Opinion ID: 2997559
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Deputy Shelnutt’s Entry into the Apartment

Text: We first address the question of whether Deputy Shelnutt possesses qualified immunity for his entry into Mr. Leaf’s apartment. The district court found that there was a question of fact whether Deputy Shelnutt had announced his purpose before entering the apartment. The district court also determined that the requirement of “announcing prior to entry has been clearly established.” R.219 at 25. We respectfully disagree with the conclusion of the district court. The facts of this case, construed in the light most favorable to the Leafs, do not allege a constitutional violation with respect to Deputy Shelnutt’s entry. Accordingly, Deputy Shelnutt is entitled to qualified immunity for his entry into Mr. Leaf’s apartment and for the manner in which the entry was accomplished. Taking up the first question in the qualified immunity inquiry, we ask whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the Leafs, allege a constitutional violation. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. A warrantless entry into a private home constitutes a search and presumptively is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Rivera, 248 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir.) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 923 (2001). No. 04-1318 17 However, a warrantless search is permissible “when police have a reasonable belief that exigent circumstances require immediate action and there is no time to secure a warrant.” United States v. Lenoir, 318 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 841 (2003). For instance, a warrantless search is permitted based on exigent circumstances “when the police ‘reasonably fear[] for the safety of someone inside the premises.’ ” United States v. Jenkins, 329 F.3d 579, 581 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 910 (2000)). To determine whether there were exigent circumstances, we must “analyze the situation from the perspective of the officers at the scene” and must ask whether the officers had “an objectively reasonable belief that exigent circumstances existed.” United States v. Marshall, 157 F.3d 477, 482 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1045 (1998). Based on these principles, we agree with the district court’s analysis of the officers’ entry. As the district court pointed out, the broken window and open patio door supported an objectively reasonable belief that a burglary was occurring and that people inside the apartment were in danger. Furthermore, a 911 call had been placed, and, although the call itself was not answered, Deputy Jacobs learned from the caller, Murphy, that a man had been seen forcing entry into the apartment. We have held that a 911 call itself “can be enough to support [a] warrantless search[] under the exigent circumstances exception, particularly where . . . the caller identified himself.” Richardson, 208 F.3d at 630. Under the circumstances known to them at the time, Deputy Shelnutt and Deputy Jacobs had a reasonable basis to believe that an emergency situation justified a warrantless search of Mr. 18 No. 04-1318 10 Leaf’s apartment. Thus, on the record before us, we must conclude that the officers’ entry was justified by exigent circumstances. We next consider whether the officers’ entry into Mr. Leaf’s apartment was rendered unreasonable as a result of the officers’ failure to announce their purpose before entering. 10 The district court did not address whether probable cause existed to justify the officers’ entry. The cases on which the district court primarily relied in its analysis of exigent circumstances, United States v. Jenkins, 329 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 910 (2000), do not address the requirement of probable cause separately from the existence of exigent circumstances. However, other cases of this court do apply the requirement of probable cause even in exigent circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 248 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir.) (holding that a warrantless search is constitutional “where there is probable cause and exigent circumstances create a compelling need for official action and insufficient time to secure a warrant”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 923 (2001); United States v. Marshall, 157 F.3d 477, 481 (7th Cir.) (holding that a warrantless search and seizure inside a home is permitted “when probable cause and exigent circumstances exist”), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1045 (1998); see also Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) (“[T]here must be at least probable cause to believe that [exigent circumstances] were present . . . .”). Circumstances constituting probable cause may include the reasonable belief “that illegal activity is being conducted in a particular place.” Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 769 (7th Cir. 2000). On the record in this case, we must conclude that the circumstances known to the officers at the time also gave them probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of Mr. Leaf’s apartment. No. 04-1318 19 11 The common law “knock and announce” principle, which requires a law enforcement officer “to announce his presence and authority” before opening the doors of a dwelling 12 and entering, “forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.” Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 11 A federal “knock and announce” statute permits a federal officer executing a warrant to break open a door or window and enter a private house if he has given “notice of his authority and purpose” and has been “refused admittance.” 18 U.S.C. § 3109. This statute codifies a common law principle, “embedded in Anglo-American law,” requiring a law enforcement officer to knock and announce himself before entering a home. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958). In 1995, the Supreme Court “squarely held” that the knock and announce principle “is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment” and thus applies to actions by state law enforcement officers as well. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995). 12 As a general rule, the knock and announcement must take place before a law enforcement officer may “break open the doors of a dwelling.” Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929. Even a minor entry or an entry which does not cause property damage is a “breaking.” See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71-72 (1998) (officers broke one garage window and pointed gun through broken window); Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589-90 (1968) (holding that opening of closed but unlocked door by police officers constituted “breaking” under § 3109); Miller, 357 U.S. at 305-06 (holding that, when officers ripped the chain off door to gain entry before announcing purpose to arrest, requirements of § 3109 were not fulfilled). In this case, the officers entered through a patio door which was wide open, but which was blocked by some blinds; Deputy Shelnutt held the blinds aside while he and Deputy Jacobs entered. In addition, once the officer has knocked and announced, he must wait a reasonable amount of time before entering. “[T]he facts known to the police are what count in judging reasonable waiting time . . . .” United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 39 (2003). 20 No. 04-1318 927, 929 (1995). The principle typically is understood to require both a knock and an announcement prior to entering. See, e.g., United States v. Buckley, 4 F.3d 552, 558 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Herman v. United States, 510 U.S. 1124 (1994). The announcement generally must relate both the officer’s identity as a member of law enforcement 13 and his purpose or authority. See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929. Because the knock and announce principle is a part of the reasonableness inquiry according to which any search is judged, it is relevant to searches conducted without a warrant under some recognized exigency, as well as those 14 authorized in advance by a warrant. The knock and announce principle is but one part of the reasonableness inquiry to be conducted under the Fourth Amendment. See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929. Therefore, the elements described above are not applied strictly in 13 See also 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise On the Fourth Amendment § 4.8(c) (3d ed. 1996) (“It would seem that [the requirement described in Wilson v. Arkansas] is not intended to be different from the common ‘authority and purpose’ assertion, as the authority cannot be established without a reference to purpose, in this context, execution of a search warrant.”). 14 Although most of the cases developing the contours of the knock and announce principle have been decided in the context of police officers executing search or arrest warrants, the guidelines developed in those cases also apply to situations in which police officers conduct warrantless searches. The requirements of § 3109 have been held to cover warrantless searches and warrantless entries to arrest made by federal agents. See, e.g., Sabbath, 391 U.S. at 588; Miller, 357 U.S. at 308-09 (“The requirement . . . applies . . . whether the arrest is to be made by virtue of a warrant, or when officers are authorized to make an arrest for a felony without a warrant.”). See also 1 William E. Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 6:7 (2d ed. 2004). No. 04-1318 21 every situation. See, e.g., id. at 934 (holding that “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement 15 that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests”). We are mindful that the principle of “knock-and-announce,” as an “element of the reasonableness inquiry,” has never been a “rigid” rule. Id. Although “in some circumstances an 15 For instance, this court has held that, in certain circumstances, the announcement of purpose is not necessary: [W]hen it is clear that someone is at home, officers must explain not just who they are but also why they are there. . . . But where . . . officers have knocked and announced “Police,” with no answer whatsoever, and there are no signs that anyone is at home, . . . [the] common law rules . . . may be complied with, in spirit at least, even if the officers neglect to state what their business is. United States v. Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original). At least one of our sister circuits has held that, in certain circumstances, the knock is not required. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 281 F.3d 712, 717 (8th Cir.) (holding that police had acted consistently with purposes underlying the knock and announce principle, even when no knock was given, when officers shouted warning and door already was off its hinges), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1004 (2002). When made, “[a] knock and announcement must be loud enough to be heard.” Leichtnam, 948 F.2d at 374 (approving an announcement made “slightly above conversational level”) (internal quotations omitted); cf. United States v. Spriggs, 996 F.2d 320, 322-23 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that announcement was “sufficient to alert the residents of the apartment” where “reasonably audible” and “slightly above a normal tone of voice” and made at 7:45 a.m., when residents likely to “be awake and responsive”) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 938 (1993). 22 No. 04-1318 officer’s unannounced entry into a home might be a violation of the Fourth Amendment,” in other circumstances, an unannounced entry may be justified by “countervailing law enforcement interests.” Id. Courts have recognized three sets of circumstances which constitute exceptions to the knock and announce principle. “In order to justify a ‘no-knock’ entry, the police must have 16 a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be [(1)] 17 dangerous or [(2)] futile, or [(3)] that it would inhibit effective investigation of the crime by . . . allowing the destruction of evidence.” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997). This court has described these situations, in which “executing [a] search in a no-knock fashion” is justified, as “exigent circumstances.” United States v. Singer, 943 F.2d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Sledd, 102 F.3d at 288. 16 The showing required by the reasonable suspicion standard is “not high,” and certainly requires less than probable cause. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997). 