Opinion ID: 1918099
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable Caselaw

Text: The Court previously has addressed the juxtaposition of appointment responsibility between the OPD and the State's trial courts in Thompson v. State, 284 Md. 113, 394 A.2d 1190 (1978). Accordingly, and indeed, Thompson and its progeny control the result of this case. In Thompson, the defendant had been convicted in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Montgomery County, of shoplifting and assault and battery. 284 Md. at 114, 394 A.2d at 1191. He appealed that conviction to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Although represented by the OPD in the District Court, he posted bond pending appeal and appeared without counsel in the Circuit Court. Id. at 116, 394 A.2d at 1191. The OPD determined that he did not qualify for the services of the OPD, id. at 118, 394 A.2d at 1192-93, and the trial court, having refused the invitation by the OPD to leave it up to the Court as to whether or not the Court wanted [it] to appoint a lawyer on his behalf, id. at 118, 394 A.2d at 1193, advised the defendant to get counsel and of the consequences of not doing so. Id. at 119, 394 A.2d at 1193. After some delay occasioned by the defendant's expressed intent, but unsuccessful attempt, to get private counsel, the case proceeded to trial and sentence with the defendant unrepresented. Id. at 121-122, 394 A.2d at 1194. Although there were three issues presented in Thompson, the dispositive one, namely, [d]id the trial court err in not fully complying with the mandate of Rule 723 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure by not properly advising ... Thompson of his rights and obligations as contained therein?, [7] id. at 114, 394 A.2d at 1191, related to the advice required by Rule 723 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure (1978) to be given to a defendant, by the court, upon his or her appearance in court not represented by counsel and before accepting or finding a waiver of counsel. Maryland Rule 723, AppearanceProvision for or Waiver of Counsel, [8] after requiring in § (a) that a defendant appear in court at the time and place specified in the summons or other writ when a charging document is filed against him or her, prescribed the inquiry requirements for several scenarios in which the defendant appeared without counsel: when the defendant appeared without counsel, § (b) [9] ; when the defendant appeared without counsel and indicated that he or she does not want representation, § (c), [10] and when the defendant appeared without counsel subsequent to his initial appearance, § (d). We concluded that the trial judge violated Rule 723 in three particulars, by failing to advis[e] Thompson pursuant to § (b), in not conducting the waiver inquiry required by § (c), and in not making a determination upon proper considerations whether Thompson was eligible to have it appoint counsel upon the refusal of the Public Defender to provide representation, id. at 130-31, 394 A.2d at 1199, either one of which constituted reversible error. Id. at 130, 394 A.2d at 1199. It is the latter that is of interest in this case. As to Rule 723(c), which implements the right to counsel, including appointed counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Thompson, 284 Md. at 122-23, 394 A.2d at 1194-95, The inquiry required to be made and the test to be met under § c before the court may accept a waiver of counsel applies not only to a defendant's appearance pursuant to § a but also to any proceeding at which he appears without counsel thereafter. In such event, the court is prohibited from proceeding before determining whether the defendant at that time desires to waive counsel or has waived counsel. § d 2. By § e, there must be a record of compliance with respect to §§ b, c and d. (footnotes omitted). Id. at 126, 394 A.2d at 1196, citing Maryland Rule 723 § (d)(2) (If the defendant appears in court without counsel, at any proceeding after his appearance pursuant to section a of this Rule, the court may not proceed before determining whether the defendant at that time desires to waive counsel, or has waived counsel, either affirmatively or by neglecting or refusing to obtain counsel.). Thus, compliance with § (c), the Court pointed out, was a prerequisite to proceeding, whenever the defendant appeared in court without counsel. One of the requirements of § (c) was subsection 4, which mandated that the court advise the defendant that, if he or she were found to be financially unable to retain private counsel, the Public Defender or the court would, if the defendant wishes, provide counsel to represent him [or her]. Pursuant to this requirement, both the court and the OPD have a responsibility to provide an indigent defendant with representation. This Court concluded, with regard to the OPD, that, were a defendant indigent, it was the duty of the Public Defender to provide legal representation for him [or her]. 284 Md. at 127, 394 A.2d at 1197. Informing that decision, it pointed out, are the questions whether the crime charged is a serious one, citing Article 27A, § 4(b)(2) [11] , whether the defendant is indigent as defined by Article 27A, § 2(f), [12] and whether he or she is otherwise eligible, applying the criteria of Article 27A, § 7(a) and (b). [13] The court's responsibility is similar, to determin[e] whether to appoint counsel under Code, art. 27A, § 6(f). [14] We observed, in that regard: there is the clear duty imposed on the court, in order to decide whether it should appoint counsel, upon the Public Defender declining to do so, to make its own independent determination whether a defendant is indigent and otherwise eligible to have counsel provided. It could not properly fulfill this duty without considering facts material and relevant to the issue. 