Opinion ID: 1947609
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Co-conspirator Exception to the Hearsay Prohibition

Text: Appellant also argues that the court erred in admitting hearsay evidence. At issue is testimony from Steve Mairs. Mairs testified that he was riding in a truck one day [40] with his friend Thomas Williams [41] , Dena Williams' brother, when Thomas got a phone call. Mairs did not know who had called Thomas, although he could tell it was a man's voice. After he hung up, Thomas stated to Mairs that the call was from Appellant and that he was looking for a gun. Mairs testified that Thomas never made any implications that, you know, he had the desire or the ability to get him one. Defense counsel objected on the grounds of hearsay. The Commonwealth argued that the statement was in furtherance of a conspiracy, admissible under KRE 801 A(b)(5). The trial court agreed the statement was allowable under that Rule. KRE 801 A(b)(5) allows the admission of a hearsay statement, even though the declarant is available as a witness, if the statement is offered against a party and is a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The hearsay exception for out-of-court statements by a co-conspirator applies only upon proof that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) both the defendant and the declarant were participants in the conspiracy, and (3) the statement was made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. [42] Appellant first argues that. Steven Mairs was not part of any conspiracy, although he does not challenge the existence of a conspiracy between Appellant and Williams. However, it is not required that the witness who testifies to the hearsay be a part of the conspiracy. KRE 801 A(b)(5) requires only that the declarant (in this case, Thomas Williams) be a coconspirator of the party against whom the statement is offered. Additionally, Appellant argues that Main did not hear a conversation between conspirators, but could only rely on what Thomas Williams said was the substance of the conversation. But we do not find any requirement in the rule that a whole conversation be heard for the admission of a statement in furtherance of a conspiracy to be admissible. There is no requirement that a statement under the rule establish the entire conspiracy. Finally, Appellant argues that the admitted statement was not in furtherance of a conspiracy because Williams did not express a desire or ability to get Appellant a gun, nor did he solicit Mairs' participation. [43] He contends it was just a narrative of what had occurred, and was not properly to be considered as being in furtherance of any activity or plot. In Marshall v. Commonwealth, [44] we stated that declarations that are simply narratives of what already occurred are not made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Federal courts have interpreted the federal version of the rule as requiring that the statement must be such as to prompt the listener who need not be a coconspiratorto respond in a way that facilitates the carrying out of the criminal activity. [45] We agree with Appellant that this was not a statement in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy between Appellant and Williams. The testimony of Mairs did not demonstrate that he was being solicited by Williams to assist in the attempt to get a gun. There is no indication that the statement was meant to prompt Mairs to participate. Instead it was analogous to a narrative describing what Appellant had done, and not in furtherance of the conspiracy. Therefore, it should not have been permitted as such. The Commonwealth argues, alternatively, that the testimony from Mairs was otherwise admissible as a present sense impression. The Commonwealth observes that if the hearsay was wrongly admitted as a co-conspirator statement, it would not be considered error if properly admissible under another hearsay exception. We have held that we will uphold a correct result of the trial court even if reached for the wrong reason. [46] A number of courts hold that a conversation on the telephone is an event which may be described or explained within the meaning of the present sense impression exclusion to the hearsay rule. [47] Under the terms of KRE 803(1), the statement is regarded as describing the event of the conversation just heard on the telephone, immediately after the event was perceived (heard) by the declarant. Perception described in KRE 803(1) can be by sight or sound. [48] The conversation must be described or explained immediately thereafter to meet the time strictures of the rule, which serve to eliminate the concerns of inaccurate reporting or fabrication. [49] In Portsmouth Paving , the conversation was considered to be within the present sense exception because it was related within a few seconds of putting down the phone. [50] We agree that the statement reported by Mairs fit within the present sense impression exception. We are persuaded by the immediacy of the statement after the phone call. If there had been any lapse of time, the statement would have lost its reliability since the declarant would have had the opportunity for reflection and/or invention. Because of its immediacy, however, we regard this as a present sense impression of the phone conversation which Williams had just heard. Therefore the statement would, have been admissible at trial had the Commonwealth sought to introduce it as a present sense impression, and we do not regard its admission as error.