Opinion ID: 2350310
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: archuleta's petition for a writ of habeas corpus

Text: ¶ 18 A threshold question presented in this case is whether Archuleta's petition is governed by common law habeas rules or by the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act (the PCRA). Archuleta's position on this appeal is somewhat inconsistent. At times he argues for the application of common law standards, and at others he asserts that the PCRA applies. The issue is complicated by the fact that although the PCRA applies only to post-conviction proceedings filed after July 1, 1996, Archuleta's case includes both an initial petition filed before that date (March 10, 1994) and a second amended petition filed thereafter (June 14, 2002). We are thus faced with a question that the parties have raised but not fully briefed, which is whether the PCRA might apply to new claims raised for the first time in an amended petition filed after its effective date. The threshold question, in other words, is whether the relevant filing date of Archuleta's post-conviction proceeding is that of his first petition or that of the second amended petition adding new claims. ¶ 19 We need not reach that question, however, because, as demonstrated below, the habeas court's decisions can be (and are) affirmed under either common law habeas or PCRA standards. Thus, we decline to decide which regime governs in a case like this one where the original petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed before passage of the PCRA but a subsequent amended petition was filed after the PCRA went into effect. ¶ 20 For purposes of this case, the common law and PCRA standards are substantially equivalent. A common law petition for habeas corpus is a collateral attack of a conviction and/or sentence and is not a substitute for direct appellate review. Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, ¶ 6, 44 P.3d 626. Habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy; if the contention of error is known or should have been known to the petitioner at the time of judgment, it must be raised and appealed through the regular and prescribed procedure[.] [O]therwise[,] the regular rules of procedure governing appeals would be nullified. Id. ¶ 14. Thus, only under unusual circumstances should a court entertain for the first time a claim collaterally attacking a conviction or sentence in a habeas proceeding. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 21 Unusual circumstances arise where an obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right has occurred, irrespective of whether an appeal has been taken. Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035 (Utah 1989). [T]he unusual circumstances test was intended to assure fundamental fairness and to require reexamination of a conviction on habeas corpus when the nature of the alleged error was such that it would be unconscionable not to reexamine, and thereby to assure that substantial justice was done. Id. (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 22 One well-established unusual circumstance arises when allegedly incompetent counsel handled the trial and the direct appeal. Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989). Under such a circumstance, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim can properly be raised for the first time via habeas corpus. Id. This is because it is unreasonable to expect [an] attorney to raise the issue of his own incompetence, and the habeas corpus petition may be the first and only means for a defendant to raise challenges to his conviction. Id. ¶ 23 The PCRA contains a similar provision. Under the PCRA, a person who has been convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the conviction or sentence if the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-104(1)(d) (Supp. 2011). ¶ 24 In his habeas corpus petition, Archuleta raised thirty substantive challenges to his conviction and sentence. He also raised numerous ineffective assistance of counsel claims asserting that trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise at trial and on appeal each of Archuleta's thirty substantive claims. The habeas court interpreted Archuleta II to have revived only Archuleta's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. With respect to those claims, moreover, the court found that Archuleta could not demonstrate that counsel did indeed render ineffective assistance under the United States Supreme Court case of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). ¶ 25 We review an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower court's conclusions of law. Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, ¶ 13, 156 P.3d 739 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, [w]hen confronted with ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we review a lower court's purely factual findings for clear error, but [we] review the application of the law to the facts for correctness. Id. For the reasons articulated below, we affirm the decisions of the habeas court.
¶ 26 In his second amended petition for habeas corpus, Archuleta raised forty-three claims, many with numerous subparts. The first thirty of those claims concerned issues that could have been, but were not, raised at trial or on appeal. Archuleta had raised all thirty of those claims in his first amended petition filed on August 11, 1994. Conceding that he did not raise these issues in his direct appeal, Archuleta argues that unusual circumstances justify our entertaining them now. Archuleta's substantive claims are the following: (1) The trial court's death-qualification of the jury ensured a jury that is more likely than not to convict and impose the death penalty. (2) The trial court erroneously removed for cause a juror whose views on the death penalty were not strong. (3) The trial court erroneously failed to grant Archuleta's challenge for cause of a juror who had demonstrated bias that impaired his ability to judge impartially. (4) The trial court erroneously failed to change venue of the trial. (5) The trial court should have excluded incriminating statements by Archuleta pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). (6) The trial court erroneously and prejudicially allowed testimony that Archuleta admitted to engaging in a sex act with Church. (7) The trial court committed error in admitting the autopsy report and allowing the jury access to the report during jury deliberations. (8) The trial court failed to clarify the jury instructions in response to a question from the jury. (9) The trial court provided an improper reasonable doubt instruction. (10) The prosecution committed misconduct in closing arguments during the guilt and sentencing phase of the trial. (11) The trial court erroneously failed to conduct hearings to determine juror misconduct during the penalty phase when it learned that a juror had been contacted about the case. (12) The trial court erroneously allowed the state to produce jailhouse informant testimony. [2] (13) The trial court erroneously allowed the jury to hear evidence regarding the victim's character and victim impact evidence. (14) The trial court failed to instruct the sentencing jury that aggravating circumstances had to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. (15) The trial court failed to give an instruction on residual doubt during the penalty phase. (16) The trial court improperly defined statutory mitigating circumstances in its instructions to the jury. (17) The trial court provided inadequate instructions in defining and considering mitigating evidence. (18) The trial court improperly incorporated all of the guilt-phase instructions, including the voluntary