Opinion ID: 1854356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Many safeguards are provided by our law for the protection of an accused.

Text: He is entitled to counsel. Counsel was provided. He is entitled to compulsory process for the appearance of witnesses. He had such aid except for the subpoena duces tecum. He was confronted by the witnesses for the state. A defendant may be tried on a felony charge only upon indictment or information and the names of the witnesses and the minutes of their testimony must be endorsed thereon (section 772.3, Code of Iowa). No other witness shall be permitted to testify for the state unless notice thereof is given pursuant to section 780.10, Code of Iowa. Under the provisions of chapter 776 of the Code an indictment may be set aside unless it conforms with the statutory provisions. Under the provisions of section 773.6, Code of Iowa, when an indictment charges an offense, but together with the minutes of evidence filed therewith fails to inform the defendant of the particulars of the offense sufficiently to enable him to prepare his defense or give him such information as he is entitled to, he may upon motion obtain a bill of particulars. If a bill of particulars is asked for and filed the state is thereafter limited to proof of the acts indicated in such specifications. State v. Schuling, 216 Iowa 1425, 1428, 250 N.W. 588. By availing himself of statutory procedure a defendant not only knows the names of the persons to be called as witnesses for the state but the substance of their testimony and may be assured and guaranteed against surprise. He is also entitled to know the contents of documents the state intends to use against him. See State v. Burris, 198 Iowa 1156, 1162, 198 N.W. 82, and State v. Bittner, 209 Iowa 109, 118, 227 N.W. 601. Our law gives greater protection against surprise than many other jurisdictions. Without suggesting that there has been any improper suppression of evidence in the case at bar we think that any suspicion thereof should be removed and that under the philosophy of our law a defendant is entitled to the benefit of such information as the court finds may be material to the issue. This is in accord with the provisions of Federal law and the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States. 18 U.S. Code Annotated, section 3500, relates to demands, production of statements and reports of witnesses in criminal prosecutions. Subparagraph (b) thereof provides: After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire contents of any such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use. Subparagraph (c) provides: If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be produced under this section contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order the United States to deliver such statement for the inspection of the court in camera. Upon such delivery the court shall excise the portions of such statement which do not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness. With such material excised, the court shall then direct delivery of such statement to the defendant for his use. If, pursuant to such procedure, any portion of such statement is withheld from the defendant and the defendant objects to such withholding, and the trial is continued to an adjudication of the guilt of the defendant, the entire text of such statement shall be preserved by the United States and, in the event the defendant appeals, shall be made available to the appellate court for the purpose of determining the correctness of the ruling of the trial judge. Whenever any statement is delivered to a defendant pursuant to this section, the court in its discretion, upon application of said defendant, may recess proceedings in the trial for such time as it may determine to be reasonably required for the examination of such statement by said defendant and his preparation for its use in the trial. Subparagraph (e) provides that the term statement includes the stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording or transcription thereof. This statute popularly known as the Jencks Act has been considered and discussed by the U.S. Ct. of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, in Lee v. United States, decided October 20, 1966, appearing in 368 F.2d 834. The court definitely frowned on anything even though done in good faith that might jeopardize the ability of an accused to defend himself. Defendant conceded in his application That under the Federal Communication Commission, the tapes recorded by police officials are not subject to public review unless so ordered by the Courts. Unfortunately police officers are required to investigate so many matters and make so many arrests that tape recordings of all activities even for a few hours would improperly disclose matters not germane to a particular issue. The Jencks Act recognizes that fact and places on the trial judge the duty of determining in camera what may be germane. This procedure protects the records from improper disclosure and at the same time protects a defendant against suppression of pertinent evidence. We think comparable procedure should have been followed in the case at bar. Until heard by the trial court and found germane we are not holding that the radio tapes should have been made available for the jury to hear. We are not holding that either defendant or his counsel was entitled to hear everything that might be recorded on the radio tapes during the period involved. Our holding is limited to the proposition that the court should have determined in the presence of the