Opinion ID: 223533
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Benabe’s Request for a Competency Hearing

Text: On the day of jury selection, counsel for defendant Benabe moved for a competency hearing. The issue of Benabe’s competence to stand trial had not been raised in the two and onehalf years following his arraignment. The motion offered no specific factual reason to believe he was incompetent other than his refusal to participate in his defense or to meet with or speak to his attorneys. The court denied this motion: Nos. 09-1190, 09-1224, 09-1225, 09-1226, 09-1227, 09-1251 Page 10 In the court’s view . . . this is a manipulation on his part on the eve of trial to decide to go down an ill-advised route that Mr. Delatorre has raised . . . . Mr. Benabe has very skillfully excused himself from participating in this trial for whatever reason he sees fit, but this is not being done on any type of mental defect that I can perceive . . . . [W]e have a very skillful and a very manipulative defendant here. A district court must hold a competency hearing if there is reasonable cause to believe the defendant may presently be incompetent, meaning that he is unable to consult with his attorney or to understand the nature of the proceedings against him. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a); see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). A court’s decision whether to hold a competency hearing is discretionary and is reviewed deferentially on appeal. United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 622 (7th Cir. 2007), citing United States v. Downs, 123 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1997). We see no reason to disturb the court’s decision here. The record shows that Benabe was deliberately trying to block the proceedings. Like the district judge, we have no doubt that Benabe was able to participate in his defense but made a calculated choice not to do so. His refusal to speak with his attorneys or to assist in his defense was simply another misguided attempt to delay the trial. The court’s refusal to entertain these tactics was not an abuse of discretion. II. Evidentiary and Other Issues Arising During Trial A. Admission of “Summary Chart” of Orlando Rivera’s Acts of Violence Rivera, the prosecution’s star witness, was a member of the Insane Deuces who cooperated with law enforcement and then testified about the inner workings of the gang and the violent acts committed by its members in exchange for total immunity. At trial, the court admitted the government’s “summary chart” of the “shootings involving Mr. Rivera.” The chart included references to incidents Rivera referred to in his trial testimony, but also shootings that he disclosed in police reports and described for the grand jury. The chart began with incidents that had occurred in 1990. It was “adopted” by Rivera the night before he testified about it. Rivera testified that the chart was a “summary of all the shootings that I was involved in from 1990 to 2002” and was “based on the prior statements to law enforcement.” The appellants appeal the admission of the summary chart. Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 provides in part: “The contents of voluminous writings, recordings or photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation.” The rule also requires that the originals be made available for examination to the other parties. But the rule is not an end-run around other rules of admissibility. The underlying records must be accurate and otherwise admissible as evidence for Rule 1006 to apply to a summary of the underlying records. See United States v. Oros, 578 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2009). Nos. 09-1190, 09-1224, 09-1225, 09-1226, 09-1227, 09-1251 Page 11 The government concedes, and we agree, that admission of the summary chart was an error under Rule 1006. The chart did not summarize writings, recordings, or photographs, as the rule requires. It was instead a summary of oral testimony that Rivera was prepared to provide. Such a summary is beyond the scope of Rule 1006, despite the prosecution’s desire to streamline Rivera’s testimony. The erroneous admission of the summary chart was harmless. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-24 (1967) (error will be considered harmless if it did not contribute to the verdict); Oros, 578 F.3d at 709 (holding that erroneous admission of summary evidence was harmless). We have trouble understanding how such a detailed exposition of the government’s cooperating witness’s violent acts caused any prejudice to the defendants. The defendants argue, however, that the chart helped the government bolster Rivera’s credibility (by emphasizing the dubious attribute that, although Rivera was involved in a terrifying number of shootings, his victims were not killed or seriously injured), while also precluding the defense from attacking Rivera’s credibility. We find this argument highly attenuated. The jury was made aware of Rivera’s long history of violence and deep ties to the Insane Deuces (including his colorful nickname, “Terminator”). Even if the government’s strategy was to paint him as a gang-banger who maimed but did not succeed in killing his victims, this evidence damning the government’s star witness could not have caused any prejudice to the defendants. B. Exclusion of Defense Investigator’s Hearsay Testimony An investigator for the defense, John Rea, interviewed another Insane Deuce, Luis Lomelli, on March 7, 2008. Lomelli told Rea that he had participated in a shooting with Rivera. According to Lomelli, the two orchestrated a drive-by shooting in Aurora on August 11, 2002, the date of the Lazcano murder. Lomelli reported that Rivera was the driver and Lomelli was the shooter in the drive-by, and that a Latin King, Juan Acevedo, was injured. Lomelli recounted that he used a Mac 10 or 11 with a 30-round clip and shot approximately 15 times. When he testified, Rivera denied being involved in the shooting of Acevedo. He also claimed that when he began cooperating with law enforcement, he stopped his involvement in violent acts. The defense subpoenaed Lomelli in the hope of impeaching Rivera. Because his testimony would have amounted to a public confession of a serious crime, Lomelli was appointed an attorney and refused to testify. When he invoked his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the defense sought to have his hearsay statement introduced through Rea’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) as a statement against Lomelli’s interest. The court ruled that the relevant part of the statement was against Rivera’s interest, not Lomelli’s, so it did not qualify for admission as a statement against the declarant’s interest. Instead, finding that it was prohibited under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) as evidence of Nos. 09-1190, 09-1224, 09-1225, 09-1226, 09-1227, 09-1251 Page 12 specific instances of misconduct to attack the credibility of a witness, the court refused to allow the testimony from Rea. All defendants appeal this ruling. We review the district court’s decision to exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion, but we review its interpretation of the rules de novo. United States v. Rogers, 587 F.3d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 2009). Even if we determine the evidentiary decision was erroneous, we will not reverse it if the jury’s ultimate decision was not influenced by the error. Oros, 578 F.3d at 707. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) (2008)3 permits admission of a hearsay statement that: at the time of its making . . . so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. For the exception to apply here, the declarant must be unavailable to testify, the statement must be against the declarant’s penal interest, and the statement’s trustworthiness must be bolstered by corroborating circumstances. United States v. Bonty, 33 F.3d 575, 579 (7th Cir. 2004). Rule 804(b)(3) “does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory.” Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01 (1994). When portions of such broader statements implicate someone else (for example, an accused co-conspirator’s statements about what another accused conspirator said or did), the statement is considered to have even less credibility than “ordinary hearsay evidence.” See id. at 601. Lomelli’s overall statement was certainly against Lomelli’s interest. He admitted shooting Acevedo. But the relevant portions of his statement were those saying that Rivera had been his driver. Williamson expressly rejected the defense strategy here. The court must carefully parse the relevant portions of the statement and cannot admit portions that do not incriminate the declarant. Some self-inculpatory statements can be admitted against accomplices, see Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603, but the defendants have not shown that the portions of Lomelli’s statement fit into that sort of theory. Because the relevant portions of Lomelli’s statement about Rivera’s involvement in the August 11, 2002 shooting were not against Lomelli’s penal interest, the district court properly refused to admit Lomelli’s hearsay statement. 