Opinion ID: 738887
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hardship to Enriques

Text: 5 Enriques offered evidence to show that deportation would (1) condemn him to poverty, (2) separate him from his child, (3) separate him from the mother of his child, and (4) expose him to political violence in the Philippines. The BIA properly addressed each of the first three claims and therefore did not abuse its discretion with respect to these claims. Because it did not address the fourth claim, however, the BIA abused its discretion. 6 First, the BIA properly addressed Enriques' claim that deportation would cause him economic hardship. According to Enriques, he is now paid $400 a week (presumably more than he would make in the Philippines), he gives much of his income to his parents, child, and siblings, he has no assets in the Philippines, and he has a Visa Card debt that he would become unable to pay on Philippine wages. The BIA considered this evidence, but concluded that Enriques' economic hardship would not be extreme because it would be no more than the common result of deportation. This was not an abuse of discretion. See Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390, 392 (9th Cir.1996) (common economic results of deportation not extreme). To be extreme, economic hardship must either lead to additional personal hardships, Tukhowinich, 64 F.3d at 463 (frustration of desire to support family), or be exceptionally severe, Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir.1981) (complete inability to find job). 7 Second, the BIA squarely addressed Enriques' claim that separation from his child would cause him extreme hardship. It is true that [t]he most important single [hardship] factor may be the separation of the alien from family, Mejia-Carrillo v. INS, 656 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir.1981); see Gutierrez-Centeno v. INS, 99 F.3d 1529, 1533 (9th Cir.1996), and that when a parent has argued that separation will cause him hardship, hardship to the parent resulting from the separation ... must be considered on a case by case basis. Cerrillo-Perez v. INS, 809 F.2d 1419, 1426 (9th Cir.1987). Enriques, however, did not offer specific evidence to show that separation from his child would cause him extreme hardship: rather, he testified only that he lives with his child and that he doesn't want to leave his child. Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by finding that this separation would not cause Enriques extreme hardship. Id. (BIA need not find hardship unless alien shows more than mere existence of a child). 8 Third, the BIA properly considered Enriques' contention that separation from the mother of his child would cause him extreme hardship. Again, Enriques offered hardly any evidence to show that this separation would cause him hardship, testifying only that he lives with the mother of his child, that he plans to marry her after resolving his immigration status, that he doesn't want to leave her, and that she won't go to the Philippines with him because she has an immigration case pending and wants to stay in America. Having considered this evidence, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by finding that severance of this relationship would not cause extreme hardship. While severance of a family-type relationship can sometimes amount to extreme hardship, Contreras-Buenfil v. INS, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir.1983) (separation from domestic partner), Enriques did not offer any specific evidence showing that separation would cause him extreme hardship in this case.