Opinion ID: 765432
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Specific Intent Under Section 1324(a)(2)(B)

Text: 16 Section 1324 of United States Code Title 8 contains two different provisions making it illegal to bring in aliens to the United States. The first of these, 8 U.S.C.S 1324(a)(1) (A)(i), makes it a crime to bring in or attempt to bring into the United States an alien, knowing that the person is an alien, at a place other than a designated port of entry. 5 The second provision, 8 U.S.C. S 1324(a)(2), under which Ms. Barajas was charged and convicted, makes it a crime to bring an alien into the United States knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien has not received official permission to enter. 6 Section 1324(a)(1)(A) hinges on the place of entry, while S 1324(a)(2) hinges on the lack of official permission to enter. Violation of S 1324(a)(1)(A) is always a felony, while violation of S 1324(a)(2) is a gross misdemeanor unless aggravating circumstances are present, including commission of the offense for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain. 8 U.S.C. S 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii). 17 Looking solely at the wording of the statutes, neither provision contains a requirement that the defendant specifically intend to violate United States immigration laws. Section 1324(a)(1)(A) requires only that the defendant know that the person being brought in is an alien; S 1324(a)(2) requires only that the defendant know or recklessly disregard the fact that an alien has not received official permission to enter the United States. This court has nevertheless held that to convict a person of violating section 1324(a)(1)(A), the government must show that the defendant acted with criminal intent, i.e. the intent to violate United States immigration laws. United States v. Nguyen, 73 F.3d 887, 893 (9th Cir. 1995). No court has addressed the required mens rea under the felony provisions of S 1324(a)(2)(B). Relying primarily on Nguyen, Barajas contends that the same intent requirement should be inferred with respect to S 1324(a)(2)(B). We agree. 18 Nguyen involved reversal of an individual's conviction under 8 U.S.C. S 1324(a)(1)(A) when he claimed that he did not intend to help bring illegal aliens into the United States. Mr. Nguyen had been employed aboard a vessel in which other crew members had clearly intended to smuggle aliens; Nguyen contended that he learned of the plan after the ship was underway, that he only helped steer the vessel in this endeavor out of fear for his personal safety, and that he tried to notify the Coast Guard to stop the smuggling. A jury acquitted him of conspiracy to smuggle aliens, but convicted him of the substantive count after the district court failed to instruct the jury that intent to violate immigration laws was required for conviction. 19 This court noted that read literally, the statute does not contain a mens rea requirement, but found that one should nevertheless be read into the statute: 20 However, the statute's silence [regarding the required mental element of the offense] by itself does not necessarily suggest that Congress intended to dispense with a conventional mens rea element. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. at 600, 605, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1797, 128 L. Ed.2d 608 (1994); accord United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438, 98 S. Ct. 2864, 2874, 57 L. Ed.2d 854 (1978) (Certainly far more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement.). Rather, we construe the statute in light of the fundamental principle that a person is not criminally responsible unless an evil-meaning mind accompanies an evil-doing hand. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251, 72 S. Ct. 240, 244, 96 L. Ed. 288 (1952). 21 . . . Accordingly, criminal offenses requiring no mens rea have a generally disfavored status, Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426, 105 S. Ct. at 2088, and we are reluctant to conclude that Congress intended to dispense with mens rea as an element of a crime absent some indication of congressional intent. E.g. Staples, 511 U.S. at 605, 114 S. Ct. at 1797[.] 22 If after examining the statutory language and the legislative history we perceive any ambiguity regarding Congress's intent to require a showing of criminal intent, we will resolve the ambiguity by implying a mens reaelement. See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S. Ct. 1056, 1059, 28 L. Ed.2d 493 (1971) ([A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.). 23 Nguyen, 73 F.3d at 890-91 (alteration in original). These principles apply equally to the present case. 24 To ascertain congressional intent, Nguyen examined the legislative history of 8 U.S.C. S 1324 at great length. See id. at 891-93. In particular, the court noted that in the early 1980s, two courts had interpreted existing law as not allowing for prosecution of individuals who brought illegal aliens into the United States and took them directly to INS officials for processing. Id. at 892. Congress then amended 8 U.S.C. S 1324 by passing a new section, S 1324(a)(2), creating a misdemeanor offense reaching the conduct at issue in the two prior decisions. Id. at 893. The Nguyen court's discussion of the legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended to eliminate the mens rearequirement for the misdemeanor offense in S 1324(a)(2). The Nguyen court, however, made a crucial distinction between the misdemeanor provision of S 1324(a)(2) and the felony provision at S 1324(a)(1)(A). The court concluded that nothing in the statute or its legislative history indicated that, with respect to the felony offense found at S 1324(a)(1)(A), Congress meant to dispense with the mens rearequirement assumed to be an element of every common law offense. Id. at 893. 25 Similarly, nothing in the statute or legislative history indicates that Congress intended to dispense with a mens rearequirement for the felony offense of violating 8 U.S.C. S 1324(a)(2)(B). Subsection (B) adds the aggravating circumstances which elevate the offense to a felony: committing the offense (i) with reason to believe that the alien will commit a serious crime against the United States, (ii) for financial gain, or (iii) without bringing the alien immediately to an immigration officer at a designated port of entry. 8 U.S.C. 26 S 1324(a)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). These three aggravating circumstances demonstrate the substantial overlap between the felony provisions of 8 U.S.C. S 1324(a)(2)(B) and S 1324(a)(1)(A). A violation of 8 U.S.C. S 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii), bringing in an alien without taking such alien to the immigration officer for inspection, is nearly identical to the conduct criminalized at 8 U.S.C. S 1324(a)(1)(A). In this case, appellant could have been charged with the felony offense of bringing in aliens under S 1324(a)(1)(A); in fact, she was charged with conspiracy to violate S 1324(a)(1)(A) rather than conspiracy to violate S 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii). The substantial overlap between the felony statutes and the serious penalties for their violation raise the concerns expressed in Nguyen : Were we to conclude otherwise, we would be left with a statute that exposes persons who perform innocent acts to lengthy prison sentences. 73 F.3d at 893. Without a specific intent instruction, the jury does not have to consider whether a defendant intended to violate immigration laws, and therefore the jury could conceivably believe that they had to convict in a case like Mr. Nguyen's where the defendant conceded his involvement in performing the act of alien smuggling but had plausible claims that he nevertheless lacked the intent to violate the law. We therefore follow Nguyen and hold that criminal intent is required for conviction of the felony offenses of 8 U.S.C. S 1324(a)(2)(B). 27 The jury instructions given at Barajas's trial did not include an instruction on specific intent, and resulted in error. 7 This conclusion, however, does not automatically compel reversal of appellant's conviction because she failed to object to them at trial. 28 The failure to object to jury instructions requires plain error review. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 (1997); United States v. Keys, 133 F.3d 1282, 1284 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Under this test, an appellate court considers whether there is (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) which affects substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467 (internal punctuation omitted). In this case, we have already concluded that there is an error. We 29 need not reach the second or third condition, however, because the error in this case clearly does not meet the fourth condition. Barajas has not argued that she did not intend to violate the immigration laws. Furthermore, the evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly demonstrated that the alien smuggling scheme in this case was conducted in knowing violation of the immigration laws, and that appellant's involvement was substantial. Cases in which a defendant knowingly transported an alien without permission to enter into the United States, and did so for financial gain, but did not intend to violate immigration laws, would be rare. Although it did not involve the financial gain element, Nguyen did involve these other circumstances; this case clearly does not. We therefore conclude that the failure to provide a specific intent instruction was not plain error justifying reversal. 30