Opinion ID: 1505341
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: evidence of smithson's negligence as a pilot

Text: After Mrs. Smithson read parts of Baumann's deposition testimony to the jury, Cessna asked to be allowed to prove that Mr. Smithson could not have become a commercial pilot because he was not qualified. Specifically, Cessna wanted to introduce evidence showing that Mr. Smithson's pilot error had caused the fatal crash and that he had been negligent during previous flights as well. Cessna now argues that the trial court erroneously prevented Cessna from introducing evidence of Mr. Smithson's acts of pilot negligence. The trial court ruled that Cessna could offer any evidence showing Mr. Smithson's incompetence as a pilot prior to the crash. Cessna, however, never attempted to prove that Mr. Smithson was negligent on previous flights. As a result, it cannot now complain about the absence of evidence in the record to show this alleged negligence. The trial court also ruled that no evidence of Mr. Smithson's negligence in causing the crash would be allowed. Evidence is admissible in wrongful death actions to show that the deceased intended to change occupations. Wichita Valley Railroad v. Williams, 6 S.W.2d 439, 442-43 (Tex.Civ.App.Eastland 1928, writ ref'd); Burlington-Rock Island Railroad v. Davis, 123 S.W.2d 1002, 1005-06 (Tex.Civ.App. Beaumont 1939, writ dism'd). Once such evidence is introduced, however, any rebuttal evidence tending to show that the deceased was unqualified to pursue the new occupation has probative value. See Burlington-Rock Island Railroad v. Davis . As a result, evidence in this case of Mr. Smithson's negligence as a pilot was relevant to the damages issue. Cessna, however, failed to perfect a bill of exceptions containing the excluded evidence, as provided in Tex.R.Civ.P. 372. The absence from the record of a proper bill of exceptions showing what the excluded deposition testimony would have been precludes a determination of whether the testimony would have been inadmissible on some other ground and whether its exclusion was harmless error under Tex.R.Civ.P. 434. For this reason, we have no basis for a finding of reversible error. [5] See Tex.R. Civ.P. 372; Gulf Paving Co. v. Lofstedt, 144 Tex. 17, 188 S.W.2d 155, 159 (1945); J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Brockman, 134 Tex. 451, 135 S.W.2d 698, 699 (1940); Biggins v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry Co., 102 Tex. 417, 118 S.W. 125, 126 (1909); Harris v. Harris, 605 S.W.2d 684, 686-87 (Tex.Civ.App.Houston [1st] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Donald R. Reedy & Co., Inc. v. Jenkins I. Co., Inc., 597 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Tex.Civ.App.Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In her motion for rehearing, Mrs. Smithson maintains that Cessna has no remaining points of error and that remand to the court of appeals is not necessary. We agree. Cessna claims that its point of error challenging the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict was not addressed by the court of appeals. In support of this position, Cessna quotes the following language from the opinion of the lower court: There is scant evidence that Smithson intended to become a commercial airline pilot.... Assuming, however, there was sufficient evidence of that intention, there are several problems concerning Mrs. Smithson's efforts to prove the earnings of a commercial airline pilot. 632 S.W.2d at 384. Mrs. Smithson, on the other hand, directs our attention to the following statements by the court of appeals appearing at the conclusion of the opinion: Although this Court has treated the major questions in dispute, the parties have other points of error and cross-points. Such other points and cross-points have been considered, all are lacking in merit and all are overruled. 632 S.W.2d at 390. The language Cessna points to was not a holding. The subsequent language, however, expressly held that all points not previously decided were overruled. Courts of Appeals are required by Tex.R.Civ.P. 451 to decide all issues presented. We therefore hold that the court of appeals here overruled Cessna's factual sufficiency point. We conclude that the court of appeals erroneously reversed the trial court's judgment on the verdict. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm that of the trial court. POPE, C.J., dissents in an opinion in which McGEE, BARROW and CAMPBELL, JJ., join.