Opinion ID: 4470964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: rodriguez rivero’s testimony

Text: Next, Rodriguez Perez argues that the district court erred in allowing the government to introduce the testimony of a critical cooperating witness who was disclosed the night before opening arguments were scheduled to commence without a showing of manifest necessity by the government. We note at the outset that Rodriguez Perez’s specific argument here is not overwhelmingly clear. He does not appear to argue that the district court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial or a new trial, thereby abandoning those arguments. United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003). He also does not properly 12 Case: 19-10561 Date Filed: 01/09/2020 Page: 13 of 16 address his argument that the government violated his rights to a fair trial, effective assistance of counsel, confrontation through cross examination, and due process of law, leading us to conclude that those arguments are abandoned, as well. See id. Moreover, Rodriguez Perez clarifies that he is not challenging the government’s failure to provide a witness list or use of an undisclosed witness at trial. The only argument that we are able to clearly discern is that the district court should have applied a “manifest necessity” requirement to the government’s attempt to introduce a late-disclosed witness. The “manifest necessity” requirement is derived from the Supreme Court’s caselaw concerning the intersection of mistrials and the Double Jeopardy Clause. Generally, retrials following mistrials do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause so long as the grant of a mistrial is because of “manifest necessity.” Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1984). Under this standard, “district courts are permitted to declare a mistrial and discharge a jury only where, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.” United States v. Therve, 764 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014). We decline Rodriguez Perez’s invitation to apply the “manifest necessity” standard in a context like his—in which the government belatedly attempts to introduce the testimony of a cooperating witness. We conceptualize Rodriguez 13 Case: 19-10561 Date Filed: 01/09/2020 Page: 14 of 16 Perez’s argument as essentially arguing that the district court made an incorrect evidentiary ruling, which we review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d 779, 783 (11th Cir. 2007). Given that we have never applied the “manifest necessity” standard outside of the Double Jeopardy Clause– mistrial context, we do not believe that the district court abused its discretion by failing to apply it here. But even if we read Rodriguez Perez’s argument as implying that his substantial rights were violated, we would nonetheless affirm the district court’s decision. “Late disclosure of evidence required to be turned over under [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 16 or a standing discovery order necessitates reversal only if it violates a defendant’s substantial rights.” United States v. Bueno-Sierra, 99 F.3d 375, 380 (11th Cir. 1996). “Substantial prejudice is established when the defendant shows that he was unduly surprised and did not have an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense or that the mistake had a substantial influence on the jury.” United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1566 (11th Cir. 1991). We have previously determined that a defendant established substantial prejudice where the testimony of the late-disclosed witness “shattered” his defense. United States v. Camargo-Vergara, 57 F.3d 993, 998–99 (11th Cir. 1995). However, we have concluded that there is no substantial prejudice when the defendant should have known that a late disclosed statement existed and there was substantial other 14 Case: 19-10561 Date Filed: 01/09/2020 Page: 15 of 16 evidence linking the defendant to the offense. United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1566–67 (11th Cir. 1991). We review the district court’s evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion. Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d at 783. In this light, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion. While we have no doubt that the late introduction of Rodriguez Rivero’s testimony adversely affected Rodriguez Perez’s defense, we do not believe that it “shattered” his defense. Instead, we find it plausible that Rodriguez Perez should have known that Rodriguez Rivero—or one of the other two men who was detained at the same time that they both were—might testify against him. All four men were engaged in the same criminal actions, were all detained at the same time by Officers Arriola and Ashe, and all had evidence connecting them to the crime. Moreover, the government informed the district court that it disclosed to Rodriguez Perez’s counsel in September 2018 the information it had related to Rodriguez Rivero, including the fact that he had been indicted along with Rodriguez Perez. In other words, Rodriguez Perez either knew or should have known that substantial other evidence was lurking in the ether. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue. Rodriguez Perez cannot demonstrate that the district court’s failure to apply the “manifest necessity” standard constituted abuse of discretion. And even if we address the potentially abandoned argument that Rodriguez Perez suffered substantial prejudice because 15 Case: 19-10561 Date Filed: 01/09/2020 Page: 16 of 16 of Rodriguez Rivero’s late testimony, we similarly do not think that the district court abused its discretion. AFFIRMED. 16