Opinion ID: 1224847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Majority Err by Approving the Trial Court's Reliance on the Truth of its Own 1990 Findings to Reject the Legislature's Subsequent Factual Findings.

Text: The trial court clearly engaged in its own independent factual analysis to conclude that the findings expressed by the Legislature in support of Chapter 433 were unsubstantiated and wrong; hence, the legislation is unconstitutional. Such a determination is endorsed by the majority opinion; however, I conclude that application or consideration of the trial court's findings is inappropriate under long-standing and well-regarded case law which the majority opinion fails to acknowledge and has not distinguished by applicable precedent. At oral argument, plaintiffs conceded that the appropriate standard of review for legislative findings was expressed in Lockard v. City of Los Angeles (1949) 33 Cal.2d 453, 461 [202 P.2d 38, 7 A.L.R.2d 990], wherein this court stated: `[T]he rule is well settled that the legislative determination that the facts exist which make the law necessary, must not be set aside or disregarded by the courts, unless the legislative decision is clearly and palpably wrong and the error appears beyond reasonable doubt from facts or evidence which cannot be controverted, and of which the courts may properly take notice. ' [Citations.] (Italics added.) This statement is an evolution of Stevenson v. Colgan (1891) 91 Cal. 649, 652-653 [27 P. 1089]: While the courts have undoubted power to declare a statute invalid, when it appears to them in the course of judicial action to be in conflict with the constitution, yet they can only do so when the question arises as a pure question of law, unmixed with matters of fact the existence of which must be determined upon a trial, and as the result of it, it may be, conflicting evidence. When the right to enact a law depends upon the existence of facts, it is the duty of the legislature, before passing the bill, and of the governor before approving it, to become satisfied in some appropriate way that the facts exist, and no authority is conferred upon the courts to hear evidence, and determine, as a question of fact, whether these co-ordinate departments of the state government have properly discharged such duty. The authority and duty to ascertain the facts which ought to control legislative action are, from the necessity of the case, devolved by the constitution upon those to whom it has given the power to legislate, and their decision that the facts exist is conclusive upon the courts, in the absence of an explicit provision in the constitution giving the judiciary the right to review such action. We therefore hold, that in passing upon the constitutionality of a statute, the court must confine itself to a consideration of those matters which appear upon the face of the law, and those facts of which it can take judicial notice. If the law, when thus considered, does not appear to be unconstitutional, the court will not go behind it, and, by a resort to evidence, undertake to ascertain whether the legislature, in its enactment, observed the restrictions which the constitution imposed upon it as a duty to do, and to the performance of which the members were bound by their oaths of office.  (Italics added.) The trial court in the instant case was aware of the restrictions placed upon its power to make factual determinations regarding statutes. In this regard, the trial court utilized the correct standard, stating: The courts may set aside the legislative findings on which the constitutionality of a statute is based only if the legislative findings could not reasonably be true on their face or in light of judicially noticeable facts. The trial court then took judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code ง 452, subdivision (d), of the findings in the statement of decision underlying the judgment entered April 17, 1990, and the findings in the orders issued after evidentiary hearings to enforce the judgment. [2] In my view, the court erred in its determination of what constituted judicially noticeable facts. We must first look to what was decided. The trial court concluded the 1990 injunction should remain in place because Chapter 433 was unconstitutional and therefore could not and did not impact the injunction. The basis for the trial court's decision was not that the legislative findings in Chapter 433 may have conflicted with its earlier injunction and findings of fact, thereby creating a possible separation of powers issue. [3] Rather, the trial court concluded the Legislature's findings of fact in Chapter 433 were palpably erroneous and inconsistent with article VII because the court took judicial notice of the truth of its previous factual findings. [4] It was by judicially noticing the truth of these factual findings that the court fundamentally erred. In effect, the trial court circumvented Lockard and Stevenson by taking judicial notice of the truth of its own