Opinion ID: 1595830
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sexual Battery Opinion Testimony

Text: Smith next asserts that the trial court erred when it permitted Dr. Vega to present opinion testimony that the victim had been sexually assaulted. Smith asserts that to allow Vega to testify with regard to commonly understood facts invaded the province of the jury and created the possibility that the jury would forgo independent analysis of the evidence to determine whether a sexual battery occurred. We have explained that [t]he determination of a witness's qualifications to express an expert opinion is peculiarly within the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed absent a clear showing of error. Ramirez v. State, 542 So.2d 352, 355 (Fla.1989). Section 90.702, Florida Statutes (2005), provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify about it in the form of an opinion; however, the opinion is admissible only if it can be applied to evidence at trial. Section 90.704, Florida Statutes (2005), further provides guidelines for the data upon which an expert may rely to reach an opinion or conclusion: If the facts or data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the subject to support the opinion expressed, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. This Court has previously allowed a qualified expert to testify that, based upon the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the victim's body, a sexual battery likely occurred. Specifically, in Dailey v. State, 594 So.2d 254, 258 (Fla.1991), this Court addressed and rejected a challenge similar to that raised by Smith here: During the penalty phase, the judge qualified Detective Halliday as an expert in homicide and sexual battery and allowed him to testify that because the victim's body was found nude and her clothing scattered, it was highly likely that a sexual battery or attempt had occurred. Dailey claims that this testimony was only common sense and it was error for the court to permit expert testimony on a matter that is within the common understanding of the jury. Halliday, however, had extensive training and experience in homicides and sexual batteries; his expert testimony was helpful in consolidating the various pieces of evidence found at the crime scene. This would not necessarily be within the common understanding of the jury. We find no error. We conclude that, with the exception of the testimony discussed below, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted Vega to present opinion testimony as to whether this victim had been sexually battered. During trial, Dr. Vega testified that various aspects of the crime scene were consistent with sexual battery: (1) the victim was discovered naked below the waist; (2) there was evidence of tearing to the victim's hymen, and one possible cause of that tearing could have been penetration during a sexual battery; (3) bruises on the body could have been caused by a struggle with her attacker; and (4) it is more likely that the victim's jeans and underwear were removed before she was dragged to the location where her body was found, rather than pulled off while she was dragged, based upon the uniformity of the abrasions found. The fact that there were alternative explanations for the condition of the body does not render Dr. Vega's testimony inadmissible. Rather, it was for the jury to decide what weight to accord Dr. Vega's opinion based upon any alternative explanations. See Delap v. State, 440 So.2d 1242, 1253-54 (Fla.1983); see also Dailey, 594 So.2d at 258 (detective's testimony that it was highly likely a sexual battery occurred was admissible because it was helpful in consolidating the various pieces of evidence found at the crime scene). The testimony of Dr. Vega assisted the jurors in deciding what happened, not who was responsible for the acts perpetrated against the victim. Cf. Martinez v. State, 761 So.2d 1074, 1079 (Fla.2000) ([A] witness's opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused is not admissible.). Accordingly, we conclude that Dr. Vega's opinion that the evidence pointed to a sexual battery here was properly admitted. We agree with Smith, however, that the trial court should have excluded one portion of Dr. Vega's testimonythat ligature strangulation is highly associated with sexual battery. Dr. Vega failed to provide any basis whatsoever to support a purported connection or correlation between these two elements, no evidence of such a connection was found here, and Dr. Vega had no research, data, or other material from which he drew this conclusion. Since it is impossible to determine from Dr. Vega's testimony whether the facts or data were of a type reasonably relied upon by experts to support the opinion expressed, it is impossible to evaluate whether Dr. Vega's conclusion is scientifically supported or even valid. Absent adequate explanation of data, research, or other material from which this conclusion was drawn, we conclude that Dr. Vega should not have been allowed to express the opinion of a purported abstract connection between ligature strangulation and sexual battery. However, defense counsel did not object to this particular statement, nor did the defense ask Vega to provide more detail with regard to this statement during cross-examination. Accordingly, this challenge was unpreserved. We have held that [t]he failure to contemporaneously object to a comment on the basis that it constitutes improper ... testimony renders the claim procedurally barred absent fundamental error.  Sexton v. State, 775 So.2d 923, 932 (Fla.2000) (emphasis supplied). To warrant reversal on the basis of fundamental error, the error must reach down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.  Walls v. State, 926 So.2d 1156, 1176 (Fla.2006) (emphasis supplied) (quoting Brown v. State, 124 So.2d 481, 484 (Fla.1960)). We conclude that Dr. Vega's testimony with regard to the ligature strangulation/sexual battery connection did not rise to the level of fundamental error. As previously discussed, there was a plethora of evidence, including semen that matched the DNA profile of Smith and Smith's confession to his brother that he engaged in rough sex with the victim, to support a conviction on this charge. We have no doubt that even if Dr. Vega had not presented this testimony, the jury nonetheless would have convicted Smith of capital sexual battery. Accordingly, no harmful error occurred, and Smith is not entitled to relief on this basis.