Opinion ID: 2994090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Calculation of Drug Amounts for

Text: Sentencing Finally, Johnson attacks the district court’s decision that, for purposes of determining his relevant conduct for sentencing, Johnson should be held responsible for between 15 and 50 kilograms of cocaine. This resulted in a base offense level of 34. See U.S.S.G. sec. 2D1.1(c)(3). Johnson complains that the district court adopted the Probation Department’s calculation of the drug quantity, which Johnson asserts was just a wholesale adoption of the government’s position on the matter./5 Thus, he seems to question the integrity of the calculations. We review the district court’s calculations of drug quantities for clear error. United States v. Span, 170 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir. 1999). We must affirm unless we are left with the firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. The defendant has the right to be sentenced on the basis of a reasonable quantity of reliable information. United States v. James, 113 F.3d 721, 730 (7th Cir. 1997). The government has the burden of establishing the type and amount of drugs attributable to the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Thus, clear error can occur with respect to drug calculations when the government fails to marshal evidence of a sufficient magnitude or where the calculations are based on unreliable evidence. Span, 170 F.3d at 803. In calculating the drug quantities, a district court may consider a wide range of information so long as it has a ’sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.’ United States v. Robinson, 164 F.3d 1068, 1070 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 72 F.3d 533, 543 (7th Cir. 1995)). In assessing the reliability of the evidence we will leave credibility determinations to the sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Miner, 127 F.3d 610, 615 (7th Cir. 1997). Here, the district judge stated his reasons for calculating the drug quantity as he did, and the evidence he relied upon in making the calculation. Well, I have listened carefully to your arguments and have had a chance to look at some of the transcript which is available. Among the things that I note from my review of the record set forth in the transcript and my notes as well as my recollection of the witnesses as they testified is that there were some places where there were inconsistencies in the testimony of Mr. Blake and Mr. Hagenkord and Mr. Babasa. But notwithstanding that Blake and Hagenkord in my view were truthful, truthful in the relevant aspects insofar as drug quantities are concerned. I note that their testimony was corroborated in large measure by the tape, the conversations of Mr. Johnson. This conspiracy lasted at least 21 months. And as Mr. Kanter has pointed out, if at least one kilogram was delivered each month then Mr. Johnson was responsible for at least 21 kilos and the quantity of drugs for which he can be held responsible is clearly within the 15 and 50 kilograms which would obviously affect the implications of the guidelines. [Sent. Tr. Vol. 16 p.14-15] It is clear from this excerpt that the district judge based his calculations on the evidence in the record, and that he did not simply restate the government’s calculations set forth in the pre-sentence report without first scrutinizing them. Rather, he determined that the government’s calculations were correct, and in fact were quite conservative. (Recall Blake’s testimony that he supplied Johnson with between 35 and 45 kilograms of cocaine.) Johnson correctly notes that there could be some problem if the district judge unwittingly relied on the recommended calculations of the pre-sentence report thinking that they were non-partisan conclusions, or if he failed to scrutinize them in any way. But district judges have the ability to read a pre- sentence report without being improperly influenced. United States v. Sifuentez, 30 F.3d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original). In this case, not only was the district judge made aware of the government’s authorship of the calculations, he based his adoption of these figures on an independent review of the record. Importantly, the Probation Department’s substantial reliance on the government’s position does not mean that the information on which it relied or the calculations that it performed were inaccurate; it simply means that the Probation Department also believed that there was a sufficient basis for these calculations. Notably, Johnson fails to show that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court’s calculations, or that the evidence on which the calculations were based is unworthy of credence; rather, his sole complaint is with the PSR’s conformity with the government’s view. Because Johnson fails to show that the district court’s determinations were incorrect or that they were based on unreliable evidence, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Johnson should be held responsible for between 15 and 50 kilograms of cocaine. For all of these reasons, we affirm. /1 Both Hagenkord and Shultz pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. sec.sec. 841(a)(1) & 846. /2 Although at first glance this statement may not appear to be hearsay, the parties agree that Hagenkord was paraphrasing Blake, and that the statement was indeed hearsay. /3 However, in at least one federal circuit, deliberate misrepresentations to the district court that no Jencks material exists precludes harmless error analysis. United States v. DeFranco, 30 F.3d 664, 667 (6th Cir. 1994). /4 The present case is much like the one we faced in United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 1981). There, we held that the defendants forfeited their argument that the prosecutor failed to provide Brady material where the prosecutor denied having such material and the defendant failed to explore the issue by cross- examining government agents or seeking a hearing. /5 The record supports Johnson’s contention that the Probation Department relied on the government’s calculations of drug quantities, as Kanter specifically stated so during the sentencing hearing. Johnson argued before the district court (but not to this court) that the only reliable evidence showed that he was responsible for 4.5 kilograms of cocaine, thereby giving him a base offense level of 30.