Opinion ID: 2621170
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A. Aggravating Factors

Text: ¶ 9 The defendant asserts that the judge improperly based his sentencing decision on Ms. Calabrese's good character. In his special verdict, the judge referred to the victim as a Good Samaritan and as a person who took great joy in helping people in need. The judge's concluding remarks, after considering all aggravating and mitigating factors, described Ms. Calabrese as a person who stood out like a shining light, as a true Samaritan and who kept her faith in God to the end. The defendant argues that the judge imposed the death sentence because he viewed the victim as a person above the norm of other murder victims. That approach, he argues, violates A.R.S. section 13-703, which does not define the character of the victim as an aggravating factor, and discriminates on the basis of the victim's status. A.R.S. § 13-703.A H (2001). ¶ 10 We agree with the State that the judge's comments, taken in context, do not show that the trial judge relied upon the victim's good character in imposing the sentence. Taken in context, the comments merely state the judge's summary of the aggravating factors, particularly the senselessness of the crime and the helplessness of the victim. The fact that the victim was delivering food when attacked is related to the senselessness of the crime; the judge's comments related to resorting to prayer for comfort describe the helplessness of the victim after she had been beaten and bound. ¶ 11 The defendant relies on Gerlaugh v. Lewis, 898 F.Supp. 1388 (D.Ariz.1995), aff'd 129 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir.1997), to support his argument that imposing a death sentence based on the social or economic background of the victim or defendant supports a claim of discrimination. In Gerlaugh, the habeas petitioner alleged that Arizona's death sentence is discriminately applied because the death penalty is more likely to be imposed if the victim is white and the defendant is a young male from a lower socio-economic background. Gerlaugh, 898 F.Supp. at 1416. The court stated that [t]o prevail on an equal protection claim, Petitioner must prove `that the decision-makers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.' Id. (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987)). The defendant points to no facts that support a finding that the trial judge acted with discriminatory purpose, and nothing in the special verdict suggests that the victim's social or economic background affected the judge's decision.
¶ 12 When a defendant commits murder as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value, the court shall consider this an aggravating circumstance. A.R.S. § 13-703.F.5 (2001). To establish the F.5 factor, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that pecuniary gain was a motive, cause, or impetus for the murder and not merely the result of the murder. State v. Kayer, 194 Ariz. 423, 433 ¶ 32, 984 P.2d 31, 41 ¶ 32 (1999) (quoting State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 292, 908 P.2d 1062, 1077 (1996)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1196, 120 S.Ct. 1259, 146 L.Ed.2d 115 (2000). We conclude the court erred in finding the State established the F.5 factor in this matter. ¶ 13 The State, relying on LaGrand and Greene, argues that the defendant's overall motive was to rob the victim and this desire infect[ed] all other conduct of the defendant. State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21, 35, 734 P.2d 563, 577 (1987); State v. Greene, 192 Ariz. 431, 439 ¶ 32, 967 P.2d 106, 114 ¶ 32 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1120, 119 S.Ct. 1772, 143 L.Ed.2d 802 (1999). The State interprets the language from LaGrand too broadly and ignores relevant restrictions that apply when evaluating the F.5 aggravating factor. A murder committed in the context of a robbery or burglary is not per se motivated by pecuniary gain. Rather, we reserve the death penalty for murders committed during a robbery or burglary for those cases in which the facts clearly indicate a connection between a pecuniary motive and the killing itself; the expectation of pecuniary gain must be a motive for the murder. ¶ 14 We distinguish a murder that occurs during a robbery or burglary in which the expectation of pecuniary gain serves as a catalyst for the entire chain of events, including the murder, from a robbery gone bad or a robbery that occurs close in time to a murder but that constitutes a separate event for the purpose of an F.5 determination. State v. McKinney, 185 Ariz. 567, 584, 917 P.2d 1214, 1231 (1996). The existence of an economic motive at some point during the events surrounding a murder is not enough to establish pecuniary gain as a motive. State v. Medina, 193 Ariz. 504, 513 ¶ 32, 975 P.2d 94, 103 ¶ 32 (1999). There must be a connection between the motive and the killing. Id. ¶ 15 Whether the needed connection exists between expected pecuniary gain and the motive for killing involves a highly fact-intensive inquiry. The inquiry usually involves deciding whether a motive for the murder was to facilitate the taking of or the ability to keep items of pecuniary value. