Opinion ID: 2647451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The First Sell Factor

Text: Dillon begins by challenging the District Court’s determination under the first Sell factor that “important governmental interests are at stake” in his prosecution. 539 U.S. at 180. A proper analysis of this first factor addresses two distinct questions. A court must first determine whether the charged crime is “serious,” because the Government’s interest in a prosecution generally qualifies as “important” when the defendant is charged with a serious crime. Id. Next, considering the specific facts of the case before it, a court must evaluate whether “[s]pecial circumstances . . . lessen the importance of that interest.” Id. Sell lists two examples of 13 special circumstances: an extended period of pretrial detention and the prospect of lengthy civil confinement. Id. Observing that Dillon had conceded the seriousness of his alleged offense, the District Court concluded that the Government’s interest in prosecuting him was “important.” 2013 WL 1859289, at . Turning to the second part of the analysis, the District Court considered, and rejected, Dillon’s argument that his pretrial confinement undercut the Government’s interest. Id. at -4. The District Court did not consider the prospect that Dillon might face a lengthy civil confinement because Dillon “did not make such an argument.” Id. at  n.7. Nor did the District Court consider any other special circumstance. Id. at -4. Dillon continues to concede on appeal that the charged crime is “serious” under Sell. Br. of Appellant at 18. In light of Dillon’s concession, we need not wade into the debate among our sister circuits about whether the seriousness of a crime is measured by the statutory maximum or the likely guideline sentence, or both. Compare United States v. Valenzuela–Puentes, 479 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007) (examining both the statutory maximum and the likely guideline sentence to determine whether a crime is “serious”), with Evans, 404 F.3d at 238 (4th Cir. 2005) (concluding that focusing on a defendant’s probable guideline range would be “unworkable”). However, Dillon argues that the District Court erred by failing to consider two “special circumstances” that he claims diminish what would otherwise qualify as an important governmental interest in his prosecution. The first special circumstance, he contends, is the prospect of his civil confinement. Br. of Appellant at 21-29. The second is his own purported non-dangerousness. Id. at 18-21. We consider each argument in turn. 14
from Civil Commitment As noted above, Sell makes clear that a district court may appropriately consider the likelihood of a defendant’s civil confinement in determining whether to order the forcible medication of a defendant to restore his competency to stand trial. On this point, the Court pointed out that “[t]he potential for future confinement affects, but does not totally undermine, the strength of the need for prosecution.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. This is unsurprising because a “defendant’s failure to take drugs voluntarily . . . may mean lengthy confinement in an institution for the mentally ill—and that would diminish the risks that ordinarily attach to freeing without punishment one who has committed a serious crime.” Id. Here, the District Court declined to analyze the issue or make a finding concerning the likelihood of civil confinement. Dillon now contends this was error. To begin with, the District Court correctly concluded that Dillon failed to raise this argument during its proceedings. In his opposition to the Government’s motion for involuntary medication, Dillon identified his pretrial custody and his purported non-dangerousness as “special circumstances” undermining the prosecutorial interest; he did not mention the prospect of civil confinement. Def.’s Opp’n to Involuntary Medication, reprinted in J.A. 12-21. And Dillon failed to pursue the point during arguments before the District Court, even though the Government mentioned the issue in its brief and at argument. See Gov’t’s Mem. at 18, reprinted in J.A. 39; Tr. of Oral Arg. (Apr. 26, 2013) at 13-14, reprinted in J.A. 212-13. The issue was never joined. It is also important to note that the District Court did not in any way foreclose Dillon from arguing the civil15 commitment point or from introducing evidence that his confinement was likely. Thus, Dillon had ample opportunity to cross-examine the Government’s witnesses and to call his own. Tr. of Hr’g (Apr. 17, 2013) at 25, 95, 136, reprinted in J.A. 82, 152, 193. In short, the record provides no basis for Dillon’s statement to this court that the District Court “foreclosed consideration” of civil commitment. See Br. of Appellant at 27 n.8. Under our well-established precedent, Dillon’s civil-confinement argument was forfeited when he failed to raise it with the District Court. See, e.g., Potter v. District of Columbia, 558 F.3d 542, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“It is well settled that issues and legal theories not asserted at the District Court level ordinarily will not be heard on appeal.” (quoting District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). Because Dillon did not argue the point before the District Court, and because the District Court did not address it, we generally inquire no further into the matter. See Dyson v. District of Columbia, 710 F.3d 415, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2013). At oral argument before this court, however, counsel for Dillon asked us to review the District Court’s omission for plain error. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), we can correct unpreserved error only when there is (1) “error,” (2) that is “plain,” and (3) that “affects substantial rights.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (alteration omitted). If all three conditions are met, we may “notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732). See generally EDWARDS, ELLIOTT & LEVY, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW ch. VIII (2d ed. 2013). 16 Sell leaves little doubt that the prospect of a defendant’s lengthy civil confinement is a focal point of the “special circumstances” analysis. 539 U.S. at 180. However, even if the District Court plainly erred when it declined to analyze the possibility of civil confinement, this omission did not affect Dillon’s substantial rights under the third prong of Olano because Dillon has not shown “a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004) (quotation and alteration omitted); EDWARDS, ELLIOTT & LEVY, supra, at 105. We rest this conclusion on the record and on Dillon’s own arguments: First, the record as it stands offers insufficient support for the proposition that Dillon is likely to be civilly confined (as opposed to committed as an outpatient); and, second, Dillon’s consistent assertions that he is not dangerous serve only to dilute any argument that Dillon is likely to be civilly confined. We amplify these two points below. The record before us does not support a finding that Dillon is likely to be civilly confined. Although the Sell Court mentioned “civil commitment,” it is clear from the context that the Court was concerned with the prospect of civil confinement. See 539 U.S. at 180 (“The defendant’s failure to take drugs voluntarily . . . may mean lengthy confinement . . . that would diminish the risks that ordinarily attach to freeing without punishment one who has committed a serious crime.” (emphasis added)). The D.C. Mental Health Commission recommended to the D.C. Superior Court that Dillon be civilly committed on an outpatient basis. Gov’t’s Mem. at 12, reprinted in J.A. 33. Even though this report does not appear in the record, we know from the applicable statute that the Commission can recommend commitment only after finding that Dillon was “mentally ill, and because of the illness is 17 likely to injure himself or other persons if not committed.” D.C. CODE § 21-544. But we also know that the Commission recommended outpatient treatment, which indicates that the Commission considered Dillon’s risk to the public at large to be minimal. See D.C. CODE § 21-545(b)(2) (authorizing the D.C. Superior Court to commit a mentally ill person to “the Department or to any other facility, hospital, or mental health provider that the Court believes is the least restrictive alternative consistent with the best interests of the person and the public” (emphasis added)). Although Dillon asserts that his outpatient status will be revoked if and when he does not take his medication, Br. of Appellant at 26-27, the applicable statute makes clear that revocation of an individual’s outpatient status requires a judicial finding that “a more restrictive treatment alternative is required to prevent the person from injuring himself or others.” D.C. CODE § 21-548(a) (emphasis added). Simply put, Dillon’s outpatient civil commitment does not imply that civil confinement is probable, as there would have to be a judicial finding by clear and convincing evidence that his confinement is “required to prevent [Dillon] from injuring himself or others.” Id. Furthermore, Dillon’s own assertions critically weaken his civil-confinement argument. Beginning with his opposition to the Government’s motion before the trial court, Dillon has consistently stated that he poses no significant danger to himself or others. See Def.’s Opp’n to Involuntary Medication at 6, reprinted in J.A. 17 (“Dillon has no history of violence . . . .”); Tr. of Oral Arg. (Apr. 26, 2013) at 32, reprinted in J.A. 231 (“Nobody thinks [Dillon is] particularly dangerous to himself or others . . . .”); Br. of Appellant at 1819, 24, 27. Assuming that Dillon is correct that he presents, at most, a minimal risk to himself or others, this fact would 18 make it less likely that Dillon will be confined. See 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d) (authorizing civil confinement when a “court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another” (emphasis added)); D.C. CODE § 21-545(b)(2) (“If the Court or jury finds that the person is mentally ill and, because of that mental illness, is likely to injure himself or others if not committed, the Court may order the person’s commitment to the Department or to any other facility, hospital, or mental health provider that the Court believes is the least restrictive alternative consistent with the best interests of the person and the public.” (emphasis added)). Dillon’s plain-error challenge thus fails for want of showing a “reasonable probability” that, but for the District Court’s failure to consider civil confinement, Dillon would not be subject to involuntary medication. The record before us does not offer a basis for finding that Dillon is dangerous enough to lead to his being civilly confined (as opposed to committed as an outpatient). See Br. of Appellant at 22 (“Obviously, the level of appellant’s dangerousness was marginal; otherwise the D.C. Mental Health Commission would not have recommended commitment to an outpatient treatment program.”). And Dillon’s consistent claims that he is not dangerous undercut the notion that a better developed record would be any different.
