Opinion ID: 1922393
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mitigating Circumstances Rejected by the Trial Court

Text: Bevel argues that the trial court erred in concluding that certain mitigators were not proven. Bevel argues, as he did in his sentencing memorandum, that he proved the existence of thirteen mitigating circumstances. [7] However, the trial court found that several mitigating circumstances were not proven by a preponderance of the evidence, including: (1) the age of the defendant at the time of the crime (statutory mitigator); (2) the defendant can be a good inmate in prison, does well in structured environments, and could be rehabilitated; (3) he felt remorse for his actions to the point of being suicidal; and (4) he was abused as a child. Because competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings, we conclude that the trial court did not err in rejecting these mitigating circumstances. First, the trial court determined that the age of the defendant statutory mitigator was not proven. In its order, the trial court extensively discussed the penalty-phase testimony of Dr. Krop and Dr. Riebsame, the two psychologists who evaluated Bevel. Although Dr. Krop indicated that Bevel had a low IQ, the court acknowledged that Dr. Riebsame believed his IQ to be much higher and that Bevel even appeared to be exaggerating his difficulties. The trial court noted that [b]oth Dr. Krop and Dr. Riebsame agreed that the defendant did not meet the criteria for mental retardation. [8] The trial court reviewed the testimony adduced at trial, the recorded confessions, and the handwritten letters Bevel sent to his girlfriend, and concluded that Bevel was a twenty-two year old man of average intelligence. Additionally, witnesses at trial testified that Bevel could support himself, could live alone without assistance, and was not dependent upon others in leading his life. Furthermore, the trial court stated that Bevel showed criminal sophistication in the commission of and follow-up to these crimes. He obtained a firearm, locked the burglar bar door before he left the house, stole the victim's car, but abandoned it several blocks from Ms. Dumas' home where he would be in hiding, and managed to evade a police dragnet for approximately one month. Again, this [sic] are not the actions of a fourteen year old, nor someone who is emotionally unstable. Based on the record, there is competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's rejection of age as a mitigating circumstance. Second, the trial court found that the mitigating circumstance that Bevel can be a good inmate in prison, does well in structured environments, and could be rehabilitated was also not proven. Although Dr. Krop testified that Bevel could be rehabilitated because he has done well in structured environments, such as jail, he also admitted on cross-examination that Bevel had disciplinary problems in the juvenile programs he attended and behavioral problems in elementary school. As noted by the trial court, Dr. Krop stated that Bevel failed to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeated lying; that he has exhibited aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults; [and] that he displays a reckless disregard for the safety of himself or others. Officer Fisette, the records custodian for the Florida Department of Corrections, testified that Bevel has received two disciplinary reports since he has been incarcerated for being in an unauthorized area and disregarding an order to stop running laps in the indoor area. Furthermore, Bevel was incarcerated after being convicted of attempted robbery and then committed these murders less than a year after his release. Accordingly, the trial court's rejection of this mitigating circumstance is supported by competent, substantial evidence. Third, the trial court found that Bevel failed to prove that he was remorseful to the point of suicide. As noted by the trial court, the only evidence that he was suicidal was the fact that he held a rifle to his chin in the car with Dumas just moments after committing the murders. Although this could indicate a moment of suicidal thoughts, the trial court aptly points out that Bevel could have been attempting to influence Dumas's conduct, the moment was short-lived, and his conduct over the next thirty days indicates that he was neither truly remorseful nor suicidal. In fact, when he was speaking to the officers after being arrested and complaining about the suicide watch prison suit that he was being forced to wear, Bevel vehemently denied being suicidal and pleaded with the detectives to take him off suicide watch. Therefore, the trial court's rejection of this mitigating circumstance is also supported by competent, substantial evidence. Fourth, the trial court found that the mitigating circumstance of Bevel's abuse as a child was not proven by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court conceded that Bevel did not have an easy childhood, but concluded that his sister failed to identify any specific instances in which Bevel was abused by his stepfather. However, the sentencing order fails to mention that Bevel's sister testified to an incident where their stepfather, William McKinney, kicked Bevel in the chest and he had to be taken to the hospital because he was having difficulty breathing. Nevertheless, she also admitted that she was very young when the incident occurred and could not remember exactly why they had taken him to the hospital. On the other hand, several of Bevel's other relatives, including his two aunts and his grandmother, testified that he had endured hardship as a child, but that he had positive and loving relationships with his extended family throughout his childhood. The trial court further noted that even [i]f [it] were able to find the defendant was abused by the testimony of Tiandra Bevel, that mitigating circumstance would be assigned little weight, because it was clearly established by the evidence that the defendant had loving, nurturing family members who still support him to this day. Thus, even if the trial court had found the existence of the child abuse mitigator, it would have assigned it little weight. We conclude that there is competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's rejection of childhood abuse as a mitigating circumstance based on the vague and relatively unspecific detail of the testimony adduced at trial. Furthermore, even if the trial court erred in rejecting child abuse as mitigation, the error would be subject to a harmless error analysis. See Bryant v. State, 785 So.2d 422, 436 (Fla.2001). In this case, any abuse that might have been suffered was limited to a single incident. Based on the weakness of this alleged mitigator, the lack of any mental mitigation and the substantial nature of the aggravators, we conclude that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. Hurst v. State, 819 So.2d 689, 699 (Fla.2002) (concluding that trial court's rejection of good family background as mitigating circumstance was harmless given the severity of aggravators).