Opinion ID: 2543599
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admitting Defendant's Confession

Text: In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 129 L. Ed.2d 362, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994), the United States Supreme Court set out the circumstances for law enforcement to consider in determining whether a suspect has invoked or waived Miranda rights during questioning. The right to counsel recognized in Miranda is sufficiently important to suspects in criminal investigations, we have held, that it `requir[es] the special protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard.' Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. [477] at 483 [(1981)]. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046-1047 (1983) (plurality opinion); id., at 1051(Powell, J., concurring in judgment). If the suspect effectively waives his right to counsel after receiving the Miranda warnings, law enforcement officers are free to question him. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372-376 (1979). But if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the interview, he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation. Edwards v. Arizona, supra, at 484-485. This `second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel,' McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991), is `designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights,' Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990). To that end, we have held that a suspect who has invoked the right to counsel cannot be questioned regarding any offense unless an attorney is actually present. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988). `It remains clear, however, that this prohibition on further questioninglike other aspects of Miranda is not itself required by the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on coerced confessions, but is instead justified only by reference to its prophylactic purpose.' Connecticut v. Barrett, supra, 479 U.S.[523], at 528 [(1987)]. 512 U.S. at 458. The trial court conducted a hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress the videotaped confession made to officers investigating the murder of Monti and ruled: Prior to the evidentiary hearing on the Defendant's motion to suppress, State's Exhibit 1 which is the videotaped statement was delivered to me, and I watched it completely, and I can tell you that I watched over and over again the portions from the time log on the tape from 215750 to 223810, and that encompasses just about everything we're arguing about here with the exception that at the commencement of the interview, Miranda Warnings were presented to the Defendant and a waiver was made at that time. Specifically at 215750, the Defendant asked to review the written waiver of Miranda, and makes the comment, `So this means I can't talk to a lawyer' which one of the detectives says is not the case, and at 220320, Defendant states, `I want to talk to a lawyer.' The tape, of course, speaks for itself, but in my view and my findings are that at that point, detectives terminated the interview, and the Defendant made the following remark. `All right, guys. Wait a minute.' And shortly thereafter, `Can I make a call to my girl and then we'll resume this?' At 221050, the Defendant indicates that he wants to talk to you again. At 221210, the followingor 221210 Defendant states, `Do I need to talk to a lawyer? Do I need to have a lawyer say something to you? If I want to talk to a lawyer, is there one here?' Based on the more involved, of course, exchange that's presented on the tape, I think each of those three statements constitutes, at best, an ambiguous request. In fact, they might not constitute a request at all. But I think under the Ninci case, they are, at best, an ambiguous request for counsel. There are following several exchanges about whether the Defendant can go home if he talks, and then at 223810, Defendant states he wants to tell the whole story, and essentially proceeds to give a lengthy detailed version of events which took place. .... I'm sure Defense counsel is correct that at some point in time here, Defendant is in custody. I don't think I need to make a finding as precisely when that occurred because my factual finding is that the Defendant made only one unambiguous request for counsel which is the one at 220320 on the tape, and then almost immediately withdrew that request and reinitiated the interview with the detectives, and that despite lengthy exchanges before he recommenced that statement, all of which are contained in Exhibit 1, I do not find that any further unambiguous request for counsel was made. Therefore, the Defendant's motion to suppress any of that statement is denied. Our standard of review is as follows: When reviewing a trial court's decision as to suppression of evidence, an appellate court normally gives great deference to the factual findings of the trial court, but the ultimate determination of the suppression of evidence is a legal question requiring independent appellate determination. State v. Shively, 268 Kan. 589, Syl. ¶ 1, 999 P.2d 259 (2000). See State v. Ninci, 262 Kan. 21, 44, 936 P.2d 1364 (1997); State v. Longbine, 257 Kan. 713, 717, 896 P.2d 367 (1995). Henry contends that the portion of his statement taken after his first invocation of his right to counsel should have been suppressed because the subsequent conversation included