Opinion ID: 3151132
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dudley's Motion to Suppress

Text: Dudley sought to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of his allegedly illegal interrogation by Agents Fife and Conley, arguing that the agents continued to question him after he had invoked his right to counsel. The thrust of Dudley's testimony was that he had requested an attorney on three separate occasions.5 3 Dudley's appeals have been consolidated pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b)(2). 4 Dudley was sentenced to 96 months of imprisonment on the possession conviction and 60 months of imprisonment on the perjury conviction, to be served concurrently. He does not challenge his sentence on appeal. 5 Six other witnesses testified at the suppression hearing. Dudley offered three witnesses who had been present on the day of the search: his wife, Lori Dudley; his mother, Cheryl Dearborn; and a close family friend and roommate of the Dudleys, Charal Boothby. In addition, three law-enforcement officers -- Agents Fife and Conley, and their supervisor, Resident Agent in Charge (RAC) Gary Cote -- testified for the government. - 4 - First, Dudley testified that, as he was led out of his apartment, he told his wife to call Gordon to get ahold of Joseph about the -- about getting a lawyer. Second, Dudley claimed that when Agent Fife asked if he was willing to talk to him, Dudley said that he would be willing to listen to an explanation but that he wanted a lawyer. According to Dudley, Agent Fife responded by telling him that he could have a lawyer if he wanted one, but he was not a suspect and it would look better if he agreed to speak with them. And finally, Dudley asserted that after being read his Miranda rights, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), he reiterated to Agents Fife and Conley his desire to have an attorney present for any questioning. As may be expected, the government disputed Dudley's version of events, countering that Dudley was not in custody when he spoke to the Agents and that, even if Dudley had been in custody when he was interviewed, he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. Specifically, the government argued that Dudley's claim that he invoked his right to counsel after being read his Miranda rights [was] simply false and that Dudley voluntarily elected to speak with investigators.
On the whole, the district court did not find Dudley's testimony credible, and largely crediting the agents' version of events, the district court found the following relevant facts, - 5 - which are reasonably supported by the record. See United States v. Hughes, 640 F.3d 428, 434 (1st Cir. 2011). On the afternoon of August 20, 2012, twelve law- enforcement officers, including six uniformed police officers, detectives and task force officers, and six HSI agents in plain clothes, arrived at Dudley's apartment to execute the search warrant. Prior to arriving at the apartment building, the officers6 had been informed by the Westbrook Police Department that Dudley lived in the apartment with his wife, Lori Dudley (Lori), their three children, and a roommate, Charal Boothby (Boothby). Officers had also been cautioned that there were frequent transients in and out of the apartment and that Dudley was potentially in possession of a firearm. While Agent Gary Cote (Cote) and another officer kept watch outside the multi-unit apartment building, the other officers entered the building and proceeded to Dudley's secondfloor apartment with their guns drawn and in the low ready position. When an officer knocked on the door and announced the presence of law enforcement, Lori answered but, when asked by the officer about Dudley's whereabouts, claimed that Dudley was not home. With unfortunate timing perhaps, Dudley then stepped into view of the officers behind Lori. Officer Fred Williams (Williams) 6 For clarity, we will refer to the officers and agents collectively as officers. - 6 - of the Saco, Maine police department immediately removed Dudley from the apartment, brought him to a landing midway down the stairwell, and frisked him. Officer Williams then proceeded to remove Dudley's cell phone, handcuff him, and lead him down the stairs and outside to the front of the building. As Dudley was being removed from the building, the remaining officers conducted a protective sweep of the apartment. In addition to Dudley and Lori, the officers came across five people in the apartment: the Dudleys' three children; the Dudleys' roommate, Boothby; and Boothby's younger brother, Robert Duquette. When officers completed the protective sweep, the search began. At that point, Agent Fife left the apartment to find Dudley and located him downstairs with Agent Cote and a Westbrook police officer. When Agent Fife arrived, Dudley asked to smoke a cigarette, and Agent Fife removed Dudley's handcuffs so that he could do so. Agent Fife then explained that the officers were there because they had information that someone using an IP address at Dudley's apartment was sharing child pornography through the Ares peer-to-peer file sharing program.7 Agent Fife further told Dudley that he was not under arrest but that he could not return to the apartment until the search was complete. Dudley asked to see the search warrant, which Fife provided. 7 Internet service providers assign individual computers specific IP addresses to access the internet. - 7 - Around this time, Agent Fife asked Dudley if he would be willing to speak with him, and Dudley said that he would. For privacy reasons, Agent Fife suggested that they talk inside his SUV, which he had parked in a driveway adjacent to Dudley's apartment. Dudley again agreed. Agent Fife sat in the driver's seat, while Dudley took the passenger seat, and Agent Conley, who by this point had joined Agent Fife, sat in the backseat behind Dudley. The doors to the SUV remained unlocked, and Dudley was reminded that he was free to leave. Agent Fife then apprised Dudley of his Miranda rights, reading from a standardized form. Dudley agreed to speak to the agents, remarking that he knew his rights and that he had been read the Miranda warnings on a previous occasion. Agent Fife did not have Dudley sign the standardized form because he did not believe that Dudley was in custody. The interview, which was not recorded, lasted about forty minutes. According to Agent Fife, the conversation was very cordial, and at no point did Dudley request that the interview stop. Near the end of the interview, Agent