Opinion ID: 2786233
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Petitioner’s Guilty Plea

Text: The petitioner argues his guilty plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. He contends the circuit court failed to sufficiently determine during the plea hearing whether his alleged bipolar disorder affected his ability to make decisions, to comprehend and appreciate the rights he was surrendering, and to appreciate that someone was going to be held accountable for shooting the victim.16 By way of example, the petitioner suggests the circuit court should have asked him whether he was taking his medications, as prescribed, and whether he was currently symptomatic. In response, the State asserts that the circuit court thoroughly questioned the petitioner in accordance with the requirements of Call v. McKenzie, 159 W.Va. 191, 220 S.E.2d 665 (1975).17 In support of its argument that the petitioner entered his plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, the State highlights his affirmative representations during the plea hearing that he was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol; that he takes his sleeping aid and antidepressant medications once daily at night; and that he was both competent and knowledgeable of the constitutional rights he would be waiving by entering his guilty plea. 16 Although the petitioner also alleges that he has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and that he attempted suicide on prior occasions, he did not make these allegations during his plea hearing. 17 Call v. McKenzie is more thoroughly discussed, infra. 16 We begin our analysis by recognizing that “[a] guilty plea based on competent advice of counsel represents a serious admission of factual guilt, and where an adequate record is made to show it was voluntarily and intelligently entered, it will not be set aside.” Syl. Pt. 3, State ex rel. Burton v. Whyte, 163 W.Va. 276, 256 S.E.2d 424 (1979). Decades ago, we outlined the procedures to be followed by trial courts for purposes of insuring that guilty pleas are entered voluntarily and intelligently, as follows: When a criminal defendant proposes to enter a plea of guilty, the trial judge should interrogate such defendant on the record with regard to his intelligent understanding of the following rights, some of which he will waive by pleading guilty: 1) the right to retain counsel of his choice, and if indigent, the right to court appointed counsel; 2) the right to consult with counsel and have counsel prepare the defense; 3) the right to a public trial by an impartial jury of twelve persons; 4) the right to have the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and the right of the defendant to stand mute during the proceedings; 5) the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers; 6) the right to present witnesses in his own defense and to testify himself in his own defense; 7) the right to appeal the conviction for any errors of law; 8) the right to move to suppress illegally obtained evidence and illegally obtained confessions; and, 9) the right to challenge in the trial court and on appeal all pre-trial proceedings. Where there is a plea bargain by which the defendant pleads guilty in consideration for some benefit conferred by the State, the trial court should spread the terms of the bargain upon the record and interrogate the defendant concerning whether he understands the rights he is waiving by pleading guilty and whether there is any pressure upon him to plead guilty other than the consideration admitted on the record. A trial court should spread upon the record the defendant’s education, whether he consulted with friends or 17 relatives about his plea, any history of mental illness or drug use, the extent he consulted with counsel, and all other relevant matters which will demonstrate to an appellate court or a trial court proceeding in habeas corpus that the defendant’s plea was knowingly and intelligently made with due regard to the intelligent waiver of known rights. Syl. Pts. 3, 4 and 5, Call v. McKenzie, 159 W.Va. 191, 220 S.E.2d 665. These requirements are echoed in Rule 11 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Rule 11”).18 18 Rule 11, originally adopted by this Court in 1981, provides, in relevant part, as follows: (c) Advice to Defendant. — Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the following: (1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law; and •••• (3) That the defendant has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been made, and that the defendant has the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, the right against compelled self-incrimination, and the right to call witnesses; and (4) That if a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is accepted by the court there will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere the defendant waives the right to a trial; and •••• (d) Ensuring that the plea is voluntary. — The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or (continued...) 18 It is abundantly clear from our review of the transcript of the plea hearing that the circuit court adhered to the requirements of both Call v. McKenzie and Rule 11 during its thorough plea colloquy with the petitioner. Notably absent from the record is any indication that the petitioner’s behavior and statements during the plea hearing would have caused the circuit judge to be concerned with his ability to understand the nature of the proceeding. Nonetheless, the petitioner argues that the circuit court should have determined whether his alleged bipolar disorder affected his decision-making ability. Like other courts, we reject this argument because there is nothing in the record that indicates the petitioner’s plea was not intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily made. In People v. Lafoe, 905 N.Y.S.2d 679 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010), the defendant argued her guilty plea was involuntary due to the trial court’s failure to hold a competency hearing after she announced during her plea colloquy that she suffers from bipolar disorder. In affirming the defendant’s conviction, the court stated [d]espite being informed by defendant of her alleged mental disorder, “. . . such history does not necessarily render a defendant incompetent to enter a knowing and voluntary plea[.]” . . . the record reflects that defendant actively 18 (...continued) of promises apart from a plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant’s willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results from prior discussions between the attorney for the state and the defendant or the defendant’s attorney. 