Opinion ID: 551885
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Showing a Fiduciary Duty

Text: 23 Allied made a motion for directed verdict at the end of plaintiff's case and again following presentation of its own evidence, both of which were denied as to the fiduciary duty claim. Following the trial, Allied moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that General Poly had presented insufficient evidence to establish the existence of a fiduciary duty. See R. Vol. 2, Doc. 729 at 22. The district court denied the motion, see id. at 27, and Allied appeals that ruling.
24 We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict applying the same standard of review as that used by the district court. See Guilfoyle v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. Co., 812 F.2d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir.1987). Although we have often used different phraseology to express this standard, the inquiry is best summarized as whether there is evidence upon which the jury could properly find a verdict for the party [against whom the motion is directed]. Hurd v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 734 F.2d 495, 498-99 (10th Cir.1984) (footnote omitted) (quoting 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 2524 at 543 (1971)). In making that determination, we are obligated to view evidence and inferences most favorably to the nonmoving party. Zimmerman v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 848 F.2d 1047, 1051 (10th Cir.1988). 25 Because the directed verdict/judgment notwithstanding the verdict inquiry asks whether there was evidence such that the jury could have properly found for the party against whom the motion is made, we must necessarily frame our analysis in terms of the underlying burden of proof. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (we are convinced that the inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for ... directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits). Under Kansas law a party seeking to establish the existence of a fiduciary relationship must prove it by clear and convincing evidence. For the plainest of reasons, agreements establishing fiduciary relationships, if not in writing, must be clear and convincing.... A confidential relationship is never presumed, and the burden of proof is on the party asserting it. Wolf v. Brungardt, 215 Kan. 272, 284-85, 524 P.2d 726, 736 (1974) (quoting Paul v. Smith, 191 Kan. 163, 170, 380 P.2d 421, 426 (1963)). 26
27 General Poly maintains that the alleged fiduciary relationship was formed at the meeting of General Poly and Allied representatives held on January 10, 1979. See Appellee's Br. at 10. However, the jury was instructed that: Plaintiff claims this relationship was formed in late January, 1979, when the parties began to pursue their joint development efforts in confidence and secrecy. Plaintiff contends the written contract signed in September of 1979 merely memorialized the parties' agreement to jointly develop resin and maintain secrecy, but that it did not change the nature of the parties' fiduciary relationship. R. Vol. 2, Doc. 660 (emphasis added). Because there is some discrepancy between the jury instruction and General Poly's position on appeal, we will not restrict ourselves to evidence of the January 10, 1979 meeting. What follows is a representative summary of the evidence presented at trial relating to the question of whether Allied consciously agreed to assume fiduciary obligations to General Poly. 28 Events Prior To The January 10, 1979 Meeting 29 The earliest contact between Allied and anyone involved in General Poly predates the formation of General Poly. Clayton A. Walker, who would later become chairman of the board and treasurer of General Poly, testified that sometime prior to October 10, 1978, he contacted George Jecha, an Allied resin sales representative. R. Vol. 10 at 601. Walker testified that he asked Jecha has Allied got anything, are they moving in any direction in high molecular weight high-density polyethylene and.... George told me yes. He said, as a matter of fact, he was aware, he didn't know exactly where they stood, but he knew that they were definitely interested in looking at developing high molecular weight high-density polyethylene product. Id. A meeting was scheduled in Houston between Allied representatives and Walker and his associates, Hans Traver and Edward Podolak. Id. at 603. 30 On or about October 11-12, 1978, a meeting was held at Traver's home in Houston. Id. Jecha attended the meeting on behalf of Allied, and Walker, Traver, and Podolak represented the then-unincorporated General Poly company. Id. Another Allied representative, technical specialist Pat Snell, was unable to attend the meeting but participated by telephone. Id. Walker testified that he and his associates told George [Jecha] that we had to have a domestic source [of high molecular weight resin] and I further told George without belaboring the issue, that the reason I had called him is that I knew he would, that he would, within the realm of his knowledge, tell me the truth about exactly what Allied was doing. Id. at 605. Traver testified that Jecha did not tell him anything about Allied's plans for high molecular