Opinion ID: 874141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court Erred by Refusing to Dismiss Miller's Intentional Tort Claims Against Yount and the ISP

Text: Miller asserted claims for assault and battery against Yount for forcibly catheterizing him. He also seeks damages from the ISP under the doctrine of respondeat superior. [7] The district court believed that Yount's actions may have been unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, creating a factual issue for the jury as to whether the catheterization was reasonable and therefore an acceptable physical contact. The ITCA immunizes public officials from some tort claims if the plaintiff does not show malice or criminal intent. It provides: [E]very governmental entity is subject to liability for money damages arising out of its negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions and those of its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties, whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function, where the governmental entity if a private person or entity would be liable for money damages under the laws of the state of Idaho.... I.C. § 6-903(a). This rule is subject to several exceptions, including one for certain intentional torts. Absent malice or criminal intent, government employees acting within the scope of their employment are not liable for claims arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, and others. Id. § 6-904(3). It shall be a rebuttable presumption that any act or omission of an employee within the time and at the place of his employment is within the course and scope of his employment and without malice or criminal intent. Id. § 6-903(e).
Civil battery consists of an intentional contact with another person that is either unlawful, harmful, or offensive. Neal v. Neal, 125 Idaho 617, 622, 873 P.2d 871, 876 (1994). Lack of consent is a critical element of battery. Id. Yount asserted in his motion for summary judgment that there was no evidence he acted with malice. All drivers in Idaho impliedly consent to BAC and drug tests upon reasonable suspicion. I.C. § 18-8002(1); State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 371, 775 P.2d 1210, 1213 (1989). Permissible testing is simply defined as a procedure or test or series of procedures or tests ... utilized to determine the concentration of alcohol or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in a person. I.C. § 18-8002(9). This Court has made it clear that `the choice as to which type of evidentiary test for concentration of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances will be requested rests with the police officer, not the defendant.' Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 832, 41 P.3d 257, 260 (2002) (quoting In re Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 370, 744 P.2d 92, 98 (1987)). A catheterization is a urine test for drugs present in the suspect's body, and since the parties agree that there was probable cause to believe that Miller was operating a vehicle while under the influence of drugs, Miller impliedly consented to it. Because Yount was acting during the course and scope of his employment, the burden was on Miller, as the plaintiff below, to show some evidence that Yount acted maliciously or with criminal intent. I.C. § 6-903(e); Hunter v. State, 138 Idaho 44, 48, 57 P.3d 755, 759 (2002). The plaintiff cannot rest on the pleadings but must show some evidence from which the court could reasonably infer the critical elements of his or her claims. Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 188, 731 P.2d 171, 183 (1986). Malice here means the intentional commission of a wrongful or unlawful act, without legal justification or excuse and with ill will, whether or not injury was intended. Beco Constr. Co. v. City of Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 864, 865 P.2d 950, 955 (1993) (quoting Anderson, 112 Idaho at 187-88, 731 P.2d at 182-83). Criminal intent is satisfied if it is shown that the defendant knowingly performed the proscribed acts. Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 470, 716 P.2d 1238, 1242 (1986) (quoting State v. Gowin, 97 Idaho 766, 767-68, 554 P.2d 944, 945-46 (1976)). As the district court freely acknowledged, Miller has not provided any evidence whatsoever in the form of an affidavit, deposition, or other document regarding the facts in this case. No shred of evidence suggests that Yount acted with malice or criminal intent. Since the parties in this case agree that probable cause existed for Yount to test Miller for drugs, the only reasonable inference is that he catheterized Miller pursuant to a valid criminal investigation. Miller instead advances a legal argument to support his battery claim. He contends that Yount had the statutory right to order a blood draw only for certain serious offenses, none of which he was charged with. Idaho Code § 18-8002(6)(b) states that peace officers are empowered to order medical professionals to withdraw blood samples for certain aggravated offenses, such as aggravated DUI and vehicular manslaughter. [8] Since Miller was charged with misdemeanor DUI, he asserts that Yount committed battery by illegally ordering him to submit to a test for bodily fluids. He also argues that § 18-8002 does not authorize police to order anyone to be subjected to a catheterization, only to blood draws. However, as this Court has already expressly held, § 18-8002(6)(b) is merely a list of situations in which peace officers can order certain medical personnel to perform a blood test upon a suspect. [A]n officer's authority to require a defendant to submit to a blood withdrawal, under I.C. § 18-8002, does not turn on whether aggravating factors are present. Halen, 136 Idaho at 834, 41 P.3d at 262. Anyone driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs impliedly consents to evidentiary testing for drugs or other intoxicating substances in the bloodstream regardless of whether he or she is suspected of an aggravated offense. That is, police can require all drivers to submit to drug tests if reasonable suspicion exists that they are under the influence of drugs. If medical personnel refuse to administer a drug test on a DUI suspect, the police cannot order them to do so. Section 18-8002(6)(b) is, however, an exception to the rule that law enforcement cannot order unwilling medical facilities to administer drug tests. It permits police to require medical personnel to administer blood tests in cases where a person is suspected of certain aggravated crimes. Id. It also does not mention urine tests whatsoever. This provision therefore has no bearing on an officer's power to require someone suspected of driving under the influence to submit to a bodily fluids test, whether for blood or urine. The district court erred by not granting summary judgment to Yount on Miller's battery claim.
For similar reasons, Yount is immune from Miller's assault claim. Assault is [a]n unlawful threat or offer to do bodily harm or injury to another. 6A C.J.S. Assault § 6 (2010) (emphasis added). As explained above, Yount had a statutory right to test Miller's urine, and Miller has provided no evidence whatsoever that Yount otherwise acted with malice or criminal intent. Under the ITCA, Yount is immune from suit for an assault. The district court erred in refusing to grant summary judgment to Yount on the assault claim.
Because Yount is not liable for any intentional torts against Yount, the ISP is not vicariously liable either. The ITCA provides: Except as otherwise provided in this act, every governmental entity is subject to liability for money damages arising out of its negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions and those of its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties, whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function, where the governmental entity if a private person or entity would be liable for money damages under the laws of the state of Idaho .... I.C. § 6-903(a) (emphasis added). As explained in the previous two subsections, Yount is immune from suit for battery or assault under the ITCA. He is not liable for money damages under the laws of the state of Idaho. Hence, the ISP, by extension, cannot be liable for these intentional torts. The district court should have granted summary judgment to the ISP on Miller's assault and battery claims.