Opinion ID: 6499669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Thompson Standard

Text: We draw our understanding of third-party retaliation claims from Thompson, 562 U.S. 170. In that case, plaintiﬀ Thompson and his ﬁancée both worked at the defendant company. His ﬁancée ﬁled a charge of sex discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Three weeks later, the company ﬁred not her but Thompson. He then sued the company, alleging that it ﬁred him to retaliate against his ﬁancée. To determine whether Thompson could bring a thirdparty retaliation claim despite not having engaged in protected activity himself, the Court ﬁrst asked whether the ﬁancée could have sued for that retaliation. That question required determining whether the employer’s ﬁring of Thompson constituted unlawful retaliation. The Court concluded with little diﬃculty that if Thompson’s version of the facts was true, then the ﬁring violated Title VII. The Court thought it was “obvious” that, under the Burlington Northern standard, “a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from engaging in protected activity if she knew that her [ﬁancé] would be ﬁred.” 562 U.S. at 174. Thus, the ﬁancée could have sued for the company’s action against Thompson as an unlawful act of retaliation against her. 20 No. 21-2496 The Court then turned to the “more diﬃcult question” whether Thompson himself could also sue for that retaliation even though, again, he did not engage in any protected activity. 562 U.S. at 175. The Court said yes. Thompson qualiﬁed as a “person aggrieved” under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). He fell within the Act’s “zone of interests,” so he had a claim for retaliation. 562 U.S. at 175–78. As the Court explained, “the purpose of Title VII is to protect employees from their employers’ unlawful actions,” and the statute enables “suit by any plaintiﬀ with an interest ‘arguably [sought] to be protected by the statute.’” Id. at 178 (alteration in original), quoting National Credit Union Admin. v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 495 (1998). Thompson was an employee, thereby falling under Title VII’s general scope. Equally important, Thompson was “not an accidental victim of the retaliation;” rather, “injuring him was the employer’s intended means of harming [his ﬁancée].” Id. Accordingly, the Court held that Thompson fell within the Act’s zone of interests and was therefore “a person aggrieved with standing to sue” under the statute. Id.