Opinion ID: 4241440
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Board’s Severinsky-Based

Text: Obviousness Determinations The Board determined that Severinsky renders obvious various claims of the ’634 and ’097 patents. Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying factual findings relating to “the scope and content of the prior art, differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, Dkt. 51 (Fed. Cir. June 29, 2017); Ltr. from Appellants, No. 17-1406, Paice LLC v. Ford Motor Co., Dkt. 46 (Fed. Cir. June 19, 2017). PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY 9 the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, and any objective indicia of non-obviousness.” Randall Mfg. v. Rea, 733 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007)). We review the Board’s ultimate legal determination of obviousness de novo and its underlying factual findings for substantial evidence. PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC, 815 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
Discloses a Torque-Based Control Algorithm Paice argues that the Board erred in finding that Severinsky discloses a torque-based system for selecting operating modes. According to Paice, Severinsky teaches a speed-based system, and, to the extent Severinsky mentions torque at all, it refers only to the engine’s output torque, which is different from the claimed road load torque. We disagree. As the Board found, Severinsky discloses that a microprocessor may determine “the load (if any) to be provided to the engine by the motor, responsive to the load imposed by the vehicle’s propulsion requirements, so that the engine can be operated in its most fuel efficient operating range.” 758 IPR, slip op. at 18 (emphasis altered) (quoting Severinsky, col. 17, ll. 11–15). The Board found that “the load imposed by the vehicle’s propulsion requirements” is the road load. Id. at 18–19. Thus, the Board reasonably concluded that Severinsky’s electric motor can be triggered in response to the vehicle’s road load. As the Board also found, Severinsky elsewhere states that the microprocessor “determines whether the internal combustion engine or the electric motor or both should 10 PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY provide torque to the wheels under various monitored operating conditions.” Id. at 15 (emphasis altered) (quoting Severinsky, col. 6, ll. 19–23). This passage suggests that “torque to the wheels”—i.e., road load—is a criterion for determining which mode of operation to select. Finally, Severinsky states that the combustion engine is used “only in the near vicinity of its most efficient operational point,” which is when the engine “produces 60–90% of its maximum torque.” Id. at 16 (quoting Severinsky col. 20, ll. 63–67). Ford’s expert testified that “a skilled artisan would have understood that Severinsky’s lower limit of 60% of MTO is a ‘setpoint.’” Id. at 17. Based on that testimony, the Board concluded that Severinsky teaches that its engine operates when the road load reaches a setpoint. The Board’s finding that Severinsky uses road load torque, rather than engine output torque, is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The Board’s findings are also consistent with the ’634 patent’s own description of Severinsky. The ’634 patent states that “an important aspect of the invention of” Severinsky is that, “[w]hen the vehicle operating conditions require torque of [a certain] magnitude, the engine is used to propel the vehicle,” but “when less torque is required, an electric motor powered by electrical energy stored in a substantial battery bank drives the vehicle.” 785 IPR, slip op. at 57 (quoting ’634 patent, col. 25, ll. 11– 24) (emphases added). As the Board concluded, this and other statements indicate that road load is used to select operating modes and are “probative on how one with ordinary skill in the art at the time of filing of the involved patent would have read and understood the disclosure of the prior art.” Id. at 54–55, 57; see also PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Admissions in the specification regarding the prior art are binding on the patentee for purposes of a later inquiry into obviousness.”). PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY 11 Paice’s argument that Severinsky discloses a speedbased comparison rather than a torque-based one is undermined by the passages described above. It is true that Severinsky refers to speed when describing certain modes of operation. See, e.g., Severinsky, col. 18, ll. 36–38 (“The vehicle will operate in a highway mode with the engine running constantly after the vehicle reaches a speed of 30–35 mph.”). But, as the Board explained, even if Severinsky describes speed as one factor that can be considered, it describes torque as another factor, as described above. Further, the ’634 patent similarly refers to speed when describing the vehicle’s operating modes, stating that “the traction motor provides torque to propel the vehicle in low-speed situations.” 