Opinion ID: 1685369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Placing Self-Defense and Imperfect Self-Defense in Issue

Text: ¶ 105. Having determined that no objective reasonable threshold is required to raise a claim of imperfect self-defense, we turn to the question of how to raise the issue of self-defense at trial. [24, 25] ¶ 106. Perfect self-defense is a privilege recognized in Wis. Stat. § 939.45(2). Before a privilege may be considered by the fact-finder, the defendant must raise the privilege as an affirmative defense. State v. Trentadue, 180 Wis. 2d 670, 674, 510 N.W.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1993). Once the defendant successfully raises an affirmative defense, the state is required to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Stoehr, 134 Wis. 2d 66, 84 n.8, 396 N.W.2d 177 (1986). ¶ 107. Unnecessary defensive force is also an affirmative defense, Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2), but not a privilege under Wis. Stat. § 939.45. When the issue of unnecessary defensive force (imperfect self-defense) has been placed in issue by the trial evidence, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts constituting the defense did not exist in order to sustain a finding of guilt under sub. (1). Wis. Stat. § 940.01(3). ¶ 108. In this case, the circuit court concluded that Debra Head failed to establish a sufficient factual basis to support any claim of self-defense. The court found that Debra failed to raise either perfect or imperfect self-defense so as to require it to admit self-defense evidence or submit the requested self-defense instructions to the jury. The court followed Camacho, and ruled that the threshold for admitting evidence to support imperfect self-defense was the same as the objective reasonable threshold for admitting evidence to support perfect self-defense. The court also concluded that McMorris evidence could not be used to establish the factual basis required for either theory of self-defense. We disagree with several of these determinations. ¶ 109. In a case of this nature, in which the defendant is charged with first-degree intentional homicide, the defendant will consider each potential defense. For instance, the defense theory may be that the defendant did not intend to kill. This defense could lead to conviction of a lesser charge, with a reduced penalty. The defense may emphasize one of the factors under Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2), such as adequate provocation or unnecessary defensive force, to mitigate the offense to second-degree intentional homicide, which also carries a reduced penalty. The defense may claim perfect self-defense under Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1), which would permit the jury to find the defendant not guilty of any offense. [26] ¶ 110. Raising the affirmative defense of unnecessary defensive force should not present great difficulty. We have already determined that the defendant is not required to meet an objective reasonable threshold. Consequently, unnecessary defensive force must have a lower threshold for the admissibility of evidence than perfect self-defense, which does have an objective reasonable threshold. Unnecessary defensive force also has a lower threshold than adequate provocation, because provocation is defined as something which the defendant reasonably believes the intended victim has done which causes the defendant to lack self-control completely at the time of causing death. Wis. Stat. § 939.44(1)(b) (emphasis added). [27] ¶ 111. Debra Head argues that a defendant attempting to place self-defense in issue should be required to meet a burden of production, not a burden of persuasion. We agree. This court addressed the procedure for raising a mitigating circumstance with an objective threshold in State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983), a case in which a defendant claimed that she had killed her husband in the heat of passion. The court stated that: The burden upon the defendant where a heat-of-passion defense is projected is merely the burden of production as opposed to the burden of persuasion. It is for the accused to come forward with some evidence in rebuttal of the state's caseevidence sufficient to raise the issue of the provocation defense. The burden of persuasion, of course, always remains upon the state. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d at 507 (emphasis added). [14] ¶ 112. We concluded in Felton that to place a mitigating factor in issue, there need be only some evidence supporting the defense. Id. ¶ 113. This court expounded on the some-evidence standard in State v. Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d 122, 258 N.W.2d 260 (1977), [15] where we examined the showing required to warrant the submission of a manslaughter instruction to the jury. The court stated that in determining whether to submit an instruction regarding imperfect self-defense, the circuit court must determine whether a reasonable construction of the evidence will support the defendant's theory viewed in the most favorable light it will `reasonably admit of from the standpoint of the accused.' Id. at 153 (quoting Ross v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 160, 172, 211 N.W.2d 827 (1973)). The court concluded that if the evidence viewed most favorably to the defendant supported the defendant's theory, it was the role of the jury to determine whether to believe the defendant's theory. Id. In other words, if under any reasonable view of the evidence the jury could have a reasonable doubt as to the nonexistence of the mitigating circumstance, the burden has been met. The Importance of Clarity, supra at 1347. ¶ 114. The standard established in Felton and Mendoza for determining whether a defendant is entitled to submission of a jury instruction based on self-defense cannot be lower than the standard for raising this issue before trial for the purpose of admitting evidence. The court of appeals, in this case, wrote that our citation to Thomas v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 483, 192 N.W.2d 864 (1972), in the McMorris case, implied that the question whether to admit evidence of a defendant's knowledge of prior acts of violence on the part of the victim should be decided on the same standard as that applied when determining whether the jury may be instructed on the issue of self-defense. Head, 2000 WI App 275, ¶ 10 n.7. [28, 29] ¶ 115. We think that the standard for giving a jury