Opinion ID: 303767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suppression of the In-Court Identification

Text: 60 The only ground advanced by the trial judge for her suppression of the prospective in-court testimony of Mrs. Edgecomb was: 61 In view of the fact that the photographic identification is excluded the Court feels that she should not make an in-court identification of the defendants at the time of her appearance here in fear it might be tainted in some way by the recent viewing of the photograph. (2d, supra) 62 Of course, if a pre-trial identification is found to have been obtained in violation of the accused's Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights, the burden is then on the Government to show an independent source for any subsequent identification made at trial. 19 A finding that this burden was not met may be inferred from the District Judge's statement quoted above. The opposite can also be inferred from what the District Judge plainly stated at the outset, It appears that Mrs. Edgecomb did have an ample opportunity to observe the two defendants while in the store, that Mrs. Edgecomb did have an independent source for in-trial identification.
63 At oral argument appellees' counsel conceded that, without the display of the lineup photograph, Mrs. Edgecomb's testimony would be admissible at trial, for whatever weight the jury might give it. 20
64 On the whole record of the pre-trial hearing, evaluating Mrs. Edgecomb's opportunity to observe at the time of the robbery and murder, the comparative clarity of the lineup photograph and the individual photographs of the accused shown the witness, her care, selectivity and spontaniety in making the identifications in the lineup photograph which she did (coupled with the previous refusal to identify in the other photos), we conclude that the witness Edgecomb had an independent source from which she may attempt an in-court identification of the accused at trial. 21 65 We have found that there were no Sixth Amendment right to counsel nor Fifth Amendment due process violations involved in the showing of the lineup photograph to Mrs. Edgecomb. It therefore follows that no showing of an independent source is required, although the trial court may be considered to have determined an independent source and on the record we have so determined; hence, any in-court identification by Mrs. Edgecomb will be properly admissible at trial. 66 Reversed and remanded. 67 BAZELON, Chief Judge, concurring in No. 22,340 United States v. Ash, 149 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 461 F.2d 92 and dissenting in No. 24,452 United States v. Brown, Proctor & Williams: Given the complex entanglement of our holding in these cases it is distressingly easy to lose sight of the straightforward propositions on which our decisions should rest. First, identifications are crucial to the fairness and reliability of convictions. No other aspect of the accusatory process creates so much opportunity for miscarriage of justice-for punishment of an innocent man. 1 Second, the safeguard at issue here obviously cannot be subjected to the attack so often leveled at judicial efforts to enforce the Constitution. Even if the convenience of the police were a controlling consideration, by no stretch of the imagination could this safeguard tie their hands or make the apprehension and conviction of criminals more difficult. If the Court were to hold that counsel must be present at all photographic identifications which take place after arrest, even the most zealous critic could not reasonably argue that law enforcement would be hindered. 2 68 In fact, the only argument against this safeguard is a vague suggestion that it would be bothersome for the police to telephone the defense attorney and to postpone the identification until he or his designee arrives. Considering the interests of the defendant and the very real possibility that an innocent man will be convicted on the basis of a mistaken identification, I am distressed by the failure to recognize an unambiguous constitutional requirement that counsel must be present at all post-arrest photographic identifications. 69 Recognizing that a post-arrest photographic identification is a poor substitute for a corporeal lineup, the Court holds in Ash that such an identification is a critical stage of the prosecution at which the presence of counsel is required. But the Court explicitly points out that [w]e do not consider in this opinion whether or to what extent [the principle of Ash] should be applicable in case of a photographic showing subsequent to a lineup. 3 70 By means of this limitation, the opinion in Ash leaves room for the decision in Brown, where the Court validates an uncounselled identification at which the witness was shown a photograph of a prior lineup. Yet in neither opinion does the Court convincingly explain why a photographic identification ceases to be a critical stage of the prosecution merely because it comes on the heels of a corporeal lineup. There are, of course, differences between Ash and Brown. But whether those differences amount to a meaningful distinction is a question answered conclusively in the negative by Judge Wright's dissenting opinion, which I join, in Brown. 71 According to the Court's opinion in Ash, the premise of Brown is that prosecuting attorneys, given their professional responsibilities and fears of jeopardizing their professional careers, are so unlikely to steer identifications that we should not impose on their busy schedules by requiring the presence of defense counsel at identifications which follow counselled lineups. Majority opinion in Ash at 1 of 149 U.S.App. D.C., at 104 of 461 F.2d 92; majority opinion in Brown at 43 of 149 U.S.App. D.C., at 141 of 461 F.2d 134. Whatever the force of that reasoning, it clearly does not differentiate Brown from Ash. In Ash, just as in Brown, the identification interview was conducted by a prosecuting attorney. And as to the reasoning itself, see, for example, the confessions of a liberal and extremely well-intentioned prosecuting attorney in Schrag, On Her Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York City, 80 Yale L.J. 1529, 1597-1598 (1971): 72 All of us in the [Consumer] Law Enforcement Division were civil libertarians. We applauded the Supreme Court decision requiring policemen to warn suspects that their admissions could be used against them, and scoffed at police officials who claimed that the case would hamstring law enforcement officials. We condemned eavesdropping and wiretapping. We decried the loss of privacy in American life. We demonstrated when police forces took the law into their own hands and beat kids over the head, or when they stood by passively while construction workers did so. We protested the use of informers and secret agents to convict Jimmy Hoffa. 73 Yet here we were, after experiencing for only one year the frustrations of law enforcement, eager to emulate every police trick we despised, and indeed, ready to invent a few of our own. By the end of that year we had an impressive inventory of electronic gadgetry, including a subminiature tape recorder with one microphone that looked like a vest-pocket fountain pen and another that hooked onto a bra-strap. We thought of the press as one of a number of arrows for our bow, rather than the safeguard of a free people against oppressive government. We first learned that the government had to lie when we discovered that many subpoenas could not be served unless we used a ruse to get into the presence of a company's officers. By the end of the year, we were routinely engaging in deception to fight deception, and even the use of wired secret agents to infiltrate companies was becoming commonplace. 74 In fact, of the two cases, Brown seems to present the greater danger of prejudice to the defense-and hence the greater need for the protection of counsel's presence. For it is precisely where a photographic identification follows a corporeal lineup, as in Brown, that the need for counsel is likely to be most acute. Photographic identifications are, after all, unlikely to follow lineups at which the witnesses successfully identify the suspect. As Brown unfortunately demonstrates, it is only where the prosecution is dissatisfied with the results of the lineup that it has a significant interest in making a second effort to obtain a positive identification. And this second attempt imposes the greatest incentive to resort, wittingly or unwittingly, to suggestive practices. Yet there is no discernible reason to conclude that the prior lineup will in any way enhance the fairness of the second, uncounselled attempt to obtain an identification. And it is entirely unclear to me why the presence of counsel at the earlier lineup-which, by hypothesis, failed to yield a positive identification-is thought to immunize the defendant from prejudice at the second identification, where the prosecution is trying to salvage its case and the risks of suggestivity are therefore maximized. 75 Accordingly, I dissent from Brown because it violates the controlling constitutional standard as announced in Ash. And for the same reason I would hold in Ash that counsel must be present at all photographic identifications held after the accused is in custody whether or not a lineup has previously been held. 4 Nothing less will satisfy the demands of the Sixth Amendment. And nothing more is needed to satisfy the demands of law enforcement. 76