county attorney and counsel for defendant whether there was anything thereon germane to the issue of entrapment and if so it should have been made available to defendant for appropriate use. II. The right of the prosecution to withhold the name of an informer has recently been considered by the Supreme Court of the United States. In McCray v. State of Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62, decided March 20, 1967, it was held that a defendant was not constitutionally entitled to the name of an informer under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or under the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The McCray opinion discussed with approval Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639, wherein this appears: We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors. A pertinent comment appears when in sustaining defendant's right to information the court said: His testimony might have disclosed an entrapment. III. Defendant claims error in the court's instruction on entrapment. He now argues that the instruction refers solely to law enforcement officers and does not include a plan and scheme set up by a private citizen i.e. Slater. In the trial court defendant objected to the instruction as too broad, inequitable and unfair to the defendant, in violation of his legal rights. We find neither objections nor request in the trial court covering the point now argued. In State v. Jensen, 245 Iowa 1363, 1371, 66 N.W.2d 480, 484, we said: Although certain instructions were requested by defendant, the point under discussion here was included in none of them.    (Citations) The defendant's complaint is without merit. Defendant cites no Iowa authorities in support of his argument that legal entrapment may be by a private citizen or an accomplice. The weight of authority is to the contrary. Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169, 175, 61 A.L.R.2d 666 (5th Cir.) considers the point and holds and cites authorities that the defense of entrapment is restricted to law enforcement officers. See also State v. Jackson, 243 N.C. 216, 90 S.E. 2d 507, 509. Defendant was not entitled to an instruction to the effect now urged. For recent annotation on entrapment see 10 A.L.R.3d 1121. IV. Our comments in Division I, supra, are not an indication that we find any affirmative error in the record before us. Neither can we say that there has or has not been an abuse of discretion because judicial discretion has not been exercised. The trial court did not know and we do not know whether the police tapes would disclose matters or evidence that would be admissible, inadmissible or subject to the discretion of the trial court. As we said in Division I, supra, a defendant is not entitled to unrestricted examination of police records. There are situations where a defendant is entitled to use records from which a witness has testified. See Barnard v. Cedar Rapids City Cab Co., 257 Iowa 734, 751, 133 N.W.2d 884. There are also situations were denial is within the discretion of the trial court. See State v. Hodge, 252 Iowa 449, 463, 105 N.W.2d 613 and Roviaro v. United States, supra, Division II. In the case before us the police were not testifying from the records defendant sought to examine. In the case at bar there was and is considerable discretion in the trial court, subject to review as to abuse, in determining what, if any, part of the police records should be disclosed to defendant's counsel on the issue of entrapment. In view of the fact that defendant was found hiding in the cooler of the place he had broken and entered and offered no defense except entrapment by officers we find no need at this time to order a new trial or complete remand. Defendant has had trial by jury aided by competent counsel. The evidence of his guilt as presented to the jury was overwhelming. Except for the possibility as indicated we find no error. We think there should be judicial inquiry into the existence in the police records as to evidence of affirmative entrapment by law enforcing officers. We are not suggesting this as an ordinary procedure. Here there was an unusual situation. There was reliance on an informer. A captured accomplice refused to testify. The driver of the car that brought defendant to the scene was never found. There were radio calls for help and a large number of officers involved. The case is remanded to the district court for a review and determination of such police or law officer radio tapes as may be germane to the issue of entrapment in the offense here involved. As to the propriety of such procedure see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908. If evidence of entrapment is found the trial court is directed to order a new trial and make the evidence available to defendant or his counsel. If there is no such evidence this case shall, upon the filing of a finding by the trial court to that effect, stand affirmed. Defendant, of course, has the right to appeal from the ruling and judgment of the trial court as a final judgment. This procedure, while perhaps unusual and we hope not too frequently necessary in Iowa, appears to us as eminently fair to the defendant, expeditious and not unnecessarily expensive and affording an opportunity for judicial review of an issue that we cannot determine from the record before us. Remanded for further hearing and entry of appropriate judgment. GARFIELD, C.J., and LARSON, MOORE, STUART and MASON, JJ., concur. RAWLINGS, J., concurs in the result. BECKER, J., dissents and would reverse on the basis of grounds considered in Divisions I, II and IV.