Opinion ID: 718359
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment on the Personal Liability Claim (Count VI)

Text: 17 On summary judgment, the district court treated both Counts VI (personal liability under Ind.Code § 32-8-3-9) and VII (foreclosure of mechanic's lien) of CDI's complaint as suits to foreclose mechanic's liens on Mansur's property. It thus applied the thirty-day limit on time to commence suit to both counts. This confusion is perhaps not surprising, given that CDI labeled Count VI, Subcontractor's Complaint for Foreclosure of Mechanic's Lien on Proceeds of Contract and that the statute under which the claim was brought is entitled Subcontractor's, journeymen or laborer's liens; notice; actions. However, CDI is correct in stating that this subsection of the Indiana Code, while it resides in the middle of the Mechanic's Lien statute, does not actually deal with liens. This portion of the Indiana Code, instead, creates a right for subcontractors to sue owners of property directly when a general contractor fails to pay them. The subsection does not create a secured interest. Coplay, 983 F.2d at 1436. 18 However, while CDI thus succeeds in convincing us that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Count VI, its victory in this regard is insubstantial. As Defendants correctly note, the judgments on CDI's breach of contract claims against Wilhelm (Counts I & II), now fully satisfied, render Count VI entirely moot. The personal liability statute grants a cause of action by a subcontractor against the owner only so long as the general contractor fails to pay. CDI has now received complete satisfaction of the debt owed to it by Wilhelm. Therefore, no claim against Mansur remains and the district court's error in dismissing Count VI left no ill effects. In any event, CDI's argument that the personal liability claim is unaffected by the thirty-day filing limitation simply because the claim is not a lien, proves too much with respect to CDI's attempt to collect attorney's fees under § 32-8-3-14. That statute, too, applies only to liens. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that, since § 32-8-3-9 does not create a lien, attorney's fees are not available under § 32-8-3-14 for suits under § 32-8-3-9. McCorry v. G. Cowser Construction, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 550 (Ind.1994), adopting the opinion in McCorry v. G. Cowser Construction, Inc., 636 N.E.2d 1273 (Ind.App. 5 Dist.1994). Thus, even if the district court had allowed Count VI to proceed, CDI would have garnered no eligibility to collect attorney's fees nor would it have recovered any damages in excess of those it has already recovered from Wilhelm. 19