Opinion ID: 1842460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony by State-Employed Mental Health Expert

Text: Before the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Arbelaez sought to exclude the testimony of Lisa Wiley, an employee of the Florida Department of Corrections who provided mental health services to Arbelaez while he was on death row. Arbelaez argued that Wiley's testimony would violate his Fifth Amendment rights because Wiley interrogated Arbelaez in prison without administering Miranda [1] warnings or obtaining his consent to her testimony. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Miranda requirements did not apply and that Arbelaez had waived any relevant privilege. Wiley testified at the evidentiary hearing. Arbelaez now appeals the trial court's denial of his motion, arguing that Wiley's testimony violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Because Arbelaez failed to raise his Fourteenth Amendment claim before the trial court, it is procedurally barred. See, e.g., Duest v. Dugger, 555 So.2d 849, 852 (Fla.1990). We reject Arbelaez's Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims on the merits. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment does not apply once the defendant's sentence has been fixed and the judgment of conviction has become final, which describes the circumstances under which Arbelaez met with Wiley on death row. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 326, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999) (citing Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 513, 81 S.Ct. 260, 5 L.Ed.2d 249 (1960)) ([W]here there can be no further incrimination, there is no basis for the assertion of the privilege.). Similarly, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to critical stages of the prosecution, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), not to postconviction meetings after the defendant has been fully prosecuted. Even if Wiley's testimony at the evidentiary hearing had violated Arbelaez's Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights, we would conclude that those violations were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The circuit court did not rely upon Wiley's testimony in reaching its decision to deny postconviction relief.