Opinion ID: 3151014
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Apparent Authority and the Initial Search

Text: The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees protection against unreasonable searches and prohibits a warrantless search of a person’s home. U.S. Const. amend. IV; U.S. Const. amend. XIV (as applied to state officers). There are exceptions to the warrant requirement, one of which is consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 7 No. 14-5946, United States v. Clay (1973). “Valid consent may be given not only by the defendant but also by a third party . . . .” United States v. Morgan, 435 F.3d 660, 663 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A warrantless entry and search does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition so long as the third party consent is from one who possesses common authority over, or other sufficient relationship to, the searched area. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170–71 (1974); see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 179, 181 (1990). Common authority is the “mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.” Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7. Authority to consent can be actual or apparent.1 At issue here is apparent authority. “Apparent authority is judged by an objective standard.” United States v. Gillis, 358 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188–89). The question at issue is whether “the facts available to the officer[s] at the moment warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises[.]” Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188 (citation, ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted). If so, the search is valid. Id. at 189. If not, the search is unlawful unless actual authority existed. Id. at 188–89. We have found that a defendant’s live-in girlfriend had apparent authority to consent to a search of shared premises regardless of the fact that the couple lived together only part time, 1 The Government does not assert on appeal that Mitchell had actual authority, and, in fact, the district court found that she did not. See R. 31 at 9–11; R. 36 at 13. Moreover, we need not decide whether Mitchell had actual authority to consent to the search because we find that the district court did not err in its determination that she had apparent authority to do so. See United States v. Penney, 576 F.3d 297, 307 (6th Cir. 2009). 8 No. 14-5946, United States v. Clay Penney, 576 F.3d at 301, 307, that the couple lived together in a hotel room, United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 956, 963–65 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that the girlfriend had apparent authority only to allow the police to enter the room and search the common area and bags they reasonably thought were shared), or that the relationship was tumultuous, Gillis, 358 F.3d at 388. Factors we consider in determining whether a girlfriend had apparent authority include whether she had a key, see United States v. Hudson, 405 F.3d 425, 442–43 (6th Cir. 2005), whether she provided a detailed description of the premises and the location of drugs, Gillis, 358 F.3d at 391, whether her name was on the lease, see id., and whether the police independently knew that she lived with the defendant. Penney, 576 F.3d at 307–08; see also Gillis, 358 F.3d at 387–88, 391 (finding apparent authority even when the consenting girlfriend had two residences and the defendant changed the locks on the exterior doors of the searched house); Penney, 576 F.3d at 309 (finding apparent authority even though the defendant had expressly asked the police to bar the consenting girlfriend from the searched house). In this case, the district court found that it was reasonable to believe that Mitchell had apparent authority to consent to the initial search based on the fact that Mitchell told the officers that she lived with Clay for several months, that her appearance corroborated her story that Clay assaulted her that very morning, that she provided information as to the location of Clay’s drugs and gun, and that she was willing to sign a consent form on which she declared the residence her premises. R. 36 at 7, 12–13. Clay claims that this information was insufficient to show her connection to the apartment. Appellant Br. at 13. We disagree. 9 No. 14-5946, United States v. Clay The information available to the officers prior to the initial search of the apartment demonstrates that Mitchell had apparent authority to consent to a search of the apartment. First, Mitchell told the officers that she lived with Clay and stored her belongings there, that she had spent the previous night at the apartment (a fact substantiated by the fact that she phoned the police before 7:00 a.m.), that she had recently been victimized (a fact corroborated by the scratches on her face), and that she shared a van with Clay (a fact corroborated when a van matching Mitchell’s description was observed outside the apartment). She also provided a detailed description of the apartment, including the specific location of where Clay stored his gun and drugs. Given these facts, we find the officers held a reasonable belief that Mitchell had authority to consent