Opinion ID: 1924753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Date of Calculation

Text: Section 8-8-10, in pertinent part, provides: Judgments for the payment of money, other than costs, if based upon a contract action, bear interest from the day of the cause of action, at the same rate of interest as stated in said contract; all other judgments shall bear interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum ... from the day of entry. (Emphasis added.) Burlington contends, in effect, that § 8-8-10 must be read in pari materia with Rules 58 and 54(b), A.R.Civ. P., and with Rule 37, A.R.App.P. We agree. Sections of the Code dealing with the same subject matter are in pari materia. Locke v. Wheat, 350 So.2d 451, 453 (Ala. 1977); Kelly v. State, 273 Ala. 240, 139 So.2d 326 (1962). This canon of construction also applies to rules of court. United States v. Godfrey, 651 F.Supp. 869, 871 (N.D.Ala.1986) (construing Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); Huskey v. W.B. Goodwyn Co., 295 Ala. 1, 321 So.2d 645 (1975) (construing Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure); 2B Sutherland Stat. Const. § 51.02 (5th ed. 1992). Ala.Code 1975, § 8-8-10; Ala.R.App.P. 37; and Ala.R.Civ.P. 54(b) and 58 all bear directly on the same subject matter, that is, the question when a judgment is properly and formally entered. They must, therefore, be `resolved in favor of each other to form one harmonious plan.' Ex parte Coffee County Comm'n, 583 So.2d 985, 988 (Ala. 1991) (quoting League of Women Voters v. Renfro, 292 Ala. 128, 131, 290 So.2d 167, 169 (1974)). Ala.R.App.P. 37 provides in pertinent part: Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in a civil case is affirmed or the appeal is dismissed, whatever interest is provided by law shall be payable from the date the judgment was entered in the trial court. (Emphasis added.) As to when a judgment is deemed to be entered, Ala.R.Civ.P. 58(c) provides: Upon rendition of a judgment or order as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule, unless it contains a specific direction otherwise or is subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), the clerk shall note such judgment or order forthwith in the civil docket if separately maintained. Notation of a judgment or order on separately maintained bench notes or in the civil docket or the filing of a separate judgment or order constitutes the entry of the judgment or order. (Emphasis added.) The committee comments to Rule 58(c) further explain that the clerk's notation of the judgment is not to be delayed unless the judgment ... is subject to Rule 54(b). (Emphasis added.) Ala.R.Civ.P. 54(b) states: When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. (Emphasis added.) For some time after the adoption of Rule 54(b), this Court dismissed ex mero motu appeals from judgments that failed to adjudicate all the claims in a suit involving multiple claims or parties unless the record revealed the trial court's (1) express determination that there [was] no just reason for delay and (2) its express direction for the entry of judgment. Id. (Emphasis added.) Tubbs v. Brandon, 366 So.2d 1119 (Ala.1979); Cates v. Bush, 293 Ala. 535, 307 So.2d 6 (1975). Subsequently, we adopted the practice of remanding the cause to the trial court for a determination as to whether it chooses to certify the order as final, pursuant to Rule 54(b), and, if it so chooses, to enter such an order and to supplement the record to reflect that certification. Foster v. Greer & Sons, Inc., 446 So.2d 605, 609 (Ala.1984). Under this practice, if the trial court subsequently enters a judgment adjudicating the outstanding claims, or certifies its interlocutory order as final, by the clear and unequivocal language required by Rule 54(b), the judgment will be taken as final as of the date the [Rule] 54(b) certification is entered. Foster, 446 So.2d at 609. However, if the trial court fails to respond to our order within 10 days, the appeal must be dismissed. We adopted this remand procedure only as a means to advance the policy considerations underlying Rule 54(b) by speeding up the process of reaching the merits in a proper case. Foster, 446 So.2d at 610. The procedure also eliminates the inconvenience and cost of dismissing the appeal and then taking a new appeal after obtaining the Rule 54(b) certification. Foster, 446 So.2d at 610. However, none of the procedures that this Court has adopted to facilitate the policies underlying Rule 54(b) should be construed as relaxing the Rule 58 requirements for the entry of a proper judgment, which, notably, are cast in terms of an express reference to the restrictions of Rule 54(b). On the contrary, these provisions, taken in conjunction with the cases construing them, compel the conclusion that if an order entered in a case with multiple claims does not meet the requirements of Rule 54(b), then no formal `judgment' ... [has been] entered, Balboa Ins. Co. v. Sippial Electric Co., 379 So.2d 579 (Ala.1980). Consequently, for the purpose of determining the date the judgment was entered, which, under Rule 37, begins the period of accrual of post-judgment interest, an order that is subject to Rule 54(b) but does not comply with it must be regarded as a nullity. [1] Similarly, a number of federal courts, construing the federal counterparts to these rules, have held that in cases involving claims comprehended by Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), post-judgment interest begins to accrue on the date of the entry of a judgment that complies with Rule 54(b), prior entries notwithstanding. See Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 642 F.2d 614, 617 (D.C.Cir.1980) (order entered in noncompliance with Rule 54(b) was not a valid judgment to which interest could attach); Caputo v. United States Lines Co., 311 F.2d 413, 416 (2d Cir.) (order entered in noncompliance with Rule 54(b) was premature for purpose of computing post-judgment interest), cert. denied sub nom, Imparato Stevedoring Corp. v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 833, 83 S.Ct. 1871, 10 L.Ed.2d 1055 (1963); Howell v. Sinclair Refining Co., 20 F.R.D. 623, 625 (N.D.Ala.1957) (clerk's authority to enter a judgment in a case within the ambit of Rule 54(b) is derived from the directive of Rule 58, which is expressly made `subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b),' the terms of which are clear and self-explanatory). The judgment entered on August 23, 1988, was determined by this Court to be defective as a matter of law. Because of the trial court's failure to adjudicate Burlington's claims against Ligon, or to comply with Rule 54(b), August 23, 1988, could not serve as the date the judgment was entered as contemplated by Rule 37 and by § 8-8-10. Instead, under our analysis of the statute and the pertinent rules, interest began to accrue on December 18, 1989, the date the trial court entered its Final Judgment and Order. [2]