Opinion ID: 844229
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Determinate Sentencing Issues

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred under section 654 in imposing multiple enhancements for the use of a single deadly weapon, the stake with which Sigler was beaten and sexually assaulted, imposing sentence on both forcible rape in concert (count 4; § 264.1) and forcible rape (count 5; § 261), imposing sentence on both foreign object penetration in concert (count 6; § 264.1) and foreign object penetration (count 7; § 289, subd. (a)(1)), and imposing sentence for any felony except first degree murder. As we earlier concluded (pt. III., ante), the evidence was insufficient to support the jury findings that defendant personally used the stake in any of the charged felonies. Because those findings must be vacated, we need not decide whether sentence was properly imposed on more than one personal use enhancement. The Attorney General concedes the trial court erred in imposing sentence for both forcible rape in concert (count 4) and forcible rape (count 5); we agree, as the evidence showed only a single indivisible act of intercourse. We also conclude section 654 did not prohibit sentencing defendant on both foreign object penetration in concert (count 6) and foreign object penetration (count 7). According to defendant’s testimony, Hardy and Armstrong each sexually assaulted Sigler with the stake, in separate penetrations; the perpetrators of these distinct crimes could each be punished for them. (See People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335-338 [§ 654 did not bar perpetrator’s punishment for each of three forcible sexual penetrations committed in sequence].) Thus, two separate, individually punishable criminal acts were committed, and defendant was found 35 criminally liable for each of them under the law of complicity. Punishing him for both does not violate section 654. Finally, defendant is clearly wrong that the trial court could sentence him only on murder. The robbery and sexual assaults were pursued with different criminal objectives than the murder and could be separately punished. (People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1207-1209, 1216.) Because the trial court must resentence defendant in a manner consistent with this opinion (vacating the personal use enhancements and staying imposition of sentence for one count under § 654), we need not decide whether the court’s imposition of the upper term on counts 2, 4, 6 and 7 violated defendant’s jury trial rights under Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, or whether any such error was harmless. On remand, the trial court is to exercise its sentencing discretion as described in People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 843-852. DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed as to the sentence of death, the jury’s findings that defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon (§§ 667.1, 12022, 12022.3), the jury’s true finding on the special circumstance of murder with the infliction of torture (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)), and the state prison sentence. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial court for a new penalty trial and for resentencing in a manner consistent with our opinion. WERDEGAR, J. WE CONCUR: CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. KENNARD, J. BAXTER, J. CHIN, J. CORRIGAN, J. LIU, J. 36 See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion People v. Pearson __________________________________________________________________________________ Unpublished Opinion Original Appeal XXX Original Proceeding Review Granted Rehearing Granted __________________________________________________________________________________ Opinion No. S120750 Date Filed: January 9, 2012 __________________________________________________________________________________ Court: Superior County: Los Angeles Judge: Tomson T. Ong __________________________________________________________________________________ Counsel: Conrad Petermann, under appointment by the Supreme court, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Sharlene A. Honnaka and Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): Conrad Petermann Law Office of Conrad Petermann 323 East Matilija Street, Suite 110 Ojai, CA 93023 (805) 646-9022 Yun K. Lee Deputy Attorney General 300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 Los Angeles, CA 90013 (213) 897-2051