Opinion ID: 197677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evasion of National Security Controls.

Text: 61 With respect to export control offenses, the sentencing guidelines provide for a base offense level (BOL) of 14 unless national security or nuclear proliferation controls were evaded, in which case the BOL escalates to 22. USSG § 2M5.1(a). The lower court found that the offense of conviction qualified for the eight-level enhancement. The appellant claims that this ruling is based on an erroneous reading of the enhancement provision. Because this claim implicates the meaning and scope of the guideline, our review is plenary. See United States v. Muniz, 49 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir.1995). 62 The appellant's core contention is that USSG § 2M5.1(a)(1) cannot apply in a sale-of-goods case unless the government presents evidence that the particular goods, when or if sold, constitute an actual threat to national security. We disagree. In Executive Order No. 12,543, the President determined that Libya posed an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States and therefore ordered an embargo covering the exportation of virtually all goods to Libya. The embargo is an exercise of executive power authorized by IEEPA to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat ... to the national security. 50 U.S.C. § 1701. In short, the embargo is intended as a national security control. 63 That ends the matter. As we read it, section 2M5.1(a)(1) applies to any offense that involves a shipment (or proposed shipment) that offends the embargo, whether or not the goods shipped actually are intended for some innocent use. See United States v. Shetterly, 971 F.2d 67, 76 (7th Cir.1992). The appellant's argument to the contrary seeks to substitute the judgment of a factfinder for that of the executive branch, which has made a determination that the export of any goods to Libya, excepting only certain humanitarian aid, threatens national security interests. Such a course is fraught with separation-of-powers perils, see Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527, 108 S.Ct. 818, 823-24, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988) (noting the primacy of presidential power to protect national security interests), and we eschew it. 64