Opinion ID: 2159195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Was it Error for the Trial Court to Submit Aggravating Factor c(4)(c) to the Jury?

Text: Over defendant's objection asserted before trial and prior to the commencement of the penalty phase, [12] the trial court submitted for the jury's consideration during its sentencing deliberations the aggravating factor set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(c), which reads: The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim. The trial court instructed the jury prior to its sentencing deliberations concerning the elements of this aggravating factor: For the purposes of this case you may consider whether the following aggravating factors exist: First, the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim. Although, of course, every murder may be viewed as vile, horrible or inhuman, this aggravating factor does not exist with respect to every purposeful or knowing killing. In order for you to find this aggravating factor present you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant inflicted upon the victim brutal and agonizing mental and bodily harm before death. The term depravity of mind means that mental state which leads a murderer to torture or commit an aggravated battery upon the victim before committing the crime of murder. Now, aggravated battery means serious bodily harm to the victim. Such bodily harm must occur before death. A person commits aggravated battery when he purposely causes bodily harm to another by depriving him of a member of his body or by rendering a member of his body useless or by seriously disfiguring his body or a part thereof. Now, purposefully has the same meaning as the definition previously charged to you at the guilt phase of the trial; I'm not going to repeat it for you. I used serious bodily injury; that term can be defined as bodily injury which creates substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss of any bodily member or organ. The injuries need not be permanent, but they must nevertheless, be substantial rather than superficial. Now, the aggravated battery must occur before death. By that I mean the aggravated battery must not be the cause of the death of the victim; it must occur prior to the death and be independent of the cause of death. Torture occurs when a victim is subjected to serious or mental abuse before death. Insofar as aggravated battery and torture are concerned, only acts and conducts occurring prior to death may be considered in determining whether this aggravating factor is present. Although the jury determined that the State did not sustain its burden of proving the existence of aggravating factor (4)(c), defendant contends that its submission to the jury was reversible error in the penalty phase. Defendant further argues, relying on State v. Christener, 71 N.J. 55 (1976), that the jury's discharge of its duty to consider factor c(4)(c) may have resulted in a compromise verdict reflected by the jury's determination that the State had sustained its burden of proving two other aggravating factors, c(4)(f) and c(4)(h). The State contends that the trial court properly submitted factor c(4)(c) to the jury, but even if that determination was erroneous, it constituted harmless error since the jury found that the existence of the factor had not been proved. In State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. 123, we acknowledged the difficulties inherent in applying this provision of our Capital Punishment Act: Section c(4)(c) of the Act is its most troublesome portion and one of its most important. The provision is troublesome because of its obvious vagueness. Merely quoting it is the best proof of that fact. The provision is important because this vagueness probably accurately expresses society's wish to limit the death penalty to only certain murderers and yet reflects society's inability to define precisely that limit. [ Id. at 198 (footnote omitted).] We also explained that the indefiniteness of the introductory language in c(4)(c) compelled us to focus on the Legislature's qualifying language in construing the statute: Quite clearly the introductory language of the provision ([t]he murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman) is indefinite beyond anyone's ability to remedy, and presumably was so recognized by the Legislature, which attached to that part of the section the explicitly limiting portion  in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim   . (Emphasis added). Interpretations by various courts throughout the nation give effect to this limitation, ultimately by construing the entire provision in a manner that results in the second portion being the essential finding. In effect, although these courts do require two independent findings (that the offense (1) is outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, and (2) involves torture, depravity or aggravated battery), in applying the construction, the first part of the provision is rendered nugatory. The resultant construction is that the aggravating factor exists when