Opinion ID: 2447372
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the Term Limitation Amendment.

Text: The proposed amendment to the state constitution is invalid for three basic reasons. First, a review of the long history of term limitation compels the conclusion that the framers rejected the idea in drafting the Constitution. Second, the imposition of term limitations upon members of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives would add a qualification not mentioned in the Constitutionlack of incumbencyto the membership requirements that are fixed by the Constitution and the several states do not have this power. Third, allowing a several state to create qualifications for national officeholders is antithetical to both the supremacy concept and to republican values. The American Colonists were well aware of the shortcomings of the imperial parliament of King George III, for they were its victims. They knew that the House of Commons existed in name only ana that tne vast majority of the British people would be denied membership even if elected because of the House of Commons self-proclaimed right to refuse to seat even duly elected members without justification. Eid & Kolbe, The New Anti-Federalism: The Constitutionality of the State-Imposed Limits on Congressional Terms of Office, 69 Den.U.L.Rev. 1, 8 (1992). A reform movement in England in the early 1770's sought to limit the seven-year parliamentary session. Id. at 11. George III consolidated his power and the reform movement languished, but the failure of that reform movement had profound consequences for the Colonists, not just in forming our own country, but in some of the governing provisions. Id. In 1777, the Articles of Confederation limited congressional delegates to three years of service, and by 1784 a handful of members were ineligible for re-election. Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretative History of the Continental Congress 218 (1979); Eid & Kolbe, supra, at 12. The Constitution, which replaced the Articles of 1789, did not incorporate any term restrictions on incumbency. This was not some mere inadvertent omission. Term limits were discussed over a period of years and were discussed in detail in the closed-door negotiations at the Convention in Philadelphia, and these discussions were replayed in the public press. Eid & Kolbe, supra, at 13. The original draft of the Constitution, the so-called Virginia Plan offered by Edmund Randolph, declared U.S. Representatives to be incapable of re-election for the space of ___ after the expiration of their term of service.... James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, in The Anti-Federalist Papers and The Constitutional Convention Debates, at 37 (Ketcham ed. 1986). The campaign against ratifying the Constitution was already underway when the Convention met in May 1787. The Anti-Federalists publicly condemned the proposed Constitution for its failure to forbid incumbent members of Congress from seeKing re-eiection. ine Anti-Federalist pamphleteer Cincinnatus argued that Senators, like the President, should be limited to a single term. Cincinnatus, Anti-Federalist No. 64 In The Anti-Federalist Papers 188 (Martin Borden ed. 1965) cited in Eid & Kolbe, supra, at 15. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts argued both at the Convention and in the press that unless congressional terms were limited, nothing could prevent the perpetuity of office in the same hands for life. Gerry, Replies to the Strictures of A Landlord' (1787) quoted in Eid & Kolbe, supra, at 15. See also Smith, Speeches of Melancton Smith in The Anti-Federalist Papers, supra, at 350. It is striking that these critics understood the Constitution to exclude term limits for members of Congress. There is no indication that they believed the states retained the power to impose such restrictions on federal officeholders. On the contrary, when William Findley urged the citizens of Philadelphia to reject the proposed Constitution, he lamented: Rotation, that noble prerogative of liberty, is entirely excluded from the new system of government and the great men may and probably will be continued in office during their lives. [Emphasis added.] William Findley, Letter of an Officer of the Late Continental Army, Nov. 3, 1787 quoted in Eid & Kolbe, supra, at 16. Findley, like others in the Anti-Federalist camp, believed the Constitution was flawed because the republic it created entirely excluded term limitation, not just for the office of the President, but for members of Congress as well. On the other side, the Federalists also thought that the members of the United States Senate and House of Representatives would be eligible for re-election under the new system of government. In The Federalist No. 53, James Madison not only predicted that some House members would be returned to office repeatedly, but argued that their re-election would benefit the institution as a whole: A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will possess superior talents; will by frequent re-elections, become members of long standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages. The greater the proportion of new members, and the less the information of the bulk of the members, the more apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid for them. The Federalist No. 53, at 335 (James Madison) (Rossiter ed. 1961). In The Federalist No. 60, at 371 (Rossiter ed. 1961), Alexander Hamilton noted that Congress's membership qualifications are defined and fixed in the Constitution, they are unalterable by the legislature. Madison wrote that the minimal requirements of age, residency, and citizenship were to be the sole criteria for congressional service, as follows: Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession, is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people. The Federalist No. 57, at 351 (James Madison) (Rossiter ed. 1961). Refusing to disqualify incumbents from re-election was consistent with the Federalists' overreaching vision of Congress as a national legislature that would do something more than simply represent state and local interests, as the Continental Congress had done under the Articles. The Federalists recognized