Opinion ID: 4542451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: standing to raise constitutional challenges

Text: The Districts also raise two constitutional challenges, arguing the ordinance violates both the state and federal due process clauses,13 and the state privileges and immunities clause. The superior court rejected these claims on the merits, after concluding the Districts had standing to raise them. On direct review, the City reasserts its position that the Districts lack standing to bring their constitutional claims. The Districts counter that they have personal standing, but if not, then they have standing in a representational capacity. We hold the Districts lack standing in either capacity. “The basic test for standing is ‘whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question’.” City of Seattle v. State, 103 Wn.2d 663, 668, 694 P.2d 641 (1985) (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King County v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 493, 585 P.2d 71 (1978)). “Standing requirements tend to overlap the requirements for justiciability under the UDJA [Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, ch. 7.24 RCW].” Am. Legion Post No. 149 v. Dep’t of 13 The Districts offer no independent state constitutional analysis. Generally, “[i]f a party does not provide constitutional analysis based upon the factors set out in [State v.] Gunwall[, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986)], the court will not analyze the state constitutional grounds in a case.” First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 120 Wn.2d 203, 224, 840 P.2d 174 (1992). -31- Lakehaven Water & Sewer Dist. et al. v. City of Federal Way, 96585-4 Health, 164 Wn.2d 570, 593, 192 P.3d 306 (2008). We apply “a two-part test for standing under the UDJA.” Id. “First, a party must be within the ‘zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute’ in question. Second, the party must have suffered an ‘injury in fact.’” Id. at 593-94 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Grant County Fire Prot. Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 150 Wn.2d 791, 802, 83 P.3d 419 (2004)). Generally, municipal corporations do not have rights under the equal protection or due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. See Seattle, 103 Wn.2d at 668; Samuel’s Furniture, Inc. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 147 Wn.2d 440, 463, 54 P.3d 1194 (2002) (“political subdivisions cannot invoke protections of the Fourteenth Amendment against a state” (citing City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192, 196, 43 S. Ct. 539, 67 L. Ed. 943 (1923))). “The due process clause protects people from government; it does not protect the state from itself. Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created for exercising such governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to them, and they may not assert the protection of the due process clause against action of the state government.” Seattle, 103 Wn.2d at 681-82 (Dolliver, J., dissenting) (quoting Mountlake Terrace v. Wilson, 15 Wn. App. 392, 394, 549 P.2d 497 (1976)). The cases the Districts rely on do not permit municipal corporations to bring due process claims. Instead, those cases address certain constitutional rights of private corporations. As noted, water-sewer districts are political subdivisions of -32- Lakehaven Water & Sewer Dist. et al. v. City of Federal Way, 96585-4 the state. Whether acting in a proprietary or governmental capacity, municipal corporations do not have personhood like private corporations do. The implications of the District’s argument based on Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2010), for instance, give us pause. If we were to accept the premise that municipal corporations are no different from private corporations, the Districts’ argument would seem to suggest they enjoy the same First Amendment right to spend money on elections. See generally id. (holding that the government may not, under the First Amendment, suppress political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity). No precedent in Washington recognizes this degree of personhood for municipal corporations, and it would corrode the democratic process to allow political subdivisions of the state to voice support for causes or candidates for office. At bottom, the Districts’ argument for individual standing to assert a due process claim is built on little more than its perceived irony in the City’s position: that the City views the Districts as performing proprietary functions yet denies them the same constitutional standing afforded to private proprietors. First, any irony cuts both ways, as the Districts maintain their functions are purely governmental. But more importantly, the unique status of municipal corporations is a feature of constitutional design that courts must respect. Even if private persons can perform -33- Lakehaven Water & Sewer Dist. et al. v. City of Federal Way, 96585-4 proprietary functions of municipal governments, a governmental entity remains just that. Municipal corporations have never been recognized as “persons” to the same extent as private corporations under the federal or state constitution. We hold the Districts lack standing to assert their due process vagueness argument under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution. See Samuel’s Furniture, 147 Wn.2d at 463. The Districts alternatively claim they have representational standing to assert claims on their ratepayers’ behalf. We disagree. “An organization ‘has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.’” Am. Legion Post, 164 Wn.2d at 595 (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n., 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1977)). “This court has adopted a more liberal approach to standing ‘when a controversy is of substantial public importance, immediately affects significant segments of the population, and has a direct bearing on commerce, finance, labor, industry, or agriculture.’” Id. (quoting Grant County, 150 Wn.2d at 803). -34- Lakehaven Water & Sewer Dist. et al. v. City of Federal Way, 96585-4 Here, ratepayers would likely have standing to challenge the ordinance. And neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Still, the Districts have not shown that the interests they seek to protect are germane to their purpose. As “special purpose” water, sewer, or combined water-sewer districts, their primary purpose is providing water-sewer services to ratepayers. No evidence in the record shows ratepayers receive diminished water-sewer services from the Districts because of the excise tax. See Grant County, 150 Wn.2d at 804 (holding that fire districts lacked representational standing because they could not show the residents would receive less effective fire protection or other emergency services). The only interest the Districts seek to protect is relief from a tax burden. Because ratepayers would likely have personal standing to argue the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, we need not apply our liberal approach to standing here. See id. The Districts next claim they have standing to pursue a claim under article I, section 12—they do not. Washington’s privileges and immunities clause provides, “No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12 (emphasis added). “Where the text of a constitutional provision is plain, the court must give -35- Lakehaven Water & Sewer Dist. et al. v. City of Federal Way, 96585-4 the language its reasonable interpretation without further construction.” Locke v. City of Seattle, 162 Wn.2d 474, 482, 172 P.3d 705 (2007). Based on its text, we have long held that our state privileges and immunities clause does not apply to municipal corporations. E.g., Bilger v. State, 63 Wash. 457, 469, 116 P. 19 (1911) (“municipal corporations . . . are expressly excepted from the terms of the prohibition”); City of Spokane v. Spokane County, 179 Wash. 130, 136, 36 P.2d 311 (1934) (“this constitutional provision by its terms does not relate to municipal corporations”); Locke, 162 Wn.2d at 482 (“By its express language, article I, section 12 does not apply to municipal corporations.”). The federal cases and out of state authority the Districts rely on do not alter our long-standing interpretation of standing under article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution. The Districts’ lack of standing is fatal to their due process and privileges and immunities claims, and we decline to consider the merits of such claims.