Opinion ID: 2551505
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the opc's motion for a protective order

Text: ¶ 45 Pendleton next claims that the disciplinary court erred in granting the OPC's motion for a protective order and thus providing relief from any obligation to respond to Pendleton's interrogatories. As discussed above, the district court is granted broad discretion in whether to enter a protective order. See R. & R. Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1079 (Utah 1997). We will `not find abuse of discretion absent an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial court's rulings.' Id. (quoting Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1996)). ¶ 46 The disciplinary court granted the OPC's motion for a protective order on two bases. First, the disciplinary court held that at the time Pendleton's interrogatories were filed and served, the only aspect of this case to be concluded was the sanctions hearing, and thus, any proper discovery request would have to be limited to matters covered by rule 4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and matters in aggravation or mitigation of the sanctions to be imposed. Examining Pendleton's interrogatories, however, the court concluded: [N]one of the interrogatories, except for the request to identify contemplated witnesses, would lead to admissible evidence on this final issue or they cover privileged or confidential information; [Pendleton's requests] are cumulative since much of the information requested is already in the record by way of deposition or transcript; [and the requests] call[] for mental impressions, conclusions or legal theories of the Utah State Bar or [its] attorneys. Second, the court noted that the interrogatories were signed by Pendleton, not by his attorney of record, as required by rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [5] ¶ 47 We conclude that both bases on which the disciplinary court entered a protective order were proper. First, as the court correctly noted, the interrogatories would not lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, were cumulative, and called for OPC work product. Pendleton's interrogatories included, for example, such requests as [i]dentify your ultimate objective in the instant case and identify the criteria by which it was established; [s]tate whether or not disciplinary counsel is subject to any professional discipline under the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability or under any other established regimen [sic]; and [i]dentify the factors which have lead [sic] you to conclude that allegations of professional misconduct which you advanced in your petition can be appropriately asserted as grounds for permanent discipline in your formal complaint whether or not Judge Bunnell found merit in them. As the disciplinary court correctly concluded, these requests would not lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and they lack any other justifiable legal basis for discovery. It was therefore proper for the disciplinary court to grant relief from Pendleton's interrogatories. ¶ 48 Second, the disciplinary court properly concluded that it was necessary under rule 11 for Pendleton's discovery request to be signed by his attorney of record. At the time the requested discovery was served, Pendleton was not acting pro se; rather, his attorney of record was Jim R. Scarth. Thus, it was necessary under rule 11 for Mr. Scarth to sign Pendleton's discovery request. Because Mr. Scarth did not sign the request, the disciplinary court properly ruled that Pendleton had failed to meet the requirements of rule 11. In sum, the disciplinary court did not abuse its discretion by entering a protective order to relieve the OPC from Pendleton's substantively and procedurally improper discovery request.