Opinion ID: 150474
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: The Distribution Formulae

Text: Plaintiffs also challenge the CEP's distribution formulae, which are the formulae that establish the amount of money that participating candidates receive under the CEP. As discussed above, the CEP provides, for general elections, full grant amounts of $85,000 to candidates for the Connecticut Senate and $25,000 to candidates for the Connecticut House. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-705(e)(2), (f)(2). Those amounts are reduced in several circumstances, such as when a participating candidate is unopposed or is opposed by only a minor-party candidate. See id. § 9-705(j). The District Court found that the CEP's grant amountsand corresponding expenditure limitsfor the Connecticut Senate and House races were based on the average expenditures in the most competitive races. Green Party II, 648 F.Supp.2d at 338. The District Court concluded that [p]egging the CEP's grant levels to the most competitive races has burdened minor party candidates' political opportunity because, by providing major party candidates financing in amounts much higher than typical expenditure levels, it slants the political playing field in favor of major party candidates. Id. It is true that the CEP's grant amounts and expenditure limits were based on historic expenditures in competitive districts, but we disagree with the District Court's conclusion that the grant amounts and expenditure limits impose a burden on minor-party candidates that is unfair or unnecessary. Again following Buckley, we examine whether there is evidence that the CEP's distribution formulae have operated to reduce the strength of minor parties below that attained before the CEP was put in place. See 424 U.S. at 98-99, 101, 96 S.Ct. 612; see also Count One, subsection II.A.2, ante. And once again, examining the record, we can find no such evidence. Based on data from the 2008 election, the one election in which the CEP was operative, minor-party candidates as a whole are arguably strongerand certainly no weakerunder the CEP. See Count One, subsection II.A.3, ante. There is, therefore, insufficient evidence in this record to conclude that any part of the CEP-including the distribution formulaeimposes a burden on minor-party candidates that is unfair or unnecessary. The District Court was troubled by the fact that the CEP's distribution formulae provided major-party candidates in uncompetitive districts with more money in public funds than they were able to raise on their own prior to the enactment of the CEP. Green Party II, 648 F.Supp.2d at 339. As a result, the District Court determined that the CEP grants amounted to a subsidy for major-party candidates, rather than merely a substitution for private funds, and the District Court concluded that the CEP's expenditure limits did not represent a true expenditure ceiling, at least for major-party candidates in uncompetitive districts. Id. at 340. The problem with that reasoning is that it assumes that because a candidate did not raise a certain amount of money prior to the CEP that candidate was unable to raise that amount of money. It is far more likely that, before the CEP, candidates in safe districtsespecially those favored to winsimply declined to raise every dollar possible, given that the outcome of the election was virtually certain. It is equally possible that donors were simply not interested in giving their money to a candidate who lacked any real competition at the polls. Indeed, if an election in a historically uncompetitive district were to become suddenly competitiveif, for example, a major-party incumbent were to face a strong challenge from a popular minor-party candidateit is certainly possible that the major-party incumbent would be able to raise far more money than he or she had raised in the previous, uncompetitive elections in that district. We cannot conclude with any certainty, therefore, that the CEP's distribution formulae provide a substantial number of major-party candidates with more money then they were able to raise before the CEP was enacted. Furthermore, in determining that the CEP slants the political playing field in favor of major party candidates, id. at 338, it seems that the District Court was referring only to the political playing field in uncompetitive districts. After all, in competitive districts, the CEP's distribution formulae provide a level of funding that is comparable to historic levels. It is, instead, only in uncompetitive districts that the CEP provid[es] major party candidates financing in amounts much higher than typical expenditure levels. Id. Yet if a district is uncompetitive, it is, by definition, a race in which minor-party candidates have no realistic chance of winning. Thus it is difficult to see how the political opportunity of a minor-party candidate in such a district could be unfairly or unnecessarily burdened by providing his or her opponent with additional funds. Put differently, if a district is truly uncompetitive, a minor-party candidate has no chance of winning, and he or she has very little political opportunity to be burdened. [18] If, however, a district is competitive in the sense that the minor-party candidate has some chance of winning, the CEP's funding levels are accurately calibrated. In any event, the General Assembly's choice in setting the distribution formulae by reference to the historic expenditures in competitive districts strikes us as a reasonable approach. It is undoubtedly difficult to predict when a historically uncompetitive district will unexpectedly become competitivewhen, for example, an incumbent will die or decline to seek reelection; when a popular challenger will enter a race to unseat an incumbent; or when the demographic characteristics of a district will change, making it no longer safe for one party. If the CEP were to make more of an attempt to differentiate between districtsproviding more money in competitive districts and less money in uncompetitive districtsthe CEP would risk providing too little funding to candidates in historically uncompetitive districts that had only recently become competitive. That could undermine public confidence in the outcome of elections, as a candidate who loses in an unexpectedly competitive election could plausibly blame the insufficient CEP funding for his defeat. It could also discourage candidates from participating in the CEP. Rather than accept a diminished CEP grant (with the accompanying expenditure limit), candidates could prefer to avoid participation in the CEP and retain the flexibility of raising so-called competitive amounts of money, lest they be left without sufficient funds if a popular challenger unexpectedly enters the race.
In sum, we acknowledge that, by providing funding comparable to competitive races in every legislative race, the General Assembly painted with a broad brush. But because the alternativemaking fine adjustments based on a district's historic or expected competitivenessis fraught with danger, and because there is insufficient evidence that the CEP's distribution formulae have reduced the strength of minor parties below that attained before the CEP became effective, we cannot conclude that the General Assembly violated the First or Fourteenth Amendments when it chose to treat every district as if it could, in any given election, involve a competitive race. We therefore hold that the District Court erred in concluding that the distribution formulae unconstitutionally discriminate against minor parties and their candidates.