Opinion ID: 77264
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Motion To Prohibit Death-Qualification Of The Jury

Text: 88 Brown also claims the district court erred in denying his motion to prohibit the death-qualification of the jury, contending that his rights were violated by excluding those jurors who could not be impartial in the penalty phase, but who could have been qualified to hear the guilt-innocence phase. 10 We review this question of law de novo. See United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir.2004). 89 Brown contends that the magistrate judge recommended denying the motion and that the recommendation was adopted by the district judge. However, a review of the record reveals that the magistrate judge denied the motion outright and that Brown did not appeal that ruling to the district judge. Thus, we are without power to consider this argument. See Brown, 342 F.3d at 1246. 90 Nevertheless, even if the issue were properly presented to us, we would readily reject the argument on the merits. In Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986), the Supreme Court held the Constitution does not prohibit the removal for cause, prior to the guilt phase of a bifurcated capital trial, of prospective jurors whose opposition to the death penalty is so strong that it would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors at the sentencing phase of the trial. Id. at 165, 106 S.Ct. 1758. Thus, Brown's claim must fail; the district court properly death-qualified the jury before the guilt phase of the trial.