the possible dangers of congressional incumbency, but decided that the benefits in the form of institutional stability and expertise outweighed the risks. They concluded that the corrupt tendencies of individual incumbents could be controlled by requiring all federal legislators to face their electors with reasonable frequency. Eid & Kolbe, supra, at 17. The Convention debate over two-year and six-year terms for Representatives and Senators, respectively, was reminiscent of that which had taken place in England a few years earlier over limiting the duration of parliamentary terms. Indeed, in rejecting the Anti-Federalists' claim that where annual elections end, tyranny begins, Madison contrasted the Constitution's biennial elections for Representatives with the seven-year sessions of the British House of Commons: As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the people so it is particularly essential that ... [the House of Representatives] should have an immediate dependence on and an intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured. But what particular degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose does not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation.... [I]f we may argue from the degree of liberty retained even under septennial elections, and all the other vicious ingredients in the [British] parliamentary Constitution, we cannot doubt ... that biennial elections, under the federal system, cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite dependence of the House of Representatives on their constituents. The Federalist No. 52, at 327-28 (James Madison) (Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis supplied). As the convention drew to a close, the Anti-Federalists' campaign for term limitation foundered. Randolph's Virginia Plan expressly limited Representatives to a single term, but the delegates voted to eliminate this provision. Gerry and others demanded term limits for Senators, but they too were unsuccessful. Later Convention debates further indicate that both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists understood the final draft of the Constitution to exclude term limits for members of Congress. Eid & Kolbe, supra, at 19. The founders' perspective of the matter of term limits for the members of Congress was settled. Those who argue, as do the interveners in this case, that the founders failed to speak on this issue simply must deny the thoroughness and decisiveness of the term limit debate, and they must deny that the founders deliberately rejected term limits for Congress. After failing to enact congressional term limits in the text of the original Constitution, Anti-Federalists tried to include such restrictions in the Bill of Rights. When the first Congress convened in 1789, Representative Thomas Tucker of South Carolina introduced term limitation proposals for both the Senate and the House. 1 Annals of Cong. 790 (Joseph Gales ed. 1789) cited in Eid & Kolbe, supra, at 21. The House never voted on either of the measures. The intervenors argue that the Constitution does not expressly prevent a state from imposing such a restriction; that the Tenth Amendment, a part of the Bill of Rights, provides that [t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the People; and, therefore, the State has retained the power to limit terms through the Tenth Amendment. The architects of the Constitution plainly intended the opposite result. From the outset Madison and his allies were determined that the Standing Qualifications Clauses contained in Article I, Sections 2 and 3 would be the exclusive list of qualifications for congressional service. Those sections provide: No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained the age of twentyfive years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state in which he shall be chosen, and, No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of the state for which he shall be chosen. The imposition of term limitations without a federal constitutional amendment would add an unenumerated qualificationlack of incumbencyto the membership requirements that are fixed by the Constitution. The founders' decision to make the Standing Qualifications Clauses the sole criteria for congressional membership is especially striking given their insistence that states be allowed to set their own restrictions on who could vote in federal elections. Article I, Section 2 provides that the electors of each State shall have the Qualifications requisite of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature. The states have frequently used this power to disqualify women, blacks, and others from voting while enforcing minimum property ownership requirements reminiscent of those in England. In contrast, the Constitution says nothing about letting states impose similar qualifications on federal officeholders. This silence was the product of one of the founders' greatest debates: whether to restrict service in the national legislature to an elite few. The majority of delegates chose to reject an array of proposed membership qualificationsmostly pertaining to wealthbefore approving the relatively minimal standing qualifications of age, residency, and citizenship that are found in Article I. Eid & Kolbe, supra, at 23. A clear understanding of the founders' intentions leads to the inescapable conclusion that additions to the Standing Qualifications Clauses can be achieved only by amending the text of the Constitution, as was done with the Twentysecond Amendment, which limits the President to eight years of service. In the two centuries since the Philadelphia Convention, both Congress and the Supreme Court have generally construed the Standing Qualifications Clauses to be the exclusive list of membership requirements for members of Congress. In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969), the Supreme Court held that Congress could not exclude a duly elected member of Congress who otherwise satisfies the age, residency, and citizenship requirements contained in Article I. The Court based its decision on an exhaustive review of the relevant historical materials. Id. at 522, 89 S.Ct. at 1964. These materials were not limited to qualifications created