Opinion ID: 2061056
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Second The issue of Fern's contribution.

Text: However, the May 9 amended judgment did refer by docket number to the actions of the Louries and Tappers and it made the first valid judgment for Fern's against Mrs. Whitten and Coca-Cola on their cross-claims. So Mrs. Whitten's appeal of June 9 was in time to keep alive the issue of contribution as to Louries and Tappers and Mrs. Packard. It will be recalled that Defendant Fern's received a judgment against all three Plaintiffs and none of the Plaintiffs appealed. The precise issue here presented to us is this: After a jury's determination that Fern's was guilty of no causal negligence toward the three Plaintiffsa determination which is final as far as the three Plaintiffs are concernedcan the other two Defendants-Cross-claimants present this identical issue on appeal? The right of one joint tort-feasor to contribution from another is a derivative right based upon a final determination that negligence of the cross-claim defendant contributed to the plaintiff's injury. C & L Rural Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Kincaid, 221 Ark. 450, 256 S.W.2d 337 (1953); Troutman v. Modlin (8th Cir. 1965) 353 F.2d 382. This determination may be made by a judgment in favor of the injured party or, when the injured party has not included the cross-claim defendant in his action, by a finding of concurring negligence which would have entitled the injured party to such a judgment if he had sought one. Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Company, 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721, 92 A.L.R. 680 (1934). In the present case the injured parties had sought to prove causal negligence against Fern's and had failed. Does the Plaintiffs' failure to appeal determine the issue finally against the Defendants? We hold that it does not. In Hobbs v. Hurley (infra and later discussed), the injured party, in a previous action, had alleged that four persons had jointly contributed to his injury but the jury had found only Hobbs and Hurley liable. There had been no appeal. Hurley, when later sued for contribution sought to reduce his proportion of contribution by showing that the other two had also contributed to the injury. The Court held that the rights of the parties had been fixed by the original judgment which could not later be attacked collaterally. A different situation exists here under our present Civil Rules. M.R.C.P. Rules 13 and 14, permitting cross-claims and third party practice, make possible the simultaneous consideration of the rights of all concerned parties thus avoiding the necessity of a second separate action such as that with which Hobbs v. Hurley was concerned. Here, all eight parties had interests in the determination of the issue of Fern's causal negligence and also in its review on appeal. The inaction of the three Plaintiffs cannot equitably control the appeal rights of the Defendants-Cross-claimants. Although Mrs. Whitten's and Coca-Cola's rights of action are derived from the Plaintiffs, they have independent rights of appeal. The appeals of Mrs. Whitten and Coca-Cola have preserved this issue for our examination on appeal, but only so far as it concerns contribution.