Opinion ID: 1754908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Points of Error Relating Solely to Richards

Text: 1. Breach of Fiduciary Duty In her first point of error, Richards asserts the trial court erred in rendering a judgment on the finding she breached her fiduciary duty to Helen because there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support a finding that: (1) [A and B] she failed to advise Helen of any material fact Helen did not know; or (2) [C and D] Helen had been damaged. The jury answered Yes to the following question: Did Dianne Richards breach her fiduciary duty to Helen Vickery while representing Helen Vickery in the divorce and marital property division between Helen Vickery and Glenn Vickery? Jury question 6A asked: What sum of money, if any, ... would fairly and reasonably compensate Helen Vickery for her damages, if any, that were proximately caused by Dianne Richards, if any, concerning the division of the marital property of Helen Vickery and Glenn Vickery? .... LOSS OF MARITAL PROPERTY: $100,000.00 MENTAL ANGUISH: $350,000.00 The trial court rendered judgment that Helen take $350,000 from Richards. A. Standard of review, sufficiency of the evidence In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the evidence and inferences, when viewed in their most favorable light, that tend to support the finding, and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752 S.W.2d 518, 522 (Tex. 1988). If there is any evidence of probative force to support the finding, the finding will be upheld. See Sherman v. First Nat'l Bank, 760 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. 1988). In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we examine all the evidence, and will set aside a verdict only if the evidence is so weak or the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986). B. Breach of fiduciary duty A fiduciary duty exists between attorney and client. Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex.1988); Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex.App. Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). The relationship between attorney and client requires absolute and perfect candor, openness and honesty, and the absence of any concealment or deception. Perez, 822 S.W.2d at 265. It is uncontroverted Richards filed a petition for divorce in Helen's name without ever consulting Helen or obtaining her permission. It is also uncontroverted Richards prepared Glenn's answer and counterclaim, someone in her office signed it for Glenn, and her office filed this document; Richards never informed Helen that Glenn filed a counterclaim. Richards testified she never informed Helen of Helen's legal rights in a divorce. Helen testified she never spoke to Richards about the divorce until the day Glenn persuaded her to sign the divorce decree. According to Helen, she told Richards she did not want the divorce; Richards, however, told Helen that Helen was doing the right thing because she was protecting the family's assets by signing the decree. Richards testified she had discussed the divorce with Helen and that Helen wanted the divorce. The jury believed Helen. We conclude the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's finding that Richards breached her fiduciary duty to Helen. We overrule Richards' point of error 1(A) and (B). In points of error 1(C) and 1(D), Richards asserts there is no evidence or insufficient evidence that Helen was damaged. Richards asserts, to recover, Helen must show she has suffered a pecuniary loss. Even assuming this proposition is true, we hold there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate Helen had been damaged. Richards never filed an inventory or did any discovery regarding the extent of the marital estate. Richards testified herself that she intentionally drafted a divorce decree that was vague about the Vickerys' assets in order to conceal these assets from potential creditors. Helen and Glenn divided some of these undisclosed assets after the divorce. However, Helen presented evidence that Glenn had concealed $1 million in gold and $500,000 in treasury bills from her. Helen established she suffered a pecuniary loss by both legally and factually sufficient evidence. We overrule Richards' point of error 1(C) and (D). 2. Evidence of the Fair Market Value of the Community Estate In point of error two, Richards asserts the trial court erred in rendering judgment against her because there was no evidence or insufficient evidence as to the fair market value of the whole or a substantial portion of the community estate without which appellee could not demonstrate she had been damaged. In point of error three, she asserts the trial court erred in admitting evidence the community estate had spent $1,400,000 for improvements to Moss Hill and evidence of the replacement cost Glenn placed on his furniture and personal effects after the divorce because this evidence was legally and factually insufficient to establish the fair market value of the community estate. We assume these assertions relate to her argument that because Helen could not establish she suffered pecuniary loss, the trial court erred in entering judgment against Richards. For the reasons articulated in our discussion of point of error 1(C) and (D), we overrule Richards' points of error two and three. 3. Mental Anguish In point of error five, Richards asserts the trial court erred in rendering a judgment for mental anguish damages because (1) as a matter of law, mental anguish is not recoverable for constructive fraud, and (2) the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support a finding of mental anguish caused by Richards' alleged breach of fiduciary duty. The following constitutes Richards' argument that mental anguish is not a measure of damages or recoverable for constructive fraud: Recovery for mental anguish has not been allowed for cases of fraud in Texas, except in one case of fraudulent inducement, distinguishing the fact that fraudulent inducement is an intentional tort. The Supreme Court reemphasized that claimants can not [sic] recover for mental anguish in negligent misrepresentation and cannot be recovered [sic] under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act absent proof of a willful or grossly negligent violation. The trend seems to be that the tort must have some scienter of the perpetrator. Fraud actions have generally been held to put the Plaintiffs [sic] back in the place where he was before the fraud occur [sic]. (Citations omitted.) We understand Richards' argument to be: (1) breach of fiduciary duty constitutes constructive fraud, (2) one cannot recover mental anguish damages for fraud, and (3) the trial court therefore erred in awarding Helen mental anguish damages. Fraud may be classified as actual or constructive. Actual fraud involves dishonesty of purpose or intent to deceive. Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Tex.1964). Constructive fraud is the breach of some legal or equitable duty that the law declares fraudulent because it tends to deceive others, violate confidences, or injure public interests. Id. The actor's intent is irrelevant. Id. Constructive fraud is most frequently found in a breach of a fiduciary or confidential relationship. 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 2(c)(2) (1943). In an action for fraud, damages are ordinarily limited to the actual loss that is a direct and proximate result of the fraud. Hudson & Hudson Realtors v. Savage, 545 S.W.2d 863, 868 (Tex.App.Tyler 1977, no writ). In Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993), the supreme court held that in Texas there is no general duty not to negligently inflict emotional distress. Id. at 594. The court noted, however, that certain relationships may give rise to a duty which, if breached would support an emotional distress award. Id. at 600. As examples of such relationships, the court cited cases involving the failure of a telegraph company to timely deliver a death message and a funeral home's negligent mishandling of a corpse. Id. In Krishnan v. Sepulveda, 916 S.W.2d 478, 482 (Tex.1995), the court found the physician-patient relationship is one that, if breached, would support an emotional distress award. Id. Dr. Krishnan had a clear, legal duty to provide competent medical care to [her patient]. A breach of this duty, coupled with the mental anguish resulting from the loss of an unborn child, could provide a sufficient basis for [the patient's] recovery [of emotional distress damages]. Id. We believe the attorney-client relationship is, like the doctor-patient relationship, a special relationship giving rise to a duty that, if breached, may support an emotional damage award. The attorney-client relationship has been held to be one of uberrima fides in other words, a relationship of the most abundant good faith, absolute and perfect candor or openness and honesty, and the absence of any concealment or deception, however slight. State v. Baker, 539 S.W.2d 367, 374 (Tex. Civ.App.Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Moreover, we conclude that the following factors support the existence of a special relationship. First, there was a contractual relationship between Helen and Richards. Second, Helen, who testified she was coerced into getting a divorce she did not want, was particularly susceptible to emotional distress. Finally, Richards knew of Helen's susceptibility to emotional distress; Helen, according to her testimony, sobbed and told Richards on November 15, 1991 that she did not want the divorce. We hold that, under the facts of this case, Richards' breach of fiduciary duty supports an award of mental anguish damages. [23] To recover for mental anguish, the plaintiff must prove such painful emotions as grief, severe disappointment, indignation, wounded pride, shame, despair, or public humiliation. Havens v. Tomball Community Hosp., 793 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied). Richards asserts there is no evidence she proximately caused the mental anguish suffered by Helen. We disagree. Helen testified that in the days after November 15, the date she signed the divorce decree and, according to her testimony, the first time she had spoken to Richards about the divorce, I didn't eat. I didn't sleep. I cried all the time. I was very emotionally disturbed. I think I was devastated. I was worried about my family. We hold the evidence was sufficient to show Richards proximately cause Helen mental anguish. We overrule Richards' point of error five. 4. The Disciplinary Rules In her point of error eight, Richards asserts the trial court erred by allowing counsel to question her concerning the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (the disciplinary rules.) After Richards acknowledged the disciplinary rules were authoritative and relevant with respect to how to deal with your client and agreed the rules were the ultimate authority in that area, Helen's counsel asked Richards a series of questions regarding her conduct in the original divorce case and the application of the disciplinary rules to that conduct. Defense counsels' objections to this line of questioning were overruled. Helen's counsel similarly used the disciplinary rules as a basis for questioning both Helen's expert witness, Earle Lilly, and Richards' expert witness, former Texas Supreme Court Justice Eugene Cook, about Richards' conduct. Defense counsel objected to the use of the disciplinary rules during Lilly's testimony, but did not object to their use during cross-examination of former Justice Cook. On appeal, she complains only of the use of the rules during her testimony; she raises no argument about counsel's use of the rules in examining Lilly and cross-examining former Justice Cook. [24] Richards argues on appeal: (1) the preamble to the disciplinary rules provides that the rules are not to be used for any civil liability, and (2) case law states that a violation of a disciplinary rule does not give rise to a private cause of action. Because Richards did not complain at trial about the use of the rules in former Justice Cook's cross-examination, and does not complain on appeal about the use of the disciplinary rules in questioning either former Justice Cook or Earle Lilly, we conclude that Richards has waived any complaint about the use of the rules during her direct examination. We overrule Richards' point of error eight. 