Opinion ID: 486363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: evidence of the murders

Text: 44 On March 2, 1985, the day opening statements were made, Rios Polanco moved to exclude from evidence details pertaining to the beatings and actual killing of the two independentistas. The district court denied the motion. The court later refused a similar request made by Rios Polanco, Colon Berrios, Quiles Hernandez, Mateo Espada, and Perez Casillas. Appellants claim error, asserting that the details of the murder (1) were not relevant to a prosecution for perjury, and (2) even if relevant, were so prejudicial as to require being excluded. We disagree. 19 45 The evidence at issue was clearly relevant. A number of the counts charged appellants with lying about specific aspects of the shootings. For example, Count 6 alleged that, induced by Perez Casillas, Miguel Marte Ruiz perjured himself before a grand jury in claiming to have heard only one set of shots. To prove this charge, the government had to demonstrate, among other things, that at least two rounds of shots were fired. In theory, this burden could have been satisfied by witnesses testifying merely that they heard a second volley. To make such testimony persuasive, however, the government needed to explain why two rounds were fired, which required going into the details of the killings. See United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir.1983) (district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of illegal or otherwise improper acts which did not constitute elements of the crime charged in the indictment, but [which] pertained to a chain of events forming the context, motive, and set-up of the crime), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1243, 104 S.Ct. 3517, 82 L.Ed.2d 825 (1984). 46 Count 19 alleged that Rafael Torres Marrero committed perjury in an March 12, 1980 deposition when he claimed, among other things, that Soto Arrivi, after being shot, fell down a steep ravine. To satisfy its burden of proving falsity, the government had to demonstrate where the body in fact lay, which required reference to the details of the shootings (e.g., that the victims were allegedly kneeling together, far from any ravine, when killed by a shotgun blast fired at close range). 47 Finally, Count 24 charged Luis Reveron Martinez with making false material declarations before the grand jury in testifying that the two independentistas never stopped resisting. They were at all times shooting against us and we were defending ourselves. Obviously, it was relevant to proof of falsity for the government to show that, although the victims had been kneeling and begging for mercy, they were beaten and subsequently killed. 20 48 Evidence may, of course, be relevant but unfairly prejudicial. Fed.R.Evid. 403. Whether this is so is a matter left, within broad limits, to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., United States v. Kadouh, 768 F.2d 20, 21 (1st Cir.1985); United States v. Kepreos, 759 F.2d 961, 964 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 227, 88 L.Ed.2d 227 (1985). The question is one of unfair prejudice--not of prejudice alone. See, e.g., Dollar v. Long Manufacturing, N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir.1977) (virtually all evidence is prejudicial or it isn't material. The prejudice must be 'unfair' ), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996, 98 S.Ct. 1648, 56 L.Ed.2d 85 (1978). Here, appellants were accused of engaging in specific acts of perjury as part of a scheme intended to cover up the shootings at Cerro Maravilla. We cannot say that it was unfair to permit the jury to become acquainted with the government's evidence pertaining to the shootings--brutal as the details were--where they were so closely intertwined with the acts of perjury charged. Cf. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 255-56, 81 S.Ct. 1469, 1499-1500, 6 L.Ed.2d 782 (1961). Given the direct relevance of the evidence to the government's case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants' motion.