Opinion ID: 2544581
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Jury's Question

Text: Kendall argues that the trial court erred in its response to a jury question that asked for a legal definition of driving. Kendall contends that the trial court's answer to the jury's question was a misstatement of the law. He also asserts that the answer relieved the State of its burden to prove an element of the crime and deprived him of a fair trial. K.S.A. 22-3420(3) says: After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed as to any part of the law or evidence arising in the case, they may request the officer to conduct them to the court, where the information on the point of the law shall be given, or the evidence shall be read or exhibited to them in the presence of the defendant, unless he voluntarily absents himself, and his counsel and after notice to the prosecuting attorney. The trial court has considerable discretion in determining the substance of its response to jury questions during deliberations regarding matters of law or evidence in the case. State v. Robbins, 272 Kan. 158, 168, 32 P.3d 171 (2001). Judicial discretion is abused only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. State v. Lopez, 271 Kan. 119, 125, 22 P.3d 1040 (2001). Further, we have said: The important consideration is that the jury be properly instructed on the essential issues presented at the trial, and this is particularly true in a criminal proceeding when the question presented by the jury involves the basic elements of the criminal offense on which the defendant is being tried. State v. Morris, 255 Kan. 964, 985-86, 880 P.2d 1244 (1994). Before deliberations, the jury was instructed on the crime of DUI. Instruction No. 7 said: The defendant is charged with the crime of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The defendant pleads not guilty. To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 1. That the defendant drove a vehicle; 2. That the defendant, while driving, was under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely driving a vehicle; and 3. That this act occurred on or about the 8th day of April, 2000, in Reno County, Kansas. The instruction was taken directly from PIK Crim.3d 70.01. The jury was also instructed on the alternative theory of attempted DUI. Instruction No. 8, taken from PIK Crim.3d 70.01-B, said: The defendant is charged in the alternative with operating or attempting to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. You are instructed that the alternative charges constitute one crime. You should consider if the defendant is guilty of operating or attempting to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and sign the verdict upon which you agree. Instruction No. 9 said: The defendant is charged with the crime of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The defendant pleads not guilty. To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 1. That the defendant attempted to drive a vehicle; 2. That the defendant, while attempting to drive, was under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely driving a vehicle; and 3. That this act occurred on or about the 8th day of April, 2000, in Reno County, Kansas. During deliberations, the jury submitted two questions to the trial court. First, the jury asked: Was Richard Kendall's truck a standard transmission or automatic transmission? The trial court, upon the agreement of the parties, answered: You must rely on your collective recollection of the testimony and evidence, and the instructions as a whole. Second, the jury asked: Is there a legal definition of driving? After hearing arguments of counsel, the court answered: The words `to drive' and `operate' are synonymous under Kansas law. Movement of the vehicle is not required. Again, the jury should refer to the answer to Question No. 1 above. At trial, Kendall took issue only with the second sentence of the answer. Kendall argues that the trial court's statement that [m]ovement of the vehicle is not required is a misstatement of the law. We agree that it applies as to operation, but movement is not required for attempted operation. K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 8-1567(a) says no person shall operate or attempt to operate any vehicle within this state while under the influence of alcohol. We explored the meaning of operate under K.S.A. 8-1567 in State v. Fish, 228 Kan. 204, 612 P.2d 180 (1980). Fish was discovered in his car parked off the highway at a community trash receptacle. He was asleep in the front seat. The motor was running and the car was in park. There was an open liquor bottle on the front seat. A highway patrol trooper woke Fish and suspected that Fish was drunk. Fish was charged with DUI under K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 8-1567(a). The State appealed on a question reserved. We described the State's argument as follows: On this appeal, the State requests this court to hold that there is a distinction between the terms `to operate' and `to drive' as used in K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 8-1567(a) and (b). The State maintains that the word `operate' is a broader term than is the term `drive' and includes acts of a person in a motor vehicle not involving the actual driving of the vehicle. Thus, the State argues, an intoxicated person, who starts the motor of an automobile and, thereafter, remains seated in the vehicle, has violated the provisions of K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 8-1567(a). The State points out there is no Kansas law defining the term `to operate' in the context of this statute. 228 Kan. at 205. In Fish, we examined other traffic laws and analyzed the legislative intent behind 8-1567(a) and concluded: [T]he word `operate' as used in section (a) of that statute should be construed to mean `drive,' thus requiring some evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that the defendant drove the automobile while intoxicated in order for the defendant to be convicted under that section. Proof of driving does not require an eyewitness to the driving. It may be shown by circumstantial evidence as was done in State v. Dill, 182 Kan. 174, and State v. Hazen, 176 Kan. 594. 228 Kan. at 210. From Fish, we derive two things: (1) to operate a vehicle as set forth in 8-1567(a) means to drive it; and (2) in order to be convicted of operating a vehicle under the influence, there must be some evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the defendant drove the vehicle. Nothing in Fish says that movement of the vehicle is not required to convict a defendant under 8-1567(a). In fact, in Fish, we noted: The Kansas cases on the subject have assumed that proof of driving or movement of the vehicle is required in order to sustain a conviction. 228 Kan. at 205-06. The State here counters that the definition of operate is much broader than the definition of drive and encompasses other activities involving a vehicle, including sitting inside it with the engine running or fastening a seat belt. The State insists that Fish was wrongly decided. It also points to K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 8-2,128(j), which defines drive to mean drive, operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle. The State characterizes this statute as a legislative response to Fish. K.S.A. 8-2,128 was enacted in 1989, 9 years after Fish, and is part of the Uniform Commercial Driver's License Act, K.S.A. 8-2,125 et seq. The statute makes clear that the definitions it contains apply to the Commercial Driver's License Act. K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 8-2,128 makes no difference here. More to the point, K.S.A. 8-1567 has been amended since our decision in Fish. The DUI statute at issue in Fish, K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 8-1567, prohibited the operation of any vehicle by a person who was under the influence of alcohol. The statute was amended in 1985 to prohibit the operation or attempt to operate any vehicle by a person under the influence of alcohol. L. 1985, ch. 48, sec. 9. Thus, the current version of the DUI statute at issue here encompasses both those accused of actually driving while under the influence and those who merely tried but failed, with no election required. Movement of the vehicle is not required in order to convict a defendant of DUI under the theory that defendant attempted to operate the vehicle. Here, the jury was separately instructed on both theories of guilt under K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 8-1567(a): (1) operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and (2) attempting to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The jury was given three options in the verdict forms: