Opinion ID: 1184860
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Introduction of evidence of defendant's prior offenses and failure of court to caution jury on the use of such evidence

Text: [6] Defendant argues that the court committed prejudicial error in admitting the testimony of Mary Caeton to the effect that upon a prior occasion defendant attempted to enter her house by stealth and physical force for the likely purpose of attempting a rape, an offense involved in the instant murder. ( People v. Hillery (1965) 62 Cal.2d 692, 704 [44 Cal. Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382].) We cannot accept defendant's contentions that such evidence should not have been introduced because it was not material and because he had not been convicted of any crime involving the witness. Nor can we concur in defendant's contention that, as to this testimony, the court failed to give the proper precautionary instructions. We have upheld the admissibility in the penalty trial of defendant's commission of criminal acts similar, or related, to the crime for which he is being tried. ( People v. Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137, 143 [37 Cal. Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381].) It does not aid defendant that his acts did not generate a conviction; in People v. Mitchell (1966) 63 Cal.2d 805, 815-816 [40 Cal. Rptr. 371, 409 P.2d 211], we said: There is no requirement that a defendant must have been convicted in order to introduce evidence of other criminal conduct during the penalty phase. ( People v. Griffin (1963) 60 Cal.2d 182, 190-191 [32 Cal. Rptr. 24, 383 P.2d 432]; People v. Jones (1959) 52 Cal.2d 636, 647-648 [343 P.2d 577].) [7] Although defendant contends that the court should have instructed the jury as to the Caeton testimony that such a charge is easily made and difficult to disprove, and that for this reason the testimony of the prosecuting witness should be examined with caution, we note, first, that defendant did not request such an instruction ( People v. Stangler (1941) 18 Cal.2d 688, 693 [117 P.2d 321]) and, second, that the court did give a proper cautionary instruction. Thus it thoroughly cautioned the jury that evidence of prior offenses may be considered only if believed beyond a reasonable doubt, complying with the rulings of People v. Mitchell, supra, 63 Cal.2d 805, 817, and People v. Polk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 443, 451 [47 Cal. Rptr. 1, 406 P.2d 641]. Before defining reasonable doubt, the court told the jury: Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that prior to the conviction of the offense for which you must now determine the penalty, the defendant may have committed other crimes. You are not permitted to consider that evidence unless and until the commission of such other crimes is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and for that purpose you must weigh such evidence as you do all other evidence in the case.