Opinion ID: 1401004
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre-Trial Preparation Deficiencies

Text: First, counsel hired Dr. Reynolds only three weeks prior to trial and met with him only two days before he testified, despite the fact that counsel was assigned to this case two years in advance of trial. Under the American Bar Association Guidelines, preparation for the sentencing phase, in the form of investigation, should begin immediately upon counsel's entry into the case. ABA Guidelines 11.8.3 (1989). The reason for the ABA's direction is obvious  there must be sufficient time for interviews, research, and adequate testing before strategic planning can even begin. Additionally, if counsel waits until immediately before trial, it is too late to correct any invalid tests or to pursue leads discovered during the testing process, a requirement for counsel to be effective. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 392, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (effective counsel would have conducted further investigation after discovering red flags in initial investigation). The rush to prepare will invariably lead to unnoticed and untapped resources. Mr. Wilson's case exemplifies the problems with delaying the investigation. Dr. Reynolds did not have time to conduct additional testing to confirm a diagnosis of schizophrenia, nor could the defense team gather collateral evidence that might provide insight into Mr. Wilson's psychology. In his affidavit, Dr. Reynolds states flatly that I needed additional testing, and further collateral data to support [a schizophrenia] diagnosis but [u]nfortunately, there wasn't enough time. Pet. Addendum 2, at ¶ 4. He further stated that, with the additional family information provided by appellate counsel after conviction and the additional testing he could then perform, he was able to reach a more accurate diagnosis, id. at ¶ 7, and that this would have improved his testimony enormously and helped the jury better understand Micheal's [sic] emotional illness and how he could have participated in the crime. Id. at ¶ 15. He stated his opinion that among the most important and significant data to tell the jury was Mr. Wilson's diagnosis of paranoid personality disorder, or schizophrenia. Id. at ¶ 14; see also id. at ¶ 8 (Mr. Wilson meets the criterion for a diagnosis of schizophrenia, paranoid type....). Time constraints due to counsel's tardy preparation precluded this more accurate and helpful diagnosis and testimony. Id. at ¶ 4. In Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir.2007), we concluded that trial counsel in a capital case was constitutionally ineffective, partly on the ground that the investigator assigned to investigate the case in mitigation did not begin his work until the month before trial. Id. at 1143. Citing the 2003 version of the ABA Guidelines 10.7 Commentary, the Court regarded this delay as indicative of ineffectiveness, even without specific evidence regarding the consequences of delay. Id. (The mitigation investigation should begin as quickly as possible, because it may affect the investigation of first phase defenses..., decisions about the need for expert evaluations ..., motion practice, and plea negotiations.). We regard the timeliness of engagement of expert evaluators as no less important. The Ninth Circuit reversed a denial of habeas corpus on grounds of ineffective assistance in a case with similar facts. In Bloom v. Calderon, 132 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir.1997), defense counsel contacted a psychiatric expert twenty days before trial  a period almost identical to the three weeks in this case. Because counsel did not acquire the services of this key witness until days before trial, a hurried and inaccurate report resulted. Id. at 1277. The court roundly rejected the claim that delay of this sort could be regarded as strategic, commenting that this would `strip[ ] that term of all substance.' Id. (quoting Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir.1994)). The court concluded: The complete lack of effort by Bloom's trial counsel to obtain a psychiatric expert until days before trial, combined with counsel's failure to adequately prepare his expert and then present him as a trial witness, was constitutionally deficient performance. Id. Below, we explain why this case, like Bloom, involved inadequate preparation and presentation of the expert witness, as well as delay in engagement. We are, therefore, driven to the same conclusion. Judge Tymkovich argues, in dissent, that the decision not to readminister the MMPI-2 test or collect collateral data was attributable not to the lack of time, but to Dr. Reynolds' failure to recommend further testing to counsel: Wilson's counsel appropriately relied on Dr. Reynolds to decide how many rounds of mental health testing should be conducted. The record does not reveal that Dr. Reynolds ever advised counsel further testing beyond the initial round was necessary or advisable. Diss. Op. 1133-34; see also id. at 1144 (counsel did not consider additional tests and interviews necessary). We do not read the record