3 Rule 804(b)(3) was amended in 2010. Although the changes are not material to the defendants’ argument, we analyze the version of the rule that was in operation in 2008 at the time of the defendants’ trial. Nos. 09-1190, 09-1224, 09-1225, 09-1226, 09-1227, 09-1251 Page 13 C. Denial of a Franks Hearing During the trial, defendant Juarez asked the court to hold a Franks hearing, pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), in an effort to suppress some evidence gathered in a search of 1227 Dearborn Street in Aurora pursuant to a warrant. The search was conducted on March 8, 2002, after Juarez was shot. Police officers went to the address of the shooting to investigate. From outside his home, they noticed bullet holes in the house, fresh blood in the rear driveway and on the rear porch, and surveillance cameras on the front of the house pointing towards the street. A search warrant was obtained and executed at the residence later that night. Officers recovered a loaded AR-15 rifle, a shotgun, nearly $20,000 in cash, more than 725 grams of marijuana, two revolvers, and a marijuana growing operation. At trial, the government planned to call witnesses regarding the shootings and the search of the residence. Citing discrepancies between the investigators’ reports and the search warrant affidavit, Juarez objected, and requested that the district court conduct a Franks hearing concerning the veracity of the warrant affidavit. (The issue arose in the middle of trial because it was based on information provided to the defense during trial.) The district court denied Juarez’s request. Juarez appeals, joined by Guzman, Salazar and Susinka. We review the district court’s decision not to hold a Franks hearing for clear error. United States v. McDuffy, 636 F.3d 361, 364 (7th Cir. 2011). As we recited in United States v. Harris, 464 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 2006), the Supreme Court held in Franks that “the Fourth Amendment requires an evidentiary hearing on the veracity of a warrant affidavit, and ultimately on the constitutionality of the search, when a defendant requests such a hearing and ‘makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and the [ ] allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.’” Id. at 738, quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56. Franks applies to omissions as well as false statements. See Harris, 464 F.3d at 738. A defendant seeking a Franks hearing must offer direct evidence of the affiant’s state of mind or circumstantial evidence that the affiant had obvious reasons for omitting or falsifying facts. See United States v. Souffront, 338 F.3d 809, 822 (7th Cir. 2003). Juarez did not make this preliminary showing before the district court. The “discrepancies” between the search warrant affidavit and the investigating officers’ reports raised by Juarez on appeal are minor. The search warrant affidavit stated that a blood trail led either to or from 1227 Dearborn, that the house had been struck by recent gunshots, and that the exterior of the house was under video surveillance and recording equipment had been observed inside. Juarez contrasts these statements with what other on-scene investigators reported: the blood trail led away from the house and a victim probably left the scene by car; the house had been shot at several times and the gunshots might have been old or new; and the Nos. 09-1190, 09-1224, 09-1225, 09-1226, 09-1227, 09-1251 Page 14 windows of the house were blacked out with plastic and plywood, so that recording equipment could not have been seen. These minor discrepancies do not suggest, however, that any facts were intentionally falsified or omitted. Even if Juarez had succeed in making the preliminary showing, “the court [would] then consider[ ] the affidavit, eliminating any false statements and incorporating material facts, and [would] determine whether probable cause existed.” Harris, 464 F.3d at 738. Regardless of which direction the blood trail led, the age of the gunshots, and whether or not the police saw recording equipment through the windows, the police had ample probable cause to search the residence. The district court did not err in refusing to hold a Franks hearing. D. Admission of the Rivera Recordings against Susinka Susinka was incarcerated on April 16, 2002, before Rivera began surreptitiously recording meetings of the Insane Deuces. Joined by Juarez and Guzman, Susinka argues that the court erred by permitting the recordings to be admitted as evidence against him. According to Susinka, his incarceration effected his withdrawal from the conspiracy. Short of that, he argues that law enforcement effectively thwarted his continued participation in the conspiracy when they arrested him. Under either theory, Susinka believes that the recordings of his codefendants’ statements made after he was arrested could not be used against him without some showing by the government that his participation in the conspiracy was ongoing. We review this evidentiary decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cruz-Rea, 626 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2010). Contrary to Susinka’s argument, incarceration does not necessarily imply a full-stop in a defendant’s participation in an underlying conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 604 F.3d 381, 388 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that defendant could be held accountable for