Opinion ID: 1614413
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: is first-degree criminal sexual conduct a specific-intent crime?

Text: Defendant Lundy asks this Court to find that first-degree criminal sexual conduct includes the element of specific intent. His only argument is that felonious assault is a specific-intent crime and, therefore, in those criminal sexual conduct situations where felonious assault is a lesser included offense logic dictates that specific intent is also an element of the criminal sexual conduct. Because Lundy possessed a weapon while committing the criminal sexual conduct herein, he argues that specific intent was an element of proof which the intoxication defense should have been allowed to negative. This case requires us to decide whether first-degree criminal sexual conduct is a general- or specific-intent crime. We have previously held, under the predecessor to the criminal sexual conduct statute, [19] that rape is not a specific-intent crime. People v Phillips, 385 Mich 30; 187 NW2d 211 (1971). [20] This comports with the overwhelming weight of authority which holds that rape is a general-intent crime. [21] An examination of the statute convinces us that the Legislature did not intend to include specific intent as an element of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Neither the first-degree criminal sexual conduct statute nor the corresponding statutory definition of sexual penetration contains any language whatsoever regarding intent. [22] The fact that the Legislature must have been cognizant, in enacting the first-degree criminal sexual conduct provision, of the established rule that rape does not require specific intent, combined with the absence of any provision regarding intent, considerably weakens defendant's argument that his crime is a specific-intent offense. If the Legislature wanted to add specific intent as an element, knowing that the predecessor statute had been consistently construed as a general-intent crime, it would have specifically done so. The fact that it did not leads us to conclude that the Legislature intended to maintain the general rule that no intent is requisite other than that evidenced by the doing of the acts constituting the offense, i.e., general intent. [23] Moreover, one of the purposes of the new act was to strengthen the laws against sexual violence by removing certain evidentiary obstacles to the prosecution of sexual assault. [24] This further strengthens our conclusion that it is unlikely that a new element of proof would be added without specific mention. Finally, we reject defendant's argument that if an applicable lesser included offense of a criminal sexual conduct offense requires specific intent, it necessarily follows that the greater offense also requires proof of specific intent. Other courts presented with this argument have rejected it, [25] and we reject it also. We concur with the United States Court of Appeals, writing in United States v Thornton, 162 US App DC 207, 210-211; 498 F2d 749 (1974): Actually, as has been stated, `[A]ll attempts require specific intent'; so if it were to follow appellant's logic of superimposing the specific intent of an included crime upon the greater offense, a specific intent would be required for practically every crime. This could not be the law. The differing requirements for lesser offenses result principally from the differing nature of the crimes and from their historical and legislative definitions. The requirement of a specific intent for lesser crimes exists because of a desire to protect the individual against conviction on slight evidence. The same protection is unnecessary where substantial overt acts are committed and fully consummated offenses are provable. There is no rule of law that crimes which carry greater punishment require the proof of greater, or even the same, criminal intent as included or related crimes which carry lesser punishment. Each crime has its own elements and peculiarities and as we said in McGuinn v United States, 89 US App DC 197, 199; 191 F2d 477, 479 (1951), `Rape is not a crime which requires a specific intent.' This is in accord with the great weight of authority which holds the crime of rape requires no intent other than that indicated by the commission of the acts constituting the offense. Accordingly, we conclude that first-degree criminal sexual conduct is a general-intent crime for which the defense of voluntary intoxication is not available. [26]