Opinion ID: 1186269
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alaska Statute 09.10.120 Governs the City's Unfair Trade Practices Claim.

Text: We next consider whether the statute of limitations for public entities, AS 09.10.120, or the statute of limitations for the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act [10] (Act), AS 45.50.531(f), [11] applies to a municipality's claim under the Act. The City argues that section .120 applies to all actions brought by a municipal corporation, and relies on Alascom, Inc. v. North Slope Borough, Bd. of Equalization, 659 P.2d 1175 (Alaska 1983). Amoco replies that AS 09.10.120 is the general statute of limitations for municipal corporations, but that AS 45.50.531(f) is the controlling statute when a claim is made under the Act. It construes Alascom to mean only that section .120 trumps other limitations statutes contained in AS 09.10. In Alascom we applied the limitations period in section .120 rather than AS 09.10.070(a)(3). [12] Alascom, 659 P.2d at 1179. Section .120 was enacted by the legislature in 1962. Id. The Act, however, was passed in 1970. See ch. 246, § 2, SLA 1970. As a general rule, `It is assumed that whenever the legislature enacts a provision, it has in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, and all should be construed together.' Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 788 (Alaska 1996) (quoting Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pacific, 585 P.2d 870, 877 (Alaska 1978)). The Act, however, fails to define the term persons in its limitations provision. See AS 45.50.531(f). Absent a definition expressly including municipal corporations or other public entities, we assume the legislature did not intend when it passed the Act to adopt a limitations period for municipal corporations different than that specifically applicable to claims of public entities. Moreover, Alascom provides guidance. We there held that section .120 applied in a property tax dispute, based on our review of the prior statute of limitations. 659 P.2d at 1179. The prior statute did not prescribe a special limitations period for political subdivisions, but rather prescribed the same limitations periods applicable to private parties. Id. We concluded that the 1962 amendment [section .120] evinces a legislative intent that a general six-year statute of limitations applies when a borough pursues a claim, regardless of the nature of the claim. Id. Amoco also claims that the more specific and recent statute of limitations should control. Section .120 is the older statute, and Amoco argues that it is the more general statute. Amoco quotes from In re Estate of Hutchinson, 577 P.2d 1074 (Alaska 1978): It is an established principle of statutory construction that all sections of an act are to be construed together so that all have meaning and no section conflicts with another. Further, where one section deals with a subject in general terms and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized, if possible; but if there is a conflict, the specific section will control over the general. Id. at 1075. Here, as the City argues, it is not clear which statute is more specific. Section .120 applies to a specific party, a political subdivision, and AS 45.50.531(f) pertains to a specific cause of action. If section .120 governs a city's unfair trade practice claims, AS 45.50.531(f) will not become void or insignificant. See, e.g., Journey v. State, 895 P.2d 955, 958-59 (Alaska 1995) (holding that principles of statutory interpretation militate against a meaningless reading of a statute); Homer Elec. Ass'n v. Towsley, 841 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Alaska 1992) (stating that statutes should be construed so that no part will be inoperative or insignificant). The two-year limitations period in AS 45.50.531(f) will continue to apply to plaintiffs other than political subdivisions. A final consideration supports our choice. If two limitations statutes may reasonably apply, preference is given to the longer limitations period. See Lee Houston & Assocs., Ltd. v. Racine, 806 P.2d 848, 855 (Alaska 1991) ([D]oubts as to which of two statutes is applicable in a given case should be resolved in favor of applying the statute containing the longer limitations period.). A similar preference is expressed in AS 09.10.010. [13] That statute permits commencement of an action even after expiration of a period prescribed in AS 09.10 if a different period is prescribed elsewhere. Section .010 does not apply here, however, because AS 09.10 contains the longer limitation, and the shorter is found elsewhere. Our preference for the longer does not conflict with AS 09.10.010, contrary to Amoco's argument otherwise.