Opinion ID: 2640195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Hire or Consider Hiring Dental Forensics Expert

Text: This court has often held that the decisions of whether and how to conduct cross-examination and whether to call or not to call a certain witness are matters of trial strategy. See State v. Ward, 227 Kan. 663, Syl. ¶ 1, 608 P.2d 1351 (1980); Winter v. State, 210 Kan. 597, Syl. ¶ 2, 502 P.2d 733 (1972). Relying on Mullins v. State, 30 Kan.App.2d 711, 46 P.3d 1222, rev. denied 274 Kan. 1113 (2002), Wilkins argues that defense counsel cannot make a strategic decision against pursuing a line of investigation when he or she has not yet obtained facts upon which that decision could be made. Mullins, 30 Kan.App.2d at 716, 46 P.3d 1222 (citing Kenley v. Armontrout, 937 F.2d 1298, 1308 [8th Cir.1991]). Further, when counsel lacks the information to make an informed decision due to inadequacies of his or her investigation, any argument of `trial strategy' is inappropriate. Mullins, 30 Kan.App.2d at 716-17, 46 P.3d 1222 (citing Clay v. State, 954 S.W.2d 344, 349 [Mo.App. 1997]). We have no hesitation in agreeing with these general statements of the law from Mullins and have enunciated similar principles in our previous cases. Mere invocation of the word strategy does not insulate the performance of a criminal defendant's lawyer from constitutional criticism. See, e.g., Bledsoe, 283 Kan. at 95, 150 P.3d 868. We must look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether Fleming's performance in regard to retaining and using a dental forensics expert fell below the measure of objective reasonableness. See Bledsoe, 283 Kan. at 90-91, 150 P.3d 868. Mullins involved a failure to employ an expert in the defense of a child sexual abuse prosecution. At trial, the State presented testimony from a nurse who said that the victim's physical examination was normal but that research, never identified to the jury, demonstrated that `physical indications of anal penetration were not present in 60 to 80 percent of the children sodomized.' See Mullins, 30 Kan.App.2d at 712, 46 P.3d 1222. The defense lawyer did nothing to contest this testimony from the nurse, and he did not obtain an expert on interviewing of children suspected to be victims of sexual abuse. At the movant's K.S.A. 60-1507 evidentiary hearing in Mullins, a criminal defense lawyer testified that an expert on child victim interviewing could have pointed out flaws in the interview process and could have enabled a defense challenge to the child victim's testimony without a direct attack on the child's credibility. This lawyer also said that the necessity of retaining such an expert was well known among members of the criminal defense bar at the time of the movant's trial. Under these circumstances, the Mullins Court of Appeals panel ruled that the movant had carried his burden of demonstrating that his trial counsel's performance so undermined the proper functioning of the adversary process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. [Citation omitted.] See Mullins, 30 Kan.App.2d at 718, 46 P.3d 1222. It noted: We are compelled, primarily, on the essentially uncontroverted record at the [K.S.A. 60-]1507 hearing. For whatever reason, the State presented no evidence, no witnesses, and did little cross-examination of [movant's] witnesses to provide the trial court any support for determining [movant's] trial counsel was effective, thus explicitly limiting the applicability of its holding to the particular facts and procedural history of the case before it. 30 Kan.App.2d at 718, 46 P.3d 1222. Subsequent Court of Appeals cases have recognized this limitation. See Lewis v. State, 33 Kan.App.2d 634, 111 P.3d 636, rev. denied 277 Kan. 924 (2003); Hill v. Simmons, No. 93,427, 2005 WL 2840293, unpublished opinion filed October 28, 2005; State v. Collins, No. 90,792, 2004 WL 1443902, unpublished opinion filed June 25, 2004, rev. denied 278 Kan. 848 (2004); Bailey v. State, Nos. 90,833, 90,836, 2004 WL 1087063, unpublished opinion filed May 14, 2004, rev. denied 278 Kan. 843 (2004); Snavely v. State, Nos. 89,156, 89,947, 2003 WL 22430275, unpublished opinion filed October 23, 2003. In this case, Fleming admitted at the K.S.A. 60-1507 hearing that he had no idea whether Winter's methodology or conclusions were sound or whether they could be challenged; and he was unable to fully understand [Winter's] forensic testimony. He testified that, knowing what he knows now, he should have consulted an expert on the subject of identification of human remains from dental evidence. At trial, Fleming had lodged no objection to the Winter testimony, nor did he cross-examine. Based on these facts alone, it is understandable that the Court of Appeals panel concluded that Fleming's failure to consult with any forensic dental experts, despite his lack of knowledge in that field; his failure to cross-examine or mount a position adverse; and his failure to refute [Winter's] technical evidence amounted to deficient performance under the first step of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel. Wilkins, slip op. at 6. But there are additional facts, established by substantial competent evidence, to consider; and they can be read to support the district court result on this issue. Fleming also testified at the K.S.A. 60-1507 hearing that he had spent time with [Winter] and had cross-examined him at Wilkins' preliminary hearing. (The record demonstrates that the district judge examined the preliminary hearing transcript, which has not been provided to this court.) It was Fleming's opinion based on his experience with Winter that Winter would hold up in front of the jury[.] I regarded him as a skunk in the building and I wanted him out as quickly as possible. I didn't want to make an issue of him. I didn't want to spend a lot of time with him. I knew what he was going to say and II didn't want him to be in front of the jury any longer than he had to be, so that's why he wasn't challenged. We also consider it significant that Wilkins' story was that he had not been present for or had anything else to do with Shipley's murder. Fleming repeatedly stated that the defense did not involve contesting the identification of the remains as Shipley's. Under the totality of circumstances and our standard of review, the question of whether Wilkins met his burden of demonstrating unreasonable performance by Fleming on this issue is close. Even if we assume, however, that Wilkins succeeded on the first part of the test for ineffective assistance, he fell short on the second part. We see no prejudice. At the K.S.A. 60-1507 hearing, the expert testimony presented to challenge Winter did not actually include an assertion that the remains found at the pond were not Shipley's. It merely demonstrated a divergence of expert opinion on appropriate methodology. Moreover, in this caseunlike Mullins where the child victim's testimony, impaired as it may have been by unchallenged coercive or suggestive interview techniques, was the only evidence that a crime occurredthere was a great deal of circumstantial and direct evidence aside from Winter's dental forensics testimony that Shipley was murdered and that Wilkins was at least one of his killers. Particularly damning were Wilkins' unprompted statements to law enforcement that showed he was aware of the location of the pond and the murder weaponwe see no reasonable probability that, but for what may be deemed Fleming's deficient performance on the dental forensics expert issue, the result of Wilkins' trial would have been different.