Opinion ID: 19777
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: An Invalid Plea?

Text: 35 It has long been the case that a valid guilty plea bars habeas review of most non-jurisdictional claims alleging antecedent violations of constitutional rights. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); Barnes v. Lynaugh, 817 F.2d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 1987). Among claims not barred are those that challenge the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge against him, Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974), and those that challenge the validity of the guilty plea itself. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985); Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 320 (1983); Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267; Barnes, 817 F.2d at 338. A plea not voluntarily and intelligently made has been obtained in violation of due process and is void. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). 36 Matthew's claim does not challenge the power of the State to bring him into court. Thus, the only means available for challenging his conviction is to claim that his plea is invalid, i.e., it was not knowingly and voluntarily entered into. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984) (It is well-settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.). We must therefore determine whether a state court in October 1994 would have felt compelled to rule that Matthew's due process rights were violated because of the failure to disclose the CPS documents, whether or not that failure amounts to a Brady violation. We again find that, given the legal landscape in existence at the time of Matthew's conviction, a state court would not have felt compelled to hold in Matthew's favor, and thus that a new rule would be required. 37 The test for determining a guilty plea's validity is 'whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.' Hill, 474 U.S. at 56 (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)). Courts assessing whether a defendant's plea is valid look to all of the relevant circumstancessurrounding it, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 749, and may consider such factors as whether there is evidence of factual guilt. 16 38 Although the Court's opinions have often used both voluntary and intelligent to describe various characteristics of constitutionally valid guilty pleas, 17 several conditions appear necessary. The defendant pleading guilty must be competent, see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 756, and must have notice of the nature of the charges against him, see Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941). The plea must be entered voluntarily, i.e., not be the product of actual or threatened physical harm, or . . . mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant or of state-induced emotions so intense that the defendant was rendered unable to weigh rationally his options with the help of counsel. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 750; Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962) (A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is void.); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988). The defendant must also understand the consequences of his plea, including the nature of the constitutional protection he is waiving. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 645 n.13; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 755; Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 493 (Out of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences.) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320. Finally, the defendant must have available the advice of competent counsel. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267-68; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 756; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 & n.14 (1970). The advice of competent counsel exists as a safeguard to ensure that pleas are voluntarily and intelligently made. Cf. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647 ([I]t may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit.); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 754 (suggesting that coercive actions on the part of the state could be dissipated by counsel). 39 Matthew's claim is not that the state threatened him, or that the state made and then broke promises made to him. He does not allege that he was incompetent. 18 He does not suggest that he did not understand the nature of the charges against him or of the constitutional protection he was waiving. Matthew does not challenge the factual basis for his plea. 19 He no longer has a claim of ineffective counsel. In short, Matthew does not suggest that his plea lacks any of the characteristics that the Court has held make up a voluntary and intelligent plea. 40 On this alone, a state court reviewing Matthew's conviction could determine that his plea was valid. Moreover, it would be supported in this conclusion by the fact that Matthew stated at his hearing that his plea was freely and voluntarily made, and that he understood the nature of the charges against him and the nature of the constitutional rights he was waiving. These statements act to create a presumption that in fact the plea is valid. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977)(These cases do not in the least reduce the force of the original plea hearing. For the representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at such a hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.). 41 Matthew's argument reduces to one based on the assessment that had he had the undisclosed information, he would have made a different decision, i.e., had he known of the documents and their contents, he would, as he stated in his evidentiary hearing, have rolled the dice and risked going to jail for ninety-nine years instead of pleading nolo to a sixteen-year plea bargain. The question, therefore, is whether a state court would have felt compelled by existing law to hold that this made Matthew's plea invalid. 42 We conclude that the answer to this question is no. A state court reviewing Brady v. United States, one of the more important cases setting forth the requirements of valid guilty pleas, would find that the Court rejected an argument very similar to Matthew's. See 397 U.S. at 750 ([T]h[e] assumption [that the accused would not have pleaded guilty except for the death penalty provision] merely identifies the penalty provision as a but for cause of his plea. That the statute caused the plea in this sense does not necessarily prove that the plea was coerced and invalid as an involuntary act.). From this language, it would seem that Matthew must do more than claim that the nondisclosure was the but for cause of his plea. 43 To gain an understanding of what more may be required to show the plea is invalid as an involuntary act, the state court would undoubtedly turn to cases holding that a plea does not preclude collateral attack on grounds that the state failed to disclose favorable information. See, e.g., Tate v. Wood, 963 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1992); White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416 (8th Cir. 1988); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir. 1988); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1985); Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 565 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1977). 