Opinion ID: 1657574
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: the trial court erred in granting the state's challenge for cause of charles butts who said he could vote for the death penalty.

Text: During death qualification of Russell's capital murder resentencing jury, the trial judge excused veniremember Charles Butts (Butts) for cause. Russell contends that Butts was eligible to serve on his jury under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), and that the trial judge erroneously struck Butts. On appeal, Russell contends that the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987), dictates the reversal of his death sentence. In the case at bar, the jury selection began with a 186-person venire. During the initial proceedings, the trial judge excused those veniremembers who were ill or those who had to take care of sick family members. Next, the trial judge excused those members of the venire over the age of sixty-five who chose to exercise their statutory right not to serve on the jury. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 13-5-23 and 13-5-25. The venire list also indicates that there were some veniremembers who either lived out of the county or out of the state, or the authorities were unable to locate. Ultimately, 77 veniremembers were excused during these initial proceedings. Next, the trial judge sought to determine if any of the remaining veniremembers were not qualified to serve on Russell's jury, i.e., veniremember not a registered voter or landowner in Montgomery County, veniremember previously convicted of a felony, veniremember not twenty-one years of age, veniremember a common gambler or habitual drunk, veniremember convicted of unlawful sale of intoxicating beverages within five years and, veniremember with a case pending in Sunflower County Circuit Court at time of Russell's resentencing. Through this process six veniremembers were disqualified from jury service. The trial judge proceeded to determine whether any of the remaining veniremembers chose to claim an exemption from jury duty as provided by Mississippi law. Four additional veniremembers chose not to serve because of exemptions, i.e., three were over sixty-five and one was the sole proprietor of a business that could not afford to be closed for several days. Veniremembers were next asked to present any personal excuses they might have for not serving on Russell's jury. After hearing all of the reasons proffered, the trial judge excused eight veniremembers. Out of the 186 people called for Russell's venire, 95 were excused for various statutory and personal reasons and 91 were left for jury qualification. The trial judge began the actual voir dire process by asking the veniremembers various general questions about the case and its participants. The veniremembers were then tendered to the State and then to Russell. At this time, none of the jurors were questioned as to their views regarding the death penalty. However, some veniremembers, of their own volition, did offer their views on capital punishment. After both sides had asked their questions, the veniremembers were allowed to leave the courtroom so that the parties could request certain excusals for cause. Eight of the State's requests were granted and nine of Russell's were granted. Also, at this time it was determined that one veniremember, Nannie Butts, was over sixty-five and had chosen not to serve. The court also noted that one veniremember had not appeared and had not given an excuse. Seventy-two people were left as veniremembers at this point. Both parties were then allowed to individually voir dire veniremembers who had informed the court that they had family members who had either been accused of, or convicted of, a crime. One veniremember was excused for cause as a result of this questioning. The remaining seventy-one veniremembers were placed into panels of twelve and tendered for death qualification. The first three panels of twelve were questioned and eight veniremembers from these three panels were excused for cause. At this point there were twenty-eight veniremembers from which jurors would be selected. The fourth panel, on which Butts was seated, was called to insure that there would be thirty-six veniremembers for jury selection. After the fourth panel was called and examined, the trial judge excused the following veniremembers for cause: Paul A. Cummings; Hattie Mae Hopkins; Charles Butts and; Joe Garrett. The first panel of twelve jurors was provisionally seated and the parties exercised their peremptory challenges alternately beginning with the State. The State used three peremptory strikes and then accepted the first three provisional jurors from the second panel and tendered the twelve provisional jurors to the defense. The defense accepted ten of the twelve tendered jurors and used two of its peremptory strikes to remove provisional jurors number 1 and 8. The prosecution used its fourth and fifth peremptory strikes to remove provisional jurors 16 and 17 and tendered the twelve provisional jurors to the defense. Russell then used his third peremptory strike to remove provisional juror number 18. Both the State and Russell accepted provisional jurors 19 and 20. This completed the process of selecting the twelve jurors. Next, two alternates were selected. During this process both parties exercised one of their two peremptories and selected provisional jurors number 21 and 24 to serve as alternates for Russell's resentencing. See Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-67. A. On appeal, Russell relies solely upon Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987), to support his contention that his death sentence be vacated. In fact, Russell argues that the case sub judice is indistinguishable from Gray. To properly address this assignment of error, we must first determine whether the trial judge incorrectly excluded Butts under Witherspoon, supra, and its progeny. This Court notes that the trial judge's determination of Butts' bias as to the death penalty is a question of fact that is entitled to deference upon judicial review. