Opinion ID: 1227989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Warrantless aerial surveillance.

Text: (1) In California, the legality of a warrantless police intrusion into allegedly private zones of activity depends on whether the government has unreasonably invaded an actual expectation of privacy which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. (E.g., Cook, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 379; Lorenzana v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 626, 638 [108 Cal. Rptr. 585, 511 P.2d 33]; see Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 350-352 [19 L.Ed.2d 576, 581-583, 88 S.Ct. 507].) All parties concede that defendant sought privacy for his residence and his marijuana gardens. They were on his private property in a remote area, away from ground-level vantage points open to the public. The gardens themselves, while not immediately adjacent to the residential structures, were carefully enclosed by fences and trees. The only issues, therefore, are whether defendant's wishes were objectively reasonable and, if so, whether the warrantless aerial observation invaded his expectations unreasonably. Three recent cases bear on these questions but do not resolve them. The first such decision is United States v. Oliver (1984) 466 U.S. 170 [80 L.Ed.2d 214, 104 S.Ct. 1735]. In two separate incidents there under review, law enforcement agents, acting without warrants or probable cause, entered remote rural private property to look for marijuana cultivation. Noting that the land inspected in each instance was some distance from any home or business, the high court found no violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Oliver majority conceded that the Fourth Amendment provides a high degree of privacy protection to the curtilage of a residence  the land immediately surrounding and associated with the home. (P. 180 [80 L.Ed.2d p. 225].) However, it affirmed the long-standing rule (see Hester v. United States (1924) 265 U.S. 57 [68 L.Ed. 898, 44 S.Ct. 445]) that the federal Constitution allows the authorities to inspect areas beyond the curtilage  so-called open fields  at will, even where they trespass on private property which was clearly intended to be shielded from the view of outsiders. (Pp. 176-184 [80 L.Ed.2d pp. 222-228].) The five majority justices concluded that open fields are not among the persons, houses, papers, and effects described in the Fourth Amendment. (Pp. 176-177 [80 L.Ed.2d p. 223]; see Hester, supra, 265 U.S. at p. 59 [68 L.Ed. at p. 900].) Moreover, the Oliver majority reasoned, society is not prepared to recognize such areas as protected zones of intimate privacy, even where the individuals who seek privacy in such places have made that intention clear. (466 U.S. at pp. 179-184 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 224-228].) [3] Under Oliver, police observation of an open field, at least from the ground, simply is not a search subject to federal constitutional limitations. [4] (2) In Cook, supra, we subsequently confirmed that the California Constitution, like its federal counterpart, protects with special zeal the legitimate expectation of privacy within a residential curtilage. Law enforcement agents may not defeat that expectation, we ruled, by spying at will on a private yard from an aircraft. We were not persuaded that police officers who examine a residence from the air are simply observing what is in plain view from a lawful public vantage point. Such reasoning, we explained, ignores the essential difference between ground and aerial surveillance. One can take reasonable steps to ensure his yard's privacy from the street, sidewalk, or neighborhood, and police on the ground may not broach such barriers to gain a view of the enclosed area. But there is no practical defense against aerial spying, and precious constitutional privacy rights would mean little if the government could defeat them so easily. (3) Even if members of the public may casually see into his yard when a routine flight happens over the property, we concluded, a householder does not thereby consent to focused examination of the curtilage by airborne police officers looking for evidence of crime. No law enforcement interest justifies such intensive warrantless government intrusion into a zone of heightened constitutional privacy. (41 Cal.3d at pp. 379-385.) Cook was decided exclusively under the California Constitution. A more recent United States Supreme Court decision, California v. Ciraolo, supra, ___ U.S. ___ [90 L.Ed.2d 210], has ruled that warrantless aerial surveillance of the curtilage does not contravene the Fourth Amendment. In Ciraolo, as in Cook, one convicted on a marijuana charge urged that the police violated his constitutional rights when they examined his enclosed backyard from an airplane to confirm vague suspicions that he was engaged in illegal cultivation. Over a vigorous dissent, a bare majority of the high court disagreed. However private the curtilage in other contexts, the majority said, the realities of air travel force a modern householder to assume that his yard and anything in it are in plain view from the air. (___ U.S. at pp. ___ [90 L.Ed.2d at pp. 215-218] [see also dis. opn. by Powell, J., at p. ___ et seq. (90 L.Ed.2d at p. 218 et seq.)]; cf., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States (1986) ___ U.S. ___ [90 L.Ed.2d 226, 235-238, ___ S.Ct. ___].) (4) Our state charter is a document of independent force ( People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 549-550 [119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099]), and its guarantees are not dependent on those [provided] by the United States Constitution unless a contrary intent appears. