Opinion ID: 2753455
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Third Time a Charm.

Text: A. Maryland’s Restitution Scheme. Restitution may be ordered as part of a sentence, according to CP § 11-603(a), or as condition of probation, according to CP § 2-221. Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 55, 862 A.2d 419, 423 (2004). In both instances, 7 restitution is a criminal sanction, not a civil remedy. Grey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 363 Md. 445, 451, 769 A.2d 891, 895 (2001). Although restitution serves to recompense the victim, it aims also to punish and rehabilitate the criminal. Pete, 384 Md. at 55, 862 A.2d at 423. A trial court may order restitution, in the sound exercise of its discretion, when, “as a direct result of the crime or delinquent act, property of the victim was stolen, damaged, destroyed, converted, or unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially decreased. . . .” CP § 11-603(a)(1) (emphasis added).6 Medical and funeral expenses, direct out-of-pocket loss, loss of earnings, and certain government expenses may provide the basis for restitution. See CP § 11-603(a). The term “victim” is defined as “a person who suffered death, personal injury, or property damage or loss as a direct result of a crime or delinquent act; or, if the person is deceased, the personal representative the estate of the person.” CP § 11-601(j). Determining whether an injury is a “direct result” of the criminal conduct is central traditionally to mapping the outer limits of a trial court’s discretion in ordering restitution in most cases. Our cases are clear that restitution may be compelled only where the injury results from the actions that made the defendant’s conduct criminal. See Goff v. State, 387 Md. 327, 6 Whether restitution is ordered as condition of probation or as a sentence, the trial court’s order must meet the “direct result” requirement of Maryland Code (1957, 2008 Repl. Vol.), Criminal Procedure Article, § 11-603. Silver v. State, 420 Md. 415 n.16, 427, 23 A.3d 867, 874 (2011); see also Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 65-66, 862 A.2d 419, 429-30 (2004). 8 344, 875 A.2d 132, 142 (2005) (finding that the defendant’s conduct was a direct result of the injury for which restitution was ordered because the property damage was caused “during and because of” the crime, without any intervening cause); Pete, 384 Md. at 60-61, 862 A.2d at 426-27 (rejecting proximate causation, mere nexus, or single charging document theories of defining the direct result of the crime and, instead, requiring “a direct result between the qualifying crime committed and the damages inflicted” in order for restitution to authorized). Further, as we announced in Walczak v. State, restitution may be compelled ordinarily only for the criminal conduct for which the defendant was convicted. 302 Md. 422, 429, 488 A.2d 949, 952 (1985). We acknowledged a narrow exception to these principles in Lee v. State. 307 Md. 74, 512 A.2d 372 (1986).7 Lee was charged in the Circuit 7 The pertinent statute in effect when we decided Lee v. State was the same essentially as the current statute: On conviction of a crime, the court may order the defendant to make restitution in addition to any other penalty for the commission of the crime, if: (i) Property of the victim was stolen, converted, unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially decreased as a direct result of the crime; (ii) The victim suffered actual medical expenses, direct outof-pocket losses, or loss of earnings as a direct result of the crime; (iii) The victim incurred medical expenses that were paid for by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or any other governmental entity; or (iv) A governmental entity incurred expenses in the removal, towing, transporting, preserving, storage, sale, or destruction of an abandoned vehicle. 9 Court for Montgomery County with forging a check and theft. Id., 307 Md. at 76, 512 A.2d at 373. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pleaded guilty to a single count of forgery. The State nolle prossed the theft count. Id. As part of the agreement, Lee admitted to the facts underlying the theft charge and told the Circuit Court that he wanted to make restitution for the theft. Id. The trial judge sentenced Lee for the forgery conviction to seven years of incarceration, with all but six months suspended, upon the expiration of which the defendant would be placed on probation for three years. Id. Lee signed an order of probation in which he agreed to pay restitution in the amount of the loss charged in the theft count. Id. Lee failed to pay the restitution as required. The State filed a petition to revoke his probation. At the probation revocation hearing, Lee argued that the court lacked authority to order restitution for theft because he had not been convicted of that charge. The Circuit Court reviewed the terms of the plea agreement, noting that Lee had agreed expressly to make restitution to the victims of the nolle prossed theft charge, and revoked the probation. Id., 307 Md. at 76-77, 512 A.2d at 373. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, in a reported opinion, the judgment of the Circuit Court. Lee v. State, 65 Md. App. 149, 499 A.2d 969 (1985). Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Rep. Vol., 1986 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, § 640(b)(1). The statute authorized directing payment of restitution to the victims of crime, government entity that suffered loss, and third party payors (including insurers). See Art. 27, § 640 (b)(2). The prior iteration of Maryland’s restitution statute, the version at issue in Walczak v. State, was also essentially the same. Lee v. State, 307 Md. 74, 78, 512 A.2d 372, 374 (1986). 10 On certiorari, we held that a trial court has the authority, under these circumstances, to order restitution for charged crimes for which no conviction ensued, if it is ordered as the result of a plea agreement as to the crime for which a conviction was entered. See id., 307 Md. at 81, 512 A.2d at 376. Like the Court of Special Appeals, we found that this exception was contemplated by Walczak. Id. (citing Walczak, 302 Md. at 426 n.1, 488 A.2d 949). In Silver v. State, we clarified that, for the exception in Lee to apply, the defendant must agree expressly to pay restitution as part of the plea bargain.8 420 Md. 415, 432, 23 A.3d 867, 877 (2011). In Silver, the defendants, a husband and wife, were each charged with three counts of animal cruelty for neglecting three horses. Id., 420 Md. at 424, 23 A.3d at 874. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendants each pleaded guilty to one charge of animal cruelty for their treatment of the euthanized horse. The State nolle prossed the two remaining counts against each defendant which charged them with mistreatment of the surviving horses. Id. After hearing a stipulated statement of facts, the District Court judge sentenced the defendants to six days imprisonment, to be served over three weekends, and ordered restitution to the veterinarians who euthanized the one horse and provided rehabilitation for the other two. Id., 420 Md. at 424-25, n.6, 23 8 Silver v. State was interpreting the current iteration of Maryland’s restitution statute. See 420 Md. 415, 427 n.15, 23 A.3d 867, 873 (2011). 11 A.3d at 874. The Circuit Court, on appeal, also ordered restitution for the care given the three horses. Id., 420 Md. at 426, 23 A.3d at 873. We vacated the judgment that ordered the defendants to pay restitution for the rehabilitation of the surviving horses. Id., 420 Md. at 437, 23 A.3d at 880. The determinative factor in Silver was that, unlike in Lee, the defendants had not agreed expressly to pay restitution for the fall-out of the nolle prossed charges as part of the valid plea agreement.9 See id, 420 Md. at 432, 23 A.3d at 876-77. B. The Circuit Court Was Authorized to Condition Stachowski’s Probation in the Bad Check Conviction on the Payment of Restitution to the Victims in the Home Improvement Cases. In the instant case, Stachowski agreed voluntarily and expressly to pay restitution to the victims in his home improvement fraud cases as a condition of probation entered on his bad check conviction.10 The 9 A defendant need not agree expressly to pay restitution of a specified amount for a trial court to order restitution for crimes other than the one or ones representing the conviction for which probation is entered. In Lee, we found valid an order of restitution where the defendant agreed “to make restitution in the full amount” for the nolle prossed charges as part of a plea agreement. 307 Md. at 81, 512 A.2d at 376. 10 Stachowski argues to us that he did not agree voluntarily to make restitution to the victims of the home improvement cases because he was incarcerated at the time restitution was ordered and was in a difficult financial situation. Although there was clear incentive for Stachowski to accept a plea agreement—namely, to limit incarceration and provide support for his family through work release—these pressures do not diminish the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea. Stachowski indicated on the record that he understood the nature of the charges and had discussed them with his attorney. Further, the trial judge questioned Stachowski regarding his understanding of the ramifications of his plea. Such circumstances, absent other indications negating voluntariness, are strong evidence that the plea was knowing and voluntary. State v. Daughtry, 419 Md. 35, 75, 18 A.3d 60, 84 (2011). 12 agreement was announced to the Circuit Court judge and acknowledged as correct by Stachowski’s attorney. In exchange for the State (1) not prosecuting the theft charge, (2) recommending a sentence of five months incarceration for the bad check case, and (3) suggesting work release, Stachowski agreed to plead guilty to the bad check charge and pay restitution to the victims of his fraudulent home improvement scheme. There were respective quid pro quos for what Stachowski and the State agreed to (and the Court implemented) that fell squarely within the narrow exception announced in Lee. The Court of Special Appeals, in reaching the opposite conclusion, focused on dicta in Silver that it construed as suggesting that the Lee exception applies only when the other charges or crimes for which restitution is ordered are related to the crime for which the defendant was convicted and probation entered. The relevant language of Silver states: “[a]s Walzcak and Lee have long since established, the State may request, in plea negotiations, that a criminal defendant agree to pay restitution for related, though uncharged, crimes.” 