Opinion ID: 2337217
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Criminal Assault

Text: The concept of criminal assault has been expanded in this jurisdiction, as in most jurisdictions, [5] to include not only the common law attempted-battery theory but also the intent-to-frighten theory adopting certain aspects from the civil law of torts. [6] See Anthony v. United States, 361 A.2d 202, 204-05 (D.C.1976). We have defined attempted-battery assault as follows: Attempted-battery assault requires proof of an attempt to cause a physical injury, which may consist of any act tending to such corporal injury, accompanied with such circumstances as denote at the time an intention, coupled with the present ability, of using actual violence against the person. Robinson v. United States, 506 A.2d 572, 574 (D.C.1986) (quoting Patterson v. Pillans, 43 App.D.C. 505, 506-07 (1915)). See also ( Joseph A.) Smith v. United States, 601 A.2d 1080, 1082 (D.C.1992); McGee v. United States, 533 A.2d 1268, 1269-70 (D.C.1987). We have articulated the following definition of intent-to-frighten assault: Intent-to-frighten assault ... requires proof that the defendant intended either to cause injury or to create apprehension in the victim by engaging in some threatening conduct; an actual battery need not be attempted. Robinson, supra, 506 A.2d at 574 (citation omitted). See also Smith, supra, 601 A.2d at 1082; McGee, supra, 533 A.2d at 1269. Three essential elements constitute the offense of simple assault under either theory. See Williamson v. United States, 445 A.2d 975, 978 (D.C.1982). First, there must be an act on the part of the defendant; second, at the time the defendant commits the act, he or she must have the apparent present ability to injure or frighten the victim; third, at the time the act is committed, the defendant must have the intent to perform the act which constitutes the assault. See id. The major distinction between the two theories is in the nature of the intent element that must be proven. Robinson, supra, 506 A.2d at 574. As noted, supra, one of the essential elements of simple assault is that, at the time the act is committed, the defendant must have the intent to perform the act which constitutes the assault. See ( Clifford) Smith v. United States, 593 A.2d 205, 207 (D.C.1991); Williamson, supra, 445 A.2d at 978. Thus, [o]ur attention is focused `upon the menacing conduct of the accused and his purposeful design either to engender fear in [(intent-to-frighten theory)] or do violence to [(attempted-battery theory)] his victim.' Sousa v. United States, 400 A.2d 1036, 1044 (D.C.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981, 100 S.Ct. 484, 62 L.Ed.2d 408 (1979) (quoting Anthony, supra, 361 A.2d at 206). Under both theories of assault, the essential element of present ability connotes apparent ability, rather than actual ability, to accomplish the threatened harm. See Anthony, supra, 361 A.2d at 205, and cases cited therein. See also Williamson, supra, 445 A.2d at 978; Patterson v. Pillans, supra, 43 App.D.C. at 507. To determine apparent ability, we must look to what the conduct of the assaulting party and the surrounding circumstances denote at the time of the assault. Anthony, supra, 361 A.2d at 205. It is important to note, however, that while the subjective perception of fear or apprehension by the victim in a particular case may be relevant, neither theory requires factual proof that the victim actually experience apprehension or fear as one of the essential elements. See Mihas v. United States, 618 A.2d 197, 200 (D.C.1992); Robinson, supra, 506 A.2d at 575; Anthony, supra, 361 A.2d at 206. See also State v. Jeremiah, 546 A.2d 183, 187 (R.I.1988). Rather, as we said in Anthony: [T]he crucial inquiry [is] whether the assailant acted in such a manner as would under the circumstances portend an immediate threat of danger to a person of reasonable sensibility.... [A]pplication of the standard of apparent present ability does not elevate the victim's subjective perception to an element of the crime of assault. Rather, this standard focuses attention squarely upon the menacing conduct of the accused and his purposeful design either to engender fear in or do violence to his victim. Both the doctrine of apparent ability and the rule abrogating the necessity to show the victim's actual fear stem from a similar appreciation of the wrongfulness of the criminal conduct involved. The criminal law, designed as it is to protect public order, proscribes acts which increase the potential for injury, and the tendency toward resistance, conflict, and violence. Id. at 206 (citation omitted). Accord, Smith, supra, 593 A.2d at 206 ([t]o prove the crime [of assault] it is not necessary that the victim experience apprehension....); Williamson, supra, 445 A.2d at 978 ([D]espite historical distinctions between the criminal and the tort concepts of assault, criminal assault in the District of Columbia encompasses such conduct as could induce in the victim a well-founded apprehension of peril.). (Emphasis added.) It necessarily follows that the victim need not be aware of the threatening act so long as an objective observer would perceive it as an immediate threat.