Opinion ID: 624999
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion in Limine/Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege

Text: Ghane next argues that the district court erred in admitting the testimony of Gluhovsky, the physician's assistant who interviewed and examined Ghane in the ER; and Dr. Houghton, Ghane's treating psychiatrist. Prior to trial, the court denied Ghane's motion in limine which sought to exclude each man's testimony at trial under an application of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. In the normal course, [w]e review the district court's admission of testimony for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Bad Wound, 203 F.3d 1072, 1075 (8th Cir.2000). However, because this case encounters the delineation of a federal testimonial privilege, which includes the decision, or not, to adopt a dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege (a matter of first impression in this circuit), our review of the district court's analysis is de novo. [T]he scope [or contours] of a privilege and the decision whether to establish a new privilege[, or to adopt an exception thereto,] are mixed questions of fact [(i.e., the applicability of a privilege)] and law [(i.e., the scope of a privilege)] which we review de novo. Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 793 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1997); see also, United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 581 (6th Cir.2000) ([W]e review de novo the district court's analysis of the contours of the psychotherapist/patient privilege.).
All evidentiary privileges asserted in federal court are governed, in the first instance, by Federal Rule of Evidence 501. [8] Federal privilege law, as conceived by Rule 501, is determined by the principles of common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. Fed.R.Evid. 501. The beginning of any analysis under Rule 501 is the principle that `the public has a right to every man's evidence.' Carman, 114 F.3d at 793 (quoting Hardwicke, L.C.J., quoted in 12 Cobbett's Parliamentary History, 675, 693 (1742)). Thus, in the development of testimonial privileges, courts start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive general rule. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996) (quotations omitted). Accordingly, these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974). The Supreme Court has recognized one such exception from every man's evidence, the psychotherapist-patient privilege. In Jaffee, the Court held that confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled disclosure under Rule 501. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15, 116 S.Ct. 1923. As relevant here, a testimonial privilege protecting confidential communications between a psychotherapist and her patient `promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.' Id. at 9-10, 116 S.Ct. 1923 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980)). That is, discussions in the course of therapy likely facilitate an atmosphere of confidence and trust conducive to meaningful treatment. Id. at 10, 116 S.Ct. 1923. Effective psychotherapy ... depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential communications made during counseling sessions may cause embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment. Id. Protecting these confidential communications from compelled disclosure at trial further serves the public as well by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem. Id. at 11, 116 S.Ct. 1923. The mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public good of transcendent importance. Id. In Jaffee, the Supreme Court extended the psychotherapist-patient privilege to licensed social workers in addition to licensed psychiatrists and psychologists for the same reasons noted above. Id. at 15, 116 S.Ct. 1923. The Court reasoned that licensed social workers provide a significant amount of mental health treatment and their clients often include individuals who may not otherwise be able to afford the assistance of a psychiatrist or psychologist. Accordingly, the Court held counseling sessions with a social worker serve the same public goals and thus conversations and notes taken during counseling sessions are protected from compelled disclosure under Rule 501. Id. at 16, 18, 116 S.Ct. 1923. The Court rejected a balancing component . . . [m]aking the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge's later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient's interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure. Id. at 17, 116 S.Ct. 1923. Very basically, in this case the district court held that the statements Ghane made to Gluhovsky during the ER intake interview and examination were not protected by the privilege because Gluhovsky was not a licensed psychotherapist and Gluhovsky did not participate in the diagnosis and treatment of Ghane under the direction of Dr. Houghton. The court further held that even though Ghane's statements to Dr. Houghton fell squarely within the psychotherapist-patient privilege, they were nonetheless admissible under a dangerous patient exception. And, finally, the district court held that even if this circuit declined to acknowledge the dangerous patient exception to the privilege, Ghane knowingly and voluntarily waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege with a full understanding of the attendant circumstances. We address each of the district court's holdings in turn.
