Opinion ID: 3040457
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Defendant’s Right to Be Present

Text: Berger next argues that his right to be present at every stage of the proceedings was violated when the judge made the challenged informal comments to the jury outside the presence of Berger and his counsel. We conclude that Berger waived his right to be present but that the scope of the waiver did not include the full range of comments made by the judge during the informal meeting with the jury. Consequently, even though the so-called Allen instruction was not coercive, the challenged language was spoken by the court without Berger’s knowledge and consent, and thus impinged his due process right to be present at every critical stage of trial. We nevertheless hold that the error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore not a ground for reversal. This court has stated that the “Constitution, the fundamental principles of jury trial, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure guarantee a defendant the right to be present at 732 UNITED STATES v. BERGER every stage of trial.” United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970) (holding right of presence secured by the confrontation clause)). In United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522 (1985), in discussing a defendant’s right to be present at critical stages of trial, the Supreme Court explained: [A] defendant has a due process right to be present at a proceeding whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge. The presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only. Id. at 526 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06, 108 (1934)) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Such an error, however, is not a basis for automatic reversal. If an ex parte communication “rises to the level of a constitutional violation, then the burden is on the prosecution to prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Rosales-Rodriguez, 289 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002).2 2 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a) provides a similar but broader right: a defendant is entitled to be present “at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict.” See Rosales-Rodriguez, 289 F.3d at 1109. A violation of Rule 43 is harmless if “there is no reasonable possibility that prejudice resulted from the absence.” Id. As this court has recognized, the constitutional harmless error standard is “more stringent” than the harmless error standard applicable to a Rule 43 violation. Frazin, 780 F.2d at 1469 n.8 (“The reasons supporting our determination that the constitutional error was harmless . . . would necessarily satisfy the more lenient standard for nonconstitutional error . . . .”). Because we ultimately conclude that the constitutional violation in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we need not decide whether Berger’s statutory right to be present was also violated. See id. UNITED STATES v. BERGER 733 [10] Our case law is clear that communication between the judge and jury outside of counsel’s presence, without a proper waiver, violates a defendant’s right to due process of law. See Frazin, 780 F.2d at 1469; see also Rosales-Rodriguez, 289 F.3d at 1110 (noting that delivery of a supplemental jury instruction is a “critical” stage of a trial that requires a defendant’s or defense counsel’s presence). A defendant, however, may waive his or her constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of the proceedings “provided such waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 671-72 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). Below, we consider the scope of Berger’s waiver of his right to be present during the court’s informal meeting with the jury. We then discuss whether the constitutional error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. B. Berger Did Not Waive His Right to Be Present During the So-Called Allen Instruction The parties do not dispute that Berger knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to be present during the judge’s informal communication with the jury. They do, however, disagree as to the scope of his waiver. We agree with Berger that he only waived his right to be present during the court’s informal meeting with the jury, so long as the discussion involved the setting of future deliberation dates that would not conflict with the child care, vacation, and travel arrangements of some of the jurors. He did not waive his right to be present during the administration of the so-called Allen instruction. We narrowly construe Berger’s waiver and only read it to include whatever Berger explicitly waived. See Gete v. INS, 121 F.3d 1285, 1293 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A] waiver of constitutional right is not to be implied and is not lightly to be found.” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Johnson, 304 U.S. at 734 UNITED STATES v. BERGER 464. Before accepting Berger’s waiver of his right to be present, the judge explained to the parties what he planned to say to the jury at the informal meeting. The judge stated, “If there had been any suggestions about an Allen instruction I want the record to indicate that I do not believe in the Allen instruction, I will not give it, never have given it.” When asked what he was specifically planning to say, the judge narrowed his plan to two specific points: first, he would “address the issue . . . regarding the jury[’s] request for days off”; second, he would “make certain that [he could] convey to them the thought that a rush to judgment is probably the worst form of verdict you could receive.” Berger expressly waived his “right to be present for the particular communication that [the court] anticipate[d] having with the jury.” [11] The record shows that the court intended to (1) discuss the scheduling conflicts some of the jurors were having, and (2) explain to the jurors that a rush to judgment would not be appropriate. More importantly, the court emphatically stated that it would not give an Allen instruction. Because Berger’s waiver only encompassed the “particular communication” that was “anticipated” by the district court, the waiver was restricted to the court’s two planned topics of discussion. [12] The jurors’ comments, however, led the judge away from his stated plan. Juror Roux stated that some jurors were “dead set” on their verdicts. In response to that comment the judge noted that “[i]t wouldn’t be wrong for you to reconsider your position if you can be convinced that perhaps your position was not accurate, that it could be wrong.” Berger argues that he did not waive his right to be present when that comment was uttered, which was, at worst, the mildest form of a mild Allen instruction. See Mason, 658 F.2d at 1265 n.1 (“In their mildest form, [Allen] instructions carry reminders of the importance of securing a verdict and ask jurors to reconsider potentially unreasonable positions.”). UNITED STATES v. BERGER 735 C. The Constitutional Error Was Harmless [13] A violation of a defendant’s due process right to be present at critical stages of trial is subject to harmless error analysis. See Frazin, 780 F.2d at 1469. Constitutional error is harmless if a court concludes “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id. at 1469-70 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). As we have thoroughly discussed, the portion of the judge’s comments that arguably exceeded the scope of Berger’s waiver did not coerce the jury into reaching a verdict. The comments were, at worst, the mildest form of an Allen instruction. Further, the jury deliberated a substantial amount of time — seven hours — after the comments at issue; and the jury did not reach unanimous verdicts on all counts. All of the factors that we considered above demonstrate that the district court’s statements were not coercive and did not affect the jury’s verdict. See RosalesRodriguez, 289 F.3d at 1111 (holding that district court’s delivery of supplemental instruction without consulting parties was harmless error because “[t]he instruction . . . was not coercive and did not cause the jury to rush to judgment”); Frazin, 780 F.2d at 1469-71 (finding that the judge’s failure to consult parties when responding to a jury note was harmless error because jury reached its own conclusion and “not as the result of actual or perceived judicial pressure”). Moreover, the defendants had an immediate opportunity to review the transcript of the meeting. The same afternoon, the court provided an ameliorative corrective instruction. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury’s verdict was not affected by any part of the court’s informal meeting with the jurors and any perceived error was harmless. Frazin, 780 F.2d at 1471. 736 UNITED STATES v. BERGER III. Materiality in Indictment Counts 34, 35, and 36 A. Indictment Counts 34, 35, and 36 — The Materiality Element Counts 34, 35, and 36 charged that, in three SEC filings, Berger knowingly omitted material facts about Craig Electronics’ (1) fraudulent accounting practices, (2) default of the Credit Agreement, and (3) overdrawn status on its line of credit. At trial, the government gave notice of its intention to call a victim investor and an SEC expert witness to testify about the materiality of omissions in the SEC filings. Berger objected on the ground that Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988), required the government to prove that the false statements were material to the SEC. Berger argued that the investor had no relevant testimony concerning the effect of the falsehoods on the SEC and that expert testimony on the materiality of omissions would invade the province of the jury. The government responded that Kungys governs false statements to government agencies was not controlling because the relevant materiality standard in securities fraud cases is whether a misrepresentation or omission would influence a reasonable investor, not the SEC. The district court agreed but concluded that under the reasonable investor standard, the proposed testimony of the investor and of the SEC expert witness were unnecessary. In a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s case-in-chief, Berger asserted that there was insufficient evidence that the falsehoods were material to the SEC. Berger also contended that the indictment charged that the false statements were material to the lending banks, not to individual investors. In a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal, Berger repeated these claims and also argued that UNITED STATES v. BERGER 737 there was a fatal variance between the indictment — which alleged that the false statements were material to the lending banks — and the proof — which established that the false statements were material to reasonable investors. The court denied both motions.