Opinion ID: 463698
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Finality and Discharge

Text: 106 Even though the Act did not provide for an exclusive remedy, it did contain a provision suggesting that if an evacuee brought a claim under its provisions he would be barred from bringing subsequent claims concerning the evacuation and internment programs. Thus Section 1984(d) of the American-Japanese Evacuation Claims Act, 50 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1981 et seq. (1982), reads as follows: 107 [T]he payment of an award shall be final and conclusive for all purposes, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, and shall be a full discharge of the United States    with respect to all claims arising out of the same subject matter. 108 The plain language of Section 1984(d) bars all suits brought under the Takings Clause once an evacuee has received an award under the Act. 69 The Claims Act must therefore be read to force claimants to choose between attempting to receive the bounty provided by Congress under the Act or exercising their constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment. 109 We are not unmindful of the hard choice to which Congress put the evacuees. By forcing them to choose between a ready administrative remedy and a costly lawsuit, Congress effectively forced the evacuees to settle for half a loaf rather than risk a fight for what the Constitution declares to be theirs by right. In so doing Congress acted on the outer perimeter of its authority. It did not, however, exceed its authority. 70 Nor are we unaware of the manner in which the Solicitor General's alleged wrongful concealment narrowed the evacuees' legal choices at that time. Nonetheless, it is apparent that the congressional offer was made in good faith and that the United States is not estopped from raising Section 1984(d). 71 We therefore reluctantly conclude that petitions for reconsideration of this harsh policy of finality are properly addressed to Congress and not to this court.