Opinion ID: 3216831
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cross-Examination of Cooperating Witnesses

Text: At trial, former members of the FARC testified for the Government. 11 Cuevas learned that these witnesses wore monitoring devices on their ankles both for their own safety and to prevent them from fleeing and illegally remaining in the United States. Cuevas sought to cross-examine the witnesses about the devices on the ground that they revealed potential bias. After consulting with the U.S. Marshal Service, the district court found the anklets were “a security practice used with many witnesses,” and were not being used because the witnesses were “under charges or otherwise untrustworthy.” The court concluded that the devices had “no 11 These witnesses were known as “reinsertados” because they had been reintegrated into civil society through a Colombian government program that grants members of the FARC immunity for past crimes in exchange for cooperation with law enforcement. 44 relevance” to the witnesses’ credibility and that inquiry would “lead into other areas . . . far afield from what is relevant in this trial,” such as the threat Cuevas himself posed to safety of the witnesses. Accordingly, the judge prohibited Cuevas from cross-examining the witnesses about the devices. Cuevas argues the limitation violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Although that Clause guarantees a criminal defendant “the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him,” a district judge has wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on . . . crossexamination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). We review the district court’s limitation of cross-examination for abuse of discretion, with the central inquiry being “whether the jury would have received a significantly different impression of the witness’s credibility had defense counsel been permitted to pursue the [disallowed] line of questioning.” United States v. Wheeler, 753 F.3d 200, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The district court did not abuse its discretion here. Questions about the devices would be of no incremental value to the defendant in this case, and the district court reasonably concluded that such questions would “stray far afield from what [was] relevant in this trial.” The jury was already aware that all the former FARC members who testified were admitted participants in a cocaine trafficking organization; 45 that several had admittedly engaged in guerilla warfare; that some were admitted murderers; and that all had been spared prosecution in return for their cooperation with law enforcement. With all this laid bare, it is highly unlikely that questions about the monitoring devices would have left the jury with a “significantly different impression of the witness’s” propensity to bias or motivation to lie on behalf of the Government. Id.