Opinion ID: 2600503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether conversations between police officers and detainees at a traffic stop are private for the purposes of Washington's privacy act

Text: ¶ 19 Washington's privacy act, chapter 9.73 RCW, places great value on the privacy of communications. State v. Christensen, 153 Wash.2d 186, 199-200, 102 P.3d 789 (2004). The act tips the balance in favor of individual privacy at the expense of law enforcement's ability to gather evidence without a warrant. Id. at 199, 102 P.3d 789. Under RCW 9.73.030, the privacy act prohibits the recording of private conversations without the consent of all parties to the conversation. RCW 9.73.030 states: (1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, it shall be unlawful for any individual . . . or the state of Washington, its agencies, and political subdivisions to intercept, or record any: . . . . (b) Private conversation, by any device electronic or otherwise designed to record or transmit such conversation regardless how the device is powered or actuated without first obtaining the consent of all the persons engaged in the conversation. . . . . (3) Where consent by all parties is needed pursuant to this chapter, consent shall be considered obtained whenever one party has announced to all other parties engaged in the communication or conversation, in any reasonably effective manner, that such communication or conversation is about to be recorded or transmitted: PROVIDED, That if the conversation is to be recorded that said announcement shall also be recorded. The statute clearly prohibits only the recording of private conversations. ¶ 20 Whether a conversation is private is a question of fact, unless the facts are undisputed and reasonable minds could not differ, in which case it is a question of law. State v. Clark, 129 Wash.2d 211, 225, 916 P.2d 384 (1996) (citing Kadoranian v. Bellingham Police Dep't, 119 Wash.2d 178, 190, 829 P.2d 1061 (1992)). In Kadoranian, this court adopted the Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1969) definition of private as `belonging to one's self . . . secret . . . intended only for the persons involved (a conversation) . . . holding a confidential relationship to something . . . a secret message: a private communication . . . secretly: not open or in public.' 119 Wash.2d at 190, 829 P.2d 1061 (quoting State v. Forrester, 21 Wash.App. 855, 861, 587 P.2d 179 (1978)). When determining whether a particular conversation is private, we look to the subjective intentions of the parties to the conversation. Clark, 129 Wash.2d at 225, 916 P.2d 384. However, because most defendants would contend that their conversations are private, we also look to factors bearing on the reasonable expectations and intent of the parties. Id. In Clark, we identified three factors bearing on the reasonable expectations and intent of the parties (1) duration and subject matter of the conversation, (2) location of conversation and presence or potential presence of a third party, and (3) role of the nonconsenting party and his or her relationship to the consenting party. Id. at 225-27, 916 P.2d 384. ¶ 21 The State [6] maintains that traffic stop detainees do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their conversations with police officers. An analysis of the factors in Clark supports this conclusion. Under the first factor, the recorded conversations in these cases were essentially brief business conversations with uniformed police officers. Under the second factor, the conversations between the police officers and the detainees occurred in public, in several cases along busy roads. Additionally, in the case of Lewis and Kelly, third parties were present for part or all of the conversations because the police officers called back-up, and in the case of Kelly, a passenger was in his car. Finally, under the third factor, it is not persuasive that the nonconsenting parties to these conversations, the drivers, would expect the officers to keep their conversations secret, when the drivers would reasonably expect that the officers would file reports and potentially would testify at hearings about the incidents. ¶ 22 The drivers contend that traffic stop conversations are private because they are involuntary. [7] However, the drivers offer no authority for the proposition that an involuntary conversation is a private one. Rather, the correct inquiry is whether the parties intend the conversation to be secret, in light of the factors from Clark. The drivers fail to establish that the parties intend the conversation to be secret in the context of a traffic stop. ¶ 23 Finally, as the State notes, this court and the Court of Appeals have repeatedly held that conversations with police officers are not private. See, e.g., Clark, 129 Wash.2d at 226, 916 P.2d 384 (no reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation with an undercover police officer when it takes place at a meeting where one who attended could reveal what transpired to others.); State v. Bonilla, 23 Wash.App. 869, 873, 598 P.2d 783 (1979) (It would strain reason for Bonilla to claim he expected his conversations with the police dispatcher to remain purely between the two of them.); State v. Flora, 68 Wash.App. 802, 808, 845 P.2d 1355 (1992) (Because the exchange [between a police officer and an arrestee during an arrest] was not private, its recording [by the arrestee] could not violate RCW 9.73.030 which applies to private conversations only.); see also Alford v. Haner, 333 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004) (noting that State v. Flora established that a traffic stop was not a private encounter for purposes of the privacy act); Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 682-83 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that an individual who videotaped a police officer during an arrest did not violate RCW 9.73.030 because the officer had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his communications with others over his police radio). ¶ 24 In light of the definition of private, our analysis of the Clark factors, and these prior decisions, we hold that traffic stop conversations are not private for purposes of the privacy act.