Opinion ID: 3170039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: L.’s letter. Both arguments are without merit.

Text: Rule 801(2) states that a “declarant is a person who makes a statement,” and rule 801(1) says that a “statement is (a) an oral or written assertion or (b) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.” Dick’s challenged testimony involves statements contained within the poem. S.D. wrote the poem. As the poem’s author, S.D. is clearly the declarant. Likewise, A.L. was clearly the declarant of the statements contained within the letter she wrote. Both S.D. and A.L. were indisputably at trial and subject to cross-examination. Smith’s arguments that rule 801(4)(a)(ii) does not apply because the documents were the declarants and not available for crossexamination is without merit. Smith also argues that Dick’s testimony about the poem (that Dick understood it to be about Smith’s raping S.D.) was inconsistent with S.D.’s in-court testimony, because S.D. did not use the word “rape” when S.D. described her poem. Instead, S.D. said the poem was very general and was about S.D.’s “hurting because someone kept hurting [her].” Although we think S.D.’s statement to Dick that Smith raped her is consistent with S.D.’s statement that someone hurt her, these two statements are not the ones rule 801(4)(a)(ii) requires us to compare. To comport with rule 801(4)(a)(ii), the out-of-court statement must be consistent with the in-court testimony recently charged with being fabricated. Smith charged S.D. with fabricating - 459 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SMITH Cite as 292 Neb. 434 her testimony that Smith sexually assaulted her. S.D.’s outof-court statement that Smith raped her is consistent with her in-court testimony. 5. Sufficiency of Evidence [23,24] We turn to Smith’s next assignment of error that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Smith assigns as error and briefly mentions in his argument that there was insufficient evidence as to all counts. But to be considered by an appellate court, an appellant must both assign and specifically argue an alleged error.35 An argument that does little more than restate an assignment of error does not support the assignment, and an appellate court will not address it.36 Because Smith’s argument addresses only the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to counts 10 through 12, we need only consider the evidence with regard to those charges. (a) Counts 10 Through 12 Counts 10 through 12 are charges based on the three photographs that Smith allegedly took of S.D, which S.D. described at trial—one count per photograph. Since the photographs were not available at trial and do not have corresponding exhibit numbers, we will refer to the photographs as photographs “1,” “2,” and “3” for purposes of our analysis. [25] All three counts involve charges that Smith violated Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1463.03(1) (Reissue 2008), which makes it “unlawful for a person to knowingly make, publish, direct, create, provide, or in any manner generate any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct which has a child as one of its participants or portrayed observers.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1463.02(5)(e) (Reissue 2008) defines “[s]exually explicit conduct,” in relevant part, as “erotic nudity,” which means “the 35 State v. Rodriguez, 272 Neb. 930, 726 N.W.2d 157 (2007). 36 State v. Filholm, 287 Neb. 763, 848 N.W.2d 571 (2014); State v. Pereira, 284 Neb. 982, 824 N.W.2d 706 (2013); State v. Mata, 275 Neb. 1, 745 N.W.2d 229 (2008). - 460 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SMITH Cite as 292 Neb. 434 display of the human male or female genitals or pubic area, the human female breasts, or the developing breast area of the human female child, for the purpose of real or simulated overt sexual gratification or sexual stimulation of one or more of the persons involved.”37 This means that in order to show “erotic nudity” as defined in § 28-1463.02, the State must prove, first, that the depiction displayed a human’s genitals or a human’s pubic area or female’s breast area, and second, that the depiction was created for the purpose of real or simulated overt sexual gratification or sexual stimulation. [26,27] To determine whether photographs were taken for the purpose of real or simulated overt sexual gratification or sexual simulation, we consider the following factors from United States v. Dost38: 1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child’s genitalia or pubic area; 2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is sexually suggestive, i.e., in a place or pose generally associated with sexual activity; 3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child; 4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude; 5) whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity; 6) whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. A visual depiction need not involve all these factors to be considered “erotic nudity.”39 Nor are the factors exclusive. We have said that the sexual nature of a photograph is not 37 § 28-1463.02(3). 38 United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986), affirmed sub nom. U.S. v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987), and affirmed 813 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1987). See, also, State v. Saulsbury, 243 Neb. 227, 498 N.W.2d 338 (1993). 