Opinion ID: 3009998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: This case involves the scope of liability under the ADEA, a federal anti-discrimination statute that renders it unlawful for an employer: (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).5 With these provisions, [t]he ADEA 'broadly prohibits arbitrary discrimination in the workplace based on age.' Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 5 . We generally rely on both ADEA cases and cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., because Title VII and the ADEA have been given parallel constructions due to their similarities in purpose and structure. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1385 n.4 (3d Cir. 1994). 120, 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 (1985) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577, 98 S.Ct. 866, 868 (1978)).6 In a privilege of employment case such as this one, it is irrelevant that SmithKline had no obligation to provide the particular benefit to its employees, for once an employer decides to grant an opportunity to some, it may not deny this opportunity to others because of their age. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 121, 105 S.Ct. at 621. As the Supreme Court has explained, '[a] benefit that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free . . . not to provide the benefit at all.' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2233-34 (1984)). SmithKline argues in the first instance that Congress, in enacting the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-43, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (OWBPA), explicitly considered and rejected a provision entitling older workers to extra consideration for release of ADEA claims.7 The OWBPA set forth, 6 . As noted above, however, the statute provides that [t]he prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). 7 . Somewhat inexplicably, at oral argument DiBiase vigorously denied that his theory of the case required employers to provide extra consideration to older workers signing general releases. To the contrary, he said that a provision for extra consideration would violate the ADEA as well and that the only way in which older people would be treated the same as younger people would be to allow older people to sign a release agreeing to waive all claims except those under the ADEA. among other things, specific standards governing whether an employee's waiver of ADEA claims is valid. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f). SmithKline points out that early drafts of the OWBPA provided that a waiver of ADEA claims is valid only when: the rights or claims are waived in exchange for consideration in addition to anything of value -- (ii) that has been offered to a group or class of individuals under an early retirement incentive or other employment termination program. See 135 Cong. Rec. § 289-01, § 356-57 (introduction of bill in Senate); 135 Cong. Rec. H 696-03, H 697 (introduction of bill in House of Representatives). SmithKline is correct in noting that (..continued) However, this case has proceeded on the assumption that DiBiase was claiming extra consideration. In ruling on SmithKline's motion to dismiss, the district court stated that DiBiase argues that an employer could secure a release of ADEA claims by offering additional consideration beyond that offered for a release of all claims except ADEA claims. Memorandum of September 27, 1993, at app. 47. Similarly, the district court commented in its opinion that I have difficulty believing that the widespread industry practice of offering enhanced benefits in exchange for a release of potential claims is so fragile that a decision requiring additional consideration for a valid release of ADEA claims will cause the practice to expire. DiBiase, 847 F. Supp. at 351. In short, the district court certainly believed that DiBiase was asking for extra consideration. At any rate, unless DiBiase is arguing that an employer never could secure a valid general release from a terminated employee protected by the ADEA, we perceive no analytical distinction between a claim for extra consideration and a claim that DiBiase should have been allowed to waive all claims except ADEA claims in exchange for the enhanced benefits. Both arguments seek special treatment. In the former situation, the older worker receives extra money. In the latter situation, the older employee preserves his or her ADEA claims. Congress did not include the provision in the OWBPA. This history supporting SmithKline's position is significant and is entitled to some weight. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 264-65 (3d Cir. 1992). However, we do not rely primarily on legislative history in resolving this case because, as the following discussion shows, it is evident that even if we disregard the history we must conclude that SmithKline's policy did not violate the substantive provisions of the ADEA. With this said, we now assess whether SmithKline's policy of providing enhanced benefits only to terminated employees signing the release violated the ADEA. A policy can be discriminatory because of its treatment of or impact on employees. In a disparate treatment case '[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion [or other protected characteristics].' Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, ____ U.S. ____, ____, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 1705 (1993) (first alteration added) (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1855 n.15 (1977)). On the other hand, disparate impact liability 'involve[s] employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.' Id. (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15, 97 S.Ct. at 1855 n.15). DiBiase contends -- and the district court found -- that older workers who signed SmithKline's release gave up more claims than younger workers who signed the release, since older workers, unlike younger workers, are protected by the ADEA. Because the argument is framed to contend that SmithKline treated older persons less favorably than younger persons, this articulation of the claim falls under the rubric of disparate treatment.