Opinion ID: 1779156
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ex parte Communications Between Trial Judge and Jury

Text: ¶ 16. The Whites next allege that the trial judge granted Yellow Freight's motion for new trial based on his improper ex parte communications with the jury after the trial. After the return of the verdict and discharge of the jury, the trial judge went into the jury room to thank the jurors for their service, distribute their paychecks, and inquire as to the adequacy of the provision for the jurors' physical needs during their service. During this exchange, a juror asked the trial judge if it was permissible to speak with Parish now that the trial was over. The trial judge responded, yes. The following exchange then took place according to the trial judge: She said we don't think it was his fault, or words to that effect. And I said, because I was concerned, I saw that she was a juror that had voted for the verdict. I said, what do you mean? She said, well, we think he was already down. I asked the questions, how many of you think he was already down All twelve jurors raised their hand. Now, that was the extent of it. The trial judge then informed the parties in open court the substance of the exchange that took place and the context. As a result, the Whites objected that such ex parte communications were improper. ¶ 17. Miss. R. Evid. 606(b) generally prohibits the admission of evidence of juror deliberations and their thought processes during the deliberations. We have not found, however, Mississippi case law or rule specifically dealing with the issue of ex parte communications between a judge and jury members after the rendering of a verdict. The Whites ask the Court to follow Peterson v. Wilson, 141 F.3d 573, 578 (5th Cir.1998), which held that impeachment of a jury verdict on the basis of information obtained from a judge's discussion with jury members after the return of a verdict was an abuse of discretion per se. However, the Whites' reliance on Peterson is misplaced. ¶ 18. In Peterson, the trial judge sua sponte granted the defendant's motion for a new trial based upon information obtained from a post-verdict, ex parte meeting with the jury and not because of insufficiency of the evidence or because the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. Id. at 575. The trial court's order in Peterson stated: The court concludes, based on the jury's verdict and comments the jurors made to the court after returning the verdict [and outside the presence of the parties and their respective counsel], that the jury completely disregarded the Court's instructions. Instead, it appears that the jury considered improper factors in reaching its verdict. Accordingly, the Court deems it in the interest of justice to grant a new trial. Id. (emphasis & alteration in original). The Fifth Circuit concluded beyond cavil that the district court based its decision on information obtained from the jurors themselves and not on the evidence and arguments of the parties. Id. According to the Fifth Circuit, the jury had been presented with extensive evidence ... much of which was in direct conflict. Id. at 579. Most importantly, the Fifth Circuit noted that palpably absent from the record of the first trial ... is a `great weight of evidence' either way. Id. ¶ 19. The actions of the trial court in the present case are quite different from the ones in Peterson. In the present case, the trial judge met with the jurors to thank them for their service, distribute their paychecks, and inquire as to the hospitality of the court personnel. The purpose of such a meeting was not to inquire about the verdict as in Peterson, but to facilitate the administrative workings of the court. This was a regular practice of the trial judge since he assumed the bench. In addition, the juror who voluntarily stated that she believed that White was already down when hit by Parish's truck expressed herself without any prompting from the trial judge, unlike in Peterson where the trial judge improperly initiated the inquiry. Furthermore, unlike in Peterson, this trial judge's post-trial order granting a new trial does not mention the post-discharge communication with the jury, but instead describes the lack of evidence supporting the verdict. In the present case, Yellow Freight attacked the evidence of causation as insufficient throughout the case, in its motion for summary judgment and its motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict. Clearly this was an issue long before any post-trial communication between the judge and jury. Finally, the present trial judge, unlike in Peterson, stated on record I will base my ruling [on the post-verdict motions] on the evidence and the evidence alone. Based upon these differences, the reasoning of Peterson is not controlling in this case. ¶ 20. In addition to Peterson, the Whites rely on Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-155 (Rev.2004), which says [t]he judge in any civil cause shall not sum up or comment on the testimony, or charge the jury as to the weight of the evidence. However, this statute governs the actions of a trial judge during the course of a trial and the submission of issues to the jury, not post-trial events. Accordingly, that statute is not applicable here. ¶ 21. The evidence is clear that the trial judge did not base his decision to grant Yellow Freight's motion for new trial on his post-trial ex parte communications with the jury. However, such communications should be undertaken with extreme caution, and be very limited in nature. Should an innocuous question or answer by a judge unexpectedly lead to such a critical statement, then the better course of action would be to cease the ex parte conversation until counsel are present. Where, as here, even arguably harmless comments are made, they could lead to additional comments that later cause legitimate concern when a JNOV or new trial is granted. The Whites' second assertion of reversible error is without merit.