Opinion ID: 2121781
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Zieba Settlement

Text: A review of the Zieba settlement reveals that plaintiff settled with Zieba for both injuries, not simply the first. Plaintiff sued Zieba for both injuries, received a settlement for both injuries, and released Zieba from liability for both injuries. Thus, defendant is entitled to set-off the amount from the settlement with Zieba in the amount of that portion of the settlement which was attributable to the second injury, or the consideration paid for the release, whichever is greater, pursuant to the Act. A problem arises, however: the Zieba settlement did not apportion the settlement proceeds in any manner. Plaintiff argues that no setoff may now be granted because no apportionment can be made. We agree with plaintiff that it is now impossible to apportion the settlement with Zieba, but disagree as to whether a setoff may now be granted. As plaintiff notes, it is now impossible for any trier of fact to hear evidence regarding Susanne's pain and suffering from the time of the accident until the time she received negligent medical care, or regarding the medical bills incurred prior to the time she received negligent medical care. Moreover, the trial court in the instant case cannot allocate the Zieba settlement because it was not involved in that settlement and did not hear any of this evidence. We believe, however, that under the facts of this case, where a plaintiff recovers for several injuries in a previous lawsuit and fails to apportion damages accordingly, a subsequent defendant should not bear the burden of proving what portion of the plaintiff's previous settlement should be set-off or be denied a setoff. In holding this, we note that while settlement is one of the goals of the Act (see Rakowski v. Lucente (1984), 104 Ill.2d 317, 325, 84 Ill.Dec. 654, 472 N.E.2d 791), public policy also favors protecting a non settling party's financial interest ( Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc. (1989), 131 Ill.2d 308, 322, 137 Ill.Dec. 579, 546 N.E.2d 524) and a plaintiff is only entitled to one recovery for her injuries. This same result was reached in Betts v. Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust (1992), 225 Ill.App.3d 882, 167 Ill.Dec. 1063, 588 N.E.2d 1193. In Betts, the plaintiff appealed the trial court's allowance of a setoff in her action against a defendant for loss of consortium. The plaintiff had previously filed suit against another defendant for loss of consortium, wrongful death, and survival arising out of the same set of facts. This previous action was settled for $400,000, $50,000 of which was specifically allocated in the settlement to the plaintiff's wrongful death claim. However, no allocation was made of the remaining $350,000 between the plaintiff's actions for loss of consortium and survival. The plaintiff in Betts asked the trial court in the second action to allocate the $350,000 for purposes of a setoff. The appellate court concluded that the trial court could not do such and noted: Since [the plaintiff] failed to agree on an appropriate allocation in the case against [the first tortfeasor] or to have the [previous] trial court exercise its discretion therein to determine an appropriate allocation, it is [the plaintiff's] burden, and not [the second tortfeasor's]    to establish the entire unallocated $350,000 of the 1987 settlement was not attributable to her cause of action for loss of consortium against [the first tortfeasor] in the earlier case. Betts, 225 Ill.App.3d at 900, 167 Ill.Dec. 1063, 588 N.E.2d 1193. We agree and hold that defendant should not bear the burden of plaintiff's failure to properly allocate the Zieba settlement. (See Farrall v. A.C. & S. Co. (Del.Super.1990), 586 A.2d 662, 667; Hirsovescu v. Shangri-La, Inc. (1994), 127 Or.App. 22, 25, 870 P.2d 859, 860; Nauman v. Eason (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990), 572 So.2d 982, 985.) We further cite with approval one of our appellate court's holdings in this area: When reviewing a proposed settlement, the trial court should consider, in addition to the good-faith elements, the percentage of the settlement to be allocated with respect to the particular cause of action. Foster v. Kanuri (1992), 241 Ill.App.3d 677, 681, 180 Ill.Dec. 886, 608 N.E.2d 8. Plaintiff argues, however, that defendant should bear the loss for any failure to allocate the settlement because it failed to join the previous actions which resulted in settlement, and did not seek contribution from Ford or Zieba. However, defendant was not required to do either of these two things. We further note that it was plaintiff, and not defendant, who chose to file three separate lawsuits and failed to properly apportion the settlement. Plaintiff also argues that defendant, by the way it tried the case, has waived its rights to argue for a setoff. Plaintiff here refers to the fact that defendant raised no objection to plaintiff's motions to restrict the evidence to only the second injury. Defendant has not waived the right to a setoff. As previously noted, defendant is liable only for the second injury, not the first. Thus, any evidence concerning the first injury's damages would have been irrelevant at this trial. Plaintiff also argues that defendant should not be protected here because it failed to settle a claim against it that was so strong that the trial court directed liability against it. Plaintiff argues that defendant only refused to settle so as to avoid its own responsibility. However, as noted, while Illinois has a public policy of encouraging settlements, Illinois also has a public policy of protecting nonsettling parties' financial interests and of limiting a plaintiff to one recovery for an injury. We further note that while defendant may have benefitted by its reluctance to settle, it could have also been held liable for a greater share of its pro rata liability under the Act as a nonsettling defendant. Settling parties are not subject to suits for contribution once they settle. This is a risk nonsettling defendants are allowed to take under the Act. We further note here that the Act provides that a settlement reduces the amount of recovery against another defendant liable for the same injury by the amount stated in the release, or by the actual consideration paid for the release. Here, plaintiff agreed to release Zieba of all claims, including plaintiff's claim against Zieba for the second injury, in exchange for $100,000. At issue is what consideration was paid for the release of the wrongful death claim. Where a promise on one side is supported by several promises on the other, the single promise will provide consideration for all promises. (See 3 S. Williston, Contracts § 7:49, at 761 (4th ed. 1992).) The release of plaintiff's claim against Zieba for the second injury was supported by the $100,000 consideration. Thus, under the Act, defendant is entitled to a $100,000 setoff as being the consideration paid for the release.