Opinion ID: 2194743
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clarity of the Verdict Form

Text: At the conclusion of trial, Dr. Townsend and Ms. Donaldson both submitted suggested verdict forms, each of which contained a set of special interrogatories. Over Dr. Townsend's objection, the trial court chose the verdict form proposed by Ms. Donaldson. Dr. Townsend argues that it leaves unanswered the question of whether each of the violations of the standard of care found by the jury was a proximate cause of Ms. Donaldson's injuries. A description of the jury form is necessary to an understanding of this argument. The three-page form began with a General Verdict section. This section, in relevant part, asked the jury whether Dr. Townsend breached the standard of care in his treatment of Ms. Donaldson, and the jury answered, Yes. It then asked whether the breach was a proximate cause of her injury, and the jury again answered, Yes. Based upon the two Yes answers, reflecting that the jury had found a breach and causation, the form then instructed the jury to proceed to fill in the amount of damages, if any, it was awarding to Ms. Donaldson. The jury wrote in its award of $3,578,488.98. The second section, entitled Special Interrogatories, was a series of six questions requiring a Yes or No answer concerning whether Dr. Townsend had breached the standard of care with respect to (a) puncturing the uterus on January 8, 2000, (b) failing to inspect the monopolar cautery equipment [the probe] on January 8, 2000, (c) failing to appropriately inspect the bowel on January 8, 2000, (d) failing to recommend a CT Scan on January 11, 2000, or January 12, 2000, (e) failing to hospitalize Kimberly Donaldson earlier than January 13, 2000, and (f) failing to obtain a consult with another physician earlier than January 13, 2000. The jury found that Dr. Townsend had breached the standard of care with respect to four of the six special interrogatories: inspection of the bowel, failing to recommend a CT Scan, failing to hospitalize the plaintiff earlier than January 13, 2000, and failing to consult with another physician earlier than January 13, 2000. Dr. Townsend argues that this verdict form was insufficient. We are compelled to agree. The General Verdict portion of the form inquired whether or not Dr. Townsend had breached the applicable standard of care and whether that breach was a proximate cause of injury to Ms. Donaldson. The special interrogatories asked only whether Dr. Townsend had violated the standard of care as to each theory. While the jury found four separate breaches of the standard of care, we have no way of knowing which ones (or one) the jury found to be a proximate cause of injury in the absence of a verdict form that specifically tells us. See District of Columbia v. White, 442 A.2d 159, 165 (D.C. 1982); see also Hubbard v. Chidel, 790 A.2d 558, 567 (D.C.2002). In other words, the jury's Yes answer in response to the general interrogatory about whether or not the jury had found proximate cause does not establish that the jury found proximate cause with respect to each of the four breaches of the standard of care. [8] Thus, as we explain, Ms. Donaldson is in the same position as the appellant in White. In that case, the plaintiff sued the District of Columbia under the Wrongful Death Act [9] alleging, in relevant part, that the decedent's death resulted from a Metropolitan Police Department detective's negligent use of excessive force. White, supra, 442 A.2d at 161. The trial court submitted two theories of liability to the jury: (1) that the District was negligent in training the detective, and (2) that the District was vicariously liable for the detective's negligence. Id. at 165. We found that there had been insufficient evidence presented upon which to submit the negligent training issue to the jury, and that this undermined the validity of the jury finding. In remanding for a new trial, the court explained: [W]e do not know whether the verdict rests on a permissible or impermissible theory of liability. Where there are several theories of liability, one of which is impermissible, and the court cannot determine on which theory of liability the jury relied when finding in favor of the appellant, leaving open the possibility that it may have relied on the impermissible one, the case must be remanded for retrial. Id. at 165 (quoting Murphy v. United States, 209 U.S.App.D.C. 382, 391, 653 F.2d 637, 646 (1981)); see also Hubbard, supra, 790 A.2d at 567. Since we do not know which of the breaches of the standard of care the jury concluded proximately caused the harm to Ms. Donaldson, we must reverse unless all of the theories would be permissible. Ms. Donaldson argues that there is no ambiguity in the verdict form because the trial judge properly instructed the jury that, to be entitled to their verdict, Ms. Donaldson had to prove, (1) What is the standard of skill and care that reasonably competent professionals follow when acting under the same or similar circumstances; (2) That the defendant . . . did not follow that standard of skill and care; and (3) That by not following that standard of skill and care, the defendant's . . . conduct was a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff. Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 9-3 (2002 ed. rev.) Hence, Ms. Donaldson urges, without the conduct being a proximate cause of injury, there could be no breach of the standard of care. Ms. Donaldson's position is not supported by the plain language of Jury Instruction 9-3, listing three separate elements necessary for a finding of liability. See also Psychiatric Inst. of Washington v. Allen, 509 A.2d 619, 623-24 (D.C.1986) (In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff must prove . . . that there was an applicable standard of care, that the defendant breached that standard, and that the breach was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. ) (emphasis added). Nothing in the instruction given by the trial court would foreclose the jury from finding that the appellant had breached the four standards of care indicated, but that not all of the breaches were a proximate cause of her injuries. Therefore, in this case, the jury may have found a breach on four of the theories submitted to it, but found proximate causation on as few as one. For the forgoing reasons, we hold that the verdict form employed by the trial court is insufficient to show which of the breaches of the standard of care the jury found proximately caused the harm to Ms. Donaldson. Thus, under White, should we conclude that there was even one theory of liability submitted to the jury for which there was insufficient evidence, the verdict in this case must be set aside. We begin by addressing Dr. Townsend's arguments that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Bechamp's standard of care testimony and then examine if there was sufficient properly-admitted evidence on each theory of liability to support the verdict. White, supra, at 442 A.2d at 165. [10]