Opinion ID: 197576
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Opinions May Be Actionable.

Text: 17 The First Amendment does not inoculate all opinions against the ravages of defamation suits. A statement couched as an opinion that presents or implies the existence of facts which are capable of being proven true or false can be actionable. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2705-06, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1977) (A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.). 2 Thus, a statement normally is not actionable unless it contains an objectively verifiable assertion. 3 Chief Judge Posner has captured the distinction between statements that are actionable and those that are not: 18 A statement of fact is not shielded from an action for defamation by being prefaced with the words 'in my opinion,' but if it is plain that the speaker is expressing a subjective view, an interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise, rather than claiming to be in possession of objectively verifiable facts, the statement is not actionable. 19 Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1227 (7th Cir.1993). 20 The Milkovich Court was careful not to discard the baby with the bath water: while leaving some statements of opinion exposed, the Court reaffirmed the protection long afforded to imaginative expression and rhetorical hyperbole. 497 U.S. at 17, 20, 110 S.Ct. at 2704-05, 2706-07. Thus, the First Amendment prohibits defamation actions based on loose, figurative language that no reasonable person would believe presented facts. See, e.g., Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284-86, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 2781-82, 41 L.Ed.2d 745 (1974) (holding that use of the word traitor to define a worker who crossed a picket line was not actionable); Greenbelt Co-op. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 1541-42, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970) (holding that a newspaper's characterization of a developer's negotiating position as blackmail was not defamatory; the word was simply an epithet and, under the circumstances, did not suggest commission of a crime); Phantom Touring, 953 F.2d at 728 (calling a play a rip-off, a fraud, a scandal, a snake-oil job was mere hyperbole and, thus, constitutionally protected). 21 The First Amendment's shielding of figurative language reflects the reality that exaggeration and non-literal commentary have become an integral part of social discourse. For better or worse, our society has long since passed the stage at which the use of the word bastard would occasion an investigation into the target's lineage or the cry you pig would prompt a probe for a porcine pedigree. Hyperbole is very much the coin of the modern realm. In extending full constitutional protection to this category of speech, the Milkovich Court recognized the need to segregate casually used words, no matter how tastelessly couched, from fact-based accusations. 22