Opinion ID: 2691602
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Separation-of-Powers Doctrine

Text: {¶ 39} The first, and defining, principle of a free constitutional government is the separation of powers. Evans v. State (Del.2005), 872 A.2d 539, 543. In Kilbourn v. Thompson (1880), 103 U.S. 168, 190-191, 26 L.Ed. 377, the United States Supreme Court stated: {¶ 40} “It is believed to be one of the chief merits of the American system of written constitutional law, that all the powers intrusted to government, whether State or national, are divided into the three grand departments, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. That the functions appropriate to each of these branches of government shall be vested in a separate body of public servants, and that the perfection of the system requires that the lines which separate and divide these departments shall be broadly and clearly defined. It is also essential to the successful working of this system that the persons intrusted with power in any one of these branches shall not be permitted to encroach upon the powers confided to 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO the others, but that each shall by the law of its creation be limited to the exercise of the powers appropriate to its own department and no other.” {¶ 41} As this court has observed with regard to our own state system of government: {¶ 42} “While Ohio, unlike other jurisdictions, does not have a constitutional provision specifying the concept of separation of powers, this doctrine is implicitly embedded in the entire framework of those sections of the Ohio Constitution that define the substance and scope of powers granted to the three branches of state government.” S. Euclid v. Jemison (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 157, 158-159, 28 OBR 250, 503 N.E.2d 136. It “represents the constitutional diffusion of power within our tripartite government. The doctrine was a deliberate design to secure liberty by simultaneously fostering autonomy and comity, as well as interdependence and independence, among the three branches.” Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, ¶ 114. {¶ 43} “ ‘ “[T]he people possessing all governmental power, adopted constitutions, completely distributing it to appropriate departments.” Hale v. State (1896), 55 Ohio St. 210, 214, 45 N.E. 199, 200. They vested the legislative power of the state in the General Assembly (Section 1, Article II, Ohio Constitution), the executive power in the Governor (Section 5, Article III, Ohio Constitution), and the judicial power in the courts (Section 1, Article IV, Ohio Constitution).’ ” Norwood at ¶ 115, quoting State ex rel. Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 462, 715 N.E.2d 1062. {¶ 44} “The essential principle underlying the policy of the division of powers of government into three departments is that powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other departments, and further that none of them ought to possess directly or indirectly an overruling influence over the others.” State ex rel. Bryant 14 January Term, 2010 v. Akron Metro. Park Dist. of Summit Cty. (1929), 120 Ohio St. 464, 473, 166 N.E. 407. Thus, the people specified in our Constitution that “[t]he general assembly shall [not]    exercise any judicial power, not herein expressly conferred.” Section 32, Article II, Ohio Constitution. Our decisions reflect these principles. {¶ 45} We have held that “[t]he administration of justice by the judicial branch of the government cannot be impeded by the other branches of the government in the exercise of their respective powers.” State ex rel. Johnston v. Taulbee (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 417, 20 O.O.3d 361, 423 N.E.2d 80, paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 46} The judiciary has both the power and the solemn duty to determine the constitutionality and validity of acts by other branches of the government and to ensure that the boundaries between branches remain intact. State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 462, 715 N.E.2d 1062. “[J]urists have long understood that they must be wary of any usurpation of the powers conferred on the judiciary by constitutional mandate and any intrusion upon the courts’ inherent powers   .” Norwood, 110 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, at ¶ 115. We therefore must “jealously guard the judicial power against encroachment from the other two branches of government and    conscientiously perform our constitutional duties and continue our most precious legacy.” Sheward at 467. {¶ 47} Our vigilance is not born of self-reverence. Rather, we protect the borders separating the three branches in order to ensure the security and harmony of the government, Weaver v. Lapsley (1869), 43 Ala. 224, 1869 WL 503, , and to avoid the evils that would flow from legislative encroachment on our independence. Lawson v. Jeffries (1873), 47 Miss. 686, 1873 WL 4108, . As Montesquieu warned, “ ‘[w]hen the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistracy, there can be then no liberty  15 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO  . [And] there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.’ ” Evans v. State, 872 A.2d at 544, quoting Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Thomas Nugent trans., 1949), fn. 39. See also Clinton v. New York (1998), 524 U.S. 417, 450, 118 S.Ct. 2091, 141 L.Ed.2d 393 (the separation-of-powers doctrine guards against the threat to liberty posed by the concentration of power in a single branch of government). {¶ 48} But the doctrine also recognizes that our government is composed of equal branches that must work collectively toward a common cause. And in doing so, the Constitution permits each branch to have some influence over the other branches in the development of the law. For example, the legislative branch plays an important and meaningful role in the criminal law by defining offenses and assigning punishment, while the judicial branch has its equally important role in interpreting those laws. {¶ 49} As the Supreme Court has explained, the Madisonian vision of the separation of powers did not contemplate three branches operating in isolation, each without influence over the others. Rather, the doctrine was designed to protect against “ ‘the whole power of one department [being] exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department,’ ” in which case “ ‘the fundamental principles of a free constitution, are subverted.’ ” (Emphases sic.) Mistretta v. United States (1989), 488 U.S. 361, 380-382, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714, quoting The Federalist No. 47 (J. Cooke Ed.1961) 325-326. The court reminds us of Madison’s belief that “our constitutional system imposes upon the Branches a degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as independence   .” Mistretta, id. {¶ 50} Navigating the boundaries between interdependence and independence of the branches is not always easy. But we have guideposts to aid us. 16 January Term, 2010 {¶ 51} Foremost in the analysis, we recognize that the Founders’ design of the tripartite model was intended to serve as “ ‘a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.’ ” Mistretta, 484 U.S. at 382, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714, quoting Buckley v. Valeo (1976), 424 U.S. 1, 122, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659. The Supreme Court counsels that “this concern of encroachment and aggrandizement” animates judicial decisions on the separation of powers and arouses vigilance against the “ ‘hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power.’ ” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 382, quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha (1983), 462 U.S. 919, 951, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317. The court has “not hesitated to strike down provisions of law that either accrete to a single Branch powers more appropriately diffused among separate Branches or that undermine the authority and independence of one or another coordinate Branch.” Mistretta, id. {¶ 52} Thus, while we must respect the fact that the authority to legislate is for the General Assembly alone, we must also ensure that its legislative prerogative is not unbridled. The General Assembly cannot require the courts “to treat as valid laws those which are unconstitutional. If this could be permitted, the whole power of the government would at once become absorbed and taken into itself by the Legislature.” Bartlett v. State (1905), 73 Ohio St. 54, 58, 75 N.E. 939. We must be wary that the legislature, in discharging its own duties, does not accrete power and encroach on the province of the judiciary. {¶ 53} In cases specifically involving the judicial branch, the Supreme Court advises vigilance against two dangers: “that the Judicial Branch neither be assigned nor allowed ‘tasks that are more properly accomplished by [other] branches,’ Morrison v. Olson [1988], 487 U.S. [654] 680-681 [108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569], and, second, that no provision of law ‘impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.’ Commodity Futures Trading 17 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Comm’n. v. Schor [1986], 478 U.S. [833], at 851 [106 S.Ct. 3245, 92 L.Ed.2d 675].” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 383, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714. Courts also condemn legislative encroachments that violate the separation of powers by vesting officials in the executive branch with the power to review judicial decisions or by commanding that the courts reopen final judgments. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. (1995), 514 U.S. 211, 218-219, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328. {¶ 54} With these principles in mind, we turn to a key aspect of the AWA – the reclassification scheme. That scheme requires the attorney general to reclassify offenders who previously were classified by Ohio judges according to the provisions in Megan’s Law and its precursor.
violate the separation-of-powers doctrine {¶ 55} The AWA’s provisions governing the reclassification of sex offenders already classified by judges under Megan’s Law violate the separationof-powers doctrine for two related reasons: the reclassification scheme vests the executive branch with authority to review judicial decisions, and it interferes with the judicial power by requiring the reopening of final judgments. It is well settled that a legislature cannot enact laws that revisit a final judgment. We have held for over a century that “the Legislature cannot annul, reverse, or modify a judgment of a court already rendered.” Bartlett v. State, 73 Ohio St. at 58, 75 N.E. 939. See also United States v. O’Grady (1874), 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641, 647-648, 22 L.Ed. 772 (“Judicial jurisdiction implies the power to hear and determine a cause, and    Congress cannot subject the judgments of the Supreme Court to the reexamination and revision of any other tribunal or any other department of the government”). As the Supreme Court of California recently explained, “judgments cannot be deprived of their ‘finality’ through statutory conditions not in effect when the judicial branch gave its ‘last word’ in the particular case,” 18 January Term, 2010 regardless of the policy behind the legislation. People v. King (2002), 27 Cal.4th 29, 35, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 214, 37 P.3d 398, citing Plaut, 514 U.S. at 227, 230, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328. “A judgment which is final by the laws existing when it is rendered cannot constitutionally be made subject to review by a statute subsequently enacted   .” Gompf v. Wolfinger (1902), 67 Ohio St. 144, 65 N.E. 878, at paragraph three of the syllabus. See also Plaut, 514 U.S. at 222, quoting The Federalist No. 81 (J. Cooke Ed.1961) 545 (“ ‘A legislature without exceeding its province cannot reverse a determination once made, in a particular case   ’ ”). The reclassification provisions violate these bedrock principles. {¶ 56} The reclassification scheme in the AWA works to “legislatively vacate[] the settled and journalized final judgments of the judicial branch of government.” State v. Russell, Trumbull App. No. 2008-T-0074, 2009-Ohio5213, ¶ 93 (Grendell, J., concurring in judgment only). The legislative attempt to reopen journalized final judgments imposing registration and communitynotification requirements on offenders so that new requirements may be imposed suffers the same constitutional infirmity. “It does not matter that the legislature has the authority to enact or amend laws requiring sex offenders to register or that the current Sex Offender Act does not order the courts to reopen final judgments. The fact remains that the General Assembly ‘cannot annul, reverse, or modify a judgment of a court already rendered.’ Bartlett, 73 Ohio St. at 58, 75 N.E. 939. [Reclassification], as a practical matter, nullifies that part of the court’s [initial classification] Judgment [in this case] ordering [the offender] to register for a period of ten years as a sexually oriented offender. To assert that the General Assembly has authority to create a new system of classification does not solve the problem that [the] original classification constituted a final judgment. There is no exception to the rule that the final judgments may not be legislatively annuled [sic] in situations where the Legislature has enacted new legislation.” State v. 19 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Grate, Trumbull App. No. 2008-T-0058, 2009-Ohio-4452, 2009 WL 2710100, ¶16. {¶ 57} Just as “Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive Branch” or interfere with the judiciary by “commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments,” Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218, 219, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328, the General Assembly cannot vest authority in the attorney general to reopen and revise the final decision of a judge classifying a sex offender. {¶ 58} Our Constitution and case law make undeniably clear that the judicial power resides exclusively in the judicial branch. Ex parte Logan Branch of State Bank of Ohio (1853), 1 Ohio St. 432, 434. The judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in the courts. Section 1, Article IV, Ohio Constitution. The power to review and affirm, modify, or reverse other courts’ judgments is strictly limited to appellate courts. Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution. The AWA intrudes on that exclusive role and thus violates the separation-of-powers doctrine. {¶ 59} Moreover, once the final judgment has been opened, the AWA requires that the attorney general “shall determine” the new classifications of offenders and delinquent children who were classified by judges under the former statutes. R.C. 2950.031(A)(1) and 2950.032(A)(1)(a) and (b). In doing so, it violates a second prohibition by assigning to the executive branch the authority to revisit a judicial determination. {¶ 60} Thus, we conclude that R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032, which require the attorney general to reclassify sex offenders who have already been classified by court order under former law, impermissibly instruct the executive branch to review past decisions of the judicial branch and thereby violate the separation-ofpowers doctrine. 20 January Term, 2010 {¶ 61} We further conclude that R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032, which require the attorney general to reclassify sex offenders whose classifications have already been adjudicated by a court and made the subject of a final order, violate the separation-of-powers doctrine by requiring the opening of final judgments. {¶ 62} In light of our conclusion that the reclassification provision is unconstitutional, we decline to address the remaining constitutional claims at this time. The sole remaining salient question is, Which remedy to apply? See State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 84.
{¶ 63} As we did in Foster, “[w]e presume that compliance with the United States and Ohio Constitutions is intended and that an entire statute is intended to be effective. R.C. 1.47(A) and (B). Furthermore, R.C. 1.50 states, ‘If any provision of a section of the Revised Code or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the section or related sections which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions are severable.’ (Emphasis added.) {¶ 64} “When this court holds that a statute is unconstitutional, severance may be appropriate.    Severance is suitable, however, only where it satisfies our well-established standard.    {¶ 65} “   Three questions are to be answered before severance is appropriate. ‘ “ ‘(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause or part is stricken out? (3) Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to separate the constitutional part from the unconstitutional part, and to give effect to the former only?’ ”’ Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 21 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO N.E.2d 470, ¶ 93-95, quoting Geiger v. Geiger (1927), 117 Ohio St. 451, 466, 160 N.E. 28, quoting State v. Bickford (1913), 28 N.D. 36, 147 N.W. 407, paragraph 19 of the syllabus. {¶ 66} Applying these standards, we conclude that severance of R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032, the reclassification provisions in the AWA, is the proper remedy. By excising the unconstitutional component, we do not “detract from the overriding objectives of the General Assembly,” i.e., to better protect the public from the recidivism of sex offenders, and the remainder of the AWA, “which is capable of being read and of standing alone, is left in place.” Foster at ¶ 98. We therefore hold that R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 are severed and, that after severance, they may not be enforced. R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 may not be applied to offenders previously adjudicated by judges under Megan’s Law, and the classifications and community-notification and registration orders imposed previously by judges are reinstated.