Opinion ID: 1044003
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Spousal Support Framework

Text: Spousal support in one form or another has been a part of Anglo-American divorce law for centuries. Prior to 1857, English ecclesiastical courts, which had jurisdiction over family matters, could grant divorces a mensa et thoro, known today as a divorce from bed and board or legal separation. See Wood v. Wood, 407 A.2d 282, 286 n. 3 (Me.1979); 2 Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 17.1 (2d ed. 1987) ( The Law of Domestic Relations ). [6] These courts would grant the wife alimony under the theory that, because the marriage bond remained undissolved, but the spouses were authorized to live apart, the husband's duty to support his family continued unabated. See Swan v. Harrison, 42 Tenn. (2 Cold.) 534, 541 (1865); The Law of Domestic Relations § 17.1. Absent an award of support, the wife would become destitute since she could not remarry, could not own property of her own, and employment opportunities for women, especially married women, were limited. The Law of Domestic Relations § 17.1; see also Reed v. Reed, 457 S.W.2d 4, 12 (Ky.Ct.App.1970) (Osborne, J., dissenting). In this country, courts imported the ecclesiastical court's practice of awarding spousal support, but expanded it to include absolute divorces. See The Law of Domestic Relations § 17.1. Tennessee was no exception, though alimony was originally permitted in this state only in cases involving a divorce from bed and board, on the theory that the parties were merely separated and thus not free to remarry. Consequently, it was appropriate to award support to the economically disadvantaged spouse. See Note, Tennessee Alimony Reform, 14 Mem. St. U.L.Rev. 219, 220 (1984). If the parties were granted an absolute divorce, Tennessee law required that support be made in the form of property division rather than periodic payments as is typically done today. See, e.g., Chenault v. Chenault, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 248, 251 (1857) (in cases of absolute divorce, courts make a reasonable division of the husband's estate to provide for the wife's support). From an early date, then, Tennessee law has been averse to providing spousal support on a long-term basis when the marriage was completely dissolved. This view continues to be reflected in the state's current spousal support framework. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(2)-(3) (2010) (reflecting a legislative preference favoring short-term spousal support over long-term spousal support). It was not until the 1860s that Tennessee courts were permitted to order spousal support in the form of periodic payments as an alternative to property division in order to supply the economically disadvantaged spouse with the necessaries suitable to her rank and condition in life. Swan, 42 Tenn. at 544. In addition, the practice of ordering spousal support from the husband's property only in bed and board divorces was changed during this time, such that support could be ordered in both bed and board and absolute divorces. Id. at 541-544. This support was to be paid according to the nature of the case and the circumstances of the parties. . . for a limited time, or for life. Id. at 543. Further, the ordered support could consist of a part of the husband's real or personal estate, or it may be charged upon the former, as the court may, in its sound discretion, under the circumstances of the case, think proper. Id. The courts also recognized that [o]f course, no fixed rule can be laid down by which every case is to be governed when determining the nature and amount of alimony. Stillman v. Stillman, 66 Tenn. (7 Baxter) 169, 183 (1874). The law then, as now, was that the need of spousal support, as well as its nature, amount, and duration, was for the discretion of the [trial court], in view of the particular circumstances of each case. Id. Once the early cases resolved threshold questions related to the type of divorce for which spousal support could be ordered and the form such an award could take, the courts' focus shifted to the amount to award and the length of time it should be paid. By the 1930s, for example, Tennessee courts had recognized that, although [t]here are no hard and fast rules governing the amount of alimony, specific factors were to be considered in determining the appropriate amount. Walden v. Walden, 13 Tenn.App. 337, 344 (Tenn.Ct.App.1930). These factors included the value of the separate property owned by the spouses, their age, income, station in life, as well as the way and manner in which the [marital] estate has been accumulated and contributions made thereto by the parties. Id. The conduct of the parties and their relative fault was likewise deemed an appropriate factor to consider. Id. See also Winslow v. Winslow, 133 Tenn. 663, 665, 182 S.W. 241 (1916). [7] The parties' standard of living could be considered as well. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 146 Tenn. 38, 45, 236 S.W. 938, 940 (1922).
