Opinion ID: 725046
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Insanity Defense Issue

Text: 5 Garcia argues that the district court erred in its insanity defense instruction to the jury to the effect that a finding of mental disease or defect could not be based upon Garcia's alcohol or drug consumption. Before we turn to the instruction at issue, we recount the evidence relating to the insanity defense raised at trial. 6 Jose Solano, Garcia's nephew, testified that he saw Garcia at approximately 12:00 p.m. on the day of the shooting when Garcia was working on a bicycle in the rear yard of Solano's apartment at 1111 Barnum Avenue. According to Solano, Garcia was acting normal, nice, and calm and was happy at that time. Solano also testified that Garcia showed Solano a gun, which Garcia claimed a friend had given to him. 7 According to his testimony, Solano left home for a few hours and returned at approximately 2:30 or 3:00 p.m. with his sister and his friend, Edwin Maldonado. When they arrived, they heard Solano's dogs barking in Solano's third floor apartment. As they approached the apartment, Maldonado, who had been living with Solano for several months, shouted to the dogs to shut up. Garcia, who was in the apartment making a sandwich and heard Maldonado yell at the dogs, came out of the apartment, grabbed Maldonado, threw him against the door, and told him never to tell the dogs to shut up. Shortly after Solano told Garcia to stop fighting with Maldonado, Garcia let go of Maldonado but continued to yell, and threatened Maldonado with the gun he had earlier shown to Solano. At Solano's request, Garcia eventually left the apartment, all the while yelling, swearing, and threatening both Solano and Maldonado. At that point, Solano telephoned his mother, Minerva Solano (Garcia's sister), and also called the police. Solano testified that, at this time, Garcia was acting angry, sounded like evil, and sounded like he ... had a demon or something. 8 When Minerva Solano arrived, Garcia was still in the yard. When his sister asked him to leave, he did so, taking his bicycle with him. As he was leaving, he yelled: They're going to get you, they're going to get me. He also threatened to blow up the block and said that Hitler was coming, that this was a communist world, and that demons are going to get you. 9 At trial, both sides put on psychiatric testimony. The psychiatrists for both sides testified to Garcia's long history of drug and alcohol use, beginning in his pre-teen years. Dr. Paul T. Amble, the defense psychiatrist, stated that Garcia had reported to him that on the day of the shooting and prior to the incident, he had smoked approximately nine or ten vials of crack cocaine and had drunk half a pint of brandy. Both Dr. Amble and Dr. Jeffrey Gottlieb, the government's psychiatrist, testified as to their awareness that Garcia had undergone numerous psychiatric evaluations in the past and that he had, on previous occasions, been diagnosed with bipolar disorder (also known as manic depression). They were also aware that, in the past, Garcia had received different diagnoses such as organic brain syndrome, secondary substance abuse, anti-social personality disorder, and substance abuse disorder. 10 Not surprisingly, the views of the psychiatrists differed as to the nature of Garcia's mental state at the time of the incident. Dr. Gottlieb testified for the government that Garcia's primary diagnosis was substance dependence--primarily on cocaine and alcohol--coupled with antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Gottlieb stated that Garcia's behavior [was] entire[l]y consistent with someone who was, in common parlance, ... really high and probably drunk too. In contrast, Dr. Amble testified for the defense that Garcia suffered, and had long been suffering, from the severe mental disease of bipolar disorder, and that he was in a manic phase and suffered from delusional thinking on March 28, 1994. Dr. Amble also testified, however, that he could not rule ... out completely the possibility that Garcia's behavior was simply the product of substance abuse. 11 On appeal, Garcia claims that the district court erred when it instructed the jury that to find that Garcia had met his burden of proving insanity, his inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions must have been caused by severe mental disease rather than by alcohol and drug use. This issue is one of first impression in this circuit. 12 The district court charged the jury as follows: 13 Now, the effects of the voluntary use of drugs or alcohol do not constitute, nor may they legally give rise to a severe mental disease or defect. The voluntary use, if any you find, of drugs or alcohol also must be disregarded in determining whether the Defendant could appreciate the nature and quality of his acts or the wrongfulness of his acts. However, if you find that at the time in issue the Defendant had a severe mental disease or defect, and that the disease or defect gave rise to an inability to appreciate the nature or quality or wrongfulness of his acts, then the Defendant's consumption of drugs or alcohol, whether voluntary or involuntary, cannot preclude his defense of insanity. 14 The district court rejected the following instruction offered by Garcia: 15 There has been evidence at this trial regarding the defendant's substance abuse. Substance abuse, standing alone, does not constitute a severe mental illness. On the other hand, if you find that the substance abuse either caused or was caused by a separate mental illness, then you can consider both the mental illness and the substance abuse in assessing whether or not the defendant was able to know and appreciate the quality or wrongfulness of his actions. 16 As we previously have stated, [a]lthough a defendant is entitled to a jury charge reflecting his theory of defense, that theory must have a valid basis in law and fact. United States v. Ruggiero, 934 F.2d 440, 450 (2d Cir.1991). We believe that the district court correctly rejected Garcia's proposed charge because Garcia's theory had no basis in fact. Although the jury was apprised of Garcia's long history of substance abuse, it heard no evidence that Garcia's substance abuse either caused or was caused by his bipolar disorder. 1 17 The district court told the jury, in effect, that voluntary substance abuse must not be taken into account in determining whether a severe mental disease or defect exists in the first instance, but where such a disease or defect is found to exist, voluntary substance abuse will not defeat an insanity defense. Our review of the charge is de novo. See United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1343, 134 L.Ed.2d 491 (1996). Because the charge is not covered expressly by the text of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (IDRA), 18 U.S.C. § 17, 2 in examining the charge for error, we are required to look to the congressional intent behind the IDRA and to existing caselaw. 18 Congress enacted the IDRA, the first federal legislation on the insanity defense, largely in response to public concern over the acquittal of John W. Hinkley, Jr. for the attempted assassination of President Reagan. In enacting the IDRA, Congress made two substantial changes to the federal insanity defense. First, it narrowed the definition of insanity that had evolved from the caselaw. 3 Second, it shifted to the defendant the burden of proving the insanity defense by clear and convincing evidence. S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 222, 225-26 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3407. Of significance to this case, Congress, speaking through the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated: The committee also intends that, as has been held under present case law interpretation, the voluntary use of alcohol or drugs, even if they render the defendant unable to appreciate the nature and quality of his acts, does not constitute insanity or any other species of legally valid affirmative defense. Id. at 229. Statements of congressional intent are rarely so clear. 19 Garcia claims, however, that the statement by the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding voluntary intoxication means only that a drug addict or alcoholic cannot assert an insanity defense based solely upon [his] addicted status. He suggests that Congress did not mean to imply that where one suffers from a mental disease or defect as well as voluntary alcoholism or substance abuse, each of which alone is insufficient to satisfy the IDRA's requirement of a severe mental disease or defect [rendering one] unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts, he may not prove that together the conditions satisfy the statute's requirement. The government responds that [c]ombining a mental disease or defect that is itself insufficient under the IDRA, with the impermissible consideration of voluntary substance abuse, to result in a valid defense of insanity under the IDRA, is wholly illogical. This would constitute nothing short of rewarding the voluntary abuse of drugs and alcohol in direct contradiction of the intent of Congress in passing the IDRA. The caselaw on this issue, although limited, recognizes as much, and we agree. 20 To date, only the Ninth Circuit has considered this issue. United States v. Knott, 894 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 873, 111 S.Ct. 197, 112 L.Ed.2d 158 (1990). On facts similar to this case, the Knott Court held that the jury could not consider a defendant's voluntary drug use or intoxication at the time of his crime in combination with his schizophrenia in determining whether the defendant was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts. Rather, in order to satisfy the requirements of the IDRA with respect to proving insanity, the defendant would have had to demonstrate that his schizophrenia alone prevented him from appreciating the nature and quality of his acts. Id. at 1121. 21 Garcia argues against our adopting the view set forth in Knott. Instead, relying on our decision in United States v. Torniero, 735 F.2d 725 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1110, 105 S.Ct. 788, 83 L.Ed.2d 782 (1985), he urges us to find error in the district court's charge. Garcia's reliance on Torniero, however, is misplaced. In Torniero, we stated that [s]ubstance abuse may only be used as the basis of an insanity defense if the affliction brings about actual insanity. Id. at 733. The Torniero case, however, involved involuntary intoxication and the above-quoted statement is thus dicta. Furthermore, there was no evidence presented that Garcia's bipolar disorder, the mental disease or defect at issue, was caused by his substance abuse. In addition, our decision in Torniero preceded passage of the IDRA, which, as we have already noted, significantly changed federal insanity defense law. 22 Finally, under the felon-in-possession count as charged, the jury only needed to decide whether Garcia understood the wrongfulness of possessing the weapon, not the wrongfulness of pulling the weapon on Officer Kirkland. The crime with which Garcia was charged was complete when Garcia possessed the gun. Solano testified that when Garcia possessed the weapon early in the day, he acted normal, nice, calm, and happy. It was entirely within the jury's discretion to choose to credit this testimony in concluding that Garcia understood the wrongfulness of possessing the weapon when he showed it to Solano several hours before the shooting incident took place. 23