Opinion ID: 1095084
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the trial court err in disregarding the prior opinion of the supreme court of mississippi in construing the testator's will in the case of gardner v. pan-american petroleum corp., 243 so.2d 399 (miss. 1971), and relying instead on the testimony of the appellees' expert witness, legal treatises and case law to construe the will?

Text: The appellants allege that William Torrey Smith's will has already been interpreted by this Court in the case of Gardner v. Pan-American Petroleum Corp., 243 So.2d 399 (Miss. 1971), and because of that fact, the chancellor was in error in holding that a life estate was not created in favor of Rosalind Collins. This Court disagrees with the appellants' claim. In Gardner, supra, the testator's oldest daughter, Thelma Smith Gardner, and others, filed a claim against Elizabeth Smith, the testator's wife, Rosalind Smith Collins, the testator's younger daughter, the Pan American Petroleum Corp., and Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. The main issue in Gardner was the interpretation of William Torrey Smith's will and whether it devised to Thelma Smith Gardner a mineral or nonparticipating royalty interest in certain land. Gardner at 400. The case involved rights under the land, not the surface estate, as in the case sub judice. In Gardner, the Court examined the devise to the testator's wife and two daughters, and concluded the following: In short, each of the three beneficiaries in this will was devised a life estate in the several parcels, with certain stated powers. Gardner at 401. The appellants now contend that this statement by the Supreme Court made in 1971 is binding on this Court and should have been binding on the chancery court. The appellees, on the other hand, contend that this statement was more properly classified as dictum, and therefore is not binding on this Court. The appellants concede that the language used in the Gardner case is dictum, but nonetheless adhere to the position that the language is binding on this Court. To the contrary, this Court has held on more than one occasion that a statement which qualifies as dictum does not have a binding effect. Simpson v. Poindexter, 241 Miss. 854, 862, 134 So.2d 445, 446 (1961); Stark v. Stark, 244 So.2d 13, 16 (Miss. 1971); Smith v. Mississippi Employment Security Commission, 344 So.2d 137, 139 (Miss. 1977). This position has also been followed in other jurisdictions. See generally Wixom Brothers Co. v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 435 So.2d 1231 (Ala. 1983); U.S.A. Oil Corp. v. City of Lipscomb, 293 Ala. 103, 300 So.2d 362 (1974); Valeriano v. Bronson, 209 Conn. 75, 546 A.2d 1380 (1988); Atlas Properties, Inc. v. Didich, 226 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1969); South Central Bell v. Utility Regulatory Commission, 637 S.W.2d 649 (Ky. 1982); Matter of University of North Carolina, 300 N.C. 563, 268 S.E.2d 472 (1980). Having addressed the issue of the binding effect of dictum, it is now necessary to examine the chancellor's findings concerning the will itself, keeping in mind this Court's limited scope of review. In section II of William Torrey Smith's will, he bequeaths approximately 190 acres to his wife Elizabeth Smith to have and to hold for her life, and at her death the same shall go to my beloved daughter, Rosalind Smith. In section IV of the will he devises to Thelma Grace Smith Lowe Gardner, his oldest daughter, approximately 40 acres to have and to hold for her life, and at her death the same shall go to the heirs of her body. The devise to his youngest daughter, Rosalind, appears in section III of the will. Nowhere in this section does he specifically state that the devise to her is for life. This Court has held that when interpreting a will, the plain, expressed intention of the testator should be followed whenever possible: The intention of the testatrix is to be ascertained from the whole will and from a consideration of all the provisions of the instrument taken together, and, if the language of the will is clear, definite, and unambiguous, the court must give to the language its clear import. Seal v. Seal, 312 So.2d 19, 21 (Miss. 1975). See also Stovall v. Stovall, 360 So.2d 679, 681 (Miss. 1978); In Re Estate of Granberry, 310 So.2d 708, 711 (Miss. 1975). This Court recently stated the rule in the following manner: If the will is unambiguous and the intent of the testator can be discerned from the face of the document, the admission of such evidence [parol evidence] is improper. Ross v. Brasell, 511 So.2d 492, 494 (Miss. 1987). In the case before us, the testator specifically bequeathed life estates to his wife and his oldest daughter by the plain language evident from the face of the will. There was no such specific devise to his daughter Rosalind, thereby arguably revealing a clear intention to not make the devise to her a life estate. Therefore, it is entirely arguable that there was no real need for extrinsic testimony from the witnesses in this case. In any event, the intent of the testator appears to have been quite evident from the face of the will. The chancellor listed several specific reasons in his opinion why he had found no life estate in favor of Rosalind Smith Collins. An independent study of case law and the reasons listed by the chancellor in the opinion leads this Court to conclude that the 1971 opinion on this point lacks the form of an adjudication. It is admitted to be dicta by all parties; therefore, it has no precedential value and does not guide our decision sub judice. This Court holds that the chancellor's decision was correct, and should not be reversed by this Court and that this assignment of error is without merit.