Opinion ID: 1686118
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the trial court err in awarding custody to barry g.?

Text: Appellants raise three distinct claims under this assignment of error. First, they argue that the youth court failed to follow the statutory scheme requiring a separate adjudication and disposition hearing. Second, they allege the court applied an improper burden of proof. Last, they contend that the court erred in not finding Barry G. to be an unfit parent. There is considerable confusion as to whether the second hearing on April 26, 1984, concerned both the general neglect charge and the contempt charge. At the outset, the state sought to consolidate the two charges, but the youth court judge indicated it would entertain the contempt charge only. At the conclusion of the hearing, the state indicated that it had presented its case as to both neglect and contempt. The state offered to put on its case as to disposition and placement, but the court postponed that until the third hearing. Thus, the hearing was nominally limited to the contempt charge but in substance dealt with the charges raised in the neglect petition. The same statute at issue in the first assignment of error, Mississippi Code Annotated § 43-21-557 (1)(d), provides that at the beginning of each adjudicatory hearing the youth court shall explain to the parties the purpose of the hearing and the possible dispositional alternatives thereof. The youth court at the outset of the third hearing indicated that the contempt charge, not the adjudication of neglect, was to be the subject of the hearing. But, at the conclusion of the hearing, the youth court's ruling implies that it had ruled as to the merits of the general neglect charge. It requested the prompt filing of a petition to modify the placement of the child and deferred until a later date a hearing on the disposition and placement of I.G. Mississippi Code Annotated § 43-21-601 (1972) concerns the scheduling of a disposition hearing. Subsection 1 provides that if a court finds that a child is a neglected child, it shall set a time and place for a disposition hearing which shall be separate, distinct, and subsequent to the adjudicatory hearing. The statute goes on to provide that the disposition hearing may be held immediately following the adjudicatory hearing unless a continuance is necessary for the parties to prepare for the proceedings. In In Interest of J.E.J., 419 So.2d 1032 (Miss. 1982), this court was confronted with a youth court's failure to follow the statutes requiring a separate dispositional hearing. The youth court in this case combined the adjudicatory and disposition hearing into one continuous procedure. This Court, per Justice R.N. Lee, reversed on the ground that the statute requires a separate, distinct disposition hearing. The Court noted that this could have been accomplished by a 15-minute adjournment between the adjudication and disposition hearings. Having not followed the express requirement of the statute, this Court reversed and remanded for a disposition hearing. Id. at 1034. In the case sub judice, it would appear that the adjudication and contempt hearings were combined, not the adjudication and disposition hearings. The disposition hearing was held about two weeks after the adjudication/contempt hearing, so the precise factual situation of Interest of J.E.J. is not present. But insofar as Interest of J.E.J. stands for a strict application of the mandates of the Youth Court Act, this Court concludes that the failure of the youth court to inform the appellants at the outset that the second hearing was on adjudication of the general neglect charges, as required by § 43-21-557(1)(d), is reversible error. Much of the same evidence was used to adjudicate the appellants in contempt and to adjudicate their child to be neglected. The appellants were entitled to know for what purpose the evidence was being offered. There is no merit to appellants' contention that the burden of proof should be clear and convincing evidence in the proceedings sub judice. Mississippi Code Annotated § 43-21-561(3) (1972) dictates the burden of proof of preponderance of the evidence in a neglect adjudication. As noted by the state, there are a number of statutory schemes to monitor the temporary placement with the youth court returning the child to its original home if possible. See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-613(2)(3) (1972). There is no merit to the final point raised by the appellants that the court erred in awarding temporary custody to Barry G. because he is an unfit father. The third hearing produced unsubstantiated allegations that Barry G. was unfit, charges which he denied. The youth court, as trier of fact, was presented with conflicting testimony. Ordinarily this Court will not reverse a trier of fact unless it can be said with confidence that the factfinder was manifestly wrong. Here the finder of fact was confronted with nothing more than the conflicting testimony of the opposing parties and their relatives, and therefore we cannot conclude with confidence that the youth court judge was manifestly wrong as the credibility of witnesses is a matter ordinarily for the trier of fact to determine. However, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the case must be reversed and remanded to the Youth Court Division of the County Court of Hinds County for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion and the statutory law. This necessitates reversal of the order of disposition and, therefore, I.G. is returned to the custody of the appellants pending further proceedings consistent with this decision. REVERSED AND REMANDED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.