Opinion ID: 786207
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 19 This court reviews a claim of insufficient evidence to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). All credibility determinations are drawn in favor of the prosecution. United States v. Avery, 128 F.3d 966, 971 (6th Cir.1997). Harb challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on all of the counts of using a communication facility to facilitate acts constituting a felony, namely the cocaine and marijuana conspiracies, and on the count of conspiring to distribute and to attempt to distribute cocaine. In making this argument, Harb basically disregards the extensive testimony of Laudato and relies instead upon his own testimony to bolster his argument — which makes this a credibility determination rather than a sufficiency problem. See, e.g., Appellant Harb's Br. at 25 ([I]n fact no proof was offered that any cocaine was ever bought, sold, delivered or, for that matter, even existed, other than the testimony of Mr. Harb and Laudato.  (second emphasis added)). 20 Harb makes a slightly more sophisticated argument with respect to each of the conversations, contending that they did not facilitate a conspiracy to distribute. While this does not merit discussion with regard to the conversations directly regarding the sale of marijuana that Harb was making to Laudato in amounts clearly intended for redistribution, it bears more parsing out with regard to the cocaine conspiracy. Harb's argument is essentially that he was a customer, not a coconspirator, and he points to cases rejecting the idea that a mere purchaser can be convicted as a coconspirator. He also argues with respect to the telephone conversations that even if the evidence supports an underlying conspiracy, the calls themselves did not facilitate the conspiracy. But Harb was clearly conspiring with Laudato in that he knew who Laudato's supplier was (referring at one point to your friend out in Mentor, J.A. at 234), gave messages to Laudato to give to Laudato's supplier in hopes of facilitating transactions, and was himself reselling cocaine and informing Laudato of that fact by phone in an attempt to use his customers' willingness to pay in order to get the cocaine from Laudato's supplier sooner. Laudato had had difficultly in getting cocaine from his supplier for quite some time at this point, a fact of which Harb was aware. Additionally, the amount of cocaine Harb was receiving from Laudato can also help in this case to show his knowledge of a wider-ranging conspiracy necessary for him to receive the drugs. See United States v. Warner, 690 F.2d 545, 551 n. 10 (6th Cir.1982); United States v. Grunsfeld, 558 F.2d 1231, 1235 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872, 98 S.Ct. 219, 54 L.Ed.2d 152 (1977). Laudato testified that he sold cocaine to Harb four to six times, at quantities ranging from one to nine ounces; one of the phone conversations recorded between Laudato and Harb was decoded by Laudato as referring to eighteen ounces of cocaine. Harb's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.