Opinion ID: 1392412
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonable Suspicion to Test

Text: The Firemen's Civil Service Commission found that reasonable suspicion existed to require drug testing of the Appellee. Specifically, the Commission cited the testimony of Chief Fuller, Deputy Chief Beckett, and Deputy Chief Tim Provaznik, all explaining that the actions and behaviors of the Appellee were consistent with illicit drug usage. Each of these individuals had been trained and certified in the City's Drug-Free Workplace Policy. In testimony presented to the Commission, the Appellee's charge of driving under the influence of alcohol was discussed as a potential indicator of dependence problems. Additionally, Deputy Chief Provaznik stated that the Appellee had utilized a substantial amount of excused and unexcused sick leave, a usage pattern which was perceived as uncharacteristic for the Appellee. Deputy Chief Provaznik further testified that excessive absenteeism is one of the factors to be evaluated in determining whether a reasonable suspicion test should be conducted. Deputy Chief Beckett explained that he suspected that the Appellee was using illegal drugs based upon information received from Mr. Giannini and his girlfriend, as well as the DUI, excessive absenteeism, and a change in personality. On appeal of this matter to the circuit court, the Commission's decision was reversed. In the circuit court order, the standard to be employed in the determination of whether to require an employee drug test was improperly identified as exigent circumstances. The appropriate standard, explicitly stated in Policy 19(J) and properly employed by the Commission, is reasonable suspicion. [4] Utilizing the exigent circumstances standard, the circuit court determined as follows: The Court does not agree with the position of the Defendants that exigent circumstances existed on April 18, 2004 so as to allow the City of Huntington, through Fire Chief Fuller, to request a reasonable suspicion drug test. . . . The circuit court's order is replete with such references to the absence of exigent circumstances. Furthermore, the circuit court relied upon the fact that no symptoms commonly attributed to the use of controlled substances were observed on the day of the drug testing. The circuit court reasoned that if exigent circumstances existed, the City would not have waited four days to request that Captain Legg [the Appellee] take a reasonable suspicion drug test. . . . A review of the policy, however, reveals no requirement that the behaviors, symptoms, or actions justifying testing actually occur on the day of testing. Thus, the circuit court introduced and relied upon a requirement which does not exist. As explained above, the circuit court's standard of review of the Commission's order is limited. Even assuming that the circuit court inadvertently identified the standard as exigent circumstances when in fact the court was correctly evaluating the issue under the standard of reasonable suspicion to test, this Court finds that the circuit court erred in reversing the Commission's finding of reasonable suspicion to test. The Commission based it conclusions upon extensive testimony and evidence presented during the hearing. This Court fails to perceive any defect in the Commission's conclusion that could be characterized as clearly erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law. Review of the record clearly indicates that a substantial and rational basis exists for the Commission's decision with regard to the reasonable suspicion to test the Appellee.