Opinion ID: 835954
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Directed Verdict Argument

Text: Turning to defendant's arguments, we first address his argument that the trial court directed, in effect, a verdict of guilty. According to the state, Simson expressly rejected the same argument that defendant makes here. We agree. In Simson, this court rejected the defendant's argument that the accomplice-witness-as-a-matter-of-law instruction amounted to a directed verdict: We believe that the jury would understand that the determination of defendant's guilt was its to make and we doubt that the jury would have understood the instruction to be an order to find the defendant guilty, given the instructions as a whole. See generally State v. Hull [, 286 Or. 511, 595 P.2d 1240]. Simson, 308 Or. at 109, 775 P.2d 837. See also State v. Gibson, 252 Or. 241, 244, 448 P.2d 534 (1968) (erroneous instruction that witness was defendant's accomplice, in context in which it was given, did not amount to directed verdict that defendant was guilty). That reasoning applies here as well. Viewing the instructions as a whole, it is apparent that the trial judge did not instruct the jury that it should find that defendant had committed the crimes. The trial court instructed the jury as to the elements of each crime alleged in the indictment and the relevant definitions of legal terms. It instructed the jury that the state had the burden of proving all elements of the crimes; that the jury was not to take out of context or place undue emphasis on any one instruction; that, as to each count, the jury could find defendant guilty of the offense charged, guilty of a lesser-included offense, or not guilty; and that defendant was innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It went on to tell the jury, You have the sole responsibility to determine what testimony or portions of testimony you will or will not rely upon in reaching your verdict. No reasonable juror could have understood the accomplice-witness instructions to mean that the jury was required to find that defendant was guilty. Defendant's reliance on Simson is misplaced for a more fundamental reason: The accomplice testimony in that case exculpated, rather than incriminated, the defendant. The accomplice-witness instructions in Simson, in other words, were erroneous because they directed the jury to view with distrust testimony that was favorable to the defendant, i.e., that the defendant was not involved in the crimes alleged in the indictment. Instructing the jury that they cannot convict defendant upon uncorroborated accomplice testimony makes no sense when the `accomplice' testimony itself does not implicate defendant in the crime. Simson, 308 Or. at 109, 775 P.2d 837. Thus, in Simson, the accomplice-witness instructions were both legally inapplicable and harmful to the defendant. [12] Here, in contrast, Johnston's testimony directly implicated defendant. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the accomplice-witness-as-a-matter-of-law instruction did not amount to a directed verdict of guilty in defendant's case.