Opinion ID: 2075955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Uniformity of construction.

Text: In support of its uniformity argument, Riggs relies on Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Cranston, 58 Cal.2d 462, 374 P.2d 819, 24 Cal.Rptr. 851 (1962) (en banc) (per Traynor, J.) and three later decisions which have adopted the reasoning of that case and reached the same result. [14] In Douglas, the court was construing a statute which, like Section 42-229(a) in our own Act, provided that the expiration of the statute of limitations shall not prevent the money or property from being presumed abandoned property or affect the holder's duty to report or deliver it. Rejecting the contrary claim of the State Controller, the court held that [t]his section does not expressly provide that it shall be retroactive or apply to claims that were already barred when it was enacted. Accordingly, under section 3 of the code [15] ... it must be interpreted as applying only to claims on which the statute of limitations had not run on the effective date of the Act, Id. at 466, 374 P.2d at 822, 24 Cal.Rptr. at 854. We would have no reluctance in following Judge Traynor's characteristically well-reasoned opinion if our own statutory framework were the same as that in California, Illinois and Alabama, but it is not. Aside from Section 42-229, which is substantially identical to the California provision construed in Douglas (and to comparable provisions in Illinois and Alabama), our Section 42-201 provides that the District's UPA applies to any and all personal property which is abandoned, without regard to any maximum length of time for which such property was abandoned or to any statute [of limitations]. (Emphasis added). The italicized language, as we have noted, means that the bill properly reaches back to authorize transfer to the District of all mentioned property which has been unclaimed for the defined minimum number of years or longer. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra, at 10 (emphasis added). By its terms, Section 42-201 embraces property abandoned for a hundred years, and the statute of limitations expired on such property a very long time ago. Accordingly, we think that the express provision found lacking in Douglas is present here. [16] The Judiciary Committee was aware of the Douglas case and of the Knight [17] decision in which the Supreme Court of Illinois followed Douglas; both cases are cited in the legislative history. Id. at 31. Immediately after that discussion, the Report continues: Even where the statute of limitations has run on the property prior to the effective date of the act, if the holder does not enforce the statute against the owner it must report and deliver the property to the state. See South Carolina Tax Commission v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 266 S.C. 34, 221 S.E.2d 522 (1975). Id. The Report then refers the reader back to the earlier discussion of the reach of the Act: Section 101 also makes clear that holders are required to report and deliver such property to the Mayor without regard to the District's statute of limitations (D.C. Code sec. 12-301) lest there be any confusion in that regard. Id. at 10. With a statute that by its terms covers property abandoned for a century or a millennium, legislative history which at least arguably rejects the applicability of the Douglas line of cases, and a bank which does not enforce the statute against original owners, [18] we do not believe that Riggs' plea for uniformity of interpretation can prevail; dissimilar statutes are not to be similarly construed.