Opinion ID: 1444406
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Inverse Condemnation Actions and Surface Water Drainage

Text: Recovery for the taking or damaging of land by the government is provided for in the Washington Constitution, which states: No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having been first made. Const. art. I, § 16 (amend.9). [3] The measure of damage in a taking case is the diminution in the fair market value of the property caused by the governmental taking or damaging. Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 94 Wash.2d 479, 482, 618 P.2d 67 (1980); Hoover v. Pierce County, 79 Wash.App. 427, 431, 903 P.2d 464 (1995). The County argues that the Court of Appeals erred in reinstating the Phillips' inverse condemnation cause of action. The term inverse condemnation is used to describe an action alleging a governmental taking, brought to recover the value of property which has been appropriated in fact, but with no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain. Lambier v. City of Kennewick, 56 Wash.App. 275, 279, 783 P.2d 596 (1989) (quoting Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash.2d 309, 310 n. 1, 391 P.2d 540 (1964)). A party alleging inverse condemnation must establish the following elements: (1) a taking or damaging (2) of private property (3) for public use (4) without just compensation being paid (5) by a governmental entity that has not instituted formal proceedings. Pierce v. Northeast Lake Wash. Sewer & Water Dist., 69 Wash.App. 76, 79, 847 P.2d 932 (1993); Rains v. Department of Fisheries, 89 Wash.2d 740, 748, 575 P.2d 1057 (1978) (Wright, C.J., dissenting). In Buxel v. King County, 60 Wash.2d 404, 409, 374 P.2d 250 (1962), we held that in certain situations a county can be liable for the damages caused by the trespass of surface water across a plaintiff's land, accomplishing thereby a taking of that property without compensation. [4] Surface water is defined as vagrant or diffuse water produced by rain, melting snow or springs. King County v. Boeing Co., 62 Wash.2d 545, 550, 384 P.2d 122 (1963). In Boeing, we reiterated that liability arises if surface water is artificially collected and discharged on surrounding properties in a manner different from the natural flow of water onto those properties. Boeing, 62 Wash.2d at 550-51, 384 P.2d 122. Generally, municipal rights and liabilities as to surface waters are the same as those of private landowners within the city. 18A E. UGENE McQUILLIN, LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.140, at 307 (3d ed.1993). In Wilber Dev. Corp. v. Les Rowland Constr., Inc., 83 Wash.2d 871, 874-75, 523 P.2d 186 (1974), we explained: A municipality ordinarily is not liable for consequential damages occurring when it increases the flow of surface water onto an owner's property if the damages arise wholly from changes in the character of the surface produced by the opening of streets, building of houses, and the like, in the ordinary and regular course of the expansion of the municipality. On the other hand, it is liable if, in the course of an authorized construction, it collects surface water by an artificial channel or in large quantities and pours it, in a body, upon the land of a private person, to his injury. Under this rule, while municipal authorities may pave and grade streets and are not ordinarily liable for an increase in surface water naturally falling on the land of a private owner where the work is properly done, they are not permitted to concentrate and gather such water into artificial drains or channels and throw it on the land of an individual owner in such manner and volume as to cause substantial injury to such land and without making adequate provision for its proper outflow, unless compensation is made. 18 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 53.144, at 538 (3d ed. rev.1963). Surface waters may not be artificially collected and discharged upon adjoining lands in quantities greater than or in a manner different from the natural flow thereof. At the same time, it is the rule that the flow of surface water along natural drains may be hastened or incidentally increased by artificial means, so long as the water is not ultimately diverted from its natural flow onto the property of another. (Citations omitted.) We concluded that if water is collected and deposited upon the land in a different manner than before development, the property owner may be entitled to damages. Wilber, 83 Wash.2d at 876, 523 P.2d 186. Many more recent cases have followed these rules and allowed damages when a municipality itself acts to collect surface water and channels it onto private property. E.g., Burton v. Douglas County, 14 Wash. App. 151, 539 P.2d 97 (1975); Hoover v. Pierce County, 79 Wash.App. 427, 903 P.2d 464 (1995). In DiBlasi v. City of Seattle, 136 Wash.2d 865, 969 P.2d 10 (1998), we recently held that there may be liability on the part of a city for damages caused by water from a city street if the street acted to collect, concentrate and channel surface water onto private property in a manner different than the natural flow. DiBlasi, 136 Wash.2d at 879, 969 P.2d at 16. While the law on liability for damages caused by surface waters may be difficult to apply, it is fairly settled law. However, the application of the law to the facts of this case is highly disputed. The County (and amici that agree with the County's position) argue that the County only acted to approve the development of private property under the laws and regulations under which the developers were vested. The municipalities argue that they must take or damage property, and not simply issue permits to a developer, in order to be liable for damages caused by surface waters. The County insists the development was entirely a private one and that an inverse condemnation action will not lie where there is no public project and no construction or other affirmative action by the County. We read the County's and amici's arguments as responding to the Court of Appeals decision which held that a municipality's mere approval of a private developer's drainage plan can accomplish a constitutional taking. Phillips, 87 Wash.App. at 485-86, 943 P.2d 306. Additionally, the Court of Appeals reinstated the inverse condemnation action against the County based on the fact that the County assumed ownership and maintenance of the drainage system after construction was completed, reasoning that the system is now a public facility. Phillips, 87 Wash.App. at 486, 943 P.2d 306. The Phillips argue that the County's liability is based on the fact that the County required that the developer deed all of the drainage facilities to the County following final plat approval and the fact that the County let the developer build the drainage facilities in the county right-of-way. While we do affirm the ultimate decision of the Court of Appeals, we do so on different grounds. This case appears complex when viewed as one issue but is more understandable (and will be a more useful explanation of the law) when viewed as a series of questions. First, if the only action taken by a county or city is to approve a private development plan under existing regulations, is the municipality liable if the drainage system is inadequate and causes damage to other landowners? Second, does the fact that a city or county accepts ownership of a storm drainage system built by a private developer in order to guarantee perpetual maintenance make the municipality liable for damages that result from the design of the drainage facilities? Third, if the municipality participates in development of the drainage facilities by allowing drainage to be built on previously owned or controlled public property, does that voluntary affirmative action give rise to liability in inverse condemnation when an adjacent landowner's property is damaged? We address each question separately.