Opinion ID: 2324508
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excited Utterance Rulings

Text: During the prosecutor's direct examination of Wallace, defense counsel objected: [T]hey are going to ask [Wallace] whether [Calm] identified Pressey as the person who robbed him. . . . I think that's clearly hearsay. The trial judge ruled from the bench as follows: Under . . . Delaware [R]ule[ ] of [E]vidence 803, an excited utterance [is a] statement related to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. The availability of the declarant is immaterial. Therefore, if the State can lay a foundation that this was indeed an excited utterance, whether or not the questions were asked of [Calm] is irrelevant. And if you can lay that foundation I am going to admit the statements as excited utterances. Immediately thereafter, Wallace testified that Calm was scared, still crying, and slouched down and that he didn't want to get out of the car when he identified Pressey as one of the robbers. The trial judge ruled that the prosecutor had laid a sufficient foundation. Wallace then testified that Calm identified Pressey as one of the robbers. During the prosecutor's direct examination of Vettori, defense counsel again objected for the same reason. The trial judge ruled: You are going to have to lay the foundation again. Vettori testified that Calm was seated in the back seat of the car, appeared to be nervous, was shaking, and [h]is voice was shaky. The trial judge again ruled that the prosecutor had laid a sufficient foundation. Vettori then testified that Calm identified Pressey as one of the robbers. Pressey argues that the trial judge abused her discretion in admitting Calm's prior out-of-court statement under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. We review a trial judge's decision to admit evidence based on an exception to the hearsay rule for abuse of discretion. [1]