Opinion ID: 1976261
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: corroboration of the confession.

Text: The defendant contends that the trial court committed error in the refusal to direct a verdict of acquittal at the conclusion of the State's case and the entire case because of insufficient corroboration of the confession. It is a widely accepted doctrine reflected in either American decisional or statutory law that an uncorroborated extra-judicial confession cannot provide the evidential basis to sustain a conviction for crime. Annotation, 45 A.L.R. 2 d 1316 (1956); 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3 d ed. 1940), § 2070, p. 393; Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde the Defendant's Confession, 103 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 638 (1955). The rule in New Jersey that a confession without more cannot sustain a conviction can be traced back through the decisional law to as early as 1818. State v. Aaron, 4 N.J.L. 231 [ Reprint pages 269, 279, 282] ( Sup. Ct. 1818). The doctrine, despite its widespread and apparently firmly rooted acceptance in American Jurisprudence, is not without its substantial critics. Judge Learned Hand in Daeche v. United States, 250 F. 566, 571 (2 Cir. 1918), remarked: that the rule [requiring corroboration of confessions] has in fact any substantial necessity in justice, we are much disposed to doubt.    it seems to us that such evils as it corrects could be much more flexibly treated by the judge at trial.    Professor McCormick has recently observed: It is submitted that hard-and-fast rules requiring corroboration are as likely to obstruct the punishment of the guilty as they are to safeguard the innocent. McCormick on Evidence, p. 230, at n. 5 (1954). Commenting upon the rule requiring corroboration of a confession, Massachusetts has alluded to it as an artificial quantitative rule, and does not adhere to it. Commonwealth v. Kimball, 321 Mass. 290, 73 N.E. 2 d 468, 470 ( Sup. Jud. Ct. 1947). In Wisconsin, also, an uncorroborated confession may sustain a conviction for crime. Potman v. State, 259 Wis. 234, 47 N.W. 2 d 884, 885 ( Sup. Ct. 1951). While the rule requiring corroboration is firmly entrenched, there is a conflict among the authorities concerning the quantum of proof independent of the confession which the State must introduce before the confession may be considered as evidential. One view is that the State must proffer independent proof of the corpus delicti. Annotation, supra, 45 A.L.R. 2 d 1316, 1327. Note, supra, 103 U. of Pa. L. Rev., at note 63, p. 647. The other view is that the extrinsic corroborative proofs need not touch upon the corpus delicti but must be of such a nature as to give the confession an aura of authenticity. Annotation, 45 A.L.R. 2 d., at p. 1329; Note, supra, 103 U. of Pa. L. Rev., at p. 665. Under the latter view it is sufficient corroboration if the State introduces independent proof of such facts and circumstances as would tend to generate a belief that the confession is true; the evidence need not establish the corpus delicti independent of the confession. See Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 75 S.Ct. 158, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954); Anderson v. United States, 124 F. 2 d 58 (6 Cir. 1941), reversed on other grounds, 318 U.S. 350, 63 S.Ct. 599, 87 L.Ed. 829 (1943); Martinez v. People, 129 Colo. 94, 257 P. 2 d 654 ( Colo. Sup. Ct. 1954); State v. Cardwell, 90 Kan. 606, 135 P. 597, L.R.A. 1916 B, 745 ( Sup. Ct. 1913). Before resolving the question of what the New Jersey corroboration rule requires it will be helpful to define the term corpus delicti. There are three basic elements in the proof of any crime. First, the occurrence of loss or injury (a death in murder, a burnt dwelling house in common law arson, etc.); secondly, criminal causation of the loss or injury as opposed to accident ( i.e., some one committed a crime), and lastly, the defendant's identity or connection with the crime ( i.e., that the defendant in fact was the perpetrator of the crime). 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3 d ed. 1940), § 2072; 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (12 th ed. 1955), pp. 130-131. Dean Wigmore has suggested that in its correct meaning the term corpus delicti has reference only to the first of these elements, namely, the fact of the specific loss or injury sustained. 