Opinion ID: 2038627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: New Factor

Text: ¶ 13. As set out above, one of the parameters in which a circuit court has the inherent power to modify a sentence is through the showing of a new factor, if that new factor is one that warrants sentence modification. Hayes , 46 Wis. 2d at 103. It is within this area of the court's inherent authority that Crochiere claims that his sentence should be modified. ¶ 14. In order to obtain sentence modification based on a new factor, an inmate must show that: (1) a new factor exists; and (2) the new factor warrants modification of his or her sentence. Franklin , 148 Wis. 2d at 8. A new factor is not just any change in circumstances subsequent to sentencing. Rather, it is: a fact or set of facts highly relevant to the imposition of sentence, but not known to the trial judge at the time of original sentencing, either because it was not then in existence or because, even though it was then in existence, it was unknowingly overlooked by all of the parties. Rosado v. State , 70 Wis. 2d 280, 288, 234 Wis. 2d 69 (1975). A new factor has been further defined as an event or development which frustrates the purpose of the original sentence. State v. Champion , 2002 WI App 267, ¶ 4, 258 Wis. 2d 781, 654 N.W.2d 242; see also State v. Michels , 150 Wis. 2d 94, 99, 441 N.W.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that the new factor standard has been further refined since Rosado as those factors that frustrate the purpose of the original sentence). A defendant must prove a new factor by clear and convincing evidence. Champion , 258 Wis. 2d 781, ¶ 4. ¶ 15. New factor analysis has been applied to a multitude of factual circumstances, with appellate courts often reaching the conclusion that the facts presented were insufficient to establish a new factor. For example, a new factor has been held not to include any of the following: an inmate's desire to testify at a post-conviction hearing regarding his side of the story, Rosado , 70 Wis. 2d at 288; the introduction of sentencing guidelines recommending a different sentence than the one a convicted defendant received, State v. Macemon , 113 Wis. 2d 662, 669, 335 N.W.2d 402 (1983); disparity in sentencing between co-defendants, State v. Toliver , 187 Wis. 2d 346, 361-62, 523 N.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1994); an inmate's progress or rehabilitation while incarcerated, State v. Kluck , 210 Wis. 2d 1, 7-8, 563 N.W.2d 468 (1997) and State v. Krueger , 119 Wis. 2d 327, 335, 351 N.W.2d 738 (Ct. App. 1984); an inmate's response to treatment while incarcerated, State v. Prince , 147 Wis. 2d 134, 136-37, 432 N.W.2d 646 (Ct. App. 1988); an inmate's shorter-than-normal life expectancy, State v. Ramuta , 2003 WI App 80, ¶ 21, 261 Wis. 2d 784, 661 N.W.2d 483; or an inmate's post-sentencing declining health, Michels , 150 Wis. 2d at 99-100. [10] ¶ 16. On the other hand, new factors have been identified where the untreatable nature of an inmate's mental condition is such that it frustrated a primary condition of his sentence, State v. Sepulveda , 119 Wis. 2d 546, 560-61, 350 N.W.2d 96 (1984); a potential conflict of interest of the mental health professional who conducted the psychological assessment of a convicted defendant for the sentencing court, State v. Stafford , 2003 WI App 138, ¶ 17, 265 Wis. 2d 886, 667 N.W.2d 370; and a convicted defendant's post-sentencing voluntary submission to revocation of his parole based on erroneous advice from his probation agent, State v. Norton , 2001 WI App 245, ¶ 16, 248 Wis. 2d 162, 635 N.W.2d 656. ¶ 17. Crochiere claims he has shown a new factor by his rehabilitation and the court's lack of knowledge of his child support obligation. Of those new factor published appellate cases in which sentences were imposed under TIS-I, only Champion involved an alleged new factor based on rehabilitation subsequent to sentencing, [11] where the lack of the parole commission and its potential effect on new factor analysis was at issue. ¶ 18. Champion pled guilty to causing great bodily harm by the intoxicated use of a motor vehicle. Champion, 258 Wis. 2d 781, ¶ 2. When sentencing her to three years in prison, the court commented on her need for a period of confinement sufficient to receive treatment for her problems with alcohol. Id. After fourteen months of confinement, Champion moved to modify her sentence from three to two years of confinement because she had met the rehabilitative purpose in less time than the court had anticipated. Id., ¶ 3. She contended that although this would not have been a new factor if she had been sentenced under indeterminate sentencing, it was a new factor under TIS-I because she did not have the opportunity to have the parole commission consider her rehabilitation. Id., ¶ 6. ¶ 19. In a well-reasoned decision, the court of appeals concluded that to do as Champion requested would undercut the clear intent of the legislature in enacting TIS. Id., ¶ 17. It explained that the legislature enacted