the murder involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim. [106 N.J. at 199 (citations omitted).] In Ramseur we adopted a narrowing construction of c(4)(c) in order to satisfy constitutional standards, concluding that the defendant's state of mind was the true focus on the Legislature's intent: We are convinced that the essence of the legislative concern is the defendant's state of mind. We do not believe that the Legislature intended to distinguish between two murderers each of whom intended to inflict immediate death upon the victim without any additional suffering whatsoever, when one victim dies immediately and the other lives for a long period of time and experiences excruciating pain. That capricious event alone would be perceived as an insufficient basis on which to inflict death on that defendant while imposing imprisonment on the other. Our system of criminal laws is predicated usually on the imposition of punishment based on the defendant's intent. Indeed, our Code's ranking of crimes by degree places those crimes committed with intentional conduct as the highest degree of crime, for which the defendant is most severely punished. Society's concern, the community's concern, the Legislature's concern, is to punish most harshly those who intend to inflict pain, harm, and suffering  in addition to intending death. [106 N.J. at 207-08.] Finally, we paraphrased in Ramseur the essence of an appropriate charge to the jury on factor c(4)(c): Therefore, depending on the facts, the jury should be charged  without quoting the statute  that this aggravating factor exists if the murder involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim. Torture or aggravated battery to the victim shall be found if the defendant intended to cause, and did in fact cause, severe physical or psychological pain or suffering to the victim prior to the victim's death, severity measured either by the intensity of the pain, or the duration of the pain, or a combination of both. Where the murder was not the product of greed, envy, revenge, or another of those emotions ordinarily associated with murder, and served no purpose of the defendant beyond his pleasure of killing, the court shall instruct the jury on the meaning of depravity in this specific context. For the defendant who killed for the enjoyment of it, because the victim just happened to be in the area, or for no reason at all, just to kill, society must be able to reserve its most extreme sanction. [106 N.J. at 211.] It is evident that the trial court's charge to the jury on c(4)(c), delivered prior to our decision in Ramseur, was erroneous. The charge did not instruct the jury that it must determine that defendant intended to cause severe physical pain or suffering to the victim prior to death. Nor did the trial court properly inform the jury that a finding of depravity requires proof that the murder served no purpose for the defendant beyond his pleasure of killing. Id. at 211. We also conclude that the evidence adduced at trial did not support the submission of factor c(4)(c) to the jury, even assuming that its submission was accompanied by a proper instruction. Aside from evidence that defendant had fired the shotgun and was knowledgeable about its capacity to inflict devastating injury, there was no proof that defendant's intention was to cause Officer Garaffa to endure pain and suffering, rather than to kill him. Although the State argues that a shotgun fired at the abdomen, rather than at a more vital organ, is likely to result in pain and suffering prior to death, this fact alone cannot be sufficient to prove defendant's intention to inflict severe pain and suffering prior to death. As we noted in Ramseur: We do not believe that the Legislature intended to distinguish between two murderers each of whom intended to inflict immediate death upon the victim without any additional suffering whatsoever, when one victim dies immediately and the other lives for a long period of time and experiences excruciating pain. [ Id. at 207.] Nor did the proofs support the submission of c(4)(c) to the jury on the basis that the murder involved depravity of mind. There was evidence produced at trial that the defendant had a propensity to use the shotgun to threaten black youths in the neighborhood. But the only evidence concerning defendant's motive for shooting Officer Garaffa was defendant's own statement indicating that he panicked and did not want to be caught with the shotgun. The State apparently accepted defendant's explanation of his reason for the murder, by submitting to the jury proof of aggravating factor c(4)(f), The murder was committed for the purpose of escaping    apprehension    for another offense committed by the defendant   , a factor found to exist by the jury in its sentencing deliberations. As we held in Ramseur, depravity of mind characterizes those who murder without purpose or meaning as distinguished from those who murder for a purpose (although a completely unjustified purpose). Id. at 209. The evidence at trial, however, indicates that defendant shot Officer Garaffa to