Opinion ID: 2509528
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unit of Prosecution for Robbery

Text: ¶ 33 The majority concludes that the legislature intended the unit of prosecution to encompass both a taking of property and a forcible taking against the will of the person from whom or from whose presence the property is taken, yet it further sets forth its conclusion that multiple counts may not be based on a single taking of property from or from the presence of multiple persons even if each has an interest in the property. Majority at 16 (emphasis added). It is this secondary assertion with which I disagree. ¶ 34 When defendants challenge multiple convictions for violations of a single statute the question to be asked is what `unit of prosecution' has the Legislature intended as the punishable act under the specific criminal statute. State v. Adel, 136 Wash.2d 629, 634, 965 P.2d 1072 (1998) (citing Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955)). To determine the unit of prosecution, we look to the plain language of the statute. State v. Tili, 139 Wash.2d 107, 113, 985 P.2d 365 (1999) (citing Adel, 136 Wash.2d at 635, 965 P.2d 1072). The Washington criminal code sets forth the definition of robbery: A person commits robbery when he unlawfully takes personal property from the person of another or in his presence against his will by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to that person or his property or the person or property of anyone. Such force or fear must be used to obtain or retain possession of the property, or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking; in either of which cases the degree of force is immaterial. Such taking constitutes robbery whenever it appears that, although the taking was fully completed without the knowledge of the person from whom taken, such knowledge was prevented by the use of force or fear. RCW 9A.56.190. RCW 9A.56.200 and .210 then go on to define first and second degree robbery respectively. ¶ 35 As the majority notes, RCW 9A.56.190 establishes the crime of robbery as one which is dual in nature. See majority at 732. That is, the statute criminalizes a robber's taking of property and a robber's use of force against persons. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 8.11, at 437 & n. 3 (1986) (noting that robbery is an offense against both persons and property, however with the modern trend ... to consider [it] as an offense against the person). ¶ 36 Contrary to the majority's conclusion however, RCW 9A.56.190's plain language evidences that the legislature principally intended to criminalize the robber's use or threatened use of force against individuals. [1] See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra, at 437 n. 3; see also 77 C.J.S. Robbery § 2 (1994) (While [robbery] can be characterized as an offense against both person and property, robbery is held to be primarily an offense against the person.). Our legislature unambiguously set forth this intent through its definition of robbery in our criminal code. ¶ 37 First, the statutory composition of our robbery statutes evinces the legislature's codification of this crime as one committed against a person. Notably, RCW 9A.56.190, RCW 9A.56.200 (first degree robbery), and RCW 9A.56.210 (second degree robbery) ignore the type, value, and number of items taken by the robber. Rather, the principal differences between first and second degree robbery are the type of weapon, if any, employed by the robber and whether the robber inflicts bodily injury on his victim. RCW 9A.56.200, .210. This clearly demonstrates the legislature's intent to punish robbers who inflict greater injury and/or pose additional physical threats to victims by brandishing a deadly weapon rather than to punish based on the number and/or value of the items taken by the robber. [2] Nor did the legislature adopt a hybrid analysis, taking into consideration both the type and degree of force used and the value of the property taken. Rather, it was solely concerned with the degree of injury and/or threat of physical violence against the person. [3] See RCW 9A.56.190-.210. ¶ 38 Second, the legislature's use of the phrase, the person of another or in his presence in RCW 9A.56.190 provides further indication of its predominant intent to protect individuals from robbers' use of violence. By stating the person of another or in his presence, the legislature refers to victims in the singular. See People v. Borghesi, 66 P.3d 93, 98 (Colo.2003). This signals with precision the legislature's intent to permit the State to charge robbers with a separate count of robbery for each individual victim against whom a robber uses or threatens force. Other jurisdictions have held similarly. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rozplochi, 385 Pa.Super. 