Opinion ID: 1706518
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal of Instruction D-2

Text: Where the jury is adequately instructed on reasonable doubt, it is not reversible error for the trial court to refuse to give a defense instruction on reasonable doubt. Giles v. State, 501 So.2d 406, 409 (Miss. 1987); Simpson v. State, 497 So.2d 424 (Miss. 1986). Reynolds asserts that the trial court committed error in refusing his proposed instruction D-2, which instructed the jury as to the a reasonable doubt standard. Reynolds' proposed instruction stated: The Court instructs the Jury that you are bound, in deliberating upon this case, to give the Defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt of his guilt that arises out of the evidence or want of evidence in this case. Mere probability of guilt, however strong, will never warrant you in convicting the Defendant. It is only when on the whole evidence you are able to say on your oaths, beyond every reasonable doubt, that he is guilty, and that there is no other way to account for the evidence in the case than that he is guilty, that the law will permit you to find him guilty. You might be able to say you believe him to be guilty, and yet, if you are not able to say on your oaths, beyond every reasonable doubt, that he is guilty, it is your sworn duty by your verdict to say, Not Guilty. The State argues that the instruction was properly refused because it improperly defined reasonable doubt. The trial court refused the instruction because it had already granted an instruction that informed the jury, either specifically or generally, of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. This Court has examined the record and holds that the instructions adequately instructed the jury on this issue. Thus, the refusal of D-2 was not reversible error by the trial court.