Opinion ID: 4705649
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sherman & Howard Report

Text: ¶17 Whether Mesnard is absolutely immune from liability for allegedly defaming Shooter by modifying the draft Sherman & Howard report to Shooter’s detriment and then releasing it to House members and the public depends entirely on whether preparation and release of the report was a legislative function. See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 624; Restatement § 590. ¶18 Shooter argues that because Mesnard’s modifications were surreptitious and dishonest, he did not engage in a legislative function. But whether Mesnard acted with ill motives or actually defamed Shooter has no bearing on whether Mesnard was performing a legislative function to which legislative immunity attaches. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966) (emphasizing that whether a representative gave a speech on the House floor in return for private remuneration involved an inquiry into his motives for a legislative function, which “is precisely what the Speech or Debate Clause generally forecloses from executive and judicial inquiry”); Sanchez, 175 Ariz. at 97 (“When Councilman Sanchez made the [allegedly defamatory] statements, he was a legislator speaking to a legislative body during a formal legislative meeting—clearly a legislative function.”); see also Green Acres Trust, 141 Ariz. at 613 (stating in the context of judicial absolute immunity that “the speaker’s motive, purpose or reasonableness in uttering a false statement do not affect the defense”). In other words, we examine the act, not the actor. See Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d 923, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1984). ¶19 The Arizona Constitution authorizes each legislative chamber to discipline its members and even expel a member “with the concurrence of two-thirds of its members.” See Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 11. Investigating the basis for discipline or expulsion is inherent in this authority because the investigatory results inform the decision whether to impose discipline on members or expel them from the chamber. Cf. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504 (noting “the power to investigate” is necessary to enable wise decisions, making it “inherent in the power to make laws,” and is therefore plainly protected by legislative immunity); Rangel v. Boehner, 785 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (concluding that a congressional disciplinary proceeding is a “legislative matter” that the Constitution places within the 8 MESNARD V. HON. CAMPAGNOLO/SHOOTER Opinion of the Court House’s jurisdiction (quoting Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gamrat v. Allard, 320 F. Supp. 3d 927, 936 (W.D. Mich. 2018) (holding that actions associated with the investigation and expulsion of a member of a state House of Representatives are legislative in nature and privileged). ¶20 Here, the House, through Mesnard acting as speaker, retained Sherman & Howard to investigate misconduct allegations against three House members, including Shooter. The investigation did not lose its character as a legislative function simply because an outside investigator conducted it. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312 (1973) (extending legislative immunity to a consultant); AIRC, 206 Ariz. at 140 ¶¶ 29–30 (acknowledging that “the modern, part-time legislature, in light of budgetary constraints, contracts with expert consultants on a variety of subjects rather than retaining staff with such expertise” and extending the legislative privilege to such contractors’ acts “that would be privileged legislative conduct if personally performed by the legislator”). ¶21 The resulting investigative report, even if modified by Mesnard, was “an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes” respecting House members’ decisions whether to vote for Shooter’s expulsion—a matter firmly within the House’s jurisdiction. See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625; see also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 (1979) (acknowledging that preparation of committee reports is protected by legislative immunity). Preparation of the report and its release to House members was therefore a legislative function protected by absolute legislative immunity. See McMillan, 412 U.S. at 313 (holding that preparing an investigative report and “authorizing the publication and distribution of that report” were “integral part(s) of the deliberative and communicative process by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to . . . matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House” (quoting Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625)). ¶22 Mesnard’s act in releasing the report to the public was also a legislative function protected by legislative immunity. Arizona law requires public records in the custody of elected officials to be “open to inspection by any person.” A.R.S. §§ 39-121, -121.01. As an elected representative who ordered the investigation, participated in drafting the report, and had custody of it, Mesnard was authorized to permit public inspection of the report and thus performed a legislative function in doing 9 MESNARD V. HON. CAMPAGNOLO/SHOOTER Opinion of the Court so. The situation here is distinguishable from the one in Gravel, where the Supreme Court held that a senator who lacked authority to arrange for private publication of classified materials introduced at a congressional subcommittee hearing was not shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause. 408 U.S. at 625–26. ¶23 The record does not show whether a member of the public asked to inspect the report before Mesnard released it. See § 39-121.01(D) (outlining request process). But even absent such a request, and given his authority, Mesnard performed a legislative function by releasing the report. See McMillan, 412 U.S. at 314 (“Members of Congress are themselves immune for ordering or voting for a publication going beyond the reasonable requirements of the legislative function.”); Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 130, 133 (reaffirming that congressional members cannot be held liable for voting to publish a committee report and distinguishing private republication of such reports); Green v. DeCamp, 612 F.2d 368, 372 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that state senators’ release of committee’s investigative report “to news reporting and publishing agencies” was a legitimate legislative activity, making the senators immune from suit); Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir. 1996) (concluding that decision to “publish” content of legislative hearings through live telecasts “constituted legislative conduct absolutely immune from civil suit”). ¶24 Shooter also argues that Mesnard’s retention of a law firm to investigate the allegations against Shooter and then create a report rather than assigning a House committee to investigate and then conduct public hearings denied Shooter due process and was outside the “sphere of legislative activity,” making release of the resulting report unprotected by legislative immunity. The sole authorities cited for this argument are cases emphasizing Arizona’s reluctance to immunize public servants from liability. See, e.g., Sanchez, 175 Ariz. at 97 (“We do not favor immunity from common law liability.”). ¶25 We are unpersuaded. Whether Mesnard violated House rules, statutory law, or even the state or federal Constitution has no bearing on whether his actions were legislative functions and thus afforded immunity. See Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 203–04 (acknowledging that immunity applies to legislative functions “without inquiring whether the exercise was regular, according to the rules of the House, or irregular and against their rules” (quoting Coffin, 4 Mass. at 27)); McMillan, 412 U.S. at 312–13 (noting legislative immunity applies to acts taken within the “legislative sphere” 10 MESNARD V. HON. CAMPAGNOLO/SHOOTER Opinion of the Court even if in other contexts the action would be “unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to criminal or civil statutes”); Eastland, 421 U.S. at 509–10 (same); Rangel, 785 F.3d at 24 (“An act does not lose its legislative character simply because a plaintiff alleges that it violated the House Rules or even the Constitution . . . .” (citation omitted)). Such sweeping protection “has enabled reckless men to slander and even destroy others with impunity, but that was the conscious choice of the Framers.” Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516 & n.11 (“The injury to the reputation of a private citizen is of less importance to the commonwealth, than the free and unreserved exercise of the duties of a representative, unawed by the fear of legal prosecutions.” (quoting Coffin, 4 Mass. at 28)). Any remedy for such abuses must come from the voters, not the courts. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 378 (“In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed to legislative conduct and as readily believed. Courts are not the place for such controversies. Self-discipline and the voters must be the ultimate reliance for discouraging or correcting such abuses.”). ¶26 In sum, Mesnard performed a legislative function when he modified the draft Sherman & Howard report and then released it to House members and the general public. He is therefore absolutely immune from liability to Shooter based on these actions.