Opinion ID: 2625875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Instruction Defining Reasonable Doubt

Text: Defendant contends that CALJIC No. 2.90, as given, unconstitutionally lessened the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt because it used the phrases moral certainty, moral evidence, and abiding conviction. We have repeatedly rejected this contention (see, e.g., People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 668, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175; People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1051, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388; People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 347, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846; People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 501-505, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249) and have been given no reason to reconsider those decisions here.