Opinion ID: 3165719
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Elements versus Means.

Text: Divisibility, like element identification, is reviewed de novo, because it “is a purely legal question which does not require any additional fact-finding.” Medina-Lara v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1106, 1117 (9th Cir. 2014); Ceron, 747 F.3d at 778 (noting that we review element identification de novo, “[b]ecause the BIA lacks expertise in identifying the elements of state statutes”). Therefore, we owe no deference to the BIA’s conclusion (without analysis) that section 10851(a) was divisible. See Matter of Almanza-Arenas, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 774. As outlined in Descamps, we distinguish indivisible statutes from divisible statutes by determining whether the statutes provide multiple, alternative means of committing the crime. See 133 S. Ct. at 2285. In United States v. CabreraGutierrez, we determined that if the elements of the crime are alternative to each other—not the mode or means of proving an element of the crime—the statute is divisible. 756 F.3d 1125, 1135–37 & n.16 (9th Cir. 2013). In Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999) (upon which Descamps relied), the Supreme Court made it clear that elements are different than means. It held: If the statute creates a single element, a “series,” in respect to which individual violations are but the means, then the jury need only agree that the defendant committed at least three of all the underlying crimes the Government has tried to prove. The jury need not agree about which three. On the other hand, if the statute makes each “violation” a ALMANZA-ARENAS V. LYNCH 15 separate element, then the jury must agree unanimously about which three crimes the defendant committed. Id. at 818. Therefore, a single element must be part of a charged offense with which a jury necessarily found the defendant guilty. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (holding that when a statute includes entry of a building or automobile, the modified approach can only be used “if the indictment or information and jury instructions show that the defendant was charged only with a burglary of a building, and that the jury necessarily had to find an entry of a building to convict”); see also Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2288 (“The Sixth Amendment contemplates that a jury—not a sentencing court—will find such facts, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. And the only facts the court can be sure the jury so found are those constituting elements of the offense—as distinct from amplifying but legally extraneous circumstances.”). Richardson makes clear that the first step in determining elements versus means (and thus divisibility) begins with the text of the statute of conviction.10 526 U.S. at 818. The text of section 10851(a), as noted above, presents three indivisible elements. Although section 10851(a) uses disjunctive phrasing in two of the three elements, the use of “or” does not 10 Judge Watford mistakenly suggests that the majority opinion is instead “predicated on the same reasoning our court adopted in Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2014).” See Concurring Op. 27 (Watford, J.). To the contrary, our decision derives from Supreme Court precedent. To the extent the Rendon decision agrees with our decision, it remains circuit precedent. 16 ALMANZA-ARENAS V. LYNCH create additional elements.11 Rather, the disjunctive phrasing creates different means of committing the one offense. The first element can be completed by either driving a vehicle or taking a vehicle (which vehicle belongs to another person). The second element can be completed by driving or taking the vehicle without the consent of the owner. The third element (the element at issue here) can be completed by either permanently or temporarily depriving the owner of his or her vehicle. The means or methods of committing the element of the offense do not make the statute divisible, because the trier of fact does not need to agree as to whether the deprivation was temporary or permanent (the length of time during which the deprivation occurred). Thus, section 10851(a) is an indivisible statute. We confirm this statutory interpretation by first examining the Shepard documents to see whether the statute displays alternative elements instead of alternative means of committing the same crime.12 See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 11 The mere use of the disjunctive term “or” does not automatically make a statute divisible. See Rendon, 764 F.3d at 1085–86 (concluding that when a state statute “is written in the disjunctive . . . that fact alone cannot end the divisibility inquiry”); see also United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1348 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Pate, 754 F.3d 550, 554–55 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 386 (2014); Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Royal, 731 F.3d 333, 341–42 (4th Cir. 2013). 12 Prior to Descamps, Judge Watford may have been correct that we should not look at Shepard documents prior to a determination of divisibility. However, a crime is only divisible if it includes alternative elements not alternative means. