Opinion ID: 2120964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: claims of sentencing error

Text: Defendant's sentencing hearing was conducted before the same jury that had determined his guilt. The statutory circumstance on which the State relied to show defendant's eligibility for the death penalty was that the murdered individual was a peace officer    killed in the course of performing his official duties and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a peace officer. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(1).) Over defendant's objection, the hearing was conducted in a single stage at which both eligibility for the penalty and all the evidence in aggravation and mitigation were considered in succession. In order to prove defendant's eligibility for the death penalty, the State first established Doyle's status as a police officer through testimony of the Chicago police department's personnel director, who read to the jury Doyle's oath. The State then presented several witnesses in aggravation, who testified to other crimes committed by defendant. This evidence showed that, several weeks before the offenses involved here, defendant had participated in another murder and attempted murder (convictions later reversed by us in Hope I ) and that he had been convicted of robbery in 1977 and of armed robbery in 1978. A surviving witness to the Hope I crimes, a security guard, related how defendant had created a disturbance in a restaurant, so that he and a second guard were induced to approach defendant, whereupon defendant's accomplice had entered the premises and killed the second guard with a sawed-off shotgun. The witness described how defendant had then knocked him to the floor, stood over him while holding a sawed-off rifle to his head, and slowly squeezed the trigger while smiling. The witness testified that he had evaded the rifle shot but pretended to be dead and that defendant then had robbed him of his gun. Evidence at the trial of the present cause showed this weapon to have been one of the two guns in defendant's possession during the subsequent crimes that are involved here. Witnesses also testified to a burglary and another robbery allegedly committed by defendant, as well as to a charge of unlawful use of weapons by defendant. Other witnesses related defendant's gang affiliation and his misconduct in prison and in the Cook County jail. In mitigation, defendant presented the testimony of family membersincluding his parentsand friends, who spoke of their affection for him and who recounted his difficult and impoverished childhood. Defendant also presented the favorable testimony of a nun who had met him in the Cook County jail during his incarceration pending trial on the charges here. The State then called one rebuttal witness, Detective Patricia Hickey, whose testimony we shall discuss further. In addition, the parties stipulated that the jury could consider all of the evidence that had been introduced at trial and that defendant was over 18 years of age at the time he committed the offenses here. We have already found that, because of overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, it was not reversible error to permit the State's improper argument regarding the murder victim's survivors at the guilt phase of defendant's trial, since beyond doubt the jury's verdict of guilt would have been the same without such argument. Far different, however, is the matter of whether the jury's sentencing verdict would have been the same without the additional, protracted, and similarly improper evidence and argument regarding survivors that it heard during the sentencing phase. This question leaves us with abiding doubt. The climactic rebuttal testimony of Detective Hickey, who was the last witness heard by the jury at the sentencing hearing, covers eight pages of the record. It focused solely on the reaction of Officer Doyle's mother to her son's death and on the effect that the crime had on her. This testimony dwelt on the mother's profound grief, her closeness to and dependence on her son, his devotion to her, the material and spiritual deprivation she would suffer because of his murder, and Officer Doyle's sister's statement to Hickey that the mother could not attend the trial because to do so would tear her heart out. The prosecution's initial and rebuttal closing arguments at the sentencing hearing urged the jury to consider the impact of Officer Doyle's death on his mother. The prosecution also urged the jury to consider the impact on the security guard's widow and children created by the previous murder for which accountability was attributed to defendant by the testimony of the guard's surviving partner. We believe that the net effect of the prosecution's tactics in dwelling on survivors at both the guilt and sentencing phases of trial was to create an emotionally charged atmosphere in which it was impossible for defendant to receive a sentencing hearing untainted by passion and prejudice. Such evidence and argument offend the teaching of Booth v. Maryland (1987), 482 U.S. 496, 502-06, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 2532-35, 96 L.Ed.2d 440, 448-50, that such evidence is irrelevant to the unique setting of capital sentencingwhich must have an individualized focus on the defendant rather than on the fortuity of the victim's or survivors' identity, circumstances, or articulateness and that the admission of such evidence creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The decision in Booth, of course, was announced after the trial