Opinion ID: 2994142
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: comes into play only on a finding of

Text: scienter; (2) operates to promote the traditional aims of punishment; (3) applies to conduct that is already a crime; (4) is not assignable to an alternative purpose to which it may be rationally connected; and (5) seems to be excessive in relation to any rational purpose that may be assigned to it. While we agree that the sanction of Section 862a comes into play only a finding of scienter, operates to promote the traditional aims of punishment, and applies to conduct that is already a crime, we do not agree that the other two factors cited by the plaintiffs- appellants indicate a criminally punitive purpose and effect. Nor do we agree that the three factors that do tip in the plaintiffs-appellants’ favor demonstrate by the clearest proof that Section 862a functions as a criminal penalty. An examination of the Mendoza-Martinez factors that the plaintiffs-appellants allege indicate a criminally punitive purpose and effect reveals that those factors are at best inconclusive. For instance, because the majority of the underlying drug offenses that trigger disqualification under Section 862a contain a scienter requirement, the statute comes into play only on a finding of scienter. LaCrosse, 137 F.3d at 931. However, this scienter requirement is not conclusive as to the criminal effect and purpose of the statute. See id. at 932. Similarly, while it is undisputed that the statute in question has a deterrent effect, the mere presence of this purpose is insufficient to render a sanction criminal, as deterrence ’may serve civil as well as criminal goals.’ Hudson, 118 S.Ct. at 496 (quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996)); see Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 777 n.14 (1994). Moreover, the mere fact that the sanction of Section 862a is triggered by criminal conduct is insufficient to show that the statute is criminally punitive because [i]t is well settled that ’Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission.’ Ursery, 518 U.S. at 292 (quoting Helvering, 303 U.S. at 399); see United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993) (rejecting same-conduct test for double jeopardy purposes). In contrast to the three factors discussed above, the remaining four factors weigh decisively in favor of the defendants-appellees. The Supreme Court has clearly recognized that the mere denial of a noncontractual government benefit does not constitute an affirmative disability or restraint, Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617, and that the denial of such a benefit has not historically been viewed as punishment. See id. at 616-17. More significantly, the sanction of Section 862a rationally promotes alternative purposes to punishment such as deterring drug use and reducing welfare fraud, and there is no indication that the sanction is excessive in relation to those purposes. Having considered the sanction of Section 862a in light of the seven guidelines outlined in Mendoza-Martinez, we conclude that the plaintiffs-appellants have failed to establish by the clearest proof that disqualification from food stamps and TANF benefits under Section 862a serves as criminal punishment. Section 862a thus functions as a civil penalty, and we accordingly reject the plaintiffs-appellants’ double jeopardy claim.