Opinion ID: 2844015
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of THC Metabolites

Text: [¶24] Lowe contends that the court erred by admitting evidence of the THC metabolites found in her blood sample because the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to Lowe. See M.R. 5 In addition to “exceptionally prejudicial circumstances,” a court may grant a mistrial where the State acts in bad faith. State v. Logan, 2014 ME 92, ¶ 14, 97 A.3d 121 (quotation marks omitted). Here, Lowe argues that both she and the State were surprised by Earl’s testimony, which negates any claim of prosecutorial bad faith. 6 On appeal, although Lowe mentions the issue in her brief, she has not meaningfully developed an argument that the timing of the Earl’s testimony unfairly prejudiced her case and that the court erred by allowing Earl to testify during the defense’s case. See Mehlhorn v. Derby, 2006 ME 110, ¶ 11, 905 A.2d 290 (stating that “issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived” (quotation marks omitted)). Even if she properly raised that argument, however, it would be unavailing because Lowe knew in advance that Earl might testify during the defense’s case; there was a legitimate explanation why the State was unable to present Earl’s testimony earlier in the trial; and the court explained to the jury that he was the State’s witness testifying out of order. Thus, the timing of the testimony was not unfairly prejudicial to Lowe. See State v. Larson, 577 A.2d 767, 770 (Me. 1990) (concluding that the court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the State to reopen its case “in the absence of surprise or unfair prejudice to the defense”). 14 Evid. 403.7 Because Lowe objected to the testimony about the presence of metabolites at trial, the trial court’s admission of evidence over her objection of unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Glover, 2014 ME 49, ¶ 8, 89 A.3d 1077.8 [¶25] Pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 2432(4) (2014), evidence of the presence of “the metabolites of any drug” in a defendant’s blood is “admissible evidence, but not prima facie, indicating whether that person is under the influence of intoxicants to be considered with other competent evidence, including evidence of alcohol level.” Thus, the evidence of THC metabolites here was “admissible evidence” pursuant to statute. If the statute is interpreted to mean that the evidence is admissible under all circumstances without regard to other evidentiary considerations, then the court did not err when it admitted the evidence. [¶26] Even if, as Lowe argues, section 2432(4) preserves the court’s discretion to exclude statutorily “admissible” evidence when the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, see M.R. Evid. 403, Lowe has not demonstrated that the court erred in admitting the evidence. 7 This rule has since been replaced by Rule 403 of the restyled Maine Rules of Evidence, which took effect on January 1, 2015. 8 At trial, Lowe also objected to the THC metabolite testimony on the grounds that the State violated discovery rules by not providing her with the data underlying the expert’s report until after the trial had started, even though the State timely produced the expert report itself. See M.R. Crim. P. 16(b)(2)(B) (superseded by M.R.U. Crim. P. 16(a)(2)(G)). She has not pressed that argument on appeal, and we do not address it here. 15 Evidence of THC metabolites in Lowe’s system had significant probative value because it corroborated eyewitness testimony that she had been smoking marijuana before the crash and lent credence to the connection between Lowe and the jacket with marijuana in the pocket. When considered in the context of that evidence, the presence of THC metabolites made it more likely that Lowe was under the influence of drugs at the time of the crash, even if the detection of the metabolites could not show conclusively that Lowe was impaired. Moreover, the risk of any unfair prejudice arising from evidence that Lowe had THC metabolites in her system was minimal given other testimony about her behavior. Because any prejudicial effect of the metabolite evidence does not substantially outweigh its significant probative value, the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State’s expert to testify regarding the presence of THC metabolites in Lowe’s blood.