Opinion ID: 2995189
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Downward Departure Request: U.S.S.G.

Text: sec. 5K1.1 Motion Atkinson contends that the district court erred during re-sentencing by failing to consider the government’s U.S.S.G. sec. 5K1.1 motion for a downward departure. He asserts that the district court did not understand it had the authority to grant a downward departure at the time of his second re-sentencing. We do not have jurisdiction to review a district court’s decision to exercise its discretion to deny a downward departure under the Guidelines. United States v.Albarran, 233 F.3d 972, 978 (7th Cir. 2000). However, we can review a refusal to depart that is based on an erroneous legal conclusion about the court’s authority to depart. United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 1991). At first glance, it appears Atkinson’s argument may have some merit. In its December 28th order, the district court, citing Tidwell, 178 F.3d 946, stated that the re-sentencing did not require a further in-court proceeding, but merely the ministerial re-creation and re- issuance of the final judgment. Also, Atkinson notes (1) the government’s sec. 5K1.1 motion was filed under seal, years before the second re-sentencing; (2) the Probation Office memorandum outlining the effect of Amendment 516 did not address the sec. 5K1.1 motion; and (3) the district court never mentioned the motion in its re-sentencing order. Among other cases, Atkinson cites United States v. Vahovick, 160 F.3d 395 (7th Cir. 1998), for support. In Vahovick, we vacated the defendant’s sentence because we could not conclude with assurance that the district court considered a specific downward departure. Id. at 398-99. Atkinson asserts that, based on the record in the present case, it is impossible to know with assurance that the district court considered a downward departure. We are unable to join in Atkinson’s conclusion. [A] claim that a seasoned judge . . . didn’t understand his discretion will rarely, if ever, be successful when built merely on inference. Article III judges are presumed to know the law. . . . Albarran, 233 F.3d at 979 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Atkinson’s argument relies almost solely upon inference. Upon examination, it becomes clear that his argument is not supported by the record. The government, in its response to Atkinson’s request for re-sentencing, advised the court that Atkinson’s previous sentence involved a discretionary downward departure under sec. 5K1.1. Citing cases from the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, the government asserted that the district court was not obligated to honor its original departure, or award a proportionately equal departure. Atkinson, in his reply to the government’s response, further addressed the sec. 5K1.1 issue, arguing that the government’s stance on the issue constituted a breach of the plea agreement. In imposing the revised sentence, the district court noted that it had considered the fully briefed arguments of the parties and the expanded record. Contrary to Atkinson’s assertions, the district court was not unaware that it had the discretion to depart. Here, although Judge Barker, the same judge who has presided over all of Atkinson’s sentencing hearings, never explicitly stated that she considered the sec. 5K1.1 motion in connection with the second re- sentencing, there is nothing in the record to suggest that she believed that she did not have the authority to depart downward. She had in fact exercised this discretion by granting downward departures on two previous occasions in this same case. The papers filed by the government in connection with the second re-sentencing made it clear that the sec. 5K1.1 departure was a matter that the court needed to consider. We conclude that the refusal to grant a downward departure was an exercise of the court’s discretion which cannot be reviewed by this court. We dismiss this portion of Atkinson’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.