Opinion ID: 1959704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Morse v. Laverdiere's Super Drug Store

Text: Marguerite Morse injured her knee while walking on a public street or sidewalk, on an errand for her employer to make a delivery to a bank. Morse filed a petition for award in 1992, which the Board denied in 1993. The Board found that the injury occurred in the course of the employment because it occurred while she was performing a task off the employer's premises at the direction of the employer. Noting that Morse gave conflicting accounts of the incident and failed to prove the specific cause of the injury, the hearing officer concluded that the injury did not arise out of her employment. Morse did not file a motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law. In Comeau v. Maine Coastal Servs., 449 A.2d 362, 367 (Me.1982), we articulated some factors that aid in the analysis of whether an injury aris[es] out of and in the course of employment. [2] The purpose of the Comeau analysis is to separate those losses which can properly be said to be a consequence of industrial activity from those losses which are a consequence of life in general. Comeau, 449 A.2d at 366. Morse contends that the hearing officer did not apply the Comeau standard but rather improperly relied on the so-called increased risk rule, which requires the employee to show that the injury was caused by a work-related risk that exceeds that which the employee would encounter in normal, non-employment life. See 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 6.30 (1994). Morse contends that, to the extent that we have recognized such a rule, it has been limited to cases in which the employee suffers from a pre-existing condition and therefore bears with him some `personal' element of risk. Bryant v. Masters Machine Co., 444 A.2d 329, 337 (Me.1982). Since the hearing officer in this case expressly found that Morse suffered from no pre-existing condition that contributed to her incapacity, Morse contends that the Bryant rule does not apply. We are unpersuaded by Morse's contentions. Because Morse did not file a motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will treat the hearing officer `as having made whatever factual determinations could, in accordance with correct legal concepts, support his ultimate decision, and we inquire whether on the evidence such factual determinations must be held clearly erroneous.' Gallant v. Boise Cascade Paper Group, 427 A.2d 976, 977 (Me.1981) (quoting Gorrie v. Elliott Jordan & Son, 408 A.2d 1008, 1011 (Me.1979)). While the decision of the Board contains some language that is similar to the language used in Bryant, read as a whole it is consistent with Comeau. The arising out of standard requires that `there must be some causal connection between the conditions under which the employee worked and the injury which arose, or that the injury, in some proximate way, had its origin, its source, its cause in the employment.' Comeau, 449 A.2d at 365 (quoting Barrett v. Herbert Eng'g, Inc., 371 A.2d 633, 636 (Me. 1977)). The hearing officer in this case concluded that, because Morse could not explain the cause of her injury, she failed to meet her burden to show that a causal connection existed between her injury and her work activity (walking). Given the deference required by Comeau and the failure of the employee to request findings of fact and conclusions of law, we cannot conclude that the opposite decision was compelled by the evidence in the record.