Opinion ID: 4553168
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the juvenile is currently under G.P.S.

Text: surveillance on house arrest; and d. the juvenile’s dispositional hearing will take place on a date yet to be determined. App. 13-14. C.S. appealed that notification order, and, at his request, the Court stayed the notification pending appeal. The Court thereafter sentenced C.S. to time served and juvenile delinquent supervision until his twenty-first birthday. C.S. appealed the final disposition, and we consolidated the appeals. II3 We have two tasks in this case: first, to examine the sufficiency of the evidence and, second, to evaluate whether the District Court had the discretion to lift the confidentiality that shields juvenile proceedings by permitting notification to the victim of the threats. We consider “a sufficiency challenge de novo,” and “review the record ‘in the light most favorable to the 3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 5032. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. When C.S. first appealed the District Court’s notification order, the final judgment had not been entered, making the appeal interlocutory. There is now a final judgment, and because “interlocutory orders . . . merge with the final judgment in a case,” we have jurisdiction to review the notification order. Verma v. 3001 Castor, Inc., 937 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008)). 10 prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt[ ] beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Hendrickson, 949 F.3d 95, 97 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc)). In reviewing a conviction or adjudication for violating § 875, we are mindful that “[w]hether a speaker’s language constitutes a threat is a matter to be decided by the trier of fact,” and the factfinder’s decision is “entitled to great deference by this [C]ourt.” United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 555 (3d Cir. 1991).4 4 Although C.S. suggests that we must decide “[w]hether a statement may qualify as a ‘threat’ as a matter of law” and conduct a plenary review of the record, Appellant’s Br. at 16 n.5 (citing, e.g., United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287, 298 (3d Cir. 2013)), his arguments actually challenge whether the evidence satisfies the legal test for a threat. “[W]hether a communication constitutes a threat or a true threat ‘is a matter to be decided by the trier of fact,’” that warrants deference. Stock, 728 F.3d at 298 (quoting Kosma, 951 F.2d at 555). In a rare case, it may be clear as a matter of law that a certain category of speech falls outside the statute’s definition of “threat.” See id. (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969), where “the Supreme Court held as a matter of law that the defendant’s statement was merely ‘political hyperbole’ that did not fit within the definition of the phrase ‘true threat’”). Because the threats here do not fall into such a category and the parties’ arguments appropriately focused on the evidence and inferences that can be drawn from them, we apply the standard of review for sufficiency challenges and do not engage in plenary consideration of the record. 11 We review the District Court’s notification order for abuse of discretion. United States v. Under Seal, 853 F.3d 706, 725 (4th Cir. 2017) (reviewing order disclosing juvenile records under the JDA for abuse of discretion); In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., LLC, 409 F.3d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 2005) (examining “a district court’s determination under the CVRA . . . for abuse of discretion”); A.D., 28 F.3d at 1361 (holding that disclosure of juvenile records under the JDA is within the district court’s discretion).