Opinion ID: 1932472
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: References to Prior Acts and Events

Text: Weber was charged with first degree assault as a result of the incident when he struck Long with a pistol in December 1984. According to the testimony of Long and her friend, Skidmore, Weber tried to persuade Long not to testify at his trial. Long testified that Weber threatened her with violence and offered her money. According to Long, Weber also told her that he would obtain an acquittal by bribing the judge. Weber was charged with intimidation and aggravated intimidation based on his expression of intent to bribe the judge, his offer of money to Long, and his threats of violence against Long. See 11 Del.C. §§ 3532-3533. The substance of actual threats and statements attributed to Weber by Long were words to the effect I killed once, I'll kill again and [my] father took care of the judge last time. Weber objected to the admission of these statements on the basis that they would inform the jury of his past criminal experience. [5] Weber argued that these statements constituted evidence of prior bad acts as described in D.R.E. 404(b). Weber asked the trial judge not to admit these statements into evidence contending that the probative value of the statements was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See D.R.E. 403. The State argued that Weber's statements were integral elements of the intimidation offenses with which Weber was charged based upon his threats to Long. The trial judge found the State's position to be persuasive and overruled Weber's objection. D.R.E. 404(b) formalizes the general common law rule forbidding the introduction of character evidence to prove that a defendant acted in conformity therewith on the occasion in question. Getz v. State, Del.Supr., 538 A.2d 726, 730 (1988). Rule 404(b) is divided into two parts. The first part proscribes the admittance of evidence to prove propensity to commit the crime which is charged. The second part enumerates illustrative purposes for which evidence of other acts, crimes, or wrongs may be used, other than for showing propensity, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. D.R.E. 404(b). In deciding whether to admit evidence, the trial judge acts in his sound discretion, and his decision will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. E.g., Baynard v. State, Del. Supr., 518 A.2d 682, 692 (1986). In the case sub judice, the evidence of Weber's statements to Long concerning his prior criminal activity does not fit into any one of the exceptions to the general rule prohibiting the admission of evidence of prior crimes. D.R.E. 404(b). This Court has recently noted that the ambiguous formulation of D.R.E. 404(b)  the statement of the prohibition followed by a catalog of exceptions  has raised questions about whether the rule should be interpreted in an exclusionary or an inclusionary way. Getz v. State, 538 A.2d at 730. Under the exclusionary approach, evidence of prior criminal acts would not be admissible unless it fits within the finite list of recognized exceptions provided for in D.R.E. 404(b). Getz v. State, 538 A.2d at 730. Conversely, under the inclusionary approach, the proponent is allowed to offer evidence of prior criminal misconduct for any material purpose other than to show a mere propensity or disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the charged crime. Id. In Getz, this Court adopted an inclusionary construction of D.R.E. 404(b). Id. at 730-31. In Getz, we held that evidence of prior misconduct is admissible when it has `independent logical relevance' and when its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. at 730. Independent logical relevance means that the evidence of other crimes must be material to an issue or ultimate fact in dispute in the case. Id. at 734. If the evidence of prior misconduct meets these standards, it is admissible whether or not it may be pigeonholed into one of the categories specifically identified in D.R.E. 404(b). Id. at 731. In the present case, we are called upon to consider the appropriateness of recognizing the admissibility of Weber's statements to Long under a theory that is not specifically identified in the catalog of exceptions set forth in D.R.E. 404(b). In this case, the basis for the charges of intimidation against Weber includes his claim that he had engaged in prior criminal activity. Therefore, it presents a situation where the defendant has made his prior criminal activity  whether or not he actually engaged in such criminal activity  an element of the crime for which he is being charged. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was presented with a similar situation in Commonwealth v. Claypool, 495 A.2d 176, 177-80 (Pa.1985). Weber's statements to Long are not only material, but also constitute an element of the charge against him. As the Claypool court noted, []if such evidence were not admissible, a criminal would only need to make sure that the fear needed for the commission of his crime emanated from a threat which only embodied a claim of prior criminal activity in order to successfully avoid prosecution. Id. at 179. Such a result is inconsistent with an inclusionary interpretation of D.R.E. 404(b). Therefore, this Court holds that when there is evidence that a statement about prior criminal activity was made by the defendant in order to threaten and intimidate his victim, and when force or threat of harm is an element of the crime for which the defendant is being tried, such evidence is admissible. Id. (footnote omitted). In applying this holding to the facts of this case, we find that Weber's statements to Long and Skidmore were properly admissible into evidence under Rule 404(b). To obtain a conviction for intimidation and aggravated intimidation, the State had to show that Weber acted knowingly and with malice. Malice is defined as an intent to vex, annoy, harm or injure in any way another person, or to thwart or interfere in any manner with the orderly administration of justice. 11 Del. C. § 3531(1). In addition, Weber was charged, in the context of the aggravated intimidation count, with making an express threat of force or violence against Long. 11 Del. C. § 3533(1). Weber's statements to Long and Skidmore that he had killed before and that he had bribed a judge were not being admitted to show a criminal disposition on his part or even that he had, in fact, committed a prior criminal act. Indeed, Weber's allegation of bribery was completely untrue. However, these statements were admissible because they were made as a part of the threats communicated by Weber to Long. These statements constituted the act of intimidation that was an element of the offenses with which Weber was charged. Nevertheless, our analysis cannot end with the conclusion that evidence of prior criminal acts, which Weber himself made relevant to prove the crimes with which he is charged, is admissible. There is a grave potential for misunderstanding on the part of the jury when this type of evidence is admitted. See Commonwealth v. Claypool, 495 A.2d at 179. This evidence of prior criminal acts cannot be submitted to the jury without guidance from the trial court. Therefore, when such evidence is admitted, it must be accompanied by a cautionary instruction which fully and carefully explains to the jury the limited purpose for which that evidence has been admitted. Id. Cf. Getz v. State, 538 A.2d at 734 & n. 8. In this case, the admission of the evidence of Weber's statements concerning his prior activities was not accompanied by such a cautionary instruction. Since such an instruction was necessary for a proper understanding of the evidence by the jury and to assure a fair trial, the failure to give such an instruction was reversible error. Cf. Scott v. State, Del. Supr., 521 A.2d 235, 241-42 (1987). Cf. Getz v. State, 538 A.2d at 734. Weber has also raised a separate issue about the admissibility of a separate reference to his prior conduct. Weber argues that the fairness of his trial was compromised when one witness made a direct reference to a prior trial and when two witnesses made indirect references to a prior trial. This Court has recognized that juror knowledge of a defendant's prior trial and conviction for the same charge that is before the jury for consideration is highly prejudicial and generally requires the declaration of a mistrial or the reversal of a conviction. Bailey v. State, Del.Supr., 521 A.2d 1069, 1076-78 (1987); Hughes v. State, Del.Supr., 490 A.2d 1034, 1044-48 (1985). The prior trial which was mentioned in this case related to a different charge than the one that was before the jury. We have recognized an exception to D.R. E. 404(b) when there is a subsequent trial for a criminal charge based upon the defendant's own reference to his prior criminal activity or conviction. This exception makes the disclosure of the prior activity and possibly the prior conviction inevitable. Therefore, in the context of the second unrelated trial, the trial judge's instruction that outlines the limited purpose for which the prior criminal activity or conviction is admitted is mandatory. Cf. D.R.E. 105. [6] In this case, although the trial judge did not give a limiting instruction, he was assiduous in his efforts to limit any reference to Weber's prior criminal activity to Weber's own words. We have found that such a limiting instruction is mandatory. We also note, however, that a limiting instruction can never be a substitute for the type of diligence that the trial judge displayed in Weber's case. Under the circumstances of this case, even though Weber's prior criminal acts were admissible, in the absence of a limiting instruction, Weber's convictions for intimidation and aggravated intimidation must be reversed.