Opinion ID: 4794166
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: 1. Complaint to Modify Nathan presents two arguments in support of his assignment that the district court erred in denying his complaint to modify. First, he argues that even though the 2018 modification was also premised on Jessica’s substance use, the court should 2 Windham v. Kroll, 307 Neb. 947, 951 N.W.2d 744 (2020). 3 Heiden v. Norris, 300 Neb. 171, 912 N.W.2d 758 (2018). - 788 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports LINDBLAD v. LINDBLAD Cite as 309 Neb. 776 have found a material change in circumstances due to Jessica’s continued substance use and an increase in drug-related arrests. Next, he argues the court abused its discretion in failing to separately address his claims that Jessica’s continued substance use rendered her unfit to exercise even supervised parenting time. We address each argument in turn, but first, we review the governing legal principles. [3,4] Ordinarily, custody and parenting time of a minor child will not be modified unless there has been a material change in circumstances showing that the best interests of the child require modification. 4 Modifying a custody or parenting time order requires two steps of proof. 5 First, the party seeking modification must show by a preponderance of the evidence a material change in circumstances that has occurred after the entry of the previous custody order and that affects the best interests of the child. 6 Second, the party seeking modification must prove that changing the child’s custody or parenting time is in the child’s best interests. 7 Here, the district court found that Nathan had not met his burden of proving a material change in circumstances affecting F.L.’s best interests, so we focus our analysis on that inquiry. [5,6] Generally speaking, a material change in circumstances is the occurrence of something which, had it been known to the dissolution court at the time of the initial decree or prior modification, would have persuaded the court to decree differently. 8 We have explained that proof of a material change in circumstances is the “threshold inquiry in a proceeding on 4 See, Jones v. Jones, 305 Neb. 615, 941 N.W.2d 501 (2020); VanSkiver v. VanSkiver, 303 Neb. 664, 930 N.W.2d 569 (2019); Eric H. v. Ashley H., 302 Neb. 786, 925 N.W.2d 81 (2019). 5 See, Weaver v. Weaver, 308 Neb. 373, 954 N.W.2d 619 (2021); Jones, supra note 4; Eric H., supra note 4. 6 See id. 7 See id. 8 See, Weaver, supra note 5; Eric H., supra note 4. - 789 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports LINDBLAD v. LINDBLAD Cite as 309 Neb. 776 a complaint to modify, because issues determined in the prior custody order are deemed preclusive in the absence of proof of new facts and circumstances.” 9 The rationale for limiting modifications of custody and parenting time to only those necessitated by a material change in circumstances is to avoid extensive and repetitive litigation and unnecessary, potentially harmful fluctuations in the child’s life. 10 Simply put, a custody or parenting time order will not be modified absent proof of new facts and circumstances arising since the order was entered that affect the best interests of the child. 11 Here, Nathan generally concedes that when the 2018 modification order was entered, the parties and the court were aware of, and attempting to address, the impact of Jessica’s substance use. This is amply supported by the record, as the face of the 2018 modification order shows that the change in custody and the supervised visitation were put in place to address evidence of Jessica’s substance use and poor decision­ making. Furthermore, the 2018 modification order appears to have anticipated the possibility that Jessica’s substance use would continue, as it directed that future modifications to her parenting time would not be entertained unless she “completed both drug/alcohol and mental health counseling . . . and has demonstrated the ability to maintain sobriety for a significant period of time thereafter.” Nathan does not argue that the nature or severity of Jessica’s substance use has changed significantly since the 2018 modification, and he adduced no evidence of such a change. Instead, he argues that her “continued drug use and multiple arrests for drug possession,” 12 and “especially her arrest” 13 at the 9 Weaver, supra note 5, 308 Neb. at 388, 954 N.W.2d at 630, citing Eric H., supra note 4. 10 See id. 11 See id. 12 Brief for appellant at 15. 