During Ghane's ER intake interview and examination with Gluhovsky, Ghane told Gluhovsky that he felt suicidal. Upon further questioning from Gluhovsky regarding Ghane's plans and means to act on these suicidal thoughts (a routine question if the subject arises during such an interview) Ghane informed Gluhovsky that he had cyanide in his apartment, which Ghane intended to use to commit suicide should Ghane eventually decide to do so. Ghane further indicated that he would not be willing to voluntarily give up this cyanide to anyone because he might want to use it later. Ghane claims that these statements fall within the psychotherapist-patient privilege and thus Gluhovsky should not have been allowed to testify at Ghane's criminal trial. Specifically as to Gluhovsky, Ghane claims that the district court construed the privilege too narrowly. For example, he claims that refusing to apply the privilege because Gluhovsky conducted the intake interview with Ghane according to standard hospital procedures and did not, in fact, ever consult with Dr. Houghton or any other psychiatrist, fails to see the forest from the trees. Ghane argues that Gluhovsky was part and parcel of Ghane's psychiatric treatment and was a necessary component of Ghane's psychiatric care at OPRMC. He further claims that the court erred as a matter of law by construing the scope of the privilege so narrowly. Referencing with authority the 1972 rules proposed by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee, which recommended that Congress recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege as part of the Rules of Evidence, Ghane argues that the psychotherapist-patient privilege extends not only to direct communications with psychotherapists, but also to any communications made to third parties who are reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication to the psychotherapist, and to communications made to those present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation, examination, or interview. 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-44 (1972) (hereinafter Supreme Court Standard 504). Here, Ghane claims, Gluhovsky was just the sort of person contemplated by the Supreme Court Standard. We acknowledge that the Supreme Court Standard 504 is a useful starting place for an examination of this privilege, as the Supreme Court, and this court, too, has looked to these proposed standards to inform the definition of the federal common law of privileges, despite the failure of Congress to enact such a detailed article on privileges. [9] In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir.1994); see also Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10-11, 116 S.Ct. 1923. As recommended by the Supreme Court in 1972, the Supreme Court Standard 504 provided that: A communication is confidential if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation, examination, or interview, or persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family. Supreme Court Standard 504(a)(3). Despite the definition set forth in Supreme Court Standard 504, however, Ghane's statements to Gluhovsky are not subject to the privilege. Gluhovsky was not a licensed psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment despite Ghane's arguments to the contrary. The psychotherapist-patient privilege contemplates treatment. It does not encompass care provided by an ER physician's assistant whose job is to assess incoming patients and conduct intake interviews and evaluations. Ghane sought admission, not treatment, from Gluhovsky. In Jaffee, the Court contrasts treatment by a physician for physical ailments that can be done on the basis of physical exams and diagnostic tests, with effective psychotherapy, which depends upon an atmosphere of trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10, 116 S.Ct. 1923. In its discussion of the contours of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Court only contemplated information gleaned during actual psychotherapy sessions conducted, obviously, by a licensed therapist. Id. at 11-12, 116 S.Ct. 1923. The Court even made a point to extend the privilege to licensed social workers as well as licensed psychiatrists, all of whom provide actual mental health treatment. Id. at 15-16, 116 S.Ct. 1923. Gluhovsky, on the other hand, in no way provided mental health treatment to Ghane, but merely completed an intake form as part of the hospital's protocol for all incoming