Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Absences Before and During the Guilt Phase (Oliver)

Text: Oliver claims the trial court violated his statutory and constitutional rights to be present at the proceedings, primarily by allowing the guilt verdict to be read on February 11, 1993, while he was hospitalized after being stabbed by another inmate. Oliver cites Penal Code sections 977, 1043, and 1148. He also invokes the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as parallel provisions of the state Constitution. [23] Under the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause, a criminal defendant does not have a right to be personally present at a particular proceeding unless his appearance is necessary to prevent `interference with [his] opportunity for effective cross-examination.' [Citations.] [¶] Similarly, under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, a criminal defendant does not have a right to be personally present at a particular proceeding unless he finds himself at a `stage ... that is critical to [the] outcome' and `his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.' [Citation.] [¶] Under section 15 of article I of the California Constitution, a criminal defendant does not have a right to be personally present `either in chambers or at bench discussions that occur outside of the jury's presence on questions of law or other matters as to which [his] presence does not bear a `reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.'' [Citations.] [¶] Lastly, under sections 977 and 1043 of the Penal Code, a criminal defendant does not have a right to be personally present where he does not have such a right under section 15 of article I of the California Constitution. ( People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 741-742, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) Oliver insists the trial court erred in having the verdict read in court while he was in the hospital recovering from injuries received in the jailhouse attack. Oliver suggests that the court lacked sufficient information to decide the issue, and that it should have either waited for his full recovery or received the verdict in his hospital room. In Oliver's view, the verdict is a nullity. The claim lacks merit under state law. Invoking section 1148, the trial court determined that the interest of justice required departure from the general rule that the verdict must be received in the presence of the defendant. ( Ibid. ) Under any applicable standard, the ruling was substantiated and sound. The court learned during jury deliberations that Oliver was in very critical condition with numerous stab wounds. When the jury later announced it had reached a verdict, the court knew that his condition was still dire and that he was in an intensive care unit. The length of Oliver's incapacitation could not be known at the time. Hence, a delay in announcing the verdict might have disrupted the proceedings or resulted in the loss of jurors. Nor can the court be faulted for not transferring the proceedings to Oliver's hospital room. That step might have been futile. Counsel described Oliver as comatose at the time. No state law violation occurred. We reach the same result as to Oliver's due process and related claims. Assuming without deciding that there is a constitutional right to presence at the reading of the guilt verdict, none of the cases cited by Oliver addresses whether such right is subject to an interest-of-justice exception analogous to the one applied here under section 1148. (See Rice v. Wood (9th Cir.1996) 77 F.3d 1138, 1140-1141, fn. 2 (en banc) [noting that existence and scope of constitutional right to presence when capital jury announces sentence is an open question].) Consistent with due process principles, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that any constitutional right to presence was not absolute, and that  in the interest of justice  the verdict could be read while Oliver was physically incapacitated and unable to attend court following a third party assault. (See, e.g., People v. Richards (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1988) 140 Misc.2d 567, 531 N.Y.S.2d 474 [holding that verdict taken in defendant's absence did not offend federal Constitution where he was hospitalized with gunshot wound and could not attend court for one month without serious medical consequences].) Specifically, as noted earlier, the trial court had ample reason to believe that Oliver's condition was serious, and that his prognosis was unclear. The court risked exacting a heavy toll on the jury if it had to wait for an uncertain or extended period to deliver its verdict while Oliver received medical treatment, emerged from his comatose state, recovered from his stab wounds, and returned to court. ( Id. at p. 573, 531 N.Y.S.2d at p. 478.) Oliver has not shown that the trial court violated any federal constitutional right in accepting the verdict in his absence under such extenuating circumstances. Oliver also asserts his right to be present was violated on other occasions. No prejudicial error occurred. (See People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, 741-742, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) (1) On October 30, 1990, an attorney, Joel Isaacson, was relieved of his appointment as advisory counsel following a conversation of which there is no record. As best we can discern, Oliver was present in court at all relevant times. (2) On August 22, 1991, another attorney, Ezekiel Perlo, was removed from Oliver's case outside of his presence. However, nothing significant occurred. Perlo was new to the case and had done little or no work on it. He advised the trial court, after making preliminary inquiries, that he wished to be relieved from Oliver's case due to a conflict of interest with another capital client and to scheduling problems. The court granted Perlo's request. The rest of that session consumed perhaps a minute or two, and concerned routine calendaring matters. Oliver's absence could not have been prejudicial, because Perlo was not effectively representing him. Also, on the next court date, August 23, 1991, Oliver was present and voiced no objection to not being represented by Perlo. Instead, Oliver announced that he wished to proceed in propria persona. (3) On May 7, 1992, three days after the court granted Oliver a mistrial and dismissed the original jury venire following the acquittals in the Rodney King case and the ensuing civil unrest in Los Angeles, Oliver was absent from a pretrial hearing involving Lewis's mistrial motion. At that time, counsel and the court discussed certain scheduling matters, and the prosecutor briefly mentioned the names of defense witnesses in conjunction with a discovery matter. However, the prosecutor accepted the comment of Charles Lloyd, counsel for Oliver, that Mr. Oliver is not present and his matter is not before the court. Hence, nothing significant occurred. Oliver's absence could not have harmed his case. (4) On September 24, 1992, neither Oliver nor, initially, his counsel was present during a pretrial discussion of scheduling, prospective juror questionnaires, jury selection procedures, and witness statements. However, Oliver's counsel arrived later in the discussion, and was informed about the matters he had missed. Any error in beginning the discussion outside counsel's presence was sufficiently cured when counsel arrived. Oliver's own absence could not have harmed his case. (5) On January 21, 1993, shortly before Oliver entered the courtroom, counsel and the court briefly discussed the question of stipulating to the excusals of a few prospective jurors and the views of one of them on the death penalty. Almost all of this discussion involved issues relating solely to Lewis. The trial court was aware of Oliver's absence and ensured that nothing of substance occurred until he was present. Accordingly, when Oliver arrived, the parties had taken no action on stipulating to excusals of prospective jurors (although Lewis's counsel commented on what he might do on behalf of Lewis), or engaged in any meaningful substantive discussion about the reasons for so stipulating. Everyone waited until Oliver was present before engaging in the stipulations. Oliver could have told counsel at that time if he objected to any of the stipulated excusals, and he did not do so. (6) On January 25, 1993, at the end of one trial day, the jury examined exhibits after Oliver  knowing that the jury would be doing so  sought to leave and was no longer present in the courtroom. Oliver knew what the jury was doing, and nonetheless chose to leave. He cannot claim error on appeal based on his own volitional actions at trial. (7) On February 25, 1993, Oliver and his attorney missed a hearing primarily concerning Lewis's mental competence to stand trial. At that time, the court anticipated scheduling problems at the penalty phase due to Oliver's incapacity. However, nothing was decided. Discussions on scheduling matters continued in the presence of Oliver and his counsel on March 8, 1993, before the penalty phase began.