7 Wigmore, supra, p. 401. (Under this view the State in the instant case need only prove that the rectory was burned and that the death of someone ensued as the result thereof.) He goes on to state: This, too, is `a priori' the more natural meaning; for the contrast between the first and the other elements is what is emphasized by the rule; i.e. it warns us to be cautious in convicting, since it may subsequently appear that no one has sustained any loss at all; for example, a man has disappeared, but perhaps he may later reappear alive. To find that he is in truth dead, yet not by criminal violence  i.e. to find the second element lacking, is not the discovery against which the rule is designed to warn and protect us. (7 Wigmore, p. 401) Nonetheless, Wigmore admits that the prevailing view is that the term corpus delicti also comprehends the second element, i.e., somebody's criminality. Ibid, at p. 502. The decisions in New Jersey are somewhat ambiguous in their treatment of the immediate problem. Although the term corpus delicti has been defined to include both the specific loss or injury and a criminal agency causing the loss or injury, State v. Morris, 98 N.J.L. 621 ( Sup. Ct. 1923), affirmed on opinion below, 99 N.J.L. 526 ( E. & A. 1923); State v. Greely, 11 N.J. 485, 488 (1953), yet the cases are not uniform with respect to whether both of these elements must be proved by evidence independent of the confession. A reading of the New Jersey cases on the subject of independent corroborative proof aliunde the confession discloses that while it has been held that a confession, corroborated by independent proof of the corpus delicti will support a conviction for crime, yet, if such proof be lacking, it will suffice if the confession be corroborated by other evidence tending to strengthen it, so that the criminal agency (as well as defendant's connection with the crime) may be proven by the confession itself. State v. Guild, 10 N.J.L. 163 ( Sup. Ct. 1828); State v. Banusik, 84 N.J.L. 640 ( E. & A. 1906); State v. Kwiatkowski, 83 N.J.L. 650 ( E. & A. 1912); State v. James, 96 N.J.L. 132 ( E. & A. 1921); State v. Geltzeiler, 101 N.J.L. 415 ( E. & A. 1925); State v. Cole, 136 N.J.L. 606 ( E. & A. 1948); State v. Klausner, 4 N.J. Super. 427 ( App. Div. 1949); State v. Cooper, 10 N.J. 532 (1952); State v. Campisi, 42 N.J. Super. 138 ( App. Div. 1956), appeal dismissed in part and reversed in part, 23 N.J. 513 (1957). In one of the earliest cases on the subject, State v. Guild, supra , Chief Justice Ewing obviously followed what Wigmore contended was the correct view of corpus delicti in discussing the rule that the confession must be corroborated by independent proof. The Chief Justice then set forth a number of authorities holding that a totally uncorroborated confession, if it be free and voluntary, was sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction, but found it unnecessary to decide the question of whether or not proof of corroborating circumstances was required, since he found such proof to exist in that case. He declared for the court: In the first place, however, it becomes material to a correct understanding of the subject, to settle what is meant by the qualification, `corroborating,' annexed to the term `circumstances.' The phrase clearly does not mean facts which, independent of the confession, will warrant a conviction, for then the verdict would stand not on the confession, but upon those independent circumstances. To corroborate is to strengthen, to confirm by additional security, to add strength. The testimony of a witness, is said to be corroborated, when it is shown to correspond with the representation of some other witness, or to comport with some facts otherwise known or established. Corroborating circumstances then, used in reference to a confession, are such as serve to strengthen it, to render it more probable, such in short as may serve to impress a jury with a belief of its truth. (10 N.J.L., at page 187). In 1906 in State v. Banusik, supra , Chief Justice Gummere, in addressing an argument that the law will not permit a conviction to stand absent proof of criminal agency causing death, declared: But this, in our opinion, is not an accurate statement, either of the rule of law as to the proof required with relation to the corpus delicti, or the condition of the evidence upon the question whether a murder was committed. Full proof of the body of the crime, the corpus delicti, independently of the confession, is not required. It may be proved by the confession itself, corroborated by other evidence. (84 N.J.L., at pages 646-647.) But in State v. Kwiatkowski, supra , Chancellor Walker, speaking for the Court of Errors and Appeals, in a case where there was ample evidence of death through criminal agency, declared: The only limitation upon the use as evidence against him of a prisoner's confession of murder, voluntarily made, is the want of proof of the corpus delicti. If death, through criminal agency, be proved, and a man confesses to having caused that death, he may be convicted of murder on his confession. (83 N.J.L., at page 660.) In State v. James, supra , the Court of Errors and Appeals recognized that either rule would suffice in holding:    in this situation, namely, proof of the death of a person by foul means and the confession of a party that he murdered the man whose death is so proved, the law of this state is entirely settled; for in State v. Kwiatkowski, 83 N.J.L. 650, this court held that the only limitation upon the use as evidence against him of a prisoner's confession of murder, voluntarily made, is the want of proof of corpus delicti. If death through criminal agency, be proved, and a man confesses to having caused that death, he may be convicted of murder on his confession. Furthermore, in State v. Banusik, 84 N.J.L. 640, this court held that in a prosecution for murder the corpus delicti may be proved by the confession made by the defendant which is corroborated by other evidence. The law does not require full proof of the body of the crime independent of such confession.    