Opinion ID: 5142158
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The First Amendment and Article 40

Text: The First Amendment to the federal Constitution is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment and, in relevant part, enjoins the enactment of laws “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” Its Maryland counterpart, Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, provides “[t]hat the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.” Although the two constitutional provisions are worded differently and this Court has sometimes held out the possibility that Article 40 could be construed differently from the 9 First Amendment in some circumstances, the Court has generally regarded the protections afforded by Article 40 as “coextensive” with those under the First Amendment. Newell v. Runnels, 407 Md. 578, 608 (2009); State v. Brookins, 380 Md. 345, 350 n.2 (2004). Neither party has suggested that the circumstances of this case provide a reason for departing from that general rule, and we see none. Accordingly, our analysis of Clear Channel’s contentions under the First Amendment applies equally to the same issues under Article 40. For convenience, we will refer solely to the First Amendment in discussing the applicable standards in this opinion, but that discussion also encompasses the application of Article 40. 2. Standard for Review of Legislation under the First Amendment In its decision in this case, the Tax Court considered whether it should apply strict scrutiny, also called “heightened scrutiny,” or rational basis scrutiny to the Ordinance, and concluded that rational basis was the appropriate test. The heightened scrutiny standard is well established in the case law for situations in which legislation infringes First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976). The source of a rational basis test in these circumstances is less clear as the judiciary does not have a freestanding general charge to review all legislation for rationality. A rational basis test does apply when a party challenges a classification in legislation under the Equal Protection Clause in circumstances where neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification is involved. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 546-51 (1983). Many cases involving challenges to legislation under the First Amendment have also relied on the Equal Protection Clause, and the courts have applied a rational basis test after 10 concluding that the heightened scrutiny test under the First Amendment was not applicable. Id.; see also Arkansas Writers’ Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227 n.3 (1987) (noting that a publication’s “First Amendment claims are obviously intertwined with interests arising under the Equal Protection Clause”). Although Clear Channel has not explicitly invoked the Equal Protection Clause in its complaint in this case, it is at least implicit in its argument that a tax triggered by the sale of advertising on off-site billboards treats it unequally. Thus, it was not inappropriate for the Tax Court to conclude that it should apply a rational basis test if heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment did not pertain to the matter at hand.8 In any event, there does not appear to be any dispute that, if a rational basis test is applied, the Ordinance passes that test as a revenue raising measure that is clearly within the taxing authority of the City. Thus, the resolution of this case depends on whether the First Amendment’s heightened scrutiny standard is to be applied here and, if so, whether the Ordinance survives that scrutiny. 3. Billboards and Speech There is no dispute that billboards are a platform for speech and that the text or images that appear on billboards are entitled to some First Amendment protection. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (plurality opinion) 8 Clear Channel has contended, without much elaboration, that, if heightened scrutiny does not apply, an intermediate scrutiny test should be applied. However, none of the cases concerning the taxation of speech platforms on which it relies applies such a test and, for the reasons stated later in this opinion, the cases it cites involving intermediate scrutiny do not apply in the circumstances of this case. See footnote 16 below. 11 (“Billboards are a well-established medium of communication, used to convey a broad range of different kinds of messages”); Donnelly Advertising Corp. of Maryland v. City of Baltimore, 279 Md. 660, 667 (1977) (ads on billboards are “entitled to some protection by the First Amendment, whether they be of a commercial, political, or charitable nature”). However, it is also true that billboards “combine communicative and noncommunicative aspects,” the latter of which “the government has legitimate interest in controlling.” Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 502. Because the regulation – or taxation – of the noncommunicative aspects of a medium may “impinge to some degree on the communicative aspects,” it has fallen to the courts to reconcile the exercise of those governmental powers with the protection provided by the First Amendment. Id. 4. Taxation and the First Amendment
