Opinion ID: 1161575
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cipollone, The Preemption Provisions of The 1965 And 1969 Cigarette Acts, And The Lessons To Be Drawn for FIFRA

Text: In Cipollone, supra, 505 U.S. 504, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407, the plaintiff, a woman who ultimately died of lung cancer after years of smoking, sued cigarette manufacturers under state common law for failure to warn consumers of the dangers of smoking. The manufacturers argued state law failure-to-warn actions were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 (Pub.L. 89-92 (July 27, 1965), 79 Stat. 282, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. (the 1965 Cigarette Act)) and its successor, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (Pub.L. 91-222 (April 1, 1970), 84 Stat. 87, amending 15 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. (the 1969 Cigarette Act)). The Supreme Court held the 1965 Cigarette Act did not bar common law claims, but the 1969 Act does. ( Cipollone, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 524-525, 530-531, 112 S.Ct. 2608.) [2] The preemptive scope of the two acts, the high court held, was governed entirely by the express language in § 5 of each Act. ( Cipollone, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 517, 112 S.Ct. 2608.) Section 5 of the 1965 Cigarette Act provided in part: (a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section 4 of this Act, shall be required on any cigarette package. [¶] (b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act. (Pub.L. 89-92 (July 27, 1965), § 5, 79 Stat. 282.) By contrast, section 5 of the 1969 Cigarette Act provides: (b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act. (Pub.L. 91-222 (April 1, 1970), § 5, 84 Stat. 87.) As the high court observed, in the preemption provision of the 1965 Cigarette Act, Congress spoke precisely and narrowly, merely prohibiting state and federal rulemaking bodies from mandating particular cautionary statements on cigarette labels or in cigarette advertisements. ( Cipollone, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 518, 112 S.Ct. 2608.) Compared to its predecessor in the 1965 Cigarette Act, the plain language of the pre-emption provision of the 1969 Cigarette Act, the high court held, is much broader, barring not simply `statement[s]' but rather `requirement[s] or prohibition[s] ... imposed under State law.' ( Cipollone, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 520, 112 S.Ct. 2608.) The phrase `[n]o requirement or prohibition' sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and common law; to the contrary, those words easily encompass obligations that take the form of common-law rules. As we noted in another context, `[state] regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy.'  (Id, at p. 521, 112 S.Ct. 2608, quoting San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon (1959) 359 U.S. 236, 247, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775.) Like the preemption provision of the 1969 Cigarette Act, section 136v(b) of FIRA provides that a state shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter. (Italics added.) There is no notable difference between the language in the 1969 Cigarette Act and the language in FIFRA. ( Taylor AG Industries v. Pure-Gro, supra, 54 F.3d at p. 559.) For this reason, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted, seven circuits have held that § 136v(b) preempts failure to warn claims based on inadequate labeling. See Bice v. Leslie's Poolmart, Inc., 39 F.3d 887, 888 (8th Cir.1994); Mac-Donald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021, 1024-25 (5th Cir.1994); Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744, 747 (4th Cir.1993) ...; King, 996 F.2d at 1349; Shaw, 994 F.2d at 371; Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 518 (11th Cir.) ...; Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir.).... (54 F.3d at p. 560.) We believe ... the prohibition of `any' requirement is the functional equivalent of `no' requirement. We see no difference between the operative effect of the two acts. ( Arkansas-Platte & Gulf v. Van Waters & Rogers, supra, 981 F.2d at p. 1179 [10th Cir.1993].) The FIFRA language prohibiting the states from `impos[ing] or continuing] in effect any requirements,' 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b), is virtually indistinguishable from the state-imposed `requirement' language that Cipollone held preempted the state common law tort claims based on inadequate warning. FIFRA's language, too, preempts the state law lack-of-warning claims involved in this case. ( King v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co., supra, 996 F.2d at p. 1349 [1st Cir.1993].) In order to succeed in the wake of Cipollone, then, Shaw would have to show that FIFRA's pre-emption language is less sweeping than the language of the 1969 Cigarette Act. Yet we can discern no significant distinction at allFIFRA says that `[s]uch State shall not impose ... any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required...,' while the cigarette law says `[n]o requirement[s] or prohibition[s] ... imposed under State law' shall be permitted. Both seem equally emphatic: `[n]o requirements or prohibitions' is just another way of saying a `[s]tate shall not impose ... any requirements.' Not even the most dedicated hair splitter could distinguish these statements. If common law actions cannot survive under the 1969 cigarette law, then common law actions for labeling and packaging defects cannot survive under FIFRA. ( Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., supra, 994 F.2d at p. 371 [7th Cir.1993].) The Court of Appeal acknowledged the weight of authority, but found the analysis flawed. A striking omission in the post Cipollone FIFRA preemption case law is the lack of any comparison of the FIFRA preemption provision and the preemption provision in the 1965 Act. We disagree. Cipollone emphasized that the pre-emptive scope of the 1965 Act and the 1969 Act is governed entirely by the express language in § 5 of each Act. (505 U.S. at p. 517, 112 S.Ct. 2608.) The circuit courts analyzed the FIFRA preemption provision in light of Cipollone. Indeed, two of them were expressly remanded in light of Cipollone. ( Papas v. Upjohn Co., supra, 985 F.2d 516; Arkansas-Platte & Gulf v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., supra, 981 F.2d 1177.) In holding that FIFRA was functionally equivalent to the 1969 Cigarette Act, insofar as their preemption provisions were concerned, they impliedly found that it was distinguishable from the 1965 Cigarette Act. In an attempt to show that section 136v(b) of FIFRA is more grammatically akin to the 1965 Cigarette Act preemption provision, the Court of Appeal substitute[d] the core of the 1965 and 1969 Cigarette Acts' preemption provisions into the format of section 136v(b), thereby literally rewriting the text of section 136v(b). Furthermore, the substitution of `requirements' for `required' to demonstrate that the 1965 Cigarette Act provision is a cognate of section 136v(b) is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's own comparison of the 1965 and 1969 provisions. As we have noted above, the Supreme Court explained that the 1965 Cigarette Act bars ... simply `statements' whereas the 1969 Cigarette Act's provision is much broader and bars  `requirements] ... imposed under State law.' (Cipollone, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 520, 112 S.Ct. 2608, italics added.) Thus, the Supreme Court drew the very distinction between the 1965 and 1969 Cigarette Acts that the Court of Appeal seeks to explain away in its effort to prove that all of the other courts are guilty of a striking omission.