Opinion ID: 1243792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Routine Street Conversations About Drug Sales Under the Privacy Act

Text: Our state has a long history of statutory protection of private communications and conversations. In 1909, the Legislature first penalized the opening of a sealed letter or divulging the contents of a telegram. RCW 9.73.010, .020. In 1967, the Legislature made it unlawful, with some statutory exceptions, to intercept or record by any device any private conversation or communication transmitted by telephone, telegraph, radio, or other device without the prior consent of all participants or a court order. RCW 9.73.030. [10] In 1977, the Legislature permitted electronic recording of conversations with one party's consent where law enforcement obtained an order from a judge or magistrate finding probable cause to believe that the nonconsenting party committed, was engaged in, or is about to commit a felony. RCW 9.73.090(2). Authorizations under this section are effective for a maximum of seven days. RCW 9.73.090(4). In 1989, the Legislature enacted the Omnibus Alcohol and Controlled Substances Act (Omnibus Drug Act) which broadened the ability of law enforcement officers to record private conversations and communications concerning drug felonies. RCW 9.73.090(5). That statute permits interception or recording for a fourteen-day period upon a finding by a judge or magistrate there is probable cause to believe that the communication or conversation concerns delivery, sale or other enumerated criminal acts relating to controlled substances. Authorization may be granted even though the true name of the nonconsenting party, or the particular time and place of the conversation, is not known at the time of the request, provided that the authorization describes the nonconsenting party and subject matter of the communication or conversation with reasonable certainty. The authorization remains valid even if there is a change in the time or location of the communication or conversation, or if an additional party not named in the authorization participates in the conversation. RCW 9.73.090(5). [11] RCW 9.73.090(5) was the basis for Operation Hardfall. [12]
Under RCW 9.73.030, the protections of the Privacy Act apply only to private communications or conversations. Kadoranian v. Bellingham Police Dep't, 119 Wash.2d 178, 189, 829 P.2d 1061 (1992). To the extent that the recordings here did not involve private conversations or communications, the trial courts properly admitted the tapes into evidence. The Court of Appeals in D.J.W. found the conversations were not private because the petitioners were vendors of merchandise selling their wares on a public street to anyone who wished to be a customer. Just as a clerk in a store would be willing to engage in a conversation about a product with any customer who happened by, so did the [defendants] manifest a willingness to engage in a conversation with any prospective buyer. 76 Wash.App. at 141, 882 P.2d 1199. We agree. A conversation between a person and a stranger on a public street about a routine sale of illegal drugs is not private and is not protected under RCW 9.73. The Legislature did not define the term private in RCW 9.73. Washington appellate courts have addressed that term by analyzing under the circumstances of a particular case whether a given conversation or communication was private. In Kadoranian, we determined the intent or reasonable expectations of the participants as manifested by the facts and circumstances of each case controls as to whether a conversation is private. Kadoranian, 119 Wash.2d at 190, 829 P.2d 1061 (quoting State v. Forrester, 21 Wash.App. 855, 861, 587 P.2d 179 (1978), review denied, 92 Wash.2d 1006 (1979)). [13] We ruled that the term private was to be given its ordinary and usual meaning: belonging to one's self ... secret ... intended only for the persons involved (a conversation) ... holding a confidential relationship to something ... a secret message: a private communication ... secretly: not open or in public. Id. at 189-90, 829 P.2d 1061. Whether a particular conversation is private is a question of fact, but where the facts are undisputed and reasonable minds could not differ, the issue may be determined as a matter of law. Kadoranian, 119 Wash.2d at 190, 829 P.2d 1061. In deciding whether a particular conversation is private, we consider the subjective intentions of the parties to a conversation. State v. Faford, 128 Wash.2d 476, 910 P.2d 447 (1996) (expectation of privacy in use of cordless