13 Id. - 790 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports LINDBLAD v. LINDBLAD Cite as 309 Neb. 776 youth soccer game, support finding a material change in circumstances. We understand Nathan to be arguing that even if Jessica’s use of illegal substances is essentially the same now as it was in 2018, the evidence showed that her drugrelated arrests have increased, and that such evidence is enough to prove a material change in circumstances affecting F.L.’s best interests. Our case law demonstrates that an increase or escalation in parental instability or parental behavior that affects the best interests of the child can support a judicial finding that there has been a material change in circumstances, even if there is some evidence of similar behavior in the past. 14 In Jones v. Jones, 15 we found that an increase in the custodial mother’s periods of unemployment and resulting housing instability since the prior modification had affected the best interests of the child by exposing him to frequent moves and requiring him to “liv[e] alongside people who were verbally and physically abusive to [his mother], used illegal drugs, engaged in criminal activity, and had violent tempers.” We concluded that even though the mother had experienced periods of unemployment and financial difficulty in the past, the escalation in those circumstances since the prior modification amounted to a material change in circumstances affecting the best interests of the child and supported a modification in custody and fewer overnight visits at the mother’s home. 16 Similarly, in VanSkiver v. VanSkiver, 17 we found that a postdecree escalation in the father’s angry, abusive, and threatening behavior toward his minor sons amounted to a material change in circumstances affecting the best interests of the children and supported modifying the decree to indefinitely suspend the father’s parenting time. We expressly rejected the father’s 14 See, Jones, supra note 4; VanSkiver, supra note 4. 15 Jones, supra note 4, 305 Neb. at 630, 941 N.W.2d at 512. 16 See Jones, supra note 4. 17 VanSkiver, supra note 4. - 791 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports LINDBLAD v. LINDBLAD Cite as 309 Neb. 776 contention that there was no proof of a material change in circumstances because his ex-wife was “afraid of him at the time of their divorce due to his threatening behavior, so the fact that she remains afraid of him due to his threatening behavior is nothing new.” 18 Nathan is correct that evidence in our record shows an increase in the number of Jessica’s drug-related arrests since the 2018 modification. Before the 2018 modification, Jessica was arrested for possession of methamphetamine, marijuana, alprazolam, Suboxone, and drug paraphernalia. Approximately 8 months after the 2018 modification, Jessica was arrested again for possession of methamphetamine, marijuana, codeine, and drug paraphernalia. Then roughly 7 months later, Jessica was arrested for possession of methamphetamine after F.L.’s soccer game. Nathan has presented concerning evidence that Jessica’s continued drug use has, quite predictably, led to continued drug-related arrests. But even if we assume that the increase in Jessica’s arrests was unanticipated at the time of the 2018 modification, we agree with the district court that Nathan has failed to adduce evidence showing that the additional arrests present a material change in circumstances that has affected the best interests of F.L. and require a change to Jessica’s supervised parenting time. It is undeniable that a parent’s use of illegal substances can expose minor children to dangerous and illegal activity; can interfere with the parent’s ability to provide safe, stable, and appropriate care for the children; and can cause deterioration of the parent-child relationship. Additionally, a parent’s habitual use of alcohol or drugs can render the parent unfit when their conduct is found by the court to be seriously detrimental to the health, morals, or well-being of the juvenile. 19 But there 18 Id. at 671, 930 N.W.2d at 574. 19 See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292 (Reissue 2016); In re Interest of Joshua M. et al., 256 Neb. 596, 591 N.W.2d 557 (1999). - 792 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports LINDBLAD v. LINDBLAD Cite as 309 Neb. 776 was no such evidence adduced at trial in this case. Instead, the evidence showed that, at least so far, the significant modifications to custody and parenting time made in the 2018 order have protected F.L. from the potentially serious and predictable consequences of Jessica’s substance use by giving legal and physical custody to Nathan and requiring Jessica’s limited parenting time to be fully supervised. In our de novo review, we see no evidence that, since the 2018 modification, Jessica has been under the influence of drugs or alcohol during her supervised parenting time, nor was there evidence that she has exposed F.L. to dangerous people or illegal activity. Like Nathan, we are concerned by the fact that Jessica had drugs in her purse during F.L.’s soccer game, but the evidence showed that the grandparents were supervising F.L.’s interactions with Jessica during this time, and there is nothing in the record suggesting that F.L. had contact with or access to the purse, or contact with any controlled substances. Further, there is