Opinion ID: 1041292
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Victim's Prior Sexual Conduct

Text: Rather than seeking to remove nonconsent altogether as an element of the crime, rape law reformers were primarily concerned with limiting the type of evidence admissible on that element. 23 Under traditional common law rape statutes, an accuser's sexual history was relevant to the likelihood that she consented to sexual intercourse with the accused. 24 This evidentiary regime reflected two assumptions: first, that evidence of consent on prior occasions was 22 See also Loh, supra, at 550-52 (The new Washington rape law, like other reform legislation . . . focuses more on the actor's use or threat of force rather than the victim's conduct as the external criterion of nonconsent . . . [but t]he 'common denominator' to the three degrees of rape is lack of consent. . . . Only in rape 3 is nonconsent expressly stated as an element of the crime, but absent aggravating factors and forcible compulsion, it is unclear what other objective evidence based upon 'the victim's words or conduct' the state can present as proof. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting former RCW 9.79.190(1)(a)). 23 Fact Sheet-Bill to Revise Present Rape Law at 1, S.B. 3173, 43d Leg., 3d Ex. Sess. (Wash. 1974) (on file with Wash. State Archives). 24 Stacy Futter & Walter R. Mebane, Jr., The Effects of Rape Law Reform on Rape Case Processing, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 72, 75 (2001) (During trial, a woman's previous sexual history and encounters with the accused and third parties were used in court to determine whether the victim had a 'tendency to consent.' (citing SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 378 (1975)). 23 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurrence) probative of a general propensity to willingly engage in sexual contact and second, 5 that an unchaste woman was not a credible witness? By the time our legislature undertook the 1975 reforms, Washington case law had substantially limited the admissibility of an accuser's sexual misconduct or chastity reputation in a rape trial. See State v. Holcomb, 73 Wash. 652, 132 P. 416 (1913); see also State v. Geer, 13 Wn. App. 71, 74, 533 P.2d 389 (1975) (There is ample a11;thority in Washington to support the proposition that specific acts of sexual misconduct on the part of the prosecutrix are inadmissible in rape cases as such evidence bears on neither the question of consent or credibility. (citing State v. Allen, 66 Wn.2d 641, 404 P.2d 18 (1965))). Nevertheless, reformers noted that 26 lower courts did not always observe these limits and that the prospect of a humiliating and dehumanizing trial therefore dissuaded many victims from pressing charges. 27 They argued that evidence of a victim's prior sexual behavior should be presumed inadmissible, so the prosecution need not move to exclude it. 25 Fact Sheet, supra note 23. 26 Fleck, supra note 14, at 3 (Washington case law on the appellate and supreme court level reflects a favorable attitude to the victim's situation. . . . Although most judges follow case law, some do not and a prosecutor cannot take appeal from a 'not guilty' verdict on the basis of reversible error.); see also App.: Summary of Coriflicting Rulings on the Admissibility of Evidence of the Victim's Sexual Misconduct To Affect Credibility or To Evidence Consent, S.B. 2196, 44th Leg., 2d Ex. Sess. (Wash. 1975) (on file with Wash. State Archives). 27 Written testimony of Jackie Griswold, supra note 17. 24 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurrence) Deborah Fleck, Intern for House Judiciary Comm., Is There a Need for Revision of the Washington State Rape Law? (1974) (on file with Wash. State Archives). The 1975 law addressed these problems. That law made evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior inadmissible on the issue of credibility. LAWS OF 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 14, § 2. On the issue of consent, it made the victim's sexual history inadmissible unless (1) the perpetrator and the victim have engaged in sexual intercourse with each other in the past, and . . . the past behavior is material to the issue of consent or (2) the judge determines at a closed hearing that the evidence is relevant to the issue of the victim's consent; is not inadmissible because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice; and that its exclusion would result in denial of substantial justice to the defendant. !d. Since 1975, the legislature has expanded these protections. Under current RCW 9A.44.020(3)(a) and (b), a defendant offering evidence of the accuser's sexual history must file a written pretrial motion, accompanied by affidavit. If the court finds that offer of proof sufficient, it must hold a hearing to determine whether any of the proffered evidence may be introduced at trial. RCW 9A.44.020(3)(c), (d).