Opinion ID: 1281413
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Defense Counsel's Potential Conflict of Interest

Text: Defendant's trial counsel was formerly a deputy district attorney in Stanislaus County. In 1980, defendant pled guilty to receiving stolen property (§ 496) in that county, which prior conviction was one of the three prior felony convictions introduced in the instant case as a circumstance in aggravation (§ 190.3, factor (c)). In preparation for the penalty phase, defense counsel went to Stanislaus County to peruse the official records of defendant's priors in search of grounds to argue their inadmissibility. In doing so, he found that the district attorney present in court when defendant entered his guilty plea to receiving stolen property in 1980 had mentioned his (defense counsel's) name. Defense counsel's further research revealed that, while a deputy district attorney, he had negotiated the plea bargain with defendant under which a charge of burglary was ultimately dismissed in exchange for defendant's guilty plea to receiving stolen property. Counsel promptly brought the matter to the court's attention. In defendant's presence, he explained all of the circumstances which led to his inadvertent discovery of his involvement in the prior proceeding. He believed there was no conflict of interest but explained that in good conscience he felt obligated to bring the matter to the court's attention. He stated that he had fully discussed the matter with defendant. Defendant acknowledged that counsel had disclosed and discussed the matter with him. When asked if there was any question in his mind about counsel's continued representation of him at the penalty phase, defendant replied negatively. Defendant stated he had no objection to counsel's continued representation of him; affirmatively stated he wished to proceed notwithstanding the disclosure; answered affirmatively when asked if he wished to waive any possible defect that may have occurred; and twice affirmed there was no doubt in his mind that he wanted to proceed represented by Mr. Giudice. In response to the court's inquiry: Do you wish to have outside counsel advise you in this matter?, defendant replied, No, sir. It is true that at one point, upon being asked if he wished to waive and give up his right to outside counsel's advice on the matter, defendant replied negatively. The record on the whole, however, convinces us that defendant's answer to that one question was misconstrued. [11] The discussion of the matter concluded with the following colloquy: THE COURT: Well, I will ask you once again, Mr. Adcox, do you want separate counsel for the penalty trial? THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: When I say separate counsel, counsel other than Mr. Giudice. THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: Do you want separate counsel? THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: Do you waive and give up that right? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Do you have any qualms, doubts, or any reservations whatsoever about proceeding on this basis of having Mr. Giudice represent you? THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. (51a) Defendant argues that these circumstances establish a conflict of interest between him and trial counsel, and that the court erred in failing to obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of said conflict. We disagree. (52) When a trial court undertakes to appoint counsel for indigent codefendants (see People v. Chacon [(1968)] 69 Cal.2d 765 [73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106, 34 A.L.R.3d 454]), it must assume the burden of assuring that its appointment does not result in a denial of effective counsel because of some possible conflict. [Citations.] ( People v. Cook (1975) 13 Cal.3d 663, 671 [119 Cal. Rptr. 500 [532 P.2d 148], cert. den. (1975) 423 U.S. 870 [46 L.Ed.2d 100, 96 S.Ct. 135]; Maxwell v. Superior Court (1982) 30 Cal.3d 606, 612 [180 Cal. Rptr. 177, 639 P.2d 248, 18 A.L.R.4th 333].) Where the evidence conflicts concerning the nature and extent of the past and present attorney-client relationship, the trial court's findings based upon such conflicting evidence are conclusive on appeal. [Citations.] ( Yorn v. Superior Court (1979) 90 Cal. App.3d 669, 674 [153 Cal. Rptr. 295].) (51b) We find no factual basis in this record to establish either an actual or potential conflict of interest. Attorney Giudice, an officer of the court, `[was] in the best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial. [Citation.]' ( People v. Mroczko (1983) 35 Cal.3d 86, 112 [197 Cal. Rptr. 52, 672 P.2d 835]; People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 776 [248 Cal. Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310].) Counsel promptly and conscientiously disclosed the facts of his involvement in defendant's prior conviction proceedings. On matters respecting the priors, he successfully managed to obtain an order excluding any evidence of violent conduct underlying defendant's prior convictions, notwithstanding the prosecution's efforts to introduce such as evidence in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b). ( Ante, p. 255.) [12] Defendant fails to explain how counsel's familiarity with all the circumstances of the prior conviction proceeding in fact worked to his disadvantage and prejudice. We therefore reject defendant's claim that a prejudicial conflict of interest has been shown. Having so concluded, his related claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to insist that defendant receive the advice of independent counsel on the matter must likewise fail. Moreover, even were we to assume that a conflict of interest was established, on this record we are satisfied that defendant effectuated a knowing, informed and voluntary waiver of his right to conflict-free representation. (See People v. Mroczko, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 110.)