Opinion ID: 158786
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bars to liability of each defendant.

Text: 39
40 To survive Trinidad's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs must show a genuine issue as to whether the employees who violated their rights were acting pursuant to an official municipal policy. Because we hold some of the violations occurred pursuant to an official municipal policy, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Trinidad and remand for further proceedings. 41 The plaintiffs' suit against the City of Trinidad might be dismissed on a motion for summary judgment even if the agents of the City did violate the plaintiffs' rights. The Tenth Circuit has held: 42 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a local government may be held liable for the constitutional violation of its employees only when employee action pursuant to official municipal policy . . . caused a constitutional tort. Therefore, to establish municipal liability a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a municipal custom or policy and (2) a direct causal link between the custom or policy and the violation alleged. 43 Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 742 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted). 44 The first prong, existence of a municipal custom or policy, is satisfied by the City Police Department's issuance of General Order 95-03. That order instructed law officials to seize any person who exhibits any potential of intoxication. See Aplt's App. at 63 (emphasis supplied). 45 The second prong, a causal link between the custom or policy and the alleged violation, is satisfied by the fact that the standard for detaining and transporting people to detox under Order 95-03 was itself a standard well below that required by the Fourth Amendment. To the extent officers conducted the unreasonable seizures under the directive of General Order 95-03, the City of Trinidad is liable. That is, by creating an official policy of detaining any person exhibiting any potential of intoxication, the city basically instructed law enforcement officers to conduct unreasonable seizures. The standard of any potential of intoxication is substantially lower than probable cause to believe the person is a danger to himself or others. Thus, the unreasonable seizures that occurred can be said to be the direct result of the city policy. 46 Not all the plaintiffs were seized pursuant to Order 95-03, however. Some seem to have been detained after the implementation of General Order 95-04. Order 95-04 directs officers to detain the intoxicated only based on probable cause that such person is intoxicated and incapacitated by alcohol and is clearly a danger to the health and safety of him\herself or others. Aplt's App. at 64. This language satisfies the probable cause standard. Thus the municipal policy was no longer a causal link to the detentions. However, the plaintiffs allege that the new policy did nothing to alter the municipal custom, and suggest the seizures made under the new policy support that allegation. An established municipal custom is sufficient to support a section 1983 action against a town, see Hollingsworth, 110 F.3d at 742, so the issue turns to whether plaintiffs will be able to establish the custom in light of a contrary policy. This will clearly be a more difficult burden for the plaintiffs to satisfy, but at this stage they have established triable issues of fact as to whether General Order 95-04 did anything to alter the custom for detaining the allegedly intoxicated in Trinidad. 47 The same standard applies to the lawsuits against defendants in their official capacities. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978). Thus, the lawsuits against the City of Trinidad and the defendants in their official capacities survive the motions for summary judgment. 48
49 To survive the summary judgment motion of the defendants in their individual capacities, the plaintiffs must establish that the law violated was clearly established at the time of the violation and that the defendants' conduct was not objectively reasonable in light of that law. Holding that the defendants do not enjoy qualified immunity against the instant suits, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in their favor and remand for further proceedings. 50 The defendants sued in their individual capacities sought summary judgment under the doctrine of qualified immunity. There is a two-part test once a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense in a motion for summary judgment. First, the plaintiff must show the defendant's conduct violated a constitutional or statutory right; second, the plaintiff must show the right the defendant's conduct violated was clearly established such that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have known the conduct violated the right. Lawmaster v. Ward, 125 F.3d 1341, 1347 (10th Cir. 1997). 51 The first prong is satisfied for summary judgment purposes as discussed in section III.A, above. The record supports the allegation that the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights were violated. 52 As to the second prong, the district court found, notwithstanding any constitutional violations, the right against unreasonable seizures for potential drunkenness was not clearly established in 1995. We disagree. 53 Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains. Medina v. City & County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). Pino, the Tenth Circuit case definitively establishing officers must have probable cause before seizing a person for incapacitation to a mental facility, was not filed until 1996. The alleged violations occurred in 1995, so Pino does not clearly establish the right for the instant case. 54 The purpose of the clearly established prong is to assure a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Lawmaster, 125 F.3d at 1350. Therefore, [q]ualified immunity does not protect official conduct simply because the Supreme Court has never held the exact conduct at issue unlawful. Rather, the shield of qualified immunity is pierced if in light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness of the conduct is apparent to the officer. Id. (emphasis added). 