Opinion ID: 1944210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Defendant's Waiver of His Right to Refuse to Take the Breathalyzer Test

Text: At the May 9 suppression hearing, defendant argued against the admissibility of the Breathalyzer test results on the ground that his consent to the test was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary; in support of that argument, he alleged that the police had affirmatively misrepresented the true nature of the charge that he would be facingnamely driving while intoxicated, death resulting. Specifically, defense counsel pointed to the fact that, when defendant inquired as to the victim's condition, Trooper Martin informed him that Mr. Juarez was not doing very well whereas the victim was, in fact, known to be deceased. The defendant offered his own testimony to the effect that he would have asked for an attorney and refused the Breathalyzer test if he had known that Mr. Juarez was dead and that he would therefore be facing the more serious charge of driving while intoxicated, death resulting. This Court has held that an individual charged with driving while intoxicated must be informed of the following: (1) his or her Miranda rights; (2) his or her right to be examined by a physician of his choice; (3) his or her right to refuse to submit to a Breathalyzer examination; and (4) the consequences attendant on refusal to consent to the test. State ex rel. Town of Middletown v. Anthony, 713 A.2d 207, 212 (R.I.1998). We have also held that the taking of breath samples is a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Locke, 418 A.2d 843, 846-47 (R.I.1980) (citing State v. Bentley, 92 Wis.2d 860, 286 N.W.2d 153, 155 (Ct.App. 1979) and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966)). Pursuant to the principles set forth in Schmerber, however, a Breathalyzer test is considered a search incident to a lawful arrest and is, therefore, deemed reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Locke, 418 A.2d at 849. In Locke, this Court further noted that the consent of the defendant is irrelevant to a consideration of the constitutionality of a Breathalyzer test; but this Court in Locke further held that, pursuant to the statutory mandate set forth in G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2(b), [7] a valid consent must be obtained from a suspect before the test results may be used at trial. Locke, 418 A.2d at 849. In the case of In re Kean, 520 A.2d 1271 (R.I.1987), this Court recognized that the right to refuse to take a Breathalyzer test is a statutory, not a constitutional, right; but the Court nonetheless applied the same criteria to the waiver of that right as is used in analyzing the waiver of constitutional rightsnamely, whether the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. at 1274. We shall conduct our analysis accordingly in the instant case. At the suppression hearing, after considering the testimony of both Trooper Martin and defendant as well as the arguments of counsel, the trial justice stated as follows:    I'm absolutely convinced [defendant] was given the full panoply of the contents of [the standardized] rights form by the trooper, in oral fashion. I believe [Trooper Martin] fully when he says he handed [the form] to the defendant to read it. I believe the trooper when he said it appeared to him that the defendant was, in fact, at least in his opinion, reading it. His eyes were fixed upon the paper. I don't have any problem in satisfying myself that the man was provided the full panoply of rights   . The trial justice further found that the prosecution had adequately proven that defendant understood the nature of his rightsand, in particular, understood his right to decline the Breathalyzer test. The trial justice noted, in pertinent part, as follows: [The defendant] exhibited a calm demeanor at the station. He never asked Trooper Martin any questions about the rights form   .    He was permitted to make a phone call; elected to call his wife. And, throughout the evening, according to Martin, the defendant was understandable, his responses to Martin's questions were appropriate to the questions that were asked of the defendant. This defendant never objected to taking the Breathalyzer test; never requested the test be stopped. And, indeed, as made clear by the defendant on the stand just some minutes ago, he very much wanted to take that test because, in the defendant's words, he didn't think he was `that bad,' in other words he didn't think he was as drunk as the officer apparently thought he was after he had, in the officer's eyes, failed the sobriety test.    [T]he defendant thought he had passed that sobriety test; he was going to go to the station and was going to demonstrate to these officers that he was not drunk, and that he had a belief that taking a Breathalyzer test would, in fact, support him. As it turned out, a very mistaken belief. The defendant said during his testimony on the direct examination that he was `better off taking the test.' So, to me that evidence is a clear indication that he knew he had a choice. We are mindful of the fact that the trier of fact is in the best position to assess the relative credibility of witnesses. See State v. Humphrey, 715 A.2d 1265, 1273 (R.I.1998); see also State v. Woods, 936 A.2d 195, 198 (R.I.2007) (quoting National Labor Relations Board v. Erie Brush and Manufacturing Corp., 406 F.3d 795, 802 (7th Cir.2005) (The hearing officer was a front row observer for this testimony, giving her a far greater edge in making credibility determinations than we could ever hope to have in reviewing the black and white transcript.)). Having reviewed the testimony presented at the suppression hearing, we are unable to perceive any indication in the record that the above-summarized analysis by the trial justice was clearly erroneous. In addition, we agree with the trial justice's conclusion that the fact that the police did not affirmatively or explicitly inform defendant that Mr. Juarez had died as a result of the accident did not taint or abrogate the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver by defendant of his right to refuse the Breathalyzer test. [8] The trial justice dispensed with defendant's argument in that regard as follows: [The defendant] has got to knowhe had to be deaf, dumb, and blind, and stupid not to know that the man who was hit in this accident, lying prone, face down on the highway, bleeding to the point where your client considers giving him CPR, is not in very good shape. And the officersalthough they didn't tell him the man had expiredcertainly told him he wasn't `doing very well.' An understatement, yes, but one that the defendant could easily understand, having viewed the scene after having just hit this fellow with his vehicle. In further support of his ruling on this issue, the trial justice cited the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987). In that case, the Supreme Court stated, in pertinent part, as follows: [A] valid waiver [of a defendant's Miranda rights] does not require that an individual be informed of all information `useful' in making his decision or all information that `might ... affec[t] his decision to confess.'    `[W]e have never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights.' Id. at 576-577, 107 S.Ct. 851 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)). [9] We are of the definite and firm conviction that defendant was fully informed of his rights by the police and that he nonetheless knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily chose to submit to the Breathalyzer test. Consequently, the trial justice's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the results of that test was not clearly erroneous.