by Congress. Rather, the Court also cited the John Wilks case and the Convention debates, to support its expansive conclusion that the standing qualifications are fixed by the Constitution. The case makes it clear that Congress cannot impose restrictions, beyond those contained in Article I, upon its membership without violating the Standing Qualifications Clauses. The holding should apply with equal force to the states. While the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issue of restrictions in addition to those of age, residency, and citizenship, the House of Representatives addressed the issue in a membership dispute over an 1802 Maryland state law that added an additional residency requirement. Although the final House resolution did not contain a report giving the reason for its vote, the overwhelming majority of House members felt that the additional residency requirement violated the Constitution. See Eid & Kolbe, supra, at 33-38. Various reasons were advanced: allowing a state to create qualifications for national officeholder was antithetical to both federal supremacy and republican values; members of Congress were federal officers, not merely agents of the states; when a state claims the right to restrict the franchise in a federal election it constitutes a direct violation of the federal constitutional supremacy; and the founders formed not a government of states, but a national government of the people. Thomas Jefferson was uncertain whether the House's decision meant that the states were absolutely forbidden to impose qualifications on their federal representatives. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Jan. 31, 1814) in Eid & Kolbe, supra, at 40. He thought that the Standing Qualifications Clauses could plausibly be understood as the minimum, but not exclusive, set of requirements for congressional service when read in light of the Tenth Amendment. Jefferson's doubts about the House's decision were in turn questioned by Justice Joseph Story, one of the greatest constitutional scholars of the era. He explained that it was the Constitutional Convention, and not the states, that created the national government. Consequently, Congress' authority can only come from the Constitution itself. Like other federal officeholders, members of Congress owe their existence to the people, whose delegates created the Constitution. He wrote: The truth is, that the states can exercise no powers whatsoever, which exclusively spring out of the existence of the national government, which the Constitution does not delegate to them. They have just as much right, and no more, to prescribe new qualifications for a representative, as they have for a president. Each is an officer of the Union, deriving his powers and qualifications from the Constitution, and neither created by, dependent upon, nor controllable by, the states. It is no original prerogative of state power to appoint a representative, a senator, or a president for the Union. Those officers owe their existence and functions to the united voice of the whole, not a portion of, the people. Before a state can assert the right, it must show, that the Constitution has delegated and recognized it. No state can say, that it has reserved, what it never possessed. Joseph Story, 2 Commentaries on the Constitution § 626 (Rothman ed. 1991) (emphasis added). The intervenors in this case also argue that the Times, Places and Manner Clause of Article I, Section 4, which permits states to establish the procedures for electing Senators and Representatives, permits states to prevent incumbents from seeking re-election. The argument is based on a subtle, and perhaps beguiling, difference between the proposed ballot title and the text of the proposed amendment. The ballot title is Term Limitation Amendment, but the full text of the proposal does not limit terms as such. Instead, it states that a Senator or Congressman who has served the specified number of previous terms shall not be eligible to have his/her name placed on the ballot for election ... from Arkansas. Thus, the intervenors argue that theirs is not a term limitation amendment, but instead is merely a procedure for electing members of Congress, and, therefore, may be governed by the state under the Times, Places and Manner Clause. The argument is based upon the fallacious assumption that the Standing Qualifications Clauses are not the exclusive criteria for congressional service. Moreover, it is beyond doubt that the Times, Places and Manner Clause lets states regulate the procedural machinery of federal elections, but it does not empower states to deny congressional membership to persons who otherwise meet the requirements of the Standing Qualifications Clauses. The Standing Qualifications Clauses are substantive rules, defining who is eligible to serve in Congress. In contrast, the Times, Places and Manner Clause allows states to draft the procedure for their election. These clauses are part of a coherent design; each must be read in the context of the other. The intervenors' interpretation would destroy their syntax. Parenthetically, if a candidate were qualified under the Standing Qualifications Clauses, but his name could not be placed on the ballot, he could run only as a writein candidate. In Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), the Court footnoted that the opportunity for write-in votes is not an adequate substitute for having the candidate's name appear on the printed ballot. In conclusion, the idea of term limitations is not new. It was discussed in England and in the colonies. The Articles of Confederation limited congressional delegates to three years of service. The concept was debated during the Constitutional Convention and also during the subsequent period of ratification. The historical evidence is overwhelming that the requirements for membership in Congress are those set out in the Standing Qualifications Clauses. No other requirements can be validly added by individual states. Thus, the proposed Term Limitation Amendment is unconstitutional. I dissent from the majority opinion, which holds that a state constitutional amendment that is in violation of the federal Constitution should be allowed to remain on the ballot.