Opinion ID: 2031164
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Player Defendants

Text: In general, every person owes a duty of ordinary care to guard against injuries to others. Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 224 Ill.2d 274, 291, 309 Ill.Dec. 361, 864 N.E.2d 227 (2007). A person who breaches this duty is deemed negligent and maybe held financially liable if his conduct proximately causes injury to another. Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n, 195 Ill.2d 210, 228, 253 Ill.Dec. 632, 745 N.E.2d 1166 (2000). However, in Pfister v. Shusta, 167 Ill.2d 417, 212 Ill.Dec. 668, 657 N.E.2d 1013 (1995), this court adopted an exception to the standard of ordinary care for participants engaged in contact sports. Under this exception, a participant in a contact sport may not be held liable for negligent conduct which injures a coparticipant. Instead, liability will arise only if a participant intentionally, or willfully and wantonly, injures a coparticipant. Stated otherwise, in a contact sport the duty owed by a participant to a fellow participant is the duty to refrain from willful and wanton or intentional misconduct. Pfister, 167 Ill.2d at 420, 212 Ill.Dec. 668, 657 N.E.2d 1013. Pfister explained the rationale for limiting participants' liability in contact sports: The contact sports exception strikes the appropriate balance between society's interest in limiting liability for injuries resulting from physical contact inherent in a contact sport and society's interest in allowing recovery for injuries resulting from willful and wanton or intentional misconduct by participants. Those who participate in soccer, football, softball, basketball, or even a spontaneous game of can kicking, choose to play games in which physical contact among participants is inherent in the conduct of the game. Participants in such games assume a greater risk of injury resulting from the negligent conduct of coparticipants.          The contact sports exception allows recovery for injuries resulting from willful and wanton and intentional misconduct while taking into account the voluntary nature of participation in games where physical contact is anticipated and where the risk of injury caused by this contact is inherent. Pfister, 167 Ill.2d at 426-27, 212 Ill.Dec. 668, 657 N.E.2d 1013. See also Azzano v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 304 Ill.App.3d 713, 718, 237 Ill.Dec. 694, 710 N.E.2d 117(1999) (the public policy underlying the contact sports exception today is the need to strike a balance between protecting participants in sporting activities and the voluntary nature of participation in games where physical contact is inherent and inevitable). Pfister also noted that a rule limiting the liability of participants in contact sports was necessary to avoid a chilling effect on the way these sports are played. As the court observed, if a negligence standard were imposed on participants, contact sports would be fundamentally altered or, perhaps, eliminated altogether. Pfister, 167 Ill.2d at 427, 212 Ill.Dec. 668, 657 N.E.2d 1013, quoting Pfister v. Shusta, 256 Ill.App.3d 186, 191-92, 194 Ill.Dec. 618, 627 N.E.2d 1260 (1994) (Green, J., dissenting). Numerous other courts have voiced the same concern and have stated that a primary justification for limiting liability in the sports context is to avoid fundamentally altering, or discouraging participation in, the sport at issue. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal.4th 296, 318, 834 P.2d 696, 710, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 16 (1992) (vigorous participation in such sporting events likely would be chilled if legal liability were to be imposed on a participant on the basis of his or her ordinary careless conduct); Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Mo. 1982) (Fear of civil liability stemming from negligent acts occurring in an athletic event could curtail the proper fervor with which the game should be played and discourage individual participation); Bowman v. McNary, 853 N.E.2d 984, 992 (Ind. App.2006). In addition, several courts have recognized a need for a rule limiting liability in the sports context in order to avoid a flood of litigation. As one court has stated: If simple negligence were adopted as the standard of care, every punter with whom contact is made, every midfielder high sticked, every basketball player fouled, every batter struck by a pitch, and every hockey player tripped would have the ingredients for a lawsuit if injury resulted.    [T]here exists the potential for a surfeit of lawsuits when it becomes known that simple negligence, based on an inadvertent violation of a contest rule, will suffice as a ground for recovery for an athletic injury. This should not be encouraged. Jaworski v. Kiernan, 241 Conn. 399, 409-10, 696 A.2d 332, 338(1997). See also Savino v. Robertson, 273 Ill. App.3d 811, 818, 210 Ill.Dec. 264, 652 N.E.2d 1240 (1995) (the practical effect of applying an ordinary negligence standard would be to open a legal Pandora's box, allowing virtually every participant in a contact sport, injured by another during a `warm-up' or practice, to bring an action based on the risks inherent in virtually every contact sport. This is exactly the type of result the courts have sought to avoid). Importantly, although Pfister referred to the contact sports exception in terms of the risks assumed by the plaintiff ( Pfister, 167 Ill.2d at 426, 212 Ill.Dec. 668, 657 N.E.2d 1013), the exception is not an affirmative defense, nor does it require the court to determine the plaintiff's subjective awareness of the risks associated with the sport. Rather, the contact sports exception is an objective doctrine that defines the scope of the defendant's duty. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 2, Comment j, at 27 (2000) (What courts often call `primary assumption of risk' is actually a doctrine about the defendant's liability or duty); Barrett v. Fritz, 42 Ill.2d 529, 535, 248 N.E.2d 111 (1969) (assumption of the risk concepts are generally duplicative of other doctrines, including scope of duty); Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property Regime, 333 S.C. 71, 80-81, 508 S.E.2d 565, 570 (1998); Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tenn. 1994); Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 437-39, 502 N.E.2d 964, 967-68, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49, 52-53 (1986). When deciding whether the contact sports exception applies, the court must consider the nature of the sport at issue and determine, based on its inherent risks, whether it is a contact sport. When the court concludes that physical contact among participants is inherent in the game ( Pfister, 167 Ill.2d at 425, 212 Ill. Dec. 668, 657 N.E.2d 1013), a player owes no duty to a coparticipant to avoid ordinary negligence. See, e.g., Landrum v. Gonzalez, 257 Ill.App.3d 942, 947, 196 Ill. Dec. 165, 629 N.E.2d 710 (1994) (whether a particular case is subject to the contact sports exception is properly resolved by examining the objective factors surrounding the game itself, not on the subjective expectations of the parties); see generally Knight, 3 Cal.4th at 315, 834 P.2d at 708, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d at 14 (a court need not ask what risks a particular plaintiff subjectively knew of and chose to encounter, but instead must evaluate the fundamental nature of the sport and the defendant's role in or relationship to that sport in order to determine whether the defendant owes a duty to protect a plaintiff from the particular risk of harm). In the case at bar, there is no dispute regarding the nature of the sport at issue. The parties agree that ice hockey, played in a game in which bodychecking is permitted, is a contact sport. Thus, pursuant to Pfister, the duty owed by the player defendants to Benjamin was the duty to refrain from willful and wanton or intentional misconduct. Pfister, 167 Ill.2d at 420, 212 Ill.Dec. 668, 657 N.E.2d 1013. Pfister defined willful and wanton conduct as a course of action which shows actual or deliberate intent to harm or which, if the course of action is not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for a person's own safety or the safety or property of others. Pfister, 167 Ill.2d at 421, 212 Ill.Dec. 668, 657 N.E.2d 1013, citing Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 161 Ill.2d 267, 273, 204 Ill.Dec. 178, 641 N.E.2d 402 (1994). The appellate court below concluded that plaintiff had pled conduct on the part of the player defendants that met this standard. According to the appellate court, because plaintiff alleged that the player defendants knowingly violated a rule against bodychecking from behind, and because they knew that Benjamin was in a position near the edge of the rink, or boards, when he was struck, plaintiff sufficiently pled a conscious disregard of Benjamin's safety by the player defendants. 369 Ill.App.3d at 892, 308 Ill.Dec. 81, 860 N.E.2d 1163. Before this court, plaintiff repeats this line of reasoning. We note that Pfister did not consider the application of the traditional willful and wanton standard to full-contact sports such as ice hockey and tackle football where physical contact between players is not simply an unavoidable by-product of vigorous play, but is a fundamental part of the way the game is played. In these sports, holding participants liable for consciously disregarding the safety of coparticipants is problematic. Striking or bodychecking a person who is standing on two thin metal blades atop a sheet of ice is an inherently dangerous action. Even a cleanly executed body check, performed according to the rules of ice hockey, evinces a conscious disregard for the safety of the person being struck. Yet, in an ice hockey game where bodychecking is permitted, players are struck throughout the game. This conduct is an inherent, fundamental part of the sport. Similarly, in tackle football, players must necessarily disregard the risk of injury to others, simply because of the way the game is played: The playing of football is a body-contact sport. The game demands that the players come into physical contact with each other constantly, frequently with great force. The linemen charge the opposing line vigorously, shoulder to shoulder. The tackier faces the risk of leaping at the swiftly moving legs of the ball-carrier and the latter must be prepared to strike the ground violently. Body contacts, bruises, and clashes are inherent in the game. There is no other way to play it. Vendrell v. School District