Opinion ID: 2599829
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial Review of Orders Granting a New Trial

Text: Although many issues were raised in the Court of Appeal, the Raiders' petition for review in this court raises only one: whether the trial court's order granting the Raiders' motion for a new trial should be sustained on the ground of juror misconduct. The parties here do not contest (1) that the only possibly viable ground for a new trial was jury misconduct; (2) that the trial court adequately specified that ground as a basis for granting the motion; and (3) that the trial court did not state its reasons for granting a new trial on that ground. Thus, we address a single, narrow issue: the standard of review  whether abuse of discretion or independent review  when, as here, a trial court grants a new trial on the ground of jury misconduct and properly specifies the ground for granting the motion but does not provide a statement of the reasons for granting the new trial on that ground. Section 657 provides for the situation in which an order granting a new trial is not supported by a specification of reasons. As noted earlier, section 657 states: On appeal from an order granting a new trial the order shall be affirmed if it should have been granted upon any ground stated in the motion, whether or not specified in the order or specification of reasons.... Consequently, when as here an order granting a new trial states the ground as jury misconduct, but the trial court fails to specify the reasons for that conclusion, the order is not void. (See Sanchez-Corea, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 901, 215 Cal.Rptr. 679, 701 P.2d 826; Hand Electronics, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 868, 26 Cal. Rptr.2d 446.) The order may still be sustained if a new trial should have been granted upon any ground set out in section 657 except the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence or inadequate or excessive damages. ( Sanchez-Corea, supra, at p. 905, 215 Cal.Rptr. 679, 701 P.2d 826.) When the trial court provides a statement of reasons as required by section 657, the appropriate standard of judicial review is one that defers to the trial court's resolution of conflicts in the evidence and inquires only whether the court's decision was an abuse of discretion. (See, e.g., Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 405, 409, 412, 93 Cal. Rptr.2d 60, 993 P.2d 388; In re Marriage of Beilock (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 713, 728, 146 Cal.Rptr. 675.) But when there is no statement of reasons, an appellate court's use of an abuse of discretion standard of review would subvert the purposes that this court has identified as underlying section 657's statement-of-reasons requirement. In Mercer, supra, 68 Cal.2d 104, 65 Cal. Rptr. 315, 436 P.2d 315, we described those purposes as twofold. One is to promote judicial deliberation before judicial action. ( Id. at p. 113, 65 Cal.Rptr. 315, 436 P.2d 315.) The statute serves that purpose by requiring a statement of reasons drafted by the court, not by the prevailing party. ( Id. at pp. 113, 115, 65 Cal.Rptr. 315, 436 P.2d 315.) The other purpose is to make the right to appeal from the order more meaningful. ( Id. at p. 113, 65 Cal.Rptr. 315, 436 P.2d 315; see Stewart v. Truck Ins. Exchange, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 484, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 338; Bigboy v. County of San Diego (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 397, 404, 201 Cal.Rptr. 226.) We explained in Mercer that before the Legislature's 1965 amendments to section 657, [i]t often occurred ... that the notice of motion was predicated on all or most of the statutory grounds, and the subsequent order specified neither the ground or grounds found applicable nor the reasons therefor; in that event, the appellant was left in the dark as to which aspect of the trial to defend, and quite understandably struck out blindly in several directions at once. ( Mercer, supra, at p. 113, 65 Cal. Rptr. 315, 436 P.2d 315.) Mercer went on to state: The new statute seeks to correct this inefficient and often frustrating procedure.... [¶] ... [T]he appellant need only address himself to those asserted deficiencies in the proof which are specified as reasons for the order.... ( Id. at p. 115, 65 Cal.Rptr. 315, 436 P.2d 315.) Our decisions have frequently overturned orders granting a new trial based on a conclusion that to do otherwise would frustrate the purposes of section 657's requirements. In Scala, supra, 3 Cal.3d 359, 90 Cal. Rptr. 592, 475 P.2d 864, for example, we held that a statement of reasons in the form of a finding of ultimate facts rather than evidentiary facts frustrates rather than promotes the legislative purpose of facilitating meaningful appellate review of the order granting a new trial, and hence is inadequate to comply with the mandate of Code of Civil Procedure section 657. ( Id. at p. 370, 90 Cal.Rptr. 592, 475 P.2d 864, fn. omitted.) We therefore reversed the order granting a new trial, observing: The order was made almost a full year after our ruling in Mercer, which prescribed in as much detail as feasible the duty of a trial court to comply with section 657. Today's decision is no new departure in the law, but simply