Opinion ID: 1747978
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: alleged improper comments on postarrest silence

Text: Appellant next contends that the trial court erred by overruling a general objection at one point, and by failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte at a later point, when the prosecutor elicited from two police officers allegedly improper comments on Appellant's exercise of his right to remain silent. In the trial's guilt phase, the State called Officer Paul Clark, who was one of the first officers to arrive at the crime scene. During Officer Clark's direct examination, the following exchange occurred: Q. After you got [Appellant] to the car, what did you do? A. We patted him down, checked his pockets and everything that he had on him, and I advised him of his constitutional rights. Q. Did you have a conversation with him then? A. No. Q. During the time that you were with him, how was he acting? A. He was just hot and all sweaty. Q. Did he say anything? DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection. A. No. THE COURT: Overruled. Q. Did he appear to be calm? A. Yes. In the penalty phase of the trial, Appellant called Officer Ralph Jefferson as a witness. During cross-examination, the State asked Officer Jefferson how Appellant was acting when he was brought to the police station. Jefferson answered: Solemn. He wasn't saying anything. He didn't appear to be angry. He really did not have much of an expression on his face. Defense counsel did not object to this testimony. According to Appellant, each of these two separate instances of testimony, by Officers Clark and Jefferson, highlighted for the jury the fact that Appellant elected to remain silent after being read his Miranda [7] rights, and amounted to the State impermissibly using his silence against him. Appellant acknowledges that neither claim has been preserved for appeal, [8] and thus requests plain error review. Appellant argues that in both instances the trial court should have granted a mistrial on its own motion. It is true, as Appellant notes, that if a defendant chooses to remain silent upon arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, it is a fundamental violation of his constitutional rights for the State to use that silence against him. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). However, while it is improper to use a defendant's post-arrest post- Miranda silence either as affirmative proof of a defendant's guilt or to impeach his testimony, State v. Howell, 838 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Mo.App.1992), a defendant's silence can be mentioned if it is not used for either of those purposes. State v. Mathenia, 702 S.W.2d 840, 842 (Mo. banc 1986). Indeed, many cases have held that evidence similar to the challenged testimony in the instant case is admissible, because no reasonable inference of guilt can be drawn merely from the fact that a defendant was informed of his rights and then exercised them when he was not being questioned at the time he invoked his rights. See State v. Johnson, 943 S.W.2d 837, 839-841 (Mo.App.1997); Howell, 838 S.W.2d at 160-163; State v. Green, 798 S.W.2d 498, 501-503 (Mo.App.1990). [9] Such is the case here. The disputed testimony consists of two brief and isolated references showing merely that Appellant was not questioned about the murders by either Officers Clark or Jefferson, and never made statements to them about it. The record shows this evidence was not used by the State either to impeach Appellant's testimony or as affirmative evidence of his guilt. Accordingly, the trial court did not err, plainly or otherwise, in failing to grant a mistrial on its own motion.