Opinion ID: 3163625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Atkins & Recent Supreme Court Precedent

Text: Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s 2002 holding in Atkins, Florida had already implemented a prospective prohibition on imposing the death sentence upon an intellectually disabled defendant. See ch. 2001-202, § 1, Laws of Fla. (enacting § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (2001)). Based on numerous considerations, including the trend within various legislative bodies to eliminate capital punishment for intellectually disabled defendants, the United States Supreme Court declared in Atkins that executing a person with an intellectual disability contravenes the Eighth Amendment. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. The Supreme Court further recognized that an intellectual disability consists of three prongs: (1) subaverage intellectual functioning; (2) significant limitations in adaptive skills; and (3) manifestation of the condition before age 18. Id. However, the Supreme Court did not elaborate as to how this standard was to be implemented and left this determination to the states, including “the task of developing appropriate ways to - 19 - enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.” Id. at 317. Once the Atkins ruling extended this protection to all capital defendants, this Court immediately implemented procedures to ensure that defendants could present evidence to establish whether they were intellectually disabled. In determining what constituted an intellectual disability, this Court looked to the statutory definition set forth in section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2002), and held that in considering whether a defendant had “subaverage intelligence,” a defendant must establish an IQ score of 70 or less. Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 712-14. This Court further held that courts were precluded from considering the application of the standard error of measurement as to the IQ score. Id. at 712-13. This Court was asked to reconsider Cherry’s holding in Hall, 109 So. 3d at 707-08, a case that is substantially similar to the one before us now. In that case, Freddie Lee Hall had been previously found to have an intellectual disability, but since his crime occurred prior to Florida’s statutory prohibition on imposing a sentence of death upon the intellectually disabled, such evidence was considered only as a mitigating circumstance. Id. at 706. Relying on the prior determination by the trial court that found Hall to be intellectually disabled, Hall sought relief after Atkins. Id. at 706-07. However, the postconviction court determined that Hall could not be considered intellectually disabled under Florida’s statutory - 20 - definition of the term because Hall’s IQ scores varied between 71 and 73 and thus did not constitute “subaverage intelligence.” Id. at 707. In a 4-2 decision, this Court affirmed the postconviction court’s finding of no intellectual disability based on the strict cut-off score of 70, as set forth in Cherry. Id. at 709-10. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hall and held that the manner in which Florida defined an intellectual disability for capital litigation violated the Eighth Amendment because it “disregards established medical practice” and “creates an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed.” Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990, 1995. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that Florida’s bright-line rule disregards established medical practice in two interrelated ways. It takes an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a defendant’s intellectual capacity, when experts in the field would consider other evidence. It also relies on a purportedly scientific measurement of the defendant’s abilities, his IQ score, while refusing to recognize that the score is, on its own terms, imprecise. Id. at 1995. In determining whether an interpretation of intellectual disability violates the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court relied on psychiatric and professional studies that elaborated on the purpose and meaning of the prong at issue. Id. at 1993. In addition, the Supreme Court stressed that a single factor should not be considered dispositive because the three factors must be considered together in an interrelated assessment. Id. at 2001 (relying on the DSM-5, at 37 (“[A] person with an IQ score above 70 may have such severe adaptive behavior - 21 - problems . . . that the person’s actual functioning is comparable to that of individuals with a lower IQ score.”)). The United States Supreme Court emphasized these same principles in its most recent decision pertaining to the intellectual disability analysis, in which the Court held that the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his intellectual disability claim. See Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2279. The Supreme Court first reiterated that an IQ test result of 75 is “entirely consistent with intellectual disability,” relying on its prior decision in Hall. Id. at 2277. The Supreme Court then addressed the next two prongs, determining that the record contained “substantial grounds to question [the defendant’s] adaptive functioning,” based on numerous examples from the defendant’s childhood, including his low birth weight, that he was placed in special classes in the fifth grade, and that he had difficulty processing information. Id. at 2280. Further, the Supreme Court noted that the evidence pertaining to his low birth weight and his intellectual shortcomings as a child provided “ample evidence” that the defendant’s disability manifested before adulthood and thus required an evidentiary hearing so that the trial court could hear all relevant evidence and determine whether the defendant is intellectually disabled. Id. at 2283.