weight (HMW) resin but said that to the best of his knowledge Allied was involved in the Baton Rouge group in developing such a high molecular weight resin; but he did not give me any great details. R. Vol. 24 at 2219. After the meeting, in a letter to Allied's high-density polyethylene (HDPE) national accounts manager, W.D. Singleton, Jecha wrote the following: 31 Having known Bud Walker for so many years and now meeting Hans Traver, there's little doubt in my mind that if they put this new company together, our being in on the ground floor will be of great benefit as this first eight million pound requirement will be a drop in the bucket compared to what they will be using in years to come. My only concern at the moment is whether or not we can put together a suitable sample for the Lima, Peru operation to get this thing started. 32 R. Vol. 9 at 401; Plaintiff's Ex. 99 (First Addendum to Appellant's Br., Doc. 1). 33 In early November of 1978, Allied's technical specialist, Pat Snell, telephoned Traver to discuss HDPE resins. See id. In that conversation, Traver indicated his willingness to offer the PeruPlast plant 1 for testing. R. Vol. 20 at 1478. After the phone conversation with Traver, in a handwritten note drafted on Jecha's memo, Snell stated that [t]his would be a great opportunity to test the B5920F 2 [Solvay resin], test an Allied version of the same, and make an entry into the HDPE film market in the U.S. Plaintiff's Ex. 99 at 2. 34 In November 1978, Walker, Traver, and Podolak met with Allied's Singleton at a trade meeting in Chicago. R. Vol. 10 at 608. Podolak testified that when Traver mentioned to Singleton that the German Hoescht Company soon planned to open a resin plant to produce HMW HDPE in Texas, Singleton replied Allied Chemical will have a product ready before the Germans have that plant up and running. R. Vol. 38 at 4190. According to both Podolak and Traver, Singleton further stated that Allied would sell its HMW resin at one or two cents a pound above the price for injection grade resin, an established HDPE resin. Id.; R. Vol. 24 at 2221. According to Walker, Singleton agreed to arrange a meeting between the promoters and Allied's decision makers. R. Vol. 10 at 609. The January 10, 1979 Meeting 35 A meeting took place at Traver's home in Houston on January 10, 1979. R. Vol. 24 at 2227-28. Traver and Walker represented the new venture--General Poly. Jecha, Singleton, and Snell attended on behalf of Allied, as well as Donald J. Bonin, Allied's vice-president and general manager for HDPE products, and Paul Heath, Allied's HDPE marketing director. Id. at 2228. 36 Walker told the Allied representatives of the planned venture and the need for a domestic supply of HMW resin. R. Vol. 11 at 635. Walker testified that he told Bonin that it was necessary to determine if [Allied] had a high molecular weight high-density poly material that was equal to or better than Hoescht. That was the whole basis of the project. Id. at 647. I told Mr. Bonin that we had to have a domestic source of raw material and that that was essential to our project, that we couldn't, we could not rely on imported material and that was the only material that was available at that point in time. R. Vol. 37 at 3967. According to Walker, Pat Snell and Don Bonin both confirmed that they had been working for some time on a high molecular weight high-density product and that the project was in super shape and they were moving right ahead; that they had anticipated that they would be the first in the business in the United States and that they had a time table and that they were moving toward that time table. Id. at 633. Don Bonin told me and Pat Snell sat there and confirmed that all he had to do to develop that material, they had the reactors, they had just put in a new large reactor in Baton Rouge in anticipation of this and all they had to do was fool with the catalyst--'tinker with the catalyst' were the exact words, and they would have a high molecular weight that was equal to the Hoescht material. Id. at 634; R. Vol. 37 at 3968. 37 Traver testified similarly, recalling that in response to inquiries about the status of Allied's HMW development project Bonin had responded [w]ell we're working on it; we already have a catalyst, now we have to play with that. R. Vol. 24 at 2231. Traver further testified that Bonin said the way it looks today we can have--we expect to have a resin out by the fourth quarter of the year, towards the end of the year. Id. According to Traver, Bonin asked him about General Poly's timetable and he replied after the money had been raised and I was in a position to issue purchase orders, it would take me six months to get the main pieces of equipment in. So it would take, let's say, three months to get the money together.... I could thereby meet the Allied time schedule. Id. at 2231-32. 38 Walker testified that during the January 10 meeting he told Don Bonin that we had to accomplish the hurdle of financing the long-term financing on the equipment and the building and that in order to do that, I had used in the past--had used revenue bond issue as a vehicle to accomplish that financing. And that I anticipated that we would use the same method of financing of the General Poly plant in this case. I asked Don Bonin if Allied would guarantee or preferably buy the bonds on the bond issue as their financial contribution to the joint venture.... Don Bonin's response was that Allied would participate financially in some manner but that ... he would have to visit with his associates ... [and] get back to me as quickly as possible and see what could happen. 