Opinion ID: 2638
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Aggravated Felony Finding

Text: Under the INA, [a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated: felony at any time after admission is deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The INA defines aggravated felony to include sexual abuse of a minor. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). [T]he language of the statute yields no clear evidence, however, of congressional intent as to the scope of th[at] phrase, Mugalli, 258 F.3d at 56, so the BIA has invoke[d] . . . as a guide the broad definition of sexual abuse of a minor in 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a), In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991, 995-96 (B.I.A. 1999). According to section 3509, the term `sexual abuse' includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexually explicit conduct or the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form of sexual exploitation of children, or incest with children; sexually explicit conduct is also defined broadly, to include actual or simulated . . . sexual intercourse, including sexual contact in the manner of genitalgenital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oralanal contact, whether between persons of the same or of opposite sex. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a). We have found that the BIA's adoption of § 3509(a) is reasonable, and have accorded it Chevron deference. Mugalli 258 F.3d at 60.
We have adopted a categorical approach to decide whether a crime of conviction fits within the definition of aggravated felony in § 1101(a)(43)(A). Santos v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 323, 325 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam). Under this approach . . . `the singular circumstances of an individual petitioner's crimes should not be considered, and only the minimum criminal conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under a given statute is relevant[.]' Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 204 (2d Cir.2001) (alteration) (quoting Calabresi, J., dissenting in part, in Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 270 (2d Cir.2000)). We have, however, modified this approach in one important respect: When a criminal statute encompasses diverse classes of criminal acts  some of which would categorically be grounds for removal and others of which would not  we have held that [the] statute[] can be considered `divisible'; the agency may then refer[] to the record of conviction for the limited purpose of determining whether the alien's conviction was under the branch of the statute that permits removal. Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44, 48-49 (2d Cir.2003). The record of conviction includes, inter alia, the charging document, a plea agreement, a verdict or judgment of conviction, a record of the sentence, or a plea colloquy transcript. Wala, 511 F.3d at 108 (internal quotation marks omitted). C. Remand is Appropriate To Allow the BIA To Consider Whether James's Statute of Conviction is Divisible In this case, the BIA first note[d] that [this] . . . matter has arisen within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where, according to the BIA, despite the general prohibition against inquiry into the factual circumstances of the crime underlying a removal order, a limited review of the record may be warranted where the statute of conviction is divisible. The BIA then reasoned that, since it is possible for a person to violate New York Penal Law section 260.10 with or without committing a sexual offense, the case law of our Circuit permits inquiry into James's underlying record of conviction. In other words, the IJ and BIA assumed that we would treat section 260.10 as divisible. We have since made clear, however, that with regard to statutes of conviction like James's, the question of divisibility is an open one. Up to this point, we observed recently in Dulcd-Whiteway v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, we have explicitly found statutes divisible only where the removable and non-removable offenses they describe are listed in different subsections or comprise discrete elements of a disjunctive list of proscribed conduct; we have not explicitly queried whether this logic extends to a statute . . . where only one type of generic conduct . . . is proscribed, but an alien can commit the conduct both in ways that would render him removable . . . and in ways that would not. . . . 501 F.3d 116, 126-27 (2d Cir.2007) (emphasis added). The statute in DulaL-Whiteway (proscribing fraud to obtain things valuing over $1,000) is one such a statute. Id. at 126. The statute in this case is another. [4] We further observed in Dulai-Whiteway that there are at least three ways of approaching such a statute  none of which we have explicitly adopted or rejected. We could find[] divisible only those statutes where the alternative means of committing a violation, some of which constitute removable conduct and some of which do not, are enumerated as discrete alternatives. Id. at 127 (emphasis added). Or we could take the position that all statutes of conviction may be considered `divisible' regardless of their structure, so long as they contain an element or elements that could be satisfied either by removable or non-removable conduct. Id. at 128. And somewhere in the middle is a third approach, developed by the Third Circuit, under which a criminal statute may be considered divisible if either (1) the statute of conviction is phrased in the disjunctive or divided into subsections such that some variations of the crime of conviction meet the aggravated-felony requisites and others do not, or (2) the relevant removability provision invite[s] inquiry into the facts underlying the conviction at issue. Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 161, 162 (3d Cir.2004). [5] Neither Supreme Court nor Second Circuit precedent, we concluded in Dulal-Whiteway, compels a conclusion one way or the other. 501 F.3d at 127. [6] And no case since Dulal-Whiteway has provided greater guidance as to how we would treat a statute like New York Penal Law section 260.10. Accordingly, the IJ and BIA based their decision on an incorrect premise. This is not a case in which we are clearly required to remand to the BIA for an initial decision on the divisibility of James's statute of conviction, for the BIA is not charged with the administration of this law. See, e.g., INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (Generally speaking, a court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands.); Ming Lam Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d 105, 112-13 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that the BIA is not charged with the administration of [state or federal criminal laws]); Michel, 206 F.3d at 262([C]ourts owe no deference to an agency's interpretation of state or federal criminal laws, because the agency is not charged with the administration of such laws.). Nevertheless, we deem it the wiser and more prudent course to give the BIA an opportunity to consider, in the first instance and in light of our recent pronouncements on this issue, whether New York Penal Law section 260.10 should properly be treated as divisible (thereby allowing inquiry into the facts underlying the conviction), or, rather, whether the categorical approach that we have applied in other cases precludes inquiry into the singular circumstances of James's crime. [7] D. Parameters for Consideration of James's Record of Conviction James has also argued on appeal that after deeming his statute of conviction divisible, the BIA impermissibly considered the details of the criminal complaint and the facts admitted in his plea minutes to determine whether he was convicted of an aggravated felony, even though he neither pleaded guilty to, nor was convicted of, the charge set out in the original complaint. We need not reach the merits of this argument, since we are remanding this case to allow the BIA to assess the divisibility of James's statute of conviction. But we note, for purposes of judicial economy, that several decisions of our Court  bearing directly on this issue  have come down since the BIA's decision in this case. In Dulal-Whiteway, the petitioner was convicted of fraud and found removable on the basis of a restitution order attributing to him $20,824.09 in losses. 