that way. According to his affidavit, Dr. Reynolds administered the MMPI-2 test during the first battery of testing, but (for an unexplained reason) the results were invalid. [B]ecause his first MMPI-2 was invalid, Dr. Reynolds explains, I needed additional testing, and further collateral data to support this diagnosis. Unfortunately, there wasn't enough time to obtain this information before trial. Pet. Addendum 2, at ¶ 4. The failure to retest had nothing to do with whether Dr. Reynolds advised counsel further testing beyond the initial round was necessary or advisable. Dr. Reynolds did not need authorization from counsel to redo the invalid test. According to his affidavit, his inability to administer the MMPI-2 a second time was due to the lack of time. That was counsel's fault for not engaging Dr. Reynolds until just before trial. The dissent also suggests that no negative consequences flowed from the late hiring because [i]f counsel had considered further investigation necessary, he could have sought a continuance or conducted what further investigation was possible in the time remaining. Diss. Op. 1144 (emphasis omitted). Perhaps so, but that does not make his performance any less ineffective. It might well be regarded as exacerbating counsel's ineffective performance that he did not take any steps to repair the damage of his late start even when the consequences became apparent. Dr. Reynolds, in his affidavit, stated as follows: Evaluations were performed on 1-22-97, 1-29-97, and 2-06-97. Results were made available to defense counsel shortly after February 7th, 1997. Pet. Addendum 2, at ¶ 13. The MMPI-2 test provided some evidence for a diagnosis of schizophrenia, id. at ¶ 4, but was invalid and had to be administered again. If counsel did not grasp the importance of obtaining an accurate diagnosis and deliberately chose to do nothing, as the dissent seems to suggest, this is but confirmation of his lack of understanding of the role of mental health evidence in the mitigation phase of a capital trial. In any event, it is far from clear that if counsel had requested a continuance, the judge would have granted the motion. The trial court might well have been reluctant to keep the jury sitting additional days so late into an already lengthy trial on account of a problem caused by counsel's own dilatoriness.
We are also disturbed by counsel's exiguous investigation. The ABA requires counsel to consider [w]itnesses familiar with and evidence relating to the client's life and development, from birth to the time of sentencing.... ABA Guidelines 11.8.3 (1989). This specifically includes [w]itnesses drawn from the victim's family or intimates who are willing to speak against killing the client. Id. Yet counsel neglected to interview a single family member  despite the fact that his mother, sister, brother, and girlfriend all were readily available and willing to talk. As we concluded on similar facts in Anderson v. Sirmons , Trial counsel did not undertake a strategic decision in this case to omit the mitigation evidence identified above [including family background]; counsel simply did not investigate and therefore did not know such evidence was available. 476 F.3d at 1145. As described in affidavits, interviews with family members would have produced potentially valuable evidence of Mr. Wilson's delusions, hallucinations, nightmares, and inability to maintain contact with reality. They also would have provided evidence supporting the schizophrenia diagnosis. Testimony about these problems, both from Dr. Reynolds and the family, would have changed the substance and tone of the sentencing hearing and would have given meaning and color to any testimony about a personality disturbance, tr. trans. 2/19/97, at 57, providing the jury with details highlighting the depth of Mr. Wilson's problems. In his affidavit, Dr. Reynolds testified to the importance of this information. He explained that the family's statements, along with additional testing, helped me reach a more accurate diagnosis since this information was not previously provided during my first evaluation. Pet. Addendum 2, at ¶ 7. He stated that his testimony could have been improved upon enormously had I been provided with the additional information provided to me by the Appellate Defense Council [sic]. Id. at ¶ 15. All of this information was easily within counsel's reach, and yet he never contacted the family. The investigation counsel performed here was far more deficient than that conducted in Rompilla, where counsel at least interviewed five family members, 545 U.S. at 381-82, 125 S.Ct. 2456, and where he had some reason to believe additional investigation would not be fruitful. To be sure, although counsel did not interview Mr. Wilson's mother, Patricia Taylor, he did make her available to Dr. Reynolds, who interviewed her for approximately one hour. But he neither interviewed the other immediate family members nor made them available. Counsel cannot know whether other family members are able to contribute important information without talking to them. This is an example, then, of trial counsel who did not trouble even to talk to a large portion of the reasonably available witnesses. