Opinion ID: 877076
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Heading: THE FEDERAL SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT: Substantive Application

Text: Plaintiff's offered instructions applying the Safety Appliance Act, stated that proof of a violation of the Act, together with a causal relationship between the violation and the injuries sustained, is sufficient to impose liability on the railroad. They further provided that the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk were not available to the railroad. The definition of causation was that which is provided for in the Federal Employers' Liability Act  and we shall have more to say of this later. The railroad also offered several instructions defining the Act, but provided that contributory negligence is a defense even if a violation of the Act is proved. (As we previously stated, the railroad eliminated its assumption of risk defense from its offered instructions because it believed that as a matter of evidence, the defense was inapplicable.) The trial court refused plaintiff's offered instructions and approved the defendant's instructions. Contributory negligence was thus a defense under the Act. Only two other instructions had direct application to the Act. The first (and a proper instruction) defined inefficient brake and defective brake; and the second (which also was proper) defined the terms inefficient and ineffective, but further stated that the terms were not synonymous. The trial court approved several more of defendant's offered instructions that apply to plaintiff's theories of recovery; but the instructions do not specify that they are intended to apply either to the negligence theory of recovery, or to the Safety Appliance Act theory of recovery, or to both. The danger, of course, is that the jury, without being properly instructed, could improperly apply the instructions without the necessary designation. One of the instructions defined reasonable care, which could apply only to plaintiff's common law negligence action. A second defined the term negligence, which again could only be applied to plaintiff's negligence theory. A third instruction defined the term contributory negligence, but did not attempt to state whether it applied to either or both of plaintiff's theories of recovery. A fourth instruction also defined contributory negligence, and is similarly defective for a failure to designate which theory it applied to. A fifth instruction defined the term proximate cause, and although properly applicable to both theories of recovery, failed to contain language telling the jury that the definition did apply to both theories. We are thus left with a series of instructions that are woefully inadequate, even assuming that the trial court had properly ruled on the application and scope of the Safety Appliance Act. If the case had gone to the jury, and the plaintiff received an adverse jury verdict, we would be compelled to reverse for the reason that the jury was improperly instructed. We next proceed to a discussion of the substantive provisions of the Federal Safety Appliance Act as they apply to this case. We have no doubt that the plaintiff is a member of the class which can invoke the provisions of the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1 thru 46. Section 11 provides in part: It shall be unlawful for any common carrier ... to haul, or permit to be hauled or used on its line, any car ... not equipped with ... efficient hand brakes ... Section 13 of the Act provides for criminal penalties for any violation. Although the Act itself does not create a cause of action in favor of anyone, it has been given effect through civil suits under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C. §§ 51 thru 60) in the case of railroad employees, and by suits in state courts invoking state law for nonrailroad employees. In Coray v. Southern Pac. Co. (1949), 335 U.S. 520, 522-523, 69 S.Ct. 275, 276, 93 L.Ed. 208, 210, the United States Supreme Court long ago stated: ... this Act, fairly interpreted, must be held to protect all who need protection from dangerous results due to maintenance or operation of congressionally prohibited defective appliances. In Boyer v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. (1967), 38 Ill.2d 31, 230 N.E.2d 173, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a railroad passenger could invoke the protection of the Act, and furthermore, that the defense of assumption of risk was not available to the railroad. In Jenkins, supra, following the lead set forth in Boyer, the Illinois Appellate Court declared that a nonrailroad employee working on the railroad's siding, could invoke the protection of the Act, and furthermore, that the defense of contributory negligence was not available to the railroad. It is thus clear to us that the plaintiff here can invoke the protection of the Act; and it is equally clear that the railroad cannot assert the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence. Because it is a federal Act, federal court decisions necessarily define the substantive provisions. The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Act imposes absolute liability that is not in any way dependent on the law of negligence. In O'Donnell v. Elgin J. & E. Ry. Co. (1949), 338 U.S. 384, 390, 70 S.Ct. 200, 204, 94 L.Ed. 187, the Court stated: ... this Court early swept all issues of negligence out of cases under the Safety Appliance Act. For reasons set forth at length in our books, the Court held that a failure of equipment to perform as required by the Safety Appliance Act is in itself an actionable wrong, in no way dependent upon negligence and for the proximate results of which there is liability  a liability that cannot be escaped by proof of care or diligence. (Citing cases.) For reasons that are not entirely clear, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has also declared that whether the railroad can assert contributory negligence or assumption of risk as defenses in a case involving a nonrailroad employee, depends entirely on state law rather than federal law. The most recent case adhering to this interpretation is Crane v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa Railway Co. (1969), 395 U.S. 164, 89 S.Ct. 1706, 23 L.Ed.2d 176. In Crane, the Court upheld an Iowa Supreme Court decision holding that one who brings suit under the Safety Appliance Act must prove (under Iowa law) that he was free from contributory negligence. In declaring, however, that a nonemployee could not invoke the same protections under the Federal Employers' Liability Act to which a railroad employee is entitled, the majority stated: We recognize the injustice of denying recovery to a nonemployee which would not be denied to an employee performing the same task in the same manner as did petitioner. But it is for Congress to amend the statute to prevent such injustice. It is not permitted the Court to rewrite the statute. 