Opinion ID: 2638727
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Causation Instruction

Text: ¶ 9 Bass first argues that her convictions must be reversed due to errors in the trial court's oral and written instructions on superseding cause. She claims the written instruction impermissibly confused the criminal law on causation with the civil standard, destroying her only theory of defense. She also charges that the oral instruction on causation was so self-contradictory and incoherent that it confused the jury. Because this is a criminal proceeding and defendant did not object to the instruction, we review only for fundamental error. See State v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 485, 503, 975 P.2d 75, 93 (1999).
¶ 10 At trial, Bass argued that Farrell improperly attempted a lane change and should have been aware that she, Bass, occupied the right-hand lane. Bass asserted that were it not for Farrell's action, crossing the line, she would not have taken evasive action, swerving right, hitting the curb, and spinning out of control into traffic. Bass alternatively alleged that even while her car was riding the curb, she was in control and that it was not until passenger Ochoa grabbed the steering wheel that the car careened into oncoming traffic. She claims that each of these intervening events was a superseding cause that broke the chain of causation and excused all criminal liability for her actions. ¶ 11 The trial court gave a jury instruction on superseding cause, substantially similar to the one requested by Bass, stating that an intervening event becomes a legal excuse, i.e., a superseding cause only when its occurrence was both unforeseeable and when with benefit of hindsight it may be described as abnormal or extraordinary. ¶ 12 Relying on a distinction first drawn in State v. Hall, 129 Ariz. 589, 594, 633 P.2d 398, 403 (1981), and applied most recently by the court of appeals in State v. Jansing, 186 Ariz. 63, 66, 918 P.2d 1081, 1084 (App.1996), Bass argues that this jury instruction was incorrect for failing to differentiate between coincidental intervening acts and responsive intervening acts. The Hall/Jansing line of criminal cases adopted separate standards for the two types of intervening events. Under that line, courts conclude that if the intervening event in question was in response to something defendant put in motion, as when Ochoa felt compelled to grab the steering wheel, it would need to be unforeseeable as well as abnormal or extraordinary in order to excuse liability. Where the intervening event was merely coincidental to defendant's actions, as in Farrell's lane change, it could be found superseding if merely unforeseeable. ¶ 13 We find this distinction strained and see no logical basis for continuing to employ a different standard in our criminal law for events that are merely coincidental. We thus dispense with the dichotomy and expressly hold, as to superseding cause, that any prior distinction between coincidental and responsive events is eliminated. Our criminal standard for superseding cause will henceforth be the same as our tort standard. See Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz County Fair and Rodeo Ass'n, Inc., 177 Ariz. 256, 866 P.2d 1342 (1994) (an event is superseding only if unforeseeable and, with benefit of hindsight, abnormal or extraordinary). To the extent that Arizona case law differs from this standard and from our holding today, we overrule it. ¶ 14 We hold the trial court's written jury instruction on superseding cause set forth the proper standard by which to determine when an intervening event becomes superseding. There are no grounds for reversal on the written jury instruction.
¶ 15 Bass further argues that regardless of the written instruction, the oral instruction was so infected with error as to have hopelessly confused the jury. We agree the transcript depicts an oral instruction fraught with problems. [2] ¶ 16 While it is unclear whether the errors occurred because the judge misspoke or were due to mistranscription by the court reporter, our opinion in State v. Chavarria presents the logical approach. 116 Ariz. 401, 402, 569 P.2d 831, 832 (1977). There, we refused to treat the error as a mere transcription problem when dealing with a matter as serious as giving up the important right to jury trial. We held that despite our factual findings as to the probable source of the error, we could not be satisfied with mere inferences ... that the court reporter made a mistake in transcription. Id. Thus, we treated the error as an omission in the proceedings. Similarly, we are not convinced by compelling evidence here that the error lies with the court reporter. We will therefore presume that the jury was instructed as the transcript reflects and proceed to the determination of whether that error is fundamental. ¶ 17 State v. Gallegos, our guiding rule, held that error in a jury instruction is reversible if the instruction, taken as a whole, supports a reasonable presumption that the jurors would be misled. 178 Ariz. 1, 10, 870 P.2d 1097, 1106 (1994); see also State v. Schrock, 149 Ariz. 433, 440, 719 P.2d 1049, 1056 (1986). The oral instruction on superseding cause, taken as a whole, cannot support that presumption. There is no evidence that the jury was misled, and [m]ere speculation that the jury was confused is insufficient to establish actual jury confusion. Gallegos, 178 Ariz. at 11, 870 P.2d at 1107 (citing State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 578, 769 P.2d 1017, 1024 (1989)). ¶ 18 The issue is whether the jury was confused in its task. Here, the jurors' confusion, if any, would have been dispelled by the error-free written instruction which correctly advised them of their charge. Thus, we do not presume juror confusion in the absence of supporting evidence, and we cannot find fundamental error where the jury benefitted from a sufficiently clear written instruction.