Opinion ID: 2634583
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Analysis under the Apprendi rationale

Text: If a trier of fact finds the premeditation allegation (§ 664(a)) true, a defendant's sentence for attempted murder increases from a determinate term of five, seven, or nine years to an indeterminate life term with the possibility of parole. (§ 664(a).) By expos[ing] the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348), section 664(a) is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury's guilty verdict. ( Apprendi, supra, at p. 494, fn. 19.) Indeed, in contrast to a doubled sentence ( id. at pp. 468-469, 120 S.Ct. 2348; Monge I, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 831, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 853, 941 P.2d 1121), or even an 18-year addition to a two-year sentence ( Almendarez-Torres, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 226, 118 S.Ct. 1219), the potential increase here is quite substantial. Significantly, unlike the sentence enhancements at issue in Monge I, supra, 16 Cal.4th 826, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 853, 941 P.2d 1121, and Almendarez-Torres, supra, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, section 664(a) does not involve a defendant's recidivism, which is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court's increasing an offender's sentence. [Citations.] ( Almendarez-Torres, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 243, 118 S.Ct. 1219; see also Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 488, 120 S.Ct. 2348.) The high court has made clear that recidivism is different for constitutional purposes. (See, e.g., Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 488, 490, 496, 120 S.Ct. 2348; Monge II, supra, 524 U.S. at p. 728, 118 S.Ct. 2246.) We have also made this difference clear. ( Monge I, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 838, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 853, 941 P.2d 1121.) In rejecting the argument that a failure of proof on a prior conviction allegation was like an acquittal at the guilt phase of a criminal trial, we noted in Monge I that a prior conviction trial is simple and straightforward as compared to the guilt phase of a criminal trial. Often it involves only the presentation of a certified copy of the prior conviction along with the defendant's photograph and fingerprints. In many cases, defendants offer no evidence at all, and the outcome is relatively predictable. ( Ibid. ) In contrast to a prior conviction allegation, a section 664(a) allegation requires the trier of fact to determine whether the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated before imposing the term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. The defendant's intent in committing a crime is perhaps as close as one might hope to come to a core criminal offense `element.' ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 493, 120 S.Ct. 2348.) Applying the rationale of Apprendi to this case, we conclude that [w]hereas recidivism `does not relate to the commission of the offense' itself, [citation], [section 664(a)'s] inquiry goes precisely to what happened in the `commission of the offense.' ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 496, 120 S.Ct. 2348.) Apprendi compels the conclusion that section 664(a) constitutes an element of the offense. ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 494, fn. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348.) In arguing that the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial here, the Attorney General seeks support in Hernandez, supra, 19 Cal.4th 835, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 754, 968 P.2d 465. In Hernandez, we rejected the argument that Monge II, supra, 524 U.S. 721, 118 S.Ct. 2246, was distinguishable because it dealt with a prior conviction allegation, and not an allegation that turned on the characterization of the present offense. ( Hernandez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 840, 842, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 754, 968 P.2d 465.) The high court spoke categorically in Monge, concluding that the federal double jeopardy clause does not apply to noncapital sentencing determinations and making no distinction between sentencing retrials that turn on the facts of the present offense and sentencing retrials that turn on the truth of the prior conviction allegation. ( Monge, supra, 524 U.S. at p. [724, 118 S.Ct. 2246].) ( Hernandez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 840, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 754, 968 P.2d 465.) We also stated that if, on remand, the Court of Appeal concludes that proof of specific intent is necessary [as an element of a serious felony under sections 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8), and 667, former subdivision (a)], the state and federal double jeopardy protections do not preclude retrial of that issue. ( Hernandez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 843, 80 Cal. Rptr.2d 754, 968 P.2d 465.) But Hernandez predated Apprendi, and it must be read in light of that decision. In Hernandez, we recognized that federal constitutional law may dictate that a sentence enhancement be treated as an element of an offense. We ultimately concluded, however, that in that case the prior conviction enhancement should not be treated as such. ( Hernandez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 840-842, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 754, 968 P.2d 465.) Apprendi now compels the conclusion that the premeditation allegation (§ 664(a)) constitutes an element of an offense. (See ante, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 185-189, 100 P.3d at pp. 875-878.) As we have explained above, section 664(a) is not a typical sentencing determination, like a prior conviction allegation, to which double jeopardy protections do not apply. (See Hernandez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 842, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 754, 968 P.2d 465.) As noted above, defendant argues that Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th 652, 49 Cal. Rptr.2d 732, 909 P.2d 1354, is distinguishable. (See ante, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 184, 100 P.3d at p. 874.) Unlike the situation here, where the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment based on its determination of evidentiary insufficiency, the jury in Bright was unable to make a finding on the premeditation allegation. ( Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 658, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 732, 909 P.2d 1354.) Neither a court nor a jury made a determination that the prosecution failed to prove its case. Significantly, [a] mistrial does not constitute a termination of jeopardy, and accordingly double jeopardy does not arise from the legal necessity of a mistrial. [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 662, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 732, 909 P.2d 1354.) This difference in procedural postures distinguishes Bright from the case here. [6] ( United States v. DiFrancesco (1980) 449 U.S. 117, 130-131, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 [federal double jeopardy clause bars retrial for evidentiary insufficiency but not for mistrial due to manifest necessity].) The Court of Appeal here found there was no evidence of defendant's deliberation or premeditation in his attempt to commit murder. Because the section 664(a) allegation effectively placed defendant in jeopardy for an offense ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 494, fn. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348), the Court of Appeal's determination of evidentiary insufficiency bars retrial of the allegation under the federal double jeopardy clause. [7] (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; Burks, supra, 437 U.S. at p. 16, 98 S.Ct. 2141.)