Opinion ID: 786967
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The district court had authority to issue the Standing Order.

Text: 50 The district court's authority to issue the Standing Order derives from two sources. First, viewing the statute in the light of general principles of statutory interpretation, we conclude that Congress' imposition of the reporting requirement implies a corresponding grant of sufficient power to authorize the Standing Order. Second, viewing the statutory requirement as part of the sentencing process in each criminal case, we conclude that the district court's inherent power to regulate the practice of litigants before it includes the authority to require a party to prepare and file documents like the sentencing reports. 51 1. By imposing a duty, § 994(w)(1) impliedly granted district courts the power to take steps reasonably necessary to comply with the duty. 52 When Congress requires a governmental body to take a specified action, the statute implicitly includes the authority for the governmental body to accomplish that statutory directive in a reasonable manner. Where a statute confers powers or duties in general terms, all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make such legislation effective are included by implication. 2B Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction 388, § 55.04 (6th ed.2000). For example, we have held that the statutory duty of the United States Attorney to prosecute for all offenses against the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 547(1), implies the authority to make plea agreements incidental to prosecution. Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir.1994). To similar effect, see United States v. Jones, 204 F.2d 745, 754 (7th Cir.1953) (A general grant of power, unaccompanied by definite directions as to how the power is to be exercised, implies the right to employ means and methods necessary to comply with statutory requirements.). The same principle has been applied in construing the scope of statutory authority given to executive-branch entities. See, e.g., In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 776-77, 88 S.Ct. 1344, 20 L.Ed.2d 312 (1968) (noting that the width of administrative authority must be considered in the light of the purposes for which it is conferred and that Congress is presumed to give authority adequate to achieve those purposes with reasonable effectiveness). 53 We hold that, under the circumstances presented in this case, demanding the assistance of the litigating parties can be considered a reasonably necessary means for the chief judge to ensure that the sentencing courts promptly submit full and accurate sentencing reports. The special circumstances found in the District of Montana — with its three active judges sitting in five separate divisions — pose special challenges for complying with the reporting requirement. By altering the reporting requirement in 2003 to require each chief judge to ensure that the reports were submitted completely and on time, Congress suggested that chief judges are to have some flexibility in developing a system for submitting the reports — indeed, the Act's text echoes the similar suggestion in the 1997 Memorandum of Understanding. As noted, that Memorandum expressly contemplated that a chief judge's system for submitting the documents could include the participation, and even the direct submission of documents, by entities such as the United States Attorney's Office. 54 In sum, § 994(w)(1) impliedly authorized the Standing Order. 55 2. The Standing Order also was permissible as a regulation of judicial proceedings. 56 The district court's power to issue the Standing Order came not only from the authority implied by the statute, but also from the court's inherent authority to regulate the practice of litigants before it. 57 Courts have (at least in the absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312, 40 S.Ct. 543, 64 L.Ed. 919 (1920). The power acknowledged by the Court in Peterson has been described as the authority to take actions necessary only in the practical sense of being useful. Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 563 (3d Cir.1985) (en banc). This inherent authority has been acknowledged explicitly by Congress in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57(b), among other provisions. Rule 57(b) gives district courts power to regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, these rules, and the local rules of the district. The advisory committee's notes to Rule 57(b) contemplate that courts may exercise this authority by issuing standing orders of general application. Fed. R.Crim.P. 57(b), advisory committee's notes (1995 amends.). 17 58 The government argues that citation to the court's case management authority is inapposite because the reporting requirement of § 994(w)(1) is not part of a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of rights. In the government's view, the court's power to regulate practice can encompass only those requirements that will assist the court in its core adjudicatory functions. Because the submission of sentencing reports is part of the court's monitoring or policymaking function, the government contends, the delegation of the duty to compile those reports is not within the court's power to regulate practice. We are not persuaded. 