Taxation is, of course, essential to the support of government – a certainty sometimes equated to mortality.9 Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the Supreme Court has reiterated that, even in the context of the First Amendment, there is a strong presumption in favor of the validity of tax legislation. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 451 (1991); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547-48 (1983). Nevertheless, the choices that a legislature makes in devising a tax scheme may be a means of penalizing or discouraging speech and thereby violate the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has 9 Benjamin Franklin is said to have coined the phrase “Nothing is certain except death and taxes.” National Constitution Center, Benjamin Franklin’s last great quote and the Constitution (November 13, 2019). 12 grappled in a series of cases with defining when a taxation scheme involving public media may infringe First Amendment rights. See Leathers, supra.; Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). Grosjean In Grosjean, Louisiana imposed a 2% gross receipts tax on the sale of advertising in newspapers, magazines and other publications with a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week. 297 U.S. at 240. Only 13 of the 137 newspapers circulating in Louisiana at that time were subject to the tax. Id. at 241. The publishers of the newspapers subject to the tax brought an action to enjoin it, invoking the First Amendment. In discerning the purpose of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court recounted a brief history of British taxes on newspapers that were effectively “taxes on knowledge” and that acted as a prior restraint on the free press, which the Court lauded as “one of the great interpreters between the government and the people.” Id. at 246-50. The Court observed that the opposition to such laws was not so much an effort to avoid taxation as to “preserve the right of the English people to full information in respect of the doings and misdoings of their government.” Id. at 247. On the other hand, the Court stated that the concern that a particular tax might be motivated to suppress criticism did not relieve newspapers from “ordinary forms of taxation for support of the government.” Id. at 250. In the case before it, the Court found the Louisiana tax to be “suspicious” as the tax was measured, not by the volume of advertising, but solely by the extent of the newspaper’s 13 circulation, with the “plain purpose of penalizing the publishers and curtailing the circulation of a selected group of newspapers.” Id. at 251. Although not explicitly mentioned in the Court’s opinion, it was apparently well known at the time that the proponents of the measure had a retaliatory motive similar to that underlying the English tax legislation described in the Court’s opinion as part of the Framers’ inspiration for the First Amendment.10 Minneapolis Star The Minneapolis Star decision concerned certain amendments to the Minnesota sales and use taxes. Prior to the amendments, periodic publications such as newspapers had been exempt from those taxes. 460 U.S. at 577. As a result of the amendments, the newspapers remained exempt from the sales tax, but ink and paper used in the publications were made subject to the use tax; a provision exempted the first $100,000 of those items consumed by a publication. Id. at 577-78. The end result was that only a small fraction of the newspapers circulating in Minnesota – 14 of 388 newspapers – were subject to the use tax and one publisher accounted for two-thirds of the revenues from the tax. Id. at 578-79. 10 See City of Baltimore v. A.S. Abell Co., 218 Md. 273, 284-85 (1958) (noting that the tax under review in Grosjean was supported by Senator Huey Long as a form of retaliation against publications that had opposed his political agenda); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 579-80 (1983) (quoting a circular distributed by the Louisiana governor and Senator Long characterizing the publications subject to the tax as “lying newspapers” and the Louisiana tax as a “tax on lying”); see also Edward J. Gerald, The Press and the Constitution 1931-1947 at 100-01 (1948). 14 The Supreme Court found that, although newspapers are appropriately subject to general economic regulation, including taxes, this application of the Minnesota sales and use taxes singled out the press for special treatment. 460 U.S. at 582. The Court observed that the use tax on paper and ink did not serve the normal function of a use tax – offsetting the incentive a sales tax creates for purchasing taxable items out-of-state – because the Minnesota tax applied to items (ink and paper) that were exempt from the sales tax. Id. at 582. In addition, and contrary to the “ordinary rule” in Minnesota that only the ultimate retail sale and not intermediate transactions were taxed, this use tax applied to intermediate components even though they would ultimately become part of a publication sold at retail. Id. Moreover, the tax not only singled out the press, but targeted a small subset of the press – those using paper and ink costing in excess of $100,000. The Court rejected Minnesota’s justification for this disparity – that it was favoring smaller businesses – because the state’s tax “resemble[d] more a penalty for a few of the largest newspapers than an attempt to favor struggling smaller enterprises.” Id. at 592. The Court stated that, even if the legislature had no “illicit” intent, “a tax that singles out the press, or that targets individual publications within the press, places a heavy burden on the State to justify its action.” Id. at 592-93. Arkansas Writers’ Project The Arkansas Writers’ Project decision concerned application of a gross receipts tax on the sale of tangible personal property in Arkansas. There were numerous exemptions from the tax, including for: “[g]ross receipts or gross proceeds derived from the sale of newspapers” and “religious, professional, trade and sports journals and/or 15 publications printed and published within this State ... when sold through regular subscriptions.” 