Opinion ID: 201336
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Downward Departure Based on Diminished Mental Capacity

Text: 52 Cheal argues that the district court erred by failing to hold a hearing on whether she was entitled to a downward departure based on diminished mental capacity. 11 The decision to hold an evidentiary hearing during the sentencing phase is within the discretion of the district court. United States v. Robles-Torres, 109 F.3d 83, 85 (1st Cir.1997). Consequently, if the district court had denied a request from Cheal for such a hearing, we would review for abuse of discretion. 53 In this case, however, Cheal did not even make such a request. It is ... clear that, at a bare minimum, he who expects to receive a discretionary dispensation must first seek it. Thus, the failure to ask the district court to convene an evidentiary hearing ordinarily spells defeat for a contention that one should have been held. United States v. Tardiff, 969 F.2d 1283, 1286 (1st Cir.1992). That is so because our review under these circumstances is for plain error only. 54 Although Cheal registered no such objection at the sentencing hearing, she now contends that the court erred in its description of the evaluations from the psychiatrists for the government and the defense. At the sentencing hearing, the court said that the reports agree that she's not entitled to a finding of diminished capacity. In fact, the defense psychiatrist's evaluation stated that, while Cheal was competent to stand trial, it is my opinion that she would meet the statutory criteria of the United States sentencing guidelines for diminished capacity. He added that Cheal did ... have a significantly reduced mental capacity. 12 55 At the same time, however, the evaluation of the defense psychiatrist contained observations suggesting that Cheal possessed a normal mental capacity, at least at the time of the evaluation. It noted that she did not appear to have any disorganization in her thought flow, nor does she suffer from any hallucinations. Her intellectual faculties appear to be intact with no cognitive deficits or decrease in her intellectual ability. Ultimately, the psychiatrist concluded that she knew that what she was doing was wrong, but did not fully appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct because, in her psychotic state, [she] believed that what she was doing was proper and moral. 56 Although the district court erred when it stated that both psychiatrists had the same opinion as to Cheal's entitlement to a departure based on mental capacity (they did not), the more critical consideration for plain-error review is whether the reports were so divergent that the court could not reasonably rely on them to reject Cheal's claim of diminished mental capacity without holding an evidentiary hearing. They were not. The court committed no plain error when it stated, on the evidence before it, that I do not believe that any of the grounds advanced by the defendant are sufficient for a departure.