Opinion ID: 1145185
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does Carpenter Have Standing?

Text: Carpenter asserts that the inclusion of Cordova in District 2 violates the requirements of compactness and socio-economic integration in Article VI, section 6 of the state constitution. [8] The Governor's position is that Carpenter lacks standing to raise this claim because she does not reside in or near the challenged district but resides and votes in Anchorage. The Governor further argues that a plaintiff in a reapportionment suit has no standing to assert the rights of voters in a district in which the plaintiff does not reside or vote. [9] Carpenter claims that her status as a registered voter of Alaska is sufficient to establish her standing to attack the reapportionment plan. She relies heavily on Article VI, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution which provides in part: Any qualified voter may apply to the superior court to compel the governor, by mandamus or otherwise, to perform his reapportionment duties or to correct any error in redistricting or reapportionment. (Emphasis added.) [10] Carpenter argues that this constitutional provision is a general grant of standing to any voter to contest the validity of a proposed reapportionment scheme, without being required to allege any personal injury. The Governor contends that the phrase any qualified voter was intended to establish a jurisdictional threshold, a first step, in addition to which one must establish standing in order to raise a reapportionment challenge. [11] We hold that Article VI, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution is dispositive of the standing issue, for it is clear that under the provisions of Article VI, section 11 [a]ny qualified voter is authorized to institute and maintain a reapportionment suit seeking to correct any error in redistricting or reapportionment. Nothing in the text of Article VI, section 11, or the relevant portions of the record of the constitutional convention, furnishes justification for a judicial construction departing from the section's unambiguous text. [12] Thus, Carpenter has standing to raise both the military exclusion and the Cordova inclusion issues. Additionally, and apart from Article VI, section 11, we hold Carpenter has standing to challenge the reapportionment plan under this court's decisions pertaining to standing. In Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 23-24 (Alaska 1976), we said in part: As previous decisions of this court indicate, the concept of standing has been interpreted broadly in Alaska, favoring increased accessibility to judicial forums. In Coghill v. Boucher, 511 P.2d 1297, 1303 (Alaska 1973), we noted that [i]n the past ... this court has departed from a restrictive interpretation of the standing requirement. Whether a party has standing to obtain judicial resolution of a controversy depends on whether the party has a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. In our recent decision of Wagstaff v. Superior Court, Family Division, 535 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska 1975), we described this requirement in terms of injury-in-fact, and explained that its purpose is to assure the adversity which is fundamental to judicial proceedings. (Footnote omitted.) In State v. Lewis, 559 P.2d 630 (Alaska 1977), appeal dismissed, 432 U.S. 901, 97 S.Ct. 2943, 53 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1977), citizens/taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of a three-way exchange of land between Alaska, the United States government, and a native regional corporation. Although the plaintiffs did not establish any injury to their personal interests, we held that the plaintiffs' status as citizens constituted a sufficient personal stake in the controversy to guarantee the adversity which is fundamental to judicial proceedings. State v. Lewis, 559 P.2d at 635. In reaching this conclusion we stressed the following factors: that plaintiffs alleged the violation of two specific constitutional provisions; that the disputed transaction would have a significant impact on the state treasury; and that there was no one in a better position than plaintiffs to litigate the complaint. Id. at 635. In the instant case, Carpenter alleges that District 2 violates a specific constitutional limitation and that the disputed transaction (the drawing of election district lines) arguably will have a significant impact on the state. [13] Here the dispute over District 2 has been fully briefed, argued at trial and on appeal, and there is no one in a better position than Carpenter to litigate these issues. In our view, Carpenter also meets the standing criteria of Lewis.