Opinion ID: 782524
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Union's Breach of its Duty of Fair Representation

Text: 31 Garrison's allegation of breach against Local 327 can be separated into two categories: (1) those actions concerning the failure to ensure that Cassens was notified of Garrison's intent to follow the Nissan work, and (2) those actions concerning the failure to prepare for and challenge Cassens's argument as to the thirty-day reporting rule. The first category cannot give rise to liability. 9 Accordingly, our focus shifts to the second. Garrison primarily points to three errors in the union's handling of the issue of the thirty-day rule to support a finding of arbitrary conduct. First, he argues that it was arbitrary conduct for Neal not to notify Garrison that Cassens had raised a new defense at the August 1996 proceeding in New Orleans. Second, Garrison maintains that Neal's failure to prepare a rebuttal in anticipation of Cassens's thirty-day rule defense amounted to arbitrary conduct. Last, he argues that it was also arbitrary behavior for Neal not to argue against the applicability of the arbitral precedent relied on by Cassens at the NJSSC proceeding in California. Although Neal acted with less than full professionalism, there was insufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that his errors rose to the level of extreme arbitrariness. 32 Neal first learned of the thirty-day rule at the New Orleans proceeding when Cassens invoked the rule as an affirmative defense to defeat Garrison's grievance. It is undisputed that prior to this hearing, and during his relatively short tenure (i.e., twenty months) as Local 327's business agent, Neal had never dealt with, or otherwise been made aware of, the little-known thirty-day rule. As Garrison himself concedes, the thirty-day rule was one [Neal] had never heard of in all of his years with the union. Garrison also recognizes that at the time of his grievance proceedings, the thirty-day rule was rarely invoked and even more rarely relied on as a basis to defeat a grievance. For instance, Garrison repeatedly and boldly emphasizes that he is the only employee in the sixty-year history of car haul who ever lost his right to be on a seniority [list] because he didn't show up within thirty days. Given the relative obscurity and deceptive unimportance of the thirty-day rule, Neal's oversight in not relaying this defense to Garrison did not amount to arbitrary conduct; at worst, the error was negligence. 10 Cf. Walk, 958 F.2d at 1329 (explaining that a union agent's failure to investigate adequately a grievant's case before submission to arbitration was negligent, but not in and of itself arbitrary); Olsen v. United Parcel Serv., 892 F.2d 1290, 1295-96 (7th Cir. 1990) (While we can imagine situations in which a union's failure to investigate might constitute substantial evidence of a breach, the mere failure to investigate, in itself, does not constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation.). 33 Approximately forty-eight hours prior to the NJSSC proceeding, Neal, Garrison, and Joe Clark of Cassens came together to swap documents that would be presented to the committee. Among the items exchanged were the seven arbitral precedents that Cassens intended to rely on in support of its thirty-day rule defense. Garrison and Neal reviewed these decisions and were of the view that the defense was inapplicable to Garrison's grievance. 11 Accordingly, Neal and Garrison did not prepare a response to this defense. Neal's decision not to research and prepare a response to a defense that he believed was inapplicable to the grievance he was handling is a tactical decision subject to deference. After evaluating the decisions submitted by Cassens — and determining they were irrelevant or distinguishable from Garrison's claim — it was in Neal's discretion to determine how he wanted to expend his time, efforts, and resources in continuing to prosecute Garrison's grievance. If Neal determined that a change in strategy was not warranted, a conclusion that Garrison concurred with, then unless discriminatory, wholly irrational, or made in bad faith, it is not for us to second guess the wisdom of the decision. Moreover, like other contexts where we engage in post hoc evaluation of conduct, we must be ever vigilant to avoid the distorting effects of hindsight. Although Neal's decision not to obviate or otherwise prepare a rebuttal to the thirty-day rule proved to be a devastating error, the error can at worst be viewed as a miscalculation of strategy. Certainly, independent research and consultation would have been the preferable course of action, particularly when such research may have uncovered the Avon Lake arbitral precedent that supported Garrison's grievance. However, as our case law makes clear, an unwise or even an unconsidered decision by the union is not necessarily an irrational decision. Walk, 958 F.2d at 1326. 