395 U.S. at 167, 89 S.Ct. at 1709. Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, dissented, arguing that a nonemployee under the Safety Appliance Act should have the same protections as those given a railroad employee who invokes the Act as a basis of predicating civil liability. Because the Safety Appliance Act creates absolute liability not dependent upon the law of negligence, we must decide this issue on the basis of whether we permit the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence where suit is brought under a state statute that imposes absolute liability. In Pollard v. Todd (1966), 148 Mont. 171, 418 P.2d 869, a case brought under the Montana Scaffolding Act, we ruled that liability is established where it is proved that a statute has been violated and there is a proximate cause connection between the violation and the resulting injuries. We ruled, furthermore, that in such a case, the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence are not available to one who has responsibility under the Scaffolding Act. We would be inconsistent in interpreting absolute liability statutes if we were to permit the railroad to invoke the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence under the Safety Appliance Act but to disallow the defenses under the Montana Scaffolding Act. In either case, the principle is the same, and the principle should be consistently applied. We are not alone in holding that the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence are not available to the railroad where sued by a plaintiff who invokes the provisions of the Safety Appliance Act. In Boyer, supra, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that the actionable wrong under the Act is the failure of the equipment to perform as required under the Act, and that once the violation is proved, the plaintiff need only prove the causal relationship between the violation and the injuries sustained. In ruling that the defense of assumption of risk was not available under Illinois law, the court stated: Under such a policy which imposes an absolute duty to provide for public safety it would be incongruous to allow the doctrine of assumption of risk to be employed by the defendant to avoid the responsibility to one for whose benefit the statute was enacted. 230 N.E.2d at 178. Not to be denied, two years later, a defendant railroad asserted the defense of contributory negligence in a suit brought by a nonrailroad employee pursuant to the Safety Appliance Act. The Illinois Appellate Court, following the lead in Boyer, held that contributory negligence is not a defense to a suit brought pursuant to the Act. Jenkins, supra. The Court stated: Because the action is one to enforce an absolute liability, the applicable state law is that which deals with those types of actions. It is elementary that contributory negligence, a concept of the law of negligence, is not an applicable defense against one seeking to enforce an absolute liability. 284 N.E.2d at 400. The court in Jenkins also laid to rest any assumption that the defenses would be available to the railroad where sued by a nonrailroad employee: Implicit in the defendant's argument is the contention that the fact that plaintiff is a nonemployee of the defendant railroad changes his status with respect to the available defenses. Defendant has not suggested, however, that plaintiff is not within the class of those intended to be protected by the statute. We can see no cogent reasons to apply the remedy the statute provides inconsistently with respect to employees versus nonemployees. Plaintiff is within the protected class and therefore he should be afforded all the incidents of the remedy, including the unavailability of contributory negligence as a defense. 284 N.E.2d at 400-401. Nor can we see any cogent reasons why the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence should be inapplicable in a suit brought by a railroad employee but applicable in a suit brought by a nonrailroad employee. The Safety Appliance Act does not require us to reach this unjust result. Crane, supra. Furthermore, our own case of Pollard, supra, clearly sets forth our position with respect to a statute imposing absolute liability  the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence are not available. There is, however, one area where a railroad employee is entitled to a more liberal standard imposing liability than is a nonrailroad employee  and that is with respect to the question of causation. In this case, the plaintiff offered an instruction which defined causation by the standards of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. That portion of the instruction stated: ... Under the Federal Safety Appliance Act, if a railroad, such as the Defendant in this action, violates any such act, and if the violation contributes in any way or manner to the injury of a person such as the Plaintiff in this case, such railroad shall be liable in damages to that person for his injuries. (Emphasis added.) This instruction defined causation according to the definition contained in the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C. § 51) and court decisions further solidifying the statutory definition. See Gallick v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co. (1963), 372 U.S. 108, 83 S.Ct. 659, 9 L.Ed.2d 618; Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. (1957), 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Crane, that one who is not a railroad employee cannot invoke the benefits of the Federal Employers' Liability Act in a suit against a railroad. ( Crane, supra, 395 U.S. at 166, 89 S.Ct. at 1708.) Because there is no definition of causation in the Safety Appliance Act, we conclude that the issue of proximate cause must be decided on the basis of the definition which prevails under state law. See, McNair v. Berger (1932), 92 Mont. 441, 15 P.2d 834; Montana Jury Instruction Guide, No. 15.00, and cases cited in the commentary to this instruction. We have not fashioned a special definition to apply to statutes imposing absolute liability. Pollard, supra.