Opinion ID: 2336542
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Reverse Amenability Determination

Text: Under 10 Del. C. § 512(b)(1)a., the Superior Court may designate a Commissioner to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the Court, except a motion for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and to involuntarily dismiss an action. Where the Commissioner determines a matter pursuant to a referral under subsection (1)a., the Superior Court may then review the Commissioner's determination under an abuse of discretion standard. In this instance, the matter referred to the Commissioner involved whether jurisdiction over Franklin should remain in the Superior Court, or whether it should be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Family Court. That is, unless the Commissioner determined that the defendant was not amenable to rehabilitation as a delinquent in Family Court, the Superior Court would be stripped of jurisdiction and the charges against the defendant would be transferred to Family Court. This would result in a de facto dismissal of the charges in Superior Court. For that reason, we conclude that the reverse amenability hearing is a potentially case dispositive pretrial motion that may not be referred to the Commissioner under 10 Del. C. § 512(b)(1)a. If this matter was properly referred to the Commissioner, then, it must be pursuant to another statutory provision. Under § 512(b)(1)b., A judge may also designate a Commissioner to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the Court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the Court, of any motion excepted in subparagraph a. of this paragraph.... In other words, a case dispositive pretrial motion prohibited under subsection a. may be referred to the Commissioner under subsection b., not for determination, but instead for findings of fact and recommendations for ... disposition. Because we conclude that the reverse amenability hearing was a potentially case dispositive pretrial motion prohibited from reference to the Commissioner under § 512(b)(1)a., it therefore must have been referred for recommendation under § 512(b)(1)b. Under the authority of that subsection, the Commissioner does not make a determination, that is, the decision of the Commissioner is not a decision at allthe Commissioner merely makes recommendations. A judge must still undertake his or her own review of the recommendations of the Commissioner issued pursuant to § 512(b)(1)b., and it is that decision which forms the opinion of the Court based upon which the Court may retain jurisdiction or transfer the matter to Family Court. [5] Pursuant to statute, the Court must consider all factors that it deems relevant to the proposed transfer of jurisdiction over the child to the Family Court, including: (1) The nature of the present offense and the extent and nature of the defendant's prior record, if any; (2) The nature of past treatment and rehabilitative efforts and the nature of the defendant's response thereto, if any; and (3) Whether the interests of society and the defendant would be best served by trial in the Family Court or in the Superior Court. [6] Here, the decision of the Superior Court, expressed in the June 19 Order, conveys nothing about how the presiding judge viewed the application of these and other relevant factors. Although he stated that he had reviewed the matter de novo, the presiding judge merely (a) recited the Commissioner's conclusion that the transfer to Family Court would be neither in the best interest of the defendant nor society, (b) stated that he had considered the Commissioner's report together with the defendant's written objections to the report and the State's response, and then (c) concluded that having conducted a de novo review of the proceedings I adopt [the Commissioner's] well-reasoned report and recommendation. [7] If the presiding judge were reviewing a report of the Commissioner under § 512(b)(1)a., which empowers the Court to reconsider whether a Commissioner's order is based on findings of fact that are clearly erroneous, or is contrary to law or an abuse of discretion, the presiding judge's June 19 Order adopting the Commissioner's report and recommendation might be appropriate. As we have found, however, this matter was necessarily referred to the Commissioner under § 512(b)(1)b. Under that subsection, a report of the Commissioner, no matter how rigorously considered or well reasoned, is merely precatory. Unlike a determination under subsection a., the Commissioner's report and recommendation under subsection b. is not a decision of the Court. Only the presiding judge's order could have that binding effect. Unfortunately, the June 19 Order on its face is insufficient. The presiding judge failed to identify what factors, whether statutorily required or statutorily permitted, influenced his determination that Franklin, a 14 year old boy, was not amenable to Family Court jurisdiction. Nor did the presiding judge identify or address the defendant's written objections to the Commissioner's report in his Order denying transfer to the Family Court. The issue that was the subject of the June 19 Order is no small matter. If, as the defendant sought, the matter had been commended to the jurisdiction of the Family Court, the issue for trial would have been the delinquency of the child and what rehabilitation measures were appropriate in light of that delinquency. If, on the other hand, the child was found non-amenable to the Family Court jurisdiction, as the State urged, he would be tried as an adult in Superior Court on three very serious felony charges, and would face as a maximum penalty that which he ultimately received: imprisonment for 30 years. The gravity of the amenability decision and its potential affect on a child of Franklin's age can hardly be overstated. Because the report of the Commissioner, however well reasoned, was purely precatory and because the presiding judge failed to articulate in any way his reasons for adopting the Commissioner's recommendations and for rejecting the defendant's written objections, this Court cannot engage in a meaningful review. We cannot evaluate whether or not the presiding judge's Order is based upon erroneous findings of fact, is contrary to law, or represents an abuse of discretion. [8] For these reasons, it is necessary to remand this matter to the Superior Court for an independent, articulated determination of the defendant's amenability to Family Court jurisdiction.