quantity of drugs distributed by a conspiracy during defendant’s period of incarceration). In this case, for example, the evidence showed that Insane Deuces leaders continued to operate from within prison and that gang members acted to protect one another in prison. To withdraw from a conspiracy, a defendant must take some affirmative act of withdrawal, such as submitting himself to the authorities for prosecution or announcing to his co-conspirators that he is withdrawing. “Simply ceasing to participate even for extended periods of time is not sufficient to show withdrawal.” United States v. Julian, 427 F.3d 471, 483 (7th Cir. 2005), quoting United States v. Wren, 363 F.3d 654, 663 (7th Cir. 2004), judgment vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1101 (2005). Withdrawing from a conspiracy is not easy, and it was Susinka’s burden to show that he affirmatively took such action. See United States v. Hall, 212 F.3d 1016, 1023 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bafia, 949 F.2d 1465, 1477 (7th Cir. 1991). It was not the government’s burden to prove that Susinka did not withdraw. Because Susinka had no evidence that he actually withdrew, the court did not abuse its discretion in Nos. 09-1190, 09-1224, 09-1225, 09-1226, 09-1227, 09-1251 Page 15 admitting the Rivera recordings as evidence against Susinka as co-conspirator statements made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). E. In-Court Identification of Susinka Lorenzo Becerra, a former Shorty member of the Insane Deuces, testified for the government pursuant to a grant of immunity. According to Becerra’s testimony, Delatorre and “Stevie” sent him on a mission to shoot at Latin Kings after the rival gang’s members threw rocks at Delatorre’s truck. (Another member of the gang, Brian Hernandez, gave Becerra twelve bullets and told him that he would get a minute’s beating for every bullet he did not shoot.) The government asked Becerra, “who is Stevie?” Becerra responded, “Stevie [is] one of the brothers.” The government then showed Becerra a previously admitted photograph of Susinka, and Becerra identified it as “Stevie.” Susinka did not object to this procedure during trial. On appeal, Susinka, joined once again by Guzman and Juarez, argues that Becerra’s in-court identification was improperly suggestive and unreliable. The government argues that because Susinka failed to move to suppress Becerra’s testimony before trial, his argument is waived under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(e). We disagree. Becerra was identifying Susinka’s photo in court. Rule 12 does not demand that a defendant predict the method and reliability of an in-court identification and move to suppress it before trial has even begun. Susinka’s argument has no merit, though. Becerra testified that his eyesight was bad and he could not see long distances. In lieu of identifying the defendants in person (whom he presumably could not see clearly) he identified the defendants by photographs that had been previously admitted as exhibits and that the government presented to him on the stand as he testified. Susinka’s photo was one of those. There was nothing improperly suggestive about Becerra’s identification of the person in the photo as “Stevie.” Any real unreliability in Becerra’s identification would have been fodder for cross-examination. It is not a sound basis for appeal. We find no error. F. Cross-Examination of Susinka Susinka testified in his defense. He complains that in cross-examination, the prosecution asked a series of questions that were not in good faith. For example, after Susinka testified that he was not an Insane Deuce, the government asked him whether a list that had been found in his pocket when he was stopped and searched by police on October 7, 2001 was a list of the names of certain Insane Deuces, the dues those members had paid, and the violations that were owed to them. Susinka admitted that he had a piece of paper in his pocket when he was arrested but denied the prosecution’s other suggestions. The prosecution did not introduce the Nos. 09-1190, 09-1224, 09-1225, 09-1226, 09-1227, 09-1251 Page 16 list into evidence, and objections to the prosecution’s efforts to elicit further testimony about the list of names from the officer who conducted the search were sustained. In denying Susinka’s motion for a mistrial, the court found that the questions were not in bad faith because the list appeared in the officer’s report. Susinka, joined by Guzman and Juarez, appeals this ruling, which we review for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Holt, 486 F.3d 997, 1000-01 (7th Cir. 2007) (scope of cross-examination reviewed for abuse of discretion). It is improper for the prosecution to ask a question that “implies a factual predicate which the examiner knows he cannot support by evidence or for which he has no reason to believe that there is