39 See, § 28-1463.02; United States v. Dost, supra note 38. - 461 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SMITH Cite as 292 Neb. 434 d­ etermined solely from the subject of the photograph, but also from the motives of the persons generating it.40 (b) Prosecuting Child Pornography Cases Without Depiction at Issue in Evidence Smith claims it was impossible for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the photographs Smith allegedly took of S.D. depicted erotic nudity, because the photographs were “not in existence” at trial.41 Smith’s argument appears to be that, without actual photographs, the jury could not determine whether a minor’s private parts were displayed in the photographs and could not apply the Dost factors to determine whether they were taken for the purpose of real or simulated overt sexual gratification or sexual simulation. The State argues in contrast that a defendant can be found guilty of creating or possessing child pornography beyond a reasonable doubt even without the actual depictions in evidence. In support of its position, the State cites three federal cases, all of which rely on U.S. v. Villard.42 In Villard, the defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury convicted him of violating the federal exploitation of children statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2012). In the lower court’s order granting the motion, it indicated that it may be possible to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant violated § 2251, even without the actual depiction at issue.43 Nevertheless, the lower court found that the evidence against the defendant was insufficient to prove that the unavailable photographs at issue were illegal child pornography in violation of § 2251. 40 See State v. Saulsbury, supra note 38. 41 Brief for appellant at 53. 42 U.S. v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1989). 43 See U.S. v. Villard, 700 F. Supp. 803 (D. N.J. 1988), affirmed U.S. v. Villard, supra note 42. - 462 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SMITH Cite as 292 Neb. 434 The circumstantial evidence in Villard included a surveillance tape, which showed the defendant and another man looking at the depiction at issue and commenting on it. At one point, the other man said to the defendant, “‘I wonder if he’s asleep. He’s three quarters hard. Maybe he sleeps in the buff like that. He’s pretty hairy, though, God but not just much under the arm.’”44 The other man also testified at trial that the pictures were all closeups of a boy who was approximately 14 or 15 years old, which showed the boy from his head to his knees. The man said that the boy’s knees were bent slightly upward and that he was “‘semi erect.’”45 After the jury in Villard convicted the defendant based on the evidence above, the lower court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. On appeal, the Third Circuit was able to find only two of the Dost factors with any certainty.46 It concluded that the evidence was insufficient and affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment of acquittal. One judge dissented, because she felt that more deference should have been given to the jury’s determination and that the majority was not viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. [28,29] We find it clear from the reasoning in Villard and similar cases that a defendant can be found guilty of creating or possessing child pornography beyond a reasonable doubt even when the actual depiction at issue is unavailable at trial. After all, we have often said that circumstantial evidence is not inherently less probative than direct evidence.47 And, although courts have recognized that proving a child 44 Id. at 806. 45 Id. at 807. 46 U.S. v. Villard, supra note 42. 47 State v. Babbitt, 277 Neb. 327, 762 N.W.2d 58 (2009); State v. Leibhart, 266 Neb. 133, 662 N.W.2d 618 (2003); State v. Miner, 265 Neb. 778, 659 N.W.2d 331 (2003); State v. Nelson, 262 Neb. 896, 636 N.W.2d 620 (2001); State v. Castor, 262 Neb. 423, 632 N.W.2d 298 (2001). - 463 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SMITH Cite as 292 Neb. 434 p­ ornography case may be considerably more difficult without the actual depiction,48 we find no case in which the court says it is impossible. Smith does not cite to any. (c) Merits of Smith’s Assignment The question we must answer is whether, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found that Smith created a depiction of “erotic nudity” involving a child, in violation of § 28-1463.02. This requires a two-step analysis.49 First, we must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the photographs at issue displayed “human male or female genitals or pubic area, the human female breasts, or the developing breast area of the human female child.”50 If so, we proceed to the second step, which is to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the depictions were created “for the purpose of real or simulated overt sexual gratification or sexual stimulation of one or more of the persons involved.”51 To answer this second question, we refer to the factors from Dost. S.D. testified that when she was 13 years old, Smith took off her clothes, put her on the bed, and took photographs of her. For one photograph, Smith grabbed S.D.’s knees, put them in the air, and took a picture of her vaginal area (photograph 1). Another photograph was of S.D. on her hands and knees with her “butt up in the air” (photograph 2). S.D. testified that her vaginal area was visible in photograph 2. S.D. said a third photograph was taken of her from her neck down while she was on her back (photograph 3). S.D. did not say that photograph 3 displayed her vaginal area. S.D. testified that Smith showed 48 See, U.S. v. Villard, supra note 42; People v. Wayman, 379 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 885 N.E.2d 416, 319 Ill. Dec. 145 (2008). 