Opinion ID: 2518840
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Probable Cause Hearing, Adjudication, and Disposition

Text: Alyssa's first set of arguments relate to the proceedings leading up to the order adjudicating Jaclyn a child in need of aid, entered in October 2003.
Alyssa contends that the department acted illegally and unreasonably when it twice took emergency custody of Jaclyn in 2002; that the department acted wrongfully by failing to provide notice to the natural father before taking custody of Jaclyn; that the superior court denied Alyssa due process by not permitting her to call her mother as a witness at the probable cause hearing; that the court violated her constitutional rights when it found probable cause to believe that Jaclyn was a child in need of aid; that the court erred in admitting hearsay testimony at the probable cause hearing; and that it also erred in overlooking evidence that Jaclyn was not a victim of abuse or neglect. Because Alyssa's claims concerning the department's decision to take custody of Jaclyn and the probable cause hearing are moot in light of the superior court's later decision adjudicating Jaclyn a child in need of aid, which we affirmed in Alyssa B. I, [8] we need not address these claims. [9]
Alyssa claims that the superior court lacked jurisdiction because Jaclyn is an Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). [10] She contends that ICWA applies because Jaclyn's father is a native Hawaiian. But the act defines Indian tribe as any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the services provided to Indians by the Secretary because of their status as Indians, including any Alaska Native village. [11] As the superior court correctly noted, native Hawaiians have not yet been recognized by Congress as Indian tribes for the purposes of applying ICWA. [12] Accordingly, this claim lacks merit.
Alyssa argues that the trial court improperly denied her a jury trial at adjudication. We decided in Alyssa B. I that there is no right to a jury trial in CINA proceedings. [13] Our decision controls here.
Alyssa contends that the trial court erred in ordering her to undergo a psychological evaluation before adjudication. We upheld the superior court's ruling on this point in Alyssa B.I. [14] There is no need to re-decide the point here.
Alyssa argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant her motion for relief from its judgment of adjudication under Civil Rule 60(b)(4). [15] It is not clear what Rule 60(b) motion Alyssa refers to; it appears that her argument could pertain to either of two filings. In September 2004 Alyssa filed what appears to be a Rule 60(b)(4) motion, challenging the department's decision to take custody of Jaclyn as an illegal seizure in want of due process of law. Because this motion apparently relates to the superior court's adjudication finding, which we affirmed in Alyssa B. I, this issue is now moot. Alternatively, Alyssa's argument might pertain to a document and proposed order she filed in May 2006, citing Rule 60(b)(4) & (6). [16] This filing consists of a rambling thirty-two-page affidavit that fails to discuss the civil rule and appears to relate mostly to the department's initial decision to take custody of Jaclyn, an issue that is now moot. Because the point appears to be moot and Alyssa's briefing presents no colorable grounds for granting Rule 60(b)(4) relief, we find no merit to her argument on this point.
Alyssa argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant her oral motion for a mistrial due to ineffective assistance of counsel at the disposition and permanency hearing following the superior court's order of adjudication. She claimed in her motion that her attorney had ignored her requests to file numerous motions on her behalf. The court declined to rule on the motion, indicating that it would consider the matter at a later time when it ruled on Alyssa's appointed counsel's request to withdraw. It does not appear from the record that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was addressed again. But regardless of the superior court's decision on the matter, we conclude that Alyssa's claim fails on appeal because it is inadequately briefed. Apart from her conclusory allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, Alyssa provides no facts or legal authority to support her claim or otherwise enable meaningful appellate review.