Opinion ID: 198886
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 18 To obtain convictions for witness tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A) & (b)(3), the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Freeman (1) knowingly use[d] intimidation or physical force, threaten[ed], or corruptly persuad[ed] Amy Clarke, (2) intending to induce Clarke to withhold testimony, or to hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1512. In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence of witness tampering, we must view the facts and witness credibility determinations, as well as draw reasonable inferences, in favor of the government. See United States v. Valle, 72 F.3d 210, 216 (1st Cir. 1995). So long as the evidence, taken as a whole, warrants a judgment of conviction, the evidence is legally sufficient. United States v. Olbres, 61 F.3d 967, 970 (1st Cir. 1995). Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence shows that Freeman made statements to Clarke on two occasions that a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt were criminally culpable. 19 Freeman was aware that there was a federal investigation of activity at the Golden Banana. Based on the evidence presented by the government, the jury could infer that Freeman was also aware that his own conduct might subject him to criminal liability as a result of the investigation. Thus, Freeman had a motive to prevent potential witnesses from relaying damaging information to the government. Clarke testified that Freeman approached her at the Golden Banana and said, I hear you've been talking and the feds are around, and stated, remember, mum's the word. Later in the same conversation Freeman said, remember with the feds around talking, keep the lip zipped, drawing his finger across his lips in an accompanying gesture. Clarke testified that this exchange made her feel a little bit intimidated. 20 In light of his motive to curtail the flow of information to the government, the jury could reasonably infer that Freeman selected language that he thought would intimidate, threaten, or corruptly persuade Clarke, and that Freeman did so intending to cause her to withhold testimony or to hinder, delay, or prevent the communication of information to the federal authorities investigating the Golden Banana. Although Freeman's words did not contain overt threats, a reasonable jury could infer that Freeman knew Clarke would be threatened by such words, given his status as a police officer and her first-hand knowledge of his erratic personality and violent temper. 21 Similarly, Freeman's statements to Clarke several weeks later at her house were sufficient to support a conviction on a second count of witness tampering. Freeman went to Clarke's house immediately following the appearance of a newspaper article about the Golden Banana that featured a front-page picture of Clarke. The jury could have inferred that Freeman went to her house at this time because the article had renewed his fear that Clarke was cooperating in the investigation. Freeman said to Clarke, the feds [are] coming down heavy, and warned her not to say anything about the Golden Banana. Clarke testified that this conversation made her feel intimidated, very uneasy, and awkward, and that she was so afraid of Freeman that she hid in the basement the next time he came to her house. 22 Again, Freeman's statements to Clarke, made in the context of a visit to her home shortly after the appearance of a newspaper article that Clarke had reason to believe had angered him, were sufficient to permit a jury to conclude that Freeman knowingly acted in a way designed to intimidate, threaten, or corruptly persuade Clarke, with the specific intent to cause her to withhold testimony or to hinder, delay, or prevent the communication of information to the federal authorities. See United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1301 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding defendant's statement to his secretary to just not say anything [to the FBI] and I wasn't going to be bothered sufficient to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1512).