Opinion ID: 1709406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: failure to conduct a separate evidentiary hearing and failure to exclude prejudicial evidence from the compensatory phase of the trial

Text: ¶ 21. In pretrial motions, Mariner moved to exclude various types of evidence, including evidence of Mariner's corporate practices, evidence of patterns of care unrelated to Edwards, and errors in the nursing home's documentation that did not affect Edwards. The trial court found these motions vague and reserved judgment on the admissibility of specific evidence until trial. After the jury found in favor of Edwards's estate, the trial court considered the information that had been presented, and ruled that the issue of punitive damages should be presented to the jury. On appeal, Mariner argues that the trial court erred in not excluding prejudicial information during the compensatory phase of the trial and in relying on evidence introduced during the compensatory phase to determine whether consideration of punitive damages was warranted. ¶ 22. When deciding whether to submit the issue of punitive damages to a trier of fact, the trial court looks at the totality of the circumstances, as revealed in the record, to determine if a reasonable, hypothetical trier of fact could find either malice or gross neglect and reckless disregard. Bradfield v. Schwartz, 936 So.2d 931, 936 (Miss.2006) (citing Ross-King-Walker, Inc. v. Henson, 672 So.2d 1188, 1191 (Miss.1996)). The trial court's determination whether a case warrants the consideration of punitive damages will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Doe ex rel. Doe v. Salvation Army, 835 So.2d 76, 81 (Miss.2003)). Evidence which does not pertain to compensating the plaintiff but instead seeks to show the malicious or grossly negligent character of the defendant's actions should not be heard by the jury until liability has been determined. Bradfield, 936 So.2d at 938. Evidence may, of course, be probative of both liability and the assessment of punitive damages. Similarly, evidence may be deemed inadmissible during the compensatory phase of trial but relevant during the evidentiary hearing on punitive damages. In making determinations about the relevance of evidence to the liability of the parties, we are guided by the underlying purpose of bifurcation to prevent issue confusion and to create a barrier between testimony regarding the fundamental issue of liability and the inflammatory issue of egregious conduct. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Williams, 936 So.2d 888, 897 (Miss.2006). ¶ 23. The failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing on punitive damages, where the plaintiff has sought such damages and the jury has awarded compensatory damages, constitutes reversible error. See Bradfield, 936 So.2d at 938. Similarly, the failure to bifurcate a case involving claims for punitive damages may constitute reversible error. Hartford, 936 So.2d at 897. However, the trial court in this case properly conducted an evidentiary hearing after the jury returned a verdict for compensatory damages in favor of Edwards's estate. The trial judge heard the evidence presented during the compensatory damages phase of the trial and determined that consideration of punitive damages was appropriate. Mariner's claim that the trial court failed to conduct a hearing is not supported by the record, and the assignment of error is without merit. ¶ 24. Mariner also argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence relevant only to punitive damages during the compensatory phase of the trial. As noted above, the trial court did not deny Mariner's motions in limine, but directed counsel to raise objections when the specific evidence was presented. During Edwards's case-in-chief, Mariner did object to plaintiff's counsel reading into the record the deposition of Roy Dumas, a regional vice-president of the company. Mariner argued that the introduction of the evidence involved two other cases involving other facilities, and [plaintiff's counsel] is seeking parts of this deposition for some generalized testimony, [and] it's not necessarily applicable to this case. Dumas testified about various aspects of the Mariner corporate structure, including a compensation system that was tied to economic efficiency, his own duties, his focus on the financial condition of the nursing homes rather than the instances of weight loss and pressure sores, and the company's four C's: care, cost, census, and cash, which were supposed to guide their business decisions. As a theory of their case throughout trial proceedings, plaintiff's counsel relied on this testimony and the testimony of Mariner's senior vice president and treasurer, Boyd Gentry, to portray Mariner as a company focused on financial success rather than competent care. ¶ 25. The standard of review regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence is abuse of discretion, and error will not be deemed reversible unless the error adversely affects a substantial right of a party. Whitten, 799 So.2d at 13. Edwards's estate argues that evidence of general corporate practices was necessary to demonstrate that Mariner's budgeting policies caused Edwards's injuries and death. However, Edwards's estate submitted no evidence that would establish a causal connection between the budgeting policies of Mariner and the injuries and death suffered by Edwards. The estate did not show that Greenwood Health was understaffed because of the budgeting policies, nor that Greenwood Health had been denied funding by Mariner. ¶ 26. The information in the depositions of Gentry and Dumas would certainly have been relevant at the punitive phase to establish whether Edwards's treatment was an aberration or consistent with company practice. However, the testimony was not probative to the issues of duty, breach, causation, or injury. Given the use of the testimony at trial to emphasize the bad corporate character of Mariner, we find that admission of the testimony materially prejudiced the defendants. In light of this prejudice, the jury's verdict must be reversed.