Opinion ID: 2630631
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Test Used By the Court of Appeals

Text: ¶ 53 In its analysis, the court of appeals employed the following three-prong test for determining whether a person voluntarily consented to a search: (1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and specific and freely and intelligently given; (2) the government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion, express or implied; and (3) [when evaluating these first two standards, we] indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived. Id. at ¶ 18 (alteration in the original) (quoting State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah Ct. App.1996) (citations omitted)). ¶ 54 The first prong of the Ham test provides that consent must be intelligently given. Id. at ¶ 22 (citing Ham, 910 P.2d at 439). To the extent this implies a person must have knowledge of the right to refuse consent, the test is incorrect. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that a person's knowledge of [the] right to refuse [consent] is a factor to be taken into account, [but] the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. See generally Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (rejecting requirement that police officers must inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary). We follow this pronouncement. ¶ 55 The third prong of the Ham test, employing a presumption against waiver, is also incorrect. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court has stated as follows: it cannot be said every reasonable presumption ought to be indulged against voluntary relinquishment of the right to refuse consent. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 243, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Later, the Tenth Circuit reiterated that application of the presumption against waiver [is] improper. United States v. Price, 925 F.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir.1991). Hence, the court of appeals erred in indulging every reasonable presumption against waiver.