Opinion ID: 2386307
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Masingo

Text: Assuming that the trial court properly sustained Travelers' right to part of the money recovered from Dodson, MEBA argues that it erred in awarding Travelers any of the funds recouped from Masingo. [7] Citing paragraph 3 of the agreement, MEBA asserts that Travelers ma[de] the aforesaid [settlement] payment strictly to cover severance losses caused by DeFries, Dodson and Daulley, not by reason of . . . and pursuant to any wrongdoing by Masingo. It points further to the facts (i) that, unlike the post-agreement recoveries from those officials, MEBA settled with and released its claims against Masingo months before entering the agreement with Travelers; and (ii) that neither in its informal demands nor in its complaint did Travelers request reimbursement from the Masingo recovery. At the least, MEBA asserts, these facts necessitate a trial on the issue of whether Masingo was within the intended scope of the assignment of claims to Travelers. Travelers responds that, in citing the release provision, MEBA elides the critical language that MEBA assigned to Travelers all claims for the amount of the aforeside payment which it may have against its officers, officials, and employees and against any other parties who acted in concert therewith (emphasis added) words broadly embracing all co-conspirators, named or unnamed in the agreement, in Travelers' right to reimbursement. Travelers asserts that the original complaint did not reference the Masingo recovery only because it did not learn of the recovery until MEBA revealed that fact in its answers to interrogatories. Moreover, it argues that MEBA waived the claim of inapplication of the agreement to Masingo by failing to raise it until after the trial judge granted summary judgment. Whether the settlement agreement entitled Travelers to reimbursement from the Masingo recovery is not a question readily answered on summary judgment. Except as limited by paragraph 4, the assignment of rights does appear to release to Travelers all claims MEBA has against anyone acting in concert to cause the wrongdoing covered by the bond; and in its interrogatory answer MEBA implicitly acknowledged Masingo to be among those wrongdoers. At the same time, however, the claims transferred to Travelers are those MEBA  may have against its officers (emphasis added), and, as MEBA asserts, it released its claims against Masingo by settling with him months before the agreement with Travelers was entered. Moreover, MEBA argues that if the agreement were meant to include the Masingo recovery, there is no reason why he would have been omittedas he wasfrom the sharing formula that left 25% of any recovery to MEBA. [8] We do not reach the merits of that issue, however, because we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to consider it for the first time in MEBA's post-judgment motion for reconsideration. In moving for summary judgment, Travelers had asked for 75% of all monies recovered from the three officials named in the complaint and their co-conspirators. It asserted that MEBA had recovered $438,000 from DeFries, $515,000 from Dodson, and $669,159.19 from the co-conspirators. Citing MEBA's interrogatory answers related to Masingo and Schamann, Travelers stated that when it filed the complaint it was under the belief that [MEBA] had recovered only $515,000 from Dodson, but that [d]uring discovery, [MEBA] revealed that they had also recovered $669,159.19 from co-conspirators. (Interrogatory answers 6 and 7 stated that in the Masingo settlement MEBA had recovered $310,759.48, and in an agreement with Schamann $358,399.71.) Travelers thus claimed entitlement to a share of [MEBA's] recovery from the co-conspirators as well, stating that it would amend its complaint to conform the pleadings to the proof and add this claim to its complaint. In opposing Travelers' motion, MEBA did not address the intended amendment and argument that Masingo was within the scope of the agreement. Although it cited to the by reason of . . . and pursuant to language of paragraph 3, it did so only to rebut Travelers' argument that the excess loss provision of the bond not cover salary losses. If that were so, MEBA said, then Travelers would have no claim to recovered salaries because it had not paid MEBA anything by reason of the salary embezzlement. (Judge Burgess agreed, as we have seen, that Travelers' had no claim against recovered salary losses.) But, importantly, MEBA did not seek to rebut Travelers' assertion that whatever rights it had against DeFries, Dodson and Daulley it also had against Masingo, requiring only formal amendment of the complaint. MEBA did not argue that, regardless of the rights assigned as to those wrongdoers, the Masingo recovery was outside the scope of the agreementas shown by the prior conclusion of the Masingo settlement, the absence of informal or formal demand for part of that recovery, or other facts. On this issue, MEBA's response failed the test of Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(e) which states that, [w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this Rule, . . . the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. MEBA raised the issue for the first time in moving for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) or, alternatively, Rule 60(b). Motions under either rule are committed to the broad discretion of the trial judge. See Wallace v. Warehouse Employees Union No. 730, 482 A.2d 801, 810 (D.C.1984) (Rule 59(e)); McMillan v. Choice Healthcare Plan, Inc., 618 A.2d 664, 667 (D.C.1992) (Rule 60(b)). A timely motion asserting that the court committed an error of law is normally treated under Rule 59(e), In re Tyree, 493 A.2d 314, 317 n. 5 (D.C.1985); but one requesting consideration of additional circumstances is properly considered under Rule 60(b). Wallace, 482 A.2d at 804. MEBA contends the trial judge committed legal error in holding Masingo to be within the scope of the agreement, or at least in doing so as a matter of law, but its motion plainly asked the judge to consider new circumstances i.e., the newly-minted claim that the agreement did not include Masingo based on (for example) the timing of MEBA's settlement with him and Travelers' earlier failure to make informal or formal demand for that recovery. Regardless of how MEBA's motion is characterized, neither Rule 59(e) nor Rule 60(b) is designed to enable a party to complete presenting [its] case after the court has ruled against [it]. Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 F.3d 825, 828 (7th Cir.1995). Both rules embody notions of due diligence. 11 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, AND M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2810.1, at 127-28 (1995 ed.) (The Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to . . . raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment); [9] id. § 2857, at 260 (cases applying Rule 60(b) have been unyielding in requiring that a party show good reason for the failure to take appropriate action sooner). MEBA offered the trial judge no reason for its failure to dispute earlier Travelers' claim for belated inclusion of Masingo in its demand for relief. It did not assert, for example, that incomplete discovery had prevented it from asserting facts tending to show that he was outside the reach of the agreement. As Judge Burgess recognized, MEBA's opposition to summary judgment essentially consisted of its own motion for judgment contending as a matter of law that its make-whole right trumped any entitlement to reimbursement that Travelers had. No argument was made that Masingo (or Schamann) was outside the reach of the agreement altogether. In these circumstances, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the post-trial motion. Award of the Masingo severance pay recovery to Travelers was not manifestly erroneous. See WRIGHT, supra, § 2810.1, at 125-26 (Rule 59(e) is available to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice). Moreover, the judge was not required to consider a new argument and new facts that MEBA could not justify failing to present to the court earlier. [10]