Opinion ID: 2386209
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Apprendi Analysis

Text: [¶ 19] There is no question that the holding in Apprendi places serious constitutional limitations on the special [enhanced] penalty provision of life imprisonment. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 152(4); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The State does not dispute that a life sentence is intended by the Legislature to be a sentence that is greater than a sentence of a definite period of any term of years. See Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d at 149 (characterizing life sentence as the harshest penalty in Maine). If the finding that the attempted murder was committed with an aggravating circumstance is used to increase the penalty for the crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum of a term of years, that fact is not merely a sentencing factor, but effectively becomes the functional equivalent of an element of the aggravated attempted murder offense. [11] See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348; accord United States v. Anderson, 236 F.3d 427, 428 (8th Cir. 2001). A court's finding of the aggravating circumstance, in this respect, is appropriately characterized as `a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.' Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 495, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986)). [¶ 20] Accordingly, because the aggravating circumstance was not submitted to the jury as an element of the attempted murder charge, and the jury was not required to make that finding beyond a reasonable doubt on that element, [12] the court was limited to sentencing Burdick to the basic statutory maximum sentence of any term of years. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481, 120 S.Ct. 2348; 17-A M.R.S.A. § 152(4). [¶ 21] In the absence of a challenge by Burdick, however, the court understood the attempted murder statute as granting it the authority to impose the enhanced sentence of life imprisonment based on its own finding that Burdick's attempted murder was committed against a law enforcement officer: [I]t seems to me that under the circumstances of the  of this case this is a particularly appropriate application of the extended range of sentences that are available here compared to other crimes of attempted murder when the victim is not a member of the law enforcement community acting in performance of  of his duties. In so concluding, the court found the existence of an aggravated circumstance and sentenced Burdick to a definite term of forty years, a sentence that it characterized as probably a de facto life sentence. [¶ 22] Burdick argues that the sentence in this case resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights pursuant to Apprendi because the court exposed him to an extended term of life imprisonment without submitting the aggravating circumstance to the jury as an element of his attempted murder charge. [13] See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The State contends, in response, that there is no Apprendi violation given the court's rejection of the opportunity to sentence Burdick to an actual sentence of life imprisonment. Because the court sentenced Burdick to a definite term of forty years, and because the attempted murder statute authorizes the court to sentence a defendant to any term of years without a finding of aggravating circumstances, the State urges us to conclude that Burdick properly received a sentence that is in accordance with Apprendi. [¶ 23] We recognize that there is some debate among the courts regarding the scope of Apprendi 's holding. Because the petitioner in Apprendi did, in fact, receive an enhanced sentence beyond the basic statutory maximum, some courts have declined to expand Apprendi 's holding to cases where the defendant is merely exposed to an enhanced sentence, without actually receiving such a sentence. [14] See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 241 F.3d 115, 121 (1st Cir.2001) (Theoretical exposure to a higher maximum punishment, in and of itself, is not enough.). Other courts, however, have found an Apprendi error where a judge's determination of facts merely exposes the defendant to an increase in the statutory maximum sentence, regardless of whether the actual sentence exceeds the original maximum. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 234 F.3d 483, 488-89 (9th Cir.2000) (finding that there was an Apprendi error but that the error was harmless). [¶ 24] We need not determine here whether mere exposure to the higher sentence would violate a defendant's rights, because we conclude that in this unique sentencing circumstance, the sentencing court may have, in fact, sentenced Burdick to an extended term of life imprisonment. [¶ 25] Burdick was fifty years old at the time of the sentencing. Although the forty-year sentence was stated in terms of years, the court also explicitly characterized its sentence as probably a de facto life sentence. In other words, the sentencing court understood its sentence as incarcerating Burdick for a term of life imprisonment, while giving words to the sentence in terms of years. In this unique and unusual sentencing framework, we construe the results against the State. [15] Thus, juxtaposing the court's term of years against its candid acknowledgement that the sentence constituted a life sentence for Burdick, we assume for purposes of our analysis that the court sentenced Burdick to an increased sentence beyond the ordinary statutory maximum sentence for attempted murder, in violation of the principles of Apprendi.