Opinion ID: 2231875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Continued Vitality of Gonzalez

Text: In Gonzalez, this court concluded that a traffic stop is analogous to a Terry investigatory stop and, therefore, the reasonableness of police conduct during a traffic stop may be judged by reference to Terry 's dual inquiry. Gonzalez, 204 Ill.2d at 226-28, 273 Ill.Dec. 360, 789 N.E.2d 260, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The two prongs of this inquiry are: (1) whether the stop was justified at its inception and (2) whether the officer's actions during the course of the stop were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that initially justified the stop. Gonzalez, 204 Ill.2d at 228, 273 Ill.Dec. 360, 789 N.E.2d 260. This court then further defined the scope inquiry, determining that the allowable scope of a stop could be exceeded either by impermissibly prolonging the detention or by fundamentally altering the nature of the stop. Gonzalez, 204 Ill.2d at 235, 273 Ill. Dec. 360, 789 N.E.2d 260. Gonzalez was a passenger in a vehicle that was subject to a lawful traffic stop. Thus, in Gonzalez, this court adopted the Terry -based inquiry not only with respect to the fourth amendment rights of drivers, but also with respect to the rights of passengers. The State argues that this court's decision in Gonzalez was implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court's decision in Caballes. We must resolve this question before addressing the request for identification issue because our analysis of the issue in Harris I was guided by the Gonzalez framework. The State asserts three bases for finding that Gonzalez has been overruled. The first two are closely related: first, if application of Caballes leads to a result different on the warrant-check issue from that this court reached in Harris I by applying the Gonzalez framework, then Gonzalez must have been implicitly overruled by Caballes; and second, Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Caballes acknowledges that the Court rejected the application of Terry principles to police conduct during a traffic stop. The State's final argument is that Gonzalez was wrong when it was decided because Terry principles are not applicable to a traffic stop based on probable cause. Caballes establishes two principles governing the analysis of police conduct during a traffic stop. First, a seizure that is lawful at its inception can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the purpose of the stop. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407, 125 S.Ct. at 837, 160 L.Ed.2d at 846. Second, so long as the traffic stop is otherwise executed in a reasonable manner, police conduct does not change the character of the stop unless the conduct itself infringes upon the seized individual's constitutionally protected interest in privacy. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 125 S.Ct. at 837, 160 L.Ed.2d at 847. What we have come to call the scope prong of the Gonzalez inquiry contains two parts  whether the duration of the stop was impermissibly prolonged and whether the police conduct altered the fundamental nature of the stop. Gonzalez, 204 Ill.2d at 235, 273 Ill.Dec. 360, 789 N.E.2d 260. The duration prong clearly survives Caballes. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407, 125 S.Ct. at 837, 160 L.Ed.2d at 846. The continued vitality of the alteration of the fundamental nature of the stop prong is in question. Caballes may be read as holding that only conduct that infringes upon a constitutionally protected privacy interest impermissibly changes the character of the stop. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, argued that the majority erred by considering only the duration of the seizure and abandoning any consideration of the manner in which the stop was conducted. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 421, 125 S.Ct. at 845, 160 L.Ed.2d at 855. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, J.). On the other hand, the Court stated in Caballes that conducting a dog sniff would not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner, unless the dog sniff itself infringed [the seized individual's] constitutionally protected interest in privacy. (Emphasis added.) Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 125 S.Ct. at 837, 160 L.Ed.2d at 847. Another reading of Caballes might be that the phrase and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner ( Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 125 S.Ct. at 837, 160 L.Ed.2d at 847), preserves some role for the second fundamental nature of the stop prong of the Terry/Gonzalez inquiry. We need not resolve this question, however, by careful parsing of the language of Caballes, because Gonzalez is unequivocally overruled by the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005). Muehler involved the detention and questioning of the occupants of a house at which the police executed a search warrant. The police had reason to believe that a gang member who had been involved in a drive-by shooting was residing in the house. The warrant authorized a search of the premises for deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. An Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officer accompanied the police officers. The occupants of the house were handcuffed and detained while the warrant was being executed, pursuant to Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (officers executing a search warrant for contraband may detain the occupants of the premises while the search is being conducted). During this period of detention, the INS officer asked Iris Mena for her name, date of birth, place of birth, and immigration status. He also asked for documentation of her immigration status. Mena's papers confirmed that she was a permanent resident of this country. