Opinion ID: 2091735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sixth Amendment Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim.

Text: In the present postconviction proceeding, an expert witness testified that a serious question was presented concerning the voluntariness of three sets of statements which were given by Hall to law enforcement officers some of which were offered as evidence against him at his trial. This witness also indicated that a serious question existed with respect to the adequacy of the Miranda warnings which were given in connection with these statements. In conclusion, Hall's expert testified that a reasonably competent attorney would have challenged each set of statements both at trial and on appeal. In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we make an independent evaluation of the totality of the relevant circumstances. Taylor v. State, 352 N.W.2d 683, 684 (Iowa 1984); State v. Wilkens, 346 N.W.2d 16, 18 (Iowa 1984). A party claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of sixth amendment rights must show that (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted from the omission. State v. Miles, 344 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Iowa 1984); Snethen v. State, 308 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Iowa 1981). When such claims are asserted in postconviction proceedings, the applicant bears the burden of proving both of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Sallis v. Rhoads, 325 N.W.2d 121, 122 (Iowa 1982). In evaluating ineffective assistance claims, it is axiomatic that the fact that the defense was not successful does not mean that counsel was ineffective. State v. Newman, 326 N.W.2d 788, 795 (Iowa 1982). We apply the foregoing principles in our consideration of Hall's present claims. A. Claimed Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel. The district court disposed of the claim for relief based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at Hall's original trial by finding that Hall has failed to demonstrate that he would have been successful on the issues not pursued by trial counsel which form the basis of such claim. The issues allegedly not pursued or ineffectively pursued relate to three sets of statements made by Hall to law enforcement officials. These statements are (1) statements made in the sheriff's office in Tonopah, Nevada; (2) statements made to officers while Hall was being transported from Nevada to Iowa; and (3) a court reported statement made by Hall after his return to Iowa. Only the second and third statements were used in evidence at Hall's trial. The district court found with respect to each set of statements that they were voluntary and not obtained in violation of Hall's Miranda or fifth amendment rights. We approve these findings and conclusions of the district court with respect to all three statements, both as to the law and the facts. Because the issues not pursued or claimed to have been inadequately pursued were, in any event, not susceptible of a favorable adjudication towards Hall, there was clearly no prejudice to him from his counsel's actions on these issues. In addition to the apparent lack of merit with respect to those claims not pursued by Hall's trial counsel, we find that the record clearly demonstrates that counsel in developing the primary theory of defense elected to pursue a course of action toward which the admissibility of the challenged statements was not antagonistic. When the challenged statements which were admitted at trial are compared to Hall's trial testimony, they serve to corroborate his primary theory of defense based on drug intoxication and are in no way antagonistic to that defense. Indeed, Hall's trial counsel testified at the postconviction hearing that if the State had not used the statements in question he would have attempted to offer them himself to rebut any claim by the State that Hall's trial testimony was recently fabricated. In Schrier v. State, 347 N.W.2d 657, 663 (Iowa 1984), and State v. Blackford, 335 N.W.2d 173, 178 (Iowa 1983), we recognized that counsel's trial performance must be judged by his primary theory of defense. We further concluded in those cases and in State v. Mulder, 313 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1981) that selection of a primary theory of defense is a tactical matter which we will not disturb if it appears to have been a conscientious, principled decision within the normal range of competency. While, in the present case, Hall's defense of drug intoxication did not succeed, we cannot say that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in his determination that this was the best avenue of defense available to his client under the circumstances. B. Claimed Ineffectiveness of Appellate Counsel. Our finding that the failure of Hall's trial counsel to pursue certain evidentiary issues was not ineffective assistance of counsel because it represented a reasonable choice of trial tactics and, in any event, the issues not pursued were lacking in merit, removes any basis for favorable consideration of Hall's additional claim that these issues should have been pursued by counsel on his direct appeal.