Opinion ID: 2451
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Majority's Interpretation of the Second and Third Claims for Relief

Text: Having thus decided, mistakenly we think, that Arar's Fourth Claim for Relief has failed, our colleagues leap to the conclusion that what remainsthe allegations contained in what Arar's complaint styles as the Second and Third Claims for Relief relates only to the legal implications of the international and foreign elements of the defendants' behavior. See supra at 569-70 (Arar's remaining claims seek relief on the basis of torture and detention in Syria....). Even were we to agree with the majority's view that the Fourth Claim for Relief warranted dismissal, we would still not concur in its crabbed interpretation of Arar's complaint in light of the facts alleged in it. [W]e may not affirm the dismissal of [a] complaint because [it has] proceeded under the wrong theory `so long as [it has] alleged facts sufficient to support a meritorious legal claim.' Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir.2000) (plurality opinion of Pooler, J.) (quoting Northrop v. Hoffman of Simsbury, Inc., 134 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir.1997)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 888, 122 S.Ct. 201, 151 L.Ed.2d 142 (2001). `Factual allegations alone are what matter[].' Northrop, 134 F.3d at 46 (quoting Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 571 n. 3 (2d Cir.1988) ( en banc )); see also Newman v. Silver, 713 F.2d 14, 15 n. 1 (2d Cir.1983) ([T]he nature of federal pleading ... is by statement of claim, not by legal theories.). [19] And we are required to read those factual allegations as a whole. See Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 721 (2d Cir.1997); see also Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1252 n. 11 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1032, 127 S.Ct. 596, 166 L.Ed.2d 431 (2006); Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 401 (7th Cir.2000). Although Arar pled in his Fourth Claim for Relief what he denominated as a separate Claim on the subject of Domestic Detention, including allegations about unconstitutional conditions of confinement and denial of access to courts and counsel, the complaint as a whole makes broader allegations of mistreatment while within the borders of the United States. According to the complaint: (1) Arar was apprehended by government agents as he sought to change planes at JFK; (2) he was not seeking to enter the United States; (3) his detention was for the purpose of obtaining information from him about terrorism and his alleged links with terrorists and terrorist organizations; (4) he was interrogated harshly on that topic mostly by FBI agentsfor many hours over a period of two days; (5) during that period, he was held incommunicado and was mistreated by, among other things, being deprived of food and water for a substantial portion of his time in custody; (6) he was then taken from JFK to the MDC in Brooklyn, where he continued to be held incommunicado and in solitary confinement for another three days; (7) while at the MDC, INS agents sought unsuccessfully to have him agree to be removed to Syria because they and other U.S. government agents intended that he would be questioned there along similar lines, but under torture; (8) U.S. officials thwarted his ability to consult with counsel or access the courts; and (9) thirteen days after Arar had been intercepted and incarcerated at the airport, defendants sent him against his will to Syria, where they allegedly intended that he be questioned under torture and while enduring brutal and inhumane conditions of captivity. This was, as alleged, all part of a single course of action conceived of and executed by the defendants in the United States in order to try to make Arar talk. It may not have been best for Arar to file a complaint that structures his claims for relief so as to charge knowing or reckless subjection to torture, coercive interrogation, and arbitrary detention in Syria (the second and third claims) separately from charges of cruel and inhuman conditions of confinement and interfere[nce] with access to lawyers and the courts while in the United States (the fourth claim). But such division of theories is of no legal consequence. `Factual allegations alone are what matter[].' Northrop, 134 F.3d at 46 (quoting Albert, 851 F.2d at 571 n. 3). The assessment of Arar's complaint must, then, take into account the entire arc of factual allegations that it containshis interception and arrest; his interrogation, principally by FBI agents, about his putative ties to terrorists; his detention and mistreatment at JFK in Queens and the MDC in Brooklyn; the deliberate misleading of both his lawyer and the Canadian Consulate; and his transport to Washington, D.C. and forced transfer to Syrian authorities for further detention and questioning under torture. Such attention to the complaint's factual allegations, rather than its legal theories, makes perfectly clear that the remaining claims upon which Arar seeks relief are not limited to his detention or torture in Syria, supra at 584, but include allegations of violations of his due process rights in the United States. The scope of those claims is relevant in analyzing whether a Bivens remedy is available.