Opinion ID: 1689940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evolving Definition of Illegal Sentence

Text: Since 1968, our procedural rules have provided for the correction of illegal sentences. Rule 3.800(a), entitled Correction, Reduction, and Modification of Sentences provides that a court may at any time correct an illegal sentence imposed by it. [4] Accordingly, rule 3.800(a) vests trial courts with the broad authority to correct an illegal sentence without imposing a time limitation on the ability of defendants to seek relief. The rule, however, does not include a definition of illegal sentence. As we recently observed, the definition of illegal sentence as interpreted by case law has narrowed significantly since that term was used in the 1960s and 1970s. See Maddox v. State, 760 So.2d 89, 96 n. 6 (Fla.2000). Although sentencing may have been a relatively straightforward exercise when we first adopted the procedural rule to correct illegal sentences at any time, sentencing has become increasingly more complex. See Amendments to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.111(e) & 3.800 & Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h), 9.140, & 9.600, 761 So.2d 1015, 1017 (Fla.1999), reh'g granted, 761 So.2d 1025 (Fla.2000). This is due in part to the multitude of sentencing statutes that have proliferated since the Court first adopted rule 3.800. In addition, many of these laws are frequently amended. The habitual offender statute, section 775.084, which authorizes extended terms of imprisonment for those who meet the statutory requirements, is but one prominent example. Therefore, expertise in sentencing is required by the defense, the State, and the trial court. Despite the best intentions of all participants, sentencing in a given case may be filled with hidden traps, thus requiring sufficient procedural safeguards to protect against a sentencing error that would require a defendant to serve more time than authorized by law. This reality precipitated our recent decision to expand the ability of defendants to file a motion to correct sentence in the trial court pursuant to rule 3.800(b) from thirty days after the rendition of the sentence to at any time until the first appellate brief is filed. Id. at 1018. Rule 3.800(a) is intended to balance the need for finality of convictions and sentences with the goal of ensuring that criminal defendants do not serve sentences imposed contrary to the requirements of law. Thus, over the past several years, this Court has attempted to formulate a workable definition of what type of sentences should be considered illegal for purposes of rule 3.800(a). In Davis, the defendant claimed his departure sentence was illegal because the trial court failed to reduce to writing the reasons for departure at the time of sentencing. 661 So.2d at 1194. Although the defendant's sentence was within the maximum authorized by law, the sentence was outside the range of the sentencing guidelines. See id. In rejecting the defendant's claim, we held that the trial court's failure to file written findings for a departure sentence did not render the resulting sentence illegal and subject to correction at any time pursuant to rule 3.800(a). See id. at 1196. Rather, we concluded that an illegal sentence is one that exceeds the maximum period set forth by law for a particular offense without regard to the guidelines. Id. We additionally made the statement that seemingly narrowed the definition of an illegal sentence by stating that [o]nly if the sentence exceeds the maximum allowed by law would the sentence be illegal. Id. On the same day that we issued our opinion in Davis, we also issued our opinion in State v. Callaway, 658 So.2d 983 (Fla.1995). In Callaway, the defendant claimed that his sentence was illegal because the trial court had imposed consecutive habitual felony offender sentences for offenses arising out of the same criminal episode in violation of Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521 (Fla.1993). Callaway, 658 So.2d at 985. In rejecting the argument that the sentence was illegal, our decision turned not on our definition of illegal sentence, but on the fact that the error at issue was not patent from the record. See id. at 988. The Court reasoned that because [a] rule 3.800 motion can be filed at any time, even decades after a sentence has been imposed... its subject matter is limited to those sentencing issues that can be resolved as a matter of law without an evidentiary determination. Id. We soon explained that our definition of illegal sentence in Davis should not be construed so narrowly as to preclude correction of a sentence that had been unconstitutionally lengthened in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Thus, in Hopping v. State, 708 So.2d 263, 265 (Fla. 1998), we concluded that a sentence that was increased upon resentencing in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause constituted an illegal sentence in that it exceeded the maximum period set forth by law for a particular offense without regard to the guidelines. We held that where it can be determined without an evidentiary hearing that a sentence has been unconstitutionally enhanced in violation of the double jeopardy clause, the sentence is illegal and can be reached at any time under rule 3.800. Id. Following Hopping, in State v. Mancino, 714 So.2d 429, 433 (Fla.1998), the Court concluded that the failure to credit a defendant with jail time served constituted an illegal sentence that should be corrected pursuant to rule 3.800(a). In Mancino, we clarified that [a]s is evident from our recent holding in Hopping, we have rejected the contention that our holding in Davis mandates that only those sentences that facially exceed the statutory maximums may be challenged under 3.800(a) as illegal. Id. at 433. Accordingly, we implicitly, if not expressly, receded from Davis in Mancino and Hopping to the extent that Davis could be read to limit challenges under rule 3.800(a) to only those sentences that exceed the statutory maximum. We went on in Mancino to state that a sentence that patently fails to comport with statutory or constitutional limitations is by definition `illegal.' Id. Although we may have defined illegal too narrowly in Davis, it appears that our newly formulated definition in Mancino may be overly broad. Both the Third and Fourth Districts have expressed the concern that defining an illegal sentence as one that patently fails to comport with statutory or constitutional limitations is too expansive because it encompasses all patent sentencing errors. See Bover, 732 So.2d at 1193; Blakley v. State, 746 So.2d 1182, 1186 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). The Third District has lamented: Rule 3.800(a) motions now routinely rely upon the statement in State v. Mancino, 714 So.2d 429, 433 (Fla.1998), that [a] sentence that patently fails to comport with statutory or constitutional limitations is by definition `illegal.' Although not intended, the statement is being interpreted as saying that any sentencing error which can be gleaned from the face of the record renders a sentence illegal, and may be raised at any time. Bover, 732 So.2d at 1193; see Kelly v. State, 739 So.2d 1164, 1165 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (observing that [r]ule 3.800(a) motions now routinely rely on the language in Mancino which has been interpreted to allow review of any sentencing error discernable from the face of the record). Despite these interpretations of Mancino, the Fourth District has concluded that the supreme court did not intend to enlarge the universe of illegal sentences beyond the three kinds identified in Davis, Callaway, Hopping and Mancino.  Blakley, 746 So.2d at 1186. We continue to refine our definition of illegal sentence in an attempt to strike the proper balance between concerns for finality and concerns for fundamental fairness in sentencing. In this endeavor, we have been assisted ably by the appellate courts, which continue to be confronted daily with the question of what sentences are illegal and correctable at any time and what sentences, although failing to comply with the law, are not subject to correction. Attempting to formulate a more workable definition of illegal sentence, Judge Farmer has explained: To be illegal within the meaning of rule 3.800(a) the sentence must impose a kind of punishment that no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes could possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances. On the other hand, if it is possible under all the sentencing statutesgiven a specific set of factsto impose a particular sentence, then the sentence will not be illegal within rule 3.800(a) even though the judge erred in imposing it. Blakley, 746 So.2d at 1186-87 (emphasis supplied). With these previous definitions of illegal sentence in mind, we turn to the specific issue in this case-whether the improper habitualization of a life felony should be considered an illegal sentence subject to correction pursuant to rule 3.800(a).