Opinion ID: 1573016
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Prosecution is Barred by the Federal Double Jeopardy Clause.

Text: Although the district court did not base its dismissal order on the federal double jeopardy clause, defendant seeks to uphold that ruling on the basis that the collateral estoppel branch of federal double jeopardy jurisprudence required dismissal of the charges against him. Consequently, we will consider that claim prior to considering the state law grounds on which the district court decided the case. Under the federal double jeopardy clause, a federal prosecution does not bar a subsequent state prosecution for state criminal violations based on the same or similar elements. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 90, 106 S.Ct. 433, 438, 88 L.Ed.2d 387, 395 (1985); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 317, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 1082, 55 L.Ed.2d 303, 309 (1978); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 136-38, 79 S.Ct. 676, 686, 3 L.Ed.2d 684, 694-95 (1959). This concept of dual sovereignty is premised on the principle that the states and federal government are each sovereign entities with the power to independently prosecute criminal offenses created under the laws of that sovereign by employing their own prosecutorial and adjudicative institutions for that purpose. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 320, 98 S.Ct. at 1084, 55 L.Ed.2d at 310-11. This court has recognized this principle for many years. See State v. Moore, 143 Iowa 240, 121 N.W. 1052 (1909) (holding federal conviction for forcibly breaking and entering post office does not bar state prosecution for burglary based on same facts). While conceding the force of the dual sovereignty doctrine, defendant asserts that it is only applicable to the more traditional version of double jeopardy jurisprudence based on retrial for the same offense. This is the so-called Blockburger theory of successive prosecution named for its application in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Defendant argues that the dual sovereignty doctrine does not preclude invoking the collateral estoppel theory of federal double jeopardy jurisprudence recognized in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-46, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1195, 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 475-76 (1970). We disagree. Although we have recognized the collateral estoppel element discussed in Ashe as a component of federal double jeopardy law, this has been in situations involving repeated prosecutions by the same sovereign. See, e.g., State v. Sharkey, 574 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Iowa 1997). When the initial prosecution is by a different sovereign, we can perceive of no reason why the dual sovereignty doctrine should not leave states free to pursue prosecutions of their own criminal law unencumbered by either the same offense and collateral estoppel branches of federal double jeopardy jurisprudence. Federal courts considering this issue have agreed with this conclusion. See Turley v. Wyrick, 554 F.2d 840, 842 (8th Cir.1977); Martin v. Rose, 481 F.2d 658, 659-60 (6th Cir.1973). So have numerous state courts. See State v. Berry, 133 Ariz. 264, 650 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Ct.App.1982); State v. Moeller, 178 Conn. 67, 420 A.2d 1153, 1157 (1979); People v. Tyler, 100 Mich.App. 782, 300 N.W.2d 411, 412 (1981); State v. Rogers, 90 N.M. 604, 566 P.2d 1142, 1145 (1977); State v. Mechtel, 176 Wis.2d 87, 499 N.W.2d 662, 667 (1993). Defendant suggests that a double jeopardy bar should be invoked in the present case because the Iowa prosecutors implicitly designated the United States attorney as an agent for pursuing the criminal charges involved in this transaction. There is no basis in the record for concluding that this is so. It would, of course, be impossible for the federal prosecutor proceeding in a federal court to act as an agent for the State of Iowa in the prosecution of crimes arising under the laws of this state. Neither the prosecutor nor the court would have authority to do that. Nor is there any basis for defendant's suggestion that the State should now be estopped from proceeding with its own prosecution. The fact that state prosecutors were willing to forego the filing of state criminal charges until the federal prosecution had run its course and provided assistance to federal authorities in the gathering of evidence does not create an estoppel against a subsequent attempt to vindicate the laws of this jurisdiction. The fact that, if defendant had been convicted of the federal charges, the State might have acted differently is not a basis for precluding its present aggressive stance following defendant's acquittal in federal court.