Opinion ID: 1111747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: was the defendant denied his right to a speedy trial?

Text: The following is a chronology of the events involved in this claim: April 29, 1981 The robbery with which Hughey was charged occurred. May, 1981 Hughey was indicted for armed robbery. September 9, 1981 Hughey was arrested in New York state on a weapons charge. March 5, 1982 Hughey entered a state prison in New York to serve two to six (2-6) years for the weapons conviction. April 22, 1982 New York correctional officer notified Mississippi Assistant Attorney General by mail that the Mississippi detainer lodged against Hughey had been received, that Mississippi authorities would be notified before Hughey was released, and that the Mississippi warrant [was] not eligible for speedy trial. That same day Hughey executed a document entitled Agreement on Detainers: Form II, which contained a notice of place of imprisonment, request for disposition of indictments, and waiver of extradition. Had Mississippi been a party to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, then Mississippi would have been required, within 180 days of Hughey's waiver, to try him or remove the detainer. Mississippi, however, is not a party to the IAD. The document was not effective to waive extradition. It is not clear whether this document was sent to Mississippi officials. September, 1982 Hughey, having been informed by legal services that Mississippi was not a party to IAD, wrote to a Mississippi Assistant Attorney General and to the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Alcorn County, asking that he be tried at the earliest possible date. October 21, 1982 District Attorney John R. Young wrote to Rodney Moody, a New York corrections official. In the letter, which was apparently a follow-up to a telephone call, the district attorney thanked Moody for advising him of the papers needed by [the New York prison] to return [Hughey to Mississippi] for trial. The letter ended, Would you please send me your Interstate Forms 6 and 7 so that I can be sure to have what you need. December 3, 1982 District attorney wrote to Hughey, telling him that he should sign a waiver of extradition so he could be tried in January of 1983. The district attorney stated in the letter that Hughey should see Rodney Moody, who would furnish him with the appropriate forms. January 4, 1983 Rodney Moody wrote to Hughey, stating the following: This is in response to your recent communication indicating that I was to furnish you with the appropriate forms for Waiver of Extradition for the State of Mississippi. My records indicate that you signed the correct form ... on April 22, 1982. For your information I am enclosing a copy of that form. The document to which Moody referred was the IAD form. February 22, 1983 Prisoners' Legal Services of New York wrote to Hughey, responding to his letter and telling him that he had done everything possible to get Mississippi to prosecute. May 17, 1983 Hughey wrote to a Mississippi Assistant Attorney General and to the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Alcorn County, asserting his right to a speedy trial and stating, by affidavit, that he had waived extradition. July 20, 1983 New York informed the district attorney that Hughey would be released on September 20, 1983. October 4, 1983 The district attorney began extradition procedures. New York continued to hold Hughey for Mississippi. November 29, 1983 Governor of New York signed extradition order. December 19, 1983 The day before New York would have released Hughey (they would hold him on detainer for 90 days past his release date) Mississippi authorities went to New York and transported him to Mississippi. February 1, 1984 Hughey was tried in Mississippi for armed robbery. In determining whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, we utilize a four-part balancing test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and applied by this Court in numerous cases, the most recent of which is Kinzey v. State, 498 So.2d 814 (Miss. 1986). The factors to be considered are 1) length of delay, 2) reason for delay 3) defendant's assertion of the right, 4) prejudice to the defendant. In regard to the length of the delay, we note that Hughey was tried approximately thirty-three (33) months after he was indicted. The State attempts on appeal to persuade us that Hughey became an accused, for purposes of computing the length of delay, only when the detainer was lodged against him in April of 1982. The State cites Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194, 199 (Miss. 1982), where we held that Perry became an accused when a detainer was lodged against him. The State misconstrues our holding in Perry. Because the detainer was lodged against the defendant in Perry before he was indicted, we held that the defendant became an accused at the time of the detainer. In the instant case, however, Hughey was indicted in May of 1981, long before the detainer was ever lodged against him. The constitutional right to a speedy trial, ... attaches at the time of a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge. Perry, 419 So.2d at 198 (emphasis added). In the case at bar, Hughey became an accused when he was indicted in May of 1981. Therefore, the length of the delay which we consider in determining whether Hughey's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, is thirty-three (33) months. Violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been found in cases involving lesser delays. Beavers v. State, 498 So.2d 788, 790 (Miss. 1986) (fourteen (14) months); Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194 (Miss. 1982) (nineteen (19) months). In assessing the reason for the delay, we consider the State's argument that Hughey could not be brought to Mississippi for trial because he was incarcerated in a state prison in New York. Nothing in the record or the briefs clarifies for us what, if anything, Mississippi could have done to procure Hughey's extradition before the completion of his New York prison term. The district attorney testified at the evidentiary hearing that New York simply would not let Mississippi have Hughey. Two (2) letters appear in the record from New York authorities to Mississippi authorities which contain the statement, This warrant [Hughey] is not eligible for a speedy trial. It appears that the district attorney contacted Rodney Moody with the New York Department of Corrections, and was told by Moody what steps would be necessary in order for Hughey to be returned to Mississippi for trial before the completion of his New York prison term. The district attorney wrote to Moody, thanking him for the information and asking that the necessary forms be sent to the district attorney. Although no further mention of these forms appears in the record, there does appear a letter from the district attorney to Hughey, instructing Hughey to waive extradition and obtain the appropriate forms to do so from Rodney Moody. Unfortunately, Rodney Moody believed, and so informed Hughey, that Hughey had waived extradition when he signed the IAD forms in April of 1982. When Hughey contacted Prisoners' Legal Services of New York, he was again told that he had done everything possible to get Mississippi to try him. When a defendant incarcerated in another state asserts his right to a speedy trial, the state seeking to prosecute him must make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring him to trial. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383, 89 S.Ct. 575, 579, 21 L.Ed.2d 607, 614 (1969); Saxton v. State, 394 So.2d 871, 875 (Miss. 1981). The record in the case at bar reveals that the district attorney contacted New York officials by telephone and by letter in an attempt to have Hughey returned to Mississippi for trial. Furthermore, the district attorney wrote to Hughey, informing him that he would have to waive extradition in order to be returned to Mississippi. The district attorney by these actions fulfilled his duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort to have Hughey returned to Mississippi for trial. Therefore, we hold that the reason for the delay weighs heavily in favor of the State. The next factor we consider is the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial. Suffice it to say that, as described above, Hughey was diligent in his assertion of this right. Next we consider the prejudice to the defendant. Hughey has made no allegation, in the trial court or on appeal, that he lost witnesses or was otherwise prejudiced in the trial of the case. Although he argues on appeal that various aspects of prison life in New York were more difficult for him because of the detainer, we note that, had he been tried in Mississippi, convicted (as he ultimately was), and then returned to New York to complete his term, the effect on his prison life would have been the same as that resulting from the detainer. We find no prejudice resulting to Hughey by virtue of this delay. In balancing these Barker factors, we conclude that Hughey was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Because this and the previous assignments of error are without merit, we affirm the conviction and sentence. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, and HAWKINS, P.JJ., and DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. ROBERTSON, J., concurs in parts I and II and dissents in part III with written opinion.