Opinion ID: 2718915
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of Arthur’s Claims

Text: Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict on Arthur’s claims. Arthur entered into a release of claims agreement with J.D. in which Arthur released all known and unknown claims against J.D. in return for $100. The trial court found that Arthur entered the release agreement knowingly, voluntarily, and freely, with knowledge of all relevant facts, that the agreement was supported by adequate consideration, and that it released and extinguished all of Arthur’s claims. The court further found that Arthur had not met his burden of providing that the release agreement was invalid or unknowingly signed. On appeal, Arthur argues that these rulings were improper because the record raised questions of fact as to whether he signed what is now purported to be the release agreement and whether he intended to release unknown claims. He alleges this is key because he only signed the agreement in return for being promised he would not be brought into the suit, he did not realize that in signing the agreement he was releasing unknown claims, and that had he known he was doing so or had he known what he knows 18 now about the circumstances of the 1990 deed and will, the $100 he received as consideration would not have been adequate. The record does not support these arguments. When a party against whom a release is asserted admits signing the release, the release purports to rest upon consideration, and the release is admitted into evidence, the release is presumed to be valid, and the party contesting the release has the burden of proving otherwise. Hatfield v. Cristopher, 841 S.W.2d 761, 766 (Mo. App. 1992); Blackstock v. Kohn, 994 S.W.2d 947, 954 (Mo. banc 1999) (“Executed releases are presumptively valid”). The release expressly states that, in return for $100, Arthur released “any and all claims … of any kind or nature whatsoever, known or unknown, and particularly on account of all damages.” The release further specifically states that it includes any claims pertaining to real estate conveyances between Vincil and Willa and Defendants, transactions by J.D. as attorney-in-fact for Vincil and Willa, and transactions related to the purchase or disposition of the proceeds from any certificates of deposit or contents of the safe deposit box by any of the Defendants. While Arthur did not initial the first two pages of the three-page release agreement and said “it could be possible” he did not see them and he did not recall signing the release, he also testified that he did sign it, that it contained his signature, and that he did not ask J.D. about the details of Mary’s lawsuit before doing so. The release is clear that it releases known and unknown claims. It also is clear that the only consideration is $100; it does not say anything about not drawing Arthur into a lawsuit as a further consideration for the release. And, while Arthur now claims that $100 is not adequate 19 consideration, he alleges no facts and cites no authority that would permit this Court to second-guess the amount he voluntarily chose to take in settlement. In sum, Arthur alleges the release was invalid for various reasons, but the evidence presented does not support any of the reasons he provides for finding such invalidity. The trial court did not err in finding that he failed to satisfy his burden to show that the release was invalid. Even assuming this Court had found the release agreement invalid and allowed him to proceed on his claims, however, the claims he sought to assert are the same ones that this Court has found to be barred by the statute of limitations and Plaintiffs’ failure to substitute a proper party for J.D. Accordingly, even were the release invalid, he has failed to show prejudicial error. ii. Dismissal of Claim Against Fry Grain Enterprises Sustaining in part Defendants’ motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ conversion claim against Fry Grain Enterprises. Fry Grain operated on the 200-acre and 160-acre tracts of land in which Willa held a life estate. In their petition, Plaintiffs alleged that while farming this land, Fry Grain deprived Willa of United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) farm payments, rent, and income. As a result, Plaintiffs alleged, Mary and Arthur received less money under Willa’s 1990 will than they otherwise would have received. Dismissing the claim, the trial court ruled that the claims were not supported by the evidence and the claims alleged conversion of property that is not able to be converted. Plaintiffs argue that USDA payments are convertible. They argue further that Fry 20 Grain improperly received USDA payments. Their point relied on fails to explain wherein and why this entitles them to damages, however, as required by Rule 84.04(d), which requires that the point relied on “state concisely the legal reasons for [the] claim of reversible error” and “explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of reversible error.” See Smith v. City of St. Louis, 395 S.W.3d 20, 28 (Mo. banc 2013). The argument section of this point is no better. It fails to cite any facts showing that Plaintiffs are entitled to any part of the USDA payments, rent, or income from the land. Plaintiffs’ brief focuses on the time period between 1986 and 1988, when Delbert allegedly altered the USDA contract to give Arthur’s 50-percent share of the 1987 payment to Fry Grain and Arthur quit farming the land. Plaintiffs admit they knew that the payments went to Fry Grain rather than Willa or Arthur at that time. They do not specifically allege any facts pertaining to conversion that occurred after Arthur stopped farming the land in 1988. Therefore, they make no showing that they brought their claims within the five-year statute of limitations for conversion. See § 516.120(1). And, while Plaintiffs’ arguments on appeal seem to be premised on the assumption that this conversion continued