Opinion ID: 1960245
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: amendment of methamphetamine charge.

Text: Finally, Appellant argues that his right to a fair trial was compromised by the Commonwealth's amendment of count three of the indictment charging him with trafficking in a controlled substance. The indictment cited former KRS 218A.1435 as the statute under which count three was charged. That statute provided: (1) A person is guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine when he knowingly and unlawfully sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, or possesses with intent to distribute methamphetamine. (2) Trafficking in methamphetamine is a Class C felony for the first offense and a Class B felony for a second or subsequent offense. Appellant was arrested on July 18, 2000, four days after the effective date of the repeal of KRS 218A.1435. (2000 Ky. Acts. ch. 169, § 2, eff. 7-14-00.) Thus, Appellant asserts he was indicted under a repealed statute. Appellant brought this fact to the trial court's attention by a pretrial motion to dismiss count three of the indictment. The trial court granted the motion but allowed the Commonwealth to amend the indictment to charge Appellant under KRS 218A.1412, which currently reads as follows: KRS 218A.1412 Trafficking in Controlled Substance in First Degree: Penalties (1) A person is guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree when he knowingly and unlawfully traffics in: a controlled substance, that is classified in Schedules I or II which is a narcotic drug; a controlled substance analogue; lysergic acid diethylamide; phencyclidine; a controlled substance that contains any quantity of methamphetamine, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers; gamma hydroxybutyric acid (GHB), including its salts, isomers, salts of isomers, and analogues; or flunitrazepam, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers. ... (Emphasis added.) KRS 218A.1412 is also a Class C felony for the first offense and a Class B felony for a subsequent offense. The trial court found that KRS 218A.1412 did not charge an additional or different offense. Thus, the amendment was appropriate under RCr 6.16. We affirm for two reasons. First, the trial court's analysis was correct. As noted in Part V of this opinion, supra, RCr 6.16 allows an amendment any time prior to verdict so long as the indictment does not charge an additional or different offense. Both KRS 218A.1412 and former KRS 218A.1435 punish a first offense as a Class C felony. KRS 218A.1412 includes methamphetamine as a controlled substance. The methamphetamine language was added to KRS 218A.1412(1) in the same legislation and effective the same date that KRS 218A.1435 was repealed. (2000 Ky. Acts, ch. 169, § 1, eff. 7-14-00.) The definition of trafficking, KRS 218A.010(28), which includes possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell, is the same when applied to KRS 218A.1412 as it was when applied to former KRS 218A.1435. Obviously, the 2000 General Assembly recognized the similarities of the statutes and purposely subsumed KRS 218A.1435 into KRS 218A.1412, probably to create consistency between KRS 218A.1412 and KRS 218A.1415, which specifically included and still includes possession of methamphetamine within the offense of possession of a controlled substance in the first degree. Thus, no additional or different offense was charged but only the same offense recompiled within a differently numbered statute. See Anderson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 135, 141 (2001) (simply chang[ing] the dates on the indictment does not charge an additional or different offense); cf. Godby v. Commonwealth, Ky., 491 S.W.2d 647, 650 (1973) (The omission of the citation of the statute defining the offense was not fatal if the defendants were not misled.). Second, Appellant was acquitted of the trafficking offense previously compiled in KRS 218A.1435 and now compiled in KRS 218A.1412 and was convicted, instead, of the lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance in the first degree. KRS 218A.1415. Prior to the repeal of KRS 218A.1435 and the amendment of KRS 218A.1412, the possession offense described in KRS 218A.1415 was a lesser included offense of both trafficking offenses. A dismissal of the charge formerly defined in KRS 218A.1435 would have only reduced that charge to the possession offense defined in KRS 218A.1415, the offense of which Appellant was actually convicted. An indictment is sufficient if it fairly informs the accused of the nature of the charged offense and does not mislead him. Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 931 S.W.2d 446, 449 (1996). A defendant receives sufficient notice of a lesser included offense when the specific language of the accusatory pleading adequately warns the defendant that the state will seek to prove the elements of the lesser offense, or if the lesser offense is necessarily included within the statutory definition of the charged offense. 41 Am.Jur.2d, Indictments and Informations § 299, at 899 (1995). [P]ossession of a controlled substance is a lesser offense included within the trafficking charge. Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 633 S.W.2d 61, 62 (1982). Thus, even if the trafficking charge cited the wrong statute, it gave Appellant notice of the offense of which he was ultimately convicted. Furthermore, although the heading of the indictment states that the indictment is for trafficking in methamphetamine under KRS 218A.1435, the body of count three actually recites that Appellant committed the offense of trafficking in a controlled substance when he had trafficked [sic] a quantity of Methamphetamine for purpose of sale, while being armed with a firearm. Strictly speaking, the caption of the indictment itself, and the facts recited therein are not part of the finding of the grand jury. 41 Am.Jur.2d, supra, § 71 (1995). Thus, in case of a variance between the language of the caption and the language of the body of an indictment, the language of the body controls. United States v. Martinez, 981 F.2d 867, 872 (6th Cir.1992) (The charging language is in the body of [the indictment] ....). Thus, amending the indictment to correct the statutory citation from KRS 218A.1435 to KRS 218A.1412 neither charged a new and different offense nor prejudiced Appellant in any way. KRS 218A.1412 includes the same offense formerly defined in KRS 218A.1435 and the indictment clearly gave notice of the offense of which Appellant was convicted. Cf. Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 20 S.W.3d 906, 908 (2000) (joinder of robbery and escape charges did not prejudice Appellant with respect to the robbery charge because he was not convicted of that offense.). Accordingly, the judgment of convictions and the sentences imposed by the Ohio Circuit Court are affirmed. All concur.