Opinion ID: 793983
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claim of Suggestive Show-up Against Tarter

Text: 96 The district court denied qualified immunity to Tarter in response to Plaintiff's allegations that Tarter used an unduly suggestive show-up procedure in getting Ms. S to identify Plaintiff. With respect to this claim, Tarter puts forth several legal arguments in this appeal. First, Tarter argues that there was no well established constitutional right in 1992 to be free of show-ups. Second, Tarter argues that Plaintiff waived his right to contest the show-up, and therefore no due process violation could have occurred. Finally, Tarter argues that, as a matter of law, any due process violation that did occur was a result of the prosecutor's choice to use the show-up identification at trial, and not the direct result of Tarter's use of the show-up in the first instance. ( See Defs. First Final Br. 36.) We address Tarter's arguments in turn. 97 This Court follows a two step inquiry in reviewing a claim for qualified immunity. First, we consider (1) whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a known [] constitutional right; and (2) whether the constitutional right was so clearly established at the time in question that a reasonable official in the defendant's position would have known that he was violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Hutsell v. Sayre, 5 F.3d 996, 1003 (6th Cir.1993) (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991)). 98 Plaintiff certainly alleges the violation of a known constitutional right. Plaintiff argues that Tarter's use of the show-up violated Plaintiff's right to be free of unduly suggestive identification procedures. Criminal suspects have a constitutional right to be free from identification procedures so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that the identification's use violates due process of law. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). If an impermissibly suggestive identification leads to a criminal conviction, the Supreme Court has held on a number of occasions that the defendant's conviction must be overturned. See, e.g., id. 99 Tarter argues that a reasonable officer would not have known that his use of the show-up was a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, because show-ups are not per se unconstitutional. Yet the Supreme Court has held that police officers must evaluate the totality of the circumstances and reach a reasoned conclusion as to whether an identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive or not. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). The Supreme Court has never said that law enforcement may do away with this consideration merely because a criminal suspect consents to come in for an identification procedure. On the contrary, the Supreme Court and this Court require an assessment of the circumstances before the decision to undertake a show-up. Id. This Court has never held that a police officer is free to ignore the constitutional restraints on police action merely because the constitution does not forbid such action in all circumstances. Tarter may as well argue that a police officer is free to make warrantless searches and seizures without fear of constitutional liability because the Constitution does not prohibit such searches in all cases. 100 This Court has entertained allegations of suggestive identification procedures as viable constitutional tort claims. See, e.g., Hutsell, 5 F.3d at 1005. To the extent that Tarter's decision to proceed with the line-up was a reasonable one in light of the infirmities of the situation, the decision is one for the finder of fact. An appeal of a denial of qualified immunity authorizes us only to address the issues of pure law. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313, 115 S.Ct. 2151. 101 Tarter also argues that Plaintiff waived his right to contest the show-up. The district court found a genuine issue of material fact going to whether Plaintiff's waiver was knowing[], intelligent[], or voluntary[]. (J.A. at 203.) A defendant may not appeal a district court's order denying a claim of qualified immunity `insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a `genuine' issue of fact for trial.' Sheets, 287 F.3d at 585 (quoting Johnson, 515 U.S. at 320, 115 S.Ct. 2151). We may not entertain Tarter's arguments which contest the district court's findings of genuine issues of fact for trial. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313, 115 S.Ct. 2151. 102 To the extent that Tarter is arguing that Plaintiff's consent to the show-up by signing the preprinted waiver form precludes any legal right to bring a due process claim, we find that Tarter misunderstands the law of constitutional waiver. Plaintiff does not have a right to a line-up versus a show-up. Plaintiff has a due process right which includes the right to be free from unduly suggestive and unreliable identification procedures. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967. By consenting to a show-up in lieu of a line-up Plaintiff was not waiving this right, but merely agreeing to be put forth in front of a witness before his indictment, when Plaintiff had a right not to appear for an identification procedure at all. Plaintiff does not contest that had the show-up not been unduly suggestive, the identification would have been properly in evidence. Rather, Plaintiff argues that as a result of circumstances unknown to him at the time, the show-up was unduly suggestive. Plaintiff did not waive any improper suggestiveness associated with the show-up by agreeing to appear. The preprinted waiver form does not include any language going to Plaintiff's right to due process or a fair trial. Criminal suspects may agree, for example, to appear for a line-up prior to any indictment or even arrest. Such agreement does not mean, however, that the suspects lose their right to contest any suggestiveness in the line-up not caused by them. 103 Finally, we come to Tarter's final argument. Tarter argues that it was the action of the prosecutor, in using the impermissibly suggestive identification at trial, which led to Plaintiff's injury, and not Tarter's procurement of the identification itself. It is true that an unduly suggestive identification does not, in and of itself, violate constitutional rights. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977). It is also true that the prosecution's use of the identification at trial is a necessary intervening act for injury to occur and liability for any party to attach. Id. It is not true, however, that the prosecutor's discretion to control the state's case at trial is such an intervening act to excuse Tarter from the natural consequences of his actions and therefore any tort liability. In constitutional-tort cases, a man [is] responsible for the natural consequences of his actions. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). This principle led the Supreme Court in Malley v. Briggs to hold that the issuance of an arrest warrant will not shield the police officer who applied for the warrant from liability for false arrest if a reasonably well-trained officer in [his] position would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant. 475 U.S. 335, 345, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court's reasoning is directly applicable here. The prosecutor's decision to use the identification does not shield Tarter from liability if he reasonably should have known that use of the identification would lead to a violation of Plaintiff's right to a fair trial. 104 Accordingly, we find that the district court correctly denied Tarter qualified immunity for Plaintiff's claim of suggestive identification.