Opinion ID: 815314
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Raised by Mr. Tavares

Text: Mr. Tavares raises several challenges to his convictions. We address these count by count.
Count One of the indictment charged Mr. Tavares with conspiring to knowingly transport an individual in interstate commerce, intending that she engage in prostitution. In support, the indictment alleged twenty-six overt acts taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. Among these was Overt Act J, which alleged that “[i]n or about February 2004, after assisting in the assault of T.B. by covering her head with a garbage bag and securing it with duct tape, Darryl TAVARES negotiated with another male to have T.B. -11- return to work for him as a prostitute.”7 T.B., a young woman who worked as a prostitute at various times for Mr. Tavares and for another pimp named “Jungle,”8 was a witness at trial. She testified about an incident when Mr. Tavares brought her to her then-pimp, Jungle. She said Mr. Tavares was with Jungle when “they tied [her] hands behind [her] back with rope.”9 She further testified that while Jungle put the bag over her head, he asked Mr. Tavares for help, but, because of the bag, she could not hear or see who participated in her subsequent beating. After the assault, Mr. Tavares offered to take T.B. back, but Jungle refused because T.B. had to work for him first. Mr. Tavares’s counsel extensively cross-examined T.B.
Although Mr. Tavares does not appeal the admission of evidence concerning the other twenty-five overt acts, he does challenge the admission of T.B.’s testimony about Overt Act J. He challenges T.B.’s testimony only as irrelevant under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. We shall address these arguments in turn.10 7 R.1 at 3. 8 Jungle is an unindicted co-conspirator. 9 R.297 at 81. 10 At trial, Mr. Tavares grounded his objection to T.B.’s testimony in Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403 and 404(b). Before us, he has abandoned his Rule 404(b) objection. -12- We review the district court’s admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 15 (1st Cir. 2009). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, “evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence[] and the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Mr. Tavares objected at trial, and presses here on appeal, that T.B.’s testimony was not relevant and is therefore inadmissible because it primarily inculpated Jungle.11 The Government submitted at trial, and the district court agreed, that T.B.’s testimony was relevant because it explained the relationship between Mr. Tavares and T.B., a fact germane to whether Mr. Tavares transported T.B. for prostitution. Further, Mr. Tavares’s offering to take T.B. off Jungle’s hands suggests that she worked for him as a prostitute, also germane to whether Mr. Tavares trafficked her for sex (Count Ten). We certainly cannot discern any abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling. The events to which T.B. testified certainly have “a tendency to make a fact [that Mr. Tavares transported T.B. and trafficked her for sex] more probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Furthermore, whether Mr. Tavares transported her and prostituted her “is of consequence in determining the action.” Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that although 11 See, e.g., R.297 at 4-5. -13- relevant, evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” We do not disturb the district court’s balancing of probative value and risk of unfair prejudice absent “extraordinarily compelling circumstances.” Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1340 (1st Cir. 1988). We see no such extraordinary circumstances here. In Mr. Tavares’s view, even if T.B.’s testimony is relevant, it still should have been excluded because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. According to Mr. Tavares, prostitution and sex trafficking of children are not violent crimes. Thus, he concludes, any mention of violence inherently poses a risk of prejudice substantially outweighing probative value and inviting jurors to decide the case purely on emotion. We accept neither Mr. Tavares’s premise nor his conclusion. Violence, abuse and other forms of human degradation are part and parcel of sex trafficking. It is not at all surprising that evidence of such acts is offered to establish a conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking. Moreover, evidence of these violent acts was particularly probative of the defendants’ relationship with the women because it directly demonstrated the control that the defendants exercised over the women in their prostitution operation. Specifically, with respect to Mr. Tavares, the evidence showed that the violent episode also entailed negotiations with Jungle to get T.B. back to work for him. The -14- testimony was also relevant to and probative of Mr. Tavares’s knowledge and intent with respect to Count Ten, charging him with recruiting and transporting T.B. to engage in a commercial sex act. Here, the district court considered Mr. Tavares’s arguments several times and concluded that the probative value of T.B.’s testimony was not substantially outweighed by any risk of unfair prejudice. That decision was certainly among the options from which a reasonable judge could be expected to choose. The record contains no basis that would justify our overturning the district court’s decision.
