Opinion ID: 1228478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Incriminating Statement.

Text: The question whether the trial court erroneously suppressed the appellee's incriminating statement turns on the interpretation of section 19-2-102(3)(c)(I), C.R.S.1973, which provides: No statements or admissions of a child made as a result of interrogation of the child by a law enforcement official concerning acts alleged to have been committed by the child which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult shall be admissible in evidence against that child unless a parent, guardian, or legal custodian of the child was present at such interrogation and the child and his parent, guardian, or legal custodian were advised of the child's right to remain silent, that any statements made may be used against him in a court of law, the right of the presence of an attorney during such interrogation, and the right to have counsel appointed if so requested at the time of the interrogation ; except that, if a public defender or counsel representing the child is present at such interrogation, such statements or admissions may be admissible in evidence even though the child's parent, guardian, or legal custodian was not present. (Emphasis added.) The trial court apparently construed the words at the time of the interrogation to modify all the prior language in the statute regarding advisement of rights, and thus to require a complete, fresh advisement at the time a statement is obtained without regard to warnings previously given. We do not agree with the trial court's interpretation. The rights set out in this section are derived directly from the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. People v. Knapp, 180 Colo. 280, 505 P.2d 7 (1973). The statute is designed to provide the child parental guidance during police interrogations, and thereby provide at least some assurance that the child's waiver of rights will be made knowingly and intelligently. People v. Maes, Colo., 571 P.2d 305 (1977); People in the Interest of L. B., 33 Colo.App. 1, 513 P.2d 1069 (1973). The question presented is whether those purposes have been fulfilled. We do not construe the statute to require, in every case, a repetitive advisement of rights immediately before any statement is taken. [8] The words at the time of the interrogation refer to the request for appointment of counsel, and do not refer back to all the rights listed. Nor is it necessary to read such a requirement into the statute to make its protections meaningful. Since these statutory rights are based upon Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, the People have the burden to prove that there has been a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver. People v. Stephens, 188 Colo. 8, 532 P.2d 728 (1975). Here the People have clearly met that burden. The appellee and his father were warned of their rights three times, the last full warning having been given less than four hours before the incriminating statement was taken. The interrogating officer reminded both father and son of the prior advisements and both indicated that they remembered and understood. Further evidence of the voluntary nature of the waiver is the fact that the appellee's mother called the sheriff's office and requested that an officer be dispatched. The record is replete with convincing evidence that both David and his father were fully aware of David's rights and these rights were knowingly waived. There is no evidence of coercion or deceit by the officers. Cf. People v. Coghlan, supra . Finally, the appellee argues that his father was not an adequate representative of his interests, since there was evidence of hostility between the two. Where the interests of a parent and child are adverse, the parent is disqualified from acting as the advising party under section 19-2-102, supra. See, e. g., People in the Interest of P.L.V., 176 Colo. 342, 490 P.2d 685 (1971). Here, however, the fact that the father was upset with his son's possible involvement in a crime does not mean that their interests were necessarily adverse. Cf. People in the Interest of P.L.V., supra (juvenile suspected of burglarizing his parents' home). We conclude that the appellee's rights were adequately protected. Accordingly, the ruling of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consonant with the views here expressed.