Opinion ID: 836508
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: VOIR DIRE (Assignments 1-11)

Text: Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of eleven separate defense motions to exclude potential jurors for cause. The motions raised primarily two types of objections: (1) that the challenged juror exhibited such extreme views in favor of the death penalty that he or she would be unable to consider mitigating evidence as required by law; and (2) that the challenged juror had independent knowledge of witnesses or events that would preclude him or her from giving fair and unbiased consideration to the evidence. As to each juror, the trial court concluded that there was insufficient evidence of actual bias and denied defendant's motions. Defendant contends that those rulings violated his right to trial by an impartial jury, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, [2] and his right to due process, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Of the eleven voir dire rulings that are assigned as error, three pertain to jurors who actually served on the jury that heard and decided defendant's case. The other challenged rulings pertain to venirepersons who did not serve on the jury, because defendant ultimately removed them through the use of peremptory challenges. The state asserts that we need not consider the second group of challenges, because the venirepersons at issue did not serve on the jury. Consequently, the state argues, any error in refusing to exclude them for cause was harmless. Defendant responds that the trial court's refusal to dismiss the eight jurors for cause was prejudicial, because it forced him to use peremptory challenges that he could have used to exclude other jurors who were objectionable to him, who did remain on the jury. [3] It may be true that, if one or more of the eight venirepersons had been removed for cause, defendant would have used his peremptory challenges differently and, as a result, would have been tried by a jury with a different membership. However, neither the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution nor Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, confers on a defendant a right to exclusive control over the composition of the trial jury. Instead, the Sixth Amendment and Article I, section 11, guarantee the impartiality of the jury that sits on the case. State v. Douglas, 310 Or. 438, 441-42, 800 P.2d 288 (1990). [4] That is not to say that peremptory challenges have no role in ensuring an impartial jury. Indeed, peremptory challenges exist for the very purpose of achieving that goal. But such challenges have no constitutional significance in and of themselves, and the fact that a defendant is forced to use them to achieve an impartial jury does not offend the right to a fair trial. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80, 90 (1988) (so holding under Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments). Defendant also argues, without further explanation, that the rulings respecting the eight venirepersons who did not serve offend the Due Process Clause. Defendant does not cite authority for that suggestion and does not identify any constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property that is affected by a trial court ruling on a venireperson who ultimately does not serve. In the context of defendant's argument as a whole, we understand his contention to be that, although perhaps harmless when taken individually, the challenged rulings, when viewed together and in the context of the voir dire proceedings as a whole, show that the trial court was engaged in an unfair pattern of denying defendant's valid for cause challenges. The effect of that pattern of rulings, defendant appears to argue, was to force defendant to exhaust his allotted peremptory challenges, thereby effectively skewing the jury selection process in favor of the state. Assuming that to be defendant's argument, we find no evidence in the voir dire record of a pattern of decisions that could serve as a basis for a claim of a due process violation. Although the trial judge required substantial evidence of bias, or hardship, before disqualifying a potential juror for cause, and generally accepted potential jurors' assertions that they could set aside personal feelings for purposes of the trial, the judge evaluated the potential jurors evenhandedly, applying the same standard to all potential jurors. Absent any showing that the trial judge employed a double standard when considering for cause challenges, we find defendant's claim of procedural unfairness unpersuasive. We conclude that any error in failing to exclude a potential juror who did not serve on the jury cannot be grounds for reversal. Therefore we do not address defendant's assignments of error respecting those potential jurors. Three of defendant's voir dire challengesthose pertaining to Hinds, Toppel, and Cutler, are not of that variety. Those three persons actually served as jurors in defendant's case. With respect to those challenges, we begin by setting out the relevant law. ORCP 57 D(1)(g) governs challenges to potential jurors for cause that are based on claims of actual bias. See ORS 136.210(1) (so stating); see also State v. Nefstad, 309 Or. 523, 527-28, 789 P.2d 1326 (1990) (so noting). That rule provides that challenges for cause may be taken for: [a]ctual bias[, which] is the existence of a state of mind on the part of a juror that satisfies the court, in the exercise of sound discretion, that the juror cannot try the issue impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging the juror.    