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 146 Ariz. 491, 501, 707 P.2d 289, 299 (1985) (defendant killed a convenience store clerk to gain access to the cash register; court found [u]nder the facts of this case (but certainly not of all robberies) the commission of the killing necessarily carried with it the expectation of pecuniary gain); State v. Correll, 148 Ariz. 468, 479, 715 P.2d 721, 732 (1986) (defendant robbed home of victims, then took victims to desert where he shot and killed them; court held that defendant very carefully executed the armed robbery, and the murders were part of the scheme of robbery. The only motivation for the killings was to leave no witnesses to the robbery.); State v. Hensley, 142 Ariz. 598, 604, 691 P.2d 689, 695 (1984) (defendant executed the victims during the robbery of a bar; court found the murders were a part of the overall scheme of the robbery with the specific purpose to facilitate the robbers' escape); LaGrand, 153 Ariz. at 36, 734 P.2d at 578 (defendant stabbed the bank clerk when the clerk frustrat[ed] defendant's continuing attempt for pecuniary gain). But see State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 512, 662 P.2d 1007, 1019 (1983) (defendant confessed that the purpose of murdering the rape victim was to eliminate her as a witness to her own rape, not to steal her credit cards and cash; court held [w]ithout some tangible evidence, or strong circumstantial inference, it is not for the sentencing court to conclude that because money and items were taken, the purpose of the murder was pecuniary gain.). If the State fails to show the needed connection between pecuniary gain and the motive for murder, the F.5 factor cannot be used as an aggravator. As we emphasized in LaGrand, an unexpected or accidental death that occurs during the course of or flight from a robbery, but which was not committed in furtherance of pecuniary gain, does not provide sufficient basis for an F.5 finding. 153 Ariz. at 35, 734 P.2d at 577. Similarly, the sole fact that a defendant takes items or money from the victim does not establish pecuniary gain as a motive for the murder. See State v. Wallace, 151 Ariz. 362, 368, 728 P.2d 232, 238 (1986). Even a conviction for robbery, during which a murder occurs, does not necessarily prove pecuniary gain as motivation for the murder. See State v. Greenway, 170 Ariz. 155, 164, 823 P.2d 22, 31 (1991); State v. Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 161, 692 P.2d 991, 1010 (1984). Although a factual finding of pecuniary gain as a motive may be based upon tangible evidence or strong circumstantial inference, State v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 280, 921 P.2d 655, 683 (1996), a finding that pecuniary gain served as a motive is essential to establishing the F.5 factor. ¶ 16 The needed connection between expectation of pecuniary gain and a motive for murder often results from a finding that one of the defendant's motives in committing the murder was to facilitate the taking of or ability to retain items of pecuniary value. A review of prior decisions illustrates the distinction between those situations and robberies gone bad. ¶ 17 For instance, in LaGrand, the defendant stabbed the victim twenty-four times when the victim was unable to open the bank safe. When evaluating the F.5 aggravating circumstance, we focused on the reason the defendant was present and the reason he stabbed the victim. LaGrand was present because he intended to rob the bank and killed the bank employee when the victim frustrat[ed] defendant's continuing attempt for pecuniary gain. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. at 36, 734 P.2d at 578. While the defendant's action in LaGrand may not have been a rational method for achieving his pecuniary goal, a clear connection existed between the desire for pecuniary gain and the motive for murder. ¶ 18 No comparable connection between pecuniary gain and motive for murder existed in State v. Rienhardt, 190 Ariz. 579, 951 P.2d 454 (1997), in which the murder took place in the context of a drug deal. The defendant held the victim as human collateral in exchange for either methamphetamine or payment of a debt. When a third party failed to return with either, the defendant killed the victim. The State, again relying on a broad interpretation of LaGrand, argued that the defendant's desire for drugs or money infected all other conduct. We rejected the State's argument and distinguished LaGrand: In LaGrand, the defendant came to rob, and killed the employee during the robbery itself. Here, while Rienhardt held his human collateral hostage in expectation of the receipt of something of pecuniary value, his decision to take Ellis to the desert and kill him signified the end of his expectation of receipt of anything of pecuniary value, because killing Ellis frustrated this purpose. The killing was also removed in time and place from the underlying drug deal that was supposed to have happened hours earlier .... Rienhardt, 190 Ariz. at 591, 951 P.2d at 466. ¶ 19 State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 4 P.3d 345 (2000), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 1616, 149 L.Ed.2d 480 (2001), provides another example of the needed connection between pecuniary gain and motive for murder. There, the evidence demonstrated that the defendant began the robbery intending to murder anyone who happened to be in the store at the time. Jones, 197 Ariz. at 309 ¶ 56, 4 P.3d at 364 ¶ 