Opinion ID: 1776319
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the trial court erroneously instruct the jury?

Text: The trial court granted Jury Instruction No. P-1(A) which stated: The court instructs the Jury that the accident between the Caperton Vehicle and the McCary Vehicle occurred as a result of the negligence of the defendant Caperton. Jury Instruction No. C-4 addressed the form of the jury's verdict: Your verdict ... may be in either one of the following forms: If you find for the Plaintiff, We, the Jury, find for the Plaintiff, ____, and assess ____ damages at $ ____. If you find for the Defendant, We, the Jury, find for the Defendant. After considering the evidence, the jury returned the following verdict: We, the Jury, find for the Defendant. An obvious conflict exists between Instruction No. P-1(A) and Instruction No. C-4. Instruction No. P-1(A) directs a verdict for the plaintiff on the issue of negligence; Instruction No. C-4 allows the jury to return a general verdict for the defendant. In Moak v. Black, 230 Miss. 337, 92 So.2d 845, 851 (1957), we held that it is error for a court to grant instructions which are likely to mislead or confuse the jury as to the principles of law applicable to the facts in evidence. The contradiction between Instruction No. P-1(A) and Instruction No. C-4 creates a clear potential for confusion. By permitting the jury to return a general verdict in favor of the defendant, Instruction C-4 effectively cancelled the peremptory language contained in Instruction P-1(A). In Griffin v. Fletcher, 362 So.2d 594, 596 (Miss. 1978), we dealt with a similar situation: An examination of the instructions in the present case indicates that, even though a peremptory instruction on liability was given in favor of the appellant, the issue of liability also was presented to the jury in other instructions... . The effect of those instructions was to countermand the peremptory instruction and the jury was obviously confused. In this situation, we are of the opinion that the motion for a new trial should have been sustained and that the case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. In the case sub judice, we cannot even be sure that the jury's verdict addressed the issue of damages. Given the trial court's instruction concerning the form of a verdict for the defendant, the jury could possibly have decided that McCary suffered damages but that Caperton was not liable for them. By granting an instruction which the jury could have interpreted as allowing them to ignore the peremptory instruction on liability, the trial court reversibly erred. We also find that the trial court erred by requiring the plaintiff to insert the words if any into Instruction No. P-5. As given, the instruction reads: The court instructs the jury that if you find for the Plaitniff [sic] in assessing her damages you may take into consideration all evidence in reference to loss [sic] wages and income Plaintiff has suffered as a result of injuries if any sustained in the accident; and all evidence in reference to pain and suffering if any the Plaintiff has suffered or is reasonably likely to suffer in the future as a result of injuries sustained in the accident; and all evidence in reference to doctor bills, hospital bills, drug bills, and medical expenses Plaintiff has incurred as a result of injuries if any sustained in the accident; provided you further believe from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that all said injuries and damages if any are the sole, direct, and proximate result of negligence on the part of Defendant in this case. (emphasis added). We do not hold that the if any language would be improper in all cases. Here, however, the record contains unrefuted evidence that McCary was injured in the December 30, 1988 accident and that the injury resulted in loss. Under these circumstances, the task of the jury was to determine the extent of McCary's injuries and loss, not whether any existed. Cf. Burrell v. Goss, 245 Miss. 420, 424, 146 So.2d 78, 79 (1962) (according to all of the evidence, the plaintiff sustained at least some injury). Since the plaintiff introduced undisputed evidence of damages, the trial court erred by modifying Instruction P-5 so as to allow the jury to find a total absence of injury or loss. McCary's remaining arguments relating to jury instructions lack merit.