Opinion ID: 1937428
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Miranda Warnings Were Unnecessary Under This Set Of Facts.

Text: Olson first argues that his confessions should have been suppressed because Lee was a law enforcement official who coerced him into confessing. We totally disagree. He relies on SDCL 22-1-2(22), which defines law enforcement officer as: [A]n officer or employee of the state or any of its political subdivisions ... who is responsible for the prevention or detection of crimes, for the enforcement of the criminal or highway traffic laws of the state, or for the supervision of confined persons convicted of a crime [.] He further cites SDCL 24-1-11, which provides that all officers and persons employed by the State Penitentiary shall perform such duties as may be required of them by the warden and that standards for such employees and officers shall be consistent with those standards of personal conduct required of law enforcement personnel. However, Lee's actual duties were those of an administrator or counselor. He was not involved in crime detection or security duties. It is noteworthy that SDCL 24-1-11 distinguishes between penitentiary officers and employees and law enforcement personnel by directing that their standards of personal conduct shall be consistent with those of law enforcement personnel. If they are all law enforcement officers, as Olson argues, the standards provision in SDCL 24-1-11 is patently redundant. Lee was not, under these statutes, a law enforcement agent. Olson was not subjected to police interrogation in circumstances which mandated Miranda warnings: The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any way. Satter v. Solem, 434 N.W.2d 725, 726 (S.D. 1989) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1629, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 725 (1966)). No police or their equivalent were involved here. In the particular factual scenario presented here, we do not consider Lee, as an administrator and counselor, to be a law enforcement officer under the statutes Olson relies upon, nor did he act as such. His status is analogous to that of a parole officer and, under this Court's holding in State v. Johnson, 87 S.D. 43, 46, 202 N.W.2d 132, 134 (1972), he is more aptly viewed as the antithesis of a law enforcement officer. His duty begins when the peace officer's duty ends, Johnson, id. Lee, we note, did not act or react as a law enforcement official and reported the incident after Olson made it common knowledge at the penitentiary. There are no indications of coercion on Lee's part; Lee had absolutely no idea what facts were unfolding when Olson began to tell his story. No investigation was under way at this time nor was Olson suspected of this crime. Olson knew Lee for two years before the incidents under consideration, regularly met Lee for counseling, and was specifically warned that Lee would report information regarding potential harm to inmates or others (a rapist with access to the public is clearly within the scope of Lee's initial advice to Olson). Olson was not in a situation remotely akin to that of a prisoner who makes incriminating statements to an undisclosed undercover police agent of the sort considered in United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980). Olson's incarceration, while a relevant factor in determining whether Miranda warnings are required, is not, in itself, determinative. Henry, 447 U.S. at 273-4, 100 S.Ct. at 2188-9, 65 L.Ed.2d at 124. Lee was not a fellow inmate whose conduct and apparent status as a person sharing a common plight could bring into play subtle influences coercing Olson into incriminating himself. Henry, id. Lee was not investigating allegations against Olson (none had been made), had no duty to do so, and the conversations occurred in the non-coercive environment of a locker room, facts which distinguish this case from Walker v. State, 102 Nev. 290, 720 P.2d 700 (1986), wherein incriminating statements uttered to a prison unit counselor responsible for and in the course of an investigation, were deemed inadmissible. This was not an interrogation looking toward prosecution. Whitfield v. State, 42 Md.App. 107, 400 A.2d 772, 783 (Md.Sp.App.1979). The mere fact that incriminating statements are made by a prisoner does not necessarily render them inadmissible. State v. LaRue, 19 Wash.App. 841, 578 P.2d 66 (1978). As Lee was not, in these circumstances, a law enforcement official or agent, and did not conduct an interrogation, we reject Olson's argument that Miranda warnings were necessary.