Opinion ID: 2633370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Submission of Competency Determination on the Psychiatric Reports

Text: On September 29, 1982, before defendant was arraigned, his defense counsel expressed a doubt as to defendant's present competence. The trial court agreed and appointed two psychiatrists, Dr. Paul Cutting and Dr. Francis Criswell, to examine defendant. The proceedings were suspended until the two doctors could examine defendant and file their reports with the court. On October 27, 1982, the court was in possession of the reports of both doctors. Both found defendant was legally competent. Defense counsel and the prosecutor submitted the question of defendant's competence on these two psychiatric reports, and the trial court found defendant competent. The proceedings then resumed. Defendant contends the failure to hold a full-blown adversarial hearing on the question of his competence deprived him of due process and requires that we vacate his convictions. Essentially, defendant claims counsel could not waive a full jury trial with live witnesses. We rejected this precise claim in People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1169, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146: Section 1368 entitles defendant to a `hearing' on the issue of competence and he received one. Although defendant's counsel, for understandable reasons, elected to waive certain available incidents of the hearing procedure, i.e., the right to jury trial and the rights to present oral testimony and to confront and cross-examine witnesses, defendant presented evidence and received an independent judicial determination of his competence to stand trial based on the stipulated record. [Citation.] [¶] Defendant cites no authority holding that submission to the court of the issue of competence to stand trial based on psychiatric reports is per se unconstitutional or a violation of statute. Of course, trial of an incompetent defendant violates an accused's right to due process. ( Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 448, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353; Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836,15 L.Ed.2d 815; People v. Hale (1988) 44 Cal.3d 531, 539, 244 Cal.Rptr. 114, 749 P.2d 769; People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 58 Cal. Rptr. 374, 426 P.2d 942.) But contrary to defendant's arguments, neither Hale nor any of our other precedents precludes a defense attorney from waiving a jury, forgoing the right to present live witnesses, and submitting the competency determination on the psychiatric reports filed with the court. The statutory references to a hearing (§ 1368, subd. (b)) or a trial (§ 1369) simply mean that a determination of competency must be made by the court (or a jury if one is not waived), not, as defendant contends, that there must be a court or jury trial, at which the criminal defendant's rights of confrontation, cross examination, compulsory process and to present evidence are honored by the court and counsel. Unlike in People v. Marks (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335, 1343, 248 Cal.Rptr. 874, 756 P.2d 260, defense counsel did not attempt to waive the competency issue; he merely submitted the matter on the psychiatric reports. To the extent defendant attempts to impugn the validity of the appointed experts' conclusions on grounds they failed to consider the effect of defendant's medication on his competency, the time to raise such a challenge has long since passed. Having submitted the competency determination on the two psychiatric reports, defendant may not now relitigate that question with arguments he did not make below. We also reject the further claim that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective under the state and federal Constitutions for waiving a jury trial and submitting the matter on the reports. We have examined the reports and conclude counsel's decision against challenging the conclusions therein was a reasonable one. [2] Defendant cites two appellate opinions in support, but neither assists him. To the extent defendant contends Moore v. United States (9th Cir.1972) 464 F.2d 663, 666, indicates the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applies a per se reversal rule to a competency determination submitted on medical reports rather than pursuant to a full-blown jury trial, we agree with respondent that defendant misconstrues the federal appellate court's position on this issue. ( Greenfield v. Gunn (9th Cir.1977) 556 F.2d 935, 939 [submission of competency question on doctor's reports permissible].) Finally, People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 158 Cal.Rptr. 316, 599 P.2d 622, also cited in support, is manifestly distinguishable; Ramirez concerned the procedural due process that must be afforded before an inmate can be excluded from the California Rehabilitation Center. Ramirez sheds no light on whether a defense attorney validly may waive the trial authorized by section 1369 and submit the competency determination on the psychiatric reports. In sum, we have already decided a defense attorney may validly submit a competency determination on the available psychiatric reports ( People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1169, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146), and defendant fails to persuade us McPeters was decided incorrectly. We thus reject this claim, finding no error under section 1368, no violation of either the state or federal Constitution, and no showing counsel was constitutionally ineffective for deciding to submit the competency determination on the psychiatric reports.