Opinion ID: 2995638
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constructive Amendment of the

Text: Indictment In determining whether the government constructively amended Trennell’s indictment, we first address the appropriate standard of review. During the instruction conference, Trennell did not object to the jury instructions concerning drug quantity when presented to the court; thus we review for plain error. See United States v. Jones, 224 F.3d 621, 626 n.3 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). Trennell’s counsel only objected to a proposed jury instruction involving aiding and abetting and that objection was resolved. In fact, when asked by the court whether he had any other objections to the instructions, he confirmed to the judge that he had none. Typically, whether a trial judge constructively amended portions of the indictment is a question of law that the Court of Appeals reviews de novo. United States v. Pigee, 197 F.3d 879, 885 (7th Cir. 1999). However, a defendant must properly preserve an objection at the trial court level before the Court of Appeals will apply this standard. See United States v. Renner, 238 F.3d 810, 812-13 (7th Cir. 2001). To assign error to any portion of the charge to the jury or omission therefrom a party must state distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the grounds of the objection before the jury retires to consider its verdict./2 Fed. R. Crim. P. 30. Because Trennell did not preserve the error by objecting to the instructions, we review for plain error. Trennell claims, however, that an indictment is a prerequisite to jurisdiction, and that the failure to charge an element of the offense in the indictment is a jurisdictional defect that requires reversal of his conviction notwithstanding the plain error standard. He claims that he was indicted under 21 U.S.C. sec. 841(b)(1)(C), which does not include drug quantity and permits a maximum sentence of 20 years. Yet he was convicted pursuant to 21 U.S.C. sec. 841 (b)(1)(A), which includes drug quantity and permits a life sentence. However, the charge was broader than Trennell claims. The indictment charges him with violating 21 U.S.C. secs. 841 & 846, and not a specific subsection under sec. 841. And this court has specifically held that drug quantity is not an element of the offense under sec. 841. United States v. Bjorkman, 270 F.3d 482, 490-91 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Brough, 243 F.3d 1078, 1080 (7th Cir. 2001). Drug quantity is also not an element of the offense of conspiracy to distribute illegal drugs. See 21 U.S.C. sec. 846; United States v. Hill, 252 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2001). Other circuits have found that the failure to charge drug quantity in the indictment deprives the district court of jurisdiction and requires automatic reversal. See United States v. Cotton, 261 F.3d 397, 407 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 803, 151 L.Ed.2d 689 (2002) (argued April 15, 2002);/3 United States v. Gonzalez, 259 F.3d 355, 361 n.3 (5th Cir. 2001). However, it is well established in this circuit that an error of omission of drug quantity in the indictment is subject to plain error analysis. See United States v. Atkins, 274 F.3d 444, 453 (7th Cir. 2001). See infra sec. IIB. We have instructed prosecutors in the past, and reiterate the position here, that post- Apprendi indictments should specify, and the trier of fact must be instructed to find, both the elements of the offense, as listed in sec. 841(a), and the drug amounts listed in sec. 841(b) that the prosecutor relies on to establish the maximum sentence. However, Trennell did not object to the failure to do so in this case and so we review for plain error. Under the plain error standard, we will not reverse a decision unless the defendant demonstrates that (1) there was error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-35. If the defendant meets these three requirements, we may correct the error if in our discretion, we find the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Ross, 77 F.3d 1525, 1538 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing Olano, 507 U.S. at 736-37). Pursuant to the plain error standard, a constructive amendment must constitute ’a mistake so serious that but for it the [defendant] probably would have been acquitted’ in order for us to reverse. United States v. Remsza, 77 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Gunning, 984 F.2d 1476, 1482 (7th Cir. 1993)). The Fifth Amendment states that [n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . . U.S. Const. Amend.