Opinion ID: 166091
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence challenge to the murder in aid of racketeering conviction

Text: 72 Mr. Smith was also convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a), which prohibits a person from, among other things, committing murder for the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing [his] position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a). As such, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) KMD was an enterprise within the meaning of RICO; (2) that KMD was engaged in racketeering activity; (3) that Mr. Smith had a position in KMD; (4) that Mr. Smith conspired to murder Mr. Miera; and (5) that his general purpose in doing so was to maintain or increase his position in KMD. See United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 381 (2d Cir.1992). Mr. Smith argues that the Government did not present sufficient evidence that he conspired to murder Mr. Miera to maintain or enhance his leadership position in KMD, contending that he murdered Mr. Miera only to avenge the attack on Mr. Trujillo. We disagree. 73 In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the record de novo. Nelson, 383 F.3d at 1229. There is sufficient evidence to uphold a conviction if a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In making this determination, we review the direct and circumstantial evidence, along with all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the Government. Id. 74 The Government need not establish that Mr. Smith's sole or principal motive for conspiring to murder Mr. Miera was to maintain or increase his position in KMD in order for it to convict Mr. Smith under § 1959(a). See United States v. Pimentel, 346 F.3d 285, 295 (2d Cir.2003). Instead, proof that the crime was committed as an integral aspect of membership in [KMD] is sufficient to establish this element of a § 1959(a) offense. United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 817 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotations omitted). Therefore, we agree with the Second Circuit that the motive requirement is satisfied if `the jury could properly infer that the defendant committed his violent crime because he knew it was expected of him by reason of his membership in the enterprise or that he committed it in furtherance of that membership.' United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 671 (2d Cir.2001). 75 In this case, there was extensive testimony at trial that acts of violence were a common part of KMD's culture and that members were expected to retaliate against acts of violence committed on fellow members. In addition, there was testimony that members of KMD felt pressure to live up to their KMD nicknames— and it is undisputed that Mr. Smith was the King of KMD. Mr. Smith, however, argues that because he was already the leader of KMD, he could not have ordered the murder to increase his position in the gang. We disagree. A conviction under § 1959(a) will stand even when the underlying crime was sanctioned by a high-ranking leader of the RICO enterprise, if the high-ranking leader was expected to act and any failure to do so would have undermined his position in the enterprise. See Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 671-72. We find this to be the case here. A reasonable jury, therefore, could have concluded that Mr. Smith ordered the murder of Mr. Miera to maintain or increase his position in KMD.