Opinion ID: 795247
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The FAA Drug-Testing Regulations

Text: 35 The FAA drug-testing regulations expressly preempt any state or local law, rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the subject matter of [this rule], including but not limited to, drug testing of aviation personnel performing safety-sensitive functions. 14 C.F.R Pt. 121, App. I § XI(A) (emphasis added). But they do not preempt provisions of state criminal law that impose sanctions for reckless conduct of an individual that leads to actual loss of life, injury, or damage to property whether such provisions apply specifically to aviation employees or generally to the public. Id. § XI(B). 36 The defendants-appellants argue that the regulations are intended to preempt all state-law civil claims arising from the drug testing of aviation personnel, and thus all of Drake's claims. We disagree. 37 1. Is Preemption Limited to Positive State Enactments? As an initial matter, we disagree with the district court's conclusion that the preemption clause was only intended to bar positive state enactments  such as statutes and regulations and was not intended to preclude any common law tort claims. Drake v. Lab. Corp., 290 F.Supp.2d at 373 (emphasis in original). The clause provides that the regulations preempt any state or local law, rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the subject matter of the regulations. 14 C.F.R. pt. 121, App. I § XI(A). We do not see why the drafters of the regulations would have used the words rule, order, and standard in addition to the words law and regulation if they meant to reach only positive state enactments. It seems to us that the additional words were included to indicate that the regulations may preempt judge-made rules, orders, and standards, as well as statutes and administrative rules and regulations. 10 38 As the Supreme Court has observed, however, the fact that federal law may pre-empt judge-made rules, as well as statutes and regulations, says nothing about the scope of that pre-emption. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 443-44, 125 S.Ct. 1788, 161 L.Ed.2d 687 (2005) (emphasis in original). Under the terms of the preemption clause, state law (however made) is preempted by the FAA regulations only if it cover[s] the subject matter of [the] rule. 14 C.F.R. Pt. 121, App. I § XI(A). 39 2. The Scope of the Phrase Covering the Subject Matter. Upon adopting its drug-testing regulations in 1988, the FAA stated that [t]he scope of the authority preempted by this final rule and the authority reserved to the States is essentially identical to the provision in the regulations issued by the Federal Railroad Administration [(`FRA')] (49 C.F.R. § 219.13). 53 Fed.Reg. at 47048. The referenced FRA regulations, in turn, rely on the preemption clause of their enabling statute, the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA). See 49 C.F.R. § 219.13 (1988) (Under section 205 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. § 434), issuance of these regulations preempts any State law, rule, regulation, order or standard covering the same subject matter....); 45 U.S.C. § 434 (1988) (providing that state laws relating to railroad safety could remain in effect until the Secretary of Transportation issued regulations covering the subject matter of such State requirement). The FAA thus stated that it intended the scope of its preemption clause to be essentially identical to FRA regulations that were drawn directly from the FRSA preemption clause. 53 Fed.Reg. at 47048. 40 In light of this regulatory history, we think that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the FRSA preemption clause sheds light on the meaning of the FAA regulations. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993); Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 146 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000). 11 In Easterwood and Shanklin, the Court considered whether state wrongful-death actions arising from railroad accidents were preempted by regulations issued pursuant to the FRSA. Interpreting the phrase covering the subject matter, the Court said: 41 To prevail on the claim that the regulations have pre-emptive effect, petitioner must establish more than that they touch upon or relate to that subject matter, for covering is a more restrictive term which indicates that pre-emption will lie only if the federal regulations substantially subsume the subject matter of the relevant state law. 42 Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732 (citation omitted); see also Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 352, 120 S.Ct. 1467 (citing Easterwood ). 43 Although the FAA regulations at issue here also contain the phrase covering the subject matter, the application of Easterwood and Shanklin to this case is not entirely straightforward. The FRSA states that federal regulations covering the subject matter of state law preempt that law, see 45 U.S.C. § 434 (1988 & Supp. II); 49 U.S.C. § 20106, while the FAA regulations provide that state law covering the subject matter of the federal regulations is preempted, see 14 C.F.R. Pt. 121, App. I § XI(A). In determining preemption, the question is ordinarily the scope of the federal government's intent to displace state law, not the scope of the state law that is displaced. It is one thing to say, as the Court did, that FRSA regulations preempt state law only when they substantially subsume the subject matter of the relevant state law, Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, and quite another to say that state laws are preempted only if they substantially subsume the subject matter of the FAA regulations. 44 But, whether it is state law that covers the subject matter of federal law or vice-versa, the Supreme Court has made clear that `covering' is a more restrictive term than touch[ing] upon or relat[ing] to. Id. We think that with the FAA regulations, as with the FRSA, proponents of preemption must establish more than some relationship between the areas of state and federal regulation in order to prevail. The intersection between the two must be substantial. 