Opinion ID: 698317
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Claims in this Case

Text: 43 Our review function in this case is limited, for district courts act with a real measure of discretion in granting a fee award under section 1988. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 902 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. at 1550 n. 19 (A district court is expressly empowered to exercise discretion in determining whether an award is to be made and if so its reasonableness.); Kattan by Thomas v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 278 (D.C.Cir.1993) (A district court's discretion as to the proper hourly rate to award counsel should not be upset absent clear misapplication of legal principles, arbitrary fact finding, or unprincipled disregard for the record evidence.); Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 901 (D.C.Cir.1980) (en banc ) (It is common learning that an attorney's fee award by the District Court will be upset on appeal only if it represents an abuse of discretion.). This limited standard of review is appropriate in view of the district court's superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941. 44 In this case, plaintiffs clearly met their burden and their requested rates were properly accorded a presumption of reasonableness. Plaintiffs submitted their counsels' declarations attesting that they charged below-market rates for non-economic, public-spirited reasons. 19 Plaintiffs submitted data demonstrating their attorneys' experience in the legal profession and in litigating complex federal court cases, as well as information probative of their attorneys' skill and reputation. Finally, plaintiffs submitted a great deal of evidence regarding prevailing market rates for complex federal litigation. This included the Laffey matrix, the U.S. Attorney's Office matrix, affidavits attesting to increases in the market rates since the original Laffey matrix, and memorandum opinions in district court cases which relied on these matrices. 45 The District, on the other hand, submitted little in rebuttal. First, the District attempted to challenge plaintiffs' requested hourly rates by suggesting that these rates were higher than the established billing rates of attorneys who litigate complex federal cases. In support, the District submitted a single declaration from an Assistant Deputy in its office recounting cases which, for the most part, were inapposite to the case at bar: attorneys in a majority of those cases never requested fees at prevailing market rates; nor did they suggest that they charged below-market rates for non-economic reasons; rather they simply sought the rates at which they typically billed clients. See Zielinski Declaration at 3-8, J.A. at I-219-24. One of the attorneys mentioned in Zielinski's declaration requested and received prevailing market rates in line with the Laffey matrix. See id. at 8, J.A. at I-224; Fischbach v. District of Columbia, Civ. Action No. 87-0646 (D.D.C. Jan. 3, 1993), J.A. at I-254. Simply put, although the District does not bear the ultimate burden in this case, its evidence did not come close to rebutting the presumption of reasonableness plaintiffs established. The District Court therefore correctly rel[ied] solely upon plaintiffs' unrebutted evidence. Covington, 839 F.Supp. at 900. 46 Second, the District attempted to argue that plaintiffs are only entitled to the rates they regularly charge, i.e., that these rates are in fact the prevailing market rates. This argument was considered and rejected by this court in SOCM, and, therefore, merits little attention here. As the SOCM court stated, [t]he result sought by plaintiffs, that is a fee award based on prevailing market rates rather than the actual rates of [plaintiffs' attorneys], is not only not inconsistent with the express intent of Congress, but rather accomplishes Congress' express goals. 20 857 F.2d at 1521. Thus, the en banc court concluded: Henceforth, the prevailing market rate method heretofore used in awarding fees to traditional for-profit firms and public interest legal services organizations shall apply as well to those attorneys who practice privately and for profit but at reduced rates reflecting non-economic goals. Id. at 1524. The District Court properly dismissed the District's argument that plaintiffs are only entitled to an award based on the fees their attorneys routinely charge clients. 47 Finally, the District argues that the court should define the relevant market, for purposes of determining the prevailing market rates, narrowly, as including only plaintiff attorneys in civil rights, employment, or discrimination actions. Covington, 839 F.Supp. at 897. The District Court rejected this narrow definition, noting that the District failed to show that a civil rights and employment discrimination market actually exists independent of attorneys who handle other types of complex federal litigation. Id. at 898 n. 8. And even assuming, arguendo, the existence of such a submarket, the trial court found no evidence that submarket rates are lower than the prevailing rates in the broader legal market. Id. at 898. The District only weakly challenges this determination on appeal, 21 so we are hard-pressed to find even a compelling argument to address. 48 The Senate Report accompanying the enactment of section 1988 suggests that Congress envisioned rates to be set according to standards in other types of complex federal litigation: It is intended that the amount of fees awarded under [Sec. 1988] be governed by the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases[,] and not be reduced because the rights may be nonpecuniary in nature. Blum, 465 U.S. at 893, 104 S.Ct. at 1546 (quoting S.REP. NO. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, pp. 5908, 5913). 22 The point is that Congress after all did not simply express its intent that the fees would attract counsel, but rather that they would be 'adequate to attractcompetent counsel.'  SOCM, 857 F.2d at 1521 (quoting S.REP. NO. 1011 at 6, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, at 5913). 49 In short, we can find no basis to overturn the District Court's determination that the relevant market is that of complex federal litigation.