Opinion ID: 40104
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of Appellants’ Claims

Text: Because the discretionary function exception applies to USACE’s and J&S’s conduct during the Galveston Island sign replacement project, the district court was correct to conclude that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellants’ claims. ALX El Dorado, 36 F.3d at 410 n.5; McNeily v. United States, 6 F.3d 343, 347 (5th Cir. 1993). “‘Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to a court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94 (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1868)). Thus, “[a] federal district court is under a mandatory duty to dismiss a suit over which it has no jurisdiction.” Stanley v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 639 F.2d 1146, 1157 (5th Cir. 1981) (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, “[w]hen a court must dismiss a case for lack of jurisdiction, the court should not adjudicate the merits 7 See also supra note 5. -13- of the claim.” Id. Because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court’s dismissal of Appellants’ claims against USACE on Rule 12(b)(1) grounds was appropriate. See ALX El Dorado, 36 F.3d at 410 n.5 (“The district court’s conclusion that the ‘discretionary function’ exception applied divested it of jurisdiction over the United States; thus, the proper ground for dismissal should have been Rule 12(b)(1).”); Davis v. United States, 961 F.2d 53, 55-56 (5th Cir. 1991) (affirming the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where an exception to the FTCA applied to the challenged governmental acts); Buchanan, 915 F.2d at 970 (“If the government’s conduct falls within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, then the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”).8 8 Appellants argue that the district court should have “converted” USACE’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment because “the jurisdiction facts are intertwined with the operative facts of the case.” Appellants’ Br. at 4. We disagree. This court has held that where a “challenge to the court’s jurisdiction is also a challenge to the existence of a federal cause of action, the proper course of action for the district court . . . is to find that jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiff's case” under either Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 415; see also Montez v. Dep’t of Navy, 392 F.3d 147, 150 (5th Cir. 2004). In this case, however, the merits of the actual cause of action--state-law negligence--are irrelevant to our determination of whether § 1346(b)(1) granted the district court subject-matter jurisdiction over those negligence claims, or whether the discretionary function exception of § 2680(a) divested the district court of jurisdiction. Ford v. Am. Motors Corp., 770 -14- The district court erred, however, when it granted J&S’s motion for summary judgment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because summary judgment acts as a final adjudication on the merits, the court was without jurisdiction to enter such a judgment. See Stanley, 639 F.2d at 1157 (“Since the granting of summary judgment is a disposition on the merits of the case, a motion for summary judgment is not the appropriate procedure for raising the defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”). Therefore, because the discretionary function exception “is premised on the notion that there is no jurisdiction to hear the claim as the United States has not waived sovereign immunity for that kind of suit, such defenses should be raised by a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction rather than by a motion for summary judgment.” Id.; see also Bank One Tex. v. United States, 157 F.3d 397, 403 n.12 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Granting summary judgment is an inappropriate way to effect a dismissal for lack of subject F.2d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that, where the discretionary function exception to the FTCA barred the plaintiffs’ negligence claims, “[t]he merits and the jurisdictional issue were not so intermeshed as to prevent the separate consideration and decision of the jurisdiction question” and affirming the dismissal of the claims on Rule 12(b)(1) grounds); see also Lively, 870 F.2d at 297 (holding that negligence is not an element of the discretionary function exception to the FTCA). Therefore, the district court was correct to dismiss USACE’s claims under a 12(b)(1) standard. See Davis, 961 F.2d at 56 n.4 (holding that dismissal on 12(b)(1) grounds was appropriate where the district court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction under the FTCA). -15- matter jurisdiction.”). Accordingly, the district court erred when it dismissed the claims against J&S on summary judgment instead of on Rule 12(b)(1) grounds. Finally, because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellants’ claims, the district court erred in dismissing the claims with prejudice, which also operates as a judgment on the merits. See Brooks v. Raymond Dugat Co., 336 F.3d 360, 362 (5th Cir. 2003); Schwartz v. Folloder, 767 F.2d 125, 129 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Dismissal of an action with prejudice is a complete adjudication of the issues presented by the pleadings and is a bar to a further action between the parties. An adjudication in favor of the defendants, by court or jury, can rise no higher than this.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) (“[A] dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction . . . operates as an adjudication upon the merits.”). Because the district court did not reach the merits of Appellants’ claims, and did not have jurisdiction to do so, it was incorrect to dismiss those claims with prejudice. Davis, 961 F.2d at 57 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of claims over which it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction, but vacating the final order of dismissal with prejudice and remanding for an entry of judgment without prejudice).