T.B.’s testimony concerning the incident with Jungle indisputably is at variance with the language of the indictment and the Government’s identical proffer to the district court. The Government expected T.B. to testify that Mr. Tavares put the plastic bag over her head. However, T.B. testified that Jungle, not Mr. Tavares, put the bag over her head. Her testimony otherwise conformed to the indictment; she indicated that Mr. Tavares “assist[ed] in [her] assault” and “negotiated with another male [Jungle] to have T.B. return to work for him as a prostitute.”12 “Not every variance calls for reversal.” United States v. Seng Tan, 674 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 2012). Mr. Tavares must 12 R.1 at 3. -15- show that the variance prejudiced him. Id. Prejudice in this context is found when, for example, “the variance . . . le[ft the defendant] so in the dark about the charge against h[im] that []he could not prepare a defense or plead double jeopardy to stop a second prosecution for the same crime.” Id. Here, Mr. Tavares faces an additional hurdle. Because he did not object in the district court to this variance, our review is for plain error. Id. Thus, Mr. Tavares “must demonstrate that (1) an error occurred which was (2) clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected his substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Savarese, 686 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2012). Mr. Tavares cannot establish any prejudice from the variance between the indictment’s language and T.B.’s testimony at trial. Mr. Tavares’s conspiracy conviction did not depend on Overt Act J being proven. Evidence was admitted concerning the twenty-five other overt acts charged in the indictment; the evidence supporting his (and Mr. Jones’s) conviction was overwhelming. Thus, any error in admitting T.B.’s testimony concerning Overt Act J was harmless. The variance between the indictment and T.B.’s testimony was not prejudicial and affords no basis for reversal. -16-
Mr. Tavares was convicted of knowingly transporting a minor, B.B., in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). A great part of the evidence on this count came from B.B.’s own testimony. In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we construe the evidence “in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Alfonzo-Reyes, 592 F.3d 280, 289 (1st Cir. 2010). At trial, B.B. testified that, when she was seventeen, Mr. Tavares and Peeples, a co-defendant who pleaded guilty, picked her up at her high school in Maine. Mr. Tavares and Peeples then took her to her sister’s home. Mr. Jones was at the home. The group talked about “[g]oing to Boston to make money.”13 Mr. Tavares, Mr. Jones and B.B. then drove from Maine to Massachusetts with some other people. B.B. testified that in the car she was told to pick her future pimp from among Mr. Tavares, Mr. Jones and another man; she chose Mr. Tavares. During the ride, B.B. sat on Mr. Tavares’s lap while he explained the rules of prostitution, including forbidding her from talking to other pimps and dictating how she should speak to him. She testified that she did not speak with Mr. Jones at her sister’s apartment or on the drive to Boston. Immediately upon arrival in Boston, Mr. Tavares took B.B. to the streets to work as a prostitute. She worked there for a considerable period of time. 13 R.295 at 40. -17- Mr. Tavares raises two challenges to his conviction for transporting B.B.: insufficient evidence and an erroneous jury instruction. He contends that the Government did not prove that he transported B.B. with the intent that she engage in prostitution and that the Government failed to prove that he knew B.B. was under eighteen at the relevant time. Mr. Tavares’s assertion that the Government’s proof of his knowledge of B.B.’s underage status was insufficient is closely linked to his challenge of the jury instruction on this count.
In order to convict Mr. Tavares of transporting B.B., the Government was required to prove, among other things, that he had the “intent that [she] engage in prostitution.” 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). This element requires proof that “criminal sexual activity [was] one of the several motives or purposes . . . not a mere incident of the trip or trips, but instead was at least one of the defendant’s motivations for taking the trip in the first place.” United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 390 (1st Cir. 1991) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we reverse only if “the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, could not have persuaded any trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Paradis, 802 F.2d 553, 559 (1st Cir. 1986). We do not weigh -18- evidence or assess credibility. See United States v. Downs-Moses, 329 F.3d 253, 261 (1st Cir. 2003). Mr. Tavares maintains that the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he transported B.B. with the requisite intent. According to Mr. Tavares, a jury could not draw a reasonable inference that he intended that B.B. engage in prostitution until they had arrived in Boston, i.e., after transportation was completed. In support, he relies on the fact that only B.B.’s participation in an escort service, not prostitution, was discussed explicitly in Maine. The record shows that the Government met its burden at trial. The jury reasonably could infer from B.B.’s testimony that Mr. Tavares’s purpose in bringing her from Maine to Boston was that she work for him as a prostitute. The discussion about “[g]oing to Boston to make money” reasonably can be understood as relating to prostitution. This interpretation is especially justifiable because Mr. Tavares is an admitted pimp, he picked B.B. up with another pimp (Peeples) and took her to discuss “mak[ing] money” with a third pimp (Mr. Jones). Even disregarding this statement, Mr. Tavares’s conduct during the ride from Maine to Boston clearly evidenced his intent in taking the trip. En route from Maine to Boston, Mr. Tavares instructed B.B. to choose a pimp for whom to work and told her his rules for the prostitutes working for him. Furthermore, the jury -19- was not limited to considering B.B.’s testimony in assessing Mr. Tavares’s intent. For example, an FBI agent testified that Mr. Tavares told him that Peeples was B.B.’s sister’s pimp but Peeples “couldn’t handle both sisters and so they [Mr. Tavares and Peeples] had made arrangements . . . to bring [B.B.] down to the Boston area.”14 Mr. Tavares’s contention that no intent reasonably could be inferred from this evidence is unavailing. The evidence produced at trial was more than sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Tavares had the requisite intent at least during, if not before, transportation.
