Opinion ID: 1708277
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Erred in Granting the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Disclosure and Production of Privileged Information?

Text: ¶ 22. The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law. Hewes v. Langston, 853 So.2d 1237, 1244 (Miss.2003) (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981)). Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby to promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice. Id. at 1249. That purpose, of course, requires that clients be free to make full disclosure to their attorneys. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562, 109 S.Ct. 2619, 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989). In its version of the attorney-client privilege, Mississippi follows the uniform rule adopted by a majority of the states. ¶ 23. Rule 502(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence defines the privilege as follows: (b) General Rule of Privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client (1) between himself or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer's representative, (2) between his lawyer and the lawyer's representative, (3) by him or his representative or his lawyer or a representative of the lawyer to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer representing another party in a pending action and concerning a matter of common interest therein, (4) between representatives of a client or between the client and a representative of the client, or (5) among lawyers and their representatives representing the same client. Miss. R. Evid. 502(b). See also Jackson Med. Clinic for Women, P.A. v. Moore, 836 So.2d 767, 771 (Miss.2003); See also Miss. Rules of Professional Conduct R. 1.6. This Court has interpreted the scope of the attorney-client privilege under Mississippi law broadly, stating: the privilege relates to and covers all information regarding the client received by the attorney in his professional capacity and in the course of his representation of the client. Included are communications made by the client to the attorney and by the attorney to the client. In that sense it is a two-way street. Barnes v. State, 460 So.2d 126, 131 (Miss.1984) (emphasis added). Further: [t]he privilege does not require the communication to contain purely legal analysis or advice to be privileged. Dunn v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 927 F.2d 869, 875 (5th Cir.1991) (applying Mississippi law). Instead, if a communication between a lawyer and client would facilitate the rendition of legal services or advice, the communication is privileged. Id. at 875. A significant part of the attorney-client privilege for purposes of this appeal is the common interest privilege, as set forth in Miss. R. Evid. 502, cmt. (b)(3). According to the comment to the rule: The privilege extends to statements made in multiple party cases in which different lawyers represent clients who have common interests. Miss. R. Evid. 502. ¶ 24. Williamson asserts that they cannot disclose the confidential information surrounding the American Home settlement because the settlement pertains to thirty-one other clients. Mere joint representation cannot act as shield against an attorney malpractice action. Although there are no prior Mississippi cases which directly speak to the issues presented here, we are guided by the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct, and the wisdom of our court in other states which have more squarely dealt with the issue here presented. ¶ 25. In many jurisdictions, joint representation of clients creates an exception to the general rule barring the disclosure of material protected by the attorney-client relationship. The joint representation exception to the general rule barring disclosure is based on the assumption that all clients engaged in an aggregate settlement are entitled to disclosure. A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims or against the clients ... unless each client consents after consultation, including the disclosure of the existence and nature of all the claims ... involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement. Miss. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.8(g). ¶ 26. In absence of an opinion directly on point in Mississippi, the trial court prudentially relied upon the most similar facts and law as presented in Scrivner v. Hobson, 854 S.W.2d 148 (Tex.Ct.App.1993). In Scrivner, former clients brought a legal malpractice action against their former attorney who represented them and other families in an environmental lawsuit, alleging that the attorney settled the lawsuit without authority, incorrectly calculated the value of their share of the settlement proceeds, and impermissibly divided the shares of settlement attributable to their property with prior landowners. The Texas Court of Appeals held that the documents requested regarding the aggregate settlement came within the exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 151-52. In Scrivner, the court interpreted Rule 503 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, which is identical to Rule 502 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, holding that: Where parties display mutual trust in a single attorney by placing their affairs in his hands, the attorney must disclose to the others all opinions, theories, or conclusions regarding the clients' rights or position to other parties the attorney represented in the same matter. Cousins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Co., 258 So.2d 629, 636 (La.App.1972). With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the general rule is that, as between commonly represented clients, the privilege does not attach to matters that are of mutual interest. See Tex.R. Civ. Evid. 503(d)(5). Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, the client should be so advised. 