Opinion ID: 185822
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Police Report Statements

Text: 34 Appellant also argues that the District Court abused its discretion in excluding as hearsay a statement from a police report that witnesses at the scene of the shooting saw the victim, not appellant, with the gun. The District Court properly excluded this evidence as hearsay. 35 At the pretrial conference, defense counsel complained that the Government had not provided Brady information that had been requested regarding the identity of witnesses who had observed someone other than appellant with a gun. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The request had been made on the basis of a police report that had been provided through discovery, which indicated that witnesses at the scene of the shooting had observed the gunshot victim holding a gun during or immediately following the shooting. The Government's counsel replied that, after speaking to each individual officer and all of the detectives, reviewing the paperwork, and speaking with Government witnesses, it appeared that the statement had been only a rumor: No witness had actually made this claim. The defense counsel pointed out that the PD 163 written by Officer Heinz identified Defendant 1 as appellant and Defendant 2 as Coates, and that it stated that witnesses at the scene of the shooting observed Def #2 with a gun in his hand during and/or just after the shooting. The Government replied that it believed that Officer Heinz had simply gotten his numbers mixed up. The District Court denied the defense's request. 36 At trial, defense counsel attempted to direct Officer Heinz's attention to the back of the PD 163, where it was written that Def #2 had been observed with the gun. The Government objected on the grounds that this issue was covered by the District Court's pretrial ruling. When defense counsel brought up Officer Heinz's preliminary hearing testimony that he had received information from Detective Voysest that there was a witness to Coates possessing the firearm, the Government objected that the information was double hearsay and, again, that the information had been determined to be incorrect. The defense counsel replied that he was offering the statement not to prove its truth, but 37 based upon the fact that this was the state of the investigation at the time of the precipitation of this document. This was the information upon which the Metropolitan Police Department acted, similar to the Government's representations earlier on with respect to the radio run and why individuals go to a certain scene. 38 5/17/00 Tr. 60. The District Court sustained the Government's objection, and the defense did not call Detective Voysest. 39 Appellant now challenges these evidentiary rulings. We review the District Court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, United States v. Warren, 42 F.3d 647, 655 (D.C.Cir.1994), and conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in this case. 40 The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that `[h]earsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. FED.R.EVID. 801(c). Hearsay is generally inadmissible as evidence. FED.R.EVID. 802. However, [a]n out-of court statement that is offered to show its effect on the hearer's state of mind is not hearsay under Rule 801(c). United States v. Thompson, 279 F.3d 1043, 1047 (D.C.Cir.2002); see also United States v. Wright, 783 F.2d 1091, 1098 (D.C.Cir.1986). 41 Appellant contends that the witness statements were not hearsay because they were offered to show the effect on the hearer's state of mind. He argues that 42 it was not the witnesses' statements that were relevant alone, but the disavowal of the statements that made them relevant by showing that, in the face of contrary information they had originally considered reliable enough to act upon, the police took action harmful to appellant by disavowing the statements inculpating the co-defendant and dismissing the case against him. 43 Appellant's Reply Br. at 14. 44 We rejected a similar claim in United States v. Evans, 216 F.3d 80 (D.C.Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 971, 121 S.Ct. 411, 148 L.Ed.2d 317 (2000). There, the trial court had permitted the Government to introduce the testimony of an FBI agent that the FBI `had received ... information that [the defendant] was involved in drug trafficking.' Id. at 85 (quoting agent's testimony; ellipsis in original). This information had come from a government informant who was not a witness and would not be available for cross-examination. The Government argued that the statement was not hearsay because it was not offered for its truth, but rather to establish why the FBI did what they did. Id. The court rejected this contention: 45 But if [the agent's] testimony about the FBI's information did not go to the truth of that assertion, to what did it go? The trial prosecutor said he offered the testimony to establish why they did what they did with George Rose. For testimony to be admissible for any purpose, however, it must be relevant. See FED.R.EVID. 402. And to be relevant, it must have a tendency to make the existence of [a] fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. FED.R.EVID. 401. How was why they did what they did with George Rose related to such a fact of consequence? Id. at 85. The court concluded that 46 the admission of [the agent's] testimony was error under the Federal Rules of Evidence: under Rules 801 and 802 because the jury was effectively told that the testimony could be used for its truth, and under Rule 403 because the probative value of the only relevant nonhearsay purpose — general background — was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 47 Id. at 89. Likewise, in this case, the statement in the PD 163 that witnesses at the scene of the shooting observed Def #2 with a gun in his hand during and/or just after the shooting is not relevant for anything other than its truth. And if it has any relevance as background, the probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice. 48 Appellant argues that the statement at issue here was offered to show the state of mind of the officers when they arrested Fowler, Coates, and appellant. The state of mind to which appellant refers is that the police understood there to be witnesses who saw the victim with the gun immediately after the shooting. Appellant's Br. at 32. However, this state of mind, if not based on the truth of the statement, is not relevant to a fact of consequence in the trial. The only real issue at trial was who possessed the gun and drugs. The statement in the PD 163 was only relevant to this issue if it was accurate. If, as the Government asserted, the statement reflected a mistaken rumor, then it would not have assisted the jury in determining who possessed the gun and drugs. To accept appellant's state of mind argument would be to permit a loophole in the hearsay rule large enough to swallow the rule itself. See Evans, 216 F.3d at 86 (If we were to accept the government's rationale here, then explaining why government agents `did what they did' through reference to statements of absent informants would be acceptable in almost any case involving an undercover operation, and in many others as well.). 49 Appellant also argues that the statement was critical to the defense to persuade the jury that the police had lied and manipulated the evidence in a manner designed to strengthen the case against appellant. Appellant's Br. at 32. This argument clearly relies on the truth of the statement. If the statement was not offered for its truth, it would not persuade the jury that the police had lied and manipulated the evidence.