patients, wherein future placement is determined for treatment. These communications are not subject to the privilege under Jaffee. In its general definition of the privilege, the Supreme Court Standard further provides: A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications, made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of his mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction, among himself, his psychotherapist, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family. Supreme Court Standard 504(b). Adding texture to the analysis, Supreme Court Standard 504(b) thus also highlights that the patient's purpose in communicating with his psychotherapist (or other such licensed therapist) factors into our analysis. Noted above, Ghane spoke to Gluhovsky for purposes of hospital admission, not treatment. Gluhovsky was clear in his testimony that he did not provide any therapy, diagnosis or treatment to Ghane during their brief encounter. Applying Jaffee, the Ninth Circuit articulates the burden placed on those wishing to invoke the benefit of the privilege, requiring a showing that 1) [the individual on the receiving end of the communications at issue] is a licensed psychotherapist, 2) [the defendant's] communications. . . were confidential, and 3) the communications were made during the course of diagnosis or treatment. United States v. Romo, 413 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir.2005). In Romo, even though an inmate's confession that he had written a threatening letter to the President was made to a licensed professional counselor who had previously provided mental health treatment during voluntary counseling sessions with the inmate, the court held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege did not apply to the counselor's later testimony at trial because at the time the defendant made the confession, the private meeting between the two did not involve therapy, diagnosis or treatment. Id. at 1048. So, depending upon the circumstances, it is cognizable that even certain communications to one's own licensed therapist are not covered by the privilege. Claiming that Gluhovsky was somehow integral or necessary to Ghane's psychiatric treatment stretches the limits of the privilege. Gluhovsky certainly facilitated Ghane's placement as a psychiatric patient, but that is the extent of Gluhovsky's involvement. Gluhovsky did not work for the psychiatric unit at the hospital, but rather answered to the demands of his own supervisor, the attending ER physician. Ghane argues that because the information collected by Gluhovsky was transmitted to Dr. Houghton and Gluhovsky knew that all of the information he collected would be employed by a psychiatrist in diagnosing and treating Ghane, Gluhovsky was reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication, and thus all statements Ghane made to Gluhovsky during the ER intake interview are covered by the privilege. Granted, the information recorded by Gluhovsky certainly became part of Ghane's admitting chart, but there is no evidence that this information was used in Ghane's later treatment or diagnosis, nor is it likely that it would be used in a way contemplated by the Supreme Court Standard. Dr. Houghton had no contact with Gluhovsky throughout these incidents, and, in fact, Dr. Houghton testified that at the time he first spoke to Ghane on February 5, Dr. Houghton conducted his own routine psychiatric admission wherein Dr. Houghton met with Ghane, interviewed Ghane and obtained the appropriate history. Gluhovsky in no way treated Ghane, did not conduct psychotherapy or counseling, nor did he consult with Dr. Houghton or any other psychiatrist during the relevant time period. Passing intake information along in a chart does not suffice as treatment sufficient to cloak these conversations with the privilege. Despite Ghane's interpretation of the language contained in Supreme Court Standard 504 defining confidential communication, extending the privilege to Gluhovsky on these facts defies Jaffee, which clearly limits the application to those licensed individuals actually involved in mental health treatment. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15-18, 116 S.Ct. 1923. A contrary conclusion on these facts would not comport with binding precedent. Therefore, as to the statements made by Ghane to Gluhovsky, the district court did not err by denying application of the psychotherapist-patient testimonial privilege.
