Opinion ID: 2639090
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Counsel's failure to understand and apply the law regarding the defense of mental disease or defect

Text: Kansas legislatively abolished the insanity or diminished capacity defense with its enactment of K.S.A. 22-3220, which provides: It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged. Mental disease or defect is not otherwise a defense. The provisions of this section shall be in force and take effect on and after January 1, 1996. During opening statements, Adams told the court that the defense theory was not guilty by reason of insanity. Adams told the court that Dr. William Logan would testify about the defendant's history of mental illness and that Dr. Logan would opine that [the defendant] was not able to understand the nature and quality of his acts at the time these acts were committed, and therefore, was legally insane at the time of the crime. The only defense witnesses at trial were Dr. Logan and the defendant. After a preliminary examination, Adams asked Dr. Logan if he was able to give a professional opinion as to whether based on all the other information you had in the case whether he might have had a diminished capacity or might have been legally insane at the time of his offense. The State objected on the grounds that that's not the standard in the state of Kansas, and the court sustained the objection. Adams then asked, [W]ere you able to determine whether he had the state of mind required to commit the crime in this case? The State's objection on foundation grounds was sustained. Adams asked if the Court could give us some guidance with respect to the foundation that we're required to come up with in this situation, and the judge replied, You want me to tell you what to do? Adams told the court that he was looking at the insanity statute and PIK Crim. 3d 54.10 for crimes committed after January 1, 1996, and the court told him that he had not established whether the doctor was aware of what the law states. Adams asked Dr. Logan if he was aware of the state law with respect to a person's mental capacity to commit a crime and his opinion with respect to that issue related to the defendant. Dr. Logan articulated the proper standard, recognized that the defendant suffered from schizophrenia, but testified that he did not see a relationship between the defendant's mental illness and the crime. He concluded that the defendant did have the mental state required to form an intent to commit the crime. Shortly thereafter, Adams again asked Dr. Logan if he understood the law of diminished capacity. The State objected again, arguing that that's not the law in Kansas any longer, and the trial court sustained the objection. In arguing for a judgment of acquittal, Adams tried to salvage the mental disease or defect defense by arguing, [E]ven if Dr. Logan doesn't come to the conclusion, I think the Court certainly can, that he did not have the state of mind required to commit the crime. At the Van Cleave hearing, Adams described his performance as follows: I did a very poor job during the course of the testimony of Dr. Logan in bringing out what I was trying to get him to say. I recognized that when I looked at the transcript. It's horrific when I consider what I should have done. But eventually in cross examination . . . he goes on there about what if you assume what Larry Davis says is true, then perhaps there is a possibility he could have been incapable of forming the intent. That's where I was trying to go with it. Adams explained that even though he started with the wrong legal standard, he eventually attempted to apply the correct standard. In his competency evaluation report, Dr. Grinage opined that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, specifically schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, was incapable of possessing the required criminal intent to engage in aggravated kidnapping or attempted rape. He based this opinion on the defendant's long history of treatment-resistant paranoia, documented noncompliance with medication prior to the alleged offense, significant alcohol and cocaine use prior to the alleged offense, and noted paranoid delusions and problems with thought processing after his arrest. The defendant argues that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel when Adams failed to show an understanding or present a solid defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The Court of Appeals concluded: Adams clearly did not adequately prepare for trial because he was unaware of the proper legal standard for a defense of mental disease or defect, which clearly falls below a level of reasonableness. The defendant's only expert aided the State in his opinion that the defendant had the required state of mind to commit the crimes. This testimony was uncontroverted by any other expert. Adams failed to adequately research and prepare for trial and did not seek another expert opinion. Consequently, it is clear that Adams' performance clearly fell below the level of competence required by the Sixth Amendment. However, a majority of the court concluded that the defendant had not satisfied the prejudice prong: Similarly, the judge also heard evidence at trial and at the Van Cleave hearing concerning whether or not the defendant possessed the requisite mental state required as an element of the crime charged, i.e., whether he could form the mens rea to commit the crime. See State v. Henry, 273 Kan. 608, 44 P.3d 466 (2002) (if the mental defect or disease was such that it negated the mens rea element of the crime). Given the record, we are convinced it is improbable that the trial judge, being fully aware of the standard involved for K.S.A. 22-3220, would have found the defendant not guilty based on his mental disease or defect. Judge Lewis dissented from the majority, reasoning that he had never seen a more incompetent performance by an attorney in a case like this. He cited to Adams' unawareness of the correct standard of the mental disease or defect defense, his eliciting testimony from his own expert damaging to the defense, his admission that he was confused about the correct standard, his admission that his questioning of Dr. Logan was horrific, and his failure to have the defendant reexamined prior to trial. Adams did not adequately prepare for trial because, by his own admission, he was unaware of the proper legal standard for a defense of mental disease or defect. In this regard, his performance was deficient. However, the majority opinion's conclusion that this deficiency did not meet the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance inquiry is incorrect. It is important to note that Adams elected to call Dr. Logan as his only expert defense witness. Not only was Adams unaware of the correct standard to be applied, but Dr. Logan's competency evaluation report available to Adams before trial clearly indicated that if he were asked the question concerning the defendant's mental state and competency, he would testify consistent with the conclusion in his report dated December 20, 1999: In conclusion, Mr. Davis had a major mental illness, Schizophrenia, at the time of the offense, which would have compromised his ability to exercise some control of his behavior, but otherwise did not appear to impair his ability to deliberate or form intent.  (Emphasis added.) Had counsel understood the correct legal standard to be applied, counsel would have attempted to secure an expert witness whose testimony would not destroy the very defense he was attempting to establish. He would have at the very least tried to find another expert witness to testify that the defendant was incapable of forming the intent to commit the charged crimes, such as Dr. Grinage. It is beyond question that counsel would not have called Dr. Logan as a witness for the defendant. While the district court had the opportunity to consider Dr. Grinage's testimony during the Van Cleave hearing, the court questioned whether such evidence expressing an opinion concerning events that occurred almost 2 years after the trial had any value. Had Dr. Grinage's opinion been presented at trial it would have had the potential of changing the result of the trial. This would even be more likely had defense counsel not called Dr. Logan at trial. The Court of Appeals' conclusion that it was improbable that the trial judge [hearing the evidence at trial and at the Van Cleave hearing], being fully aware of the standard involved for K.S.A. 22-3220, would have found the defendant not guilty based on his mental disease or defect is in itself improbable. On those occasions where the trial court was presented with uncontroverted evidence regarding the defendant's competency, the trial court relied upon the expert testimony. Had the trial court had available Dr. Grinage's opinion or an opinion similar to his at the time of trial with no evidence presented by the State, it is probable that the trial court would have relied upon such an opinion and testimony notwithstanding Dr. Logan's report which had been rendered almost a year before the trial. Under the totality of the evidence in the record, the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel, was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance of counsel, and as a result was deprived of a fair trial. See State v. Washington, 275 Kan. 644, 679-80, 68 P.3d 134 (2003) (defense counsel who was not aware of statutory provisions relating to hard 50 sentence and failed to present any response was ineffective, even though trial court was on board throughout the process and therefore considered all the evidence). While the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the district court were made, the decision reached and affirmed by the Court of Appeals on this issue does not follow as a matter of law from the facts stated as its basis. The decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed and the case remanded to a new district court judge for further proceedings.