Opinion ID: 1394852
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Arrest of Stephen Aguilar

Text: (8) Petitioner claims that the referee's determinations relating to the arrest of Stephen Aguilar are supported by the law and the evidence, and relies on the portion of the report summarized below. Aguilar's testimony at trial flatly contradicted Powell's. During Aguilar's testimony, prosecutor Pippin and investigator Wilson discussed its incriminating nature. According to Wilson, a joint decision was made to arrest Aguilar. Pippin, however, denied he told Wilson to make the arrest. Wilson decided to arrest Aguilar in the hallway of the courthouse just outside the courtroom. He did not see Aguilar exhibit any signs of flight. He did see at least two defense witnesses and a news reporter in the hallway. He did not think about the impact such an arrest might have on defense witnesses. Aguilar testified he thought he saw camera lights, but was not sure. Friends told him they had seen him on television. One of the defense witnesses present in the hallway, Marcia Sharpe, stated the arrest took place in front of her and defense witnesses Michelle Goff and Cynthia Rosenthal. As a result of the arrest, Goff and Rosenthal turned white and began shaking. Local newspapers carried news of Aguilar's arrest in the morning and afternoon editions. At least one television station carried news of the arrest during its noon coverage on the following day. The portion of the report summarized above concludes: The arrest of Mr. Aguilar, the defense's first witness at petitioner's criminal trial, was well-publicized and well-known to the three witnesses subpoenaed by the defense who later declined to testify. It is an important factor which must be considered in assessing the issue of prosecution intimidation. The Attorney General raises several objections to the referee's determinations. He first argues in substance that the arrest of Aguilar was proper as a constitutionally reasonable seizure of the person and as such was proper insofar as petitioner's compulsory-process rights were concerned. Even if we assume for argument's sake that the arrest was lawful, we cannot accept the Attorney General's conclusion. The Fourth Amendment's guarantee given to all persons against unreasonable searches and seizures and the Sixth Amendment's recognition of the criminal defendant's right to present evidence on his own behalf are each designed to serve different purposes and protect different values. Hence, contrary to the Attorney General's assumption, it does not follow that conduct on the part of the government that does not violate the former constitutional provision necessarily does not violate the latter. It is clear to us that the prosecution committed misconduct under the Sixth Amendment in arresting Aguilar when and where it did: Wilson engaged in activity that was completely unnecessary under the circumstances  he was under no legal or practical compulsion to make the arrest in the presence of defense witnesses and the press  and was of such a character as to transform [a defense witness] from a willing witness to one who would refuse to testify ( United States v. Smith, supra, 478 F.2d at p. 979). Our conclusion is strengthened by the Attorney General's concession that there might have been a more ideal setting for the arrest, and all the more so by the fact and content of the discussion, related by supervising prosecution investigator Rolan, which took place in the district attorney's office the day after the arrest. In Bray v. Peyton, supra, 429 F.2d 500, the Fourth Circuit held that the prosecution committed misconduct by arresting a defense witness during trial, finding it difficult to imagine that the incident would not have had an intimidating effect not only on the person arrested but on other defense witnesses as well. ( Id. at p. 501.) In this case, we come to the same conclusion for the same reason. The Attorney General attempts to make much of the fact that the referee did not specifically find that Wilson intended to intimidate witnesses in arresting Aguilar. But as we have explained, the existence of bad faith or improper motives on the part of the governmental agent is not required. ( United States v. Morrison, supra, 535 F.2d at p. 227; see People v. Bryant, supra, 157 Cal. App.3d at p. 590; People v. Robinson, supra, 144 Cal. App.3d at p. 970; United States v. Smith, supra, 478 F.2d at p. 979; Bray v. Peyton, supra, 429 F.2d at p. 501.) The Attorney General also argues in effect that the defense was partially responsible for the arrest because it allegedly violated an agreement to bring to the court's attention potentially privileged testimony before such testimony was given, and hence that it may not now be heard to complain. The argument must be rejected. The referee impliedly found  with what appears to be adequate support in the record  that no such broad agreement existed, and that even if it did the defense committed no violation of its terms. In any event, the alleged violation plainly did not contribute in any way to the improvident manner of the arrest and therefore does not bar petitioner from making his complaint. [6] After independent review, we agree with the referee's determination that the time, place, and manner of Stephen Aguilar's arrest were improper, and accordingly adopt it as our own.