Opinion ID: 1275658
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: False Report

Text: With respect to Count II, again, the crux of the dispute revolves around whether the report was made with the intent to induce official action. The district judge found there was no evidence that the report was made with the intent to induce official action. The State argues that the report is required to comply with statutorily mandated official action: to be filed in accordance with K.S.A. 28-170(a). The State argued to the district judge: The state would note the alleged illegal act is the making and filing of the report. It is a non sequitur to hold, as the court does, that `the report was filed months after the alleged illegal act.' The illegal act was the report. Clearly the court misapprehended the charges and the evidence involved. The court does simply state `There is no evidence with regard to the idea that this writing was made with the intent to induce official action.' [Citation omitted.] This statement does not recognize that the only reason to prepare this report is to comply with a statutorily mandated official action: to be filed in accordance with K.S.A. 28-170(a). The State's argument fails to identify the official action the report was intended to induce. Instead, the State argues that the defendant was by statute required to file the report, the report filed was false, and, therefore, the crime was committed. In State v. Rios, 246 Kan. 517, two Dillard's store managers were charged under 21-3711. They had been taking cash and filing false vouchers with the corporate headquarters to cover the thefts. The vouchers were not used to acquire the money; they were an accounting tool used by the defendants to avoid discovery of the prior theft. In deciding that 21-3711 was not an appropriate statute with which to charge defendants, the Rios court stated: Dillard's was not induced and was not intended to be induced to part with the money shown on the voucher by presentation of the voucher. Dillard's had been deprived of the money shown on the voucher before the voucher was processed by Dillard's. Each voucher was created for and used to cover up the theft of the money shown on its face. Intent to defraud requires that the maker of the instrument intended to deceive another person and to induce such person, in reliance upon the deception, to assume, create, transfer, alter, or terminate a right, obligation, or power with reference to property. 246 Kan. at 530. The Rios court observed that it may be argued that the coverup of each theft by means of a voucher allowed such theft to remain undiscovered and, hence, permitted the defendants to remain in the employ of Dillard's with the opportunity to commit new thefts. However, the statutory definition of intent to defraud is not broad enough to include the facts alleged. 246 Kan. at 530. The Rios court concluded: In order to convict a defendant of theft by deception under K.S.A. 21-3701(b), the State must prove that the defendant, with the required intent, obtained control over another's property by means of a false statement or representation. To do so, the State must prove that the victim relied in whole or in part upon the false representation in parting with his or her property. 246 Kan. 517, Syl. ¶ 2. The facts in Rios are indistinguishable from the alleged facts in the State's complaint charging Kraushaar. No money changed hands as a result of the PATF report. The report was an accounting procedure. Its falsity simply covered up any prior wrongdoing by defendant. K.S.A. 21-3711 punishes false writings intended to induce official action, not false writings made in response to statutory requirements. The complaint filed does not satisfy the requirements of K.S.A. 21-3711. Dismissal of the charges is affirmed.