Opinion ID: 2077350
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Error in Death-Eligibility Verdict Forms

Text: Defendant was found death eligible based on two statutory aggravating factors: (1) murder in the course of another felony (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1996)); and (2) murder of two or more individuals (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1996)). Defendant contends that the verdicts returned by the jury on these two factors were legally insufficient because they omitted the mental state necessary to support a finding of death eligibility. The felony-murder aggravating factor requires, as an element of death eligibility, that the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(b) (West 1994). Similarly, the multiple-murder aggravating factor provides for death eligibility where, inter alia, the deaths were the result of either an intent to kill more than one person or of separate acts which the defendant knew would cause death or create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1994). In the case at bar, the eligibility verdict forms returned by the jury omitted the necessary finding regarding defendant's mental state. The felony-murder verdict states: We the jury unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Maynard McCallister, Jr., is eligible for a death sentence under the law. We unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant was 18 years or older at the time of the murders for which he was convicted in this case; and (2) the following statutory aggravating factor exists: The murdered person(s) was killed in the course of another felony, Armed Robbery. The multiple-murder eligibility verdict is identical, except that the last line reads: The defendant has been convicted of killing two or more persons. Defendant maintains that, pursuant to People v. Mack, 167 Ill.2d 525, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437 (1995), these verdict forms were legally insufficient. As a result, according to defendant, there has been no finding that defendant is eligible for the death penalty under Illinois law. Defendant concedes that no objection was made to the verdict forms at trial. Defendant argues, however, that the use of the defective verdict forms constituted plain error and that, in addition, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the verdict forms. We agree that pursuant to Mack and its progeny (see, e.g., People v. Buss, 187 Ill.2d 144, 223-25, 240 Ill.Dec. 520, 718 N.E.2d 1 (1999); People v. Macri, 185 Ill.2d 1, 58, 235 Ill.Dec. 589, 705 N.E.2d 772 (1998); People v. Jackson, 182 Ill.2d 30, 68, 230 Ill.Dec. 901, 695 N.E.2d 391 (1998)), the death eligibility verdicts were deficient. We do not believe, however, that under the facts of this case, the use of the forms constituted plain error or that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to those forms. In Mack, the defendant was convicted of murder in a bench trial. The sentencing hearing was conducted before a jury. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the jury returned a felony-murder eligibility verdict that omitted the required mens rea. Examining the validity of the jury's eligibility verdict, we noted the critical importance of the mental state finding to establishing a valid death-eligibility verdict. Mack, 167 Ill.2d at 533, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437. We also noted that the process of interpreting a jury's verdict should not become a speculative attempt to reconstruct the jury's deliberations and divine its unexpressed conclusions. Mack, 167 Ill.2d at 536-37, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437. Because the jury in Mack never expressed a conclusion as to whether the defendant possessed the required mental state, the eligibility verdict was legally insufficient. Mack, 167 Ill.2d at 538, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437. We further noted, in Mack, the unavailability of harmless error analysis to cure the eligibility verdict ( Mack, 167 Ill.2d at 539, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437). Subsequent cases have established the inappropriateness, under the due process clause, of this court independently making a determination that a defendant is death eligible. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill.2d 301, 344, 239 Ill.Dec. 311, 713 N.E.2d 1161 (1998) (under the Illinois death penalty statute, if a defendant elects to have a jury perform the sentencing function, the defendant has a protected liberty interest in having the jury determine death eligibility); People v. West, 187 Ill.2d 418, 445-46, 241 Ill.Dec. 535, 719 N.E.2d 664 (1999) (same). In the case at bar, unlike in Mack, the same jury which found defendant death eligible also heard the guilt-innocence phase of defendant's trial. And, at the conclusion of the guilt-innocence phase, the jury returned verdicts finding defendant guilty of the intentional or knowing murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1996)) of Stanley Williams, Ernestine McCoy and Orlando McCoy. Thus, the principal concerns animating our decision in Mack are not present in the case at bar. We need not speculate as to whether the jury found that defendant acted with the requisite mens rea because the jury did, in fact, make that determination at the guilt-innocence phase of trial. Nor do we need to substitute our judgment for that of the jury to find the defendant death eligible because, again, the jury made the requisite finding regarding defendant's mens rea. Consequently, although the omission of the mental state from the eligibility verdicts was error, we cannot say that the omission was so fundamental a defect that it amounted to plain error. People v. Childress, 158 Ill.2d 275, 198 Ill.Dec. 794, 633 N.E.2d 635 (1994) (omission of mental state from felony-murder eligibility verdict not reversible error where same jury returned finding at guilt phase that defendant was guilty of knowing or intentional murder). Defendant argues, however, that under the eighth amendment and the Illinois death penalty statute, capital defendants are entitled to have the jury make the necessary findings to support death eligibility at the sentencing hearing, regardless of what findings are made at trial. Otherwise, defendant argues, eligibility hearings would be rendered meaningless and unnecessary in many cases. For example, according to defendant, no eligibility hearing would be necessary for a defendant convicted at trial of the intentional or knowing murder of more than one person, because those trial findings are all that are needed to establish death eligibility under the multiple-murder aggravating factor (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1994)). The Illinois death penalty statute requires eligibility hearings in every capital case. We do not hold, in this case, that eligibility hearings are ever unnecessary. Instead, our holding is simply that, in this case, because the same jury heard both the guilt-innocence phase and sentencing phase of trial, and because that jury returned an unequivocal finding of the requisite mens rea at the guilt-innocence phase of trial, the omission of that mens rea from the eligibility verdict is not so fundamental a defect that it constitutes plain error. We also hold that, because the jury did, in fact, find the necessary mental state to sustain defendant's death eligibility, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the eligibility hearing would have been different had trial counsel objected to the verdict forms. Accordingly, we hold that trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the eligibility verdict forms.