Opinion ID: 1822476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Attorney's Letter As Offer of Compromise

Text: The defendant claims that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing into evidence a letter written from the defendant's attorney to the plaintiff's attorney. The defendant claims that the letter was inadmissible as an offer of compromise between the parties. Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. Peterson, 506 So.2d 317 (Ala.1987) (offers of compromise made either before or after litigation is begun are inadmissible). See generally 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 629-30 (1967). Likewise, conditional offers to perform amount to mere efforts to settle a pending claim and are thus inadmissible. Yeager v. Hurt, 433 So.2d 1176 (Ala.1983). However, an express admission of the fact of responsibility contained in an offer of compromise may be admitted into evidence. Griffin v. Hardin, 456 So.2d 1113 (Ala.Civ.App.1984). The letter from the defendant's attorney was dated June 29, 1988, was addressed to Mrs. Johnson's attorney, and read as follows: James Kohn has authorized me to respond to your letters of May 2 and June 15, 1988 concerning Sharon [sic] Johnson. Except for a water spot around the light fixture, which was not due to Mr. Kohn's work, Mrs. Johnson was apparently pleased with the work until she contacted you. Mr. Kohn tells me that the water damage to the light fixture can be repaired for under $100, and he is willing to make that repair even though it is not his fault. He has made several attempts to do so already. I have no confidence in the opinions of your hired witness, Mr. Bruner, and may consider a libel action against him at a later time. Also, in my opinion damages for mental anguish are not recoverable for the alleged breach of contract. I have advised Mr. Kohn that your demands are grossly exaggerated and unreasonable, and that he should not be intimidated, but rather should allow you to proceed with the threatened lawsuit. The plaintiff did not file her complaint until August 26, 1988. The rationale and public policy underlying the privileged nature of settlement negotiations is the encouragement of extrajudicial settlement of disputes among potential litigants. Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. Peterson, 506 So.2d 317 (Ala.1987) (citing Indemnity Company of America v. Pugh, 222 Ala. 251, 132 So. 165 (1931)). Clearly, the letter set out above does not constitute an express admission of the fact of liability. In fact, the letter contains language specifically stating that the defendant denies any responsibility for the defects in the plaintiff's house. The letter did contain language to the effect that the defendant remained willing to make certain repairs to the Johnson addition, apparently in settlement of the dispute. However, the offer of settlement was not clearly stated. Even though the letter may not have been properly admissible into evidence, in order for its admission to warrant a reversal the claimed error arising therefrom must create some prejudice to the defendant. Rule 45, A.R.App.P., provides as follows: No judgment may be reversed or set aside, nor new trial granted in any civil or criminal case on the ground of ... the improper admission or rejection of evidence, ... unless in the opinion of the court to which the appeal is taken or application is made, after an examination of the entire cause, it should appear that the error complained of has probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties. The central complaint of the defendant regarding the use of the letter is that Mrs. Johnson's attorney was allowed to cross-examine the defendant concerning whether the defendant was aware of more than one defect in the addition. The defendant argues that Mrs. Johnson's attorney was allowed to elicit testimony from the defendant showing that he was aware of numerous defects in the construction and yet offered to repair only a single defect. We do not believe that the defendant was prejudiced by the admission of the letter into evidence or was prejudiced by the cross-examination that was based on its contents. Neither the letter nor the defendant's testimony in cross-examination on this point supports a conclusion that the defendant was aware of numerous defects in the construction. The basis of the defendant's liability stems from Mrs. Johnson's testimony and her expert evidence showing that the addition was in a dangerous condition due solely to the defendant's failure to build it in a workmanlike manner. In addition, it does not appear that this evidence was presented in a calculated attempt to create an improper jury verdict. Beutel v. Paul, 741 S.W.2d 510 (Tex.App. 1987). We believe that the verdict in this case is fully supported by the evidence considered by the jury, in the absence of the evidence of this alleged settlement offer. Where the alleged error in admitting evidence does not affect the result of the trial, this court will not require a reversal. Baker v. Horsley, 212 Ala. 181, 101 So. 830 (1924). In this case, the testimony showing the defendant's awareness of any defects would have had little, if any, effect on the jury's conclusion as to the damages required to put the plaintiff in the position she would have been in had the contract been properly performed. As we stated earlier, the jury was fully justified in finding that $15,000 would be required to properly repair Mrs. Johnson's addition. That conclusion was amply supported by Mrs. Johnson's evidence. Therefore, the judgment is due to be, and it hereby is, affirmed. AFFIRMED. MADDOX, ALMON, ADAMS and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.