Opinion ID: 1784340
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issue: Whether the Jury's Premature Decision to Sentence Holland to Death Constituted a Reversible Error?

Text: Upon conclusion of the guilt phase, at 2:49 p.m., the judge excused the jury while he and the attorneys discussed some preliminary matters regarding the sentencing phase. Vol. XIV, at 2403-04. At 3:11 p.m., the judge received a note from the jury. The note read: We, the jury, sentence Gerald James Holland to death. Holland immediately moved for a mistrial, which the judge overruled. Id. at 2407-09. Instead, the judge summoned the jury to the courtroom and instructed it accordingly: Ladies and gentlemen, I have received your note and I want to let you know that the guilt stage of the trial is over with. There are certain administrative matters that the Court has to dispose of before we get to the second phase, which is the sentencing phase. At that stage there will be, of course, some testimony and I will instruct you as to the law that will govern the deliberations at that stage. Until we get to that point, I instruct you to refrain from any further deliberations. I can't tell you the exact time, but it will be shortly and the Court will bring you back out here and the Court will begin the sentencing phase, the second stage of the  Jury go to the jury room. Id. at 2411. The sentencing phase eventually commenced and, after approximately 2 hours and 43 minutes of testimony and argument, the phase concluded. The jury then deliberated for approximately 2 hours and 15 minutes before returning a sentence of death. Id. at 2439-513. Holland now questions the judge's decision to overrule his motion for a mistrial.
Holland contends that a mistrial should have been granted because the jurors not only deliberated prior to the presentation of evidence and instructions, they arrived at a verdict, and thereby abandoned any pretense of impartiality going into the sentencing phase. Appellant's Brief at 5-6 (citing cases). The State counters that: It is clear that the jury deliberated some two hours and ten minutes after receiving the instructions of the court at the end of testimony and arguments in the sentence phase of the trial. Clearly the jury followed the instructions of the Court and made the proper findings prior to imposing the sentence of death. The length of time that the jury took to arrive at its verdict demonstrates that it did not simply walk in the jury room and copy the verdict of death down. That would have only taken minutes. The length of time clearly shows that the jury seriously considered the aggravating and mitigating factors prior to arriving at their verdict. Appellee's Brief at 9. The State adds that jurors are presumed to follow the instructions of the court. Id. (citing cases). Alternatively, the State contends that, assuming that the judge erred, the error at most should be deemed harmless: It cannot be said, after considering all the evidence presented, that the jury would not have found that the aggravating circumstances did not outweigh the mitigating circumstances and sentenced the defendant to death. Id. at 10 (citing cases).

The Sixth Amendment, in part, guarantees the criminal defendant the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968) (applying the sixth-amendment right to states through the fourteenth amendment); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 51 L.Ed.2d 393, 402 (1977) (sentencing process ... must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause); Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657, 670 (Miss. 1990) (constitutional guarantees which are applicable to guilt phase are also applicable to sentencing phase); Dycus v. State, 440 So.2d 246, 257-58 (Miss. 1983) (same). Jurors must not discuss a case among themselves until all the evidence has been presented, counsel have made final arguments, and the case has been submitted to them after final instructions by the trial court. State v. Washington, 182 Conn. 419, 438 A.2d 1144, 1147 (1980) (citing several treatises); accord State v. McGuire, 272 S.C. 547, 253 S.E.2d 103 (1979); State v. Drake, 31 N.C. App. 187, 229 S.E.2d 51 (1976). In short, each juror [must] keep an open mind until the case has been submitted to the jury. United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir.1974). An open mind is critical because: [A]n opinion [prematurely] formed could only be removed, if at all, by evidence. This in effect shift[s] the burden of proof and place[s] upon the defendants the burden of changing by evidence the opinion thus formed. A juror having in discussion not only formed but expressed his view as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, his inclination thereafter would be to give special attention to such testimony as to his mind strengthened, confirmed or vindicated the views which he had already expressed to his fellow jurors, whereas, had there been no discussion and no expression of tentative opinion, he would not be confronted with embarrassment before his fellow jurors should he change the tentative opinion which he might entertain from hearing evidence. Winebrenner v. United States, 147 F.2d 322, 328 (8th Cir.1945); accord United States v. Aaron Burr, 25 F.Cas. 49, 50 (C.C.Va. 1807) (Such a person may believe that he will be regulated by testimony, but the law suspects him, and certainly not without reason. He will listen with more favor to that testimony which confirms, than to that which would change his opinion; it is not to be expected that he will weigh evidence or argument as fairly as a man whose judgment is not made up in the case.); Washington, 438 A.2d at 1148 (Once a juror has expressed an opinion ... the die may well have been cast.). Admittedly, not every incident of juror misconduct requires a new trial. Klee, 494 F.2d at 396. A new trial may be unwarranted if the misconduct is proved beyond a reasonable doubt to be harmless. Washington, 438 A.2d at 1149 (Inasmuch as the error was one of constitutional dimension, it is incumbent upon the state to show that it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.) (citing Aillon v. State, 168 Conn. 541, 363 A.2d 49 (1975)). Meeting this burden has generally been a formidable task because, [a]lmost without exception, where the issue has been properly raised, every court has held that ... [mere] discuss[ion by jurors of] the case before its submission to them constitutes reversible error. Id. at 1148 (citing numerous cases from various jurisdictions); see, e.g., State v. Gill, 273 S.C. 190, 255 S.E.2d 455, 457 (1979) (an oft-cited, capital-murder case which the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed because jurors prematurely commenced deliberations).
Applying the law to the facts, this Court concludes that the jury's premature deliberations prejudiced Holland's right to a fair hearing during the sentencing phase. A different conclusion may have been reached had the trial judge questioned the jurors in order to determine whether each of them could have remained impartial. See, e.g., United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir.1984) (mistrial unwarranted because the trial judge removed two jurors who prematurely deliberated and questioned each of the remaining jurors and determined each was not influenced); United States v. Anello, 765 F.2d 253 (1st Cir.1985) (same); People v. Castillo, 144 A.D.2d 376, 534 N.Y.S.2d 188 (2d Dep't 1988) (same); see also Jones, 461 So.2d at 692 (trial court is certainly free to employ a second jury if it wishes). In some jurisdictions, trial judges are required or advised to conduct a thorough inquiry when a juror or jurors prematurely deliberated or formed an opinion. In the case sub judice, the judge merely instructed the jurors to refrain from further deliberations. This instruction was insufficient to insure that Holland's right to a fair hearing was not prejudiced. The case must be remanded for re-sentencing by an impartial jury.