Opinion ID: 2365187
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Terry StandardReasonable Suspicion and the Totality of the Circumstances

Text: The Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from seizing persons absent a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Speight, supra, 671 A.2d at 446 (citing Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868). [10] [S]ome minimal level of objective justification is required for a seizure, Thompson, supra, 745 A.2d at 315 (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)), and an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or `hunch' does not meet that standard. Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868; In re T.L.L., 729 A.2d 334, 340 (D.C.1999) (citations omitted). Thus, the officer effectuating the seizure is required to indicate specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion. Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The reasonableness of the stop turns on the facts and circumstances of each case. Mendenhall, supra note 10, 446 U.S. at 561, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Gomez, supra, 597 A.2d at 889 (`case matching' is of limited utility in Fourth Amendment analysis of street encounters between citizens and police officers, for `two cases are seldom sufficiently alike for the first to be an absolute binding precedent for the second'). Justice Powell has indicated that an assessment of reasonableness should be informed by (i) the public interest served by the seizure, (ii) the nature and scope of the intrusion, and (iii) the objective facts upon which the law enforcement officer relied in light of his knowledge and expertise. Mendenhall, supra note 10, 446 U.S. at 561, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (reasonableness depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); In re T.T.C., 583 A.2d 986, 989 (D.C.1990) (noting that the Supreme Court has recognized that the balancing of competing interests is the key principle of the Fourth Amendment and, thus, the determination of whether police behavior is supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity lies in a comparison between the degree of police intrusion and the level of police justification) (internal citations omitted). The requirement of reasonable suspicion is not an onerous one since it is substantially less than probable cause and considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. In re T.L.L., supra, 729 A.2d at 339 (citations omitted). However, the reasonable, articulable suspicion must be particularized as to the individual stopped. Id. at 340. Thus, a description applicable to large numbers of people will not suffice to justify the seizure of an individual when other circumstances that provide sufficient particularity are lacking. Id. Our analysis must focus on whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure ... warrant a man [or woman] of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate. Carr v. United States, 758 A.2d 944, 946-47 (D.C. 2000) (citing Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868). We assess the lawfulness of Terry stops by considering the totality of the circumstances, the whole picture: Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.... [This] analysis proceeds with various objective observations, information from police reports, if such are available, and consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductionsinferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person. Cortez, supra note 10, 449 U.S. at 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690; see also Mayes v. United States, 653 A.2d 856, 864 (D.C.1995) (the whole may sometimes be more than the sum of its parts). Moreover, innocent individual acts or circumstances do not rule out a finding of reasonable suspicion: Even if each specific action of appellant was of itself susceptible of an explanation consistent with innocence of [criminal conduct], the observing police officer may see a combination of facts that make out an articulable suspicion. ( William) Brown v. United States, 546 A.2d 390, 393 (D.C.1988) (citation omitted); see also Gomez, supra, 597 A.2d at 890 (the Terry standard does not require that an officer rule out the possibility of innocent behavior, for suspicious conduct by its very nature is ambiguous, and the principal function of the investigative stop is to quickly resolve that ambiguity) (citation and internal quotations omitted). But see Duhart v. United States, 589 A.2d 895, 899 (D.C.1991) (If the behavior of a subject is capable of `too many innocent explanations,' then the intrusion cannot be justified). The record before us indicates that on June 23, 1996 at approximately 2:45 a.m., Officer Reid received a lookout broadcast for a a gray two-door Honda, nothing additional other than occupied once or twice. Last seen in the area of Mount Pleasant and Lamont, reference to a stabbing. The officer was aware that the stabbing had taken place approximately twenty-five minutes earlier. Two seconds after hearing the lookout, Officer Reid saw appellant's vehicle, which he initially believed matched the lookout description in certain respects. Upon getting behind the vehicle, the officer realized that due to the nighttime conditions he had mistaken appellant's dark blue Honda for a gray one. However, he then observed that the vehicle was proceeding real slow or cautiously and that a dark-colored T-shirt was appended to the trunk. The officer also testified that traffic was light at that hour, and that appellant's vehicle was approximately one block away from the border between the District of Columbia and Maryland. Based on these observations, Officer Reid concluded that he should investigate. Although this case is a close one, we conclude that under the totality of the circumstances, the information available to Officer Reid at the time he stopped appellant's vehicle was sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion that appellant was connected with the homicide stabbing. While we have recognized that there are limits to the inference[s] that an experienced reasonable police officer can rationally draw, Duhart, supra, 589 A.2d at 899, for the reasons discussed below, we do not believe that the officer here drew unreasonable inferences in concluding that the vehicle he was observing