Opinion ID: 564833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: was cassady deprived of a constitutional right?

Text: 11 The District Court disposed of Cassady's claim of constitutional injury by relying principally on Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). The Court in Baker concluded that an allegedly negligent arrest based on mistaken identity could not support a section 1983 action for deprivation of liberty. While generally relevant in holding that not all state tort claims rise to the level of federal constitutional deprivations, Baker does not speak directly to Cassady's claims, which are based on intentional, not negligent, action under color of state law.
12 The fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures is triggered  'only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.'  United States v. Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1493 (6th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)). What constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude that [she] is not free to leave will vary with the police conduct at issue and the setting in which the conduct occurred. Rose, 889 F.2d at 1493. Coercive or intimidating behavior supports a reasonable belief that compliance is compelled. United States v. Collis, 766 F.2d 219, 221 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 851, 106 S.Ct. 150, 88 L.Ed.2d 124 (1985). 13 While nearly all seizure cases involve the arrest of a private person by a police officer, this family of precedent includes some interesting cousins. These atypical cases suggest several potentially relevant principles of law. First, it is apparent that the fourth amendment protects public officials such as Cassady from unreasonable government searches and seizures. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 1390, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) (drug testing of public employees constitutes a search under the fourth amendment); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 1496, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (plurality) (public hospital psychiatrist suspected of professional improprieties is protected against unreasonable search of his office by supervisors); Kirkpatrick v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir.1986) (search of police officer to investigate alleged work-related misconduct must meet reasonable suspicion standard of the fourth amendment); Security & Law Enforcement Employees v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 203-04 (2d Cir.1984) (search of prison employees to investigate work-related misconduct falls under the fourth amendment); Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228, 230 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932, 91 S.Ct. 2256, 29 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971) (the compelled appearance of 62 police officers in a lineup for possible identification as wrongdoers could be considered a seizure under the fourth amendment). 14 Secondly, Cassady need not have been accused of wrongdoing to enjoy the protections of the fourth amendment. It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1731, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). See also Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 605, 612 (10th Cir.1979) (plaintiff stated a 1983 claim in alleging that a police officer arrested her for a minor infraction solely to intimidate her and assist the officer's friend in recovering on an overdue loan made to her); Inada v. Sullivan, 523 F.2d 485, 488 (7th Cir.1975) (plaintiff stated a section 1983 action by alleging he was arrested solely because the arresting officer disliked and was prejudiced against him); Williams v. Tansey, 610 F.Supp. 1083, 1085 (E.D.Pa.1985) (same). 15 In this case, both the District Court and Tackett analyzed Cassady's deprivation of liberty claim under the fourth amendment. The District Court concluded that because Tackett's conduct consisted only of threats, and there was no infliction of any physical wrong, the allegations and evidence even in the light most favorable to her did not constitute a seizure. If Cassady reasonably believed that her freedom of movement was restrained and that she was compelled to remain within her office lest Tackett or his deputies make good their threats to kill her, she may be able to establish a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. See Rose, 889 F.2d at 1493. The threats may have confined Cassady as effectively as fetters. That both parties here are prison officials and that this kind of conduct has no legitimate law enforcement purpose arguably is of no matter on the authority of Von Raab, Camara and the other cases cited above. 16 In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), the Court directed that [i]n addressing an excessive force claim brought under Sec. 1983, analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force.... The validity of the claim must then be judged by reference to the specific constitutional standard which governs that right, rather than to some generalized 'excessive force' standard. In reference to claims arising under the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures, the Court, citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), noted that the 'reasonableness' of a particular seizure depends not only on when it is made, but also on how it is carried out. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, 109 S.Ct. at 1871 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, Tackett's alleged actions must be examined under the totality of the circumstances to determine whether they were objectively reasonable. Id. at 397, 109 S.Ct. at 1872; Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-9, 105 S.Ct. at 1699-700. 17 Tackett has not defended this action on the basis that he had a right to terrorize Cassady, thus forcing her to confine herself to her office. Further, examined under the standard of objective reasonableness, there appears to be no legitimate reason for Tackett's alleged actions as described by plaintiff. Not every threat will arise to the level of a constitutional violation, of course. 4 But where the credibility of the threats presents a jury question as to whether the threats foreseeably resulted in the seizure of the person, a constitutional violation can occur. Cf. Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008, 102 S.Ct. 1646, 71 L.Ed.2d 876 (1982); Douglas v. Marino, 684 F.Supp. 395, 398 (D.N.J.1988). Since it appears that Tackett's threats did cause a loss of liberty, we need not decide what level of emotional distress, without more, is necessary to establish a constitutionally cognizable injury when the injury results from unreasonable threats of force. 18
19 Cassady contends with little elaboration that her stand-off with Tackett on January 13, 1988 shocks the conscience in a civilized society. The shock the conscience language of course comes from Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), where the Court held that police conduct in pumping a suspect's stomach in search of evidence violates due process standards. In support of her claim, Cassady cites only White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir.1979). There it was held that police abandonment of an arrestee's children on a highway late on a cold night shocked the conscience and deprived them of due process rights. 592 F.2d at 383-84. Because White presents entirely different facts, it seems that the shocks the conscience holding in that case has little if any relevance to the present one. Trying to apply White to this case highlights the inchoate nature of the shocks the conscience standard, but is otherwise unhelpful. In Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 224-25 (6th Cir.1990), this Circuit recently discussed this point in the context of a section 1983 suit against a police officer for false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution: 20 Applying the shock the conscience test in an area other than excessive force ... is problematic. Not only are there fewer instances in the case law, but the shock the conscience test is not as uniformly applied to cases where excessive force or physical brutality is not the basis of the claim. The shock the conscience standard, fuzzy under the best of circumstances, becomes fuzzy beyond a court's power to interpret objectively where there is a dearth of previous decisions on which to base the standard. We doubt the utility of such a standard outside the realm of physical abuse, an area in which the consciences of judges are shocked with some degree of uniformity. 21 Braley, 906 F.2d at 226. Since the present case, like Braley, does not concern physical abuse, we are reluctant to apply the shock the conscience standard. 6 22 In summary, Cassady has presented evidence from which a jury might find an illegal seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. However, her substantive due process claim falls short. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is REVERSED and the action REMANDED to the District Court for further proceedings. 23