Opinion ID: 1971691
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Rest of UIFSA

Text: Section 401 of UIFSA, codified at D.C.Code § 46-304.01 (2001) (Petition to establish support order), appears to be directly relevant, and it provides, in pertinent part, that (a) If a support order entitled to recognition under this chapter has not been issued, a responding tribunal of the District may issue a support order if: (1) The individual seeking the order resides in another state; or (2) The support enforcement agency seeking the order is located in another state. . . . Id. The related commentary explains: This section authorizes a tribunal of the responding state to issue temporary and permanent support orders binding on an obligor over whom the tribunal has personal jurisdiction. UIFSA does not permit such orders to be issued when another support order exists, thereby prohibiting a second tribunal from establishing another support order and the accompanying continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. See Section 205 (Continuing, Exclusive Jurisdiction) and Section 206 (Enforcement and Modification of Support Order by Tribunal Having Continuing Jurisdiction).[ [8] ] UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 401 cmt. (1996), 9 U.L.A. 398 (2005). Because Ms. Connole resides in another state, and because no support order has yet been issued, it would not contravene UIFSA § 401 if the Superior Court issued an order in this case. Additional limits on the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction are found in section 204 of UIFSA, codified at D.C.Code § 46-302.04 (2001), and entitled Simultaneous proceedings in another state. [9] Section 204 restricts the authority of the Superior Court to establish a support order, but only in circumstances not present here. See, e.g., D.C.Code § 46-302.04(a) (describing limited circumstances in which [a] tribunal of the District may exercise jurisdiction to establish a support order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed after a petition or comparable pleading is filed in another state. . . . (emphasis added)); D.C.Code § 46-302.04(b) (describing circumstances in which [a] tribunal of the District may not exercise jurisdiction to establish a support order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed before a petition or comparable pleading is filed in another state. . . . (emphasis added)). Of course, there was no proceeding in another state when Ms. Connole filed her motion in the Superior Court. Although she later filed a protective suit for child support in Maryland, none of the provisions in UIFSA § 204 would preclude the Superior Court from issuing a child support order in the circumstances presented here. [10] Nevertheless, Mr. DeGroot insists that the Superior Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to issue the support order sought by his ex-wife. He points to D.C.Code § 46-302.05 (2001) [11] and especially the corresponding comment in the Uniform Act, which explains that if all the relevant persons  the obligor, the individual obligee, and the child  have permanently left the issuing state, the issuing state no longer has an appropriate nexus with the parties or child to justify exercise of jurisdiction to modify.  UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 205 cmt. (1996), 9 U.L.A. 340 (2005) (emphasis added). [12] As its language makes obvious, the comment on which Mr. DeGroot relies discusses jurisdiction to modify a child support order. This key restriction implements the one-order system contemplated by UIFSA. See In re Marriage of Hillstrom, 126 P.3d 315, 318 (Colo.Ct.App. 2005) (UIFSA allows for only one enforceable order in a case at any time. This is accomplished by limiting jurisdiction to modify the original order.); Bordelon v. Dehnert, 770 So.2d 433, 436 (La. Ct.App.2000) (UIFSA attempts to limit modification jurisdiction to just one state at a time, once there is an existing child support award issued.). See also McLean v. Kohnle, 940 So.2d 975 (Miss.Ct. App.2006) (once Virginia court modified Mississippi divorce decree and support order, the Virginia order became the controlling order; Mississippi court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify its prior judgment). [13] The commentary suggests that the court automatically loses its continuing exclusive jurisdiction when all of the relevant parties have left the jurisdiction. However, the statute itself indicates that the issuing state loses its power to modify only when a court of another jurisdiction has modified the order: A tribunal of the District issuing a child support order consistent with the law of the District may not exercise its continuing jurisdiction to modify the order if the order has been modified by a tribunal of another state pursuant to a law substantially similar to this chapter. D.C.Code § 46-302.05(b) (emphasis added.). We need not resolve the ambiguity because the drafters of the Uniform Act intended section 205(a) to apply only to the court's jurisdiction to modify its support orders[,] Zaabel v. Konetski, 209 Ill.2d 127, 282 Ill.Dec. 748, 807 N.E.2d 372, 376 (2004), and the power to modify a child support order is not at issue here. [14] As many cases illustrate, subject matter jurisdiction is not a monolithic concept under UIFSA. See Jurado v. Brashear, 782 So.2d 575, 579 (La.2001) ([I]f the issuing state loses continuing, exclusive jurisdiction (such as when the obligor, the obligee and the child all relocate to another state), and no party takes actions to establish jurisdiction in another state (which would be the responding state if such action had been taken), two separate questions arise: (1) whether the court of the issuing state may enforce the order that it issued and (2) whether that court may modify the order. (emphasis in original)). Curiously enough, a court may lack jurisdiction to modify an order it issued, but still retain jurisdiction to enforce it. See, e.g., Linn v. Delaware Child Support Enforcement, 736 A.2d 954, 956 (Del.1999) (holding that a Minnesota Court did not lose jurisdiction in 1995 to enforce its 1983 Child Support Order, despite that all the parties and the children had left Minnesota by that time, because no other court had assumed jurisdiction over the matter.); Zaabel, 282 Ill.Dec. 748, 807 N.E.2d at 377 (We hold that section 205(a) of the Act does not apply to the circuit court's jurisdiction to enforce its support order.); Lunceford v. Lunceford, 204 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Mo.Ct.App.2006) (Although an issuing state may lose subject matter jurisdiction to modify a child support order, that state may still enforce the child support order then in effect until the order is properly modified by another state pursuant to UIFSA.); Nordstrom v. Nordstrom, 50 Va.App. 257, 649 S.E.2d 200, 204 (2007) (the trial court retained continuing jurisdiction to enforce, as opposed to modify, the order. . . . (emphasis in original)); Commonwealth, Dept. of Social Services ex rel. Kenitzer v. Richter, 23 Va. App. 186, 475 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1996) (We hold that Virginia continues to have the right to enforce its own decrees even if all parties are no longer residents.); cf. Desai v. Fore, 711 A.2d 822 (D.C.1998) (case not governed by UIFSA; Superior Court had jurisdiction to enforce its child support order although parents and children no longer lived in the District of Columbia). The parties have not cited, and we have not found, a case precisely like this one, but we apply the principles discussed above, refining our inquiry to ask: subject matter jurisdiction to do what? As we have seen, Section 205 and its commentary do not restrict the Superior Court's jurisdiction to issue or establish a support order in the circumstances presented here, and we have found no other provision of UIFSA that does so. Mr. DeGroot thus has not demonstrated that it would contravene UIFSA if the Superior Court retained jurisdiction of this case for the purpose of issuing or establishing a support order, as otherwise authorized by our case law and by D.C.Code § 16-914.01. We therefore hold that the Family Division of the Superior Court has jurisdiction to consider Ms. Connole's motion, irrespective of the fact that the parties no longer reside in the District. [15]