to the initial search of the apartment. Despite being forced out of the apartment, the information available to the officers corroborated Mitchell’s assertion that she lived there. Clay allowed Mitchell to live with him, albeit intermittently, and in doing so, he assumed the risk that Mitchell could permit unwanted visitors. The officers were “entitled to rely on this ‘assumption of risk,’ and there [was] no burden on the police to eliminate the possibility of atypical shared occupancy arrangements absent some ‘reason to doubt that the regular scheme [was] in place.’” Pratt v. United States, 214 F. App’x 532, 535 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111–12 (2006)). Mitchell provided no such reason. Clay’s arguments in favor of a contrary result are unavailing. First, Clay’s argument that Gillis and Penney warrant a contrary conclusion fails because, like the consenting persons in those cases, Mitchell provided the officers with corroborating information that established her connection with the apartment, namely, a detailed description of its premises. See Gillis, 10 No. 14-5946, United States v. Clay 358 F.3d at 388, 391 (finding the defendant’s girlfriend had apparent authority in part because she was able to provide a detailed description of the searched house), Penney, 576 F.3d at 309–10 (determining the defendant’s girlfriend had apparent authority to consent to the search of unlocked, unopened containers based on her knowledge of where the drugs were located). Second, Clay’s argument that the fact that Lieutenant Sutton knew that Mitchell did not have a key to access the apartment and the fact that neither Clay’s nor Mitchell’s names were on the lease called into question Mitchell’s apparent authority to consent, carries little weight. Appellant Br. at 12 (citing United States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838, 845 (6th Cir. 2005)). In Waller, the Court ruled that, “if the circumstances make it unclear whether the property about to be searched is subject to mutual use by the person giving consent, then warrantless entry is unlawful without further inquiry.” 426 F.3d at 846 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (finding a third-party host could not consent to the search of defendant’s overnight bag when the police knew it was defendant’s bag and defendant was nearby to clarify ownership). First, as an initial matter, Clay misrepresents what Lieutenant Sutton knew: he did not know that Mitchell had never possessed a key, R. 25 at 158, and it is unclear whether Lieutenant Sutton knew that Gross was the lessee of the apartment prior to the first search. 2 Second, the fact that Mitchell did not have a key is not conclusive. In this case, Lieutenant Sutton testified that he believed that Mitchell’s priority upon leaving the apartment, 2 While neither party appears to contest the facts established by the district court, Clay argues here that Peach Rentals informed Sutton prior to the initial search of the apartment that Gross was the true lessee of the apartment. Sergeant Quire and Lieutenant Sutton testified that they did not know that Clay was not the true lessee, R. 25 at 103, 158, and Peach Rentals’ representative’s testimony was unclear: she stated she informed someone in the morning but could not confirm speaking to the police about the fact until the afternoon. Id. at 233–34. 11 No. 14-5946, United States v. Clay as a recent victim of domestic violence, was just that—her exit—not whether she had her key. R. 25 at 166. Third, while it is unclear when the officers learned Gross was the lessee of the apartment, it is not the property interests that courts consider, rather, it is the “mutual use” by a person with “common authority.” Waller, 426 F.3d at 845 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7) (emphasis in original). Thus, although they shared an “atypical [living] arrangement,” Lieutenant Sutton had no reason to doubt that Mitchell had access to the apartment equal to Clay. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 112. Accordingly, the rule established in Waller does not apply to this case. See id. (discussing Rodriguez, 467 U.S. 177 (1990) (“[I]t would be unjustifiably impractical to require the police to take affirmative steps to confirm the actual authority of a consenting individual whose authority was apparent. . . .”)); see also Penney, 576 F.3d at 309 (“Lovers’ quarrels and reconciliations are as much of a ‘reality in today’s world’ as is cohabitation without ‘legal formalities,’ and the police cannot be faulted for not presuming that a particular quarrel put an end to the couple’s relationship and living arrangements.”). Although the police could have inquired into whether Mitchell had ever had a key and whether her name was on the lease, it was apparent she had authority to consent to the first search: her status suggested she had mutual use of the property and had common authority to come and go as she pleased regardless of whether her name was on the lease. In sum, given the totality of what the officers knew prior to the consented search of the apartment, the officers reasonably relied on Mitchell’s apparent authority to conduct the initial search of the apartment. 12 No. 14-5946, United States v. Clay