Opinion ID: 75885
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Continued Use

Text: 29 The district court instructed the jury that trademark registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of the mark as well as the owner's continued use of the registered mark, in accordance with its previous ruling that registration is prima facie proof of continuing use would apply to criminal as well as civil cases. 8 Guerra does not dispute that in a civil context, trademark registrations constitute prima facie evidence of continued use of the mark. Guerra asserts that the district court erred in applying this presumption in a criminal context. 30 Guerra is correct that there is no support for the application of the entire civil presumption in a criminal context. Under the statute, the genuine mark must not only be federally registered, but it also must be actually in use. The term counterfeit mark is defined as: 31 (A) a spurious mark — 32
33 (ii) that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a mark registered for those goods or services on the principal register in the United States Patent and Trademark Office and in use, whether or not the defendant knew such mark was so registered; and 34 (iii) the use of which is likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive; ... 35 18 U.S.C. § 2320(e)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added); see also 130 Cong. Rec. 31674. Thus, the Government is not absolved of its burden to show that the genuine marks are in use simply by presenting certificates of registration. Therefore, the jury instruction allowing for such a presumption of use is in error. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979) (evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge may not be used if they have the effect of relieving the state of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of the crime). 36 Nevertheless, the harmless error doctrine applies to a Sandstrom error if it is determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Davis v. Kemp, 752 F.2d 1515, 1521 n. 7 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc) (citation omitted). A Sandstrom error can be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under two circumstances: (1) where the faulty instruction applied to an element of the crime is not at issue at the trial; or (2) where evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Id. at 1521. The error in this case is clearly harmless as the Appellants do not dispute that they themselves introduced evidence of a presumably current issue of a periodical that pictured, described, and rated all the trademarked cigars. 9 The record shows that Appellants did not contest whether the trademark owners actually sold the genuine merchandise for the duration of the counterfeiting operation. Thus, if properly charged, the jury would have concluded that the genuine trademarks were in use at the time of the counterfeiting conspiracy.