Opinion ID: 2622902
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Longline Fishery

Text: An applicant must establish that he or she is eligible to apply for a permit. To establish eligibility for the Southern Southeast Inside longline fishery, an applicant must prove that he or she harvested the fishery resource commercially while participating in the fishery as the holder of a gear license . . . and an interim-use permit . . . during at least one of the calendar years 1975-1984. [18] Participation is defined as: Active engagement in a commercial fishing operation that harvested and sold the sablefish resource in the fishery for which the applicant is applying if the sablefish sales were in accordance with regulations governing the sale or use of commercially caught sablefish applicable at the time of sale, including regulations regarding proper completion of reports required of processors; buyers, and fishermen. [19] In sum, to establish eligibility an applicant must prove both a commercial harvest and that participation took place within the boundaries of the fishery while properly licensed. May challenges CFEC's determination that he was not eligible to apply for a permit in the longline fishery. CFEC based its determination on its findings that May did not participate in the fishery and did not prove a commercial harvest. May contests both findings. May first contends that CFEC erred when it determined that he did not participate in the fishery. This question turns largely on where May fished in 1980 and whether he submitted adequate documentation to support his claim of where he fished. The affidavits from his crew and from May himself indicated that they fished in Southern Clarence Strait and in the waters outside Noyes Island. During the November 4, 1988 hearing, May indicated the areas he fished with an X. As CFEC summarized, the marks are all in waters between 132 degrees 20' and 131 degrees 40' West longitude, and 54 degrees 30' and 54 degrees 50' North latitude. Barry Bracken had testified that although the waters above 54 degrees 40' North latitude (the AB line) were closed, the waters below that line were open [20] In his decision, the hearing officer stated that [i]n deciding where Mr. May probably fished in 1980, and with what kind of gear, one has to choose which version of the events to believe, his testimony at the hearing or his earlier statement, which is in accord with the statements of his crew.. The hearing officer concluded: [May] probably fished with longline gear in the southern part of Clarence Strait, probably north of the [AB] line and possibly south of it, and then went back to the federal waters outside Noyes Island. . . . The record supports a finding that Mr. May probably caught black cod with longline gear north of the [AB] line (the federal intrusion zone in the southern part of Clarence Strait) but it does not support a finding that he did so south of that line Unfortunately, his landings north of the [AB] line were illegal since the area was not open at the time, and his landings in outside federal waters were far beyond the area included in Southeastern Alaska. . . . In deciding that May was not eligible, the hearing officer also noted considerable vagueness and uncertainty surrounding the way things worked in 1980. . . . But as the hearing officer recognized, despite any uncertainty, it was undisputed that any fishing May did south of the AB line was legal. And May himself indicated that he fished below the AB line. May's earlier affidavit and those of his crew confirm that he was fishing in the general geographic area. Contrary to the hearing officer's suggestion, these affidavits are not inconsistent with a finding that May caught fish south of the AB line. Although the affidavits do not give an exact latitude sufficient to prove exactly how far south May fished, they do not contradict a finding that May fished south of the AB line. Yet despite the affidavits of May's crew, May's own testimony, and the hearing officer's note that May possibly fished south of [the AB line], the hearing officer inexplicably concluded that May did not catch black cod south of the AB line. Under these circumstances, this determination is not supported by substantial evidence. Similarly, CFEC's determination that May did not prove a commercial harvest is based on speculation rather than substantial evidence. In contesting CFEC's finding, May points to his own affidavit and testimony along with affidavits from his crew and an AIPC manager indicating that he sold black cod and a ledger sheet from AIPCas proof of his commercial sale. May maintains that the hearing officer's conclusion that May merely resold bait to AIPC and sold black cod to other fishermennot to AIPCamounts to speculation and theory that is not supported by substantial evidence. We agree. During his hearings, May testified that he sold longline-caught black cod to AIPC in 1980. May also submitted affidavits from members of his crew recalling the catch and sale of black cod with longline gear, as well as an affidavit from Freeman McGilton, manager of AIPC, who indicated that he bought longline-caught black cod from May in 1980. May also submitted an accounts receivable ledger from AIPC along with a letter stating that it appears that Mr. May did sell black cod to Annette Island Packing Company in [1980]. Despite this evidence, the hearing officer reasoned that AIPC issued no fish ticket because Mr. May was not selling commercially caught fish. He concluded: The bait Mr. May sold to AIPC on May 13 was probably part of the bait he purchased for his pots before going out to federal waters off Noyes Island with the [CIGALE]. It probably stayed frozen in the [CIGALE's] freezer, and when his disastrous attempts to fish for black cod ended, he was left with a surplus of bait, which he then sold to (or back to) AIPC. . . . It appears more likely than not that Mr. May did not sell black cod to AIPC in 1980 but, rather, sold a total of 691 pounds of black cod to someone, perhaps another fisherman, and AIPC merely advanced him the amount to be paid by the buyer. But as May notes, this conclusion is based solely on speculation. And this speculative conclusion contradicts the sworn affidavits of May, his crew, and Freeman McGilton, manager of AIPC. [21] Under these circumstances, the hearing officer's decision that May did not commercially harvest sablefish with longline gear is not supported by substantial evidence. In upholding the hearing officer's decision, CFEC noted May's failure to produce fish tickets, and concluded that [s]uch an unauthorized landing would not be entitled to