Opinion ID: 70766
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: king's other issues

Text: 10 King argues that he was entrapped as a matter of law, and that the district court erred in submitting the entrapment issue to the jury instead of granting a judgment of acquittal on all three counts. King also argues that the district court's jury instruction on entrapment was inadequate because it did not specifically state that the government must prove predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the court should have given the additional entrapment instructions King requested, which would have done that. 1
11 King moved for a judgment of acquittal on all three counts, arguing that he was entrapped as a matter of law. The district court denied his motion, and submitted the entrapment issue to the jury. King contends that the district court's refusal to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal was error under the Supreme Court's holding in Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 118 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992). 12 In Jacobson, the Supreme Court explained the government's burden of proof in an entrapment case: Where the government has induced an individual to break the law and the defense of entrapment is at issue ... the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by Government agents. Id. at 548-49, 112 S.Ct. at 1540. In Jacobson itself, the Court held that the Government did not prove that this predisposition was independent and not the product of the attention that the Government had directed at petitioner. Id. at 550, 112 S.Ct. at 1541. 13 Applying Jacobson, in United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 309, 133 L.Ed.2d 212 (1995), we observed that [e]ntrapment is generally a jury question, and [t]herefore, entrapment as a matter of law is a sufficiency of the evidence inquiry. Id. at 622 (citations omitted); see also Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 886, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988) (holding that the question of entrapment is generally one for the jury, rather than for the court). Our inquiry is whether the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant was predisposed to take part in the illicit transaction. Brown, 43 F.3d at 622 (citing United States v. Aibejeris, 28 F.3d 97, 99 (11th Cir.1994)). Although our review of an entrapment defense is de novo, we must view all facts and make all inferences in favor of the government. Id. 14 King's primary argument is that Jacobson requires the government to have evidence of predisposition before it begins its investigation of the defendant. This Court disposed of that contention in Aibejeris, where we held: 15 This is an incorrect reading of Jacobson. That case does not stand for the proposition that the government must have evidence of predisposition prior to investigation. Rather, Jacobson holds that the government must prove at trial beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was actually predisposed to commit the underlying crime absent the government's role in assisting such commission. 16 28 F.3d at 99. Accordingly, it matters not when the evidence of King's predisposition to sell drugs was developed. It does matter whether that predisposition itself existed before the government became involved. 17 Turning to the sufficiency of the evidence of predisposition, we hold that there was enough evidence that King was predisposed, independent of any government involvement, to commit the crimes for which he was convicted, to create a jury question. A reasonable jury could have believed Gandy's testimony that prior to Gandy becoming an informant, King had provided narcotics to Gandy on more than one occasion. Likewise, a reasonable jury could also have believed Gandy's testimony that during the time Gandy was acting as an informant, King was dealing drugs with others but refused to deal with Gandy because King was suspicious that Gandy was an informant. Finally, a reasonable jury could have believed Gandy's testimony that even though Gandy made his first offer to engage in drug transactions with King on March 29, 1992, King had told Gandy on February 14, 1992, that Alphonso was coming from Florida with two killer kilograms of cocaine. All of this evidence supports the conclusion that King was predisposed to commit the crime, independent of any government involvement. Unlike the situation in Jacobson, much of the evidence about predisposition in this case was evidence of the defendant's conduct and statements prior to the government's involvement, and therefore was independent and not the product of the attention that the Government ... directed at [the defendant], see Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550, 112 S.Ct. at 1541. We hold that the district court properly denied the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts 1 and 2, and properly submitted the entrapment defense to the jury.
