Opinion ID: 711634
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 5 [R]elief under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 is limited to 'an error of law that is jurisdictional, constitutional, or constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.'  Bischel v. United States, 32 F.3d 259, 263 (7th Cir.1994) (quoting Borre v. United States, 940 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir.1991) (internal quotations omitted)). On appeal from the denial of a Sec. 2255 motion, we review the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the government. Messinger v. United States, 872 F.2d 217, 219 (7th Cir.1989). We review questions of law de novo, and the district court's factual findings for clear error. Stoia v. United States, 22 F.3d 766, 768 (7th Cir.1994). To hold the district court's findings of fact clearly erroneous, we must be left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 6 Flores's claims that he was entrapped in a sting operation and that the government withheld evidence about Cabral are based entirely on the argument that Cabral was an FBI operative prior to October 1, 1990. The claims that Flores's trial counsel was ineffective, that the prosecution allowed its witness, Cabral, to commit perjury, and that the length of Flores's sentence was based on unreliable evidence, are also largely based on the same argument. Flores offers three grounds for his assertion that Cabral was an FBI operative prior to October 1, 1990: an affidavit by FBI agent Robert Garcia, an unnamed reliable source, and inferences from Cabral's trial testimony. As the district court succinctly explained, Garcia's affidavit provides no proof that Cabral was an agent prior to October 1990: Garcia's affidavit discusses information supplied by Cabral but does not mention when Cabral provided the information. Garcia simply discusses facts regarding Flores's drug trafficking operations, some of which involved events before October 1990. Mem.Op. at 5 (emphasis in original). The district court also was correct to disregard the reliable source, since Flores does not name his source or attempt to establish his source's reliability. Id. Finally, Flores infers from Cabral's trial testimony that since Cabral received favorable treatment from the FBI, he must have been working for the FBI. However, any favorable treatment that Cabral received from October 1, 1990 onwards may be attributed to Cabral's cooperation with the FBI starting on October 1, 1990. As to Cabral's treatment before October 1, 1990, Flores suggests that Cabral avoided jail by working for the FBI. But Flores does not point on appeal to any specific evidence to support this allegation. 2 We find no clear error in the district court's fact finding. 7 Flores also argues that Green provided ineffective assistance since he had loyalties to the main witness against him, having represented him in 1988-89. 3 Furthermore, Flores contends that Green failed at trial and sentencing to explore Cabral's motives to lie or slant his testimony. 4 Flores points to no evidence, either in his motion or on appeal, that Green ever represented Cabral. All he cites is the government's pre-trial motion for judicial inquiry into a possible conflict of interest. R.83. According to that motion, Cabral informed the government that he had previously assisted Jose Gomez in the payment of legal fees to counsel Michael Green. Cabral was instructed to send Michael Green large sums of money which in part constituted legal fees for his representation of Gomez, by means of wire transfers in various amounts and under fictitious names. Cabral did as he was instructed, and in fact had contact with Green's office to advise them as to the particulars of the incomming [sic] money orders including what names they would be arriving under. The motion then stated that the government disclosed this information to Green, who replied that although he did represent Mr. Gomez, and that his fees were paid by wire transfer, he did not believe that any potential existed for a conflict of interest. The government was not aware of any other details concerning any past relationship between Mr. Green and Mr. Cabral. Certainly, this motion for judicial inquiry is evidence that Green was paid by Cabral, and may suggest that Green had reason to know that Cabral was paying him. But this is not evidence that Green ever represented Cabral. 8 The prejudice component of an ineffective assistance claim is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350, 348 (1980)). However, Flores has presented no evidence that Green had any relationship with Cabral by the time Green began to represent Flores. In other words, there is no evidence that Green, during his representation of Flores, either was under an actual conflict of interest or was actively representing both Flores's interests and Cabral's interests. 9 Accordingly, Flores must show prejudice. Id. at 691-93. As we held in the appeal of Flores's first Sec. 2255 motion, Flores must show that Green's errors were so serious as to deprive Flores of a fair trial, that is, of a trial whose result is reliable. Flores, 5 F.3d at 1079-80 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, and United States ex rel. Duncan v. O'Leary, 806 F.2d 1307, 1312 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987)). We concluded that Flores did not suffer prejudice, since [t]he abundant evidence against Flores establishes that the result of the trial--Flores' conviction--was reliable. Id. at 1080. Flores's contentions in the present appeal do not persuade us to alter this conclusion. The abundant evidence against Flores included not only Cabral's testimony, but also telephone records, tape recordings, and both drugs and a large amount of equipment suitable for dealing drugs found in his co-conspirator's apartment, where Flores was arrested. See id. at 1074-76. Both the jury and the judge could infer on their own, from the obvious facts that Cabral had worked for the FBI after October 1, 1990 and was a drug dealer testifying for the prosecution, that Cabral might have shaped his testimony in order to gain rewards or avoid adverse actions from the FBI. Since the motives of Cabral to lie were apparent, the failure of Green to highlight the issue of Cabral's motives does not establish a reasonable probability that Cabral's statements would otherwise have been discounted and that the results of the trial or sentencing would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 10 Flores also raises a due process challenge to his sentence, arguing that Cabral's testimony was unreliable, given Cabral's motives to lie. A criminal defendant 'has a due process right to be sentenced on the basis of reliable information.'  United States v. Vold, 66 F.3d 915, 918 (7th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Beler, 20 F.3d 1428, 1432 (7th Cir.1994)). However, arguments based on the motives of witnesses to provide unreliable information are  'wasted on an appellate court' because questions of credibility are solely for the trier of fact. United States v. Garcia, 66 F.3d 851, 857 (7th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341, 1347 (7th Cir.1989)). In fact, a district court is entitled to credit even testimony that 'is totally uncorroborated and comes from an admitted liar, convicted felon, large-scale drug dealing, paid government informant.'  Id. (quoting Molinaro, 877 F.2d at 1347). Accordingly, we will not upset the trial court's decision to credit Cabral's testimony in sentencing Flores, even though Cabral was a drug-dealer and a government informant. 11 Flores's final claim is that his appellate counsel was ineffective on his direct appeal and his first Sec. 2255 motion. Flores had no right to effective assistance of counsel on his Sec. 2255 motion. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756-57 (1991). He did have a Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel on his direct appeal. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Hollenback v. United States, 987 F.2d 1272, 1275 (7th Cir.1993). However, Flores has presented in his second Sec. 2255 motion the claims that he believes that his appellate counsel should have made. He has failed to support his claim that Cabral worked for the FBI prior to October 1990, or any other claim. His claims do not entitle Flores to relief now, and would not have entitled him to relief on direct appeal. Thus, Flores cannot show any serious detriment from the alleged deficiencies in his appellate counsel's performance, and is not entitled to relief on this ineffective assistance claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 5 12 The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.