findings. It was precisely these findings of fact which the trial court utilized to undermine the legislative findings and to conclude that Chapter 433 was unconstitutional: In Chapter 433 of the Statutes of 1993, the Legislature has sought to provide defendants with justifications under article VII to implement their administrative and management policies for contracting. The legislative findings and directives comprising the justifications, however, are obviously erroneous, unreasonable and inconsistent with the constitutional civil service mandate. Under the rule of Lockard and Stevenson, the trial court's prior factual findings when made could not properly be the basis upon which to find erroneous the legislative conclusions set forth to support Chapter 433. They cannot, therefore, become the basis through the mechanism of judicial notice. In other words, the trial court cannot do indirectly what it is not permitted to do directly. Further, judicial notice of findings of fact does not mean that those findings of fact are true, but, rather, only means that those findings of fact were made. ( Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal. App.4th 1548, 1564-1565 [8 Cal. Rptr.2d 552]; accord, Fowler v. Howell (1996) 42 Cal. App.4th 1746, 1749 [50 Cal. Rptr.2d 484]; Ludwig v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal. App.4th 8, 14, fn. 6 [43 Cal. Rptr.2d 350] [ability to judicially notice truth of statements seriously doubted]; Western Mutual Ins. Co. v. Yamamoto (1994) 29 Cal. App.4th 1474, 1485 [35 Cal. Rptr.2d 698].) [N]either a finding of fact made after a contested adversary hearing nor a finding of fact made after any other type of hearing can be indisputably deemed to have been a correct finding...[;] `[u]nder the doctrine of judicial notice, certain matters are assumed to be indisputably true, and the introduction of evidence to prove them will not be required.' (1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) [Judicial Notice,] ง 80[, p. 74].) Taking judicial notice of the truth of a judge's factual finding [is] tantamount to taking judicial notice that the judge's factual finding must necessarily have been correct and that the judge is therefore infallible. ( Sosinsky v. Grant, supra, 6 Cal. App.4th at p. 1568.) The majority note that the trial court's 1990 injunction has become final, and that Caltrans has never challenged the trial court's earlier findings and conclusions. While this is true, it is irrelevant in determining whether the trial court properly took judicial notice of those earlier findings and conclusions. Under the doctrine of judicial notice, certain matters are assumed to be indisputably true, and the introduction of evidence to prove them will not be required. (1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) Judicial Notice, ง 80, p. 74, italics added.) `[F]acts' which were in actuality the subject of a reasonable dispute [do not] become, after the dispute has been judicially decided, `facts' which could not reasonably be subject to dispute merely because the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, if properly shown to apply, might operate to prevent further litigation of the dispute. ( Sosinsky v. Grant, supra, 6 Cal. App.4th at p. 1566.) Whether a factual finding is true is a different question than whether the truth of that factual finding may or may not be subsequently litigated a second time. The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel will, when they apply, serve to bar relitigation of a factual dispute even in those instances where the factual dispute was erroneously decided.... [Citations.] ( Id. at p. 1569.) Plaintiffs also assert there was no objection to the trial court taking judicial notice. However, the constitutionality of a statute cannot turn on the vagaries of litigation tactics. ( D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 14 [112 Cal. Rptr. 786, 520 P.2d 10].) To hold otherwise would invite chaos. The constitutionality of Chapter 433 is a question of law; hence, we are not bound by evidence presented on the question in the trial court. [Citations.] The propriety of the use of extrinsic materials in determining legislative intent is a question which may properly be considered on appeal regardless of whether the issue was raised in the trial court. ( California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 699 [170 Cal. Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856].) Accordingly, the propriety of the trial court's action in taking judicial notice may be considered on appeal despite the lack of objection in the trial court. Thus, contrary to the majority, I conclude that the trial court's prior findings of fact should not and cannot properly be utilized to invalidate the legislation in Chapter 433 as unconstitutional. The trial court's earlier findings of fact cannot be used to controvert the Legislature's later findings. This court must disregard the earlier findings in determining whether Chapter 433 is unconstitutional.