Opinion ID: 547214
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: standard of review

Text: 15 At the outset, we must consider what material is appropriately before us. The district court dismissed the action against West but denominated the dispositive order as to Hafer as the grant of summary judgment for Hafer. We have previously held that the label used by a district court, albeit indicative,  'is not binding on a Court of Appeals.'  Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 443 (3d Cir.1977) (quoting Tuley v. Heyd, 482 F.2d 590, 593 (5th Cir.1973)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086, 98 S.Ct. 1280, 55 L.Ed.2d 791 (1978); see also Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 340 (3d Cir.1989). Rather, we must look to the course of the proceedings and basis for decision in the district court to determine our standard of review. Bogosian, 561 F.2d at 443. If the district court dismisses an action for failure to state a claim on the face of the pleadings on a motion for summary judgment, a motion so decided is functionally equivalent to a motion to dismiss and we must review it accordingly. Id. at 444; see also 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice p 56.02, at 56-33 to 56-34 (2d ed. 1988). 16 The plaintiffs contend that we should not consider any discovery materials extraneous to the complaint, as they did not have an opportunity to complete discovery and the district court in fact disposed of the actions based on the face of the complaint. Hafer and West, on the other hand, argue that the plaintiffs had an adequate time to conduct discovery and we should therefore determine whether they are entitled to summary judgment based on the factual record compiled during discovery. 17 Although the parties have engaged in some discovery and have submitted a variety of documents external to the complaints and their answers, we conclude that we must review the district court's action as one granting a motion to dismiss. The district court's memorandum opinion makes no reference to any of the materials submitted by the parties that were extraneous to the pleadings. It is clear that the court's action rested solely on the failure of the allegations on the face of the complaint to state claims against Hafer and West. See Bogosian, 561 F.2d at 444 (district court order should be treated as one dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim because it excluded everything but the complaint in granting the motions). 18 Furthermore, the district court's July 14, 1989 order deferred the filing of a joint discovery schedule and ordered Hafer to submit her motion for summary judgment by August 9, 1989. Although this order did not technically prohibit the parties from engaging in further discovery, it could reasonably have deterred further discovery by plaintiffs. Certainly the order demonstrates that the court was willing to consider the defendants' dispositive motions without a complete factual record developed during a defined discovery period. 19 The plaintiffs' objections to proceeding with summary judgment were called to the district court's attention by the Melo plaintiffs in their response to West's motion. They sought to comply with Rule 56(f) through the declaration by Melo 3 in which he stated that neither I nor the other plaintiffs would have personal knowledge of [West and Hafer's communications during the 1988 election] and requested that the court grant a continuance of discovery until counsel has had an opportunity to examine under oath the defendants, Mr. Bailey and all other persons who have knowledge of the matter. Melo App. at 111, 112. The district court's failure to rule on the Melo plaintiffs' request for a continuance of discovery, as well as its failure to rule on West's motion for a protective order, suggests that the court considered the discovery issue irrelevant for purposes of its decision. 20 Because we treat the district court's orders as granting a motion to dismiss, we must determine whether, in accepting as true the factual allegations in the Melo and Gurley plaintiffs' complaints and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, no relief can be granted under any set of facts which could be proved. See Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir.1988). For this purpose, we cannot take cognizance of the affidavits of Hafer and West denying many of the plaintiffs' factual allegations. B. Individual Capacity Claim Against Hafer 21 In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), the Supreme Court held that neither a state nor state officials sued in their official capacities for money damages are persons under section 1983, 4 and that therefore a suit brought in state court against the Michigan Director of State Police was barred. The district court, relying on Will, concluded that the plaintiffs have sued Hafer only in her official capacity and therefore dismissed their section 1983 claims. On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the district court erred as a matter of law. 22 The lines marking the boundaries between official and personal capacity suits have been drawn primarily in the context of Eleventh Amendment cases. That amendment has been interpreted to bar suits for monetary damages by private parties in federal court against a state or against state agencies. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3106 n. 14, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1355-56, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). 5 It also bars a suit against state officials in their official capacity, because the state is the real party in interest inasmuch as the plaintiff seeks recovery from the state treasury. