Opinion ID: 2306140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper Questioning

Text: Appellants also argue that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to question Wray about his grand jury testimony and his fear of testifying, and in refusing to grant Johnson's request for a mistrial after Wray suffered an anxiety attack shortly after leaving the witness stand. We disagree. We review a trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. Gordon v. United States, 783 A.2d 575, 583 (D.C.2001) (citing Mercer v. United States, 724 A.2d 1176, 1185 (D.C.1999)). [E]vidence concerning a witness' fear tends to be extremely prejudicial because it appeals to the passions of the jury and may cause the jury to base its decision on something other than the rule of law, especially where reference to fear may suggest that the witness fears reprisal at the hands of the defendants or their associates if he or she testifies. Murray v. United States, 855 A.2d 1126, 1132 (D.C.2004) (quoting Gordon, supra, 783 A.2d at 586). Thus, questioning and argument by prosecutors about witness fearespecially fear of the defendants on trialmust be the limited exception rather than the rule. Id. at 1133. Whether to order a mistrial is subject to the broad discretion of the trial court and our standard of review is deferential. Gordon, supra, 783 A.2d at 583. The question here is whether Wray's testimony was substantially more prejudicial than probative and whether, looking at the totality of the circumstances, the introduction of the fear evidence resulted in a miscarriage of justice, warranting a mistrial. Id. at 587. Wray testified both before the grand jury and at the appellants' trial. In the grand jury, Wray indicated that he was concerned about his safety and whether his testimony would be made public. Assured that no one would know the contents of his testimony unless he told them, Wray testified before the grand jury about what had happened. At trial, however, Wray indicated multiple times that he did not recall what he testified to at the grand jury proceeding and that he didn't know why he couldn't recall it, though he admitted recalling having gone to the grand jury proceeding itself. On the second day of his testimony, during which he continued to say that he could not remember his grand jury testimony, the government asked Wray whether Johnson was present when Wray gave his grand jury testimony, Wray said that he was not sure. When the government asked [d]on't you think that was something you would remember? Wray closed his eyes and rubbed his forehead with his right hand. The government asked Wray if he was all right, and Wray said, No. I got to go to the bathroom. Wray was excused and subsequently found on the floor of the men's room, making retching noises. He was taken to Howard University Hospital by ambulance, where he was diagnosed as having had an anxiety attack. The court denied appellants' motions for a mistrial, and Wray resumed his testimony three days later. Wray continued being unable to recall much of what he had previously testified to and again said he did not know why he couldn't recall. [2] In closing argument, the prosecutor asked the jury to consider which is more credible, what Wray said in the grand jury when [the appellants] weren't there or what he said here in court with those men sitting 15 feet away. While we do not condone probing the depths of a witness' fear of testifying so as to cast unfounded suspicion of intimidation on a defendant, and while the prosecution's questioning could have been more circumspect with an obviously frightened witness, the prosecution's attempts to refresh Wray's recollection and the subsequent impeachment of Wray do not generally appear to have been intended to imply that the appellants threatened Wray. Rather, the government's questions seemed designed to help the jury understand something the jury might naturally have understood anyway: that witnesses to a violent crime subpoenaed to testify in court may continue to exhibit fear of those they believe were the perpetrators. Murray, supra, 855 A.2d at 1135. Moreover, the government offered, and the court indicated its willingness to give, an instruction to the jury to indicate that the fear testimony went only to Wray's general fear of testifying and that the questioning should not be interpreted to mean that Wray had been subjected to specific threats, but the appellants refused the instruction. Thus, while the prosecutor's questions may have left something to be desired, all of these instances were consistent with a general inquiry into a witness' fear of testifying against people he believes are dangerous. These instances would have been more significant to our decision if they were proportionally a greater part of the record or if the government had actually referred to the defendants as having caused the inconsistencies in Wray's testimony, which it did not. In short, because Wray's general reluctance to testify was probative of Wray's credibility as a witness at trial, especially in the context of Wray's testimony before the grand jury, and because the appellants refused a curative instruction, we cannot conclude that the trial court, looking at the totality of the circumstances, abused its discretion in determining that Wray's testimony was not substantially more prejudicial than probative, and that its admission did not result in a miscarriage of justice. Goins v. United States, 617 A.2d 956, 958 (D.C.1992). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court on this point.