Opinion ID: 1284866
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Conduct of the Administrative Hearings

Text: Since the conduct of the administrative hearings is at the heart of the litigation before us, it is important to understand both the legislative intent in passing these statutes and the ways in which the statutes are interrelated. First, we will present a broad overview of the statutes themselves and a description of the stages through which the legislature intended both the administrative agencies and the applicants for HVTL corridors to pass. Then we will examine both specific instances of alleged noncompliance with the spirit and/or letter of the statutes and, drawing on the case law from this and other jurisdictions, the effect of such noncompliance, if correctly alleged, on the entire process of administrative decision-making in this controversy. In the 1973 and 1974 legislative sessions, the Minnesota legislature passed a number of interrelated statutes aimed at protecting the environment in the context of continued economic development. Three of these statutesMinn.St. c. 116D (MEPA), §§ 116C.51 to 116C.69 (PPSA), and Minn.St. 1976, c. 116H (the Minnesota Energy Agency Act)play central roles in the controversy over the construction of this HVTL through much of central Minnesota. Thus, it will be helpful to outline briefly what we believe the legislature intended to accomplish when it passed these pieces of environmental legislation. On May 19, 1973, the legislature enacted c. 116D (MEPA). Patterned on NEPA [28] (the National Environmental Protection Act), which was passed by Congress in 1969, MEPA states that it is the state's policy to use all practicable means and measures    in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of the state's people. [29] Minn.St. 116D.02, subd. 1. This policy could be advanced through the procedural mechanism of the EIS. Toward this end, the legislature required that all major governmental action or    major private action of more than local significance with potential for significant environmental effects be preceded by a detailed EIS, § 116D.04. To ensure that administrative decision-making affecting the environment was made with environmental factors in mind, MEPA directed that a draft environmental impact statement be made available to MEQC and the public and that [t]he final detailed environmental impact statement and the comments received thereon    precede final decisions on the proposed action and    accompany the proposal through an administrative review process. Minn.St. 116D.04, subd. 4. Since the legislature directed, in § 116D.03, subd. 1, that to the fullest extent practicable the policies, regulations and public laws of the state shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in sections 116D.01 to 116D.06 [MEPA], the other environmental legislation passed later was to be administered in accordance with the policies of MEPA. [30] Just 4 days after the passage of MEPA, the legislature enacted the PPSA. This act specifically dealt only with power generating plants and HVTLs, but it is clear from its statement of policy that the legislature intended it to complement MEPA. Section 116C.55, subd. 1, declares that it is the state's policy to site large electric power facilities in an orderly manner compatible with environmental preservation and the efficient use of resources and that MEQC shall choose sites that minimize adverse human and environmental impact. The remaining sections of the PPSA set out the orderly process the state is expected to follow. Basically, the legislature contemplated four stages, each with a specified time limit: (1) Development of criteria and standards to be used to develop an inventory of potential sites/corridors; time limit: Approximately one year. Minn.St. 1976, § 116C.55, subd. 2. (2) Development of an inventory of potential sites/corridors; time limit: One year. Minn.St. 1976, § 116C.55, subd. 3. (3) Choice of specified site/corridor for development of an electrical facility by a public utility; time limit: One year after request for a site, 180 days (6 months) after request for a corridor. Minn.St. 1976, § 116C.57, subd. 1. (4) Choice of specific route within the designated corridor; time limit: 180 days (6 months). Minn.St. 1976, § 116C.57, subd. 2. [31] The legislature also specifically mandated widespread and continuous public participation in all stages of this process. Minn.St. 1976, §§ 116C.55 to 116C.60. In the Minnesota Energy Agency Act, the legislature modified to some extent the stages outlined above by requiring a utility to apply for and receive a certificate of need from the MEA before it could apply to MEQC for corridor designation. Minn.St. 116H.13, subd. 2. In keeping with the orderly procedure described above, the legislature intended MEA to develop [a]n estimate of statewide and geographical area energy need for the forthcoming five and ten year period which    will reasonably balance requirements of state and service area growth and development, protection of public health and safety, preservation of environmental quality, and conservation of energy resources. Such forecasts established by the director shall serve as the basis for certification of large energy facilities in section 116H.13.  