Opinion ID: 178901
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mere Tardiness as a Failure to Appear

Text: Camaj alternatively raises the compelling argument that the IJ abused her discretion when she ordered him deported in absentia for failing to appear because he arrived only 40 minutes late to his hearingand only six minutes after she had entered the order against him. In other words, he asserts that mere tardiness does not amount to a failure to appear under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A). Appellant Br. 10. Unfortunately, Camaj presents this argument for the first time on appeal, and Congress has stripped the Federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction to entertain administratively unexhausted deportation claims, no matter how meritorious. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); accord Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir.1994). As a final note, we feel that we must stress that our current legislative, administrative, and judicial procedures have combined to deprive a fellow human being of his day in the courts of our country. It is true that there is no showing on the record that Camaj would have been entitled to the political asylum he sought. That is of no moment. The facts of this case should have entitled him to have his case heard on the merits. When a similar case again comes before this Courtas one surely willwe would implore our colleagues to hold that slight tardiness to one's hearing does not qualify as a failure to appear at an immigration proceeding and that to order an individual's deportation under such circumstances constitutes an abuse of discretion. [4] This simple clarification would preclude the miscarriage of justice that Camaj today must endure and would make it less likely that this Court will have its docket congested with similar cases in the future. Our sister circuits have followed a similar path to facilitate the administration of justice. The Ninth and Second Circuits have held that an immigration judge abuses his discretion when he treats mere tardiness as a failure to appear. See, e.g., Perez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 770, 774-75 (9th Cir.2008); Abu Hasirah v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 478 F.3d 474, 479 (2d Cir. 2007). Similarly, the Third Circuit has held that [w]hen the delay is as short as it was here [(15 to 20 minutes)], there have been no prior instances of tardiness, and the IJ is either still on the bench or recently retired and close by, it is a due process violation to treat the tardiness as a failure to appear. It is accepted practice for Article III judges to give marginally tardy litigants a second chance, because [i]t is both harsh and unrealistic to treat as a non-appearance a litigant's failure to be in the courtroom at the precise moment his case is called. We expect nothing less from immigration judges who sit in this circuit, given the severity of the consequences of removal and the minimal disruption to the operations of the Immigration Court. We agree with the Fifth Circuit that judges must remember that they are appointed, not anointed.