Opinion ID: 677324
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Monthly Probation Reports

Text: 25 Giorgi also contends that the Probation Form 8 reports for March, April and May of 1992, filed with the Probation Office, erroneously were admitted in evidence because they were not linked to him. We disagree. Under Fed.R.Evid. 901(a), which governs the requirement of authentication and identification for admissibility, the Government 'need only prove a rational basis from which the jury may conclude that the exhibit did, in fact, belong to the appellant[ ].'  United States v. Serna, 799 F.2d 842, 850 (2d Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Natale, 526 F.2d 1160, 1173 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 1724, 48 L.Ed.2d 193 (1976)) (alteration in Serna ), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013, 107 S.Ct. 1887, 95 L.Ed.2d 494 (1987). Here, Deputy Chief Probation Officer DeFelice testified that he was personally familiar with Giorgi and specifically connected those reports to him, noting that they had been retrieved from Giorgi's file. Thus, his testimony sufficiently connected the exhibits to Giorgi to warrant their submission to the jury. See Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(1) (testimony of witness with knowledge satisfies authentication requirement of Rule 901(a)). 26 In addition, Giorgi raises a hearsay challenge to the admission of the monthly probation reports, claiming that [t]he hearsay problem arises in connection with whether or not [he] engaged in the non-verbal conduct of proffering or submitting the form. Although we find it difficult to discern the exact basis for Giorgi's hearsay objection as it pertains to non-verbal conduct, any such claim nevertheless must fail. 1 Even if we assume that the act of submitting the reports to the Probation Office was a statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted, see Fed.R.Evid. 801(a)(2), (c), such conduct by Giorgi would not constitute hearsay because it was an admission by a party-opponent, see Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A); see also In re Grand Jury Matter, 768 F.2d 525, 531 n. 5 (3d Cir.1985) (in banc) (Becker, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Braswell, 487 U.S. 99, 108 S.Ct. 2284, 101 L.Ed.2d 98 (1988). 3. Two-Inference Jury Charge 27 The Government concedes that the two-inference jury instruction on reasonable doubt was improper. The instruction explained that where the evidence reasonably permitted a finding of both innocence and guilt, the jury should adopt the conclusion of innocence. We repeatedly have emphasized that such a charge is improper because it may mislead a jury into thinking that the government's burden is somehow less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Khan, 821 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir.1987); accord United States v. Attanasio, 870 F.2d 809, 818 (2d Cir.1989). Nevertheless, we review the district court's reasonable doubt instruction to determine whether the instruction as a whole properly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. Victor v. Nebraska, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1243, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994); see Khan, 821 F.2d at 92. We conclude that the instruction in this case satisfies this standard. The court instructed the jury on the meaning of reasonable doubt and emphasized several times that the Government had the burden of proving Giorgi's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that Giorgi was presumed innocent. See Attanasio, 870 F.2d at 818; Khan, 821 F.2d at 92. Moreover, the court reiterated the Government's burden immediately before and after the two-inference instruction was given. See Attanasio, 870 F.2d at 818. Accordingly, the court's entire charge shows that it fairly conveyed to the jury the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Khan, 821 F.2d at 92. 4. Giorgi's Other Arguments 28 Giorgi raises various other arguments in challenging his conviction. We have reviewed these arguments and find them to be without merit.