Opinion ID: 201862
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Accrual under the FTCA

Text: 28 It is `elementary' that the United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit unless it has consented to be sued. Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir.2003) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980)). Moreover, a waiver of the Government's sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign. Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996). The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives sovereign immunity by giving consent to suits for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680. One condition of this waiver is that a claim shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues. Id. § 2401(b). [T]he general rule under the [FTCA is] that a tort claim accrues at the time of the plaintiff's injury. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979).
29 In Kubrick, the Supreme Court recognized a discovery rule for medical malpractice claims under the FTCA. Id. at 113, 100 S.Ct. 352. Under the discovery rule, the plaintiff's claim accrues when she knows both the existence and the cause of [her] injury. Id. We have previously considered the Supreme Court's reasoning in Kubrick and applied the discovery rule to claims under the FTCA involving theft, Attallah v. United States, 955 F.2d 776, 778-79 (1st Cir.1992), and wrongful death, Skwira, 344 F.3d at 75. For claims other than medical malpractice, we apply a more forgiving rule because the identity of the individual(s) responsible for an injury may be less evident. Id. at 77. In such cases, a plaintiff's claim accrues only when she also knows that there is a causal connection between the government and her injury. Id. at 78. 30 The knowledge standard under the discovery rule has two qualifications. First, something less than definitive knowledge is required. Skwira, 344 F.3d at 78. Accrual is triggered by the discovery of sufficient facts about the injury and its cause to prompt a reasonable person to inquire and seek advice preliminary to deciding if there is a basis for filing an administrative claim against the government. Id. Second, a plaintiff is charged with knowledge of facts which in the exercise of reasonable diligence [she] should have discovered. González v. United States, 284 F.3d 281, 288 (1st Cir.2002). This is an objective standard. Id. 31 Plaintiff filed an administrative claim with the FBI on May 14, 2002. The United States argues that her suit is barred because her claim accrued more than two years before this date. We must therefore determine (1) what facts relevant to her claim Plaintiff knew or should have known, and (2) whether Plaintiff had sufficient facts about the existence of her injury (that Callahan was killed), the cause of her injury (that Bulger and Flemmi had Callahan killed), and a causal connection between her injury and the government to prompt her to inquire and seek advice preliminary to deciding if there is a basis for filing an administrative claim against the government. Skwira, 344 F.3d at 78. Plaintiff clearly knew of her injuries soon after Callahan's death. Thus, we must determine the facts relevant to showing that Bulger and Flemmi had Callahan killed and showing that the government was causally connected to the murder. 32 The dismissal of the complaint in this case was not based on what facts Plaintiff actually knew. Rather, the district court concluded, in light of a variety of uncontested facts, that Plaintiff should have known of her claim by October 1, 1999. Here, as below, the facts themselves are not at issue. We determine only whether the judge was correct to conclude, as a matter of law, that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff objectively should have known of her claim by October 1, 1999. While review of Rule 12(b)(1) dismissals requires deference to a judge's factual findings, our review of this case, which involves only a question of law, is de novo. Valentín, 254 F.3d at 363. See also Skwira, 344 F.3d at 71-72. 33 Plaintiff's complaint describes two possible theories of causation. The first theory is that the FBI created a protective shield around Bulger and Flemmi. This protective shield not only allowed them to escape prosecution for past crimes but emboldened them to commit future crimes. The second theory, and the one emphasized on appeal, is that the FBI told Bulger and Flemmi information that prompted them to kill Callahan. The information was either that the FBI was seeking information from Callahan regarding the Wheeler murder or that Callahan knew that Bulger and Flemmi were skimming profits from WJA. 34 These two theories roughly correspond to the two theories this court considered for the two groups of appellants in McIntyre v. United States. 367 F.3d 38, 53-54, 57-58 (1st Cir.2004). For the Wheeler appellants (family of the same Wheeler referred to in this case), we addressed the claim that the FBI provided Bulger and Flemmi with a `protective shield' against prosecution and investigation that gave the two criminals the opportunity to commit crimes and emboldened them to do so, proximately causing Wheeler's murder. Id. at 58. For the McIntyre appellants, we addressed the claim that the FBI caused McIntyre's death . . . by leaking his confidential informant status to Bulger and Flemmi, in violation of a special duty of non-disclosure owed to him by the government. Id. at 54. Although the two theories are fundamentally different, id. at 57, the dispositive issue for the Wheelers and the McIntyres was not the theory itself, but when the plaintiffs knew or should have known of the facts supporting the theory, id. at 54-55, 59. 