39 R. Vol. 11 at 656; see also R. Vol. 8 at 252. 40 At the same meeting, the two groups discussed plans to conduct a test of resin at Traver's plant in Lima, Peru. Walker testified that: 41 I can recall that when Hans [Traver] went over the specifications on the equipment that he had in Peru and the type of equipment, it was German equipment, not any of that equipment available in the United States at that time, and Don Bonin was delighted to find out that that equipment was available and he asked Hans if they could utilize that equipment in some manner to further their technology in testing resins in Peru. Because he pointed out that one of the things they had, they had everything in place, they had everything from a manufacturing standpoint but they had no pilot plant or they had no equipment in their laboratory to actually make film. And that was--the proof of the pudding was to make film. So, he was delighted to find out that Hans had that equipment and Hans made it clear that he would make [available] that equipment and that technology, which included not only equipment, it included trained people, trained personnel, experienced force and technology. 42 R. Vol. 11 at 638. Walker explained that Bonin told Traver that he wanted to use Traver's extrusion technology to test Allied's resins. R. Vol. 11 at 639. Mr. Bonin told me that he wanted to test his material that they had recently run tests and he wanted to test his material to see also if it was equal to the Hoescht material. So that they'd know what they had. R. Vol. 12 at 755. According to Walker, Bonin, Singleton, all of the people said that they had an experimental high molecular weight high-density poly product and they wanted to test it. Id. at 639-40. 43 Traver testified similarly, indicating that the question was whether we could send experimental resins for testing to Lima. R. Vol. 24 at 2232. [Bonin] asked me if he could use our facilities in Lima for that purpose, and I said, 'Well, of course, delighted to, anything to speed the project along'. Id. [H]e wanted to test the Allied resins. He wanted to see how the resins were doing. Id. 44 Other topics of discussion at the January 10 meeting were the quantity of HMW resin which Walker and Traver anticipated General Poly would need from Allied and the price at which Allied would sell HMW resin to General Poly. Traver explained the method by which he calculated General Poly's expected resin needs and said I put down a capacity figure of six hundred thousand pounds a month. Id. at 2234. 45 And then after we had those figures, well, Paul Heath says, Well, Hans, how much you gonna buy from us? And I said Well, obviously at least fifty percent or we wouldn't be here with that many people, and if you want to, we can go a hundred percent but that's something we need to talk about. Depends on how good you're gonna be to me. ... That's about as far as we went in the meeting.... Of course, it was understood it was going to be high molecular weight high-density polyethylene; but the specific quality of that resin was brought out during the meeting and the specific quality was a resin like the Hoescht 9255 F. 46 Id. at 2235. 47 Walker testified that the price of the HMW resin to be purchased from Allied was also discussed at the January 10th meeting. Don Bonin told me that they had to get a premium price over the injection molding grade resin and that their price would be what Singleton had said, depending on the market conditions, one to no more than two cents a pound over injection molding grade resin. R. Vol. 11 at 637; id. at 658. Walker testified that: 48 [W]e agreed that we would buy our material--I agreed that we would buy--Hans and I were there. Hans agreed also we would buy our material from Allied, once developing the product, once having a resin and knowing that we had a resin, we would go ahead with the project, we would buy one hundred percent of our requirements from Allied. And we would buy it at a benchmark price of one to two cents a pound over injection molding grade resin; that I told Mr. Bonin that. 49 Id. at 658-59. 50 Communications After the January 10, 1979 Meeting 51 Although General Poly contends that Allied assumed fiduciary obligations at the January 10, 1979 meeting, it also argues that communications with Allied after the meeting further demonstrated the formation of a fiduciary relationship on January 10, 1979. 