Opinion ID: 2234512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: second degree murder instructions

Text: The State next challenges the appellate court's finding that the trial court erroneously barred second degree murder instructions on the felony-murder counts. Relying on People v. Williams, 164 Ill. App.3d 99, 115 Ill.Dec. 334, 517 N.E.2d 745 (1987), and People v. Kidd, 295 Ill.App.3d 160, 229 Ill.Dec. 682, 692 N.E.2d 455 (1998), the appellate court held that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on second degree murder where the intent to kill or to use deadly force in a felony-murder case is formed after the formation of his belief in the need for self-defense. 307 Ill.App.3d at 715-16, 240 Ill.Dec. 725, 718 N.E.2d 206. The appellate court found that this error constituted reversible error with regard to Jon's conviction for the first degree murder of Lila. The State argues that pursuant to the plain language of the second degree murder statute (720 ILCS 5/9-2 (West 1996)), it is clear that second degree murder does not apply to a felony-murder count. The second degree murder statute provides: (a) A person commits the offense of second degree murder when he commits the offense of first degree murder as defined in paragraphs (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of Section 9-1 of this Code and either of the following mitigating factors are present: (1) At the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the individual killed or another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidentally causes the death of the individual killed; or (2) At the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his belief is unreasonable. 720 ILCS 5/9-2(a) (West 1996). The State contends that because the second degree murder statute, by definition, does not encompass felony murder, the appellate court committed reversible error when it found that the jury should have been given second degree murder instructions for the felony-murder counts. In Williams and in Kidd, the appellate court held that, where provocation occurs prior to the time that a defendant forms a felonious intent or commits an aggravated battery, he is entitled to a jury instruction on second degree murder. Kidd, 295 Ill. App.3d at 165, 229 Ill.Dec. 682, 692 N.E.2d 455; Williams, 164 Ill.App.3d at 110, 115 Ill.Dec. 334, 517 N.E.2d 745. The court in Kidd stated that barring a second degree murder instruction in a felony-murder case would effectively eliminate the second degree murder statute in intentional or knowing murder cases. Kidd, 295 Ill. App.3d at 165, 229 Ill.Dec. 682, 692 N.E.2d 455. The second degree murder statute would be eliminated because prosecutors that had sufficient evidence to defeat a claim of provocation would charge knowing or intentional murder, while prosecutors that did not have sufficient evidence to defeat a claim of provocation would simply bar that claim by charging a defendant with felony murder. Kidd, 295 Ill.App.3d at 165-66, 229 Ill.Dec. 682, 692 N.E.2d 455. The Kidd court also noted that in Viser, an instruction on the provocation defense was given. Kidd, 295 Ill.App.3d at 165, 229 Ill.Dec. 682, 692 N.E.2d 455. In reversing the trial court's order denying defendant's request for a second degree murder instruction on the felony-murder charges, the appellate court in this case held that the trial court had erred in declining to follow the precedent set by the court in Williams and in Kidd. Because we find the holdings in Williams and Kidd to be erroneous, however, we reverse the appellate court's finding that the trial court should have followed the precedent set forth in those cases and should have given second degree murder instructions on the felony-murder counts. The primary rule in statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Hickman, 163 Ill.2d 250, 261, 206 Ill.Dec. 94, 644 N.E.2d 1147 (1994). In addition, courts must give the language of a statute its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Tucker, 167 Ill.2d 431, 435, 212 Ill.Dec. 664, 657 N.E.2d 1009 (1995). Here, the second degree murder statute states that a defendant commits second degree murder when he commits first degree murder as set forth in sections 9-1(a)(1) or (a)(2) of the Code and certain mitigating factors are present. Nowhere does the second degree murder statute reference section 9-1(a)(3) of the Code, felony murder. In addition, in construing a legislative act, courts should consider each section in connection with other sections. Bubb v. Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill.2d 372, 382, 212 Ill.Dec. 542, 657 N.E.2d 887 (1995). Section 9-1(a)(3) of the Code states that a person commits first degree murder if in performing the acts which caused the death, he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder.  (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1996). It would be anomalous, then, to give a second degree murder instruction with regard to a charge of felony murder. Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, it is clear that the provocation defense of second degree murder is not available to a charge of felony murder. Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court's finding that a second degree murder instruction should have been given on the charges of felony murder, and affirm the trial court's order declining to give that instruction.