Opinion ID: 1598839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Impeachment by Illegally Obtained Statements

Text: At a Goodchild hearing, see State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1017 (1965), prior to the prosecutor's cross-examination of Kuntz, the circuit court ruled that Kuntz's custodial statement was admissible for impeachment purposes because it satisfied the voluntariness and trustworthiness requirements of Wold v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973). The circuit court did not address whether the police obtained Kuntz's statements in violation of Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, or Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 973 (1981). We proceed, as the court of appeals did in this case, by assuming without deciding that the statements were in violation of Miranda. Kuntz asserts that the presumably illegally obtained statement was used by the prosecution in its cross-examination of him to impeach the testimony of a prosecution witness, Beverly Salmon, and thereby violated his due process rights. Kuntz relies on the Supreme Court's recent decision in James v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 648, 650 (1990), which held that the impeachment exception, which permits the prosecution to introduce illegally obtained evidence to impeach the defendant's own testimony, does not permit illegally obtained evidence to be used to impeach defense witnesses. The defendant argues that the statement contradicts Salmon's testimony that she, and not Kuntz, had suggested going for a ride and taking back roads when they drove to Beloit and Milwaukee on the night of the murder. Kuntz asserts that this statement was crucial to the closing argument made by the prosecutor that the defendant's contact with Salmon demonstrated the defendant's plan to create an alibi, get rid of incriminating evidence, and flee the scene of the crime. The State agrees with Kuntz's characterization of the evidence. The State argues, however, that the statement was admissible under the impeachment exception because James applies only to defense witnesses and not prosecution witnesses. We find that the record does not support the conclusion that the admitted statement impeached Salmon's testimony and, therefore, we do not address the issue of whether the Court's rationale in James applies equally to prosecution witnesses. Nothing in Kuntz's statement to the police, nor in his testimony, can be characterized as disputing Salmon's testimony. On cross-examination of Kuntz, the following exchange took place which is relied upon by Kuntz for his assertion: Q: Do you remember telling Investigatory Meyer during that same interview that when you got to Salmon's house you told her you wanted to take a ride, and that you wanted to take her car and you didn't want to drive; do you remember saying that? A: Yes, I do, that was after I was sitting inside the Car. Salmon had testified earlier, as a prosecution witness, that on the night of the murder, she had returned home at about 10 p.m. to find Kuntz waiting for her in his truck. Salmon testified that she had asked Kuntz to get in her car. The examination then proceeded as follows: Q: What conversation did you have, what did Mr. Kuntz say and what did you say? A: Well, I think I said to him, I said: You're out here, And he said: Yeah, he came out to the house and he was waiting for me to come home because when he was at his place I wasn't at his place. Q: What did you say? A: And I said what  I kind of asked him what he wanted to do, and he wanted to go check on the lottery tickets because they had, you know, the lottery had rolled over a few times. Q: Did you  Before you got to the discussion of the lottery, did you say that you were going to take a drive? A: Mm-hmm (indicating affirmative response). Q: And after that  A: He asked me if I wanted to go for a ride, and I said: Why not. On cross-examination, Salmon testified as follows: Q: Was there anything  And I want to ask you a question. You indicate you took the back roads when you headed to Illinois. Why did you take back roads? A: I didn't know. I just chose to take back roads. Q: Did Harold tell you, listen  A: No, Harold had nothing to do with it. I'm the one that suggested it. I go the back roads many places many times. Q: And when you testified: I'll take you on roads that you have never been on going to Milwaukee, did Harold ask you to take different roads or backwood roads? A: No. When I felt South Beloit, I just said to him, I said: You want to go for a ride, I said: I'll take you on roads you have never been before. [13] As the excerpts of the relevant portions of Kuntz's and Beverly Salmon's testimony indicate, nothing in the illegally obtained statement of the defendant that was admitted contradicts Salmon's testimony or calls into question her credibility. The crucial piece of information concerns who wanted to take a ride. Both Salmon's testimony and the defendant's illegally obtained statement acknowledge that Kuntz suggested they go for a ride. Nor can it be said that Kuntz's illegally obtained statement carried any weight as direct evidence. Kuntz, in his direct testimony, indicated that the first thing he had said to Salmon was, Hi, how about going for a ride and check out the numbers. At most the direct evidence provided by Kuntz's illegally obtained statement was cumulative. Any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.