Opinion ID: 2338285
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Wrongful Discharge/Breach of Contract

Text: Futrell argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on her wrongful discharge claim since she presented sufficient evidence to create a material factual issue as to whether she had entered into an implied employment contract with DOLFCU, based on representations made in DOLFCU's Employees' Handbook and its Employee Guidebook or through representation made by Kravetz in letters dated July 8, 1999 and August 19, 1999. The trial court, after reviewing both documents, concluded that the Employees' Handbook was a union contract which extended certain grievance procedure privileges to non-managerial employees, not management-level employees such as Futrell and that the Employee Guidebook failed to create an implied contract of employment, because nothing in the Employee Guidebook either suggests or implies that the credit union committed itself to abiding by a particular procedure before it terminated an employee, and boldfaced disclaimers pervade the document serving to put all employees on notice that their status remains that of employees-at-will. Finally, the trial court concluded that the letters from Kravetz failed to establish an implied employment contract. We agree. In the District of Columbia, we recognize the presumption that a hiring not accompanied by an expression of a specific term of duration creates an employment relationship terminable at will by either party at any time. Strass v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 744 A.2d 1000, 1011 (D.C.2000); Perkins v. District Gov't Employees Fed. Credit Union, 653 A.2d 842 (D.C.1995). But this presumption can be rebutted by a showing that the parties intended that termination be subject to specific preconditions. Strass, supra, 744 A.2d at 1011. Moreover, the terms of an employer's personnel or policy manual may be sufficient to raise a jury question as to whether the manual creates contractual rights for the employee ... [since] contractual rights may arise from language in employee manuals. Id. However, such implied contractual rights can be disclaimed, and the legal effect of such a disclaimer is, in the first instance, a question for the court to decide. Id. at 1011. With respect to the Employees' Handbook, the trial court did not err in concluding that it was only intended to extend to non-managerial employees. The document distinguishes between employee and Manager, and it is the employee that enjoys the grievance rights under a collective bargaining agreement that Futrell attempts to assign to herself. In addition, her expert also testified that the Guidebook, which includes the disclaimer, not the Handbook, was the most current version of DOLFCU's policy and procedures manual. The trial court's legal conclusion that the May 1998 Employee Guidebook did not create an implied employment contract is also supported by the evidence. The Guidebook clearly states in boldfaced print that it does not constitute an expressed or implied employee contract, and also provides that [e]mployees may terminate their employment with the credit union any time, for any reason, and may be terminated by the credit union any time, for any reason, with or without notice. The inclusion of such unambiguous language and the lack of any specific preconditions in the Guidebook that must be met before employment will be terminated supports the conclusion that Futrell's arguments is without merit and summary judgment was properly granted. See Dantley v. Howard Univ., 801 A.2d 962 (D.C.2002); see Roberts v. Howard Univ., 740 A.2d 16, 19 n. 1 (D.C.1999). Moreover, the record indicates that Futrell, herself, testified during her June 8, 2000 deposition that she understood that the Employee Guidebook did not create an express or implied employment contract. She also testified that she was not given a written contract when she assumed the position of Manager in July 1998, and that she was not given any indication that she would remain in the position for a specified period of time or under what circumstances she would be terminated. Futrell's final argument, that Kravetz's July 8, 1999 and August 19, 1999 letters created implied contracts of employment, is also unavailing. In the July 8, 1999 letter, the DOLFCU Board demanded Futrell's resignation as Manager, and presented her with two options-severance pay or a demotion and reassignment to an Assistant Manager position-in view of her prior contributions and many years of service to the Credit Union. This letter was subsequently withdrawn on August 19, 1999. In a letter dated the same day, DOLFCU decided that the reassignment would be her only option. Such letters certainly do not constitute an expression of a specific term of duration triggering contractual rights. See Strass, supra, 744 A.2d at 1011. We conclude that none of the evidence presented-the Handbook, Guidebook or the letters-created an express or implied employee contract and, thus, the trial court did not err in concluding that Futrell was an at-will management employee, who could be discharged at any time and for any non-discriminatory reason. Since the District of Columbia does not recognize the tort of wrongful discharge for at-will employees, unless the employee was discharged for refusing to violate public policy, Smith, supra, 620 A.2d at 269, summary judgment was properly granted on this issue.