Opinion ID: 891641
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Development of Actual Physical Control After Boone

Text: {19} Following Boone, this Court did not address actual physical control again until Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233. At issue in Johnson was whether the State can charge a defendant with DWI pursuant to NMSA 1978, § 66-8-102 (1997, prior to 1999 amendment) when the defendant is on private property and in actual physical control of a non-moving vehicle. Id. ¶ 1. Neither of the consolidated cases in Johnson, however, turned on the meaning of actual physical control. Id. ¶ 19 (Respondents do not challenge the finding that they were in actual physical control of their vehicles when they were arrested for DWI[.]). The Court's review was limited to whether the Legislature intended to place a geographical limitation on the offense of DWI depending on the type of activity constituting the `driving' of a vehicle. Id. ¶ 5. That is, while the driving prohibition applies on both public and private property, id. ¶ 9, this Court sought to determine whether being in actual physical control also applied on private as well as public property. Id. In holding that actual physical control also applied on private property, Johnson reject[ed] any public/private property distinction with respect to the offense of DWI. Id. ¶ 1. Notwithstanding the limited scope of the issue before it, this Court went further to define `actual physical control[.]' Id. ¶ 19. {20} We stated that a person is in actual physical control over a vehicle when he or she exercises direct influence over the vehicle. Id. [T]he clear purpose of the `actual physical control' element of the DWI statute is to deter persons from placing themselves in a situation in which they can directly commence operating a vehicle while they are intoxicated, regardless of the location of the vehicle. Id. In discussing actual physical control, we strayed into dicta by addressing an issue that was not squarely before us, was not challenged by the parties, and was not necessary for decision in the case. Kent Nowlin Constr. Co. v. Gutierrez, 99 N.M. 389, 390-91, 658 P.2d 1116, 1117-18 (1982) (holding that dicta is language unnecessary to the decision of the issues before the court and is not binding as a rule of law). This broadly worded dicta led to Defendant's conviction in this case based on very little evidence to show actual physical control of his vehicle. {21} In reaching our decision in Johnson, we relied on a series of Court of Appeals opinions developing this nascent jurisprudence stemming directly from Boone, most important among them being State v. Harrison, 115 N.M. 73, 846 P.2d 1082 (Ct.App. 1992), as well as an out-of-state case with a different DWI provision. Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, ¶ 19, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233 (citing City of Cincinnati v. Kelley, 47 Ohio St.2d 94, 351 N.E.2d 85, 87 (1976) (The clear purpose of the control aspect of the instant ordinance is to deter persons from being found under circumstances in which they can directly commence operating a vehicle while they are under the influence of alcohol or particular drugs.)). In Harrison, the defendant was a passenger in his own vehicle until it stalled and would not restart. 115 N.M. at 74, 846 P.2d at 1083. The driver steered the vehicle toward the curb and left in search of help. Id. at 74-75, 846 P.2d at 1083-84. Concerned that the defendant would attempt to drive while intoxicated, the driver took the keys from the ignition, placed them under the seat, positioned bricks before the front and back tires of the vehicle on the driver's side, and instructed the defendant not to leave the vehicle. Id. Some time later, police officers investigated and found the defendant passed out behind the steering wheel of the car with the key in the ignition, the ignition turned on, the transmission in drive, and with the defendant's foot on the brake and hands on the steering wheel. Id. at 75, 846 P.2d at 1084. The officers noted that the defendant had slurred speech, red blood-shot eyes, and smelled of alcohol. Id. The defendant refused field sobriety tests, but after being transported to the Bernalillo County Detention Center he submitted to a breath-alcohol test that produced readings of .17 and.15, well in excess of the legal limit. Id.; § 66-8-102(C). {22} Based on these facts, the Court of Appeals held that [i]t can reasonably be inferred that Defendant actively searched for the vehicle keys, started the engine, and was prepared to drive away before he passed out or fell asleep. Harrison, 115 N.M. at 76, 846 P.2d at 1085. The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction, holding that a defendant may exercise `actual physical control' over a vehicle when he is discovered behind the wheel of an automobile, either passed out or asleep, under these circumstances. Id. (emphasis added). That is, the circumstantial evidence supported a finding that the defendant exerted actual, not hypothetical, physical control over the vehicle because he turned on the vehicle's engine, placed its transmission in the drive position, and applied his foot to the vehicle's brake. {23} The Harrison Court further held that under Boone, [t]he fact that the officers discovered no signs that the vehicle had been moved by Defendant is irrelevant. Harrison, 115 N.M. at 76, 846 P.2d at 1085. The Court of Appeals also determined for the first time in Harrison that DWI is a strict liability crime because the statute makes absolutely no reference whatsoever to a required intent on the part of an accused. Id. at 77, 846 P.2d at 1086. Based on the strict liability nature of the crime and on previous interpretations of the legislative policy behind the DWI legislation, Harrison made strong statements about the public policy supporting the Court's interpretation of the statute. See id. (the public's interest in deterring individuals from driving while intoxicated is compelling; the policy behind the DWI statute is to prevent individuals from driving or exercising actual physical control over a vehicle when they ... are unable to exercise the clear judgment and steady hand necessary to handle a vehicle with safety both to themselves and the public); see also Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, ¶ 17, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233 ([T]he public interest and potential harm posed by intoxicated drivers is so compelling that the offense of DWI is a strict liability crime.). The Harrison Court was particularly concerned with a defendant who argued that he could not be convicted of DWI because he was too intoxicated to form the conscious intent to drive drunk. 115 N.M. at 78, 846 P.2d at 1087. As the Court in Harrison reasoned in support of its strict liability determination, [t]o allow persons charged with DWI the opportunity to present such a defense would be absurd and undoubtedly contrary to the statute's purpose. Id.