Opinion ID: 181046
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Santiago's Claims Against the Supervising Officers

Text: We address first the dismissal of Santiago's claims against the Supervising Officers. The District Court dismissed those claims because it held that Santiago had not pled any basis of liability in the Supervising Officers' own acts but, instead, had alleged only a theory of respondeat superior liability, which cannot serve as the basis of a claim for constitutional violations. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948 (Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. ). While we conclude that the Third Amended Complaint can be read as alleging liability based on the Supervising Officers' own acts, we will nevertheless affirm the District Court's ruling because those allegations fail to meet the pleading requirements set forth by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal.
Liability based on respondeat superior arises solely on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee relationship, regardless of whether the employer had any part in causing harm. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Contrary to the District Court's view, that is not the theory Santiago advances. Instead, Santiago's allegations appear to invoke a theory of liability under which a supervisor may be personally liable ... if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates' violations. [5] A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir.2004). Specifically, Santiago alleges that Chief Murphy and Lt. Donnelly developed a plan that sought to have all occupants exit the Plaintiff's home, one at a time, with hands raised under threat of fire, patted down for weapons, and then handcuffed until the home had been cleared and searched. (Third Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 21, 23.) The claim is thus that, through the creation and authorization of the plan, Chief Murphy and Lt. Donnelly directed others to violate [Santiago's rights]. A.M., 372 F.3d at 586. The related allegation that Lt. Springfield, as the person in charge of the operation, permitted the use of excessive force appears to be a claim that Lt. Springfield acquiesced in his subordinates' violations. [6] A.M., 372 F.3d at 586. Consequently, although the Third Amended Complaint seeks a species of supervisory liability, it is not respondeat superior liability.
That Santiago has alleged supervisory liability claims does not mean that she has supported those allegations with sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,' Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 262 n. 27 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949), as is required by the seminal Supreme Court decisions in Iqbal and Twombly. To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under the pleading regime established by those cases, a court must take three steps: First, the court must tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. [7] Second, the court should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 1950. Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief. Id.