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2288. Thus, after Descamps, the Supreme Court allows us to look at Shepard documents to confirm the determination of the statute’s elements (and thereby its divisibility). Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285 n.2. Here, we look ALMANZA-ARENAS V. LYNCH 17 2285 n.2 (“When a state law is drafted in the alternative, the court merely resorts to the approved documents and compares the elements revealed there to those of the generic offense.”). Here, an examination of the Shepard documents confirms our conclusion that section 10851(a) is indivisible. The indictment charges that Almanza violated section 10851(a) by taking the car “with intent either permanently or temporarily to deprive the owner” of the car. Prosecutors may not charge a defendant in the disjunctive, as the indictment did here, if they are charging two separate offenses.13 See The Confiscation Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 92, 104 (1874) (“[A]n indictment or a criminal information which charges the person accused, in the disjunctive, with being guilty of one or of another of several offences, would be destitute of the necessary certainty, and would be wholly insufficient.”). As noted in Descamps, “[a] prosecutor charging a violation of a divisible statute must generally select the relevant element from its list of alternatives.” 133 S. Ct. at 2290. Thus, when reviewing the Shepard documents, a court can discover what the prosecutor included as elements of the crime and to what elements the petitioner pleaded guilty. Therefore, because the indictment charged Almanza with having intent either to permanently deprive or temporarily deprive the owner, the to Shepard documents merely “as a tool for implementing the categorical approach.” Cf. id. at 2284. 13 We are mindful that prosecutors’ charging documents do not always charge a defendant properly. In some instances, prosecutors may fail to “select the relevant element[s] from its list of alternatives,” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2290, or may include the specific means of committing the offense out of convenience. We are also mindful that defendants may plead to these imprecisely charged indictments or informations without alteration. Therefore, the divisibility analysis may not end after looking to Shepard documents. 18 ALMANZA-ARENAS V. LYNCH indictment reveals that (under state law) the two forms of intent are alternative means of accomplishing the same crime instead of two separate crimes. Section 10851 is therefore an indivisible statute.14 Even though the plain language of the statute is confirmed by the Shepard documents (section 10851(a) only has three elements), the BIA found (and the government argued) that the statute is divisible because the intent element was written in the disjunctive. Therefore, to further support our analysis, we verify that our interpretation of section 10851(a)’s intent element is the same as the interpretation of the California courts.15 As the Supreme Court has counseled, if the state courts have addressed the issue, “we simply are not at liberty to ignore that determination and conclude that the alternatives 14 The Supreme Court has cautioned us not to engage in judicial factfinding. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 214 (2007), overruled on separate grounds by Johnson, 559 U.S. 133. “[B]y applying Taylor’s categorical approach, we [have avoided] any inquiry into the underlying facts of [Almanza’s] particular offense, and have looked solely to the elements of [section 10851(a)] as defined by [California] law.” Id. Under Judge Watford’s approach, it seems anything written in the disjunctive (whether elements or means) is divisible regardless of whether a jury necessarily had to find a defendant committed the element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather than treating everyone (who has committed an offense under § 10851(a)) equally, he mistakenly would look to the facts of each case to see if he can discover the means of how the person committed the offense. See Concurring Op. 35 (Watford, J.). 15 Descamps does not preclude us from looking to state law to determine whether the statute is indivisible after we have examined the Shepard documents. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285 n.2. ALMANZA-ARENAS V. LYNCH 19 are, in fact, independent elements under state law.”16 Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 636 (1991) (plurality opinion); see also Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242, 244 (1953) (per curiam) (“The construction given to a state statute by the state courts is binding upon federal courts.”). We look to a state’s laws to determine whether that state’s courts “have determined that certain statutory alternatives are mere means of committing a single offense, rather than independent elements of the crime.” Schad, 501 U.S. at 636. Therefore, we must verify that our interpretation of elements versus means is consistent with how California would instruct a jury as to this offense.