Opinion ID: 2994954
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Gaughan

Text: Mr. Gaughan challenges the amount of crack attributed to him by the district court. The district court found that Mr. Gaughan had delivered 30 kilograms of cocaine to Bonner and that he should have foreseen that at least 1.5 kilograms of cocaine would have been converted to crack cocaine. Mr. Gaughan argues that he could not have foreseen the amount of cocaine that would have been converted to crack. The district court’s determination of the amount of cocaine and crack attributable to Mr. Gaughan is a factual one that we review for clear error. See United States v. Roe, 210 F.3d 741, 748 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Burns, 128 F.3d 553, 554 (7th Cir. 1997). We shall reverse the district court’s conclusion only if we are left with the firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made. See United States v. Galbraith, 200 F.3d 1006, 1011 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Taylor, 111 F.3d 56, 58 (7th Cir. 1997). Mr. Gaughan was considered a Category I offender by the district court. On this appeal, he does not challenge the district court’s factual finding that 30 kilograms of cocaine may be attributed to him, and the record amply supports this finding. At Mr. Gaughan’s sentencing hearing, Bonner testified specifically that he made approximately 30 pickups from Mr. Gaughan, receiving one kilogram of cocaine each time. According to U.S.S.G. sec. 2D1.1(c), a person convicted of a crime involving between 15 and 50 kilograms of cocaine has a base offense level of 34. However, the district court also found that Mr. Gaughan’s crimes involved 1.5 kilograms of crack, which mandates an offense level of 38. The court did not enter detailed findings of fact regarding the percentage of the cocaine converted to crack, stating simply: The evidence also indicates that Defendant Gaughan knew or reasonably should have foreseen the conversion to crack form, and at a very minimum one and a half kilograms of crack cocaine. Gaughan Sent. Tr. at 67. We must determine whether the record supports the district court’s decision to sentence Mr. Gaughan at a base offense level of 38 rather than 34. Mr. Gaughan was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine. It is appropriate for a district court to attribute to a defendant the conversion of cocaine into crack by the defendant’s co-conspirators if that conversion was foreseeable. See United States v. Shorter, 54 F.3d 1248, 1261 (7th Cir. 1995) (The evidence also indicated that Shorter knew of or reasonably should have foreseen the conversion to crack form.)./16 The record contains evidence indicating that Mr. Gaughan was aware that some cocaine was being converted to crack. Bonner testified at trial that he spoke to Mr. Gaughan about problems Mr. Ford was having with the conversion of cocaine into crack. According to Bonner, Mr. Gaughan responded that his other peoples were not having problems with the conversion. Tr. at 311. Later, Bonner was asked, Did [Mr. Gaughan] know that some of his crack cocaine--some of his cocaine was going to be cooked into crack; Bonner answered Yes, he--he knew that. Tr. at 479. From this testimony, the district court could properly conclude that Mr. Gaughan was aware that some cocaine was being converted to crack./17 The burden is on the government to establish the type and amount of drugs attributable to the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 529, 537 (7th Cir. 2000). It therefore was incumbent upon the Government to establish a conversion ratio. See United States v. Hunter, 145 F.3d 946, 952 (7th Cir. 1998) ([C]onversion ratios are a finding of fact that must be determined in each individual case.); United States v. Chisholm, 73 F.3d 304, 307-08 (11th Cir. 1996) ([E]vidence of a conversion ratio must be considered before any such ratio is applied.). A conversion ratio includes two components. One is the percentage of the powder cocaine that Mr. Gaughan could reasonably foresee would be converted into crack. The other is evidence of the percentage of weight lost during the process of converting cocaine into crack. See Hunter, 145 F.3d at 952; accord Fox, 189 F.3d at 1120. At times, the Government will be able to provide evidence indicating that all of the powder cocaine in a conspiracy was converted to crack cocaine. See United States v. Taylor, 116 F.3d 269, 273-74 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Misher, 99 F.3d 664, 671 (5th Cir. 1996) ([T]here is evidence from which the court could conclude that Cobb eventually converted all of the powder to crack cocaine.). When the Government cannot prove that all of the cocaine was converted to crack, it must at least provide some evidence of a conversion ratio to support the district court’s finding. Furthermore, the district court’s determination must be based on reliable evidence, as the Guidelines require, and not on impermissible speculation. See United States v. Howard, 80 F.3d 1194, 1202 (7th Cir. 1996) (We must be satisfied, however, that the calculation is based on reliable evidence; speculation and unfounded allegations will not do.). The Government, however, points to no evidence suggesting a conversion ratio. Although the Government has provided evidence that Mr. Gaughan could foresee the conversion of some percentage of the cocaine, it has offered no evidence showing what percentage he expected would be converted. It also has not provided testimony regarding the percentage of cocaine lost in the conversion to crack, which has been relied upon in cases such as this one. See, e.g., Hunter, 145 F.3d at 952. We acknowledge that the district court’s estimate of the conversion ratio was conservative. However, because the district court did not discuss the evidence supporting its determination of the conversion ratio, we cannot say that its finding was based on reliable evidence and that it did not ’calculate drug amounts by guesswork’ in contravention of the Guidelines’ requirements. United States v. Beler, 20 F.3d 1428, 1433 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Paulino, 996 F.2d 1541, 1545 (3d Cir. 1993)). Consequently, we must remand to the district court for resentencing. We emphasize again that we do not disturb the district court’s finding that Mr. Gaughan is responsible for 30 kilograms of cocaine; we vacate the sentence only because the Government has not provided reliable evidence of the conversion ratio foreseeable to Mr. Gaughan. Finally, Mr. Gaughan submits, by motion filed after oral argument, that the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) makes his sentence invalid. We cannot accept this argument. According to 21 U.S.C. sec. 841(b)(1)(C), the statutory maximum for an offense involving even a small amount of cocaine is 20 years. See 21 U.S.C. sec. 841 (b)(1)(C). Mr. Gaughan’s sentence of 235 months is below that statutory maximum and therefore Apprendi does not apply.