Opinion ID: 552336
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: What Is Relevant Conduct?

Text: Under the sentencing guidelines as they relate to most narcotics cases, the base offense level--a critical datum in arriving at the GSR--is predicated in large part on the amount of drugs involved. The drug quantity is derived from all acts that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction, whether or not charged in the indictment. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(2). This means that in a drug distribution case, quantities and types of drugs not specified in the count of conviction are to be included in determining the offense level if they were part of the same course of conduct or ... common scheme or plan as the count of conviction. Id., commentary (backg'd); accord United States v. Restrepo, 903 F.2d 648, 653 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Blanco, 888 F.2d 907, 910 (1st Cir.1989); United States v. White, 888 F.2d 490, 498 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Taplette, 872 F.2d 101, 105 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 128, 107 L.Ed.2d 88 (1989). We painstakingly explained the mechanical operation of this model in Blanco, 888 F.2d at 909-11, and therefore refrain from repastinating ground already well ploughed. To bring uncharged conduct into play, the government must establish a sufficient nexus between the conduct and the offense of conviction. See United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir.1989); United States v. Fox, 889 F.2d 357, 360-61 (1st Cir.1989). The government's burden is to prove the nexus by a preponderance of the evidence. See Mocciola, 891 F.2d at 15; Blanco, 888 F.2d at 909. The rules of trial evidence do not apply; in weighing the facts the sentencing court may evaluate virtually any dependable information. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 6A1.3 (sentencing court may consider all pertinent information which has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy); see also United States v. Bradley, 917 F.2d 601, 605 (1st Cir.1990); Blanco, 808 F.2d at 908-09; Wright, 873 F.2d at 441. On appeal, the sentencing court's finding that drugs other than those specified in the indictment were part of the same conduct/scheme/plan is entitled to considerable deference. See Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 48; Wright, 873 F.2d at 443-44; see also 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(d). Absent mistake of law, we review such conclusions only for clear error and will not disturb supported findings unless our scrutiny of the record convinces us that a serious mistake was made. See United States v. Gooden, 892 F.2d 725, 729 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 2594, 110 L.Ed.2d 274 (1990); Mocciola, 891 F.2d at 16. In terms of a drug case, relevance depends upon the existence and scope of a single course of conduct, scheme, or plan. There is no available compass by which a judge can chart such boundaries with scientific precision. Judges can, however, plot some landmarks. We start from the perspective that courts must be careful to hold the adjudicative balance steady and true, giving U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(2) the scope which its letter commands while at the same time resisting prosecutorial efforts aimed at enlarging it. Not every drug transaction undertaken by every drug trafficker is necessarily linked in a meaningful sense. See White, 888 F.2d at 500 (Offenses of the same kind, but not encompassed in the same course of conduct or plan, are excluded.). Isolated acts cannot be conjoined and drug quantities aggregated for sentencing purposes without a rational basis. By the same token, we do not think that the Sentencing Commission intended to give section 1B1.3(a)(2) less than the due which its language portends or to create artificial barriers to its application. Direct evidence tying one act to another is not indispensable; if persuasive, circumstantial evidence will suffice to demonstrate the linkage between charged and uncharged acts. See, e.g., Gooden, 892 F.2d at 729. Criminal enterprises, by their very nature, tend to be conducted furtively and in the shadows. It is the rare narcotics trafficker who authors a formal business plan or keeps meticulously detailed inventory records. Cf., e.g., Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 48 (Drug dealers are unlikely to make much use of position descriptions or organizational charts.). Thus, while the sentencing court's determination of the existence and scope of a particular course of conduct must be gleaned from the facts, it will often represent a practical, real-world assessment of probabilities, based on the totality of proven circumstances. That is as it should be; in determining whether the necessary nexus exists, courts are not required to throw good judgment, human experience, and common sense to the winds. Here, the facts, viewed in context, make clear that if the 12 packages sent to Sklar all contained cocaine--a question which we address below--then the district judge's finding that Sklar's receipt of the drugs comprised a single course of conduct was sustainable. The repetitive nature of the mailings, their common origin and destination, their frequency over a relatively brief time span, the unvarying use of a particular mode of shipment, Sklar's admission that he supported himself, in part, by selling drugs from September 1988 through January 1989, his lack of any known employment during that interval, and his acknowledgement when arrested that he owed the sender money for an earlier debt, were more than enough to forge the requisite linkage. See, e.g., United States v. Woolford, 896 F.2d 99, 104 (5th Cir.1990); Mocciola, 891 F.2d at 16; United States v. Allen, 886 F.2d 143, 145-46 (8th Cir.1989). The court could rationally have concluded that these were drug transactions of a similar character which, in sum, represented a single pattern of continuous drug activity. Gooden, 892 F.2d at 729.