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 429, 105 S.Ct. 844, 855, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Ruiz v. Norris, 868 F. Supp. 1471, 1551 (E.D.Ark. 1994); C.f., Cabello v. State, 490 So.2d 852, 856 (Miss. 1986) (trial judge's finding of fact that waiver of Miranda rights voluntarily given accorded deference upon judicial review). In this case, there were three veniremembers with the surname Butts and one veniremember with the surname Burt. Charles Butts and Tony Burt were on the fourth jury panel and the record reveals that Butts was veniremember number 68 and Burt was veniremember 69. Upon reviewing the questioning of the fourth panel we are not convinced that the trial judge erroneously struck Butts for cause. [1] During questioning by the trial judge and prosecution, both Butts and Burt expressed the unequivocal opinion that they could not impose the death penalty under any circumstances. However, during Russell's attempt to rehabilitate the veniremembers the following exchange was had between Russell's attorney and Butts and Burt: ... . Q. What would your answer be? Regardless of the killing; I don't care how bad it could possibly get; regardless of the killing, would you never impose the death penalty? BY MR. BURT: I don't think I could. Q. Are you unsure or are you positive that you could never impose the death penalty? A. I don't think I ever could. Q. Never could. And you are? A. Burt. Q. Burt. Could you under no circumstances vote for the death penalty? A. No, sir. Q. Doesn't make any difference how bad the killing was, you could never vote for the death penalty? BY MR. BUTTS: You said no matter how bad it was? Q. Yes. A. According to how bad it was, I believe I could. Q. Okay. So, in your mind it would be a question of just how bad the crime was. If it wasn't so bad, you might vote death. Is that correct? A. Yeah. Q. Okay. So, you could impose the death penalty if you thought the evidence in this case warranted it, is that correct? A. Right. Q. Okay, and you could do that, couldn't you? A. Right. Q. Okay, and you could do that, couldn't you A. Right. (Vol. 4, pp. 280-81). Later, when the State and Russell challenged fourth panel members for cause, the following exchange occurred: BY THE COURT: Any challenges for cause on this panel? BY MRS. BRIDGES: Yes, sir. Hattie Mae Hopkins. She indicated that she could not vote for the death penalty under any circumstances. BY THE COURT: What number is she? BY MRS. BRIDGES: She's on the top of the page on the right side? BY SHERIFF TOMPKINS: 65. BY THE COURT: Okay. BY MRS. BRIDGES: Was that challenge granted? BY THE COURT: Uh-huh. BY MRS. BRIDGES: Charles Butts, who indicated likewise. BY MR. STUCKEY: Objection. I believe that he was rehabilitated. He indicated that he could, in fact, impose the death penalty. BY THE COURT: Mr. Butts said he never could. I will grant the challenge. BY MRS. BRIDGES: Your Honor, I would also challenge Tony Burt, who answered my question that regardless of what I proved, under no circumstances would he vote for the death penalty. And Counsel asked him just under an extreme [sic] horrible murder, could he vote for a death sentence, and Counsel has objected to the State proving heinous, atrocious, and cruel circumstances as an aggravating circumstance. Taking that out, this juror has stated that he could not under any circumstances in this case vote for the death penalty. BY MR. STUCKEY: To which the Defendant would object, Your Honor. I think that in his mind, and I asked him this, was it a matter of degree on how bad the crime was, and he said, yes, it was; that's what it depended on. I think it's what everybody makes their decision on. BY THE COURT: He said it depends on how bad it was. I think that rehabilitates him. I'm not going to grant that challenge. ... . (Vol. 4, pp. 288-89). In reviewing the record as a whole to determine whether the trial judge correctly excluded Butts for cause, we are led to the conclusion that the court reporter mistakenly transposed the names of Butts and Burt during Russell's voir. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 431, 105 S.Ct. at 856 (finding of trial judge court presumed correct unless finding of bias is not fairly supported by the record viewed as a whole). This conclusion is made clear when we examine the grounds offered by the State (Mrs. Bridges) for striking Butts and Burt for cause and when we examine the reasons given by Russell (Mr. Stuckey) to the trial court as to why the two are not excludable for cause. For example, the transcript of Russell's voir dire of Burt clearly indicates that Burt would never impose the death penalty (Vol. 4, p. 280). However, when we look to the attorneys' argument as to why Burt should not be excluded for cause (Vol. 4, pp. 288-89), we find that the State was concerned that the only time Burt could impose the death penalty was if the murder was an extreme and horrible murder, i.e., especially atrocious, heinous or cruel. Burt's response concerned the State because earlier the trial judge had ruled that the State could not attempt to prove the especially atrocious, heinous or cruel aggravator in the case sub judice. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(h). To rebut the State's attempt to have Burt excused for cause, Russell argued that Burt should not be excluded because he indicated that he would impose the death penalty if the murder was bad enough. The trial judge concurred with Russell's assessment of Burt's voir dire responses and emphatically stated that Burt would impose the death penalty if the murder was bad enough. On the other hand, the testimony attributed to Butts indicates that Butts would impose the death penalty if the circumstances of the murder were bad enough. (Vol. 4, pp. 280-81). When arguing for Butts' excusal, the prosecution argued that Butts would never impose the death penalty. Russell countered and said that Butts indicated that he would indeed impose the death penalty. (Vol. 4, p. 288). During this argument, Russell did not indicate that Butts would impose the death penalty if the circumstances warranted it. The trial judge agreed with the prosecution and struck Butts. The problem is plain; Russell's voir dire of Burt indicates that Burt would never impose the death penalty and Russell's voir dire of Butts indicates that