Opinion ID: 2074510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Ms. Stewart-Veal argues that the trial court erred by dismissing her amended complaint for negligence because it properly states a claim for negligence and is not barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to such intentional torts as false arrest; rather, her negligence claim is governed by the three-year statute of limitations. The District contends that Ms. Stewart-Veal's amended complaint is barred by the one-year statute of limitations because it states, in substance, claims for intentional torts, while characterizing them as negligence. The trial court apparently dismissed Ms. Stewart-Veal's amended complaint for negligence, pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Therefore, we review this matter de novo. See McCracken v. Walls-Kaufman, 717 A.2d 346, 350 (D.C.1998) (citing Fraser v. Gottfried, 636 A.2d 430, 432 n. 5 (D.C. 1994)). In a case such as the one before us, the same course of conduct may support both a claim of assault and battery [or other intentional tort] and a claim of negligence, provided that it is established that the defendant, in the process of engaging in the conduct that included the intentional tort, was also breaching another recognized duty owed to the plaintiff. Id. at 351. The trial court is not bound by a plaintiff's characterization of an action and. . . use of the terms `carelessly and negligently,' without more, are conclusory and do not raise a cognizable claim of negligence. District of Columbia v. Chinn, 839 A.2d 701, 708 (D.C.2003). In a negligence action, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on three issues: the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff's injury. Reaves-Bey v. Karr and Zoom Courier Serv., 840 A.2d 701, 704 (D.C.2004). Ms. Stewart-Veal's complaint reflects two approaches to her negligence claim. The first appears to be based on the actions of the arresting officers, and not on the alleged negligence of their superiors. As such, it is not separate and distinct from the false arrest claim; rather, it is intertwined with and dependent on that claim. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing Ms. Stewart-Veal's negligence claim in so far as it is based on the alleged negligence of the arresting officers in conducting the arrest. See Chinn, supra, 839 A.2d at 711; Sabir v. District of Columbia, 755 A.2d 449, 452 (D.C.2000). The second approach in the amended complaint is based on the alleged negligence of the arresting officers' superiors with respect to hiring, training, and supervision. In Reaves-Bey, supra, the trial court dismissed appellant's complaint for negligence, in response to defendant's motion for summary judgment. Appellant argued that her negligence action, although related to [an] assault incident, should be governed by the three-year statute of limitations. Id. at 703. The trial court, agreeing with the defendant, had concluded that the plaintiff's negligence count was intertwined with, and thus barred by, the same one-year statute of limitations that barred [the] action for assault. Id. We reversed the trial court's judgment dismissing the negligence claim. We determined that appellant had alleged a distinct claim of negligence apart from the assault claim, and ha[d] done more than merely recharacterize her assault claim as one grounded in negligence, Id. at 703, 704. As to Ms. Stewart-Veal's claim of negligent hiring, training, and supervision, we reach a similar conclusion here. The case before us is unlike Maddox v. Bano, 422 A.2d 763 (D.C.1980), on which the District relies, in which we concluded that appellant's amended complaint specif[ied] no negligent act, and fail[ed] to characterize the breach of duty which might have resulted in negligence liability. Id. at 764. Nor can we say, as in Maddox, that appellant's [amended] complaint pleads in substance a cause of action for assault, battery, false arrest, and nothing more. Id. at 765. In contrast to the amended complaint in Maddox, Ms. Stewart-Veal's negligence claim in her amended complaint is based [partly] on an independent duty, an applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard [of care] by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and [her] injury. Reaves-Bey, supra, 840 A.2d at 703, 704. During our discussion in Reaves-Bey, we cited Marusa v. District of Columbia, 157 U.S.App. D.C. 348, 484 F.2d 828 (1973), in which the District made a similar argument, as here, that the one-year statute of limitations was applicable to a complaint based on the shooting of the plaintiff by a police officer. However, the court in Marusa rejected that argument, noting that a jury could well find the misuse by the officer of his weapon `to have been proximately caused by the government's negligence in hiring, training, or supervising the policeman,' a distinct count in negligence. Reaves-Bey, supra, 840 A.2d at 703 (quoting Marusa, supra, 157 U.S.App. D.C. at 351, 353, 484 F.2d at 831, 833 (referencing McCracken, supra, 717 A.2d at 351)). Ms. Stewart-Veal's amended complaint for negligence alleged, in part: 12. The conduct of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Officers, from the onset of the Plaintiff's arrest on November 13, 2002, until her release from their custody, was a manifestation of a lack of duty owed to Plaintiff and acts of negligence committed by the officers were reflective of their department, to adequately recruit, train, supervise, re-train periodically its members, and its retention of its officers, with such deficient skills, serves to compound its negligence. 