481 U.S. at 224. The Court struck down the tax on two grounds. First, as with the sales and use tax in Minneapolis Star, the exemptions from the Arkansas tax meant that the tax effectively targeted a small group of speakers – those magazines not encompassed in the exemptions. Id. at 229. Second, the tax discriminated based on content of a taxpayer’s speech because application of the magazine exemption depended on a review of the subject matter of the publication. Id. As to the latter rationale, the Court stated that it did not matter that the tax was based on the general subject matter of the publication, as opposed to the expression of a particular viewpoint on that subject matter. Id. at 230. Leathers In the Leathers decision, the Supreme Court reprised its prior discussions of the First Amendment in the context of tax laws affecting the media, but distinguished the operation of the tax in question from those that the Court had found to violate the First Amendment in Grosjean, Minneapolis Star, and Arkansas Writers’ Project. The Leathers case arose from an amendment that extended an Arkansas sales tax on sales of personal property and specified services to include the services of cable television operators. Sales of newspapers and magazines remained exempt from the tax, and the amendment did not extend the tax to satellite broadcast television services. 499 U.S. at 441-43. The tax was challenged as violative of the First Amendment. The Court thus addressed the question “whether the First Amendment prevents a State from imposing its sales tax on only selected segments of the media.” Id. at 444. 16 The Court summarized the principles it distilled from its prior decisions: [D]ifferential taxation of First Amendment speakers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens to suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints. Absent a compelling justification, the government may not exercise its taxing power to single out the press. The press plays a unique role as a check on government abuse, and a tax limited to the press raises concerns about censorship of critical information and opinion. A tax is also suspect if it targets a small group of speakers. Again, the fear is censorship of particular ideas or viewpoints. Finally, for reasons that are obvious, a tax will trigger heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment if it discriminates on the basis of the content of taxpayer speech. 499 U.S. at 447 (citations omitted).11 The Court also stressed that the inevitable classifications and distinctions made by legislatures in designing a tax statute are entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality. Id. at 451-52. As to the case before it, the Court observed that the Arkansas tax was generally applicable and did not single out the press; nor was it structured so as to raise suspicions that it was intended to interfere with a cable operator’s First Amendment activities. 449 U.S. at 447-48. In contrast to the operation of the tax and exemption in Arkansas Writers’ Project – which effectively targeted a small group of magazines for the tax and exempted others – the tax at issue in Leathers applied uniformly to all cable systems in the state. Id. Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that the tax did not discriminate on the basis of the content of taxpayer speech. Id. at 449. The Court stressed that the underlying concern of the First Amendment is the potential for censorship of ideas. Thus, “differential taxation 11 Although the Leathers opinion referred to the standard of review in such cases with the phrase “heightened scrutiny,” the Supreme Court later indicated that the standard was equivalent to that meant by the more familiar phrase “strict scrutiny.” See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661 (1994). 17 of speakers, even members of the press, does not implicate the First Amendment unless the tax is directed at, or presents the danger of suppressing, particular ideas.” Id. at 453.12
This Court has considered the constraints that the free speech provisions of the State and federal constitutions place on taxation of media on two occasions. Prior to most of the Supreme Court cases described in the previous section of this opinion, this Court considered a challenge to a Baltimore City ordinance that imposed a sales tax on the sale of advertising in various media, including billboards. City of Baltimore v. A.S. Abell Co., 218 Md. 273 (1958). Several decades later, following all of the Supreme Court decisions described above, this Court applied the principles set forth in those cases to decide whether the exclusion of an advertising circular from the “newspaper exemption” to the State sales tax violated the First Amendment. Maryland Pennysaver Group, Inc. v. Comptroller, 323 Md. 697 (1991). A.S. Abell Co. In A.S. Abell Co., two Baltimore City ordinances imposed a tax on the gross sales of advertising space and time in newspapers, radio and television broadcasts, and billboards. 218 Md. at 278. A regulation under those ordinances exempted most broadcast 12 In the Arkansas state courts, the cable television operators had also contended that the tax, which did not apply to satellite television services, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court left it to the Arkansas Supreme Court to address that issue on remand. 