intoxication instruction, at the penalty phase. (19) The trial court improperly allowed the jury to double count aggravating circumstances. (20) The trial court failed to address Archuleta's competency to stand trial under a proper procedure. (21) Archuleta was improperly forcibly medicated at trial. (22) The death sentence was imposed and affirmed on appeal without a finding of facts in compliance with Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). (23) The state did not establish that Church was conscious throughout the totality of the assault, thus failing to establish that the murder was especially heinous. (24) Heinous, atrocious, or cruel as aggravating factors are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad as applied to acts committed after the victim has lost consciousness. (25) The Utah death penalty scheme improperly allows for consideration of non-statutory aggravating factors. (26) The Utah death penalty scheme improperly creates a presumption of death. (27) The Utah death penalty scheme improperly allows consideration at the penalty phase of any evidence deemed to have probative force. (28) The Utah death penalty scheme does not allow for genuine narrowing of the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty. (29) The trial court failed to ensure Archuleta's presence at all proceedings. (30) The trial court failed to ensure a complete appellate record. ¶ 27 After the filing of the first amended petition, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. On October 4, 1996, Judge Lynn W. Davis, who was then assigned to Archuleta's case, granted Respondent's motions and rejected all of Archuleta's claims. Archuleta appealed Judge Davis's ruling to the Utah Supreme Court. ¶ 28 In a short opinion, this court reversed on June 26, 1998. The court asserted that Archuleta's first amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus challeng[ed] his conviction on the ground that he had been denied his Sixth Amendment constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel both at the trial of his case and on the appeal of the conviction. Archuleta II, 960 P.2d 399 (Utah 1998). The court noted that Judge Davis had dismissed the petition on the ground that the claims asserted by Archuleta were procedurally barred because they could have been raised on direct appeal and were not. Id. The court therefore concluded that the district court erred in ruling that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was based on the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal, was barred. Id. The Archuleta II court made no reference to Archuleta's substantive (i.e., non-ineffective assistance of counsel) claims that comprise his first thirty claims in the present appeal. ¶ 29 The habeas court interpreted Archuleta II to revive only Archuleta's ineffective assistance of counsel claims and to foreclose all of Archuleta's other claims which could have been but were not raised at trial or on appeal. The court considered the Archuleta II court's silence on the substantive claims to mean that Judge Davis's holding dismissing those claims was final. The court cited for this proposition our holding in State v. Carter that an appellate court need not analyze and address in writing each and every argument, issue, or claim raised and properly before [it] on appeal. 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) (overruled on other grounds). Thus, according to the habeas court, with the exception of [Archuleta's] ineffective assistance of counsel claim[s], the [Utah Supreme] Court left undisturbed Judge Davis's ruling that the other claims in the first amended petition were procedurally barred. ¶ 30 Archuleta contends that this holding was incorrect and that Archuleta II revived all of his claims, even those not based on a theory of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, Archuleta claims error because the habeas court never examined any of his first thirty claims to determine whether any of them presented unusual circumstances that would exempt them from the procedural bar. But whether the habeas court examined Archuleta's substantive claims for unusual circumstances is not the question, for presumably Judge Davis did so (at least Archuleta has not indicated otherwise). Put differently, if the habeas court was correct that Archuleta II affirmed Judge Davis's dismissal of Archuleta's non-ineffective assistance of counsel claims, then there is no need to pass through them a second time, and it is irrelevant that the habeas court did not do so. ¶ 31 Second, Archuleta contends that by merely raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims that were premised on counsel's failure to raise the substantive claims contained in claims one through thirty, he thereby revived the substantive claims. As support for this creative argument, Archuleta cites a provision of the PCRA that states that a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35A-106(2) (since renumbered as § 78B-9-106(3) (Supp. 2011)). ¶ 32 Archuleta is simply wrong to assert that by raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim he thereby revives the underlying substantive claim upon which the ineffective assistance claim was premised. The cited statute clearly allows an otherwise procedurally barred airing of a substantive claim when it wasn't raised because of ineffective assistance of counsel. But there must first be a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. The mere allegation of ineffective assistance is not enough alone to revive the substantive claim. See Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 550 (Utah 1989) (declining to consider claim of jury bias on habeas review, but allowing claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise jury bias claim). And as we detail at length below, Archuleta has not shown ineffective assistance of counsel relating to any of substantive claims one through thirty. ¶ 33 Ultimately, Archuleta has not persuasively combated the habeas court's conclusion that Archuleta II forecloses further airing of Archuleta's substantive claims. In Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, 44 P.3d 626, we reiterated that this court reviews and decides each of the allegations of error raised in a death penalty case. Id. ¶ 5. That said, we need not analyze and address in writing each and every argument, issue, or claim raised. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). [I]f an issue raised depends upon essential principles that have already been established, we may well omit discussion of that issue. Use of this rule in capital punishment cases continues to be appropriate and important in enabling this Court, after fair and comprehensive review, to expeditiously focus judicial resources and energy on those critical or outcome-determinative issues. Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 34 This is what happened in Archuleta II. There, we reversed Judge Davis's dismissal of Archuleta's claims in partonly with respect to Archuleta's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We did not reverse Judge Davis's dismissal of Archuleta's substantive claims, even though we did not analyze them in a written opinion. Accordingly, the habeas court was correct to dismiss those claims as procedurally barred. [3] Archuleta has failed to demonstrate that any of the exceptions enumerated above apply in this case. We therefore conclude that because the first thirty claims raised in Archuleta's second amended petition duplicate claims Judge Davis rejected as procedurally barred, these thirty claims remain procedurally barred. [4] The habeas court, therefore, correctly concluded that Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on these thirty claims.
