Opinion ID: 561243
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Aircraft Piracy.

Text: 11 Count one of the indictment charged appellant with having committed an act of aircraft piracy. The Air Piracy Statute provides that: 12 the term aircraft piracy means any seizure or exercise of control, by force or violence or threat of force or violence, or by any other form of intimidation, and with wrongful intent, of an aircraft within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. 13 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1472(i)(2). The elements of the offense are, therefore, (1) a seizure of, or exercise of control over, an aircraft, (2) by means of force, violence, or intimidation, (3) with wrongful intent, (4) when the aircraft is within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. Accord United States v. Dixon, 592 F.2d 329, 339-40 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 951, 99 S.Ct. 2179, 60 L.Ed.2d 1056 (1979). Appellant contends that the government failed to prove these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. He is wrong. 4 14 According to the trial testimony, Mena approached the cockpit in mid-flight, dressed in militaristic garb and carrying what he proclaimed was a sensitive explosive device. He threatened to blow up the aircraft unless he was flown to Cuba. He was flicking his lighter in a way that indicated a willingness to ignite the fuse. Even after receiving false assurances from the pilot, Mena did not simply repair to his seat; he sat down sideways, assuming a position from which he could watch both the pilots (fore) and the passengers (aft). At all times, he kept the menacing device prominently in view. Moreover, Mena's actions were not completely unproductive. The crew did not overtly challenge his hegemony. There was also significant disruption of the flight's normal routine: other aircraft were vectored out of the way, an unwonted landing priority materialized, and the ordinary taxi run was prolonged. Although the passengers and crew were able to deplane shortly after arrival, the pilot's departure was delayed. Mena himself appropriated the aircraft's flare gun and remained aboard for several hours, in sole physical control of the aircraft, continually demanding to be taken to Cuba. 15 Notwithstanding this mountain of evidence, defense counsel has made the best of a difficult climb. First, citing the pilots' coolness under pressure (e.g., alerting the control tower that a hijack was in progress, persuading Mena of the need to land in San Juan, undertaking aeronautical sabotage), she argues that the crew never relinquished control of the aircraft. In a closely related vein, she asseverates that Mena's conduct aboard Flight 329 necessarily fell short of what was required to prove a completed or consummated act of air piracy. Counsel claims that, at most, the evidence established merely an attempt (a crime not charged in the indictment at all). Yet, the foundation of these contentions--counsel's assertion that, in this case, the Air Piracy Statute only criminalizes conduct which occurred while the aircraft was aloft--is set in quicksand. 16 1. Special Aircraft Jurisdiction. To convict a defendant of aircraft piracy, the government must prove that the first three elements of the offense, see supra p. 23, were committed within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1472(i)(2). The special aircraft jurisdiction attaches 17 while th[e] aircraft is in flight, which is from the moment when all external doors are closed following embarkation until the moment when one such door is opened for disembarkation or in the case of a forced landing, until the competent authorities take over responsibility for the aircraft and for the persons and property aboard. 18 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1301(38). Appellant's claim that his guilt must be judged solely on the basis of his conduct up until disembarkation began depends, therefore, on the assumption that, because the airplane landed when and where it was scheduled to land, no forced landing was involved. The assumption is unfounded. 19 Section 1301(38) was enacted as part of the Antihijacking Act of 1974, coincident with an expansion and refinement of the Air Piracy Statute as a whole. Given this background, we have scant difficulty in concluding that a forced landing does not necessarily mean an unscheduled landing. Where, as here, a pilot lands a hijacked aircraft at a scheduled time and place, but does so subject to the hijacker's permission, ostensibly to refuel for the next leg of the hijacker's jaunt, we think it fair to say that the landing is forced--no less so than if the pilot, under precisely the same circumstances, put down to refuel at an airport a few miles away. The appellation seems particularly suitable in a case like this one, where the landing was (1) effected under the baleful eye of the hijacker, who was seated within an arm's reach of the pilot and was clutching what realistically appeared to be (and had been represented as) a bomb; and (2) marked by demonstrable departures from the normal landing routine, attributable to the exigencies of the moment. 20 In adopting this interpretation of section 1301(38), we harmonize the various parts of the statutory scheme by reading the term forced landing in pari materia with the reference to force or violence or threat of force or violence contained in 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1472(i)(2). A forced landing, in short, includes any landing by an airplane laboring under the rigors of an ongoing hijacking, that is to say, laboring under the impetus of force, violence, or intimidation. Such a construction is likewise faithful to our earlier opinion in United States v. Hall, 691 F.2d 48 (1st Cir.1982), where we found that the offense--there, interference with a crew member in violation of 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1472(j)--lasted not only throughout the time the crew was responding to the episode, but thereafter, until such time as the appellant was physically removed from the airplane. 