Opinion ID: 283896
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the post-conspiracy statement

Text: 39 Pyne also assigns as error a ruling of the trial court which permitted the jury to apply against Pyne a post-conspiracy statement made by Fellabaum to agent Tolan. 40 Tolan testified that on June 20, 1966, Fellabaum told him about the meeting with Kaiser and the events that ensued in the hotel room. This admission to Tolan took place after the conspiracy, by the terms of the indictment, had ended. it was not, therefore, admissible against Pyne, a co-conspirator. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 69 S.Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790 (1949); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 67 S.Ct. 224, 91 L.Ed. 196 (1946). Fellabaum's statement to Tolan did not directly in culpate Pyne, and therefore the error did not reach constitutional proportions under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). Cf. United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968); United States v. Guajardo-Melendez, 401 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1968). 41 Upon objection, the trial judge originally ruled that Fellabaum's admission was not to be applied to Pyne, and he instructed the jury that 'the record may show that this testimony at this time pertains only to the defendant Fellabaum'. (Tr. 77) Again, a few moments later, the judge stated 'at this time it applies only to the defendant Fellabaum'. (Tr. 78) See Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 73 S.Ct. 481, 97 L.Ed. 593 (1953). 42 Two days later, the government moved to have the testimony of another witness admitted against boty Pyne and Fellabaum on the ground that a prima facie case of conspiracy had been proved. After hearing argument in that matter, the court ruled that 43 'All of the evidence that has been introduced, that the court indicated would apply just to either the defendant Fellabaum or to the defendant Pyne, or that would be considered in connection with the case, is now considered as against both the defendants here on trial and may be so considered by the jury.' (Tr, 396-97) 44 It was in this manner, the defendant Pyne argues, that the testimony of two days earlier became applicable against Pyne, and it is to this ruling that the objection is now made. When the court made the ruling just quoted above, no reference was made in the presence of the jury to the earlier statement (by Fellabaum to Tolan); however, since that ruling was broad enough to include the statement of Fellabaum to Tolan, the ruling must be deemed to be error under Krulewitch and Fiswick, both cited above. However, for the reasons which follow, we find that the error was harmless and did not affect Pyne's substantial rights under rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946); United States v. D'Antonio, 326 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. den. 385 U.S. 900, 87 S.Ct. 204, 17 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966). 45 As just stated, the trial judge's challenged ruling made no specific mention of the Fellabaum declaration; it was therefore not directly called to the attention of the jury. Also, the judge instructed the jury that: 46 '   in determining whether a particular defendant was a member of the conspiracy, if any, you should consider only his acts and statements. He cannot be bound by the acts or declarations of the other participants.   ' 47 (Tr. 708) 48 and that 49 '   statements of any conspirator which are not in furtherance of the conspiracy, or made before its existence, or after its termination, may be considered as evidence only against the person making them.' (Tr. 710) 50 See Calhoun v. United States, 368 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1966). 51 An additional reason for holding the error harmless is that there was substantial independent evidence of the entire operation of the conspiracy and of the guilt of Pyne and his associates. See Calhoun, supra. Hammock testified concerning his conversations and dealings with Fellabaum about the victim, Kaiser; Hammock also related his conversations with Pyne concerning the matter of extorting Kaiser. Hammock further testified that when he came to Chicago to meet with Pyne, at Kaminsky's instruction, they discussed 'making a play' for Kaiser. Fellabaum's admission to Tolan was strong evidence of the homosexual event, but direct evidence is not needed to find a conspiracy; circumstantial evidence suffices. Miller v. United States, 382 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. den. 390 U.S. 984, 88 S.Ct. 1108, 19 L.Ed.2d 1285, reh. den. 391 U.S. 971, 88 S.Ct. 2037, 20 L.Ed.2d 888 (1968). 52 Defendant Pyne contends that another error occurred during the trial when, in the presence of the jury, the prosecutor contended that certain evidence should be received on the ground 'that the government has shown a prima facie case of conspiracy'. 53 Pyne's attorney promptly moved for a mistrial, which the court denied, and then the jury was excused in order that the court could consider the receipt of the evidence in question. Thereupon, the court recalled the jury and ruled that the evidence introduced could be employed against both the defendants. No reference was made by the court to the government's claim that a prima facie case of conspiracy had been proved. Although the court supported the government's position with regard to the application of the evidence, it does not follow that the jury would read into such ruling a judicial approbation of the government's contention that a prima facie case had been proved. We find no error in this regard.