Opinion ID: 181251
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Readback

Text: Newhoff argues for a new trial on the ground that by reading back Officer Cochran's testimony without admonishing the jury not to give it undue emphasis, the district court caused undue emphasis to be given. Failure to give such an admonition, assuming that it is error, does not permeate the entire framework of the trial, [3] but is simply an error in the trial process. Because it is not structural, [4] it can lead to reversal only if prejudicial. [5] Because counsel expressly stated that they had no objection to how the judge had conducted the readback, the error can justify reversal only if it was plain error. [6] Plain error requires that (1) there must be error; (2) that error must be plain; and (3) that error must affect substantial rights. [7] Even if these conditions are met, we may notice the error only if it seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. [8] As for whether there was error, Newhoff argues that there was, under United States v. Richard, [9] United States v. Binder , [10] and United States v. Hernandez. [11] Binder holds that rereading a witness's testimony is disfavored when it unduly emphasizes that testimony, and that undue emphasis should not be permitted. [12] We reversed in Hernandez, where the district court had allowed a transcript of part of a single witness's testimony to be sent into the jury room without taking adequate precautions to avoid undue emphasis. [13] The district court had not admonished the jury that they should avoid giving undue emphasis to the testimony of the one witness in the transcript provided. We explained that to avoid the possibility of this undue emphasis, the preferred method of rehearing testimony is in open court, under the supervision of the court, with the defendant and the attorneys present. [14] Among the benefits of this approach are that the court can assure that the jury heard the whole transcript and no one cuts off the reading by saying I've heard enough, and counsel can correct errors. In Richard, we reversed in a felon in possession case, where the jury got a readback of the only witness who saw the gun in the defendant's possession. [15] The court had denied a defense request that the jury hear all the testimony of that witness, not just a selected part, and had failed to admonish the jury against giving undue emphasis to what was read back. We held that these two factors made the conduct of the read-back an abuse of discretion, and said certain precautions must generally be taken [16] to avoid the inherent risk of undue emphasis from a readback: (1) preferably the readback or replay should take place in open court with all present; (2) the jury should ordinarily be provided with the witness's entire testimony, direct and cross-examination; and (3) the jury should be admonished to weigh all the evidence and not just one part. [17] That the jury seeks only part of a witness's testimony does not lessen the risk of overemphasis, but rather crystallizes it, [18] requiring measures to mitigate that risk. The wording of Richard generally, should ordinarily, etc.appears to allow for exceptions, but plainly the general rule is that if the jury wants a readback, and the court exercises discretion to allow it, the court should make the jury hear the entirety of the witness's testimony in open court (except where excessive length makes that impractical and fairness can be assured by using an excerpt preferably agreed upon by counsel), with counsel for both sides and the defendant present, and with an adequate admonition. The admonition should tell the jurors that (1) because they requested a readback, it is being provided to them, but all readbacks run the risk of distorting the trial because of overemphasis of one portion of the testimony; (2) the jury will be required to hear all the witness's testimony (except where an excerpt was selected because of excessive length), on direct and cross-examination, to avoid the risk that they might miss a portion bearing on their judgment of what testimony to accept as credible; (3) the transcript is not evidence, just a record of what the testimony was, and since nothing is perfect and the transcript could possibly contain errors, their recollections and understandings of the testimony itself rather than the transcript is the evidence on which they must make their decision; (4) the transcript cannot reflect matters of demeanor, tone of voice, and other aspects of the live testimony the jurors heard, which may affect what they judge to be credible; and (5) the testimony read cannot be considered in isolation, but must be considered in the context of all the evidence presented, both testimony and exhibits, in the jurors' exercise of their judgment. As for whether the error of reading back Officer Cochran's testimony without an admonition was plain, we conclude that it was. We need not explore the reasons why, because the district judge expressly decided that he should give the admonition against undue emphasis. His exercise of discretion to give the admonition was sound. The only explanation we can see on this record for not giving the admonition was that the judge forgot. That is an easy thing to do in a trial. And it is a reason why judges do, and this judge did, ask counsel for objections. They are called counsel, in part, because they counsel the court. It is incumbent on defense counsel to protect his client and the court from judicial error, including forgetting something, and incumbent on the prosecutor to protect the court from error, even where the error might, at least before appeal and possible reversal, benefit the prosecution. The only explanation for why both attorneys said they had no objection to failure to give the admonition is that they too forgot, again an easy thing to do in a trial. But error it was. That leaves for us the question of whether the failure to give the admonition affected Newhoff's substantial rights. We conclude that it did not, so under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) and United States v. Olano, [19] we cannot reverse. That the jury returned a verdict immediately after the readback does not show an effect on Newhoff's substantial rights, under United States v. King . [20] The jury may have already reached a verdict and merely desired a confirming clarification on one point; the clarification on a point may have been the `straw that broke the camel's back' in swaying a verdict properly based on the totality of the evidence. [21] What is most striking about this particular readback is that Officer Cochran, though called by the prosecution, provided the jury with the strongest evidence for the defense. This point was well argued by the defense. If the jury believed what Officer Cochran testified the other policeman told him, the gun was passed from the front-seat passenger, Christopher Phillips, to the backseat passenger, Hobbick. Since Newhoff was the driver, this part of Officer Cochran's testimony corroborated Newhoff's testimony that he did not possess the gun. The four jurors who requested Officer Cochran's testimony might have been asking for it to see whether it exonerated Newhoff, a position they might have been holding out for, not whether it convicted him. The testimony, though, also undercut Newhoff's defense. Officer Cochran also testified that Newhoff admitted handling the gun. Since the jury was read all of Officer Cochran's testimony, they could listen again to both points. Also, even though all the friends and acquaintances were of dubious character and credibility, and several might have had problems perceiving, remembering, and relating what happened because of alcohol and methamphetamine intoxication during the events, their accounts were plausible. Unlike the defendant in Richard, several witnesses, not just the one whose testimony was read back, put Newhoff in possession of the pistol. Two witnesses testified that Newhoff offered to sell them the pistol, one witness saw Newhoff try to sell it, at least three saw him handling it, and one testified that he had passed it to her in the car. Despite all the reasons the jury had to doubt them, their testimony was plausible and coherent enough so that they might be believed.