Opinion ID: 3150928
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ikejiani’s “Dispensed” Argument

Text: Defendant Ikejiani argues for the first time on appeal that his guilty plea must be vacated because, as a wholesaler, he is innocent of the charged conduct. Ikejiani’s argument turns on the use of the word “dispensed” in 21 U.S.C. 7 Case: 15-10486 Date Filed: 10/30/2015 Page: 8 of 17 § 353(b)(1), which, he argues, is limited to distribution to the end user by virtue of the definition of “dispensed” given in 21 U.S.C. § 802(10).1 We apply plain error review when a defendant failed to raise an argument in the district court. United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). To demonstrate plain error, the defendant must show that there is (1) error, (2) that is plain and (3) that affects substantial rights. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007). If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. Federal law prohibits “the doing of any . . . act with respect to. . . [a] drug . . . if such act is done while such [drug] is held for sale (whether or not the first sale) after shipment in interstate commerce and results in such article being adulterated or misbranded.” 21 U.S.C. § 331(k). “The act of dispensing a drug [without a prescription] shall be deemed to be an act which results in the drug being misbranded while held for sale.” Id. § 353(b)(1). 1 21 U.S.C. § 802 provides: “As used in this subchapter . . . [t]he term dispense means to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(10) (emphasis added). Section 802 appears in Title 21, Chapter 13, Subchapter I, while the charged offense appears in Title 21, Chapter 9, Subchapter III. Accordingly, it is not clear how the definition of “dispense” in § 802, which is expressly limited to its use in Chapter 13, Subchapter I, has any bearing on the construction and interpretation of the term “dispensing” as used in § 353. In any event, as discussed below, Ikejiani’s argument is squarely foreclosed by binding precedent. 8 Case: 15-10486 Date Filed: 10/30/2015 Page: 9 of 17 In the context of a 21 U.S.C. § 331(k) prosecution, this Court’s predecessor held that the term “dispensing,” as used in § 353(b)(1), applies to all sales, including wholesale sales, and not merely to sales to end users. United States v. De Freese, 270 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 1959). The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). This Court is bound to follow prior binding precedent until it is overruled by this Court sitting en banc or by the United States Supreme Court. United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008). Here, the district court did not plainly err by accepting Ikejiani’s guilty plea. This Court’s predecessor rejected Ikejiani’s argument long ago in a precedential decision that has not been overruled. De Freese, 270 F.2d at 736. Specifically, the former Fifth Circuit held that “the fact that the crime . . . is wholesale, instead of retail, gives [the defendant] no special claim to immunity.” Id. at 737. We are bound to follow this precedent. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d at 1236. Accordingly, even though Ikejiani was a wholesale seller, he was properly charged under 21 U.S.C. § 331(k), and the district court committed no plain error by accepting his guilty plea. 9 Case: 15-10486 Date Filed: 10/30/2015 Page: 10 of 17