Opinion ID: 1831096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: arthur's right to a speedy trial was violated by the almost twelve month delay before his trial.

Text: ¶ 10. Arthur was 15 years of age at the time of his arrest and incarceration on July 24, 1994. Prior to prosecution a year later on July 17, 1995, for capital murder, Arthur was denied bond by the County Court of Warren County who found in the wake of a preliminary hearing conducted on October 4, 1994, that ... there is probable cause that the offense charged... has been committed in Warren County, Mississippi, and that the Defendant is the one who committed this crime. Arthur's indictment was returned on November 2, 1994. Arthur was arraigned on November 4, 1994. On December 22, 1994, this Court denied Arthur's amended petition for emergency hearing of bond denial. Arthur was confined in the Warren County Jail from the date of arrest on July 24, 1994, until after his trial on July 21, 1995. His trial commenced on July 17, 1995, approximately 362 days from the date of his arrest on July 24, 1994. A period of three months elapsed between arrest and indictment, and approximately 255 days intervened between arraignment and trial. ¶ 11. Arthur claims on appeal that a trial delay of almost one year violated the speedy trial rights of a 15 year old incarcerated defendant. Arthur relies on Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo , employed a four pronged balancing test in determining whether a defendant had been deprived of his right to a fair trial. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The four prongs are: (1) length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Id. ¶ 12. In Barker, the United States Supreme Court held: The length of delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Id. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. ¶ 13. This Court has held in Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss. 1989), that a delay of eight months is presumptively prejudicial. See also Bailey v. State, 463 So.2d 1059, 1062 (Miss.1985) (298 day delay); Atterberry v. State, 667 So.2d 622, 627 (Miss.1995); (280 day delay was well over the presumptively prejudicial requirement). The 362 day lapse in time between Arthur's arrest and trial is therefore presumptively prejudicial, requiring a close assessment of the other factors. ¶ 14. The second Barker factor is the reason given by the government for the delay. The United States Supreme Court in Barker, held that, A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182. ¶ 15. The trial judge recognized that this time delay was presumptively prejudicial but in the trial record explained the reason for the delay as an overcrowded court docket. The trial court stated, [t]here were about 30 or 40 other cases set on that date. One of which was another murder case. ¶ 16. The third Barker factor is Arthur's responsibility to assert his right which he did. The final Barker factor is the resulting prejudice to Arthur. This is where Arthur loses his argument. Arthur was not prejudiced by this delay. The record is devoid of any testimony from Arthur himself reflecting anxiety and concern, and there is no evidence that Arthur's defense was impaired. Arthur was found by the jury not guilty of capital murder, and not guilty of murder less than capital. Given this outcome, no prejudice to Arthur is readily apparent. ¶ 17. Judge Vollor analyzed the four Barker factors individually and concluded that Arthur's constitutional right to a speedy trial had not been violated. The trial court was correct in his ruling. This issue is therefore, without merit.