Opinion ID: 1374482
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Arizona Law

Text: Our statute provides that it is unlawful: For a licensee or other person to serve, sell or furnish spirituous liquor to an intoxicated or disorderly person, or for a licensee or employee of the licensee to allow or permit an intoxicated or disorderly person to come into or remain on or about the premises, ... A.R.S. § 4-244(14). For a variety of reasons, we believe this statute is not an exceptional statute designed to protect those who cannot protect themselves. First, it does not express a clear legislative intent to place absolute liability for harm sustained by intoxicated adults on those in the business of selling intoxicating liquor. We cannot imply such a purpose. Until our decisions in Ontiveros, supra, and Brannigan, supra, the statute had never been interpreted to provide a civil remedy to the patron. Even in those cases, we did not find that the statute had been enacted as a civil damage act or dram shop act and acknowledged that the legislative purpose was `to regulate the business rather than to enlarge civil remedies.' Ontiveros, 136 Ariz. at 510, 667 P.2d at 210 (quoting Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 289, 162 P.2d 125, 127 (1945)). We went on to hold in Ontiveros that there was a common law duty, that the statute was intended partly for the safety of others, and that the duty imposed by [the] statute was one adopted by the common law. Ontiveros, 136 Ariz. at 511, 667 P.2d at 211. But see id. at 513, 667 P.2d at 213 (Holohan, C.J., concurring). Thus, the courts of this state have consistently stated that A.R.S. § 4-244 and its predecessors [6] were intended to regulate the liquor business and not to broaden civil liability of tavern keepers. See, e.g., Collier v. Stamatis, supra ; see also Thompson v. Bryson, 19 Ariz. App. 134, 505 P.2d 572 (1973); Pierce v. Lopez, 16 Ariz. App. 54, 59, 490 P.2d 1182, 1187 (1971). We cannot now hold that the legislature intended this same statute to render tavern owners absolutely liable and remove from their patrons all civil responsibility for their own conduct. Parrett v. Lebamoff, 408 N.E.2d 1344 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). Second, what has been said makes it obvious that the statute was not intended solely to protect the limited class of intoxicated people. We believe the statutes that prohibit sale of liquor to minors and intoxicated persons also  and perhaps primarily  were intended to protect the general public. See Tome v. Berea Pewter Mug, Inc., 446 N.E.2d 848, 852, 854, 4 Ohio App.3d 98, 102, 104 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (the inebriated or minor imbiber also violates the law by driving). We have adopted common law dram shop liability and have concluded that the prohibition on sales was intended as a general safety measure rather than a narrow protective statute. Ontiveros, 136 Ariz. at 510, 667 P.2d at 210. Third, although recently there has been dramatic change in the law of dram shop liability, we do not think it is in the best interests of the public to impose absolute liability where no liability previously existed for selling liquor to an able-bodied person. Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 234, 20 N.E. 73, 74 (1889), quoted in Comment, Tort Liability for Serving Alcohol: An Expanding Doctrine, 46 MONT.L.REV. 381, 381 (1985). Fourth, we believe that the strongest argument favoring the imposition of absolute liability is not fully applicable in Arizona. The question of recovery by the patron for injuries caused by his own affirmative acts is essentially a question of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. Herrly v. Muzik, 374 N.W.2d 275, 279-80 (Minn. 1985) (Scott, J., dissenting); Tome v. Berea Pewter Mug, Inc., supra . Many courts holding that the affirmative defenses may not be raised in a dram shop action base their decision on the argument that permitting such defenses would absolutely bar the action in almost every case and therefore make the duty recognized by the cause of action illusory. See, e.g., Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 589-90, 218 A.2d 630, 634-35 (1966); cf. Zerby v. Warren, supra . That argument has much less weight in Arizona after the adoption of comparative negligence. Herrly v. Muzik, 374 N.W.2d at 279-80 (Scott, J., dissenting). Of course, the case before us is governed by prior law. However, for reasons peculiar to Arizona the argument was not as compelling even before the effective date of the comparative negligence statute. Under art. 18, § 5 of the Arizona Constitution, contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are always questions of fact for the jury. Thus these defenses cannot bar plaintiff's suit as a matter of law, and a directed verdict can never be granted even if the evidence establishing the defense is uncontradicted. Chambers v. Western Arizona CATV, 130 Ariz. 605, 607, 638 P.2d 219, 221 (1981). Furthermore, this constitutional provision permits jurors to award damages even if they find plaintiff was contributorily negligent or had assumed the risk. Grant v. Arizona Public Service Co., 133 Ariz. 434, 442, 652 P.2d 507, 515 (1982); Layton v. Rocha, 90 Ariz. 369, 371, 368 P.2d 444, 445 (1962). The rationale is that art. 18, § 5 deprived the court of the power to instruct the jury as to what its verdict