Opinion ID: 2783215
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Abrogation Here of the Common Law?

Text: Maryland’s common law doctrine of respondeat superior holds employers liable “for the tortious conduct of . . . [an] employee committed while the servant was acting within the scope of the employment relationship.” Barclay v. Briscoe, 427 Md. 270, 283, 47 A.3d 560, 567 (2012)) (quoting Embrey v. Holly, 293 Md. 128, 134, 442 A.2d 966, 969 (1982)). For employee conduct to be within the scope of employment, “the acts must have been in furtherance of the employer's business and authorized by the employer.” Barclay, 427 Md. at 283, 47 A.3d at 567-68 (quoting S. Mgmt. Corp. v. Taha, 378 Md. 461, 481, 836 A.2d 627, 638 (2003)). Expanding the vicarious liability of security guard agencies by statute to include all on-duty acts of employees (strict liability) would alter significantly the common law scheme of respondeat superior and amount to an abrogation of the common law. The common law doctrine of respondeat superior not only holds employers liable for the actions of their employees in furtherance of the employer’s business, but also 7 This rule of statutory interpretation was formulated as well to implement the will of the Legislature. See, e.g., Hooper v. City of Baltimore, 12 Md. 464, 475 (1859) (stating that “the law . . . infers that the act did not intend to make any alteration [to the common law] other than what is specified, and besides what has been plainly pronounced”). The rule of construction seeks to limit judicial hair-splitting and reading acts of the Legislature as changing the common law when the Legislature had no such intention. In theory, it might also cause legislatures to announce clearly when it is their intent to abrogate the common law. 7 limits an employer’s liability to those situations. It is central to the doctrine that an employee’s acts committed outside the scope of employment, i.e., not in the furtherance of the employer’s business, are not attributable to the employer. The universe of the types of employee acts for which the employer might be held strictly liable is limited. A temporal interpretation of the Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501 would eliminate the distinction between employees’ acts within the scope of employment and those outside the scope of employment. Rather than turning on the character of employee acts, the focus would be on when the acts happened and whether the security guard was on duty. Security guard agencies would be liable for a broader set of acts of their employees, including, according to Appellants, even acts in direct opposition to the employers’ interests. Such a change in employer liability would alter fundamentally the common law. Contrary to Appellants’ arguments, interpreting the Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501 to impose vicarious liability on security guard agencies for all on-duty acts of their employees would operate more than to supplement the common law. Statutes we have held to supplement, rather than abrogate, the common law provide typically alternative remedies or criminal sanctions. See, e.g., Nickens v. Mount Vernon Realty Grp., LLC, 429 Md. 53, 74-75, 54 A.3d 742, 755-56 (2012) (holding that a Baltimore City ordinance providing for a statutory eviction scheme supplemented, rather than abrogated, the common law remedy of peaceable self-help); Genies v. State, 426 Md. 148, 159, 43 A.3d 1007, 1013 (2012) (holding that a statute creating a separate criminal offense for inmates exposing their private parts to correctional officers of the opposite 8 sex as a means to abuse corrections officers did not abrogate the pre-existing common law crime of indecent exposure). Appellants’ interpretation of the Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501, in contrast, would not create a new cause of action, but rather would modify the liability of security guard agencies for existing torts committed by their employees.8 The common law doctrine of respondeat superior answers the question: When is an employer liable for the torts of its employee? The Maryland Security Guards Act § 19501 answers the same question with specific reference to employers who are security guard agencies. To change the answer amounts to an abrogation of the common law. Therefore, we look for an abundantly clear intent on the part of the Legislature to change the common law by its adoption of § 19-501.