Opinion ID: 2977121
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Underlying Suit

Text: The essential facts do not appear to be in dispute for purposes of this appeal. For twentyeight years, DeLeon was employed as a police officer by the City of Ecorse. After an on-the-job physical altercation between DeLeon and Ecorse’s City Attorney, for which DeLeon was charged with a misdemeanor count of assault and battery, the police department initiated a disciplinary proceeding against DeLeon. This “Chief’s Hearing” was held on March 17, 2004, and shortly thereafter the department gave DeLeon the options of either termination or voluntary retirement. On April 6, 2004, DeLeon submitted his retirement letter. However, in letters dated May 25 and October 25, 2004, DeLeon, through his counsel, wrote to Ecorse Mayor Larry Salisbury stating that DeLeon was a veteran of the United States Marines who served during the Vietnam War and requesting that DeLeon therefore be afforded the pre-termination hearing to which he was entitled under the Michigan Veteran’s Preference Act (MVPA), Mich. Comp. Laws § 35.402.1 DeLeon also claimed that his alleged conduct did not justify his discharge 1 The MVPA prohibits the removal (and other specified adverse employment actions) of a veteran holding public employment “except for official misconduct, habitual, serious or willful neglect in the performance of duty, extortion, conviction of intoxication, conviction of felony, or incompetency”; and any such removal may only occur “after a full hearing” before, in DeLeon’s case, “the mayor of [the] city.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 35.402. Moreover, “at such hearing the veteran shall have the right to be present and be represented by counsel and defend himself against such charges,” and “shall be entitled to a notice in writing stating the cause or causes of removal . . . at least 15 days prior to the hearing . . . , and such removal . . . shall be made only upon written order of . . . the mayor[.]” Id. 2 under the discipline provision in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between police officers and the City of Ecorse. Mayor Salisbury apparently did not respond to these letters. On December 22, 2004, DeLeon sued the City of Ecorse, Mayor Salisbury (in his official and individual capacities), and police chief George Anthony (in his official capacity).2 This one-count complaint alleged that defendants violated DeLeon’s due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, DeLeon argued that he had a property interest in his employment based on two “independent sources”: the MVPA and the CBA. Joint Appendix (J.A.) 11 (Compl. ¶ 1). He contended that he was constructively discharged; that the defendants made no findings regarding the criteria for discharge under the MVPA, the CBA, or the city’s charter; and that his decision to retire was “involuntary and unknowing.” J.A. 13-15 (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 17, 19, 23-24). He claimed that, “[a]s a result of the constructive discharge,” he suffered “severe and extreme emotional and psychological stress due to his constructive discharge [] and loss of pension rights,” as well as “a loss of back pay, seniority status, reduction in pension and other benefits.” J.A. 16 (Compl. ¶¶ 31-32). DeLeon also sought punitive damages from Mayor Salisbury in his individual capacity. J.A. 16 (Compl. ¶ 33). DeLeon alleged that defendants’ failure “to hold a ‘right to reply’ pre-termination hearing[,] . . . to hold a ‘full trial-like’ hearing at some point, either pre-termination or posttermination[,] . . . [and] to make findings regarding the substantive predicates necessary for discharge” as defined by the MVPA, the CBA, and the city’s charter all violated DeLeon’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. J.A. 17-18 (Compl. ¶¶ 39-43). DeLeon’s prayer for relief requested “reinstatement and all equitable remedies,” compensatory damages, punitive 2 Suit was originally filed in state court and was subsequently removed. 3 damages, attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and costs and interest. J.A. 19 (Compl. at 10). On January 11, 2006, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of defendants as to the alleged individual-capacity liability of Mayor Salisbury and the municipal liability of the City of Ecorse, but denied defendants’ motion as to the official-capacity liability of Salisbury for failing to provide the MVPA hearing DeLeon demanded. DeLeon v. City of Ecorse, No. 05-CV-70187-DT, 2006 WL 83063, at  (E.D. Mich. Jan. 11, 2006). The court rejected two of DeLeon’s arguments in support of his claim that his procedural due process rights had been violated. See id. at -9. However, the court also ruled that because “only a mayor can be the final decisionmaker pursuant to the MVPA, not a chief of police,” and because it was undisputed that DeLeon did not have a hearing before Mayor Salisbury as was required by the MVPA, a reasonable jury could find that DeLeon’s right to such a hearing was violated. Id. at . The court observed that DeLeon did not cite any evidence to dispute a finding that his “violent, indeed criminal, conduct” was anything less than “serious neglect” in the performance of his duty—which would be a sufficient basis for discharge under the MVPA. Id. Nevertheless, because Mayor Salisbury had not held the hearing to which DeLeon was entitled, the court denied summary judgment on DeLeon’s “MVPA procedural due process claim.” Id. Shortly after the court’s ruling, in an apparent attempt to cure the procedural defect that the court had identified, the City of Ecorse conducted a hearing before Mayor Salisbury—purportedly “in strict compliance with the Michigan Veterans Preference Act”—at which the Mayor determined that any termination of DeLeon would be justified. J.A. 59 (Defs.’ Renewed Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 3). Plaintiff, by his attorney, objected to the hearing and did not attend because he believed it “illegal 4 for the mayor (or anyone chosen by the City of Ecorse or the mayor) to be the decisionmaker.” J.A. 206 (Pl.’s Mot. for Att’y Fees & Costs at Ex. 8). Nevertheless, after holding the hearing, defendants renewed their motion for summary judgment on the remaining MVPA claim. However, according to defendants, the court was “not satisfied with the process surrounding the MVPA hearing” and refused to dismiss the claim. J.A. 239 (Resp’ts’ Post-Hr’g Br. 2, Pl.’s Mot. for Att’y Fees & Costs at Ex. 10). The parties subsequently entered into settlement discussions and agreed to submit the case to the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Defendants agreed that “the issue of the dismissal and any remedy beyond that would be handled through the arbitration process.” J.A. 67 (Settlement Conf. Tr. 4) (quoting defense counsel). The parties further agreed that the district court would dismiss the case but retain jurisdiction so that plaintiff could, if he wished, file a motion for attorney’s fees and costs after the arbitration concluded—and that any such motion would not be entirely dependent on the arbitrator’s decision. See J.A. 67-69 (Settlement Conf. Tr. 4-6). On March 10, 2006, the district court issued an order dismissing the matter “pursuant to the settlement agreement placed on the record” at the settlement conference and ordering that “the Plaintiff’s claims in their entirety” were to be submitted to the AAA for “binding arbitration.” J.A. 63 (Order Dismissing Claims & Retaining Jurisdiction for Att’y Fees & Costs 2). The court retained jurisdiction “solely for the purpose of entertaining a motion by plaintiff for attorneys fees and costs.” Id.