Opinion ID: 2014063
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Psychiatric Evaluation of Merriman

Text: Before trial, defendant requested that the circuit court order a psychological and psychiatric evaluation of Randy Merriman. In addition, defendant asked the court to require the State to disclose Merriman's mental health treatment records. The circuit court denied defendant's request for an examination of Merriman but ordered the State to submit records of Merriman's mental health treatment for an in camera inspection by the court. After examining the records, the circuit court granted defense counsel's request to use eight documents for purposes of impeaching Merriman's testimony. At trial, Merriman testified on direct and cross-examination concerning his history of substance abuse, mental illness, and memory problems. Defendant acknowledges that the jury was presented with information concerning Merriman's mental health, but he contends that a current psychiatric evaluation was needed to allow the defense to investigate and possibly present defense evidence to the jury as to how Merriman's mental problems affected his credibility as a witness as well as his ability to perceive reality at the time of the crime. According to defendant, Merriman's credibility was critical to the State's case against defendant, and the circuit court's refusal to order an evaluation of Merriman deprived defendant of his right under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution to confront witnesses and present a defense. A criminal defendant's right to confrontation under the sixth amendment includes the right to cross-examine witnesses against him. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill.2d 81, 130, 235 Ill.Dec. 667, 705 N.E.2d 850 (1998), citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 (1974). Any permissible matter which affects the witness's credibility may be developed on cross-examination. Kliner, 185 Ill.2d at 130, 235 Ill.Dec. 667, 705 N.E.2d 850. However, [a] defendant's rights under the confrontation clause are not absolute. Rather, `the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.' (Emphasis in original.) People v. Jones, 156 Ill.2d 225, 243-44, 189 Ill.Dec. 357, 620 N.E.2d 325 (1993), quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 294, 88 L.Ed.2d 15, 19 (1985). The latitude allowed on cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the circuit court, and a reviewing court will not interfere unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to the defendant. People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill.2d 326, 357, 168 Ill.Dec. 108, 589 N.E.2d 508 (1992); People v. Sandoval, 135 Ill.2d 159, 194, 142 Ill.Dec. 135, 552 N.E.2d 726 (1990). Because of the information made available to the defendant through Merriman's mental health treatment records, we cannot conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying defendant's request for a psychological and psychiatric evaluation of Merriman. The defense received copies of records from June 1997 through March 1998. These records, which included psychiatric and mental health evaluations, indicated that Merriman had sought treatment for depression and substance abuse several times in 1997 and 1998. Records of evaluations on June 3, 1997, and July 30, 1997, showed that Merriman had been diagnosed with major depression with psychotic features. He had been prescribed Risperdal and Serzone in May 1997, which improved the symptoms of his depression. Also according to these records, Merriman said he had suicidal thoughts, described his thoughts as jumbled up, and stated that he had problems with his memory and concentration. In addition, he reported a history of cocaine dependence but stated that he had not used cocaine since April 1997. In October 1997, Merriman told mental health workers that he had not used cocaine since April 1997. In December 1997, however, Merriman sought treatment for substance abuse. At that time, he admitted smoking $50 of crack cocaine a day and reported hallucinations of people hiding behind trees in front of his parents' house. According to the December evaluation, Merriman's use of drugs appeared to aggravate his psychiatric symptoms. Other mental health treatment records provided to the defense indicated that, following Merriman's release from a drug rehabilitation program in 1998, he relapsed and entered drug treatment again in February 1998 after using $600 of crack cocaine on one day. These records permitted the defense to conduct an effective cross-examination of Merriman. At trial, Merriman testified on direct examination that he was a drug addict and that he had been diagnosed with a severe major depressive disorder with psychotic features. He stated that he ingested medication for this mental illness on August 7. Merriman acknowledged that he sometimes had problems remembering things but asserted that he recalled the events of August 7, 8, 14, and 15 pretty well. On cross-examination, Merriman stated that he had been treated for cocaine addiction in 1997 and 1998 and sought mental health treatment in 1997 on several occasions. He admitted that, on July 30, he had complained of jumbled thought, bad memory, and hallucinations and had indicated that his cocaine addiction made his symptoms worse. He had been on medication since May 1997 and used crack cocaine on the morning of August 8. As this testimony demonstrates, the defendant was able to provide the jury with ample information from which to evaluate Merriman's credibility and ability to perceive and recall the events surrounding the Brewer murders and defendant's arrest. Accordingly, the circuit court's refusal to order a psychological and psychiatric examination of Merriman was not an abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to defendant, and defendant was not denied his rights under the sixth amendment.