Opinion ID: 1985887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: S. Johnson Co.

Text: September 2, 1993 PEI Construction 780 West Maples Avenue, Suite 101 Vienna, Virginia 22180 Attention: Thomas Pavel, ATTENTION: President Reference: NIH Building 30 HVAC Modifications Dear Mr. Pavel, We respectfully inform you of our intention to withdraw our proposal for the above referenced project due to an error in our bid. As discussed in our telephone conversation and face to face meeting, the management of A.S. Johnson Company was reviewing this proposal, upon which we were to confirm our pricing to you. Please contact Mr. Harry Kick, General Manager at [telephone number deleted] for any questions you may have. Very truly yours, /s/ James H. Kick Estimating Manager PEI responded to both the September 1 phone call, and the September 2 letter, expressing its refusal to permit Johnson to withdraw. On September 28, 1993, NIH formally awarded the construction contract to PEI. PEI found a substitute subcontractor to do the mechanical work, but at a cost of $930,000. [6] PEI brought suit against Johnson in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County to recover the $32,000 difference between Johnson's bid and the cost of the substitute mechanical subcontractor. The case was heard by the trial court without the aid of a jury. The trial court made several findings of fact, which we summarize: 1. PEI relied upon Johnson's sub-bid in making its bid for the entire project; 2. The fact that PEI was not the low bidder, but was awarded the project only after the apparent low bidder was disqualified, takes this case out of the ordinary; 3. Prior to NIH awarding PEI the contract on September 28, Johnson, on September 2, withdrew its bid; and 4. PEI's letter to all potential mechanical subcontractors, dated August 26, 1993, indicates that there was no definite agreement between PEI and Johnson, and that PEI was not relying upon Johnson's bid. The trial court analyzed the case under both a traditional contract theory and under a detrimental reliance theory. PEI was unable to satisfy the trial judge that under either theory that a contractual relationship had been formed. PEI appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, raising both traditional offer and acceptance theory, and promissory estoppel. Before our intermediate appellate court considered the case, we issued a writ of certiorari on our own motion.