Opinion ID: 3036135
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instruction for Obstructing an Agency

Text: Proceeding [5] Bhagat was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 for the crime of obstructing an SEC investigative proceeding by making false statements to SEC investigators. The government was required to prove three elements: (1) that there was an agency proceeding; (2) that the defendant was aware of that proceeding; and (3) that the defendant “intentionally endeavored corruptly to influence, obstruct or impede the pending proceeding.” United States v. Price, 951 F.2d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). Because Bhagat failed to object to the instructions as given, we review for plain error. United States v. Delgado, 357 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004). Bhagat contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599-601 (1995), added two additional elements going to mens rea: that his false statements must have the “natural and probable effect” of obstructing justice, and that he was aware of that effect. Bhagat asserts that we recognized the applicability of Aguilar to Section 1505 proceedings in our decision in United States UNITED STATES v. BHAGAT 1429 v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1999). We disagree. [6] Aguilar did not involve obstruction of agency proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 1505. Rather, the court in Aguilar addressed false statements made during the course of an agency’s investigative proceeding that obstructed a judicial proceeding pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1503’s “catchall” provision.4 The Supreme Court noted that judicial proceedings are distinct from government investigations, and that the intent to obstruct an agency proceeding did not automatically demonstrate intent to obstruct the related judicial one. See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599-601. To transpose the intent to obstruct an agency proceeding into the judicial proceeding context, the Court held that there had to be a “nexus” between the two proceedings. Id. at 599. The Court then held that the jury could infer the existence of that nexus if the “natural and probable effect” of the defendant’s conduct vis á vis the agency proceeding would obstruct justice. Id. [7] Because Bhagat was charged under Section 1505 with obstructing an agency proceeding and not a judicial one, there was no need to create a causal nexus and, consequently, no need to supplement the Price instructions with additional elements. Cf. United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 103-04 (2d Cir. 1997) (declining to incorporate a nexus requirement into 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), the witness tampering statute); Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601 & n.2 (distinguishing Aguilar from cases where false statements were made directly in the relevant proceedings). Bhagat’s reliance on Hopper, 177 F.3d at 830-31, fails for 4 18 U.S.C. § 1503 contains a “catchall” provision prohibiting the obstruction of “the due administration of justice.” That provision has been interpreted as encompassing judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 598-99; United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1250 (11th Cir. 1998). 1430 UNITED STATES v. BHAGAT similar reasons. In Hopper, the defendants were charged with obstructing the IRS’s attempt to collect on a tax judgment. Id. at 830. The Hopper defendants argued that they were wrongfully charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1505, because their interference was with a court judgment, not an agency proceeding. Id. Citing to Aguilar, we disagreed, stating that the defendants’ attempt to avoid payment of the tax would have the “probable and natural effect” of interfering with the IRS’s attempt to collect taxes. Id. We used Aguilar’s “natural and probable effect” language to explain how the defendants’ conduct affected the IRS’s collection proceeding, not to add an additional element of proof. [8] Because the provided jury instructions adequately addressed the elements needed to obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1505, Bhagat is not entitled to a new trial on this basis.