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 24.) We grant respectful consideration to constitutional interpretations of the United States Supreme Court, but they are to be followed in California only where they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by California law. ( People v. Longwill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 943, 951, fn. 4 [123 Cal. Rptr. 297, 538 P.2d 753].) On many occasions, we have concluded that the California Constitution accords greater protection to individual rights within our borders than federal law guarantees throughout the nation. (E.g., People v. Bustamonte (1981) 30 Cal.3d 88, 102 [177 Cal. Rptr. 576, 634 P.2d 927]; People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 246-252 [145 Cal. Rptr. 861, 578 P.2d 108]; People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 113 [127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272].) Having carefully examined the majority decisions in Ciraolo and Dow Chemical, cited supra, we find ourselves unconvinced by their reasoning. We adhere to our holding in Cook. The question remains whether the federal and state Constitutions nonetheless permit the random rural aerial surveillance at issue in this case. Before Oliver was decided, California courts displayed some uncertainty about whether the open fields doctrine had survived the intervening principle of Katz, supra, that the [Constitution] protects people, not places and may shield what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public.... (389 U.S. at p. 350 [19 L.Ed.2d at p. 582]; compare, e.g., People v. Krivda (1971) 5 Cal.3d 357, 364-365 [96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 486 P.2d 1262] [what person seeks to preserve as private, even in public area, may be constitutionally protected]; People v. Edwards (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1101 [80 Cal. Rptr. 633, 458 P.2d 713] [whether place such as open field is or is not constitutionally protected area does not necessarily determine reasonable expectation of privacy]; Burkholder v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal. App.3d 421, 425-430 [158 Cal. Rptr. 86] [secluded open field on private property protected from ground, but not air, inspection]; and Phelan v. Superior Court (1979) 90 Cal. App.3d 1005, 1011 [153 Cal. Rptr. 738] [expectation of privacy in remote rural marijuana garden is reasonable if desire for privacy is exhibited] with People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 881-882, fn. 9 [109 Cal. Rptr. 304, 512 P.2d 1208] [open fields are among places so public that search is justified without warrant or exigency]; People v. Scheib (1979) 98 Cal. App.3d 820, 826-827 [159 Cal. Rptr. 665] [citing Dumas ]; and People v. Ketchum (1975) 45 Cal. App.3d 328, 330 [119 Cal. Rptr. 368] [same].) However, pre- Oliver California cases consistently upheld warrantless surveillance of rural marijuana gardens from airplanes flying at normal altitudes, even when surveillance was part of a random overflight program, employed optical aids, and inspected homes or human activities near the gardens. Interpreting Katz in a manner which anticipated Oliver, the Courts of Appeal reasoned that common habits in the use of agricultural and woodland property preclude any reasonable expectation that crops growing there will not be seen from legal aerial vantage points by the public or the police. ( Dean v. Superior Court (1973) 35 Cal. App.3d 112, 114, 117 [110 Cal. Rptr. 585] [patch located in an isolated area of the Sierra foothills, ... hidden from view by the surrounding hills and woods]; see also People v. Egan (1983) 141 Cal. App.3d 798, 800, 806 [190 Cal. Rptr. 546] [overflight of ranch prompted by rumors of marijuana cultivation; [t]he appellate courts of this state have consistently upheld aerial surveillance from lawful altitudes over rural and relatively unpopulated property....]; Tuttle v. Superior Court (1981) 120 Cal. App.3d 320, 327 [174 Cal. Rptr. 576], cert. den., 454 U.S. 1033 [70 L.Ed.2d 477, 102 S.Ct. 571] [Tents, `other structures,' vehicles, and people... observed near rural garden area; trails led from structures to garden]; People v. Joubert (1981) 118 Cal. App.3d 637, 640-641 [173 Cal. Rptr. 428] [binoculars used; outbuildings resembling barns [and a] `predominant house' observed within 29-acre parcel; house was focus of particular attention by observers]; People v. St. Amour (1980) 104 Cal. App.3d 886, 889-893 [163 Cal. Rptr. 187] [Humboldt County random surveillance program; plants seen on a mountain slope in a deserted area a mile and a half from nearest town; though no business or other human activities were observable, the site included a tent]; Burkholder, supra, 96 Cal. App.3d at pp. 423-425 [Santa Cruz County random surveillance program; binoculars and telephoto camera used; garden observed in a heavily wooded, mountainous area].) Courts in other jurisdictions have applied similar principles to uphold, under a wide variety of circumstances, warrantless aerial surveillance for marijuana in rural areas. ( United States v. Allen (9th Cir.1980) 675 F.2d 1373, 1380-1381, cert. den. (1981) 454 U.S. 833 [70 L.Ed.2d 112, 102 S.Ct. 133] [helicopter surveillance with binoculars and telephoto lenses; seacoast ranch routinely traversed by Coast Guard helicopters for law enforcement purposes; prior site-specific suspicion of drug smuggling]; United States v. DeBacker (W.D.Mich. 1980) 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 [isolated episodes of surveillance over farm in boondocks at altitudes as low as 50 feet and distances as near as 40 feet to one of working farmhands; public overflights at low altitudes not uncommon]; Diehl v. State (Fla.App. 1984) 461 So.2d 157, 158 [no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial observation of open field (citing Oliver )]; State v. Bigler (1983) 100 N.M. 515 [673 P.2d 140, 141] [unaided aerial view of cornfield containing marijuana; no reasonable expectation of privacy from airplanes; municipal airport nearby and low-altitude cropduster flights common]; State v. Stachler (1981) 58 Hawaii 412 [570 P.2d 1323, 1325-1329] [random surveillance; binocular-aided helicopter view of marijuana patch 15 feet from house on remote and secluded 4-acre parcel; helicopter's maintenance of legal altitude (300 feet) and frequency of overflights by other aircraft contribute to finding of no reasonable privacy expectation]; State v. Davis (1981) 51 Ore.App. 827 [627 P.2d 492, 493-494] [airplane flying at 600-700 feet observed marijuana patch 150-300 feet from dwellings on defendant's locked, posted, and secluded land in somewhat populated area; no reasonable expectation of privacy even though aircraft's altitude violated F.A.A. regulations]; State v. Layne (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) 623 S.W.2d 629, 632-636 [helicopter surveillance of rural field containing 5 persons from altitude of 1,800 feet; marijuana observed by police from legal aerial vantage point is in open view]; see People v. Lashmett (1979) 71 Ill. App.3d 429 [27 Ill.Dec. 657, 389 N.E.2d 888, 890-894], cert. den. (1980) 444 U.S. 1081 [62 L.Ed.2d 765, 100 S.Ct. 1034] [observation of stolen tractor from legal height of 2,400 feet; rural field away from house and curtilage; open field doctrine applies].) (5) For state as well as federal purposes, we accept Oliver 's premise that there is a greater legitimate expectation of privacy within the home and curtilage than in open fields. We agree that the curtilage, under both the state and federal Constitutions, is confined to those outdoor areas immediately adjacent to the home to which extend the intimate activity associated with the `sanctity of a [person's] home and the privacies of life' [citation omitted] ...; outdoor places beyond this adjacent and intimate zone are open fields. ( Oliver, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 180 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 225]; see also p. 182, fn. 12 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 226].) (6) Moreover, we conclude, as prior cases have suggested, that there can be no reasonable expectation of absolute privacy from warrantless aerial surveillance by the police of crops growing in open fields. Insofar as the open fields are observed from sufficient altitude to prevent disruption or detailed observation of individual activities below, the fields are in plain view from the air, and aerial surveillance for illegal cultivation there is not a search governed by either Constitution. [5] (7) In our view, the crop at issue here lay outside the curtilage, in an open field. We recognize that some decisions have defined rural curtilages expansively. Yet we are not persuaded that the cultivation which drew the officers' attention here was within a zone of heightened privacy. The suspicious vegetation was seen in a secluded, mountainous area, some 200 or more feet from trailers which might be residences. While the cultivated area was shielded from ground-level vantage points outside appellant's property, it was not in an area immediately adjacent to the trailers to which ... the intimate activity associated with the `sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life' could be expected to extend. There was no physical indication, such as a common enclosure, that the trailers and gardens were considered a common zone of private residential activity. (8) Appellant urges that, even if his crop was therefore in an open field, the officers' simultaneous scrutiny of his house and curtilage was an invalid warrantless search. That impropriety, appellant asserts, requires suppression of the marijuana discovery. For several reasons, we cannot accept this premise. The surveying officers admitted that they did not avert their eyes from the terrain surrounding the suspicious cultivation, and the aerial photos presented to the magistrate depict not only the garden itself, but the nearby trailers, hillsides, trails, and roads. One officer conceded he unavoidably examined the apparently inhabited zone, since the eye did encompass quite a bit. It is clear, however, that the focus of the examination for criminal activity was the cultivated area outside the curtilage. The officers saw nothing criminal within the curtilage, and it appears that their primary interest in noticing this area was to establish its relationship, if any, to the outlying crops. (9) The observations took place from over 1,000 feet above defendant's property. The officers testified that the photographs presented to the magistrate, though some may have been taken with telephoto equipment, accurately show the scale of objects as they appeared to the naked eye. [6] If that is so, the details of human activity could scarcely have been discernible from the aircraft. All the photographs reveal is evidence that inhabited structures exist in the vicinity, and that they may be related to cultivation in open fields. The most casual passing airplane could see as much. (10) We think that observation of crops growing in open fields is not transformed into an unconstitutional search when the officers incidentally and unavoidably observe the existence of a nearby home and curtilage, and its relationship to the fields, from a visual altitude at which the possibility of intrusion on private activities below is remote. [7] Our holding here is distinguishable from that of Cook, supra . There we prohibited all warrantless aerial scrutiny of a residential curtilage for the particular purpose of confirming a suspicion that criminal activity is taking place there. (11) There is a