Opinion ID: 222036
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: The parties disagree about the correct standard of review for this claim. Northridge argues that our review should be de novo, because we are reviewing the district court's denial of a motion to set aside an allegedly void judgment under Rule 60(b)(4). Plymouth contends that entering into a consent judgment is a voluntary dismissal, so our review should be for abuse of discretion under Warfield v. AlliedSignal TBS Holdings, Inc., 267 F.3d 538, 542 (6th Cir.2001). We have explained that we review de novo a district court's denial of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion. Gen. Star Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 289 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir.2002). Deference is inappropriate in this context because, if the underlying judgment is void, it is a per se abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a movant's motion to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4). Antoine v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 66 F.3d 105, 108 (6th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Warfield does not alter this standard, since that case relied on a Rule 41(a)(1)(i) voluntary dismissal with prejudice to assess the Rule 60 motion for an abuse of discretion. 267 F.3d at 541-42. Because entry into a consent judgment is not analogous to a dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41, we review Northridge's Rule 60(b)(4) challenge de novo. Id.; see also Gen. Star Nat'l Ins. Co., 289 F.3d at 437.