Opinion ID: 2220719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: western i

Text: In its answer to Western's petition, the City set forth a counterclaim in which it asked the court to set aside the judgment in the foreclosure action which is the subject of Western I. The City alleged that although Keeley, Western's president, testified that he was never asked to sign, nor did he sign, any plat or dedication on behalf of Western other than the plat signed on August 31, 1977, he did, in fact, sign on September 29, 1977, a document entitled Restrictive Covenants, which was a dedication of street and utility easements upon which the City relied. The City argues that this nondisclosure was material to the decision in Western I and that, therefore, that judgment should be set aside. The document to which the City refers provides that anyone taking title or possession of property within Homestead First Addition waives any claim against Western or BRG arising out of construction, maintenance, repair, renewal, replacement, or operation of utility easements. It was signed by Keeley before the mortgage was executed, was offered into evidence in the foreclosure action, and presumably was considered by the court. Thus, according to Western, the issue of its lack of approval of the dedications is res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata is based on the principle that a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive upon the parties in any later litigation involving the same cause of action.... Res judicata is founded on a policy favoring termination of an action by preclusion or prevention of subsequent litigation on the same cause. NC + Hybrids v. Growers Seed Assn., 228 Neb. 306, 310-11, 422 N.W.2d 542, 545 (1988). In addition, `if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties ....' (Emphasis supplied.) Norlanco, Inc. v. County of Madison, 186 Neb. 100, 107, 181 N.W.2d 119, 123 (1970) (quoting 46 Am. Jur.2d Judgments § 422 (1969)). Of course, a court may modify or vacate a judgment pursuant to Neb.Rev. Stat. § 25-2001 (Reissue 1989) or its equitable powers. Although a court's authority to vacate or modify a judgment under § 25-2001 is not exclusive, Joyce v. Joyce, 229 Neb. 831, 429 N.W.2d 355 (1988); State ex rel. Birdine v. Fuller, 216 Neb. 86, 341 N.W.2d 613 (1983); and Emry v. American Honda Motor Co., 214 Neb. 435, 334 N.W.2d 786 (1983), a litigant seeking to proceed in equity must show that § 25-2001 is not applicable, because equitable relief does not lie where there is a remedy at law, State ex rel. Birdine v. Fuller, supra , and Emry v. American Honda Motor Co., supra . Section 25-2001(4) provides that a judgment may be modified or vacated if the judgment was the result of fraud practiced by the successful party in obtaining the judgment or order. The City contends that Keeley's testimony in the foreclosure action regarding his supposed ignorance of the improvements being made to the property was unbelievable and that our decision in Western I was the result of Keeley's false testimony. Because the grounds on which the City asserts Western I should be vacated fall within § 25-2001(4), and the City failed to file a petition to vacate the judgment as required by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-2002 (Reissue 1989), we do not have the power to vacate the judgment in Western I. The question of whether Keeley approved the dedications to the City was central to our decision in Western I. Therefore, under the doctrine of res judicata, we are bound by the factual findings in Western I, as discussed below.