Opinion ID: 874884
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Resentence procedure

Text: Upon petitions for rehearing both the State and the defense urge this Court to remand for a special sentencing proceeding pursuant to I.C. § 19-2515. In 2003, the Idaho Legislature passed a recodification of I.C. § 19-2515. Because we have determined that Payne must be resentenced due to excessive, inappropriate victim's impact statements, the 2003 amendment to I.C. § 19-2515 gives specific direction as to how the resentencing must be conducted. In 2003, the Idaho Legislature amended I.C. § 19-2515 to direct a new sentencing procedure in which the jury is to find beyond a reasonable doubt any statutory aggravating circumstances which render the defendant death-eligible as well as conduct the weighing process of aggravating and mitigating factors to determine if the defendant should be sentenced to death. An uncodified statutory paragraph was a part of that amendment. It reads as follows: SECTION 6. This act shall apply to any capital sentencing proceeding occurring after the effective date of this act, including those cases where the murder for which sentence is to be imposed occurred before the effective date of this act and including those cases where a first-degree murder conviction or death sentence occurring before the effective date of this act has been set aside and the case is before the court for retrial or resentencing; provided however, that the provisions of this act relating to mandatory fixed life sentences based upon the finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance apply only to crimes occurring after the effective date of this act and provided further that the provisions of this act relating to notices of intent to seek the death penalty apply only to cases where the entry of a plea occurs after the effective date of this act. No provision of this act shall be construed to invalidate a death sentence that has been imposed prior to the effective date of this act. (emphasis added) Although unnecessary under Ring v. Arizona , it is very plain the Idaho Legislature meant that in all capital cases after the enactment of the 2003 amendments juries were to conduct the analysis the judge had previously conducted under the old I.C. § 19-2515. The codified language of I.C. § 19-2515 as amended in 2003 also supports such resolution. Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2515(5)(c), if a special sentencing proceeding is needed for any reason, including a remand from an appellate court, the trial court shall impanel a new jury of twelve (12) persons to hear the sentencing proceeding. Idaho Code § 19-2515(5)(d) goes on to state that [a]t the special sentencing proceeding, the state and the defendant shall be entitled to present all relevant evidence in aggravation and mitigation. (emphasis added). Subsection (7) instructs how the jury must be instructed if the jury finds or does not find a statutory aggravation. Most importantly, in I.C. § 19-2515(8) the jury must return a special jury verdict showing that the statutory aggravator has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt and then must weigh all mitigating evidence against that statutory aggravator. Surely the reference to the jury throughout this new codification refers to the newly impaneled jury in I.C. § 19-2515(5)(c). Therefore, because of clear, unequivocal legislative intent of the 2003 amendments, the case must be sent back to the trial court for a special sentencing procedure under I.C. § 19-2515.