52 Walker testified that Bonin called him within a week of the meeting in Houston. R. Vol. 11 at 660. Walker further testified as follows: 53 Mr. Bonin told me ... that Allied would not undertake contingent liabilities of a financial nature without approval from the board of directors.... He had a counterproposal as far as financial help from Allied and their financial assistance in the joint venture and that was within the realm of his authority as general manager, he said: We will give you extended trade terms as a portion of our financial contribution.... Mr. Bonin told me when we first started buying the material that we would set it up to start with on ninety day terms and that these terms could be adjusted, depending on how the project progressed.... And that was agreeable with me because when we did our cash flows and ninety day terms on eight million pounds of product would have been the same thing as giving us an injection of capital or working capital that would have amounted to about 5 hundred thousand dollars. 54 Id. at 660-62. According to Walker, Bonin also said, I'm going to forward you ... the secrecy agreement that we talked about in our meeting of January the 10th. Id. at 664. 55 As discussed in his phone conversation with Walker, on January 23, 1979, Bonin sent Walker a letter containing the following statements: 56 It is our intention, as stated to you in our recent meeting in Houston, to pursue the development of competitive polymers to satisfy [the] market. As you know we already supply some resins for the film market but feel that additional new resins are needed and can be developed to meet specific requirements such as yours. 57 As discussed at our meeting with you and Mr. Hans Traver, we would like to have you evaluate these new resins as they are developed. 58 We, therefore, are proposing that we enter into a joint technical development program with your commitment to test new resins at the Peru Plant in Lima, Peru. To this end we will be forwarding under separate cover a secrecy agreement required to insure the confidentiality of our joint effort. 59 Plaintiff's Ex. 139 (First Addendum to Appellant's Br., Doc. 3); R. Vol. 11 at 665. The next day, in a letter to more senior Allied management, Bonin wrote: 60 Attached for your files is a review of all activities concerning General Poly to date. We are pursuing this matter in some detail because of the complexities involved in acquiring technical skills to penetrate the film market. In the absence of the pilot plant equipment for development work, we must develop a plan of pulling ourselves up by the bootstraps in this area.I believe that General Poly Corporation, if formed, offers us an opportunity for ground floor participation in a plant designed specifically for processing high density polyethylene film. 61 Plaintiff's Ex. 141 (First Addendum to Appellee's Br., Doc. 8). 62 On February 14, 1979, a draft of the agreement Bonin and Walker had discussed was sent to Walker. After a series of proposed changes and revisions and lengthy delays, a final copy was signed by the authorized representatives of both General Poly and Allied and dated September 21, 1979. That agreement [the September 1979 Agreement] provides, in relevant part: 63 WHEREAS, Allied Chemical is a manufacturer of high density polyethylene resin; 64 WHEREAS, General Poly desires to manufacture high density polyethylene films for which high density polyethylene resins having special characteristics may be required; 65 WHEREAS, Allied Chemical and General Poly desire to enter into a period of joint cooperation aimed at developing and evaluating high density polyethylene resins having the characteristics required for the manufacture of such high density polyethylene films; 66 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual understanding hereinafter set forth, it is agreed as follows: 67 1. Joint Cooperation. Upon execution of this agreement there shall commence a one (1) year period of joint cooperation in the performance of which Allied Chemical and General Poly shall cooperate with each other to develop high density polyethylene resins and films prepared therefrom. 68 1.1 During this period of joint cooperation, Allied Chemical shall have the royalty-free, exclusive right and license to use extrusion technology developed by General Poly. After this period of joint cooperation or extended period as provided for in Section 4.2 herein, Allied Chemical shall have a perpetual, royalty free, non-exclusive right and license to use such extrusion technology. 69 1.2 For a period commencing with the production by Allied Chemical of a semi-commercial or commercial scale of any new high density polyethylene film grade resin developed and terminating three (3) years thereafter, it is agreed that General Poly shall have the first right to purchase such high density polyethylene film grade resin from Allied Chemical up to a maximum of 500,000 pounds per month. General Poly's first right to purchase film grade pursuant to this Section 1.2, however, shall be contingent upon General Poly giving Allied Chemical at least thirty (30) days' prior written notice of its requirements for each calendar month in which General Poly chooses to exercise its first right to purchase. With respect to each calendar month for which Allied Chemical receives no written timely notice, as provided for herein, Allied Chemical shall be relieved of any obligation to General Poly. 70 2. Secrecy. For a period of five (5) years from the date hereof, General Poly shall maintain in confidence all information disclosed to it in writing hereunder by Allied Chemical and Allied Chemical shall maintain in confidence all information disclosed to it in writing by General Poly relating to extrusion of high density polyethylene film. Each party shall take all reasonable steps and measures necessary to prevent disclosure of such information to third parties; provided, however, that the foregoing obligations shall not apply to any such information if and to the extent that: 71 (a) at the time of disclosure or subsequent thereto, through no fault of the receiving party, it was or it becomes known to the general public; or 72 (b) it had been independently perfected by the receiving party or was otherwise in the receiving party's lawful possession prior to disclosure, as shown by written records; or 73 (c) after such disclosure it is acquired from a third party which did not acquire the information under an obligation of confidentiality from or through the disclosing party. 