Opinion ID: 867503
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Term-Limits Provision

Text: ¶7 Kavanaugh appeals the superior court’s judgment that the Mesa City Charter’s term-limits provision precludes his bid for reelection as District 3 Councilmember. He asserts that the provision does not apply to this case because he has only served a single term as a “District Councilmember.” We disagree with his analysis. ¶8 Section 201(E) of the Mesa City Charter provides that “[n]o person shall be eligible to be elected to the office of Councilmember for more than two (2) consecutive four- (4-) year terms.” Because we indulge “a presumption in favor of the eligibility” of candidates, see McCarthy v. State ex rel. Harless, 55 Ariz. 328, 335, 101 P.2d 449, 451 (1940), we view 1 In the original action before Judge Paul A. Katz, Kavanaugh contested the court’s jurisdiction to hear the dispute, alleging that the Mesa City Charter provided its City Council with original jurisdiction over candidate-qualification disputes. Judge Katz rejected Kavanaugh’s argument, holding that the superior court was an appropriate venue and had jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 16-351. Kavanaugh expressly declined to appeal Judge Katz’s ruling on this issue. Consequently, we do not consider the issue of jurisdiction in this decision. - 5 - narrowly such limits on a candidate’s ability to serve. Id. at 334-35, 101 P.2d at 451 (noting that we should read restrictions so as not to “impair[] the right of the people to select officers of their own choosing”). ¶9 Nonetheless, we interpret statutes, rules and charter provisions according to their plain language, giving “full effect to the intent of the lawmaker.” Adams v. Bolin, 74 Ariz. 269, 276, 247 P.2d 617, 621 (1952). The word “Councilmember” in the 1967 term-limits provision does not distinguish between district and at-large members. It appears to refer to all individuals who serve as members of the City Council. ¶10 Kavanaugh contends, however, that the language change in the City Charter following the 1998 amendments renders “atlarge Councilmember” and “DISTRICT Councilmember” two distinct positions. Kavanaugh notes that the 1998 amendments changed the language of Section 201(A) from “[t]here shall be a City Council consisting of a Mayor and six (6) other Councilmembers” to its current version: “There shall be a City Council consisting of a Mayor and six (6) other DISTRICT Councilmembers.” (Emphasis in original.) Thus, Kavanaugh asserts that “the two-termlimitation only applies prospectively to the newly created District Councilmembers.” ¶11 Kavanaugh’s argument is undercut not only by the plain language of the term-limits provision, but also by the practical - 6 - effect that such a rigid construction would have on the termlimits rule. If adopted, the argument that the position of “District Councilmember” is distinct from that of an “at-large Councilmember” would eviscerate the term-limits rule. By that reasoning, if council boundaries shifted, a Councilmember would hold a new district position, one not subject to the term-limits rule. Nor under this reasoning would Kavanaugh be barred from serving a third or fourth term as a Councilmember if he moved from District 3 to another district. Indeed, because the City has recently changed to district representation, Kavanaugh’s interpretation would mean that the term-limits provision applies to no one for this election cycle. Moreover, if the position of “District Councilmember” is separate and distinct from the position of “Councilmember,” the former would appear not to be bound at all by Section 201(E)’s limitation on the terms of “Councilmembers.” This could not have been the intent of the drafters. The plain language of Section 201(E), that “[n]o person shall be eligible to be elected to the office of Councilmember for more than two (2) consecutive four- (4-) year terms,” must be construed to mean what it says. ¶12 Additionally, we note that despite the fact that Kavanaugh originally served as an “at-large Councilmember” before becoming a “District Councilmember,” he does the same job and represents many of the same constituents he represented - 7 - before. This is not a “new” or “distinct” public office. Rather, it appears that the 1998 amendments merely added the term “District” to the position title to highlight that future Councilmembers would be elected from districts rather than serving at-large. ¶13 We therefore conclude that Section 201(E) of the Mesa City Charter should be read to limit the ability of all Councilmembers to exceed the term-limits rule. This view is consistent both with a reading of the Charter as a whole and with an existing Attorney General Opinion that redistricting should not be permitted to circumvent term limits. See Op. Ariz. Att’y Gen. I01-019 (noting that term limits reduce the advantages of incumbency, a purpose that is hindered if a redistricting process allows an incumbent to run for an additional term).2