Opinion ID: 1920351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Grant of Jury Instruction 5-8 and the States Burden of Proving Intent to Commit the Underlying Felony

Text: Spicer argues that Jury Instruction 8 [22] misled the jury on the intent necessary for a for a conviction of capital murder as defined in Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e). [23] According to Spicer, Instruction 8 not only did not focus the jury's attention on the issue of intent, but peremptorily instructed the jury that the issue of intent was irrelevant. Thus, Spicer asserts, Instruction 8 created an irrebuttable presumption relieving the jury of its responsibility of determining whether Spicer intended to commit robbery at the time of the killing. ś 48. In support of his argument Spicer cites Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d 1171 (Miss.1992). In Jenkins, the defendant was convicted of capital murder with the underlying felony of robbery. Id. at 1173-74. Jenkins objected to the following jury instruction: The Court instructs the Jury that if a person enters upon the commission of a crime involving danger to human life, such as robbery, said person is criminally accountable for death caused in the common enterprise. It need not be that the design is to commit the particular crime which is subsequently committed, but there must be a preconcerted plan to do some unlawful act. Therefore, if you find from the evidence in this case that all of the elements of Capital Murder, as defined in the Courts instructions, have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant WILLIAM WAYNE JENKINS, guilty of the crime of Capital Murder, even though, at the outset, he may not have intended to do the particular thing constituting the crime. Id. at 1179. Jenkins objected that the instruction was erroneous because it informed the jury that they could convict [him] of capital murder even if he did not form the intent to rob until the homicide had occurred. Id. After having earlier in the opinion reversed Jenkins's conviction due to discovery violations by the State, this Court replied to Jerkins's assertion that the above jury instruction was given in error: Without a thorough review of the merits of this claim, we note that Instruction S-3 was, at best, confusing to the jury and, at worst, peremptory in nature. S-3 did nothing to focus the jury's attention upon the issue of Jenkins' intent. Consequently, it merely obfuscated the issue and left the jury shrouded by smoke. Upon retrial, we must recommend that S-3 be revised or deleted from the court's instructions. Id. at 1179-80. ś 49. Spicer is procedurally barred from asserting his seventh allegation of error. At trial, Spicer objected to instruction 8 on the basis that there is no time of death proven. [24] Spicer did not place before the trial judge the present issue of whether Instruction 8 relieved the State of the burden of proving intent to commit the underlying felony of robbery. This Court cannot find that a trial judge committed reversible error on a matter not brought before him or her to consider. Montgomery v. State, 891 So.2d 179, 187 (Miss.2004). [A]n objection on one or more specific grounds constitutes a waiver of all other grounds. Doss v. State, 709 So.2d at 379 (quoting Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1255 (Miss.1993)). ś 50. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, we find that Spicer's argument is without merit. In determining whether error exists in granting or refusing jury instructions, the instructions must be read as a whole; if the instructions fairly announce the law and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found. Martin v. State, 854 So.2d 1004, 1009 (Miss.2003). The trial judge did not instruct the jury that Spicer's intent was irrelevant nor did he relieve the jury of its responsibility of determining whether Spicer intended to commit robbery at the time of the killing. Instead, the trial judge allowed Instruction 8 which correctly stated the law regarding the continuous chain of events theory in capital cases and when the underlying felony of robbery could have occurred. See Duplantis v. State, 708 So.2d 1327, 1343 (Miss.1998). [25] This Court said in West v. State: [W]e construed our capital murder statute and held that the underlying crime begins where an indictable attempt is reached.... An indictment charging a killing occurring while engaged in the commission of' one of the enumerated felonies includes the actions of the defendant leading up to the felony, the attempted felony, and flight from the scene of the felony. The fact that the actual moment of the victim's death preceded consummation of the underlying felony does not vitiate the capital charge. 553 So.2d 8, 13 (Miss.1989) (citations omitted). See also Simmons v. State, 805 So.2d 452, 477-78 (Miss.2001); Turner v. State, 732 So.2d 937, 949-50 (Miss.1999). The trial judges instruction in the present case mirrored this Court's holding in West and other cases. Furthermore, the trial judge's instruction is almost an exact quote of the instruction upheld by this Court in Duplantis. The instruction cited by Spicer from Jenkins is not similar to the one at issue in the present case, and this Court's disapproval of the Jenkins instruction is not controlling. We find that Spicer's seventh assertion of error is without merit.