Opinion ID: 790646
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ellerman's Booker Claims

Text: 22 The district court concluded Ellerman was part of a criminal conspiracy that began within 15 years of his release from custody on prior state felony convictions and therefore sentenced him as a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. 6 Ellerman was convicted of burglary and stealing on April 9, 1979. He received a suspended sentence and five years' probation. On March 26, 1982, Ellerman was convicted of second-degree assault and sentenced to five years. Because of the assault conviction, Ellerman's probation was revoked and he was sentenced to five years to run concurrently with the assault conviction. Ellerman was released on parole on December 13, 1983. He was convicted for second degree burglary on December 3, 2002. The district court held Ellerman to be a career offender based on the 1982 and 2002 convictions. 23 Ellerman argues that because he was released on parole on December 13, 1983, the government must prove he joined the conspiracy prior to December 13, 1998 — the 15-year period. Ellerman contends the government did not meet its burden of proof because the only evidence that predates December 13, 1998 is Burns's address book with the name Lonzo and a phone number, along with Neustel's reference to probably meeting Ellerman in the summer of 1998, and, that at some unknown date later, Neustel saw Ellerman receive methamphetamine from Burns. 24 Ellerman objected to being sentenced as a career offender. We review de novo whether the district court correctly applied the Guidelines. United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir.2005). In United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876 (4th Cir.1994), the Fourth Circuit held, in determining the date of the instant offense for purposes of calculating the 15-year period, that the district court should consider all relevant conduct. Id. at 890; U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, Commentary n.8. Relevant conduct includes all acts... committed [or] aided ... by the defendant and when a conspiracy is involved all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the [conspiracy] that occurred in preparation for that offense. Kennedy, 32 F.3d at 890 (emphasis in original); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1). Activities that occurred before the date identified by the indictment as the starting date for the offense are included. Kennedy, 32 F.3d at 890. The commentary to U.S.S.G. 1B1.3 indicates that `[c]onduct that is not formally charged or is not an element of the offense of conviction may enter into the [sentencing] determination.' Id. ; United States v. Strachan, 968 F.2d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir.1992) (relevant conduct includes conduct which is not formally charged or adjudicated.). 25 The instant conspiracy began before December 13, 1998, and Ellerman's acts, even though small, are nonetheless relevant when determining career offender status, as are those of the other conspirators. Neustel met Burns in spring 1998. Neustel received small quantities ofmethamphetamine from Burns for distribution. A search warrant served on Burns in April 1998 revealed methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and a black address book that identified Ellerman as Lonzo. Neustel was introduced to Ellerman in summer 1998. Ellerman had a long standing relationship with Burns. Sometime later, Neustel observed Burns distribute methamphetamine to Ellerman and eventually also distributed methamphetamine to Ellerman. By joining the conspiracy, Ellerman participated in, and is liable for, all prior co-conspirators' actions that furthered the conspiracy. Kennedy, 32 F.3d at 890. These actions predated winter 1998. 26 Ellerman also objected to receiving a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C 1.1. We review de novo whether the district court correctly applied the Guidelines. Mashek, at 1013. The enhancement was based on Ellerman's disclosure of Britton's identity to Burns. Under Britton's direction, Neustel attempted to arrange a methamphetamine transaction between Britton and Burns. However, prior to the transaction, Burns contacted Neustel and told Neustel that he was concerned about dealing with Britton because Ellerman told him Britton was a police officer. Burns told Neustel that Ellerman stated they've got [Neustel] on three counts of selling, three felony counts of selling to an undercover cop. Burns indicated that Ellerman described Britton in detail, including his vehicle and undercover name. Ellerman denied that he disclosed Britton's identity. The district court found this testimony convincing and corroborated by Burns's changed demeanor and later method of transacting business. 27 An enhancement for obstruction of justice is appropriate where the misconduct occurs with knowledge of an investigation or at least the correct belief that an investigation is underway. United States v. Dierling, 131 F.3d 722, 738 (8th Cir.1997). The government bears the burden of proof that an obstruction enhancement should apply. United States v. Cox, 985 F.2d 427, 432 (8th Cir.1993). Ellerman was aware that there was an ongoing investigation at the time that Britton's identity was disclosed because Ellerman believed that he was still operating under an informant agreement with COMET. Neustel provided adequate proof that Ellerman told Bums Britton was a police officer. That testimony was reasonably accepted by the district court. 28 We find that in both instances the district court correctly applied the guidelines. However, our analysis does not stop there because in his supplemental brief, Ellerman argues that his sentence violates the mandates of United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Because Ellerman failed to raise a Sixth Amendment Apprendi -type claim, 7 we review for plain error, Pirani, at 552, under the four-part test of United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Under that test 29 there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 30 Pirani, at 553 (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770). In Pirani we resolved that the third Olano factor turns on whether [a defendant] has demonstrated a reasonable probability that he or she would have received a more favorable sentence with the Booker error eliminated by making the Guidelines advisory. Id. at 556. In reviewing the record, we find no indication that the district court would have given Ellerman a more favorable sentence under an advisory Guideline scheme. 31 Finally, we must review Ellerman's sentence for reasonableness. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 765; Mashek, at 1018. In doing so, we find that Ellerman's sentence is reasonable. 32 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.