Opinion ID: 534798
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Heading: should mrs. cipollone's post-1965 conduct have been

Text: 92 CONSIDERED IN DECIDING HER COMPARATIVE FAULT ON THE FAILURE TO WARN CLAIM? 5 93 The New Jersey Comparative Fault Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1, states that: 94 Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person ... to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought.... Any damages sustained shall be diminished by the percentage sustained of negligence attributable to the person recovering. 95 The Comparative Fault Act can apply to strict liability actions if the plaintiff's conduct can be found to constitute contributory negligence. See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 81 N.J. 150, 164, 406 A.2d 140, 147 (1979). Thus, if Mrs. Cipollone were more than 50% responsible for her own smoking, as the jury found her to be, plaintiff would be barred from recovering under his failure to warn claim. As we have noted, the interplay between New Jersey's comparative fault scheme and the preemptive effect of the Labeling Act produced an anomalous situation at trial. The district court did not distinguish between Mrs. Cipollone's pre-1966 and post-1965 conduct when instructing the jury to consider the degree to which she was at fault pursuant to New Jersey comparative fault law. 6 96 The wording of special verdict interrogatories 10, 11, and 12 was to the same effect, 7 permitting the jury to consider Mrs. Cipollone's fault to the extent it believed that she acted unreasonably in continuing to smoke after 1965. However, the court instructed the jury not to consider Liggett's post-1965 conduct. Mr. Cipollone contends that the jury instructions were inconsistent with Ostrowski v. Azzara, 111 N.J. 429, 545 A.2d 148 (1988), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court held that once a legal wrong has occurred, plaintiff's conduct after that time bears only on mitigation of damages (even if some of plaintiff's injuries have not yet manifested themselves). Such conduct does not, however, bear on whether plaintiff's comparative fault falls above or below the 50% threshold. 97 Mr. Cipollone also contends that the district court's jury instructions were asymmetrical and unfair because they permitted the jury to use Mrs. Cipollone's post-1965 conduct to bar her claim even though the post-1965 marketing practices of the defendant were free from scrutiny. He points out that the jury was required to bar Mrs. Cipollone's failure to warn claim in its entirety if it believed that she was 80% responsible for her injury in light of her smoking from 1942 to 1983 even if it believed that Liggett's failure to warn was, for example, 67% responsible for Mrs. Cipollone's smoking from 1942 to 1966. 98 Because the facts and reasoning of Ostrowski are so important to our resolution of the issue of Mrs. Cipollone's post-1965 conduct, we recount them in some detail. Mrs. Ostrowski was a patient whose diabetes, poor diet, and cigarette smoking caused her to have severe blood circulation problems. She went to her podiatrist to complain of soreness in her left toe. After several visits, and after considering her representation (which proved to be false) that she had seen her internist regarding her diet and insulin dosage, the podiatrist recommended that the toe nail on the sore toe be removed to allow drainage. After the surgery, the plaintiff continued to smoke, despite advice that she should stop (because smoking greatly increases the blood circulation problems caused by diabetes). Several weeks after the surgery, it became clear that the blood flow to the toe was insufficient to heal the toe; the plaintiff was left with a non-healing, pre-gangrenous wound. Mrs. Ostrowski had to undergo three different by-pass surgeries to increase blood circulation to the toe. The last operation involved a vein transplant from one leg to the other. 99 Mrs. Ostrowski sued the podiatrist, contending that the podiatrist was negligent in her initial decision to remove the toe nail, that the toe nail should not have been removed, and that her subsequent problems with her leg were proximately caused by the podiatrist's negligence. The podiatrist contended that the plaintiff was at fault in both her pre-surgery and post-surgery conduct and that this conduct contributed to her injuries. The jury found that the podiatrist had acted negligently in removing the plaintiff's toenail but found that plaintiff's fault, based on both her pre- and post-surgery conduct, exceeded that of the podiatrist (51% to 49%). The plaintiff's recovery was therefore barred by the trial court under New Jersey comparative fault law because her fault exceeded 50%. 100 The Appellate Division of the Superior Court affirmed, but the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed. Because the podiatrist's negligence was in performing the toe surgery, the Court conceptualized the plaintiff's behavior after treatment had begun but before the toe surgery as relevant to comparative fault. However, the Court concluded that her post-surgery behavior was relevant only to avoidable consequences. 8 On remand, the jury was instructed to arrive at two percentage figures regarding plaintiff's conduct: first, the degree to which her conduct after treatment had begun was responsible for the toe surgery, and second, the degree to which her conduct after treatment had begun--considering her conduct both before and after the toe surgery--was responsible for her ultimate injury, the bypass surgery. If the first percentage (the plaintiff's fault for the toe surgery) was less than the physician's fault for the toe surgery, the plaintiff would recover. Her recovery, however, would be offset by the second percentage times the damages suffered (which reflects plaintiff's total responsibility for her ultimate injury). 