49 See State v. Saulsbury, supra note 38; § 28-1463.02. 50 § 28-1463.02(3). 51 Id. - 464 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SMITH Cite as 292 Neb. 434 her the photographs and that the photographs reflected what she had described Smith took of her. (i) Display of Private Area Based on S.D.’s testimony, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could find that the photographs displayed S.D.’s genital area. S.D. testified as to the contents of the photographs. With respect to photographs 1 and 2, S.D. testified that they displayed her vaginal area. Although S.D. did not specifically describe the individual body parts depicted in photograph 3 the way she did with respect to photographs 1 and 2, we conclude that a rational jury could infer from S.D.’s testimony that at least her breasts, and possibly her genitals or pubic area, were depicted in photograph 3. This reasonable inference is supported by S.D.’s testimony that Smith took off her clothes and took a photograph of her from her neck down; that at the time Smith took the photographs of S.D., he had a history of sexually assaulting her and continued to do so after the photographs were taken; and that Smith placed the photograph into his photo album alongside sexually explicit photographs of S.D.’s mother. (ii) Purpose of Sexual Stimulation or Gratification We also conclude that a rational trier of fact could find that the photographs were created for the purpose of sexual gratification or sexual stimulation. [30,31] We consider the Dost factors outlined above, which are primarily helpful in determining from the depiction whether it was created for sexual gratification or sexual stimulation. But we have also held that whether the photograph was created for the purpose of sexual gratification or stimulation must be determined, not only from the depiction, but from the motive of the persons generating it.52 Thus, a trier of fact may consider circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s intent in determining 52 See State v. Saulsbury, supra note 38. - 465 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SMITH Cite as 292 Neb. 434 whether a depiction was created for overt sexual gratification or sexual stimulation.53 For example, the jury could consider the context in which the photographs were alleged to have been taken.54 Here, Smith took the photographs during the time he was forcing S.D. to have sexual intercourse and oral sex with him. The jury may have also considered S.D.’s testimony that Smith placed S.D.’s photographs in the photo album along with nude photographs of Jennifer, which Smith described as “adultoriented pictures.” Additionally, the photographs meet many of the Dost factors. Photographs 1 and 2 meet, at least, factors 2 through 4 and 6. Both photographs were taken while S.D. was lying on the bed, a place generally associated with sexual activity.55 S.D.’s attire and poses in those photographs were unnatural for a 13-year-old girl and suggest a willingness to engage in sexual activity. S.D. was nude and on her hands and knees with her “butt up in the air” in one photograph, and on her back with her knees up in the air in the other. And, based on the context of Smith’s repeated sexual assaults, the photograph was clearly designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer, Smith. Photograph 3 meets, at least, Dost factors 4 and 6. The photograph depicted S.D. nude and was intended to elicit a sexual response in Smith. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith took the photographs for the purpose of his own overt sexual gratification or sexual stimulation in violation of § 28-1463.03. Finding both parts of the “erotic nudity” analysis met, we affirm Smith’s convictions on counts 10 through 12. 53 Id. 54 See id. See, also, U.S. v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 2008); U.S. v. Vanderwal, 533 Fed. Appx. 498 (6th Cir. 2013). 55 See United States v. Dost, supra note 38. - 466 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SMITH Cite as 292 Neb. 434 6. Brady v. Maryland and Neb. R ev. Stat. § 29-1912 (Cum. Supp. 2014) Next, Smith asserts that the trial court erred in failing to order a new trial, as to all counts, after the medical report on A.L. was not timely disclosed, which Smith alleges was in violation of Brady v. Maryland56 and the Nebraska discovery rules. [32] Under Brady, the nondisclosure by the prosecution of material evidence favorable to the defendant, requested by the defendant, violates due process, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.57 But Brady is not violated where the evidence is disclosed during trial.58 Here, the parties became aware of the medical examination on the third day of trial. Because the medical examination was disclosed during the trial, we conclude that Smith’s right to due process was not violated by the timing of the disclosure. [33] However, our review is not complete. In Nebraska, discovery in criminal cases is also governed by statute, and we have said that § 29-1912 exacts more than the constitutional minimum.59 Nevertheless, if a continuance would have been a sufficient remedy for a belated disclosure in violation of § 29-1912, a defendant who fails to request a continuance waives any rights he or she may have had pursuant to § 29-1912.60 We do not determine whether the timing of the disclosure here violated § 29-1912, because we find that Smith waived his rights under that statute when he failed to request a 56 Brady v. Maryland, supra note 2. 