5. Trial Judge as Witness; Comment on the Weight of the Evidence In Richards' point of error nine, she asserts she was entitled to a mistrial because the trial judge testified against her and made a comment on the weight of the evidence and because of a sidebar remark made by opposing counsel. Helen asserted, among other things, that Richards was negligent in not filing an inventory of the estate in the divorce action. Helen called Richards as an adverse witness. During direct examination, Helen's counsel asked Richards about rule 6B of the Harris County Family Trial Division rules. Neither Richards nor Helen has provided this Court with the text of rule 6B, although Helen's counsel read the text of the rule into the record: In all cases requiring the division of property and/or liabilities, the husband and wife each shall file with the Court or upon written mutual agreement exchange between themselves sworn inventories within 75 days of the date that suit is filed. Both defendants' counsel objected that the rule did not apply to uncontested divorces, although, as read into the record, the rule does not provide it is inapplicable to uncontested divorces. Glenn's counsel argued, This Court knows that everybody does not file an inventory in every case that's filed in this building. That's just a given. The trial court overruled defendants' objections, stating: That's not as I understand the rules of the Family Law Bar or as they are practiced [sic]. And to include all of the cases that are going to trial does not exclude inventories being filed. In fact even the statute says in regard to some sworn inventories [sic]. Helen's counsel asked Richards if she had filed an inventory and she responded she had not. The following exchange then occurred: Mr. Krist: And you know that you were supposed to [file an inventory]? Richards: Not in an uncontested matter, no, Sir, I don't. Mr. Krist: All right. Then you disagree with Judge Elliott's ruling on the matter as having been something that's required in all cases. Richards: Yes, sir. Mr. Krist: Okay. Well, I will go along with the Judge's interpretation. Both defendants' counsel objected to Krist's comment, and Richards' counsel moved for a mistrial, stating, [A]t this point I believe counsel has injected the Judge as a witness in this case at this point by his questioning, indicating and asking the witness to disagree with His Honor.... And, unfortunately what it's done, we have had a comment on the weight of the evidence. On appeal, Richards asserts that Rule 605 of the Texas Rules of Evidence prohibits a trial judge to [sic] testify in a trial he is presiding over. Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 605 provides, The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. No objection need be made in order to preserve the point. Richards argues, [P]art of the contested issue is whether or not there was a breach of the duty by not filing an inventory. Rule 6B of the Family Trial Division relates to inventories. The Judge's comments were the Judge's interpretation of those rules. The Judge's comment was testimony and was an impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence. We agree with Helen that the trial court's comment was elicited by defense counsel. Further, we do not consider the trial court's statement to be testimony. A trial court comments on the weight of the evidence when it indicates an opinion as to the verity or accuracy of the facts in inquiry. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Martin Surgical Supply Co., 689 S.W.2d 263, 272 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Even if the trial court's comment constituted a comment on the weight of the evidence, we again note that the comment was elicited by defense counsel; Glenn's counsel argued,  This Court knows that everybody does not file an inventory in every case that's filed .... (emphasis added). Further, Helen's counsel questioned Helen's family law expert, Earle Lilly, about rule 6B. Lilly testified the rule must be complied with and can be disregarded only in rare instances in which the divorce is uncontested and the parties have little or no property. He further testified this was not the type of case in which the filing of an inventory should be waived. He testified the failure to file (or at least exchange) an inventory in this case fell extremely beneath the standard of care expected of an attorney. In light of this testimony, in addition to testimony discussed elsewhere in this opinion, we cannot say the sole comment by the trial court probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. TEX.R.APP. P. 44.1(a)(1). We overrule Richards' point of error nine. 6. Motion to Quash In point of error 11, Richards asserts the trial court erred in granting the motion filed by Robert Newey to quash and to limit production. In March 1992, Helen retained the law firm of Rosen & Newey. She met with Marian Rosen to determine whether the divorce decree protected her assets. Rosen apparently advised Helen that it did. In June 1992, Newey represented Helen in her post-divorce settlement negotiations with Glenn before this lawsuit was filed. In November 1993, Richards served Newey with a subpoena for a deposition; the subpoena specified that Newey was to produce the entire file pertaining to Helen. Newey filed a motion to quash, citing the attorney-client and work product privileges. In his motion, Newey stated he would tender the documents for in camera review, and Helen states in her brief he did tender the documents. The trial court granted the motion. On appeal, Richards asserts that Helen waived the attorney-client privilege by making affirmative use thereof. An offensive, rather than a defensive, use of a privilege occurs when a party seeks affirmative relief against another, yet attempts, on the basis of privilege, to deny the other party the benefit of evidence that would materially weaken or defeat the claims against the other party. Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex.1985) (orig.proceeding). The supreme court has held such offensive use may constitute a waiver of privilege: A plaintiff cannot use one hand to seek affirmative relief in court and with the other lower an iron curtain of silence against otherwise pertinent and proper questions which may have a bearing upon his right to maintain his action. Id. at 108 (quoting Pavlinko v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 192 Conn. 138, 470 A.2d 246, 251 (1984)). The Ginsberg offensive use waiver applies to the attorney-client privilege. Republic Ins. Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex.1993) (orig.proceeding). Richards asserts information between attorney and client in the April/May meeting could be outcome determinative with regard to [sic] if Helen Vickery still wanted the divorce in the Spring of 1992, or was unhappy with the division. [25] Richards has not directed our attention to any portion of the record in which a copy of the trial court's order can be found. Neither has she provided this Court with a statement of facts from the hearing at which the trial court ruled that the documents were privileged. Finally, she has failed to supply this Court with copies of the documents that were tendered to the trial court by Newey for in camera review. Because of these deficiencies in the record, Richards has waived any complaint with respect to this point of error. Accordingly, we overrule Richards' point of error 11.