foundation of truth.” United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1307 (7th Cir. 1976). A prosecutor’s questions on cross-examination must be based on more than the prosecutor’s own suspicions. See United States v. Elizondo, 920 F.2d 1308, 1313 (7th Cir. 1990) (prosecutor’s insinuation on cross-examination that Mexican traffic ticket serving as defendant’s alibi was a sham was improper because questions were based on nothing more than prosecutor’s unsubstantiated suspicions). That general rule does not mean that the government has a duty to introduce the factual predicate for a potentially prejudicial question posed in cross-examination. See United States v. Jungles, 903 F.2d 468, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1990). By the same logic, it also is not necessary for the government to be prepared to produce independently admissible evidence to support the implications of a question. Id. Here, Susinka argues that the existence of the list could not be supported by evidence. The document could not be produced for introduction at trial because it had not been inventoried anywhere, and the court sustained objections to the government’s attempt to elicit testimony about the information contained on the list from the officer who had stopped and searched Susinka. But that officer testified to the existence of the list, as did Susinka. As the district court noted in its ruling, the list was noted in the officer’s police report. Susinka does not contest the court’s assertion regarding the contents of the police report. We agree with the district court that this notation gave the prosecution good faith to ask Susinka what was on the list. Susinka also raises a second argument concerning his cross-examination. The prosecution introduced evidence that on March 13, 2002, police observed Susinka throw away a gun while riding his bicycle. A ballistics expert testified that the recovered gun was used in the gang-related shooting of two men in Aurora on March 10, 2002. In cross-examination, the prosecution asked Susinka whether his sister had told him not to leave the house with a gun on March 13, 2002. Susinka denied that his sister had said that. Susinka objected to this line of questioning, but he did not articulate a basis for his objection. Later, in his motion for a mistrial, he denied that he was challenging the government’s good faith basis for asking this question. He has forfeited this argument, and our review is for plain error. United States v. Jaimes–Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 848-49 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining the difference between waiver and forfeiture and Nos. 09-1190, 09-1224, 09-1225, 09-1226, 09-1227, 09-1251 Page 17 reviewing forfeited argument for plain error). But Susinka failed to raise a cogent objection to this question at trial, and without one he has failed to show a plain error.4 G. Closing Argument against Susinka Susinka argues that the government denied him a fair trial based on several comments in closing arguments. Juarez and Guzman join Susinka in his contentions that, in its attempt to tie Susinka to the Insane Deuces, the prosecution improperly referred to the missing list, supposedly of gang members, dues, and violations that had been uncovered in a search of his pocket on October 7, 2001, and impermissibly described Susinka’s two companions on that date as Insane Deuces without evidence to support those assertions. He also contests the prosecution’s rebuttal attack on his credibility and its references to his possession of “nation guns” (i.e., guns belonging to the Insane Deuces) on November 24, 2001 and March 13, 2002. More generally, Susinka contends that the government improperly implied that he was guilty by association. Susinka failed to object to the government’s closing on these bases at trial. We review these points only for plain error. United States v. Sandoval, 347 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Anderson, 303 F.3d 847, 854 (7th Cir. 2002). In essence, the issue here is whether it was a plain error for the district court not to have granted a mistrial on its own initiative, in the absence of a timely objection. See United States v. Tanner, 628 F.3d 890, 898-99 (7th Cir. 2010). This is a very demanding standard, and appropriately so. Consider the possibility, for example, that a defendant and his lawyer feel the trial has gone as well for them as possible. A retrial would allow the prosecution to correct its mistakes and tighten its case, and would subject the defendant to the time, stress, and expense of a second trial. Defense counsel in such a case might prefer at most to raise an objection to an improper comment in closing argument, but 4 When Susinka was testifying, his counsel objected but did not state specific grounds. In his reply brief, Susinka asserts that this argument was preserved. He cites the record as follows: “[When] asked if challenging that good faith, counsel for Susinka answered ‘I am.’