Opinion ID: 1121458
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Boyd, Smith and Stevens

Text: (22) Defendant correctly contends that in some circumstances a conflict of interest can result from an attorney's duty of loyalty to a client and the professional fiduciary obligations arising from the attorney's present or former representation of an opposing witness in a different proceeding. (See Leversen v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 530, 538 [194 Cal. Rptr. 448, 668 P.2d 755].) The record reveals, however, that no actual or potential conflict resulted from the representation of Boyd, Smith and Stevens by the public defender's office. Brown, as an officer of the court, was in the best position to assess whether a conflict of interest existed or was likely to arise. (E.g., People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 776 [248 Cal. Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310].) Brown represented to the court that he possessed no confidential information relating to any of the three witnesses in question. (See ibid. [no actual or potential conflict found in similar circumstances arising in the context of firm under contract to county to be conflict public defender].) Both Brown and Allen represented to the court that the cross-examination of these witnesses would not be affected by any prior representation by the public defender's office. Furthermore, neither Brown nor his office represented any of the witnesses at the time of his or her cross-examination. Therefore, he did not have any interest in attempting to shield these witnesses from impeachment or to otherwise ensure that their testimony was well-received. (Cf. In re Darr (1983) 143 Cal. App.3d 500 [191 Cal. Rptr. 882].) We reviewed the instances where defendant claims that the cross-examination of these witnesses was prejudicially deficient. After doing so, we find no reason to conclude that the alleged conflicts adversely affected defendant's representation.