as to USDA payments after 1988, their brief fails to cite any specific evidence that any USDA payments were made after 1988 or any authority showing that Mary or Arthur legally were entitled to such payments. (Defendants claim to the contrary.) Plaintiffs’ single-paragraph discussion of the alleged conversion of rent and income is particularly bereft of evidence or authority supporting such a claim. It is not this Court’s duty to search the record for such evidence or to make Plaintiffs’ 21 argument for them. Further, any claim to the payments accrued in Willa and, therefore, upon her death would belong to Willa’s estate, if the claim was not time-barred. Plaintiffs offer no legal authority for their claim that they can sue for these payments because, had the payments gone to Willa, they believe that she would have passed them on in her will. iii. Dismissal of Claims Against Delbert Only three claims remained against Delbert after Plaintiffs dropped Count VII during trial: one brought by Susan and David for fraud and undue influence arising out of the 1990 deeds and wills and two brought by Arthur arising out of Arthur’s release of claims agreement. As discussed above, the trial court properly dismissed Arthur’s claims relating to the release agreement. The trial court also properly dismissed Susan and David’s claims for fraud based on the 1990 will and deeds because the reasons those claims are barred by the statute of limitations apply equally to Delbert. 16 Accordingly, no submissible claims remained against Delbert. iv. Mary’s Equitable Claim After the jury returned its verdicts, Plaintiffs moved the trial court to add to the final judgment a list of personal property that Mary sought to recover from the family homestead. The motion cited two counts of the petition that sought money damages or, in the alternative, an order for delivery of personal property. The court never entered an 16 As Plaintiffs’ claims against Delbert were time-barred, this Court need not further address the additional issue raised as to whether, had the claims not been barred, Plaintiffs failed to make a submissible case that Delbert had any involvement in the alleged fraud or undue influence. 22 order on this claim, and Plaintiffs argue that this was error. While Mary argues that the Defendants knew she wanted this property and that she included it on a list she prepared of personal property she wanted from her parents’ home, she has not identified why she had a legal or equitable right to receive this specific property, as opposed to a certain percentage of the value of all the property bequeathed. In fact, Plaintiffs cite no law for the proposition that Mary was entitled to an order directing Defendants to give her this property. Further, a review of the record does not show that Willa left Mary this specific property in her will or directed it be held in trust for her or that the will referred to a list of personal property that said these items were to be left to Mary. See § 474.333 (permitting will to dispose of personal property by separate list). In the absence of some legal or equitable basis for the trial court to be required to award this property to Mary, it did not err in failing to do so. Even had Mary identified a basis for her claim to these specific items, she chose instead to seek a money judgment for the portion of Willa’s property that she claimed should have gone to her. When a party has the right to pursue one of two inconsistent remedies and makes an election, institutes suit, and prosecutes it to final judgment, that party thereafter cannot pursue another and inconsistent remedy. Trimble v. Pracna, 167 S.W.3d 706, 711 (Mo. banc 2005). The purpose of the election of remedies doctrine is to prevent double recovery for a single injury. Whittom v. Alexander-Richardson P’ship, 851 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Mo. banc 1993). To illustrate: [T]he plaintiff whose horse has been stolen can sue the thief for damages or for conversion, or he can bring replevin … to get the horse back. But he cannot do both, for this would give him both the value of the horse and the 23 horse itself, a form of double recovery. Id., quoting DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES, § 1.5 at 14 (1973). In the petition, Mary requested either money damages or an order for delivery of personal property. Because Mary elected her remedy of monetary damages and received a verdict for those damages, the election of remedies doctrine precludes her from pursuing her alternative remedy. 17 v. Punitive Damages Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on punitive damages. Punitive damages may not be awarded in the absence of nominal or actual damages. See, e.g., Compton v. Williams Bros. Pipeline Co., 499 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Mo. 1973) (“[A]ctual or nominal damages must be recovered before punitive damages can be recovered”); Giles v. Riverside Transp., Inc., 266 S.W.3d 290, 296 (Mo. App. 2008) (“[I]t is fundamental that a determination of liability is a prerequisite to a finding of damages, such that an award of damages cannot survive independent of the accompanying determination of liability. A plaintiff must prevail on his or her underlying claim to submit punitive damages to the jury”) (internal citations omitted). Because this Court reverses the damage judgments against Defendants, Plaintiffs are entitled to no actual damages and the punitive damages issue is rendered moot. 17 While Mary argues that the jury was aware that she would request the specific property after the verdicts were returned and, therefore, did not include the value of that property in its verdict, the instructions directed the jury to return the damages to which Mary was entitled under the evidence; the instructions did not tell the jury to subtract out the value of the specific items. In any event, as noted, Mary elected her remedy of money damages, and her claim was barred for the reasons noted. 24