Opinion ID: 1249059
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preclusion of Undisclosed Witnesses from the Government's Case-in-Chief

Text: A district court has the power to exclude the government's evidence as a sanction, but only for a violation of any constitutional provision, federal statute, specific discovery order, or any other recognized right. United States v. Schwartz, 857 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir.1988) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Gatto, 763 F.2d at 1046 (holding that the separation-of-powers principle imposes significant limits on the district court's use of its supervisory powers to exclude government's evidence); Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(d)(2)(C). Here, the district court was legitimately concerned with giving Grace adequate opportunity and information to prepare its defense. A generalized concern with a defendant's ability to prepare is not a sufficient basis upon which to exclude evidence, however. See Schwartz, 857 F.2d at 658. It is quite clear that the court was frustrated by the government's apparent inability to bring focus and closure to its case preparation. However, in entering the December 2005 and February 2006 orders limiting the government's presentation of nonexpert witnesses in its case-in-chief to those already disclosed, the district court did not explicitly find the government to be in violation of any constitutional provision or federal statute. Because the district court lacked the authority to order the government to disclose its nonexpert witnesses before trial, the government's failure to produce a finalized list of such witnesses by December 5, 2005 cannot serve as the basis for precluding such undisclosed witnesses from the government's case-in-chief. Even had the district court found that the government violated a constitutional provision, a federal statute or a legitimate discovery order, exclusion is not an automatic remedy. See United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1247 (9th Cir.1997) (addressing Rule 16). Exclusion can be a too harsh remedy for discovery violations and generally is an appropriate remedy for a discovery rule violation only where `the omission was willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage.' United States v. Finley, 301 F.3d 1000, 1018 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988)) (emphasis removed). [6] This is certainly so in the case of an order that broadly precludes evidence, one we would expect to be accompanied by findingsnot present hereof government misconduct and prejudice to the defendants. See Schwartz, 857 F.2d. at 659 (noting that the government had not violated any discovery orders or behaved duplicitously); see also United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285, 1292 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that [i]n selecting a proper [discovery] sanction, a court should typically consider (1) the reasons the government delayed producing requested materials, including whether the government acted in bad faith; (2) the extent of prejudice to defendant as a result of the delay; and (3) the feasibility of curing the prejudice with a continuance). On the record before us, therefore, we cannot justify the blanket exclusion from the government's case-in-chief of undisclosed nonexpert witnesses as the orders of December 2005 and February 2006 provide. We therefore reverse these orders insofar as they preclude witnesses the government had failed to identify as of December 5, 2005.