Opinion ID: 1694753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merits of First Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: The Trust argues that a number of its claims are not based on the defendants' cessation of coal-mining operations in 1989, but rather relate to numerous breaches of the Lease (and other wrongful acts) that occurred more recently than 1989, including many that date back only to 1999 and continue to this date. (Trust's reply brief, p. 4.) Although the Trust states in a footnote to its initial brief that it does not concede that all coal mining ceased on the premises in 1989, it offers no argument in opposition to that fact other than to note its ignorance, which it alleges is caused by the lack of full discovery. In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment, `we utilize the same standard as the trial court in determining whether the evidence before [it] made out a genuine issue of material fact,' Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988), and whether the movant was `entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' Wright v. Wright, 654 So.2d 542 (Ala.1995); Rule 56(c), Ala.R.Civ.P. When the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating such an issue. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989). Evidence is `substantial' if it is of `such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.' Wright, 654 So.2d at 543 (quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989)). Our review is further subject to the caveat that this Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Wilma Corp. v. Fleming Foods of Alabama, Inc., 613 So.2d 359 (Ala.1993); Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So.2d 412, 413 (Ala.1990). Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. 690 So.2d 341, 344 (Ala.1997). The defendants made a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to when coal-mining operations ceased on the leased premises. The Trust did not exercise its option under the last sentence of Rule 56(c)(1), if it contended that that material fact was in dispute, of filing a statement in opposition. It sought no continuance to conduct or to compel discovery. Although the burden had shifted to it to present substantial evidence creating such an issue, 690 So.2d at 344, it submitted no opposing evidence  substantial or otherwise. Thus, for purposes of the application of any statute of limitation the defendants established the undisputed fact that coal-mining operations had ceased on the leased premises after January 1989. Both parties cite AC, Inc. v. Baker, 622 So.2d 331, 335 (Ala.1993), for the proposition that a claim alleging breach of contract must be brought within six years of the date of the breach. (Trust's brief, p. 5; Defendants' brief, page 26.) The Trust does not dispute the legal proposition asserted by the defendants that there is no discovery rule applicable to a breach-of-contract claim. (Defendants cite Henson v. Celtic Life Insurance Co., 621 So.2d 1268, 1274 (Ala.1993), for the proposition that the discovery rule applies only to fraud claims.) The Trust's breach-of-contract averments were set out in paragraph 19 of its complaint as follows: Defendants failed and neglected to perform in material breach of the Lease by, among other things: failing to pay royalties on coal actually mined, removed, and sold from the Premises; failing to furnish true and correct statements showing the amount, dates, and selling price of coal actually mined, removed, and sold from the Premises; denying [the Trust] access to defendants' books, accounts, sales record, maps and plans for the purpose of verifying the amount and selling price of coal taken from the Premises; refusing, upon written request, to direct third parties to make available all information relating to coal mined from the Premises necessary for those same purposes; and refusing, upon written notice and within sixty (60) days, to correct said material breaches. For the reasons stated, the November 28, 2001, partial summary judgment is due to be affirmed as to the claim that the defendants failed to pay royalties on coal actually mined, removed, and sold from the Premises. The Trust argues, however: If the Defendants are correct in arguing that [the Trust's] claims for nonpayment of royalties are subject to a six year statute of limitations that began running in 1989, [the Trust] may or may not be entitled to recoup the One Hundred Forty-five Thousand ($145,000) Dollars in missing royalties that all evidence suggests was not paid by Defendants as it should have been. But [the Trust] is certainly entitled, for so long as the Lease remains in effect and for so long as Defendants continue to occupy the Premises and exploit the Premises for their own financial gain, to a full accounting of the Defendants' activities on the Premises, to the full production of Defendants' records of their mining activities on the Premises, and to the full production of Defendants' financial records of royalty payments on coal mined from the Premises. (Trust's reply brief, p. 7.) All of the claims of breaches of the lease based on the defendants' alleged failure or refusal to provide information or access to information are dependent upon paragraphs 5 and 6 of the lease. Under paragraph 5, United Land is obligated to provide monthly statements in connection with [a]ll payments of royalties, reflecting various information relating to the computation of royalty, including the exact amount of coal removed during the preceding month. However, also in paragraph 5 [i]t is agreed that Lessee shall not be required to furnish statements for months in which coal is not mined, removed and sold under this Lease. At six-month intervals, the lessee is to furnish maps showing mining progress on the Premises during the previous six months, and ... the results of test holes and coal analysis, if any, for coal mined on the Premises during the previous six months. Paragraph 6 of the lease authorizes the Trust to inspect United Land's books, accounts, sale records, maps and plans for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of coal taken from the Premises, and verifying the selling price of the coal sold. That paragraph also obligates United Land, upon written request from the Trust, to authorize and direct third persons with whom United Land shall have had any dealings with respect to coal mined from the Premises to make available to the Trust all information relating to coal mined from the Premises, as may be reasonably required by [the Trust] to verify or to determine the amount of royalties due to be paid by [United Land] under this lease, or any other matter relating to performance of [United Land's] obligations hereunder. It having been established, for the purposes of our analysis, that no coal was mined, removed, and sold under the lease after January 1989, any breach of the obligations in the lease to provide information or access to information relating to coal mined, removed, and sold from the premises necessarily would have occurred more than six years before the filing of this action. Accordingly, summary judgment based on expiration of the statute of limitation was warranted as to those breach-of-contract claims as well, and the defendants had no duty under the lease to furnish information at later times in the absence of the renewal of coal-mining operations on the leased premises. In its demand for an accounting the Trust asserts that the defendants have failed to provide the necessary information and access to information required by the lease and that an accounting is needed so that the Trust can reconcile the payments received by defendants for coal mined from the Premises, and the royalties paid to the plaintiff on the same. Again, it having been established for the purposes of this appeal that the defendants have not mined any coal from the leased premises since 1989, all statutes of limitation possibly applicable to an accounting for coal taken and sold have expired. Waters v. Cochran, 291 Ala. 610, 285 So.2d 474 (1973). The same is true for the Trust's claim that the defendants have been unjustly enriched by having received royalties and income from coal mined on the premises, which they failed to remit to the Trust. The Trust devotes no argument in its briefs to its claim for rescission; rather, it argues persistently that the lease continues in full force and effect. Matters not argued in brief are deemed waived. Moore v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 849 So.2d 914, 923 (Ala.2002). Accordingly, the Trust has waived any contention that the summary judgment was erroneously entered as to its claim for rescission of the lease. Therefore, the trial court did not err in entering the November 28, 2001, partial summary judgment for the defendants as to all claims except the fraudulent-suppression claim.