Opinion ID: 1922439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Trash Bag

Text: (a) Choice of Law The defendant also asserts that the trial justice improperly applied Rhode Island law in determining the admissibility of the evidentiary contents of the trash bag. He asserts that New Hampshire has a greater interest than Rhode Island in the application of its law to this issue. He contends that under New Hampshire law, he has automatic standing to challenge the seizure, [8] and that New Hampshire law provides him with greater protections while placing a heavier burden of proof on the actions of the state. He then asserts that the New Hampshire case of State v. Westover, 666 A.2d 1344 (N.H. 1995) controls the outcome of this case. [9] In resolving conflict-of-laws issues, this jurisdiction has adopted the `interest-weighing approach' and employs five guidelines in making such determinations. Victoria v. Smythe, 703 A.2d 619, 620 (R.I.1997) (per curiam). Those guidelines are: (1) [p]redictability of results[,] (2)[m]aintenance of interstate and international order[,] (3)[s]implification of the judicial task[,] (4) advance of the forum's governmental interest[, and] (5)[a]pplication of the better rule of law. Id. at 620-21 (quoting Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 300, 243 A.2d 917, 923 (1968)). At the suppression hearing, the trial justice conducted an interest-weighing analysis to determine which jurisdiction's law applied to the defendant's motion to suppress the contents of the trash bag. In concluding that Rhode Island law was applicable, the trial justice adopted the findings that he had made earlier when ruling on the defendant's motion to suppress the statements the defendant made to the state police detectives. There he found: one, that the place of the injury, that is to say, the murder of Patricia Jacques, took place in Rhode Island and was allegedly committed by this defendant; two, that Mrs. Jacques was a resident of the State of Rhode Island, residing in Tiverton; three, that the trial of this case will be held within the jurisdiction of Rhode Island; four, that Chester Briggs, the defendant, had at least a friendly relationship with the victim, Patricia Jacques, in the State of Rhode Island; five, that the State of Rhode Island has an interest in apprehending those who commit crimes within its borders and prosecuting those accused according to its laws; six, that many of the State's witnesses, such as police, medical examiner and various others either reside or are employed, or at the least were here when this homicide took place. It is clear to us that the trial justice carefully analyzed the record evidence before him in finding that Rhode Island had the most significant interest in the outcome of this case. In viewing this analysis in light of the guidelines employed in Victoria, we conclude that the trial justice did not err when he applied Rhode Island law in ruling upon the constitutional validity of the police seizure of the trash bag. (b) Suppression of the Trash Bag The record reveals what we conclude to be the relevant facts concerning the trial justice's decision on the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence found in the trash bag. The defendant owned at least four residential properties in New Hampshire: his home in Chichester, the neighboring house where Courtemanche lived, and two properties in Pittsfield, a town located about fifteen miles from Chichester. One of the Pittsfield properties was a multidwelling tenement that had a communal dumpster in its parking lot. The defendant rented the dumpster from a private company for use by his tenants. At least two other people, namely, the defendant and Courtemanche, also used the communal dumpster. They did so because the Town of Chichester did not have a municipal garbage pickup service and they had to make arrangements for the disposal of their own trash. [10] The defendant and Courtemanche both placed their trash in a communal trash can in the defendant's barn in Chichester. They mutually agreed that whenever one of them would travel to Pittsfield, that person would dispose of all their accumulated trash into the communal dumpster at the multidwelling tenement. Such accumulated trash included any overflow trash that the defendant may have placed in the bed of his pickup truck. The defendant permitted Courtemanche to use his pickup truck when he was not using it, and facilitated this use by leaving the keys to the pickup truck either in the ignition or in the ashtray. Courtemanche used the defendant's truck to run errands and to dispose of trash into the defendant's dumpster. On February 21, 1997, Courtemanche took the defendant's pickup truck to Pittsfield to run some errands. After discovering a trash bag in the bed of the pickup truck, Courtemanche drove to the defendant's tenement property and threw the bag into the communal dumpster. The police, who had been following Courtemanche, then seized the trash bag from the dumpster. The defendant, in seeking to suppress the admission of the trash bag and its contents, asserted that the police seized the evidence in violation of his Fourth Amendment protections. