Opinion ID: 3021704
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Spence’s Conviction

Text: Unlike Cook, Spence did receive relief on his Batson claim. Relying on Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108 (3d Cir. 1996), the District Court concluded that “the jury selection claims would not necessarily invalidate any future trial heard by a properly empaneled jury, but, as in Smith, Spence’s claims of conspiracy and withholding of exculpatory evidence would invalidate any possible conviction that might arise out of a new trial.” Cook v. City of Philadelphia, No. 04-2173, Order at 7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2005). In Smith, we explained that the favorable termination rule applies to pending charges as well as final convictions. See Smith, 87 F.3d at 112-13. There, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated a conviction because the trial court improperly admitted otherwise inadmissable hearsay evidence. Smith then discovered that the prosecution had intentionally withheld exculpatory information. Smith filed a motion to dismiss his charges arguing that intentional misconduct places any retrial within the scope 5 of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed and dismissed the charges holding that “the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits retrial of a defendant . . . when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 325 (Pa. 1992). It continued that the intentional withholding of material exculpatory evidence rose to the point of denying a fair trial. We were called on to address whether the statute of limitations for filing a civil rights complaint commenced at the time Smith discovered that the prosecution withheld exculpatory materials, or when his charges were dismissed. Id. at 110-11. We concluded that Heck barred the suit until the charges were dismissed because a holding in Smith’s favor would have implied the invalidity of any future conviction. Id. at 113-14. The District Court held that ruling in Spence’s favor with respect to the Batson issue would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his future conviction. We assume this is because finding that the previous jury was intentionally improperly empaneled does not appear to affect the validity of a newly selected panel. However, a ruling against McMahon that he intentionally excluded Black venire members to deny Spence a fair trial would invoke Pennsylvania’s Double Jeopardy Clause and require the dismissal of all charges. See Smith, 615 A.2d at 325. The same is true for his official liability claims. See Grazier ex rel. White v. City of Philadelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that success on a failure to train case requires a showing of a conscious or deliberate choice that a particular policy shall govern official conduct). Finally, his 6 conspiracy and failure to intervene claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 are also barred under Heck because to prove either claim, Spence must show that he was denied his constitutional rights and that the officials intended or knew about the deprivation. See Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1989) (§ 1985); 42 U.S.C. § 1986; Jones v. City of Philadelphia, 491 F. Supp. 284, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (requiring that officials possess knowledge of the deprivation in order to be liable under § 1986). Spence’s request for the appointment of counsel on appeal is denied as moot.2 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I). 2 We note that District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to address the state causes of action. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).