Opinion ID: 181741
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Personal Jurisdiction Defense Is Waived

Text: Xcentric and Magedson argue that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. But even when a valid personal jurisdiction defense exists, the defense is waived if the objecting party fails to timely raise it, FED.R.CIV.P. 12(h)(1); Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 705, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982), or if the objecting party proceeds to litigate the case on its merits, see Cont'l Bank, N.A. v. Meyer, 10 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (7th Cir. 1993). In its initial response to the Blockowiczs' motion to enforce the injunction against Xcentric and Magedson, Xcentric wrote that it contests that the [district court] has personal jurisdiction over it and does not waive any arguments it has pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). Even if this footnote adequately raised their defense, Xcentric and Magedson waived it by participating in the district court proceedings, which included both briefing and oral arguments addressing the merits of the Blockowiczs' claim. See Meyer, 10 F.3d at 1296-97 (The defendants did raise the defense in their answer, and therefore the waiver provided for by Rule 12(h) did not occur. However, the privileged defenses referred to in Rule 12(h)(1) may be waived by formal submission in a cause, or by submission through conduct. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); ECHO, Inc. v. Whitson Co., Inc., 52 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 1995) (The parties consented to personal jurisdiction simply by participating in the proceedings before the district court without protest.). Other than their one footnote, we find no indication in the record that Xcentric or Magedson ever pursued their personal jurisdiction defense before this appeal. Their defense is waived.