¶ 35 As noted above, absent unusual circumstances, a party may not raise issues in a habeas corpus petition that could or should have been raised on direct appeal. Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989). One such unusual circumstance exists when trial counsel represented the defendant on direct appeal and the defendant in a subsequent habeas proceeding contends that he had ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, on appeal, or both. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994). This rule is grounded in the rationale that trial counsel cannot reasonably be expected to raise the issue of his or her own incompetence on appeal. Id. Archuleta was represented by the same counsel at trial and on appeal, and his claims of ineffective assistance are accordingly properly before us. See Archuleta II, 960 P.2d at 399 (Utah 1998) (The district court erred in ruling that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was based on the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal, was barred.). ¶ 36 Archuleta asserted dozens of counts of ineffective assistance of counsel in the habeas court. The habeas court dismissed several of those claims on summary judgment either because Archuleta chose not to oppose summary judgment on them or because having rejected Archuleta's proffer of evidence on those claims as barred by the rules of evidence, the court deemed summary judgment to be unopposed. Archuleta contends that this sweeping dismissal of many of his claims was error. The habeas court also examined several of the claims for which Archuleta opposed summary judgment. The court granted Respondent summary judgment on all but one class of those claims based on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). After hearing evidence on the one remaining class of claims, the habeas court dismissed those claims for failure to satisfy Strickland. ¶ 37 Archuleta appeals the decision of the habeas court on eleven claims. He contends that his counsel: (1) failed to object to and raise on appeal improper closing arguments made by the prosecution; (2) failed to object to and raise on appeal inadequate supplemental jury instructions regarding object rape; (3) failed to object to or raise on appeal penalty phase jury instructions that improperly created the presumption that death was the appropriate penalty; (4) failed to argue at trial or on appeal that Utah's death penalty scheme does not adequately narrow the class of death-eligible murders and does not appropriately channel the capital sentencer's discretion; (5) failed to argue at trial or on appeal that the especially heinous aggravating circumstance is unconstitutional as applied to acts committed after the victim has lost consciousness; (6) failed to object to or raise on appeal the admission of the autopsy report; (7) failed to object to and raise on appeal the trial court's reasonable doubt jury instruction; (8) failed to object to and raise on appeal the trial court's failure to provide a jury instruction regarding the burden of proof as to the existence of aggravating circumstances; (9) failed to object to and raise on appeal the trial court's application of the guilt phase jury instructions to the penalty phase; (10) failed to object to and raise on appeal the trial court's double counting of aggravating circumstances; and (11) inadequately investigated and presented mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of the trial and failed to raise this issue on appeal. ¶ 38 In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining whether a criminal defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel has been violated. We restated that test as follows: To prevail, a defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988). We have applied this test in several cases. See, e.g., State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 1990); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989) (overruled on other grounds); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). ¶ 39 In evaluating counsel's performance under the first Strickland prong, we recognize `the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel [and] the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.' Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (alteration in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Accordingly, a defendant seeking to establish ineffective assistance of counsel must overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989). ¶ 40 To establish prejudice under Strickland 's second prong, a defendant must present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Templin, 805 P.2d at 187; Carter, 776 P.2d at 893-894. In cases where the defendant challenges a sentence of death, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. Reasonable probability means a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of the sentence. Parsons, 871 P.2d at 522. ¶ 41 The two-step Strickland test is moored in the purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to counselto ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, [T]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial. Absent some effect of challenged conduct on the reliability of the trial process, the Sixth Amendment guaranty is generally not implicated. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). Accordingly, unless a defendant satisfies both prongs of Strickland (deficient conduct of counsel and prejudice), it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. We therefore require[] defendants claiming ineffective assistance of counsel to affirmatively prove both prongs of the Strickland test to prevail. Parsons, 871 P.2d at 522. As a result, it is not necessary for us `to address both components of the inquiry' if we determine that a defendant has made `an insufficient showing on one.' Id. at 523 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). In the event it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, we will do so without analyzing whether counsel's performance was professionally unreasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. [5] ¶ 42 Finally, only one class of Archuleta's ineffective assistance of counsel claims survived summary judgment. All others were dismissed, either because Archuleta chose not to oppose summary judgment on certain claims, or because Archuleta had failed to present a genuine issue of material fact on one or both of the Strickland components. In order to avoid summary judgment on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Archuleta must demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to each prong of the Strickland test. Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c). ¶ 43 Any showing in support of summary judgment must preclude all reasonable possibility that the loser could, if given a trial, produce evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor. Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Ctr., Inc., 354 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah 1960). Only when it so appears, is the court justified in refusing such a party the opportunity of presenting his evidence and attempting to persuade the fact trier to his views. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). However, if the party moving for summary judgment satisfies his burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying the portions of the pleadings or supporting documents which [he] believes demonstrates an absence of a genuine issue of material fact, TS 1 P'ship v. Allred, 877 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), then the opposing party cannot simply rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. See id.; see also UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(e). ¶ 44 In the subsections that follow, we examine first whether the habeas court correctly dismissed on summary judgment the group of ineffective assistance of counsel claims for which Archuleta did not adequately oppose summary judgment. We next examine each claim that the habeas court examined and dismissed individually. Finally, we review the one claim that did survive summary judgment and that was rejected on its merits.
