Opinion ID: 787929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Do The Finality Provisions In Section 1514(a) Bar Ad Hoc's Claim?

Text: 45 While Ad Hoc agrees with the Court of International Trade that none of the Second Review Entries had been deemed liquidated under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d), it challenges the trial court's holding that the finality provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) preclude judicial review of Customs' decision to recognize and post the deemed liquidations. Ad Hoc argues that under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e)(2), Customs was required to liquidate the Nogales Entries in accordance with the final court decision in the action at the final assessment rate of 106.846 percent ad valorem. 46 Ad Hoc presents several arguments that 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) does not bar judicial review of its claim. First, it contends that Congress intended that the Court of International Trade exercise judicial review over a domestic industry's challenge to Custom's erroneous liquidation of entries subject to an antidumping administrative review. Second, Ad Hoc argues that the posting of the Bulletin Notice by Customs cannot effect a liquidation under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d), which can only occur by operation of law. Third, because the posting of the Bulletin Notices did not constitute a decision of the Customs Service, Ad Hoc claims that section 1514(a) does not apply. We consider each of Ad Hoc's arguments in turn. 47
48 The trial court noted that [i]f a deemed liquidation or any liquidation is adverse to an importer, it has protest remedies under 19 U.S.C. § 1514 and access to judicial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). Cemex II, 279 F.Supp.2d at 1362. By contrast, domestic parties have no specific avenue of relief for improper liquidation. Unlike importers, domestic parties are limited to prospective challenges to the rate and classification of antidumping duty decisions, as provided in 19 U.S.C. § 1516. Ad Hoc nonetheless contends that Congress clearly intended that the Court of International Trade exercise judicial review over a domestic industry's challenge to Customs' erroneous liquidation of entries notwithstanding the final and conclusive language in 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a). We disagree. 49 Section 1514(a) is subject to several exceptions. 7 Two of these exceptions are pertinent. Specifically, as the trial court aptly noted, section 1514(a) is subject to subsection (b), which speaks to finality of Customs officers' determinations unless a civil action contesting a determination listed in section 1516a of this title is commenced in the United States Court of International Trade.... Section 1516a affords interested parties, including domestic producers, judicial review in countervailing duty and antidumping proceedings. Yet, as the trial court reasoned, nothing in § 1514(b) indicates it prevents finality as to Customs' determinations after court proceedings are conclusively terminated. Id. In other words, while Ad Hoc had challenged the antidumping duty determinations for the Second Review Entries under section 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii), those proceedings had terminated on April 8, 1998, with no petition for certiorari filed in the Supreme Court. Section 1514(b), thus, could not act as a bar to the finality provisions of section 1514(a). 50 Neither could section 1516 prevent finality. Designed to enable domestic manufacturers to contest Commerce's determinations regarding the appraised value, classification, or rate of duty on imported merchandise, 8 section 1516 contemplates remedies solely prospective in nature, and cannot after-the-fact cure Customs' decisions with respect to liquidation, legal or illegal. As we observed in National Corn Growers Association v. Baker, 51 [t]he House Report to the Customs Court Act of 1980 detailed that section 1516 permits American manufacturers to protest administrative determinations regarding imported merchandise, citing to former section 1582(b) defining the scope of such protests. 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3729, 3756, H.R. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., at 45. After much debate, Congress determined that any relief forthcoming from such objections could only be prospective in nature. 52 840 F.2d 1547, 1551 (Fed.Cir.1988). 53 In sum, section 1514 extends judicial review to domestic producers through sections 1516 and 1516a. As neither exception applies, Ad Hoc is without recourse to challenge Customs' decision to liquidate the Nogales Entries at the as entered rate. 54 2. Did Customs' Posting Of The Bulletin Notices Effect A Deemed Liquidation Under Section 1504(d)? 55 Ad Hoc contends that Customs' posting of the Bulletin Notice in April 2001 cannot constitute a deemed liquidation, which occurs solely by operation of law. We need not reach this question, because we agree with the Court of International Trade that Customs' decision to acknowledge that liquidation, deemed or otherwise, had occurred falls within the purview of section 1514(a) and is, therefore, final and conclusive upon all persons — including Ad Hoc. 56 3. Did Customs Make A Decision Regarding Liquidation Within The Meaning Of 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)? 57 In March 2001, Customs Headquarters informed the import specialist at the Port of Nogales that the [Second Review] entries were now considered deemed [and] sent the attached instructions on liquidating the entries. The liquidation of those entries as entered was promptly posted. The Court of International Trade characterized this act by Customs officials as a decision to recognize deemed liquidations and to post them, adding that [i]t is Customs' decision to declare deemed liquidation, not that of any other agency, which is at issue. Cemex II, 279 F.Supp.2d at 1362-63. We agree. 