Opinion ID: 2227708
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: collateral attack: judgment entered without personal jurisdiction

Text: Ratigan's second assignment of error asserts that both the county and district courts abused their discretion in not allowing her to collaterally attack the Iowa judgment in Nebraska. In Olson v. England, 206 Neb. 256, 260, 292 N.W.2d 48, 50 (1980), a common-law action to enforce a foreign judgment, we stated: There can be no doubt as to the general principle that a judgment of a foreign state can be collaterally attacked by evidence that the court was without jurisdiction. Further, [a] judgment rendered in one State is subject to collateral attack in another State on the ground that the State in which the judgment was rendered had no jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject matter, even though it appears in the judgment record that the court had jurisdiction and extrinsic evidence is necessary to establish its invalidity.... Id., quoting Restatement of Judgments § 12, comment c. at 71 (1942). If a judgment on its face appears to be one entered by a court with jurisdiction, such jurisdiction  `will be presumed, unless disproved by extrinsic evidence or by the record itself.'  Olson, 206 Neb. at 264, 292 N.W.2d at 52, quoting Repp v. Repp, 156 Neb. 45, 54 N.W.2d 238 (1952). We reaffirmed Olson in First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Wyant, 238 Neb. 741, 746, 472 N.W.2d 386, 390 (1991), finding that [w]hile it is presumed that a foreign court rendering a judgment had jurisdiction over the parties, a foreign judgment can be collaterally attacked by evidence that the rendering court was without such jurisdiction .... Similarly, we have held that a foreign judgment can be collaterally attacked in a Nebraska enforcement action brought pursuant to the NUEFJA adopted from the 1948 version of the UEFJA based upon evidence that the rendering court was without jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter. Walksalong v. Mackey, 250 Neb. 202, 549 N.W.2d 384 (1996); Miller v. Walter, 247 Neb. 813, 530 N.W.2d 603 (1995). It follows that the same principle should apply to a foreign judgment filed in a Nebraska court pursuant to the current version of the NUEFJA, which provides that when so filed, the foreign judgment has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a court of this state. § 25-1587.03. A judgment entered by a Nebraska court which lacks jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter is void and therefore subject to collateral attack. Kuhlmann v. City of Omaha, 251 Neb. 176, 556 N.W.2d 15 (1996); Ehlers v. Grove, 147 Neb. 704, 24 N.W.2d 866 (1946). See, also, In re Interest of Joshua M. et al., 251 Neb. 614, 558 N.W.2d 548 (1997) (stating that collateral attacks on previous proceedings are impermissible unless grounded upon court's lack of jurisdiction over parties or subject matter). Therefore, we hold that a foreign judgment filed in a Nebraska court pursuant to § 25-1587.03 may be collaterally attacked on the ground that the court which entered the judgment lacked jurisdiction to do so, and the resolution of this issue must be made by the Nebraska court. When Deuth filed his judgment in the Douglas County Court, Ratigan had a right to have that court decide whether her claim that the judgment was void and unenforceable because the Iowa court lacked jurisdiction over her person when it rendered the 1979 judgment was legitimate. The county court abused its discretion by requiring that Ratigan obtain a determination of this issue by an Iowa court and refusing to permit her to offer evidence at the February 20, 1997, hearing. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which excludes evidence unless a substantial right is affected and the substance of the evidence was made known to the judge by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-103(1)(b) (Reissue 1995); Allphin v. Ward, 253 Neb. 302, 570 N.W.2d 360 (1997). Although Ratigan was present and apparently ready to testify at the February 20, 1997, hearing, no formal offer of proof was made concerning her proposed testimony. However, the record reflects the following statement made by her counsel: Ifif you read the original petition in this matter it was for wages owed to Rainbow. Eileen was just an employee of Rainbow. She has talked to someone who is still there, who was there back in `79. He is willing to testify and confirm that Eileen did notwas not working for Rainbow at the time that the judgementor that the service allegedly occurred; and the service allegedly occurred at Rainbow. Eileen hashas also tried to track down her landlord at that time. She was living in Milwaukee at the time that she was allegedly served in Des Moines in this action and she has attempted to try and locate her landlord toto get some evidence. She doesn't have any evidence from 17 years ago and she's trying to get some to show to this Court that she was not living in Des Moines or even the state of Iowa at the time that she was originally served. And she is certainly willing to take the stand and testify that she did not live there. This record is sufficient for us to determine the substance of Ratigan's proposed testimony. If proved, Ratigan's absence from the State of Iowa on the date she was allegedly served with summons there would be relevant to the issue of whether the Iowa court had personal jurisdiction to enter the judgment which is the subject of this proceeding. The refusal of the county court to receive this testimony on the ground that Ratigan was obligated to have the issue determined by an Iowa court is an error requiring reversal because it affected Ratigan's substantial right to collaterally attack the foreign judgment in the Douglas County Court.