Opinion ID: 785287
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Alleged Wrongful Acts

Text: 27 Kougasian's remaining four causes of action are based on other alleged wrongful acts by the defendants. All of these causes of action were previously adjudicated by the state courts in Kougasian I and/or II. Because Kougasian is attempting to have the judgments of these two courts set aside based on the alleged extrinsic fraud by defendants, however, these four causes of action are not barred by Rooker-Feldman. 28 However, even if Kougasian were not seeking to set aside the judgments because of extrinsic fraud (or even if the federal court concludes that there was no extrinsic fraud), Rooker-Feldman still does not bar these four causes of action. Kougasian does not, in these causes of action, allege legal errors by the state courts; rather, she alleges wrongful acts by the defendants, such as negligently designing the ski run and negligently placing or failing to remove the rock. It is true that factual allegations and legal claims in these four causes of action are almost identical to the allegations and claims asserted in state court in Kougasian I and II, but that is not sufficient reason to find the causes of action barred by Rooker-Feldman. 29 If issues presented in a federal suit are inextricably intertwined with issues presented in a forbidden de facto appeal from a state court decision, Rooker-Feldman dictates that those intertwined issues may not be litigated. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 1303. But the issues in Kougasian's four causes of action are not inextricably intertwined within the meaning of Rooker-Feldman. In an ordinary language sense, the issues in Kougasian's claims are indeed inextricably intertwined with the issues in Kougasian I and II. But, as we explained in Noel v. Hall, inextricably intertwined has a narrow and specialized meaning in the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1166. 30 If a federal plaintiff has brought a de facto appeal from a state court decision — alleging legal error by the state court and seeking relief from the state court's judgment — he or she is barred by Rooker-Feldman. The federal plaintiff is also barred from litigating, in a suit that contains a forbidden de facto appeal, any issues that are inextricably intertwined with issues in that de facto appeal. Id. at 1158. The inextricably intertwined test thus allows courts to dismiss claims closely related to claims that are themselves barred under Rooker-Feldman. 31 Some of our sister circuits have read the inextricably intertwined language of Rooker-Feldman more broadly. See, e.g., Moccio v. New York State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d Cir.1996) (We agree that the Supreme Court's use of `inextricably intertwined' means, at a minimum, that where a federal plaintiff had an opportunity to litigate a claim in a state proceeding (as either the plaintiff or defendant in that proceeding), subsequent litigation of the claim will be barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine if it would be barred under the principles of preclusion.); Wang v. New Hampshire Bd. of Registration in Med., 55 F.3d 698, 703 (1st Cir.1995) (dismissing due process challenge to revocation of a medical license as inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment affirming revocation of the license on the merits); see also Bechtold v. City of Rosemount, 104 F.3d 1062, 1065-66 (8th Cir.1997). Such a broad meaning of the phrase inextricably intertwined, however, is not warranted by the Supreme Court's decision in Feldman, where the phrase originated. Nor is it warranted by the function of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in our federal system. 32 As applied in Feldman, the inextricably intertwined test was used to prevent Feldman, the federal plaintiff, from raising, in the non-appeal part of his suit, issues that he was prevented from litigating in his forbidden de facto appeal. In that setting, the inextricably intertwined test made good sense, for it prevented Feldman from making an end-run around the rule against de facto appeals. But the inextricably intertwined test does not mean that a federal plaintiff can never raise issues that are inextricably intertwined with issues already decided in completed state court litigation. If that were so, Rooker-Feldman would in some cases give greater preclusive effect to state court judgments than the states themselves would give those judgments. Such super-preclusive effect would violate the requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 that federal courts give the same (not more and not less) preclusive effect the rendering state courts would give to those judgments. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982); Noel, 341 F.3d at 1160. Similarly, if the inextricably intertwined test means that a federal plaintiff cannot raise issues that are inextricably intertwined with issues raised in simultaneous ongoing state court litigation, Rooker-Feldman would prevent the parallel state and federal litigation that is one of the hallmarks of our federal system. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970); Green v. City of Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 1097-98 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc); Noel, 341 F.3d at 1159. 33 In this case, Kougasian has asserted no legal error by the state court. She is therefore not bringing a de facto appeal under Rooker-Feldman. Because she is not bringing a forbidden de facto appeal, there are no issues with which the issues in her federal claims are inextricably intertwined within the meaning of Rooker-Feldman. Therefore, even though Kougasian's remaining four causes of action are essentially identical to the causes of action already adjudicated in Kougasian I and/or II, Rooker-Feldman does not bar Kougasian's federal suit on those causes of action.