phone). But our inquiry does not stop there because any defendant will contend that his or her conversation was intended to be private. We also look to other factors bearing upon the reasonable expectations and intent of the participants. Duration and subject matter of the conversation. In Kadoranian, a citizen answered a telephone call from a stranger, told the caller that her father was not home, and then took a message. This very abbreviated conversation was not private because the nature of the information conveyed to the stranger indicated it was not intended or reasonably expected to be kept secret. Kadoranian, 119 Wash.2d at 190-91, 829 P.2d 1061. Similarly, in State v. Riley, 121 Wash.2d 22, 33-34, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993), we held that a line trap used to obtain the telephone number of an alleged computer hacker did not violate RCW 9.73. The telephone number did not constitute a private conversation under the statute. See also State v. Bonilla, 23 Wash. App. 869, 873, 598 P.2d 783 (1979) (no reasonable expectation of privacy under the Act in telling police of murder because a reasonable person would expect the conversation to be reported to other police officers). Location of Conversation and Presence or Potential Presence of a Third Party. A person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation that takes place at a meeting where one who attended could reveal what transpired to others. State v. Slemmer, 48 Wash.App. 48, 53, 738 P.2d 281 (1987). Similarly, a conversation on a public thoroughfare in the presence of a third party and within the sight and hearing of passersby is not private. State v. Flora, 68 Wash.App. 802, 806, 845 P.2d 1355 (1992). In Flora, two citizens recorded two police officers who allegedly were harassing one of the citizens on a public street within sight or hearing of passersby. The notion of privacy entails a matter into which there should not be prying or intrusion, and that the thing into which there is intrusion or prying must be, and be entitled to be, private. Flora, 68 Wash.App. at 808, 845 P.2d 1355 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jeffers v. City of Seattle, 23 Wash.App. 301, 315, 597 P.2d 899 (1979)). The officers in Flora had no personal privacy interest in statements made as public officers effectuating an arrest in public. Id. at 807, 845 P.2d 1355. In general, the presence of another person during the conversation means that the matter is not secret or confidential. [14] The fact that a transaction is conducted with the public has been enough for us to find that such transaction is not private, even when the transaction takes place inside a private home, a location normally afforded maximum privacy protection. State v. Hastings, 119 Wash.2d 229, 233, 830 P.2d 658 (1992). A person has no expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in a home where illegal business is openly conducted. Id. at 232, 830 P.2d 658. Role of the Nonconsenting Party and His or Her Relationship to the Consenting Party. The nonconsenting party's apparent willingness to impart the information to an unidentified stranger evidences the non-private nature of the conversation. Kadoranian, 119 Wash.2d at 190, 829 P.2d 1061. In State v. Goucher, 124 Wash.2d 778, 784, 881 P.2d 210 (1994), the defendant telephoned his cocaine supplier's house and arranged to buy cocaine from the person who answered the telephone, a police officer conducting a search. We concluded the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy because he voluntarily exposed his desire to buy drugs to a stranger and, thus, ran the risk that such stranger might provide others access to the conversation. Id. at 786, 881 P.2d 210. A communication is not private where anyone may turn out to be the recipient of the information or the recipient may disclose the information. State v. Wojtyna, 70 Wash.App. 689, 695-96, 855 P.2d 315 (1993) (transmittal of telephone number to pager device not a private communication because the information would be received by anyone in possession of the pager), review denied, 123 Wash.2d 1007, 869 P.2d 1084 (1994). `[W]hat is voluntarily exposed to the general public' is not considered part of a person's private affairs, Goucher, 124 Wash.2d at 784, 881 P.2d 210 (quoting State v. Young, 123 Wash.2d 173, 182, 867 P.2d 593 (1994)). While each of these factors is significant in making a factual determination as to whether a conversation is private, the presence or absence of any single factor is not conclusive for the analysis.