420 Md. at 432, 23 A.3d at 876-77 (emphasis added). Although, as a matter of formal logic, this statement does not frustrate the State from requesting restitution for unrelated crimes, oftentimes, in typical usage, the express mention of one thing is the exclusion of the other. Thus, the intermediate appellate court’s view is not without basis. 13 We make clear here, therefore, that the Lee exception is not limited only to related charges or crimes. Our analysis in Walzack and Lee did not turn on whether the crimes were related and neither case mentioned relatedness when discussing the authority of a trial judge to order restitution for crimes for which the defendant was not convicted, but agreed nonetheless to make restitution. The allowance of restitution for other criminal conduct as the result of a plea bargain is just as rational for unrelated crimes as related crimes, provided a defendant gives his or her voluntary and express agreement to the restitution. As U.S. v. McLaughlin, a case we relied upon in Lee, noted: First, plea-bargaining in situations involving multicount indictments would be severely restricted. If a defendant could not consent to make restitution for the actual loss caused by his or her conduct relating to the indictment, and have such be a condition of any probation he or she might receive, then the government would have little reason to dismiss indictment counts in order to limit a defendant's potential period of incarceration. More importantly, however, it would frustrate the rehabilitation goals of the probation system. . . . To permit a defendant who freely admits his or her guilt, and the amount of loss caused thereby, to avoid making the aggrieved party at least economically whole is intolerable from a societal perspective. 512 F. Supp. 907, 912 (D. Md. 1981) (quoted in Lee, 307 Md. at 80-81, 512 A.2d at 375). Plea agreements are useful equally to realize the punitive, rehabilitative, and compensatory goals of Maryland’s restitution statute in the context of unrelated crimes. Enforcing the reasonable expectations of the parties to plea agreements benefits defendants, the State, and victims. The Maryland General Assembly did not aim to limit 14 the State’s use of plea agreements to resolve efficiently cases involving multiple, unrelated charged crimes pursuant to CP § 11-603(a), or its statutory predecessor that was at issue in Lee. Other jurisdictions with restitution regulatory regimes similar to Maryland’s do not require the other criminal conduct, for which restitution is ordered, to be related to the conviction associated with the probation in order for trial courts to impose restitution, provided the defendant consents to it through a valid plea agreement. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (authorizing in federal courts restitution to persons other than the victim of an offense, if agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement); Ex parte Killough, 434 So. 2d 852, 853 (Ala. 1983); Kimbrell v. State, 666 P.2d 454, 455 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); People v. Quinonez, 735 P.2d 159, 164 (Colo. 1987); Barnes v. State, 489 So. 2d 1182, 1183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Dorsey, 889 P.2d 93, 96 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995) (discussing an Idaho statute authorizing restitution for crimes not before the court, if with consent of the parties); People v. McClard, 834 N.E.2d 984, 985 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (discussing Illinois statute authorizing restitution for losses arising from dismissed charges, if agreed to as part of a plea agreement); Kinkead v. State, 791 N.E.2d 243, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Hymer, 26 P.3d 63, 68 (Kan. 2001) (implying restitution that was ordered in a case decided previously could have been imposed as a condition of probation, if part of a plea agreement); Commonwealth v. Morseman, 379 S.W.3d 144, 152 (Ky. 2012) (considering Maryland’s restitution regime as persuasive authority in its holding); State v. Stephenson, 706 So. 2d 604, 608-09 (La. Ct. App. 1998); State v. LaCasce, 512 A.2d 312, 316 (Me. 1986); State v. Kennedy, 327 N.W.2d 3, 4-5 (Minn. 15 1982); Sims v. State, 134 So. 3d 300, 303-04 (Miss. 2014); State v. Blanchard, 889 P.2d 1180, 1183 (Mont. 1995); State v. McMann, 541 N.W.2d 418, 422 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing the Nebraska statute authorizing restitution for uncharged crimes and crimes dismissed, with the parties’ consent, pursuant to a plea agreement); Erickson v. State, 821 P.2d 1042, 1042-43 (Nev. 1991); State v. Steinolfson, 483 N.W.2d 182, 185 (N.D. 1992); State v. Carson, 243 P.3d 73, 75 (Or. Ct. App. 2010); Martin v. State, 874 S.W.2d 674, 680 n. 