Opinion ID: 2311086
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Competency in 1986

Text: Appel first argues that he is entitled to relief because he was incompetent during the time he pled guilty, waived his right to counsel, and was sentenced to death. Appel claims that the original competency evaluation and the trial court's determination of competency based on that evaluation in 1986 are unreliable and have been undermined by the testimony of witnesses he presented at the PCRA hearing. A defendant's competency is an absolute and basic condition of a fair trial, and conviction of a legally incompetent defendant violates his constitutionally guaranteed due process rights. Commonwealth v. Marshall, 456 Pa. 313, 318 A.2d 724 (1974). Section 402(a) of the Mental Health Procedures Act [7] provides that a defendant is legally incompetent if he or she is substantially unable to understand the nature or object of the proceedings against him [or her] or to participate and assist in his [or her] defense. [8] 50 P.S. § 7402(a). Stated otherwise, the relevant question is whether the defendant has sufficient ability at the pertinent time to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 435, 555 A.2d 1264, 1270 (1989) ( quoting, Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)). Additionally, a determination of a defendant's competency to stand trial rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and can be disturbed only on a showing of an abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. Sam, 535 Pa. 350, 635 A.2d 603 (1993), cert. denied 511 U.S. 1115, 114 S.Ct. 2123, 128 L.Ed.2d 678 (1994). This Court has also stated that the sensitive nature of competency determinations requires that a trial judge's conclusions be afforded great deference because the judge has the opportunity to personally observe a defendant's behavior. Commonwealth v. Chopak, 532 Pa. 227, 235, 615 A.2d 696, 700 (1992). See also, Commonwealth v. McGill, 545 Pa. 180, 680 A.2d 1131 (1996) (trial court's observations of defendant during colloquies and throughout trial supported the conclusion that appellant was competent to stand trial). Furthermore, when making a competency determination, the trial court may resolve conflicts in the testimony of expert witnesses and may accept an expert's opinion if the record adequately supports it. Commonwealth v. Banks, 513 Pa. 318, 521 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873, 108 S.Ct. 211, 98 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987). See also Hughes (where the record reveals that the Commonwealth's expert witnesses were familiar with the defendant's condition and had sufficient information upon which to base their opinions, the trial court does not err in choosing to accept the Commonwealth's experts' opinions rather than those of defendant's experts). It is the burden of the person asserting mental incompetency to establish such incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. 50 P.S. § 7403(a)(amended July 2, 1996); Commonwealth v. duPont, 545 Pa. 564, 681 A.2d 1328 (1996). During the 1986 court proceedings in this case, former Section 7403(a) of the Mental Health Procedures Act provided that a party seeking to show incompetency shall have the burden of establishing incompetency to proceed by clear and convincing evidence. 50 P.S. § 7403(a)(repealed, July 2, 1996). That statute was still in effect during Appel's PCRA proceedings in the lower court, which concluded on June 14, 1995. Appel now cites the United States Supreme Court's April 1996 ruling in Cooper v. Oklahoma, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996), to challenge the clear and convincing evidence standard contained in the former Section 7403(a). In Cooper, the United States Supreme Court held that an Oklahoma statute that required a defendant alleging incompetency to establish such by clear and convincing evidence violates the defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the proper standard is proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence. This Court recently followed Cooper in duPont, in which we held former Section 7403(a) of the Mental Health Procedures Act unconstitutional, and we held that a defendant who asserts his or incompetency bears a burden of proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Although Cooper and duPont have affected the statutory burden of proof at competency hearings, Appel is not entitled to relief because the trial court determined that Appel did not meet his burden of proof pursuant to either the clear and convincing evidence standard or the preponderance of the evidence standard. In its Opinion in the present case, the trial court first applied the clear and convincing standard, but also held that Appel did not meet his burden of proof pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard. Because the trial court specifically held that Appel failed to meet his burden of proof pursuant to the proper preponderance of the evidence standard, any application of the clear and convincing standard according to the former section 7403(a) in this case was harmless error. See Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 405, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (1978)(where a trial court violates the federal constitution, this Court must employ the federal harmless error rule and must determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)(where a violation of a federal constitutional right constitutes harmless error, reversal is not required).
