Opinion ID: 71035
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of Factors to this Case

Text: 28 With these principles in mind, we turn to the evidence in this case. Although we initially consider the factors separately, we ultimately weigh them collectively and qualitatively to determine whether the pickers, notwithstanding any employment relationship with the contractor, 11 were economically dependent on, and therefore jointly employed by, the growers under the FLSA and AWPA.
29 The first indicator of joint employment status concerns the nature and degree of [the growers'] control of the workers. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(4)(ii)(A). Such control arises when a grower determines, for example, the number of workers hired for a job, when work should begin on a particular day, which workers should be assigned to specific tasks, and whether a worker should be disciplined or retained. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 441. As noted earlier, the suffer or permit to work/economic dependence standard defines employment in a way that does not depend on the common-law understanding of employment, which was based on limiting concepts of control. See id. at 439. Nevertheless, a grower's control of farmworkers does shed some light on economic dependence. 30 The evidence indicates that the growers exercised control over the farmworkers in several ways. First, the growers told Turke how many farmworkers to bring each day. 12 Second, the growers' foremen, rather than Turke, determined the precise moment when picking would commence each day. Third, the growers were free to directly delay or stop the workers from continuing their work. For example, when new immigration laws that required increased worker documentation went into effect, the growers stopped the harvest to verify that Turke and his workers were in compliance with the laws, and they did not allow work to resume until Turke demonstrated their compliance the following day. 13 Finally, the growers had the ability indirectly to assign work to specific workers. During the 1986-87 season, for example, they moved the pickers from one row to another and from one plot to another by assigning their own tomato-picking crews to pick plots and rows that were being picked by the farmworkers. Compare Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at 237-38 (finding that farmer exercised a degree of apparent on-the-job control over workers by tell[ing] the crewleaders at what hour to begin work) with Aimable, 20 F.3d at 440-41 (concluding that contractor had absolute, unfettered, and sole control over farmworkers).
31 The second factor bearing on joint-employment status is the degree of supervision [by the grower], direct or indirect, of the work. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(4)(ii)(B). Somewhat similar to the previous factor, such supervision includes overseeing the pickers' work and providing direction. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 441. This factor, like the growers' control over the workers, has more to do with common-law employment concepts of control than with economic dependence. Indeed, the suffer or permit to work standard was developed in large part to assign responsibility to businesses which did not directly supervise the activities of putative employees. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 728 & n. 7, 67 S.Ct. at 1476 & n. 7; Sheffield FarmsSlawson-Decker Co., 121 N.E. at 476. Nevertheless, a grower's supervision of farmworkers, like a grower's control of them, provides some guidance to our inquiry. 32 In considering this factor, special aspects of agricultural employment [must] be kept in mind. House Report at 4554. When unskilled labor is utilized in an agricultural setting, for example, the grower is not expected to look over the shoulder of each farmworker every hour of every day. Thus, [i]t is well settled that supervision is present whether orders are communicated directly to the laborer or indirectly through the contractor. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 441 (citing Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at 238). 33 In this case the evidence reflects that the growers supervised the pickers in substantial ways. In addition to telling them when picking could begin and distributing the boxes, the growers' field workers directly oversaw and intervened in the pickers' work, both directly and indirectly, on a daily basis. Turke testified to the growers' oversight and direct intervention as follows: 34 Q. And what would these D & S Farms people do? 35 A. They would walk around and make sure the baskets were full, make sure the quality control was there, no trash in the baskets. If there was a problem, they'd bring it to our attention. 36 Q. Did you ever see the D & S Farms employees talk directly to the workers or try to show them what they were doing wrong? 37 A. Yes. Yes. 38 Q. Did that happen very often? 39 A. Day to day. They couldn't hardly be out there without it. 40 Turke also testified that the growers would complain to him that the job was not going fast enough. 41 We find this supervision more substantial than the infrequent assertions of minimal oversight by the grower in Aimable, 20 F.3d at 441, where the grower's employees, except on rare occasions, left supervision and oversight of [the farmworkers] entirely to [the contractor] and his crew and rarely provided any direction to [the farmworkers'] work, id. In contrast to this de minimis supervision, id., the growers in the present case oversaw and directly intervened in the pickers' work on a daily basis. See Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at 238 (finding joint employment where farmer's field supervisors regularly gave instructions to crew leaders who passed them on to workers); Haywood v. Barnes, 109 F.R.D. 568, 590 (E.D.N.C.1986) (finding joint employment based in part on regular supervision). 42
