Opinion ID: 1394404
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: indemnity agreement and summary judgment

Text: The trial court granted summary judgment to Weyher-Livsey although, as noted by the court of appeals, the basis is not entirely clear. Scudder, 858 P.2d at 1007 n. 2. The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment, holding that the indemnification agreement between Kennecott and Weyher-Livsey expressed a clear and unequivocal intent that Weyher-Livsey was obligated to indemnify Kennecott and Stearns against any and all liabilities. This included liability arising because of Kennecott's or Stearns' negligence unless the liability arises as a result of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of Kennecott or Stearns. The court of appeals also held that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60, did not impose any bar to the operation of the indemnification agreement. [2] Scudder, 858 P.2d at 1009-10. We need not, and do not, here decide whether the summary judgment was granted in error. Any error was harmless in view of the jury finding that Weyher-Livsey was not negligent in causing Scudder's injuries. To require reversal, error must be substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a different result. State v. Kozik, 688 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah 1984) (citing State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1980)). In reviewing the record, we find that the jury was instructed on the duty which Weyher-Livsey owed to Scudder. [3] Stearns does not contend that the instruction was erroneous or inadequate. In addition, Weyher-Livsey was (1) mentioned several times during the presentation of evidence, (2) referred to throughout closing argument, and (3) listed on the special verdict form so that fault, if any, could be apportioned to it. [4] In light of all this, the jury nevertheless did not apportion any fault to Weyher-Livsey. We do not believe that there is a reasonable likelihood that even if Weyher-Livsey had remained in the suit because of any obligation it may have had under the indemnity provision and was present at trial, defending itself, the verdict would have been any different. The court of appeals, however, concluded that it was prejudicial error for Weyher-Livsey to be absent from trial: It is logical that in apportioning liability the jury would seek to impose full liability on parties actually involved in the lawsuit, and not on Weyher-Livsey, a phantom defendant who did not participate in the trial. Moreover, the jury was likely left with the impression that, as a result of Weyher-Livsey's dismissal from the case by the trial judge, it could not be negligent and therefore liable for Scudder's injuries. Had Weyher-Livsey been required to participate in the trial, and to explain its actions and responsibilities, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have found Weyher-Livsey negligent and apportioned at least some liability to Weyher-Livsey. If the jury had found Weyher-Livsey negligent and apportioned any liability to it, the indemnification agreement between Kennecott and Weyher-Livsey would have required Weyher-Livsey to indemnify Kennecott and Stearns in full. Consequently, the absence of Weyher-Livsey at trial as a result of the erroneous grant of summary judgment was sufficiently prejudicial so as to undermine our confidence in the ultimate verdict. Scudder, 858 P.2d at 1011. In essence, the court of appeals reasoned that it was probable that the jury did not apportion any fault to Weyher-Livsey because it did not participate in the trial. Weyher-Livsey asserts that this reasoning contradicts two of our recent decisions, and we agree. In Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1993), we concluded that the purpose and intent of the Utah Liability Reform Act require that a jury account for the relative proportion of fault of a plaintiff's employer that may have caused or contributed to an accident, even though the employer is immune from suit. Therefore, Weyher-Livsey was correctly included on the special verdict form even though it had been previously dismissed from the case through summary judgment. Like the instant case, the employer in Sullivan was immune under the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. Sullivan thoroughly analyzed a situation very similar to the instant case but did not require the immune employer to be present and participate in the trial itself. Having the fault of the immune employer accounted for is sufficient. Id. at 878, 881. Similarly, in Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993), an injured employee sued Salt Lake City and the Salt Lake Airport. The city, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against the employer, who was immune under the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, holding that it had no duty to indemnify the city. Nevertheless, the employer was listed on the special verdict form over the objection of the plaintiff employee that the employer should not have been included in the apportionment of fault. Consistent with Sullivan, we upheld the special verdict: Apportionment of an employer's fault does not subject the employer to civil liability, but ensures that no defendant is held liable to any claimant for an amount of damages in excess of the percentage of fault attributable to that defendant. Id. at 999. Once again, our decision did not require that the immune employer actually participate in the trial. Without some empirical evidence to the contrary, we do not agree with the court of appeals that the jury would have been reluctant to apportion some percentage of fault to Weyher-Livsey if it believed it was partially or wholly at fault. Following the court of appeals' reasoning would require every immune employer whose fault can be apportioned on a special verdict form to additionally be present at and participate in the trial. Such a requirement would be superfluous since the immune employer cannot be held financially accountable for any apportioned fault. It was incumbent upon Stearns to prove that Weyher-Livsey was partially or wholly at fault. [I]t is common practice and generally appropriate for a defendant to assert that a third party is liable. Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1025 n. 7 (Utah 1994). Stearns had every opportunity to introduce evidence and argue that theory. Since Weyher-Livsey was not present, it had no opportunity to rebut any evidence offered against it. We thus conclude that an employer who is immune under the exclusive remedy of the Workers' Compensation Act and who is listed on the verdict form is not required to be present at and participate in the trial.