Opinion ID: 3009129
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim Against the United States

Text: ATC’s duties mainly derive from the ATCM, FAA Order 7110.65. See Rodriquez, 823 F.2d at 740; Remo, 852 F. Supp. at 368. As set forth in the ATCM, “[t]he primary purpose of the ATC system is to prevent a collision between aircraft operating in the system and to organize and expedite the flow of traffic.” ATCM § 2-1- 1., J.A. 811. ATC must also provide other services if “permitted by higher priority duties and other circumstances.” ATCM, § 2-1-1., J.A. 811. In addition, having assumed the responsibility of safely organizing the flow of air traffic, ATC owes a duty beyond those provided for in the ATCM to exercise reasonable care in performing that service. See, e.g., Zabala Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140, 1147-48 (1st Cir. 1977); Yates v. 2 In addition to their negligence claim, plaintiffs assert a contract claim against Agusta based on Agusta’s lease agreement with the City of Philadelphia. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that Agusta breached the provision of the lease requiring it to “observe and comply with all requirements of the constituted public authorities and with all federal, state, or local statutes, ordinances, regulations and standards applicable to [Agusta] or its use of the Premises,” including the FARs. See J.A. 1638. This claim, however, merely repackages plaintiffs’ negligence claim under a contract heading and therefore falls under Pennsylvania’s “gist of the action” doctrine that is designed to prevent such duplicative claims from arising under both tort and contract law. See Craig v. Amateur Softball Ass’n of Am., 951 A.2d 372, 377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (citing Reardon v. Allegheny Coll., 926 A.2d 477, 486-87 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)); Padalino v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. 2d 538, 549-50 (E.D. Pa. 2008). In any event, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that Agusta breached the lease agreement for the same reasons that they cannot show that Agusta violated any duty of care. United States, 497 F.2d 878, 883-84 (10th Cir. 1974); Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870, 873-74 (5th Cir. 1968); cf. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69, 76 S.Ct. 122, 126-27 (1955) (“[O]nce [the Coast Guard] exercised its discretion to operate a light on Chandeleur Island and engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light, it was obligated to use due care to make certain that the light was kept in good working order; and, if the light did become extinguished, then the Coast Guard was further obligated to use due care to discover this fact and to repair the light or give warning that it was not functioning.”). ATC breaches its duty of care if it gives a pilot deficient instructions upon which the pilot relies. See Rodriquez, 823 F.2d at 740; Yates, 497 F.2d at 883; Himmler, 474 F. Supp. at 928 (“Where, as here, a pilot places himself in the hands of the controller and thereafter follows the controller’s suggestions or instructions, the pilot is entitled to rely upon such information and directions and is not free or expected to disregard same.”). We will assume for purposes of this opinion that Richburg breached her duties as an air traffic controller by suddenly and urgently directing the Grumman to “make right traffic” after clearing the Agusta to depart in a potentially conflicting direction and without warning the Grumman pilots of the Agusta’s location. Nevertheless, “an admittedly negligent act does not necessarily entail liability; rather even when it is established that the defendant breached some duty of care owed the plaintiff, it is incumbent on a plaintiff to establish a causal connection between defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.” Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Pa. 1978); see Redhead, 686 F.2d at 182. In Pennsylvania, establishing such a causal connection requires demonstrating both but-for causation and proximate cause. Reott v. Asia Trend, Inc., 55 A.2d 1088, 1103 (Pa. 2012). We conclude that plaintiffs have not established a genuine question of fact on the issue of proximate causation. To prove proximate causation, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s breach was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm. See Powell v. Drumheller, 653 A.2d 619, 622 (Pa. 1995). The plaintiff may rest on circumstantial evidence of such proximate causation. See Harvilla v. Delcamp, 555 A.2d 763, 764 (Pa. 1989) (opinion announcing the judgment of the court); Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1285. But the plaintiff may not rely on speculation and conjecture. See Young v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Transp., 744 A.2d 1276, 1277 (Pa. 2000); Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1288 n.9 (“A mere possibility of . . . causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation and conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant.” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B cmt. a (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiffs’ theory of causation is that upon heeding Richburg’s instruction and turning the Grumman to the right, the sight of the Agusta startled Angelina and caused him to pull back reflexively on the yoke leading to the aircraft stalling. Plaintiffs point to Marks v. Mobil Oil Corp., 562 F. Supp. 759, 765-66 (E.D. Pa. 1983) aff’d, 727 F.2d 1100 (3d Cir. 1984), and Rich v. Finley, 89 N.E.2d 213, 215 (Mass. 1949), as showing that a defendant may be liable for causing another individual’s involuntary startle reaction that results in harm to the plaintiff. Unlike the plaintiffs in those cases, however, plaintiffs here did not provide reliable evidence that there actually was a startle reaction. Plaintiffs reason that the Agusta pilots’ surprise at seeing the Grumman turn right and their execution of a quick stop indicates that Angelina may have experienced a “similar response” upon seeing the Agusta. Appellants’ br. at 62. But the Agusta pilots’ conscious decision to execute a controlled deceleration maneuver offers inadequate support to find that Angelina experienced an unreasoned brain stem reflex that led him to yank back on the yoke and stall his aircraft. In these circumstances, plaintiffs only can surmise that Angelina had an involuntary startle response upon seeing the Agusta decelerating from an already slow speed, half a mile away. Even plaintiffs’ accident reconstruction expert Stimpson stated that “[t]here’s absolutely no way [he] could” say that the Gruman pilots even observed the Agusta while making the right turn to “a reasonable degree of certainty.” J.A. 1817. Such speculation regarding the cause of the crash is an insufficient basis for plaintiffs to avoid summary judgment.