Opinion ID: 1907834
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Relevant CMPA Provisions.

Text: Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the third sentence of Section 1-602.4(c) does not require the rejection of Ms. Clay's claim, that section nevertheless must be viewed not in isolation, but together with other relevant provisions of the CMPA. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Morrissey, 668 A.2d 792, 797 (D.C.1995) (citations omitted). Our consideration of those sections of the Act which deal with the problem at hand, and which were relied upon by Chairman Clarke, reinforces our disagreement with the OEA's disposition of the case. Section 1-610.3(a)(3) provides that the appropriate personnel authority [10] may appoint to the Excepted Service [a]ll employees of the Council of the District of Columbia, except those permanent technical and clerical employees appointed by the Secretary or General Counsel. Ms. Clay's position was more than that of a technical or clerical employee. On the contrary, she held important policy-making responsibilities. See note 6, supra. Section 1-610.3(a)(3) thus contemplates that Ms. Clay and others in similar positions would be in the Excepted Service and not in the Career Service. Moreover, the regulations implementing the CMPA provide that all Council employees, except those who are in grade DS-10 or less and whose functions do not include advocacy or policy, shall be in the Excepted Service. [11] Ms. Clay was not a lower grade technical or clerical employee and does not fall within the exception for such employees which is recognized in the cited regulations. [12] Section 1.610.7, quoted at page 5, supra, is also difficult to reconcile with Ms. Clay's position. That provision automatically transferred to the Career Service only those otherwise qualified District of Columbia employees who were classified as a GS-10 or less  under the federal classification system. If Section 1-602.4(c) had been intended to move into the Career Service government employees who, like Ms. Clay, held grades of GS-11 or above, then the language in Section 1-610.7, italicized above, would serve no purpose and would have no effect. We must be especially mindful, in interpreting the CMPA as a whole, that each provision of the statute should be construed so as to give effect to all of the statute's provisions, not rendering any provision superfluous. Morrissey, supra, 668 A.2d at 798 (quoting Thomas v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 547 A.2d 1034, 1037 (D.C.1988)). Moreover, canons of construction aside, it surely defies common sense to suggest that if the Council intended to ensure the automatic transfer to the Career Service of otherwise eligible employees regardless of grade, it would have written into the statute a transfer provision limited to those employees who were classified at GS-10 or less. [13]