Opinion ID: 2634685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: PDA Exemptions

Text: Unfortunately, the damage caused to the core principles of the PDA by the majority does not end with its holding requiring a party to specifically identify requested records that cannot be specifically identified. The majority further holds that the attorney-client privilege codified at RCW 5.60.060(2)(a) falls within the narrow exemptions to disclosure of public documents articulated at RCW 42.17.260(1). Like the former, the latter holding does not come close to conforming to the PDA's mandate for broad public disclosure. In accordance with the PDA's mandate for broad public disclosure, information requested under the PDA must be disclosed unless a specific exemption is applicable. Dawson v. Daly, 120 Wash.2d 782, 789, 845 P.2d 995 (1993); RCW 42.17.260(1). The majority misconstrues the other statute exemption of RCW 42.17.260(1) by holding that it incorporates the attorney-client privilege. The majority can reach its conclusion only by reversing the mandate for broad disclosure and creating a broad exemption. The foundation of the majority's approach is an assertion that a plain reading of RCW 42.17.260(1) can lead to no other conclusion but that the other statute language incorporates RCW 5.60.060(2)(a), which is an other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records. RCW 42.17.260(1). However, a plain reading of both statutes together leads to the opposite conclusion. RCW 42.17.260(1) states, in pertinent part, Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying all public records, unless the record falls within the specific exemptions of subsection (6) of this section, RCW 42.17.310, 42.17.315, or other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records. (emphasis added). The plain language directs the agency to disclose records unless a specific exemption applies, and an other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure must be applicable to that agency to be incorporated into RCW 42.17.260(1). The majority mistakenly incorporates the codified attorney-client privilege into the other statute exemption even though the attorney-client privilege statute is directed at the attorney, not the agency. The attorney-client privilege statute provides: An attorney or counselor shall not, without the consent of his or her client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him or her, or his or her advice given thereon in the course of professional employment. RCW 5.60.060(2)(a) (emphasis added). While the attorney-client privilege prohibits attorneys from disclosing information, PDA requests are directed at agencies. By ignoring this key distinction, the majority opinion renders ineffectual the PDA's strong mandate to agencies that they must disclose public information. The attorney-client privilege also fails to meet the requirements of the PDA because the attorney-client privilege is not an other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure.... RCW 42.17.260(1) (emphasis added). The attorney-client privilege conditions disclosure upon consent of the client to disclose; it does not exempt or prohibit disclosure. A broad condition does not conform to the PDA's plain language that requires consent by the client to disclose except in narrow, specifically-articulated exemptions. Further, the attorney-client privilege fails the specificity requirement of the other statute exemption of the PDA. The other statute exemption incorporates into the PDA only another statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records. RCW 42.17.260(1) (emphasis added). If another statute exempts specific information or records and meshes with the PDA, it operates to supplement the PDA. Progressive Animal Welfare Society v. The Univ. of Wash. (PAWS), 125 Wash.2d 243, 261-62, 884 P.2d 592 (1994). However, in the event of a conflict between the PDA and another statute, the provisions of the PDA govern. RCW 42.17.920. As we pointed out in PAWS, the Legislature takes the trouble to repeat three times that exemptions under the Public Records Act should be construed narrowly. RCW 42.17.010(11); RCW 41.17.251; RCW 42.17.920. PAWS, 125 Wash.2d at 260, 884 P.2d 592. The statute protecting trade secrets discussed in PAWS exemplifies the type of statute that exempts specific information without conflicting with the PDA's mandate to construe exemptions narrowly. See PAWS, 125 Wash.2d at 262, 884 P.2d 592. Here, the majority does not incorporate a narrow exemption of specific information or records into the PDA, but rather incorporates the extremely general attorney-client privilege which swallows the PDA's purpose of allowing citizens a right to public records. The holding is, to use a word from the majority opinion, absurd. Finally, the majority's argument is inconsistent with the legislative history of the statutory exemptions that created the other statute exemption. The other statute language was added by the Legislature in 1987. LAWS OF 1987, ch. 403. The Legislature made this change in direct response to our case of In re Rosier, 105 Wash.2d 606, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986). LAWS OF 1987, ch. 403, § 1. In Rosier, we read into the Public Disclosure Act a general privacy exemption to disclosure and allowed agencies to examine the context of a public records request in order to determine if the agency was required to comply with the request. The Legislature specifically rejected this interpretation and amended the language of the PDA. The Legislature stated that it intend[ed] to restore the law relating to the release of public records largely to that which existed prior to the Washington Supreme Court decision in `In Re Rosier,' 105 Wash.2d 606 [717 P.2d 1353] (1986). This revision clarified that the purpose of the 1987 amendments was to restrict the exemptions of the Act, not to expand them. Thus, the majority's position that the attorney-client privilege is fully incorporated into the PDA, is directly at odds with the stated purpose of the amendments. In short, the majority's plain reading of RCW 42.17.260(1) is done in a vacuum that ignores related statutory context, although we have recently clarified that such an approach is inappropriate. Rather than determining whether an ambiguity exists by examining statutory language in isolation, courts must consider legislative purposes or policies appearing on the face of the statute as part of the statute's context. In addition, background facts of which judicial notice can be taken are properly considered as part of the statute's context because presumably the legislature also was familiar with them when it passed the statute. Reference to a statute's context to determine its plain meaning also includes examining closely related statutes, because the legislators enact legislation in light of existing statutes. Dept. of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002) (quoting 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48A:16, at 809-10 (6th ed.2000)). By failing to consider the statutory context, the majority construes RCW 42.17.260(1) in a manner at odds with clear legislative intent and our recent precedent. As the majority asserts, the language the legislature used is clear. Unfortunately, the majority misreads it. I would hold that the attorney-client privilege is not an exemption of specific information or records directed at a public agency. Accordingly, the other statute exemption of RCW 42.17.260(1) does not incorporate the attorney-client privilege. I dissent. WE CONCUR: SANDERS, MADSEN and CHAMBERS, JJ.