Opinion ID: 1990665
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Charging Document

Text: Solicitation is a common law crime in Maryland. The gist of the crime is counselling, enticing or inducing another to commit a crime. Monoker v. State, 321 Md. 214, 220, 582 A.2d 525, 528 (1990) ( quoting Cherry v. State, 18 Md.App. 252, 258, 306 A.2d 634, 637-38 (1973)) ( quoting Clark and Marshall, LAW OF CRIMES 219-23 (7th ed.1967)). See also Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 723, 404 A.2d 1073, 1082 (1979). We observed in Monoker, 321 Md. at 220, 582 A.2d at 528: In other words, the person accused of solicitation must make an effort to coerce someone else into committing a criminal offense. The person solicited need not commit, attempt to commit, or even intend to commit the act for the solicitation to be complete. The solicitation is complete once the incitement is made, even if the person solicited does not respond at all. As noted, the criminal information here, in each of the two counts, charged that petitioner solicited the aid of Moroz for the purpose of committing and with the intent of committing murder and gave the date or dates of the solicitations. It thus identified petitioner as the solicitor and Moroz as the person solicited and alleged as well the criminal purpose of the solicitation and the dates when the solicitations were made. The complaint is that neither count identified the victim. Maryland Rule 4-252 requires that certain issues in criminal cases be raised by motion filed within 30 days after the appearance of counsel in the case and directs that if not so raised are waived unless the court, for good cause shown, orders otherwise. Among the issues required to be raised by such a motion are [a] defect in the institution of the prosecution and [a] defect in the charging document other than its failure to show jurisdiction in the court or its failure to charge an offense. Rule 4-252(e) requires that a motion, including a motion under section (a) of the Rule, state the grounds upon which it is made and contain or be accompanied by a statement of points and citation of authorities. The obvious and necessary purpose of that requirement is to alert both the court and the prosecutor to the precise nature of the complaint, in order that the prosecutor have a fair opportunity to defend against it and that the court understand the issue before it. As we have observed, the omnibus motion filed by petitioner gave no factual or legal basis for a conclusion that there was a defect either in the institution of the prosecution or in the charging document. It has apparently become the practice for some defense counsel to file this kind of motion, seeking a panoply of relief based on bald, conclusory allegations devoid of any articulated factual or legal underpinning, presumably in the belief that if the motion complies with the time requirement of Rule 4-252(b), compliance with Rule 4-252(e) is unnecessary. That is not the case. If a motion fails to provide either a factual or legal basis for granting the requested relief, it cannot be granted. Recognizing the time constraints under which defense counsel and pro se defendants often operate, however, some courts have routinely overlooked the impermissible generality of such motions and have permitted the defendant to make the complaint more specific at, or in preparation for, a hearing on the motion. Although that practice is not what the Rule anticipates and is not to be encouraged, we have not disturbed the discretion of the trial courts to permit defendants to supplement unsupported allegations in the motion at or before the hearing, at least where the State is not unduly prejudiced by being called upon to respond immediately to allegations of which it had no prior notice. Here, however, petitioner not only failed to supplement the bald, unsupported request but failed as well even to mention it at the hearing. To the extent that a request to dismiss the criminal information because of any defect in it or in the institution of the prosecution generally was ever validly made, it was effectively withdrawn. The mandate of Rule 4-252(a) does not apply to the failure of a charging document to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense. That is because jurisdictional challenges may be made at any time. See Rule 4-252(d) (A motion asserting failure of the charging document to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense may be raised and determined at any time.). The argument made by petitioner in this appeal does not directly charge, much less establish, any such jurisdictional defect, however, but rather complains about the confusion that ensued from the failure of the criminal information to identify the intended victim(s). [3] The gravamen of even the current complaint seems to be the lack of fair notice of the nature of the charges. Unquestionably, a charging document that fails to give adequate notice of the charges is deficient and subject to dismissal. See Williams v. State, 302 Md. 787, 490 A.2d 1277 (1985); State v. Mulkey, 316 Md. 475, 560 A.2d 24 (1989). That kind of deficiency is the proper subject of a motion under Rule 4-252(a). It does not necessarily translate into the failure to show jurisdiction or to allege a criminal offense, however. That kind of failure would result only if the name or identification of the victim is an element of the crime of solicitation. Maryland Rule 4-202(a) requires a charging document to name or describe the defendant and to contain a concise and definite statement of the essential facts of the offense with which the defendant is charged and, with reasonable particularity, the time and place the offense occurred. The Rule does not require that any victim be named or identified. Although the Legislature has, with respect to certain crimes, crafted a form indictment that it regards as sufficient and most of those form indictments charging crimes against a person do call for the victim to be identified ( see Md.Code, Criminal Law Article, § 1-203 (conspiracy to murder), § 2-208 (murder or manslaughter), § 2-209 (manslaughter by vehicle or boat), § 3-206 (assault, but not reckless endangerment), and § 3-317 (rape, sexual offense)), the Legislature has not chosen to prescribe such a form for solicitation. Because the crime of solicitation may arise from an incitement to commit an offense for which there may not be an identifiable victim, the name or identity of a victim is not, ordinarily, a jurisdictional prerequisite. [4] Although identifying the victim in cases where there is a known victim is not a jurisdictional requirement, it is certainly a useful thing to do and may, in some circumstances, be required in order to satisfy the defendant's Federal