Opinion ID: 5126740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Armatas’s Substantive Due Process Claim

Text: While the district court dismissed all of Armatas’s original claims, on appeal, Armatas challenges only the dismissal of his substantive due process claim.1 “We review the district court’s grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo using the same standard as for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 623 F.3d 281, 284 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Under this standard, the plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted). Plausibility is marked by the ability of the “court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). “On a motion to dismiss, ‘[w]e must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all allegations as true.’” Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 588 (6th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted) (alteration in original). Armatas does not challenge—either facially or as applied—the constitutionality of the Hedge Ordinance. Rather, he alleges that the Defendants’ conduct “[i]n attempting to adopt an [a]mendment to the Hedge Ordinance” was government action that violated his substantive due process rights. To state a substantive due process claim challenging a government action, Armatas must allege that “(1) a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest exists, and (2) the constitutionally protected interest has been deprived through arbitrary and capricious [government] action.” White Oak Prop. Dev., L.L.C. v. Washington Township, 606 F.3d 842, 853 (6th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). Here, Armatas has not claimed any liberty interest, nor has he sufficiently alleged a protected property interest. To have a constitutionally protected property interest, “a person must 1 Because Armatas has provided no argument relative to the other claims in the original complaint, he has waived review of those claims. See Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov’t, 833 F.3d 590, 610–11 (6th Cir. 2016). -8- No. 21-3190, Armatas v. Haws have a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement.’” Taylor Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. City of Taylor, 313 F. App’x 826, 830 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). But if local government actors have discretion in granting or denying what the plaintiff wants, there is no legitimate claim of entitlement. See Triomphe Invs. v. City of Northwood, 49 F.3d 198, 202–04 (6th Cir. 1995). “[A] party cannot possess a property interest in the receipt of a benefit when the state’s decision to award or withhold a benefit is wholly discretionary.” R.S.W.W., Inc. v. City of Keego Harbor, 397 F.3d 427, 435 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted) (alteration in original). Consequently, Armatas must allege that some source of state law limited the Defendants’ discretion or that there was a “mutually explicit understanding” that limited the Defendants’ discretion. Id. (quotation omitted). Armatas alleges neither in his complaint. In fact, Ohio law grants to municipal corporations broad discretion in amending ordinances. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 713.10 (“The legislative authority of such municipal corporation may amend or change the number, shape, area, or regulations of or within any district . . . .”). We have also held that a plaintiff similarly situated to Armatas had no protected property interest in an amendment or an interpretation of an ordinance because he “ha[d] no legitimate claim of entitlement to a discretionary decision.” See Richardson v. Township of Brady, 218 F.3d 508, 517 (6th Cir. 2000). And Armatas cannot allege a protected property interest in the amendment process itself. See id. at 517–18 (holding that the plaintiff “can have no protected property interest in the [township’s] procedure itself”). On appeal, Armatas argues that his property interest is derived from “the precise text of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.” But state law and other independent sources create protected property interests; they are not created by the Constitution. See Wojcik v. City of Romulus, 257 F.3d 600, 609 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Even though individuals often claim property -9- No. 21-3190, Armatas v. Haws interests under various provisions of the Constitution, such interests are not created by the Constitution; nor may individuals manufacture a property interest.”). Therefore, because Armatas has not alleged a protected property interest, the district court properly dismissed his substantive due process claim.