Opinion ID: 2654518
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Faragher/Ellerth defense

Text: Even absent a tangible employment action, if Sergeant Benson qualifies as a “supervisor” the County is vicariously liable for his severe or pervasive sexual harassment unless it can establish the affirmative defense announced in Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, and Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. This defense has “two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Pinkerton v. Colo. Dep’t of Trans., 563 F.3d 1052, 1061 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). The defendant bears the burden to prove both prongs of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Mallinson-Montague v. Pocrnick, 224 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08). Thus, the employer -35- “must prove both that it acted reasonably in preventing and correcting harassment and that the victimized employee unreasonably failed to act by not utilizing complaint opportunities. The employer will lose this defense if it fails either prong.” Clark v. United Parcel Servs., 400 F.3d 341, 349 (6th Cir. 2005). To win summary judgment on the Faragher/Ellerth defense, an employer must “support its motion with credible evidence . . . that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial.” Anderson v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 947 (10th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The defendant must demonstrate that no disputed material fact exists regarding the affirmative defense asserted” when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Helm v. Kansas, 656 F.3d 1277, 1284 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks, omission, and alteration omitted). 11 Even on undisputed facts, however, “the judgment call as to reasonableness is itself a jury issue unless no reasonable jury could decide it in the plaintiff’s favor.” Reed, 333 F.3d at 34. Wasatch County has not supported its summary judgment motion with evidence that entitles it to judgment as a matter of law under either of the affirmative defense’s two prongs. 11 Only after the defendant makes such a showing does the burden shift back to the plaintiff, who must then “produce evidentiary materials that demonstrate the existence of a ‘genuine fact’ for trial.” Anderson, 907 F.2d at 947 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). -36- 1. Prong One: Wasatch County’s evidence does not establish as a matter of law that the County took reasonable means to prevent and promptly correct sexual harassment. The first prong of the affirmative defense requires the employer to establish that it took reasonable care to both “prevent and correct promptly” sexual harassment. Helm, 656 F.3d at 1288. The County had a policy prohibiting sexual harassment and Ms. Kramer was aware of it. Rather than arguing that the policy was a substantively deficient form of prevention, Ms. Kramer’s appeal centers on whether the County took reasonable care to “promptly correct” sexual harassment. With respect to this prong, the district court concluded: [T]he Sheriff exercised reasonable care to promptly correct any sexual harassment of which he became aware. The record shows that whenever the Sheriff was actually informed about such type of behavior, he took immediate action. . . . Ms. Kramer points to the Sheriff’s re-enactment of harassment during the 2006 staff meeting as an example of unreasonable action that simply perpetuated the hostile work environment. Although that meeting was inartfully conducted by Sheriff Van Wagoner, it nevertheless was an attempt to promptly remediate the reported sexual harassment. It does not establish that the County failed to exercise reasonable care to remedy sexual harassment in the workplace. Kramer, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 1208-09. In requiring Ms. Kramer to “establish” that the County failed to exercise reasonable care, the district court applied the wrong standard. Requiring the plaintiff to establish the employer’s unreasonableness is the standard for analyzing Wasatch County’s liability under a negligence theory. -37- Adler, 144 F.3d at 677. But the Faragher/Ellerth framework functions by obviating the need for the plaintiff to plead or prove negligence where the harasser is a supervisor. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747 (question presented, and answered in the affirmative, is whether an employee “can recover against the employer without showing the employer is negligent or otherwise at fault for the supervisor’s actions” (emphasis added)). Because the burden to prove the defense is the employer’s, summary judgment on the affirmative defense cannot be entered on the basis of anything the plaintiff failed to do until the defendant has supported its motion with evidence “that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial.” Anderson, 907 F.2d at 947 (internal quotation marks omitted). Wasatch County’s evidence that it took reasonable measures to promptly correct sexual harassment falls short of this standard. The County’s evidence that the Sheriff responded to sexual harassment “of which he became aware,” Kramer, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 1208-09, does not automatically entitle the County to judgment as a matter of law. Not just any response to sexual harassment establishes reasonable efforts to comply with Title VII. Employer responses must also meet minimal standards of quality that reflect the preventive purpose of Title VII and the Faragher/Ellerth defense. A showing that an employer made “an attempt to promptly remediate the reported sexual harassment,” id. at 1208, without any showing that such attempts were “reasonably calculated to end the harassment” and deter future harassers, does not -38- entitle the County to judgment as a matter of law. See Adler, 144 F.3d at 676. The County did not provide any evidence that the Sheriff Department’s interventions were reasonably calculated to end the harassment, deter future harassers, or protect Ms. Kramer. The parties hotly dispute what happened at the meeting called by the Sheriff in response to Ms. Kramer’s initial complaint about harassment in the jail, and Ms. Kramer testified that the harassment did not stop after that meeting. While her perceptions regarding that meeting are relevant to her own reasonableness under Faragher’s second prong, as we discuss infra, we need not decide what that meeting does or does not say about the County’s efforts to comply with Title VII because the undisputed facts about the County’s response to Ms. Kramer’s subsequent allegations against Sergeant Benson are enough to preclude judgment as a matter of law for the County on Faragher’s first prong. When the Sheriff first learned of the allegations, he initiated an investigation into what he referred to as “some sex” or “sexual misconduct” between Ms. Kramer and Sergeant Benson which, he explained, is “a violation of our policy and procedure, . . . especially if it’s on-duty.” Aple. Supp. App. at 166. It is unclear if he perceived the putative policy violation as sexual harassment or simply as a prohibited intra-office relationship between a -39- supervisor and his subordinate. 12 See id. at 171 (the Sheriff explained that because Sergeant Benson was Ms. Kramer’s “supervisor . . . POST does not condone that kind of relationship”). The Sheriff did not consult the County’s human resources professional about the allegations or ask him for advice as to what to do. 13 Instead, the Sheriff assigned the investigation to Detective Brian Gardner, not because Detective Gardner had any specific qualifications for this task but because he “was the unfortunate guy that was on-duty on that particular day.” Id. at 167. Moreover, Detective Gardner had been friends with Sergeant Benson for over ten years and considered him a mentor. In addition, the fact that Detective Gardner was never trained to investigate a complaint of sexual harassment is relevant to whether the County’s efforts were deficient. See Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1239 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). Nor did the Sheriff give Detective Gardner any “policy or procedures on how to conduct the investigation.” Aple. Supp. App. at 171. The Sheriff 12 The Sheriff’s testimony suggests his view was that sex with “no consent” by a supervisor might only violate Department policy if it occurred while the employees were on the clock, and that sex while on the clock was his real concern. The Sheriff explained: “consent” or “no consent,” “the fact that . . . some of these happened on lunch hours that I am paying for on my time. That’s a direct violation . . . .” Aple. Supp. App. at 173. 13 The Sheriff explained that he did not use a human resources employee to investigate because the human resources department “consists of one person. We have never used him for any of our investigations.” Aple. Supp. App. at 168. -40- explained that he gave Detective Gardner no such instructions because “[w]e don’t have any real hard-set investigative standards policy . . . other than what the state has and the federal government has put out, as far as sexual harassment.” Id. at 172. That statement is contrary to the evidence the County argues proves its reasonable efforts to prevent harassment: the Wasatch County Personnel Policy, which does in fact contain an “Investigation Procedure” for sexual harassment. Id. at 250. The investigative procedure provides that the investigator should “obtain[] a written statement from complainant . . . [,] discuss[] the matter with the alleged offender . . . [,] [and] obtain[] statements from possible witness(es) from both sides of the issue. Upon completion, an investigation report shall be submitted to the personnel officer or Board of County Commissioners as appropriate.” Id. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the Sheriff’s ignorance of the County’s policy, Detective Gardner’s “investigation” did not follow these steps. He did not obtain a written statement from Ms. Kramer, nor did he submit a report to the personnel officer or to anyone other than the Sheriff. The record does not contain any evidence that he “obtained statements from possible witnesses from both sides of the issue.” Instead of seeking to discover whether Title VII had been violated – in other words, whether Ms. Kramer had been sexually harassed in a way that affected her ability to do her job – which he admits he did not do, Detective Gardner focused on finding out who was the father of Ms. Kramer’s baby and -41- then on uncovering the extent of Ms. Kramer’s consensual affair with that man. Ms. Kramer testified that Detective Gardner repeatedly told her no one would believe her allegations about Sergeant Benson unless she confessed to having a consensual affair with her baby’s father. Upon learning that Ms. Kramer’s paramour was a County firefighter, Detective Gardner reported this information to the Sheriff. Detective Gardner then returned to Ms. Kramer’s house for a second interview, during which he repeatedly suggested that, due to her relationship with a firefighter, she should resign. 