74 Nothing herein shall prevent the use of such information in conjunction with the prosecution of patent applications, or as deemed necessary in conjunction with the sale of resin or film products. 75
76 3.1 Patentable inventions conceived or reduced to practice during and as a result of the joint cooperation provided in Section 1 hereof shall be treated as follows: 77 3.11 Such inventions shall be owned by Allied Chemical when the invention is directed to high density polyethylene resins, or processes for manufacturing the same; 78 3.12 Such inventions shall be owned by General Poly where the invention is directed to high density polyethylene film or processes for manufacturing the same; 79 3.13 The party owning any such invention may elect, at its own option and expense, to apply for patent coverage thereon; 80 3.14 No rights are hereby granted with respect to any inventions, patent applications or patents owned by either party other that those specifically provided for in this Section 3. 81
82 4.1 The period of joint cooperation hereunder shall be one (1) year from the date of execution of this agreement unless sooner terminated by either party by giving thirty (30) days' written notice to the other party. Termination of the period of joint cooperation shall not relieve the parties of their obligations under Sections 1, 2 and 3 hereof. 83 4.2 The period of joint cooperation hereunder may be extended by mutual agreement of both parties for such period or periods as the parties desire. 84 5. Assignment. This agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and the respective successors and assigns of the entire business relating to the subject matter hereof but shall not otherwise be assigned by either party without the written consent of the other, and except as so provided, any purported assignment shall be void. 85 6. Law Governing. This agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the internal laws of the State of New York without regard to conflict of laws. 86 Plaintiff's Ex. 420 (First Addendum to Appellant's Br., Doc. 8). General Poly maintains that the above written agreement served to memorialize certain aspects of the January 10, 1979 meeting in which Allied assumed fiduciary obligations. 87 3. The Basis of the District Court's Denial of Allied's 88 Motion For Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 89 The district court denied Allied's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, holding that [t]he evidence presented at trial clearly supports the jury's verdict that a fiduciary relationship existed between the parties and that the fiduciary duties were breached by Allied. R. Vol. 2, Doc. 729 (Dist. Ct. Memorandum and Order, February 26, 1988, at 22). The court explained that the evidence clearly shows, and the jury found, that a fiduciary relationship existed between these two parties from the beginning of their negotiations. Id. Although the district court concluded that the relationship was not a joint venture, the court nonetheless relied on joint venture principles for its conclusion. The district court explained its reliance upon joint venture principles as follows: 90 Although I concluded at [the] summary judgment stage that a technical joint venture did not exist between these parties because they did not share profits, they did have a joint cooperation agreement very similar to a joint venture agreement. Thus, the type of fiduciary duties existing between these parties may be best understood by recognizing its analogy to a joint venture relationship.... In a joint venture situation, the fiduciary relationship arises when the parties begin their negotiations. In 46 Am.Jur.2d on Joint Ventures, the following general statement is made as to when the fiduciary relationship arises: 91 The fiduciary relationship upon which such obligations are consequent does not necessarily await the inception of the relationship as joint venturers. It may be predicated upon an arrangement to assume such a relationship. Thus, it is the plain and imperative duty of promoters of a syndicate, toward persons who are invited to cooperate in the enterprise, not only to abstain stating as a fact that which is not a fact, but not to omit to state any circumstances within their knowledge the existence of which might in any way affect the extent of quality of the advantages held out as inducements to the others. 92 46 Am.Jur.2d Joint Ventures Sec. 50 (1969). 