Opinion ID: 404972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: appeal of maurice brown

Text: Applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) 15 Nine of the counts on which Brown was convicted alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b), and one additional count alleged a conspiracy to violate that section. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) provides in relevant part that: 16 Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money or any other thing of value exceeding $100 belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. 17 Appellant argues that, at most, the only evidence of criminal activity presented to the jury showed that he and the other defendants agreed to use forged checks to withdraw proceeds from banks whose funds were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. He contends that this constitutes obtaining money by false pretenses and is not encompassed within the term steal or purloin in 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b). This narrow construction of the statutory language has been rejected by three circuits, see United States v. Guiffre, 576 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833, 99 S.Ct. 113, 58 L.Ed.2d 128 (1978); United States v. Fistel, 460 F.2d 157, 162-63 (2d Cir. 1972); Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958, 86 S.Ct. 1222, 16 L.Ed.2d 301 (1966). These decisions relied in the main on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 77 S.Ct. 397, 1 L.Ed.2d 430 (1957), where the Court construed the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2312, which makes it illegal for one to transport a motor vehicle in interstate commerce while knowing it to have been stolen. The defendant in Turley had borrowed an automobile with the owner's consent and subsequently sold the automobile after crossing state lines. Defendant argued that his conduct constituted only embezzlement and not stealing which he claimed was limited to those acts constituting larceny at common law. The Court rejected the argument that the terms stolen and steal have a common law meaning that is  'equated or exclusively dedicated to larceny' . Id. at 411-12, 77 S.Ct. at 399. Instead the Court relied on dictionary definitions of steal and stolen which give these terms broader scope, and referred specifically to Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed., 1951) which stated that steal may denote the criminal taking of personal property either by larceny, embezzlement, or false pretenses. See id. at 412, 77 S.Ct. at 399 (emphasis added). As the Court noted: 18 (S)tolen and steal have been used in federal criminal statutes, and the courts interpreting those words have declared that they do not have a necessary common-law meaning coterminous with larceny and exclusive of other theft crimes. Freed from a common-law meaning, we should give stolen the meaning consistent with the context in which it appears. 19 Id. at 412-13, 77 S.Ct. at 399-400 (footnote omitted). 20 In arguing that the holding in Turley is inapplicable, Brown relies on the holding of the Ninth Circuit in LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1967), that Congress did not intend to include obtaining money by false pretenses within 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b). Accord, United States v. Feroni, 655 F.2d 707, 711 (6th Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit reached its conclusion based on its review of the legislative history of the statute. We have also reviewed that history and reach a contrary conclusion. 21 In 1934 Congress considered a bill introduced in the Senate to provide punishment for certain offenses committed against banks, organized or operating under laws of the United States, or any member of the Federal Reserve System. S.2841, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Cong.Rec. 2946 (1934). This bill made bank robbery a crime by punishing anyone who by force and violence, or by putting in fear, feloniously takes, or ... attempts to take ... any property or money from a bank. It would also have proscribed burglary and taking and carrying away property or money from a bank with the consent of such bank obtained by the offender by any trick, artifice, fraud, or false or fraudulent representation. 78 Cong.Rec. 5738 (1934). The bill passed the Senate on March 29, 1934 but was amended in the House of Representatives by deletion of the provisions covering burglary and taking property or money by trick, artifice, fraud, etc. Id. at 8132-33. The Conference Committee approved the version of the bill passed by the House of Representatives, 78 Cong.Rec. 8767, 8776 (1934), and it became law. Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 304, 48 Stat. 783. 22 There is no explanation in the published legislative history as to why these two sections were deleted by the House of Representatives. This bill was one of several which had been introduced as a group in the Senate and was accompanied by a letter from the Attorney General expressing concern that legislation was needed to curb organized groups of gangsters who ... move rapidly from the scene of one crime of violence to another across State lines. 78 Cong.Rec. 2947 (1934). 23 On March 24, 1937, a bill to amend the bank-robbery statute to include burglary and larceny was introduced in the House of Representatives. H.R. 5900, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 81 Cong.Rec. 2731 (1937). This bill retained the bank robbery offense provision of the 1934 act without change, but added two new offenses to the bank robbery statute. First, it prohibited burglary of a bank and second, it made it a crime for anyone to take and carry away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to ... any bank. 81 Cong.Rec. 5376 (1937); H.R.Rep.No.732, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). The bill was thereafter amended in the House of Representatives to differentiate the steal or purloin offense from the other two offenses, bank robbery and bank burglary. As amended, the bill provided less severe penalties for the steal or purloin offense, and made a further distinction based upon the value of the property stolen or purloined. Thus, the bill as amended stated that whoever shall take and carry away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money or any other things of value exceeding $50, belonging to ... any bank, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, but that someone who had similarly stolen or purloined bank property or money not exceeding $50 could only be fined a maximum of $1,000, or imprisoned for up to one year, or both. 81 Cong.Rec. 5376-77 (1937). This bill, as so amended, passed the House of Representatives on June 7, 1937. Id. 24 On August 19, 1937, the Senate accepted and passed the House version of the bill. No further changes were made, 81 Cong.Rec. 9331, 9198 (1937), and the bill, entitled AN ACT To amend the bank-robbery statute to include burglary and larceny, became law. Act of August 24, 1937, ch. 747, 50 Stat. 749. The steal or purloin offense provision in the 1937 act is identical for all relevant purposes to the present subsection (b) of 18 U.S.C. § 2113. 5 25 There is very little legislative history behind the 1937 statute. The two-page House Judiciary Committee report states in relevant part: The Attorney General has recommended the enactment of this proposed legislation which is designed to enlarge the scope of the bank robbery statute, enacted in 1934, ... to include larceny and burglary of the banks protected by this statute. H.R.Rep.No.732, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937). A letter from the Attorney General was made part of the House report and reprinted in full. It stated in part: 26 The fact that the statute is limited to robbery and does not include larceny and burglary has led to some incongruous results. A striking instance arose a short time ago, when a man was arrested in a national bank while walking out of the building with $11,000 of the bank's funds on his person. He had managed to gain possession of the money during a momentary absence of one of the employees, without displaying any force or violence and without putting any one in fear-necessary elements of the crime of robbery-and was about to leave the bank when apprehended. As a result, it was not practicable to prosecute him under any Federal statute. 27 The enclosed bill which has been drafted in this Department proposes to amend ... the above-mentioned statute so as to include within its prohibitions, the crimes of burglary and larceny of a bank covered by its provisions. 28 Id. at 1-2. The two-page Senate Judiciary Committee report expressly adopted most of the House report verbatim. S.Rep.No.1259, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). The House floor discussion of the bill is similarly unhelpful. 6 29 There is no discussion of the term steal or purloin anywhere in the published legislative history of the 1937 Act. The Ninth Circuit in LeMasters relied primarily on the deletion in 1934 of the language expressly referring to obtaining money by fraudulent representation for its restrictive interpretation of the language of § 2113(b). The court differentiated the Dyer Act, which was the subject of the Supreme Court's Turley decision, from § 2113(b) and stated: We are aware of no background of evil at which Congress was pointing the statute except the evil of interstate operation of gangster bank robbers. 378 F.2d at 267. The court also construed the statute to resolve any ambiguities in favor of the accused. Id. at 268. 30 In deference, we find ourselves unpersuaded by the Ninth Circuit's analysis. There is no indication in the 1937 legislative history that three years after the passage of the original statute, Congress' concern was limited to gangster activities. In fact, the Attorney General's letter, quoted above, indicates the contrary. The passage of the burglary provision in almost identical language to that deleted in 1934 suggests that Congress had expanded the scope of its concern with respect to taking property or money from banks. Furthermore, although subsequent legislative history must be used with caution in attempting to derive the intent of an earlier Congress, we believe that the subsequent amendments to § 2113(b) manifest a consistent attempt by Congress to expand rather than restrict the scope of that provision. In 1940, Congress amended the bank robbery act again, creating a new separate substantive offense which made it a federal crime to receive, possess, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of any property or money or other thing of value knowing the same to have been taken from a bank in violation of (the other provisions of the federal bank robbery act). Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 455, 54 Stat. 695. This provision is currently codified, in somewhat modified form, as subsection (c) of 18 U.S.C. § 2113. In a series of amendments beginning in 1950, Congress amended § 2113 to expand the scope of the institutions within its provisions. In 1950, Congress amended § 2113 to include federally insured savings and loan associations within the coverage of its provisions. Act of August 3, 1950, ch. 516, 64 Stat. 394. In 1952, Congress further expanded the definition of savings and loan associations in § 2113(g) to cover building and loan associations, homestead associations, and state cooperative banks insured by the FSLIC. Act of April 8, 1952, ch. 164, 66 Stat. 46; see S.Rep.No.898, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1951). In 1959, the definition of the term savings and loan association was again amended to include federal credit unions as defined in the Federal Credit Union Act. Act of September 22, 1959, Pub.L.No.86-354, § 2, 73 Stat. 628, 639. In 1970, § 2113 was again amended to include federally-insured credit unions within its coverage. Act of October 19, 1970, Pub.L.No.91-468, § 8, 84 Stat. 994, 1017. 31 This legislative history demonstrates that Congress' concern had expanded beyond the gangsterism referred to in the legislative history of the original 1934 Act and that thereafter Congress' concern was directed at least in part to the federal government's potential obligation as an insurer to reimburse various financial institutions if they were to become victims of offenses covered by § 2113. In view of the absence of any contemporaneously expressed congressional intent when the statute was enacted in 1937, we believe that the conclusion of legislative intent reached by the Ninth Circuit in LeMasters is not compelling. On the contrary, it is just as reasonable to conjecture that at that time Congress may have decided that language expressly referring to fraud, artifice and false pretenses in § 2113 might presage a narrow interpretation of other criminal statutes using the words steal or purloin. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 661, containing similar language construed as not limited to offenses amounting to common law larceny in United States v. Maloney, 607 F.2d 222, 231 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 1280, 63 L.Ed.2d 603 (1980). Since the statute on its face does not limit the words steal or purloin as they appear in § 2113(b), we believe they should be given a construction consistent with that given similar statutory language by the Supreme Court in the Turley case. 32 We recognize that there may be some concern about broad expansion of federal jurisdiction in criminal law. However, we note that recently the Supreme Court in McElroy v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 1332, 71 L.Ed.2d 522 (1982), found that concern unpersuasive in making a broad interpretation of the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. The Court rejected the principle of lenity in the absence of any ambiguity. Id. at 1341. It focused on the absence of any limiting language on the face of the statute and on the broad purpose reflected in the congressional history to permit federal prosecutors to come to the aid of the states in combating crime in interstate commerce. Id. at 1336-39. Certainly, when the underlying offense affects federally insured money or property, Congress has a legitimate concern in exercising its jurisdiction to outlaw conduct such as that found to have occurred in this case. 33 Brown suggests that this court's opinion in United States v. Pinto, 646 F.2d 833 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 94, 71 L.Ed.2d 85 (1981), compels a contrary result. In Pinto we held that the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) does not include the transfer to the defendant's corporation of bank funds as a result of a unilateral mistake of the bank, or the payment of such funds either to defendant or to creditors of his corporation. Id. at 836. In that case, the local bank mistakenly interpreted a foreign telex and credited the defendant's corporation with substantially more funds than authorized by the telex. The defendant withdrew the funds before the bank was aware of the error, and the prosecution for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b), inter alia, was instituted. The difference between the facts in Pinto and those presented here, where there was an ongoing and comprehensive scheme to withdraw funds from a series of banks through forged checks, is apparent on its face. Moreover, the holding in Pinto was explicitly limited to the facts before the court at that time. As the court stated, there was no 'taking away' of funds from either bank in a trespassory way. Id. 34 Although there is language in that opinion which might be susceptible of a restrictive construction of the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b), and concern about that restriction was the basis for the position taken by Judge Adams and Judge Garth in voting for rehearing en banc, United States v. Pinto, 673 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1981) (sur denial of petition for rehearing en banc), we would not be bound by what is at most dictum. The effect on subsequent panels of gratuitous statements is discussed in the dissenting opinion of Judge Aldisert in Chowdhury v. Reading Hospital and Medical Center, 677 F.2d 317 at 323-324 (3d Cir. 1982). In any event, the Pinto opinion itself carefully distinguishes between the factual situation before it and the fact situation presented here. The court stated that the facts before it were factually quite different from those cases where the bank funds taken and carried away were drawn out of a bank through various fraudulent schemes. 646 F.2d at 837. 35 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the words steal or purloin in 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) encompass a scheme, such as this, whereby forged checks were utilized to remove funds from insured banks.
36 Brown claims that the trial court erred in refusing to question prospective jurors about their willingness to follow the presumption of innocence. In Jacobs v. Redman, 616 F.2d 1251, 1255-56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 944, 100 S.Ct. 2170, 64 L.Ed.2d 799 (1980), we held that the trial court did not err in refusing to ask this particular question on voir dire. We are bound by that decision unless the Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305, 101 S.Ct. 1112, 1121, 67 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981), compels a contrary result. In Carter v. Kentucky, the Court held that the trial court must, at the request of the defendant, instruct the jury that a defendant is not compelled to testify and the fact that he or she does not testify cannot be used as an inference of guilt. In the case before us, the defendant does not contend that the trial court failed to give an appropriate jury instruction. Since Carter v. Kentucky related only to jury instructions, it does not overrule our holding in Jacobs v. Redman that the trial court is not obliged to ask about the presumption of innocence at the voir dire stage of the proceedings. 37 Brown argues that the court erred in permitting testimony by the government witness Straker regarding acts of check forging by Brown and Straker substantially before the period charged in the indictment. Brown failed to timely object to this testimony at trial, and failed to ask for a limiting instruction. We do not believe that in the circumstances of this case the admission of such evidence can be considered to be plain error. Under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), evidence of prior crimes or bad acts are admissible  'if relevant for any purpose other than to show a mere propensity or disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime.'  United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 765 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985, 99 S.Ct. 577, 58 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978). In Government of the Virgin Islands v. Carino, 631 F.2d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 1980), we held that the enumerated purposes (of Rule 404(b)) are not exclusive, as demonstrated by the language of the Rule authorizing use of other crimes evidence 'for other purposes, such as....'  (emphasis in original). In this case the testimony of Straker, a co-conspirator and the key prosecution witness, could be considered as relevant to provide necessary background information, to show an ongoing relationship between Straker and Brown, and to help the jury understand Straker's role in the scheme. See United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 57-58 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct. 732, 50 L.Ed.2d 748 (1977). 38 Brown further claims that although the indictment charged a single conspiracy the evidence presented at trial proved three conspiracies. Essentially, defendant is arguing that the evidence at trial failed to sustain the single conspiracy charged in the indictment. However, as this court held in United States v. Boyd, 595 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1978), the government may establish the existence of a continuing core conspiracy which attracts different members at different times and which involves different sub-groups committing acts in furtherance of the overall plan. Our review of the evidence convinces us that there was sufficient evidence to prove that defendants were involved in a single conspiracy, even if each co-conspirator did not know all of the participants in the conspiracy. We also have considered and reject Brown's contentions that the trial court committed error in denying his motions for a severance before and during trial, in refusing to allow him to introduce into evidence the unredacted statement of Elizabeth Baucom, and in permitting the introduction of a tape recording of a telephone conversation between Brown and Straker. 39 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the conviction of Brown.