Opinion ID: 1162726
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the claim of permanent disability[17]

Text: During the formal hearing, the special prosecutor presented the expert testimony of Dr. William Thornton and Dr. Lynn B. Gerow, both licensed psychiatric physicians retained on behalf of the commission to examine appellant. Dr. Thornton testified that, in his opinion, appellant was suffering from a disability that is a direct result of his being depressed. Dr. Thornton, however, did not consider that disability to be by any means permanent. Assuming appropriate treatment with anti-depressant medications and some psychotherapy, Dr. Thornton's prognosis for appellant's chances of functioning in a law-related capacity was excellent. Dr. Gerow similarly testified that appellant was not permanently mentally incapacitated. Rather, Dr. Gerow stated, appellant was suffering from a type of depression that was a temporary impairment. With a leave of absence and systematic therapy, Dr. Gerow opined, appellant could return to whatever legal pursuits he wished. Appellant presented the testimony of Dr. Lance Mayor (a physician of internal medicine), Dr. Juan Carlos Laborati (a physician and psychiatrist), and Dr. Joan Owen (a clinical psychologist). Dr. Mayor had previously treated appellant for high blood pressure. He conceded that he would have to defer to a psychiatric physician respecting appellant's mental fitness for the bench. Because of the stress associated with being a judge, however, he had encouraged appellant to consider leaving the bench. Moreover, Dr. Mayor stated that in his view appellant was to a reasonable medical certainty permanently disabled from being a judge. Based on visits with appellant between December 1985 and May 1986, Dr. Laborati diagnosed appellant as afflicted with major reactive depression aggravated by pre-existing back problems and hypertension that complicated the presence of the depression. In his opinion, appellant was permanently incapacitated from performing the functions of a judge. Dr. Laborati testified that it was possible, but not probable, that appellant could return to the bench. If appellant was still his patient, the doctor stated, he would advise against appellant's return to judicial duties because exposure to continuous stress could have a deleterious effect on appellant's depression. Dr. Laborati further indicated, however, that appellant was not mentally incapacitated from any kind of productive work. In Dr. Laborati's view, appellant could do anything but be a judge. Dr. Owen, a clinical psychologist, testified that she had seen appellant professionally approximately twenty-five or thirty times since April of 1987. Her treatment focused on issues of stress, career options, family issues. Over the special prosecutor's objection that Dr. Owen was not qualified to render an expert medical diagnosis of appellant's mental or physical condition, the commission permitted her to state her opinion as a therapeutic counselor that appellant was afflicted with major depression and that he was permanently incapacitated from returning to the bench. Additional evidence before the commission relating to the alleged permanent nature of appellant's claimed disability consisted of exhibits submitted by appellant detailing his medical history. The medical records indicated that appellant had been hospitalized numerous times since 1982 with various complaints, including lower back pain, giant hives, ulcers, hypertension, headaches, fainting spells and episodes of visual blurring and weakness in his limbs. On one such occasion in December of 1985, appellant was admitted to a hospital emergency room after his secretary found him on the floor of his chambers in an altered state of consciousness. He was subsequently diagnosed as suffering from depression, placed on medication and discharged in stable health. He was again admitted briefly to the hospital in February 1986 after a fainting spell and was discharged with instructions to relax and get some rest. On another occasion in April 1986, appellant was hospitalized and diagnosed as suffering from probable depression and anxiety. Following treatment with medication, he improved rapidly and was discharged feeling much better. On October 17, 1986, appellant again sought treatment in a medical facility in Orange, California. The records indicate that appellant was diagnosed as suffering from a very real bipolar disorder which would require longstanding psychiatric support. The records further indicate that, although appellant was discharged in fair condition, his mental status at the time of discharge was still one of a person given to rapid cycling mood swings but he was cooperative and comfortable. The commission returned the following findings respecting the permanency of appellant's alleged disability: 1. Although [Judge Goldman] claims to be permanently disabled to perform the duties of his office, this claim is contradicted by responsible medical testimony indicating that, at most, [Judge Goldman] is suffering from a condition of depression and stress which with proper treatment should only be temporary. The Commission credits and accepts this testimony. The Commission further rejects as unpersuasive any ostensibly contrary testimony of [Judge Goldman's] expert witnesses. 2. In light of the foregoing, the Commission finds that [Judge Goldman] has failed to establish any claim for a disability pension, because even assuming, arguendo, he is or has been disabled, [Judge Goldman] has failed to establish that such disability is likely to be permanent in nature. 