Opinion ID: 1123296
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: judgment supported by the evidence.

Text: One of the main contentions of appellants is that the findings of the trial court and its judgment are not sustained by the evidence. It is admitted that there is conflict therein, so that we are confronted with the well-known rule that it is for the trial court to resolve that conflict and that we do not interfere. However, the value of the property involved in this case is not inconsiderable. And we shall consider the case in some detail in the light of the foregoing rule. We shall, however, do that in our own way and shall not attempt to answer all the various arguments and various conclusions arrived at by the counsel for the appellants. Rosemary Dixon testified in part as follows: She discussed the purchase of the Murray Ranch with Alvy Dixon before it was actually bought. She knew of the negotiations which were carried on in connection therewith. Alvy Dixon stated to her sometime in November, 1940 that: We are going to buy the Murray Ranch and we will buy it together. The witness did not think that the land should be bought because we didn't have the amount of money to pay for it in cash and I didn't like the idea of taking on other lands. But Alvy Dixon was very anxious to acquire the ranch and stated: I think we can build it up. The deceased was very seriously ill in the hospital at Laramie, Wyoming commencing with April 12, 1941 but he began to recover about the middle of June, 1941. The witness talked to Mr. McConnell about signing the mortgage. She objected thereto. I understood that I was to be a party of the purchase, a part of the owner of the Murray Ranch. Mr. Dixon had made me believe that we were buying the ranch together, and    when I asked Mr. McConnell if my name was on the deed, Mr. McConnell said, `no, the deed was made to Alvy Dixon.' She was sent for at one time to come to Laramie. She talked to Mr. McConnell. He wanted the witness to sign the mortgage. I asked Mr. McConnell how the deed was to be made, and he said it was to be made to Alvy Dixon, and I told Mr. McConnell that was not my understanding of it, and I wouldn't sign the mortgage. The witness then called Dr. Story and asked him what the condition of Alvy Dixon was. The doctor informed her that he was alright and able to transact business. She then called a taxi and she and Mr. McConnell went to the hospital to Mr. Dixon's room. Mr. McConnell had the mortgage in his possession and then she and Alvy Dixon signed it. That, she said, was on June 27, 1941. Q Did you talk with Mr. Dixon? A I asked Mr. Dixon how the deed was to be made. Q What did he say? A `To you and I.' Q Who else was in the room at the time? A Mr. McConnell and I. Q What was done? A I signed the paper. Mr. Dixon signed the paper first, and I signed. Q Now why did you sign the mortgage? A I signed the mortgage because I expected an interest in this Murray Ranch. Q And were you assured that you would get an interest in it? A Indeed. Q By whom? A By the  by Mr. Dixon, in his expression of `we bought the ranch together', and by Mr. Dixon's expression, `the deed is to be made to you and I.' Q Now your objection to signing the mortgage was because you wanted an interest in the ranch? A Yes, indeed. The witness Bryan White, a defendant and appellant herein, testified that sometime about February, 1943, when he obtained a lease to the property herein involved, Alvy Dixon told him that he had given all the rest of the children fairly sizeable considerations and that he and Rosemary had bought the Murray Ranch so that it could not be touched by the rest of the children. The witness Mrs. C.C. Curzon who had been nursing Alvy Dixon testified that Mrs. Dixon was at the hospital about June 27, 1941 and that she, at Mrs. Dixon's request, brought a pen and ink to the room with which to write. This testimony was introduced to corroborate Mrs. Dixon that she and Alvy Dixon signed the mortgage at the hospital at the same time. She also testified that months afterwards, perhaps in 1943 when the lease of Bryan White came in question, that Alvy Dixon asked her whether or not Rosemary Dixon was trying to sell her interest supposedly in the Murray Ranch. G.R. McConnell, an attorney at law and legal advisor of Alvy Dixon testified in part as follows: The transaction in connection with the purchase of the property was not completed until the latter part of June and the early part of July, 1941 because of the fact that Alvy Dixon was seriously ill in a hospital from April 12 until the early part of July, 1941 and he was not permitted to see Alvy Dixon until June 27, 1941. The money for the Murray Ranch was all paid by Alvy Dixon and he executed the mortgage for the payment of the balance due on the purchase price on or about June 27, 1941, at which time he also made a check for the cash payment of $13,500. That was done in the presence of Arch LaBeau. Neither Rosemary Dixon nor Mrs. Curzon were present at that time. The deceased at no time stated that Mrs. Dixon's name was to be inserted in the deed, nor did he ever authorize the witness to insert her name therein. The original owners of the land insisted that Mrs. Dixon should sign the mortgage. The witness took the position that that was not necessary. But, in view of the fact that the owners insisted, he asked Mrs. Dixon numerous times to sign the mortgage but she constantly refused to do so unless her name was inserted in the