¶ 45 The habeas court summarily dismissed several of Archuleta's ineffective assistance of counsel claims because he did not properly oppose Respondent's motion for summary judgment on those claims. For some of the claims, Archuleta failed entirely to oppose summary judgment. On others, he opposed summary judgment by submitting affidavits that the habeas court disallowed for various reasons, including that they consisted of inadmissible hearsay evidence. Pursuant to rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the habeas court dismissed these claims for inadequately opposing summary judgment. ¶ 46 Archuleta claims error, asserting that rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply in this case, and that he accordingly was not required to set forth any specific facts showing that there was a genuine issue for trial on any of his claims. All he had to do, under this view, was to baldly assert an ineffective assistance claim and the district court would have to conduct hearings on those claims. He also alleges that he may rais[e] novel claims or theories of recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. (quoting Lafferty, 2007 UT 73, ¶ 47 n.5). ¶ 47 Archuleta purports to ground these standards in rule 65C, which governs proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under the [PCRA]. UTAH R. CIV. P. 65C(a). As Archuleta indicates, that rule provides that a court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death. Id. 65C(h)(4). According to Archuleta, this language demonstrates that the habeas court committed error when it dismissed his claims on summary judgment, and he should be allowed a hearing regarding each of his asserted claims. ¶ 48 This argument fails whether Archuleta's petition is governed by common law habeas corpus rules or by the PCRA. See supra ¶¶ 20-23. First, rule 65C does not apply to common law habeas corpus cases. Archuleta's claims would be governed instead by rule 65B, see UTAH R. CIV P. 65B(b) (Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, this paragraph shall govern all petitions claiming that a person has been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and the court may grant relief appropriate under this paragraph.), which expressly states that [n]othing in the rule shall be construed to prohibit the court from ruling upon the [habeas corpus] petition based upon a dispositive motion. Id. 65B(b)(6). Under rule 65B, a district court would be justified in invoking rule 56 in deciding whether to grant summary judgment. And rule 56(e) allows a district court to grant a motion for summary judgment on claims that are not adequately opposed. See id. 56(e) (When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response.). ¶ 49 Second, even if the PCRA were to apply to Archuleta's appeal, his argument that a district court may never render summary judgment in a death penalty case is simply wrong. To be sure, rule 65C applies to petitions for post-conviction relief governed by the PCRA. See id. 65C(a) (This rule governs proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under the [PCRA].). And rule 65C(h)(4) prohibits a district court from review[ing] for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death. But in referring to summary dismissal, rule 65C speaks not of the sort of summary judgment rendered by the habeas court in this case, but of an earlier screening mechanism that allows judges to weed out frivolous post-conviction claims that have a low likelihood of success. Rule 65C(h)(1) gives broader context to a judge's authority to summarily dismiss certain post-conviction claims. The assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face. Id. 65C(h)(1). Nothing in rule 65C prevents a district court from ruling on a dispositive summary judgment motion, however, provided that the nonmoving party is given the chance to respond. In fact, courts rule on summary judgment motions in PCRA cases all the time. See Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ¶ 57, 234 P.3d 1115; Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, ¶ 1, 194 P.3d 913; Lafferty, 2007 UT 73, ¶ 23. The habeas court justifiably followed this well-established pattern.
¶ 50 Archuleta appeals the habeas court's individual rejection of several of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. For the reasons provided below, we affirm each of the habeas court's challenged holdings.
¶ 51 In closing arguments before the sentencing jury, the prosecution depicted Archuleta as a callous killer who lit up a cigarette after realizing that Mr. Church was dead, as a cold indifferent killer who thought of Mr. Church as nothing more than a dead rabbit and [who] was deliberate, calculating and methodical, and as a person who, after the killing, returned home to have sex with his girlfriend. Archuleta contends that these statements were inappropriate and prejudicial under this court's decision in State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), and that his counsel should have objected to them. He also argues that his appellate counsel should have sought reversal on this basis. ¶ 52 The habeas court granted summary judgment on this claim because Archuleta proffered nothing in support of his burden to establish Strickland prejudice. Archuleta has shown no error in that ruling. The sum of his prejudice argument is that [p]rosecutorial misconduct occurred, together with the accompanying reasonable likelihood of prejudicing and influencing the jury. Merely repeating the legal prejudice standard is insufficient. See Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 877. Archuleta does nothing else. We affirm on that basis. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 ([A] court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.).
