Opinion ID: 4026534
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Double Jeopardy of Two Assault Convictions

Text: ¶ 23. Defendant argues that his convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and attempted simple assault by physical menace violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Federal Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. V. ¶ 24. Defendant did not raise this claim in the trial court. On appeal, the State contends that by failing to raise the issue below, defendant waived it. The State relies on State v. Callahan, which cited federal caselaw for the proposition that a double-jeopardy claim not raised pretrial or at trial is waived. 155 Vt. 571, 573, 587 A.2d 970, 972 (1991) (citing United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1365 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that double-jeopardy claim waived when raised for first time on appeal)). Since Callahan, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified the difference between “forfeited-but-reversible error” and “waiver” of an error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1993). Forfeiture results from “the failure to make the timely assertion of a right,” and those errors are reviewed under a plain-error standard. Id. at 733. Waiver results from “the intentional relinquishment of abandonment of a known right” and prevents any appellate review of a claim under the right. Id. (quotation omitted). Based on Olano, federal courts have held that where a defendant simply fails to assert a double-jeopardy claim, rather than affirmatively waiving it, he has forfeited his right and his claim is entitled to plain-error review. United States v. Lewis, 492 F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing impact of Olano, 10 abrogating Bascaro, and holding that double-jeopardy claim not asserted before trial court is forfeited not waived and defendant is entitled to plain-error review); accord United States v. Hernandez-Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 842 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1995). ¶ 25. We conclude that defendant’s claim was forfeited, not intentionally waived, and therefore, that we can review the claim.6 Because defendant failed to raise it below, however, our review is for plain error and we will reverse only if there was an error that seriously affected substantial rights and had an unfair prejudicial impact on the outcome of trial. In re Carter, 2004 VT 21, ¶ 21, 176 Vt. 322, 848 A.2d 281. ¶ 26. The Double Jeopardy Clause states that no person may “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. This provision prohibits subsequent prosecutions for the same offense and the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense. Wiley, 2007 VT 13, ¶ 8. The Legislature may, however, proscribe conduct by more than one criminal statute, and it is question of legislative intent whether a conviction and sentence may be had under each statute. Id. In evaluating whether two offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes, we consider whether each statutory provision requires proof of a fact that the other does not. Id. “If this test is not satisfied, we must presume that the Legislature did not intend to authorize the imposition of cumulative punishments for the two offenses.” State v. Breed, 2015 VT 43, ¶ 17, 198 Vt. 574, 117 A.3d 829. ¶ 27. To prove aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, the State was required to prove that: (1) defendant was armed with a deadly weapon; (2) he intended to threaten to use that deadly weapon on a law enforcement officer; and (3) the law enforcement officer was performing a lawful duty at the time. To prove the attempted simple assault, the State was required to prove: 6 Although we have not explicitly so held, we have in the past reviewed unpreserved double-jeopardy objections for plain error. See, e.g., State v. Wiley, 2007 VT 13, ¶ 7, 181 Vt. 300, 917 A.2d 501. 11 (1) defendant intended to put the officer in fear of imminent serious bodily injury; (2) defendant took physical action to accomplish his goal; (3) defendant’s actions would have placed the officer in fear of imminent serious bodily injury if defendant had not been interrupted; and (4) the police officer was performing a lawful duty.7 ¶ 28. We have held that, as charged and instructed here, simple assault is a lesserincluded offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. State v. Bolio, 159 Vt. 250, 254, 617 A.2d 885, 887 (1992). A lesser-included offense is one that is “composed of some, but not all, of the elements of the greater offense and does not have an element included in the greater offense.” Id. at 252, 617 A.2d at 886 (quotation omitted). Therefore, by definition a defendant cannot be convicted of both the greater and lesser-included offenses. The State has presented no reason why the two convictions in this case do not violate double jeopardy principles. Therefore, we conclude that conviction for both offenses violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. We also conclude that allowing the two convictions to stand denies defendant a substantial right and is plain error. ¶ 29. Defendant asserts that the proper remedy is to vacate the conviction for the greater offense. Our case law is clear that the State has the right to choose which charge is to be dismissed. See State v. Gagne, 2016 VT 68, ¶ 44 n.3, __ Vt. __, __ A.3d __ (“The State is free to exercise its prosecutorial discretion to request that we vacate the greater conviction.”); State v. Cahill, 2013 VT 69, ¶ 22 (“On remand, the State must move to vacate one of the convictions at its election.”); State v. Rooney, 2011 VT 14, ¶ 34, 189 Vt. 306, 19 A.3d 92 (recognizing that when an action violates two criminal statutes, State has discretion to prosecute under either, as long as it does not “arbitrarily discriminate against an individual or class of individuals”). 7 We make one point here for the sake of clarity. The final element listed in each list regarding officers is derived from 13 V.S.A. § 1028(a)(1), which enhances penalties for simple or aggravated assault convictions if they are committed against law enforcement officers, firefighters, health care workers, or emergency personnel who are performing lawful duties at the time of the assault. We have listed the enhancer alongside the original elements of each offense to mimic the jury instructions. 12 ¶ 30. Here, as in Gagne, the State has “clearly requested” that, in the event that we determine that both convictions could not stand, that we affirm the greater conviction. Gagne, 2016 VT 68, ¶ 44 n.3. Therefore, we vacate the attempted simple assault conviction.