Opinion ID: 1935115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Applicability of Aggravating Factor c(4)(g)

Text: In McDougald, supra, 120 N.J. 523, 577 A. 2d 419, the defendant was charged with murdering the parents of his girlfriend. The State relied on the felony-murder aggravating factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(g), on the theory that the defendant had murdered the parents in the course of a burglary. The burglary allegation was based on the defendant's having entered the parents' home with the intent of murdering their daughter. The defendant claimed that the evidence at trial supported the conclusion that the burglary had been for the purpose of committing the murder of the daughter and her parents, and argued that the c(4)(g) aggravating factor would not be appropriate because the burglary would have been incidental to commission of the murders rather than a separate felony in the course of which the defendant committed the murders. Because we reversed the defendant's death sentence on other grounds, we dealt only briefly with that claim. We observed that the evidence supported alternative theories that either the defendant had entered the house solely to kill the daughter, and only afterwards had decided to kill the parents; or that the defendant had planned to kill [the daughter] and her parents from the very beginning, so that he did not murder [the parents] in the course of trying to murder [the daughter]. Id. at 569-70, 577 A. 2d 419. We noted that although the evidence was sufficient to submit the factor to the jury at a penalty-phase rehearing, the court should carefully instruct the jury on the independent relationship that must exist between the murders and the felony to support the c(4)(g) factor. Id. at 570, 577 A. 2d 419. Based on our language in McDougald, particularly the observation that the defendant may have intended to kill all the victims from the very beginning, defendant claims that because the State's theory of the case was that defendant and Alexander had planned originally to kill both Skov and Bell, the court should not have submitted the c(4)(g) aggravating factor to the jury, or at least should have instructed the jury that that factor did not apply if the jury found that both killings had been intended from the outset. The State counters that the meaning of the language in McDougald is properly understood only if read in the context of the argument that the defendant in McDougald advanced. We agree with the State's position. McDougald addressed a situation in which the felony on which the c(4)(g) aggravating factor was based arguably had been a burglary committed to facilitate the commission of a murder. That that burglary could have aggravated McDougald's culpability for the homicides is self-evident. The narrower issue that defendant raises is whether a murder that was planned before commission of the c(4)(g) felony can be considered a murder committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary or kidnapping as required by N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(g). Defendant essentially argues that the c(4)(g) factor requires that the intent to commit the murder be formed while the commission, attempt to commit, or flight from the underlying felony is in progress. We find no support for defendant's argument, either in logic or in our cases. In Moore, supra, 122 N.J. 420, 585 A. 2d 864, we addressed arguments concerning the relevance to the c(4)(g) factor of the sequence of the killing and the underlying felony. In that case the defendant faced the death penalty for each of two murders, and each murder was the underlying felony that aggravated the other. The defendant argued, You either kill A in the course of killing B or kill B in the course of killing A, but not both. Id. at 470-71, 585 A. 2d 864 (emphasis added). We observed, Contrary to defendant's assertions, the statute does not rely on the temporal sequence of the murders to determine application of [the c(4)(g)] aggravating factor. The factor applies to murders committed before, during, or after the commission of a felony   . Id. at 471, 585 A. 2d 864. We determined that the c(4)(g) aggravating factor reflects a qualitative judgment that a murder  is worse when it is committed at the same time as another murder, or other serious felony. Ibid. Justice Handler, in a separate opinion, contended that the fundamental argument was that the murder to which the c(4)(g) factor was being applied had to have been the probable consequence of the other felony, analogous to the requirements of the offense of felony-murder, see Martin, supra, 119 N.J. at 25-27, 573 A. 2d 1359, from which the c(4)(g) factor had been derived. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 506-07, 585 A. 2d 864 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Defendant's argument is one step removed from either of the issues discussed in Moore. In Moore, the defendant's claim was based on the premise that the c(4)(g) factor should not apply where the killing occurred prior to commission of the underlying felony. Defendant essentially argues that the c(4)(g) factor should not apply where the intent to kill is formed prior to commission of the underlying felony. We reject defendant's contention. In our view, the Legislature's adoption of the c(4)(g) factor reflected its considered judgment that murders committed in the course of a felony are more blameworthy than other murders, irrespective of whether the intent to commit the murder was formed before, during, or after commission of the felony. We find no error in the trial court's decision to submit the c(4)(g) factor to the jury.