Opinion ID: 1977253
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Propriety of writ of prohibition.

Text: Petitioner asserts that the county court was threatening to act outside of or in excess of its jurisdiction because (1) no action could be legally commenced except by an attorney for the city of Milwaukee, (2) petitioner had been deprived of her right to a jury, and (3) the city could not prosecute this action because prosecutions for ordinance violations are really criminal prosecutions. On the basis of these assertions she claims that prohibition is a proper remedy. However, before prohibition will lie, certain well-settled prerequisites must be satisfied. First of all, it must appear that an appeal is not an adequate remedy. [1] Secondly, it must be shown that extraordinary hardship will result unless a writ of prohibition is available. [2] In regard to both of these prerequisites, the petitioner seeking the intervention of the supervisory court has the burden of alleging sufficient facts to show both the inadequacy of appeal and extraordinary hardship. [3] In this case petitioner is faced with defending a civil forfeiture action based upon a citation for speeding. Her petition contains no factual allegations regarding why an appeal is inadequate in this situation, or why she will suffer hardship unless a writ of prohibition issues. It contains only the general conclusory statement that your petitioner has no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise. It must be conceded that a court appearance for a speeding violation is a regular, routine matter of relatively minor significance, both in terms of possible sanctions and time involved. Absent extraordinary circumstances, which do not appear in the record of this case, it cannot be said that proceeding to trial on this matter would result in grave hardship or that appeal is not an adequate method of correcting whatever errors might be involved. We therefore conclude that the circuit court properly quashed the alternative writ in this case because of failure to meet the necessary preconditions for this extraordinary remedy. There is an additional reason why prohibition does not lie in this case. In Petition of Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co. [4] this court stated: . . . [In order for prohibition to lie] the duty of the court below must be plain; its refusal to proceed within the line of such duty, or, on the other hand, its intent to proceed in violation of such duty must be clear . . . . This requirement that the duty of the lower court must be plain and clear has been cited approvingly and followed in recent cases affirming a circuit court's decision not to issue a writ of prohibition. [5] In the case at hand it can hardly be said that the county court had a clear and plain duty to dismiss the case or to grant petitioner a jury trial. On the contrary, in denying this relief the county court was following the clear and plain direction of Wisconsin law. This is merely another way of saying that what petitioner really seeks are some very basic changes in Wisconsin law, which would require the overruling of several cases, and a finding that several statutes are unconstitutional. But the way to seek this end is by the ordinary course of appeal, and not by writ of prohibition, which requires that the deviation by the lower court be from clear and plain principles of law.