Opinion ID: 3037409
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voluntariness of the Miranda Waiver

Text: Falciglia first claims that a state police officer and federal law enforcement agents misled him into giving incriminating statements when questioning him about the stolen guns. By his account, the agents suggested he would receive a more lenient sentence in 2 exchange for incriminating his accomplices. He argues that the officers told him that his cooperation would be “helpful,” which he interpreted as meaning that any statements he made would not be used against him but rather would be used against his coconspirators. Our sister courts of appeals are uniform in holding that an officer may indicate that the defendant’s statements could bring about leniency without violating Miranda. See, e.g., United States v. Gaines, 295 F.3d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]here is no inconsistency between the required warning that the defendant’s statement may be used against him and a further statement that cooperation can help him. Both are true.”). But see id. (noting “that unfulfillable promises or certain other misrepresentations made to a suspect might render a confession involuntary because they overcome his desire to remain silent.”). Thus, even if the agents had made promises, those promises did not render the waiver involuntary. Considering the totality of the circumstances, Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 608 (3d Cir. 1986), we hold that Falciglia’s waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and voluntary. He was not under pressure during the brief interrogation in which he made incriminating statements. Moreover, he had substantial experience within the criminal justice system. We also agree with the District Court that nothing in a recorded phone conversation between Faciglia and his wife (which he both seeks to suppress and to rely upon, depending on the issue) supports his claim that his waiver was involuntary. 3