Opinion ID: 1755365
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Privacy and Entertainment

Text: I believe the present case strongly implicates the right of privacy outlined above. If the state may prohibit individuals from discreetly inquiring into matters that may interest them, whether characterized as literature, reading material, or entertainment, then the personal autonomy guaranteed by the right of privacy is illusory. Even a cursory review of censorship law discloses not merely the fact that views of obscenity have changed profoundly over time, but that a frequent result of censorship is the suppression of personal, intellectual, artistic, and literary inquiry. Works now studied as masterpieces of English literature, such as Lord Byron's Don Juan, have been held to be obscene. F. Schauer, The Law of Obscenity 6 (1976) (quoting Craig, Suppressed Books 22 (1963)); A. Gerber, Sex, Pornography, & Justice 74 (1965) (citing Lord Byron v. Dugdale, 1 L.J.Ch. 239 (1823)). Similarly, American courts have ordered suppression of works now regarded as classics, such as Theodore Dreiser's An American Tragedy, [15] D.H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterly's Lover, [16] and Erskine Caldwell's God's Little Acre. [17] In 1933, the United States government made a serious but unsuccessful effort to suppress James Joyce's Ulysses, now considered to be one of the greatest modern novels. United States v. One Book Called Ulysses, 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.1934). A similarly unsuccessful effort was directed at William Faulkner's Sanctuary shortly before Faulkner became one of a handful of American writers to win the Nobel Prize for literature. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (Phila. 1949). The attempts at censorship described in these cases reveal how difficult it is to determine what constitutes obscenity. They show that, too often, the label obscenity has been used as little more than a buzz-word by which some partisan group has attempted to impose its views of life, art, or entertainment on others who do not share those views. Censorship, in other words, often has served as a vehicle for restricting individual autonomy. This is a result directly contrary to the spirit of Florida's privacy amendment. For this reason, I believe that the ability to read, think and inquire as one sees fit is a vital component of the right to be let alone because it is a crucial means by which an individual may exercise a genuine, meaningful autonomy free of governmental intrusion. This conclusion necessarily flows from our case law. As noted earlier, Florida law is settled that the individual has an interest in independence in making personal decisions, Rasmussen, 500 So.2d at 535, and a right to inviolability of thought, person, and personal action that is preeminent over majoritarian sentiment. Shaktman, 553 So.2d at 150-51. The purpose of this right is to foster individual dignity and autonomy, T.W., 551 So.2d at 1193, so that a person is free to lead his private life according to his own beliefs. Wons, 541 So.2d at 98. Florida's right to be let alone protects the sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination as fundamental constituents of life. Id. at 100 (Ehrlich, C.J., specially concurring) (citing with approval Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426). It guarantees an individual's expectation of privacy regardless of whether society recognizes that expectation as reasonable. Shaktman, 553 So.2d at 153 (Ehrlich, C.J., specially concurring). In sum, Florida's right to be let alone actually consists of a bundle of rights. It creates a zone of privacy protecting not merely seclusion and bodily integrity, but also guaranteeing a right to structure one's life as one sees fit so long as no avoidable harm is done to self or others. The right prohibits the government from intervening in the noninjurious aspects of personal life involving matters such as the actualization of one's own identity, spirituality, home or family life, intellect, personal opinions, and emotions. I believe that, of necessity, this bundle of rights includes a right to obtain noninjurious reading materials and entertainment for discreet personal use. Without such a right, the self-determination and self-actualization guaranteed by the right to be let alone would be meaningless indeed. Minds forbidden to inquire are no less enslaved than minds whose thoughts are dictated by others. The right to be let alone cannot be exercised if all such material, entertainment, and information are subject to the dictates of a community censor or the strictures of a censorial criminal code. The attempt to impose such restrictions plainly rests on the kind of majoritarian sentiment described in Shaktman, 553 So.2d at 150-51. Indeed, it appears that the state's primary motive in enforcing the 1985 and 1986 statutes is the desire to impose a particular perspective on those who do not necessarily share nor desire to share that perspective, at least within the confines of their private lives, and when no harm has been proven. The language of Florida's obscenity statute emphasizes this point. According to section 847.011(11) (1985), gauging obscenity requires the application of contemporary community standards to determine whether the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest (emphasis added). In the 1986 version of the statute, obscenity is material that [t]he average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. § 847.001(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1986) (emphasis added). By definition, community standards about the propriety of particular kinds of reading or entertainment constitute majoritarian sentiment within the meaning of Shaktman, 553 So.2d at 151. I can only conclude that the statutory reliance upon community standards directly intrudes upon the right of personal autonomy and decision-making protected by Florida's right to be let alone. Under the requirements of this right, a community standard may not dictate whether individuals may discreetly inquire into noninjurious forms of literature, reading, and entertainment. What one thinks, views or reads in private, without harm to self or others, is an integral part of the self-actualization and personal development vital to individual autonomy. I agree with our Sister Court in Hawaii when it concluded that [r]eading or viewing pornographic material in the privacy of one's own home in no way affects the general public's rights. Anyone who is offended by pornography need not be subjected to it so long as others confine their taste for it to their homes. We accept the eloquent reasoning in Stanley: It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas. This freedom ... necessarily protects the right to receive... . This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is fundamental to our free society. State v. Kam, 69 Haw. 483, 494, 748 P.2d 372, 379 (1988) (emphasis deleted) (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564-65, 89 S.Ct. at 1247-48). As the Hawaii Court concluded, [s]ince a person has the right to view pornographic items at home, there necessarily follows a correlative right to purchase such materials for ... personal use, or the underlying privacy right becomes meaningless. Id. 748 P.2d at 380.