Opinion ID: 3018373
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The sentence was reasonable.

Text: Lloyd argues that the 168-month sentence, though at the bottom of the guidelines range, was unreasonable because it was greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of criminal punishment and a lesser penalty would have been sufficient. He argues that the sentence was unreasonable because: he was only 26 years old at the time of resentencing; he has three children; he did not know his father; his mother was a drug addict who died when he was 17; he accumulated nine criminal history points by age 18; he left high school after the tenth grade; he was a drug abuser; he made significant efforts at self-improvement while in prison; and he has loving friends and family. Lloyd asserts that “[a]ny ‘reasonable’ sentencing decision would have to take into account these objective indicators of a substantial need for and likelihood to benefit from rehabilitation, following a rocky start in very difficult circumstances.” Appellant’s br. at 34-35. In Booker “the Supreme Court directed appellate courts to review sentences for reasonableness . . . . ” Cooper, 437 F.3d at 326. In Cooper we described the sentencing court’s obligations and the contours of an appellate court’s review: To determine if the court acted reasonably in imposing the resulting sentence, we must first be satisfied the court exercised its discretion by considering the relevant [§ 3553(a)] factors . . . . The record must demonstrate the trial court gave meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) factors. The court need not discuss every argument made by a litigant if an argument is clearly without merit. Nor must a court discuss and make findings of each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court took the factors into account in sentencing . . . . .... first point should be exactly contrary to the one he takes. 13 In addition to ensuring a trial court considered the § 3553(a) factors, we must also ascertain whether those factors were reasonably applied to the circumstances of the case. In doing so, we apply a deferential standard, the trial court being in the best position to determine the appropriate sentence in light of the particular circumstances of the case. Under such circumstances, deference should be given. As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held, [t]he question is not how we ourselves would have resolved the factors identified as relevant by section 3553(a) . . . nor what sentence we ourselves ultimately might have decided to impose on the defendant. We are not sentencing judges. Rather, what we must decide is whether the district judge imposed the sentence he or she did for reasons that are logical and consistent with the factors set forth in section 3553(a). While we review for reasonableness whether a sentence lies within or outside the applicable guidelines range, it is less likely that a within-guidelines sentence, as opposed to an outside-guidelines sentence, will be unreasonable . ... Although a within-guidelines range sentence is more likely to be reasonable than one that lies outside the advisory guidelines range, a within-guidelines range is not necessarily reasonable per se. Otherwise, as several Courts of Appeals have concluded, we would come close to restoring the mandatory nature of the guidelines excised in Booker. Nor do we find it necessary . . . 14 to adopt a rebuttable presumption of reasonable for within-guidelines sentences . . . . To sum up, appellants have the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness. A sentence that falls within the guidelines range is more likely to be reasonable than one outside the guidelines range. There are no magic words that a district judge must invoke when sentencing, but the record should demonstrate that the court considered the § 3553(a) factors and any sentencing grounds properly raised by the parties which have recognized legal merit and factual support in the record. Id. at 329-32 (citations and footnotes omitted). Lloyd has not satisfied his burden of proving that the 168month sentence followed by a 5-year term of supervised release was unreasonable. The sentence was at the bottom of the guideline range and thus, in the words of Cooper, was “more likely to be reasonable that one outside the guidelines range.” The court gave “meaningful consideration” to the relevant section 3553(a) factors and “reasonably applied the factors to the circumstances of the case.” See United States v. Charles, No. 05-5326, F.3d , 2006 WL 3231396, at  2 (3d Cir. Nov. 9, 2006). Though the court considered Lloyd’s life circumstances which he contends should have mitigated the sentence, the fact is that there is no denying Lloyd was involved in criminal conduct involving a substantial quantity of cocaine.8 He has been living the life of a criminal since age 17, having been convicted of numerous felonies and other offenses. 8 Arguably Lloyd’s criminal history suggests that a longer rather than shorter sentence than otherwise might have been appropriate should have been imposed. That view of a substantial criminal history surely is the more conventional approach than that which Lloyd takes. After all, under the sentencing guidelines the more aggravated a defendant’s criminal history, the higher his sentencing range is likely to be. 15