Opinion ID: 2233278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Propriety of the Trial Court's First-Stage Dismissal

Text: Defendant alternately requests cross-relief, seeking reversal of the circuit court's dismissal of the petition based on res judicata or waiver. We note that the trial court did not specify which basis it ruled on as to each claim. Defendant argues only two of six of his claims in his pro se petition on appeal. The first relates to the health of his counsel during his trial. The second concerns his trial counsel's decision not to introduce evidence about his alcohol and marijuana use prior to the killing during his direct examination. He alleges that the facts relating to the claims do not appear on the face of the original appellate record. He additionally contends that his appellate counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to raise these same claims on direct appeal. Defendant makes no argument on appeal as to the other allegations in his petition. Our review is de novo. Boclair, 202 Ill.2d at 97, 273 Ill.Dec. 560, 789 N.E.2d 734. First, defendant asserts that counsel was obviously medicated and often incoherent during her few brief visits to defendant in his holding cell outside the courtroom and, consequently, her illness and her personal problems affected her judgment and her preparation for the motion to suppress and trial. Defendant seeks an exception to res judicata, as he argues this is outside the record of his direct appeal. Defendant presented no further related facts in the affidavit attached to the petition. On appeal, defendant argues that this allegation states a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel which is not barred by res judicata or forfeiture because it constitutes a new allegation outside the record. The record reveals that after trial in the former proceedings, defendant filed a pro se motion for a new trial, alleging that during the trial his attorney became physically ill and did not ask for a continuance, and his attorney's illness may have caused her to inadequately represent the defendant. The trial judge stated, As to defendant's motion for new trial, based upon the fact his attorney was physically ill and did not ask for a continuance in this matter, I find there is no merit whatsoever. Counsel did an excellent job in representation of this defendant. This motion will also be denied. We note that the appellate court, in the direct appeal, rejected defendant's claim that trial counsel neglected his case because she was `obviously medicated' due to an illness, making her often incoherent. The appellate court stated that a review of defendant's contentions established that they are either unsupported by the record or based on matters that are outside the record. In a footnote, the appellate court provided that defendant had expressly declined to argue his posttrial motion on this point and the trial court denied the motion, stating that it was without merit. People v. Blair, No. 1-98-4119 (2000) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Defendant has presented nothing outside the record in his instant petition and affidavit. Rather, he merely reasserts that counsel was obviously medicated and often incoherent. Even assuming these allegations of illness are not conclusions ( West, 187 Ill.2d at 425-26, 241 Ill.Dec. 535, 719 N.E.2d 664 (broad, unsupported, conclusory allegations in a postconviction petition are not allowed)), the petition says nothing as to how, even taking the illness as true, the illness affected counsel's performance. More importantly, this conclusory claim does not rebut the trial judge's observation that counsel's in-court performance during the proceedings before him was excellent. Therefore, the petition contains nothing but the bare assertion that counsel neglected his case, which was also rejected by the appellate court on direct appeal. Hence, there is nothing on this issue which has not previously been addressed by the trial court and appellate court on direct appeal. The trial court correctly decided that this issue was barred by res judicata. Defendant's next argument pertains to the following allegation, that defendant informed his P.D. that while he was at the picnic prior to the incident, he had indeed been drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, which would of course describe his state of mind and lend to the explanation of how he could have easily (however unreasonable) believed he needed to protect himself if that belief was unreasonable at all. The P.D. should not have withheld this information from the jury, especially considering the fact that the only evidence offered at trial by the P.D. was the testimony of the petitioner stating his belief of being threatened. Defendant contends the allegation is outside the record and not barred by forfeiture. We first note that the petition's allegations are factually rebutted by the record. First, the trial transcript reveals that defendant's friend who was present at the shooting, Marcus Wright, testified on cross-examination that he had been drinking beer and gin with defendant and that Wright thought defendant had been smoking marijuana. The trial transcript reveals, therefore, that defendant's trial counsel did elicit evidence of defendant's marijuana and alcohol use at trial. Second, the trial transcript reveals that defendant left the picnic at midday or in the afternoon, and the shooting did not occur until 8:45 p.m., thus negating an implied time frame in his petition that the shooting occurred shortly after the picnic. Indeed, although evidence was in the record and presented to the jury that defendant had consumed drugs and alcohol, this evidence did not alter the jury's verdict. Moreover, defendant failed to meet the Act's affidavit requirement. He has provided no facts whatsoever concerning his alcohol use or marijuana use in his affidavit, other than a general statement that the facts in his petition are true. Nor is there an explanation as to why it is not provided, although such evidence would be within his own recall. A postconviction petition is required to have attached affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or shall state why the same are not attached. 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2002). More importantly, however, defendant cannot assert an exception to forfeiture. Because the facts regarding defendant's mere alcohol and marijuana use are already in the record, defendant presents no new allegations in his petition or affidavit that can be deemed outside the record. Therefore, defendant's claim on this matter is forfeited. Furthermore, our research has revealed no authority stating that the mere fact of alcohol and marijuana use is sufficient to support a second degree murder instruction or negate the intent for first degree murder. Defendant next argues that the rule of res judicata and forfeiture should be relaxed because of his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Defendant argues that appellate counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court should have conducted an investigation regarding his trial counsel's alleged illness when he presented his posttrial motion pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.2d 181, 80 Ill.Dec. 62, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984) (concerning the appointment of counsel by the trial court to investigate a defendant's posttrial pro se allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel). This issue was addressed in the defendant's direct appeal and is therefore barred by res judicata. After the public defender filed a motion for leave to withdraw and a brief in support of the motion pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), defendant filed a pro se response alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on a failure to raise issues pertaining to ineffective assistance of trial counsel, including the issue of trial counsel's illness. As stated above, the appellate court rebuffed these claims which were contained in defendant's pro se posttrial motion relating to trial counsel's alleged illness, although without specifically citing Krankel. The appellate court stated, [B]ecause we held that trial counsel was not ineffective based upon defendant's various allegations, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that issue on appeal. Blair, No. 1-98-4119 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Defendant makes no further argument that res judicata and forfeiture should be relaxed under a third exception, fundamental fairness, nor does our review of the record on appeal and defendant's petition reveal any such claim. Defendant also makes no argument as to a claim of actual innocence. We also note that the State has not indicated that it wishes to forgo the affirmative defenses of res judicata and forfeiture on appeal. Finally, defendant also argues that his mittimus should be corrected to reflect the time he spent in custody from January 17, 1996, to and including January 28, 1996. The State has made no objection. We remand to the circuit court to issue a corrected mittimus.