Opinion ID: 2598851
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Expressed intentions

Text: Henry claims he did not think recitation of the agreement after mediation constituted a final agreement. In determining the parties' intent, [we] look first to the parties' expressed intentions. [8]
Preliminarily, Henry notes that the transcript available to the superior court is incomplete as it ends before the termination of the proceeding. [9] Henry argues that Judge Thompson could not have properly assessed whether the recital led to a binding settlement because he did not rely on a complete transcript of the proceeding. From his comments at the hearing, it appears that Judge Thompson relied on the incomplete transcript. Judge Thompson made reference to page numbers from the incomplete transcript at the hearing. Henry's argument was not raised below and is therefore waived. Moreover, the superior court's failure to use a complete transcript in rendering its decision was not clearly erroneous. The dialogue missing from the transcript used by the trial court only further supports Judge Thompson's findings that Henry intended the settlement to be binding, as it makes clear the parties' intent that the agreement is final. There are some minor instances where the incomplete and complete transcripts differ; however, none of these differences provides any basis for reversing the trial court's decision.
At the April 12 hearing, Judge Thompson found that the degree of Henry's participation indicated his intent to engage in a final, binding process on the day of mediation. Judge Thompson noted eleven separate instances in the recital process where Henry made topical and relevant observations regarding settlement of various issues: The subjects being discussed at the time he's making his contribution, all of which seem sensibl[e] contributions on his part where he points out the difficulty in disposing of a documented vessel, where he reminds the participants that Ms. Ford can't mail firearms.... I mean these are all very sensible observations. [These do] not appear to be observations that would be made by a person who is in so much pain [he] can hardly be aware of what's going on around him. He seems to have been a full-fledged participant there. There is no expression to suggest that Henry was suffering any type of pain, that he in some way did not agree with the final settlement, or that he did not understand what was taking place. Henry argues that this is because he tuned out and just wanted the mediation to be over. We rejected a similar argument in Pavek v. Curran. [10] In Pavek, Curran was present and spoke at the hearing [11] and did not object to the terms of the agreement. [12] Curran then claimed she did not understand the significance of the agreement and alleged that the settlement was invalid. [13] We found Curran's claim groundless, finding that her presence at the hearing without objection and her participation in it implied her understanding. [14] Similarly, in light of Henry's active participation, particularly at the end of the day when he now alleges he was exhausted and unable to understand the process, the superior court's finding that Henry intended to settle the case on August 31 was not clearly erroneous. [15]
Henry next argues that the parties' stated intention to reduce the agreement to writing shows that their oral recital was not a binding agreement. But a brief review of all of the participants' statements shows the incorrectness of Henry's position. Sanders began the recital process by stating that a settlement had been reached and was going to be placed on the record. Brand stated that it was her intent to put the agreement in written form so that the parties could have something to reference but that the settlement was final. Keene stated that the agreement, as stated on the record, was binding on Henry and Darlene. Sanders ended the proceedings by stating that Alaska law was clear the parties would be held to the settlement as set out at that point by the parties. Under these circumstances, the references to a later writing do not support Henry's position that the recital was not final and binding.
Henry also claims that his age and condition affected his understanding and that it was error for Judge Thompson to find that his age could only have benefitted him throughout the mediation process. It is true that Henry has well-documented medical problems and that he was 73 years of age at the time of the litigation below. There is no evidence, however, that these conditions affected Henry at the mediation. Moreover, Henry was represented by counsel. Neither Keene nor any doctor has submitted an affidavit stating that Henry was incompetent at the time, that he did not understand the proceedings, or that he had trouble concentrating. And his active participation throughout the recital process undercuts his present claim. Henry asserts that he felt safe in tuning out because he did not believe the agreement was final, but there is no contemporaneous evidence that Henry did in fact tune out. Rather, Henry actively participated in discussions on how the marina would be divided: Henry's counsel asked how an allowance granted to Darlene for her efforts in marketing the marina would be impacted by expenditures over the allotted amount. When Henry heard the answer, he commented, That's fair. He volunteered to contact the Coast Guard regarding disposal of garbage at the marina. Henry also stated that he would work to ensure that a vessel was removed from the marina prior to his vacating the property. He discussed how profits from the sale of oil containers would be shared. In all, he contributed no less than seven comments to the discussion concerning the marina's division. From these statements, we conclude that Judge Thompson's findings that Henry not only participated at the mediation, but that it was his intent for Darlene to sell the property and that the proceeds from that sale would be distributed to the parties, and that Henry intended the settlement to be binding, were not clearly erroneous.
