Opinion ID: 1711656
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: stipulation/liability limit

Text: The parties also dispute the maximum amount of liability applicable in this case. The City argues that its liability is limited to $50,000 for each claim, pursuant to § 893.80(3). Cavanaugh contends that he is entitled to $250,000 under § 345.05(3), because the damages suffered resulted from Andrade's negligent operation of a motor vehicle. The State counters that even if § 345.05 applies, Andrade is bound by the oral stipulation of damages in the amount of $100,000. Because we conclude that Andrade was not negligent in the operation of a motor vehicle, the $250,000 liability limit under § 345.05(3) is inapplicable in this case. Instead, § 893.80(3) provides the appropriate liability limit of $50,000 for each claim, for a total recovery of $100,000. As a result, we need not address the issues of whether the parties' original stipulation of damages in the amount of $100,000 is binding. By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to the circuit court to enter judgment consistent with this opinion. SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I join that portion of the majority opinion holding that the City is not immune from liability in this case and affirming the jury's verdict against the City. I disagree with that part of the majority opinion relating to the liability of the officer. I conclude that the court should affirm the court of appeals' decision affirming the jury's finding that the officer was negligent with respect to the operation of his motor vehicle during the chase. As the majority observes, the general discretionary act immunity defense inscribed in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) is qualified by Wis. Stat. § 346.03. Section 346.03(5) warns that the operator of an emergency vehicle is not relieved from the duty to drive with due regard under the circumstances for the safety of all persons or from the consequences of his or her reckless disregard for the safety of others. [1] Placed squarely within the section of the statutes prescribing the rules and regulations applicable to emergency road vehicles, Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) makes clear that while emergency vehicle operators may on occasion disregard certain traffic rules, when they do so without due regard under the circumstances for the safety of all persons, they are negligent. [2] But having acknowledged that Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) qualifies discretionary act immunity, the majority opinion abruptly reverses course. First, the majority attempts to segregate an officer's decision to initiate or continue a pursuit from the question of whether that officer drives with due regard under the circumstances for the safety of all persons. The majority concludes that an officer's decision to initiate or continue a pursuiteven when that pursuit is undertaken at high speeds through major intersections in a densely populated areais automatically entitled to discretionary act immunity. In short, while Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) is designed to limit discretionary act immunity, the majority invokes discretionary act immunity to limit Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5). In rendering an officer's decision to initiate or continue a pursuit immune from liability, the majority creates an exception to the negligence statute which threatens to swallow the statute itself. In contrast to the majority opinion, a number of state supreme courts interpreting provisions substantially similar to Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) have concluded that a law enforcement officer is not immune from liability for a discretionary decision to give or not to give chase and that the negligence standard is applicable to the officer's conduct. [3] Second, the majority converts the clear language of Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) requiring an officer to driver with due regard under the circumstances for the safety of all persons into a requirement that an officer not be negligent in the physical operation of the vehicle. Majority op. at 317.18. Surely, as Maryland's highest court observed in interpreting a provision similar to Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5), [4] [n]egligent operation of a car is not limited to the negligent manipulation of the gas pedal, steering wheel, or brake pedal. Boyer v. State, 594 A.2d 121, 129 (1991). A decision to operate or continue operating the car, when a reasonable person would not due so, clearly can be `negligent operation.' Id. Under the majority's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5), however, it is unclear if even the manipulation of the gas pedal, steering wheel, or brake pedal would provide grounds for finding a pursuing officer negligent, since the manner in which one accelerates, steers and brakes is integrally related to one's decision to initiate or continue pursuit. Indeed, a reader would be hard pressed to ascribe any concrete meaning to Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) if, as the majority maintains, it refers to one negligent in the physical operation of the vehicle. Any activity which might fit under this rubric might just as easily be described as an activity related to an officer's decision to pursue or not pursue. Hence while the majority professes agreement with the court of appeals' conclusion that an officer remains liable on negligence grounds under Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5), majority op. at 317, the majority fails to follow the court of appeals' lead in upholding a jury verdict that the officer in this case was negligent with respect to the operation of his motor vehicle. Instead, the majority relies upon cases drawing a distinction between an officer's discretionary decision to initiate and continue a pursuit and the physical operation of the vehicle. Majority op. at 317-18. It is hard