Opinion ID: 204284
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applying the Cat's Paw Theory

Text: The Supreme Court has not yet resolved the circumstances under which an employer may be held liable based on the discriminatory intent of employees who influence but do not actually make the ultimate employment decision. See Ricci v. DeStefano, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2688-89, 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009) (Alito, J. concurring). However, the Court has granted certiorari and heard argument in Staub, see ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2089, 176 L.Ed.2d 720 (2010), and may soon offer guidance on the issue. In the meantime, we need not decide in this case whether the influence must be singular or whether a less demanding causation standard is sufficient. Here, interpreting the conflicting evidence in favor of the plaintiff, the jury could reasonably conclude that when the decision was made to fire Schandelmeier, only Adams's biased voice mattered. Whether it was McDonald or Rowland who made the nominal decision to fire Schandelmeier, there was sufficient evidence at trial from which the jury could have concluded that Adams had the decisive input in the decision. The jury could conclude that any investigation conducted by McDonald or Rowland was irrelevant because Adams was the sole source of nearly all the pertinent information. Because a reasonable jury could have found that Adams's influence over the termination decision was singular, we must reverse the grant of judgment as a matter of law.
McDonald, who was three supervisory levels removed from Schandelmeier, testified that she had very little contact with Schandelmeier during her employment. She did not personally observe Schandelmeier's job performance, and McDonald's office was located off-site. In evaluating Schandelmeier's performance, she relied entirely on information from others, including their oral descriptions of Schandelmeier's performance and documents such as samples of her improperly completed incident reports. According to the employer's version of events, about a week before the J.J. incident, McDonald, Rowland, Williams and Adams met in McDonald's office to discuss Schandelmeier's possible termination. No formal decision was made in that discussion, although McDonald testified that Adams certainly had input, and that the decision ultimately was a joint decision. Even though it was a joint decision and the group did not reach a consensus, McDonald testified, she had decided by July 24th that Schandelmeier should be terminated. On that day, McDonald sent the following e-mail to Rowland under the subject line CAM request, short for Corrective Action Meeting request: Cathleen Schandelmeier has had several ongoing problems at South Shore in the past few weeks that are pretty serious. Andrea [Adams] and Alonzo [Williams] have both had several conversations with her about the various issues. Things are not working out with her and I know she is still within her probationary period. Andrea has already put together a memo regarding the issues and struggles, and I believe that you also have a copy. Because she is non union, and because she is still within her probationary perioddo we have to even schedule a CAM, or can we release her from her duties? If we need to schedule a CAM, please do that as soon as possible. If we don't can you please check with Beka and confirm that we are able to release her? No responsive e-mail from Rowland was introduced into evidence. McDonald also testified that she informed both Williams and Adams of her decision to terminate Schandelmeier sometime between July 24th and August 1st. If McDonald really was the decisionmaker, and if her decision was already made on July 24th, it would be more difficult to conclude that Adams's exhibition of racism on July 31st tainted McDonald's already-made decision to fire Schandelmeier. The most basic problem for the Park District is that the evidence does not point consistently in that direction. McDonald herself described the decision as a joint one (and one in which Adams certainly had input), but the supervisory group had not reached a joint decision about Schandelmeier's employment as of July 24th. Both Williams and Adams testified that they had no idea that Schandelmeier would be terminated until she was actually terminated on August 1st. If McDonald had actually reached a decision before thenespecially the joint decision she described in her testimonythe jury could reasonably infer that she would have informed Schandelmeier's direct supervisorsWilliams and Adams, who supposedly participated in the joint decisionof her decision. Also, the language McDonald used in her CAM request e-mail is not absolute and does not state that any decisionhers or anyone else'shad been made. The jury could have reasonably read McDonald's message as only a request for information in case a decision was made to terminate Schandelmeier. The jury had reasonable grounds for discounting McDonald's testimony that her mind was made up on July 24th and that her mind was the only one that counted. The Park District also attempted to show that McDonald did not know about the J.J. incident until after Schandelmeier's termination. McDonald testified that she had no knowledge of the J.J. incident until after August 1st, and Adams testified that she did not discuss the J.J. incident with anyone on July 31st. But the jury also had Adams's last straw memo, drafted on August 1st and addressed to McDonald, which began with the words per our conversation. Here again, the jury had sufficient evidence from which it could have concluded that, contrary to her testimony, McDonald knew about the J.J. incident before she decided to fire Schandelmeier, and that Adams had decisive influence over that decision.
