Opinion ID: 779335
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Famousness

Text: 52 Aside from establishing the identity or near identity of the marks, a party alleging dilution must satisfactorily prove that (1) its mark is famous; (2) the defendant is making commercial use of the mark in commerce; (3) the defendant's use began after the plaintiff's mark became famous; and (4) the defendant's use presents a likelihood of dilution of the distinctive value of the mark. Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 874. 8 As we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could not find TREK famous in any relevant market segment, we need not proceed beyond the first prong of this inquiry. 53 (1) General Principles: The federal anti-dilution statute limits protection to the owners of a famous mark. § 1125(c)(1). To help determin[e] whether a mark is distinctive and famous, the statute, in keeping with trademark law's apparent penchant for flexible eight-factor tests, lists eight non-exclusive factors a court may consider. 9 § 1125(c)(1). The only case in this circuit to explicate the famousness requirement, Avery Dennison, stressed that fame in the dilution context must be very narrow: Dilution is a cause of action invented and reserved for a select class of marks — those marks with such powerful consumer associations that even non-competing uses can impinge their value. 189 F.3d at 875. As a result, to meet the famousness element of protection under the dilution statutes a mark must be truly prominent and renowned. Id. (quoting I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 46 (1st Cir.1998) (internal quotations omitted)). 54 This limitation on dilution protection created by the narrow definition of famousness, like the identical or nearly identical requirement already discussed, is critical. Antidilution is the most potent form of trademark protection and has the potential of over-protecting trademarks. Id. Further, the concept of dilution is more abstract than the concept of trademark infringement, which is anchored by the likelihood of confusion standard. 10 Absent strict policing of the famousness requirement, neither participants in the commercial market-place nor courts are likely to apply dilution statutes in a predictable fashion. It is one thing to determine whether consumers are likely to transfer associations evoked by a truly famous mark to an unrelated product; we can say with some certainty that nearly anyone in the civilized world buying a product titled Coca-Cola will associate that product with the soft drink, its packaging, and its advertisements. It is quite another to determine whether a less well known mark will evoke such associations. With respect to less well known marks, inquiries into consumers' mindsets become fuzzier, as likely associations become more dependent on individual backgrounds and experiences. 55 (2) Fame in a Niche Market: Despite its repeated admonition that only truly prominent and renowned marks deserve protection under § 1125(c)(1), Avery Dennison held that marks famous in only a limited geographic area or a specialized market segment can be famous for the purposes of the federal anti-dilution statute. 189 F.3d at 877 (fame in a localized trading area may meet the famousness requirement as may fame in a specialized market segment when the diluting uses are directed narrowly at the same market segment) (internal quotations and citations omitted). We are bound by Avery Dennison to accept and apply the niche fame concept, despite its apparent tension with Avery Dennison's overall message cautioning restraint in applying dilution protections. 56 Niche fame protection is, however, limited. The statute protects a mark only when a mark is famous within a niche market and the alleged diluter uses the mark within that niche. Id. 57 Applying that concept here, we conclude, first, that a reasonable fact-finder could find that Trek and Thane operate in the same narrow market segment. Id. Avery Dennison indicated that a company providing integrated customer care to telephone and Internet customers operates in the same market segment as a company that provides engineering and installation services to the telecommunications industry. Id. at 878 (citing Teletech Customer Care Mgmt. Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F.Supp. 1407, 1409-10 (C.D.Cal. 1997)). Similarly, a factfinder could conclude that stationary exercise bicycle manufacturers and stationary elliptical trainer manufacturers share the same market segment. 11 58 A reasonable factfinder could not, however, conclude that mobile bicycles and elliptical orbit machines operate in the same narrow market segment for purposes of the niche fame concept, although both products can be used for exercise. To maintain coherence, the niche fame concept must focus on highly specialized market segments with an identifiable customer base. Where those conditions obtain, participants are likely to make associations between marks that the general public will not make. As the market segments in which the senior and junior products operate become less specialized and less unitary, the notion that participants in those diverse markets will necessarily recognize and form mental associations with an established mark becomes increasingly questionable. 