Opinion ID: 2581048
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Interference with Contract Claim Against Hart Crowser

Text: Discovery removed Kinzel from the Fort Wainwright site at the specific request of Hart Crowser's Martin. Discovery then reassigned Kinzel an arduous job, which he claims was meant to be punitive and was an effort to force him to resign. Soon thereafter he injured his back and left work. In early September, Kinzel was fired by Discovery. In his complaint, Kinzel alleged that Martin made false, defamatory, and otherwise harmful statements to Brown, thereby inveigl[ing], encourag[ing] and extort[ing] plaintiff's employer to get rid of and discharge plaintiff. This, Kinzel asserted, amounted to an improper interference with his Discovery employment contract by Hart Crowser. Hart Crowser moved for summary judgment on this issue, arguing that Kinzel had been terminated by his employer Discovery for reasons wholly unrelated to the Hart Crowser project at Fort Wainwright. Attached to this motion was a sworn affidavit from Brown. Brown attested that: I was solely responsible for the decision to assign Mr. Kinzel to the Glennallen work site.... Hart Crowser had no input in my decision.... Furthermore, my decision to assign Mr. Kinzel to the Glennallen job as opposed to some other project was in no way influenced by Hart Crowser's request that Mr. Kinzel be removed from the Ft. Wainwright job. Brown further insisted that Kinzel would have been removed from the Wainwright site within a week anyway since that job was nearing completion. He concluded, [a]fter Mr. Kinzel was removed from the Ft. Wainwright project Hart Crowser had no involvement in any aspect of Mr. Kinzel's employment. In his opposition motion, Kinzel attempted to link his efforts to improve safety at the Fort Wainwright site with his eventual termination. He accused Martin of seriously undermining Kinzel's position at Discovery by means of a series of damaging and at times defamatory e-mails. This, according to Kinzel, led to his removal from Fort Wainwright and his eventual termination. Prior to trial the superior court granted Hart Crowser's motion for summary judgment on this intentional interference with contract claim. The court gave no reasons for its decision. Kinzel claims that there are material facts in dispute as to whether Hart Crowser interfered with his employment at Discovery. To prevail on an intentional interference with contract claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the defendant was aware of the contract; (3) the contract was breached; (4) the defendant's conduct was the cause of that breach; (5) the damages; and (6) the defendant's conduct was not privileged. [62] We have recognized that this tort applies to terminable at-will contracts: though a contract is terminable at will, a claim of unjustifiable interference can still be made, for (t)he wrong for which the courts may give redress includes also the procurement of the termination of a contract which otherwise would have (been) continued in effect. [ [63] ] Hart Crowser points out that many of Kinzel's arguments are inappropriate because they refer to trial testimony. In this discussion we only consider facts available to the trial court at the time of its ruling, [64] but we also note that the trial court had a duty to examine the existing record (including the aforementioned e-mails) in its entirety before determining that no genuine issue of material fact existed. [65] Hart Crowser claims that Kinzel presented no evidence in his opposition to Hart Crowser's motion for summary judgment demonstrating that Hart Crowser, and specifically Martin, had induced Discovery to terminate Kinzel. It further claims that the only relevant evidence presented to the superior court was the affidavit of Brown, confirming that Kinzel was terminated for reasons particular to Discovery and wholly unrelated to the project at Fort Wainwright and Hart Crowser. But the e-mails between Martin and Brown, when viewed in a light most favorable to Kinzel, [66] show that Martin was responsible for Kinzel's firing. In a June 24 e-mail Martin comments to Brown that it would be better if you didn't have Jeff up here. He further insinuates that Kinzel was responsible for sabotaging the worksite. Martin's subsequent e-mails demonstrate a pattern of attempts at undermining Kinzel's desirability as an employee: I think it is very unwise to have these guys complaining to everyone they meet about the unsafe work conditions that Hart Crowser forces them to work under ... one of our clients [might not find it humorous]. We will give Jeff ( or whoever is up here ) [a group of tasks to accomplish]. TOP THREE WHINES OF THE WEEK [all mentioning Jeff Kinzel]. I have grave concerns about Jeff doing good work at a reasonable productive level at this point. Brown eventually recalled Kinzel from the worksite after Martin asked that Kinzel be removed. When Martin asked Brown to remove Kinzel from the site, Brown asked for an official reason, stating that it would be helpful. Martin's reply did not mention Kinzel's lack of productivity, or whining about health hazards, or any other past complaint. Rather than these themes, Martin accused Kinzel of not wearing a respirator. Further, since respirators were no longer required by the time Martin responded, he also referred to other Health & Safety concerns in regards to Jeff. Despite not specifying what these were, he stated that he would have no choice but to shut down the job if Kinzel were not removed: My only other option will be to shut the project down, if we cannot ensure safety at the site. Removing Jeff from the site is your decision. Given the lack of any specified present safety concerns and Martin's history of finding fault with Kinzel, the totality of the evidence casts doubt on the veracity of the official reason. Hart Crowser nevertheless insists that causation is impossible to prove in this case. It argues that, though a lapse in time between interference and termination is not fatal to these claims, what is fatal is when intervening events make it highly unlikely that defendant's conduct could have caused the termination. Hart Crowser claims that there were several intervening occurrences prior to Kinzel's termination all of which demonstrate a separate cause of termination, such as Kinzel's injury and his failure to return to work. But the e-mails demonstrate that the safety complaints put a strain on the relationship between Hart Crowser and Discovery. Brown, anxious to maintain business, quickly expressed a desire to patch things up as soon as possible. As early as July, just after Kinzel was recalled from Fort Wainwright, Brown e-mailed Martin, I assume we might take up all that at a later time when the wound is not so fresh. On August 13 Brown further urges, I would hope that it's not something that you hold against me forever. This tends to show that Hart Crowser still had an influence over Discovery after Kinzel's removal from the Fort Wainwright job but before his eventual termination in September. In subsequent e-mails of December 16, 1998, and March 23, 1999, Brown was still making amends to Martin for Kinzel's complaints. Although the e-mails do not conclusively prove that Discovery's termination of Kinzel was based upon Martin's complaints to Brown, they clearly raise a genuine issue of material fact on that point. It is also a question of fact whether Hart Crowser's actions against Kinzel were privileged. [W]here there is a direct financial interest in a contract, the essential question in determining if interference is justified is whether the person's conduct is motivated by a desire to protect his economic interest, or whether it is motivated by spite, malice, or some other improper objective. [67] Here there is no question that Hart Crowser as contractor had a direct financial interest in the relationship between its subcontractor Discovery and Kinzel, so long as Kinzel was employed on the Fort Wainwright project. But the question remains whether Martin's e-mails were intended to achieve an improper objective such as removal of Kinzel in retaliation for Kinzel's safety complaints. If so, no claim of privilege could be maintained. In conclusion, because material facts are in dispute as to causation and privilege, the superior court's grant of summary judgment cannot be sustained.