Opinion ID: 1420377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists As To Whether O'Toole-Buck Was Mentally Incompetent At The Time Her Cause of Action Accrued.

Text: HRS § 657-13 provides in relevant part: If any person entitled to bring any action specified in this part (excepting actions against the sheriff, chief of police, or other officers) is, at the time the cause of action accrued ... [i]nsane[,] ... such person shall be at liberty to bring such actions within the respective times limited in this part, after the disability is removed or at any time while the disability exists. In Zator v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 69 Haw. 594, 752 P.2d 1073 (1988), this court held that the insanity provision of HRS § 657-13(2) tolled the no-fault statute of limitations when a claimant is mentally incompetent at the time the cause of action accrues. Id. at 598, 752 P.2d at 1075. See also Gorospe v. Matsui, 72 Haw. 377, 819 P.2d 80 (1991) (applying the tolling provision in HRS § 657-13 to toll the no-fault statute of limitations for minority plaintiffs). We further held that once a guardian is appointed for the incompetent person's property, the limitation period commences. Zator, 69 Haw. at 599, 752 P.2d at 1076. In this case, it is undisputed that Buck commenced the instant action thirty-nine months after O'Toole-Buck's claim for relief accrued. Buck, nevertheless, claims that O'Toole-Buck was insane at the time the action accrued, thus raising the issue of the applicability of the tolling provision of HRS § 657-13(2). As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that the word insane in the context of HRS § 657-13 has never been defined by the either the legislature or the courts. In Christian v. Waialua Agricultural Co., 31 Haw. 817 (1931), we briefly discussed the term insanity as it applied to rescission of a deed or contract, stating: The test generally agreed upon is this: A deed or contract cannot be set aside on the ground of insanity if the person had sufficient mental capacity to understand in a reasonable manner the nature of the particular transaction in which he was engaged and its consequences and effects upon his rights and interest.... The proper inquiry is whether he was capable of understanding and appreciating the nature and effect of the one particular act or transaction which is challenged. Id. at 822. Other jurisdictions examining the meaning of insanity in the context of tolling the statute of limitations have liberally defined the term as: (1) the inability to understand one's legal rights or manage one's affairs, see Adkins v. Nabors Alaska Drilling Inc.,, 609 P.2d 15, 23 (Alaska 1980); Allen v. Powell's Int'l, Inc., 21 Ariz.App. 269, 518 P.2d 588, 589 (Ariz.App.1974); Davidson v. Baker Vander Veen Constr. Co., 35 Mich. App. 293, 192 N.W.2d 312, 316 n. 4 (Mich. App.1971); (2) the inability to understand the nature or effect of one's acts, see Peach v. Peach, 73 Ill.App.2d 72, 218 N.E.2d 504, 509 (Ill.App.1966); Hornig v. Hornig, 6 Mass. App.Ct. 109, 374 N.E.2d 289, 291 (Mass.App. Ct.1978); or (3) the inability to carry out one's business and prosecute the claim, See Harrington v. County of Ramsey, 279 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Minn.1979); Cline v. Lever Bros. Co., 124 Ga.App. 22, 183 S.E.2d 63 (Ga.App.1971). With these definitions in mind, we turn to the record in this case. In opposition to Dr. Miles's motion for summary judgment, Buck submitted, among other things, a psychological evaluation from a clinical psychologist and sworn affidavits of two additional mental health professionals, each opining that O'Toole-Buck was mentally incompetent to manage her legal and business affairs subsequent to her stroke on September 18, 1988. The general rule is that material in support of, or in opposition to, a motion for summary judgment must set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence. HRCP Rule 56(e). To be admissible, documents must be authenticated by and attached to an affidavit that meets the requirements of... Rule 56(e) and the affiant must be a person through whom the exhibits could be admitted into evidence. Takaki v. Allied Machinery Corp., 87 Hawai`i 57, 69, 951 P.2d 507, 519 (App.1998) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2722, at 58-60 (2d ed.1983) (brackets omitted)). It does not appear that Dr. Greene's psychological evaluation was supported by any appropriate affidavit or certification pursuant to the foregoing requirements. For this reason, Dr. Greene's evaluation must be excluded from consideration. This being the case, we now examine the affidavits of the psychiatrist, Shepard Ginandes, M.D., and the neuropsychologist, Robert Sbordone, Ph.D. Affidavits in a summary judgment motion are scrutinized to determine whether the facts they aver are admissible at trial and made on the personal knowledge of the affiant. Miller v. Manuel, 9 Haw.App. 56, 66, 828 P.2d 286, 292 (1991). See also HRCP Rule 56(e) (Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.). Here, Dr. Ginandes's affidavit was based on his personal knowledge of the record and examination of O'Toole-Buck. He indicated that O'Toole-Buck suffered from significat [sic] neuropsychiatric deficits involving marked impairment of her remote and recent memory, judgment, decision-making capacity, cognition, comprehension, and suppression as a result of her stroke on September 18, 1988. Dr. Ginandes further opined, to a high degree of psychiatric certainty, that Mrs. O'Toole-Buck was not mentally competent to manage her business or legal affairs since September 18, 1988. He also stated that, given the severity of O'Toole-Buck's mental incompetence and incapacity, she would remain mentally incompetent and unable to manage her business or legal affairs for the duration of her life[.] Dr. Sbordone also personally attested in his affidavit that O'Toole-Buck sustain[ed] infarctions in the left temporal lobe or along the middle cerebral artery, which extends anteriorly into the left frontal lobe and posteriorly into the parietal lobe, resulting in O'Toole-Buck exhibiting significant impairments on tasks which involved sustained attention, vigilance, cognitive flexibility, set maintenance, cognitive processing speed, verbal fluency, receptive language processing, verbal learning, verbal and visual memory, higher-order motor/executive functions, proverb interpretation, judgment, problem solving, organization and planning. Dr. Sbordone thus opined that O'Toole-Buck was not mentally competent to manage her business or legal affairs and that her mental incompetence was a direct result of her stroke on September 18, 1988. The averments in the affidavits submitted by Dr. Ginandes and Dr. Sbordone provide an adequate basis upon which a trier of fact could find inferentially that O'Toole-Buck was suffering from a mental defect that prevented her both from comprehending and managing her personal affairs and from understanding the nature or effect of her actions. The fact that O'Toole-Buck retained counsel and settled an unrelated lawsuit is some evidence that she was sane, but does not conclusively establish that fact. See Harrington, 279 N.W.2d at 796 ([T]he retention of counsel is evidence, although not conclusive, of a person's sanity or legal capacity for the purpose of the running of the statute of limitations.); Davidson, 192 N.W.2d at 312 (We are not prepared to say that ability to retain a lawyer is conclusive evidence of mental competence for the purposes of this tolling provision.). Thus, considering the definition of insanity and construing the motion liberally in favor of Buck, we hold that the averments in the affidavits of Dr. Ginandes and Dr. Sbordone were sufficient to invoke the tolling provision in HRS § 657-13. We stress that this holding is not a determination that O'Toole-Buck was insane during the time alleged, but merely that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to O'Toole-Buck's sanity. Whether or not the specific mental malady pled in Buck's motion in opposition and affidavits constituted or resulted in O'Toole-Buck's insanity is a question to be determined by the trier of fact and should not be decided summarily as a matter of law. Accordingly, we vacate and remand the case for further consideration of the issue. If, on remand, the circuit court ultimately rules that O'Toole-Buck was mentally incompetent for the period September 18, 1988 through December 4, 1991, the date in which Buck was appointed guardian, the two-year limitation period under HRS § 657-7.3 would have been tolled by reason of incompetence during this thirty-eight month period.