Opinion ID: 1608539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Admissibility of Challenged Hearsay.

Text: Broadlawns argues that the district court erred in admitting a number of hearsay statements made by one of the Estate's witnesses. We review the admission of an alleged hearsay statement for correction of errors at law. McElroy v. State, 637 N.W.2d 488, 493 (Iowa 2001). To determine the admissibility of such a statement, we consider the purposes for which the alleged hearsay testimony was offered. State v. Sowder, 394 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Iowa 1986); see also State v. Belken, 633 N.W.2d 786, 801 (Iowa 2001); State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784, 792 (Iowa 1994); State v. Hollins, 397 N.W.2d 701, 705-06 (Iowa 1986). In making this analysis, we make an objective finding based on the facts and circumstances developed by the record. Sowder, 394 N.W.2d at 371. If, on a review of the record, the evidence is deemed relevant and otherwise admissible for the purpose for which it supposedly was offered, then that purpose is supported objectively in the record and will be accepted. Hollins, 397 N.W.2d at 706. In the absence of an objectively valid purpose, the testimony, even if offered for what appeared to be a proper purpose, must be excluded. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.802. Prejudice is presumed in cases in which hearsay testimony is improperly offered unless it is affirmatively established that the opponent of the proffered testimony has suffered no prejudice. Sowder, 394 N.W.2d at 372. However, where substantially the same evidence is in the record, erroneously admitted evidence will not be considered prejudicial. Id. Broadlawns believes that a number of statements made by Jillene's mother (also the estate's administrator), Dolores Smith, while testifying in the trial, constitute inadmissible hearsay. In its estimation, Dolores' testimony could only have been offered for the purpose of establishing that Broadlawns undertook the duty to notify Jillene of Gerald's discharge from the facility. The Estate counters that Dolores' testimony was offered for the purpose of establishing Jillene's state of mind during the week in which Gerald was shuttled between the hospitals. Thus, if the testimony was garnered for this purpose, the statements offered through Dolores' testimony would be admissible hearsay under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(3). There were a number of statements made by Dolores while testifying concerning a promise by Broadlawns to notify Jillene of Gerald's discharge, generally stated in terms such as Broadlawns told Jillene or Jillene told me, that provoked an objection from Broadlawns. These statements were offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein: particular statements of fact made by Broadlawns to Jillene and particular statements of fact that Jillene made to her mother. For obvious reasons, Jillene was unable to convey these statements to the jury personally. Instead, the statements were offered through her mother's testimony. For these reasons, the statements were hearsay. Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(c). Consequently, they could only be admitted under one of our recognized exceptions to our rule against hearsay. As explained at length already, this case was properly approached under the principles of duty described in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 323. One of the methods by which a party may show liability under section 323 is to establish that the harm [to the plaintiff] is suffered because of [her] reliance upon the undertaking. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323. We believe that each of Dolores' statements, examined in context with the whole of her testimony and the record as developed, indicate that they were offered for the purpose of establishing Jillene's state of mind during the week in which the statements were made which led to her reliance on Broadlawns' assertions. As such, Jillene's statements fall under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and are relevant to the issues at trial. Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(3). Moreover, the record as a whole does not reveal any prejudice from the admission of Dolores' testimony. In addition to eliciting testimony from Dolores, the Estate also elicited testimony from Charlyn Dowling-Smith, Gerald's social worker during his time at Broadlawns. Charyln spoke with Jillene during the week of Gerald's treatment and her testimony provided strong evidence that Broadlawns had promised to notify Jillene of Gerald's discharge. Charlyn's testimony presaged that of Dolores, and Broadlawns did not object to Charlyn's statements relating to any promised notification. For that reason, substantially the same evidence as that later garnered from Dolores was already in the record when she testified. Sowder, 394 N.W.2d at 372. Therefore, even if Dolores' testimony was erroneously admitted, it was not prejudicial. Id.