again to say he did not go into the Couch home at all. Wilson's latest admission is inconsistent with his putative excited utterance that Davis entered the home and began to assault the victim. Wilson thus fabricated at some point in the development of his story, which casts further doubt on the reliability of his original, self-serving, utterance. While [t]he fact that a statement is self-serving does not make the statement inadmissible, nevertheless the self-serving nature of a statement may be an important factor in judging spontaneity in particular instances. 5B Tegland, supra, § 803.6, at 423-24 (footnote omitted). Looking at the length of time between Wilson's going from the victim's home to Burks's house, the fact his story is inconsistent with later statements, and the fact it was self-serving demonstrate the statements lacked the suddenness, spontaneity, and other indicia of reliability necessary to justify admission of hearsay as exceptions to the rule. The majority's conclusory assertions to the contrary (The opportunity for [Wilson] to reflect on the statement was minimal and the evidence supports a conclusion he was under stress when he spoke to Mr. Burks.; [T]he time between the event and the statement was sufficiently slight to ensure that when he made the statement to Mr. Burks, Mr. Wilson was still under the stress of witnessing Appellant's attack upon Ms. Couch. Majority at 1004-1005) are conclusions not in tune with the facts.