Opinion ID: 600354
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Role of the Jury

Text: 70 The panel majority finds that Judge Cabranes could reasonably conclude that Dr. Grove's testimony would complicate the jury's task. This conclusion underestimates the intelligence of the jury in general and misreads the jury's well-established role in evaluating expert psychiatric testimony. 71 As this circuit has recently observed, in deciding that DNA profiling evidence was properly admitted by the trial judge, [t]he jury is intelligent enough, aided by counsel, to ignore what is unhelpful in its deliberations. United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 797 (2d Cir.) (emphasis in original) (quoting 3 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence § 702 at 702-36 (1989)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 104, 121 L.Ed.2d 63 (1992); cf. United States v. Torniero, 735 F.2d 725, 734 (2d Cir.1984) (The framers of the Bill of Rights expected that juries would be capable of resolving disputed issues of fact in the federal courts. Even in civil litigation, where non-perspicuous issues and abstruse evidence proliferate, we have never acknowledged a 'complexity exception' to the right to a jury trial. (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1110, 105 S.Ct. 788, 83 L.Ed.2d 782 (1985). 72 Furthermore, the jury can be instructed that the expert's opinion is solely for their assistance, and subject to their complete rejection if they consider it unreliable. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1200 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117, 99 S.Ct. 1025, 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979). 73 This faith in the intelligence and good sense of the jury extends to its ability to cast a critical eye on psychiatric testimony. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3399 n. 7, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983) (All of these professional doubts about the usefulness of psychiatric predictions can be called to the attention of the jury. Petitioner's entire argument ... is founded on the premise that a jury will not be able to separate the wheat from the chaff. We do not share in this low evaluation of the adversary process.) (emphasis added), cited in United States v. Torniero, 735 F.2d at 734. 74 In the instant matter, the government was free to challenge Dr. Grove's professional qualifications, vigorously cross-examine Dr. Grove as to his diagnosis, or place its own psychiatrist on the stand to testify about Dr. Grove's diagnosis in particular and the effects of Dependent Personality Disorder in general. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1200. As the Supreme Court has concluded, in the context of an insanity defense: 75 Psychiatry is not, however, an exact science, and psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness, on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms, on cure and treatment, and on likelihood of future dangerousness. Perhaps because there often is no single, accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity in a given case, juries remain the primary factfinders on this issue, and they must resolve differences in opinion within the psychiatric profession on the basis of the evidence offered by each party.... By organizing a defendant's mental history, examination results and behavior, and other information, interpreting it in light of their expertise, and then laying out their investigative and analytic process to the jury, the psychiatrists for each party enable the jury to make its most accurate determination of the truth on the issue before them. 76 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. at 81, 105 S.Ct. at 1095 (emphasis added). Moreover, [t]he mere fact that there may be conflicting testimony by experts is not a sufficient basis to exclude such evidence. Indeed, not uncommonly, there is conflict among experts on most any subject. United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d at 51; see also United States v. Torniero, 735 F.2d at 734 (It is the function of the jury to evaluate conflicting evidence and reach a decision on criminal responsibility by applying society's values to the legal issues in dispute. In making this legal and moral judgment, the jury should not be shielded from differences of opinion in a profession [i.e., psychiatry] that can never be entirely devoid of subjective disagreements. (citation omitted)). 77 Furthermore, precisely because the issue presented in this case deals with human behavior, rather than an area of knowledge totally foreign to most laypersons (e.g. DNA detection technology), the jurors are better able to evaluate any evidence presented by Dr. Grove. As one commentator has argued, the factfinder must be aware that results in [the fields of psychiatry and psychology] vary with the interpreter. Furthermore, this 'soft science' expertise is less likely to overwhelm the common sense of the average juror than 'hard science' expertise because it is closer to his common understanding and jurors usually recognize the subjectivity of the opinion. Herasimchuk, A Practical Guide to the Admissibility of Novel Expert Evidence in Criminal Trials Under Federal Rule 702, 22 St. Mary's L.J. 181, 197-98 (1990). 78 The panel majority underestimates both the wisdom of the jury and the additional insight into human behavior that a psychiatrist can provide. There is no doubt in my mind that the jury could not, without expert testimony, assess to the best possible degree whether DiDomenico, who was allegedly afflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder, had guilty knowledge. Therefore, I would find the district court's decision to preclude Dr. Grove's testimony under Rule 702 to be manifestly erroneous. 79