Opinion ID: 772647
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Delay in Obtaining the Indictment

Text: 14 The Speedy Trial Act requires the filing of an indictment or information within thirty days of a defendant's arrest or service of summons. See 18 U.S.C. S 3161(b); RamirezCortez, 213 F.3d at 1153. After this time, the government may indict on new charges, or it may abandon the original charges upon which the defendant is held, but it may not indict on the same charge for which the defendant was arrested. United States v. Lopez-Osuna, 242 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir.2000). 15 However, under the statute, certain periods of delay are excluded from the thirty-day computation. See 18 U.S.C. S 3161(h)(1)-(9). Most important to this case,[a]ny period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant is excludable. Id. S 3161(h)(1). 16 The criminal complaint charging Arellano-Rivera with violating S 1326 was filed on October 6, 1999. The STA clock started running on that date. See United States v. Candelaria, 704 F.2d 1129, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 1983). Counting ahead thirty days, excluding the day of arrest but including weekends and holidays, see United States v. Pollock , 726 F.2d 1456, 1460 n.6 (9th Cir. 1984), the government was initially required to obtain an indictment charging Arellano-Rivera with violating S 1326 by November 6, 1999. The government did not obtain an indictment charging Arellano-Rivera with violating S 1326 until January 5, 2000, well after the thirtyday window prescribed by the STA. See 18 U.S.C. S 3161(b). 17 The government acknowledges that it did not obtain an indictment on the S 1326 charge within thirty days of filing the criminal complaint, but contends that a significant portion of the intervening time is excludable under the statute. According to the government, once the delay attributable to other proceedings is properly excluded, see id. S 3161(h)(1), the indictment against Arellano-Rivera was obtained within the thirty-day safe harbor. See 18 U.S.C. S 3161(b). We agree. 18 We recently decided an identical issue in United States v. Lopez-Osuna. 242 F.3d 1191. In that case, the government filed a criminal complaint charging Lopez-Osuna with violating 8 U.S.C. S 1326. Id. at 1191. As part of its fast-track program, the government offered to drop theS 1326 charge, if Lopez-Osuna agreed to plead guilty to lesser charges under 8 U.S.C. S 1325. Id. Lopez-Osuna initially reacted favorably to the offer, so the prosecutor filed a criminal information charging him with violating S 1325. Id. at 1197. Lopez-Osuna waived indictment on the S 1325 charges, and the case initiated by the information proceeded. Id. On several occasions and for varying reasons, Lopez-Osuna sought and was granted a continuance. Id. at 1191. Eventually, he decided not to plead guilty to the S 1325 charges. Id. at 1195. In response, the government obtained an indictment charging Lopez-Osuna with violating S 1326 and dismissed the case initiated by the S 1325 information. Id. 19 We observed that the government clearly did not obtain the S 1326 indictment within the thirty-day time period allotted by the STA. Id. at 1196-97 (citing 18 U.S.C.S 3161(b)). Nevertheless, we determined that a significant portion of the intervening time was excludable. Id. In particular, we noted that delay resulting from trial with respect to other charges against the defendant, including the period of time utilized in making necessary preparations for trial, was excludable as delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant. See id. at 1197 (citing United States v. Lopez-Espindola, 632 F.2d 107, 110 (9th Cir. 1980) and 18 U.S.C. S3161(h)(1)(D)). Because SS 1325 and 1326 are separate offenses with some different elements, we concluded that the case initiated by the S 1325 information was an other proceeding  for purposes of the STA. Id. Thus, [a]ll time was excludable after Lopez waived indictment so long as the information was pending. Id. 20 Arellano-Rivera's case is indistinguishable from LopezOsuna. The government did not obtain an indictment charging Arellano-Rivera with violating S 1326 within the thirty-day period prescribed by the STA. See 18 U.S.C.S 3161(b). However, once Arellano-Rivera waived indictment on theS 1325 charges, the case triggered by the S 1325 information was an other proceeding for purposes of the STA. See LopezOsuna, 242 F.3d 1191, 1196-97. Accordingly, any delayattributable to the case initiated by the S 1325 information is excludable. 