Opinion ID: 1388423
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reaching the merits of the vicarious liability issue serves little purpose and will create confusion.

Text: Plaintiff has only one interest in this court: obtaining an affirmance of the monetary judgment in her favor. We can, and should, grant her that relief on the basis of the City's invited error on the jury instruction. Any discussion of whether vicarious liability should arise in future cases serves no purpose for plaintiff. Yet the majority insists on a broad and potentially mischievous holding that local governments may be liable without fault if a police officer commits a crime that is somehow related to the authority wielded by virtue of peace officer status. One must keep in mind the precise disposition of this case. The verdict against the City was returned pursuant to an instruction that the City was vicariously liable for the rape by Officer Schroyer because it was a result of the exercise of his authority, even if it occurred without the City's knowledge, was not related to Officer Schroyer's duties, was not for the City's benefit, was solely for the personal benefit of Officer Schroyer, and violated the City's rules. There is no claim that the City was negligent in hiring Schroyer or had reason to know that he might take advantage of his position of authority to commit rape. The sole basis on which the City's liability is predicated is that he acted within the scope of his employment while committing a rape. Despite the majority's effort to suggest some limitations on its holding, the practical result is clear: no matter how attenuated the relationship between police misconduct and an officer's employment, if he takes advantage of the authority he acquires as an officer in order to commit the crime, he may be found to be acting within the scope of his employment, and the City will be liable for any damages he causes. This is an unprecedented expansion of liability which is unauthorized by the controlling governmental immunity statutes. For the foregoing reasons, I would decide this case in plaintiff's favor solely on the ground of the City's invited error. Because the majority, however, decides the broader scope of employment issue, I address that too.