Opinion ID: 625172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Feola and Appellees' Motion in Limine

Text: Brown argues that the district court erred in its ruling to exclude from evidence any alleged adverse employment action that occurred after June 20, 2000. We review a district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, and we will reverse only if an erroneous ruling affected a party's substantial rights. Marcic v. Reinauer Transp. Cos., 397 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir.2005). Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e) has been repeatedly held to be a self-executing statute that deems vacant any public office upon the officer's conviction of an oath of office offense. See, e.g., Feola, 860 N.Y.S.2d 457, 890 N.E.2d at 221; Duffy v. Ward, 81 N.Y.2d 127, 596 N.Y.S.2d 746, 612 N.E.2d 1213, 1214 (1993) (collecting cases). Feola made clear that Endangering is an oath of office offense as defined by Duffy v. Ward, 596 N.Y.S.2d 746, 612 N.E.2d 1213, which held that Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e) applies to misdemeanor offenses for which a facial review of the elements reveals a lack of moral integrity. Reviewing the elements of the offense without consideration of the underlying facts, a conviction for endangering the welfare of a child under Penal Law § 260.10(1) conclusively establishes a lack of moral integrity. Feola, 860 N.Y.S.2d 457, 890 N.E.2d at 222. It went on to note that the Second Department had misconstrued Duffy by examining the alleged conduct rather than the elements of the crime. Id. Under New York law, Brown ceased his employment relationship with the City of Syracuse upon his conviction. See id. Thus, the July 2000 suspension without pay and the arbitration proceedings leading to his termination all occurred after Brown had lost his job by operation of law. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that it would preclude evidence that Brown suffered an adverse employment action once his employment ceased. See Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 557 (7th Cir.2011) (finding no evidence of adverse employment action for complaints after plaintiff ceased being employed by defendant). [5]