Opinion ID: 2521377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Garcia's Representation of the Facts and Law

Text: Whether an attorney committed an infraction under Rule 11 is a decision committed to the discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Jagow, 30 P.3d 798, 805 (Colo.App.2001), aff'd on other grounds, 49 P.3d 1151 (Colo.2002). We apply the same standard to review the PDJ's decision and hold that the PDJ's finding that Garcia violated Rule 11 was an abuse of discretion. In the relevant allegation, the amended complaint stated: On January 4, 2001, in connection with paying his attorney registration fees for the years 2000 and 2001, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 227(2)(a), the respondent misrepresented to the clerk of the Supreme Court that although he was not in compliance with respect to any outstanding child support orders, he had taken measures to pay back child support. In fact, the respondent had not filed any motions or taken any steps to pay his child support arrearages. (emphasis added). In his decision, the PDJ incorrectly wrote that both the complaint and amended complaint alleged that Trupp  knowingly and intentionally misrepresented his child support situation (emphasis added). In fact, Garcia had removed the words knowingly and intentionally from the claim prior to filing the first amended complaint. Nonetheless, the PDJ found that the allegation that Trupp knowingly and intentionally misrepresented that he had taken measures to pay back child support was not an accurate statement of the investigative facts available to [Garcia]. The PDJ relied on Garcia's statement in her investigatory notes: [Trupp] thinks this [social security money] will be applied to child support arrearages. Because of this notation, the PDJ found that Garcia knew that Trupp subjectively believed the social security payments would be applied to his child support obligations. Thus, the PDJ held that Garcia's allegation that Trupp knowingly and intentionally misrepresented having taken measures to pay back child support was not an accurate statement of the facts. The PDJ held that Garcia's logic was a legal conclusion not reflective of what Trupp had actually done. Including this inaccuracy in the complaint, the PDJ ultimately held, violated Rule 11. Moreover, the PDJ found that Garcia did not disclose to the Attorney Regulation Committee any information regarding Trupp's state of mind in connection with the written words he added to his attorney registration forms and therefore Garcia was not protected by the usual procedural safeguards in the attorney regulation system. We reject the PDJ's analysis. Indeed, Trupp told Garcia that he believed that the social security payments, at some point, would be applied to child support arrearages. However, Trupp also admitted that at the time he filed his attorney registration forms he had not yet taken any steps to modify his child support order or to make the payments through the child support registry. As an attorney, Trupp is deemed to have knowledge of the applicable statutes and case law. This is especially true here because Trupp represented clients in domestic relations cases. At the time that Trupp swore that he had taken measures to pay his arrearage, he knew or should have known that under Wright he was not legally satisfying his child support obligations. Under the facts and law known to her, it was not unreasonable for Garcia to allege that Trupp had made a misstatement when he said that he had taken measures to comply with his child support order. Thus, it was an abuse of discretion for the PDJ to hold that Garcia violated Rule 11. Because we base our decision on Garcia's own actions and knowledge, we need not examine whether the Attorney Regulation Committee's prefiling review of the complaint further insulated Garcia from Rule 11 sanctions, as in most cases it would.