Opinion ID: 1816783
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Effect of a Judgment in the Possessory Action

Text: The most difficult problem in this case is that a decision on the narrow issue presented here raises more questions than it answers. The lurking question in the present case involves the effect and the value of the judgment that a plaintiff receives in a possessory action to maintain possession of a servitude. The possessory action protects only the right to possess the servitude, which is different from the right of servitude itself. The issue of the right of servitude is beyond the scope of a possessory action involving a servitude, just as the issue of ownership or title is beyond the scope of a possessory action involving immovable property. When the plaintiff prevails in a possessory action involving immovable property, he is entitled to be maintained in his possession until another party claims ownership of the immovable property and proves his title thereto. However, when the plaintiff prevails in a possessory action involving a servitude, he is entitled to be maintained in possession until another party claims ownership of the immovable property allegedly burdened by the servitude and proves that he owns the immovable property free of the claimed servitude. The true effect of a judgment in a possessory action involving a servitudeplacing the burden of proof on the owner to prove no servitude has ever been establishedmay be of little value to the plaintiff in this case. In an action to declare the property free of the claimed servitude, the owner will have to prove that no servitude has been established by title, by destination, or by acquisitive prescription. See La.C.C. Art. 740. In the present case, neither title nor destination is mentioned in the petition, and defendant in brief asserted that there was no acquisition by title or destination. Moreover, there can be no acquisitive prescription in this case, because La.C.C. Art. 740 (which provided for the first time the right to acquire by acquisitive prescription an apparent servitude previously classified as discontinuous) did not become effective until 1978, only six years before this suit was filed. While these thoughts go beyond the holding of this case, such an analysis was necessary for a conceptual examination of this case's narrow issue in perspective. I have written these inconclusive thoughts for whatever value they may have to the parties in future proceedings.