During her deposition, Rowland testified that she fired Schandelmeier, that no one else fired Schandelmeier, and that no one else recommended to her that Schandelmeier be fired. At trial, however, Rowland testified that McDonald had recommended that Schandelmeier be fired, although Rowland did not know what information McDonald considered or why she recommended termination. Rowland also testified at trial that she fired Schandelmeier because, two or three weeks before August 1st, she had witnessed Schandelmeier not interacting with day-campers. She testified that Schandelmeier had failed to prepare camp schedules and that parents were complaining. When pressed, though, Rowland admitted that no parent had actually spoken to her or complained about the availability of camp schedules. Nevertheless, Rowland claimed she drafted Schandelmeier's termination letter on August 1st as soon as she arrived in the office because this was an important thing that needed to get done that morning, so that was the first thing that I did when I got into my office. As in McDonald's version, Rowland testified that she acted without knowledge of the J.J. incident or Adams's last straw memo. But Rowland also was confronted byand the jury heardher earlier deposition testimony in which she stated that she discussed the J.J. incident with Williams on the morning of August 1st. Also, Adams testified that she was certain that she had called and spoken to Rowland on July 31st. The jury was not obligated to believe Rowland's explanation for why she decided to fire Schandelmeier, or even that she was the decisionmaker at all, let alone that the timing was innocently coincidental. To the contrary, given all of the conflicts in the evidence, including the conflicts between the different defense witnesses' testimony, the jury heard sufficient evidence to have concluded that it was more likely than not that Rowland knew of the J.J. incident when she drafted the termination letter, and that Adams had a decisive influence on the termination decision. Regardless of whether McDonald or Rowland was the actual decisionmaker, the parties' briefs have focused on pinpointing the details of who, what, and when about the J.J. incident, as though all discriminatory bias in this case stems from that one event. The jury, however, was not required to see it that way. The J.J. incident provided strong evidence of Adams's racial bias, but the jury was not required to assume that Adams's bias affected her only at that specific time with respect to that single incident. Nor was the jury required to assume that the termination decision could have been tainted by Adams's influencesingular or notonly if the decision could be connected to that one incident. Under the cat's paw theory, the appropriate inquiry is whether the biased Adams had influence over the decision to terminate Schandelmeier, and, if so, how much influence she had, without limiting the inquiry to the single incident where that bias was displayed so flagrantly.
Under any formulation of the cat's paw standard, the chain of causation can be broken if the unbiased decisionmaker conducts a meaningful and independent investigation of the information being supplied by the biased employee. See, e.g., Martino, 574 F.3d at 453 (decisionmaker's independent investigation defeated effort to rely on cat's paw theory); Willis v. Marion County Auditor's Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547-48 (7th Cir.1997) (same). Here, however, Schandelmeier presented ample evidence from which the jury could have concluded that, whether the decisionmaker was McDonald or Rowland, the Park District's investigation into Schandelmeier's job performance was not independent of Adams's input. The jury could find that, in fact, the supposed investigation was based almost entirely on Adams's input. McDonald testified that she did not personally observe Schandelmeier's performance and that she relied entirely on information she got from other people. She never saw the food service write-ups. [5] Prior to drafting her July 24th CAM request e-mail, she discussed Schandelmeier's performance with Adams, Williams, and Rowland, and her e-mail referred to Adams's memo. This was the full extent of McDonald's investigation. Williams testified that he observed some issues with Schandelmeier's employment, but neither he nor McDonald testified as to what Williams may or may not have conveyed about Schandelmeier's performance to McDonald. His testimony was specific, however, that he never recommended that Schandelmeier be fired. Adams, on the other hand, papered Schandelmeier's file with performance-related memos, in particular the August 1st last straw memo. McDonald did not attempt to observe Schandelmeier's work performance