Butts would impose the death penalty if the circumstances were bad enough. This is directly contrary to what the parties argued when the State challenged Butts and Burt for cause. Because Russell's attorney failed to differentiate between Butts and Burt, as he did with Garrett, Anderson and Hopkins, we are led to the conclusion that the court reporter mistakenly labeled Butts' responses as those of Burt and labeled Burt's responses to Russell's questioning as those of Butts. Therefore, upon reviewing the record as a whole, we find that the trial judge did not err in concluding that Butts would never impose the death penalty and that Burt could impose the death penalty if the circumstances warranted such a penalty. See M.R.A.P. 14(a). Accordingly, given that the trial judge's finding of bias is accorded great deference on judicial review, Witt, 469 U.S. at 429, 105 S.Ct. at 855, we conclude that the trial did not err in excluding Butts for cause. B. Even if we were to find that Butts was erroneously stricken for cause, we find that Gray, supra, is distinguishable from the case sub judice. In Gray, the prosecution was forced to use several of its peremptory challenges to remove jurors who should have been excused for cause under Witherspoon. Gray, 481 U.S. at 669, 107 S.Ct. at 2057. After the State had used all of its peremptory strikes, prospective juror, Mrs. H.C. Bounds, stated that although she was against the death penalty, she could, in appropriate circumstances vote for the death penalty. The State, confronted with the absolute certainty of having Bounds as a juror, sought the restoration of a peremptory challenge so that it could remove Bounds. The trial judge realized his earlier errors and attempted to remedy these mistakes by striking Bounds for cause. Ultimately, the jury sentenced Gray to death and the United States Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, reversed Gray's death sentence. Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987). In the term following the Gray decision, the United States Supreme Court decided yet another case dealing with a capital murder defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Right to a fair and impartial jury. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988). In Ross, the defendant sought the removal for cause of a veniremember who should have been excused under Witherspoon. The trial judge refused to strike the veniremember for cause and Ross was forced to use a peremptory strike to keep the veniremember off the jury. Ross, 487 U.S. at 84, 108 S.Ct. at 2276. Ultimately, Ross was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Ross appealed and argued that Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987), mandated the reversal of his death sentence because he was denied an impartial jury. On appeal, the Petitioner argued that had he not used his sixth peremptory challenge to remove Huling, he could have removed another juror, including one who ultimately sat on the jury. Ross also argued that had he used his sixth peremptory challenge differently, the prosecution may have exercised its remaining peremptory challenges differently in response, and consequently, the composition of the jury panel might have changed significantly. Ross, 487 U.S. at 87, 108 S.Ct. at 2277-78. While the Ross Court agreed with the Petitioner's contention that the failure to remove Huling may have resulted in a jury panel different from that which would otherwise have decided the case, the Court rejected the petitioner's argument that Gray mandated reversal of his death sentence and stated: We decline to extend the rule of Gray beyond its context: the erroneous Witherspoon exclusion of a qualified juror in a capital case. We think the broad language used by the Gray Court is too sweeping to be applied literally, and is best understood in the context of the facts there involved. In the instant case, there is no need to speculate whether Huling would have been removed absent the erroneous ruling by the trial court; Huling was in fact removed and did not sit. Ross, 487 U.S. at 87-88, 108 S.Ct. at 2278 (internal citations omitted). We think it clear that the United States Supreme Court, in Ross, limited the holding of Gray to the context of the facts there involved, i.e., erroneous Witherspoon exclusions where the veniremember would have served on the defendant's jury but for the trial judge's erroneous exclusion. In Gray, the erroneously excluded veniremember, Mrs. H.C. Bounds, undoubtedly would have served on the jury had it not been for the trial judge's error. In the case sub judice, we cannot say that Butts would have served on Russell's jury and therein lies the difference between the case at bar and Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987). After reviewing the record, it is clear to this Court that the jury and the two alternates in this case were selected from the first twenty-four jury panel members and no jury panel member from the fourth panel in which Charles Butts had been a member was reached. [2] Butts would have been panel member number 35 if he had not been excused for cause. Even if the defense had chosen to use all twelve of its peremptory challenges, the prosecution would have had to oblige the defense and use at least 11 of its peremptory challenges to enable Butts to serve on the jury. We think it far too speculative to assume that the defense would have used all twelve of its peremptory challenges and that the State would have then used at least eleven of their challenges to allow Russell to reach Butts. This is especially so in light of Butts' conflicting statements as to whether he could impose the death penalty. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution guarantee a defendant on trial for his life the right to an impartial jury. Ross, 487 U.S. at 81, 108 S.Ct. at 2277; Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). We find that Russell was afforded such a jury. Upon examination of the record, we note that none of the twelve jurors were challenged for cause and likewise, on appeal, Russell does not allege that any of the twelve were not impartial. Accordingly, we conclude that Russell's right to an impartial jury was not abridged.