Opinion ID: 2425092
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Breach of Contract or Negligence

Text: The court of appeals, with one justice concurring and one justice dissenting, affirmed. A majority of the court held that Bell's cancellation of DeLanney's Yellow Pages advertisement was correctly submitted as a negligence claim. The dissenting justice argued that because DeLanney sought damages for breach of a duty created under the contract, rather than a duty imposed by law, the claim sounded only in contract. We agree with the dissent. The majority below relied on Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck, 146 Tex. 153, 157, 204 S.W.2d 508, 510 (1947), where we quoted from 38 AmJur. Negligence § 20 (1941) as follows: Accompanying every contract is a common-law duty to perform with care, skill, reasonable expedience and faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and a negligent failure to observe any of these conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of the contract. In scharrenbeck, the defendant agreed to repair a water heater in plaintiff's home. A short time after repair, the heater ignited the roof, destroying the house and its contents. Although the contract obligated the defendant to put the water heater back in good working order, the law also implied a duty to the defendant to act with reasonable skill and diligence in making the repairs so as not to injure a person or property by his performance. In failing to repair the water heater properly, the defendant breached its contract. In burning down plaintiff's home, the defendant breached a common-law duty as well, thereby providing a basis for plaintiff's recovery in tort. The principle recognized in Scharrenbeck has also been recognized by commentators in this area. As one prominent authority has explained: Tort obligations are in general obligations that are imposed by lawapart from and independent of promises made and therefore apart from the manifested intention of the partiesto avoid injury to others. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 92 at 655 (5th Ed.1984) [hereinafter Prosser and Keeton]. If the defendant's conduct such as negligently burning down a housewould give rise to liability independent of the fact that a contract exists between the parties, the plaintiff's claim may also sound in tort. Conversely, if the defendant's conductsuch as failing to publish an advertisementwould give rise to liability only because it breaches the parties' agreement, the plaintiff's claim ordinarily sounds only in contract. [1] In determining whether the plaintiff may recover on a tort theory, it is also instructive to examine the nature of the plaintiff's loss. When the only loss or damage is to the subject matter of the contract, the plaintiff's action is ordinarily on the contract. See Prosser and Keeton at 656; 1 J. Edgar, Jr. & J. Sales, Texas Torts and Remedies § 1.03[4][b] at 1-36 (1990). We applied this analysis in Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1986), where we wrote: The acts of a party may breach duties in tort or contract alone or simultaneously in both. The nature of the injury most often determines which duty or duties are breached. When the injury is only the economic loss to the subject of a contract itself the action sounds in contract alone. Bell's duty to publish DeLanney's advertisement arose solely from the contract. DeLanney's damages, lost profits, were only for the economic loss caused by Bell's failure to perform. Although De-Lanney pleaded his action as one in negligence, he clearly sought to recover the benefit of his bargain with Bell. We hold that Bell's failure to publish the advertisement was not a tort. [2] Under our analysis in Reed, DeLanney's claim was solely in contract. DeLanney, however, did not request jury questions on breach of contract. Because the jury was asked only questions as to liability resulting from Bell's negligence, DeLanney waived any claim for breach of contract. Ramos v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 784 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. 1990) (the plaintiff has the burden to obtain affirmative answers to jury questions as to the necessary elements of his cause of action) (citing Tex.R.Civ.P. 279). DeLanney did obtain an affirmative answer to the question whether there was a disparity in bargaining power between the parties in negotiating the Yellow Pages agreement. The court of appeals correctly determined that disparity in bargaining power is irrelevant in a negligence suit. Perhaps the issue was submitted because DeLanney pled that Bell's conduct was unconscionable under the DTPA. Because of his failure to comply with the notice requirements of the DTPA, however, DeLanney's entire cause of action under the DTPA, including any claim of unconscionability, was dismissed by a directed verdict. For this reason, and because DeLanney submitted no contract issues, the jury finding concerning disparity of bargaining power is of no effect. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and judgment is rendered that DeLanney take nothing. GONZALEZ and DOGGETT, JJ., concur. MAUZY, J., dissents.