When Dr. Houghton met with Ghane on February 5, 2003, the day after Ghane's admission to OPRMC, Ghane threatened unnamed government employees in the Corps of Engineers and noted that he had access to chemicals. Ghane made these statements to Dr. Houghton in a highly charged emotional state; Ghane's demeanor that day was different, more irritated and hostile, than it had been on all of Dr. Houghton's multiple, previous encounters with Ghane. As a result of this perceived threat, Dr. Houghton sought the advice from the hospital's risk management and ultimately obtained Ghane's consent to notify appropriate legal authorities of the threats. Both parties astutely agree that the statements made by Ghane to Dr. Houghton fall directly within the psychotherapist-patient privilege previously discussed. Dr. Houghton was Ghane's treating psychiatrist and Ghane's statements were made to Dr. Houghton in the course of treatment. However, the district court applied, and Ghane now challenges, an exception to this privilege recognized by a discrete number of circuits; that is, the dangerous patient exception. Accordingly, Dr. Houghton testified at Ghane's criminal trial. In Jaffee, the Court observed in a footnote: [W]e do not doubt that there are situations in which the privilege must give way, for example, if a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 n. 19, 116 S.Ct. 1923. Arising from this dictum is a dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege discussed, but often rejected, by circuit courts. United States v. Auster, 517 F.3d 312, 315-16 (5th Cir.2008) (recognizing that an exception to the privilege exists and can be useful in a criminal trial, but refusing to apply it on the facts of the case because the patient knew his communication to his therapist was not confidential); United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (holding that even if a patient knows that a threat is not made in confidence, any statements made to the therapist are privileged in a federal trial); Hayes, 227 F.3d at 583-87 (analyzing and ultimately rejecting the dangerous patient exception to the federal psychotherapist-patient testimonial privilege); United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1360 (10th Cir.1998) (restricting the application of the exception to situations where the threat was serious when it was uttered and its disclosure was the only means of averting harm). Ghane argues that the dangerous patient exception has no place in federal criminal law, citing the reasoning of the Sixth and Ninth circuits, which have rejected its application. We agree with our sister circuits that have rejected this exception and decline to interpret the dictum in Jaffee as establishing a precedentially binding dangerous patient exception to the federal psychotherapist-patient testimonial privilege. In Hayes, the Sixth Circuit adeptly analyzed the dangers associated with the adoption of such an exception. We adopt Hayes' reasoning. At the outset, we, too, reject the Tenth Circuit's application of the dangerous patient exception, which ties the standard of care exercised by a treating psychotherapist in complying with a state's duty to protect requirement, with the applicability of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in criminal proceedings. Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360 (determining that the alleged exception to the Jaffee privilege is applicable only where the threat was serious when made and disclosure is literally the only means of averting harm). We see only a marginal connection, if any at all, between a psychotherapist's action in notifying a third party (for his own safety) of a patient's threat to kill or injure him and a court's refusal to permit the therapist to testify about such threat (in the interest of protecting the psychotherapist/patient relationship) in a later prosecution of the patient for making it[, or any other prosecution for a similarly related criminal charge]. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 583-84. Advancing any connection between the standard of care exercised by a treating psychotherapist with an application of the dangerous patient exception is unsound in theory and in practice. Id. at 584. Such an inquiry would, at a minimum, be highly speculative and very likely lead to erratic results[,] as the scope of this federal testimonial privilege would vary depending upon state determinations of what constitutes reasonable professional conduct in these circumstances. Id. Second, adopting a dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege would necessarily have a deleterious effect on the confidence and trust the Supreme Court held is implicit in the confidential relationship between the therapist and a patientan interest the Court also held serves public ends by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10, 11, 116 S.Ct. 1923; Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584-85. The dangerous patient exception to the federal testimonial privilege is quite different from a therapist's duty to protect, which is already in place. While early advice to the patient that, in the event of the disclosure of a serious threat of harm to an identifiable victim, the therapist will have a duty to protect the intended victim, may have a marginal effect on a patient's candor in therapy sessions, an additional warning that the patient's statements may be used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution would certainly chill and very likely terminate open dialogue. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584-85. We likewise recognize, as did the Sixth Circuit in Hayes, that there are times when a therapist can testify at a hearing and it will not have the above-mentioned deleterious effect on the confidence the therapist shares with his patient. Id. Having a therapist testify at his patient's own involuntary commitment proceedings is a different matter altogether. Testimony such as this comports with the already-existent duty to protect the patient or identifiable third parties placed on therapists generally. And, once committed, the patient's mental health care continues, quite possibly with the very same mental health professional that recommended the involuntary commitment. Id. at 585. This furthers the public interest advanced and discussed by the Supreme Court in Jaffee. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11, 116 S.Ct. 1923. The same cannot be said for testimony at a patient's later criminal trial, for example. [A] psychotherapist's testimony used to prosecute and incarcerate a patient who came to him or her for professional help cannot be similarly justified. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 585. Once incarcerated as the result of a criminal prosecution, the probability of the patient's mental health improving diminishes significantly and a stigma certainly attaches after the patient's sentence is served. Id. We hold, therefore, that the federal psychotherapist/patient privilege does not impede a psychotherapist's compliance with his professional and ethical duty to protect innocent third parties, a duty which may require, among other things, disclosure to third parties or testimony at an involuntary hospitalization proceeding. Conversely, compliance with the professional duty to protect does not imply a duty to testify against a patient in criminal proceedings or in civil proceedings other than directly related to the patient's involuntary hospitalization, and such testimony is privileged and inadmissible if a patient properly asserts the psychotherapist/patient privilege. Id. at 586. Thus, we do not adopt the dangerous patient exception to the federal psychotherapist-patient testimonial privilege. As such, the court erred in applying such an exception and admitting Dr. Houghton's testimony at trial. This, however, was not reversible error, as discussed below.
