Opinion ID: 2823847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Respondents Lack Individual Standing

Text: Â¶16Â Â Â Â Â Although we reverse the court of appealsâ determination that Respondents have taxpayer standing, our standing inquiry is not limited to the specific basis for standing that the court of appeals considered. See Moody v. People, 159 P.3d 611, 616 (Colo. 2007) (recognizing that appellate courts have authority to address standing issues sua sponte if there is a sufficient factual record upon which to resolve the issue). Thus, we next consider whether Respondents have individual standing, the only other viable basis for standing in this case, based on their alleged psychic harm as nonbelievers who were exposed to media coverage of the Colorado Day of Prayer honorary proclamations. Â¶17Â Â Â Â Â Like taxpayer standing, Colorado courts provide for broad individual standing. See Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 (explaining that Coloradoâs test for standing âhas traditionally been relatively easy to satisfyâ). Despite our tradition of conferring individual standing to a broad class of plaintiffs, id. at 853, we have refused to permit individual standing when the alleged injury is indirect and incidental to the defendantâs conduct. For example, in Wimberly we considered whether the bail-bondsmen plaintiffs had individual standing to sue the Denver District Court for adopting a pretrial release program that allowed criminal defendants to choose among a greater number of bail alternatives. 194 Colo. at 165, 168, 570 P.2d at 537, 539. Emphasizing that the possible injury to the bail bondsmenâs business was âindirect and incidentalâ to the courtâs adoption of the release program, we concluded that the bail bondsmen did not have standing to sue. Id. at 168, 570 P.2d at 539. Â¶18Â Â Â Â Â Respondents argue that they have suffered an injury as nonbelievers that is sufficient to establish individual standing because they were exposed to unavoidable and extensive media coverage revealing the existence of the honorary proclamations. Specifically, Respondents allege that the challenged proclamations amount to â[e]xhortations to prayâ that promote and endorse religion in violation of the state constitution, and that the Governorâs designation of a Day of Prayer âcreate[s] a hostile environment for non-believersâ who are âmade to feel as if they are political outsiders.â Importantly, however, Respondents do not allege that the government coerced them to participate in the Colorado Day of Prayer, nor that they suffered any negative consequences at the hands of the government as a result of their nonparticipation, nor that the government prevented them from exercising their right to nonbelief. In short, although Respondents allege that the Governor violated the Colorado Constitution, they âfail to identify any personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees.â Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982). Â¶19Â Â Â Â Â Although we do not question the sincerity of Respondentsâ feelings, without more, their circuitous exposure to the honorary proclamations and concomitant belief that the proclamations expressed the Governorâs preference for religion is simply too indirect and incidental an injury to confer individual standing. To hold otherwise would render the injury-in-fact requirement superfluous, as any person who learned of a government action through the media and felt politically marginalized as a result of that secondhand media exposure would have individual standing to sue the government. Because such a result would stretch our already broad conceptualization of individual standing beyond recognition and thrust the judiciary beyond its article III limits, we hold that Respondents have not alleged an injury sufficient to establish individual standing.