Minn.St. § 116H.11, subd. 1(b). (Italics supplied.) The legislature then set a deadline of September 15, 1975, for the promulgation of assessment-of-need criteria for electric transmission lines, § 116H.13, subd. 1, and mandated that after that date no large energy facility would be constructed in Minnesota without the issuance of a certificate of need, § 116H.13, subd. 2. Thus, by September 15, 1975, the legislature anticipated that the various state agencies charged would have prepared the mandated inventories, standards, and criteria specified in the PPSA [32] and c. 116H. From that time, a utility wishing to build a HVTL would apply first to MEA for a certificate of need and then to MEQC initially for a corridor designation and later for a route designation within the approved corridor. Appellants object to the manner in which the various decisions were reached on a number of grounds. They contend that the failure to require an EIS at the corridor selection stage, the inversion of the corridor selection and certificate of need hearings, the refusal of the hearing officer to permit additional corridors to be considered, and the inadequacy of the EIS that was eventually prepared are all reversible errors. Appellants therefore request that the entire case be remanded to MEQC and MEA for new hearings to be conducted in conformity with legislative intent as outlined above. Although the judiciary has the responsibility of ensuring that administrative agencies comply with legislative mandates, a presumption of administrative regularity exists. As we recently iterated in Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, Minn., 256 N.W.2d 808, 824 (1977), decisions of administrative agencies enjoy a presumption of correctness, and deference should be shown by courts to the agencies' expertise   . To prevail in this appeal, appellants must demonstrate that the decisions complained of were improperly reached and incorrect, a burden of proof which they have been unable to meet. Appellants argue that it was reversible error for MEQC not to require an EIS at the corridor-selection stage of the proceedings. Since the designation of a corridor was a major governmental action with potential for significant environmental effects, and since this was the last discretionary stage in the proceedings, [33] the lack of an EIS violated both the spirit and the letter of MEPA. There are cases from other jurisdictions that appear to support this position. See, Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm., 156 U.S.App. D.C. 395, 481 F.2d 1079 (1973); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Comm., 146 U.S.App.D.C. 33, 449 F.2d 1109 (1971); Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm., 455 F.2d 412 (2 Cir. 1972); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5 Cir. 1973); Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677 (9 Cir. 1974); Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10 Cir. 1972); Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm. of Ventura Co., 13 Cal.3d 263, 118 Cal.Rptr. 249, 529 P.2d 1017 (1975); No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal.3d 68, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34, 529 P.2d 66 (1974); Secretary of Environmental Affairs v. Massachusetts Port Auth., ___ Mass. ___, 323 N.E.2d 329 (1975); Byers v. Board of Clallam County Commrs., 84 Wash.2d 796, 529 P.2d 823 (1974); Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assoc. Inc., 82 Wash.2d 475, 513 P.2d 36 (1973); Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wash.2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023 (1973). We conclude, however, after our independent examination of the agency's record and decision, see, Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, supra , that while it would have been preferable for MEQC to have required an EIS at the corridor-selection stage of the proceedings, its failure to do so does not constitute reversible error, for the following reasons: (1) Under the law in effect at the relevant time, MEQC was given discretion to determine when an environmental impact statement was required. Minn.St. 116D.03, subd. 1, provides: The legislature authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent practicable the policies, regulations and public laws of the state shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in sections 116D.01 to 116D.06. (Italics supplied.) This discretion is found neither in NEPA nor in the statutes of those states whose courts have nullified administrative proceedings when an EIS was absent. (2) There never has been a specific statutory requirement mandating an EIS at the corridor inventory selection stage of the proceedings; and, indeed, the legislature in its 1977 amendments to the PPSA has eliminated the corridor stage from the HVTL process. L.1977, c. 439, § 10. (3) An EIS was prepared and was available for the guidance of the agency prior to the selection of the specific route. While we agree that an adequate EIS should be required by the administrative agency at the earliest possible stage, we are not prepared to say that in this case the agency failed to act within the wide discretion granted it by § 116D.03, subd. 1. (4) Whatever reservations we have about the procedure followed, no information has been presented to convince us that the administrative agency did not adequately consider the factors specified in 116C.57, subd. 4. Although not the equivalent of a properly prepared and assembled EIS, substantial compliance with this subsection makes the absence of an EIS less critical than it would otherwise be. [34] It may very well be that the legislature gave a broader range of discretion to MEQC than it should have and that MEQC could better carry out its legislative mandate if it required the preparation of a draft environmental impact statement earlier in the process than it did. It may also be true that MEQC in the future should be more vigilant in protecting the alleged interests of the public and that it should play more of an active role as an advocate of environmental values. These considerations, however, fall outside the scope of our review and are more properly addressed to the legislature than to the courts. Appellants further claim that the failure of the hearing officer in the corridor selection proceedings to consider the question of need for this HVTL was reversible error. Although the statutory scheme