Opinion ID: 2581604
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Instruct on Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter

Text: The trial court instructed the jury on two theories of first degree murder: willful, premeditated, and deliberate murder, and felony murder during the course of rape, sodomy, or lewd acts. The court also instructed on second degree murder. The court refused defendant's request for instructions on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Defendant argues the court erred in refusing to give instructions on manslaughter because there was sufficient evidence to support a verdict of involuntary or voluntary manslaughter, and without such instructions the jury was left with an all or nothing choice between conviction for capital murder and acquittal. We disagree. We have held that a defendant has a constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence and that, whenever there is substantial evidence raising a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense are present, the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense, even in the absence of a request, constitutes a denial of that right. ( Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 980, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 75 P.3d 53.) `Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to `deserve consideration by the jury,' that is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive.' ( Id. at p. 981, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 75 P.3d 53.) Manslaughter is `the unlawful killing of a human being without malice.' ( People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 87, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675.) A court is not obligated to instruct sua sponte on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense in the absence of substantial evidence that the defendant acted in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion (§ 192, subd. (a)), or that the defendant killed in `unreasonable self-defense' ( Blakeley, at p. 88, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675). Pointing to medical evidence that Consuelo's internal injuries were caused by external blows and to the statement of the defense expert who suggested it was not likely Consuelo was injured by running into a door but the most likely scenario is that this child was abused by someone in a rage, defendant argues a reasonable juror could conclude Consuelo was beaten to death in response to provocation, passion, and spontaneous rage. We disagree. In light of evidence that Consuelo was severely beaten and sexually assaulted, the isolated statement of the expert is not substantial support for a reasonable conclusion that there existed passion and provocation sufficient to reduce culpability from murder to voluntary manslaughter. Further, a court is not obligated to instruct on involuntary manslaughter in the absence of substantial evidence that the defendant killed his victim `in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to [a] felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection.' ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40, overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 823, fn. 1, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) Consuelo suffered tearing injuries to her anus and vagina and internal injuries equivalent to those suffered in a car accident. For this evidence to support an involuntary manslaughter instruction, there would have to have been sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that medical personnel, not defendant, were the sole cause of the injuries to Consuelo's anus and vagina, and that a misdemeanor, not felony, battery was the cause of her internal injuries. A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another. (§ 242.) A battery is deemed to be a felony unless specifically designated as a misdemeanor by either the prosecution or the court. (§ 17, subd. (b); Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 902, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 30, 69 P.3d 951; People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 685, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 50 P.3d 355.) Defendant cites numerous cases of involuntary manslaughter that involved a misdemeanor assault or battery where the act was of a less serious nature than that which would constitute a felony ( People v. McGee (1947) 31 Cal.2d 229, 238, 187 P.2d 706 [defendant not acting in self-defense fired fatal shot with intent to frighten victim]; People v. Wild (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 829, 832-833, 131 Cal.Rptr. 713 [bar owner's use of deadly force in attempting to stop fleeing misdemeanant]; People v. Jackson (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 179, 183, 20 Cal.Rptr. 592 [defendant knocked victim to ground and jumped on him]; People v. Mullen (1908) 7 Cal.App. 547, 549, 94 P. 867 [victim intervened in fight, was hit in head and died a few days later]), and argues that the evidence here could have supported a charge of misdemeanor battery. It could not; in light of Consuelo's vulnerability at the hands of defendant, the secrecy in which the crimes occurred, and the number and severity of injuries inflicted, we cannot find sufficient evidence that Consuelo's assailant engaged in misdemeanor activity, much less that he had committed a lawful act without due caution and circumspection, and that therefore the killing was involuntary manslaughter. In addition, the jury found true three special circumstance allegations, namely that defendant killed Consuelo during the commission of the felony offenses of rape, sodomy, and lewd conduct on a child under the age of 14. Given these findings, the jury necessarily determined that the killing of Consuelo was first degree felony murder perpetrated in the commission of rape[, sodomy,] and lewd conduct, and not any lesser form of homicide. ( People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 886, 85 Cal. Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15 ( Earp ).) Further, contrary to defendant's assertions, the jury was not left with an all or nothing choice between capital murder and acquittal when the court refused to instruct on manslaughter. (See Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 633-635, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 [sentence of death violates the Fourteenth Amendment when the jury was not permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of a lesser included noncapital offense and the evidence would have supported such a verdict].) The jury had the choice of finding defendant guilty of second degree murder as instructed by the court. Finally, defendant argues that the failure to give instructions on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter was prejudicial error resulting in a denial of his rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty verdict under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and parallel provisions of the state Constitution. This claim fails because, as we have concluded, the court did not err.