Opinion ID: 177263
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sister Circuits

Text: Subsequent to Wallace, four other circuits have considered the constitutionality of moment of silence laws. First, the Third Circuit in May, 780 F.2d 240, held that New Jersey's moment of silence law violated the Establishment Clause. May involved a situation, like Wallace, in which there was no secular purpose justifying the moment of silence law. Specifically, in May the Third Circuit held that the district court's conclusion that the legislature lacked any secular purpose for adopting the moment of silence was not clearly erroneous. Id. at 252-53. The May court, though, expressly recognized that a moment of silence law enacted with a secular purpose would be constitutional. Id. at 251-52. The Eleventh Circuit next considered the constitutionality of a moment of silence law in Bown, 112 F.3d 1464. At issue in Bown was Georgia's moment of silence law which required every teacher to open the school day with a brief period of quiet reflection for not more than 60 seconds. Id. at 1466 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1050(a)). The statute further stated that the moment of quiet reflection is not intended to be and shall not be conducted as a religious service or exercise but shall be considered as an opportunity for a moment of silent reflection on the anticipated activities of the day. Bown, 112 F.3d at 1466 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1050(b)). Prior to amendment, Georgia's moment of silence law provided for a discretionary moment of silence for silent prayer or meditation. Id. at 1470 n. 3. The Eleventh Circuit applied the Lemon test and first considered whether the law served a valid secular purpose. The court concluded that both the preamble and the statutory language provided a secular purpose and added that [b]y stating that the moment of quiet reflection shall not be conducted as a religious service or exercise, the statute indicates that Georgia is not advocating the moment of quiet reflection as a time for religious activity. Id. at 1469-70. The court also reviewed the legislative history in detail and noted that some Georgia legislators had expressed religious motives for voting for the Act. Id. at 1472. The Eleventh Circuit, however, concluded that [t]he Act's legislative history, although somewhat conflicting, is not inconsistent with the express statutory language articulating a clear secular purpose and disclaiming a religious purpose.... We are thus faced with legislative history that is much different from that in [ Wallace ]. Id. at 1471. The Fourth Circuit was the next circuit to consider the constitutionality of a moment of silence law. In Brown, 258 F.3d 265, the court upheld Virginia's moment of silence law, which required schools to observe a moment of silence during which students could meditate, pray, or engage in any other silent activity.... Id. at 270 (citing Va.Code Ann. § 22.1-203). The Fourth Circuit concluded that the statute's text supported two secular purposes: to promote non-religious meditation and to accommodate religion. Id. at 276. The Brown court concluded that a statute having dual legitimate purposesone clearly secular and one the accommodation of religioncannot run afoul of the first Lemon prong. Id. at 277. Finally, in Croft, 562 F.3d 735, the Fifth Circuit upheld Texas's 2003 moment of silence law that required school districts to observe one minute of silence during which each student may, as the student chooses, reflect, pray, meditate, or engage in any other silent activity that is not likely to interfere with or distract another student. Id. at 738 (quoting Tex. Educ.Code § 25.082). The 2003 moment of silence law challenged in Croft had amended Texas's 1995 moment of silence law. Among other things, the amendment made the moment of silence mandatory and added the word pray to the list of options, as well as adding the catch-all or engage in any other silent activity that is not likely to interfere with or distract another student. Id. at 738-39. In addition to the moment of silence law, Texas also had another statutory provision addressing the broader First Amendment rights of students, similar to Illinois's Section 5. Croft, 562 F.3d at 738 (quoting Tex. Educ.Code § 25.901). The Fifth Circuit held that Texas's moment of silence law had a valid secular purpose based on both the statutory language and the legislative history. Croft, 562 F.3d at 746-49. After reviewing the legislative history in detail, the court concluded that on the whole, the legislative history suggested there were several reasons for amending Texas's moment of silence law, including the return to prayer but also purely secular ones such as a reflective moment.... Id. The Croft court added that [e]ven if some legislators had religious motives in promoting this legislation, there are clear secular legislative purposes present. Id. The court then stressed that the Supreme Court in Wallace noted that even though a statute is `motivated in part by a religious purpose' it may still satisfy the Lemon test. Id. (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56, 105 S.Ct. 2479). Thus, the court upheld Texas's moment of silence law and distinguished it from Wallace and May, where there were no secular purposes at all. Croft, 562 F.3d at 748-49. This case is more in line with Croft, Brown, and Bown than May. In Croft, Brown, and Bown the text of the moment of silence laws at issue demonstrated a clear secular purpose, and the legislative history supported the asserted secular purpose. Moreover, Section 1, like the statute at issue in Bown, clearly stated that the period of silence shall not be used as a religious exercise. Bown, 112 F.3d at 1466 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1050(b)). Where a legislature expresses a plausible secular purpose for a moment of silence statute in either the text or the legislative history, or [where] the statute disclaims an intent to encourage prayer over alternatives during a moment of silence, ... courts should generally defer to that stated intent. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 74-75, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In fact, in many ways, this case presents an even more compelling case than Croft, Brown, and Bown. In those cases, there was evidence that the goal of at least some legislators was the return of prayer to school. Croft, 562 F.3d at 738-39 (acknowledging that there were references by some legislators to returning prayer to schools); Brown, 258 F.3d at 271 (noting that the Senate sponsor when asked by a newspaper reporter about his intent in sponsoring the bill ... responded that his intent was not to force prayer in schools, but he added, `[t]his country was based on belief in God, and maybe we need to look at that again'); Bown, 112 F.3d at 1471 (noting that some legislators indicated a desire to reinstitute school prayer). There is no similar legislative history to either the original passage of Section 1 or its recent amendment; rather, the legislative history to Section 1 indicates a solely secular purpose. Moreover, Illinois's amendment to Section 1 did not add pray to the list of permissible options, as the legislature in Croft had done; rather, prayer has been included in Section 1 since its original passage in 1969. And unlike this case, the statutes at issue in both Croft and Brown did not specify that the moment of silence shall not be conducted as a religious exercise. Croft, 562 F.3d at 738; Brown, 258 F.3d at 271 n. 1. Because Section 1 does contain this prohibition, the constitutionality of the Illinois statute is even more compelling.