Opinion ID: 1913184
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether an assignee of contract for deed buyers may assert the statutory remedy of equitable adjustment after its repeal.

Text: On October 8, 1982, when Daryl and Becky borrowed $25,000.00 and executed an Assignment of Contract for Deed, SDCL 21-50-2 provided: The court in such actions shall have the power to equitably adjust the rights of all the parties thereto, but it shall not be necessary in such actions, to entitle the plaintiff to a judgment, that proof be made on the trial of an offer or tender of performance, where such offer is made in the complaint and the proof shows that the plaintiff is able and willing to fully perform the terms of the contract sought to be foreclosed at the time of trial. (Emphasis added.) SDCL 21-50-2 was repealed however, effective July 1, 1992, prior to Daryl and Becky's default and the commencement of this action. It is general basic law that the effect of the repeal of a statute, where neither a saving clause within the repealing statute itself nor a general saving statute exists to prescribe the governing rule for the effect of the repeal, is to destroy the effectiveness of the repealed act in futuro and to divest the right to proceed under the statute which, except as to proceedings passed and closed, is considered as if it had never existed. .... Thus, it can be said that the general rule is that the repeal of a statute cancels an action brought pursuant to that statute unless the action is permitted to survive by the operation of a saving clause or by the vesting of a right under the statute. State Highway Comm'n v. Wieczorek, 248 N.W.2d 369, 372-73 (S.D.1976) (citation omitted); Vail v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 108 Colo. 206, 115 P.2d 389, 391 (1941). See also 82 C.J.S. § 437 (As a general rule the repeal of a statute imposing a liability, by a subsequent act containing no saving clause, operates to release all liabilities incurred under the repealed statute where no proceedings have been commenced to enforce such liability ... unless vested rights have been acquired under the statute prior to its repeal.) Since no saving clause is included in this repealing act, we must determine whether South Dakota's general saving statute, SDCL 2-14-18, applies. SDCL 2-14-18 provides: The repeal of any statute by the Legislature shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute unless the repealing act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. (Emphasis added). According to this saving statute, the repeal of SDCL 21-50-2 does not release any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred. [1] See Colorado v. Montera, 195 Colo. 118, 575 P.2d 1294 (1978) (holding that Colorado's general saving clause, which is very similar to SDCL 2-14-18, has no application to acts other than those which relate to a penalty, forfeiture or liability incurred under a repealed statute. (Emphasis in original.) Colorado v. McMillin, 150 Colo. 23, 370 P.2d 435 (1962) (holding that the repeal of a statute does not bar actions commenced after the repeal if predicated on liability which accrued when the act was in force ). [2] Since Schultz had not incurred a liability before Daryl and Becky defaulted, the general saving statute has no bearing on this case. Compare Wieczorek, 248 N.W.2d at 376 ([W]here a statute gives rights of action upon grounds of public policy, no vested rights as to the continuance thereof are conferred and a general saving statute does not operate to permit the right of action to continue or survive.) Therefore, SDCL 2-14-18 does not apply and the trial court was correct. Jibben also argues that the repeal of SDCL 21-50-2 constitutes a change in substantive law and therefore should not be applied retroactively. The general rule is that newly enacted statutes will not be given a retroactive effect unless such an intention is plainly expressed by the legislature. Dahl v. Sittner, 474 N.W.2d 897, 901 (S.D. 1991) (citations omitted). Statutes which merely affect a remedy or procedure however, as opposed to substantive [law], are given retroactive effect. [3] Lyons v. Lederle Labs., 440 N.W.2d 769, 770 (S.D.1989). We find that, under Lyons v. Lederle Labs ., the repeal of SDCL 21-50-2 merely affected a remedy, the remedy of equitable adjustment, as opposed to substantive law. Therefore, it was proper for the trial court to apply the repeal immediately, prospectively, and even retroactively, as long as it did not affect vested rights or incurred liabilities. Accordingly, the circuit court's Order is affirmed. MILLER, C.J., and WUEST and AMUNDSON, JJ., concur. HENDERSON, J., concurs in result.