14 The Sheriff told POST about Ms. Kramer’s affair with the firefighter, and POST suspended Ms. Kramer’s certification. The Sheriff admitted he told Detective Gardner that he wanted Ms. Kramer to resign in order to protect the reputation of the fireman and of the Sheriff’s Department. Ms. Kramer never returned to work for the County. In her view, the County’s response just 14 Transcript of interview: Gardner: “. . . a resignation is going to look better for you as far as getting another job, as far as looking good on a resume. Um, and as far as keeping your POST certification. No, I’m not going to tell you which way to go. I know um, just from me to you, a resignation would look a lot better. . . . Well, do you want to give me a resignation, today? . . . I’m not trying to persuade you either way, . . . but I know your hands hurt and you can’t write[,] but I would write a resignation right up for you today if you would like me to. Do you want to do that?” Aple. Supp. App. at 361-62. We note also that Ms. Kramer was on narcotic pain relievers and tranquilizers at the time of this interaction, having just been in a car crash. Gardner: “What kind of medications are you on today?” Kramer: “Um, Valium and Lortab and I think one else, but I don’t remember.” Id. at 366. -42- confirmed her suspicion that complaining was a bad idea. 15 Responses to complaints that encourage the plaintiff to drop the complaint or otherwise penalize the plaintiff certainly do not prove an employer’s reasonableness as a matter of law. See Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 224 F.3d 1203, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000); EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 615.4(a)(9)(iii), 3103, 3213 (1988) (“appropriate corrective action . . . fully remedie[s] the conduct without adversely affecting the terms or conditions of the charging party’s employment in some manner . . . .”). More specifically, investigations targeting the victim for unrelated misconduct are especially contraindicative of reasonably calculated efforts to promptly correct sexual harassment. 16 See McInnis v. Fairfield Communities, Inc., 458 F.3d 1129, 1135 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding employer unreasonable when in response to plaintiff’s complaints, employer focused on plaintiff’s past misconduct); see also Williams, 497 F.3d at 1090 n.7 (“[T]he ‘prospect’ of an investigation [into the plaintiff] . . . could dissuade a reasonable employee from 15 After Detective Gardner’s investigation began, Ms. Kramer said: “that’s when I determined that I was in trouble and that nobody had an interest in the rape and I wasn’t believed and I needed to get myself an attorney.” Aplt. App. at 132. 16 Ms. Kramer’s consensual sex life with another person, County employee or not, was unrelated to her allegations regarding Sergeant Benson. “A person’s private and consensual sexual activities do not constitute a waiver of his or her legal protections against unwelcome and unsolicited sexual harassment.” Windsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1001 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). -43- making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” (internal citation omitted)). Using a sexual harassment complaint as an opportunity to investigate the complainant herself for unrelated misconduct does not communicate to other employees that complaining about sexual harassment can be done “without undue risk or expense.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806. Not only did the investigation here fail to demonstrate that the County employed reasonable means to discharge its Title VII obligations, the Sheriff’s response to Ms. Kramer’s allegations suggests that he did not understand he had a Title VII compliance matter on his hands. Under Title VII, “[e]mployers have a duty to express strong disapproval of sexual harassment, and to develop appropriate sanctions.” Adler, 144 F.3d at 684 (Briscoe, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f)). In response to learning that Sergeant Benson was not the father of Ms. Kramer’s baby and that “it was possibly a rape,” the Sheriff decided instead that the Department need not continue to investigate. He reported Ms. Kramer to POST for having relations with the County firefighter and he asked Todd Hull, the person investigating Ms. Kramer for the missing money, to “please handle” the rape investigation. Aple. Supp. App. 166-67. The Sheriff said: “basically my end of [the investigation] was completed within a couple of days.” Id. at 167. The evidence shows that Todd Hull handled the investigation as a purely criminal matter. There is no evidence the Department sought to improve its -44- sexual harassment prevention program or otherwise reduce the “risk of future harassment.” Fuller v. City of Oakland, Cal., 47 F.3d 1522, 1529 (9th Cir. 1995). “An employer’s failure to fully investigate a complaint supports a finding that its response was inadequate . . . . Moreover, an employer’s decision to do nothing on the basis of an inadequate investigation likewise supports a finding that the employer did not take prompt and effective remedial action.” Wilson v. Tulsa Junior Coll., 164 F.3d 534, 543 n.7 (10th Cir. 1998). Sergeant Benson did ultimately resign, but that alone is not sufficient to avoid vicarious liability. Harrison, 248 F.3d at 1026 (the fact that the harassment ends is not “sufficient by itself to avoid vicarious liability under Title VII for sexual harassment committed by a supervisory employee”). On this record, there remains a genuine issue of fact as to whether the County’s response to Ms. Kramer’s sexual harassment complaint fell short of demonstrating that the County took reasonable efforts to discharge its duty under Title VII, as required to establish the affirmative defense. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806. 