Opinion ID: 820512
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Management Enhancement

Text: Section 3B1.1(b) provides, [i]f the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants -6- or was otherwise extensive, increase by 3 levels. Lopez-Soto does not dispute the conspiracy had five or more participants. Instead, she argues she was not a manager or supervisor because Dizdarevic, whom the district court found Lopez-Soto supervised, participated in the conspiracy prior to Lopez-Soto’s involvement. LopezSoto contends she could not supervise someone whose involvement preceded her own. We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its application of the Guidelines de novo. United States v. Woods, 670 F.3d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotation and citation omitted). We first determine whether the district court committed any procedural error, including failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). If the sentence is procedurally sound, we then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. Lopez-Soto, however, failed to object to the application of the enhancement at sentencing. If a defendant fails to timely object to a procedural sentencing error, the error is forfeited and may only be reviewed for plain error. United States v. Phelps, 536 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 2008). Under plain error review, the defendant must show: (1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3) that affects substantial rights. Id. Application note 4 of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 provides the factors to consider when determining if the enhancement is appropriate: the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope -7- of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others. We have defined the terms manager and supervisor broadly and have held a defendant need only have managed or supervised one other person to qualify for the enhancement. United States v. Lopez, 431 F.3d 313, 317-18 (8th Cir. 2005). Likewise, the enhancement may apply even if the management or supervisory activity was confined to a single transaction. United States v. Garrison, 168 F.3d 1089, 1096 (8th Cir. 1999). The government presented evidence at sentencing which demonstrated LopezSoto directed Dizdarevic's activities on at least two occasions. Dizdarevic admitted in her post-arrest interview that when she deposited money into Arbelaez's account, Lopez-Soto drove her to the bank, gave her the money and the account number, and instructed her on the proper procedure to make the deposit. Moreover, we have previously considered and rejected the argument that criminal activity by other participants prior to the time the defendant joined the conspiracy precludes the defendant from managing those prior participants. See United States v. Mendoza, 341 F.3d 687, 693-94 (8th Cir. 2003). Given this evidence, we cannot say the district court plainly erred when it adjusted Lopez-Soto's sentence by three levels for her management role in the conspiracy.