Opinion ID: 2581274
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Is a Mandatory Psychiatric Examination Discovery?

Text: The People, real party in interest in this case, first argue a court-ordered psychiatric examination falls outside of, and is thus not governed by, the criminal discovery statutes because those statutes create a mechanism for requiring the disclosure of evidence already in existence and in the possession of an opposing party. Citing the language of sections 1054.1 and 1054.3, the People contend the criminal discovery statutes presume[] that the evidence to be disclosed already exists. A mere order compelling a defendant to submit to an examination does not constitute `discovery,' because nothing has as yet been produced that should be disclosed under the discovery statutes. (2) We agree that the sections cited refer to information already reduced to physical form or otherwise known to the prosecution. For example, under section 1054.1, the prosecutor must disclose the names and addresses of witnesses (subd. (a)); [s]tatements of all defendants (subd. (b)); [a]ll relevant real evidence seized or obtained (subd. (c)); felony convictions of material witnesses (subd. (d)); [a]ny exculpatory evidence (subd. (e)); and [r]elevant written or recorded statements of witnesses including the results of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, [and] experiments (subd. (f)). Defendants have a similar, though not identical, statutory obligation to disclose evidence to the prosecution. (§ 1054.3, subds. (a), (b).) Accordingly, the People have requested, and petitioner does not oppose, discovery of all written or recorded information in Dr. Gomez's possession. We disagree, however, that the descriptions in sections 1054.1 and 1054.3 of materials subject to discovery can fairly be read to exclude other types of materials from the reach of the criminal discovery statutes. First, sections 1054.1 and 1054.3 do not express such a limitation. Second, a psychiatric examination of a party has long been considered a form of pretrial discovery. For example, in Ballard v. Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 159 [49 Cal.Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838], a case in which a defendant was charged with sexual assault, we considered whether the defendant was entitled to three forms of pretrial discovery from the prosecution: (1) statements of all witnesses who testified before the grand jury; (2) records of a polygraph examination performed on the prosecuting witness ( id. at pp. 165-171); and (3) a pretrial psychiatric examination of that witness (id. at pp. 171-177). Ballard held the trial court had discretion to order the complaining witnessas a form of pretrial discoveryto submit to a pretrial psychiatric examination for the purpose of determining whether her mental or emotional condition affected her veracity. ( Id. at p. 171.) Although the doctrinal underpinnings of Ballard's holding have since been discredited (see People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 575 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347]; People v. Espinoza (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1310-1312 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 700]) and the holding itself superseded by statute (§ 1112), it remains clear that, at least as early as 1966, we considered that a mental examination could be a form of pretrial discovery. (3) Third, the Legislature recognizes such examinations are a form of discovery. Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.020, subdivision (a), part of the Civil Discovery Act ( id., § 2016.010 et seq.), provides that [a]ny party may obtain discovery ... by means of a physical or mental examination of ... a party to the action.... (Italics added.) As the People fail to proffer a persuasive explanation why a mental examination constitutes a form of discovery in civil cases but not in criminal cases, we conclude a court ordered mental examination of a defendant is discovery within the meaning of the criminal discovery statutes. Centeno v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 30 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 533] ( Centeno ), on which the People rely, does not compel a different result. In Centeno, the defendant, charged with capital murder, sought a pretrial determination of his possible mental retardation, which would have made him ineligible for the death penalty. ( Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304 [153 L.Ed.2d 335, 122 S.Ct. 2242].) The trial court ordered the defendant to submit to a mental retardation examination by a prosecution expert, and he appealed. While his appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted statutory procedures to allow for the determination of retardation in capital cases. (§ 1376.) In rejecting the defendant's claim that forcing him to submit to an examination by a prosecution expert would violate the criminal discovery statutes, the Centeno court explained that [e]xamination of a defendant by a prosecution expert is unrelated to disclosure of information by defense counsel and thus is not logically encompassed by the criminal discovery statutes. ( Centeno, at p. 41.) Because section 1376, subdivision (b)(2) authorized the trial court in Centeno to appoint an expert to examine the defendant, the discovery order in that case was authorized by an express statutory provision[], as required by section 1054, subdivision (e). Accordingly, the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the examination did not constitute discovery under the criminal discovery statutes was unnecessary. Moreover, the court's dictum is not persuasive on its own terms. First, the court does not discuss Ballard v. Superior Court, supra, 64 Cal.2d 159, or the fact mental examinations are considered a type of discovery in civil cases (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.020). Further, by concluding that a mental examination was not a form of discovery within the criminal discovery statutes, the court necessarily assumed that Penal Code section 1054.3 described the universe of information a prosecutor can discover from a criminal defendant. But although section 1054.3 lists only evidence that is tangible, has been reduced to physical form, or is information otherwise known to the prosecution, the section does not state that it is an exclusive list, nor does it purport to be. In fact, materials not listed in section 1054.3 are discoverable by the prosecution if required by some other statute or mandated by the United States Constitution. For example, although an expert examination for mental retardation is not mentioned in section 1054.3, such an examination is authorized by section 1376. Because the criminal discovery statutes allow for prosecutorial discovery of materials from a criminal defendant that do not fall within section 1054.3, the premise of the Centeno court's analysis on this point was incorrect. Having concluded a mental examination is a form of discovery subject to the criminal discovery statutes, we turn next to whether such an examination is authorized by those statutes.