2. Prong Two: Wasatch County’s evidence does not compel the conclusion that Ms. Kramer was unreasonable. The second prong of the affirmative defense requires the employer to “prove that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avoid or reduce harm.” Suders, 542 U.S. at 146. The County contended it was entitled to summary judgment on -45- this prong because Ms. Kramer did not “take advantage of preventive or corrective opportunities provided by [Defendants]” in a timely manner. Aple. Br. at 8. It argued that Ms. Kramer’s excuse for failing to timely complain to the Sheriff – that she was scared Sergeant Benson would retaliate – was “not sufficient to explain a delay in reporting,” id. at 34, and that Ms. Kramer voluntarily put herself in situations in which she should have known she would be sexually harassed by Sergeant Benson. The district court agreed. Once again, our review of the record convinces us that fact questions remain on this issue. a. Ms. Kramer’s failure to lodge a formal complaint does not itself demonstrate unreasonableness as a matter of law. The County emphasizes that “Sheriff Van Wagoner never received a complaint from the plaintiff with regard to Benson’s actions.” Aple. Br. at 32 n.10. The district court agreed that this was inexcusable because Ms. Kramer “had followed” the procedures for reporting harassment “in the past.” Kramer, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 1209. But the fact that Ms. Kramer had used County grievance procedures in the past to report other things done by co-workers does not by itself establish she was unreasonable as a matter of law in failing to use them to report severe sexual abuse at the hands of her supervisor. Her failure to complain formally to the Sheriff is simply not dispositive of the affirmative defense’s second prong. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 782 (plaintiff never complained, but employer not relieved of liability); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 748 (same); see also -46- Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73 (same); Reed, 333 F.3d at 36 (“the Supreme Court’s premise” is that “sometimes inaction is reasonable”). In Faragher itself, the Court held that the defendant’s efforts to prevent sexual harassment were so deficient that it could not assert the affirmative defense at all, even though the plaintiff had never complained to any management personnel. 524 U.S. at 808. The only duty placed upon plaintiffs is to act reasonably. And what is “reasonable” must be analyzed given the totality of the circumstances. Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir. 2010). It is not enough for the County to simply show that Ms. Kramer did not complain; it must also show that her failure to do so was unreasonable under the circumstances. Suders, 542 U.S. at 152. b. Ms. Kramer’s fears of retaliation A failure to use internal grievance procedures can be unreasonable where the record reveals no reason for it other than a “generalized” fear of retaliation. Pinkerton, 563 F.3d at 1063. But where the fear of complaining is not “general” or “nebulous” but is based on “concrete reason[s] to apprehend that complaint would be useless or result in affirmative harm to the complainant,” whether the plaintiff was reasonable and whether her fears are credible are questions of fact. Reed, 333 F.3d at 35-36. As previously detailed, Ms. Kramer testified that on numerous occasions Sergeant Benson sexually assaulted her and subsequently told her to “be quiet” -47- and “not say anything” or it would be “a career ender.” See, e.g., Aplt. App. at 105; id. at 121 (“[I]f I go down, you go down. I’m not going down alone. . . . You better keep your mouth shut . . . not one word to anyone.”). Sergeant Benson also threatened Ms. Kramer with a poor evaluation unless she would “keep [her] mouth shut and not say anything.” Id. at 112. These are not unlike the facts in Wilson, where the harasser “instructed [the plaintiff] not to file a complaint with either [the college] or the police and to keep her mouth shut, threatening [her] with, among other things, a poor recommendation to prevent her from getting a job in the future.” 164 F.3d at 539 (emphasis added). Sergeant Benson’s threats were arguably made more intimidating by his actions. In addition to the constant harassment at work, he called and texted Ms. Kramer six times after her lie detector test and followed her home from work regularly. During the same time period, he allegedly threatened to break the taillights of court clerk Collette Ryan’s car and court clerk Mindy Probst suspected him of having vandalized her car. The district court characterized Ms. Kramer’s fears as unreasonably based upon “speculation and a patchwork of unrelated and exaggerated events.” Kramer, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 1209. Crediting Ms. Kramer’s version of events, as we must, the events are neither a “patchwork” nor “unrelated.” They instead demonstrate a persistent theme: Sergeant Benson was an intimidating person with job-related power over Ms. Kramer who would sexually harass her and then -48- threaten that she would lose her job if she complained. Ms. Kramer’s fear that Sergeant Benson would make good on his threats was not per se unreasonable given that he did in fact take adverse job actions against her at work – denying her leave time, threatening her with a bad performance evaluation, and giving her long shifts on the magnetometer. Even if these actions did not rise to the level of a tangible employment action, “a reasonable employee could well find . . . a combination of threats and actions taken with the design of imposing both economic and psychological harm sufficient to dissuade him or her from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Williams, 497 F.3d at 1090. This evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether Ms. Kramer’s fears of Sergeant Benson were credible and reasonable because they were grounded in “concrete reason[s] to apprehend that complaint would . . . result in affirmative harm to the complainant.” Reed, 333 F.3d at 35-36. c. Ms. Kramer’s failure to complain for lack of confidence in the County’s remediation efforts Ms. Kramer also contends she reasonably believed that the County would not adequately respond to complaints of sexual harassment. Fear that an employer’s sexual harassment remediation program is inadequate, if credible, can rebut an employer’s argument that the plaintiff was unreasonable. Id. at 36; Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Hous. Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 525-26 (5th Cir. 2001) -49- (plaintiff’s delay in reporting harassment not unreasonable when he had grounds for believing remediation process would be ineffectual due in part to harasser’s influence). Ms. Kramer argues that her failure to complain was reasonable because the workplace culture was one in which women who spoke out about inappropriate conduct were “ostracized” and given undesirable assignments, while men who had engaged in misconduct were promoted or unaffected. See Aplt. App. at 70, 101. She testified that women in the Sheriff’s department were expected to tolerate sexual conduct and language and were penalized for complaining about it. Ms. Kramer offered specific evidence that lends credence to her perceptions. She testified that male jail employees used workplace computers to display sexually explicit “Girl of the Day” screensavers and to watch pornography, a fact corroborated by the Sheriff. See Aple. Supp. App. at 161. Ms. Kramer testified in her deposition that when a jail co-worker named Shylah Richins decided to complain about the offensive screensaver images, another female coworker, Tammy Thacker, told Ms. Kramer “[w]e’re all going to suffer because she can’t just handle it.” Aplt. App. 70. The County is incorrect that Ms. Thacker’s statement to Ms. Kramer is inadmissible hearsay. It is not offered for the truth of what was said – that Ms. Kramer and Ms. Thacker were “going to suffer” – but for the fact that it was said, that Ms. Kramer heard it, and that it contributed to her perception of the workplace culture. Because Ms. Thacker’s -50- statement was not offered for its truth, it is nonhearsay. See F ED . R. E VID . 801(c)(2). Ms. Kramer testified that after Shylah Richins complained, the man responsible for the screensaver was promoted to a road officer position while Ms. Richins was (in Ms. Kramer’s opinion) given undesirable assignments and ultimately quit. The Sheriff’s testimony corroborates Ms. Kramer’s chronology of events: he confirmed that the “female employee” who had complained about the offensive screensaver “quit and went to work for Summit County.” Aple. Supp. App. at 161. 17 Ms. Kramer also testified that after she complained about harassment in the jail, the Sheriff held an inadequate and humiliating staff meeting which did not cause the harassment to stop. When she complained that the harassment had not stopped, Sergeant Benson told her “under the direction of the sheriff . . . just to stay out of the jail.” Id. at 7. 18 As further evidence of the County’s lax approach to discipline, Ms. Kramer describes a judge’s banishment of Sergeant Benson from his courtroom. It is undisputed that the judge did so because Sergeant Benson had been glaring intimidatingly at the female court clerks there. The judge characterized the 17 Ms. Kramer offered this sequence of events to support her perception of the Department as inhospitable to complainants, not to prove that the Department was actually inhospitable to complainants. 18 This sequence of events was corroborated by the Sheriff: “Q: Did you ever tell Camille not to go back to the jail area because of the problems amongst the jail staff? A: I probably did.” Aple. Supp. App. at 170. -51- matter as quite serious, stating in a memo to the Sheriff: “[t]his court considers this a very serious matter and will take what ever actions are deemed necessary to insure that our court clerks are not intimidated or harassed in any way in the future by this officer.” Aplt. App. at 158. Sergeant Benson disregarded the judge’s order by entering the courtroom in question. The Sheriff’s response to Sergeant Benson’s behavior was to call him into his office and simply tell him to follow the judge’s order, not to impose any additional discipline. Ms. Kramer observed this series of events and interpreted it as more evidence that the Sheriff would not discipline Sergeant Benson for his misconduct if she were to complain about it. See Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1148-49 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding employer’s failure to “discipline” an employee who engaged in misconduct could communicate to other employees that the employer condoned or tolerated the misconduct). Taken together, this evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether Ms. Kramer was reasonable in believing it would be futile and potentially detrimental to herself to complain. d. Ms. Kramer’s “voluntary” acts in going to Sergeant Benson’s house do not make her unreasonable as a matter of law. The district court found Ms. Kramer unreasonable because she “voluntarily went to Sergeant Benson’s house more than once, even after the harassment began (including the time after the rape when she went to his house to deliver a Coke to -52- him when he asked). There is no evidence that she was compelled to do so. She could have avoided some of the encounters.” Kramer, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 1209. It is well settled that “the fact that sex-related conduct was ‘voluntary,’ in the sense that the complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII. The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were ‘unwelcome.’” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68 (emphasis added). Moreover, sexual assaults that take place off-site and outside of work hours can still qualify as actionable sex discrimination. See Deters v. Equifax Credit Info Servs., 202 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 2000). By assuming that Ms. Kramer reasonably could have avoided going to Sergeant Benson’s house without repercussions, the district court impermissibly weighed evidence in favor of defendant and drew inferences against Ms. Kramer. See Tademy, 614 F.3d at 1141. While it is debatable whether sex-related conduct with one’s supervisor is truly “voluntary” or is a symptom of implicit pressure, see Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68, here there is evidence that Sergeant Benson explicitly pressured or coerced Ms. Kramer into going to his house on each occasion. First, as to the “foot rub” incident, Ms. Kramer agreed to go to Sergeant Benson’s house only after constantly telling him “no” had zero effect, after she had complained to the Sheriff’s secretary (who apparently did not tell the Sheriff), and after Sergeant Benson’s harassment took a turn toward the “intimidating and kind of scary.” -53- Aplt. App. at 88-90. She capitulated when he promised that he would stop harassing her if she gave in. She went with Sergeant Benson in his car because she was eager for road training and he was the only person authorized by the County to provide it to her. He used that time to take her to his house, where he sexually assaulted her. He thereafter stopped his car in a tunnel and assaulted her again. On the third occasion, the house-cleaning incident, Ms. Kramer had rejected Sergeant Benson’s request to clean several times, specifically to avoid going to his house. After he started another barrage of harassment at work, enlisting others to similarly pressure her, she finally gave in when he offered to pay for her gas, to give his daughter’s used clothes to her daughter, and to permit her children to come along. He then trapped her in his room and raped her. Afterward, he continued with a campaign of more intimidation and manipulation. Finally, with regard to the Coke incident, Sergeant Benson called Ms. Kramer at work and ordered her to transport inmates and to “[b]ring me a Coke.” Id. at 124. He then talked her into coming near him by saying “Kramer, can we just talk about work,” id. at 125, and assaulted her again. Accepting Ms. Kramer’s version of the facts, a picture emerges in which Sergeant Benson used his job-related power over Ms. Kramer to compel, pressure, or coerce her to do his bidding. While Ms. Kramer technically “could have avoided” some of the encounters, the record does not establish that she could have done so without incurring some form of adverse employment action. -54- Where harassment becomes severe – as it did when Sergeant Benson first assaulted Ms. Kramer – it would obviously be preferable for an employee to complain to upper management immediately. It would also seem logical from an employee’s point of view (blessed by 20/20 hindsight) to refuse to go to the harasser’s house again after the first instance. But there is a long continuum separating behavior that is less-than-perfect from behavior that is unreasonable as a matter of law, see, e.g., Reed, 333 F.3d at 35; Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 104-05. Title VII does not require employees who are already “run[ning] a gauntlet of sexual abuse” at work, Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), to figure out how to effectively stop their harasser or forfeit any legal remedy. See Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 104-05. Ultimately, whether the sexual conduct was “unwelcome” and whether Ms. Kramer was unreasonable in participating in it “present[] difficult problems of proof and turn[] largely on credibility determinations committed to the trier of fact.” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68; see also Reed, 333 F.3d at 35-36 (plaintiff who was coerced by her supervisor to babysit at his house where he sexually assaulted her was not unreasonable as a matter of law). The evidence here gives rise to inferences that Ms. Kramer’s fears were credible and that her behavior may have been reasonable given all the circumstances. The evidence of Sergeant Benson’s specific threats and actions, the power asymmetry between him and Ms. Kramer, the fact that Ms. Kramer was dealing with the trauma of having been sexually -55- assaulted by her supervisor, and the County’s Title VII compliance efforts (or lack thereof) are relevant to whether Ms. Kramer’s behavior was “objectively unreasonable for one in her position.” Reed, 333 F.3d at 37. Accordingly, we reverse summary judgment for Wasatch County on both prongs of the Faragher/Ellerth defense. D. The district court correctly held that County liability could not be premised on negligence. If Sergeant Benson does not qualify as a supervisor but is only a co-worker, Ms. Kramer faces a greater burden: in order to establish a Title VII violation, she must show that the County had actual or constructive notice of the harassment and negligently failed to remedy or prevent it. Turnbull, 255 F.3d at 1244. The record evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Kramer fails to support an inference that the County had actual or constructive knowledge of Sergeant Benson’s sexual harassment before Ms. Kramer’s car accident. Accordingly, the County cannot be held liable for Sergeant Benson’s harassment on the basis of negligence. In assessing whether an employer was negligent in dealing with known harassment, “[a]ctual knowledge will be demonstrable in most cases where the plaintiff has reported harassment to management-level employees.” Adler, 144 at 673. Although the Sheriff had actual knowledge of Ms. Kramer’s jail harassment by co-workers and the money-related harassment by Sergeant Benson, he did not -56- have actual knowledge of the sexual harassment and sexual assaults by Sergeant Benson that form the core of Ms. Kramer’s hostile work environment claim. 