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 546-47, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Interviewing the family members is hardly an onerous requirement, rather, it is the starting point for most investigation. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381-82, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (counsel at least interviewed family and defendant). It is true that at times, some investigation will produce no new information. But while we do not require counsel to interview every single extended family member, see, e.g., Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 389, 125 S.Ct. 2456 ([q]uestioning a few more family members ... can promise less than looking for a needle in a haystack when a lawyer truly has reason to doubt there is any needle there  (emphasis added)), it is incomprehensible that counsel can be effective in a case where life is at stake without interviewing any family members  particularly those in the immediate family. Nor were the witnesses counsel did interview and present adequate substitutes for the family members. The two teachers had not seen Mr. Wilson in five to six years. There is no evidence that the family friends from church knew Mr. Wilson particularly well; their testimony at sentencing certainly does not suggest a close relationship. See tr. trans. 2/19/97, at 13, 19, 22 (describing Mr. Wilson as mannerable, respectful, and intelligent.). None of them were in a position to observe the kind of strange behavior, nightmares, and delusions noted by the family members in their affidavits, much of which took place during the night or at odd times when outsiders would not be present. And in general, there is no substitute for the information counsel can glean from the family when researching the defendant's background, as they are almost always the only people who can provide a complete narrative of the defendant's life. Under our precedents, this was ineffective performance. Anderson, 476 F.3d at 1145; Hooper v. Mullin, 314 F.3d 1162, 1170-71 (10th Cir.2002). As with the delay in engaging a mental health expert, other courts of appeals have found ineffective assistance on the basis of a similar failure to interview family members. See, e.g., Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916, 931-35 (6th Cir.2007); Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 712 (6th Cir.2007). Judge Tymkovich, in dissent, argues that counsel fulfilled his obligation by engaging Dr. Reynolds and providing him with access to Wilson's mother, other witnesses, and Wilson's records. Diss. Op. 1136. If Dr. Reynolds thought further interviews would be helpful, he could have suggested them to counsel, but we have no information that Dr. Reynolds did so. Id. We cannot agree. The information here  interviews with close family members  is so basic that counsel should not have to be told by an expert that they are necessary. ABA Guideline 11.8.3 (1989) specifically instructs defense counsel to investigate [w]itnesses drawn from the victim's family or intimates who are willing to speak against killing the client. Id. ; see also Anderson, 476 F.3d at 1143-44 (reversing denial of habeas where counsel did not investigate family history). Such witnesses are commonly valuable for reasons entirely aside from assistance to mental health experts. And Rompilla holds that the failure to investigate readily available sources can be ineffective assistance even if the fruits of that investigation would be something other than what counsel could reasonably have expected to find. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 390, 125 S.Ct. 2456. We would be remiss to hold that the lack of evidence, in the record, that Dr. Reynolds specifically asked defense counsel to interview family members excuses counsel's failure to do so. Of course it is true that reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 383, 125 S.Ct. 2456. But there is a certain threshold of investigation counsel must conduct prior to making that strategic decision  in other words, counsel must be reasonably diligent to be able to decide where to draw [the] line. Id. ; see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (the defendant was deprived of competent representation when his counsel abandoned their investigation of [his] background after having acquired only rudimentary knowledge of his history from a narrow set of sources.). Without conducting a reasonable investigation, counsel's choice of strategy will be arbitrary, as the strength of each potential strategic choice is contingent on the outcome of the initial investigation. Hooper, 314 F.3d at 1170-71; Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 597 (5th Cir.1990). Wiggins makes clear that to be reasonably diligent, counsel must `conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background' for  all reasonably available mitigating evidence. Id. at 522, 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, and ABA Guideline 11.4. 