Opinion ID: 2481410
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Excusing of Prospective Juror for Cause

Text: During voir dire, prospective juror N.W. was questioned by the trial court about his ability to vote for or against a death penalty verdict. He answered that he did not have strong feelings about the death penalty that would cause him to vote automatically for or against imposing a death penalty. Instead, if the evidence showed that death was an appropriate sentence, N.W. indicated he could sign the verdict. Likewise, if the evidence did not demonstrate that death is the appropriate sentence, he would not sign the death penalty verdict form. However, upon further questioning by the State, the following exchange occurred: MR. ELWARD [prosecutor]:    If at the end of this case, Jim, Mike and I prove to you by the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty, he is eligible for the death penalty, and at the sentencing hearing, in your opinion, the only appropriate sentence is the death penalty, can you sign that verdict? [Prospective Juror N.W.]: No, I don't think that I could. MR. ELWARD: And I appreciate your honesty. Can you tell me why not? [Prospective Juror N.W.]: I am not for sure why not. I don't want to take responsibility for that. MR. ELWARD: You don't want to take responsibility for that. [Prospective Juror N.W.]: Yeah. MR. ELWARD: Judge, I don't have any more questions. Later, N.W. was questioned by defense counsel. During this questioning, the following exchange occurred: MR. CARTER: Concerning the issue of the death penalty that you may have to determine, if you are selected as a juror in this case, would you listen to the opinions of the other jurors concerning that process? [Prospective Juror N.W.]: Yeah. MR. CARTER: And would you consider their opinion in making your decision? [Prospective Juror N.W.]: No. MR. CARTER: You would not. [Prospective Juror N.W.]: It dependsI don't know. MR. CARTER: Well, I am asking you if you would consider having an open mind to the possibility of voting for the death penalty, if you are asked to serve and follow the law in the case. And I am asking you, can you do that? [Prospective Juror N.W.]: Yeah. The State challenged N.W. for cause on the ground, among others, that he stated he could not sign a verdict of death. Defense counsel objected, arguing that N.W. indicated he had no feelings one way or the other on the death penalty and that he indicated he would be fair and impartial. The trial court allowed the State's challenge for cause, stating, The prospective juror indicated that he could not sign a verdict form imposing the death penalty, and just as he understood the other questions, this was not a failure to communicate, in the court's opinion. He understood the question, and he answered it indicating that he could not do that. This is the first juror who has indicated when a clear and succinct question has been put to them as to whether they could or could not sign that form, indicated that he could not, and that's troublesome to the Court, and in the exercise of my discretion I am going to excuse the juror on that basis and on that basis alone. Defendant now contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State's challenge, resulting in a violation of his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights. A trial court may remove a prospective juror for cause because of the person's views toward the death penalty when the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-52 (1985), quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589 (1980); People v. Banks, 237 Ill.2d 154, 189-90, 343 Ill.Dec. 111, 934 N.E.2d 435 (2010). It is not enough, to dismiss a juror for cause, that the juror voices only general objections to the death penalty. Banks, 237 Ill.2d at 189, 343 Ill.Dec. 111, 934 N.E.2d 435. The trial judge is in a superior position to gauge the meaning of the prospective juror's responses to the examination. People v. Tenner, 157 Ill.2d 341, 363, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138 (1993). Therefore, a decision of the trial court to excuse a prospective juror for cause is reviewed for abuse of discretion. People v. Taylor, 166 Ill.2d 414, 421-22, 211 Ill. Dec. 518, 655 N.E.2d 901 (1995). Defendant argues that, in this case, it cannot be concluded that N.W.'s views are opposed to the death penalty. Defendant supports this claim by arguing N.W. informed the court that he had no difficulty with Illinois law providing for a death penalty and that his beliefs would not prevent him from being fair and impartial to both sides. Defendant argues that N.W., at no time, expressed any feelings against the death penalty. We disagree. It is necessary to consider the prospective juror's statements as a whole and not in isolation. Taylor, 166 Ill.2d at 421, 211 Ill.Dec. 518, 655 N.E.2d 901. Although N.W. informed the court that he did not have strong feelings either for or against the death penalty, in response to a direct question as to whether he could sign a verdict imposing a death sentence, he replied, No, I don't think I could. He explained that he did not want to take responsibility for that. Although N.W. went on to agree that he could have an open mind to the possibility of voting for the death penalty, N.W.'s statements, taken as a whole, demonstrate at least some doubt as to whether he would be able to sign a death verdict. Defendant argues that N.W.'s views on the death penalty are not even known. However, we can infer that whatever his views of the death penalty in ideological or moral terms, he admitted he did not think he could sign a death verdict. Thus, whatever his views may be, his answer demonstrated they could have foreclosed or substantially impaired the performance of his duties, thereby undermining the fairness of defendant's trial. Precise knowledge of the prospective juror's views, or the reasons behind them, are not always necessary to determine whether such views will interfere with the juror's ability to perform his duties. It might be helpful to question a prospective juror as to such matters if the court thinks he is seeking merely to avoid jury duty. However, where the court determines the prospective juror to be sincere in his belief he cannot sign a particular verdict, and where his answers suggest an inability to carry out his duties, the court need not examine in detail the prospective juror's moral and political leanings. Here, the record reflects statements by N.W. that suggest he would not have been able to carry out his duties. The trial court was in the best position to determine whether N.W. was credible as to those statements. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding prospective juror N.W. for cause.