Opinion ID: 2365187
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Specificity and Source of Lookout, Time Lapse

Text: Appellant argues that the lack of specificity in the lookout description should render illegal any investigative detection made in reliance upon it. However, we conclude that the description was reasonably detailed as to the color, make and model of the vehicle (a gray, two-door Honda) given that the lookout was broadcast during the early morning hours, the dark blue vehicle appeared gray during nighttime conditions according to the testimony of both Officer Reid and Garcia, and the officer saw the vehicle two seconds after the broadcast. As discussed above, vehicles of that make and model are hardly common during the early morning hours when the city streets are nearly deserted. Thus, there was no potential for the dragnet seizure against which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect. See United States v. Turner, 699 A.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C.1997). We have recognized that the more the description provided ... can be said to be particularized, in the sense that it could apply to only a few persons in the relevant universe, the better the chance of having at least sufficient grounds to make a stop. Id. at 1129 n. 3. The relevant universe as determined by the amount of time which had passed since the offense, approximately twenty-five minutes here, and that the lookout was broadcast during the early morning hours when traffic was light supported the officer's reasonable suspicion that the Honda he observed two seconds after hearing the lookout was connected to the stabbing homicide. See id. at 1130 (The relevant universe ... as indicated... by the amount of time which had passed since the offense ... and the number of people ... in that area to whom the description applied narrowly circumscribed the discretion of the police in making a seizure) (internal quotations omitted). The officer was hardly faced with a description that was so vague that it could encompass multiple vehicles at 2:45 a.m. Of course, the officer's subsequent observations upon seeing appellant's vehiclethat there was a dark T-shirt on the trunk and that the car was being driven real slow or cautiouslycontributed to enhancing his suspicions that investigation was appropriate. With respect to appellant's argument that his vehicle differed substantially from the lookout description, the trial court correctly recognized that the time of night should be taken into account when determining whether the color discrepancy between the lookout description and appellant's vehicle should invalidate the stop. We have recognized that a mistake regarding an item's color when observations occurred in the early hours of the morning under artificial lighting conditions would not be deemed fatal where points of similarity exist. Brown (Marvin), supra note 12, 590 A.2d at 1019 (citations omitted). Moreover, Officer Reid could have reasonably inferred that if he initially believed that the dark blue vehicle was gray, the individual or individuals providing the lookout information also made the same error in the darkness. [13] See Groves v. United States, 504 A.2d 602, 604 (D.C. 1986) (officer's error in believing that a Chevrolet was a Pontiac was an error that the informant could have also made upon observing the vehicle because the two models are similar). Thus, we conclude that the color discrepancy is not dispositive in our assessment of the legality of the Terry stop, particularly in view of the fact that the lookout was not the sole basis for the officer's decision to effectuate the stop. Relying principally on Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971), appellant argues that the Terry stop was invalid because no evidence was presented concerning the source of the lookout description in order to determine its reliability. [14] This argument is without merit. Even if the government had failed to definitively establish the source of the lookout, we have recognized that the absence of direct proof of the source of lookout information is not a ground for suppression ... [when the] source may be proved inferentially. Carey, supra, 377 A.2d at 45 (citations omitted). In Carey, the court believed that one of the victims must have been the lookout source, and concluded that it is apparent that the officers ... were acting on eyewitness information within a few moments of the offense. Id. From the record before us, it is equally apparent that the likely source of the information concerning the color and other characteristics of the vehicle came from Garcia, who was an eyewitness to the stabbing and testified that he initially thought the Honda was gray, presumably accounting for the color discrepancy between the lookout description and the actual color of appellant's car. Appellant also argues that the time lapse between the stabbing and the stop approximately twenty-five minutesis a sufficient basis to invalidate the Terry stop. However, the cases cited by appellant for this proposition are all distinguishable. Those cases involve police response times to locations based on anonymous informants' tips and, consequently, are not analogous to the facts before us. See Cauthen, supra note 12, 592 A.2d at 1023; Brown (Marvin), supra note 12, 590 A.2d at 1017-18; Speight, supra, 671 A.2d at 448; Holston v. United States, 633 A.2d 378, 381 (D.C.1993); Gomez, supra, 597 A.2d at 889. [15]