Opinion ID: 172534
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal Without Prejudice of the Indictment After the Speedy Trial Act Violation

Text: Mr. Williams argues that the district judge abused his discretion by dismissing his original indictment without prejudice. He raises a variety of arguments, the most salient of which we address explicitly. He further argues that he was entitled to a hearing before the district judge dismissed his indictment. We reject both arguments.
A district judge's decision to dismiss an indictment without prejudice for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jones, 213 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir.2000). When the district court has exercised that discretion, our function is to insure that the statute is effectuated, recognizing that `when the statutory factors are properly considered, and supporting factual findings are not clearly in error, the district court's judgment of how opposing considerations balance should not lightly be disturbed.' Id. at 1257 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 337, 108 S.Ct. 2413, 101 L.Ed.2d 297 (1988)). Relevant factors in determining whether a dismissal should be with or without prejudice include, but are not limited to: (1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and (3) the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the Speedy Trial Act and on the administration of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). We address each of these factors, and conclude that the district judge did not abuse his discretion by dismissing Mr. Williams's original indictment without prejudice.
The district judge correctly concluded that Mr. Williams's charged offenses were serious. If the court determines the offenses committed by the defendant are serious, this factor weighs in favor of dismissing without prejudice. United States v. Saltzman, 984 F.2d 1087, 1092-93 (10th Cir.1993). Included in the four count indictment was one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and two counts of possession with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base. Being a felon in possession of a firearm is a serious offense. See United States v. Carnes, 309 F.3d 950, 957 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that possession of a firearm by a felon is a serious offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2)). Moreover, felony drug charges are generally treated as serious offenses. Saltzman, 984 F.2d at 1093 n. 8. And Congress's permitting, and sometimes mandating, that a life sentence be imposed for possession with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base demonstrates the seriousness of Mr. Williams's particular drug offenses. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). Therefore, we conclude that this factor weighs heavily in favor of dismissal without prejudice.
We agree with the district judge that the facts and circumstances that led to the dismissal support dismissal without prejudice. In evaluating these facts and circumstances, the court should focus on the culpability of the delay-producing conduct. Saltzman, 984 F.2d at 1093. For example, we have explained that where the delay in bringing the case to trial is the result of intentional dilatory conduct, or a pattern of neglect on the part of the Government, dismissal with prejudice is the appropriate remedy. Id. at 1093-94. The record does not show either intentional dilatory conduct or a pattern of neglect by the Government, nor does Mr. Williams assert that such conduct was present. Moreover, the record demonstrates that Mr. Williams is partially responsible for the delay. Contrary to Mr. Williams's assertions, he did not assert his Speedy Trial Act rights until after the Act had been violated, and the district judge's inquiry into his responsibility for the delay in his trial was relevant. Mr. Williams asserts that he timely asserted his Speedy Trial Act rights in an August 2005 letter that he sent to the district judge. In that letter, Mr. Williams states that Its been Almost a Calendar year since a Lawyer has filed motions on my behalf with that alone lets you know that someone's not doing their job in order to help their client. R. (08-5116), Vol. I, Doc. 48, at 1 (Letter from Demarco Deon Williams to the Honorable H. Dale Cook). The letter further stated that it was solely for the purpose to inform the Court that [Mr. Williams's attorney] is not competent. Id. By its terms, Mr. Williams's letter is solely directed toward complaints about his attorney. The record makes clear that Mr. Williams did not assert his Speedy Trial Act rights until September 9, 2005, the date he filed his motion to dismiss the original indictment on Speedy Trial Act grounds. By that time, the Act had already been violated. See Williams, 511 F.3d at 1047, 1059. The district judge properly considered that fact and other indications that Mr. Williams may have contributed to the delay in his trial when making his decision to dismiss the case without prejudice. See Saltzman, 984 F.2d at 1094 (holding that a defendant who waits passively while the time runs has less claim to dismissal with prejudice than a defendant who demands, but does not receive, prompt attention); United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 463 (10th Cir.2006) (holding that the defendant must also shoulder his share of the responsibility for the delay that resulted in a violation of the Speedy Trial Act). This factor favors dismissal without prejudice.
We are also convinced that the district judge correctly concluded that the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the Speedy Trial Act and on the administration of justice supported dismissal of the indictment without prejudice. In determining whether a dismissal with or without prejudice serves the administration of the Speedy Trial Act and of justice, a court should consider, among other factors, whether the delay caused by the Government was intentional and the prejudice suffered by the defendant from the Act's violation. See Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d at 463-64; Saltzman, 984 F.2d at 1094; see also Taylor, 487 U.S. at 334, 108 S.Ct. 2413. The defendant has a burden under the Act to show prejudice other than that occasioned by the original filing. Saltzman, 984 F.2d at 1094. As we have observed above, there is no evidence that the Government engaged in intentional dilatory conduct. Further, Mr. Williams has failed to demonstrate sufficient prejudice to require dismissal with prejudice. Mr. Williams's October 7, 2004, indictment alleged two counts of possession with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base. Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), a person that possesses with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base with two or more prior felony drug convictions faces a mandatory life sentence. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Further, under 21 U.S.C. § 851(d), the Government is required to file an information with the district judge stating the defendant's prior felony drug convictions before a defendant's sentence can be enhanced under § 841(b)(1)(A). See id. § 851(a)(1). Section 851(d) further provides that [n]o person who stands convicted of an offense under [§ 841] may challenge the validity of any prior conviction alleged under [§ 851] which occurred more than five years before the date of the information alleging such prior conviction. Id. § 851(d). Mr. Williams asserts that he was prejudiced by his inability to challenge the validity of two prior felony drug convictions from 1993 and 1994 that were to be used to enhance his sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). However, the prejudice that a defendant must establish to seek a dismissal with prejudice for a Speedy Trial Act violation must be caused by that violation. See Saltzman, 984 F.2d at 1094 ([T]he defendant has a burden under the [Speedy Trial Act] to show specific prejudice other than that occasioned by the original filing.). Here, even if a trial had been held shortly after the date of the original indictmentOctober 2004he would still not have been able to challenge the validity of either his 1993 or his 1994 conviction. Both convictions would have occurred more than five years before the date the § 851 information would have been filed (presumably after October 2004). Therefore, Mr. Williams's inability to challenge his two prior convictions is irrelevant to the district judge's decision to dismiss his original indictment without prejudice. In sum, on this record we cannot conclude that the district judge abused his discretion by dismissing Mr. Williams's original indictment without prejudice.
Mr. Williams further argues that he was entitled to a hearing before his indictment was dismissed without prejudice, relying on the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Delgado-Miranda , which mandated such a hearing. See United States v. Delgado-Miranda, 951 F.2d 1063, 1064 (9th Cir.1991). We find no reversible error. We have not decided whether a defendant has a right to a hearing before a district judge dismisses an indictment for a Speedy Trial Act violation, and we need not answer that question here. We conclude that any error in failing to hold such a hearing was harmless; that is, there is no indication that had a hearing been held, the district judge would have dismissed the case with prejudice. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(a) (Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (explaining that Rule 52(a) applies to all but a limited class of fundamental constitutional errors). As explained above, the factors the district judge was required to consider in making his decision to dismiss with or without prejudice weighed heavily in favor of dismissal without prejudice. Moreover, Mr. Williams fails to point to any facts that the district judge was not already aware of that he would have attempted to establish at a hearing. Under these facts, we are convinced that the district judge's decision to forgo a pre-dismissal hearing, if erroneous, was harmless.