Opinion ID: 212239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applicability of Section 4A1.2(c)(1) to Driving While Impaired Offenses

Text: Read as a whole, Application Note 5 to section 4A1.2(c) is ambiguous. It can mean that, like felonies, driving while ability impaired sentences are always counted, without possibility of exception. That reading renders the second sentence of the Application Note meaningless. It can also be read as setting forth the direction that driving while ability impaired sentences must not be treated as minor traffic infractions or local ordinance violations and excluded under section 4A1.2(c)(2). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the second reading is correct. The first sentence of Application Note 5 provides that: Convictions for driving while intoxicated or under the influence... are counted. Both parties implicitly ask us to read additional language into that sentence. The government would have us interpret it to mean: Convictions for driving while intoxicated or under the influence ... are counted [without exception]. Gonzalez-Rivera would have us interpret it to mean: Convictions for driving while intoxicated or under the influence... are counted [unless an exception applies]. The essential difference between these two views is that the government wants driving while impaired convictions treated like felonies (counted without exception) and Gonzalez-Rivera wants such convictions treated like all other misdemeanors and petty offenses (counted unless an exception applies). We cannot accept the government's interpretation of Application Note 5 for two reasons. First, we reject the government's reading because it is inconsistent with the text of the Guideline section, while the defendant's reading is not. The Supreme Court has noted that Sentencing Guidelines commentary explains the guidelines and provides concrete guidance as to how even unambiguous guidelines are to be applied in practice. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993). There is no question that the interpretations of the guidelines contained in the commentary represent the most accurate indications of how the Commission deems that the guidelines should be applied because [t]he Commission, after all, drafts the guidelines as well as the commentary. Id. at 45, 113 S.Ct. 1913. However, commentary is not binding in all instances, including if it is inconsistent with the Guideline section it interprets. Id. at 43, 113 S.Ct. 1913. The government's reading of Application Note 5 is that it removes DWAI offenses from the category of misdemeanor and petty offenses, where DWAI would appear to reside on the face of section 4A1.2(c), and creates a new category of alcohol-related driving offenses that, like felonies, are always counted. However, in the absence of Application Note 5, it would be plainly inconsistent with section 4A1.2(c) to argue that DWAI offenses, although they are misdemeanor [or] petty offenses, are always counted and can never fit within the exclusion explicitly provided in section 4A1.2(c)(1). We simply see no part of the Guideline section, ambiguous or unambiguous, that is consistent with the government's interpretation of Application Note 5. The defendant's reading, on the other hand, interprets Application Note 5 to recognize that DWAI offenses are countedlike all other misdemeanor and petty offenses that are counted unless an exception provided in section 4A1.2(c)(1) appliesand to further provide that the minor traffic infraction exception is not available. This reading, unlike the government's, presents no conflict with the text of the Guideline section and, therefore, pursuant to Stinson, remains the most accurate indication of how to apply the Guideline. 508 U.S. at 45, 113 S.Ct. 1913. Second, we cannot accept the government's reading of Application Note 5 because it completely ignores the existence and effect of the second sentence of the Application Note. That sentence provides: Such offenses are not minor traffic infractions within the meaning of § 4A1.2(c). If driving while impaired sentences were counted without exception, it would be unnecessary to identify one of the potential exceptions and eliminate it. Thus, the government's reading of the Application Note renders the second sentence entirely superfluous. Accordingly, that interpretation violates the cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31, 122 S.Ct. 441, 151 L.Ed.2d 339 (2001) (internal quotations omitted); United States v. Savin, 349 F.3d 27, 35-36 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that traditional principles of statutory construction apply to the Sentencing Guidelines and its interpretive or explanatory commentary). Interpreted as the defendant urges, section 4A1.2(c) ensures that, if driving while impaired offenses are similar to any offenses listed in section 4A1.2(c)(1), the seriousness of the conduct in each individual case will determine whether the sentence actually counts. The exception in section 4A1.2(c)(1) takes the severity of the sentence into account in determining whether it is counted, while the exception in section 4A1.2(c)(2) does not. If the conduct of conviction was serious enough to warrant a sentence of more than a year of probation or at least thirty days in prison, then the section 4A1.2(c)(1) exception will not apply. If the section 4A1.2(c)(2) exception were potentially availablewhich all agree Application Note 5 precludesthen regardless of the severity of the sentence, a driving while impaired conviction held to be similar to an offense listed in section 4A1.2(c)(2) would not be counted. Had the Sentencing Commission wanted to prohibit the potential application of section 4A1.2(c)(1) to driving while ability impaired convictions, it could simply have said so. It did not. Application Note 5 does not say that driving while ability impaired convictions are always counted. Nor did the Sentencing Commission amend the second sentence of Application Note 5 by adding a citation to section 4A1.2(c)(1) when it amended the subsection to include careless or reckless driving as a listed offense. [3] In short, we see nothing in the text of the Guideline or in the Application Note to suggest that driving while ability impaired sentences cannot be excluded from the criminal history calculation if they are similar to careless or reckless driving and if the other provisions of section 4A1.2(c)(1) do not preclude exemption. Nor do our prior decisions require a different result. Indeed, the question whether a driving while impaired conviction can qualify for exemption from counting under section 4A1.2(c)(1) is an issue of first impression in this Circuit. Although one of our decisions contains fairly sweeping statements about the meaning of Application Note 5, those statements are merely dicta. Thus, in Jakobetz, we wrote: The commission's decision to count prior DWI convictions and related offenses like Jakobetz's DWAI charge reflects the commission's determination that DWI offenses are of sufficient gravity to merit inclusion in the defendant's criminal history, however they might be classified under state law. 955 F.2d at 806. That statement does not bear on the narrow issue raised by Jakobetz, which was whether the DWAI conviction constituted a `minor traffic infraction' inappropriate for consideration under the guidelines. Id. at 805. Accordingly, we do not read Jakobetz as having decided the issue raised by this appeal. Similarly, the two other decisions of this court relied upon by the government fail to hold anything more than that a driving while ability impaired conviction is not a minor traffic infraction within the meaning of section 4A1.2(c)(2) and therefore must be counted like any other misdemeanor or petty offense. [4] See Loeb, 45 F.3d at 722 (Because Loeb's conviction for driving while his ability was impaired falls within the applicable time period and is not a minor traffic infraction, we find that the district court properly counted it towards his criminal history calculus.) (citation omitted); Moore, 968 F.2d at 225 (Because Donahue's DWAI convictions are not `minor traffic infractions' under the Guidelines, they should have been taken into account in determining Donahue's Criminal History Category.). We find nothing in the text of section 4A1.2(c), Application Note 5 to that section, or our prior decisions that precludes consideration of a conviction for driving while ability impaired against the criteria set forth in section 4A1.2(c)(1). We hold that driving while ability impaired convictions should be treated like any other misdemeanor or petty offense, except that they cannot be exempted under section 4A1.2(c)(2). Thus, because Gonzalez-Rivera's conviction was not a felony, the District Court erred by failing to apply section 4A1.2(c)(1) when calculating Gonzalez-Rivera's criminal history category.