Opinion ID: 2523874
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Separate Opinions Upon Denial of Rehearing

Text: ¶ 223 Justice THOMAS, writing in support of denial of rehearing: ¶ 224 In his petition for rehearing, Jonathon asks this court to retain jurisdiction of the case pursuant to this court's supervisory authority, and remand the cause to the trial court for a hearing on the issue of whether the trial court was aware of Jonathon's shackles, so that this court can determine whether plain error occurred. This court has denied Jonathon's petition for rehearing. As noted in our opinion, there is no evidence in the record that the trial court committed error in this case with regard to Jonathon's shackling. Therefore, there is no need to remand this cause to the trial court for further hearings, or for this court to determine whether plain error occurred. ¶ 225 Nonetheless, three justices have dissented from the denial of rehearing. Justice Freeman writes that if the trial court knew that Jonathon was shackled, then the trial court committed plain error entitling Jonathon to a new juvenile proceeding. Justice Burke would allow Jonathon's request for a remand and would allow him the opportunity to make a record to show that the trial court was aware of Jonathon's shackles at the outset. Justice Burke states that if the trial court was aware of the shackles but did not hold a Boose hearing or require the shackles to be removed, the court committed plain error and Jonathon should be granted a new trial. Justice Kilbride believes that the trial court's failure to conduct a Boose hearing to determine the manifest need to shackle Jonathon should be reviewed as plain error under the fundamental fairness prong of the plain-error doctrine. ¶ 226 Although we find no evidence that the trial court committed error in this case, we briefly address the issue of plain error, as it has been raised by the dissenting justices. As set forth below, even if the trial court indicated that it knew that Jonathon was shackled during his juvenile proceeding, the error did not amount to plain error requiring reversal of Jonathon's conviction of criminal sexual assault. Consequently, we disagree with the dissenting justices that rehearing is required in this case. ¶ 227 The plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when: (1) a clear or obvious error occurs and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant; or (2) a clear or obvious error occurs, and the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. People v. Herron, 215 Ill.2d 167, 178-79, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467 (2005). The second prong is not at issue in this case. Although the dissenting justices would find plain error, assuming the trial court was aware of the shackles, based solely on the fact that Jonathon was shackled and the trial court did not conduct a Boose hearing, the court in People v. Allen, 222 Ill.2d 340, 305 Ill.Dec. 544, 856 N.E.2d 349 (2006), considered and rejected the argument that a shackling error alone is an error so serious that it affects the fairness of a defendant's trial and the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. Consequently, contrary to the position of the dissenting justices, a shackling error alone does not constitute per se reversible error. ¶ 228 In Allen, the court considered the defendant's claim that it was error for him to be forced to wear an electronic security belt as a restraining device at trial. The court first held that the trial court's failure to follow the procedures set forth in Boose before ordering the defendant to continue to wear an electronic stun belt during his trial constituted a due process violation. Allen, 222 Ill.2d at 349, 305 Ill.Dec. 544, 856 N.E.2d 349. The court took judicial notice of the routine use of stun belts on felons in Will County cases in support of its holding that stun belts should be subject to a Boose hearing. Id. at 356, 305 Ill.Dec. 544, 856 N.E.2d 349. However, the defendant did not even mention the electronic restraint until the third day of his trial and, even then, defense counsel made an alternative suggestion to remove the restraint, but did not ask that an objection be noted on the record, or that a Boose hearing be held. Id. at 353, 305 Ill.Dec. 544, 856 N.E.2d 349. ¶ 229 Although the court found that requiring a defendant to wear a stun belt throughout his trial without a Boose hearing amounted to a due process violation, the court nonetheless held that the error did not constitute per se reversible error. Allen, 222 Ill.2d at 353-54, 305 Ill.Dec. 544, 856 N.E.2d 349. The error did not result in fundamental unfairness or cause a severe threat to the fairness of the defendant's trial. Id. at 360, 305 Ill.Dec. 544, 856 N.E.2d 349. Further, the defendant did not claim, nor could he claim, that the evidence presented was closely balanced, or that his presumption of innocence, ability to assist his counsel, or the dignity of the proceedings was compromised. Id. at 353, 305 Ill.Dec. 544, 856 N.E.2d 349. Accordingly, because the defendant could not demonstrate plain error, the defendant forfeited his right to review of the issue. Id. at 360, 305 Ill.Dec. 544, 856 N.E.2d 349. ¶ 230 Because the error in this case was not so serious that it affected the fairness of Jonathon's trial, or the integrity of the judicial process, only the first prong of the plain error analysis is at issue. If the trial court was aware that Jonathon was shackled during trial and did not conduct a Boose hearing, the error amounted to plain error only if the evidence was so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against Jonathon. ¶ 231 Jonathon