Opinion ID: 2516849
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Applicability of co-employee immunity

Text: [¶ 12] In answering the first certified question, we begin with the language contained in our own Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-101, et seq. In doing so, we are mindful of the legislative intent expressed in § 27-14-101(b) that the common law rule of liberal construction shall not apply and the Act is not to be given a broad liberal construction. [¶ 13] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104 (LexisNexis 2001), the immunity provision of Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Act, provides as follows: (a) The rights and remedies provided in this act for an employee including any joint employee, and his dependents for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of all other rights and remedies against any employer and any joint employer making contributions required by this act, or their employees acting within the scope of their employment unless the employees intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury to the injured employee, but do not supersede any rights and remedies available to an employee and his dependents against any other person. (b) No contract, rule, regulation or device shall operate to relieve an employer from any liability created by this act except as otherwise provided by this act. (c) This act does not limit or affect any right or action by any employee and his dependents against an employer for injuries received while employed by the employer when the employer at the time of the injuries has not qualified under this act for the coverage of his eligible employees, or having qualified, has not paid the required premium on an injured employee's earnings within thirty (30) days of the date due. (Emphasis added.) [¶ 14] Under subsection (a) of this section, an employer making the required worker's compensation contributions is absolutely immune from liability for injuries suffered by an employee in the course of extrahazardous employment. Additionally under subsection (a), the immunity available to employers extends to their employees so long as they are acting within the scope of their employment and do not intentionally cause injury to a fellow employee. Finally, subsection (a) specifies that the immunity provision leaves fully intact an injured employee's rights against any person other than his employer or another employee of his employer. The first question we must answer, then, is whether Pillon was an employee of Schlumberger at the time of Fields' injury or was instead an other person within the meaning of § 27-14-104(a). In making this determination, we look to the 1997 version of the Act in effect at the time of Field's injury. [¶ 15] The term employee is defined in § 27-14-102(a)(vii) (Michie 1997) of the Act as follows: (vii) Employee means any person engaged in any extrahazardous employment under any appointment, contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, and includes legally employed minors and aliens authorized to work by the United States department of justice, immigration and naturalization service. Employee does not include: (A) Any individual whose employment is determined to be casual labor; (B) A sole proprietor or a partner of a business partnership; (C) An officer of a corporation unless coverage is elected pursuant to W.S. XX-XX-XXX(k); (D) Any individual engaged as an independent contractor; (E) A spouse or dependent of an employer living in the employer's household; (F) A professional athlete; (G) An employee of a private household; (H) A private duty nurse engaged by a private party; (J) An employee of the federal government; (K) Any volunteer unless covered pursuant to W.S. XX-XX-XXX(e); (M) Any prisoner or probationer unless covered pursuant to W.S. XX-XX-XXX(d)(ix); (N) An elected public official, except for a duly elected or appointed sheriff; (O) The owner and operator of a motor vehicle which is leased or contracted with driver to a for-hire common or contract carrier.... (P) A member of a limited liability company unless coverage is elected pursuant to W.S. XX-XX-XXX(n). Reading this section alone, and giving the language its plain and ordinary meaning, it would seem that Pillon was an employee within the meaning of the Worker's Compensation Acthe was a person engaged in extrahazardous employment under a contract of hire at the time Fields was injured and did not fall within any of the exclusions set forth in (vii)(A) through (P). However, § 27-14-102(a)(vii) cannot be read in isolation; it must be read in light of other provisions of the Act, and effect must be given to each word, clause, and sentence so that no portion is rendered meaningless or superfluous. Matter of Interest of WJH, 2001 WY 54 ¶ 16, 24 P.3d 1147. [¶ 16] Pillon and SOS Staffing argue in their reply brief that in determining whether Pillon is entitled to immunity under § 27-14-104, the court need look only at the definition of employee contained in the act. We do not agree. As we have said, § 27-14-104 merely extends the immunity available to employers to their employees; it does not create immunity for employees separate and apart from that available to their employers. If an employer is not entitled to immunity for some reason, neither are its employees. Therefore, in determining whether an employee is entitled to immunity, we must also determine whether the employer is, in fact, an employer as defined by the Act. [¶ 17] W.S. XX-XX-XXX(a)(viii) (Michie 1997) provides as follows: (viii) Employer means any person or entity employing an employee engaged in any extrahazardous occupation or electing coverage under W.S. XX-XX-XXX(j) and at least one (1) of whose employees is described in W.S. XX-XX-XXX. Employer includes: (A) The department of employment for Federal Job Training Partnership Act participants if that participation does not otherwise establish a covered occupational arrangement between the employer and employee relationship; (B) The