reiterates the Mercer construction of the statutory intent and the manner of translating that intent into action. ( Scala, supra, at p. 371, 90 Cal. Rptr. 592, 475 P.2d 864.) In La Manna v. Stewart, supra, 13 Cal.3d 413, 118 Cal.Rptr. 761, 530 P.2d 1073, the trial court stated its reasons for granting a new trial orally, specifying the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. ( Id. at p. 417, fn. 1, 118 Cal.Rptr. 761, 530 P.2d 1073.) It later filed a written statement of reasons after the statutory 10-day period had run. ( Id at p. 417, 118 Cal. Rptr. 761, 530 P.2d 1073.) Rejecting the argument that the trial court had substantially complied with section 657, we reversed the order granting the new trial because the statement of reasons did not conform to the specific requirements of section 657. ( La Manna v. Stewart, supra, at pp. 420-423, 118 Cal.Rptr. 761, 530 P.2d 1073.) Miller v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. (1973) 8 Cal.3d 689, 106 Cal. Rptr. 1, 505 P.2d 193 was a wrongful death and personal injury suit in which the plaintiffs alleged that the flood control district had negligently maintained a dam-like flood control basin, thereby creating a dangerous condition of public property. ( Id. at p. 693, 106 Cal.Rptr. 1, 505 P.2d 193.) During a rainstorm, water and debris flowed over the basin and demolished the plaintiffs' house, causing the death of one resident and injuries to another. ( Ibid. ) After the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, the trial court granted the flood control district's motion for a new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. ( Id. at p. 696, 106 Cal.Rptr. 1, 505 P.2d 193.) The court's statement of reasons stated only that the defendant completely and adequate discharged its obligations, without any further explanation. ( Ibid. ) We reversed the order granting a new trial, holding that the trial court's statement of reasons was inadequate because we could not determine whether the trial court found that a hazardous condition never existed or that it had been remedied before the date of the plaintiffs' injuries. [T]he amendments to section 657, we said, were intended to preclude just this type of guesswork. ( Id. at p. 698, fn. 8, 106 Cal.Rptr. 1, 505 P.2d 193; see La Manna v. Stewart, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 420, 118 Cal.Rptr. 761, 530 P.2d 1073.) In Sanchez-Corea, supra, 38 Cal.3d 892, 215 Cal.Rptr. 679, 701 P.2d 826, the trial court's order specifying insufficiency of the evidence as the ground for granting a new trial was not filed until after the trial court had lost jurisdiction. ( Id. at pp. 898, 903, 215 Cal.Rptr. 679, 701 P.2d 826.) Consequently, under the terms of section 657, the new trial order could not be sustained on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence, excessive damages, or inadequate damages. ( Sanchez-Corea, supra, at p. 905, 215 Cal.Rptr. 679, 701 P.2d 826.) We observed, however, that if the motion states any other ground for a new trial, an order granting the motion will be affirmed if any such other ground legally requires a new trial. ( Ibid., original italics.) The moving party in Sanchez-Corea argued that the order granting a new trial should be affirmed on the ground that the verdict was against law (§ 657). In this context, a verdict is against law only if it was unsupported by substantial evidence. ( Sanchez-Corea, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 906, 215 Cal.Rptr. 679, 701 P.2d 826.) We therefore reviewed the record in the case, but in doing so, we did not defer to the decision of the trial court granting the new trial motion. To the contrary, we examined the record in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, and we concluded that substantial evidence supported the verdict. ( Id. at p. 907, 215 Cal.Rptr. 679, 701 P.2d 826.) Finally, we note the decision of the Court of Appeal in Thompson, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th 544, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 51. There, the plaintiff sued for breach of an employment contract. ( Id at p. 547, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 51.) The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the trial court granted the defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground of excessive damages. ( Id. at pp. 547-548, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 51.) The trial court adopted a statement of reasons that the defendant had prepared  a clear violation of section 657, which requires the court itself to prepare the statement of reasons. ( Thompson, supra, at pp. 548-549, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 51.) Thompson concluded that in the absence of a statement of reasons prepared by the trial court, the appellate court should independently review all the grounds advanced for the new trial motion to determine if a new trial was required on any stated ground. ( Id at p. 550, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 51.) Applying an independent standard of review, and finding no stated ground that required a new trial, the Court of Appeal in Thompson reversed the new trial order. ( Id at pp. 550-552, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 51.) The Raiders urge us not to apply a standard of independent