Opinion ID: 2427524
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summation Issues

Text: Sabir contends that the district court erred by (1) precluding him from arguing in summation that the government had targeted him for prosecution based on his religion, while allowing the government to make a contrary argument; and (2) permitting the government to vouch for its witnesses. In support of the first argument, Sabir points us to the following excerpt from the summations. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Dr. Sabir is an important piece on the chess board. He's an important piece to the FBI investigation, and he's an important piece to Shah. Everybody wants Dr. Sabir. [THE GOVERNMENT]: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:. . . . [T]here's a very interesting discourse that occurred between myself and [Agent] Soufan while he was testifying about whether or not there was an increase in investigation by the FBI of the Muslim community post 9/11. Well, common sense, when you talk about common sense, you all know that there was, and to sit here and try to tell you that there wasn't just belies what the agenda is. [THE GOVERNMENT]: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. Ladies and gentlemen, the decision of the government to investigate an individual or the decision of a grand jury to indict an individual is none of your concern. The only concern this jury has is whether or not the government has or has not proved each element[] of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Trial Tr. at 2417-18. A sidebar conference ensued, at which the district court cautioned defense counsel to refrain from arguing selective prosecution to the jury, advising that such a defense should be raised with the court in a post-trial motion. [38] Defense counsel initially complied with this instruction, but then more subtly returned to the selective prosecution theme in attacking the FBI for decid[ing] which way the case [against Sabir] was going based on an internal perception of what was correct without regard to whether reality demonstrated otherwise. Id. at 2431. The government responded with the following rebuttal argument: Then, there was the argument that the government is out looking for sinners. The government picked and chose Dr. Rafiq Sabir as some sort of trophy blaming the government for its efforts [in] fighting terrorism; and this from a defendant who said, I support all anti-terrorism efforts, that is, except for if it involves the use of undercovers, except if it involves people infiltrating the mujahideen. . . . Well, the government, as the Judge told you, is not on trial. It's not a game of shifting blame to the government and blaming agents for what they do, their jobs, putting their lives on the line and finding terrorism wherever it is. You heard the testimony of both the agents in this case; former Agent Ali Soufan, and Special Agent Brian Murphy. Both served this country with distinction. Both told you that they followed the investigation where it went. Where it went and where it ended up was May 20, 2005. With the defendant taking bayat to bin Laden. Id. at 2487-88. Following rebuttal, Sabir unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial, arguing that the government had improperly raised the issue of selective prosecution and vouched for its own witnesses. Reviewing the district court's decision for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Smith, 426 F.3d 567, 571 (2d Cir.2005), we identify none. First, we identify no error in the district court's challenged rulings with respect to the defense summation. As we have explained, a selective prosecution defense alleges a defect in the institution of the prosecution, and as such is an issue for the court rather than the jury. United States v. Regan, 103 F.3d 1072, 1082 (2d Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3)(A). Second, we identify no error in the government's rebuttal. The law has long recognized that summationsand particularly rebuttal summationsare not detached exposition[s], United States v. Wexler, 79 F.2d 526, 530 (2d Cir.1935), with every word carefully constructed . . . before the event, Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974). Precisely because such arguments frequently require improvisation, courts will not lightly infer that every remark is intended to carry its most dangerous meaning. Id. To be sure, the prosecution may not appeal to . . . passion in urging a guilty verdict, United States v. Wilner, 523 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1975), but it may be passionate in arguing that the evidence supports conviction, see United States v. Wexler, 79 F.2d at 530 (recognizing that summations are inevitably charged with emotion). As a consequence, a defendant who seeks to overturn his conviction based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct in summation bears a heavy burden. United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 123 (2d Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). He must show more than that a particular summation comment was improper. See generally United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 680 (2d Cir.2004) (observing that prosecutors' comments standing alone will rarely warrant overturning conviction (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 142 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that it is a `rare case' in which improper summation comments by prosecution will be so prejudicial as to warrant new trial (quoting Floyd v. Meachum, 907 F.2d 347, 348 (2d Cir.1990))). He must show that the comment, when viewed against the entire argument to the jury, United States v. Bermudez, 529 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), and in the context of the entire trial, was so severe and significant as to have substantially prejudiced him, depriving him of a fair trial, United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d at 680; see United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 945 (2d Cir.1993). That is not this case. In his own summation, defense counsel repeatedly ignored court warnings and insinuated to the jury that Sabir was the victim of selective prosecution. While it was the court's role, not the prosecution's, to instruct the jury that this question was not before them, the government hardly deprived Sabir of a fair trial by briefly alluding to these improper arguments in reminding them of the judge's instruction. See generally United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 130 (2d Cir.1998)([W]here the defense summation makes arguments and allegations against the government, the prosecutor may respond to them in rebuttal.); United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir.1992) (noting that defense argument may `open the door' to otherwise inadmissible prosecution rebuttal); United States v. Marrale, 695 F.2d 658, 667 (2d Cir.1982) (noting that prosecutor is ordinarily entitled to respond to the evidence, issues, and hypotheses propounded by the defense). Similarly, we identify no error in the prosecution's response to the defense attack on its agents' credibility and competency. See United States v. Perez, 144 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir.1998) (recognizing prosecutors' greater leeway in commenting on own witnesses' credibility after defense attack). While prosecutors may not strike foul blows they may strike hard ones, Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935), and the challenged arguments stayed on the permissible side of this line, cf. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (holding that prosecutor may not imply that extrinsic evidence not before jury supports witness's credibility); United States v. Drummond, 481 F.2d 62, 64 (2d Cir.1973) (holding that prosecutor may not make issue of own credibility (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d at 884. While routine credibility attacks do not generally call for references to the life-threatening nature of law enforcement work, where, as in this case, the defense referenced the danger inherent in dealing with co-defendant Shah to question the undercover agent's credibility or competency in certain respects, the government's brief allusion to agents putting their lives on the line was within the bounds of fair response.