Opinion ID: 848910
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the phrase is receiving or will receive

Text: I also disagree with the majority's rejection of the Court of Appeals finding that, within the meaning of M.C.L. § 421.27(f)(1), the funds were not received. Once again, the majority brushes aside reasonable interpretations other than its own and characterizes a word as unambiguous. The facts of this case show that plaintiff did not take the pension funds into her possession within the dictionary definition of receive. Instead, defendant transferred the funds directly into an individual retirement account in her name. The Court of Appeals decision interpreted receive by relying in part on interpretive letters issued by the United States Department of Labor (USDOL) [5] and the Michigan Employment Security Commission. [6] Both conclude that, when an employer transfers an employee's retirement funds into an individual retirement account, the employee does not receive them for purposes of the relevant unemployment compensation laws. The majority ignores these letters, choosing instead to construct a definition of receive on the basis of a dissenting opinion [7] and dictionary definitions. However, it is a long-established principle of law that  `[t]he construction given to a statute by those charged with the duty of executing it is always entitled to the most respectful consideration and ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons.' Oakland Schs Bd. of Ed. v. Superintendent of Pub. Inst, 401 Mich. 37, 41, 257 N.W.2d 73 (1977), quoting United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 760, 24 L.Ed. 588 (1877). The majority offers no cogent reason to deviate from the administrative agencies' interpretations, which provide a reasonable construction of the statutory language consistent with the purpose and the policy of the MESA. This Court should accord that interpretation due deference and hold that plaintiff did not receive a retirement benefit within the meaning of § 27(f) of the MESA.