instruction on self-defense may, in some circumstances, be higher than the standard for admitting self-defense evidence at trial, because a defendant's claim of self-defense may be so thoroughly discredited by the end of the trial that no reasonable jury could conclude that the state had not disproved it. In any event, the threshold for admitting evidence at trial is either lower or the same as the threshold for giving a jury instruction. This means that if, before trial, the defendant proffers some evidence to support her defense theory and if that evidence, viewed most favorably to her, would allow a jury to conclude that her theory was not disproved beyond a reasonable doubt, the factual basis for her defense theory has been satisfied. [30] ¶ 116. Logically, the threshold for perfect self-defense evidence is higher than the threshold for imperfect self-defense evidence because of the objective reasonableness required for perfect self-defense and because the consequences for the state of not disproving perfect self-defense are much greater than the consequences of not disproving imperfect self-defense. Nonetheless, the elements of the two affirmative defenses so overlap that it would be very challenging for the court to exclude evidence that could come in for one affirmative defense but not for the other. These issues should be clearer at the close of trial after all the evidence has come in. Although it may be difficult, as the State suggests, to unring the bell after a defendant has alluded to perfect self-defense throughout the trial, the defendant is not entitled to a perfect self-defense instruction unless perfect self-defense has a reasonable basis in the evidence. ¶ 117. We next consider what evidence a court should consider in determining whether some evidence exists to place self-defense in issue. In this case, Debra Head filed a motion in limine seeking to admit McMorris evidence regarding Harold Head's violent character and his past acts of violence. ¶ 118. After Debra made her offer of proof, the circuit court determined that she had not established that a sufficient factual basis existed to support a claim of self-defense. The court therefore did not allow Debra to present McMorris evidence of Harold's violent character and past acts of violence. ¶ 119. In determining whether Debra had established a sufficient factual basis to raise self-defense, the circuit court focused on the testimony regarding events that occurred the night before and the morning of the shooting. It excluded most of the evidence that was not contemporaneous with the shooting, including past incidents of Harold's physical abuse to Debra herself. ¶ 120. In its brief to this court, the State asserted that the circuit court was correct in not considering non-contemporaneous evidence and evidence of violence to others in evaluating the sufficiency of Debra's showing of some evidence of self-defense. In essence, the State asserted that a defendant wishing to introduce McMorris evidence is required to make an objective threshold showing of a factual basis for a self-defense claim without using the McMorris evidence. According to the State's brief, if a defendant made an objective threshold showing separate from the McMorris evidence, the McMorris evidence would be probative; however, if the defendant could not make a separate showing, the McMorris evidence would have no probative value. This position has some textual support in McMorris, where the court said that the question was whether the defendant,  after establishing a factual basis to raise the issue of self-defense, may introduce evidence of personal knowledge of prior acts of violence on the part of the victim to prove what the defendant believed to be the turbulent and violent character of the victim. McMorris v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 144, 147, 205 N.W.2d 559 (1973) (emphasis added). ¶ 121. Prior to oral argument, however, the State altered its position, acced[ing] to the view that a defendant can use McMorris evidence to establish the factual basis for a claim of self-defense and can use it to satisfy both the subjective and objective prongs of the Camacho test. Letter from Christopher G. Wren, Assistant Attorney General, to Wisconsin Supreme Court (October 4, 2001). ¶ 122. We accept the State's concession that McMorris evidence may be used to establish a factual basis to support a self-defense claim. McMorris evidence may not, as we held in McMorris, be admitted if a sufficient factual basis for a claim of self-defense is not established, but the McMorris decision does not mandate that a defendant establish her sufficient factual basis for self-defense wholly separate from the proffered McMorris evidence. [31] ¶ 123. We conclude that evidence of a victim's violent character and of the victim's prior acts of violence of which a defendant has knowledge should be considered in determining whether a sufficient factual basis exists to raise a claim of self-defense. Such evidence may be probative of a defendant's state of mind and whether she actually believed that an unlawful interference was occurring, that danger of death or great bodily harm was imminent, or that she needed to use a given amount of defensive force to prevent or terminate the unlawful interference. In determining any of these issues, the circuit court should consider all the evidence proffered. ¶ 124. In summary, we conclude that a defendant need not meet an objective reasonable threshold to assert imperfect self-defense. Rather, the defendant must show evidence of actual beliefs that she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that the force she used was necessary to defend herself. In order to place imperfect self-defense in issue, a defendant need present only some evidence of self-defense. In determining whether the defendant has established a sufficient factual basis for the defense, the circuit court should consider all the evidence at hand, including evidence presented by the state and any McMorris evidence that is proffered. [32] ¶ 125. If a defendant were charged with second-degree intentional homicide instead of first-degree intentional homicide, the mitigating circumstances specified in Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2) would not be available as defenses. Wis. Stat. § 940.05(3). In these circumstances, a defendant claiming perfect self-defense has to meet the same some-evidence standard, but her evidence would be measured against an objective reasonable threshold.