Opinion ID: 2116413
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Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Is the City immune from liability under the Iowa Tort Liability of Governmental Subdivisions Act, Iowa Code chapter 670?

Text: Iowa Code chapter 670 establishes the parameters of a municipality's liability for the negligent acts or omissions of its employees. [1] See Hansen v. City of Audubon, 378 N.W.2d 903, 905 (Iowa 1985). In doing so, it abrogates in part, a municipality's immunity from suits sounding in tort. Id. [2] Iowa Code section 670.2 states in pertinent part: Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, every municipality is subject to liability for its torts and those of its officers and employees, acting within the scope of their employment or duties, whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function. As contemplated by Iowa Code section 670.2, there are various exceptions to a municipality's liability. These exceptions are listed in Iowa Code section 670.4. The relevant exceptions to a municipality's liability that are at issue in this appeal are the discretionary function exception, see Iowa Code section 670.4(3), and the emergency response exception, see Iowa Code section 670.4(11). We will consider each of these exceptions in turn.

The defendant City contends that its decision not to sandbag or otherwise close the railroad opening in the levee was a decision involving a discretionary function and that it is therefore immune from liability under the discretionary function exception to liability. Iowa Code § 670.4(3). The City asserts that it relied on reports from the Weather Bureau as to the river levels in the Des Moines area, that it made its decisions concerning how to respond to the flood according to that information, and that there was no way the City could have known that the water would rise to a level higher than predicted. The City argues that these facts show that its decision not to close the railroad opening was a discretionary function. Plaintiffs contend that although decisions concerning the initial design and construction of the levee and railroad opening were a matter of discretion, the actual execution of the flood plan project, by deciding which openings in the levee to close, was an operational decision. Plaintiffs thus assert that the City is not immune from liability as a matter of law under the discretionary function exception.
Iowa Code section 670.4(3) provides immunity to a municipality for: 3. Any claim based upon an act or omission of an officer or employee of the municipality, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute, ordinance, or regulation whether the statute, ordinance or regulation is valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of the municipality or an officer or employee of the municipality, whether or not the discretion is abused. Under this provision, a municipality is not liable for claims arising from an officer or employee's failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function. Conversely, a municipality is not immune from liability for acts or omissions made at the operational level. Iowa Code section 670.4(3) is similar to the discretionary function exception in the Iowa State Tort Claims Act, see Iowa Code section 669.14(1), and to the discretionary function exception in the Federal Tort Claims Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1994). [3] To determine whether a decision challenged under chapter 670 was discretionary, we have adopted the planning-operational dichotomy set forth in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953). See Hansen, 378 N.W.2d at 906; Butler v. State, 336 N.W.2d 416, 419-20 (Iowa 1983). Under analogous section 669.14(1), we explained the planning/operational distinction as follows: The planning level is generally characterized as the policy making stage and is said to encompass decisions that involve the formulation of policy, that call for a weighing of competing interests, that require an assessment of the practicability or feasibility (including the consideration of budgetary constraints) of a proposed course of action, or that entail an evaluation of how the public interests will best be served. Thus the initial decision to undertake a project falls within the immunity of the planning stage. The implementation of decisions made at the planning level is operational; decisions made at the operational level are not covered by the discretionary function exception. For example, in the area of highway construction and repair [o]nce the decision [has been] made to construct [or repair] a ... freeway ..., the State [is] obligated to use due care to make certain that the freeway [meets] the standard of reasonable safety for the traveling public. The distinction between the two levels is best illustrated in terms of judicial review. Policy decisions, such as when and where to construct a freeway, involve the weighing of the merits of social, political and economic factors traditionally