Opinion ID: 430550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Propriety of Closing Argument and Excessiveness of Verdict.

Text: 12 Union Pacific and Burlington Northern urge that the district court erred in denying their motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for a remittitur. Defendants argue that plaintiff's counsel used inflammatory statements in his closing argument. These remarks, they contend, caused bias and prejudice in the minds of the jury and resulted in a grossly excessive verdict for the plaintiff. 13 Closing arguments are made under the direct control of the trial court. Argument of counsel is a procedural question to be determined by federal law. Illinois Central Railroad v. Staples, 272 F.2d 829 (8th Cir.1959). Under federal law, considerable discretion is given to the trial court to control arguments. Yeargain v. National Dairy Products Corp., 317 F.2d 779 (8th Cir.1963). The standard of review on appeal is clear. The district court is in a better position to determine whether prejudice has resulted from a closing argument and the appellate court will not disturb the district court's ruling unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Vanskike v. ACF Industries, Inc., 665 F.2d 188 (8th Cir.1981), quoting McDonald v. United Airlines, Inc., 365 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.1966). 14 To constitute reversible error, statements made in oral arguments must be plainly unwarranted and clearly injurious. Homan v. United States, 279 F.2d 767 (8th Cir.1960). After reviewing the record, this court finds no statements so prejudicial as to require reversal in this case. While the court does find oratorical exaggeration and provocative remarks in the closing arguments of counsel for both plaintiff and defendants, there is nothing in the record which strikes this court as plainly unwarranted or completely beyond the province of counsel in attempting to impress certain views on the minds of the jury. This court holds the fundamental belief that jurors are intelligent, discerning people and that they can usually sort out emotional and passionate arguments and follow what the court tells them to do. 15 Under the standards set out above, defendants must show that the statements are unwarranted and make a concrete showing of prejudice resulting from the argument. Defendants urge that an excessive jury verdict constitutes a showing of prejudice in this case. The test on appeal is whether the verdict is so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience of this court. Drotzmanns, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 500 F.2d 830, 835 (8th Cir.1974). 16 The trial court has an opportunity to set aside a verdict or to order a remittitur if, in the opinion of the court, the jury has exceeded the limits of fair and reasonable compensation. Therefore, in reviewing a jury verdict on the grounds of excessiveness, this court has consistently applied the following standard: 17 (E)xcessiveness of a verdict is basically, and should be, a matter for the trial court which has had the benefit of hearing the testimony and of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and which knows the community and its standards, ... we shall continue to consider review ... not routinely and in every case, but only in those rare situations where we are pressed to conclude that there is plain injustice or a monstrous or shocking result. Solomon Dehydrating Co. v. Guyton, 294 F.2d 439, 447-448 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 929 [82 S.Ct. 366, 7 L.Ed.2d 192] (1961). 18 Appellants have cited numerous cases in which jury verdicts for similar injuries were less than $1.8 million and yet were deemed excessive. Conversely, cases cited by appellee illustrate damage awards which are higher but are held to be not excessive. Such comparisons are not greatly helpful because each case must be evaluated as an individual one, within the framework of its distinctive facts. Morrow v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 541 F.2d 713 (8th Cir.1976). 19 Assessment of damages is within the sound discretion of the jury. Each case is evaluated by a different, randomly selected group of individual jurors. 20 (W)e must expect substantial disparities among juries as to what constitutes adequate compensation for certain types of pain and suffering. This is a litigious fact of life of which counsel, clients and insurance carriers are fully aware. Once they place their fate in the hands of a jury, then they should be prepared for the result.... They cannot expect the Court to extricate them in all cases where the award is higher or lower than hoped for or anticipated. Taken Alive v. Litzau, 551 F.2d 196 (8th Cir.1977), quoting Mainelli v. Haberstroh, 237 F.Supp. 190, 194 (M.D.Pa.1964), aff'd 344 F.2d 965 (3rd Cir.1965). 21 The retrial on the issue of damages lasted for two weeks. The jury and the trial court heard exhaustive testimony on the nature and extent of Warren Vanskike's injuries. The record shows that Warren was fully conscious during the forty-five minute period it took to free his arm from the collapsed hitch. He underwent several subsequent surgeries for amputation and stump repair. He suffered extensive psychological and emotional problems. Warren continues to experience severe pain from resulting neuromas and phantom sensations. An appellate court should be extremely hesitant to overturn a verdict which includes damages for pain and suffering. Taken Alive v. Litzau, supra. 22 This court notes that the verdict for the plaintiff on retrial was approximately twice the recovery in the first trial. Yet, under the facts presented at the second trial, the verdict is not grossly excessive. The trial court stated in its order 4 23 (T)he plaintiff's evidence of damages was much more significant and extensive at this second trial because of many events which had occurred between the two trials. For example, at the time of the first trial, the plaintiff had been fitted with a prosthesis which he was attempting to learn to use and wear and which he testified was so painful that he could not wear it for any extended period of time. Defendants' counsel intimated strongly in that trial that he was malingering and that many other people who had lost an arm had successfully worn a prosthesis and been able to use it. At the second trial, it was established by irrefutable medical evidence that it was absolutely impossible for this plaintiff to wear the artificial arm and this Court feels that his undisputed fact, plus the constant pain and twitching of the stump of the arm, enhanced the plaintiff's damages award. 24 The jury and the trial court heard the testimony and assessed the credibility of the witnesses offering it. After reviewing the facts as they appear in the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant defendants' motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for a remittitur. 25 Further, this court is aware of its duty to refer to the law of the forum state when determining the inadequacy or excessiveness of a jury verdict. Block v. R.H. Macy & Co., Inc., 712 F.2d 1241 (8th Cir.1983); Hysell v. Iowa Public Service Co., 559 F.2d 468 (8th Cir.1977). The damage award may not exceed that which could be sustained before the highest court of the state whose substantive law gives rise to the claim. Id. at 472. 26 The parties agree that Missouri law controls. After a careful review of Missouri damage awards 5 and in light of the evidence presented at retrial, this court is unable to say that an award of $1,811,177.00 is excessive as a matter of law. 27