Opinion ID: 1372929
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the settlement intended to address the switchgear?

Text: The key inquiry regarding this issue is whether the mutual release set forth in the settlement agreement applies to the dispute concerning the switchgear. [8] Martech contends that the release does not apply because Ogden's refusal to purchase the switchgear occurred after the settlement was executed, and therefore was not anticipated at the time of execution. Ogden contends that even if it had a duty to purchase the switchgear, the dispute over the switchgear arises out of the settled transaction and the duty was thus discharged by the settlement. Martech claims that the agreement between Ogden, Cummins and itself was a separate agreement from the principal subcontract and thus not encompassed by the settlement agreement. It argues that the wrongful act from which the claim arose, Ogden's refusal to take delivery of the switchgear, occurred after the settlement was executed and thus did not arise on or prior to November 4, 1988. Martech relies on Petroleum Sales, Ltd. v. Mapco Alaska, Inc., 687 P.2d 923 (Alaska 1984), for the proposition that a settlement agreement does not release liability for post-settlement conduct. Mapco was sued by two local fuel distributors for antitrust violations. Id. at 925. The suit was settled and a settlement and release was executed which covered any and all claims, equitable and legal, known or unknown, which they presently have ... and each covenant not to sue [the other] based on any such claims existing as of this date. Id. at 926 (alteration, omission in original). Two years later, the distributors again sued Mapco for antitrust violations. The suit claimed that price increases instituted after the settlement were unlawfully exploitive. Id. The issue before the court was whether the distributors asserted a claim sufficiently distinct from those which they voluntarily relinquished in the settlement. Id. at 927. This court held that the second suit, although based on new conduct which triggered the litigation, substantially echoe[d] the settled suit because both required that Mapco be found to hold a monopolistic position. Id. at 928. Since that finding was covered by the settlement, it could not be litigated again. Id. We also held that the behavior addressed in the settlement, unlawful monopolistic pricing, encompassed both the underpricing complained of in the first suit and the overpricing complained of in the second suit. Id. We did not discount the possibility that in the future the distributors could maintain an antitrust claim against Mapco. There is no dispute that a new cause of action accrues for damages caused by post-settlement antitrust conduct each time such new or renewed conduct is engaged in. Id. at 929. However, the new cause of action would have to be actionable independently of the monopolistic position approved of in the settlement. [9] Id. at 928-29. We rejected the blanket contention that the settlement should not cover post-settlement damages from post-settlement conduct, because the damages were too uncertain at the time of the settlement. We held that the release would cover all claims reasonably ascertainable at the date of its execution. Id. at 930. The claim sought to be maintained in this case is not the independent claim envisioned in Mapco. The settlement declares that the parties intended to resolve all of their financial and contractual obligations to each other. Even assuming that an agreement for Ogden to purchase the switchgear existed, [10] we are not persuaded that this agreement was wholly independent from the principal subcontract discharged by the settlement. Delivery of and payment for the switchgear were not resolved at the time the settlement was executed. Thus, the failure of Ogden to accept the switchgear does not stand as a cause of action without the background of the dispute addressed by the settlement agreement. Therefore, existing questions of fact regarding the possible agreement by Ogden to pay for the switchgear will not defeat the summary judgment. The release executed by Ogden and Martech was not limited to claims on the principal subcontract. Rather, the liability was released against any claims of any nature whatsoever between the parties. The settlement thus sought to resolve the entire transaction. The dispute over the switchgear existed before the settlement, the responsibility for the switchgear being debated back and forth between Ogden and Martech. Certainly the dispute between Ogden and Martech regarding the switchgear was a claim arising from or relating to the subject contract. We conclude that this claim was abandoned in accordance with the settlement. Moreover, we conclude that the claim involving the switchgear was encompassed in the settlement according to the test for certainty employed in Mapco. [11] The claim regarding the switchgear was an issue which was reasonably ascertainable at the time of executing the settlement. See Mapco, 687 P.2d at 930. Even if Martech justifiably believed that Ogden would pay for and own the switchgear, Martech signed the purchase order and was contractually bound to Cummins. Martech should have anticipated that the switchgear issue would be resolved by the settlement along with the entirety of the contractual relationship. It is not significant that the switchgear was never actually discussed in the settlement negotiations. First, the agreement indicates a complete washing of the hands between the parties using as soap blatantly broad language to cover all possible causes of action: All liability from whatever damage, fully, finally and forever; any damages whatsoever; claims of any nature whatsoever; and all claims, demands, rights, and causes of action that each has or may have against the other with respect to the above-captioned dispute. Second, although the switchgear was not specifically discharged, neither was it specifically reserved as an independent claim. The broad language used implies that claims not specifically contemplated are settled. Those deserving special attention were addressed separately. There are no catch-all phrases to preserve omitted claims as there are to abandon them. [12] Third, if an agreement did exist for Ogden to purchase the switchgear, it arose pursuant to the contractual relationship as it could have been one of the items for which an invoice was to be submitted to arbitration. [13]