499 U.S. at 453. The state supreme court later held that the different treatment accorded to cable television and satellite television operators under the Arkansas law satisfied the rational basis test and did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Medlock v. Leathers, 842 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Ark. 1992). 18 advertising from the tax – which this Court noted as a possible indication of “discrimination in a constitutional sense against the newspapers.” Id. at 280. The Court engaged in an extended discussion of the Grosjean decision, the leading Supreme Court precedent at that time. Applying that decision to the situation before it, the Court observed that the Baltimore City tax was imposed on only a segment of the advertising industry – primarily newspapers and broadcasters – and “singled out” entities subject to the protection of the First Amendment. Id. at 287-88. The Court held that such a tax violated the free speech rights of the newspapers and broadcasters and effected just as serious a restraint upon First Amendment rights as one with an ulterior retaliatory motive, as apparently had been the case with the tax in Grosjean. Id. at 289. The Court did not classify billboards as equivalent to newspapers and broadcast media and did not reach the question whether a tax on billboard advertising revenue would violate the First Amendment. It assumed, without deciding, that the tax was constitutional as it related to billboard operators. Id. at 289. However, the Court concluded that the City would not have adopted the tax if the tax had applied only to billboard advertising and that therefore the provision concerning billboards was not severable. Id. at 289-90.13 Accordingly, the Court struck down the tax as it related to billboard advertising as well. 13 The Court made a similar assumption as to the constitutionality of the tax as it applied to out-of-state purchasers of advertising and came to a similar conclusion as to severability of that application of the tax. 19 Maryland Pennysaver Several decades later and a few months after the Supreme Court’s decision in Leathers, this Court had occasion to apply that decision in Maryland Pennysaver. That case involved a publication printed on newsprint and referred to as an advertising circular or “pennysaver.” The publication consisted largely of commercial ads purchased by businesses and classified ads purchased by individuals, but also included content labeled “Community News” consisting primarily of announcements of activities such as meetings, fundraisers and social events, as well as some columns on topics of local interest authored by public officials. 323 Md. at 699-700. The publisher sought to have the publication declared exempt from the State sales tax under a regulation known as the “newspaper exemption.” Alternatively, the publisher argued that exclusion of the pennysaver from that exemption would violate the First Amendment. Id. at 701. This Court first determined that the pennysaver did not fall within the newspaper exemption as a matter of statutory and regulatory construction. 323 Md. at 701-11. It then assessed the constitutional question by reviewing the four Supreme Court decisions outlined in the previous section of this opinion and quoting extensively from Leathers. In concluding that application of the sales tax to the pennysaver was constitutional, the Court noted that the sales tax was broad-based, that other publishers with advertising targeted to localities were subject to the tax, and that it was not inappropriate to treat the pennysaver differently from a newspaper in light of the pennysaver’s “overwhelming commercial speech content.” Id. at 714-15. It concluded that there was “no threat to the dissemination of ideas” in treating a pennysaver differently from a newspaper and that there was no 20 infringement of First Amendment rights.14 The Court also held that the exclusion of shopping advertisers from the definition of newspaper in the sales tax regulations was not unconstitutionally vague, at least as applied to the publication before the Court. Id. at 71617.
We discern the following principles from the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court outlined above: ● The potential for censorship or prior restraint by the government was the animating concern of the First Amendment, particularly with respect to “the press” as the interpreter of the activities of the government to its citizens and with respect to a law that was effectively a “tax on knowledge.” However, to demonstrate infringement of First Amendment rights, it is not essential that a party show, or that a court find, that a legislature had an illicit intent in enacting a law that has such an effect. Grosjean; Minneapolis Star; A.S. Abell Co. ● Tax laws are presumed to be valid and constitutional, even in the context of a First Amendment challenge. The First Amendment does not exempt the press, or other speakers, from broad-based taxes. Grosjean; Leathers. ● A tax may not “single out the press” unless there is a compelling reason for doing so. Grosjean; Minneapolis Star; Leathers. 14 Even if the law was considered a restriction on speech in the pennysaver, the Court held that the tax was not a “restriction of constitutional dimension.” 323 Md. at 715. 