Opinion ID: 2807365
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: As noted above, Britton raises two arguments on appeal. We address each separately below. A. The Trial Court Did Not Err When It Found Britton's Guilty Plea Was Entered Voluntarily. A trial court may accept a guilty plea upon a determination, on the record, that the plea was voluntarily and intelligently made, with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Porter v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.3d 382, 385 (Ky. 2011) (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)); RCr 8.08. Prior to sentencing, when a defendant moves to withdraw his or her guilty plea, the court must hold a hearing to determine whether the plea was entered voluntarily. Porter, 394 S.W.3d at 385. If the court finds the plea was involuntary, it has no discretion and must grant the motion to withdraw. Id. at 385-86. However, if the trial court determines the plea was voluntary, it may deny the motion to withdraw according to its discretion. Id. When determining whether a guilty plea is voluntary, intelligent and made with sufficient awareness, the trial court considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea. Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 2001). Thus, the trial court is in the best position to make this inherently 5 factual inquiry which requires considering the defendant's demeanor, background and experience, as well as, any indication of reluctance, misunderstanding, involuntariness, or incompetence to plead guilty. Id. at 487. Sworn declarations by the defendant in open court that his or her guilty plea is made voluntarily are not conclusive, but they do 'carry a strong presumption of verity.' Johnson v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.3d 157, 168 (Ky. 2013) (quoting Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558, 569 (Ky. 2006)). Accordingly, an appellate court reviews a trial court's finding regarding voluntariness for clear error, that is, whether the determination was supported by substantial evidence. Porter, 394 S.W.3d at 386. In this case, the trial court's finding of voluntariness is supported by substantial evidence. The trial court placed Britton under oath and, in open court and on the record, conducted a thorough exam of both Britton and his attorney to determine the voluntariness of Britton's plea. Britton admitted that he understood the nature of all the charges, the potential defenses, and the result of his plea of guilty; he made a full and knowing waiver of his rights; and he agreed that the plea was being made willingly, freely, and voluntarily and that it was not a product of threats or promises. Britton indicated that he had sufficient time to discuss his case with his attorney and had no complaints with his representation. Britton's attorney submitted to the court that Britton understood his rights and that a guilty plea was consistent with his advice. Moreover, the trial court specifically explained the difference between the two indictments and between the standard guilty plea and the Alford plea. Finally, 6 the court went beyond the Boykin requirements when it inquired into the mediation process. As noted above, Britton agreed that his participation in mediation was voluntary and that he believed the process and negotiations were fair. Because substantial evidence exists to support the trial court's finding of voluntariness, no clear error exists. B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Britton's Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea. Despite finding that a guilty plea is voluntarily entered, [a]t any time before judgment the court may permit the plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill, to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted. RCr 8.10; Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 8, 10 (Ky. 2002) (emphasis added). It is well established that an appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw for abuse of discretion or whether it was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Porter, 394 S.W.3d at 386; Edmonds, 189 S.W.3d at 570. Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Britton's motion to withdraw. The trial court properly held a hearing and considered written and oral arguments from Britton and the Commonwealth. The trial court reviewed the record and specifically recalled Britton's voluntary plea affirmations. Moreover, the agreement was freely negotiated and fair to Britton for three reasons: (1) he received a sentence of twenty (20) years' imprisonment instead of the life sentence he could have received; (2) he reduced his parole eligibility from eighty-five percent (85%) to twenty percent (20%); and (3) he will 7 not be required to register as a sex offender. The denial of Britton's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea was reasonable, fair, and supported by sound legal principles. While Britton acknowledges the abuse of discretion standard, he also submits that this court should consider the federal approach. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d) allows for the withdrawal of a guilty plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason. This Court has mentioned this rule twice before; however, we have declined to adopt it in our criminal rules.' Furthermore, our abuse of discretion standard takes into account the fairness and reasonableness of the trial court's decision making. Moreover, Britton unsuccessfully articulated this argument in his brief when he set out the standard but then failed to specifically identify any fair and just reason other than the lack of voluntariness for withdrawing his guilty plea. Even if we assume for the sake of completeness that Britton had argued here as he argued before the trial court, we would not be persuaded. In his original Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, Britton argued that his plea under 12CR-204 was entered involuntarily because, during the mediation, the Commonwealth would only accept a package deal. Britton claimed that he was ready and willing to plead guilty to 12-CR-151 but that he wanted to take 12-CR-204 to trial. However, the Commonwealth would only enter into a plea I In Bowman v. Commonwealth, No. 2005-SC-000234-TG, 2006 WL 141586, at