Opinion ID: 1796148
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Appropriate Punishment for Judge Gibson

Text: ¶ 7. We have publicly reprimanded, assessed the costs of the proceeding, and fined a judge for acting outside of the scope of her authority when she suspended the sentence of a former client and placed an inmate on probation after his conviction and sentence had been affirmed by the court of appeals. Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Sanders, 708 So.2d 866, 877-78 (Miss.1998); see also Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So.2d 929 (Miss.1997). In Sanders, we found that public reprimand and a fine of $1500 were the appropriate punishment for a judge who acted without authority in usurping the judgments of other state courts. Sanders, 708 So.2d at 877-78. In determining whether or what fine to impose, the Sanders Court relied entirely upon the recommendation of the Commission. Id. at 877. However, in determining the propriety of whether to impose a public reprimand, the Sanders Court used the Baker test which considers mitigating factors, along with evidence from the case, that weigh in favor of confidential, private action. Id. [1] ¶ 8. In Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Bishop, 761 So.2d 195, 198 (Miss.2000), we named Baker's seven-factor test and inaccurately held those factors were to be used when determining appropriate judicial sanctions. In fact, as noted above, the purpose of Baker's test is to determine  whether a reprimand should be public . . . [rather than a] confidential, private action. Miss. Judicial Performance Comm'n v. Walker, 565 So.2d 1117, 1125 (Miss.1990) (emphasis added), citing In re Baker, 535 So.2d 47 (Miss. 1988). However, our mistaken description of the test highlights the need for a generally applicable test to provide greater uniformity in regard to the punishments given in judicial misconduct proceedings. ¶ 9. Today, in line with the spirit of Bishop, we modify Baker to apply generally to the determination of all sanctions in judicial misconduct proceedings (rather than merely applying to the question of public reprimand) and examine the appropriateness of such sanctions based on the following factors: (1) The length and character of the judge's public service; (2) Whether there is any prior case law on point; (3) The magnitude of the offense and the harm suffered; (4) Whether the misconduct is an isolated incident or evidences a pattern of conduct; (5) Whether moral turpitude was involved; [2] and (6) The presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. ¶ 10. First, there is no evidence on the record of the length or character of Judge Gibson's public service. Second, as noted above, in Sanders we found that judicial usurpation of the authority of other state courts deserved public reprimand and a fine of $1500. However, we note that Sanders is different in that Judge Sanders was cited for two violations while Judge Gibson's conduct occurred only once. In cases where judges have dismissed fines or tickets, we have previously held that the appropriate punishment for such conduct is payment of the amount of fines inappropriately dismissed. See Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Boykin, 763 So.2d 872 (Miss.2000). In this case, the amount of lost fines and court costs to the City of Derma was $330.00. Third, the nature of the conduct was a gross abuse of Judge Gibson's power to act in his official capacity as a municipal court judge. Fourth, the record does not show any other incidents that demonstrate that this type of behavior evidences a pattern of conduct by Judge Gibson. Fifth, there was no moral turpitude involved in the offense. Finally, aggravating circumstances are present in that, along with dismissing a ticket, Judge Gibson dismissed another judge's order and did so without notice or hearing. Mitigating circumstances are also present in light of the fact that Judge Gibson has publicly acknowledged the inappropriateness of his conduct and agrees with the findings of the Commission.