Opinion ID: 2551230
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Tenant's Arguments

Text: The tenant's arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. He urges us to interpose the mailbox rule that acceptance of an offer generally is effective as soon as put out of the offeree's possession, without regard to whether it ever reaches the offeror.... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 63(a) (1981). We have seen no indication that the legislature intended to incorporate this common law rule by implication. Indeed, the language, history, and structure of TOPA seem to exclude this possibility. The plain language of § 42-3404.11(1) (applying to accommodations with five or more units) precludes use of the mailbox rule by providing that the tenants shall ... deliver an application for registration [as a tenant organization] to the Mayor and the owner by hand or by first class mail within 45 days of receipt of a valid offer. Although use of the mail plainly is authorized, the application must be delivered within 45 days. It would be odd, indeed, if the legislature meant to take a radically different approach and incorporate the mailbox rule into a corresponding section of TOPA without at least mentioning that change. Cf. Orius Telecommunications, Inc., 857 A.2d at 1068 ([W]e cannot endorse the mailbox rule because its application ignores the existence of relevant statutory language and would nullify the essential holding of the director's interpretation that the relevant date under the statute is that of receipt by the claimant.). [15] Nor are we persuaded by the fact that some provisions of TOPA expressly allow (or require) notice to be sent by mail. See, e.g., D.C.Code § 42-3404.03 (2001) (offer of sale); D.C.Code § 42-3404.11(1) (2001) (copy of application for registration as a tenant organization). Nothing we say in this opinion precludes the tenant from sending his statement of interest by mail. He simply has to make sure that the owner receives it within the thirty-day period. In other words, the tenant who elects to use the mail accepts the risk of delay in receipt. Finally, while we recognize that the Council intended that ambiguities in the statute be resolved toward the end of strengthening the legal rights of tenants or tenant organizations, see D.C.Code § 42-3405.11 (2001); [16] Wilson Courts Tenants Ass'n, Inc. v. 523-525 Mellon Street, LLC, 924 A.2d 289, 294 (D.C.2007); Allman v. Snyder, 888 A.2d 1161, 1166 (D.C.2005), that rule of statutory construction, by its own terms, applies only when there is ambiguity. [17] Here, after consulting the language, structure, and legislative history of § 42-3404.09, we conclude that the statute is not ambiguous and we apply its plain meaning. Even if we were to apply this legislative rule of statutory construction, it does not provide a straightforward answer to the question before us. [S]trengthening the legal rights of tenants as a whole is not the same thing as devising an ad hoc rule that would permit an individual tenant to win. Moreover, the provision of TOPA at issue in this case was meant to balance the rights of tenants and owners. [N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs. Deciding what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of legislative choiceand it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the law. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987). Indeed, as we have demonstrated above, the interpretation of provide ... with that we adopt today could in fact benefit tenants as well as owners, even though it does not help the individual tenant in this case.