governmental entity for which recipients of public assistance perform work if that work does not otherwise establish a covered employer and employee relationship; (C) The governmental entity for which volunteers perform the specified volunteer activities under W.S. XX-XX-XXX(e); (D) The governmental entity for which prisoners and probationers work or perform community service under W.S. XX-XX-XXX(d)(ix) or (xv); (E) An owner-operator of a mine at which any mine rescue operation or training occurs; (F) A temporary service contractor for a temporary worker; (G) Any person, contractor, firm, association or corporation otherwise qualifying under this paragraph as an employer and who utilizes the services of a worker furnished by another contractor, joint employer, firm, association, person or corporation other than a temporary service contractor, joint employer, independent contractor or owner and operator excluded as an employee under subparagraph (a)(vii)(O) of this section; (H) Any employer otherwise qualifying under this paragraph as an employer and participating in a school-to-work program approved by the department of employment, any local school district board of trustees, community college district board of trustees or the department of education, and the employer previously elected coverage in writing pursuant to W.S. XX-XX-XXX(m). (Emphasis added.) [¶ 18] Giving the language in the section its plain and ordinary meaning, it is clear that a temporary service contractor is the employer of a temporary worker for purposes of the Worker's Compensation Act. Subsection (F) expressly provides that a temporary service contractor is the employer for a temporary service worker. Consistent with subsection (F), subsection (G) clearly provides that the term employer includes anyone using the services of a worker furnished by another, except in the case of a temporary service contractor furnishing the services of a worker to another. In the latter case, unlike other situations involving workers furnished to another, the temporary service contractor is the employer for Worker's Compensation pursuant to the plain language of subsection (F). Section 27-14-102(a)(xxv) (Michie 1997) further clarifies subsections (F) and (G) by defining temporary service contractor as any person, firm, association or corporation conducting a business that employs individuals directly for the purpose of furnishing services of the employed individuals on a temporary basis to others. [¶ 19] Schlumberger, Pillon, and SOS Staffing cite Franks v. Olson, 975 P.2d 588 (Wyo.1999) as support for their argument that Pillon is a co-employee and immune from liability under Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Act. However, Franks was decided under the 1992 version of the Act which did not contain the temporary service contractor language contained in the Act at the time of Field's injury. Absent the specific language added in 1995 defining temporary service contractors as the employer, the court looked to the definitions of employee and employer contained in the 1992 version and, based upon those definitions, concluded that Olson was a co-employee and immune from liability. Because Franks was decided under an older version of the Act which did not include the current temporary service contractor language, the case is not relevant to our determination. [¶ 20] Giving the applicable statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, SOS Staffing was a temporary service contractor pursuant to § 27-14-102(a)(xxv) and was Pillon's employer pursuant to § 27-14-102(a)(viii)(F). Given the very specific language of W.S. XX-XX-XXX(viii)(G) excluding temporary service contractors, Schlumberger was not, and by express statutory directive could not be, Pillon's employer for purposes of the Worker's Compensation Act. The conclusion that Schlumberger was not Pillon's employer as that term is expressly and very specifically defined in Wyoming's worker's compensation statutes compels the further conclusion that the immunity available to Schlumberger does not extend to Pillon. As we have said previously, Pillon is entitled to immunity only to the extent that immunity is available to his employer. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a). Stated differently, employee immunity is merely an extension of the employer immunity. Pillon's employer, SOS Staffing, has no immunity from liability for injuries to Fields because SOS Staffing paid no premiums on his behalf, and he is not an SOS Staffing employee. SOS Staffing having no immunity from liability for Fields' injuries, Pillon likewise has no such immunity. [¶ 21] In reaching this result, we are aware that many legal authorities and jurisdictions which have addressed the issue have reached the opposite result. Restatement, Second, Agency § 227 (1958) states that [a] servant directed or permitted by his master to perform services for another may become the servant of such other in performing the services. 30 C.J.S., Employers' Liability, § 175 (1992) states [a]n employee of one employer who is lent to, and becomes subject to the control of, another employer is generally regarded, as far as concerns the application of the fellow-servant rule, as the employee of the employer to whom he is lent. Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.1999) similarly defines employee as a person who works in the service of another person (the employer) under an express or implied contract of hire, under which the employer has the right to control the details of work performance. Black's specifically acknowledges that the employer of an employee borrowed from another may be entitled to assert immunity under worker's compensation laws in some jurisdictions. While we are aware of these authorities, we are constrained by the specific language in Wyoming's worker's compensation statutes to hold that Pillon is not an employee of Schlumberger and for that reason Schlumberger's immunity from liability for Fields' injuries does not extend to Pillon.