escape detection for his unlawful possession of a sawed-off shotgun, and the State acknowledged defendant's purpose by its submission of aggravating factor c(4)(f) to the jury. Under the circumstances, that aspect of factor c(4)(c) focusing on depravity of mind should not have been submitted to the jury. Defendant relies on State v. Christener, supra, 71 N.J. at 55, for the contention that the improper submission to the jury of aggravating factor c(4)(c) constitutes an independent ground for reversing the death sentence in this case. In Christener, the victim was the estranged husband of the woman with whom defendant resided in a mobile home. There was substantial evidence of the victim's physical strength and violent temper. The murder occurred after the victim broke into the mobile home early one morning, and ignored defendant's demands that he leave. He was shot while lunging toward his estranged wife. The jury, charged on first- and second-degree murder, manslaughter, self-defense, and defense of others, found defendant guilty of manslaughter. We reversed the conviction, concluding that it was plain error for the trial court to have charged the jury on first degree murder, id. at 69, and that such error was prejudicial since the jury's manslaughter verdict might have been a compromise verdict induced by the erroneous charge. Id. at 69-70. Relying on our holding in Christener, defendant argues that the erroneous submission to the jury of aggravating factor c(4)(c) may have resulted in a compromise by the jury in finding the existence of the two other aggravating factors relied on by the State. Since there exist independent grounds for reversing defendant's death sentence, we need not now definitively resolve the question whether the improper submission of an aggravating factor to the jury in the penalty phase of a capital case necessarily constitutes reversible error. We noted in State v. Thomas, 76 N.J. 344, 365 (1978), that our decision in Christener focused on the prejudicial effect of overcharging a jury, i.e., instructing it on a crime more serious than the evidence warrants, where the result may induce a compromise verdict. Unlike the mutually exclusive choices between first-degree murder and manslaughter available to the jury in Christener, the jury's function in the penalty phase of a capital case is first to assess, independently of each other, the sufficiency of proof of the aggravating and mitigating factors. Its rejection of one such factor neither compels nor inhibits its determination that another factor exists. We also note on this record that there was overwhelming proof of the existence of aggravating factors c(4)(f) and c(4)(h). Hence, it would be highly speculative to conclude that the erroneous submission to the jury of aggravating factor c(4)(c), a factor rejected by the jury, prejudicially affected this jury's deliberations concerning the remaining aggravating factors, the mitigating factors, and its weighing process. 5. Was it Error for the Trial Court to Have Admitted Into Evidence the Police Tape Recording, Articles of the Victim's Clothing, and an Autopsy Photograph? Defendant contends that the trial court's admission of certain physical evidence during the guilt phase of trial, and in the penalty phase on the prosecutor's motion, violated the New Jersey Rules of Evidence and defendant's right to a fair trial. The challenged evidence consists of a police tape recording of transmissions to and from the Irvington police dispatcher before and after the shooting of Officer Garaffa, an autopsy photograph of Officer Garaffa's body that reveals the site of the entry wound and the location of the incisions made in the course of the emergency surgery at University Hospital, and the tattered and blood-stained shirt and undershirt worn by Officer Garaffa when he was shot. The police tape recording was played for the jury, without objection, during the guilt phase of trial while Officer Kenneth Verzal testified. Officer Verzal was the Irvington police dispatcher on the night of the shooting and identified voices heard on the tape over a span of about ten minutes. He testified that at approximately 11:48 p.m. on August Eighth, Officer Garaffa called in to police headquarters, stating: [Car] 2's off on 40th Street, guy with a bag. Officer Verzal understood the transmission to mean that Officer Garaffa was leaving his vehicle to question someone. The officer testified that approximately thirty-four seconds later he heard cries over the police radio and subsequently called for emergency assistance when he learned that Officer Garaffa had been shot. The tape records Officer Garaffa crying-out, the transmissions seeking emergency aid, and the sound of ambulances. After Officer Venzal testified, the tape recording was admitted into evidence without objection, and also admitted, with the other guilt-phase evidence, in the penalty phase. The prosecutor played the tape again for the jury during his summation. Defendant contends that the tape recording was not probative of any fact in issue. Moreover, he argues that the officer's