Opinion ID: 2011173
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Feasibility of Indefinite Foster CareThe Wait and See Option.

Text: Our conclusion that early reunification would constitute an unwarranted gamble with M.D., Jr.'s future is not, in and of itself, dispositive of this appeal. Indeed, the question of the child's custody is not technically before us, for the neglect proceedings relating to M.D., Jr. are before a different judge who, according to the trial judge in this case, may hold a view of the situation different from her own. Although here, as in L.W., supra, the only conceivable basis for denying the petition by [L.L.] would be to enable [the] biological father to assume custody, 613 A.2d at 355 n. 10, and although the father's counsel indicated at argument that he will promptly seek the return of his son if the trial court's decision is affirmed, immediate reunification and termination of parental rights are not the only available alternatives. A third option would be to affirm the denial of the petitions, in the expectation that the trial court would seek to bring about more effective action by the social service agencies, and then to wait and see, in the hope that, contrary to the expert testimony, reunification with the father will become feasible some time in the future. Termination of parental rights is a drastic remedy, which should be ordered only upon a showing of clear necessity. See, e.g., In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228, 1241, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880, 99 S.Ct. 216, 58 L.Ed.2d 192 (1978); see also In re Adoption of Carlos, 413 Mass. 339, 596 N.E.2d 1383, 1389 (1992) (characterizing termination as an extreme step). Courts are properly expected to exercise restraint before ordering such relief. William L., supra, 383 A.2d at 1240-41. We are therefore obliged to consider whether the trial judge's denial of the petitions was an appropriate exercise of that restraint and therefore within her discretion, notwithstanding our disagreement with some of her legal analysis. We are mindful, in that regard, of the fact that M.D., Jr. presently has a father with whom, according to the trial judge, he has bonded. Adoption of M.D., Jr. by L.L. would deprive the father of any legally protected interest in the boy's future upbringing, and M.D., Jr. would no longer have a legally recognized father. The trial judge's refusal to dissolve permanently the existing legal relationship between father and son is not to be lightly overridden. Nevertheless, we cannot sustain the wait and see option. Legislatures and courts alike have recognized that, in the words of one commentary, no child can grow emotionally while in limbo. He cannot invest except in a minimal way ... if tomorrow the relationship may be severed. M. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of Neglected Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STANFORD L.REV. 985, 995 (1975) (quoting BRYCE & EHLERT, 144 Foster Children, 50 CHILD WELFARE 499, 503 (1971)). In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977), the Supreme Court recognized that protracted stays in [foster] care ... may deprive [neglected] children of positive, nurturing family relationships and have deleterious effects on their development into responsible, productive citizens. Id. at 835-36 n. 37, 97 S.Ct. at 2105 n. 37 (quoting legislative finding). Legislation on the federal and local levels has been enacted to counteract the dangers inherent in the consignment of neglected children for an indefinite period to temporary expedients such as foster care. The federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1986 (AACWA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 670, et seq., requires affected jurisdictions to facilitate permanent placement for children as a condition to receiving federal funding for their foster care and adoption assistance programs. [T]he central purpose of the legislation is to remove children from long term foster care, either by uniting them with their parents or by placing them with adoptive parents or in some other permanent arrangement. Ashley K., supra note 19, 156 Ill.Dec. at 938, 571 N.E.2d at 918. Foster care, with few exceptions, should be a temporary placement. Id. (quoting Senator Cranston's remarks in introducing the bill, 125 Cong.Rec. S22684 (Aug. 3, 1979)); see also In re Adoption No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 642 A.2d 201, 204 (1994). [30] The District of Columbia receives federal financial assistance pursuant to the AACWA, see LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.Supp. 959, 962-64 (D.D.C.1991), aff'd sub nom. La-Shawn A. v. Kelly, 301 U.S.App.D.C. 49, 990 F.2d 1319 (1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 691, 126 L.Ed.2d 659 (1994), and is obliged to comply with its mandates. The District has also enacted legislation requiring prompt planning for the permanent placement of a child who has not been reunited with his or her family within a reasonable time. See D.C.Code §§ 6-2123(b)(2); 16-2360(b); LaShawn A., supra, 762 F.Supp. at 964; see also In re A.W., 569 A.2d 168, 172-73 (D.C.1990) (discussing legislative history of TPR statute). [31] Almost everyone agrees that a child should not be suspended permanently in foster care ... if any other solution is possible. 3 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, § 29.10, at 77 (2d ed. 1994). If a child is adoptable, then adoption is the statutorily preferred plan, for the goal of permanency planning is to end the uncertainty of foster care and allow the dependent child to form a long-lasting emotional attachment to a permanent caretaker. In re Brian R., 2 Cal. App.4th 904, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 768, 778 (6th Dist. 1991) (citations omitted). A child cannot, and should not, be left suspended in foster care, nor be made to await uncertain parental maturity. In re Interest of J.W., 224 Neb. 897, 402 N.W.2d 671, 676 (1987); see also P.M.C., supra, 437 N.W.2d at 792. In the present case, according to the expert testimony, the improvement of the father's condition to the point where he could safely look after M.D., Jr., is not only uncertain but, for the foreseeable future, extremely improbable. Although we sincerely hope that [the father] one day finds mental and emotional stability, we cannot leave [M.D., Jr.] in legal limbo waiting for an event that likely will never happen. In re Adoption No. 10941, supra, 642 A.2d at 211. The recent decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Adoption No. 10941 is instructive. There, the maternal grandparents of Ivan M., who was born in June, 1990, and who had lived with them since birth, filed a petition to adopt him. The Department of Social Services filed a companion petition to terminate Ivan's mother's parental rights. [32] The mother, who was mentally retarded and schizophrenic, opposed the petition and sought to obtain custody of Ivan. The trial judge found that it was in Ivan M's interest to remain in the custody of his grandparents, but held that his continued placement with them did not require termination of the mother's parental rights. He reasoned that the [c]hild is presently in a stable environment with his grandparents, and this environment provides him with the security and sense of belonging to a family that is the goal of adoption. In re Adoption No. 10941, supra, 642 A.2d at 211 (quoting the trial court's order). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that [o]nly termination of parental rights and a subsequent permanent placement, such as the adoption sought by the grandparents here, can provide Ivan with the permanency he needs and the Legislature has mandated. Id. at 212. The court explained that it was necessary to approve the grandparents' petition to adopt because, so long as Ivan has not been adopted, he remains within the foster care system, and thereby subject to administrative review every six months. He also remains under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, subject to periodic judicial review. This constant administrative and judicial supervision is disruptive to the lives of Ivan and his grandparents, and is the very type of uncertainty the child welfare statutes were designed to avoid. Also, as Ivan's natural guardian, [the mother] has the right to visitation and the right to make educational and medical decisions on his behalf. [Statutory citation omitted.] More importantly, while the grandparents have expressed their unequivocal desire to adopt Ivan, if they are not his legal parents, they can later decide, for whatever reason, that they are no longer in a position to care for Ivan. If this were to occur, the grandparents would simply inform the juvenile court that retains jurisdiction over Ivan that they can no longer care for him and the court would have no alternative but to place him back in the foster care system. This possible foster care drift is exactly what Congress and our General Assembly desire to avoid. Id. at 212. These considerations apply with at least equal force to M.D., Jr.'s situation. [33] See also In re Adoption of Gwendolyn, 29 Mass.App. 130, 558 N.E.2d 10, 14 (1990). If the decision in this case were to wait and see, then for how long should the trial court do so? M.D., Jr. has already lived with the foster mother for three years. May permanency for M.D., Jr. be deferred for two more years? Five years? Even ten more, according to Dr. Moldauer, would not be enough to make a placement with the father feasible. We conclude, as a matter of law, that on these facts, the wait and see alternative cannot be reconciled with M.D., Jr.'s best interests or with the authorities which we have cited. [34]