284 Md. at 129, 394 A.2d at 1198. In Thompson, more than merely acknowledging that both the OPD and the courts have a responsibility to ensure that indigent defendants are afforded representation, this Court recognized, even if it did not state it expressly, that the responsibility was a separate responsibility, its discharge entrusted fully to the OPD and the court, as required, and that the responsibility, or its discharge, of one neither infringed nor superseded the responsibility or discharge of the other. So it was that the Court observed and instructed: The Public Defender wanted to leave it up to the court, making clear that if the court so ordered he would provide representation. The court refused to so order, properly we believe, on the ground that the question whether the Public Defender represented a particular defendant was for the Public Defender and not for the court. Id. at 128, 394 A.2d at 1197. That also was the message being conveyed by this Court's discussion of the trial court's approach to the defendant's right to representation [15] : The record before us does not show what investigation was made by the Office of the Public Defender and all that was considered by it with respect to Thompson's eligibility vel non. It seems, however, that the primary reason for declining to represent him was that a surety bond had been posted for him. As we have seen, the Public Defender raised this specter at the first hearing on 10 February 1978 when he mentioned the bond after stating that Thompson was `technically' eligible for the services of the Public Defender. Whereupon, Thompson flatly declared that the Public Defender had told him that `if I had somebody to post the money out on bond, I should get my own lawyer. That's what he told me.' The judge then presiding expressly did not dispute that the Public Defender had so stated. Assistant State's Attorney Dean represented to the court at the hearing on 19 April that `[t]he amount of the bond that [Thompson] made indicated to the Public Defender's Office that he wasn't really as indigent as expected, whereas he represented.' The judge originally in the case was completely content with the Public Defender's conclusion, whatever it may have been based upon, that Thompson was not entitled to have representation provided`you tell me he is not eligible and that is good enough for me.' This view governed the court's action in the face of an utter lack of the data contemplated by art. 27A, § 7, the absence of any expression by the Office of the Public Defender of the reasons why it declined to provide representation, and the fact that the Public Defender had represented Thompson in the District Court.... The judge made no attempt to determine whether the refusal of the Office of the Public Defender to provide representation was despite Thompson's eligibility to have counsel provided. Neither judge thereafter involved in the case took any steps to determine whether Thompson was in fact an indigent person entitled to representation. The court was obligated to make that determination in the circumstances. As we have indicated, if Thompson were indigent and otherwise entitled to assistance of counsel, the law, implemented by statute and our rules of procedure, required the court to appoint an attorney when the Office of the Public Defender declined to provide counsel. The failure of the court to determine whether Thompson was eligible to have counsel provided was reversible error. (footnotes omitted). 284 Md. at 129-30, 394 A.2d at 1198-99. The message was received. [16] See Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 114 n. 16, 532 A.2d 1066, 1080 n. 16 (1987); Howell v. State, 293 Md. 232, 242, 443 A.2d 103, 108 (1982); Davis v. State, 100 Md.App. 369, 380-81, 641 A.2d 941, 947 (1994); Baldwin v. State, 51 Md.App. 538, 552-553, 444 A.2d 1058, 1067-68 (1982). See also Miller v. Smith, Attorney General of State, 115 F.3d 1136, 1142 (4th Cir.1997). In Baldwin, Judge Alan Wilner, for the Court of Special Appeals, explicating Thompson, stated expressly: In Thompson v. State, 284 Md. 113, 394 A.2d 1190 (1978), the Court of Appeals seemed to hold that if the Public Defender declines to represent a defendanteven on grounds of non-eligibility (as opposed to a potential conflict of interest)the court has no authority to order him to provide representation. Upon that premise, the question before us is not whether the Public Defender erred in declining representation but whether the court was derelict in discharging its own responsibility to assure compliance with appellant's Constitutional right of counsel, in accordance with its authority under § 6(f) of art. 27A. 51 Md.App. at 552-553, 444 A.2d at 1067. The intermediate appellate court stated the reasoning underlying that statement: noting the Thompson Court's approval of the rejection by the trial court of the OPD's invitation to the court to order it to provide representation and the basis for that approval, it concluded, by logical extension, that, although the court may appoint