Opinion ID: 2621100
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Rape Charge

Text: Hill argues that the district court committed structural error by failing to instruct the jury that its verdict must be unanimous regarding which of the two acts of digital penetration constituted the rape. B.M. testified that Hill penetrated her vagina with his finger both in the bathroom and in the kitchen. Until the day before trial, the State was unaware that a second penetration had allegedly occurred in the kitchen. Thus, Hill was charged with only one count of rape (the bathroom incident). Here, the district court gave a general unanimity instruction. It also gave the following instruction: Each crime charged against the defendant is a separate and distinct offense. You must decide each charge separately on the evidence and law applicable to it, uninfluenced by your decision as to any other charge. The defendant may be convicted or acquitted on any or all of the offenses charged. Your finding as to each crime charged must be stated in a verdict form signed by the presiding juror. The court instructed the jury on rape and that sexual intercourse was a required element of rape. However, the court did not instruct the jury that its verdict must be unanimous regarding which of the two acts of digital penetration constituted the rape. Hill keys on the failure to so instruct, labeling the failure structural error mandating reversal. At this point in the opinion, a review of the transcript is appropriate to show how the evidence of the digital penetration in the kitchen was heard by the jury. The State in its direct examination of B.M. did not ask about penetration in the kitchen. B.M.'s testimony on direct was: A.... [W]hen I got into the kitchen he started kissing me again. Q. Was he touching you again? A. Yes. Q. Was he touching your breasts again? A. Yes, but my sports bra wasn't lifted up. Q. So he's touching you on the outside of that? A. Yes. Q. Was he touching you below also? A. Yes. Q. How did it stop? A. I backed away from him. Q. And what happened? A. I walkedI was going to grab the phone and I decided not to because I was scared he might do something to me and so I walked into the living room and he tried to push me down on the couch and I said, `Jimmer, you need to leave, my dad is going to be home,' and he kissed me and then he sat down on the couch and I went to walk into the bathroom and I stopped at the end of the hallway and he said, `Yeah, I guess I do,' and he got up and left. The kitchen digital penetration testimony occurred during B.M.'s cross-examination. The questioning from Hill's counsel developed this way: Q. Did you stay in the kitchen? A. I stood in the middle of the kitchen, yes, told him he needs to leave. Q. Did Mr. Hill come into the kitchen after you? A. Yes, he did. Q. And what did he do there? A. He kissed me repeatedly, lifted my sports bra up, and he did the same exact thing he did in the bathroom except he did not kiss my chest area. Q. Did hedid he insert his finger in your vagina again? A. Yes, he did. Q. Both from the back and the front? A. Just the back. The State did not reference the kitchen rape in its closing argument. Hill contends his right to a unanimous verdict was violated by the district court's failure to give a unanimity instruction with respect to the multiple acts of alleged rape. Hill failed to request such an instruction at trial. Generally, when no request or objection is made, we reverse only if the failure to give an instruction was clearly erroneous. See State v. DePriest, 258 Kan. 596, 605, 907 P.2d 868 (1995). The Court of Appeals here found that the district court erred in failing to give a unanimity instruction but concluded that the error was harmless. Hill notes that the Court of Appeals' holding conflicts with State v. Wellborn, 27 Kan. App.2d 393, 4 P.3d 1178, rev. denied 269 Kan. 940 (2000), and State v. Barber, 26 Kan. App.2d 330, 988 P.2d 250 (1999). Wellborn and Barber applied a structural error analysis in reversing and remanding for new trials where unanimity instructions were not given in multiple acts cases. Resolution of the harmless error-structural error conflict involves a question of law, over which we have unlimited review. See State v. Belcher, 269 Kan. 2, 4, 4 P.3d 1137 (2000). The Court of Appeals in an extensive analysis recognized the existence of two views regarding juror unanimity in multiple acts cases. One view holds that the failure to give the specific unanimity question results in structural error, which requires the appellate court to reverse and remand the case. See State v. Arceo, 84 Hawaii 1, 32-33, 928 P.2d 843 (1996) (defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict is violated unless the State elects the specific act it is relying on to establish the crime or a specific unanimity instruction is given); Hill, 28 Kan. App.2d at 31 (citing concurring case law in other jurisdictions). Structural errors are so intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal (i.e., `affect substantial rights') without regard to their effect on the outcome. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7, 144 L. Ed.2d 35, 119 S. Ct. 1827 (1999). Automatic reversal is required in limited situations. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468-69, 137 L. Ed.2d 718, 117 S. Ct. 1544 (1997) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 9 L. Ed.2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792 [1963]) (complete denial of counsel); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 282, 124 L. Ed.2d 182, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993) (defective reasonable doubt instruction); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264, 88 L. Ed.2d 598, 106 S. Ct. 617 (1986) (racial discrimination in selection of grand jury). However, the vast majority of constitutional errors fall within the broad category of trial error subject to harmless error review. People v. Flood, 18 Cal.4th 470, 499-500, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869 (1998) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed.2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824 [1967]). Other jurisdictions have applied a version of the harmless error analysis where reversal is not automatic. In those jurisdictions, there is a common theme regarding potential juror confusion. See United States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (specific unanimity instruction required when there is a genuine risk of juror confusion or of conviction resulting from different jurors concluding the defendant committed different acts); United States v. Schiff, 801 F.2d 108, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied 480 U.S. 945 (1987) (general unanimity instruction is sufficient to ensure a unanimous verdict unless complexity of the evidence or other factors create a genuine danger of jury confusion); Hill, 28 Kan. App. 2d at 32 (citing concurring case law in other jurisdictions). In using a harmless error analysis, the Court of Appeals here relied upon the Simms v. U.S., 634 A.2d 442, 445 (D.C. 1993), definitions of legally separate and factually separate incidents. Incidents are legally separate when the appellant presents different defenses to separate sets of facts, or when the court's instructions are ambiguous, but tend to shift the legal theory from a single incident to two separate incidents. (Emphasis added.) (Citing Gray v. U.S., 544 A.2d 1255, 1257 [D.C. 1988]). Incidents are factually separate when independent criminal acts have occurred at different times, or when a subsequent criminal act is motivated by `a fresh impulse.' Simms, 634 A.2d at 445. The District of Columbia, New Hampshire, and New Mexico have concluded that the requirement for a special unanimity instruction arises when the court cannot deduce from the record whether the jury must have agreed upon one particular set of facts. See Horton v. U.S., 541 A.2d 604, 610-11 (D.C. 1988) (a unanimity instruction was required where multiple factual scenarios may have been deduced from the evidence depending upon which, if any, of the defendant's defenses the jury may have chosen to accept); State v. Smith, 144 N.H. 1, 9, 736 A.2d 1236 (1999) (one act, not multiple acts, and no genuine possibility of juror confusion as to the culpable act); State v. Dobbs, 100 N.M. 60, 71, 665 P.2d 1151, cert. denied 100 N.M. 53 (1983) (declining to speculate about a possible nonunanimous jury verdict in the absence of confusion). The Michigan Supreme Court has held that when evidence of multiple acts is presented, the district court is to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on the same specific act, if the acts are materially distinct or if there is a reason to believe the jurors may be confused or disagree about the factual basis of the defendant's guilt. A general instruction to the jury that its verdict must be unanimous was sufficient where evidence offered to support three alleged acts of penetration was materially identical. People v. Cooks, 446 Mich. 503, 530, 521 N.W.2d 275 (1994). In State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis.2d 582, 592-93, 335 N.W.2d 583 (1983), the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that where crimes are conceptually similar, a unanimity instruction is not required. Lomagro concluded that the jury did not have to be unanimous about which specific act Lomagro committed to convict because the acts were conceptually similar. 113 Wis.2d at 598. In discussing precedent in Alabama and New Jersey, the Court of Appeals said: In Alabama, where only generic evidence on a series of acts was introduced, the absence of a specific unanimity instruction was deemed harmless error. R.L.G., Jr. v. State, 712 So.2d 348, 368 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997). In R.L.G., the evidence showed a continuing pattern of sexual abuse of young children without identifying any separate and distinct incidents of abuse. Recognizing the problem with strict election in cases involving child molestation, the court modified the `either/or rule' (either elect the act, or there must be jury unanimity to all acts) in cases where there is only generic evidence. In R.A.S. v. State, 718 So.2d 117 (Ala. 1998), the Alabama Supreme court expanded the rule in R.L.G. to include cases with evidence of specific acts. In State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. 363, 478-479, 694 A.2d 196 (1997), evidence showed four different acts of sexual penetration but only two counts were charged. Although the jury was not instructed with a specific unanimity instruction, the court found acts of sexual penetration involving a bat, broom, stick, the defendant's fingers, and fellatio conceptually similar enough not to require a specific unanimity instruction. The court noted no evidence of jury confusion capable of producing an unjust result. 301 N.J. Super. at 480. 28 Kan. App.2d at 34.