screams and garbled utterances, combined with the transmissions seeking emergency aid, were highly inflammatory and served to create substantial danger of undue prejudice or confusing the issues or of misleading the jury. Evid.R. 4. The State argues that the tape recording was relevant to demonstrate that approximately thirty-four seconds elapsed between the time Officer Garaffa alighted from his vehicle and the shooting, thus contradicting defendant's contention that the shooting was impulsive and resulted from panic. Based on our review of the tape recording, and its admission without objection at the guilt phase, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in not excluding the evidence in the guilt phase sua sponte under Evidence Rule 4. Moreover, although the recording was not material to any of the penalty-phase issues, its admission in the penalty phase occurred as a matter of course, also without objection, and simultaneously with the other guilt-phase evidence. We are satisfied that any error that occurred in admitting the tape recording in the penalty phase was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. R. 2:10-2. The trial court's admission of the autopsy photograph occurred in the context of the State's offer of five photographs of the victim's body. Three of the photographs, which apparently depicted various aspects of the wounds sustained by the victim, were excluded by the trial court on the ground that they were inflammatory and could prejudice the jury. Another autopsy photograph was admitted without objection by defense counsel, since it depicted the site of the entry wound. Defense counsel objected to the admission of photograph S-36, contending that the site of the entry wound had already been established by admission of the prior autopsy photograph. The trial court disagreed, and admitted S-36 because it showed the entry wound in relation to the victim's upper torso. Before us, defendant argues that the photograph was gruesome and inflammatory and therefore should have been excluded under Evidence Rule 4. The State asserts that the photograph was relevant to prove the location of the entry wound and, in connection with aggravating factor c(4)(c), to prove the extent of the victim's injury. Similarly, defendant argues that the trial court's admission over defense counsel's objection of Officer Garaffa's blood-stained undershirt and shirt constituted prejudicial error, asserting that articles of the victim's clothing were offered solely for shock value and were highly inflammatory. The State contends that the clothing was admissible to show that the shotgun was near contact with the victim's body when fired, citing testimony from Irvington Police Officer Salvato, who had performed various tests to determine the distance between the shotgun and the victim at the instant of firing. The trial court admitted the clothing into evidence to show what the injury was and the extent of the injury caused to him. The general rule is that the admissibility of photographs of the victim of a crime rests in the discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of its discretion will not be reversed in the absence of palpable abuse. State v. Thompson, supra, 59 N.J. at 420; see also Evid.R. 4 (the judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will    (b) create a substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or misleading the jury). On balance, we conclude that the trial court should have excluded the second autopsy autograph, in view of its capacity to create undue prejudice, and since the site of the entry wound had already been established through another photograph. However, the error was plainly harmless in the guilt phase in view of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. We have already determined that it was error for the trial court to submit aggravating factor c(4)(c) to the jury in the penalty phase; hence, the second autopsy photograph was not admissible to prove any of the elements of factor c(4)(c). We reach the same conclusion with respect to the admission of the victim's articles of clothing. The State's evidence concerning the distance between the shotgun and the victim's body did not require admission of Officer Garaffa's blood-stained shirt and undershirt into evidence, and this evidence had a clear capacity to inflame and prejudice the jury. Thus, it should have been excluded under Evidence Rule 4. However, in view of the compelling evidence of guilt, we are fully satisfied that the error was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result. R. 2:10-2. 6. Was it Error for the Trial Court to Permit Rebuttal of Mitigating Factor c(5)(f) by Conduct not the Subject of a Prior Criminal Conviction? Prior to the commencement of the penalty phase, defense counsel sought a ruling from the trial court that would have restricted the State, in rebutting evidence of mitigating factor c(5)(f) (The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity), to proof of the defendant's prior criminal convictions. The trial court denied the motion: Obviously I'm not going to rule at this point whether I'm going to permit that evidence of rebuttal by the Prosecutor because I'm not going into a vacuum and I'm not going to anticipate what may come before me.         