Opinion ID: 2624513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Swanson's Disputes Regarding Ybarra's Complaint

Text: In his brief, Swanson admitted to a violation of KRPC 1.5(d) for failing to establish a written contingent fee agreement with Ybarra but took issue with the other findings of the hearing panel relating to Ybarra's termination of Swanson's representation. Then at the hearing before this court, Swanson advised that he was not disputing that he violated KRPC 1.1 (competence), KRPC 1.3 (diligence), KRPC 1.5 (fees), KRPC 1.16 (declining or terminating representation), and KRPC 3.2 (expediting litigation). While his admission at the court hearing is sufficient for us to deem the violation to be admitted, we also note that our review of the record reveals clear and convincing evidence of these violations. Swanson's disputes, therefore, relate to the panel's findings that he violated KRPC 4.1 for knowingly and intentionally asserting that Ybarra terminated the representation on December 2, 1999, when Ybarra did not terminate Swanson's representation until May 24, 2000 and that he violated KRPC 8.4(c) for testifying at the disciplinary hearing that he received a December 1999 letter from Ybarra and testifying that Ybarra terminated the representation in December 1999. He argues these findings are contrary to the jury verdict in the federal malpractice case in which the jury found that Ybarra terminated the representation on December 2, 1999. To support his argument, Swanson cites Supreme Court Rule 202 (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 261) (grounds for discipline), which provides that civil judgments are prima facie evidence of the findings made therein and shall raise a presumption as to their validity. Swanson relies on the rule to argue that, because of the jury's verdict in the federal malpractice case, there is a presumption that Ybarra terminated his representation in December 1999.