Opinion ID: 150460
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Abraham Carrillo–Morones

Text: Carrillo presents eight issues for review: (1) whether the district court erred by denying his motion to sever the trials; (2) whether the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress certain evidence related to currency seized by the Government; (3) whether the prosecutor’s improper question prejudiced his right to a fair trial; (4) whether the district court erred by failing to strike the testimony of Humberto Nunez–Padilla (Nunez) testimony without proper explanation to the jury; (5) whether the district court erred in admitting an evidentiary summary and organizational chart as evidence; (6) whether the district court erred in dealing with a prosecutor’s statement that may have improperly addressed his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent; (7) whether sufficient evidence supported his jury conviction; and (8) whether the district court erred at sentencing. We address each in turn. 1. Whether the district court erred by denying Carrillo’s motion to sever the trials. Carrillo first argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to sever his trial from Hidalgo and Romero’s trial, contending that he did not participate in the same conspiracy and that he was prejudiced by the evidence presented against Hidalgo and Romero. We find no error in the district court’s denial of severance. 10 Case: 08-51161 Document: 00511169784 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/12/2010 Nos. 08-51161, 08-51162, 08-51191 “We review a grant or denial of severance for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Lewis, 476 F.3d 369, 383 (5th Cir. 2007). “There is a preference in the federal system for joint trials of defendants who are indicted together, particularly in conspiracy cases.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “To prevail, the defendant must show that: (1) the joint trial prejudiced him to such an extent that the district court could not provide adequate protection; and (2) the prejudice outweighed the government's interest in economy of judicial administration.” United States v. Peterson, 244 F.3d 385, 393 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted). We find no error in the joinder of the defendants here. The Government alleged that each defendant was part of a larger conspiracy, charging overlapping activity in furtherance of that conspiracy. At trial, the Government presented testimony from several witnesses showing that each defendant worked with the same individuals to transport drugs from El Paso and to return with drug money. “In this situation joinder of both offenses for trial fulfills the purpose underlying the rule because it avoids duplication of time and effort of both the prosecution and the courts and minimizes the prejudice to the defendants.” United States v. Gentile, 495 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 1974). Further, we are not persuaded that Carrillo has shown the requisite “clear, specific, and compelling prejudice” so as to require severance. United States v. Posada–Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 863 (5th Cir. 1998). “A spillover effect, by itself, is an insufficient predicate for a motion to sever.” United States v. Bieganowski, 313 F.3d 264, 287 (5th Cir. 2002). Moreover, the large quantity or drugs discovered when Hidalgo and Romero was arrested, which Carrillo claims prejudiced his trial, is not the type of evidence we have found to be prejudicial to co-defendants. See, e.g., Posada–Rios, 158 F.3d at 863 (5th Cir. 1998) (determining that evidence of “gruesome murders” committed by co-conspirators did not prejudice co-defendants so as to require severance and noting that “while 11 Case: 08-51161 Document: 00511169784 Page: 12 Date Filed: 07/12/2010 Nos. 08-51161, 08-51162, 08-51191 the district court must guard against undue prejudice, it need not protect conspirators from evidence of their confederates’ acts in furtherance of their common illegal aim.”) (alterations and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the district court gave numerous instructions to the jury, which mitigated any prejudice. See Harper, 527 F.3d at 402. In sum, we discern no error on this issue. 2. Whether the district court erred by denying Carrillo’s motion to suppress certain evidence related to currency seized by the Government. Carrillo argues that the district court should have suppressed evidence related to currency seized on June 4, 2007. Carrillo filed a motion in limine to exclude this evidence, claiming that the Government averred that it would make the seized currency available to him for inspection, but instead disposed of the currency. Carrillo contends that the failure to produce this evidence deprived him of the ability to present exculpatory evidence of a lack of fingerprints on this currency. We find no error in the district court’s decision.5 The Government is required “to disclose to criminal defendants favorable evidence, material to guilt or punishment.” United States v. Moore, 452 F.3d 382, 387 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). “[I]mpermissibly withheld evidence must be either (1) material