Opinion ID: 2978025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fourteenth Amendment Claims (Count Two)

Text: The Fourteenth Amendment provides two possible causes of action for prosecutorial decisions: selective prosecution and vindictive prosecution. United States v. Anderson, 923 F.2d 450, 453 (6th Cir. 1991). The district court correctly determined that Wiley failed to establish the elements for either. To state a claim for selective prosecution, the plaintiff must show three elements: (1) the state actor singled out a person belonging to a protected, identifiable group; (2) the state actor initiated prosecution with a discriminatory purpose; and (3) the prosecution had a discriminatory effect on the group identified. Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 873 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Anderson, 923 F.2d at 453). The plaintiff must show that “similarly situated persons outside her category were not prosecuted,” and the district court properly granted summary judgment to the City Defendants because Wiley offered no evidence of such dissimilar treatment. Id. It also properly noted that Wiley’s filings indicate that she was “targeted” because of her personal relationships, rather than her national origin or race, which would not result in a constitutional violation. To state a claim for vindictive prosecution, a plaintiff must show that the prosecutor acted “to deter the exercise of a protected right by the person prosecuted” or that the prosecutor had a “stake” in deterring that person from exercising his rights and his conduct was unreasonable. Anderson, 923 F.2d at 453-54. The district court properly found that such a claim could not survive summary judgment because Wiley did not show that she was targeted for the exercise of a constitutional right or that Walsh had a stake in deterring her from exercising that right. C. State Law Malicious Prosecution Claim (Count Four) -8- No. 07-4441 Wiley v. Oberlin Police Dep’t. et al. The district court correctly concluded that Wiley could not succeed on her state law malicious prosecution claim because of the existence of probable cause. It properly relied on its analysis of probable cause for the federal malicious prosecution claims because of the similarity between the state and federal definitions of probable cause. See United States v. Campbell, 486 F.3d 949, 957 (6th Cir. 2007) (definition of probable cause for Fourth Amendment purposes); State v. Moore, 734 N.E.2d 804, 806-07 (Ohio 2000) (explaining that the Ohio Constitution and Fourth Amendment provide “nearly identical” protection from unreasonable searches and seizures and referencing federal standards in the analysis of probable cause under state law). D. Municipal Liability (Count Five) A municipality may be liable under § 1983 for inadequate police training “only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). However, because Wiley failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation by any of the City Defendants, the district court correctly determined that her claim for municipal liability must also fail. See Fox, 489 F.3d at 238. E. Other Possible Claims The district court also properly identified other possible causes of action from Wiley’s complaint: (1) negligence or conversion of property by the City Defendants, (2) conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights (that included the police officers and Houghland), and (3) state law claims against Houghland such as improper eviction, theft, or conversion of her property. Then, it properly found that these claims either lacked merit or were not properly before it. Wiley cannot bring a claim under § 1983 for the recovery of items that were lost or stolen by the police because she has -9- No. 07-4441 Wiley v. Oberlin Police Dep’t. et al. not shown that Ohio law does not provide an adequate remedy. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-33 (1984). Similar to the municipal liability claim, Wiley cannot succeed on a conspiracy claim because there was no underlying constitutional violation that injured her. See Bauss v. Plymouth Twp., 233 F. App’x 490, 500 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 943-44 (6th Cir. 1985)). Finally, potential state law claims against Houghland are unrelated to the § 1983 claims, and the district court did not have federal jurisdiction over them. AFFIRMED. - 10 -