Opinion ID: 2150554
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Necessity of citing sec. 939.05, Stats., in the information.

Text: The defendant contends it was error to charge him with being a principal in the armed robbery without additionally including in the information sec. 939.05, Stats., informing him that he was being charged as a party to a crime. In this case the defendant did not actually point the gun and take the money, but he may be convicted and punished as though he did, pursuant to sec. 939.05, Stats. Since this is the law, defendant argues that the information must cite sec. 939.05, Stats., in addition to the substantive crime with which he is charged. He relies on La Vigne v. State (1966), 32 Wis. 2d 190, 145 N. W. 2d 175, wherein this court commended the practice of citing sec. 939.05 in the information when the district attorney knows in advance that it will be applicable. In Bethards v. State (1970), 45 Wis. 2d 606, 618, 173 N. W. 2d 634, this court was asked to make the suggested practice in La Vigne mandatory. The court declined, and the reasons therefore are dispositive of the same issue in this case. In Bethards the court said: We are satisfied that what we commended in La Vigne as good practice should not now be made mandatory. The state has well observed that the recommendation of La Vigne should not be made a mandatory requirement because (1) it is often difficult to tell in advance of filing the information whether to charge the defendant as the principal or under this section as a party to the crime; (2) the statute itself does not require that a defendant in a position such as the instant defendant, be specifically charged with violation of this section; and finally, (3) that even if it was error for the information not to contain reference to sec. 939.05, Stats., it was harmless error for the defendant could not have been prejudiced by a failure to narrow this complaint down to this specific statutory reference. In all likelihood, the district attorney knew of the facts surrounding this incident prior to the filing of the information so presumably it was known that defendant could be charged under the party-to-a-crime action. This should have been done. However, failure to do so, in the absence of other circumstances showing a detrimental effect on the defendant, would appear to be harmless error. The defendant knew what he was charged with and there is nothing in the record to indicate that had this statute been specifically referred to in the information, his trial strategy would have been any different. The state's burden of proof is still the same in either event. (Emphasis supplied.) Here the complaint and warrant with which the defendant was served indicates unequivocally in the probable cause portion of each of those documents that the defendant was one of the four persons who held him up and robbed him of his money as aforestated. We conclude that failure to charge the defendant under the party-to-a-crime section, in the absence of other circumstances showing a detrimental effect on the defendant, would be harmless error.