58 Customs made an affirmative determination to acknowledge and implement the deemed liquidation of the Nogales Entries pursuant to Commerce's March 23, 1998 e-mail. 9 Operating under the mistaken belief that the March 23, 1998 email from Commerce had been timely and valid, Customs chose to recognize the legal fiction of deemed liquidation at the as entered rate rather than apply section 1516a(e)(2) to liquidate the subject entries at the final rate of 106.846 percent ad valorem. 10 59 Ad Hoc relies on Mitsubishi Electronics America v. United States, 44 F.3d 973 (Fed.Cir.1994), to argue these acts do not constitute a decision by Customs within the meaning of section 1514(a). Not so. In Mitsubishi, we held that the challenged action was not that of Customs but of Commerce, and thus outside the confines of section 1514(a). In that case, the importer filed a protest challenging Commerce's assessment of duty rates on its entries of DRAMS between the preliminary and final less-than-fair-value determinations at the previous, higher rate rather than at the final rate computed. After its protest was denied, the importer appealed to the Court of International Trade, which determined that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claim. In affirming the Court of International Trade, we explained that the importer's protest under section 1514(a) was improper, as the challenged actions, i.e., the improper calculation of antidumping duties, were within the province of Commerce rather than Customs. Commerce conducts the antidumping duty investigation, calculates the antidumping margin, and issues the antidumping duty order. Mitsubishi, 44 F.3d at 976. Instead, Customs merely follows Commerce's instructions in assessing and collecting duties. Id. at 977. 60 While we agree that Customs' role in making antidumping decisions, i.e., in calculating antidumping duties, is generally ministerial, Customs here made a decision regarding liquidation. 11 Following an inquiry into the legal posture of the Second Review Entries, Customs chose to effect their liquidation by posting the Bulletin Notices. 12 More than passive or ministerial, Customs' actions constitute a decision within the context of section 1514(a). Customs' admittedly erroneous decision to liquidate falls within the ambit of section 1514(a)(5), which shields such decisions from challenge, without regard for their legality. 13 61 Our prior decision in Juice Farms, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1344 (Fed.Cir.1995), is instructive. In Juice Farms, we held untimely an importer's protest of Customs' illegal liquidations of orange juice entries subject to suspension of liquidation orders pending antidumping investigations and administrative reviews. Id. at 1346. Because of the suspension order, the importer had failed to monitor the bulletin notices posted by Customs and did not learn of the premature assessment of duties until the ninety-day protest period had passed. Interpreting section 1514(a) to mean that all liquidations, whether legal or not, are subject to the timely protest requirement, we rejected the importer's argument that the ninety-day period should, under those circumstances, be subject to equitable tolling. Instead, we held that where Customs had posted public bulletin notices of its liquidations, those notices supplied sufficient notice to trigger the ninety-day protest window. 14 We further explained that the importer bears the burden to check for posted notices of (admittedly premature) liquidation and to protest timely. Absent such watchfulness, Juice Farms cannot circumvent the timely protest requirement by claiming that its own lack of diligence requires equitable relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). Id. 62 In Juice Farms, importers who failed to file a timely protest were left with no legal recourse to challenge improper liquidation. While we recognize that section 1514(c)(2) does not grant protest rights to domestic producers, 15 we find no statutory basis for concluding that, in the absence of express remedies under the statute, Ad Hoc has greater rights than those persons authorized by statute to file protests or that Ad Hoc has more time to do so than the ninety days allotted. 63 Like Juice Farms, this case asks the question of who bears the brunt of monitoring the implementation of antidumping duties. Clearly, where the final assessment rate greatly exceeds the as entered rate, the importers will have little, if any, incentive to ensure that the higher rate is applied. That burden must by necessity fall on the other interested parties, here, the domestic producers. 64 This result, while seemingly harsh, was not unavoidable, as Ad Hoc should have heeded the repeated warning signs. Ad Hoc should have perceived the first sign of trouble when Commerce failed to publish the required notice of the final duty assessment in the Federal Register. In the absence of a Federal Register notice, Ad Hoc should have looked for public liquidation instructions from Commerce, which never issued. Finally, Ad Hoc should have watched for the notice of liquidation at the Port of Nogales, not posted by Customs until some three years after the final judgment in Cemex I. In view of these notable and noticeable omissions, Ad Hoc should have moved the Court of International Trade to enforce the judgment in 1998, rather than in 2003. Here, where Congress declined to give domestic producers protest rights, monitoring the enforcement of its court judgment fell upon Ad Hoc. Unfair as that may seem, the proper forum for remedying the harshness of the statute is Congress, not this court.