Opinion ID: 3178867
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: M.M.-H., 300 Kan. 532, 535, 331 P.3d 775 (2014).

Text: The statutory scheme governing the timeliness of Norris' petition for judicial review has been altered by the legislature since the district court decision in this case. We therefore must discuss the law in effect at the time of the district judge's dismissal of Norris' claim because of a lack of jurisdiction and the law applicable since the statutory amendment. Law in Effect at Time of District Court Dismissal The KESL explicitly provides that judicial review of a Board decision is available under the KJRA. K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 44-709(i) provides, in relevant part: 5 Any action of the board is subject to review in accordance with the Kansas judicial review act. . . . In the absence of an action for such review, the action of the board shall become final 16 calendar days after the date of the mailing of the decision. The KJRA explicitly addresses the timing of filing of a petition for judicial review: Subject to other requirements of this act or of another statute: .... (b) If reconsideration has not been requested and is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review, a petition for judicial review of a final order shall be filed within 30 days after service of the order. (c) . . . if reconsideration has been requested or is a prerequisite for seeking judicial review, a petition for judicial review of a final order shall be filed: (1) Within 30 days after service of the order rendered upon reconsideration . . . (2) within 30 days after service of an order denying the request for reconsideration . . . . K.S.A. 77-613. As stated above, Norris' petition for judicial review was filed 36 days after the date on the Board's initial decision. Its March 21 filing date falls outside the KESL's 16-day finality time limit as well as outside the KJRA's 30-day petition filing time limit, even if a 3-day mail rule is applied. The survival of Norris' ability to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court to review the Board's decision against her is dependent upon the legal effect, if any, of her motion for Board reconsideration of its initial decision. As the Court of Appeals panel recognized, the language of K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 44709(i) from the KESL does not explicitly authorize or prohibit the Board from 6 considering a motion for reconsideration. See Norris, 50 Kan. App. 2d at 77. The plain language of that provision merely sets up a 16-day time period for determining finality of a Board order that has not, at the expiration of the 16 days, become the subject of a petition for judicial review. In addition, despite Norris' argument to the contrary, K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 44709(f)(6), another part of the KESL, does not answer the question before us. K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 44-709 outlines the procedure for filing a claim for benefits, determination of benefits, and subsequent review of the determination of the claim. The general procedure calls for an examiner to review a claim and decide its validity, the date benefits should begin, and the amount of benefits payable. See K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 44-709(b). After the examiner issues a decision, any interested party has 16 days to seek review of the examiner's decision by a referee. See K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 44-709(c). A referee must affirm or modify the examiner's findings of fact and decision. K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 44-709(c). The referee's decision is final unless a further appeal to the board of review is filed within 16 days. K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 44-709(c). Subsection (f)(6) outlines the specifics of Board review procedure. It states in pertinent part: (6) The board, on its own motion, may affirm, modify or set aside any decision of a referee on the basis of the evidence previously submitted in the case; may direct the taking of additional evidence; or may permit any of the parties to initiate further appeal before it. The board shall permit such further appeal by any of the parties interested in a decision of a referee which overrules or modifies the decision of an examiner. . . . The board shall promptly notify the interested parties of its findings and decisions. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 44-709(f)(6). 7 Norris begins by arguing that the (f)(6) language allowing the Board to affirm, modify or set aside any decision of a referee on the basis of the evidence previously submitted in the case anticipates an appeal to the Board from a referee ruling. This is an unobjectionable assertion. But Norris further insists that (f)(6)'s later language allowing the Board to permit any of the parties to initiate further appeal before it can only reference Board reconsideration of its initial decision and not a review of an order originating from any rung below the Board on the administrative ladder. The Board's counterargument is that the further appeal language, when considered in the context of the full subsection, does not refer to the Board's ability to reconsider one of its own decisions; rather, it still contemplates only an appeal from a referee to the Board. We agree with the Board on this question because the language and the design of subsection (f)(6) plainly support it. The pertinent quoted portion of the subsection contains three sentences addressing the Board's review functions and duties. The first is permissive, listing what the Board may do in its discretion. This includes the Board's ability to permit any of the parties to initiate further appeal before it. The second sentence clarifies the meaning of further appeal as used in the first sentence and is at least directory, if not mandatory. See State v. Holt, 298 Kan. 469, 474, 313 P.3d 826 (2013) (articulating four factors to determine whether shall makes particular statutory provision mandatory or directory). It states that [t]he board shall permit such further appeal, i.e., the further appeal of the immediately preceding sentence, by any of the parties interested in a decision of a referee which overrules or modifies the decision of an examiner. K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 44709(f)(6). In other words, if a referee's decision has deviated from the decision of the examiner, the Board is at least encouraged, if not commanded, to entertain review of the referee's decision. Simply put, the legislature has said that, if an examiner and a referee have ended up in the same place on a claim, the Board need not