contended that the evidence in this case was so closely balanced as to give rise to a reasonable doubt of guilt on the sexual assault charges. Therefore, he argues, it is impossible to conclude that the shackling had no adverse effect on the proceedings. ¶ 232 We disagree with Jonathon that the evidence in this case was so closely balanced that the shackling error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against him. Jonathon's trial was a bench trial before a judge, not a jury. Consequently, the concerns that shackling will prejudice a jury are not present. See Staley, 67 Ill.2d at 37, 7 Ill.Dec. 85, 364 N.E.2d 72. Rather, in cases where there is no jury, courts consider whether an accused's presumption of innocence, his ability to cooperate with his attorney and defense, or the dignity of the judicial process, were compromised. Jonathon does not allege, and there is no evidence in the record, that his shackles compromised his presumption of innocence, his ability to cooperate with his attorney and defense, or the dignity of the judicial process. ¶ 233 Moreover, although Jonathon characterizes the evidence of the criminal sexual assault as simply a credibility contest between himself and C.H., so closely balanced that the shackles may have tipped the balance in favor of C.H.'s credibility, it is clear from the record that the trial judge gave due consideration to all the evidence and testimony in finding Jonathon guilty. In fact, in rendering its decision, the trial judge stated that, [b]oth counsel are correct in that this case really does come down to the issue of credibility although this is not a case where the Court only has his word versus her word to examine. The evidence before me consists of the observations and testimony of multiple witnesses as well as physical evidence.  Emphasis added. The trial judge then extensively detailed the testimony of the parties and all the witnesses, and recognized that there were inconsistencies in the testimony of both C.H. and Jonathon. ¶ 234 The trial court noted that it had compared Jonathon's testimony to the statements that Jonathon gave to the investigators and other individuals. The trial court noted the discrepancy concerning what time Jonathon asked Destiny for $40, with Jonathon testifying he got the money after encountering C.H. around midnight or 12:30 a.m., while Destiny testified that Jonathon asked her for the money around 10:45, right before she went to bed. The trial court also noted Jonathon's changing story concerning his encounter with C.H., and observed that Jonathon and G.W. had approximately 45 minutes to an hour to discuss what they would tell police before they opened the door to the townhouse at 2701B Campbell. The trial court found it significant that Jonathon and G.W. refused to open the door or respond to repeated police requests that they come out during that time period. ¶ 235 In contrast, C.H.'s statements to Deputy Good and paramedic Ramey were made at the scene immediately after the attack, so that C.H. would have no time to make up a story. The trial court further noted the different responses of C.H. and Jonathon when Deputy Good came upon the scene and announced himself. Jonathon and G.W. turned and fled, while C.H. ran toward Good and collapsed on the street. The trial court also stated that it considered not only the content of the parties' testimony, but also the manner and demeanor of the parties while testifying. ¶ 236 The trial court then concluded: The bottom line having considered all the evidence and the testimony, the manner and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, the statements of the witnesses, any impeachment or inconsistencies, the physical injuries, the damage to the clothing, the actions taken in the face of police intervention and the time frame, I do believe [C.H.] was sexually assaulted by [Jonathon] as she has described. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 237 The trial judge thoughtfully and thoroughly considered the evidence in this case. Although there were inconsistencies in the testimony of both C.H. and Jonathon, this case did not turn solely on C.H.'s testimony versus Jonathon's testimony. Given the testimony of all the witnesses, as well as the physical evidence in the case, we cannot say the evidence was so closely balanced that the shackling error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against Jonathon. [M]inor discrepancies in the evidence, whether between two witnesses or within the testimony of one witness, are not unusual. In re M.W., 232 Ill.2d 408, 438, 328 Ill.Dec. 868, 905 N.E.2d 757 (2009). Thus, even if the trial court was aware of Jonathon's shackles and failed to conduct a Boose hearing, the error did not amount to plain error which would require reversal of Jonathon's conviction of criminal sexual assault. Therefore, there is no need to grant Jonathon's petition for rehearing and remand the case to the trial court. Even if the trial court stated for the record that it knew Jonathon was shackled during his juvenile proceedings, that information would not alter our disposition of this case. ¶ 238 Justice KARMEIER joins in this opinion in support of denial of rehearing. ¶ 239 Justice THEIS, writing in support of denial of rehearing: ¶ 240 I continue to agree with the majority's determination that the record is devoid of any indication that the trial court committed error with regard to Jonathon's shackling. Accordingly, Jonathon's petition for rehearing should be denied. I cannot, however, join with my colleagues writing in support of the denial of rehearing because the plain-error analysis in which they engage is unnecessary in the absence of trial error.