Opinion ID: 1699223
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Vicarious Liability of the City for the Act of the Policeman

Text: The City invokes § 6-5-338 immunity against vicarious liability for the act of the policeman. Section 6-5-338(a) provides in pertinent part: (a) Every peace officer ... employed ... by ... [a] municipality [subject to conditions not relevant in the present lawsuit] shall at all times be deemed to be officers of this state, and as such shall have immunity from tort liability arising out of his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties.  (Emphasis added.) Whether a qualified peace officer is due § 6-5-338(a) immunity is now judged by the restatement of State-agent immunity articulated by Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000), and adopted by a majority of this Court in Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173 (Ala.2000), and Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d 911 (Ala.2000). Howard v. City of Atmore, [Ms. 1021312, Dec. 12, 2003] ___ So.2d ___, ___ (Ala.2003) (Since Cranman, we analyze immunity issues [under § 6-5-338(a)] in terms of `State-agent' immunity [as restated in Cranman ], rather than `under the dichotomy of ministerial versus discretionary functions') (quoting Ex parte Hudson, 866 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Ala.2003)); see Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So.2d 1046, 1051 (Ala.2003), and Ex parte Turner, 840 So.2d 132, 134 n. 1 (Ala.2002). Cranman reads: We therefore restate the rule governing State-agent immunity:  A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent's [some emphasis added, some original] (1) formulating plans, policies, or designs; or (2) exercising his or her judgment in the administration of a department or agency of government, including, but not limited to, examples such as: (a) making administrative adjudications; (b) allocating resources; (c) negotiating contracts; (d) hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising personnel; or (3) discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for performing the duties and the State agent performs the duties in that manner; or (4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to arrest persons [emphasis added]; or (5) exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons of unsound mind, or educating students. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall not [emphasis original] be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity (1) when the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws, rules, or regulations of this State enacted or promulgated for the purpose of regulating the activities of a government agency require otherwise; or (2) when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law. 792 So.2d at 405. We notice a difference between certain critical language in the statute, § 6-5-338(a), and certain critical language in the Cranman restatement describing the conduct immunized. That is, the statute refers to conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties while immune category (4) of the Cranman restatement refers to conduct exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to arrest persons. In the particular case now before us, we need not decide whether or how the difference between the language of the statute and the language of the Cranman restatement affects the scope of the immunity, since the record does not establish without dispute or as a matter of law that the act of the policeman in ordering the plaintiffs not to reenter the burning house to fight the fire fits within either description of immune conduct. Nor does the record establish without dispute or as a matter of law that the act of the policeman fits within any of the other Cranman categories of immune conduct. Thus, we cannot rely on the § 6-5-338(a) immunity, as described by either the statute itself or the Cranman restatement, to affirm the summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claim for vicarious liability for the act of the policeman. See Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d at 914: Dr. Rizk's treatment of his patient, the plaintiff's decedent, does not fit within any of the categories of immune State-agent conduct contained in the Cranman restatement. Therefore, Dr. Rizk is not immune. The policeman may or may not have been negligent in ordering the plaintiffs not to reenter the burning house to fight the fire. Thus, the City may or may not be liable for his conduct. That issue is not before us because the summary-judgment motion of the City did not raise the factual merits of the plaintiffs' claims. See Liberty National and Tanner, supra . Accordingly, while we must reverse the summary judgment on this claim, we express no opinion about the factual merits.