Opinion ID: 2606
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: satanism and other religious evidence

Text: Fell next contends that testimony elicited by the prosecution concerning a past interest in satanism and his interest, while incarcerated and awaiting trial, in Native American and Muslim religions denied him due process and violated the First Amendment. See Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 163-69, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992). Fell's claims relate to the testimony of three witnesses called by the defense: Teri Fell, the defendant's sister; James Rushlow, a case worker at Northwest Correctional Facility; and James Aiken, an expert witness in penology. Teri Fell testified on direct examination about the abusive and violent home life she and her brother experienced. On cross-examination, when the government inquired as to his religious interests when they were growing up, she testified that Fell initially did not believe in God and on several occasions jokingly characterized Satan as the kindest beast. She also testified that Fell had a tattoo of an upside-down cross with 666, which she believed he had gotten when he was 15 or 16 years old. However, Teri Fell explained that she did not believe that Fell worshiped Satan. James Rushlow testified on direct examination as to Fell's adjustment in prison and his participation in certain religious and educational opportunities afforded by the institution. On cross-examination, the prosecution confirmed that Fell had signed up for Christian Bible Studies, and asked Rushlow: During your time working with Mr. Fell, has he also claimed to practice Native American rituals? In response, Rushlow testified that Fell had filed a grievance and a lawsuit seeking the right to perform Native American rituals. With no objection from the defense, the government introduced into evidence a certified copy of the record in that litigation [20] Rushlow further stated that Fell had wanted to participate in Ramadan, as a Muslim, and that he had filed numerous other grievances for himself and on behalf of others. In addition, Rushlow testified, without objection, that Fell had both a 666 tattoo and one of an anarchy symbol. The defense called James Aiken to testify further about Fell's positive adjustment in prison. The government cross-examined Aiken regarding the possibility of Fell committing future assaults, and asked him to describe the significance of Fell's 666 tattoo. He responded: Well, the 666 denotes possible involvement in some type of relationship with an organization. I will leave it at that because I have not dwelled into that from the intelligence reports. Number two is that I am more concerned about who he's controlling at the prison. And he's not controlling anybody. The prosecutor's summation made no reference to Fell's tattoos or Fell's purported satanic interest and made no attempt to explain the relevance of this evidence to the murders. The prosecutor did, however, argue that Fell had not made positive contributions while incarcerated because he generated numerous grievances and filed a lawsuit which was predicated on a feigned interest in multiple religions. [21] The First Amendment forbids the uncabined reliance on a defendant's abstract beliefs at sentencing. Dawson, 503 U.S. at 166-67, 112 S.Ct. 1093; see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 485-86, 113 S.Ct. 2194, 124 L.Ed.2d 436 (1993) ([A] defendant's abstract beliefs, however obnoxious to most people, may not be taken into consideration by a sentencing judge). However, the government may introduce evidence of beliefs or associational activities, so long as they are relevant to prove, for example, motive or aggravating circumstances, to illustrate future dangerousness, or to rebut mitigating evidence. See United States v. Kane, 452 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam); see also Dawson, 503 U.S. at 167, 112 S.Ct. 1093; Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948-49, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983) (plurality opinion) (upholding the consideration of defendant's racial intolerance in evaluating motive and as an aggravating factor). Because Fell did not raise a contemporaneous objection to the government's inquiry into his beliefs, his claim is subject to plain error review. [22] The crucial question is whether the evidence at issue was used for permissible purposes or merely to show that Fell was morally reprehensible due to his abstract beliefs. Kane, 452 F.3d at 143; see Dawson, 503 U.S. at 166-67, 112 S.Ct. 1093. [23]
We conclude that the testimony regarding Fell's interest in Native American and Muslim religions was relevant in the context in which the testimony was elicited. Fell undertook to prove the following mitigating factor: Donald Fell has made positive contributions to the Northwest Correctional Facility by working, gaining an education, and helping to resolve inmate grievances. In support of this factor, Rushlow testified that Fell was picked by management to act as a unit representative for other inmates, took part in Bible study and other educational opportunities, and had a disciplinary record reasonably free of infractions. However, on cross-examination, Rushlow retreated from several of his prior assertions. He conceded that Fell did not resolve inmate grievances but instead manufactured grievances based on his purported religious beliefs. The government also showed that while Fell participated in Bible studies, he simultaneously filed grievances and a lawsuit demanding that sweat lodges and talking circles be made available in the prison so that he could engage in Native American religious practices. During that same period, Fell also participated in Ramadan. The government elicited testimony that Fell was appointed unit manager in part because his familiarity with the administrative procedures, due to his constant filing of complaints, made it easier to have the other inmates funnel their grievances through him. The jury was free to find that Fell had successfully adjusted to prison, was genuinely interested in several religions, and filed grievances for entirely legitimate purposes. By the same token, the jury was also free to find that Fell's interest in multiple religions was cynical or feigned and that his multiple grievances reflected a failure to adjust to incarceration. Contrary to Fell's contention that the evidence was intended to incite religious prejudice, the testimony was reasonably elicited to present a more complete picture of Fell that belied the one of a well-adjusted inmate offered by the defense. In any event, the evidence played a very minor role in the trial and added little to the quantum of evidence before the jury. We see no error and certainly no plain error in its admission.
We are more troubled by the testimony that the government elicited regarding Fell's satanic beliefs and tattoos  evidence that Fell argues was irrelevant to sentencing and intended to demonize him and frighten the jury. The government justified the cross-examination questioning as relevant to establishing motive, to explain the multiple killings, and to prove the heinous, cruel and depraved manner statutory aggravating factors. According to the government, a satanist believes he can murder rape and rob at will without regard for the moral or legal consequences, an inference buttressed by the fact that Fell committed the murders while wearing a Slayer t-shirt. [24] Fell did not object to this evidence and therefore we review its admission for plain error. See Jones, 527 U.S. at 389-90, 119 S.Ct. 2090. While evidence of the defendant's abstract moral beliefs may in some cases be constitutionally admissible to show motive, see Kane, 452 F.3d at 143, there must be stronger evidence of the connection than occurred here and it was a mistake for the prosecutor to offer the evidence. Although the government posits on appeal a relationship between the t-shirt Fell wore during the murders and Fell's satanic interests and his motive for killing Teresca King, we are not persuaded by the relevance of this evidence, which in any event was not argued to the jury. Nevertheless, to the extent that any unjustified reference to Fell's satanic beliefs occurring in the testimony constituted constitutional error, it was not challenged at trial and did not constitute plain error. It neither prejudiced Fell nor did it seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Gonzalez, 110 F.3d at 945-46. The strength of the government's case convinces us that Fell cannot show that any error prejudicially affected substantial rights. See Jones, 527 U.S. at 389, 119 S.Ct. 2090. At trial, the government presented essentially uncontested evidence that there were multiple murders and that Fell killed King in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. The evidence of Fell's interest in satanism, an issue that occupied a very small amount of trial time, added little to this showing and subtracted even less from the extensive mitigation evidence presented by Fell. As the verdict suggests, the jury was highly attentive to the aggravating and mitigating evidence that mattered. Moreover, the district court controlled any risk of prejudice through its instruction to the jury that it could not consider Fell's religious beliefs in rendering its decision because those considerations are completely irrelevant. In the special verdict form, each juror certified that he or she followed that instruction. For these reasons, we conclude that there was no plain error.