Opinion ID: 2168808
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: testimony of moore

Text: Canbaz first asserts that the trial court erred in admitting the expert testimony of Moore. The decision whether to exclude expert witness testimony in a criminal case is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Larsen, supra . An abuse of discretion takes place when the sentencing court's reasons or rulings are clearly untenable and unfairly deprive a litigant of a substantial right and a just result. State v. Bartholomew, 258 Neb. 174, 602 N.W.2d 510 (1999). At trial, Canbaz' attorney objected to Moore's testimony on the basis of foundation, stating, My foundational objection is that this person has never met Mr. Canbaz and, therefore, does not have foundation to give testimony or any opinions in this case. Opinion evidence which is unsupported by appropriate foundation is not admissible. State v. Clark, supra . Thus, according to Canbaz, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Moore to testify. In his brief, Canbaz relies on Tvrz v. State, 154 Neb. 641, 48 N.W.2d 761 (1951), to assert that a personal examination of a defendant by the testifying expert is required in order for a medical expert to have the proper foundation to render an opinion regarding the defendant's state of mind. In Tvrz, we stated three possible ways to lay a proper foundation: acquaintance with the party under investigation, a medical examination made by the expert, or a hypothetical case stated to the expert in court. Thus, Tvrz does not support Canbaz' assertion that a personal medical examination is necessary. Furthermore, in 1975, the Legislature adopted Neb.Rev. Stat. § 27-703 (Reissue 1995), regarding expert testimony. The statute states: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Moore possessed sufficient foundation to offer his opinion regarding Canbaz' mental state under § 27-703. An expert must possess facts which enable him or her to express a reasonably accurate conclusion as distinguished from a mere guess or conjecture. State v. Johnson, 215 Neb. 391, 338 N.W.2d 769 (1983). Here, the record shows that Moore's opinions were based on a review of the same information upon which Gutnick relied, namely Canbaz' medical records and the police reports from the shooting, which included Canbaz' statement. Moore additionally reviewed Gutnick's written report and Gutnick's testimony regarding his examination of Canbaz, which incorporated some of Canbaz' statements to Gutnick during the examination. As such, Moore had sufficient facts to allow him to express his opinion regarding Canbaz' mental state. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Moore had sufficient foundation to testify. See, e.g., McGilberry v. State, 741 So.2d 894 (Miss.1999) (state's expert witness not required to personally examine defendant). Canbaz also asserted at trial that Moore should not be allowed to testify because the State did not disclose Moore's identity as a witness prior to trial. Such nondisclosure, argues Canbaz, amounts to a violation of the district court's pretrial discovery order. Canbaz does not argue in his brief that Moore's testimony was somehow improper rebuttal testimony. In fact, the record shows that Moore's testimony was offered by the State, after Gutnick offered his testimony on behalf of Canbaz, to rebut Gutnick's evidence regarding Canbaz' mental state at the time of the shooting. See State v. Fahlk, 246 Neb. 834, 524 N.W.2d 39 (1994). As a proper rebuttal witness, [i]t has long been the rule in this state that the requirement that the names of the witnesses for the state must be endorsed upon the information has no application to rebuttal witnesses. State v. Pratt, 197 Neb. 382, 387, 249 N.W.2d 495, 498 (1977). See, also, Griffith v. State, 157 Neb. 448, 59 N.W.2d 701 (1953). Thus, the State was not required to provide Canbaz with Moore's name prior to trial. Canbaz asserts, however, that the pretrial discovery order obligated the State to name rebuttal witnesses. The pretrial discovery order, drafted by Canbaz, ordered the State to provide various items, including the names, addresses and telephone numbers of all witnesses upon whose evidence the charges are based. The discovery order does not require the State to disclose any information with regard to rebuttal witnesses. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in allowing Moore to testify because the trial court correctly determined that the State had no obligation under our case law, or under the terms of the discovery order, to identify Moore as a rebuttal witness prior to his testifying. Finally, Canbaz asserts that Moore should not have been allowed to testify because Moore was present in the courtroom during the testimony of Gutnick, in violation of the witness sequestration order entered by the court. The reasoning from State v. Vosler, 216 Neb. 461, 345 N.W.2d 806 (1984), and State v. Jackson, 231 Neb. 207, 435 N.W.2d 893 (1989), is helpful in addressing this issue. In Jackson, the defendant requested that the State's expert medical witness be sequestered during trial. The trial court denied the request. The State explained that the presence of its expert was necessary because the State `has no opportunity under the law, unless the defense allows [it], to examine the defendant at all, other than to be present in court when [the defendant] testifies.' 231 Neb. at 213, 435 N.W.2d at 897. We recognized in Jackson that there are constitutional constraints upon the State's ability to obtain information on a defendant's mental state and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sequester the State's expert. In Vosler, we noted that because the State could not compel a defendant to submit to a mental examination unless he or she tenders an insanity defense, [t]he State could also have an appropriate witness attend the trial and testify on the issue [of the defendant's mental state] based upon what the witness learned as a result of the evidence adduced at trial. 216 Neb. at 471, 345 N.W.2d at 812. Consistent with Jackson and Vosler, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Moore to testify because Moore was properly present in the courtroom during Gutnick's testimony.