Opinion ID: 2490897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The issue of whether the refusal was incident to a lawful arrest is within the allowable scope of review of a DHSMV hearing officer in a proceeding to determine if sufficient cause exists to sustain the suspension of a driver's license under section 322.2615, Florida Statutes, for refusal to submit to a breath-alcohol test.

Text: This second question is related to the first question and concerns the method of challenging a suspension for refusal to submit to a breath test. After an individual's driver's license is suspended under section 322.2615 for refusing to submit to a breath test under section 316.1932, that section entitles the driver to request a formal or informal review of the validity of the suspension. § 322.2615(1)(b)3., Fla. Stat.; see also § 322.2615(4), (6), Fla. Stat. The statute defines what the hearing officer may review in either a formal or informal review hearing: (7) In a formal review hearing under subsection (6) or an informal review hearing under subsection (4), the hearing officer shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether sufficient cause exists to sustain, amend, or invalidate the suspension. The scope of the review shall be limited to the following issues: . . . . (b) If the license was suspended for refusal to submit to a breath, blood, or urine test: 1. Whether the law enforcement officer had probable cause to believe that the person whose license was suspended was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state while under the influence of alcoholic beverages or chemical or controlled substances. 2. Whether the person whose license was suspended refused to submit to any such test after being requested to do so by a law enforcement officer or correctional officer. 3. Whether the person whose license was suspended was told that if he or she refused to submit to such test his or her privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended for a period of 1 year or, in the case of a second or subsequent refusal, for a period of 18 months. § 322.2615(7), Fla. Stat. In the prior version of the statute, the hearing officer's scope of review included consideration of the additional issue of [w]hether the person was placed under lawful arrest for a violation of s. 316.193. § 322.2615(7)(b)(2), Fla. Stat. (2005), amended by ch.2006-290, § 45, Laws of Fla. Because the Legislature deleted this statutory language and made other deletions in the amended statute, the DHSMV contends that the issue of whether a person was placed under a lawful arrest is no longer a consideration in the suspension process. As noted by the circuit court in McLaughlin, although the Legislature's removal of the lawful arrest requirement from section 322.2615(7) may seem clear, the Legislature left that requirement in the implied consent law. McLaughlin v. Fla. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, No. 2007-CA-001672, order at 4 (Fla. 10th Cir.Ct. Sept. 18, 2007) (order denying petition for writ of certiorari) (stating that the Legislature had created an unnerving quagmire). We agree with the First and Fifth District Courts of Appeal that section 322.2615 cannot be read in isolation but must be read in concert with section 316.1932, which defines the scope of the driver's obligation to submit to a breath test. As the Fifth District cogently explained: Section 322.2615 does not establish any obligation on the part of a driver to take a test upon the request of law enforcement; it only establishes consequences for refusal. Section 316.1932 is what creates and defines the scope of the obligation, and its mandate is certain: the test must be incident to a lawful arrest. These statutes cannot be construed in isolation, therefore, as Petitioner urges, because they are interdependent. Instead, we must consider them in pari materia. See Ferguson v. State, 377 So.2d 709, 710 (Fla.1979) (basic rule of statutory construction that statutes which relate to the same or to a closely related subject or object are regarded as in pari materia and should be construed together and compared with each other). When we do, the conclusion is inescapable that a suspension may not be predicated on refusal to take a test that is the product of a unlawful arrest. Pelham, 979 So.2d at 307 (emphasis added). We further agree with the statutory construction analysis utilized by the Fifth District in construing section 322.2615(7): Nor have we overlooked the language of subsection 322.2615(7), which purports to limit the scope of review to three issues. The first issue, probable cause, is a concept that is often inextricably intertwined with the lawfulness of the detention as it is in this case. The second issue directs the hearing officer to address whether the driver refused to submit to any such test. (Emphasis added). § 322.2615(7)(b)2., Fla. Stat. We construe any such test to refer to the lawful test that the suspension must be pursuant to. The final issue, the provision of notice, relates to the form of notice mandated by the same statute, which too refers to a lawful test. Therefore, we do not construe this so-called limitation on the hearing officer's scope of review to nullify the statute's directive that the hearing officer determine. . . whether sufficient cause exists to sustain, amend, or invalidate the suspension. § 322.2615(7), Fla. Stat. (2007). Under the statutory scheme, the lawfulness of the suspension is central to any determination that there is sufficient cause to sustain