1) (first emphasis added). Mr. Wilson's immediate family and his girlfriend were readily available and all swore that they would have testified at trial. We recognize that in many situations, the expert will know better than counsel what evidence is pertinent to mental health diagnoses and will be more equipped to determine what avenues of investigation are likely to result in fruitful information. To a degree, counsel should be able to rely on that expert to determine what evidence is necessary to an effective evaluation, and what additional evidence the expert needs to complete testing. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1038-39 (9th Cir.1995). However, counsel may not simply hire an expert and then abandon all further responsibility. As another court has stated: an attorney ha[s] a responsibility to investigate and bring to the attention of mental health experts who are examining his client, facts that the experts do not request. Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir.1999) (Kozinski, J.). As in any managerial role, counsel must at a minimum continue to exercise supervisory authority over the expert, ensuring that the expert examines those sources of information that the ABA has indicated are necessary for adequate preparation for the sentencing phase. Only once either the expert or counsel has consulted all readily available sources can counsel's reliance on the expert's opinion be reasonable. Finally, we note that the State does not defend counsel's pre-trial investigation on the ground that the expert did not ask counsel to provide the family interviews. Generally speaking, we do not rely on a ground not put forward by the party. See Webber v. Scott, 390 F.3d 1169, 1179 n. 6 (10th Cir.2004); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n. 7 (10th Cir.1994); but see Richie v. Mullin, 417 F.3d at 1128 n. 3 (Hartz, J., concurring). If the government had argued that Dr. Reynolds' affidavit was insufficient because it failed to provide the expert's recommendations to counsel regarding necessary background information, Petitioner might well have been able to cure the deficiency with a supplemental affidavit reciting what Dr. Reynolds recommended to counsel. Because the State did not, and to this day still has not, contended that Dr. Reynolds' affidavit was insufficient on account of its failure to report his recommendations to counsel, we cannot affirm on that ground. It would be unfair to allow the government to sit back and decline to object to the sufficiency of the proffered affidavits, and then to penalize the defendant when it is too late for him to supplement any alleged gaps. If, on remand, this issue proves material, the district court may wish to obtain additional testimony, or hold an evidentiary hearing, to resolve it.
In dissent, Judge Tymkovich argues that it is impossible to determine that counsel knew or should have known further investigation was necessary, or that counsel's late hiring of the expert prejudiced the investigation, because we lack an affidavit from counsel that sheds any light on these issues. Diss. Op. 1132. According to the dissent [t]he absence of any admissions in counsel's affidavit to errors at trial stands in stark contrast to other death-penalty appeals in which counsel confesses his performance was deficient. Id. at 1132 n. 7. There is no support for the proposition that the absence of an affidavit from trial counsel is fatal to a habeas petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance. See Barkell v. Crouse, 468 F.3d 684 (10th Cir. 2006) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing without an affidavit from counsel); Sallahdin v. Gibson, 275 F.3d 1211, 1240 & n. 11 (10th Cir.2002) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing so that counsel could testify as to his reasons, or lack thereof, for not presenting the expert, as the affidavit submitted was extremely vague.). There is often a conflict of interest between client and counsel on this question. If trial counsel confesses to deficient performance, he may face court sanctions such as fees or removal from the court appointed attorney list. Even if counsel does not receive some court-induced punishment, his reputation will certainly be impugned, which may in turn affect his practice. A requirement that the defendant receive a full confession of deficiency, in writing, from trial counsel puts the defendant at the mercy of his lawyer. If more information from trial counsel is necessary to resolve particular issues, which the State here does not contend, the court may subpoena him at the evidentiary hearing. In any event, an affidavit from trial counsel is unnecessary here. While the record lacks a statement from Wilson's counsel that he did not have enough time to obtain a further diagnosis, diss. op. 1132, Dr. Reynolds' affidavit provides us with that information. Moreover, the undiscovered witnesses in this case were Mr. Wilson's immediate family members  the most obvious of resources. We do not need an affidavit from trial counsel informing us that he was aware he had incomplete information, as even the most inexperienced trial counsel knows that an investigation cannot be complete without talking to the immediate family.