Opinion ID: 76818
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Second Issue

Text: 24 Grant claims that the district court erred in finding that Section 5G1.1(b) applied upon remand. Citing no authority, he claims that it does not apply to cases in which the defendant has already been granted a downward departure from the statutory minimum. 25 Where ordinarily, Grant claims, Section 5G1.1(b) trumps the otherwise applicable guidelines range of Section 2D1.1(c), substituting the statutory minimum of ten years, it does not apply on remand once a defendant has already earned a downward departure under Section 3553(e) and Section 5K1.1. Grant concedes that he is surprised to find no decisional law squarely addressing this issue.
26 In rebuttal of Grant's argument that he has a vested right to have no statutory mandatory minimum sentence be applied on remand, the government cites United States v. Stinson, 97 F.3d 466 (11th Cir.1996). Stinson holds that an original sentence is wiped away by a vacatur, leaving the district court with a clean slate upon which to write at a defendant's re-sentencing. Id. at 469. 27 The government does concede that Grant had the right to have a Section 5K1.1 motion filed on his behalf at re-sentencing. One was filed. In response, the district court halved Grant's original sentence of 108 months to 54 months. 28