Opinion ID: 1124985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: assistance of counsel issues

Text: Porter alleges a number of instances of ineffectiveness of counsel at trial. Although he contends that the Idaho Constitution affords a broader right to effective counsel than the United States Constitution, he has failed to articulate any basis as to why we should apply a different standard in Idaho. Thus, we analyze Porter's allegations in terms of whether the conduct of Porter's counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, as that test is defined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Under the Strickland two-part test, the claimant bears the burden of proving that counsel's performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 680, 104 S.Ct. at 2060-61. In this analysis, counsel's effectiveness must be evaluated from the time of the alleged error, not in hindsight. Id. at 681, 104 S.Ct. at 2061. The claimant also must prove that the deficient performance prejudiced the claimant's case. Id. at 680, 104 S.Ct. at 2060-61. However, prejudice will be presumed if the defendant was denied counsel altogether or if counsel represented conflicting interests. Id. at 683, 104 S.Ct. at 2062. Although Porter asserts that he is not required to show prejudice, we have determined that the authority cited in support of his assertion is inapposite. Porter was not denied an opportunity to cross-examine any witnesses, nor was evidence essential to his argument inadvertently destroyed. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317-18, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110-11, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 12, 539 P.2d 556, 564 (1975). Thus, we conclude that prejudice will not be presumed. Porter points to eight separate alleged deficiencies to support his contention that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and we will address each of these. When reviewing a defendant's allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, we will not second-guess trial counsel's strategic and tactical choices. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988). Furthermore, on review, we presume that trial counsel was competent and that trial tactics were based on sound legal strategy. Id., 760 P.2d at 1177. Porter initially contends that his counsel was inexperienced in defending capital cases and had not attended any continuing legal education courses regarding such cases. In Aragon, this Court determined that counsel's experience was not dispositive to a claim of ineffective counsel. Id., 760 P.2d at 1177. Rather, a meritorious claim must focus on counsel's performance, as it weighs against an objective standard. Id. at 761-62, 760 P.2d at 1177-78. Thus, we conclude that Porter's first claim, on its own, is without merit. Porter next asserts that his counsel failed to request co-counsel in a timely fashion and that this failure falls below a reasonable standard of representation. As discussed in Part II, B, supra, the state of Idaho has not recognized a need for the appointment of two defense counsel to a capital case, and we do not believe that defense counsel's failure to satisfy the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases is ineffective per se. In hindsight, we recognize that, in the present case, only one defense attorney may have been overwhelmed by the prosecution's manpower. However, this Court will not resort to hindsight when it reviews a defense attorney's failure to request co-counsel in a timely manner, nor will we accept Porter's invitation to adopt the ABA standard that recommends the appointment of two defense counsel in death penalty cases. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 680, 104 S.Ct. at 2060-61. Thus, we conclude that the failure of Porter's counsel to request co-counsel in a timely fashion was not deficient. Porter contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to file a motion for a change of venue. According to Porter's trial counsel, the decision not to file for a change of venue was based on trial strategy, including the difficulty associated with trying a case out of town. Porter's counsel additionally expressed doubt that the district court would have granted the motion. On appeal, this Court will not second-guess trial strategy, and, therefore, we conclude that this claim also fails. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. See also Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct.App. 1995). Porter additionally claims that his counsel failed to make discovery requests, alleging that this failure constituted ineffective counsel. We disagree. Although the failure to make discovery requests may rise to the level of inadequate trial preparation and, thus, ineffective assistance of counsel, the claimant must allege what evidence was discoverable that counsel failed to uncover. Tucker, 97 Idaho at 12-13, 539 P.2d at 564-65. Porter has not met this burden. Porter asserts that his counsel failed to file a motion to suppress but does not identify the evidence that his counsel should have requested that the district court suppress. Presumably, the evidence that Porter contends should have been suppressed, however, was his guitar case, which had both the victim's blood and strands of Porter's hair on it. Thus, we examine Porter's allegation, as it relates to the failure to suppress the guitar case. Defense counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress will constitute ineffective counsel if the reviewing court determines that the evidence at issue would have been suppressed. Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 795, 702 P.2d 826, 833 (1985). There was a question that Porter's guitar case was seized illegally. The search warrant was issued December 27, 1988, but the executing officers did not seize the guitar case at that time. Three weeks later, at the request of law enforcement officers, Porter's brother took the guitar case to the Idaho County Sheriff's Office. Prior to trial, there was some speculation that Porter's brother had retrieved the guitar case without Porter's permission from a room in which Porter had been residing, but the possibility of an illegal seizure was not explored further. Although we question the decision of Porter's counsel not to file a motion to suppress, we may not second-guess trial strategy. