Opinion ID: 2576429
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: police report

Text: ¶13 Finally, Weaver argues that the trial court erred by refusing to admit into evidence the police report containing Esprit's statements. The standard for reviewing a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence turns on whether the ruling was one determining the facts to which the law will be applied [or one] applying the law to determined facts. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.11 (Utah 1993). Since the parties do not dispute the content of the police report, the issue of whether the trial court correctly refused to admit the report is a question of law, which we review for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991). However, before any review can be undertaken the issue must be preserved in the proceedings below. ¶14 The police report containing Esprit's statements was clearly hearsay under rule 801(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, and as such it was not admissible as evidence in the trial unless it satisfied the requirements of an exception to the hearsay rule. See Utah R. Evid. 801(c) (defining hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted); id. 802 (providing that hearsay is not admissible unless certain specified exceptions apply). At trial, Weaver argued that the report was admissible under the statement against interest exception, claiming that both the declarant, Esprit, and the reporting police officer were unavailable to testify and that the statements were contrary to Esprit's interests. See id. 804(a), (b)(3). The trial court correctly held however that Esprit's statements did not in fact expose him to possible criminal liability and were self-serving and exculpatory in that they provided reason to exonerate him. ¶15 Weaver now argues on appeal that the report was admissible under the exceptions for business and public records set forth in rule 803(6) and (8) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Weaver notes that this court has held that police reports of crimes should ordinarily be admitted when offered by the defendant in a criminal case to support his defense. State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181, 1185 (Utah 1983). However, in the present case, Weaver did not raise rule 803(6) or (8) as a basis for admitting the report in the trial court, nor did he argue plain error in his opening brief. Thus, as explained below, the claim regarding the business records and public records exceptions is unpreserved and procedurally barred. ¶16 In general, a timely and specific objection must be made [in the trial court] in order to preserve an issue for appeal. State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ¶ 45, __ P.3d ___ (citing Utah R. Evid. 103(a)); see also State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994). The principle underlying this rule is that the trial court, as the court of first impression, must have an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it before appellate review is appropriate. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989); see also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346. ¶17 Weaver concedes that he did not specify rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence as a basis for admitting the police report into evidence, but he maintains that he communicated the legal precept by arguing that the police report should be admitted as evidence in place of testimony by the interviewing police officer who wrote the report because it was part of the investigations of [a] police report. However, the record indicates that the discussion regarding the absence of the reporting police officer occurred solely in connection with defendant's argument on the statement against interest exception. Because Weaver did not distinctly or specifically allege rule 803, or the business and public records exceptions as a basis for admitting the police report, we hold that he did not preserve this claim for review on appeal. ¶18 In Utah, we have recognized three instances in which an appellate court may address an issue for the first time on appeal: (1) where the appellant establishes that the trial court committed plain error; (2) where exceptional circumstances exist; or (3) in some situations, where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised on appeal. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, ¶ 21 n.2, 61 P.3d 1062; State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In the present case, Weaver argued neither exceptional circumstances nor ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, our determination of whether to consider the issue on appeal, in spite of Weaver's failure to assert it in the lower court, rests on whether Weaver adequately alleged plain error on appeal. ¶19 Weaver claims in his reply brief that he should be allowed to raise the applicability of the business and public records exceptions on appeal because the trial court plainly erred in excluding the report. However, this court has required the party seeking appellate review on issues not brought before the lower court to articulate the justification for review in the party's opening brief. See Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, ¶ 9, 17 P.3d 1122; see also Pinder, 2005 UT 15 at ¶ 45. In Coleman, we held that we will not consider matters raised for the first time in the reply brief, and thus we declined to review the issues in question because of the failure to properly raise [the] issues in the trial court and thereby preserve them for appellate review, and because [appellant] argued plain error. . . for the first time in his reply brief. 2000 UT 98 at ¶ 9. Similarly, Weaver's claim in the present case is procedurally barred because he failed to argue plain error in his opening brief.