and exculpatory or (2) only potentially useful, in combination with a showing of bad faith on the part of the government.” Id. Here, we are unpersuaded that the currency evidence “destroyed” by the Government was material. Carrillo could have cross-examined the officers to 5 Generally, an evidentiary ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion, but where an appellant fails to renew an objection made by motion in limine before the disputed evidence was introduced at trial, review is for plain error. See United States v. Duffaut, 314 F.3d 203, 209 (5th Cir. 2002). It is undisputed that Carrillo did not re-raise this motion when the currency evidence was introduced at trial, but the district court did state, at the hearing on the motion in limine, that the error was “preserved.” Thus, we assume, arguendo, that Carrillo sufficiently preserved error on this issue, and we review the district court’s suppression decision for abuse of discretion. Finding no abuse of discretion, we necessarily find that there was also no “plain error” in the district court’s decision. 12 Case: 08-51161 Document: 00511169784 Page: 13 Date Filed: 07/12/2010 Nos. 08-51161, 08-51162, 08-51191 ask if they removed any latent prints related to him. Admission by the agents that no fingerprints were present would likely have mirrored the exculpatory value of Carrillo’s having actually tested the money for prints himself. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 490 (1984) (noting that defendant could cross-examine officer administering breathalyzer to suss out exculpatory evidence). Indeed, it is not clear that not finding fingerprints on money is exculpatory evidence itself: money, by its nature, is touched by numerous persons in transactions and the savvy criminal knows to conceal his fingerprints. Cf. id. (noting the low probability of finding exculpatory evidence). Moreover, as opposed to other failure to preserve cases, the Government sought to introduce the currency evidence to show generally that currency of a certain amount was transported, not that Carrillo himself touched the dollars: the Government did not introduce evidence of the attributes of this currency. Cf. United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432, 1437–38 (9th Cir. 1986) (following Trombetta, failure to preserve currency that canine detected cocaine on did not require suppression of evidence of canine cocaine detection). Further, even if the evidence was “potentially useful,” Carrillo has not shown any bad faith on the Government’s behalf. See Moore, 452 F.3d at 387. Carrillo does not contend that the Government followed improper procedures in transforming the seized funds into a cashiers check. As such, there is no bad faith here. See id. at 388–89 (“[E]vidence . . . destroyed pursuant to standard procedure . . . did not constitute a constitutional violation . . . . [The Government] did not destroy the [evidence] in bad faith.”). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Carrillo’s motion to exclude evidence of the seized currency. 3. Whether the prosecutor’s improper question prejudiced Carrillo’s right to a fair trial. 13 Case: 08-51161 Document: 00511169784 Page: 14 Date Filed: 07/12/2010 Nos. 08-51161, 08-51162, 08-51191 Carrillo next argues that the Government asked an improper question while examining an agent at trial. Specifically, the Government asked a federal agent whether “there are ongoing investigations still that relate to this case.” Carillo’s counsel objected to this question, and the district court sustained the objection before the agent could answer. However, the court denied Carillo’s subsequent motion to strike the question. Carillo contends on appeal that the question was unduly prejudicial to his right to a fair trial. We are unpersuaded. “In evaluating the extent to which prosecutorial comments have affected the defendant’s right to a fair trial, three factors are probative: the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the remarks, the efficacy of any cautionary instruction, and the strength of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” United States v. Diaz–Carreon, 915 F.2d 951, 956 (5th Cir. 1990). Here, the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s remark is small because it does not necessarily suggest that Carrillo or his co-defendants were facing further charges. See id. at 956–57 (“When the prosecutor’s argument is considered in context, however, it is apparent that the prejudicial effect of the questionable comments is limited.”). Second, the defense counsel’s timely objection mitigated any prejudice from the prosecutor’s statement. See id. at 958. Finally, the prosecutor’s question, within the volumes of transcript and evidence in the case, hardly suggests unfairness. Cf. id. at 959 (finding no reversible error even where the prosecutor “repeated[ly]” reli[ed] on sarcasm, innuendo or misstatement.”). We find no reversible error on this issue. 