Opinion ID: 203079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper Cutback of Future Accrued Benefits?

Text: Under ERISA, a plan administrator is not permitted to amend a plan so as to significantly reduce the rate of future benefit accrual unless it provides notice to the plan participants. See ERISA § 204(h)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1054(h)(1)(1998). The ERISA regulation in effect in 1998, at the time of the merger of the GSX and SPX pension plans, required the plan administrator to provide[] a written notice, setting forth the plan amendment and its effective date. [4] Id. Gillis argues that the district court erred by failing to compare the amount he would have accrued under the previous GSX pension plan at normal retirement age with the same amount calculated at normal retirement age under the SPX plan. To support his argument, he relies on an affidavit from an actuary that he submitted to the district court, which he claims shows that the lump sum payout under the previous GSX plan would have been eleven percent greater than that under the SPX plan. As a preliminary matter, SPX objects that Gillis's claim of a cutback of his future benefit accrual without notice is not properly before this court, because he raised it only in a memorandum of law submitted to the district court after the close of the summary judgment record. While that is so, it is also true that Gillis sought and received leave from the court to file the memorandum. However, it is not at all clear that the memorandum Gillis actually filed comported with his stated ground for seeking to file the document. [5] While we have serious concerns as to whether Gillis properly preserved this issue below, we need not decide that question definitively because, in any event, his claim fails on the merits. [6] In order to show a violation of ERISA § 204(h)(1), the regulations require a plan participant to show that it is reasonably expected that the amendment will reduce the amount of the future annual benefit commencing at normal retirement age.  26 C.F.R. § 54.4980F-1, Q & A-6(b) (emphasis added). In other words, Gillis was required to submit credible evidence to the district court demonstrating that the amount he would have accrued under the previous GSX pension plan, calculated as of the age of 65, was more than the amount he would have accrued under the SPX plan, again assuming a retirement age of 65. In his memorandum submitted to the district court, Gillis simply did not provide this information. First, in the body of his memorandum, he provided the court only with accrued benefit amounts under the SPX plan as of the date of his actual retirement, rather than a projected calculation of his accrued benefit as of retirement at age 65. Second, the actuarial affidavit he attached to the memo calculated only the amount Gillis purportedly would have earned as of age 65 under the GSX plan. It offered no calculation of the projected accrued benefit under the SPX plan as of age 65, nor did it compare that number with the equivalent figure under the previous GSX plan. Therefore, even if this argument were properly raised below, Gillis failed to provide evidence to the district court upon which it could conclude that Gillis would have earned more, as of his normal retirement age, under the previous GSX plan than under the SPX plan. Gillis's suggestion on appeal that the district court should have somehow made this comparison itself, without Gillis's providing the court with the relevant argumentation and data, betrays a misapprehension of our adversarial system and the burden he carried as a plaintiff opposing summary judgment before the district court. [7] See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ([T]here is no issue unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.) (internal citations omitted); Siegal v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 921 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir.1990) (Appellant cannot prevail against the motion for summary judgment . . . unless she has demonstrated to the district court . . . that there is no element essential to her cause of action which is not at least trial-worthy.). Therefore, we find no error in the district court's decision on this point. [8]