it. Id. at 307-08 (citation omitted). To fail to read these related statutes together would also have serious constitutional implications. A driver whose license is unlawfully suspended must have a means to challenge that suspension, and the only means by which a driver can challenge the suspension of his or her driver's license for failure to submit to a breath test is through section 322.2615. Whether denominated a right or a privilege, the loss of a driver's license is most definitely an extreme hardship. In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), the United States Supreme Court stated: Once licenses are issued . . . their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. In the almost forty years since Bell was decided, driving has become an increasingly important part of American life and a near necessity in obtaining and maintaining employment. The Bell Court explained: Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. This is but an application of the general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a right or a privilege. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). With regard to due process rights, in N.C. v. Anderson, 882 So.2d 990, 993 (Fla. 2004), this Court stated: The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. This same protection is provided in the Florida Constitution. See Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. Procedural due process serves as a vehicle to ensure fair treatment through the proper administration of justice where substantive rights are at issue. Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So.2d 957, 960 (Fla.1991). Procedural due process requires both reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See id. The notice must be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). (Emphasis added.) Here, the interpretation of the statutes urged by DHSMV would allow the DHSMV to suspend a driver's license without reasonable notice and no possibility of a meaningful process to review the lawfulness of the suspension. A reading of section 322.2615 to prohibit review of an unlawful license suspension would lead to an unreasonable result that would render the statutory scheme constitutionally infirm. We have held that [s]tatutes, as a rule, `will not be interpreted so as to yield an absurd result.' State v. Iacovone, 660 So.2d 1371, 1373 (Fla.1995) (quoting Williams v. State, 492 So.2d 1051, 1054 (Fla.1986)). Further, [t]his Court has an obligation to give a statute a constitutional construction where such a construction is possible. Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 901 So.2d 802, 810 (Fla.2005). We conclude that the only reading of the statute that avoids an unreasonable and unconstitutional result is to construe sections 322.2615 and 322.1932 in pari materia and allow the hearing officer to review whether the test was administered incident to a lawful arrest. We conclude, as did the First and Fifth Districts, that reading the two statutes together leads to the conclusion that there must be a means for challenging the legality of the suspension when the request for a breath test was not incident to a lawful arrest. Once section 322.2615 and section 316.1932 are read together, it becomes clear that under the statutory scheme, sufficient cause to sustain the suspension under section 322.2615(7) and whether the person whose license was suspended refused to submit to any such test require that the hearing officer make the determination of whether the test was administered incident to a lawful arrest, as required by section 316.1932, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, we answer the second rephrased certified question in the affirmative. Because the Legislature has mandated that an individual need only consent to a test under section 316.1932 if the test is administered incident to a lawful arrest and has provided the procedure for challenging a suspension for a refusal, an individual must be able to challenge the legality of the suspension if the refusal was not incident to a lawful arrest. To read the statute otherwise would produce an unreasonableand unconstitutionalresult. The dissent contends that licensed drivers are chargeable with knowledge of the laws and that the lawfulness of a suspension will be upheld without regard to whether the suspension was incident to a lawful arrest. However, the dissent overlooks the fact that a driver is on notice that he or she must consent to a breath test or else face suspension of his or her driver's license only if the test is administered incident to a lawful arrest. That is what the Legislature has expressly provided for in section 316.1932. To remove that consideration from the hearing officer's review would allow illegal suspensions without any possibility of a meaningful process to challenge the legality of the suspension. Under the dissent's view, an illegal suspension that is contrary to the implied consent statute would be automatically upheld. The dissent also asserts that our reading of the statute abrogates legislative intent. To the contrary, such a reading is necessary in order to save the legislative scheme from constitutional infirmity and the unreasonable result that while a driver need only submit to a breath test incident to a lawful arrest, the absence of that legislatively imposed requirement cannot be challenged. Under the dissent's view, police may suspend an individual's driver's license on a whim without following the requirements of law set forth by the Legislature.