Opinion ID: 1148312
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the lower court erred in admitting into evidence the confession of david reuben, jr., in violation of his fifth and sixth amendment rights.

Text: When Reuben was originally brought to the Pelahatchie Police Station by his father and was given his Miranda rights, his father informed the Pelahatchie police that an attorney was desired and that no statements would be made until one was present. The police understood that this was an effective assertion of Reuben's rights. After an extensive hearing the trial judge ruled that this was an effective assertion of Reuben's rights. On appeal there is no dispute as to whether Reuben's right to remain silent and right to consult with an attorney before further interrogation were properly invoked. After Reuben's rights had been invoked, Officer Dodd questioned him about the weapon and took David Reuben, Sr., away from the police station in search of this weapon. Chief Myers kept David Reuben, Jr., at the Pelahatchie Police Station while Officer Dodd and David Reuben, Sr., searched for the weapon. Since the Pelahatchie Jail had been condemned, David Reuben, Jr., was to be transported to Brandon. However, instead of immediately transporting David Reuben, Jr., to Brandon, Chief Myers kept him in Pelahatchie, where a crowd had gathered outside of the police station causing Chief Myers to fear for Reuben's safety. Myers kept David Reuben, Jr., in his office where Reuben supposedly confessed without any interrogation. The trial judge addressed this confession and stated: Now, the State has tried to maintain here that he was sitting silently with the police officer, and that he comes up and makes voluntary statements later; and, consequently, they come within the voluntary statement exception to this situation. I don't buy that. I have held, and I am continuing to hold, that this was not a voluntary statement made that night but was in response to continuing interrogation in violation of his Miranda rights because he had asserted a right to counsel... . During this interrogation, Chief Myers arranged to obtain a written statement the next morning. The next morning Chief Myers went to the Brandon Jail to get a written confession from David Reuben, Jr. After receiving his Miranda warnings again, Reuben complied with the chief's request and provided a written statement. Chief Myers testified that this written statement was practically the same thing that he gave us that night. The trial judge applied the totality of the circumstances test from Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), and ruled that the written statement was admissible though the oral statement was not. This statement was introduced at trial, over objection, and the trial judge's failure to suppress it is assigned as error. The right against self-incrimination is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution through the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Mississippi Constitution, Article III, Section 26, and Rule 1.03 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice. In Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1984), this Court indicated, that subject to the guidance of federal law, Mississippi Jurisprudence will control the resolution of issues involving rights which are adequately and independently secured by the laws of this State. Cannaday, at 722. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). In weighing the admissibility of the written statement the trial judge used the totality of the circumstances test found in Brown v. Illinois, supra . In numerous decisions this Court has applied the totality of the circumstances test to determine if a statement was voluntarily given. See Hemmingway v. State, 483 So.2d 1335, 1336 (Miss. 1986); In the Interest of W.R.A., 481 So.2d 280, 285-287 (Miss. 1985). However, the test has not been, and cannot properly be applied when the defendant has invoked his right to remain silent and requested an attorney, and a statement is subsequently obtained as a result of an impermissible interrogation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). In Edwards, supra, the defendant had invoked his right to remain silent and his right to counsel on January 19, and was given his Miranda warnings and interrogated again on January 20. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 479, 101 S.Ct. at 1882, 68 L.Ed.2d at 382. The Arizona Supreme Court applied the totality of the circumstances test and determined the statement was given voluntarily. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Arizona Supreme Court applied an erroneous standard for determining waiver where the accused has specifically invoked his right to counsel. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482, 101 S.Ct. at 1883-84, 68 L.Ed.2d at 385. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court stated, If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d at 723. See also, Edwards v. Arizona, supra ; Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). In Cannaday v. State, supra , Justice Prather stated: It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 58 S.Ct. 1019 [1023], 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938). Cannaday, at 723, quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 482, 101 S.Ct. at 1884, 68 L.Ed.2d at 385. It was further stated that waiver of these rights, should not be inferred from the mere response by the accused to overt or more subtle forms of questioning. Cannaday, at 723, quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484, 101 S.Ct. at 1884, 68 L.Ed.2d at 386. Edwards v. Arizona established that the totality of the circumstances test cannot properly be applied to a statement which was solicited by the State after the accused had invoked his right to counsel, unless the State can show a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482, 101 S.Ct. at 1882, 68 L.Ed.2d at 385. The prosecution cannot, on this record, demonstrate that Reuben understood and waived his rights. The record states: Q. All you did was read it [ Miranda ] to him. You didn't discuss it with him, did you? A. I read it to him and asked him if he understood it. He said, Yes. Q. Okay. Now, did you ask him anything else other than did he understand it? A. Not pertaining to rights. No. Q. That's all you asked him: do you understand that? A. Right. Q. And you did not ask him at that time, Well, do you want a lawyer here? A. I don't recall yes or no. I wouldn't answer your question yes or no. This case is further complicated by the fact that Reuben's substantive rights were violated by Officer Dodd and Chief Myers on the night he was arrested. The oral statements which they obtained from Reuben were not voluntary. The impermissible questioning which occurred in the Pelahatchie Police Station bears on the admissibility of the written statement which was obtained the next morning in Brandon. It can be said that the written statement flowed from the impermissible questioning which occurred the previous night. The record reflects that during the impermissible questioning in Pelahatchie, Chief Myers arranged to have the statement reduced to writing on the following day. The written statement which Reuben gave the police was the same as the oral one he had given the night before. In Yates v. State, 467 So.2d 884 (Miss. 1984), speaking through Bowling, J., this Court allowed a defendant's statement to be admitted but held: The situation would be entirely different had the confession not been reiterated and signed after appellant conferred with his attorney. Yates, at 886. In Yates the defendant had been offered the opportunity to confer with an attorney and had conferred with an attorney and then waived his Miranda rights and gave the written statement. That is not the case here. There is no event in this record which breaks the causal connection between the illegal interrogation in Pelahatchie and the written statement which was obtained by the Chief of Police the following morning. The written statement should have been suppressed because it was the product of an illegal interrogation, which occurred without the presence of counsel after the right to counsel had been invoked. The police initiated questioning of Reuben in Brandon was impermissible and the Miranda warnings which were given were insufficient. Having once invoked his rights in vain it would have been reasonable for Reuben to conclude that he would be interrogated regardless of his response to the Miranda warnings. The admission of the written statement into evidence against David Reuben, Jr., violated his rights secured by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article III, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution, and Rule 1.03 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice. Therefore, the conviction of David Reuben, Jr., must be reversed and this cause remanded to the Circuit Court of Rankin County, Mississippi. REVERSED AND REMANDED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, ANDERSON, GRIFFIN and ZUCCARO, JJ., concur.