21 ● A tax that targets a small group of speakers among the press is suspect, particularly when that small group is defined by the content of its publication, even if not by the expression of a particular viewpoint. Grosjean; Minneapolis Star; Arkansas Writers’ Project; Leathers. ● Differential taxation of speakers is particularly suspect under the First Amendment when it discriminates on the basis of the content of speech and targets the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints. Grosjean; Arkansas Writers’ Project; Leathers. C. Whether the Ordinance is Constitutional Applying the principles outlined in the previous section of this opinion, we conclude that the First Amendment does not require heightened scrutiny of the Ordinance and that the Tax Court correctly concluded that the Ordinance is constitutional. First, there is no dispute that the Ordinance is within the taxing power of the City,15 was properly enacted by the Mayor and City Council, and is entitled to the strong presumption of validity accorded to such enactments. As this Court did in Maryland Pennysaver, we look to the framework provided by Leathers. Leathers makes clear that a tax on selected segments of the media, like the tax 15 The City has the “power to tax to the same extent as the State of Maryland has or could exercise said power within the limits of Baltimore City as a part of its general taxing power.” Baltimore City Charter, Article II, §40; Maryland Constitution, Article XI-A; see generally Department of Legislative Services, Maryland Handbook Series, Vol. VI (Maryland Local Government) at 108 (2018) (taxing authority of Baltimore City under State law established in Baltimore City Charter). 22 on billboards here, does not necessarily trigger heightened scrutiny 16 or violate the First Amendment. Instead, differential taxation triggers heightened scrutiny “when it threatens to suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints.” 499 U.S. at 447. The Tax Court made no finding of a retaliatory motive or potential for censorship such as that which inspired the tax law in Grosjean and the record would not support such a finding, if one had been made.17 There is no evidence that the Ordinance, in intent or effect, is designed to censor or exert a prior restraint on the press. Nothing in the legislative history of the 16 Clear Channel argues that even if the Ordinance is not subject to strict scrutiny, it should be subject to intermediate scrutiny, citing Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). Turner concerned a “must carry” regulation of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) that required cable television systems to devote a portion of their channels to local broadcast television stations. In upholding the regulation, the Supreme Court applied an intermediate scrutiny test rather than heightened or strict scrutiny. Although the FCC regulation was content-neutral, it directly concerned what speech would appear on the cable stations, unlike the excise tax at issue in this case. Likewise, the intermediate scrutiny applicable to commercial speech under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) has no application here. Central Hudson concerned a state regulation that directly regulated commercial speech – it prohibited advertising by utilities that promoted the use of electricity. Accordingly, the four-part test created by that decision was addressed to how a regulation restricts content. Even if an intermediate standard were to be applied, the Ordinance would satisfy that standard. Cf. Donnelly Advertising Corp. of Maryland v. City of Baltimore, 279 Md. 660, 668-70 (1977) (applying intermediate scrutiny and rational basis tests in holding that ordinance requiring removal of all off-premises signs in urban renewal district did not violate First or Fourteenth Amendments). 17 Clear Channel suggests that an owner of a site leased for a billboard may be wary of messages critical of local officials and that, some years ago, City officials might have been unhappy about a billboard advertisement purchased by a public employees’ union that was critical of the City government at that time. Neither conjecture was linked to the Ordinance. 23 Ordinance suggests such an intent and, as outlined below, the tax imposed by the Ordinance has no relation to the content of the ads that might be displayed on Clear Channel’s billboards. The Ordinance does not regulate the size of a billboard, where it can be located, what it can say or who can say whatever it says. In the absence of a finding that the Ordinance was designed to suppress the expression of ideas or viewpoints, we consider the criteria identified in Leathers that may require heightened scrutiny: (1) whether the Ordinance “singles out the press”; (2) whether it “targets a small group of speakers”; and (3) whether it “discriminates on the basis of the content of taxpayer speech.” 499 U.S. at 447. Although Clear Channel primarily focused on the second Leathers criterion in the Tax Court and in its petition for certiorari in this case,18 it has asserted in brief and argument that all three apply. Accordingly, we shall address all three. 1. Whether the Ordinance Singles Out the Press Although Clear Channel does not primarily urge a heightened scrutiny standard based on a theory that the Ordinance singles out the press, it does assert that off-site billboards are part of “the press.” This seems a bit of a stretch. The First Amendment 18 In its petition for a writ of certiorari, Clear Channel posed the following two questions: 1 – Is the operation of billboards protected by the First Amendment, thereby subjecting its taxation to heightened scrutiny? 2 – Does the Tax single out a single platform for speech or a small group of speakers, thereby subjecting it to heightened scrutiny? 