Opinion ID: 2587573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: part iii. legal analysis.

Text: ¶ 12 On summary judgment Robert, in part, argued appellants were merely suing him as a guarantor and because there was no guaranty in writing signed by him, the statute of frauds provided him with a complete defense. [11] Although appellants did assert a guaranty theory of liability in their amended petition, the theory was not exclusive. The amended petition and the summary judgment record make it plain that appellants also claimed Robert was intended to be and was an undisclosed party to the sale, i.e. he was a joint purchaser along with his wife and he was not merely a guarantor. A party litigant may plead, and rely on at trial, alternative and inconsistent theories or defenses under the Oklahoma Pleading Code, 12 O.S.1991, § 2001 et seq., as amended. 12 O.S.1991, § 2008(E)(2); Howell v. James, 1991 OK 47, 818 P.2d 444. Although inconsistent judgments or double recovery may not be permissible, § 2008(E)(2) generally allows a party to fully litigate inconsistent theories or defenses at trial. Howell v. James, 818 P.2d at 447. Thus, as we explain below, if Robert was in actuality a joint purchaser, the statute of frauds would not provide a viable defense and summary judgment was inappropriate. ¶ 13 A guaranty, in its common acceptation, is understood to mean an undertaking to answer for the payment of some debt, or the performance of some duty, of another, in the case of a failure of such other to pay or perform. Gravelle v. Pollock Stores Co., 1928 OK 229, 131 Okla. 20, 267 P. 473, 474-475. [12] A guaranty is generally understood to be a collateral undertaking or liability, rather than a direct one, because the guarantor agrees to pay only in the case of the default of the party to whom goods are furnished or credit is extended. Gravelle, 267 P. at 473, Syllabus by the Court. In Gravelle the following legal precept was stated by this Court: unless, under all the testimony, all reasonable persons must reach the conclusion that the liability was collateral (i.e. merely a guaranty) and not direct, an issue as to whether a promise of a person sought to be bound is direct or collateral for statute of fraud purposes is a question of fact to be submitted to the jury. 267 P. at 473, Syllabus by the Court. See also Cales v. Gray, 1924 OK 1096, 105 Okla. 54, 231 P. 300 Syllabus by the Court (basically same). Although in Cales the facts did not warrant a reasonable conclusion that a joint obligation was intended, this Court recognized that if the facts do warrant, a joint obligation may be created. Cales, 231 P. at 301. We also note that it is not unusual for a husband and wife to engage in some type of business enterprise together. See e.g. Vogel v. Traders' Compress Co., 1928 OK 122, 129 Okla. 200, 264 P. 147 (husband and wife engaged in partnership relationship buying and selling cotton). ¶ 14 The case of Waldock v. First Nat. Bank of Idabel, 1914 OK 424, 43 Okla. 348, 143 P. 53 makes plain that a joint obligation or debt is not a guaranty and it is not subject to the statute of frauds requirement of a writing. In the Syllabus by the Court in Waldock three potential scenarios and the applicability or inapplicability of a statute of frauds defense are set forth. Waldock states: Where money is loaned to R. solely upon a verbal promise of W. and credit is extended solely to W. and no credit is extended to R., the promise of W. is original, and does not come within the statute of frauds. Where money is loaned or goods sold to R. and W. jointly, and credit is extended to both, and both promise to pay the same, although such money is borrowed or goods purchased for the sole benefit of R., the promise of R. and W. is original, and they are codebtors, and such promise need not be in writing, and either or both will be liable for the debt. Where money is loaned or goods sold to R. for his use and benefit, and credit is extended to R. and W. jointly, or if any credit is extended to R., W.'s promise to pay is collateral, and comes within the statute of frauds, unless it be in writing. The following facts contained in the summary judgment record are plainly sufficient to warrant, at least, the reasonable inference that Robert and Colleen were joint purchasers of the company and, if they were, the second scenario spelled out in Waldock cannot be ruled out at the summary judgment stage. Robert's name appears on the two stock certificates as a joint transferee along with Colleen; he was the person that would be funding the purchase of company or, at least, the remainder of the purchase price; and Colleen would apparently be the person that would handle running the company had the sale gone through. If Robert and Colleen were joint purchasers, the statute of frauds would provide no defense because Robert's liability would be original, not collateral. Further, if they were joint purchasers Robert might have some liability for the remaining purchase price and summary judgment should not have been granted in his favor.