Opinion ID: 3153229
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Interaction While Smoking

Text: Turning to the petitioner’s other assertion of jury misconduct, it is well-settled that when a juror allegedly engages in a private communication with a third party about the matter on trial, the trial court is required to hold a hearing and consider the claim: In any case where there are allegations of any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about a matter pending before the jury not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial with full knowledge of the parties; it is the duty of the trial judge upon learning of the alleged communication, contact, or tampering, to conduct a hearing as soon as is practicable, with all parties present; a record made in order to fully consider any evidence of influence or prejudice; and thereafter to make findings and conclusions as to whether such communication, contact, or tampering was prejudicial to the defendant to the extent that he has not received a fair trial. Sutphin, 195 W.Va. at 553-54, 466 S.E.2d at 404-05, syl. pt. 2. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court held that when there has been alleged prohibited contact with a juror, the trial court “should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate.” 20 Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 230 (1954). “[T]he remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982). This hearing, commonly referred to as a “Remmer hearing,” was held by the circuit court herein when considering the petitioner’s post-trial motions. During a Remmer hearing, the person seeking a new trial must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that improper influence on a juror occurred and affected the verdict. See Sutphin, 195 W.Va. at 553, 466 S.E.2d at 404, syl. pt. 1 (quoted above). Proof of the mere opportunity to influence the jury is insufficient to warrant a new trial. Id. We recently emphasized that “the mere allegation of juror misconduct is insufficient to warrant a new trial. . . . [There] must be proof that some improper event has occurred. Misconduct on the part of the jury as grounds for a new trial is not presumed but must be fully proved by the moving party.” State v. Trail, __ W.Va. __, __ S.E.2d __, 2015 WL 5928478, slip op.  (W.Va. Oct. 7, 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation. Were that the rule, few trials would be constitutionally acceptable. The safeguards of juror impartiality, such as voir dire and protective instructions from the trial judge, are not infallible; it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote. Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences 21 when they happen. Such determinations may properly be made at a hearing like that ordered in Remmer[.] Id., slip op.  16 (quoting Smith, 455 U.S. at 217). If the moving party proves that some improper event involving a juror did occur, the trial court must then determine whether that event affected the juror to the prejudice of the moving party. In that regard, we have held that [i]n the absence of any evidence that an interested party induced juror misconduct, no jury verdict will be reversed on the ground of juror misconduct unless the defendant proves by clear and convincing evidence that the misconduct has prejudiced the defendant to the extent that the defendant has not received a fair trial. Sutphin, 195 W.Va. at 554, 466 S.E.2d at 405, syl. pt. 3. If, however, the juror misconduct was induced or participated in by an interested party, prejudice will be presumed and must be rebutted. Legg v. Jones, 126 W.Va. 757, 763, 30 S.E.2d 76, 80 (1944); State v. Daniel, 182 W.Va. 643, 647, 391 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1990); Sutphin, 195 W.Va. at 559-60, 466 S.E.2d at 410-11; Bluestone Indust., Inc. v. Keneda, 232 W.Va. 139, 143, 751 S.E.2d 25, 29 (2013). Ultimately, if the court concludes that there was prejudicial juror misconduct, a new trial is warranted. Legg, 126 W.Va. at 757, 30 S.E.2d at 77, syl. pt. 3 (“Misconduct of a juror, prejudicial to the complaining party, is sufficient reason . . . to set aside a verdict returned by the jury of which he is a member.”). 22 In both Trail and Sutphin, there was no question that a juror had, in fact, conversed with a non-juror about the trial. Those cases focused on the issue of prejudice, including whether the juror was induced to commit misconduct by an interested party such that prejudice is presumed. By contrast, following the Remmer hearing held in the case at bar, the circuit court found that the petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that any misconduct had even occurred. The judge expressed doubt about the credibility and motivation of Ms. Grindstaff and Ms. Branham. Not only are they close family members of the petitioner, they asserted so many instances of misconduct that the court found their claims to be suspect. The court concluded that, at most, the petitioner established the mere opportunity to influence a juror which, under Johnson and Sutphin, is insufficient to prove juror misconduct. Johnson, 111 W.Va. at 654, 164 S.E. at 32, syl. pt. 7; Sutphin, 195 W.Va. at 553, 466 S.E.2d at 404, syl. pt. 1. However, under the particular circumstances of this case, where two witnesses provided sworn, detailed testimony claiming to have seen the victim and a juror socializing with one another over the course of multiple days of trial, we are concerned that the circuit court rejected the allegations without hearing from any of the people who allegedly engaged in the conduct: Juror Crites, Sherman Truax, and, to a lesser extent, Nicholas Truax. Sutphin requires a “full consider[ation]” of the evidence pertaining to alleged juror misconduct. 