Opinion ID: 857090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Due Process Violation for Sentencing

Text: Warren next argues that the state trial court violated his due process rights by considering his attempted plea withdrawal against him. Specifically, the court characterized Warren as attempting to “weasel out of” his plea bargain. (Appellant’s Br. at 43.) The government urges us to refrain from considering this claim because the Wisconsin state courts held that it was procedurally defaulted. (Appellee’s Br. at 59); (R. 21-2 at 7). Warren counters by arguing that, if the claim has merit, Bowe’s ineffective assistance, for failing to raise the claim on direct appeal, could potentially excuse his procedural default. (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 18) (citing Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012)). 24 No. 12-1148 We note first that Warren has certainly defaulted this argument by failing to comply with proper Wisconsin procedure. See Farmer v. Litscher, 303 F.3d 840, 846 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A federal court will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the state-court decision rests on a state procedural ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment”); State v. EscalonaNaranjo, 517 N.W.2d 157, 162 (Wis. 1994) (claims that the defendant failed to raise may not be the basis for postconviction relief, unless the court determines that there was a “sufficient reason” for the failure). Because we must consider the possibility of excuse, though, we take up the merits of Warren’s due process argument here and find that the claim lacks merit. Again, no state court considered the merits of Warren’s argument, so we review the issue de novo. Cone, 556 U.S. at 472. A defendant is entitled to have sentencing determinations made based on reliable evidence rather than speculation or unfounded allegations. See, e.g., United States v. England, 555 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2009). Because the judge is the factfinder at sentencing, however, he may draw reasonable conclusions about the testimony and evidence presented. United States v. Hankton, 432 F.3d 779, 786 n.14 (7th Cir. 2005). The “key inquiry” posed by a due process challenge to a sentencing determination is whether the court’s findings “were sufficiently based on reliable evidence to satisfy due process, or if they amount to speculation.” England, 555 F.3d at 622 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Evidence will satisfy the reliability requirement if it bears sufficient No. 12-1148 25 indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” Id. (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).3 During sentencing, while discussing whether Warren accepted responsibility for his crimes, the state trial court judge made the following remark: So far as taking responsibility is concerned, it seems to be whatever suits you and whatever is in your best interest at the time. And it appeared a week or two ago it was in your best interest to try to weasel out of this plea, so-to-speak, and not take responsibility because you didn’t really like the recommendation of the presentence writer. (R. 21-14 at 12.) Warren characterizes this as an instance where the court relied on an incorrect assumption to determine the sentence, an error that might warrant overturning the sentence. We think this misconstrues the record, and as such, is not a basis for granting Warren’s petition. The court’s comment that Warren was trying to “weasel out of” his no contest plea came during the court’s appraisal of Warren’s acceptance of responsi- 3 The district court interpreted Warren’s pro se petition to implicate judicial bias. Warren, 2011 WL 6016630, at  (discussing Franklin v. McCaughtry, 398 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2005)). Warren has clarified on appeal that his due process concern relates to reliability, and, accordingly, we address that argument. 26 No. 12-1148 bility. Read in that context, we think the court was attempting to explain, if perhaps inartfully, why it did not credit the reliability of Warren’s expressions of remorse. Warren’s statements of acceptance flatly contradicted the arguments he made to the court in attempting to withdraw his plea. This, understandably, caused the court to be skeptical of both Warren’s purported acceptance of responsibility as well as his motives for attempting to withdraw the plea. When we are called upon to review a federal district court’s appraisal of a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, we give great deference to the trial court. See United States v. Gilbertson, 435 F.3d 790, 798-99 (7th Cir. 2006). We do so because the trial judge is uniquely posi- tioned to assess the credibility of the defendant before her. See United States v. Cunningham, 103 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 1996). Such deference is also appropriate here. The state trial judge was in a much better position to gauge whether Warren was “motivated by genuine acceptance of responsibility or by a self-serving desire to minimize his own punishment,” a task that appellate judges are “ill-equipped” to carry out. Id. The incon- sistency between Warren’s argument to withdraw his plea and his ostensible acceptance of responsibility is a sufficient indicium of reliability to satisfy due process. Because this claim lacks merit, Bowe could not have been ineffective for failing to raise it, and Warren’s procedural default in the state court is not excused. No. 12-1148 27