57 Id. 58 State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456, 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998), modified on denial of rehearing 255 Neb. 889, 587 N.W.2d 673 (1999) (citing U.S. v. Gonzales, 90 F.3d 1363 (8th Cir. 1996)). 59 State v. Lotter, supra note 58; State v. Kula, 252 Neb. 471, 562 N.W.2d 717 (1997). 60 See State v. Lotter, supra note 58. - 467 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SMITH Cite as 292 Neb. 434 continuance. Smith’s main complaint is that, had exhibit 25 been disclosed sooner, Smith “would have been able to better prepare for the cross examinations of both [A.L.] and . . . Haney as well as aid in the preparation of . . . McFadden.”61 Because a continuance would have cured the prejudice Smith alleges and Smith failed to request a continuance, we conclude that he waived any rights he may have had pursuant to § 29-1912. 7. H aney’s Testimony R egarding Exhibit 25 Smith makes several arguments that Haney’s testimony about exhibit 25 should not have been admitted. But his arguments overlap and are scattered. Thus, in this section, we address Smith’s complaints about Haney as we understand them, to the extent such issue has not already been addressed. (a) Haney’s Endorsement One of Smith’s complaints is that the trial court erred in endorsing Haney as a witness 3 months before the trial began. On February 24, 2014, the State moved to endorse additional witnesses, including Haney. On March 3, a hearing was held, and Smith’s counsel objected to the State’s motion on the grounds that it was the State’s sixth change to the complaint, trial was scheduled to occur on March 18, and Smith’s counsel did not know in what capacity Haney would be testifying. The court granted the State’s motion, requiring the State to submit an affidavit documenting discovery materials provided to Smith related to Haney. In its order, the court stated, “[I]f [Smith] needs additional time to conduct further discovery, a continuance may be requested.” Smith availed himself of that option and waived his right to a speedy trial. Trial began June 3. [34,35] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1602 (Reissue 2008) generally requires the prosecution to endorse the names of all known 61 Brief for appellant at 37. - 468 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SMITH Cite as 292 Neb. 434 witnesses in the information at the time it is filed, but permits the endorsement of additional witnesses up to and including 30 days prior to trial. Additionally, we have said that a trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, may permit additional witnesses to be endorsed within the 30 days before trial and even after the trial has begun, provided doing so does not prejudice the rights of the defendant.62 The trial court offered and granted Smith a continuance. The trial began on June 3, 2014, which made the State’s motion to endorse additional witnesses more than 90 days prior to trial. We conclude that Smith was not prejudiced as a result of the endorsement, and accordingly, the trial court did not err in endorsing Haney. Smith seems to think that the trial court’s endorsement of Haney was somehow related to the sudden emergence of exhibit 25 at trial and somehow caused Haney’s unanticipated testimony that exhibit 25 did not exonerate Smith. However, it is clear from the record that exhibit 25 did not come to surface until the third day of trial, because Miller inadvertently kept it in his personal file. Thus, at the time of Haney’s endorsement, neither the court nor the State anticipated that Haney would testify about exhibit 25. Smith’s argument is without merit. (b) Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharamaceuticals, Inc. Smith also claims that the trial court erred in allowing Haney to provide an expert opinion about exhibit 25, because it did not require the articles on which Haney based her opinion to be vetted under the standards set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.63 [36] Under Daubert and Schafersman v. Agland Coop,64 the trial court acts as a gatekeeper to ensure the evidentiary 62 State v. Mecum, 225 Neb. 293, 404 N.W.2d 431 (1987). 63 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). 