Opinion ID: 3178168
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voluntary Retirements During the RIF Process

Text: We begin with the OEA administrative judge‘s determination that the Department permissibly left unfilled the open positions in the retention register created by the voluntary retirements of three criminal investigators after the register was issued. Appellant objects to this determination for three reasons. First, he argues that the CMPA and the RIF regulations require agencies to move lower-ranking employees up into positions vacated by voluntary retirees so as to minimize the impact of the RIF. Second, he argues that even if agencies generally may be permitted to leave such vacated positions unfilled, the Department was under an obligation to revise the retention register to fill them in this instance by ________________ (continued) 36 A.3d at 834. See Wash. Hosp. Ctr. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 789 A.2d 1261, 1264 (D.C. 2002) (explaining that, to receive deference, ―agency interpretations must reflect the careful legal and policy analysis required in making choices among several competing statutory interpretations, . . . and the record must provide evidence that the agency considered the language, structure, or purpose of the statute when selecting an interpretation.‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166–67 (2012) (―[D]eference [to an agency‘s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations] is [] unwarranted when there is reason to suspect that the agency‘s interpretation does not reflect the agency‘s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.‖) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Euclid St., LLC v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Auth., 41 A.3d 453, 460 n.8 (D.C. 2012) (declining to defer to statutory and regulatory interpretations advanced by an agency solely in its pleadings and briefs during litigation). 12 virtue of its commitments to the Mayor and to union officials. Third, appellant argues that even if the Department had discretion to leave the vacancies unfilled, it exercised its discretion improperly. We address these contentions in order. To begin with, as we recognized in Dupree I, the CMPA and the RIF regulations do not specifically direct how an agency should handle voluntary retirements occurring during a RIF following the statutorily required round of lateral competition that culminates in the issuance of a retention register.23 At a more general level, however, the statute and regulations tend to support the OEA administrative judge‘s conclusion that whether to fill the vacated slots with lowerranking employees who otherwise would be released in the RIF is a question committed to the agency‘s discretion. The regulations provide that ―an agency may, within its budget authorization, take appropriate action, prior to planning a reduction in force, to minimize the adverse impact on employees‖ by ―[r]eassigning employees to vacant positions which have been determined to be essential to the continued maintenance of the agency‘s operation.‖24 The regulations further state that ―[p]ersonnel authorities and agencies may, in order to 23 36 A.3d at 834. 24 6B DCMR § 2403.2 (emphasis added). 13 minimize the adverse impact of a reduction in force, offer a released employee a vacant position for which he or she qualifies.‖25 The administrative judge construed the word ―may‖ in these provisions to confirm that an agency is permitted to move lower-ranking employees into slots that open in a retention register due to voluntary retirements, but is not required to do so. This is a reasonable implication to draw from the cited provisions.26 It comports with the general prerogative of management to determine the number, types, and grades of positions of agency employees.27 25 Id. § 2405.2 (emphasis added). 26 See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, Metro. Police Dep’t Labor Comm. v. District of Columbia, 52 A.3d 822, 827–28 (D.C. 2012) (holding that the word ―may‖ rendered an attorney‘s fees provision ―expressly permissive‖); In re J.D.C., 594 A.2d 70, 75 (D.C. 1991) (observing that the word ―may,‖ used in a statutory context, is ―quintessentially permissive‖); Trice v. United States, 525 A.2d 176, 187 (D.C. 1987); Bell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 507 A.2d 548, 557 (D.C. 1986). 27 See D.C. Code § 1-617.08 (a)(5) (2014 Repl.) (―The respective personnel authorities (management) shall retain the sole right . . . [t]o determine . . . [t]he number, types, and grades of positions of employees assigned to an agency‘s organizational unit, work project, or tour of duty.‖). (We quote the current statute, which reflects nonsubstantive alterations that were made subsequent to appellant‘s release from service by the Labor Relations and Collective Bargaining Amendment Act, D.C. Law 15-334 (Jan. 19, 2005)). 14 In the proceedings before the OEA, the Department and its expert witness explained why an agency has such discretion when an employee, who encumbers a position not scheduled for abolishment, voluntarily retires before a RIF is fully implemented. In lieu of filling the vacancy with an employee in the same competitive level who otherwise would be released in the RIF, management may deem it in the agency‘s best interest to (1) leave the vacated position unfilled in order to seek authorization to abolish the position, as the RIF regulations expressly allow28; (2) fill the vacancy after the RIF by allowing competition for it from a wider pool of applicants whose positions were abolished in the RIF; or (3) use the position vacancy in another program area of the agency. Appellant has not argued that these alternative courses of action are precluded by the CMPA or the RIF regulations. We need not decide whether they all are permissible; we think it enough to say that the action the Department did take—leaving the vacancies unfilled—is not precluded. Appellant argues that this amounts to approving of ―unlimited agency discretion‖ in responding to an opening and is ―inimical to the principle of merit competition‖ embodied in the CMPA.29 But that surely is 28 See 6B DCMR § 2405.8 (―During a reduction in force, the agency, with the approval of the personnel authority, may increase or decrease the number of positions previously identified for abolishment.