Opinion ID: 1428244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Speech in the Workplace

Text: Of course, speech is not wholly protected from government regulation in all places; the location of the speech is relevant to the degree of protection, if any, the speech will receive under the First Amendment. ( Frisby v. Schultz (1988) 487 U.S. 474, 479, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 ( Frisby ) [To ascertain what limits, if any, may be placed on protected speech, we have often focused on the `place' of that speech, considering the nature of the forum the speaker seeks to employ.]; Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights (1974) 418 U.S. 298, 302-303, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 41 L.Ed.2d 770 (plur.opn.) [[T]he nature of the forum and the conflicting interests involved have remained important in determining the degree of protection afforded by the [First] Amendment to the speech in question.].) For example, speech uttered in a traditional public forum is afforded the highest degree of protection from state regulation. ( Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn. (1983) 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 ( Perry ).) Streets and parks have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. ( Hague v. C.I.O. (1939) 307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423.) Content-based restrictions on speech uttered in a traditional public forum must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. ( Perry, supra, at p. 45, 103 S.Ct. 948.) Speech may occur in nonpublic fora as well, but in such cases the government is permitted to place reasonable restrictions on speech, even based on its content. (See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union (1977) 433 U.S. 119, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 [prison]; Greer v. Spock (1976) 424 U.S. 828, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 [military base]; Adderley v. Florida (1966) 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 [jail].) Thus, speech in nonpublic fora is subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions, and the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view. ( Perry, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 46, 103 S.Ct. 948.) Not all speech-related activity occurs publicly in traditional public or even nonpublic fora. For most adult Americans, a great deal of time is spent at work. That the speech at issue in this case occurred at plaintiffs' workplace is significant, because the Supreme Court has recognized that speech occurring in the workplace presents special considerations that sometimes permit greater restrictions on First Amendment rights. For example, in Connick v. Myers (1983) 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 ( Connick ), an assistant district attorney unhappy with a job transfer circulated a questionnaire in her office, asking her colleagues their opinion about [the] office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns. ( Id. at p. 141, 103 S.Ct. 1684, fn. omitted.) The district attorney fired her in part for this speech-related action, but the district court ordered her reinstated. The circuit court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. The court explained that, with the exception of the question about political campaigns, the plaintiffs speech was not a matter of public concern and that [w]hen employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment. ( Id. at p. 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684.) Thus, the Supreme Court held the employee's free speech rights could constitutionally be curtailed on the job. (See also Branti v. Finkel (1980) 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 [recognizing that for some public jobs, an employer could fire an employee for belonging to a particular political party without violating the employee's First Amendment rights, but holding assistant public defender is not such a job]; but see Rankin v. McPherson (1987) 483 U.S. 378, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 ( Rankin ) [violation of clerical employee's First Amendment rights for constable to fire her for expressing opinion, while on the job, that she disagreed with the president's policies and hoped he would be killed]; Rosenthal, Permissible Content Discrimination Under the First Amendment: The Strange Case of the Public Employee (1998) 25 Hastings Const. L.Q. 529, 550-551 [criticizing Connick and arguing that Connick and Rankin point in different directions].) The intersection of an individual's place of employment and his or her free speech rights also appeared in CSC v. Letter Carriers (1973) 413 U.S. 548, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 ( Letter Carriers ). In that case, the high court held the Hatch Act (5 U.S.C. former § 7324(a)(2), now see § 7323), which as then written prohibited federal employees from taking active roles in political campaigns for public office, did not violate federal employees' rights under the First Amendment. Although activity in political campaigns is core political speech that would otherwise be entitled to the highest constitutional protection, the court found substantial public policy reasons justified the limitation on employee speech. [A] judgment [was] made by this country over the last century that it is in the best interest of the country, indeed essential, that federal service should depend upon meritorious performance rather than political service, and that the political influence of federal employees on others and on the electoral process should be limited. ( Letter Carriers, supra, at p. 557, 93 S.Ct. 