Opinion ID: 1841280
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Concealment or Fraud Exclusion

Text: Having determined the intentional loss provision is unenforceable against Ramona, it must still be determined whether she is barred from recovery under the policy's concealment or fraud exclusion. Farm Bureau argues Ramona is barred from recovery because she materially misrepresented the extent of personal property destroyed in the fire. In support of its argument, Farm Bureau cites Webb v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., in which we denied recovery where an insured had intentionally misrepresented the extent of personal property destroyed and ... the misrepresentation was material. 493 N.W.2d at 812. On this issue, the district court made only a limited number of factual findings. The record contains contradictory evidence about the condition of numerous items of personal property left in the house after the fire. The court expressly found Ramona submitted a proof of loss form which contained a substantial number of items... not destroyed in the fire. The court later characterized Ramona's actions as a misrepresentation, but regrettably declined to answer whether such misrepresentation bars Ramona from recovery. See id. at 811 (concealment or fraud clause will not void policy unless inaccuracies in the proof of loss form were made with intent to defraud); Goldstein v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 124 Iowa 143, 145, 99 N.W. 696, 696 (1904) (same); Stone v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 68 Iowa 737, 741-42, 28 N.W. 47, 49 (1886) (same). The procedural posture of this case, then, is manifestly unlike Webb. In Webb, a jury expressly found the insured had with intent to defraud, concealed a material fact or circumstance as to the extent of the personal property destroyed. 493 N.W.2d at 810. We concluded there was sufficient evidence to support this finding, and upheld a district court judgment that a similar concealment or fraud exclusion precluded recovery under the insured's policy. Id. at 812. In the case at bar, however, there was no corresponding finding in the district court on Ramona's intent. [2] As indicated, appellate review is limited to assigned error in the district court's application of law pertinent to the controversy. Stewart, 590 N.W.2d at 547. In this case, the record does not contain sufficient factual findings to which we might apply the law. Mindful of our proper role, then, we must refrain from deciding matters for ourselves. It makes no difference that this case was decided on stipulated facts. See Illinois Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 578 N.W.2d 670, 671 (Iowa 1998) (When a case is submitted on stipulated facts, our only task is to construe the provisions of the insurance policies.). Under these circumstances, the only appropriate course of action is to remand the case. On remand, the district court shall make specific factual findings and then, applying the law, determine whether Ramona is barred from recovery under the concealment or fraud exclusion of her policy with Farm Bureau. We vacate the court of appeals' disposition to the contrary. In a final assignment of error, Farm Bureau contends the court of appeals failed to provide guidance on Ramona's interest in the loss and how much she is entitled to recover. Because we do not decide whether Ramona will ultimately recover under the policy, we do not reach this issue. A ruling on this issue is too speculative at this time, and, in any event, must initially be made by the trial court. See Wilson v. Ribbens, 678 N.W.2d 417, 423 (Iowa 2004).