no evidence that Jessica’s continued substance use or her arrests have made her unavailable or unable to exercise parenting time. Moreover, the evidence was undisputed that the relationship between F.L. and Jessica continues to be good. According to F.L.’s therapist, the only current concern regarding Jessica’s visitation is that when visits do not occur, it causes F.L. to worry. Nor are we persuaded that Nathan has shown Jessica’s continued substance use necessarily renders her unfit to exercise even supervised parenting time. We simply see no evidence that the existing supervised parenting time conditions have been, or may be, inadequate to address the obvious safety concerns accompanying Jessica’s continued use of controlled substances. 20 While we have no doubt that sobriety would vastly improve Jessica’s opportunities to meaningfully parent 20 See, e.g., In re Interest of Jeremy U. et al., 304 Neb. 734, 936 N.W.2d 733 (2020) (finding insufficient evidence to adjudicate children on ground they had been exposed to mother’s persistent drug use when mother had placed children in grandmother’s care). - 793 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports LINDBLAD v. LINDBLAD Cite as 309 Neb. 776 F.L., Nathan has not shown that Jessica’s ongoing substance use, or an increase in her drug-related arrests, presents a material change in circumstances that has affected F.L.’s best interests and requires modifying the supervised visitation provisions under the 2018 modification order. Stated differently, had the district court known of Jessica’s continued drug use and additional arrests at the time it entered the 2018 modification order, we are not persuaded it would have imposed any different custody arrangement or supervised parenting time provisions. Instead, the record shows the supervised parenting time schedule the court imposed in 2018 continues to be necessary and, at least so far, has been an effective way to maintain the important parent-child relationship while keeping F.L. safe. On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Nathan’s complaint to modify. 2. Grandparent Visitation In his second assignment of error, Nathan argues the district court erred in awarding grandparent visitation. His primary argument is that the grandparents failed to meet their burden of proof. He also argues the district court abused its discretion in failing to set a specific schedule for grandparent visitation. We begin our analysis with a review of the legal principles governing grandparent visitation. (a) Legal Principles Grandparent visitation in Nebraska is governed by statute. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1801 (Reissue 2016) defines a grand­ parent as the “biological or adoptive parent of a minor child’s biological or adoptive parent.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1802 (Reissue 2016) provides that a grandparent may seek visitation if, among other things, the marriage of the child’s parents has been dissolved. In determining whether a grandparent shall be granted visitation, § 43-1802 provides: (2) . . . [T]he court shall require evidence con- cerning the beneficial nature of the relationship of the - 794 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports LINDBLAD v. LINDBLAD Cite as 309 Neb. 776 grandparent to the child. The evidence may be presented by affidavit and shall demonstrate that a significant beneficial relationship exists, or has existed in the past, between the grandparent and the child and that it would be in the best interests of the child to allow such relationship to continue. Reasonable rights of visitation may be granted when the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that there is, or has been, a significant beneficial relationship between the grandparent and the child, that it is in the best interests of the child that such relationship continue, and that such visitation will not adversely interfere with the parent-child relationship. (3) The court may modify an order granting or deny- ing such visitation upon a showing that there has been a material change in circumstances which justifies such modification and that the modification would serve the best interests of the child. [7,8] Summarizing these statutory requirements, we have explained that a grandparent seeking visitation must prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) there is, or has been, a significant beneficial relationship between the grandparent and the child; (2) it is in the best interests of the child that such relationship continue; and (3) such visitation will not adversely interfere with the parent-child relationship. 21 Clear and convincing evidence is that amount of evidence which produces in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of a fact to be proved. 