1 See id. 21 As indicated above, the government was initially required to obtain the indictment charging Arellano-Rivera under S 1326 by November 6, 1999. Arellano-Rivera waived indictment on the S 1325 charges and elected to proceed by way of information on November 4, 1999. The STA clock was tolled at that time. See 18 U.S.C. S 3161(h)(1)(D); Lopez-Osuna, 242 F.3d 1191, 1196. On January 5, 2000, the same day Arellano-Rivera decided not to plead guilty to the S 1325 charges, the government obtained the indictment under S 1326. Thus, all time between November 4, 1999, and January 5, 2000 is excludable under the STA. 18 U.S.C. S 3161(h)(1)(D); Lopez-Osuna, 242 F.3d 1191, 1196. Because the government had until January 7, 2000, to obtain an indictment under S 1326, and it did so on January 5, 2000, there was no Speedy Trial Act violation. 22 Arellano-Rivera attempts to distinguish his case from Lopez-Osuna and claims that it is more analogous to United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000). We respectfully disagree. 23 Ramirez-Cortez concerned an entirely different provision of the STA than the provision at issue here. Ramirez-Cortez addressed whether certain amounts of time were excludable under the so-called ends-of-justice provision. See 18 U.S.C. S 3161(h)(8); Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d at 1153-54. In contrast, the instant case (as well as Lopez-Osuna ) addresses whether certain amounts of time are excludable under the other proceedings provision. See 18 U.S.C. S 3161(h)(1); Lopez-Osuna, 242 F.3d 1191, 1196. Moreover, in Ramirez-Cortez, the government never filed a separate information under either S 1325 or S 1326. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d at 1151-52. Nor did the defendant waive indictment on separate charges or agree to proceed with a different case by way of information. Id. In contrast, the prosecutor in the instant case filed a criminal information underS 1325, and Arellano-Riviera knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived indictment on those charges. As explained above, the prosecutor's filing of a criminal information on wholly separate charges, together with the defendant's willingness to proceed with the case initiated by the information, trigger the other proceedings exception of the STA. See 18 U.S.C. S 3161(h)(1)(D); Lopez-Osuna, 242 F.3d 1191, 1196. 24 Arellano-Rivera argues also that unlike the defendant in Lopez-Osuna, he actually informed the government that he would not accept its plea offer. Specifically, ArellanoRivera's defense counsel claims that on November 9, 1999 (five days after waiving indictment), he unequivocally told the government that his client would not plead guilty to the charges in the S 1325 information. Arellano-Rivera asserts that the STA clock should have been reactivated on that day. Arellano-Rivera's contention is belied by the evidence in the record. On December 1, 1999 -nearly a month after allegedly informing the government that his client would not plead guilty to the S 1325 charges -Arellano-Rivera's counsel asked the judge for a continuance in the case that had been triggered by the S 1325 information. Defense counsel expressly stated that he anticipated Arellano-Rivera's case to be a disposition (i.e. guilty plea). See Lopez-Osuna, 242 F.3d 1191 (defining disposition hearing  as guilty plea). When the judge asked, are you reasonably sure that they will dispo, counsel responded:Yes, very sure. This is certainly not an unequivocal statement by Arellano-Rivera that he would not plead guilty to the S 1325 charges; in fact, the contrary is true. We leave for another day the issue of whether a defendant's unmistakable indication that he will not plead guilty to charges in a criminal information somehow reactivates the STA clock that had been tolled when the defendant waived indictment on those separate charges. 25 In sum, there is no Speedy Trial Act violation under the circumstances of this case. The goals of the STA would not be served by allowing a defendant to game the system by reacting favorably to a government's plea offer, waive indictment on lesser charges, and then after reneging on his part of the bargain, complain that the government failed to obtain an indictment within the appropriate time frame.