The government alternatively argues that because Ghane consented to Dr. Houghton notifying appropriate legal authorities of Ghane's alleged threats, Ghane waived any protection from the psychotherapist-patient privilege. While we agree with the proposition that the psychotherapist-patient privilege can be waived, Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15 n. 14, 116 S.Ct. 1923, Ghane's consent was legally insufficient and there was no waiver here. Here, after Dr. Houghton met with Ghane on February 5, Dr. Houghton contacted the hospital's risk management, seeking guidance on how to handle the threats expressed by Ghane, especially given Ghane's demeanor during his interaction with Dr. Houghton. Upon the advice of risk management, and before reporting Ghane's statements to the FBI, Dr. Houghton obtained Ghane's written and oral consent. In doing so, Dr. Houghton told Ghane that given the nature of the threats, Dr. Houghton felt legal authorities needed to be advised and that it would probably be the police. Dr. Houghton asked Ghane if that would be okay and Ghane said, yes. Then, Ghane signed a consent form, indicating that information regarding Ghane's hospitalization and conditions could be released to anyone. The word anyone was handwritten in a blank by Ghane. We have already stressed the policy implications and distinct differences between advising a patient regarding the therapist's duty to protect and advising the patient of the possibility that the patient's statements may be used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution. It is one thing to inform a patient of the `duty to protect;' [but] it is quite another to advise a patient that his `trusted' confidant may one day assist in procuring his conviction and incarceration. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 586. The consent obtained in this case was insufficient. Although Dr. Houghton advised Ghane that legal authorities should be notified regarding Ghane's general threats, Dr. Houghton did not, importantly, inform Ghane that should Ghane consent to such disclosure, Ghane's statements may be used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution. [I]t must be the law that, in order to secure a valid waiver of the protections of the psychotherapist/patient privilege from a patient, a psychotherapist must provide that patient with an explanation of the consequences of that waiver suited to the unique needs of that patient. Id. at 587. Accordingly, on these facts, Ghane cannot be said to have knowingly or voluntarily waived his rights to assert the psychotherapist-patient privilege here, which renders the government's waiver argument meritless. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (a knowing and intelligent waiver is made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it).
