Opinion ID: 4517909
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ward v. Tilly’s, Inc.

Text: While this appeal was pending, the California Court of Appeal published Ward v. Tilly’s, Inc., 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461. Ward addressed a question closely similar to one in this case: whether retail store employees were due reporting time pay pursuant to Wage Order 7 when they contacted the store two hours before their Call-In shift (i.e., “on-call” shift) started—as required by their employer—and were told not to come to work. Ward, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 463–65. The court “conclude[d] that the on-call scheduling alleged . . . triggers Wage Order 7’s reporting time pay requirements,” reasoning that such shifts “burden employees, who cannot take other jobs, go to school, or make social plans during oncall shifts—but who nonetheless receive no compensation . . . unless they ultimately are called in to work. This is precisely the kind of abuse that reporting time pay was designed to discourage.” Id. at 463–64. The dissent in Ward maintained that the drafters’ intent behind the wage order was to require a worker to physically appear at the workplace to qualify for reporting time pay. Id. at 479–80. Relying on the “plain meaning of the word ‘report,’” Ward, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 480 (quoting Casas v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, LLC, No. CV 14-6412- GW(VBKx), 2014 WL 12644922, at  (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2014)), the partial dissent reasoned that reporting for work required “physically showing up at the place ready to work,” Ward, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 480 (quoting Casas, 2014 WL (2) hours of work on the second reporting”). Because the district court did not consider this claim, we do not address it here. On remand, the district court may address this claim as appropriate. 12 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC. 12644922, at ), by definition excluding Call-In shifts from the wage order’s reporting time pay requirements. The California Supreme Court denied a petition for review in Ward. We follow Ward to resolve the parties’ dispute about the meaning of “report for work” under subsection (5)(A) of Wage Order 7. As a federal court, we are not “free to choose [our] own rules of decision whenever the highest court of the state has not spoken.” Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. at 236. Instead, “[w]here an intermediate appellate state court rests its considered judgment upon the rule of law which it announces, that is a datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.” Id. at 237; Torrance Nat. Bank v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 251 F.2d 666, 669 n.6 (9th Cir. 1958) (“This decision on local law by a highly respected intermediate court of appeal must be accorded great weight.”). “This is the more so where, as in this case, the highest court has refused to review the lower court’s decision.” Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. at 237; see also Ogden Martin Sys., Inc. v. San Bernardino Cty., 932 F.2d 1284, 1289 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We are less strictly compelled to follow intermediate appellate decisions when those decisions have not been appealed to the state’s highest court.”). Even if it is arguable that the California Supreme Court “will at some later time modify the rule . . . [i]n the meantime the state law applicable to these parties and in this case has been authoritatively declared by the highest state court in which a decision could be had.” Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. at 238. 3 3 In Segal v. Aquent LLC, a district court held that calling in to work on assigned workdays is reporting for work within the meaning of the HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC. 13 Zumiez argues that we should not follow Ward because there is persuasive data that the California Supreme Court would reach a different conclusion. As we shall explain, we are aware of no such persuasive data. Alternatively, Zumiez argues that we should certify the question of interpreting Wage Order 7’s reporting time pay provision to the California Supreme Court—even though the California Supreme Court recently denied a petition for review in Ward, which presented that very question. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. at 237. Notably, there are no conflicting California Courts of Appeal decisions. See Contra Pooshs v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 561 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2009) (certifying a question where multiple California Courts of Appeal decisions spanning the course of two decades had produced split decisions); Estrella v. Brandt, 682 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir. 1982) (certifying a question where three California Courts of Appeal had construed the meaning of the applicable statute in different ways). Because we are the first federal appellate court to address this issue, there is no “sharp split of authority between the California Courts of Appeal and the Ninth Circuit regarding the proper interpretation of” state law. Emery v. Clark, 604 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010) (certifying a question where statute. No. 18-cv-346-LAB (JLB), 2018 WL 4599754, at  (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2018). In contrast, Casas v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, LLC, held that the reporting-time provisions of the wage order do not provide a remedy for employees who are required to call in to work but then not permitted to work. No. CV-14-6412-GW (VBKx), 2014 WL 12644922, at  (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2014). Disagreement among federal district courts does not persuade us that the California Supreme Court would decide the question differently than the California Court of Appeal, especially as it had the chance to do so after the district court decisions. See Daniel v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.3d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that we “must adhere to state court decisions—not federal court decisions—as the authoritative interpretation of state law”). 14 HERRERA V. ZUMIEZ, INC. “a conflict [had] been recognized by courts on both sides of the precedential divide”). We decline to certify the question because we have no reason to doubt that the California Supreme Court would reach an outcome consistent with Ward.