Opinion ID: 4682858
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Discovery Motion

Text: The Trust also moved for discovery of two items: 1. the version of the BYU Intellectual Property Policy provided to Dr. Robertson in 1980 with his appointment letter and 2. the version of the BYU Intellectual Property Policy in effect from 1989 to 1992. The district court denied the motion, and BYU defends the ruling because the Trust had no pending claim when the court disallowed discovery. As BYU suggests, discovery would ordinarily be pointless without a pending claim. 8 But as noted above, we are reversing the dismissal with instructions to grant the Trust’s motion for leave to amend to add a 8 Federal litigants’ discovery is limited to “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). A litigant has no right to discovery on an unpleaded claim even when discovery is needed to make the claim viable. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686 (2009) (“Because respondent’s complaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is not entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise.”). For the first time in its reply brief, the Trust argues that the requested discovery would bear on a defense to BYU’s claim. But we do “not ordinarily review issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.” United States v. RaPower-3, LLC, 960 F.3d 1240, 1250 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Stump v. Gates, 211 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 2000)). 20 crossclaim for breach of contract. Upon the filing of the amended crossclaim, the district court should reconsider the Trust’s motion for leave to conduct discovery.