laws that would cause a sentence of one year of incarceration to result in one year of incarceration and that the legislature eliminated parole to assure that an inmate's conduct while incarcerated would not change the certainty of the sentences imposed. Id. ¶ 20. Crochiere contends that we should reject the reasoning in Champion because Champion was grounded solely on the inmate's rehabilitation during incarceration. While by comparison, Crochiere also has a child support obligation, which was not known to the circuit court at sentencing and is linked to his rehabilitation. [12] Crochiere points out that his rehabilitative efforts, which have resulted in his classification as a minimum security prisoner with off-site work approval by the Department of Corrections, demonstrate that he should be released early so he can resume the job he had before he was imprisoned and earn approximately ten dollars per hour, thereby increasing his ability to help support his child. ¶ 21. The circuit court held a hearing to permit Crochiere to develop all the facts relevant to his child support obligation. The court then reviewed the factors on which it based Crochiere's sentence and concluded that its lack of knowledge that Crochiere had a son to help support would not have affected the sentence it imposed. The court said, And the question, in my mind, looking at all the factors that I went through in sentencing the defendant, would that information [regarding the defendant's child support obligations and the child's mother's dependence on that child support] have made a difference in the sentence that I came up with? And I have to say that it would not have. Therefore, even though the circuit court initially was unaware of Crochiere's obligation to support his son, that fact was not one that frustrated the purpose of the sentence imposed. ¶ 22. Additionally, Crochiere's rehabilitation is not a circumstance that frustrates the purpose of the sentence. The record shows that the circuit court was most concerned about Crochiere's repeated operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OMVWI), his two previous convictions for OMVWI, the reckless conduct that resulted in an injury to the officer who stopped him for speeding, his assaulting another inmate while incarcerated and the lengthy list of his prior misdemeanor convictions as evidence that Crochiere had little remorse for his past criminal conduct. The court was of the opinion that Crochiere was a danger to the community. Deterrence and punishment were the major factors upon which the court focused. And, as has been noted, rehabilitation while incarcerated is not a circumstance that will frustrate the purpose of a sentence, Champion, 258 Wis. 2d 781, ¶ 13, as we conclude it is likely that circuit courts sentence with the hope that rehabilitation will occur. ¶ 23. Furthermore, Crochiere's early release would undercut the seriousness of the offense, the court's concern about the victim's injuries and its efforts at protecting the public. And, as Champion pointed out when interpreting TIS-I, the legislature intended that conduct subsequent to incarceration would not reduce an inmate's sentence. [13] In sum, we conclude Crochiere has failed to persuade us, just as he failed to persuade the circuit court and the court of appeals, that the facts he presents constitute a new factor that could be used to modify his sentence. ¶ 24. And finally, a decision on whether to modify a sentence is within the circuit court's discretion. See Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d at 424; Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d at 8; Champion, 258 Wis. 2d 781, ¶ 4; Michels, 150 Wis. 2d at 97. In order to succeed on a claim for sentence modification based on a new factor, an inmate must prevail in both steps of new factor analysis by proving the existence of a new factor and that it is one which should cause the circuit court to modify the original sentence. Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d at 8. Accordingly, we point out that if a circuit court concludes that the facts shown are insufficient to constitute a new factor, as a matter of law, it need go no further in its analysis to decide the inmate's motion. Or, in the alternative, a circuit court may assume that a new factor does exist, without articulating the first step of new factor analysis, if the court concludes that in the exercise of its discretion, the alleged new factor is insufficient to warrant sentence modification. ¶ 25. Here, when the circuit court became aware of Crochiere's child support obligation, it held a hearing to take additional testimony to determine whether that fact would have caused it to select a sentence different from that which it imposed and concluded it would not. It also concluded that Crochiere's rehabilitation was insufficient to constitute a new factor. In so doing, the circuit court correctly identified and applied the law. Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion in refusing to modify Crochiere's sentence. [14]