Opinion ID: 608132
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Improper Reliance on Dismissed Counts

Text: 7 In addition to describing the offenses to which McAninch had pleaded guilty, the presentence report contained information about the victims of the counts that were to be dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. At the sentencing hearing, the court characterized McAninch's conduct as over a year's worth of repeated bombardment, although the specific counts to which McAninch had pleaded referred only to acts committed between September 1990 and January 1991. (Sentencing Transcript (S.T.) at 41.) The judge permitted a victim of one of the dismissed counts, Luma Nichol, to address the court concerning the racist nature of McAninch's actions. As part of McAninch's sentence, Nichol was awarded $250.91 in restitution, representing the amount she had spent to cancel magazine subscriptions and undo other effects of the harassment against her. 8 McAninch contends that the district court's consideration of conduct that was the subject of dismissed counts entitles him to a remand. We review the district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, United States v. McInnis, 976 F.2d 1226, 1233 (9th Cir.1992), and the court's factual findings in connection with sentencing for clear error, United States v. Chapnick, 963 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir.1992). 9 This circuit recently addressed the issue whether dismissed counts can be taken into consideration by the sentencing judge. United States v. Fine, 975 F.2d 596 (9th Cir.1992) (en banc). In Fine, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of a multicount mail fraud scheme and challenged his sentence because it was based on losses that were part of the same scheme but alleged in dismissed counts. We held that the court could consider dismissed counts in establishing the loss caused by Fine's fraud because under the guidelines they were groupable with the count of conviction and therefore constituted relevant conduct pursuant to section 1B1.3(a)(2). Id. at 599-600; see also United States v. Von Mitchell, 984 F.2d 338, 339-40 (9th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (applying Fine). In Fine, however, we distinguished and reaffirmed our previous holding in United States v. Castro-Cervantes, 927 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.1990), that a court may not depart upward from the guidelines sentence on the basis of dismissed charges. Fine, 975 F.2d at 602; Von Mitchell, 984 F.2d at 339. 10 Offenses to which guideline 2F1.1 applies, which include the mail fraud charged in count three, are groupable offenses. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d) (1991); Fine, 975 F.2d at 599. The two threatening communications counts to which McAninch pleaded, and to which section 2A6.1 applied, however, are specifically excluded from the grouping provisions of the guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d) (1991). Under Fine, then, the district court was entitled to look at the entire fraud scheme, including the dismissed mail fraud counts, to establish the offense level for count three, but had to treat the threatening communications counts as independent offenses. 11 The injuries inflicted by McAninch were more psychic than financial. Under the logic of the Sentencing Guidelines, this meant that McAninch received the lowest possible base offense level rating for the mail fraud to which he pleaded guilty in count three, level 6. See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(A) (1991) (offenses resulting in losses of $2,000 or less). The court adopted the recommendation of the presentence report to increase the offense level by two pursuant to section 2F1.1(b)(2)(A) because the fraud involved more than minimal planning, resulting in an offense level of eight for count three. 3 12 There is nothing in the presentence report upon which the district judge relied that indicates that the calculation of the offense level for count three related to any of the dismissed charges. In recommending level eight (and considering but rejecting a vulnerable victim adjustment), the probation officer, in his report, mentioned only the victim of that count, the wife of the deceased man whose mail McAninch had fraudulently forwarded. Similarly, there is nothing in the record that shows that the court was relying on dismissed counts in adopting the level 12 as the base offense level for counts nine and ten. Twelve is the minimum under section 2A6.1. 13 McAninch's primary concern appears to be that the court considered the experiences of Nichol before imposing the sentence. 4 Count eight, the only count specifically concerning Nichol, charged McAninch with mail fraud in connection with a magazine he ordered in Nichol's name. Even if the court had looked to conduct directed against Nichol and other aspects of McAninch's overall fraudulent scheme in setting the offense level for count three, it would have been entitled to do so, because the fraud counts were groupable. 5