Opinion ID: 781387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constructive Reopening

Text: 28 First, Byam argues that the ALJ constructively reopened the previous applications by reviewing the evidence provided in those earlier applications and making a decision on the merits of that evidence. However, the district court held that the ALJ had not constructively reopened the previous applications, because he had not ruled on their merits but had only assessed whether there was new evidence to establish good cause to reopen them. We agree with the district court. 29 Byam points to language that, when read in isolation, suggests that the ALJ may have considered the merits of the earlier applications. For example, the ALJ found that [t]here was no medical evidence which can establish Disability prior to June 21, 1996, and that [t]he medical evidence supports a continued period of disability beginning June 21, 1996 but not prior there to [sic]. 30 However, as the district court correctly pointed out, the ALJ made these statements in the context of deciding whether Byam had demonstrated good cause for reopening her earlier applications. The ALJ followed those remarks by stating: Therefore, I find that there is no new and material evidence or error on the face of the evidence that would establish good cause for reopening the prior decision. Cf. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1489. Byam makes no showing that the ALJ ruled on the merits of the earlier evidence, and nothing in the record indicates that the ALJ's disability determination was based on anything other than evidence submitted as part of the 1996 application. His finding that Byam was disabled beginning June 21, 1996 resulted from the fact that she filed the fourth application for SSI benefits on that date, and not from any substantive review of evidence submitted in previous applications. Of course, when presented with a request to reopen earlier applications, the Secretary must look into the facts of those applications to determine whether there is cause to reopen them. A similar inquiry would necessarily be triggered by an argument that the present claim is barred by res judicata. But in either case, such a threshold inquiry into the nature of the evidence should not be read as a reopening of this claim on the merits. McGowen, 666 F.2d at 68. Otherwise these threshold inquiries would lead to frequent unwarranted judicial review, defeating Congress's choice for finality. Califano, 430 U.S. at 108, 97 S.Ct. 980. Here the district court considered the earlier applications for the limited purpose of deciding whether there was good cause to reopen them. This was not the sort of merits review that amounts to a constructive reopening, and we reject Byam's argument that it was.