Opinion ID: 2365445
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adequacy of Instructions Defining Consent for Attempted Rape

Text: Defendant contends the trial court's instructions improperly allowed the jury to find that he committed an attempted forcible rape even if it concluded Mele passively acquiesced in his sexual advances and that he neither knew nor could reasonably be expected to know (from his own conduct or hers) that she did not want to have sex. He claims the trial court had a duty to instruct on its own motion that passive or unexpressed assent can be consent, that positive cooperation in an act or attitude as an exercise of free will does not require any physical or verbal expression of cooperation, and that the alleged victim must express her lack of consent in a manner such that a reasonable person would perceive she did not consent. Defendant argues the failure to so instruct prejudiced him because his jury reasonably could have concluded that Mele initially passively acquiesced in his sexual advances and that he stopped trying to have sex with her as soon as she snapped out of it and pushed him off of her. He asserts the instructions improperly reduced the prosecution's burden of proof and denied him due process of law, a fair trial, the right to present a defense, a trial free from improper lessening of the prosecution's burden of proof, and a reliable and nonarbitrary determination of guilt, death eligibility, and penalty in violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 1, 7, 15, 16 and 17 of the California Constitution. We conclude defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object to the trial court's consent instruction or to request any modification or amplification of it at trial. A trial court has no sua sponte duty to revise or improve upon an accurate statement of law without a request from counsel ( People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 535 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385]), and failure to request clarification of an otherwise correct instruction forfeits the claim of error for purposes of appeal. ( People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 454, 180 P.3d 224]; People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1163 [91 Cal.Rptr.3d 874]). Here, with only minor exceptions, the challenged portion of CALJIC No. 1.23.1, which defines consent, tracks the language of section 261.6. Section 261.6 provides in pertinent part: In prosecutions under Section 261 ... in which consent is at issue, `consent' shall be defined to mean positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will. CALJIC No. 1.23.1, as given in this case, informed the jury that consent means positive cooperation in an act or attitude as an exercise of free will. (See CALJIC No. 1.23.1 (6th ed. 1996).) [13] As given, CALJIC No. 1.23.1 correctly expressed the law. If defendant believed the instruction on consent required elaboration or clarification, he was obliged to request such elaboration or clarification in the trial court. ( People v. Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 151; People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 622 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683].) Were we to address the merits of defendant's contention regarding the trial court's alleged failure to give clarifying instructions on consent, we would find that the jury instructions on consent were adequate in this case. The jury was instructed as follows on the law of attempt, the crime of forcible rape, and the intent required for attempted rape: An attempt to commit a crime consists of two elements, namely, a specific intent to commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done towards its commission. [¶] In determining whether such an act was done, it is necessary to distinguish between mere preparation on the one hand, [and] the actual doing of the criminal deed on the other. Mere preparation which may consist of planning the offense or devising, obtaining, or arranging the means for its commission is not sufficient to constitute an attempt. However, acts of a person who intend[s] to commit a crime will constitute an attempt where those acts clearly indicate a certain unambiguous intent to commit that specific crime. These acts must be an immediate step in the present execution of the criminal design, the progress of which would be completed unless interrupted by some circumstance not intended in the original design. [¶] Rape is defined as follows: [¶] Every person who engages in an act of sexual intercourse with another person who's not the spouse of the perpetrator accomplished against that person's will by means of force, violence, duress or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to that person is guilty of rape. [¶] Any sexual penetration, however slight, constitutes engaging in an act of sexual intercourse. Proof of ejaculation is not required. [¶] `Against the person's will' means without the consent of the alleged victim. [¶] `Force' means that amount of physical force required in the circumstances to overcome the victim's resistance. [¶] `Duress' means a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, or retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to perform an act which she would not have otherwise performed or acquiesce in an act [to] which she otherwise would not have submitted. The total circumstances, including the age of the alleged victim and her relationship to the defendant are factors to consider in apprising the existence of duress. [¶] The fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury must be actual and reasonable under the circumstances. [¶] In order to prove the offense of attempted rape, each of the following elements must be proved: 1. A direct but ineffectual act was committed by the defendant toward the commission of rape of the alleged victim; 2. At the time of the act, the defendant had the specific intent to rape the alleged victim[.] [¶] [I]n order to prove defendant had the specific intent to rape, each of the following elements must be proved: 1. The defendant had the specific intent to engage in an act of sexual intercourse with the alleged victim; 2. The defendant had the specific intent to engage in an act of sexual intercourse against the will of the victim; and 3. The defendant had the specific intent to accomplish the act of sexual intercourse by means of force, violence, duress, menace or fear of immediate or unlawful bodily injury. Pursuant to CALJIC No. 1.23.1, the jury next was instructed that consent in the context of rape means positive cooperation in an act or attitude as an exercise of free will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction involved. Based on CALJIC No. 10.65, the jury also was given the following