Opinion ID: 1709662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: remediation and retroactivity

Text: [3] ถ 53. It is a well-established rule in Wisconsin that legislation is presumed to be prospective in application unless: (1) the statute reveals by express language the legislature's intent to apply the provisions retroactively; or (2) the language reveals such intent by necessary implication. See, e.g., Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 199-200, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995); Chappy v. LIRC, 136 Wis. 2d 172, 180, 401 N.W.2d 568 (1987); State v. ILHR Dept., 101 Wis. 2d 396, 403, 304 N.W.2d 758 (1981). We conclude that Wis. Stat. ง 144.76(3) (1977) reveals the legislature's intent to authorize retroactive remediation under the Spills Law by necessary implication. ถ 54. Wisconsin Stat. ง 144.76(3) (1977) requires those in violation of its provisions to take the actions necessary to restore the environment to the extent practicable and minimize the harmful effects from any discharge to the air, lands or waters of this state. We must presume that the legislature chose its words carefully in drafting this statute. See, e.g., Ball v. District No. 4, Area Bd. of Vocational, Technical and Adult Educ., 117 Wis. 2d 529, 539, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984). Use of the phrase restore the environment to the extent practicable by necessary implication reveals an intent to address past conduct. Even those whose conduct in part predated the Spills Law cannot escape liability under this provision: they must perform complete remediation of the spill site to make the environment whole again. ถ 55. Any other interpretation or construction of this language would produce an absurd result, which this court has a duty to avoid. See, e.g., State ex rel. Reimann v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 214 Wis. 2d 604, 621, 571 N.W.2d 385 (1997). If remediation under the Spills Law were to apply in a prospective fashion only, Chrysler would be liable solely for remediation of the hazardous substance spills which occurred after 1978. Even assuming that courts could ascertain the precise date upon which the barrels began discharging their hazardous substances, it would be absurd to allow Chrysler to stop short of complete remediation by focusing on that portion of the spill which represents post-1978 spillage alone. [4] ถ 56. Were Chrysler to do so, it would not be restoring the environment to the extent practicable. Therefore, we conclude that the language of Wis. Stat. ง 144.76(3) (1977) necessarily implies that violators of the Spills Law are liable for complete and thorough remediation of hazardous substance spillsโeven those spills which in part occurred prior to the statute's effective date. [21] ถ 57. Our interpretation of the Spills Law is analogous to the interpretation that federal courts have given to the imminent hazard provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. ง 6973 (1994). In United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D. N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982), the United States brought an action for injunctive relief to remedy the hazards posed by chemical dumping that occurred at a landfill in 1971 and 1972. The action was brought pursuant to, among other statutory provisions, section 7003 of RCRA. [22] See id. at 1057. Section 7003 became effective in 1976, several years after the dumping had occurred. See id. at 1070. ถ 58. In responding to the defendants' argument that the statute should not be applied retroactively to impose liability for acts they performed in 1971 and 1972, the United States District Court stated: The gravamen of a section 7003 action, as we have construed it, is not defendants' dumping practices, which admittedly ceased with respect to toxic wastes in 1972, but the present imminent hazard posed by the continuing disposal (i.e., leaking) of contaminants into the groundwater. Thus, the statute neither punishes past wrongdoing nor imposes liability for injuries inflicted by past acts. Rather, as defendants themselves argue, its orientation is essentially prospective. When construed in this manner, the statute simply is not retroactive. It merely relates to current and future conditions. Admittedly, from a practical perspective, defendants may be compelled under our reading of the statute to remedy the continuing effects of acts they performed prior to the statute's adoption. But we do not conceive of this as contrary to the purposes of the RCRA. . . . Because the gravamen of a section 7003 action is the current existence of a hazardous condition, not the past commission of any acts, we see no retroactivity problem with the statute. Id. at 1071-72 (citation omitted). ถ 59. In Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1436 (S.D. Ohio 1984), the district court reached a similar conclusion regarding RCRA. Noting that the word disposal is defined by RCRA as the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that. . .[it] may enter the environment, see 42 U.S.C. ง 6903(3) (emphasis added), the Jones court concluded that RCRA authorizes restraint of further leaking of hazardous wastes [originally disposed of in 1973 and 1974], and that the leaking need not result from any affirmative action by the defendant. Jones, 584 F. Supp. at 1436. [23] See also United States v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1329, 1334 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (To hold that remedial environmental statutes could or should not apply to conduct engaged in antecedent to the enactment of such statutes, when the effects of such conduct create a present environmental threat, would constitute an irrational judicial foreclosure of legislative attempts to rectify pre-existing and currently existing environmental abuses.).