Opinion ID: 2975842
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional Tort

Text: In Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1005 (6th Cir. 1999), this court held that fabricating evidence and manufacturing probable cause to unlawfully detain a suspect constituted a Fourth Amendment violation. With the exception of one panel’s decision in Frantz v. Village of Bradford, 245 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2001), the law in this circuit is uniform and well established that a malicious prosecution claim can be based on the Fourth Amendment, and that prosecution without probable cause constitutes a violation of that Amendment. In Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709 (6th Cir. 2006), the court stated: We “recognize a separate constitutionally cognizable claim of malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment.” Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 259 (6th Cir. 2003). Such a claim encompasses wrongful investigation, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration. Id. at 258 (citing Spurlock, 167 F.3d at 1005-07). Nos. 05-1371/1373 Peet, et al. v. City of Detroit, et al. Page 22 Id. at 715-16. See also Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 749 (6th Cir. 2006) (“continued8 detention without probable cause is an actionable Fourth Amendment injury under § 1983”); Bielefeld v. Haines, 192 F. App’x 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2006) (“this circuit has recognized a Section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution based on the Fourth Amendment”); Doyle v. McFadden, 182 F. App’x 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2006). While it is clear that a malicious prosecution claim is cognizable under § 1983 as a Fourth Amendment violation, our circuit has not yet defined all of the elements of this constitutional tort. In Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 237 (6th Cir. 2007), the court stated: This court has recognized a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution arising under the Fourth Amendment, but the contours of such a claim remain uncertain. Wallace, 127 S.Ct. 1096, n.2; McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418, 444-45 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1026 (2006); Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301, 308-12 (6th Cir. 2001). What is certain, however, is that such a claim fails when there was probable cause to prosecute, or when the defendant did not make, influence, or participate in the decision to prosecute. McKinley, 404 F.3d at 444-45; Darrah, 255 F.3d at 312; Skousen v. Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520, 529 (6th Cir. 2002). See also Thacker, 328 F.3d at 259 (“[a]lthough this Court has yet to resolve the elements of a federal malicious prosecution claim, it is clear that a plaintiff must show, at a minimum, ‘that there was no probable cause to justify [his] arrest and prosecution.’”). In previous decisions of this court, it usually was not necessary to formulate the elements of a federal malicious prosecution claim, because either the plaintiff had failed to show that the prosecution was without probable cause or the plaintiff was estopped from asserting such a claim by reason of a judicial finding of probable cause following a fair evidentiary hearing. In view of the fact that, for the reasons hereafter stated, I believe that a jury question is presented on the issue of probable cause for the plaintiffs’ prosecution and that plaintiffs are not collaterally estopped from asserting their claims, it appears that this is a case in which the elements of plaintiffs’ wrongful prosecution claims necessarily need to be considered.