Opinion ID: 2589798
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Severance Motions

Text: The trial court granted the prosecution's motion to consolidate defendant's case with that of Flores. Defendant contends the trial court's denial of his ensuing motions to sever the trials violated his federal constitutional rights to due process, an impartial jury, a fair trial, and a reliable death verdict. Under section 1098, [w]hen two or more defendants are jointly charged ... they must be tried jointly, unless the court order[s] separate trials. In light of this legislative preference for joinder, separate trials are usually ordered only `in the face of an incriminating confession, prejudicial association with co-defendants, likely confusion resulting from evidence on multiple counts, conflicting defenses, or the possibility that at a separate trial a codefendant would give exonerating testimony.' ( People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 312, 208 Cal.Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669, overruled on other grounds in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1115, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306, quoting People v. Massie (1967) 66 Cal.2d 899, 917, 59 Cal.Rptr. 733, 428 P.2d 869.) A trial court's ruling on a severance motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion on the basis of the facts known to the court at the time of the ruling. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 189, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365; People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1287, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) Here, at the time the trial court first ruled on the severance motion, it expressly noted that by seeking consolidation, the prosecutor risked total exclusion of defendants' statements. (See People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1287, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) Subsequently, Flores testified at trial, and hence defendant had no Aranda objection to his statement, and Flores introduced defendant's statements, thereby waiving his own Aranda objections. (See People v. Aranda, supra, 63 Cal.2d 518, 47 Cal.Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265.) Thus, while defendant renewed his severance motion several times during trial, no circumstance developed which required the trial court to change its initial ruling. Nor did defendant suffer a prejudicial association with Flores. Along these lines, defendant contends severance was required because defendant, but not Flores, was subject to the death penalty. However, as the trial court stated, The exclusion of the death penalty against Flores is not based upon an election by the People.... If the jury should conclude somebody must pay with his life, it would be more likely to exact that penalty from [defendant] in a separate trial, since it could not reach anyone else. The jury was aware that Flores was not subject to the death penalty because of his age at the time of the crimes. In addition, defendant claims he was denied his right to confrontation by certain extrajudicial statements made by Flores's witnesses. He does not, however, identify these witnesses (other than Dr. Zigelbaum), or indicate why their testimony would not be admissible on behalf of the People in a separate trial. (See People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1288, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) Even assuming Dr. Zigelbaum's testimony would not have been admitted at a separate trial, the trial court precluded this expert from opining as to defendant's mental state. Moreover, Zigelbaum was not permitted to testify that in his opinion the events on August 9, 1989, at the Gilhousen residence had occurred in a certain way. Rather, he was asked to assume that certain events had occurred and base his opinion on these assumptions. The jury was expressly and repeatedly instructed that the assumptions were not evidence, and that the jury was the sole finder of fact as to what had occurred on that day. In addition, as noted above, Zigelbaum was impeached by an ongoing Massachusetts medical license review and by certain inaccuracies on his resume. Indeed, it is apparent the jury rejected Zigelbaum's opinion in any event since it found Flores guilty on all counts. Nor was defendant prejudiced by his inability to conduct voir dire in a manner that openly indicated why he was exercising his peremptory challenges. A severed trial is nonetheless adversarial, and even in that situation a defendant would likely be circumspect about defense strategy at the jury selection stage. Nor does defendant persuasively explain how certain jurors' possible low opinion of Flores's counsel would prejudice him. Moreover, contrary to defendant's assertion, severance was not required merely because it was anticipated defendants would attempt to shift responsibility for the capital crimes to each other. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 190, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365; People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1287, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) Here, as in Cummings, the defense positions were antagonistic because the circumstances of Chandler's death, and the identity of April's and Bryan's killer, were in dispute. That each was involved in the incident was undisputed, however, and the prosecution had offered evidence sufficient to support verdicts convicting both defendants.... [T]his was not a case in which only one defendant could be guilty.... Here the prosecution theory was that both defendants participated in, and were guilty of, the murder[s]. ( Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1287, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) The jury was presented with a straightforward decision regarding both defendants' relative culpability; its verdict finding each defendant guilty as charged reveals it accepted neither defense. Finally, contrary to defendant's speculation, there is no evidence Flores would have offered testimony exonerating defendant had they been separately tried. ( People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1286, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) In sum, no gross unfairness depriving defendant of a fair trial or due process is evident. ( People v. Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 313, 208 Cal.Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669.)