Opinion ID: 2390645
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Brown's Conduct in the Officer's Presence.

Text: The government contends that additional support for the seizure was provided by what it describes as Brown's attempt to evade the officer. On the particular facts of this case, we think that the significance of the evidence of evasion was marginal at most. To attach substantial importance to it would improperly penalize Brown for the exercise of his constitutional rights. The allegedly evasive conduct to which the government alludes [15] consisted of Brown's attempt to walk away when Officer Walker spoke to him. The officer acknowledged that Brown did stop after the officer pressed the point. We recently observed in Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 316-17 (D.C.1989) ( en banc ) that [t]ypically, in those cases in which we have found that flight indicated a consciousness of guilt, the accused clearly knew that police were present and reacted by immediately running from the scene of the alleged crime. (Emphasis added). That is not what occurred here. Brown did not run. There was no flight. Officer Walker's testimony established that Brown was not eager to have a discussion with a policeman in uniform. The trial judge found no more [16] and there was no more. Citizens have no legal obligation to talk to the police. In re D.J., 532 A.2d 138, 141 (D.C.1987); see Cobb v. Standard Drug Co., 453 A.2d 110, 112 (D.C.1982). A police officer may approach a citizen on the street and speak to him if the citizen is willing to listen, but the latter has the right to proceed on his way without answering the officer's question and without listening, and may not be detained solely for doing so. D.J., supra, 532 A.2d at 142. [D]eparture ... from an imminent intrusion cannot bootstrap an illegal detention into one that is legal. To permit such justification would be effectively to create a duty to respond to the police, and would seriously intrude upon the liberty and privacy interests which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We recently held en banc that [l]eaving a scene hastily may be inspired by innocent fear, or by a legitimate desire to avoid contact with the police. A citizen has as much prerogative to avoid the police as he does to avoid any other person, and his efforts to do so, without more, may not justify his detention. Smith, supra, 558 A.2d at 316; accord, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion). To say that a citizen is free to leave without responding to the officer's questions, see Lawrence v. United States, 566 A.2d 57, 60-62 (D.C.1989), is meaningless if the exercise of that freedom generates authority for a seizure where none previously existed. This is not to say that a suspect's behavior on the scene is of no consequence. Conduct by the individual which suggests he is attempting to flee from a crime may also be taken into account with the available description. LAFAVE, supra, § 3.4(c), at 748. Where a suspect reacts in an unusual way to police investigation short of detention, this may properly be included in the calculus. State v. Baldic, 131 N.H. 225, 226-27, 551 A.2d 977, 978 (1988) (opinion per Souter, J.). Brown's brief attempt to exercise his right not to participate in an encounter with Officer Walker, however, did not constitute the kind of conduct on the scene that could significantly bolster the government's showing of probable cause or articulable suspicion. [17]