Opinion ID: 831671
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: defendant's role in the delivery of heroin to corson

Text: Given that Spencer's delivery of heroin violated both statutes at issue here, the question posed in this appeal is whether defendant's actions make him as culpable as Spencer under the law. The prosecution does not argue that defendant physically delivered the heroin to Corson; rather, the prosecution argues that he aided and abetted Spencer's delivery of heroin to Corson. [24] Under our aiding and abetting statute, [e]very person concerned in the commission of an offense, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense or procures, counsels, aids, or abets in its commission may hereafter be prosecuted, indicted, tried and on conviction shall be punished as if he had directly committed such offense.[ [25] ] This Court recently described the three elements necessary for a conviction under an aiding and abetting theory: `(1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person; (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime; and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that [the defendant] gave aid and encouragement.'[ [26] ] A bindover is required when probable cause exists to support each of the elements of a crime. [27] As stated, it is not contested that the first element was established. There was ample evidence to support probable cause that Spencer committed both crimes at issue when he sold heroin to Corson. Thus, to sustain the prosecution's aiding and abetting theory, the evidence must support defendant's act of encouragement and assistance of Spencer's crime (element 2) as well as defendant's knowledge of Spencer's criminal delivery to Corson or defendant's intent that this delivery crime be committed (element 3). We believe that the evidence presented at the preliminary examination more than satisfies all three aiding and abetting elements. Defendant claims that at most he assisted Corson in obtaining possession of heroin from Spencer, but did not assist Spencer in delivering heroin to Corson. Defendant's analysis, which has been accepted by the circuit court, the Court of Appeals majority, and this Court's dissent, conflates two crimespossession and deliverysuch that defendant's focus on the possessory crime obscures the delivery crime. What the lower courts and the dissenting justices have failed to appreciate is that a criminal delivery of narcotics necessarily requires both a deliverer and a recipient. Accordingly, a defendant who assists either party to a criminal delivery necessarily aids and abets the deliverer's commission of the crime because such assistance aids and abets the delivery. [28] Corson testified that defendant drove her from Ann Arbor to Detroit on the day in question for the specific purpose of engaging in a drug transaction with Spencer. Moreover, defendant paid for the heroin that Corson used on the drive back to Ann Arbor, provided to defendant's ex-girlfriend in defendant's apartment, and subsequently shared with Gregory in defendant's apartment. Furthermore, the evidence adduced at the preliminary examination suggests a consistent pattern of heroin activityfrom acquisition to consumptionin defendant's presence. As the district court held, this evidence was sufficient to establish probable cause that defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the delivery of heroin from Spencer to Corson on the day in question and, furthermore, that he intended . . . or had knowledge that Spencer would deliver heroin to Corson. [29] The Court of Appeals majority attempted to distinguish the instant case from three earlier Court of Appeals cases applying Michigan's aiding and abetting doctrine to the delivery of narcotics. In People v. Izarraras-Placante, [30] the defendant drove a drug dealer to a transaction with an undercover police officer, was overheard discussing the price with the drug dealer, and was identified by the drug dealer as his partner. In People v. Lyons, [31] the defendant answered a hotel room door, asked an undercover officer what he desired, and led the officer into the room to obtain heroin from another person inside the room. In People v. Berry, [32] the defendant met an undercover officer who was going to purchase cocaine from a drug dealer, convinced the officer to obtain the cocaine from another drug dealer, and coordinated the transaction. When the undercover officer suggested that the defendant pool his money with the officer's money to get a better price on narcotics, defendant did so. They therefore purchased the narcotics together. By including these three cases as comparative examples of aiding and abetting the delivery of narcotics, the Court of Appeals majority implied that the evidence in this case was insufficient to establish probable cause for a bindover. However, none of these cited cases supports the requirement the Court of Appeals majority imposed that a defendant charged with aiding and abetting the delivery of narcotics must have aided and abetted only the person who delivered the narcotics. [33] Thus, the Court of Appeals majority erred by confining its inquiry to whether defendant aided and abetted the drug dealer in delivering the drugs to Corson. [34] Instead, the crux of the appropriate inquiry is whether defendant aided and abetted the delivery itself by assisting any party to that transaction. Such assistance to any party to an illegal transaction necessarily encourage[s], support[s], or incite[s] the commission of that crime. [35] Because defendant drove Corson to purchase heroin and supplied the money for the heroin, there is probable cause to bind defendant over for violating MCL 333.7401 and MCL 750.317a. The district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion by binding defendant over on these charges.