24 decisions invalidating taxes on which Clear Channel relies – Grosjean, Minneapolis Star, Arkansas Writers’ Project, and A.S. Abell Co. – all singled out newspapers, broadcasters, magazines, and other topical periodicals for special treatment – the sort of media that, in the words of the Grosjean decision, act as “interpreters of the government” to its citizens and that report on the “doings and misdoings” of government. Nevertheless, as methods of expression change, the First Amendment principles that protect speech adapt. For example, the Supreme Court noted that, upon the rise of cable television during the latter half of the 20th century, a cable television operator “partakes of some of the aspects of speech and the communication of ideas as do the traditional enterprises of newspaper and book publishers, public speakers, and pamphleteers.” City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986). As a result, a cable television operator is thus “engaged in ‘speech’ under the First Amendment, and is, in much of its operation, part of the ‘press.’” Leathers, 499 U.S. at 444.19 Billboards have long displayed messages other than commercial advertising and the development of digital billboards creates the opportunity for a single billboard to display a greater number and variety of messages. Even so, the billboards subject to the Ordinance are more akin to the advertising circular in Maryland Pennysaver which, although it devoted some space to editorial 19 This Court has similarly recognized that freedom of the press is not necessarily limited to traditional media when the communication involves “such free and general discussion of public matters as seems essential to prepare people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.” Howard Sports Daily v. Weller, 179 Md. 355, 361 (1941). 25 content, was primarily a medium for advertising. While Clear Channel exercises some discretion in deciding how to allocate the scarce space on its billboards to its best advantage, it does not claim to be a newsgathering organization that curates what it disseminates according to journalistic principles. It is more accurately described as a commercial advertising vehicle that dabbles in non-commercial content, paid and unpaid. The fact that a billboard may function on occasion or in some measure like the traditional “press” does not make it equivalent to a newspaper or broadcaster for purposes of the First Amendment. Unlike traditional media that fall within the rubric of “the press,” billboards could be limited or banned entirely – as Baltimore City has done prospectively – under the land use laws for esthetic and safety reasons without offending the First Amendment.20 See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512, 541, 55961, 570 (1981); Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269, 1272 (4th Cir. 1986). Clear Channel’s billboards thus may qualify as a medium that in some small aspect functions similarly to what is traditionally referred to as “the press.” However, even from that perspective, the Ordinance can hardly be said to “single out” the press. A tax singles out the press when some aspect of it indicates “a purposeful attempt to interfere with First Amendment activities” or it “is structured so as to raise suspicions that it was intended to 20 A billboard operator may be of two minds about this. While such regulation could portend the demise of the operator’s business, it also – as in the case of Clear Channel’s Baltimore City billboard business – erects a barrier to entry that fortifies the market power of a dominant incumbent operator. 26 do so.” Leathers, 499 U.S. at 448. The tax in Grosjean singled out widely circulated newspapers and had the “direct tendency” to “restrict circulation.” 297 U.S. at 244-45. The Supreme Court found this effect similar to the early English “taxes on knowledge” that curtailed the circulation of newspapers and thus “the opportunity for, the acquisition of knowledge by the people in respect of … the doings or misdoings of their government” that the framers of the First Amendment had in mind. Id. at 247. The key in Grosjean was not simply that the tax was assessed on an element of the press, but that it singled out those that most acted as government watchdogs. Similarly, the tax in Minneapolis Star “single[d] out the press for a different method of taxation” under the otherwise broad-based use tax by taxing components of newspaper production (ink and paper) for the largest newspapers in the state and thus had the effect of “a penalty for a few of the largest newspapers.” 460 U.S. at 578. By contrast, the Ordinance in this case taxes all operators of off-site billboards in the City who sell advertising on those billboards and has no direct or indirect effect on the extent of the circulation of billboards. The fact that it applies only to billboards, without more, is insufficient to deem it a tax that “singles out” the press. As in Leathers, there is no indication that the City has taxed billboard operators to interfere with First Amendment activities or that the tax is structured to raise suspicion that it was intended to do so. 2. Whether the Ordinance Targets a Small Group of Speakers To determine whether the Ordinance targets a small group of speakers, one must first decide how to define the appropriate reference group. “Small,” of course, is a word of comparison. If the relevant universe is defined as all entities subject to a tax, then the 27 tax is universal. If the relevant reference group is defined to include many besides those subject to the tax, then the taxed group is by comparison “small.” Unsurprisingly, the parties choose different reference groups to assess this question. Clear Channel argues that the Ordinance targets a small group of speakers because it applies to 760 billboards controlled by four entities, but not the many other outdoor commercial signs in the City or the many other businesses in the City. The City