deed. The witness had drawn the will of Alvy Dixon in which Mrs. Dixon was left one-fourth of the property of the deceased and he finally figured that it would not make any difference if Mrs. Dixon's name was inserted in the deed, not realizing that (under Peters vs. Dona, 49 Wyo. 306, 54 P.2d 817) an estate by the entirety would be created if the deed were made to husband and wife jointly. So, upon the insistence of Mrs. Dixon, he finally caused her name to be inserted in the deed on or about the 5th or 7th of July, 1941, and after that was done and he had told Mrs. Dixon, she then signed the mortgage. The witness never had occasion to tell Alvy Dixon that her name was inserted in the deed. In fact, he was afraid to tell him when the thing was first done because of his health, fearing that it might result in Alvy Dixon's death. Nor did Alvy Dixon ever see the deed. After it had been filed of record, it was returned to his office and has been there ever since that time. A.H. LaBeau corroborated the witness McConnell in reference to the signing of the mortgage by the deceased on or about June 27, 1941 and that no one except Alvy Dixon, McConnell and himself were present at that time. The original mortgage in question is in the record before us. It is signed by Alvy Dixon and Rosemary Dixon. It is witnessed by G.R. McConnell and A.H. LaBeau. It purports to be acknowledged before G.R. McConnell as Notary Public as of June 27, 1941 by both Alvy Dixon and Rosemary Dixon. The testimony of Mrs. Dixon and Mr. McConnell is contradictory and cannot be reconciled. The court was bound to reject the testimony of either one or the other. Counsel for appellants argue that the testimony of Mrs. Dixon should be accepted as representing the actual facts in this case. One reason given by them for not accepting the testimony of Mr. McConnell is that he admits in his testimony that he took the acknowledgement of Alvy Dixon and Rosemary Dixon to the purchase money mortgage on June 27, 1941 but that Rosemary Dixon did not actually sign the mortgage until later in July, 1941. They berate him severely. It is, of course, true that McConnell committed an irregularity. If he had stopped to think, he would immediately have known that he should have made a certificate of acknowledgement as to Mrs. Dixon separately. It is probable, and the record indicates, that the mortgage, as it was originally drawn, contained but one certificate naming both Mr. and Mrs. Dixon and McConnell did not take the trouble of changing that and making a separate certificate when he took the acknowledgment of Mrs. Dixon, although, of course, he should have done so. Ordinarily the exact date of acknowledgment is not of vital importance. The main question ordinarily is as to whether or not the acknowledgement was actually taken. It happens that in this particular case it was of no importance at all, as McConnell well knew, since it was not necessary for Mrs. Dixon to waive her homestead rights, in view of the fact that the mortgage was a purchase money mortgage. In any event, the irregularity committed by McConnell  though it furnished Mrs. Dixon a basis upon which to base part of her testimony and it seems a poor basis at that  is not controlling herein. Counsel for appellants also berate McConnell severely by reason of the fact that he admitted that he inserted the name of Rosemary Dixon in the deed in violation of his client's trust and confidence. This matter is mentioned in the brief of appellants so often and in terms that are bitter, and they seem to rely upon this matter to so large an extent for a reversal of the judgment herein, that a passing notice in that connection is perhaps required of this court. The measure of censure to be cast upon McConnell must be determined by the facts and circumstances in the case and the intention with which he acted. He had nothing to gain by inserting Mrs. Dixon's name in the deed. He sought no gain. We have discovered no selfish or evil motive that might have actuated him, nor has any been pointed out by appellants. He was under pressure to see that the transaction was completed, not only by reason of the severe illness of Alvy Dixon, but also by reason of the fact that as hereafter mentioned, Lloyd E. Dixon's purchase of another tract of land could be completed. He sought for some time  a month as Mrs. Dixon testified in one place  to have the transaction completed exactly as intended. It was only by reason of the behavior of Mrs. Dixon in refusing to sign the mortgage that he finally, as a last resort, thinking, as he testified, that it would not change the situation, resorted to that violation of his client's trust and confidence. He made a mistake, it is true, but we doubt, after reading the record before us, that his action deserves that ultra definitive censure bestowed upon it by counsel for appellants. In fact, it took courage on his part, which not all attorneys might have had, to acknowledge the mistake that he made. In any event, Mrs. Dixon must share the blame for any violation of trust and confidence equally with McConnell. The case hardly presents a situation as counsel for appellants would have us believe, where an innocent, unworldly woman was imposed upon by a learned counselor at law. It seems that she was asked to sign the notes connected with the transaction (see below), but she shrewdly refused to sign them, taking no risk of sustaining any possible loss. True, she had the legal right to refuse to sign them, and