Opinion ID: 1433803
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: internal hearing unit

Text: Sheneman asserts three complaints regarding the Internal Hearing Unit. First, he argues the Internal Hearing Unit was created illegally because the Division was not empowered to adopt rules and regulations to deal with the resolution of contested matters that are not required to be heard by the [Office of Administrative Hearings] including agency review of claimed late filings. [3] The Division points to Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-112(a) and (e) (1997) of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act as well as Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-802(a) (Cum.Supp.1995) for the authority of the Division to promulgate the Workers' Compensation Rules and Regulations. In Painter v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 953, 955 (Wyo.1997), this court addressed the precept of pari materia: We have often stated the precept that the worker's compensation statutory scheme should be construed as a whole, its component parts in pari materia. Newton v. State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 922 P.2d 863, 865 (Wyo.1996); Little America Refining Co. v. Witt, 854 P.2d 51, 55 (Wyo.1993). Sheneman's claim that the Division lacked authority to promulgate rules and regulations under these circumstances is unfounded. First, Sheneman's argument focuses on the specific enumerations of Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-802(a). He omits any reference to the permissive language of the first sentence that empowers the Division to adopt rules and regulations: The director may adopt rules and regulations for administration of this act. The director shall by rule and regulation establish for qualification of resident and non-resident employers, provide for advance payments of employer premiums under W.S. XX-XX-XXX(e), provide fee schedules for all medical and hospital care rendered injured employees and for the establishment of the state's average monthly wage. Changes in any rule or regulation adopted under this subsection shall be considered only at quarterly intervals. Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-802(a) (emphasis added). Other provisions in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act mandate that the Division, as an agency, promulgate rules and regulations: (a) In addition to other rulemaking requirements imposed by law, each agency shall: (i) Adopt rules of practice setting forth the nature and requirements of all formal and informal procedures available in connection with contested cases [.] Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-102 (1997) (emphasis added). In addition, Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-112 provides: (a) If not otherwise authorized by law there shall preside at the taking of evidence in all contested cases the statutory agency, one (1) or more members of the body which comprises the agency, or an employee of the agency or an employee of another agency designated by the agency to act as presiding officer. The functions of all those presiding in contested cases shall be conducted in an impartial manner.       (e) When required by law an agency shall adopt rules and regulations providing a procedure for the use and the selection of an administrative hearing officer. An agency shall not delegate the authority to make final decisions to an independent administrative hearing officer unless required by law. (Emphasis added.) These provisions not only empower the Division to enact rules and regulations, but specifically authorize one (1) or more members of the body which comprises the agency, or an employee of the agency to take evidence in a contested case. Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-112(a). The Division is required to refer contested cases to a medical hearing panel of the Medical Commission or to the Office of Administration Hearings. Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-616 (Cum.Supp.1995). The Division chose to form the Internal Hearing Unit, comprised of members of its agency, to determine the timeliness of an apparent untimely filing for a hearing. Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-601(k)(vi) (Cum.Supp.1995); Wyoming Workers' Compensation Rules, Regulations and Fee Schedules, ch. 1, § 6 (Jan.1996). Based on our examination of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act and the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act as a whole, looking at the component parts as well as the purposes of the acts and underlying policy considerations, we hold that the Division had ample authority to form the Internal Hearing Unit. Additionally, we hold the Division was authorized to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the resolution of contested matters that are not required to be heard by the Medical Commission or the Office of Administrative Hearings, including agency review of claimed late filings. Sheneman argues issues two and three together because they are one and the same. He complains the Internal Hearing Unit did not have jurisdiction because it was not in existence at the time he sustained his injury on June 28, 1995. [4] Sheneman cites Starr v. Sunlight Ranches, 890 P.2d 1096 (Wyo.1995), stating this court held that a hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings is a substantive right fixed at the time of injury and that the Medical Commission, created by statute to hear certain worker's compensation cases, could not hear cases where the injury date preceded the creation of the Medical Commission. The Division states Starr is not controlling because a hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings was expressly precluded in this case, absent a timely request for a hearing under Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-601(k)(iv). This issue is resolved by determining whether Sheneman's complaint is substantive or procedural. We discussed the effect of a substantive law and procedural law in Connors v. Connors, 769 P.2d 336, 349 (Wyo. 1989): The question here is clearly one of procedural law, which has been defined as `those rules    applicable in the administration of the remedies available in cases of invasion of primary rights of individuals in Courts or other lawfully constituted tribunals and agencies[,]' [State ex rel.] Frederick [v. District Court], 399 P.2d [583] at 585 [(Wyo.1965)] ( quoting Kellman v. Stoltz, 1 F.R.D. 726, 728 (N.D.Iowa 1941)), providing ` the method of enforcing and protecting [the] duties, rights, and obligations as are created by substantive laws.' Frederick, 399 P.2d at 585 ( quoting In Re McCombs' Estate, 80 N.E.2d 573, 586 (Ohio 1948)). See also McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1290 n. 15 (Wyo.1980). More specifically, `procedure' is the machinery for carrying on the suit, including pleading, process, evidence, and practice   [;] a statute relating to the proper method of obtaining jurisdiction in respective instances [is] a part of the law of procedure and not of substantive law. Frederick, 399 P.2d at 585. (Emphasis added.) The Division's rules and regulations forming the Internal Hearing Unit provided the machinery for carrying on the claim since Sheneman's request for a hearing on the merits was untimely. It is interesting to note that Sheneman would have had no right of review at all absent the rules and regulations of which he now complains. While Sheneman argues his request for hearing should have been heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings, that remedy was and is expressly precluded by statute. Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-601(k)(vi) precludes review [i]f timely written request for hearing is not filed, the final determination by the division pursuant to this subsection shall not be subject to further administrative or judicial review. The Division's rules and regulations relating to the proper method of obtaining jurisdiction in this instance are a part of the law of procedure and not of substantive law. Starr, 890 P.2d at 1096 is not controlling because the statute creating the Medical Commission related to a substantive right, not merely a procedural right. Establishing the fact that the jurisdiction of the Internal Hearing Unit is procedural leads us to State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 763 n. 7 (Wyo.1990), where we said: The State Fund cites W.S. XX-XX-XXX(a) and XX-XX-XXX. Those statutes were found in the prior law and are similar but not identical with the present provisions. The 1986 recodification, effective June 23, 1986, is to be applied procedurally as long as a substantive right is not adversely affected. Owens v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 52 Cal.2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959). See also Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525, 78 S.Ct. 893, 2 L.Ed.2d 953, reh'g denied 357 U.S. 933, 78 S.Ct. 1366, 2 L.Ed.2d 1375 (1958) and 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 354 at 490 (1974). Processing was handled under the hearing examiner administrative structure that was first created by the 1986 enactment. Bemis v. Texaco, Inc., 400 P.2d 529, reh'g denied, 401 P.2d 708 (Wyo.1965) is not inapposite since the issue there concerned substantive rights and not procedural provisions changed by a newly enacted statute. (Emphasis added.) The Wyoming Workers' Compensation Rules and Regulations that became effective January 1, 1996 are to be applied procedurally as long as a substantive right is not adversely affected. After Sheneman failed to file a timely request for a hearing on the substantive issue of whether his coronary condition qualified for worker's compensation benefits, his only remaining complaint was the procedural question of whether or not he failed to file a timely request. Sheneman's substantive right was not adversely affected. We hold processing of claims is a procedural right that was properly conducted under the Internal Hearing Unit even though the Internal Hearing Unit was created after Sheneman's injury.