Opinion ID: 601510
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the district court erred in instructing the jury to continue deliberations

Text: 50 After spending a great deal of time deliberating, the jury notified the court that it had reached verdicts on counts two through five, but was unable to each a verdict on count one. The court instructed the jury to continue deliberating, without limiting the instruction to count one as requested by defendant's counsel. Defendant contends this was error. The government contends that the court's instruction to the jury to continue to deliberate was not prejudicial or coercive. One juror's affidavit suggests that after the jury received the court's instruction to continue deliberating, they not only reached a not guilty verdict on count one, but changed their verdicts on counts two and five from not guilty to guilty. In one sense, then, defendant was prejudiced by the judge's instruction to the jury. However, there was no reversible error. 51 A judge may encourage jurors who are having difficulty reaching a verdict to deliberate longer, and to give due consideration and respect to the views of their peers. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896). See also United States v. Bailey, 480 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.1973) (affirming en banc United States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652 (5th Cir.1972)). However, a judge errs in instructing the jury to deliberate further if the jury has reached a final verdict, which has been announced and recorded, United States v. Taylor, 507 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir.1975), or when the instruction unduly coerce[s] the minority into surrendering its views for the purpose of rendering a verdict, or set[s] a time limit for the deliberations, United States v. Cheramie, 520 F.2d 325, 329-31 (5th Cir.1975). See also United States v. Lindell, 881 F.2d 1313, 1321 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1087, 110 S.Ct. 1152, 107 L.Ed.2d 1056 (1990). 52 In this case, there is no suggestion that the jury's verdict on counts two through five was final when the judge instructed the jury to continue deliberating. In Taylor, this court stated that: 53 [A] jury has not reached a valid verdict until deliberations are over, the result is announced in open court, and no dissent by a juror is registered. Even at this point, where the verdict is announced in open court and no dissent is voiced, the verdict may not be accepted by the court if a poll taken before the verdict is recorded indicates a lack of unanimity.... Votes taken in the jury room prior to being returned in court are preliminary.... This applies particularly where more than one count has been submitted to the jury, for continuing deliberations may shake views expressed on counts previously considered. Jurors are not bound by votes in the jury room and remain free to register dissent even after the verdict has been announced, though before the verdict is recorded. 54 507 F.2d at 168 (citations omitted and emphasis added). See also United States v. White, 972 F.2d 590, 595 (5th Cir.1992), reh'g denied, 977 F.2d 576 (5th Cir.1992), petition for cert. filed (Jan. 6, 1993). 55 Considering the standard of review that applies (abuse of discretion), 13 we cannot say that the district court erred in encouraging the jury to deliberate further. The note to the jury simply said, Members of the jury: Considering the length of the trial and the amount of the evidence to be considered, the Court requests that you continue your deliberations in an effort to reach a verdict on all counts. The note did not coerce the minority jury members into agreement with the majority, or set a time limit on deliberations. The note expressed no opinion as to what kind of verdict the court preferred, or whether the verdicts on counts two through five should be revisited. Of course, the phrase considering the length of the trial and the amount of the evidence to be considered might have been read by a juror to mean that the result should be obvious to all jurors upon due consideration of the evidence. However, it remains difficult to construe the note as coercive or as favoring a particular verdict, insofar as it simply urged that an effort be made to reach a unanimous verdict. Thus, even if the note's language deviated in some respects from that of previously approved Allen charges, it was acceptable. See Lindell, 881 F.2d at 1320-21. Allen 's age-old wisdom was intelligently applied in this case.