Opinion ID: 508517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Drug Records Recovered from Vehicle and Apartment.

Text: 26 Defendant Pulido advances three arguments in support of his contention that the district court erred in admitting narcotics records recovered in a search of his car and apartment. First, although he concedes that the government had an absolute right to seize the vehicle pursuant to the forfeiture provisions of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 881(a), and thereafter to conduct an inventory search of the car, Pulido argues that the government exceeded the proper scope of an inventory search when DEA agents opened and perused the contents of two notebooks found in the car. Second, Pulido argues that the government failed to lay a proper foundation for admission into evidence of documents found in his apartment because it failed to attribute the documents to him. Finally, defendant argues that notations concerning narcotics transactions going back to 1983, three years prior to the incident which formed the basis of the indictment, were too remote in time to be relevant to the current offense. 27 Each of Pulido's arguments is without merit. An inventory search pursuant to standardized procedures will be upheld unless there is a showing that the government acted in bad faith or searched the car for the sole purpose of investigation. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372, 107 S.Ct. 738, 742, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3099, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61-62, 87 S.Ct. 788, 791, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). The district court credited the testimony of Agent Anderson who acknowledged that inventory searches are standard procedure after a car is seized pursuant to the forfeiture statute, and that such searches are routinely undertaken [t]o make sure there is no other contraband or weapons or evidence, anything left in the car before it [is] placed into storage. Beyond defendant's bare allegation that the inventory search was a pretext to make an investigatory search, there is no showing that the car was searched for any purpose other than to secure the car and its contents prior to storage. 28 Furthermore, Pulido's contention that agents exceeded the permissible scope of the inventory search when they opened two notebooks, which defendant likens to closed containers, cannot stand in light of Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374, 107 S.Ct. at 743 (no requirement that police weigh privacy interests of defendant before inventory of closed container found in car), and Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2610, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983) (search incident to arrest allows police to search any container or article in arrestee's possession). It was not an abuse of discretion, therefore, for the district court to admit the results of the inventory search of Pulido's car. 29 Nor was it an abuse of discretion to admit the results of the vehicle and apartment searches against defendant Pulido. Under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), evidence of similar acts is admissible for such purposes as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan [or] knowledge. The district court will admit similar act evidence if there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the similar act. Huddleston v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1499, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). The government showed that the notations were found in Pulido's apartment and car. One of the records was written on the back of a deposit slip bearing Pulido's name and signature on the front. Some of the same names appeared on both the narcotics records found in Pulido's car and his apartment. It is obvious that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the drug notations were connected to Pulido. 30 Evidence of similar acts is properly admitted if its probative value is not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, Fed.R.Evid. 403, and the district court bears the responsibility of making this determination. United States v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47, 60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 3214 (1987) & cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 3233, 97 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987). To meet Pulido's defense that he was merely on hand to assist Arango-Correa in receiving a shipment of paper and that he had no knowledge of the true nature of the shipment, the government's offer of proof that Pulido was familiar with narcotics transactions was clearly relevant and probative. See United States v. Martino, 759 F.2d 998, 1005 (2d Cir.1985) (defense of mere presence entitled government to offer proof of knowledge of narcotics transactions with 11-year old conviction for narcotics offense). We note that the district court was careful to give limiting instructions confining the offer of proof to the issue of Pulido's knowledge of narcotics transactions in general, thereby minimizing the danger that the jury would connect those documents to Arango-Correa or to the April 29 shipment of cocaine. Having undertaken a conscientious evaluation of the potential for unfair prejudice, the district court's determination that the evidence was admissible is entitled to deference and will not be disturbed.