Opinion ID: 6290
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jose Puig

Text: 72 Jose Puig was sentenced to a total of 285 months' imprisonment. The district court set his base offense level at 34, the level specified in section 2D1.1(a)(3) for participation in an offense involving at least 3,000 kilograms but less than 10,000 kilograms of marihuana. Jose Puig appeals his sentence, contending that the district court erred by attributing to him the entire amount of marihuana trafficked by the conspiracy. He argues that because he was incarcerated for a substantial portion of the life of the conspiracy, he should be held accountable for less than the 4,086 kilograms attributed to him by the district court. Jose Puig also argues that the district court failed to make specific findings as to whether the conduct of his co-conspirators was reasonably foreseeable to him. 73 When the conspiracy was formed, in December of 1987, Jose Puig was incarcerated; when the conspiracy ended, in August of 1991, Puig was also incarcerated. He was released from custody on October 14, 1988, arrested again on June 15, 1990, and remained incarcerated throughout the remainder of the conspiracy. After his release in October of 1988, Jose and Abigail Puig married and Jose became an integral part of the operation of the conspiracy. Jose and Abigail Puig extended the distribution area of the conspiracy, importing marihuana from Mexico into Georgia and Florida. Jose Puig's direct and overt involvement in the conspiracy lasted until June 15, 1990, when he was arrested in Houston while making a delivery of 55 pounds of marihuana. At sentencing, the government conceded that this delivery was part of the instant conspiracy. 74 Jose Puig's PSR concluded that the entire amount of marihuana involved in the conspiracy--i.e., a minimum of 4,086 kilograms--was attributable to him. Jose Puig filed objections to the PSR, which included, inter alia, an objection to attributing to him any amount of marihuana involved in the conspiracy before he was released from prison. At the sentencing hearing, Jose Puig's counsel again asserted the objection that Puig could not reasonably foresee marihuana trafficked before he joined the conspiracy. In response, the district court stated that the greater portion of this conspiracy and conspiratorial conduct occurred after [Jose Puig] was released [from jail on October 14, 1988]. Later, the court stated: 75 based on the evidence as I've heard it, the majority of the marijuana, if that--if that is the way I need to address it. I'm not sure that there was significant testimony of loads of marijuana before 1988 that would concern me in sentencing him fair and equitably because the majority of the people who testified in this case as to specific loads that they hauled occurred in 1988 up through 1990 or there abouts.... 76 The plain meaning of majority and greater portion is a number greater than one half of a total. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1363 (1961). As the sentencing court found that the instant conspiracy involved approximately 4,000 kilograms of marihuana, it is impossible for this Court to determine whether the sentencing court found anything more than that the quantity of marihuana foreseeable to Jose Puig was a number greater than 2,000 kilograms. Because the Guideline range at which Jose Puig was sentenced is triggered by a relevant conduct determination of 3,000 kilograms, we must remand to allow the district court to clarify its finding of the amount of marihuana attributable to Jose Puig. 77 Clearly, any amount of marihuana which was trafficked before October of 1988 cannot be attributed to Jose Puig because  'relevant conduct' as defined in section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) is prospective only, and consequently cannot include conduct occurring before a defendant joins a conspiracy. Carreon, 11 F.3d at 1235-36. However, Jose Puig also contends that the marihuana trafficking activities of his co-conspirators which occurred after his June 15, 1990, arrest should not be attributed to him either. 78 If we interpret Jose Puig's contention to be that by virtue of his 1990 arrest and incarceration he terminated his involvement in the conspiracy, his argument fails. Ordinarily, a defendant is presumed to continue involvement in a conspiracy unless that defendant makes a  'substantial' affirmative showing of withdrawal, abandonment, or defeat of the conspiratorial purpose. United States v. Branch, 850 F.2d 1080, 1082 (5th Cir.1988) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018, 109 S.Ct. 816, 102 L.Ed.2d 806 (1989). Indeed, [a] member of a conspiracy continues to be responsible for acts committed by coconspirators even after the former's arrest unless he has withdrawn from the conspiracy. United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 209 (5th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021, 101 S.Ct. 3014, 69 L.Ed.2d 394 (1981). To withdraw from a conspiracy, a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that he has committed [a]ffirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy [that are] communicated in a manner reasonably calculated to reach conspirators. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 464, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2887, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978); Killian, 639 F.2d at 209. Because a defendant's incarceration is not an affirmative act on the part of a defendant, it cannot, by itself, constitute withdrawal or abandonment. See Branch, 850 F.2d at 1083; Killian, 639 F.2d at 209. 79 Although Jose Puig has failed to demonstrate that he withdrew from the instant conspiracy, his incarceration may still have had some effect on the foreseeability of the acts of his coconspirators occurring after his June 15, 1990, arrest. The reasonable foreseeability required of section 2D1.4 requires a finding separate from a finding that the defendant was part of the conspiracy. United States v. Puma, 937 F.2d 151, 160 (5th Cir.1991); see also U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3, comment. (n. 1) (Nov.1993) (the focus is on the specific acts and omissions for which the defendant is to be held accountable in determining the applicable guideline range, rather than on whether the defendant is criminally liable for an offense as a principal, accomplice, or conspirator). Hence, upon remand, the district court should consider specifically whether (and, if so, to what extent) Jose Puig's incarceration limited the foreseeability to him of any of the marihuana transactions that took place after his June 15, 1990, arrest. The court should consider this foreseeability in light of the nature of the conspiracy, the nature of Jose Puig's involvement in the organization prior to his arrest, and the relationship or nexus between the conspiracy's transactions occurring before his arrest of which he is charged with knowledge and those which took place after his arrest. The temporal proximity of the arrest to the termination of the conspiracy may also be important; the longer the time between incarceration and termination, the more attenuated the connection between the defendant and the conspiracy. 80 Thus the district court on remand will need to expressly find the relevant amount of marihuana involved in the conspiracy after October 1988 and the portion thereof reasonably foreseeable to Jose Puig taking into account his June 1990 arrest.