Opinion ID: 480542
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interference with Defendant's Right to Counsel

Text: 18 The second reason advanced by defendant for dismissing the indictment is that Bradley interfered with defendant's right to counsel. Following the indictment of defendant and Adamson and the imprisonment of defendant, Bradley and Adamson renewed their affair. During this time, Bradley disparaged the attorneys who were representing defendant and Adamson. The district court stated: 19 Based on the affidavits and motion papers before it, this Court is prepared to infer that Detective Bradley, during the period following the indictments of Adamson and Cole, intentionally pursued a course of action designed to interfere with those defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel and that such conduct is fully binding on the United States. 20 The court, however, found that there was no demonstrable prejudice to defendant. We agree. 21 Bradley's disparaging remarks had no effect on defendant, assuming that they were relayed to him. Because defendant and Adamson were represented by attorneys who were partners in the same law firm, the district court held a hearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c). 3 The court fully and meticulously explained to both defendant and Adamson the risks involved in being represented by members of the same law firm. By the time of the hearing, the defendant must have been aware that Adamson's affections were at least shared with Bradley. Defendant chose to keep the attorney whom he had retained originally. And that attorney has capably represented defendant through this appeal. We affirm the district court's finding that Bradley's disparagement of defendant's counsel to Adamson did not result in prejudice to defendant. 22 The next question is whether, in light of the district court's finding that Bradley intentionally pursued a course of conduct designed to interfere with [defendant's] Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the indictment should have been dismissed as a matter of law for prophylactic purposes. The Supreme Court teaching prohibits a dismissal on purely prophylactic grounds. 23 In Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977), an undercover agent, unknown as such to defendant and his attorney, attended a meeting between defendant and his attorney. The agent did not attempt to obtain any information for the prosecutor, nor did he relay any information to the prosecutor. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that attending the meeting amounted to a per se violation of defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial. The Supreme Court rejected this prophylaxis approach and found that because there was no tained evidence in this case, no communication of defense strategy to the prosecution, and no purposeful intrusion by Weatherford, there was no violation of the Sixth Amendment.... Id. at 558, 97 S.Ct. at 845. 24 An even stronger case is United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981). In Morrison, federal agents, fully aware that defendant had been indicted on drug charges and had retained counsel, met with her without her attorney's knowledge. The purpose of the meeting was to seek her cooperation in a related investigation. The government agents disparaged defendant's counsel and told her that she would gain various benefits if she cooperated, but faced a stiff jail term if she failed to cooperate. Defendant refused the agents' overtures and notified her attorney of what had transpired. The agents visited defendant again in the absence of counsel. At no time did respondent agree to cooperate with them, incriminate herself, or supply any information pertinent to her case. Contrary to the agents' advice, respondent continued to rely upon the services of the attorney whom she retained. Id. at 362-63, 101 S.Ct. at 666-67. The district court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment. As here, there was a conditional plea of guilty while defendant appealed. The Third Circuit held that, whether or not defendant had been prejudiced, her sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated and dismissed the indictment with prejudice. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, reversed. It held, absent demonstrable prejudice or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly inappropriate, even though the violation may have been deliberate. Id. at 365, 101 S.Ct. at 668. (footnote omitted). 25 Since there was no demonstrable prejudice here, there is no ground for dismissing the indictment.