Opinion ID: 2812639
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis of motion challenged on appeal

Text: Turning to the motion spawning this appeal, Ms. Bergman asked the district court to dismiss the indictment because of matters that occurred before the grand jury; to grant a hearing on the forfeiture count and order the return of property seized by the government, along with interest and attorney fees; and to reconsider its order denying her request for transcripts of the grand jury proceedings to research grounds supporting dismissal of the indictment. See R. doc. 848. Given the government’s ultimate dismissal of all counts against Ms. Bergman, her request for dismissal of the indictment and her objections pertaining to the grand jury proceedings leading to the indictment are obviously moot and we consider them no further. The only potential controversy at this point concerns the return of property seized by the government. In that regard, the district court concluded it had previously rejected Ms. Bergman’s efforts to relitigate such matters (in the decision recounted above) and that such efforts were otherwise untimely. We agree. Before reaching the merits, we must address the government’s contention that Ms. Bergman’s appeal is untimely because she filed it seven days after the fourteen-day deadline for criminal appeals specified in Rule 4(b)(1)(A). As the government acknowledges, this is the same jurisdictional objection this court rejected in Ms. Bergman’s prior appeal on the basis that proceedings seeking the return of property are governed by the sixty-day civil appeal deadline in Rule 4(a)(1)(B)(i). Because she is again seeking such relief (in the only aspect of the appeal that remains a live controversy), we conclude her appeal is timely under the latter rule. 5 Her appeal fails on the merits, however. The primary focus of her briefing is the $30,000 placed in trust for her son pursuant to the agreement under which the government dismissed the forfeiture count. She contends the dismissal of the conspiracy charge, upon which the forfeiture count was contingent, requires a return of the $30,000 to her. In a related vein she also repeats her argument that forfeiture of the $30,000 was a part of her sentence and thus must fall with the dismissal of the substantive criminal counts. Both of these contentions are inapposite for the same reason: the $30,000 was disposed of not as a forfeiture to the government but as a function of the agreement she made to avoid such a forfeiture and ensure that her son would receive the funds. The ultimate dismissal of the charges against her is irrelevant to the effectuation of that agreement, which was not qualified in any way with respect to the disposition of her criminal prosecution. Ms. Bergman also challenges the validity of the agreement itself, alleging it was the product of fraud and duress. She made similar allegations in her first motion for return of property, the denial of which we affirmed on her last appeal, noting that the time to attack the 2008 settlement agreement “has long passed,” Bergman, 550 F. App’x at 655. A fortiori, the repetition of such allegations is untimely now. Finally, Ms. Bergman objects in conclusory fashion to an allegedly wrongful seizure of personal property from her vehicle. As discussed above, we rejected the same objection in her last appeal because it did not state a plausible claim for relief. See id. She provides no basis to justify reviving and revisiting this settled matter. 6