Opinion ID: 878269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Double Jeopardy/Multiple Convictions

Text: Defendant next contends that constitutional and statutory provisions against double jeopardy were violated when he was convicted of both aggravated burglary and aggravated assault. He argues, first, that under the facts of this case the aggravated assault charge was completely merged with the aggravated burglary, and, second, that one fact  the use of a knife  provided the aggravating circumstance raising both the burglary to aggravated burglary and the assault to aggravated assault. These contentions fail. The double jeopardy prohibition contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution has been applied to state proceedings since 1969. Benton v. Maryland (1969), 395 U.S. 784, 796, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2063, 23 L.Ed.2d 707, 717. This prohibition protects a defendant from both multiple prosecutions for offenses arising out of the same transaction and from multiple punishments imposed at a single prosecution for the same offense. See North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-665. Where, as here, defendant was tried at a single prosecution for all of the statutory crimes in question, the issue is one of multiple punishments. State v. Close (1981), Mont., 623 P.2d 940, 949, 38 St.Rep. 177, 188. The analysis that this Court has consistently applied in determining whether one offense is included within another offense is the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306, 309. In Blockburger, the Court ruled: The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182, 76 L.Ed. at 309. The Blockburger test is codified in section 46-11-502, MCA. This Court has adopted the approach whereby the analysis is applied to the statutes in question rather than to the facts of the individual case. State v. Ritchson (1981), Mont., 630 P.2d 234, 237, 38 St.Rep. 1015, 1018. In determining whether multiple punishments should be allowed for offenses arising out of the same transaction, the dispositive question then becomes whether the legislature intended to provide for multiple punishments. State v. Close (1981), supra, 623 P.2d at 949, 38 St.Rep. at 188. Blockburger's analysis must stand or fall on the working of the statutes alone, not on the indictment. Close, 623 P.2d at 950, 38 St.Rep. at 189. See also, State v. Buckman (1981), Mont., 630 P.2d 743, 745, 38 St.Rep. 1007, 1009; State v. Coleman (1979), Mont., 605 P.2d 1000, 1008-1009, 36 St.Rep. 1134, 1138-1140A; State v. Perry (1979), 180 Mont. 364, 368, 590 P.2d 1129, 1131; State v. Davis & Close (1978), 176 Mont. 196, 199, 577 P.2d 375, 377; State v. Radi, supra, 176 Mont. at 462, 578 P.2d at 1176. There are several bases for concluding that the legislature intended to permit punishment for both aggravated burglary and the related felony of aggravated assault. First, in applying the Blockburger analysis to the statutes involved, we do not conclude that the offense of aggravated assault is the same offense as aggravated burglary. It is clear that one can commit aggravated burglary without committing aggravated assault and that one can commit aggravated assault without committing aggravated burglary. Second, Montana case law interpreting the State's burglary statutes has consistently distinguished the crime of burglary from any other offense that the burglar intends to commit and has allowed prosecution for both. The essential elements of burglary have always been the wrongful presence of the burglar with an intent to commit another offense. It is not necessary to demonstrate that the related offense was in fact committed where the intent to commit it is shown. This Court has always observed that difference: As early as Territory v. Willard, 8 Mont. 328, 331, 332, 21 P. 301, 302, this court noted the distinctions between burglary and larceny, stating: `It is plain from the definitions that they [burglary and larceny] are two distinct crimes, and the larceny is not necessarily included in the burglary. In order to sustain the indictment for burglary it would only be essential to prove the felonious entry with the intent, while to convict on the charge of larceny, it becomes necessary to show the taking, for the entry may have been without any felonious intent. Burglary, on the other hand, may, as it frequently does, exist without actual theft, and larceny may be committed without burglary. Therefore, in making out the case of larceny, the prosecution need not have shown any burglarious intent or entering; it became only necessary to prove the usual elements of theft,  that is, the venue, the identity of the accused, the felonious taking, the intent to convert to the taker's use, the property stolen, its value, the ownership, and that the offense occurred within the time limited for such prosecutions   .' The various decisions of this court since the Willard case, supra, have not materially departed from this explanation of the two crimes. Morigeau v. State of Montana & Ed Ellsworth (1967), 149 Mont. 85, 89, 423 P.2d 60, 62. Since burglary is based upon the wrongful entry or remaining with the requisite intent to commit an offense, the burglary occurs at the time of unlawful entrance upon the premises. State v. Solis (1973), 163 Mont. 293, 295, 516 P.2d 1157, 1158. See also State v. Harris (1972), 159 Mont. 425, 430, 498 P.2d 1222, 1225; State v. Moran (1963), 142 Mont. 423, 384 P.2d 777. The intent and the entry are determinative. ... In Perkins on Criminal Law, p. 166 (1957), the author states: `Larceny is usually the purpose for which burglary is committed but it is not