22 As noted, Nathan conceded at trial that the grandparents and F.L. have a significant beneficial relationship, and we do not understand him to argue otherwise on appeal. Rather, Nathan’s argument is that the grandparents failed to meet their burden of proving the second and third elements recited above. 21 Hamit, supra note 1. See, also, Nelson, supra note 1; Eberspacher, supra note 1. 22 Hamit, supra note 1. - 795 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports LINDBLAD v. LINDBLAD Cite as 309 Neb. 776 As we explain, our de novo review of the record persuades us otherwise. (b) Grandparents Met Burden of Proof Our review of the record demonstrates the grandparents met their burden of proving both that it was in F.L.’s best interests to continue the relationship with her maternal grandparents and that grandparent visitation would not adversely interfere with the parent-child relationship. We address each element of proof in order. The record contains clear and convincing evidence that it is in F.L.’s best interests for her relationship with her maternal grandparents to continue. First, we observe this issue was not really contested at trial; Nathan testified that he believed the relationship between F.L. and her grandparents was beneficial and should continue, but he did not want a set visitation schedule. Furthermore, the parties’ temporary mediated agreement, entered into evidence at trial, expressly stated that “all [parties believe] that it is in the best interest of [F.L.] (age 6) to share as full a relationship as possible with both Nathan and her maternal grandparents.” There was also ample evidence that continuing F.L.’s relationship with her grandparents helps to facilitate safe and structured interaction with F.L.’s mother, her same-age cousins, and her extended family, which is also in F.L.’s best interests. Similar grandparent relationships have been found to be in the child’s best interests in other cases decided by this court. 23 Nathan’s primary contention, both before the district court and on appeal, is that the grandparents did not meet their burden of proving the third element of grandparent visitation: that allowing such visitation will not adversely interfere with the parent-child relationship. According to Nathan, ordering grandparent visitation on “a mandated schedule would adversely interfere with his relationship with [F.L.] and his nuclear 23 See, Hamit, supra note 1; Rosse v. Rosse, 244 Neb. 967, 510 N.W.2d 73 (1994). - 796 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports LINDBLAD v. LINDBLAD Cite as 309 Neb. 776 family consisting of [his current wife] and their other three children.” 24 We addressed a similar argument in Hamit. 25 There, the paternal grandparents sought visitation after their son died. On the question of whether allowing grandparent visitation would adversely interfere with the parent-child relationship, a psychologist interviewed the grandparents and testified she did not think they were harboring resentment toward the mother, and other witnesses testified they had never heard the grandparents speak negatively about the mother in the presence of the children. The grandparents testified that they had no animosity toward the mother and that they tried to follow the mother’s directions and wishes concerning the care of the children, including returning the children early when requested. However, the record also contained testimony from the children’s therapist that one of the children did not want to visit his grandparents and was afraid of them. The trial court did not find this aspect of the therapist’s testimony credible, noting she had never talked with the grandparents or observed the children with the grandparents, and other evidence in the record directly contradicted the suggestion that the children were scared while visiting their grandparents. On our de novo review, we concluded in Hamit that despite evidence of a strained relationship between the grandparents and the mother, the grandparents had shown by clear and convincing evidence that grandparent visitation of 10 hours per month and 7 days in the summer would not adversely interfere with the parent-child relationship. In contrast, in Morris v. Corzatt, 26 we found the grandparents had not sufficiently proved the third factor of the grandparent visitation test. In that case, after the father was killed in an automobile accident, the maternal grandparents sought visitation. The children’s mother opposed visitation, and she testified 24 Brief for appellant at 23. 25 See Hamit, supra note 1. 26 Morris v. Corzatt, 255 Neb. 182, 583 N.W.2d 26 (1998). - 797 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports LINDBLAD v. LINDBLAD Cite as 309 Neb. 776 that she felt the grandparents undermined her authority with the children by ignoring her wishes regarding discipline, telling the children how much better things were at the grandparents’ home compared to their mother’s home, and even taking one of the children to an eye doctor without the mother’s permission. Other witnesses observed that the relationship between the mother and the grandparents was significantly strained and that they appeared to be competing to “one-up the other for the children’s affection.” 