43 The third indicator of joint employment is the growers' right, directly or indirectly, to hire, fire, or modify the employment conditions of the workers. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(4)(ii)(D). In this case, the evidence indicates that the growers had the power to veto Turke's hiring decisions and to modify employment conditions such as the hours the pickers worked. For example, the growers themselves monitored the workers' job qualifications rather than relying on Turke to do so when they stopped work until they could verify compliance with the new immigration laws. 44 Additionally, as discussed above, the growers dictated the workers' hours, a condition of employment, by deciding when the work was to begin, by forcing the pickers to stop picking when prices were bad, and, during the '86-'87 season, by sending their own tomato-picking crews into fields assigned to the farmworkers, causing them to run out of work by noon. Compare Aimable, 20 F.3d at 442 (finding no dependence where grower never dictated hours employees could work) with Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at 237 (finding dependence where business decided daily starting times). 45
46 The next factor is the degree to which the putative employer has the [p]ower to determine the pay rates or the methods of payments of the workers, 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(4)(ii)(C). In this case, Turke and the growers agreed to the payment of $3.90 per box. However, pay rate refers not only to the amount of compensation to be paid, but includes benefits such as worker's compensation insurance and social security, as well as how these various payments are allocated. Method of payment refers to the basis upon which a worker is paid, for example, by the hour or by the piece. See Aimable, 20 F.3d at 442; Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at 238. 47 The growers' power to exercise some control over the workers' pay in this case is evidenced by their deduction of money from their payments to Turke. First, rather than paying Turke the full $3.90 per box of beans harvested, they deducted 11cents per box to purchase worker's compensation insurance, decided which insurance to buy, and named themselves as the policy holders. Thus, Turke did not solely and independently establish wage rates and other benefits for the workers. Indeed, Turke could not purchase insurance to cover the workers because he lacked the economic wherewithal; in his own words, [he] didn't have the money to fork up for workman's comp right then and there. Thus, the farmworkers were dependent on the growers to obtain financial compensation for job-related injuries. See Fahs, 166 F.2d at 42 (finding dependence where employee covered by business' worker's compensation insurance); Hamilton v. Shell Oil Co., 215 So.2d 21, 22 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968) (holding that relationship of employer-employee is essential to liability for workmen's compensation benefits); cf. Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at 236 (finding dependence where business deducted social security payments from check given to crew leader). 48 The evidence shows that the growers also deducted money from the negotiated box price to cover social security taxes, giving Turke a separate check for the employer and employees' shares of these taxes. The growers segregated the payments to ensure that Turke properly reported and paid the taxes on the farmworkers' labor. Cf. Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at 236 (observing that crew leader was totally incapable of seeing that social security [wa]s paid in behalf of the harvesting crews). Like the deduction for worker's compensation insurance, the growers' segregation of the social security payments limited Turke's freedom to allocate the money he received for his services. And just as the workers depended on the growers for worker's compensation coverage, they relied on them to see that the social security payments were made as well. Cf. id. (stating that [t]he fact that [the business] ... handled the social security contributions for the harvest workers also tend[s] to indicate an employment relationship). 14 49
50 The next factor, which in this case is interrelated to the determination of pay rates, is the putative employer's involvement in the [p]reparation of payroll and the payment of wages to the workers. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(4)(ii)(E). This factor is probative of joint employment because of the likelihood that when a business undertakes to help an independent contractor prepare its payroll and pay its wages, it is likely that the contractor lacks economic substance on which the workers can solely depend. 51 Here, as noted earlier, the growers computed and segregated social security taxes and purchased worker's compensation to cover the workers. These actions certainly do not demonstrate that Turke was a truly independent employer. On the contrary, they indicate another way in which the farmworkers were economically dependent on the growers. See Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at 236 (finding dependence where contractors totally incapable of seeing that social security is paid in behalf of the harvesting crews). 52
