Opinion ID: 879552
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issues 1-3

Text: Following its review, the District Court made these findings of fact: XII. The the use of [Lescovar Motors, Copper King Inn, and Wendy's Hamburgers] properties for comparable market values is not a true reflection of the market value as the sales are speculative and further (2) of the comparables are too far from the subject properties to be of value in establishing market value in close proximity. XIII. That such values set for purposes of appraisal of the Plaintiff's property are inconclusive as a test of true market value. It is a personal observation of this Judge that the Plaintiff's property does not generate business comparable to other motels, even minor active motels on Harrison Avenue. One motel larger than Defendant's [sic] motel closes for the winter months because of lack of occupancy. The Butte-Silver Bow business community has lost, as of the date of the appraisal herein, at least one-third of its theretofore business. The Department of Revenue is clearly wrong and it should have to make another appraisal. [Emphasis added.] The District Court made the following conclusions of law: 2. That the system of appraisal using speculative land purchases as applied is inconsistent with providing a general and uniform method of classifying lands in accordance with true market value fails to provide an equitable and uniform basis of assessment of the Plaintiff's property when compared with the market value of the property. 3. That similar properties in the same area of Harrison Avenue have been appraised differently as the Plaintiff demonstrated by comparing his property to that of the Hamm's Motel. 4. That a review of the entire record together with the evidence presented at the hearing indicates that the Board's denial of the Plaintiff's appeal and retaining the appraisal value of the subject property on the tax rolls is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable probative and substantial evidence on the whole record. [Emphasis added.] DOR contends that the District Court exceeded its scope of review under § 2-4-704, MCA. DOR argues that the District Court has the expertise in ascertaining the law, but STAB has the expertise in ascertaining the facts. DOR asserts that STAB, as the trier of fact, was entitled to determine the proper appraised value of O'Neill's property. Issues 1, 2 and 3 are interrelated and require discussion of § 2-4-703, § 2-4-704, and § 15-2-303(4), MCA. Our analysis of these issues begins with the Montana Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA) § 2-4-703, MCA, which requires prior permission of the court before any additional evidence can be presented to an administrative agency: If, before the date set for hearing, application is made to the court for leave to present additional evidence ... the court may order that the additional evidence be taken before the agency upon conditions determined by the court. [Emphasis added.] Under § 2-4-703, MCA, when the court has allowed such additional evidence, it may be presented to the agency, but not to the court. This limitation accords with the standard of review of contested MAPA cases under § 2-4-704, MCA, which confines the court's review to the record: (1) The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record ... The court, upon request, shall hear oral argument and receive written briefs. (2) The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced... [Emphasis added.] In contrast, the court's review of contested STAB decisions is not confined to the record. Section § 15-2-303(4), MCA provides: Notwithstanding the provisions of 2-7-704(1), the court may, for good cause shown, permit additional evidence to be introduced. In other words, judicial review of MAPA contested cases under § 2-7-704, MCA, is limited to the record, but judicial review of STAB contested cases under § 15-2-303(4), MCA, allows the court to supplement the record. Dept. of Revenue v. Davidson Cattle Co. (Mont. 1980), 620 P.2d 1232, 1235, 37 St.Rep. 2074, 2077. Under § 15-2-303(4), MCA, the court reviewing a STAB decision may, on its own initiative or upon motion of a party, find good cause and allow additional evidence to be introduced before the court. Hi-Line Radio Fellowship v. DOR (Mont. 1987), 737 P.2d 886, 44 St.Rep. 955. Once the additional evidence is introduced into the record, the reviewing court must then make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P. On the day of the hearing on judicial review, O'Neill moved the District Court for leave to introduce additional evidence. The court granted O'Neill's motion, and he then testified about the market value of his property. O'Neill also introduced a Butte title officer's affidavit, which stated that two parcels near J.C. Penney's sold for approximately $20,000/acre, and that one parcel north of Lydia's Restaurant sold for approximately $7,500/acre at a tax sale. DOR contends that O'Neill failed to show good cause for the addition of his testimony and the affidavit, and that the sudden introduction of the evidence denied DOR the opportunity for effective rebuttal. DOR asserts that O'Neill failed to show that the affiant was unavailable as a witness, and therefore the affidavit was hearsay. DOR further argues that O'Neill had ample opportunities to fully state his case before the Silver Bow Tax Appeal Board and STAB, and that his testimony was unsupported and cumulative. We find that the showing of good cause under § 15-2-303(4) is permissive, not mandatory. Any legally sufficient reason meets the good cause requirement of § 15-2-303(4), MCA, and such sufficiency lies within the discretion of the reviewing court. Furthermore, the additional evidence is not restricted to the parties. The court can accept evidence from a variety of sources. In the instant case, O'Neill's testimony may have been cumulative, but it was also probative of the market value of the property and thus fulfilled the good cause requirement. The affidavit did not violate the good cause requirement because it offered evidence of comparable sales. The availability of the affiant is a question of credibility, not admissibility. We hold that the District Court properly exercised its discretion under § 15-2-303(4) when it permitted the introduction of O'Neill's testimony and affidavit.