Opinion ID: 1786705
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court committed error in allowing hearsay testimony of several witnesses under the tender years exception.

Text: ¶ 11. Milton argues the testimony of the victim's mother, aunt, and the two police officers was inadmissible hearsay because the trial court's finding of substantial indicia of reliability in spontaneity failed to meet the specific requirements of M.R.E. 803(25), which provides: A statement made by a child of tender years describing any act of sexual contact performed with or on the child by another is admissible in evidence if: (a) the court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide substantial indicia of reliability; and (b) the child either (1) testifies at the proceedings; or (2) is unavailable as a witness: provided, that when the child is unavailable as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of the act. ¶ 12. The trial court conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury where it addressed the issue of reliability in detail. As to the issue of spontaneity, the trial judge held Stacey Ball stated that she saw [the child] was walking funny, and she asked a question, and the response was one that was very spontaneous as it related to the question being asked. ¶ 13. The leading case on the tender years exception to the hearsay rule is Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), where the Court held that the child declarant's statements must have substantial indicia of reliability to be admissible at trial. The United States Supreme Court reviewed several factors to assist trial courts in determining the reliability of a child's statement, including: spontaneity and consistent repetition; mental state of the declarant; use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age; and lack of motive to fabricate. Id. at 821, 110 S.Ct. at 3150. The Court further advised these factors are not exclusive, and stated the unifying principle is that these factors relate to whether the child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the statement was made. Id. at 822, 110 S.Ct. at 3150. ¶ 14. Wright is distinguishable from the case at bar in that the declarant in Wright was unavailable and the Court was concerned with the reliability of the out-of-court statements and violations of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. In the present case, the child victim testified at trial and was available for cross-examination by defense counsel. ¶ 15. This Court has utilized the Wright factors in several cases. See Hennington v. State, 702 So.2d 403 (Miss.1997); Eakes v. State, 665 So.2d 852 (Miss.1995); Griffith v. State, 584 So.2d 383 (Miss.1991). The Wright factors have also been incorporated into the official commentary to M.R.E. 803(25), which provides guidelines to trial judges for use in determining the admissibility of hearsay statements under the tender years exception. ¶ 16. On appeal, Milton acknowledges the trial court properly followed the Wright factors and evidentiary guidelines, yet erred in the application of those guidelines to the facts in this case. Milton contends the trial court based the admissibility of the hearsay testimony on an erroneous premise of spontaneity. Milton specifically argues that the victim's statements were not spontaneous because her aunt, Stacey Ball, had a preconceived idea of what the victim's response to her question would be, and therefore she asked a very suggestive question to elicit that response. Milton further asserts that all of the victim's other statements were made as a result of the investigation which ensued after her initial response to Ball's suggestive questioning. Milton argues the trial court's analysis of all the factors to determine the reliability of the declarant's statements is therefore tainted, and the testimony of the State's witnesses is inadmissible. ¶ 17. We disagree with the assertion that Ball's question was highly suggestive. Ball testified: I just asked her is anybody touching her in the wrong way. This question is sufficiently generalized and inquires as to inappropriate touching, not penile penetration. Ball could not have expected the victim's detailed response as to specific sexual acts performed on her by her male relatives. There is also no evidence in the record to suggest that any of the four hearsay witnesses suspected any inappropriate sexual behavior between Milton and the victim prior to June 19, 1997, to have prompted such questioning. We find the victim's statements were spontaneous under the facts in this case. ¶ 18. When the correct legal standard is used by the trial court, this Court will not reverse a finding of admissibility unless there is a finding of an abuse of discretion. Eakes, 665 So.2d at 865. The record reflects the trial court conducted the appropriate legal analysis and hearings on the record out of the presence of the jury to determine the admissibility of the statements in accordance with M.R.E. 803(25). We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion and, therefore, no reversible error.