Opinion ID: 685134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Precedents in Child Welfare Cases

Text: 38 A review of the jurisprudence in this area discloses that many very similar lawsuits challenging the provision of services to foster children have been certified despite the varieties of factual differences that characterize the plaintiffs in each case and despite the variety of legal claims any one class may make. Many of these cases also involve claims by classes that include differently situated plaintiffs, who were not, at the time of the litigation, suffering identical injuries from the defendants' conduct. 39 For example, in a class action brought in Vermont state court, 16 the court certified a class of handicapped children challenging the provision of child welfare services over defendants' commonality and typicality objections based on factual differences of class members. The court explained: 40 Certainly, the plaintiffs will have different stories to tell. However, it is apparent from the pleadings that plaintiffs legal claims are based on a common factual predicate: the defendants alleged failure to fulfill their duties in providing for a coordinated system that protects the welfare of class members. The individual treatment of handicapped youths, while important and crucial to plaintiffs' case, only serves to support a larger inquiry into the functioning of the state structure appropriated for administering programs that serve the handicapped. 41 Jane T. v. Morse, No. S-359-86 WnC, slip op. at 4, (Vt.Super.Ct., June 12, 1987). 42 Courts have also certified class actions alleging a variety of legal claims falling under the rubric of a systemic failure to provide certain child welfare services. See e.g., LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.Supp. 959, 960 (D.D.C.1991). In that case the class challenged the alleged failure of the District of Columbia Department of Human Services to initiate timely investigations into reports of abuse or neglect, the failure to provide services to families to prevent the placement of children in foster care, the failure to place those who may not safely remain at home in appropriate foster homes and institutions, the failure to develop case plans for children in foster care, and the failure to make permanent placements. The class included foster children under the care of the DHS and children reported as abused or neglected, though not yet in the care of the DHS. The court certified the class. 43 Another federal court allowed a class of children in the custody of a child welfare agency to challenge the agency's failure to provide children with follow-up caseworkers to work with the family, to arrange for appropriate services, and to oversee the fulfillment of the childrens' medical and educational needs. The action requested a declaratory judgment that the policies violated the Fourteenth Amendment, an injunction requiring the defendant to submit a plan assuring legally adequate care and treatment, and the appointment of a master to determine the adequacy of the plan and to oversee its implementation. The court granted class certification. B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F.Supp. 1387, 1389 (N.D.Ill.1989). 44 There are many additional examples of certification of class actions asserting a broad range of grievances closely resembling those alleged in this case. See e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 822 n. 7, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 2098 n. 7, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977) (perceiving no error in district court's certification of foster parents, children, and intervening natural parents); Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 506 n. 1 (1st Cir.1983) (affirming district court's preliminary injunction, in favor of a class of foster children and their natural and foster families, ordering state social services department to comply with case plans and to review obligations of foster care maintenance program); Eric L. v. Bird, No. 91-376-D slip op. (D.N.H. Dec. 16, 1993) (certifying class of all New Hampshire children concerning whom the State Division of Children and Youth Services (DCYS) had received a complaint of abuse or neglect, who are the subject of a petition brought pursuant to state law or are entitled to services from DCYS as a result of court proceedings, and all children with disabilities who are placed either in twenty-four hour residential facilities or in foster care and whose families are in need of support services); David C. v. Leavitt, No. 93-C-206W slip op. (D.Utah May 5, 1993) (certifying over adequacy-of-representation objections a class of all children who are or will be in Utah's DHS custody or will be placed in a foster home, a group home, institutional care or a shelter and children who are or will be known to DHS by virtue of report of abuse or neglect). 45 Admittedly, these cases did not (with the exception of Jane T.) discuss commonality and typicality; nevertheless, the trial judges had to be satisfied that the requisites of Rule 23 (or its state law equivalent) were met in order to certify the classes. We find it persuasive that these courts have found quite similar actions to comply with Rule 23's requirements. 46