established by the legislature obligates a utility proposing to construct a HVTL to apply first to MEA for a certificate of need, § 116H.13, subd. 2, the sequence in which the statutes were adopted meant that CPA/UPA was granted a certificate of corridor compatibility prior to, but contingent upon, the issuance of the certificate of need. It is argued that this placed MEA in the position of being compelled to issue a certificate of need even though the evidence failed to establish adequately the line's necessity. We believe that this argument is without merit. In our judgment the need for additional electric power was so clear that the order in which the hearings were held was of no practical significance. This belief is confirmed by the fact that during the course of oral argument before this court none of the appellants seriously argued that the electrical energy to be supplied by this project was unnecessary. Appellants also attack on a number of grounds the hearing officer's decision that the HVTL's entry point was fixed. They object to the agency's refusal either to consider additional corridors which would permit the HVTL to enter Minnesota at some other point or to allow appellants to introduce evidence on the availability of such other corridors. The hearing officer found that the language of § 116C.57, subd. 1, precluded the suggestion of other corridors by citizen participants, and we believe this determination to be correct. His task was to decide whether the proposed corridor should be approved; generalized references to other corridors would have served no useful purpose. And appellants have not convinced us that a different routing of the power line would do more than merely shift the burdens associated with its presence from one group of landowners to another. While adding other corridors to the proceedings would change the identities of the individuals and groups objecting to the placement of the power line on their property, we are not persuaded that it would improve the situation from an environmental point of view. Finally, appellants challenge the EIS prepared during the route selection proceedings on the following grounds: (1) That many of the statements made in the EIS are conclusory, rather than factual, in nature. (2) That it does not include an adequate discussion of alternatives to the HVTL. (3) That it does little more than incorporate information provided by the applying utilities. The usual statement of the standard of review of the adequacy of an environmental impact statement under NEPA is that it should be determined through the use of a rule of reason. Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9 Cir. 1974); Accord, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 458 F.2d 827 (1972). As the court noted in Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9 Cir. 1974),    The procedures required by NEPA    are designed to secure the accomplishment of the vital purpose of NEPA. That result can be achieved only if the prescribed procedures are faithfully followed; grudging, pro forma compliance will not do.   .       This does not mean that the courts are to `fly speck' environmental impact statements. The preparation of such a statement necessarily calls for judgment, and that judgment is the agency's. But the courts can, and should, require full, fair, bona fide compliance with NEPA. Although appellants raise serious questions about the conclusory nature of much of the EIS and its failure to discuss alternatives to the HVTL, they have not carried their burden of persuading us that MEQC's actions comprised less than full, fair, bona fide compliance with MEPA. A number of federal courts have also held that it is an abdication of agency responsibility under NEPA for its EIS to rely solely on information prepared by a project's proponent. City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 552 F.2d 736 (7 Cir. 1977); Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm., 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2 Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm., 146 U.S.App. D.C. 33, 43, 449 F.2d 1109, 1119 (1971). The purpose of all environmental legislation, at both the state and the federal levels, is to force agencies to make their own impartial evaluation of environmental considerations before reaching their decisions. The agency's role in the preparation of an EIS is not to serve as an arbiter between two opposing parties, as a judge is expected to do in the adversary process. Instead, it is expected to be a source of independent expertise whose scientific investigation can uncover the data necessary to make an informed environmental decision. This theme was stressed in Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm., supra (455 F.2d 420): The Federal Power Commission has abdicated a significant part of its responsibility by substituting the statement of PASNY for its own. The Commission appears to be content to collate the comments of other federal agencies, its own staff and the intervenors and once again to act as an umpire. The danger of this procedure, and one obvious shortcoming, is the potential, if not likelihood, that the applicant's statement will be based upon self-serving assumptions. We must emphasize, however, that the mere fact that much of the information in the proponent's environmental statement also appears in the agency's EIS is not sufficient, by itself, to demonstrate its inadequacy. While appellants have challenged the completeness and adequacy of the EIS, they have not established that it is untrue, inaccurate, or misleading. After carefully considering appellants' criticisms, particularly in light of the extensive hearings held during the course of the administrative process, we are not persuaded that the EIS was fatally defective. Thus, we find the challenged EIS to be adequate.