Opinion ID: 1704873
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Framework as Applied to These Circumstances

Text: The circumstances in each case must be applied within this general framework to determine the context-specific meaning of the various words included within this version of section 448.24(1)(b). Again, the Legislature could have utilized a fixed rate but, instead, chose to provide flexibility for that which constitutes a reasonable amount under discrete circumstances. Here, we conclude that the trial court's interpretation of the terms public transportation and geographic area was reasonable under these circumstances. In ruling that WTS was not liable to Liner under section 448.24(1)(b), the trial court made the following findings with regard to the meaning of public transportation and geographic area: 1. Public transportation is not limited to bus travel.... 3. Geographic area in this case means the tri[-]county area since that is the area serviced by WTS and the area within which Mr. Liner worked. On the facts of this case, we conclude that the trial court's interpretation of geographic area to refer to the tri-county area is supported by competent, substantial evidence from the record. During the evidentiary hearing, reasonable testimony established that transportation for this tri-county area is not planned exclusively on a county-by-county basis but, instead, is predicated upon a tri-county basis published by the South Florida Regional Transportation Authority. The record establishes that the rates for intra-county travel in South Florida vary between Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. For example, the bus fare for travel within Broward County between December 2002 and March 2004 was $1.00 per ride, whereas the bus fare within Palm Beach County during the same time period was $1.25 per ride. [9] Regardless, the trial court correctly deduced that, even if the geographic area consisted solely of Broward County, this determination would not have altered its ultimate ruling that WTS is not liable to Liner under the Act. The trial court reasoned: In order for Mr. Liner to prevail on his claim based on these facts public transportation must mean travel exclusively by bus. Any other form of public transportation would be more expensive than that charged by WTS. Even the bus in combination with any other form of public transportation would be more expensive than that charged by WTS. The concept of public transportation simply cannot be limited to bus travel in this area, and under the circumstances of the instant case, Liner cannot prevail. The Legislature intended for the phrase to or from the designated worksite to modify the entire second clause of section 448.24(1)(b). Thus, in the context of any particular case, public transportation cannot be limited to a form of transportation that does not provide site-to-site service to the relevant worksites. This conclusion is supported by the statutory definitions that the Legislature has provided for this same term in other legislation: Public transportation is not limited to bus service but, instead, also includes motor vehicle[s] [10] and other means of conveyance operating as a common carrier. §§ 163.566(8), 343.62(5), Fla. Stat. (2004). Additionally, in a separate statute, the Legislature defined public transit as including both governmentally owned and privately owned transportation systems and also paratransit, which is defined as taxis, dial-a-ride buses, and other means of conveyance that provide service between  specific origins  and are characterized by their nonscheduled, nonfixed route nature. § 341.031(5)-(6), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis supplied). We conclude that the Legislature similarly intended for the term public transportationas enacted within the context of section 448.24(1)to have a broad, general meaning to allow for flexible application under different, specific factual circumstances involving different, specific locations. Here, the record establishes that bus service in Broward County did not provide site-to-site service to the Broward County WTS worksites. During the evidentiary hearing, competent, substantial evidence established that distances remained between the nearest arrival bus stops and any of the Broward County worksites included within the sample. These additional distances did not exist when the day laborers used the site-to-site van service of WTS. Thus, the cost associated with the distance from the nearest arrival bus stop to the worksite (and vice versa at the end of the workday) must be taken into account to determine whether WTS's transportation charge of $1.50which encompassed site-to-site transportation to or from the designated worksiteconstituted a reasonable amount. The evidence established that the least expensive form of site-to-site public transportation that could service these additional distances under such circumstances would be taxi service. Further, the record establishes that (1) the taxi companies of Broward County could provide service from these arrival bus stops to the worksites; (2) the rates for taxi service in Broward County are established by the Broward County Board of County Commissioners; and (3) the rate for the first one-eighth of a mile (or any lesser distance) is $1.50. When this cost of taxi service from the arrival bus stop to the designated worksite (i.e., $1.50) is added to the cost of bus travel from the labor hall in Broward County to the arrival bus stop (i.e., $1.00), it becomes apparent that WTS's transportation charge of $1.50 did not exceed the cost of public transportation to the designated worksite. [11] Consequently, the term public transportation cannot be limited exclusively to the cost of bus travel under the circumstances of the instant case, and for that reason alone, WTS is not liable to Liner under section 448.24(1)(b).