Opinion ID: 714803
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brady Act Consistent with Structural Limits of Tenth Amendment

Text: 39 We turn first to the formal limits imposed by the federal structure of our Constitution. Sheriff Frank, relying primarily on New York, urges that the interim background check requirement is unconstitutional regardless of the quantitative degree of the burden imposed. The Tenth Amendment does impose structural restrictions on congressional action. But unlike the statute at issue in New York, which attempted to foist the responsibility for addressing the problems of low-level radioactive waste upon the States, the Brady Act is consistent with the constitutional scheme. 40 As already noted, we rejected at the outset plaintiff's contention that Congress may never compel state officials to perform duties and may only seek to guide States' behavior by attaching conditions to federal funds, threatening preemption, or passing generally-applicable legislation. New York did not purport to revert to the 19th-century rule that the federal government may never impose obligations on state officers. Instead, that case involved a unique statute that in its take title provision coerced state governments into implementing federal law and therefore violated the Tenth Amendment. 505 U.S. at 177, 112 S.Ct. at 2429. The Supreme Court reasoned that the take title provision and its alternative pressed state governments into federal regulatory service by offering States the choice between regulating according to Congress' instructions or themselves assuming liability for the waste. Id. at 175, 112 S.Ct. at 2427-28. The offending take title provision violated Hodel 's edict that the national government cannot mobilize the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program. 452 U.S. at 288, 101 S.Ct. at 2366. 41 The Brady Act does not direct the States to enact legislation or to promulgate regulations. See Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir.1995). Rather, to the extent that it implicates the States' legislative processes at all, it merely allows States to enact a background check or permit system for handgun purchases as an alternative to federally-required checks by CLEOs, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(C)-(D). But, such a state enactment is not mandated or even significantly encouraged. 42 Sheriff Frank, further relying on New York, urges that the Brady Act contravenes the Tenth Amendment because Congress has the power to regulate individuals, not States, New York, 505 U.S. at 166, 112 S.Ct. at 2423, and that [t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program, id. at 188, 112 S.Ct. at 2435. The background check requirement of the Act does not transgress New York 's holding. Unlike the statutory scheme established in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, designed to encourage States to reach their own solutions, the Brady Act is an exercise of Congress's power to regulate individuals. The thrust of the Act is to improve the effectiveness of the laws governing handgun transfers between individual citizens. To achieve this purpose, the Act requires registered dealers and potential transferees to supply information to law enforcement personnel when a transaction is proposed, and it prohibits the consummation of potential transactions found to be illegal. That the Brady Act enlists state officials during the interim period, pending the implementation of a national system for instant background checks, does not change the Act's basic character. Because the Act neither requires States to enact regulations by requiring them to fashion their own solutions, nor abdicates political responsibility in the handgun control field, it is distinguishable from the statutory provision found offensive in New York. 43 Congress has authority to subject state governments to generally applicable laws that govern the conduct of private parties. Such laws are different from attempts by the national government to direct or otherwise motivate the States to regulate in a particular field in a particular way, that is to say, it is permissible for Congress to require private citizens to act in a certain manner and for the States to help administer such a federal law, but Congress cannot require the States to pass laws requiring their citizens to act in a certain manner. 44 Congress is, according to New York, barred under the Tenth Amendment from compelling state legislatures to enact legislation because the federal government may not commandeer the basic decisionmaking processes of state government. This view is reinforced by the Supreme Court's repeated reference to Hodel, which upheld provisions of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 because that statute did not compel the States to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program and thereby take over the States' legislative processes. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288, 101 S.Ct. at 2366, quoted in New York, 505 U.S. at 161, 162, 170, 176, 112 S.Ct. at 2420-21, 2421, 2425, 2428-29. The offending provision in New York--because it required States to enact their own regulatory solution--was the sort of unconstitutional legislation alluded to in Hodel. 45 Moreover, the Framers contemplated and approved the administration by state officials of federal laws applicable to individuals. Thus, Madison said collection of tax revenue for national purposes will generally be made by the officers ... appointed by the several States. The Federalist No. 45, at 237 (James Madison) (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1961). Hamilton agreed: The national legislature can make use of the system of each State within that State. The method of laying and collecting ... taxes in each State can, in all its parts, be adopted and employed by the federal government. The Federalist No. 36, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis in original). Mandates to local officials to enforce federal as well as state laws--as in the interim provisions of the Brady Act--do not encroach on state sovereignty in any appreciable manner. 46 The absence of compelled regulation helps illuminate the central reason that New York is not controlling: the roles of the federal government and the States under the Brady Act are consistent with the values underlying federalism. [W]here the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished. New York, 505 U.S. at 168, 112 S.Ct. at 2424. Under an arrangement like that in New York, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decisions. Id. at 169, 112 S.Ct. at 2424. 