Opinion ID: 1918099
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Corrective Role

Text: The Public Defender statute does not provide for a corrective role by which trial judges may review the OPD's eligibility determinations, erroneous or otherwise. When the OPD declined representation, the trial court, to be sure, was required independently to determine whether it found the defendant to be indigent. When, as a result of that determination, it concluded that the OPD had misapplied its governing statute, as the ultimate protector of those [Constitutional] underpinnings, Baldwin, 51 Md.App. at 552, 444 A.2d at 1067, the trial court, in accordance with our holdings, could have, and should have, pursuant to the statutory authority prescribed in § 6(f), appointed an attorney. Not so, says the majority. It reasons: Under Art. 27A, § 7, the ` initial determination, under the law, is to be made by the Public Defender,' based upon the criteria enumerated in the statute for determining indigency. Baldwin, 51 Md.App. at 551, 444 A.2d at 1066 (emphasis added). The OPD's initial determination of indigency is not final, however, because [i]n obvious recognition of the fact that the whole system has Constitutional underpinnings and that the courts must, of necessity, be the ultimate protector of those underpinnings, id. at 552, 444 A.2d at 1067[.]' .... OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 432, 992 A.2d at 67-68. The majority further concludes that: the General Assembly provided in Art. 27A, § 6(f), a clear oversight and corrective role for the courts in the indigency determination and appointed-counsel process. OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 432, 992 A.2d at 68. It is true, of course, that the initial determination of a defendant's eligibility for appointive counsel generally will be made by the OPD. It is also true that, when it has a conflict or when it declines representation, the OPD may not, and likely will not, make the final determination; indigent individuals are entitled to representation even when the OPD cannot, or will not, provide it. Section § 6(f) recognizes this to be so and, thus, addresses those situations. With regard to the situation sub judice, it makes clear that the trial courts may appoint when the OPD has refused to. Giving courts that authority, in that circumstance, is a far cry from giving them a corrective role over the OPD, which, by express statutory provision, see § 4(a), is the primary player in the process. Neither this Court nor the Court of Special Appeals has ever held that § 6(f) prescribes a corrective role for trial courts and § 6(f), by its express terms, do not purport to give trial courts such a role, as it pertains to the indigency determination and appointed-counsel process. The majority all but concedes this point when it acknowledges, as it must, that § 6(f) does not specify either the procedure or the standard to be employed by the court. OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 432, 992 A.2d at 68. Nevertheless, relying on Thompson's pronouncement that courts must make their own independent indigency determination, id., and the absence of prohibitory language[n]o appellate court in this State has held previously that the attorneys in the local OPD are ineligible from appointment by a circuit court following the local OPD's factually and legally erroneous rejection of representation of an indigent defendant OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 436, 992 A.2d at 70, it reads into that section an affirmative corrective role. The lift is too heavy. Requiring trial courts to make an independent assessment of the indigency of a defendant turned down by the OPD is a far cry from investing those courts with a corrective role. It must be remembered that the Court that imposed the independent assessment requirement on trial courts, the Thompson Court, rejected the notion being espoused by the majority, Thompson, 284 Md. at 129, 394 A.2d at 1198, that it had a responsibility, a role to play in directing or correcting the OPD. That Court was clear in holding that there was no such role. Nor is the absence of appellate decisions holding the OPD, who has declined representation, immune to appointment by a circuit court persuasive. The converse is equally true. There are an equal dearth of appellate opinions holding the OPD eligiblethat the OPD can be forced to represent an individualfor appointment. I reject the assertion that appointing the OPD is necessary in order to prevent the court from being rendered powerless to correct a manifest error. OPD v. State, 413 Md. at 431, 992 A.2d at 67. The goal of the Public Defender statute is to ensure a defendant's right to counsel. A manifest injustice would occur if the defendant were wrongly denied counsel. The OPD is entrusted with the primary responsibility to provide counsel and, in discharging that responsibility, is required to make eligibility determinations. Section 6(f) addresses the situation when the OPD's determination is to deny representation; its purpose and effect are to ensure that an indigent individual is provided representation. The trial court, in that event, is authorized to determine for itself whether the defendant is eligible and, if so, to appoint counsel. Thus, the trial court is not powerless to correct a manifest injustice. As the ultimate arbiter of the constitutional mandate, it is empowered, as, where appropriate, it may, and is expected, to appoint counsel. Denying the trial court the ability to appoint the OPD simply does not have the effect the majority posits and supposes.