Opinion ID: 624033
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Louper-Morris's Claims

Text: Louper-Morris alleges that the district court erred by denying Appellants' joint motion to dismiss the indictment because the United States allegedly made a material misrepresentation to the grand jury. In reviewing the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment for alleged government misconduct, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Pumpkin Seed, 572 F.3d 552, 557 (8th Cir.2009) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Approximately two months after the deadline for filing pretrial motions, Appellants moved to dismiss the indictment. They alleged that the United States misinformed the grand jury by representing to the grand jury that no program materials or educational content existed on the CyberStudy website in 2000. The magistrate judge heard oral arguments on the motion. It concluded that Appellants had no good cause for untimely filing the motion and also ruled that the motion failed on the merits. Specifically, the magistrate judge found that the record was devoid of any facts to support the proposition that the United States made any misrepresentations in the indictment or to the grand jury. Thus, the magistrate judge denied the motion. We find no reversible error in the district court's denial of the dismissal of the indictment, because even assuming that there were errors in the charging decision that may have followed from the conduct of the prosecution, the petit jury's guilty verdict rendered those errors harmless. Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted). [6]
Louper-Morris asserts that the district court erred in denying Appellants' joint motion for a new trial because the United States allegedly intimidated one of Appellants' witnesses thereby depriving her of the right to present a complete defense. We review a district court's denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Perez, 663 F.3d 387, 391 (8th Cir.2011). Reversal of a denial of a motion for new trial is rare. Perez, 663 F.3d at 391. (citation omitted). In the motion for a new trial, Appellants alleged that Michelle Garcia-Strait, a potential defense witness, was intimidated by the United States. Garcia-Strait had sent a fax and an email to the district court describing her unplanned meeting with a governmental agent. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the matter. At the evidentiary hearing, Garcia-Strait testified to the following: on the day she was to testify, someone who she believed to be from the United States Attorney's office spoke with her in a conference room outside of the courtroom. The governmental agent summoned Garcia-Strait from the defense's conference room to the United States's conference room. The door was left partially open. For approximately five to ten minutes, the agent asked her about CyberStudy and some checks she had written. Garcia-Strait said that she felt intimidated by the experience. She did not recall telling either of Appellants' attorneys that she was intimidated or unwilling to testify. When asked by the district court if the governmental agent had threatened her or told her not to testify, Garcia-Strait replied that the agent had not done either of those things. Garcia-Strait could not recall if Appellants' attorneys dismissed her before or after she had spoken with the governmental agent. She also indicated that Appellants were debating whether to call her to testify because of Garcia-Strait's pending felony fraud and forgery charges on which she could be cross examined. The following colloquy occurred between Garcia-Strait and Assistant U.S. Attorney Timothy Rank: Rank: You said that one of the things that [defense attorney] was trying to figure out was whether you would get cross-examined on those issues? Garcia-Strait: Correct. This is exactly why I was afraid to testify, yes. Rank: You were afraid to testify because you could get cross-examined on Garcia-Strait: By you, yes. Rank: on issues related to your pending felony fraud and forgery charges? Garcia-Strait: Yes. After the hearing, the district court issued an order denying the motion for a new trial. The district court expressly found that the United States did not threaten Garcia-Strait, and that Appellants chose not to call her as a witness. The district court noted that Garcia-Strait was concerned about testifying because she could be cross-examined about pending state court fraud and forgery charges. The district court concluded that there was not any impermissible governmental interference and a new trial was not warranted. In light of the record, Louper-Morris's argument is unpersuasive. In fact, the record directly refutes her argument. The record clearly shows that Garcia-Strait was afraid to testify because of the possibility of being cross-examined on her pending fraud and forgery charges. Moreover, Garcia-Strait admitted that she was not threatened in any way or instructed not to testify. Garcia-Strait was available to testify, but Appellants' attorneys chose not to call Garcia-Strait as a witness. The United States's conduct did not prevent Garcia-Strait from testifying and, therefore, the United States did not compromise Louper-Morris's right to a fair trial. See Dodd v. Nix, 48 F.3d 1071, 1075-76 (8th Cir.1995) (finding no due process violation when defense counsel chose not to call witness without consideration to the prosecution's conduct). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants' motion for new trial on the ground of witness intimidation.
