Opinion ID: 1773224
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: comparative fault instructions

Text: Owens Corning argues before this Court that the evidence concerning Appellees' smoking and Parrish's failure to wear a mask justified both the trial court's decision to instruct the jury concerning comparative fault and the jury's apportionment of fault to Appellees. Coyle and Parrish contend that the trial court's decision to instruct the jury regarding their comparative fault was both legally and factually erroneous. Specifically, they argue: (1) Under Kentucky's Product Liability Act, [7] the factfinder may consider as comparative fault only a plaintiff's use or misuse of the product itself [8] and, because neither their smoking nor Parrish's failure to use a mask constituted misuse of Owens Corning's asbestos products, their conduct cannot be comparative fault; and (2) Since asbestosis is caused only by the inhalation of asbestos fibers, no causal connection exists between smoking cigarettes and their development of asbestosis. Parrish also argues that the evidence concerning his failure to wear a protective mask was insufficient to support a comparative fault instruction. Coyle also contends that the trial court should not have given comparative fault instructions regarding his conduct because he filed suit before the effective date of KRS 411.182. We address each argument in turn and hold that the evidence justified the comparative fault instructions given by the trial court. This Court first established comparative fault as part of Kentucky common law in Hilen v. Hays , [9] and in so doing, we extracted suggested jury instructions from the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (the Act) [10] : In order to apply this rule in the present case, we extract the following jury instructions from the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, § 2, 12 U.L.A., Civ.Proc. & Rem.Law, 39 (Cum.Supp.1984), for the jury to use in the event it finds both parties at fault: `(a) ... the court ... shall instruct the jury to answer special interrogatories ... indicating: (1) the [total] amount of damages [the] claimant would be entitled to recover if contributory fault is disregarded; and (2) the percentage of the total fault ... that is allocated to [the] claimant [and] defendant, [the total being 100%]. (b) In determining the percentages of fault, the [jury] shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed.' [11] This Court again turned to the Act in Wemyss v. Coleman, [12] where we observed that [t]he Act uses the terms `negligence' and `fault' for purposes of determining comparative negligence as equivalent and interchangeable terms ... [13] and we adopted its definition of fault [14] : Fault includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable express consent, misuse of a product for which the defendant otherwise would be liable, and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the basis for liability and to contributory fault. [15] When this Court first established comparative fault as part of the common law, the statutory contributory negligence provisions of Kentucky's Product Liability Act barred a plaintiff from recovery when that plaintiff was negligent in his or her use of the product. [16] But the legislature, subsequent to Hilen and Wemyss , removed this vestige of contributory fault when it codified comparative fault: (1) In all tort actions, including products liability actions, involving fault of more than one party to the action, including third-party defendants and persons who have been released under subsection (4) of this section, the court, unless otherwise agreed by all parties, shall instruct the jury to answer interrogatories or, if there is no jury, shall make findings indicating: (a) The amount of damages each claimant would be entitled to recover if contributory fault is disregarded; and (b) The percentage of the total fault of all the parties to each claim that is allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party defendant, and person who has been released from liability under subsection (4) of this section. (2) In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed. (3) The court shall determine the award of damages to each claimant in accordance with the findings, subject to any reduction under subsection (4) of this section, and shall determine and state in the judgment each party's equitable share of the obligation to each claimant in accordance with the respective percentages of fault. (4) A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a person liable, shall discharge that person from all liability for contribution, but it shall not be considered to discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides. However, the claim of the releasing person against other persons shall be reduced by the amount of the released persons' equitable share of the obligation, determined in accordance with the provisions of this section. [17] This enactment repealed KRS 411.320(3), and in products liability actions, a plaintiff's own negligence with respect to the product itself is no longer a complete bar to recovery but is instead governed by the same comparative fault principles which govern the fault of any party in a tort action. [18] In codifying comparative fault, the legislature, like this Court in Hilen , emphasized § 2 of the Act. The comparative fault statute, however, did not define fault. We assume, however, that the legislature was aware of our adoption of the definition in Wemyss , and because the legislature partially codified the other provisions of the Act [19] which are consistent with the definition we adopted, we believe it reasonable to further assume that they acquiesced in our definition of fault. Accordingly, the definition of fault this Court adopted in Wemyss remains applicable to comparative fault in all tort cases, including product liability actions. In light of our definition of fault, we do not agree with Appellees' argument that a plaintiff's comparative fault in products liability