Opinion ID: 200077
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Contested Jury Instruction

Text: 12 Appellant contends that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury that her supervisor's discriminatory animus had to be the determining factor, rather than a motivating factor, in the decision to terminate her. We review a contested jury instruction de novo, Ponce v. Ashford Presbyterian Cmty. Hosp., 238 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir.2001), and begin by looking briefly at the crowded landscape of discrimination cases. 13 These cases fall into two general categories. The more common genre involves evidence of discrimination that is circumstantial. In such cases the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), applies. For our purposes, it is enough to say here that after plaintiff and defendant bear their preliminary burdens, plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving that the alleged discriminatory action was the determining factor in an adverse employment action. 14 The second and less common type involves direct evidence, evidence that unambiguously implicates a disability discrimination motive. Where such evidence exists, a mixed-motive analysis applies; that is, a plaintiff's burden is tempered so that she need prove only that the discriminatory action was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision. 1 The defendant then may assert an affirmative defense, bearing the burdens of production and persuasion that it `would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.' Weston-Smith v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., 282 F.3d at 64 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)). 2 15 Direct evidence, which consists of statements by a decisionmaker that directly reflect the alleged animus and bear squarely on the contested employment decision, Febres, 214 F.3d at 60, opens the door to a mixed motive analysis. The high threshold for this type of evidence requires that mere background noise and stray remarks be excluded from its definition. Id. at 61; see also Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 580-81 (1st Cir.1999) (concluding that the owner's statement that he did not need minorities ... on the job could have been either discriminatory or a response to what he perceived as an unjustified attempt to impose some sort of quota system upon his company). A statement that can plausibly be interpreted two different ways — one discriminatory and the other benign — does not directly reflect illegal animus, and, thus, does not constitute direct evidence. Id. at 583. Hence, direct evidence is relatively rare. Id. at 580. To be sure, that burden is not insurmountable. For example, in Febres, we concluded that plaintiff presented direct evidence where an employer's criteria for an employment decision involved job performance, union identification, and `in some cases, the age.' 214 F.3d at 59. 16 Patten argues that the two sets of comments by her supervisors referring to her disability, see supra at 24, constitute direct evidence and thus take her out of the McDonnell Douglas framework. None of these statements constitutes direct evidence, however. Our standard for direct evidence requires statements that are not inherently ambiguous, Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 583. We require statements that give us a high degree of assurance that a termination was attributable to discrimination. Id. at 580. Neither of the sets of statements in this case meets this test. Both are subject to the interpretation that management fully understood that appellant had a disability but could not further abide appellant's gross and repeated absenteeism. A decisionmaker's mentioning of a disability in the context of an adverse employment action cannot, without more, constitute direct evidence of discrimination. 3 Cf. id. at 583. 17