Opinion ID: 2299553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Line-up Procedures

Text: First, defendant contends that he was denied his right to counsel at the pre-arraignment line-up performed by the Providence police, and that this denial requires the suppression of identifications gained through this impermissible identification procedure. However, this issue was not raised as a basis for an objection at trial, and therefore is waived on appeal. See State v. Pineda, 712 A.2d 858, 861 (R.I.1998). Moreover, even if preserved for appeal, defendant's argument on this point is without merit, since no right to counsel exists at pre-arraignment line-ups. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972); State v. Holland, 430 A.2d 1263, 1272 (R.I.1981); State v. Delahunt, 121 R.I. 565, 571-72, 401 A.2d 1261, 1265 (1979). Second, defendant asserts that the line-up procedures used by the Providence police were so suggestive that the procedures produced a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Specifically, defendant maintains that his prominent nose made him stick out from the other members of the line-up who had less distinguished nasal features. Therefore, defendant concludes, the trial justice erred when he denied defendant's motion to suppress the line-up identifications. In reviewing a claim of suggestive identification, we must consider each case on its facts to determine whether the identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 105 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2248 n. 8, 53 L.Ed. 2d 140, 148 n. 8 (1977) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 971, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1253 (1968)); see also State v. Andrade, 657 A.2d 538, 541 (R.I. 1995) (applying Manson ). However, even if the identification is the product of suggestive procedures, the admission of testimony concerning a suggestive identification does not violate due process so long as the identification possesses sufficient aspects of reliability. Manson, 432 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 2249, 53 L.Ed.2d at 149. The `central question' is `whether under the totality of circumstances the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure [may have been] suggestive.' Id. The factors to be considered    include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of his [or her] prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation [identification procedure], and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself. Id. at 114, 97 S.Ct. at 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d at 154. In this case, the Providence police used neutral, non-suggestive procedures. The members of the line-up were sufficiently similar in appearance, despite defendant's claim to the contrary, that the line-up did not impermissibly suggest the identity of the suspect. See State v. Pailon, 590 A.2d 858, 862 (R.I. 1991) (citing Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969)). All line-up members were white males of approximately the same age, build, height while seated, and complexion. In fact, defendant called three of the four officers as witnesses in the hope of convincing the jury that Donnelly and Michalczyk's identifications were the product of suggestion. This tactic proved unsuccessful, however, as the jury took only twenty minutes to find defendant guilty on both counts. Nor were the Providence police under an obligation to produce a line-up of persons with similar noses, as defendant urged at trial. We have never required that line-ups be composed of near identical people, but only that line-up members be reasonably similar. State v. Cline, 122 R.I. 297, 327, 405 A.2d 1192, 1208 (1979); see also State v. Walker, 667 A.2d 1242, 1248-49 (R.I.1995) (suspect only line-up member with white pants; not suggestive); State v. Camirand, 572 A.2d 290, 293-94 (R.I.1990) (suspect only line-up member with beard; not suggestive); State v. Robichaud, 118 R.I. 684, 688, 376 A.2d 1053, 1056 (1977) (rejecting argument that defendant was the only `pretty' woman in the line-up). Requiring that line-up participants be near mirror images would set an impossible standard and embroil the courts in determining the significance of subtle physical differences. Additionally, Officer McGurn's unrebutted testimony was that he had the witnesses view the line-up separately, so neither identification could influence the other, and that he made no indication of which line-up member was the suspect. Donnelly corroborated McGurn's testimony, asserting that she was separated from Michalczyk, only told not to be afraid, and only asked if I could identify one of them in the line-up. The defendant made no inquiry into the circumstances surrounding Michalczyk's identification. Therefore, nothing in the police procedures suggested which member of the line-up was the suspect. Consequently, the fact that defendant has a large nose is insufficient in this case to render the line-up unduly suggestive. Moreover, even if the identification procedures were suggestive, under the totality of circumstances, we find that a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification does not exist. Manson, 432 U.S. at 105 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. at 2248 n. 8, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 148 n. 8. Both Donnelly and Michalczyk, while agreeing that defendant's nose was large, denied under vigorous cross-examination that this feature alone led to their identification of defendant. Donnelly stated that I picked him out as the man I saw, not just because of his nose, that is what I remember. Michalczyk testified to a number of characteristics other than defendant's nose, from height to taut skin, that led him to identify defendant. Each had a clear opportunity to observe the gunman during the attempted robbery, and the gunman undoubtedly demanded their undivided attention. Moreover, Michalczyk observed the same man twice in the preceding two weeks and correctly described defendant's facial characteristics and approximate age when questioned by the police just after the crime. Additionally, he was able to identify defendant after viewing the line-up for only ten to fifteen seconds. Even though Donnelly told police that she never looked at the bandit's face, seeing defendant at the line-up sparked a memory and she was able to identify him right away. While approximately eight weeks had passed between the crime and the line-up, in view of the other indicia of reliability, this lapse does not alter our view that the line-up did not create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Id. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court was correct to deny defendant's motion to suppress these identifications.