Opinion ID: 760895
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court Properly Applied the Daubert Framework

Text: 13 Hall contends that the district court believed it had no discretion to allow expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identifications. For this reason, Hall submits the district court excluded Dr. Wells' testimony without properly testing the proffer under the framework set forth in Daubert. Relying heavily on our decision in Hall I, Hall argues that the district court failed to make the requisite preliminary findings as to the reliability and helpfulness of Dr. Wells' testimony as required by Daubert and the law of this Circuit. 14 In Hall I, we reversed Hall's earlier conviction on the basis that the district court did not apply the proper Daubert framework in evaluating Hall's proffer of an expert on false confessions. Hall, 93 F.3d at 1346. In reaching that conclusion, we stated that [t]he judge never mentioned Daubert specifically, and thus he never focused on the individual questions that must be answered. The only thing that is clear is his conclusion that the testimony would not assist the jury in its task. Id. at 1342. As a result, we concluded [t]he district court's failure to test the [expert] proffers under [the Daubert] framework may have led to the exclusion of critical testimony for Hall. Id. at 1346. Therefore, we reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. In this case, however, our review of the record indicates the district court adhered to the framework set forth in Daubert in reaching its decision to exclude Dr. Wells' testimony. 15 As an initial matter, the record plainly reveals that the district court recognized the applicability of Daubert to the task at hand. At the hearing conducted by the district court, the Daubert standard was discussed at length. 2 Furthermore, it is equally evident from the record that the court recognized that Daubert required it to determine whether the proffered testimony was scientifically valid and whether such testimony would assist the trier of fact. 16 With respect to the first prong under Daubert, the district court correctly noted that the scientific theories underlying Dr. Wells' testimony must be found to be scientifically valid in order for his testimony to be admissible as scientific knowledge under Rule 702. However, because the government challenged Dr. Wells' testimony solely on the basis that it would not assist the trier of fact--the second prong of Daubert--the district court assumed, as do we, that the proposed testimony qualified as scientific knowledge under Daubert and Rule 702. 3 Because the district court presumed the scientific reliability of Dr. Wells' testimony, a claim that the court failed to conduct a proper inquiry under the first prong of Daubert and Rule 702 cannot form a basis for reversing Hall's conviction in this case. 4 17 The district court recognized that this Court's presumption against admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identifications stemmed from our concerns about whether such expert testimony would actually assist the trier of fact, rather than about its reliability. For this reason, the district court focused its attention primarily on the second inquiry under Daubert. The record reveals that the court properly inquired as to how Dr. Wells' testimony would assist the trier of fact in understanding the eyewitness evidence in this case. When counsel for Hall proceeded to present Dr. Wells' qualifications in response to the district court's inquiry, the court interrupted stating, [c]ounsel you're not addressing the issue that concerns me. If you want me to rule in your favor, I'm not concerned about whether or not the scientific basis for Dr. Wells' theories are reliable. Rather, the district court sought to inquire about the proposed fit between Dr. Wells' testimony and the eyewitness identifications in this case. A colloquy ensued between the district court and counsel for Hall regarding the specifics of Dr. Wells' testimony and its proposed relation to the eyewitness identifications. For example, counsel for Hall stated that Dr. Wells would testify regarding the correlation between a witness's confidence in making an identification and the resulting reliability of that identification. In response, the court asked, [w]ho is the eyewitness that he is going to relate? What's the fit between that testimony and our case? Counsel then was provided with the opportunity to explain what he perceived to be the fit between Dr. Wells' testimony and the eyewitness identifications in this case. Thus, it is clear that the district court considered the second inquiry under Daubert--whether Dr. Wells' testimony would assist the trier of fact to understand the eyewitness identification evidence. 18 In summary, our review of the record indicates that the court made proper use of the framework established by Daubert in arriving at its decision to exclude Dr. Wells' testimony. The district court explicitly referenced the Daubert decision and addressed the two threshold inquiries regarding the reliability of the expert testimony and whether such testimony would assist the trier of fact in this case. Therefore, we turn to whether the district court abused its discretion in precluding Dr. Wells' testimony. 19