Opinion ID: 586864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Cross-examination of Tucker.

Text: 14 During the prosecution's cross-examination of Tucker the following colloquy took place between Tucker and the prosecutor, Mr. Lenfant: 15 Q. Where is Ricky Truvia? Is he here today? 16 A. I can't tell you where he is at, now. 17 Mr. O'Hara: I don't think that's relevant. 18 The Court: Overruled. 19 Mr. O'Hara: Note an objection for the record. Examination by Mr. Lenfant: 20 Q. Where is Ricky? 21 A. I can't tell you where he is. 22 Q. You know where he is, don't you? 23 A. I can't tell you where Ricky Truvia is right now. 24 Q. Why don't you give us a general location? 25 A. The court is suppose to be based on facts. I could only conjecture as to his whereabouts. 26 Q. Do you know for a fact that Ricky Truvia was convicted of armed robbery and is in Angola right now? 27 A. No, I don't. 28 Q. You don't know that? A. No. 6 29 Tucker contends that he was prejudiced by this exchange. He argues that the trial court's decision to overrule the relevancy objection deprived him of his right to a fair and impartial trial. He also argues that the prosecutor's statement regarding the conviction and current incarceration of Ricky Truvia was an act of prosecutorial misconduct that rendered the entire trial unfair. Finally, he argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to move for a mistrial when the prosecutor made this statement. 30 In order to grant habeas relief for the petitioner, this Court must find that the prosecutor's questioning or the judge's decision to allow the questions was a crucial, critical, highly significant factor in the jury's determination of guilt. 7 Although the prosecution's questions may have been unnecessary and even improper, we hold that these questions did not seriously prejudice the petitioner. 31 On direct examination Tucker testified, as part of his alibi, that he was driving Truvia's car on the night the robbery occurred. He also testified that Truvia was with him when the police arrested him. Truvia did not testify at trial, nor did Tucker provide any other corroboration for his alibi. The state contends that the questions regarding the present whereabouts of Truvia were intended to test the reliability of the alibi. This line of argument is less than convincing--there was no need to inquire into Truvia's criminal history in order to demonstrate that the alibi lacked corroboration. 32 Tucker argues that these questions by the prosecution implied that he was guilty by association. He also argues that the jury was misled into believing that Truvia had been convicted for the same robbery. We disagree with Tucker's contentions; we agree with the district court's conclusion that [p]etitioner was convicted because of the overwhelming evidence and not because of the prosecutor's limited reference to Truvia's armed robbery conviction. 33 First, the prosecution made no insinuations implying that Truvia was an accomplice to this robbery. There was no reason for the jury to infer that Truvia had been convicted for participating in this robbery. Second, there was ample evidence--including eyewitness testimony--linking Tucker to the robbery. As the district court noted: The prosecutor's questions were isolated, limited, and insignificant in the overall case ... [s]uch questioning did not constitute a critical or crucial error in the context of the entire trial. Thus, these comments did not result in a fundamentally unfair trial or a denial of due process. 34 The petitioner also alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that his attorney failed to move for a mistrial after these questions occurred. To succeed on this argument, petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 8 Failure to prove either of these elements is fatal to the entire claim. The ineffective assistance contention fails because the prosecutor's questions did not prejudice his trial. 35