Opinion ID: 1899037
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proof of Inefficiency.

Text: First, Hutchinson contends that the Department did not prove that the 911 call was lost because he failed to enter it properly, rather than because of a system malfunction at his computer terminal. The OEA administrative judge concluded otherwise. Although Hutchinson appeals from the Superior Court's review of the OEA's decision, we review the administrative decision as if the appeal had been taken directly to this court. See District of Columbia v. Davis, 685 A.2d 389, 393 (D.C.1996). We review the OEA's findings under the familiar substantial evidence test. Id. Substantial evidence is defined as `such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' Davis-Dodson v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 697 A.2d 1214, 1218 (D.C.1997) (quoting Ferreira v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 667 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1995)). If the administrative findings are supported by substantial evidence, we must accept them even if there is substantial evidence in the record to support contrary findings. Metropolitan Police Dep't v. Baker, 564 A.2d 1155, 1159 (D.C.1989). [4] The Department was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the cause cited for Hutchinson's dismissal, namely, inefficiency. See OEA R. 632.1, 39 D.C.Reg. 7404, 7424 (1992) (defining preponderance as [t]hat degree of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find a contested fact more probably true than untrue). The administrative judge heard detailed testimony about how communications operators receive 911 calls, assign each call a priority code depending on the gravity of the situation, and enter the information into the computer system. She also heard technical testimony concerning the computer system itself. The administrative judge concluded that Hutchinson's inefficiency, not a system malfunction, was the more persuasive explanation for why the call was not entered into the computer system. This conclusion is supported by the testimony of Hutchinson's shift supervisor, Michael Hardgrove, who explained that the system generated a printout of all properly-entered calls, but that Hutchinson's call did not appear on the printout. A separate record of all incoming calls and an audio tape, however, confirmed that the call was made and that Hutchinson answered the line. According to the testimony of the Department's computer programmer, operators always received an on-screen confirmation that a call has been entered properly. When the system malfunctioned, it would not post an on-screen confirmation and would not accept any further entries. [5] Thus Hutchinson would be aware of a malfunction, and of the need to enter the call again, because he would not receive a confirmation and the system would not accept further calls. Hutchinson testified, however, that he was able to enter the next call without any interruption. From the evidence that the system did not stop, a reasonable mind could fairly conclude that a malfunction did not occur, but rather that Hutchinson simply failed to enter the call properly. Through cross-examination of the Department's witnesses, and through the direct examination of his own witnesses, Hutchinson raised the specter that undiscovered software bugs and inadequate memory may have caused the problem. One of his witnesses, James Figard, had been fired from the Department after an unrelated mishap involving a 911 call. Figard testified that on hundreds of occasions the computer system would not accept his entries even though he followed the appropriate steps. The administrative judge, however, found Figard's testimony to be given in a glib and offhanded manner and[] generally ... unreliable. [6] Hutchinson contends that glib and offhanded are not valid reasons to discredit a witness. In reviewing the OEA, we give great deference to any credibility determinations of the administrative factfinder. Baker, supra, 564 A.2d at 1159. An administrative factfinder need not give any reason at all for his or her credibility determinations. See McKinley v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 696 A.2d 1377, 1386 (D.C.1997); Gunty v. Department of Employment Servs., 524 A.2d 1192, 1198-99 (D.C.1987). Thus Hutchinson was not entitled to an explanation for why the administrative judge discredited Figard. In any event, glib and offhanded are valid reasons for discrediting a witness because they bear on the manner of the witness's testimony and the seriousness with which the witness has approached the proceedings. Although Hutchinson insists that his evidence successfully rebutted the Department's, the administrative judge, not this court, decides what weight to accord the evidence in evaluating whether the Department proved its case by a preponderance. Because the record contains substantial evidence supporting the administrative judge's conclusion that Hutchinson's inefficiency, and not a computer malfunction, caused the loss, we must affirm her decision. See Baker, supra, 564 A.2d at 1159.