A challenge for actual bias may be taken for the cause mentioned in this paragraph, but on the trial of such challenge, although it should appear that the juror challenged has formed or expressed opinion upon the merits of the cause from what the juror may have heard or read, such opinion shall not of itself be sufficient to sustain the challenge, but the court must be satisfied, from all the circumstances, that the juror cannot disregard such opinion and try the issue impartially. (Emphasis added.) In deciding whether a juror should be excluded for actual bias, the fact that he or she has preconceived ideas about a matter relevant to the case is not determinative. Rather, the test is whether the prospective juror's ideas or opinions would impair substantially his or her performance of the duties of a juror to decide the case fairly and impartially on the evidence presented in court. State v. Montez, 309 Or. 564, 574, 789 P.2d 1352 (1990) ( Montez I ); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-52, (1985) (to the same effect). The question whether a juror is biased is one of fact, to be determined by the trial court from all the circumstances, including the challenged juror's demeanor, apparent intelligence, and candor. Montez I, 309 Or. at 574-75, 789 P.2d 1352. Trial court discretionary decisions on such challenges are entitled to deference and will not be disturbed except for abuse of discretion. See Nefstad, 309 Or. at 528-29, 789 P.2d 1326 (so holding and citing cases). 1. Juror Hinds Defendant contends that juror Hinds' views in favor of the death penalty were extreme and that she automatically would vote for the death penalty in any aggravated murder case. Defendant correctly notes that a person who automatically votes for the death penalty in cases of aggravated murder does not perform the person's duty as a juror to consider mitigating evidence. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729-36, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492, 502-07 (1992) (stating proposition). He points to the following voir dire exchange: Q [Defense Attorney]: Are you of the opinion that everybody who commits that kind of aggravated murder like Ted Bundy should be put to death? A [Hinds]: I believe, when you get a personality type such as Ted Bundy's, there is virtually no chance for rehabilitation. I believe, yes, they should be executed. I don't believe the American public should have to support them. They serve no constructive good for society. Q: Do you understand what I mean by aggravated murder? I mean something that is intentional and aggravating factor that's done with it like in the course of committing another crime. A: Yes. Q: Can you think of any situation, intentional murder that has those kinds of aggravating circumstances, can you think of any situation where the death penalty is not appropriate? A: Not really.         Q: The 4th question is simply should the defendant receive a sentence of death. I want to ask it this way. If you get to this point in trial, as a juror, you would have already found a person guilty of intentional aggravated murder. You'd have already found that the person acted deliberately. Already found that there was no provocation, and you would have already found that there was a probability that that person would commit acts of violence in the future. With all that as background, is there any situation in which you could sentence or respond no to the question should a defendant receive a sentence of death? A: I can't think of any? Q: So, in every situation where those facts were in existence, you would answer yes to that question? A: Yes, I would. Q: Would it matter to you if the defendant there had a terrible childhood, had been abused, and neglected, and mistreated? A: There is a lot of people who have that that don't go out and do these things. Q: So that would not mitigate against the death penalty, if all those other things were answered yes? A: No. Q: What about the age of the person, what if there were someone who were 18, or 19, or 55, or 60 or 65, that wouldn't matter to you either? A: No, it wouldn't.      Q: What if you were instructed by the judge to consider age, emotional pressure, things of that nature? A: I would follow what the judge would tell me to do even though I might not agree with it. Q: How can you follow that if you just told me that you would vote yes in every instance to that question? A: Well, if the court dictates that you're supposed to do something, you know, they told me I was supposed to be here today, I'm here, you know.    