Opinion ID: 2581939
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: raising affirmative defenses in motions to dismiss

Text: ¶ 6 In response to the Tuckers' amended complaint, State Farm filed a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging, in part, that the complaint was time barred by section 31A-21-313 of the Utah Code. The Tuckers addressed this statute of limitations issue by filing a motion to strike, asserting, in part, that affirmative defenses may not be raised in motions to dismiss. In support of this position the Tuckers cite, inter alia, Gill v. Timm, which notes that [a]ffirmative defenses must be set forth in responsive pleadings and are usually waived if not so pleaded. (citations omitted). 720 P.2d 1352, 1353-54 (Utah 1986). ¶ 7 Gill recites the general rule that affirmative defenses should be set forth in responsive pleadings. Id.; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c). Because dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) is justified only when the allegations of the complaint itself clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a claim, 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 at 345 (2d ed.1990) (emphasis added), [2] this general rule recognizes that affirmative defenses, which often raise issues outside of the complaint, are not generally appropriately raised in a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6). ¶ 8 In some instances, however, the existence of the affirmative defense may appear within the complaint itself. For example, [a] complaint showing that the statute of limitations has run on the claim is the most common situation in which the affirmative defense appears on the face of the pleading.... [T]he inclusion of dates in the complaint indicating that the action is untimely renders it subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. Id. at 352-54. We agree that in such a case a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) may raise affirmative defenses. Although we have not previously expressly articulated the rule that affirmative defenses may be brought by motion under rule 12(b)(6) when they appear within the complaint, we have previously recognized that a statute of limitations defense can be raised in a motion to dismiss. See Keller v. Southwood N. Med. Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102, 106 (Utah 1998) (A party waives a statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it in a responsive pleading or by motion .... (emphasis added)). We note also that other jurisdictions have similarly held that in certain circumstances affirmative defenses may be raised in a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Mathis, 151 Ariz. 551, 729 P.2d 905, 908 (1986) ([An affirmative defense] may be properly raised in a motion to dismiss, if the facts establishing the occasion for the [defense] appear in the pleadings.); Murrey v. Specialty Underwriters, Inc., 233 Ga. 804, 213 S.E.2d 668, 671 (1975) ([S]ome affirmative defenses may properly be raised by a motion to dismiss if the facts are admitted or are not controverted or are completely disclosed on the face of the pleadings and nothing further can be developed by a trial of the issue.); Harden v. State of Iowa, 434 N.W.2d 881, 883 (Iowa 1989) (The bar of the statute of limitations is properly raised by a motion to dismiss when the necessary facts appear on the face of the pleadings . . ..); Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 396 Mass. 836, 489 N.E.2d 671, 673 (1986) ([I]f the complaint shows on its face the existence of an affirmative defense, the complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and a motion to dismiss under ... 12(b)(6) is appropriate.). ¶ 9 Thus, had the Tuckers expressly stated in their amended complaint that State Farm had reimbursed the Tuckers and refused to pay certain expenses in November 1996, the issue of the propriety of raising the statute of limitations in the motion to dismiss would be settled in State Farm's favor. [3] Had this date been specified by the Tuckers, the allegations of the complaint itself would have clearly demonstrated that the Tuckers' claim was time barred, rendering the motion to dismiss an appropriate procedural vehicle for raising the statute of limitations. The Tuckers' amended complaint did not, however, explicitly mention this date. Rather, the amended complaint made reference to the events which began the running of the statute of limitations, (Defendant STATE FARM paid only the reasonable value of Plaintiffs' medical expenses . . . .), without expressly mentioning the date on which those acts occurred. To be sure, the amended complaint does specify a dateSeptember 18, 1997 but this date refers to a subsequent denial of payment, not to the date that payment was received and the Tuckers were initially informed of State Farm's intention to deny a portion of their claims. ¶ 10 Recognizing, presumably, that resolution of the statute of limitations issue required consideration of matters outside the complaint, the trial court noted that it was exercising its discretion to treat State Farm's motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b); see also Strand v. Associated Students of the Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977) (explaining that the trial court has initial discretion to consider matters outside the pleadings in rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss). In exercising its discretion to treat this motion as one for summary judgment under rule 56, the trial court became able to ascertain the relevant date for statute of limitations purposes. We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to treat State Farm's motion as one for summary judgment and hold that in doing so, the trial court cured any procedural defect in State Farm's motion to dismiss caused by the Tuckers' exclusion of a date in their complaint. ¶ 11 Thus, in the narrow instance where a plaintiff's complaint describes events which establish when a statute of limitations begins to run but fails to explicitly set forth the relevant date on which those events occurred, a defendant may raise a statute of limitations defense in a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provided that the trial court treats the motion as one for summary judgment, thus giving all parties the reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion.... Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). This holding is particularly appropriate in light of our policy to liberally construe[] the rules to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a). We therefore affirm the trial court's implicit determination that, in this case, the motion to dismiss was a proper procedural vehicle for State Farm to assert its statute of limitations defense.