Opinion ID: 867478
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Improper Expert Testimony

Text: ¶ 101 Moody contends that the State's mental health expert, Dr. Morenz, invaded the province of the jury. Moody alleges error in two different statements: that Moody committed these murders because of his cocaine use and that malingering is a medical term for lying. [9] ¶ 102 As an initial matter, we note that Moody did not object at trial to either statement by Dr. Morenz. This court has long held that an appellant may not challenge on appeal testimony to which there has been no objection, unless the error is fundamental. State v. Thomas, 130 Ariz. 432, 435, 636 P.2d 1214, 1217 (1981). We therefore review each statement only for fundamental error. See State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 297, 896 P.2d 830, 837 (1995); see also State v. King, 158 Ariz. 419, 424, 763 P.2d 239, 244 (1988) (defining and reviewing for fundamental error).
¶ 103 Moody first alleges error in Dr. Morenz's testimony about Moody's possible motive for the murders. At trial, Dr. Morenz testified that, in his opinion, it was very likely that the motivation [for the murders] was money and cocaine. Moody alleges that this was inappropriate opinion testimony permitted by neither the Arizona Rules of Evidence nor our case law on expert testimony. ¶ 104 Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 provides that an expert witness may testify on any subject if the witness's specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. This court has interpreted Rule 702 to preclude expert testimony, however, if the subject of inquiry is one of such common knowledge that people of ordinary education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness. State v. Poland, 144 Ariz. 388, 398, 698 P.2d 183, 193 (1985) (quoting State v. Owens, 112 Ariz. 223, 227, 540 P.2d 695, 699 (1975)). ¶ 105 Moody alleges that Dr. Morenz exceeded the permissible scope of Rule 702 by testifying that Moody's cocaine use was a motive for the murders. Moody contends that although Dr. Morenz could express an opinion on whether Moody was suffering from mental illness, he was not permitted to offer an opinion that Robert killed Michelle Malone and Patricia Magda because of his cocaine use. Moody argues that because there was no evidence that he had used cocaine at the time of the murders, and therefore no foundation for the opinion, Arizona case law renders Dr. Morenz's testimony improper. See State v. Miles, 186 Ariz. 10, 18, 918 P.2d 1028, 1036 (1996) (upholding trial court's decision to preclude defense expert's testimony on cocaine intoxication where the expert had no basis upon which to render an opinion about the effects of crack cocaine use at the time of the murder); State v. Gretzler, 126 Ariz. 60, 85, 612 P.2d 1023, 1048 (1980) (stating that [t]estimony concerning intoxication should be limited to the time of the crime for which the defendant is being tried), modified on other grounds by State v. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, 194, 665 P.2d 70, 76 (1983). ¶ 106 A review of the context of that testimony, however, undermines Moody's claim. Dr. Morenz was called on rebuttal, shortly after the jury heard evidence from the defense experts that Moody was in a psychotic, dissociated state when he committed the killings. Dr. Morenz testified that he had eleven reasons for concluding that Moody was not insane, but rather was malingering. One of these reasons was that the murders did not fit the profile of psychotic killings. Dr. Morenz testified that psychotic killings rarely have any rational motive. He then told the jury that one indication that Moody was malingering was that, unlike psychotic killers, Moody actually did have a likely motive  namely, that his substantial cocaine addiction had rendered him broke and desperate. ¶ 107 What evidence is permissible on rebuttal is left to the trial court's discretion. See State v. Young, 116 Ariz. 385, 387, 569 P.2d 815, 817 (1977). The rebuttal evidence provided by Dr. Morenz in this case responded to the issues covered by the defense and is of the type on which expert testimony is generally allowed: the mental health and thought processes of a defendant who alleges insanity or mental illness or defect. Dr. Morenz testified to motive in support of his opinion that Moody's actions contradicted a diagnosis of psychosis. We find no abuse of the court's discretion in permitting this testimony, and certainly no fundamental error.
¶ 108 Moody also alleges that Dr. Morenz exceeded the scope of permissible expert testimony by offering an opinion on [Moody's] credibility by characterizing malingering as a medical term for lying. The defense takes Dr. Morenz's statement out of context. ¶ 109 On direct-examination, Dr. Morenz defined a malingerer as someone who makes up their [sic] symptoms for a particular purpose. He further stated that [i]n Mr. Moody's case, [that purpose is] to escape criminal prosecution or gain some kind of leniency from the court. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Dr. Morenz whether Moody had been called a malingerer, which is a medical term for liar. Dr. Morenz responded, yes. Moody claims that by that answer, Morenz improperly expressed his professional opinion that [Moody] is a liar. ¶ 110 We find no merit in Moody's argument for two reasons. First, the question posed by defense counsel is a compound question. For that reason, it is unclear whether Dr. Morenz was answering yes to the question whether Moody had been called a malingerer, or whether he was affirming that malingerer is a medical term for a liar. ¶ 111 Second, even if we assume that Dr. Morenz intended to testify that malingerer ... is a medical term for liar, that definition was offered as a leading question by defense counsel on cross-examination. This court has long held that a defendant who invited error at trial may not then assign the same as error on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Endreson, 109 Ariz. 117, 122-23, 506 P.2d 248, 253-54 (1973). We can envision few situations in which a defendant can be said to invite an error more condemningly than by asking a leading question that he assigns to the witness on appeal. For that reason, while we find no error here because of the compound nature of the question and the ambiguous response, even if Dr. Morenz's statement were erroneous, it was invited by the defense and for that reason would not provide a basis for reversal.