Opinion ID: 1190207
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application to this case of constitutional provision and related statutes.

Text: At the time of the oral argument in this case the attorney for the Commission on Judicial Fitness conceded that although it has recommended the suspension of the accused for a period of three months, rather than his permanent removal from office, the Commission must nevertheless prove that the accused has been guilty of one of the specific grounds for removal as stated in Article VII, § 8. [11] We agree with that conclusion. As previously noted, ORS 1.410 and 1.430, as amended in 1971, provide no separate grounds for suspension. And although ORS 1.430(3) provides that upon suspension the salary of a judge shall cease, if so ordered, it is provided by Article VII, § 1 (amended), of the Oregon Constitution that the compensation of judges shall not be diminished during the term for which they are elected. That requirement cannot be modified by statute, but only by constitutional provision, such as by the provisions of Article VII, § 8, for removal of judges for the grounds specified in that section. The Commission on Judicial Fitness, neither in its complaint nor in its findings, conclusions and recommendation, has charged or found the accused to be guilty of wilful misconduct in a judicial office involving moral turpitude  the only specific ground for removal of a judge stated in Article VII, § 8, that could have any possible application to the facts of this case. Again, it was conceded on oral argument by the attorney for the Commission that in order to sustain its recommendations this court must find that the conduct of the accused was not only wilful misconduct in his judicial office, but that such misconduct was so wrongful as to involve moral turpitude. Despite the protestations by the accused, we find that his continued practice of law after assuming judicial office constituted wilful misconduct. He knew that upon becoming a judge he was not supposed to practice law and he checked some authorities on that question. ORS 1.220 and Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics both clearly provide that upon assuming judicial office a judge may no longer practice law in any manner, without qualification, and whether or not for compensation. [12] As we said in In re Nicholas D. Zafiratos, 259 Or. 276, 281, 486 P.2d 550, 553 (1971): We are of the opinion that the accused's misconduct, particularly as a judge, was such that any thinking lawyer should have known it was unethical.   . Just as an attorney is held by the Code of Professional Responsibility to standards of integrity and ethical conduct higher than that required for ordinary persons, we hold that because the office of judge is one of even greater trust and confidence, a judge must be held by the Canons of Judicial Ethics (now the Code of Judicial Conduct) to standards of integrity and ethical conduct higher than those required for attorneys. The confidence of the public in the integrity of the courts of Oregon demands no less. We are unable to find, however, that the misconduct by the accused was such as to involve moral turpitude. It appears from the legislative history of Article VII, § 8 that the legislature attached no special meaning to that term other than as found in the case law. This intent is confirmed by the fact that Article VII, § 8 also provides for the removal of a judge convicted of a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude. Probably the most common definition of moral turpitude, as defined in the case law, is stated in Ruble v. Kirkwood, 125 Or. 316, 320-21, 266 P. 252, 254 (1928), as follows: `An act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow man or to society in general contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.' [Citing authorities]. To the same effect, see 1 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure 67, § 31 (Anderson ed. 1957). [13] There has been considerable difficulty and uncertainty in determining whether various crimes are to be classified as crimes involving moral turpitude or as crimes not involving moral turpitude. [14] We do not believe that the misconduct of the accused in this case was of such baseness, vileness or depravity as to constitute misconduct involving moral turpitude, according to either the general definition of that term in the case law or the common understanding of the meaning of that term. As previously noted, the words moral turpitude as a limitation upon wilful misconduct in a judicial office as a ground for the removal of a judge was added by the 1967 Oregon Legislature to the provisions of the proposed constitutional amendment as originally recommended by the Oregon Judicial Council. It follows that there is no basis under the facts of this case for the removal of the accused from his judicial office. It also follows, for reasons previously stated, that there is no proper basis for his suspension from office under the provisions of ORS 1.420 and 1.430, as amended. We do, however, by the publication of this opinion, reprimand the accused for his misconduct as a judge. We believe that the authority to reprimand judges for misconduct in judicial office is within the inherent power of this court, as confirmed to this court by ORS 1.002 to supervise the courts of this state, and that this power is not restrained by the limitations imposed by Article VII, § 8, upon the power of this court to remove judges for misconduct. [15] Although no one suffered injury or loss as a result of the misconduct of the accused and although it did not directly affect the integrity of the Circuit Court for Klamath County, it was of such a nature as to tend to undermine the confidence of the public in the integrity of that court. It has been truly stated that: For every bad judge, there are a hundred good, conscientious, hard working judges who want the image of the judiciary protected. The misconduct by one judge casts an adverse reflection upon every judge   . [16]