Opinion ID: 831445
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: application of the mootness doctrine

Text: In this case, the prosecution's own action clearly rendered its subsequent appeal moot. After the circuit court suppressed the evidence, the prosecution moved to dismiss the charges against defendant. As a result of the prosecution's voluntarily seeking dismissal of the charges, the circuit court dismissed the charges without prejudice and any existing controversy between the parties was rendered moot. Once the charges were dismissed, an action no longer existed, and, thus, there was no longer any controversy left for the Court of Appeals to consider. Accordingly, because all the charges against defendant had been dismissed at the time of the prosecution's appeal, the Court of Appeals judgment was based on a `pretended controversy,' Anway, 211 Mich. at 610, 179 N.W. 350 (citation omitted), that did not rest upon existing facts or rights, Gildemeister, 212 Mich. at 302, 180 N.W. 633. Because a court cannot tender advice on matters that are no longer in litigation, see Anway, 211 Mich. at 611-612, 179 N.W. 350, quoting Snell v. Welch, 28 Mont. 482, 482, 72 P. 988 (1903) (quotation marks omitted), the Court of Appeals made a determination on a `mere barren righta purely moot question,' which, under this Court's precedent, it did not have the power to decide, Anway, 211 Mich. at 605,179 N.W. 350, quoting Tregea v. Modesto Irrigation Dist, 164 U.S. 179, 186, 17 S.Ct. 52, 41 L.Ed. 395 (1896). [3] Although the prosecution does not have a constitutional right to appeal, the dissent argues that the prosecution may nevertheless appeal because the dismissal was a final order and the prosecution has a statutory right under MCL 770.12(1) and MCR 7.202(6)(b) to appeal a final order. The final order that the prosecution appealed in this case, however, was the order of acquittal/dismissal that was granted at the prosecution's request. This dismissal rendered the other issues in the case moot, [4] including the evidentiary issue, and the prosecution's statutory right to appeal does not give courts the power to review an otherwise moot issue. [5] Thus, in this case, the prosecution, not this Court, denied itself appellate review by obtaining dismissal of its own case and, therefore, rendering its appeal moot. [6] When the issues raised by a party on appeal are clearly moot, an appellate court should ordinarily decline to address the substantive issues raised in the appeal unless an exception to the mootness doctrine applies. As noted, this Court has held that even though an issue is moot, it is nevertheless justiciable if the issue is one of public significance that is likely to recur, yet may evade judicial review. Federated Publications, 467 Mich. at 112, 649 N.W.2d 383. The facts of this case, however, do not meet this exception. This Court has declined to apply this exception when the party seeking review of an issue on appeal has rendered the issue moot by that party's own volitional conduct and the party could have avoided mooting the issue by seeking an appeal. For example, in Federated Publications, the city denied a newspaper's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. Id. at 103, 649 N.W.2d 383. The newspaper subsequently sued for disclosure under FOIA. The circuit court granted, in part, the newspaper's motion for summary disposition and ordered the release of certain documents. The city filed an emergency motion in the Court of Appeals to stay the circuit court proceedings. Id. at 104, 649 N.W.2d 383. The Court of Appeals initially granted the city's emergency motion to stay, but later vacated its order. Id. at 104-105, 649 N.W.2d 383. After the Court of Appeals vacated its order, the city released the documents that were subject to the circuit court's order to the newspaper without taking any additional action. Id. at 105, 649 N.W.2d 383. The city later appealed the circuit court's motion for partial summary disposition as of right, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision in part. Federated Publications, Inc v. City of Lansing, unpublished opinion per curiam, issued November 14, 2000 (Docket Nos. 218331 and 218332), 2000 WL 33401843. The city appealed in this Court. After this Court determined that the city's release of the documents to the newspaper rendered moot any claimed exemptions for those records, we reasoned that the case did not present an issue that was likely to recur yet regularly evade judicial review because [q]uite simply, all that the city would have had to do ... to secure review of [the] issue was to appeal the disclosure order to this Court. Federated Publications, 467 Mich. at 112-113, 649 N.W.2d 383. Thus, because the city released the documents, this Court determined that the issue would not otherwise have evaded review because it had been rendered moot only by the city's own conduct. See id. at 101, 113, 649 N.W.2d 383. [7] Like the city's action in Federated Publications, the issue in this case is not likely to recur yet evade judicial review because the prosecution's own conduct rendered the issue moot. The prosecution could have obtained judicial review of the circuit court's decision by simply seeking an interlocutory appeal of the suppression order, rather than voluntarily obtaining dismissal of the charges. [8] Therefore, by opting to dismiss the charges, the prosecution voluntarily removed from its claim the controversy that would generally have allowed it to seek appellate review. [9] As in Federated Publications, we decline to extend the mootness exception on the basis of mere speculation that the issue could recur but evade judicial review because of the prosecution's own procedural misstep. [10] Notably, the facts of this case are distinguishable from cases in which this Court has decided to address an otherwise moot issue because it was one of public significance that was likely to recur yet evade judicial review. In general, this Court has applied the doctrine to cases in which the transitory nature of a particular controversy would render the issue moot before a party could obtain appellate review. See, e.g., Socialist Workers Party v. Secretary of State, 412 Mich. 571, 582 n. 11, 317 N.W.2d 1 (1982) (stating that the fact that an election had taken place presented the classic situation where a controversy is `capable of repetition, yet evading review' because the parties would seldom obtain appellate review of the issue before an election takes place); see, also, People v. Kaczmarek, 464 Mich. 478, 481, 628 N.W.2d 484 (2001), and In re Midland Publishing Co., Inc., 420 Mich. 148, 151 n. 2, 362 N.W.2d 580 (1984). This Court has also applied the doctrine when an opposing party could, by its own conduct, render an issue moot to preclude an aggrieved party from seeking appellate review of the issue. See, e.g., Detroit v. Ambassador Bridge Co., 481 Mich. 29, 50-51, 748 N.W.2d 221 (2008). Neither of these situations is present in this case. Although there may be other instances in which a court will never-theless decide the merits of an other wise moot issue, to the extent that this Court has considered them, they are not applicable here. [11] And, as in Federated Publications, we decline to address an otherwise moot issue when it is not likely that the issue will recur but evade judicial review because the party seeking relief voluntarily rendered the issue moot. As a result, the Court of Appeals erred by reaching the substantive issues of the prosecution's otherwise moot appeal. [12]