any other qualified counsel to represent an indigent defendant, it may not appoint the Public Defender against his wish. Id. at 553 n. 11, 444 A.2d at 1067 n. 11. In Davis, the Court of Special Appeals again opined: In Maryland, there are two options available to defendants in criminal cases who are financially unable to retain their own counsel. The first option is representation by the Public Defender's Office as authorized by Maryland Annotated Code, Article 27A, § 4 (1993 Repl. Vol.). If the Public Defender's Office determines it is unable to represent a defendant due to his or her income, the court must conduct its own inquiry as to whether the defendant qualifies for a court-appointed counsel. Md.Code Ann. Art. 27A, § 6(f) (1993 Repl. Vol.); Baldwin v. State, 51 Md.App. 538, 553, 444 A.2d 1058 (1982). cert. denied, 299 Md. 425, 474 A.2d 218 (1984). The necessity for this independent court evaluation stems from the judiciary's role as the `ultimate protector' of the rights awarded under the Constitution, including the right to counsel. Baldwin, 51 Md.App. at 552, 444 A.2d 1058. 100 Md.App. at 380-81, 641 A.2d at 947. The majority does not agree that the appointment responsibilities of the court and the OPD are separate and distinct and that the court does not review the OPD's determination of ineligibility. Indeed, characterizing this Court's statement in Thompson as dicta, but without clearly saying why, it expressly holds that the trial court's responsibility extends to inquiring into the correctness of the OPD's indigency, and thus representation, decision: the OPD and the Dissent rely heavily on the above quoted language, [17] and other dicta in Thompson and Baldwin, ... to support their contentions that, where the OPD declines representation, a reviewing court is powerless to correct a manifest error in the local OPD's determination of eligibility by appointing the local OPD as counsel for the indigent defendant.... Such dicta is wholly unpersuasive, particularly in light of the statutory scheme designed by the General Assembly to govern the respective responsibilities of the OPD and the courts in determining whether a criminal defendant qualifies as indigent and whether such individual is entitled to representation paid for by the taxpayers. (footnotes omitted). OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 430-31, 993 A.2d at 67. I disagree with the majority. Before explaining why the majority is wrong, however, it is necessary to address its assertion that statements in Thompson and Baldwin indicating that the appointment responsibilities of the court and the OPD are separate and distinct and that the court may not appoint the OPD are dicta. Distinguishing between what is dicta and what is the court's holding can be challenging. Without understanding what dicta is, it is not possible to know or appreciate the difference. This Court considered the meaning of dicta in Carstairs v. Cochran, 95 Md. 488, 52 A. 601 (1902). There, concerned with whether the Court's discussion in Monticello Distilling Co. v. Baltimore City, 90 Md. 416, 45 A. 210 (1900), interpreting the Act of 1892, was dicta or holding, the Court rejected the argument that Monticello was decided on one sole ground and that the expression of opinion upon any other point was not involved in the decisive objection on which the judgment was reversed, and was therefore `obiter dictum,'  Carstairs, 95 Md. at 499, 52 A. at 601, explaining: We cannot agree that the expression of opinion referred to was an obiter dictum. ... It may be difficult to frame a concise definition of an obiter dictum applicable to every such expression of opinion, and some Courts incline to the rule that the most deliberate expression of opinion, upon a question distinctly raised in the record, and fully argued by counsel, may nevertheless be regarded as a dictum, unless essential to the actual disposition made of the case. But as Bouvier well says: `It is difficult to see why, in a philosophic point of view, the opinion of the Court is not as persuasive on all the points which were so involved in the cause that it was the duty of counsel to argue them, and which were deliberately passed on by the Court, as if the decision had hung upon but one point;' and in Maryland the rule is in accord with this view. In Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471 [1854], it is said: `All that is necessary in Maryland to render the decision of the Court of Appeals authoritative on any point decided, is to show that there was an application of the judicial mind to the precise question adjudged;' and in Michael v. Morey, 26 Md. 239 [1867], it was said that a decision there cited, could not be said to be obiter dictum, `as the question was directly involved in the issues of law raised by the demurrer to the bill, and the mind of the Court was directly drawn to, and distinctly expressed upon the subject.' Carstairs, 95 Md. at 499-500, 52 A. at 601-02. These principles concerning dicta were recently reiterated by in Schmidt v. Prince George's Hospital, 366 Md. 535, 551-52, 784 A.2d 1112, 1121 (2001). Before citing to the Carstairs language above, Judge Harrell, writing for the Court noted: When a question of law is raised properly by the issues in a case and the Court supplies a deliberate expression of its opinion upon that question, such opinion is not to be regarded as obiter dictum, although the final judgment in the case may be rooted in another point also raised by the record. See Scott v. State, 297 Md. 235, 256, 465 A.2d 1126, 1137 (1983) (Murphy, C.J., dissenting); Carstairs v. Cochran, 95 Md. 488, 499, 52 A. 601, 601 (1902) (citing Monticello Distilling Co. v. City of Baltimore, 90 Md. 416, 45 A. 210 (1900)). Id. at 551, 784 A.2d at 1121. Additionally, Black's Law Dictionary notes that obiter dictum, which is Latin for something said in passing is defined as: a judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive). 