Opinion ID: 852958
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Can a Party Withdraw Its Exceptions?

Text: The State argues that a party has an absolute right to withdraw its exceptions to the appraisers' report, and says the trial court thus erred in disallowing the State's motion to withdraw. The State correctly observes that when the only party to file exceptions to the appraisers' report later withdraws those exceptions, no issues remain for the trial court to decide. State v. Redmon, 205 Ind. 335, 186 N.E. 328 (1933). The State is incorrect, however, in its position that a party has an absolute right to withdraw. Although Denny v. State, 244 Ind. 5, 189 N.E.2d 820 (1963), appeared to presume an absolute right to withdraw exceptions, subsequent cases have held that a pretrial order can restrict a party's ability to withdraw. See State v. Blount, 154 Ind.App. 580, 290 N.E.2d 480 (1972) (party may ordinarily withdraw exceptions if its motion is timely but when a party agrees to a pretrial order limiting the parties' ability to change the trial plan, then does not seek to modify it, the party has no basis to object when judge denies its motion); McGill v. Muddy Fork of Silver Creek Watershed Conservancy District, 175 Ind. App. 48, 370 N.E.2d 365 (1977) (in absence of an express agreement or order, motion was timely and party could withdraw); Public Serv. Co. of Ind. v. Rounder, 423 N.E.2d 666, 667 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) (Absent an express pretrial agreement, a pretrial order or other controlling order, a party may withdraw its exceptions to an appraisers' award.). In Daugherty v. State, 699 N.E.2d 780 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), the Court of Appeals recognized that the practical effect of these cases was to place the decision whether to grant or deny the motion at the discretion of the trial court. As Judge Kirsch wrote: The effect of the Blount decision and the subsequent cases that recognized this exception was to create a rule that was regulated through the trial court's discretion. Our decision here makes explicit what was implied in Blount: a party does not have an absolute right to withdraw exceptions to the appraisers' report; rather, the withdrawal of exceptions is subject to the trial court's discretion. While the court in the exercise of such discretion may ordinarily allow the withdrawal, it may deny the request to withdraw or condition the withdrawal upon such terms and conditions as the court deems necessary to avoid injustice. Id. at 782. We conclude that the exercise of discretion concerning withdrawal, based on factors such as timeliness and inconvenience to opposing parties is more likely to produce just outcomes than a rule conferring an absolute right of withdrawal. The Daugherty court held that [t]he trial court in exercising its discretion should allow the withdrawal of exceptions except in instances where injustice would result. 699 N.E.2d at 782-83. We emphasize what the Daugherty court saidreiterated by the Court of Appeals in this case: parties who wish to insure a trial on the merits should file their own timely exceptions, and those who file should recognize that they may not be permitted to withdraw those exceptions and terminate litigation which they have begun. The State argues alternatively that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. The Daugherty court proposed the following non-exclusive factors for the trial court to consider in making its determination: [1] the length of time between the filing of the appraisers' report and the motion to withdraw, [2] whether the withdrawing party is attempting to do so on the eve of the trial, [3] whether the withdrawing party and trial court have been put on notice of the other party's dissatisfaction with the report, either that be through the filing of belated exceptions or otherwise, and [4] the extent of trial preparation which has already occurred, including the securing of expert witnesses and the extent of discovery. Id. at 783. We adopt this approach, emphasizing that the factors are not a four-part test but are merely a non-exclusive list of circumstances for the trial judge to consider when exercising discretion. Appellate courts will reverse only where the court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn from those facts and circumstances. Lucre Corp. v. County of Gibson, 657 N.E.2d 150, 152 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). Following this approach, we cannot say it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the State's motion. The State filed its exceptions to the appraisers' report on December 9, 1997, and did not seek to withdraw its exceptions until two years and four months laterfifteen days before the scheduled trial. In addition, the State was arguably put on notice of the Bishops' dissatisfaction with the report through information exchanged during discovery or during mediation. Finally, the Bishops claim that they had exchanged interrogatories, retained two expert witnesses and spent several tens of thousands of dollars on attorneys' fees, appraisers and other expenditures. (App. at 189.) The trial court might well have allowed the withdrawal, or conditioned it upon the payment of the Bishop's litigation expenses. Filing a request to withdraw after two years and four months may be understandable in cases where a party conducted discovery and attempted mediation then realized that the appraisers' amount was reasonable. Similarly, whether the withdrawing party is attempting to withdraw on the eve of trial is also relevant. See McGill, 175 Ind.App. 48, 370 N.E.2d 365 (motion to withdraw made six days before trial held timely). The State also argues that the Bishops would have incurred many of the same expenses even if the State had withdrawn its exceptions much earlier. Finally, the State argues that the Bishops did not demonstrate that the withdrawal would result in injustice. Despite these arguments, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion.