Opinion ID: 867235
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Challenges to Second Penalty Jury Process

Text: ¶ 6 Under the law in effect when Prince murdered Cassandra, the judge decided whether to impose a death sentence and resolved any doubt as to the ultimate sentence in favor of life imprisonment. See former A.R.S. § 13-703(E) (1997). In contrast, § 13-752(K) provides that if the jury cannot reach a verdict at the first penalty phase, the court shall dismiss the jury and shall impanel a new jury. Prince claims § 13-752(K) violates the ex post facto clauses of both the United States and Arizona Constitutions by giving the state a second chance to seek a death sentence, which could not occur under the law in effect at the time of the murder. ¶ 7 We rejected an identical ex post facto argument in State v. Cropper, 223 Ariz. 522, 526 ¶ 11, 225 P.3d 579, 583 (2010). Prince acknowledges that decision but claims Cropper violates the spirit of Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 611, 123 S.Ct. 2446, 156 L.Ed.2d 544 (2003), in which the Supreme Court struck, on ex post facto grounds, a California statute authorizing the prosecution of child sex crimes after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Prince analogizes his situation to Stogner, claiming former § 13-703(E) created a statute of limitations regarding the death penalty: once a particular sentencer had doubts about the propriety of the death penalty, the limitations period expired. ¶ 8 The statute in Stogner created new criminal liability when none otherwise existed by resurrecting crimes after their limitation periods had expired. 539 U.S. at 613, 123 S.Ct. 2446. Impaneling a second jury when the first cannot unanimously agree on a sentence creates no new liability unless a hung jury is tantamount to an acquittal. Yeager v. United States, ___ U.S. ____, 129 S.Ct. 2360, 2366, 174 L.Ed.2d 78 (2009), rejected that characterization in the guilt phase for double jeopardy purposes, and Cropper appropriately extended Yeager's reasoning to the penalty phase for sentencing purposes. Moreover, no analogue to a hung jury exists for judges. See Cropper, 223 Ariz. at 526 ¶ 11, 225 P.3d at 583 (A judge, unlike a jury, cannot `deadlock' on a sentencing decision[,] and [a] jury's decision to acquit a defendant differs from a jury's failure to reach a decision.). Because Prince offers no other compelling reason to revisit Cropper, we reject his ex post facto claim.
¶ 9 Prince argues § 13-752(K) is unconstitutionally vague because it does not establish procedures governing the admission, to a new jury during the second penalty phase, of evidence of the aggravating factors previously found by the aggravation-phase jury. ¶ 10 Before commencing the second penalty phase, the trial court ruled that it would inform the new jury only of Prince's first degree murder conviction and of the descriptive titles and definitions of the two aggravating circumstances found by the aggravation-phase jury. The judge thus precluded either side from presenting any evidence relating to guilt or the aggravating circumstances. ¶ 11 The court of appeals accepted jurisdiction of the State's subsequent special action and vacated the trial court's order, ruling that the facts of the crime and aggravating factors are relevant to determining whether there is mitigation sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. State ex rel. Thomas v. Duncan (Prince), 1 CA-SA 08-0042, 2008 WL 4501925, at  ¶ 15 (Ariz.App. May 6, 2008) (mem. decision). We denied Prince's petition for review. State ex rel. Thomas v. Prince, 219 Ariz. 127, 194 P.3d 394 (2008). ¶ 12 The State claims Prince is now barred from challenging the constitutionality of § 13-752 because the court of appeals' decision is the law of the case. But we are not precluded from addressing issues in a direct mandatory appeal simply because we declined to review in the same case an interlocutory court of appeals' decision. Our prior denial of review does not mean we accepted the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals' legal analysis or conclusion and has no precedential value. Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co., 144 Ariz. 291, 297 n. 5, 697 P.2d 684, 690 n. 5 (1985). Consequently, the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable, and we thus address Prince's argument on the merits. ¶ 13 During the penalty phase, the defendant and the state may present any evidence that is relevant to the determination of whether there is mitigation that is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. A.R.S. § 13-752(G). [2] Additionally, the state may present any evidence that demonstrates that the defendant should not be shown leniency. Id. The penalty jury shall consider as [a] mitigating circumstance[ ] any factors proffered by the defendant or the state that are relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence less than death, including any aspect of the defendant's character, propensities or record and any of the circumstances of the offense. A.R.S. § 13-751(G). Any evidence admitted during the aggravation phase is deemed admitted at the penalty phase, as long as the penalty jury is the same jury that tried aggravation. See A.R.S. § 13-752(I). ¶ 14 As noted earlier, if the jury is unable to reach a verdict at the first penalty phase, the court shall dismiss the jury and shall impanel a new jury. A.R.S. § 13-752(K). This new jury may not retry the defendant's guilt or the issue regarding any of the aggravating circumstances that the first jury found by unanimous verdict to be proved or not proved. Id. ¶ 15 Although no provision comparable to § 13-752(I) addresses the admissibility of aggravation-phase evidence during a second penalty phase, the statutes are not vague or wholly silent on the issue. Section 13-752(G) is framed broadly and generally governs the admission of evidence at the penalty phase. Significantly, that statute prescribes only one criterion for admissibility: relevance to the determination of whether there is mitigation that is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. A.R.S. § 13-752(G). Subject to overarching due process considerations, see State v. Pandeli, 215 Ariz. 514, 527-28 ¶ 43, 161 P.3d 557, 570-71 (2007), any evidence that meets § 13-752(G)'s criterion is admissible, regardless of whether the evidence was admissible at a prior stage of the trial. ¶ 16 Importantly, § 13-752(G) uses the phrase mitigation that is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency, rather than simply mitigating factors. The former phrase contemplates liberal admission of any evidence relevant not only to the existence of mitigating factors, but also to the jury's ultimate determination of whether those factors call for leniency in sentencing. Thus, the statute's standard for admissibility is framed in terms of the penalty-phase jury's duty to assess whether to impose the death penalty based upon each juror's individual, qualitative evaluation of the facts of the case, the severity of the aggravating factors, and the quality of any mitigating evidence. State ex rel. Thomas v. Granville (Baldwin), 211 Ariz. 468, 472 ¶ 17, 123 P.3d 662, 666 (2005). Jurors cannot perform that duty without knowing relevant facts about the circumstances of the murder and the aggravating factors, making aggravation-phase evidence directly relevant to whether the mitigation is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. ¶ 17 Similarly, by also allowing the state to present any evidence that demonstrates that the defendant should not be shown leniency, § 13-752(G) permits any evidence probative on that issue, subject only to due process limitations. That standard is not constrained by the existence or nature of mitigating factors, or limited to evidence that was relevant or admissible at a prior stage of the trial. ¶ 18 Consequently, during a second penalty phase, the state and the defendant may introduce evidence pertaining to the aggravating circumstances previously found, subject to § 13-752(G)'s general relevance standard. The parties largely control which facts are presented to the jury about the aggravating circumstances, with the trial judge acting as a gatekeeper. Cf. State v. Nichols (Nordstrom), 219 Ariz. 170 174 ¶ 12, 195 P.3d 207, 211 (App.2008) (stating the legislature has placed no express limits on what evidence a defendant may present during the aggravation phase, except those limitations imposed by the rules of evidence (citing former A.R.S. § 13-703(B), now A.R.S. § 13-751(B))). ¶ 19 Our cases support this conclusion. In State v. Garza, we affirmed the trial court's admission of a 911 tape during the penalty phase, noting that it was relevant because the penalty jury may consider the circumstances of the crime in its evaluation of mitigation. 216 Ariz. 56, 68 ¶ 57, 163 P.3d 1006, 1018 (2007). And in State v. Harrod, we held that A.R.S. § 13-751(G) does not permit residual doubt evidence during the penalty phase, but stated that the phrase any of the circumstances of the offense in § 13-751(G) refers to such factors, among others, as [ ] how a defendant committed first degree murder. 218 Ariz. 268, 280 ¶ 43, 183 P.3d 519, 531 (2008). ¶ 20 Our view of § 13-752(G) also comports with federal constitutional principles. At the penalty phase, the jury must make a reasoned, individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligible defendant's record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances of his crime. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 174, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 165 L.Ed.2d 429 (2006) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion)). Construing § 13-752(G) as generally authorizing the admission of evidence concerning the circumstances of the crime and the aggravating factors thus preserves the entire statutory scheme's constitutionality. See Kilpatrick v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 413, 416, 466 P.2d 18, 21 (1970). Because the statutes governing the second penalty phase provide sufficient guidance, we reject Prince's void-for-vagueness argument.
¶ 21 Prince challenges the trifurcation of his trial, in which separate juries tried the guilt, aggravation, and penalty phases. A defendant, however, is not entitled to have the same jury render verdicts in each phase of a capital trial. State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, 348 ¶ 85, 111 P.3d 369, 390 (2005). Consequently, the use of different guilt and sentencing-phase juries does not violate a defendant's rights. Id. We extended Anderson in State v. Moore, upholding the use of different juries in the aggravation and penalty phases. 222 Ariz. 1, 17 ¶ 90, 213 P.3d 150, 166 (2009). [3] ¶ 22 Prince nonetheless argues that the final penalty-phase jury in a trifurcated proceeding might not have heard all of the relevant circumstances of the crime. He repeats his claim that § 13-752(K) does not adequately guide judges on the admissibility of aggravation-phase evidence during the second penalty phase. Additionally, even if the same witnesses testify in each proceeding, Prince contends a witness's demeanor and words might change, altering how each jury perceives the same testimony. ¶ 23 As explained earlier, however, § 13-752(G)'s general relevance standard governs the admissibility of evidence during a second penalty phase. If a defendant believes a trial judge incorrectly excluded admissible evidence or admitted excludable evidence at any phase, he has a remedy on appeal. And even if each jury in a trifurcated proceeding perceives the same testimony differently, that does not invariably disadvantage, and in some cases could greatly benefit, a defendant. ¶ 24 Most importantly, Prince does not point to any relevant evidence that was excluded from the second penalty jury's consideration because of the trifurcated proceeding. As in Moore, [s]ubstantially the same evidence was introduced at the second sentencing trial as at the . . . first sentencing trial. 222 Ariz. at 17 ¶ 90, 213 P.3d at 166; see Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 348 ¶ 85, 111 P.3d at 390 (noting the aggravation and penalty phases were essentially a full-blown re-presentation of the entire case). ¶ 25 The federal constitution requires only that the jury render a reasoned, individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligible defendant's record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances of his crime. Marsh, 548 U.S. at 174, 126 S.Ct. 2516. As long as a state's procedures satisfy this requirement, the state enjoys a range of discretion in imposing the death penalty. Id. Nothing about a trifurcated proceeding under § 13-752(K) deprives a defendant of a fair trial or reliable sentencing determination. Thus, the trifurcated proceeding did not violate Prince's constitutional rights.