Mr. Tavares also challenges the sufficiency of his conviction on Count Nine by contending that the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew B.B. was under eighteen at the time he transported her. This claim is linked closely to his contention that the district court erred in instructing the jury that it could convict him on this count15 without finding that he knew B.B. was under eighteen. Therefore, we address the instructional issue first. 14 R.299 at 78. 15 Mr. Tavares also challenges the district court’s instruction for Count Twelve, which involved the same offense with a different victim and an identical jury instruction. However, Mr. Tavares was acquitted of Count Twelve, and so we do not address this claim. -20- Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 2423(a) criminalizes “transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity.” It provides that [a] person who knowingly transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign c om m e r ce, or in any commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States, with intent that the individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life. Id. The district court instructed the jury that, in order to convict Mr. Tavares, it had to find that the Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Mr. Tavares knowingly transported B.B. in interstate commerce, (2) with the intent that B.B. engage in prostitution and (3) B.B. was under eighteen years old at the time of the transportation. The district court applied the “knowingly” requirement only to the act of transportation, not to the age of the individual transported. We review de novo claims of legal error in jury instructions. Figueroa v. Alejandro, 597 F.3d 423, 434 (1st Cir. 2010). Although we have not addressed whether § 2423(a) requires knowledge of the victim’s underage status, all six circuits to -21- consider the issue have concluded that it does not.16 Mr. Tavares, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009), urges that we break with our sister circuits and extend the knowledge requirement to the victim’s underage status. In Flores-Figueroa, the Court construed 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), which penalizes a person who “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person.” The Court found that the statutory language required applying “knowing” to two elements: the “means of identification” and “of another person.” Id. at 652-57. Mr. Tavares contends that Flores-Figueroa represents an emerging trend in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of applying the scienter requirement to every statutory element. Thus, he concludes, this court should extend “knowingly” to the victim’s underage status. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have considered and rejected this argument. See United States v. Daniels, 653 F.3d 399, 410 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Cox, 577 F.3d 833, 837-38 (7th Cir. 2009). These circuits agree that “the context of § 2423(a) compels a reading of the statute that does not require 16 See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 653 F.3d 399, 410 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Cox, 577 F.3d 833, 837-38 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 535, 539 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Griffith, 284 F.3d 338, 350-51 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hamilton, 456 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1972). -22- ‘knowingly’ to be applied to the victim’s age.” Daniels, 653 F.3d at 410. The court in Daniels held that this reading “is consistent with congressional intent that minors need special protection against sexual exploitation.” We agree that this context justifies requiring a defendant--who would presumably know he is treading close to the line in transporting a young person to engage in illicit sexual activity--to bear the risk that the person transported is underage. Id. (quoting Cox, 577 F.3d at 837). In addition to context, the court noted that under the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421, a defendant commits a crime any time he transports an individual for the purpose of prostitution. Therefore, age in § 2423(a) is not a factor that distinguishes criminal behavior from innocent conduct, but rather serves to justify a harsher penalty when a victim is underage. In contrast to the aggravated-identity-theft statute [at issue in Flores- Figueroa], when a defendant violates the Mann Act, he knows a real victim is involved, even if he does not know that victim is a minor. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). There is further reason to doubt that the Supreme Court intended such a modification of existing case law interpreting § 2423(a). In Flores-Figueroa, Justice Alito, noting the -23- importance of context in legislative interpretation, suggested in a concurring opinion that the majority’s principles of interpretation would not extend the scienter requirement in § 2423(a) to the underage status of the victim. 556 U.S. at 660 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).17 As the Seventh Circuit noted in Cox, 577 F.3d at 838, the majority in Flores-Figueroa did not take explicit issue with Justice Alito’s caution and, indeed, appeared to endorse it. See Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. at 652. For these reasons, we are persuaded by the reasoning of our sister circuits, and we see no need to depart from it. Our construction of the term “knowingly” in the statutory language is fatal to Mr. Tavares’s second sufficiency challenge and to his claim that the jury instruction was infirm. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Government had not produced sufficient evidence of Mr. Tavares’s knowledge of B.B.’s age, such a failure is irrelevant. The Government was under no obligation to prove that Mr. Tavares knew B.B. was underage. 17 “In interpreting a criminal statute . . . it is fair to begin with a general presumption that the specified mens rea applies to all the elements of an offense, but it must be recognized that there are instances in which context may well rebut that presumption.” Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 660 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Alito then specifically mentioned § 2423(a) as an example of such a situation and noted that “[t]he Courts of Appeals have uniformly held that a defendant need not know the victim’s age to be guilty under this statute.” Id. -24-