Opinion ID: 1267767
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffective Assistance with Respect to Sentencing

Text: Libberton argued to the district court that his counsel at trial and sentencing, George Lim, was unconstitutionally ineffective. He appeals the denial of his ineffectiveness claim only as to sentencing. Partly in reliance on the evidence not presented to the state court and excluded by the district court, we conclude that Libberton's representation with respect to sentencing was unconstitutionally ineffective.
[13] Before reaching the merits of Libberton's IAC claim, we note two things. First, the state court's order denying his IAC claims was unreasoned. That order provided no citations to state or federal law and simply noted that defendant received nothing but effective assistance of three very experienced and qualified criminal attorneys. Libberton had only one attorney at trial and at sentencing; we assume that the court was also referring to his appellate counsel. The state court concluded, without addressing any of Libberton's arguments or evidence, that nothing defendant has raised in his current petition for post-conviction relief would have affected the outcome of the trial or the sentencing. Given this lack of reasoning, we independently review the record to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of Supreme Court law. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir. 2009). We also note that the state court did not have before it some of the evidence that is now before us. This new evidence, which Libberton diligently pursued but did not discover while in state court, adds substantially to Libberton's ineffectiveness arguments. Second, a common shorthand for an IAC claim is ineffective assistance during the penalty phase. If taken literally, this shorthand is misleading. The question is whether a defendant's counsel was ineffective with respect to the penalty imposed, irrespective of when during the proceedings the counsel was ineffective. It is often the case that a counsel's ineffectiveness is manifested during the penalty phase, as the common shorthand suggests. For example, defense counsel may have failed to discover a witness who would have testified favorably during the penalty phase. But ineffectiveness is often manifested earlier. For example, defense counsel may have failed to discover impeaching evidence that could have been used against an unfavorable witness who testified during the guilt phase, and which would have portrayed the defendant in a light that would have assisted him at the penalty phase. As we wrote in Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1210 (9th Cir. 2005), The combination of counsel's guilt and penalty phase deficiencies . . . den[ied] Daniels effective representation and prejudiced the outcome of his penalty phase trial. See also Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586, 619 (5th Cir. 1999) ([C]ounsel's deficient performance, including counsel's performance during the guilt phase of Moore's trial, prejudiced the outcome of the punishment phase of Moore's trial.); Slagle v. Bagley, 475 F.3d 501, 528 (6th Cir. 2006); Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1208-09 (10th Cir. 2003).
[14] Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), provides that, in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, one must show both deficient performance and prejudicial effect. To establish deficient performance, a defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688. To establish prejudice he must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. Three recent Supreme Court opinions address an attorney's obligation to conduct an investigation in preparation for a sentencing hearing in a capital case. All three cases were decided under the standards established in AEDPA. First, in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395 (2000), an attorney's representation during the sentencing phase fell short of professional standards. The Supreme Court explained that defendant's counsel failed to conduct an investigation that would have uncovered extensive records graphically describing Williams' nightmarish childhood, not because of any strategic calculation but because they incorrectly thought that state law barred access to such records. Id. Had this investigation occurred: the jury would have learned that Williams' parents had been imprisoned for the criminal neglect of Williams and his siblings, that Williams had been severely and repeatedly beaten by his father, that he had been committed to the custody of the social services bureau for two years during his parents' incarceration (including one stint in an abusive foster home), and then, after his parents were released from prison, had been returned to his parents' custody. Id. The Court noted that [o]f course, not all of the additional evidence was favorable to Williams. Id. at 396. The Court disagreed with the state court's analysis of prejudice, noting that it was unreasonable insofar as it failed to evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceedingin reweighing it against the evidence in aggravation. Id. at 397-98. The Court held that if all the mitigation evidence had been presented to the jury, it might well have influenced the jury's appraisal of his moral culpability, and that [m]itigating evidence unrelated to dangerousness may alter the jury's selection of penalty, even if it does not undermine or rebut the prosecution's death-eligibility case. Id. at 398. [15] Second, in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003), defendant's IAC claim stem[med] from counsel's decision to limit the scope of their investigation into potential mitigating evidence. The state argued that the limited investigation reflect[ed] a tactical judgment not to present mitigating evidence at sentencing and to pursue an alternative strategy instead. Id. The Court rejected this argument. The Court noted that Wiggins's counsel investigated three sources of mitigating evidence: a psychologist's report, the presentence report, and social service records. Id. at 523. Despite the fact that funds were available, Wiggins's counsel did not order a report from a forensic social worker. Id. at 524. The Court further noted that ABA Guidelines require that investigations into mitigating evidence should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor. Id. (quotation marks omitted). The Court concluded that [t]he record of the actual sentencing proceedings underscores the unreasonableness of counsel's conduct by suggesting that their failure to investigate thoroughly resulted from inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment. Id. at 526. Given the fact that counsel did not investigate beyond the evidence described above, the Court concluded that they chose to abandon their investigation at an unreasonable juncture, making a fully informed decision with respect to sentencing strategy impossible. Id. at 527-28. The Court concluded that the mitigating evidence counsel