Although Tennessee spousal support law continued to be shaped and refined in the decades after these developments, the law as it exists today reflects most of these longstanding and almost universally accepted principles. [8] Current Tennessee law recognizes several distinct types of spousal support, including (1) alimony in futuro, (2) alimony in solido, (3) rehabilitative alimony, and (4) transitional alimony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(1). In analyzing the present dispute, it is helpful to begin with an overview of each type. The first type of spousal support, alimony in futuro, is intended to provide support on a long-term basis until the death or remarriage of the recipient. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(1). This type of alimony can be awarded where the court finds that there is relative economic disadvantage and that rehabilitation is not feasible. Id. See also Burlew, 40 S.W.3d at 470-71; Riggs v. Riggs, 250 S.W.3d 453, 456 n. 2 (Tenn.Ct.App.2007). Alimony in futuro is appropriate when the disadvantaged spouse is unable to achieve, with reasonable effort, an earning capacity that will permit the spouse's standard of living after the divorce to be reasonably comparable to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, or to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the other spouse. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(1). Alimony in futuro is not, however, a guarantee that the recipient spouse will forever be able to enjoy a lifestyle equal to that of the obligor spouse. Riggs, 250 S.W.3d at 456 n. 2. In many instances, the parties' assets and incomes simply will not permit them to achieve the same standard of living after the divorce as they enjoyed during the marriage. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d at 340. While enabling the spouse with less income to maintain the pre-divorce lifestyle is a laudable goal, the reality is that [t]wo persons living separately incur more expenses than two persons living together. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d at 234. Thus, in most divorce cases it is unlikely that both parties will be able to maintain their pre-divorce lifestyle. . . . Id. It is not surprising, therefore, that [t]he prior concept of alimony as lifelong support enabling the disadvantaged spouse to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage has been superseded by the legislature's establishment of a preference for rehabilitative alimony. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d at 340. The second type of support, alimony in solido, is also a form of long-term support. The total amount of alimony in solido is set on the date of the divorce decree and is either paid in a lump sum payment of cash or property, or paid in installments for a definite term. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(h)(1); Broadbent, 211 S.W.3d at 222 (Alimony in solido consists of a definite sum of money that is paid in a lump sum or in installments over a definite period of time.). A typical purpose of such an award would be to adjust the distribution of the parties' marital property. Burlew, 40 S.W.3d at 471. Alimony in solido may be awarded in lieu of or in addition to any other alimony award, in order to provide support, including attorney fees, where appropriate. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(5). Unlike alimony in futuro, the other form of long-term support, alimony in solido is considered a final judgment, not modifiable, except by agreement of the parties, and does not terminate upon the death or remarriage of the recipient or payor spouse. [9] Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121(h)(2)-(3); see Riggs, 250 S.W.3d at 456 n. 3. In contrast to alimony in futuro, rehabilitative alimony is intended to assist an economically disadvantaged spouse in acquiring additional education or training which will enable the spouse to achieve a standard of living comparable to the standard of living that existed during the marriage or the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the other spouse. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121(e)(1). See also Robertson, 76 S.W.3d at 340-41; Riggs, 250 S.W.3d at 456 n. 4. Rehabilitative alimony thus serves the purpose of assisting the disadvantaged spouse in obtaining additional education, job skills, or training, as a way of becoming more self-sufficient following the divorce. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d at 340-41; Isbell v. Isbell, 816 S.W.2d 735, 738-39 (Tenn.1991). This purpose is markedly different than the purpose of alimony in futuro, which is to provide long-term support when the economically disadvantaged spouse is unable to achieve self-sufficiency. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d at 234. The fourth category of support, transitional alimony, is appropriate when a court finds that rehabilitation is not required but that the economically disadvantaged spouse needs financial assistance in adjusting to the economic consequences of the divorce. