Opinion ID: 2575864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jail Assault

Text: Defendant contends that the trial erred in overruling his objections to admission of evidence of his assault on Steven Baldwin, and that this error violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. On April 14, 1994, the prosecution notified defendant that it intended to introduce in aggravation evidence of defendant's assault on Steven Baldwin, which had occurred in July 1991, soon after defendant's arrest. The defense moved to exclude evidence of the incident on the ground that the notice was untimely. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion without prejudice to its renewal if the trial reached the penalty phase. Defendant renewed the motion to exclude after the jury returned its guilt verdicts and made its special circumstance finding. In support of the motion, defendant informed the court that jail documents listing the inmates who were housed in the module where the assault occurred and the employees who worked in that module had been destroyed on or before July 1993, although a report relating to the incident had been preserved. The trial court denied the renewed motion to exclude, rejecting defendant's argument that, in light of the document destruction, use of the incident in aggravation would violate his constitutional right to due process of law. Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying the motions to exclude. Section 190.3, factor (b) provides for the admission, during the penalty phase of a capital trial, of evidence of any criminal activity by the defendant involving the use or attempted use of force or violence. ( People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1070, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) Section 190.3, factor (b), imposes no time limitation on the introduction of unadjudicated violent crimes; rather, it permits the jury to consider a capital defendant's criminally violent conduct occurring at any time during the defendant's life. ( People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1174, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 233, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710.) Thus, evidence of violent criminal activity is admissible even though prosecution of the crime would be time-barred ( People v. Williams, supra, at p. 233, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710), the right to a speedy trial is not implicated ( People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1161, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1), and the defense of laches is not available ( People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1087-1088, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335). As we have explained, the remoteness in time of a prior incident goes to its weight, not to its admissibility. ( People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 172, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357.) Defendant asks us to reconsider these decisions, but he does not persuade us to do so. Here, as defendant concedes, defendant's assault on Steven Baldwin was not remote in time; indeed, it occurred after the charged capital offense, the murder of Teresa Holloway. Defendant nonetheless contends that the trial court should have excluded evidence of the incident because the prosecutor's lack of diligence in discovering the incident and in providing notice of his intention to offer evidence of the incident in aggravation resulted in the destruction of relevant jail records, thereby compromising defendant's ability to defend against the charge. The prosecutor told the trial court that he first learned of the incident in December 1993 during an interview of Steven Baldwin while preparing the case for trial. Although defendant argues that the prosecutor could have discovered the incident earlier, he cites no authority for the proposition that a prosecutor in a death penalty case has an obligation to promptly and diligently search for all available aggravating evidence, or that, if such a duty exists, exclusion of evidence is an appropriate and lawful sanction for its violation. Thus, defendant fails to persuade us that he suffered any legally cognizable harm as a result of the prosecution's failure to discover the incident at an earlier time. The prosecution is required to notify a capital defendant of its intended penalty phase evidence within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial. (§ 190.3.) Notice provided before jury selection begins is generally considered timely, and the purpose of the notice provision is satisfied if the defendant has a reasonable chance to defend against the charge. ( People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 562, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182.) Here, the prosecutor gave notice to defendant of his intention to introduce evidence of the Baldwin assault 11 days before jury selection began. Defendant then received, or had already received, a report that described the incident and included the names of two inmates, in addition to Baldwin and defendant, who had been present in the module and were questioned about the incident. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that defendant received timely and adequate notice. Defendant also argues that the incident was inadmissible because it did not constitute a crime by defendant. Evidence of other criminal activity introduced in the penalty phase under section 190.3, factor (b), must demonstrate the commission of an actual crime, specifically, the violation of a penal statute. ( People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72, 222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423; see also People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1133, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450; People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) The prosecution did not argue that defendant personally assaulted Baldwin, but instead that he aided and abetted an assault on Baldwin by loudly referring to Baldwin as a snitch, knowing that snitches are commonly the targets of assault in jail. [A]n aider and abettor is a person who, `acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.' ( People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 259, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013, quoting People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318.) On the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant, acting with the intent to have Baldwin assaulted, and with knowledge that other inmates would likely do so if told that Baldwin was a snitch, encouraged or instigated the assault by openly announcing to the other inmates that Baldwin was a snitch. Defendant's remark to Baldwin after the assault (You can't be in this cell) supports an inference that defendant orchestrated the assault to achieve his own purposes, intimidation of Baldwin and his removal from the module. Therefore, we reject defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to show that defendant violated a penal statute.