credit toward eligibility. In its brief before this court, CFEC does not argue that the failure to produce fish tickets is dispositive-indeed such an argument would be inconsistent with CFEC's own precedent. In Krumal, [22] Ayojiak, [23] and Weis, [24] CFEC found applicants eligible despite a lack of fish tickets. In those cases, CFEC excused the lack of fish tickets where applicants had explanations for their inability to produce the tickets and where evidence supported a finding that applicants had commercially harvested the resource while properly licensed. Though not dispositive, CFEC argues that May's failure to produce a fish ticket raises an inference that a landing may not have occurred, or if it did occur, may have been unauthorized and cannot be used to demonstrate eligibility. [25] CFEC goes on to contend that May failed to overcome this inference because he never explained the absence of fish tickets and never proved a commercial harvest. But as we explained above, the record supports a conclusion that May commercially harvested sablefish with longline gear. Moreover, he did offer an explanation for the lack of fish tickets. During his May 19, 1988 hearing, May admitted that he was unable to produce fish tickets to support the sale of sablefish in 1980. May's counsel explained that May attempted to obtain fish tickets from AIPC. However, he did not succeed: Freeman said well I don't know, let's go look in the loft. So they went and looked in the loft, and they said no, everything's down in Seattle now, because that's where their home office is. So they went to Seattle and they said we don't know where they are. What we have is accounts receivable sheets which they evidently faxed up to Annette Island, so that Annette Island could figure out where they were. May's counsel explained that Annette Island has changed hands three times since this thing was put up. Bert no longer really, fishes for them. So they're not really helpful. Thus, contrary to CFEC's contention, May did offer an explanation as to why he did not have fish tickets. Taken together, the affidavits and testimony that May submitted to prove his commercial harvest, along with this explanation for his failure to produce fish tickets, overcome any negative inference resulting from May's failure to produce fish tickets. As a result, we conclude that CFEC erred when it determined that May was not eligible to apply for a permit in the longline fishery.
CFEC determines applicants' order of priority using a points-based system that awards points for past participation in the fishery and economic dependence on the fishery. [26] CFEC determined that, even if May were eligible to apply for a permit, he had not established that he qualified for any points. May contests this determination, claiming he is entitled to past participation points based on extraordinary circumstances. CFEC awards up to seventy points for past participation in the fishery. [27] To be eligible for skipper participation points, an applicant must have commercially harvested at least 1,000 pounds of sablefish in the longline fishery and 2,000 pounds of sablefish in the pot fishery as a skipper. [28] Skipper participation points are available for the 1982 through 1984 seasons. [29] In addition, those who are eligible for points for the 1982, 1983, or 1984 seasons may also claim points for the 1975 through 1981 sections. [30] May does not claim to have participated in the years 1982 through 1984. As a result, he is not eligible for past participation points unless he can demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from participating in 1982, 1983, or 1984. CFEC regulations provide: If extraordinary circumstances prevented an applicant from participating in the fishery in a given season, the commission will, in its discretion, award the applicant those points the applicant could reasonably have claimed but for the extraordinary circumstances. Extraordinary circumstances include temporary illness or disability, the loss of a vessel or equipment through sinking, destruction, or extensive mechanical breakdown, and other similar objectively verifiable causes of non-participation. Extraordinary circumstances do not include, for example, voluntary or involuntary retirement from the fishery, permanent illness, permanent disability, or loss of the financial means to participate in the fishery. [31] May contends that he proved extraordinary circumstances when he testified that he was forced to sell the CIGALE in 1981 when his marriage dissolved. Ile argues that this was a moral obligation, that circumstances were sudden and beyond his control. As a, result, he concludes that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from participating in 1982 and claims that he should be awarded points for at least 1980 through 1982 in the Pot fishery and for 1975 and 1980 through 1982 in the longline fishery. We hold that CFEC properly denied May's claim for past participation points. As May recognizes, 20 AAC 05.707(a)(1)(C) and cant be eligible for points in 1982, 1983, or 1984 before he can claim points for previous years. May's only claim for points in 1982 through 1984 is his extraordinary circumstances claim, which CFEC properly denied. In Cleaver v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, we upheld the hearing officer's determination that an applicant with mechanical problems did not meet the three-part test for extraordinary circumstances. [32] This test requires an applicant to show: (1) specific intent to participate; (2) that extraordinary circumstances prevented participation; and (3) that the applicant made all reasonable [or possible] efforts. [33] We noted that Cleaver's lack of experience and appropriate equipment [did] not constitute extraordinary circumstances. [34] Similarly, May cannot show extraordinary circumstances. As the hearing officer noted, May had another vesselthe F/V SATELITEwhich he could have used in the years 1982 through 1984 but elected not to use. When asked at his November 4, 1988 hearing why he did not fish with the SATELLITE, May testified that his wife was after half of any income that I had prior to the divorce. So I couldn't do anything without giving her half. When asked if there was any other reason, he testified that the price was terrible. In other words, May made no showing of any intent to participate, nor did he demonstrate how-even if it qualified as an extraordinary circumstance [35] the sale of the CIGALE prevented him from using the SATELLITE. Because May does not meet the test for extraordinary circumstances, CFEC properly refused to award him past participation points.
