Opinion ID: 1597233
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: judge bridges recused himself on october 9, 1989, voiding judgments of october 10, 1989 and october 20, 1989.

Text: Not appearing in the record, but appended to Roussel's Reply Brief is (apparently) a transcript from a hearing held October 9, 1989, before Judge Bridges on the motion to Recuse. Counsel for appellees deny receiving notice of this hearing. Roussel testified that he believed Chancellor Bridges could not be impartial in judging the case, because he had accepted a $1000 campaign contribution from Lem Adams after the suit had been filed. Roussel's counsel added that this created an appearance of impropriety. Judge Bridges stated that this was the first time he had heard that Adams had donated $1000 to him, and that he did not know if this were true. He stated that his (Adam's) firm may have given me some money, but if so, his committee had not informed him. The Chancellor stated that he would certainly make an investigation into that to see. Roussel added that he was not accusing the Chancellor of any wrongdoing, stating, I just don't feel like I can get a fair and impartial trial before your Court. The Chancellor responded: Well, I'm going to give you the opportunity to get a fair and impartial trial with another judge because I think the fact that Mr. Adams is involved as a member of the bar would be sufficient for me to recuse myself ... (s)o I will, sua sponte, recuse myself from this proceeding, and I will allow you the opportunity either to select by agreement another judge ... The statute provides that I either go (sic) the governor and recuse myself or let him appoint one, or I think there's an alternate method (sic) now to make provision for the Supreme Court to appoint one. Or if you all want to, by agreement of the parties, select a judge, then I can sign an order for a special chancellor. (By Mr. Marshall): All right, sir. I would like the opportunity to see of we can do one by agreement. (By the Chancellor): All right, sir. I think you need  tell me when you're going to do that then. If you don't, I need to prepare a letter recusing myself to the governor. No letter, order, or other document in the record indicates that the Chancellor in fact recused himself. That is, the only evidence of recusal is the purported transcript of the hearing. However, the transcript is not properly part of the record in this case, appearing as it does appended to Roussel's reply brief. Roussel neither designated the transcript as part of the record on appeal, nor followed the correct procedure for amending the record to include it. The transcript, and order of recusal (assuming there was one) could have been placed in the record by means of a motion to supplement. This Court has stated: We have on many occasions held that we must decide each case by the facts shown in the record, not assertions in the brief, however sincere counsel may be in those assertions. Facts asserted to exist must and ought to be definitely proved and placed before us by a record, certified bylaw; otherwise we cannot know them. Mason v. State, 440 So.2d 318, 319 (Miss. 1983) (citations omitted). The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Chancellor Bridges is no longer the judge of record in this case. However, Roussel's contention that his recusal (assuming it occurred) renders void the October 10th and 20th Final Judgments as to MP & L and Gray, is without merit. [11]