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Bickley, 60 P.3d 582, 584 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (discussing Utah’s statute authorizing the trial court to order restitution for conduct which the defendant agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement); State v. Gorton, 90 A.3d 901, 905 (Vt. 2014) (discussing Vermont’s statute authorizing the trial court to order restitution when the defendant, knowingly and voluntarily, accepts it as part of a plea agreement); State v. Kinneman, 119 P.3d 350, 357 (Wash. 2005); Graham v. State, 261 P.3d 239, 242 (Wyo. 2011). Our reference to “related cases” in Silver does not erode the plea agreement exception described in Walzack and Lee, which mirrors, as noted above, the rule in many of our sister states and the Federal courts. Rather, Silver recognized merely that, as was the case in Lee, plea agreements including restitution for uncharged crimes or convictions will often involve related charges.11 11 Even in the context of a plea agreement, the amount of restitution the defendant agrees to pay the victim of the uncharged crimes must be certain and there must be no factual dispute that the defendant’s criminal conduct caused or was responsible for the aggrieved party’s loss. See Lee, 307 Md. at 80, 82, 512 A.2d at 375, 376 (1986). In Stachowski’s case, the previous convictions supplied the factual basis for the amount of restitution ordered and Stachowski’s responsibility for it. 16 C. We Decline to Abrogate Lee. In the end, Stachowski asks us to revisit Lee, pointing to alternative interpretations of CP § 11-603(a) and invoking the noted ambiguous dicta from Silver. He points particularly to the statutory requirement that restitution ordered be the “direct result” of the crime. Before engaging Stachowski’s arguments, we pause to reflect on the implications of the doctrine of stare decisis. The crux of the doctrine of stare decisis is that courts should reaffirm, follow, and apply ordinarily the published decisional holdings of our appellate courts even though, if afforded a blank slate, the court might decide the matter differently. Coleman v. Soccer Ass'n of Columbia, 432 Md. 679, 689, 69 A.3d 1149, 1154-55 (2013). The doctrine of stare decisis encourages the consistent development of legal principles, public reliance on our judicial decisions, and the perceived integrity of the courts. Livesay v. Baltimore Cnty., 384 Md. 1, 14, 862 A.2d 33, 40 (2004). Our devotion to stare decisis, however, is not absolute. We may decline to follow the doctrine when persuaded the prior decision is clearly wrong, Townsend v. BethlehemFairfield Shipyard, 186 Md. 406, 417, 47 A.2d 365, 370 (1946), or when the precedent has been rendered archaic and inapplicable to modern society through the passage of time and evolving events, Harrison v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 459-60, 456 A.2d 894, 903 (1983). Neither of these “outs” release us from honoring Lee in the present case. As noted above, allowing a defendant to consent to pay restitution for his or her other crimes in addition to the crime for which he or she stands convicted, as the result of 17 a plea agreement, is consistent with the goals and purposes of Maryland’s restitution statute. The General Assembly contemplated restitution to serve compensatory, rehabilitative, and punitive goals. Pete, 384 Md. at 55, 862 A.2d at 423. If courts could not order a defendant who admits freely to wrongdoing and accepts the responsibility to pay restitution as part of a plea agreement, prosecutors would have less incentive to refrain from prosecuting to the fullest all charges and seeking the maximum allowable sentence. Contrary to the goals of the statute, the reading of CP § 11-603(a) urged by Stachowski would limit compensation of the victim and the commencement of the voluntary rehabilitation of the defendant. There was, and remains, strong support for our interpretation in Lee of Maryland’s restitution statute. The Lee approach is accepted widely, as noted supra at 14-16. Thus, Lee is not an aberration or an outlier from a bygone era inapplicable to modern society12 : several states and the Federal courts, as noted earlier, follow a similar rule.13 Further, the Maryland 12 Indeed, this line of reasoning continues to gain new adherents. In 2012, the Supreme Court of Kentucky considered for the first time whether a trial court could order restitution for crimes for which the defendant had not been convicted if the defendant agreed to restitution pursuant to a plea agreement. Commonwealth. v. Morseman, 379 S.W.3d 144 (Ky. 2012). The Court noted that the Kentucky restitution statutes, strictly construed, would only allow a court to order restitution for crimes for which the defendant had been convicted. Id. at 14849. After considering, however, the nature and aims of the statute and the interpretation of similar statutes by the courts of other states, including Maryland, the Kentucky Court held “that a trial court is authorized to order restitution for damages not suffered as a direct result of the criminal act(s) for which the defendant has been convicted when, as part of a plea agreement, the defendant freely and voluntarily agrees to the restitution condition.” Id. at 152. 13 The U.S. Supreme Court interpreted narrowly the federal statute authorizing restitution in Hugey v. U. S., 495 U.S. 411 (1990). The Supreme Court held that the relevant federal statute did not authorize the federal courts to order restitution for crimes for which the defendant had 18 General Assembly, in the twenty-eight years since Lee, not only has failed to abrogate Lee, but also has broadened the scope of restitution. See 2006 Md. Laws Ch. 428 (adding to courts’ authority to order restitution the performance of services); 2006 Md. Laws Ch. 429 (broadening the class of persons and entities to which a court may order criminal restitution paid). We stand by our decision in Lee.