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. Porter's trial counsel testified at the post-conviction relief proceeding that Porter had led him to believe that the whereabouts of the guitar case could be explained innocently [2] and, therefore, that he had dismissed the possibility of attempting to suppress the guitar case. Given this explanation, we conclude that Porter's defense counsel's actions simply were trial strategy and, thus, hold that his conduct did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Porter additionally asserts that his counsel failed to challenge for cause or to assert peremptory challenges to potential jurors. Porter's counsel, however, testified at the post-conviction relief proceeding that, during voir dire of the jury, there was no indication of juror prejudice resulting from media exposure to the case. Therefore, according to Porter's counsel, such challenges were unnecessary, and we will not question that decision. Porter claims that his counsel also rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to call expert witnesses at trial. In order for this claim to succeed, Porter must assert facts that would have been discovered by additional investigation and should offer expert testimony that would have been produced if the funds to hire the experts had been requested. Charboneau, 116 Idaho at 139, 774 P.2d at 309. Porter points to the experts called at the post-conviction relief proceeding to satisfy this burden. Those individuals include a clinical psychologist who testified that hair pulling was common among men who physically abused women; a clinical neuropsychologist who testified that Porter is intellectually deficient; [3] and a forensic pathologist who testified regarding the commonality of hair loss in victims of violent crimes, the errors made during the autopsy of the victim's body, the difficulties presented by the cremation of the body, and the possibility that the victim did not die as a result of torture. We are somewhat troubled by the fact that Porter's counsel made no attempt at all to employ a pathologist to review the autopsy and to give an independent opinion, especially since the district court had approved funds for an expert witness in pathology. We also have some question about trial counsel's failure to request any kind of psychologist to determine Porter's capabilities, particularly since his IQ apparently is not much better than Cooper's IQ. Nonetheless, we do not believe that this conduct was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Porter additionally asserts that his trial counsel failed to prepare adequately. To succeed, this claim must be supported by evidence of facts or defenses that could have been developed with further preparation. Id., 774 P.2d at 309. We do not believe that Porter has met his burden. Furthermore, based upon our findings regarding Porter's other allegations, we conclude that his counsel's performance was reasonable and, therefore, that his counsel's preparation was adequate. We are not prepared to conclude that Porter's counsel at trial was stellar. However, we believe that Porter has failed to overcome the presumption announced in Aragon that trial counsel's performance was competent and that trial tactics were based on sound legal strategy. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. Consequently, we do not believe that, overall, the performance of Porter's trial counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Porter points to only two alleged deficiencies at the sentencing phase. On review, we apply the same standards to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing as we applied above to Porter's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 104 S.Ct. at 2052; Aragon, 114 Idaho at 758, 760 P.2d at 1174. Porter contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a motion in limine regarding statements Porter might make during the interview that would be conducted pursuant to preparation of the presentence investigation report. Initially, we note that the failure to file a motion is considered deficient performance by counsel if there were a reasonable probability that the motion would have been meritorious. Hassett, 127 Idaho at 316, 900 P.2d at 224. Given that the sentencing court orders a presentence investigation report and that sentencing hearings are governed by extremely lenient evidentiary rules, see I.R.E. 101(e)(3), we do not believe that a motion to exclude evidence from a presentence investigation report would have been granted. Furthermore, Porter's counsel testified at the post-conviction relief proceeding that, because Porter maintained innocence, there was no need to be concerned that Porter would tell the presentence investigator anything different than Porter had revealed while testifying at trial. Thus, Porter's claim does not satisfy the standards set forth in Strickland and Aragon. Porter also claims that his counsel's preparation for the sentencing hearing was deficient because his counsel failed to present mitigation evidence. We recognize that a situation such as this presents defense counsel with a dilemma. When a defendant maintains innocence, it is exceptionally difficult for defense counsel to present evidence demonstrating remorse or explaining why the defendant committed the crime. Faced with this problem, Porter's counsel presented only basic background information, including evidence that Porter was verbally and physically abused by an alcoholic father. Nonetheless, Porter claims that a mitigation report similar to the one that the district court properly excluded at the sentencing hearing could have convinced the sentencing court to impose a sentence less severe than death. We disagree. We have indicated that we will not second-guess defense counsel's decisions, and we believe this principle properly applies to the present issue. See Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. Although the mitigation report contained additional psychological evaluations of Porter, it also contained many documents that were irrelevant and, moreover, inadmissible. Consequently, we conclude that Porter has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that his counsel was deficient in not producing the additional allegedly mitigating evidence.