Opinion ID: 526440
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Characterizing the Present Dispute.

Text: 43 Based upon the principles articulated above, the district court found that a plausible interpretation of the collective bargaining agreements in effect between [CSX] and the defendant unions would provide a substantial contractual justification for the sale of the Buffalo-Eidenau line without additional bargaining. Decker II, 688 F.Supp. at 112. The dispute between the parties was accordingly deemed minor and subject to binding arbitration before an adjustment board, id., pursuant to RLA Sec. 3, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 153 (1982). 44 Appellants contend, however, that the dispute arises from an action by CSX which will change existing employment rights of CSX employees as currently embodied in the Agreements, and as presenting a legitimate attempt by appellants to negotiate new agreements for the affected employees. 45 The district court's finding that the dispute was minor was grounded on two bases: 1) the existence of various reduction-in-force (RIF) provisions in the Agreements, Decker II, 688 F.Supp. at 110-11; and 2) CSX's allegedly established practice of selling or abandoning rail lines without engaging in RLA bargaining over related job abolitions, id. at 111-12. We next consider these matters. 46
47 CSX's principal argument that the instant dispute is covered in the Agreements is premised upon the RIF provisions of those Agreements. The district court cited a typical RIF clause, which provides in relevant part: 48 (a) When it becomes necessary to reduce expenses, the forces at any point or in any department or subdivision thereof shall be reduced, seniority to govern; and employees affected to take the rate of the job to which they are assigned. 49 (b)(1) Five working days advance notice will be given to employees affected before the abolishment of positions or reduction in force, and list of employees affected will be furnished to the local committee.... 50 Decker II, 688 F.Supp. at 110. CSX contends that these RIF procedures are applicable to job abolishments resulting from line sales, as well as other changes in CSX's operations. 51 The district court found that the pertinent collective bargaining agreements also provided for various labor protections and furlough benefits for terminated employees, and that in the last previous (1984) round of collective bargaining, some of the appellant unions had traded off demands for new or enhanced protective provisions for other benefits. See Decker II, 688 F.Supp. at 104 & n. 7 (detailing labor protections and furlough benefits). 52 Appellants dispute the applicability of the RIF provisions, and point to the fact that they do not refer specifically to line sale situations. Appellants contend that the RIF provisions only allow management to abolish a position for which work has disappeared. Distinguishing the situation presented by the sale of the Buffalo-Eidenau line, appellants argue that here work did not disappear, but rather was transferred by a deliberate action of the carrier. Appellants note in this regard that many of the CSX employees who worked on the Buffalo-Eidenau line had seniority rights specific to that line which would not survive a sale under which B & P did not assume any obligation to continue to administer the Agreements providing those rights. 53 Appellants also contend that the district court, by concluding that the controversy presented for determination was a minor dispute, improperly abdicated its exclusive jurisdiction to determine what the status quo is which the Railway Labor Act requires to be maintained during bargaining under that statute. 54 Addressing the last contention first, it seems to us that appellants have the situation analytically backward. As indicated earlier, there is generally no duty to maintain the status quo during a minor dispute, but only during a major dispute. 8 Air Cargo, Inc. v. Local Union 851, IBT, 733 F.2d 241 (2d Cir.1984), for example, on which appellants place considerable reliance, ruled that while the major dispute procedures of section 6 are being carried out, the district court has exclusive jurisdiction to ensure that the status quo is being maintained.... [and] therefore ... to determine what the status quo is. Id. at 247 (emphasis added). It is accordingly necessary to address, as a threshold matter, the nature of the controversy between the parties. Once the district court ruled that the controversy was a minor dispute, the status quo issue upon which appellants rely was mooted. 55 The question remains, of course, whether the district court correctly ruled that a minor, rather than major, dispute was before it. As indicated earlier, the district court was only required to conclude that CSX's position was plausible, see Local 553, 695 F.2d at 673, and not obviously insubstantial, see Southern Ry., 384 F.2d at 327. We conclude that CSX met this relatively light burden with respect to interpretation of the pertinent labor agreements, and that the district court properly so concluded. Any further inquiry by the district court would have been unwarranted, since it is not for [the court] to weigh, and decide who has the better of the argument. If the court [does] this, it overstep[s] its bounds and usurp[s] the arbitrator's function. Maine Cent. R.R., 787 F.2d at 782. 56
