Opinion ID: 1234716
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: McKaskle ERROR

Text: Because we have identified a § 2254(d)(1) error in the Arizona state court's opinion, we review de novo Frantz's Sixth Amendment claim regarding his exclusion from the chambers conference.
Faretta established a criminal defendant's right to represent himself, provided only that he knowingly and intelligently foregoes his right to counsel and that he is able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 173, 104 S.Ct. 944. But Faretta did not recognize an unqualified right for pro se defendants to stand alone in a courtroom. Instead, the Supreme Court allowed states to appoint standby counsel to aid pro se defendants if and when [they] request[ ] help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant's self-representation is necessary. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525. In McKaskle, the Supreme Court reiterated Faretta 's holding concerning standby counsel and indicated that rather than creating an absolute bar on standby counsel's unsolicited participation, 465 U.S. at 176, 104 S.Ct. 944, Faretta allows standby counsel sometimes to participate without violating an individual's right to self-representation. Id. at 177, 104 S.Ct. 944. But to clarify the distinction between permissible and impermissible interference by standby counsel, McKaskle impose[d] some limits on the extent of standby counsel's unsolicited participation, id. at 177, 104 S.Ct. 944, so as to protect the Faretta right. Those limitations are, first, that the pro se defendant is entitled to preserve actual control over the case he chooses to present to the jury, and, second, that participation of standby counsel without the defendant's consent should not be allowed to destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself. Id. at 178, 104 S.Ct. 944. Because the conference that Frantz challenges took place out of sight of the jury, we are concerned today with the first, but not the second, of McKaskle 's two core limitations. McKaskle offers considerable guidance as to when a standby attorney's participation so reduces a defendant's control as to violate Faretta. On the one hand, [i]f standby counsel's participation over the defendant's objection effectively allows counsel to make or substantially interfere with any significant tactical decisions... or to speak instead of the defendant on any matter of importance, the Faretta right is eroded. Id. at 178, 104 S.Ct. 944 (emphasis in original). On the other hand, standby counsel may assist in two ways: (1) in overcoming routine procedural or evidentiary obstacles to the completion of some specific task, such as introducing evidence or objecting to testimony, that the defendant has clearly shown he wishes to complete, id. at 183, 104 S.Ct. 944; and (2) by help[ing] to ensure the defendant's compliance with basic rules of courtroom protocol and procedure. Id. Applying this guidance, we conclude that Lamb's solo participation in the chambers conference may well have violated Frantz's right to self-representation, but that we need some further development of the record before we can decide the ultimate constitutional question. We first hold that, even if Lamb accurately portrayed Frantz's wishes, unconsented  to exclusion from the conference would so substantially reduce Frantz's ability to shape and communicate his own defense as to violate his Faretta rights. Having so concluded, we then consider whether we can determine from the present record that Frantz did not accede to Lamb's participation, or whether instead we must remand for an evidentiary hearing on the question.
The chambers conference involved two questions relevant to this case: (1) whether the jury, at its own request, should be allowed to hear the 911 tape; and (2) if the tape was not admitted, how the judge should respond to the jury's request. [16] Neither question fell within McKaskle 's categorical exceptions to Faretta protection. Certainly, neither involved the basic procedural issues contemplated by McKaskle as appropriate for intercession by standby counsel. See 465 U.S. at 184, 104 S.Ct. 944 (excusing standby counsel's participation in matters of basic mechanics such as informing the court of the where-abouts of witnesses, supplying [the defendant] with a form needed to elect to go to the jury at the punishment phase of trial, explaining to [the defendant] that he should not argue his case while questioning a witness). And both questions discussed at the chambers conference involved far more than routine ... obstacles to the completion of some specific task ... that the defendant ha[d] clearly shown he wishe[d] to complete. Id. at 183, 104 S.Ct. 944. Both the substance of the jury's request  for evidence not admitted at trial  and the judge's apparent willingness to consider granting it were highly unusual. [17] Moreover, Frantz had not earlier established his position on the jury's inquiry, as the request had just then been made. The upshot is that Lamb's participation was entirely distinct from that of the standby attorney in McKaskle, who  with the Supreme Court's approbation  questioned a witness to establish an appropriate predicate only after the defendant sought in open court to introduce the very evidence himself and encountered difficulty because of the lack of such predicate. Id. at 184, 104 S.Ct. 944. As neither of the roles for standby counsel recognized in McKaskle pertains, we must turn to the more general standard enunciated in McKaskle: Was the inchambers proceeding in which Frantz did not participate one involving any significant tactical decisions or any matter of importance? Id. at 178, 104 S.Ct. 944. We hold that it involved both and that, therefore, Frantz had to be allowed to make the tactical decisions involved and to speak for himself about them, unless he consented to Lamb's doing so instead. In considering these issues, we are aware of the Tenth Circuit's observation that McKaskle seems to stop short of a per se rule when it states that [standby counsel's interference in such matters] only `erode[s]' Faretta rights. `Erode' is not a synonym for `violate.' United States v. McDermott, 64 F.3d 1448, 1454 (10th Cir.1995). In some cases, it may be that standby counsel can erode Faretta rights without violating them. This case, however, is not a borderline one of that kind. The chambers conference involved two issues with undoubted tactical importance. Particularly because the conference involved discussions that Lamb and Frantz could not have accurately predicted or rehearsed in advance, Frantz's exclusion resulted in a complete silencing of Frantz's voice on the matters. We take the two matters discussed at the in-chambers conference in turn: