Opinion ID: 2353802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: On Defendant's Request For Reargument

Text: The defendant Dion seeks rehearing of this appeal on the strength of what he claims to be the theory upon which the trial proceeded below. This aspect of the motion contends this Court acted on its own initiative in sustaining the plaintiff's right to maintain this action under 11 V.S.A. § 491 after its corporate charter had been revoked for failure to file its annual report. He argues that this issue was not available for review since the court below and counsel acquiesced in the theory that the first Black River Corporation had no standing in the chancery court and this misconception became the law of the trial, binding this Court in the disposition of the case on appeal. The defendant argues that the application of this rule requires a reversal of the decree. And since we held the assignment of the second corporation to be without force and effect, the entire cause should be dismissed for want of a plaintiff who could maintain the action. By this reasoning, the defendant calls upon the Court to bar the action on an issue that should have been raised by a proper pleading at the first opportunity. By proceeding to trial without a plea of nul tiel corporation, or a motion to this effect, by way of answer, the issue was waived and not properly before the Court. Hendy Bros., Inc. v. Tucker (April 1967) 126 Vt. ___, 229 A.2d 301, 303. The doctrine of the law of the trial applies to rulings by the court below, which are accepted by all parties without objection. It may apply, too, where the trial proceeds on a certain theory in which the court and the parties are impliedly agreed. But the rule is merely one of appellate practice and subject to the power of the court to depart from it in a proper case. Perkins v. Hydro-Electric Corp., 106 Vt. 367, 415-417, 177 A. 631. The record here affords no justification for the application of the rule. The evidence which established that the plaintiff's corporate charter had been revoked was erroneously interjected into the complainant's case by the defendant. It was received as the defendant's exhibit A, but over the plaintiff's timely objection and exception. There was no acquiescence by the plaintiff that this question should become an issue in the case. In an obvious attempt to meet this problem, the plaintiff amended its complaint and introduced evidence of the formation of the second Black River Corporation and the purported assignment of the pending action to the successor corporation. All of this was opposed by the defendants. There was no common or mutual acquiescence in any of the rulings involved in this development of the trial. The defendant complains that this turn of events misled him in the conduct of his defense. He refers us to a question asked by the chancellor and directed to plaintiff's counsel as to why this action could not be maintained in the name of the old corporation under the section (11 V.S.A. § 491) you just referred to? Counsel for the plaintiff indicated it might have been so maintained except for its assignment to the second corporation. The defendant represents that this concession by plaintiff's counsel caused him to forego his defense on the merits and concentrate on the invalidity of the assignment. If these considerations led the defendant to abandon his defense to pursue a dilatory matter, it was a tactic of his choosing. The defendant was given full opportunity to present his defense against either or both plaintiffs. When called upon by the chancellor to proceed with his proof, he elected to rest his cause at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence. Later in the trial, when the court continued the cause to allow the plaintiff to produce further evidence in support of its amendment to the complaint, it relieved the defendants from having rested their case,so that if either defendant desired to introduce further evidence when the court reconvened, they were at liberty to do so. Having declined this opportunity of presenting evidence on the merits of the controversy, the defendant's claim that he was misled in this respect, is unavailing. The remaining point of the defendant's motion refers to evidence upon which he claims an equity equal or superior to that created by the plaintiff's executory contract of sale. The evidence, which the defendant asserts was overlooked or misapprehended, appears in the testimony of one of the plaintiff's employees in relating that the defendant's wife had told himwe had made a $750 deposit and have bought this property. We take this statement to mean only that the defendant and his wife believed they had bought the property by their deposit of $750. This apparently was the construction afforded by the chancellor. The defendant's equity at this point of time was not the equivalent of the plaintiff's option which had already ripened into a binding contract. If the defendant had done anything more than make a partial payment, it was incumbent upon him to present evidence to this effect. Without such proof, the bare payment of a deposit to some person unknown cannot effectively compete with the contract of sale exhibited by the plaintiff. Insofar as the motion seeks to challenge the provision in the plaintiff's contract concerning liquidated damages, he advances a question that was not presented in his original brief. It is inappropriate for reargument. Since the opinion and entry order have been withheld pending disposition of the motion for reargument, we have taken the occasion to revise the next to the last paragraph of the opinion. This revision does not affect the result. Request for reargument denied. Let full entry go down.