‖). 15 hyperbole; the overall seniority- and merit-based character of the round of lateral competition in a RIF is scarcely altered by allowing a discretionary response by the agency in the occasional and limited situations created by voluntary retirements in the thirty-day notice period following the competition. Arguably, moreover, requiring agencies to generate new retention registers whenever there are material changes in the competing employees‘ circumstances during the thirty-day notice period would tend to disrupt and delay the RIF process and create administrative burdens. As examples of what could happen, the District posits that ―[a]n employee served a separation notice might hesitate to take steps needed to protect his interests; an employee with no residency credit might quickly move into the District to improve his position on the retention register; and a less senior employee might pressure a senior employee to retire so he can compete for the vacancy.‖30 Such concerns, which cannot be dismissed out of hand, lend additional support to the interpretation of the RIF regulations endorsed by the OEA ________________ (continued) 29 See generally D.C. Code § 1-624.02 (a). 30 Brief for Appellees at 39. 16 administrative judge. The CMPA affords employees the right to ―one round of lateral competition‖—no more.31 Appellant argues that his claim of entitlement to a revised ranking in the retention register is supported by 6B DCMR § 2419.1. That section provides that ―[t]he retention standing of each employee released from his or her competitive level shall be determined as of the date of release.‖ Appellant did not mention § 2419.1 in the administrative proceedings on remand, however, even though the remand was meant to secure an informed analysis by the OEA of whether the RIF regulations required the Department to amend the retention register in response to voluntary retirements prior to the effective date of appellant‘s release. As a result, neither the District‘s expert witness nor the administrative judge addressed the applicability of § 2419.1. Under these circumstances, appellant must be held to 31 D.C. Code § 1-624.02 (a)(2) (emphasis added). The issuance of a retention register is intended to be a final, appealable decision. D.C. Code § 1-624.04 provides that an employee who has been notified he will be released in a RIF may file an appeal with the OEA if he believes the agency has incorrectly applied the statutory provisions and regulations governing RIFs. ―An appeal must be filed no later than 30 calendar days after the effective date of the action. The filing of an appeal shall not serve to delay the effective date of the action.‖ Id. 17 have forfeited his argument based on that section by failing to raise it before the OEA on remand.32 But even if we were to relieve appellant of his forfeiture,33 we are not persuaded by appellant‘s interpretation of the section. His argument that § 2419.1 requires agencies to update or reissue retention registers in response to events that take place during the notice period—despite the conspicuous absence of any language to that effect—ignores the fact that the statutory right to a single round of competition has been satisfied once the register is generated. As we read § 2419.1, it requires each employee‘s SCD, and therefore his or her retention standing, to be determined by reference to the RIF effective date (which is the date of release for 32 See Goodman v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm’n, 573 A.2d 1293, 1301 (D.C. 1990) (―In the absence of exceptional circumstances, a reviewing court will refuse to consider contentions not presented before the administrative agency at the appropriate time.‖). 33 See id. at 1301 n.21 (―We agree . . . that a reviewing court has discretionary authority to consider issues which have not been raised before the agency. We join the federal courts in holding, however, that this authority should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances to avoid manifest injustice.‖); cf. Tindle v. United States, 778 A.2d 1077, 1082 (D.C. 2001) (―[T]he Supreme Court of the United States and this court have distinguished between ‗claims‘ and ‗arguments,‘ holding that although ‗claims‘ not presented in the trial court will be forfeited (and thus subject to the plain error review standard), parties on appeal are not limited to the precise arguments they made in the trial court.‖) (internal quotation marks omitted). 