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial justice granted that motion. The state appeals. The state contends that the trial justice erred in suppressing the trash bag evidence. It asserts that because the defendant had abandoned the trash bag property, he retained no standing to challenge its taking and search by the police. In addition, the state avers that when the defendant left the trash bag contents out for disposal, he gave up any and all reasonable expectation of privacy in the trash bag or its contents. Many persons had ready access to the dumpster, and Courtemanche, as well as the defendant's other tenants, had ready access to the trash bag and its contents in an open and unlocked dumpster some fifteen miles from where the trash originated and had been discarded. Upon review of a trial justice's decision on a motion to suppress, deference is given to the findings of the trial justice, and those findings shall not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Ortiz, 609 A.2d 921, 925 (R.I.1992) (citing In re Kean, 520 A.2d 1271, 1276 (R.I.1987); In re John, 463 A.2d 174, 176 (R.I.1983)). We have stated previously that: The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that the challenged seizure violated his own Fourth Amendment rights.    It is not enough for a defendant seeking to suppress evidence to show that a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, rather some personal infringement must be established.    To determine whether a defendant should be allowed to assert infringement of his Fourth Amendment rights, we examine whether the individual had a legitimate expectation that those rights would be safeguarded. State v. Wright, 558 A.2d 946, 948 (R.I.1989). In Rhode Island, we employ a two-step process to determine from the record `whether a legitimate expectation of privacy sufficient to invoke Fourth Amendment protection exists.' State v. Jimenez, 729 A.2d 693, 696 (R.I.1999) (per curiam) (quoting Wright, 558 A.2d at 948). First we determine whether the defendant `exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy' and if that expectation is established, then we consider `whether, viewed objectively,' the defendant's expectation was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. (quoting Wright, 558 A.2d at 948-49). Usually, the second part of the test, i.e., whether the asserted expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable, is the most disputed. Commonwealth v. Krisco Corp., 653 N.E.2d 579, 582 (1995). This element is highly dependent on the particular facts involved and is determined by examining the circumstances of the case in light of several factors. Id. The relevant factors that are considered include: possession or ownership of the area searched or property seized, prior use of the area searched or property seized, the ability to control or exclude others' use of the property, and legitimate presence in the area searched. Wright, 558 A.2d at 949. This Court previously has not addressed the issue of a warrantless search and seizure of garbage; thus, we will look to other jurisdictions for guidance. Whether a warrantless search and seizure of garbage is constitutionally reasonable depends on whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the garbage. State v. Yakes, 226 Wis.2d 425, 595 N.W.2d 108, 110 (1999) (citing Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed 2d 30 (1988)). In garbage cases, Fourth Amendment reasonableness turns on public accessibility to the trash. United States v. Long, 176 F.3d 1304, 1308 (10th Cir.), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 283, 145 L.Ed.2d 237 (1999) (citing Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41, 108 S.Ct. at 1629, 100 L.Ed.2d at 37). [W]hether the Fourth Amendment's protections are invoked to protect the sanctity of the home or of commercial property, the touchstone of the inquiry into the objective reasonableness of an expectation of privacy is whether the governmental intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values the Fourth Amendment protects. United States v. Hall, 47 F.3d 1091, 1094 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 516 U.S. 816, 116 S.Ct. 71, 133 L.Ed. 31 (1995) (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 1743-44, 80 L.Ed. 2d 214, 227 (1984)). See also Yakes, 595 N.W.2d at 110 (stating that [w]hile both residential and commercial property are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment    the factors probative of an objectively reasonable privacy expectation differ depending on the nature of the property). The fact that the test of the legitimacy of an expectation is the same in both the residential and commercial sphere does not mean, however, that the factors which tend to be of probative value in resolving the inquiry when the governmental intrusion involves a residence, are to be accorded the same weight when the inquiry is directed at the legitimacy of a privacy expectation in commercial property. Hall, 47 F.3d at 1095. In order for persons to preserve Fourth Amendment protection in the area immediately surrounding [their] residence, they must not conduct an activity or leave an object in the plain view of those outside the area. Id. (citing United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 316, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 1147, 94 L.Ed. 2d 326, 344-45 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). The occupant of a commercial building, in contrast, must take the additional precaution of affirmatively barring the public from the area. Hall, 47 F.3d at 1095. See also Yakes, 595 N.W.2d at 111 (concluding that `the owner of commercial property has a reasonable expectation of privacy in those areas immediately surrounding the property only if affirmative steps have been taken to exclude the public.') (Emphasis added.) In the commercial context, the failure to exclude the public takes on increased significance when