Opinion ID: 1328029
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Proper School Age/Pre-Kindergarten

Text: The next two issues of the instant appeal by the State are outgrowths of one another. As a consequence, we address them in tandem. Initially, the State contends that the trial court erred when it ruled that the proper age for school children was a justiciable issue. In the State's view, the proper age at which children should be permitted to attend public school is a nonjusticiable political question reserved for the General Assembly. To the extent that the State argues that establishing the proper age parameters for starting and completing school  i.e., kindergarten, the entering class for public school students, shall be composed of five-year-olds  we agree. Article IX, Section 3 of the North Carolina Constitution provides that [t]he General Assembly shall provide that every child of appropriate age ... shall attend the public schools. Pursuant to such authority, the General Assembly has determined that five-year-olds may attend school and that seven-year-olds must attend school. N.C.G.S. §§ 115C-364, -378 (2003). Our reading of the constitutional and statutory provisions leads us to conclude that the determination of the proper age for school children has indeed been squarely placed in the hands of the General Assembly. In addition, the United States Supreme Court has defined issues as nonjusticiable when either of the following circumstances are evident: (1) when the Constitution commits an issue, as here, to one branch of government; or (2) when satisfactory and manageable criteria or standards do not exist for judicial determination of the issue. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210, 82 S.Ct. 691, 706, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, 682 (1962). In our view, not only are the applicable statutory and constitutional provisions persuasive in and of themselves, but the evidence in this case demonstrates that the trial court was without satisfactory or manageable judicial criteria that could justify mandating changes with regard to the proper age for school children. Thus, with regard to the issue of whether the trial court erred by interfering with the province of the General Assembly  establishing the appropriate age for students entering the public school system  we conclude that the trial court did so err. First, our state's constitutional provisions and corresponding statutes serve to establish the issue as the exclusive province of the General Assembly and, second, there was no evidence at trial indicating the trial court had satisfactory or manageable criteria that would justify modifying legislative efforts. As a consequence, the Court holds that any trial court rulings that infringed on the legislative prerogative of establishing school-age eligibility were in error. However, when considered in the context of the related issue of pre-kindergarten programs, the crux of this issue is less about whether school must be offered to four-year-olds than it is about whether the State must help prepare those students who enter the schools to avail themselves of an opportunity to obtain a sound basic education. While the General Assembly may be empowered to establish the actual age for beginning school, the question of whether the General Assembly must address the particular needs of children prior to entering the school system is a distinct and separate inquiry. For example, the General Assembly, in its discretion, could establish that mandatory school attendance begins at four years of age, five years of age, or six years of age. However, the State's power to establish such an age does not answer the question of whether or not it must address the particular needs of those children who are, or are approaching, the established age for school admission. Thus, the issue before us is less about at-risk four-year-olds than it is about at-risk children approaching and/or attaining school-age eligibility as established by the General Assembly. In our view, the evidence presented at trial clearly supported these findings and conclusions by the trial court: (1) A large number of Hoke County students had failed to obtain a sound basic education; (2) A large number of Hoke County students were being denied their rightful opportunity to a sound basic education because the State had failed in its duty to provide the necessary means for such an opportunity; (3) There were an inordinate number of at-risk students attending Hoke County schools; (4) The special needs attendant to such at-risk students were not being met; and (5) It was ultimately the State's responsibility to meet the needs of at-risk students in order for such students to avail themselves of their right to the opportunity to obtain a sound basic education. See Part IV, above. In addition to ordering the State to reassess its resource allocations to Hoke County schools in an effort to improve them for students currently in attendance, the trial court heard evidence concerning the plight of those children who were about to enter the school system. Plaintiffs essentially argued that such evidence was relevant because it would show that the problem of at-risk students extended beyond those students already in school and would thereby support additional remedies that specifically targeted incoming students. Once the problems of at-risk students had been demonstrated at trial, it was not beyond the reach of the trial court to hear evidence concerning whether preemptive action on the part of the State might assist in resolving the problems of such at-risk students. Thus, we conclude that because the evidence presented showed that at-risk students in Hoke County were being denied their right to an opportunity to obtain a sound basic education, the trial court properly admitted additional evidence intended to