Opinion ID: 1093261
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the mississippi speedy trial statute.

Text: MCA § 99-17-1 (Supp. 1987), states: Indictments to be tried within 270 days of arraignment. Unless good cause be shown, and a continuance duly granted by the court, all offenses for which indictments are presented to the court shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy (270) days after the accused has been arraigned. Fisher's arraignment occurred 787 days before the trial in the rape case began. In Nations v. State, 481 So.2d 760, 762 (Miss. 1985), this Court interpreted the speedy trial statute as meaning that a circuit judge's written order of continuance was the equivalent of a judicial determination that good cause existed for granting that continuance and therefore, such a continuance would toll the 270-day time limitation. Nevertheless, Fisher argues that even if the delay was for good cause, the deduction of the 485 days from the 787 leaves 302 days, still in excess of the time period specified in the speedy trial statute. The state replies that by its terms, the order of continuance was to remain in effect until further motions or requests of either the defendant or the state. Fisher never made such a motion; the present case was set for retrial on the district attorney's motion filed January 8, 1986. The trial began 22 days later. We think that because the continuance contained a provision for its own termination by motion, it tolled the statutory period until the motion was made. In short, we hold that the delay did not contravene the Speedy Trial Statute.