55 In light of this rationale underlying the qualified immunity doctrine, this court has held, for example, that police did not enjoy qualified immunity where there was not a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case directly on point, and where, in fact, there was some contrary authority, albeit distinguishable, from other circuits. See Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 787-91 (10th Cir. 1993). 56 In Franz we affirmed the district court's denial of an officer's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The officer had been sued for conducting a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The officer noted the absence of Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case law on point. He also noted cases in other circuits permitting similar searches by social workers without probable cause. He argued that these cases precluded a finding by the court that a warrant or probable cause requirement for such searches by police was clearly established law. We disagreed based on the longstanding Fourth Amendment probable cause requirements and the officer's presumed familiarity therewith. Looking to the reasonableness of an officer's belief that such a search was legal, in light of those longstanding principles, we ruled the officer did not enjoy qualified immunity notwithstanding the absence of direct case law. See id. 57 In 1995, no Tenth Circuit case or Supreme Court decision had directly addressed the issue of whether an officer must have probable cause to seize a person under a civil provision premised on protecting the seized person and others. However, six circuits had addressed this question, and, without exception, every one held that probable cause was required. 58 In 1991, four years before the alleged conduct, the Ninth Circuit wrote: Although there are few decisions that discuss the fourth amendment standard in the context of seizure of the mentally ill, all have recognized the proposition that such a seizure is analogous to a criminal arrest and must therefore be supported by probable cause. Maag v. Wessler, 960 F.2d 773, 775 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Gooden v. Howard County, Maryland, 917 F.2d 1355, 1361 (4th Cir. 1990); McKinney v. George, 726 F.2d 1183, 1187 (7th Cir. 1984); Harris v. Pirch, 677 F.2d 681, 686 (8th Cir. 1982); In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370, 1373 (D.C.Cir. 1971)). In 1993 the Second Circuit also agree[d] with these decisions and conclude[d] that the Fourth Amendment applies to involuntary commitment. Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55, 58 (2nd Cir. 1993). 59 All of these circuits addressed the issue in the context of the mentally ill. However, as noted above, the context of protecting the public from the mentally ill is directly analogous to that of protecting the public from the intoxicated. As there is no analytical or practical difference between the two, the same longstanding Fourth Amendment principles apply. 60 Thus by 1995, when the alleged conduct occurred, six circuits had considered the issue; all of them definitively held that probable cause is required for civil seizures of persons premised on self-protection or protection of the public; the earliest of those decisions dates back to 1971 (In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). The weight of authority was strong enough in light of the well-established principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, to find the right was clearly established. 61 Furthermore, when considered in terms of whether a reasonable official would know what he is doing violates a right, it seems incredible to suggest that officers, well aware of the restrictions on their ability to deprive persons of liberty without probable cause, would not know that detaining for potential intoxication infringes a constitutional right. See Franz, 997 F.2d at 786 (Police officers are expected to know the subtleties of the probable cause and warrant requirements.). 62 The Colorado Supreme Court had specifically ruled that an officer has no authority to take [a] person into protective custody under [the public drunkenness statute] unless the officer has probable cause to believe that the intoxicated person is 'clearly dangerous to the health and safety of himself or others.' Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 164 (Colo. 1986) (quoting public drunkenness statute). Leake addressed the authority of police under Colorado law (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-1-310(1) (West 1999)), and while we do not look to state law in determining the scope of federal rights, the fact that the Colorado Supreme Court and legislature limited the power of police over the intoxicated in precisely the manner the Fourth Amendment would limit such power is indicative of the degree to which the Fourth Amendment limit was established. 63 Looking to civil forfeitures is also instructive in assessing the reasonableness of the defendants' belief that they were not violating the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights. Federal law provides for civil seizure of property only after a court judgment of liability, pursuant to a warrant, or with probable cause. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(b). Police officers are expected to know the subtleties of the probable cause and warrant requirements. Franz, 997 F.2d at 786. It seems unreasonable to suggest that seizing property suspected of use in selling drugs might be more difficult than forcibly detaining a person who has consumed alcohol unreasonable both to suggest that property might be more protected than liberty, and to suggest that drug-related seizures might be more difficult than alcohol-related seizures. 64 In light of the clear weight of authority that existed prior to 1995, and in light of the laws of seizure police officers should be expected to know, we hold it was clearly established in 1995 that civil seizures without probable cause to believe a person was a danger to himself or others violated the Fourth Amendment. The defendants in their individual capacities are not protected by qualified immunity.
65 Crossroads sought summary judgment on the ground that as a private corporation it is not a state actor and thus not subject to section 1983 suit. [T]he only proper defendants in a Section 1983 claim are those who represent the state in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it. Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1447 (10th Cir. 1995). 66 There are numerous tests used to determine whether a private entity is acting under color of state law and is thus subject to section 1983 liability. See, e.g., id. at 1447 (describing the nexus text, the symbiotic relationship test, the joint action test, and the public functions test). 67 Appellants argue they have demonstrated state action under three of these four tests. These tests apply with more or less force depending on the factual circumstances of each case, and each test really gets at the same issue is the relation between a nominally private party and the alleged constitutional violation sufficiently close as to consider the nominally private party a state entity for purposes of section 1983 suit? If any one of the tests indicates a party is a state actor, that alone is sufficient to find the party a state actor. At the summary judgment stage of this case, we find the joint action test speaks most clearly to whether Crossroads acted as a state actor. Further, because we hold at this stage that Crossroads may be a state actor under this test, we do not consider the same facts under the other tests. 68 State action is . . . present if a private party is a 'willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.' Id. at 1453 (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)). The query is thus, whether state officials and private parties have acted in concert in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights. Id. [S]ome courts have adopted the requirements for establishing a conspiracy under Section 1983. These courts conclude that '[a] requirement of the joint action charge . . . is that both public and private actors share a common, unconstitutional goal.' See id., at 1454 (quoting Cunningham v. Southlake Ctr. for Mental Health, Inc. 924 F.2d 106, 107 (9th Cir. 1991)). 69 The record clearly establishes that Crossroads acted in concert with state officials. Mr. Lucero, the Executive Director of Crossroads, created the Advisory Board. The Advisory Board existed for the express purpose of work[ing] toward the re-establishment of local Detox services [in Trinidad]. See Aplt's App. at 272(a). By Mr. Lucero's design, the Advisory Board was composed almost exclusively by the state-actor defendants in this lawsuit who had the power to implement policies making reopening of detox services in Trinidad a possibility. The minutes of the Advisory Board meetings are replete with agreements between the state actors and Crossroads to increase referrals to the Pueblo detox center so Crossroads would have a viable application to reopen the Trinidad detox center. For example, Mr. Lucero made it clear that at a minimum, 50 referrals a month [were required] for a full service detox [in Trinidad], and insisted that we all need to come together and find solutions to the money problems. See id. at 261-63. Chief Montoya predicted imminent increases in referrals to the Pueblo detox, and when these increased referrals became reality, Mr. Lucero complemented the City Police Department on their referrals. Id. at 259, 274. Finally, when the goal of reopening detox services in Trinidad had been realized, Mr. Lucero complemented Chief Montoya on his support and assistance in the re-opening. Id. at 277. 70 The record thus supports and possibly establishes that Crossroads worked in conjunction with state officials, but was it the concerted action that caused the deprivation of constitutional rights alleged? 71 To the extent Crossroads is being sued for its role in implementing the policy that caused the plaintiffs to be illegally arrested and eventually detained in detox, summary judgment would be premature. The record supports the conclusion that Crossroads collaborated with state actors in reopening the Trinidad detox center. Further, the record supports the conclusion that Crossroads had reason to collaborate and even initiated this effort. 72 Crossroads' motivation to implement the new policy has been made clear. Crossroads derives over ninety percent of its funding from government entities. See Aplt's App. at 288. The existence of state funding does not by itself support a finding that an otherwise private entity is a state actor. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982). However, this factor does add plausibility to the plaintiffs' claims that Crossroads orchestrated the entire sequence of events that led to their illegal seizures. Prior to the reopening of the Trinidad facility, Crossroads was paying transportation costs of sixty dollars per trip for referrals from Trinidad to Pueblo. Perhaps Crossroads' interest in the new detox center was great enough to overcome any concern about the rights that would be violated to effect its opening. 73 Further, the alleged efforts by Crossroads to increase seizures were successful. The minutes of the Advisory Committee meetings clearly document the requests by Crossroads for more referrals by police, and the granting of these requests by the police. Following the reopening of detox services in Trinidad, referrals more than tripled in the first month. And General Order 95-03 itself states, The [Crossroads] Detox will remain available contingent on full utilization. A great deal of cooperation, effort and resources went into the re-opening of this facility. If client referrals are not frequently made the facility will not remain available. Aplt's App. at 63. 74 But Crossroads' mere lack of concern or even recklessness for causing the violation of others' constitutional rights would not seem to rise to the level of establishing Crossroads' liability under section 1983. What might establish such liability, however, is Crossroads' role in creating the unconstitutional detention policy that led to the allegedly illegal seizures. The record suggests there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Crossroads directly participated in the creation of the policy. 75 Mr. Lucero discussed policies adopted by other towns that would increase referrals to detox at the March 23, 1994 Advisory Board meeting. See Aplt's App. at 262-66. Among these measures was that used by Alamosa, where [p]eople are being referred for detox when charged with a crime. Id. Mr. Lucero seems to have been proposing a similar policy. Such a policy would increase referrals and thus secure the Trinidad detox center. However, it might run afoul of the standard for civil arrests of the intoxicated. 76 Furthermore, at the June 22, 1994 Advisory Board meeting (again, held between town and county officials and police, and Crossroads executives), [a] discussion took place on the required utilization needed to re-open Detox services in Trinidad. Revision of arrest protocol has increased referrals to Detox. Id. at 272(b). What revision of arrest protocol had occurred at that point is not clear from the record. Also unclear on the current record is the extent to which Mr. Lucero's presentation three months earlier effected the new arrest protocol. 77 These recorded discussions do create a triable issue of fact as to Crossroads' role in developing the policy that caused the plaintiffs' alleged illegal seizures. Because Crossroads might have been a state actor in creating the policy that led to the arrests, summary judgment in favor of Crossroads is, at this juncture, premature and erroneous.