show that preemptive action on the part of the State should target those children about to enroll, recognizing that preemptive action affecting such children prior to their entering the public schools might well be far more cost effective than waiting until they are actually in the educational system. We now turn our attention to the trial court's findings and conclusions concerning at-risk children who are or were about to enter the Hoke County school system. In paragraph 74a of their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that many [`at-risk'] children living in [Hoke County] begin public school kindergarten at a severe disadvantage. They do not have the basic skills and knowledge needed for kindergarten and as a foundation for the remainder of ... school. Plaintiffs also alleged that the lack of pre-kindergarten services and programs offered in Hoke County deprived such students from receiving their opportunity for a sound basic education, and said that [Hoke County] schools do not have sufficient resources to provide the pre-kindergarten and other programs and services needed for a sound basic education. As relief for the allegations raised in paragraph 74a, plaintiffs sought an order from the trial court that would, in essence, compel the State to provide remedial and preparatory pre-kindergarten services to at-risk four-year-olds in Hoke County. In assessing the evidence presented at trial pertaining to the allegations of paragraph 74a, the trial court found: (1) that there was an inordinate number of at-risk children who were entering the Hoke County school district; (2) that such at-risk children were starting behind their non at-risk counterparts; and (3) that such at-risk children were likely to stay behind, or fall further behind, their non at-risk counterparts as they continued their education. In addition, the trial court found that the evidence showed that the State was providing inadequate resources for such at-risk prospective enrollees, and that the State's failings were contributing to the at-risk prospective enrollees' subsequent failure to avail themselves of the opportunity to obtain a sound basic education. In support of its findings, the trial court tracked and noted the number and percentage of prospective enrollees who ultimately entered Hoke County schools as at-risk students, and referred to other evidence demonstrating the students' lack of success as they continued through school. As for evidence concerning the State's failure to identify such at-risk prospective enrollees and its failure to provide remedial services so such at-risk students could avail themselves of a Leandro -conforming educational opportunity, the trial court found that the State's current remedial programs for at-risk prospective enrollees in Hoke County were limited to three pre-kindergarten classes serving eighteen students each. Other testimony at trial indicated that besides the fifty-four students who were attending such remedial classes, there were over 300 more who would benefit from such classes. The trial court additionally noted that the three class offerings were funded by a combination of state Smart Start and federal Title One monies. As a consequence of its findings, the trial court concluded that State efforts towards providing remedial aid to at-risk prospective enrollees were inadequate. To that point in the proceedings, we agree with the trial court, and hold that the evidence supports its findings of fact and that its findings support its conclusions of law. In our view, judging by its actions, it appears that even the State concedes that at-risk prospective enrollees in Hoke County are in need of assistance in order to avail themselves of their right to the opportunity for a sound basic education. Yet there is a marked difference between the State's recognizing a need to assist at-risk students prior to enrollment in the public schools and a court order compelling the legislative and executive branches to address that need in a singular fashion. In our view, while the trial court's findings and conclusions concerning the problem of at-risk prospective enrollees are well supported by the evidence, a similar foundational support cannot be ascertained for the trial court's order requiring the State to provide pre-kindergarten classes for either all of the State's at-risk prospective enrollees or all of Hoke County's at-risk prospective enrollees. Certainly, when the State fails to live up to its constitutional duties, a court is empowered to order the deficiency remedied, and if the offending branch of government or its agents either fail to do so or have consistently shown an inability to do so, a court is empowered to provide relief by imposing a specific remedy and instructing the recalcitrant state actors to implement it. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 552, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1376-77, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 521 (1964) (upholding order adopting a temporary reapportionment plan for Alabama legislature to ensure the plan complied with equal protection requirements); Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226, 228-29 (4th Cir.1993) (affirming lower court's order requiring that the Citadel, an all-male state military college, allow female plaintiff to enroll in its day program); N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F.Supp. 752, 768-69 (E.D.N.Y.1973) (ordering recalcitrant state school to hire additional staff and make specific repairs as a means to ensure that the institution would meet minimum standards); Stephenson v. Bartlett, 357 N.C. 301, 304-05, 582 S.E.2d 247, 249-50 (2003) (referring to the Court's prior approval of a trial court's interim redistricting maps for use in the 2002 elections). However, such specific court-imposed remedies are rare, and strike