Opinion ID: 2519864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: strict liability under section 76-5-401

Text: ¶ 8 When interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to evince `the true intent and purpose of the Legislature.' State ex. rel . Div. of Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, ¶ 10, 44 P.3d 680 (quoting Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)). We discern legislative intent and purpose by first looking to the best evidence of its meaning, which is the plain language of the statute itself. Id.; see also Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997). When examining the statutory language we assume the legislature used each term advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary meaning. Tooele County, 44 P.3d 680, 2002 UT 8 at ¶ 10 (citing Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995)); see also Platts, 947 P.2d at 662. Furthermore, we avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative. Hall v. State Dep't of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 15, 24 P.3d 958. ¶ 9 Section 76-5-401 states in relevant part: (1) For purposes of this section minor is a person who is 14 years of age or older, but younger than 16 years of age, at the time the sexual activity described in this section occurred. (2) A person commits unlawful sexual activity with a minor if . . . the actor: (a) has sexual intercourse with the minor ... (3) A violation of subsection (2) is a third degree felony unless the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence the mitigating factor that the defendant is less than four years older than the minor at the time the sexual activity occurred, in which case it is a class B misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-401 (2001). [4] Section 76-5-401 does not specify a culpable mental state for the crime of unlawful sexual activity with a minor. It simply says that [a] person commits unlawful sexual activity with a minor if ... [the person] has sexual intercourse with the minor. The sole mitigating factor provided in the statute is if the defendant can show that he or she was fewer than four years older than the victim at the time of the offense. The plain language of section 76-5-401, therefore, does not require that a defendant intend to have sexual intercourse with a minor who is fourteen or fifteen years old. The commission of the sexual act itself is sufficient to violate the statute. ¶ 10 When a statute does not supply a mental state for proscribed conduct, further guidance is provided by section 76-2-102 of the Utah Code, which states: Culpable mental state required.... An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental state. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (2001). We must therefore determine whether the legislature intended to impose criminal liability for unlawful sexual activity with a minor without requiring proof that the defendant intended to engage in sexual intercourse with a fourteen or fifteen-year-old. If we find that this was the legislature's specific purpose, then the crime is one of strict liability, and proof of a culpable mental state is not required. ¶ 11 The plain language of section 76-5-401 does not contain a mens rea element yet we may look to the relationship between other sections of the criminal code and the section at issue for further guidance on legislative intent. See State v. W.C.P., 1999 UT App 35, ¶ 8, 974 P.2d 302 (In discerning the purpose of [the statute], we are guided by the relationship [of the section] to other sections of the criminal code.); see also State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 468 (Utah 1988) ([W]hen possible, statutes must be interpreted harmoniously with other statues relevant to the subject matter.). Section 76-2-304.5, entitled Mistake as to victim's age not a defense, explicitly prohibits a defendant from raising mistake as to the victim's age as a defense to a violation of section 76-5-401. Section 76-2-304.5 states: It is not a defense to the crime of unlawful sexual activity with a minor, a violation of Section 76-5-401 ... that the actor mistakenly believed the victim to be 16 years of age or older at the time of the alleged offense or was unaware of the victim's true age. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304.5(2)(2001). This section clearly states the legislative intent. The plain language of both section 76-2-304.5 and 76-5-401 shows that the legislature intended to impose criminal responsibility for sexual activity with a minor whether or not the defendant knew the victim's true age. [5] Allowing the defense of mistake as to the victim's age, or requiring the prosecution to prove a mens rea for a violation of section 76-5-401 would render section 76-2-304.5 inoperative. [6] ¶ 12 Defendant's statutory analysis of the strict liability question focuses on the clearly indicates a legislative purpose language of section 76-2-102, to the exclusion of the rest of the sentence which reads, ... to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct ... without requiring proof of any culpable mental state. That is, defendant seems to assert that clear legislative purpose cannot be discerned from the language of the statute, but that some other sign of legislative purpose is needed. However, as we have previously stated, [t]he fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are generally to be construed according to their plain language. Zoll & Branch, P.C. v. Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997). Section 76-5-401 makes sexual intercourse with a fourteen or fifteen-year-old a violation of the statute, irrespective of defendant's knowledge of the victim's age, and section 76-2-304.5 specifically clarifies the legislature's intent regarding knowledge or mistake. We note that Utah is not unique in this regard. The majority of states do not allow mistake of age as a defense to statutory rape, and the defendant's knowledge of the victim's age is not an essential element of the crime. Colin Campbell, Annotation, Mistake or Lack of Information as to Victim's Age as Defense to Statutory Rape, 46 A.L.R. 5th 499, 508 (1997). Statutory rape, then, is commonly referred to as a strict-liability crime, meaning that the mental intent of the defendant is not important. The only inquiry is whether the act was performed on a prohibited person. Id. at ¶ 2[a]; see also 6 Am.Jur.2d 63 Proof of Facts (2001) ([M]ost states treat statutory rape as an exception to the general rule, in that guilt is established on proof of the prohibited act, and the defendant's reasonable belief that the female was at or over the age of consent is not a defense). ¶ 13 Defendant argues that section 76-5-401, despite its plain language, does not clearly indicate a legislative intent to impose strict liability because general common law principles require a mens rea for criminal responsibility. Defendant fails to explain, however, why the legislature's imposition of strict liability for this particular crime would not fall within one of the recognized exceptions to the general mens rea rule, [7] or to explain exactly why a plain language reading of the statute negates strict liability. Instead, defendant repeatedly asserts the conclusory argument that section 76-5-401 does not clearly indicate that the Legislature intended that unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor should be a strict liability crime and cites other factors and policy reasons the court should consider in discerning the legislature's true intent. The statute, however, is not ambiguous and we decline to read strict liability out of the statute. Unlawful sexual activity with a minor is a strict liability crime.