Opinion ID: 1118523
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Waiver Instruction

Text: The Authority claims it was prejudiced by the trial court's jury instruction on waiver: A party is not liable for breach of contract if the other party has waived the breach. Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be evidenced by conduct, by words, or by acquiescence. R. Vol. 12 at 174. A waiver instruction in this form was less than ideal in the present case, because waiver of contractual breach was not an issue at trial. No prejudice resulted, however, because the jury was not given a chance to employ that aspect of waiver in rendering its special verdict. Everton v. Blair, 99 Idaho 14, 576 P.2d 585 (1978), cited by the Authority, is distinguishable. The Authority relies upon Everton for the proposition that it was prejudicial error for the court below to instruct the jury on the law of waiver when no evidence at trial supported a finding of waiver. In Everton, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant Blair, on whose behalf a waiver instruction had been given, thereby creating the possibility that the jury had relied upon the erroneous instruction in reaching its verdict. Due to that possibility, we held that the trial court had properly granted a new trial. Here, because no waiver of breach was found, there was no possibility that the jury relied upon the instruction, and hence, no error mandating a new trial. The Authority also claims prejudice because the court allowed BBH, in closing argument, to refer to the waiver instruction in conjunction with their argument that the Authority had waived a claim to any set-off damages by terminating BBH from the Project. Whether or not this argument was proper, no prejudice can be shown to have occurred; the jury clearly did not find that the Authority had waived a right to a set-off, as evidenced by the fact that they awarded the Authority set-off damages. Although no reversible error occurred by virtue of the jury instructions, we acknowledge that the instruction on waiver contained excess verbiage which did not address the specific issue of waiver of set-off damages. The second paragraph of that instruction which states, [w]aiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be evidenced by conduct, by words, or by acquiescence, is sufficient by itself to inform the jury of the law of waiver. Such an instruction would work in conjunction with given instruction number 16 which clearly and accurately states the Authority's potential entitlement to set-off damages. Of course, in event of a new trial, a waiver instruction would be appropriate only if evidence presented supported a possible finding of waiver of set-off damages. Walton v. Potlatch Corp., 116 Idaho 892, 781 P.2d 229 (1989); Bratton v. Slininger, 93 Idaho 248, 460 P.2d 383 (1969). In any case, BBH's requested instruction, If you find that the defendants have breached the agreement by terminating the architects, then they have waived their right to a set-off, is not an accurate statement of the law and in the event of a retrial, should not be given in instructing the jury.