Opinion ID: 68902
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Merits of the Section 1981 and Title VII Claims

Text: Section 1981 entitles all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States with the same rights to enter in and enforce contracts as those “enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The elements of an employment discrimination claim asserted under § 1981 are identical to a discrimination claim asserted under Title VII. Flanagan v. Aaron E. Henry Cmty. Health Sevs. Ctr., 876 F.2d 1231, 1233 (5th Cir. 1989). Thus, employment discrimination claims brought under § 1981 are analyzed under the same evidentiary framework as Title VII claims. Roberson v. Alltel Information Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 651 (5th Cir. 2004). Under Title VII it is “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Taylor has not provided direct evidence of discrimination, therefore, his claim based on circumstantial evidence is analyzed under the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). See Turner, 476 F.3d at 345. Taylor must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by establishing that he “(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by someone outside the protected class, or in the case of disparate treatment, shows that other similarly situated employees were treated more favorably.” Bryan v. McKinsey & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 2004). Once Taylor demonstrates a prima facie case, Seton must articulate a legitimate, 5 No. 08-51283 non-discriminatory reason for its decision to terminate Taylor. Id. If Seton meets this burden, Taylor must then offer sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Seton’s reasons are false or unworthy of credence and, thus, merely a pretext for discrimination. See id. at 312.
Taylor failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The first three elements are settled: Taylor is an African-American, his qualification for the position has not been challenged, and he was discharged. Seton challenges only the fourth element of Taylor’s prima facie case, arguing that Taylor provided no evidence that he was replaced by a non-African-American or female or that a similarly situated non-African-American or female was treated more fairly. To satisfy this element, Taylor must provide evidence of another employee in a similar position accused of similar impropriety in the workplace who was treated more favorably than himself. Wheeler v. BL Dev. Corp., 415 F.3d 399, 406 (5th Cir. 2005). Taylor provided no evidence of a non-AfricanAmerican or female who was accused of similar impropriety and received more favorable treatment. He does not argue otherwise. Taylor failed to provide evidence of the fourth element of the prima facie case of discrimination. 3. Seton’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason Even if Taylor had provided evidence of a prima facie case of discrimination, Seton has offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision to terminate Taylor. Seton asserts that it discharged Taylor because he verbally harassed a co-worker. Seton provides evidence to support this reason, and Taylor does not attempt to rebut this allegation. Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, Seton’s establishment of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging Taylor would require Taylor to prove that the given reason was merely a pretext for discrimination if he had first established a prima facie case of discrimination. Bryan, 375 F.3d at 312. 6 No. 08-51283 4. Pretext for discrimination To survive summary judgment, Taylor must ultimately provide evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that either (1) Seton’s reason is false and is a pretext for discrimination, or (2) that although Seton’s reason is true, Taylor’s protected characteristic was a motivating factor for the adverse employment action. Id. Taylor asserts the pretext alternative. He must produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find either that Seton’s explanation is unworthy of credence or that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated Seton’s decision to terminate him. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). Taylor asserts that Seton’s investigation into the allegations of harassment was flawed because witnesses who would have corroborated his side of the story were not interviewed, thus showing a discriminatory animus. Taylor offers his own sworn declaration, the sworn declaration of Tracy Hill (“Hill”), and a copy of a document detailing interview notes taken by Norma Gonzales in her interview with Sam Olivio after the incident. He asserts that he did not bite Tafilaj’s buttocks and that Hill, a co-worker who witnessed the incident through an open door, would have testified to that fact if the Seton investigators would have accepted her repeated requests to be interviewed. None of this information shows that Seton’s proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. Seton’s explanation for discharging Taylor is that he verbally harassed Tafilaj. In fact, Taylor was not terminated immediately after the alleged biting incident. After Seton completed its investigation, it suggested that Taylor request a transfer to another unit. He took this action and was allowed to retain his level of pay although it would normally have been reduced. After the biting allegation, Tafilaj reported two separate instances of verbal harassment by Taylor. Seton corroborated the first instance with a statement from Alicia Michalz, a co-worker who was present at the time of the incident. 7 No. 08-51283 Seton corroborated the second instance with video-tape from a camera which monitors the hospital entrance. Taylor provides no evidence to the contrary. In addition to failing to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Taylor fails to provide evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that Seton’s reason for discharge was merely a pretext for discrimination.