Opinion ID: 1983858
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The State of the Art Defense.

Text: RSA 507-D:4 (Supp. 1979) codifies what is known in products liability law as the state of the art defense. Under this section of the statute, it is an affirmative defense that the risks complained of by the plaintiff were not discoverable using prevailing research and scientific techniques under the state of the art and were not discoverable using procedures required by federal or state regulatory authorities charged with supervision or licensing of the product in question. Discoverability of risks shall be measured as of the time the manufacturer parted with possession and control of, or sold the product in question, whichever occurred last. The plaintiffs have raised a general objection to this provision on equal protection grounds. One assertion raised by the plaintiffs is that RSA 507-D:4 (Supp. 1979) codifies current industry practice as the standard by which discoverability of risk is to be measured. We find this contention to be without merit. [21, 22] It has long been recognized that because entire industries may lag behind in the development of safer and technologically feasible alternatives, custom and usage is an unsound standard of liability. See The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932); Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 204 Neb. 468, 479-80, 283 N.W.2d 25, 35 (1979). The legislative history of RSA 507-D:4 (Supp. 1979) indicates the legislature's intent to reject mere compliance with current industry practice as a defense to liability. See N.H.S. JOUR. 1028-29 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Bradley). Instead, RSA 507-D:4 (Supp. 1979) holds a defendant in a products liability action to the standard of technological feasibility at the time of sale or distribution. See Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 101, 115 and n.71 (1977). In recent years, some courts have held manufacturers liable for defects which, at the time of sale, were scientifically unknowable. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 202-09, 447 A.2d 539, 545-49 (1982). By imposing what amounts to absolute liability upon manufacturers, such judicial decisions sever the traditional connection between tort liability and fault. To hold Ford Motor Company to today's standard of scientific knowledge when determining liability for an injury caused by a Model T bought in 1921 appears to us to be clearly unreasonable. [23] We view a properly worded state of the art defense as being a rational means of addressing manufacturers' reasonable objection to application of modern legal concepts and scientific knowledge to products made decades ago. We therefore find it both reasonable and constitutionally permissible to raise an affirmative defense based upon discoverability of risk as measured by the state of the art at the time of distribution or sale. [24] We note that the standard enunciated in RSA 507-D:4 (Supp. 1979) is consistent with our decision in Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. at 807, 395 A.2d at 846, as well as with the judicial actions of many of our sister States. See, e.g., Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 204 Neb. at 479-80, 283 N.W.2d at 35; Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex. 1980). As we stated in Thibault, strict liability is not a no-fault system of compensation. The common-law principle that fault and responsibility are elements of our legal system applicable to corporations and individuals alike will not be undermined or abolished solely by a concept of spreading of risk and cost in this State. 118 N.H. at 806, 395 A.2d at 845-46. Despite the constitutional validity of RSA 507-D:4 (Supp. 1979) viewed in isolation, the question of its severability from the portions of the products liability statute which have been stricken, remains. Indeed, the plaintiffs have asserted that if we find enough of RSA chapter 507-D (Supp. 1979) to be unconstitutional, we should follow our decision in Carson v. Maurer and strike down the statute in its entirety. We agree. In Carson, we addressed the severability of the unconstitutional provisions of RSA chapter 507-C (Supp. 1979), the medical-malpractice statute, from the remainder of that statute. We stated that we were not sure that the remaining provisions of RSA ch. 507-C (Supp. 1979) would have been enacted without the rest. 120 N.H. at 946, 424 A.2d at 839. Accordingly, the entire statute was stricken. [25] Here, too, we are not sure whether the legislature would have enacted a state of the art defense in the absence of all of the unconstitutional provisions of the products liability statute. We must therefore leave that question to the legislature. Because we have stricken the remainder of the substantive sections of the statute, we void the entire chapter. [26] In light of our holding that RSA chapter 507-D (Supp. 1979) is void in its entirety, the plaintiffs' argument that the retrospective application of the chapter under RSA 507-D:5 (Supp. 1979) is unconstitutional is moot. Nos. 82-203, 82-275, 82-314, 83-053, and 83-093 are reversed and remanded; Nos. 82-170, 82-458, 82-485, and 82-497 are remanded to the United States District Court.