Opinion ID: 1276352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged Sentencing Errors.

Text: Defendant asserts that the district court erred in ordering restitution of the amounts which he owed to the Iowa State Bank as a result of the transactions found by the jury to have been fraudulent. His primary argument in this regard is that the obligations have been discharged in bankruptcy. Noticeably, the defendant does not base his contentions upon the effect of the federal bankruptcy laws under the supremacy clause of the federal constitution. Cases which have considered the effect of the supremacy clause with respect to court-ordered restitution of discharged civil claims in criminal prosecutions have upheld the right of a state to order restitution. See, e.g., Barnette v. Evans, 673 F.2d 1250, 1251 (11th Cir.1982); United States v. Carson, 669 F.2d 216, 217 (5th Cir.1982). Defendant's argument against the ordering of restitution in the present case is based upon his interpretation of Iowa Code section 910.1(2) (1981) which defines those pecuniary damages which may be the object of restitution as all damages ... which a victim could recover against the offender in a civil action arising out of the same facts or event.... It is defendant's theory that the court-ordered restitution in the present case is not permitted by the foregoing statute because, as a result of his discharge in bankruptcy, the victim could not have enforced a civil claim for collection of said sums. [1] This issue involves statutory interpretation of an act not previously construed in this context. While the wording of section 910.1(2), literally applied, lends some support to defendant's argument, we cannot agree that it was the intent of the legislature to proscribe court ordered restitution of otherwise valid victim claims because of a debtor's discharge in bankruptcy. The federal bankruptcy laws are themselves drawn in a manner which, upon timely perfected objection by a victim, would deny a discharge with respect to recovery of money or property obtained by criminal acts or fraud. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(4) and 523(a)(2)(A). We cannot believe the fact that a discharge of such a claim may in fact have been granted, by reason of a failure to object or a difference in the proof between the bankruptcy and criminal actions, is a circumstance limiting victim restitution within the intent of chapter 910. Defendant's other objection to the sentencing order is the fact that the court ordered two consecutive five-year periods of probation. Iowa Code section 907.7 (1981) provides: The length of the probation shall be for such term as the court may fix but not to exceed five years if the offense is a felony or not to exceed two years if the offense is a misdemeanor. Defendant urges that the five-year limitation on the length of probation for a felony conviction is not extended when there are multiple convictions involved in a single sentencing order. In support of this claim, it is urged that the legislature has made no indication that the maximum period of probation should change as a result of the length of the period of incarceration. While the issue is not free from doubt, we accept defendant's proposed interpretation. We believe section 907.7 reflects the attitude of correctional authorities that rehabilitation will occur within five years or not at all. See J. Yeager & R. Carlson, Criminal Law and Procedure § 1731, at 377-78 (1979). This result is consistent with a federal court decision involving the maximum period of probation under federal law for multicount convictions. United States v. Albano, 698 F.2d 144, 146 (2d Cir.1983). The error in the sentencing order with respect to length of the period of probation may be corrected by an amended sentencing order without the necessity of resentencing. The judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed subject to correction with respect to the period of probation. The case is remanded to the district court for that purpose. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.