Opinion ID: 148932
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Cheryl and Stephen Crowe's Additional Fourth Amendment Claims

Text: Cheryl and Stephen Crowe claim two further Fourth Amendment violations. First, they allege that warrants ordering them to provide blood samples were not supported by probable cause. Second, they allege that they were unlawfully detained in the Escondido police station on the day of Stephanie's murder. The district court denied summary judgment to defendants on both counts, Crowe II, 359 F.Supp.2d at 1023-26, and we affirm.
On February 5, 1998, Officer Claytor sought and obtained search warrants for blood samples from Cheryl and Stephen. Crowe II, 359 F.Supp.2d at 1023. On February 6, 1998, Cheryl and Stephen provided blood samples pursuant to the warrants. Id. The district court held that the warrants were not supported by probable cause because the evidence was sought to prove that an individual other than Cheryl or Stephen committed the crime. Id. at 1023-24. The district court denied qualified immunity, concluding that it was clearly established that probable cause must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized. Id. The Escondido defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity for two reasons. First, they argue that Cheryl and Stephen consented to having their blood drawn, based on deposition testimony from Stephen in which he stated that they would have cooperated with a request for blood in the absence of a search warrant. This argument is unavailing because the Crowes did not give consent, they submitted to a search warrant. Crowe II, 359 F.Supp.2d at 1023. Defendants cannot hide behind a consent defense when no such consent was given. Second, the Escondido defendants argue that the district court erred in determining that the search warrants were not supported by probable cause. The affidavit in support of the warrants contained the following information: (1) that Stephanie Crowe had been stabbed to death in her home; (2) that Cheryl and Stephen Crowe were in the house at the time of Stephanie's death; (3) that blood analysis would tend to show that a particular (but unspecified) person committed the murder; and (4) that to have valid test results, all persons that had contact with the victim needed to be eliminated as a source of the blood. Id. Defendants argue, as they did before the district court, that the affidavit was supported by probable cause because the blood was sought to prove that someone other than Cheryl or Stephen killed Stephanie. As the district court noted, the Supreme Court and this Court have both long held that probable cause must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person.); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th Cir.1995), overruled on other grounds by City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000) ([T]he drawing of blood from free persons generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a person has committed a criminal offense and that his blood will reveal evidence relevant to that offense... .). As the district court also noted, a police officer is not entitled to qualified immunity for a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant where the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable. Mills v. Graves, 930 F.2d 729, 731 (9th Cir.1991). Under clearly established Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit law, no reasonable police officer could have believed that the desire to prove that another person (presumably Michael) killed Stephanie established probable cause to draw Stephen and Cheryl's blood. The district court properly denied summary judgment and qualified immunity.
The district court also properly denied summary judgment as to Cheryl and Stephen's claim that they were unlawfully detained at the Escondido police station on January 21, 1998. Cheryl and Stephen allege that when they attempted to leave the police station Detective Wrisley pulled out his gun, pointed it at Stephen's chest, and ordered Stephen and Cheryl back upstairs, where they remained until Wrisley told them that they had to go to a hotel and could not leave with Stephen's brother, as Stephen had requested. Crowe II, 359 F.Supp.2d at 1026. The district court denied summary judgment on the grounds that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Cheryl and Stephen had been seized and defendants failed to provide any justification. Id. The Escondido defendants argue that Cheryl and Stephen returned upstairs voluntarily. In support of that argument, defendants cite Stephen's deposition in which he stated that after Detective Wrisley pointed a gun at them and ordered them upstairs, Cheryl said let's go back upstairs and Stephen responded fine, let's go back upstairs. Defendants' argument is untenable. Assent in the face of an order from a police officer, emphasized with a firearm, cannot reasonably be interpreted as consent. The district court properly denied summary judgment and qualified immunity.