Opinion ID: 2431283
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: informed consent actions are based on a negligence theory

Text: In his appellate brief, Keel attempts to couch this cause of action in battery and the right of individuals to make decisions about their own bodies. This contention disregards the holding of Holton v. Pfingst, Ky., 534 S.W.2d 786 (1975), which held that such an action lies in negligence: It is difficult to logically analogize the situation with traditional concepts of assault and battery. The physician intends no harm and the relationship itself inherently contemplates contact rather than trespass. . . . Hence, we are persuaded that the prevailing view to the effect that the action, regardless of its form, is in reality one for negligence in failing to conform to a proper professional standard is the soundest approach. Holton at 788. The only exception to this rule is when no consent is given by the patient. See Clark, Informed Consent in Kentucky After The Medical Malpractice Insurance and Claims Act of 1976, 65 Ky.L.J. 526, 528-529 (1976-1977), and cases therein cited. The instant case does not lie in battery because Keel consented to the CT scan when he walked into St. Elizabeth and admitted himself for that procedure. Whether or not the consent given by Keel was an informed consent is the issue Keel raised when he brought this action.