become involved. If an examiner and a referee have disagreed, then the Board should, and possibly must, settle 8 the administrative outcome. The third quoted sentence requires notice to the parties of the Board's resolution on review. In contrast to K.S.A. 44-709(i) and 44-709(f)(6) from the KESL, the KJRA explicitly contemplates that a motion for reconsideration of an initial decision by an entity such as the Board may precede the filing of a petition for judicial review. See K.S.A. 77-613(b) (If reconsideration has not been requested and is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review, a petition for judicial review of a final order shall be filed within 30 days after service of the order.); K.S.A. 77-613(c) ([I]f reconsideration has been requested or is a prerequisite for seeking judicial review, a petition for judicial review of a final order shall be filed: [1] Within 30 days after service of the order rendered upon reconsideration . . . [2] within 30 days after service of an order denying the request for reconsideration.). Because the KESL expressly incorporates compatible KJRA judicial review provisions, see K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 44-709(i); Transam Trucking, Inc., 30 Kan. App. 2d 1117, Syl. ¶ 1, we conclude that Norris' petition for judicial review to the Board was permitted. This conclusion eliminates any necessity for us to consider whether Norris also has a persuasive equitable claim to timeliness based on the Board's failure to notify her or her counsel of its abandonment of its past practice of accepting and considering motions to reconsider. We do note, however, that the Board's longstanding practice suggests that its historical understanding of the KJRA's language was consistent with the conclusion we arrive at today. Given statutory authority for the Board to entertain a motion for reconsideration, we observe that Norris' filing of her motion was within the KESL's 16-day finality time limit. In addition, the KJRA's 30-day time period for filing of a petition for judicial review was met, because it did not begin to run until there was a final order from the Board. See K.S.A. 77-613(b), (c). That final order was issued no earlier than the writing 9 of the Board's March 6 letter, making Norris' petition for judicial review filed March 21 timely and endowing the district court with the jurisdiction it needed to address its merits. Law in Effect Now After this court granted Norris' petition for review, the legislature amended K.S.A. 44-709, removing any question about whether the Board may entertain a motion for reconsideration of its initial decision and equating the statute's 16-day time period for determining agency finality with the time limit for filing a petition for judicial review. The amended K.S.A. 44-709(i) now states in pertinent part: (i) Any action of the employment security board of review may not be reconsidered after the mailing of the decision. An action of the board shall become final unless a petition for review in accordance with the Kansas judicial review act is filed within 16 calendar days after the date of the mailing of the decision. If an appeal has not been filed within 16 calendar days of the date of the mailing of the decision, the decision becomes final. L. 2015, ch. 57, § 5; K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-709(i). This new language went into effect on July 1 of 2015. See L. 2015, ch. 57, § 8 (statute goes into effect after its publication in the statute book); K.S.A. 45-310 (words publication in the statute book mean publication of session laws); K.S.A. 45-311 (date of publication generally July 1). In its supplemental brief to this court, the Board argued that the amendment to K.S.A. 44-709(i) should be applied retrospectively because the amendment was to a procedural law. In general, a statute operates prospectively unless its language clearly indicates that the legislature intended it to operate retroactively. State v. Williams, 291 Kan. 554, 10 Syl. ¶ 1, 244 P.3d 667 (2010). But a statutory change [that] does not prejudicially affect the substantive rights of the parties and is merely procedural in nature may apply retroactively. 291 Kan. 554, Syl. ¶ 1. Procedural laws relate to the 'machinery for carrying on the suit, including pleading, process, evidence, and practice and the mode or proceedings by which a legal right is enforced, that which regulates the formal steps in an action.' Brennan v. Kansas Insurance Guaranty Ass'n, 293 Kan. 446, 461, 264 P.3d 102 (2011) (quoting Resolution Trust Corporation v. Fleischer, 257 Kan. 360, 366, 892 P.2d 497 [1995]). In contrast, [s]ubstantive laws give or define the right, give the right or denounce the wrong, or create liability against a defendant for a tort committed. Brennan, 293 Kan. at 461. Although procedural statutes may be applied retroactively, retroactive application is not an absolute. Such application is inappropriate if new legislation affects a vested right. Brennan, 293 Kan. at 460. Three factors are considered in determining the existence of a vested right: '(1) the nature of the rights at stake (e.g., procedural, substantive, remedial), (2) how the rights were affected (e.g., were the rights partially or completely abolished by the legislation; was any substitute remedy provided), and (3) the nature and strength of the public interest furthered by the legislation.' [Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fleischer,] 257 Kan. [360], 369, [892 P.2d 497 (1995)]. Brennan, 293 Kan. at 460. [W]hile we have applied the general rule that a legislature may retrospectively modify the remedies by which rights are enforced, we have not done so when the modification has the practical effect of abrogating the right. Owen Lumber Co. v. Chartrand, 276 Kan. 218, 225, 73 P.3d 753 (2003). We also have noted that '[a] procedural statute will not be given retrospective application where a party does not have a reasonable time after the enactment of the statute to comply with notice requirements before the suit is barred.' 276 Kan. at 226-27. 11 As discussed, under the law in effect at the time of the district court's dismissal, Norris' petition for judicial review was timely and the district court had jurisdiction to determine its merits. Application of the amended K.S.A. 44-709(i) retroactively would divest Norris of a cause of action she possessed at its passage without giving her an opportunity to comply with its new time requirement. Although the amendment can be characterized as procedural, it has a practical effect of abrogating Norris' substantive right. We therefore hold that the law in effect at the time of the district court dismissal, including the unamended K.S.A. 44-709(i), governs this case.