18 The district court gave the Eleventh Circuit pattern jury instruction on entrapment, which King requested, but did not give the additional entrapment instructions requested by King. In particular, King sought to have the jury instructed separately and specifically that when the defendant shows government inducement existed, the burden shifts to the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not entrapped. King claims that the lack of such a specific instruction was reversible error, given the Supreme Court's recent statement in Jacobson that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to being approached by Government agents. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 549, 112 S.Ct. at 1540. King argues that Jacobson changed the law so that when government inducement exists, the government now bears the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was not entrapped, and any pre-Jacobson holdings on this issue are no longer good law. 19 The pattern entrapment instruction given by the district court states that if the evidence in the case leaves you with a reasonable doubt whether the Defendant had any intent to commit the crime except for inducement or persuasion on the part of some Government officer or agent, then it is your duty to find the Defendant not guilty. In addition to the pattern instruction on entrapment, the court also gave the general pattern instruction on the government's burden of proof in criminal cases, which states that the government must prove each element of the offenses beyond reasonable doubt. 20 The government argues that the pattern entrapment instruction was sufficient. First, the government contends that Jacobson did not alter the well-established law that when government inducement exists, the burden is on the government to prove predisposition beyond reasonable doubt. We agree. To begin with, Jacobson only incidentally dealt with the reasonable doubt issue; the central concern of the decision was the temporal frame regarding the defendant's predisposition. In particular, Jacobson held that the government must prove that the defendant was disposed to committing the criminal act prior to being approached by government agents. Although one clause from the Jacobson opinion does state that a defendant's predisposition must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, that clause simply restated well-established entrapment law regarding the burden of proof. See, e.g., United States v. Vadino, 680 F.2d 1329, 1337 (11th Cir.1982) (stating that government bears burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt in entrapment case), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082, 103 S.Ct. 1771, 76 L.Ed.2d 344 (1983); United States v. Smith, 588 F.2d 111, 116 n. 25 (5th Cir.) (same), modified on other grounds, 594 F.2d 1084 (1979); United States v. Benavidez, 558 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir.1977) (same); United States v. Silver, 457 F.2d 1217, 1220 (3d Cir.1972) (referring to fact that burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt is on government in entrapment case as a settled principle[ ]). Thus Jacobson dealt with what the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt once inducement is shown in an entrapment case; but it did not change the law that the government, not the defendant, bears that burden of proof once inducement is shown. That has long been the law. 21 Second, the government argues that because Jacobson did not change the law regarding the burden and standard of proof in an entrapment case, this Court's prior decisions upholding the pattern entrapment instruction, as well as decisions upholding virtually identical instructions, against similar challenges, are binding upon this panel. See United States v. Davis, 799 F.2d 1490, 1493-94 (11th Cir.1986) (upholding pattern entrapment instruction as simply and clearly instructing the jury about the government's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, despite defendant's contention that instruction must detail the shifting burdens of production and proof); United States v. Sonntag, 684 F.2d 781, 787 (11th Cir.1982) (upholding virtually identical entrapment instruction against challenge that instruction was deficient because it fails to unequivocally state that the government has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not entrapped); Vadino, 680 F.2d at 1337 (upholding virtually identical entrapment instruction against challenge that instruction should specifically state that the burden of proving that the defendants were not entrapped was on the government). Again, we agree. See, e.g., Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1424 n. 9 (11th Cir.) (subsequent panel is bound by precedent established by prior panel), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2578, 132 L.Ed.2d 828 (1995). 22 As part of his argument that Jacobson changed the law regarding the burden or standard of proof in entrapment cases and that our pre-Jacobson holdings are thereby invalid, King argues that our post-Jacobson decision in Brown casts doubt on those prior holdings. Brown upheld the pattern entrapment instruction against a challenge that the instruction did not sufficiently inform the jury that the defendant's predisposition must have existed before any contact with government officers or agents. Even so, King contends that Brown supports his position that the pattern entrapment instruction was insufficient. In particular, King points to certain statements in a footnote in which we observed that, it is not difficult to imagine a case where the Eleventh Circuit pattern instruction could mislead the jury, and that other circuits have clarified their entrapment instructions in light of Jacobson. Brown, 43 F.3d at 628 n. 8. However, the remainder of the footnote, which King does not acknowledge, makes clear that in Brown we were referring to an issue wholly distinct from the present one. The remainder of the footnote explains that, in long and complex government campaign[s], like that occurring in Jacobson, extra clarity [beyond that provided by the pattern instruction] would be required to keep the temporal frame in focus. Brown, 43 F.3d at 628 n. 8 (emphasis added). This reference to temporal frame makes clear that the footnote in question addressed only the particular issue raised in the Brown case: whether the pattern entrapment instruction sufficiently instructed the jury that the defendant's predisposition must have existed before any contact with government officers or agents. The Brown opinion does not address the present issue, which is whether the pattern entrapment instruction sufficiently instructed the jury that when government inducement is demonstrated, the burden is on the government to prove predisposition beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, Brown could not cast any doubt on the continuing validity of any prior decisions on that issue. 23 We hold that our pre-Jacobson decisions upholding the pattern entrapment instruction against challenges that it fails to adequately address the burden and standard of proof, see Davis, 799 F.2d 1490; Sonntag, 684 F.2d 781; Vadino, 680 F.2d 1329, are still good law. No additional instruction that the burden is on the government to prove predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt is required to comply with Jacobson. Our conclusion is the same as that of the Vadino Court: although it may have been better to include within the entrapment instruction itself an instruction on burden of proof, the jury instruction considered as a whole was sufficient. 680 F.2d at 1337.