59 In this case, the smallest market segment that bicycles and elliptical orbit machines could be said to share is the sporting goods market. This is a widely diverse market that encompasses everything from football helmets to ice skates. There is no reason why participants in this broad market will have any particular knowledge about products in submarkets in which they do not participate. 60 Although a factfinder could conclude that stationary exercise bicycle manufacturers and stationary elliptical trainer manufacturers share the same market segment, it could not reasonably find that TREK is a famous mark in that niche market segment, as opposed to in the market segment frequented by bicycle enthusiasts. One of the eight statutory factors for adjudging famousness is the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods and services with which the mark is used. § 1125(c)(1)(B). Trek stationary bicycles were sold for a fairly short time. If not extinct at the time OrbiTrek began selling its elliptical exercise machines, they were at least a threatened species. 61 Any future plans Trek may have had to reenter the stationary exercise machine market is not pertinent to the famousness inquiry. The federal statute applies only if the junior use begins after the mark has become famous. § 1125(c)(1). Therefore, any fame Trek may acquire for its mark in the future in the stationary exercise machine market could not preclude OrbiTrek from using its mark in that market. 62 Where famousness is the question, the extent and duration of the use of a mark within a particular market segment will often be dispositive. No matter the degree of distinctiveness, § 1125(c)(1)(A), the geographic reach of the mark in the pertinent market segment, § 1125(c)(1)(D), the extent to which third parties use similar marks, § 11225(c)(1)(G), or the registration status of the mark, § 1125(c)(1)(H), a mark that is not widely associated with a particular product within a particular niche market is almost surely not famous in that market. The focus of the antidilution statute is on preventing junior users from appropriating or distorting the goodwill and positive associations that a famous mark has developed over the years. Where there has been no successful, long-term development of goodwill with respect to particular markets, asserting fame within that specialized market is simply inconsistent with the purpose of the antidilution protection. 12 63 Trek, it is true, primarily sells bicycles and bicycle accessories, and the evidence is more than sufficient to allow a trier of fact to find that TREK is a famous mark within the narrow market segment devoted to non-stationary bicycle production and sales. But there is no reason to expect that the typical purchaser of stationary exercise machines — particularly those who buy their exercise machines as a result of seeing television infomercials — buys bicycles or bicycle-related products, reads bicycle magazines or watches bicycle competitions on television, any more than any-body else does. That the mark TREK is famous with bicycle enthusiasts is therefore of little pertinence in gauging the fame of the mark in the market segment occupied by Thane, the junior user. 64 (3) Fame Outside a Niche Market: Finally, we consider whether TREK is famous outside any specialized market. While the antidilution statute can protect marks under the niche fame concept from dilution within their specialized markets, the main thrust of the statute is to provide select marks with broad anti-appropriation protection both within and beyond their specialized markets. Such protection is both more potent and more difficult to obtain than niche fame protection. It is more potent because, with important exceptions, § 1125(c)(4), the statute prohibits the use of its mark by any business, regardless of its industry or location. And it is more difficult to obtain because a finding of fame within only a specialized market is not sufficient for protection outside the niche fame context. 65 The statute does not indicate just how famous a mark must be in order to benefit from the anti-dilution statute's general protection. § 1125(c); TCPIP, 244 F.3d at 98. As the Second Circuit has observed, the word `famous' is susceptible to widely different understandings, including some that would deem a mark famous even if only a small fraction of the population has heard of it. TCPIP, 244 F.3d at 98-99. If § 1125(c) provided protection to marks that were famous under these broader understandings, the statute would have a crippling effect on the marketing of products, as more and more marks would be off limits for use in any market. 66 Because some limitation on what qualifies as famous is necessary and because the statutory language provides no guidance in shaping this limitation, Congress likely passed § 1125(c) counting on courts to understand the legislature's intentions and to interpret the word or phrase in a sensible manner to carry out those intentions. TCPIP, 244 F.3d at 99. To conduct this task we turn to a consideration of the statute's purposes, as expressed in its legislative history. 67 The legislative history does not contain an express statement regarding how famous a mark must be to merit protection, but it does provide lengthy explanations into the statute's purposes. These purposes provide significant insight into the famousness threshold Congress intended. 