Opinion ID: 2510266
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the District Judge Abuse his Discretion in Refusing to Permit the Defendants to Offer the Plaintiff's Driving Record into Evidence?

Text: The Defendants sought to offer into evidence the Plaintiff's driving record, which showed a stop sign violation and a speeding violation in 1996, two speeding violations in 1997, a speeding violation in 1998, and a speeding violation in 1999. They contended that such evidence was admissible to show the Plaintiff's habit of speeding and to support the opinion of their vocational expert. The district judge held that the Plaintiff's driving record was not admissible to show he had a habit of speeding, and we agree. Evidence of past law violations is inadmissible to show a person's character in order to show he or she has a propensity to commit that type of crime or committed it on the day in question. State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 988 P.2d 1170 (1999); I.R.E. 404(b). Evidence of a habit of a person is relevant to prove that the person's conduct on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit. I.R.E. 406. There is a difference between a person's habit and his or her character. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 362 (1969). A habit is a person's regular practice of responding to a particular situation with a specific kind of conduct. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003). The Defendants have not identified the situation to which the Plaintiff regularly responded by speeding. If the situation were simply being in the driver's seat of a car, you would expect the Plaintiff to have many more speeding violations than he did. The Plaintiff's last speeding ticket was over one year prior to the accident. The Defendant's argument that the driving record was admissible to show the Plaintiff's habit of speeding was merely a thinly disguised attempt to show the jury that the Plaintiff was a person of bad character. The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiff's driving record was admissible as part of the foundation for their vocational expert's testimony. They contend the expert would have testified that the driving record would have precluded the Plaintiff from pursuing his desired career in law enforcement or security. The Defendants' vocational expert did testify that the Plaintiff had worked as a security guard prior to the accident and was disciplined by his employer for inappropriate conduct. The expert also testified regarding the Plaintiff's severe learning disabilities that had been diagnosed in high school and his sporadic work history. He testified that in his opinion the Plaintiff's lack of education, past difficulty in obtaining and maintaining employment, and lack of expertise made him unqualified for a job as a law enforcement officer or airport security screener prior to the accident. Rule 703 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence provides, Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect. The district judge ruled that the probative value of the Plaintiff's driving record in assisting the jury to evaluate the vocational expert's opinion did not substantially outweigh the prejudicial effect of such evidence. The district judge's conclusion in this regard is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 16 P.3d 890 (2000) (trial judge's conclusion of whether the probative value of evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard). The Defendants have not shown that the district judge abused his discretion.