Opinion ID: 1232597
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disclosure Substantially Chills First Amendment Rights

Text: ¶ 158 The majority relies upon the test expounded upon in NAACP, decided in 1958, and Buckley to determine whether Rongstad made a factual showing that disclosure would chill First Amendment rights. Factually, however, the present case is very different from NAACP, Buckley, and any of the other cases the majority cites. Unlike the cases cited by the majority, this case concerns a public official's attempt to obtain confidential membership information in the course of a defamation claim for the purpose of adding those anonymous members as defendants in the lawsuit. This distinction matters because the amount of time and money required for private individuals to defend against a defamation claim should be recognized as sufficient to establish an objective, substantial chill upon First Amendment rights. See Torgerson, 210 Wis.2d at 538-39 n. 14, 563 N.W.2d 472 (The threat of being put to the defense of a lawsuit brought by a popular public official may be as chilling to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as fear of the outcome of the lawsuit itself) (quoting Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (C.A.D.C.1967)). ¶ 159 Since the Supreme Court decided NAACP and Buckley, legislatures, courts, and commentators have come to appreciate just how much lawsuits like this one chill First Amendment rights. Lassa's defamation suit against Rongstad fits within the classic prototype of a SLAPP suit (a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation). Kathleen L. Daerr-Bannon, Cause of Action: Bringing and Defending Anti-SLAPP Motions to Strike or Dismiss, 22 Causes of Action 2d 317, 323 (2003) (noting that libel and slander are among the most common claims alleged in SLAPP complaints). SLAPP suits are fashioned as traditional lawsuits for tortious misconduct but are in actuality thinly disguised efforts to abuse the litigation process in order to silence citizen discussions on issues affecting the public well-being. Id. at 322. The purpose of the SLAPP . . . is distinctly not to succeed on the merits, but to so intimidate the private citizen (or even the government official) that citizen activity ceases because the expense, risk and anxiety engendered by the process of litigating a SLAPP is too great. Id.; accord In re Discipline of Attorney, 442 Mass. 660, 815 N.E.2d 1072, 1074 n. 2 (2004); Dickens v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 117 Cal.App.4th 705, 713, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 877, 882 (2004). ¶ 160 Since the State of Washington enacted the first statute imposing procedural hurdles upon SLAPP suits in 1989, [9] at least 19 states have enacted legislation to discourage SLAPP suits (anti-SLAPP statutes). See Daerr-Bannon, supra, at 341-43 (listing 19 states); California Anti-SLAPP Project, http://www.casp.net/menstate.html (last updated Feb. 6, 2006) (listing 24 states). In addition, as of February 2006 anti-SLAPP legislation was pending in 10 states. California Anti-SLAPP Project, http://www.casp.net/menstate.html (last updated Feb. 6, 2006). ¶ 161 Until this case, the term SLAPP suit had been relatively unheard of in Wisconsin jurisprudence. [10] Mention of a SLAPP suit is made in only one Wisconsin case. See Vultaggio v. Yasko, 215 Wis.2d 326, 359, 572 N.W.2d 450 (1998) (Bradley, J., dissenting). In Vultaggio Justice Bradley recognized that [r]egardless of whether such suits are legitimate grievances or SLAPP suits (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) the possibility of a multi-million dollar lawsuit may chill democratic participation .... Vultaggio, 215 Wis.2d at 359, 572 N.W.2d 450 (Bradley, J., dissenting). I believe that the present suit substantially chills First Amendment rights of speech and association and that the majority seriously errs by refusing to balance the competing interests to determine whether the circuit court should have compelled Rongstad to disclose the membership of the Alliance. Cf. Major v. Silna, 134 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1490-91, 36 Cal. Rptr.3d 875, 878 (2005) (noting the anti-SLAPP law has been applied to actions arising from political literature discussing the qualifications of candidates during elections.). ¶ 162 Use of discovery to obtain confidential information pertaining to the membership of the Alliance, and the majority's response, demonstrate the need for legislation to prevent parties from manipulating the legal system to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights. The legislature should consider the experience of other states that have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes and consider adopting legislation modeled upon the anti-SLAPP statutes in states like California, Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 425.16 (West 2005), and Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231, § 59H (West 2005). The potential for the strategic abuse of legal process is real. As one court put it: SLAPP suits function by forcing the target into the judicial arena where the SLAPP filer foists upon the target the expenses of a defense. . . . The purpose of such gamesmanship ranges from simple retribution for past activism to discouraging future activism. Needless to say, an ultimate disposition in favor of the target often amounts merely to a pyrrhic victory. Those who lack the financial resources and emotional stamina to play out the game face the difficult choice of defaulting despite meritorious defenses or being brought to their knees to settle. The ripple effect of such suits in our society is enormous. Persons who have been outspoken on issues of public importance targeted in such suits or who have witnessed such suits will often choose in the future to stay silent. Short of a gun to the head, a greater threat to First Amendment expression can scarcely be imagined. Gordon v. Marrone, 155 Misc.2d 726, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1992).