of this cause, but it clearly applies retroactively here, since this direct appeal was pending when Booth was decided. (See Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649; People v. Simms (1988), 121 Ill.2d 259, 271-72, 117 Ill.Dec. 147, 520 N.E.2d 308.) Exposing the jury to the evidence and argument regarding survivors also contravened existing Illinois law. E.g., People v. Bernette (1964), 30 Ill.2d 359, 197 N.E.2d 436; People v. Gregory (1961), 22 Ill.2d 601, 177 N.E.2d 120; People v. Dukes (1957), 12 Ill.2d 334, 146 N.E.2d 14; Filippo v. People (1906), 224 Ill. 212, 79 N.E. 609. Nor can the prosecutorial improprieties here be distinguished. These were not the type of incidental references found tolerable under Booth and Illinois precedent in People v. Del Vecchio (1989), 129 Ill.2d 265, 287-91, 135 Ill.Dec. 816, 544 N.E.2d 312. Here, the objectionable testimony and argument did dwell upon [the] family as victims and were presented in a manner likely to appeal to the jury's sensitivities. ( Del Vecchio, 129 Ill.2d at 291, 135 Ill.Dec. 816, 544 N.E.2d 312.) They were not limited sections of a written presentence report, as in People v. Phillips (1989), 127 Ill.2d 499, 536-37, 131 Ill.Dec. 125, 538 N.E.2d 500, and People v. Jones (1988), 123 Ill.2d 387, 424-25, 123 Ill.Dec. 944, 528 N.E.2d 648. The prosecution's argument about survivors was not general and vague as in People v. Spreitzer (1988), 123 Ill.2d 1, 37, 121 Ill.Dec. 224, 525 N.E.2d 30. The evidence and argument were not necessary to the proper presentation of the State's case, merely an incidental reflection of the obvious fact that the victim left a family, or isolated references of minor significance, as discussed in People v. Barrow (1989), 133 Ill.2d 226, 272, 274-75, 139 Ill. Dec. 728, 549 N.E.2d 240. On the contrary, here we have as powerfully emotionladen a body of argument and testimony as supported the finding of reversible error in People v. Simms (1988), 121 Ill.2d 259, 117 Ill.Dec. 147, 520 N.E.2d 308and in Simms the argument and testimony were heard by a sentencing judge alone rather than, as here, by a presumably more impressionable jury. As for the State's suggestion that any error was harmless here, [t]he extent to which such inflammatory [evidence and argument] affected the jury    in its vote to impose the death penalty will never be known ( Hope I, 116 Ill.2d at 278, 108 Ill.Dec. 41, 508 N.E.2d 202), and [w]e cannot speculate as to the extent to which the jury was influenced by this incompetent evidence and inflammatory argument ( People v. Dukes (1957), 12 Ill.2d 334, 340, 146 N.E.2d 14). The State exacerbated the error here by also dwelling on the horror and outrage of Officer Doyle's colleagues in the police department. Officer Doyle's status as a police officer was a relevant factor in aggravation, but the attitude of other officers was not. Cf. People v. Ramirez (1983), 98 Ill.2d 439, 75 Ill.Dec. 241, 457 N.E.2d 31 (vacating a death sentence in part because of improper argument as to the deceased's status as a police officer). The State cannot successfully contend that defendant invited the improper survivor references by presenting testimony as to defendant's and his mother's remorse over the murder's effects on Mrs. Doyle. This testimony followed rather than preceded the State's initiation of argument regarding survivors, which had occurred at the guilt phase of trial. In addition, the testimony appeared to be spontaneous and not the result of leading questions, and it recognized Mrs. Doyle's suffering rather than disputing it. Neither can the State prevail by contending that defendant's mitigation evidence of his own family's suffering opened the door to the survivor evidence in aggravation. Besides the fact that ample precedent forbids such survivor evidence as irrelevant and prejudicial, a defendant's right to offer any relevant evidence in mitigation is unalloyed, does not depend on any symmetry with the State's ability to present aggravation evidence, and derives from its own constitutional sources. See McKoy v. North Carolina (1990), 498 U.S. ___, ___, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 1231-32, 108 L.Ed.2d 369, 378-81; Blystone v. Pennsylvania (1990), 494 U.S. ___, ___, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 1082, 108 L.Ed.2d 255, 263; Penry v. Lynaugh (1989), 492 U.S. ___, ___, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2946-52, 106 L.Ed.2d 256, 277-84; Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982), 455 U.S. 104, 110-12, 102 S.Ct. 869, 874-75, 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 8-9; Lockett v. Ohio (1978), 438 U.S. 586, 604-05, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964-65, 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 990 (plurality opinion); People v. Ruiz (1989), 132 Ill.2d 1, 25, 138 Ill.Dec. 201, 547 N.E.2d 170. We understand and sympathize with the grief of Officer Doyle's family. We also understand and sympathize with the outrage of Officer Doyle's colleagues over his tragic and senseless murder; and we recognize the everpresent dangers that confront police officers in the line of duty. However, we must uphold the law and assure that the death penalty, when imposed, is the product of deliberate and rational consideration rather than emotion. Accordingly, defendant's convictions are affirmed, his sentence of death is vacated, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court of Cook County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Convictions affirmed; sentence vacated; cause remanded.