Opinion ID: 2461163
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: preservation of inadequate warning theory

Text: Alcoa provided J.F.W. with a 1970 owner's manual containing the following warning: Leakage or closure blow-off at lower pressures can occur when the closure application is improper ... Alcoa, then, did warn J.F.W. that caps could blow-off if the capping machine was not properly adjusted to prevent misapplication. Alcoa still could have breached its duty to Alm if it inadequately warned J.F.W. Alm, however, failed to plead either that Alcoa was negligent for failing to warn J.F.W. or that Alcoa was negligent for failing to adequately warn J.F.W. Further, Alm did not request an issue or instruction regarding the adequacy of the warning. The adequacy of the warning to J.F.W. is a question of fact. Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868, 873-74 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Alm, the party with the burden of establishing duty and breach of duty on a failure to warn theory, had the burden to plead and secure a jury finding that the warning to the intermediate assembler was inadequate. Tex.R.Civ.P. 279. Alm failed to do either. Alcoa, on the other hand, properly objected to the submission of the broad negligence issue [1] which did not limit the jury's consideration to acts pleaded and proved. [2] In Scott v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., we observed that: Under Rule 277, the trial court has the discretion to submit an issue broadly, including the combination in one issue of several acts or omissions which may be alleged to constitute negligence. However, when one or more pleaded acts or omissions are unsupported by evidence and the record contains evidence of other possible negligent acts or omissions which were not pleaded, failure to limit the broad ultimate fact issue to acts or omissions which were raised by both pleadings and proof violates Rule 277 and is error. In view of the wide variance between the pleadings and unpled facts and circumstances from which the jury could have inferred that the railroad was negligent, such error was reasonably calculated to and properly did cause the rendition of improper judgment. 572 S.W.2d at 273, 277 (Tex.1978). Alcoa has shown a substantial variance. Alm pleaded allegations of negligence in the design, testing, formulation, manufacture, preparation, inspection, instructions for the use of, warnings for the use of, servicing, sale, and distribution of the thirty-two (32) fluid ounce bottle, cap and contents of the `7-Up' soft drink in question. All these allegations are directed at the soft drink bottle. There is a total lack of any evidence in regard to most of these categories of negligence. While it can be argued that Alm's pleadings were based on a failure to warn consumers theory, it is not at all accurate to assert that Alm pleaded that Alcoa failed to warn, or failed to adequately warn, J.F.W. On the other hand, Alm raised matters before the jury which were not supported by his pleadings and which could be construed by the jury as evidence of fault. For instance, Alm's expert testified about the potential for intermittent misapplication of the capping machine, even though the cap that injured Alm was misapplied because the machine was out of adjustment. Alm offered testimony by an expert on patent law that Alcoa could, through its licensing agreements, require others to include a warning on soft drink bottles. No support whatsoever in Alm's pleadings for any supposed negligent failure to enforce such agreements. Another area of variance dealt with Alcoa's closure system. Alm's expert was allowed, over objection, to testify about alleged defects in the Alcoa process enclosure. Alm attempted to hold Alcoa liable for negligence in its closure system. Such allegation of negligence was clearly outside of its pleadings pertaining to the 7-Up bottle and cap. Finally, and most importantly, Alm, without pleadings, argued in trial that Alcoa failed to provide J.F.W. with an adequate warning. Yet, Alm failed to offer any evidence with respect to a proximate causal relationship; thereby implying negligence without any requisite proof on proximate cause. Alcoa, then, complained of the lack of pleadings and proof in regard to whether Alcoa adequately warned J.F.W. The trial court overruled Alcoa's objection. Alcoa preserved error on this point in its motion for judgment non obstante verdicto and in its points of error presented to the court of appeals. The court of appeals did not address this point because it held that the warning was adequate. The court of appeals' rationale was that because the jury affirmatively found that J.F.W. was negligent, the jury must have found that J.F.W. knew or should have known that its negligent act of misapplying the cap, or its own failure to warn, could foreseeably result in Alm's personal injuries. The rationale continues that because it is well established that one does not have a duty to warn a party already aware of a danger, the jury must have found that Alcoa adequately warned J.F.W., or did not need to warn, since J.F.W. was already aware of the danger. Thus, the court of appeals overlooked Alcoa's argument on the improper submission of the broad issue and arrived at a favorable result for Alcoa under its own analysis. The courts use of implied findings under Rule 279 was improper. In our review of the judgment of the court of appeals, it is well settled that the party who prevailed in the court of appeals is entitled to have his assignments, which were properly presented in that court, considered by this court insofar as may be necessary to determine what judgment should have been rendered by the court of appeals. McKelvy v. Barber, 381 S.W.2d 59, 64 (Tex.1964); Holland v. Nimitz, 111 Tex. 419, 232 S.W. 298 (1921). Moreover, we are required to examine the brief of the prevailing party in the court of appeals to determine if there is another ground on which its judgment should be affirmed. Knutson v. Morton Foods, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 805, 809 (Tex.1980); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jefferson Constr. Co., 565 S.W.2d 916, 920 (Tex.1978); McKelvy, 381 S.W.2d at 64. Alcoa properly raised points of error in regard to the submission of a broad negligence issue that allowed the jury to find negligence on theories which were not pleaded such as Alcoa's alleged failure to adequately warn J.F.W. Even though Alm did not plead that Alcoa failed to warn J.F.W. or that the warning was inadequate, and even though there was no assertion by Alm in the briefs or during oral argument that these issues were tried by consent, the court remands this cause to the court of appeals because there is some evidence of an inadequate warning. The court of appeals is then to determine whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury's subsumed finding that Alcoa provided an inadequate warning to J.F.W. Because the jury found Alcoa negligent, the court holds that it must have found that Alcoa inadequately warned J.F.W. Yet, the jury did not have to find that Alcoa inadequately warned J.F.W., as it may have found Alcoa negligent for one of the other three alleged acts upon which the court of appeals remanded to the trial court for a new trial. Defendants now have burden to negate all pleaded and proved acts of negligence and even all unpleaded and objected to acts of negligence. The court does not give defendants any opportunity to complain of the submission broad issues. In doing so, the court ignores this court's prior analysis in the Scott case. Basically, defendants are thrown to the wolves with regard to unpleaded or unsubmitted grounds of recovery that are included in broadly submitted issues.