854 S.W.2d at 151. ¶ 27. Under Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(g), documents requested in discovery involve matters of interest common to all the plaintiffs involved in the aggregate settlement. The logic of Scrivner indicates that when an attorney represents joint clients in obtaining a joint settlement for which no individual negotiations on behalf of any one client were undertaken, the client may have access to the documents which pertain to the case. Id. In regard to an attorney's duty to his client, the Scrivner court stated that the documents requested are relevant to the claims of the [former clients] that the proceeds of the aggregate settlement were improperly and fraudulently distributed among the various plaintiffs in the environmental lawsuit. Id. The Scrivner court held that the former clients could obtain discovery of the documents under the exceptions to the attorney-client or attorney work product privileges. Id. ¶ 28. We agree with the trial court's analysis of this case. We concur that by virtue of representing some thirty-one clients jointly in litigation, mediation and settlement, the joint client exception to the Mississippi Rules of Evidence is applicable in this case such that Williamson cannot shield himself from a motion to compel discovery based on the attorney-client privilege. Under Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(g), Williamson obtained a lump sum aggregate settlement for all of his clients during settlement negotiations. In determining whether the proceeds of the aggregate settlement were improperly or fraudulently distributed among the various plaintiffs in the American Home suit, the information requested by the Edmondses is highly relevant to their claims of breach of contract and breach of the duties of care and loyalty. The client is entitled to know the amount of the settlement, and the basis for the calculations, distributions and accounting of the proceeds of the settlement with American Home. ¶ 29. Additionally, Williamson asserts that the physician-patient privilege prevents disclosure of the documents. However, Miss. R. Evid. 503(a)(4) defines a communication as confidential only where it is not intended to be disclosed to third persons. Additionally, [a]ny party to an action or proceeding ... who by his or her pleadings places in issue any aspect of his or her physical, mental, or emotional condition thereby and to that extent only waives the privilege otherwise recognized.... Miss. R. Evid. 503(f). The comment to this rule suggests the waiver should only apply to the American Home action. The comment is persuasive, however, because the plaintiffs in the American Home settlement used their medical condition as a sword to further their case against the company, they cannot now use the physician-patient privilege as a shield to entirely protect information which weighed heavy in the negotiation and settlement of their case and is highly relevant to the Edmondses' malpractice action. ¶ 30. Finally, Williamson argues that the confidentiality agreement signed by the Edmondses and the QSF order purporting to seal the settlement prohibit disclosure of the information sought. The confidentiality agreement and the QSF order were put into place to prevent public dissemination of any information indicating the existence of litigation or settlement, not to prevent the Edmondses from obtaining information relating to the case they participated in as plaintiffs. ¶ 31. This Court adopts a modified, narrower view of Scrivner. This problem in conjunction with the aforementioned privilege issues presented is easily remedied by the trial judge. Instead of opting for the most severe course of action and barring the Edmondses from obtaining this potentially highly relevant information due to privilege, the confidentiality agreement or the QSF order, or requiring all documents requested to be disclosed as in Scrivner and as the trial court ordered here, we hold that the following procedure shall be followed. On remand, the trial court shall review all of the documents objected to by Williamson and the other American Home plaintiffs. The trial court shall conduct an in-camera inspection of all documents requested in discovery and objected to by Williamson to ascertain relevancy and admissibility in the Edmondses' case at bar. The trial court shall require of the defense counsel to redact all information specifically identifying the other plaintiffs (i.e. name, address, etc.) in the American Home settlement, medical records of other plaintiffs, documents related to attorney/client issues, and any other information the trial court holds should be redacted. With respect to the persons about whom settlement and medical information has been requested, Williamson shall provide the Edmondses a chart which lists the persons, identified only as # 1, # 2, # 3, etc. For each person, the defendant shall provide: (1) the medical diagnosis, (2) additional information, if any, which affected the amount of settlement, and (3) the amount of settlement. In the event that the Edmondses request verification of the information provided by Williamson, Williamson shall provide medical records, settlement documents and other such documents as are necessary to the trial court, in camera, so that the trial court can verify the accuracy of the information on the chart. The trial court shall allow a reasonable time for inspection of the redacted documents by the person, or his or her counsel, before the documents are produced to the Edmondses. ¶ 32. Enabling members of the bar to wholly shield themselves from malpractice actions through the invocation of privileges, confidentiality agreements, and QSF orders would do a tremendous disservice to the public at large, as well as the legal profession. Indeed, if this Court found otherwise, a dangerous precedent would be set encouraging attorneys to advise their clients to sign and agree to confidentiality agreements and QSF orders in order to sidestep potential malpractice liability after a case is settled.