¶ 53 During the guilt phase, the jury asked the following question concerning object rape: Can participation in previous sexual acts which could have incited Wood to commit object rape be legally considered encouragement? The court answered: This is for you to determine as fact finders. You have instructions that can assist you. Archuleta contends that the trial court committed constitutional error by failing to adequately address the jury's question asked during jury deliberation, and that Archuleta's attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present this claim on appeal. ¶ 54 The habeas court rejected this claim because Archuleta did not demonstrate[] that a genuine issue of material facts existed concerning prejudice. Archuleta put forth only a terse statement that it remains to be seen after an evidentiary hearing is held in this case whether the `different outcome' prong will be satisfied. The court found this statement to be insufficient to find that Archuleta had demonstrated that a genuine issue exists on whether there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome as a result of trial counsel's failure to object or that, had the issue of trial counsel's failure been raised by appellate counsel, it probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal. ¶ 55 We agree with the habeas court's conclusion. A petitioner must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to establish a genuine issue. Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, ¶ 31, 54 P.3d 1054. In his briefs on this appeal, Archuleta adds nothing further to this claim, arguing opaquely that the direct appeal did not resolve how [this] issue impacts the question of effective assistance of counsel or the question of how that issue interacts with the other issues raised by the petition to undermine confidence in the guilty verdict, penalty verdict, or both. With these issues in doubt and unaddressed, Archuleta continues, summary judgment was inappropriate. Such general assertions of prejudice are insufficient to survive summary judgment. We accordingly affirm the habeas court's dismissal of this issue.
¶ 56 Archuleta contends that the penalty phase jury instructions improperly created a presumption that death was the appropriate penalty, because they insufficiently emphasized the second Wood elementthat a death sentence must be justified and appropriate, State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83 (Utah 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)and that his trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to raise this claim at trial or on appeal. The habeas court refused to reach this claim because Archuleta first raised it in opposition to summary judgment. ¶ 57 Archuleta's claim is without merit. In Wood, this court established the appropriate standard to be followed by the sentencing authority . . . in a capital case: After considering the totality of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, [1] you must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravation outweighs total mitigation, and [2] you must further be persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the imposition of the death penalty is justified and appropriate in the circumstances. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the penalty phase instruction in this case substantially tracked this language from Wood, and because we have not since disavowed this aspect of Wood, it is still good law and trial counsel's failure to object was not ineffective. ¶ 58 In so holding, we reject Archuleta's assertion that our decision in State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989), somehow superseded Wood. In that case, this court vacated a death sentence because the trial court failed entirely to apply the second Wood element. See id. at 1027 ( [T]he judge did not decide whether, based on all the circumstances, the death penalty was justified and appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt.). The Holland court described the purpose of the second Wood step as to determine whether the death penalty is appropriate under all the circumstances of the case and in light of the circumstances of the defendant's background and life as a whole. Id. The court then explained why that failure was important. [T]he Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not permit the death penalty to be imposed for every intentional homicide. To avoid having the first part of the Wood test produce an unduly broad application of the ultimate sanction, Wood also requires the sentencing authority to take a long, hard second look at the totality of the circumstances in light of societal values and the high value that this state and the Eighth Amendment place on the value of all human life and the humanity of every human being, no matter how depraved he or she may have become or how far he or she may have fallen from the norms of a civilized society. It is in applying the second part of the test that the sentencing authority may rely on leniency to refuse to impose the death penalty, even in the face of overwhelming aggravating evidence. After considering all aspects of the case, in addition to the particular aggravating and mitigating circumstances relied on by the State and the defendant, the sentencing authority must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the imposition of the death penalty is justified and appropriate in the circumstances. Thus, the sentencing authority may refuse to impose the death penalty even though it concedes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1028 (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Archuleta argues that this languageespecially the statement that the jury must examine the appropriateness of the death penalty in light of the circumstances of the defendant's background and life as a whole, id. at 1027should have been included in the jury instruction and that its omission violated Holland. We disagree. Holland did not displace Wood. It merely provided context for why including the second Wood step is so crucial. Because the trial court included both Wood steps in its jury instruction, we uphold the determination of the habeas court rejecting this claim.
¶ 59 Archuleta contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object and argue to the trial court that the Utah Death Penalty Scheme as contained in [Utah Code section] 76-5-202(1) does not narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and to channel the sentencer's discretion. He also contends that appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to raise this issue on appeal. According to Archuleta, Utah's death penalty scheme fails to narrow the class of death-eligible murders or properly channel the sentencing authority's discretion because (1) by stating so many broad categories of capital murder[,] . . . virtually all intentional murders qualify as aggravated, and (2) the standard set forth in Wood, and adopted by the legislature, fails to give . . . jurors adequate guidance in the imposition of the death penalty[] and permits so much juror subjectivity to enter into the decision as to virtually guarantee arbitrary results. ¶ 60 The claim that Utah's death penalty scheme fails to narrow the class of murders eligible for the death penalty is not a new one. This court has entertained and rejected that claim on multiple occasions. In State v. Arguelles, we rejected a similar claim, stating that [w]e have addressed challenges to Utah's . . . death penalty scheme and found [it] to be constitutional. 2003 UT 1, ¶ 127 63 P.2d 731. [6] ¶ 61 Noting the numerous cases from this court rejecting claims identical to Archuleta's, the habeas court held that trial counsel's decision not to raise them at trial was not unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. We agree and see no need to proceed to the second component of Strickland. Given our repeated rejection of this claim, Archuleta's trial and appellate counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel for electing not to bring a claim that had little or no chance of gaining any traction.