failed to discover and present in this case is powerful, and that the failure to discover it was prejudicial. Id. at 534. Wiggins had been abused as a young child, including physical torment, sexual molestation, and repeated rape during his subsequent years in foster care. Id. at 535. Wiggins was also homeless for a time, and had diminished mental capacities. Id. Given both the nature and the extent of the abuse petitioner suffered, we find there to be a reasonable probability that a competent attorney, aware of this history, would have introduced it at sentencing in an admissible form. Id. Had the jury been able to place petitioner's excruciating life history on the mitigating side of the scale, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance. Id. at 537. Third, in Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381 (2005), the Court described the defense attorney's pre-sentence investigation, noting that [t]his is not a case in which defense counsel simply ignored their obligation to find mitigating evidence. Defense counsel interviewed some members of Rompilla's family and examined the reports of three mental health experts. In all, Rompilla's lawyers spoke with five members of Rompilla's family in a detailed manner in an attempt to unearth mitigating information. Id. Those family members, however, didn't really feel as though they knew him all that well. Id. at 382. During Rompilla's post-conviction process, new counsel pursued evidence that his trial counsel had never investigated, including school records, records of Rompilla's juvenile and adult incarcerations, and evidence of Rompilla's history of alcohol abuse. Id. Most important, Rompilla's postconviction attorneys investigated the court file on Rompilla's prior conviction, which his trial counsel had not done. Id. at 383. The Court concluded that the unexamined court file led to mitigating evidence of sufficient persuasive power that counsel's ineffective assistance had prejudiced Rompilla. The file revealed that both Rompilla's parents were severe alcoholics who drank constantly, and that Rompilla's father frequently beat Rompilla's mother. Id. at 391-92. Rompilla's father abused him physically and verbally. Id. at 392. Medical experts discovered that Rompilla had organic brain damage and had likely suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome. Id. The Court concluded that [t]his evidence adds up to a mitigation case that bears no relation to the few naked pleas for mercy actually put before the jury, and although we suppose it is possible that a jury could have heard it all and still have decided on the death penalty, that is not the test. Id. at 393. Since the mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, might well have influenced the jury's appraisal of [Rompilla's] culpability, the Court remanded either for resentencing or for stipulation to a life sentence. Id. (quotation omitted and alteration in original).
[16] Under the Court's analysis in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, Lim's performance at Libberton's sentencing hearing was deficient. Lim called only two mitigating witnesses, both of whom were only tenuously connected to Libberton. One had not seen Libberton in ten years. The other was the mother of an ex-girlfriend. Lim did not interview Libberton's sister, who could have been easily located. And while Lim did talk with Libberton's mother, he did not ask her to testify. As a consequence, the only information from Libberton's family that made its way to the judge was contained in the PSR. The PSR contained Libberton's father's damning conclusion that his son is a liar and a thief. The PSR paraphrased Libberton's father as stating that he does not doubt that the defendant actually committed this crime and, in fact, believes [Libberton] may have been the leader in planning the crime. Lim made no attempt to impeach the father's comments. [17] Lim also did not pursue evidence of James's primary responsibility for the crime. He said at the sentencing hearing that Libberton had not been the driving force behind the murder, but he did not present any testimony or evidence to that effect. He could have interviewed a number of witnesses, all of whom would have confirmed James's violent nature and mental state on the day of the crime. Lim also did not investigate Norton's background; as seen above, Norton described Libberton at trial as an equal participant with James in Maya's murder. If Lim had conducted an adequate investigation of Norton's background, he would have discovered powerful psychological evidence showing Norton to be an unreliable witness. [18] The Supreme Court has found deficient performance even where a lawyer did far more than Lim did in this case. The Court in Rompilla wrote, This is not a case in which defense counsel simply ignored their obligation to find mitigating evidence, and their workload as busy public defenders did not keep them from making a number of efforts, including interviews with Rompilla and some members of his family, and examinations of reports by three mental health experts who gave opinions at the guilt phase. 545 U.S. at 381. The Court went on to specify that the lawyers spoke with five members of Rompilla's family (his former wife, two brothers, a sister-in-law, and his son). Id. [19] Lim's deposition, in conjunction with the minimal presentation of mitigating evidence at Libberton's sentencing, conclusively establishes that Lim's performance was worse than that of the attorneys in Rompilla. During the four months between conviction and the sentencing hearing, Lim spent very little time preparing for sentencing. In his deposition, Lim did not recall interviewing any witnesses for trial, and only a very few witnesses for sentencing. The two witnesses he did present at sentencing had only tangential knowledge of Libberton's family history, and had no knowledge whatsoever about the details of the crime and Libberton's role in it. Lim obtained funds to hire an investigator, but the investigator never interviewed anyone. Lim acknowledged in his deposition that [p]erhaps it might have helped to interview a couple of the witnesses. He further admitted in his deposition that he never interviewed Norton, and that he never tried to talk to anybody to find out background information about Norton, whether he was a truthful person. No possible strategy could justify this lack of diligence in pursuing mitigating evidence. Under Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, Lim's conduct fails the first prong of Strickland.
[20] The state PCR court and the federal district court concluded that Libberton had failed to establish prejudice. We disagree. The Supreme Court has explained that the prejudice inquiry requires us to reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534. We therefore begin by recounting the evidence that was presented to the jury. We then describe the evidence Lim failed to discover and present, and analyze how that evidence would have materially changed the sentencing calculus.