Q: Is it one of those situations where you consider it and then vote yes? A: I would probably, if the judge said we need to consider it, I would probably try to weigh the severity of it, okay? I mean, how bad was it? Q: What would you do with that information? You just said you can't imagine voting anything but yes to that 4th question. A: I know. I can't, you know. It would be extremely difficult for me because it would be something that is against everything I believe. Defendant also highlights the following exchange: Q [Defense Attorney]: Part of [your] belief system is that you resent, just quoting from you questionnaire, `resent supporting violent offenders that are of no use to society?' A [Hinds]: That's right. Q: With that as part of you belief system, how can you ever answer no to question 4? A: Like I said, I don't know that I could. Q. Given what you've just told me, what do you think about life without the possibility of parole? A. I've thought about that a lot, Okay. I guess in an aggravated murder case such as the definition you just gave me, I guess I ask why?    I mean, why should this person continue in a situation where    any kind of local tax dollars go on supporting that guy, you know, or gal, or whoever it may be? It makes no sense to me. Q: Is that another reason to vote for the death penalty in every case of intentional, aggravated murder? A: Yeah   . The state acknowledges that juror Hinds expressed a strong personal bias in favor of the death penalty, but contends that the trial court's refusal to exclude her was within the bounds of its discretion. The state notes that most of the foregoing exchange involved a discussion about Hinds' personal beliefs, not about the law and how she would apply it. The state also notes that Hinds expressed a complete willingness to follow the court's instructions, even when doing so was contrary to her deeply felt beliefs. Defendant responds that Hinds' professed willingness to follow instructions was contradicted by her other comments during voir dire and, as such, should be deemed insufficient to counteract the clear and inflexible bias that her voir dire testimony revealed. Defendant also contends that the court's refusal to exclude Hinds for cause was part of a larger attempt to rehabilitate aggressively and unfairly jurors who, for all intents and purposes, automatically would vote for the death penalty. Defendant contends that, whether taken individually or viewed more broadly, the trial court's decision vis-a-vis Hinds amounted to an abuse of discretion. Under ORCP 57 D(1)(g), actual bias does not arise out of the mere fact that the challenged juror holds certain views, but out of the fact that those views are likely to impair the juror's performance of his or her duties. Hinds' statements that she would follow the law, even when it ran counter to her own beliefs, was relevant to that inquiry. The fact that those statements may have been contradicted by other statements that she made might diminish their value to some degree. See Lambert v. Srs. of St. Joseph, 277 Or. 223, 230-31, 560 P.2d 262 (1977) (mere statement by juror that he will be fair and impartial becomes less meaningful in light of other testimony and facts that suggest probability of bias). However, it is in situations in which a potential juror's answers are contradictory or unclear that the trial court's discretion most meaningfully may come into play. The trial court has the opportunity to observe the challenged juror and may develop a sense about the juror's probable future behavior. Its observations may enable the trial court to make sense of seemingly contradictory statements. As such, even when a juror's statements that support a trial court's ruling on a challenge for bias are equivocal, there is good reason for applying our usual standard of review, i.e., abuse of discretion. Defendant suggests that Nefstad, 309 Or. at 523, 789 P.2d 1326, is to the contrary. We disagree. In Nefstad, the court concluded that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding a potential juror for cause. The juror had expressed general objections to the death penalty but also had stated that he would be able to set aside that view and vote for the death penalty in appropriate circumstances. The trial court granted the state's motion to exclude the juror for cause. We affirmed that ruling, noting that the juror's statements about his ability to separate his opinions from the facts were equivocal. Id. at 537-38, 789 P.2d 1326. Defendant suggests that, because juror Hinds' statements to the same effect also were equivocal, she likewise should have been excluded for cause. That argument misses the point in Nefstad. The court affirmed the trial court in that case, not because the juror's statements were equivocal, but because the trial judge had an opportunity to observe him while he offered those equivocal responses and, therefore, to determine which of his seemingly contradictory expressions was the best reflection of the juror's true state of mind. Ibid. Applying that same principle hereas we mustthe outcome is clear. There is evidence in the record, even when considered in light of other, contradictory evidence, to support the trial court's conclusion that Hinds could serve as a fair and impartial juror. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's challenge. We already have discussed defendant's contention that a series of erroneous denials of challenges for cause skewed the composition of the jury in favor of the state. We rejected that contention in the due process context, because it was not supported by the record. We reject it here for the same reason. The trial court's repeated denials of defendant's for cause challenges is not, in itself, evidence of an inequitable pattern. Absent a showing that the trial court treated the prosecution's for cause challenges differently, there is no basis for finding an abuse of discretion in this respect. 