20 These opinions,however, would provide little guidance. In most instances, the state court would find language noting that the undisclosed information must be the but for cause of the plea, see, e.g., Tate, 963 F.2d at 24 (The test of materiality in the context of a plea is whether there is a reasonable probability that but for the failure to produce such information the defendant would not have entered the plea but instead would have insisted on going to trial. (citing Miller, 848 F.2d at 1322)); Campbell, 769 F.2d at 324 (Certainly the knowledge of [the undisclosed information] was important to Campbell and his attorney, but we cannot say it would have been controlling in the decision whether to plead.), but little suggesting what a defendant must show in addition to demonstrate involuntariness. Several courts' opinions seem to acknowledge that their analysis required extension of the definition of a valid plea. See Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320 ([E]ven a guilty plea that was 'knowing' and 'intelligent' may be vulnerable to challenge if it was entered without knowledge of material evidence withheld by the prosecution.); Campbell, 769 F.2d at 318 (The question then becomes whether this nondisclosure renders involuntary Campbell's otherwise voluntary plea, given without knowledge of this evidence.); id. at 321 (We believe that in Tollett and the Brady Trilogy the Supreme Court did not intend to insulate all misconduct of constitutional proportions from judicial scrutiny solely because that misconduct was followed by a plea which otherwise passes constitutional muster as knowing and intelligent.). 21 Thus, rather that indicating how a defendant may show his plea was made involuntary by the undisclosed information, courts have simply added to the requirements of a valid plea by suggesting that such a plea must be made with all material exculpatory evidence held by the prosecution. 44 The state court reviewing these cases also would be confronted with reasoning supporting their holdings that is at odds with Supreme Court opinions. For example, one reason given for holding that a defendant pleading guilty may attack the plea claiming nondisclosure is that courts cannot satisfy themselves that pleas of guilty are voluntarily and intelligently made by competent defendants with adequate advice of counsel and that there is nothing to question the accuracy and reliability of the defendants' admissions that they committed the crimes with which they are charged, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 758, without material exculpatory evidence before them. See Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590, 599 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). That courts may be benefitted by a review of exculpatory information in discharging their duties would be relevant only if those duties included ascertaining the nature of the information on which the guilty plea was based, and weighing available evidence to determine whether there was a factual basis to support the plea. 22 On these points, theCourt's description of the allegations in Hill is illuminating: 45 Here petitioner does not contend that his plea was involuntary or unintelligent simply because the State through its officials failed to supply him with information about his parole eligibility date. We have never held that the United States Constitution requires the State to furnish a defendant with information about parole eligibility in order for the defendant's plea of guilty to be voluntary, and indeed such a constitutional requirement would be inconsistent with the current rules of procedure governing the entry of guilty pleas in the federal courts. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c). 46 474 U.S. at 56. Rule 11(c) also says nothing about the court needing to ascertain whether the state provided the defendant with access to material exculpatory information, or on what information the defendant's guilty plea was based. Rule 11(f) also does not require a weighing of the evidence. 23 In general, state courts are not required by the Constitution to ensure that a factual basis for a guilty plea even exists. See, e.g., Higgason v. Clark, 984 F.2d 203, 207-08 (7th Cir. 1993); Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1986) (State courts are under no constitutional duty to establish a factual basis for the guilty plea prior to its acceptance . . . .); Wallace v. Turner, 695 F.2d 545, 548 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not impose a constitutional duty on state trial judges to ascertain a factual basis before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere that is not accompanied by a claim of innocence); Wabasha v. Solem, 694 F.2d 155, 157 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that factual basis requirement comes from the Federal Rules, not the Constitution); cf. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969) (noting that the Rule 11 procedure has not been held to be constitutionally mandated). 47 Even more problematic is reasoning based on the Court's observation in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 756, that the decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by a defendant's appraisal of the prosecutor's case. See, e.g., Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320. This observation, although undoubtedly applicable to a large number of defendants, may be seen as rather weak support for holdings that allow defendants to challenge their pleas on grounds that the prosecution failed to provide them with exculpatory information it held. The Court has explicitly recognized that the decision whether to plead guilty or go to trial is one made under circumstances of incomplete, and often inaccurate, information. See, e.g., McMann, 397 U.S. at 769 ([T]he decision to plead guilty before the evidence is in frequently involves the making of difficult judgments. All the pertinent facts normally cannot be known unless witnesses are examined and cross-examined in court. Even then the truth will often bein dispute.). Mistakes in calculating the strength of the state's case have been declared insufficient to render the plea unintelligent or involuntary. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 757 (A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State's case . . . .). State action leading a counseled defendant to perceive he has a weak case has been held insufficient to render a resultant guilty plea invalid. See, e.g., McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 (holding that a defendant alleging that he pleaded guilty solely because of a prior coerced confession was not entitled to habeas review). 48 The state court would also be faced with a basic problem: If it were the case that defendants assessing whether to plead guilty must be given an opportunity to weigh the state's case in order to make a voluntary and intelligent decision, requiring that material exculpatory information be provided prior to entry of a guilty plea would not achieve the objective. As the Court noted in Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112, Brady information would provide only part of the picture. Without all of the state's inculpatory evidence, the defendant could not realistically assess the state's case against him. Thus, the rule Matthew seeks may be seen as falling short in achieving its intended results. 49 In light of our survey of the legal landscape, we again find that Matthew requires a new rule in order to prevail. 24 As a result, we turn next to an assessment of whether the new rules fall into either of the exceptions recognized by the Court. If they do, we may announce them, and apply them to Matthew's case. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989). 50