limits its comparison to off-site billboards. It is instructive to consider the taxes in Grosjean, Minneapolis Star, and Arkansas Writers’ Project, the groups of speakers affected by those taxes, and the benchmark group referenced in each of those cases by the Supreme Court. As indicated in Leathers, the design of the taxes in each of those cases affected a smaller group within a larger universe of similar members of the same media. The tax in Grosjean singled out higher circulation newspapers but left many more newspapers with lower circulation untaxed. The tax in Minneapolis Star fell on newspapers that consumed more paper and ink – which presumably correlated to higher circulation – but left the many more newspapers that consumed less of those components untaxed. As the Court observed in Leathers, both of those taxes “selected a narrow group to bear fully the burden of the tax.” 499 U.S. at 449. Similarly, the tax in Arkansas Writers’ Project exempted newspapers and numerous categories of magazines and left only a few magazines subject to the tax, which “operated in much the same way as did the … exemption in Minneapolis Star.” Id. at 446. Given that the test is whether a law “targets” a small group of “speakers,” implying that there are other speakers who are not targeted, the appropriate reference group should 28 include similarly-situated members of the same medium. Thus, the principle drawn from these cases is that a tax targets a small group of speakers when it distinguishes among members within related types of media, not simply when it applies to a specific form of media. It is over-inclusive to group off-premises billboards with all other commercial signs for purposes of this analysis. Billboards have characteristics as a medium that can warrant separate treatment from other signs. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 509 (“We [] hesitate to disagree with the accumulated, common-sense judgments of local lawmakers and of the many reviewing courts that billboards are real and substantial hazards to traffic safety.”). Moreover, to hold that any tax on a particular form of media – or group of entities that could be characterized as “speakers” – automatically qualifies as targeting a small group of speakers would inject the First Amendment as a new uniformity requirement for tax legislation that would encumber a legislature’s legitimate and important ability to tax.21 The Ordinance applies to all off-site billboards in the City for which the operator charges customers for displaying the customer’s advertising. It does not distinguish among billboards according to any other factor, such as the duration or extent of speech (e.g., the circulation of a newspaper) or its subject matter. The fact that there are only four taxpayers 21 See Herman v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 189 Md. 191, 197 (1947) (“The State … may impose different taxes upon different trades and professions and may vary the rates of excise upon various products. In levying such taxes, the State is not required to resort to close distinction or to maintain a precise, scientific uniformity with respect to composition, use, or value. To hold otherwise would be to subject the essential taxing power of the State to an intolerable supervision, hostile to the basic principles of our government.”). 29 affected by the Ordinance is due largely to market conditions, not the structure of the Ordinance. As noted above, the City banned the construction of new billboards 20 years ago, which has effectively barred new entrants from challenging Clear Channel’s near monopoly of the medium. In our view, the Ordinance does not trigger heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment by targeting a small group of speakers. 3. Whether the Ordinance Discriminates Based on Content As noted earlier, the tax imposed by the Ordinance does not depend on what messages are displayed on a billboard, who a message is attributed to, or how long any particular message is displayed. Unlike the tax in Arkansas Writers’ Project, even the general content of the message does not matter. What matters is whether Clear Channel charges the person or entity responsible for the message to display it on the billboard. If Clear Channel devoted a billboard entirely to its own message or to a message of someone else without charge, no tax would be levied under the Ordinance, regardless of the substance of the message. It is the commercial transaction, not the content of the message, that triggers the tax. Clear Channel argues that the Ordinance discriminates on the basis of the content of taxpayer speech because it applies only to off-premises billboards, and one must read a billboard in order to determine whether it qualifies as an off-premises or on-premises sign. It cites the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015), which held that content-based restrictions on speech in signs could manifest both 30 in obvious ways, such as by relating to the subject matter of a sign, and in more subtle ways, such as by relating to a sign’s function or purpose. The decision in Reed did not hold that an on-premises/off-premises distinction – a common distinction made in the regulation of billboards – was a content-based regulation that would trigger heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment. The sign regulation at issue in Reed was content-based on its face for other reasons. 576 U.S. at 164. Notably, while all nine justices joined in the judgment in that case, there were four separate opinions filed in the case. Of the six justices who joined the primary opinion in the case, three also