Opinion ID: 1199062
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sandra B.

Text: Defense counsel commenced his cross-examination of Sandra B. by asking her a number of questions relating to her trial. She replied she did not know if she was going to have a jury trial. She asserted the attorney-client privilege in response to questions whether it was her understanding that the prosecutor would argue for second degree murder and that her trial might be decided by the court (sitting without a jury) based on the transcribed proceedings in this case. She again asserted the attorney-client privilege when defendant's counsel asked her whether her attorney had told her of the penalty for second degree murder, whether she had discussions with the prosecutor or her attorney about being prosecuted for manslaughter, and whether she already had waived her right to a jury trial or intended to do so. (35) Defendant contends that Sandra B.'s assertion of the attorney-client privilege violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable verdict, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to present all relevant mitigating evidence. Generally, the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation encompasses inquiry into a witness's bias or motivation for testifying. ( Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678-679 [89 L.Ed.2d 674, 682-683, 106 S.Ct. 1431].) The attorney-client privilege, on the other hand, applies to discussions between a witness and the witness's attorney relating to possible plea bargains. ( People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1228 [255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047]; accord, Brookings v. State (Fla. 1986) 495 So.2d 135, 140 [right to cross-examine does not extend to witness's conversations with attorney]; compare State v. Hembd (1975) 305 Minn. 120 [232 N.W.2d 872] [confrontation clause negates doctor-patient privilege]; State v. Farrow (1976) 116 N.H. 731 [366 A.2d 1177] [same].) Here, to the extent defense counsel's questions related to Sandra B.'s understanding or state of mind, the trial court erred in upholding her assertion of the attorney-client privilege. Such questions are properly addressed to bias, because a witness's belief that his or her testimony will result in a lenient sentence is relevant to the witness's credibility. The error, however, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, for the jury had before it ample information of the possible bias of Sandra B. ( People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 48-49 [222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423]; see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 684 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 686-687].) In his opening statement at the penalty phase, the prosecutor told the jury that Sandra's case was pending in the same court and that she would probably have a court trial. In closing argument, the prosecutor noted that Sandra and her lawyer may have some hope of getting something out of this. Defense counsel in his closing argument reiterated what the prosecutor had said before: that Sandra would face a court trial, that her case would be submitted on the transcripts of the proceedings in this case, and that the prosecutor might argue only for second degree murder. Thus the jury was sufficiently apprised of any possible bias by Sandra. The questions relating to what Sandra B.'s attorney had told her, however, were subject to the attorney-client privilege insofar as they sought disclosure of the substance of confidential communications and were not necessary in ascertaining bias. ( People v. Garrison, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 774-775.) (36) There is no merit to defendant's argument that the sentence Sandra B. might have hoped to receive was relevant to the jury's sentencing decision regarding defendant. The sentence of a codefendant is not relevant to a capital defendant's penalty determination. ( People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 810-813 [248 Cal. Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310].) We reject defendant's argument that the trial court violated a number of his constitutional rights by sustaining an objection when the defense asked Sandra B. if she had ever displayed a handgun in the presence of a person named Tirvett. The trial court's ruling was proper. The question did not relate to any of the issues in this case. Thus, it was of marginal relevancy and would unduly consume time. ( Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 679 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 683]; Evid. Code, § 352.) Defendant's remaining contentions find no support in the record.