Opinion ID: 1838204
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether any statutes preclude recognition of this cause of action

Text: We also find that recognition of this cause of action does not conflict with any existing statutes. In fact, this civil cause of action is consistent with the criminal statutory prohibition against interference with custody, which is generally classified as a third degree felony. § 787.03, Fla. Stat. (1997). This statute prohibits a person, without lawful authority, from knowingly or recklessly interfering with the lawful custody of a child seventeen years of age, or younger. See id. The fact that the Legislature does not also provide a civil remedy in its criminal statutes is not dispositive because the recognition of a common law tort, which is not inconsistent with our statutes and Constitution, falls within the judicial domain. This Court has consistently stated that we are not prevented from recognizing a cause of action simply because the legislature has not created it. See Dempsey, 635 So.2d at 964; Zorzos v. Rosen, 467 So.2d 305, 307 (Fla.1985); Wilkie, 91 Fla. at 1068, 109 So. at 227. We therefore reject the appellees' reliance on Mantooth v. Richards, 557 So.2d 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), because the complaint in Mantooth did not allege a common law cause of action based on abduction or tortious interference with custody. Instead, the father sought money damages in a civil action under the specific authority of sections 772.102(1)(a)(12), 772.103, 772.104 and 787.01, Florida Statutes (1987), pertaining to the kidnapping of a minor. The Fourth District concluded that there was no civil remedy for the violation of these statutes. See Mantooth, 557 So.2d at 646. We also disagree that the statutory abolition of an action for alienation of affections precludes a cause of action for intentional interference with the parent-child relationship. [7] As the Restatement of Torts recognizes, the causes of action for alienation of affections and the intentional interference with the custodial parent-child relationship are two separate torts. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 699, 700 (1977). Like Florida and the other jurisdictions that have abolished cause of actions for alienation of affections, see § 771.01, Fla. Stat. (1997); Prosser, supra § 124, at 930, the Restatement specifically rejects a cause of action for alienation of a child's affections. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 699 (One who, without more, alienates from its parent the affections of a child, whether a minor or of full age, is not liable to the child's parent.). Nonetheless, the Restatement specifically recognizes a cause of action for intentional interference with the custodial parent-child relationship in section 700. As explained by West Virginia's highest court, unlike the tort of alienation of affections, which merely requires allegations of an interference with the child's affections, [t]ortious interference with parental or custodial relationship intimates that the complaining parent has been deprived of his/her parental or custodial rights; in other words, but for the tortious interference, the complaining parent would be able to exercise some measure of control over his/her child's care, rearing, safety, well-being, etc. By contrast, alienation of affections connotes only that the parent is not able to enjoy the company of his/her child; this cause of action does not suggest that the offending party has removed parental or custodial authority from the complaining parent. Kessel, 511 S.E.2d at 761 n. 44; see also Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 351 (finding tort of intentional interference with custodial relationship requires physical absence of child from home, distinguishing the tort from alienation of affections); Keeton, supra, § 124, at 930. Because of the important distinction between these two torts, Florida's statutory abolition of the tort of alienation of affections does not preclude our recognition of a cause of action for intentional interference with the custodial parent-child relationship. We thus disagree with the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir.1986). In McDougald, the Eleventh Circuit considered, among other claims, the father's counterclaim for tort damages based on the surreptitious removal of his son from Florida by his son's mother and grandmother. The Eleventh Circuit opined that because the Florida legislature abolished the cause of action for alienation of affections, based on the policy that domestic quarrels-who did what to whom before and during a marriage-should not be the subject of damage suits and jury trials, this State would not recognize the right of action, based on similar policy concerns. McDougald, 786 F.2d at 1489-90 (quoting Mims v. Mims, 305 So.2d 787, 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)). While we disagree with McDougald 's reasoning regarding the effect of the abolition of the tort of alienation of affections, we do not decide whether we also disagree with the result in that case because McDougald involved an action by one parent against the other parent. Clearly, in the instant case the Eleventh Circuit did not consider its opinion in McDougald dispositive because it certified the question without reference to McDougald. See Stone, 135 F.3d at 1443.