Opinion ID: 6341391
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Third-Party Redressability

Text: The plaintiffs also fail to plead facts suggesting SeaWorld would turn over the necropsy and medical history reports even if the NMFS were so to direct. Indeed, as we have noted before, “[w]hen a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the Government’s regulation of a third party that is not before the court, it becomes ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish standing.” NCWA, 366 F.3d at 938 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562). “Because the necessary elements of causation and redressability in such a case hinge on the independent choices of the regulated third party, ‘it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.’” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562). Here the plaintiffs’ pleadings come close to suggesting a favorable decision would not redress their injury, for they allege that public display facilities have not sent necropsy reports to the NMFS for the past couple of decades. First, the complaint states: “very few public display facilities make such reports available on a voluntary basis.” Then the complaint implies SeaWorld did not voluntarily release the necropsy information after the death of Tilikum in January 2017 even though the NMFS had not yet issued its March 10 decision. In other words, the plaintiffs’ complaint suggests SeaWorld was not complying with the terms of the permit even before the NMFS issued its decision and is not likely to comply unless forced to do so by the NMFS — which, as we have seen, the plaintiffs did not allege is likely. See Teton Historic Aviation Foundation v. DOD, 785 F.3d 719, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[A] plaintiff does not have standing to sue when redress for its injury depends entirely on the occurrence of some other, future event made no more likely by its victory in court.”). 10 Finally, citing Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. Donovan (ILGWU), 722 F.2d 795, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the plaintiffs argue there is a “strong presumption” a regulated entity will comply with the law, which they say is all that is required to establish redressability here. But the ILGWU case does not support this proposition; the relief requested there would have made illegal several third parties’ subminimum wages, causing a competitive injury to the plaintiffs. Id. The court held “only by taking extraordinary measures . . . could third parties prevent redress of the appellants’ injuries” if the court ruled those subminimum wages were illegal. Id. In contrast, granting the plaintiffs’ requested relief here would not by itself make it unlawful for SeaWorld to refuse to release necropsy data. Therefore, ILGWU is irrelevant to the plaintiffs’ cause. Even if ILGWU applied here in principle, it would not help the present plaintiffs because they do not allege SeaWorld ever created and still retains the reports the plaintiffs seek. The closest they come is to allege that “some public display facilities continued to submit necropsy and clinical history reports” after 1994. SeaWorld’s retention of such reports is particularly unlikely because the relevant regulation requires only that “necropsy records will be maintained at the marine mammal’s home facility and at the facility at which it died, if different, for a period of 3 years.” 9 C.F.R. § 3.110(g)(2). Tilikum and the other two orcas referenced in the complaint were all dead by August 15, 2017, more than three years ago. As a result, we cannot infer SeaWorld would (or could) comply with the permit requirement, even if the NMFS agreed to enforce it. Therefore, the possible independent choices of a third party, SeaWorld, also defeat the plaintiffs’ case for redressability. 11