Opinion ID: 804463
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discovery of Factual Predicate

Text: Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), the statute of limitations runs from the latest of several specified dates. One such date is the date on which the factual predicate of the [habeas claim] could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Holmes argues that the factual predicate for his primary ineffective assistance of counsel claim is the fact that the alleged deal with the prosecutor regarding the Rule 29 Motion was precluded as a matter of law. Further, he argues that he could not have discovered this fact through the exercise of due diligence until the summer of 2000. Thus, Holmes argues, the statute of limitations on his habeas claim did not even start to run until he filed his Rule 30 Motion in August of 2000. However, Holmes's argument misconstrues the language of the statute. We have interpreted § 2244(d)(1)(D)'s reference to the phrase factual predicate to mean evidentiary facts or events[,] and not court rulings or legal consequences of the facts. Brackett v. United States, 270 F.3d 60, 69 (1st Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295 (2005). Here, Holmes claims that Graham's strategy to enter a guilty plea and file a Rule 29 motion was constitutionally deficient. The principal facts upon which this claim is predicated -- that Holmes originally intended to go to trial; that his attorney instead convinced him to plead guilty; and that this -15- course of action was influenced by his expectation of a subsequent sentence reduction -- were known, at the latest, by the date of his conviction on May 1, 1998. That this advice may have been flawed, and could potentially form the foundation for an ineffective assistance claim, are the legal consequences of those facts -- matters of law that are beyond the purview of § 2244(d)(1)(D). See Brackett, 270 F.3d at 69; Murphy v. Strack, 9 F. App'x 71, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (summary order) (The factual predicates of [the petitioner's] claims are that he testified at his trial and that his attorney told him he was required to testify. . . . What [the petitioner] contends he did not know prior to 1999 was not a factual matter but rather a matter of law, i.e., his constitutional right not to testify. The latter is beyond the scope of § 2244(d) (1)(D).); Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000) (Unlike some state systems, which start the [limitation period] only when a party knows (or should recognize) that a legal wrong has been done, [§ 2244(d)(1)(D)] use[s] objective indicators as triggers. [. . .] Time begins when the prisoner knows (or through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.). Thus, in all events, Holmes's discovery that his attorney's advice was allegedly misleading, while unfortunate, is ultimately unavailing under the language of § 2244(d)(1)(D). -16-