Opinion ID: 1913318
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: did the trial court err in refusing to hear holland's motion to suppress the confession?

Text: ¶ 71. Holland raised this identical issue in his previous appeal on this case. The facts and circumstances surrounding the issue of its validity were exhaustively analyzed, with the Court concluding that Holland knowingly waived his rights in giving his confession. Holland I, 587 So.2d at 862. ¶ 72. Here, on resentencing, Holland attempted to reopen suppression hearings regarding his confession, stating that he did not have experience with Miranda rights. The trial court then asked Holland if he had any new evidence to offer the court. In response, Holland indicated that he did not have as much experience with Miranda rights as the Holland I opinion stated. After discussing the relevance of the findings in the Holland I opinion, the trial court refused to hold the suppression hearing. ¶ 73. The question, in short, is whether a suppression hearing should have been granted. Holland relies on West v. State in arguing that on retrial, all issues, including that of evidence admissibility, are to be retried de novo. West v. State, 519 So.2d 418, 425 (Miss. 1988). Holland has misapplied West as that case is clearly distinguishable because it concerned a retrial on both guilt and sentencing, not sentencing alone. West, 519 So.2d at 418-19. ¶ 74. The State correctly argues that Jordan v. State settled this issue, stating that res judicata on admissibility of a tape recording bars relitigation at resentencing. Jordan v. State, 518 So.2d 1186, 1189, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 818, 109 S.Ct. 57, 102 L.Ed.2d 35 (1988). This Court refused to address the issue of a suppression hearing through res judicata, where the confession issue was fully litigated in the guilt phase of the first trial. Jordan, 518 So.2d at 1189. Again, as in Jordan, we hold that Holland is barred because the issue is res judicata. ¶ 75. The bar notwithstanding, alternatively we address the issue on the merits. The United States Supreme Court held that Fifth Amendment privileges against self-incrimination apply at sentencing. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1872-73, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981); State v. Tinkham, 74 Wash. App. 102, 871 P.2d 1127, 1129-31 (1994). However, in this case, Holland's Fifth Amendment rights have been litigated once before, thereby distinguishing the case at bar from Estelle and other cases. ¶ 76. Other states have held that a defendant's motion to reconsider a suppression hearing on voluntariness, under these circumstances, would be barred under res judicata, where the type of additional evidence asserted was likely available at the first hearing. People v. Brownell, 123 Ill. App.3d 307, 78 Ill.Dec. 817, 822, 462 N.E.2d 936, 941 (1984); State v. Gilbert, 277 S.C. 53, 283 S.E.2d 179, 181 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S.Ct. 2258, 72 L.Ed.2d 863 (1982). Alternatively, the trial court would be required to hold the suppression hearing at sentencing if the confession could not have been litigated at the first trial. Brownell, 78 Ill.Dec. at 817, 462 N.E.2d at 936. ¶ 77. We find that this issue lacks relevance because Holland's alleged ignorance of the meaning of his Miranda rights was evidence which Holland could well have asserted in his first trial, since he presumably knew about his own knowledge of Miranda all along. Accordingly, this Court, under the authority of Brownell and Gilbert, rejects this issue as being without merit. The issue is barred and is alternatively without merit.