We have thus established that on these facts, as to Ghane's statements to Dr. Houghton, Ghane should have been afforded the protections of the psychotherapist-patient privilege without exception and Dr. Houghton should not have been allowed to testify. The government does not maintain that admission of Dr. Houghton's testimony was harmless error. Given this waiver, we are not obliged to reach the issue in our analysis. United States v. Causevic, 636 F.3d 998, 1004 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Montgomery, 100 F.3d 1404, 1407 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that when harmless error is not raised in an appellate brief, the argument is waived unless the court exercises discretion to overlook the waiver). However, an appellate court has discretion to overlook the waiver in certain circumstances, including when we are certain, for example, that reversal would merely result in protracted, costly and futile proceedings in district court. Lufkins v. Leapley, 965 F.2d 1477, 1481 (8th Cir.1992). Finding the latter true in this case, we find the district court's erroneous admission of this testimony harmless in the final analysis. This court . . . `will not reverse a conviction if an error was harmless.' United States v. Aldridge, 664 F.3d 705, 714 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting United States v. Henderson, 613 F.3d 1177, 1183 (8th Cir.2010)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2151, 179 L.Ed.2d 935 (2011). An evidentiary error amounts to harmless error if, after viewing the entire record, the reviewing court determines that no substantial rights of the defendant were affected, and that the error had no, or only slight, influence on the verdict. United States v. White Bull, 646 F.3d 1082, 1093 (8th Cir.2011) (quotation omitted). In determining harmlessness, this court considers the effect of the erroneously-admitted evidence in the overall context of the government's case. United States v. Worman, 622 F.3d 969, 976 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 369, 181 L.Ed.2d 235 (2011). This court has found harmless error where, `the government introduced ample competent evidence from which the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty even without the evidence that should have been excluded.' Aldridge, 664 F.3d at 714 (quoting United States v. Falls, 117 F.3d 1075, 1077 (8th Cir.1997)). After carefully reviewing the trial transcript, we are satisfied that the admission of Dr. Houghton's testimony was harmless. Dr. Houghton testified that Ghane had access to chemicals and that Ghane was a self-admitted threat to himself and others. But this was cumulative of other testimony to the same effect. Additionally, several witnesses, including Dr. Houghton, testified as to Ghane's admissions that he had suicidal thoughts, and the jury specifically asked whether suicide sufficed under the charged statutean issue we previously determined the jury was fully capable of determining. Dr. Houghton's testimony added nothing to the jury's latter discussion. Dr. Houghton did uniquely testify that Ghane further honed his threats against the government, albeit not by much, directing them generally to the Corps of Engineers; and Dr. Houghton also testified about his treatment of Ghane on prior visits as well as the day in question. At trial, the burden was on the government to prove the charge contained in the indictmentthat is, that Ghane did knowingly stockpile, retain, and possess, a chemical weapon, that is, potassium cyanide, which is a toxic chemical not intended by the defendant to be used for a peaceful purpose as that term is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 229F(7)(A), all in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 229(a)(1) and 229A(a)(1). Here, the government presented substantial evidence independent of Dr. Houghton that met its burden. On appeal the parties do not spend much time, if any, discussing the admissions Ghane voluntarily [10] made to Detective Seever the night of February 4. When Detective Seever and his partner arrived at the hospital, Gluhovsky informed them of Ghane's psychiatric issues, Ghane's threats, and the mention of potassium cyanide. During Detective Seever's interview with Ghane, although Ghane denied having cyanide in his apartment, Ghane indicated to Detective Seever that he had access to potassium cyanide. During this interview, Ghane gave the officers consent to search his apartment, which resulted in the seizure of the potassium cyanide. Thus, on the basis of Detective Seever's testimony alone, the jury could determine that the government established that Ghane possessed a substance that could be considered a chemical weapon under the charging statute, and that he had threatened himself and, possibly, others. Layering Gluhovsky's testimony on top of Detective Seever's readily leads us to conclude that any error in admitting Dr. Houghton's testimony was harmless. Gluhovsky testified that Ghane checked himself in to the ER with suicidal thoughts and that he was in possession of potassium cyanide, which Ghane was unwilling to surrender when asked. And, finally, Ghane himself testified that he stole the potassium cyanide, kept it in his apartment, and possessed it with the intention to commit suicide if life became intolerable. [11] Ghane also testified that he never intended to conduct any type of medical experiments with this potassium cyanide. Given the weight of the admissible evidence, we hold that Dr. Houghton's testimony had only a slight effect, if any, on the jury's verdict. The district court's evidentiary error was thus harmless.