Opinion ID: 476738
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Eighth Amendment Liberty Interest

Text: 48 Plaintiffs argue that the existence of eighth amendment violations in the administrative segregation units raises a due process liberty interest. We disagree. 49 Plaintiffs' sole authority for this proposition is a footnote from Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Hewitt v. Helm. We find this a curious use of authority. Not only is the sole authority a footnote from a dissenting opinion, but the footnote does not support plaintiffs' position. Justice Stevens indicated that if such eighth amendment violations existed, the Constitution would impose substantive, rather than procedural limits on transfers into segregated status. 459 U.S. at 481 n. 4, 103 S.Ct. at 876 n. 4 (emphasis added). 50 Some fundamental considerations support Justice Stevens' conclusion. The state has no right to subject a prisoner to cruel and unusual punishment. The eighth amendment is not a maybe or a sometimes proposition. If conditions violate the eighth amendment, all prisoners have the right to be free of such conditions. The right does not vary depending on the threat that the individual prisoner presents to institutional security. No amount of process can justify subjecting a prisoner to cruel and unusual punishment. 51 Moreover, acceptance of such an argument would create an unworkable standard. The assumption implicit in plaintiffs' argument is that eighth amendment violations exist in the segregation unit but do not exist in the general population. If both locations were infected with eighth amendment violations, process would be a meaningless gesture; it would make no sense to interpose a constitutional impediment to transfer from one place to another when the conditions in both locations are constitutionally impermissible. 12 52 Assuming arguendo that the conditions in the general population lacked significant eighth amendment violations, we would have to determine what quantum of violation in administrative segregation would be sufficient to create an eighth amendment liberty interest. Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d at 1133-35, counsels that we consider separately each condition that allegedly contributes to the violation of plaintiffs' eighth amendment rights; a variety of discrete conditions exist in the segregation units. If we were to find that the defendants cured one of the conditions, would the eighth amendment liberty interest evaporate? Or if we were to find that a particular condition in the general population violated the eighth amendment, would the liberty interest vanish? Or perhaps plaintiffs would have us hold that a prisoner has an interest in remaining with his own eighth amendment violation and not being subjected to another in its place. Plaintiffs' approach would require a comprehensive determination regarding the conditions throughout the prison, if not the entire state prison system, to determine whether the eighth amendment created a due process liberty interest. We decline to require such an ambitious task in the name of such a dubious proposition. 53 The presence of eighth amendment violations in the segregation units, therefore, does not create a liberty interest. We will not parlay one constitutional right into another.