Cote signaled to Agent Fife that he needed to speak with him. There was a brief pause in the conversation as the agents spoke outside the vehicle, but Dudley remained in the car and the interview resumed shortly thereafter. At the conclusion of the interview, Agent Fife told Dudley that he still could not return to the apartment because the - 8 - search was ongoing, but Dudley was allowed to sit alone and unhandcuffed on the front stoop near Agent Cote and other officers. When officers found a CD containing child pornography in Dudley's office, Agent Fife approached Dudley on the stoop to ask if the items on his desk belonged to him. Dudley responded affirmatively to Agent Fife's questions.8 Three hours after it began the search concluded, resulting in Dudley being handcuffed and placed under arrest. As Dudley was transported to the county jail, he became agitated, repeatedly asked the officers what probable cause they had for the arrest, and threatened to sue. In its decision, the district court assumed Dudley was in custody,9 and also assumed that as he was escorted from the apartment he asked his wife to contact his attorney. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that there was no evidence that any law enforcement officer actually heard Dudley's statement to his wife and, therefore, the statement was not in itself an unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel. The district court also determined that Dudley's assertion that he had twice invoked his right to counsel during his interview with Agents Fife 8 Although Dudley's response is not part of the district court's factual findings, Agent Fife testified that Dudley responded that the items in his office belonged to his business. 9 The parties do not contest the district court's assumption that Dudley was in custody. - 9 - and Conley was not credible. Instead, the district court credited the agents' testimony that Dudley never requested an attorney and never asked to stop the interview. In particular, the district court noted that Dudley admitted on cross-examination that (i) he knew his Miranda rights prior to his encounter that day with officers, (ii) he knew enough to ask to see the search warrant, (iii) upon his arrest later that day, he accused the officers of arresting him without probable cause and threatened to sue them, and (iv) he was 'quite protective' of his rights. Therefore, the district court found that Dudley likely would have invoked his right to counsel, and ceased answering officers' questions, if he did not wish the interview to continue. Dudley now challenges this ruling, arguing, as he did below, that he unambiguously invoked his right to counsel as he was led from the apartment and again both before and during his interview with Agents Fife and Conley. Consequently, Dudley argues the district court erred in denying his suppression motion. We see no error.
When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, [w]e view the facts in the light most favorable to the district court's ruling. United States v. Camacho, 661 F.3d 718, 723 (1st Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Soares, - 10 - 521 F.3d 117, 118 (1st Cir. 2008)). And we review the district court's findings of fact and credibility determinations for clear error. Id. Under clear error review, we will reverse only if, after considering all the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. (quoting United States v. McCarthy, 77 F.3d 522, 529 (1st Cir. 1996)). On the other hand, we review the district court's legal determinations, including its application of the law to the facts, de novo. Id. at 724.
Once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel during a custodial interrogation, all questioning must stop until counsel can be provided. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). But this request for counsel must be clear and unambiguous. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (statement, Maybe I should talk to a lawyer, was not an unambiguous request for counsel, id. at 462). [I]f a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, officers need not stop questioning. Id.
Here, Dudley first argues that his statement to his wife as he was taken from the apartment (something along the lines of - 11 - call Gordon to get ahold of Joseph about the -- about getting a lawyer or call Higgins) was a clear and unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel. We do not agree. Dudley testified that on the day of the search he was coming out of the bathroom when he heard a commotion. According to Dudley, when he walked into the living room, a police officer immediately grabbed his shoulder and led him from the apartment. As he was being taken outside, and while everybody was rushing into the house, he made mention to his wife, who was standing at the door, that she should call Gordon to get ahold of Joseph about the -- about getting a lawyer. Lori similarly testified that shortly after the police entered her home, Dudley told her to call Higgins, his lawyer. Dudley contends that if Lori heard his request, there can be no doubt that the officers seizing [] Dudley also heard the request. But neither Dudley nor Lori claimed that Dudley yelled or shouted his request -- testifying instead that Dudley said or mentioned to Lori that she should call his attorney. Lori further said that when, in response to her husband's request, she reached for the telephone to call Dudley's attorney, an officer told her that she could not use the telephone.10 The 10 She acknowledged on cross examination, however, that she was never handcuffed or told that she could not leave the apartment, and that if she had wanted to call someone she could have left the apartment and used someone else's phone. - 12 - implication being, Dudley argues, that the officer must have heard Dudley's request and was prohibiting her from carrying it out. Agent Fife, who was a member of the entry team, testified that he did not hear Dudley say anything as he first made contact with him upon entering the apartment.11 And Agent Conley, who was also a member of the entry team and who was present on the landing when Dudley was removed from the apartment, testified that he never heard Dudley say anything about an attorney. In considering all the evidence presented and making credibility determinations, the district court concluded that there was no evidence the officers had heard Dudley's request to his wife. And the evidence shows that -- crediting that Dudley made this statement -- it nonetheless would have been made in the chaos of the initial protective sweep, as ten officers, with their guns in the low and ready position, moved quickly through the front door trying to secure the apartment. Taken as a whole, we find that the evidence supports the district court's findings, and, as such, we find no clear error. See Camacho, 661 F.3d at 723 ([W]e 'will uphold a denial of a motion to suppress if any reasonable view of the evidence supports it.' (quoting United States v. Mendez-de Jesus, 85 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1996))). [W]hen 'the district court chooses to draw a 11Agent Fife acknowledged that he may have been branching off into another area by the time Dudley passed his wife at the door. - 13 - reasonable (though not inevitable) inference from a particular combination of facts,' that inference is entitled to respect. Hughes, 640 F.3d at 434 (quoting United States v. Espinoza, 490 F.3d 41, 46 (1st Cir. 2007)). This is especially true where, as here, evaluations of witnesses' credibility are concerned since we must be especially deferential to the district court's credibility findings. United States v. Nee, 261 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Jones, 187 F.3d 210, 214 (1st Cir. 1999)). Finding no clear error in the district court's findings, our inquiry is a simple one. If no officer heard Dudley's statement to his wife, it could not have been a clear invocation of his right to counsel. [T]his is an objective inquiry, Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, and officers could not have objectively understood a statement they did not hear to be an assertion of the right to counsel. But even assuming the entry team officers heard Dudley's request to his wife as they moved through the apartment, such a request simply does not unequivocally demand assistance, request the lawyer's presence, or otherwise clearly indicate an unwillingness to make a statement absent presence of an attorney. United States v. Oquendo-Rivas, 750 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2014). Under the Davis standard, Dudley had to articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police - 14 - officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. Telling his wife to call Gordon to get ahold of Joseph about the -- about getting a lawyer, is not sufficiently clear to adequately inform officers whether or not Dudley wanted an attorney present for subsequent questioning.12 See Grant-Chase v. Comm'r, N.H. Dep't of Corr., 145 F.3d 431, 436 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding reasonable a state court's determination that a pre-Miranda request to call a lawyer was ambiguous as to purpose because it was unclear whether the suspect sought the assistance of an attorney in dealing with the forthcoming interrogation and concluding that in the face of such ambiguity officers were within their rights to continue the interrogation without asking for clarification); United States v. Fontana, 948 F.2d 796, 806 (1st Cir. 1991) (suspect's instruction to his wife to call an attorney -- made while in the presence of an officer -- was not a reassertion of the right to counsel); cf. Obershaw v. Lanman, 453 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2006) (suspect inquiring whether he could talk to a lawyer, rather than expressly asserting that he in fact wanted to do so was not an unambiguous request for counsel). Accordingly, we conclude that Dudley's request to his wife that she call Gordon was not an unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel. 12 We note that Dudley made no incriminating statements until after he received the Miranda warnings. - 15 -
As for Dudley's alleged requests for counsel before and during his interrogation in Agent Fife's SUV, Dudley argues that the district court committed clear error in finding that Dudley never invoked this right. At the suppression hearing, both Agents Fife and Conley testified that Dudley never mentioned an attorney. Agent Fife further testified that Dudley never asked to stop the interview. And while Dudley did testify that he requested a lawyer, he also testified that he understood his rights and was quite protective of them (indeed he testified that he knew to ask to see the search warrant and to use the phrase probable cause when challenging his arrest), but that he nevertheless continued answering the officer's questions after allegedly invoking his right to counsel on three separate occasions. The district court did not find this testimony credible,13 deem[ing] it unlikely that the defendant would have 13Highlighting minor inconsistencies in the agents' testimony (e.g., differences among the agents as to when, or if, Dudley's interview was interrupted by Agent Cote), Dudley argues that it was clear error for the district court to find Dudley's testimony unreliable because his testimony, as opposed to the agents, was comprehensive and unwavering. Dudley also argues that because the agents admittedly did not consider Dudley to be in custody, his asking for an attorney was not perceived as invoking his right to counsel under Miranda and therefore [was] more forgettable to the agents. These arguments go nowhere as the district court explicitly noted a number of these same inconsistencies when making its credibility determinations. For example, the district court noted the discrepancies surrounding Agent Cote's disruption of the interview, but unambiguously credited Agent Fife's testimony while - 16 - proceeded to answer the officers' questions had he invoked his right to an attorney. Rather, the district court found it likely that Dudley chose to continue answering questions because he perceived an advantage, or at least no harm, in doing so. This credibility determination was reasonable and was well within the trial court's purview. As such, we will not second-guess the district court's findings. See United States v. McGregor, 650 F.3d 813, 820 (1st Cir. 2011) (Clear-error review is highly deferential, requiring us to let the judge's fact-sensitive conclusions and credibility calls stand unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the judge made a mistake.). The district court's conclusion that Dudley never unambiguously invoked his right to counsel was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the motion to suppress was properly denied. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 462 (Unless the suspect actually requests an attorney, questioning may continue.).