Opinion ID: 2979072
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unfair or Improperly Influenced Verdict

Text: Nos. 08-2232, 08-2268 Hillside Productions, Inc., et al. v. County of Macomb Page 15 Plaintiffs next argue that the district court abused its discretion when it held that the jury’s verdict was not improperly influenced or otherwise unfair due to the admission of evidence concerning advice of counsel and the Fifth Third Bank documents, and the improper conduct of defense counsel. Evidentiary rulings fall within the broad discretion of the district court, Conklin v. Lovely, 834 F.2d 543, 551 (6th Cir. 1987), and a new trial is proper only when an abuse of discretion has an effect on the final result, Leonard v. Uniroyal, Inc., 765 F.2d 560, 567 (6th Cir. 1985). As the district court noted, the challenged evidence2 – the advice of counsel evidence and the Fifth Third Bank evidence – constituted “a small portion of a nearly month-long trial and did not relate to an actual defense.” (August 28, 2008 Dist. Ct. Order at 13.) It held that this evidence did not have a substantial effect on the final result of the trial. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion in limine concerning the advice of counsel evidence, “finding that Defendant would not rely on advice as counsel as an affirmative defense and that the such evidence was therefore not relevant to any fact of consequence in the case.” (Id.) After trial, the district court held that the County “in fact presented no such defense at trial.” (Id.) It noted that while “certain witnesses touched upon advice of counsel, it [sic] did so in a tangential way and not with the effect of suggesting to the jury that Defendant simply followed the advice of counsel and should therefore not be held liable.” (Id.) 2 Plaintiffs also challenge the admission of testimony by two individuals, Brumbaugh and Meyerand. The district court properly held that Plaintiffs waived this issue by failing to provide adequate briefing on it in their motion for judgment as a matter of law. Moreover, as the County notes, “Although plaintiffs’ counsel asserted at trial that these witnesses had not been produced for deposition, plaintiffs’ counsel subsequently withdrew her objection, stating that counsel ‘let him testify and then I can bring in the history of correspondence between us if necessary.’” (Appellee’s Br. at 41.) No correspondence was provided, and no curative jury instruction was requested. Nos. 08-2232, 08-2268 Hillside Productions, Inc., et al. v. County of Macomb Page 16 With regard to the Fifth Third Bank documents the court noted that Plaintiffs did not object to this evidence at trial, and held that it was not convinced that these documents were “surprise” evidence. With respect to the alleged misconduct of counsel, the district court noted that “Plaintiffs raise isolated moments in a lengthy trial.” (Id. at 14.) The district court correctly found that there was no unfair prejudice resulting from the admission of the challenged evidence at trial or the conduct of counsel at trial. Much of the testimony that Plaintiffs describes as “advice of counsel” evidence was elicited by Plaintiffs. There were adequate jury instructions, no advice of counsel defense presented at trial, no timely objections to the admission of the contested evidence, and the contested evidence was merely a small portion of the evidence presented at trial and was not prejudicial. When a new trial is requested on the basis of counsel’s conduct, there must be clear prejudice that would justify a new trial. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1939). The alleged misconduct drew no timely objections. The district court instructed the jury not to consider the arguments of counsel as evidence (Jury Instruction 4-5), and courts must presume that juries follow instructions. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9 (1985). Plaintiffs have failed to show that there has been an abuse of discretion that had a substantial effect on the outcome of the trial. See Conklin, 834 F.2d at 551. Moreover, even if the admission of the challenged evidence was an abuse of discretion, it was harmless error. Admission of improper evidence at trial will not warrant a new trial unless a different ruling would have caused a different outcome at trial. See Morales v. American Honda Motor Co, 151 F.3d 500, 514 (6th Cir. 1998). The challenged evidence relates to issues that were Nos. 08-2232, 08-2268 Hillside Productions, Inc., et al. v. County of Macomb Page 17 merely tangential to the parties claims and did not create the type of prejudice that would affect the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, the district court’s rulings on these issues and the jury’s verdict are AFFIRMED. B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment As a Matter of Law The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding that Plaintiffs failed to bring a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law before the case was submitted to the jury. We review a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. See Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Systems, Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005). A court may grant a motion for a judgment as a matter of law if “‘there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue . . . .’” Mike’s Train House, 472 F.3d 398, 405 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1)). Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact for the jury, and reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion, in favor of the moving party.” Noble v. Brinker International, Inc., 391 F.3d 715, 720 (6th Cir. 2004). Courts may grant a party’s motion for judgment as a matter of law if “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). A motion for judgment as a matter of law must “be made at any time before the case is submitted to the jury. The motion must specify the judgment sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(1)(2); see American and Foreign Nos. 08-2232, 08-2268 Hillside Productions, Inc., et al. v. County of Macomb Page 18 Insurance Co. v. Bolt, 106 F.3d 155, 160. “A post-trial motion for judgment can be granted only on grounds advanced in the pre-verdict motion.” American and Foreign Insurance Co., 106 F.3d at160 (quoting Advisory Committee Note, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 (1991)). Plaintiffs claim that they were prohibited from elaborating on their Rule 50 motion; however, the record indicates otherwise. At trial before the jury recessed, counsel for Plaintiffs stated, “I’d like to reserve my Rule 50 motion for later so we can keep proceeding on.” (5/1/2009 Tr. at 127.) The court indicated that “you’ve successfully preserved that position.” (Id.) After the jury recessed, the parties had oral argument on the County’s pending Rule 50 motions and several other matters. (Id. at 128-205.) During these arguments, although the court noted that Plaintiffs’ counsel mentioned that she wanted to elaborate on Plaintiffs’ Rule 50 claims, Plaintiffs’ counsel never did so. Counsel discussed Defendant’s Rule 50 motions during oral argument. Plaintiffs responded to the County’s Rule 50 motions by seeking a jury determination on the issues. The morning following this oral argument, the court announced its decision to reserve the pending Rule 50 motions and return to them after the jury deliberated. Plaintiffs did not object to this, and Plaintiffs never made a Rule 50 motion on the record before the jury verdict was rendered. Plaintiffs never provided the factual or legal basis for their entitlement to relief under Rule 50. Plaintiffs may not now rely upon their general statement that they reserved their right to make a Rule 50 motion. A Rule 50 motion “must specify the judgment sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(1)(2). The record is clear that Plaintiffs never made a motion on the record before the verdict was rendered. The arguments were centered Nos. 08-2232, 08-2268 Hillside Productions, Inc., et al. v. County of Macomb Page 19 on the County’s Rule 50 motions, and Plaintiffs never raised any issues or provided a basis for why they were entitled to relief under Rule 50. In fact, Plaintiffs argued in favor of a jury determination on many of the issues. Their failure to raise their claims was more than a minor technical error – they simply never made the motion. Rule 50 is meant to “narrowly restrict the grounds used to overturn a jury verdict by requiring that parties raises important issues before the case is submitted to the jury.” American and Foreign Insurance Co. v. Bolt, 106 F.3d 155, 160. Accordingly, the district court properly held that Plaintiffs did not make a Rule 50 motion and its determination on this issue is AFFIRMED. C. Exclusion of Plaintiffs’ Expert Testimony When considering the admissibility of proffered expert testimony, trial courts are given “the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.” Daubert v. Merrell Down Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993). The trial court is afforded “a relatively wide degree of discretion” in determining whether to admit expert testimony. See United States v. Paris, 243 F.3d 286, 288 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The party proffering the evidence bears the burden of proving its admissibility. See Nelson v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 243 F.3d 244, 251 (6th Cir. 2001). A “party proffering expert testimony must show by a ‘preponderance of proof’ that the expert whose testimony is being offered is qualified and will testify to scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in understanding and disposing of issues relevant to the case.” Pride v. BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10) . Nos. 08-2232, 08-2268 Hillside Productions, Inc., et al. v. County of Macomb Page 20 Plaintiffs’ expert, Mark Crawford, is a certified public accountant, and his testimony was intended to establish the damages stemming from the County’s alleged breach of contract. The district court excluded the expert testimony and found that “Crawford’s report is heavy on argumentative narrative and short on verification for his