Opinion ID: 1890550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Andrade and its Offspring

Text: The issue of whether prejudgment interest applies in actions against the state was one of first impression for this Court in Andrade v. State, 448 A.2d 1293 (R.I.1982). There, the plaintiff sued the state for negligence after her son, a resident of the Rhode Island Training School, was killed in a fire at the institution. Although the trial justice awarded damages within the limits of the Governmental Tort Liability Act, [7] prejudgment interest was also added, resulting in a recovery for the plaintiff that far exceeded the statutory tort liability limit applicable to the state. Id. at 1294. On appeal, this Court looked to the language of the act, and held that because the legislation effectively waived the common law concept of sovereign immunity for tort damages claimed against the state, that statute should be strictly construed. We held that interest is not an element of damages, and because the act expressly and consistently refers to the liability of the state in terms of damages only, interest would not be added to judgments against the state. Id. at 1295. In Matarese v. Dunham, 689 A.2d 1057 (R.I.1997), this Court relied on Andrade to affirm a Superior Court judgment barring prejudgment interest against the City of Providence. Id. at 1058. After an automobile accident with a city employee, the plaintiff sued both the driver and the city under the theory that in cases wherein the state is performing a proprietary function, prejudgment interest may be appropriately awarded. [8] Id. (quoting Lepore v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 524 A.2d 574, 575 (R.I.1987)). The plaintiff argued that the defendant's operation of a motor vehicle was a proprietary function because it easily could have been performed by a private person under ordinary circumstances. We disagreed and held that because the defendant was a city employee who was responsible for the maintenance of government buildings and who was on call and driving a city-owned car at the time of the accident, he was engaged in a governmental, rather than proprietary, function. This Court concluded that [b]ecause the activity in question was governmental, the claim against the city was covered by the limitations contained in § 9-31-3 of the Tort Claims Act. Matarese, 689 A.2d at 1058. With the law clearly established that prejudgment interest did not apply to the state and municipalities, the question then arose as to who, exactly, should be entitled to benefit from this immunity. In the seminal case of Pridemore v. Napolitano, 689 A.2d 1053, 1056 (R.I.1997), this Court held that the exemption from prejudgment interest for municipalities that we recognized in Andrade and that derived from the residual sovereign immunity that survived the limited waiver of such immunity established by the Governmental Tort Liability Act    does not extend to government employees who are liable in tort. In Pridemore, the plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of a collision between the car in which she was a passenger and a city-owned vehicle operated by a Providence police officer on his way to work. The plaintiff sued both the city and the officer. [9] A verdict was rendered in the plaintiff's favor and against both the city and the officer. The trial court excluded prejudgment interest with respect to the city, but added it to the judgment against the officer. Id. at 1055. In his appeal, the officer argued that because the city would not be liable for prejudgment interest, he should not be either, reasoning that under Rhode Island law, a master and servant or principal and agent shall be considered a single tortfeasor, and that the principal's immunity extends to its agent and shields them both from an assessment of prejudgment interest. Id. at 1056 (quoting G.L.1956 § 10-6-2). This Court did not agree with defendant's interpretation of the statute, and concluded that the purpose and effect of the above-mentioned language were to unify master and servant or principal and agent for purposes of assigning liability, so that a release of the servant or agent from liability for tortious conduct would serve to release the master or principal whose liability was only derivative, but not to extend to the tortfeasor any special immunity enjoyed by the master or principal. Id. at 1056. After Pridemore, this Court addressed a factually similar situation in Gelsomino v. Mendonca, 723 A.2d 300 (R.I.1999). In that case, a vehicle driven by an on-duty Central Falls police officer collided with a trailer that was serving temporarily as an elementary school classroom. The plaintiff classroom teacher was injured and sued both the officer and the city. After a jury awarded damages, the court clerk added prejudgment interest, which the trial justice later struck. Id. at 301. This Court found the trial justice's preclusion of prejudgment interest against the defendant police officer to be in contravention with Pridemore, and reiterated that the police officer is not entitled to the residual effect of sovereign immunity recognized by this Court in Andrade   . Id. at 303. As in Pridemore, this Court's discussion in Gelsomino neither rested on nor referred to the capacity in which the officer was sued. Despite the clarity of our previous holdings, defendant Perry invites us to revisit this issue and hold that public employees share immunity from prejudgment interest when found liable for tortious conduct in the performance of their duties. In doing so, defendant advances a two-pronged argument based upon public policy grounds as well as our recent holding in Feeney.