195 W.Va. at 553-54, 466 S.E.2d at 404-05, syl. pt. 2. While the circuit court may have been 23 correct in finding that no misconduct occurred, we are unable to confirm this conclusion from the record before us. Furthermore, Rule 606(b)10 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence expressly permits limited testimony from a juror on the issue of improper outside influence or extraneous prejudicial information. Although the petitioner subpoenaed Juror Crites to the post-trial hearing and asked to take her testimony, the circuit court refused to allow it. United States v. Brantley, 733 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1984), is instructive. In Brantley, the co-defendants, who were convicted of drug-smuggling offenses, moved for a 10 Rule 606(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, as it was written at the time of the petitioner’s post-trial hearing in August of 2014, provided as follows: (b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. – Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question [of] whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror’s affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter upon which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes. Id. (emphasis added.) Effective September 2, 2014, this Court amended Rule 606 to improve its organization and clarity, but those changes are immaterial to the issues in this appeal. 24 new trial arguing that an improper extrinsic influence on the jury had denied them a fair trial. Reportedly, one juror, Angela Blige, had told the other jurors that she personally knew CoDefendant James Murray’s daughter and thus knew that Murray had “been in this kind of trouble before.” Id. at 1439. Although the trial judge held hearings on the claim of juror misconduct, the judge conducted his own inquiry of Juror Blige, refusing to allow counsel for the parties to question her, and did not allow testimony from other jurors who may have been impacted by the statement. Id. Based on this review, the trial court concluded that the co-defendants failed to prove their allegation of jury misconduct. Id. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that “[a] party claiming that an improperly influenced jury returned a verdict against him must be given an opportunity to prove that claim.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The appellate court ultimately concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion by conducting an insufficient investigation into the allegation. Id. at 1440. Finding no other error, the appellate court conditionally affirmed Murray’s conviction but remanded the case back to the trial court for a more complete hearing on the juror misconduct claim. Id. at 1441. We conclude that in the case at bar, the circuit court abused its discretion by denying the petitioner’s motion for a new trial without permitting him to elicit testimony from Juror Crites on the limited issue of any communication she may have had with the Truaxes during trial. By refusing to allow this requested testimony, the circuit court unduly 25 restricted the petitioner’s opportunity to prove his claim of juror misconduct. The serious and detailed nature of these allegations warrant a Remmer hearing where the persons alleged to have committed the misconduct are allowed to participate.11 Accordingly, we remand this case to the circuit court for an additional post-trial Remmer hearing. The circuit court is directed to permit the petitioner to subpoena and take sworn testimony from Juror Crites regarding any communication she may have had with the Truaxes during trial recesses. Moreover, either party shall also be permitted to subpoena and take sworn testimony on this issue from Sherman and Nicholas Truax. If the evidence on remand confirms the circuit court’s previous conclusion that no jury misconduct was proven, then the circuit court should reaffirm its denial of the motion for new trial. However, if on 11 We must emphasize that not every allegation of juror misconduct requires that the challenged juror be called to testify. The decision on whether to hear juror testimony depends on the facts and the accusations, and how well the accusations are supported by the moving party. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals surveyed decisions from various federal courts and determined that the cases fall along a continuum focusing on two factors. At one end of the spectrum the cases focus on the certainty that some impropriety has occurred. The more speculative or unsubstantiated the allegation of [juror] misconduct, the less the burden to investigate. . . . At the other end of the continuum lies the seriousness of the accusation. The more serious the potential jury contamination, especially where alleged extrinsic influence is involved, the heavier the burden to investigate. United States v. Caldwell, 776 F.2d 989, 998 (11th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). 26 remand the circuit court finds clear and convincing evidence that juror misconduct occurred, the circuit court must then determine whether there was prejudice that warrants a new trial. In summary, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support the petitioner’s convictions, and we find no merit to his claims of trial error. However, we conditionally affirm the petitioner’s conviction based on our limited remand of this case to the circuit court for an additional Remmer hearing, as discussed herein. See Brantley, 733 F.2d at 1441 (conditionally affirming criminal conviction subject to remand hearing to review issue of juror misconduct); State v. Bibb, 626 So.2d 913 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (same); cf. Syl. Pt. 1, Perrine v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co., 225 W.Va. 482, 694 S.E.2d 815 (2010) (conditionally affirming civil case, in part, subject to outcome of hearing on remand regarding statute of limitations).