19 participated in the plea colloquy, answered County Court’s questions intelligently, acknowledged that she understood the consequences of the plea and the nature of the proceedings, had conferred with counsel and accepted the terms of the plea agreement. As there is nothing in the record indicating that defendant lacked the capacity to enter a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea, it was not an abuse of discretion for County Court to accept the plea without holding a competency hearing[.] 905 N.Y.S.2d at 681 (internal citations omitted). Likewise, in Koenig v. State, 121 P.3d 780 (Wyo. 2005), the defendant argued that his guilty pleas were “involuntary because he was suffering from bipolar disorder, which rendered him incompetent to enter his pleas.” Id. at 782. In addressing this issue, the court stated: His broad claim that he suffers from bipolar disorder . . . is insufficient to establish he was incompetent to knowingly and voluntarily enter his guilty pleas. (internal citation omitted). [O]ur review of the record supports a finding that Koenig’s guilty pleas were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. The transcript from the change of plea hearing reveals the district court very carefully complied with the mandates of W.R.Cr.P. 11. . . . [T]he district court thoroughly advised Koenig of his rights and the ramifications of his decision to plead guilty. Koenig indicated his understanding of the charges and their attendant penalties, the consequences of his guilty pleas, and the rights he would relinquish if he entered those pleas. We are satisfied Koenig was true to his word when he stated to the court he was entering his pleas voluntarily and of his own free will. 121 P.3d at 782-83; see also, Rice v. Com., No. 2012-CA-000360-MR, 2013 WL 3237367 (Ky. App. June 28, 2013) (finding alleged prior diagnosis of bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and post-traumatic stress disorder did not speak to issue of competency exhibited by 20 defendant at time he appeared in court, engaged in lengthy plea colloquy, and made decision to knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty); People v. Sylvan, 969 N.Y.S.2d 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (finding trial court’s thorough inquiry adequately demonstrated that defendant was fully able to understand plea proceedings notwithstanding his bipolar disorder); Commonwealth v. Baney, 860 A.2d 127, 132 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (addressing defendant’s argument that he was unable to understand his guilty plea proceedings because he supposedly suffers from bipolar disease and finding he had unequivocally stated that he understood all questions being asked and was entering his guilty plea voluntarily and that it was “[o]nly after the court was satisfied that Baney knew all of his rights and was making an intelligent and voluntary decision, did it accept Baney’s negotiated guilty plea . . . . As such, Baney’s claim is frivolous and provides no basis for relief.”); Douglas v. State, No. 08-09-00027-CR, 2010 WL 2196082, at  (Tex. App. May 28, 2010) (finding trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct informal inquiry into defendant’s competency after she testified that she had been recently diagnosed with “schizoaffective disorder and bipolar disorder, suffered from hallucinations, and was taking medications that quiet the voices she hears and control her racing thoughts[]” where record showed defendant’s testimony was “lucid, her answers to the questions posed were responsive and clear, and [] [she] coherently relayed her side of the story.”). 21 As demonstrated in this line of cases, even if we were to assume the petitioner’s alleged bipolar diagnosis is accurate,19 the record flatly contradicts his contention that his guilty plea was not intelligently and voluntarily made. Throughout the circuit court’s plea colloquy with the petitioner, his answers to the circuit judge’s questions were responsive and clear. The petitioner repeatedly assured the circuit judge that he understood each of the constitutional rights that he would be waiving through his guilty plea and that the decision to plead guilty was his alone. Further, the petitioner and his counsel confirmed that they had met at length before the petitioner accepted the terms of the plea agreement. Moreover, the petitioner’s counsel, who had ample opportunity to observe the petitioner’s behavior and demeanor, both prior to and during the plea hearing, informed the circuit judge that the petitioner was “lucid and knows where he is and why we’re here and what he’s doing” and had always been “oriented as to time and place” and able “to recall past events.”20 In short, there is nothing in the record that would lead this Court to find the petitioner’s guilty plea was either improperly given by him or improperly accepted by the 19 There is no medical evidence in the record to support the petitioner’s assertion that he has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. However, even if there were, it would not alter our decision. 20 Although the petitioner now claims that a statement he made during his pre-sentence interview raises a question as to whether he had taken his antidepressant medications the morning of his plea hearing, the record reflects that he stated during the plea hearing that he takes his antidepressant medications once daily–at night–and he gave no indication that he did not take his medications, as prescribed. 22 circuit court. The record is simply bereft of any such evidence. Accordingly, we find the petitioner’s guilty plea was voluntarily, knowledgeably, and intelligently made.