Opinion ID: 619464
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Facsimile Constitutes a Communication

Text: Our review of the district court's factual findings is for clear error; legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of Olathe, 248 F.3d 1267, 1274 (10th Cir.2001). We view the record in its entirety in the light most favorable to the district court's findings, accepting those findings, if plausible, even though we might have weighed the evidence differently. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). The FDCPA was enacted to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). The law provides, among other things, that a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). A communication is defined as the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). The facsimile in question is not a communication under the FDCPA. A third-party communication, to be such, must indicate to the recipient that the message relates to the collection of a debt; this is simply built into the statutory definition of communication. This fax cannot be construed as conveying information regarding a debt. Nowhere does it expressly reference debt; it speaks only of verify[ing] [e]mployment. Nor could it reasonably be construed to imply a debt. In order to substantiate the claim that the facsimile conveys information regarding a debt, either directly or indirectly, Ms. Marx had the burden of proving such a conveyance; the standard is not whether the facsimile could have had such an implication. No testimony shows that Ms. Marx suffered any actual harm (such as embarrassment or a denial of promotion) or that her employer was aware that the facsimile in any way concerned a default on a student loan. Aplt.App. 180-185; 199-200. Ms. Marx did not call any witnesses from her employer's office to testify as to what they inferred from the facsimile. Aplt.App. 355. Instead, she argues that the existence of a debt was implied by the ID or account number that appeared on the facsimile; this, she claims, makes it a communication. Aplt. Br. at 4-5. GRC, however, designed the form precisely to avoid such an implication. When asked at trial why the faxed form contained an ID number, the agent who sent it testified: One of the first things we're taught in training is you can never imply debt to a third party. ID could be ajust an identification number to an application, or whatever. We don't ever say account when we're speaking with an authorized third party. Aplt.App. 221. GRC conceded at oral argument that if its corporate name had somehow disclosed the nature of its business, the case would different. But absent any evidentiary showing that Ms. Marx's employer either knew or inferred that the facsimile involved a debt, the facsimile does not satisfy the statutory definition of a communication. A party may seek to verify employment status (without hinting at a debt) for any number of reasons, including as part of processing a mortgage, conducting a background check before hiring, or determining eligibility for an extension of credit. Because we find that the facsimile did not constitute a communication within the ambit of the FDCPA, we need not consider whether GRC violated § 1692c(b)'s prohibition against debt-collector communicat[ions] with third parties.