501 F.3d at 119. We vacated the removal order. Breaking new ground, we held that the BIA, in determining whether an alien is removable based on a conviction for an offense set forth in the INA, may rely only upon information appearing in the record of conviction that would be permissible under the Taylor-Shepard approach in the sentencing context. Id. at 131. That is, [f]or convictions following a plea, the BIA may rely only upon facts to which a defendant actually and necessarily pleaded in order to establish the elements of the offense, as indicated by a charging document, written plea agreement, or plea colloquy transcript. Id. Since Dulal's record of conviction did not establish that his crime involved loss over $10,000, and since the amount of loss indicated in the restitution order was not necessarily limited to the admissions in [Dulal's] plea or to the elements alleged, the order of removal was improper. Id. at 134. [8] We reached a similar result in Wala, where the BIA determined that the petitioner had committed a crime involving moral turpitude (and was therefore removable) because, the BIA found, he intended to commit a permanent taking. 511 F.3d at 104-05. We noted that the petitioner had admitted to taking various items from the victim's house, thereby establishing the elements of burglary with intent to commit a larceny under Connecticut law, but that he had not admitted to taking these items with the intent to appropriate them permanently. Id. at 109. We therefore vacated the removal order. [A]lthough it may have been reasonable for the BIA to infer that Wala intended permanently to keep the items he admitted taking, we explained, the modified categorical approach does not permit the BIA to draw inferences of this kind. Id. Finally, in the sentencing context, which has long informed our jurisprudence regarding aggravated felony findings under the INA, we recently remanded a case because it was unclear to what extent the District Court based its sentencing enhancement (for a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor) on unsubstantiated charged conduct. See United States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694, 700-01 (2d Cir.2007). We reminded the District Court that [f]actual matters considered as a basis for sentence must have some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation, and that an indictment is not meant to serve an evidentiary function. Its primary purpose is to acquaint the defendant with the specific crime with which he is charged. . . . Id. at 701 (internal quotations marks omitted) (alteration in original). In this case, the IJ and BIA relied upon a factual allegation in the charging instrument  that James had sexual intercourse with a sixteen-year-old when he was twenty-two  to conclude that James was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor. But this factual allegation was not actually and necessarily pleaded to in order to establish the elements of endangering the welfare of a child. Dulah-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 131. New York Penal Law section 260.10 does not require engagement in sexual intercourse, see People v. Chase, 186 Misc.2d 487, 720 N.Y.S.2d 707, 708 (2d Dep't 2000), and James did not so plead; he admitted to having had sexual contact with a minor. Sexual contact does, of course, fall within the broad definition of sexual abuse that the BIA has adopted. See Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. At 996-97 (invoking 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a) as a guide in defining sexual abuse); 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8), (9) (defining sexual abuse to include sexually explicit conduct, and sexually explicit conduct to include sexual contact). But it is by no means clear that admitting to sexual contact with a minor under New York law would be enough to establish sexual abuse of a minor under the INA. For one thing, New York law has defined sexual contact to include any touching, whether by the victim or by the actor, of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person not married to the actor for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party. N.Y. Penal Law § 130. Thus, under New York law, a kiss on the mouth constitutes sexual contact. See People v. Rondon, 152 Misc.2d 1018, 579 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320-21 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1992) ([T]his court holds that a kiss on the mouth without the insertion of a tongue can be considered a touching of an intimate part, constituting the essential element of sexual abuse.); see also People v. Morbelli, 144 Misc.2d 482, 544 N.Y.S.2d 442, 445-46 (N.Y.Crim.Ct. 1989) (contact with the leg); People v. Belfrom, 124 Misc.2d 185, 475 N.Y.S.2d 978, 980-81 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1984) (contact with the navel). This definition is broader than that of the federal statute from which the BIA has drawn guidance. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(9)(A) ([S]exual contact means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify sexual desire of any person.). For another thing, New York law does not categorize as criminal sexual conduct sexual contact between persons of the ages that James and his victim we're at the time of the offense. And while such contact may result in a conviction for Endangering of the Welfare of a Child, that crime is not listed in the chapter of New York's penal code dealing with sex offenses. See N.Y. Penal Law § 130, et seq. For this reason, James's statute of conviction is distinguishable from the Connecticut statute that we considered in Santos. See Santos, 436 F.3d at 325 (holding that where the petitioner pleaded guilty to violating a statute that criminalizes contact with the intimate parts of a child under the age of sixteen in a sexual and indecent manner, his conviction was one of sexual abuse of a minor under the INA). In sum, should the BIA conclude that James's statute of conviction is divisible and that consultation of James's record of conviction is therefore appropriate, we urge the BIA to adhere to the principles we have set forth in Dulal-Whiteway, Wala, and Juwa. And should the BIA take into account James's admission of sexual contact with a minor, we encourage the BIA to consider carefully what that term means under New York law.