Opinion ID: 792365
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Analysis: Sufficiency of the Evidence

Text: 130 We are aware that [c]ourts have interpreted the language [of] the Hobbs Act very broadly. United States v. Arena, 894 F.Supp. 580, 587 (S.D.N.Y.1995). Nonetheless, we are bound by the fundamental principle that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068. Here, it seems to us inescapable that this standard has not been met. 131 The Indictment clearly and expressly charges Appellants with conspiring to commit extortion, as the term is defined in [18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2)], by conspiring to obtain property from and with the consent of others, . . . which consent would be and was induced by the wrongful use of actual and threatened force, violence and fear. The jury charge, too, expressly recited the victim's con[s]ent as an element of extortion. There is nothing in the Record, however, to suggest that there was an agreement to obtain the property of either Hua or the gambling operation at 75 Eldridge by consent — forced or otherwise. An inference may fairly be drawn that Appellants and others agreed to visit the 75 Eldridge Street parlor to rob it, but that is all. 132 In particular, the evidence establishes that on at least eight separate occasions, Xiao discussed an agreement between himself, Appellants, and others. But each time the criminal conduct was discussed, it was in terms of a robbery. Extortion was neither spoken of nor apparently ever contemplated. Indeed, not a single fact was elicited from Xiao that could lead to an inference that a co-conspirator planned, or agreed, to extort — as opposed to rob — the gambling parlor at 75 Eldridge Street or any individual at that location. 133 Again, absent from the Record is any indication that Appellants thought, or sought, to obtain property from Hua, or anyone else at 75 Eldridge Street, by means of a forced consent. Rather, the Record supports an agreement among, and an actual effort by, Appellants and others to get a person at that location to open a door so that Appellants and others could enter the establishment and rob it. Indeed, this very method of robbery was discussed. But the only evidence that even arguably can be identified as indicating extortion came from Hua, who testified that he was gambling at the 75 Eldridge Street parlor when he received a phone call, either from Xiao or someone on Xiao's behalf. 134 Hua testified that the caller demanded $10,000. Hua refused and hung up the phone. Later, Hua was summoned to come outside the parlor, where he was confronted by Xiao, Appellants, and another gangster, all of whom were pointing guns at Hua. Xiao demanded $10,000, and Hua refused, informing the gangsters that he had no money. Xiao then hit Hua in the head, grabbing the chain from around his neck, and the gang fled. Xiao testified that the chain was later sold and that he, Appellant, and Li Wei then split the proceeds. It seems inescapable that this incident was nothing more nor less than a classic robbery. 135 Absent from Hua's testimony is any suggestion that either Appellant was even involved in the alleged extortionate phone call. Hua's testimony was inconsistent as to the identity of the caller, and he never identified either of the Appellants as the caller. The Government argues that Appellants must have been involved, because the call was placed after the gang formed up in Brooklyn and during the time that Xiao recalls traveling to 75 Eldridge. It is true that both the caller and the gang demanded $10,000, supporting the inference that it was one of the gangsters who placed the call. But even disregarding the uncertainty and vagueness of the timeline established by Xiao's testimony and assuming arguendo that the gangsters made the call, absent from Hua's testimony is any suggestion that the call itself conveyed any degree of threat — implied or express, violent or otherwise. Thus, either accepting Hua's testimony alone, or viewing it in conjunction with Xiao's testimony (as the jury was instructed to do), the evidence does not support any inference of a threat in the phone call. 136 The Government contends, however, that the fact of the phone call combined with the facts surrounding the gang's visit to 75 Eldridge reasonably supports the inference that the purpose of the call was to extort, since the demand for $10,000, which was initially made by telephone, was then repeated by the gang in person before they resorted to violence and took the chain. Thus, concludes the Government, the phone call was both an attempted extortion and an act in furtherance of an extortion conspiracy. But again, there was no testimony that the call itself was threatening in any way. Nor was there any testimony from Xiao, or any other witness, to fill this gap and place the call in a threatening and thus extortionate context. 137 The caller recited no consequences — deleterious or otherwise — of a failure to tender the $10,000, and no evidence was put before the jury suggesting that any such consequences were implied by the caller or understood implicitly by Hua. Moreover, there was nothing in Hua's testimony from which one could reasonably infer that he was placed in a subjective state of fear, or felt threatened in any way, by the call. Hua testified that Xiao was somewhat familiar to him; that he had seen Xiao once or twice in Chinatown; and that he knew Xiao by the name Vietnamese [B]oy. But Hua said nothing from which a juror could reasonably infer that Xiao was feared in the neighborhood or known to be involved in criminal activities; nor was there anything else in the Record to support such an inference. 13 Thus, the mere fact that the caller, whom Hua could not identify, stated that Vietnamese Boy would come to Hua's gambling parlor to pick up the demanded $10,000 cannot support a rational inference that Hua was threatened or placed in fear by the caller. If the name Vietnamese Boy was intended to strike fear in the heart of Hua, there is simply no evidence that it in fact did so. Indeed, that Hua hung up the phone after stating simply that he had no money suggests that he saw no negative consequences in refusing to consent to the demand or, for that matter, in ignoring the call altogether. 138 It is notable that during Xiao's testimony, he had ample opportunity to convey information indicating that he had agreed and planned with Appellants to extort Hua or the gambling business. But he never conveyed any such information. Rather, Xiao repeatedly described a robbery that was initiated and planned by him and Appellants. Indeed, as the gang arrived at 75 Eldridge and when they summoned Hua outside, their guns were already drawn and, thus, a robbery was then taking place. This was, therefore, not the culmination of an unsuccessful extortion or unfruitful extortion conspiracy but, rather, a full-fledged robbery under way. 139 A robbery plus a cryptic and ambiguous phone call does not equal extortion — at least, not on the facts presented to us in this case. And without some evidence in the Record to support the charges of extortion and conspiracy to extort, there was nothing to permit a rational juror to infer that what the defendants were about was anything other than a robbery and/or conspiracy to rob. Cf., e.g., Ceballos, 340 F.3d at 129-30. 140 Even considering the improperly admitted plea allocution of Li Wei, there simply was no evidence of an agreement to obtain property from Hua or anyone else with their consent through the threat or use of force, nor of any actual effort or attempt to do so. And, as discussed above, it is this notion that the victim of extortion consents to the taking — albeit through threat or force — that separates extortion from robbery. Indeed, in the Indictment, the Government charged Appellants with agreeing, intending, and attempting to take (Count One), and of taking (Count Two), with consent. But again, the Record contains no evidence that Appellants agreed, intended, or attempted to take with consent, by threat, the property of individuals associated with the gambling business at 75 Eldridge Street or that of the business itself, and Li Wei's plea allocution does not cure this deficiency. Indeed, his statement that, on July 23rd, he went to 75 Eldridge Street with Appellants [t]o do the extortion that was on the indictment, to take money merely recites an ultimate legal conclusion without setting forth the requisite factual basis to support that conclusion. 14 141 In light of all the foregoing, we conclude that the evidence put forward by the Government to prove the charged extortion and conspiracy to extort, even viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was insufficient as a matter of law to prove the crimes charged in Counts One and Two of the Indictment. At best, the evidence proves an uncharged conspiracy to rob, and the robbery of, an individual at 75 Eldridge Steet. Accordingly, we reverse the convictions of Appellants under Counts One and Two, for the crimes of conspiracy to extort and extortion, respectively.