Opinion ID: 1711324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: FAILURE TO GIVE INSTRUCTION MAI-CR 3d 300.20 and 306.4

Text: Roberts does not dispute these facts. Indeed, the evidence that he killed Ms. Tayloreven if one discounts his confession totallyis overwhelming and virtually uncontroverted. Because of what the jury could see so clearly from the physical evidence, Roberts decided to defend himself on the one issue the jurors could not seehis mental state at the time of the murder. He claimed that he suffered from a dysrhythmic activity of the brain affecting the frontal and temporal lobe; that this condition produced impulsive behavior, disinhibitive behavior, mood swings and loss of judgment and reasoning ability; and that, as a result, he lacked the mental capacity to deliberate before he killed Ms. Taylor. To support and contest this claim of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility at trial, Roberts and the state offered testimony of mental health professionals offering opinions concerning Roberts's ability to deliberate. As part of that testimony, these witnesses revealed a history of sordid and violent acts Roberts had committed during and since his youth. These acts included sexual intercourse with his five-year-old sister when he was fifteen; sodomy of his five-year-old sister; arson; assaulting his mother; sodomy of his younger brother; assaults of inmates while in jail; and robbery. Prior to this testimony, Roberts's counsel asked the trial court to caution the jury with MAI-CR 3d 300.20. The trial court refused and similarly refused to instruct the jury in accordance with MAI-CR 3d 306.04 at the close of the evidence.
Section 565.020.1, RSMo 1994, defines first degree murder. A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if he knowingly causes the death of another person after deliberation upon the matter. Section 552.015.2(8), RSMo 1994, permits the parties to present evidence relating to a defendant's mental state when a defendant claims he did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense, provided the defendant files a written notice of his purpose to rely on [a defense of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility]. Section 552.030.2, RSMo 1994. Roberts initially filed a Notice of Intent to Rely on the Defense of Mental Disease or Defect and a Motion for Mental Examination. Roberts founded the latter on sections 552.020 and 552.030. The trial court ordered the mental examination as provided for under Sections 552.020 and 552.030. Roberts filed a subsequent Motion for Psychiatric Examination of the Accused by a Physician of Defendant's Choosing when the initial examination did not produce results to his liking. Section 552.030.3 expressly permits such an examination. Roberts's motion expressly cited section 552.030.3. The trial court's order sustained the motion pursuant to Section 552.020, an apparent legal nonsequitur given the sole legal foundation claimed in Roberts's second motion. [1] Subsequently, Roberts filed a Motion Withdrawing Intent to Rely on a Defense of Mental Disease or Defect and filed a Notice of Intent to Present the Defense of Mental Disease or Defect to Negate a Culpable Mental State.
No statement made by the accused in the course of any such examination and no information received by any physician or other person in the course thereof, whether such examination was made with or without the consent of the accused or upon his motion or upon that of others, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the issue of whether he committed the act charged against him in any criminal proceeding then or thereafter pending in any court, state or federal. The statement or information shall be admissible in evidence for or against him only on the issue of his mental condition, whether or not it would otherwise be deemed to be a privileged communication. If the statement or information is admitted for or against the accused on the issue of his mental condition, the court shall, both orally at the time of its admission and later by instruction, inform the jury that it must not consider such statement or information as any evidence of whether the accused committed the act charged against him. Roberts claims on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to caution the jury in accordance with MAI-CR 3d 300.20 and instruct the jury with MAI-CR 3d 306.04. [2] The next witness to testify is [name of doctor]. He will testify concerning the mental condition of the defendant at the time of the alleged offense. In the course of his testimony, [name of doctor] may testify to statements and information that were received by him during or in connection with his inquiry into the mental condition of the defendant. In that connection, the Court instructs you that under no circumstances should you consider that testimony as evidence that the defendant did or did not commit the acts charged against him. MAI-CR 3d 300.20. The state disagrees on two grounds. First, the state says that State v. Strubberg, 616 S.W.2d 809, 812-3 (Mo. 1981), prohibits using a section 552.020 examination for purposes of section 552.030. Second, even if the trial court erred in failing to caution and instruct the jury, the state claims that Roberts suffered no prejudice as a result of the error.
Strubberg contains these words: [The defendant] was not entitled to and did not receive the .030 examination nor could his.020 examination be treated by the court as an .030 examination. This sentence is the fulcrum of the state's claim that the trial court did not err in refusing the profferred instructions. In context, however, Strubberg says: Appellant did not plead not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility for the acts charged nor did he give written notice of his intent to rely on such defense. He was not entitled to and did not receive the .030 examination nor could his .020 examination be treated by the court as an .030 examination. It was not error for the court to fail to give [MAI-CR3d 300.20] in this case. Id. at 817. In this case, the defendant gave notice of his intent to rely on a defense of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility. Where a defendant files a timely notice of intent or a notice is accepted by the trial court as establishing good cause for a late notice of intent to rely on a defense of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility, section 552.030.2, it is the use to which the defendant puts the mental examination that determines whether the trial court must give the mandatory instruction. Strubberg does not apply.
In State v. Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. banc 1996), this Court held that [i]f any statement or information obtained from the section 552.030 examination is admitted, the trial court must, orally at the time of its admission, and, later, by instruction, inform the jury that it must not consider the statement or information as evidence of whether the accused committed the act charged against him. Id. at 870. The failure to give a required instruction is error. The trial court failed to give the required instruction and erred in so doing.
When a trial court errs in failing to give a required instruction, reversal is not mandated unless the defendant suffers prejudice as a result of the error. Prejudice occurs where the jury may have been adversely influenced by an erroneous instruction or by the lack of an instruction required by statute. State v. Betts, 646 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Mo. banc 1983). A crime generally consists of two elements: the physical, wrongful deed (the actus reus ) and the guilty mind that produces the act (the mens rea ). Kreutzer holds that [t]he `acts' to which the limiting instruction [MAI-CR 3d 300.20 and 306.40] refers are only those actions that culminated in the death [of the victim].... [T]he instruction emphasizes to the jury that it must consider such testimony only in its determination of whether appellant had the mens rea necessary to be guilty of murder in the first degree. Id. at 871. In this case, Roberts confessed to the actus reus. Defense counsel acknowledged to the jury on several occasions that Roberts had killed Ms. Taylor. When a defendant makes a voluntary judicial admission of fact before a jury, it serves as a substitute for evidence and dispenses with proof of the actual fact and the admission is conclusive on him for the purposes of the case. State v. Olinger, 396 S.W.2d 617, 621-2 (Mo. banc 1965). By conceding that he killed the victim, Roberts could not have been harmed by the failure of the trial court to give the limiting instructions. This is because the only issue before the jury after the admission was whether Roberts deliberated prior to doing what he admitted he did. The jury did not need to be warned that it should not use the mental health experts' testimony as proof that Roberts committed the murder. Roberts's trial admission removed that issue from the jury's consideration. The point is denied.