Opinion ID: 4565247
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of Section 1254a

Text: In construing the scope of any jurisdictional statute, we are guided by the well-established presumption in favor of judicial review over colorable constitutional claims, see Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (“[W]here 32 RAMOS V. WOLF Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.”), as well as over challenges to agency actions, see Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1905 (2020) (beginning its reviewability analysis with the APA’s “basic presumption of judicial review [for] one ‘suffering legal wrong because of agency action’” (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967))); Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347, 1356 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The courts have long recognized . . . a presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative actions.”). “This presumption, like all presumptions used in interpreting statutes, may be overcome by specific language or specific legislative history that is a reliable indicator of congressional intent.” Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984); see also Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 141 (“[O]nly upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review.” (citation omitted)). Keeping these principles in mind, we turn first to the text of the statute. See Los Angeles Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 795, 802 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e start, as we must, with the text of the statute.”). Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) precludes review of “any determination . . . with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state under this subsection.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A). The statute does not define the phrase “any determination” except to use it in immediate reference to “the designation . . . of a foreign state” for TPS. However, the Supreme Court has placed significance on the term “determination” in its analysis of a similar judicial review bar provision in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of the 1986 (“Reform Act”), which states: “There shall be no administrative or judicial review of a determination RAMOS V. WOLF 33 respecting an application for adjustment of status” under the Reform Act’s Special Agricultural Workers (“SAW”) amnesty program. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 486 n.6 (1991) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(1)). According to the Court in McNary, the “critical words” in that statute “describe the provision as referring only to review ‘of a determination respecting an application’ for SAW status,” and “[s]ignificantly, the reference to ‘a determination’ describes a single act rather than a group of decisions or a practice or procedure employed in making decisions.” McNary, 498 U.S. at 491– 92 (emphasis in original). When read in the context of the surrounding statutory provisions, the Court concluded that this judicial review bar precluded only “direct review of individual denials of SAW status, rather than . . . general collateral challenges to unconstitutional practices and policies used by the agency in processing applications.” Id. at 492. Two years later, the Court reached the same conclusion in the context of another statutory provision that limited review over “determination[s] respecting . . . application[s] for adjustment of status.” See Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) (“CSS”) (analyzing 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)). Applying McNary, the Court found that the “language setting the limits of the jurisdictional bar ‘describes the denial of an individual application.’” Id. at 56 (quotation omitted). Consequently, the Court concluded that “an action challenging the legality of a regulation without referring to or relying on the denial of any individual application” was not barred from judicial review under the statute. Id. at 56. The textual similarities between section 1254a(b)(5)(A) and the provisions at issue in McNary and CSS, see 8 U.S.C. 34 RAMOS V. WOLF § 1160(e)(1), § 1255a(f), provide us an important starting point for understanding the scope of the TPS statute’s judicial review bar. Specifically, like the provisions in McNary and CSS, section 1254a(b)(5)(A)’s reference to “determination” limits the scope of the provision to individual decisions regarding the designation of a foreign country for TPS. Thus, the provision generally precludes direct review of the Secretary’s country-specific TPS determinations, but does not bar review of “general collateral challenges to unconstitutional practices and policies used by the agency” in reaching those determinations. McNary, 498 U.S. at 492. Our view of the limits of section 1254a(b)(5)(A) is further solidified when we compare it with the language of other statutory provisions by which Congress has barred a greater scope of claims from judicial review. See id. at 494 (“[H]ad Congress intended the limited review provisions . . . to encompass challenges to INS procedures and practices, it could easily have used broader statutory language.”). For instance, in Gebhardt v. Nielsen, 879 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2018), we considered a pair of jurisdictional provisions that insulated from review the Secretary’s “no-risk” determinations under the Adam Walsh Act in adjudicating I- 130 petitions. Id. at 984. The first provision barred judicial review of any “decision or action . . . the authority for which is specified [as falling under] the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), and the second granted “the Secretary ‘sole and unreviewable discretion’ in making ‘no-risk’ determinations” under the Adam Walsh Act, Gebhardt, 879 F.3d at 984 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I)). We found that the language of these “provisions clearly demonstrate Congress’ intent to prevent us from reviewing how the Secretary exercises his or her ‘sole and RAMOS V. WOLF 35 unreviewable discretion’ to make ‘no risk’ determinations.” Id. Accordingly, we held that we lacked jurisdiction to review the claims raised in that case “because each one challenges how the Secretary exercises—or has exercised— his or her ‘sole and unreviewable discretion’ to adjudicate I- 130 petitions.” Id. at 987. Unlike the provisions in Gebhardt, section 1254a(b)(5)(A) does not expressly grant the Secretary “sole and unreviewable” discretion in her TPS decision-making or even refer to the discretionary nature of the Secretary’s TPS determinations. In fact, the statute sets forth at least some limitations on the Secretary’s discretion to make TPS decisions. For instance, it specifies the three situations under which the Secretary may designate a country for TPS, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1), and imposes a number of procedural requirements—such as interagency consultation and a periodic review process under which the Secretary “shall” consider “conditions in the foreign state” and “determine whether the conditions [for TPS designation] continue to be met.