Opinion ID: 223136
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Events at Trial

Text: At trial, during direct examination, Wiley's counsel asked Kirtsaeng, Now sir, if we were to go back and look at January 1st of 2008, what were your financial assets at that point in time? The District Court sustained an objection by Kirtsaeng's counsel and a sidebar discussion followed. After the sidebar conference and a recess, the first question by Wiley's counsel to Kirtsaeng was: Mr. Kirtsaeng, before the break we were talking about your net worth during the period of 1999, correct? Excuse me. 2009. Kirtsaeng answered yes. Wiley's counsel proceeded to ask Kirtsaeng a series of questions about his net worth in an attempt to impeach his previous statements. Specifically, he attempted to enter into evidence a record of Kirtsaeng's PayPal revenues, showing $1.2 million in revenues, in contrast to Kirtsaeng's previous testimony that he had earned only $900,000 in revenues. Joint App'x at 295-97. At a second sidebar conference, during which the jury was excused from the courtroom, the District Court excluded the record of the PayPal evidence as confusing and unfairly prejudicial. Id. at 298. When the jury reentered the courtroom, Wiley's counsel continued to ask Kirtsaeng about his revenues from eBay sales. Although Kirtsaeng's counsel immediately objected to the line of questioning on the basis that it had already been asked and answered  an objection the District Court initially sustained  the Court subsequently allowed the questioning, explaining that it was uncertain whether the same questions had in fact been asked of the witness earlier in the examination. At the end of the trial, the District Court charged the jury to determine whether Kirtsaeng had infringed the copyrights of each of eight works and whether any such infringements had been willful. The District Court explained that, under the statutory damages scheme found at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c), see note 10, ante, if the jury found that Kirtsaeng had infringed Wiley's copyright, it could award no less than $750 and no more than $30,000 in damages for each infringed work. The District Court identified two exceptions to this rule. First, the District Court instructed the jury that, if it found that Wiley had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the infringement was willful, under the statutory scheme the jury had the option of awarding up to $150,000 in damages per infringed work. Second, if the jury found that Kirtsaeng had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not aware and had no reason to believe that his acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the jury could choose to impose an award of statutory damages as low as $200 per infringed work. The jury ultimately found Kirtsaeng liable for willful copyright infringement of all eight works and imposed damages of $75,000 for each of the eight works. Kirtsaeng filed a timely notice of appeal. He claims that (1) the District Court erred in holding that the first sale doctrine was not an available defense in the circumstances presented; (2) the District Court should have advised the jury of the first sale doctrine as a defense to the claim of willful infringement; and (3) with respect to the jury's assessment of statutory damages, the admission into evidence of testimony regarding the amount of Kirtsaeng's gross receipts was unduly prejudicial.