Opinion ID: 1793458
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: routine booking question.

Text: If at any time during a police interrogation the suspect has clearly asserted his right to counsel, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Appellant contends that his rights under Edwards and Miranda were violated when, after he had invoked his right to counsel, the Commonwealth elicited information from him that he was unemployed and then used that information against him at trial. The Commonwealth responds that Miranda only extends to custodial interrogations, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, and that routine booking questions are not deemed to be a custodial interrogation. The United States Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (plurality opinion). The police officers in Muniz arrested the defendant for driving while under the influence of intoxicants (DUI) but did not advise him of his Miranda rights. Nevertheless, they asked him a number of routine booking questions regarding his name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and age. A plurality of the Supreme Court rejected the Commonwealth's present argument and determined that the questioning was indeed custodial interrogation. Id. at 601, 110 S.Ct. at 2650. [C]ustodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda includes both express questioning and words or actions that ... the officer knows or reasonably should know are ... reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Id. Nevertheless, the Court found the questions to be admissible under the routine booking question exception, i.e., biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services. Id. at 601-02, 110 S.Ct. at 2650. Because these questions were reasonably related to the police's administrative concerns, they fell outside the protections of Miranda and, as such, their answers did not need to be suppressed. Id. Although Muniz was only a plurality opinion on this issue, no court addressing the issue since Muniz has rejected the routine booking exception. E.g., Clayton v. Gibson, 199 F.3d 1162, 1173 (10th Cir.1999); United States v. Brown, 101 F.3d 1272, 1274 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. D'Anjou, 16 F.3d 604, 608 (4th Cir.1994); United States v. Clark, 982 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Leung, 929 F.2d 1204, 1209 (7th Cir.1991); Thomas v. United States, 731 A.2d 415, 421 (D.C.1999); Franks v. State, 268 Ga. 238, 486 S.E.2d 594, 597 (1997); Hughes v. State, 346 Md. 80, 695 A.2d 132, 140 (1997); Commonwealth v. White, 422 Mass. 487, 663 N.E.2d 834, 844 (1996); People v. Rodney, 85 N.Y.2d 289, 624 N.Y.S.2d 95, 648 N.E.2d 471, 473 (1995); State v. Stevens, 181 Wis.2d 410, 511 N.W.2d 591, 599 (1994). For a listing of pre- Muniz federal decisions holding that Miranda does not apply to biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services, see United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989). Nor is the application of the exception affected by whether a defendant specifically invoked his or her constitutional rights, as opposed to the mere failure to give the Miranda warnings, or by the fact that the inquiry pertained to a defendant's employment status as opposed to personal identification. In United States v. Gotchis, 803 F.2d 74 (2nd Cir.1986), DEA agents arrested the defendant while he was in possession of two packages of cocaine. The defendant immediately and specifically invoked his constitutional right to remain silent. Nevertheless, one of the agents proceeded to ask him for his identity, date of birth, address, telephone number, and employment status. To the latter inquiry, the defendant replied that he had been unemployed for eight years. As in the case sub judice, the government used this information at trial as circumstantial evidence that the defendant possessed the cocaine for the purpose of sale. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the defendant's employment status fell within the benign category of basic identifying data required for booking and arraignment, noting that one purpose for such questioning is to obtain information to enable a magistrate to fix the appropriate amount for bail. Id. at 79 (internal quotation and citation omitted). We have held that Section Eleven of the Constitution of Kentucky and the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States are coextensive and provide identical protections against self-incrimination. Newman v. Stinson, Ky., 489 S.W.2d 826, 829 (1972) See also Hourigan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 860, 864 (1998); Commonwealth v. Cooper, Ky., 899 S.W.2d 75, 77 (1995). We therefore recognize as applicable in Kentucky the routine booking question exception to Miranda , including its application to inquiries about a defendant's employment status per United States v. Gotchis . The only remaining issue is Appellant's claim that Detective Duvall deliberately elicited incriminating information under the guise of asking a routine booking question. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Pennsylvania v. Muniz , [r]ecognizing a `booking exception' to Miranda does not mean, of course, that any question asked during the booking process falls within that exception. Without obtaining a waiver of the suspect's Miranda rights, the police may not ask questions, even during booking, that are designed to elicit incriminatory admissions. 496 U.S. at 602 n. 14, 110 S.Ct. at 2650 n. 14. This allegation is properly decided pursuant to a motion to suppress the statement. RCr 9.78. The trial court held a suppression hearing and made a finding on the record that the inquiry with respect to Appellant's employment status was not geared to elicit an incriminating response. That finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence and is, thus, conclusive of the issue. RCr 9.78. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed therefor by the Henderson Circuit Court, are affirmed. All concur.