19 Ms. Kramer must therefore point to evidence that the County had constructive notice of the risk to which she was exposed. Ms. Kramer apparently seeks to premise constructive notice on the notion that Sergeant Benson was a “dangerous employee” whose tendencies the County should have known about, an approach to constructive notice we ratified in Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 61 F.3d 777, 783-84 (10th Cir. 1995). To support her dangerous employee theory, Ms. Kramer contends the County knew of Sergeant Benson’s “history of rule-breaking” before he became her supervisor based on allegations that he had engaged in sexual misconduct with female confidential informants (CIs) when he worked in the narcotics unit, 20 that 19 A “management-level employee,” for the purposes of imputing knowledge of co-worker harassment to the employer, need only be someone who has at least some authority over the plaintiff or at least some control over the working environment. See Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1074 (10th Cir. 1998). The parties do not dispute that the Sheriff would fit this definition. Ms. Kramer does not argue that anyone other than the Sheriff had knowledge and would qualify as a management-level employee for the purposes of imputing notice to the County. 20 The evidence regarding Sergeant Benson’s alleged sexual conduct with confidential informants comes from a police report written by one of the officers investigating Ms. Kramer’s rape allegations. The report states: “On Thursday, July 26, 2007, I met with Lt. Winterton, Brian Gardner . . . the sheriff, the chief deputy . . . they said there was an allegation that Rick may have been sexually active with two CIs when he worked narcotics.” Aplt. App. at 166-67. The district court held that this report was inadmissible hearsay. The report would be hearsay if offered to show that Benson had a history of sexual harassment, but it (continued...) -57- he had fixed a ticket for a friend, and that he had taken a County vehicle out of the county. In addition to those incidents, which predate the events in this case, Ms. Kramer points to specific complaints made during the relevant time period: her complaint to the Sheriff that Sergeant Benson was harassing her about the missing money, Judge McCotter’s telling the Sheriff that Sergeant Benson was glaring intimidatingly at the female clerks, and the Sheriff’s awareness that a female clerk suspected Sergeant Benson of having vandalized her car. An employer’s knowledge that the harasser had harassed people other than the plaintiff could be relevant to whether the employer had constructive notice of the dangerousness of the employee, but the “extent and seriousness of the earlier harassment and the similarity and nearness in time to the later harassment should be factors in deciding whether to allow the evidence of harassment of others to prove notice.” Hirase-Doi, 61 F.3d at 783-84. Applying these factors here, the instances of Sergeant Benson’s misconduct of which the County had actual knowledge did not impute constructive notice to the County of his sexually assaulting Ms. Kramer. Sexual assault is not the kind of harm that would fall “within the risk” 20 (...continued) is nonhearsay if offered only to show that the Sheriff, or other high-level County personnel, had knowledge that there had been allegations of sexual misconduct against Sergeant Benson in the past. See Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 408 (1st Cir. 2002) (out-of-court statement not hearsay because not offered to prove actual past harassment, but employer’s knowledge of alleged past harassment). -58- created by an employee known to fix tickets or misuse work vehicles. See id. at 784 (quoting R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) OF A GENCY § 213, cmt. d (1958)). Sexual misconduct with CIs comes closer to creating a relevant risk, but there is no evidence to suggest that this sexual conduct was nonconsensual. Nor does the record even suggest a time frame regarding when this alleged misconduct occurred. Temporal proximity is crucial when considering whether knowledge of past bad acts creates constructive notice of later acts. Compare id. at 780, 784 (knowledge that harasser was harassing other women during the same time period as he was harassing plaintiff created constructive notice), with Ford v. West, 222 F.3d 767, 776-77 (10th Cir. 2000) (notice of similar events from more than ten years prior did not create constructive notice). Because there is no evidence that the CI misconduct was either similar in nature or close in time to Ms. Kramer’s hostile work environment, it cannot support an inference that the CI affair gave the County constructive notice of the risk that Sergeant Benson was likely to sexually harass his subordinates. Nor would the complaints that were made during the relevant time period have given the County constructive notice of the risk posed by Sergeant Benson. Although Sergeant Benson’s harassment of Ms. Kramer about stealing money put the County on notice that he had a proclivity to harass subordinates about stealing (as the type of harm “within the risk”), it did not give the Sheriff constructive notice that Sergeant Benson also had a proclivity to sexually harass -59- subordinates. 