Opinion ID: 499811
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Asylum and Withholding Standards

Text: 5 Because Arteaga conceded deportability, the government's burden is satisfied, and Arteaga must show entitlement to relief from deportation. Estrada v. INS, 775 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir.1985). Arteaga contends that the BIA's decision failed to distinguish the legal standards for withholding of deportation under Sec. 243(h) and political asylum under Sec. 208(a). Arteaga is entitled to mandatory withholding of deportation if his life or freedom would be threatened in [El Salvador] on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1253(h)(1). In INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the 'clear probability of persecution' standard remains applicable to Sec. 243(h) withholding of deportation claims. The Court explained that under the clear probability standard [t]he question ... is whether it is more likely than not that the alien [will] be subject to persecution. Id. at 424, 104 S.Ct. at 2498. 6 Arteaga qualifies for a discretionary grant of asylum if he shows a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.... 8 U.S.C. Secs. 1101(a)(42), 1158(a). The well-founded fear standard play[s] no part in the decision whether to withhold deportation, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1212, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987), and is in fact 'more generous' than the clear-probability test. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1984). See Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir.1985); Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir.1985). In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court concluded: 7 Our analysis of the plain language of the Act, its symmetry with the United Nations Protocol, and its legislative history, lead inexorably to the conclusion that to show a well-founded fear of persecution, an alien need not prove that it is more likely than not that he or she will be persecuted in his or her home country. 8 107 S.Ct. at 1222. The Court pointed out that [o]ne can certainly have a well-founded fear of an event happening when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place. Id. at 1213. The Court explained this by citing a hypothetical example in which a one-in-ten possibility of persecution would give rise to a well-founded fear. Id. 9 This court has said that our case law quite clearly establishes that the legal difference between 'clear probability' and 'well-founded fear' must be respected. Rebollo-Jovel v. INS, 794 F.2d 441, 444 (9th Cir.1986). Accordingly, the BIA decision should make it apparent that the Board appreciated the necessity of applying separate and discrete standards. Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1468 (9th Cir.1986). 10 The BIA has frequently resorted to catchall statements in its asylum decisions that a given petitioner has failed to meet the asylum standard regardless of whether [petitioner's] claim is assessed in terms of demonstrating a 'clear probability,' a 'realistic likelihood,' a 'reasonable possibility,' or a 'good' or 'valid reason to fear' persecution. Corado Rodriguez v. INS, No. 85-7417, slip op. at 3267 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 1988); see Vides-Vides, 783 F.2d at 1468; Rebollo-Jovel, 794 F.2d at 446; Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d 1448, 1450 (9th Cir.1985). Such a catchall analysis may fail to make clear that the BIA properly applied the discrete standards to withholding and asylum relief, respectively, particularly where the BIA makes reference to its decision in Matter of Acosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986 (BIA 1985). In Acosta, the BIA declared: 11 It has been our position that as a practical matter the showing contemplated by the phrase a well-founded fear of persecution converges with the showing described by the phrase a clear probability of persecution.... Accordingly, we have not found a significant difference between the showings required for asylum and withholding of deportation. 12 Acosta, slip op. at 2 (citations omitted). 13 In Vides-Vides, supra, this court held that a BIA decision that fails to state explicitly that the asylum standard is more generous than the withholding standard is nevertheless sufficient if it, read as a whole, reflects its recognition of the distinctive standards. 783 F.2d at 1468. Significantly, Vides-Vides considered a BIA decision rendered prior to Acosta, and the court specifically left open the question of whether boiler-plate analysis was sufficient in post-Acosta cases: In light of Acosta, it may be appropriate henceforth to require a more explicit statement from the BIA that, even were it to apply a more generous standard such as required in this circuit, it would still deny the asylum petition. 783 F.2d at 1468 n. 3. 