Opinion ID: 1404175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the grants are entitled to a new trial on their claims authorized by the idaho tort claims act

Text: The Grant brothers contend that they pled negligence in their complaint, offered proof of negligence at trial, and were therefore entitled to have the jury instructed on the negligence issue. We agree, but nevertheless affirm the judgment of the trial court on this issue. One problem with this case that has faced both the trial court and this Court is that neither party was overly adept at distinguishing the tort claims cognizable under the ITCA from the constitutional claims cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus the pleadings of both parties, the proof offered at trial, and the jury instructions are all a jumble of the evidence and the law applicable under these two very different statutory schemes. While they may not have accomplished it artfully, however, it is clear that the Grants pled negligence in paragraph 6 of their amended complaint, and that counsel's arguments concerning reasonableness preserved the issue at trial sufficiently to merit jury instructions on negligence. Despite these findings, we are compelled by recent case law announced by this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court insofar as it concerns the gist of the Grants' claims authorized by the ITCA. The ITCA was designed to alleviate the harshness of previously existing law, which afforded governments and their employees absolute immunity from liability for wrongful acts. The Act is structured in three tiers: The general rule is that governmental entities are liable for damages arising out of their own negligent or otherwise wrongful acts and for those of their employees who were acting within the course and scope of their employment. I.C. § 6-903. Section 6-904 then sets out certain exceptions to liability, including, relevant to the present discussion, an exception for acts such as battery and false imprisonment commonly known as intentional torts. The third tier is also established by I.C. § 6-904. It states that the exceptions to liability do not apply if the acts were committed with malice or criminal intent. It was this latter provision on which instructions were given at trial, and on which the jury rendered a verdict for the defendants. That verdict has not been challenged by the Grants. Their appeal instead focused on the argument that instructions should have been given concerning the first ITCA tier, that of negligence. Our decision on this issue is governed by the Court's recent pronouncement in White v. University of Idaho, 118 Idaho 400, 797 P.2d 108 (1990). The White Court held that to commit a civil battery one need only have the intent to make physical contact with another person, not the intent to cause harm. The White decision engendered a strong dissent from one member of this Court. White, 118 Idaho at 403, 797 P.2d at 111 (Bistline, J. dissenting). Nevertheless, White is now Idaho case law precedent, dictating that we not send the Grants' negligence claim back for trial. The officers clearly intended to make physical contact with the Grants, and that contact resulted in harm. Under White, that action constitutes a battery, for which both the city and the individual officers are immune under I.C. § 6-904(3). This interpretation of the tort actions permitted by the ITCA may appear harsh to the Grants, but the entire suit against the City of Twin Falls was voluntarily dismissed. On the other hand, neither the § 1983 claim nor the tort claim against the individual officers was dismissed. In fact, the tort claim against the officers went to trial on the theory that malice was involved. The jury found in favor of the officers on that claim, and the ITCA precludes actions for nonmalicious battery. Even though the jury was not instructed on a negligence theory, such a theory on these facts has been precluded by White v. University of Idaho .