Opinion ID: 437648
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: wallace brown

Text: 19 Plaintiff Brown was employed by the Sheriff's Department as a criminal investigator and warrant officer. He was fired on November 15, 1978, twelve days after he filed a Title VII discrimination complaint against the department with the EEOC. Brown claims that he was fired in retaliation for the filing of that complaint. The district court found to the contrary that Brown was fired because of his record of insubordination, culminating in an incident on November 13, 1978 in which Brown insulted a superior. Brown questions the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the district court's finding. 11 20 Section 704(a) of Title VII prohibits an employer from acting against an employee in retaliation for the filing of a discrimination charge by the employee. 12 The order and allocation of proof for Title VII cases articulated in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at 252-58, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-96, apply to actions for unlawful retaliation under section 704(a). McMillan v. Rust College, Inc., 710 F.2d 1112, 1116 (5th Cir.1983); DeAnda v. St. Joseph Hospital, 671 F.2d 850, 856 (5th Cir.1982). 21 Applying these standards to a retaliation case, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing (1) that [he] engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) that an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) that there was a causal connection between the participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment decision. Once the prima facie case is established, the burden of producing some nondiscriminatory reason falls upon the defendant. The employee then assumes the burden of showing that the reasons given were a pretext for retaliation. McMillan at 1116 (citations omitted). 22 When, however, the case has been fully tried on the merits, the trial court is in a position to decide the ultimate factual issue in the case. United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d 403, 410 (1983); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095; Williams v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., supra, 718 F.2d at 717. That issue is whether or not, but for the protected activity, any adverse action would have been taken. McMillan at 1117-18; DeAnda at 857 n. 12. The plaintiff may meet his ultimate burden of persuasion either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proferred explanation is unworthy of credence. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095. In either case, the trier of fact must then determine which explanation, employer's or employee's, is the more persuasive. Williams at 717. 23 The district court in this case believed the defendants' explanation, concluding that the dismissal of Brown did not result from any retaliatory motive. The court found: 24 The evidence as a whole shows that between June and November, 1978, Brown had become a disruptive force within the Sheriff's Department. He had antagonized and offended co-workers, members of other law enforcement agencies, and members of the public. His insubordination reached the point of cursing and threatening superiors within the Department. The Court finds that Brown's discharge was based upon these reasons, and was not an act of retaliation for the filing of an EEOC charge. 13 25 In reviewing the ultimate finding that there was no retaliatory discharge, as well as the district court's subsidiary findings, we again must apply the clearly erroneous standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). McMillan at 1116. 26 In the several months prior to his dismissal, Brown had received at least two reprimands from his superiors for improper conduct during criminal investigations. There was testimony that the first reprimand, issued in June 1978, was instigated by Brown's use of profanity and his uncooperative attitude during two rape and burglary investigations. The second reprimand, issued on September 20, 1978, was prompted by two incidents during a criminal investigation in which Brown appeared for duty in improper attire, and by other misconduct during the investigation. 14 27 On November 6, 1978 Brown was denied access to departmental records pertaining to ongoing criminal investigations. There is sufficient evidence to conclude that the denial of access was not related to the filing of the EEOC complaint by Brown. 15 On November 13 Brown confronted then Chief Sheriff's Deputy Mac Stout concerning the November 6 order and used derogatory language toward him. 16 There is no evidence that Brown was engaged in any activity protected by Title VII while attempting to gain access to the departmental records or confronting Stout. 28 Our review of the record convinces us that the evidence before the district court was amply sufficient to find that these instances of misconduct by Brown, not the filing of the EEOC complaint, precipitated Brown's dismissal. The district court's finding to this effect was not clearly erroneous.