Opinion ID: 1748904
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Heading: Codal Principle of Legal Fault or Strict Liability

Text: A principle of legal fault or strict liability underlies articles 2317-22 of the Civil Code: When harm results from the conduct of a person or defect of a thing which creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others, a person legally responsible under these code articles for the supervision, care, or guardianship of the person or thing may be held liable for the damage thus caused, despite the fact that no personal negligent act or inattention on the former's part is proved. The injured person must prove the vice (i.e., unreasonable risk of injury to another) in the person or thing whose act causes the damage, and that the damage resulted from this vice. Once this is proved the owner or guardian responsible for the person or thing can escape liability only if he shows the harm was caused by the fault of the victim, by the fault of a third person, or by an irresistible force. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So.2d 441 (La.1975). The strict liability or legal fault thus arising from our code provisions is more than a rebuttable presumption of negligence. The owner or guardian cannot be absolved from his strict liability even if he proves that he did not know and could not have known of the unreasonable risk of harm to others. See Loescher v. Parr, supra . (A tree owner is responsible for damage caused by the tree's fall although he could not reasonably have known of its internally diseased condition. C.C. Article 2317); Holland v. Buckley, 305 So.2d. 113 (La.1974). (A dog owner is strictly liable for injury done by the animal's first bite even if he could not have known of the dog's harm-causing characteristic. C.C. 2321); Turner v. Bucher, 308 So.2d 270 (La.1975). (A parent is strictly liable for damage caused by his child's defective conduct regardless of the fact that the parent could not have prevented the child's act. C.C. 2318); Olsen v. Shell Oil Corp., 365 So.2d 1285 (La.1979) (A building owner is strictly liable for damage caused by the defective condition of the premises regardless of whether he is ignorant of the condition and reasonably could not have detected it. C.C. Art. 2322). The underlying reason for the owner's or guardian's strict liability is that the person to whom society allots the supervision, care or guardianship (custody) of the risk-creating person or thing should bear the loss resulting from creation of the risk, rather than some innocent third person harmed as a consequence of his failure to prevent the risk. Loescher v. Parr, supra ; See Olsen v. Shell Oil Corp., supra n. 13; Starck, The Foundation of Delictual Liability in Contemporary French Law, 48 Tul.L.Rev. 1043 (1975); See Comment, Article 2322 and the Liability of the Owner of an Immovable, 42 Tul.L.Rev. 178 (1967). The principle of strict products liability is analogous to the principle of legal fault or strict liability underlying civil code articles 2317-22. The manufacturer who places an unreasonably dangerous product on the market that causes injury to innocent victims is subject to strict liability even if he has not been guilty of any negligence. The liability arises from his legal relationship to the product and is based on the product's unreasonably dangerous condition. One of the reasons for strict products liability is similar to that underlying the codal strict liability: The person to whom society allots the supervision, care, or guardianship (custody) of the risk-creating thing bears the loss resulting from creation of the risk, rather than some innocent third person harmed as a consequence of its defective condition. Although the manufacturer usually does not have custody of the product when the injury occurs, in order for strict product liability to arise, the plaintiff must prove that the product's unreasonably dangerous condition arose or existed while it was in the manufacturer's control, that the condition existed at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer, and that the product reached the user in substantially that same defective condition. Another underlying reason for strict products liability affords grounds for holding the manufacturer even more strictly liable than the owner or custodian for damage caused by his risk-creating product: Manufacturers typically are better able than owners or custodians to spread the cost of strict liability through pricing and liability insurance. Because of the close resemblance between the two forms of strict liability and the reasons for them, reliance on analogy to the civil code indicates that the manufacturer who places an unreasonably dangerous product on the market that causes injury to innocent victims should not be permitted to escape liability by showing that he did not know and could not have known of the danger. Otherwise, the liability of a manufacturer who distributes large numbers of unreasonably dangerous products causing multiple injuries and deaths would be less strict than that of an ordinary homeowner for the act or defect of his child, animal or tree. An injured person cannot recover under the codal theory of strict liability if he fails to prove there was an unreasonable risk of injury inherent in the thing which caused his damage. Failing in his attempt to prove a vice in the thing, the injured person cannot rely on strict liability but must pursue a theory of recovery instead which requires him to impugn the conduct of the defendant. Analogy to the product liability field indicates, therefore, that an injured consumer who fails to prove that the product is unreasonably dangerous per se or has a construction defect must pursue a less strict theory of recovery which impugns the conduct of the manufacturer, such as an action for failure to warn or for failure to adopt an alternative design. The parties urge contradictory arguments based on different parts of this court's opinion in Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co. of New York, supra . Plaintiff contends that one passage in that opinion indicates that the manufacturer is absolutely and conclusively presumed to know of the defects in its products under all theories of products liability recovery, including the failure to warn theory. Defendant argues that another passage imposes a general requirement that the particular danger which results in the user's injury must have been foreseeable by the manufacturer for it to be held strictly liable. But, in Weber the manufacturer was held liable under a theory that the product was unreasonably dangerous because of a manufacturing flaw or construction defect, viz., an excessive amount of arsenic in cattle dip not made in accordance with the producer's intended specifications. Thus, the difficult issues presented by scientifically unknowable dangers or liability for failure to warn were not raised, and we do not attribute to the Weber court any intention to decide these issues prematurely. Even if we were to agree with one of the parties' interpretations, we would still answer the certified question as we have. Weber is this court's landmark opinion on strict products liability, and we continue to be guided by its basic holding and its spirit. Nevertheless, this court has viewed strict products liability as an instrument of public order based on both codal principles and empirical considerations, not as a purely judicial creation. Accordingly, the principle of strict liability has developed since Weber, and its shape will continue to be molded by its purpose within our codal framework. See, e.g., Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, supra ; Hunt v. City Stores, Inc., supra ; Chappuis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra ; cf. Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 418 So.2d 493 (La.1982); Entrevia v. Hood, supra .