17 Deputy Shelnutt argues that an announcement of purpose should be excused as futile on the ground that Mr. Leaf was asleep. However, the futility exception to the knock and announce principle applies when the occupant of the premises to be entered most likely already knows why the officers are approaching. See, e.g., Miller, 357 U.S. at 310 (“It may be that, without an express announcement of purpose, the facts known to officers would justify them in being virtually certain that the [occupant] already knows their purpose so that announcement would be a useless gesture.”); United States v. Tracy, 835 F.2d 1267, 1270 (8th Cir.) (“[T]he officers could have justifiably believed defendants were anticipating their arrival and knew their purpose. Thus, announcing their purpose would have been a useless gesture.”), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1014 (1988). On the record in this case, we must conclude that the futility exception does not apply. No. 04-1318 23 Most of the cases explaining the danger exception to the knock and announce principle have taken place in the con18 text of searches pursuant to warrant. However, this court also has excused officers’ failure to comply with the knock 18 See, e.g., Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 71 (holding that police had a reasonable suspicion that “knocking and announcing their presence might be dangerous,” justifying their unannounced entry to execute an arrest warrant, when a “confidential informant had notified the police” that a man “with a violent past who reportedly had access to a large supply of weapons” “might be inside respondent’s home, and an officer had confirmed that possibility”). This court has excused compliance with the knock and announce principle in circumstances presenting danger to officers executing warrants. See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 336 F.3d 550, 554 (7th Cir. 2003) (excusing “less than full compliance” with knock and announce principle by officers executing search warrant when pit bulls had been seen on the property, individuals with weapons convictions had been seen entering the house and configuration of house “provided no cover”); United States v. Gambrell, 178 F.3d 927, 929 (7th Cir.) (holding that, when officer knew before entering that the occupant typically “answered the door wearing a .25 caliber gun in her front pocket; that she and her roommate regularly carried guns in the apartment; [and] that . . . there were other guns . . . in the apartment,” there was “a reasonable suspicion that an announced entry would have subjected the officers to a substantial risk of harm”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 920 (1999); United States v. Buckley, 4 F.3d 552, 558 (7th Cir. 1993) (determining that “exigent circumstances” excused knock and announce where “the officers knew that the defendants possessed a pit bull and firearms”), cert. denied sub nom. Herman v. United States, 510 U.S. 1124 (1994); United States v. Howard, 961 F.2d 1265, 1267 (7th Cir.) (concluding that “exigent circumstances justified disregarding the knock and announce requirement” where officers executing search warrant “had specific knowledge that the [occupant] was in possession of a firearm, and that he had previously fired it in the hallway outside his apartment”), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 882 (1992). 24 No. 04-1318 and announce principle when the officers were making a warrantless entry and the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable belief that knocking and announcing would be dangerous to the officers. United States v. Hardy, 52 F.3d 147, 150 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 877 (1995). In Hardy, “the same exigent circumstances” that justified an officer’s warrantless search of a hotel room “also excuse[d] a failure to knock and announce.” Id. The circumstances known to the police in that case led them to “reasonably believe that their 19 safety or the safety of others” was at risk. Id. at 149. In this case, the circumstances reflected in the record compel the conclusion that the officers had a reasonable basis to conclude that knocking and announcing themselves would have been dangerous. Although Deputy Jacobs had not seen or heard a person within the apartment during his approximately eight-minute observation, there were several signs that someone other than the apartment’s lawful occupant had entered it. For instance, the sliding patio door had been left open and an ice chest had been pushed up against the apartment’s front door; this would have been consistent with the presence of a burglar attempting to block all but one path of entry and exit. The officers had no conclusive information that the apartment was empty. The residents told Deputy Jacobs they had seen a man forcing entry into the apartment, and Deputy Jacobs did not witness anyone leave the apartment during his eight-minute observation prior to Deputy Shelnutt’s 19 In Hardy, the room’s occupant was a murder suspect who knew that the police were pursuing him, had a history of committing crimes using guns and was known to be armed with a shotgun; also, women and children were known to be in the room with him. See United States v. Hardy, 52 F.3d 147, 149 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 877 (1995). No. 04-1318 25 arrival. Deputy Jacobs had shone a flashlight upon the broken window and open patio door; that alone could have alerted a burglar to the need to remain still and silent. Although the interior of the apartment did not appear to have been disturbed, this may have convinced the officers that an intruder still was present. Furthermore, the officers had very little information about the identity or temperament of the person who may have been inside except that Murphy had told Deputy Jacobs the man was belligerent. Indeed, all signs pointed to the need to investigate and to exercise caution in doing so. Taking all the facts and circumstances in the light most favorable to the Leafs, we still must conclude that Deputy Shelnutt did not violate the Fourth Amendment by entering Mr. Leaf’s apartment without knocking and with20 out announcing his purpose. 20 We note that our holding is based on the specific facts presented by this case and not on a general invocation of exigent circumstances. The Supreme Court has instructed that, when “exigent circumstances” might have justified officers’ warrantless entry into a home without a knock, if the record does not reflect “any substantial basis for excusing the failure of the agents . . . to announce their authority and purpose,” the entry violates the Fourth Amendment. Sabbath, 391 U.S. at 591. When agents making a warrantless entry “ha[ve] no basis for assuming [the occupant is] armed or might resist arrest, or that [the undercover agent present is] in any danger,” then compliance with the knock and announce principle will not be excused. Id. This guidance accords with the Court’s later directive, made in Richards, that officers must have a “reasonable suspicion,” based on the circumstances, that one or more of the exceptions to the knock and announce principle applies. Richards, 520 U.S. at 394. There is no general rule permitting officers to enter a private residence (continued...) 26 No. 04-1318