Opinion ID: 2264301
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of social workers' testimony in child abuse cases

Text: We addressed the constitutionality of § 11-304 in State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314 (2005). We found that the legislation was enacted in response to concerns that child abuse and sexual offenses were not being prosecuted adequately due to many child victims' inability to testify as a result of their young age or fragile emotional state. Id. at 76, 867 A.2d at 321. We then summarized the statutory requirements for the admissibility of such statements: the Maryland Legislature imposed safeguards in the tender years statute intended to insure that any admitted statement possessed `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' Md.Code (2001), § 11-304(d)-(f) of the Criminal Procedure Article. First, the statute requires that, if the child does not testify at trial, the State must produce corroborative evidence demonstrating that the defendant had the opportunity to commit the alleged abuse. Id. § 11-304(d)(2). The statute also requires that the trial court conduct a hearing to determine whether the proposed statements possess `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' Id. § 11-304(e)-(g). The statute contains a list of non-exclusive factors that the judge must consider in making this determination.[ [6] ] Id. § 11-304(e)(2). The judge must examine the child victim in chambers, closed to all except the judge, the victim, the victim's attorney, and one attorney each for the defendant and the prosecution. Id. § 11-304(g). The judge must then make a finding, on the record, as to `the specific guarantees of trustworthiness that are in the statement.' Id. § 11-304(f)(1). The defendant also has an opportunity to depose the health or social work professional whose testimony the State intends to offer. Id. § 11-304(d)(4). Snowden, 385 Md. at 76-77, 867 A.2d at 321 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution, [7] we interpreted these requirements in light of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). We determined that if the out-of-court statements were testimonial in nature they would be inadmissible unless the declarants were unavailable or subject to prior cross-examination. Snowden, 385 Md. at 92, 867 A.2d at 330. Petitioner argues that Nigha's out-of-court statements to the social worker were testimonial. [8] When the declarant testifies at trial, however, a different analysis is required. [9] In Snowden, we held that the testimony of the social worker violated the Confrontation Clause because [i]n a criminal trial, the State is required to place the defendant's accusers on the stand so that the defendant both may hear the accusations against him or her stated in open court and have the opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses. In Snowden's case, the State circumvented this right, through use of the tender years statutory framework, by having the social worker testify in place of the children. The burden, however, is on the State, not Snowden, to prove its case through production of witnesses and evidence that conform to the U.S. Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights. Snowden, 385 Md. at 95-96, 867 A.2d at 332 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). However, as Justice Scalia pointed out in Crawford: when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements. . . . The Clause does not bar admission of a testimonial statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. at 1369 n. 9, 158 L.Ed.2d 177. In petitioner's case, the social worker did not testify in place of the children. The declarant, Nigha, testified. [10] Lawson had the opportunity to, and did, cross-examine Nigha specifically with regards to her out-of-court statements to the social worker. We find that the social worker was acting lawfully in the course of her profession when she interviewed Nigha. Furthermore, even if the out-of-court statements were testimonial in nature (and we do not so hold), they were admissible because the declarant testified at trial. As a result, the Court of Special Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's admission of the social worker's testimony.