Opinion ID: 1057956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Scarborough

Text: Scarborough's blood was drawn while he was incarcerated following his convictions of felonies committed after July 1, 1998. The DNA collection statute required Scarborough to provide this biological specimen irrespective of any consent he may have granted or withheld. [8] While we recognize that prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), prisoners do not enjoy the breadth and depth of Fourth Amendment protection accorded law-abiding citizens. See Padgett, 401 F.3d at 1278 (recognizing that prisoners do not enjoy the same Fourth Amendment rights as free persons). Rather, courts have recognized that prisoners comprise a separate category of persons for purposes of the [Fourth] Amendment. Id. at 1278-79; see also Raines, 857 A.2d at 33 (recognizing that incarcerated persons have a severely diminished expectation of privacy). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has gone so far as to declare bluntly that persons incarcerated after conviction retain no constitutional privacy interest against their correct identification. Groceman, 354 F.3d at 413-14; see also Kincade, 379 F.3d at 837 n. 32 (recognizing that [t]hose who have suffered a lawful conviction lose an interest in their identity to a degree well-recognized as sufficient to entitle the government permanently to maintain a verifiable record of their identity; not merely sporadically to demand its production under independently lawful conditions). These cases make clear that Scarborough's status as an incarcerated felon reduced significantly his expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Scarborough's interest in keeping private his biological identity is also lessened by the fact that Tennessee likely already has a plethora of identifying information about [him], in light of [his] status as convicted felon[]. Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 671. Additionally, the intrusion occasioned by a blood draw is not significant. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966)); see also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985) (recognizing that blood tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an individual's personal privacy and bodily integrity) (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771, 86 S.Ct. 1826) (footnote omitted). In the context of DNA analysis, it appears that the intrusion occasioned by a blood draw may even become unnecessary as technology progresses and allows the biological specimen to be obtained through measures requiring no physical invasion whatsoever. As noted by Judge Raker in his concurring opinion in Raines, [i]t is now possible to `extract DNA by applying a sticky patch to the skin on an individual's forearm for a moment to acquire epidermal cells without puncturing the skin surface.' 857 A.2d at 47 n. 3 (quoting B. Quarmby, The Case for National DNA Identification Cards, 2003 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 2, 20 (2003)) (Raker, J., concurring). We are mindful, however, that the DNA analysis performed after the collection of the biological specimen is a separate and distinct search which is potentially a far greater intrusion than the initial extraction of DNA, since the state analyzes DNA for information and maintains DNA records indefinitely. Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 670. As noted by Judge Gould in his concurring opinion in Kincade, DNA stores and reveals massive amounts of personal, private data . . . and the advance of science promises to make stored DNA only more revealing in time. 379 F.3d at 842 n. 3 (Gould, J., concurring). However, Tennessee's DNA collection statute specifies that the biological specimen obtained from felons is to be analyzed for identification purposes. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-321(a). Thus, as noted by many courts before us, the second search serves as a form of fingerprinting so as to provide a statistically precise method of identifying a single [9] individual: a method that the subject cannot impugn by altering his or her appearance. We next consider the regime under which the blood specimen was drawn. As noted above, the Fourth Amendment generally requires a search to be preceded by a warrant issued upon probable cause. This limitation serves to protect our citizenry from the potential abuses of unlimited discretion by law enforcement agents and officers. The blood draw at issue in Scarborough's case, however, was not the product of any particular law enforcement officer's individual decision to intrude upon his privacy. Rather, the challenged draw was the product of a statutory scheme that is aimed at certain classes of convicted felons. If the subject has been convicted of committing a specified crime, the subject is required to provide a biological specimen for DNA analysis. The statute allows for no discretion as to who will be required to provide a specimen. Neutral oversight to protect against overzealous law enforcement officers exercising unfettered discretion is therefore not necessary. This statutory regime, which is discretion-less in its coverage, weighs in favor of the reasonableness of the searches. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (opining that warrant to obtain urine test of Customs employee was not necessary in part because the search regime involved no discretion by officers in the field). Scarborough's blood was obtained not only without a warrant, it was obtained with no individualized suspicion of any particular wrongdoing by him. However, the DNA testing performed pursuant to the DNA collection statute is not aimed at discovering incriminating evidence of particular criminal activity by the donors. See Raines, 857 A.2d at 29 n. 11 (noting that a DNA collection act does not result in gathering direct evidence of a crime). Rather, the instant searches were undertaken to further establish Scarborough's identity. See Berge, 354 F.3d at 678 (noting that [t]he primary purpose of the Wisconsin DNA law . . . is not to search for `evidence' of criminal wrongdoing . . . [but] to obtain reliable proof of a felon's identity). The state's interest in Scarborough's identity was triggered not by any individualized