4. Whether the district court erred in its decisions concerning Nunez’s testimony. Carrillo next urges that the district court improperly dealt with Nunez’s testimony. Nunez testified concerning both a March 2007 and a May 2007 drug and money load, indicating that Carrillo participated in these shipments. Specifically at issue here, Nunez testified about a drug transaction occurring on 14 Case: 08-51161 Document: 00511169784 Page: 15 Date Filed: 07/12/2010 Nos. 08-51161, 08-51162, 08-51191 May 29, 2007, at a carwash. At trial, Carrillo raised numerous objections to Nunez’s testimony. Ultimately, the court struck Nunez’s testimony “[a]s it relates to the exchange that took place at the carwash on May 29 . . . which the witness did not have personal knowledge and did not view.” Carrillo now argues that the district court’s strike of this testimony “was too little too late,” claiming that initially allowing this testimony substantially prejudiced his trial. We find no merit in this argument. Admission of testimony is an “evidentiary ruling [which we review] for abuse of discretion . . . subject to the harmless error rule.” United States v. Dunigan, 555 F.3d 501, 507 (5th Cir. 2009). Here, we find no effect on Carrillo’s substantial rights both because other witnesses later testified to the same events as Nunez, suggesting that Nunez’s testimony was not prejudicial, and because the district court did strike the questionable portions of Nunez’s testimony, with instructions to the jury to disregard it. As stated above, the jury is presumed to follow such instructions. See Harper, 527 F.3d at 402. In short, Carrillo does not show reversible error on this issue. 5. Whether the district court erred in admitting a “phone chart” into evidence. At trial, the Government sought to introduce a “phone chart” indicating certain facts about the conspiracy. After a federal agent laid the foundation for introducing this evidence, Carrillo objected, arguing that the evidence was not admissible, though admitting that the chart might be proper as a “demonstrative exhibit.” The district court overruled the objection, admitting the chart under Rule 611 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Carrillo claims that the admission of the chart into evidence was error, given that it summarized information already admitted, and that the chart’s portrayal of him at the “center” of the conspiracy prejudiced his rights. We find no reversible error. The district court’s admission of a summary chart is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Winn, 948 F.2d 145, 157 (5th Cir. 1991). “If the 15 Case: 08-51161 Document: 00511169784 Page: 16 Date Filed: 07/12/2010 Nos. 08-51161, 08-51162, 08-51191 court errs in its evidentiary ruling, the error can be excused if it was harmless. In applying this rule, we have stated: A nonconstitutional trial error is harmless unless it had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Buck, 324 F.3d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). We assume, arguendo, that admission of the chart into evidence was error because the Government admits the chart summarized information previously admitted into evidence. See id. at 790–91 (detailing the interplay of Rules 611 and 1006 and discussing the proper admission of charts and exhibits under each rule). However, we think any error harmless. The chart accurately summarized records previously admitted, and the claimed “implication” of the chart is not sufficient to warrant reversal. See id. at 791 (“Despite the fact that it was an error of law, and therefore an abuse of discretion, to admit the diagram, it was harmless, because the diagram accurately summarized testimony and other evidence that had been properly admitted and therefore was already before the jury.”); id. (determining that even though defendant “rest[ed] on the argument that [the chart wa]s misleading because it implie[d a greater role in the crime]” the defendant’s ability to cross-examine witnesses and examine evidence supporting the chart was sufficient to protect against any improper implications of the chart). We find no reversible error on this issue. 6. Whether the district court erred regarding the prosecutor’s statement which may have improperly addressed the defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights. Carrillo also points to error concerning the following statement during the Government’s closing statement rebuttal: “And you know something that neither of these guys can explain to you, and they haven’t explained to you, is what happens when they get to . . .” Defense counsel for Hidalgo and Romero objected to this statement and the court sustained the objection and struck the statement, ordering the jury to disregard it. Defense counsel then moved for a 16 Case: 08-51161 Document: 00511169784 Page: 17 Date Filed: 07/12/2010 Nos. 08-51161, 08-51162, 08-51191 mistrial, but the court denied that motion, without giving further curative instructions or admonitions. Carrillo now argues that the character of the remark was such that the jury would construe it as a comment on his silence, and that the statement “had substantial impact on the jury verdict.” We disagree. “The Fifth Amendment prohibits a prosecutor from commenting directly or indirectly on a defendant’s failure to testify.” United States v. Mackay, 33 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 1994). “This protection extends to oblique comments on a defendant’s failure to testify, if sufficiently suggestive.