As seen above, the corpus delicti was proved independently of the confession, but, if it were not, as contended for by the prisoner, still the confession was so thoroughly corroborated by other evidence that both together afforded full proof of the body of the crime. (96 N.J.L., at pages 147, 148.) In State v. Geltzeiler, supra , the court declared: In the history of the law so many persons are known to have confessed the commission of crimes they never committed, even including murder, that the rule requiring proof of the corpus delicti has been evolved. However, when there is a voluntary confession of the offense by the defendant in a criminal case, full proof of the body of the crime is not required in addition to the confession, but sufficient proof thereof may arise out of evidence corroborating some fact or facts in the confession itself. (101 N.J.L., at page 416.) See also State v. Cooper, supra, 10 N.J. at page 545, and State v. Campisi, supra, 42 N.J. Super. at page 145. In our view, the test first enunciated in the Guild case, i.e., that the State must introduce independent proof of facts and circumstances which strengthen or bolster the confession and tend to generate a belief in its trustworthiness, plus independent proof of loss or injury, affords ample protection for the accused and is the rule best designed to serve the ends of justice in the administration of the criminal law. Historically the doctrine of corroboration evolved from notorious instances both in England and the United States where individuals confessed to the murder of missing persons were convicted and hung on the sole strength of their confessions, and afterwards the alleged decedent returned very much alive. See Note, supra, 103 U. of Pa. L. Rev., at pages 638, 639, 646, and authorities therein cited. The evil at which the corroboration rule was aimed was not that the death which was confessed to was in fact accidental rather than felonious, but rather that there was, in fact, no death at all. This objection is, as Dean Wigmore noted, overcome by the requirement that the State prove independently of the confession only the fact of loss or injury. It might be argued that the State ought also to prove criminal agency before a confession be considered as evidential, in order to assure that confession was not the imaginary product of a mentally diseased or deficient mind. But if criminal agency must be proven aliunde the confession, why not the defendant's connection with the crime? There seems to be little difference in kind between convicting the innocent where no crime has been committed and convicting the innocent where a crime has been committed, but not by the accused. Yet, no jurisdiction imposes such a requirement, for that would in effect inverse the rule and render the confession merely corroborative of a crime independently proven. Indeed, it is ofttimes more likely that persons giving false confessions because of mental disease or defect will confess to crimes where there is abundant proof of the two elements of the corpus delicti but where there is no proof as to the perpetrator. The danger is not so much that such persons will confess to non-criminal occurrences but rather to crimes committed by some one other than themselves. Under such circumstances the confessor is probably afforded greater protection by the requirement that the State must introduce such independent corroborative proof of facts and circumstances tending to generate a belief in the trustworthiness of the confession than he is by the rule requiring independent proof of the corpus delicti. Confessions, like other admissions against interest, stand high in the probative hierarchy of proof. It is for this reason that the law imposes various safeguards designed to assure that the confession is true. But safeguards for the accused should not be turned into obstacles whereby the guilty can escape just punishment. No greater burden should be required of the State than independent corroborative proof tending to establish that when the defendant confessed he was telling the truth, plus independent proof of the loss or injury. In our view, the State's corroborating proofs aliunde the confession presented a question for the jury as to the trustworthiness of the confession. Lucas stated that he set the fire at approximately 4:00 A.M. That the fire started about that time is beyond cavil from the proofs in the record. Lucas described the night as rainy, nasty  it had in fact rained all night on March 14. His description of having set the fire