review, contending that doing so would be inconsistent with two older decisions of this court, Malkasian, supra, 61 Cal.2d 738, 40 Cal.Rptr. 78, 394 P.2d 822, and Treber, supra, 68 Cal.2d 128, 65 Cal.Rptr. 330, 436 P.2d 330. As we will explain, those decisions suggest that an appellate court should defer to the trial court in determining whether an act of misconduct was prejudicial. But before a court can consider whether an act of misconduct was prejudicial, it must first determine whether the act occurred, and on that question Malkasian and Treber do not require deference to the trial court. At the time of the Malkasian trial, section 657 did not require a statement of reasons, but it did require the trial court to state whether its order was based on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. (See ante, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 640, 161 P.3d at pp. 155-156.) The motion for a new trial in Malkasian was based on several grounds. The trial court said it was granting the motion on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, but the written order prepared by the court clerk did not specify the grounds for granting a new trial. ( Malkasian, supra, 61 Cal.2d at pp. 743-744, 40 Cal.Rptr. 78, 394 P.2d 822.) This court in Malkasian held that the language of section 657 prevented the trial court from correcting that mistake by an order made after the expiration of the 10-day period. ( Malkasian, supra, at pp. 744-745, 40 Cal.Rptr. 78, 394 P.2d 822.) We therefore examined the record to determine whether the order granting new trial was supported on any other ground ( id. at p. 745, 40 Cal.Rptr. 78, 394 P.2d 822), and we concluded that the order could be sustained on the ground of improper argument to the jury by the defendant's counsel ( id. at pp. 745-749, 40 Cal. Rptr. 78, 394 P.2d 822). In Malkasian, the analysis proceeded in two steps. We first determined that the defendant's attorney had engaged in misconduct during argument to the jury, and then that the attorney's misconduct was sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial. The first step, determining whether misconduct had occurred, did not require the resolution of conflicting evidence because the undisputed record showed that the attorney's argument to the jury had relied on purported facts that were unsupported by the evidence presented during the trial. ( Malkasian, supra, 61 Cal.2d at pp. 746-747, 40 Cal.Rptr. 78, 394 P.2d 822.) We did not state what standard of review we used to decide whether the argument was erroneous, but explicitly applied an abuse of discretion standard to determine whether the erroneous argument was prejudicial. [3] Treber, supra, 68 Cal.2d 128, 65 Cal. Rptr. 330, 436 P.2d 330, the other case cited by the Raiders, was a companion case to Mercer, supra, 68 Cal.2d 104, 65 Cal.Rptr. 315, 436 P.2d 315. Treber involved a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to vacate an order granting a new trial that lacked an adequate specification of reasons. ( Treber, supra, at p. 130, 65 Cal.Rptr. 330, 436 P.2d 330.) We held mandate unavailable because the petitioner had an adequate appellate remedy. ( Id. at p. 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 330, 436 P.2d 330.) We also explained that in reviewing an order granting a new trial, the appellate court will independently review an issue of law ( id. at p. 132, 65 Cal.Rptr. 330, 436 P.2d 330; see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493) but will defer to the trial court's judgment on the issue of prejudice because that issue involves an assessment based on the entire record of the proceedings before the trial court, and it is thus more suitably made by the trial court ( Treber, supra, at p. 132, 65 Cal.Rptr. 330, 436 P.2d 330; see People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1267-1268, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 302, 95 P.3d 523; Hand Electronics, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 871, 26 Cal. Rptr.2d 446). The Court of Appeal here concluded that the absence of a statement of reasons calls for independent review of the trial court's order granting a motion for a new trial. We agree. [4] The reviewing court should not, in a situation such as that presented here, defer to the trial court's resolution of conflicts in the evidence, or draw all inferences favorably to the trial court's decision, because in the absence of a statement of reasons, the record does not show whether the trial court resolved those conflicts or drew those inferences. Our decision is a narrow one. We address only the situation in which there is conflicting evidence on the issue of juror misconduct, not the question whether misconduct, shown by the record, is prejudicial. We do not address the situation in which apparently conflicting declarations can be reconciled, so that on close examination it is determined that the crucial allegations of misconduct are not in dispute. (See, e.g., McDonald v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1999) 71 Cal. App.4th 256, 263-265, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 734; Young v. Brunicardi (1986) 187 Cal. App.3d 1344, 1351, 232 Cal.Rptr. 588; Clemens v. Regents of University of California (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 356, 365, 97 Cal. Rptr. 589.)