Opinion ID: 2510862
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lost Wages Awards

Text: The jury awarded past wage loss for nearly three yearsfrom the date APC wrongfully terminated Reust in April 1998 to the beginning of the trial on January 2, 2001. The jury also found that the length of Dan Reust's future wage loss was seven years. The jury thus awarded Reust lost wages for a total of about ten years. APC argues that a wage-loss award for a ten-year period was excessive, speculative, and not supported by the record. Viewed, as it must be, in the light most favorable to Reust, [36] the trial evidence nonetheless does not support a conclusion that Reust would have worked for APC continuously for ten years. APC manager Mike Bailey testified that APC project managers typically work one to three years. There was evidence that employment tenure in the construction industry is uncertain; a witness, when asked how long he would have been in a certain job, testified that there was no telling with construction work. Moreover, Reust's own employment history, including previous stints with APC, undermines the likelihood of a ten-year tenure. Reust testified that he worked for APC on several different occasions and his resume indicates that APC employed him at Prudhoe Bay from 1992 to 1995 and at Milne Point from 1995 to 1996. Reust points to the testimony of Todd Pizzuto, another APC manager, who testified that Reust's position was not project-specific. This suggests that Reust could have been assigned to other projects once his initial assignment was finished. But Pizzuto also testified that that Reust's position could be terminated due to a reduction of force. [37] Reust's counsel suggested in closing argument that Reust would have worked for APC until retirement in 2014. This amounted to a request for about sixteen years of lost wages. But the jury's award of lost wages for ten years implicitly rejected that claim. We have stated that [t]he normal rule is that a wrongfully discharged employee is entitled to the total amount of the agreed upon salary for the unexpired term of his employment [contract] .... [38] For example, in Central Bering Sea Fishermen's Ass'n v. Anderson ( Anderson I ) we held that a wrongfully discharged employee's lost earnings should be measured by the amount and duration of the contract that [he or] she expected to have with [the employer], which in that case was one year. [39] In comparison, Reust had an at-will relationship of no specified term. We declined in Kinzel to rule on what the appropriate measure of damages for lost wages would be for the tortious discharge of a whistleblower because the issue was not fully briefed. [40] We now hold that when an at-will employee is wrongfully discharged, damages are appropriately measured by the likely duration of employment had the wrongful discharge not occurred. [41] The evidence in this case cannot support a finding of ten years as the likely duration of employment. The record reveals that Reust would have been employed for one to three years had APC's tortious conduct not intervened. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Reust, no reasonable jury could find that the likely duration of employment would have exceeded three years. Therefore, we vacate the jury's lost wages awards and remand for entry of a revised judgment awarding lost wages for a period of three years.
APC contends that the superior court abused its discretion by excluding evidence that Reust's position had been eliminated in a corporate reorganization. [42] APC manager Mike Bailey testified at trial on direct examination by APC that he had been advised the very morning he took the witness stand that the position has been eliminated. After Reust raised a hearsay objection, the superior court conducted a lengthy conference out of the jury's presence. Bailey proffered additional testimony during this session that he had been told by APC's president, in a telephone call that morning, that Reust's position had been eliminated. APC, asserting here that the superior court excluded the testimony as a sanction for failure to disclose and not because it was hearsay, argues that the superior court was first required to ascertain whether a continuance would have provided a reasonable alternative to exclusion. We do not need to address this argument because APC's starting premisethat the superior court excluded the disputed testimony to remedy a discovery violationis incomplete. The superior court ruled the testimony was inadmissible hearsay, stating: We're going to start with the proposition that that's hearsay, and I'm going to instruct the jury that that testimony is stricken. APC does not challenge this ruling on appeal, nor do we see any indication that such a challenge would have been successful. [43] As a result, we conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude Bailey's testimony that Reust's position had been eliminated. [44]
APC argues in a footnote in its reply brief that it learned for the first time at trial that Reust had provided reckless testimony in the Jantz lawsuit. APC suggests that this after-acquired evidence would have caused APC to terminate Reust for legitimate reasons and therefore that his damages arguably should be limited to the date of the trial. [45] APC has waived this argument by first presenting it in its reply brief. [46]