Opinion ID: 548382
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Issues Raised for the First Time in the Second Petition

Text: 11 As to the arguments that Schouest raises for the first time in his second petition, we again affirm, but for different reasons. The magistrate first considered whether those claims could be dismissed as an abuse of the writ. He concluded that they could, and so recommended. The magistrate went on, however, to consider the merits of Schouest's new claims, and found them to be without substance. Thus, although we hold that Rule 9(b) dismissal of these claims was not proper, we affirm the denial on the merits.
12 Mindful that pro se cases generally are governed by more forgiving standards of pleading than cases in which the prisoner is represented by counsel, we have previously noted that 13 the courts are careful not to dismiss a [pro se ] habeas petition as an abuse of [the] writ simply because it sets forth a claim that existed when a previous petition was filed. The newly asserted ground must have been known to the petitioner at the time of the earlier petition. 14 Matthews, 833 F.2d at 1171. Thus, when both the first and second petitions are filed pro se, the standard for dismissal of the second petition for abuse of the writ is somewhat higher than it is when the prisoner had the benefit of counsel in filing the first petition. In other words, as the Matthews Court explained, 15 for the abuse of writ doctrine to apply in a pro se case, the petitioner must at least have had actual knowledge of the facts and legal theories that form the basis of the newly asserted claim when he filed the previous petition. 16 Id. (emphasis added). See also Passman v. Blackburn, 797 F.2d 1335, 1343 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 948, 107 S.Ct. 1609, 94 L.Ed.2d 794 (1987) (dismissal of pro se habeas petition for abuse of the writ is proper only where petitioner subjectively knew about a particular claim when the earlier petition was filed). The rule is different when the prisoner was represented by counsel in filing his first habeas petition. See Daniels v. Blackburn, 763 F.2d 705, 707 (5th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (where petitioner was represented by counsel in filing his first petition, and does not challenge the competency of that counsel in his second petition, he will be charged in the second petition with the awareness that a competent lawyer would have possessed). 17 Schouest acted pro se in both his petitions. There is not, however, any finding below that Schouest had actual knowledge of the new claims he raises in his second petition at the time he filed his first petition. To the contrary, while the magistrate concluded that, at the time he filed his first petition, Schouest was aware that ineffective assistance of counsel was a recognized basis for habeas relief, the magistrate also found that Schouest had only constructive knowledge of the factual basis which underlies his new claims. As the magistrate put it, the factual basis supporting any claim could be gleaned from a reading of the state record. Accordingly, it was not proper to dismiss these new claims under Rule 9(b).
18 In both petitions Schouest has claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial: in his second petition Schouest argues that his attorney erred 1) by allowing the state to introduce [at trial] a report of Dr. Mann without the testimony of Dr. Mann, and 2) by making no effort to call Dr. Mann or Dr. [Bishop] 2 at the sanity hearing. Neither of these arguments was presented in Schouest's first federal habeas petitions, although they were presented to the Louisiana courts in Schouest's state habeas proceedings. 3 19 The magistrate carefully considered both of these claims, and found them to be without merit. In particular, as to Schouest's complaint about the failure to call Dr. Mann at trial, the magistrate found that 1) both counsel stipulated that Dr. Mann's testimony, had he been called, would have been the same as Dr. Birchard's, and that 2) Dr. Birchard's testimony was entirely consistent with Dr. Mann's report. As to Schouest's claim that his attorney erred in failing to subpeona the doctors at the sanity hearing, the magistrate found that 1) Schouest did not contend that their testimony would have been any different than that of the doctor who did testify, 2) Schouest did not know what the testimony of those doctors would have been, and 3) Schouest acknowledged that he was competent at the time of trial to assist his attorney. Accordingly, we agree with the magistrate's conclusion that Schouest has not met the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), for making out a cognizable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.