Opinion ID: 2457130
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Attorney as witness and advocate

Text: The physicians, in a position adopted by Calcitek, AMI, and St. Joseph's, allege that the trial court erred in allowing one of the attorneys representing the class, Charles Hicks, to testify and act as advocate at the July 7, 1994, class certification hearing. During this proceeding, Mr. Hicks took the witness stand and testified under oath while his associate, Mr. Porter, asked questions of him on direct examination. As the physicians assert in their brief, Mr. Hicks testified as to the characteristics of Orthoblock, commented on what medical X-rays showed, summarized the anecdotal complaints of his clients, described medical tools allegedly used to insert the Orthoblocks, offered his opinion on the expected length of trial and the adequacy of potential compensation, and concluded that there was no question this is a mass injury situation. It was also through Mr. Hick's testimony that all of the appellees' exhibits were introduced. While Mr. Hicks was undoubtedly the primary witness at the hearing, Betty Zearley and Herman Zearley also offered testimony. The physicians objected to Mr. Hicks's testimony at the July 7, 1994, hearing, and again a post-hearing motion to reconsider and to disqualify him as counsel, both of which were overruled by the trial court. On appeal, Mr. Hicks asserts that he merely assisted the trial court with an analysis and evaluation of the proof, and was not actually a witness in the case. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7 provides as follows: A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where: (1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client. The general rule is clear and unmistakable. A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness. The reasoning underlying the general rule is to prevent prejudice and a conflict of interest. The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties. Conversely, a witness is to tell the truth without loyalty to either party and without regard to which side his testimony might favor. Combining the dissimilar roles of attorney and witness can prejudice the opposing party and can involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and his client. The court of appeals has written that: There are several reasons for the general rule. First, because of interest or the appearance of interest in the outcome of the trial, the advocate who testifies at trial may be subject to impeachment and the evidentiary effect of his testimony will be weakened, thus harming his client. Second, opposing counsel may be handicapped in cross-examining and arguing the credibility of trial counsel who also acts as a witness. Third, an advocate who becomes a witness may be in the unseemly position of arguing his own credibility. Fourth, the roles of advocate and witness are inconsistent and should not be assumed by one individual. Last, the attorney should not act as both trial counsel and a material witness because of the appearance of impropriety. Ford v. State, 4 Ark.App. 135, 139, 628 S.W.2d 340, 342 (1982) (footnotes omitted). Our case law is equally clear. In Enzor v. State, 262 Ark. 545, 559 S.W.2d 148 (1977), in interpreting an earlier version of the same rule, we wrote: The Arkansas Reports are replete with cases where this Court has registered its disapproval of an attorney testifying in an action in which he is an advocate. See: Canal Insurance Company v. Hall, 259 Ark. 797, 536 S.W.2d 702 (1976); Watson v. Alford, 255 Ark. 911, 503 S.W.2d 897 (1974). In this action, one of the appellant's attorneys testified in behalf of appellant. We must again take this opportunity to reiterate strongly our disapproval of an attorney testifying in an action in which he is an advocate. An attorney who is to testify in an action should withdraw from the litigation. On the other hand, if an attorney is going to serve as an advocate for his client, he should refrain from testifying in the action. Id. at 551, 559 S.W.2d at 151. Other cases where we have made similar statements include the following: Purtle v. McAdams, 317 Ark. 499, 879 S.W.2d 401 (1994); Burnette v. Morgan, 303 Ark. 150, 794 S.W.2d 145 (1990); Bishop v. Linkway Stores, Inc., 280 Ark. 106, 655 S.W.2d 426 (1983); Boling v. Gibson, 266 Ark. 310, 584 S.W.2d 14 (1979); Jones v. Hardesty, 261 Ark. 716, 551 S.W.2d 543 (1977); Canal Ins. Co. v. Hall, 259 Ark. 797, 536 S.W.2d 702 (1976); Dingledine v. Dingledine, 258 Ark. 204, 523 S.W.2d 189 (1975); McWilliams v. Tinder, 256 Ark. 994, 511 S.W.2d 480 (1974); Watson v. Alford, 255 Ark. 911, 503 S.W.2d 897 (1974); Montgomery v. First Nat'l Bank of Newport, 246 Ark. 502, 439 S.W.2d 299 (1969); Old American Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 244 Ark. 709, 427 S.W.2d 23 (1968); Rushton v. First Nat'l Bank of Magnolia, 244 Ark. 503, 426 S.W.2d 378 (1968). The exceptions to the general rule are equally clear. They are: (1) A lawyer can testify if the testimony relates solely to an uncontested matter; (2) A lawyer can testify to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case by the lawyer or his firm to the client; (3) A lawyer can testify if refusal would work a substantial hardship on the client because of the distinctive value of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in the particular case. Not one of the three exceptions is applicable to the case before us. These three exceptions are the only ones provided by the rule. It is a settled rule of construction that when certain exceptions are specified in a rule, all others are excluded. The Latin maxim is expressio unius est exclusio alterius. In the case before us, the trial court allowed Mr. Hicks's testimony on the basis that he had testified in a hearing on dealing with a procedural consideration by the court. Accordingly, the appellees ask us to agree that because the class certification was procedural, Mr. Hicks did not act as an advocate at trial, and, as such, the general rule prohibiting an attorney from testifying is not applicable. In rejecting the appellees' argument, we recognize that there is no exception that allows an attorney to testify about the propriety of a class certification in a contested case, and note that the creation of such an exception would not be a legitimate construction of the rule. An attorney in our system of jurisprudence is to serve as an advocate and is to have complete loyalty, within the bounds of the law, to his client. The attorney so acted at the certification hearing. He testified on direct examination about the characteristics of Orthoblock; testified about what medical x-rays showed; summarized the anecdotal complaints of his clients; testified to the foundation for introduction of exhibits; testified about the medical tools used in the procedure; an even testified that there was no question this is a mass injury situation. The beginning of his cross-examination is abstracted as follows: I am the plaintiff's counsel on the record on all pleadings in these 80 cases. Mr. Porter, who's been asking me questions [on direct] is employed by my law firm ... I have a financial interest in all of this litigation ... that I'm testifying to as a witness. At this very moment I am testifying strictly as to factual issues and not acting as advocate. I did not renounce my contingency fee before I took that stand ... As I've testified and put my credibility as issue from that witness stand, I have still maintained an attorney/client relationship with the 80-something different litigants in the lawsuits. (Emphasis added.) The issue was whether a class should be certified. The issue was fully, even bitterly, contested by all parties at the hearing. The record of the certification hearing contains ten volumes. The appeal to this court of the certification ruling contains one abstract, and eight briefs. Mr. Hicks engaged in full and complete advocacy, representing his known clients with all of his considerable ability. Aside from his clients' interests, he had something very close to a personal interest. He not only sought class certification, he also sought the identity of all possible clients who might become members of the class, as he asked for, and obtained, an order requiring the appellants to disclose the names, addresses, telephone numbers, and social security numbers of over three hundred other patients who had this same procedure so that they would become members of this lawsuit. The witness was advocating a class action with all of his ability. Under these circumstances, we hold that it was error to permit Mr. Hicks to testify and act as advocate in the same proceeding. In declaring that this ruling was in error, we acknowledge the trial judge's finding that he would have certified the class in the absence of Mr. Hicks's testimony. That being the case, we must now examine the remaining evidence to determine whether the trial court erred in certifying the class.