No. 26C, 233 Or. 1, 15, 376 P.2d 406, 412 (1962). In full-contact sports such as tackle football, and ice hockey where bodychecking is permitted, a conscious disregard for the safety of the opposing player is an inherent part of the game. D. Lazaroff, Torts & Sports, 7 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L.Rev. 191, 213 (The infliction of pain with the knowledge of danger is inherent in certain sports such as football and hockey). A standard of care that holds a player liable based on conduct that is inherent in the sport is contrary to the underlying rationale of Pfister. As noted, the rule announced in Pfister is based on the longstanding principle that certain sports contain inherent risks for which a defendant owes no duty of care. Pfister, 167 Ill.2d at 426-27, 212 Ill.Dec. 668, 657 N.E.2d 1013; see also Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173 (1929) (Cardozo, J.). Although they evince a conscious disregard for the safety of other players, bodychecking and tackling are an inherent part of the sports of ice hockey and football. Pursuant to Pfister, a participant has no duty to avoid such conduct. Moreover, imposing liability under the conscious disregard of safety standard would have a pronounced chilling effect on full-contact sports such as ice hockey and football. If liability could be established every time a body check or tackle resulted in injury  because that conduct demonstrates a conscious disregard for the safety of the opposing player  the games of ice hockey and football as we know them would not be played. Pfister, 167 Ill.2d at 427, 212 Ill.Dec. 668, 657 N.E.2d 1013, quoting Pfister, 256 Ill.App.3d at 191-92, 194 Ill.Dec. 618, 627 N.E.2d 1260 (Green, J., dissenting). Finally, the conscious disregard of safety standard is unfair to defendants in full-contact sports such as ice hockey. As one commentator has noted, ice hockey, like football, is an example of a sport in which body checking and physical play may foreseeably result in frequent injuries. It would be    unjust to predicate participant liability upon the participant's knowledge that a tough check or collision could result in injury. This type of conduct is inherent in the sport itself. 7 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L.Rev. at 214. In full-contact sports, such as ice hockey where bodychecking is allowed, and tackle football, the traditional willful and wanton standard is both unworkable and contrary to the rationale underlying Pfister. To remain consistent with the reasoning of Pfister, a standard of care must be employed that more accurately accounts for the inherent risks associated with these sports. In considering the appropriate standard of care to be followed, we note that a majority of courts have concluded that rules violations are inherent and anticipated aspects of sports contests and, thus, insufficient to establish liability by themselves. T. Davis, Avila v. Citrus Community College District: Shaping the Contours of Immunity and Primary Assumption of the Risk, 17 Marq. Sports L.Rev. 259, 274 (2006). As this court observed in Pfister, in numerous sports, `players regularly commit contact beyond that which is permitted by the rules even as applied. In basketball, such an illegal contact is described as a foul for which a sanction is imposed. Sometimes the player fouled is injured. This is to be expected.' Pfister, 167 Ill.2d at 427,212 Ill.Dec. 668, 657 N.E.2d 1013, quoting Pfister, 256 Ill.App.3d at 191-92, 194 Ill.Dec. 618, 627 N.E.2d 1260 (Green, J., dissenting). See also Lang v. Silva, 306 Ill.App.3d 960, 968-69, 240 Ill.Dec. 21, 715 N.E.2d 708 (1999) (even in sports where there are rules governing the permissible degree of physical contact, rule infractions are inevitable and justify a lower standard of care than ordinary negligence); Jaworski, 241 Conn. at 407-08, 696 A.2d at 337 (In athletic competitions, the object obviously is to win. In games, particularly those    involving some degree of physical contact, it is reasonable to assume that the competitive spirit of the participants will result in some rules violations and injuries. That is why there are penalty boxes, fouls shots, free kicks, and yellow cards); Mark v. Moser, 746 N.E.2d 410, 419 (Ind. App.2001). Policy reasons also justify the holding that rules violations, by themselves, are insufficient to impose liability in a contact sport: [E]ven when a participant's conduct violates a rule of the game and may subject the violator to internal sanctions prescribed by the sport itself, imposition of legal liability for such conduct might well alter fundamentally the nature of the sport by deterring participants from vigorously engaging in activity that falls close to, but on the permissible side of, a prescribed rule. (Emphasis in original.) Knight, 3 Cal.4th at 318-19, 834 P.2d at 710, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d at 16. At the same time, courts have uniformly recognized that not all misconduct can be considered an inherent aspect of the sport being played. [S]ome of the restraints of civilization must accompany every athlete on to the playing field. Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 Ill.App.3d 212, 215, 334 N.E.2d 258(1975). Courts have expressed a standard of care that balances these concerns and, in particular, acknowledges the risks inherent in certain sports, in various ways. Perhaps the most frequently cited standard is that adopted by the Supreme Court of California in Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal.4th 296, 834 P.2d 696, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 (1992). There, the court stated that a participant breaches a duty of care to a coparticipant only if the participant intentionally injures another player or engages in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport. Knight, 3 Cal.4th at 320, 834 P.2d at 711, 11 Cal. Rptr.2d at 17. Other authorities have adopted similar standards. See, e.g., Turcotte, 68 N.Y.2d at 441, 502 N.E.2d at 970, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 55 (liability will lie for flagrant infractions unrelated to the normal method of playing the game and done without any competitive purpose); Mark, 746 N.E.2d at 422 (liability will not lie where the injury causing action amounts to a tactical move that is an inherent or reasonably foreseeable part of the game and is undertaken to secure a competitive edge); 17 Marq. Sports L.Rev. at 283 (liability will lie for extreme conduct that falls squarely outside of the customs or ordinary conduct that can be expected in a particular sport). Regardless of the precise wording, these standards all draw a line in a way that permits recovery for extreme misconduct during a sporting event that causes injury, while at the same time foreclosing liability for conduct which, although it may amount to an infraction of the rules, is nevertheless an inherent and inevitable part of the sport. We agree with the standards set forth in the above authorities, and conclude that, in a full contact sport such as ice hockey or tackle football, a participant breaches a duty of care to a coparticipant only if the participant intentionally injures the coparticipant or engages in conduct totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport. Knight, 3 Cal.4th at 320, 834 P.2d at 711, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d at 17. As currently pled, nothing takes the play at issue in this case totally outside the range of ordinary activity associated with ice hockey in a game in which bodychecking is allowed. The complaint contains no allegation that Benjamin was deliberately targeted by the player defendants, either in retaliation for an earlier incident or some other purpose, or that the player defendants had any intent to hurt him. Although the complaint alleges that Benjamin was struck while next to the boards at the edge of the rink, there is no allegation that body checks are prohibited in that area, or that the body check was in some way out of the normal area of play. Nor does the complaint allege that plaintiff was struck after play had been stopped. The key allegation in plaintiff's complaint is that the player defendants violated a rule against body checking from behind when they struck Benjamin. However, as noted, rules violations are considered an inherent, unavoidable risk of playing a contact sport. As pled then, plaintiff's complaint fails to allege conduct totally outside the ordinary range of activity associated with ice hockey. The circuit court properly dismissed count I of plaintiff's complaint, and the judgment of the appellate court reinstating that count must be reversed. This is not to say, however, that conduct totally outside the ordinary range of activity associated with ice hockey did not occur in this case. For example, if Benjamin was struck by the player defendants, not in the heat of play while struggling to gain possession of the puck, but away from the puck and the action of the game, that might well be a breach of the standard adopted here. However, in his complaint, plaintiff does not include any indication of where Benjamin was in relation to the puck, and any ongoing play, when the contact took place. A plaintiff cannot successfully plead a cause of action for conduct which is totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport without including facts that describe the play that was occurring at the time of injury. The appellate court below suggested that the defendant players could raise the location of the puck as an issue in rebuttal, to defeat the inference of willful and wanton conduct raised by plaintiff's complaint. 369 Ill.App.3d at 892, 308 Ill.Dec. 81, 860 N.E.2d 1163. However, this would improperly shift the burden to defendants. It is a plaintiff's responsibility to plead facts that establish a defendant's duty ( Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n, 195 Ill.2d 210, 228, 253 Ill.Dec. 632, 745 N.E.2d 1166 (2000)), and thus, in a full-contact sport, it is plaintiff's responsibility to plead facts that show conduct totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport. Finally, we acknowledge that the standard of care we adopt today, while necessitated by the underlying rationale of Pfister, was not explicitly set forth in that decision. Under these circumstances, to avoid any unfairness to plaintiff, we deem it appropriate to remand this cause to the circuit court with instructions to permit plaintiff to amend count I of his complaint in conformance with the standard of care set forth in this opinion, if he is able to do so.