Opinion ID: 688699
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Allocation of Fines

Text: 56 The State next contends that the district court erred in holding the State solely responsible for paying the sanctions for overcrowding. We reject this argument. 57 As noted above, the district court clearly has the power to assess contempt fines for a violation of its population cap order. See Bagwell, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2257-58; A.W. Thompson, Inc., 651 F.2d at 1145; Schill Steel Prods., 480 F.2d at 599. Here, the district court specifically found that the majority of the problems ... at the Harris County Facility result from the large number of TDCJ inmates which the State will not receive. The court also noted that the primary responsibility for the overcrowding crisis in the Harris County Jail Facility lies with the State Defendants who have the power and the ability through legislation to act to resolve the situation. The State has declined to do so. In light of these determinations, the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that it could ensure compliance with its order by fining the State for overcrowding. The fact that the Court did not identically fine the County to ensure its compliance with the court order does not indicate an abuse of discretion. 11 58 The State next argues that the allocation of the fines is erroneous because it ignores the relative responsibilities of the County and the State for the prisons under state law. We find this argument to be without merit. 59 In Alberti I, we noted that, the state courts should eventually determine whether the state or the county is responsible for [transfer-ready felons] in the county's jails. Alberti I, 937 F.2d at 1002. Nevertheless, we agreed with the district court that the fact that the State of Texas has virtually complete freedom to decide who will be responsible for the confinement of felons provides no shield for liability for the State Defendants in this case because state law clearly places primary responsibility for the confinement of felons upon them. Id. at 997. 60 Moreover, in denying the State's petition for prohibition, stay, and rehearing, we rejected the State's contention that the legislature, by enacting H.B. 93, and the parties by their settlement agreement, ha[d] changed the legal relationship between the state and the counties in any way that affected our finding in Alberti I. Thus, we refused to upset our affirmance of the district court's conclusion that the State had a responsibility for transfer-ready felons in county jails. Similarly, in Alberti II, we were unpersuaded by the State's argument that under Texas law, it was not responsible for transfer-ready felons. Alberti II, 978 F.2d at 895 (rejecting the contention that the State's responsibility for the care of felons in the county jails had become uncertain in light of rulings by the Ruiz court and legislation proposed by the Texas legislature; both signal[ing] that prisoners who are ready for transfer to TDC remain the responsibility of the county until their transfer to TDC.). 61 Simply, current Texas law does not affect the State's liability for the unconstitutional conditions directly attributable to the State's refusal to accept transfer-ready felons. The district court, after dealing with this case for two decades, determined the most appropriate methods for ensuring that the jails meet constitutional standards. In assessing sanctions against the State to meet this goal, the court did not abuse its discretion. 62 Finally, we reject the State's invitation to certify the question of the relative responsibilities of the County and the State to the Texas Supreme Court. Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 114(a), a question of law can be certified to the Supreme Court of Texas  'if it appears to the certifying court that there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Texas.'  Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 418 (5th Cir.1986) (quoting Tex.R.App.P. 114(a)); accord Swearingen v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 968 F.2d 559, 564 (5th Cir.1992). We have also noted, however, that [c]ertification does not constitute a panacea for resolution of those complex or difficult decisions of state law which have not been answered by the highest court of the state. Swearingen, 968 F.2d at 564 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 63 In this case, although the Texas Supreme Court has not passed on the relative responsibilities of the State and the County regarding conditions of overcrowding caused by the State's refusal to accept transfer-ready felons, we have previously held that, we are not persuaded that the state's duty [in regard to the problems of the jails is] so uncertain. Alberti II, 978 F.2d at 895. Moreover, we have repeatedly rejected the State's contention that state law absolves the State of all of its responsibility for transfer-ready felons. Accordingly, we reject the State's invitation to certify this question to the Texas Supreme Court. 64