Opinion ID: 1039978
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Second Penalty Phase Trial

Text: According to Howell, his trial counsel made a “serious error” during the sentencing retrial in 1996: “Counsel called as a witness for Mr. Howell his prison case manager to inform the jury about Mr. Howell’s good conduct in prison. . . . The witness did not mention ‘death row,’ but counsel did. Several times.” Aplt. Br. at 47 (emphasis in original).
To make out an IAC claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), Howell must show both (1) that his counsel provided deficient assistance and (2) that there was prejudice as a result. “To establish deficient performance, [Howell] must show . . . that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed [Howell] by the Sixth Amendment.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 787 (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish prejudice, Howell “must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Id. at 788 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Even under de novo review, the standard for judging counsel’s representation is a most deferential one.” Id. “Establishing -42- that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The OCCA rejected this IAC claim, reasoning, “[I]t was counsel’s strategy to show that [Howell] had been a model prisoner while on death row, thereby rebutting the continuing[-]threat aggravating circumstance. Evidence was presented that [Howell] had not been in solitary confinement twenty-four hours a day, but had been outside of his cell with other prisoners. This Court will not second guess trial strategy.” Howell II, 967 P.2d at 1226.
Under our “doubly” deferential standard of review, Howell’s claim cannot prevail. First, Howell argues that “telling the jury that a different, prior jury, had sentenced someone to death is a terrible mistake, predisposing the instant jury to follow the earlier jury’s recommendation.” Aplt. Br. at 47. But he cites no clearly established law saying as much, nor can we find any. Therefore, under AEDPA deference, we cannot overturn the OCCA’s decision. Admittedly, Howell’s counsel could have demonstrated Howell’s good behavior in prison without mentioning death row specifically. But that mistake alone is not enough to overcome Strickland and AEDPA deference. And in fact, -43- “evidence of a prior death sentence may not produce a unidirectional bias toward death.” Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 20 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Here, because the jurors were being asked to give Howell a new sentence, they could have deduced that the prior sentence was handed down in error—i.e., it was wrong. So when they learned from defense counsel that Howell’s first sentence was death (implied from Howell being on death row), that revelation could have weighed against giving Howell a death sentence again. Second, Howell argues that by informing the jury of his presence on death row, his counsel relieved the jury from making a new, independent, reasoned moral judgment about whether Howell should live or die, thereby violating Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). The district court correctly rejected this argument—the OCCA’s decision did not violate the holding in Caldwell. “To establish a Caldwell violation, [Howell] necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law.” Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407 (1989). Following its review of the record, the district court noted that “no statements or insinuations were made that anyone other than the jury had the duty and responsibility to determine [Howell’s] sentence,” so no attorney committed a Caldwell violation. Howell v. Mullin, No. CIV-99-1803-A, slip op. at 48. Howell does not demonstrate otherwise. His sole allegation—that counsel told the jury Howell was on death row—is not an “improper[] descri[ption] [of] the role -44- assigned to the jury.” In fact, it is not a reference to the jury’s role at all, and for that reason alone, this argument fails. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of relief on this ground.