Opinion ID: 1989451
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Estate's Cause of Action

Text: ¶ 57. The Estate alleges that due to the defendants' negligent treatment, Anneatra experienced pain, suffering and disability; medical, psychiatric and psychological expenses; loss of enjoyment of life. In holding that the Estate does allege a claim upon which relief can be granted, we recognize the well-settled rule that courts liberally construe allegations presented in a complaint and accept them as true for purposes of determining whether a claim is stated. See Hermann v. Town of Delavan, 215 Wis. 2d 370, 378, 572 N.W.2d 855 (1998). We read the Estate's claim as a valid survival action seeking compensatory damages stemming from professional negligence. ¶ 58. Whether the Estate has stated a cause of action which survives Anneatra's death is governed by Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1), Wisconsin's survival statute, as well as considerations of public policy. The defendants divide the Estate's claim into two separate causes of action. They argue first that the allegations concerning Anneatra's loss of enjoyment of life is precluded as personal to Anneatra and therefore not surviving under our interpretation of the scope of Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1). Second, the defendants maintain that the Estate's allegations concerning pain, suffering and disability; medical, psychiatric and psychological expenses, while not precluded by Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1) or our interpretation of the statute, should be barred by considerations of public policy. ¶ 59. Wisconsin Stat. § 895.01(1) governs survival claims and provides in relevant part, that [i]n addition to the causes of action that survive at common law, the following shall also survive: causes of action. . .for. . .other damage to the person. . . . Id. The parties are in agreement that should the Estate have properly stated a survival claim, it must be read as one alleging other damage to the person. ¶ 60. While we have written that Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1) does not limit the nature of the damages that may be recovered under a survival action, Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 310, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980), we have held that not all actions survive one's death. See Howard v. Lunaburg, 192 Wis. 507, 511, 213 N.W. 301 (1927). Specifically, we held that [d]amage to feelings, or loss of consortium did not constitute a property right nor damages to the person within the meaning of the survival statute. Id. Subsequently, in Hanson v. Valdivia, 51 Wis. 2d 466, 187 N.W.2d 151 (1971), we held that an action for the alienation of affection did not survive to the Estate. ¶ 61. Here, the defendants argue that the Estate's claim alleging loss of enjoyment of life is the equivalent of a claim for the termination of Anneatra's relationship with her parents, and must be rejected in accord with our holding in Hanson. However, Hanson does not control, for a claim seeking damages for the loss of enjoyment of life resulting from professional negligence is not analogous to an action for the alienation of affection. Loss of enjoyment of life includes those damages that result from one's diminished capacity for enjoying life or due to the deprivations of the pleasures of life. See Bassett v. Milwaukee N. R. Co., 169 Wis. 152, 159, 170 N.W.2d 944 (1919). These are not the equivalent to damages to feelings or loss of consortium upon which we precluded a claim for alienation of affection in Hanson. Instead, the alleged damages are those that flow from professional negligence just as pain and suffering and costs associated with medical treatment flow. They include but are not limited to damages associated with a plaintiff's inability to engage in the activities of life he or she had been able to prior to the defendant's negligence, and they are not damages predicated upon a relationship with another person. ¶ 62. The defendants also assert that the Estate's claim, alleging only psychological damages, must be dismissed on the public policy grounds that allowing the Estate's claim would open the way for fraudulent claims; they rely upon our decision in Bowen for this conclusion. However, the claim asserted by the Estate is not analogous to the claim brought in Bowen, nor does consideration of the public policy which precluded imposing liability there lead to the same conclusion here. ¶ 63. The estate's claim in Bowen was one for the negligent infliction of emotional distress which related to the apprehension and fear [the decedent] suffered before his death. Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 661. The decedent in Bowen was killed when he was hit by a vehicle and fatally injured while riding his bicycle. Id. at 634. This court rejected the Estate's claim for the decedent's emotional distress which was allegedly endured in the few moments immediately preceding his death. We concluded that It is mere speculation to assert that [the decedent] knew of the impending impact or suffered severe emotional distress in the moments before impact. Allowance of recovery under the circumstances of this case would be too likely to open the way to fraudulent claims. Id. at 662. [8] ¶ 64. The facts of this case are inapposite. The most compelling difference between the Estate's claim here and the claim in Bowen is the length of time between the negligent act to the moment of death. While in Bowen, mere moments between the two acts passed and we rightly believed that one could not determine the amount of distress, if any, the victim could have experienced, here, Anneatra's injuries are not necessarily speculative. At the motion on the hearing for summary judgment, the circuit court elicited from plaintiffs' counsel the manner in which they intended to prove Anneatra's injuries, namely through examination of witnesses who had opportunity to talk with Anneatra in the many years she was being treated by the defendants, as well as evidence of her injuries in diary entries. Further, the emotional injuries Anneatra suffered may be determined with a view to her medical records. The concerns we expressed in Bowen are not present in this case to the extent that we must conclude that the Estate's claim should not be allowed to proceed. The professional negligence claim survives to Anneatra's Estate.