Opinion ID: 2575903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Impeaching Mental Health Expert With Defendant's Statement

Text: Defendant claims that his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, along with sections 15 and 16 of article I of the California Constitution (specifically his rights not to be a witness against himself and to counsel), were violated when the prosecution impeached his expert witness on mental health with his prior extrajudicial statement, made when he was being evaluated for competency to proceed to trial, about certain circumstances of the crime. On December 1, 1986, defendant told Dr. John Peschau, a psychiatrist who was examining him to determine his competency ( ante, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 606, 131 P.3d at p. 1006), that he was surprised by the charges against him and that the victim shouldn't have got in the way of a good robbery. All I wanted was the cocaine. What I used was an Uzi type shotgun, automatic. When I get out I'm going to get a machinegun for all those people. During the first trial, in 1990, defendant moved for an order to prohibit the prosecution from impeaching him with any statements he made to Dr. Peschau in the course of the court-ordered competency examination. He cited, inter alia, People v. Arcega (1982) 32 Cal.3d 504, 186 Cal. Rptr. 94, 651 P.2d 338, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the federal Constitution. The trial court granted the motion. At the second penalty phase, in 1993, defendant made a similar but not identical motion, to a different judge (the Hon. Jeffrey W. Horner) from the judge who oversaw the guilt phase (the Hon. Stanley Golde). This time he argued that because the evidence had been obtained in the course of evaluating his competency, rather than in connection with criminal proceedings, it was irrelevant and substantially more prejudicial than probative. (Evid. Code, її 350, 352.) He contended that the facts of the crime belied his comments and that he was not presenting a defense to the crimes, which had already been adjudicated, or a case in mitigation based on temporary insanity at the time of the crimes; instead, his case in mitigation was that his actions were the product of longstanding mental defects. The trial court ruled that it would be improper to restrict the ability of the district attorney to cross-examine [mental health expert witnesses] as to all information that has some relevance to their opinions. It denied the motion. Thereafter, the prosecutor asked defendant's psychiatric expert witness, Dr. Woods (see ante, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 631, 131 P.3d at p. 1027), if the statement, which the prosecutor quoted to the jury, showed a goal-oriented and coherent mental state. Defendant does not renew his state law arguments of irrelevance and undue prejudice (Evid.Code, її 350, 352). As for his constitutional claims, he failed to present them to the different judge who was overseeing the second penalty phase. He did not call the court's attention to the written motion he had filed on this question during the guilt phase three years earlier, and the record does not show that the court was aware of any basis for his motion other than the relevance and undue prejudice provisions of Evidence Code sections 350 and 352. He has, accordingly, failed to preserve them for review. A motion to exclude evidence, like an oral objection in open court to the admission of evidence, must fairly inform the trial court, as well as the party offering the evidence, of the specific reason or reasons the ... party believes the evidence should be excluded, so the party offering the evidence can respond appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling.... A party cannot argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to conduct. ( People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th 428, 435, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765; see People v. Lilienthal, supra, 22 Cal.3d 891, 896, 150 Cal. Rptr. 910, 587 P.2d 706.) [20] Defendant argues that if we find his Sixth Amendment claim forfeited, counsel's failure to raise it before Judge Horner constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree. As noted, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment entails deficient performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness and prejudice under a test of reasonable probability of an adverse effect on the outcome. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.) The Strickland standards also apply under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. (E.g., People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, 718, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) As Strickland makes clear, to be entitled to relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. ( People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 199, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331.) Accordingly, we need not decide whether counsel's performance was deficient. Whether it was or was not, we discern no prejudice to defendant. The evidence that was presented to the jury was insignificant. Though the prosecutor's reference to Dr. Peschau's interview did not flatter defendant, it was brief and pointed as much to an individual in the grip of delusions as to one who realistically posed a serious continuing menace if he should somehow be set free. (Cf. People v. Arcega, supra, 32 Cal.3d 504, 525-526, 186 Cal.Rptr. 94, 651 P.2d 338.) The jury knew defendant never would be in a position to obtain and fire a machine gun no matter what verdict it might reach. Moreover, the other aggravating evidence was strong, including the circumstances of the crimes, defendant's record of unadjudicated violent crimes and felony convictions, his statement to sheriff's deputies evincing a lack of remorse for murdering Lees, and the impact of Lees's death on a number of people. The mitigating evidence was of mixed value: it showed that defendant had suffered from a hard childhood and perhaps mental problems, but it also showed that his antisocial behavior was partly responsible for his childhood difficulties and persisted even after he received and benefited from the care and devotion of others in a decent setting. In sum, the mitigating evidence was not particularly compelling. If defendant had preserved his Sixth Amendment claim for review, we would conclude that any error in admitting the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ( Satterwhite v. Texas, supra, 486 U.S. 249, 256, 258, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 [applying the Chapman standard]; see Arcega, supra, at p. 525, 186 Cal.Rptr. 94, 651 P.2d 338 [applying the Chapman standard to a Fifth Amendment claim of improper use of evidence gleaned from a competency examination]), and reversal of the judgment would not be required. Because we find no reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the admission of the evidence, we conclude that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel. ( People v. Mayfield, supra, 5 Cal.4th 142, 199, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331.)