Opinion ID: 4561577
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inclusion of Haneberg’s Testimony

Text: Plaintiffs aver that the district court erred by admitting Haneberg’s testimony regarding specific incidents attacking Patterson’s credibility in violation of Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We disagree.
As discussed above, evidentiary rulings are reviewed under a “deferential abuse of discretion standard,” Williams, 898 F.3d at 615, and are subject to the harmless-error doctrine, Heinsohn, 832 F.3d at 233. Therefore, even if the district court has abused its discretion, “the ruling will be reversed only if it affected the substantial rights of the complaining party.” Nunez, 604 F.3d at 844.
“[E]xtrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness.” Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). The rule “is limited to instances where the evidence is introduced to show a witness’s general character for truthfulness.” United States v. Farias-Farias, 925 F.2d 805, 811 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). “It in no way affects the admission of evidence of such prior acts for other purposes.” Id. 9 Case: 19-20651 Document: 00515545895 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/31/2020 No. 19-20651 Rule 608 does not prohibit the introduction of extrinsic evidence used to attack the credibility of a witness where “the evidence tends to show bias or motive for the witness to testify untruthfully.” United States v. Thorn, 917 F.2d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 1990). Further, evidence that may be inadmissible under Rule 608 if used to attack the witness’s general character for truthfulness may nonetheless be admitted if offered for another purpose. 5
Plaintiffs do not contest that the district court admitted Haneberg’s testimony for the purpose of impeaching Patterson’s credibility on account of bias. Instead, they assert only that the court failed appropriately to limit the testimony to effect that purpose. Plaintiffs’ quibble is unpersuasive. Plaintiffs assert that the court erred by permitting Haneberg to testify regarding Patterson’s falsified resume. That falsification resulted in her termination, which served as defendants’ foundation for Patterson’s alleged bias. It was squarely within the court’s broad discretion to permit the jury to hear the details and context surrounding an occurrence properly introduced as extrinsic evidence to show a witness’s bias. 6 “[C]ourts of appeals afford broad discretion to a district court’s evi- dentiary rulings” out of “deference to a district court’s familiarity with the 5 United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 56 (1984) (“It would be a strange rule of law which held that relevant, competent evidence which tended to show bias on the part of a witness was nonetheless inadmissible because it also tended to show that the witness was a liar.”). 6 See Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008); cf. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997) (Evidence thus has force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning, and as its pieces come together a narrative gains momentum . . . .”); FDIC v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 45 F.3d 969, 980 n.6 (5th Cir. 1995) (affirming admission of evidence that “define[d] and ‘elucidate[d] the nature of the transaction’”). 10 Case: 19-20651 Document: 00515545895 Page: 11 Date Filed: 08/31/2020 No. 19-20651 details of the case and its greater experience in evidentiary matters.” Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. at 384. The district court applied the proper legal standard by admitting extrinsic evidence for the purpose of showing Patterson’s bias. Thorn, 917 F.2d at 176. The scope of the testimony it permitted to accomplish that purpose did not abuse its “broad discretion.” Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. at 384.