Opinion ID: 2809264
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Webb’s Malicious-Prosecution Claim

Text: The district court held that Lucas did not recklessly or knowingly make false statements in his grand-jury testimony against Webb. According to the district court, the grand-jury indictment against Webb therefore prevented him from meeting the “no probable cause” requirement for malicious prosecution. Webb, 2013 WL 1303776, at . We disagree with this conclusion for two reasons. First, Bray’s 2007 statements to OIG investigators that Lucas was a knowing participant in the scheme to frame Webb establishes a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lucas lied in his grand-jury testimony. Bray told investigators that he used a DEA-provided device to record a face-to-face conversation with Webb on the day before the drug buy targeting Webb, but Webb made no incriminating statements. Bray told Lucas that he would be unable to get Nos. 14-3443/3444 Webb, et al. v. United States, et al. Page 15 Webb to sell drugs at a controlled buy, but Lucas instructed him to “do what he had to do.” That night, Bray paid Conrad $200 to act as a stand-in for Webb for the following day. In his first five interviews with federal investigators, Bray repeated his claim that Lucas was an active participant in the stand-in scheme against Webb. However, Bray later recanted these allegations at Lucas’s criminal trial in 2010, where he testified that he acted alone to frame Operation Turnaround targets and lied about Lucas’s participation in the Webb drug buy. The Defendants argue that we should not credit Bray’s initial allegations because he recanted them at Lucas’s criminal trial. But it is commonplace for individuals to make contradictory statements. When this occurs, we permit litigants to use inconsistencies to impeach or discredit those statements and leave it to a fact-finder to determine whether one statement is more truthful than the other. See United States v. Dobson, 529 F. App’x 536, 539 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Factfinders regularly face recanting witnesses, and must decide whether to credit one version of the events over another, or to disregard them all.”). It is for the jury to determine whether Bray was telling the truth in his first five interviews with federal investigators, Lucas’s criminal trial, or neither. Lucas argues that the “sham affidavit” doctrine prevents us from crediting Bray’s initial statements. This doctrine prevents a party from submitting a new affidavit to manufacture a factual dispute by contradicting an earlier testimony. Aerel, S.R.L. v. PCC Airfoils, L.L.C., 448 F.3d 899, 907 (6th Cir. 2006). The doctrine is not applicable because the statements that Lucas seeks to discredit do not contradict Bray’s earlier statements. Rather, they are the earlier statements. Because “[r]ecantation testimony is properly viewed with great suspicion,” Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468 U.S. 1231, 1233-34 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), we will not at this stage credit Bray’s recantation at Lucas’s criminal trial over his earlier statements to federal investigators. “To make out a genuine issue of material fact, [a] plaintiff must present significant probative evidence tending to support her version of the facts, evidence on which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for her.” Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 913 (6th Cir. 2009). Bray’s initial claim that Lucas knowingly participated in the stand-in scheme does not stand by itself. It is bolstered by federal investigators’ finding that “Lucas wrote and testified Nos. 14-3443/3444 Webb, et al. v. United States, et al. Page 16 [falsely] to corroborate Bray and ‘cover-up’ Bray’s other misconduct.”2 Cf. United States v. Hadley, 431 F.3d 484, 510-14 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a sentencing court did not commit error by relying on a domestic-abuse victim’s initial statements even though she recanted those statements later, because the initial statements were corroborated by other evidence). Viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the injured party,” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, as we must when making a qualified-immunity determination, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lucas was an active participant in Bray’s stand-in scheme. This would mean that the grand-jury indictment could not be the basis for probable cause because it was tainted by Lucas’s knowingly false testimony that it was Webb who sold him drugs on October 14, 2005. Even if Lucas had not been a participant in Bray’s scheme, the jury could reasonably conclude that Lucas knowingly or recklessly testified falsely against Webb because he should have recognized that Conrad—the stand-in Bray used for Webb at the October 14 controlled buy—was not Webb. Lucas maintains that he continues to believe that Bray introduced him to Webb—rather than Conrad—on October 14, 2005, to conduct a controlled buy. Lucas’s Br. (143443) at 11. For summary-judgment purposes, we must accept Webb’s assertion that Lucas in fact met Conrad, who was acting as a stand-in for Webb. This means that, even though Lucas’s sole objective at the drug buy was to confirm the identity of the person seated next to Bray, he misidentified Conrad as Webb. Because he testified to the grand jury that he bought drugs from Webb, his testimony contained a false statement. The key question is whether Conrad so closely resembled Webb that it was objectively reasonable for Lucas to have confused Conrad for Webb. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639. Webb argues that he and Conrad had noticeably different appearances. Whereas Webb was 6’3” tall and weighed 260 pounds, Conrad was only 5’9” and was slight in build. Conrad testified in an affidavit that he has known Webb for many years and that the two of them differ in appearance in “several important ways.” In addition to the obvious size difference, Conrad noted that, unlike Webb, he was not missing teeth and wore no earrings at the time of the drug deal. 2 The 2011 OIG report suggests that Lucas lied only after he “became aware that some defendants alleged that Bray lied or was mistaken,” which could only have occurred after his grand-jury testimony that led to Webb’s indictment and arrest. However, all of Lucas’s reporting occurred before his grand-jury testimony on November 8, 2005. Therefore, if the OIG report were correct that Lucas lied in his reports to cover up for Bray, he must have begun to do so before Operation Turnaround targets alleged that Bray was lying. Nos. 14-3443/3444 Webb, et al. v. United States, et al. Page 17 Conrad further stated that his “FTW” and Chinese-character tattoos could not have been mistaken for the “bizarre” tattoos that Webb had at the time. Webb argues that Lucas should have noticed these differences when Lucas spent several minutes in a hand-to-hand transaction at approximately 4:00 PM with Conrad. The question of whether two individuals resemble one another is an issue of fact. Webb put this issue into dispute by pointing to evidence that Webb looked different from Conrad. We must draw factual inferences in favor of Webb unless the Defendants can show that no reasonable jury could find that Webb looked significantly different from Conrad. The Defendants’ counterarguments do not make this showing. First, the Defendants argue that Conrad’s comparatively small stature would not have been apparent because he was sitting in a car. But, as Webb notes in his brief, “every indicia of height and weight does not disappear just because someone is seated, particularly inside a car where there are frames of reference.” Webb’s Br. at 58. The differences were particularly acute in this case because Conrad was half a foot shorter than Webb and was of slimmer build. Second, the Defendants argue that Conrad and Webb looked similar because they were both white men with shaved heads and visible tattoos. But nothing suggests that two had similar facial features. Tattoos may obscure some facial differences but, if they are different in pattern and location, they may enhance the distinctiveness between Webb and Conrad rather than minimize them. In the absence of contrary evidence, we must credit Conrad’s affidavit that Webb’s tattoos were distinctive. The district court nonetheless concluded that Conrad looks like Webb even though there is no indication that the court compared any images of Conrad and Webb. The district court relied instead on Bray’s testimony that he chose someone whom he believed to resemble Webb. But that resemblance extended only to skin tone and hairstyle; Bray also testified that Conrad was not stocky like Webb, and his testimony did not contain any indication that the two had similar facial features. It is unlikely that Bray had a large number of associates who were willing to act as stand-ins in drug deals.3 At best, Conrad was the person who most resembled Webb from the limited pool from which Bray was able to draw. The evidence suggests that there was ample room for variation in height, build, facial features, and tattoo patterns between Conrad and 3 Bray used Darren Transou, for example, as a stand-in for two different Operation Turnaround targets. Nos. 14-3443/3444 Webb, et al. v. United States, et al. Page 18 Webb that would have been apparent at close proximity in broad daylight. Therefore, it remains a genuine issue of material fact whether Conrad looked like Webb. A law-enforcement defendant is deliberately indifferent—and therefore not entitled to qualified immunity—if he mistakenly identifies an individual as a suspect when the individual does not match the suspect’s description. In Gray v. Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Department, the plaintiff was mistakenly incarcerated due to an identity error even though his jailers had in their possession the photograph and physical description of the suspect who was supposed to be incarcerated. 150 F.3d 579, 582 (6th Cir. 1998). We denied qualified immunity to the jailers and held that, in light of apparent differences between the suspect and the plaintiff, the principal question for the trier of fact will be whether [the jailers] acted with something akin to deliberate indifference in failing to ascertain that [the plaintiff] they had in custody was not the person wanted by Michigan authorities . . . . This question will require resolution whether the defendants proceed on the merits, or whether they reassert the defense of qualified immunity. Id. at 583. Because there is a dispute of material fact as to whether Webb and Conrad looked alike, we cannot determine that it was objectively reasonable for Lucas to believe that the person who sold him drugs on October 14, 2005, was Webb unless he undertook appropriate efforts to confirm Webb’s identity in light of potential differences. Nothing in the record indicates that Lucas undertook such efforts. Accordingly, a jury could reasonably conclude that Lucas’s grand-jury testimony contained knowing or reckless falsehoods as to the identity of the person who sold him drugs, and therefore the grand-jury indictment against Webb cannot be the basis for probable cause at summary judgment. Absent Lucas’s allegedly false testimony, the only remaining evidence against Webb was information supplied by Bray. Information from a confidential informant who has been established as reliable can serve as the basis for probable cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). But the law-enforcement Defendants could not have reasonably relied on Bray’s information to establish probable cause because they were aware that, while acting as a confidential informant, Bray was arrested for cocaine possession, provided false tips, and stole money from the Defendants. See Mott v. Lucas, No. 1:10-cv-164, 2011 WL 2938145, at -14 Nos. 14-3443/3444 Webb, et al. v. United States, et al. Page 19 (N.D. Ohio July 15, 2011). Therefore, we reverse the district court’s holding that there was probable cause to prosecute Webb. ii. Whether Each Defendant Participated in the Decision to Prosecute Webb Because the grand jury indicted Webb solely on the basis of Lucas’s testimony, there is no doubt that Lucas participated in the decision to prosecute Webb. Further, the federal prosecutor who prosecuted Webb testified that he consulted with Lucas about Operation Turnaround cases and relied on information supplied by Lucas in deciding whether to bring charges. The district court concluded that the remaining individual Defendants—Cross, Mayer, Metcalf, Faith, and Ansari—played only passive and neutral roles. Webb, 2013 WL 1303776, at -18.  DEA Agent Cross While Cross was at the scene of the Webb controlled buy and met with the prosecutor, he could not see the participants and so would have had no reason to believe that a stand-in played the role of Webb. Webb nonetheless argues that Cross aided in his prosecution because Cross shared custody of the N-18 recording of the October 14, 2005, drug buy, and therefore he could have been one of several individuals who potentially manipulated that recording to falsely incriminate Webb. Webb’s Br. at 67. But the N-18 recording was not presented to the grand jury, and the prosecutor testified that he generally does not listen to audiotapes before determining whether to bring charges against a person. Webb provides no evidence that the prosecutor relied on the altered recording in this case. Therefore, Cross did not aid in Webb’s prosecution.  RCSO Detective Mayer The prosecutor testified that he did not consult with Richland County officers in deciding to prosecute any of the Operation Turnaround targets. Webb nonetheless argues that Mayer aided in his prosecution in two ways: (1) doctoring the N-18 recording and (2) destroying a videotape of the drug buy that would have shown that the drug dealer was not Webb. As with Cross, because the doctored audio recording could not be shown to have affected the grand jury’s decision to indict or the prosecutor’s decision to charge Webb, it could not be the basis of a Nos. 14-3443/3444 Webb, et al. v. United States, et al. Page 20 malicious-prosecution claim. The same argument applies with respect to the missing videotape. Therefore, Mayer did not aid in Webb’s prosecution.  RCSO Detective Metcalf Webb argues that, in addition to potentially altering the N-18 recording, Metcalf aided in the decision to prosecute him by misdating the N-17 recording of a conversation between Webb and Bray as having taken place on October 13, 2005, the day before the drug buy for which Webb was prosecuted. Metcalf does not deny this allegation, and argues only that the date of the recording is immaterial. Metcalf’s Br. (14-3443) at 18-19. Metcalf is mistaken. The N-17 recording indicates that Bray agreed to pay Webb “a couple stacks tomorrow.” If the recording had occurred on a date other than October 13, then it could not have been evidence of an agreement to transact for drugs on October 14. Webb presented phone-record evidence indicating that the recorded call did not occur on October 13. Drawing factual inferences in Webb’s favor, we presume that Metcalf misdated the call. Due to Metcalf’s well-documented Operation Turnaround-related misconduct, including concealing exculpatory video evidence, altering the transcripts of recordings, and perjury, a reasonable jury could conclude that Metcalf’s misdating was not a good-faith mistake, but was an attempt to falsely incriminate Webb. Lucas’s grand-jury testimony that led to Webb’s indictment and DEA-6 report that convinced the prosecutor to pursue charges against Webb relied on the misdated recording to show that Webb agreed to sell Bray drugs on October 14, 2005. Webb, 2013 WL 1303776, at . Accordingly, a reasonable jury could conclude that Metcalf aided in Webb’s prosecution by influencing Lucas to testify falsely before the grand jury and by influencing the prosecutor’s decision to bring charges.  RCSO Detective Larry Faith and DEA Task Force Officer Jamal Ansari Webb concedes that, with respect to Ansari and Faith, “there is no evidence of their personal misconduct . . . .” Webb’s Br. at 70. He argues that they are nonetheless liable because “there is plenty of evidence establishing their complicity in the broader Operation Turnaround conspiracy.” Ibid. But “to overcome a qualified immunity defense, an individual must show that his or her own rights were violated, and that the violation was committed personally by the Nos. 14-3443/3444 Webb, et al. v. United States, et al. Page 21 defendant.” Robertson, 753 F.3d at 615; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“[P]laintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”). While Ansari and Faith may have violated the clearly established constitutional rights of some Operation Turnaround targets, Webb does not show that they violated his clearly established rights. Therefore, Ansari and Faith are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity with respect to Webb’s malicious-prosecution claim. Accordingly, we affirm grants of qualified immunity as to Cross, Mayer, Faith, and Ansari with respect to Webb’s § 1983 and Bivens malicious-prosecution claims. We reverse as to Lucas and Metcalf.