2880; but see Bauers v. Cornett (8th Cir.1989) 865 F.2d 1517, 1523 [explaining that Hatch Act was amended after Letter Carriers ].) Thus, a strong public policy in avoiding coercing public employees to work on political campaigns justified restrictions on employees' First Amendment rights. (Cf. Snepp v. United States (1980) 444 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 763, 62 L.Ed.2d 704 ( per curiam ) [imposition of constructive trust on book profits justified by failure of former Central Intelligence Agency employee, in violation of employment agreement, to obtain pre-clearance from agency before publishing book based on admittedly unclassified information].) Thus, in order to vindicate sufficiently weighty public policies governing the workplace, the high court has in the past found the First Amendment rights of employees must sometimes give way. In the cases described above, however, the government directly restricted the speech of public employees. Not so with NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. (1969) 395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 ( Gissel ). In that case, a private employer, Sinclair Company, faced a union organizing campaign among its workers. When the president of Sinclair Company first learned of the campaign, he spoke to his employees, attempting to dissuade them from joining a union. He stated that the workers were forgetting the `lessons of the past' when a prior strike had shut down the plant for three months and the plant had then reopened without a union contract; that the company was still on `thin ice' financially; that a strike `could lead to the closing of the plant'; and that because of their age and the limited usefulness of their skills, the workers would not find ready employment if the plant closed. ( Id. at pp. 587-588, 89 S.Ct. 1918.) In the weeks leading up to the election, the company sent each of the workers letters and pamphlets to the same effect. ( Id. at pp. 588-589, 89 S.Ct. 1918.) When the union lost the election, it filed objections to the employer's communications. As pertinent here, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found Sinclair Company's communications with its workers violated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, codified at 29 United States Code section 158(a): It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer [¶] (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title. Title 29, United States Code section 158(c) provides: The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the NLRB's ruling. On certiorari before the Supreme Court, Sinclair Company argued that application of these rules to the speech of its president violated his First Amendment rights. The high court rejected the argument, reasoning that [a]ny assessment of the precise scope of employer expression, of course, must be made in the context of its labor relations setting.  ( Gissel, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 617, 89 S.Ct. 1918, italics added.) The Supreme Court emphasized that the employer's First Amendment rights must be balanced against the equal rights of the employees to associate freely, and the court must take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers. ( Ibid. ) In such a setting, said the court, free speech rights in the workplace must be distinguished from speech relating to the election of legislators or the enactment of legislation ... where the independent voter may be freer to listen more objectively and employers as a class freer to talk. ( Id. at pp. 617-618, 89 S.Ct. 1918.) In short, because the speech at issue occurred at the workplace, some restrictions on speech could be tolerated that would be impermissible if applied to speech in other settings. Of course, employees retain First Amendment rights while on the job ( Rankin, supra, 483 U.S. 378, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315; Branti v. Finkel, supra, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574); Gissel did not create a general workplace exception to the First Amendment. Still, in Gissel the Supreme Court validated congressional power, under the Commerce Clause, to impose content-based speech restrictions in the workplace to effectuate values embodied in the greater Constitution. The Gissel Court's holding, in large part, rested on its understanding of the unique nature of the employment relationship and the potential for even subtle coercion in this context to undermine valid economic policy which promotes constitutional interests. (Sangree, No Collision in Sight, supra, 47 Rutgers L.Rev. at p. 520; see also Fallon, Sexual Harassment, supra, 1994 Sup.Ct. Rev. at p. 19 [advocating development of a workplace speech doctrine responding to distinctive features of the workplace]; but see Volokh, Workplace Harassment, supra, 39 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. at pp. 1820-1822 [reading Gissel much more narrowly].) Thus, Connick, Letter Carriers and Gissel demonstrate the Supreme Court's recognition that strong public policies governing the workplaceboth private and publicmay justify some limitations on the free speech rights of employers and employees. This view is consistent with the reality that workplaces and jobsites are not usually thought of as marketplaces for the testing of political and social ideas (Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment (1990) 1990 Duke L.J. 375, 423 [suggesting some may view workplace speech as different from political speech generally]), and, therefore, the importance of preserving the workplace as a forum where free speech rights will outweigh other important constitutional considerations is diminished.