Opinion ID: 1723445
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Good Faith Criterion Issue and The Single Employer Issue

Text: Whether interim employment ends disqualification for unemployment benefits is dependent on the wording of the statute. Thomas v. Employment Security Comm., 356 Mich. 665, 97 N.W.2d 784 (1959). Because of conflicting Court of Appeals decisions, we are alerted to the fact that the statutory language of § 29(8)(b) may be subject to differing interpretations. We note that the plain wording of the statute does not express a good faith requirement. We note also that the phrase an employer may be interpreted in the plural as well as in the singular. Therefore, we consider whether good faith employment with a single employer was nonetheless intended by the Legislature. We begin our analysis by examining the rationale underlying the MESA. Doing so sharpens our understanding of the circumstances surrounding its enactment. We review the prelegislative history and the motivations that induced enactment. Horack, The disintegration of statutory construction, 24 Ind L J 335, 338 (1949). Next, we look to this Court's decisions that touch on the history and the circumstances surrounding § 29(8)(b). Dow Chemical Co. v. Curtis, 431 Mich. 471, 480, 430 N.W.2d 645 (1988); Great Lakes Steel Corp. v. Employment Security Comm., 381 Mich. 249, 254, 161 N.W.2d 14 (1968). Throughout our analysis, we bear in mind the underlying purpose of the act. Dep't of Social Services v. Brewer, 180 Mich.App. 82, 84, 446 N.W.2d 593 (1989). Once we have ascertained the Legislature's intent, we follow the primary rule of statutory construction for cases interpreting the MESA: a liberal construction to afford coverage and a strict construction to effect disqualification. See Linski v. Appeal Bd. of Michigan Employment Security Comm., 358 Mich. 239, 99 N.W.2d 582 (1959). In order to comply with the public policy of the act, we recognize that this primary rule must prevail, despite any other conflicting rule. People v. Russo, 439 Mich. 584, 595, 487 N.W.2d 698 (1992). Other rules of construction serve only as guides to assist us in determining the intent with a greater degree of certainty. Nolan v. Dep't of Licensing & Regulation, 151 Mich.App. 641, 648, 391 N.W.2d 424 (1986). We recognize that, as a general rule, deference is given to an administrative agency's decisions, provided that the agency's construction is consistent with the purpose and policies of the statute itself. [5]
The MESA was enacted primarily for the benefit of persons involuntarily unemployed. Its purpose is to lighten the burden of economic insecurity on those who become unemployed through no fault of their own. Kalamazoo Tank & Silo Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 324 Mich. 101, 107, 36 N.W.2d 226 (1949). The act specifies: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this state. Involuntary unemployment is a subject of general interest and concern which requires action by the legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family, to the detriment of the welfare of the people of this state. Social security requires protection against this hazard of our economic life. Employers should be encouraged to provide stable employment. [M.C.L. § 421.2; M.S.A. § 17.502.] As the MESA is a remedial statute, it should be liberally construed to achieve its intended goal. Dudewicz v. Norris Schmid, Inc., 443 Mich. 68, 77, 503 N.W.2d 645 (1993). The precise language of the act springs from its underlying policy. The wording expresses our legislators' ideas, which, taken as a whole, become the basis for legislative intent.