Opinion ID: 1832864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: admissibility of conviction for traffic infraction as evidence of negligence

Text: We begin with the issue presented by Wright's cross-appealthe admissibility of Wright's conviction as evidence of negligence. Wright relies on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-693 (Reissue 2004), which provides that Inlo evidence of the conviction of any person for any violation of any provision of the Nebraska Rules of the Road [3] shall be admissible in any court in any civil action. Had Wright been convicted of violating a Nebraska state traffic regulation, § 60-693 would be dispositive of this issue. But Wright was convicted of violating a Lincoln city ordinance. Strictly speaking, § 60-693 does not apply to a conviction for violating a municipal ordinance. But the rule stated in § 60-693 is representative of the general rule followed by the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions to have considered the admissibility of a traffic conviction in a subsequent civil proceeding. The general rule is that traffic convictions are not admissible in later civil proceedings as evidence of the facts that serve as a basis for the conviction. [4] As explained by the Illinois Supreme Court: Ultimately, the danger of unfair prejudice from a traffic conviction outweighs its probative value. . . . A conviction conveys a deceptive sense of certainty to the jury in a civil case that is difficult to challenge. [J]uries may have difficulty grasping the distinction between a prior judgment offered as evidence and one that is conclusive, giving the judgment binding effect even if this is contrary to substantive law. . . . The jury in a civil action may substitute the opinion of the police officer who issued the ticket or the opinion of the traffic judge for its own. . . . Traffic court may therefore become the cornerstone of a significant civil action filed after the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. [5] [3] Generally, evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty, adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year, is admissible to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment. [6] But traffic infractions, including violation of the municipal ordinance under which Wright was convicted, are not punishable by imprisonment in excess of 1 year. [7] And this rule is based on the valid distinction between a conviction for a more serious offense and for a relatively minor matter such as a traffic infraction. [8] Especially in traffic violations, expediency and convenience, rather than guilt, often control the defendant's `trial technique.' [9] Stevenson points out, correctly, that unlike a conviction based on a plea or payment of a fine, Wright's conviction was based on a trial in the county court. But it is unrealistic and impractical to examine a prior conviction to determine whether the defendant vigorously defended himself, and to do so would amount to penalizing individuals who exercised their right to defend against the charges against them. Wright should not be penalized for having an attorney to defend him. [10] And we note that this case does not involve a plea of guilty and, thus, does not implicate the use, in a subsequent action, of a plea of guilty entered by the defendant in a criminal action as an admission that the defendant committed the acts charged. [11] Fundamentally, there is no principled reason for us to distinguish a traffic infraction conviction under state law from one under a municipal ordinance. While municipal ordinances regulating traffic are not technically part of the Nebraska Rules of the Road, such ordinances exist only because they are authorized by those rules. [12] And the admissibility of a conviction should not depend on the charging authority's decision whether to prosecute an alleged offender under state law or a functionally equivalent local ordinance. In this case, Wright was convicted of violating § 10.14.290, which provides: It shall be unlawful for any person to drive, use, operate, park, cause to be parked, or stop any vehicle (a) in a careless manner, or (b) in a reckless manner, or (c) in a negligent manner, or (d) in such manner as to endanger life, limb, person, or property, or (e) in such a manner as to endanger or interfere with the lawful traffic or use of the streets, or (f) in such a condition as to endanger or interfere with the lawful traffic or use of the streets. Section 10.14.290 has no precise analog in the Nebraska Rules of the Road, but § 60-6,212 provides that lalny person who drives any motor vehicle in this state carelessly or without due caution . . . shall be guilty of careless driving. And we have held that [t]he words `carelessly or without due caution' are synonymous with `negligently or without due care . . . .' [13] Wright could just as easily have been charged with violating state law, and it would make little sense to give greater effect to his conviction under local law for the same conduct. [4] But more importantly, while § 60-693 `may not be literally applicable, [it is] clearly indicative of legislatively approved public policy, and this determination is one that we are bound to respect. [14] Based on the policy underlying § 60-693, and the overwhelming weight of authority from other jurisdictions, we hold that evidence of conviction for a traffic infraction [15] is not admissible in a civil suit for damages arising out of the same traffic infraction. The district court erred in concluding that Wright's conviction under § 10.14.290 was admissible against him as evidence of negligence.