Opinion ID: 1372411
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Common, Ordinary Meaning of the Term Spouse Includes Surviving Spouses

Text: The common-law meaning of the term spouse supports our reading of the INA. First, we observe that the term spouse is not defined in the immediate relative provision of the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151. In the definition section of the INA, however, the term spouse is defined only to the extent it excludes a spouse, wife, or husband by reason of any marriage ceremony where the contracting parties thereto are not physically present in the presence of each other, unless the marriage shall have been consummated. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35). Because the term spouse is not defined in the INA, we must determine the meaning of the term from its ordinary, contemporary, common meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979); Limited, Inc. v. Comm'r, 286 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir.2002). Enacted in 1965, the original immediate relative provision of the INA stated, in relevant part: `immediate relative' ... shall mean the children, spouses and parents of a citizen of the United States: Provided, That in the case of parents, such citizen must be at least twenty-one years of age. See Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub.L. No. 89-236. At that time, the ordinary, common meaning of the term spouse included a surviving spouse. According to Black's Law Dictionary, a spouse is one's wife or husband. Black's Law Dictionary 1574 (4th ed.1951). That definition cites Rosell v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 164 Or. 173, 95 P.2d 726, 729 (1939), which, in turn, states: [t]he legal, as well as the ordinary, meaning of `spouse' is `one's wife or husband'; and a `surviving spouse', therefore, must be the one, of a married pair, who outlives the other. Later, in 1990, when Congress amended the INA to add the second sentence of the immediate relative provision, it did not provide an alternative definition of the term spouse. And, at that time, the sixth edition of Black's Law Dictionary provided that a spouse is one of a married couple who outlives the other. Black's Law Dictionary 1402 (6th ed.1990). Therefore, we conclude that the common, ordinary meaning of the term spouse includes a surviving spouse. As such, spouse, as used in the immediate relative provision of the INA, includes a surviving spouse. The Secretary, however, argues that because a marriage ends with the death of one spouse, a surviving spouse is not a spouse within the common, ordinary meaning of the term. The Secretary cites the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, the USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub.L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 § 421, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub.L. 108-136, 117 Stat. 1693, and Ohio law, Dibble v. Dibble, 88 Ohio.App. 490, 100 N.E.2d 451, 461 (1950) (holding death terminates marriage in Ohio). We find this argument unavailing. First, the Secretary's argument under the Defense of Marriage Act fails because the plain language of [s]ection 7 emphasizes that spouses shall be of the opposite sex, it does not mandate that spouses lose their status as such with the death of either one of them. [1] Taing v. Chertoff, 526 F.Supp.2d 177, 184 (D.Mass.2007), appeal docketed, No. 08-1179 (1st Cir. Feb. 11, 2008). Second, the language of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 modifies the second sentence of the immediate relative provision, not the first. As explained above, the first and second sentences of the immediate relative provision are two distinct provisions. Like the second sentence of the immediate relative provision, which permits an alien spouse to file a self-petition in the event that his or her spouse did not file a Form I-130 petition on the alien's behalf prior to his death, the Patriot and the National Defense Authorization Acts provide a separate avenue for self-petitioning without requiring the alien-spouse to have been married for two years in the event that the deceased citizen did not petition prior to death. [2] Finally, the Secretary's argument also fails under Ohio law. According to the Secretary, under Ohio law, a marriage ends with the death of one of the spouses. Dibble, 100 N.E.2d at 461. Although federal courts may look to state law for guidance in defining terms, formulating concepts, or delineating policies, courts need not incorporate state-law definitions where to do so would frustrate a federal statute's purposes. See Ford v. Uniroyal Pension Plan, 154 F.3d 613, 617 (6th Cir.1998) (citing De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 76 S.Ct. 974, 100 L.Ed. 1415 (1956)) (noting courts may look to state-law definitions of terms in defining such terms in a federal statute but need not where doing so would frustrate the purpose of the federal statute). Moreover, the Secretary does not explain why we should elevate Ohio's definition of spouse or marriage above the intent of Congress. Nor does the Secretary argue that Congress considered Ohio law or any other state law when drafting the immediate relative provision or during the amendment of that statute. Accordingly, we find that the common, ordinary meaning of the term spouse includes surviving spouses. As such, a surviving alien-spouse is a spouse under the immediate relative provision.