Opinion ID: 796140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: improper statements by witnesses

Text: 65 Defendants allege that several improper statements by witnesses at trial required the district court to grant a mistrial, and that its failure to do so was erroneous. We review the district court's denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 336 (6th Cir.2005). In considering whether improper statements warrant granting a mistrial, this Court evaluates five factors: 66 (1) whether the remark was unsolicited, (2) whether the government's line of questioning was reasonable, (3) whether a limiting instruction was immediate, clear, and forceful, (4) whether any bad faith was evidenced by the government, and (5) whether the remark was only a small part of the evidence against the defendant. 67 Zuern v. Tate, 336 F.3d 478, 485 (6th Cir.2003) (citing United States v. Forrest, 17 F.3d 916 (6th Cir.1994)). In making this inquiry, the primary concern is fairness to the defendant. Forrest, 17 F.3d at 919. With this framework in mind, we now turn to the specific statements.
68 On direct examination, the government was allegedly attempting to elicit testimony about a quarter-kilogram of crack cocaine that Defendant Cloud's girlfriend flushed down the toilet on July 4, 2003. The following exchange occurred between the prosecution and Walker: 69 Q. Did any of your transactions occur [at Cloud's girlfriend's house]? 70 A. Yes. 71 Q. And can you tell us about that, Mr. Walker? 72 A. I would call him and tell him I'm on my way over there, and I would go up there. 73 Q. Did you have a conversation with Fred Cloud about a Fourth of July incident in 2003? 74 A. Yes. 75 Q. Can you tell use about that? 76 A. Oh, about when, when his—he tried to spray gasoline over his baby's mother's house. 77 J.A. at 1656-57. Defense counsel objected, and the court stated, there was no reason for that, was there? The jury will disregard that last answer. J.A. at 1657. Defendant Cloud later moved for a mistrial, which the district court denied. 78 Applying the factors from Forrest, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial. The government was in the process of questioning Walker on a legitimate line of inquiry, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that they solicited the remark. The line of questioning was also reasonable, as it was aimed at eliciting admissible testimony, specifically, the amount of drugs involved. The district court immediately instructed the jury to disregard the testimony, and Defendant Cloud's counsel asked that no other instruction be given to the jury on the matter. There was also no indication of bad faith on the part of the government; in fact, Defendant Cloud's counsel stated that he certainly [didn't] believe the government would deliberately [elicit such testimony]. J.A. at 1666. Finally, as discussed above, the evidence against Defendant Cloud was substantial. In sum, all factors cut in favor of the government, and the court did not abuse its discretion in not granting a mistrial.
79 On direct examination, the government was asking Hall about the activities in which he had seen Defendant Abdullah participate. The following exchange took place: 80 Q. What did you see Mr. Abdullah doing in that time frame, 2002 and 2003, in the neighborhood? 81 A. Selling crack. 82 Q. And how often would you see that? 83 A. It was real often. I had just got out of jail in 2002, so in 2003—I got out of jail in 2002, September 5—September 19 of '02. And when I got out there, he was really out there grinding. Then he went to jail. Then when he got out of jail— 84 Q. Just what you saw, Mr. Hall, out there. 85 J.A. at 1086-87. Defendant Abdullah's attorney requested a side-bar, where he moved for a mistrial. The district court denied the motion. 86 Applying the factors from Forrest, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant Abdullah's motion for a mistrial. At the side-bar, Defendant Abdullah admitted that the remark was unsolicited—in fact, the government cut Hall off immediately. The government's line of questioning, about what direct knowledge its witness had of Defendant Abdullah's drug dealing, was reasonable, relevant questioning not likely to result in information that was improperly prejudicial. Although no limiting instruction was given, Defendant Abdullah's trial strategy was to avoid calling attention to the statement. There is a paradoxical impossibility in asking an individual not to think about a particular fact, because that very request calls attention to the fact that is to be ignored. See Ferguson v. Knight, 809 F.2d 1239, 1243 (6th Cir.1987). This course of not drawing attention to the statement may be perfectly sound from a tactical standpoint, but, once undertaken, any objection to the lack of a limiting instruction should fall on deaf ears. 13 There is also no indication of bad faith on the part of the government. Finally, there was substantial evidence against Defendant Abdullah. All factors favor the government; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant Abdullah's motion for a mistrial.
87 During cross examination, counsel for Defendant Abdullah asked Morris in which city he lived. The following exchange took place: 88 Q. Did you own the home you were living in? 89 A. No. 90 . . . 91 Q. And where was it? A. That's irrelevant. 92 Q. What city was it in? 93 A. That's irrelevant. 94 [Defendant's Abdullah's counsel]. Your honor, would you direct the witness to answer the question please? He's making legal determinations. 95 [Morris]. So they can come back and have somebody kill my daughter and my kids? J.A. at 1005. 96 Defendant Cloud and Defendant Caver argue that the court should have granted a mistrial in response to this statement. However, as neither Defendant objected at trial, we review only for plain error. United States v. Kincaide, 145 F.3d 771, 781 (6th Cir.1998). 97 Applying the Forrest factors, we conclude that the court's failure to sua sponte declare a mistrial does not amount to plain error. Because the remark occurred on cross examination, whether the government solicited the remark is inapplicable, as is the question of whether the government's line of questioning was reasonable. There was no indication of bad faith by the government, and there was substantial evidence against Defendant Cloud and Defendant Caver adduced at trial. The fact that there was no limiting instruction, on the other hand, favors Defendants, but this alone is not sufficient to carry Defendants' burden of plain error. We conclude that no plain error occurred.
98 Defendant Cloud additionally objects to two statements made during the direct examination of Hall. Hall, being asked how he recognized an undercover police car, responded that I have got arrested with Fred Cloud before. J.A. at 1093. Defendant Cloud moved to strike, and the motion was sustained. Defendant Cloud did not move for a mistrial. Later, the government asked Hall if he recalled Defendant Cloud selling drugs in the neighborhood during the 2002 to 2003 time frame. Hall responded, Well, in 2002 when I got out of jail, [Defendant Cloud] was on house arrest. J.A. at 1126. Defendant Cloud again did not make a motion for a mistrial. We thus review for plain error. Kincaide, 145 F.3d at 781. 99 We conclude that the district court did not commit plain error in failing to sua sponte declare a mistrial. These remarks were unsolicited. The government's questioning, which related to events that were relevant to the conspiracy, was reasonable. There was no indication of bad faith on the part of the government, and the evidence against Defendant Cloud was substantial. The only Forrest factor that favors Defendant Cloud is the failure of the district court to give a limiting instruction. This failure does not amount to plain error.