essential to guilt that the intruder succeed in carrying out the intent with which the house was broken into, nor that it should be for the purpose of stealing. There is no common-law burglary, however, unless the intrusion is perpetrated with an intent to commit some felony. Thus if a rogue breaks into the dwelling of another at night with intent to commit murder he is guilty of burglary even if he leaves without finding his intended victim and without having committed any felony in the house. On the other hand he would not be guilty of burglary if he broke in for the purpose of trespass only even if he subsequently did commit some felony during his wrongful visit.' State v. Austad (1975), 166 Mont. 425, 428, 533 P.2d 1069, 1070. The third basis for finding that the legislature intended multiple punishments is its adoption of the Montana Criminal Code of 1973 and its subsequent amendment of the burglary statutes. The 1975 revision added unlawfully after the requirement that a burglar knowingly enters or remains ... This change reflects a clear intention to return to the common law view that the gravamen of burglary was the threat to person resulting from the wrongful intrusion into someone's occupied structure. Annotations, section 45-6-204, MCA, at 200. State v. Shannon (1976), 171 Mont. 25, 27, 554 P.2d 743, 744. By contrast, the crime of aggravated assault deals with the more serious forms of assault. The crime of battery is merged with the assault provision and in all but subsection (1)(c) of the aggravated assault statute an actual physical contact or battery is required. Subsection (1)(c) requires reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury caused by use of a weapon. Annotation, section 45-5-202, MCA, at 146. The focus of the aggravated assault statute is on the victim and the actual injury to him or his reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury caused by use of a weapon. While the crux of the burglary statute is to prevent the threat to a person resulting from the unlawful intrusion into his property, it is not necessary that a burglary victim be harmed in any way or that the victim even be aware of the threat to his person from the unlawful intrusion. The legislature unmistakably intended multiple punishments for the offenses of aggravated burglary and aggravated assault. If a person enters or remains unlawfully in an occupied structure with the intent to commit an aggravated assault, he has committed a burglary. If he then commits the aggravated assault, he may be convicted of it and sentenced for it in addition to conviction and sentencing for the burglary. Defendant's second argument, that he was placed in double jeopardy since the use of a knife was the one aggravating circumstance raising both crimes to the aggravated level, is without merit. Again, the Blockburger analysis as applied to the statutes will not result in a finding of double jeopardy. In addition, under the facts of the instant case there is still no possibility that the use of the knife raised both crimes to the aggravated level. Defendant was charged with aggravated assault under subsection (1)(b) of 45-5-202, MCA. The jury was instructed to find him guilty of aggravated assault if it found that he had purposely or knowingly caused bodily injury to the victim with a weapon. The factor raising the crime from simple assault (purposely or knowingly causing bodily injury to another) to aggravated assault was the use of a weapon  the knife. The aggravating factors raising the burglary to aggravated burglary were two-fold. The elements of simple burglary are that a person enter or remain unlawfully in an occupied structure with the purpose to commit an offense therein. Aggravated burglary requires (1) the defendant's intent that the offense be a felony and, (2) that in effecting entry, committing the offense or in flight thereafter, the defendant purposely, knowingly, or negligently inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury upon another. Section 45-6-204(2)(b), MCA. Here, the jury was instructed that in order to find defendant guilty of aggravated burglary, it would have to find: that he entered or remained unlawfully in the occupied structure, with the purpose to commit aggravated assault, and that in the course of committing the offense he purposely, knowingly, or negligently inflicted bodily injury upon anyone. The aggravating factor for assault was use of the weapon. The aggravating factors for the burglary were that the offense was a felony and that defendant purposely, knowingly, or negligently inflicted bodily injury upon anyone. There was ample evidence presented to the jury to support conviction for aggravated assault (bodily injury with the knife) and a conviction for aggravated burglary (an intent to commit aggravated assault and bodily injury resulting from choking the victim or hitting her on the head). The jury instructions given on aggravated burglary allowed an independent conviction for the burglary without a conviction for aggravated assault. The jury could have convicted defendant of aggravated burglary if it found that the State proved intent to commit the felony (aggravated assault). The jury could have found the related aggravated assault if it found that defendant placed the victim in serious apprehension of bodily injury with a weapon by holding a knife in front of her face. Finally, the jury could have found that defendant committed the underlying aggravated assault by inflicting serious bodily injury upon the victim. The attending physicians testified that Terry received life threatening wounds. Defendant was not placed in double jeopardy.