Opinion ID: 1311766
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable Principles

Text: The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.... The provision creates two very different protections. The establishment clause guarantees the government will not impose religion on us; the free exercise clause guarantees the government will not prevent us from freely pursuing any religion we choose. Because the First Amendment refers only to Congress, it originally did not apply to state and local governments. (See, e.g., Permoli v. New Orleans (1845) 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 610 [11 L.Ed. 739, 748-749] [upholding conviction of Catholic priest for violating ordinance against exposing corpses to public view when he blessed the deceased at a funeral mass].) After the Civil War the states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, and pursuant thereto the Supreme Court made the free exercise and establishment clauses federally enforceable against the states. ( Everson v. Board of Education (1947) 330 U.S. 1, 8 [91 L.Ed.2d 711, 719-720, 67 S.Ct. 504, 168 A.L.R. 1392]; Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1217-1218, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352].) California guarantees free exercise and disestablishment in the state Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 4.) (6) The religion clauses protect only claims rooted in religious belief. ( Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 205, 215 [32 L.Ed.2d 15, 25, 92 S.Ct. 1526].) The free exercise clause protects religious beliefs absolutely. ( Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. at pp. 303-304 [84 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1217-1218].) While a court can inquire into the sincerity of a person's beliefs, it may not judge the truth or falsity of those beliefs. ( United States v. Ballard (1944) 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 [88 L.Ed. 1148, 1153-1155, 64 S.Ct. 882].) The government may neither compel affirmation of a religious belief ( Torcaso v. Watkins (1961) 367 U.S. 488, 495 [6 L.Ed.2d 982, 987, 81 S.Ct. 1680]), nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups because of their religious beliefs ( Fowler v. Rhode Island (1953) 345 U.S. 67, 70 [97 L.Ed. 828, 831, 73 S.Ct. 526]), nor use the taxing power to inhibit the dissemination of particular religious views ( Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943) 319 U.S. 105, 116 [87 L.Ed. 1292, 1300, 63 S.Ct. 870, 146 A.L.R. 81]). (7) However, while religious belief is absolutely protected, religiously motivated conduct is not. ( Sherbert v. Verner (1963) 374 U.S. 398, 402-403 [10 L.Ed.2d 965, 969-970, 83 S.Ct. 1790]; People v. Woody (1964) 61 Cal.2d 716, 718 [40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813].) Such conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. ( Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. at p. 304 [84 L.Ed. at p. 1218].) Government action burdening religious conduct is subject to a balancing test, in which the importance of the state's interest is weighed against the severity of the burden imposed on religion. ( Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 214 [32 L.Ed.2d at p. 24].) The greater the burden imposed on religion, the more compelling must be the government interest at stake. (Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at pp. 221-235 [32 L.Ed.2d at pp. 34-36] [government's strong interest in educating citizens insufficient to justify educational requirement that threatened continued survival of Old Order Amish communities], with Goldman v. Weinberger (1986) 475 U.S. 503, 508 [89 L.Ed.2d 478, 484-485, 106 S.Ct. 1310] [government's reasonable interest in uniform military attire sufficient to justify mild burden on religious expression created by ban against Jewish officer wearing a yarmulke].) A government action that passes the balancing test must also meet the further requirements that (1) no action imposing a lesser burden on religion would satisfy the government's interest and (2) the action does not discriminate between religions, or between religion and nonreligion. ( Braunfield v. Brown (1961) 366 U.S. 599, 607 [6 L.Ed.2d 563, 568-569, 81 S.Ct. 1144].) Applying these criteria, the Supreme Court has allowed some religious conduct to be banned entirely (see, e.g., Reynolds v. United States (1878) 98 U.S. 145, 166 [25 L.Ed. 244, 250] [upholding law against polygamy]; Prince v. Massachusetts (1944) 321 U.S. 158, 170-171 [88 L.Ed. 645, 654-655, 64 S.Ct. 438] [permitting state to prohibit parents from allowing their children to distribute religious literature when necessary to protect children's health and safety]), and some conduct to be compelled in the face of religious objections (see, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905) 197 U.S. 11, 38 [49 L.Ed. 643, 654-655, 25 S.Ct. 358] [upholding compulsory vaccinations for communicable diseases]; United States v. Lee (1982) 455 U.S. 252, 261 [71 L.Ed.2d 127, 134-135, 102 S.Ct. 1051] [upholding mandatory participation of Amish in Social Security system]). Other religious conduct, though not banned, has been restricted. (See, e.g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (1981) 452 U.S. 640, 654 [69 L.Ed.2d 298, 310-311, 101 S.Ct. 2559] [upholding law restricting sale and distribution of literature and soliciting of funds at state fair to booths at specified locations]; Cox v. New Hampshire (1941) 312 U.S. 569, 575 [85 L.Ed. 1049, 1053, 61 S.Ct. 762] [upholding license requirement for religious parades].) Still other religious conduct, though not banned or restricted, has been made more costly. (See, e.g., Braunfield v. Brown, supra, 366 U.S. 599, 605 [6 L.Ed.2d 563, 567-568] [upholding Sunday closing law in spite of financial burden on Orthodox Jew who must refrain from working Saturday as well]; Bob Jones University v. United States (1983) 461 U.S. 574, 604 [76 L.Ed.2d 157, 181, 103 S.Ct. 2017] [upholding denial of tax-exempt status to private school practicing religiously motivated racial discrimination]; Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secty. of Labor (1985) 471 U.S. 290, 305 [85 L.Ed.2d 278, 290-291, 105 S.Ct. 1953] [holding minimum wage laws applicable to religious groups].) (8) While judicial sanctioning of tort recovery constitutes state action sufficient to invoke the same constitutional protections applicable to statutes and other legislative actions ( New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 265 [11 L.Ed.2d 686, 697-698, 84 S.Ct. 710, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412]), religious groups are not immune from all tort liability. It is well settled, for example, that religious groups may be held liable in tort for secular acts. (See, e.g., Malloy v. Fong (1951) 37 Cal.2d 356, 372 [232 P.2d 241] [religious corporation liable for negligent driving by employee].) Most relevant here, in appropriate cases courts will recognize tort liability even for acts that are religiously motivated. (See, e.g., O'Moore v. Driscoll (1933) 135 Cal. App. 770, 778 [28 P.2d 438] [allowing priest's action against his superiors for false imprisonment as part of their effort to obtain his confession of sins]; Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church (1975) 462 Pa. 330 [341 A.2d 105, 107] [allowing action for interference with marriage and business interests when church ordered congregation to shun former member]; Carrieri v. Bush (1966) 69 Wn.2d 536 [419 P.2d 132, 137] [allowing action for alienation of affections when pastor counselled woman to leave husband who was full of the devil]; Candy H. v. Redemption Ranch, Inc. (M.D.Ala. 1983) 563 F. Supp. 505, 516 [allowing action for false imprisonment against religious group]; Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc. (D.Mass. 1982) 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1135 [[c]auses of action based upon some proscribed conduct may, thus, withstand a motion to dismiss even if the alleged wrongdoer acts upon a religious belief or is organized for a religious purpose].)