Opinion ID: 2602179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Totality Of The Circumstances Test Is Inapplicable

Text: The majority analyzes the totality of the circumstances surrounding the mother's written waiver and holds that the written waiver is the juvenile's waiver as well. Maj. op. at 549-50. I disagree. First, a totality of the circumstances analysis is inapplicable to this case. Second, the facts demonstrate that the police obtained the parent's written waiver but only the juvenile's oral waiver. The majority utilizes a totality of the circumstances test without applying that appellation to the test it creates. The majority states, [A] trial court may also examine the circumstances that purportedly gave rise to the waiver.... The trial court should examine all relevant circumstances bearing on the reliability of the written waiver and uphold it when appropriately supported. Maj. op. at 549. The majority lists a number of factors to consider. The majority then concludes that the written waiver in this case adequately recorded the intent of Grant and his parents to relinquish their statutory right to parental presence. Maj. op. at 550. In my view, a totality of the circumstances test is inapplicable. In Nicholas, we held that the statute did not create a totality of the circumstances test, rather section 19-2-511 mandated a per se rule of inadmissibility. Nicholas, 973 P.2d at 1219. In Colorado, through section 19-2-210, the legislature has enacted an explicit statutory rule of evidence that operates as a per se or automatic rule of exclusion in the absence of the procedural safeguards set forth in that section. Id. at 1220 (section 19-2-210 is currently codified at section 19-2-511). We expressly rejected a totality of the circumstances test in substitution for the express statutory language: The first is an after-the-fact review of the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a juvenile's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The second is the adoption of initial safeguards and a rule of exclusion whenever the juvenile has not been afforded the special assistance required. This per se approach automatically excludes a waiver based on the absence of certain circumstances i.e., on the absence of the requisite procedural safeguards. One reason for the adoption of a per se rule is to ensure more consistent application than is possible with a totality of the circumstances test. Id. at 1219 (citation omitted). In 1999, the General Assembly responded to the Nicholas decision in two ways. It added section 19-2-511(6) to address situations, such as the one in Nicholas, where a juvenile deliberately misrepresented his age or some other material fact-which the police then relied on in good faith-to conclude that the mandatory parental presence requirement did not apply to the case. Ch. 258, sec. 1, § 19-2-511, 1999 Colo. Sess. Laws 1017. Significantly, the legislature also amended section 19-2-511(2) to include a totality of the circumstances test, but  by its express terms  this test applies only when the juvenile makes a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of rights and the juvenile was emancipated, a runaway from another state of sufficient age and understanding, eighteen years or older at the time of interrogation, or misrepresented his or her age to be over eighteen: 19-2-511 Statements. (2)(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, statements or admissions of a juvenile shall not be admissible MAY BE ADMISSIBLE in evidence, by reason of NOTWITHSTANDING the absence of a parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian, if THE COURT FINDS THAT, UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE JUVENILE MADE A KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER OF RIGHTS AND: (I) The juvenile is eighteen years of age or older at the time of the interrogation OR THE JUVENILE MISREPRESENTS HIS OR HER AGE AS BEING EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL ACTS IN GOOD FAITH RELIANCE ON SUCH MISREPRESENTATION IN CONDUCTING THE INTERROGATION; if (II) The juvenile is emancipated from the parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian; or if (III) The juvenile is a runaway from a state other than Colorado and is of sufficient age and understanding. Ch. 332, sec. 10, § 19-2-511(2), 1999 Colo. Sess. Laws 1369, 1374-75. Because the juvenile in the case before us did not fit any of the conditions stated in section 19-2-511(2)(a), the totality of the circumstances test the majority utilizes is plainly inapplicable under the statute. In my opinion, we cannot graft the totality of the circumstances test onto section 19-2-511(5) because the General Assembly did not choose to do so in making its post- Nicholas amendments. We must presume that the General Assembly acted with full knowledge of our judicial precedent on the subject. Pierson, 48 P.3d at 1219; Resolution Trust Corp. v. Heiserman, 898 P.2d 1049, 1054 (Colo.1995). We consider the General Assembly's course of action and intent when enacting and amending statutes. Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1152 (Colo.2001). Therefore, because the General Assembly  in deciding how to address our Nicholas decision  chose not to create a totality of the circumstances test for written waivers of parental, presence under section 19-2-511(5), except as provided in section 19-2-511(2), I must conclude that it did not intend a totality of the circumstances test to be applied to section 19-2-511(5)'s written waiver requirement. Moreover, the facts the majority relies upon do not support its conclusion that the written waiver is the juvenile's as well as his parent's. The majority recites that both Jeron Grant and his parents signed a written Miranda waiver and his statement was voluntary and in full compliance with his constitutional rights. Maj. op. at 550. The majority observes that the juvenile and his parents had the opportunity to consult before the police interrogation, and they did so. Maj. op. at 550. However, the majority cites to no facts that show that the police presented the juvenile with the section 19-2-511(5) written waiver, that he read it, that he acknowledged its contents as his own, or that it was intended to be his written waiver. The opening recitation of the written instrument is solely in the I ... expressly waive of the mother; no parallel I or we recitation records this instrument to be the son's written waiver. The face of the document evidences otherwise. The police were intent on securing the mother's written waiver and had only an oral waiver from the son. The juvenile's oral waiver is not sufficient under the statute.