Opinion ID: 3046880
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: First A m endm ent right to petition

Text: governm ent A s their final federal claim, Plaintiffs alleged in their second amended complaint that Defendants, in enacting Act 44 in the manner they did, deprived Plaintiffs of their First and Fourteenth Amendment “freedom of speech to lobby their elected state representatives 44 concerning passage of House Bill 1521 before it was enacted into law as A ct 44.” A pp. at 70. Specifically Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants, acting at all times under color of state law, implemented the legislative process used to enact Act 44, as part of a continuing pattern of illegal statutory enactment, thereby depriving Plaintiffs [of] their right to freedom of speech to lobby their elected state representatives concerning passage of House Bill 1521 before it w as enacted into law as Act 44, as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States C onstitution, as more fully described in the preceding paragraphs, all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for which the individual Defendants are individually liable. Id. In the “preceding paragraphs” of the complaint, Plaintiffs further asserted that [t]he truncated legislative process used by the Leaders [of the General Assembly] to enact Act 44, and the early morning hour at which it was triggered, intentionally inhibited P lain tiff s[ ’] ability to receive tim ely information regarding proposed government actions necessary to exercise their First Amendment right of free speech to support or o p p o s e th e S e n a te - H o u s e c o n f e r e n c e committee’s new version of H ouse Bill 1521 45 before it was enacted by the General A ssembly into law. Id. at 56. 8 The district court held that Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert this claim because they alleged only a generalized, abstract grievance shared by all Pennsylvanians. See Common Cause, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 426-30. Plaintiffs reiterate these same arguments on appeal. 9 On appeal, Plaintiffs expand their First Amendment claim to encompass the alleged secret discussion of Act 44 that occurred between officials of the three branches of Pennsylvania’s government, prior to the enactment of that 8 On appeal, Plaintiffs make clear that they are not challenging the late hour at which the General Assembly considered Act 44: “Appellants do not allege that the Petition Clause prevents a state legislature from round the clock legislative sessions or constrains a legislature from enacting law s to times convenient to a citizen’s right to petition government.” Aplt. Br. at 61. 9 Defendant Chief Justice Cappy complains that Plaintiffs, before the district court, alleged only a violation of their First Amendment freedom of speech and to lobby. According to Cappy, it is only in their appellate briefs that Plaintiffs expressly assert the deprivation of their freedom to petition the Government. It appears, however, that the gist of Plaintiffs’ claim before the district court remains the same now on appeal. 46 legislation. Again, Plaintiffs generally cannot create standing through new allegations asserted for the first time on appeal. 1 0 See Storino, 322 F.3d at 297; see also In re M ystic Tank Lines Corp., 544 F.3d at 528. Even considering all of these allegations, however, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they in particular were actually and concretely injured by Defendants’ challenged conduct. Instead, Plaintiffs continue to allege only a general, abstract grievance shared by all Pennsylvanians. 10 For the first time in their appellate reply brief, Plaintiffs allege that, at approximately 10:00 p.m. on July 6, 2005, citizen Plaintiff Potts contacted the executive director of Plaintiff Common C ause to find out if the General Assembly was to consider “anything of note” that night. Aplt. Reply Br. at 32 n.18. If so, Potts intended to “exercise his right to petition.” Id. The executive director of Common Cause “made inquiries within the General Assembly and he was assured nothing of import or surprising would occur that night.” Id. The Common Cause executive director informed Potts, who then “left on vacation.” Id. The General Assembly enacted Act 44 at 2:00 a.m. the follow ing morning. Because Plaintiffs waited until their appellate reply brief to make these allegations, we do not consider them. See United States v. Pellulo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding appellant ordinarily may not raise issue for the first time in a reply brief, absent exceptional circumstances); see also Storino, 322 F.3d at 297. 47 To illustrate this point, Plaintiffs specifically alleged in their complaint that “[t]he Leaders [of the General Assembly] intentionally deprived Plaintiffs, and the entire Pennsylvania electorate, of any notice of the text of H ouse B ill 1521 . . . before it was enacted into law by a legislative process lasting a few hours in the very early morning.” A pp. at 56 (emphasis added). And on appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the Petition Clause . . . must forbid individual sta te actors from intentionally a n d affirmatively orchestrating sophisticated modes of total interference w ith A ppellants’ right to informally petition and communicate with their elected state representatives on any issue of concern, including the Act in this case. The Petition Clause must preserve some small quantum of effective communication between the electorate and the elected from intentional interference by other state actors. To hold otherwise is to condemn a First A m endment right to a mere privilege subject to the whims of political elites; elites who far too often are beyond the electoral reach of those whose rights they have intentionally invaded. Aplt. Br. at 61-62. Because these allegations and arguments are only generalized, ab stract grievances held b y all Pennsylvanians, the district court did not err in concluding 48 Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge their First Amendment claim. Cf. Goode, 539 F.3d at 315, 320-22 (dismissing taxpayers’ right-to-petition claim because their alleged “injuries are no different in nature from the general interest in enforcing compliance with the law which the public shares”). 1 1 IV . C O N C LU SIO N For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue the federal claims they assert in this action. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision dismissing those claims. 11 Appellants’ Request, dated February 5, 2009, for Leave to File Post-Argument Letter Brief is denied. 49