Opinion ID: 4531068
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Number of Accidents

Text: Finally, also at issue was the number of accidents that occurred under the T&G policy. The district court concluded the events constituted a single accident.5 Its conclusion had two bases. First, it pointed to State Auto Property and Casualty Co. v. Matty, 690 S.E.2d 614 (Ga. 2010), where the Georgia Supreme Court adopted the “cause” theory to define the word “accident” in insurance policies. See id. at 617–18. “Under this theory, the number of accidents is determined by the number of causes of the injuries, with the court asking if [t]here was but one proximate, uninterrupted, and continuing cause which resulted in all of the injuries and damage.” Id. at 617 (quotation marks omitted). In the context of vehicle accidents involving multiple collisions that do not occur simultaneously (recognizing that it is almost impossible that such collisions can occur without any difference in time and place), courts look to whether, after the cause of the initial collision, the driver regained control of the vehicle before a subsequent collision, so that it can be said there was a second intervening cause and therefore a second accident. 4 Because it concluded Grange was not liable under the FST policy, the district court noted that there could be no liability under the umbrella policy. 5 The number of accidents matters because the T&G insurance policy limits the amount that Grange will pay “Per Accident.” 8 Case: 18-13555 Date Filed: 05/01/2020 Page: 9 of 25 Id. Defendants did not dispute that if State Auto controlled there was one “accident.” But Defendants did dispute whether State Auto controlled. They said the policies themselves provided a definition of “accident,” which they indeed seem to do: “‘Accident’ includes continuous or repeated exposure to the same conditions resulting in ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage.’” The district court believed the policy definition comported comfortably with the rule announced in State Auto. But it alternatively rejected Defendants’ argument that multiple collisions can never constitute the exact “same conditions,” per the policy definition. As the district court put it, [I]t is clear that the collisions in this case involved the “same conditions.” On the same day, at the same time, on the same road, the truck “was sideswiped by [one] vehicle, and [then] . . . struck another vehicle.” Notably, a single motor vehicle accident report was prepared, treating both collisions under the same accident number. The description of the accident by the reporting officer and diagram demonstrating the events make clear that a single accident occurred. Of particular import is the fact that the accident report provided the same “condition information” for both collisions. This kind of information, not Defendants’ unique interpretation, is what is ordinarily meant by “same conditions.” Both collisions occurred under the same lighting conditions, the same weather conditions, the same road conditions, the same traffic conditions, etc. (citations omitted). Moreover, the limit of insurance clause in the policies applies “[r]egardless of the number of . . . vehicles involved in the ‘accident’.” The district 9 Case: 18-13555 Date Filed: 05/01/2020 Page: 10 of 25 court concluded that Defendants’ argument that any time separate collisions occur there are different “conditions” would read that language out of the contract. It also rejected Defendants’ suggestion that any time there is a multi-auto collision, there are multiple accidents.