Opinion ID: 1631088
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Octavious Eggerson's Written Statements.

Text: In the second instance, the trial court prohibited Appellant from introducing written statements of another witness, Octavious Eggerson (Eggerson). From the record, it appears that Eggerson's written statements, one six months after the murder and another two months before trial, bolstered his testimony rather than impeaching it. Again, because the trial court found Appellant's failure to disclose this evidence to be a violation of the reciprocal discovery rules, the evidence was excluded. Appellant now argues that the written statements should have been admissible under the hearsay exception for prior inconsistent statements or prior consistent statements. We do not agree. Initially, we note that the trial court's exclusion was indeed correct, but find that the basis for such an exclusion was improper. As already stated, Appellant's obligation under the reciprocal discovery agreement referred to RCr 7.24(3)(A)(i), which applies only to results or reports of scientific tests or experiments. Thus exclusion for violating the reciprocal discovery agreement was erroneous, though any error in the exclusion of Eggerson's prior statements was harmless as the statements were otherwise inadmissible. KRE 801A(a)(1) allows admission of prior inconsistent statements of witnesses provided the witness testifies at trial and is examined about the statement, with the proper foundation laid pursuant to KRE 613. Of course, the most important point is that the statements made at trial must, in fact, be inconsistent with those made prior to the witness's testimony. [I]t is not a mere difference of statement that suffices; nor yet is an absolute oppositeness essential; it is an inconsistency that is required. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 281 S.W.2d 891, 895 (Ky.1955). Inconsistency may be found when the proffered statement and the witness' testimony lead to inconsistent conclusions, indicating the witness' differing expressions appear to have been based on incompatible beliefs. Id. at 897. Since Eggerson's testimony at trial was nearly identical to his written statements, the evidence was not admissible as prior inconsistent statements. Thus, this argument fails. Appellant also argues that the written statements were admissible as prior consistent statements. There is no merit to this argument, as there is no rule which would allow defense counsel in this case to introduce Eggerson's prior statements. Prior consistent statements are admissible provided the proper foundation is laid pursuant to KRE 613 and the statements are offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. KRE 801A(a)(2). None of the conditions required for the admission of prior consistent statements were apparent in this case. Moreover, because prior consistent statements can have a rehabilitative effect on a witness's credibility, [2] it is inconceivable that a party would want to rehabilitate a primary witness of his opponent or rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper motive on the part of an opponent's witness. Again, although the trial court erred in excluding the written statements on the basis of an alleged violation of the reciprocal discovery agreement, any error in doing so was harmless as the evidence was otherwise properly excluded for the reasons set forth herein.