It also seems to me the Legislature has provided wording in the mitigating factor, namely, that the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. They don't say prior criminal convictions, they say activity. Activity is different from conviction. If the defense is allowed simply to state evidence that he has no particularly significant history of prior criminal activity and the Prosecutor has knowledge of prior criminal activities, it would seem to me it would be unfair to the State to prevent them from going into acts of prior criminal activity not the subject matter of criminal conviction and for that reason I will deny motion number 6. Again I will have to rule on it as it arises on each issue. [Defense Counsel] I understand that, Judge, but I also understand the general thrust of the Court's ruling to be that the mitigating factor F is not limited to prior convictions. THE COURT: I don't think it is based on its wording. [Defense Counsel]: Judge, if that's the Court's ruling I will advise the Court and the Prosecutor now that we may in fact withdraw this mitigating factor and we will advise both the Court and the Prosecutor tomorrow. Based on the trial court's refusal to restrict the State's evidence in rebuttal of mitigating factor c(5)(f) solely to prior criminal convictions of defendant, defense counsel advised the trial court that it was withdrawing mitigating factor c(5)(f). Defendant contends that the trial court's ruling constituted reversible error in the penalty phase, since it improperly deprived defendant of the right to prove this mitigating factor to the jury. We find no error in the trial court's ruling. Although nothing in the legislative history of the Capital Punishment Act illuminates the Legislature's intent, we attach substantial significance to the plain meaning of the words used to define factor c(5)(f). See Levin v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 82 N.J. 174, 182 (1980). The Legislature's use of the word convicted in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(a) suggests that its choice of the word activity in defining factor c(5)(f) was deliberate. Defendant argues that the drafters of the Model Penal Code, the source of mitigating factor c(5)(f), used the term significant history of prior criminal activity in order to distinguish extensive prior records of serious convictions from records of trivial or remote convictions. Model Penal Code § 210.6(4)(a) (1986 ed.). In the comments to the first proposed official draft of the Code, the drafters explained the change from the originally submitted language of the defendant has no history of prior criminal activity to the present language as follows: The word significant has been inserted before history in Subsection (4)(a) in order to meet the concern expressed by some Institute members lest any trivial and remote conviction bar consideration of an otherwise law-abiding life as a mitigating factor. [ Model Penal Code § 210.6 comment (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (emphasis added).] Most courts that have considered the question have held that this mitigating factor may be rebutted by evidence of criminal activity not necessarily the subject of a criminal conviction. See Funchess v. Wainwright, 772 F. 2d 683, 694 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031, 106 S.Ct. 1242, 89 L.Ed. 2d 349 (1986); Barfield v. Harris, 540 F. Supp. 451, 471 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 719 F. 2d 58 (4th Cir.1983); Smith v. State, 407 So. 2d 894, 901 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S.Ct. 2260, 72 L.Ed. 2d 864 (1982); Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658, 666 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 937, 99 S.Ct. 2063, 60 L.Ed. 2d 666 (1979); State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 567, 250 N.W. 2d 881, 892 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878, 98 S.Ct. 231, 54 L.Ed. 2d 158 (1977); State v. Gladden, 315 N.C. 398, 435, 340 S.E. 2d 673, 696 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S.Ct. 241, 93 L.Ed. 2d 166 (1986); State v. Noland, 312 N.C. 1, 21, 320 S.E. 2d 642, 654 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230, 105 S.Ct. 1232, 84 L.Ed. 2d 369 (1985); State v. Matson, 666 S.W. 2d 41, 44 (Tenn. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct. 225, 83 L.Ed. 2d 154 (1984). But cf. Cook v. State, 369 So. 2d 1251 (Ala. 1978) (requiring proof of criminal conviction to rebut analogous mitigating factor under Alabama statute); Dragovich v. State, 492 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1986) (testimony that defendant was called The Torch and had reputation as arsonist held insufficient to constitute evidence of criminal activity). It is self-evident that a trial court must prudently exercise its discretion in determining the quality of proof necessary to constitute a significant history of prior criminal activity as evidence of rebuttal of mitigating factor c(5)(f). In this case the trial court expressed its intention to rule on the evidence as it arises on each issue, but did not have the opportunity to do so because defendant withdrew factor c(5)(f) from consideration by the jury. We find no error in the trial court's ruling. 