Opinion ID: 1387661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Substantial Competent Evidence and the Decision of the Commission.

Text: With those standards of review established, we now apply them to the decision of the Commission, evaluating both the evidence in the record which supports the decision of the Commission and the evidence weighing against it. Finally, we will decide whether in light of the whole record, there existed substantial competent evidence to render the Commission's finding of fact a reasonable one. The record reflects without dispute that the quality of Hunnicutt's work was good. While testifying for the ISIF, the manager of the ISIF, Diane Plastino, stated that Mr. Hunnicutt has a great deal of knowledge about the State Insurance Fund and about Worker's Compensation. Transcript of Hearing Before Hearing Officer at 61 (Oct. 20, 1982) (hereinafter cited as Tr.). At the hearing on Hunnicutt's motion to reopen the case before the full Commission so as to allow the introduction of additional evidence, counsel for the ISIF noted: [W]e are perfectly willing to admit that Mr. Hunnicutt's qualified. He's been working for the State Insurance Fund or the State, I'm not sure which, for 26 years. We're perfectly willing to admit Mr. Hunnicutt's qualified. But that doesn't produce audits... . And the fact that he is nice and gets along with his clients out in the field, that doesn't produce audits either. Transcript of Hearing on Reopening Case at 7 (May 13, 1983) (hereinafter cited as Tr. on Reopening). Plastino testified that the quality of work on audits and the relationship between the auditors and their clients are important. Tr. at 59. In addition to the above evidence, which the ISIF does not dispute, the Commission in its opinion referred to two exhibits Hunnicutt had offered at the hearing before the hearing officer. These exhibits were memoranda to Hunnicutt from his supervisor commending him for work on several audits. The ISIF contends that neither was admitted at the hearing, and argues that the Commission violated its own rules by considering them. Whether the Commission should not have considered these exhibits, however, is of little moment. [1] In its effort to exclude the exhibits, the ISIF stipulated to precisely the same point for which the exhibits were offered, and to precisely what the Commission found as a matter of fact. Counsel for the ISIF stated: [T]he Fund wouldn't have any difficulty stipulating that Mr. Hunnicutt performed audits  when he did perform the audits, they were performed with some degree of quality. Tr. at 33. The stipulation has all of the force of evidence, and was equally substantial as the offered exhibits. In stipulating, ISIF thereby conceded that Hunnicutt's audits were quality productions, rather than the isolated examples alluded to in the exhibits. The ISIF offered into the record evidence that it had established a production standard of two audits per day which Hunnicutt had not met. Except for a temporary increase in production during 1981, Hunnicutt had failed to attain the standard through 1980, 1981, and the first half of 1982. Tr. at 7, 16. Hunnicutt was called in for reviews, and suffered one temporary reduction in salary because of low production. Tr. at 12. The parties dispute the significance of the production standard. The ISIF apparently established the standard pursuant to I.C. § 67-5309C(c), [2] which provides: (c) It is hereby declared to be the intent of the legislature that the advancement of an employee to steps providing an increased salary within each pay grade shall be based solely on merit, including factors such as increased productivity, reliability, effectiveness, and the ability to achieve the goals and objectives of the particular position. No employee shall advance to a higher step within a pay grade without an affirmative certification for such purpose by the employee's immediate supervisor, approved by the departmental director or the director's designee, in accordance with the following schedule and criteria... . (Emphasis added.) This subsection on its face pertains to the advancement of an employee; it makes no provision for the discharge of an employee who failed to meet a productivity standard. As already noted, classified employees may only be discharged for cause. The causes enumerated in I.C. § 67-5309(n) do not include the failure to attain a productivity standard established pursuant to I.C. § 67-5309C(c). In addition, I.C. § 67-5309 provides the Commission, not individual agencies, with the power and authority to adopt, amend or rescind rules of discharge or reduction of rank or grade. Simply stated, the failure of ISIF auditors to meet productivity standards alluded to in § 67-5309C(c) was not included in any of the grounds for discharge under § 67-5309(n). The ISIF basically conceded that its productivity standard was not a rule of discharge when it described the two audit per day requirement variously as management technique and a management tool only. The enumerated rules of discharge include [i]nefficiency, incompetency, or negligence in the performance of duties. I.C. § 67-5309(n)(2). The failure to meet a productivity standard would be competent evidence of charged inefficiency. In its weighing of the evidence offered to establish the claimed inefficiency, the Commission would be expected to consider the evidence of Hunnicutt's failure to meet the