Opinion ID: 1376871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony admissible under deadman's and res gestæ statutes.

Text: Appellants specify error of the admission of hearsay testimony that deceased had said he was buying a ranch and covering up the purchase, etc., as summarized above. Appellants' objection is that the statements are not admissible as declarations against interest under any exception to the rule which excludes hearsay testimony. The applicable statute permits testimony of the act or declaration of a deceased person done or made against his interest in respect to his real property . R.C.M. 1947, § 93-401-27, subd. 4. Emphasis supplied. Respondent contends that no error was committed, arguing also that the testimony is admissible under the res gestæ rule. Under our statutes the res gestæ rule applies, Where, also, the declaration, act, or omission forms part of a transaction, which is itself the fact in dispute, or evidence of that fact. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-401-7. By the wording of section 93-401-27, Subd. 4, personal property is excluded, so that in no event would deceased's statements be competent testimony in support of plaintiff's demand for a trust in the personal property. In support of the district court's ruling which admitted the testimony of the alleged land purchase and cover-up by deceased, respondent cites the case of Thompson v. Steinkamp, 120 Mont. 475, 187 P.2d 1018. Gift within the parental relationship is not an element of that case. The citation is off point. Counsel for appellants urge the majority opinion in Wilson v. Davis, 110 Mont. 356, 103 P.2d 149, which holds that declaration against interest are excluded from testimony admissible in personal property disputes and are admissible in real property disputes as an exception to the hearsay rule only when made by a declarant then holding title to the disputed real property. Here it should be noted that the declaration to which the former partner testified is, of all the testimony, the only direct statement indicating completed purchase by the deceased. The testimony is: He told me he bought the place and put it in Bill's [defendant William Platts] name to cover up. The only other testimony suggesting fraud is narrative and comes from the son who stands to gain if the trust is raised. This testimony is that the deceased said to this son, Neil Platts: I might as well tell you I am buying a ranch and putting it in Bill's name for the present time until I get rid of my wife. This is a narrative statement of future intentions. It is not a statement of present ownership. Respondent's argument on appeal lays more stress on res gestæ than on declarations against interest, undoubtedly for the reason that admissible res gestæ are not limited to owned real property. Res gestæ testimony is admissible on the assumption of spontaneity, immediacy and relevance. See Jones on Evidence, §§ 320, 321 and 323 (5th Ed.), for discussion in order above named. Narration is not res gestæ; it is story not statement. ` Res gestæ are events speaking for themselves through the instinctive words and acts of participants, and not the words and acts of participants when narrating the events. ' 1 Nichols on Applied Evidence, 384. Wilson v. Davis, supra, 110 Mont. at page 368, 103 P.2d at page 155. As pointed out in Wilson v. Davis, res gestæ are admissible because they are spontaneous and spontaneous declarations are admissible because made when there must have been an interest at the time to say the contrary. Wilson v. Davis, supra, 110 Mont. at page 369, 103 P.2d at page 156, quoted by the court from 3 Wigmore on Evidence, § 1459(3) (2d Ed.). Some of deceased's purported statements date from before the purchase was completed by appellants in their own names, some date thereafter. None are contemporaneous with the purchase. As we have pointed out, so far as the sellers knew they were dealing only with defendants. We have commented above on the doubtful credibility of the one witness on which deceased's statement reflecting a completed purchase must rest. This court's last discussion of the deadman's statutes, R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-401-9, 93-401-10, 93-401-27, subd. 4, 93-701-3, subd. 3, is found in In re Vincent's Estate, ___ Mont. ___, 324 P.2d 403, 410. There the dangers incident to admitting hearsay testimony of what a deceased is said to have one time said, before or after or even during a transaction, are discussed. It is elementary, that such exceptions to the prohibitions of the hearsay rule be expanded with great caution. The comparative credibility of the witnesses in the present case is the best example. What is said in In re Vincent's Estate is of equal applicability here: The able presiding judge    followed a well-established and proper liberal practice when trying a case without a jury, of giving the litigants an opportunity to fully develop any enlightening facts. We seriously question, and we are sure the trial judge did, whether it was proper to admit the alleged oral statements. In re Vincent's Estate, supra, quoting at length from Marcellus v. Wright, 65 Mont. 580, 594, 212 P. 299. See also Mowbray v. Mowbray, 131 Mont. 580, 312 P.2d 995, and Cox v. Williamson, 124 Mont. 512, 227 P.2d 614. Likewise see Hoppin v. Lang, 81 Mont. 330, 263 P. 421, also dealing with gift as opposed to resulting trust. The second specification of error is well taken.