Opinion ID: 2499159
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The exclusion of Dr. Fairchild was an error of law

Text: ¶ 16 Discovery sanctions are generally within the sound discretion of the trial court. Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 131 Wash.2d 484, 494, 933 P.2d 1036 (1997). However, the court may impose only the least severe sanction that will be adequate to serve its purpose in issuing a sanction. Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash.2d 299, 355-56, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993). A trial court may impose only the most severe discovery sanctions upon a showing that (1) the discovery violation was willful or deliberate, (2) the violation substantially prejudiced the opponent's ability to prepare for trial, and (3) the court explicitly considered less severe sanctions. Burnet, 131 Wash.2d at 494, 496-97, 933 P.2d 1036. Discovery sanctions that trigger consideration of the Burnet factors include exclusion of witness testimony. Mayer v. Sto Indus., Inc., 156 Wash.2d 677, 690, 132 P.3d 115 (2006) (holding that while imposition of the most serious sanctions, such as witness exclusion, triggers a Burnet analysis, imposition of lesser sanctions, like monetary compensation, does not). ¶ 17 Findings regarding the Burnet factors must be made on the record. Id. A trial court may make the Burnet findings on the record orally or in writing. See Blair v. TA-Seattle E. No. 176, 171 Wash.2d 342, 348-49, 254 P.3d 797 (2011) (noting that the trial court did not make Burnet findings on the record where it did not engage in a colloquy with counsel or hear oral argument and did not include the findings in the written order). Thus, where an order excluding a witness is entered without oral argument or a colloquy on the record, findings on the Burnet factors must be made in the order itself or in some contemporaneous recorded finding. Id. at 349, 254 P.3d 797 (rejecting the argument that the record below speaks for itself and thus obviates the need for the trial court to explain its reasons on the record). ¶ 18 In Blair, we addressed a situation very similar to this case. Blair had not met certain discovery deadlines and TA-Seattle moved twice to strike witnesses as untimely disclosed. Id. at 345-46, 254 P.3d 797. The trial court granted both motions. Id. at 346, 347, 254 P.3d 797. The trial court's first order struck half of Blair's witnesses; the second order struck two late-disclosed additions to her list. Id. The trial court did not enter findings supporting either order, nor did it engage in colloquy with counsel or hear oral argument. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's exclusion orders. Id. at 347, 254 P.3d 797. In doing so, the Court of Appeals agreed with TA-Seattle that the juxtaposition of the two orders indicated that the trial court had considered lesser sanctions. Id. at 350, 254 P.3d 797. We reversed, rejecting the premise that an appellate court can consider the facts in the first instance as a substitute for the trial court findings that our precedent requires. Id. at 351, 254 P.3d 797. ¶ 19 The similarities between Blair and this case are striking. The discovery process was quite contentious and the Teters admit that they missed several discovery deadlines. Teters' Suppl. Br. at 3. And Judge Washington's order excluding Dr. Fairchild did not contain the findings required by Burnet. CP at 351-54. Although Judge Washington found that the Teters failed to comply with discovery orders and that Dr. Deck was prejudiced in his trial preparation, Judge Washington made no record other than the order: he held no colloquy with counsel and heard no oral argument on the motion. Therefore, the requisite findings must be set forth in the order itself. See Blair, 171 Wash.2d at 349, 254 P.3d 797. Because the order contains no finding (1) that the Teters discovery violations were willful or (2) that Judge Washington explicitly considered less severe sanctions, Judge González was correct when he concluded that the order does not comply with Burnet. [8] See CP at 709-10. ¶ 20 Dr. Deck argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the record plainly reflects that Judge Washington considered each of the Burnet factors. We reject Dr. Deck's and the Court of Appeals' attempts to read willfulness and lesser sanction findings into the order from a review of the record as a whole.
¶ 21 The Court of Appeals noted that a party's violation of a court's order is deemed willful if it was without reasonable excuse or justification. Teter, 158 Wash.App. 1015, 2010 WL 4216151, at  (citing Magaña v. Hyundai Motor Am., 167 Wash.2d 570, 584, 220 P.3d 191 (2009)). But in Magaña, the trial court made findings that Hyundai's discovery violations were willful; on appeal, we agreed with the Court of Appeals that the trial court's willfulness findings were reasonable because the record supported them. 167 Wash.2d at 585, 220 P.3d 191. Magaña is therefore inapposite. ¶ 22 Here, the Teters explained that Dr. Golden's sudden withdrawal was beyond their control because Dr. Golden himself was not aware of the basis for his conflict of interest when he agreed to be their expert witness. In Magaña, the trial court explicitly discredited Hyundai's excuse based on facts in the record. Id. at 585-86, 220 P.3d 191. Here, only Dr. Deck asserts that the Teters had no reasonable excuse for the late disclosure. CP at 365. This bare assertion cannot substitute for the trial court's rejection of the Teters' explanation. Judge Washington made no reference to the Teters' explanation and did not explicitly reject it. Therefore, the Court of Appeals' cursory reliance on Magaña conflicts with our holding in Blair. Teter, 158 Wash.App. 1015, 2010 WL 4216151, at ; Blair, 171 Wash.2d at 351, 254 P.3d 797.
¶ 23 The Court of Appeals also agreed with Dr. Deck's argument that Judge Washington's consideration of lesser sanctions is apparent from the record because Judge Washington had already imposed lesser sanctions. Resp't's Answer to Pet. for Review at 12; see Teter, 158 Wash.App. 1015, 2010 WL 4216151 at . Again, we rejected this argument in Blair, when we held that a prior order excluding only some of Blair's witnesses could not substitute for consideration of lesser sanctions on the record for the subsequent exclusion order. 171 Wash.2d at 350-51, 254 P.3d 797. We continue to reject this argument here. Mere issuance of lesser sanctions during the discovery process cannot substitute for on-the-record consideration of lesser sanctions when excluding a witness. [9]