Opinion ID: 2239861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Retrospective Application of the Statute

Text: Although the legislature's amendment reducing the period for redemption was permissible, the new, shorter period should not have been applied to the delinquent taxpayers in these two cases. In Gosnell v. Indiana Soft Water Services, this Court held that: Unless there are strong and compelling reasons, statutes will normally be given prospective application. While statutes addressing merely procedural and remedial matters may be applied retroactively, such application is not required.       Even under [the] argument that the statute is merely procedural or remedial, retroactive application is the exception, and such laws are normally to be applied prospectively absent strong compelling reasons. (1987), Ind., 503 N.E.2d 879, 880. (Emphasis supplied) This is not an instance in which the legislature expressly or implicitly indicated that the amendment should be applied retroactively. It is also not a case in which there is a pressing societal need  such as protection of the health, safety or welfare of the citizenry  to apply the statute in any manner other than prospectively. This Court has held, in other circumstances, that the law in force at the time of the sale is the law that governs the process of redemption. See Edwards v. Johnson (1886), 105 Ind. 594, 597, 5 N.E. 716; Davis v. Rupe (1887), 114 Ind. 588, 598, 17 N.E. 163; and Moor v. Seaton (1869), 31 Ind. 11, 12. This resolution is most logical. We conclude that although the legislative amendment reducing the period of tax sale redemption from two to one year is permissible, such amendment should not have been applied retroactively to Mitchell and NCNB. These cases are remanded to the trial courts for resolution in accordance with these holdings. SHEPARD, C.J., and DeBRULER, GIVAN and DICKSON, JJ., concur.