Opinion ID: 1178403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: lesser included offenses of first degree felony murder

Text: [3] Finally, appellant Spencer assigns error to the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the elements of first and second degree manslaughter as lesser included offenses of first degree felony murder. The test as to what constitutes a lesser included offense is set out in State v. Roybal, 82 Wn.2d 577, 583, 512 P.2d 718 (1973): A lesser included offense exists when all of the elements of the lesser offense are necessary elements of the greater offense. State v. Bishop, 6 Wn. App. 146, 491 P.2d 1359 (1971). Put another way, if it is possible to commit the greater offense without having committed the lesser offense, the latter is not an included crime. Comment, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine, 5 Conn. L. Rev. 255, 261 (1972). See also State v. Culp, 30 Wn. App. 879, 881, 639 P.2d 766 (1982). [4] The statutory definitions of first and second degree manslaughter require proof of specific mental elements that are not required to prove first degree felony murder. Manslaughter in the first degree requires proof of recklessness, RCW 9A.32.060, and manslaughter in the second degree requires proof of criminal negligence, RCW 9A.32.070. By contrast, first degree felony murder provides only that: (1) A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when: ... (c) He commits ... (1) robbery, in the first or second degree, ... and; in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or in immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants;... RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c). The above statutory provision requires no specific criminal mental state other than the one necessary for the predicate crime  in this case, robbery in the first degree. In State v. Dudrey, 30 Wn. App. 447, 450, 635 P.2d 750 (1981), the court simply held that [i]n the case of felony-murder, the act, coupled with a felonious intent, may be transferred to the act resulting in death. We have previously stated, with regard to the felony murder rule, that: While it may be that the felony murder statute is harsh, and while it does relieve the prosecution from the burden of proving intent to commit murder, it is the law of this state. (Italics ours.) State v. Thompson, 88 Wn.2d 13, 17, 558 P.2d 202 (1977). Accord, State v. Dudrey, supra ; State v. Peyton, 29 Wn. App. 701, 719, 630 P.2d 1362 (1981). Since under the test of Roybal, one can commit the crime of first degree felony murder without having committed first or second degree manslaughter, the latter are not lesser included offenses of the former. As such, appellant Spencer was not entitled to an instruction on the elements of first or second degree manslaughter. Dudrey, at 455. The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury as to lesser included offenses of first degree felony murder. In summary, we hold that: (1) appellants Frazier and Spencer were properly transferred for adult criminal prosecution because, until a decline hearing was conducted, the juvenile court lacked authority to accept their proffered juvenile court guilty pleas; (2) the trial court properly exercised its discretion to admit, as a jury exhibit, appellant Spencer's tape recorded statement to the police; and (3) since first and second degree manslaughter are not lesser included offenses of first degree felony murder, appellant Spencer was not entitled to have the jury instructed as to those crimes. We affirm the convictions and sentences of life imprisonment of appellants Robert Andre Frazier and Kirk R. Spencer. STAFFORD, UTTER, BRACHTENBACH, DOLLIVER, DORE, DIMMICK, and PEARSON, JJ., and CUNNINGHAM, J. Pro Tem., concur.