Opinion ID: 4582154
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Agency’s Right of Rebuttal

Text: Cutting through the Administrative Judge’s failures to comply with our remand order, we find that the combination of our prior decision, Delgado’s evidence at the hearing, and the AJ’s findings on causation in the 2014 Case establish together that Delgado carried his burden of proof for both the 2014 and 2018 Cases. He made protected disclosures, he suffered adverse actions, he exhausted his remedies before the Oﬃce of Special Counsel, and he has shown via the knowledge/timing test that his protected disclosure was a contributing factor in his not being promoted to GS-14 in 2014 and again in 2016. Accordingly, he is entitled to corrective action unless “the agency demonstrate[d] by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of such disclosure.” 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2). The Administrative Judge did not make findings on whether the agency carried its rebuttal burden because she found, arbitrarily, capriciously, and in defiance of our remand No. 19-2239 17 order, that Delgado had not even made any protected disclosures. The government argues that if we find that the AJ’s decisions under review cannot be aﬃrmed, we should remand yet again so that the AJ can make findings on the agency’s rebuttal case. We are mindful of the agency’s statutory right, but we find such a remand unnecessary. The agency’s evidence and arguments have already been heard. Its evidence fell short of satisfying the defense, both as to the March 2014 promotions and especially as to the 2016 promotion Delgado was denied despite being the only qualified candidate. The Administrative Judge held a three-day evidentiary hearing with numerous witnesses. Neither party argues here that the record is incomplete. The AJ made clear that she expected the parties to oﬀer their evidence on all the issues, including the agency’s aﬃrmative defense.3 The AJ ended the evidentiary hearing by ordering the parties to submit their closing arguments in the form of written briefs, due nearly three months after the hearing. In its written closing argument, the agency argued: “The undisputed evidence of record also shows that the Agency demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel actions—non-selecting Appellant for the three positions—regardless of the Appellant’s protected disclosure.” The 3 For example, at one point in the hearing the agency objected to Delgado’s testimony regarding his opinion of another applicant for one of the GS-14 positions. The AJ allowed that testimony, saying, “Okay, I’m going to have to allow this because, you know, if the Appellant meets all of his burden, as we’ve discussed and is in the pre-hearing conference order, then the Agency has to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the same actions anyway. So, I think the Appellant’s opinion here is relevant to that. So, I’m going to allow some leeway.” 18 No. 19-2239 agency’s brief then marshaled its best arguments in favor of its rebuttal burden. In short, the agency’s rebuttal was on the record and was fully before the Administrative Judge. She did not reach that issue only because of the errors in her analysis of Delgado’s prima facie case. On review, however, it is apparent that the agency’s evidence and rebuttal arguments fall well short of a “clear and convincing” showing required by statute. The agency’s closing brief of February 2019 made three primary arguments. The agency argued that the November 13, 2016 email that Delgado sent to then-Attorney General Lynch and others could not have influenced his non-selection for the 2016 GS-14 vacancies because members of the interview panel were unaware of this email. This is a rehash of the knowledge/timing analysis that we rejected above. The decision-makers were not aware of that particular email, but they were certainly aware of Delgado’s history of protected disclosures on exactly the same issue. The agency then touted the qualifications of the other agents who were selected for those positions. We might need to remand for further findings as to some of the promotions if the case depended on them. We are convinced, however, that such a remand is not appropriate at this stage of this longterm litigation siege. First, we cannot overlook the Board’s inexplicable refusal to comply with our previous remand order, nor the ATF’s successful eﬀorts to persuade the Board to flout the law of this case on whether Delgado engaged in protected activity. No. 19-2239 19 Second, our review of the record persuades us that the agency’s evidence cannot meet the high bar of “clear and convincing evidence” needed to establish the aﬃrmative defense. See Miller v. Dep’t of Justice, 842 F.3d 1252, 1257–58 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (reversing Board finding that agency had proven this defense, which was not supported by substantial evidence), quoting Whitmore v. Dep’t of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (vacating Board finding that agency had proven this defense; Board erroneously excluded or ignored critical evidence). The Federal Circuit, which hears most federal whistleblower cases, has explained: Whether evidence is suﬃciently clear and con- vincing to carry this burden of proof cannot be evaluated by looking only at the evidence that supports the conclusion reached. Evidence only clearly and convincingly supports a conclusion when it does so in the aggregate considering all the pertinent evidence in the record, and despite the evidence that fairly detracts from that con- clusion. Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1368. Reviewing the record as a whole, we find that one of the most striking points is Delgado’s status as the only candidate on the Best Qualified List for the October 2016 promotion. This fact did not, by itself, entitle Delgado to the promotion, but there was more. Delgado had previously led the Chicago group in an acting position. And the receiving manager on the promotion panel was one of the assistant special agents in charge in Chicago, who reported to the special agent in charge. This is relevant because Delgado oﬀered an undisputed aﬃdavit from a senior ATF oﬃcial stating that a month 20 No. 19-2239 or two before the 2016 decision not to promote Delgado, the special agent in charge of the Chicago oﬃce told him, “I can’t promote this guy. It would kill the morale of the Division.” Pet’r’s App. 208–09. (By the time of the hearing, the special agent in charge had retired. He refused to testify voluntarily; neither side subpoenaed him.) The Administrative Judge discounted this testimony with- out a more explicit link between this comment and the actions of the assistant special agent in charge on the promotion panel. With respect, since the special agent in charge had such strong feelings on the subject as to volunteer his views to a colleague at ATF headquarters, we find it hard to imagine that the special agent in charge had not made those views about Delgado known to his assistant special agent in charge.4 The evidence from that 2016 promotion board indicates that the assistant special agent in charge played a decisive role in convincing the panel not to promote Delgado. Two of the other three members of the panel actually scratched out and lowered their scores for Delgado’s answers after the assistant special assistant in charge explained his views to them. See Pet’r’s App. 120–21, 338–43, 373–75. Moreover, the testimony of the assistant special agent in charge explaining his reasons for not promoting Delgado was so inconsistent with the record that it could support a finding of pretext. Considering the 4 Other portions of the official’s affidavit provided substantial evidence that hostility to Delgado in the Chicago office was widespread in the wake of the Labno incident. When the official started in Chicago, “numerous personnel” advised him to stay away from Delgado, and key supervisors refused to support Delgado’s investigations. The hostility stemmed from the Labno shooting incident. Pet’r’s App. 208. No. 19-2239 21 record as a whole, the ATF’s evidence regarding the 2016 denial could not reasonably be deemed to clear the high bar of “clear and convincing evidence” needed to establish the affirmative defense. Regarding the March 2014 decisions not to promote Delgado, the then-assistant special agent in charge, who had been angry about Delgado’s protected disclosure regarding Labno, was on the promotion panel. Evidence from both Delgado and the panel showed that the assistant special agent in charge set ground rules for Delgado’s interview that prevented him from answering questions based on his extensive experience with the United States Air Force. That put Delgado at a significant disadvantage. Pet’r’s App. 221–22 & 232. One of the two selected candidates had less, and less relevant, experience. And the panel members described the other as “a bit rough around the edges.” Administrative R. 188, ECF No. 51- 4. Overall, the agency’s highly subjective explanations for not promoting the qualified and more experienced Delgado just weeks after his whistleblowing also cannot clear the high bar of “clear and convincing evidence.” Finally, the sheer number of promotions Delgado was qualified for but denied in the wake of his protected disclosure weighs against the aﬃrmative defense. Perhaps one or two might be explained away. But there is ample evidence here of widespread resentment of Delgado’s protected disclosure and too many denials to accept all of the agency’s explanations as clear and convincing. After his protected disclosure, Delgado’s career was going nowhere. Reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude that a remand on the agency’s aﬃrmative defense would waste both judicial and the parties’ 22 No. 19-2239 resources. Moreover, based on the response to our first remand, we must say with regret that we are not confident that such an order would be faithfully implemented. Accordingly, we VACATE the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in both cases under review. We REMAND only for calculation of damages based on salary and benefits as if Delgado had been promoted, as he should have been, to GS-14 as of March 4, 2014, and for a decision on the merits as to whether he is entitled to any additional relief, including whether he would have received any subsequent promotion to GS-15. If we were remanding to a U.S. district court, we would ensure that a diﬀerent judge would preside. See Cir. R. 36. Here that choice is left to the Board’s discretion, but we strongly urge the Board to assign a new administrative judge to this case. See Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 970 (7th Cir. 2003). Finally, we invite Mr. Delgado to submit a motion to this court for attorney’s fees pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 1221(g)(1)(B)(3).