Henry last argues that extrinsic circumstances support his contention that he did not intend to be bound by the agreement. While the trial court pointed to the delay from the August mediation to Henry's first objection to the settlement's validity in February as evidence that Henry originally intended to be bound and was now only suffering from buyer's remorse, Henry argues that during the entire period he did not believe any agreement had occurred; therefore he had no reason to ask his lawyer to try and rescind the agreement. Henry claims his delay was simply the result of Brand's delay in reducing the agreement to a written document. Henry argues that his failure to abide by the agreement was further evidence of his not knowing that it was binding. Henry's argument does not account for what actually occurred during the recital and is not persuasive as to what occurred later. Henry was present after the mediation when Sanders, Brand, and Keene (Henry's lawyer) stated that the agreement was binding. Moreover, it is not entirely true that Henry failed to abide by the agreement. At one point Keene requested an extension of the date Henry was to leave the property, which suggests that Henry did in fact know there was an agreement. Also, at both sides' request, the trial was taken off the calendar, and no further settlement conferences or litigation ensued. Yet Henry took no step to resolve a matter that, according to his present position, was unresolved. Finally, we agree with Darlene's contention that to credit Henry's argument that his failure to abide by the agreement is evidence that he did not believe he was bound by it opens the door for any party to a contract to breach the contract and then use that breach as evidence of his or her belief that no contract had been entered. 2. Enforcing an agreement where the mediator failed to ask the parties whether the agreement was entered into voluntarily and whether they understood the agreement does not violate public policy. Henry contends that it would violate public policy to enforce an agreement where no one asked the parties whether they had entered into it voluntarily, understood its contents, and agreed to be bound. Henry argues that the presumption of enforcing settlements should not apply in these circumstances. Darlene responds that any such magic words requirement would itself be against public policy. We agree with Darlene. Henry argues that, because he was not asked whether he entered into the agreement voluntarily, no valid settlement was reached. He claims that the court erred in applying the presumption in favor of settlement, [16] as that presumption only applies to those settlements that are valid. Henry misconstrues both the law and Judge Thompson's statements. In his remarks, Judge Thompson stated that settlements are favored and should be enforced. But Judge Thompson was careful to note that the presumption applied only to a valid settlement: for their own sake we should enforce settlements when they're reached.  (Emphasis added.) Thus, it is clear that the court carefully determined the settlement to be valid before it applied the presumption of enforcement. In Crane v. Crane, [17] we held that a party need not expressly state on the record that it entered into a settlement agreement voluntarily for the agreement to be considered valid. [18] We made this finding based on the fact that Crane was represented by counsel and by looking to the record. [19] Henry distinguishes himself from Crane by arguing that, unlike Crane, he did not have the final settlement agreement before him, he was not present before a superior court judge, and he was not required to read or sign off on a written document. These distinctions do not call for a different result. Henry did not have an agreement before him because the parties had yet to put the oral agreement into written form. And the presence of a superior court judge is not required for the parties to enter into a binding agreement. Henry argues the lack of a judge is evidence that he did not intend the recital to be final. However, non-judicial settlement officers, mediators, and arbitrators are frequently used and Henry's rule would require a judge's presence to complete an agreement in any of these settings, an obviously unattractive rule. It is true that this case would be easier for usand would have been easier for the superior courtif the mediator had directly addressed the parties during the recorded session and confirmed that each understood the settlement and agreed with it. Simple affirmations by the parties of their understanding and intent to be bound may have obviated the need for an extensive evidentiary hearing and for later detailed reviews of the recitations made at the recorded session. Nonetheless, we reject Henry's contention that, without particular questions or recitations when a settlement is put on the record, either party may successfully attack the settlement. We encourage judges and mediators who conduct settlement proceedings, and who reach settlements, to confirm on the record directly with the parties their understanding of the settlement and their intentions to enter into it, but we reject the proposition that the failure to conduct such inquiries is necessarily fatal to the entry of a settlement. It was not clear error for Judge Thompson to find that Henry did intend to settle. It was not an abuse of discretion for Judge Thompson not to have required statements of voluntariness from the parties for the agreement