Louper-Morris asserts that the district court erred by enhancing her base level offense by four points for her role as a leader or organizer of a criminal activity involving five or more participants under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.1. [7] She argues that the United States failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that one of the persons identified in the pre-sentence investigation report as a participant, Jennifer Davis, was criminally responsible for the offense. [8] Therefore, she contends that the district court erred in applying the leadership enhancement pursuant to § 3B1.1. When we review the imposition of sentences, whether inside or outside the Guidelines range, we apply `a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.' United States v. Hayes, 518 F.3d 989, 995 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)). In reviewing for procedural error, we review the district court's application of the [G]uidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Bennett, 659 F.3d 711, 714 (8th Cir.2011) (citations & quotation omitted). `Procedural error' includes `failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentenceincluding an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.' United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586). United States Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.1(a) states, Based on the defendant's role in the offense, increase the offense level as follows: (a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels. (emphasis omitted). In order for the district court to apply the § 3B1.1(a) leadership enhancement, the United States needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Louper-Morris led or organized five or more participants in the CyberStudy fraud or that the organization was otherwise extensive. United States v. Cosey, 602 F.3d 943, 947-48 (8th Cir.2010); United States v. Rodriguez-Ramos, 663 F.3d 356, 365 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating burden of proof). A `participant' is a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 1. The record conclusively shows that five or more individuals were participants within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. Denita Hollie testified Louper-Morris was the leader of five or more criminally responsible individuals. She stated that in addition to herself, Benita Williams, Morris, and Jennifer Davis all forged signatures on the power-of-attorney forms in order for CyberStudy to receive the tax credit. Benita Williams corroborated this testimony. Cheryl Cardinal also testified that she left the employment of CyberStudy because she no longer felt comfortable marketing something that wasn't therethat is, marketing CyberStudy 101 even though it lacked educational content. Denita Hollie, Benita Williams, and Cheryl Cardinal's testimony all prove that Louper-Morris was the leader or organizer of five or more participants who committed fraud either through forging signatures or marketing CyberStudy 101's nonexistent educational content. The leadership enhancement is also appropriate if the United States proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the organization was otherwise extensive. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). A four-level leadership enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) is appropriate if the trial testimony shows that the criminal activity was otherwise extensive. See United States v. Brown, 627 F.3d 1068, 1073 (8th Cir.2010) (internal quotation omitted). In accessing whether an organization is `otherwise extensive,' all persons involved during the course of the entire offense are to be considered. Thus, a fraud that involved only three participants but used the unknowing services of many outsiders could be considered extensive. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 3. Regarding the leadership enhancement, the district court stated: As to the leadership role, I think there were many participants here. I don't know that we need to count to only five. There are many who participated in one way or another to encourage people to participate in this program, and I think the evidence was clear on that. So the four-level increase as a leader and organizer is appropriate in this case. We construe the district court's statement as a finding that it believed not only that the CyberStudy fraud involved more than five participants, but that the criminal activity was otherwise extensive. The criminal activity was otherwise extensive in that Louper-Morris recruited numerous individuals to assist in CyberStudy's customer recruitment and tax form preparation. In addition, Rev. McAfee provided unknowing services for CyberStudy by acting as a front for the pool loan. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in applying a four-level leadership enhancement to Louper-Morris's sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) because the criminal activity was otherwise extensive.
Lastly, Louper-Morris contends that cumulative trial errors warrant reversal or, at least, remand. We may reverse where the case as a whole presents an image of unfairness that has resulted in the deprivation of a defendant's constitutional rights, even though none of the claimed errors is itself sufficient to require reversal. United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074, 1099 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting United States v. Samples, 456 F.3d 875, 887 (8th Cir.2006)). We have painstakingly considered the record and find that there is not even a specter of unfairness much less any deprivation of Louper-Morris's constitutional rights. Any error was harmless error. Louper-Morris's claim of cumulative, reversible error is without merit.