Opinion ID: 4537850
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: service of the protective order

Text: ¶20 Bridgewaters argues that the district court should have granted his motion to quash the bindover because the State did not produce evidence that he was properly served with the protective order he is charged with violating. We agree that the State was required to produce evidence of proper service, and that proper service in this context mandates service under rule 4. However, because this argument applies only to the protective order, not the ex parte order, our agreement with Bridgewaters here does not lead to a reversal of the magistrate’s decision on the motion to quash. 5 ¶21 As a threshold matter, proper service is an element of the charged offense, and therefore the State was required to produce evidence that Bridgewaters was properly served. At a preliminary hearing, the State must “establish probable cause” by “produc[ing] evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the defendant committed the charged crime.” State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 17, 137 P.3d 787. And proper service is an element of the crime charged here. The Violation Statute states that “[a]ny person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective order” or “ex parte protective order . . . who intentionally or knowingly violates that order after having been properly served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.” UTAH CODE § 76-5-108(1) (2017) (emphasis added). __________________________________________________________ 5 Bridgewaters does not dispute that he was properly served with the ex parte order. So this section deals only with service of the protective order. 6 Cite as: 2020 UT 32 Opinion of the Court ¶22 Bridgewaters argues that proper service in this context means service under rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Although this is a criminal case, which is generally governed by the procedural rules established in the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the protective order Bridgewaters is charged with violating was issued in a civil proceeding under the Cohabitant Abuse Act. See UTAH CODE §§ 78B-7-101 to -116 (2017). When a plaintiff or petitioner commences a civil action, rule 4 generally governs how the plaintiff must serve the summons and complaint on the defendant. Rule 4 requires service upon the defendant personally; leaving the documents at the defendant’s “dwelling house or usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there”; delivery of the documents to an authorized agent; or sending the documents by mail or commercial courier service, “provided the defendant signs a document indicating receipt.” 6 UTAH R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(A), (2)(A). If the plaintiff cannot locate the person to be served, or if the person is avoiding service, rule 4 allows the plaintiff to move to serve the defendant by some other means. 7 Id. 4(d)(5)(A). ¶23 The State counters that the Cohabitant Abuse Act does not require the protective order to be served in accordance with rule 4. It argues that the protective order was properly served when T.T.’s counsel mailed it to Bridgwaters’ last known address in accordance with rule 5(b)(3)(C). Rule 5 governs the service of pleadings and papers after a civil action has been initiated. 8 The __________________________________________________________ 6 These methods of service apply unless the defendant is a “minor under 14 years old”; has been “judicially declared to be incapacitated, of unsound mind, or incapable of conducting the individual’s own affairs”; or is “incarcerated or committed at a facility operated by the state or any of its political subdivisions.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(B), (C), (D). 7 Specifically, alternative methods of service may be available “[i]f the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, if service upon all of the individual parties is impracticable under the circumstances, or if there is good cause to believe that the person to be served is avoiding service.” Id. 4(d)(5)(A). 8Rule 5 permits service of a paper upon a party’s lawyer, or upon a party if he or she is unrepresented, through the following (Continued . . .) 7 STATE v. BRIDGEWATERS Opinion of the Court State reasons that rule 5 should have governed service of the protective order because the action had already commenced with the ex parte order, which had been personally served on Bridgewaters. ¶24 While the Violation Statute establishes that proper service is an element of the offense, the statute does not contain further guidance regarding what is meant by that phrase. So we turn to the civil Cohabitant Abuse Act, under which the underlying protective order was issued. Although the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure govern service of process, pleadings, and papers in civil cases, the Cohabitant Abuse Act sets forth some unique procedures that are specific to protective order proceedings, as described below. In light of this, the Act states, “Insofar as the provisions of this chapter are more specific than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, regarding protective orders, the provisions of this chapter govern.” 9 UTAH CODE § 78B-7-106(12) (2017). methods: emailing the paper to the email address provided by the person; mailing it to the person’s last known address; handing it to the person; leaving it at the person’s office with a person in charge, in a receptacle for deliveries, or in a conspicuous place; leaving it at the “person’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there;” or any other method agreed to by the parties. Id. 5(b)(3)(B)–(G). 9 Article VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution requires this court to “adopt rules of procedure . . . to be used in the courts of the state.” The legislature may amend those rules “upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the Legislature.” See also Brown v. Cox, 2017 UT 3, ¶ 17, 387 P.3d 1040. When the legislature enacts procedure, this provision contemplates that it must do so by amending our rules. Such an amendment “would need to contain a reference to the rule to be amended and a clear expression of the Legislature’s intent to modify our rules.” Id. ¶ 20. While the Cohabitant Abuse Act contains unique procedural rules that purport to supersede the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure where applicable, see UTAH CODE § 78B-7-106(12) (2017), the legislature did not enact those procedural provisions in a joint resolution that amended the corresponding rule of civil procedure. The State has not challenged the constitutionality of (Continued . . .) 