691 F.2d at 50. 21 In this case, the jury could certainly have found that the landing was forced, i.e., it would not have occurred in the way that it did had the pilot not been in thrall to the menace which Mena posed. Consequently, the aircraft remained within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States until Mena deplaned and competent authorities t[ook] over the responsibility for the aircraft.... 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1301(38). It was, therefore, entirely appropriate for the jury to consider appellant's actions while on the ground in San Juan as direct evidence that he had seized or exercised control over the airplane. 5 22 2. Seizure or Exercise of Control. If the landing was forced, then the first element of the offense was amply proven; while on the tarmac, appellant can be said to have actually seized, and exercised plenary control over, the aircraft. Even if the landing is viewed as unforced, however, Mena's actions before the airplane landed and one ... door [was] opened for disembarkation, 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1301(38), constituted a seizure or exercise of control alone sufficient to bottom a conviction. 23 The legislative history behind the statute explains how the definition of aircraft piracy, and the phrasing seizure or exercise of control, 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1472(i)(2), came into existence. The House Report notes: 24 The proposed new subsection ... would define the offense of aircraft piracy.... This is the provision of the bill which is aimed at the acts commonly referred to in the press as the hijacking of aircraft.    [T]he term piracy, along with the term hijacking, has come to be associated with the incidents that have occurred in which individuals, by force or violence or threats thereof, have taken over the control of aircraft and forced the pilot and other flight crew members to do their bidding.... 25 H.R.Rep. No. 958, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1961 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2563, 2567. A seizure may be constructive as well as actual. Clearly, Congress did not intend that a wouldbe hijacker must enter the cockpit, supplant the pilot at the throttle, and navigate the aircraft himself in order to have exercise[d] control of the aircraft within the meaning of the statute. It is enough that the hijacker coerce the crew to do his bidding, by force or intimidation. Hence, we cannot honor appellant's claim of evidentiary insufficiency, forced landing or not. 26 Without belaboring every nuance in this record, there was evidence to support the following findings: during the flight, appellant presented a threat of extreme violence; the threat was believable when made; the pilot took it seriously; when appellant was apprised of the lack of adequate fuel to reach Cuba, he adopted a plan suggested by the pilot; once adopted, this plan was set in motion; and the aircraft landed to refuel as a step in the hijacker's plot. On these facts, a reasonable jury could have found beyond a shadow of a doubt that, for some significant amount of time, the pilot's will was overborne and Mena's control over the aircraft had been effected. That Mena was ultimately duped by a pair of quick-witted aviators and thwarted in his efforts to reach Havana does not mean he did not consummate the crime of air piracy. 6 27 Appellant's selectively drawn parallels to cases like United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184, 106 S.Ct. 2921, 91 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986), United States v. Castaneda-Reyes, 703 F.2d 522 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 856, 104 S.Ct. 174, 78 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983), and United States v. Figueroa, 666 F.2d 1375 (11th Cir.1982), are unhelpful. All of those cases involved attempts rather than consummated acts. In each of them, unlike here, a demand or plan to divert an aircraft was halted by the crew, without any significant disruption of the aircraft's normal flight pattern or routine. See, e.g., Hack, 782 F.2d at 865; Castaneda-Reyes, 703 F.2d at 523. Indeed, in Figueroa, which appellant claims involved a situation strikingly similar to his own, the putative pirate was an unarmed passenger who never threatened violence, who made his request to be flown to Cuba by handing the flight attendant an apologetic letter (which explicitly stated that th[e] aircraft [was] in no danger), and who was arrested without resistance as soon as the aircraft made its scheduled landing. Figueroa, 666 F.2d at 1376-77. 28 Appellant's string citation to a line of cases involving convictions for consummated acts of air piracy, see, e.g., Dixon, 592 F.2d 329; United States v. Busic, 549 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.1977); United States v. McNally, 485 F.2d 398 (8th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978, 94 S.Ct. 1566, 39 L.Ed.2d 874 (1974), is no more convincing. While it is true that each of these cases involved the actual rerouting of an aircraft to effect an unscheduled landing, there is nothing in any of them--or in the Air Piracy Statute--to suggest that such a diversion is required to establish the element of seizing, or exercising control over, an aircraft. 7 The fact that Flight 329 landed on time at its planned destination neither disproved the fact that an air piracy may have occurred nor barred the jury from reaching the reasonable conclusion that Mena had taken control of the aircraft. 29 No more need be said. Our review of the record persuades us that it was within the factfinder's province to resolve whatever ambiguities were presented by the actions of Mena and the pilot. The evidence was sufficient to underbrace the guilty verdict. 30