Opinion ID: 4187625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Intent of General Assembly

Text: Appellant contends although SORNA’s stated purpose is to protect the public, the real intent of the General Assembly is to punish offenders. Appellant’s Brief at 9. Appellant buttresses this argument by claiming SORNA’s statement of purpose implicates “sexual offenders” who are classified solely by their criminal record rather than the class of “sexually violent predators” to whom the former Megan’s Law statutes applied, and which required an individualized determination of SVP status. Id. at 11. Appellant also points out SORNA is entirely codified under the sentencing section of Pennsylvania’s Crimes Code. Id. at 12-13. Finally, appellant argues, SORNA vests administrative authority, not with a public safety department, but with the Pennsylvania State Police, a traditional enforcer of criminal laws, and failure to comply with SORNA results in arrest. Id. at 13-14. The Commonwealth concedes SORNA is broader in application than previous Megan’s Law statutes, but nevertheless insists the statutes do not differ in purpose, as SORNA explicitly provides the registration requirements shall not be construed as punitive. Commonwealth’s Brief at 15-16, citing 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.11(b)(2). The Commonwealth further contends since the statutory language regarding purpose is unambiguous further interpretation of legislative intent should be avoided. Id. at 16. “In applying the first element of this test, the sole question is whether the General Assembly’s intent was to punish.” Williams II, 823 A.2d at 971. This is a question of statutory construction and “[w]e must consider the statute’s text and its structure to determine the legislative objective.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 92, citing Flemming v. Nestor, [J-121B-2016] - 28 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960). Furthermore, “considerable deference must be afforded to the intent as the legislature has stated it.” Id. at 93. The General Assembly specifically stated SORNA “provides a mechanism for the Commonwealth to increase its regulation of sexual offenders in a manner which is nonpunitive but offers an increased measure of protection to the citizens of this Commonwealth.” 42 Pa.C.S §9799.11(a)(2). The statute further states “the exchange of relevant information about sexual offenders ... [is] a means of assuring public protection and shall not be construed as punitive.” 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.11(b)(2). Furthermore, the first listed purpose of SORNA is “[t]o bring the Commonwealth into substantial compliance with the [federal] Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006.” 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.10(1). Nothing in the expressed purpose, legislative findings, or declaration of policy of SORNA explicitly states the legislature intended the law to do anything other than create a remedial civil scheme to comply with federal legislation and protect the public. At the same time, we recognize the following aspects of SORNA are troubling and actually cast doubt on the stated legislative intent: the act encompasses a much broader class of offenders than Megan’s Law II, and includes relatively minor offenses within its net; the act is codified within the sentencing section of the Crimes Code; and the acts vests regulatory authority with the state police. However, we note the fact SORNA encompasses a broad class of offenders is a reflection of the legislature’s intent to comply with federal sex offender laws for funding purposes. Furthermore, Megan’s Law II was also codified completely within the Crimes Code and also vested regulatory authority in the state police. As such, we recognize the General Assembly’s intent in enacting SORNA apparently was twofold: to comply with federal law; and, as we stated in Williams II, “not to punish, but to promote public safety through a civil, regulatory scheme.” Williams II, 832 A.2d at 972. [J-121B-2016] - 29