Opinion ID: 1516240
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ill Dec.laratory Judgment Action Under RSA 491:22

Text: PPG's final argument is that the trial court should have allowed its declaratory judgment action, even if it were untimely because PPG filed it outside of the thirty-day appeal period provided in RSA 677:15, I. See Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin, 132 N.H. 502, 567 A.2d 188 (1989); Morgenstern v. Town of Rye, 147 N.H. 558, 561, 794 A.2d 782 (2002). We have held that a plaintiff who chooses to initiate a declaratory judgment action to challenge the validity of a zoning ordinance may do so after the expiration of the [applicable statutory] appeal period. Morgenstern, 147 N.H. at 561, 794 A.2d 782; see Blue Jay Realty Trust, 132 N.H. at 509, 567 A.2d 188. In Blue Jay Realty Trust, we explained that this was an exception to the usual requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted. We noted that, generally, [w]hen the issue in an appeal involves a question of law rather than a question of the exercise of administrative discretion, administrative remedies need not always be exhausted. Blue Jay Realty Trust, 132 N.H. at 509, 567 A.2d 188 (quotation omitted). Similarly, in Olson v. Litchfield, 112 N.H. 261, 262, 296 A.2d 470 (1972), we explained that it is proper to permit the use of the declaratory judgment procedure to challenge the validity of a zoning ordinance, even if the challenge is outside the applicable time period, where . . . the question is one peculiarly suited to judicial rather than administrative treatment and no other adequate remedy is available to plaintiff. Under these circumstances the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable. We have not, however, expanded this line of cases to challenges to planning board decisions. Indeed in Town of Auburn v. McEvoy, 131 N.H. 383, 385, 553 A.2d 317 (1988), decided before we decided Blue Jay Realty Trust, we held that a constitutional challenge to a planning board decision was not exempt from the thirty-day appeal period in RSA 677:15, I. Even if we assume, without deciding, that one may challenge a planning board decision outside of the thirty-day appeal period in RSA 677:15, I, PPG's action would still be prohibited. PPG's challenge to the planning board's decision did not raise a question of law, but rather contested the planning board's exercise of administrative discretion. Therefore, the thirty-day appeal period applied. For all the above reasons we hold that the trial court did not err when it granted the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. PPG's motion to remand to the trial court for findings on whether the condition was a condition precedent or a condition subsequent is, thus, denied. In the absence of specific findings, a trial court is presumed to have made all findings necessary to support its ruling. Bell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 146 N.H. 190, 196, 776 A.2d 1260 (2001). In this case, the trial court necessarily found the condition to be a condition subsequent when it granted the motion to dismiss. Affirmed.