Opinion ID: 2331578
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Black Butte's Car-Checking Procedure

Text: [¶ 15] Before we address the parties' main contentions, we must address a factual issue raised by Union Pacific. On appeal, Union Pacific contends that the new Black Butte car checking procedure, in effect at the time of [] Glenn's accident, dictated that Black Butte employees should do the car checking job at the tipple, not on the balloon track. Further, Union Pacific argues that The testimony at trial established that Glenn was working on the balloon track because [the production superintendent] ordered him to do so, in clear violation of the Black Butte car checking procedure. There was substantial testimony presented at trial, however, indicating that Black Butte intended for its employees to check the cars on the balloon track, although that testimony was not entirely consistent. The production superintendent, who had authored the new procedure and who had instructed Mr. Glenn to walk the loop, was less than perfectly clear about its intended execution in his testimony at trial. During direct examination by counsel for Union Pacific, he testified as follows: COUNSEL: Where in this policy does it tell the employees that they should either do this job, that is the car checking job, at the tipple or on the loop? WITNESS: It doesn't. COUNSEL: Should it say that? Should it tell the employees that I don't want you doing it out on the loop because it's bad footing, I want you to do it up by . . . the tipple where you have got a smooth flat area? WITNESS: I think the point we are trying to make is not to do anything with a moving train or the possibilities of a moving train. COUNSEL: But when you formulated this policy on June 27 did you intend to convey to the coal plant personnel that you wanted them to do this job, that is the job of checking the doors, and closing, latching and locking the doors up at the tipple? WITNESS: No, it didn't specify at the tipple. COUNSEL: I know you didn't specify at the tipple, but I guess what I'm asking is was that your intention, was that your thought that that is where I want them to do that? WITNESS: I can't be sure. I think the intent was, like I said, that we didn't want to endanger employees with the possibility of a train moving through the checking process. COUNSEL: Okay. That was the only idea you wanted to convey to the car checking crews? WITNESS: Yes. . . . COUNSEL: So you didn't care one way or the other where the employees closed, latched and locked the doors? WITNESS: I didn't say I didn't care. I just said our fear was we wanted to make sure they were safe around moving equipment. And they have to determine on their own if it is safe. Look at the environment you are working in, if there's obstructions or whatever. It's part of your hazard recognition to ensure you are going to be safe. There is nothing to say you can't slip in the tipple area either. But you have to make that determination on your own. COUNSEL: So you left that up to the employees to determine where they were going to do the job of closing, latching and locking the doors? WITNESS: Yes. Later on in his testimony, however, the production superintendent indicated that the new procedure did require cars to be checked at the tipple: COUNSEL: When you dropped off Mr. Glenn, did you assume that Mr. Glenn and [his co-employee] were going to do this job at the tipple? WITNESS: I'm not sure the circumstances, whether the train didn't have a crew and it was parked there or if the crew was on board and they were going to pull through. I'm not clear right now the exact status of that train. COUNSEL: But when you dropped Mr. Glenn off to do that job did you assume he was going to do that at the tipple pursuant WITNESS: That would have been my assumption, yes. COUNSEL: Because that would have been pursuant to the policy and procedure? WITNESS: Yes. COUNSEL: Doing it out on the loop would have been contrary to the policy and procedure? WITNESS: According to the process, yes. The testimony of other witnesses, however, was less ambiguous. Mr. Glenn, the coworker who helped him check the cars, the drill and blaster superintendent on duty at the time of the accident, and the head mine superintendent on duty at the time of the accident all testified, in unequivocal terms, that the new procedure required Black Butte personnel to close the dump doors on the balloon track rather than exclusively at the tipple. In light of the testimony of these witnesses, and the apparently contradictory testimony of the production superintendent, we find sufficient evidence to support Mr. Glenn's contention that checking the train cars on the balloon track was consistent with Black Butte's new car-checking procedure.