Opinion ID: 2264839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Prosecutor's Closing Remarks Regarding Shelton's Lack of Remorse

Text: Shelton contends that the prosecutor's closing remarks in the penalty hearing regarding Shelton's lack of remorse violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. According to Shelton, the prosecutor's comment on his lack of remorse was an indirect statement on his failure to testify and focused the jury on an improper consideration  whether he had a duty to express remorse in order to avoid the death sentence. Shelton argues that commenting on his failure to express remorse violated his right against self-incrimination and infected the integrity and fairness of the process. Furthermore, he argues that the court's failure to issue a curative instruction on the prosecutor's improper comment was error. Shelton failed to make this argument at trial or on direct appeal. Therefore, under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3), he must show cause for his procedural default and prove resulting prejudice. In an attempt to do so, Shelton couches this argument in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The issue arose out of the following circumstances. Exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent, Shelton did not testify during the guilt phase of the trial. During the penalty phase, Shelton made to the jury the following statement in allocution: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I stand before you not to plead for my life. I feel that's wrong and improper and basically disrespectful to the victim's family and to mine. The State has painted a picture, and that picture is not very pretty, pertaining to me and my co-defendants. And I would just like to present to the jury a different side or a different meaning to Steven Shelton. The State has pictured me as being a monster, as being a rapist, as being a violent individual, but as you heard from my family, that's not so. The State only presents one side of the picture. There's two sides to every story. And the State just presents a negative side. The jury has found me guilty of these allegations, and now it's the jury's turn to render a verdict. And that verdict is either life in jail or death. Again, I'm not here to plead for my life, but just ask the jury to be fair in their decisions. That's all I have to say. [168] In his summation to the jury during the penalty hearing, the prosecutor said the following: Another thing that judges, for me, the importance of what you do and what this all means is the remorse that has been shown in this case in the words of Jack Outten in allocution and also Steven Shelton in allocution. And they told you or paid lip service that they had concerns for the families of the victim, but what did you hear about their remorse for their acts? What did you hear about that concern for the families of the victim whose life was taken innocently, without any wrong that he caused any of these individuals? [169] Shelton argues that since he did not testify at trial, it was improper for the prosecutor to comment on his lack of remorse, because it was also an impermissible comment on his failure to testify. We disagree. The Fifth Amendment prohibition against self-incrimination bars a prosecutor from commenting on the defendant's failure to testify at trial or the penalty phase. [170] This rule is applicable in both the guilt and penalty phases of a death penalty trial. [171] A defendant does not waive his rights by testifying at the penalty hearing solely on mitigating factors that are wholly collateral to the merits of the charges against him. [172] But when a defendant allocutes at the penalty hearing, [c]learly, then, he could not claim a Fifth Amendment privilege against cross-examination or prosecutorial comment on matters reasonably related to his credibility or the subject matter of his testimony. [173] It has been held that a prosecutor or the court may advise the jury that it may draw an adverse inference from the defendant's silence when the defendant has testified as to some facts concerning the crime charged, but has refused to testify as to other facts within his knowledge. [174] Thus, a defendant does not waive completely the Fifth Amendment privilege by testifying solely on collateral or preliminary matters. [175] In determining whether the prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant's right to remain silent, the test is whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. [176] In making this determination, we must examine the comments in their trial context. [177] Since Shelton did not testify under oath during the penalty phase, he was not subject to cross-examination by the prosecutor. In allocution, Shelton stated that he had another side, one that was not violent and included the love from his family. He stated that the State had distorted the image of the true Steven Shelton by depicting him as being a monster, ... a rapist, ... and a violent individual. [178] He asked that the jury be fair in determining his sentence and refused to plead for mercy because it would be disrespectful to his family and Mannon's family. During closing arguments, the prosecutor responded by directing the jury's attention to Shelton's allocution and indicated that he failed to express any remorse for his actions. We agree with the Superior Court that Shelton's comments in allocution open[ed] the door for the prosecutor to comment on his lack of remorse. [179] The prosecutor's comments did not touch upon the charges against Shelton, nor his failure to testify at trial. [180] Taken in their context, the prosecutor's remarks followed after Shelton's statement in allocution. It is noteworthy that the prosecutor did not make these comments at the guilt phase of the trial, where the comments could be viewed as direct attacks on his right to silence. [181] Rather, the prosecutor's comments pertained directly to the statement Shelton proffered in allocution and reflected solely on his character  that is, his failure to express remorse for his actions. Unlike Lesko v. Lehman , where the prosecutor commented on collateral issues that the defendant had not mentioned during the penalty phase, the prosecutor's comments in this case were not tangential to what Shelton had said in allocution. Because the prosecutor's comments were made on matters reasonably related to [Shelton's] credibility or the subject matter of his testimony, we affirm the trial court's decision. [182] We agree that the natural inference the jury would draw from the prosecutor's statement in this case would be that Shelton was an unfeeling man, not that he failed to testify. [183] Because the prosecutor merely commented on the statements made by Shelton in allocution, Shelton retained his right to be free from prosecutorial comment about his failure to testify about the merits of the prosecution's case. [184] In addition, the prosecutor's comment on the element of remorse was brief and can not be read fairly as having undermined the fundamental fairness of the penalty hearing. [185] Thus, the prosecutor did not infringe upon Shelton's Fifth Amendment right to silence by commenting on Shelton's lack of remorse in allocution. As a result, defense counsel was not deficient in failing to object to the prosecutor's statement during closing arguments. [186] In any event, Shelton has failed to prove that, but for counsel's alleged error, the result of the penalty hearing would have been different. Shelton argues that [t]he prejudice from counsel's ineffectiveness is that the jury was left with the impression that Shelton was not remorseful for the death of the victim, thereby increasing the probability that he would receive the death sentence. [187] We are not persuaded by this conclusory argument. The prosecutor's comment was but a few lines of 27 pages of transcript. Shelton has failed to show how an objection from counsel would have changed the jury's recommendation of death.