Opinion ID: 2633651
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Assertedly defective voluntary manslaughter instruction

Text: Defendant asserts the trial court erred prejudicially in failing to instruct on its own motion on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter under an imperfect self defense theory. (See People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 674, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1.) He contends the error deprived him of rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution, warranting reversal of his conviction for the Clark murder. The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.40 that voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought when there is an intent to kill, and that there is no malice aforethought if the killing occurred upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. In the written version of CALJIC No. 8.40 given to the jury, the trial court crossed out the following language explaining imperfect self defense: there is no malice aforethought if the killing occurred ... in the honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend oneself against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury. The trial court gave a similarly modified version of CALJIC No. 8.50 distinguishing murder and manslaughter. It did not give CALJIC No. 5.17, which further explains the imperfect-self-defense theory of voluntary manslaughter. [29] In People v. Flannel we thus explained the doctrine of imperfect self-defense: [a]n honest but unreasonable belief that it is necessary to defend oneself from imminent peril to life or great bodily injury negates malice aforethought, the mental element necessary for murder, so that the chargeable offense is reduced to manslaughter. ( People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 674, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1, italics omitted; see also In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 773, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574.) We since have reaffirmed this doctrine, but have cautioned that it is narrow and will apply only when the defendant has an actual belief in the need for self-defense and only when the defendant fears immediate harm that ` must be instantly dealt with. ' ( In re Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 783, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574.) We have explained further that imperfect self-defense is not a true defense; it is rather a shorthand description of one form of the crime of voluntary manslaughter. ( People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 200, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) Thus, a trial court's duty to instruct on this theory arises whenever the evidence is such that a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant killed the victim in the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense. ( People v. Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 201, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) Here, there was no substantial evidence from which the jury could have concluded defendant killed Clark due to an honest but unreasonable belief that he needed to defend himself from an imminent threat to his life or to his bodily integrity. Neither defendant nor his experts testified defendant actually believed he had to kill Clark to defend himself from such an imminent threat. In support of the instruction, defendant points to his own testimony that when Clark was walking toward him with her finger pointed at him, he felt threatened and afraid and shot her out of a need for protection. He also points to his mental health experts' testimony that the killing of Clark was an act of survival. For example, Dr. Franz testified the events leading up to the shooting, including defendant's failure to perform sexually and Clark's taunts and physical threats, caused defendant to react like a frightened, abused child and to fire the gun as a defense mechanism to protect himself. Dr. Bird also explained defendant associated Clark with his abusive stepmother and shot her out of fear of not surviving himself. Contrary to defendant's contention, we do not read this testimony as supporting an inference that defendant believed he needed to defend himself from death or great bodily injury. Rather, Dr. Franz's and Dr. Bird's testimony is more susceptible of the interpretation that defendant feared for his emotional survival rather than that he feared for his physical survival. For example, Dr. Franz stated defendant lost a sense of his body and began to try to protect his essence, his soul, that last thread that was trying to be moral and solid and sane. Further, defendant himself testified only that he felt fear and a need for protection. He did not state what he feared and certainly never testified he feared his life was in danger or that he would suffer great bodily injury. The only testimony suggesting that defendant actually feared for his life came from Dr. Bird, who acknowledged it is ridiculous to fear for your own life when somebody is pointing a finger at you. That isolated comment did not constitute substantial evidence  that is, evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable persons could find ( People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094)  that defendant (a deputy sheriff armed with a revolver) feared great bodily injury or death from an unarmed 15-year-old girl. For these reasons, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct on the doctrine of imperfect self-defense.