Opinion ID: 2590307
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Claims Against Co-employee Pacheco

Text: [¶ 16] Our usual standard of review for orders granting summary judgment applies here as well, and we will not repeat it in detail. However, the matter of co-employee liability and the meaning conveyed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a) (LexisNexis 2009) (unless the employees intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury to the injured employee ...) have been before this Court on two recent occasions and we make reference to those cases because they do play a significant role in the resolution of the instant matter. See Bertagnolli v. Louderback, 2003 WY 50, ¶¶ 10-18, 67 P.3d 627, 630-33 (Wyo.2003). More recently, in Hannifan v. American National Bank of Cheyenne, 2008 WY 65, ¶¶ 33-35, 185 P.3d 679, 691-93 (Wyo.2008), we applied our holding in Bertagnolli to a case wherein a properly instructed jury found that a co-employee had acted with the requisite intent so as to create co-employee liability. [¶ 17] With respect to this summary judgment motion the district court made these findings: . . . The above-entitled case is currently before the Court on Defendant Gilbert Pacheco's motion for summary judgment. Defendant Pacheco asserts that he owes no liability to Plaintiff, a co-employee, because he had no knowledge, contribution, or negligence in the circumstances that resulted in Plaintiff's injury. This Court finds that no issue of fact arises as to whether Defendant willfully and wantonly disregarded Plaintiff's safety concerns which resulted in Plaintiff's injuries; summary judgment is granted for the following reasons: I. Background This case is a personal injury case resulting from a mining accident at the Solvay Chemicals, Inc. trona mine near Green River, Sweetwater County, Wyoming. An experienced operator of Solvay's roof bolter, Plaintiff Jose Loredo was employed to drive metal bolts into the mine's rock ceiling to protect against collapse or falling rocks in freshly mined, underground rooms. On August 14, 2002, the left tram on Plaintiff's roof bolter had not been working properly, and Plaintiff was forced to adjust power to the left side of the bolter in order to maneuver it correctly. Plaintiff's awkward tramming drove one of the bolter's tires into a corner of the mine wall and caused Plaintiff to get stuck. Working the roof bolter's levers, Plaintiff attempted to free the bolter by moving forward and backward. While he worked to free the bolter, Plaintiff inadvertently drove under unbolted mine ceiling. It was here that a slab of rock fell from the mine ceiling and rendered Plaintiff quadriplegic. Plaintiff brought a cause of action against Defendant Gilbert Pacheco, Plaintiff's supervisor at the time of the accident, for the willful, wanton, and intentional disregard of safety concerns raised by the Plaintiff. Defendant counters that no genuine issue of material fact arises as to whether he willfully and wantonly acted to cause Plaintiff's injury. II. Discussion . . . . The Wyoming court equated the concept of willful and wanton misconduct with the statutory language found in W.S. § 27-14-104(a)[FN1]. and found that a co-employee is liable for intentionally acting to cause physical harm or injury. Bertagnolli, ¶ 15, 67 P.3d at 632. A co-employee supervisor will be found to have intentionally caused physical harm to an employee and to have engaged in willful and wanton misconduct when the supervisor had knowledge of [a] dangerous condition and demonstrated a disregard of the risks through intentional acts. Id. ¶ 19, 67 P.3d at 634. The aggravating factor that distinguishes willful misconduct from ordinary negligence is the co-employee's state of mind that approaches intent to do harm. Smith v. Throckmartin, 893 P.2d 712, 714 (Wyo.1995) (citations omitted). An act is willful if it is done purposely, with knowledge-or misconduct of such a character as to evince a reckless disregard of consequences. Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188, 191 (Wyo.1989). FN1. Wyoming Statute § 27-14-104(a) (LexisNexis 2007) states, The rights and remedies provided in this act for an employee ... in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of all other rights and remedies against any employer... [or] employees acting within the scope of their employment unless the employees intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury to the injured employee.... Willful and wanton misconduct consists of intentional actions which recklessly disregard the safety of an employee. Bertagnolli, ¶ 15, 67 P.3d at 632. A situation in which a supervisory co-employee has knowledge of a hazardous condition and fails to correct it, although certainly sufficient to indicate ordinary negligence, is not sufficient to satisfy the much more stringent test of culpable negligence. Cockburn v. Terra Res., Inc., 794 P.2d 1334, 1344 (Wyo.1990). A supervisor is liable where he has intentionally acted or intentionally failed to act in reckless disregard of the consequences and under circumstances and conditions that a reasonable person would know, or have reason to know that such conduct would in a high degree of probability, result in harm to another. Bertagnolli, ¶ 15, 67 P.3d at 632 (citations omitted). Willful misconduct does not arise merely from a thoughtless, heedless or inadvertent act, or an error in judgment, it is more than mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement or confusion ... or simple inattention, but it is an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent. Smith, 893 P.2d at 714 (citations and quotations omitted). The Bertagnolli court reversed summary judgment and found material questions of fact existed as to whether the plaintiff's supervisors knew of the general risks surrounding the circumstances which resulted in plaintiff's injury. The supervisors had instructed the employee, under threat of termination, that he shovel ore rubble on a mine shuttle belt, but they refused to lock the shuttle