Opinion ID: 2375518
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Enforceability of the Agreement

Text: [1] Because the determination of the existence of a contract in the present case depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence, it is the function of the master as the trier of fact to make that determination. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 238(2) (Tent. Draft No. 1-7 1973); accord, Erin Food Services, Inc. v. 688 Properties, 119 N.H. 232, 235, 401 A.2d 201, 203 (1979); O'Donnell v. Cray, 109 N.H. 223, 225, 248 A.2d 83, 84 (1968). In such an instance, we will reverse a master's finding that a contract exists only when it cannot `reasonably be made on the evidence,' or when it `can be said to be erroneous.' Humiston v. Bushnell, 118 N.H. 759, 762, 394 A.2d 844, 846 (1978) (citations omitted). The plaintiffs claim that the original agreement had expired because of the passage of time and the dates expressly imposed by the contract. They argue that even if it is found that they had agreed to an extension or that they had entered into a second agreement, such extension or additional agreement would be unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. RSA ch. 506. [2] The master found that the Statute of Frauds is inapplicable in this case because the defendant relied and acted on the plaintiffs' written and oral statements and their course of conduct, which indicated that the plaintiffs considered the purchase and sale agreement to be of continuing effect. The record is replete with evidence to support this finding. The finding is supported by the correspondence between the parties' lawyers extending indefinitely the time of performance. The testimony of plaintiff Bower indicates that he was aware of his lawyer's role in securing a contract extension. It may be inferred that Bower had full knowledge of his lawyer's acts and intended to adopt them. See deRochement v. Holden, 99 N.H. 80, 83, 105 A.2d 43, 46 (1954). We therefore reject the plaintiffs' contention that they are not bound by acts of their lawyer. Cf. Manchester Housing Authority v. Zyla, 118 N.H. 268, 385 A.2d 225 (1978) (action within scope of lawyer's authority during civil litigation binding on client). On January 31, 1974, the plaintiffs' lawyer wrote, My clients have requested that I obtain from you a letter confirming that the parties are now operating under an extension of time. . . . The defendant's lawyer responded in a letter dated February 4, stating, This letter will confirm that we have agreed to an indefinite extension of time for the performance under the purchase and sale agreement dated December 20, 1973, . . . . The exchange of letters indicates that the parties intended to continue their contractual relationship, and intended the provisions of the written agreement to remain operative. [3, 4] A party to a purchase and sale agreement who consents to a postponement of the time for performance and induces the other party to act upon the consent cannot claim default and argue that the contract has lapsed. This is true even when time has been made of the essence in the original written agreement. Warren v. Dodge, 83 N.H. 47, 51, 138 A. 297, 299-300 (1927), citing Neppach v. Oregon & California Railroad Co., 46 Or. 374, 397, 80 P. 482, 487 (1905). If we were to allow the plaintiffs to prevail in this case, we would sanction their practice of treating the contract as binding and as rescinded at the same time. Weeks v. Robie, 42 N.H. 316, 320 (1861); Sumner & Company v. Parker, 36 N.H. 449, 454 (1858). This we will not do. [5-7] We further reject the plaintiffs' implicit argument that their performance under the purchase and sale agreement should be excused under either the doctrine of impossibility of performance or commercial frustration. The impossibility doctrine requires that there be complete and permanent impossibility. Perry v. Champlain Oil Co., 99 N.H. 451, 453, 114 A.2d 885, 887 (1955). Under the commercial frustration doctrine, frustration is relative, and usually not deemed present when the contract's main purpose is obtainable. Id. at 553-54, 114 A.2d at 888. In the present case, the conveyance of marketable title was neither impossible nor unobtainable. At the time the plaintiffs repudiated the agreement, the defendant was able and willing to tender marketable title, and the plaintiffs were obligated to purchase it.