Opinion ID: 159762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: denial of peremptory challenges

Text: Petitioner argues that she was denied a fair trial and an impartial jury because she was required to share peremptory challenges with Bryson despite their allegedly inconsistent defenses. See Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 655 (1981) (providing that when two first degree murder defendants have inconsistent -18- defenses, each is entitled to nine peremptory challenges; otherwise, they share peremptory challenges). She contends she was prejudiced because she was unable to challenge three jurors--Nellie Fay Haynie, Pamela K. Crownover, and Sherman I. Roberts--who served on the jury. On direct appeal, the state appellate court held petitioner was not entitled to nine peremptory challenges because § 655 applies only to inconsistent legal defenses presented at the first stage and any inconsistencies arose only during the second stage. See Plantz , 876 P.2d at 276-77. The federal district court determined petitioner failed to prove a constitutional claim. Because only the federal district court reviewed for federal constitutional error, our review is de novo . Petitioner received the peremptory challenges to which she was entitled under state law. See Hammon v. State , 898 P.2d 1287, 1301 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (providing that where inconsistency goes to the level of each defendant’s culpability, co-defendants may be required to share peremptory challenges). Therefore, any constitutional challenge to the number of peremptory challenges she received fails. See Ross v. Oklahoma , 487 U.S. 81, 88, 89, 91 (1988); see also Cummings , 161 F.3d at 619 (“The number of peremptory challenges is a matter of state law that raises no constitutional concerns.”). -19- Nonetheless, she had a right to an impartial jury. See Ross , 487 U.S. at 85; see also Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (peremptory challenges are means of assuring selection of qualified, unbiased jury). As the district court found, petitioner did not show her jury was partial. Although Ms. Haynie believed Oklahoma is too lax with the death penalty and it should be reserved for the worst cases where there is no choice, we agree with the district court that Ms. Haynie’s responses were invited by petitioner’s counsel’s inquiry. Further, at no time did she indicate she would not be fair. The district court correctly determined that Ms. Crownover had not given serious consideration to her views on the death penalty before she arrived for jury duty. This, however, did not indicate she would not give fair consideration to each of the possible punishments. Indeed, she presumed the co-defendants were innocent of the charges until proven guilty, could agree to impose any of the three possible punishments, would apply the law as instructed, would consider all possible mitigating evidence, needed to hear both sides before making up her mind whether a defendant should receive the death penalty, and was sure there could be things she had not really thought about which could persuade her life or life without parole would be the appropriate sentence. Mr. Roberts volunteered he formerly worked with the trial judge’s sister but it would have no affect on his serving as a juror, complained that he did not know -20- the rules about when he could use the restroom, had facial pain controlled by medication which did not affect his judgment, and was recovering from back surgery. He also indicated he could consider all possible punishments and give the defendants a fair and impartial trial. Again, we agree with the district court that nothing indicated Mr. Roberts would not be a fair and impartial juror.