Opinion ID: 6983251
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Force Used Against Ingram and Collins

Text: In the present case, the district court questioned the “integrity” of Ingram’s version of the facts because although Plaintiffs’ affidavits stated the officers had thrown Ingram against the couch, Ingram’s medical reports showed she told medical personnel that she had fallen when pushed during a police raid. The district court further found that Plaintiffs’ injuries were only “minor” in that the doctor prescribed only ice and Advil, and that there was “no injury whatsoever to the face of Betty Ingram.” Finally, the district court found that Ingram and Collins interfered with the officers in their pursuit of Carroll by holding onto them and blocking their path, and that these facts rendered reasonable the officers’ use of force against Ingram and Collins. We find the district court clearly erred in making these findings, and in concluding that Ingram and Collins did not raise genuine issues of material fact as to whether the officers unlawfully subjected them to excessive force. At the outset we observe that although faced -with a motion for summary judgment by Defendants, the district court disregarded the assertions of Ingram and Collins that they did not interfere with Defendants’ entry into their home, and instead credited Defendants’ claims to the contrary. Moreover, in questioning Ingram’s version of events, the district court ignored her specific charge that the officers struck her in addition to throwing her against the couch. In light of this allegation, Ingram did not contradict her version of events by telling medical personnel she was pushed during a police raid. Indeed, the affidavits state that one officer struck Ingram with such force that her dentures fell as she hit the floor. Moreover, the affidavits set forth that Ingram and Collins did not in any way interfere with the officers who entered their home that afternoon, did not resist arrest, and did not attempt to escape from the officers. Faced with a motion for summary judgment, the district court should have drawn all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, and should have taken Plaintiffs’ evidence as true. As these issues of fact are material as to whether the officers acted reasonably, the district court erred not only in discrediting Plaintiffs’ assertions, but also in finding as a consequence that Plaintiffs had raised no genuine issue of material fact. Cf. Sova v. City of Mount Pleasant, 142 F.3d 898, 903 (6th Cir.1998). The district court further erred by finding as a matter of law that the officers did not apply excessive force in arresting Ingram and Collins on the grounds that their injuries were not sufficiently severe. In so concluding, the district court asserted, without citation to legal authority, that consideration of the “ ‘nature and quality of the intrusion’ must include consideration of the severity of any injury inflicted.” To the contrary, we have held that a plaintiff may allege use of excessive force even where the physical contact between the parties did not leave excessive marks or cause extensive physical damage. See Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir.1996) (upholding excessive force claim where plaintiff alleged that officers used excessive force in removing her wedding ring). Claims of excessive force do not necessarily require allegations of assault. See Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 915 (6th Cir.1992). As we recognized in Holmes, a victim of police brutality may recover under § 1983 for “emotional harm [that] can often be quite difficult to measure in mere monetary terms.” 78 F.3d at 1048. In accordance with these legal precedents, the district court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that the officers did not use excessive force against Ingram and Collins on the grounds that they did not suffer sufficient injuries.