Opinion ID: 2742021
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: SSL’s Appeal

Text: On appeal, SSL asserts that the district court erred in failing: (1) to grant SSL’s motion for a new trial on infringement of claim 27 of the ’796 Patent, and (2) to find that SSL was the prevailing party.
a) Destination Address The district court construed “destination address” as “the network address of a computer or server.” SSL Servs., 816 F. Supp. 2d at 385. In support, it pointed to the claim language, finding that the phrase “destination address” refers to the address on the network of the claimed second client computer. Id. at 386. Turning to the written description, the district court emphasized the distinction between the terms “destination” and “destination address.” Id. The district court explained that to construe “destination address” the same as “destination” would write the term “address” out of the former term. Id. It further clarified that the network address is not limited to Internet Protocol (“IP”) based protocols, concluding that the claimed invention may use non-IP based protocols. Id. SSL SERVICES, LLC v. CITRIX SYSTEMS, INC. 13
Although SSL agrees that “[t]he plain meaning of ‘destination address’ is the address of the destination— here, the second client computer or server,” it asserts that the district court erred in interpreting the term to require a network address, and then further equating “network address” with IP address. Appellant Br. 45–47. SSL argues that the district court should adopt its construction: an “[i]dentifier for a desired location.” Appellant Br. 48; see also SSL Servs., 816 F. Supp. 2d at 385. Citrix responds that the district court correctly construed the claim language in the context of a claim covering transmissions between computers on an open network as a network address of a computer. We agree with Citrix that the district court correctly construed the term “destination address.” To determine the scope and meaning of the asserted claims, we look to the words of the claims, the specification, the prosecution history, and any relevant extrinsic evidence. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We find the claim language regarding the destination address informative. Claim 27 requires “means for transmitting data to and receiving data from an open network.” ’796 Patent col. 20 ll. 49–53. The claim further states “intercepting a destination address during initialization of communications between said one of said client computers and a second of said client computers on said virtual private network,” and “transmitting the encrypted files directly to the destination address.” Id. at col. 20 l. 66–col. 21 l. 2, col. 22 ll. 4–5. Consequently, the destination address is the address for a second client computer on the network, which is the network address of that specific computer. Furthermore, the language of transmitting the files directly to the destination address that is intercepted during the initialization of communications suggests that the destination address allows transmission to the target client computer without having to distin14 SSL SERVICES, LLC v. CITRIX SYSTEMS, INC. guish or differentiate through various internal identifiers or other methods to determine where those files need to be delivered. This requires the destination address to be the network address. The written description further supports the district court’s construction. It states that the most commonly used set of software routines for the transport or TDI layer is the transport control protocol (“TCP”)/IP protocol, where the TCP packages the data into datagrams and provides addressing functions, and the IP “further packages those datagrams into packets by adding additional headers used in routing the packets to a destination address.” ’796 Patent col. 3 ll. 16–24. The written description also describes other transport protocols that can be used, including the user diagram protocol (“UDP”), the internet control message protocol, and non-IP based protocols such as Netbeui or IPX. Id. col. 3 ll. 24–28. It further states that “the shim 55 intercepts IP packets from applications . . . [and] checks the destination address (which can be in TCP format, UDP format, and so forth).” Id. col. 10 ll. 45–48. This language suggests that the “destination address” is a part of the address portion of data packets in a network address format. Therefore, we conclude that the district court correctly construed the term “destination address” to mean “network address.” While SSL alleges that the district court’s construction limited the format to an IP format, we disagree. As discussed above, the district court clarified that “the claimed invention is not limited to IP-based protocols and may use non-IP based protocols.” SSL Servs., 816 F. Supp. 2d at 386. Although the district court focused on how the accused products use IP-based protocols during its infringement analysis, the district court properly did not limit the construction of the term “destination address” to an IP address. SSL SERVICES, LLC v. CITRIX SYSTEMS, INC. 15
SSL argues that even if we agree that the district court correctly construed the term “destination address,” our analysis of the infringement verdict must continue. SSL asserts that it is entitled to a new trial if we agree that any one of the disputed claim constructions was erroneous, arguing that we must assess the constructions relating to all the disputed limitations before we can rest assured that the jury’s non-infringement finding was not infected by some error. Because the jury returned a general verdict of non-infringement after hearing multiple theories of non-infringement, SSL argues that “it would be impossible for this Court to discern whether the jury rested its verdict of non-infringement on the erroneous claim construction.” Appellant Br. 52. We agree that the general verdict rule applies with the same force in patent cases as it does in all other cases. We also agree that Citrix misreads our decision in Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010), which does not even address the general verdict rule or reach any conclusions regarding how that rule might have been implicated—or avoided—on the facts presented. 5 We find, however, that there is no evidence in the record from which a good faith argument can be made that the Citrix GoTo Products’ identifiers are “network addresses” as that term was construed by the 5 We specifically conclude that Verizon does not, as Citrix contends, stand for the proposition that a general verdict of non-infringement may be affirmed upon a decision that the district court’s challenged construction of even one claim term relating to a single claim limitation is correct. That is so only, where, as here, there is no argument and no evidence that substantial evidence might have supported a finding of non-infringement under the first challenged construction which we consider. 