Opinion ID: 1175098
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Irreparable Injury to Petitioner's Business and Property

Text: The record shows that petitioner acquired the land concerned in July, 1954  some 18 years after [4] the amendment of the zoning ordinance to ban private schools from Zone A; the last prior owner of the land was The Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco, a California corporation sole. The same corporation sole owns additional, adjoining, land on which are a Roman Catholic Church, and a rectory occupied by priests of said Church who serve Corpus Christi Parish in the Archdiocese of San Francisco of such Church. The school building which petitioner seeks to construct would have dimensions of 204 feet by 65 feet and an area of 13,260 square feet; in addition petitioner's land has an area of some 16,240 square feet which is available for incidental and/or school playground uses. Petitioner's land along its east boundary fronts upon the west side of Park Boulevard, all of which boulevard in that area lies within the corporate limits of the city of Oakland and not within the city of Piedmont. Adjacent to petitioner's land is a residential area known as `St. James Wood,' which comprises approximately 227 building sites, all of which are restricted, by restrictions of record, to single family residences; the owners of said property have formed and are members of an association known as `St. James Wood Homes Association.' If a witness were called for city of Piedmont he would testify that at a meeting of the members of said Association, held June 15, 1954, said members voted (170 to 2) objection to the granting of a permit for the building of petitioner's proposed school. It thus is shown that petitioner's land was acquired by it with advance knowledge that such land lies in a single family residential zone, and, further, that the adjacent land within the city of Piedmont is used for single family residential, rather than for private business, purposes. Under such circumstances no support is found for petitioner's assertion of irreparable injury to its business and property if it does not secure the private school building permit it seeks. In Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino (1946), supra, 29 Cal.2d 332, 340, this court said that An examination of the California decisions discloses that the cases in which zoning ordinances have been held invalid and unreasonable as applied to particular property fall roughly into four categories: 1. Where the zoning ordinance attempts to exclude and prohibit existing and established uses or businesses that are not nuisances. [Citations.] 2. Where the restrictions create a monopoly. [Citations.] 3. Where the use of adjacent property renders the land entirely unsuited to or unusable for the only purpose permitted by the ordinance. [Citation.] 4. Where a small parcel is restricted and given less rights than the surrounding property, as where a lot in the center of a business or commercial district is limited to use for residential purposes, thereby creating an `island' in the middle of a larger area devoted to other uses. [Citations.] Petitioner has alleged no facts showing, and makes no effort to support a claim, that the present case falls into any of the categories above listed, but merely alleges generally that Unless respondents are compelled ... to issue to petitioner the permit which it has requested and, thus authorize the petitioner to construct, erect and establish its proposed school, petitioner's business and property will suffer irreparable injury. The law is settled, however, that The mere fact that some hardship may be experienced is not material, for `[e]very exercise of the police power is apt to affect adversely the property interest of somebody.' ( Clemons v. City of Los Angeles (1950), supra, 36 Cal.2d 95, 99; Zahn v. Board of Public Works (1925), 195 Cal. 497, 503 [234 P. 388].) Where it is claimed that the ordinance is unreasonable as applied to plaintiff's property, or that a change in conditions has rendered application of the ordinance unreasonable, it is incumbent on plaintiff to produce sufficient evidence from which the court can make such findings as to the physical facts involved as will justify it in concluding, as a matter of law, that the ordinance is unreasonable and invalid. It is not sufficient for him to show that it will be more profitable to him to make other use of his property, or that such other use will not cause injury to the public, but he must show an abuse of discretion on the part of the zoning authorities and that there has been an unreasonable and unwarranted exercise of the police power. [Citation.] ( Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino (1946), supra, 29 Cal.2d 332, 338.) [I]t must be shown that there has been an unreasonable, oppressive, or unwarranted interference with property rights in the exercise of the police power before a zoning ordinance can be held invalid [citations] ... The burden rests upon the plaintiff to establish the invalidity of the ordinance and its application to the property involved. The plaintiff's failure to sustain this burden raises a presumption of the existence of such facts as are sufficient to sustain the ordinance. [Citation.] ( Beverly Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1953), 40 Cal.2d 552, 559 [254 P.2d 865].) If we conform to the principles above stated the writ sought should be denied.