Opinion ID: 582735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Should the Trial Court Have Suppressed Evidence of a 9

Text: 65 MM Handgun Found in Defendant's Automobile at the 66 Time of His Arrest? 67 Appellant challenges the admission of evidence showing that he was in possession of a loaded pistol when arrested. The handgun was uncovered immediately after defendant had left his apartment where the cocaine and other firearms were later found by agents executing a search warrant. After a bench conference outside of the presence of the jury, the trial court found that the evidence was probative as to defendant's intent, knowledge, and use of the weapons found in his bedroom. Finding that the probative value of the evidence outweigh[ed] the prejudicial effect, R.Vol. II at 69-71, the trial court allowed the evidence. In evaluating the trial court's admission of evidence, we are bound to uphold the trial court unless we find an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983, 987 (10th Cir.) (decision whether to exclude evidence as being unfairly prejudicial is one for which trial judge is particularly well-suited), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 160, 112 L.Ed.2d 125 (1990). The trial court is given broad discretion in determining whether evidence is relevant and whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs any unfair prejudice to the defendant. We find no abuse of discretion here. 68 Although appellant contends that there was never any showing that the[re] was any connection between the 9 mm. handgun and the drug trafficking charges, Appellant's Brief at 45, we believe that the handgun was indeed relevant to defendant's possession, knowledge and ownership of the firearms found in the bedroom in the apartment. R.Vol. II at 70. Faced with almost identical circumstances in United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir.1990), this court agreed with several other circuits that firearms are generally admissible in a drug conspiracy trial because they are 'tools of the trade' for those engaged in illegal drug activity. Id. at 1420 (citations omitted). Although we noted that such a broad proposition must not substitute for a more detailed case-by-case analysis under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, id., we were persuaded that the admission of the weapons was proper. We reach the same conclusion here. 69 In this case, we think the handgun may indeed have been relevant to determining whether the guns seized in the bedroom were merely collateral or protection for appellant's drug trade. Although we agree with appellant that such evidence may have carried the potential for jury prejudice, we cannot say that it was error for the district court to conclude that the probative value of the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect.... R.Vol. II at 71. Moreover, we note that the prejudicial effect of such evidence might have been further minimized by a jury instruction limiting the use of the handgun. However, appellant never requested such an instruction, either at the time the evidence was admitted or at the conclusion of the case. He has accordingly waived this aspect of the issue. Since we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow evidence and testimony of the 9 mm. handgun, we affirm the trial court. 70