Opinion ID: 2367192
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ex Post Facto and Retroactive Application

Text: The crimes with which appellants de Veau and Wilson are charged occurred before § 1325(a) became effective on July 9, 1982. Thus, they argue that the Statute's application to them violates both the ex post facto clause [12] and the principle of statutory construction against retroactive application. But, as we have held herein, the amendment to § 1325(a) does not impose (or increase) punishment. In addition, the amendment does not make formerly legal conduct a crime, or change the elements of murder or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt. Therefore, there is no ex post facto violation. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977). Appellants' argument that the application of amended § 1325(a) violates the statutory principle against retroactive application is meritless. In order to violate the principle, the amendment would have to deprive appellants of a matured or unconditional right. See Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 720, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2020, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974). Because, as this court noted in Edwards, there is no constitutional right to bail, the amendment does not deprive appellants of any right. Moreover, application of the new bail law can only effect pretrial liberty after its effective date. Therefore, application of the amended statute to appellants does not violate the statutory principle against retroactive application.