Opinion ID: 2517841
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Modify Verdict

Text: Defendant insists the trial court committed various errors in denying the automatic motion to modify the death verdict under section 190.4(e). Such errors, he argues, led to a death sentence that was arbitrary, capricious, and fundamentally unfair under the federal and state Constitutions. We disagree. Under section 190.4(e), the jury's imposition of the death penalty triggers a motion to modify the verdict. The trial court must review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and must decide whether the jury's findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence presented. ( Ibid.) In other words, the statute requires the court to make an independent determination concerning the propriety of the death penalty, and to independently reweigh the evidence in aggravation and mitigation and determine whether, in the court's own judgment, the weight of the evidence supports the jury verdict. ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 891, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1 ( Burgener) .) The court need not describe `every detail' supporting its ruling. ( Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th 970, 1064, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775.) The statement of reasons (see § 190.4(e)) is sufficient if it allows meaningful appellate review. ( Ibid.) Here, defendant presented his arguments both orally and in writing. The trial court responded, at length, with its reasons' for not modifying the penalty verdict under section 190.4(e). The court first described its duties under applicable law to independently reweigh the sentencing factors and determine the propriety of the death sentence. The court expressly declined to apply any other standard of review, such as the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict. The court identified the evidence in aggravation (circumstances of the capital crime, prior felony convictions, and other violent crimes), and described it as overwhelming. (§ 190.3, factors (a)-(c).) Some statutory factors were found to be either neutral (defendant's age at time of crime) ( id., factor (i)), or inapplicable (victim or accomplice participation, and duress or moral justification). ( Id., factors (e)-(g) & (j).) The trial court largely accepted, as mitigating, the evidence emphasized by defendant, especially his dysfunctional upbringing and resulting emotional state.. (§ 190.3, factors (d), (h) & (k).) However, the court rejected defendant's view that he had received no protection, affection, or nurturing from loved ones. According to the court, defendant was never abandoned by his family, and loved ones always intervened to help raise him. The court contrasted defendant's situation with children who must be physically removed from their homes by the state due to parental rape, beatings, or extreme neglect. [20] Exercising its independent judgment, the court concluded that aggravation far outweighed mitigation, and emphasized the premeditated and brutal nature of the attack on Nguyen. The court noted that while it had not mentioned every item of evidence in the record, nothing was omitted from its consideration. The parties were invited to seek clarification and express any concerns. However, both of defendant's attorneys had nothing to say. The court then denied the motion. Preliminarily, defendant has forfeited the right to challenge the trial court's ruling. He did not object on any ground below. Defendant cannot do so for the first time on appeal where, as here, the modification hearing (held in 1994) postdated the finality of People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1013, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984 (which imposed the objection requirement). ( Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th 970, 1064, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775.) The court's solicitation of questions and complaints before denying the motion undermines defendant's suggestion that an objection would have been futile, and would not have prevented any of the errors cited on appeal. On the merits, we reject defendant's argument that the court improperly deferred to the jury's verdict. The court articulated the correct standard of review. It also applied that standard to independently review the evidence and weigh the sentencing factors. This case is not one in which the record provides no assurance that the court was aware of and exercised its independent judgment. ( Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th 833, 891, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1 [criticizing trial court's apparent reliance on deferential substantial-evidence standard].) Defendant contends the trial court failed to consider relevant evidence offered in mitigation, such as expert testimony of psychosexual disturbance and extreme emotional abuse suffered as a child. Defendant also complains the court relied on irrelevant evidence outside the appellate record involving the fate of other children in the child welfare system. We disagree. The trial court considered the entire record, and paid particular attention to evidence emphasized by the defense. Its ruling made clear that any failure to mention specific mitigating facts did not mean they had been ignored. By alluding to severe forms of child abuse not present in the record, the court simply sought to illustrate the weight it placed on the childhood evidence that was introduced. Thus, defendant's complaint is not that the court failed to properly consider and weigh mitigation, but that it reached an unfavorable result. We have no basis on which to set the result aside. (See Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1107, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40 [rejecting, as unfounded, defendant's challenge to outcome of modification motion]; see also People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1211, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 117 P.3d 476 [appellate court makes no de novo penalty determination].)