Opinion ID: 793749
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ownership of the Ambulances and Other Equipment

Text: 44 The Town contends that the district court erred in finding that the Corps was the owner of the seized ambulances and equipment, arguing (a) that the contracts did not provide that the Corps was to own the ambulances, and (b) that even if the contracts allowed the Corps to own the ambulances, those contracts are unenforceable because they violate the New York State (State) Constitution's provision prohibiting municipalities from making gifts of money or property to private corporations. 45 The question of who owns a given item of personal property is a mixed question of law and fact. See, e.g., Iselin v. Starin, 144 N.Y. 453, 460, 39 N.E. 488, 489 (1895); McKee v. Jessup, 62 A.D. 143, 144, 70 N.Y.S. 796, 797 (1st Dep't 1901). To the extent that the determination of ownership turns on the interpretation of provisions of a contract, the existence and terms of the contract are questions of fact, but the effect of those terms on ownership is strictly a question of law if the provisions are unambiguous, for under New York law, the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law, see, e.g., K. Bell & Associates v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 97 F.3d 632, 637 (2d Cir.1996); Teitelbaum Holdings, Ltd. v. Gold, 48 N.Y.2d 51, 56, 421 N.Y.S.2d 556, 559, 396 N.E.2d 1029 (1979). However, if the contract is ambiguous and relevant extrinsic evidence as to its meaning is available, its interpretation is a question of fact for the factfinder. See, e.g., Revson v. Cinque & Cinque, P.C., 221 F.3d 59, 66 (2d Cir.2000); Consarc Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 996 F.2d 568, 573 (2d Cir.1993); Rothenberg v. Lincoln Farm Camp, Inc., 755 F.2d 1017, 1019 (2d Cir.1985); In re Consolidated Mutual Insurance Co., 77 N.Y.2d 144, 150, 565 N.Y.S.2d 434, 436, 566 N.E.2d 633 (1990). Further, under New York law, the existence of an implied contract is likewise a question of fact. Shapira v. United Medical Service, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 200, 210, 257 N.Y.S.2d 150, 157, 205 N.E.2d 293 (1965). 46 In interpreting an ambiguous contract provision, the factfinder should, when possible, apply the same measure as the parties have applied in performing their obligations. William C. Atwater & Co. v. Panama R. Co., 255 N.Y. 496, 501, 175 N.E. 189, 191 (1931); see, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. City of Omaha, 230 U.S. 100, 118, 33 S.Ct. 967, 57 L.Ed. 1410 (1913) (of great significance is the practical interpretation of a contract by the parties to it for any considerable period of time before it comes to be the subject of controversy). Where an agreement involves repeated occasions for performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection is given great weight in the interpretation of the agreement. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(4) (1979); see also Brooklyn Life Insurance Company of New York v. Dutcher, 95 U.S. 269, 273, 24 L.Ed. 410 (1877) (There is no surer way to find out what parties meant, than to see what they have done.... Parties in such cases often claim more, but rarely less, than they are entitled to.). 47 When the district court as factfinder has considered relevant extrinsic evidence in connection with a contract provision that was not unambiguous, its findings as to the meaning of the provision are findings of fact that may not properly be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); see, e.g., In Time Products, Ltd. v. Toy Biz, Inc., 38 F.3d 660, 665 (2d Cir.1994); Marine Transport Lines, Inc. v. International Organization of Masters, 878 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S.Ct. 724, 107 L.Ed.2d 743 (1990); Network Publishing Corp. v. Shapiro, 895 F.2d 97, 99 (2d Cir.1990). Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). 48 Various sets of legal principles may govern the determination of ownership under an established set of facts. As a matter of New York law, the certificate of title of a vehicle is presumptive evidence of the vehicle's ownership. See N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 2108 (McKinney 1996). [T]his presumption of ownership is not conclusive, and may be rebutted by evidence which demonstrates that another individual owned the vehicle in question. Aronov v. Bruins Transportation, Inc., 294 A.D.2d 523, 524, 743 N.Y.S.2d 131, 133 (2d Dep't 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). 49 The New York State Constitution, invoked by the Town, provides that no municipality shall give or loan any money or property to or in aid of any individual, or private corporation or association, or private undertaking. N.Y. Const. Art. 8, § 1. This anti-gift provision was intended to curb raids on the public purse for the benefit of favored individuals or enterprises furnishing no corresponding benefit. Taylor v. McGuire, 100 Misc.2d 834, 837, 420 N.Y.S.2d 248, 251 (Sup.Ct. N.Y.Co.1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). The prohibition on gifting requires that a municipality expend its funds only to meet its lawful obligations incurred as a result of the performance of its governmental functions. Corning v. Village of Laurel Hollow, 48 N.Y.2d 348, 353, 422 N.Y.S.2d 932, 935, 398 N.E.2d 537 (1979). Notwithstanding that prohibition, New York law allows a town to [c]ontract with one or more individuals, municipal corporations, associations, or other organizations to supply, staff and equip emergency medical service or ambulance vehicles suitable for such purposes and operate such vehicles for the furnishing of prehospital emergency treatment. N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 122-b(1)(c) (McKinney Supp. 2004). 