Opinion ID: 184673
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Multiple-car and trainload shipments of wheat and barley

Text: 18 We have previously ruled, and the parties agree, that we have jurisdiction over claims relating to rates charged for multiple-car shipments of wheat and barley (Docket No. 37815S) pursuant to the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2321(a) and 2342(5). In Burlington Northern, we concluded that Section 1336(b) has no application to this second category of claims because they arise out of the Montana Department of Agriculture complaint, not the district court referral. 985 F.2d at 592. 19 3. Single-car shipments of barley and single-car shipments of wheat moving after September 12, 1980 20 The determination of our jurisdiction over the third set of claims is more difficult. Characterizing this jurisdictional question as exceptionally difficult, we declined to decide this issue in Burlington Northern on the grounds that it was not necessary to resolve all jurisdictional questions where the merits of a case are clearly against a party seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction. Id. at 593. However, in light of the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), this position is no longer tenable. As Justice Scalia noted in that case, proceeding to the merits despite jurisdictional objections carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles of separation of powers. Id. at ----, 118 S.Ct. at 1012. Therefore, we must resolve all jurisdictional questions before proceeding to the merits. 21 McCarty Farms challenges this court's jurisdiction over the third category of claims on the ground that these claims fall within the statutory exception to our jurisdiction found in 28 U.S.C. § 1336(b). McCarty Farms argues that these claims arose out of the referral from the Montana district court and that the district court therefore has exclusive [332 U.S.App.D.C. 393] jurisdiction to review the STB's decision regarding these claims on appeal. In order to determine whether we have jurisdiction over the third category of claims, we must start with the text of Section 1336(b). The question of which court has jurisdiction turns on the construction of the term arising in Section 1336(b). In general usage, the meaning of the term arise is to originate. Black's Law Dictionary 99 (5th ed.1979). Consistent with this usage, the third category of claims cannot be said to have arisen out of the district court's referral. 22 In no sense did the third category of claims originate in the district court's referral. The referral did not mention rates for shipments of barley or rates for shipments of wheat moving after September 12, 1980. The complaint filed with the district court did not even reference these rates. See McCarty Farms, 787 F.Supp. at 942 & n. 10 (reproducing relevant sections of the amended complaint). Indeed, McCarty Farms has petitioned the district court to clarify its referral order so that it specifically references these claims, but the district court has refused to do so. Id. at 947. We find McCarty Farms' argument that the claims may arise out of a referral that makes no mention of them unpersuasive. McCarty Farms has supplied no workable definition of the term arise supporting its contentions. 23 We acknowledge that other courts have noted that the legislative history of Section 1336(b) evidences an intent on the part of Congress to avoid piecemeal appeals by directing the district court to review all claims arising from its referral. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. ICC, 894 F.2d 915, 917 (7th Cir.1990) (The insight behind section 1336(b) is that if a question within the purview of the ICC arises in the course of a district court proceeding, submission of the ICC's answer in the first instance to the district court rather than to the court of appeals will avoid a cumbersome and potentially protracted bifurcation of judicial review. (citing S.Rep. No. 1394, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964))). Some courts have pointed to this legislative history in justifying a broad construction of the term arising in order to further this congressional goal. See, e.g., Union Pacific R.R. v. Ametek, Inc., 104 F.3d 558, 561 (3rd Cir.1997) (noting that a narrow construction of the term arising would lead to problems arising out of parallel proceedings in different courts arising out of a single controversy). 24 Nevertheless, we hold that we have jurisdiction over the third category of claims on the present facts. McCarty Farms could not have filed the third category of claims in the district court, even if it had wanted to do so. In the complaint it filed with the ICC, McCarty Farms sought a prescription on future rates, a remedy not available in the district court. See 49 U.S.C. § 11705(b)(1) (1988). The fact that these claims as outlined in the administrative complaint could not have been brought in the district court demonstrates that they could not have arisen from the district court's referral. Congress did not intend to authorize litigants to expand the district court's jurisdiction beyond its legitimate scope by filing complaints with the ICC and then seeking review of those complaints by the district court pursuant to Section 1336(b). 