Opinion ID: 1891888
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Allegations of Error in the Guilt Phase

Text: Although Wesley has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the jury's verdict of first-degree murder, in all cases of first-degree murder where the trial court has imposed the death penalty, we must perform an independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction for first-degree murder. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937, 942 n. 3 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn from that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, was sufficient to enable the fact finder to conclude that the Commonwealth established all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Hall, 549 Pa. 269, 701 A.2d 190, 195 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1082, 118 S.Ct. 1534, 140 L.Ed.2d 684 (1998). The elements of first-degree murder are that the defendant unlawfully killed a human being, the defendant killed with malice aforethought, and the killing was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a), (d) ; Commonwealth v. Cox, 556 Pa. 368, 728 A.2d 923, 929 (1999). The willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to kill is the element that distinguishes first-degree murder from other degrees of murder. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 543 Pa. 429, 672 A.2d 293, 297(Pa.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 951, 117 S.Ct. 364, 136 L.Ed.2d 255 (1996). The Commonwealth may prove this specific intent to kill by circumstantial evidence. Id. The use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim's body may constitute circumstantial evidence of a specific intent to kill. Commonwealth v. Bond, 539 Pa. 299, 652 A.2d 308, 311 (1995). The Commonwealth presented vivid evidence of the crime scene and the condition of the victim. Evidence showed Wesley stole into the victim's apartment and bound and brutally attacked her. The jury heard testimony from several witnesses that demonstrates that the victim died of repeated blows to the head with a baseball bat. The circumstantial evidence could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Wesley had the specific intent to kill the victim. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the Commonwealth established all of the elements of first-degree murder.
Wesley alleges that the assistant district attorney who prosecuted the case engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, Wesley claims that the prosecutor made an impermissible statement concerning Wesley's decision not to testify in violation of federal and Commonwealth constitutional law. U.S. Const. Amend 5; Pa. Const. Art. 1, § 9; see Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965); Commonwealth v. Davis, 452 Pa. 171, 305 A.2d 715, 717 (1973); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 5941(a) (preventing a trial judge or counsel from adversely referring to a defendant's failure or refusal to testify). In reviewing claims of improper comments by prosecutors, the standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the comments were or were not improper. Commonwealth v. Keaton, 556 Pa. 442, 729 A.2d 529, 538 (1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1180, 145 L.Ed.2d 1087 (2000); see Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 553 Pa. 285, 719 A.2d 242, 257, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 86, 145 L.Ed.2d 73 (1998). Generally, comments by a prosecutor do not constitute reversible error unless the unavoidable effect of such comments would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant such that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and render a true verdict. Commonwealth v. Baez, 554 Pa. 66, 720 A.2d 711, 729 (1998), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 78, 145 L.Ed.2d 66 (1999); Commonwealth v. Carter, 537 Pa. 233, 643 A.2d 61, 74 (1994), cert. denied 514 U.S. 1005, 115 S.Ct. 1317, 131 L.Ed.2d 198 (1995). When evaluating comments to determine whether they prejudiced the fact-finding purpose of the jury, we must look at the context in which the remarks were made. Commonwealth v. Dennis, 552 Pa. 331, 715 A.2d 404, 413 (1998); Commonwealth v. Jones, 542 Pa. 464, 668 A.2d 491, 514 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 826, 117 S.Ct. 89, 136 L.Ed.2d 45 (1996). At the close of the defense's case, Wesley, apparently frustrated with his counsel for failing to call certain witnesses, and in the presence of the jury, asked the trial court that he be allowed to make a statement, and the prosecutor responded. The exact text of the exchange follows: The Court: Thank you. Mr. Conrad. The Defendant: Excuse me, Your Honor, members of the jury [Counsel for the Defendant]: Hold on. The Defendant: I have something I want to say. The Court: Do you want to talk to your client[?] Do you want to have a recess[?] Defendant: No. No. [The Assistant District Attorney]: I would like the jury shown out. I will not have him speak if he is not going to testify. N.T., 01/23/96, at 437. A prosecutor may not comment adversely upon a defendant's refusal to testify, as to the merits of the charges against him because it compromises the privilege against self-incrimination and the defendant's constitutional presumption of innocence. Commonwealth v. Clark, 551 Pa. 258, 710 A.2d 31, 39 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1070, 119 S.Ct. 1465, 143 L.Ed.2d 550 (1999); Hall, 701 A.2d at 199. Responding immediately to the challenged comments, the trial court declared a recess and held an in-chambers conference with defense counsel and the prosecutor. During the discussion, defense counsel requested that the trial court give a cautionary instruction to the jury. We have held that prompt and effective curative instructions may remove prejudice resulting from improper comments by a prosecutor. Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 535 Pa. 210, 634 A.2d 1078, 1089-90 (1993). After concluding the brief recess, the trial court instructed the jury that the Commonwealth's statements were not evidence and they could not consider them in reaching their verdict. Defense counsel did not object to the instruction. Wesley now contends that the cautionary instruction was inadequate and could not cure the prejudice caused by the allegedly improper comments. First, Wesley argues that only an instruction that specifically addressed the right of a defendant not to testify could have prevented prejudice. Second, according to Wesley, but for the prosecutor's comments, the jury could not have returned a guilty verdict because he alleges that there was not enough evidence to convict him of first-degree murder. Assuming that Wesley has not waived this issue because his counsel failed to preserve it with a timely objection, there remains no constitutional violation. Clearly, it was not the intention of the Commonwealth to remark on Wesley's decision whether to testify. Taken in context of the entire dialogue, it is more likely than not that the assistant district attorney was reacting to Wesley's impromptu interjection in an attempt to gain control over the courtroom to give his closing argument. Furthermore, we are not convinced that the comments in question were so significant as to have any measurable influence on the jury's deliberation. See id. at 1090. As we have noted earlier, the jury had sufficient evidence to find Wesley guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first-degree murder. Even if the comments had some prejudicial effect, the cautionary instruction supplied by the trial court cured any potential harm to Wesley. A trial court has wide discretion in phrasing jury instructions, and absent an abuse of discretion or an inaccurate statement of law, there is no reversible error. Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 549 Pa. 352, 701 A.2d 492, 511 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1083, 118 S.Ct. 1535, 140 L.Ed.2d 685 (1998). The trial court expressly ordered the jury not to consider as evidence the comments at issue made by the prosecutor and Wesley. N.T., 01/23/96, at 444. Absent evidence to the contrary, a presumption exists that a jury will follow the instructions of the trial court. Commonwealth v. O'Hannon, 557 Pa. 256, 732 A.2d 1193, 1196 (1999). Because the prosecutor's comments did not prejudice Wesley, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit an error of law.