this Court as inappropriate at this juncture of the instant case for two related reasons: (1) The subject matter of the instant case  public school education  is clearly designated in our state Constitution as the shared province of the legislative and executive branches; and (2) The evidence and findings of the trial court, while supporting a conclusion that at-risk children require additional assistance and that the State is obligated to provide such assistance, do not support the imposition of a narrow remedy that would effectively undermine the authority and autonomy of the government's other branches. [17] While this Court assuredly recognizes the gravity of the situation for at-risk prospective enrollees in Hoke County and elsewhere, and acknowledges the imperative need for a solution that will prevent existing circumstances from remaining static or spiraling further, we are equally convinced that the evidence indicates that the State shares our concerns and, more importantly, that the State has already begun to assume its responsibilities for implementing corrective measures. At the time of the trial, Smart Start, a public-private partnership that provides funds for early childhood welfare programs, was already in place. While Smart Start is not principally a pre-kindergarten education program, monies from the program often help LEAs establish and maintain pre-kindergarten classes. Hoke County and Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools were among a group of LEAs that operated such programs when this case was being heard. Although evidence at trial indicated that the State and Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools were at odds over the effectiveness of the latter's Bright Beginnings program, other testimony and evidence showed that State officials: (1) recognized the need for, and effectiveness of, early intervention programs like pre-kindergarten; and (2) had authorized the establishment of such programs by LEAs that desired them. Meanwhile, plaintiffs and even the trial court seem to suggest that the State's claims and evidence concerning the issue amounted to little more than lip service, and that the evidence at trial more accurately reflected a showing that the State, to the point of the trial, had done nothing to provide for a statewide pre-kindergarten program and had done nothing to expand pre-kindergarten services to the nearly 300 other Hoke County at-risk prospective enrollees who were eligible for such classes. In further support of that view, this Court notes that among all the reports submitted to the trial court by the State since the trial concluded, [18] the State makes no mention of its efforts, continuing or otherwise, on behalf of at-risk prospective enrollees in Hoke County. But even if this Court were to concur fully with plaintiffs' view, we note that the question before us does not concern the extent of the State's compliance with the trial court's order regarding pre-kindergarten for at-risk prospective enrollees in Hoke County schools, but whether the State must comply with that portion of the order. In our view, there is inadequate foundational support for an order that compels the State to provide pre-kindergarten services for all at-risk prospective enrollees in Hoke County. At this juncture, the suggestion that pre-kindergarten is the sole vehicle or, for that matter, a proven effective vehicle by which the State can address the myriad problems associated with such at-risk prospective enrollees is, at best, premature. The evidence shows that the State recognizes the extent of the problem  its deficiencies in affording at-risk prospective enrollees their guaranteed opportunity to obtain a sound basic education  and its obligation to address and correct it. However, a single or definitive means for achieving constitutional compliance for such students has yet to surface from the depths of the evidentiary sea. Certainly, both sides have conceded that pre-kindergarten is, and can be, an effective method for preparing at-risk prospective enrollees for the rigors of their forthcoming education. Nevertheless, neither side has demonstrated to the satisfaction of this Court that it is either the only qualifying means or even the only known qualifying means. The state's legislative and executive branches have been endowed by their creators, the people of North Carolina, with the authority to establish and maintain a public school system that ensures all the state's children will be given their chance to get a proper, that is, a Leandro -conforming, education. As a consequence of such empowerment, those two branches have developed a shared history and expertise in the field that dwarfs that of this and any other Court. While we remain the ultimate arbiters of our state's Constitution, and vigorously attend to our duty of protecting the citizenry from abridgments and infringements of its provisions, we simultaneously recognize our limitations in providing specific remedies for violations committed by other government branches in service to a subject matter, such as public school education, that is within their primary domain. Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred when it imposed at this juncture of the litigation and on this record the requirement that the State must provide pre-kindergarten classes for all at-risk prospective enrollees in Hoke County. In our view, based on the evidence presented at trial, such a remedy is premature, and its strict enforcement could undermine the State's ability to meet its educational obligations for at-risk prospective enrollees by alternative means. As a consequence, we reverse those portions of the trial court order that may be construed to the effect of requiring the State to provide pre-kindergarten services as the remedy for constitutional violations referenced in Part V of this opinion.