Opinion ID: 433473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs

Text: 31 Chua argues that the 1970 Drug Act under which he was convicted and sentenced incorporates the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which limits the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States. Chua points to Article 36(a)(2)(iv) of the Single Convention which states: 32 (iv) Serious offenses heretofore referred to committed either by nationals or by foreigners shall be prosecuted by the Party in whose territory the offense was committed, or by the Party in whose territory the offender is found if extradition is not acceptable in conformity with the law of the Party to which application is made, and if such offender has not already been prosecuted and judgment given. 33 18 U.S.T. 1407, 1425 (emphasis added). 34 Chua cites no authority supporting the proposition that the Single Convention limits the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States. The plain language of the cited provision does not limit the jurisdiction of the United States. The only effect of the provision is that Malaysia would have been required to prosecute Chua if extradition had not been acceptable to Malaysia. The provision is not applicable in this case because extradition was acceptable to Malaysia. V DOUBLE JEOPARDY 35 Chua argues that he was convicted in Malaysia for the same offense as in the instant case and that the fifth amendment bar against double jeopardy was thereby violated. Chua also argues that the Single Convention proscribes a second prosecution in the United States. These arguments are frivolous. 36 This court rejected an identical double jeopardy argument in United States v. Richardson, 580 F.2d 946 (9th Cir.1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1068, 99 S.Ct. 835, 59 L.Ed.2d 33 (1979). This court clearly held that prosecution by a foreign sovereign does not preclude the United States from bringing criminal charges. Id. at 947. The court also held that the Convention neither affects the sovereignty of member nations nor embodies an agreement to refrain from prosecuting a defendant who has previously been tried by another signatory nation. Id. Chua's attempts to distinguish Richardson are unpersuasive. VI CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED 37 Chua claims that the Bureau of Prisons has improperly denied him credit for the time served in Malaysia from August 4, 1975 to October 1, 1977. The Bureau based its decision on a telegram from the State Department which stated Chua's initial arrest was in no way related to the offense for which Chua was arrested and deported. The Government contends this issue is not properly before this court because Chua has not exhausted his administrative remedies. 38 Under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3568, [t]he Attorney General shall give any such person credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent in custody in connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed. This court has held that [i]t is the administrative responsibility of the Attorney General, the Department of Justice, and the Bureau of Prisons to compute sentences and apply credit where it is due. It is not the province of the sentencing court. United States v. Clayton, 588 F.2d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir.1979). It is only when a prisoner has exhausted his administrative remedies that he becomes entitled to litigate the matter in the district court. United States v. Mathis, 689 F.2d 1364, 1365 (11th Cir.1982). 39 This court recently explained why a petitioner must exhaust his administrative remedies before filing for collateral relief: 40 The requirement of exhaustion of remedies will aid judicial review by allowing the appropriate development of a factual record in an expert forum; conserve the court's time because of the possibility that the relief applied for may be granted at the administrative level; and allow the administrative agency an opportunity to correct errors occurring in the course of administrative proceedings. 41