to imagine any decision pertaining to an officer's physical operation of a police vehicle that might not also be characterized as a discretionary decision entitling that officer to immunity. In short, according to the majority, even when officers engaged in high-speed chases are negligent, they are entitled to immunity. [5] In concluding that police officers can be shielded from their negligent acts under the doctrine of official act immunity, the majority ignores the limiting language within the immunity statute itself, which states that [w]hen rights or remedies are provided by any other statute against ... any officer ... such statute shall apply. Wis. Stat. § 893.80(5). An immunity statute's primary purpose is to insure that liability will not attach to governmental actors as a consequence of their actions. By definition, an officer who has not acted negligent will have no need of the protection which an immunity statute provides; it is only when an officer has acted negligently that an immunity statute might serve some purpose by providing relief from liability. Consequently, when, as is the case in this state, an immunity statute explicitly contemplates the prospect that immunity might be waived by other statutes, and when one of those other statutes explicitly states that officers engaged in high-speed chases are not relieved of liability for their negligent acts, this state's immunity statute is irrelevant. Under Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5), it matters not whether one characterizes the officer's decisions in this case as discretionary or ministerial. Neither formulation can shield an officer from the statutorily prescribed duty to drive with due regard under the circumstances for the safety of all persons. [6] In holding otherwise today, the majority not only shields officers from liability for their negligent conduct, but also shields municipalities from liability so long as those municipalities dutifully issue the guidelines required under Wis. Stat. § 343.05(6). Thus an innocent victim of a negligently conducted high-speed case will frequently be unable to collect damages from either the negligent officer or from the municipality for which that officer works. Finally, the majority does not give sufficient deference to the jury verdict. In this case, the jury found the pursuing officer responsible for 2% of the victim's injuries. When there is any credible evidence to support a jury's verdict, even though it be contradicted and the contradictory evidence be stronger and more convincing, nevertheless the verdict must stand. Weiss v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 197 Wis. 2d 365, 390, 541 N.W.2d 753 (1995) (citations omitted). I conclude that credible evidence supports the jury's determination that the pursuing officer's decision to continue the pursuit was negligent. [7] For example, the driver of the pursued vehicle stated that he would have stopped speeding and running red lights if the officer had stopped chasing him. In the report which police officer Dennis Pajot filled out on the accident giving rise to this case, the roads were described as slippery and frosted with ice. Officer Pajot considered travel at 50-55 miles per hour too fast for conditions; evidence in the record suggests that at times both the pursuing and pursued vehicles were travelling at speeds above 70 miles per hour. The pursuing officer in this case testified that all he knew for certain was that the driver of the pursued vehicle had violated traffic law. He also testified that he never considered terminating the pursuit. Furthermore, the plaintiff's expert Leonard Territo, who has written numerous books and articles on the subject of high-speed chases, testified that when the only infraction known to have been committed by the driver of a pursued vehicle is a traffic violation and when, as was the case here, the pursued vehicle is approaching a number of major intersections, an officer should consider terminating the pursuit. Based on this record, a reasonable jury could have concluded that the officer's violation of the duty to drive with due regard under the circumstances for the safety of all persons was unreasonable and contributed to the subsequent accident. Because there is credible evidence supporting the jury's finding of causal negligence against the pursuing officer, I would uphold the jury's verdict. In overturning that verdict today, the majority may be creating a blanket rule immunizing both law enforcement officers and municipalities from liability whenever a high-speed chase precipitates a collision. While the legislature recognizes that police pursuit is often important and necessary, the legislature has not concluded that all chases are reasonable, regardless of the circumstances. Wisconsin's emergency vehicle statute displaces the presumption of negligence that ordinarily arises from a violation of traffic rules. As Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) makes clear, it is not intended to shelter drivers of emergency vehicles from liability for their negligent actions. The court should interpret and apply this statute as it is written and allow the trier of fact to assess whether an officer engaged in high-speed pursuit has driven with due regard under the circumstances for the safety of all persons. For the reasons set forth, I write separately. JANINE P. GESKE, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with that part of the opinion in which the majority concludes that Officer Andrade is entitled to immunity for his discretionary decisions made in relation to his pursuit of Zergoski. However, I write this dissent because I do not agree that the City can be held liable under the facts of this case. Initially, it should be noted that the majority's conclusions on causation are built upon the foundation of its interpretation of the ministerial duty imposed by Wis. Stat. § 346.03(6). Throughout the opinion, the majority makes repeated reference to the statute as mandating that