Opinion ID: 1133622
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Supplemental Instruction Regarding Special Circumstances

Text: During the jury's deliberations, shortly after the jurors had requested and been given the verdict forms, the court received a note signed by the foreperson inquiring as to the special circumstance verdict forms. This note was misplaced and is not in the appellate record, but the trial court recalled that the jury was confused as to how to approach the special circumstances, and that the jurors did not understand the use of the special circumstances, and when they come into play. In response to the note, the court instructed the jury in pertinent part as follows: Apparently there is some confusion regarding what these special circumstances verdicts are. [¶] Now, the special circumstances verdicts come into play only in the event that the defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree. And if he's found guilty of any other charge, murder in the second degree or involuntary manslaughter, these are not to be used. [¶] Only in the event that he is found guilty of murder in the first degree, then in that event you then find true or not true the three special circumstances that are alleged. [¶] And by reading the form here, you will see that there are three special circumstances alleged, alleging that the murder was committed while engaged in the ... commission or attempted commission of burglary in the first degree, and you would look at that and find whether that is true or not true. [¶] The second one is while the murder was committed while he was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of robbery, and you would look to find whether that was true or not true, [¶] And then the third one, the murder was committed while he was engaged in the attempted commission of the crime of rape, you would look at that and say whether that is true or not true, [¶] At the bottom of each one it says `make only one finding.' That refers to the true or not true part. That may be a little confusing, too.... After the jury resumed its deliberations, defense counsel complained that the court had not also informed the jury that [a] special circumstance referred to in these instructions is not established if the robbery, rape, or burglary was merely incidental to the crime of murder. The court responded that it already had given such an instruction with all the other jury instructions, and it agreed with the prosecutor's observation that the jury's question had come out with the verdict forms themselves and was designed to receive an answer as to how these verdict forms might come into play. Defense counsel replied that the jury appeared to be confused regarding the special circumstances, and he asked the court to reread in their entirety the special circumstance instructions previously given, including the pinpoint instruction it had read regarding advancement of the independent felonious purpose of robbery. [13] The court denied defendant's request but sent a note to the foreperson that stated: It occurred to me that I did not fully answer your inquiry regarding the special circumstances findings. Please indicate at the bottom if you would like to have read the instructions that might be applicable or whether the explanation I gave was sufficient. The foreperson indicated that the jurors understood the court's answer to their question, and the court gave no further instructions. Defendant contends that reinstructing the jury with fewer than all the instructions on the three special circumstances did not eliminate the jurors' confusion. The effect of the supplemental instruction responding to the foreperson's note, according to defendant, was to permit true findings on the special circumstances even if each underlying felony was merely incidental to the murder. Defendant contends that the incomplete instruction deprived him of the right to have the jury instructed on all elements of the special circumstances, in violation of his rights to due process of law and a jury trial. Section 1138 imposes upon the court a duty to provide the jury with information the jury desires on points of law. [14] ( People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1212, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159.) If, however, `the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the court has discretion under ... section 1138 to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury's request for information.' ( People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 522, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119, quoting People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 97, 279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311; People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1213, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159.) The trial court properly exercised its discretion. The jury's note, which was sent to the court along with the special circumstance verdict forms, expressed confusion regarding the verdicts themselves. The court reasonably concluded that the jury was uncertain whether and under what circumstances it should complete some or all of these verdict forms. The court's explanation was clear and correct. To the extent the court referred to the substantive definition of the special circumstances, its supplemental instruction simply repeated the language appearing on the verdict forms themselves. Thus, the verdict forms required the jury to find whether the murder ... was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of the [rape, robbery, or burglary]. Because the court simply repeated the language appearing on the verdict forms (to which defendant has not objected), its explanation could not have prejudiced defendant. The jury had been read lengthy instructions on the special circumstances the previous afternoon, including the merely incidental and independent felonious purpose language requested by defendant, and the jury had a copy of the written versions of those instructions. We must assume it was clear to the jury that the court's explanation of the verdict forms did not purport to be a complete reinstruction on the special circumstances. The court reasonably declined to instruct further on the issue, particularly in light of the foreperson's indication that the jury no longer was confused. We find no reasonable likelihood that the jury believed it could find the special circumstances true without determining that the underlying crimes were not merely incidental to the murder.