Opinion ID: 149697
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Shocking and outrageous government conduct

Text: Struckman next attempts to fit his quest for mandatory dismissal into the second exception to the Ker/Frisbie rule: Where the Government's conduct to obtain a defendant's presence is so shocking and outrageous as to violate the universal sense of justice, United States v. Barrera-Moreno, 951 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.1991) (internal quotations omitted), the means of obtaining jurisdiction over the defendant amounts to a due process violation, and dismissal is required. See Anderson, 472 F.3d at 666. [8] The government's conduct meets this standard, Struckman argues, because the U.S. government interfered with his Sixth Amendment right to counsel while in Panama and induced the Panamanian government to deport him by making misrepresentations regarding his criminal status in the United States. We review de novo the district court's denial of Struckman's motion to dismiss the indictment based on outrageous government conduct in connection with the government's efforts to secure Struckman from Panama. See United States v. Holler, 411 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir.2005). [W]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and we accept the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Gurolla, 333 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 995, 124 S.Ct. 496, 157 L.Ed.2d 395 (2003). We agree with the district court that dismissal was not required under the second Ker/Frisbie exception. Some of the government's actions in Panama are quite disturbing, particularly the flat misstatements to Panamanian authorities. But a comparison to the circumstances in other cases in which the outrageous conduct exception was held inapplicable makes clear that the governmental conduct here does not meet the extremely high standard required for dismissal under the outrageous conduct/due process defense. United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 897 (9th Cir.1991). The involvement of U.S. government agents in facilitating the expulsion of Struckman from Panama and receiving him in the United States surely does not meet this standard. We have previously held, for example, that abduction of a defendant by U.S. Marshals from the defendant's home was not so shocking and outrageous as to warrant dismissal. See Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 761, 763. The lies told by O'Brien to Panamanian officials are considerably more troubling than other aspects of U.S. governmental involvement in Panama. We are not prepared to say that blatant lies to a foreign government that induce the foreign government to transfer a defendant to the United States when it otherwise would not could never amount to conduct so shocking and outrageous as to violate due process and require dismissal of pending criminal proceedings in the United States. In this case, though, the district court found that O'Brien's misrepresentations came after the Panamanians had already decided to cooperate with the United States in returning Struckman and had issued the resolutions. So the Panamanians did not rely on these misrepresentations for that purpose. Also, Struckman was deported after his passport was revoked, which provided a separate reason for deportation under Panamanian law, in addition to those covered in the resolutions. In Anderson, we declined to apply the Ker/Frisbie shocking and outrageous conduct exception because Costa Rica's decision to extradite the defendant was not dependent on representations made by United States government agents to Costa Rican authorities [that] may have misled Costa Rica into believing [the defendant] had an unserved prison sentence. 472 F.3d at 667. Here, similarly, Struckman has not demonstrated prejudice from O'Brien's misstatements, so there was no due process violation justifying dismissal of the charges. Nor does it matter whether Struckman had a right under Panamanian law to appeal the deportation order against him or pursue a habeas proceeding. Anderson held in nearly identical circumstances that government behavior does not become outrageous because a defendant is removed from a foreign country pending his right of appeal. See id.
Our rejection of Struckman's outrageous conduct/due process claim does not end our inquiry into the denial of the motion to dismiss because of the manner in which Struckman was brought to the United States from Panama. Even if the [government's] conduct does not rise to the level of a due process violation, [a] court may nonetheless dismiss [an indictment with prejudice] under its supervisory powers. United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir.2008) (internal quotations and brackets omitted). Courts may dismiss an indictment under their inherent supervisory powers (1) to implement a remedy for the violation of a recognized statutory or constitutional right; (2) to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before a jury; and (3) to deter future illegal conduct. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 763 (citing United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir.1991)). [9] The defendant must demonstrate prejudice before the court may exercise its supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988); United States v. Ross, 372 F.3d 1097, 1110 (9th Cir.2004) (citing United States v. Tucker, 8 F.3d 673, 674-75 (9th Cir.1993) (en banc)); United States v. Rogers, 751 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.1985). We review for abuse of discretion the district court's denial of Struckman's motion to dismiss based on the court's supervisory powers. Ross, 372 F.3d at 1109.