Opinion ID: 781039
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonable Likelihood

Text: 113 We also note that, if it is determined following an evidentiary hearing that counsel's trial performance was constitutionally deficient, it is highly likely that Strickland 's prejudice component would be satisfied. Under AEDPA, a federal habeas court must consider whether the Appellate Division's decision was an objectively unreasonable application of the teachings of the Supreme Court in Strickland  regarding the prejudice prong. Aeid v. Bennett, 296 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir.2002). Strickland 's prejudice inquiry looks at whether counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This requires the defendant to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability, under Strickland, is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 95 (2d Cir.2001). 114 Eze's conviction rested entirely on Chendo and Nnedi's stories, Henry's explanation of why sexually abused children tell inconsistent and changing stories, and Dr. Lazoritz's medical conclusions that sexual activity may have occurred. In each of these critical areas, Eze received representation of a quality that concerns us. It seems beyond dispute that the jury's decision to credit the girls' testimony went to the very heart of this case. Yet, the jury never learned that, in January 1992, the girls asked Henry whether Eze knew what their father had done to them. Similarly, to the extent that the girls told inconsistent and changing stories, the prosecution attempted to substantiate the girls' credibility through Henry's testimony on the behavioral stages of sexually abused children. Because the defense did not call a rebuttal expert, the jury may have accepted the girls' inconsistent stories in light of Henry's testimony. Were the credibility of the girls' stories identifying Eze as an assailant undermined, the link to Eze would have become all the more attenuated. In addition, without Dr. Lazoritz's medical conclusions, we doubt that the jury would have concluded that sexual assault occurred in 1991. The defense, however, inexplicably failed to show that Nnedi's 1988 medical examination reflected findings similar to those from 1992, which would have cast significant doubt as to whether Nnedi's physical condition existed prior to the alleged abuse in 1991. Further, although part of the methodology for Dr. Lazoritz's conclusions had been criticized by experts in the medical community, the defense failed to bring forward these questions either through an effective cross examination or through its own expert witness. Accordingly, Eze's counsel's inability to provide a convincing explanation for these critically important omissions would undermine our confidence in the outcome of the trial. See Aparicio, 269 F.3d at 95.