Opinion ID: 436140
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Amount of Punitive Damages Award

Text: 28 First Commodity claims that even in the absence of preemption the award of $275,000 in punitive damages is excessive. It asserts that since remittitur was ordered with respect to actual damages, the trial court should have remitted the award of punitive damages. First Commodity relies on Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581 (8th Cir.1981). In Ogilvie the jury returned a verdict awarding separate actual and punitive damage awards on each of ten counts of fraud. Throughout each of the ten counts, the jury consistently used a multiple of four times actual damages to determine the amount of punitive damages awarded on each count. The trial judge remitted the actual damage awards, but not the punitive damage awards. This resulted in wide variations in the ratios between the punitive damage awards and the actual damage awards on the various counts, such ratios ranging from a low of 8.1 to 1 to a high of 52.4 to 1 after the remittitur. Given the clear evidence of a consistent jury formula, this Court held that the punitive damages must be remitted to conform to the intent of the jury. The Court stated: 29 We recognize that appellate courts are reluctant to reduce a punitive damage award because such a decision rests peculiarly in the discretion of the jury. We believe, however, that when the jury clearly assesses punitive damages as a multiple of actual damages, the court, by proportionally reducing punitive damages, will more likely effect the original judgment of the jury, while avoiding excessive damage awards. 30 Id. at 587. (Citation omitted). Ogilvie is readily distinguishable because in the present case the jury returned a verdict on only one count of fraud and there is no clear evidence that they intended or used a specific multiple of actual damages in assessing punitive damages. The standard for reviewing the trial court's decision concerning remittitur is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Ouachita National Bank v. Tosco Corp., 716 F.2d 485, 488 (8th Cir.1983). We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to remit the award of punitive damages. 31 First Commodity also asserts that the punitive damage award was the product of bias and prejudice. This argument largely rests on appellant's assertion that the similar occurrence evidence discussed supra should have been excluded and on the fact that the jury's award of actual damages was remitted. First Commodity contends that the erroneous admission of the similar occurrence evidence inflamed the jury and caused them to render an excessive award. Our holding that such evidence properly was admitted and properly could have been considered by the jury on the issue of punitive damages is a complete answer to this argument. 32 First Commodity further argues that, since the ratio of the punitive damages award to the remitted actual damages award is approximately twelve-to-one, the punitive damages award is therefore monstrous and shocking as a matter of law. Missouri case law does not support this argument. First, Missouri courts have held that even a nominal damage award may provide a sufficient basis for an award of punitive damages. Coonis v. Rogers, 429 S.W.2d 709, 716 (Mo.1968). Moreover, in one Missouri case a punitive-to-actual-damage award ratio of greater than forty-to-one was approved. Price v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 530 S.W.2d 249 (Mo.Ct.App.1975). The purpose of punitive damages is fundamentally different from the purpose of compensatory damages; the former, as their name implies, serve to punish the defendant and to deter both the defendant and others from engaging in similar conduct in the future. The degree of malice and the financial wealth of the defendant both are relevant in determining the proper amount of punitive damages. Armstrong v. Republic Realty Mortgage Corp., 631 F.2d 1344, 1351-2 (8th Cir.1980) (applying Missouri law). Missouri courts require a nexus between the wrong committed by the defendant and the amount of punitive damages, not between the amount of actual damages awarded and the amount of punitive damages. Beggs v. Universal C.I.T. Corp., 409 S.W.2d 719, 724 (Mo.1966). The jury has wide discretion in determining the amount of punitive damages, and that determination is not to be disturbed unless it is the product of bias or prejudice or is otherwise an abuse of discretion. Id. We cannot say that the jury abused its discretion in awarding $275,000 in punitive damages in the instant case. 33 We have reviewed carefully the record and the briefs of the parties, and have heard oral argument in this case. Having considered First Commodity's other arguments and finding them to be without merit, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.