64 Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001). - 469 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SMITH Cite as 292 Neb. 434 r­ elevance and reliability of an expert’s opinion. This gatekeeping function entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is valid and whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.65 But to sufficiently call specialized knowledge into question under Daubert and Schafersman is to object with enough specificity so that the court understands what is being challenged.66 The initial task falls on the party opposing expert testimony to sufficiently call into question the reliability of some aspect of the anticipated testimony.67 Normally, a challenge to the admissibility of evidence under Daubert and Schafersman should take the form of a concise pretrial motion.68 But we recognize this was not an option for Smith, because he was not aware prior to trial that Haney would testify about exhibit 25. Nevertheless, we have said that the pretrial motion should identify, in terms of the Daubert and Schafersman factors, what is believed to be lacking with respect to the validity and reliability of the evidence.69 Smith, in his brief on appeal, does not identify any particular factor he deems to be lacking, but asserts only that the trial court did not “determine if the studies were tested [or] if they were valid or if they had general acceptance within the relevant scientific community.”70 65 State v. Daly, 278 Neb. 903, 775 N.W.2d 47 (2009); State v. Edwards, 278 Neb. 55, 767 N.W.2d 784 (2009); State v. Schreiner, 276 Neb. 393, 754 N.W.2d 742 (2008); State v. Gutierrez, 272 Neb. 995, 726 N.W.2d 542 (2007), abrogated on other grounds, State v. Thorpe, 280 Neb. 11, 783 N.W.2d 749 (2010). 66 State v. Huff, 282 Neb. 78, 802 N.W.2d 77 (2011). 67 Id. 68 State v. McClain, 285 Neb. 537, 827 N.W.2d 814 (2013). 69 Id. 70 Brief for appellant at 39. - 470 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SMITH Cite as 292 Neb. 434 [37] Moreover, although Smith claims the articles that Haney relied on in forming her opinion should have been subjected to Daubert standards, his true grievance concerns Haney’s opinion that a normal anal/genital examination neither confirms nor excludes the possibility of sexual abuse. When Haney testified to that opinion at trial, Smith did not object. Failure to make a timely objection waives the right to assert prejudicial error on appeal.71 We conclude that Smith did not properly preserve this issue for appeal. 8. Cumulative Error Doctrine In Wamsley v. State,72 we recognized the doctrine of cumulative error in the context of a criminal jury trial. We explained that although one or more trial errors might not, standing alone, constitute prejudicial error, their cumulative effect may be to deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to a public trial by an impartial jury. Smith claims the trial court committed “copious errors including those aforementioned.”73 We have already determined that the errors assigned by Smith are either meritless or inconsequential. Smith did not assign, but adds to his ­cumulative-error allegations, only that the prosecution improperly gave S.D. “gas money” and improperly met with S.D. two or three times without providing Smith with reports. [38] But a party who fails to make a timely motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct waives the right to assert on appeal that the court erred in not declaring a mistrial due to such prosecutorial misconduct.74 Smith did not make a timely motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct. 71 State v. Watt, 285 Neb. 647, 832 N.W.2d 459 (2013); State v. Nadeem, 284 Neb. 513, 822 N.W.2d 372 (2012); State v. Kibbe, supra note 6. 72 Wamsley v. State, 171 Neb. 197, 106 N.W.2d 22 (1960). 73 Brief for appellant at 59. 74 State v. Stricklin, supra note 6; State v. Robinson, 271 Neb. 698, 715 N.W.2d 531 (2006); State v. Lotter, supra note 58; State v. Wilson, 252 Neb. 637, 564 N.W.2d 241 (1997). - 471 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SMITH Cite as 292 Neb. 434 We therefore conclude that Smith waived his right to assert that issue on appeal. Smith’s argument that cumulative error deprived him of his right to a fair trial is without merit. Although we avoided the question of whether Smith’s birth certificate was properly authenticated, we determined that, regardless of error, its admission would be harmless. We determined that all of Smith’s other arguments concerning trial errors are without merit. Thus, there are not multiple trial errors to aggregate. 9. Enhancement We turn lastly to sentencing issues, beginning with Smith’s assignment of error that the trial court erred in finding Smith’s prior conviction was properly authenticated and certified for purposes of enhancing his sentences. Smith’s sexual assault of a child crimes were charged in the information as enhancements, to the effect that, if a prior similar conviction was proved, Smith would receive enhanced sentences for the sexual assault crimes of which he was convicted. Smith was convicted of three counts of third degree and two counts of first degree sexual assault of a child. At Smith’s enhancement hearing, the State offered exhibit 37, which was purported to be Smith’s prior conviction for attempted first degree assault. Exhibit 37 contains a signature and certification on the last page. Smith argues that the trial court erred in finding that exhibit 37 was properly authenticated and certified for purposes of enhancement, taking the position that a seal of authenticity should be on every page of the document. Smith is correct that neither § 28-319.01 nor § 28-320.01 provides any guidance as to what is required to prove a prior conviction. In