Opinion ID: 1429255
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of Second Hearing

Text: In the case before us, after Judge Brian had granted Mag Corp's first motion for summary judgment, AMS's only remaining claim against Mag Corp was based on negligence. When Mag Corp made its second motion for summary judgment before Judge Rokich, it argued that AMS could not establish any evidence to show a legal duty owed AMS by Mag Corp. In its memorandum in opposition to the motion, AMS argued that Mag Corp did have a duty based on statutory policy considerations, Utah land policy, case law, foreseeability, and reliance. Judge Rokich held an initial hearing on the motion on July 10, 1995. During that hearing, not only was the issue of mutual reliance discussed, but also AMS made arguments that Mag Corp had a duty based on (1) statute-based policy considerations, (2) general common law as expressed in the Second Restatement of Torts, and (3) case law. The trial court explicitly rejected the arguments relating to statute-based policy and implicitly rejected all others when it concluded that it would hold a second hearing limited only to arguing the basis on which AMS felt that it could rely on Mag Corp's perimeter dike. Importantly, Judge Rokich gave AMS the chance to argue that the issue of reliance should not be the focus of the hearing. In response to AMS's question whether reliance would be the sole issue, the trial court stated: Right. And I think that's the issue in this case. If I'm wrong, tell me now if you see it differently. Instead of objecting, AMS agreed to the hearing and its limited scope. Thus, because the trial court had rejected AMS's other arguments relating to the basis for Mag Corp's alleged duty, it was not improper to limit the scope of the second hearing to the issue of reliance.