3. To the contrary, the Commission affirmatively finds that [Judge Goldman] is not, and has not been, physically or mentally disabled to perform the duties of his office, in the sense contemplated by the Nevada Constitution and statutes. [18] 4. The Commission concludes, as a matter of law, that even if [Judge Goldman] had been suffering from a disability at the time of some of the aforementioned misconduct, any such disability would not justify the Commission in awarding him an enhanced pension for such disability, because it does not appear that any such disability was, or is likely to be, permanent in nature. Nev. Const. art. 6, § 21(6)(b). Our review of the record reveals clear and convincing evidentiary support for the commission's findings. As noted, Drs. Thornton and Gerow both testified that appellant's depression was in the nature of a temporary impairment which was by no means permanent. Dr. Gerow's testimony specifically refuted the evidence contained in the medical records indicating that appellant may have suffered from a long-term bipolar disorder. [19] The testimony of Dr. Gerow and Dr. Thornton provided a clear and convincing factual basis for finding that, with medication and systematic treatment, appellant could function as a judge and that, therefore, appellant's alleged disability was not likely to be permanent in nature. Even discounting that expert testimony, however, the record provides substantial support for the commission's finding that appellant failed in his burden to demonstrate that he was permanently disabled from performing the duties of his office in the sense contemplated by the Nevada Constitution and statutes. Although evidence in the record indicates that appellant suffered from intermittent bouts of depression and stress-related ailments, other testimony and evidence was adduced at the hearing establishing that appellant's condition stabilized or rapidly improved on the occasions when he received a systematic course of prescribed and supervised treatment. Such treatment enabled him to remain quite functional. It was also established during the hearing, for example, that in the early 1980's appellant was able to preside over some of the most complex litigation ever to come before the Eighth Judicial District Court. Moreover, the only testimony presented by appellant from an expert qualified to render a medical and psychiatric opinion was at best ambiguous. In our view, the record as a whole provides a sound basis to discount Dr. Laborati's testimony that appellant could do anything but be a judge. See Ex Parte McFaddin, 175 S.E.2d 218 (S.C. 1970). Additionally, we note that the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions do not establish procedures allowing for periodic or future review of a claimant's disability status once an early, enhanced judicial disability pension has been awarded. The absence of any such provisions persuades us that an early judicial disability pension may be awarded only where clear and convincing evidence establishes that a judge is truly in extremis and that, even with medical treatment, the judge will not be likely to recover his health and capacity to perform the duties of his office. [20] Compare Ex Parte McFaddin, 175 S.E.2d 218, 219-20 (S.C. 1970) (judge's petition for permanent disability retirement denied where medical reports failed to show that medical treatment was not available to provide relief from emotional discomforts and other conditions) with State Ex Rel. Simms v. Simmons, 711 P.2d 949, 952 (Okl.Jud.App.Div. 1985) (retirement compensation awarded where seventy-year old judge demonstrated erratic, bizarre behavior and erosion of judicial ability and temperament following surgery and radiation therapy for progressive and worsening cancer and other physical maladies). In our view, on the basis of the evidence disclosed in this record, any contrary findings by the commission authorizing appellant's retirement on an early, enhanced disability pension would have manifestly expanded the constitutional and statutory intendment of the disability provisions far beyond that which was envisioned by the legislature or the electorate. We note, as did the commission, that the record does contain ostensibly conflicting evidence. The commission, however, was entitled to rely on the expert testimony of Dr. Thornton and Dr. Gerow, and it was for the commission to determine the weight and credibility to give to any conflicting testimony or evidence. See, e.g., Ogden v. State, 96 Nev. 697, 615 P.2d 251 (1980) (when there is conflicting psychiatric testimony at a competency hearing, the trier of fact resolves the conflicting testimony of the witnesses). As noted above, we are not free to disregard the factual determinations of the commission simply because the circumstances involved might also be reconciled with contrary findings of fact. Even assuming, without suggesting, that some evidence may have legitimately supported such contrary findings, we are obligated to uphold the factual findings of the commission unless they are unsupported by clear and convincing evidence in the record as a whole. The commission's findings are adequately supported by the evidence. Therefore, we affirm the commission's determinations that appellant was not entitled to an early, enhanced permanent disability pension, and that, instead, he was entitled only to such standard and ordinary retirement benefits as he had earned during the course of his actual and active judicial service. See Powers v. Bd. of Control of Jud. Ret. Fund, 434 So.2d 745 (Ala. 1983). Appellant asserted the affirmative defense in the proceedings below that the commission lacked jurisdiction to resolve his alleged entitlement to an early, enhanced permanent disability retirement and that, therefore, the commission had usurped the authority and power vested by the Legislature in the office of the Governor of the State of Nevada pursuant to NRS 3.092. In Goldman v. Bryan, 106 Nev. 30, 787 P.2d 372 (1990), we previously addressed the commission's jurisdiction in a somewhat different context. Bryan entailed a challenge to an order of the district court denying appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus. The petition sought to compel the governor to act on appellant's request to retire under NRS 