Opinion ID: 458933
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence against milliken

Text: 61 Milliken's final contention is that the district court erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal because insufficient evidence existed to sustain his guilty verdict. Milliken asserts that he lacked the specific intent required to commit the offenses with which he was charged, as his participation in the loan-finding program was undertaken in complete good faith. He supports this assertion by pointing to the testimony of several of the loan applicants named in the indictment. This testimony includes assertions by one or more of the witnesses that Milliken did not intentionally mislead him; that Milliken believed in the program; that the fee paid to Milliken was not just in connection with the overborrow program but was for a year-long financial package offered by Milliken, an accountant; that Milliken neither guaranteed the program nor represented that any loan had yet closed; and that he had discussed the program with his banker or attorney. 62 As we have often stated, on review of the district court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, giving the Government the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may logically be drawn from the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Gleason, 766 F.2d 1239, 1246 (8th Cir.1985); United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d at 924. A motion for acquittal should be granted only where the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, is such that a reasonably minded jury must have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of any of the essential elements of the crime charged. Brim, 630 F.2d at 1311 (citations omitted; emphasis added). After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude that the jury could have reasonably determined that Milliken acted with a reckless disregard of whether the representations being made about the loan-finding program were true. 63 First, the scheme was simply outlandish; Milliken's suspicion should have been aroused from the start. Indeed, Milliken testified that he was skeptical on first being told about the plan, but incredibly came to believe that the scheme could work. Second, that Milliken took finder's fees upfront seems to detract from his alleged good faith belief in the scheme. Although some applicants testified that they paid fees to Milliken for a year-long financial program, others testified that they knew nothing about such a program and understood that the fees were in payment for being referred to Wilson by Milliken. The jury reasonably could have believed the Government's theory that the financial program was a ruse to justify the referral fees. Third, Assistant Iowa Attorney General Hamilton, who attended a sales pitch posing as the attorney for a prospective borrower, testified that Milliken made a representation to the effect that a 99% probability existed that the loans would be funded. Fourth, the record does not reflect that Milliken made any effort to check out Robinson, even after Ormiston disclosed adverse facts about Robinson to Milliken on July 28, 1980. Fifth, once Milliken received this information about Robinson, he failed to disclose it to clients brought in after that date before taking their money. Sixth, Milliken's asserted good faith belief in the loan program seems questionable in light of his failure to sign up for such a wonderful opportunity for himself or a relative. The jury was free to disbelieve Milliken's unsupported, self-serving testimony that he was in the process of making a loan request for himself to fund a bank to loan money to farmers. Based on all of these factors, we decide that the denial of Milliken's motions for judgment of acquittal was not error.