Opinion ID: 1388553
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Special Finding

Text: At defendant's request, the jury was told that it must unanimously agree on the particular [lewd] act or acts found to support the special circumstance charge, and that it must set forth any such act in writing on the verdict form. [19] Two and a half hours after deliberations began, the jury sent the court the following note: Must we comment [on] and explain the specific lewd or lascivious act? [The verdict] form seems to call for an entry. In the presence of the clerk and reporter, but without notifying counsel, the court wrote the word yes on the note and returned it to the jury. The verdict form supplied by defendant and ultimately signed by the jury contained preprinted language stating that the special circumstance claim of murder in the commission of a lewd act was true. In a blank space calling for a description of the specific lewd or lascivious act(s) committed by defendant, the jury wrote, witnessed by the victim [']s nudity and obvious use of force. (Italics added.) [20] Defendant moved to strike this finding on grounds it did not state a violation of section 288(a) as a matter of law. The court denied the motion. Defendant raises several claims concerning the foregoing events, none of which has any merit. (11) He first argues that the court erred in answering the jury's inquiry about the special circumstance verdict without prior notice to counsel. (Citing § 1138; People v. Hogan, supra, 31 Cal.3d 815, 848-849.) While the court technically erred, no prejudice occurred under any applicable standard. The court's one-word answer simply directed the jury to follow defense instructions previously given, requiring unanimous overt agreement on any lewd act found to support the special circumstance charge. (12) Defendant next argues that the special circumstance must be set aside because the jury ambiguously described the lewd act attributed to defendant. He suggests that unanimous agreement on the nature of the act was never reached. However, the jury obviously agreed that a lewd and lascivious act had occurred under one of two viable, closely connected theories, i.e., that defendant either forcibly undressed Lashan or forcibly compelled her to undress herself. (See discussion, ante. ) Any asserted failure to identify or unanimously select one of these factual scenarios is immaterial. As we have recently observed, the requirement of jury unanimity in criminal cases is of constitutional origin. ( People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 321 [270 Cal. Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643], citing Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) It is primarily intended to ensure that jurors agree upon a particular act where evidence of more than one possible act constituting a charged criminal offense is introduced. ( Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 321 [maj. opn. of Lucas, C.J.], 327 [dis. opn. of Mosk, J.].) Contrary to defendant's suggestion here, the unanimity rule does not extend to the minute details of how a single, agreed-upon act was committed. (See People v. Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d 68, 92-94.) [21] (13) Defendant also claims there was insufficient evidence to support the special circumstance finding on a disrobing theory. We disagree. The evidence established that 12-year-old Lashan was extremely modest, that she never relaxed in the nude at home, and that she undressed at night only under parental compulsion. Nothing unusual was noticed about her appearance when she was last seen alive watching television at 7:30 p.m. Thus, the jury could reasonably infer that Lashan was clothed an hour later, when the stabbing most likely occurred. However, her body was found in the nude and bore signs of a violent struggle or assault. A rational trier of fact could conclude that, at a minimum, the murder occurred during a sexually motivated, compulsory act of disrobing. (§§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(v), 288(a); Austin, supra, 111 Cal. App.3d 110, 114-115; see People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578 [162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255].)