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1), (b)(3). Thus, unlike decisions in which Congress has expressly granted the Secretary “sole and unreviewable discretion,” the Secretary’s discretion to make TPS determinations is not wholly unfettered. The fact that Congress enacted the TPS statute to curb and control the executive’s previously unconstrained discretion under the EVD process also supports this conclusion. We therefore find significant that section 1254a(b)(5)(A) is textually more akin to the judicial review bar provisions in McNary and CSS than those in Gebhardt. At the same time, we recognize that the judicial review bar in the TPS statute is not entirely identical to those in McNary and CSS. Although these provisions may be similar in their use of the term “determination,” the TPS statute otherwise differs in 36 RAMOS V. WOLF both text and context. In effect, while McNary and CSS may help us understand that section 1254a(b)(5)(A) bars judicial review of the Secretary’s country-specific TPS determinations, it sheds little light as to what precisely constitutes such an unreviewable TPS determination. For that, we must look to the rest of the TPS statute. Under section 1254a, the Secretary’s discretion to make TPS determinations, while not without check, is undoubtedly broad and unique in nature. To begin, the authority to designate a foreign country for TPS is vested solely with the Secretary “after consultation with the appropriate agencies of the Government.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1). And when it comes to designating a country for TPS, the Secretary “may” do so if she finds that the country has been stricken by a natural disaster, armed conflict, or other “extraordinary and temporary conditions in the foreign state.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b). The word “may” indicates that, even if the Secretary finds one of these three requisite criteria is met, she retains the discretion not to designate a country for TPS. In contrast, once a country has been designated for TPS, the Secretary “shall” periodically review the country conditions and “shall” terminate TPS if she finds the requisite criteria are no longer met. These provisions, taken together, indicate a legislative intent to limit the designation, redesignation, and extension of TPS by requiring both periodic review as well as termination when those conditions are no longer met. Thus, to the extent the TPS statute places constraints on the Secretary’s discretion, it does so in favor of limiting unwarranted designations or extensions of TPS. Moreover, designations of TPS directly concern the status of “any foreign state (or any part of such foreign state)”, see id., rather than that of any individual, even if such RAMOS V. WOLF 37 designation ultimately benefits individual nationals of the designated foreign states. In that regard, a Secretary’s TPS determination under section 1254a is quite unlike an agency “determination respecting an application for adjustment of status” under the immigration relief programs that the Court considered in McNary and CSS. Here, the TPS statute does not provide any formal avenue or administrative process for foreign citizens to “apply” for TPS designation of their countries. Rather, the decision to designate any foreign country for TPS begins and ends with the Secretary, so long as certain limited statutory criteria are met. This makes perfect sense, given that the TPS program was intended to provide a substitute for EVD under which the executive branch, subject to some legislative control, could continue to exercise its discretionary power to grant humanitarian relief to citizens of foreign countries on a nation-state level. The TPS statute also does not dictate any substantive guidelines or restrictions on the manner by which the Secretary may reach her TPS determinations, other than setting forth the three possible findings that the Secretary must make before designating a country for TPS. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1). Nor does the statute set forth or define the “conditions in the foreign state” that the Secretary must consider in her periodic review, or how she should weigh these conditions. See id. § 1254a(b)(1). Read in the context of these provisions, section 1254a(b)(5)(A) makes clear that the Secretary’s discretion to consider and weigh various conditions in a foreign country in reaching her TPS determinations is not only broad, but unreviewable. In other words, the statute not only sets forth very few legal parameters on what the Secretary must consider in designating, extending, or terminating TPS for a foreign country, but also expressly bars judicial review over these determinations. Logically then, section 1254a(b)(5)(A) 38 RAMOS V. WOLF generally precludes courts from inquiring into the underlying considerations and reasoning employed by the Secretary in reaching her country-specific TPS determinations. In short, the TPS statute precludes review of non- constitutional claims that fundamentally attack the Secretary’s specific TPS determinations, as well as the substance of her discretionary analysis in reaching those determinations. But, as McNary instructs us, where a court “lacks jurisdiction over a challenge to the agency’s ‘actions’ or ‘conduct’ ‘in adjudicating a specific individual claim,’” it may still have “jurisdiction over ‘a broad challenge’ to the agency’s ‘procedures’ or ‘practices.’” City of Rialto v. W. Coast Loading Corp., 581 F.3d 865, 875 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Mace v. Skinner, 34 F.3d 854, 858–59 (9th Cir. 1994)). To the extent a claim purports to challenge an agency “pattern or practice” rather than a specific TPS determination, we may review it only if the challenged “pattern or practice” is indeed collateral to, and distinct from, the specific TPS decisions and their underlying rationale, which the statute shields from judicial scrutiny. The scope of section 1254a’s bar on judicial review does not change even in the context of the APA, which codifies the “basic presumption of judicial review” over agency action. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140. Indeed, the APA by its own provisions does not apply where “statutes preclude judicial review” or where the “agency action” challenged is “committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1), (2). Accordingly, where a claim challenges an agency action over which the TPS statute precludes judicial review, or which the TPS statute has committed to agency discretion, the APA cannot be invoked as an independent basis for affording judicial review. For instance, an RAMOS V. WOLF 39 allegation that the Secretary reached certain TPS determinations in an “arbitrary and capricious” manner would not be reviewable under section 1254a. Although such a claim raises a cognizable violation of the APA, it also directly attacks the Secretary’s specific TPS determinations, rather than a broad agency pattern or practice, and is thereby shielded from judicial review by the TPS statute. With these principles in mind, we turn next to whether Plaintiffs’ APA claim qualifies as a reviewable challenge to a collateral agency practice or policy under the TPS statute.