Opinion ID: 2520185
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mandatory and Permissible Rebuttable Presumptions

Text: [P]resumptions are a staple of our adversary system of factfinding. It is often necessary for the trier of fact to determine the existence of an element of the crime  that is, an `ultimate' or `elemental' fact  from the existence of one or more `evidentiary' or `basic' facts. ( Ulster County, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 156, 99 S.Ct. 2213.) The term presumption is defined in section 600, subdivision (a) of the Evidence Code: A presumption is an assumption of [an ultimate or elemental] fact that the law requires to be made from [an evidentiary or basic] fact or group of [such] facts found or otherwise established in the action. A presumption is not evidence. Put differently, presumptions are conclusions that the law requires to be drawn (in the absence of a sufficient contrary showing) when some other fact is proved or otherwise established in the action. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, com. on Assem. Bill 333 (1965 Reg. Sess.) [enacting Evid.Code] reprinted at 29B pt. 2, West's Ann. Evid.Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 600, p. 3.) This statutory definition of a presumption is incomplete, however, because the law also recognizes the permissive presumption, which allows  but does not require  the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and which places no burden of any kind on the defendant. ( Ulster County, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 157, 99 S.Ct. 2213, italics added.) Thus, Evidence Code section 600, subdivision (a) defines a mandatory presumption, which tells the trier that he or they must find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least unless the defendant has come forward with some evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts. ( Ulster County, at p. 157, 99 S.Ct. 2213.) Evidence Code section 600, subdivision (b) defines the term inference and provides: An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action. Like a presumption, an inference is not itself evidence; it is the result of reasoning from evidence. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, com. on Assem. Bill 333 (1965 Reg. Sess.) [enacting Evid.Code] reprinted at 29B pt. 2, West's Ann. Evid.Code, supra, foll. § 600, p. 4.) There is no substantive difference between the inference defined in Evidence Code section 600, subdivision (b) and the permissive presumption defined by the high court in Ulster County. [5] In addition, the mandatory and permissive presumptions contemplated by Evidence Code section 600 are rebuttable. As provided in Evidence Code section 601, A presumption is either conclusive or rebuttable. Every [mandatory or permissible] rebuttable presumption is either (a) a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence or (b) a presumption affecting the burden of proof. [6] In other words, whether the fact finder may find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact (a permissive presumption) or must find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact (a mandatory presumption), the defendant has the opportunity to rebut the presumed connection between the basic and ultimate facts. (See Ulster County, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 157, 99 S.Ct. 2213.) In deciding whether a rebuttable presumption in a criminal case is mandatory or permissive, the jury instructions generally will be controlling, although their interpretation may require recourse to the statute involved and the cases decided under it. ( Ibid. ) Because a mandatory rebuttable presumption tells the trier of fact that he or they must find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least until the defendant has come forward with some evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts, it is a troublesome evidentiary device in a criminal case since the prosecution bears the burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Ulster County, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 157, 99 S.Ct. 2213.) The prosecution may not rest its case entirely on a [mandatory rebuttable] presumption unless the fact proved is sufficient to support the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Id. at p. 167, 99 S.Ct. 2213.) In People v. Roder (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302 ( Roder ), we construed the mandatory rebuttable presumption contained in Penal Code section 496, which informed the jury that if it found that the defendant was a dealer in secondhand merchandise who bought or received stolen property under circumstances that should have caused him to make a reasonable inquiry of the seller's legal right to sell the same, it shall presume the defendant bought or received such property knowing it to be stolen, unless from all the evidence it had a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the property was stolen. ( Roder, at pp. 495-496, 189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302.) We stated that this was a classic example of a mandatory rebuttable presumption, for it `tells the trier [of fact] that he or they must find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least unless the defendant has come forward with some evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts.' ( Id. at p. 501, 189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302, quoting Ulster County, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 157, 99 S.Ct. 2213.) Echoing the high court in Ulster County, we held that a mandatory rebuttable presumption is reconcilable with the prosecution's burden of proof ... only if the basic fact proved compels the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Roder, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 498, fn. 7, 189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302.) [7]