Opinion ID: 2600070
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of motion for individual sequestered voir dire

Text: Defense counsel filed several pretrial motions concerning the voir dire of prospective jurors. In one, counsel asked that voir dire be done either individually and sequestered or in small groups of 15 to 20 prospective jurors. Counsel argued that individual voir dire was necessary to probe the strong biases the circumstances of the casea young African-American man accused of committing sexual assaults that caused the death of an elderly White womanwere likely to evoke. After hearing, the trial court denied defendant's request, finding no need to deviate from its customary practice of questioning prospective jurors in open court. The trial court rejected the argument that jury selection done in a large group is tainted by an inherent herd instinct, in which potential jurors feel pressured to answer questions about their biases neutrally, rather than truthfully. In the trial court's view, [a]ttitudes within the community are fairly fixed on the subject of the death penalty and if people are against it, they say so and if they aren't[,] they say so. The trial court also noted that potential jurors would have several days to complete a questionnaire in which they could privately express their feelings about the death penalty, and would be questioned based on their written responses. The trial court also indicated that although it planned to conduct the group voir dire itself, it would allow the attorneys to ask questions directly in the event a prospective juror wanted to be questioned in chambers, outside the presence of other jurors. Defendant contends the trial court violated his constitutional rights by refusing to conduct individual, sequestered voir dire. Initially, we disagree with respondent's assertion that defendant has forfeited his claim because he did not challenge any juror for cause or exercise all of his peremptory challenges at trial. A defendant's failure to raise a for-cause challenge or to exhaust all peremptory challenges is relevant to the question whether he has preserved a claim on appeal that members of his jury were unacceptable to him. ( People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 904 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 162 P.3d 528]; People v. Hart, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 589.) But a defendant who has made a timely objection to group voir dire and proposed that the trial court question prospective jurors individually has done all that is necessary. ( People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 513, fn. 6.) Thus, defendant's claim that the trial court erred in refusing his request is properly before us. However, the claim fails on the merits. As we have repeatedly observed, there is no federal constitutional requirement that a trial court conduct individualized, sequestered voir dire in a capital case. ( People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 494; People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 511-513.) Nor did the trial court's denial of the motion for individual, sequestered voir dire violate any of defendant's rights under the state Constitution or state law. ( People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 494; People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 713-714 [denial of motion for individual, sequestered voir dire reviewed for abuse of discretion].) Section 223 provides in relevant part that [v]oir dire of any prospective jurors shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other jurors . . . . Group voir dire may be impracticable when it has resulted in actual, rather than merely potential, bias. ( People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 288 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990].) Here, however, defendant does not suggest that either the trial court's comments or the responses of other prospective jurors to the trial court's questioning influenced any prospective juror, and we find nothing in the record to indicate that group voir dire resulted in actual bias. (Cf. People v. Lewis, supra, at pp. 494-495 [evidence that 16 jurors changed their questionnaire answers after being educated during the voir dire process did not establish actual bias]; People v. Vieira, supra, at p. 289 [the possibility that prospective jurors may have answered questions to please the trial court shows at most potential, not actual, bias].) Furthermore, the trial court acted well within its discretion in determining that group voir dire was practicable in this case. Though aware it had discretion to order individual, sequestered voir dire, the trial court, for the reasons it stated, reasonably rejected the argument that a herd instinct required a departure from its usual practice of questioning prospective jurors in large groups. Moreover, prospective jurors received lengthy questionnaires to complete on their own time, and the trial court, aided by counsel, conducted individualized voir dire when further inquiry into a questionnaire response was required or requested by any prospective juror who wished to discuss sensitive issues privately in chambers. The trial court's approach to voir dire was reasonable on this record. (Cf. People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 514 [group voir dire was practicable where the trial court used juror questionnaires and allowed counsel privately to question certain prospective jurors].) Accordingly, we find that in denying defendant's motion for individualized voir dire of all prospective jurors, the trial court neither abused its discretion nor violated defendant's constitutional rights.