Opinion ID: 486570
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: motion for particulars

Text: 28 The defendant asserts that the prosecution never defined the nature of the alleged fraudulent taking of the securities. 2 Nathan contends that the prosecution introduced proof during trial of three types of fraud: (1) forging the endorsement of a security, (2) theft of Shirley's money for the defendant's own personal use, and (3) false representations, dishonesty and deceit by the defendant in obtaining the securities. The bill of particulars, however, specified fraud by means of the forged endorsement. Appellant asserts therefore that the proof at trial was at variance with the bill of particulars and that a new trial should be ordered. Nathan also argues that the jury instruction should have incorporated only the allegations of the bill of particulars as elements of the offense. 29 In United States v. Fruehauf Corp., 577 F.2d 1038 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953, 99 S.Ct. 349, 58 L.Ed.2d 344 (1978), we discussed the standard for whether a variance between the particulars alleged in the indictment and the proof at trial is prejudicial. The court stated: 30 A variance is not to be regarded as material where it is not of a character which could have misled the defendant at the trial, Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82, 55 S.Ct. 629 , 79 L.Ed. 1314 [ (1935) ]; or where it involves no element of surprise prejudicial to the efforts of the defendant to prepare his defense, United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 526, 62 S.Ct. 374 , 86 L.Ed. 383, rehearing denied, 315 U.S. 826, 62 S.Ct. 620, 86 L.Ed. 1222 [ (1942) ]; or where it does not affect substantial rights. Rule 52(a), F.R. of Crim.P.; cf. United States v. Haskins, 345 F.2d 111, 114 (C.A.6 [1965]. Whether or not a variance is prejudicial is a judgment that must be made on the facts of each case. United States v. Russano, 257 F.2d 712, 715 (C.A.2 [1958]. 31 Id. at 1057 (quoting United States v. Mills, 366 F.2d 512, 514 (6th Cir.1966)). 32 We hold that the proof at trial did not vary materially from the bill of particulars charge and, therefore, variance, if any, was not prejudicial. Failure to include the specifics of the bill of particulars in the jury charge was not error under the circumstances. See United States v. Thetford, 676 F.2d 170, 183 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1148, 103 S.Ct. 790, 74 L.Ed.2d 996 (1983); United States v. Francisco, 575 F.2d 815, 819 (10th Cir.1978); United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556, 565-67 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820, 97 S.Ct. 68, 50 L.Ed.2d 81 (1976); Pipkin v. United States, 243 F.2d 491, 494 (5th Cir.1957). We are satisfied that the defendant was fully apprised of the nature of the fraud involved which included deceit, misrepresentation, and false endorsement. We find the variance in the proof, if any, did not affect defendant's substantial rights. We therefore decline to set aside the convictions on the basis of this challenge.