59 The reporting requirement is reasonably incidental to the core judicial function of sentencing individual defendants and, therefore, is part of a judicial proceeding in which courts enjoy their usual power to regulate practice. Ordering the United States Attorney to compile the contents of sentencing reports falls within the court's broad authority to regulate practice. 60 In regulating practice, courts commonly and permissibly compel assistance from litigants that is essentially clerical in nature and is only loosely related to the court's core adjudicatory functions. And district courts regularly demand this assistance in order to complete tasks that the courts themselves are required to accomplish. For example, district courts are required to make findings of fact in civil cases. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Yet, we have recognized that district courts have the power to, and commonly do, order a party to prepare the written statement of those findings. See, e.g., Stead Motors of Walnut Creek v. Auto. Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 1204 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (recognizing the all too commonplace practice of district judges to adopt findings prepared by the prevailing party); Indus. Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchem. Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir.1970) (same). Indeed, some courts decide a case and then order the prevailing party to prepare and submit findings of fact. See 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 530, § 2578 (1995). Such written findings do not help the judge decide the facts, but are an after-the-fact administrative or ministerial chore imposed on the party. 18 Here, the United States Attorney represents the federal government, which is a party to each federal criminal proceeding. 61 Other administrative obligations that our own court imposes on the United States Attorney are even further removed from our core function of deciding a case. See, e.g., Ninth Circuit General Order 2.3(b) (requiring the United States Attorney to serve default orders on defendants); id. 12.8 (requiring the United States Attorney to deliver returned mail to prisoners). Furthermore, these obligations apply both before and after issuance of a disposition. 62 It is true that the Supreme Court has characterized the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 as a delegation to the judicial branch of nonadjudicatory functions. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 388-89, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989). 19 However, the Court went on to explain that the judiciary can be compelled to perform nonadjudicatory duties and functions, but only if they are closely related to the central mission of the judicial branch. Id. at 389, 109 S.Ct. 647. The Court gave several examples of duties and functions permissibly delegated to Article III courts that are not necessarily or directly connected to adversarial proceedings in a trial or appellate court. Id. at 389 n. 16, 109 S.Ct. 647. These functions included supervising grand juries, participating in the issuance of search warrants, and reviewing wiretap warrant applications. Id. 63 These examples show that a court retains its authority to manage the proceedings before it even when it is not engaged directly in adversarial or adjudicatory proceedings. For instance, we have acknowledged that, as part of their supervision of grand jury proceedings, district courts continue to possess the inherent ability ... to formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or Congress to supervise the administration of justice, so long as those rules do not contravene or circumvent other federal statutes or rules. United States v. Larrazolo, 869 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir.1989), overruled on other grounds by Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799-800, 109 S.Ct. 1494, 103 L.Ed.2d 879 (1989); see also United States v. Armstrong, 781 F.2d 700, 703 (9th Cir.1986) (When a grand jury witness refuses to testify, civil contempt sanctions can be imposed to coerce compliance with the court's order, and penalties for criminal contempt can be assessed to punish the witness' disobedient conduct.). 64 In a sense, Congress grafted the requirements of § 994(w)(1) onto the sentencing phase of each criminal proceeding in district court. When judges are assigned tasks falling outside the precise limits of their adjudicatory functions, they are not — and should not be — stripped of their power to manage the proceedings, at least when the assigned task is one closely connected to each judicial proceeding. The district court's Standing Order was a permissible method of managing this aspect of the criminal proceedings before it. 65 Contrary to the government's arguments, it does not follow from our conclusion that there is no limit to what a district court can require of a litigant in connection with a particular case. Section 994(w)(1) itself provides the limit to the authority we recognize here. That is, a district court can compel the assistance of litigants to complete tasks the court is required to complete in connection with a judicial proceeding. Because Congress chose to attach the reporting requirement to the conclusion of each criminal proceeding, the reporting requirement falls within the district court's authority to manage those proceedings and does not implicate the separation-of-powers doctrine. Indeed, interpreting the reporting requirement in this way allows us to avoid another constitutional concern. 66