Opinion ID: 1542810
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Wilson is a consumer under the CPPA

Text: We are unpersuaded by appellants' contention that the trial court erred in submitting to the jury, as a question of fact, the issue of whether Wilson qualified as a consumer within the meaning of the CPPA, the statute under which Wilson was able to recover both treble and punitive damages. [30] Appellants argue that Wilson's role as a landlord precludes her from being considered a consumer, because her rental of a room in the house shows that the house was not her primary residence and thus the house was not a consumer good because it was not primarily for personal, household, or family use. Appellants' argument is misplaced. The question of whether the home was Wilson's primary residence and whether her house was used primarily for personal, household, or family use are two different inquiries. Cf. Ford v. ChartOne, 908 A.2d 72, 83 (D.C.2006) (reasoning that [a] motive may be pecuniary and still be personal). Consumer is defined in the CPPA, D.C.Code § 28-3901(a)(2), to mean[ ] a person who does or would purchase, lease (from), or receive consumer goods or services including a co-obligor or surety, or a person who does or would provide the economic demand for a trade practice; as an adjective, `consumer' describes anything, without exception, which is primarily for personal, household, or family use[.] (emphasis added). The purpose of the CPPA is to protect consumers from a broad spectrum of unscrupulous practices by merchants, therefore the statute should be read broadly to assure that the purposes are carried out. See District Cablevision, supra, 828 A.2d at 722-23 (citation omitted). Thus, the statute should be read in conjunction with other provisions within the CPPA which clarify the meaning of primarily for personal, household, or family use. D.C.Code § 28-3901(a)(2). For example, goods and services under the statute are defined as any and all parts of the economic output of society, at any stage or related or necessary point in the economic process, and includes consumer credit, franchises, business opportunities, real estate transactions, and consumer services of all types. D.C.Code § 28-3901(a)(7) (emphasis added). As we have previously noted, the specific inclusion of `franchises' and `business opportunities' in this definition demonstrates unequivocally that the consumer in a consumer transaction is allowed to have a financial motive. Ford, supra, 908 A.2d at 83; see also Weschler & Son, Inc. v. Klank, 561 A.2d 1003, 1005 (D.C.1989) (holding that a person purchasing an antique from an auction was engaged in a consumer transaction within the meaning of the CPPA). Given the evidence presented, the jury could reasonably have concluded that Wilson entered into the transaction to prevent foreclosure so that she could continue to live in the house that she had owned for over twenty years. In the alternative, the jury could have concluded that Wilson entered into the transaction to prevent foreclosure on her home and to continue to rent the house to tenants, earning income from a house that she owned for over twenty years. In either conclusion, one thing remains the same: the purpose for which Wilson entered into the transaction was to maintain her ownership of the home. Therefore, the purpose of the transaction was personal to Wilson; she contracted with the appellants not as a landlord in order to gain profit, but as a consumer seeking to receive their services as self-proclaimed foreclosure specialists and money lenders, to help her maintain ownership of her house. We applied a similar analysis in Browner v. District of Columbia, where we considered whether the Loan Sharking Act, D.C.Code § 26-901, applied to a defendant who claimed that he had never loaned money to the plaintiff. 549 A.2d 1107, 1114 (D.C. 1988) (substance, not form, of the transactions was critical in determination that they were loans within the meaning of the Loan Sharking Act). Since, the evidence presented during trial on the consumer issue was contested, the outcome depended upon weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of the witnesses at trialfunctions which are squarely within the purview of the trier of fact. Further, because the jury instruction given by the trial judge on the consumer question quoted directly from the statute, the jury was properly instructed on the correct legal framework with which to determine the facts and evaluate the disputed evidence. Therefore, we conclude that given the disputed facts presented at trial, the issue of whether Wilson qualified as a consumer under the CPPA was a question of fact properly submitted to the jury and the verdict is supported by the evidence. [31]