Opinion ID: 2978646
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness of Carpenter’s Sentence

Text: Next, Carpenter argues that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence. Sentences imposed under an advisory Sentencing Guidelines regime are reviewed for procedural and substantive reasonableness. United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383-85 (6th Cir. 2005). We have -6- No. 07-4496 United States of America v. James P. Carpenter held that whether a sentence is procedurally reasonable depends on three factors: (1) whether the district court correctly calculated the applicable Guidelines range and used it as a starting point for its sentence analysis; (2) whether the parties were given the opportunity to argue for sentences they deemed appropriate and the district court made an individualized sentencing decision based upon the facts and § 3553(a) factors; and (3) whether the district court explained its reasoning with enough detail to allow for meaningful appellate review and to give the impression of fair sentencing. United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 579-80 (6th Cir. 2007). Procedurally reasonable sentences are reviewed for substantive reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of whether the sentence is within or outside the Guidelines range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, the district court’s substantive conclusions about the relative significance of the various sentencing factors is beyond the scope of appellate review. United States v. Sexton, 512 F.3d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 2008). Carpenter argues that his 108-month sentence is greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553. In particular, Carpenter claims that the district court erred by not considering his previous time served and by failing to consider adequately his poor health.
Carpenter argues that the district court should have granted him credit for the time he served in Indiana for selling unregistered securities. While Carpenter raised this issue in his Sentencing Memorandum, he did not raise it at the sentencing hearing, and the district court did not address the issue. If, however, Carpenter was not entitled to credit for his time served, there is no harm resulting from the district court’s failure to address the question. See United States v. Smith, 510 F.3d 603, -7- No. 07-4496 United States of America v. James P. Carpenter 608 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] district court need not explain its reasons for rejecting each argument made by the defendant.”). We conclude that the district court did not err because the two provisions on which Carpenter relies, 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) and U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, do not apply here. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), “[a] defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences” in two situations: “(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or (2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense . . . .” In United States v. Wilson, the United States Supreme Court held that it is the Attorney General, through the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), and not the district court, who has the authority to grant credit for time served. 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)); see also United States v. Sylvester, 289 F. App’x 860, 867 (6th Cir. 2008) (applying Wilson and rejecting defendant’s argument that the district court should have considered his time served). In addition, Carpenter does not qualify for a departure under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) or (c) because he seeks credit for a fully discharged conviction. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 provides that a district court may effect a downward departure for an undischarged sentence but does not provide for a downward departure for a discharged sentence. See United States v. Mohler, Nos. 97-3586/97-3671, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 16211, at -11 (6th Cir. July 9, 1999) (per curiam) (“We find it is neither irrational nor arbitrary for § 5G1.3(b) to mandate that a sentence be imposed concurrently with any undischarged term of imprisonment . . . but not to require that a credit be granted when the defendant completed the term of imprisonment . . . .”). Moreover, as the PSR indicates, the state crimes for which Carpenter served time and now seeks credit were not a basis for increasing his offense level, -8- No. 07-4496 United States of America v. James P. Carpenter meaning that he cannot qualify for a downward departure for his discharged sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.23 (referring to § 5G1.3(b) and requiring that a prior offense be the basis for an increase in offense level for an offender to receive credit for a discharged sentence). Thus, the district court did not err by not giving Carpenter credit for time served.
Carpenter also claims that the district court did not adequately consider his poor health and, therefore, his sentence should be reduced under either 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) or U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4. Section 3553(a)(2)(D) provides that a district court must consider “the need for the sentence imposed--to provide the defendant with needed . . . medical care.” Similarly, U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 allows a district court to depart for “extraordinary physical impairment.” Carpenter argues that his 108-month sentence, given his health, is effectively a life sentence and his family is better equipped than is the BOP to address his medical needs. Carpenter does have medical problems. He underwent a kidney transplant in January 1985; suffers from high blood pressure, Hepatitis C, and cataracts; and developed skin cancer several years ago. At the sentencing hearing, however, the district court acknowledged Carpenter’s poor health and concluded that the BOP’s facilities are equipped to treat him. Once the court considered Carpenter’s health conditions, it had discretion to vary or depart from the Guidelines range because of those conditions and decided not to do so. See United States v. Clark, 469 F.3d 568, 571 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming district court’s rejection of defendant’s argument that his health conditions warranted a below-Guidelines sentence); United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 873-74 (6th Cir. 2004) (applying plain-error standard to district court’s decision to depart for medical infirmity and -9- No. 07-4496 United States of America v. James P. Carpenter age). As an initial matter, we note that a district judge’s decision denying a downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines is not reviewable, provided that the judge understood his discretion to depart downward. United States v. Puckett, 422 F.3d 340, 345 (6th Cir. 2005). Here, because the judge understood his discretion, his decision not to depart is not reviewable. Of course, Carpenter also argues that the district court should have varied from the Guidelines range under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). The district court did not abuse its discretion. Carpenter was only fifty-seven years old when he was sentenced, and while he does have health problems, he has offered no evidence that the BOP is unable to provide adequate medical care. Thus, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not reducing Carpenter’s sentence due to his medical conditions and conclude that Carpenter’s sentence is reasonable.