8 Cite as: 2020 UT 32 Opinion of the Court ¶25 Protective order petitions do not commence with a summons and complaint. Compare id. § 78B-7-105 (2017) (discussing forms for petitions and protective orders), with UTAH R. CIV. P. 3(a) (discussing commencement of a civil action by filing a complaint and serving a summons with a copy of the complaint). Rather, if a person files a petition for an order of protection, a court may immediately issue an ex parte protective order, without notice to the respondent or a hearing, “[i]f it appears from [the] petition . . . that domestic violence or abuse has occurred.” UTAH CODE § 78B-7-106(1) (2017). ¶26 If the court issues an ex parte protective order, it must schedule a hearing on the petition within twenty days of the issuance of the ex parte order. 10 Id. § 78B-7-107(1)(a) (2017). If at the hearing the court does not issue a protective order, the ex parte order expires. Id. § 78B-7-107(1)(b) (2017). But if the court does issue a protective order and the respondent is not present at the hearing, “the ex parte protective order remains in effect until service of process of the protective order is completed.” Id. § 78B- 7-107(1)(d) (2017). ¶27 Relevant here, the Cohabitant Abuse Act specifies how a protective order issued after a hearing must be served. It states that “[f]ollowing the protective order hearing, the court shall . . . the Act’s procedural provisions, so we will not opine on that question. We note, however, the practical concern with the way in which section 78B-7-106(12) (2017) purports to take precedence over less specific rules. In protective order proceedings, litigants and courts are faced with two sets of procedural rules running on parallel tracks and are required to make judgment calls about which rule should apply in a given circumstance. Aside from any constitutional concerns, the legislature could increase clarity for the bar and the bench if it were to enact rule changes through joint resolutions that specifically amend the relevant rule of procedure. 10The court may extend the ex parte order beyond twenty days only if the petitioner is unable to attend the hearing, the respondent has not been served, the respondent has had the opportunity to present a defense at the hearing, the respondent requests that the ex parte order be extended, or exigent circumstances exist. Id. § 78B7-107(1)(b) (2017). 9 STATE v. BRIDGEWATERS Opinion of the Court as soon as possible, deliver the order to the county sheriff for service of process.” Id. § 78B-7-106(4)(a) (2017) (emphasis added). ¶28 The Act’s use of the phrase “service of process” indicates that the protective order must be served in accordance with rule 4. Most importantly, rule 4 explicitly governs service of process. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 4 (titled “Process”). We have explained that “[s]ervice of process implements the procedural due process requirement that a defendant be informed of pending legal action and be provided with an opportunity to defend against the action.” Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Utah 1987). In this context, “process” means a “summons or writ, esp[ecially] to appear or respond in court.” Process, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). And the phrase “service of process” is generally understood as service on a defendant of the documents that commence an action, pursuant to rule 4. See Weber County v. Ogden Trece, 2013 UT 62, ¶¶ 28, 45, 48, 64, 321 P.3d 1067. ¶29 In using the phrase “service of process,” the legislature referenced the procedure codified in rule 4. Accordingly, we conclude that even though the protective order does not initiate a protective order proceeding in the same way a summons and complaint commence other civil actions, the legislature intended a protective order to be served as if it were “process.” This implicates rule 4, not rule 5. 11 __________________________________________________________ 11 The State argues that it would be duplicative and unnecessary to require rule 4 service of the protective order where the ex parte order has already been personally served, as is the case here. But the language of the Act does not support that argument. It clearly states that a protective order issued after a hearing shall be delivered “to the county sheriff for service of process.” Id. § 78B-7-106(4)(a) (2017). The State does not identify statutory language modifying this requirement where the defendant was personally served with a previous ex parte order. Further, such dual service would not necessarily be duplicative and unnecessary, because both the ex parte order and the protective order can give rise to criminal and civil liability in the event of a violation. See id. § 78B-7-106(5)(a) (2017). And a protective order can include certain additional restrictions not present in the ex parte order. See id. § 78B-7-106(2)–(3) (2017). In this way, a protective order is substantively different than other (Continued . . .) 10 Cite as: 2020 UT 32 Opinion of the Court ¶30 But unlike rule 4, which puts the onus of service on the plaintiff, the Cohabitant Abuse Act provides for rule 4 service by the sheriff. See UTAH CODE § 78B-7-106(4)(a) (2017). The Act directs the court to transmit the order to the sheriff “as soon as possible.” Id. It then specifies that the sheriff must provide “expedited service” for orders for protection, and that once the order has been served, the sheriff must transmit verification of service of process to the statewide domestic violence network. Id. § 78B-7-106(8)(a) (2017). ¶31 Here, for reasons that do not appear in the record, these procedures were not completed. The sheriff did not serve Bridgewaters with the protective order. Instead, T.T.’s counsel mailed the protective order to Bridgewaters’ last known address. ¶32 Bridgewaters argues that this does not constitute proper service under the Violation Statute because it does not satisfy the requirements of rule 4. We agree. Because the Cohabitant Abuse Act requires service of process pursuant to rule 4, mailing the protective order to Bridgewaters’ last known address pursuant to rule 5 does not suffice. 12 Accordingly, the protective order was not papers and pleadings that are typically served under rule 5. The State also raises a policy concern that a dual-service requirement could allow a defendant to avoid service of the protective order after being alerted to the proceeding by the ex parte order. We note that our reading of section 78B-7-107(1)(d) (2017), infra ¶¶ 33–40, alleviates this concern by holding that the ex parte order remains in effect until service of the protective order. 12 In his briefing, Bridgewaters occasionally appears to equate rule 4 service of process with personal service. But as Bridgewaters acknowledges, rule 4 includes service short of personal service, such as service by certified mail, or by alternative means in certain circumstances. UTAH R. CIV. P. 4(d)(2), (d)(5). We are not presented here with the question of whether a particular method of service under rule 4 meets constitutional procedural due process requirements in this context. We hold only that the Act requires service of the protective order under rule 4. 11 STATE v. BRIDGEWATERS Opinion of the Court properly served upon Bridgewaters as required by the Violation Statute. 13