herself, nor did she attempt to speak to Schandelmeier about her performance issues. The jury could easily conclude from this evidence that the only meaningful information McDonald acquired in her investigation came from Adams, the racially biased source. Even if the jury concluded that Rowland was the decisionmaker instead of McDonald, that additional layer of supervision did not improve the quality of the investigation into Schandelmeier's job performance. Rowland's investigation was even less thorough and independent than McDonald's. She testified at trial that her termination decision was based on input she received from McDonaldwhose own opinion, as noted, was based almost entirely on information garnered from Adams. Rowland testified, too, that two or three weeks before Schandelmeier's termination, she had witnessed Schandelmeier not interacting with day-campers, and that parents were complaining because Schandelmeier had not prepared a schedule for camp. Rowland was the human resources manager, however, and the jury was entitled to find that her statements regarding Schandelmeier's performance were not entirely credible, particularly after she admitted that no parents actually complained to her about the missing camp schedules. Rowland did not testify that she sought additional input from Williams, Schandelmeier herself, or even Adams. This evidence, again, does not diminish the pervasive influence of Adams and her bias. Keeping in mind the Rule 50 standard, we find sufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the decisive influence on the decision was Adams's bias, regardless of whether McDonald or Rowland was the formal decisionmaker. By way of illustration, compare this evidence to the lack of similar evidence in Willis v. Marion County Auditor's Office , in which judgment as a matter of law in favor of an employer was affirmed. Willis was a retaliatory discharge case. No evidence was presented from which the jury could have concluded that the decisionmaker harbored an impermissible racial or retaliatory bias against the plaintiff. Willis, 118 F.3d at 546. But evidence was presented to suggest that two non-decisionmakers did. Despite a jury verdict for the plaintiff, judgment as a matter of law for the defense was upheld because it was shown that, rather than accepting the biased supervisors' word regarding the plaintiff's performance problems, the actual decisionmaker permitted the plaintiff to explain her deficiencies, which she was unable to do. The decisionmaker also aired the plaintiff's suspicions that she was being targeted for impermissible reasons and permitted the plaintiff to try (unsuccessfully) to substantiate her claim. Also, the decisionmaker's termination decision was based ultimately on the plaintiff's undisputed violations of objective performance standards. See id. at 547-48. Because of these factors, we agreed with the district court that the causal chain had been broken in Willis as a matter of law. Similar factors are not present here, at least beyond reasonable factual dispute, so the jury could find that the causal chain remained intact. Schandelmeier's race discrimination case survived summary judgment because the district court found that disputed issues of material fact existed as to whether the decision to terminate Schandelmeier was made before or after Adams sent the August 1st last straw memo, among other things. The court found that if that fact were resolved in Schandelmeier's favor at trial, a jury could believe that Adams objected to Plaintiff in her employment capacity because of her race and perceived inability to understand allegedly African-American social mores, leading her to write the August 1 memorandum that may have caused Plaintiff to be fired later that same day, and that even if McDonald were the sole decisionmaker, Adams's prejudices could be imputed to McDonald if it can be shown that Adams concealed relevant information from McDonald or fed false information to her in order to influence her decision. See Schandelmeier-Bartels v. Chicago Park Dist., 2008 WL 4855649, at , n. 3 (N.D.Ill. Nov.7, 2008), citing Lust, 383 F.3d at 585. We agree with that analysis. If that evidence had not materialized at trial, and if Schandelmeier had not introduced other evidence in its place, this court would be obligated to affirm the grant of the Park District's Rule 50 motion. See Filipovich v. K & R Express Systems, Inc., 391 F.3d 859, 863 (7th Cir.2004). However, Schandelmeier offered sufficient evidence at trial to connect Adams's racial bias to the Park District's decision to terminate her employment. The district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Park District is reversed, and the jury's finding of liability is reinstated.