357, 364, 561 A.2d 25 (1989) (defendant could be convicted of two robberies for threatening two people during a single theft because the state statute was written with regard to an individual person being placed in danger ... and that a separate offense is committed for each individual person placed in such danger); see also Jordan v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 590, 595, 347 S.E.2d 152 (1986) (The statute refers to the victim in the singular and suggests that the General Assembly's primary purpose was the protection of an individual from violence and fear of harm during a robbery.). We should likewise recognize this clear indication of legislative intent. See State v. Westling, 145 Wash.2d 607, 610, 40 P.3d 669 (2002) (The meaning of a plain, unambiguous statute must be derived from the language in the statute.). ¶ 39 Here, the plain language in RCW 9A.56.190 unambiguously declares the legislature's intent to permit the State to charge a count of robbery for each victim against whom a defendant uses or threatens force to accomplish the taking of personal property against the victim's will from the victim's person or in his presence. [4] Further, as we have previously held, the taking of personal property under the robbery statute is satisfied when (1) the stolen property was under the victim's possession and control, (2) the victim acts in a representative capacity over the property, or (3) the victim has an ownership interest in the property. Rupe, 101 Wash.2d at 693, 683 P.2d 571; State v. Latham, 35 Wash.App. 862, 865, 670 P.2d 689 (1983) (The deprivation of any ownership interest, including an undivided share, in the property taken, will support a robbery conviction. Also, `[a] taking from one having the care, custody, control, management, or possession of the property is sufficient.' (citation omitted) (quoting 67 AM.JUR.2D Robbery § 14, at 38-39 (1973))). I would thus hold here, in accord with the numerous other jurisdictions that have similarly held, [5] that in the event a defendant takes property by the use of or threat of force from the person or presence of multiple victims against their will, and the victims enjoy a joint ownership, representative, or possessory interest in the stolen property, a defendant may be convicted of counts of robbery equal to the number of victims. ¶ 40 A careful examination of the facts of this case reveals the correctness of this interpretation. Recounting the facts as set forth by the majority: on the morning of September 23, 2000, Tvedt entered an Exxon service station in Pierce County where two people were present, owner Monty Younce and cashier Addie Schaefer.... [Tvedt] quickly went behind the counter [and] pushed a knife blade into Schaefer's stomach. Majority at 730-731 (emphasis added). Tvedt then forced Younce and Schaefer to lie face down on the floor [and][w]hile brandishing the knife, Tvedt demanded money. See id. (emphasis added). Younce, under threat of the knife, instructed him where it was located. Id. Both Younce and Schaefer possessed an ownership, representative, or possessory interest in the property taken. It is clear that both Younce and Schaefer were individually victims of Tvedt's robbery. ¶ 41 Next, two days later, Tvedt walked into a Texaco service station where store manager Jack Shepherd and assistant manager Teresa Piper were behind the counter. Majority at 730-731. Tvedt suddenly drew a knife ... and stuck the knife into Shepherd's left side. Id. at 731 (emphasis added). He then prodded both Shepherd and Piper toward the back storage area, forced them to lie on the floor, and demanded the weekend receipts and Piper, under duress, told Tvedt where the money was located. Id. Both Shepherd and Piper possessed an ownership, representative, or possessory interest in the property taken. Again, both Shepherd and Piper were individually victims of Tvedt's robbery. ¶ 42 The majority's reasoning ignores the common understanding that things get stolen while people get robbed. Younce, Schaefer, Shepherd, and Piper were all victimized by Tvedt when he unlawfully [took] personal property from their person or in their presence, over which they had an ownership, representative, or possessory interest, against [their] will by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to that person. [6] RCW 9A.56.190 (emphasis added). The majority's interpretation erroneously circumscribes the legislature's intent behind the robbery statute in the context of multiple victims and business establishments. The majority seemingly posits that the Texaco and Exxon stations were robbed, not the employees whom worked there and were placed in fear of their lives. I do not agree that this is the crime the legislature defined nor intended, and I thus cannot concur with the majority's resolution of this issue.