Opinion ID: 1900382
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Fourteenth Amendment and Sec. 1983

Text: 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 provides the statutory vehicle for the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment rights: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part: [N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. [4-5] We have, since this appeal was taken, recognized that state courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over claims based on sec. 1983. Terry v. Kolski, 78 Wis.2d 475, 254 N.W.2d 704 (1977). Also decided after the trial court's order was Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), in which the Court, overruling its prior holding in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), held that local governments are persons within the meaning of sec. 1983. The defendants maintain that Monell should be applied prospectively only. [6,7] Retrospective application of a judicial holding is a question of policy, not constitutional law. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965). In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971), the Court articulated three factors to be considered in deciding whether a holding ought not to be applied retrospectively: In our cases dealing with the nonretroactivity question, we have generally considered three separate factors. First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. Second, it has been stressed that `we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.' Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for `[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the injustice or hardship by a holding of non-retroactivity.' (Citations omitted.) We find nothing in the Monell opinion limiting its application to cases arising in the future. Our consideration of the factors set forth in Chevron supports the conclusion that there is no reason to depart from the general principle of retrospective application. It is true that Monell represents a departure from the law established in Monroe v. Pape, supra . However, in deciding to overrule the holding in Monroe v. Pape that municipalities did not fall within the definition of persons in sec. 1983, the Monell Court observed that Monroe was a departure from prior practice and that municipalities can assert no claim of reliance on Monroe to violate constitutional rights. 436 U.S. at 695-700. The Court also noted that it had decided many cases dating from 1954, brought under sec. 1983, in which the principal defendant was a school board. 436 U.S. at 663-65. The significance of Monell's overruling Monroe pales in the light of these considerations. We conclude that retrospective application of Monell's holding would generally further the policies embodied in sec. 1983 and would not work inequitable results. The Court in Monell, supra at 690-91 said: Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under sec. 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, ..., the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the body's officers. Moreover, although the touchstone of the sec. 1983 action against a government body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution, local governments, like every other sec. 1983 `person,' by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental `custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels. The plaintiff attributed her denial of sick leave and subsequent discharge to the defendants. Each personal defendant is named in his individual and official capacities. It is a reasonable inference, consistent with a liberal reading of the complaint, that the acts alleged involved official policy. The question presented is whether the defendants' alleged conduct in denying the plaintiff sick leave and in discharging her violates rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The validity under the Fourteenth Amendment of the plaintiff's alleged employment termination is controlled by the principles of Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). In that case the Court struck down school board regulations requiring pregnant teachers to take an unpaid leave of absence several months before the expected birth of the child. The Court observed that [b]y acting to penalize the pregnant teacher for deciding to bear a child, overly restrictive maternity leave regulations can constitute a heavy burden on the exercise of [the] protected freedoms [of choice in marriage and family matters]. Id. at 640. Neither the state interest in continuity of educational instruction nor the fitness of teachers justified the creation of an irrebuttable presumption of unfitness to teach at a prescribed point months before the child's birth. Id. at 645-48. See also: Turner v. Dept. of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (Per Curiam). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on LaFleur, recently held invalid the discharge of a pregnant police officer where there was no evidence that she was unable to work due to the pregnancy. United States v. City of Philadelphia, 573 F.2d 802, 810 (3d Cir. 1978). Though LaFleur was decided after the plaintiff's alleged discharge, we have no trouble concluding, on the basis of the guideposts established in Chevron, that its holding should apply to these facts. [1] The defendants cite Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), as authority for the proposition that failure to cover pregnancy medical expenses is not a violation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's holding in that case was premised on a detailed factual record; here we are only asked to decide whether the complaint states a cause of action. We cannot say, on the basis of the facts alleged in the complaint, that the plaintiff will be foreclosed from recovery by the Geduldig Case. Although we have found a cause of action to exist, we will proceed to comment on other causes of action alleged in the complaint.