Opinion ID: 203367
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Restriction of Ofray's Cross Examination of Govt. Witness

Text: Ofray claims that the district court erred by (a) not granting his Rule 33 motion for a new trial on the ground that the court improperly precluded Ofray from introducing evidence of a Government witness's bias and motive; and (b) limiting Ofray at trial from cross-examining the Government's witness as to bias and motive. The Government's witness, Agent Candelaria, testified that, in the early morning of July 14, 2002, he was sleeping at his residence when he was awakened by a detonation that sounded like a gunshot. Candelaria called the police and then, from his window, observed Ofray on the street outside Rumba's Pub, holding a weapon. Candelaria then saw Ofray walk up to a parked van and place the weapon inside. Based on the information provided by Candelaria, police later recovered the weapon, an automatic pistol, from the van. Ofray was arrested hours later, and at the time of his arrest, a second weapon was recovered from his duffel bag. During cross-examination, Ofray's counsel sought to question Candelaria about alleged family ties and hostile relations that existed between him and Ofray. Specifically, Ofray wished to show that Candelaria had known Ofray a long time because of the latter's ownership of Rumba's Pub and that the two men were in fact related, namely because Candelaria's brother had a son with Ofray's sister  in other words, that the two men shared a nephew. Ofray wished to introduce evidence of family troubles between [Ofray's] sister and the witness' brother to impeach the witness as to bias and motivation to cause harm to [Ofray] by fabricating a case against him. After hearing the proffer of testimony to be elicited from Candelaria, the district court precluded Ofray's counsel from questioning Candelaria about the allegedly hostile family relationship. In addition to restricting the scope of Ofray's cross examination of Candelaria, the trial court precluded the defense from calling in its case-in-chief Agent Irving Ofray, who Ofray's counsel proffered was being called to testify about bias and motivation on the part of the Government agents to induce witnesses to fabricate evidence against the defendant-appellant. Denial of a Rule 33 motion for a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Díaz, 300 F.3d 66, 78 (1st Cir.2002). As a threshold matter, the Government points out that the district court never ruled on Ofray's Rule 33 motion. Accordingly, we remand Ofray's Rule 33 motion to the district court. Thus, the remaining claim is that the court erred by restricting the scope of cross-examination. A court's limitation of the scope of cross-examination is reviewed de novo to determine whether the defendant was afforded a reasonable opportunity to impeach adverse witnesses in conformity with the Confrontation Clause. United States v. Martinez-Vives, 475 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir.2007). Under the Confrontation Clause, a defendant has the right to cross-examine the government's witness about his bias against the defendant and his motive for testifying. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). Nevertheless, the right to cross-examination is not without limits, and trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Id. The trial court's latitude in shaping such restrictions is `wide.' United States v. Vega Molina, 407 F.3d 511, 523 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431). [R]estrictions on cross-examination regarding bias are erroneous only if they are manifestly unreasonable or overbroad. United States v. Callipari, 368 F.3d 22, 36 (1st Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1098, 125 S.Ct. 985, 160 L.Ed.2d 998 (2005) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 219 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)). To establish that the district court has abused its discretion, the defendant must show that the limitations imposed were clearly prejudicial. United States v. Williams, 985 F.2d 634, 639 (1st Cir.1993). It follows logically, therefore, that should an error be revealed, we may affirm the conviction if we are confident that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Martinez-Vives, 475 F.3d at 53. Here, the district court precluded the proffered cross examination primarily on the ground that it was collateral matter. The court stated that cross examination as to Candelaria's bias would be irrelevant, in light of the fact that other evidence corroborated Candelaria's account, namely the testimony of a police officer who recovered a weapon in the van parked outside of Rumba's Pub several hours after Candelaria claimed to have witnessed Ofray deposit the weapon in the van. The fact that Candelaria's testimony was partially corroborated by the subsequent testimony of another officer, however, did not provide an adequate basis for the court's preclusion of the cross examination sought by Ofray. While it is true that police recovered a firearm from the exact place where Candelaria testified the firearm was deposited, there was no corroboration of Candelaria's testimony that it was Ofray, rather than another individual, who placed the weapon in the van. In other words, cross examination of Candelaria as to his bias against Ofray could have allowed the jury to infer that Candelaria observed an individual other than Ofray possess a gun and then  because of hostility between him and Ofray  pinned the act of firearm possession on Ofray. Although cross examination of Candelaria would indeed have required a certain amount of delving into collateral matter, the issue of Candelaria's possible bias against Ofray was a relevant fact for the jury to consider in deciding whether to credit Candelaria's testimony. It was thus error for the trial judge to preclude the defense from attempting to show that there was a familial tie between Candelaria and Ofray, and that bad blood existed between the two men. This was clearly evidence of Candelaria's motive and bias for providing inculpating testimony. [10] Any error, however, was harmless, because the jury was confronted with other testimony that established that Ofray sold large quantities of drugs and regularly carried weapons in connection with his role as the operator of several drug points. Although Ofray's possession of a weapon on July 14, 2002, was an overt act charged in the Indictment, the jury could have chosen to disbelieve all of Candelaria's testimony about the gun possession, and even have disbelieved the testimony of the police officer who discovered the gun in the van, and still found Ofray to be guilty of the charged drug conspiracy. As discussed above, the Government's proof of Ofray's participation in the charged conspiracy was overwhelming. This was not a case where the success of the Government's proof turned on the jury's determination of Candelaria's credibility. Cf. United States v. Mulinelli-Navas, 111 F.3d 983, 993 (1st Cir.1997) (finding erroneous limitation of cross examination not harmless where proof of charges relied solely on government witness's testimony and allowing cross examination to proceed could have allowed jury to discredit witness's testimony). Here, Ofray's theory of the case  urged in cross examination of most of the Government's witnesses, in opening statement, and in closing argument  was that the Government had failed to present credible evidence of any connection between Ofray and Las Avispas. Ofray's theory of defense, although ultimately unsuccessful, did not suffer as a result of his inability to impeach Candelaria's testimony regarding Ofray's possession of a firearm on a single occasion. See United States v. Cunan, 152 F.3d 29, 38 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding no error in court's restriction of cross examination where restrictions did not impede assertion of theory of defense). In sum, the trial court's decision to limit the cross examination of Candelaria, even if erroneous, was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of Ofray's guilt.