Opinion ID: 1846641
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Predicate Offenses

Text: The trial court struck counts 1 (racketeering), 2 (conspiracy to commit racketeering), and 130 (white collar crime) from the information, finding that section 817.505 was not a proper predicate on which the State could charge racketeering and white collar crime. The Fifth District affirmed this decision. Rubio, 917 So.2d at 399-400.
The defendants were charged with violating section 895.03(3), Florida Statutes (2002) (the RICO statute), which provides: It is unlawful for any person employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt. The defendants were also charged with conspiracy to commit racketeering, which is prohibited by section 895.03(4), Florida Statutes. The relevant definition of racketeering (and point of contention in the instant issue) is found in section 895.02, Florida Statutes (2002), and provides: (1) Racketeering activity means to commit, to attempt to commit, to conspire to commit, or to solicit, coerce, or intimidate another person to commit: (a) Any crime which is chargeable by indictment or information under the following provisions of the Florida Statutes: . . . . 26. Chapter 817, relating to fraudulent practices, false pretenses, fraud generally, and credit card crimes. The defendants argue that although the patient brokering statute falls within chapter 817, it is not an appropriate predicate for a racketeering charge because it does not require that the accused have committed fraud in order to be convicted of patient brokering. Thus, the defendants' argument is that section 895.02(1)(a)(26) limits its predicate offenses to only those sections that include the elements of fraud by including the relating to fraudulent practices, false pretenses, fraud generally, and credit card crimes language. The trial court agreed and dismissed counts 1 and 2 against the defendants. The Fifth District affirmed the dismissal, holding that the relating to language in section 895.02(1)(a)(26) meant that only those provisions under chapter 817 that required fraud as an element of the crime prohibited were to be considered valid predicate offenses. The court noted: Construing the `relating to' language as merely referring to the chapter already listed would render that language superfluous. Rubio, 917 So.2d at 399. The State argues that the Fifth District misread the plain language of the RICO statute. The State notes that the words following relating to in section 895.02 are the titles of the various parts of chapter 817: Fraudulent Practices; False Pretenses and Frauds, Generally; and Credit Card Crimes. The State maintains, therefore, that those words are simply used to describe the chapters which the statute references and are not intended to limit the chapters in any way. Indeed, section 895.02 includes a relating to provision for each of its subsections, often either the title of the section or chapter to which it cites. Chapter 817 is entitled Fraudulent Practices and includes three parts: part 1, False Pretenses and Frauds, Generally; part 2, Credit Card Crimes; and part 3, Credit Service Organizations. However, we also consider that section 895.02 uses the relating to language in regard to chapters in which there are different crimes set out and it is unclear that the crimes that are not stated are intended to be included in section 895.02. For example, section 895.02(1)(a)(9) sets forth as a predicate offense [c]hapter 550, relating to jai alai frontons. The immediately preceding subsection, section 895.02(1)(a)(8), sets forth [s]ection 550.235, s. 550.3551, or s. 550.3605, relating to dogracing and horseracing. If the entirety of chapter 550, which is titled Pari-Mutuel Wagering, was to be included by the reference in section 895.02(1)(a)(9), then the specification of particular sections in section 895.02(1)(a)(8) was unnecessary. Another example is section 895.02(1)(a)(18), which sets forth as a predicate offense [c]hapter 784, relating to assault and battery. Chapter 784 is titled Assault and Battery; Culpable Negligence. From this subsection it is not clear that culpable negligence is to be considered a predicate offense to racketeering. We agree with the Fifth District and the trial court on this issue and affirm the Fifth District's decision dismissing the racketeering charges (counts one and two) of the information, which are based on violations of chapter 817, Florida Statutes.
The defendants raised similar challenges to count 130 in the information, which charged the defendants with violating section 775.0844, the White Collar Crime Victim Protection Act. The defendants argued that section 817.505 was not a proper predicate upon which to base the white collar crime charge. The trial court again agreed and dismissed this count. Section 775.0844(2), Florida Statutes (2002), provides: Due to the frequency with which victims, particularly elderly victims, are deceived and cheated by criminals who commit nonviolent frauds and swindles, frequently through the use of the Internet and other electronic technology and frequently causing the loss of substantial amounts of property, it is the intent of the Legislature to enhance the sanctions imposed for nonviolent frauds and swindles, protect the public's property, and assist in prosecuting white collar criminals. Section 775.0844(3)(a)(4) provides that white collar crime means the commission or conspiracy to commit any felony offense specified in [c]hapter 817, relating to fraudulent practices. The Fifth District affirmed the trial court's dismissal of this charge for the same reasons that it affirmed the dismissal of the racketeering charges. Rubio, 917 So.2d at 400. For the reasons set forth in the analysis in the prior section of this opinion concerning the RICO predicate issue, we affirm the Fifth District's decision on this issue.