Opinion ID: 2982291
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: denial of motions for new trial & mistrial

Text: Cooper argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial when it determined that the jury’s verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. “Generally, such motions are granted only in the extraordinary circumstance where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.” United States v. Hughes, 505 F.3d 578, 592–93 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In this situation, a reversal “is proper when the government has presented sufficient evidence to convict, but the [district court] disagrees with the jury’s resolution of conflicting evidence.” United States v. Lutz, 154 F.3d 581, 589 (6th Cir. 1998). The court then “can act in the role of a ‘thirteenth juror’ and consider the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence to insure that there is not a miscarriage of - 42 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. justice.” Id. We review the trial court’s ruling to determine whether it was a clear and manifest abuse of discretion. Hughes, 505 F.3d at 593. In denying Cooper’s motion, the district court ran through the same evidence we have discussed regarding Cooper’s sufficiency of evidence claim. Cooper’s only new argument on appeal is that the district court erred in denying the motion after it acknowledged inconsistencies existed in the testimony of a jailhouse informant and between some witnesses’ testimony. However, the district court made clear that, having “heard all the proof at trial and observed the witnesses first-hand,” it determined the case was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court based this decision on its assessment of the witnesses, the nature of the proof, and the weight of other evidence against Cooper. While Cooper once again presents the inconsistencies in testimony on appeal, nothing in the record indicates to us that the district court abused its discretion in assessing the witnesses’ credibility and, as a result, in finding the verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Maddox argues that the trial court erred in denying a motion for mistrial that he filed in response to the government’s questions about and references to his religious beliefs. He claims that, “[o]n this ground alone, the entire trial was rendered unfair, a mistrial should have been granted by the trial court, and a new trial should be granted by this Court.” We review the district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 336 (6th Cir. 2005). At trial, the government introduced evidence that Maddox and various co-defendants used coded language to communicate. As explained by Shawn McGirt, the government’s second witness, this included a code for numbers based on the “Supreme Mathematics” system - 43 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. employed by members of the Five Percent Nation (or “Five Percenters”), a group affiliated with the Nation of Islam. Testimony regarding the Five Percenters came up three times at trial. First, the government played a recorded phone call between McGirt and Maddox in which McGirt ordered 500 grams of cocaine. On the call, McGirt told Maddox, “I’m trying to receive some Power, Cipher, Cipher when I get there.” McGirt testified that “power, cipher, cipher” meant 500 because “power” represented “five” and “cipher” meant “ten” in the Five Percent Nation’s Supreme Mathematics system. When asked to explain what the Five Percent Nation was, he said, “Well, it’s the Nation of Islam.” Maddox’s counsel immediately objected to the mention of Islam, arguing in a sidebar that “bringing up . . . Islam in these times in highly prejudicial.” Noting that discussion of the code was admissible, the court overruled the objection, but admonished the government not to “go into pursuing the religious aspect of it.” Several days later, the government asked Rush if he was familiar with the term Five Percenter. He responded: “Yes, Sir. A Five Percenter is a person who don’t believe in God, which I do. A Five Percenter is a person who believe that they are God, that they control their own destiny.” Maddox’s counsel immediately objected, and the court instructed the jury to disregard the statement. Rush then continued by testifying about his understanding of the Supreme Mathematics code. After a break, Maddox’s counsel moved for a mistrial, which the court denied. Finally, after Maddox took the stand one week later, the government asked him on cross examination, “what does it mean to be a Five Percenter?” Maddox refused to answer the - 44 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. question, which his counsel then objected to, and the government agreed to move on in its questioning. In considering whether improper statements made by a witness at trial warrant granting a mistrial, this Court considers five factors: “(1) whether the remark was unsolicited, (2) whether the government’s line of questioning was reasonable, (3) whether the limiting instruction was immediate, clear, and forceful, (4) whether any bad faith was evidenced by the government, and (5) whether the remark was only a small part of the evidence against the defendant.” Zuern v. Tate, 336 F.3d 478, 485 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Forrest, 17 F.3d 916, 920 (6th Cir. 1994)). In addition, “[g]enerally, ‘the subsequent striking of erroneously admitted evidence accompanied by a clear and positive instruction to the jury to disregard it cures the error’ unless the stricken evidence is so prejudicial that its harmful effect cannot be eliminated.” United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1263 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Greene, 400 F.2d 847, 848 (6th Cir. 1968)), superseded on other grounds by statute as recognized in United States v. Avery, 128 F.3d 966, 972 (6th Cir.1997). Based on these factors, it is clear that McGirt’s and Rush’s comments did not warrant a mistrial, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Maddox’s motion. First, the government had reason to ask McGirt to explain the context of a code he used in a recorded conversation he had with Maddox. When he responded that the code came from the Five Percent Nation’s Supreme Mathematics system—terms likely unfamiliar to an average juror—the government reasonably asked McGirt to explain what the Five Percent Nation is. The government did not launch a fishing expedition into Maddox’s beliefs by asking these basic questions, and McGirt’s matter-of-fact response that the Five Percent Nation “is the Nation of Islam” was neither inappropriate nor unduly prejudicial on its own. - 45 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. By contrast, Rush’s comment about Five Percenters not believing in God was inappropriate, but did not warrant a mistrial under the Forrest factors. The remark came unsolicited, as the government asked Rush if he was familiar with the Five Percent Nation, not to explain the group’s religious beliefs. He began by answering, “yes, sir” before beginning an unsolicited repudiation of the Five Percenters’ beliefs. But, in asking Rush about his familiarity with the Five Percent Nation, the government appeared to be reasonably laying the foundation to elicit testimony from Rush about Supreme Mathematics specifically. (It questioned Rush about this soon after Maddox raised the objection.) Undoubtedly, the government could have asked Rush if he was familiar with Supreme Mathematics, rather than asking first if he was familiar with the Five Percent Nation and risking drawing an objectionable response. That said, the two subjects—Supreme Mathematics and the Five Percent Nation—appear so intertwined in practice that a witness like Rush speaking to his familiarity with the code likely could not explain one without at least mentioning the other. In addition, the government realized the impropriety of the response and did not object to striking the remark. The Court then immediately and clearly instructed the jury to disregard the testimony. Ultimately, this comment formed only a tiny part of the evidence presented at trial, which lasted ten days and included testimony by almost forty witnesses. Nonetheless, Maddox argues Rush’s comment was grounds for a mistrial because it was unduly prejudicial and was “a bell that could not be un-rung.” This Court does not agree. The statement, while inappropriate, had nothing to do with the substance of the charges in the case and was so irrelevant to the issue of guilt that it could easily have been ignored by the jury, which was presented with overwhelming evidence of Maddox’s role in the drug-trafficking - 46 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. operation. As was in its discretion, the trial court immediately instructed the jury to disregard the statement. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. As for the government’s direct question to Maddox, the issue is one of prosecutorial misconduct.9 “When reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct [based on statements made by the government’s counsel], we determine first whether the statements were improper. If they appear improper, we then look to see if they were flagrant and warrant reversal.” United States v. Tarwater, 308 F.3d 494, 511 (6th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Here, the government’s statement—a question to Maddox about what the term “Five Percenter” means—does not appear to have been improper, though it may very well have been extraneous or even deliberately provocative before a hostile witness. Again, this question related to an admissible subject of testimony: the code Maddox and some co-defendants used to communicate. The question itself did not ascribe any beliefs to or make judgments about Five Percenters—it simply asked Maddox to describe them. In addition, there is no evidence that the government posed the question in bad faith. Once Maddox’s counsel objected, the prosecution immediately agreed to move on. Nonetheless, on appeal, Maddox cobbles together a pastiche of reasons why the statement was improper. First, he suggests the question was inappropriate in light of the religious freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment, but stops short of arguing the government violated any First Amendment protections.10 (“The government’s repeated trespasses . . . are in 9 The district court ruled on the motion for mistrial before the government cross-examined Maddox, and Maddox did not renew his motion after the government’s allegedly improper question. Neither party addresses this timing issue. However, this Court will treat the government’s question as supporting Maddox’s motion for mistrial. 10 Maddox broadly characterizes all three statements as “the government’s actions,” which he finds objectionable under the First Amendment. However, the first two comments were made by - 47 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. the vein of the very type of government conduct against which the First Amendment is meant to be an absolute prohibition.”) This Court declines to entertain the suggestion that a First Amendment violation has occurred; Maddox cannot seriously argue that the First Amendment serves as an absolute bar to government questioning of a witness on a question relevant to proving a defendant took part in illegal activity—however benign the government’s question— simply because the answer touches upon a person’s belief system. Next, Maddox suggests the government’s question served to recall prior witnesses’ unduly prejudicial testimony and “was an apparent attempt to attack his credibility,” in violation of Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 610. See Fed. R. Evid. 610 (2010) (amended 2011) (“Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature the witness’ credibility is impaired or enhanced.”). First, no actual violation of the rules of evidence occurred here, as a lawyer’s unanswered question is not evidence. Second, Maddox offers no argument or actual evidence to show that the government intended to elicit improper testimony from Maddox. As discussed above, nothing in the record suggests that the government acted in bad faith in questioning witnesses about the Five Percent Nation, or that its broad question to Maddox was an attempt to ridicule him or undermine his credibility. The use of the Supreme Mathematics code was a relevant fact at trial. In this context, that Maddox’s substantive beliefs may be unpopular or out of the mainstream alone does not suffice to make the government’s question improper. As a result, the district court did not err in denying Maddox’s motion for mistrial. McGirt and Rush. If he assumes that their comments should be considered government action because they served as witnesses for the prosecution, he has not argued this. - 48 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al.