Opinion ID: 1469394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conduct of the Proceedings in Staples' Absence

Text: When the presiding Justice was notified that the defendant had left the courthouse, he extended the recess another hour while the defendant's counsel attempted to locate the defendant. Then, after inquiring of the defendant's counsel as to the circumstances of the defendant's leaving the courthouse, the presiding Justice found that the defendant's absence was voluntary and, over counsel's objections, ordered that the trial continue. The defendant now urges us that due process entitled the defendant to notice and hearing on the issue of the voluntariness of his departure. There can be no doubt that the governmental prerogative to proceed with a trial may not be defeated by conduct of the accused that prevents the trial from going forward. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 349, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1063, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 362 (1970). Although only a voluntary absence can justify the trial continuing in a defendant's absence, it is obvious that if a departed defendant has to be found and notified of an opportunity to be heard on the voluntariness of his absence before the trial can continue, an escaping defendant could force the court to declare a mistrial or keep the jury waiting until the defendant could be found and returned. It would seem clear that the public interest in the orderly determination of criminal charges would be frustrated by long suspension of trials while authorities attempted to find and return defendants to the courtrooms. Equally unacceptable would be the maintenance of custody over all defendants for the duration of trials in order to prevent such absences. We are certain that due processjudicial fair play is observed in such a situation when a Justice (1) makes sufficient inquiry into the circumstances of a defendant's disappearance to justify a finding whether the absence was voluntary, (2) makes a preliminary finding of voluntariness (when justified), and (3) affords the defendant an adequate opportunity to explain his absence when he is returned to custody and before sentence is imposed. (Of course, if the Justice was then satisfied that the defendant's absence was not voluntary, he would order a new trial.) We are satisfied that each of these requirements was met here.