Opinion ID: 1963790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Availability of a Cy Pres Approach

Text: The issue remaining to be addressed, then, is whether the charitable trust created by Miriam Winslow having failed, there may be a cy pres administration of the trust on the basis that the settlor had manifested a general charitable intent. Snow v. President and Trustees of Bowdoin College, 133 Me. 195, 175 A. 268 (1934); Bancroft v. Maine State Sanatorium Association, 119 Me. 56, 109 A. 585 (1920). Ascertainment of the presence, or absence, of general charitable intent requires an ad hoc scrutiny of the settlor's intent in specific relation to the fact that the particular gift made has failed. Snow v. President and Trustees of Bowdoin College, supra; Robert W. Traip Academy v. Staples, Me., 317 A.2d 816 (1974); 4 Scott on Trusts (3rd Ed.) § 399. More precisely, then, our inquiry must focus upon determining whether Miriam Winslow viewed the exact original location of Winslow Park as essential to her scheme, preferring its extinction at any future date to continuance at another site. We decide that she did not. The authorities furnish us with some general guidance. Thus, the absence of an express reverter has often been held indicative of general charitable intent. Pierce v. How, 153 Me. 180, 200, 136 A.2d 510 (1957); Louisa T. York Orphan Asylum v. Erwin, Me., 281 A.2d 453, 457 (1971); Petition of Rochester Trust Company, 94 N.H. 207, 208, 49 A.2d 922 (1946). An order permitting administration cy pres is more appropriate once the trust has been performed than at the outset. Pierce v. How, supra, 153 Me. at 194, 136 A.2d 510; 4 Scott on Trusts, supra, § 399.3 at 3111. Conversely, where the dispositive instrument clearly shows an attachment to one object, or one donee, the subject property will revert to the donor's estate. Snow v. President and Trustees of Bowdoin College, supra, 133 Me. at 200, 175 A. 268, citing, inter alia, Gilman v. Burnett, 116 Me. 382, 102 A. 108 (1917) and Bancroft v. Maine State Sanatorium Association, supra. Likewise, an order permitting administration cy pres of a trust established to further a purpose already accomplished is normally inappropriate. Doyle v. Whalen, 87 Me. 414, 32 A. 1022 (1895); 4 Scott on Trusts, supra, § 399.3 at 3112-3113. In light of these guidelines, we find the wording of Miriam Winslow's 1903 deed, as read in view of surrounding factors, to be more indicative of a general charitable intent by Miss Winslow than a purpose by her that her gift be operative only as restricted to its precise terms. We previously noted the absence of any express reverter other than the provision directing forfeiture for failure to complete construction within two years. See n. 20, supra. Indeed, the inclusion in the document of an express reverter limited to the initial two-year period enhances the significance of the absence of a like provision applicable after that period. Had she wished, Miriam Winslow evidently knew how to direct reversion to her heirs. We, therefore, conclude that her desire was otherwise. Also persuasive is the fact that the trust has failed of specific performance after successful operation for half a century. The inclination of Courts to favor cy pres administration once a charitable trust has been in effect has, basically, two theoretical underpinnings. One is a dictate of practicality:the ascertainment and location of remote heirs after the passage of time entails difficulty and expense tending to discourage the finding of an intended reversion. 4 Scott on Trusts, supra, § 399.3 at 3111. The instant case presents no such problems, since the heirs have apparently come forward without delay. To the extent that the potential for practical difficulties enters into assessment of the donor's intent, however, the theory is consistent with our view of Miriam Winslow's wishes. A second rationale for the favoring of cy pres administration of an operating charitable trust is that cy pres will more likely fulfill the donor's intent: `The court can fairly infer an expectation on the part of the settlor that in course of time circumstances might so change that the particular purpose could no longer be carried out, and that in such a case the settlor would prefer a modification of his scheme rather than that the charitable trusts should fail and the property be distributed among his heirs who might be very numerous and only remotely related to him.' Pierce v. How, 153 Me. 180, 194-195, 136 A.2d 510, 518 (1957), citing Restatement of the Law, Trusts, § 399.f. We find appropriate, here, an inference that the donor would have preferred modification of her original plan, carried on successfully for 50 years, to a distribution of condemnation proceeds to remote [21] heirs. Further, we are satisfied, as we explain more fully below, that Miriam Winslow did not manifest an attachment to the original site sufficiently strong to bar removal, through the medium of cy pres, to another site nearby. We stress, too, that this is not a case where the donor's purpose has been fully accomplished; instead, the park was to be maintained in perpetuity. We find no Maine case presenting the special duality of purpose evidenced by Miriam Winslow's deed, that is, a charitable goal (establishment of a public park) coupled with a personal desire to memorialize deceased loved ones. Thus, our decision in Gilman v. Burnett, 116 Me. 382, 102 A. 108 (1917), rejecting the use of cy pres based on the donor's special attachment to the beauty of a site no longer available, is not fully apposite since it lacks the memorial element. Insofar as Gilman provides an example of the importance of a location alone, we find it distinguishable from the instant situation. The testatrix there wished to establish a refuge for employees of the straw industry of Massachusetts on her Augusta, Maine farm. Thus, the particular quality of that rural setting was held essential to her scheme, she having expressly described it as this beautiful spot in her will. Miriam Winslow's deed contains no such reference, and we infer that she was attached only to the neighborhood and to her parents' memory, not to any unique characteristic of the triangular plot conveyed. In Perry v. Town of Friendship, Me., 237 A.2d 405 (1968) this Court found an absence of general charitable intent in relation to a gift for the erection of a community building in which was to be placed a plaque in memory of the testatrix' late husband. 