Opinion ID: 708
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissions of a Party-Opponent

Text: Hearsay “is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” F ED. R. E VID. 801(c). However, the Rules define as non-hearsay an admission by a partyopponent, which includes “(A) the party’s own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity or ... (D) a statement made by the party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship.” F ED. R. E VID. 801(d)(2). Booker argues that Ms. April’s statement falls within the quoted definition of non-hearsay because she was testifying 5 Booker also suggests that the statement posed no hearsay problem, as the declarant (one of the police officers) was available to testify. This argument has no merit. Rule 802 provides that “[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules ... .” F ED. R. E VID. 802. Booker thus had the burden of articulating how the statement was either excluded from the definition of hearsay or how it fell into an exception to the hearsay rule, and he has not provided any persuasive argument to meet that burden. -11- about a statement made by a law enforcement officer, who is “an agent working within the scope of his authority and in a representative capacity.” 6 (Appellant’s Op. Br. at 20.) Here, the party-opponent is the United States. The party who allegedly made the statement, a police officer employed by Newark, New Jersey, is not an agent of the United States for purposes of Rule 801(d)(2). Indeed, several courts, including ours, “have held that statements by police officers or other law enforcement officials are not admissible on an admissions theory as substantive evidence against the sovereign in a criminal prosecution.” Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1497 (3d Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Arroyo, 406 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that “government agents are not party-opponents for purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)”); United States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1014 (3d Cir. 1986) (“There is no authority for the proposition that the prosecution is a ‘party’ against whom [Rule 801(d)(2)] evidence can be offered.”). Further, Booker has failed to offer any factual support for the existence of an agency relationship between the United States and the New Jersey detectives whose statement he 6 The government asserts that Booker waived his 801(d)(2) arguments by not raising them at trial when the government objected to Ms. April’s testimony, but instead arguing that the evidence should be admissible as impeachment evidence. Although there is some support for the government’s position that Booker abandoned his in limine arguments by choosing to rely exclusively on Rule 613 at trial, see United States v. Silva, 554 F.3d 13, 20 n.8 (1st Cir. 2009) (defendant likely waived the argument that a prior inconsistent statement should have been admitted for its truth where he offered it at trial solely for impeachment pursuant to Rule 613(b)); see also United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2008) (a party fails to preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal by not making a timely, specific objection), we need not resolve the issue of waiver because we hold that Booker’s Rule 801(d)(2) argument has no merit. -12- sought to admit. See Lippay, 996 F.2d at 1498 (explaining that an agency relationship under Rule 801(d)(2) requires the party-opponent to personally supervise the declarant’s work on a continuing basis). Because a statement allegedly made by a Newark police officer cannot bind the United States in a criminal prosecution, Ms. April’s testimony cannot be considered an admission of a party-opponent under Rule 801(d)(2).7