and State Constitutional rights to fair notice. Given the record of what occurred here, this became, even if it did not begin as, such a case. There was no inherent ambiguity in the criminal information itself but, in light of the evidence pertaining to the initial solicitation to kill Mr. Norman, it seems that everyone, at one point or another during the trial and sentencing proceeding, became confused as to whether one of the counts was based, in whole or in part, on a solicitation to kill Mr. Norman. The confusion generated by the evidence regarding Mr. Norman was understandable. The law is not entirely clear whether any subsequent withdrawal or abandonment of the initial solicitation to kill him would suffice to preclude its prosecution. See Wayne R. LaFave, CRIMINAL LAW 492-93 (2d ed.1986); Rollin M. Perkins and Ronald N. Boyce, CRIMINAL LAW 654-58 (3d ed.1982). When this case returns to the Circuit Court, the State, to avoid a repetition of this confusion, should either refrain from offering any evidence regarding the initial solicitation to kill Mr. Norman or make clear through particulars that both counts charge a solicitation to kill only Judge Levitz. JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE JUDGMENT OF CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO THAT COURT FOR RETRIAL; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY BALTIMORE COUNTY. Dissenting opinion by BATTAGLIA, Judge, Joined by CATHELL, Judge. I respectfully dissent. In determining the existence of reversible error, this Court conducts two inquiries: (1) whether an error occurred in the trial court and, if so, (2) whether that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the first inquiry, as the majority correctly states, a trial court's actions and decisions are generally presumed to be correct. Majority slip op. at 10 (citing Mora v. State, 355 Md. 639, 650, 735 A.2d 1122, 1128 (1999)). To overcome the presumption of correctness, the appellant has the burden of producing a sufficient factual record for the appellate court to determine whether error was committed. Mora, 355 Md. at 650, 735 A.2d at 1128; see State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 184, 825 A.2d 452, 461 (2003); Bradley v. Hazard Technology Co., 340 Md. 202, 206, 665 A.2d 1050, 1052 (1995). If the appellant establishes that error occurred, the burden falls on the State to demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 658, 350 A.2d 665, 677 (1976). My disagreement with the majority involves its evaluation of the first inquiry. The majority states: It is clear that a communication from the jury was received, for it appears in the record and is labeled as a court exhibit. It is also clear that neither petitioner nor his attorney were informed about the communication. That alone constitutes error. Majority op. at 951. If the record were as clear as the majority describes it, I might agree that some error occurred. The record, however, is far from clear. In fact, of the entire record, only a single, unexplained jury note forms the basis for the majority's conclusion that the jury communicated with the judge without the petitioner's or his attorney's knowledge. That note, although signed and marked as a court exhibit, is not referenced in the transcript and bears no time stamp to indicate whether and when the court, in fact, received it. Further, the record contains no information that, if the trial judge knew of the note at all, he had time to respond to the jury's request. Without more, the petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing trial court error. The majority accuses the Court of Special Appeals of speculating that the jury returned a verdict before the jury note could have been answered. Because of its utter silence on the matter, however, the record only permits speculation, which is exactly how the majority reaches its own conclusion that the judge received the note and never discussed its existence with the petitioner or his lawyer before the jury returned its verdict. The majority offers no factual support, and none exists in the record, for the assertion that petitioner and his counsel first learned of the note after the jury verdict and sentence. Instead, the majority apparently relies completely on the allegation made by petitioner's appellate counsel, who did not participate at trial and therefore also can only speculate as to what actually happened. Neither petitioner's appellate counsel, the State, nor this Court has the slightest idea how or when the jury note entered the record or, for that matter, whether error occurred. [1] As the record is insufficient to support a claim of trial court error, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. That outcome would not preclude the petitioner from seeking a remedy under the Maryland Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act, codified as Maryland Code, Section 7-101 et. seq. of the Criminal Procedure Article (2001). Litigation under those provisions would take place in a forum where petitioner could develop a factual record of how the jury note entered the record, what the judge did with the note, if anything, and whether petitioner's trial counsel knew of the note before the jury verdict. This Court recently had occasion to discuss the utility of post-conviction proceedings in developing a sufficient factual record for appellate review. In Mosley v. State, 378 Md. 548, 567, 836 A.2d 678, 689 (2003), the Court declined to address the merits of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because the factual record on that issue had not been adequately developed. The Court explained that, in cases involving alleged constitutional, jurisdictional, or other fundamental violations that occurred at trial, the Maryland Post Conviction Act allows the defendant to attack the validity of a conviction collaterally in a separate evidentiary proceeding. Id. at 559, 836 A.2d at 684. To that end, the Act provides the defendant with the possibility of an evidentiary hearing, reflecting a recognition that `adequate procedures exist at the trial level, as distinguished from the appellate level, for taking testimony, receiving evidence, and making factual findings thereon concerning the allegations of error.' Id. at 560, 836 A.2d at 685 (quoting Wilson v. State, 284 Md. 664, 675, 399 A.2d 256, 262 (1979)). Like in Mosley, the record in this case does not provide the necessary information to determine whether some fundamental error occurred at trial. Rather than relying on conjecture to reach its result, the majority should have required the petitioner to develop an adequate record for review in a proceeding best suited for that purpose. Judge CATHELL authorizes me to state that he joins in this dissent.