Opinion ID: 2447581
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: waiver or forfeiture

Text: The issue then becomes whether the right to a jury trial, which attached in this case, can be forfeited by non-compliance with our contemporaneous objection rule or whether the right can only be lost by an overt waiver in accordance with Ark. R.Crim.P. 31.1-31.3. Under these facts, I contend that the right can be forfeited. As already noted, Article 2, Section 7, relates to civil casesnot criminal. Its waiver provision, as a consequence, does not control this case, as the majority maintains. Our criminal rules and our statutes provide for a jury-trial waiver by the defendant which must be expressly made. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-108 (1987). Ark. R.Crim.P. 31.1-31.3. Again, though, the rules and statute must be interpreted as relating primarily to Article 2, Section 10, and Section 10 guarantees the right for felonies, not misdemeanors. [2] But, in addition, the statute and rules do not provide the exclusive means of losing a constitutionally protected right. That right may also be forfeited under circumstances such as we have here. When a defendant has been charged with a felony, the right to a jury trial and the waiver provisions kick in under state law. When a defendant has been charged with a serious misdemeanor, the United States Supreme Court also says the right to a jury trial must be afforded. But the Court has not gone so far as to hold that with respect to all misdemeanors the right may not be forfeited under state law. A reasonable interpretation is that the right can be forfeited in certain misdemeanor cases by failure to demand it or to object to its absence. That is exactly what happened in the instant case. Failure to object to a matter at the trial level deprives the circuit court of the opportunity of ruling on that issue, as we have noted many times. See, e.g., Withers v. State, 308 Ark. 507, 825 S.W.2d 819 (1992); Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980). The contemporaneous objection rule is well-entrenched in this state. For example, we said in Withers: We have long been resolute in holding that a contemporaneous objection is a prerequisite to our review.... [Citations omitted.] Otherwise, this would give rise to a basic unfairness in that the trial court would be foreclosed from considering the point of error on appeal. 308 Ark. at 510, 825 S.W.2d at 821. Parties on appeal are, therefore, bound by the scope and nature of those arguments presented to the trial court for its consideration. Williams v. State, 304 Ark. 279, 801 S.W.2d 296 (1990). This court has stressed that the denial of any right, even a constitutional one like due process protection, must be objected to at trial to be preserved for appeal. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Little Rock, 305 Ark. 168, 806 S.W.2d 371 (1991) [retroactive application of legislation]; Kittler v. State, 304 Ark. 344, 802 S.W.2d 925 (1991) [failure to receive notice prior to trial of filing of habitual offender charge]; Barnes v. State, 294 Ark. 369, 742 S.W.2d 925 (1988) [challenge to constitutionality of probation statute]; Harvey v. State, 292 Ark. 267, 729 S.W.2d 406 (1987) [defective recording of statement as violation of due process]; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2508, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), where the Court noted: If a criminal defendant thinks that an action of the state trial court is about to deprive him of a Federal Constitutional right there is every reason for following state procedure in making known his objection. There is precedent for a situation virtually identical to our present dilemma. See Griggs v. State, 280 Ark. 339, 658 S.W.2d 371 (1983). In Griggs , the issue also was a misdemeanor trial before the circuit court involving third-degree burglary, and a year's sentence was given with nine months suspended. We said there that we recognized the constitutional right to a jury trial in felony cases, but we also stated that in Griggs a constitutional issue was not involved, which, implicitly, was due to the fact that the crime was a misdemeanor. We then held that a constitutional question must be raised in the trial court for the question to be reviewable on appeal. Since it was not raised in the trial court, it was forfeited for purposes of appeal. Thus, in Griggs , we squarely associated forfeiture of the right to a jury trial in a misdemeanor case with failure to object to its absence at the trial court level. The same issue now looms before us in this case. As in Griggs , the record is silent on the jury trial question. It may have been discussed at the circuit court level or it may not have been. We can only speculate on the matter. What we do know is that no demand or objection relating to a jury trial appears of record. No action was taken by Calnan to preserve her right to trial by jury for DWI, a misdemeanor, and she was sentenced to two days in jail. She is presumed to have known her rights, especially when she was represented by counsel. Yet, she opted for trial before the circuit judge. It was only after conviction and on appeal to this court that she asked for a jury trial. We go too far in mandating jury trials for misdemeanors when no jury trial has been requested and no objection made. Defense counsel and the appellant were presumed to have known the appellant's rights. By waiting until after conviction to assert a jury trial guarantee smacks of double protection. Failure to demand a right in a misdemeanor appeal must carry with it some consequences. In this case, the consequence should be forfeiture of that right. I respectfully dissent. HAYS and GLAZE, JJ., join.