Opinion ID: 1766558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: State's Disclosure of Test Results

Text: In point six, Taylor argues that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Taylor's motions to exclude the test results based on the timing of the disclosure of this evidence prior to trial. He argues that the State had no valid reason to delay the testing for almost two years, which resulted in Taylor receiving this evidence shortly before trial.
When Taylor was arrested in December 2004, police recovered a pair of sunglasses from a bag in Taylor's possession. On September 15, 2005, Taylor requested notice of whether the State intended to use DNA evidence, the type of DNA testing that would be conducted, and whether the State had physical evidence submitted for analysis or examination. On May 25, 2006, Taylor filed a motion, requesting the return of his personal property, including the sunglasses. In August 2006, the State took possession of the sunglasses from the police, and three months later in November, the bag and sunglasses were brought to the crime lab for testing. The phenolphthalein test was performed in November 2006, and the DNA tests were performed from December 2006 to January 2007. The DNA report was completed in April 2007. Taylor received the report from the phenolphthalein test in March 2007 and the DNA report in April 2007. At this time, the trial was set to begin on May 30, 2007. In April 2007, Taylor filed a motion to exclude the evidence of the phenolphthalein and DNA testing based on the late disclosure, and alternatively, if the evidence was not excluded, Taylor requested a continuance. A hearing was held in May 2007 at which the State explained that they disclosed the reports as soon as they received them and did not withhold the evidence purposely. The trial court overruled the motion to exclude the DNA evidence and granted Taylor a continuance until February 2008 with the understanding that the request is being made reluctantly and only due to the facts and circumstances that gave rise to this motion.
The trial court has discretion to impose sanctions for discovery violations under Rule 25.03. State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 534 (Mo. banc 2003). A trial court's denial of a requested sanction is an abuse of discretion only where the admission of the evidence results in fundamental unfairness to the defendant. Id. Such fundamental unfairness exists if there is a reasonable likelihood that the failure to disclose the evidence affected the result of the trial. Id. Rule 25.03 governs discovery in a criminal proceeding and requires the State to disclose upon request any reports or statements of experts including results of scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons. The State had access to this evidence since Taylor's arrest in December 2004, but the tests were not performed until shortly before trial. However the State disclosed the results as soon as they were completed, and the record does not reveal bad faith on the part of the State. Taylor was also provided additional time for discovery and to prepare for trial on account of this disclosure. Most importantly, trials are truth-seeking procedures and exclusion of relevant evidence is not favored. The trial court's decision to admit the evidence and grant Taylor a continuance to determine how or if to respond to this evidence was not an abuse of discretion. Point six is denied.