Opinion ID: 3157470
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Construction of the Deed

Text: [¶8] The Estate argues that the easement created in 1880 was an easement in gross for the personal benefit of Reuben Hutchings and did not, therefore, pass with the land to French. This is contrary to Maine’s strong preference in favor of construing easements to be appurtenant, rather than in gross, see Stickney, 2001 ME 69, ¶ 33, 770 A.2d 592, and contrary to the intent of the parties to the 1880 transaction as found by the District Court and supported by the circumstances surrounding the transaction. [¶9] An easement may be either appurtenant to a dominant estate or in gross for the benefit of a particular individual or individuals. Stickney, 2001 ME 69, ¶¶ 31-32, 770 A.2d 592. An easement appurtenant runs with the dominant estate, id. ¶ 31, while an easement in gross terminates, at the latest, with the death of the benefited individual, id. ¶ 32. [¶10] Maine has recognized a strong preference for construing easements as appurtenant rather than in gross. Id. ¶ 33 (“The traditional rules of construction for grants or reservations of easements required that, whenever possible, an easement be fairly construed to be appurtenant to the land of the person for whose use the 5 easement is created.”). Under the common law, “to give effect to the intention of the parties this court . . . routinely construed a provision in a deed purporting to reserve an easement for the benefit of land retained by the grantor as the creation of an easement appurtenant.” O’Neill v. Williams, 527 A.2d 322, 324 (Me. 1987). [¶11] The interpretation of this deed is supported by reference to the Short Form Deeds Act, see 33 M.R.S. § 772 (2014); Tarason v. Wesson Realty, LLC, 2012 ME 47, ¶ 16, 40 A.3d 1005, which requires that an easement be construed as appurtenant “unless a different intention is clearly expressed in the instrument . . . by an explicit restriction of the interest to the use and benefit only of the person or persons to whom it is conveyed or reserved,” 33 M.R.S. § 772(1) (2014); see also Tarason, 2012 ME 47, ¶ 18, 40 A.3d 1005. [¶12] The 1880 deed between Reuben and Edward Hutchings states that Reuben reserves “the right of way from said lot East of Meadow Brook to the County road in the way as now travelled.” The Estate argues that the use of the definite article “the” in referring to the reserved easement, rather than the indefinite article “a,” is a reference to an earlier easement conveyed to Reuben Hutchings by his father in 1867 and that the 1880 deed should be read to convey an identical easement.3 3 Contrary to the Estate’s assertion, the trial court did not conclude that the 1880 transaction “changed the easement from in gross to appurtenant.” The easement created in 1867 was extinguished when Reuben Hutchings later acquired fee simple ownership of both the dominant and servient estates. 6 [¶13] The 1867 conveyance arguably created an easement in gross because it specifically granted the right to Reuben Hutchings, who at that time held only a life estate in the benefited parcel with the remainder held by the owner of the servient estate. Cf. LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984, 986-87 (Me. 1979). [¶14] Prior to the 1880 transaction, however, Reuben Hutchings had become the fee simple owner of the property that was benefited by the easement created in the 1880 transaction. Given this fact, and in the absence of an explicit indication that the right was intended to be in gross, the stronger interpretation is that the word “the” was used to define the location of the easement, rather than its character as appurtenant or in gross.4 Therefore, the court did not clearly err in finding that Reuben Hutchings intended the easement to be appurtenant to his landlocked parcel, thereby maintaining a means of access for future owners of the property. See O’Neill, 527 A.2d at 324 (“It is highly unlikely that [the] grantor would knowingly have impaired the value of the property he retained by limiting the easement to a life interest.”). [¶15] Given the strong preference for easements appurtenant and the facts surrounding Reuben Hutchings’s transfer of the property, the record supports the See LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984, 988 n.3 (Me. 1979). The trial court correctly concluded that the 1880 transaction created a new easement. 4 The original grant from the father to Reuben Hutchings uses the definitive article as well, suggesting that this family simply used the phrase “the right of way” to indicate a person’s right to cross another’s property for the purpose of obtaining access to property. 7 trial court’s finding that the 1880 conveyance created an easement appurtenant, the benefit of which passed with the land to French. See LeMay, 397 A.2d at 989. The benefit of an easement appurtenant passes automatically with the transfer of the dominant estate. Id. The burden of an easement appurtenant passes so long as the holder of the servient estate has “actual, constructive or implied notice of the servitude.” Id. Explicit reference to “the right granted to Reuben H. Hutchings” in the deed conveying the Estate’s lot to the Estate provides constructive notice and, therefore, the burden of the easement ran to the Estate. See id.