Opinion ID: 2621193
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Argument of Prosecutor

Text: Defendant contends that the prosecutor, over defense objection, urged the jury to consider nonstatutory factors in aggravation, thereby taking advantage of the asserted vagueness of section 190.3. At the commencement of his opening argument to the jury at the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecutor asked the jury to consider Mr. Catlin's attitude when he was committing these crimes. Mr. Catlin's total indifference to the pain and suffering these people suffered at the time that ... he gave paraquat to Martha Catlin or with the death of Joyce and Glenna Kaye, he knew the horrible pain and suffering that the persons would go through. He also knew at the time he murdered Joyce Catlin, she was the mother of eight children and at the time he murdered Glenna Kaye, he knew that she was the mother of one child. [¶] He knew that Glenna Kaye's parents ... would witness her horrible death in the hospital. Mr. Catlin had a total indifference of taking their lives, absolutely no respect for their lives. [¶] Mr. Catlin actually took pleasure in committing these crimes. Think of the planning and the premeditation.... Later, defendant complains, the prosecutor argued we should not kill our parents. Contrary to defendant's claim that these comments were not relevant to any of the factors set forth in section 190.3, comments on the culpable mental state of a defendant at the time he or she committed the charged crimes are permissible characterizations of the circumstances of those crimes under section 190.3, factor (a). (See People v. Millwee, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 151-152, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990; People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1062, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388; People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 495, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373.) The prosecutor's comments were drawn from the evidence at trial regarding the circumstances of the crimes or were based upon reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. Furthermore, under authority decided after the trial in defendant's case, comments on the impact of the crime on the victim's family also are permissible under section 190.3, factor (a), as long as the comments are based on evidence that logically shows the harm caused by the defendant. ( People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 835, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436) Contrary to defendant's claim, this authority properly is applicable retroactively to cases not yet final on appeal. ( People v. Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 991, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214; see also People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1017, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248; People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 672, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.) We believe that the prosecutor's allusions to the surviving children of the victims fall within the bounds of appropriate comment. Contrary to defendant's claim that the suffering of Glenna's parents was irrelevant to the charged crimes, the prosecutor's reference was permissible in that it related to the prior-murder special-circumstance finding in the present case, and the evidence of Glenna's murder also was highly relevant to the charged murders. That a prosecutor may comment on the moral opprobrium incurred by a person who kills his or her parent is too obvious to require discussion. Finally, we consistently have rejected the claim that factor (a) is too vague to satisfy constitutional requirements. (See People v. Lucero, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 728, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248, and cases cited; see Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976-977, 114 S.Ct. 2630,129 L.Ed.2d 750.)