16 SSL SERVICES, LLC v. CITRIX SYSTEMS, INC. district court. Because we now affirm that construction, we conclude that, even if the district court erred in its construction of the other challenged limitations, the result the jury reached—the finding of non-infringement—would not change. In these circumstances, we soundly can base our conclusion that the non-infringement verdict stands on the fact that the single network address limitation is not practiced by the accused products. See Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“We may affirm the jury’s findings on infringement or validity issues if substantial evidence appears in the record supporting the jury’s verdict and if correction of the errors in a jury instruction on claim construction would not have changed the result, given the evidence presented.”). SSL seems to concede that it must show prejudice in the trial court’s instructions to the jury regarding the meaning of a relevant claim term before an erroneous instruction regarding any such term can justify disturbing a jury verdict. See, e.g., Ecolab Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., 285 F.3d 1362, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“A party seeking to alter a judgment based on erroneous jury instructions must establish that ‘those instructions were legally erroneous,’ and that ‘the errors had prejudicial effect.’”) (quoting Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1271, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). It implies, however, that prejudice must be presumed whenever a general verdict makes it impossible to discern on which specific limitation the jury rested its verdict of non-infringement. The cases upon which SSL relies do not give rise to such a presumption, however, and we know of no case law that creates one. The general verdict rule guards against the threat of a tainted or improper verdict. See SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Under the general verdict rule, where one or more of multiple claims is found legally invalid, a reviewing court must reverse and order a new trial if [the reviewing SSL SERVICES, LLC v. CITRIX SYSTEMS, INC. 17 court is] unable to determine whether the invalid theory tainted the verdict.”) (citation omitted), aff’d on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). But, the burden to establish that such a threat exists is on the party challenging the verdict. Ecolab, 285 F.3d at 1373. SSL has not satisfied the burden of establishing that an error in any other claim construction could have changed the verdict here if we conclude, as we have, that the “destination address” in claim 27 of the ’796 Patent means the “network address of a computer or server.” While SSL argued that the Citrix GoTo Products’ identifiers would infringe under SSL’s construction of “destination address” because they are “identifier[s] for a desired location,” SSL did not argue in its opening brief to this court that the GoTo Products would still infringe under the district court’s construction. See Appellant Br. 48–49. Not until its reply did SSL contend that the jury might have found that the Citrix GoTo Products met the destination address limitation as construed by the district court. Appellant Reply Br. 32–33. And, even then, SSL failed to point to testimony or evidence in the record upon which such a finding could be predicated. 6 Accordingly, we find that SSL waived the argument that the jury could have found that the GoTo Products met the destination address limitation under the district court’s construction. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Our law is well established that arguments not raised in the opening brief are waived.” (citation omitted)). Even if this argument was not waived, moreover, all relevant evidence supports the finding that the Citrix 6 While SSL cites to the trial court’s refusal to grant summary judgment or otherwise take the question of infringement from the jury, those orders are not the same as record evidence. 18 SSL SERVICES, LLC v. CITRIX SYSTEMS, INC. GoTo Products’ identifiers 7 are not “network addresses” that are intercepted during initialization of communications between the first and second client computer where the encrypted files are transmitted directly. First, there is no dispute that the Citrix GoTo Identifiers are not IP addresses. The GoTo Products, however, use IP-based protocols. Accordingly, the network addresses of the client computers running the GoTo Products necessarily are the respective IP addresses. Therefore, because the GoTo Identifiers are not the IP addresses of the client computers, the record commands the finding that the Citrix GoTo Products do not contain the “destination address” limitation. Second, the first client computer never knows the IP address of the second client computer based on the GoTo Identifiers. Only the intermediary, such as a broker or communications server, knows the second client computer’s IP address. Accordingly, the GoTo Products could neither intercept nor provide the network address to direct the encrypted files. Because the GoTo Identifiers are not the IP address of the second client computer, the “destination address” limitation is simply not met. SSL proffers no facts or evidence to support a contrary conclusion. Consequently, we affirm the denial of SSL’s motion for a new trial on infringement of the ’796 Patent, without considering the “intercepting” and step order limitations. 8
We review the district court’s determination of whether a party is the “prevailing party” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 de novo. 7 MeetingID, SessionID, MachineNameKey, or QuickConnectID (collectively, “GoTo Identifiers”). 8 We do not imply that the trial court’s construction of those terms was erroneous, we simply do not reach those questions. SSL SERVICES, LLC v. CITRIX SYSTEMS, INC. 19 See Shum v. Intel Corp., 629 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Inland Steel Co. v. LTV Steel Co., 364 F.3d 1318, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In a patent case, Federal Circuit law governs the determination of which party has prevailed. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (“Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs— other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party”); Manildra Milling Corp. v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc., 76 F.3d 1178, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1996). To be the “prevailing party,” we require: (1) that the party “received at least some relief on the merits,” and (2) “[t]hat relief must materially alter the legal relationship between the parties by modifying one party’s behavior in a way that ‘directly benefits’ the opposing party.” Shum, 629 F.3d at 1367 (citations omitted); see also Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992) (“[A] plaintiff ‘prevails’ when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.”). A party does not need to prevail on all claims to qualify as the prevailing party. See Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales Del Centro S.A. de