must be. Layton, 90 Ariz. at 371, 368 P.2d at 445. By requiring the jury to be the sole arbiter of contributory negligence and by impliedly allowing the jury to balance the plaintiff's conduct against that of the defendant, the Arizona Constitution has been interpreted as effectively transforming contributory negligence into a form of de facto comparative negligence. Note, Defining State Law According to State Court Results: The Arizona Contributory Negligence Rule in Federal Tort Claim Cases, 26 ARIZ.L.REV. 377, 379 (1984); Comment, Comparative Negligence in Arizona, 1979 ARIZ.ST.L.J. 581, 587; The Arizona Supreme Court 1970-71  Contributory Negligence  Confusion out of Compromise, 13 ARIZ.L.REV. 556, 562 (1971). Thus, unlike most states, in Arizona the affirmative defenses never constituted a complete bar to a dram shop action and the abrogation of those defenses was not necessary in order to prevent the cause of action from becoming illusory. It is quite possible that under particular facts a jury will find in favor of a plaintiff even though the affirmative defenses are legally and factually established. Sagadin v. Ripper, 175 Cal. App.3d 1141, 1165-68, 221 Cal. Rptr. 675, 690-92 (Cal. App.3d 1985). Certainly, such a possibility acts as a deterrent on the conduct of the supplier. The explicit adoption of comparative fault in all cases filed after August 31, 1984, [7] further reduces any perceived need to abrogate the affirmative defenses in the future. Finally, we believe that the preservation of those defenses in dram shop actions would be good judicial policy, at least in cases involving service to intoxicated patrons. [8] The interests of the public are better served by the common law principles that make most persons responsible for their conduct. Congini by Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 162, 470 A.2d 515, 518 (1983). Allowing the assertion of the common law defenses furthers both the public policy of deterring drunk driving and the judicial policy of limiting rules of nonresponsibility for special groups. Ontiveros, 136 Ariz. at 512, 667 P.2d at 212. Thus, we do not believe that the statute may be interpreted to abolish the affirmative defenses in dram shop negligence actions. For many of the same reasons, we do not believe that we should contemplate abolition of such defenses as a matter of common law decision. The common law has recognized contributory negligence and assumption of the risk as defenses in tort actions for almost 200 years. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra § 65, at 416 n. 1. So far as comes to mind, no exceptions to the availability of these defenses have been recognized except those based on the quality of defendant's conduct. Thus, contributory negligence is no defense where defendant was grossly negligent. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Lueck, 111 Ariz. 560, 574, 535 P.2d 599, 613 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 913, 96 S.Ct. 1510, 47 L.Ed.2d 763 (1976). Nor will contributory negligence affect plaintiff's right to recover in situations where the humanitarian doctrine applies. Thus, defendant's last clear chance to avoid the accident extinguishes plaintiff's contributory negligence. Schneider v. Macari, 111 Ariz. 483, 485, 533 P.2d 540, 542 (1975); Casey v. Marshall, 64 Ariz. 260, 169 P.2d 84 (1946). We are not disposed to recognize new common law exceptions on the availability of the defenses based on the nature of defendant's business. In this court's view, the same rules of liability and responsibility should apply to all of suitable age and discretion. Cf. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 143 Ariz. 368, 694 P.2d 198 (1984). Other than the common law exceptions just mentioned, the only other recognized exceptions to the availability of the common law defenses are those based upon legislative enactment. One of these is the special statute which evinces legislative intent to abolish the defenses. As indicated ante, 151 Ariz. at 168-169, 726 P.2d 584-585, the statutes relevant to the facts of this case do not evince such a purpose. The other type of legislative enactment which commonly affects the availability of the common law defenses is the comparative negligence doctrine. As indicated ante, 151 Ariz. at 169, 726 P.2d at 585, we have always had a disguised version of this in Arizona under art. 18, § 5 of our constitution and have now been given the doctine expressly by A.R.S. § 12-2505 (Supp. 1985). We deem it inappropriate to add to these constitutional and legislative provisions by judicial decision. If by judicial decision we were inclined to give any group such a special immunity from the consequences of their own conduct, consumers of alcohol would have a low priority. We hold, therefore, that the common law affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk may be asserted in common law dram shop actions brought prior to the effective date of the comparative negligence statute. A fortiori such defenses may be asserted in actions brought after the effective date of the statute. The trial court therefore erred in holding the defenses were legally unavailable even if factually supported. Relief is granted and the action remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. HOLOHAN, C.J., GORDON, V.C.J., and HAYS, J., concur. CAMERON, J., did not participate in the determination of this matter.