35 In McIntyre, we specifically reserved the question of whether a plaintiff could put forth multiple theories of causation for the same tort. Id. at 54 n. 6. We now hold that although a plaintiff is free to put forth multiple theories of causation, the only relevant theory for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations is the first one in time to establish the requisite causation. A plaintiff's claim accrues at the time when she knew or should have known of a causal connection between her injury and the government. Thus, a claim accrues if there is any causal connection. Putting forth a specific theory of causation based on particular facts does not help a plaintiff, because only the earliest theory of causation matters for accrual analysis. 5 36 In this case, Plaintiff is emphasizing her second theory on appeal, presumably because it will create a later accrual date than her first theory. The second theory, however, cannot change the fact that causation could have been known at an earlier date under the first theory. Even if Plaintiff discovered tomorrow a new, crucial fact related to causation — e.g., that Agent Connolly gave Martorano the gun used to kill Callahan — Plaintiff could not change the fact that she should have known of causation at an earlier date. We will thus determine accrual under Plaintiff's first theory. 37 We now turn to when Plaintiff's claim accrued. The court below held that Plaintiff's claim accrued no later than October 1, 1999, this date being soon after the news reporting of Martorano's plea agreement and Judge Wolf's Salemme opinion. On appeal, Plaintiff contends that her claim could not have accrued until after May 14, 2000 and points to the fact that Martorano did not formally plead guilty to the murder of Callahan until March 20, 2001. We agree with the court below that Plaintiff's claim accrued no later than October 1, 1999. 38 We must address what Plaintiff should have known regarding the cause of Callahan's death and the causal connection between the government and his death. We will consider national and Boston news reporting because [w]here events receive widespread publicity, plaintiffs may be charged with knowledge of their occurrence. McIntyre, 367 F.3d at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted). Numerous articles in Boston newspapers, as early as 1996, speculated that Bulger and Flemmi killed Wheeler, Halloran, and Callahan and that the FBI was somehow involved. See supra Part I.C. In 1998, two nationwide news broadcasts, CNN Impact and 60 Minutes, also speculated that Bulger and Flemmi killed Callahan, possibly with the acquiescence of the FBI. Id. 39 Most importantly, Boston newspapers heavily reported three events from federal court proceedings connected with the Callahan murder. The first event was FBI Agent Morris's testimony in April 1998 that the FBI had informed Bulger and Flemmi that Halloran was implicating them in Wheeler's murder and that he believed that Bulger and Flemmi may have killed Halloran. Agent Morris also testified that he informed Bulger and Flemmi of a bugged location that they should avoid. The Boston Globe and Boston Herald reported his testimony the next day. See supra Part I.D. While his testimony was not directly connected with the Callahan murder, the Wheeler, Halloran, and Callahan murders were long thought to be related. See supra Part I.C. For example, a December 1997 article reported that federal court hearings will probe whether FBI agents and federal organized crime prosecutors violated any federal laws or guidelines in the way they handled informants like Bulger and Flemmi, and that Florida police investigating the Callahan murder are hoping [the] hearings . . . will lead to a break in the case. Ralph Ranalli, Police Reopen Mob Murder Probe, Boston Herald, Dec. 15, 1997. 40 The second event, made public on September 9, 1999, was Martorano's agreement to plead guilty to a number of murders, including the murder of Callahan. In the following days, Boston newspapers published several articles about Martorano's plea agreement and his willingness to implicate Bulger and Flemmi. See supra Part I.E. Further, Plaintiff was quoted in a September 12, 1999 article, saying that she was trying to forgive Martorano, the killer of her husband. Andrea Estes, Outraged Hit Man Turned Rat for Revenge, Boston Herald, Sept. 12, 1999. The same article clearly indicates that Bulger and Flemmi were involved in the Callahan murder and that Martorano would implicate them. Id. 41 The third event was the publication of Judge Wolf's opinion in United States v. Salemme on September 15, 1999. As we have already noted, his opinion discussed in depth the corrupt relationship between the FBI, Bulger, and Flemmi. That Judge Wolf's opinion contains a section titled The Wheeler, Halloran, and Callahan Murders where he discusses the connections between the three murders, Bulger and Flemmi, and the FBI is particularly relevant. Salemme, 91 F.Supp.2d at 208-13. He details specific instances of clear misconduct, including attempts by the FBI to protect Bulger and Flemmi from prosecution, and attempts by Bulger and Flemmi to curry favor with the FBI agents. See supra Part I.F. 42 Given the extensive news reporting and the close connection of the events to her husband's death, we find that Plaintiff should have known the basic facts underlying these three events. Further, the reporting on these three events should have prompted Plaintiff to obtain certain publicly available documents, namely Morris's 1998 testimony, Martorano's plea agreement, and the Salemme decision. 