Opinion ID: 1145252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lack of a consistent practice in this case.

Text: An information initially was filed against defendant on a charge of robbery in the second degree, and a preliminary hearing was scheduled for May 4, 1981. On May 1, however, a deputy district attorney sought and obtained from the grand jury an indictment on the same charge. Defendant was so informed at his district court appearance on May 4. He nevertheless requested a preliminary hearing, which was denied by the district court. He then filed in the circuit court a motion for a preliminary hearing or to dismiss the indictment and asked for a hearing in which to show that the denial of the preliminary hearing did not meet the standards indicated in State v. Clark, supra , and State v. Edmonson, supra . At that hearing, on July 15, 1981, the court heard testimony from the District Attorney of Multnomah County and from the deputy district attorney to whom defendant's case was assigned concerning the practices by which the choice between proceeding with or without a preliminary hearing is made. The testimony was responsive but brief. The district attorney stated that the only written policy guidelines direct that preliminary hearings be avoided whenever possible in prosecutions for rape or sexual attack and cases involving a youthful victim. This is done out of consideration for the witness. All other decisions on preliminary hearings are left to the discretion of the individual trial deputy, the court docket and the time in the preliminary hearing court. In practice, crimes against property but not against a person are taken before the grand jury when no one is in custody. When a suspect is arrested, however, as in the present case, a preliminary hearing is initially scheduled, but the assigned deputy may later decide to cancel the hearing and proceed by indictment. According to the district attorney, differences between defendants enter the choice of procedure primarily in predicting whether to anticipate a plea of guilty or a trial: Obviously, [if] there would be a high risk defendant or a high profile defendant, we probably would avoid a preliminary hearing if possible. One consideration might be to minimize opportunities to cross-examine witnesses, because anyone who has tried cases knows that a past reported statement can be turned into a past inconsistent statement. Another consideration might be to avoid a tainted eyewitness identification of the defendant alone at the preliminary hearing rather than from among several persons in a line-up. The district attorney also mentioned the docket on a given day at a given time in the preliminary hearing court and the availability of witnesses, the prosecutor, and defense counsel for the hearing. The choice of procedure is in the discretion of the assigned deputy. No tabulations correlating types of cases or defendants with the charging procedures are kept, and none were compiled and submitted in this case. The deputy district attorney's testimony gave even more weight to administrative or what he called logistical reasons. Some of these arise from the division of work in the office. Because in that office preliminary hearings are handled by one deputy, that deputy's inadequate time to prepare a case leads to taking it instead to the grand jury. Similarly, the relatively short time allowed in a preliminary hearing in Multnomah County leads to taking to a grand jury cases in which the deputy expects to call more than the minimal number of witnesses. These were among the reasons for canceling the scheduled preliminary hearing in this case. The character of the offense did not play a role; some persons charged with robbery are given a preliminary hearing while others, like this defendant, are not. The circuit court found that these reasons did not meet the constitutional requirement that preliminary hearings be allowed upon the same terms to similarly situated citizens under the principles of Clark and Edmonson. The court wrote an opinion which summarized the testimony of the district attorney and deputy district attorney reviewed above. The court stated: Based upon this record, and applying the holdings of the Supreme Court in Clark and Edmonson, supra, as I understand them, it is my opinion that in Multnomah County `the choice between prosecution by information and preliminary hearing or by indictment [does not] uniformly rest on meaningful criteria that indeed make the privileges of a preliminary hearing equally available to all persons similarly situated or, in the constitutional phrase, upon the same terms.' Instead, since the decision is made primarily at the discretion of the prosecution who bases his decision upon `logistical' and `tactical' criteria, the choice of procedure is administered `purely haphazardly or otherwise on terms that have no satisfactory explanation under Art I, § 20.' State v. Edmonson, supra, 291 Or. at 254. Therefore, I hold that defendant has been denied an equal privilege and equal protection in violation of Art I, § 20, Oregon Constitution and the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (Brackets in original). On the record before the court, this ruling was not error. It is true that this defendant does not complain of discriminatory treatment on the basis of his personal characteristics. Nothing in the record suggests prejudice or bad faith on the part of the prosecutor. The Court of Appeals reversed because it thought that we required such a motive for improper discrimination, although it conceded that the circuit court's reading of Clark and Edmonson might be correct. 58 Or. App. at 171, 647 P.2d 966. We agree with the circuit court that even without such ad hominem discrimination, the present case falls within the principle that equal treatment may not be denied haphazardly by ad hoc decisions that, as the court quoted from 291 Or. at 254, 630 P.2d 822, do not uniformly rest on meaningful criteria that indeed make the privileges of a preliminary hearing equally available to all persons similarly situated, or, in the constitutional phrase, `upon the same terms.' As the witnesses explained the manner in which the choice is made, one person accused of participating in a robbery might be afforded a preliminary hearing and another, under otherwise identical circumstances, might be denied such a hearing merely because the assigned deputy did not wish to subject his witnesses to cross-examination. Also, the charging procedure might be changed up to the last minute for the convenience of a witness, or of the district judge, or of the prosecutor himself. A scheduled preliminary hearing might be canceled and a grand jury indictment substituted merely because the prosecutor is not ready or believes there is insufficient time on the calendar to complete the hearing. We intend no criticism of the witnesses testifying in this case; no doubt the two charging procedures were widely thought to be simply alternative tools in the hands of prosecutors until the compatibility of that view with constitutional standards of equal treatment was challenged in Clark and Edmonson. Once those standards are applied, however, it is clear that such day-by-day logistical circumstances as the readiness of the prosecutor or the coincidence of an empty courtroom or a crowded hearing calendar cannot determine the grant or denial of an important procedural step in the defense against a criminal prosecution, if the assurance that privileges must be provided upon the same terms is to have any meaning. [13] They fail the test of discretion to make policies for even application, not discretion to treat each case on an ad hoc basis. Sun Ray Dairy v. OLCC, supra . The circuit court did not misapply article I, section 20, in so holding. To allay misapprehension, perhaps a further comment is in order. In dicta at the end of his opinion, the able trial judge expressed concern about the possible consequences if his application of Clark and Edmonson were taken to mean that all potential criminal defendants in Multnomah County were entitled to preliminary hearings. Clark and Edmonson did not so hold, nor, as we have made clear, does the present decision. Clark and Edmonson rejected such a claim on the assumption that it is possible to administer the dual charging system so as to provide equal treatment for persons similarly situated. We continue to assume that this can be done consistent not only with article I, section 20, but also with federal equal protection standards. As we have noted, all there was before the circuit court and is before this court on the present record is the brief testimony given in this case. We do not generalize on this record that charging procedures in Multnomah County may not in other cases conform to required standards of consistent practice, or that they cannot readily be brought into conformity. This may already have been done since the denial of a preliminary hearing here at issue, which occurred shortly after Clark and Edmonson were decided. Also, as stated above, the choice of consistent procedures, and the factors that may go into the choice, may well be quite different in counties with different case loads and conditions of access to preliminary hearing courts and to grand juries compared with the conditions in Multnomah County.