belt in spite of the employee's requests and concerns over his safety. Id. ¶ 21, 67 P.3d at 634. As the employee worked, a sheave wheel caught and severed the back of his right foot; ultimately, the employee's leg had to be amputated below the knee. Id. ¶ 7, 67 P.3d at 630. The supervisors testified that they were unaware that the sheave wheel was unguarded, that company policies required the wheel to be locked, that the employee had requested a union steward, or that the employee had been threatened with termination if he did not work on the shuttle belt. Id. ¶ 24, 67 P.3d at 635. The court found that a question of fact remained over whether the supervisors knew of the broader dangers of the shuttle belt area beyond the unguarded sheave wheel. Id. ¶ 25, 67 P.3d at 635. The jury should have been permitted to determine whether the supervisors intentionally acted to cause physical harm or injury and whether their actions constituted willful and wanton misconduct. Id. Similarly, the court reversed summary judgment in a case in which the plaintiff had been injured in a fall on a known, but ignored, hidden grease spot on a metal surfaced boom. Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d at 194. The court found an issue of fact over whether some of the plaintiff's supervisory co-employees had recklessly disregarded the consequences of their conduct that a reasonable man would know, or have reason to know, that such conduct would, in a high degree of probability, result in substantial harm. Id. at 196 (citations omitted). The mine safety coordinator was uniquely aware of the dangerous condition of the boom and had heard the plaintiff's complaints about it but had refused to act and even destroyed the plaintiff's written maintenance request to have the boom cleaned. Id. at 196. A maintenance supervisor for the mine knew about the boom's condition but he refused to act upon the plaintiff's suggestion to improve safety measures. Id. at 197. Another maintenance supervisor had ignored the plaintiff's complaints about the condition of the boom and threatened to fire the plaintiff if he did not get on the boom to work or if he sought medical attention for his injuries. Id. at 197. Whether these supervisors had engaged in a willful or reckless departure from ordinary care was a question of fact for the jury. In contrast, the court granted summary judgment to the co-employees in McKennan v. Newman, 902 P.2d 1285, 1285 (Wyo. 1995), where an employee was killed by a wood chip-augur that entangled him when he tried to unclog it. The plaintiff had shown only ordinary negligence in producing evidence that co-employees had violated company safety policies and OSHA regulations. Id. at 1288. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the co-employees acted with knowledge or that the high probability of harm presented by the chip-augur was obvious. Id. Likewise, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact is raised as to whether Defendant willfully, recklessly, and intentionally disregarded Plaintiff's safety. The evidence does not demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact arises over whether Defendant thoughtlessly ignored Plaintiff's safety, made an extreme departure from ordinary care, and recklessly disregarded the dangerous condition presented by the roof bolter's problematic tramming function. Plaintiff testified that Defendant did not demand that Plaintiff should proceed with his work in an unreasonable or dangerous way. Q. Now, did Mr. Pacheco give you instructions on how to bolt the room? A. No. Q. He didn't need to do that, you knew? A. Yes. Q. You know how the bolting pattern is supposed to be? A. Yes. Q. One every four feet? A. Every four feet. Q. Do it from right to left? A. From right to left. Q. Okay. You had been doing it that way for years? A. Yes. (Loredo Dep. at 32, ll. 4-22.) Plaintiff had suggested to his supervisor that additional roof bolts could improve safety in the mine crosscuts; however, Defendant adhered to the mine's bolting plan and asserted that additional bolting would take too much work time. (Loredo Dep. at 79.) Plaintiff eventually requested a transfer to a different roof bolting position, which was denied by Defendant. (Loredo Dep. at 86.) The evidence indicates that Plaintiff informed Defendant of his concerns over the roof bolter's problematic tramming, but Defendant never threatened Plaintiff with a disciplinary action for notifying him of the defective roof bolter. Plaintiff testified, Mr. Pacheco told me that to go ahead and run the machine and they'll get it fixed in down shift. (Loredo Dep. at 74, 11. 23-24.) In fact, just prior to his accident, Plaintiff did not inform Defendant that the roof bolter was unsafe to operate because of the tramming problems. (Loredo Dep. at 34.) At the moment of his injury, Plaintiff did not know where Defendant Pacheco was or what he was doing. (Loredo Dep. at 39, 11, 10-12.) Although Plaintiff expressed concern for his safety, the evidence does not suggest Defendant intentionally or recklessly disregarded Plaintiff's safety. The evidence presented does not raise an issue of fact over whether Defendant exercised an extreme departure from ordinary care and recklessly disregarded the dangerous condition presented by the roof bolter's problematic tramming function. There is no indication ... of an aggravating factor suggesting that Defendant intended to do harm. Smith, 893 P.2d at 714. Defendant's adherence to the roof bolting plan and assurance that the roof bolter would be fixed in the down shift do not rise to the level of purposeful and reckless disregard of consequences to Plaintiff's safety. Case, 776 P.2d at 191. Defendant owes no liability for Plaintiff's injuries. [¶ 18] We conclude the district court correctly determined that there is no genuine issue of material fact apparent in the record on appeal that Pacheco acted willfully, wantonly, or intentionally so as to contribute to Loredo's injuries. Thus, as a co-employee, he remains immune from Loredo's action against him.