Opinion ID: 2633336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the district court's findings establish the existence of a prescriptive easement

Text: Derifield maintains that the district court erred in its determination that the Benningers have an express easement across the Derifield property. The district court's decision is based upon language in deeds and sales agreements relating to the properties in issue. The legal effect of an unambiguous written document must be decided by the trial court as a question of law. If, however, the instrument of conveyance is ambiguous, interpretation of the instrument is a matter of fact for the trier of fact. Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 673 P.2d 1048 (1983). In interpreting and construing deeds of conveyance, the primary goal is to seek and give effect to the real intention of the parties. Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 65 P.3d 525 (2003); C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 25 P.3d 76 (2001). If the language of a deed is plain and unambiguous, the intention of the parties must be ascertained from the deed itself and extrinsic evidence is not admissible. Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 11 P.3d 20 (2000). Uncertainties should be treated as ambiguities; such ambiguities are subject to be cleared up by resort to the intention of the parties as gathered from the deed, from the circumstances attending and leading up to its execution, from the subject matter, and from the situation of the parties at the time. City of Kellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests, 135 Idaho 239, 16 P.3d 915 (2000). As it concerns the creation of an easement, the Idaho Court of Appeals has suggested that: [A]n easement may be created by way of exception or by reservation.... No particular forms or words of art are necessary; it is necessary only that the parties make clear their intention to establish a servitude. Regardless of the terms used, courts generally will attempt to ascertain the intention of the parties by referring not only to the language of the deed, but also to the circumstances attending the transaction and the condition of the property. Seccombe v. Weeks, 115 Idaho 433, 436, 767 P.2d 276, 279 (Ct.App.1989), disapproved of on other grounds, Rodriguez v. Oakley Valley Stone, Inc., 120 Idaho 370, 378, 816 P.2d 326, 334 (1991). The district court observed that the sales agreements were not models of clarity. It then found that the driveway was clearly visible on the premises, that the driveway access had been present and in use, and that the driveway provided access to the respective property owners over the years. The district court analyzed the following documents: For Lot 3: In the Lucas-Benninger Sale Agreement dated December 15, 1967: IT IS AGREED AND UNDERSTOOD the above described property is subject to easement for roads (driveway), pump and water system as they now exist in favor of Lots 3, 4, 5, and 6 of said Garfield Bay Addition No.2. In the Lucas-Benninger Warranty Deed dated December 14, 1967, and recorded April 6, 1974: SUBJECT TO: . . . Easement for roads (driveways), pump and water system as they now exist in favor of Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 of said Garfield Bay Addition No.2. For Lot 4: In the Lucas-Wigley Sale Agreement dated January 23, 1968: IT IS UNDERSTOOD the above described property is subject to easement for roads (driveway), pump and water system as they now exist in favor of Lots 3, 4, 5, and 6 of said Garfield Bay Addition No.2. For Lot 5: In the Van Slyke-Van Doren Warranty Deed dated August 29, 1985: ... free from all encumbrances except ... any private rights of way, easements, or prescriptive rights ... For Lots 4 and 5: In the Van Doren-Derifield Warranty Deed dated May 31, 2000: SUBJECT TO: ... Easements, restrictions, reservations, provisions of record, and Assessments for the Garfield Water and Sewer District, if any. . . . Said premises are free from all encumbrances except current years taxes, levies, and assessment, and except U.S. Patent reservations, restrictions, easements of record, and easements visible upon the premises.... As it concerns Lots 3 and 4, the evidence establishes that Lucas owned Lot 4 when the Lucas-Benninger sale of Lot 3 occurred, and therefore Lucas had the legal right to grant a driveway easement over Lot 4. Also, when the Lucas-Wigley sale occurred, there was no reservation of an interest in land to a stranger (the Benningers), only the confirmation of an interest in the right of way that had been previously created by the Lucas-Benninger transfer. As it concerns Lot 5, the district court noted that although the language regarding the easement was exactly the same as that in the conveyance documents for Lots 3 and 4, the Benningers were strangers to the transaction and the evidence does not show that Lucas was entitled to convey an interest in Lot 5 when either the Lucas-Benninger or the Lucas-Wigley transactions occurred. This finding supports Derifield's contention that the instruments for Lot 5 are void for all purposes as they contain reservations to strangers. See Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 76 P.3d 969 (2003). However, the district court found Derifield's factual position to outweigh his legal argument and lend more support to the Benningers' claim that an express driveway easement existed. This is because, in his own testimony, Derifield actually drew out, on the property map of Exhibit 3 where the original driveway wasstarting from the county road below (West Garfield) and continuing on to his property, near his well head. Derifield's testimony was further supported by photographs, and Derifield's own acknowledgement of the driveway through his construction improvements to it. Clearly, the evidence before the trial court established a visible driveway. The district court decision calls into question the adequacy of the documentation to establish an express easement and the so-called stranger rule which provides that reservations to strangers are ineffective. See Hodgins; Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204, 360 P.2d 403 (1961). The record is insufficient to establish an express easement. However, under the factual findings of the district court that are not in question it is unnecessary to determine those questions. The district court's factual findings establish the existence of an easement by prescription. The Benningers purchased Lot 3 in 1967. The driveway was in use prior to that time. The driveway was clearly in use prior to the time Derifield purchased his property. The Benningers have used the driveway for ingress and egress to their home. It has provided access for visitors and as access in case of emergency caused by fire or health problems. According to the district court, The Benningers did not seek or obtain any other party's permission to use the driveway. The driveway was clearly visible to Derifield who acquired his property subject to easements of record, and easements visible on the premises.... The decision of the district court does not address the presumption that when the alleged easement is over wild and unenclosed lands the use of such lands is permissive. However, the record in this case is clear that this property is not wild and unenclosed lands in the manner intended to be protected by the presumption. The property in question has been part of Garfield Bay Addition No. 2 since some time before 1967 when the Benningers purchased Lot 3. It is subdivision property. The presumption of permissive use does not apply. The finding of the district court that the Benningers have used the driveway without seeking or obtaining anyone's permission is supported by substantial, competent evidence. The findings of the district court establish the elements of a prescriptive easement. The only issue that remains in that regard is the scope of that easement which may or may not be the same as that determined by the district court for an express easement. A remand is necessary to define the scope of the easement.