Opinion ID: 1750183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: funding for dr. pack

Text: The Commonwealth argues that it was error for the trial court to grant the ex parte order authorizing funding for Dr. Pack and that the Court of Appeals erred in finding such error was harmless in this case. The Commonwealth relies heavily on this Court's decision in Bishop v. Caudill, 118 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Ky.2003), wherein we held that the Commonwealth is not entitled to an independent evaluation of the defendant's competency to stand trial under KRS 504.100. The Court of Appeals in the instant case extended that holding to the defense, stating [n]othing in the statute authorizes independent evaluations by either the Commonwealth or the defendant. We do not believe the holding in Bishop is to be extended to the defense and that the Court of Appeals erred in so ruling. The Bishop Court distinguished between the functions of mental health experts for determinations relative to the defense of mental illness or insanity (KRS 504.070) and for determinations of competency (KRS 504.100). Id. at 161-63. KRS 504.100(1) provides: If upon arraignment, or during any stage of the proceedings, the court has reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the court shall appoint at least one (1) psychologist or psychiatrist to examine, treat and report on the defendant's mental condition. While the Bishop Court recognized that a competency examiner appointed under KRS 504.100(1) is working for the court, not necessarily the defense or the Commonwealth, the Court was not faced with the issue of funding for an independent competency evaluation for the defense, only the Commonwealth. Id. at 163 (internal citation omitted). And indeed the Court's entire policy rationale in Bishop for not allowing the Commonwealth an independent competency evaluation  the risk of disclosure of other evidence, conduct or defense strategy not otherwise accessible to the prosecution  would not be applicable in the case of an independent competency evaluation for the defense. Id. at 163-64. A competency determination has significant consequences for both the defendant and the Commonwealth. Id. at 166 (concurring opinion, Justice Keller). As observed in Justice Keller's concurring opinion in Bishop : Although ... the psychologist or psychiatrist who performed a neutral competency evaluation pursuant to a KRS 504.100(1) order is subject to cross-examination at this evidentiary hearing, the appointed examiner's report is only part of the evidence the factfinder must consider. Parties are entitled to  and, in practice, do  introduce additional evidence for the court's consideration. In fact, KRS Chapter 504 explicitly recognizes that [a] psychologist or psychiatrist retained by the defendant shall be permitted to participate in any examination under this chapter. [KRS 504.080(5)]. Of course, it goes without saying that a defendant with the financial means to do so can develop additional expert testimony by submitting to an independent competency evaluation by an expert of his or her choice. But, we have held that, in cases where the defendant is indigent: (1) the assistance of a psychological expert is constitutionally and statutorily required; and (2) the funds necessary to retain such an expert are a reasonable and necessary expense authorized under KRS Chapter 31. Id. at 165-166 (internal citations and quotations omitted). In Crawford v. Commonwealth, 824 S.W.2d 847 (Ky.1992), the defendant sought funds for a second independent competency examination. This Court held that while the defendant is entitled to an independent expert to evaluate his mental state and his competency to stand trial, he is not entitled to an additional state-provided examination or funds to hire additional experts simply because the initial evaluation was contrary to his defense. Id. at 850 (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985)). Although we adjudge it was not per se error for the lower court to authorize funding for an independent competency examination for Deanna in the instant case, there is still the issue of whether it was error to authorize the funding if there was no determination of whether the use of a private expert was reasonably necessary pursuant to KRS 31.110, or that state facilities were unavailable or would be impractical pursuant to KRS 31.185(1). Additionally, there is the question of whether it was error to authorize the funding for a competency expert when Deanna's counsel represented it was to be for mental evaluations for guilt and innocence defenses and mitigation. In order to hire a state-funded private psychologist, the defendant must make the requisite showing that the state facilities were unavailable or that the use of state facilities would be impractical. Commonwealth v. Paisley, 201 S.W.3d 34, 36 (Ky.2006); Binion v. Commonwealth, 891 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Ky.1995); KRS 31.185(1). The defendant must also demonstrate that the desired expert assistance is reasonably necessary. Crawford, 824 S.W.2d at 850 (citing Young v. Commonwealth, 585 S.W.2d 378 (Ky.1979)). Because the order for funding was obtained ex parte in this case, the record is not clear whether a hearing was held on the reasonable necessity of a private expert or the impracticality or unavailability of state facilities. The record does not reflect that such a hearing was held. However, the ex parte order authorizing the employment of Dr. Peggy Pack states: A reasonable necessity has been shown for the defendant herein to employ the services of DR. PEGGY PACK as a forensic psychologist. There are no state facilities nor personnel available whom defense counsel could utilize to obtain this assistance, which is necessary to provide the defendant with a fair trial under both state and federal constitutional law. Given the court's findings above, we must presume that Deanna made a sufficient showing of unavailability of state services and of reasonable necessity for the hiring of Dr. Pack to support the trial court's order. See Hamblin v. Johnson, 254 S.W.2d 76, 77 (Ky.1952). We next turn to the Commonwealth's assertion that because the initial representation in Deanna's ex parte motion was that it was for a mental evaluation for guilt and innocence defenses and mitigation, when, in fact, it was for a competency evaluation, the order authorizing the funding was entered in error. As we have ruled above that an indigent defendant is entitled to an independent expert for purposes of determining competency under a proper showing of necessity and unavailability/impracticality of state services, we deem any error to be harmless. RCr 9.24.