Opinion ID: 1917412
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of RSA 677:15, I

Text: We first consider whether RSA 677:15, I, applies to Collden's claims. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, we consider whether the allegations are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery. Mikell v. Sch. Admin. Unit # 33, 158 N.H. 723, 727, 972 A.2d 1050 (2009). We assume the [petitioner]'s pleadings to be true and construe all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to [the petitioner]. Id. We then test the facts in the petition against the applicable law. Id. RSA 677:15, I (2008) provides: Any persons aggrieved by any decision of the planning board concerning a plat or subdivision may present to the superior court a petition, duly verified, setting forth that such decision is illegal or unreasonable in whole or in part and specifying the grounds upon which the same is claimed to be illegal or unreasonable. Such petition shall be presented to the court within 30 days after the date upon which the board voted to approve or disapprove the application; provided however, that if the petitioner shows that the minutes of the meeting at which such vote was taken, including the written decision, were not filed within 144 hours of the vote pursuant to RSA 676:3, II, the petitioner shall have the right to amend the petition within 30 days after the date on which the written decision was actually filed. This paragraph shall not apply to planning board decisions appealable to the board of adjustment pursuant to RSA 676:5, III. The 30-day time period shall be counted in calendar days beginning with the date following the date upon which the planning board voted to approve or disapprove the application, in accordance with RSA 21:35. RSA 677:15, I, provides the jurisdictional deadline for superior court review of a planning board decision. Prop. Portfolio Group v. Town of Derry, 154 N.H. 610, 613, 913 A.2d 750 (2006). New Hampshire law requires strict compliance with statutory time requirements for appeals of planning board decisions to the superior court ... because statutory compliance is a necessary prerequisite to establishing jurisdiction [there]. Id. (citation omitted). When construing a statute, we first examine the language found in the statute and where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to words used. Appeal of Garrison Place, 159 N.H. 539, 542, 986 A.2d 670 (2009) (brackets and quotation omitted). When a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, we need not look beyond [it] for further indications of legislative intent. Id. (quotation omitted). Courts can neither ignore the plain language of the legislation nor add words which the lawmakers did not see fit to include. Appeal of Astro Spectacular, 138 N.H. 298, 300, 639 A.2d 249 (1994) (quotation omitted). Additionally, we do not consider words and phrases in isolation, but within the context of the statute as a whole, so that we may better discern the legislature's intent and ... interpret statutory language in light of the policy or purpose sought to be advanced by the statutory scheme. General Insulation Co. v. Eckman Construction, 159 N.H. 601, ___, 992 A.2d 613, 616 (2010); see Residents Defending Their Homes v. Lone Pine Hunters' Club, 155 N.H. 486, 488, 924 A.2d 366 (2007) (We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. (quotation omitted)). Relying upon DHB v. Town of Pembroke, 152 N.H. 314, 318, 876 A.2d 206 (2005), Collden highlights the language voted to approve or disapprove the application in RSA 677:15, I, contending that the statute is inapplicable because the planning board had already approved its application in 1993. The town, also relying upon DHB, 152 N.H. at 318, 876 A.2d 206, and Totty v. Grantham Planning Board, 120 N.H. 388, 389, 415 A.2d 687 (1980), contends that RSA 677:15, I, applies because the planning board had already accepted Collden's application, and the 2004 decision was a final decision. The town concedes that we have not yet considered whether an application continues to be before the planning board after approval such that the planning board's decision regarding whether conditions subsequent are met is a decision regarding the approval or disapproval of an application within the scope of RSA 677:15, I. We conclude that Collden's argument is inconsistent with the plain language of RSA 677:15, I, and our case law, and hold that the planning board's 2004 decision was a final decision subject to the time restrictions of RSA 677:15, I. See DHB, 152 N.H. at 318, 876 A.2d 206; Prop. Portfolio, 154 N.H. at 613, 913 A.2d 750. There is no indication from the plain language of RSA 677:15, I, that the legislature intended to exempt all planning board decisions, save those approving or disapproving applications, from the thirty-day appeal requirement of RSA 677:15, I. As planning boards make a variety of decisions, it would make little sense to exempt the 2004 planning board decision in this instance from RSA 677:15, I. See, e.g., RSA 676:4-a (2008) (planning board's authority to revoke prior subdivision approval); RSA 674:36, III (planning board's authority to require applicant to provide security under certain circumstances). Indeed, the first sentence of RSA 677:15, I, provides that anyone aggrieved by any decision of the planning board concerning a plat or subdivision may appeal to the superior court. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, in DHB, we held that RSA 677:15, I, did not apply because the planning board had not approved or disapproved the application at issue, and determined that a planning board decision that forecloses further proceedings before the planning board was a final decision entitl[ing] [the petitioner] to review. DHB, 152 N.H. at 319, 876 A.2d 206; see also Town of Auburn v. McEvoy, 131 N.H. 383, 387-88, 553 A.2d 317 (1988) (holding that constitutional objections to property dispositions were subject to time limitations of RSA 677:15, I, under prior version of statute). Our determination that the 2004 decision triggered the thirty-day appeal requirement of RSA 677:15, I, is consistent with the purpose of the statute. RSA 677:15 provides for deference to the decisions of local land use bodies, finality for those whose interests are affected by such decisions, and speedy appeals to the superior court. See RSA 677:15, IV (requiring court to give any hearing under this section priority on the court calendar); McNamara v. Hersh, 157 N.H. 72, 74, 945 A.2d 18 (2008) (policy behind administrative exhaustion requirement based on the reasonable policies of encouraging the exercise of administrative expertise, preserving agency autonomy and promoting judicial efficiency); K & J Assoc. v. City of Lebanon, 142 N.H. 331, 336, 703 A.2d 253 (1997) ( Horton, J., dissenting) (noting that town citizens are entitled to finality in planning board matters). We note that Collden first obtained subdivision approval nearly seventeen years ago. Collden's interpretation of the statute would impede finality for those whose interests are affected by planning board decisions. Given that we construe statutes in a manner to effectuate [their] overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result, we decline to interpret RSA 677:15, I, in the manner that Collden suggests. Residents Defending Their Homes, 155 N.H. at 488, 924 A.2d 366.