3.092(3). We held in Bryan that the commission derived its authority to determine appellant's entitlement to disability retirement directly from the constitution. See Nev. Const. art. 6, § 21(1), (6) and (7). Additionally, we affirmed the district court's conclusion that the applicable provisions of the constitution constitute the supreme law of the state and control over any conflicting statutory provisions. See Robison v. District Court, 73 Nev. 169, 313 P.2d 436 (1957) (provision in constitution respecting impeachment of state officer controls over conflicting legislative enactment providing statutory scheme for removal). Thus, we held that the commission's constitutional jurisdiction to resolve appellant's claim to an early, enhanced disability pension prevailed over the authority conferred upon the governor under the provisions of NRS 3.092(3). Bryan, 106 Nev. at 37, 787 P.2d at 377. Nevertheless, we also emphasized in Bryan that the commission had in fact expressly assumed jurisdiction over the issue of appellant's entitlement to an early, enhanced disability retirement prior to the time appellant filed his petition in the district court seeking to compel the governor to act in accordance with NRS 3.092(3). We concluded under those circumstances that the commission's express assertion of its primary constitutional jurisdiction, prior to the date appellant petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus was completely dispositive of the issues presented by appellant's petition for extraordinary relief. Id. at 43, 787 P.2d at 381. Additionally, we stated that although mandamus may have been available to compel the Governor to act in the absence of any pending Commission proceedings, once the Commission exercised its constitutional authority and jurisdiction, the remedy of mandamus was foreclosed and appellant could not utilize NRS 3.092(3) as a means of escaping the Commission's disciplinary authority. Id. at 38, 787 P.2d at 378 (emphasis added). We take this opportunity to clarify our precise holding in Bryan to stress that the commission's express assertion of its jurisdiction is not the sole, determinative factor precluding action by the governor pursuant to NRS 3.092(3). Our holding in Bryan was never intended to imply that a judge may automatically defeat the commission's jurisdiction to commence proceedings relating to the alleged misconduct or disability of that judge by racing to the governor with a notice of intention to seek early, enhanced disability retirement in accordance with NRS 3.092(3). As we noted in Bryan, the commission's jurisdiction derives directly from the constitution. That constitutional authority can neither be precluded nor ousted by a judge's notice to the governor stating an intention to retire pursuant to NRS 3.092(3). See generally Quinn v. State Com'n on Judicial Conduct, 430 N.E.2d 879, 885 (N.Y. 1981) (judge charged with misconduct may not generally avoid consequences of removal for cause by racing to resign); Matter of Probert, 308 N.W.2d 773, 775-77 (Mich. 1981) (judge should not have the power, simply by leaving office, to short-circuit investigation of allegations against him); see also Powers v. Bd. of Control of Jud. Ret. Fund, 434 So.2d 745 (Ala. 1983); In re Peoples, 250 S.E.2d 890 (N.C. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979). Overriding considerations of public policy, as well as the underlying policy and purpose of discipline commission proceedings, demand a thorough and comprehensive investigation and adjudication where mixed questions of misconduct and disability are potentially at issue. The commission, rather than the Office of the Governor, is the proper entity exclusively empowered to act in the first instance, whenever issues of possible misconduct are presented along with issues of disability in a given case... . Bryan, 106 at 41, 787 P.2d at 379. An untenable and intolerable situation would arise, for example, if a judge who had committed misconduct in office could foreclose the commission's jurisdiction by invoking the provisions of NRS 3.092(3) and simply tendering to the governor a notice of intention to seek an early, enhanced disability retirement. The statute contemplates that the governor's authority to retire a judge may be invoked only where the matters in controversy are limited to the permanency and the extent of the judge's disability. The commission, on the other hand, must and does have the constitutional authority to consider and balance the competing and conflicting social and public policy interests at issue where the matters in controversy include mixed questions of misconduct and disability. In evaluating whether to retire or remove, the commission, unlike the governor, may consider the policy concerns underlying NRS 3.092(3), i.e., to encourage and permit a seriously disabled judge to step down from office with dignity and some protection from the specter of financial ruin. Further, the commission may take into account the equally compelling social and public policy against permitting an undeserving judge to retire with an early, enhanced pension and thus benefit from or avoid the consequences of misconduct. The commission possesses the authority to weigh and balance all the equities as well as the rights of the judge and the public's interest in the competence and ethical integrity of the bench. Thus, where, as here, allegations of judicial misconduct provide an incipient basis for commission action under the state constitution, overriding concerns of public and social policy, as well as the commission's preeminent constitutional authority to resolve all potential questions of misconduct and entitlement to early, enhanced disability retirement, must foreclose any attempt by a judge to compel the governor to act in accordance with NRS 3.092(3). The proceedings before the commission must be permitted to run their full constitutional course from their inception to their conclusion.