Opinion ID: 3157592
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Probation Officer Warren Weeks

Text: At 10:13 p.m. on April 7, 1991, Clemons finished giving his audiotaped statement to detectives in which Clemons: (a) admits raping Julie and Robin Kerry but (b) denies pushing (or helping anyone else push) them to their deaths. Though Clemons was under arrest at that time, the detectives continued to hold him in an interrogation room in the homicide division in the 7th Street headquarters. At 2:15 a.m. on April 8, Detective Pappas escorted Clemons to the men’s “holdover” facility in the same building. There, Clemons was booked and, at 2:40 a.m., he was photographed and fingerprinted. 21 At 5:42 a.m., Clemons was interviewed by Commissioner Yvonne Edwards of the St. Louis Pre-Trial Release (“PTR”) office. This interview was part of the process to see which new arrestees are eligible to be released on a pre-set bond (or their own recognizance) without an initial court appearance. When detectives from Internal Affairs investigated Clemons’ later allegation that the detectives had assaulted him prior to his taped statement, Commissioner Edwards told them that she recalled her interview with Clemons. She said that Clemons had no apparent injuries to his face or elsewhere at that time and that he said nothing to suggest that he had been assaulted by anyone. At 5:25 a.m., however, just minutes before this interview with Commissioner Edwards, Clemons was “pre-interviewed” by Warren Weeks. Weeks was a Probation and Parole officer assigned to the PTR office as a bond investigator. The purpose of Weeks’ pre-interview was to question Clemons and, using his answers, fill out Clemons’ Pre-Trial Release report. This report would then be checked and completed by Commissioner Edwards. Weeks characterized Clemons as “not reluctant” and testified that he was “as talkative as other prisoners.” Using Clemons’ answers, Weeks filled out the portions of Clemons’ PTR report that dealt with his residence, family, friends, employment and education. When he reached the third page of the form, Weeks asked Clemons about his physical condition. Weeks checked the box on the form marked “No Problems” because that is what Clemons told him. On the blank lines below this “No Problems” box, however, Weeks wrote the words “Asthmatic – Medications” because Clemons said that he had asthma that required medication. 22 Eighteen years later, at his deposition in October 2012, Weeks testified that – even though Clemons said he had “no problems” – Weeks remembered seeing a large swelling on Clemons’ right cheek that was “between the size of a golf ball and a baseball.” Weeks admits he did not think that Clemons had been hit. 7 When Weeks remarked to Clemons about the swelling, Clemons – who appears to have responded to everything else – did not respond or otherwise confirm Weeks’ impression. In sum, Weeks concedes that he did not ask Clemons what caused the apparent swelling and admits that Clemons did not say – or even suggest – that he had been beaten by detectives at any time or for any reason. Despite Clemons’ failure to mention any injury to his cheek when Weeks asked about his physical condition and, more importantly, despite Clemons’ failure even to acknowledge Weeks’ comment about a swelling on the side of his face, Weeks testified in 2012 that he felt compelled to make a note about this swelling on Clemons’ PTR report. But Weeks did not use the portion of the form devoted to Clemons’ physical condition to give a complete description of the location, extent, or apparent age of the swelling. Nor did Weeks note that the swelling was “between the size of a golf ball and a baseball.” Instead, Weeks testified in 2012 that he simply wrote the word “bruise” on Clemons’ PTR report, or maybe it was “bump;” Weeks does not remember. The word “bump” may have been written just below Weeks’ note concerning Clemons’ asthma, but the word has been crossed out and is illegible. Weeks testified that 7 Weeks testified that he thought the swelling on Clemons’ cheek might have been caused “by a spider bite.” 23 he did not cross out the word on the morning of April 8, 1991, which is the last time he saw the form (or Clemons). But Weeks also admits that he does not know who did cross the word out or, more importantly, when this was done. In 1991, Weeks’ supervisor asked Weeks about what he had seen on Clemons’ face and questioned whether there was anything for Weeks to see. The prosecutor also met with Weeks and showed him pictures of Clemons taken shortly before and after Weeks’ interview with him. Weeks concedes those photos showed no injury, let alone a swelling between the size of a golf ball and a baseball, but neither the photographs nor the fact that Commissioner Edwards observed no swelling or other injury to Clemons’ cheek just seconds after Weeks left him had any effect on Weeks or his story. Weeks admits that the prosecutor did not try to make him change his story or keep the matter secret. Free to tell anyone what he remembered, Weeks never contacted Clemons’ counsel, and they never contacted him. Clemons, of course, knows best who he met with in the hours and days following the interrogation, particularly those who volunteered remarks about an apparent injury to Clemons’ face. Yet defense counsel made no effort to depose Weeks prior to Clemons’ suppression hearing and trial, even though the state disclosed him as a potential witness and disclosed that he had been working at PTR in the early morning of April 8 when Clemons was booked. Like Clemons’ trial counsel, Clemons’ subsequent lawyers never questioned Weeks at any time during Clemons’ lengthy state and federal post conviction proceedings. It was not until 2012, when Weeks reached out to the defense after hearing about the Master’s 24 proceedings at his home in Texas, that Clemons’ counsel questioned Weeks about what he remembers seeing more than 20 years earlier. Because Clemons did not plead this claim in his 2009 Petition (or anywhere else), he has never had to specify precisely what it is about Weeks that the state failed to disclose. Clemons knows who he met with during the early morning hours of April 8 and certainly should remember the only person who supposedly volunteered a remark about the swelling on Clemons’ cheek. Of course, Clemons might not remember that person’s name. But the state disclosed Weeks’ name and the fact that we was working at 7th Street PTR in September 1992, long before Clemons’ trial. Legal File, at p. 505. This leaves only Clemons’ PTR report, which Weeks prepared. But the state also disclosed Clemons’ PTR report in February 1992, more than a year before Clemons’ trial. See Clemons’ Criminal Trial Legal File, at p. 506. 8 Accordingly, the state produced all it had, and Clemons had all he needed to ask Weeks about what Weeks thought he saw on Clemons’ face. Clemons ignores the state’s disclosure of the PTR report, Weeks’ name, Weeks’ job, and the fact that Weeks’ was working in PTR early on April 8, 1991. Instead, 8 There is no question that Clemons had the PTR Report more than a year before his trial. Clemons’ counsel had the disclosure correspondence (found at page 506 of the original Legal File) marked as Exhibit 13 for the Master’s hearing, and the Bates stamp on this document shows that it was produced from the files of Clemons’ original trial counsel. In addition, both Clemons’ interview with Weeks and Clemons’ PTR report are mentioned in, and attached to, the report from Sergeant Huelsman of the Internal Affairs Division, which found Clemons’ allegations of abuse to be unsubstantiated. The copy of the PTR report that was admitted at the Master’s hearing has a Bates number that identifies it as having been produced by “IAD” as an attachment to that report, which the Master included as Exhibit 1 to his Report. Clemons has known about the IAD’s report since August 1991, and the state disclosed the IAD’s report to him no later than September 1992. Accordingly, there is no doubt that Clemons had the PTR report and knew who Weeks was (and why he was important) long before trial. 25 Clemons argues that the state failed to disclose Weeks’ subjective impression concerning Clemons’ appearance and physical condition that night. As with the “draft police report” discussed previously, however, this is information that Clemons had and/or could have obtained with reasonable diligence. Accordingly, Clemons cannot demonstrate sufficient “cause” for failing to assert this claim earlier and – even if he could – the state’s failure to disclose this information was not a “nondisclosure” under Brady.
Brady does not apply to all evidence that might be “helpful” to the defense. Instead, it only applies to exculpatory evidence, i.e., “evidence [that] is material either to guilt or punishment.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. See also Merriweather v. State, 294 S.W.3d 52, 54 (Mo. banc 2009) (Brady applies to “evidence [that] is material either to guilt or punishment”) (emphasis added); State ex rel. Engel v. Dormire, 304 S.W.3d 120, 126 (Mo. banc 2010) (same). Later, Brady was extended to impeachment evidence. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. But Giglio does not extend Brady to all impeachment evidence, only “evidence affecting credibility” where the “reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence.” Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. The first question, therefore, is whether Weeks’ subjective impression of Clemons’ condition is exculpatory evidence. The Master did not find that it was, and this plainly is correct. There is no logical or legal connection between Weeks’ subjective impression of Clemons’ appearance at 5:25 a.m. on April 8 and the role that Clemons did (or did not) play in the deaths of Julie and Robin Kerry on the Chain of Rocks Bridge in the early morning hours of April 5. 26 Second, the Master did not find that Weeks’ evidence would have impeached Cummins or Winfrey, the only two witnesses at trial whose testimony clearly was “determinative of guilt or innocence.” Id. Nor did the Master find that Weeks’ evidence would have impeached the testimony of the two detectives who testified at the suppression hearing and denied that they (or anyone else) abused Clemons at any time. This, too, is correct because Weeks admits that he has no idea how or if Clemons was injured, let alone whether it resulted from the detectives beating him prior to 9:35 p.m. on April 7 (i.e., when Clemons claims the abuse ended) in an effort to coerce Clemons into making a statement. Instead, the Master concluded that Weeks’ subjective impression that Clemons’ face looked swollen was impeachment evidence – not for the detectives – but for ancillary witnesses (e.g., Sergeant Williams) who testified that Clemons’ cheek was not swollen in the hours and days after he gave the audiotaped statement. The Master is correct. It was the state’s burden at the suppression hearing to show that Clemons’ statement was voluntary, not Clemons’ burden to show it was involuntary. The detectives’ testimony, if believed, is sufficient for the state to carry its burden. Unlike the detectives’ testimony, testimony from Sergeant Williams (and others) that Clemons appeared uninjured in the hours and days after he gave his statement does not prove the statement was voluntary, even if believed. Instead, this evidence makes the detectives’ testimony more believable because it corroborates their testimony. By the same token, evidence from Weeks (and others) that Clemons’ face was swollen in the hours and days after Clemons made his statement does not prove that the statement was 27 involuntary. Instead, it only casts doubt on the evidence from Sergeant Williams (and others) that corroborates the detectives’ testimony. Accordingly, the Master correctly concluded that “testimony by Weeks is a method of impeachment” to cast doubt on the credibility of Sergeant Williams. Report at 103. Just because Weeks’ subjective impression of Clemons’ appearance is properly characterized as impeachment evidence, however, does not necessarily mean it is covered by Brady. As noted above, Giglio does not extend Brady to every piece of evidence that might impeach any witness on any issue. Instead, Giglio extends Brady only to impeachment evidence when the “reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence.” Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (emphasis added). See also Engel, 304 S.W.3d at 120 (undisclosed evidence would have impeached “chief prosecution witness”). Here, Sergeant Williams testified that he saw no swelling on Clemons’ face on the afternoon of April 8. He is not a witness “who may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,” and neither were any of the other witnesses who saw no injury to Clemons’ face in the hours and days after his interrogation during the evening of April 7. Accordingly, Weeks’ evidence is not impeachment evidence for purposes of Brady. Suppression hearings protect important constitutional rights, usually under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth amendments. But these proceedings do not determine guilt or innocence. In fact, courts readily acknowledge that suppression often comes at the expense of determining these questions. This is why federal courts have been skeptical as to whether Brady even applies to evidence in suppression hearings. 28 The information was relevant to impeaching the officers’ explanation at the suppression hearing as to why they had probable cause to detain and arrest Ienco, but the Seventh Circuit has never squarely held that Brady applies to suppression hearings. See United States v. Stott, 245 F.3d 890, 901–02 (7th Cir. 2001). And, although Ienco could have used the report to impeach the defendants’ testimony regarding the arrest, such impeachment does not go to Ienco’s guilt or innocence, and thus does not fall within the parameters of Brady. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763 (noting that when the reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within the Brady rule); see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 677, 105 S.Ct. 3375. Ienco simply failed to satisfy Brady’s materiality prong. Ienco v. Angarone, 291 F. Supp. 2d 755, 762 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (emphasis added), aff’d, 429 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2005). Another district court provided this overview of the issue: Circuit courts have split on the issue whether Brady v. Maryland’s restrictions apply to suppression hearings, although it is not likely that a prosecutor must disclose impeachment evidence before a suppression hearing in light of the Supreme Court’s conclusion in United States v. Ruiz that a prosecutor does not have to disclose impeachment evidence before the entry of a guilty plea.