7. Must the Jury Weigh any Mitigating Circumstances that the State Failed to Disprove? Defendant requested that the trial court charge the jury that if there were any believable evidence of a mitigating factor not disproved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury was required to find that the mitigating factor exists. The trial court declined, instructing the jury instead that it need only be satisfied that the defendant has shown that the existence of a mitigating factor is more likely than not. Defendant contends the trial court's charge was error. In State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384 (1988), we considered this question and concluded that [t]he jury's determination of whether matters in evidence constitute mitigating factors is the result of a qualitative judgment. Id. at 438. We adhere to that principle. Thus, whether or not the State rebuts defendant's proof of a mitigating factor, the jury must still decide if defendant's evidence is sufficient to establish the existence of the mitigating factor. We find no error in the trial court's instruction. 8. Did the Trial Court's Failure to Provide the Jury with More Detailed Explanations of the Mitigating Factors Deprive Defendant of his Constitutional Rights? Defendant raises as plain error the trial court's instruction to the jury concerning the mitigating factors relied on by defendant. Defendant contends that the court's instruction consisted essentially of a reading of the statutory language, and consequently failed to supply the jury with adequate instructions on which to base its deliberations. We recently had occasion to consider this general issue in State v. Bey II, supra , and we reiterate the general guidelines set forth in that opinion: The requirement that capital sentencing must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating circumstances would be hollow without an explanation of how the evidence can mitigate the imposition of the death penalty. Otherwise, the court would subject the defendant to the risk of an arbitrary and capricious jury determination.    Even before the enactment of the Act, we recognized that [a]ppropriate and proper charges are essential for a fair trial and that the charges should explain to the jury in an understandable fashion its function in relation to the legal issues involved.    In sum, it is the trial court's duty to assure that a reasonable juror will understand the meaning and function of mitigating factors.            With respect to the general function of mitigating factors, the trial court should have made clear that the attempt to establish the existence of those factors was not to justify or excuse defendant's conduct, but to present extenuating facts regarding the defendant's life or character or the circumstances surrounding the murder that would justify a sentence less than death. In failing to tell the jury that it could consider all mitigating evidence adduced in either the guilt or sentencing proceedings, the charge failed to meet that test. Similar deficiencies appear in the charge concerning specific mitigating factors. For example, the court merely read the words of the statute when charging the jury on the mitigating factors pertaining to defendant's emotional disturbance at the time of the offense, § c(5)(a); intoxication, § c(5)(d); age, § c(5)(c); and the catch-all mitigating factor, § c(5)(h). Jurors are untrained in statutory interpretation,    and instructions that merely repeat verbatim the language of the Act generally are inadequate. [ Id. at 169-170 (citations omitted).] Accord State v. Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 430-431. On remand, the trial court should conform its instructions concerning mitigating factors to the standards set forth in Bey II. 9. Should the Jury Have Been Required Specifically to Find that Death was the Appropriate Punishment? Defendant objects to the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that it should sentence defendant to death only if the jury unanimously believes that death is the only appropriate punishment. As noted above, the jury verdict form contained language virtually identical to the requested charge. Supra at 513. Nevertheless, as we observed in State v. Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 437, no incantation had to accompany the jury's sentence of death, provided that the court's instructions have imparted to the jury its obligation to make the normative judgment that death was `the fitting and appropriate punishment for the offense before them.' Ibid. (quoting State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 316 n. 80). Accordingly, the trial court's refusal to give the requested charge was not error.