53 The first non-regulatory factor indicative of an employment relationship in this case is the putative employer's ownership of the facilities where the work occurred. See Aimable, 20 F.3d at 444; see also Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730, 67 S.Ct. at 1477; Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at 238. This element is probative of joint-employment status for the obvious reason that without the land, the worker might not have work, and because a business that owns or controls the worksite will likely be able to prevent labor law violations, even if it delegates hiring and supervisory responsibilities to labor contractors, see Gulf King Shrimp Co. v. Wirtz, 407 F.2d 508, 513-14 (5th Cir.1969). We need not dwell on this factor because there is no question that the growers owned the land where all the work was performed. 54
55 Another non-regulatory indicator of an employment relationship between workers and a grower is the workers' performance of a line-job integral to the harvesting and production of salable vegetables. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 444. This factor is probative of joint employment because a worker who performs a routine task that is a normal and integral phase of the grower's production is likely to be dependent on the grower's overall production process. See Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730, 67 S.Ct. at 1477; Fahs, 166 F.2d at 43-44. 56 The evidence in this case indicates that the pickers performed a routine line-job integral to the growers' business of growing, harvesting and packing snap beans for fresh market sale. Turke and his crew were but one part of an integrated economic unit operated by the growers. Because the farmworkers performed a routine task that was a normal and integral part of the growers' bean production process, they were analogous to employees working at a particular position on a larger production line. They were dependent on the growers' overall production process, of which they were one small but indispensable part. See Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 729-30, 67 S.Ct. at 1476-77; Fahs, 166 F.2d at 43-44.
57 Finally, one must consider the relative degree of investment in equipment and facilities by the independent contractor on the one hand, and the putative employer on the other. See Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730, 67 S.Ct. at 1477; Ricketts v. Vann, 32 F.3d 71, 74 (4th Cir.1994). This factor is probative because of the workers' economic dependence on the person who supplies the equipment or facilities. 15 58 In this case the growers owned virtually all the equipment and facilities used by the farmworkers: the picking boxes, the lids and wire used to close them, the pallets on which the boxes were placed, and the trucks used to transport the boxes to the packinghouse. Unlike the contractor in Aimable, who made significant investments in equipment and facilities, including trucks, tools and a labor camp, Aimable, 20 F.3d at 443, Turke had no equipment or vehicles of his own. Thus, his role was more like that of the contractor in Rutherford Food Corp., who provided no equipment and had no real business organization. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 731, 67 S.Ct. at 1477. Just as the workers in Rutherford Food Corp. could not realistically depend on their crew leaders for other work if the slaughterhouse shut down, id., the farmworkers here could not depend on Turke alone for their economic livelihood.
59 When we consider the preceding factors collectively and qualitatively, we conclude that the evidence before the district court indicated that the farmworkers were jointly employed by Turke and the growers under the AWPA and the FLSA. To be sure, many aspects of the relationship demonstrate that the pickers were economically dependent on Turke. Turke hired and assigned pickers to particular fields; he directly supervised their work; he negotiated the price per box; he fired and disciplined workers; and he paid the workers' wages. At the same time, however, significant aspects of the relationship evidence the pickers' economic dependence on the growers as well. The growers exercised a measure of control in terms of the numbers of pickers needed and the specific hours of work. They exercised a measure of supervision and directly intervened in their work process. They involved themselves in the payroll process and in making provision for social security and workers compensation insurance when the labor contractor was too financially unstable to do so. The growers owned the facilities and controlled the overall production scheme in which the pickers performed an integral line job; and the growers, unlike Turke, had substantial investment in equipment and facilities that were necessary for the pickers' work. 60 The totality of the evidence before the district court at summary judgment demonstrates the economic dependence of the pickers on both Turke and the growers. Such joint economic dependence was expressly contemplated by Congress when it adopted the joint employer doctrine as the best means to ensure that the remedial purposes of the AWPA would be fulfilled. Thus, the district court erred in concluding that the farmworkers were not employees of the growers for purposes of the FLSA and the AWPA.