contrast, for purposes of the habitual criminal statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2222 (Reissue 2008) provides that “a duly authenticated copy of the former judgment and commitment, from any court in which such judgment and commitment was had, for any of such crimes formerly committed - 472 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SMITH Cite as 292 Neb. 434 by the party so charged, shall be competent and prima facie evidence of such former judgment and commitment.” [39] In construing a statute, a court must look at the statutory objective to be accomplished, the problem to be remedied, or the purpose to be served, and then place on the statute a reasonable construction which best achieves the purpose of the statute, rather than a construction defeating the statutory purpose.75 We see no reason why the proof required of prior conviction for purposes of §§ 28-319.01 or 28-320.01 should be any different than the proof required under § 29-2222 for the habitual criminal statute. [40] Accordingly, we hold that for purposes of §§ 28-319.01 and 28-320.01, a duly authenticated copy of the former judgment and commitment, from any court in which such judgment and commitment was had, for any of such crimes formerly committed by the party so charged, shall be competent and prima facie evidence of such former judgment and commitment. [41] Exhibit 37 is a self-authenticating document. Copies of judicial records that are certified by a deputy clerk for the clerk of the district court and impressed with the court’s seal do not require extrinsic evidence of authenticity for admission under rule 902.76 Exhibit 37 is a copy of Smith’s record concerning his attempted first degree sexual assault conviction. It is certified by a deputy clerk for the Douglas County District Court and bears the court’s seal. Page 10, which is the order sentencing Smith for his conviction of attempted first degree sexual assault, is file stamped and separately authenticated by the clerk of the court. We conclude that exhibit 37 was a self-authenticating document, which was prima facie evidence of Smith’s previous attempted first degree assault conviction. Therefore, Smith’s argument is without merit. 75 State v. Rathjen, 266 Neb. 62, 662 N.W.2d 591 (2003). 76 § 27-902; State v. Hall, supra note 16. - 473 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SMITH Cite as 292 Neb. 434 10. Sentences Smith argues that his case should be remanded for new sentencing because the trial court abused its discretion in imposing Smith’s sentences, which were based on the court’s erroneous impression that the counts with mandatory minimum sentences needed to be consecutive to all other counts. Smith is correct that his sentencing was imposed by the trial court under a mistake of law. In imposing Smith’s sentences, the trial judge said that he understood the case law to require him to impose the sentences carrying mandatory minimum sentences consecutively to the sentences for the other counts. It appears the trial court relied on a statement in State v. Castillas77: “Mandatory minimum sentences cannot be served concurrently. A defendant convicted of multiple counts each carrying a mandatory minimum sentence must serve the sentence on each count consecutively.” We clarified this statement in State v. Berney,78 when we said: We were not speaking of enhancements under the habitual criminal statute, but of those specific crimes that required a mandatory minimum sentence to be served consecutively to other sentences imposed. There is a distinction between a conviction for a crime that requires both a mandatory minimum sentence and mandates consecutive sentences, and the enhancement of the penalty for a crime because the defendant is found to be a habitual criminal. In the former, the mandatory minimum sentence must be served consecutively to any other sentence imposed, because the statute for that crime requires it. In the latter, the law does not require the enhanced penalty to be served consecutively to any other sentence imposed. The sentence is left to the discretion of the court. 77 State v. Castillas, 285 Neb. 174, 191, 826 N.W.2d 255, 268 (2013), disapproved, State v. Lantz, 290 Neb. 757, 861 N.W.2d 728 (2015). 78 State v. Berney, 288 Neb. 377, 382-83, 847 N.W.2d 732, 736 (2014). - 474 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SMITH Cite as 292 Neb. 434 The question is whether the trial court’s mistake of law amounted to an abuse of discretion in imposing Smith’s sentences when the judge expressly stated that “even if [consecutive imposition of mandatory minimum sentences] was not required, . . . that would be appropriate given the time frames.” The issue is unique, and we are unaware of any case law on point. Nevertheless, we are concerned that the court’s imposition of Smith’s sentences on the convictions carrying mandatory minimum sentences may have seemed appropriate to the court because such sentences were ones thought to be required. This is not to say that the exact same sentences imposed with a full understanding of the law would be an abuse of discretion. Rather, we want to ensure that the court actually exercised its discretion and did not simply impose sentences that it thought were required. We therefore remand the cause for resentencing and do not reach Smith’s argument that his sentences were excessive.