Opinion ID: 2596115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: rehearing on competency

Text: The Court of Appeals applied an abuse of discretion standard of review, presumably relying on the language in K.S.A. 22-3305(2) that says the court may set a hearing after notification of discharge from the treatment facility. Here, we are dealing with K.S.A. 22-3303(3), which says the court shall conduct a hearing. Nevertheless, in determining whether reasonable grounds existed to revisit the competency issue, we should afford a great deal of deference to the trial court that conducted the original proceedings. On the existence of reasonable grounds to believe that Johnson had become competent to stand trial, the district court made the following findings: 2. The defendant was found incompetent to stand trial as a result of brain trauma and the evidence established the effects of the trauma are permanent and irreversible, and therefore, the passage of time is not a reasonable ground to believe the defendant is competent. 3. The recent dismissal of involuntary commitment proceedings in Ness County District Court Case No.2006-CT-02 does not provide reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant is competent as contemplated by K.S.A.2005 Supp. 22-3303(3). The district court was absolutely correct in its assessment of the relevance of the dismissal of the involuntary commitment proceedings. That action simply meant that there was no probable cause to believe that Johnson was a mentally ill person subject to involuntary commitment for care and treatment because his sole diagnosis was an organic mental disorder. An organic mental disorder is, however, a mental defect within the meaning of the competency statutes. As noted previously, the district court understood the distinction; the prosecutor should have understood it as well. The district court's finding as to the nature and extent of Johnson's traumatic brain injury is directly supported by the opinions of both Dr. Woltersdorf and Dr. Burrows. Even Mr. Thibault, who testified for the State, did not dispute the diagnosis, but rather he simply disputed the effect of the injury on Johnson's ability to assist with his defense. Even then, Mr. Thibault acknowledged that Dr. Woltersdorf's testing was considerably more thorough. The district court specifically found Dr. Woltersdorf's testimony to be more credible. Nevertheless, it is not the function of an appellate court to weigh conflicting evidence, to evaluate witnesses' credibility, or to redetermine questions of fact. Hodges v. Johnson, 288 Kan. 56, 65, 199 P.3d 1251 (2009). The Court of Appeals appeared to do all three in Johnson II. One of factors the Court of Appeals cited as supporting a new competency evaluation and hearing was a belief that the original competency hearing was both controverted and limited in scope. Johnson II, slip op. at 16. A determination of whether reasonable grounds existed to have a second competency hearing should not lead an appellate court to redetermine the factual questions from the original hearing. Moreover, as we noted, incompetency can occur if the defendant is either unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or unable to make or assist in making his defense. The fact that only one of the alternative definitions of incompetency was present in the case does not provide reasonable grounds to believe that competency has been restored. The Court of Appeals not only weighed the evidence, it endeavored to provide its own analysis of the significance of certain test scores. That task was best left to the experts. Two of those experts, Dr. Woltersdorf and Dr. Burrows, opined that, given the lapse of time since the accident, they would not expect to see any significant improvement in Johnson's cognitive abilities. In rendering those opinions, the experts had the benefit of Johnson's results on the base line tests in January 2002 and the results from the same tests which were given subsequently. Although the experts noted slight improvement on the later tests, part of that was attributed to the patient's familiarity with the tests the second time around. Nevertheless, the experts had the test results when opining that Johnson would not significantly improve. We should not question the credibility of those opinions based upon our own lay analysis of what the test results show. Moreover, the experts' opinions directly refute Johnson II's assertion that the passage of time since the last medical evaluation of Johnson's cognitive abilities provides a reasonable ground to believe he is now competent. If the diagnosis is permanent and irreversible brain damage, the relative date of that assessment is immaterial. Further, any reliance on the detective's affidavit setting forth the conversation he overheard between Johnson and a store clerk is suspect. The State provided no foundation as to the detective's knowledge of computer programs to give context to his statement that the conversation contained some technical detail. For the uninformed, gibberish can sound like technical detail. Moreover, we do not know whether Johnson's part of the conversation was responsive to that of the clerk. Nevertheless, the district court considered the affidavit and opined that it did not override the expert opinions that were contained in the court file. We agree. If the State wanted an assessment of what the conversation may have meant on the issue of competency, it should have submitted the information to an expert for analysis. Also, we question the Court of Appeals' characterization of Dr. Woltersdorf's recommendation that Johnson engage in computer-assisted cognitive rehabilitation. Johnson II viewed it as an acknowledgment that Johnson could be rehabilitated to competency to stand trial. We are unwilling to put those words in the doctor's mouth. The more likely reason for the treatment recommendation was to assist Johnson in reaching some level of independent living, rather than to attain competency to stand trial. Finally, the Court of Appeals believed it was a factor that Dr. Woltersdorf had testified about certain strategies or accommodations which could be employed by the district court during a trial of this matter in an effort to mitigate the effects of Johnson's brain injury. Johnson II, slip op. at 20. However, the doctor discussed those possible strategies while giving his opinion that Johnson was incompetent to stand trial; he did not say that the strategies would resolve the problem. To the contrary, the doctor said that he knew of no adjustments in the courtroom which could compensate for Johnson's slow mental processing, which emanated from a nonhealing area of the brain. In conclusion, the district court's finding that the State had not proffered any evidence to establish reasonable grounds to believe that Johnson had been restored to competency to stand trial is supported by the record. In fact, the record provides reasonable grounds to believe that Johnson will never be restored to competency to stand trial. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision and affirm the district court's order dismissing the criminal proceedings without prejudice.