25 Moreover, the third category of claims could not have been brought in the district court because, by the time McCarty Farms filed its complaint with the ICC, the district court had been divested of jurisdiction to hear those claims. On October 1, 1980, approximately six months before McCarty Farms filed its complaint with the ICC on March 27, 1981, Congress enacted the Staggers Rail Act. The Staggers Act provides in relevant part that [t]he jurisdiction of the Board over ... transportation by rail carriers ... is exclusive. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b). After the parties petitioned the district court to clarify its referral order, that court rightly held that the Staggers Act had divested it of jurisdiction over the third category of claims. As a result, the court concluded that it could not allow McCarty Farms to amend its complaint to include the third category of claims, and it could not itself alter its referral order to specifically reference those claims. The court reasoned as follows: 26 [The Staggers Act] did, contrary to the assertion of the plaintiffs, divest this court of jurisdiction over challenges to the reasonableness [332 U.S.App.D.C. 394] of rail rates in effect on or after the effective date of the Staggers Rail Act, i.e., October 1, 1980. Because the court would not have had jurisdiction to entertain the challenges advanced by the plaintiffs to rail rates in effect as of October 1, 1980, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction by retroactive amendment of the order of referral. 27 McCarty Farms, 787 F.Supp. at 947. These claims, not being within the jurisdiction of the district court, could not have arisen out of any referral from that court. 28 Despite any lack of clarity in either the text of Section 1336(b) or its legislative history, we are satisfied that our construction is consistent with congressional intent. Although members of Congress may have expressed an intent to further judicial economy, that laudable goal will not compel a construction whereby claims that are only tangentially related to those referred by the district court arise out of that referral along with those specifically referenced by the district court. Further, there is little danger of piecemeal appeals where the disputed claims are not raised with the district court, but rather are brought before the STB in the first instance. Moreover, given the specific facts in this case, there necessarily will be some duplication of judicial effort since it is undisputed that we have jurisdiction over the second category of claims, and it is clear that the district court has jurisdiction over the first category. 29 We have stated before that the exception to our jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act found in Section 1336(b) is a narrow one. Overland Express, Inc. v. ICC, 996 F.2d 356, 358 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1993), judgment vacated, 511 U.S. 1103, 114 S.Ct. 2095, 128 L.Ed.2d 658 (1994) (noting that  § 1336(b) is a narrow exception to our jurisdiction over challenges to Commission proceedings under the Hobbs Act). Construing the statute narrowly gives the parties a bright line rule they may follow in seeking review of an STB decision. See Ametek, 104 F.3d at 566 (Roth, J., dissenting) (The application of such a strict interpretation of § 1336(b) would reduce the chance that appeals are made to the wrong court. Counsel need only look to the language of the district court's referral to determine whether the issue was properly reviewable by a district court....). Under a strict construction of Section 1336(b), issues expressly set out in the district court's referral order are reviewed by the district court. The court of appeals reviews all other issues. 30 We note that the district court has come to the same conclusion, ruling that the scope of the court's jurisdiction to review the Interstate Commerce Commission's decisions is determined by the scope of the referral order itself. McCarty Farms, 787 F.Supp. at 942. After reviewing its own referral to the ICC, that court concluded that the third category of claims at issue here did not arise from its referral. Id. at 943 (Contrary to the assertion of the plaintiffs, the express language of the court's order of referral cannot be read to have encompassed single-car, multiple-car, and trainload rates assessed by the Burlington Northern on shipments of wheat which occurred from September 12, 1980, forward and for the future, nor on single-car, multiple-car, and trainload rates on barley from March 26, 1981, the date plaintiffs filed their administrative complaint, forward, and for the future.). 31 In sum, we are convinced that the disputed claims, not having been within the jurisdiction of the district court, cannot have arisen out of a referral from that court. We further hold that this conclusion is consistent with the intent of Congress as expressed in Section 1336(b).