Opinion ID: 1385884
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conatser's Sentence

Text: The district court determined Conatser's base offense level pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) § 2H1.1(a)(1) (2005), which cross-referenced the guideline applicable to any underlying offense. Holding Conatser responsible for the assault of Martinez (as relevant conduct), the offense level was borrowed from the guidelines for aggravated assault. USSG § 2A2.2(a). The base offense level of 14 was increased by five levels because the victim sustained serious bodily injury, USSG § 2A2.2(b)(3)(B); by six levels because the offense was committed under, color of law, USSG § 2H1.1(b)(1)(B); and by two levels because the victim was physically restrained in the cell during the offense, USSG § 3A1.3. [5] With a total offense level of 27 and a criminal history score of 0, the sentencing judge determined the advisory guidelines range to be 70 to 87 months. Conatser argued for a below-guidelines sentence, presented considerable evidence in support of that request, and made a statement at sentencing. The district judge recognized the advisory nature of the guidelines, indicated that he considered all of the relevant § 3553(a) factors, and denied the request for a downward variance from the guidelines range. In doing so, the district judge explained that it wouldn't reflect the seriousness of the offense that the jury has found and wouldn't afford, adequate deterrence. The judge also added that the absence of any prior criminal history made a sentence at the bottom of the guidelines range appropriate. Without contesting the guidelines calculations, Conatser argues that the sentence was unreasonable because the district judge did not discuss or give appropriate weight to several § 3553(a) factors. The essence of this argument is that the district judge failed to give sufficient weight to his mitigating evidence, which is a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. First, echoing his arguments concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, Conatser argues that the district judge did not give sufficient weight to the nature and circumstances of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). That is, Conatser argues the sentence was too harsh because there was no direct evidence, other than acquitted conduct, that he assaulted or participated in the assault of any specific inmate in violation of the inmate's civil rights. On the contrary, we find that the district court properly focused on the fact that the conviction was for conspiracy and determined the offense level based on the foreseeable assault of Martinez in violation of his civil rights. This determination, taken with the color-of-law and victim-restraint enhancements, represented appropriate consideration of the nature and relative seriousness of Conatser's conduct. Next, with respect to the history and characteristics of the defendant, § 3553(a)(1), defendant argues that he should have received a lesser sentence because he had no criminal history and was a pillar of his community. Conatser presented testimony from friends, family, clergy and others who described him variously as decent, caring toward others, giving of his time, hardworking, and religious. The district judge also received and reviewed 135 letters of support that had been submitted on Conatser's behalf prior to sentencing. There can be no doubt that the plea for leniency on the grounds of Conatser's otherwise good character was presented and fully considered, and the absence of any prior criminal history was cited as the reason for selecting a sentence at the bottom of the advisory guidelines range. We find that it was not unreasonable for the district judge who heard all the evidence at trial to conclude that this factor did not warrant a below-guidelines sentence. Finally, Conatser argues that the district court did not adequately consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. Conatser did not raise the issue at sentencing, and, in fact, the government argued that this factor weighed in favor of a sentence at the top of the guidelines range. Section 3553(a)(6) identifies as one of the sentencing factors to be considered the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. We have explained, however, that this factor concerns national disparities between defendants with similar criminal histories convicted of similar criminal conductnot disparities between codefendants. United States v. Simmons, 501 F.3d 620, 623-24 (6th Cir.2007); United States v. LaSalle, 948 F.2d 215, 218 (6th Cir.1991). Since there was no suggestion that national uniformity in sentencing was of particular concern in this case, the district judge could but was not required to consider disparities between codefendants. Simmons, 501 F.3d at 626. The focus of Conatser's contention was the comparison of his sentence to the probationary sentences that Bradley and Westmoreland received, and the proportionally light sentence of 108 months that Hale received despite his direct involvement in the conduct that led to Kuntz's death. Disparities between the sentences of coconspirators can exist for valid reasons, such as differences in criminal histories, the offenses of conviction, or one coconspirator's decision to plead guilty and cooperate with the government. United States v. Dexta, 470 F.3d 612, 616 n. 1 (6th Cir.2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 3066, 168 L.Ed.2d 775 (2007); United States v. Nelson, 918 F.2d 1268, 1275 (6th Cir.1990). This is just such a case, as Bradley and Westmoreland each cooperated with the government and pleaded guilty to a different offense under a separate indictment. Hale's sentence, although greater than Conatser's, was much lower than it might have been if he had not pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count, which carried a maximum penalty of ten years' imprisonment. See also Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 599 (noting that because the guidelines take into consideration the need to avoid unwarranted disparities, consideration of the properly calculated guidelines range necessarily entailed consideration of the need to avoid unwarranted disparities under § 3553(a)(6)). Accordingly, we find that it was not unreasonable for the district court to sentence Conatser at the bottom of the guidelines range.