Opinion ID: 6321839
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Giglio and Brady Violations

Text: Sheppard next argues that the circuit court erred in finding that Brady and Giglio violations did not occur at his trial with respect to (1) Michael Roberts, (2) Willie Carter, and (3) Khalilah Cook Mejors. We affirm the circuit court’s denial with respect to these claims. “To establish a Brady violation, the defendant has the burden to show that: (1) the evidence was either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.” Duckett v. State, 231 So. 3d 393, 400 (Fla. 2017) - 45 - (quoting Davis v. State, 136 So. 3d 1169, 1184 (Fla. 2014)). To establish materiality or prejudice under Brady, the defendant “must demonstrate . . . a reasonable probability that the jury verdict would have been different had the suppressed information been used at trial.” Smith v. State, 931 So. 2d 790, 796 (Fla. 2006) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289 (1999)). “To establish a Giglio violation, it must be shown that: (1) the testimony given was false; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the statement was material.” Duckett, 231 So. 3d at 400 (quoting Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2003)). Unlike a Brady claim for which the defendant bears the burden of proof as to the materiality prong, “[u]nder Giglio, once a defendant has established that the prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony at trial, the state bears the burden to show that the false evidence was not material.” Guzman, 868 So. 2d at 507. “This requires the State to prove that the presentation of false testimony was ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,’ id. at 506, or in other words, that ‘there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.’ ” Ponticelli v. State, 941 So. 2d 1073, - 46 - 1088 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Guzman, 868 So. 2d at 506, and then State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986)). This Court applies a mixed standard of review to the lower court’s determination of Brady and Giglio claims. It reviews the factual findings for competent, substantial evidence and reviews the legal conclusions de novo. Duckett, 231 So. 3d at 400.
The facts supporting Sheppard’s Brady and Giglio claims for Roberts’s testimony are the same as the facts supporting the newly discovered evidence claim concerning Roberts’s recantation. As noted above, Sheppard produced an affidavit and two witnesses to testify about Roberts’s recantation. At the evidentiary hearing, the State presented Roberts’s defense attorney, who testified that Roberts was not promised a deal on his pending charges in exchange for his testimony. The assistant state attorney who represented the State at Sheppard’s trial, Caliel, also testified at the evidentiary hearing that he told Roberts that he could not make him any specific promises regarding his pending criminal charges. In support of his argument that the State had a deal with Roberts, Sheppard notes that Roberts’s pending criminal charges were - 47 - resolved favorably, but he does not present evidence that this was due to any undisclosed deal that Roberts made with the State in exchange for his testimony. Consistent with Caliel’s postconviction testimony, the trial record also suggests that Roberts did not have an undisclosed deal with the State. Roberts testified at trial that his Duval County charge was dropped before Sheppard’s trial began. Roberts also candidly testified that he was seeking reduced sentences in exchange for his trial testimony; the fact that he later received favorable sentences, without more, does not establish Sheppard’s claim that Roberts entered into a specific deal with the State in exchange for his testimony. Moreover, Roberts’s affidavit recanting his testimony is not inconsistent with his testimony at trial that he entered an open plea in the hope that the State would inform the court of his substantial assistance in Sheppard’s case. Though the circuit court denied the Brady and Giglio claims based on its ruling that Roberts’s affidavit was not admissible evidence, we uphold denial of these claims on an alternative basis, namely that Sheppard did not show that the State willfully or inadvertently suppressed favorable evidence as necessary to prevail - 48 - under Brady or that the State presented testimony that it knew was false as required to prevail under Giglio. See Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002) (explaining that an appellate court may affirm when the trial court reaches the right result for the wrong reason so long as there is a basis in the record to support the trial court’s ruling).
At trial, Carter testified that he witnessed Sheppard and Evans steal James’s car. He identified Sheppard as the person who entered the driver’s side of James’s car. Carter was incarcerated during his testimony, but he testified that he did not have charges pending at the time of his testimony. On redirect, he clarified that he was serving a twelve-year sentence on a cocaine charge that was unrelated to his testimony. Sheppard argues that the State had a deal with Carter to recommend a sentence reduction in exchange for favorable testimony in Sheppard’s case. To support this argument, Sheppard notes that the State filed a substantial assistance motion for Carter after he testified in Sheppard’s trial and Carter received a reduced sentence. During the hearing on the - 49 - motion for reduction of sentence, the State mentioned that Carter had recently testified in Sheppard’s case. At Sheppard’s postconviction hearing, Caliel testified that Carter was convicted and sentenced for his charges before his testimony in Sheppard’s case and the motion for sentence reduction was for a separate matter. Caliel further explained that he became aware of the sentence reduction after the motion was filed and he did not provide testimony or attend the hearing. Moreover, Carter’s trial testimony was consistent with his deposition testimony, which he gave before he was arrested on the charges that resulted in the twelve-year sentence. Carter could not have been offered a deal for his testimony because he was not facing criminal charges when, during his deposition, he identified Sheppard as one of the people who stole James’s car. Moreover, Caliel testified that he was unaware of any sentence reduction motion until after it had been filed by another state attorney. Therefore, we agree with the circuit court’s legal conclusion that the facts are insufficient to show that the State violated Brady or Giglio. - 50 -
The facts of this claim are substantially similar to the facts of the newly discovered evidence claim related to Mejors. The only additional fact is that shortly after the shooting, Mejors told police that she was not wearing her prescription glasses when she witnessed the shooting. However, this information did not appear in any police reports, and the State only inquired about her vantage point, not her vision, during trial. Sheppard argues that the State knowingly concealed information of Mejors’s nearsightedness because police knowledge is imputed to the prosecutor. We agree with the circuit court that, even if Sheppard could show that the State withheld favorable evidence about Mejors’s nearsightedness so as to violate Brady and that the State knowingly presented testimony that was false under Giglio, Sheppard would still not be entitled to relief. Mejors’s testimony was cumulative, and her nearsightedness would not discredit her overall testimony, which was consistent with the testimony of other witnesses. Even presuming that Mejors’s testimony about her vantage point was false within the meaning of Giglio for omitting that she was not wearing her prescription glasses, the error was harmless beyond a - 51 - reasonable doubt, as there is no reasonable possibility it contributed to the conviction. See Ponticelli, 941 So. 2d at 1088. Also, even assuming the State’s suppression of favorable evidence, having failed under the more “defense friendly” materiality prong of Giglio, Sheppard cannot meet his burden to show “a reasonable probability that the jury verdict would have been different had the suppressed information been used at trial” as required to establish materiality under Brady. Smith, 931 So. 2d at 796. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief.