Opinion ID: 1441398
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Guardian

Text: [¶ 14] When the Superior Court acts as an intermediate appellate court, this Court reviews the decision of the trial court directly. See State v. Curtis, 1998 ME 254, ¶ 2, 721 A.2d 175, 176; State v. Spaulding, 1998 ME 29, ¶ 4, 707 A.2d 378, 378. A commitment order is reviewed on questions of law, and the District Court's findings of fact are not set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. See 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3864(11)(A)-(B) (1988). [¶ 15] The Appellant argues that since he is a ward of a public guardian, the District Court should not have considered his statements that he would not remain medication compliant and his lack of commitment to supervised living as recent actions and behavior which demonstrate a likelihood of serious harm as defined by 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3801(4)(C) (1988). According to appellant, the guardian has an affirmative duty to consent to community services on Marcial O.'s behalf, to ensure that he actively cooperates with community service providers and to ensure that he remains medication compliant, even if that requires bringing him to a hospital to have medications administered by injection. We disagree. [¶ 16] The court appoints public guardians for incapacitated persons ... in need of protective services. 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-601 (1998). An incapacitated person is one: who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or other cause except minority to the extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his person; 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-101 (1998). A guardian shall make provision for the care, comfort and maintenance of his ward. 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-312(a)(2) (1998). A guardian may establish the ward's place of abode and may place the ward in any hospital or other institution for care in the same manner as otherwise provided for by law. 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-312(a)(1). A guardian also may give or withhold consents or approvals related to medical or other professional care, counsel, treatment or service for the ward. 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-312(a)(3). [¶ 17] The trial court did not err in using the evidence that the appellant challenges, even though he has a guardian. Marcial O.'s guardian testified that Marcial O. repeatedly refused community services, even though she discussed with him on multiple occasions the benefits that the services could provide him. She also testified that she could not force him to accept these benefits since he had the right to refuse them. Dr. Tingley and Dr. Wilson testified that a treatment plan will not be successful unless the patient participates in its development and cooperates with its implementation. [¶ 18] Further, the guardian's duty to secure housing for Marcial O. if he were released into her custody is not a guarantee that he would accept it. See Guardianship of Hughes, 1998 ME 186, ¶ 11, 715 A.2d 919, 922 (Although a guardian is entitled to establish the ward's place of abode, nothing prevents the ward from simply walking away from the chosen residence.) (citation omitted). Marcial O.'s lack of commitment to the idea of supervised living and the testimony of Dr. Tingley and Dr. Roberts that at various points Marcial O. discussed wanting to leave the state, indicate that even if he had been placed in supervising living, he would not have accepted it at that time. [¶ 19] Similarly, the guardian's authority to consent to medications for Marcial O. is not an assurance that he will remain medication compliant. Nothing in the statute imposes an affirmative duty on the guardian to force medications on a ward or to bring the ward to a hospital to have medications administered by injection, if a ward decides to stop following a medication regimen. Marcial O.'s guardian, Dr. Roberts and Dr. Wilson testified that although a guardian technically may consent to medication for a ward, as a practical matter, the guardian will not force medications upon a ward even if needed. Moreover, a guardian may not possess sufficient medical knowledge to determine immediately that the ward has stopped taking prescribed medications before the ward's condition has deteriorated significantly. [¶ 20] The fact that Marcial O. has a public guardian does not negate the relevance of his refusal to cooperate with community service providers and his statements that he would stop taking his medications. Thus, the trial court did not err by using this evidence in deciding to grant the involuntary commitment order.