Opinion ID: 57058
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cornett’s Subjective Complaints of Pain

Text: Cornett also contends that the ALJ gave insufficient weight to his subjective complaints of pain. The ALJ found that Cornett’s allegations regarding his physical limitations were “not totally credible.” Cornett’s challenge to the ALJ’s finding on credibility focuses on what he argues was the ALJ’s improper use of an admission he made below. The admission was that Cornett was convicted of possession of child pornography under federal law in June 1992 and served a five year prison term for the crime. The ALJ’s decision referred to Cornett’s statement that the crime was “victimless,” an assertion that the ALJ described as “a gross misstatement” and a demonstration that Cornett 6 No. 07-40318 had “a disregard for truth and a debased conscience.” Consequently, the ALJ gave “less weight” to his testimony. Cornett refers to this conclusion as his sole reason for arguing that the ALJ revealed an improper bias. The ALJ’s reference to the child pornography matter is preceded by five pages of detailed record analysis, comparing Cornett’s subjective complaints with the diagnoses of medical professionals. The ALJ’s decision sets forth several reasons for attaching diminished weight to Cornett’s assertions, including: (1) Cornett took fewer medications than a person with his alleged level of pain would be expected to take, (2) Cornett did not seek medical treatment at the level one would expect for a person with his alleged symptoms, and (3) inconsistencies between Cornett’s subjective complaints and the results of clinical evaluations.3 Considering the decision in its entirety, it is clear that the ALJ considered both the objective medical evidence and Cornett’s subjective complaints of pain before making an eligibility determination. The decision to credit the medical evidence to a greater extent than Cornett’s subjective complaints was valid. See Loya v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1983). Further, the ALJ did not totally reject Cornett’s subjective complaints; he merely ascribed “less weight” to them. An ALJ’s failure to consider a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain or failure to indicate the basis for his credibility determinations is reversible error. See Scharlow v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 645, 648-49 (5th Cir. 1981). Here, the ALJ referred to the complaints and gave them 3 Cornett claims that he cannot afford additional medications or treatment and, therefore, the ALJ’s consideration of these factors was improper. There is authority that even when medical treatment would remedy a condition, a person unable to afford that treatment may still be considered disabled. Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 59-60 (5th Cir. 1987). But Lovelace is inapplicable because the record does not support that Cornett’s alleged disabilities would be alleviated by regular medical treatment. The ALJ properly gave weight in the credibility determination to Cornett’s minimal efforts to obtain treatment. See Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1024 (5th Cir. 1990) (ALJ was not precluded from relying on lack of treatment as an indication that subjective complaints of pain were not credible where there was no evidence that medical treatment would have alleviated alleged disability). 7 No. 07-40318 some weight. Cornett’s argument that his subjective complaints were not given enough weight is unavailing. See Carrier v. Sullivan, 944 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1991). The ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and we will not reweigh that evidence on appeal. See Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1024 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[A] factfinder’s evaluation of the credibility of subjective complaints is entitled to judicial deference if supported by substantial record evidence.”). Further, there is no basis in the record for Cornett’s claim that the ALJ exhibited a “bias” against him. The ALJ’s remarks do not indicate that he was predisposed to rule against Cornett because of his conviction for possession of child pornography, nor do they reveal an excessive dislike of Cornett. Instead, they disclose a reasoned judgment that Cornett’s claims should be received with some skepticism. See Brown, 192 F.3d at 500 (“‘[J]udicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge’ unless ‘they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). C. Legal Impediments Preclude Cornett from Working Cornett argues that the ALJ erred in finding that he was capable of performing jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy. “If the Secretary fulfills his burden of pointing out potential alternative employment, the burden then shifts back to the claimant to prove that he is unable to perform the alternate work.” Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). This finding was vigorously disputed in Cornett’s initial appeal to the magistrate judge. There, Cornett attacked the vocational testimony offered in support of this finding as unreliable and 8 No. 07-40318 inadequately accounting for his mental limitations. Those arguments were rejected by the magistrate judge. Cornett did not pursue those arguments on appeal to the district court or to this Court. Instead, he now argues that the ALJ failed to consider legal impediments to his ability to perform the jobs of usher, ticket taker, or cashier. He offers two alleged legal impediments to his performance of these jobs, one based on his use of certain prescription medications, the other on his conviction: (1) state and federal law prohibit a person from being under the influence of drugs at the workplace and while driving a vehicle; and (2) Texas state law prohibits sex offenders from working “anywhere children may go or congregate.” Cornett did not present his legal impediments arguments to the magistrate judge and, therefore, is not entitled to raise them on appeal. See Cupit v. Whitney, 28 F.3d 532, 535 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994). Moreover, in making this new argument on appeal, Cornett provided no citation to a particular statute, regulation, ordinance or any other authority. Though we review the briefs of pro se appellants with some relaxation of the usual demands on counseled parties, we do not abandon the insistence that some minimal legal basis for arguments must be offered. Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993). Even a pro se appellant must set forth “the reasons he deserves relief ‘with citation to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on.’” Weaver v. Puckett, 896 F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(4)). Finally, Cornett’s new argument about legal impediments reflects a misunderstanding of the meaning of “disability.” Whether Cornett is capable of performing work which exists in the national economy is determined by reference to vocational factors (such as age, education, and work experience) and his residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a), (g); 416.960(c). A regulation informs a claimant of what does not constitute sufficient proof: 9 No. 07-40318 (c) Inability to obtain work. We will determine that you are not disabled if your residual functional capacity and vocational abilities make it possible for you to do work which exists in the national economy, but you remain unemployed because of –
... (3) The hiring practices of employers; ... (7) You would not actually be hired to do work you could otherwise do. ... 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.966(c). We agree that the proper interpretation of these exclusions is that a “claimant will also be considered not disabled if the claimant is able to do work which exists in the national economy but remains unemployed because of a criminal record.” 3 SOCIAL SECURITY LAW AND PRACTICE § 43:138 (Michael Flaherty and Wendy S. Sigillo eds.,West 2005) (citation omitted). D. Cornett’s Constitutional claims Cornett asserts that the Commissioner violated his right to due process and equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. First, Cornett claims that he was denied a fair hearing. However, he took full advantage of the administrative claims process, was provided with a hearing before an ALJ, and exercised his right to appeal to the district court and this Court. He has not identified any aspect of these proceedings that was constitutionally deficient. Our review of the record reveals that Cornett has been afforded a full and fair opportunity to present his case. His conclusory allegations to the contrary are not availing. See Kinash v. Callahan, 129 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1997). Cornett next claims he was the victim of a “class based animus” exhibited by the ALJ. But he has not offered any evidence that he was treated differently than other Social Security claimants. Cf. Wheeler v. Miller, 168 F.3d 241, 252 10 No. 07-40318 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Generally, to establish an equal protection claim the plaintiff must prove that similarly situated individuals were treated differently.”). Finally, Cornett argues that he was the victim of ineffective assistance of counsel at his hearing before the ALJ. However, this claim does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The Supreme Court has never recognized a constitutional right to counsel in Social Security proceedings. Brandyburg v. Sullivan, 959 F.2d 555, 562 (5th Cir. 1992). Therefore, we reject Cornett’s claim that his due process and equal protection rights were violated. We also reject his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In conclusion, the ALJ’s decision to deny Cornett’s claim for SSI benefits is supported by substantial evidence and comports with relevant legal standards. Accordingly, the order of the district court dismissing Cornett’s complaint is AFFIRMED. 11