93 By analogy, the fiduciary relationship began between General Poly and Allied at the January 10, 1979 meeting when the parties agreed to enter a joint cooperation agreement and when Allied made certain representations about the extent of its resin development. Thus, at the time of the Peru test, Allied had a fiduciary duty to reveal the true source of the resin tested. 94 .... 95 Contrary to Allied's arguments, the evidence clearly shows that the parties did not have an ordinary buyer/seller relationship. When the parties' relationship began, Allied did not have a product to sell which General Poly could buy. In January of 1979, Allied represented to General Poly that it had developed an experimental resin but it still needed work. Allied needed General Poly's special equipment and specially trained people to help in this development.... Of course, unbeknownst to General Poly, Allied had not in fact developed any type of resin at all. 96 Id. at 23-25 (emphasis in original). 97 In reaching its conclusion, the district court emphasized that Allied sought to benefit through its cooperation with General Poly by developing an HMW resin which it did not have at the time a fiduciary relationship was allegedly formed. See id. at 25. The district court was persuaded that the written agreement is highly unusual and not that of a typical buyer/seller. Id. The court also felt that evidence showing General Poly agreed to buy offgrade resin in part to assist Allied was indicative of a fiduciary relationship. Id. Finally, the district court pointed to the testimony by Allied's Jecha and Snell that the General Poly arrangement was a unique one as evidence that a fiduciary relationship was formed. Id. at 26. 3 98 The district court concluded its analysis of Allied's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict by reiterating the following statement made earlier in rejecting Allied's motion for directed verdict on General Poly's fiduciary duty claim: 99 Mr. Traver's testimony just cries out as regards the parties' mutual trust and their mutual risk in finally reaching a commercial high molecular weight resin. I believe that his letter of July 8, 1981, says it all in [stating that such a relationship existed] between a party (sic). In my view, and given definition of a fiduciary, circumstances here are such that the jury may well find these parties were indeed fiduciaries.... R. Vol. 41 at 4592. 4 4. Review of the District Court's Decision 100 After carefully reviewing the evidence presented at trial, and viewing that evidence most favorably to General Poly (with all inferences drawn in its favor), we are unable to affirm the district court's ruling denying Allied's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Our review of the record does not disclose any sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could properly conclude that General Poly had established the existence of a fiduciary relationship with Allied. Although we would reach this conclusion even if General Poly was required only to show the relationship by a simple preponderance of the evidence under Kansas law, our holding is compelled all the more strongly because under Kansas law General Poly was obligated to prove the fiduciary relationship by clear and convincing evidence. 101 None of the evidence reviewed above indicates that Allied ever consciously assumed fiduciary duties as to General Poly. As discussed in section one, a showing that Allied consciously accepted fiduciary duties is the sine qua non of General Poly's claim. The duties of a fiduciary are serious and many, and an agreement to assume such duties will not be presumed. See Denison State Bank v. Madeira, 230 Kan. 684, 695-96, 640 P.2d 1235, 1243-44 (1982). 102 Relying on cases such as Paul v. North, 191 Kan. 163, 380 P.2d 421 (1963), and Wolf v. Brungardt, 215 Kan. 272, 284-85, 524 P.2d 726, 736 (1974), General Poly argues that the evidence at trial demonstrated that Allied and General Poly willingly and knowingly acted for one another's benefit in a manner to impose mutual trust and confidence. Wolf, 215 Kan. at 284, 524 P.2d at 736. However, that argument ignores the central importance of the holding in Denison. Merely acting for one another's benefit will not give rise to fiduciary duties under Kansas law unless it is shown that the alleged fiduciary consciously assumed fiduciary responsibilities. Although the evidence at trial showed that Allied intended to act in a manner which would have consequential benefits for General Poly, nothing in the record suggests that any authorized representative of Allied ever intended to assume fiduciary duties on behalf of General Poly. 103 Neither the testimony of the Allied and General Poly representatives, their written correspondence and internal memoranda, nor the written agreement itself support General Poly's assertion that a fiduciary relationship existed. Reviewing the evidence in a manner most favorable to General Poly, all that was shown was an arm's length commercial relationship. The General Poly representatives told Allied of their plans to enter the film market using HMW HDPE resin. The Allied representatives told the General Poly representatives of Allied's plans to develop and perfect such a resin. General Poly agreed to make available its extrusion equipment for Allied