Opinion ID: 6111839
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inspector Shen’s Testimony

Text: Saini challenges the district court’s admission of Inspector Shen’s expert testimony. He argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that Inspector Shen’s testimony was (1) proper under Federal Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 702(a) because it concerned matters outside the common knowledge of the average layperson; and (2) not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 because of his impressive resume and qualifications. 12 Inspector Shen’s testimony mainly focused on details about how thieves obtain personal information and use such information to commit fraud. For example, he explained that thieves can easily obtain personal information on the dark web and described how that information can then be used to gain access to credit card accounts. The district court reasonably concluded that these types of details would help the jury, and thus the court properly admitted Inspector Shen’s testimony under Rule 702(a). Indeed, that we have 12 Rule 702(a) provides: “A witness who is qualified as an expert . . . may testify in the form of an opinion . . . if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). Rule 403 provides: “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. 22 UNITED STATES V. SAINI found similar modus operandi testimony to be the proper subject of expert testimony further supports that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Inspector Shen’s testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Alonso, 48 F.3d 1536, 1540 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that law enforcement testimony “discussing observations of people, countersurveillance and surveillance” was the proper subject of expert testimony, as it concerned the “methods and techniques” used in criminal activity); United States v. Valencia-Amezcua, 278 F.3d 901, 909 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The admissibility of this expert testimony [about large-scale methamphetamine lab operations] is persuasively supported by our several prior decisions endorsing the admission of modus operandi testimony and in particular those suggesting that drug traffickers generally do not entrust large quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters.”). Saini’s argument that Inspector Shen’s impressive qualifications were unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 is also unavailing. The district court rejected this argument. The district court’s determination was reasonable, as Saini discusses no authority supporting that an expert’s impressive qualifications alone can be unfairly prejudicial, and he cited no such authority to the district court. In sum, Saini fails to show that the district court abused its discretion in admitting Inspector Shen’s testimony. Saini also argues that the district court erred in admitting Inspector Shen’s testimony because it was unnecessarily cumulative under Rule 403. We review this argument for plain error. 13 See Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1135–36. Because 13 Saini does not refute the government’s argument that plain error review applies. And the record shows that Saini failed to sufficiently preserve the issue for appeal. Although Saini’s counsel briefly made the UNITED STATES V. SAINI 23 Saini makes no attempt to show that he has satisfied the plain error factors, his cumulative evidence argument under Rule 403 fails.