Opinion ID: 2999543
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: indot

Text: Tomanovich also sued INDOT for retaliation, claiming that INDOT refused to hire him in retaliation for filing EEOC charges against his former employer, the City. As with his claim against the City, Tomanovich attempts to establish his retaliation claim against INDOT under both the direct and indirect methods.
Tomanovich argues that he presented sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment on his retaliation claim under the direct method because he established a causal connection between his Title VII complaint and INDOT’s refusal to hire him. As proof, Tomanovich points to the statements made by Lawrence (who worked for the City) that the City could not answer any of INDOT’s questions beyond Tomanovich’s dates of employment, due to pending litigation. Lawrence, however, never indicated that the pending litigation involved Title VII, and Title VII only prohibits retaliation for opposing a practice made unlawful under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Tomanovich also argues that statements made by Kumar (the Deputy Commissioner with INDOT) to INDOT’s Human Resources Division Chief, Trout, that there were “some issues” with INDOT hiring Tomanovich constitutes direct evidence of retaliation. There is no evidence, however, that “some issues” meant that Tomanovich had filed a charge of discrimination against the City. Tomanovich failed to present any evidence showing that INDOT knew that he had filed a complaint under Title VII. “It is not sufficient that [an employer] could or even should have known about [an employee’s] complaint; [the employer] must have had 18 No. 05-1653 actual knowledge of the complaints for [its] decisions to be retaliatory.” Luckie v. Ameritech Corp., 389 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 2004). Because these statements do not indicate that INDOT knew of Tomanovich’s Title VII complaints, Tomanovich cannot succeed on his retaliation claim against INDOT under the direct method.
Tomanovich also argues that he presented sufficient evidence under the indirect method. Again, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the indirect method, Tomanovich must show that he: (1) engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) met the employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) suffered a materially adverse action; and (4) was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who did not engage in statutorily protected activity. Moser, 406 F.3d at 903. However, proof of retaliation under the indirect method presupposes that the decision-maker knew that the plaintiff engaged in a statutorily protected activity, because if an employer did not know the plaintiff made any complaints, it “cannot be trying to penalize him for making them.” Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc., 417 F.3d 663, 664 (7th Cir. 2005). See Durkin v. City of Chicago, 341 F.3d 606, 614 n.4 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that an employer’s knowledge of the protected activity is implicit in the first element of the indirect method). Because, as noted, there is no evidence that INDOT knew that Tomanovich had filed Title VII complaints against the City, Tomanovich also cannot proceed under the indirect method. Moreover, even had Tomanovich presented evidence that INDOT knew of his EEOC complaint, he nonetheless failed to establish a prima facie case. Specifically, Tomanovich did No. 05-1653 19 not establish that a similarly situated employee who did not engage in statutorily protected activity was treated more favorably. Tomanovich argues otherwise, pointing to a statement by INDOT’s Legal Counsel, Kelly Whiteman, that she had never encountered problems gaining information from an applicant’s previous employer. This evidence, however, does not show that INDOT treated Tomanovich differently than applicants who had not filed a charge of discrimination. Rather, this evidence shows that INDOT made several attempts to verify Tomanovich’s employment record. Tomanovich also argues that Risch’s testimony that, in thirty years of working for INDOT, he had never been required to withdraw an offer of employment, shows that he was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees. This testimony, however, does not establish that the other applicants were similarly situated. Moreover, in this case, INDOT presented evidence that it withdrew its offer to Tomanovich because it only learned after having made the offer that Tomanovich was a candidate for City Council and under Indiana law could not be hired as an engineer. Tomanovich did not identify any other applicant who was barred by Indiana law from holding a position, but was nonetheless hired. Tomanovich also failed to present evidence of other applicants who were hired by INDOT even though INDOT could not confirm details of their prior employment. Therefore, Tomanovich did not show that INDOT treated a similarly situated applicant, who had not engaged in protected activity, more favorably. Furthermore, even if Tomanovich had established a prima facie case, INDOT presented evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for withdrawing its job offer and not hiring Tomanovich. Specifically, INDOT presented evidence that it withdrew its employment offer only after learning that Tomanovich was a candidate for public office and 20 No. 05-1653 barred by state law from working as an engineer. INDOT further presented evidence that after Tomanovich withdrew his candidacy for city council, it did not hire him because it was unable to confirm details about his job performance in his previous position. Tomanovich failed to present any evidence that these proffered reasons were pretextual. Accordingly, Tomanovich’s retaliation claim against INDOT cannot succeed under the indirect method, and the district court properly granted INDOT summary judgment.