56. We found that the defendant murdered the individuals to facilitate the robberies and then escape punishment, stating: These murders were not robberies gone bad. Instead, Jones and his co-defendant set out to accomplish the results they obtained, simply to acquire money. Thus, the F.5 factor applies and has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. ¶ 20 In contrast to the defendant's motive in Jones, the defendant's motive in State v. Medina, 193 Ariz. 504, 975 P.2d 94 (1999), had no apparent connection to his desire for pecuniary gain. In Medina, the defendant and two companions, in an effort to steal the victim's car, beat the victim, dragged him from his car, beat and kicked him again, and then repeatedly drove over him. We concluded, while the reason for beating him may have been a desire to steal, the same is not necessarily true of the homicide. 193 Ariz. at 513 ¶ 30, 975 P.2d at 103 ¶ 30. Instead, the evidence suggested that it was just as likely the defendant acted for his own amusement. Id. ¶ 21 We have also found that a murder committed to facilitate escape and/or hinder detection by police furthers the pecuniary interest of the criminal. See Greenway, 170 Ariz. at 165, 823 P.2d at 32; State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 137 ¶ 87, 14 P.3d 997, 1017 ¶ 87 (2000) (finding F.5 present [w]hen a robbery victim is executed to facilitate the killer's escape and hinder detection for the purpose of successfully procuring something of value). In Greenway, the defendant murdered his victims execution-style after robbing their home. Greenway entered the home knowing the victims were present and made no attempt to disguise his identity; the practical effect of the murders was to eliminate the only witnesses to the crime. 170 Ariz. at 165, 823 P.2d at 32. We found [t]he specific purpose of the murders was to facilitate defendant's escape and hinder detection, thereby furthering his pecuniary goal. Id. ¶ 22 The facts of this case do not establish that the expectation of pecuniary gain provided a motive for the murder. Although pecuniary gain certainly was a motive for the defendant's decision to beat and bind the victim, her rape and the murder appear to be separate events. Unlike LaGrand or the cases cited therein, this murder did not facilitate the taking or keeping of the stolen property. While the defendant's initial intention was to rob the victim, we cannot conclude that his motive for killing her was pecuniary in nature. Cf. Medina, 193 Ariz. at 513 ¶ 32, 975 P.2d at 103 ¶ 32 (concluding [e]ven if the defendant's initial intention was to take the car or radio, we cannot conclude that his motive for later running over and killing the victim was pecuniary gain). The murder, which occurred at least an hour after the victim's arrival, did not facilitate the defendant's ability to secure pecuniary gain, particularly in light of the fact that he bound the victim almost as soon as she entered his home. ¶ 23 We also disagree with the State's assertion that the defendant committed this murder to facilitate escape and hinder detection by police. After the murder, the defendant left Ms. Calabrese in his bedroom for four to five hours, then placed her in the backyard where she was visible over a low fence. The next morning, without any further attempts to escape or evade detection, he left for work but instead drove to his sister's home, where he confessed to her. The defendant's father eventually summoned the police, who peaceably took the defendant into custody. Further, in distinction to the facts in Greenway, the defendant's decision to kill Ms. Calabrese did not eliminate the only witness to the crime: the defendant's wife and their children were present during the entire chain of events. The State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt a connection between the motive and the killing related to pecuniary gain for the purpose of F.5. Medina, 193 Ariz. at 513 ¶ 32, 975 P.2d at 103 ¶ 32. ¶ 24 We conclude that the trial court erred in finding the State established the F.5 factor beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 25 When a defendant commit[s] the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner, it shall be considered an aggravating circumstance. A.R.S. § 13-703.F.6 (2001). We have defined the terms used in F.6 as follows, heinous: hatefully or shockingly evil: grossly bad. cruel: disposed to inflict pain esp. in a wanton, insensate or vindictive manner: sadistic. depraved: marked by debasement, corruption, perversion or deterioration. State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 543, 562 P.2d 704, 716 (1977). We narrowly construe these terms to apply only to killing[s] wherein additional circumstances of the nature enumerated above set the crime apart from the usual or the norm. Id. Because the statute is written in the disjunctive, the sentencing judge need find only one of the factors to establish an F.6 aggravating factor. State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 51, 659 P.2d 1, 10 (1983); State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 312, 896 P.2d 830, 852 (1995) (cruelty alone is sufficient to support a finding of F.6); State v. Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. 46, 68, 906 P.2d 579, 601 (1995) (heinousness or depravity alone is sufficient to support a F.6 finding).
