Opinion ID: 1843568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: district court's findings of fact

Text: For his remaining three arguments, Cerny asserts that the district court erred (1) in its finding of fact as to what conduct was required to meet the applicable standard of care, (2) in its finding of fact that the coaches' decision to permit Cerny to reenter the game did not violate the applicable standard of care, and (3) in its resolution of the question of fact that the School was not negligent. Cerny is asserting on appeal that the evidence shows that Cerny's coaches, Mitchell Egger and Robert Bowman, acted negligently in failing to keep Cerny out of competition until after he had received clearance from a physician to play. Cerny thus claims that the district court erred in finding under the facts of this case that the conduct of Egger and Bowman, in allowing Cerny to return to play in the Beemer game, satisfied the standard of care. Because the record contains evidence supporting the district court's various findings of fact, we determine there is no merit to Cerny's arguments. As noted above, in Cerny I, we set forth the standard of care to be applied in this case. We stated that determining the standard of care to be applied in a particular case is a question of law, and we concluded that in the instant case, [t]he applicable standard of care by which the conduct of the School's coaching staff should be judged is that of a reasonably prudent person holding a Nebraska teaching certificate with a coaching endorsement. Id. at 77, 628 N.W.2d at 706. Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, the applicable standard of care that the School's coaches were required to meet in this case has been conclusively established. See Houston v. Metrovision, Inc., 267 Neb. 730, 677 N.W.2d 139 (2004). On remand, we directed the district court to determine what conduct was required by the standard of care under the circumstances of this case, and to determine whether the conduct of Egger and Bowman in this case comported therewith. These determinations are findings of fact. See Cerny I, 262 Neb. at 75, 628 N.W.2d at 705 (stating a finder of fact must determine what conduct the standard of care would require under the particular circumstances presented by the evidence and whether the conduct of the alleged tort-feasor conformed with the standard). In actions brought pursuant to the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, the findings of a trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly wrong, Estate of McElwee v. Omaha Transit Auth., 266 Neb. 317, 664 N.W.2d 461 (2003), and it is not the purview of the appellate court to reweigh the evidence. City of LaVista v. Andersen, 240 Neb. 3, 480 N.W.2d 185 (1992). In actions brought pursuant to the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, when determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the trial court's judgment, it must be considered in the light most favorable to the successful party; every controverted fact must be resolved in favor of such party, and it is entitled to the benefit of every inference that can reasonably be deduced from the evidence. Skinner v. Ogallala Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 262 Neb. 387, 631 N.W.2d 510 (2001).