Opinion ID: 1941379
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Existence of an Enforceable Promise

Text: [¶ 10] Teresa contends that the Dows, having made general promises to convey land to her at some point and then assenting to her building a $200,000 house on their property in reliance on those promises, are now estopped from asserting that she has no rights to the land the house is located on. The Superior Court agreed that the Dows made general promises to convey land to Teresa, but concluded that they were too indefinite to enforce because there was no agreement on basic elements such as the boundaries or size of the property involved. We review the court's factual findings for clear error, and its legal conclusion that those facts do not make out a claim of promissory estoppel de novo. Daigle Commercial Group, Inc. v. St. Laurent, 1999 ME 107, ¶ 13, 734 A.2d 667, 672. [¶ 11] The doctrine of promissory estoppel applies to promises that are otherwise unenforceable, and is invoked to enforce [such] promises ... so as to avoid injustice. Id. ¶ 14, 734 A.2d at 672 (quotation marks omitted); Cottle Enters., Inc. v. Town of Farmington, 1997 ME 78, ¶ 17 n. 6, 693 A.2d 330, 335. It is an accepted doctrine in Maine. June Roberts Agency, Inc. v. Venture Props., Inc., 676 A.2d 46, 49 (Me.1996). We have adopted the definition of promissory estoppel set out in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which states: A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981); Bracale v. Gibbs, 2007 ME 7, ¶ 14, 914 A.2d 1112, 1115. [¶ 12] Here, the record supports the trial court's finding that although they made general promises to Teresa that she would at some time receive some of their land as a gift or inheritance, the Dows did not make an express promise to convey a parcel of land of any specified size, or with any defined boundaries, at any time certain. The court was correct in finding that the existence of a promise to convey property was an essential element of Teresa's claim, and in holding that if there was no promise on which Teresa could rely, then her claim of promissory estoppel failed. See Tarbuck v. Jaeckel, 2000 ME 105, ¶¶ 17, 18, 752 A.2d 176, 181 (stating that [t]he court's finding that there was no promise on which [the party] could rely thereby foreclosed her argument of promissory estoppel); Gagne v. Stevens, 1997 ME 88, ¶ 13, 696 A.2d 411, 416 (holding that claim of promissory estoppel failed when plaintiff made no promise specific enough to enforce). [¶ 13] If the evidence consisted only of the Dows' general promises to convey land as a gift or inheritance, we would agree that Teresa's claim of promissory estoppel should be denied. However, the evidence included an important second component: the Dows' acquiescence, support, and encouragement of Teresa's construction of a house upon the property and the application of section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts to those facts. Neither the initial decision and judgment nor the order on Teresa's motion for findings of fact addressed these critical points. [¶ 14] Against the backdrop of the parties' general understanding that Teresa would one day receive property as a gift or inheritance from her parents, she decided to build a new house on their land. Jeffrey Dow Sr. agreed to the location, obtained a building permit to allow construction at that site, and not only acquiesced in the house being built, but built a large portion of it himself. In a promissory estoppel analysis, [t]he promise relied on by the promisee need not be express but may be implied from a party's conduct. June Roberts Agency, Inc., 676 A.2d at 50; see Nappi v. Nappi Distribs., 1997 ME 54, ¶ 9, 691 A.2d 1198, 1200 (stating that promise may be implied from a party's conduct). [¶ 15] At least as to the land on which Teresa's house now sits, a promise by Jeffrey Dow Sr. to convey that specific parcel could be implied from his conduct, and if that implication is made, given that Teresa now has an immobile $200,000 asset on that parcel, [t]he circumstances [are] such that the refusal to enforce the promise to make a gift would work a fraud upon the donee. Tozier v. Tozier, 437 A.2d 645, 648-49 (Me.1981); see Nappi, 1997 ME 54, ¶ 9, 691 A.2d at 1200 (stating that when applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel [i]n the context of the transfer of land, when the donee has made substantial improvements to the land in reliance upon the promise to convey the land, courts will enforce the promise to convey. (quotation marks omitted)). Under these circumstances, a promise is enforceable notwithstanding a lack of consideration. See Nappi, 1997 ME 54, ¶ 9, 691 A.2d at 1200. [¶ 16] In Tozier, a father told his son that he could have a parcel of land to live on. 437 A.2d at 646. The son moved from where he had been living and built a house on the parcel with his father's help. Id. Years after the father's death, the son's brother made a claim to the property and eventually filed an action for possession. Id. at 646-47. [¶ 17] Analyzing the father's original parol promise to give his son a parcel of land, we said: [T]he enforceability of a promise to make a gift of land depends not upon contract principles, but upon principles of fraud. A mere showing that a donee incurred some detriment at the instance of the donor is insufficient to enforce a parol gift. When the donee, however, has made substantial improvements to the land, and the donee has made the improvements in reliance upon the promise to convey the land, courts will enforce the promise to convey. Id. at 648 (emphasis in original). We then held that building a house constituted a valuable and permanent improvement[ ] such that [t]o deny the [son] his rights in the property ... would be both unjust and inequitable. Id. at 649. The same equities are applicable in this case. [2] [¶ 18] The Restatement (Second) of Contracts also lends support to the inference that the Dows might have made an enforceable promise to convey the site of Teresa's house to her. It defines a promise as a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2(1) (1981); see § 90, reporters' note cmt. a (stating that [o]n the meaning of `promise,' see § 2). Jeffrey Dow Sr.'s actions in approving the site of Teresa's house, obtaining a building permit for it, and then building a substantial part of it himself at that location would seem to be manifestation[s] of [his] intention to act... in a specified waynamely a manifestation of his intent to confirm his general promise to convey land to Teresa and to direct it to that specific parcel. [¶ 19] In addition to giving a general definition of the term promise, section 90 specifically discusses promises to make a gift. It explains that [s]uch a promise is ordinarily enforced by virtue of the promisee's reliance only if his conduct is foreseeable and reasonable and involves a definite and substantial change of position which would not have occurred if the promise had not been made. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 cmt. f. An illustration to that discussion describes a scenario analogous to the one presented here: A orally promises to give her son B a tract of land to live on. As A intended, B gives up a homestead elsewhere, takes possession of the land, lives there for a year and makes substantial improvements. A's promise is binding. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 cmt. f, illus. 16. [3] [¶ 20] In sum, on the facts found by the Superior Court, Teresa's reliance on the Dows' general promise to give her land at some time, when coupled with their affirmative actions in allowing her to build a substantial house on a particular piece of their land, would seem to be eminently foreseeable and reasonable. From those actions, a promise by the Dows to convey that specific site could be fairly implied. Neither the absence of an explicitly articulated promise, nor the absence of consideration is a bar to enforcing that promise. The Superior Court erred in failing to consider the Dows' actions, in conjunction with their generalized statements, in determining whether the existence of a promissory estoppel is established on these facts. [4] Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the matter to the Superior Court for consideration of the issues identified herein. The entry is: Judgment as to count one of the complaint and count one of the counterclaim vacated; remanded for further proceedings on those counts. In all other respects, judgment affirmed.