Opinion ID: 4160071
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Object Claims

Text: McMillian also alleges that counsel’s failure to object at several points during his trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. However, we affirm the trial court’s denial of these claims. First, McMillian contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony of the victim’s parents. “As a general rule, members of a victim’s family should not identify a victim at trial where nonrelated, credible witnesses are available to make such identification.” Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1272 (Fla. 2005). However, if the family member’s testimony is essential for a purpose other than just identification, it may properly be introduced at trial. Id.; see also Justus v. State, 438 So. 2d 358, 366 (Fla. 1983). Moreover, “[c]ounsel - 19 - cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection.” Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 546 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Hitchcock v. State, 991 So. 2d 337, 361 (Fla. 2008)). In this case, the testimony of the victim’s mother, Mrs. Stubbs, provided details about her daughter’s move, her daughter’s relationship with McMillian, the conversation she had with McMillian prior to the murder, and importantly, she provided details of the events that transpired the day the victim’s body was found. And while parts of the testimony of the victim’s father, Mr. Stubbs, was cumulative of the mother’s testimony, Mr. Stubbs did provide additional testimony describing the condition of the crime scene when he arrived. Mr. and Mrs. Stubbs also testified about State’s exhibit # 54, describing that Danielle Stubbs’ brother punched a hole in the wall when he discovered the victim’s body. Accordingly, there was no error in Danielle Stubbs’ parents testifying at trial. See Rodriguez, 919 So. 2d at 1272 (finding no error in deceased victim’s sister-in-law testifying at trial and identifying victim because she also identified property on the victim’s person at the time of the shooting and provided a recounting of the victim’s statements to her immediately after he was shot); see also Peede v. State, 955 So. 2d 480, 501-02 (Fla. 2007) (finding admission of deceased victim’s daughter’s identification testimony harmless where she testified to matters in addition to identification). - 20 - Accordingly, Danielle Stubbs’ parents’ testimony was properly admitted, and trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection. See Schoenwetter, 46 So. 3d at 546. Next, we find no merit to McMillian’s ineffectiveness claim for failure to object to Detective Wolcott’s testimony regarding cell phone information. Under section 90.702, Florida Statutes (2010), expert testimony is defined as “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Additionally, “[t]he basic principles of cellular technology have been widely accepted and admitted into evidence.” Gosciminski v. State, 132 So. 3d 678, 697 (Fla. 2013). Moreover, this Court has held that non-experts may testify about phone records. See Gordon v. State, 863 So. 2d 1215, 1219 (Fla. 2003) (stating that testimony about cell phone records and comparing them to locations on cell site maps was not expert testimony and was properly admitted); Perez v. State, 980 So. 2d 1126, 1131-32 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (ruling that cell phone records, cell site maps, and testimony explaining them was properly admitted and did not constitute expert testimony). Here, Wolcott testified about the contents of the cell phone records and spoke generally about cell records. Wolcott’s testimony was about basic principles of cellular technology and did not require “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” See § 90.702, Fla. Stat. Accordingly, Wolcott’s testimony was - 21 - properly admitted, and trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection. See Schoenwetter, 46 So. 3d at 546. Additionally, McMillian argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to portions of the State’s closing arguments, including a description of the victim’s death and comments about McMillian being unfaithful. However, having reviewed the challenged prosecutorial comments in context, we find that the failure to object did not “so affect the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.” Jackson v. State, 147 So. 3d 469, 487 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Davis v. State, 928 So. 2d 1089, 1122 (Fla. 2005)). Lastly, McMillian asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State’s use of a “dummy indictment” in which both the first-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder charges were addressed. Because the first-degree murder charge, contained in an indictment, and attempted seconddegree murder charge, contained in a separate information, were consolidated, the State prepared a document, the “dummy indictment,” specifically for purposes of reading to the jury, which included language from the original indictment and information on one document. The record demonstrates that the indictment and the information were each properly filed. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.140. And the purpose of combining the documents was to allow the trial court to read both charges to the jury. The trial court had jurisdiction over both charges. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, - 22 - 969 So. 2d 938, 952-54 (Fla. 2007). Therefore, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection. See Schoenwetter, 46 So. 3d at 546. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief regarding these claims.