Opinion ID: 1516216
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Glen Mills Records[25]

Text: Next, appellant argues that the trial court committed constitutional error, violating both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, when it refused to admit appellant's Glen Mills records into evidence without authentication. Appellant contends that his performance at Glen Mills, a school for delinquent youth, demonstrates his positive performance in an institutional setting, making the records vital mitigating evidence. Appellant asserts that the trial court's ruling prevented him from presenting a defense to the death penalty. He also declares that the prosecutor committed a Brady violation by not disclosing the records to appellant earlier. Appellant then attaches these claims of trial court and prosecutor error to boilerplate allegations of counsel ineffectiveness. The Commonwealth responds that appellant has previously litigated this claim and, therefore, it does not deserve redundant review. The PCRA court agreed with the Commonwealth, stating it was bound by this Court's previous resolution of the claim on appellant's direct appeal. On direct appeal, appellant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to produce witnesses to authenticate the Glen Mills records and introduce the records into evidence. Carson I, 741 A.2d at 707. This Court found that appellant did not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the absence of the records, because he failed to show witnesses were willing and available to testify on his behalf and he neglected to establish that the records would have been helpful to him. Id. Thus, any ineffectiveness claim appellant now makes in respect to his trial counsel's failure to present witnesses to authenticate the records is previously litigated. 42 Pa. C.S.  9544(a)(2). However, to the extent that appellant argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to make certain arguments to the Court on direct review, we accept the claim as a distinct ineffectiveness claim and will conduct a substantive review. See Collins, 888 A.2d at 573. Appellant's argument that appellate counsel should have raised a Brady argument on direct appeal is curious, since he previously acknowledged on direct appeal that trial counsel could have become aware of the Glen Mills records simply by questioning his client and gathering appellant's criminal history through discovery. Carson I, 741 A.2d at 707. In discussing appellant's Brady claims, supra at Section I.B.4, we explained that there is no Brady violation where the information is available through non-governmental sources and can be obtained through defense counsel's own reasonable investigation. Morris, 822 A.2d at 696; Paddy, 800 A.2d at 305. Obviously, appellant's attendance and performance at Glen Mills was not information exclusively within the government's knowledge such that it qualifies as Brady material. Consequently, this portion of appellant's argument is frivolous. Regarding appellant's additional argument that the trial court's exclusion of the records violated his constitutional rights and his right to present a defense against the imposition of capital punishment, the United States Supreme Court has stated that a defendant's disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life in prison is a relevant factor in sentencing determinations. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1672, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). However, before evidence may be admitted at a sentencing hearing, the trial court must determine whether the evidence is relevant and admissible on the question of the sentence to be imposed. 42 Pa.C.S.  9711(a)(2). Business records, which include records from non-profit institutions, [26] are: competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business at or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the tribunal, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission. 42 Pa.C.S.  6108(b); see also Pa.R.E. 803(6) (amended in 2001 to allow business records to be authenticated by certification). Here, appellant has never accused the trial court of erroneously ruling that an individual needed to authenticate the Glen Mills records before they could be deemed admissible. Instead, appellant argues that evidentiary rules should not operate to prevent introduction of what he feels is reliable and critical sentencing evidence from being presented to the jury. [27] Counsel was not obliged to invent this novel argument, which has yet to be accepted by any controlling tribunal. Appellant is, furthermore, ill-suited to demonstrate prejudice from the exclusion of the Glen Mills records when the jury found four aggravating factors [28] and no mitigating factors. [29] Most notably, appellant's sentencing jury opted not to find any mitigating factors after appellant's presentation of arguably more compelling mitigation evidence than his delinquency school records ÔÇö namely, testimony from the mother of appellant's child and his cancer-stricken father that depicted appellant as a loving family man. Because appellant has not proved his argument has merit or that he was prejudiced, he is not due any relief on this claim.