Opinion ID: 2431351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: criminal liability for first-degree burglary

Text: The appellant was charged and convicted of first-degree burglary pursuant to KRS 511.020(1)(b), which provides in pertinent part: (1) A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when, with the intent to commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building, and when in effecting entry or while in the building or in the immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime: . . . . (b) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime. The word building in KRS 511.020 is defined in KRS 511.010 as follows: (1) `Building,' in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any structure, vehicle, watercraft or aircraft: (a) Where any person lives; or (b) Where people assemble for purposes of business, government, education, religion, entertainment or public transportation. Each unit of a building consisting of two (2) or more units separately secured or occupied is a separate building. KRS 511.010 also separately defines dwelling (a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein) and premises (which includes the term `building' as defined herein and any real property). Appellant contends that the structure where the body was found, the abandoned, condemned and uninhabited building at 1417 Chesapeake in Covington, Ky., was not a building within the definition of a building as it applies to first-degree burglary because, conclusively, this was not a building where any person lives or where people assemble for purposes of business, government, education, religion, entertainment or public transportation. The resolution of this issue turns on whether the qualifying phrases in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of KRS 511.010(1) refer to any building as the appellant contends, or refer only to the words any structure, vehicle, watercraft or aircraft as the Commonwealth contends. The Commonwealth argues the first-degree burglary statute applies to every structure that meets the definition of a building as used in common parlance, without regard to whether it is inhabited or inhabitable. In 1980, the Kentucky General Assembly amended the language of KRS 511.020 to provide that the crime of first-degree burglary may encompass acts committed within a building in contrast to the language of the former statute requiring that the crime be committed in a dwelling. The appellant contends the effect of the 1980 change is restrictive, and the Commonwealth contends the effect is expansive. The Commonwealth argues: In this case, the General Assembly clearly and unequivocally broadened the scope of KRS 511.020 to encompass `buildings' and not just `dwellings'. The intention of the General Assembly is so apparent on the face of the statute that there is no room for construction. The Majority of this Court agrees. [1]