held to be within the purview of the legislature. Judicial review of such decisions would be an apparent violation of the separation of powers principle. Decisions made at the operational level, however, do not involve the same overriding policy determinations and can readily be reviewed under judicially manageable tort standards of due care and reasonableness. Butler, 336 N.W.2d at 419 (holding that State's decision not to update an installed guardrail was made at the operational, rather than the planning level, and thus did not fall within the discretionary function exception) (citations omitted). [4] We have also stated, the planning level is generally the policy-making stage and decisions made at that level involve the formulation of policy for which the government entity will be immune from liability. Nordbrock v. State, 395 N.W.2d 872, 873 (Iowa 1986). Thus, a decision involving a discretionary function generally involves the evaluation of broad policy factors. See Julius Rothschild & Co. v. State, 66 Haw. 76, 655 P.2d 877, 880-81 (Haw.1982) (per curiam) (decision whether to replace or reconstruct portion of bridge involved consideration of broad policy factors and thus was a discretionary function within State's tort liability act). Such an evaluation would include a consideration of the financial, political, economic, and social effects of a given plan or policy. Id. at 881; see also National Union Fire Ins. v. United States, 115 F.3d 1415, 1421 (9th Cir.1997) (in deciding whether federal government's decision involves a discretionary function, the test is (1) whether challenged action involved an element of choice or judgment, and if not, whether a federal statute, regulation or policy specifically prescribed a course of action for an employee to follow, and (2) whether the judgment involved consideration of social, economic or political policy such that Congress should be understood to have shielded it from judicial review). On the other hand, actions at the operational level implement the decisions that were made at the planning level. Nordbrock, 395 N.W.2d at 873-74 (emphasis added). Thus, the rule is that [i]n order for the [government] to be immunized from liability, the choice must represent a policy judgment of superior authority that a particular task be done in accordance with the prescribed policy. Hawkeye Bank v. State, 515 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Iowa 1994) (state not immune from liability under discretionary function exception in suit for negligence in supervising child on playground at state operated school). One legal authority has commented on the planning/operational distinction as follows: The planning level is generally characterized as the policy-making stage, encompassing decisions that involve the formulation of policy, a weighing of competing interests, the assessment of the practicability or feasibility (including budgetary constraints) of a proposed course of action, or decisions that entail an evaluation of how public interests will best be served. The test involves a delineation between actual high-level policy-making decisions or basic policy determinations made at the planning rather than at the operational level by one who, faced with alternative approaches, weighed the competing policy considerations and made a conscious choice. Operational acts, for which there is no immunity, consist of conduct which merely puts into effect a predetermined plan, or acts which concern routine, everyday matters, not requiring evaluation of broad policy factors. 57 Am.Jur.2d Municipal, County, School & State Tort Liability § 121, at 133-34 (1988) (emphasis added). Operational level decisions generally mean those that involve routine, every day matters, not requiring evaluation of broad policy factors. See Ransom v. City of Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 743 P.2d 70, 73 (Idaho 1987). Discretionary acts, in contrast, do not include carrying out previously established plans or policies. 57 Am.Jur.2d Municipal, County, School & State Tort Liability § 121, at 134. Performance of a discretionary function requires an exercise in judgment and choice as to what is proper and just under the circumstances. It involves the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed, or establishing plans, specifications, and schedules where there is room for policy judgment and decision .... If a public employee is required to decide and act without fixed or readily ascertainable standards, that act is a discretionary function. At the point where discretion is exhausted, duty arises, and further acts or functions may be considered ministerial. Id. § 119, at 131-32 (emphasis added). These principles suggest that the primary factor in determining whether a particular activity qualifies as a discretionary function is whether the decision to act involves the evaluation of broad policy factors. See Julius Rothschild & Co., 655 P.2d at 880-81. If so, the decision is more likely to be characterized as a discretionary function. Id.
