Opinion ID: 2493631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 30

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in denying Gulfport's Motion to Reconsider Change of Venue.

Text: ¶ 93. On December 15, 2003, the trial court granted Dedeaux's Motion for Change of Venue, transferring the case from the First Judicial District to the Second Judicial District. [25] In Dedeaux I, this Court found that Gulfport's appellate challenge to the trial court's decision to grant Dedeaux's Motion for Change of Venue was procedurally barred because it was raised for the first time on appeal.... Dedeaux I, 938 So.2d at 846. On April 2, 2008, Gulfport filed a Motion to Reconsider Change of Venue, [26] contending, inter alia, that [t]he court does not have the authority to transfer jurisdiction in an eminent domain case because the venue statute in eminent domain is jurisdictional. ¶ 94. At the motion hearing, the trial judge stated that he had granted the Motion for Change of Venue to the Second Judicial District so we didn't have a problem selecting the jury that would have any conflict at all by living in the utility districts whether it's being run by Dedeaux or Gulfport. The trial judge added that for practical purposes we're still in Harrison County. Thereafter, the trial court denied Gulfport's Motion to Reconsider Change of Venue. ¶ 95. Gulfport argues that [w]hen a statute provides for only one county of venue, venue then is jurisdictional. Gulfport maintains that, under Mississippi Code Section 11-27-5, [t]he only court with jurisdiction over eminent domain proceedings is the Special Court of Eminent Domain of the [c]ounty in which the land is situated. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-27-5 (Rev.2004). Since Harrison County has two judicial districts which are treated by statute as two separate counties[,] Gulfport contends that [t]he [t]rial [c]ourt's order transferring the venue of this case from the First Judicial District ... to the Second Judicial District equated to transferring the case to another ... county. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-53 (Rev.2002). Gulfport adds that, despite the delay in presenting its Motion to Reconsider Change of Venue, it is not procedurally barred, because subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred ... or waived by the parties. ¶ 96. Procedurally, Dedeaux responds that Gulfport's Motion to Reconsider Change of Venue, filed more than four years after the Motion for Change of Venue was granted in December 2003, is time-barred. Substantively, Dedeaux asserts that Mississippi Code Section 11-27-5 is silent with respect to the propriety of a subsequent transfer of the case to a different venue in the event that a party cannot secure a fair trial in the county in which the affected property is situated. ¶ 97. The standard of review for the grant or denial of a motion for change of venue is abuse of discretion. See Bayer Corp. v. Reed, 932 So.2d 786, 788 (Miss.2006); Donald v. Amoco Prod. Co., 735 So.2d 161, 181 (Miss.1999); Miss. State Highway Comm'n v. Rogers, 240 Miss. 529, 539-40, 128 So.2d 353, 358 (1961). Likewise, the standard of review for the denial of a Rule 60 motion is abuse of discretion. See Perkins v. Perkins, 787 So.2d 1256, 1261 (Miss.2001). ¶ 98. Procedurally, this Court notes that Rule 60(c) states: [a]n order transferring a case to another court will become effective ten (10) days following the date of entry of the order. Any motion for reconsideration of the transfer order must be filed prior to the expiration of the 10-day period, for which no extensions may be granted. Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(c). Gulfport clearly failed to comply with this rule. Furthermore, Dedeaux I concluded that Gulfport's challenge to the trial court's granted change of venue was procedurally barred. Dedeaux I, 938 So.2d at 841. But this Court also has stated that a new trial provides a clean slate. The issues must be retried, and the parties may thus present evidence differently. As such, a new trial requires its own law, and the judge is once again empowered to make judgments concerning Mississippi law as required by the evidence. White, 932 So.2d at 33. Based thereon, this Court will proceed to the substantive analysis. ¶ 99. Mississippi Code Section 11-27-5 provides, in pertinent part, that [a]ny person or corporation having the right to condemn private property for public use shall file a complaint to condemn with the circuit clerk of the county in which the affected property, or some part thereof, is situated .... Miss.Code Ann. § 11-27-5 (Rev.2004) (emphasis added). Gulfport's complaint of eminent domain was filed in the First Judicial District. But since the affected property ... is situated in Harrison County, that complaint also could have been filed in the Second Judicial District. Id. Unquestionably, Mississippi Code Section 11-1-53 provides that Harrison County is a county having two (2) judicial districts, that the jurisdiction of said courts of said districts shall be the same as if each district were a separate county[,] and that a change of venue from either of such districts to the other ... shall be made according to the procedure provided for by the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.... Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-53 (Rev.2002). For purposes of Section 11-27-5, however, this Court concludes that either the First Judicial District or the Second Judicial District could have had jurisdiction of this case. Moreover, Section 11-27-5 does not prohibit change of venue. In fact, this Court previously has held a lower court in error for refusing to grant a motion for change of venue in an eminent-domain proceeding. See Rogers, 128 So.2d at 357-58. Under these circumstances, i.e., remaining in Harrison County and the trial court's sound rationale for granting change of venue, this Court cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Gulfport's Motion to Reconsider Change of Venue.