the asserted expectation of privacy is in discarded garbage. Hall, 47 F.3d at 1096. The reason for this is because [s]ociety does not recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in `trash left for collection in an area accessible to the public.' Long, 176 F.3d at 1308. An instructive case in the context of the search and seizure of residential garbage is United States v. Redmon, 138 F.3d 1109 (7th Cir.1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1066, 119 S.Ct. 794, 142 L.Ed.2d 657 (1999). There, the defendant lived in a townhouse with an attached garage, and he shared a common driveway with his neighbor. A municipal ordinance prohibited residents from placing garbage on the curbside for collection, so the defendant customarily placed his garbage cans outside his garage on the common driveway. Finding that the defendant did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his garbage cans, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that: [t]he paths to the front doors passing near the garbage cans without any obstruction were open to use by friends and guests of himself and his neighbors, as well as solicitors, strangers, postal people, and a myriad of others including animals, and even snoops   . Redmon, 138 F.3d at 1114. In the present case, the trial justice relied upon People v. Edwards, 71 Cal.2d 1096. 80 Cal.Rptr. 633, 458 P.2d 713 (1969), to find that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the seized trash bag. That reliance was misplaced. Assuming, without deciding, that the defendant even had standing to challenge the search and seizure of the trash bag in the first instance, we conclude that he did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents. In Edwards, the police searched a trash can that was located only a few feet from the back door of the defendant's home. Edwards, 80 Cal.Rptr. 633, 458 P.2d at 718. The contents of the trash can were not visible without `rummaging' in the receptacle. Id. The defendants were the sole residents of the property. Id. After reviewing these particular facts and circumstances, the California Supreme Court concluded that the defendants exhibited an expectation of privacy that was reasonable. Id. Edwards is readily distinguishable from the present case. In this case, the trash bag was thrown into a communal dumpster in the parking lot of a multidwelling tenement about fifteen miles from the defendant's residence. The defendant had a specific arrangement with Courtemanche concerning the disposal of each other's trash. The defendant specifically knew that if he placed trash in the bed of his pickup truck, Courtemanche, in accordance with their agreement, probably would throw the trash into the unlocked and open communal dumpster in Pittsfield, where it would be available to anyone curious enough to look into the dumpster and to take the bag for whatever reason they might have for doing so. Nevertheless, notwithstanding this knowledge, the defendant, placed the contested trash bag into the bed of his pickup truck. In doing so, he effectively abandoned his subjective expectation of privacy, and any expectation of privacy that later he asserted was objectively unreasonable. [11] Even if the defendant had retained a subjective expectation of privacy while the trash bag remained in the bed of the pickup truck, that expectation became unreasonable after Courtemanche threw it into the communal dumpster. [12] The record indicates that defendant was the absentee landlord of the multidwelling property in Pittsfield, where the dumpster was located. Assuming that this does not require him to take the additional precaution of affirmatively barring the public from the area in order to preserve his Fourth Amendment protection, Hall, 47 F.3d at 1095, the fact that so many people had access to the dumpster dissipates any expectation of privacy that he may have had before the trash bag was dumped. Such people included the tenants in the property, as well as the tenants' guests, solicitors, strangers, postal people, animals; indeed, on at least three occasions, even the police had access to the property. [13] See Redmon, 138 F.3d at 1114; see also Long, 176 F.3d at 1308. In addition, the private company that collected the trash also had access to the communal dumpster. Consequently, we conclude that the defendant had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the disputed and disposed of trash bag, and that the trial justice erred in suppressing its contents. For all the foregoing reasons, the state's appeal is sustained in part and denied in part. Its appeal from the trial justice's order as it concerns suppression of that portion of the defendant's February 21-22, 1997, statement given while at the New Hampshire State Police Headquarters, beginning with questions and answers Nos. 1 through 1260, is sustained. Its appeal from the trial justice's order as it concerns suppression of all questions and answers noted after question 1260 contained in the defendant's statement is denied. The state's appeal from the trial justice's order suppressing admission of the trash bag and its contents is sustained. The defendant's appeal from the trial justice's order denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to the Rhode Island State Police at his home at 111 Kaime Road in Chichester, New Hampshire, on February 21, 1997, and his request that all of his motions to suppress be decided in accordance with applicable New Hampshire law are denied. The papers in this case are remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.