13. The Plaintiff did nothing to contribute to the negligent performance of the Police Officers in their duties, and is entirely without blame. 14. That the proximate cause of the Plaintiff's negligent arrest, the discomfort, illegality and indignities to which she was subjected, were caused by the Police Officers in the negligent performance of their assigned duties . . . . 16. The District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Officers, owed the Plaintiff a duty, to perform their assigned duties, with due care, their arrest and concomitant treatment of the Plaintiff afterwards, deviated from this standard, and was a breach of their duties, and the nexus between their assigned duties, and a breach of said duty was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries, which caused the ensuing traumatic damages to the Plaintiff. These paragraphs stated the elements of a negligence claim, which is governed by a three-year statute of limitations. This claim alleging negligence in hiring, training, and supervision was a separate and distinct cause of action, and was not fatally intertwined with the intentional tort causes of action. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting the District's motion to dismiss the claim for negligence. See Reaves-Bey, supra ; Marusa, supra . Ms. Stewart-Veal also contends that her intentional tort actions survived under the relation-back doctrine since they were raised in her May 2003 complaint. The District maintains that the relation-back doctrine is not applicable here since Ms. Stewart-Veal filed a second complaint, and the statute of limitations for intentional torts was not tolled following the dismissal of her May 2003 complaint. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 15(c) provides, in part: Relation back of amendments. An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when (1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of limitations applicable to the action, or (2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, or (3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted . . . . These provisions are identical to Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Since they are an adoption without modification of the corresponding federal rule, [they are] to be given the same meaning. Arrington v. District of Columbia, 673 A.2d 674, 680 n. 6 (D.C.1996) (citing Strother v. District of Columbia, 372 A.2d 1291, 1297 n. 15 (D.C.1977)) (other citation omitted). There are two problems with regard to Ms. Stewart-Veal's reliance on the relation-back doctrine. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 15(c) specifies that the amendment relates back to the original proceeding. Here, the original proceeding was filed in May 2003, but the amended complaint for negligence filed by Ms. Stewart-Veal on November 19, 2004, related to a separate complaint for negligence filed on September 29, 2004. The amended complaint made no attempt to amend or reassert the original claims of intentional torts. Rule 15(c) simply does not apply where, as here, the party bringing suit did not seek to `amend' or `supplement' [her] original pleading, but rather, opted to file an entirely new [complaint] at a subsequent date. Neverson v. Bissonnette, 261 F.3d 120, 126 (1st Cir.2001). See also Lucchesi v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 226 F.R.D. 172, 174-75 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.2005) (The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates the relation back of pleadings only in the context of a single proceeding.) (footnote omitted). Consequently, Ms. Stewart-Veal's amended complaint for negligence does not relate back to her original May 2003 complaint. There is another reason, however, as to why Ms. Stewart-Veal cannot invoke the relation-back doctrine. In Ciralsky v. Central Intelligence Agency, 359 U.S.App. D.C. 366, 355 F.3d 661 (2004), the court declared that once a suit is dismissed, even if without prejudice, `the tolling effect of the filing of the suit is wiped out and the statute of limitations is deemed to have continued running from whenever the cause of action accrued, without interruption by that filing.' Id., 359 U.S.App. D.C. at 377, 355 F.3d at 672 (citing Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir.2000)). The court further explained that `when a suit is dismissed without prejudice, the statute of limitations is deemed unaffected by the filing of the suit, so that if the statute of limitations has run the dismissal is effectively with prejudice.' Id. (quoting Elmore, 227 F.3d at 1011). Under this principle of law, when the trial court dismissed Ms. Stewart-Veal's May 2003 complaint, without prejudice, the one-year statute of limitations on her intentional torts was no longer tolled, and because the statute of limitations had expired as of mid-November 2003, the June 17, 2004 dismissal of the May 2003 complaint was effectively with prejudice. Ciralsky, supra . Consequently, because the statute of limitations had expired on Ms. Stewart-Veal's intentional torts before she filed her amended complaint, those claims no longer were viable when she filed her amended complaint in November 2004. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Ms. Stewart-Veal's intentional torts, as well as her negligence claim in so far as it is based on the alleged false arrest by the arresting police officers, but we reverse the dismissal of Ms. Stewart-Veal's negligence claim based on the District's alleged negligent hiring, training and supervision of its police officers. On that claim, she has alleged enough to permit her to conduct discovery. So ordered.