Opinion ID: 1346296
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Application to Amend Plaintiff's Petition.

Text: Plaintiff asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow her proposed amendment to the petition she filed on December 21, 1992. The motion to amend was filed on February 14, 1994, the last day to amend pleadings under the court's scheduling order. The amendment sought to add various new claims, including punitive damage claims against the defendant doctors, breach of warranty, abandonment, medical battery, malicious and willful battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty, and tortious interference with medical treatment. Plaintiff uses the cases of Burke v. Hawkeye National Life Insurance Co., 474 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1991), and Hariri v. Morse Rubber Products, 465 N.W.2d 546 (Iowa App. 1990), to support her argument for amendment in this case. However, both of those cases dealt with amendments to conform to the proof and were submitted either during or after the start of trial. Unlike the amendment contemplated by plaintiff's counsel, an amendment to conform to the proof does not necessitate more discovery because all the evidence has already been admitted during the trial. A motion to amend pleadings should not be granted in close proximity to trial if it will substantially alter the issues. Britt-Tech Corp. v. American Magnetics Corp., 487 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Iowa 1992); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Reed, 212 N.W.2d 454, 456 (Iowa 1973). We are unable to conclude that an order by a trial court establishing a deadline for filing applications to amend pleadings carries any assurance that all applications made prior to the court's deadline will be granted. It is quite possible for a proposed amendment to be within the period prescribed in the court's order and yet be denied as untimely based on the extent to which the proposed new pleadings would alter the course of the litigation. We agree with the district court that the proposed amendment would have substantially changed the issues to be tried, potentially deprived defendants of adequate representation if they were not granted a continuance, and would also have completely altered the course of trial preparation by reopening the entire discovery process. There is a strong indication in the record that plaintiff's counsel knew of the potential for asserting these claims as early as December of 1992 and yet failed to assert them until more than one year later. The district court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing the proposed amendments.