18 separated employees) when the register is generated. Presumably, then, pertinent events that are certain to occur prior to the effective date—for example, a scheduled mandatory retirement—should not be disregarded. But it would be highly impractical to require that an agency look into the future when generating the register and try to account for subsequent events that are uncertain and beyond its control—such as anticipated voluntary retirements that have not yet occurred when the register is issued and that might be rescinded prior to the RIF effective date or delayed until after it. Thus, even were we to resurrect appellant‘s forfeited argument, we would remain unconvinced that § 2419.1 lends any support to his claim.34 Appellant alternatively argues that the Department in effect limited the ambit of its discretion by committing to the Mayor and in collective bargaining that 34 The District argues for a narrower interpretation in its brief. Emphasizing that § 2419.1 addresses the retention standing of the ―released‖ employee, the District argues that the section does not speak to the initial competition for retention standing at all, but merely establishes the effective date for determining retention standing in the event an employee is found to have been released due to an error in the register. This argument finds some support in § 2419.2, which provides that ―[w]hen the personnel authority discovers an error in the determination of an employee‘s retention standing, it shall correct the error and adjust any erroneous reduction-in-force action in accordance with the employee‘s true retention standing as of the effective date established under this section.‖ We need not decide whether the District‘s interpretation of § 2419 is correct, though if it is, it rebuts appellant‘s claim. 19 it would fill openings in the retention register when they arose in the 2001 RIF. However, the record does not support this argument. Appellant cites the May 10, 2001, memorandum in which the Director of the Department requested the Mayor‘s authorization to implement the RIF (which the Mayor gave). The memorandum noted that the Department‘s earlier reassignment of staff to funded vacancies in order to maintain security would ―minimize[] the number of incumbent positions actually slated for the RIF.‖ But neither this statement nor anything else in the memorandum purported to commit the Department to fill retirement-related vacancies occurring during the RIF, or otherwise to limit the Department‘s discretion with respect to such vacancies. Appellant also sought to testify in the OEA proceeding on remand about an agreement between the Department and his union, the Fraternal Order of Police/Department of Corrections Labor Committee (FOP/DOC). Appellant was the Chairman of the FOP/DOC in the period leading up to the 2001 RIF. The extent of his proffer (as stated at the hearing by his counsel) was that the Department had agreed with the union that ―funded vacant positions would be filled by persons that would otherwise be affected by this reduction in force, in order to retain . . . sufficient personnel to complete the agency‘s mission.‖ Appellant did not proffer the putative agreement itself, or any other witnesses who 20 professed to be aware of it, or any details as to when, how, or by whom the agreement supposedly was made.35 When the relevance of his proposed testimony about this agreement was questioned, appellant argued that the agreement bore on whether the Department retained discretion with respect to filling vacancies because the RIF regulations provided that, ―[t]o the extent inconsistent with the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, this chapter [governing RIFs] shall not apply to employees covered by such agreement with respect to the specific inconsistencies.‖36 The administrative judge excluded testimony on this subject as being outside the scope of the issues properly before him. Appellant claims this ruling was in error. Assuming arguendo that the existence of such a collective bargaining agreement would have been relevant, we must examine whether appellant sufficiently proffered that he could present probative evidence of such an agreement. As we have indicated, his proffer was vague. It failed to show that appellant‘s testimony would have been specific and detailed enough to establish 35 Another witness called by appellant, a human resources specialist in the District‘s Office of Personnel who was involved in the RIF preparations, recalled having participated in meetings between the Office and the union, but she did not recall an agreement of any kind. 36 6B DCMR § 2402.2. 21 that the Department had entered into a collective bargaining agreement, or any kind of binding agreement with FOP/DOC, obligating it to fill vacancies created in the retention register by voluntary retirements during the thirty-day notice period. What the putative agreement actually required depends on its exact terms, which appellant did not purport to recount.37 Moreover, it is significant that appellant did not proffer for inspection the agreement itself, which would have been the best evidence of its terms. As the District argues, under the best evidence rule, appellant‘s testimony would not have been sufficient to establish the terms of the alleged agreement because appellant did not provide an explanation for its absence.38 If there was an agreement limiting the Department‘s discretion in the 37 Given the generality of the proffered testimony, it may be there was nothing more than an informal and non-binding understanding that the Department would seek to fill vacancies in order to retain ―sufficient personnel‖ to fulfill its mission; or, if there was an actual, binding agreement, that it allowed the Department to exercise its discretion not to fill a vacancy under some circumstances or for valid reasons. An agreement plausibly might have applied to the preparations for the RIF and the establishment of the various competitive levels, but not to vacancies arising in the thirty-day notice period after the issuance of each retention register and the lateral competitions at each level. 38 See Abulqasim v. Mahmoud, 49 A.3d 828, 837 (D.C. 2012) (―The best evidence rule requires that when the contents of a writing are to be proved the original must be produced unless its absence is satisfactorily explained. . . . Secondary evidence of the contents of the writing is admissible on proof that the original is lost.‖) (quoting Walker v. United States, 402 A.2d 813, 813–14 (D.C. 1979)). 22 manner appellant asserts, it was incumbent on appellant to produce it or justify his failure to do so.39 Curiously enough, appellant actually proffered documentary evidence belying the existence of the agreement he alleges. This was a Report and Recommendation submitted by a hearing examiner on March 21, 2002, to the Public Employee Relations Board concerning unfair labor practice complaints by FOP/DOC against the Department of Corrections.40 According to the report, the union complained that the Department had failed to bargain collectively in good 39 We recognize that the administrative judge would have had discretion to relax the requirements of the best evidence rule had he been given sufficient reason to do so. See id. (―A reasonable discretion is vested in the trial court in the application of the best evidence rule.‖) (quoting Walker, 402 A.2d at 814); see also Comm. for Wash.’s Riverfront Parks v. Thompson, 451 A.2d 1177, 1184 (D.C. 1982) (noting the rules of evidence are ―subject to more flexible application in the context of administrative proceedings‖). But appellant did not give the judge any reason to relax the rule. Indeed, we think it would have been patently unfair to the District, and hence an abuse of discretion, had the judge disregarded the best evidence rule and relied on appellant‘s self-interested and unverified testimony that an agreement appellant inexplicably failed to produce for inspection bound the Department to revise the retention register. See Goon v. Gee Kung Tong, Inc., 544 A.2d 277, 283 (D.C. 1988) (citing Roberts v. United States, 508 A.2d 110, 112 (D.C. 1986)) (holding that secondary proof of the contents of a document is permissible only if proponents can ―show that [the] primary source material was unavailable through no fault of their own‖). 40 We note that according to the hearing examiner, the union was represented by appellant‘s counsel in the instant case. 23 faith with respect to the impact and effects of the RIFs implemented in connection with the closing of the Lorton correctional complex, including the 2001 RIF that is the subject of this appeal. FOP/DOC did not complain that the Department violated any agreement with the union by failing to fill vacancies in the retention register created by voluntary retirements during the RIF. Rather, FOP/DOC complained, inter alia, about the Department‘s failure to agree to a union proposal, submitted on June 4, 2001, providing that employees could volunteer to be released from their competitive level and retired from government service. The hearing examiner found that the Department reasonably rejected this proposal on the ground that it was contrary to law and not an appropriate subject of bargaining. In other words, it appears the union acknowledged and the hearing examiner found that there was no agreement covering vacant positions in a retention register due to voluntary retirements. On the record before us, we conclude that appellant has not established that he was prevented from presenting credible evidence of a collective bargaining agreement requiring the Department to fill retention register vacancies resulting from mid-RIF retirements. 24 Finally, appellant contends that the Department‘s decision not to allow him to compete for the retirement-related vacant positions in the retention register was not a proper exercise of whatever discretion the Department possessed. This contention also is premised on the notion that the Department was under a legal duty to mitigate the effects of the RIF, which it could have done by allowing employees scheduled for release to compete for retained positions vacated by retirements during the thirty-day notice period. As we have discussed, however, appellant has not shown that the Department was under a legal duty to mitigate. To be sure, an agency is required to correct errors in a retention register.41 But the subsequent voluntary retirement of employees who still held their positions at the time the register was issued, i.e., voluntary retirements after the round of lateral competition is over and termination notices have gone out to affected employees, does not mean the register contained an error for the agency to correct.42 41 See 6B DCMR § 2419.2. 42 To the extent that appellant is claiming he effectively was denied his statutory right to ―one round of lateral competition,‖ D.C. Code § 1-624.02 (a)(2), we reject the claim. Appellant was afforded the right to compete for one of the remaining criminal investigator positions when the retention register was generated. At that time, all those positions were filled. It might be argued that the Department had foreknowledge of the upcoming retirements and therefore should have taken them into account when it generated the register. But as explained above, that would have been infeasible, because the Department had no guarantee (continued ...) 25 In sum, we construe the CMPA and the RIF regulations as the OEA administrative judge construed them—as leaving it to agency discretion whether to fill vacancies in a retention register that are created by voluntary retirements after the register has been generated and the RIF notices have been issued. Appellant has not demonstrated that the Department exercised its discretion improperly or breached a collective bargaining agreement or other binding commitment when it left the retirees‘ positions vacant in the 2001 RIF. Accordingly, we hold that appellant‘s lateral competition right was not violated by that action and it does not entitle him to relief.