1177, (9th ed. 2009). Inconsistent with this Court's interpretation and the plain meaning of dicta, the majority opines: Regarding the OPD's representation to the court that it would represent the defendant if the court so ordered, we stated, in dicta and without citation to authority, that `[t]he court refused to so order, properly we believe, on the ground that the question whether the Public Defender represented a particular defendant was for the Public Defender and not for the court.' [ Thompson, 284 Md.] at 128, 394 A.2d at 1197. Four years after our decision in Thompson, the Court of Special Appeals, in Baldwin, observed, also in dicta, that Thompson `seemed to hold that if the Public Defender declines to represent a defendanteven on grounds of non-eligibility (as opposed to a potential conflict of interest)the court has no authority to order him to provide representation.' Baldwin, 51 Md.App. at 552, 444 A.2d at 1067.... This question, however, was not at the core of Baldwin.  OPD, 413 Md. at 430, 992 A.2d at 66-67. The majority is wrong for several reasons. The question the Thompson Court was asked to resolve and the analysis it employed to resolve it make clear that the identified statement was not dicta. Indeed, it required the Court to define the role and the duty of the trial court in the process. The issue in Thompson related to Rule 723, the whole of it, not just certain provisions. Thompson, 284 Md. at 114, 394 A.2d at 1191 (The issue posed by the second question, `[d]id the trial court err in not fully complying with the mandate of Rule 723 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure by not properly advising ... Thompson of his rights and obligations as contained therein?'). As we have seen, the Thompson Court recognized that its shared responsibility, acknowledged by Rule 723(c)(4), to provide counsel to indigent defendants, was grounded in Art. 27A § 6(f), which it construed as imposing on the court not simply the responsibility of appointing counsel when the OPD declined to do so, but also required, as a prerequisite to doing so, that it independently determine the defendant's indigency. It was in explaining this responsibility that the Court said, The Public Defender wanted to leave it up to the court, making clear that if the court so ordered he would provide representation. The court refused to so order, properly we believe, on the ground that the question whether the Public Defender represented a particular defendant was for the Public Defender and not for the court, id. at 128, 394 A.2d at 1197 (emphasis added), thus, approving of the court's rejection of the OPD's offer to follow its order. The disputed language, therefore, is not dicta. The majority also overlooks the inescapable relationship between Rule 723 and Art. 27A § 6(f) that Thompson recognizes: When a defendant appears pursuant to § a of Rule 723, § b 6 requires the court to [a]dvise the defendant that if the Public Defender declines to provide representation, the defendant should immediately notify the clerk of the court so that the court can determine whether it should appoint counsel pursuant to Article 27A, section 6(f) of the Maryland Code. Id. at 128-29, 394 A.2d at 1198. Viewed in context with Rule 723 and Art. 27A § 6(f), the statement was not just relevant, but essential to the Thompson holding. Maryland courts have acknowledged that Thompson stood for the proposition now being dismissed as dicta. Considering the question whether the `trial court abused its discretion, and thus denied [the defendant] rights secured ... by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and Md.Code Ann., Article 27A, § 6(f),' Baldwin, 51 Md.App. at 545, 444 A.2d at 1063, the Court of Special Appeals held: By declining to appoint counsel, the court failed to discharge its responsibility under § 6(f) of art. 27A, proceeded to trial in contravention of Maryland Rule 723, and thus effectively denied appellant his Federal and State Constitutional right to counsel. Id. at 556, 444 A.2d at 1069. In reaching its holding, the court referenced the Thompson precedent, which it interpreted as holding that a trial court could not appoint the Public Defender against his wish. Id. at 552, n. 11, 444 A.2d at 1067. It then stated: Upon that premise, the question before us is not whether the Public Defender erred in declining representation but whether the court was derelict in discharging its own responsibility to assure compliance with appellant's Constitutional right of counsel, in accordance with its authority under § 6(f) of art. 27A. Id. at 552-53, 444 A.2d at 1067. It is clear and apparent, by the intermediate appellate court's reference, in Baldwin, that it understood Thompson to stand for the proposition that a trial court could not appoint the OPD to represent an individual it had declined to represent. That proposition was understood to be at the core of the decision, it was holding, not dicta.