Opinion ID: 1515674
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evidence of Office Routine

Text: Brown next contends that Dr. DuShuttle's testimony about his office procedures for documenting the denial of preauthorization is admissible as the routine practice of an organization ... [offered] to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the ... routine practice. [35] Brown seeks to show that Liberty Mutual was aware that pre-authorization was required for Brown's treatment by proving that Dr. DuShuttle would note a denial of pre-authorization in a patient's records only if the billing department had conclusively confirmed the denial. Rule 406 does not authorize the admission of every personal habit or office routine. Under this rule, only evidence of specific, `semi-automatic' conduct that is capable of consistent repetition is admissible to prove conformity with that habit on a particular occasion. [36] Courts generally apply a more liberal standard to evidence of office routine than they apply to evidence of personal habit because there is no concern that the evidence could be used improperly as character evidence. [37] Nevertheless, to be admissible under Rule 406, the office routine must be relatively simple, involve little judgment, and not be susceptible to too much variation. [38] Although Dr. DuShuttle's voir dire testimony established that the billing department followed the same general procedure in documenting denied pre-authorizations, this procedure is not a series of semiautomatic actions involving minimal judgment or variation. On the contrary, the office routine appears to be relatively informal and ad hoc. For example, Dr. DuShuttle testified that requests for pre-authorization are not always performed by the same employees in his office. Dr. DuShuttle also testified that there was no regular reporting routine; instead, he would generally just go up to the Billing Department [and] say what's the status, what's going on. Because of the casual and discretionary nature of this process, we conclude that Dr. DuShuttle's testimony about his office's procedures is not admissible as evidence of a routine practice under Rule 406. [39]