Opinion ID: 2135771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Class X Offender Sentencing

Text: Defendants next contend that sentencing under the Class X provision resembles trial on the issue of guilt and, therefore, Bullington should apply. We note at the outset the disagreement in our appellate court concerning whether double jeopardy would bar the State's second attempt to sentence a defendant as a Class X offender on remand where the State failed to present sufficient proof for Class X sentencing in the original sentencing proceeding. People v. Shelton (1991), 208 Ill. App.3d 1094, 153 Ill.Dec. 722, 567 N.E.2d 680, People v. Brooks (1990), 202 Ill.App.3d 164, 147 Ill.Dec. 519, 559 N.E.2d 859, and People v. Washington (1990), 195 Ill. App.3d 520, 142 Ill.Dec. 326, 552 N.E.2d 1067, each holds that double jeopardy is not implicated. The court in People v. Hamilton (1990), 198 Ill.App.3d 108, 144 Ill.Dec. 426, 555 N.E.2d 785, however, reached a contrary conclusion. Because we find none of the Bullington trial-like factors operational for Class X sentencing, we agree with Shelton, Brooks and Washington. We begin our analysis with a brief statement of the Class X offender provision. If a defendant over the age of 21 has been convicted of a Class 1 or a Class 2 felony, after having been twice convicted of any Class 2 or greater class felonies in Illinois, and such charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of a different series of acts, the defendant must be sentenced as a Class X offender. See Ill.Rev.Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 100553(c)(8). Sentencing procedures for Class X offenders are conducted pursuant to section 541 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 10054 1(a)). Section 541 provides in part: (a)    At the hearing the court shall: (1) consider the evidence, if any, received upon the trial; (2) consider any presentence reports; (3) consider evidence and information offered by the parties in aggravation and mitigation; (4) hear arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (5) afford the defendant the opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf. Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 100541(a). Noticeably absent under section 541 are those strict evidentiary and procedural rules attendant at trial. The only requirement for the admissibility of evidence in Class X sentencing under section 541 is that the evidence be relevant and reliable. ( Williams, 149 Ill.2d at 490, 174 Ill.Dec. 829, 599 N.E.2d 913, citing People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill.2d 378, 422-23, 69 Ill.Dec. 1, 447 N.E.2d 218; see People v. Adkins (1968), 41 Ill.2d 297, 242 N.E.2d 258; Williams, 149 Ill.2d 467, 174 Ill.Dec. 829, 599 N.E.2d 913 (instructive on the manner in which evidence is admitted at sentencing proceedings).) Unlike sentencing under the Habitual Criminal Act, the State need not present certified records of the defendant's prior convictions for purposes of showing Class X eligibility. Presentence reports are adequate. Williams, 149 Ill.2d at 493, 174 Ill.Dec. 829, 599 N.E.2d 913. Further, in Williams, 149 Ill.2d 467, 174 Ill.Dec. 829, 599 N.E.2d 913, this court held that the State had no burden to prove a defendant's prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, concerning sentencing discretion, we observe that no sentencing judge has complete discretion to fashion what he or she deems an appropriate sentence. Sentencing authorities are constrained in those decisions by statute. In the case of the Class X offender, the sentencer, while required by statute to impose a sentence from an elevated sentencing range, is nonetheless permitted discretion to determine an appropriate sentence within that range. Such restriction is no different from sentencing restrictions generally. However, the sentencer's discretion under section 5 41 is not analogous to the lack of discretion present in Bullington. We conclude that because none of the trial-like factors present in Bullington are present under our Class X sentencing proceeding, double jeopardy does not bar a subsequent attempt to prove Class X eligibility at resentencing. Despite the absence of these factors, defendants maintain that double jeopardy applies. They insist that the burden of proof in Class X sentencing procedures is at least by a preponderance of the evidence. They then assert the doctrine of collateral estoppel as applicable to this lesser standard and, therefore, that double jeopardy is implicated. The reasonable doubt standard applies to criminal proceedings (see 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 339 (4th ed. 1992)), to which double jeopardy attaches. In contrast, the preponderance of the evidence standard is generally reserved for civil matters (see 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 339 (4th ed. 1992)), to which double jeopardy does not attach (see Village of Maywood v. Houston (1957), 10 Ill.2d 117, 120, 139 N.E.2d 233). Thus, the requirement of a mere preponderance quantum of proof effectively defeats any analogy to trial on the issue of guilt and, therefore, any claim that jeopardy has attached. Further, to the extent that defendants suggest collateral estoppel as an independent basis to bar the State's second attempt to prove Class X eligibility, we reject the suggestion. The doctrine of collateral estoppel, embodied in the fifth amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy, applies to bar relitigation of a valid and final judgment. (See Ashe v. Swenson (1970), 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 475; see also People v. Frias (1983), 99 Ill.2d 193, 75 Ill.Dec. 674, 457 N.E.2d 1233.) Sentencing determinations do not carry the same finality as the judgment of guilt or innocence on the merits. ( DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328.) Thus, in the context of non-trial-like sentencing proceedings, we afford the doctrine of collateral estoppel no viability independent of the double jeopardy clause. We note defendants' additional argument that res judicata or law of the case bar a second attempt to prove Class X eligibility. Defendants cite to no authority to support the conclusion that either concept, like collateral estoppel, is embodied in double jeopardy. Again, we note, however, that sentencing determinations do not carry the same finality as do final judgments. Thus, defendants' reliance on these concepts is also unavailing. We hold that Class X sentencing, which is governed by section 541, does not bear sufficient hallmarks of a trial on the issue of defendants' guilt. Thus, the Bullington exception is inapplicable to bar resentencing of defendants as Class X offenders; double jeopardy is not implicated.