Opinion ID: 1499368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of Hearsay Exception for Dying Declaration

Text: Peter McManus, defendant's father-in-law, and Rodney Moody, a rescue worker, testified that following the stabbing Cline identified Henry Sprague as his assailant. The issue is whether this testimony was properly admitted over defendant's objection that the foundational requirements for the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule had not been met. Rule 804(b)(2), M.R.Evid., provides two requirements for the application of the dying declaration exception: (1) the declarant must have made the statement while believing that his death was imminent [2] and (2) the statement must concern the cause or circumstances of what he believed to be his impending death. [3] The presiding justice must admit the contested evidence [i]f he is satisfied that there is credible evidence which if believed would permit but not compel the jury to find these preliminary facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . State v. Chaplin, Me., 286 A.2d 325, 332 (1972). It is undisputed that the content of the admitted statements satisfied the second requirement. Instead, defendant argues that the State failed to establish the first preliminary fact because (1) Rodney Moody could not recall whether Cline had stated that he was going to die and (2) Cline did not dispute Moody's verbal assurance that the wound would not prove fatal. We reject each contention. Under direct questioning by the presiding justice, Rodney Moody testified that Cline had said, I'm going to die and I feel like I'm going to die. [4] The fact that Cline also asked, Am I going to die? does not detract from the force of his other statements directly reflecting a belief that death was imminent. Further, even apart from the victim's statements to Moody, the State submitted sufficient evidence to meet the foundational requirement. Nancy Sprague testified that immediately after the stabbing, Cline pleaded: This is for real. I'm going to die. Help me. In addition, both defendant's sister and her boyfriend reported hearing Cline state that he thought he was going to die. Finally, although this court has previously acknowledged that [t]he hope of recovery, completely absent on one occasion, may. . . be later renewed by . . . the assurances offered by doctors and nurses, id. at 331, defendant presents no evidence that the rescue worker's verbal assurance did, in fact, revive Cline's hope for survival. As the Supreme Court of North Carolina noted in rejecting a similar challenge to the application of the dying declaration exception, State v. Brown, 263 N.C. 327, 139 S.E.2d 609 (1965), a verbal statement of comfort and assurance from an attending physician and even a subsequent statement by the victim that she did not know if she was going to make it or not. . . do not amount to a subsequent change of her consciousness of the certainty of imminent death by the recurrence of a hope of life. Id. at 335, 139 S.E.2d at 614. In short, the presiding justice did not err in finding credible evidence that could lead the jury to conclude that Cline's belief in his impending death had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.