Opinion ID: 3012244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: References to White and the Jacobs Incident

Text: Pickard first takes issue with references by the AUSA to Philomena White, a homeless woman whom Pickard says the AUSA implied that he had murdered. Pickard states that no charges were filed and no evidence was introduced in regard to White’s death. The government argues that since the references to White originally came from a witness who claimed that the mention of White’s name by Pickard let her know that he was threatening her, they were highly relevant and not improper. During the trial, Michael Friedman, testifying for the government, stated that he heard Pickard say to White, You don’t know me. I’ll shoot your mother scunt [sic]. Two other witnesses, Cora Mannix and Winston Tutein, testified that Pickard verbally threatened them by referring to White. Mannix testified that while Pickard was beating her, he said keep [your] mouth shut, or else [you’ll] be next, and when, referring to White, he made this threat while forming the shape of a gun with his hands and pointing his fingers at her forehead. Similarly, Tutein testified that Pickard, after punching him twice in the stomach, pulled out his gun and said I’ll shoot you. You want what happened to Philomena [White] to happen to you? Count 1 of the indictment clearly charged that the defendants conspired to threaten, oppress and intimidate persons residing in and visiting St. Croix. The indictment further charged Pickard with using unreasonable force against Mannix and Tutein. In this context, references to Philomena White were highly probative of Pickard’s intent to deprive Mannix and Tutein of their civil rights, and thus relevant to proving that the conduct alleged in the indictment. Bates raises two issues concerning the Christopher Jacobs incident. In the first, the AUSA stated, at trial, that Philbert was not asked any questions on [the Jacobs incident], was not asked any questions regarding that at all. That too speaks volumes, because he was not there. Bates claims that the AUSA engaged in misconduct by impermissibly shift[ing] the burden of proof to [Bates by], commenting on his failure to ask Philbert questions relating to the [Jacobs] incident. In the second, the AUSA commented that if the jury were to believe Pickard’s testimony that Philbert, and not Bates, was with him on the night of the Jacobs incident, and Philbert is convicted then Bates can’t be prosecuted because somebody has already been found guilty at the time. It’s called double jeopardy. Bates claims that by referencing the benefits Bates could reap under double jeopardy, the AUSA impermissibly tried to persuade the jury to convict him. In ruling on Bates’s new trial motion, the District Court noted that the prosecutor had made an incorrect statement of the law which served to bolster the government’s case regarding Bates’s identification. We have carefully considered Bates’s contentions regarding the AUSA’s remarks, and we find Bates’s arguments to be without merit. We agree with the District Court’s analysis of the government’s strong identification. We also note the curative and general jury instructions the District Court issued. In sum, we do not find that the AUSA’s remarks were so egregious as to ’undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a miscarriage of justice’. United States v. Colletti, 984 F.2d 1339, 1344 (3d Cir. 1992) (concluding there was no plain error where prosecutor’s comments were made during rebuttal, the jury was properly charged, and the government presented a strong case) (citing, inter alia, U.S. v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 n. 14, (1985)). B. Comments about the Virgin Islands Police Department Public and Safety Both Pickard and Bates complain of comments that the AUSA made in which he referenced reform of both the government and the police department of the Virgin Islands in connection with their convictions. In this case, some of the AUSA’s comments clearly exceeded the parameters of what was germane to the case and proper for the jury’s consideration. Among other things, the AUSA stated to the jury: The decision you have to make today, you may not realize how monumental the decision is because it’s going to have repercussions from this day forward with the Virgin Islands Police Department, with the Virgin Islands government, because it’s going to have an effect on training, funding all these things. Because now what you have heard on the evidence for the last two and a half weeks or so is going to be the bench mark for future activities, lawlessness of law enforcement employees. If you choose to ignore the evidence and find the defendants not guilt[y] at this time, the rest of the officers will know the jury found the officers not guilty so we know we can go this far. You’re putting the community at risk. Can you really afford to put community at risk and ignore the evidence that’s been presented to you? This is an opportunity where Legislators are not involved, Governor’s [sic] are not involved. The community makes the decision and a lot of times changes come[] from the community up. You tell the powers that be these are the changes we want made. We’re fed up. You have to make a change, and if you don’t do it we have to take it into our own hands on the jury, based on the evidence, and get you in gear to start to make decisions.... ... You have to decide, are you going to be the voice of the community at this point in time to try and corral the officers that are not doing their job, that have crossed the line? Because everything we’ve talked about is where they get excessive, they’ve used unreasonable force. ... You know many might think that the officers learned their lessons... but ask yourself what guarantee do you have that the behavior of the members of the Virgin Islands Police Department is going to be stopped at this point in time?... The question you have to decide...is what kind of police department do you want after today? Upon the completion of the prosecutor’s remarks, counsel for Pickard approached the bench and requested a curative instruction or, in the alternative, a mistrial. In response, the District Judge provided the following curative instruction: Ladies and gentlemen, in reaching your decision and your verdict as to each count, please remember that you are to consider only the evidence that has been accepted into evidence and that has been presented to you, and you should not take into account what effect that decision will have on the department of police or public safety in general. You are here only to decide on the guilt or innocence of the accused. In response to Pickard’s motion for a new trial based upon the AUSA’s remarks, the District Court noted that [b]ecause the remarks by the prosecutor were limited to a small segment of the two and a half week trial, because curative instructions were given, and because the case against Defendant Pickard was strong, this Court finds that even if the prosecutor[’]s statements were in error, the error was harmless because there was no substantial prejudice to Pickard. The AUSA’s remarks concerning the government and the Police Department of the Virgin Islands were clearly inappropriate and improper in the context of this case. We are not satisfied, however, that in the context of all the evidence presented, the remarks were so prejudicial as to amount to a denial of a fair trial. See, e.g., United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 241 (3d Cir. 2000) (observing that when a prosecutor’s remarks are over the line, and arguably even out of line, they warrant a new trial only if the defendant was prejudiced by them); Homer, 545 F.2d at 867 (noting that trials are rarely, if ever, perfect and improprieties of argument by counsel to the jury do not call for a new trial unless they are so gross as probably to prejudice the defendant and the prejudice has not been neutralized by the trial judge before submission of the case to the jury.). We observe again that [t]he prosecutor is entitled to considerable latitude in summation to argue the evidence and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence, Werme, 939 F.2d at 117. In ruling of Defendants’ claim of prejudice, we consider the scope of the objectionable comments and their relationship to the entire proceeding, the ameliorative effect of any curative instructions given, and the strength of the evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 1265. Here, the AUSA’s organization and compartmentalization of evidence, combined with the District Court’s issuance of curative instructions shows that in the larger context of the lengthy and essentially carefully-run trial, no misconduct occurred that merits a reversal of any of the convictions. We do note, however, that [a] United States Attorney in a criminal case has an even greater responsibility than counsel for an individual client. For the purpose of the individual case he represents the great authority of the United States and he must exercise that responsibility with the circumspection and dignity the occasion calls for. United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 736 (3d Cir. 1974). While we conclude that a new trial is not warranted since the evidence of guilt for all three defendants was overwhelming, and defendants were not prejudiced, the AUSA’s remarks were clearly inappropriate. As we did in Helbling, we urge the United States Attorney for [the Virgin Islands] to remind his assistants of the limits of appropriate advocacy. 209 F.3d at 241.