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66, 105 S.Ct. at 3104-05. In a suit against state officials in their personal capacity, however, where the plaintiff seeks recovery from the personal assets of the individual, the state is not the real party in interest; the suit is therefore not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 165-68, 105 S.Ct. at 3104-07. 23 The Will Court's conclusion that section 1983 suits could not be brought against state officials in their official capacity followed from the Court's earlier Eleventh Amendment decisions. Although the Will Court did not have occasion to consider the status of personal capacity suits against state officials under section 1983, we conclude, borrowing the same Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence that the Will Court looked to, that because personal capacity suits against state officials are actions against the individual and not the state, state officials sued for damages in their personal capacities are persons under section 1983 and therefore subject to suit. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 567 n. 10 (1st Cir.1989). 24 In determining whether plaintiffs sued Hafer in her personal capacity, official capacity, or both, we first look to the complaints and the course of proceedings. Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. at 3106 n. 14 (quoting Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 469, 105 S.Ct. 873, 876, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985)); see Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 119 (3d Cir.1988). One of the Gurley complaints, which contains a request by six of the plaintiffs for both reinstatement and damages, explicitly specifies that plaintiffs' request for reinstatement is asserted against the defendant in her official capacity, but that their monetary claims against Hafer are asserted against the defendant in her personal capacity. 25 The Will opinion supports maintenance of a section 1983 claim against a state official for reinstatement. The Court, relying again on the Eleventh Amendment, stated that a State official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under Sec. 1983 because 'official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.'  Will, 109 S.Ct. at 2311 n. 10 (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. at 3106 n. 14). It follows that the district court erred insofar as it dismissed the Gurley plaintiffs' claim for reinstatement against Hafer. 6 26 As we noted above, these Gurley plaintiffs were explicit that their monetary claims were asserted against Hafer in her individual capacity. The remaining Gurley plaintiffs and the Melo plaintiffs, although not as explicit, signified a similar intent because the captions in the complaints only list Barbara Hafer, and not the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as a defendant, and only request damages from Hafer and not from the state. It appears that Hafer understood that plaintiffs sought to sue her in her personal capacity because she raised the defense of qualified immunity throughout the course of these proceedings, a defense available only for governmental officials when they are sued in their personal, and not in their official, capacity. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-67, 105 S.Ct. at 3105-06; Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 394 n. 8 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856, 109 S.Ct. 147, 102 L.Ed.2d 118 (1988); Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 727 n. 32 (10th Cir.), reh'g granted in part on other grounds, 888 F.2d 724 (10th Cir.1989); Lundgren v. McDaniel, 814 F.2d 600, 604 (11th Cir.1987). 7 Moreover, once plaintiffs explained in the district court that they sued Hafer for damages in her individual capacity, they should have been given leave to amend to so assert with specificity, if there was any remaining ambiguity about that issue. 27 The district court held that the plaintiffs only sued Hafer in her official capacity, notwithstanding their protestations to the contrary, because Hafer would not have been empowered to effectuate the removal of plaintiffs from their positions had she been acting in her personal capacity rather than in her role as Auditor General. However, the fact that Hafer's position as Auditor General cloaked her with the authority to fire the plaintiffs merely supports the undisputed proposition that she acted under color of state law in firing the plaintiffs, a prerequisite to a successful section 1983 suit. See Robb v. City of Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286, 290 (3d Cir.1984). 8 It does not follow that every time a public official acts under color of state law, the suit must of necessity be one against the official in his or her official capacity. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166, 105 S.Ct. at 3105 (to establish personal liability under section 1983 it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right) (emphasis added). 28 We reject Hafer's suggestion that a state official can be sued in her personal capacity only if the allegedly unconstitutional actions were not taken in her official capacity. The Supreme Court cases expressly recognize that individual capacity suits may be brought against government officials who acted under color of state law. See, e.g., Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 472-73, 105 S.Ct. 873, 878-79, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637-38, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1408-09, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980). In fact, underlying each of the cases considering the availability of a qualified immunity defense to a claim for damages against the state official was an individual capacity claim. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (suit by arrestee against state trooper); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984) (suit by employee against official of state highway department); Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 104 S.Ct. 2820, 81 L.Ed.2d 758 (1984) (suit by clients against public defenders who allegedly conspired with state officials); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 98 S.Ct. 855, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978) (suit by prisoner against state prison officials); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (suit by former prisoner against state prosecuting attorney). 29 Hafer argues that because she has final policymaking authority over hiring and firing in the Auditor General's Department, her actions leading to the firing of the plaintiffs, even if in violation of a just cause dismissal policy followed by previous Auditor Generals, constitutes a new state policy and therefore precludes suit against her in her personal capacity. The Second Circuit, in a persuasive opinion, has rejected a similar argument. 30 In Farid v. Smith, 850 F.2d 917 (2d Cir.1988), an inmate filed a civil rights action against the superintendent of the correctional facility for improperly depriving him of access to certain personal materials. The court held that although the Eleventh Amendment barred suit for damages against the superintendent in his official capacity, it did not bar the inmate from pursuing the action against the superintendent in his personal capacity, even if he was following state policy when committing such acts. Id. at 921. A fortiori, a state official who herself is responsible for an unconstitutional policy would be personally liable, unless of course she is ultimately successful in her qualified immunity claim. However, disposition on qualified immunity grounds is far different from a disposition on failure to state a claim, which is what the district court did here. 31 In short, we hold that a section 1983 claim for reinstatement may be maintained against Hafer in her official capacity, that a damage claim under section 1983 alleging civil rights violations may be maintained against Hafer in her individual capacity, that the allegations in the complaints adequately put her on notice of that claim, and that such a claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Just as the district court erred in dismissing the reinstatement claims because Hafer is a person for injunctive relief, so also the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' section 1983 damage claims against Hafer individually because she is a person in that capacity 9 . C. Sec. 1983 Conspiracy Claim Against West 32 The section 1983 claim against West asserted by the Melo plaintiffs stands on a different footing than the claim against Hafer. We must consider whether, under the allegations of the complaint, West, who was not a state official, can be viewed to have been acting under color of state law. Because the district court only considered the allegation that West and Hafer conspired to deprive the Melo plaintiffs of their constitutional rights as a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(3), 10 it did not reach this issue. A fair reading of the complaint shows that plaintiffs seek to assert a section 1983 claim, and West does not contend otherwise. 33 Maintenance of a section 1983 claim requires a showing that the defendant acted under color of state law, but the Supreme Court has held that private parties acting in a conspiracy with a state official to deprive others of constitutional rights are also acting under color of state law. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 186-87, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1605, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1156, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966). 11 Consequently, such private parties can be subject to liability under section 1983. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152, 90 S.Ct. at 1605. It follows that federal employees who conspire with state officials to violate someone's constitutional rights are treated as acting under color of state law. See Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 623 (7th Cir.1979), rev'd in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980). 12 34 The Melo complaint alleges that West transmitted the jobs bought list to Hafer when she was a candidate with a knowledge, understanding and expectation that he would be creating a campaign issue favorable to Ms. Hafer and that Ms. Hafer, if elected, would fire all the people on the list. Melo App. at 13. Assuming arguendo that the alleged working relationship between Hafer and West during the fall 1988 campaign constitutes concerted or joint action sufficient to transmute West, a private actor, into one acting under color of state law, see Robb v. City of Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286, 291-92 (3d Cir.1984); Cruz v. Donnelly, 727 F.2d 79, 82 (3d Cir.1984), it is insufficient in this case because Hafer was not a state actor at the time of the alleged concerted and conspiratorial conduct. 13 We note that the complaint does not allege that Hafer and West conspired at any time after Hafer took office. 35 It is true that conspirators can be held liable for subsequent acts taken pursuant to a conspiracy, see Hampton, 600 F.2d at 621, and that the Melo plaintiffs have alleged that their firing after Hafer became a state official was in the course of, in furtherance of and was the culmination of the aforesaid conspiracy. Melo App. at 18. However adequate these allegations might be, if proven, to impose liability under civil conspiracy law generally for acts subsequent to the formation of the conspiracy, they do not supply the missing link of action under color of state law. 36 When a private party has been held to be acting under color of state law, it has always been because of action in conjunction with an official who was then a state actor. See, e.g., Adickes, 398 U.S. at 149-52, 90 S.Ct. at 1603-06; Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941-42, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2755-56, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982); United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge, 865 F.2d 1539, 1546-47 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 51, 107 L.Ed.2d 20 (1989); Robb, 733 F.2d at 291-92. It is the presence of that state actor that clothes the private party with the under color of state law vestment. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152, 90 S.Ct. at 1605 ( 'Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action, are acting under color of law for purposes of the statute.' ) (quoting Price, 383 U.S. at 794, 86 S.Ct. at 1156 (1966)) (emphasis added); Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941, 102 S.Ct. at 2756 (private party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party as a 'state actor' for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment) (emphasis added). When neither of the parties who allegedly conspired is a state official, there is no state actor to supply even a colorable basis for investing the private actor with a state mantle, even if one of the parties later becomes a state official. Plaintiffs have cited no case for such a proposition, and we see no reason to stretch the law so far. It follows that the Melo complaint failed to state a section 1983 claim against West, and the court did not err in dismissing that claim. D. State Law Claims 37 We turn finally to the dismissal of the state law claims. While the Melo action against West containing both federal and state law claims was pending in the district court, the government filed a scope of employment certification and motion to substitute itself for West. In doing so, the government followed the procedure established by the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (FELRTCA), which amended the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1988). 38 FELRTCA was passed in response to Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 108 S.Ct. 580, 98 L.Ed.2d 619 (1988), which held that a federal employee is immune only if s/he was acting within his/her scope of employment and was exercising governmental discretion. The primary purpose of FELRTCA was to return Federal employees to the status they held prior to the Westfall decision, that is, a status of absolute immunity for activities within their scope of employment. See H.R.Rep. No. 100-700, 100th Cong., 2d sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5945, 5947 [hereinafter H.R.Rep. No. 100-700]. To accomplish that mission, FELRTCA established an exclusive remedy against the United States for suits based on certain negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2679(b)(1) (1988), and also added a statutory procedure for certification by the Attorney General to effect a substitution of the United States for its employees in cases pending in federal courts. The relevant provision states that: 39 [u]pon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a United States district court shall be deemed an action against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant. 40 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2679(d)(1) (1988). 41 The district court granted the United States' motion for substitution, explaining that because the government certified that West had acted within the scope of his employment, 14 the substitution of the government for West was necessitated. The court then granted the United States' motion to dismiss the state law claims of defamation and contractual interference because the FTCA's waiver of tort immunity for damages caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the federal government where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b) (1988), does not apply to [a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(h) (1988). 42 Although the district court stated that plaintiffs do not contest that West was acting within the scope of his employment when he allegedly performed the acts complained of, plaintiffs do in fact contest the accuracy of the scope of employment certification. We must thus consider whether the government's certification under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2679(d)(1) 15 is binding for purposes of substitution of the government, as the government argued in the district court and the district court held, or whether such a certification is subject to judicial review. The courts have divided on this issue. Compare Nasuti v. Scannell, 906 F.2d 802, 813 (1st Cir.1990) (judicial review of scope certification permitted); Arbour v. Jenkins, 903 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.1990) (same); Gogek v. Brown University, 729 F.Supp. 926, 933 (D.R.I.1990) (same); Baggio v. Lombardi, 726 F.Supp. 922, 925 (E.D.N.Y.1989); Martin v. Merriday, 706 F.Supp. 42, 44-45 (N.D.Ga.1989) (same); with S.J. and W. Ranch, Inc. v. Lehtinen, 717 F.Supp. 824, 826-27 (S.D.Fla.1989) (no judicial review of scope certification); Mitchell v. United States, 709 F.Supp. 767, 768 & n. 4 (W.D.Tex.1989) (same), rev'd on other ground, 896 F.2d 128 (5th Cir.1990); 16 see also Mitchell v. Carlson, 896 F.2d 128, 134, 136 (5th Cir.1990) (suggesting no judicial review of scope certification); Aviles v. Lutz, 887 F.2d 1046, 1049 (10th Cir.1989) (same). 43 While this case was on appeal, the United States changed its position on this issue. The government now states that although the government's determination is entitled to deference, the district court may review the Attorney General's certification that the challenged acts occurred within the scope of employment of a federal official. 17 In light of the division among the courts on this issue, we will analyze the issue de novo before establishing this court's position. 