Opinion ID: 2394901
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The question of parole

Text: The jury during the course of its deliberations sent a series of questions to the trial judge. The first one was: Life Imprisonment how many years until parole. The trial judge responded: This question cannot be answered and your decision must be made based on the factors contained in the paper entitled Findings & Sentence Determination. At trial counsel for Bowers asked the court that the jury be instructed that for the purposes of their determination a life sentence, sentence to life imprisonment means a sentence to life imprisonment and they are to follow that. To us it is argued that it is not improper to inform the jury, at the request of the defendant, that in the event of a life sentence the defendant will not be eligible for parole until he has served a certain number of years; that the defendant is not under the same restrictions as the State regarding the type of information that he may wish the jury to consider, for while the State in proving aggravating circumstances is limited to a showing that one or more of the aggravating circumstances specifically listed under Art. 27, sec. 413(d) exists, ... the defendant may prove any mitigating circumstances. (Emphasis by Bowers.) He further argues, Additionally, although the possibility that a defendant will be paroled is clearly not a relevant concern if the question is, should the defendant therefore be executed, Poole [ v. State, 295 Md. 167, 453 A.2d 1218 (1983)], it does seem that the fact that the defendant will not be paroled until a certain number of years has passed is a relevant concern if the question is, should the defendant therefore not be executed. (Emphasis in original.) Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27, ง 413(c)(1) states: (1) The following type of evidence is admissible in this proceeding: (i) Evidence relating to any mitigating circumstance listed in subsection (g); (ii) Evidence relating to any aggravating circumstance listed in subsection (d) of which the State has notified the defendant pursuant to ง 412(b); (iii) Evidence of any prior criminal convictions, pleas of guilty or nolo contendere, or the absence of such prior convictions or pleas, to the same extent admissible in other sentencing procedures; (iv) Any presentence investigation report. However, any recommendation as to sentence contained in the report is not admissible; and (v) Any other evidence that the court deems of probative value and relevant to sentence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any statements. In Poole v. State, 295 Md. 167, 453 A.2d 1218 (1983), the Court was faced with the prosecution's inflamatory arguments to the jury pertaining to parole. Judge Couch said for the Court: In our view, reference to the possibility of future parole was improper and, upon remand, should not again be made. We have previously addressed the issue of the propriety of the prosecutor commenting on the possibility of parole and clearly held that such comments are improper. See Shoemaker v. State, 228 Md. 462, 180 A.2d 682 (1962). In Shoemaker, Chief Judge Brune stated: `The statements with regard to parole in the context in which they were made here, we think, exceeded the limits of permissible comment by the prosecutor. This Court has never had occasion, as far as we are informed, to consider the question whether remarks relating to possible parole, or similar remarks, constituted reversible error. Of course, each case depends a good deal on its own facts, even where the remarks may fall into the same general classification. References by a prosecutor to the right of appeal, the possibility of executive clemency and parole of a defendant have, however, been considered by many other courts. Although there are decisions each way, we think that the better reasoning and the weight of authority are against the propriety of such arguments. One reason in support of what we think is the better rule is that arguments should be based upon the evidence, but the principal objection to arguments of this type goes even deeper and is exemplified, we think in the present case. `The chief vice of the reference in this case to the possibility of parole is that it suggested to the jury that it might in part shift its responsibility for a finding of the defendant's guilt to some other body.' Id. at 468-69, 180 A.2d at 685 (numerous citations omitted). In the instant case, we believe this type of argument is likely to allow the jury to disregard its duty to determine aggravating and mitigating factors, and to then balance one against the other as required by Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, ง 413, before imposing the death penalty. Any consideration of the possibility of parole as such simply is irrelevant and obviously prejudicial; we cannot condone such argument. 295 Md. at 196-97, 453 A.2d at 1233. Evidence as to the length of time an individual might have to serve under a life sentence before becoming eligible for parole would not, in our view, be of probative value and relevant to sentence.... Under the statute such evidence thus would not be admissible. The responsibility of the jury is to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors and to determine whether the sentence should be death or life imprisonment. The actual length of time one might have to serve under a life sentence is no more relevant to that determination than the means which the State would use to impose the death penalty or whether there might be court proceedings subsequent to the determination of sentence by way of appeal, post conviction or federal habeas corpus.