Opinion ID: 2318487
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court's Grant of Appellees' Motion

Text: Having decided that Judge Terrell's ruling was not sufficiently final to establish the law of the case, we still must determine whether the trial court erred in granting judgment to appellees. See Elmira Corp. v. Bulman, 135 A.2d 645, 647 (D.C.App.1957) (after deciding that the denial of a motion for summary judgment did not establish the law of the case, [t]he only remaining question is whether the trial judge decided the case correctly on the merits); see also Williams v. Paul, 945 A.2d 607, 611 n. 4 (D.C.2008); Wilner, supra, 760 A.2d at 593 ([R]eversal is not warranted where ... the appellate court agrees on the merits with the second judge's analysis.); District of Columbia v. Faison, 278 A.2d 688, 690 (D.C.1971). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Phillips v. Fujitec America, Inc., 3 A.3d 324, 327 (D.C.2010). In doing so, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and ask whether the record demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact on which a jury could find for the non-moving party. In other words, does the evidence present a sufficient factual disagreement to require submission to a jury or is it so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Id. at 327-28 (quotations omitted). To prevail on a claim of negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, that his reliance on the defendant's misrepresentation was to his detriment. See Redmond v. State Farm Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 1202, 1207 (D.C. 1999); Dresser v. Sunderland Apartments Tenants Ass'n, Inc., 465 A.2d 835, 839 (D.C.1983). [9] The material facts are not in dispute. When told his employment with WASA was at an end, Kumar was given two sets of choices: first, to resign or to be terminated; and second, to sign a waiver of claims in exchange for severance pay or to not sign the waiver and preserve his claims. He resigned and signed the waiver. Regarding this second set of choices, WASA admitted that Kumar was improperly denied the period of time required by the OWBPA to review his severance agreement. Subsequently, Kumar was allowed to revoke his waiver, and he indeed filed an age discrimination claim. This is what the OWBPA guarantees, see Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 427, 118 S.Ct. 838, 139 L.Ed.2d 849 (1998), and nothing more. [10] What is clear from the undisputed facts is that Kumar's employment with WASA was going to end that day, either through his resignation or his termination. Thus, even if he proved that he was deceived into choosing one alternative over the other, he has not alleged any detriment that turned on that choice other than the waiver of claims, which he was allowed to revoke. [11] We have held that [t]here can be no recovery if the plaintiff is none the worse off for the misrepresentation. Dresser, supra, 465 A.2d at 840 n. 15 (citations omitted). As a result, we are satisfied that the trial court did not err in dismissing Kumar's negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation claim as a matter of law.