Opinion ID: 547302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Opportunity for Full and Fair Litigation3

Text: 12 Terrovona contends the state courts denied him an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his warrantless arrest claim because they failed to apply the standard enunciated in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). 13 The Stone Court did not specify a test for determining whether a State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a claim, but did cite the case of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), in a footnote. 4 In Mack v. Cupp, 564 F.2d 898 (9th Cir.1977), we said that although the Townsend test must be given great weight in defining what constitutes full and fair consideration under Stone, it need not always be applied literally ... as the sole measure of fullness and fairness. 564 F.2d at 901. We have also considered the extent to which the claims were briefed before and considered by the state trial and appellate courts. Abell v. Raines, 640 F.2d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir.1981). 14 As Terrovona challenges the state courts' application of the law, rather than their factual determinations, the Abell factors are more useful than the test enunciated in Townsend. The transcript of the suppression hearing, including nearly one hundred pages of examination and cross-examination of the arresting officers, indicates that the trial court gave ample consideration to the legality of Terrovona's arrest. Both parties referred to Payton and assumed it governed the issue. 5 At the end of the hearing, the judge reviewed the factors indicating probable cause for the arrest and considered whether exigent circumstances justified the arrest. Although the trial judge did not refer to Payton by name, he applied the pertinent tests. 15 A substantial portion of Terrovona's brief before the Washington Supreme Court 6 was devoted to the issue of whether the police had probable cause to arrest, and whether the warrantless arrest ran afoul of Payton. The Supreme Court considered the issues of probable cause and exigent circumstances and, contrary to Terrovona's claim, cited and applied Payton. State v. Terrovona, 105 Wash.2d 632, 643-45, 716 P.2d 295, 301-02 (1986) (en banc). 7 16 Since Terrovona received an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his Fourth Amendment claim, his case does not fall within the exception to Stone. 8 III Implied Waiver of Miranda Rights 9 17 In North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979), the Supreme Court determined that a waiver of Miranda rights need not be express: [I]n at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated. 441 U.S. at 373, 99 S.Ct. at 1757. [T]he question of waiver must be determined on 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.'  Id. at 374-75, 99 S.Ct. at 1757-59 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). 10 18 The facts surrounding the alleged waiver, as found by the district court, 11 are as follows. Detective Bart had Terrovona read aloud from a standard Miranda form. Bart and Terrovona at the time were in Terrovona's apartment where he had been arrested. Bart asked Terrovona whether he understood what he had read, and Terrovona responded: Yeah. It means I'm under arrest. Bart responded that the form meant he had the right to have an attorney and to remain silent. 12 Detective Ward then informed Terrovona of his stepfather's death and asked of his whereabouts that evening. Terrovona responded that he had been with friends. During this questioning, officers were quickly checking the premises for people and weapons. Terrovona objected to what he considered to be a warrantless search of his apartment. As the cursory search continued, Terrovona stated that he didn't shoot Gene, intending to exculpate himself. Upon realizing that the statement was actually incriminating (because the police had not mentioned a shooting), Terrovona immediately abandoned his attempt to talk his way out of trouble, and asked for an attorney. The questioning then ceased. 19 Terrovona was handcuffed when he read aloud from the Miranda form. Detectives Bart and Ward testified that they did not ask Terrovona to sign the form in the space designated for indicating a waiver because Terrovona was handcuffed. Detective Ward testified that the officers never asked Terrovona if he wanted to waive his rights 13 and that Terrovona had never stated a desire to waive his rights. 20 Terrovona, described by the district court as an articulate and college-educated adult, does not seriously contend he did not understand his rights under Miranda, or that he expressly refused to waive his rights. Rather, he argues that his response to Detective Ward's questions about the crime should not constitute a waiver. 21 This circuit has acknowledged that the prosecution must show both that the defendant was informed of his or her Miranda rights and that the defendant waived those rights. United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 542 (9th Cir.1983). In United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir.1988), the defendant received Miranda warnings and remained silent for several minutes despite repeated questioning by a DEA agent before ultimately making an incriminating response. The court concluded that the agent's questioning, after [the defendant's] initial refusal to respond, violated an express directive of Miranda: 'If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.'  