Opinion ID: 2600070
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Off-the-record proceedings

Text: After trial ended and the parties had reviewed the trial transcripts, defendant's appellate counsel asked the trial court for permission to prepare a settled statement on oral trial proceedings the court reporter did not record. (See Cal. Rules of Court, former rules 4(e), 7, 36, now rules 8.137, 8.346.) The written request referenced 83 unreported matters. Following both formal and informal discussions by the parties and a court hearing, the trial court ordered inclusion in the record of 27 settled statements. Regarding the unreported proceedings that could not be settled, defendant's appellate counsel and respondent's counsel stipulated that, as to some, the parties had no independent recollection, and as to the others, the request for a settled statement had been denied or withdrawn. Citing the items that are not part of the record as settled statements and other unreported discussions, defendant now claims the trial court violated section 190.9 by holding numerous pretrial and trial proceedings without a court reporter present. In relevant part, section 190.9 provides: In any case in which a death sentence may be imposed, all proceedings conducted in the superior court, including all conferences and proceedings, whether in open court, in conference in the courtroom, or in chambers, shall be conducted on the record with a court reporter present. (§ 190.9, subd. (a)(1).) Although, as defendant argues, the trial court apparently failed to comply with section 190.9, the error is not reversible because defendant has failed to carry his `burden of demonstrating that the appellate record is not adequate to permit meaningful appellate review.' ( People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 509.) As to most of the cited instances of unreported proceedings, which include matters such as discussion in chambers scheduling meetings, and sidebar conferences during witness testimony, defendant makes no effort to establish prejudice or even to place the unreported exchanges in context. ( People v. Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1281.) Although defendant suggests the trial court's practice of discussing jury instructions off the record raises red flags, he acknowledges the trial court recited for the record the parties' instructional objections. And although he contends the trial court's summary of the parties' arguments was truncated and incomplete, he fails to explain how the unreported discussions prevent us from conducting an adequate review of the jury instructions the trial court gave or refused. ( People v. Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 110-112.) Nor does defendant describe how he was prejudiced by the trial court's off-the-record discussions with counsel regarding four questions the first jury posed during its penalty phase deliberations. As above, the trial court summarized the unreported conference on the record, including the parties' various objections and its rulings, and nothing in the record suggests counsel disagreed with the trial court's summation. Defendant fails to demonstrate any way in which the unreported discussion hampers appellate review. ( People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 800, fn. 16 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 78, 209 P.3d 1].) Indeed, given that the first jury deadlocked on penalty, it is unclear how defendant could show the off-the-record discussion prejudiced him. Defendant properly concedes he cannot demonstrate he suffered prejudice as a result of the trial court's failure to comply with section 190.9. But he urges us to reconsider the rule that places on him the burden of showing prejudice, and to declare instead that a trial court's violation of section 190.9 is reversible per se. We declined a similar invitation in People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at page 860, and do so again here. (35) We also reject defendant's assertion that the trial court's failure to conduct all proceedings in the presence of a court reporter violated his rights to due process and fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment. The due process clause requires the state to furnish an indigent defendant with a record sufficient to permit an adequate and effective appellate review. [Citations.] ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 857.) Where, as here, the procedures for using settled statements are used to fill in the gaps and the resulting record is adequate to permit meaningful appellate review ( People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1165 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315]), there is no due process violation ( People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 661-663 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640]; People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 66-67 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118]). Nor, contrary to defendant's assertion, did the violation of section 190.9 deprive defendant of his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable death penalty determination. ( People v. Rogers, supra, at pp. 857-858.) Finally, we reject defendant's remaining argument that the violation of section 190.9 constituted a deprivation of a state-created liberty interest under Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343 [65 L.Ed.2d 175, 100 S.Ct. 2227]. Defendant cites no case, and we are aware of none, that suggests a capital defendant has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the presence of a court reporter at every oral exchange that occurs during the pendency of his case. ( Engle v. Isaac (1982) 456 U.S. 107, 121, fn. 21 [71 L.Ed.2d 783, 102 S.Ct. 1558] [mere error of state law is not a denial of due process].) Hicks is not implicated here.