Opinion ID: 1823190
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Washington correctly notes that if a complaint initiating an election contest is defective as to any of the jurisdictional requirements, it cannot be amended by adding the missing element after the time for commencing the contest has expired. Groom v. Taylor, 235 Ala. 247, 178 So. 33 (1937). Washington next argues that Hill's election complaint is jurisdictionally defective because as initially filed it does not state that Hill was a qualified elector of the Town of Greensboro; it does not give the date and time of the election she is contesting; and it does not state as part of her affidavit that the statements contained in her complaint were true. These arguments are without merit. Section 11-46-69(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides that a qualified elector has standing to contest a municipal election: The election of any person declared elected to any office of a city or town may be contested by any person who was at the time of the election a qualified elector of such city or town. . . . Furthermore, [s]uch contest shall be instituted in the manner prescribed by Section 17-15-29, which provides: [T]he party contesting must file in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of the county in which the election was held, a statement in writing, verified by affidavit, of the grounds of the contest as provided in this article and must give good and sufficient security for the costs of the contest, to be approved by the clerk. Each of these statutory requirements is fundamentally one of substance rather than form. Thus a contestant to a mayoral race must possess the status of a qualified elector but need not make a specific affirmative statement in the complaint that the contestant is a qualified elector. Some statement in writing of the grounds of the contest is required, but the Code does not specify the exact wording of that statement. An affidavit is required, but no specific form is required. Similarly, provided some form of security is given, this jurisdictional requirement is met, even if the form of the security is initially rejected by the clerk. Dobbins v. City of Anniston, 469 So.2d 583, 585 (Ala.1985). In fact, provided the substance of an element necessary for jurisdiction is present and any necessary filing is timely, any deficiency in form may be cured by amendment. See, e.g., Wilson v. Duncan, 114 Ala. 659, 21 So. 1017 (1897) (recognizing the form of a timely filed bond may be amended). Although Washington is correct in his assertion that Hill did not state in her initial complaint that she is a qualified elector of the Town of Greensboro, nothing in the record indicates that she is not a qualified elector, nor is she required specifically to so state. In fact, Washington acknowledges in his brief that Hill's complaint was verified, that Hill was duly sworn, and that Anne S. Bailey signed as a notary. Consequently, the fact that Hill stated she was a candidate for mayor of Greensboro, Alabama, in a duly signed and notarized statement is evidence that she possessed the status of a qualified elector to meet the jurisdictional requirement; otherwise, she could not have become a candidate. Washington nevertheless contends that mere status as a qualified elector is insufficient when challenging the outcome of a mayoral election under Ala.Code 1975, § 17-15-20, which requires that an elector make a statement in writing setting forth specifically . . . that he was a qualified voter when the election was held. However, Ala.Code 1975, § 11-46-69, which governs municipal elections, does not reference § 17-15-20 as a source of jurisdictional requirements for a contest of a municipal election. Absent such incorporation by reference, Washington must explain why strict construction of § 17-15-20 does not require limiting its application to those offices specified in its text: the office of senator, representative in the Legislature, judge of the circuit court or district court, any office which is filled by the vote of a single county or constable. Washington has failed to demonstrate why this Court need go beyond the text of § 17-15-20, which, on its face, does not apply to mayoral elections. We see no other reason it must apply, and we conclude that the trial court correctly rejected Washington's argument that Hill was not qualified to contest the election merely because she did not state in her initial complaint that she was a qualified elector of the Town of Greensboro when the election was held. Furthermore, the applicable statute does not require the statement in an election contest to, as Washington asserts, include specific reference to the date and time of the election being contested or specific wording in an affidavit averring that the statement is true. What the text of the statute requires is language that makes sufficiently clear which election is being challenged and some form of an affidavit by the contestant that communicates the grounds of the contest. As a result, we conclude that the trial court did not err by failing to require stricter adhesion to the form of the election-contest statement than is required by the text of the statute. Washington next argues that [f]rom the outset of this contest . . . [Hill] failed to file the necessary security required by the statute because she did not post a security bond that was approved by the clerk of the circuit court in a timely manner. In support of his argument, Washington cites Dobbins, supra; Bowen v. Holcombe, 204 Ala. 549, 550, 87 So. 87, 88 (1919); and Ala.Code 1975, § 11-46-69(b). These authorities, however, do not support Washington's argument. In Dobbins, although this Court observed that the election contest must be commenced within five days after the results of the election are declared, pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 11-46-69(b), and that such contest should include the filing of security pursuant to the statutory requirement in Ala.Code 1975, § 17-15-29, we cited Bowen for the proposition that as long as a contestant has complied `in form at least' with the statute, the contest should not be dismissed. 469 So.2d at 585. The law does not require that the initial security be acceptable to the clerk in order for the election contest to proceed; rather, it requires that the contestor make a good-faith effort by timely filing some form of security, and, if the initial security is deemed unacceptable by the clerk, the contestor will be permitted to amend or substitute the security: [W]here an attempt was made to comply with the statute requiring bond, the fact that the bond may be insufficient, inadequate, or defective will not authorize dismissal of the contest; rather, the court should allow an amendment, and in some instances even a substitution, to be filed to correct the error. Dobbins, 469 So.2d at 585. In the present case, Hill did attempt . . . to comply with the statute requiring bond when she originally filed her security. When the clerk denied her initial security, Hill amended it by adding a cosigner. Then, when the clerk indicated that a $2,500 cash bond was required, Hill provided the bond as a substitute for her original security. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in finding that Hill did timely post a security bond pursuant to the statute and that all jurisdictional requirements were met.