Opinion ID: 1674535
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: capacity to make a will

Text: For his second point, Franklin argues that the special judge erred in finding the testator competent to make a will and, more specifically, in finding that the testimony of the lay witnesses outweighed that of his expert, Dr. Robert Searcy, and other medical witnesses. Probate cases are tried de novo on appeal, and this court does not reverse unless the findings of the probate judge are clearly erroneous. Baerlocker v. Highsmith, 292 Ark. 373, 730 S.W.2d 237 (1987); Hiler v. Cude, 248 Ark. 1065, 455 S.W.2d 891 (1970). This court will, however, give due deference to the superior position of the probate judge to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony. Id.; Reddoch v. Blair, 285 Ark. 446, 688 S.W.2d 286 (1985). The party contesting the validity of the will has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the testator lacked mental capacity at the time the will was executed. Baerlocker v. Highsmith, supra ; Rose v. Dunn, 284 Ark. 42, 679 S.W.2d 180 (1984); Abel v. Dickinson, 250 Ark. 648, 467 S.W.2d 154 (1971). We have further established the test for determining mental capacity in two lines of cases: The rule has been generally expressed that sound mind and disposing memory, constituting testamentary capacity, is (a) the ability on the part of the testator to retain in memory without prompting the extent and condition of property to be disposed of; (b) to comprehend to whom he is giving it; and (c) to realize the deserts and relations to him of those whom he excludes from his will. Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243, 112 S.W. 405; Boone v. Boone, 114 Ark. 69, 169 S.W. 779; Mason v. Bowen, 122 Ark. 407, 183 S.W. 973, Ann.Cas. 1917D, 713; Griffin v. Union Trust Company, 166 Ark. 347, 266 S.W. 289; Puryear v. Puryear, 192 Ark. 692, 94 S.W.2d 695; Petree v. Petree, 211 Ark. 654, 201 S.W.2d 1009. Testamentary capacity means that the testator must be able to retain in his mind, without prompting, the extent and condition of his property, to comprehend to whom he is giving it, and relations of those entitled to his bounty. Tatum v. Chandler, 229 Ark. 864, 319 S.W.2d 513; Sullivant v. Sullivant, 236 Ark. 95, 364 S.W.2d 665; O'Dell v. Newton, 228 Ark. 1069, 312 S.W.2d 339. Hiler v. Cude, 248 Ark. at 1076, 455 S.W.2d at 898; see also Rose v. Dunn, supra , Baerlocker v. Highsmith, supra . Complete sanity in a medical sense is not essential to testamentary capacity if the power to think rationally existed when the will was made. Abel v. Dickinson, supra ; Hiler v. Cude, supra ; Green v. Holland, 9 Ark.App. 233, 657 S.W.2d 572 (1983). The time to look at a testator's intent to make a will is when the document was executed. Hiler v. Cude, supra ; Rogers v. Crisp, 241 Ark. 68, 406 S.W.2d 329 (1966); Yarbrough v. Moses, 223 Ark. 489, 267 S.W.2d 289 (1954). The testator's condition either before or after the time of making the will is not the test as to his mental capacity but is only relevant as indicating the testator's condition at the time of signing the instrument. Rogers v. Crisp, supra . We have also recognized that, despite any mental impairment, a testator may sign a will during a period when he or she is experiencing a lucid interval. Hiler v. Cude, supra ; Thiel v. Mobley, 223 Ark. 167, 265 S.W.2d 507 (1954); Green v. Holland, supra . We cannot say that the record in this case fails to support the special judge's conclusion of competency. Attorney Dudeck, his notary, and the two disinterested witnesses, the Gregorys, were convinced that the testator was competent and aware of what he was doing in leaving everything to Marguerite and in writing Franklin out of his will. Moreover, the medical records, though incomplete on August 21, 1990, are indeed contradictory, as the special judge found. Some medical notations evidence a man who was alert and feeling better and whose temperature was almost normal on the day of the will's execution; others suggest higher temperature and, two hours after the will signing, physical deterioration. It is true that the medical records for the previous three days refer to the testator's confusion and disorientation and his need to be restrained. It is further true that the charge nurse, Margaret Townsend, questioned the testator's competency during this period, but she was not on duty on August 21. Dr. Lisa Bishop testified that the testator had trouble following commands and was confused, though she also was not tending the testator the night he executed the will and admitted that she did not know if he was competent at that time. The testimony of Dr. Geisle Urrutibeheity and Dr. Robert Searcy may also cast doubt on the testator's competency, but their testimony is not conclusive on this point. Dr. Urrutibeheity observed the testator two hours after he signed the new will and would offer no opinion at trial as to his competency when he made the will. Dr. Searcy never actually saw the testator and, though he posited a theory of incompetency based on the incomplete medical records, he admitted the possibility of a lucid interval and that eyewitness accounts would have validity. Franklin also emphasizes the inconsistencies in the testimony of the four lay witnesses who support the will. Inconsistencies may exist as to precise length of time of the four witnesses in the testator's room, the medical equipment used by the testator, and the medical personnel who entered. Those inconsistencies, however, are not of such moment as to reverse the decision of the special judge. Nor does the fact that the Gregorys erred on some of the particulars in the will militate against competency. Whether the witnesses can recite verbatim the terms of the will is not the crucial issue. The issue is whether the testator had the mental capacity to make a will. Deathbed wills must be carefully scrutinized by the courts of this state because of the doubts and suspicions that they necessarily raise. We have no doubt that such scrutiny was given in the instant case and that the special judge carefully weighed the evidence before him and after doing so reached his decision in favor of competency. In these cases, credibility of the witnesses is extremely important, and we emphasize the obvious point that the special judge was privy to the witnesses and had the benefit of assessing their demeanor. See Edwards v. Vaught, 284 Ark. 262, 681 S.W.2d 322 (1984). All four witnesses who were in the testator's room at the time of explanation and execution were certain about the testator's understanding of his property, his heirs, and the identity of those to whom he wished to leave his property. Frank Dudeck and the Gregorys were particularly adamant and descriptive about the testator's intentions. Two of those witnessesthe Gregoryswere disinterested and had no formal connection with the lawyers or the parties in this case. And the signing took place without the major distributee under the new willMargueritebeing present in the room. There was, too, the testimony of Timothy Daley that the testator, prior to his final illness, had made statements suggesting that he wanted Marguerite to have a roof over her head and be taken care of. We further are persuaded by the fact that the testator amended his will in the hospital room and wrote Franklin completely out of it at that time. This was a radical departure from the changes that Marguerite had initially conveyed to the lawyer at the direction of her father. Though suspicions may abound under circumstances of this sort, we cannot say that the special judge clearly erred in his decision. The appellee, Marguerite Boroughs, also moves to strike the appellant's preliminary statement or, alternatively, the statement of the case as argumentative and too long and for costs occasioned by her preparation of a supplemental abstract. The appellant did have a preliminary statement that was three and one-half pages in length and a statement of the case that was one and one-half pages. Our Rules provide for a statement of the case without argument ordinarily not exceeding two pages in length. Ark.Sup.Ct.R. 9(b). Here, the total was five pages, and the statements were perhaps less than balanced in their description of the facts. Our clearly stated preference is as set out above in our rule, and, in appropriate cases, we will strike overly long and argumentative statements. We do not believe the circumstances in this case warrant that either statement be struck. Also, though we observe minor discrepancies in the appellant's abstract, we do not see them as so egregious as to warrant the payment of costs to the appellee. In this regard, much of the appellee's supplemental abstract is duplicative of the appellant's abstract. The decision is affirmed. The appellee's motion to strike and for costs is denied. NEWBERN, J., not participating.