Opinion ID: 2224496
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: proof of intent to kill

Text: The focal point in Rokus' appeal is his contention that he did not intentionally cause Kashuba's death. `Circumstantial evidence' means facts or circumstances, proved or known, from which existence or nonexistence of another fact may be logically inferred or deduced through a rational process. State v. Jasper, 237 Neb. 754, 763, 467 N.W.2d 855, 862 (1991). See, also, State v. Witt, supra ; State v. Fleck, supra . A defendant may be convicted by circumstantial evidence which establishes the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The State is required to establish the defendant's guilt for the crime charged, but is not required to disprove every hypothesis consistent with the defendant's presumed innocence. State v. Blue Bird, 232 Neb. 336, 339, 440 N.W.2d 474, 476 (1989). Accord, State v. Witt, supra ; State v. Fleck, supra . Intent is the state of the actor's mind when the actor's conduct occurs. State v. Pierce, 231 Neb. 966, 971, 439 N.W.2d 435, 440 (1989). Accord State v. Craig, 219 Neb. 70, 361 N.W.2d 206 (1985).  Intentionally means willfully or purposely, and not accidentally or involuntarily. State v. Schott, 222 Neb. 456, 462, 384 N.W.2d 620, 624 (1986). Accord, State v. Pettit, 233 Neb. 436, 445 N.W.2d 890 (1989); State v. Pierce, supra . The intent involved in conduct is a mental process and may be inferred from the conduct itself, the actor's language in reference to the conduct, and the circumstances surrounding an incident. State v. Pierce, 231 Neb. at 971, 439 N.W.2d at 440. Accord, State v. Witt, supra ; State v. Tuttle, supra ; State v. Swigart, 233 Neb. 517, 446 N.W.2d 216 (1989). When an element of a crime involves existence of a defendant's mental process or other state of mind of an accused, such elements involve a question of fact and may be proved by circumstantial evidence. State v. Hoffman, 227 Neb. 131, 140, 416 N.W.2d 231, 237 (1987). Accord State v. Witt, supra . From circumstances around a defendant's voluntary and willful act, a jury may infer that the defendant intended a reasonably probable result of his or her act. See, People v. Bartall, 98 I11.2d 294, 74 Ill.Dec. 557, 456 N.E.2d 59 (1983); People v. Getch, 50 N.Y.2d 456, 407 N.E.2d 425, 429 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1980). Consequently, the court in United States v. Kimmel, 777 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir.1985), approved the following instruction: As a general rule it is reasonable to infer that a person ordinarily intends the natural and probable consequences of his knowing acts. The jury may draw the inference that the accused intended all the consequences which one standing in like circumstances and possessing his knowledge should reasonably have expected to result from any act of conscious omission and any such inference drawn is entitled to be considered by the jury in determining whether or not the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did possess the required intent. Cf., State v. Jasper, supra (constitutionally prohibited instruction that requires an inference adverse to a criminal defendant); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) (constitutionally prohibited use of a mandatory presumption that a criminal defendant intended probable consequences of the defendant's acts). Circumstances surrounding the fatal shot from Rokus' revolver allow and support the inference that Rokus intended to shoot and kill Kashuba. The jury was entitled to find that Kashuba was seated in a dining room chair while Rokus was approaching from behind Kashuba. From the location of the contact wound on Kashuba's head, the jury could infer that the fatal hollow-point bullet was fired at point-blank range from the .44 Magnum's muzzle at the base of Kashuba's skull; hence, Rokus was deliberately pointing the revolver at Kashuba when the weapon discharged. None can argue that a hollow point bullet fired from a .44 Magnum is not a life-threatening projectile. Intent to kill may be inferred from deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably likely to cause death. See, Furr v. State, 308 Ark. 41, 822 S.W.2d 380 (1992) (homicidal intent may be inferred from the type of weapon used, the manner of its use, and the nature and location of the wounds); Rhinehardt v. State, 477 N.E.2d 89 (Ind.1985) (intent to kill may be inferred from use of a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably likely to cause death); State v. Noble, 425 So.2d 734 (La.1983) (defendant's shooting the victim in the head at close range may be a basis for the jury's inference that the defendant intended the victim's death); Raspberry v. State, 275 Ind. 504, 417 N.E.2d 913 (1981) (intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death); State v. Price, 365 N.W.2d 632 (Iowa App.1985) (intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon); People v. Evans, 92 Ill.App.3d 874, 48 I11. Dec. 346, 416 N.E.2d 377 (1981) (intent to kill may be inferred from a defendant's use of a deadly weapon to harm the victim). The .44 Magnum was equipped with a fully operational safety, had no defects, and required substantial pressure on the trigger for firing, especially if the revolver was in its double-action mode, namely, 11¾ pounds of pressure had to be applied to the trigger to discharge the revolver. A firearm equipped with an operational safety device and requiring heavy trigger pull or pressure on the trigger for firing may be considered by the jury with other evidence to determine whether a defendant's discharging a firearm was intentional or accidental. See State v. Martin, 195 Conn. 166, 487 A.2d 177 (1985). See, also, State v. Hamilton, 478 So.2d 123 (La.1985) (a firearm's requiring substantial trigger pull to fire the weapon, i.e., more than 4½ pounds pressure on the trigger, was a circumstance which the jury could consider in determining whether the defendant deliberately discharged the firearm); People v. Quiles, 172 A.D.2d 859, 569 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1991) (a firearm's operable safety mechanism and requisite 7 to 7½ pounds of trigger pressure to fire the weapon were circumstances which may establish a defendant's intent to kill the victim); Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (heavy trigger pressure required to discharge a firearm is a circumstance relative to determining whether discharge of the firearm was an intentional act). Consequently, the jury could have concluded that Rokus' firing the revolver in its double-action mode required a conscious and appreciable effort by Rokus. Thus, Rokus' intent to cause Kashuba's death may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as the type of weapon used, namely, a .44 Magnum which Rokus knew was loaded with hollow-point bullets; Rokus' manner of using the revolver, that is, his close-range pointing of the lethal weapon at the base of Kashuba's skull; and the nature of the wound inflicted on Kashuba, a contact wound, from Rokus' deliberate discharge of the revolver. Therefore, the evidence at Rokus' trial, construed most favorably to the State, supports the jury's finding that Rokus intentionally caused Kashuba's death without premeditation. For that reason, Rokus' assignment of error is without merit; hence, we affirm Rokus' conviction and sentence. AFFIRMED.