Opinion ID: 891666
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Defendant's Scandalous Accusations Against Green

Text: {26} Defendant argues that the testimony concerning Defendant's accusations about the bizarre alleged plot by Green to kidnap, sodomize, and murder his own child was inadmissible because the evidence was irrelevant under Rule 11-401 NMRA, was uncharged misconduct that did not meet the requirements of Rule 11-404(B) NMRA, and was more prejudicial than probative under Rule 11-403 NMRA.
{27} First, we determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding the evidence relevant. Rule 11-402 NMRA makes it clear that only relevant evidence is admissible. Rule 11-401 defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. As our case law has observed, [a]ny doubt whether the evidence is relevant should be resolved in favor of admissibility. State v. Balderama, 2004-NMSC-008, ¶ 23, 135 N.M. 329, 88 P.3d 845. It is the role of the jury, not that of the court, to decide what weight, if any, to give the evidence in light of the factual context of a particular case. Id. ¶ 35. {28} To determine whether Defendant's insistent, incredible, and uncorroborated accusations against Green were relevant, we consider whether they related to the issues in the case. See id. ¶ 24. The State clearly and repeatedly articulated its theory that the accusations displayed Defendant's motives and malicious intent toward Green. Proof of motive sheds light on the likelihood of a defendant's guilt, and intent is an essential element of murder. Evidence that makes motive or intent more or less probable is therefore relevant. See id. ¶ 25. {29} We conclude that the evidence of Defendant's accusations against Green, while not conclusive when viewed in isolation from the other evidence, could have made it appear more probable to the jury that he was motivated to hurt or kill Green than would have been the case had the evidence been kept from them. The evidence therefore meets the definition of relevant evidence in Rule 11-401 and was admissible under Rule 11-402.
{30} Defendant also argues that admission of his accusations against Green violated the first sentence of Rule 11-404(B): Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. The very next sentence of the rule, however, makes it clear that evidence reflecting negatively on an accused's character or conduct is not made inadmissible for that reason, so long as it is relevant for reasons other than to show a defendant is the kind of person who might have committed the charged crime: It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. Id. {31} We have noted that in order to avoid the introduction of uncharged misconduct that does no more than indicate a defendant is the kind of person inclined to commit the crime charged or other bad acts, it is incumbent upon the proponent of Rule 11-404(B) evidence to identify and articulate the consequential fact to which the evidence is directed. Part of the proponent's responsibility is also to cogently inform the court ... [of] the rationale for admitting the evidence to prove something other than propensity. State v. Gallegos, 2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 25, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828. {32} As required by Gallegos, the State articulated both before and during trial that Defendant's accusations demonstrated attempts to hurt and isolate Green from others after the relationship breakup, evincing Defendant's motive and intent. In Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 47, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829, we upheld the introduction of evidence of a defendant's prior violent acts against a victim and of his deteriorating relationship with the victim to support the state's theory that the defendant had a motive for killing her after she broke off their relationship. [E]vidence of the deterioration of [the defendant's] relationship with the victim ... directly addresses the motivational theories presented at trial. Id. In determining Defendant's guilt, the jury may consider the relationship of the parties and the animus of the accused toward the deceased. Id. ¶ 24. The evidence here similarly helped shed light on the likelihood that Defendant was the killer and on the intent with which he acted. The evidence was therefore admissible under Rule 11-404(B).
{33} Finally, Defendant argues that the evidence of his accusations against Green was more prejudicial than probative and should have been excluded under Rule 11-403, which gives courts discretion to exclude otherwise relevant and admissible evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. Gallegos, 2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 22, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828; see Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 48, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829. {34} The accusations Defendant made to Green's ex-wife and the police purported to show scandalous intentions on the part of Green, not of Defendant. To the extent that they reflected adversely on Defendant instead of Green, it was only because they reflected a malicious intent to harm and isolate Green, which made them probative evidence of Defendant's own motive and intent. [T]he fact that some jurors might find this evidence offensive or inflammatory does not necessarily require its exclusion. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 48, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829. {35} [D]etermining whether the prejudicial impact of evidence outweighs its probative value is left to the discretion of the trial court. State v. Wilson, 117 N.M. 11, 17, 868 P.2d 656, 662 (Ct.App.1993). We should reverse only where we find the trial court has abused that discretion. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 48, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829. In this case, the State offered both testimony of Defendant's frantic warning calls and the actual images he faxed to Green's ex-wife that he claimed were illustrations of what Green intended to do to his own son. After considering the arguments of counsel, the district judge made considered decisions to admit the testimony and exclude the graphic depictions as unduly prejudicial. {36} It is obvious that the trial judge took seriously his responsibility under Rule 11-403 to balance the prejudicial and probative aspects of the evidence by permitting testimony related to the accusations while barring the related graphic images. Because the evidence was probative of motive and intent, and because the trial court took prudent and reasonable steps to minimize any unduly prejudicial effect, we conclude that admission of the testimony was not an abuse of discretion.