In the PCRA proceedings below, Appel alleged that he was unable to participate in his defense in 1986 because he suffered from delusional thinking that made it impossible for him to accept the assistance of an attorney or to participate in his defense. Specifically, he claimed that in 1986, he suffered from an encapsulated delusion, and he believed that his killing of the people in the bank was a secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) mission to eliminate moles and clones working in the bank. According to Appel, his delusions in 1986 required that he could not offer a defense to the prosecution or the imposition of the death penalty. [9] To support his claims of incompetency, Appel presented evidence concerning his personal history, character and mental condition until 1986, including the testimony of his mother, his girlfriend, acquaintances, and co-defendant Herzog. These individuals described numerous incidents of strange behavior that Appel allegedly exhibited for several years. According to some of these lay witnesses, Appel was preoccupied with the military, the CIA, and with military intelligence. [10] Appel did not testify in the PCRA proceedings, other than to explain that he wanted his current attorneys to represent him during the PCRA proceedings. Appel also presented extensive testimony from experts in the mental health field, who gave differing diagnoses and opinions regarding Appel's mental health status during the 1986 court proceedings. Several defense experts, who did not examine Appel until 1995, opined that Appel was delusional and incompetent at the time of the 1986 court proceedings. [11] None of these defense experts examined Appel before or during the 1986 court proceedings. Although they relied on the records and reports from that time, Appel's experts examined him nine years after his guilty plea and sentencing. The trial court expressly considered this factor when it rejected their testimony. In addition, Appel introduced testimony from the three experts who examined him in 1986, Dr. Schwartz, Dr. Gross and psychologist Dolores Kristofits. All three of these experts concurred in their prior determinations that Appel was competent during the 1986 court proceedings. Dr. Schwartz and Dr. Gross both testified that they did not have information regarding Appel's bizarre behavior or about his alleged CIA delusions in 1986. However, both testified that if they had such information, it would not have changed their respective recommendations. Appel also introduced expert opinion testimony that he suffered from Graves disease in 1986 and that this condition contributed to his alleged mental illness at that time. [12] The trial court did not credit the expert testimony concerning incompetency and delusions introduced by Appel's defense team, and instead accepted evidence that Appel was competent during the 1986 court proceedings and that he simply committed these crimes for money. To rebut Appel's belated allegations of incompetency, the Commonwealth introduced considerable evidence that Appel's motivation for this crime was to get money, and that he had rational reasons for wanting to plead guilty and be executed. The Commonwealth also presented expert testimony that Appel was competent during the 1986 court proceedings. Albert Levitt, a forensic psychologist for the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia and former chief psychologist for the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, also testified for the Commonwealth. Mr. Levitt did not examine Appel, but reviewed Appel's prison records, test results, and reports prepared by the defense experts. Levitt concluded that Appel was legally competent during the 1986 court proceedings. Levitt also testified that Appel suffered from a character disorder, but was not mentally ill. He opined that Appel was using the CIA story to manipulate others, and that Appel was not delusional and had never been. Kenneth Kool, M.D., a board certified psychiatrist, also testified for the Commonwealth. Dr. Kool testified that Appel was not delusional in 1986 and was competent during the court proceedings. He based his opinions on a videotape of an interview with Appel, Levitt's analysis, Kristofits' testing, Dr. Schwartz' report, Dr. Gross' report, and a transcript of the court proceedings. Dr. Kool's opinions were not limited to Appel's competency during the 1986 court proceedings, but also concerned Appel's state of mind when he committed this crime. Dr. Kool concluded that Appel was not psychotic, but that he had sociopathic features, criminal goals, and the capacity to act on them. He noted that no physician from 1986 to 1994 diagnosed Appel as having a major mental illness and that the intricacy of the planning of the robbery, negated the possibility of a major or discrete mental illness. During the PCRA proceedings below, the trial court also reviewed the 1986 reports of Dr. Schwartz, the first court appointed psychiatrist, and Dr. Gross, the second psychiatrist appointed at the defense's request. Both of those reports concluded that Appel was competent then. Also, the two doctors testified during the PCRA hearing and continued to hold their opinions that Appel was competent during the 1986 court proceedings. Dr. Schwartz testified at the PCRA hearing that Appel demonstrated no evidence of Graves disease, that he was not delusional, and that he told her that he committed the bank robbery because it was the easiest way to get quick money to pay his bills and help his girlfriend. He also told her that he shot the victims because he did not want to leave any witnesses, and that he expected to get a lot more money than he did. In addition, Appel gave Dr. Schwartz the following rational reasons for wanting imposition of the death penalty: it was preferable to spending the rest of his life in prison; he thought that God might forgive him if he cooperated with the state in the prosecution; if he died, his girlfriend would receive insurance benefits; he wanted to die because he deserved to die; and his death might