12 45 3. The Subject Matter of the Regulations. The defendants-appellants acknowledge the relevance of Easterwood and Shanklin to this case, but they contend that the preemption clause of the FAA regulations is broader than that of the FRSA because the FAA regulations, unlike the FRSA, expressly define[] the relevant `subject matter.' Whaley Br. at 13. The FAA regulations provide that state law is preempted when it covers the subject matter of the regulations, including, but not limited to, drug testing of aviation personnel performing safety-sensitive functions. 14 C.F.R. pt. 121, App. I § XI(A). According to the defendants-appellants, the FAA thus defined the subject matter of its regulations as the drug testing of aviation personnel because it intended to preempt all state-law claims arising from such drug testing, not only those claims that overlapped with specific provisions of the regulations. 46 We agree that some state laws covering the subject matter of the drug testing of aviation personnel may be preempted even if they regulate issues not specifically addressed by the FAA regulations. As noted, the FAA regulations establish a comprehensive antidrug program for aviation personnel. They lay out in considerable detail the steps that aviation-industry employers and (by reference to DOT regulations) drug-testing laboratories must take to carry out the program, from the selection of drugs to test for to the handling of test results. See 14 C.F.R. pt. 121, App. I; 49 C.F.R. pt. 40. Upon adopting the regulations, the FAA stated that it included a preemption clause in response to the recommendations of certain aviation-industry employers, who asked the agency to proscribe[] State or local legislation that would interfere with the consistent and uniform testing and rehabilitation opportunities for aviation employees mandated by this final rule. See 53 Fed.Reg. at 47048. It seems to us that some state laws concerning drug testing—even if they address issues on which the FAA regulations are silent—may interfere with the consistent and uniform drug-testing program that the FAA intended. 47 In our view, however, state law does not necessarily cover[] the subject matter of the drug testing of aviation personnel whenever it is applied to events that occur during the course of such drug testing. On the contrary, the regulations clearly anticipate that some tort claims arising from regulated drug testing will be viable. The applicable DOT drug-testing protocols, expressly incorporated into the FAA regulations, see 14 C.F.R. pt. 121, App. I § I.B., provide that employees may not be required to waive liability with respect to negligence on the part of any person participating in the collection, handling or analysis of the specimen or to indemnify any person for the negligence of others, 49 C.F.R. § 40.25(e)(22)(ii) (1993); see also 49 C.F.R. § 40.27 (employers may not require employees to waive liability in connection with DOT drug and alcohol testing program). As several courts have noted, that prohibition suggests that negligence claims may be brought. 13 See Drake, 290 F.Supp.2d at 373; Ishikawa, 343 F.3d at 1133; Chapman v. Lab One, 390 F.3d 620, 627 (8th Cir.2004); cf. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000) (The saving clause assumes that there are some significant number of common-law liability cases to save.). 48 As we have pointed out, moreover, upon adopting its drug-testing regulations, the FAA commented that their preemptive scope was essentially identical to regulations issued by the FRA. 53 Fed.Reg. at 47048. The FRA, when it adopted the regulations referenced by the FAA, stated that it did not intend to require an employee to waive any claim for malpractice with respect to the drawing of blood or proper handling of the samples. See Control of Alcohol and Drug Use in Railroad Operations; Final Rule and Miscellaneous Amendments, 50 Fed.Reg. 31508, 31532 (Aug. 2, 1985). 14 Insofar as the scope of the FAA's preemption clause was intended to be essentially identical to the FRA's, the FAA regulations would also seem to be compatible with at least some such claims. 49 Based on these indications from the text and history of the FAA regulations, we do not think that they preclude all tort claims arising from regulated drug testing. We doubt, for example, that the regulations prevent an aviation-industry employee who slips and falls upon entering a urine collection site from bringing a suit in negligence, or that they immunize a urine collector from liability for all intentional torts he might commit while administering a drug test. It seems to us, rather, that state law cover[s] the subject matter of the drug testing of aviation personnel, and is therefore preempted, 14 C.F.R. pt. 121, App. I § XI(A), when it implicates the drug testing of aviation personnel in such a way that it interferes with the FAA's stated desire to regulate such drug testing in a consistent and uniform manner, 53 Fed. Reg. at 47048. 50 4. The Regulations' Saving Clause. The defendants-appellants argue, however, that the preemptive scope of the FAA regulations is broader than the regulations' preemption clause suggests. Relying on the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Frank, they contend that the saving clause of the FAA regulations, which provides that some state criminal statutes are not preempted, see 14 C.F.R. Pt. 121, App. I § XI(B), impl[ies] that state law claims are otherwise broadly preempted, Frank, 314 F.3d at 200. They argue, in other words, that we must infer from the FAA's decision to save only certain state criminal laws that the agency intended to preempt all civil claims arising from FAA-regulated drug testing. 51 But although a narrow saving clause may in some contexts support an inference that preemption is otherwise broad, we do not think that such an inference is a strong one here. It is countered by persuasive evidence, discussed above, that the federal regulations are not intended to preempt all negligence claims arising from the drug testing of aviation personnel. In light of this evidence, we cannot conclude that the saving clause of the FAA regulations carries a negative pregnant that other state law is preempted. Ishikawa, 343 F.3d at 1132; see also id. (rejecting similar argument with respect to the analogous saving clause of the OTETA).