Opinion ID: 1808830
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Woodruff's Status as a Quasi-Official

Text: Woodruff and the Talladega County Judicial Commission contend that Woodruff's status as the nominee of the Alabama Democratic Party makes him a quasi-incumbent. They rely upon State ex rel. Norrell v. Key, 276 Ala. 524, 526, 165 So.2d 76, 78 (1964), in which this Court held, in the context of measuring the timeliness of a quo warranto proceeding, that the holder of a certificate of nomination has the status of a quasi-officer, thereby obliging the relator to initiate his action prior to the election. Article VI, § 151, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off.Recomp.), authorizes the legislature to increase or decrease the number of circuit judges. Section 151(c) provides: An act decreasing the number of circuit or district judges shall not affect the right of any judge to hold his office for his full term. This limitation on legislative authority is confined to officeholders and is silent as to nominees. Woodruff and the Talladega County Judicial Commission have not cited any authority applying the concept of quasi-officer in the context of a statutorily created office that has been abolished whereby the quasi-officer was deemed a quasi-incumbent and thereby insulated from the effects of the abolition of the office. We decline to rely upon the concept of quasi-officer, useful in settings not involving vested rights to public offices of statutory creation, as the basis to limit further the authority of the legislature provided in § 151. This result is consistent with the view that a public office that is a creature of the legislature confers no vested right. See Lane v. Kolb, 92 Ala. 636, 640, 9 So. 873, 874 (1891): When an office is not provided for by the Constitution, but is the creature of statute, there is no element of contract between the officer chosen and the public, or constituent body which confers the office. Being created, and its functions and emoluments conferred, by the legislature, the same body may abolish it, take away or reduce its functions and emoluments, or make any change its wisdom or caprice may suggest, not inhibited by the organic law. Applying similar principles, other courts have rejected a contention by a candidate that his status protects him from the impact of legislation abolishing the office for which he is a candidate. See State ex rel. Weller v. Schirmer, 131 Ohio St. 455, 3 N.E.2d 352 (1936), in which an individual filing a petition for nomination as a candidate for judge of a court of common pleas before the repeal of a statute providing for such office was held not entitled to have his name placed on the ballot at an election held after the repeal; State ex rel. Core v. Green, 160 Ohio St. 175, 181, 115 N.E.2d 157, 160-61 (1953) (While the statute was in effect, the petitioners had the privilege to demand an election, but when the statute was repealed before the election was held, such privilege was taken away without any impairment of vested or contractual rights.); and Corn v. City of Oakland City, 415 N.E.2d 129, 133 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981): The question of whether or not an office holder or candidate or officer-elect has any vested right to an office has been clearly settled contrary to Corn's position. In State, ex rel. Yancey v. Hyde, [129 Ind. 296, 28 N.E. 186 (1891)], our Supreme Court, at 129 Ind. 302, 28 N.E. 186[,] said: `Offices are neither grants nor contracts, nor obligations which can not be changed or impaired. They are subject to the legislative will at all times, except so far as the Constitution may protect them from interference. Offices created by the Legislature may be abolished by the Legislature. The power that creates can destroy. The creator is greater than the creature. The term of an office may be shortened, the duties of the office increased, and the compensation lessened, by the legislative will. (Citations omitted.)' Woodruff's status as the nominee of the Democratic Party does not insulate him from the effects of the 2006 Act in amending the 1999 Act.