47 The Brady Act has no such effect on accountability. First, the Act itself is a national, comprehensive approach to identifying potential illicit handgun transactions. Because it requires no additional enactments by state governments, it poses little risk of shifting the blame (or glory) for its provisions to local officials. Additionally, because the administration of the interim provisions is vested in a federal agency--the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms--there is little danger of confusion. For example, the Act instructs potential transferees to fill out a Form 5300.35, clearly identified as a federal form. See 27 C.F.R. § 178.102(a)(1) (1995). 48 Second, political accountability would be jeopardized were local officials able to invoke the Tenth Amendment to defeat even the lightest and most insignificant federal mandate. Just as Congress in New York attempted to shift responsibility to state officials, federal officials could shift the blame for inaction by attributing persistent national problems, such as handgun violence, to the intransigence of local officials. Even more problematic is the possibility that federal officials could consistently surrender responsibility for national problems by invoking abstract notions of federalism, which would result in dissipation, as opposed to a mere shifting, of political responsibility. Thus, the accountability concerns discussed in New York support the validity of the Brady Act. 49 Today's ruling serves the purposes of federalism in another way. Returning to the 19th-century prohibition of any direct mandate to state officers would lead Congress, when it acts, to do so exclusively through federal instrumentalities. Rather than promoting the constitutionally mandated division of authority intended by the framers to protect individual citizens' liberties, Lopez, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1626, the perverse result would be a further concentration of authority in the federal government. Sheriff Frank has not asserted in this litigation that Congress could not, by exercising its commerce power, bypass local governments and employ federal agents to check on citizens who wish to purchase firearms. Such action illustrates how direct federal intervention could follow from the adoption of a simple no compulsion rule. Federalism is too crucial, too central to our system of government to be trivialized by a rule that would make any co-optation of any state official into a violation of the Constitution. The effect of such a rigid rule would be the multiplication of direct federal bureaucratic intervention and, hence, in practice, a greater reduction in effective federalism. 50 In addition to being qualitatively different from arrangements like the one invalidated in New York, the duties imposed on CLEOs are more like those that have been upheld in prior cases. Congress can require state courts to entertain a federal claim despite a contrary state rule or policy. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 67 S.Ct. 810, 91 L.Ed. 967 (1947). Although a state court may refuse to do so if it has a valid excuse, see Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 388, 49 S.Ct. 355, 356, 73 L.Ed. 747 (1929), [a]n excuse that is inconsistent with or violates federal law is not a valid excuse. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 2440, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990). This principle does not apply only to state courts; Congress also may enlist state regulators to vindicate federal rights. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 760 & 763 n. 27, 102 S.Ct. at 2137-38 & 2139 n. 27 ([I]t is difficult to perceive any fundamental distinction between the state legislature's power to establish limits on the jurisdiction of the state courts, and its prerogative to set ratemaking criteria for use by quasi-legislative utilities commissions.). 51 CLEOs' duties under the Brady Act are not qualitatively different from the congressionally-imposed functions upheld in such cases as Testa and FERC. When a Form 5300.35 is forwarded by a transferor, a CLEO is required to consult relevant records and issue a determination as to whether the transaction can be consummated. If the decision is favorable, the five-day waiting period is truncated and the weapon may be transferred. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii)(II). The same result obtains if the five-day period has elapsed without notice from the CLEO. See § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii)(I). If the decision is not favorable, then the transaction has been identified as illegal and may not take place. See § 922(s)(1). In the operation of the Brady Act, as in the circumstances of FERC and Testa, the federal government has taken responsibility for determining the applicable standards, and state officials are being asked to apply those standards to a particular situation. Although plaintiff attempts to dismiss FERC and Testa as merely addressing adjudicatory bodies, in so doing he fails to acknowledge the striking similarity between the obligations imposed in those cases and those imposed on CLEOs. The applicability of the Testa principle depends upon the role performed by the state officer, not the governmental branch involved. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 762 n. 27, 102 S.Ct. at 2139 n. 27. Thus, the proffered distinction is irrelevant. Testa was distinguished in New York on the grounds that the legislation in question in the latter case did not regulate individuals and required States to engage in legislation. Id. at 178-79, 112 S.Ct. at 2429-30. Unlike a statute that commands state legislatures to legislate, the Brady Act simply requires CLEOs to apply federal law in the regulation of individuals and to perform a function similar to those validated in FERC and Testa. 52 In sum, after Testa, Garcia, Gregory, and New York it is now clear that Congress acts within its broad power to regulate under the Commerce Clause when its legislation neither obscures lines of political accountability nor disturbs the ordinary presumed sovereignty of the States. This principle furthers federalism and strengthens its attendant political safeguards--the double security--in our constitutional system. 53