Opinion ID: 1683520
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: As to the Appeal

Text: Warwick advances several theories to support a reversal of the judgment below. After careful analysis of the lengthy briefs and voluminous record, we deem it necessary, in regard to the appeal, to discuss only Warwick's claim that the trial judge's failure to dismiss the abuse of process claim brought by GV and the Club constitutes reversible error. Warwick's initial position that an underlying action of some sort must terminate in the plaintiff's favor before an abuse of process action can be maintained is misplaced. Abuse of process is often confused with the tort of malicious prosecution. Several important elements, however, distinguish the two. The chief distinction is that in an action for malicious prosecution the original action must terminate in favor of the plaintiff. An abuse of process action, on the other hand, does not require termination in favor of the person bringing the action; in fact, abuse of process does not even require termination of the suit. The reason for the distinction is that malicious prosecution concerns the wrong in the issuance of the process, while abuse of process rests on the wrongful use of the process after it has been issued. Wilson v. Brooks, 369 So.2d 1221 (Ala.1979); Clikos v. Long, 231 Ala. 424, 165 So. 394 (1936); Dickerson v. Schwabacher, 177 Ala. 371, 58 So. 986 (1912). An abuse of process action presupposes an originally valid and regular process, duly and properly issued, and the validity of the process is no defense to an action for its abuse. Farm Country Homes, Inc. v. Rigsby, 404 So.2d 573, 576 (Ala.1981). See also Board of Education v. Farmingdale Classroom Teacher Association, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 343 N.E.2d 278 (1975), for a good discussion of the evolution of the tort. GV and the Club filed their abuse of process claim following Warwick's amendment to its counterclaim seeking to eject GV and the Club from the premises for failure to pay a portion of the ad valorem taxes. Here, the process issued with the filing of the counterclaim by Warwick, not with the letter notice sent to GV declaring the lease null and void. The burden is on the plaintiff to show that the process was issued for an illegal purpose. [1] The defendants contend that because they had some reason to test the validity of the lease, the filing of the counterclaim contesting the validity does not constitute abuse of process. However, we do not believe that the resolution of the issue of whether there was an abuse hinges on whether there is a valid use for which process could be used, but whether there was an ulterior purpose in filing this action and a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. Reynolds v. McEwen, 416 So.2d 702 (Ala.1982). For example, in Board of Education v. Farmingdale Classroom Teacher Association, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 343 N.E.2d 278 (1975), the court held there was abuse of process when an attorney subpoenaed 87 teachers as witnesses for a hearing when it was proven that it was done for the ulterior purpose of harassment and intent to injure the Board of Education. Obviously, he had a right to subpoena witnesses for the hearing. The court held, [w]here process is manipulated to achieve some collateral advantage, whether it be denominated extortion, blackmail or retribution, the tort of abuse of process will be available to the injured party. Id., 38 N.Y.2d at 404, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 643, 343 N.E.2d at 283. [2] A typical case of abuse of process is where criminal proceedings are started for the purpose of collecting a debt. Tolbert v. State, 294 Ala. 738, 321 So.2d 227 (1975); Hotel Supply Co. v. Reid, 16 Ala.App. 563, 80 So. 137 (1918); see generally W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 121 (4th ed. 1971). The fact that there was a proper use for the criminal proceedings would not be a defense to an abuse of process action. In this case plaintiff contends that defendants' only purpose for filing the unlawful detainer claim was retribution for being sued. There is evidence from which the jury could infer that the defendant orchestrated the non-payment of taxes so as to set up the unlawful detainer claim. James Grayson testified to the following at trial: Q. [By Mr. Acker] And you let GV Corporation pay the taxes for that year on the property you hadWarwick had the fee simple title in, is that right? A. Yes. Q. You didn't send any eviction notices? A. No, sir. Q. And you didn't send any notices of termination of the lease? A. And we weren't being sued either. Q. And you weren't being sued either, is that what you said? I want to hear that again, `You weren't being sued either?' Is that what you said? A. That is correct. Q. So when you were being sued, you sent an eviction notice, is that right? Yes or no? A. We started abiding by the letter of the lease. Q. Did you file an eviction notice when you were not being sued? Did you? A. I didn't. Q. You didn't abide by the letter of the lease until you were sued, is that right? A. Because we were doing everything we could to help the country club go. (Emphasis supplied.) (TR. 1750). As this exchange shows, prior to being sued defendants had cooperated in allowing plaintiffs to pay the taxes. After being sued they did not do so because of the fact that they were being sued. The failure to pay taxes was the basis of the unlawful detainer claim. Therefore, this claim would not call into question the validity of the lease at the time plaintiffs' claims arose. The jury could infer from this that upon being sued the defendant created a claim and sued plaintiffs in retribution. We believe that under these facts there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that defendants initiated the unlawful detainer proceedings as retribution for plaintiffs' having sued the defendants and not to test the validity of the lease. Therefore, the judgment for plaintiffs is affirmed.