Opinion ID: 1280555
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Interpretation of Instrument

Text: IV. We have thus far considered this matter, as did the trial court, entirely from the standpoint of reading into the contract implied agreements independent of the intent of the parties. The cases considered, and our own consideration, have been decided on a rule of law akin to, if not in fact based on, a constructive contract, or, more accurately, a contract implied in law. [4] This has been done in easement cases primarily on the basis of the exigencies of each given situation. Gulf Pipe Line Co. v. Thomason, Tex.Civ.App., 299 S.W. 532; Ohio Fuel Gas Company v. Sun Oil Company, Ohio Com.Pl., 164 N.E.2d 922; Industrial Gas Co. v. Jones et al., 62 Ohio App. 553, 24 N.E.2d 830; Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Minnette et al., 115 Cal.App. 2d 698, 252 P.2d 642; Ellard v. Goodall, 203 Ala. 476, 83 So. 568. If the matter is considered from the perspective of an attempt to interpret the instrument in accordance with the intent of the parties the result reached here is the same. The rules applicable to the construction of deeds generally apply with full force and effect to instruments conveying easements or other similar rights or privileges. Eastman v. Piper, 68 Cal.App. 554, 229 P. 1002, 1004; 28 C.J.S. Easements § 26, p. 680, n. 61. In Switzer v. Pratt, 237 Iowa 788, 797, 23 N.W.2d 837, 842 we said: `The main object in construing a deed is to ascertain the intention of the parties from the language used and to effectuate such intention where not inconsistent with any rule of law.' (citing cases) It is evident that the intention should govern when not in conflict with some established rule of law: `The tendency of modern decisions is to disregard technicalities and to treat all uncertainties in a conveyance as ambiguities subject to be cleared up by resort to the intention of the parties as gathered from the instrument itself, the circumstances attending and leading up to its execution, and the subject matter and the situation of the parties as of that time. Hence, in the construction of deeds surrounding circumstances are accorded due weight. In the consideration of these various factors, the court will place itself as nearly as possible in the position of the parties when the instrument was executed.' In construing deeds the intent of the grantor as evidenced by the entire instrument is controlling. Crecelius v. Smith, 255 Iowa 1249, 125 N.W.2d 786. Both parties agree the pertinent provisions of this instrument are ambiguous in that the width of the easement is not defined. Extrinsic evidence to aid in interpretation was clearly admissible. Hamilton v. Wosepka, Iowa, 154 N.W.2d 164, 168. Where a right-of-way has been conveyed or an easement granted the mere fact that the width of the way is not designated will not defeat the easement. 3 Tiffany, Real Property, 3 Ed. § 805, p. 331. At page 332 the same authority states: If the width is not fixed by the terms of the grant, the grantee is ordinarily entitled to a way of such width as is sufficient to afford reasonable ingress and egress. And if the way is granted for a particular purpose, what is reasonably necessary for that purpose is to be considered, in the light of circumstances existing at the time of the grant and of circumstances thereafter coming into existence if they are such as may reasonably be presumed to have been within the contemplation and intention of the parties. The trial court made no finding as to the intent of the parties. No extrinsic evidence was produced as to intent. Neither the evidence nor the instrument itself shows a manifestation of mutual assent to a 50 foot right-of-way by the grantor, her attorney, her guardian or the court that approved the grant. We do not charge those individuals with constructive knowledge of the needs and desires of the pipeline industry. Grantor cannot be said to have intended to give up 50 feet of right-of-way including a prohibition against building on any part of the strip thus established. The effect of this judgment is to limit the right to use the property to growing crops. The plain words of the grant are contra. The said grantors shall have the right to fully use and enjoy the surface of said premises, except for the purpose hereinabove granted. If defendant wanted a specific easement width and specific prohibition against building, it could have spelled out the rights in the instrument or acquired them by condemnation. Then the grantor could have bargained or resisted on the basis of actual sale or taking. On the basis of interpretation of the contract between the parties we reach the same result noted in Divisions II and III. Both width of the easement available and any questions involving building on the right-of-way must be reserved until an actual controversy arises under specific fact situations then existing. The intent of the parties cannot be determined here except by aid of legal fictions. As indicated, we do not believe such legal fictions should be extended to the degree of particularity reached here. The trial court recognized the need to go beyond the intent of the parties by emphasizing the public necessities involved. These necessities are recognized by law and result in a grant of power of eminent domain to the pipeline company. They do not extend to the company the right to claim more for its privately purchased easement grant than is set out in the instrument itself. V. We express no opinion as to relevancy of the correlative rights herein recognized to the question of damages for condemnation of a right-of-way for a new and additional pipeline. Accordingly this case is reversed and remanded for dismissal of plaintiffs' petition at plaintiffs' cost.