Opinion ID: 1457749
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Causation in First and Fourth Amendment Cases After Hartman

Text: To summarize: We hold, first, that to the degree Smiddy I could be understood under our case law to apply to a First Amendment-based retaliatory arrest or prosecution cause of action, Smiddy I is inconsistent with Hartman and cannot stand. In such cases, we will not separately inquire, through application of a presumption or otherwise, into the prosecutor's actual state of mind. Instead, a showing of a retaliatory motive on the part of an official urging prosecution combined with an absence of probable cause supporting the prosecutor's decision will suffice to rebut the presumption of regularity and settle the causation issue. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265, 126 S.Ct. 1695. Second, in any constitutional tort case, including Fourth Amendment-based cases, in which a prosecutor has instigated a prosecution, it is necessary, if not sufficient, that a plaintiff seeking to sue non-prosecutorial officials alleged to be responsible post-complaint for the arrest or prosecution show the absence of probable cause. If that were not so, Smiddy I would be irreconcilable with Hartman. See Miller, 335 F.3d at 900. [14] Third, we do not overrule Smiddy I 's rebuttable presumption approach in the Fourth Amendment context, leaving the question whether it should be overruled for a case in which the answer matters. Instead, we demonstrate that Beck survives summary judgment even if Smiddy I does apply. To implement our approach, we address Beck's First and Fourth Amendment causes of action separately. But, as the causes of action share the common requirement that Beck show that probable cause for his arrest was absent, we first address that issue and hold that probable cause was, indeed, lacking. We next hold that Beck has satisfied Hartman, preserving his First Amendment cause of action, because he has alleged and shown retaliatory animus under two distinct theories, both of which are viable on the present summary judgment record. See Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 470. Turning to the Fourth Amendment cause of action, we observe that the prosecutor, Gaetano, asserted privilege rather than testifying as to whether he felt pressure from the police to make his charging decision and whether he was influenced by the police officers' felony submission. Critical evidence necessary to rebut the Smiddy I presumption of independence is therefore unavailable, and, under the express language of Smiddy I itself, Beck is not required to rebut the presumption of prosecutorial independence. In the absence of the presumption, a rational jury could well conclude that the officers had not met their burden to show an independent intervening cause cuts off [their] tort liability. Smiddy I, 665 F.2d at 267. Beck's Fourth Amendment cause of action therefore also survives.