237 A.2d at 406. We note that such finding was not really necessary to the decision since it was not shown that the trust had failed, 237 A.2d at 409; see also: Miller v. Inhabitants of Town of Friendship, Me., 265 A.2d 608 (1970). In any event, on its actual facts Perry is plainly distinguishable from the situation before us. The testatrix had directed that her gift was to be added to the Community Building Fund and to be used for the erection and maintenance of a Community Building. . .. (p. 406 of 237 A.2d) (emphasis supplied) Thus, the Court was not there asked merely to change the location of a charitable project after half a century of successful service while preserving its initial park/memorial character. Rather, it was proposed that the gift be diverted from a fund and a purpose apparently in existence and known to the donor before her death, and that this be done before any operation according to her direction. The special goal sought by the testatrix in Perry, as enhanced by her knowledge before death that the town itself contemplated implementing that goal and thus would surely carry out her specific gift, sharply distinguishes Perry from the case at bar. Decisions of other courts, concerned with situations more akin to the instant case, lend support for a finding, here, of the general charitable intent making cy pres administration appropriate. In State v. Federal Square Corporation, 89 N.H. 538, 3 A.2d 109 (1938), a trust supporting a library in the City of Concord, New Hampshire failed of its specific purpose because of the State's exercise of eminent domain. The building in which it was housed had been conveyed fifty years earlier by deed specifying that it be used in perpetuity as a public library, and directing the maintenance of an inscription honoring the donors' parents, for fifty years residents of Concord, and always active promoters of the educational and intellectual advancement of its citizens. (p. 540 of 89 N.H., p. 111 of 3 A.2d). The Court ordered that cy pres be utilized to continue the library elsewhere. The Court reasoned that no express provision barred such application, and [n]o reasons practical or sentimental exist to demand that the site conveyed by the deed should be the only one which under all circumstances must be kept in order to keep alive the trust. (p. 544 of 98 N.H., p. 114 of 3 A.2d) The case at bar is strikingly similar. Winslow Park provided public benefit and private memorial until condemnation terminated it; it too had operated for several years; its governing instrument contains no stated prohibition against removal to another site in the event of taking by eminent domain. While it may be argued that sentimental considerations here endow the subject land with special value since it had once been owned by Miriam Winslow's fatherwe do not so find. It was but a plot of land without buildings, chosen to benefit the public and memorialize the Winslows in their beloved neighborhood, as the donors in State v. Federal Square Corporation, supra, chose to honor their forebears' interest in the City of Concord and the advancement of its citizens. See also: Rector of St. James Church v. Wilson, 82 N.J.Eq. 546, 89 A. 519 (1913), aff'd sub nom. West v. Rector of St. James' Episcopal Church of Long Branch, 83 N.J.Eq. 324, 91 A. 101 (1914). Other courts have approved a change in location under cy pres administration where faced with a sentimental attachment to an original site stronger than any we can discern here. Thus, in Rogers v. Attorney General, 347 Mass. 126, 196 N.E.2d 855 (1964), the Massachusetts Court ordered abandonment as the location of a home for the aged of a homestead built by an ancestor 210 years prior to the donor's death and held by her family up to that time. The Court found a general charitable intent on her part permitting such modification despite its express recognition that the donor had a strong attachment to the family homestead and . . . desired its preservation . . .. (p. 132 of 347 Mass., p. 860 of 196 N.E.2d.) See also: In re Wornock's Will, Sup., 124 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1953). The facts of In re Wilkey's Estate, 337 Pa. 129, 10 A.2d 425 (1940) are closer to those now before us. The testatrix there established a trust for the purpose of razing a farmhouse in the City of Philadelphia held by her family since the days of William Penn, and erecting on that site a church memorializing the Wilkey family, using, if possible, stones from the razed house. Shortly after her death the land was condemned for school purposes. The Pennsylvania Court held the importance of the site secondary to her dual charitablecommemorative purpose, and ordered construction of the memorial church elsewhere. We presently confront no question of the special feelings evoked by long-established family homesteads; instead, we deal only with a vacant parcel of land. See, e. g., Shoemaker v. American Security & Trust Company, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 270, 163 F.2d 585 (1947). Finally, at least one court has recognized the special force of a commemorative purpose in determining the existence of general charitable intent. Any such goal, coupled, of course, with a desire to benefit the public, tends to strengthen the inference that the donor wished modification in order to ensure perpetual operation, since failure of the charity entails failure of the memorial as well. In re Young Women's Christian Association of New York, 96 N.J.Eq. 568, 126 A. 610, 613 (1924). We, therefore, interpret the 1903 deed of Miriam Winslow as evidencing a general charitable intent sufficient to permit, by use of cy pres, the removal of the public park, and its plaque honoring James N. and Ella M. Winslow, to the proposed site at Baxter Boulevard and Preble Street Extension in the City of Portland. The entry is: Appeal sustained. Case remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein.