Opinion ID: 2960205
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: B(iv) Committed to Agency Discretion

Text: The district judge determined that the challenged actions were committed to agency discretion. Final agency action is not subject to judicial review under the APA “to the extent that such action is committed to agency discretion by law.” Lunney, 319 F.3d at 558 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). This restriction applies only in “those rare instances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (internal citation omitted); see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985) (restriction applies only if the statute or regulation said to govern the challenged agency action “is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion”). As we have explained, the court need not subject the agency’s exercise of discretion to judicial review in order to resolve Sharkey’s suit. Conclusion: Jurisdiction Vests under APA Therefore, absent some other reason to oust the court of its jurisdiction, jurisdiction vests in the district court under the APA and the federal question statute. Our conclusion to allow 22 review is buttressed by the fact that the statutory scheme provides no alternative mechanism for judicial review of Sharkey’s claims. See McNary, 498 U.S. at 496 (“[G]iven our well-settled presumption favoring interpretations of statutes that allow judicial review of administrative action, . . . it is most unlikely that Congress intended to foreclose all forms of meaningful judicial review” (internal citations omitted)). II. Other Possible Bars to Subject Matter Jurisdiction The Director argues on appeal that the suit is barred by sovereign immunity considerations. The argument is without merit. Section 702 of the APA “waives the federal government’s sovereign immunity in actions [for non-monetary relief against an agency or officer thereof] brought under the general federal question jurisdictional statute.” Lunney, 319 F.3d at 557-58; see 5 U.S.C. § 702. The Director next argues that the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction in deference to the judiciary’s historical practice of refusing to interfere with any aspect of visa issuance. The argument is best couched as a separation of powers argument. The D.C. Circuit recently rejected a similar argument, holding that the judiciary has the power to determine whether an alien has LPR status, even absent any INS hearing on the matter. See United States v. Yakou, 428 F.3d 241, 250 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“The United States's suggestion that a federal court's determination of [the petitioner’s] status interferes with the separation of powers under which immigration matters are largely within the province of the Executive Branch, obscures the fact that the court is not changing [the alien’s] LPR status; rather, the court is looking . . . to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) as interpreted by the BIA to determine whether [the alien’s] LPR status changed over ten years ago when he departed the United States for more than a temporary visit abroad.). 23 Similarly here, the court would not be changing Sharkey’s LPR status; rather, it would be finding facts, and applying law, to determine whether she was granted that status in the first place. Moreover, by providing that a reviewing court, in the removal context, can determine whether a petitioner has LPR status, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2), Congress has made clear that courts may determine whether an alien has LPR status without violating the separation of powers.