“ Susinka Reply at 12. This misstates the record. The passage came in a bench conference during which Susinka’s lawyer moved for a mistrial. After counsel for Susinka stated “I am,” the court asked Susinka’s lawyer to clarify whether he was generally objecting to the question being asked, or whether he was objecting specifically to the prosecution’s good faith basis for asking the question. The court then asked again, “are you challenging their good faith basis?” Defense counsel conferred, and then Susinka’s lawyer responded, “Judge, I don’t have a specific recollection. I made my objection. That’s all I’ll say.” After the failure to state a ground for the objection during the testimony itself, this response could easily be deemed a waiver rather than forfeiture. Nevertheless, we review Susinka’s argument under the plain error standard. Nos. 09-1190, 09-1224, 09-1225, 09-1226, 09-1227, 09-1251 Page 18 without seeking a mistrial. This is part of the reason why it is extremely rare for trial judges to order a mistrial in the absence of an objection and motion, especially at the end of a long trial. When evaluating whether the government’s comments to the jury reached the level of prosecutorial misconduct, we first examine whether the remarks themselves were improper. Sandoval, 347 F.3d at 631. If improper, we then evaluate the statements in the context of the entire record and determine whether Susinka was deprived of a fair trial. Id. In so doing, we consider: (1) the nature and seriousness of the misconduct; (2) the extent to which the comments were invited by the defense; (3) the extent to which the prejudice was ameliorated by the court’s instruction to the jury; (4) the defense’s opportunity to counter any prejudice; and (5) the weight of the evidence supporting the conviction. Id., quoting Anderson, 303 F.3d at 854. Where the defendant fails to object to the remarks at the time they were made, the plain error standard additionally requires that the defendant “establish ‘not only that the remarks denied him a fair trial, but also that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different absent the remarks.’” Id., quoting United States v. Durham, 211 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2000). Even if some of the prosecutor’s comments about Susinka misstated the record or otherwise were improper, we find no plain error. The judge took steps to protect against such errors, giving the standard jury instruction that advised the jury members not to consider the attorneys’ arguments as evidence and to trust their own memory and view of the evidence. The court went further, instructing the jury that gang membership, by itself, was not a violation of the law and that the jury should confine itself “to considering the charges in this case, and you should not find yourselves emotionally swayed by the use of the word ‘gang’ or ‘Insane Deuces.’” Susinka has not presented any basis from which we might conclude that the jury did anything other than follow the instructions it was given. In addition, the weight of the evidence amply supported Susinka’s conviction. Although the prosecution arguably made some missteps in what was a long closing argument at the end of a long and complex trial, there was no timely objection, and we find no plain error here. The situation is a little different with the prosecution’s statement in closing that Susinka had a “gang list that talked about violations and names of participants at meetings.” There was no immediate objection. During the next recess, however, after the government had finished the opening portion of its argument, Susinka himself raised an objection with the court, pointing out correctly that the list was not in evidence. The court told Susinka that his lawyer could make that point in his closing argument, and that was exactly what happened. Nos. 09-1190, 09-1224, 09-1225, 09-1226, 09-1227, 09-1251 Page 19 We review the court’s handling of this problem under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Ochoa-Zarate, 540 F.3d 613, 616-17 (7th Cir. 2008). The government concedes that this portion of its argument was improper because the list was not in evidence, but Susinka was not denied a fair trial. Susinka’s counsel was able to rebut the government’s assertion by reminding the jury that, “there’s no list in evidence. There’s no list with any writing on it or any information for you to consider. . . . Because the government says something is so doesn’t make it so.” The court properly instructed the jury to decide the case on the evidence and that the lawyer’s statements were not evidence. And, a great deal of evidence supported Susinka’s conviction. There was no abuse of discretion in handling the problem this way and declining to grant a mistrial on the court’s own motion.