Opinion ID: 1172016
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Instruction on General Intent

Text: The court read to the jury CALJIC No. 3.30, which provides that In the crimes charged in Counts 7 and 8 and the lesser included offenses of Kidnapping and False Imprisonment within the offense of Kidnapping as alleged in Counts 3 and 4, there must exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct and general criminal intent. To constitute general criminal intent it is not necessary that there should exist an intent to violate the law. When a person intentionally does that which the law declares to be a crime, he is acting with general criminal intent, even though he may not know that his act or conduct is unlawful. Defendant contends that this instruction required the jury to draw a conclusive presumption of intent based upon the doing of a particular act and that this error mandates reversal of his conviction for possession of a silencer for a firearm (count 8). Defendant argues the jury should have been allowed to reject the inference of `general criminal intent' even if it found that defendant intentionally did a particular act which the law declares to be a crime. (He fails to explain why the instruction did not also infect his convictions for kidnapping and unlawful possession of a machine gun.) In essence, defendant challenges the concept of general intent crimes. We reject the challenge; CALJIC No. 3.30 properly instructs on general intent.