Opinion ID: 150080
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prima Facie Showing of a Protected Act

Text: Defendant Kamran bears the burden of demonstrating that Mindys' suit against him arises from a protected act. Vess, 317 F.3d at 1110. An act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; (4) or any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 425.16(e). Kamran contends that filing a trademark application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) constitutes a protected act under categories (1) and (2). The district court did not determine whether this act constituted a protected act because it concluded that the suit did not arise from the filings even if they were protected. While it is a close question, we follow the California legislature's direction that the anti-SLAPP statute be construed broadly, id. § 425.16(a), and hold that Kamran's act of filing the trademark applications with the USPTO was a protected act within the meaning of the statute.
The filing of a trademark application is a formal communication to the USPTO seeking official action in a process governed by statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (Application for registration; verification). We conclude that the application is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute as a writing made before . . . [an] executive [or] . . . other official proceeding authorized by law. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 425.16(e)(1). The application may also be a writing made in connection with an issue under consideration . . . by . . . [an] executive . . . body, or any other official proceeding. Id. § 425.16(e)(2). California appellate courts interpreting the anti-SLAPP statute have distinguished between communications made in the course of official proceedings, which are protected, and mere ministerial business communications, which are not. For example, in ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1009, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 (2001), the court of appeal found that filing a complaint with the SEC that was designed to solicit an investigation qualified at least as a statement before an official proceeding under § 425.16(e)(1). [C]ommunication to an official administrative agency . . . designed to prompt action by that agency is as much a part of the `official proceeding' as a communication made after the proceeding had commenced. Id. (internal citations and some quotation marks omitted). In Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital District, 39 Cal.4th 192, 199, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 41, 138 P.3d 193 (2006), the California Supreme Court held that a hospital's peer review procedure qualifies as an `official proceeding authorized by law'. . . because that procedure is required under [California] Business and Professions Code section 805 et seq., governing hospital peer review proceedings. In Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 52 Cal. App.4th 1036, 1049, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 (1997), the court of appeal similarly concluded that an investigative audit conducted by a state auditor was an authorized, public proceeding because it is government-sponsored and provided for by statute. In contrast, California appellate courts have held that ministerial acts involving primarily private transactions are not protected acts. For example, in Blackburn v. Brady, 116 Cal.App.4th 670, 677, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 696 (2004), the court of appeal rejected the contention that statements made in connection with a Sheriff's auction could amount to protected speech under the anti-SLAPP law. The ministerial event of a Sheriff's sale or auction simply does not concern an issue under review or determine some disputed matter as contemplated under the anti-SLAPP law. Id. It was a mere business dealing or transaction. Id.; see also Kajima Eng'g & Constr., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 932, 116 Cal. Rptr.2d 187 (2002) (The submission of contractual claims for payment in the regular course of business before the commencement of litigation simply is not an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute.) (citing People ex rel. 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Bldg. Permit Consultants, Inc., 86 Cal.App.4th 280, 285, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 71 (2000); Ericsson GE Mobile Commc'ns, Inc. v. C.S.I. Telecomms. Eng'rs, 49 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1601-02, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 491 (1996)). Filing a trademark application is more than merely a ministerial act connected with a business transaction. It is an attempt to establish a property right under a comprehensive federal statutory scheme. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992); 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (registering a trademark provides constructive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership thereof). The filing party seeks a determination by USPTO examiners that it is the presumptive owner of a protectable mark. See, e.g., Applied Info. Scis. Corp. v. eBAY, Inc., 511 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2007) (Registration of a mark on the Principal Register in the Patent and Trademark Office constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark on the goods and services specified in the registration. (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted)); Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir.2005) (Federal registration of a mark constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of the mark.). We therefore conclude that such a filing is a protected act under the anti-SLAPP statute.
Kamran must also demonstrate that the suit against him arises from his protected act of filing a trademark application. In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant's protected free speech or petitioning activity. Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82, 89, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d 703 (2002); see also City of Cotati v. Cashman, 29 Cal.4th 69, 76-77, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 519, 52 P.3d 695 (2002) ([T]he mere fact an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean it arose from that activity.). The district court relied on two California court of appeal cases in which the court concluded that attorney malpractice claims do not arise from a protected act. See Benasra v. Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP, 123 Cal.App.4th 1179, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 621 (2004); Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton, 145 Cal.App.4th 1532, 52 Cal. Rptr.3d 712 (2006). It is true that in several cases involving attorney malpractice claims, courts of appeal have concluded that the alleged malpractice does not arise from a protected act under the anti-SLAPP statute. See PrediWave Corp. v. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, 179 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1221-26, 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 245 (2009) (describing cases). For example, in Benasra, the court determined that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to a former client's suit against a law firm for breach of loyalty. The court reasoned that [t]he breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit may follow litigation pursued against the former client, but does not arise from it. Benasra, 123 Cal.App.4th at 1189, 20 Cal. Rptr.3d 621. In Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp, 114 Cal.App.4th 624, 7 Cal. Rptr.3d 715 (2003), the court held that the malpractice action fell outside of the anti-SLAPP statute when it alleged the attorneys' failure to respond to discovery requests and to comply with court orders. In Kolar, the court explained, In a malpractice suit, the client is not suing because the attorney petitioned on his or her behalf, but because the attorney did not competently represent the client's interests while doing so. 145 Cal.App.4th at 1540, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 712. However, there is no categorical exclusion of claims of attorney malpractice from the anti-SLAPP statute. The California Supreme Court has observed that [n]othing in the statute itself categorically excludes any particular type of action from its operation. Navellier, 29 Cal.4th at 92, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d 703. The anti-SLAPP statute's definitional focus is not the form of the plaintiff's cause of action but, rather, the defendant's activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liabilityand whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning. Id. Each of Mindys' causes of action arises not out of a general breach of duty, but out of Kamran's act of filing the trademark application in Sonya's name. The trademark application was not incidental to the causes of action, see Freeman v. Schack, 154 Cal.App.4th 719, 732, 64 Cal. Rptr.3d 867 (2007), but was their gravamen, see Cotati, 29 Cal.4th at 79, 124 Cal. Rptr.2d 519, 52 P.3d 695. But for the trademark application, Mindys would have no reason to sue Kamran. Because Mindys' claims arose from Kamran's act of applying to register the trademarks in Sonya's name, they are properly subject to an anti-SLAPP motion.