Opinion ID: 2378907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony Relating to the Gun in Victim Taylor's Briefcase

Text: The state called Detective Cantwell, who testified that investigators found Taylor's briefcase at the crime scene. On cross-examination, defense counselover the state's relevancy objectionelicited the following testimony from Detective Cantwell: Q: Okay. And I'd like to show you Defendant's Exhibit A. Would you look at that, please. A: (The witness complies.) Q: Do you recognize that photograph? A: Yes, I do. Q: Is that a blow-up of a photograph that you took? A: Yes, it is. Q: What does that photograph show? A: This photograph shows this same briefcase being propped open with a Bible taken from inside and showing a.32 automatic inside. Q: What is the condition of that .32 automatic? A: It's probably in fair condition. The hammer is cocked. Q: The hammer is cocked? Was the weapon loaded at the time that you found it? A: At the time I found it, it was determined to be loaded. I did not make that determination though. The state later called Detective Leyshock, who testifiedover defense objectionthat two days before the murder, Taylor stated that he was going to start carrying a gun because he had heard the Shurns were going to kill him. The trial court instructed the jury to limit its consideration of the testimony only to show Taylor's state of mind, and not to consider it for its truth. The state also called Taylor's wife, who testified that Taylor carried a gun after hearing he was in danger, that Shurn's brother Larry had given Taylor a thumbs-down gesture at the courthouse during Larry's trial, and that the word out on the street was that Shurn was going to kill him. The court again instructed the jury to consider the testimony only as to Taylor's state of mind and not for its truth. Shurn now contends that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony regarding Taylor's state of mind because it was hearsay and irrelevant. A hearsay statement is any out-ofcourt statement used to prove the truth of the matter asserted. State v. Harris, 620 S.W.2d 349, 355 (Mo. banc 1981). Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible. See State v. Summers, 362 S.W.2d 537, 543 (Mo. 1962). Citing State v. Lingar, 726 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 206, 98 L.Ed.2d 157 (1987), the state argues that Shurn opened the door to this evidence. In Lingar , this Court stated that where the defendant has injected an issue into the case, the State may be allowed to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence in order to explain or counteract a negative inference raised by the issue the defendant injects. Id. at 734-35 ( citing State v. Starr, 492 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Mo. banc 1973)). In Starr, defense counsel asked a detectiveon cross-examinationwhere he learned that the murder weapon was in the defendant's basement. Id. at 799. The detective responded that James Goodlow had given him the information. Id. On re-direct, the prosecutor asked the detective whether Goodlow had explained how he knew the weapon was in the defendant's basement. Id. Defense counsel made a hearsay objection, which the trial court overruled. Id. at 800. On appeal, this Court held that the trial court did not err in overruling the objection, because defense counsel had first injected the issue into the case. Id. Starr and Lingar thus rely on the doctrine of curative admissibility: where the defendant introduces inadmissible evidence, the state may then use evidenceeven if inadmissibleto explain or counteract any negative inference raised by the defendant's inadmissible evidence. 1 Wigmore Evidence § 15 (Tillers rev. 1983). Citing Lingar the state contends that Shurn injected the issue of the gun into the case, raising a negative inference that Taylornot Shurn nor his accomplice William Weaverwas the aggressor. However, the state misreads Lingar . Lingar and the curative admissibility doctrinedoes not apply to this case, because Shurn's evidence that Taylor possessed a gun was admissible to show that Taylor was the aggressor. Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 167 (1985). However, the statements by Detective Leyshock and Ms. Taylor were admissible under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule. A victim's statements of fear of the defendantwhere relevant and not unduly prejudicialare admissible under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule. State v. Boliek, 706 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 903, 107 S.Ct. 302, 93 L.Ed.2d 276 (1986); see also Wigmore on Evidence § 1730 at 148 (1976). Shurn contends that the testimony about Taylor's state of mind was inadmissible because it was irrelevant. The victim's statements of fear are relevant where the defendant argues selfdefense. See United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 768-69, 773-74 (D.C.Cir.1973); People v. Armendariz, 37 Cal.3d 573, 209 Cal.Rptr. 664, 671, 693 P.2d 243, 251 (1984); State v. Langley, 354 N.W.2d 389, 398-99 (Minn.1984). Shurn did not raise self-defense, but did argue that Taylor was the aggressor and that Weaver reacted by shooting Taylor. Nevertheless, a self-defense theory and Shurn's theory both contend that the victim was the aggressor. Taylor's fear of Shurn was therefore relevant to whether and how Taylor would be an aggressor in response to Shurn and an accomplice. Shurn argues that he did not raise this issue until after Detective Leyshock and Ms. Taylor testified. However, when the issue of the gun-in-the-briefcase first arosejust before the above-quoted transcript excerpt Shurn's counsel specifically stated that his theory in the case is going to be that this man [Taylor] had this weapon and this man was going to use this weapon before he was killed. Defense counsel did not request a self-defense or defense-of-others instruction, but these instructions would have been inconsistent with Shurn's evidence. Shurn testified that Taylor was the aggressor and that Weaver not Shurnreacted to Taylor's reaching for the gun. During opening argument (deferred until the close of the state's evidence), defense counsel stated that when confronted by Shurn and Weaver, Taylor reached in his briefcase and began to pull this gun out and it was cocked. During closing argument, defense counsel further stated: Mr. Westfall [the prosecutor] finally got to the probably major piece of evidence in this case, the gun in the briefcase. That's the way he described it. Well, he [the prosecutor] knows he's got to deal with that gun in that briefcase. He cannot overlook it. And what does he tell you about that gun in the briefcase? Well, this man [Taylor] is walking around with a cocked pistol in his briefcase with a round in the chamber with an automatic. I don't know how many of you know anything about guns, but you don't walk around with a cocked automatic in your briefcase with a round in the chamber. You just don't do that. You could drop the briefcase and the gun could go off, or you might shoot yourself in the foot. You don't do that. Charles Taylor had that gun cocked in that briefcase because he had tried to get it out and he was stopped by William Weaver as he tried to get that gun out of the briefcase. Daryl told you that while he was talking to Charles Taylor, Taylor came out with this briefcase and some other objects in his hand. Well, Mr. Westfall wants to make you believe that Charles Taylor had to be a juggler in order to get to this briefcase. All you've got to do is pop it open and reach in (demonstrating) and start to pull that gun out. And then William Weaver jumps over, pushes you in your chest, drops you back. You drop that gun and the chase is on. Because Weaver has his gun out. Shurn's counsel injected the issue that Taylor was the aggressor. Taylor's fear of Shurn was therefore relevant, and the trial court properly allowed the state to introduce evidence of Taylor's state-of-mind for carrying the gun.