Opinion ID: 1089369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Declaratory-Judgment Aspect of Good Hope's Complaint

Text: Good Hope argues that it is entitled to a declaratory judgment against ALDOT notwithstanding the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Implicit in this argument is the proposition that Good Hope can sue the State agency directly instead of naming as a defendant the relevant State official. We discussed the declaratory-judgment exception to State immunity in Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro. In that case, the Town of Lowndesboro and a landowner filed a declaratory-judgment action against the Alabama Department of Environmental Management (ADEM) seeking to invalidate a permit issued by ADEM to operate a solid-waste landfill. Ultimately, the trial court declared the landfill permit void, and it awarded the plaintiffs interim attorney fees and expenses. ADEM appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which reversed the trial court's judgment on the ground of sovereign immunity. On certiorari review, we affirmed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. Although the declaratory-judgment action named only the State agency, and not a State official, we expressed] no opinion regarding whether the underlying declaratory-judgment action was permissible under § 14. We concluded that the award of attorney fees and costs was prohibited by the State's sovereign immunity. Similarly, we express no opinion regarding whether the declaratory-judgment exception allows Good Hope to name a State agency as a defendant notwithstanding that agency's absolute immunity under § 14, Ala. Const.1901. Even if we were to assume that the declaratory-judgment exception could apply to an action naming a State agency, [3] the exception would be of no help to Good Hope. The declaratory-judgment exception to sovereign immunity applies when the declaratory-judgment action seeks no relief other than the `construction of a statute and how it should be applied in a given situation.' Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So.2d at 1211 (quoting Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. at 230, 250 So.2d at 679). Good Hope's complaint does not ask the trial court to construe a statute and declare how it should be applied. Instead, it asks the trial court to declare the liquidated-damages provision of its contracts with ALDOT illegal as an unenforceable penalty. For the first time in this Court, Good Hope argues that in its complaint it was seeking a declaratory judgment construing § 41-16-3(a), Ala.Code 1975, which reads, in pertinent part, as follows: Whenever the State of Alabama is a party to any contract, the contract shall be executed by all parties in a timely fashion. When a party to a contract, other than the state, has fully executed the responsibility under the contract and there remains only the payment of funds by the state, payment shall be made in a timely manner. Good Hope does not explain how this statute is legally relevant to its claim. Moreover, [s]ection 14 bars an action characterized as a declaratory-judgment action `when it is nothing more than an action for damages.' Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So.2d at 1211 (quoting Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So.2d 257, 263 (Ala.2003)). It is not at all apparent how our construction of § 41-16-3(a) could benefit Good Hope unless, in construing it, we also concluded that the liquidated-damages provision in the contracts is void as a penalty or that ALDOT otherwise breached its contractual obligations. A result favorable to Good Hope, however, would then directly affect a contract right of ALDOT and would necessarily open the doors of the State treasury to legal attack. Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So.2d at 1211. Good Hope has gone beyond pray[ing] for guidance both to complainant and the State officers trying to enforce the law so as to prevent them from making injurious mistakes through an honest interpretation of the law. . . . Curry v. Woodstock Slag Corp., 242 Ala. 379, 381, 6 So.2d 479, 481 (1942). For this reason, even though Good Hope's complaint is styled in part as seeking a declaratory judgment, it is nonetheless barred by the immunity provision of § 14, Ala. Const.1901.