57 As indicated earlier, CSX also supports its position by pointing to its past practice of selling or abandoning rail lines without engaging in RLA bargaining over those sales and abandonments. As the First Circuit stated in Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Boston & Maine Corp., 788 F.2d 794 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829, 107 S.Ct. 111, 93 L.Ed.2d 59 (1986): 58 In defending an operation change as not raising a major dispute, a carrier is not limited to the collective bargaining agreement to show the basis for its action. The Supreme Court has stated that the carrier can rely on those actual, objective working conditions out of which the dispute arose, and clearly these conditions need not be covered in an existing agreement. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line Railroad v. United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142, 153, 90 S.Ct. 294, 301, 24 L.Ed.2d 325 (1969). The Supreme Court has made clear that for a past practice to be considered an actual, objective working condition[ ], it must have occurred for a sufficient period of time with the knowledge and acquiescence of the employees to become in reality a part of the actual working conditions. Id. at 154, 90 S.Ct. at 301 (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, in an opinion of this court also published today, we found a minor dispute where the carrier could identify instances of past practice accepted by the unions which, arguably, could support its contention. Maine Central Railroad v. United Transportation Union, 787 F.2d 780, 782 (1st Cir.1986). 59 Id. at 799. 60 In the instant case, the district court found persuasive the fact that CSX had in the past accomplished ten separate sales of line segments, involving job abolishments and employee furloughs, without objection by appellants that these sales violated the Agreements or the RLA. Appellants contend, however, that there was no acquiescence on their part in these sales. Rather, their failure to initiate major dispute processes under the RLA in the past came about because other protections were available under the ICA. 61 It was only after a 1982 policy change, appellants contend, that the ICC began refusing to impose these employee protections in cases of rail line sales. Appellants point out that they unsuccessfully petitioned the ICC to change its position and then challenged that position in court. In addition, the district court found that at least one union, the UTU, served a Section 6 notice in connection with one prior sale, although the notice was later withdrawn when CSX contended that the notice violated the moratorium agreement in the CSX-UTU agreement, see supra note 1, and in any event that the ICC had exclusive jurisdiction over the sale. See Decker II, 688 F.Supp. at 111. Appellants contend, in summary, that they attempted to obtain protection for affected employees through the ICC, the courts or by bargaining in each sale where such protections were not afforded by the ICC and employees were affected. 62 As stated earlier, a carrier is entitled to rely upon past practices which have been accepted by the affected unions as establishing an agreement between them. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 788 F.2d at 799 (both stating rule and determining that carrier had not established acceptance of past practices). In view of the contested issues of fact concerning appellants' acquiescence in the prior sales by CSX, we give little weight to this consideration, and even less to prior abandonments which pose distinguishable legal and factual considerations, but nonetheless agree with the district court that CSX's position with respect to past practice is arguable, see Decker II, 688 F.Supp. at 112, and lends some minimal support to a minor dispute determination which rests primarily upon the RIF provisions of the pertinent collective bargaining agreements. 63
64 Appellants contend that CSX was required to file a Section 6 notice with respect to the sale of the Buffalo-Eidenau line and related job abolishments, and that the Section 6 notices which appellant unions filed after April 1, 1988, see supra note 1, make clear that the underlying dispute in this case is clearly a major dispute, for [appellants are] seeking to acquire by bargaining rights which do not exist today. Appellants also point out that the order of the district court from which this appeal is taken contains the following provision: 65 While [CSX] can proceed with the sale of the line, [CSX] is ordered to bargain with Defendant unions, consistent with the requirements of the Railway Labor Act, over notices served pursuant to Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 156, on or after April 1, 1988, in connection with the sale of the Buffalo-Eidenau line. 66 First, CSX was under no obligation to serve Section 6 notices if the job abolishments which it was undertaking with respect to the sale of the Buffalo-Eidenau line were authorized by its existing labor agreements. Since, as the district court concluded in Decker II and we conclude herein, those agreements may plausibly be interpreted to provide that authority, CSX was entitled to treat the controversy as a minor dispute, and therefore had no obligation to file Section 6 notices. 67 Second, assuming that a minor dispute is in fact presented, the service of Section 6 notices by the appellant unions would have no transforming or alchemizing effect upon that situation. As we stated in Rutland:In reaching for resolution of this problem of course we must not place undue emphasis on the contentions or the maneuvers of the parties. Management will assert that its position, whether right or wrong, is only an interpretation or application of the existing contract. Unions, on the other hand, in their assertions about the dispute at issue, will obviously talk in terms of change. Since a Section 6 notice is required by the statute in order to initiate a major dispute, the labor representatives are likely to serve such a notice in any dispute arising out of an ambiguous situation so as thereby to make the controversy appear more like a major dispute. Or they may seek to bring the particular conflict at issue within the bounds of an outstanding Section 6 notice that in reality does not relate to that dispute. 68 307 F.2d at 33 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 69 Appellants' assertion that, by giving their Section 6 notices, they were seeking to acquire bargaining rights that [did] not exist, underscores the weakness of their position on this issue. If the agreements existing between CSX and the appellant unions governed the abolishment of positions in connection with the sale of the Buffalo-Eidenau line, rights which appellants might seek to obtain by bargaining for future agreements would manifestly be irrelevant to that controversy. 70 Finally, in view of the foregoing, we confess to being somewhat puzzled by the district court's direction that CSX bargain with appellants with respect to Section 6 notices served by them on or after April 1, 1988, in connection with the sale of the Buffalo-Eidenau line. In any event, since the parties have since submitted the matter to arbitration before a special adjustment board in accordance with the district court's determination that it presented a minor dispute, and an award has been entered in that arbitration, this directive is presumably moot at this juncture. 71
