Opinion ID: 1796621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Whether Hull's Rights to a Speedy Trial under Section 99-17-1 of the Mississippi Code, Federal and State Constitutions Were Violated.

Text: Hull was arrested on May 7, 1990. One hundred eighty-two days passed until his arraignment on November 30, 1990. Over two years passed until the time of Hull's trial on February 1, 1993. The trial court found the following: In addition to those dates set forth in Exhibit D-5, the Court thinks there's some additional dates that need to reflect in this record, based on the file in this case. On February the 6th, 1991, the Court had to rule on a defense motion seeking to obtain certain records  medical records of the victim in this cause. The case was set for trial on February the 21st, and the State's motion for continuance was filed February the 13th of 1991, and there may be some overlapping here. The reason given for that continuance was because of the blood work being in progress, that being the same day the State filed it's motion for taking blood and saliva samples. The Court found that that was good cause for continuance as it would have made it virtually impossible to try Jackie Hull for this crime on February the 21st, even had there not been another case that was tried, being the Charles Thomas case, and the Court will take judicial knowledge of the fact that that case took approximately one full week, going into Saturday. On February the 25th, 1991, the Defendant filed a motion for additional discovery. On May 23rd the State requested a continuance because the work done by the State Crime Lab was inconclusive, and the State wished to have DNA testing done by the FBI. The order dated May the 27th found that the samples had been sent to the Crime Lab at Quantico, Virginia, pursuant to the State Crime Lab's request, but would not be completed by the September, 1991, Term, and found good cause for continuance. The Court also in that order acknowledged that that delay could prove exculpatory to the Defendant, depending on the results of the DNA testing. After the DNA testings were furnished to the Defendant on or about July 25th, the Defendant made a motion for additional discovery on August the 2nd. There was a hearing on that motion, and the motion was denied on August the 22nd. On that date there was also a motion for additional discovery made by the Defendant. On September the 3rd, 1991, the Defendant filed several other motions, including a motion to extend the deadline for motions. On September the 9th of 1991, the Defendant filed additional motions, and the affidavit of the Defendant's attorney attached to one of those motions states in part that the investigation is still ongoing and that he had names of additional witnesses which had not been furnished to the State, but would be furnished on request. Then, on September the 27th, 1991, the Defendant filed a motion for continuance from the October 8th setting, because his expert had not had time to investigate and prepare and requested a setting in the February, 1992, term. On January the 6th of 1992, the Defendant filed another motion for additional discovery. The critical date at this juncture is November the 30th, 1990, the date the Defendant was arraigned, and also the date of September the 27th of 1991, being the date of the Defendant's filing of motion for continuance to the February term. Based on the Defendant's calculations in Exhibit D-5, that is three hundred and one days, one hundred and twenty of which were days in which the FBI was analyzing the samples furnished to them. The State of Mississippi has no control over the FBI and could not speed up that testing that the Court determined could have been exculpatory. Deducting a hundred and twenty days from the three hundred and one days, that's a period of one hundred and eighty-one days. Likewise, during that time there were defense motions filed which had to be disposed of, accounting for additional delays which should be charged to the Defendant. The Court finds that any delays chargeable to the State were reasonable and necessary and good cause shown therefor. Therefore, the Court overrules the motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution within the two hundred and seventy day period. This Court has held that post-delay determinations of cause are permissible and, when supported by substantial credible evidence, shall not be overturned. McNeal v. State, 617 So.2d 999, 1007 (Miss. 1993); Folk v. State, 576 So.2d 1243, 1247 (Miss. 1991); McGee v. State, 608 So.2d 1129, 1132 (Miss. 1992). As to one of Hull's main complaints, that the State's investigation was improperly handled, the trial court found there to be good cause shown. The other complaint is that when the trial court issued a subpoena duces tecum against Dr. Acton, the delay in finding and preparing new experts should be chargeable to the State because the subpoena was improperly issued. Hull does not, on appeal, raise the subpoena issue independently of the 270-day motion. Thus, we find that the ruling of the trial court was based on substantial credible evidence and this issue is without merit.