Opinion ID: 1360370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional Tort Jury Instruction

Text: The Nolans argue that the jury was not properly instructed on their substantive due process claim. At trial, the district Court gave the following instruction on the § 1983 substantive due process claim: In order for plaintiff to establish that defendant Theodore Anderson and/or Eldridge Henry's actions against Martin Nolan violated his constitutional rights, the plaintiff must first show that Martin Nolan suffered an injury so severe that it violated his constitutional rights. In order to prove such an injury the plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) Coach Anderson's or Coach Henry's application of force caused severe injury to Martin Nolan; and (2) The force or aggression applied by Coach Anderson or Coach Henry was disproportionate to the need presented; and (3) The force or aggression applied was inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal, which amounted to brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience. If Martin Nolan failed to prove any of these three elements, you must find that he has not suffered a constitutional injury. It is also important that you consider that corporal punishment for discipline is legal in the State of Tennessee and was allowed at all times relevant to this case in the Memphis City Schools. (ROA Tr. 557-58.) The Nolans contend that the instruction as given was misleading to the jury. They argue that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to replace subpart (1) of the instruction with the following language: (1) Coach Anderson's or Coach Henry's application of force was continuous, severe, and pervasive or administered repeatedly in a highly visible setting designed to demean and embarrass an individual in a highly vulnerable position. The quoted language in the proposed instruction was drawn from the district court's analysis of the constitutional tort claim in its summary judgment order. The Nolans also argue that the district court erred by refusing to delete the last paragraph of the disputed instruction and by refusing to include the definition of severe in its instructions. Contrary to the Nolans' contentions, the jury instruction as given was proper. Jury instructions are proper if, as a whole, they fairly and adequately submitted the issues and applicable law to the jury. Arban, 345 F.3d at 404. The constitutional tort instruction in this case does so. The language used by the district court is an accurate and nearly verbatim statement of this Circuit's shocks the conscience test for substantive due process claims as announced in Webb v. McCullough. 828 F.2d at 1158. The Nolans offer no support for their proffered instruction other than the language used by the district court in denying summary judgment. Similarly, the last paragraph of the instruction is an accurate statement of law based on Tennessee's corporal punishment statute. Tenn. Code Ann. §XX-X-XXXX. The district court correctly added the words for discipline in response to the Nolans' objection. Further, it was not necessary to define the word severe. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion either by giving the instruction or by denying the Nolans' motion for new trial on this ground.