Opinion ID: 2708442
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Modification of Pattern Jury Instructions

Text: Thoroughbred’s principal argument on the merits is that the district court erred by modifying the Wisconsin Pattern Jury Instructions for Lemon Law claims. “We review jury instructions de novo to determine whether they provide fair and accurate summaries of the law.” Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 934 (7th Cir. 1999). In crafting jury instructions, however, the district court is afforded substantial discretion, and we will reverse only if it failed to state the law completely and correctly and the error caused prejudice. Id. The district court’s modifications were entirely appropriate to adapt the pattern instructions to the facts of this case. To explain, we must examine the substantive provisions of the Wisconsin Lemon Law, which provides a remedy for a purchaser of a defective motor vehicle beyond the contractual warranty. Wis. Stat. § 218.0171. The applicable version of the Lemon Law (in effect prior to March 1, 2014) required the consumer to provide notice of the defect (or “nonconformity”) and an opportunity to repair: If a new motor vehicle does not conform to an appli- cable express warranty and the consumer reports the nonconformity to the manufacturer, the motor vehicle lessor or any of the manufacturer’s authorized motor vehicle dealers and makes the motor vehicle available for repair before the expiration of the warranty or one year after first delivery of the motor vehicle to a con- (9th Cir. 2009) (directing district court to decide removal fees where appeal resulted in remand to state court after judgment for plaintiff in district court). The case would also have to be retried in state court, requiring further attorney fees on both sides. No. 13-2520 9 sumer, whichever is sooner, the nonconformity shall be repaired. Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(a). A “nonconformity” is defined as “a condition or defect which substantially impairs the use, value or safety of a motor vehicle” and is covered by an express warranty, but the definition excludes the results of abuse, neglect, or unauthorized modification of the vehicle by the consumer. § 218.0171(1)(f). If the nonconformity persists after a “reasonable attempt to repair,” the manufacturer must provide either a full refund or a replacement vehicle. Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(b). The “reasonable attempt to repair” has failed if four attempts to repair the same nonconformity are unsuccessful or if the vehicle is out of service for repairs for 30 days or more in the first year. § 218.0171(1)(h). Thoroughbred challenges nine similar modifications of the jury instructions. We focus on one, the instruction titled “Lemon Law Claim: Out of Service Warranty Nonconformity,” to illustrate the issue. Here is the relevant excerpt of the pattern instruction: … you must find that (plaintiff) notified the manufacturer or any authorized dealer of a (the) nonconformity(ies) and gave the manufacturer or dealer an opportunity to repair the condition or defect. Wis. Pattern Jury Instruction – Civil 3303. Based on the evidence in this case that the manufacturer told the consumer to have the vehicle repaired at Amato Ford, which was not an authorized dealer for the manufacturer, the court modified the pattern instruction as shown by italics in this passage: 10 No. 13-2520 … you must find that Ronald Burzlaff notified the manufacturer or any authorized dealer of the nonconformities and gave the manufacturer, an authorized dealer, or any other repair facility acting on the manufacturer’s behalf, an opportunity to repair the nonconformities. The parties agree that notice of a nonconformity must be given to “the manufacturer, the motor vehicle lessor or any of the manufacturer’s authorized motor vehicle dealers.” Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(a). Burzlaff did so. The statute also requires a consumer to make the vehicle “available for repair.” Id. Thoroughbred contends that if the vehicle is not taken to one of the listed entities for the actual repairs, the Lemon Law does not apply. Burzlaff counters that the statute limits only those entities to which notice must be given. He argues that the vehicle has been made “available for repair” once it is taken to any authorized shop, whether the shop is also an authorized dealer or not. Burzlaff’s approach fits better both the text and purpose of the Lemon Law. The text of the Lemon Law has fairly strict requirements for who must receive notice but flexible options for who can perform repairs. The consumer must report the nonconformity to the manufacturer or to one of its authorized dealers (or, in case of a vehicle lease, to the lessor). That notice makes sure that the manufacturer learns of the problem. To take advantage of the law, the consumer must then make the vehicle “available for repair,” which obliges the manufacturer to repair the nonconformity. Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(a). The text of the statute simply does not say, as Thoroughbred argues, that the vehicle is “available for repair” only if it is actually taken to the manufacturer or an authorized No. 13-2520 11 dealer (or, if applicable, the lessor). The more flexible language reflects an obviously sensible approach. It preserves Lemon Law protection when the manufacturer directs the consumer to a repair shop other than the manufacturer’s own authorized dealers, who may be few and far between. 3 Flexibility for repairs is also consistent with the law’s broader legislative purpose. The Wisconsin Lemon Law was passed to provide consumers with an alternative to the “inadequate, uncertain and expensive remedies of the Uniform Commercial Code or the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.” Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 542 N.W.2d 148, 150 (Wis. 1996). The Lemon Law is “‘obviously remedial in nature,’” and courts should “‘construe the statute with a view towards the social problem which the legislature was addressing when enacting the law.’” Id. at 151, quoting Hartlaub v. Coachmen Industries, Inc., 422 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Wis. App. 1987). Following this approach, Hughes held that “pecuniary loss” as used in the damages provision of the Lemon Law included the purchase price, not merely the costs flowing from the defect. Id. (“Certainly the law is intended to do 3 Thoroughbred fails to recognize that the more flexible reading benefits manufacturers as well as consumers. The law would make the products of small manufacturers like Thoroughbred much less attractive to consumers if they could preserve their rights under the Lemon Law only by repairing a nonconforming vehicle at one of a small number of dealers or the factory itself. Instead, a small manufacturer may pay for work at a more convenient location, as Thoroughbred did in this case, while still protecting consumers’ rights under the Lemon Law. 12 No. 13-2520 more than simply parrot the remedies previously available to the consumer.”). 4 The Lemon Law would not be an effective safeguard under Thoroughbred’s narrow interpretation. A consumer could lose the law’s protections by taking the vehicle to a different repair facility when directed to do so by the manufacturer. That result would be unjust to the point of absurdity. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has quoted with approval the understanding that it “‘should go without saying that the legislature contemplated that all the parties covered by the Lemon Law should act in good faith.’” Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2012 WI 57, ¶ 17, 815 N.W.2d 314, 319 (Wis. 2012), quoting Herzberg v. Ford Motor Co., 2001 WI App. 65, ¶ 18, 626 N.W.2d 67, 72 (Wis. App. 2001). The interpretation proposed by Thoroughbred in this case would be an invitation to bad faith conduct by manufacturers. In essence, Thoroughbred wants this court to find that Burzlaff lost his rights by following its own instructions for repairing the vehicle. The text of the statute does not support that result, which also raises obvious issues of estoppel. The Supreme Court explained the general principle long ago: “The vital principle is that he who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by dis4While we have sometimes expressed doubts about the value of the canon that remedial statutes are to be construed liberally, see Bushendorf v. Freightliner Corp., 13 F.3d 1024, 1026 (7th Cir. 1993), Wisconsin courts apply the canon to the Wisconsin Lemon Law. E.g., Garcia v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 2004 WI 93, ¶ 8, 682 N.W.2d 365, 368 (Wis. 2004). Our role here is to decide questions of state law as we predict the state’s highest court would decide them. No. 13-2520 13 appointing the expectations upon which he acted.” Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 580 (1879); see also Union Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 80 U.S. 222, 233 (1871) (insurer could not use its own agent’s actions as defense against payment of benefits); Texas Co. v. Chicago & A.R. Co., 126 F.2d 83, 90–91 (7th Cir. 1942). We made a similar point in Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank—Illinois, 223 F.3d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 2000), where we explained how an employer could be estopped from relying on a statutory defense under the Family and Medical Leave Act if it had misled an employee about her eligibility for leave. More to the point in this case applying state law, the Wisconsin courts apply equitable estoppel to avoid similarly unjust results. E.g., Milas v. Labor Ass’n of Wisconsin, Inc., 571 N.W.2d 656, 660–61 (Wis. 1997) (county employer’s participation in arbitration estopped it from denying validity of agreement requiring arbitration); Dunn v. Pertzsch Constr. Co., 157 N.W.2d 652, 654 (Wis. 1968) (owner of land estopped from asserting trespass claim against business to whom her husband sold fill from land); Baierl v. Riesenecker, 230 N.W. 605, 606 (Wis. 1930) (applying equitable estoppel to bar purchaser of property from denying validity of mortgage after having deducted mortgage principal from purchase price). Thoroughbred first advertised that Stallions could be repaired at Ford dealers. Then, when Burzlaff had problems with his vehicle and asked Thoroughbred for help, it told him to take his vehicle to a Ford dealer for warranty repairs. Burzlaff reasonably relied on that advice by going to Amato Ford. We cannot imagine that the Wisconsin courts would hold that Burzlaff lost his rights under the Lemon Law by relying on the manufacturer’s instruction. 14 No. 13-2520 To counter the manifest injustice of stripping a consumer of his statutory rights because he followed the manufacturer’s instructions, Thoroughbred points out that its theory would still leave a consumer with the protection of contractual warranties. Yet the Lemon Law was enacted precisely because manufacturers could delay or avoid remedies through costly litigation over the precise language of a contractual warranty. See Hughes, 542 N.W.2d at 150. To give effect to the Lemon Law, Wisconsin courts have rejected crabbed readings that narrow its reach. See, e.g., Garcia v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 2004 WI 93, ¶¶ 11–12, 682 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Wis. 2004) (collecting Wisconsin Supreme Court cases to show that Lemon Law should be interpreted broadly). The Lemon Law thus protects consumers who go to a repair facility authorized by the manufacturer. That is true whether the facility is a “manufacturer’s authorized motor vehicle dealer” or not. With this understanding of the statute, the district court’s instructions were right on target. In light of the evidence and the parties’ arguments, the district court needed to instruct the jury how the law would apply when the manufacturer told the consumer to have repairs done by someone other than a “manufacturer’s authorized motor vehicle dealer.” The instructions correctly distinguished the narrower requirements for notice (restricted to “the manufacturer or any authorized dealer”) from the more flexible provision for repair at various facilities so long as the repairs are made on the manufacturer’s behalf. They also focused the jury on the central issue of the case: whether Amato Ford was acting on Thoroughbred’s behalf when repairing Burzlaff’s vehicle, or whether he went there at his own risk and without Thoroughbred’s authorization. The district No. 13-2520 15 court’s instruction explained accurately and clearly the issues relevant to the Wisconsin Lemon Law claim.