Opinion ID: 164215
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Count 3: Alleged Violations of the Requirement of Fair Membership Balance in Representation

Text: 53 The plaintiffs' third claim in their complaint is that the agency failed to abide by its regulation requiring that advisory committees have a fair membership balance. 43 C.F.R. § 1784.2-1(a). As with Counts 1 and 2, the plaintiffs brought their claim under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and the district court dismissed the count because the regulation was too vague to provide a meaningful standard of review. We conclude that this regulation is justiciable. Section 1784.2-1(a) states: 54 Each advisory committee shall be structured to provide fair membership balance, both geographic and interest-specific, in terms of the functions to be performed and points of view to be represented, as prescribed by its charter. Each shall be formed with the objective of providing representative counsel and advice about public land and resource planning, retention, management and disposal. 55 43 C.F.R. § 1784.2-1(a) (emphasis added). The regulation was promulgated pursuant to FACA, see 43 C.F.R. § 1784.0-3(a), and the emphasized portion closely tracks the language of FACA's § 5(b)(2), which requires that advisory committees be fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be performed by the advisory committee. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2). In addition, in a section speaking specifically about the RACs, the BLM regulations say that [i]n appointing members of a [RAC] from the 3 categories set forth in [§ 1784.6-1(c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3)] ... the Secretary shall provide for balanced and broad representation from within each category. 43 C.F.R. § 1784.6-1(d). 56 There is no case law addressing the precise question whether the fair balance requirements of 43 C.F.R. §§ 1784.2-1(a) and 1784.6-1(d) are justiciable. However, several courts have addressed the question whether the analogous fair balance provision in 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2) is justiciable. The Fifth and D.C. Circuits have held that the fair balance requirement of § 5(b)(2) is justiciable, and no court of appeals has held to the contrary. See Cargill, 173 F.3d at 335; Public Citizen v. Nat'l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 886 F.2d 419, 423-25, 433 (D.C.Cir.1989) (majority agreeing that § 5(b)(2) is justiciable). The Eleventh Circuit also has strongly suggested that § 5(b)(2) is justiciable by upholding a district court's injunction imposed to remedy violations of § 5(b). 5 Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Dep't of Interior, 26 F.3d 1103, 1106-07 (11th Cir.1994). We find these cases to be persuasive authority for the instant case. 57 We therefore adopt the reasoning of the Fifth and D.C. Circuits and apply it to the fair balance requirement of 43 C.F.R. §§ 1784.2-1(a) and 1784.6-1(d). The BLM regulations are not [one of] those rare instances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). As Judge Edwards wrote in Microbiological Criteria: 58 It does not matter that the fairly balanced requirement falls short of mathematical precision in application, or that it may involve some balancing of interests by the agency. The presumption in favor of judicial review is not altered in the face of a diffuse statutory directive. Indeed, this [is] one of the principal points of the Supreme Court's decision in Overton Park. In that case, the Court allowed a suit under a statute that prohibited the Secretary of Transportation from authorizing the use of federal funds to finance the construction of highways through public parks if a feasible and prudent alternative route exists and allowed construction through parks only if there has been all possible planning to minimize harm to the park. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411, 91 S.Ct. 814.... The feasible and prudent and minimize harm standards involved a significant and ill-defined weighing of interests by the agency, just as does the fairly balanced standard in this case. However, as the Court made clear, this did not mean that there was no law to apply. Id. at 410-13, 91 S.Ct. 814.... While the difficulty of determining what precisely constitutes a fair balance may incline courts to be deferential in reviewing the composition of advisory committees and may defeat a plaintiff's claims in a given case, this cannot be grounds for refusing to enforce the provision altogether. 59 Microbiological Criteria, 886 F.2d at 434 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 60 Compared to the statutes at issue in Overton Park and Microbiological Criteria, which provided law to apply even though they required ill-defined weighing of interests, the BLM regulations provide a more precise standard for determining what constitutes a fair balance of interests on the RACs. Section 1784.6-1(c) requires that appointees to RACs be representative of three general groups, each of which is comprised of specific subgroups: (1) people with interests in federal grazing permits, transportation or rights-of-way, outdoor recreation, commercial timber operations, or energy and mineral development; (2) people representing nationally or regionally recognized environmental groups, dispersed recreational activities, archeological and historical interests, or wild horse and burro interest groups; and (3) persons who hold state, county or local elected office, are employed by state natural resources agencies, represent local Indian tribes, are employed as academics in natural resource management or the natural sciences, or represent the public-at-large. 43 C.F.R. § 1784.6-1(c)(1)-(3). The regulations state that the Secretary shall provide for balanced and broad representation from within each category of interests described in § 1784.6-1(c). 43 C.F.R. § 1784.6-1(d). Thus, whereas under § 5(b)(2) a court must determine what interests should be represented in light of the purpose and functions of the advisory committee before deciding whether those interests are fairly represented, see Cargill, 173 F.3d at 336, 337, under § 1784.6-1(c) the court knows which categories of interests are entitled to representation on the RACs. 61 In fact, the BLM regulations do more than simply list the interest groups that are to be represented on the RACs. The regulations require that RACs be organized consistent with one of three models described in 43 C.F.R. § 1784.6-2. The three models differ in terms of what jurisdiction the RAC covers, what constitutes a quorum for conducting RAC business, and what subgroups may be formed to work under the RAC. See 43 C.F.R. § 1784.6-2(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3). Most relevant for our purposes, however, is how this section specifies the membership requirements for each model RAC. Under Model A, [e]ach council shall have 15 members, distributed equally among the 3 interest groups specified in § 1784.6-1(c). 43 C.F.R. § 1784.6-2(a)(1)(ii). Model B is more precise, consisting of 15 members, distributed equally among the 3 interest groups specified in § 1784.6-1(c), and will include at least one representative from wildlife interest groups, grazing interests, minerals and energy interests, and established environmental/conservation interests. The Governor [of the covered state] shall chair the council. 43 C.F.R. § 1784.6-2(a)(2)(ii). Model C states that [m]embership of the council shall be 10 to 15 members, distributed in a balanced fashion among the 3 interest groups defined in § 1784.6-1(c). 43 C.F.R. § 1784.6-2(a)(3)(ii). In requiring equal representation of the three groups defined in § 1784.6-1(c), Models A and B require that five members of the fifteen-member RAC be drawn from each interest group. Model C requires balanced representation from among the three interest groups because RACs under the model may have 10, 11, 13, or 14 members, sizes that do not permit equal representations from among the three groups. Still, balanced representation under Model C at least requires that none of the interest groups be significantly over-represented compared to the others. 62 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the fair balance requirement of 43 C.F.R. §§ 1784.2-1(a) and 1784.6-1(d) is justiciable and the district court erred in dismissing Count 3 of the complaint.