Opinion ID: 1095462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: conclusion

Text: As we have noted, Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-105(3)(h) insofar as it authorizes legislators to be employed by a state-financed agency other than the Legislative body of which they are members is unconstitutional and void. We further find that Frazier and Anderson were in violation of Article 4, Section 109 by virtue of their serving in the Legislature and also being employed on the faculty of a state-supported university. The declaratory judgment as to them is affirmed. As to Nunnally we likewise find that he was in violation of Article 4, Section 109 by virtue of serving in the Legislature and also being employed as a public school teacher. It follows that the declaratory judgment as to Nunnally's dual employment is affirmed. Insofar as the judgment against Nunnally was based upon his wife being employed as a public school teacher, however, the chancellor erred, and as to this finding the judgment is reversed. The employment of Mrs. Nunnally as a public school teacher while Nunnally served in the Legislature was not a violation of Section 109. As to Logan and Killebrew, we likewise find that insofar as Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-105(3)(h) authorized either of them to be employed by a political subdivision and simultaneously serve on the governing board of another political subdivision with discretionary authority to vote tax levies for the support of the political subdivision by which they are employed is unconstitutional and void. We further find that Killebrew, in serving upon the Board of Supervisors of Quitman County with discretionary authority to levy ad valorem taxes for the support of the Quitman County School District while employed as a public teacher in that school district, was in violation of Article 4, Section 109, and the judgment as to him is affirmed. We further find that Logan, in serving upon the city board of Long Beach in 1985 when it levied a discretionary ad valorem tax levy of 3.95 mills for the support of the public schools of the Long Beach Municipal Separate School District, while at the same time being employed as a public school principal in that school district was in violation of Article 4, Section 109, and the judgment in finding him in violation of this section for that year is affirmed. Insofar as the chancery court found Logan in violation of Section 109 for the years 1982, 1983 and 1984, however, the chancellor erred, and as to this finding the judgment is reversed. Logan was not in violation of § 109 for these years, because the city board was required by law to make the tax levy actually levied. As to Knox we find that insofar as the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-103(3)(a) authorized the contract between the banks in which he was an officer and a stockholder, and Panola County when he was a member of the Board of Supervisors, is unconstitutional and void. Finally, we find that Knox, in serving as a member of the Board of Supervisors of Panola County which contracted with the bank of which he was an officer and stockholder, was in violation of Section 109, and the judgment as to him is affirmed.