in the library, i.e., the rectory office, was corroborated by the evidence relating to the point of origin of the fire previously detailed. Lucas accurately described the layout and contents of the office, including the paper books on the mantel which caused him to think the room was a library, although by his own admission he had never been there before. Edith Egan, who occupied the room during the day, confirmed this by testifying that although she believed that she had seen Lucas in the Cathedral, he had never been in the office. The chairs lined up against one of the walls, which Lucas described, had only been in the office for several months prior to the fire. Under a concentrated mass of rubble located at the point in the office where the fire was believed to have started, at the floor level, were the eight fragments of glass. While the State's proof would have been stronger had it been successful in attempts to identify the fragments, nonetheless these otherwise unaccounted for fragments of glass could have formed the basis for an inference by the trier of fact that they were the remains of the bottle in which Lucas claimed to have carried the gasoline and which he threw into the fire. The State further proved that charred telephone books were found on the office floor, again mute confirmation of Lucas' story that he poured gasoline over some paper books which were on the mantel in the office. Also the spontaneity of Lucas' re-enactment of the crime corroborates his confession. Defendant argues that the following circumstances negate the truth of the confession: That Lucas' employer, Maxwell Kleinerman, testified that he picked Lucas up at between 4:48 and 5:00 A.M. on the morning of March 14. Though it had rained all night and was still raining, Kleinerman testified that Lucas' clothes were dry when he picked him up. Kleinerman further testified that he is allergic to the smell of gasoline, and though he and Lucas rode together in the truck for the remainder of the day, he could detect no smell of gasoline about Lucas. It should be noted that there is nothing in the record to indicate that Lucas spilled any of the gasoline on his clothing. It may be noted that Kleinerman further testified that in jest he asked Lucas: if he had done, it, if he had set fire to the Cathedral, and he says, `No, they can't pin that on me. I wasn't anywhere near there.' Q. Did he say anything else about it?
Q. And what were his precise words?    A. `I didn't know anyone lived there.' He also stated that although Lucas had a habit of crossing himself when they drove past the Cathedral, that practice, as well as his determination to convert to Catholicism, ceased after March 14, 1956. That it was established that the doors by which Lucas claimed to have entered the rectory were usually locked at 9 or 9:30 P.M.; that the cook, returning home at about 11:10 P.M., used a key to enter the premises by those doors, and that the firemen, when they arrived at the rectory had to use a Kelly tool (an axe-like instrument) to force open the doors. Chief Dovgala testified that it was very doubtful that the heat from the flames would have caused the doors to expand. However, the cook did not know whether she was the last person to enter the premises that evening, and further she testified that people attempting to lock the doors experienced some difficulty in so doing. That the conclusion of the Fire Department was that the cause of the fire was unknown and that the State Police Crime Laboratory conducted ultra-violet ray tests in the rectory office designed to detect the presence of a petroleum base, the results of which were negative. But Chief Dovgala testified that evidence of arson is usually destroyed in the fire itself and that the firemen are their own worst enemies in this connection, since in extinguishing the fire the evidence may be washed away. A million gallons of water were used to extinguish the blaze in the instant case. That the attendant at the gasoline station at the time when Lucas claimed to have purchased the gasoline testified for the defense that he had not sold gasoline to any person on foot during the night of the fire. On cross-examination he admitted that while he had probably sold gasoline to persons on foot on many occasions, he could not recall a single specific night on which he sold gasoline to any one on foot. He further admitted that it is contrary both to local ordinance and his employer's policy to sell gasoline in a bottle, and that he would probably lose his job if he did so sell it. That the police during their investigation did not attempt to confirm Lucas' account of his walk down Perry Street and his stop at the bus terminal for a drink of water. Janet Cassidy, the night ticket agent at the terminal, testified that Lucas, whom she knew on sight, did not enter the terminal on the night of the fire, and that the doors were locked between 3:30 and 5:00 A.M. in order for the terminal to be cleaned. From her station she had an unobstructed view of the drinking