Opinion ID: 1776416
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the trial court commit reversible error in admitting purported confessions of the defendant?

Text: In determining whether a confession was freely and voluntarily given, the circuit court sits as a fact finder. McCarty v. State, 554 So.2d 909, 911 (Miss. 1989). This Court will not reverse a lower court on a finding of fact unless it was manifestly wrong. Smith v. Estate of Harrison, 498 So.2d 1231, 1233 (Miss. 1986). Flowers argues that his confessions, admitted through Sheriff Bryan and through Charles Smith, should not have been allowed into evidence because they were not given voluntarily without threat or fear. The statement made by Flowers to Sheriff Bryan, although ruled admissible at the pre-trial suppression hearing, was not offered into evidence at trial. Furthermore, no witness testified as to the contents of this statement. Therefore, this statement was not before the jury in any form and had no influence on its decision to convict. However, the statement made to Charles Smith, the polygraph examiner, was admitted first through Smith's testimony and later through the testimony of David Walker, Flowers' former attorney. There is little disputed about the content of the confession given by Flowers in the presence of Charles Smith and David Walker. Both testified to the same content (that Flowers denied sexual intercourse but admitted kissing C.L., fondling her breasts, putting his finger in her vagina, and giving her five dollars ($5.00) not to tell anyone), although Smith claimed that this conversation transpired prior to the actual polygraph test in the presence of only himself and Flowers while Walker recalled that the conversation took place afterward and in the presence of himself and two others. Either way, no promises of leniency were made to Flowers. The only threat claimed by Flowers was that Smith made a statement to Flowers that he needed to tell the truth or come clean. There was no evidence that Flowers was under any mental or emotional disability, was on drugs or alcohol, and there was evidence of his ability to read and write. Whether the statement was made as part of the polygraph pre-test or following the polygraph exam, Flowers had been read his Miranda rights and signed a waiver and release before the statement was made. It appears that Flowers was adequately warned and under the totality of the circumstances made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights. McCarty, 554 So.2d at 911; Davis v. State, 551 So.2d 165, 169 (Miss. 1989), certiorari denied 494 U.S. 1074, 110 S.Ct. 1796, 108 L.Ed.2d 797 (1990), rehearing denied 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2221, 109 L.Ed.2d 546 (1990). The statement was not made under the influence of promises or threats but was a product of Flowers' free and rational will. Chisolm v. State, 529 So.2d 630, 634 (Miss. 1988); U.S. v. Rogers, 906 F.2d 189, 190 (5th Cir.1990). The State carried its burden of proof and the trial court properly found that the statement was freely and voluntarily given. McCarty, 554 So.2d at 911; Davis, 551 So.2d at 169. As there is no manifest error in this determination, we affirm on this issue.