productivity standard. We do not see that the Commission failed to give consideration to that evidence. Rather, the Commission specifically ruled that (1) evidence of Hunnicutt's low productivity was negated by other evidence which showed that Hunnicutt's low productivity was a logistical problem rather than a human failing; and (2) that such evidence was outweighed by evidence of Hunnicutt's good quality of work. In the process of establishing what weight to give the evidence related to the issue of Hunnicutt's productivity, the Commission naturally looked to the description of the job for which he was employed. That description requires the ability to: recognize different accounting methods used by business and governmental entities; determine how salary and fringe payments are made in different accounting systems; interpret workers' compensation laws, National Council on Compensation Insurance rules and regulations, and policy contracts; analyze records to determine direct and indirect employer payrolls; recognize errors in payroll records and potential premium adjustment; work independently in arranging appointments for audits and follow-up; communicate effectively both orally and in writing; maintain good rapport with policyholders. The Commission took careful note that this description does not mention quantity of job audits to be performed daily but it does refer to content and quality required. (Emphasis added.) The Commission further noted the ISIF's characterization of the production standard variously as a management tool and a management technique. The Commission concluded, We find that all state employees should be judged on the quality as well as the quantity of work performed by said employees. Judging an employee on quantity performance only is neither desirable nor equitable. (Emphasis added.) This sentence adequately demonstrates that the Commission considered both quality and quantity. It is not for this Court to disagree with the Commission's belief that quality of work should be considered in passing on a charge of inefficiency. Audits done quickly but inaccurately do not equate to audits competently or efficiently rendered. ISIF manager Plastino said as much in her testimony. Tr. at 59. The Commission considered the quantity evidence at some length. It noted Hunnicutt's testimony that scheduling problems and policyholders' cancelling appointments had interfered with meeting the two-audit standard. It noted also that he had requested extra audits to compensate for the cancellations. The Commission concluded not that productivity was irrelevant or unimportant, but that Hunnicutt's problem of averaging two audits per working day seemed to be one of scheduling. The Commission observed that the ISIF had concerned itself only with the quantity and not the quality of Hunnicutt's work. The Commission reviewed the evidence of the quality of Hunnicutt's work, observed that his problem with quantity of audits was not due to slothfulness and was not irreversible, and concluded that Hunnicutt did not demonstrate inefficiency or incompetency in the performance of his required duties  the duties specified in the description of his job  Compensation Insurance Payroll Auditor. The ISIF argues that the Commission erred in considering the job description. This contention is based on the premise that the hearing officer had not mentioned the job description in her decision. Respondent's Brief, p. 6. Such an argument is without merit. The ISIF did not raise it as an issue on appeal; therefore, the issue is not properly before us. Furthermore, regardless of ISIF's argument on this matter, we note that the Commission may, and in fact must, observe and be bound by its own rules. I.C. § 67-5309(a) required the Commission to make a rule requiring itself to describe an ISIF auditor's duties and responsibilities ... and requirements of minimum training, experience and other qualifications, suitable for the performance of duties of the position. The Commission did so. Taking cognizance, or notice, of the job description which it had itself made for the job which Mr. Hunnicutt held was not only proper, but required. For certain it was not engaged in finding a fact. It was merely observing its own handiwork done pursuant to a rule, the making of which was legislatively mandated. The fact that the hearing officer, also a member of the Personnel Commission, may not have done so, or if having done so, thought the job description of no importance, did not in one iota preclude the Commission from doing so. The Commission was well within its powers to notice its own job description. Cf. Hubbard v. Canyon County Commissioners, 106 Idaho 436, 437, 680 P.2d 537, 538 (1984) (under I.C. § 67-5210(4) of the APA, an agency is entitled to take judicial notice of its own [regulatory enactments]... .) Significant to this appeal is the fact that the ISIF does not dispute the accuracy of the noticed job description or its relevance to this case; it merely stands on its rather questionable argument that the Personnel Commission was precluded from considering any law, rule, regulation, or description of Hunnicutt's job, which it had drafted. For the above stated reasons, we disagree with ISIF on this matter and note that it is difficult to comprehend how the Commission, or the hearing officer in the first instance, could evaluate Hunnicutt's job performance without reference to his job description.