Upon our review, we conclude that the decision of the City not to sandbag or otherwise close the railroad opening was an operational decision and not an exercise of a discretionary function. As we have stated before, `[e]very act involves discretion.' Sullivan v. Wickwire, 476 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Iowa 1991) (quoting Stanley v. State, 197 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 1972)). Thus, while it is true that the City's decisions concerning where and when to expend resources to fight the flood involved an exercise of judgment and discretion, those decisions were made pursuant to the flood protection plan developed by the Corps of Engineers and pursuant to the City's emergency flood plan. Such decisions, made pursuant to established plans and specifications, do not involve a discretionary function. The policy and planning decisions were made by the Corps of Engineers when the flood project was designed, and at the time the City assumed responsibility for maintaining the flood project. It was then that decisions were made whereby officials weighed competing interests, assessed the practicality or monetary feasibility of a proposed course of action, and evaluated how the public interest would best be served. See Butler, 336 N.W.2d at 419. Decisions at this level fall under the discretionary function exception to liability, while decisions concerning how to carry out the flood protection plan, such as the decision when to close openings in the levee, are decisions made at the operational level. See id. (implementation of decisions made at planning level are operational); 57 Am.Jur.2d Municipal, County, School & State Tort Liability § 121, at 134 (operational acts are those which merely put into effect a predetermined plan). [5] We conclude that the decisions concerning how to properly maintain the levee, including decisions regarding when to close openings therein, were decisions that do not fall within the discretionary function exception to the City's general waiver of immunity. Accordingly, we conclude the district court correctly overruled the City's summary judgment motion in the Merchants case on this issue.

The City contends that it is immune from liability concerning plaintiffs' claims under the emergency response exception to liability, see Iowa Code section 670.4(11). Specifically, the City asserts that it is immune from liability concerning plaintiffs' claims because its decision not to close the railroad opening was made in response to an emergency, the unprecedented flood. The City urges that a flood of this proportion could be nothing but an emergency and thus it is immune from liability for any decisions it made during its efforts in fighting the flood. It thus contends that the district court properly granted its motion for summary judgment in the Keystone case on this basis and erred in denying its motion in the Merchants case. Plaintiffs contend that the City is not immune from liability under the emergency response exception to liability. Plaintiffs assert that the emergency did not occur until the flood waters started coming through the railroad opening and that the City therefore could have closed the opening in the levee before the emergency occurred. Plaintiffs thus claim that the City was not responding to an emergency when it decided not to close the opening.
Iowa Code section 670.4(11) provides immunity to a municipality for: A claim based upon or arising out of an act or omission in connection with an emergency response including but not limited to acts or omissions in connection with emergency response communications services. By its language, section 670.4(11) gives a municipality immunity for claims concerning the action and reaction of its officers or employees in response to an emergency situation. Cf. City of Arlington v. Whitaker, 977 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex.Ct.App.1998) (interpreting Texas emergency exception in Texas Tort Claims Act and stating emergency exception by its language completely removes emergency action and reaction from the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity ). Therefore, if a municipality chooses not to act, and such decision is made during the course of an emergency, the municipality is immune from liability for any claims related to its inaction. The question we must therefore decide is whether it can be said as a matter of law that an emergency existed at the time the City decided not to close the railroad opening in the levee.
Upon our review, we conclude that there is a material issue of fact concerning whether the City's omission or failure to close the railroad opening was made in response to an emergency situation. We recognize that the flood during the time in question was an unprecedented flood. We also note that the record shows that the City made its decisions concerning how it would fight the flood based on information it received from the Weather Bureau regarding water levels of the river at particular locations. However, the record also contains evidence that other officials, besides Des Moines city officials, believed that the water levels were actually going to be higher than those predicted by the Weather Bureau. This information was conveyed to the City, but the City chose not to close the railroad opening. Viewing the record in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, as we are required to do, we believe that a material issue of fact was generated concerning when an emergency occurred as a result of the flood waters and the time the City had for a response to oncoming flood waters. We therefore cannot say as a matter of law that the City was acting in response to an emergency when it decided not to close the railroad opening in the levee. Accordingly, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the City is immune from liability under the emergency response exception to the City's general waiver of immunity under Iowa Code section 670.4(11). Cf. Odello Bros. v. County of Monterey, 63 Cal.App.4th 778, 791, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 911 (Cal.App.1998) (county not immune from inverse condemnation claim under emergency exception because although county was responding to flood when it intentionally breached a levee, the emergency was due to inadequacy of another levee, of which city had knowledge, but took no action to repair). On this issue raised in the City's motions for summary judgment, the district court correctly overruled the motion in the Merchants case and erred in sustaining the motion in the Keystone case.