Opinion ID: 2736929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fails to provide guidance

Text: In the 15 years since Bone-Club, our courts have vacated dozens of convictions in cases where no Bone-Club analysis was performed. 4 In the wake of these 4 See, e.g., In re Pers. Restraint of D'AIIesandro, 178 Wn. App. 457, 314 P.3d 744 (2013); State v. Jones, 175 Wn. App. 87, 303 P.3d 1084 (2013); Morris, 176 Wn.2d 157; Wise, 176 Wn.2d 1; State v. Paumier, 176 Wn.2d 29, 288 P.3d 1126 (2012); Strode, 167 Wn.2d 222; Easterling, 157 Wn.2d 167; Brightman, 155 Wn.2d at 506; Orange, 152 Wn.2d 795; State v. Hummel, 165 Wn. App. 749, 266 P.3d 269 (2012); State v. Njonge, 161 Wn. App. 568, 255 P.3d 753 (2011 ), review granted in part, 176 Wn.2d 1031 (2013); State v. Tinh Trinh Lam, 161 8 No. 85809-8 (Wiggins, J., concurring in result) reversals, Washington judges and practitioners seek guidance. Unfortunately, we have offered them a test that provides little clarity, as evidenced by the persistent uncertainty around whether the public trial right attaches to a particular proceeding. In 2012, this court reviewed a number of public trial cases in which jurors had been questioned individually in chambers. Wise, 176 Wn.2d 1; State v. Paumier, 176 Wn.2d 29, 288 P.3d 1126 (2012). We concluded that a defendant's right to a public trial applies to the jury selection process. Wise, 176 Wn.2d at 11-13; Paumier, 176 Wn.2d at 34-35. But, when confronted with an arguably analogous case, we came to a different conclusion. The lead opinion in Slert finds that the public trial right does not attach to pre-voir-dire in-chamber discussions about jurors' answers to questionnaires designed to evaluate the jurors' fitness to serve. State v. Slert, No. 87844-7, slip op. at 8 (Wash. Sept. 25, 2014). The Slert dissent, however, points out that several jurors were dismissed for cause after filling out the questionnaire, indicating that this was voir dire and not a precursor to voir dire. S/ert, slip op. at 1 (dissent) (emphasis added). Arguably, the logic and experience test should have been easily applied to S/ert under our past precedent. Like Wise and Paumier, S/ert involved erroneous closure of a portion of the jury selection process-specifically, inchambers discussions that resulted in jurors being excused for cause based on their answers to questions. Cf. Wise, 176 Wn.2d 1; Paumier, 176 Wn.2d 29. Wn. App. 299, 254 P.3d 891 (2011 ), review granted, 176 Wn.2d 1031 (2013); State v. Leyerle, 158 Wn. App. 474, 242 P.3d 921 (2010); State v. Bowen, 157 Wn. App. 821, 239 P.3d 1114 (2010); State v. Waldon, 148 Wn. App. 952, 202 P.3d 325 (2009); State v. Sadler, 147 Wn. App. 97, 193 P.3d 1108 (2008); State v. Erickson, 146 Wn. App. 200, 189 P.3d 245 (2008); State v. Duckett, 141 Wn. App. 797, 173 P.3d 948 (2007); State v. Frawley, 140 Wn. App. 713, 167 P.3d 593 (2007), review granted, 176 Wn.2d 1030 (2013). 9 No. 85809-8 (Wiggins, J., concurring in result) If experience teaches us anything, it is that there is no clear, meaningful way to define trial procedures, such as the jury selection process, thus rendering even easy cases difficult. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 174 Wn. App. 328, 298 P.3d 148 (2013) (right does not attach to excusal of jurors for illness related reasons because this is pretrial juror excusal, not voir dire). But see State v. Jones, 175 Wn. App. 87, 303 P.3d 1084 (2013) (public trial right attached to court recess during which the court clerk randomly selected four alternate jurors); State v. Tinh Trinh Lam, 161 Wn. App. 299, 254 P.3d 891 (2011) (public trial right attached to questioning of sworn-in juror because process was procedurally similar to and conducted for the same purpose as voir dire), review granted, 176 Wn.2d 1031 (2013). Indeed, in another recent case involving jury selection, the court held that the public trial right did not attach to parties' use of peremptory and for-cause challenges at a sidebar conference. State v. Love, 176 Wn. App 911, 918, 309 P.3d 1209 (2013). The court distinguished voir dire-the questioning of juries-from the exercise of peremptory and for-cause challenges and reasoned that, historically, challenges are not made in public. 5 /d. The court also held under the logic prong that exercising challenges to excuse jurors in open court did not further the goals of the public trial right. /d. These cases demonstrate that it remains near impossible to predict whether the public trial right attaches, even when proceedings are closely analogous to our prior case law. 5 Instead of characterizing the closure as a sidebar closure, the court focused on the substantive actions taken at the sidebar-i.e., the exercise of challenges to excuse jurors. Love, 176 Wn. App. at 918. 10 No. 85809-8 (Wiggins, J., concurring in result) Applying the logic and experience test to new situations has proved equally difficult. The majority and dissenting opinions in the current case demonstrate the difficulties associated with identifying what constitutes experience and logic under the test. Both opinions apply the test to arrive at different conclusions. The majority reasons that under the experience prong, sidebars have historically and necessarily included counsel but excluded the public and the defendant. Majority at 7. Moreover, sidebars deal with mundane issues implicating little public interest. /d. at 9. Under the logic prong, neither the defendant nor the public has a right to be present during in-chambers or bench conferences because they add nothing to the discussion. /d. at 11-12. Thus, the majority holds that sidebars do not implicate the public trial right. The dissent reaches the opposite conclusion, reasoning that under the experience prong, the sidebars here involved discussion of important evidentiary issues, and many judges discuss evidentiary matters in open court. Dissent at 5. The dissent argues that logic dictates that whether a key piece of evidence is admitted or not can determine the outcome of a case. !d. at 8. Accordingly, the dissent concludes that it is important to make this process open to the public. !d. If the same judges who adopted the logic and experience test cannot apply it consistently in a simple case, the test is unworkable and harmful; we should overrule our prior case law. Our decisions in these cases provide few answers and raise more questions. In this case, neither a party nor a member of the public objected to the sidebar process. But what will we do when, in a high profile criminal prosecution, a news media reporter asks to be included in the sidebar? We are deciding here that sidebars are not subject to the public trial right; presumably the reporter's request will be denied. 11 No. 85809-8 (Wiggins, J., concurring in result) Or what if, as unlikely as it seems, the trial judge makes biased or improper statements during the sidebar, knowing that the sidebar is not public? Or what if sidebars result in consistently one-sided rulings, and a courtroom observer asks that all further sidebars be made public? What if there is absolutely no record of what was discussed at sidebar? The logic and experience test is harmful because it adds to the confusion rather than providing clear guidance to trial and appellate judges. A recent law review article remarks that trial judges have become increasingly reluctant to conduct any type of in-chambers or sidebar conference in light of the unsettled state of the law. Anne L. Ellington & Jeanine Blackett Lutzenhiser, In Washington State, Open Courts Jurisprudence Consists Mainly of Open Questions, 88 WASH. L. REV. 491, 519 n.194 (2013) (citing Interview with the Hon. Susan Craighead, King County Superior Court, in Seattle, Wash. (Dec. 1, 2011 ); Interview with the Hon. Anne Ellington, Washington State Court of Appeals, in Seattle, Wash. (Dec. 29, 2011 )). We should not so disempower our trial judges. Because these issues may arise in every criminal case, we should provide further guidance to avoid the wasted resources inherent in retrials.