14 This question was recently resolved in Corado Rodriguez v. INS, supra, which held that in post-Acosta cases the Board must be explicit that it is applying the more generous standard to the asylum claim. Slip op. at 3268-69. In Corado Rodriguez, the BIA had held that the petitioner's asylum claim failed regardless of whether her claim is assessed in terms of demonstrating a 'clear probability,' a 'realistic likelihood,' a 'reasonable possibility,' or a 'good' or 'valid reason to fear' persecution. Id. The court held that this catchall language failed to show that the Board had properly applied the well-founded fear standard, particularly where the Board reiterated its Acosta position and analyzed well-founded fear using terms used by the Ninth Circuit to define the stricter clear probability test. Id. at 3270. 15 Our analysis of this issue must also be guided by the decision in Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir.1986). There, the court held that a post-Acosta decision by the BIA had adequately applied the well-founded fear standard. The BIA had inartfully chosen to make occasional use of the words would be or will be in its evaluation of the asylum claim, arguably suggesting that it had applied the stricter standard. 3 However, the court found that the doubt raised by the occasional use of the words 'would be' or 'will be'  was sufficiently clarified by the BIA's lengthy quotation from Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d 1448, together with an explicit statement that it was bound by Ninth Circuit precedent. 16 The BIA's decision in the instant case states that Ninth Circuit precedent controls, 4 quotes from Cardoza-Fonseca, and holds that the petitioner has not shown a clear probability of persecution under section 243(h) or a well-founded fear of persecution under section 208(a), as that standard is described in Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS.... This aspect of the BIA opinion resembles Sanchez-Trujillo. However, in the instant case the BIA also states that the Board's analysis of [the well-founded fear standard] is set forth in Matter of Acosta. See Corado Rodriguez, slip op. at 3269 (BIA reiterated its position advanced in Acosta ). By contrast, there is no indication in Sanchez-Trujillo that the Board there had cited Acosta as an authority. 17 Moreover, the BIA opinion scrutinized in Sanchez-Trujillo made it apparent that the inartfully chosen words, when read in context, merely stat[ed] that an objective basis must be shown for a well-founded fear. 801 F.2d at 1579. If that is the case, the challenged language did not amount to a misapplication of the law. In the instant case, it cannot be said that the inartfully chosen words were subsumed under an essentially correct statement of the law. Instead, the BIA stated that Arteaga failed to demonstrate that he as an individual would be singled-out and targeted for persecution and bolstered this statement with citations to cases expounding or applying the clear probability standard. See INS v. Stevic, supra; Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir.1982) (equating clear probability with well-founded fear); Matter of Acosta, supra. 5 The BIA continued its legal analysis by stating that there is no evidence that the respondent was ever persecuted or which suggests the likelihood that he will be if returned to El Salvador. (Emphasis added). The word likelihood, too, indicates that the BIA was applying the stricter standard. Nowhere in the BIA's legal analysis of the particular facts does it employ language indicative of the more generous well-founded fear test. 18 The instant case is distinguished from Corado Rodriguez by only two elements. First, the BIA did not use the particular boiler-plate language cited in Corado Rodriguez.  Second, the BIA cited and quoted from Cardoza-Fonseca and alluded to the well-founded fear standard. However, this court must address questions relating to the standard applied [by the BIA] on a case-by-case basis, deciding each not on the basis of 'certain magic words,' but on the basis of what the Board actually did. Corado Rodriguez, slip op. at 3269, quoting Rebollo-Jovel v. INS, 794 F.2d at 444. Thus, the boiler-plate statement employed by the BIA should not control, if it appears that the appropriate legal standard has not been applied but merely invoked as so many magic words. 19 Here, the citation to controlling Ninth Circuit authority is set forth as black letter, but is framed by two citations to Acosta and a citation to a Third Circuit case squarely in conflict with Cardoza-Fonseca. See Rejaie v. INS, supra. In applying the facts to the law, the BIA decision uses language suggesting that the clear probability standard was applied. Notwithstanding its lip service to Cardoza-Fonseca, the BIA decision here fails to make explicit that the more generous standard was applied to the asylum claim. Corado Rodriguez, slip op. at 3269-70. We conclude that the case should be remanded to the BIA to enable it explicitly to apply the more generous well-founded fear standard. See id. at 3268-69.