Opinion ID: 1755850
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lay Counsel

Text: At his initial appearance on September 27, 1984, Benson informed the court that he was financially able to hire an attorney and that it would take approximately four weeks for him to do so. On October 19, 1984, the court held a hearing for purposes of entering a plea. Benson informed the court that he had not yet retained counsel and that more than twenty-five attorneys had refused to represent him. Benson refused to enter a plea at that hearing and, pursuant to Rule 11(a), N.D.R.Crim.P., the court entered a plea of not guilty on his behalf. At a subsequent hearing on Benson's pretrial motions, Benson appeared with Keith Anderson as his counsel. Anderson, who informed the court that he was not a licensed attorney, was not permitted to represent Benson. Benson then informed the court that he was still attempting to employ an attorney, and the court delayed ruling on Benson's pretrial motions. Benson appeared without counsel at trial on March 7, 1985, and the following dialogue took place: THE COURT: The record should indicate we are in chambers prior to jury selection in the case of State versus Gene Benson. The defendant, Gene Benson, is present proceeding pro se, without counsel. MR. BENSON: I have to object to that, sir. I'm absent without counsel, period. I've been denied counsel of my choice, and I'm standing on that, too. THE COURT: All right. So that the record is clear, you indicated at the time of the arraignment that you were intending to provide your own counsel in this case. MR. BENSON: I attempted that. You denied me my counsel of my choice, Your Honor, so I will stand on that. THE COURT: And the counsel of your choice was a non-licensed attorney; is that correct? MR. BENSON: He is from out of state. He's been counsel out there before as far as I know. Benson contends that he was denied the right of assistance of counsel of his choice [2] because the court refused to permit Anderson to represent him. Benson relies on three United States Supreme Court decisions to support his argument. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967). We do not believe those cases are controlling. In Faretta, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself and proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. In Argersinger, supra, the Supreme Court held that, absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, an indigent defendant may not be imprisoned unless represented by counsel at trial. In Burgett, supra, a case involving a recidivist statute, the Supreme Court held that the records of a prior conviction raised a presumption that the defendant had been denied his right to counsel in that conviction and the admission of those records into evidence in a subsequent trial resulted in the defendant suffering from the deprivation of his right to counsel. Although these cases address a criminal defendant's constitutional rights regarding counsel, none stands for the proposition that a defendant has a constitutional right to be represented by a lay person. However, Benson relies on a footnote in Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820, 95 S.Ct. at 2533, which indicates that it was not an uncommon practice for colonial defendants to receive counsel at trial by personal friends who had received no formal training in the law. However, that linguistic analysis has been repudiated by the courts that have considered the issue of whether the right to assistance of counsel includes the right to representation by a lay person, and it is well established that the Sixth Amendment does not afford an accused the right to be represented by a lay person. See, e.g., United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507 (10th Cir.1979); United States v. Benson, 592 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.1979); United States v. Buttorff; 572 F.2d 619 (8th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 906, 98 S.Ct. 3095, 57 L.Ed.2d 1136 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 884, 99 S.Ct. 228, 58 L.Ed.2d 199 (1978); United States v. Wilhelm, 570 F.2d 461 (3rd Cir.1978); United States v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952, 98 S.Ct. 1581, 55 L.Ed.2d 803 (1978). These cases also recognize that to permit a lay person to represent a criminal defendant would sanction the unauthorized practice of law which our statutes expressly prohibit. [3] Our research has not revealed any jurisdiction which permits a lay person to represent a criminal defendant as a constitutional right. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly refused to permit a lay person to represent Benson.