Opinion ID: 1121511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Foucha v. Louisiana

Text: Petitioners next argue that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Foucha v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 118 L.Ed.2d 437, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (1992) forbids the civil commitment of sexually violent predators because it constitutes unconstitutional preventive detention. As is patently obvious, however, both the facts and the statute in Foucha differ significantly from those presented here. Contrary to petitioners' claim, our holding is consistent with and supportive of Foucha. In Foucha, the Court overturned a Louisiana statute dealing with insanity acquittees because the release procedures were inadequate. The Court described the statute as follows: When a defendant in a criminal case pending in Louisiana is found not guilty by reason of insanity, he is committed to a psychiatric hospital unless he proves that he is not dangerous. This is so whether or not he is then insane. After commitment, if the acquittee or the superintendent begins release proceedings, a review panel at the hospital makes a written report on the patient's mental condition and whether he can be released without danger to himself or others. If release is recommended, the court must hold a hearing to determine dangerousness; the acquittee has the burden of proving that he is not dangerous. If found to be dangerous, the acquittee may be returned to the mental institution whether or not he is then mentally ill. Foucha, 112 S.Ct. at 1781-82. Four years after Terry Foucha had been committed, following an acquittal by reason of insanity of aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm, the superintendent of the facility where he was held recommended that he be released. The review panel reported that there had been no evidence of mental illness since admission. Foucha, 112 S.Ct. at 1782. The trial court heard medical testimony that Foucha was probably in remission from what had been a temporary condition  likely a drug induced psychosis. The court heard further testimony that Foucha had an antisocial personality, that such condition was not a mental illness, and that he had no other mental disorders. However, an ultimate medical determination about his dangerousness could not be made. Instead, a doctor testified only that he could not certify that [Foucha] would not constitute a menace to himself or others if released. Foucha, 112 S.Ct. at 1782. Based solely on this equivocal testimony, the trial court returned him to the mental institution. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that absent a determination of current mental illness and dangerousness, continued confinement under the Louisiana scheme was impermissible. Foucha, 112 S.Ct. at 1788-89. The Court relied on three reasons to overturn the confinement and the underlying statute. First, the statute did not meet the minimal due process requirement that the nature of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed. Foucha, 112 S.Ct. at 1785. The State of Louisiana was continuing to confine Foucha in a psychiatric facility even though he was not suffering from a mental disease or illness. Second, the statute did not provide constitutionally adequate procedures. Foucha, 112 S.Ct. at 1785. Finally, the Court determined that Foucha was not confined under any previously recognized authority of the State. It recognized three ways in which an individual could be confined: by the criminal justice system; pursuant to civil commitment law; or under the narrow circumstances set forth in United States v. Salerno, supra . Foucha, 112 S.Ct. at 1785-86. The Statute here withstands the scrutiny required in Foucha. As explained above, the sexually violent predator Statute is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Also, before a person can be civilly committed, the State must prove that the individual is mentally ill [12] and dangerous  a condition that was satisfied in Young's and Cunningham's respective trials. As such, the sexually violent predator commitment scheme falls squarely within Foucha's definition of constitutionally permissible civil commitment. See Foucha, 112 S.Ct. at 1784-86. The State may also confine a mentally ill person if it shows `by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and dangerous'. Foucha, 112 S.Ct. at 1786 (quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 362). [20, 21] In addition, the sex predator Statute does not suffer from the procedural infirmities that rendered Louisiana's insanity acquittee scheme unconstitutional. Under the Washington law, the State must satisfy the highest burden of proof to civilly commit a sex predator. A higher burden of proof tends to equalize the risks of an erroneous determination that the subject of a commitment proceeding has the condition in question. Heller, 125 L.Ed.2d at 272. Whereas Louisiana attempted to continue Foucha's confinement without claiming that he suffered from a mental illness, the Washington Statute makes proof of a current mental disorder a condition of commitment. Also, in regard to dangerousness, Louisiana placed the burden on Foucha, while the Washington Statute places the burden on the State. In contrast to the Louisiana statute, the sexually violent predator Statute is the type of sharply focused scheme which the Supreme Court called for in Foucha. 112 S.Ct. at 1786. Our interpretation of the holding in Foucha finds support in Justice O'Connor's crucial concurring opinion. In providing the necessary fifth vote which formed the majority, Justice O'Connor carefully pointed out the limitations of that holding: I write separately, however, to emphasize that the Court's opinion addresses only the specific statutory scheme before us, which broadly permits indefinite confinement of sane insanity acquittees in psychiatric facilities. Foucha, 112 S.Ct. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Where the incapacitation is more closely tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns related to the acquittee's continuing dangerousness, continued confinement may be permitted. Foucha, 112 S.Ct. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., concurring). [22] The dissent claims that the sex predator program constitutes preventive detention because the statute is not civil commitment and sex predators are detained for an indefinite period of time. We reject this characterization. First, the sex predator Statute does not rely upon the Salerno line of cases. It falls comfortably within the civil commitment category discussed in Foucha because the State must prove both a mental illness and dangerousness. Second, civil commitments are not subject to any rigid time limit. Rather, the commitment is tailored to the nature and duration of the mental illness. Finally, unlike pretrial detainees, those committed under the sex predator statute have been through a full trial with a complete range of procedural protections. In short, despite the dissent's protests to the contrary, the sex predator Statute does not create any ominous dangerousness court, but rather follows traditional civil commitment norms. Even though petitioners potentially face a long period of civil commitment, the sexually violent predator Statute is wholly sustainable. Those committed under the sex predator Statute have been through a full trial with a complete range of procedural protections. From this trial, a jury has determined that the State has met the highest burden possible  beyond a reasonable doubt  in proving that the committed individual suffers from a mental abnormality which renders him a danger to the community. Although the period of confinement is not predetermined, the Statute's release provisions provide the opportunity for periodic review of the committed individual's current mental condition and continuing dangerousness to the community. In sum, the circumstances of the Foucha case clearly dictated the result reached by the United States Supreme Court. The case before us deals with vastly different facts and law, and is wholly consistent with the principles enunciated in Foucha.