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “The test for determining whether a prosecutor’s remarks constitute a comment on a defendant’s silence is a twofold alternative one: (1) whether the prosecutor’s manifest intent was to comment on the defendant’s silence or (2) whether the character of the remark was such that the jury would naturally and necessarily construe it as a comment on the defendant’s silence.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “Both the intent of the prosecutor and the character of the remarks are to be determined by reviewing the context in which they occurred.” Id. Here, we are not persuaded that the prosecutor’s statement was a comment on the defendants’ silence. First, the prosecutor discussed two testifying witnesses statements right before he made the challenged statement. As such, the “these guys” in the challenged statement could also have referred to the testifying witnesses, not the defendants. See id. at 495 (“Placed in context, the prosecutor’s comments do not manifest an intent to comment on [the defendant]’s failure to testify . . . . The sentences immediately preceding the highlighted comments clarify the antecedent of ‘that’ and ‘that testimony.’”). Further, as the statement came in a closing statement rebuttal, we do not think the jury would necessarily construe the comment as concerning the defendants’ silence, instead seeing the statement as commenting on the unpersuasiveness 17 Case: 08-51161 Document: 00511169784 Page: 18 Date Filed: 07/12/2010 Nos. 08-51161, 08-51162, 08-51191 of the defendant’s closing argument. Cf. id. at 496 (“Read in context, the prosecutor’s remarks simply argue to the jury that the defense failed to produce evidence [supporting its theory]. It is not error to comment on the defendant’s failure to produce evidence on a phase of the defense upon which he seeks to rely.” (quotation marks omitted)); accord United States v. Green, 324 F.3d 375, 382 (5th Cir. 2003) (prosecutor did not reference the defendant’s failure to testify where the statement was made in response to a comment made by the defense). We find no reversible error on this issue. 7. Whether sufficient evidence supported Carrillo’s conviction. Like Hidalgo and Romero, Carrillo argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction, claiming a number of deficiencies. We disagree. We ask “whether the evidence is sufficient by viewing the evidence and the inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict and determining whether a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.” Valdez, 453 F.3d at 256 (quotation marks omitted). “It is not necessary that the evidence exclude every rational hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except guilt, provided a reasonable trier of fact could find the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Carrillo’s arguments challenging the credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony are unpersuasive. See Casillas, 20 F.3d at 602. Carrillo’s arguments concerning spillover are likewise unpersuasive. See Lewis, 476 F.3d at 384. Further, Carrillo’s argument that little direct evidence shows his knowledge of drugs or the other elements charged in the conspiracy also fails to persuade. See United States v. Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 155 (5th Cir. 1998). The testimony presented showed that Carrillo participated in several drug transactions by both transporting contraband and aiding in the logistical 18 Case: 08-51161 Document: 00511169784 Page: 19 Date Filed: 07/12/2010 Nos. 08-51161, 08-51162, 08-51191 aspects of several drug and money runs. This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, could lead a rational jury to conclude that the Government sufficiently proved all elements of the charged crimes. See Valdez, 453 F.3d at 256. In sum, sufficient evidence supports Carrillo’s conviction. 8. Whether the district court erred at sentencing. Finally, Carrillo challenges his sentence, arguing that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the district court’s determination of facts at sentencing and that his sentence was generally unreasonable. Carrillo’s Sixth Amendment arguments concerning the court’s determination of drug quantities for sentencing are foreclosed. See United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The sentencing judge is entitled to find by a preponderance of the evidence all the facts relevant to the determination of a Guidelines sentencing range . . . .”); accord United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 2006) (extending Mares to drug quantities). Further, because Carrillo was sentenced within the Guidelines, we cannot say that his sentence was “unreasonable.” See Mares, 402 F.3d at 519 (“If the sentencing judge exercises her discretion to impose a sentence within a properly calculated Guideline range, in our reasonableness review we will infer that the judge has considered all the factors for a fair sentence set forth in the Guidelines.”). Carrillo’s arguments do not convince us that the district court’s factual findings were erroneous or that his within guidelines sentence was unreasonable. We find no error in Carrillo’s sentence.