Opinion ID: 1768076
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal Charges

Text: Chappell was charged with four counts of mail fraud and faced a possible sentence of twenty years in prison in addition to a substantial fine. Three of the four federal charges against Chappell were ultimately dismissed. Chappell pled guilty to the remaining charge and was sentenced to two years in prison. Bowling argues that Chappell struck a deal to trade testimony in Bowling's state trial in exchange for a favorable disposition of Chappell's federal charges. In ruling on Bowling's RCr 11.42 motion on this issue, the trial court concluded that the evidence did not support finding that Chappell in fact had received a benefit for his testimony: Nothing in the record herein or testimony introduced at this hearing establishes that a benefit in fact was bestowed upon Mr. Chappell in his Federal case. Mr. Chappell's cooperation was brought to the attention of the Federal Trial Judge, but as to what effect it may have had, if any, upon his sentence, is not established. In support of his argument that the federal court did take Chappell's cooperation into consideration, Bowling points to these comments made by the federal judge in pronouncing Chappell's sentence: Now, the Court feels that probation is not quite in order, but the Court will give you what I feel is the minimum sentence under thisunder the situation we have here. This statement is hardly conclusive. Moreover, even if the federal sentencing hearing did definitively establish that a deal was struck, there could have been no Brady violation for failing to disclose either the disposition of the federal charges against Chappell or the federal judge's comments made contemporaneously with the imposition of Chappell's sentence. As a general rule [t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case and Brady did not create one.... Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 846, 51 L.Ed.2d 30, 42 (1977). Rather, Brady concerns those cases in which the government possesses information that the defense does not and the government's failure to disclose the information deprives the defendant of a fair trial. Therefore, reversal is required only where there is a `reasonable probability' that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is the probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 494 (1985). Moreover, Brady only applies to the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342, 349 (1976) (emphasis added). Bowling's defense counsel knew that Chappell had been convicted in federal court and cross-examined him about the disposition of the charges. The defense, as conceded in Bowling's brief, could havewithout the Commonwealth's assistance or permissionobtained the transcript of the federal sentencing hearing. Thus, in the case at bar, there could have been no Brady violation in connection with the federal charges against Chappell, because the information in question does not fall within the Brady rule.