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(4), (g)(1); Riggs, 250 S.W.3d at 456 n. 5. Simply put, this type of alimony aid[s] the person in the transition to the status of a single person. Mills v. Mills, No. M2009-02474-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3059170, at  (Tenn.Ct.App. Aug. 4, 2010); see also Montgomery v. Silberman, No. M2009-00853-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4113669, at  (Tenn.Ct.App. Nov. 24, 2009) (affirming trial court's award of transitional alimony to wife to bridge the gap, so to speak, between her married life and single life); Engesser v. Engesser, 42 So.3d 249, 251 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.2010) (en banc) (describing transitional alimony as [b]ridge-the-gap alimony designed to smooth the transition of a spouse from married to single life). In contrast to rehabilitative alimony, which is designed to increase an economically disadvantaged spouse's capacity for self-sufficiency, transitional alimony is designed to aid a spouse who already possesses the capacity for self-sufficiency but needs financial assistance in adjusting to the economic consequences of establishing and maintaining a household without the benefit of the other spouse's income. As such, transitional alimony is a form of short-term support. Transitional alimony is payable for a definite period of time and may be modified only upon certain circumstances: (1) the parties agree that it may be modified; (2) the court provides for modification in the divorce decree; or (3) the recipient spouse resides with a third person following the divorce. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121(g)(2). The statutory framework for spousal support reflects a legislative preference favoring short-term spousal support over long-term spousal support, with the aim being to rehabilitate a spouse who is economically disadvantaged relative to the other spouse and achieve self-sufficiency where possible. See Tenn.Code Ann § 36-5-121(d)(2)-(3); Bratton, 136 S.W.3d at 605; Perry v. Perry, 114 S.W.3d 465, 467 (Tenn.2003). Thus, there is a statutory bias toward awarding transitional or rehabilitative alimony over alimony in solido or in futuro. While this statutory preference does not entirely displace long-term spousal support, alimony in futuro should be awarded only when the court finds that economic rehabilitation is not feasible and long-term support is necessary. See Bratton, 136 S.W.3d at 605; Robertson, 76 S.W.3d at 341-42. Finally, in determining whether to award spousal support and, if so, determining the nature, amount, length, and manner of payment, courts consider several factors: (1) The relative earning capacity, obligations, needs, and financial resources of each party, including income from pension, profit sharing or retirement plans and all other sources; (2) The relative education and training of each party, the ability and opportunity of each party to secure such education and training, and the necessity of a party to secure further education and training to improve such party's earnings capacity to a reasonable level; (3) The duration of the marriage; (4) The age and mental condition of each party; (5) The physical condition of each party, including, but not limited to, physical disability or incapacity due to a chronic debilitating disease; (6) The extent to which it would be undesirable for a party to seek employment outside the home, because such party will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage; (7) The separate assets of each party, both real and personal, tangible and intangible; (8) The provisions made with regard to the marital property, as defined in § 36-4-121; (9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage; (10) The extent to which each party has made such tangible and intangible contributions to the marriage as monetary and homemaker contributions, and tangible and intangible contributions by a party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other party; (11) The relative fault of the parties, in cases where the court, in its discretion, deems it appropriate to do so; and (12) Such other factors, including the tax consequences to each party, as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i). Although each of these factors must be considered when relevant to the parties' circumstances, the two that are considered the most important are the disadvantaged spouse's need and the obligor spouse's ability to pay. Riggs, 250 S.W.3d at 457. See also Bratton, 136 S.W.3d at 605; Robertson, 76 S.W.3d at 342; Burlew, 40 S.W.3d at 470. Carefully adhering to the statutory framework for awarding spousal support, both in terms of awarding the correct type of support and for an appropriate amount and time, fulfills not only the statutory directives but also alimony's fundamental purpose of eliminating spousal dependency where possible.