Opinion ID: 764076
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Trial Court's Denial of Johnson's Continuance Motion

Text: 58 Johnson next claims that the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance to obtain the attendance of allegedly crucial expert witnesses denied his right to a fair trial. The experts in question were forensic scientists, Dale Nute and James Halligan, both of whom were allegedly prepared to testify that cuts on Johnson's hands were consistent with his defense that he tried to prevent Fields from stabbing Officer Langham with the knife. According to Johnson, scheduling conflicts prevented the two men from testifying. 59 The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected this claim on Johnson's direct appeal, concluding it was frivolous because Johnson did not attach any affidavits to his continuance motion indicating the materiality of the experts' testimony and because he filed his motion only ten days before his trial was set to begin. Johnson, 477 So.2d at 210-11. The district court concluded that the state trial court had not abused its discretion in denying the continuance motion, and, in any event, that Johnson had failed to show that the experts' testimony would have altered the verdict. We review Johnson's claim that the trial court's denial of his continuance motion amounted to a due process violation de novo. See Schrader v. Whitley, 904 F.2d 282, 288-89 (5th Cir.1990). 60 As the district court correctly noted,  '[w]hen a denial of a continuance forms a basis of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, not only must there have been an abuse of discretion but it must have been so arbitrarily and fundamentally unfair that it violates constitutional principles of due process.'  Schrader, 904 F.2d at 288 (quoting Hicks v. Wainwright, 633 F.2d 1146, 1148 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan.1981)). Among the factors we must consider in determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance motion are: the defense's diligence in interviewing and procuring the presence of the witnesses, the defense's estimation of the probability of procuring live testimony within a reasonable time, the specificity with which the defense is able to describe the expected testimony, the degree to which such testimony is expected to be favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the testimony. See id.; Hicks, 633 F.2d at 1149. 61 We agree with the Mississippi Supreme Court and the district court that Johnson has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the continuance motion. Johnson's only argument in support of his contention that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion is that, quoting United States ex rel. Martinez v. Thomas, 526 F.2d 750, 755 (2d Cir.1975), a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality. We agree with Johnson that, under some circumstances, a trial court's refusal to grant a continuance can interfere with a defendant's constitutional rights. See Hicks, 633 F.2d at 1149-50 (concluding that trial court's denial of continuance motion violated petitioner's due process rights). However, unlike in Hicks, Johnson has presented no evidence that he informed the trial judge of the uniqueness, materiality, and imminent availability of his witnesses' live testimony. On the contrary, Johnson attached no affidavits to his continuance motion indicating what the experts' proposed testimony would be or addressing the materiality or necessity of their testimony. Moreover, on August 18, 1982, twelve days before the trial was to begin, the trial court told Johnson's counsel that I don't know what [the experts are] going to testify to or anything about it and I don't know where it's material or immaterial.... Johnson's attorney only replied that Johnson would likely call the experts to testify, and that the availability of the experts was important to help [the defense] understand the basis of [the state's] case. Unlike in Hicks, where it was clear that the witness at issue would be available to testify later that day, see id. at 1148, Johnson's counsel gave no indication when Nute and Halligan could give testimony. Thus, we conclude that, given the lack of specificity with which Johnson's counsel described the experts' proposed testimony, the materiality of the testimony, or the probability of procuring the presence of the experts within a reasonable time, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson's motion for a continuance. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of habeas relief on this issue.