¶ 62 Archuleta next contends that one of the four aggravating circumstances found by the sentencing jury is vague and overbroad on its face and does not adequately channel the jury's discretion and protect against the arbitrary application of the death penalty. Specifically, Archuleta asserts that the especially heinous aggravating circumstance set forth in Utah Code section 76-5-202(1)(q) requires the victim to endure pain and suffering beyond that which is necessary to simply cause the victim's death. This aggravating circumstance is therefore unconstitutional, Archuleta argues, when applied to acts committed after a victim has lost consciousness. Because there was no showing at trial that Church was conscious during the entirety of the brutal assault, especially the violent object rape, Archuleta maintains that there was no showing that the the heinous assault on Church caused him to endure additional pain and suffering, and it would therefore be unconstitutional for the especially heinous aggravating circumstance to apply to Archuleta's case. ¶ 63 In granting summary judgment to Respondent on this issue, the habeas court observed that the question [w]hether the `especially heinous' aggravating circumstance requires that the victim have a conscious awareness of pain during the lethal attack has not been expressly answered by the Utah Supreme Court. It also noted that various state jurisdictions are split on the questionsome requiring the victim to consciously experience additional pain above and beyond that generally required to produce death, [7] and others holding that consciousness during a lethal attack is not required. [8] Reasoning from the language of the statute in question and the judicial glosses placed on the statute by this court, the habeas court sided with those courts that do not require conscious suffering to trigger the especially heinous aggravating circumstance. The court accordingly held that trial and appellate counsel did not render ineffective assistance for failing to raise this claim. We affirm. ¶ 64 At the time of Archuleta's trial, an intentional homicide was classified as a capital offense if it was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(q) (1989). The United States Supreme Court has held this language to be unconstitutionally vague, however, because [t]here is nothing in these few words. . . that implies any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980). In order to remedy this vagueness problem, the legislature amended the statute to clarify its meaning and to limit the types of cases to which the especially heinous aggravating circumstance could apply, adding that an especially heinous murder is one that is demonstrated by physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim before death. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(q) (1989). ¶ 65 This court placed an additional gloss on the new version of subpart (q) in State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1989). The court stated in Tuttle that if subpart (q) is interpreted too literally, it would include all murders not resulting in instantaneous death because all murders involve serious bodily injury. Id. at 1216. To avert this problem, the court further limited the range of murders that could qualify as especially heinous. An intentional homicide is committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner only if the facts demonstrate (1) that the defendant inflicted physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury [upon] the victim before death which is qualitatively and quantitatively different and more culpable than that necessary to accomplish the murder, and (2) that any of these forms of abuse were inflicted upon the victim while the defendant was in a mental state materially more depraved or culpable than that of most other murderers. Id. at 1216-17. Unless there is a convergence of serious physical abuse and a depraved mental state (both of which must exceed that which is normally required to intentionally kill the victim), the especially heinous aggravating circumstance is not applicable to the case. See id. at 1218. ¶ 66 Archuleta does not deny that he was in a depraved mental state at the time he inflicted the tire iron assault and other injuries upon Church. He only asserts that physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim must occur before he loses consciousness, a showing that was not made at trial. ¶ 67 We now hold that the especially heinous aggravating circumstance does not require that the victim have a conscious awareness of pain during the depraved attack. The only requirement that appears in the language of the statute is that the torture, physical abuse, or bodily injury occur prior to death. The statute says nothing of the victim's consciousness during the attack. We recognize that common definitions of physical torture involve the infliction of intense pain . . . to punish or coerce someone. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2414 (1986). And, as Archuleta points out, if Church was rendered unconscious by blows to his head, he would not have felt the pain of the multiple unnecessary and depraved assaults he endured between the time of his being rendered unconscious and his death. ¶ 68 We need not resolve whether the depraved infliction of physical injury on an unconscious person qualifies as torture under subpart (q), however. In addition to torture, that provision defines an especially heinous murder as one involving serious physical abuse and serious bodily injury. Those terms do not suggest that conscious awareness of pain is a necessary prerequisite to a finding that physical abuse or bodily injury occurred. Bodily injury, for example, is defined by statute as physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601(3) (2008) (emphasis added); and serious bodily injury is defined as bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death, id. § 76-1-601(10). When he rammed the tire iron into Church's rectum so far that it pierced his liver, Archuleta at a minimum impaired the function of one of Church's organs unnecessarily and with a depraved mental state. Under this analysis, Church could have been rendered completely unconscious by the blows to his head while still suffering physical abuse that is quantitatively greater and qualitatively more severe than the physical abuse necessary to accomplish an act of murder. See Boggs v. Commonwealth, 331 S.E.2d 407, 421 (Va. 1985) (For purposes of the `vileness' determination, it is immaterial whether the decedent remained conscious during the course of several assaults. The number or nature of the batteries inflicted upon the victim is the essence of the test whether the defendant's conduct was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved. . . an aggravated battery. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). ¶ 69 Accordingly, the habeas court did not err in granting summary judgment to Respondent on this claim. The prosecution was not required to demonstrate that Church was conscious at the time he was assaulted with the tire iron, and Archuleta's counsel thus did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by not raising this claim at trial or on direct appeal.