43 The facts that Plaintiff should have known would have prompt[ed] a reasonable person to inquire and seek advice preliminary to deciding if there [was] a basis for filing an administrative claim against the government. Skwira, 344 F.3d at 78. John Martorano's plea agreement and Judge Wolf's opinion easily provide the requisite knowledge under the discovery rule that Bulger and Flemmi were responsible for the murder of Callahan. Moreover, Agent Morris's testimony and Judge Wolf's opinion easily provide the requisite knowledge that the FBI protected Bulger and Flemmi from prosecution and emboldened them to commit crimes, including the murder of Callahan. 44 Plaintiff argues that conflicting information reasonably prevented her filing an administrative claim. First, she emphasizes that the FBI would not release the name of Callahan's killer as late as April 2000. Given Martorano's plea agreement, made public on September 9, 1999, we find this argument unavailing. Second, she contends that the FBI told her that she should not rely on newspaper stories and that reports were inaccurate. However, such statements do not specifically contradict any relevant information and even if they did, Plaintiff could surely rely on publicly available court documents for accurate information. Third, plaintiff argues that in the face of conflicting newspaper stories, she did not have sufficient, reliable information. Although she does not cite the newspaper articles, she claims that as late as 1997 newspapers reported government denials of a corrupt relationship between the FBI and Bulger and Flemmi. However, the lack of conflicting stories in 1998 and 1999 and the publicly available court documents allow us to easily dispose of this argument. Finally, Plaintiff makes much of a statement in Judge Wolf's September 15, 1999 opinion: 45 As a result of the delayed disclosure of the Halloran documents by the government and of the failure of the adversary system to operate fully and effectively on this issue, questions remain regarding the role, if any, played by Bulger and Flemmi in the Wheeler, Halloran, and Callahan murders, and the full degree to which the FBI in Boston has, from 1981 until recently, attempted to keep and such role from being discerned and demonstrated. 46 This statement, however, hurts Plaintiff more than it helps her. Certainty is not required for a claim to accrue. Rather, Judge Wolf's statement would prompt a reasonable person to further investigate the matter by seeking legal advice in order to determine whether action should be taken against the government. This is all that is required for accrual. Skwira, 344 F.3d at 78.
47 Like the discovery rule, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment is a means available to plaintiffs seeking to toll the statute of limitations. In order for a plaintiff to prevail on a fraudulent concealment claim, the defendant `must have engaged in fraud or deliberate concealment of material facts relating to his wrongdoing and the plaintiff must have failed to discover these facts within the normal limitations period despite his exercise of due diligence.' Torres Ramírez v. Bermúdez García, 898 F.2d 224, 229 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting Hernández Jiménez v. Calero Toledo, 604 F.2d 99, 101 (1st Cir.1979)). During the course of this sordid affair, the FBI almost surely engaged in fraudulent concealment by denying any FBI complicity in the criminal activities of Bulger and Flemmi. We need not specifically address this, however, because we find that any fraudulent concealment by the FBI ended no later than October 1, 1999. 48 Plaintiff claims that the FBI engaged in fraudulent concealment when agents refused to tell her who killed Callahan. Any purported fraudulent concealment of this fact ended when portions of Martorano's plea agreement were made public on September 9, 1999. The public portion of the plea agreement stated that Martorano would plead guilty to the murder of Callahan. Even if after this date FBI agents refused to tell Plaintiff who killed Callahan, this fact was no longer concealed. 49 Plaintiff also claims fraudulent concealment as a result of FBI agents' statements to her that she should not rely on newspaper stories and that reports were inaccurate. Such general statements cannot rise to the level of fraudulent concealment because they do not even indicate which newspaper stories are inaccurate or should not be relied upon. Further, the statements have a non-fraudulent explanation. The FBI agents could simply have been evading Plaintiff's questions because they did not wish to discuss a pending criminal prosecution. 50 We have already decided in considering the discovery rule that Plaintiff should have known of sufficient facts by October 1, 1999 to prompt a reasonable person to file an administrative claim. The reason that Plaintiff should have known of these facts is that they were easily discoverable had she diligently (or even not so diligently) kept herself informed of the legal proceedings and news reporting of events closely related to Callahan's murder. Thus, Plaintiff had either discovered the purportedly concealed information or was not diligent in seeking to obtain it. Either way, we find no fraudulent concealment.