Opinion ID: 835910
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Exclude Evidence of Defendant's Nazi Beliefs

Text: Defendant assigns error to the trial court's ruling that permitted the state to introduce certain evidence that related to defendant's beliefs in white supremacy and Nazi ideology. Before the penalty-phase proceeding began, defense counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude any evidence relating to defendant's belief or expressions of belief in racist ideals, white supremacy or other matters of similar nature or defendant's use or display of symbols of such belief. In response to defendant's motion, the state submitted a list of the evidence that it sought to introduce during the penalty-phase proceeding that related to defendant's racist beliefs. The state asserted that its proffered evidence was relevant to the jury's determination of defendant's future dangerousness, ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B), as well as to the jury's determination whether defendant should receive the death sentence, ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D). The trial court ruled that some of the state's evidence was relevant to the issue of defendant's future dangerousness, but that the admissibility of other items of evidence would depend upon the context in which the state offered it. During the penalty-phase proceeding, the state introduced the testimony of Goodman and Flory, both employees of MacLaren Youth Correctional Facility, that defendant had contributed to racial tensions, had made racist remarks to and provoked a fight with a minority youth, and had committed acts of racist graffiti while defendant had been in custody at MacLaren in 1995 and 1996. The state also offered the testimony of Douglas County Detective Perkins that defendant had confessed to spray-painting swastikas, the letters SS, and the words Juden Frei [22] on a shack on the night of Marion Carl's murder. The state later introduced photographs of that shack as exhibits, showing graffiti that included a swastika, the letters SS, and the words Death to All Jews and Fuck Niggers and Jews. In addition, the state introduced testimony that defendant had scratched graffiti, including a swastika symbol and the letters SS, in his jail cell after his arrest for the crimes in this case. Over defendant's objection, the state also introduced five exhibits that consisted of writings by defendant. In the disputed exhibits, defendant had expressed a hatred of minorities, as well as beliefs in white supremacy and Nazi ideology. [23] In this court, defendant challenges only the admissibility of the five disputed exhibits consisting of defendant's writings. He argues that those exhibits were irrelevant under OEC 401 [24] as to any of the four statutory questions set out in ORS 136.150(1)(b) and were unfairly prejudicial under OEC 403. [25] Citing Dawson, 503 U.S. 159, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309, defendant also asserts that the introduction of the challenged exhibits violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. [26] We address defendant's subconstitutional arguments before addressing his federal constitutional claim. [27] This court reviews a trial court's determination of relevance for errors of law. State v. Titus, 328 Or. 475, 481, 982 P.2d 1133 (1999). To be relevant to the issue of a defendant's future dangerousness under ORS 136.150(1)(b)(B), the proffered evidence must have a tendency to show that a probability either does or does not exist that the defendant will commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Moore, 324 Or. at 417, 927 P.2d 1073. This court repeatedly has held that a broad range of evidence is admissible to make that showing, including a defendant's entire prior criminal history, unadjudicated bad acts by a defendant, and evidence of a defendant's previous bad character. Id. at 416, 927 P.2d 1073; see also State v. Moen, 309 Or. 45, 73, 786 P.2d 111 (1990) (evidence of defendant's prior conduct, good and bad, is relevant to question of defendant's future dangerousness). In Moore, this court considered whether evidence of the defendant's beliefs in white supremacy was relevant to the question of the defendant's future dangerousness. The court concluded that, although evidence of a defendant's abstract beliefs or expression of beliefs generally is irrelevant to the issue of future dangerousness, such evidence is relevant when the state also introduces evidence of past dangerous conduct by the defendant that was predicated upon those beliefs. Moore, 324 Or. at 418-19, 927 P.2d 1073. The court reasoned that, in such circumstances, evidence relating to the defendant's beliefs is probative of the defendant's propensity to act dangerously in the future because it demonstrates the depth of the defendant's adherence to beliefs that drove the defendant to act dangerously in the past. Id. at 419, 927 P.2d 1073. That same reasoning applies here. As in Moore, the state did not introduce only evidence that defendant previously had expressed feelings of racial hatred and beliefs in Nazi ideology; rather, the state also introduced evidence, which defendant does not challenge on review, that demonstrated that defendant previously had engaged in criminal conductincluding assaultive conduct and acts of graffitirelated to those beliefs. Under those circumstances, defendant's expressions of his racist beliefs were probative of his propensity to act dangerously in the future and, thus, were relevant to the jury's determination under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B). [28] In this case, we also fail to see any danger of unfair prejudice to defendant from the admission of the disputed exhibits. See OEC 403 (relevant evidence may be excluded if probative value substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice). As noted, in addition to those exhibits, the jury also heard substantial evidence of defendant's racist beliefs from other testimony and exhibits that the state presented during the penalty-phase proceeding that defendant does not challenge on review. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision that the disputed exhibits were not prejudicial and, therefore, no error. See State v. Rose, 311 Or. 274, 290-91, 810 P.2d 839 (1991) (court reviews trial court's ruling under OEC 403 for abuse of discretion). Finally, we reject defendant's assertion that the admission of the disputed exhibits violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment. As this court explained in Moore, the admission of evidence relating to a defendant's beliefs or expression of beliefs does not violate the First Amendment when that evidence is relevant to the jury's determination of an issue in the proceeding. Moore, 324 Or. at 422, 927 P.2d 1073; see also Dawson, 503 U.S. at 166-68, 112 S.Ct. 1093 (evidence of defendant's membership in Aryan Brotherhood violated defendant's First Amendment rights, because evidence not relevant to any issue being decided in proceeding). Because, as we determined above, the evidence at issue here was relevant to the jury's determination under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B), the admission of that evidence did not violate defendant's First Amendment rights.