Opinion ID: 721469
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Jass' Vicarious Liability Claim Against PruCare for Dr. Anderson's Alleged Negligence

Text: 42 Having concluded that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists over Jass' claims against Margulis and PruCare for Margulis' alleged negligence, we now return to the question of subject matter jurisdiction over the vicarious liability claims against PruCare for the alleged negligence of Dr. Anderson. The district court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the claim against Dr. Anderson premised on ERISA preemption. It did not. (The claim against Dr. Anderson was not completely preempted and therefore the claim did not arise under federal law). See supra at 1488. But because the district court did have federal question jurisdiction over two of Jass' other claims, it could have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the vicarious liability claims against PruCare that were based on Dr. Anderson's alleged negligence. But the district court did not consider supplemental jurisdiction as a basis for jurisdiction over PruCare. When PruCare originally removed the case from state court, complete diversity existed between the plaintiff, Jass, and the two defendants, Margulis and PruCare. Not until about six months later, when Jass amended the complaint to state a claim against non-diverse defendant Dr. Anderson, did subject matter jurisdiction become a problem. Even then, the district court was working under the incorrect assumption that it had federal question jurisdiction over the vicarious liability claims against PruCare for Dr. Anderson's alleged negligence. 7 So the situation was this: The district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against PruCare that were tied to Dr. Anderson's alleged negligence. Without a federal question under ERISA, the joinder of Dr. Anderson, who shared Jass' Illinois residency, would destroy diversity jurisdiction over this claim against PruCare unless the court exercised its supplemental jurisdiction. Since the court did not do so, the joinder of Dr. Anderson was inappropriate without remand to the state court. See Title 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the state court.). 43 We need not concern ourselves with the intricacies involved here, however, because when the district court subsequently remanded Jass' claim against Dr. Anderson to state court it cured the jurisdictional problem by in effect dismissing the non-diverse party. While federal jurisdiction ordinarily depends on the facts as they exist when the complaint is filed, Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830, 109 S.Ct. 2218, 2222, 104 L.Ed.2d 893 (1989), or where an amended complaint is filed based on the amended complaint, Wellness Community-National v. Wellness House, 70 F.3d 46, 49, 50 (7th Cir.1995), both district courts and appellate courts have the authority to dismiss a nondiverse party to retain diversity jurisdiction. Newman-Green, 490 U.S. 826, 109 S.Ct. 2218. The district court inadvertently achieved this result when it remanded the malpractice claim against Dr. Anderson. In this appeal, the parties remaining in the underlying lawsuit are diverse, and federal question jurisdiction remains over two of the claims as well. 44