Opinion ID: 1375029
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denying Motion to Dismiss for Seizure of Papers

Text: (19) Defendant contends that the court erred in failing to grant his motion to dismiss the information for the seizure and scrutiny of certain papers and the seizure and loss of others. (Apparently he made his motion under authority of section 1385, but the record is unclear on the point.) The ruling, in defendant's view, caused a violation of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. He seeks reversal of his conviction or a remand for a hearing to determine whether any Sixth Amendment rights were violated. On the day that it imposed the sentence of death on defendant, the court at the prior trial directed the sheriff to confiscate from the defendant all copies of the Reporter's Transcripts of the proceedings [forthwith] ... and return them to Department SE L.... Rather than let the parties call witnesses, the court herein accepted various offers of proof and found that 14 pages of defendant's trial notes, as well as the annotated transcripts of the prior trial, were taken from him by the court order and then lost, and also that his legal papers were briefly seized in prison in 1982, scrutinized, and returned to him. Defendant objected to the hearing procedure  he preferred to present witnesses. At argument on the motion, counsel asserted that defendant could not recall from the prior trial conversations with counsel about his arrest and questioning, matters of strategy, the demeanor of witnesses, or the names or location of witnesses and locations where evidence favorable to him might be found. In reply, the prosecutor said that he could not imagine what witnesses Mr. Memro might be talking about. The court found that under the standard set forth in United States v. Morrison (1981) 449 U.S. 361 [66 L.Ed.2d 564, 101 S.Ct. 665], there was no demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof ( id. at p. 365 [66 L.Ed.2d at pp. 568-569]) that would justify imposing a remedy in this particular instance even if the state intentionally interfered with defendant's right to counsel. It denied the motion to dismiss the information. Assuming, as appears likely, that the court denied a motion to dismiss the information brought under section 1385, we review it for an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Superior Court ( Howard ) (1968) 69 Cal.2d 491, 502 [72 Cal. Rptr. 330, 446 P.2d 138].) And we review the underlying basis for the ruling  a decision that the facts do or do not support a claim of state interference with the right to counsel  for substantial evidence. (Cf. U.S. v. Leisure (8th Cir.1988) 844 F.2d 1347, 1359-1360 [applying clearly erroneous standard].) Here, the court decided that even if there was intentional interference with that right, defendant had been able to show no prejudice. The ruling was sound. The case against defendant centered on his detailed confessions to the crimes. The court could reasonably refuse to believe that he would forget about a witness who could cast doubt on their authenticity. And it could also reasonably conclude that the other reasons he advanced in pressing his motion to dismiss the information were unpersuasive. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that attorney-client communications were revealed, and the prosecutor stated in his offer of proof that no information from the materials was known to, received by, or used to benefit the prosecution or the police. Defendant also contends that certain Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the court accepted offers of proof in ruling on his motion rather than hearing witnesses' testimony. But, asked by the court what specific constitutional ground or grounds would justify not considering offers of proof favorable to the defense rather than live testimony, he was unable to offer any. It appears that there were no disputed material issues of fact. Unless the court is alerted to the presence of such issues, it is difficult to perceive what would be gained by a hearing with live witnesses. (See People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 415 [272 Cal. Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260].) Moreover, it is difficult to imagine what they could have added that would have favored defendant more than the state of the record the court adopted: it ruled that the record would reflect an offer of proof that when defendant's papers were seized in prison in 1982, as related by his counsel, two deputies went through Mr. Memro's legal folder and read portions of every document that they picked up ... and when it was returned the documents had been gone through, that they were not in the same order they had been in before they were confiscated. It also ruled that the papers seized in jail immediately following the prior trial were mislaid and were never recovered.