Opinion ID: 3039377
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Opening the Door to Prior Bad Acts Evidence

Text: Bucklew asserts that his counsel was ineffective for opening the door to evidence of prior bad acts, namely his assault against Ray on March 6, 1996. The trial court initially had granted a motion in limine to prevent the prosecutor from referencing this assault. Bucklew's counsel then referenced the incident in opening statements to demonstrate that Bucklew was distraught after discovering that Ray was romantically involved with Sanders. This reference opened the door for the prosecutor to admit all of the attendant circumstances, including that Bucklew had threatened and assaulted Ray that day. The Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that counsel's performance was not deficient because, regardless of the trial court's ruling in limine, the evidence was admissible under state law as evidence of motive, absence of mistake or accident, and common scheme or plan. Bucklew, 38 F.3d at 401. In the habeas context, [r]ules of evidence and trial procedure are usually matters of state law. A federal issue is raised only where trial errors infringe on a specific constitutional protection or are so prejudicial as to amount to a denial of due process. Adail v. Wyrick, 711 F.2d 99, 102 (8th Cir. 1983). Bucklew does not argue that the evidence was in fact inadmissible on a specific constitutional ground, and when viewed in light of all the evidence of this crime, the evidence of the March 6 assault was not so prejudicial as to amount to a denial of due process. The state court determination– that counsel's act of opening the door to evidence otherwise admissible on state law grounds is not ineffective assistance under Strickland–is not an unreasonable application of federal law. B. Ineffective Assistance Claims in the Penalty Phase 1. Mitigating Evidence–Dr. Gelbort Bucklew argues that his trial attorneys rendered ineffective assistance during the penalty phase by failing to call Dr. Gelbort to testify concerning his diagnosis of organic brain dysfunction and its effect on his behavior. The state courts concluded -11- that Dr. Gelbort's testimony would have been cumulative in the penalty phase and that Bucklew did not prove a reasonable probability that this testimony would have produced a sentence other than death. The Supreme Court of Missouri noted that Dr. Gelbort's findings were summarized–almost verbatim–by Dr. Bruce Harry, M.D., who testified during the penalty phase concerning Bucklew's mental condition as well as his physical condition and the effects of his medication. Bucklew, 38 S.W.3d at 398. Bucklew argues that his attorneys were deficient because his lead counsel at the penalty phase never spoke with Dr. Gelbort. It is not deficient performance for a team of attorneys to divide among them the workload of a case in a rational and efficient manner. We emphasize that this case does not involve an incomplete investigation by Bucklew's team of two attorneys. Cf. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (holding counsel improperly abandoned their investigation into the defendant's background after acquiring only rudimentary knowledge of his history from a narrow set of sources). Prior to trial, his attorneys thoroughly investigated his background by talking with Bucklew and his family and consulting medical and legal records. They also thoroughly investigated his state of mind at the time of the offense, obtaining the opinions of both Dr. Gelbort, a neuropsychologist, and Dr. Harry, a psychiatrist. Although one of Bucklew's attorneys did not speak with Dr. Gelbort, the other member of the defense team spoke with him and forwarded his evaluation to Dr. Harry, whom the defense team eventually decided to call as a witness at the penalty phase. Counsel indicated at the PCR hearing that they chose Dr. Harry to testify because, as both a medical doctor and a psychiatrist, he could give the most complete picture of Bucklew's mental and physical condition. It was reasonable to choose an expert whom the attorneys determined could give the most comprehensive picture of Bucklew's condition and to avoid calling a second expert who would have the potential of overemphasizing the undesirable behavioral characteristics of Bucklew's personality that Dr. Gelbort would have been asked to confirm on cross-examination. -12- Bucklew asserts that Dr. Gelbort's testimony would not have been cumulative because he could have given a more complete picture of Bucklew's condition, but the state court's contrary decision is supported by the record. Dr. Harry's testimony summarized Dr. Gelbort's evaluation, in part, as follows: He [Dr. Gelbort] talked about Mr. Bucklew being alert, oriented to person, place, time and situation. Had a normal range of mood and was mildly sad under the circumstances. He had some problems with mental control. He specifically mentioned that while [Mr. Bucklew] was able to do more straight-forward tasks, his mental control, that is the ability to control his mental activity broke down as the complexity of the tasks increased. In addition, he noted that his information processing speed, that is the ability in the speed with which he can take in new information coming at him from a variety of sources and put it together and make some sense out of it also declined significantly with more complex tasks. He showed . . . a tendency to act before thinking, act suddenly and without thought or warning. And trouble managing multiple cognitive tasks at one time. . . . Also, he had an IQ Test . . . that is in the low normal range. . . . To the extent we know, it's brain deficits, it's not lack of desire or not wanting to. It's a person can't do it. . . . And [Dr. Gelbort] noted that when confronted with rapidly evolving complex types of activities, cognitive activity he's expected to respond at essentially chance levels. (Trial Tr. at 1076-79.) Dr. Harry's testimony substantively encompassed the totality of Dr. Gelbort's findings–mainly, that Bucklew's neurological brain deficits affected his behavior, severely impairing his reasoning and problem-solving abilities in rapidly evolving situations. The fact that Dr. Harry used the term brain deficits rather than brain dysfunction does not render counsel's performance deficient. We cannot conclude that counsel's performance was outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also id. at 690 (noting that strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and -13- facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable). Nor can we say that the state court unreasonably determined that Dr. Gelbort's testimony would have been cumulative at the penalty phase. 2. Mitigating Evidence–Additional Character Evidence Bucklew asserts that his trial attorneys were ineffective in not calling five friends and family members to testify as character witnesses on his behalf. Bucklew's brother and sister-in law and a friend, Mike Walton, would have testified about Bucklew's prior good treatment of Ray and her children, his deteriorating health, and their opinion that he was not violent. John Rhode would have testified that Bucklew was a good friend and kind person, and another friend, Kimberly Nichols, also would have testified that Bucklew had been kind to her. The Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that Bucklew was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to call these witnesses because their testimony would have been cumulative and would have had little beneficial impact after the witnesses had been confronted in cross-examination with Bucklew's numerous undisputed violent and dishonest prior acts. See Bucklew, 38 S.W.3d at 400-01. Trial counsel did not fail to investigate or present mitigating character evidence; they elicited testimony from Bucklew's ex-wife that he was a good father, and his parents testified of their love for him. Ray herself testified that Bucklew had been good to her and her children in the past. Dr. Harry testified about Bucklew's deteriorating health. The prosecutor undisputably had a wealth of information available for cross-examination to demonstrate Bucklew's violent and deceptive past in contradiction to the testimony of the five character witness Bucklew now identifies. Thus, the state court's conclusion that these witnesses would have provided cumulative evidence that may even have been harmful and would not have affected the outcome was not an unreasonable application of federal law. -14-