Opinion ID: 2534341
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Stang contends, and the present majority opinion agrees, that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Stang v. State, 24 So.3d 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). I disagree. This Court has held in innumerable cases, in both published and unpublished decisions, that a prisoner cannot use habeas corpus to litigate or relitigate issues that could have been, should have been, or were raised on direct appeal or in prior postconviction proceedings. See, e.g., Denson v. State, 775 So.2d 288, 289 (Fla. 2000) ([A]n extraordinary writ petition cannot be used to litigate or relitigate issues that were or could have been raised on direct appeal or in prior postconviction proceedings.); Mills v. Dugger, 574 So.2d 63, 65 (Fla.1990) ([H]abeas corpus is not to be used for obtaining additional appeals of issues which were raised, or should have been raised, on direct appeal or which were waived at trial or which could have, should have, or have been, raised in prior postconviction filings.) (internal quotation marks omitted); White v. Dugger, 511 So.2d 554, 555 (Fla.1987) ([H]abeas corpus is not a vehicle for obtaining additional appeals of issues which were raised, or should have been raised, on direct appeal or which were waived at trial or which could have, should have, or have been, raised in [prior postconviction] proceedings.). In the present case, according to the plain language of the decision under review, the Second District Court of Appeal violated this principle. In the opinion below, the district court stated that Stang first raised a court-based challenge to the corrected sentencing order in the rule 3.850 proceeding, which was denied on the merits on April 18, 2008. At that point, he could have, should have, or did raise all justiciable issues with respect to that order. Nevertheless, despite the fact that Stang was given that opportunity, the Second District Court of Appeal stated that he was later given another opportunity to challenge the same corrected order anew, this time in a different courtthe Tenth Circuit Court in Hardee Countyin a habeas proceeding. And finally, the Second District Court of Appeal stated that Stang was given yet another opportunity to challenge the corrected order in yet another courtthe Second District Court of Appeal itselfin yet another habeas proceeding, this time to review the Tenth Circuit Court's habeas ruling. Thus, according to the plain language of the opinion, Stang, through the use of habeas corpus, was given three separate bites at the same corrected sentence apple in three different courts. To the extent Stang claims that the corrected sentencing order was void because it was entered during the pendency of his direct appeal and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter it and that a claim of lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any time, Stang has overlooked the plain language of rule 3.850, which addresses such jurisdictional claims: (a) Grounds for Motion. The following grounds may be claims for relief from judgment or release from custody by a person who has been tried and found guilty or has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere before a court established by the laws of Florida: (1) The judgment was entered or sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or the State of Florida. (2) The court did not have jurisdiction to enter the judgment. (3) The court did not have jurisdiction to impose the sentence. (4) The sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law. (5) The plea was involuntary. (6) The judgment or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850 (emphasis added). Rule 3.850 places a two-year time limit on the filing of such claims, see Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b), and this time bar cannot be circumvented through the filing of an extraordinary writ. The decision of the Second District Court of Appeal, on its face, conflicts with Denson, Mills, and White, and countless other decisions of this Court addressing the procedural bar that applies to habeas proceedings.