Opinion ID: 1302154
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Docherty and Jeross: Allocution at resentencing

Text: Both Docherty and Jeross further challenge their resentencings on the ground that the district court did not give them the opportunity to personally address the court pursuant to Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. That rule requires the court, before imposing a sentence, to address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence. Id. When a defendant is given an opportunity to object to a sentence in the district court and does not clearly articulate any objection and the grounds upon which the objection is based, we review the objections raised on appeal under the plain-error standard. United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872-73 (6th Cir.2004). Plain-error review requires us to determine whether (1) there was an error, (2) the error was obvious or clear, (3) the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, and (4) this adverse impact seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 459 (6th Cir.2006). In United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 627 (6th Cir.1996), this court held that the district court had erred in failing to allow the defendant to exercise his right of allocution at his sentencing and remanded the case for resentencing. We had previously held, however, that Rule 32 requires allocution only before a court imposes the original sentence on a defendant, and does not require allocution at resentencing. United States v. Coffey, 871 F.2d 39, 40-41 (6th Cir.1989) (holding that allocution was not required in resentencing following revocation of the defendant's probation, and adopting the approach set forth in United States v. Core, 532 F.2d 40, 42 (7th Cir.1976), where the Seventh Circuit concluded that [w]e interpret the rule to mean that allocution is required only before imposing the original sentence); see also Pasquarille v. United States, 130 F.3d 1220, 1223 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that [t]he defendant's right to speak . . . applies to the original sentence and not to the subsequent resentencing). According to the foregoing Sixth Circuit precedent, which neither defendant acknowledges, the district court was not required to allow them to allocute at resentencing. The court therefore did not err in failing to give them the opportunity to do so. See Coffey, 871 F.2d at 40. Nevertheless, we recognize the sound practice for a district court to permit a defendant to speak regardless of the timing of the sentence. Id. at 41. Docherty and Jeross do not dispute the fact that the court gave them the opportunity to speak before their original sentences were imposed. Jeross affirmatively told the judge that he had nothing to say, and Docherty actually addressed the court at length. Neither Docherty nor Jeross submitted any new evidence or raised new arguments at their resentencings. These facts significantly undermine their argument on appeal. See Pasquarille, 130 F.3d at 1223 (noting that the defendant had the opportunity to address the court at his original sentencing, had not submitted any new, mitigating evidence at resentencing, and did not dispute the facts of record). The district court in the present case resentenced Jeross and Docherty on the same record that was before it at their initial sentencings. Their resentencings each followed a limited remand, the sole purpose of which was to allow[] the court to determine if it would have granted a different sentence, had it known at the time of the [initial] sentencing that the Sentencing Guidelines were advisory, not mandatory. See United States v. Haynes, 468 F.3d 422, 425 (6th Cir.2006). No new evidence was submitted, the defendants' PSRs were not revised, and neither defendant raised any new arguments at resentencing. Furthermore, Docherty and Jeross were subject to, and each received, the very same sentence, whereas the defendant in Coffey received a significantly longer term of imprisonment at resentencing. The defendants in this case also fail to provide any basis for concluding that their substantial rights were affected or that the integrity of the proceedings was impaired. They raise only the wholly speculative possibility that the court might have sentenced them differently if the defendants had personally addressed the court. As previously mentioned, the better practice is for a district court to permit allocution at any sentencing proceeding, regardless of the timing, and the district court below would have been well advised to do so in this case. Jeross and Docherty nevertheless had no right to allocution at their resentencing, so the district court's failure to allow for allocution does not constitute a reversible error.