¶ 70 Archuleta next challenges trial counsel's failure to object to the admission of the autopsy report and appellate counsel's failure to raise this issue on appeal. To support these claims, Archuleta cites State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 643 (Utah 1995) (superseded by statute), for the proposition that a party who is allowed to admit evidence on a disputed issue in written form will be unfairly advantaged over the party who admits evidence on the issue in oral form only. Because the prosecution was permitted to admit the 21-page autopsy report, which detailed numerous of Church's horrific injuries, while the jurors were left to their collective recollection of the oral cross-examination of the medical examiner, Archuleta argues that the prosecution was given an unfair advantage that should have been prevented by a timely objection from trial counsel. ¶ 71 The habeas court rejected this claim and granted Respondent's summary judgment motion on this issue on both Strickland prongs. First, the habeas court noted that in State v. Kell , this court held that a medical examiner's report is not inadmissible on grounds of hearsay and lack of confrontation if the medical examiner relied on the report in her testimony at trial . . . [and] [d]efendant had ample opportunity to cross-examine her regarding the report itself. 2002 UT 106, ¶ 37. Because the medical examiner in Archuleta's case testified at trial and defense counsel cross-examined her, the habeas court held that it would have been futile to challenge the admissibility of the autopsy report in light of our holding in Kell. Accordingly, it was not unreasonable for counsel to choose to not challenge the admission of the autopsy report. ¶ 72 Moreover, as to the second Strickland component, the court noted that nowhere in his pleadings has [Archuleta] presented evidence demonstrating that there is a genuine issue with respect to the prejudice prongi.e., that counsel's failure would have had an effect on the outcome of the guilt or innocence phase of the trial, or that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether such a claim probably would have resulted in a reversal on appeal. Based on its conclusions regarding both Strickland prongs, the habeas court granted Respondent's motion for summary judgment on this issue. ¶ 73 We agree with both lines of analysis set forth by the habeas court, and we accordingly affirm the court's grant of summary judgment on this issue.
¶ 74 At both the guilt and penalty phases, the trial court instructed the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court defined reasonable doubt as follows: [A] reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason and common sense growing out of the evidence or lack of evidence in the case. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute certainty but requires that degree of proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. ¶ 75 Archuleta claims that his counsel should have challenged this definition both at trial and on appeal, and that failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Archuleta contends that the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction was constitutionally deficient insofar as it failed to affirmatively define the appropriate standard of proof. That is, the definition provided by the court failed to distinguish between what is required for a finding beyond a reasonable doubt, and a finding based upon lesser standards of proof, like the clear and convincing evidence or preponderance of the evidence standards. According to Archuleta, this makes the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction constitutionally deficient because, presumably, it allow[ed] a finding of guilt based upon a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause. Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990). ¶ 76 The habeas court dismissed this claim on summary judgment because Archuleta failed to demonstrate that there is any genuine issue of material fact related to whether the decision by either trial or appellate counsel to not raise this issue was reasonable under prevailing professional norms. Specifically, Archuleta, in opposing summary judgment, identified no authority indicating that a trial court must contrast the definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt with lesser standards of proof. ¶ 77 We affirm the habeas court's decision. It is well settled that the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. . . . [S]o long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (citations omitted). Constitutional problems arise only when courts incorrectly define reasonable doubt so that they effectively make the state's burden something less than beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 5-6. Thus, to establish ineffective assistance, Archuleta must prove that defense counsel overlooked an error in the instruction that made the state's burden lower than beyond a reasonable doubt. He has not done so. ¶ 78 Finally, Archuleta complains about the trial court's reference to `that degree of proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.' Again, Archuleta cites no authority available to counsel demonstrating that this language was constitutionally infirm. In fact, at the time of Archuleta's trial, both this court and the United States Supreme Court had rejected challenges to instructions incorporating this language. Hopt v. People, 120 U.S. 430, 440 (1887); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 572-73 (Utah 1987). ¶ 79 In sum, Archuleta points to no case that would have alerted defense counsel to any flaw in the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction. He has not shown that any challenge to the instruction had a reasonable chance of succeeding. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the habeas court on this issue.