21 The same is true with respect to the Sheriff’s knowledge that Sergeant Benson was glaring intimidatingly at female clerks in Judge McCotter’s courtroom and that one of the court clerks suspected Sergeant Benson of vandalizing her car. None of that information concerned the type of sexual misconduct that Ms. Kramer argues created the illegal hostile work environment here. While these latter examples pass the close-in-time test, they are too substantively dissimilar to have put the employer on notice of the risk to which Ms. Kramer was unfortunately exposed. Cf. Tademy, 614 F.3d at 1147 (employer’s knowledge of similar racist conduct against another employee supports constructive notice regarding racial harassment of plaintiff). Ms. Kramer alternatively seeks to impute constructive knowledge to the County on the theory that sexual harassment in the workplace was so pervasive 21 Ms. Kramer contends her complaint to the Sheriff about Sergeant Benson was general and cites Lockard, 162 F.3d at 1074, for the proposition that general complaints can put an employer on notice of the risk of sexual assault. We disagree. In Lockard, the plaintiff told her manager repeatedly that she felt “uncomfortable” waiting on certain customers and asked him not to assign her to those customers. The manager was aware that the customers in question had just assaulted Ms. Lockard by pulling her hair. We held that the manager had constructive notice of the risk that the customers would sexually assault the plaintiff. Id. at 1075. Here, by contrast, Ms. Kramer’s complaint to the Sheriff was not a general complaint that Sergeant Benson made her feel uncomfortable, but was a specific complaint about a specific behavior – Sergeant Benson’s accusing her of taking the money. Like notice about car misuse and ticket fixing, notice of this kind of misbehavior is too substantively dissimilar to put an employer on notice of the risk of sexual harassment. Moreover, we fail to see how this kind of complaint, unlike the one in Lockard, would have placed upon the Sheriff a duty to inquire about “why [Ms. Kramer] felt uncomfortable,” id. at 1074, when Ms. Kramer gave the Sheriff a specific reason for feeling uncomfortable – the fact that Sergeant Benson was accusing her of being a thief. -60- the County should have discovered it. See Turnbull, 255 F.3d at 1244. Pervasive sexual harassment can suffice to create constructive notice, but it is only when the incidents are “so egregious, numerous, and concentrated as to add up to a campaign of harassment that the employer will be culpable for failure to discover what is going on.” Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1346 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1986)). To impute constructive notice to the employer, the level of pervasiveness must exceed that required to make out a prima facie hostile workplace case and the plaintiff must point to specific facts to support such a finding of pervasiveness-plus. Adler, 144 F.3d at 675. Ms. Kramer argues that the sexual discussions in the jail, the sexual materials on jail computers, and the jail harassment that she experienced – combined with Sergeant Benson’s “doctor’s note” posted on the wall – put the County on notice under a pervasiveness-plus theory. We cannot agree. The facts of known harassment here are far less “egregious, numerous and concentrated,” Baker, 903 F.2d at 1346, than the facts in cases where we have identified a jury question on pervasiveness-plus. For instance, the plaintiff in Turnbull was sexually assaulted by a mental patient at the hospital where she worked. 255 F.3d at 1242. We held that constructive notice to the hospital could be premised on pervasiveness-plus where hospital staff were aware that “sexual acting out” by patients was an “issue that arose regularly,” a risk whose dangers -61- were “highlighted when a female employee was murdered by a patient” a year before the plaintiff joined the staff, and where the hospital made the plaintiff sign a form acknowledging that her job description included “the risk of assault by patients.” Id. at 1241-42, 1244. Similarly, we found a jury question on pervasiveness-plus in Hirase-Doi, where the harasser was known to have harassed “at least eight to ten different women during his three month tenure” with the employer. 61 F.3d at 784. In contrast to those cases, the facts proffered by Ms. Kramer for pervasiveness-plus do not include allegations that Sergeant Benson was previously accused of sexually harassing anyone, as were the facts in Hirase-Doi, or that the risk of being sexually assaulted was obvious and known to the employer, as were the facts in Turnbull. Nor is the conduct Ms. Kramer points to as the basis for notice – offensive materials on computers, offensive discussions, and the foot-rub note – substantively similar to the type of sexual harassment she experienced. No reasonable jury could conclude that these incidents add up to sexual harassment required to establish constructive notice. Baker, 903 F.2d at 1346. The record simply does not contain sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that the County had constructive notice on a pervasiveness-plus theory. Because there is insufficient evidence to create a fact question on knowledge, we need not address the second element of the negligence inquiry, which is whether the employer responded adequately to known or constructively -62- known harassment. We affirm the district court’s conclusion that County liability under Title VII cannot be premised on negligence.