Opinion ID: 1190445
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged statement by Marta Daniels

Text: Prosecution witness Marta Daniels, who had lived with McCray for several years and was his common law sister-in-law, testified on direct examination that on the morning of the killings she asked defendant to give her a dollar and that he told her he had no money but would have one when he got through with his lick. To Daniels, a lick meant a robbery, a scam, a con, or any kind of thing where you get something for doing something wrong. Later that same day, August 15, defendant gave Daniels $50 to buy some cocaine. Three days later, she observed defendant with jewelry and watches. Defendant testified that on the afternoon of August 15, Daniels came to the house where defendant was staying. The prosecutor made a hearsay objection when defendant was asked to recount the substance of his conversation with Daniels that day. Defendant's offer of proof was, She [Daniels] asked me if I had sold the stuff [the jewelry].) The trial court sustained the hearsay objection, explaining that the alleged inquiry by Daniels was being offered to prove the truth of the implied assertion that McCray had told her that he had given the jewelry to defendant. (9a) Defendant contends the alleged question by Daniels as to whether defendant had sold the jewelry was nonhearsay because it was not being offered to prove the truth of the matter implicitly asserted (i.e., McCray's ownership of the jewelry) but rather to explain defendant's state of mind and conduct in giving part of the jewelry to Daniels. We reject the contention for two reasons. First, in his offer of proof to the trial court defendant contended only that the alleged inquiry by Daniels was not hearsay because it was in the form of a question rather than a statement. Defendant did not assert that the alleged inquiry was in any way relevant to his state of mind or conduct. (10) To preserve an alleged error for appeal, an offer of proof must inform the trial court of the purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence.... (Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a).) This is in accord with the general rule that questions relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeal.  ( People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 548 [146 Cal. Rptr. 732, 579 P.2d 1048], italics added.) (9b) Defendant's present contention as to his state of mind comes too late. Second, Daniels's alleged inquiry was irrelevant. Defendant contends Daniels's alleged inquiry would help to explain why he gave her jewelry. He seems to reason as follows: (1) Evidence that he gave jewelry to Daniels suggested to the jury that defendant had obtained the jewelry and thus was the Brice killer; and (2) the alleged inquiry by Daniels would have contradicted this implication, apparently by suggesting that defendant gave her jewelry because he knew she was a friend of McCray and that defendant was afraid of McCray because the jewelry belonged to McCray rather than to defendant. The first prong of this reasoning is not supported by the record. Daniels did not testify that defendant gave her jewelry. To the contrary, she testified that he never gave her jewelry. At the time of defendant's offer of proof, there was no evidence he had given jewelry to Daniels. The reason why he allegedly gave her the jewelry was irrelevant. Moreover, the subsequent record makes clear that the alleged inquiry was being introduced for a hearsay purpose. After the trial court excluded the evidence, defendant himself testified that he had given Daniels approximately one-half of the jewelry that defendant had allegedly obtained from McCray. The obvious purpose of this testimony, which was contrary to Daniels's testimony, was to suggest to the jury that defendant gave the jewelry to Daniels because it belonged to her friend McCray, rather than to defendant. That implied assertion, in turn, would have tended to support defendant's claim that McCray committed the robbery and killings. The purpose of the alleged inquiry by Daniels was therefore to prove the truth of the implied assertion that the jewelry belonged to McCray rather than to defendant. Defendant's own testimony as to the transfer of jewelry to Daniels was meant to exonerate himself. Defendant's contention that he needed to refute a harmful implication based on his alleged transfer of jewelry to Daniels ignores the fact that defendant himself introduced evidence of the transfer. The trial court did not err in excluding defendant's testimony as to the alleged inquiry by Daniels. Even if defendant were correct that the excluded testimony would have demonstrated his state of mind or his conduct  the reason why he gave jewelry to Daniels  exclusion of testimony as to Daniels's alleged inquiry was not prejudicial. Defendant was allowed to testify that he gave her the jewelry, and he could have further testified as to why he did so. The choice not to do so was his. Moreover, according to defendant's own offer of proof, Daniels's alleged question was simply whether defendant had sold the jewelry. This question would have added almost nothing to defendant's contention that he was afraid of McCray. It is not reasonably probable in light of the entire record that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached if the alleged inquiry had been admitted into evidence. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 837.) [2]