Opinion ID: 2332073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did sergeant nicoletta receive a hearing comporting with due process requirements?

Text: In Fuentes v. Shevin, supra, 407 U.S. at 80, 92 S.Ct. at 1994, 32 L.Ed. 2d at 569, the Supreme Court, quoting from Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233, 17 L.Ed. 531, 534 (1864), asserted: For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified. The first prerequisite then of due process is fair notice, Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 525 (1975), so that a response can be prepared and the respondent fairly heard. As stated by Judge Goldmann in Department of Law and Public Safety v. Miller, 115 N.J. Super. 122, 126 (App. Div. 1971): Adequate notice and an opportunity to prepare remains the key to proper administrative proceedings.    There can be no adequate preparation where the notice does not reasonably apprise the party of the charges, or where the issues litigated at the hearing differ substantially from those outlined in the notice. It offends elemental concepts of procedural due process to grant enforcement to a finding neither charged in the complaint nor litigated at the hearing. In Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1413, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1377, 1390-91 (1959), the Supreme Court averred that: Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. There is little if any contrariety of view as to the requirement of specific and informative notice of the substance of the issue to be heard and decided. And we need not labor the point that the letter to Nicoletta, failing to notify him of the real charge against him, that of instigating the fight, and failing also to advise him of any of the other matters to be investigated at the hearing was totally deficient as measured by due process notice requirements. That deficiency was such, in the narrow circumstances of this case, as to render both conferences (hearings) quite meaningless. Nor need we pause here to discuss the impartiality of the hearing tribunal (in this case several members of the Commission) except to note that such hearers, in order to be neutral and detached, need not be disassociated from the administrative process. Monitored by other safeguards which we shall mention, we sense no hazard of arbitrary decision-making [which would] be held violative of due process. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2982, 41 L.Ed. 2d 935, 959-60 (1974). In Williams, supra, Justice Mountain, in a comparable case, saw minimal danger of injustice resulting from possible bias on the part of the employer-hearer, and said such injustice could be readily corrected by resort to the courts. 66 N.J. at 160. The phrase some kind of hearing used by the Supreme Court in Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 570 n. 7, 92 S.Ct. at 2705, 33 L.Ed. 2d at 556, and by Justice White in Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. at 557, 94 S.Ct. at 2975, 41 L.Ed. 2d at 952, was selected by Judge Henry J. Friendly as the title for his Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267 (1975). He outlined some of the important elements of a fair hearing including (1) an unbiased tribunal, (2) notice of the proposed action and grounds asserted for it, (3) an opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action should not be taken, (4) the rights to call witnesses, to know the evidence against one, and to have decisions based only on the evidence presented, (5) counsel, (6) the making of a record and a statement of reasons, (7) public attendance and (8) judicial review. Id. at 1277-95. He noted that these factors are listed roughly in order of importance and that all of them may not be necessary in any given hearing; he added that if an agency chooses to go further than is constitutionally demanded with respect to one item, this may afford good reason for diminishing or even eliminating another. Id. at 1279. We remember that at least one of these requisites  public attendance  has been rejected by our Court in a similar proceeding due to the confidentiality of police information and other factors noted by Justice Sullivan in Kelly v. Sterr, 62 N.J. 105, cert. den., 414 U.S. 822, 94 S.Ct. 122, 38 L.Ed. 2d 55 (1973). We specifically affirm this holding in application to the present case. As to the hearing itself, fairness and not rigid formality should be the touchstone. [F]ormality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed. 2d 113, 119 (1971), the goal being to minimize the possibility of error or injustice, rectifiable in any case by subsequent judicial review. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed. 2d 18 (1976). In examining the components of a fair hearing under due process norms, in a case such as the present one, we adopt the philosophy and manner of its implementation stated by the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed. 2d 484 (1972). In that parole revocation case, the Court held: Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due. It has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. [C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L.Ed. 2d 1230, 1236 (1961).    Its flexibility is in its scope once it has been determined that some process is due; it is a recognition that not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure. [408 U.S. at 481, 92 S.Ct. at 2600, 33 L.Ed. 2d at 494].