Opinion ID: 161720
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instruction on the Value of the Stone

Text: 34 The McPhilomys argue that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the BLM's value of the stone, $7.50 per ton, controls the determination of value. 6 We cannot agree. 35 The stone's value is important because the theft charge carries a penalty of a fine and up to ten years' imprisonment only if the value of the stolen property exceeds $1,000. 18 U.S.C. 641. For this purpose, 'value' means face, par, or market value, or cost price, either wholesale or retail, whichever is greater. Id. The jury instructions quoted this definition of value, and, based on this instruction, the jury found that the value of the stolen property on each count of theft exceeded $1,000. 36 The evidence showed that the BLM charges permittees $7.50 per ton to remove common variety stone from the Red Mountain Community Pit. The price that the BLM charges permittees for the stone, however, is not definitive. The phrase either wholesale or retail, whichever is greater plainly contemplates a comparison of wholesale and retail prices and does not limit the value to the amount that the BLM would have charged an individual who purchased it through proper procedures. An expert testified that the retail value was $120 or $280 per ton, depending on the size of the particular pieces of stone. The McPhilomys sold the stone for $300 per ton. Using the lowest figure of these figures, $120 per ton, both the value of the stone taken in July (an estimated 77 tons) and the value of the stone taken in September (an estimated 36 tons) would clearly exceed the $1,000 statutory requirement. 37 We see no reason that someone who removes material from a community pit without authorization should receive the benefit of the government's price for purposes of determining the severity of the crime. The McPhilomys did not comply with the requirements for obtaining stone at the $7.50 a ton price. They employed heavy machinery and removed materials for a commercial purpose, although stipulations for the community pit allow removal only by hand tools and for noncommercial purposes. In other words, even if the McPhilomys had been able to obtain a permit, it would not have allowed them to remove the materials they removed in the manner they removed them at a price of $7.50 per ton. 38 This holding does not conflict with our previous decisions in United States v. Williams, 50 F.3d 863, 864 (10th Cir. 1995), and United States v. Alberico, 604 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1979). In Williams, we calculated market value based on the value to the victim. That case, however, required assessing loss under the Sentencing Guidelines, not value under 18 U.S.C. 641. Moreover, the issue in Williams was limited to determining market value, while here the value we are seeking could be either wholesale or retail, whichever is greater. 39 In Alberico, we affirmed a felony conviction under section 641, because the face value of checks the defendant had stolen clearly exceeded the statutory requirement, and [e]vidence of value in a thieves' market is unnecessary when face value is available. Id. at 1321. Alberico does not stand for the proposition that a predetermined value must always control, but rather for the proposition that a face value that exceeds the statutory minimum suffices to demonstrate that value exceeds the statutory minimum. As such, the case has no application here. 40 The defendants ask us to follow the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Seaman, 18 F.3d 649, 651 (9th Cir. 1994), in which that court held that evidence of the price at which the defendants offered to sell firewood did not prove the retail value of the timber the defendants stole, because the finished cords of wood offered for sale represented a different product with a greatly enhanced value from the logs as originally removed. The Ninth Circuit itself, however, has restricted the applicability of this principle to cases involving a commercial modification of the stolen goods, and no commercial modification occurred here. United States v. Campbell, 42 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 1994). Moreover, that court has specifically declined to deduct a thief's expenses for purposes of determining the value of stolen property, id., which is precisely what the McPhilomys ask us to do here. Seaman, then, even if it were binding on this court, would not support the defendants' argument. 41 We therefore hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion and that its jury instruction properly stated the law. 42