2. Juror Toppel Defendant contends that juror Toppel should have been excluded for cause, because he made statements during voir dire that revealed actual bias. Toppel stated that, in filling out the preliminary juror questionnaire, he had failed to mention that his wife had been raped when she was a teenagera crime that he knew to be relevant to the case being tried. When questioned about how his feelings about that rape might affect his ability to try the case fairly, he denied emphatically that it would have any effect in the guilt phase. However, with respect to the penalty phase, his answer was more equivocal: Q [Prosecuting Attorney]: I imagine it gets a little more difficult or a little more complicated when you get to the penalty phase in terms of assessing, you know, what he's done and so forth. But, again, are you willing to, I guess keep it in perspective of, you know, kind of take yourself out of [] you have had some experiences, your wife has had, and you are aware of it [] and keep it in a perspective that you can be fair and impartial to anyone who hasit's the same type of impartiality to anyone that you believe has committed a crime of this severity. Kind of long-winded question. A [Toppel]: That one is harder. While I think I can sit here and say it philosophically, yes. I am not sure emotionally I can say that. Q: At the risk oflet me back up a step. Can you follow the court's instruct[ions] that direct you what evidence you should consider and so forth in a case like this. A: I think so. Later, when asked a similar question by the defense attorney, juror Toppel again was equivocal: A: [Toppel]: I don't know if I can answer that until the time. I can try, but I don't honestly know.      Q: Rape is a very emotional issue. A: Correct. Q: And we need people who can sort of, I mean, I know you can't guarantee anything in life, but we need people that come as close as possible, that they're not going to be overtaken by emotion and they can give us their best to be fair and impartial and not have that impeded by anything in their circumstances. A: I'm trying to figure out how I can help you here. Maybe a percentage would be, I don't know, 50/50, 60/40, I don't know. Mentally I believe I can do it. I just don't know. The trial court acknowledged that Toppel was a hard call but, ultimately, concluded that he could serve as a juror: In my evaluation of his answers what he's saying is that he can't promise something because he's not been there before, but its the kind of thing that he does, for instance, he mentioned he just recently fired someone [a] much lower level decision, but it is a decisionand he's, quite frankly, he's generally a very insightful, introspective, almost, I don't want to say sensitive, but he is. Actually I think he's a good defense juror, quite frankly    And I'm going to find that it is much more likely than not that he won't be affected. And if he is, he'll be able to deal with that appropriately and still follow[ ] my instructions. Although Toppel repeatedly acknowledged the possibility that his emotions about his wife's experiences might affect his ability to judge the case fairly and impartially, he also stated that he would try to be fair and that he believed that he could be fair. The trial judge, who watched the entire voir dire exchange, obviously was impressed with Toppel's thoughtful demeanor, believed that Toppel would recognize when his emotions were getting the better of him, and would be able to deal with that appropriately. Taking Toppel's voir dire statements as a whole, and giving due weight to the opinion of the trial judge (who was able to observe Toppel's general demeanor), we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to excuse juror Toppel for cause. See Montez I, 309 Or. at 592-93, 789 P.2d 1352 (trial court did not err in refusing to excuse for cause juror who made similar equivocal statements about ability to set aside personal feelings and degree of likelihood that he could be fair). 3. Juror Cutler Defendant contends that juror Cutler should have been removed for cause, because she had been acquainted with Coolidge, a state witness. Defendant contends that, although Cutler had denied that her past relationship with Coolidge would have any effect on her ability to judge the case fairly, that relationship inevitably would have an effect on her, because Coolidge was a critical, emotional witness. Coolidge was scheduled to appear in the penalty phase to testify to the fact that defendant had broken into her home and sexually assaulted her. The trial court found that Cutler would not be affected by her previous relationship with Coolidge. There is ample evidence in the record, other than Cutler's own statements, to support that conclusion: Coolidge had been a customer of Cutler's at a previous job, the relationship had existed in the far past, had not been renewed in the intervening 35 years, and was a business relationship, not a close friendship. The trial court did not abuse its discretion, and therefore did not err, in denying defendant's motion to exclude juror Cutler for cause.