¶ 80 Archuleta next contends that trial counsel provided ineffective representation when he failed to ask for a jury instruction requiring the jury to find each penalty phase aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously. He also contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal when the issue was not raised in that forum. ¶ 81 We have entertained this claim before. The petitioner in Carter, for example, asked this court to adopt[] a death sentencing scheme which would require the jury to unanimously and specially find, beyond a reasonable doubt, each aggravating factor upon which it relies in imposing its sentence. 888 P.2d at 655. Only then, the petitioner argued, could he be given a fair hearing. Id. ¶ 82 The Carter court declined to adopt such a sentencing scheme. We held, [g]iven the procedures required at trial and the careful appellate review given by this Court to death penalty cases over the years, a specification of reasons by the sentencing authority on the record for imposing the death penalty, even if it were practicable, is not necessary to prevent arbitrary and capricious sentences. Indeed, such a procedure would be extraordinarily cumbersome, especially when a jury would have to agree unanimously on a statement of reasons under the process outlined in Wood. Id. at 656 (alteration in original) (quoting Holland, 777 P.2d at, 1025. The court accordingly dismissed the petitioner's arguments. ¶ 83 Archuleta acknowledges our holding in Carter, but he nevertheless argues that juror unanimity at the sentencing phase was required on each aggravating factor. In support of this contention, Archuleta points to a United States Supreme Court decision from 2002 that held that [i]f a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that factno matter how the State labels itmust be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002). According to Archuleta, this holding supersedes Carter and requires capital sentencing juries to unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of an aggravating factor before that factor may be relied upon to reach a sentence of death at the penalty phase. ¶ 84 The habeas court rejected this claim. It held that Ring does not alter or call into question Utah's case law on this issue. In Archuleta's case, the jury convicted him of first degree murder by unanimously finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he intentionally or knowingly caused Church's death under four statutory aggravating circumstances. As a result of his unanimous conviction, Archuleta became eligible for the death penalty, subject to a comparative weighing of all aggravating and mitigating circumstances by the penalty phase jury. Thus, the habeas court held that it was not ineffective assistance for Archuleta's counsel to fail to raise this claim at trial or on appeal. ¶ 85 We affirm this holding. First, Ring was decided in 2002 and was thus not available to Archuleta's counsel at trial or on appeal. The law available at the time of Archuleta's trial did not require unanimity on individual aggravating circumstances, and counsel accordingly did not perform unreasonably in not raising this claim. At that time, the law required unanimity only on whether the totality of the aggravating circumstances outweighed the totality of the mitigating circumstances. Wood, 648 P.2d at 83-84. The trial court correctly instructed the jury on that burden. In fact, six years after Archuleta's trial, this court made clear that the sentencing jury is not obligated to reach unanimity on individual sentencing phase aggravating circumstances. See Carter, 888 P.2d at 655-57. ¶ 86 Second, Ring does not require a unanimous jury determination on whether to impose a death sentence, but holds only that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt on any fact that makes death a possible sentence. Ring, 536 U.S. at 596-609. Under Arizona law, the facts that the defendant's jury found during the guilt phase exposed him to a maximum possible sentence of life. Id. at 596. The maximum possible sentence did not increase to include death until the sentencing judge found at least one statutory aggravator at the penalty phase. Id. at 597. Ring held that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed a jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt only on that issue. Id. at 609. ¶ 87 In Utah, the fact finder in the guilt phase must find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubtthe statutory aggravator that makes death a possible sentence. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(3) (1989). The maximum possible sentence does not increase at the subsequent penalty phase. Rather, the sentencing jury decides only whether to impose the maximum possible sentence. Ring does not require a unanimous jury determination on that issue. Therefore, it does not call into question controlling Utah precedent that Archuleta has no constitutional right to require the jury to find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt each aggravating circumstance it considers in selecting the sentence.
¶ 88 During proceedings at the penalty phase of trial, the trial court instructed the jury that the instructions previously given to you in the guilt phase of the trial are to apply in the penalty phase where applicable. Archuleta contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge this instruction, and that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he didn't raise this issue on appeal. Archuleta claims that this instruction created a conflict among the guilt phase and penalty phase instructions, which ultimately prevented the sentencing jury from giving mitigating effect to evidence that Archuleta was intoxicated at the time of the crime. ¶ 89 The evidence at trial indicated that Archuleta had consumed alcohol before the homicide and that he felt it. There was a conflict in the evidence, however, as to the extent of Archuleta's alcohol impairment. The jury was instructed during the guilt phase that [i]t is not a defense to a crime that a person has merely been drinking or is intoxicated and that [b]eing under the influence of alcohol is not an excuse for the commission of a crime where it merely makes a person more excited or reckless, so that one does things which he might not otherwise do. During the penalty phase, however, the jury was instructed that it is a mitigating circumstances that [a]t the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of . . . intoxication. Archuleta contends that because the trial court told the jury that the guilt or innocence phase instructions applied during the penalty phase where applicable, without any further elaboration, the jury gave inadequate weight to the penalty phase instruction. ¶ 90 The habeas court rejected this ineffectiveness claim. For starters, the trial court instructed the jury that it could rely on the guilt or innocence phase instructions only if they were applicable. Given that the penalty phase instructions regarding intoxication contradicted the guilt or innocence phase instruction, the where applicable proviso kicked in and instructed the jury to disregard the guilt or innocence phase instruction. Moreover, the habeas court noted that during the penalty phase the court instructed the jury that mitigating circumstances may include circumstances which do not constitute justification or excuse for the crime but which may be considered as extenuating or reducing the moral culpability or blame. Because the jury was expressly informed that circumstances which do not excuse the crime may still constitute mitigating evidence, the habeas court continued, no conflict was created by the trial court's instructions and, therefore, neither trial nor appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in choosing not to raise this issue. We agree with the habeas court's astute analysis and affirm its rejection of this claim.