44 We must first look to the language of the statute, see United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606, 106 S.Ct. 3116, 3121, 92 L.Ed.2d 483 (1986), and in particular to the distinction in the language between sections 2679(d)(1), governing certifications in cases filed initially in federal court, and section 2679(d)(2), authorizing the Attorney General to provide certifications for the purpose of removing actions filed in state court to federal court. 18 The last sentence of section 2679(d)(2) specifically provides that [t]his certification of the Attorney General shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2679(d)(2) (emphasis added). There is no similar language of conclusiveness in section 2679(d)(1). Also, the explicit statement that the binding character of certification applies only for purposes of removal suggests that Congress recognized a distinction between use of the certification for removal and its use for purposes of substitution of the government as the defendant in actions filed in federal court. See Nasuti, 906 F.2d at 812-813. 45 There are significant policy reasons why Congress would choose to give the government an unchallengeable right to have a federal forum for tort suits brought against its employees. Historically, the government has generally preferred to have litigation which it or its employees are defending in the neutral confines of federal courts. For example, a similarly absolute right of removal is provided by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1442(a)(1) whenever a suit against a United States officer is filed in a state court for any act under color of [federal] office because, as the Supreme Court has explained, Congress has decided that federal officers, and indeed the Federal Government itself, require the protection of a federal forum. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407, 89 S.Ct. 1813, 1816, 23 L.Ed.2d 396 (1969). 46 There is no suggestion in FELRTCA that once the federal forum has been secured, Congress was inclined to make the Attorney General's right to substitute the government for the employee unreviewable. In fact, Congress acknowledged the propriety of having a federal court review the scope of employment issue when the positions of the federal employee and the government conflict. Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2679(d)(3) (1988), [i]n the event that the Attorney General has refused to certify scope of office or employment under this section, the employee may at any time before trial petition the court to find and certify that the employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment. The same provision insures a federal forum for such a judicial determination. 19 There is no reason why Congress would have provided employees with judicial review of the scope of employment certification decisions while denying a similar review of certification decisions to dissatisfied plaintiffs. 47 The legislative history of the Act also supports our reading of FELRTCA. In discussing the exclusivity issue, the House Report noted that the Federal Drivers Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2679(b)-(e) (1982) (subsequently amended in 1988), one of the components of the FTCA, provided an exclusive federal remedy when the injuries resulted from the operation of a motor vehicle by a federal employee acting within the scope of his employment. See H.R. 100-700, 1988 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 5948. The Drivers Act contained a provision for a scope of employment certification by the Attorney General for purposes of removal to federal court. Although it did not set forth any scope of employment certification procedures for actions filed in federal court, federal courts routinely made a determination as to whether the employee was acting within his or her scope of employment before ruling whether the action could be maintained against the government exclusively. See, e.g., Cronin v. Hertz Corp., 818 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir.1987); Borrego v. United States, 790 F.2d 5 (1st Cir.1986); Levin v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 770 (D.C.Cir.1972). 48 The extensive discussion in the House Report on the factors relevant to whether an act was within the employee's scope of employment, see H.R.Rep. No. 100-700, 1988 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 5949-50, suggests that Congress intended that the practice of court determination of the issue should be continued. Representative Frank, the sponsor of the Act, confirmed that FELRTCA was meant to ensure continuity, rather than a break, with past practice when he stated at a legislative hearing that the plaintiff would still have the right to contest the certification if they [sic] thought the Attorney General were certifying without justification. Legislation to Amend the Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 60, 128 (April 14, 1988) (statement of Representative Frank). 49 Based on the language, structure, and legislative history of FELRTCA, we thus independently conclude that the district court may review the government's certification that the actions which the Melo plaintiffs allege that West took were within the scope of his employment. 50 It is therefore evident that we must vacate the district court's dismissal of the state law claims. The dismissals were predicated on the government's status as a defendant, which in turn is dependent on whether West was acting in the scope of employment. On remand, the parties will have an opportunity to address that issue. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b) (scope of employment determination under the FTCA to be made in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred); see also Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857, 76 S.Ct. 100, 100 L.Ed. 761 (1955) (per curiam). The district court will also have to decide which factors are relevant to that determination. The briefs of the parties have not discussed that issue. 20 IV.