Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 30

Heading: whether the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of the verdict on count i into evidence at the sentencing phase.

Text: ś 390. Evans argues that the trial judge erroneously allowed the State to introduce the jury's verdict on Count I into evidence at the sentencing phase as proof of the aggravating circumstance that the offense was committed during a kidnapping. Specifically, Evans argues that the jury's guilt-innocence phase verdict was not competent evidence of the aggravating circumstance that the offense occurred during a kidnapping. ś 391. This issue was recently before this Court in Williams v. State, 684 So.2d 1179 (Miss.1996). In Williams, the trial court allowed the State to introduce the guilty verdict from the guilt-innocence phase at Williams' re-sentencing after the case was reversed by this Court on direct appeal. This Court held that the second jury did not have to `re-find' the elements of murder and/or kidnaping, the underlying offense and could rely upon the prior finding made... during the guilt-finding phase. Id. at 1188. ś 392. In Williams, this Court relied on Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241-46, 108 S.Ct. 546, 552-55, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988), reh'g denied, 485 U.S. 944, 108 S.Ct. 1126, 99 L.Ed.2d 286 (1988), wherein the United States Supreme Court approved of the overlap between a finding of guilt in an underlying felony supporting a capital offense, and the reuse of that felony to prove an aggravator in the sentencing phase. Applying Lowenfield to the facts presented in Williams, this Court held with its `no reason' language, Lowenfield allows a resentencing jury to rely on what was found in the original trial in deciding whether or not an aggravator would apply. Williams, 684 So.2d at 1189. ś 393. In Williams, this Court recognized that Irving v. State, 441 So.2d 846, 849 (Miss. 1983), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1042, 107 S.Ct. 1986, 95 L.Ed.2d 826 (1987), clearly holds that the resentencing jury could not relitigate the issue of guilt, [r]ather the second jury's function was to accept the first jury's finding that Irving was guilty of felony-murder involving robbery and then to determine [the] sentence. Thus, this Court concluded that the resentencing jury could `reuse' the capital murder conviction to establish the aggravator that the offense was committed while Williams was engaged in the commission of kidnaping. 684 So.2d at 1190-91. The issue at the resentencing hearing was not the initial elements of the crime, but rather the sentence imposed upon a defendant who had been found guilty by a prior jury. Id. ś 394. In the present case, one jury heard all of the evidence regarding the charges against Evans and returned a guilty verdict against Evans for the crime of capital murder during the commission of a kidnapping. Certainly this same jury is entitled to rely upon their verdict in determining the appropriate punishment for that offense. Moreover, as in Williams, the jury in the present case was properly instructed that they were required to find aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Contrary to Evans' argument, there is nothing which indicates that the introduction of the guilty verdict resulted in unfair prejudice. This issue is without merit.