27 There was also testimony that the grandparents told the guardian ad litem “‘[t]he children would be better off with us, we could raise them better.’” 28 The district court in Morris concluded that the persistent animosity and competition between the grandparents and the mother was unhealthy for the children, undermined the ­mother’s parental authority, and adversely affected the parentchild relationship. On de novo review, we agreed and found no abuse of discretion in denying grandparent visitation. [9] Here, the facts are far more similar to those in Hamit than those in Morris. There was no evidence that the grandparents were attempting to undermine Nathan’s authority with F.L. by ignoring his wishes regarding discipline or diet. To the contrary, they testified they try to communicate with Nathan and respect his wishes about how to discipline and feed F.L. during visitation, and they wanted to maintain a positive relationship. There was evidence that the grandmother spoke negatively about Nathan’s current wife—a claim the grandparents denied—but it is plainly apparent that the district court considered the grandparents’ testimony on this issue to be more credible. When evidence is in conflict, the appellate court considers and may give weight to the fact that the trial court heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than the other. 29 27 Id. at 184, 583 N.W.2d at 28. 28 Id. at 185, 583 N.W.2d at 28. 29 Tilson v. Tilson, 307 Neb. 275, 948 N.W.2d 768 (2020). - 798 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports LINDBLAD v. LINDBLAD Cite as 309 Neb. 776 And to the extent Nathan seems to be arguing that grand­ parent visitation would interfere with his parent-child relationship simply because it would take F.L. away from her paternal nuclear family, we note that is not the type of interference with the parent-child relationship that this prong of the grandparent visitation test was intended to address. All grandparent visitation necessarily results in some time away from the natural parents, and the reasonableness of the visitation schedule is a separate issue from whether the grandparents have carried their burden of showing that visitation would not adversely interfere with the parent-child relationship. And in any event, as we discuss next, because the grandparent visitation time awarded in this case was coextensive with Jessica’s parenting time, it will have no practical impact at all on the time F.L. spends with Nathan. On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the grandparents had proved all three factors of grandparent visitation by clear and convincing evidence. (c) Grandparent Visitation Schedule Was Not Abuse of Discretion Nathan argues that even if grandparent visitation was properly ordered, the schedule set by the district court was an abuse of discretion. The district court’s order found the grandparents met their burden of proof and “should be granted grandparent visitation time.” It then directed: [B]ased on the Court’s order in the Custody Modification, the Court is not defining a set schedule because [the grandparents] will be seeing [the child] while they supervise parenting time with her mother. Should that change in the future, [the grandparents] should move this Court for a specific schedule and that will be ordered after a hearing where all parties can be heard and offer suggested schedules to the Court. Nathan argues that this visitation schedule was an abuse of discretion and “makes no practical sense in application or - 799 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports LINDBLAD v. LINDBLAD Cite as 309 Neb. 776 enforcement.” 30 First, he argues that once the court entered the order denying his complaint to modify and effectively reinstating Jessica’s supervised parenting time, the grandparent visitation request was moot and the grandparent visitation order became simply “advisory” 31 because no case or controversy was before the court. [10,11] Mootness refers to events occurring after the filing of a suit which eradicate the requisite personal interest in the resolution of the dispute that existed at the beginning of the litigation. 32 A case is not moot if a court can fashion some meaningful form of relief, even if that relief only partially redresses the prevailing party’s grievances. 33 The reinstatement of Jessica’s supervised parenting time did not render the grandparents’ request for visitation moot or merely advisory. Nothing in Nebraska’s grandparent visitation statutes limits the grandparents to seeking visitation only if one of the parents does not have parenting time. And at least two Nebraska cases have affirmed awards of grandparent visitation even when both parents had parenting time. 34 The grandparents here pursued their statutory right to grandparent visitation, which ensured their legal right to visitation time with F.L. The fact that their grandparent visitation schedule was coextensive with Jessica’s supervised parenting time, as explained below, does not render the relief ordered by the court any less meaningful. The reinstatement of Jessica’s parenting 30 Brief for appellant at 26. 