Opinion ID: 1034078
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of Exculpatory Statements

Text: Defendants’ final argument with regard to the audio recordings and related transcripts is that the district court erred in excluding defendants’ exculpatory statements. Defendants argue that such statements were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 106. “The ‘rule of completeness’ allows a party to correct a misleading impression created by the introduction of part of a writing or conversation by introducing additional parts of it necessary to put the admitted portions in proper context.” United States v. Holden, 557 F.3d 698, 705 (6th Cir. 2009). The common-law doctrine of completeness is partially codified in Rule 106: “If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.” FED. R. EVID. 106; see Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 171–72 (1988). We have determined previously that Rule 106 “covers an order of proof problem; it is not designed to make something admissible that should be excluded.” United States v. Costner, 684 F.2d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 1982).31 Right or 31 Recognizing “that one panel of this court cannot overturn a decision of another panel,” United States v. Lanier, 201 F.3d 842, 846 (6th Cir. 2000), we note that should this court sitting en banc address whether Rule 106 requires that the other evidence be otherwise admissible, it might consider: Stephen A. Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 46 5336/ 5337/ 5366 wrong, this court has acknowledged that under Costner “[e]xculpatory hearsay may not come in solely on the basis of completeness.” United States v. Shaver, 89 F. App’x 529, 533 (6th Cir. 2004); see Holden, 557 F.3d at 706 (rejecting defendant’s Rule 106 argument because “his statements are inadmissible hearsay and were properly excluded”). Defendants point to numerous instances where the purposes of Rule 106 would have been served by admitting their exculpatory statements. For example, cooperating witness Kennon White was directed by the government to tell Maricle about the questions that were asked when Kennon testified before the grand jury. In the present case, the jury heard: Kennon: [D]id you use Cletus Maricle’s influence as circuit judge to get people to vote for Phillip Mobley? . . . Maricle: Did you promise anybody I’d do anything for them? Kennon: Only one was that Downy boy; Bobby Downy’s brother . . . . A.A. at 769–70. The government was permitted to omit Maricle’s response: “That’s one thing I did very seldom, promised to do, I never promised anybody that I would help somebody in a Court case . . . UI . . . the simple reason is . . . UI . . . I don’t believe having cases held over head forever for some political thing.” Id. at 770. In a later recording when Kennon brought up the “Downy boy” again, Maricle stated “I don’t Saltzburg et al., 1-106 Federal Rules of Evidence Manual § 106.02 (“We believe that these rulings are misguided and contrary to the completeness principle embodied in Rule 106. A party should not be able to admit an incomplete statement that gives an unfair impression, and then object on hearsay grounds to completing statements that would rectify the unfairness.”); Charles Alan Wright et al., 21A Federal Practice and Procedure § 5078.1 (2d ed. 2012) (“Even were Rule 106 ambiguous on this point, Rule 102 requires that it ‘be construed to secure fairness in administration . . . to the end that the truth be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.’ No one has ever explained how these standards would be met by a construction that would allow a party to present evidence out of context so as to mislead the jury, then assert an exclusionary rule to keep the other side from exposing his deception.”); Dale A. Nance, A Theory of Verbal Completeness, 80 IOWA L. REV. 825 (1995); United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“The structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence indicates that Rule 106 is concerned with more than merely the order of proof. . . . Rule 106 can adequately fulfill its function only by permitting the admission of some otherwise inadmissible evidence when the court finds in fairness that the proffered evidence should be considered contemporaneously. A contrary construction raises the specter of distorted and misleading trials, and creates difficulties for both litigants and the trial court.”). Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 47 5336/ 5337/ 5366 know a thing about that no Downy boy.” Id. at 730. The district court excluded this statement too. Wanda White, the government’s other cooperating witness, was given the same instructions as her husband, Kennon. In one instance, the jury heard: Wanda: He asked me, um, oh, how I become an election officer over again. Did you appoint me to election officer. Maricle: Did I appoint you? (Laugh) Wanda: Yeah. Id. at 291. The district court excluded Maricle’s response: “I don’t really have any authority to appoint anybody.” Id. at 660. Defendants claim that “by severely cropping the transcripts, the government significantly altered the meaning of what [defendants] actually said.” Maricle Br. at 35. Although we agree that these examples highlight the government’s unfair presentation of the evidence, this court’s bar against admitting hearsay under Rule 106 leaves defendants without redress. Maricle responds that if his exculpatory statements were not admissible under Rule 106 during the government’s case-in-chief, such statements became admissible when he testified during his defense. The district court rejected this argument because “[a]n exculpatory statement made outside the presence of the jury is still an exculpatory statement that’s inadmissible under [Rule] 801.” R. 883 (03/12/2010 Trial Tr. at 30) (Page ID #9980). On appeal, Maricle relies solely on United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005). Paladino does not, however, address the issue of whether hearsay is admissible under Rule 106, and Maricle fails to assert that his exculpatory Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 48 5336/ 5337/ 5366 statements fall within a valid hearsay exception.32 Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendants’ exculpatory statements.