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 96, 125 S.Ct. at 1468, 161 L.Ed.2d at 305. Mena subsequently filed a section 1983 lawsuit (42 U.S.C. § 1983) against the officers, alleging violations of her rights under the fourth amendment based on (1) the use of handcuffs and (2) the INS officer's questioning her about her immigration status in the absence of reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing on her part. The jury awarded actual and punitive damages and the Court of Appeals affirmed on both counts. Mena v. City of Simi Valley, 332 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir.2003). The United States Supreme Court reversed. For our purposes, only the Court's resolution of the second claim is relevant. The Court noted its repeated prior holding that `mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.' Muehler, 544 U.S. at 100, 125 S.Ct. at 1471, 161 L.Ed.2d at 308, quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. at 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d at 398. Court quoted Bostick further, stating that: `[E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine the individual's identification; and request consent to search his or her luggage.' Muehler, 544 U.S. at 100, 125 S.Ct. at 1471, 161 L.Ed.2d at 308-09, quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. at 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d at 398. Applying this rule to Mena, the Court concluded that because her detention was not prolonged by the questioning, there was no additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the officer did not need reasonable suspicion to ask Mena for her name, date and place of birth, or immigration status. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 101, 125 S.Ct. at 1471, 161 L.Ed.2d at 309. The Court then referred to its recent decision in Caballes, noting, first, its holding in that case that a dog sniff is not a search subject to the fourth amendment and, second, its rejection of the notion that a dog sniff, which need not be justified by reasonable suspicion, causes a shift in purpose that converts a lawful traffic stop into a drug investigation. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 101, 125 S.Ct. at 1471, 161 L.Ed.2d at 309, citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 125 S.Ct. at 837, 160 L.Ed.2d at 847. Applying these principles to Mena, the Court concluded that her detention was lawful at the time the immigration officer questioned her regarding her immigration status (there having been no finding that the duration was unduly prolonged), and that no additional Fourth Amendment justification for the inquiry was required. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 101, 125 S.Ct. at 1471-72, 161 L.Ed.2d at 309. Similarly, the dog sniff performed during Caballes' traffic stop did not cause an additional seizure or implicate constitutionally protected privacy interests, and, therefore, no additional justification in the form of reasonable suspicion was required. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 125 S.Ct. at 837, 160 L.Ed.2d at 847. In light of Muehler, it becomes clear that Caballes rejected reasoning that led to this court's adoption of the fundamental alteration of the nature of the stop portion of the scope prong of Gonzalez. All that remains is the duration prong. During a lawful seizure, as occurred in both Muehler and Caballes, the police may ask questions unrelated to the original detention and are not required to form an independent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before doing so. Further, the Court's reliance on Bostick in Muehler indicates that the encounter should be analyzed under Bostick, even when the person being questioned has already been seized. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 101, 125 S.Ct. at 1471, 161 L.Ed.2d at 309 (mere questioning of a seized individual does not constitute an additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). Finally, we note that the applicability of Muehler, which did not involve a traffic stop, to the facts of the present case, which does involve a traffic stop, cannot be questioned. First, Muehler itself relied on Caballes  a traffic stop case  thus illustrating that the principles being applied are relevant without regard to the factual basis for the encounter between the police and the individual. Second, numerous federal and state courts have concluded that Muehler is applicable to both drivers and passengers who are seized during a lawful traffic stop. See, e.g., United States v. Soriano-Jarquin, 492 F.3d 495 (4th Cir.2007); United States v. Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 505 (8th Cir.2007); United States v. Mendez, 476 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir.2007); United States v. Stewart, 473 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hernandez, 418 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir.2005); United States v. Singh, 415 F.3d 288 (2d Cir.2005); Salmeron v. State, 280 Ga. 735, 632 S.E.2d 645 (2006); State v. Baxter, 144 Idaho 672, 168 P.3d 1019 (App.2007); Marinaro v. State, 163 P.3d 833 (Wyo.2007). Indeed, our own appellate court has reached this same conclusion. People v. Starnes, 374 Ill.App.3d 329, 313 Ill.Dec. 88, 871 N.E.2d 815 (2007); People v. Ramsey, 362 Ill. App.3d 610, 298 Ill.Dec. 446, 839 N.E.2d 1093 (2005). Third, the parallels between a lawful traffic stop and the execution of a search warrant are clear. Both are based on probable cause. The occupants of the vehicle and the occupants of the premises covered by the warrant are lawfully seized for the duration of the stop or warrant search, so long as the duration is not unreasonably prolonged. Brendlin, 551 U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 2406, 168 L.Ed.2d at 138-39; Summers, 452 U.S. at 705, 101 S.Ct. at 2595, 69 L.Ed.2d at 351. The same principles that permit the questioning of Mena regarding her immigration status without the requirement of individualized reasonable suspicion permit an officer to request the passenger in a stopped vehicle to provide identification. We, therefore, overrule Gonzalez to the extent that it holds that the reasonableness of a traffic stop must be judged not only by its duration, but by the additional criterion of whether the actions of the officer alter the fundamental nature of the stop. [3] The duration prong of the inquiry predates our decision in Gonzalez and has been reaffirmed in both Caballes and Muehler. It, therefore, survives as the sole focus of the scope inquiry. See Gonzalez, 204 Ill.2d at 230, 273 Ill.Dec. 360, 789 N.E.2d 260, citing United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir.1993) (rejecting premise that questioning by a police officer that is unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop is itself a fourth amendment violation).