Opinion ID: 499730
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence Explaining State of Mind

Text: 21 Goodoak next argues that Callahan's testimony explaining the reasons for his concern should have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. In particular, Goodoak argues, the court should have excluded Callahan's statements about Goodoak's alleged organized crime connections. In Goodoak's view, the limited probative value of this testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice engendered by associating him with organized crime. 22 We disagree with Goodoak's assessment of the probative value of Callahan's testimony. Goodoak makes much of the fact that in his November 1982 conversation with Callahan, it was not he but Callahan who initiated the discussion of the Somerville and Charlestown organized crime groups. But Goodoak's response was hardly passive or innocent. To the contrary, he took pains to identify himself with the Somerville group, saying, Well, then you know who I am then, and to say of the Charlestown group that they're the opposition. 23 It is possible that Goodoak would never have made such remarks if Callahan had not raised the topic. And it is possible that Goodoak's self-proclaimed association with the Somerville group did not exist in fact but was merely a spur-of-the-moment invention of Goodoak's. But these hypotheticals are irrelevant. What matters is that, in a conversation with Callahan, Goodoak affirmatively claimed a connection to an organized crime group, causing Callahan to be very concerned. We think that Callahan's explanation of why he felt threatened was highly relevant to the question whether Goodoak had threatened him. 24 Goodoak also objects to Callahan's testimony that Callahan knew the Somerville group was still flourishing and that this was an additional cause for concern. Goodoak protests that this testimony was not based on anything he had said to Callahan and thus had no probative value on the question whether he had threatened Callahan. Goodoak points out that, in asking Callahan the reasons for his concern, the government had asked him to describe only his reactions to statements actually made by Goodoak. The government did so because defense counsel had argued at sidebar that an open-ended explanation of the reasons for Callahan's concern might prejudicially overemphasize the subject of organized crime. 25 It is true that Callahan did not testify that his knowledge that the group was still flourishing was directly based on any specific statement of Goodoak's. But we note, first, that Goodoak never objected to the remark on this particular basis. Goodoak moved for a mistrial because of the testimony's prejudicial effect, which motion was denied, but he did not move to strike or argue that the remark had little probative value because it was not based on what he had told Callahan. We also note that Goodoak's statement, Well, then you know who I am then, and his remark about the Charlestown group that they're the opposition, were both phrased in the present tense. This might well have suggested to Callahan that the group to which Goodoak claimed a connection was still in existence. Thus we are not persuaded that Callahan's testimony went beyond what could be inferred from what Goodoak had actually told him. 26 Assuming arguendo that Callahan's answer did rely on information from sources other than Goodoak's statements, we nevertheless think that it was probative on the issue of Callahan's state of mind and thus on the ultimate issue of whether Goodoak had threatened him. The state of mind of an intended victim of extortion depends not only on what the defendant has said or done to the victim but also on what the victim independently believes about the context in which both are operating. Had Callahan not believed that the Somerville group was still operating, he might not have felt concerned by Goodoak's claimed association with that group; had he not felt concerned, the jury might have been less inclined to conclude that Goodoak had threatened him. Therefore Callahan's independent belief about the continued existence of the Somerville group had ample probative value. 4 27 Goodoak finally objects to Callahan's testimony that the Somerville group was known as the Winter Hill Gang. Goodoak correctly asserts that there is no evidence that he ever used this term in his conversations with Callahan; the term must have been known to Callahan independently. But we note again that Goodoak did not raise this objection at the time. And we think that the remark had some probative value on the issue of Callahan's state of mind. Goodoak had, after all, claimed an association with an organized crime group; the fact that Callahan had heard of this group by name could have helped the jury understand how Goodoak's remark affected Callahan. 28 As the above discussion demonstrates, Callahan's testimony explaining his state of mind had probative value on the key question of whether Goodoak had threatened him, because evidence of the result is relevant to whether there was an attempt. Our discussion would not be complete without pointing out that Callahan's explanatory testimony, even if not based on anything Goodoak had told him, was relevant to that key question in another, more direct sense. In his conversation with Goodoak, Callahan had demonstrated some familiarity with the organized crime situation in Somerville; on this basis, Goodoak might well have assumed that Callahan was aware of the Somerville group's continuing existence and its ability to harm him. Goodoak might thus have felt that all he had to do to threaten Callahan was to claim a connection with this group; he could rely on Callahan to put two and two together and to feel afraid. 29 Stated more generally, we think that whether a defendant has attempted to induce fear in a victim depends only in part on what the defendant has said or done to the victim. It also depends on what the defendant thinks or reasonably should think the victim independently believes about the context in which both are operating. A defendant who points a gun need not announce that it is loaded or that he intends to pull the trigger unless the victim complies with his demands. Likewise, a defendant who threatens a victim in esoteric, veiled, or elliptical language need not offer a simultaneous translation or define his terms, as long as he thinks or should think the victim understands what has been said. Cf. United States v. DiCarlo, 565 F.2d at 807 (stating that defendant's lesson on the alleged political facts of life in Boston could be taken as a thinly veiled reference to payoffs). We see Callahan's testimony explaining his state of mind as essentially an explanation of this process of putting two and two together. This explanation had probative value because it helped the jury understand how Goodoak's claim of a tie to organized crime formed part of a threat against Callahan. 30 Turning to the question whether unfair prejudice resulted from Callahan's testimony explaining his concern, we find that there was none. The references to organized crime were brief and restrained; the most damning reference, to Goodoak's claimed association with the Somerville group, came directly out of Goodoak's mouth. And we reject Goodoak's claim that Callahan's testimony was actually prejudicial character evidence. Goodoak's claimed association with organized crime was not offered to show that he had acted in conformity with some criminal propensity but to show Callahan's state of mind. Cf. Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 739-42 (9th Cir.1963) (approving victims' testimony that they knew of Hobbs Act defendant's underworld reputation, where evidence was offered not to show action in conformity with character but to show that defendant had planned to frighten victims), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953, 84 S.Ct. 1626, 12 L.Ed.2d 498 (1964). 31 In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its Rule 403 discretion in permitting Callahan's testimony. Cf. United States v. Grassi, 783 F.2d 1572, 1577-79 (11th Cir.) (finding no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of Hobbs Act defendant's reputed Mafia connections to show victims' state of mind), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 573, 93 L.Ed.2d 577 (1986); United States v. Russo, 708 F.2d 209, 214 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993, 104 S.Ct. 487, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983). 5 32 Affirmed.