Opinion ID: 1155832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: severability of invalid penalty provision

Text: The next question we must consider is whether our conclusion that the City's mandatory minimum penalty provision for prostitution is invalid requires dismissal of the complaint against defendant. The trial court concluded that the City's prohibitory ordinance could not stand without the applicable mandatory minimum penalty provision. Although neither party has addressed this issue, we conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that the invalid mandatory minimum penalty section is severable. This court has long recognized the principle of statutory construction that the unconstitutional part of a statute may be excised without destroying a separable part. See, e.g., Ivancie v. Thornton, 250 Or. 550, 443 P.2d 612, cert den 393 U.S. 1018, 89 S.Ct. 623, 21 L.Ed.2d 563 (1968); Dilger v. School District 24CJ, 222 Or. 108, 119, 352 P.2d 564 (1960). The principle of severability applies where the part of the statute which must be stricken is a penalty provision. Dilger v. School District 24CJ, supra, 222 Or. at 120, 352 P.2d 564. For acts of the Legislative Assembly, this principle has been codified at ORS 174.040, which provides: It shall be considered that it is the legislative intent, in the enactment of any statute, that if any part of the statute is held unconstitutional, the remaining part shall remain in force unless: (1) The statute provides otherwise; (2) The remaining parts are so essentially and inseparably connected with and dependent upon the unconstitutional part that it is apparent that the remaining parts would not have been enacted without the unconstitutional part; or (3) The remaining parts, standing alone, are incomplete and incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent. This principle has also been applied to a city ordinance. Ivancie v. Thornton, supra, 250 Or. at 554, 443 P.2d 612. The same analysis should be employed to determine whether part of an ordinance, if held to be unconstitutional, should be severed from the remaining parts. In the instant case, nothing in the text of the city ordinances at issue indicates that the City Council intended, if the mandatory minimum were held to be unconstitutional, that the provision defining and prohibiting prostitution would be invalid. In fact, the two provisions are in separate chapters of the City Code. [11] Although the two provisions were proposed and enacted as a package, [12] the prohibitory ordinance is not so essentially and inseparably connected with and dependent upon the mandatory minimum penalty provision, that it is apparent from the text or the legislative history that it would not have been enacted without the mandatory minimum provision. Finally, the prohibitory ordinance is neither incomplete nor incapable of being executed absent the mandatory minimum provision because, upon conviction, a defendant could be sentenced to the penalty provided for in the general penalty provision applicable to the City Code, section 14.08.020. [13] Thus, after the trial court declared the mandatory minimum penalty provision invalid, it erred in dismissing the complaint. Defendant could have been tried and, if convicted, punished pursuant to section 14.08.020 of the City Code. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.