Opinion ID: 785414
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Demonstrating Municipal Liability

Text: 29 In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the Supreme Court established that [l]ocal governing bodies... can be sued directly under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers. Id. at 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018. The Court reached this conclusion by first holding that municipalities were persons within the meaning of § 1983. Monell then found that the language of § 1983, which provides that [e]very person who... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any... person ... to the deprivation of rights... secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable to the party injured, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added), requires a causal connection between the actions of the municipality itself and the alleged constitutional violation. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Demonstrating that the municipality itself caused or is implicated in the constitutional violation is the touchstone of establishing that a municipality can be held liable for unconstitutional actions taken by municipal employees. 30 Monell established that alleging that a municipal policy or ordinance is itself unconstitutional is always sufficient to establish the necessary causal connection between the municipality and the constitutional deprivation, because an employee's act of enforcing an unconstitutional municipal policy may be considered the act of the municipality itself. Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018; see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). Conversely, constitutional torts committed by city employees without official sanction or authority do not typically implicate the municipality in the deprivation of constitutional rights, and therefore the employer-employee relationship is in itself insufficient to establish the necessary causation. Id. Thus, a city cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. 31 Later cases have considerably broadened the concept of official municipal action. In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, the Court recognized that although the phrase `official policy' often refers to formal rules or understandings ... that are intended to, and do, establish fixed plans of action to be followed ... consistently and over time, a city frequently chooses a course of action tailored to a particular situation and not intended to control decisions in later situations. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480-81, 106 S.Ct. 1292. Thus, when a city decides to adopt [a] particular course of action[,] ... it surely represents an act of official government `policy' as that term is commonly understood. Id. at 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292. It is not necessary, therefore, for plaintiffs to prove that a municipality has followed a particular course of action repeatedly in order to establish the existence of a municipal policy; rather, a single action taken by a municipality is sufficient to expose it to liability. 32 Moreover, municipal liability does not lie only where the official policy or ordinance is itself unconstitutional. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, New York, 783 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir.1986). Where a city's official policy is constitutional, but the city causes its employees to apply it unconstitutionally, such that the unconstitutional application might itself be considered municipal policy, the city may be held liable for its employees' unconstitutional acts. Such circumstances may be found, for example, where the city is aware that its policy may be unconstitutionally applied by inadequately trained employees but the city consciously chooses not to train them, City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 387, 109 S.Ct. 1197, or where the city's official policy on the reasonable use of force in arrests is valid, but the city's actual practice is to use excessive force, see Fiacco, 783 F.2d at 327 (stating that the practice of using excessive force can be the basis for municipal liability even though the city's policy on force is itself constitutional). 33 Where plaintiffs allege that their rights were deprived not as a result of the enforcement of an unconstitutional official policy or ordinance, but by the unconstitutional application of a valid policy, or by a city employee's single tortious decision or course of action, the inquiry focuses on whether the actions of the employee in question may be said to represent the conscious choices of the municipality itself. Such an action constitutes the act of the municipality and therefore provides a basis for municipal liability where it is taken by, or is attributable to, one of the city's authorized policymakers. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-82, 106 S.Ct. 1292. Thus, even a single action by a decisionmaker who possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered, id., is sufficient to implicate the municipality in the constitutional deprivation for the purposes of § 1983. 34 More often than not, however, plaintiffs allege constitutional deprivations at the hands of the lower-level municipal employees to whom some authority has been delegated, rather than at the hands of those officials with final policymaking authority. While allowing the municipality to be held liable on the basis of the mere delegation of authority by a policymaking official would result in respondeat superior liability, allowing delegation, without more, to defeat municipal liability would contravene the remedial purposes of § 1983. Therefore, § 1983 plaintiffs may establish that the city is liable for their injuries by proving that the authorized policymakers approve[d] a subordinate's decision and the basis for it. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (plurality opinion). 35 Thus, when a subordinate municipal official is alleged to have committed the constitutional violation, municipal liability turns on the plaintiffs' ability to attribute the subordinates' conduct to the actions or omissions of higher ranking officials with policymaking authority. One means of doing so, of course, is to establish that a policymaker ordered or ratified the subordinates' actions. See Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 803 (2d Cir.1986) (holding that liability could be premised on sheriff's ordering of unconstitutional strip searches). Another method of implicating a policymaking official through subordinates' conduct is to show that the policymaker was aware of a subordinate's unconstitutional actions, and consciously chose to ignore them, effectively ratifying the actions. See, e.g., Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep't, 971 F.2d 864, 870-71 (2d Cir.1992) (stating that municipal liability lies where the subordinate's misconduct is so manifest, as to imply the constructive acquiescence of senior policymaking officials). Thus, where a policymaking official exhibits deliberate indifference to constitutional deprivations caused by subordinates, such that the official's inaction constitutes a deliberate choice, that acquiescence may be properly thought of as a city `policy or custom' that is actionable under § 1983. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (citations omitted); see also Vann v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1040, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995), Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 63 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that sheriff's acquiescence in unconstitutional retaliation could be inferred from his tolerance and encouragement of harassment of plaintiffs). Moreover, because a single action on a policymaker's part is sufficient to create a municipal policy, a single instance of deliberate indifference to subordinates' actions can provide a basis for municipal liability. 36