Opinion ID: 2723232
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the imposition of sanctions against attorney

Text: LAROCHE Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s imposition of sanctions against attorney LaRoche pursuant to Rule 11. “An appellate court reviews all aspects of the district court’s Rule 11 determination for an abuse of discretion.” Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 87 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1996). Rule 11 sanctions are proper, inter alia, “‘when the party files a pleading that is based on a legal theory that has no reasonable chance of success and that cannot be advanced as a reasonable argument to change existing law.’” Id. (quoting Jones v. Int’l Riding Helmets, Ltd., 49 F.3d 692, 694 (11th Cir.1995)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2), (c). The district court imposed sanctions on this ground. We find no abuse of discretion. We note that, in addition to the claims rejected gaming compacts, and many “have provisions that deal with[, inter alia,] . . . tribal and state enforcement of compact provisions; allocation of civil, regulatory, and criminal jurisdiction and law enforcement; . . . [and] state inspection, testing, and approval of gaming devices and facilities.” Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 12.05[2] (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012). Plaintiffs have not drawn our attention to any Tribal-State compact that governs gaming at the Poarch Creek facility. 25 Case: 14-10326 Date Filed: 09/03/2014 Page: 26 of 26 supra in Part II, Plaintiffs initially claimed a violation of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. This claim had no reasonable chance of success even before the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), for reasons discussed in Parts IV.B and IV.E of the district court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss the Complaint. See Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 503, 112 S. Ct. 820, 828–29 (1992) (construing section 5 to reach only changes that have “a direct relation to voting and the election process”). Plaintiffs’ counsel argues that the district court’s imposition of sanctions violated his due process rights because he was entitled to notice and an opportunity to respond either orally or in writing. Plaintiffs’ counsel did have such an opportunity. Defendant Strange provided Plaintiffs’ counsel with written notice of his intent to seek sanctions. He later filed a written Motion for Sanctions and served it on Plaintiffs’ counsel. Plaintiffs’ counsel filed a written response in opposition and did not request a hearing or any other additional process. Plaintiffs’ counsel does not explain why he was entitled to more.