Dillon argues that he is not dangerous and that this fact undermines the Government’s interest in prosecuting him. He further argues that because the District Court “did not believe dangerousness should be considered at all, the matter should 19 be remanded for fact development.” Br. of Appellant at 21. Citing other circuits’ decisions finding that a defendant’s dangerousness is relevant, Dillon reasons that “if dangerousness bolsters the government’s interest under Sell, the lack thereof must have the opposite effect.” Id. at 19-20 (citing United States v. Mackey, 717 F.3d 569, 575 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 694 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010); Gomes, 387 F.3d at 160). Dillon also presses the obvious point that if he was dangerous he would not have been civilly committed on an outpatient basis by the D.C. Mental Health Commission. Id. at 22. We first dispose of the Government’s primary rejoinder to these arguments. The Government asserts that lack of dangerousness can never be considered to undermine the importance of the Government’s interest in prosecution because the Sell framework applies only after there has been a predicate determination that a defendant is not dangerous. Br. for Appellee at 34-39. That is, in the Government’s view, the Supreme Court’s suggestion that courts sequence Harper determinations before Sell determinations necessarily implies that all defendants who make it to a Sell hearing are, by definition, not dangers to society. On this view, then, the Sell framework admits consideration of dangerousness “in only two specific contexts”: (1) when assessing the likelihood of civil commitment and (2) when evaluating the “characteristics of the crime and whether the sentence for that crime reflects a legislative determination that persons who commit it typically present a serious risk to the safety of the community.” Id. at 36-38 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Government’s argument misapprehends the nature of the Sell inquiry. The “result of [a] Harper hearing . . . establishes only that [a defendant] does not pose a danger to himself or others while confined in the institutional context. 20 [It does] not address whether [the defendant] might pose a danger to himself or others if released.” Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 694 n.6 (citation omitted). It is simply incorrect, then, to say that a court must assume that any defendant who reaches the Sell inquiry poses no danger to society. It may be that some persons who pose a danger to themselves or others while confined might also pose a danger to themselves or others if released, but the latter does not necessarily follow from the former. The Government has cited no meaningful studies or other evidence to show that the two propensities are coterminous. More fundamentally, the Government seeks to impose a formalism and rigidity at odds with the sensitive balancing required by Sell in light of the significant liberty interests implicated by forcible medication. The Supreme Court crafted a sensitive and fact-specific inquiry, stating that “[c]ourts . . . must consider the facts of the individual case in evaluating the Government’s interest in prosecution.” 539 U.S. at 180. And the examples the Court listed (pretrial and future civil confinement) are just that – examples. Id.; see also United States v. Grigsby, 712 F.3d 964, 969-70 (6th Cir. 2013); White, 620 F.3d at 412. At bottom, Dillon makes a common-sense argument: The dangerousness of a defendant surely may affect the strength of the governmental interest. This is indisputable. The Government has an interest in incapacitating individuals who endanger the public, see United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 880-82 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and thus its interest in a particular prosecution may be stronger in the case of a dangerous defendant than in a case that involves a defendant who is not dangerous. The simplicity of Dillon’s argument is attractive, but the argument is shortsighted. It is one thing to acknowledge that the Government often has a strong interest 21 in prosecuting persons who appear to be dangerous, but it is quite another to say that the Government’s interest in incapacitating a dangerous defendant is necessary to the Government’s interest qualifying as “important” under the first Sell factor. As we observed in Weston, a bundle of governmental interests are implicated in any given prosecution. Id.; cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (listing three purposes of sentencing distinct from the need to protect the public by incapacitating a defendant, including, e.g., the need for a sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”). Dillon’s argument also fails to acknowledge that, although a defendant’s dangerousness may be relevant to the Government’s interest in prosecuting him, courts are necessarily constrained in their fact-finding by the nature of the charges for which a defendant has been indicted. This case is a perfect example. Dillon has been charged with a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 871 – “threat[ening] to take the life of, to kidnap, or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States” – that is both serious and involves significant danger. To permit a Sell hearing to focus on the underlying criminal charges would risk converting the Sell inquiry into a mini-trial on the merits. In other words, in response to the Government’s request for authorization to medicate Dillon so that he is competent to stand trial, the District Court would be required to first adjudicate the merits of the indictment to assess Dillon’s dangerousness. This would make little sense. In these circumstances, this court is hard pressed to give credit to a claim that Dillon’s alleged lack of dangerousness is a special circumstance that meaningfully weighs against the Government’s interest in pursuing prosecution. Dillon has been charged with a serious and dangerous crime. The only 22 way to determine whether he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus dangerous as charged, is to allow the Government to proceed with prosecution. However, Dillon is incompetent to stand trial sans medication, so we cannot determine his dangerousness until his competence has been restored and there has been a trial on the merits. We thus conclude that it is unnecessary to remand the case for further fact-finding with respect to Dillon’s purported non-dangerousness. The necessary implications of the indictment in this case preclude a finding that Dillon is harmless. The grand jury indicted Dillon for threatening to inflict bodily harm upon the President. Indictment, reprinted in J.A. 9-10. Even assuming that Dillon is harmless in other respects, the District Court could not find that Dillon poses no danger to the President without a full trial on the merits of the criminal charges. As a result, we hold that the District Court correctly concluded that the Government established an important interest in prosecuting Dillon.