Opinion ID: 2510363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: parameters of the standard

Text: ¶ 23 In adopting the substantial certainty standard, this Court is mindful that [i]n applying the substantial certainty test, some courts have confused intentional, reckless, and even negligent misconduct, and therefore blurred the line between intentional and accidental injuries. Beauchamp, 398 N.W.2d at 893. In a determined effort to prevent such confusion, the standard must be clearly articulated and its parameters defined. ¶ 24 In order for an employer's conduct to amount to an intentional tort, the employer must have (1) desired to bring about the worker's injury or (2) acted with the knowledge that such injury was substantially certain to result from the employer's conduct. Under the second part of this standard, the employer must have intended the act that caused the injury with knowledge that the injury was substantially certain to follow. The issue is not merely whether injury was substantially certain to occur, but whether the employer knew it was substantially certain to occur. The employer's subjective appreciation of the substantial certainty of injury must be demonstrated. In most cases, however, it will be necessary to demonstrate the employer's subjective realization by circumstantial evidence. Thus, an employer's knowledge may be inferred from the employer's conduct and all the surrounding circumstances. ¶ 25 To satisfy the substantial certainty standard, more than knowledge and appreciation of the risk is necessary. Id. As Professor Prosser explains: [T]he mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk, short of substantial certainty, is not the equivalent of intent. The defendant who acts in the belief or consciousness that he is causing an appreciable risk of harm to another may be negligent, and if the risk is great his conduct may be characterized as reckless or wanton, but it is not classified as an intentional wrong. Prosser, § 8 at 32. Thus, the employer must have acted, or have failed to act, with the knowledge that injury was substantially certain, not merely likely, to occur. The employer must have knowledge of more than foreseeable risk, more than high probability, and more than substantial likelihood. Nothing short of the employer's knowledge of the substantial certainty of injury will remove the injured worker's claim from the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, thus allowing the worker to proceed in district court. ¶ 26 Mere allegations of intentional conduct will not circumvent the Workers' Compensation Act. The worker must allege facts which plausibly demonstrate that the employer's conduct was intentional under the substantial certainty standard. Harn, 506 N.W.2d at 95. In terms of intentional tort then, the use of the word `intent' in allegations `is not a talisman that can change the allegations into colorable claims. . . .' Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 491 A.2d 368, 375 (1985)(quoting Keating v. Shell Chem. Co., 610 F.2d 328, 332 (5th Cir.1980)). ¶ 27 This pronouncement is not intended to expand the narrow intentional tort exception to workers' compensation exclusivity. [3] Rather, it constitutes this Court's refusal to apply a stricter standard of intent to a worker's tort claim against the employer than the Restatement standard of intent which would be applied to any other intentional tort. By adopting the substantial certainty standard in workers' compensation, this Court furthers the workers' compensation objective of workplace safety while balancing the interests of employer and employee. At the same time, it furthers the general tort principle that injuries are to be compensated and anti-social behavior is to be discouraged. See Prosser, § 1 at 3.