fountain. On cross-examination Mrs. Cassidy admitted that she napped occasionally while she was on the job, but she insisted that she remained awake on the night of the fire. It should be noted that Lester Meeks, the terminal policeman, testified for the State on rebuttal that Mrs. Cassidy did take naps and that on occasion it was difficult to wake her up. After Meeks left for the night, at approximately 4:00 A.M., he would lock up two of the doors to the terminal, but the back door was left open. Pursuant to company policy the janitor must lock the other door after Meeks' departure. However, Meeks did not know whether this procedure was followed on March 14. That Father Basco called by the defense testified that he had never given religious instruction to Lucas, although he had been the pastor of the only Catholic parish in Florence from 1939 to the date of trial, with the exception of one year. That although the police inquired, none of the priests at the Cathedral remembered having an altercation with Lucas. That it was further established that Lucas was not registered, as he claimed in his confession, at the Hotel Penn on the night of the fire. In summary, the core of the State's case on corroboration is that the facts recited in Lucas' confession could only have been known by the one who set the fire. Nowhere in the record is there evidence tending to explain, consistent with the hypothesis of innocence, how Lucas acquired the incriminating information which he recited to the police. At best, the proof tending to negate the crucial facts in the confession were circumstantial, leading to inconclusive inferences. The proofs tending to negate the peripheral facts recited in the confession, such as where Lucas resided on the night of the fire, whether he had had previous religious training in Catholicism, whether Lucas entered the bus terminal for a drink of water, even if accepted as true, were not in their totality sufficient as a matter of law to warrant the conclusion that the confession was untrustworthy. Giving due consideration to the points raised by defendant to evince a negation to the truth of the confession, still there existed at the conclusion of the State's case and the entire trial a factual situation for the determination of the jury as to its trustworthiness. On motion to direct an acquittal on grounds of lack of corroboration the trial court must determine whether there is any legal evidence, apart from the confession of facts and circumstances, from which the jury might draw an inference that the confession is trustworthy. See State v. Dunphy, 24 N.J. 10, 16 (1957); State v. Kollarik, 22 N.J. 558, 564 (1956); State v. Rogers, 19 N.J. 218, 232 (1955). As we have indicated, the test has clearly been met and the trial court was correct in refusing to direct a judgment of acquittal on grounds of failure of corroboration both at the conclusion of the State's case and at the conclusion of the entire case. On the question of corroboration, the court charged defendant's request to charge number 29 as follows: The corpus delicti, in order to corroborate the confession, must be proved by evidence other than the confession, beyond a reasonable doubt. No further request to charge on the subject of corroboration was made. It should be noted that the charge placed a greater burden on the State than the law requires and was in that sense favorable to the defendant. The corroborative proofs need only establish the trustworthiness of the confession and not the corpus delicti. Defendant argues that, although no charge on the subject was requested, the trial court should have defined the term corpus delicti. We do not find that the court's failure to specifically charge the jury with respect to their duty to find corroboration within the standards outlined in this opinion constituted plain error, pursuant to R.R. 1:5-1( a ) which, as defined in State v. Corby, 28 N.J. 106, 108 (1958), means legal impropriety affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result. State v. Haines, 18 N.J. 550, 565 (1955); State v. Picciotti, 12 N.J. 205, 211 (1953). The entire thrust of the defense, aside from insanity, was to establish that the facts recited in the confession were untrue. The court charged defendant's request number 18 as follows: It is for the Jury to decide whether the Defendant spoke the truth when he confessed, if he did confess, and whether the witnesses who testified that he made such a confession testified truthfully. And in the main body of the charge the court declared that the weight and credibility to be given to the confession were for the jury to determine after a consideration of all the evidence in the case. The jury, in weighing the confession, and assaying its truth, must have considered the state of the independent corroborative proofs. In light of all of the foregoing we are not convinced that the failure to specifically charge on the subject of corroboration of the confession possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.