Opinion ID: 1809444
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Conviction of Use of Weapon to Commit Felony

Text: Pruett contends that he cannot be convicted of both manslaughter and use of a weapon to commit a felony because both manslaughter and the act of reckless assault are unintentional crimes. Pruett argues that a person can be convicted of use of a weapon to commit a felony only when the underlying felony is an intentional crime. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-1205(1) (Reissue 1995) provides: Any person who uses a firearm, a knife, brass or iron knuckles, or any other deadly weapon to commit any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of this state or who unlawfully possesses a firearm, knife, brass or iron knuckles, or any other deadly weapon during the commission of any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of this state commits the offense of using a deadly weapon to commit a felony. In State v. Ring, 233 Neb. 720, 724, 447 N.W.2d 908, 911 (1989), applying principles of statutory construction, we held that the language `to commit any felony' in § 28-1205 is synonymous with `for the purpose of committing any felony.' We further explained that the purposes behind § 28-1205 are to discourage individuals from employing deadly weapons in order to facilitate or effectuate the commission of felonies and to discourage individuals from carrying deadly weapons while they commit felonies. We then stated, It cannot reasonably be said that § 28-1205 will dissuade a person from using a deadly weapon to commit an unintentional felony; the two concepts are logically inconsistent. Ring, 233 Neb. at 724, 447 N.W.2d at 911. As a result, we concluded that when the felony which served as the basis of the use of a weapon charge was an unintentional crime, the accused could not be convicted of use of a weapon to commit a felony. Under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-305(1) (Reissue 1995), [a] person commits manslaughter if he kills another without malice, either upon a sudden quarrel, or causes the death of another unintentionally while in the commission of an unlawful act. Pruett was convicted of unintentionally causing the death of Wakan while in the commission of a second degree assault under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-309 (Cum.Supp. 2000). A person commits second degree assault under § 28-309 if he or she: (a) Intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another person with a dangerous instrument; [or] (b) Recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another person with a dangerous instrument.... Pruett was specifically charged with reckless assault. He was not charged with intentionally assaulting Wakan, and the jury was instructed on only reckless assault. Although Pruett was charged under § 28-305 with unintentionally causing Wakan's death, the State, however, argues that Pruett intentionally committed the crime of reckless assault and, thus, committed a felony which can serve as the basis for his conviction of use of a weapon to commit a felony. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-109(19) (Reissue 1995) provides: Recklessly shall mean acting with respect to a material element of an offense when any person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his or her conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to the actor, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation. In State v. Kistenmacher, 231 Neb. 318, 436 N.W.2d 168 (1989), we discussed the extent to which a reckless act involves a conscious choice in a course of action but held that the definition of recklessly contained in § 28-109(19) is an objective one, thereby making testimony as to the defendant's subjective intent irrelevant. Our decision in Kistenmacher illustrates that reckless assault is not an intentional crime. Although recklessness can involve some intent on the part of the actor, for example, the act of intentionally pointing a gun at another person, this does not transform the crime of reckless assault into an intentional crime. Reckless assault requires not just the act of reckless behavior, but the result of serious bodily injury. A person can be guilty of reckless assault when he or she acted recklessly but did not intend serious bodily injury to occur. Thus, the state of mind to convict for reckless assault does not rise to the level of knowing or intentional. See, generally, State v. Hemmer, 3 Neb.App. 769, 531 N.W.2d 559 (1995) (holding that no crime of attempted reckless assault of police officer exists because reckless is not intentional mens rea). See, also, Jenkins v. State, 640 So.2d 1053 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (sentence could not be enhanced due to commission of felony with weapon when underlying felony was reckless assault). We hold that reckless assault is not an intentional crime. As a result, under State v. Ring, 233 Neb. 720, 447 N.W.2d 908 (1989), Pruett could not be convicted of using a weapon to commit a felony when the underlying felony was manslaughter due to unintentionally causing Wakan's death while in the commission of reckless assault. We set aside the verdict and vacate the sentence for use of a weapon to commit a felony.