modified Mayberry [14] instruction regarding the reasonable and good faith belief in consent as a defense to attempted rape: In the crime of attempted rape, criminal intent must exist at the time of the commission of the attempted rape. There's no criminal intent if the defendant had a reasonable and good faith belief that the other person voluntarily consented to engage in sexual intercourse. Therefore, a reasonable and good faith belief that there is voluntary consent is a defense to such a charge. [¶] However, a belief that is based on ambiguous conduct by an alleged victim that is the product of force, violence, duress or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another is not a reasonable and good faith belief. [¶] If after a consideration of all of the evidence you have a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the criminal intent at the time of the attempted act of sexual intercourse, you must find the special circumstance not true. These instructions were sufficient to apprise the jury of the relevant principles of law on the issues of intent and consent in the present case. The defense to the attempted rape charge was based on defendant's mental state. Under these standard instructions, which tracked the statutory language on consent and mental state, defendant's jury could consider all the circumstances in the case in determining whether defendant intended to accomplish sexual intercourse without Mele's consent. The instructions permitted the jury to consider defendant's argument that the law does not require that before a man can start to make some kind of a sexual advance toward a woman that she has to say yes. The instructions similarly permitted the jury to consider defendant's argument that he got the wrong impression about whether Mele was willing to have sex with him, and his related argument that there was a difference between a man who maybe hasn't been told yes but starts making some sexual advance and is told no and makes a choice to stop, [and] the man who doesn't care about consent or no consent and does intend to use force or violence. Reviewing the instructions as a whole, as we must ( People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 220 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 125, 186 P.3d 496]), we find no reasonable likelihood that the instruction [on consent] caused the jury to misconstrue or misapply the law ( People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 436 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 461, 161 P.3d 3]). Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not have a sua sponte duty to further instruct that positive cooperation in act or attitude includes passive acquiescence or assent, or to elaborate that the jury could not find a forcible rape if Mele merely was passive and defendant did not know and had no reason to know she did not consent. Having concluded the instructions on consent and mental state were adequate, and having rejected defendant's claims to the contrary, we do not reach the question whether an instruction that consent may be proved by evidence of an alleged rape victim's passive acquiescence would be consistent with the intent of the Legislature as expressed in section 261.6. We likewise need not address defendant's claim that, if section 261.6 excludes passive acquiescence from the definition of consent, retroactive application of that definition to him constitutes an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute in violation of his rights to notice and an opportunity to defend the charges against him. For the same reason, we need not reach defendant's claim that construing section 261.6 to exclude passive assent from the meaning of consent removes the requirement of a mens rea, or culpable mental state, from the crime of forcible rape, thereby violating due process of law by `offend[ing] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' ( McMillan v. Pennsylvania (1986) 477 U.S. 79, 85 [91 L.Ed.2d 67, 106 S.Ct. 2411].) We add that, here, the jury was instructed that to find an attempted forcible rape it must find defendant intended to use force, violence, duress, or fear to overcome Mele's will ( People v. Gonzalez (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1443-1444 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 778]), [15] and, additionally, that a good faith and reasonable belief in lack of consent is a defense to attempted rape; this ensured defendant would not be found guilty of that crime unless the jury concluded he acted with a culpable mental state. ( People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 360 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961]; People v. Mayberry, supra, 15 Cal.3d at pp. 154-155; see also People v. Gonzalez, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1443-1444). Furthermore, as noted above, the evidence was more than sufficient to establish that defendant ignored Mele's expressed unwillingness to engage in sexual intercourse. (4) Defendant finally contends section 261.6 and CALJIC No. 1.23.1 violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by creating a mandatory presumption that an alleged rape victim has not consented unless she expressly communicates her consent, and by relieving the prosecution of the burden of proving nonconsent in cases where the victim is passive. (See Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263, 265 [105 L.Ed.2d 218, 109 S.Ct. 2419]; Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 U.S. 307, 313-314 [85 L.Ed.2d 344, 105 S.Ct. 1965].) This claim lacks merit because CALJIC No. 1.23.1 does not tell a jury that it must presume lack of consent if the alleged victim has not actively expressed consent. The instruction simply explains what consent means in the context of forcible rape, without unconstitutionally shifting the burden of proving consent to defendant. ( People v. Gonzalez, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1443.) The jury was instructed that defendant was presumed innocent until the People proved him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; that the People had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the truth of the special circumstance of murder during an attempted rape; that the prosecution had to prove defendant had the specific intent to engage in an act of sexual intercourse against the will of the alleged victim; and that `against that person's will' means without the consent of the alleged victim. The instructions as a whole ensured the jury understood that the prosecution at all times bore the burden of proving each element of the charged offense and the special circumstance allegation, including, in the context of attempted rape, that defendant intended to have sex with Mele against her will and without her consent.