statements of the officers that were tantamount to or the functional equivalent of conducting an interrogation in violation of his right to counsel. At the suppression hearing, a detective who conducted the interview testified regarding Henry's first request for an attorney. The detective was asked: Q. And Detective Olney left the room to go retrieve [the waiver of Miranda Henry had signed at the inception of the interview]. At 10 p.m. Detective Olney came back in and at 10:02 p.m. Mr. Henry asked `Since I signed this form does that mean I can't talk to a lawyer?' Did you answer the question? A. Yes, we did. Q. What did you tell him? A. I said, `No. That's not what that means at all. What's on that paper is your rights.' Q. Did he say something after that then? A. Yes, he did. He said, `I want to talk to a lawyer.' Q. Okay. Are you all trained as to what to do in an interview when a suspect says that? A. Yes. Q. What do you do? A. That's when we would stop the interview. Q. And so what did you all do then when Mr. Henry said, `I want to talk to a lawyer?' A. We both began to, or we stopped the interview. We were getting ready to get up and walk out. I had closed the book that I had which I was taking notes in. Q. Uh huh. A. I closed that. I was getting ready to stand up and with the intent of leaving the room. At that point Mr. Henry put his hand up and said, `Wait a minute, guys.' And then there was some conversation and both Detective Olney and I asked him are you saying that you want to continue to talk to us. Q. Did he respond to that question? A. Yes. Q. Did you take that to be a re-initiation of contact? A. Yes, I did. We have reviewed the pertinent parts of the videotaped interview. At first, Henry gave very little in the way of incriminating information. At approximately 11:58 p.m., Henry requested that the officers allow him to review the Miranda form he had signed at the beginning of the interview. One of the detectives left the room to obtain the form. While the detective was out of the room, the other detective talked to Henry about honor, courage, and commitmentmarine values (Henry had served in the marines). When the detective returned with the form, he did not immediately give the form to Henry, but instead began to review with Henry the facts they had already obtained. When Henry asked to see the form, the detective handed it to Henry. As Henry read, one of the detectives stated to Henry that they would get the story from Rails if they were unable to obtain it from him. After reading the Miranda form, Henry asked if by signing the waiver he had given up his right to talk to an attorney. The detectives told Henry that he had not given up the right to an attorney that the form was just an explanation of his rights. Henry then stated that he wanted to talk to an attorney and the detectives began putting their notebooks away. One detective asked Henry for his attorney's name. Henry said that he did not have an attorney and could not afford one. The detectives immediately got up out of their chairs to leave. Henry stopped them, stating, All right, guys, wait a minute. A detective asked Henry, What are you telling me, we've got rules; we have to abide by what you said; it's up to you; we won't try to sway you. Henry said, Can I make a phone call? The detectives said that Henry could make the call, and asked, Then do you want to come back and talk to us? Henry said, I just wanna make the call. The detectives then asked Henry to tell them what he wanted to do after the call. Henry said, I want to call, then we can come back in here. The detectives said, If you want to talk to us, you have to tell us. Henry then made a telephone call to his girlfriend. He could be overheard saying into the telephone, I can go home, but I'm not going to, I'm staying here. I'll explain when I get home. When the detectives and Henry returned to the interview room, a detective asked, Do you want to talk? Henry said, Yes and asked whether he needed an attorney. The detectives explained that they were not at liberty to give him that kind of advice. After that point, there is a considerable length of time where the detectives tried to persuade Henry to tell his story, but Henry was reticent and remained silent for much of the time. The detectives informed Henry that they wanted to listen, but that there were rules they had to follow about questioning and they had to be sure that he wanted to talk. Henry agreed to talk, but stated that he would have to back up in the story and straighten out a few points. Henry then proceeded to confess to his role in the killing of Monti. When Henry made an unambiguous request for an attorney, the officers immediately responded to it by terminating the questioning. Henry then stopped the detectives from leaving the room, asking them to wait. Henry was very clear that after he made a telephone call, he would be willing to talk further with the detectives. After making the call, Henry reconsidered his decision to resume the interview. It is the period after the phone call and before the confession that Henry claims was the functional equivalent of an interrogation that violated his right to counsel. We note that although Henry was at times reticent, the officers did not coerce or coax Henry to confess. We conclude that under the circumstances, Henry unequivocally withdrew his request for counsel before questioning resumed and there was no violation of the defendant's right to counsel.