Opinion ID: 44183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Prior Drug Purchases

Text: Lewis argues that Green should not have been allowed to testify about drug purchases that occurred prior to the dealings preceding the period covered in the indictment. He argues that the testimony was prejudicial and unnecessary because 13 he did not place intent at issue, and, therefore, he argues that the only purpose of the testimony was to prove propensity for criminal activity in violation of Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). As previously noted, “[t]he district court has broad discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb the court's judgment absent a clear abuse of discretion.” McLean, 138 F.3d at 1403. The testimony Lewis finds objectionable was elicited as follows: Q: Prior to July 2003, did you ever buy drugs from the defendant? A: Yes. The government specifically requested that it be allowed to ask Green that one question to establish foundation, personal knowledge, and credibility, and it specifically indicated that it would not ask for details. The district court agreed with the government, stating that the testimony was “important to explain the relationship between the witness and the defendant . . . otherwise, I think his testimony might seem truncated, or . . . it might cost the witness some credibility if he doesn’t say anything about why he happened to be going to see the defendant on the particular occasion involved in our case.” “Evidence, not part of the crime charged but pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context, motive and set-up of the crime, is properly admitted 14 if linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.” McLean, 138 F.3d at 1403, quoting United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985). Here, the very limited question was asked solely to indicate why the government’s witness would have even been involved with Lewis, and did not indicate anything specific or prejudicial. The question and response clearly placed Green’s testimony and involvement in context, and it was not an abuse of discretion to allow that testimony. It is notable as well that Lewis did not even renew his objection when the question was asked. Lewis argues that his case is similar to United States v. Hubert, 138 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 1998), where we held that, where the defendant was indicted on criminal activity between July 1992 and July 1993, it was error to permit the defendant’s co-conspirator to testify that: [H]e and Hubert started using drugs in the 1970's; that he and Hubert had always been partners in drug dealing; that at one time he and Hubert had an apartment together in Miami from which they sold marijuana and powder cocaine; that in the late 1980's, Hubert supplied him with cocaine from time to time; that starting in 1990, Hubert regularly sold him cocaine powder which he would then cook into crack cocaine; and that in 1991, he and Hubert reaffirmed their drug dealing partnership, agreeing to a 50/50 split in profits. Hubert, 138 F.3d at 914. We went on to find that the error was harmless based on the rest of the evidence against him. Id. 15 The limited testimony elicited in this case does not square with the facts in Hubert. The level of specific detail in the testimony of the co-conspirator in Hubert, encompassing 20 years of criminal history, does not bear any resemblance to the testimony elicited here, which merely indicated that the government’s cooperating witness, Green, had purchased drugs from Lewis in the past, clarifying why he would have contacted Lewis in the first place. It cannot be said that the district court abused its discretion in permitting such limited testimony.