the legal right to refuse to sign the mortgage even though that might frustrate the anxious wishes of her husband. And if she had stood on her legal rights, no one could complain. But she had no right to induce or attempt to induce McConnell to commit an unauthorized act, or be a party thereto, and the mere fact that what she did was by indirection, rather than directly, does not absolve her from sharing the responsibility of the act with McConnell. The record contains a number of facts and circumstances which the trial court doubtless considered as rather persuasive, if not conclusive, that the testimony of Mr. McConnell in its essential particulars was true and correct. In the first place McConnell testified that Mrs. Dixon never saw the deed, but the latter in answer to Question 900 stated that she saw the deed in question in December, 1941 and that her name was inserted in the deed with a pen. The original deed is in evidence in this case and it discloses clearly that her name was inserted by a typewriter rather than a pen. Again she was rather inconsistent in some of her testimony in attempting to show that she saw Alvy Dixon on June 27, 1941 when according to her testimony he told her that the deed was made to you and I. She was asked: Q How many times, prior to that day (June 27, 1941) had Mr. McConnell talked to you about signing the mortgage  frequently? A No. Q Just a few times? A Yes, just a few times. Q During what period of time was it? Over two months, a month, a week? A I believe more than a month  more than a month. That answer strongly corroborated McConnell. But she immediately contradicted herself and her testimony is in part as follows: A I didn't discuss the signing of the mortgage, because I didn't know the instrument that was going to be presented to me until Mr. McConnell presented it to me to be signed that day. (Namely June 27, 1941). Q Had he talked to you about the mortgage? A No, there hadn't been a mortgage mentioned. Q He hadn't asked you to sign a mortgage? A No. Q Up to the day you actually signed it? A Up to the day I actually signed it. The original deed is in the record before us. It shows that it originally named Alvy Dixon as the sole grantee and that Mrs. Dixon's name was inserted therein subsequent to the original drawing of that deed. It was made pursuant to the negotiations which had been carried on in behalf of Alvy Dixon by his son, Lloyd E. Dixon, as we shall hereafter mention in greater detail. Alvy Dixon's own letter in evidence in this case shows that the deed was to be made to him and to him alone. He had been seriously sick in the hospital for more than two and a half months before the deed was delivered. There is no indication in the record that he ever saw the deed before its actual delivery. The testimony in the record shows the contrary. It seems improbable in the face of the negotiations above mentioned, of which Alvy Dixon had knowledge and the fact that he never saw the deed, he would tell Mrs. Dixon that it was to be made to you and I. On June 28, 1941, the day after she, according to her testimony, signed the mortgage M.E. Corthell wrote to his clients in Pennsylvania as follows: Mr. McConnell informed me this morning that he has secured Alvy Dixon's signature and acknowledgement to the mortgage deed and notes, but that he has been unable to get Mrs. Dixon to execute the mortgage.    Mr. McConnell said that he would make one more attempt to have her sign and acknowledge the mortgage, and in the event she refuses, I suggested that he try to get her to make an affidavit that she claimed the (her then) residence as her homestead. On July 7, 1941 M.E. Corthell wrote another letter to his clients in the east stating in part as follows: In order to obtain Mrs. Rosemary Dixon's signature to the mortgage deed back from Alvy Dixon on purchase of the Murray Ranch, Mr. McConnell had to tell her that he would have her named as grantee with Alvy Dixon in the warranty deed. I do not see any objection to her being named as grantee, as long as she executes the mortgage deed which contains a provision releasing the homestead right. She has not signed the notes, and refuses absolutely to do so.    Will you please advise me by wire if it is agreeable to have her name inserted as grantee with Alvy Dixon in the Warranty deed, and to accept the notes and mortgage executed as above stated. On July 9, 1941 M.E. Corthell received a wire back substantially authorizing that the name of Rosemary Dixon might be inserted in the deed. That was done and she then signed the mortgage. M.E. Corthell represented the mortgagee. He would not have gone through the idle ceremony of writing the foregoing letters, if the mortgage had been complete on June 27, 1941, as claimed by Mrs. Dixon. No reason is assigned why McConnell should have kept it out of Corthell's hands after it was completed. He testified, as heretofore stated, that he was being pressed to get the transaction completed. Corthell testified: I knew Alvy Dixon. I learned that he was seriously ill  so serious that it was a matter of concern to immediately close the deal, lest he might not survive. Counsel for appellants argue that courts hesitate to upset deeds as executed, and require the clearest and most convincing evidence before doing so, citing Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, Vol. 2, Section 464. We think that the trial court was justified in finding that the rule mentioned was fully satisfied in this case.