Opinion ID: 1857482
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Claimed Vagueness.

Text: Moore further claims that the standard articulated in § 29-2522(2) is rendered vague by the inclusion of the word approach. His specific complaint is that it is not clear how closely the mitigating circumstances must approximate the weight of the aggravating circumstances before a death sentence becomes inappropriate. Thus, according to Moore, different sentencing authorities could reach different conclusions, rendering the application of the death penalty arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court has established two phases to a constitutional capital sentencing process: (1) the determination that the defendant is death eligible and (2) the creation of an individualized sentence for the defendant. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994). In the first phase, the trier of fact must convict the defendant of murder and find one `aggravating circumstance' (or its equivalent) at either the guilt or penalty phase. ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2634. The aggravating circumstance must meet two requirements. First, it must not apply to every defendant convicted of a murder; rather, it must apply to only a subclass of defendants convicted of murder. See Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 1542, 123 L.Ed.2d 188 (1993) ([i]f the sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm). Second, the aggravating circumstance may not be unconstitutionally vague. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980). There is a separate requirement for the second phase, where the sentencing authority determines if a defendant eligible for the death penalty should in fact receive that sentence. What is important here is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2744, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). At this stage, `discretion to evaluate and weigh the circumstance relevant to the particular defendant and the crime he committed' is not impermissible in the capital sentencing process. Tuilaepa, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2639, citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987). Indeed, as the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, the sentencing authority may be given `unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible for that penalty.' Tuilaepa, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2639, citing Zant, supra . Although under the federal Constitution it would clearly be permissible to grant the sentencing authority unfettered discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed, our law directs that the death penalty not be imposed in cases where sufficient mitigating factors approach or exceed the weight given to the aggravating circumstances. The narrow question before us, then, is whether the word approach is so vague as to compromise the sentencing procedure leading to bias or caprice in sentencing. It is not. In everyday usage, the word approach means a coming or being near in quality or character. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 106 (1993). Thus, the reasonable meaning of § 29-2522(2) is that when sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which [come near to]... the weight given to the aggravating circumstances, the death penalty cannot be imposed. Although application of the standard obviously requires a balancing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the standard is not vague.