Opinion ID: 76461
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: General Grand Jury Principles

Text: 64 We now turn to the district court's wholesale disclosure of all grand jury transcripts. We first review the general principles governing the disclosure of secret grand jury material and then apply them to this case. 65 It has long been a policy of the law that grand jury proceedings be kept secret.... The English rule of grand jury secrecy has been incorporated into our federal common law and remains `an integral part of our criminal justice system.' Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1555 (11th Cir.1988) (citing Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 1672 n. 9, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979)); see also United States v. Phillips, 843 F.2d 438, 441 (11th Cir.1988) (stating that [t]he secrecy of the grand jury is sacrosanct). In Douglas Oil, the Supreme Court summarized the reasons for, and interests served by, grand jury secrecy as follows: (1) if preindictment proceedings were made public, many prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that those against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony; (2) witnesses who appeared before the grand jury would be less likely to testify fully and frankly, as they would be open to retribution as well as to inducements; (3) [t]here ... would be the risk that those about to be indicted would flee; (4) there would be the risk that those about to be indicted would try to influence individual grand jurors to vote against indictment; and (5) by preserving the secrecy of the proceedings, we assure that persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule. 441 U.S. at 219, 99 S.Ct. at 1673. 66 Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure codifies this secrecy principle and prohibits the disclosure of grand jury material except in the limited circumstances provided for in Rule 6(e)(3). The only Rule 6(e)(3) exception at issue here is in Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(I), which permits disclosure of grand jury material when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in conjunction with a judicial proceeding. 29 Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(I). 67 Although Rule 6(e)(3) enumerates the exceptions to the traditional rule of grand jury secrecy, the Supreme Court and this Court have recognized that the district courts have inherent power beyond the literal wording of Rule 6(e)(3) to disclose grand jury material and that Rule 6(e)(3) is but declaratory of that authority. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 398-99, 79 S.Ct. 1237, 1240-41, 3 L.Ed.2d 1323 (1959); Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials, 735 F.2d 1261, 1268 (11th Cir.1984) (hereinafter  Appeal of Hastings ). 30 Nonetheless, we also have indicated that courts are not empowered to act outside of Rule 6(e) in other than exceptional circumstances consonant with the rule's policy and spirit. Appeal of Hastings, 735 F.2d at 1269; see id. at 1272. 31 Thus, while district courts have inherent authority to act outside Rule 6(e)(3), any inherent disclosure authority is exceedingly narrow and exists only in exceptional circumstances. See id. at 1272 (concluding that a petition by a judicial investigating committee presents one of the occasions when a district court may act outside the strict boundaries of Rule 6(e)). 32 68 The Aisenbergs seek to uphold the grand jury disclosure based both on the district court's inherent authority and on the exception in Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(I). The guidelines for determining when grand jury secrecy may be broken are well settled and apply in both situations. Specifically, parties seeking disclosure must show: 69 (1) that the material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding; 70 (2) that the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy; and 71 (3) that their request is structured to cover only material so needed. 72 Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 222, 99 S.Ct. at 1674; United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312, 1320-21 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Burke, 856 F.2d 1492, 1495-96 (11th Cir.1988); United States v. Elliott, 849 F.2d 554, 557 (11th Cir.1988); Appeal of Hastings, 735 F.2d at 1273. 73 These same demanding standards apply even after the grand jury has concluded its operations. Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 222, 99 S.Ct. at 1674 (stating that [s]uch a showing must be made even when the grand jury whose transcripts are sought has concluded its operations, as it had in Dennis [v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 86 S.Ct. 1840, 16 L.Ed.2d 973 (1966)]); Elliott, 849 F.2d at 557 (same); Burke, 856 F.2d at 1496 (same). [I]n considering the effects of disclosure on grand jury proceedings, the courts must consider not only the immediate effects upon a particular grand jury, but also the possible effect upon the functioning of future grand juries. Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 222, 99 S.Ct. at 1674. 74 Further, the burden of demonstrating that the need for disclosure outweighs the need for, and public interest in, secrecy rests upon the private party seeking disclosure. Id. at 223, 99 S.Ct. at 1675; United States v. Liuzzo, 739 F.2d 541, 545 (11th Cir.1984). In order to carry this burden, the party seeking disclosure of grand jury material must show a compelling and particularized need for disclosure. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682, 78 S.Ct. 983, 986, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958) (stating that the `indispensable secrecy of grand jury proceedings' must not be broken except where there is a compelling necessity, and that instances where the need outweighs the countervailing policy must be shown with particularity) (internal citation omitted); United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 443, 103 S.Ct. 3133, 3148, 77 L.Ed.2d 743 (1983) (stating that, [w]e have consistently construed [Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(I)] ... to require a strong showing of particularized need for grand jury materials before any disclosure will be permitted); United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d at 1320-21; Cox v. Adm'r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1421 (11th Cir.1994); Burke, 856 F.2d at 1496; Elliott, 849 F.2d at 557; United States v. Cole, 755 F.2d 748, 758-59 (11th Cir.1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 613 F.2d 501, 506 (5th Cir.1980); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. City of Fort Pierce, 323 F.2d 233, 242 (5th Cir.1963). 33 75 To show a compelling and particularized need, the private party must show `circumstances had created certain difficulties peculiar to this case, which could be alleviated by access to specific grand jury materials, without doing disproportionate harm to the salutary purpose of secrecy embodied in the grand jury process.' Elliott, 849 F.2d at 558 (quoting Liuzzo, 739 F.2d at 545). As we stated in Cox, `disclosure of grand jury testimony is properly granted where there is a compelling need for such disclosure and such disclosure is required by the ends of justice.' Cox, 17 F.3d at 1421 (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 323 F.2d at 242). 76 Even when persons requesting disclosure have carried the burden of showing that they have a compelling and particular need for the grand jury material in order to avoid an injustice and that their need for disclosure outweighs the secrecy need, access is limited and covers only those materials actually needed. Cox, 17 F.3d at 1421 (` Disclosure even in these circumstances must be closely confined to the limited portions of the testimony for which there is found to be a particularized need. ') (emphasis in original) (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 323 F.2d at 242); In re Subpoena to Testify Directed to Custodian of Records, 864 F.2d 1559, 1562 (11th Cir.1989) (stating that [e]ven when the person requesting such disclosure has shown a particularized need for the materials, access is limited and covers only those materials actually needed); Liuzzo, 739 F.2d at 545 (noting that when particularized need is shown, access to grand jury materials must still be `discrete[ ] and limited[ ],' and must be `structured to cover only the material needed') (alterations in original) (quoting Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 683, 78 S.Ct. at 987, and Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 222, 99 S.Ct. at 1674). Accordingly, a blanket request for all ... grand jury materials... cannot be described as the kind of particularized request required for the production of otherwise secret information. United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d at 1321. 77 Finally, the district court has substantial discretion in determining whether grand jury materials should be released. Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 223, 99 S.Ct. at 1675; see also Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 360 U.S. at 399, 79 S.Ct. at 1240 (1959); United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d at 1320; Coronado v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 222 F.3d 1315, 1322 (11th Cir.2000). We now apply these principles to this case. 78