Opinion ID: 4192155
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the court’s instructions to the jurors

Text: As is typical, the parties’ presentation of the case was bookended by the court’s instructions to the jurors—which, as the court stressed at both ends, provided the jurors with “the law that you’re to apply to the facts as you find the facts to exist” and which “[y]ou must take . . . as I give it to you.” As is also typical, the court instructed the jurors on the elements of the charged offenses and on an assortment of other standard matters common to criminal trials—including, as the majority notes, general advisements about 21 As the majority summarizes, the defendant also presented testimony from two other witnesses. First, his sister testified to some basic biographical information about him, such as his history of employment and military service. Then, a former girlfriend, who had lived in his and the Kountzes’ neighborhood and had dated him for roughly a year at one point, testified that (1) she had had a “[v]ery nice” relationship with the defendant, free from any verbal or physical abuse, and (2) during the time period relevant to this case, she had never heard anything in the neighborhood about the defendant being verbally and physically abusive to his girlfriend at that time. 16 the meaning of “reasonable doubt” and the jury’s role as the finder of fact (and with it, the arbiter of credibility). The court, however, wove amidst these standard instructions some of its own making, including the one that launched this case on its long appellate odyssey. A few of these bear particular mention. First, the court instructed the jurors regarding the prosecution’s voluminous testimony about the defendant’s abuse of Louise. Before doing so, the court had discussed with the parties the proper instruction for this evidence, with the parties ultimately agreeing that M Crim JI 4.11a (regarding “Evidence of Other Acts of Domestic Violence”) would be best. This model instruction provides: (1) The prosecution has introduced evidence of claimed acts of domestic violence by the defendant for which [he / she] is not on trial. (2) Before you may consider such alleged acts as evidence against the defendant, you must first find that the defendant actually committed such acts. (3) If you find that the defendant did commit those acts, you may consider them in deciding if the defendant committed the [offense / offenses] for which [he / she] is now on trial. (4) You must not convict the defendant here solely because you think [he / she] is guilty of other bad conduct. The evidence must convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the alleged crime, or you must find [him / her] not guilty.[22] This, however, was not the instruction the court then provided to the jurors. Instead, the court instructed: You have heard a lot of evidence, testimony that the respondent committed some improper acts against Louise Kountz, who was at the time his girlfriend. They had that type of relationship. It appears from the 22 Brackets appearing in quotations of the Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions in this opinion appeared in the original. 17 testimony that that testimony of his improper acts against someone is not the decedent and who is accused of murdering, that testimony you must very carefully consider it for certain purposes. You may only think about whether that evidence intends to show that the defendant had a motive to kill Andrew Weathers, the decedent, and also that it tends to show to you that the complete picture of the defendant’s history as it relates to the part of it that Melvin, the decedent Andrew Weathers. You’ve heard that testimony involving Louise Kountz, the deceased Andrew Weathers, Melvin, the deceased --- now, Louise Kountz died, I guess, just four or five years ago and of natural --- not in this murder, but she was living at this address at 88 Louise Street in Highland Park, and that there were other people living at that address. And that the other people have testified as to improper acts that the defendant committed not against Andrew Weathers, but against Louise Kountz for the most part. You must carefully balance that testimony of improper acts so not to prejudice yourself against this defendant and this murder, to only that he had a motive and he was in this environment, the decedent Andrew Weathers. Now, I mentioned motive, in that bit of the instructions as to those improper acts committed, if you find that they were, in fact, committed, against, if you will, Louise Kountz, who was --- well, you know the relationship between her and the defendant. That those acts were for motive of the defendant to kill someone else, Melvin, not Ms. Kountz. This, it seems, was an amalgam between the agreed-upon M Crim JI 4.11a and M Crim JI 4.11, the model instruction for evidence admitted under MRE 404(b) 23—with substantial 23 M Crim JI 4.11 provides: (1) You have heard evidence that was introduced to show that the defendant committed [a crime / crimes / improper acts] for which [he / she] is not on trial. (2) If you believe this evidence, you must be very careful only to consider it for certain purposes. You may only think about whether this evidence tends to show: [Choose one or more from (a) through (g):] 18 liberties taken by the court as to both. For instance, while the court advised the jurors that they “must carefully balance that testimony of improper acts so [as] not to prejudice yourself against this defendant and this murder,” it did not expressly advise them, as both M Crim JI 4.11 and 4.11a would have, that they “must not convict the defendant here because you think [he] is guilty of other bad conduct.” 24 (a) That the defendant had a reason to commit the crime; (b) That the defendant specifically meant to ___________; (c) That the defendant knew what the things found in [his / her] possession were; (d) That the defendant acted purposefully—that is, not by accident or mistake, or because [he / she] misjudged the situation; (e) That the defendant used a plan, system, or characteristic scheme that [he / she] has used before or since; (f) Who committed the crime that the defendant is charged with. (g) [State other proper purpose for which evidence is offered.] (3) You must not consider this evidence for any other purpose. For example, you must not decide that it shows that the defendant is a bad person or that [he / she] is likely to commit crimes. You must not convict the defendant here because you think [he / she] is guilty of other bad conduct. All the evidence must convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the alleged crime, or you must find [him / her] not guilty. 