Opinion ID: 3013834
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: opportunity to comment on their

Text: accuracy. We now turn to the defendant’s objection that she was Failure to give notice entitled to notice that the departure which realistically prevents a defendant would be affected by the court’s doubts from presenting evidence on a disputed as to the truthfulness of her testimony at point may, in some circumstances, affect the Ogden trial. substantial rights and require resentencing. See United States v. Himler, The Sentencing Guidelines 355 F.3d 735 (3d Cir. 2004). However, require the court to provide the parties in United States v. Reynoso, 254 F.3d with an adequate opportunity to present 467, 475 (3d Cir. 2001), the court information when a sentencing factor is concluded that although Fed. R. Crim. P. reasonably in dispute. See U.S.S.G. § 32 had been violated, the error was 6A1.3(a). In United States v. Burns, 501 harmless because even if notice had been U.S. 129 (1991), the Supreme Court held given there was nothing that defense that Fed. R. Crim P. 32 requires counsel would have done differently at “reasonable notice” to parties before a the sentencing hearing. district court considers an upward departure on a ground not identified in Similarly, United States v. the pre-sentence report or in a pre- Nappi, 243 F.2d 758, 770 (3d Cir. 2001), hearing submission. determined that failure to provide notice 5 was not plain error unless the defendant by the defendant’s conduct, and did so would have done something by way of sua sponte and without any notice to the argument or proof that probably would parties. On appeal, Himler asserted that have affected the outcome. See also if a warning had been given, he would United States v. Rivera, 192 F.3d 81 (2d have subpoenaed certain financial Cir. 1999). records bearing on the financial security of the victims, investigated factors There is a paucity of cases underlying the sale of property which citing a lack of notice to challenge a had a connection with the charged fraud, limited downward adjustment; in most as well as invoked Guidelines provisions cases citing lack of notice, the issue was that disfavored enhancement in the a “surprise” upward adjustment or failure circumstances. Based on the assertion to grant any downward departure that such specific measures would have whatsoever. In United States v. Patrick, been employed had notice been given, 988 F.2d 641, 648 (6 th Cir. 1993), the we concluded that re-sentencing was sentencing judge relied on the testimony required. Himler, 355 F.3d at 743. It is and bearing of a co-defendant at his plea worth noting that the specific avenues of hearing to justify a sentence defense foreclosed by lack of notice in enhancement for defendant Patrick that case were quite different from the because of his leadership role. The circumstances in Patrick. Court of Appeals concluded that advance comment on the co-defendant’s IV. testimony would not have provided Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h) Patrick with any additional incentive or speaks to a “departure from the ability to challenge its accuracy. “To the applicable sentencing range” when no extent that the sentencing judge relied on notice was given either in the pre- a comparison of the demeanors of the sentence report or a submission by a two defendants, that evidence was party. In this case notice was given essentially irrebuttable.” Had the through the government’s motion under sentencing judge earlier notified Patrick 5K1.1 for a reduction of sentence and that his “bearing, as compared to that of therefore, by its terms, the Rule does not his co-defendant, was that of a leader, it apply. is difficult to see what evidence or arguments such a disclosure would have Moreover, Rule 32(h) does prompted Patrick to offer.” Patrick, 988 not limit a court’s discretion as to the F.2d at 648. extent of a downward departure it may apply. See United States v. King, 53 F.3d By comparison, in United at 591 (noting that the extent of a States v. Himler, the sentencing court departure is a “non-mechanical process,” based an upward departure on the by which a sentencing court must give economic impact on the victims caused 6 “appropriate weight to the government’s Berzon, 941 F.2d 8 (1 st Cir. 1991). Here assessment and recommendation, [but it was the testimony of the defendant still] consider all other factors relevant to herself that was under scrutiny. this inquiry.”) Defendant was fully aware of what she