Opinion ID: 153855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Access to the Courts and Legal Resources

Text: 8 Plaintiff claims that he was denied access to the prison law library and the courts as a result of his placement in Living Unit II. In Lewis v. Casey, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996), the Supreme Court recently clarified a prisoner's right to access legal resources and the courts. The Court explained that under Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), the Fourteenth Amendment only guarantees the right of access to the courts. Although providing access to a law library is an acceptable means of effectuating the right of access to the courts, Bounds did not create an independent right of access to a law library or legal assistance. Lewis, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2179-80. The Lewis Court stated: 9 Because Bounds did not create an abstract, free-standing right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance program is sub-par in some theoretical sense. That would be the precise analogue of the healthy inmate claiming constitutional violation because of the inadequacy of the prison infirmary. Insofar as the right vindicated by Bounds is concerned, meaningful access to the courts is the touchstone, Bounds, 430 U.S., at 823 [97 S.Ct., at 1495] ... (internal quotation marks omitted), and the inmate therefore must go one step further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim. 10 Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2180. Therefore, an inmate must satisfy the standing requirement of actual injury by showing that the denial of legal resources hindered the prisoner's efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim. Id. at ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2179, 2182. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint: 11 The defendants severely restricted Plaintiff's regularly [sic] library privileges to only fifteen (15) minutes on Thursdays. Because the defendants placed restrictions on the number of segregated inmates who could go to the library on Thursdays, Plaintiff spent approximately eighteen (18) hours per day in a cell for weeks at a time with nothing to read which caused Plaintiff mental deterioration, anxiety and deep depression. 12 .... 13 Before July 27, 1992 Plaintiff's Law library privileges were afternoons and evenings, Monday through Friday, for at least five (5) hours per day. From July 27, 1992 until approximately December 10, 1992 the defendants restricted Plaintiff's Law Library access unreasonably to only one (1) to five (5) hours per week. Sometimes Plaintiff's legal access requests slips were thrown away or ignored. 14 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 28 (emphasis omitted). Plaintiff makes a general allegation in his brief on appeal that his restricted library privileges denied him access to the courts. The injury plaintiff complains of, however, is that the restricted access left him with nothing to read which caused Plaintiff mental deterioration, anxiety and deep depression. Plaintiff failed to allege that the library restrictions placed on unassigned prisoners hindered his effort to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim. 15 Additionally, the constitutional obligation to provide inmates access to courts does not require states to give inmates unlimited access to a law library, see Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 358 (10th Cir.1978), and inmates do not have the right to select the method by which access will be provided. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 583 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041, 101 S.Ct. 1759, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981). Time records of when Mr. Penrod spent time in the law library at Limon during the periods in question were attached to defendants' motion for summary judgment; the records show that he had access to the library several hours every week. (R., Vol. I, No. 39.) When a prison limits access to the courts by restricting an inmate's access to legal resources, we must determine whether the prison's policy is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Petrick v. Maynard, 11 F.3d 991, 994-95 (10th Cir.1993). In the past we have considered economic factors, the reasonable alternatives to accommodating inmate requests, and whether there is a 'valid' connection between the prison policy and putative government interest. Id. at 995; see Twyman, 584 F.2d at 359 (considering economic factors in examining the constitutionality of prison regulations). Considering the security problems at the Limon facility, the limits on unassigned prisoners' access to the law library were not unreasonable or constitutionally impermissible.