cases can only involve the plaintiff's use or misuse of the product. [Any] ... act[] or omission[] that [is] in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person ... of the actor ... will suffice if the evidence shows a causal connection between the plaintiff's act or omission and the plaintiff's injury or damages. [20] Our broad interpretation of fault does not limit the gambit of potential acts or omissions which may constitute comparative fault to uses and misuses of the product, and we specifically reject Appellees' argument that KRS 411.320(3) limits a plaintiff's comparative fault to use of the product. As stated earlier, the legislature's enactment of the comparative fault statute abolished the statutory contributory negligence defense in products liability actions. [21] Appellees attempt to resurrect KRS 411.320(3) as a limitation upon the scope of conduct contemplated in the later-enacted comparative fault statute. If the legislature had intended to place such a limitation on KRS 411.182's application to product liability cases, we believe the comparative fault statute itself would have provided this limitation. Accordingly, we hold that the comparative fault statute does not limit the plaintiff's fault to use of the product. Appellee Coyle correctly observes that, because he filed his action prior to its effective date, [22] Kentucky's comparative fault statute, KRS 411.182, did not require the trial court to instruct the jury regarding his comparative fault. [23] We disagree, however, with Coyle's conclusion that the trial court's decision to instruct the jury as to comparative fault was error because Kentucky Common Law required such instructions. After Hilen , comparative fault existed in Kentucky as part of the common law at the time Coyle filed suit [24] and Wemyss also decided prior to the filing datehad defined the term fault for the purpose of comparative fault. Thus, while KRS 411.182 does not apply to Coyle's claim, the common law this Court identified in Hilen required a comparative fault instruction for any acts or omissions connected to his claim for damages which did not involve the use of Owens Corning's product. [25] Coyle's smoking obviously did not involve his use of asbestos, and therefore, it may be the basis of a comparative fault instruction under Hilen even though KRS 411.182 may not be applied retroactively. Appellees correctly submit that the undisputed medical evidence established that exposure to asbestos fibers is the sole cause of asbestosis and that smoking alone can never result in asbestosis. They further observe correctly that, because Appellees' complaints sought damages only for their exposure to asbestos-containing products, the trial court's instructions limited any award of damages accordingly. [26] Therefore, they posit that the trial court's instructions should not have permitted the jury to apportion fault to them for conduct which caused other, distinct injuries. We disagree with this conclusion. While asbestosis is a restrictive disease of the lungs, and smoking causes distinct obstruction pulmonary diseases, e.g., emphysema or bronchitis, the trial evidence established that Appellees' exposure to asbestos and their smoking combined to produce a single result or harm, i.e., decreased lung function manifesting itself in shortness of breath. Appellees did not introduce sufficient evidence in this case [27] to allow the factfinder a logical and reasonable basis to apportion this single harmshortness of breathbetween those separate causes. [28] In fact, the medical experts made no attempt to do so. [29] Thus, while Appellees' exposure to asbestos and their smoking are distinct causes, they did not produce either distinct harms or a single harm capable of apportionment between the distinct causes. The trial evidence did not permit the jury to determine the proportion of lung impairment caused exclusively by Appellees' asbestos exposure or exclusively by Appellees' smoking and, consequently, the jury had no basis to apportion Appellee's lung impairment damages between the two causes. [30] An apportionment of damages in this case between the separate causes would have constituted little more than improper jury speculation or conjecture. [31] Because no apportionment between the separate causes of this shortness of breath, i.e., asbestosis exposure and smoking, was possible, the trial court [32] acted within its discretion when it allowed the jury [33] to consider Appellees' smoking as comparative fault. To summarize, if distinct causes produce distinct harms, or if distinct causes produce a single harm and the evidence presented at trial provides a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to the single harm, a trial court should instruct the jury to apportion the damages to the distinct causes without resorting to comparative fault. If, however, as is the case here, the evidence does not permit apportionment of the damage between separate causes, then comparative fault principles apply, and the trial court should instruct the jury to apportion damages according to the proportionate fault of the parties. Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge properly submitted comparative fault instructions and thereby allowed the jury to assign fault to Appellees based upon their smoking histories. [34] We also agree with Owens Corning's contention that the evidence concerning Parrish's failure to wear a safety mask provided by his employer sufficiently warranted the trial court's comparative fault instruction. Undisputed evidence proved that only the inhalation of asbestos fibers can cause asbestosis. Thus, simple logic permits the inference that Parrish's failure to utilize the safety mask and prevent further inhalation of asbestos fibers may have contributed to his asbestosis. While Parrish's testimony offered several reasons for his failure or refusal to wear a safety mask, the trial court appropriately allowed the jury to evaluate this testimony when determining the reasonableness of Parrish's failure or refusal to wear the safety mask.