Opinion ID: 664075
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: RICO Points

Text: 77 Blain, Faulkner and Toler were convicted of conspiring to violate the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(d), as alleged in Count 88 of the indictment. They raise several challenges to their RICO conviction and the forfeiture ordered under the statute. The indictment charged conspiracy to violate Sec. 1962(c). 78 Faulkner and Toler argue that when a defendant is charged with conspiracy to violate RICO, the government must prove that the defendant agreed to personally commit or personally aid or abet at least two predicate offenses, or actually commit two predicate acts. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1039 (5th Cir.1981) (finding that defendant could be convicted of conspiring to violate RICO so long as he committed or agreed to commit and least two separate crimes in furtherance of the conspiracy's single objective), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S.Ct. 2965, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354 (1982). Appellants claim that under this standard there is insufficient evidence to sustain the RICO convictions, and that the jury was erroneously instructed that the government may establish a defendant's membership in the conspiracy by proof that he agreed that another would violate Sec. 1962(c) by committing two acts of racketeering. The government argues that this circuit has not squarely addressed this issue, and that the majority of circuits require only that a defendant agree with other conspirators that two predicate acts will be committed pursuant to the conspiracy. E.g. United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 494-500 & n. 3 (7th Cir.) (rejecting requirement that defendant agrees personally to commit two predicate acts, and concluding that the Fifth Circuit has not definitively resolved this issue.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939, 107 S.Ct. 421, 93 L.Ed.2d 371 (1986). We need not resolve this issue. The jury verdict form asked whether Blain, Toler and Faulkner were guilty under Count 88, and then inquired as to which racketeering acts each defendant committed or agreed to commit. The jury checked off numerous racketeering acts as to each defendant. It specifically found that each of the three had committed or agreed to commit wire fraud under Counts 37, 65 and 66. 38 As addressed above, we find sufficient evidence that each violated the wire fraud statute under these counts. 79 Faulkner and Toler also claim insufficient evidence to support the RICO forfeiture verdict under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1963(a)(1), which provides for forfeiture to the government of any interest [defendant] has acquired or maintained in violation of Section 1962. Faulkner and Toler were assessed $40 million and $38 million penalties, respectively. These figures were based on amounts received by Faulkner and Toler, their companies and family members. They do not demonstrate any computational errors in these figures, 39 but they argue that they should not be forced to forfeit amounts that went to their families and companies. We find sufficient evidence that they acquired or maintained the amount forfeited. The evidence showed that they had control over the disbursement of the proceeds of the land transactions, and directed the disbursements from a land sale after it was deposited in an account of their choosing. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21, 104 S.Ct. 296, 299-300, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) (It undoubtedly was because Congress did not wish the forfeiture provision of Sec. 1963(a) to be limited by rigid and technical definitions drawn from other areas of the law that it selected the broad term 'interest' to describe the things that are subject to forfeiture under the statute. Congress selected this general term apparently because it was fully consistent with the pattern of the RICO statute in utilizing terms and concepts of breadth.); Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 495 (noting that RICO must be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes); United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A., 795 F.Supp. 477, 480 (D.D.C.1992) (In light of the deliberately broad language of Sec. 1963 and the ambitious purpose of RICO, interpretation of the term 'interest' to include the assets of a racketeering corporation's alter ego clearly is warranted.). 80 Appellants also argue that the evidence is insufficient to show that the proceeds would not have been acquired but for the defendant's racketeering activity. United States v. Ofchinick, 883 F.2d 1172, 1183 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1034, 110 S.Ct. 753, 107 L.Ed.2d 769 (1990) and other cases impose such a but for test. However, we do not agree with appellants' suggestion that the amounts subject to forfeiture must be directly linked or traced to the specific racketeering acts proved. For example, we do not agree with Faulkner that the brokered deposits made the basis of one racketeering act found by the jury must be tied to a particular loan. We agree with the government that the forfeiture should reflect the scope of the offense. The RICO offense here is not merely the commission of particular predicate acts, but a conspiracy to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of an enterprise. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(c). See United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 902 (5th Cir.) ([T]he object of RICO conspiracy is to violate a substantive RICO conviction--here, to conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity--and not merely to commit each of the predicate crimes necessary to demonstrate a pattern of racketeering activity.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953, 99 S.Ct. 349, 58 L.Ed.2d 344 (1978). We conclude that sufficient evidence was offered as to the profits earned by appellants from the overall RICO conspiracy. 40 81 Appellants also complain that the court improperly instructed the jury that a violator of RICO shall, as part of the penalty, forfeit any interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of Section 1962. They claim that the instruction should not have been written in mandatory language, and instead should have told the jury that it may direct a forfeiture. They cite United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1348 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005, 104 S.Ct. 996, 79 L.Ed.2d 229 (1984), where we stated that a proper jury instruction should include language that suggests that a jury may find an interest or contractual right forfeitable.... There the court was addressing whether there must be a nexus between the defendant's conduct and the property claimed. The case cannot be read to suggest that forfeiture is a matter left to the jury's discretion once the elements of forfeiture are established. Here the instruction properly followed the statute, which provides that whoever violates section 1962 ... shall ... forfeit ... any interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962.... 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1963(a) (emphasis added).