72 The Seventh Circuit recently addressed a fact situation almost identical to that presented here in Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. RLEA, 855 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 493, 102 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988). That case dealt with a line sale by Chicago & North Western Transportation Company (C & NW) where, as here, the carrier obtained expedited ICC approval. The proposed sale was to result in the abolishment of over 300 jobs, and C & NW did not serve Section 6 notices. Upon learning of the sale, the affected unions filed Section 6 notices expressing a desire to negotiate various employment rights, including seniority protections. Subsequent strike threats were met with a motion for a temporary restraining order by C & NW, which led in turn to a cross-motion to enjoin the line sale. Id. at 1280. 73 As here, the district court determined that the dispute was minor and ordered a preliminary injunction forbidding any strike. The circuit court affirmed, concluding that collective bargaining agreements and past practices arising thereunder embraced matters of job abolishment involved in a line sale. Id. at 1284. While the court found C & NW's interpretations of the pertinent labor agreements to be subject to challenge, they were at least plausible, resulting in a determination that the controversy was a minor dispute. Id. at 1285. 74 Other cases support this analysis and result. In Maine Cent. R.R. v. UTU, 787 F.2d 780 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 169, 93 L.Ed.2d 107 (1986), for example, it was held that job abolishments brought about by a lease of a rail line to a customer constituted a minor dispute, and an injunction was ordered against any strike by the affected unions during the pendency of arbitration procedures. See also ALPA v. Eastern Air Lines, 863 F.2d 891 (D.C.Cir.1988) (airline's net reduction of 143 flights per day causing furlough of 2222 union employees resulted in a minor dispute under pertinent agreements); IAM v. Eastern Air Lines, 826 F.2d 1141 (1st Cir.1987) (airline's layoff of 68 mechanics presented a minor dispute over relocation of work); RLEA v. Boston & Maine Corp., 808 F.2d 150, 159-60 (1st Cir.1986) (carriers' permanent abolition of positions covered by collective bargaining agreements constituted minor dispute because action arguably within carriers' contractual rights), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 102, 98 L.Ed.2d 62 (1987); IBT v. Braniff Int'l Airways, 437 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir.1971) (abolishment of twenty-five jobs arguably justified by contract interpretation); St. Louis, S.F. & T. Ry. v. Railroad Yardmasters, 328 F.2d 749 (5th Cir.) (permissibility of abolishment posed minor dispute because dependent upon contract interpretation), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 980, 84 S.Ct. 1886, 12 L.Ed.2d 748 (1964); ALPA v. Eastern Air Lines, 701 F.Supp. 865 (D.D.C.1988) (shuttle sale contemplated by past agreements and consistent with past practices presented minor dispute); International Bhd. of Firemen v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 560 F.Supp. 169 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (abolition of numerous railroad positions presented a minor dispute); Independent Union of Flight Attendants v. Pan Am. World Airways, 502 F.Supp. 1013 (D.D.C.1980) (decision to close flight attendant bases and furlough approximately 1000 flight attendants posed a minor dispute). 75 The cases cited to us by appellant do not call for a different conclusion. Burlington N. R.R. v. UTU, 848 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.1988), and RLEA v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 848 F.2d 102 (8th Cir.1988), are companion cases which were addressed to the interplay between the ICA, the RLA and (in the case of Burlington ) the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 101-115 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Both cases assumed the existence of a major dispute. There was no consideration in either case of the major/minor dispute dichotomy, or of the agreements between the parties upon which such an analysis must necessarily focus. 76 RLEA v. Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R., 845 F.2d 420 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 489, 102 L.Ed.2d 526 (1988), involved a sale by a railroad of all of its rail assets, in which the Third Circuit stated: There is no argument about whether the collective bargaining agreement itself permits or prohibits the proposed sale. If that were the crux of the dispute, then this case would require an interpretation of the agreement, and would thus be a minor dispute.... Id. at 428 n. 9. 77 Similarly, United Indus. Workers v. Board of Trustees, 351 F.2d 183 (5th Cir.1965), involved a lease of the carrier's entire railroad operations which would have terminated the employment of all its union employees. As the Fifth Circuit succinctly analyzed the situation, during the term of the contract, the Carrier terminated the contract by going out of business. Id. at 189. The Fifth Circuit has since limited this case to its facts. See Railway Express Agency v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 437 F.2d 388, 393 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919, 91 S.Ct. 2230, 29 L.Ed.2d 696 (1971); see also Chicago & N.W. Transp., 855 F.2d at 1286 n. 3 (distinguishing Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R. and United Indus. Workers on the same grounds advanced herein). 78 In sum, after consideration of the pertinent provisions of the RLA, the agreements between the parties, the prior practices of the parties and the relevant case law, we agree with the district court that the controversy between the parties was a minor dispute justifying the permanent injunction issued by the district court. 79