to test its product. In exchange, Allied agreed to sell its HMW resin, once developed, to General Poly on favorable credit terms with a first right to purchase a specified quantity. The two corporations agreed that all disclosures between themselves made during this one year period of joint cooperation would be protected by a secrecy agreement binding for five years. Nothing in that course of conduct suggests that Allied ever intended to take on the many responsibilities of a fiduciary in its dealings with General Poly. 104 Allied was not shown to be acting primarily for the benefit of General Poly. To the contrary, it was openly and unabashedly developing its own capacity to produce HMW resin. Denison, 230 Kan. at 691-92, 640 P.2d 1241. Allied was not given and did not assume, any influence over General Poly other than the normal commercial arms length influence that suppliers and customers have over each other in the marketplace. Id. Allied did have superior knowledge of its own product and production capabilities, but that will be true of every supplier or potential supplier, and that is not sufficient to give rise to a fiduciary obligation. Ritchie Enterprises v. Honeywell Bull, Inc., 730 F.Supp. 1041, 1054 (D.Kan.1990). None of General Poly's property, interest or authority was placed in charge of Allied. Denison, 230 Kan. at 691-92, 640 P.2d at 1241. The parties did place confidence in each other, but once again, that was a confidence based on commercial self-interest in which both parties had the power contractually to protect their own interests however they chose. Here, General Poly did not choose to obtain the contractual guarantees and rights that it now wishes it had. But, it can not imply fiduciary duties that were not clearly and convincingly assumed by Allied in order to cure its contractual deficiencies. Wedman v. Home National Bank of Arkansas City, No. 88-1439-K (D.Kan. Jan. 25, 1990) (WESTLAW, 1990 WL 7501) (J. Kelly) (citing Denison for the proposition that when a person is competent and able to protect his own interests, he may not abandon all caution and responsibility for his own protection and unilaterally impose a fiduciary relationship on another without a conscious assumption of such duties by the other party.); Pizza Management, Inc. v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 737 F.Supp. 1154, 1184 (D.Kan.1990) (J. Crow) (refusing to impose fiduciary duties on a franchisor under Kansas law: In the setting of a commercial contract between two equally sophisticated business entities, this court is not prepared to impose heightened legal duties on one of the parties simply because that party may have more powers and discretion under the express terms of the agreement. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claims.); Ritchie Enterprises v. Honeywell Bull, Inc., 730 F.Supp. 1041, 1053-54 (D.Kan.1990) (J. Crow) (refusing, under Kansas law, to find a fiduciary duty on behalf of a supplier of a computer system, even though the supplier has superior knowledge of his systems. This court is unwilling to radically alter the given scheme of commercial dealings by the possible imposition of a fiduciary relationship upon a seller under these circumstances.); LNS Investment Company, Inc. v. Phillips 66 Company, No. 87-2215-0 (D.Kan. Aug. 29, 1989) (WESTLAW, 1989 WL 103637) (C.J. O'Connor) (refusing, under Kansas law, to imply a fiduciary relationship on a major purchaser of bottled motor oil who terminated a relationship with its supplier because of supplier's inability to provide the needed quantities of product.); Adams Parker Furniture, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., No. 86-2113-5 (D.Kan. Oct. 13, 1987) (WESTLAW, 1987 WL 56676) (J. Saffels) (refusing, under Kansas law, to imply a fiduciary duty on a furniture manufacturer who terminated a distributorship even though the manufacturer had superior knowledge and power. While [the manufacturer] certainly had a duty to meet any contractual obligations it owed to plaintiff, including a duty not to mislead plaintiff so it would detrimentally rely ... it did not owe a duty to put [plaintiff's] interests before its own. It was not plaintiff's fiduciary, and therefore summary judgment ... will be granted.). See also Gillespie v. Seymour, 14 Kan.App.2d 563, 796 P.2d 1060 (1990). 105 The evidence upon which the district court relied in denying Allied's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is similarly inadequate. There was testimony by Allied representatives that the relationship with General Poly was unique. However, that characterization falls far short of demonstrating that Allied intended to increase its duties from those inherent in a commercial transaction to the level of those which are imposed in a fiduciary relationship. Likewise, the letter by Mr. Traver which the district court pointed to as evidence of the fiduciary relationship does no more than summarize the interactions of the two corporations, interactions which we find inadequate to show Allied consciously accepted fiduciary duties. Therefore, we reverse the district court's order denying Allied's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and order that judgment be entered in favor of Allied on this claim. 5 106