Opinion ID: 710090
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Existence of a Policy or Practice.

Text: 13 Under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), municipalities may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort. The Supreme Court made clear that in addition to an official policy, a municipality may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such custom has not received formal approval through the [governmental] body's official decisionmaking channels. Id. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. at 2035; see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481-82 n. 10, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1299-1300 n. 10, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). 14 Proof of random acts or isolated events is insufficient to establish custom. Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir.1989). But a plaintiff may prove the existence of a custom or informal policy with evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officials were not discharged or reprimanded. Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 345, 126 L.Ed.2d 310 (1993). Once such a showing is made, a municipality may be liable for its custom irrespective of whether official policy-makers had actual knowledge of the practice at issue. Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1444. 3 15 The Navarros claim that the County carried out a policy and practice of not treating 911 requests for assistance relating to domestic violence as emergency calls. The Navarros rely primarily on the deposition of Helen Pena, the 911 dispatcher who answered Maria Navarro's call. In her deposition, Helen Pena testified that it was the practice of the Sheriff's Department not to classify domestic violence 911 calls as Code 2 or emergency procedure calls. See Deposition of Helen Pena (5-13-93) at 32-33. 4 Ms. Pena also testified that dispatchers were not instructed to treat domestic violence calls as emergencies, that there were no clearly delineated guidelines for responding to domestic violence calls, and that as such, the dispatchers were allowed to exercise unbridled discretion. Id. at 40-42. 16 The County points out that Helen Pena testified that there was no written policy or procedure that precluded dispatchers from sending a patrol car to the scene of an impending domestic violence crime, nor any policy or procedure that accorded domestic violence 911 calls less priority than non-domestic violence calls. However, this testimony does not contradict Ms. Pena's admission that it was the practice of the Sheriff's Department not to classify domestic violence calls as an emergency. Because there was no conclusive evidence that the Sheriff's Department has a policy of refusing to send a squad car to non-domestic crimes not yet in progress, or of only treating crimes in progress as emergencies, a practice of not treating domestic crimes as emergencies may have been the cause of the failure to send a squad car to assist Navarro. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1206, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (stating that Sec. 1983 liability only attaches if the municipal practice actually caused the constitutional violation). The fact that dispatchers readily send patrol cars to crimes in progress regardless of their domestic or non-domestic nature also does not refute Ms. Pena's testimony regarding the general practice of the Department not to treat domestic violence calls as an emergency. Finally, the County's defense that the discretion to send a patrol car rests with each dispatcher is not dispositive of the question whether the dispatchers in practice fail to respond to domestic violence calls unless a crime is in progress. 17 Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) provides that in opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleadings, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. The Navarros have satisfied this requirement. Ms. Pena's testimony that dispatchers in practice treat domestic violence calls differently from non-domestic violence calls, if proved, could establish the County's liability under Monell. We must view the Navarro's evidence in the light most favorable to them, the nonmoving party, Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130; thus, the district court erred in concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the County had a policy or custom of not classifying domestic violence calls as an emergency. 18