Opinion ID: 1137798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Introduction of Evidence after the Completion of Closing Arguments

Text: Appellant's/Defendant's first argument is that the trial court erred in allowing Plaintiff to introduce evidence after the evidence portion of the trial was closed. Defendant objected to Plaintiff's reference to a mortality table in his argument because, according to Defendant, the table had not been timely introduced into evidence. Plaintiff responded that the table had been introduced before trial resumed that morning in an in-chambers meeting between the judge and counsel representing both parties. The judge agreed with Plaintiff's perception of what had transpired earlier. Nevertheless, at this time Plaintiff offered, and the Court admitted, the mortality table into evidence. We find the following exchange in the record: (Whereupon, the proceeding occurred on Friday, 5/15/84, at approximately 10:25 a.m., in the chambers of the Honorable Judge Price, outside of the presence of and hearing of the jury): Mr. Hooper [Plaintiff's counsel]: What I want to do is introduce the mortality table. I think the Court knows the section ... that says that these are admissible into evidence. And I want to introduce the mortality table into evidence. Mr. Butler [Defendant's counsel]: The only objection we have to this is that I don't believe there has been evidence that the injury from this accident is of a permanent nature and I don't think the mortality table would apply unless there is testimony of permanent injury. ... The Court: Overruled. I will let them in. (Whereupon, Plaintiff's Exhibit Number Three was marked for identification purposes and admitted.) We recognize that the judge's statement, I will let them in, is subject to two interpretations. It could mean that the judge agreed to admit the mortality tables into evidence at some future time, presumably in open court. On the other hand, the judge's statement could be interpreted to mean that he admitted them into evidence at that moment, in which case his use of the word will would have been in its permissive sense, rather than in its time sense. We feel that he used the word will in a permissive sense, and that his usage of will did not refer to some future time. Indeed, this was the perception of everyone present at the in-chambers meeting (including the court reporter), except the Defendant's counsel. We find, therefore, that the mortality tables were introduced properly before the close of the evidence. In reference to the introduction of the mortality tables, however, the Defendant further argues that it is error to introduce documentary evidence outside the presence of the jury. To be sure, with certain exceptions, [1] [i]n all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court. A.R.Civ.P. 43(a). There is, however, no such explicit rule for the introduction of documentary evidence, and we see no reason why there should be. Rule 43(a) was enacted to correct the abuses of taking testimony by deposition in the historic equity practice. 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2407 (1971). To require that witnesses testify in open court prevents the court from receiving or considering anything in confidence or secret from the parties or their Counsel and permits fair and complete examination and cross-examination. G. McLeod, Trial Practice and Procedure in Alabama 254 (1983). Thus, the Rule 43(a) directive that all witnesses' testimony is to be taken in open court is primarily to insure that the parties have notice of all proceedings. It only peripherally, if at all, concerns the fact that the jury is or is not present. Therefore, we hold that an in-chambers introduction of documentary evidence, with all parties' counsel present, does not violate the spirit of Rule 43(a). Defendant's/Appellant's argument to this effect is without merit.