Opinion ID: 1266755
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: constitutionality of best interest standard

Text: In considering the constitutionality of the Georgia statute on parent-third party custody disputes, there are two relevant lines of cases. One involves the termination of parental rights, which have usually required a showing of parental unfitness before ending the parent-child relationship. [27] The other involves third-party visitation rights, which have historically considered the best interests of the child. Termination of Parental Rights The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children. [28] Based on this liberty interest, the Court has concluded that parents have the right to establish a home, direct the upbringing of their children, and control their children's education, [29] and the state may not sever the rights of parents in their natural child in a neglect proceeding unless it proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parents are unfit to raise their children. [30] In cases dealing with the rights of unwed fathers, however, the Court refused to adopt unfitness as the sole standard for enforcing a biological father's due process rights, instead distinguishing between a developed parent-child relationship and a potential relationship. For example, the Court in Stanley v. Illinois [31] held that an unwed father who had lived with his children and supported them all their lives was entitled to a hearing in a dependency proceeding on his fitness as a parent before the state could take away his children. In contrast, in Lehr v. Robertson, [32] where the putative father had assumed no parental responsibility, the Court concluded that his biological link did not merit the same protection as the father's significant custodial, personal, and financial relationship with his children in Stanley. `(The) importance of the familial relationship ... stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in (promoting) a way of life through the instruction of children ... as well as from the fact of blood relationship.' [33] In Quilloin v. Walcott, [34] a case arising out of this state, the Supreme Court rejected the unwed father's contention that he was entitled to an absolute veto over the adoption of his child absent a finding of his unfitness. Instead, the Court concluded that the unwed father's substantive due process rights were not violated by rejecting his petition to legitimate the child and finding that the stepfather's adoption was in the child's best interest. The Court noted that the case did not involve the breakup of a natural family, a biological father who had ever sought custody of his child, or the placement of the child with a new set of parents. Rather, the result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a family unit already in existence. [35] Thus, even when the parental bond is to be severed, the United States Constitution permits courts to use a best interests standard. Unlike the parental termination cases, third-party custody cases do not sever the relationship between parent and child. Instead, the parent retains significant rights, including the right to visitation and to obtain custody under changed circumstances. [36] When parental rights are not severed, federal constitutional law does not require a showing that the parent is unfit before custody may be awarded to a third party. [37] Grandparent Visitation Cases In the second line of cases, this Court held in Brooks v. Parkerson that our state grandparents' visitation statute was unconstitutional under both the Georgia Constitution and United States Constitution because it failed to require a showing of harm before visitation could be ordered. [38] Reviewing the parents' protected interest in raising their children against the state's interest in protecting a child, we concluded that state interference with a parent's right to raise children is justifiable only where the state acts in its police power to protect the child's health or welfare, and where parental decisions in the area would result in harm to the child. [39] As a result, the Georgia General Assembly amended the grandparent visitation statute to require a finding of harm to the health or welfare of the child before visitation is granted. [40] The Supreme Court's decision last term in Troxel v. Granville [41] raises the question whether we correctly interpreted federal constitutional law as requiring a showing of harm to the child before a state may intervene in the parent's right to raise his or her family. In Troxel, the Court declined to strike down the Washington state statute on grandparent visitation as facially invalid, instead holding it unconstitutional as applied. [42] The plurality found that the Washington statute was breathtakingly broad, allowing any person at any time to petition for visitation rights, and contained no requirement that the parent's decision about visitation was entitled to any deference or presumption of validity. [43] Although the state supreme court had the opportunity to give the statute a more narrow interpretation, it had declined to do so. Reviewing the facts in the case, the Court found that the trial court failed to give any weight to the fit custodial parent's decision, established a presumption in favor of grandparent visitation that the parent had to disprove, and failed to give significant weight to the parent's offer of meaningful visitation to the grandparents. [44] Because the Court based its decision on the sweeping breadth of the statute and the trial court's application of the statute's unlimited power, it did not decide whether due process required all grandparent visitation statutes to include a showing of harm as a condition precedent to granting visitation. [45] The Court's plurality decision expressed hesitancy in holding that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate due process as a per se matter, agreeing with Justice Kennedy that the constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation depends on the manner in which the standard is applied. [46] In his dissent, Justice Kennedy notes that every state, except Georgia, employs the best-interest-of-the-child standard and establishes a variety of ways to ensure that parental decisions are given respect. [47] Unlike the grandparent visitation cases, however, the custody cases in this appeal do not involve a third party seeking to intrude upon an established parent-child custodial relationship. Instead, they involve a biological parent seeking to gain custody from a third party who has been responsible for the daily care of the child and already has established a family unit for the child. Thus, the relationship among the parent, child, and third-party relative differs in these custody cases from the relationship among the parties in Troxel and other grandparent visitation cases. Applying the Court's distinction in the unwed father cases, more than a biological link exists between the child and noncustodial father, but the relationship does not rise to the level of a daily association. [48]