Opinion ID: 200425
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Admission of Evidence of Unreported Freelance Income as Other Bad Act Evidence

Text: 27 At trial, the government, without objection, cross-examined Boulerice concerning her failure to report freelance income to the IRS after 1992. Boulerice now claims that this extrinsic evidence, as she describes it, 5 was highly prejudicial other bad act evidence offered to show criminal propensity without serving another legitimate purpose, in violation of Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403. 6 28 The government responds with a number of theories of admissibility. We need not dwell at length on any of them, however, for two reasons. First, since Boulerice failed to object below, we review only for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); United States v. Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674, 684 n. 11 (1st Cir.2000). Under this standard, we will disregard the purported error unless a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result, or if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Second, the government had already introduced evidence of Boulerice's unreported freelance income, without objection, during its case-in-chief, precluding any argument that this cross-examination affected Boulerice's substantial rights. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). 29 Among the witnesses called by the government was Marvin Kennedy, the AIC accountant who assisted with the preparation of Boulerice's 1991 and 1992 tax returns and who testified that Boulerice had provided him with receipts for freelance income which he included on her returns for those years. Thereafter, the government elicited testimony from Michael Barret, the AIC accountant who assisted with the preparation of Boulerice's 1993 and 1994 tax returns, that Boulerice did not claim any freelance income during those two years. When the government asked Barret if he would have included freelance income had Boulerice provided documentation of any, Boulerice objected to the question as calls for speculation. 7 The objection was overruled. Subsequently, the government — without objection from Boulerice — introduced evidence of paid freelance work performed by Boulerice in 1993 and 1994 through, among other things, the testimony of Boulerice's employers. 30 When Boulerice took the stand, the government first cross-examined her about her knowledge of her responsibilities under the tax code: 31 Q: And you know what wages are, for example? You know what that is, don't you? 32 A: What you make. 33 Q: And it's what you make when you work, correct? 34 A: Correct. 35 Q: And you knew that wages have to be reported accurately to the Internal Revenue Service, isn't that correct? 36 A: Yes. 37 . . . . 38 Q: You knew you had to report the figure on the income tax return accurately and truthfully and correctly, isn't that correct? 39 A: Yes. 40 Boulerice then testified that she had assisted her accountant in the preparation of her tax returns: 41 Q: And you recall that you would send him information to assist him in reporting accurately all your income; do you recall doing that? 42 A: I believe I did. 43 At this point the government began to cross-examine Boulerice about her various freelance jobs, the income she received from those jobs, and her failure to report that income on her tax returns. Under this questioning, Boulerice admitted to having failed to report significant freelance income on her tax returns. 44 Boulerice contests on appeal only this cross-examination and not the evidence of her unreported freelance income admitted during the government's case-in-chief. Hence we need not address the government's theories regarding the propriety of the cross-examination. Since the jury had already heard evidence of Boulerice's unreported freelance income without objection, Boulerice cannot be heard to complain that her cross-examination regarding the same was unfairly prejudicial. See United States v. Perrotta, 289 F.3d 155, 165 (1st Cir.2002); Doty v. Sewall, 908 F.2d 1053, 1057 (1st Cir.1990); Lacy v. Gardino, 791 F.2d 980, 986 (1st Cir.1986). Thus, we conclude that the district court did not plainly err in indulging the cross-examination.