Opinion ID: 1090851
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether counsel was rendered unconstitutionally ineffective due to cumulative errors.

Text: ¶ 101. Russell argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase, and that we must review the totality of the circumstances and the cumulative effect of counsel's lapses. Russell cites, along with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Ninth Circuit and Texas opinions in Harris ex rel. Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir.1995); Wenzy v. State, 855 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.Ct. App.1993); and Ex parte Welborn, 785 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). The State answers that some errors will have isolated effect and others may be pervasive, and the test Russell suggests is simply wrong. ¶ 102. The proper standard for determining if counsel was constitutionally ineffective is as follows: In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove that his attorney's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency was so substantial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. This Court looks at the totality of circumstances to determine whether counsel's efforts were both deficient and prejudicial. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance [is] highly deferential. There is a strong but rebuttable presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Only where it is reasonably probable that but for the attorney's errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different, will we find that counsel's performance was deficient. Holly v. State, 716 So.2d 979, 989 (Miss. 1998) (citations omitted).