officers consider the severity of the crime upon initiating or continuing a pursuit. However, the statute contains no language concerning initiating or continuing pursuits. In fact, the statute refers only to providing written guidelines for its officers regarding  exceeding speed limits under the circumstances specified in sub. (4) [to obtain evidence of a speed violation or if responding to a felony in progress call] and when otherwise in pursuit of actual or suspected violators. Wis. Stat. § 346.03(6) (emphasis added). Nothing in the plain language of the statute refers to a point in time that an officer must evaluate certain factors, nor does it impose a mandate that successive reevaluations be conducted at set intervals. [1] In particular, it is the section of the opinion on causation that prompts me to write this dissent. The majority concludes that there was credible evidence to support the jury's finding that the City was causally negligent with respect to its defective pursuit policy. Majority op. at 315. It bases this conclusion on the testimony of Officer Andrade, his supervisorBuechner, Zergoski, and in large part the plaintiff's expert witness Leonard Territo, who testified that he believed the failure of the City's policy to instruct its officers to consider the nature of the offense was a substantial factor in causing Cavanaugh's injuries. The majority correctly states that this court must uphold a jury's finding of fact if it is supported by any credible evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom. However, it is impermissible to base a judgment on `conjecture, unproved assumptions, or mere possibilities.' Merco Distributing Corp. v. Commercial Police Alarm Co., 84 Wis. 2d 455, 461, 267 N.W.2d 652 (1978) (quoting Schwalbach v. Antigo Electric & Gas, Inc., 27 Wis. 2d 651, 655, 135 N.W.2d 263 (1965)). Further, `when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant.' Merco, 84 Wis. 2d at 460 (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts 241 (4th ed. 1971)). The majority mischaracterizes the causation analysis as hinging on whether Officer Andrade or his supervisor considered the severity of the crime despite the defective policy. Majority op. at 306. On the contrary, determination of cause is based on whether the breach was a substantial factor in causing the injury. I cannot agree with the majority that the credible evidence needed to establish this link was presented. In order to establish the causal nexus in this case the plaintiff had to present evidence that the breach (the fact that the City's policy did not state that an officer must consider the severity of the crime in deciding whether to exceed the speed limit while pursuing a vehicle) was a substantial factor in causing the injury (Cavanaugh's death). In other words, the plaintiff had the burden to prove that: (1) if the written policy required officers to consider the severity of the crime, (2) then, Officer Andrade would have terminated the chase, and (3) Zergoski would have slowed down or stopped his vehicle before reaching the intersection at 60th and Morgan thereby averting the collision. [2] In order to sustain a finding of liability against the City, the court must find sufficient credible evidence in this record to support the conclusion that Officer Andrade would have terminated his pursuit if the written policy had included severity of offense as one of the factors he must consider. Yet, Officer Andrade, well aware of the multiple traffic violations he had observed both before and during the pursuit, testified that he never considered letting the fleeing vehicle simply speed away from him because, in his opinion, public safety (itself, a baseline statutory requirement) [3] was best served by continuing the pursuit. Officer Andrade testified that he wanted to stay close to Zergoski's vehicle, to give warning to the public out there that this guy is coming through. People hear sirens out there. I didn't want to call it off at that time because I knew if he shot through any one of those lights right there and I wasn't close enough I knew nobody is going to hear him coming; and, if some innocent citizen were driving there through [sic], they would be hit by him and they wouldn't know it. [4] Similarly, supervisor Buechner testified that Zergoski was driving in a dangerous manner and represented a danger to the public. Therefore, although he considered whether Officer Andrade should terminate the pursuit, he decided based on a number of factors, that the pursuit should not be terminated. Further, despite the fact that Buechner did not use the exact words I considered the severity of the offense, he testified that circumstances under which a pursuit could be terminated include: [w]eather conditions, pedestrians or vehicle conditions, lighting conditions, the nature of the driving by the pursuit vehicle or by the driver of the pursued vehicle, possibly the reason that this person was being pursued. The plaintiff's expert, Territo testified that in his opinion officers who had been properly informed through a non-defective policy would have stopped the chase. Further, his opinion that Andrade's failure to terminate the pursuit was a substantial factor in causing the accident was based on his generic theory that removal of the incentive (pursuit) invariably leads to cessation of the dangerous driving behavior by one being pursued. Yet, under cross-examination, Territo admitted that his opinion on causation  assumes that Gary Allen Zergoski would have stopped driving recklessly when he noticed that Officer Andrade stopped pursuing him. This assumption is highly speculative, especially in light of the fact that Zergoski was speeding, driving recklessly, and had already run a red light before Officer Andrade began pursuing him. In analyzing causation, the issue is not what some hypothetical officer would have done, but rather, whether this specific officer would have stopped pursuing Zergoski if the City had included severity of the crime in its