Opinion ID: 797308
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Effect of Garcetti

Text: 12 We held in Spiegla I that Spiegla's speech was protected, but because the judgment in this case is not yet final, we are obliged to reevaluate that holding in light of Garcetti. See Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule . . . must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review. . . .). More specifically, we must reexamine whether Spiegla's statements to the assistant superintendent qualify for First Amendment protection under the standard articulated in Garcetti. The inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, not fact. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). 13 Whether public-employee speech is protected is determined by reference to the two-part Connick-Pickering test. Spiegla I, 371 F.3d at 935. First, we inquire whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Id. (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684). If not, the employee has no cause of action for First Amendment retaliation and there is no need to reach the second part of the test, which requires a balancing of the employee's interest as a citizen in commenting on the matter against the public employer's interest as [an] employer[] in promoting effective and efficient public service. Id. at 940 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968)); see Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1960. Prior to Garcetti, we considered the content, form, and context of the employee's speech to determine whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, with content being the most important factor. Spiegla I, 371 F.3d at 935 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684); Gustafson v. Jones, 290 F.3d 895, 907 (7th Cir.2002). 14 After Garcetti, however, the threshold inquiry is whether the employee was speaking as a citizen; only then do we inquire into the content of the speech. Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646, 647-48 (7th Cir.2006). Garcetti made clear that public employees speaking pursuant to their official duties are speaking as employees, not citizens, and thus are not protected by the First Amendment regardless of the content of their speech. See Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1959-60. Consequently, the operative question now is whether Spiegla made her statements to Assistant Superintendent Schrader pursuant to her official duties as a correctional officer. 15 Based on the record as a whole, we conclude that Spiegla was speaking pursuant to her official duties—not as a citizen—when she told Schrader about the conduct of Hull and Huff, and about Moody's action in preventing her from conducting a search. As a correctional officer assigned to the main gate, Spiegla's primary responsibility was to regulate and monitor the vehicle and foot traffic through the gate. This involved searching incoming vehicles and people for contraband, tasks for which she received specialized training. Written prison post orders dictated who and what were subject to search, and Spiegla's employment required her to faithfully follow those orders. As a correctional officer, she also had a more general responsibility to keep the facility secure and report any suspicious behavior by prison inmates, staff, or visitors to her superiors. 16 Spiegla became suspicious when she saw Hull and Huff transfer bags to their state truck from their private cars. As they approached the gate, she got up to discharge her official duty—search the truck (as she did all vehicles) and make sure there was nothing in those bags. When her immediate supervisor, Sergeant Moody, told her not to search the truck, she disagreed based on her understanding that regardless of who you are, you are to be searched. Upset that she could not go out there and do [her] job, Spiegla noted the incident in her log. 17 Later that day while still in uniform and on duty at the main gate, Spiegla saw Assistant Superintendent Schrader and explained to him that Moody stopped her from searching the truck of two higher ups she believed should have been searched. Spiegla recounted the incident to Schrader pursuant to her responsibility as a correctional officer to inform her superiors of a possible breach in prison search policy, especially one involving two senior prison officers. In doing so she spoke as an employee, not a citizen, because ensuring compliance with prison security policy was part of what she was employed to do. See Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1960. 18 We acknowledged in Spiegla I that Spiegla's statements were consistent with her general duty as a correctional officer to keep the facility secure. 371 F.3d at 939. We went on to conclude, however, that because they were not part and parcel of her core function[ ] to implement but not question prison security policies, she acted beyond her employment capacity and spoke as a private citizen on a matter of public concern. Id. This focus on core job functions is too narrow after Garcetti, which asked only whether an employee's expressions [were] made pursuant to official responsibilities. Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1961. Because Spiegla reported the possible security breach to Schrader as part of her official responsibility as a correctional officer to keep the prison secure, her speech was not citizen speech protected by the First Amendment. This holding is consistent with the early post- Garcetti precedent in this and other circuits. Compare Mills, 452 F.3d at 647-48 (police sergeant critical of her boss's personnel decision spoke as employee, not citizen), Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 242 (3d. Cir.2006) (borough manager who relayed worker complaints to borough council spoke as part of his duties as manager, not a citizen), and Freitag v. Ayers, 463 F.3d 838, 855 (9th Cir.2006) (correctional officer did not speak as a citizen when she made internal reports to superiors about inmate sexual misconduct), with Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir.2006) (deputy sheriff spoke as citizen because he made a public statement in his capacity as a union representative), and Freitag, 463 F.3d at 854 (correctional officer spoke as a citizen by sending letters to a state legislator and the state inspector general). 19 That Spiegla's statements highlighted potential misconduct by prison officers does not change the fact that she was speaking pursuant to her official responsibilities, not as a citizen contributi[ng] to the civic discourse. Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1960. The memo at issue in Garcetti also pointed to serious official misconduct— possible misrepresentations made by a deputy sheriff in a warrant affidavit. But the assistant district attorney who wrote it was responsible for supervising warrant applications; because this was one of the tasks he was paid to perform, he acted as a government employee when he wrote the memo and his speech was not protected. Id. 20 Similarly here, Spiegla acted as a government employee when she reported the possible misconduct to her superior and sought clarification of a security policy she felt may have been breached. She did not make a public statement, discuss politics with a coworker, write a letter to newspapers or legislators, or otherwise speak as a citizen. See id. at 1960, 1961 (listing examples of prototypical protected speech by public employees). Because Spiegla did not speak as a citizen under the standard articulated in Garcetti, she has no claim for First Amendment retaliation under § 1983. 21 Accordingly, the judgment entered in Spiegla's favor must be vacated, but not without our observation that the record and the jury's verdict substantiate that Spiegla was punished for simply trying to follow the rules. Garcetti instructed that public employers should, `as a matter of good judgment,' be `receptive to constructive criticism offered by their employees.' Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1962 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 149, 103 S.Ct. 1684). Our holding here, however, is a straightforward application of the principle in Garcetti that there is not a constitutional cause of action behind every statement a public employee makes in the course of doing his or her job. Id. The judgment is VACATED and the case is REMANDED to the district court with instructions to enter judgment for the defendants.