Opinion ID: 1989352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: In filing its appeal, the State relies on V.R.A.P. 4(9) as reflecting, if not creating, a right in the State to appeal the trial court's denial of its motions to modify the sentences. Amicus argues that the State's motion to reconsider sentence in State v. Saari should have been denied as untimely and no appeal to this Court allowed. Defendant Saari was sentenced on July 15, 1986. The State filed a motion to reconsider sentence on July 24, 1986, nine days after imposition of sentence. The State is required, under 13 V.S.A. § 7042(b), to file a motion to reconsider within seven days of imposition of sentence. We note, however, that the State's notice of appeal in each action was filed on August 2, 1986, within thirty days of the sentences, and was timely. V.R.A.P. 4. The timeliness of the post-conviction motion is insignificant in this instance, given our characterization of the appeal as a petition for extraordinary relief, and we will not, on those grounds, dismiss the case. While it is true that V.R.A.P. 4(9) refers to an appeal of an order granting or denying a motion to modify a criminal sentence, as attempted here, the purpose of the provision is to set time limitations for filing notices of appeal, not to create rights of appeal in either party. V.R.A.P. 4 is the procedural framework for appeals permitted by law as of right. The sole legal authority for criminal appeals by the prosecution to this Court under Rule 4 is provided in 13 V.S.A. § 7403. At one time, § 7403 provided only for interlocutory appeals, in both felony and misdemeanor cases, and then only on the condition that the State's exceptions were allowed and placed upon the record before final judgment. 13 V.S.A. § 7403 (1947). These limitations reflected the protections of the double jeopardy clause. State v. Velander, 123 Vt. 60, 61, 181 A.2d 60, 61 (1962). In 1982, the opportunity for the State to appeal in felony cases was expanded by a revision of the statute which differentiated between misdemeanors and felonies. 13 V.S.A. § 7403. The limitations on the State's ability to appeal final rulings in misdemeanor cases remains the same: only interlocutory appeals are allowed. Neither the sentence nor the decision on a motion to reconsider sentence are prejudgment, interlocutory orders. Thus appeals by the State in Saari and Branch are not allowed by the statute. If the State's attempted appeal ran afoul of the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution, we would look no further to exercise jurisdiction. There is, however, no constitutional bar to the State's appeal of a sentence it believes is beyond the lawful authority of the trial court. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136, 101 S.Ct. 426, 437, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980) (The double jeopardy considerations that bar reprosecution after an acquittal do not prohibit review of a sentence.). Although no statute confers appellate jurisdiction in this case, the State may avail itself of our jurisdiction through a petition for extraordinary relief. V.R.A.P. 21. Extraordinary relief provides the proper avenue for redress where no other relief exists. Crabbe v. Veve Assoc., 145 Vt. 641, 643, 497 A.2d 366, 368 (1985). Among the writs consolidated in the extraordinary relief rule is mandamus, see V.R.A.P. 21(a), which will lie for the enforcement of a purely ministerial act, that is, an act `regarding which nothing is left to discretion....' Bargman v. Brewer, 142 Vt. 367, 369, 454 A.2d 1253, 1255 (1983). Vermont courts have not had occasion to use mandamus to review a sentencing order; such orders are traditionally within the court's discretion. V.R.Cr.P. 32, 35. Mandamus is appropriately invoked `to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so' .... [but] only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial `usurpation of power' will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95, 88 S.Ct. 269, 273, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967) (mandamus denied; improper review of discovery order requested) (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26, 63 S.Ct. 938, 941, 87 L.Ed. 1185 (1943), and De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217, 65 S.Ct. 1130, 1132, 89 L.Ed. 1566 (1945)); see also Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 39-40, 37 S.Ct. 72, 73, 61 L.Ed. 129 (1916); United States v. Denson, 588 F.2d 1112, 1129 (5th Cir.1979) (court denied review of sentence brought by petition for writ of mandamus); United States v. Hundley, 858 F.2d 58, 66 (2d Cir.1988) (motion to set aside sentence denied). We hold that the trial court stepped outside its authority by rejecting the applicable sentencing statute. Therefore, extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus is an appropriate vehicle for review. See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. at 26, 63 S.Ct. at 941 (considerations guiding judicial discretion in use of mandamus include whether act was within trial court's jurisdiction or tended to thwart appellate review of ruling); United States v. Jackson, 550 F.2d 830, 831 (2d Cir.1977) (petition for mandamus granted to review sentence and case remanded). A petition for extraordinary relief is normally presented to this Court with an allegation, supported by affidavit, stating that no adequate remedy is available through the superior court. V.R.A.P. 21(b); see Reed v. Department of Public Safety, 137 Vt. 9, 11, 398 A.2d 301, 303 (1979). This was not done here. But this Court may, on its own motion, suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a particular case for good cause. V.R.A.P. 2; see In re Smith, 131 Vt. 24, 25, 298 A.2d 823, 825 (1972). We will do so here because of the importance of the issue and because no further facts are necessary in order to consider the merits of the issues raised.