Opinion ID: 2487736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The August 7, 2009, Sentencing Order

Text: On August 7, 2009, the trial court entered it order sentencing Armstrong to death. In its extensive sentencing order, the trial court found and afforded great weight to each of the following three aggravating circumstances: (1) the Defendant was convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person (prior violent felony); (2) the capital felony was committed while the Defendant was engaged or was an accomplice in the commission of or an attempt to commit the crime of robbery (robbery); and (3) the victim in this capital felony case was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his duties. [7] The trial court considered and rejected four statutory mitigators: (1) the Defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity, (2) the age of the Defendant (Armstrong was 28 years old) at the time of the crime, (3) the Defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor, and (4) the Defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. However, the trial court did find one statutory mitigator: (1) the existence of any other factors in the defendant's background that would mitigate against the imposition of the death penalty. The trial court considered the following background mitigation under this statutory mitigator: (a) Armstrong was born and raised in an impoverished country (Jamaica) where living conditions were deplorable and there was a constant threat of erupting and escalating violence (little weight); (b) had a problematic health history as a child and suffered from dyslexia (little weight); (c) was a good prisoner and regularly attended religious ceremonies while incarcerated (little weight); (d) suffered abuse at the hands of his stepfather and his brother cut off a portion of his finger when he was working in the cane fields (some weight); and (e) assisted in raising his siblings in Jamaica (some weight). Finally, the trial court found that four of the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were applicable after considering whether Armstrong (1) had problems growing up because he was biracial (little weight); (2) was a member of the police in Jamaica who assisted during times of rioting and political unrest (not applicable); (3) assisted and trained others for jobs and counseled young adults while in Boston and Florida (not applicable); (4) taught himself how to read and write while imprisoned (not applicable); (5) was suffering from a benign internal tumor, at the time of sentencing, the size of a golf ball which could turn into cancer in the future (not mitigating); (6) having been incarcerated for 18 years at that point, was deprived of seeing his children grow as a result of his incarceration (not mitigating); (7) was a kind, gentle man (not mitigating); (8) assisted the police in preventing the sale of drugs while in Massachusetts (nonexistent); (9) was a good businessman (rejected); (10) expressed sorrow for the death of Greeney and the shooting of Sallustio and for their families, but maintained that he did not commit the crimes (no remorse); and (11) properly raised a residual or lingering doubt (not appropriate). The trial court weighed the aggravating factors and the mitigating factors and found that the aggravating circumstances in this case far outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The aggravating circumstances in this case are overwhelming. Armstrong was again sentenced to death for his conviction of first-degree murder. He was also sentence to two consecutive life sentences for the attempted first-degree murder and armed robbery convictions.