Opinion ID: 1085312
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Aiding and Abetting Health Care Fraud

Text: The focus of this appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Mr. Rufai of aiding and abetting health care fraud. “Whoever . . . aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures [the] commission [of an offense against the United States] is punishable as a principal.” 18 U.S.C. § 2. “[T]o aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant ‘in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, [and] that he seek by his action to make it succeed.’” Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949) (quoting United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2nd Cir. 1938)). The Government must first “prove that someone committed the underlying substantive offense.” United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071, 1088 (10th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Cooper, 375 F.3d 1041, 1049 (10th Cir. 2004). Second, the Government must prove that the defendant “(1) willfully associated with the charged criminal venture and (2) aided the venture through affirmative action.” United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 1295 (10th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Rosalez, 711 F.3d 1194, 1205 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Bowen, 527 F.3d 1065, 1078 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Anderson, 189 F.3d 1201, 1207 (10th Cir. 1999). “Liability as an aider and abett[o]r is based . . . on the act of intentionally counseling, aiding, or assisting another in the commission of a crime.” Bowen, 527 F.3d -27- at 1077 n.10; see also Nye, 336 U.S. at 620. “One need not participate in an important aspect of a crime to be liable as an aider and abett[o]r; participation of relatively slight moment is sufficient. Even mere words or gestures of encouragement constitute affirmative acts capable of rendering one liable under this theory.” Bowen, 527 F.3d at 1078 (citations omitted) (quotations omitted). There is no need for “actual communication between an aider and abettor and the principal” or for “the aider and abettor [to] know by whom the crime is actually perpetrated.” White v. United States, 366 F.2d 474, 476 (10th Cir. 1966). Nevertheless, the Government must make “some showing of intent to further the criminal venture.” United States v. Delgado-Uribe, 363 F.3d 1077, 1084 (10th Cir. 2004). “[A] defendant may not stumble into aiding and abetting liability by inadvertently helping another in a criminal scheme unknown to the defendant.” United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 869 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotations omitted). Even “presence at the scene of the crime” or “knowledge that [a] crime is being committed” is insufficient. Id. “[T]o be convicted of aiding and abetting, a defendant must share in the intent to commit the underlying offense.” United States v. Willis, 476 F.3d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). “[W]e have repeatedly held that circumstantial evidence may support a jury’s reasonable inference of guilty knowledge by the defendant.” Rahseparian, 231 F.3d at 1262. -28-