Opinion ID: 2082463
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The decision as to Coffey

Text: In Honaker I Judge Orth observed for the Court: The precise issue for decision is whether the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment. Maryland Rule 610, § d 1 spells out two requirements for the grant of the judgment. It provides that the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show (1) that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and (2) that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. [ Id. 278 Md. at 458.] The function of a summary judgment proceeding is not to try the case or to attempt to resolve factual disputes, but to determine whether there is a dispute as to material facts sufficient to provide an issue to be tried. Dietz v. Moore, 277 Md. 1, 4-5, 351 A.2d 428 (1976), and cases there cited. A part of the controversy here involves the use of Saxe clips. Thus, it is interesting to note that Derby, in its demurrer to Coffey's second amended declaration, stated that the declaration shows on its face that [Derby] `designed, manufactured, sold and delivered' structural steel beams to be used by others for a particular purpose, and therefore Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol., 1971 Cum. Supp.), Art. 43, § 54D, which makes it unlawful to use Saxe clips in any construction involving the use of structural iron or steel is not applicable to Derby. There is a similar demurrer to Coffey's first amended declaration. In it Derby says that the declaration shows on its face that [Derby] was a `designer, manufacturer and vendor' of steel beams and that said steel beams were `used' in construction by people other than Derby, thereby barring any liability under Art. 43, § 54D. In determining whether a factual dispute exists, even if the underlying facts are undisputed, all inferences must be resolved against the moving party. Merchants Mortgage Co. v. Lubow, 275 Md. 208, 217, 339 A.2d 664 (1975); James v. Tyler, 269 Md. 48, 53-54, 304 A.2d 256 (1973); Roland v. Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc., 221 Md. 11, 14, 155 A.2d 691 (1959); White v. Friel, 210 Md. 274, 285, 123 A.2d 303 (1956). It follows, therefore, that since Derby was the one making the motion for summary judgment, the evidence in the deposition and exhibits and the reasonable inferences which might be derived therefrom must be considered in a light most favorable to Coffey. We recently said in Porter v. General Boiler Casing Co., 284 Md. 402, 396 A.2d 1090 (1979): The function of the trial judge on such a motion is said to be much the same as that which he performs at the close of all the evidence in a jury trial when motions for a directed verdict or requests for peremptory instructions require him to determine whether an issue requires resolution by a jury or is to be decided by the court as a matter of law. Washington Homes [ v. Inter. Land Dev., 281 Md. 712,] 716 [, 382 A.2d 555 (1978)]; Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Products, 273 Md. 1, 8, 327 A.2d 502 (1974); and Salisbury Beauty Schools v. St. Bd., 268 Md. 32, 41, 300 A.2d 367 (1973). Moreover, even where the underlying facts are undisputed, if those facts are susceptible of more than one permissible inference, the choice between those inferences should not be made as a matter of law, but should be submitted to the trier of fact. Fenwick Motor Co. v. Fenwick, 258 Md. 134, 138, 265 A.2d 256 (1970), and cases there cited. It follows, accordingly, that if there is a conflict between the inferences which may be drawn from that before the court, summary judgment is not proper. [ Id. at 413.] It will be recalled that the test laid down in the statute and in Honaker I for a determination of whether an individual is a statutory employer requires proof, among other things, that he has contracted to perform work which is a part of his trade, business or occupation.... The sum total of that which was before the trial judge on the motion for summary judgment is susceptible of an inference that Derby is no longer engaged in the trade, business or occupation of steel erection. Accordingly, the matter should be tried so that a finding of fact may be made as to whether Derby is in the steel erection business. As to Appeal No. 55: Judgment affirmed; appellants to pay the costs. As to Appeal No. 60: Judgment reversed and case remanded to the Court of Special Appeals for passage of an order reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County and remanding the case to it for further proceedings consistent with this opinion; appellee to pay the costs.