be a comfort to the victims' friends and families. On May 6, 1987, nearly one year after the murders, Appel gave an interview for a television documentary entitled In the Mind of a Murderer. The Commonwealth introduced a videotape of excerpts from that interview during the PCRA hearing to allow the trial court to observe Appel's demeanor at that time, and to show that Appel continued to admit that his motivation for robbing the bank was to get money, and that he killed the victims so that they would not be able to testify against him. Another Commonwealth exhibit at the PCRA hearing was a videotape of a deposition of Appel dated April 18, 1990, taken in connection with a civil lawsuit against the bank and other parties. In that deposition, Appel stated that he selected the First National Bank of Bath because it was physically isolated. Both of these videotapes belied Appel's current claims that he robbed this bank and killed people inside because he believed that there were CIA moles in this bank. The Commonwealth also introduced a transcript of a taped interview with Appel on September 16, 1993. During the interview, Appel explained that his idea to use Graves disease as a basis to appeal came from Jay Smith, a former inmate on death row. [13] Appel also explained that he robbed the bank to get money for his girlfriend, and that if they caught and executed him, she would get insurance proceeds. Appel said that he enjoyed being in control of the court proceedings and assisting the Commonwealth in his prosecution. The Commonwealth also introduced the testimony of several lay witnesses who testified concerning their interactions with Appel after his arrest. Social worker John Weaver testified that he interviewed Appel shortly after his arrest and Appel told him that money was the motivation for committing this crime. John Spirk, one of the assistant district attorneys who prosecuted Appel testified that he spoke to Appel many times because Appel represented himself and that Appel appeared to understand the court proceedings. Another assistant district attorney, Anthony Blasco, testified that Appel told him that during the first six months of 1986, he and Herzog were not making enough money and decided to do something bigger. The Commonwealth also introduced a videotape of Appel's civil deposition testimony, in which Appel stated that he had cased four banks, and chose the First National Bank of Bath because it was physically isolated. According to Appel's former girlfriend's PCRA hearing testimony, Appel was spending more money than he was making, and he was also giving money to her. She testified that Appel was always talking about money, and that he once told her that he could kill everybody at a bank and get $15,000. Before the robbery, he told her that he was going to rob a bank and kill everyone so there would be no witnesses. Appel told his girlfriend that he considered robbing the Holiday Inn, where she worked, and that he had cased other banks, but selected this particular bank because there were not too many people there. Earlier in the week of the murders, Appel said to her, Friday is payday, and that she would not have to worry about money because there would be a big payday. Appel's payday was normally Wednesday at that time, and on the Wednesday before the robbery, he gave her his entire pay-check. Appel also told her that he made her the beneficiary of his life insurance, and that he wanted her to get the insurance proceeds. Thus, contrary to Appel's recent claims of CIA delusions, Appel's statements to his girlfriend before these murders clearly exhibited that a desire to obtain money motivated him. Co-defendant Herzog corroborated Appel's girlfriend's testimony that he robbed the bank to obtain money. Herzog testified that he and Appel had been on a six-month crime spree consisting of thefts and strong-arm robberies before the bank robbery. Herzog stated that he participated in these crimes just for the thrills, and that he always let Appel keep the money they stole. Before the June 6 robbery, he and Appel had cased other banks, but picked the First National Bank of Bath because it was in an isolated rural area. Herzog stated that one of the reasons they chose June 6 to commit the robbery was that it was a Friday and there would be more money in the bank because people would be cashing their paychecks. In its well-reasoned opinion, the trial court considered all of the evidence besides its own observations of Appel in 1986 and 1995. Most notably, the trial court found that Appel participated in the colloquies in a meaningful way and fully comprehended the court's instructions. The trial court had numerous opportunities to observe Appel's demeanor throughout the court proceedings in 1986 and concluded that Appel could understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him and to participate and assist in his defense. The trial court concluded that Appel was not operating in a delusional state during court proceedings in 1986 and that he was legally competent at that time. Based on the record before us, there is no basis for this Court to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that Appel was competent during the 1986 court proceedings. To the contrary, the record shows that the trial court was vigilant in ensuring that Appel was competent by ordering a competency evaluation sua sponte before accepting Appel's waiver of his right to counsel, and by granting a defense request for a second competency evaluation. The trial court's opinion expressly states that the court accepted the expert testimony presented by the Commonwealth, and rejected the testimony of the defense experts who concluded that Appel was incompetent. [14] As Dr. Kool explained before the trial court, this case is an example of a criminal person with a criminal goal, who carefully planned, practiced, and rehearsed this crime to obtain money. The trial court properly rejected Appel's belated claims of incompetency and CIA delusions. Accordingly, this claim does not warrant relief pursuant to the PCRA.