Opinion ID: 38
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wemmick's Castle[19]

Text: In addition to a heightened concern for public sensitivity to potentially offensive attorney communications, the Court in Florida Bar upheld the moratorium in part because of its belief that people should be given more of an option to avoid offensive speech in the privacy of their homes. See Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 625, 115 S.Ct. 2371 ([W]e have consistently recognized that the State's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society. (quotation marks and alterations omitted)). In this respect, the Court was adhering to a long-held position: One important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the unwilling listener. Although in many locations, we expect individuals simply to avoid speech they do not want to hear, the home is different. That we are often `captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech ... does not mean we must be captives everywhere. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 1491, 25 L.Ed.2d 736 (1970). Instead, a special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own walls, which the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid intrusions. Thus, we have repeatedly held that individuals are not required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and that the government may protect this freedom. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988) (some internal citations omitted); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 25 L.Ed.2d 736 (The ancient concept that `a man's home is his castle' into which `not even the king may enter' has lost none of its vitality, and none of the recognized exceptions includes any right to communicate offensively with another.). In Rowan, the Supreme Court categorically reject[ed] the argument that a vendor has a right under the Constitution or otherwise to send unwanted material into the home of another, and held that [t]he asserted right of a mailer ... stops at the outer boundary of every person's domain. Id. at 738, 90 S.Ct. 1484. Yet, a letter in a mailbox is no more intrusive than the newspaper in the mailbox, the e-mail in one's inbox, the television in the living room, the radio in the kitchen, or the Internet in the study. Arguably, mail is directly targeted at a residence, whereas television, radio, and the Internet may be viewed outside the home. But the Court has seemingly not focused on this distinction, and, instead, has held that the home should be protected from offensive language that disturbs domestic tranquility through the airwaves: Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder. Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content. To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow. One may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option does not give the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm that has already taken place. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978) (internal citation omitted) (upholding the FCC's regulation of radio broadcast); cf. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736-37, 90 S.Ct. 1484 ([A] mailer's right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee.). Once again, we find no reason to distinguish among these media for our First Amendment analysis.