50 We review the district court's conclusions on questions of law de novo. See, e.g., Schermerhorn v. Local 100, Transport Workers Union of America, 91 F.3d 316, 322 (2d Cir.1996). The matter of whether a given agreement is barred by law is, of course, a question of law. 51 In the present case, we see no clear error in any of the district court's factual findings that, as a matter of contract, the Corps owned the ambulances and other seized equipment. Although the last written contract between the parties was in 1985, and the 1985 Agreement was silent as to the ownership of the ambulances, the court was amply justified in relying on the parties' course of conduct over the years in order to determine their intent as to who would own the ambulances and other vehicles. Until their seizure in February 2004, not one of the eight vehicles in question had been claimed by the Town as Town property at any time. Rather, the parties' conduct prior to the present controversy included the purchase and operation of each of the four ambulances and four other vehicles exclusively by the Corps; the registering of title to each of those eight vehicles in the name of the Corps; the insuring of each of those eight vehicles in the name of the Corps; and the Town's not listing any of those vehicles on the Town's property inventory. 52 Further, the manner of the vehicles' procurement supports the district court's finding that the parties understood the vehicles were to be owned by the Corps, not the Town. The vehicles were not acquired through a State contract or a competitive bidding process; rather, each year, the Corps submitted a budget request to the Town that included both capital and operating expenses. It is undisputed that the Town considered these requests item by item; but after a budget was approved, the Town simply made a lump sum payment to the Corps. Further, the Town classified these budget items as contractual expenses, not as purchases for the Town or donations to the Corps. 53 The court inferred that placement of title to the ambulances in the name of the Corps was in accordance with the parties' intent that the Corps own the vehicles, and not merely an oversight on the part of the Town. It drew this inference in part from the above evidence and in part from the fact that when the Town purchased an ambulance with funds raised through the 1994 public bond issue, the Town took title to that ambulance in its own name. The court's inference was permissible and hence cannot be termed clearly erroneous. 54 Further, the Corps had total control of its accounts, and it could use the funds paid by the Town to purchase equipment as it saw fit. The Town did not pay the Corps's bills; and, aside from reviewing the Corps's expenditures 4-6 times a year for procedural irregularities, the Town did not actively involve itself in the Corps's business decisions. Finally, unlike funds held by Town departments, any surplus funds remaining in the Corps's account at the end of the year did not revert to the Town; they instead remained the property of the Corps. 55 In sum, the record furnishes ample support for the inferences that the Town paid the Corps pursuant to a contract for services that could not be available without expensive equipment; that the moneys paid were intended to and did become the property of the Corps; and that the Corps thus purchased the ambulances and other equipment out of its own funds and thereby owned the vehicles and equipment. The trial court's finding that as a matter of contract, the parties intended that the Corps would own the ambulances and other equipment is well supported by the evidence. 56 Nor do we see any error in the district court's conclusion that the contract pursuant to which the Corps was meant to own the vehicles was not in violation of New York law. Although, as set forth above, the State Constitution forbids municipalities to make gifts to private entities, State law expressly authorizes municipalities to [c]ontract with independent entities  to supply ... emergency medical service or ambulance vehicles suitable for such purposes, N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 122-b(1)(c) (emphases added). Interpreting these provisions, the State's Comptroller, its highest-ranking fiscal officer, has opined that although the provisions of section 122-b(1)(c) may not be utilized as a means of circumventing the [State Constitution's] prohibition against gifts of municipal money, Op. 80-702, 1980 N.Y. St. Comp. 193, 193, 1980 WL 8103, at  (State Comptroller's Nov. 1980 Opinion), § 122-b(1)(c) does allow a municipality to pay an ambulance corps sufficient sums to permit the ambulance corps to purchase corps ambulances and other vehicles. Responding to an inquiry from a county that planned to contract with a volunteer ambulance corps that would provide its own vehicles, the Comptroller opined that 57 [i]n determining the amount which it will pay, we believe a municipality may consider such things as the corps' need to replace its vehicles, supplies and/or equipment; the corps' need for new, different and/or additional equipment, supplies and vehicles; and the corps' ability to raise money from donations. 58 ... [I]t follows from the foregoing that an ambulance corps may use the money paid by the county to replace and/or purchase vehicles ... which are no longer repairable ... and to purchase needed new, different and/or additional vehicles .... 59 State Comptroller's Nov. 1980 Opinion at  (emphases added). 60 We conclude that the district court did not err in concluding that the contracts for emergency medical services under which the Town paid the Corps sums sufficient for the Corps to purchase the ambulances and other equipment needed for the rendering of such services did not contravene State law, and that the eight vehicles, along with other equipment, were owned by the Corps. 61