Looking in a general way at the sixteen conversations in these consolidated cases, the duration and location of the conversations, the presence or absence of third parties, the subject matter of the conversations, and the defendants' relationship to Glass are factors in determining the conversations here were not private. Glass was a complete stranger to the defendants. The defendants' conversations with him were essentially the same conversations that the defendants might have had with a great many other strangers who approached asking for cocaine. In dealing with Glass, the defendants clearly had no concern for who he was, other than to assure themselves on some occasions that he was not the police. They dealt with him as they would have dealt with anyone else on the street in conducting their business with the public. Hastings, 119 Wash.2d at 233, 830 P.2d 658. The conversations here were not private because they were routine conversations between strangers on the street concerning routine illegal drug sales. Defendants emphasize they would not have had the same incriminating conversations with persons they knew to be working for the police. They argue that this means we must conclude their conversations with Glass were private. They contend that one can have a private conversation with large numbers of other people, as long as one class of listeners, such as police, is not intended to hear the conversation. We reject this analysis. One cannot intend or reasonably expect a conversation, the gist of which is repeated with large numbers of strangers, to be private. The relevant time for assessing the defendants' intent and reasonable expectations is at the time of the conversation, not at the time of their arrest and prosecution. When they were talking with Glass, the defendants clearly would have not withheld the same information from any other prospective purchaser. Such routine street-level or retail sales conversations are not private. Moreover, the conversations often took place in front of other persons, or with other dealers wrestling for business in a marketplace atmosphere. In fact, ten of the defendants' conversations with Glass took place in front of a third party. We believe that the presence of one or more third parties in these cases, regardless of whether the defendant and third party were in the car, means that the conversations were not private in any ordinary or usual meaning of that word. See Slemmer, 48 Wash.App. at 53, 738 P.2d 281. Two other conversations were not in front of third parties, but the defendants stood in a public street during their entire encounter with Glass. They were in plain view and potentially within sight or hearing of anyone who might have passed by. The nature of their interaction with Glass would have indicated to any resident of a high drug trafficking area what was transpiring. These conversations were not private. See Flora, 68 Wash.App. at 806, 845 P.2d 1355. The remaining four defendants did not speak in front of a third party or entirely while standing in a public street. However, they initiated their sales conversations with Glass in the street, agreeing to provide him with cocaine, and then moved into the car to carry out the transaction. [15] Although holding a conversation behind closed doors may tend to make it private in the usual case, these four conversations were not usual. They involved conversations between the defendants and a stranger, and merely consummated a deal arranged while defendants were in plain view on a public street. Three of these defendants expressly agreed to sell Glass cocaine, as they respectively stood on the street or in a parking lot. Piggee Ex. 1; T.L.C. Ex. 4; Harris Ex. 2. The fourth, C.R.G., entered the car wordlessly after Glass had asked for cocaine, implicitly agreeing to the transaction while on the public street. C.R.G. Ex. 2. Even when they moved into the car, the four defendants' interaction with Glass was at least partially visible to passersby. Just as a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy when consuming illegal drugs in front of a picture window, visible to any passerby, State v. Drumhiller, 36 Wash.App. 592, 595, 675 P.2d 631, review denied, 101 Wash.2d 1012 (1984), these four defendants had no expectation of privacy solely because they consummated their public drug deal in a car: [A] man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the plain view of outsiders are not protected because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), quoted in Drumhiller, 36 Wash.App. at 595, 675 P.2d 631. To any passerby in a high drug trafficking area, the activity of the four defendants who initiated an exchange on the street and carried it out in Glass' car was perfectly transparent. Further, the ordinary person does not reasonably expect privacy in a stranger's car. Privacy is a concept that entails the notion that certain matters should not be the subject of prying or intrusion. Flora, 68 Wash.App. at 808, 845 P.2d 1355. To record a conversation behind a closed door usually would entail prying or intrusion into a person's home, workplace, automobile or other private zone. But these four defendants entered a stranger's car. If a person may not reasonably expect privacy when dealing with the public in his own home, that person must expect even less privacy when dealing with the public on the streets and in the cars of strangers. Hastings, 119 Wash.2d at 232, 830 P.2d 658. [16] In sum, we find that none of these conversations was private. Each was a brief and routine sales conversation, just like any other, conducted or initiated on the street with a stranger. Each could not have been reasonably intended or expected to be private, secret, or confidential under the circumstances of Operation Hardfall. [17] We emphasize that our ruling is limited to these sixteen conversations where the defendants approached a stranger for brief, routine conversations on the street about drug sales. We are not suggesting or deciding that a conversation is not private solely because it takes place on a street or solely because it relates to a commercial or illegal transaction. [18] Clearly, there are many commercial and/or illegal transactions that may involve private conversations. These conversations may involve relationships and transactions wholly unlike the anonymous and spontaneous street-level transactions here. [19] We also make no suggestion in this opinion that law enforcement officials should electronically intercept or record private conversations without complying with the requirements in the Privacy Act. Whenever a suspect is known in advance of recording, law enforcement officials should not find it difficult to obtain the requisite authorization under RCW 9.73.