Opinion ID: 806386
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District’s Burden of Production

Text: Even if Bucalo were correct that “any rational person would have to find the existence of facts constituting” her prima facie cases for age discrimination and retaliation, Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509, she would still not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the District satisfied its burden of production under the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework. As noted above, a plaintiff’s demonstration of her prima facie case shifts the burden of production to the defendant, who must “‘produc[e] evidence’ that the adverse employment actions were taken ‘for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.’” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254). Both the Supreme Court and our Court have emphasized that, in typical discrimination and retaliation cases, the defendant must articulate its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason with some specificity. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that to satisfy its burden, “the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255; see also id. at 255 n.9 (“An articulation not admitted into 20 evidence will not suffice.”). Likewise, we have held that “[a]n employer’s explanation of its legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons must be ‘clear and specific.’” Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 381 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 997 (2d Cir. 1985)); see also Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2000). In the ordinary discrimination or retaliation case, this requirement of specificity serves “to meet the plaintiff’s prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the [defendant’s] action and to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56. However, in rare cases, such as this one, an employer will be unable, through no fault of its own, to articulate clearly and specifically its legitimate reasons for an adverse employment action.8 In this case, Lanier was the sole District employee who played any role in selecting the four candidates who received interviews for the librarian position. Because of his debilitating illness, which began prior to the initiation of this lawsuit in 2004 and took his life in 2005, the parties were unable to preserve his testimony in admissible form. Accordingly, throughout this litigation, the District’s ability to articulate its reasons for not hiring Bucalo has been severely compromised. 8 We note that none of the Supreme Court’s decisions applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, including Burdine, have involved circumstances similar to those in the present case, in which the defendant was hampered in its ability to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its hiring decision because of the death or unavailability of the relevant decision maker. 21 With such situations in mind, we have suggested that a defendant’s failure to “come[] forward with a non-discriminatory reason” does not compel a jury verdict for the plaintiff if the defendant “furnishes a satisfactory explanation for its inability to tell the reason why plaintiff was disfavored.” Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1335 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Reeves, 530 U.S. 133. We can think of few explanations for a defendant’s inability to articulate its reasons more compelling than the one in this case – the extremely poor health, and eventual death, of the sole decision maker with direct knowledge regarding the employment decision at issue. We have not had occasion since Fisher to discuss what sort of evidence a defendant may rely upon to prove a decision maker’s reasons where clear and specific evidence of those reasons is unavailable. We believe that the district court did not err by permitting the District to rely upon circumstantial evidence – i.e., Bucalo’s resume and the resumes of the other applicants, which were properly admitted as business records – to prove Lanier’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not hiring Bucalo. To hold otherwise under the unusual circumstances of this case would be to adhere to an excessively inflexible version of the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 519 (cautioning that “[t]he McDonnell Douglas methodology was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic” (internal quotation marks omitted)).9 Further, we believe that in the context of this case the resumes were sufficient to 9 Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bucalo’s motion in limine to preclude the use of the resumes as circumstantial evidence. 22 meet the defendant’s burden of production. As the district court noted, “the resumes speak for themselves,” Bucalo, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 282, and a reasonable juror could infer from Bucalo’s resume that Lanier did not select her for an interview in light of her unstable career as an educator, librarian, and one-time real estate agent. Likewise, we agree with the district court that it was not improper “for defense counsel to underscore the patent differences she perceived among the resumes during her summation even if some of those differences” echoed the reasons Lanier presented in his hearsay affidavit. Id.10 As the Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254; see also Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507 (same). Bucalo attempted to shoulder that burden and failed, with a case that, while sufficient to call for trial, was strikingly devoid of direct evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory intent, and relied on weak inferences from the bare facts of age disparity and possible knowledge on the part of the decision maker of her prior charge of discrimination. The jury was entitled to examine the resumes of the candidates to make its own determination of whether they suggested that legitimate or invidious 10 Thus, Bucalo’s argument that the District’s summation “turned to the suppressed Lanier affidavits and spirited through the back door what the District Court had blocked at the front,” Appellant’s Br. at 27, is incorrect. The summation made no reference to Lanier’s death, or to his affidavit, and did not insinuate that counsel for the District had extra-record access to Lanier’s own account of his reasons. Counsel argued only that the reasons could be inferred from the resumes, as she was entitled to do. 23 motives more likely explained the hiring decision. Bucalo may not take advantage of Lanier’s unavailability to claim an automatic victory in a case that the jury found unpersuasive.