Opinion ID: 2618245
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 42

Heading: Jury View of the Crime Scene

Text: During trial, the prosecution moved to have the jury view the crime scene. The relevance of the view was disputed because the Morgan home had been vacant for two years and the conditions had changed. The trial court nevertheless granted the motion, noting that the jury would be told how the scene had changed in the intervening years. (Parsons, the neighbor that discovered the bodies, had already testified that the front door had been sanded to prevent it from sticking.) In addition, the court ordered that there would be no talking, testimony, questions, or physical demonstrations; the jury would merely silently view the premises to gain a better understanding of the circumstances of the crime. (51) Defendants present three arguments arising from the jury view procedure. First, they claim reversal is required because an alternate juror violated the trial court's order that no talking was allowed at the jury view. During the view, an alternate juror asked to see the back side of the front door. The trial judge closed the door and the juror commented, The sun must have warped it, or words to that effect. Although technically violating the court's order that no questions or talking would be allowed, the violation was de minimis and no prejudice resulted. For similar reasons, we reject defendants' claim that the trial court was obligated to hold a hearing on the matter; the court's decision not to hold a hearing was well within its discretion. ( Hedgecock, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 415-416.) Second, defendants object to what they characterize as an improper experiment. Because one juror was allowed to observe the back side of the front door, as well as seeing the door opened and closed, it was agreed by the defense attorneys that all the jurors would be permitted to do so. Defendants complain that this gave the jury a false sense of how well the door fit in the door jamb, a potentially important issue in the case. [25] The jury, however, had already heard testimony that the door had been sanded since the killings, and it clearly knew two full years had passed since the crime. On examining the entire record, we find no reasonable probability defendants suffered actual prejudice ( Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 117), even if we assume defendants adequately preserved the issue for appeal. Third, the jury observed a handprint on the wall and a stain on the carpet in the bedroom. Defendants argue that these stains were possibly made with blood and prejudicially inflamed the passions of the jury. Because Detective Jamieson later testified, however, that the handprint and the carpet stain were not a result of the crime scene at the time of the murders, we assume the jury disregarded the evidence. Moreover, the jury was later permitted to see actual photographs of the victims in the bedroom. It is thus extremely unlikely that viewing the handprint and carpet stain was prejudicial.