Opinion ID: 1732360
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: defendants' theory

Text: Defendants base their argument for comparative fault on the theory that when the State of Michigan adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence, the state, of necessity, adopted the corollary, comparative fault. Furthermore, the defendants argue that comparative fault must apply to all tortfeasors, including settling tortfeasors, which means that plaintiff's total damage recovery must be reduced by the settler's proportionate share of fault rather than the value of the settlement. In passing, it should be noted that the adoption of comparative negligence in Michigan, judicially by Placek in 1979 and legislatively for products liability in 1978, was subsequent to the commencement of this matter on January 18, 1978. The importance of this is that the parties recognize that the current state of the law, rather than the state of the law existing at the time of the accident, controls the conduct of this case. There is no question but that defendants' argument is not without logic. However, it confronts two stubborn legislative facts. First, as to comparative fault, MCL 600.2925b; MSA 27A.2925(2), at the time of the accident and also commencement of the action, provided in pertinent part: (a) Their relative degrees of fault shall not be considered. (Emphasis supplied.) [4] In other words, the Legislature specifically proscribed comparative fault. Second, MCL 600.2925d; MSA 27A.2925(4), in pertinent part, at that time provided and now provides: When a release    is given in good faith    [i]t reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release    or to the extent of the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever amount is the greater. In other words, the Legislature provided and now provides that the total share of damage liability of non-settling tortfeasors should be the entire amount of damages minus the value of the settlement rather than minus the proportionate share of fault of the settling tortfeasor. Confronted with these facts, defendant road commission argued: The imposition of this [release] statute, which predates comparative negligence, upon a comparative negligence system is ill-conceived and illogical. In no fashion can MCL 600.2925d; MSA 27A.2925(4) be treated as a `legislated answer'    to the question posed to this Court. An answer cannot logically predate the question. Both defendants relied on Conkright v Ballantyne of Omaha, Inc, 496 F Supp 147, 152 (WD Mich, 1980), which, in the absence of Michigan judicial precedent and alleged absence of legislative guidelines, attempted to predict the way Michigan law was most likely to evolve as follows: I believe that Michigan will adopt an approach under which the comparative fault of a defendant dismissed pursuant to a settlement is determined by the finder of fact, and this proportion of fault is employed to reduce plaintiffs' recovery against nonsettling defendants. The circuit court's disposition of the motion in this case, delivered orally, specifically recognized and quoted the statute prohibiting consideration of degrees of fault, MCL 600.2925b; MSA 27A.2925(2), but did not refer to, or consider, the contribution-release statute, MCL 600.2925d; MSA 27A.2925(4). That court preferred to rely on Jorae v Clinton Crop Service, 465 F Supp 952 (ED Mich, 1979), and on Greenwood v McDonough Power Equipment, Inc, 437 F Supp 707 (D Kan, 1977), [5] and reached the conclusion that the joint liability of non-settling tortfeasors would be the amount of the verdict reduced by an amount proportionate to a settling tortfeasor's percent of fault. [6]