Opinion ID: 2511832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: The protective order is valid

Text: ¶ 43 Turning to the legal principles that are unfortunately either misstated or misapplied, the majority rejects, as did the court in Boyd, the argument that the possibility that material may be disseminated on the Internet if released in the form of a copied hard drive justifies a protective order. The majority says that there is a minimal risk of improper dissemination of such images because of defense attorneys' professional responsibilities as officers of the court. Majority at 173 (citing Boyd, 160 Wash.2d at 438, 158 P.3d 54). But the risk is significant. As Congress has determined, there is a large risk of child pornography being distributed. And unfortunately the professional responsibilities of attorneys have not prevented some attorneys from being involved with child pornography. The majority engages in wishful thinking when it concludes that because an attorney is an officer of the court, he or she will not be or become part of the Internet trafficking in child pornography. ¶ 44 The fact is that those who engage in illegal conduct concerning child pornography come from all walks of life, and attorneys do not refrain from such conduct because of their professional obligations. Even a brief search shows numerous cases where attorneys have engaged in illegal conduct involving child pornography. See, e.g., In re Raquet, 870 N.E.2d 1048 (Ind.2007); In re Conn, 715 N.E.2d 379 (Ind.1999); Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Blazek, 739 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 2007); In re Gackle, 283 Kan. 502, 153 P.3d 493 (2007); In re Sosnowski, 197 N.J. 23, 961 A.2d 697 (2008); In re St. Clair, 32 A.D.3d 170, 821 N.Y.S.2d 684 (2006); Disciplinary Counsel v. Ridenbaugh, 122 Ohio St.3d 583, 2009-Ohio-4091, 913 N.E.2d 443 (2009); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Winch, 2009 WI 64, 318 Wis.2d 408, 769 N.W.2d 474 (2009). ¶ 45 Moreover, further dissemination of child pornography is a valid concern. Both trial judges who considered the matter reasonably concluded that protecting the minor victims of Grenning's sexual assaults from further victimization on the Internet demanded a protective order as the State requested. The same concern was part of the reason that Congress enacted the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Adam Walsh Act), which limits a defendant's access to property or material constituting child pornography. Pub.L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, 629 (2006). A provision of this act, 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m), limits access to discovery materials by requiring that material that constitutes child pornography must remain in the care, custody, and control of the government or a court, and a court shall deny any defense request to copy, photograph, duplicate, or otherwise reproduce the material so long as the Government makes the property or materials reasonably available to the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m)(1), (2)(A). ¶ 46 The Adam Walsh Act does not apply in the present case, but the findings underlying the act are highly relevant to the question whether the protective order in this case was valid. In its findings Congress determined that [t]he illegal production, transportation, distribution, receipt, advertising and possession of child pornography ... is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the children depicted in child pornography and has a substantial and detrimental effect on society as a whole. Pub.L. No. 109-248, § 501(1)(A). Congress also found that [t]he government has a compelling State interest in protecting children from those who sexually exploit them, and this interest extends to stamping out the vice of child pornography at all levels in the distribution chain. Id. at (2)(C).  Every instance of viewing images of child pornography represents a renewed violation of the privacy of the victims and a repetition of their abuse.  Id. at (D) (emphasis added). ¶ 47 Congress was quite concerned about the ease with which child pornography can be distributed, specifically finding that [t]he advent of inexpensive computer equipment with the capacity to store large numbers of digital images of child pornography has greatly increased the ease of possessing child pornography, contributing to the increased market in child pornography. Pub.L. No. 109-248 § 501(1)(C). ¶ 48 The potential for repeated victimization of the children whose images are child pornography stored on computer hard drives was a legitimate basis for the trial judges in this case to issue the protective order and to deny the defendant's motion for reconsideration. Not only was this true as a general proposition, it was true based on the specific facts in this case. At the hearing on the motion to compel discovery, the trial judge was advised that the impetus for the State's investigation of illegal sexual acts involving the elder of Grenning's two victims of sexual assault, including rape, was an inquiry from federal police in Australia. During an investigation involving child pornography, the Australian police had seen pictures of this child, which Grenning took while on a camping trip. At the end of the hearing, the trial judge expressed concern about the first victim and the fact that this four- or five-year-old victim is depicted in these photographs, and I feel some obligation to protect his image from making it into the mainstream of the market of child pornography. RP at 23 (July 25, 2003). ¶ 49 Thus, the judge not only considered the potential for images appearing on the Internet and victims being revictimized, a legitimate concern in and of itself, she also had knowledge that dissemination of images had already occurred with respect to one of the two children that Grenning allegedly (at that point in time) had raped. ¶ 50 Because it is an unfortunate fact of life that attorneys, as with members of any other profession or field of work, can be involved in illegal viewing, collection, and distribution of child pornography, and because revictimization of the children who are the victims of child pornography is a legitimate and very real concern, the majority's rejection of the reason for the protective order is legally unsound. Ultimately, the majority emphasizes the mandatory nature of the discovery rule in CrR 4.7(a)(1)(v) but gives little regard to the rule's provision regarding protective orders. The rule provides that  [e]xcept as otherwise provided by protective orders or as to matters not subject to disclosure, the prosecuting attorney shall disclose  the listed items. CrR 4.7(a)(1). By summarily dismissing the reasons for the protective order, the majority is able to focus solely on the mandatory language of the rule. But even as to the listed items in the rule that shall be disclosed, discovery is subject to protective orders. ¶ 51 Moreover, the protective order in this case did not bar discovery at all. Rather, it allowed full discovery of the defendant's hard drives, via mirrored hard drives. As explained above, nothing in the record shows that the defendant's expert could not conduct a forensic evaluation of the drives at the County-City Building. It may have been more convenient for the expert to have copies of the three hard drives, but not having them did not prevent discovery from occurring. In the end, we do not know why the defense did not carry through on discovery, nor do we know why Mr. Apgood did not testify at trial. It appears, however, that he continued to work on behalf of the defense, because he apparently was involved in making a list of inquires that were included in a formal discovery request in a letter to the prosecuting attorney dated May 7, 2004. CP at 463-64; see 1 VRP at 3-5, 20-22 (May 7, 2004).