Opinion ID: 1763136
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Brady ViolationsMammolito Evidence

Text: Engel's principal argument for habeas relief is that the prosecution wrongly failed to disclose to him material impeachment evidence related to Mammolito, which he argues violated his due process rights under Brady . Brady holds that `the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.' Merriweather v. State, 294 S.W.3d 52, 54 (Mo. banc 2009) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194). To prevail in his Brady claims based on the Mammolito evidence, Engel must show each of the following: (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to him, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) he was prejudiced. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936; Merriweather, 294 S.W.3d at 54.
To prevail in his Brady claim that evidence related to Mammolito was wrongly not disclosed to him, Engel first must establish that the Mammolito evidence at issue was favorable to him. Id. The evidence developed in Manning's case related to Mammolito supports Engel's allegations that Mammolito was paid for his testimony against Engel and Manning. New evidence includes a letter to Mammolito's mother that enclosed a $500 payment and mentioned the help [Mammolito] provided in this very important case. Other evidence supports Engel's allegations that investigators coached Mammolito to align his testimony with their testimony. And Engel now has letters evidencing that investigators sought leniency for Mammolito based on his cooperation in the kidnapping case. This Mammolito evidence is impeachment evidence favorable to Engel that proves the first prong of his Brady claim.
Engel next must prove his Brady claim as to the Mammolito evidence by showing that the State suppressed the evidence, either willfully or inadvertently. Id. There is no dispute that, during Engel's trial, he was not provided the Mammolito impeachment evidence that is the subject of his habeas claims. The State contends, however, that Engel cannot show that the Mammolito evidence was suppressed for Brady purposes because it did not exist at the time of trial. It argues that the prosecutor cannot be faulted for failing to provide not-yet-existent documents about the alleged deal made between Mammolito and investigators. Documents memorializing the deal, however, need not have existed at the time of trial; it is enough that the evidence shows that the deal itself already existed, even if had not yet been documented. Under Brady , due process requires that the prosecution disclose to the defendant any evidence in its possession that is favorable to him and that is material to his guilt or punishment. Id. Brady provides that the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (emphasis added). It is irrelevant to Engel's Brady claim that the Mammolito evidence at issue in his habeas request involves non-Missouri investigators. These investigators were part of Missouri's prosecutorial team in the kidnapping cases against Engel and Manning, essentially acting as the prosecutor's agents during the investigation. Similarly, it is no hindrance to Engel's Brady claim that the prosecutor did not have the same knowledge about his case as the investigators. [4] The prosecutor's lack of knowledge about information asserted in a Brady claim is not an impediment because the prosecutor is considered `the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.' Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935)). Engel has satisfied the second prong for his Brady claim by showing that the Mammolito evidence that is the subject of his habeas petition was suppressed wrongly.
Having proved the first two prongs of his Brady claim, Engel also must show that he was prejudiced by the nondisclosure of the Mammolito evidence at issue. See Merriweather, 294 S.W.3d at 54. Before determining whether the evidence meets the test for Brady prejudice, this Court must assess whether the evidence at issue is material to Engel's case. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282, 119 S.Ct. 1936. Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure to the defense would have caused a different result in the proceeding. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936. The materiality standard for Brady claims is established when the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555. The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. Id. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555. The State suggests that the nondisclosure of the Mammolito impeachment evidence was not material or prejudicial to Engel because the defense offered other impeachment evidence related to Mammolito during the trial. Efforts to discredit Mammolito during the trial included attacking his character by highlighting his criminal history and work as a drug dealer, highlighting that he had testified in exchange for not being charged in the kidnapping, and noting inconsistencies in his pre-trial and trial testimonies. The State contends that any evidence that Mammolito had a deal with investigators would have been overkill and, therefore, was not material impeachment evidence. Contrary to the State's assertions, it makes no difference to Engel's Brady claim that other Mammolito impeachment evidence was unpersuasive to the jury during the trial. See Taylor v. State, 262 S.W.3d 231, 244 (Mo. banc 2008) (noting [t]he fact that a witness was impeached in other ways does not conclude the materiality inquiry required under Brady  because the witness's credibility is not a collateral issue). In determining whether the suppressed impeachment evidence was material, the reviewing court must evaluate not only the ways that [the witness] was impeached, but also the ways that he was not impeached that would have been available had [the Brady claim] evidence been disclosed. Id. If a witness is presenting false testimony, his testimony is not rendered truthful because he is cross-examined. See Napue v. People of the State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) (noting that a lie is a lie (internal quotation omitted)). The unknown impeachment information, especially when coupled with the impeachment information presented at the time of trial, could have led the jury to a different assessment of Mammolito's credibility. See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002). The defense's efforts to impeach Mammolito's credibility were deprived of significant evidentiary force by the prosecution's failure to disclose to Engel the evidence supporting his belief that investigators had encouraged Mammolito to testify falsely about Engel's role in the kidnapping. Taylor, 262 S.W.3d at 245. The Brady materiality of the undisclosed Mammolito evidence is shown because (1) knowledge of [the undisclosed] facts could have significantly undermined the legitimacy of [Mammolito's] testimony and involvement in the case in a way that no other impeachment presented was able to do and (2) [h]aving failed to disclose this impeachment evidence, the state was able to claim much greater credibility from [Mammolito's] testimony than the true facts would have warranted. See id. Having determined that the undisclosed Mammolito evidence was material for purposes of Brady , this Court also considers whether the nondisclosure of this material evidence prejudiced Engel so as to warrant habeas relief based on a Brady violation. This assessment questions whether Engel's trial result[ed] in a verdict worthy of confidence. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555. This Court finds that Engel has presented evidence showing that the verdict in his case is not worthy of confidence. Nondisclosure of impeachment evidence related to Mammolito, who was a chief prosecution witness, caused Engel to suffer Brady prejudice because his defense hinged on undermining Mammolito's credibility. Cf. Merriweather, 294 S.W.3d at 57 (noting prejudice where impeachment evidence was nondisclosed wrongly and the defendant's credibility was pitted against the witness's credibility). The jury's verdict in Manning's federal civil case demonstrates that the nondisclosed Mammolito impeachment evidence would have aided Engel in discrediting Mammolito's testimony at trial. [5]