Opinion ID: 2974049
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Carballea’s Sentence

Text: Carballea argues that the district court erred in considering the hearsay testimony of a law enforcement agent when determining the drug amount used to determine his advisory Guidelines Page 18 of 22 range. This argument was not clearly articulated in Carballea’s brief. The Government construed his argument as asserting that the district court improperly engaged in judicial fact-finding in accepting the agent’s hearsay testimony in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Appellee’s Br. at 51. At the sentencing hearing, the law enforcement officer testified to the drug quantity based on Carballea’s guilty pleas. The officer also testified that Carballea and Fonseca were equal partners in the drug conspiracy and described evidence of their drug trafficking. After the law enforcement agent testified, the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the drug quantity was approximately twenty pounds. There was no Sixth Amendment violation. This Court has conclusively held that Booker does not forbid all judicial fact-finding. “[P]ost-Booker, judges may enhance sentences based upon facts not found by the jury, provided they do not consider themselves required to do so.” Davis, 397 F.3d at 352 (Cook, J., concurring). In addition, the district court did not err in using the officer’s testimony to support Carballea’s advisory range. The officer’s testimony was based, in part, on the plea agreement. The district court’s finding that the drug amount was twenty pounds was not clearly erroneous. Further, Carballea’s sentence was reasonable as the judge also properly considered § 3553(a) factors in sentencing Carballea, stating that he should not receive a sentence higher than that given to the co-leaders of the conspiracy. Carballea’s argument that the agent’s testimony is inadmissable hearsay also fails. This Court has held that hearsay is admissible in sentencing hearings as long as it bears some indicia of reliability. United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1513-14 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc) cert. denied, 507 U.S. 990 (1993). See also United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005). Here, the officer’s testimony was supported by Carballea’s own plea as to the drug quantity. The district Page 19 of 22 court properly considered the agent’s testimony regarding the drug quantity. Therefore, we affirm Carballea’s sentence. F. Jurisdiction over Fonseca’s Failure to File a Rule 35(b) Motion and Downward Departure Fonseca argues that his sentence is unreasonable because the district court failed to “take into account the true remorse and substantial cooperation [he] displayed . . . .” Appellant Fonseca’s Br. at 10. He also asserts that the United States failed to file a Rule 35(b) motion based on his cooperation. We reject both arguments. The Government filed a motion for downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 based upon Fonseca’s substantial assistance. After the downward departure, the district court sentenced him to 168 months. The district court has unfettered discretion to determine the extent of a downward departure based upon substantial assistance. United States v. Jones, 417 F.3d 547, 550 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that the extent of a district court’s departure after it grants a § 5K1.1 motion is an issue “entirely committed to the district judge’s discretion;” this Court has no jurisdiction to review). Since Jones is the controlling authority on this issue, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review a district court’s discretionary denial of a further downward departure for substantial assistance. Fonseca’s Rule 35(b) challenge also fails. Rule 35(b)(1) provides that within one year of sentencing, “[u]pon the government’s motion . . . the court may reduce a sentence if: (A) the defendant, after sentencing, provided substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting another person[.]” Fed. R. Crim. P. § 35(b)(1)(A). The Government, however, did not file a Rule 35(b) motion, thus no such relief is available to Fonseca. United States v. Monus, 356 F.3d 714, 718 n.4 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that defendant’s request for sentencing relief based upon Rule 35(b) is Page 20 of 22 “wholly without merit” since under the plain language of the Rule only the United States can file such a motion, absent a “substantial threshold showing” of unconstitutional motive for the government’s refusal to make the motion). We affirm Fonseca’s sentence.