Opinion ID: 625291
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Habeas Relief Under AEDPA is Warranted in Peak's Case

Text: Peak's Confrontation Clause right was unquestionably violated. At Peak's trial, the prosecution admitted into evidence over Peak's objectionand played three timeshis non-testifying, co-conspirator's testimonial hearsay confession implicating Peak as the triggerman. Meeks never took the stand, and the exception in Crawford did not apply because Meeks was available and Peak had not had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him. This constitutional violation is clear under the simplest, most straightforward application of the Confrontation Clause and Supreme Court jurisprudence, as outlined above. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 131, 119 S.Ct. 1887 ([T]he admission of a nontestifying accomplice's confession, which shifted responsibility and implicated the defendant as the triggerman, `plainly denie[s] the defendant the right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause.' (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965)) (internal alteration omitted)). Despite this incontrovertible violation, the Kentucky Supreme Court plurality ruled that Peak's Confrontation Clause rights were not violated. The Kentucky Supreme Court thus unreasonably applied the Sixth Amendment to Peak's case and unreasonably extended a legal principle that permits the use of testimonial hearsay when the prosecution is unable to call its witnesses to the stand, see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-43, 124 S.Ct. 1354, to situations where the prosecution is able to do so but chooses not to. It also permitted the admission of a non-testifying accomplice's confession implicating Peak, contrary to the rule in Bruton, 391 U.S. at 132, 88 S.Ct. 1620. Habeas relief is therefore warranted under the standards set forth in § 2254(d)(1), as interpreted by Williams and Harrington, and their progeny. Also indicative of the Kentucky Supreme Court's unreasonable application of the Confrontation Clause in Peak's case is the fact that the Kentucky Supreme Court itself recently reconsidered the issue and came to the opposite conclusion. See Coleman v. Commonwealth, No. 2008-SC-72-MR, 2009 WL 3526657, 2009 Ky. Unpub. LEXIS 128 (Ky. Oct. 29, 2009). The Kentucky Supreme Court majority in Coleman correctly held that there is a Confrontation Clause violation where the prosecution admits witnesses' untested accusations against a defendant without calling the witnesses to the stand, despite the fact that the witnesses [are] present in the courthouse under the prosecution's subpoena and are able and allegedly willing to testify. Id. at , 2009 Ky. Unpub. LEXIS 128 at -11. The Kentucky Supreme Court went so far as to hold that [t]he only possible conclusion in this situation is that the defendant's [Confrontation Clause] rights were violated. Id. at , 2009 Ky. Unpub. LEXIS 128 at . While the fact that the relevant Coleman and Peak factual scenarios are nearly identical but yielded different results does not necessarily establish unreasonableness under § 2254(d)(2), it does raise[] a red flag to possible `extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice system.' Rice v. White, 660 F.3d 242, 255 (6th Cir.2011). Finally, one of our sister circuits recently applied Crawford to a habeas claim nearly identical to Peak's claim. See Jones v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030, 1041 (7th Cir.2011). In Jones, during a defendant's trial for robbery and murder, the prosecution admitted a testimonial, hearsay accusation of a declarant who had been subpoenaed by the prosecution and was available to testify, without calling that witness to the stand. Id. The court found no reasonable room for doubt that the Confrontation Clause was violated by this conduct and that habeas relief was warranted due to the state court's clear error, beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement, in permitting such a violation. Id. at 1043, 1052. In sum, the Kentucky Supreme Court plurality was objectively unreasonable in its application of the Sixth Amendment, and its decision was contrary to clearly established federal law.