Opinion ID: 1238266
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Rotting Carp

Text: This entire case reminds me of the old saying that There's something rotten in Denmark. Well, there is definitely something rotten in West Virginia, and I am outraged not only by the aspects of the history of this case that the record permits us to get our teeth into, but perhaps even more so by various hidden agendas that smell [1] to the high heavens, but which we can't get our teeth into on this record. Because of the lack of factual development, I am limited in my ability to pull back the curtains so as to cast light upon the shrouded plans, conduct, and actions surrounding the entire process from inception to date. Indeed, a review of the available documents, most of which are only here as a result of being requested by this Court, suggests that anybody who is not confused, doesn't really understand what's going on. Nevertheless, even the sparse documentation available casts an odor not unlike that of a dead and rotting carp. This opinion will neither win friends nor influence people on either side of the philosophical aisle, but these are things that need to be said. That I have voted with the majority should not be taken as an opinion that the dismissal of the underlying lawsuits was a wise or even proper course of action. [2] Nor should it be taken as agreement with anything that either of the last two Commissioners or the Performance Council have done in this entire issue. Moreover, the decision of the Court that neither prohibition nor mandamus is appropriate should not be construed as limiting the possibilities for bringing a lawsuit for breach of fiduciary responsibility, violations of open government requirements, violations of ethics requirements, or any other potential causes of action. In fact, as I shall make clear, I believe there should be a full and complete factual exposition of what occurred here so that the chips can fall where they may. The reason I join the majority is that the law is absolutely clear that neither prohibition nor mandamus is available to order the Commissioner to dismiss the lawsuits. The Commissioner is a statutory animal, created, molded, and maintained by legislative authority. West Virginia Code § 21A-2-6 (1996) provides that the Commissioner is the executive and administrative head of the bureau and has the power and duty to... exercise general supervision..., [s]upervise fiscal affairs and responsibilities..., [i]nvoke any legal or special remedy..., [e]xercise any other power necessary to standardize administration, expedite bureau business, and assure the establishment of fair rules and promote the efficiency of the service[.] West Virginia Code § 23-1-1(a) (1996) provides that the Commissioner has the sole responsibility for the administration of this chapter except for such matters as are entrusted to the compensation programs performance council.... West Virginia Code § 21A-2-1 (1996) further defines the Commissioner's role, indicating that the Commissioner shall be appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall hold his office subject to the will and pleasure of the governor. Thus, the Commissioner's powers, duties, and limitations have been broadly delineated by statute and have been created exclusively by statute. A mandate by this Court that the Commissioner must obtain court approval for dismissals of civil actions would be an improper intrusion by this Court into the legislative arena. Courts are not free to read into the language what is not there.... State ex rel. Frazier v. Meadows, 193 W.Va. 20, 24, 454 S.E.2d 65, 69 (1994). It is not the province of courts to revise the work of the Legislature and supply what, in their opinion, are omissions of provisions necessary to make a statutory system or plan wise and expedient. If that could be done in one case it could be done in all, and the courts would become legislative, as well as judicial, tribunals, a result positively forbidden by the Constitution of the state. In re Application for License to Practice Law, 67 W.Va. 213, 231, 67 S.E. 597, 604-05 (1910). In Boyd v. Merritt , 177 W.Va. 472, 354 S.E.2d 106 (1986), we explained that [t]his Court does not sit as a superlegislature, commissioned to pass upon the political, social, economic, or scientific merits of statutes pertaining to proper subjects of legislation. It is the duty of the legislature to consider facts, establish policy, and embody that policy in legislation. Id. at 474, 354 S.E.2d at 108. Similarly, in Randolph County Board of Education v. Adams, 196 W.Va. 9, 467 S.E.2d 150 (1995), we stated: When acting within its legitimate constitutional sphere, judicial deference given to both the West Virginia Legislature and administrative bodies has been confirmed. See Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dept. of W. Va., 195 W.Va. 573, 466 S.E.2d 424 (1995). The practice of deferring to rationally based legislative enactments is a paradigm of judicial restraint. Id. at 24, 467 S.E.2d at 165. One local newspaper recently ran an editorial to the effect that the Commissioner should not be allowed to drop the lawsuits. I was intrigued by the newspaper's comment that We leave the complex legal details to the State Supreme Court, but, we hope they find a sound reason to prevent the lawsuits' dismissal. Well, the devil is in the details. The fact is that the complex legal details involve the doctrine of the separation of powers and a whole history of legal precedent, and they to me are not just niceties that can be overlooked.