to be valid. B. The Trial Court Properly Entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Minor Factual Errors in the Findings and Conclusions Do Not Require Reversal. Henry claims the trial court committed legal error by not reading the findings of fact and conclusions of law before signing them. He points to two mistaken dates [20] and a misstatement that Henry appeared personally rather than telephonically at the hearing. Henry also notes a substantive error in the divorce decree: The property table states that the Ford Marina is valued at $1,400,000 and apportions $700,000 to both Darlene and Henry, whereas paragraph 2 of the decree states that fifty-five percent of the value of the marina should be distributed to Darlene and forty-five percent to Henry. Darlene argues in response that Henry never properly objected to these factual errors at the trial court level to allow for their correction. She further contends that the errors are merely clerical and do not affect the substance of the divorce decree or findings of fact and conclusions of law. We agree with Darlene. Henry failed to bring these errors to the superior court's attention after initially requesting additional time to bring objections under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), raising the possibility that he waived the alleged errors. But we need not decide whether Henry's failure to file objections under Rule 78(b) constituted a waiver of these arguments, because Henry's arguments for reversal lack merit. Although Henry is correct that the decree of divorce and findings of fact and conclusions of law do contain factual errors, the errors are not substantial. [21] They hardly constitute evidence that Judge Thompson did not read the documents. Further, the one substantive error does not warrant undoing the settlement. This is because the mistake in the distribution in the property table is evident from the text of that table. The property table states entire property (upper and lower) to be sold and proceeds distributed as set forth in Paragraph 2 below. Paragraph 2 thus controls and the division should be governed by the fifty-five percent/forty-five percent division in Darlene's favor found in that paragraph. Moreover, even if the document were ambiguous, the transcript of the recital of the agreement makes clear that the parties intended a fifty-five percent/forty-five percent split. There is, therefore, no basis to reverse the superior court's findings and conclusions. It is sufficient that the superior court correct the clerical errors concerning dates, note that Henry participated telephonically rather than in person at the hearing, and insert the correct distributional figures (fifty-five and forty-five percent of $1,400,000 for Darlene's and Henry's shares, respectively, of the marina). C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Issuing the Order To Enforce the Settlement Agreement. Henry argues that the order to enforce the settlement agreement grossly exceeded the terms of the actual agreement, a modification the court did not have the power to enforce. We disagree. Under the decree Darlene was charged with marketing the marina, and Henry agreed to undertake certain tasks to aid in that endeavor. The decree provided Darlene with payment for her services and advanced her the sum of $3,500. Darlene was to notify Henry of proposed expenditures in excess of this amount and obtain his consent. Darlene and Henry would then split these costs. When Henry failed to meet his obligations, Judge Thompson ordered Henry to pay Darlene $10,000 as an advance for her expenses in hiring people to help her clean up the Ford Marina. Henry claims this was a unilateral modification of the property settlement and thus impermissible. Henry relies on Davis v. Dykman, [22] where we found a settlement agreement invalid because it was uncertain. [23] The agreement failed to state a dollar amount of the settlement or any method for calculating the dollar amount. [24] Although the parties asked the superior court to fill in this gap for them, we held that `[t]he courts should not impose on a party any performance to which he [or she] did not and probably would not have agreed.' [25] Henry argues that the trial court should not have been allowed under Davis to order the additional payment. But Davis is inapposite. Here the trial court was faced with remedying a breach, not filling in the gaps of an agreement. Henry did not fulfill any of his responsibilities under the agreement with regard to the Ford Marina. He did not clean the property, sell the equipment on the property, or ensure the property was vacated by its tenants. Indeed, the condition of the property allegedly worsened after the August 31 mediation. In order to remedy the situation, Darlene requested in her motion to enforce that she be entitled to take all necessary actions and be compensated for her actions to ready the marina for sale. She also requested that she be advanced $10,000 for this purpose. Judge Thompson thus ordered Henry to pay Darlene an advance of $10,000 to accomplish this. Henry did not object to this request at the superior court level and only now voices his opposition. The order falls within the superior court's powers to enforce its own orders [26] and was not an abuse of the court's discretion. Henry also asks that the award of attorney's fees be vacated as an improper exercise of the court's authority. We decline to consider the argument because it is inadequately briefed. [27]