Opinion ID: 2497278
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the circuit court erred in denying the Estate's motion for new trial based upon juror misconduct.

Text: ¶ 19. Our judicial system is grounded toward providing a fair trial. Hudson v. Taleff, 546 So.2d 359, 362 (Miss. 1989). To that end, Article 3, § 14 of the Mississippi Constitution guarantees due process of law, including a fair and impartial trial. Brown v. Blackwood, 697 So.2d 763, 769 (Miss.1997) (citing Hudson, 546 So.2d at 363). Accordingly, [t]he circuit court has an absolute duty . . . to see that the jury selected to try any case is fair, impartial and competent.  Brown, 697 So.2d at 769 (emphasis added). In short, a jury verdict impermissibly influenced, without adherence to the evidence and in defiance of instructions of the trial court, cannot be sanctioned, as that verdict is the product of a trial that is neither fair nor impartial. ¶ 20. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 606(b) prohibits jurors from testifying to statements made during jury deliberations, subject to the exception that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Miss. R. Evid. 606(b) (emphasis added). See also Payton v. State, 897 So.2d 921, 954 (Miss.2003) (jurors may testify about misconduct in their presence or about outside influences on the jury panel). Based upon the record presented, the learned circuit judge fulfilled his duty in jury selection based upon the disclosures provided. However, unbeknownst to the circuit court during trial, the voir dire and jury-deliberation processes were flawed. Specifically, Lopez's affidavit and subsequent testimony offered unrebutted evidence that Lowden failed to truthfully answer questions during voir dire[,] which implicated an `outside influence' contemplated by Rule 606(b). Mariner Health Care, Inc. v. Estate of Edwards, 964 So.2d 1138, 1146 (Miss.2007); Salter v. Watkins, 513 So.2d 569, 573 (Miss.1987). According to this Court: [t]he standard of review for juror misconduct arising from a failure to respond to questions during voir dire is as follows: [w]here a prospective juror . . . fails to respond to a question . . . on voir dire, the [c]ourt should determine whether the question was (1) relevant to the voir dire examination, (2) whether it was unambiguous, and (3) whether the juror had substantial knowledge of the information sought to be elicited. If all answers to the above questions are affirmative, then the court determines if prejudice . . . in selecting the jury could be inferred from the juror's failure to respond. Mariner Health Care, 964 So.2d at 1146-47 (quoting Barker v. State, 463 So.2d 1080, 1083 (Miss.1985)) (emphasis added). ¶ 21. During voir dire, the circuit judge asked the venire, [w]ith that type of case, a case where a doctor has been sued for malpractice, will that affect your judgment in this case? The first inquiry posed by counsel for the Estate during voir dire was [w]ould you raise your hand if any of you have had an occasion to be treated at the [Clinic] by Dr. Lee or any other doctors[?] Counsel for the Estate later asked the venire, would you raise your hand if you feel like . . . you should not sit on this jury because of the knowledge of . . . Dr. Lee or his [C]linic . . ., that you feel like you shouldn't sit on this jury because you can't put aside that bias[?] Finally, counsel for Dr. Lee asked the venire, you will make your decision based on the actual evidence and the [j]udge's instruction. Are you all aware of that? During voir dire, the venire members (including Lowden) also responded affirmatively that they still have an open mind and can receive the evidence and the law of this case and make a fair decision[,] and that they will listen to the evidence, listen to the [c]ourt, and . . . follow the [c]ourt's instructions, even if for some reason you disagree. . . . [12] This Court finds the aforementioned questions were unambiguous and relevant to the voir dire examination, insofar as each sought to reveal potential juror bias. Mariner Health Care, 964 So.2d at 1146-47 (quoting Barker, 463 So.2d at 1083). Yet, according to the record presented, Lowden failed to respond affirmatively to any of these questions despite having substantial knowledge of the information sought to be elicited[,] such that he was under an obligation to bring that information to the attention of the court. Id.; Salter, 513 So.2d at 574. Lowden's judgment was affected not only by the nature of the action, but also the participants to the proceeding, given his statement that Dr. Lee was a good docto[r]. . . . Moreover, Lowden failed to respond honestly to voir dire queries and did not reveal until jury deliberations that he had been a patient of . . . Dr. Lee. . . . Additionally, Lowden's repeated references to the separate lawsuit against Dr. Clark, another good docto[r], despite the circuit court's clear and unequivocal instruction to disregard the lawsuit against Dr. Clark, reveals a decision guided by neither the evidence admitted nor the circuit court's instructions of law. ¶ 22. Regarding prejudice, when: a party shows that a juror withheld substantial information or misrepresented material facts, and where a full and complete response would have provided a valid basis for challenge for cause, the trial court must grant a new trial, and, failing that, we must reverse on appeal. We presume prejudice. Where, as a matter of common experience, a full and correct response would have provided the basis for a peremptory challenge, not rising to the dignity of a challenge for cause, our courts have greater discretion, although a discretion that should always be exercised against the backdrop of our duty to secure to each party trial before a fair and impartial jury. T.K. Stanley, Inc. v. Cason, 614 So.2d 942, 949 (Miss.1992) (citing Myers v. State, 565 So.2d 554, 558 (Miss.1990)) (emphasis added). Lowden's failure to respond to the aforementioned questions amounted to withholding substantial information which would have provided a valid basis for challenge for cause. . . . T.K. Stanley, 614 So.2d at 949 (citing Myers, 565 So.2d at 558). In fact, the Estate had challenged for cause all individuals who had been treated by Dr. Lee, and several of those individuals had been excused by the circuit court for cause. Furthermore, Lowden's refusal to abide by the circuit court's instruction to disregard the lawsuit against Dr. Clark resulted in the repeated, prejudicial injection of that subject during jury deliberation. ¶ 23. For these collective reasons, this Court concludes that the Estate's right to a fair, impartial and competent jury was prejudicially compromised. Brown, 697 So.2d at 769. Lowden's lack of candor during voir dire, and subsequent disclosures and opinions which surfaced only in jury deliberation, resulted in fundamental unfairness to the Estate. T.K. Stanley, 614 So.2d at 954. Accordingly, this Court reverses and remands for a new trial.