Opinion ID: 6342797
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intentional Acts Claims against Mr. Ayersman

Text: Mr. Ayersman next argues the circuit court should have found he was entitled to qualified immunity for the following intentional acts: (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) civil conspiracy; (3) malicious prosecution; and (4) abuse of process. The theory underlying each of these is that Mr. Ayersman worked in concert with FSI and Erie to determine that the fire at the Wratchfords’ home was the result of arson so Erie would not have to pay the Wratchfords’ insurance claim. Mr. Ayersman contends that, because each of these claims stem from the allegedly wrongful arrest, charge, and prosecution of Ms. Wratchford, he is entitled to qualified immunity insofar as he had probable cause to file charges against her. We disagree. In making his argument Mr. Ayersman cites to a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which held that in determining whether a law enforcement officer like the fire marshal “is entitled to qualified immunity, the guiding principle is that ‘[o]nly where the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable will the shield of immunity be lost.’” Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting Malley v. 20 Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1986)). Essentially, he argues that a magistrate found probable cause to arrest and charge Ms. Wratchford, so he is necessarily entitled to qualified immunity. However, in making his argument, Mr. Ayersman overlooks pertinent authority in West Virginia which undermines his position. While a magistrate found probable cause to arrest and charge Ms. Wratchford, we note that the grand jury specifically declined to indict her. This Court has recognized that “‘public policy favors prosecution for crimes and requires the protection of a person who in good faith and upon reasonable grounds institutes proceedings upon a criminal charge. The legal presumption is that every prosecution for crime is founded upon probable cause and is instituted for the purpose of justice.’” Syl. Pt. 3, Jarvis v. W. Va. State Police, 227 W. Va. 472, 711 S.E.2d 542 (2010) (quoting Syl. Pt. 4, McNair v. Erwin, 84 W. Va. 250, 99 S.E. 454 (1919)). In this context we have recognized that, while “a grand jury indictment is prima facie evidence of probable cause for the underlying criminal prosecution. . .a plaintiff may rebut this evidence by showing that the indictment was procured by fraud, perjury, or falsified evidence.” Id. at 474, 711 S.E.2d at 544, syl. pt. 5, in part (emphasis added). This comports with our longstanding holding that “the discharge by a justice of the plaintiff, who has been arrested and brought before him for examination, or the refusal of the grand jury to indict him, is prima facie evidence of a want of probable cause.” Thomas v. Beckley Music & Elec. Co., 146 W. Va. 764, 773, 123 S.E.2d 73, 78 (1961) (citing Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Harper v. Harper, 49 W. Va. 661, 39 S.E. 661 (1901)) (some emphasis added). 21 Here, the Hardy County grand jury explicitly declined to indict Ms. Wratchford; under the law in this state, that is evidence of a want of probable cause. Accordingly, Mr. Ayersman’s assertion that he is entitled to immunity on the grounds that he had probable cause to charge Ms. Wratchford must be reviewed by the finder of fact. That said, even if the grand jury had indicted her, thus creating a prima facie showing of probable cause, Ms. Wratchford would still be entitled to rebut that evidence by showing that the indictment was procured by fraud, perjury or falsified evidence. As discussed supra, she raised several allegations to that effect insofar as she asserted that Mr. Ayersman’s criminal complaints contained false and misleading statements — in the form of omitted financial information, and the inclusion of an allegedly false statement that Ms. Wratchford admitted to a prior arson attempt. In this regard, we explained long ago that “[p]robable cause in [a] malicious prosecution action is generally [a] mixed question of law and fact[.] Syl. Pt. 3, in part, Staley v. Rife, 109 W. Va. 701, 156 S.E. 113 (1930). We have further explained that [i]n a civil action for malicious prosecution, the issues of malice and probable cause become questions of law for the court where the evidence pertaining thereto is without conflict, or, though conflicting in some respects, is of such nature that only one inference may be drawn therefrom by reasonable minds. Syl. Pt. 7, Truman v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 146 W. Va. 707, 123 S.E.2d 59 (1961) (emphasis added). Without question, the facts surrounding the arrest, charging, and prosecution of Ms. Wratchford are in conflict; accordingly, our holding in Truman dictates 22 that the questions of probable cause and malice in this action are not questions of law, but are instead questions of fact which must be submitted to a jury. 17 In examining the remaining claims, we have even less trouble determining that summary judgment would not have been appropriate. As to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, there are questions regarding Mr. Ayersman’s conduct, including his tactics in interviewing Ms. Wratchford, and his allegedly acting in concert with the other defendants to falsify the results of the investigation. Likewise with respect to the civil conspiracy claim, as the Wratchfords allege that each of the defendants, including Ayersman and the WVSFMO, acted jointly to accomplish an unlawful purpose, in that they allegedly fabricated a finding of arson to relieve Erie of its obligation to pay the Wratchfords’ insurance claim. The record, as noted in the preceding sections, contains 17 As a final aside, we would also point out that some of the disputes may inure to Mr. Ayersman’s benefit. In particular, there were myriad irregularities in the presentation of the criminal charges against Ms. Wratchford to the grand jury. These include but are not limited to the prosecutor’s decision to call a fire marshal totally uninvolved in the investigation to testify on behalf of the WVSFMO, and the prosecutor’s flagrant misrepresentation to the grand jury that an expert witness retained and compensated by the Wratchfords was “an independent witness for the State.” While we cannot say that these irregularities influenced the grand jury in its decision not to indict Ms. Wratchford, a civil jury may come to that conclusion. In that instance, the civil jury could reasonably find that, despite the grand jury’s refusal to indict Ms. Wratchford, Mr. Ayersman had probable cause to seek her prosecution. In that event Mr. Ayersman would be entitled to qualified immunity on these claims. 23 evidence that could lead a jury to find that Ayersman and the WVSFMO are not entitled to qualified immunity to shield them from these claims. Ultimately, the circuit court correctly concluded that there are issues of fact which must be resolved in order to determine whether Mr. Ayersman is entitled to qualified immunity with regard to the Wratchfords’ claims of intentional tortious conduct. For this reason, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment as to these claims.