policy. Although the expert's opinion on what the hypothetical officer would or should do under the facts of this case was clearly relevant to the issue of Andrade's alleged negligence, the majority correctly concludes that Officer Andrade is immune from liability. In determining whether the City can be held liable, we must search the record for evidence of a causal link between the City's negligence and Cavanaugh's damages, and not for evidence of Officer Andrade's alleged negligence. In contrast to proof of negligence, which is based on standards of what the hypothetical reasonable person would have done under the circumstances, in order to establish causation, we must find credible evidence which can connect the actual conduct that has been found negligent by the specific defendant (here, the City's failure to perform its ministerial duty) to the plaintiff's damages. An expert's opinion that some hypothetical officer would have chosen not to continue the chase, and therefore the accident would never have happened, does not provide the necessary link between the City's failure to perform its ministerial duty and the damages in this case. Neither can an expert simply opine, as did Territo, that under the specific fact situation, the City's defective policy was a substantial factor in causing Cavanaugh's injury and thereby create credible evidence to support his conclusion. There must be credible evidence in the record to support his opinion that if the City had included severity of the crime in the list of factors for an officer to consider when deciding to exceed the speed limit in pursuit of actual or suspected violators. Officer Andrade would have decided to let Zergoski get away and that therefore Cavanaugh's damages would not have occurred. There is no such evidence in the record. Cause was never established, and therefore, the City cannot be held liable. Additionally, I feel that I must address disturbing public policy implications of the majority's opinion. [5] Under the standard advocated by Territo, and seemingly adopted by the majority, a non-defective pursuit policy would require officers to consider severity of offense, not only at the initiation of a pursuit but in an ongoing evaluation of whether to terminate. More importantly, it would encompass a presumption that continuation of pursuit is justified only for major offenses and those involving other violations should be terminated. [6] The majority states that nothing in [its] opinion or in § 346.03(6) creates ... a presumption [that continuing pursuits can only be justified for major offenses], and that the case is not about ... officers being stripped of their discretion. Majority op. at 314. Yet the majority relies on Territo's opinions on this very issue [the propriety of termination of pursuit given the specific facts of this case] to establish causation, thereby at least implicitly engrafting limitations upon police discretion. Territo testified that he was not critical of Officer Andrade's decision to initiate pursuit, that in fact, Officer Andrade would have been derelict in his duty if he had not attempted to stop [Zergoski]. The plaintiff's expert based his criticism of Officer Andrade (and of the City's policy) on the officer's failure to terminate the pursuit. Territo testified that if the City's policy included severity of the crime, Andrade and his supervisor would have been informed that a less severe offense, such as a traffic violation, would result in greatly diminished latitude as opposed to chasing a person wanted for murder. I agree with the majority that § 346.03 does not contemplate that an officer's latitude or discretion should be diminished during a chase on the sole basis of the severity of offense, but remain concerned that the message conveyed by the majority opinion does just that by affixing liability under the circumstances of this case. While in pursuit, Officer Andrade knew that the fleeing party had committed several offenses, including speeding, running a red light and stop signs, weaving, fishtailing and other indicia of reckless driving, and he suspected drunken driving. [7] Additionally, Officer Andrade testified that Zergoski's driving was reckless and in his opinion posed a risk to the public. If the policy advocated by Territo were adopted, it would seemingly require officers to terminate pursuit of persons whom they know to be driving recklessly, whom they suspect are driving while intoxicated, and whom they feel pose a risk to the public. What would happen if an officer applying this policy ceased a pursuit and the fleeing driver continued driving in a dangerous fashion and struck a pedestrian a few blocks later? It would not be at all farfetched to foresee the City finding itself in the position of defending a negligence claim based on failure to protect the public from a known risk. A policy that requires officers to cease pursuing those who are driving recklessly and speeding would only seem to encourage people bent on eluding the police to persist in such behavior. Rather than making our streets safer, such a policy has the potential to backfire and actually promote dangerous evasive driving. There is nothing in Wis. Stat. § 346.03(6) that indicates that the legislature intended that officers should be stripped of the discretion to pursue unless they know the fleeing suspect has committed offenses in addition to those observed. As the majority pointed out in its conclusion on the City's negligence, the statute requires that the policy consider the severity of the crime with respect to pursuing at excessive speeds. Nothing in the statute mandates that the City have a policy requiring an officer, after observing highly dangerous driving behavior, to discontinue a chase if the officer thinks that the fleeing driver is unlikely to voluntarily stop. I think this court should be hesitant to judicially impose such restrictions. For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion concluding that the City is causally liable for Cavanaugh's injuries.