Opinion ID: 676432
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Purposeful Discrimination in Jury Selection

Text: 6 Risher argues that his right to a fair trial was violated because an African-American juror, only one of two on the panel, was excluded from the jury. During voir dire, the prospective juror stated that he was a lay minister and was unemployed. The government used one of its peremptory challenges to strike the juror. The government also struck a Caucasian juror who was unemployed. 7 To argue purposeful discrimination in jury selection, the defendant must first show that the prosecutor has peremptorily challenged members of the defendant's race under circumstances that raise an inference of discrimination. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986). To defeat such a showing, the prosecutor must articulate a racially neutral explanation for the challenge. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. The trial court then determines whether the defendant has successfully carried the burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Id. The reviewing court gives great deference to the district court's finding that the prosecutor's explanation is race neutral, and will not disturb it unless it is clearly erroneous. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991); United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir.1992). 8 The court concluded that the prospective juror's ministry and his irregular work record were legitimate, racially neutral grounds for the prosecutor's challenge: 9 It is not an uncommon perception that clergy are too understanding. In a way, they are like social workers and cannot divorce themselves from their calling. And, as such, can be a poor juror for a prosecutor because they tend, despite however well-intentioned they are and whatever declarations they make, they tend to be sympathetic. R.T. 2/22/89 at 95. 10 This is not a case where a facially neutral criterion for a challenge served as a surrogate for race. Cf. Bishop, 959 F.2d at 826 (where residence was used as a proxy for a racial stereotype in jury selection, defendant's conviction was reversed). The prosecutor expressed a legitimate concern that ministers are uniquely forgiving. Several cases have upheld peremptory challenges on similar grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921 (5th Cir.1992) (upholding peremptory challenge of African-American juror who was an ordained minister); United States v. Wilson, 867 F.2d 486 (8th Cir.) (upholding peremptory challenge of African-American juror who was a social worker), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 827 (1989). 11 Further, we note that the district court did not err in concluding that the prosecutor's racially neutral explanation for the challenge was in good faith. The trial court has the opportunity to observe the conduct of the prosecutor during voir dire, and [e]valuation of the prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies 'peculiarly within a trial judge's province.'  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985)). Here, the district court expressly noted that the prosecutor had not indicated any lack of neutrality. 12 Given the government's legitimate explanation and the demeanor evidence, we affirm the district court's conclusion that Risher failed to establish purposeful discrimination.