9 If the first percentage was greater than the physician's fault for the surgery, plaintiff's recovery would be barred by the Comparative Fault Act. 101 The Court distinguished between the plaintiff's conduct before and after the toe surgery on the ground that [a]voidable consequences ... come[ ] into action when the injured party's carelessness occurs after the defendant's legal wrong has been committed but [c]ontributory negligence ... comes into action when the injured party's carelessness occurs before defendant's wrong has been committed or concurrently with it. 111 N.J. at 438, 545 A.2d at 152. 10 In explaining why it thought that the jury should arrive at two percentages to measure plaintiff's fault, the Court reasoned that it would be the bitterest irony if the rule of comparative negligence, designed to ameliorate the harshness of contributory negligence, should serve to shut out any recovery to one who would otherwise have recovered under the law of contributory negligence [because her contributory conduct was relevant to avoidable consequences rather than contributory negligence]. Id. at 441-42, 545 A.2d at 154. 102 The Court held that the plaintiff's conduct before treatment had begun was irrelevant to both the comparative fault and avoidable consequence inquiries, under the doctrine that the  'defendant must take the plaintiff as he finds him. '  Id. at 438, 545 A.2d at 152 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, the Court made clear that the plaintiff's conduct before treatment had begun was not totally irrelevant to the case: that conduct was relevant to determining what damages were a proximate result of the defendant's negligence, because, as we have noted, some of the damage to the plaintiff's leg could have been caused not by the defendant's negligence but by the plaintiff's pre-treatment condition. See id. at 448, 545 A.2d at 157. 11 103 We agree with Mr. Cipollone's contention that it is appropriate to conceptualize our preemption decision as imposing an automatic cut-off date for imposition of liability. We further agree with Mr. Cipollone that, in light of the preemption decision, the doctrines set out in Ostrowski should have been applied in this case. As Liggett emphasizes throughout its brief, its post-1965 marketing practices could not form the basis for any tort or warranty claim as a matter of law; hence, Liggett's arguably tortious conduct was completed as of January 1, 1966. Therefore, Mrs. Cipollone's post-1965 conduct should have been considered as relevant to avoidable consequences, possibly reducing her damages but not foreclosing liability. 104 We reject Liggett's contention that application of plaintiff's interpretation of Ostrowski would require this court to hold that the case overruled the New Jersey Supreme Court's [product liability] decisions in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Maiorino v. Weco Products Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965) and Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965). Liggett's Br. at 43 n. 50. Liggett's argument apparently is that the instant case is no different from the typical toxic tort case in which there may be a significant interval between the time of defendant's wrongful act (the sale of or exposure to the defective product) and the time plaintiff's injury from use of the product manifests itself. Therefore, according to Liggett, all of the plaintiff's pre-injury conduct should bear on comparative fault. Our preemption decision renders this analogy inapposite, however. In the more typical case, the jury considers all of the defendant's pre-injury conduct also. Because that cannot happen here, we find it unfair and impermissible for the jury to consider Mrs. Cipollone's comparative fault during the period (1966-1981) for which Liggett's conduct is unjudgable. 105 We have no way of knowing how much of the 80% fault that the jury ascribed to Mrs. Cipollone is attributable to her pre-1966 smoking and how much to her post-1965 smoking. The judgment entered on the jury verdict in Liggett's favor on the failure to warn claim must therefore be reversed (the error is obviously not harmless) and the case remanded for a new trial on that issue. 106 We do not dispute Liggett's contention that we could analyze the case differently. However, we believe that the artificial cut-off so skews the normal balance that only the Ostrowski avoidable consequences analysis can mitigate the unfairness and disruption to state tort law wrought by our preemption decision. We acknowledge that the retrial must proceed, to some extent, with an artificial distinction between conduct before and after January 1, 1966, and that the expert witnesses will face a difficult task on allocating the consequences of pre-1966 and post-1965 conduct. However, that result is forced upon us by the circumstances. This will not be the first time, nor the last, that a legal construct will have constrained a trial. We are confident that the extremely able lawyers and the distinguished trial judge in whose hands this case rests will do it justice. 107 On retrial, the jury should be asked whether Liggett's pre-1966 failure to warn caused Mrs. Cipollone to smoke cigarettes. 12 The jury must consider the relative degrees to which Mrs. Cipollone and Liggett were at fault for Mrs. Cipollone's pre-1966 smoking. If Mrs. Cipollone is thought to have been more than 50% at fault than Liggett for her pre-1966 smoking, then the failure to warn claim ends there, and Mrs. Cipollone's recovery is barred on that claim. If, however, the jury finds that Mrs. Cipollone's pre-1966 fault for her smoking is 50% or less (and that that smoking was a proximate cause of her cancer), the jury must then consider the issue of avoidable consequences, considering Mrs. Cipollone's conduct both before and after January 1, 1966. The jury may not evaluate the propriety of the defendants' cigarette marketing practices after 1965, because the defendants have been absolved from liability for otherwise tortious and unfair marketing practices by the Labeling Act. 108