31 Id. at 28. 32 Nesbitt v. Frakes, 300 Neb. 1, 911 N.W.2d 598 (2018). 33 Nebuda v. Dodge Cty. Sch. Dist. 0062, 290 Neb. 740, 861 N.W.2d 742 (2015). 34 See Rosse, supra note 23 (grandparents given 7 hours visitation every other month when mother had primary custody and father had 10 hours visitation every other weekend); Beal v. Endsley, 3 Neb. App. 589, 529 N.W.2d 125 (1995) (grandparents given visitation of fifth weekend of any month where father had primary custody and mother had parenting time). - 800 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports LINDBLAD v. LINDBLAD Cite as 309 Neb. 776 time therefore did not render the grandparents’ request for visitation moot or invalid. Second, Nathan argues the grandparent visitation order is ineffective because it awarded no specific grandparent time. Setting aside questions of whether Nathan invited the very error about which he now complains, we disagree with Nathan that the court ordered an “open-ended ‘wait and see’” 35 visitation schedule. We understand the court to have ordered a grandparent visitation schedule that was coextensive with Jessica’s supervised parenting time. The Nebraska Court of Appeals addressed a somewhat similar order in Beal v. Endsley. 36 In that case, the mother and father were divorced. The father, who lived in Alliance, Nebraska, had physical custody, and the mother, who lived in Colorado, had parenting time. The maternal grandparents, who lived in Kansas, sought grandparent visitation. The district court found the grandparents had met their burden of proof on all three grandparent visitation factors and awarded them “weekend visitation on the fifth weekend of any month that occurs. They shall also be allowed to exercise weekend visitation on any weekend or holiday that their daughter [the mother] is allowed visitation with the children. They may also have visitation during the summer months with the minor children when the daughter [the mother] has visitation with the minor children . . . .” 37 The grandparents appealed, contending the visitation time awarded was insufficient and thus unreasonable under the statutes. In examining the district court’s order, the Court of Appeals found that the portion of the order stating the grandparents “‘may’” have visitation during the summer did not award 35 Brief of appellant at 26. 36 Beal, supra note 34. 37 Id. at 594, 529 N.W.2d at 129. - 801 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports LINDBLAD v. LINDBLAD Cite as 309 Neb. 776 specific visitation, but simply recognized the grandparents had the opportunity to see the children during the mother’s summer parenting time. 38 And it clarified that the portion of the order granting the grandparents visitation on the mother’s holidays and weekends meant they could visit only when the mother invited them during this time. It thus construed the district court’s order as awarding specific grandparent visitation time on only the fifth weekend of any month that occurs and analyzed whether such an award was reasonable. Here, the district court similarly concluded the grandparents had met their burden of proof and were entitled to specific grandparent visitation. In addressing the visitation schedule, we construe the order to have declined setting a schedule that was separate from Jessica’s existing supervised visitation schedule; instead, the court ordered that grandparent visitation would occur at the same time the grandparents were supervising Jessica’s parenting time. Jessica has not opposed such a schedule and has not cross-appealed on the issue. Furthermore, we construe the order to acknowledge that if and when the grandparents are no longer supervising visits between Jessica and F.L., then they can seek to modify the grandparent visitation order, as is permitted under the grandparent visitation statute upon showing a material change in circumstances. 39 We thus clarify that, having found the grandparents met their burden by clear and convincing evidence, the district court awarded them grandparent visitation coextensive with Jessica’s supervised parenting time, which the grandparents are responsible for supervising under the 2018 order of modification. For the sake of clarity, we modify the order of grandparent visitation to reflect such a construction, and we reject Nathan’s contention that the court’s grandparent visitation order was an abuse of discretion. 38 Id. at 598, 529 N.W.2d at 131. 39 See § 43-1802(3). - 802 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports LINDBLAD v. LINDBLAD Cite as 309 Neb. 776