Opinion ID: 1621408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Analysis under Lynce v. Mathis

Text: In Lynce, petitioner Lynce argued that, like regular gain time, [7] prison overcrowding credits could constitute part of an inmate's sentence because a prisoner's eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a significant factor entering into both the defendant's decision to plea bargain and the judge's calculation of the sentence to be imposed. Lynce, 519 U.S. at 445-46, 117 S.Ct. 891 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 32, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)). The State argued that with prison overcrowding credits, the above-mentioned reliance argument was not present because at the time of the plea bargain and sentencing, the petitioner could not have reasonably expected to receive any such credits given that the State could have alleviated the prison overcrowding problem by other means by the time the inmate reached prison. Accordingly, the State argued, unlike regular gain time, the existence or amount of prison overcrowding is always speculative. The United States Supreme Court found this argument unpersuasive in Lynce's case because the actual course of events [made] it unnecessary to speculate about what might have happened. Lynce, 519 U.S. at 446, 117 S.Ct. 891. Stated another way, in Lynce, no one had to speculate about whether the contingency of the relevant prison overcrowding threshold might be reached during Lynce's incarceration so as to allow for such awards because it was reached during Lynce's incarceration, and he was awarded a specific number of Provisional Credits. The Court, therefore, made clear that, for ex post facto purposes, there is no difference between regular gain time and prison overcrowding gain time. In this case as well, there is no need to engage in such speculation because prison overcrowding did reach the relevant percentages in 1993 and but for the effective repeals of the earlier programs, the petitioners would have received credits and their sentences would have been reduced. There is a distinction, however, between this case and Lynce. In Lynce, the issue was whether the petitioners' credits should be restored. In this case, the issue is whether the petitioners should receive the overcrowding credits they would have received if the actual overcrowding mechanism which was in effect at the time of their offense had continued in effect. In other words, in this case, there was no cancellation of overcrowding credits already awarded. Accordingly, it is at least arguable that the circumstances present in Lynce are not present here. Nevertheless, the Lynce Court specifically relied on and cited extensively to Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), which is quite similar to this case. In Weaver, the Department attempted to alter the manner of awarding basic and incentive gain time which resulted in a reduction in the availability of gain time. The Supreme Court found that because the new provision constricts the inmate's opportunity to earn early release, [it] thereby makes more onerous the punishment for crimes committed before its enactment. This result runs afoul of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 35-36, 101 S.Ct. 960 (emphasis added). This case is similar because the substituted overcrowding program (Control Release) significantly constricted the petitioners' opportunity to earn early release under the prior statutory provisions by making them effectively ineligible. As mentioned above, the Department asserts that the petitioners are not entitled to relief because Secretary Singletary would not have exercised his discretion under the Provisional Credits statute to continue to award Provisional Credits, because he felt that the Control Release program was a better program. While we agree that the Control Release program certainly seems to have been better designed to ensure public safety and that the Secretary might have had the discretion to refuse to award any type of overcrowding credits, we do not believe that the Ex Post Facto Clause gives the Secretary the discretion to choose to allow the implementation of the later, more onerous Control Release statute to these inmates in place of the statutes which were in effect at the time of their offenses. Accordingly, we are compelled by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lynce to conclude that for these inmates, the substitution of the Control Release program for the earlier programs resulted in an ex post facto violation under Weaver. Our decision today is consistent with our recent decision in Britt v. Chiles, 704 So.2d 1046 (Fla.1997). In that case, this Court rejected the State's argument that a change in the gain time forfeiture statute which increased the amount of gain time forfeitable was not subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause because it was too contingent upon future events. This Court granted the petition because the statute eliminate[d] an inmate's opportunity to earn incentive gain-time for a certain amount of time after a disciplinary infraction was committed. Britt, 704 So.2d at 1047-48. This Court specifically likened the situation in Britt to that in Weaver, because by reducing the ability to earn gain time after a disciplinary infraction, the Department was essentially curtailing the availability of future credits [and therefore] it effectively postpone[d] the date when [an inmate] would become eligible for early release. Britt, id. at 1046-47 (first brackets added)(quoting Lynce, 519 U.S. at 442, 117 S.Ct. 891). Accordingly, we grant the instant consolidated petition and order the Department to apply the version of the overcrowding statute in effect at the time of each petitioner's offense.