Opinion ID: 1167656
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Contract Implied in Fact

Text: The plaintiff's second claim includes an assertion that during the course of his 14½ year employment relation with the county an implied-in-fact contract developed. The terms of this contract, he maintains, are established by the county's personnel rules, policies, and procedures, which apparently require good cause for discharge and which were enacted after the plaintiff was initially appointed to office. He alleges that the defendants breached this contract by forcing him to resign. The defendants argue in essence that these county personnel rules did not apply to the plaintiff because he was appointed by and served at the pleasure of the Board of County Commissioners under ORS 204.601(2) and ORS 455.150(1). [14] The defendants' reliance on these provisions is misplaced. ORS 204.121 provides: It is the intent of the Legislative Assembly that no provision of ORS 204.116, 204.126 or 204.601 shall supersede any provision of the county civil service law, and when any conflict arises between any provision of ORS 204.116, 204.126 or 204.601 and any provision of the county civil service law, then the county civil service law shall prevail. (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff alleges that an implied agreement existed because of county rules and personnel policies. If the county personnel rules apply to the plaintiff (and the plaintiff's complaint alleges that they do), then under ORS 204.121 they supersede the statutory provisions on which the defendants rely. Section A of the county rules, under the heading Disciplinary Action, states what action shall be considered good cause for disciplinary action. Such causes include any action which reflects discredit upon the county service,    misconduct, inefficiency, incompetence, insubordination, indolence [and] malfeasance, among others. Section A also provides for an appeal by any discharged employee. The plaintiff's allegation that these rules created an implied agreement is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See Graves v. Arnado, 307 Or. 358, 363, 768 P.2d 910 (1989). Moreover, even if the county personnel rules do not expressly apply to persons of the plaintiff's rank or office, they could (as the plaintiff suggests) become an implied part of his contract. See Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., 281 Or. 651, 656, 576 P.2d 356 (1978). The second claim sufficiently alleges a claim of an implied-in-fact contract.