Opinion ID: 1199598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the order refusing leave to amend the pleadings

Text: ¶ 27 Martin also appeals the decision of the trial court to dismiss her claim based upon tortious interference with contract without allowing her to amend. Her suit contains allegations relating to a breach of contract against the School District as well as those sounding in tort against the District and as individuals. At this point in the litigation we are concerned only with the issue of whether the petition could be amended to state a claim for relief against Johnson and Hoover individually based upon the tort of interference with contract. ¶ 28 The tort liability of a school district is, of course, subject to the provisions of the Governmental Tort Claims Act, (51 O.S.1991 §§ 151 et seq.). 51 O.S.Supp.1994 § 152(8)(b), (a school district is a political subdivision for the purpose of the Act). Application of the Act may require a determination of whether a government employee was acting within the scope of employment. [5] An act of the employee is not in the scope of employment if the employee acted maliciously or in bad faith. Nail v. City of Henryetta, 1996 OK 12, ¶ 7, 911 P.2d 914, 916. A government employee acting within the scope of employment is relieved from private liability for tortious conduct. Nelson v. Pollay, 1996 OK 142, ¶ 7, 916 P.2d 1369, 1373. However, when an employee acts outside the scope of employment the political subdivision is relieved from liability. Parker v. City of Midwest City, 1993 OK 29, ¶ 12, 850 P.2d 1065, 1068. ¶ 29 The essence of the Defendants' argument is that even if they were acting outside of the scope of their employment, in bad faith and maliciously, for the purpose of the Governmental Tort Claims Act, they were nevertheless agents (or employees) of the School District, for the purpose of the interference with contract claim. They argue that as agents or employees of the School District no action for interference with contract would lie. ¶ 30 We have held that an agent of a principal cannot be held liable for interfering with a contract between the principal and a third party. Voiles v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 1996 OK 13, ¶ 18, 911 P.2d 1205, 1210; Ray v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Sapulpa, 1994 OK 100, ¶ 15, 894 P.2d 1056, 1060; Whitson v. Oklahoma Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., 1995 OK 4, ¶ 6, 889 P.2d 285, 287. However, in Ray, Voiles, and Whitson, the Court did not address whether an agent could be held personally liable on an interference with contract claim if the agent was acting against the interests of the principal and in furtherance of interests of the agent. ¶ 31 Some courts have examined the issue in the context of officers, agents, or employees of a corporation interfering with a contract of their corporate employer. In Mason v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 115 F.3d 1442 (10th Cir.1997), the federal court observed the following: The Oklahoma Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether a corporate officer, director or other employee can be held liable for tortiously interfering in a corporate contract. We are convinced, however, that corporate employees can be found liable under Oklahoma law for tortious interference with a corporate contract. See Johnson, 802 P.2d at 1297 (suggesting a tortious interference claim could be stated against the supervisor who actually made the decision to terminate the plaintiff). As with any tortious interference claim, the determinative issue remains whether the actor's interference was justified, privileged, or excusable. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that it is not unlawful for one to `interfere with the contractual relations of another if [this is done] by fair means, if [it is] accomplished by honest intent, and if [it is done] to better one's own business and not to principally harm another.' Morrow Dev. Corp. v. American Bank & Trust, 875 P.2d 411, 416 n. 21 (Okla.1994) (alterations in original) (quoting Del State Bank v. Salmon, 548 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Okla.1976)). Therefore, a corporate officer's or director's interference with a corporate contract will be privileged only when the interference is undertaken in good faith and for a bona fide organizational purpose. Q.E.R., Inc. v. Hickerson, 880 F.2d 1178, 1184 (10th Cir.1989) (applying Colorado law); Allison v. American Airlines, Inc., 112 F.Supp. 37, 38 (N.D.Okla.1953). Id. 115 F.3d at 1453, note omitted. [6] The Tenth Circuit thus concluded that in Oklahoma for a corporate officer's interference with a corporation's contract to be privileged as to that officer it must have been done in good faith. [7] Although the holding of the federal court on matter of state law has no precedential value in this proceeding, we agree with its conclusion. ¶ 32 It is fundamental that an employee or agent must act in good faith and in the interest of the employer or principal. Butcher v. McGinn, 1985 OK 58, ¶ 18, 706 P.2d 878, 882. If an employee acts in bad faith and contrary to the interests of the employer in tampering with a third party's contract with the employer we can divine no reason that the employee should be exempt from a tort claim for interference with contract. Courts in other jurisdictions agree. [8] ¶ 33 Of course, characterizing an employee's conduct as contrary to the interests of the employer cannot be based merely upon the employee's interference with the contract. Voiles v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., supra , Ray v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Sapulpa, supra , Whitson v. Oklahoma Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., supra . Every breach of contract does not give rise to a claim of tortious interference with contract merely because an employee or agent of a party to the contract was involved in the breach. An allegation that a breach of contract occurred and was effectuated by an employee of the School District, does not, by itself, show a tortious breach of contract. In Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 1995 OK 108, 905 P.2d 778, we said that the wrongful discharge tort pursuant to Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 1989 OK 22, 770 P.2d 24, was not designed to protect an employee from the employer's poor business judgment. Hayes, at ¶ 27, 905 P.2d at 788. The same observation may be made concerning the tort of interference with contract. The interference with contract tort is not designed to protect against an employee acting in good faith but using poor business judgment. Acting in good faith and using poor business judgment are not mutually exclusive. [9] ¶ 34 Martin sought to amend her petition to add allegations that the two employees of the school district tortiously interfered with her teaching contract. Defendants argued that as a matter of law such an action could not be brought against the employees because their employer was the other party to the contract. The trial court agreed, but did not determine the sufficiency of Martin's proposed allegations. On an appeal this Court does not make first instance determinations on disputed questions of fact or law. YWCA v. Melson, 1997 OK 81, n. 1, 944 P.2d 304, 306. We decline to make a premature determination in this Court. We thus reverse the judgment of the District Court declining to allow Martin to amend her petition in her claim that the two employees of the school district tortiously interfered with her contract. She may file her amended petition.