Opinion ID: 884325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Woodland's actions following arrival of Officers Keim and McManis

Text: Section 46-6-502(2), MCA, requires a private citizen to immediately notify local authorities and relinquish custody to the officer or agency with jurisdiction. In support of its argument that Woodland acted within his authority in conducting field sobriety tests, effecting an arrest and requesting a breathalyzer, the State relies on our decision in Maney v. State (1992), 255 Mont. 270, 842 P.2d 704, in which we affirmed an arrest where a Chinook City police officer, after observing Maney driving erratically in town, followed him out of town (outside the officer's jurisdiction) where he observed further erratic driving. He then stopped Maney and conducted field sobriety tests in the presence of a sheriff's deputy who had arrived on the scene. Maney, 842 P.2d at 705. The Chinook city police officer then transported Maney to the Blaine County Sheriff's Office in Chinook where he requested that Maney take a breathalyzer. Maney refused. His license was suspended as a result. Maney, 842 P.2d at 705. On appeal, Maney relied on § 46-6-502(2), MCA, for his contention that the officer's arrest and request for breathalyzer were illegal due to failure of the police officer to relinquish custody of Maney to the sheriff's deputy who had jurisdiction outside the city limits. Maney, 842 P.2d at 706. We determined that the officer making the arrest was still a peace officer for purposes of the implied consent statute even though he made the arrest as a private citizen. Maney, 842 P.2d at 707. We noted that the police officer immediately notified the Blaine County Sheriff's Office and promptly transported Maney to the sheriff's office for booking. As soon as Officer Gomke entered the Chinook city limits he was within his jurisdiction and it would make no sense to require Officer Gomke to transfer his prisoner to another officer who also had jurisdiction. Maney, 842 P.2d at 706. The Maney decision does not specifically address the question of whether Officer Gomke's authority as a private citizen ceased upon the arrival of the sheriff's deputy, although the decision, by necessary implication, certainly suggests that his authority did not cease. Rather, Officer Gomke was allowed to continue with the field sobriety tests in the presence of the sheriff's deputy, to then transport Maney to the City of Chinook where Gomke had jurisdiction, and then to request a breathalyzer. Maney, 842 P.2d at 706. We now conclude that this Court's holding in Maney is too broad in the scope of authority that it grants to a citizen's arrest pursuant to § 46-6-502, MCA. Absent any exigent circumstances, when a citizen or out-of-jurisdiction peace officer, acting as a citizen, makes a stop or arrest, his or her authority to proceed ceases once a peace officer with jurisdiction arrives at the scene. Woodland exceeded his authority as a citizen when, after the arrival of the Bozeman police officers, instead of relinquishing custody to the officers, he conducted field sobriety tests, detained and arrested Hendrickson and requested that he submit to a breathalyzer. We conclude that any evidence obtained by Woodland (including the initial refusal and/or results of the breathalyzer test) after the police officers arrived was obtained illegally and must be suppressed as requested by Hendrickson. To the extent that Maney suggests a contrary result, it is overruled. The State contends that Woodland had authority to assist peace officers from other jurisdictions. Section 46-6-402, MCA, provides that a peace officer making an arrest may command the aid of persons 18 years of age or older. In the present case, however, the Bozeman police officers did not command aid in making a lawful arrest. Rather, it was Woodland acting as a citizen who was seeking assistance. In State v. Williams (1995), 273 Mont. 459, 904 P.2d 1019, this Court held that a peace officer from one jurisdiction could assist a peace officer in another if his assistance were requested. Williams, 904 P.2d at 1022-23. However, unlike the facts before this Court in Williams, there were no exigent circumstances requiring Woodland to engage in investigating and charging Hendrickson. See Williams, 904 P.2d at 1022. The Bozeman police officers arrived on the scene a relatively short time after Woodland had stopped Hendrickson and had already commenced the field sobriety testing and arrest process. These officers were fully capable of conducting the investigation and arrest on their own. This is not a situation where officers within their jurisdiction were pursuing a suspect or investigating a crime and, due to exigent circumstances, called upon Officer Woodland's assistance. Rather, this situation was initiated by Woodland as a result of Woodland's observations while outside his jurisdiction. Section 46-6-502(2), MCA, required Woodland to immediately notify the local authorities and relinquish custody of Hendrickson to Bozeman City Police. Indeed, beyond making the traffic stop, Woodland was not compelled to render assistance in this case. Once Keim and McManis of the Bozeman City Police Department arrived, they had the authority and duty to conduct any investigation and arrest. We hold that Woodland acted outside the authority given to a private citizen under § 46-6-502, MCA, by failing to turn Hendrickson over to the Bozeman City Police once Officers Keim and McManis arrived on the scene. Woodland had no authority to conduct field sobriety tests, detain and arrest Hendrickson or request a breathalyzer test once the Bozeman City Police were available to complete these tasks. Therefore, we affirm the District Court's conclusion that [t]he field sobriety tests and so forth were illegal and unlawful. We hold that all evidence obtained by Woodland after Keim and McManis had arrived on the scene must be suppressed. However, the fact that Woodland's arrest of Hendrickson was illegal and that evidence obtained incident to that arrest is inadmissable, does not mean that the charges against Hendrickson must be dismissed. An illegal arrest has no impact on a subsequent prosecution based upon evidence not tainted by the illegality. The State can pursue a prosecution despite the manner of the arrest so long as the evidence remaining is otherwise admissible. State v. Sor-Lokken (1991), 247 Mont. 343, 348, 805 P.2d 1367, 1370-71; State v. Woods (1983), 203 Mont. 401, 662 P.2d 579. Woods cited United States v. Crews (1980), 445 U.S. 463, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537, in which the Court stated: An illegal arrest, without more, has never been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid conviction. Crews, 445 U.S. at 474, 100 S.Ct. at 1251. The illegality of the detention does not deprive the government of the opportunity to prove guilt through the introduction of evidence wholly untainted by police misconduct. Crews, 445 U.S. at 475, 100 S.Ct. at 1252. The fact that Woodland exceeded his authority by not relinquishing custody to the Bozeman City Police does not mean that his observations prior to that time cannot form the basis for a charge against Hendrickson. Woodland's Affidavit of Probable Cause sets forth in great detail his observations of Hendrickson's difficulties while trying to maneuver his motorcycle in traffic, his slurred speech, red and watery eyes and the smell of alcohol on his breath. Even when the statement in the Affidavit that Hendrickson failed 5 of 5 field sobriety tests is excised, the balance of the Affidavit is sufficient to establish probable cause to charge Hendrickson with DUI. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's conclusion that the tests conducted by Woodland were illegal and the results of those tests cannot be used against Hendrickson. However, we reverse the District Court's dismissal of charges against Hendrickson and remand this matter to the District Court for trial on the merits. TURNAGE, REGNIER, TRIEWEILER and GRAY, JJ., concur.