Opinion ID: 2086038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right to be Present at the Proceedings

Text: Ridley lists seven occasions during the proceedings when neither he nor any codefendant was present for discussions between counsel for both sides and the court. He contends that this absence violated his right to be present at all critical stages of the proceedings Specifically, Ridley was absent during each of the following: (1) a pretrial hearing on the State's motion to redact juror identification information from juror questionnaires; (2) a discussion resulting in the excuse of two jurors for hardship; (3) the tender and rejection of preliminary instructions by the State and the defense; (4) the transmission of a request that an alternate juror be excused; (5) Ridley's counsel's motion to exclude an item of discovery received during the trial; (6) the tender and acceptance of an exhibit related to the pre-trial motion for change of venue; and (7) the court's announcement that agreement on final jury instructions was near. Ridley cites four different sources for the right he relies on: the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and § 13 of the Indiana Constitution, without clearly distinguishing among them. His reference to the Fifth Amendment appears in a string citation and is waived for failure to develop the claim. The remaining three sources guarantee a defendant a right of presence but they are not identical. [2] Accordingly, we discuss each in turn. The Sixth Amendment right of the accused to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial is [o]ne of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause.... Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). Because it is rooted in the Confrontation Clause, the Sixth Amendment right to be present is implicated when the absence of an accused results in a Confrontation Clause violationfor example, when witnesses or hearsay evidence are presented in the accused's absence affecting the opportunity to cross-examine. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737-38, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2662-63, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987). In the present case, the proceedings that occurred in Ridley's absence were not related to the presentation of witnesses or evidence. They dealt with jurors, jury instructions, evidence relevant to a pre-trial motion, and the belated receipt of an item of discoverytelephone subscriber informationthat duplicated information already made available to the defendants. For the most part, these proceedings were nonsubstantive and none involved Ridley's right of cross examination under the Confrontation Clause. Accordingly, there was no Sixth Amendment violation. In situations not implicating the Confrontation Clause, however, the right to be present may be guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The accused has a due process right to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.... [T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence and to that extent only. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934)). In sum, a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. at 2667. Ridley contends that what he could or would have contributed to these discussions is unknown because he was not present. But this is not enough. The defendant has the burden to show how his presence could contribute to a more reliable determination of the fact at issue. If a defendant can contribute or gain nothing from attending the proceeding, then his due process right is not violated. Id.; see also Hovey v. Calderon, 1996 WL 400979, at  (N.D.Cal. July 10, 1996). Ridley has not shown, or attempted to show, how any of these proceedings were critical to the outcome of the trial or how his presence would have contributed to the fairness of the procedure. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. at 2667. Accordingly, his due process claim fails. [3] Finally, Ridley cites Article I, § 13 of the Indiana Constitution. Section 13 protects a defendant's right to be present at every stage of a criminal proceeding which requires the presence of the jury. [4] James v. State, 613 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind.1993); Brown v. State, 445 N.E.2d 82, 83 (Ind.1983) (citing Harris v. State, 249 Ind. 681, 231 N.E.2d 800 (1967)). Waiver of the right must be done expressly and must be done by the defendant. Miles v. State, 222 Ind. 312, 319, 53 N.E.2d 779, 782 (1944); Harris, 249 Ind. at 688, 231 N.E.2d at 804. Unless waived, a defendant's absence raises an inference of prejudice. However, the inference can be rebutted by the State and may be harmless. James, 613 N.E.2d at 24; Harris, 249 Ind. at 690-92, 231 N.E.2d at 805-06; Childers v. State, 408 N.E.2d 1284 (Ind.Ct.App.1980). None of the proceedings at issue in the current case, however, occurred in the presence of the jury. Each concerned matters that either were of a type often dealt with in the absence of the defendantsettling instructions, pre-trial motions or discovery issues or which were properly discussed outside the defendants' presencewhether to redact juror identification information from the juror questionnaires. Because Ridley does not contend that he was absent from voir dire or any other critical proceeding, neither the rebuttable inference of prejudice nor the rule permitting only an express waiver applied. Accordingly, the right to be present under § 13 was not implicated by Ridley's absence and the claims are waived for failure to object or to establish any prejudice.