Opinion ID: 2253079
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Distinct and Definite Branch

Text: Turning to the question presented, Huffman argues that the August 1991, partial summary judgment was final and appealable and that Berry missed the deadlines for filing the motion to correct errors, Ind.T.R. 59(C), the praecipe, App.R. 2(A), and the record of the proceedings, App.R. 3(B). Berry concedes that if the judgment was final, his appeal was not timely, and the Court of Appeals was right to dismiss. Huffman relies on the doctrine of finality employed prior to the adoption of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure in 1970. Indiana case law held that a judgment was final and appealable even if it did not dispose of all the issues as to all the parties, so long as it disposed of a distinct and definite branch of the litigation. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Blakely (1955), 234 Ind. 167, 125 N.E.2d 437. In multiparty litigation, this meant that an order finally determining all of the issues and claims raised by one of the parties was final. If that party failed to perfect a timely appeal from that judgment, he lost his right to appeal. See Washington v. Chrysler Corp. (1964), 137 Ind. App. 482, 200 N.E.2d 883. This scheme, however, often left litigants uncertain whether to pursue an appeal that might be dismissed as premature or risk losing their right of appeal altogether. Following the federal model, we adopted Indiana Trial Rules 54(B) and 56(C) in an effort to provide greater certainty to the parties and to strike an appropriate balance between the interest in the speedy review of certain judgments and the inefficiencies of piecemeal appeals. See 3 William F. Harvey, Indiana Practice: Rules of Procedure Annotated § 54.2 at 480-82 (2nd ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993). Trial Rule 54(B) defines the procedure for entering a final judgment as to less than all of the issues, claims, or parties in an action. According to this rule, a judgment as to less than all of the parties is final only when the court in writing expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay and expressly directs entry of judgment. The rule explicitly states that, absent certification, the judgment shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties and is not final. Similarly, T.R. 56(C) states that partial summary judgments are interlocutory unless the trial judge expressly determines in writing that there is not just reason for delay and expressly directs entry of judgment as to less than all the issues, claims, or parties. These rules provide useful certainty to the parties and place the discretion with the person in the best position to determine the finality of a trial court's order or judgment  the trial judge. Cf. Charles A. Wright, The Law of the Federal Courts § 101, at 699-701 (4th ed. 1983) (tracing development of Fed. R.Civ.P. 54(b)). If the judge does not expressly certify the order as final, the parties know that they need not appeal. If the order is certified, the parties must take a timely appeal. Huffman contends, however, that the distinct and definite branch doctrine of finality survived the adoption of the Trial Rules. He cites a case decided soon after the rules went into effect, Richards v. Crown Point Community School Corp. (1971), 256 Ind. 347, 269 N.E.2d 5, in which we held that a partial summary judgment settling a distinct and definite branch of the litigation, was final and could be appealed if the party filed a motion to correct errors. While the parties to that appeal did not raise the applicability of the new Trial Rules, effective only four months when that appeal was docketed, there was at least an implication that distinct and definite might still be viable. We hold today that the certification requirements of Trial Rules 54(B) and 56(C) supersede the distinct and definite branch doctrine. Accord Stanray Corp. v. Horizon Construction, Inc. (1976), 168 Ind. App. 164, 342 N.E.2d 645 (same); see also Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp. v. Evansville Teachers Ass'n (1986), Ind. App., 494 N.E.2d 321. Judgments or orders as to less than all of the issues, claims, or parties remain interlocutory until expressly certified as final by the trial judge. To the extent that Richards and other cases support the distinct and definite branch doctrine, they are overruled. Were we to hold otherwise, litigants would again be left to guess whether or not a given order was appealable. This is precisely the situation that T.R. 54(B) and 56(C) were drafted and adopted to prevent. In this case, the trial judge did not expressly find that there was no just reason for delay or expressly enter final judgment against Berry. Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, No. 39C01-9001-CP-40 (Jefferson Cir.Ct. Aug. 9, 1991). R. at 270-71. To the contrary, the judge expressly found that the summary judgment was not a final appealable order and permitted Berry to withdraw his praecipe. Order, No. 39C01-9001-CP-40 (Jefferson Cir.Ct. Nov. 13, 1991). Sup.R. at 5.