warranted investigation. When assessing the totality of the circumstances, we have held that a court should consider various factors including, but not limited, to the time of day, flight, the high crime nature of the location, furtive hand movements, an informant's tip, a person's reaction to questioning, a report of criminal activity or gunshots, and the viewing of an object or bulge indicating a weapon. Anderson v. United States, 658 A.2d 1036, 1038 (D.C. 1995). Although each factor is useful in determining whether there were articulable facts justifying the stop, these factors are not elements of a conjunctive test, and no one factor is outcome determinative. In re D.A.D., 763 A.2d 1152, 1155 (D.C.2000). The totality of the circumstances may establish reasonable suspicion despite the fact that all of the factors are not met, and additional circumstances may also be considered. Id. at 1156. Under our facts, two of the Anderson factorsthe time of day and that the stop was made in response to criminal activitysupport a finding of reasonable suspicion. See Anderson, supra, 658 A.2d at 1038. The stop of appellant's vehicle was made at approximately 2:45 a.m.hardly an hour when Hondas of the type described in the lookout are ubiquitous on our city streets as appellant argues. In addition, the stop was made in response to a report of criminal activity that had taken place approximately twenty-five minutes earlier. In addition to the two Anderson factors and the similarities between the lookout description and appellant's vehicle in terms of its make, model and, at first glance, color, the reasonableness of the Terry stop is also supported by the additional observations made by the officer. When explaining his decision to stop appellant's vehicle, Officer Reid made specific references to the fact that the vehicle was being driven real slow or cautiously and that a dark T-shirt was appended to the trunk. [11] Although both observations in themselves reflect arguably innocent conduct, we may factor them into our calculus in determining whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the investigative detention. See Thomas v. United States, 553 A.2d 1206, 1208 n. 9 (D.C.1989) (recognizing that suspicious behavior can support police intervention even if some innocent explanations for it cannot be ruled out). Moreover, the reasonableness of the stop was also supported by the fact that appellant was stopped approximately twenty-five minutes after the stabbing and only seconds following the lookout broadcast when appellant was one block from the Maryland border. See Cox v. United States, 256 A.2d 917, 918 (D.C.1969) (The emergency nature of the situation confronting the officers is also a factor that may be considered in determining whether the arrest was proper. Had the officers waited for further details about the suspect before taking action, the automobile... may well have made its escape into another part of the city or another jurisdiction). Since we must consider the totality of the circumstances through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training, Green v. United States, 662 A.2d 1388, 1390 (D.C.1995), we conclude that Officer Reid's observations met the requirements of a reasonable suspicion justifying an investigative detention. Under the circumstances here, the officer's decision to stop appellant's vehicle in order to determine his identity [and] ... maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information was certainly reasonable given the information available to the officer at the time. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). The similarities between the lookout and the suspect's vehicle in terms of make and model; the fact that Officer Reid was responding to the report of a stabbing that had taken place twenty-five minutes earlier; the officer's belief that the dark blue vehicle was gray during nighttime conditions; the fact that the officer saw appellant's vehicle seconds after the lookout was broadcast, during the early morning hours when traffic was light, and one block from the Maryland border; and the officer's additional observations that a dark T-shirt was on the vehicle's trunk and that the vehicle was being driven cautiously, certainly were not the type of observations and ambiguities that should have caused a responsible officer to shrug his shoulders and allow ... a criminal to escape by eschewing further investigation. See id. at 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921; see also Carey v. United States, 377 A.2d 40, 44 (D.C.1977) (we do not hold reasonable action impermissible simply because, in retrospect, an alternative is preferred). Rather, the officer faced circumstances during a swiftly developing situation which warranted the minor intrusion of an investigative detention in order to dispel his suspicions. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); see also Upshur v. United States, 716 A.2d 981, 984 (D.C.1998) ( Terry permits `freezing' the situation very briefly while an ongoing and fast moving situation was clarified); Turner v. United States, 623 A.2d 1170, 1173 (D.C.1993) (citing Sharpe, supra, 470 U.S. at 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568) (Our determination of whether the officer's conduct was reasonable is informed by whether the police are acting in a quickly developing situation, such circumstances being the type that argue against courts indulg[ing] in unrealistic second-guessing of the police officer's judgment). Thus, after viewing the whole picture, we conclude that the lookout description, Officer Reid's observations, and his inferences from the same were sufficient to support a reasonable, articulable suspicion that appellant's vehicle was the one wanted in connection with the stabbing. The officer's observations and concomitant suspicions based on those observations certainly exceeded the inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or `hunch,' see Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868 which will not support an investigative stop. [12] The facts here indicate that the officer was possessed of the minimal level of objective justification which would warrant a brief detention of the occupants of the vehicle[] so that the police could investigate further. Gomez, supra, 597 A.2d at 890 (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).