Opinion ID: 405433
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Motion to Quash the Indictment

Text: 9 Appellant's motion to quash the indictment rests upon two contentions: first, that Congress has the exclusive primary jurisdiction to try and punish a federal judge for high crimes and misdemeanors through the impeachment process; 6 and second, that the principle of separation of powers prohibits the executive branch from seeking to prosecute an active federal judge for acts committed in his official capacity. 10 This Republic is fortunate that in its long history the federal courts have had only one previous occasion to address the constitutional problems posed by the criminal prosecution of a federal judge. 7 On that occasion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided that contentions similar to those made by appellant here were without merit. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 3184, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974). We are persuaded that Isaacs contains the correct statement of the law. 11 Appellant's first contention is based upon the literal language of article I, § 3, cl. 7 of the Constitution: 12 Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law. 13 According to appellant, this clause creates a constitutionally mandated sequence for the prosecution of a federal judge: first, Congress must act to remove him from office, and only then can the article III courts subject him to trial, judgment and punishment, according to law. 14 We find no merit in appellant's argument. Rather, we agree with the seventh circuit that this portion of section 3 was intended to assure that after impeachment a trial on criminal charges is not foreclosed by the principle of double jeopardy. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1142. 8 Read in this light, section 3 represents an attempt by the framers to anticipate and respond to questions that might arise regarding the procedural rights of the accused during the impeachment process. Like article III, § 2, cl. 3 which provides that the right to trial by jury does not extend to impeachment proceedings, 9 section 3 serves to clarify the rights of civil officers accused of high crimes and misdemeanors, not to limit the jurisdiction of article III courts. 10 15 Appellant's second argument relies upon the principle of separation of powers. He contends that the courts would be subject to intolerable pressure from the executive if executive officers were allowed to prosecute active federal judges for acts involving the exercise of their judicial power. 11 16 Appellant is of course correct that the independence of the judiciary from external pressures is a highly valued element of our constitutional system. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-18, 101 S.Ct. 471, 482, 66 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). That independence is already protected by specific provisions in the Constitution. 12 See, e.g., art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (incompatibility clause); 13 art. III, § 1 (life tenure clause) 14 (compensation clause). 15 Additionally, judges enjoy the same protection as do all citizens from vindictive prosecution by officers of the executive branch. See United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1307 (5th Cir. 1978). 16 We are not persuaded that the proposed rule of absolute judicial immunity from federal criminal prosecution is a necessary complement to the Constitution's explicit protections. 17 Indeed, the miniscule increment in judicial independence that might be derived from the proposed rule would be outweighed by the tremendous harm that the rule would cause to another treasured value of our constitutional system: no man in this country is so high that he is above the law. It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220, 1 S.Ct. 240, 261, 27 L.Ed. 171 (1882). A judge no less than any other man is subject to the processes of the criminal law. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1133; see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 n.5, 101 S.Ct. 183, 187 n.5, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429, 96 S.Ct. 984, 994, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503, 94 S.Ct. 669, 679, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). 18 17 We decide today only that appellant may be prosecuted under the instant federal indictment. 19 We conclude that the district court was correct in denying appellant's motion to quash that indictment. 20 We therefore affirm the district court's order and deny the petition for writs. Let the mandate issue forthwith. 18 The interlocutory order of the district court is AFFIRMED; the petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition is DENIED.