Opinion ID: 1367009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: (4) In exercising discretion under Penal Code section 1272, courts may consider (1) the likelihood of the defendant's flight, (2) the potential danger to society posed by the defendant's release, and (3) the frivolousness or lack of diligence in defendant's prosecution of his appeal; moreover, to facilitate meaningful review trial courts should provide a brief statement of reasons supporting a denial of release pending appeal.

Text: Finally, defendant claims that even if he is not entitled to release on appeal as a matter of right, the trial court nonetheless abused its discretion under Penal Code section 1272 in denying release in this case. In order properly to analyze this issue, we must determine at the outset what considerations a trial or appellate court may properly weigh in determining whether or not to grant a convicted felon release on appeal. The statutory language of section 1272 is, in itself, not especially helpful in this regard, for, as we have seen, the statute provides only that release may be ordered as a matter of discretion. From the earliest cases construing this section, however, our courts have emphasized that the discretion referred to in the statutes is not ... an arbitrary discretion to do abstract justice according to the popular meaning of that phrase, but is a discretion governed by legal rules to do justice according to law.... ( Ex Parte Hoge (1874) 48 Cal. 3, 5.) Throughout the statute's history, the authorities have endeavored to articulate the legal rules or appropriate considerations which should properly guide courts in the exercise of their legal discretion. As one jurist-commentator who has devoted considerable time and study to this problem has aptly pointed out, however, the decisions of this court over the past century have not been entirely consistent in this task. (See Molinari, Bail Pending Appeal in California (1967) 1 U.S.F.L. Rev. 217, 218-222.) From an early decision indicating that judicial discretion under the statute should be liberally exercised in favor of granting release on appeal ( Ex Parte Hoge, supra, 48 Cal. 3, 6-7), the court moved to an interpretation which indicated that release on appeal should only be ordered in extraordinary circumstances. (See, e.g., In re Pantages (1930) 209 Cal. 535, 536-537 [291 P. 831]; In re Ward (1900) 127 Cal. 489, 490 [59 P. 894]; Ex Parte Smallman (1879) 54 Cal. 35, 36.) In In re Brumback (1956) 46 Cal.2d 810, 814-815 [299 P.2d 217], however, our court specifically disavowed the extraordinary circumstances standard, recognizing that the rigid limitation on bail on appeal which such a standard imposed found no support in the explicit statutory language. The Brumback court held instead that the discretion authorized by section 1272 is a sound legal discretion to be exercised in light of all attending circumstances. (46 Cal.2d at p. 813.) Accordingly, since Brumback, the rule has been clear that under section 1272 no presumption against release on appeal arises, and that such release should not be reserved for the extraordinary case. [8] (5) The Brumback decision additionally provides guidance as to the specific matters which a trial court should consider in determining whether to release a defendant pending appeal. The Brumback court emphasized that a trial judge should recognize that the primary purpose of bail, before or after conviction, is practical assurance that defendant will attend upon the court when his presence is required. (46 Cal.2d at p. 813.) As numerous out-of-state authorities indicate, a multiplicity of factors relate to the likelihood that an individual defendant will jump bail: (1) the defendant's ties to the community, including his employment, the duration of his residence, his family attachments and his property holdings; (2) the defendant's record of appearance at past court hearings or of flight to avoid prosecution; and (3) the severity of the sentence defendant faces. (See, e.g., Harris v. United States (1971) 404 U.S. 1232, 1236 [30 L.Ed.2d 25, 29, 92 S.Ct. 10]; Cohen v. United States (1961) 7 L.Ed.2d 13 [82 S.Ct. 8, 9]; Bandy v. United States (1960) 5 L.Ed.2d 218 [81 S.Ct. 197, 198]; cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b).) [9] If a defendant can demonstrate that the likelihood of his flight is minimal in light of these criteria, he should be considered as having presented at least a prima facie case for release pending appeal. (See Molinari, Bail Pending Appeal in California (1967) 1 U.S.F.L.Rev. 217, 224.) Past California decisions additionally make clear, however, that the likelihood of flight is not the only factor that a court may properly consider in deciding whether to release a felon pending appeal. In In re Scaggs, supra, 47 Cal.2d 416, 419, we noted that another important consideration is whether there is any danger that, if released, [the defendant] would continue to commit crime. Defendant in the instant case asserts that any consideration of the potential danger of a convicted defendant is precluded by this court's recent decision in In re Underwood, supra, 9 Cal.3d 345. As we have already pointed out, however, Underwood simply holds that under the California Constitution a defendant charged with a non-capital crime may not be denied preconviction bail on the ground that he poses a danger to the community; Underwood specifically notes that a different rule prevails with respect to bail on appeal. (9 Cal.3d at p. 347, fn. 1; accord Banks v. United States (1969) 414 F.2d 1150, 1152 [134 App.D.C. 254].) (6) Although Underwood does not support the contention that a defendant's potential danger to the community can never be considered in determining release pending appeal, we think that Underwood does have some relevance to the manner in which the danger to the community criterion should be applied in this context. In Underwood we noted that considerable questions had been raised concerning the ability of courts to predict future criminal conduct (9 Cal.3d at p. 349, fn. 5); in People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 325-328 [121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 535 P.2d 352], we recently acknowledged similar uncertainties with respect to the accuracy of comparable predictions made by those who are ostensibly expert in the predictive field. Although predictive inquiry may become more manageable once a defendant has in fact been convicted of a criminal act, we believe nonetheless that courts should be somewhat cautious in basing a denial of bail on the alleged dangerous propensities of the defendant. (See, e.g., Harris v. United States, supra, 404 U.S. 1232, 1236 [30 L.Ed.2d 25, 29]; Sellers v. United States (1968) 21 L.Ed.2d 64 [89 S.Ct. 36, 38].) When the pattern of a particular defendant's history indicates that additional criminal conduct will probably ensue if the defendant is released, however, a court unquestionably retains the authority to deny release on appeal. (See In re Scaggs, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 419; Carbo v. United States (1962) 7 L.Ed.2d 769 [82 S.Ct. 662, 666, 668-669]; United States v. Wilson (2d Cir.1958) 257 F.2d 796, 797.) [10] (7) Finally, inasmuch as the statutory provision for bail on appeal has as its basic purpose the full effectuation of a defendant's right to appeal his conviction, a court may, in its discretion, decline to grant such release if it determines either that the appeal is wholly frivolous or that the defendant is not diligently prosecuting his appeal. [11] In this regard, however, a court should not require as a prerequisite to release that the appeal actually appear meritorious (see Ex Parte Hoge, supra, 48 Cal. at pp. 6-7); instead, denial of release on these grounds is only justifiable if the appeal is so baseless as to deserve to be condemned as frivolous or is sought as a device for mere delay. ( Ward v. United States (1956) 1 L.Ed.2d 25, 27 [76 S.Ct. 1063, 1065].) (8) In applying the foregoing criteria, [i]t is settled that the primary discretion belongs to the trial judge ... [and] [w]here the trial judge has passed upon the merits of the application his ruling will not be disturbed unless a manifest abuse of discretion appears [citations].... ( In re Brumback, supra, 46 Cal.2d 810, 813-814.) (9) Although a trial court's exercise of discretion is thus clearly subject to a limited review in the appellate courts, such review in the past has been largely frustrated because trial courts have not been required to articulate their reasons for denying an application for release pending appeal. On a number of occasions in recent years, this court has emphasized that meaningful judicial review is often impossible unless the reviewing court is apprised of the reasons behind a given decision. In In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 268-270 [113 Cal. Rptr. 361, 521 P.2d 97], for example, we concluded that the demands of procedural due process required the Adult Authority to support its decision denying a prisoner parole with a statement of reasons. Similarly, in Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 513-518 [113 Cal. Rptr. 836, 522 P.2d 12], we concluded as a matter of statutory interpretation that written findings were necessary to permit meaningful review of quasi-judicial administrative decisions. And, most recently, in Juan T. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal. App.3d 207, 210-211 [122 Cal. Rptr. 405], the Court of Appeal reached an analogous conclusion, holding that the juvenile court must state its reasons [when it finds] that a minor is not a fit and proper subject for treatment under the juvenile court law. (See, e.g., In re Bye (1974) 12 Cal.3d 96, 110 and fn. 14 [115 Cal. Rptr. 382, 524 P.2d 854]; Kent v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 541, 561 [16 L.Ed.2d 84, 97, 86 S.Ct. 1045].) As these authorities suggest, a requirement of articulated reasons to support a given decision serves a number of interests. In the first place, as we have noted, the statement of such reasons will frequently be essential to any meaningful review of the decision. Secondly, a requirement of articulated reasons acts as an inherent guard against the careless decision, insuring that the judge himself analyzes the problem and recognizes the grounds for his decision. Finally, articulated reasons aid in preserving public confidence in the decision-making process by helping to persuade the parties [and the public] that ... decision-making is careful, reasoned and equitable. ( Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 517.) In view of all these considerations, we hold, pursuant to our supervisory authority over state criminal procedure (see, e.g., People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 461 [105 Cal. Rptr. 305, 503 P.2d 1313]; People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434, 442 [282 P.2d 905, 50 A.L.R.2d 513]), that trial courts in the future should render a brief statement of reasons in support of an order denying a motion for bail on appeal. (Cf. Febre v. United States (1969) 396 U.S. 1225 [24 L.Ed.2d 48, 90 S.Ct. 19]; Fed. Rules of Appellate Proc., rule 9(b).) Such a statement need not include conventional findings of fact; all that is required is that the basis for the order be set forth `with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.' ( People v. Browning (1975) 45 Cal. App.3d 125, 137-138 [119 Cal. Rptr. 420] (quoting Kent v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 541, 561 [16 L.Ed.2d 84, 97, 86 S.Ct. 1045]).) As noted above, the trial court in the instant case did not purport to give a full statement of its reasons for denying defendant's motion for bail on appeal. Although the court mentioned several factors which apparently influenced its determination, we doubt that such reasons could properly support a denial of release under the applicable standards discussed above. [12] (10) In any event, although this opinion's requirement of a statement of reasons accompanying orders denying release on appeal is to be applied prospectively only, considerations of fairness convince us that the present defendant is entitled to the benefits of this ruling. (See Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804, 829-830 [119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226]; Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293, 301 [18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1206, 87 S.Ct. 1967].) Accordingly, although we decline to release defendant at this time, our denial of habeas corpus relief is specifically without prejudice to defendant's right to file a new application for bail on appeal with the superior court, which application is to be determined in accordance with the views expressed herein. The order to show cause, having served its purpose, is discharged, and the writ of habeas corpus is denied.