¶ 26 To find cruelty, the court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was conscious during the attack and that the defendant knew or should have known that the victim would suffer. See State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 18, 951 P.2d 869, 883 (1997). However, the victim need not be conscious for each and every wound inflicted. See State v. Lopez, 163 Ariz. 108, 115, 786 P.2d 959, 966 (1990). Further, cruelty can exist even if the victim remained conscious for only a short period during the attack. State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, 421 ¶ 44, 984 P.2d 16, 29 ¶ 44 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1172, 120 S.Ct. 1199, 145 L.Ed.2d 1102 (2000); State v. Mann, 188 Ariz. 220, 226, 934 P.2d 784, 790 (1997); State v. Herrera, 176 Ariz. 21, 34, 859 P.2d 131, 144 (1993); State v. Rossi, 146 Ariz. 359, 365, 706 P.2d 371, 377 (1985). ¶ 27 The judge made three specific findings at sentencing that relate to Ms. Calabrese's consciousness. First, the judge concluded that she was rendered unconscious by the blows to the head but later regained consciousness. Second, she suffered defensive wounds, indicating that she was conscious during the attack. Finally, she would not have died for several minutes after the defendant stabbed her. ¶ 28 The defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that the victim was conscious long enough to suffer within the meaning of F.6. He argues that the only evidence of her consciousness came from Kara Sansing, who had to be refreshed with an earlier interview during the sentencing hearing. ¶ 29 The defendant asks us to focus on the testimony of the medical examiner. The medical examiner, discussing the blunt force trauma that caused a large laceration on the back of Ms. Calabrese's head, expressed some doubt as to whether she could have regained consciousness. When asked directly, however, the medical examiner stated, It is possible, yes. I wasn't there. Is it possible? Yes, but I doubt it. The State then asked the doctor if it was medically unlikely or impossible that the victim had a conversation with the defendant during the sexual assault, to which the doctor replied, Not at all. The medical examiner also testified that if Ms. Calabrese had regained consciousness, the blows and resulting injuries would have been painful. These facts support the sentencing judge's findings. ¶ 30 Furthermore, Ms. Calabrese was conscious when the defendant grabbed her from behind and threw her, face down, into the carpet in the defendant's dining room. She was conscious while the defendant and his wife bound her wrists and ankles with extension cords. All four of the defendant's children reported that she said, Lord, please help me. The defendant stipulated in his plea agreement that she was conscious when he returned from moving her truck. Finally, Kara Sansing testified that she heard Ms. Calabrese and the defendant talking during the sexual assault. The record is replete with evidence that the victim was conscious for at least part, if not the majority, of the attack. ¶ 31 The defendant also argues that the time frame between the beginning of the attack and Ms. Calabrese's loss of consciousness was too short to support a finding of cruelty. The defendant compares the facts of his case to other cases in which we upheld a finding of cruelty and asks us to distinguish his facts from those. See, e.g., State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 814 P.2d 333 (1991) (defendant cut victims several times before stabbing them, and one of the victims saw his own mother stabbed in the back prior to murder); State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 769 P.2d 1017 (1989) (defendant drove victim to desert, forced victim to lie on ground while captors debated victim's fate); State v. McCall, 139 Ariz. 147, 677 P.2d 920 (1983) (armed defendants broke into victims' home, victims listened while defendant shot family members and waited for their turn). ¶ 32 We disagree that the time frame cannot support a finding of cruelty. This case closely resembles the factual situation in State v. Mann, 188 Ariz. 220, 934 P.2d 784 (1997). In Mann, the central issue with respect to the F.6 finding involved conflicting information regarding the consciousness of the victim. The defendant argued that the medical examiner testified that [the victim] probably was conscious only for ten to twenty seconds and during that time may have been in a state of shock. Mann, 188 Ariz. at 226, 934 P.2d at 790. In contrast, an eyewitness testified that the victim was alive for three to five minutes. The trial judge and this court found the testimony of the eyewitness to be more persuasive. Id. In the instant case, the medical examiner expressed doubt about the victim's consciousness after the blow that caused the large laceration but did not opine that consciousness was impossible. We find the testimony of the five eyewitnesses to be more persuasive than that of the medical examiner who admitted, It is possible [that the victim did regain consciousness], yes. I wasn't there. The evidence provides substantial support for the sentencing judge's findings. ¶ 33 Furthermore, considering whether a victim had time to contemplate her ultimate fate, we have found cruelty present when the victim suffered for only a short time before death. All four of the defendant's children reported hearing Ms. Calabrese pray, Lord, please help me. Kara Sansing testified hearing the victim say, God please help me, and, If this is the way you want me to come home, then I will come home. Additionally, Kara Sansing testified that the victim asked the defendant's children to call the police about three, four times. The evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was aware and had sufficient time to contemplate her fate. ¶ 34 The finding of cruelty alone is sufficient to establish the F.6 aggravating factor. State v. Clabourne, 194 Ariz. 379, 384 ¶ 17, 983 P.2d 748, 753 ¶ 17 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1028, 120 S.Ct. 1439, 146 L.Ed.2d 327 (2000); State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 312, 896 P.2d 830, 852 (1995); State v. Lopez, 175 Ariz. 407, 411, 857 P.2d 1261, 1265 (1993). Because we concur with the sentencing judge's finding with respect to cruelty, we find it unnecessary to address the question of heinousness or depravity.