34 In Walk, a plaintiff brought a hybrid § 301 suit alleging that he was wrongfully discharged due to an erroneous drug test result that indicated a positive finding of marijuana. The plaintiff argued numerous errors in the union's handling of his arbitration proceedings. The most difficult issue was whether the union's failure to challenge the clinic's method of collecting and sealing the specimen, a method that was not in compliance with the procedures outlined in the collective bargaining agreement, amounted to breach of the duty of fair representation. Under existing case law from the Northern District of Ohio, a defect in the mandated chain of custody arguably could serve as a basis to set aside a discharge resulting from a drug test violation. See id. at 1329. Accordingly, we had to consider whether the union's failure to raise this issue in a timely fashion may have constituted more than mere negligence, and whether not raising the chain of custody issue may have been far outside a wide range of reasonableness because it may well have made a difference in the outcome of [the plaintiff's] grievance. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Although recognizing that the issue was a close call, we held that the error did not rise to the level of breach. Specifically, we found that 35 The chain of custody issue is the most difficult of those raised by Walk. Failure to challenge the procedure did not involve a mere tactical decision by Local 299, and it did not involve a large expenditure of funds. It presents a very close question, but we are persuaded that this failure was more of an omission or oversight, a negligent error of judgment that was not directed against plaintiff capriciously or in bad faith. We accordingly conclude, despite some reservation, that this conduct was not outside the O'Neill standard under all the circumstances. 36 Id. Thus, Walk presented a much more difficult question than the case at bar because unlike the situation here, in Walk, the union's decision not to research and present a particular defense was not even the product of a tactical decision. Here, Neal's decision not to prepare a response to the applicability of the thirty-day rule was a tactical decision subject to deference. Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of arbitrary conduct on this issue. 37 Last, Garrison maintains that it was arbitrary behavior for Neal to sit silent during the NJSSC hearing and not challenge the arguments made by Cassens in support of the applicability of the thirty-day rule. Again, although Neal's muteness was not the most effective method to assist Garrison in his grievance, it was not so unreasonable to constitute sufficient evidence of breach of the duty of fair representation; at worst, it was negligence. See Black, 15 F.3d at 584 (As the Supreme Court has made abundantly clear, a plaintiff will not succeed if he can show only slightly unreasonable behavior on the part of the union....). The fact of the matter is that Garrison assumed primary responsibility for presenting his grievance before the NJSSC. In his capacity as chief presenter, he responded to and challenged Cassens's assertion that the thirty-day rule should defeat his claim. Before the committee, Garrison specifically argued that I did not believe the thirty (30)-day report rule ... is applicable, because you will find [that] in NMATA ... seniority shall not be broken except by discharge, voluntary quit, [or more than a seven (7)-year layoff]. Given that Neal had made the reasoned judgment not to research or prepare for what he believed was an inapplicable rule, we cannot see — and Garrison has not explained — what more Neal could have said or done before the committee other than repeat Garrison's interpretation of NMATA. Although Garrison is correct to assert that Neal would likely have more credibility than Garrison, any intervention by Neal would not have added much, if any, value to what was already argued by Garrison. Also, regardless of the arguments made at the hearing, the NJSSC panel was supplied copies of the prior arbitration decisions, and itself was able to assess the relevance of those decisions. 38 Without sufficient evidence that Local 327 breached its duty of fair representation, Garrison's hybrid § 301 action must fail. Accordingly, we need not address Cassens's alleged breach of the collective bargaining agreement, or the numerous other issues that Cassens has raised on appeal. Because we reverse the denial of Cassens's motion for judgment as a matter of law, we consider whether any grounds exist that might warrant a new trial. See Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 328-29, 87 S.Ct. 1072, 18 L.Ed.2d 75 (1967). Garrison did not request a new trial in his brief in the event we reversed the district court and has presented no reasons why a new trial should be ordered. Our review of record also convinces us that no such grounds exist. Therefore, we direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law for Cassens. See id. at 326, 87 S.Ct. 1072 (holding that an appellate court may in its discretion appropriately instruct the district court to enter judgment against a jury-verdict winner when further proceedings are unwarranted). Accordingly, the judgment below is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED to the district court for the entry of judgment as a matter of law for Cassens.