figures.” (February 15, 2008 Dist. Ct. Order at 3.) This finding was not an abuse of discretion given the content of the report. The district court noted that Mark Crawford’s report is nineteen pages long, and six of those pages provide background on the case. The court found that the report tends to repeat the claims in the complaint and does not provide much independent specialized analysis. And, the analysis that it does provide relies on questionable methodology. As the district court noted, the “most glaring example of unsubstantiated conclusion” was Crawford’s projection that the projected loss should be based on the total purchase of the transaction “without offsetting the value of the asset that Plaintiffs retained when the transaction fell through.” (February 15, 2008 Dist. Ct. Order at 5.) Plaintiffs argue that this methodology was not improper because “there were no willing purchasers after the transaction . . . failed to close.” (Appellants’ Br. at 68.) However, there is evidence on record that PSE is still willing to enter a contract with Plaintiffs. Furthermore, the expected profits analysis in the report does not have a sufficient basis in the facts or reliable methodology. Crawford projected an over $2 million loss in 2006 although Plaintiffs did not make a profit prior to 2006. When asked about the basis of one of his assumptions at reaching this figure, he stated that he pulled it “right out of my head.” (Id. at 5.) Given these serious methodological issues in his analysis, the district court did not abuse its wide discretion in excluding Crawford’s report. Nos. 08-2232, 08-2268 Hillside Productions, Inc., et al. v. County of Macomb Page 21 Moreover, even if the exclusion of Crawford’s testimony was erroneous, it was a harmless error. The jury never reached the issue of damages because it rejected Plaintiffs’ claims that the County committed a breach of contract. See Toth v. Grand Trunk Railroad, 306 F.3d 335, 355 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding the exclusion of damages testimony harmless error where the jury found that the plaintiff failed to prove the claim at issue). For the foregoing reasons, the district court exclusion of Crawford’s testimony is AFFIRMED. D. Plaintiffs’ Procedural Due Process Claims Plaintiffs argue that the district court improperly granted summary judgment against them on their procedural due process claims. This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. See Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 727 (6th Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is only appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. 56(c). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693, 699 (6th Cir. 2005). Plaintiffs must show that they had a constitutionally protected property interest, suffered a deprivation of this protected interest, and that the County did not provide adequate procedural rights prior to the deprivation to prevail on a procedural due process claim. See Med Corp., Inc. City of Lima, 296 F.3d 404, 409 (6th Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs argue that “MCPRC’s improper vote to keep all parking revenue from non-Hillside-sponsored events was done without affording plaintiffs proper notice or an opportunity to be heard, and was an act that in and of itself inflicted an immediate injury on plaintiffs.” (Appellants’ Br. at 65.) The district court rejected this argument and noted that the deprivation would not occur until parking revenue had been collected, divided, and paid; Plaintiffs had the opportunity to challenge the vote before it went into effect; and Nos. 08-2232, 08-2268 Hillside Productions, Inc., et al. v. County of Macomb Page 22 the County had proposed a meeting on the issue a few days after Plaintiffs objected to the vote. The MCPRC vote could have been rescinded after such meeting. Plaintiffs cite Nasierowski Brothers Inventory Co. v. Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1991), to support their claim that they suffered an immediate injury after the Board made its decision to keep all parking revenue. In Nasierowski, the city passed a zoning ordinance, without notice or an opportunity to be heard, that severely limited plaintiff’s ability to use his land and resulted in immediate injury. Id. However, that case is clearly distinguishable from the current matter. Unlike the plaintiff in that case, who would be “placed in a position where he would be required to expend considerable time, effort, and money to restore the status quo ante,” see id., Plaintiffs would have incurred no injury until after the parking revenues were collected. The MCPRC’s decision did not change the nature of the property or the nature of the type of activities that could occur there. Plaintiffs had ample opportunity to be heard during the County’s proposed meeting and were given adequate notice of the County’s decision. There were no genuine issues of material fact concerning the adequacy of procedural due process that the County provided Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the district court determination on this issue is AFFIRMED.