Opinion ID: 1793795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Standard of Objective Reasonableness

Text: The second inconsistency between Leon and State v. Parmar, 231 Neb. 687, 437 N.W.2d 503 (1989), involves the standard by which the good faith of the police should be judged when evaluating whether the warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. The present standard in Parmar is whether the affidavit was sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable cause. Applying that standard to this case, it is clear that, standing alone, the February 4 affidavit would not create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable cause. See State v. Reeder, 249 Neb. 207, 543 N.W.2d 429 (1996). Thoughtful and competent judges would know that an affidavit lacking any information concerning the credibility of a confidential informant is insufficient. Such judges would likewise know that the February 7 affidavit, although enough to establish probable cause when considered collectively with the February 4 affidavit, cannot relate back to the February 4 warrant. This analysis is, however, merely academic. Leon's analysis clearly indicates that the question is not what thoughtful and competent judges would know about the warrant, but, rather, what an objectively reasonable police officer would know. In U.S. v. Taxacher, 902 F.2d 867 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied 499 U.S. 919, 111 S.Ct. 1307, 113 L.Ed.2d 242 (1991), the 11th Circuit rejected the standard applied in U.S. v. Hove, 848 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1988), and adopted by this court in Parmar. The court in Taxacher noted that under Leon, the focus is on the officer, not the judge or magistrate. The `good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization.' U.S. v. Taxacher, 902 F.2d at 871, quoting United States v. Leon, supra . The Taxacher court recognized that the Court in Leon had opined that reasonable jurists had disagreed about whether there was probable cause on the facts in Leon. However, the court explained that the reasonable jurist language used in Leon was merely intended to bolster the Court's holding that the officer had acted reasonably under the circumstances; Leon did not establish a reasonable jurist test as the threshold. If a reasonable jurist could believe in objective good faith that there was probable cause, obviously a reasonably well-trained officer could believe likewise. However, because a reasonable jurist has more legal training than a reasonably well-trained officer, what would be reasonable for a well-trained officer is not necessarily the same as what would be reasonable for a jurist. U.S. v. Taxacher, 902 F.2d at 872. In other words, the fact that thoughtful and competent judges would agree that there was no probable cause to support a warrant does not necessarily mean that an objectively reasonable police officer could not execute the warrant in good faith. Likewise, it is of no great import that the judge or magistrate issued a warrant and an appellate court subsequently concludes that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. In every case in which a warrant is issued and later invalidated, there is disagreement between judicial officers. If the fact that an appellate court came to a different conclusion than the issuing judge or magistrate was dispositive of good faith, the exclusionary rule would have no force. We conclude that when evaluating whether the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable, an appellate court should address whether the officer, considered as a police officer with a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits, acted in objectively reasonable good faith in relying on the warrant.