Opinion ID: 2392074
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The Accardi Doctrine

Text: The Accardi doctrine, which traces its roots to the Supreme Court decision of United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681 (1954), has been recognized in federal and some state jurisdictions. Accardi, however, involved much more than mere technical violations of an internal agency regulation pertaining to the orderly transaction of agency business. It involved an attempt to bypass three levels of review required by the agency's regulations. It was not mere technical inaccuracies written on a form. In Accardi, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of a request for a writ of habeas corpus where the Attorney General disregarded applicable procedures of the Board of Immigration Appeals. There, a deportable alien appealed from an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying his application for suspension of deportation. The procedure to be followed in processing such an application was prescribed by regulations of the Attorney General acting pursuant to the Immigration Act, which called for decisions at three separate administrative levels below the Attorney General, i.e., by a hearing officer, by the Commissioner and by the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Attorney General did not follow this procedure in Accardi because while the deportation proceeding was pending, the Attorney General sent the Board of Immigration Appeals, an administrative agency within the Department of Justice whose members serve for the Attorney General, a confidential list of unsavory characters who the Attorney General felt should be deported, one of whom was Accardi. The Supreme Court concluded that this communication constituted a violation of the regulations which conferred initial decision making authority upon a hearing officer, the Commissioner and the Board of Immigration Appeals, subject to review by the Attorney General. Thus, even though the Attorney General had the final power to ultimately deport Accardi and the Attorney General had no statutory or constitutional obligation to provide for intermediate action by the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Court held that, In short, as long as the regulations remain operative, the Attorney General denies himself the right to sidestep the Board [of Immigration Appeals] or dictate its decision in any manner. Accardi, 347 U.S. at 267, 74 S.Ct. at 503, 98 L.Ed. at 686 (alteration added). [9] However, as we indicated supra, there is a principal exception to the doctrine, which provides that the doctrine is not applicable to an agency's departure from procedural rules adopted for the orderly transaction of agency business. Hopkins v. Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission, 40 Md.App. 329, 336, 391 A.2d 1213, 1217 (1978). [10] In the post Accardi case of American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U.S. 532, 538-39, 90 S.Ct. 1288, 1292-93, 25 L.Ed.2d 547, 553 (1970), the Supreme Court declined to set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission when the Interstate Commerce Commission failed to comply with its own regulations for processing applications for temporary operating authority, and stated: The rules were not intended primarily to confer important procedural benefits upon individuals in the face of otherwise unfettered discretion ... nor is this a case in which an agency required by rule to exercise independent discretion has failed to do so. Thus there is no reason to exempt this case from the general principle that `it is always within the discretion of a court or an administrative agency to relax or modify its procedural rules adopted for the orderly transaction of business before it when in a given case the ends of justice require it. The action of either in such a case is not reviewable except upon a showing of substantial prejudice to the complaining party.' ... Unlike some rules, the present ones are mere aids to the exercise of the agency's independent discretion. [Citations omitted.] [Emphasis added.] Thus, with American Farm Lines, the Supreme Court limited the Accardi doctrine by exempting agency housekeeping regulations unless the violation causes substantial prejudice. This is what is commonly known as the Accardi exception. In Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City v. James, 96 Md.App. 401, 421-22, 625 A.2d 361, 372, cert. denied, 332 Md. 382, 631 A.2d 452 (1993), the Court of Special Appeals, after discussing the Accardi exception, stated: Similarly, a failure to comply with a published statement of `policy,'or `internal documents' to guide employees, or agency `guidelines,' has been held not to invalidate agency action, absent a showing of prejudice. [Citations omitted.] [Emphasis added.] Then, in Anastasi v. Montgomery County, 123 Md.App. 472, 491 n. 8, 719 A.2d 980, 990 n. 8 (1998), the Court of Special Appeals, when discussing the Accardi doctrine and the James case, emphasized: As the James Court made clear, even if an agency rule does not have the force and effect of law (that is, even if it is simply interpretive, a statement of policy, or any other, lesser, rule of agency organization, procedure, or practice), a violation of that rule will still invalidate an agency's action if the complainant can show that he was substantially prejudiced by the violation. However, given that Administrative Procedure 4-8 does not have the force and effect of law ..., Anastasi does not have to make such a showing. [Emphasis added.] It is clear that the Court of Special Appeals has applied the Accardi exception and that if there is a showing of prejudice in such circumstances, a violation by the agency will still invalidate the agency's action. Nonetheless, to determine whether in the first instance an agency rule triggers the application of the Accardi doctrine, the Court of Special Appeals has further explained that Maryland courts generally look to see whether it `affects individual rights and obligations,' or whether it confers `important procedural benefits upon individuals.'  Anastasi, 123 Md.App. at 491, 719 A.2d at 990 (citation omitted). If so, under the Court of Special Appeals' cases the doctrine might apply. In the alternative, if the agency rule or regulation is determined to be one adopted for the orderly transaction of agency business, then the exception to the Accardi doctrine is applicable.