848 F.2d at 1475 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627-28); see also United States v. Christian, 571 F.2d 64 (1st Cir.1978). 14 22 Unlike the defendant in Wallace, Terrovona gave the detectives no indication that he wished to remain silent. Rather, he offered an alibi to explain his whereabouts on the evening in question, indicating a willingness to talk. Moreover, as the district court correctly noted, he demonstrated an ability to assert his rights when he objected to the search of his apartment and when he requested an attorney after making an incriminating statement. In light of Terrovona's background, experience, and conduct, we conclude that he made a valid implied waiver of his Miranda rights. See Gorham v. Franzen, 760 F.2d 786 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 922, 106 S.Ct. 255, 88 L.Ed.2d 262 (1985); United States v. Ogden, 572 F.2d 501 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Rankin v. United States, 439 U.S. 979, 99 S.Ct. 564, 58 L.Ed.2d 650 (1978). IV Evidence of Prior Conviction 23 Terrovona claims the State Court erroneously evaluated the probative value against the prejudicial effect in admitting the testimony of his probation officer. The probation officer testified regarding Terrovona's request for permission to carry a firearm based on his fear of the deceased, and regarding statements Terrovona made about the deceased's mishandling of the proceeds of Terrovona's mother's estate. 24 As the Terrovona I panel stated, Terrovona can be granted habeas corpus relief based on the admission of bad act testimony only if the 'admission of the testimony was arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.'  852 F.2d at 429 (quoting Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839, 107 S.Ct. 142, 93 L.Ed.2d 84 (1986)). 25 The district court correctly found that the admission of the probation officer's testimony was not arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. The trial court heard arguments from both sides, balanced the probative weight against the prejudicial effect, as required by Washington Rule of Evidence 404, 15 and gave a cautionary instruction before admitting the testimony. 16 The probation officer's testimony was highly probative evidence on the relationship between Terrovona and his stepfather and on a possible motive for the murder. Although the prosecution presented two other witnesses to testify as to motive, the officer's testimony as to Terrovona's request for permission to carry a firearm was unique and thus not cumulative. The admission of this testimony did not violate due process. V 26 Evidentiary Hearing and Appointment of Counsel A. Evidentiary Hearing 27 An evidentiary hearing is mandatory if (1) the petitioner's allegations, if proved, would establish the right to relief; and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, after a full and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant facts. Terrovona I, 852 F.2d at 429 (citing Van Pilon v. Reed, 799 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir.1986)); see also factors enunciated in Townsend, supra note 4. After finding that Terrovona's claims of warrantless arrest (tainted confession), involuntary waiver and improper admission of bad act testimony, if proven, would establish right to relief, the Terrovona I panel stated: If a full and fair hearing that reliably found the facts did not occur, we instruct the district court to appoint counsel for any evidentiary hearing that might be required. 852 F.2d at 429. 28 Terrovona argues, essentially, that the trial court did not reliably find the facts because it admitted into evidence the incriminating statements and testimony on his probationary status. He thus alleges mistakes in the court's legal determinations, rather than the way in which it found the pertinent facts. In light of the narrow standard of review and Terrovona's failure to assert any deficiencies in the trial court's fact-finding processes, we reject Terrovona's claim. B. Appointment of Counsel 29 Terrovona I obligated the district court to appoint counsel only if an evidentiary hearing was required. As mentioned above, the district court determined that no such hearing was required. Under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A(a)(2)(B) (1988), a habeas petitioner may obtain representation whenever a magistrate or the district court determines that the interests of justice so require. We assess the district court's exercise of discretion by determining whether denial of appointed counsel amounted to a violation of due process. Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir.1986); Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1023, 107 S.Ct. 1911, 95 L.Ed.2d 516 (1987). 30 In the present case, the issues were briefed and argued in two state courts, as well as in federal district court and before a panel of this court. The Terrovona I panel sufficiently narrowed the issues to be considered on remand. In light of this extensive case history and the generous standard for assessing pro se petitions, including de novo review in this court, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion.