Opinion ID: 2417351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Objections to Instructions

Text: Tokar raises three points of error regarding submission of approved MAI-CR instructions to the jury.
First, Tokar alleges trial court error in submitting MAI-CR 3d 313.42B over a defense objection. This instruction allows the jury to decide, while considering the aggravating circumstances it has found in MAI-CR 3d 313.40, whether the death penalty is warranted. Tokar claims the instruction does not allow for the proper weighing of the mitigating circumstances with the aggravating circumstances, as required by § 565.030.4(3), the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and § 21 of the Missouri Bill of Rights. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). Basically, Tokar takes issue with the order in which the instructions were given because the jurors were forced to find aggravating circumstances before they were asked to consider the mitigating circumstances. Tokar states that MAI-CR 3d 313.42B (decision whether death penalty is warranted) should not be given to the jury before 313.44B (consideration of mitigating circumstances) and 313.46B (final decision on punishment) are given. Jurors do not need to consider mitigating circumstances until they find an aggravating circumstance that sufficiently warrants imposition of the death penalty. Instruction 313.42B does not ask the jury to impose the death penalty, but rather it specifically directs the jury to decide whether the aggravating circumstances are sufficient to warrant [4] the imposition of death as punishment. (emphasis added). This instruction actually erects a barrier, in favor of the defendant, which must be surpassed before the jury can even begin to consider whether it should impose the death penalty under the specific facts of the defendant's case they are deciding. The succeeding two instructions make absolutely clear that: 1) the jury can decide the mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances (313.44B); and 2) the jury never has to decide to impose the death penalty, even if they find the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances (313.46B). The question whether mitigating circumstances exist does not logically present itself until the jury first finds the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance sufficient to warrant the death penalty. See § 565.030.4; State v. Shaw, 636 S.W.2d 667, 675 (Mo. banc 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 928, 103 S.Ct. 239, 74 L.Ed.2d 188 (1982) (explaining that a jury finding of one or more statutory aggravating circumstances is the threshold requirement that must be met before the jury can decide to recommend the death sentence). The trial court did not err. The point is denied.
Second, Tokar claims the trial court erred by submitting MAI-CR 3d 313.44B over a defense objection because it does not provide for a full consideration of all mitigating circumstances. Tokar alleges that the trial court erred when it did not submit his proffered alternative instruction, which specifically listed nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. Tokar further argues the instruction tells the jurors that they may also consider any nonstatutory circumstances, but it does not allow the defendant to present a list of such circumstances while the prosecution gets to present a list of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. Tokar contends that this is a violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Constitution of the United States, and §§ 2, 10, and 21 of the Missouri Bill of Rights. There is no merit to either of these arguments. The approved instruction adequately covers the jury's consideration of mitigating circumstances, and we have repeatedly held that there is no requirement that the jury be given a non-MAI list of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494, 518 (Mo. banc 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 757, 130 L.Ed.2d 656 (1995); State v. Mease, 842 S.W.2d 98, 113 (Mo. banc 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 918, 113 S.Ct. 2363, 124 L.Ed.2d 269 (1993). Furthermore, this Court has stated that may consider language does not preclude the necessary consideration of mitigation evidence by the jury. Instead, it gives the jury discretion in weighing mitigating evidence. State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641, 655 (Mo. banc 1993). This instruction complies with the constitutional requirements for the submission of mitigating circumstances in death penalty cases. Id. The trial court did not err. The point is denied.
Finally, Tokar complains that the trial court erred by submitting, over a defense objection, MAI-CR 3d 313.40, which instructed: In determining the punishment to be assessed against defendant for the murder of John P. Douglass, you must first unanimously determine whether one or more of the following aggravating circumstances exist: 1. Whether the murder of John P. Douglass involved depravity of mind and whether, as a result thereof, the murder was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman. You can make a determination of depravity of mind only if you find that the defendant killed John P. Douglass after he was bound or otherwise rendered helpless by defendant and that defendant thereby exhibited a callous disregard for the sanctity of all human life. 2. Whether the murder of John P. Douglass was committed while the defendant was engaged in the perpetration of burglary. A person commits the crime of burglary when he knowingly enters unlawfully in a building or inhabitable structure for the purpose of committing stealing. You are further instructed that the burden rests upon the State to prove at least one of the foregoing circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. On each circumstance that you find beyond a reasonable doubt, all twelve of you must agree as to the existence of that circumstance. The instruction is patterned after the statutory aggravating circumstances provided by § 565.032.2(7) and (11). Tokar argues the language in the first statutory aggravating circumstance instruction is unconstitutionally vague, inflammatory, and provides a basis for verdicts rooted in raw emotion. In this case, the jury was specifically provided guidance on when they could find this aggravating circumstance. This Court has previously held that such language and limiting instruction provides sufficient guidance to the sentencing jurors and that the instruction is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Mease, 842 S.W.2d 98, 113 (Mo. banc 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 918, 113 S.Ct. 2363, 124 L.Ed.2d 269 (1993); Sidebottom v. State, 781 S.W.2d 791, 799 (Mo. banc 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032, 110 S.Ct. 3295, 111 L.Ed.2d 804 (1990). Moreover, the jury also found the second statutory aggravating circumstance, that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the perpetration of a burglary, under § 565.032.2(11). In the instruction, the jury was sufficiently apprised of what constitutes burglary. The evidence fully supports a determination that the murder was committed while Tokar was burglarizing the Douglass residence. The second aggravating circumstance found by the jury is valid, and Tokar has not argued otherwise on appeal. Therefore, even if the first aggravating circumstances was invalid, the failure of one circumstance does not taint the proceedings so as to invalidate the other aggravating circumstance found and the sentence of death imposed. Sidebottom, 781 S.W.2d at 799. A death sentence will be affirmed if even one valid statutory aggravating circumstance is found. State v. Sloan, 756 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Mo. banc 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1040, 109 S.Ct. 1174, 103 L.Ed.2d 236 (1989). The trial court did not err. The point is denied.