difference, significant for constitutional purposes, between surveillance focused on a particular residential yard, on the one hand, and, on the other, surveillance which concentrates on open fields and merely notices their relationship to nearby habitation. In the former case, represented by Cook, there is no independent justification for the overflight; in the latter, the open fields doctrine provides an initial justification for the officers' airborne presence. Moreover, in the Cook situation, the intensity and focused nature of the observation, even if it occurs from substantial altitudes, enhances the danger that innocent activities occurring within a legitimate zone of protected privacy will be unreasonably infringed. (12) Finally, we cannot ignore the differing law enforcement interests involved. The inquiry whether particular privacy expectations are reasonable, and whether government has intruded upon them unreasonably, involves a weighing of the competing privacy and law enforcement interests. (See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, 336 [83 L.Ed.2d 720, 731, 105 S.Ct. 733] and conc. opn. of Blackmun, J., at 469 U.S. at p. 351 [83 L.Ed.2d at p. 741]; United States v. Martinez-Fuente (1976) 428 U.S. 543, 560-567 [49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 1129-1134, 96 S.Ct. 3074]; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1974) 422 U.S. 873, 883-884 [45 L.Ed.2d 607, 617-618, 95 S.Ct. 2574]; Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905-906, 88 S.Ct. 1868]; People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 292-293 [145 Cal. Rptr. 876, 578 P.2d 123].) The People advise, and appellant does not dispute, that Humboldt County's random surveillance program was prompted by the rise of a large-scale illegal marijuana cultivation industry in remote areas of the county. There have been serious consequences, the People suggest, for the safety of law-abiding residents and visitors. Precisely in order to avoid discovery, the growers have retreated to places where detection from the ground is difficult or impossible. Persons who do approach a cultivated plot face the prospect of armed resistance. (See fn. 1, ante. ) Secure in their weapon-enforced privacy, the farmers pursue their illicit trade unhindered. Aerial surveillance of these remote, inaccessible, and dangerous areas may be the only feasible means of confronting this extraordinary law enforcement problem. Aerial surveillance also seems the least intrusive way of doing so, since it does not physically impinge at close range upon persons or private premises. (See discussion, ante. ) (13) In our view, mere suspicion that marijuana is growing in the enclosed backyard of a single residence can never justify a warrantless aerial invasion of the enclosure. On the other hand, we do not believe that airborne police officers infringe unreasonably on legitimate privacy in homes and curtilages by merely observing the configuration of nearby structures while patrolling open fields for large-scale marijuana cultivation. We conclude that the surveillance here at issue did not violate appellant's constitutional rights. [8] In so holding on these facts, we do not minimize the difficulties involved in keeping a random surveillance program of this kind within proper bounds. At the behest of irate citizens, a United States District Court has already enjoined certain overreaching surveillance practices of the Humboldt County program. ( Nat. Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen (N.D.Cal. 1985) 608 F. Supp. 945.) (14) (See fn. 9.) In the wake of Proposition 8, such civil actions may prove the most effective bulwark against violations of the state Constitution by agents of law enforcement. [9] A principal advantage of this form of enforcement is that all parties will have a full opportunity to present facts bearing on the constitutional reasonableness of a particular surveillance program. Perhaps the most significant protection for the privacy interest of innocent citizens would be the development of regulatory standards which prescribe and limit the manner in which overflights may be conducted. Such standards would have multiple advantages: they would, among other things, provide law enforcement personnel with a clear guide to the exercise of their discretion; serve as a basis for internal discipline in the event of violation; and establish a foundation for meaningful judicial review. Most of all, publicly announced standards would reassure householders who seek legitimate privacy in their homes and yards, thus promoting that peace of mind which is an important ingredient of ordered liberty. (See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment (1974) 58 Minn.L.Rev. 349, 416 et seq.; Mertens, The Fourth Amendment and the Control of Police Discretion (1984) 17 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 551, 553-563.) Such standards may of course be established by the Legislature, but we encourage the law enforcement agencies responsible for marijuana surveillance overflights to adopt them as administrative regulations in the first instance. (Cf., Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523, 538 [18 L.Ed.2d 930, 940-941, 87 S.Ct. 1727].) Indeed, in the event of a civil lawsuit aimed at curbing abuse (see discussion, ante ), the existence or nonexistence of such standards may be considered an important factor in determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief. (See, e.g., Stark v. Perpich (D.Minn. 1984) 590 F. Supp. 1057 [injunction against drunk driving survey checkpoint denied where promulgation of standards minimized police discretion]; Note, Curbing the Drunk Driver Under the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of Roadblock Seizures (1983) 71 Geo. L.J. 1457.)