Opinion ID: 2748542
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exhaustion of 2010 EEOC Charges

Text: The Department argues that Stone’s complaint includes allegations not raised in her 2010 EEOC charge and therefore she did not exhaust her administrative remedies as to these allegations. In her August 2010 EEOC charge, Stone alleged race discrimination and harassment. In her November 2010 EEOC charge, she included allegations of retaliation. In her untimely 2013 EEOC charge, Stone alleged disparate treatment and/or disparate impact. In her complaint filed with the district court, Stone alleged constructive discharge for the first time. “Title VII requires employees to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.” Huckabay, 142 F.3d at 239 (internal citations omitted). An employee may file a lawsuit “not only upon the specific complaints made by the employee’s initial EEOC charge, but also upon any kind of discrimination like or related to the charge’s allegations, limited only by the scope of the EEOC investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the initial charges of discrimination.” Fellows v. Universal Rests., Inc., 701 F.2d 447, 451 (5th Cir. 1983). “‘[A] charging party’s rights should [not] be cut off merely because [s]he fails to articulate correctly the legal conclusion emanating from his factual allegations.’” Simmons–Myers v. Caesars Entm’t Corp., 515 F. App’x 269, 272 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 462 (5th Cir. 1970)). We must determine whether the EEOC charge “stated sufficient facts to trigger an EEOC investigation and to put an employer on notice of the existence and nature of the charges”. Id. at  (citing Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., 332 F.3d 874, 878 (5th Cir. 2003); Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 462)). Stone did not allege any facts in her 2010 EEOC charges that reasonably encompass her later claims for constructive discharge, disparate impact or disparate treatment. See Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788–92 (5th Cir. 8 Case: 14-30204 Document: 00512826702 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/05/2014 No. 14-30204 2006). At the time she filed her 2010 EEOC charge she was still employed with the Department. Stone also fails to identify a facially neutral Department policy or practices that was applied to her in a discriminatory way. See Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 860 (5th Cir. 2002). She further failed to allege facts sufficient to show she suffered disparate treatment. In her EEOC charge, she states only that she saw her supervisor “react differently” by making a face when an African American co-worker arrived late and have no reaction when a Caucasian employee arrived late. In her amended charge she stated that a Caucasian co-worker was not required to quote “applicable law” when presenting audits, but Stone was. This also is insufficient to trigger an EEOC investigation and to put an employer on notice of a disparate treatment claim. See Manning, 332 F.3d at 878; Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 462. Thus, Stone’s subsequent claims fall outside “the scope of the EEOC investigation” and could not reasonably be expected to grow out of her initial charge of race discrimination and harassment. As such, Stone has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on these later raised claims.