Opinion ID: 397187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: are the unions genuinely aggrieved?

Text: 31 This case is a particularly egregious example of filing solely to forum-shop. It taxes the imagination to find a basis for Local 1309's standing to file a petition for review of the Board's order. 8 Both Bayshore and the Board argue that Local 1309 has received all the relief it requested from the decision of the Board. Local 1309 does not really contest this. Instead, it claims that the failure of the Board to pass specifically on Local 1309's motion for summary judgment has aggrieved Local 1309 within § 10(f). This argument is so gossamer that it affords no cover for the union's attempt to place venue in this court for ulterior purposes. 32 Local 1309 reads Sections 102.24, 102.25, and 102.50 of the NLRB's Rules and Regulations to require the Board to issue a written decision with respect to any motion submitted to it. 9 In a burst of hyperbole Local 1309 concludes that (t)he entire concept of due process as it is expressed in our legal system is based upon the fact that a party making a motion has a right to have a ruling on that motion. If indeed the Board is required to rule on this motion, either by its own regulations or the entire concept of due process, then this appears to be the classic case of harmless error. 10 33 Local 1309 has failed to point out to this court any additional or different relief the Board or this court can award it, apart from this abstract obligation of the Board to answer all motions in writing. 11 Under these circumstances, the test set out in UAW has been satisfied. Local 1309's choice of forum is thus entitled to no weight. 34 A canvass of the factors which courts employ in discretionary transfer cases brought under § 2112(a) leads to the ineluctable conclusion that the Ninth Circuit is the appropriate forum to hear the case. Bayshore is the truly aggrieved party, and has properly filed there a petition for review of the Board's order. Both the company and the union local are located in San Diego, California, where the alleged unfair labor practices took place. 12 The law firms engaged by the parties to represent them are located in San Diego. Convenience of the parties, and more importantly, convenience of counsel are relevant factors in deciding whether to transfer. 13 The Board itself suggested that this case be transferred to the Ninth Circuit: It is done.
35 The petition filed by Local 2 in No. 80-1746 is marginally different from the above case because the petitioning party received all of the customary relief it requested from the Board, but did not receive the special or extraordinary relief it sought in addition. In the process of directing the employer to cancel working conditions which were unilaterally promulgated, restore the status quo ante, make whole the employees for loss of time and expenses incurred as a result of the working conditions, rescind any disciplinary action, bargain with Local 2 upon request, and post the appropriate notice, the Board did not specifically address and therefore denied Local 2's request for attorney's fees. Local 2 argues this was error, rendering it substantially aggrieved. 36 Each and every aspect of the Board's order is directed to the wholesalers. It is only the denial of attorney's fees which renders Local 2 a person aggrieved and permits it to file a petition for review. 14 Because this aggrievement relates to no part of the underlying dispute between employer and union other than fees and costs, it is insubstantial. 37 This court has held that the Board has the power, pursuant to § 10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976) 15 , to award to the charging party counsel fees and litigation costs as additional affirmative relief. Food Store Employees Union, Local 347 v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 546, 550-551 (D.C.Cir.1973), rev'd in part on other grounds, 417 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 2074, 40 L.Ed.2d 612 (1974). But the Board has determined that such an award is appropriate only upon a showing of clearly aggravated and pervasive misconduct or when the defenses are palpably without merit. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243, 1250 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950, 91 S.Ct. 239, 27 L.Ed.2d 256 (1970). 16 Although the union persistently prays for attorney's fees, such fees and litigation expenses are generally not considered by the Board as part and parcel of its usual compensatory remedy. Only in rare cases are attorney's fees granted by the Board, and rarer still the case where a court of appeals will reverse the Board's denial of attorney's fees. 17 The Board's choice of remedies in enforcing the Act is entitled to great deference from the courts. As this court recently stated, the imposition of remedies is a matter of special administrative competence, subject to very limited judicial review. United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 616, at 629 (D.C.Cir.1981). With these considerations in mind, we believe that a petition for review, filed solely to fight an uphill battle with respect to no part of the underlying dispute between employer and union other than litigation expenses, may be considered so inherently implausible or insubstantial that it should not be determinative of the forum for review. 18 38 We do not intend to suggest that a request for extraordinary relief denied by the Board will never render the charging party genuinely aggrieved. But it is for the Board in the first instance to determine if the facts justify such an award. Our review of that decision is very limited. 39 Prior opinions of this court wisely caution the court of first filing not to delve into the merits of the underlying dispute lest there be an appeal within an appeal. UAW, 373 F.2d at 364; International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, 610 F.2d at 962. We observe that stricture, but here it is manifest from the parties' moving papers that Local 2's protest of a routine denial of counsel fees and litigation expenses was at best ancillary to the dispute. In such circumstances, the court of first filing can subordinate the forum preferences of a party who has substantially prevailed before the Board and seeks review only of the Board's refusal to grant it additional ancillary relief. The court may then engage in an appropriate exercise of discretion under § 2112(a) to retain the case or to transfer the case to an appropriate circuit for the convenience of the parties in the interest of justice. 19 40 The Second Circuit is the convenient forum in which this case should be heard. Local 2 and the Companies are all located in New York, and both sides have enlisted counsel from New York City on their behalf. The unfair labor practice allegedly occurred in New York. 41 Local 2 argues without citation that case law forbids the court of first filing from considering the residence of the parties and the situs of the alleged unfair labor practice. These arguments are incorrect. Residence of the parties, although not a major factor, nevertheless has been considered by this court. E. g., Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965, 971 (D.C.Cir.1977). Indeed, the plain wording of § 2112(a) belies any notion of its irrelevance. It is not true that where the unfair labor practice occurred is immaterial. This court has noted only that the locus of the unfair labor practice should not be dispositive of a motion to transfer. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, 610 F.2d at 962.