CFEC regulations provide that Lamn applicant may claim 15 points for investment, as of January 1, 1985, in a vessel that the applicant used or intended to use in the Southern Southeast Inside sablefish fishery. [36] To be eligible for vessel investment points, an applicant must demonstrate `that the sum of the applicant's annual catch values for the years 1982-1984 is at least $1,000. [37] May argues that he should be granted fifteen points for vessel investment because he still owned the [SATELLITE] on and after the qualification date and, but for the extraordinary circumstances . [that required the sale of the CIGALE,] he would likely have harvested' at least $1,000 worth of sablefish in 1982-1984. But May points to no evidence that he used or intended to use the SATELLITE in the fishery. Indeed, he testified that the SATELLITE was seaworthy and that he still had some pots and longline gear, yet he did not use the vessel in the fishery. Instead, he suggests that he intended to use it but was somehow prevented from doing so by the sale of the CIGALE. But he does not explain how that sale prevented him from using the SATELLITE in the fishery. May's own testimony that he did not use the SATELLITE because of his divorce and the low price contradicts his argument that he intended to use the SATELLITE in the fishery. Based on this testimony, CFEC's conclusion that May did not use or intend to use the SATELLITE in the fishery in 1982 through 1984 is supported by substantial evidence. As a result, CFEC properly determined that May was not entitled to fifteen points for vessel investment.
CFEC may limit participation in a fishery by setting a maximum number of permits. [38] As we explained in Simpson v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, the maximum number must be at a level no lower than the highest number of participants during any one of the four years prior to limitation of the fishery and must meet the Act's two legislative purposes of `enabling fishermen to receive adequate remuneration and conserving the fishery.' [39] May challenges CFEC's determination that eighteen is the maximum number of permits in the longline fishery. He claims that CFEC failed to cite any evidence to support its determination of the maximum number in the fishery and contests CFEC's determination that he does not have standing to challenge the maximum number of permits in the longline fishery. In its final commission decision, CFEC concluded that May did not have standing to challenge the maximum number because he was not eligible to apply for a permit and because he qualified for zero points. [40] But as explained above, we hold that May was eligible to apply for a permit. And although we affirm CFEC's determination that May was not entitled to points, CFEC does not refute May's contention that even an applicant with zero points could qualify for a permit if the maximum number were higher. As a result, May has an interest in challenging the maximum number of permits. CFEC also maintains that May has the burden of proof in challenging the maximum number. CFEC quotes our holding in Simpson that a person challenging the maximum number has the burden of showing that the number was an expression of whim rather than a product of reason. [41] It asserts that May failed to meet this burden and argues that the regulation is presumed valid. CFEC contends that May is attempting to shift the burden of proof and is asking that this court indulge him in a search of Commission records to support his proposition that the maximum number should be higher. CFEC is correct that we held in Simpson that an applicant challenging a maximum number must show that the number was the expression of whim. [42] However, unlike in Simpson, where CFEC had considered Alaska Department of Fish and Game comments that this fishery was troubled and that even seventy-three might be too large a number to promote effective management, [43] CFEC points to no documentation explaining its determinations in this case. We therefore cannot conclude as a matter of law that May's contention is without merit. Because CFEC based its determination below on its conclusion that May did not have standing to challenge the maximum number, and because we hold that he does have an interest in challenging the maximum number, we remand for further consideration of his argument. [44]