Opinion ID: 743614
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Attempted Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine

Text: 198 Rosa contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he attempted to possess with intent to distribute fifteen kilograms of cocaine from February 3 to February 5, 1994. He argues that the government presented no evidence to demonstrate that he took steps toward obtaining possession of the cocaine. 199 To prove that a defendant attempted to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, the government must establish that the defendant acted with the specific intent to commit the underlying offense, and further that he took a substantial step toward its completion. United States v. Cea, 914 F.2d 881, 887 (7th Cir.1990). Rosa claims only that the government failed to prove that he took a substantial step toward obtaining the cocaine. He does not contest the intent element. 200 The recorded phone conversations that took place from February 3 to February 5, 1994, between Rosa, Toma and Valencia, establish that Rosa took a substantial step toward obtaining 15 kilograms of cocaine. On February 3, Rosa called Toma and told him that he wanted 15. Later that afternoon, Toma called Valencia and asked him for 15. On February 4, Rosa called Toma to check on whether he had gotten the 15. Toma then called Valencia and asked, Did you get that for me? Valencia responded, Yeah, but not the kind you want. Valencia also told Toma that he would give him 3 to try. Toma responded that Valencia should [t]ry to get 15. Toma then called Rosa back and told him that he had 3 tickets. Later that evening, Toma told Valencia that he had shown them the 3 and that they wanted 12 more tomorrow. 201 On February 5, Valencia told Toma that if you got the money ... they can give it to us. Toma told Valencia to bring 12 but Valencia responded that he could only get 8. Valencia and Toma agreed to meet in Toma's garage. However, Rosa called Toma before the meeting and told him that he had gotten a lower price, so the deal was on hold. On February 6, Toma and Youmaran went to Rosa's house in Toma's load car. Toma explained to Youmaran that the purpose of the trip was to provide Rosa with another one, because Rosa had sold those three I [Toma] gave him. (Tr. 740.) Youmaran testified that he accompanied Toma to Rosa's house, where Toma delivered another kilo of cocaine to Rosa. 202 Viewing the evidence of the phone conversations and the visit by Toma and Youmaran to Rosa's house on February 6 in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable and properly instructed jury could conclude that Rosa took a substantial step toward acquiring the fifteen kilograms of cocaine. 16 Rosa called Toma and ordered fifteen kilos of cocaine. While Toma was not able to deliver all of the cocaine, Toma and Rosa did more than merely agree on the delivery of fifteen kilos of cocaine; Toma delivered a portion of the fifteen kilos and was in the process of attempting to find twelve more, but Rosa put the deal on hold. This distinguishes the present case from Cea, the case on which Rosa relies. In Cea, the sole evidence of a substantial step consisted of the defendant leaving his home following a phone call in which he had agreed to pick up drugs, which the government argued meant that he was very likely in the process of picking up the drugs he had discussed on the phone. 914 F.2d at 888. In rejecting this argument, we stated that while the government does not have to wait until the transaction is complete ... it needs more evidence than what it produced at trial. Id. Here, by contrast, the tape of Toma's conversation with Youmaran, and Youmaran's testimony, which explained that Toma had delivered three of the fifteen kilos sought by Rosa and was in the process of negotiating for the delivery of the other twelve, illustrate that the attempted possession by Rosa of fifteen kilograms of cocaine had gone far beyond the attempt in Cea; indeed, Rosa had already acquired part of what he sought. In United States v. Wilks, 46 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir.1995), we stated [w]hether [the defendant] took a substantial step toward completing that transaction was a question of fact for the jury to decide. It found that he did, and we agree. As in Wilks, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish a substantial step by Rosa toward the possession of fifteen kilos of cocaine. 203