Opinion ID: 2544661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Automatic Motion to Modify Penalty Verdict

Text: When it denied the automatic motion to modify the penalty verdict of death, the trial court explained the reasons for its ruling with reference to the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors listed in section 190.3. After reciting section 190.3, factor (h) (Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or the affects of intoxication), the trial court said this: The defendant at most had mild brain damage and some drinks. None of this affects in any way the cold, calculated stabbing of Henry Michael Pedersen in the back. [¶] Moving the body to the bathtub and turning the pillow over to conceal the blood. While in the house, the defendant selected several pieces of jewelry and items of value, and calmly walked away from the home of Michael Pedersen. [¶] The court personally and independently concludes this to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, and is an aggravating factor. Defendant contends that, because section 190.3, factor (h) may only be mitigating ( People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 944, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277), the trial court erred in finding it to be an aggravating factor in this case. Although susceptible to the interpretation proposed by defendant, the trial court's remarks are not entirely free from ambiguity, and it is possible that what the trial court found to be aggravating was the circumstances of the crime (section 190.3, factor (a)) rather than the absence of mental impairment (section 190.3, factor (h)). In any event, even if we assume the trial court erred in the manner defendant suggests, defendant was not prejudiced by that error. We do not agree with defendant that on the evidence presented here the trial court was required to find that section 190.3, factor (h), had substantial mitigating value. The evidence was at best conflicting, and the trial court could reasonably conclude that whatever impairment defendant suffered, as a result of brain injury or intoxication, in his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, was relatively slight and insignificant. Defendant's attempt to hide the bloodstains by turning over the couch cushions and carrying the body to the bathtub indicate an appreciation that the killing was wrongful. (See People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 990, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.) The trial court properly found that the circumstances of the crime, defendant's prior felony convictions, his prior violent acts, and his age were all aggravating factors. (§ 190.3, factors (a)-(c) & (i).) Because there were these four substantial aggravating factors, and the mitigating evidence was relatively insubstantial by comparison, we conclude that the trial court's error, if any, was nonprejudicial. (See People v. Kaurish, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 718, 276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278.)