Opinion ID: 75654
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Fulford contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to satisfy the specific intent requirement of the federal carjacking statute, § 2119. We review this contention de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of the jury's verdict. See United States v. Trujillo, 146 F.3d 838, 845 (11th Cir. 1998). To constitute carjacking under § 2119, the taking of a motor vehicle must be committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm. 18 U.S.C. § 2119. The intent requirement of § 2119 is satisfied where the government proves that at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the driver's automobile the defendant possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car. Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 12 (1999). The defendant's intent 'is to be judged objectively from the visible conduct of the actor and what one in the position of the victim might reasonably conclude.' United States v. Guilbert, 692 F.2d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). In this case, Fulford put a gun to Iglesias's face and told him to [g]et the fuck out of the car. Iglesias testified that he feared for his life, and Fulford testified that he had been previously convicted of armed robbery. This evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Fulford had the conditional intent to kill or seriously harm Iglesias if necessary to steal the Blazer.