68 Congress passed the anti-dilution measure seeking to protect unauthorized users of famous marks from attempt[ing] to trade upon the goodwill and established renown of such marks, regardless of whether such use causes a likelihood of confusion about the product's origin. H.R.Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995) reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030. The legislative history speaks of protecting those marks that have an aura and explains that the harm from dilution occurs when the unauthorized use of a famous mark reduces the public's perception that the mark signifies something unique, singular, or particular. Id.; S.Rep. No. 100-515, at 7 (1988). For example, such harm occurs in the hypothetical cases of DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin, and KODAK pianos, according to the legislative history. Id. 69 It is clear, then, that for the harm envisioned by Congress to occur, a mark must have achieved enough fame that someone operating a business in a completely different industry than the mark owner could reasonably believe that the mark possesses goodwill from which he could benefit. Congress' hypothetical piano manufacturer can free ride on the aura imbued in KODAK only because potential piano buyers have positive associations with that mark. These potential piano purchasers have warm feelings for KODAK not because the piano and photography industries have any particular overlap — they do not — but because KODAK has achieved fame throughout the population at large. Because the general public, and not just those with special knowledge about photography, perceive KODAK as unique, businesses in all industries may be tempted to trade on KODAK's name. 70 Thus, only marks that have achieved fame among the general consuming public, as opposed to a more particularized segment of the public, are susceptible to the kind of out-of-market free riding that Congress sought to prevent in passing the antidilution statute. Marks that have not achieved such fame are not susceptible to this free riding outside their own narrow market segment. If a piano manufacturer selects the mark of a photography business little known by the general public but well known to photographers, the piano firm will not benefit much from the goodwill associated with that mark, given the small number of professional photographers in the world. Most of the piano firm's potential customers will not have heard of the mark and will thus have no preconceived perception that the mark symbolizes something unique, singular, or particular. 71 In short, for purposes of § 1125(c), a mark usually will achieve broad-based fame only if a large portion of the general consuming public recognizes that mark. Put another way, as a district court recently did, the mark must be a household name. A.B.C. Carpet Co., Inc. v. Naeini, 2002 WL 100604, at  5 (E.D.N.Y.2002); see also McNeil Consumer Brands, Inc. v. U.S. Dentek Corp., 116 F.Supp.2d 604, 608 (E.D.Penn.2000). This understanding is suggested by Avery, which limited the possibility of demonstrating fame to a select class of marks, i.e., those that are truly prominent and renowned, in order not to upset the balance in favor of over-protecting trademarks, at the expense of potential non-infringing uses. 189 F.3d at 875. Further, the Avery court chided Avery Dennison for not providing evidence showing that customers in general have any brand association with Avery Dennison's marks. Id. at 879 (emphasis added). 72 In many cases, the list of famousness factors contained in the statute can be quite useful in assisting a fact-finder to determine whether a mark is famous. § 1125(c)(1)(A) to (H). But the party seeking protection must initially make at least a minimal showing of the requisite level of fame. In this case, Trek has presented no evidence that its TREK mark has achieved fame among the general consuming public, as opposed to simply among bicycle enthusiasts. 73 The closest Trek has come to demonstrating this type of fame has been to produce evidence showing that the champion bicycle racer Lance Armstrong has often been pictured with a Trek bicycle in prominent displays, such as the front page of large circulation newspapers and on Wheaties boxes. 13 This incidental appearance of a Trek bicycle does not by itself constitute evidence that the bicycle brand is famous. Many products receive broad incidental media coverage. Such promotion does not lead to the conclusion that their trademarks have become a part of the collective national consciousness. On the other hand, surveys showing that a large percentage of the general public recognizes the brand, press accounts about the popularity of the brand, or pop-culture references involving the brand would provide evidence of fame. 14 TCPIP, 244 F.3d at 99; see also Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903 (noting that the commercial success of the Barbie Girl song establishes the fame of the Barbie mark.) 74 Because TREK has produced no evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could find that TREK is famous among members of the general consuming public, we conclude that, for reasons different from those given by the district court, Trek's dilution cause of action cannot succeed. Summary judgment was properly granted to OrbiTrek on that cause of action.