suspicion that he had engaged in any particular criminal activity prior to the blood draw, but rather as incidental to his demonstrated willingness to commit certain felony offenses. The concerns addressed by the general requirement of some level of individualized suspicion were therefore not present during the instant searches. Indeed, as recognized by Maryland's high court, [r]equiring individualized suspicion to obtain DNA for future use would negate the very purpose of the Act itself, considering that the Act does not seek to obtain evidence, but to merely identify persons. Raines, 857 A.2d at 29; see also Jones, 962 F.2d at 306-07 (concluding that the Fourth Amendment does not require an additional finding of individualized suspicion before blood can be taken from incarcerated felons for the purpose of identifying them) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, Scarborough's rights under the Fourth Amendment were not violated simply because the instant blood draw was taken without any level of individualized suspicion. We turn now to the government's interest in drawing Scarborough's blood and then analyzing it. As set forth above, Scarborough's blood was drawn in order to establish his identity through DNA analysis. As recognized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, [t]he governmental justification for this form of identification . . . relies on no argument different in kind from that traditionally advanced for taking fingerprints and photographs, but with additional force because of the potentially greater precision of DNA sampling and matching methods. Jones, 962 F.2d at 307. The government's interest in correctly identifying those who have broken its laws is obvious: It is a well recognized aspect of criminal conduct that the perpetrator will take unusual steps to conceal not only his conduct, but also his identity. Disguises used while committing a crime may be supplemented or replaced by changed names, and even changed physical features. Traditional methods of identification by photographs, historical records, and fingerprints often prove inadequate. The DNA, however, is claimed to be unique to each individual and cannot, within current scientific knowledge, be altered. The individuality of the DNA provides a dramatic new tool for the law enforcement effort to match suspects and criminal conduct. Even a suspect with altered physical features cannot escape the match that his DNA might make with a sample contained in a DNA bank, or left at the scene of a crime within samples of blood, skin, semen or hair follicles. Id. Moreover, as recognized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, [a] DNA database promotes increased accuracy in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases. It will aid in solving crimes when they occur in the future. Equally important, the DNA samples will help to exculpate individuals who are serving sentences of imprisonment for crimes they did not commit and will help to eliminate individuals from suspect lists when crimes occur. While the presence of [a felon's] DNA in CODIS may inculpate him in the future, it may also exonerate him. The interest in accurate criminal investigations and prosecutions is a compelling interest that the [federal] DNA Act can reasonably be said to advance. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 185 (footnote omitted); see also Raines, 857 A.2d at 33 (The DNA profile thus serves the purpose of increasing the efficiency and accuracy in identifying individuals within a certain class of convicted criminals. The purpose is akin to that of a fingerprint.). We agree with the many courts that have preceded us that the government's interest in conducting these searches is weighty, indeed. See, e.g., Raines, 857 A.2d at 31 (recognizing the compelling government interest in identifying persons involved with crimes); Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 669 (finding that New York has a strong governmental interest in obtaining identifying information from convicted offenders and keeping a record of such information); Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 185 (recognizing that [t]he interest in accurate criminal investigations and prosecutions is a compelling interest). This factor also weighs in favor of the reasonableness of searches conducted pursuant to the DNA collection statute. In sum, our legislature has put into place a method of more accurately identifying those who commit and are convicted of felonies, thereby enabling law enforcement personnel to more quickly and accurately exonerate the innocent and prosecute the perpetrators. The gravity of the public concern served by the instant searches is therefore significant. Given the heightened accuracy of DNA analysis compared to more traditional methods of identification, such as fingerprints and eyewitness testimony, the degree to which the DNA collection statute advances that interest is also significant. Additionally, Tennessee's DNA collection statute clearly and unambiguously specifies who is subject to the searches: the risk of arbitrary or capricious searches is therefore eliminated. Further, no measure of individualized suspicion is necessary because the searches are not aimed at recovering incriminating evidence of contemporaneous criminal conduct. Finally, we have determined that the convicted felons subject to search pursuant to the statute have a significantly reduced expectation of privacy. Accordingly, we agree with the high court of Maryland in its rejection of a Fourth Amendment challenge to Maryland's DNA collection statute: a search like the one authorized by the Act in this case, whose primary purpose is to identify individuals with lessened expectations of privacy, is totally distinguishable from a search of ordinary individuals for the purpose of gathering evidence against them in order to prosecute them for the very crimes that the search reveals. Raines, 857 A.2d at 33. Applying the totality of the circumstances test, we conclude that the blood draw from Scarborough and its subsequent analysis, both conducted pursuant to Tennessee's DNA collection statute, were reasonable under all of the circumstances and therefore did not violate Scarborough's rights under the Fourth Amendment. [10]