Opinion ID: 1660783
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: This Court's scope of review in bond validation cases is limited to the following issues: (1) whether the public body has the authority to issue the bonds; (2) whether the purpose of the obligation is legal; and (3) whether the bond issuance complies with the requirements of the law. See Poe v. Hillsborough County, 695 So.2d 672, 675 (Fla.1997). Here, appellant's challenge focuses on the City's authority to issue the bonds without complying with the requirements of chapter 159. However, in Pinellas County v. State, 776 So.2d 262 (Fla.2001), this issue appears to have been resolved contrary to appellant's position. In Pinellas County, the County had proposed to incorporate a reclaimed water service component into its existing water and sewer facilities. It proposed to fund this project with sewer revenue bonds. Some of the affected municipalities which would be served by the project opposed the bond validation. The trial court denied the County's request to validate the bonds, finding that, pursuant to chapter 153, Florida Statutes, the County was required to obtain the additional consent of the municipalities within the service area (which it had not done) before adding a reclaimed water system to the existing water services. This Court reversed, holding that the County, which was authorized by its home rule charter powers and the Special Acts to add reclaimed water improvements to its existing water and sewer system, was not required to comply with additional requirements of chapter 153, Florida Statutes, where it neither relied, nor was required to rely, upon such supplemental authority. Pinellas County, 776 So.2d 262, 264-65 (footnote omitted). Here, as in Pinellas County, the local government acted pursuant to its home rule charter powers in authorizing issuance of the bonds in question. Article VIII, section 2, Florida Constitution, which provides that municipalities may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as provided by law, has consistently been construed as giving municipalities broad home rule powers. Art. VIII, § 2(b), Fla. Const.; see Boschen v. City of Clearwater, 777 So.2d 958, 963 (Fla.2001); State v. City of Sunrise, 354 So.2d 1206, 1209 (Fla.1978). Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the Legislature enacted the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act (codified in chapter 166, Florida Statutes), which provides that municipalities have full authority to issue bonds. See §§ 166.021, 166.111(1), 166.141, Fla. Stat. (2000); see also Boschen, 777 So.2d at 963; Washington Shores Homeowners' Ass'n v. City of Orlando, 602 So.2d 1300, 1302 n. 2 (Fla.1992). The City's Charter also vests it with broad authority to issue bonds. See Charter art. I, § 1.01, art. IX. Further, Ordinance No. 6675-01, through which the City authorized issuance of the Bonds, refers only to Chapter 166, Part II, Florida Statutes [the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act], and other applicable provisions of law, and makes no reference to chapter 159. See Bond Ordinance § 1. Although the City looked to chapter 159 to interpret the phrase, industrial development, as used in its charter, it did not thereby invoke chapter 159 as a source of authority in exercising its charter powers to issue the bonds, [4] and did not need to meet the requirements of chapter 159. In Pinellas County, this Court found that the local government was not required to utilize the supplemental statutory authority which contained requirements the cities asserted had not been met in issuing the subject bonds. Pinellas County, 776 So.2d 262, 264-65; cf. also City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So.2d 25, 29 (Fla.1992) (holding that the City of Boca Raton, in levying the special assessment at issue, did not have to follow the requirements of chapter 170, Florida Statutes, which provided a supplemental, additional, and alternative method of procedure for the benefit of all cities, towns, municipal corporations of the state, but was free to exercise its home rule powers to develop its own procedures); Taylor v. Lee County, 498 So.2d 424, 426 (Fla.1986) (observing that, in areas in which a non-charter county has authority to issue bonds, it may choose between adopting an ordinance pursuant to its home rule power or adopting it pursuant to another [supplemental and additional] statutory authority); Speer v. Olson, 367 So.2d 207, 213 (Fla. 1978) (observing that an act, when it recites that it is an additional and supplemental grant of power, may be used in addition to other laws on the same subject, but may be rejected by a public entity and another applicable law used in its place). Here, similarly, chapter 159 provides that the authority contained therein is supplementary, and not in derogation of any powers of a local agency otherwise conferred. Section 159.43, Florida Statutes (2000) specifically provides: 159.43. Liberal construction. Part II of this chapter, being necessary for the prosperity and welfare of the state and its inhabitants, shall be liberally construed to effect the purposes thereof; shall be, and be deemed, authority in addition to, and shall provide alternative methods for, any other authority provided by law for the same or similar purposes; and is supplemental to and not in derogation of any powers of any local agency otherwise conferred. The criteria and requirements of this part are applicable only to projects financed under authority of this part, except as otherwise expressly incorporated by references in other provisions of law. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, as in Pinellas County, the taxpayer's argument here that a referendum was required to issue the Bonds fails. Both the record evidence and applicable case law support the trial court's conclusions here. Chapter 159 is clear and unequivocal in providing that its authority and application are supplemental to, and do not invalidate, other sources of authority for undertaking the activities authorized by the statutory provisions. See § 153.20, Fla. Stat. (1997). Review of the applicable resolutions and the ordinance in this case reflects that the City did not invoke, nor did it need to invoke, chapter 159 in attempting to issue the industrial development bonds. [5] Therefore, the trial court correctly found that the City was not bound by the referendum requirement of the Charter. Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the final judgment validating the bonds. It is so ordered. WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.