758 IPR, slip op. at 20 (quoting ’634 patent, col. 17, ll. 46–47; id. col. 19, ll. 45–46). As the Board explained, “Paice cannot hold Severinsky to a different standard than it holds the claimed invention.” Id. We note also that the Board’s findings are consistent with our rulings in Paice II and Paice III, which involved Severinsky and Paice’s related patents. In those cases, we found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that, “although Severinsky describes the use of speed as a factor considered by the microprocessor, it also uses the vehicle’s torque requirements, or road load, in determining when to operate the engine.” Paice II, 681 F. App’x at 915; Paice III, 685 F. App’x at 946 (“On this record, the Board had substantial evidence to find that Severinsky discloses comparing the amount of torque required to propel the vehicle to a predetermined torque value in deciding whether to operate the engine.”). And, while we “disagree[d] with the Board’s reinterpretation of ‘road load’ as including output torque,” we affirmed the Board’s finding that “Severinsky relies on road load to start and operate the engine and motor.” Paice II, 681 F. App’x at 915. We also rejected many of the same arguments that Paice makes on appeal here. See, e.g., id. 12 PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY (rejecting argument that “Severinsky’s microprocessor uses speed to make such determinations regarding operation of the engine”). Paice does not persuasively explain why a different result is required on this record. For these reasons, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Severinsky discloses a torque-based system for selecting operating modes. 2. The Board’s Finding That Severinsky Satisfies the “abnormal and transient conditions” Claim Limitation The Board also found that Severinsky discloses the “abnormal and transient conditions” limitation recited in certain claims of the ’634 and ’097 patents. The Board interpreted “abnormal and transient conditions” to capture “starting the engine and stopping the engine,” including in “city traffic and reverse operation.” See 785 IPR, slip op. at 14–16; 792 IPR, slip op. at 13–15; 801 IPR, slip op. at 15–16. Paice asserts that the Board’s construction is too broad. In IPR proceedings, the Board gives claim terms their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the claims and specification. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142–46 (2016). We review the Board’s ultimate claim constructions de novo and its underlying factual determinations involving extrinsic evidence for substantial evidence. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841–42 (2015); PPC Broadband, 815 F.3d at 751. We agree with the Board’s construction of “abnormal and transient conditions.” The ’634 patent claims do not specify what “abnormal” or “transient” conditions are, stating only that the engine must operate at torque output levels less than the setpoint when such conditions exist in order “to satisfy drivability and/or safety considerations.” ’634 patent, col. 83, ll. 51–54 (claim 265). Further, neither “abnormal” nor “transient” is used in the PAICE LLC v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY 13 patent specifications. With no intrinsic evidence to shed light on the claim term’s meaning, the Board turned to the ’634 patent’s parent patent, U.S. Patent No. 7,104,347 (“’347 patent”), which is at issue in the companion appeals. See Paice LLC v. Ford Motor Co., Nos. 17-1263, 171264, 17-1308, 17-1309, 17-1310, 17-1311, 17-1442, 171443 (Fed. Cir.). Claim 22 of the ’347 patent recites “abnormal and transient conditions” comprising “starting and stopping of the engine and provision of torque to satisfy drivability or safety considerations.” ’347 patent, col. 60, ll. 17–21. As the Board correctly found, claim 22 of the ’347 patent does not present a definition, but instead identifies non-limiting examples of abnormal and transient conditions—i.e., (1) starting and stopping of the engine, and (2) provision of torque to satisfy drivability or safety considerations. The Board appropriately concluded that “abnormal and transient conditions” include starting and stopping the engine. This conclusion is reasonable; starting and stopping the engine is a “transient” condition insofar as it is temporary. Once the engine is on, the condition has ceased. This conclusion, moreover, is consistent with the prosecution history of the ’097 patent. Paice emphasized during prosecution that the “abnormal and transient conditions” recited in the claims “are such conditions as starting the engine, during which operation it must necessarily be operated at less than SP for a short time.” J.A. 12,489 (emphasis added). 4 This statement clearly indicates that “abnormal and transient conditions” encompass at least starting the engine. See Ventana Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biogenex Labs., Inc., 473 F.3d 1173, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“As with statements made by the inven-