Opinion ID: 855855
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Per Diem Penalty

Text: It is well established that where a coercive civil contempt sanction is imposed, the contemner must have the opportunity to purge himself or herself of contempt by complying with the relevant court order. Robinson, 166 W. Va. at 670, 276 S.E.2d at 818; Westinghouse, 648 F.2d at 651; see also Slauenwhite v. Slauenwhite, 679 A.2d 93, 94 (Me. 1996); Ohio Dept. Of Taxation v. Kunkle, 903 N.E.2d 692, 696 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). It is often said, somewhat literally in the case of imprisonment and metaphorically in the case of a monetary sanction, that the contemner “has the keys to the cell in his or her own hands.” In re Marriage of Tatham, 688 N.E.2d 864, 871 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997); see also 26 Varley v. Varley, 934 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (to same effect). Petitioner claims that her contempt cannot be classified as civil in nature because the nunc pro tunc imposition of a $50.00 per diem sanction did not allow her to purge herself of the contempt, since the time for purging had already elapsed at the time the sanction was imposed. See State Farm, 188 W. Va. at 632, 425 S.E.2d at 587 (“a civil contempt sanction that sets monetary penalties retroactively before the hearing on contempt for failure to comply with a discovery order cannot be enforced.”). We agree, although only with respect to that portion of the fine that imposed daily penalties from October 28, 2008, the date on which the mental hygiene commissioner orally recommended that the petitioner be held in contempt, to August 25, 2010, the date on which the circuit court entered its order of contempt and set the $50.00 per day penalty. The whole purpose of a prospective fine is to coerce obedience to a lawful order of the circuit court, by giving the contemner the “power to avoid any penalty” by complying with the order. Penfield Co. v. S.E.C., 330 U.S. 585, 590 (1947). In this case, the circuit court retroactively imposed a prospective fine, meaning that it was not prospective at all for the period beginning October 28, 2008, and ending on August 25, 2010. The retroactive fine was not a “coercive sanction[] to compel the contemnor to do what the law made it [her] duty to do . . . ,” and was therefore not remedial; it was punitive. Id.; see also 27 State Farm, 188 W. Va. at 632, 425 S.E.2d at 587 (“impos[ition of] a monetary fine for conduct which occurred before the plaintiff was found in contempt of the court’s discovery order, [is] a sanction which smacks of a criminal penalty, rather than a coercive civil penalty which can be purged upon compliance with the discovery order.”).18 It is not clear from the petitioner’s brief whether she is contesting the fine insofar as it actually did operate prospectively, i.e., from August 25, 2010, to June 11, 2011, the date on which Frieda died. However, there can be no serious question that from August 25, 2010, forward, the fine was civil in nature and entirely proper as a sanction pursuant to this Court’s decision in State Farm: it operated to coerce Cordelia’s compliance with the circuit court’s orders, and Cordelia could have avoided it completely by promptly turning over the accounting of Frieda’s assets, Frieda’s physical property, and Frieda’s will. “A monetary per diem penalty is permissible where it is set prospectively from the date of the contempt order as a means of ensuring compliance with the underlying discovery order.” Syl. Pt. 6, in part, State Farm, 188 W. Va. at 632, 425 S.E.2d at 587. In light of the foregoing, we reaffirm the continuing vitality of the law enunciated 18 It is of no moment that the mental hygiene commissioner had orally found Cordelia to be in contempt two years before the circuit court entered its contempt order. The commissioner did not have contempt power; rather, she had the power to make findings and recommendations, which could then be accepted or rejected by the court. 28 in State Farm, which held that a per diem penalty is a permissible civil contempt sanction in a case where a litigant has refused to obey an order of the court, where the fine is set prospectively from the date of the order of contempt, and where the contemner has the ability to purge himself or herself by complying with the order. However, “[a] civil contempt sanction that sets monetary penalties retroactively before the hearing on contempt for failure to comply with a discovery order cannot be enforced.” Syl. Pt. 6, in part, State Farm, 188 W. Va. at 632, 425 S.E.2d at 587. Applying these principles to the case at bar, that portion of the per diem penalty covering the period of time from October 28, 2008, to August 25, 2010, the date of entry of the circuit court’s order of contempt, was impermissible as it “smacks of a criminal penalty, rather than a coercive civil penalty which can be purged upon compliance[.]” State Farm, 188 W. Va. at 632, 425 S.E.2d at 587. That portion of the per diem penalty which was prospective from August 25, 2010, to June 11, 2011, the date of Frieda’s death, was a permissible civil contempt penalty, as the contemner could have purged herself at any time after August 25, 2010, and thus avoided the penalty.