24 On direct appeal, the defendant raised a very cursory challenge to this instruction, which the Court of Appeals panel addressed briefly in its first unpublished opinion, after concluding the defendant was entitled to a new trial based on the instructional error now before us. The panel observed that “although the trial court’s instructions on other acts evidence may not have been so inadequate as to warrant reversal, they were certainly imperfect” and should, on re-trial, be corrected to adhere to the model instructions. Lyles, 19 At this point, the prosecution asked to approach the bench, but the court preferred to finish its instructions first. Ultimately, the court instructed the jurors on various other aspects of the prosecution’s proofs, including that (1) “evidence that the defendant moved away . . . does not prove his guilt” but may reflect “a consciousness of guilt,” and the jurors “must decide whether the evidence is true and if true, whether it shows that the defendant had a guilty state of mind”; (2) “[t]he prosecutor does not have to prove that the defendant had a reason to commit the alleged crime, she only has to show that the defendant actually committed the crime or that he meant to do so”; and (3) “you may use the [prosecution’s] identification testimony alone to convict the defendant as long as you believe the testimony and you find that it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who committed the crime.” After the court finished its instructions, counsel for both sides raised a number of concerns and omissions—including the court’s failure to provide the agreed-upon instruction under 4.11a, and its failure to instruct the jury on the defendant’s character evidence under M Crim JI 5.8a(1), which provides: (1) You have heard evidence about the defendant’s character for [peacefulness / honesty / good sexual morals / being law-abiding / (describe other trait)]. You may consider this evidence, together with all the other evidence in the case, in deciding whether the defendant committed the crime with which (he / she) is charged. Evidence of good character alone may sometimes create a reasonable doubt in your minds and lead you to find the defendant not guilty.[25] unpub op at 6. The panel also briefly rejected two other, similarly cursory challenges the defendant had raised. Id. The defendant did not seek our review of any of these rulings. 25 M Crim JI 5.8a provides in full: 20 The court then recalled the jury and rattled off further instructions. It did not revisit its instruction regarding the domestic-violence evidence, but—as we well know at this point, and in apparent response to defense counsel’s request for M Crim JI 5.8a(1)— it did provide the following instruction: [Y]ou’ve heard the testimony of --- about witness’ [sic] truthfulness. You may consider this evidence together with all other evidence in the case in deciding whether you believe the testimony of the witness, in[] deciding how much weight to give to that witness. The prosecutor has examined some of the defendant’s character witnesses as to whether or not they heard anything bad about the defendant. You should consider such cross- (1) You have heard evidence about the defendant’s character for [peacefulness / honesty / good sexual morals / being law-abiding / (describe other trait)]. You may consider this evidence, together with all the other evidence in the case, in deciding whether the defendant committed the crime with which (he / she) is charged. Evidence of good character alone may sometimes create a reasonable doubt in your minds and lead you to find the defendant not guilty. [(2) The prosecutor has cross-examined (one / some) of the defendant’s character witnesses as to whether they had heard anything bad about the defendant. You should consider such cross-examination only in deciding whether you believe the character witnesses and whether they described the defendant fairly.] [(3) The prosecutor also called witnesses who testified that the defendant does not have the good character described by the defendant’s character witnesses. This evidence can only be considered by you in judging whether you believe the defendant’s character witnesses and whether the defendant has a good character for (describe trait). It is not evidence that the defendant committed the crime charged.] As the instruction’s Use Notes make clear, and as the parties here don’t dispute, only Subsection (1) of this instruction applied to this case, as the prosecution did not crossexamine “the defendant’s character witnesses as to whether they had heard anything bad about the defendant” and did not call any witnesses to rebut them. 21 examination only in deciding whether or not you believe the character witness and whether they described the [defendant] fairly. The prosecutor also has called witnesses who have testified that the defendant did not have good character of the other acts. This, of course, wasn’t M Crim JI 5.8a(1), and neither it nor any other instruction made any mention of the defendant’s character evidence or its potential legal effect on the jurors’ assessment of reasonable doubt. Instead, it was another court-fashioned amalgam, seemingly derived from M Crim JI 5.8 (“Character Evidence Regarding Credibility of Witness”)—an instruction that the parties neither requested nor had reason to request, given the evidence presented. 26 The court didn’t simply swap 5.8a for 5.8, however. The court modified the last sentence of M Crim JI 5.8(3) to refer not to 26 M Crim JI 5.8 provides in full: (1) You have heard evidence about the character of [name witness] for truthfulness. You may consider this evidence, together with all the other evidence in the case, in deciding whether you believe the testimony of [name witness] and in deciding how much weight to give that testimony. [(2) The prosecutor has cross-examined (one / some) of the defendant’s character witnesses as to whether they had heard anything bad about the defendant. You should consider such cross-examination only in deciding whether you believe the character witnesses and whether they described (him / her) fairly.] [(3) The prosecutor also called witnesses who testified that the defendant does not have a good character for truthfulness. This evidence can only be considered by you in judging the believability of the defendant’s testimony. It is not evidence that (he / she) committed the crime charged.] As with M Crim JI 5.8a, there is seemingly no dispute that the second two subsections of M Crim JI 5.8 are inapplicable here. The same holds true for the first subsection of 5.8, as neither party provided character evidence regarding the truthfulness of any witness who testified at trial. 22 testimony about the defendant’s bad character for truthfulness but instead to testimony about his bad character “of the other acts”—hearkening the jury back once again to the evidence of the defendant’s abuse of Louise and the character inference to be drawn therefrom, but lending no further guidance as to how that inference could be considered. Defense counsel again objected, but—after a seemingly prescient but unheeded aside by the trial court that judges “get in trouble when they ad lib”—the instructions went unchanged and the jurors went forward with their deliberations, 27 ultimately returning the guilty verdict now before us once again. 28