Opinion ID: 1739421
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the Country Club entitled to third party beneficiary status?

Text: The appellant Country Club contends that it is a third party beneficiary of the release between the guest passenger and the driver's estate and is a member of a specified class discharged under the general release language: All other persons, firms, organizations, or corporations ... Recently in Smith v. Falke, 474 So.2d 1044 (Miss. 1985) this Court considered a release executed between a plaintiff and one codefendant. This Court there held that the language of the release discharging a codefendant and all others whatsoever could not be construed to release another codefendant absent a manifest intent to do so. Noted in that opinion was Miss. Code Ann. § 85-5-1 (1972), which states as follows: In all cases of joint or joint and several indebtedness, the creditor may settle or compromise with and release any one or more of such debtors; and the settlement or release shall not effect the right or remedy of the creditor against the other debtors for the amount remaining due and unpaid, and shall not operate to release any of the others of the said debtors; Smith v. Falke further stated that [w]hen the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, parole testimony is inadmissible to contradict the written language. Id. at 1046. However, where parole evidence is offered to clear up an ambiguity or explain terms of a writing, such evidence is admissible. The courts have admitted parol evidence to show the intent of the parties as to various matters, such as persons covered or bound by the release, etc. A.L.R. Annot., 13 A.L.R.3rd 313 (1967). Appellee Saucier also cites cases from other jurisdictions to support its contention that only parties specifically named in the release are absolved of liability. In Spector v. K-Mart Corp., 99 A.D.2d 605, 471 N.Y.S.2d 711 (App.Div. 1984), K-Mart claimed to have been included within the purview of all other persons, firms or corporations named in a release given by Spector to Smith Kline Corp. The New York Supreme Court there found the language was more of an attempt to insulate the entire corporate structure of Smith Kline than to release some outside entity such as K-Mart. In Aymond v. State Department of Highways, 333 So.2d 380 (La. App. 1976) the Louisiana State Highway Department was not a named party to a release signed between a plaintiff and an insurance company for settlement of a claim. The Louisiana Court held that the Highway Department was not within the meaning of the release's phrase: all other persons, firms and corporations who might be liable. In Young v. State, 455 P.2d 889 (Alaska, 1969) the Alaska Supreme Court held that tortfeasors are not released unless specifically named in a release. In Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 101 Ill.2d 196, 77 Ill.Dec. 738, 461 N.E.2d 361 (1984) the Illinois Court held that tortfeasors must be specifically named or otherwise identified in order to be discharged by a release; and tortfeasors will not be discharged unless they have been named or specifically designated. Finally, in Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984) the Texas Supreme Court held that a specific identification for the release of a tortfeasor is met when the reference in the release is so particular that a stranger can readily identify the released party; and a tortfeasor can claim the protection of a release only if the release refers to him by name or with such descriptive particularity that his identity or his connection with the tortious event is not in doubt. Appellant, like the codefendant, in Falke relies on Burns v. Washington, 251 Miss. 789, 171 So.2d 322 (1965), wherein this Court stated: [A] third party may in his own right and name, enforce a promise made for his benefit even though he is a stranger both to the contract and to the consideration. But in the case sub judice, like Falke, the facts are distinguished from Burns. In Burns, the Court found that the parties clearly intended to include the third party as a beneficiary. In this case the Court in a finding of fact determined that the parties did not intend that The Country Club benefit from the release. It is also clear that appellant was a stranger to the release contract and paid no consideration for it, nor was consideration paid for its benefit. Findings of fact made by a chancellor may not be set aside or disturbed on appeal unless manifestly wrong. Spain v. Holland, 483 So.2d 318 (Miss. 1986); Carr v. Carr, 480 So.2d 1120 (Miss. 1985). [A]n injured party executing a release incident to a settlement with one tortfeasor releases others by whom or on whose behalf no considerations have been given only where the intent to release the others is manifest. Smith v. Falke, 474 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Miss. 1985); Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 885(1) (1979). No such intent appears here. Miss. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Garrett, 487 So.2d 1320 (Miss. 1986).