Opinion ID: 1737820
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the victim's statements

Text: Leatherwood next assigns as error the admission into evidence over his objection of all the hearsay statements made by the victim, including the May 20 handwritten note. For legal reasons other than those assigned, we agree that some of them were not competent. Trial began January 27, 1986, after the January 1, 1986, effective date of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence (MRE), [2] Rule 802 states: Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law. The comment states Rule 802 is a statement of existing common law. The victim having testified as a witness, the admissibility of the hearsay statements made to various persons was governed by Rule 803, Hearsay Exceptions: Availability of Declarant Immaterial. Rule 803 begins: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the defendant is available as a witness: ... And, 803(4) provides: (4) Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. This rule and its comment made the victim's statements to Dr. Walker, the emergency room physician, to Dr. Magee, and to Dr. Gillespie admissible, such statements all being reasonably necessary for her diagnosis and treatment. The victim's statements to Linda Moore, a qualified expert in child behavior, fall outside Rule 803(4) for the reason that the services she rendered the victim were not generically medical. In Hall v. State, 539 So.2d 1338, 1342 n. 8 (Miss. 1989), we resist[ed] the temptation to elasticize our Rule 803(4), hearsay exception beyond the diagnosis and treatment of matters medical. Hall held that statements of one such as the victim made to a social worker likeunto Moore were not admissible under Rule 803(4). Paraphrasing, Moore sought to aid and counsel the victim, but she was not a physician nor may the services she rendered be stretched into the world of the medical. Hall, 539 So.2d at 1342, citing Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 536 A.2d 666, 678-89, (1988) To like effect is Mitchell v. State, 539 So.2d 1366, 1371 (Miss. 1989). The remaining hearsay testimony of statements made by the victim must be evaluated upon remand.
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, as noted in Gill v. State, 485 So.2d 1047 (Miss. 1986), in child sex abuse cases, we had broadened the hearsay exception beyond that already allowed in rape cases involving females over the age of puberty. Anderson v. State, 82 Miss. 784, 788, 35 So. 202, 203 (1903). In Gill, following Williams v. State, infra , we found no error in admitting testimony that a twelve-year-old child ran out of the house and told the next door neighbor that her stepfather had just raped her. In Williams v. State, 427 So.2d 100 (Miss. 1983), an eleven-year-old child was raped by her stepfather, and we found no error in the admission into evidence of statements made to her older sister the next morning that she had been raped, as well as to a local minister who the police had asked to take the child to the hospital for examination. In that case the child's statements as to who committed the crime were not offered to the jury, however. We adopted the Michigan rule, stated in People v. Mikula, 84 Mich. App. 108, 116, 269 N.W.2d 195, 199 (1978): Hearsay testimony concerning the details of a complaint of sexual assault is admissible where the complainant is of tender years if her statement is shown to have been spontaneous and without indication of manufacture, and if any delay is making the complaint is excusable insofar as it is caused by fear or other equally effective circumstances. 427 So.2d at 102-103. Thereafter, in Cunningham v. State, 467 So.2d 902 (Miss. 1986), a rape case with an adult victim, we broadened the hearsay exception in such cases by holding that where the usual criteria for admitting hearsay testimony of a rape victim were met, it was not objectionable that the victim's statement also identified the attacker. It would appear that the statements the victim made to Mrs. Patsy Smith, and to Mrs. Downey on April 30 and May 1, 1985  as well as her handwritten note insofar as relevant  were admissible under the tender years exception we adopted in Williams, supra, and Gill, supra . There was a plausible reason for the delay in making a complaint. We note that in Hunt v. State, 44 Ala.App. 479, 213 So.2d 664 (1968), the Alabama Court of Appeals found no error in admission of a statement made by a child victim nine months after incest committed by her father. For the same reason, the victim's statements made on May 1 to her sister, her uncle and her aunt, who went to the school and took her home; and to her mother, Mrs. V., and her aunt, Mrs. G.B., when she got home, would have been competent under this exception. All these statements were embraced in a continuing recitation by the victim to her teachers and family of sexual assault made on her by Leatherwood six weeks previously. It is doubtful that the statement the victim made to Mrs. Valmena Smith Blackmon on May 20 following, and the note the victim wrote, qualified under our pre-rules decisions. Likewise, the statements she made on May 2 to her grandmother, probably did not meet the tender years exception. These are points unnecessary for us to decide, however, in view of the conclusion we have reached.
Unfortunately for the State's position, Rule 1103 of the Rules of Evidence provides: All evidentiary rules, whether provided by statute, court decision or court rule, which are inconsistent with the Mississippi Rules of Evidence are hereby repealed. We cannot, therefore, rely upon Williams, supra, or Gill, supra, but must resort to Rule 803 to determine whether these remaining statements of the victim's were admissible. Mitchell v. State, 539 So.2d 1366, 1369 (Miss. 1989). Following the decision of People v. Mikula, supra , the Michigan Supreme Court adopted the Michigan Rules of Evidence, quite similar, as ours, to the Federal Rules of Evidence. In the case of People v. Kreiner, 415 Mich. 372, 329 N.W.2d 716 (1982), the Michigan Supreme Court held that the tender years exception to the hearsay rule of that state no longer existed, and any such statements, if admissible at all, would be admissible only under existing exceptions under the Michigan Rules of Evidence. 329 N.W.2d 717. In that case the trial court admitted, under the tender years exception, testimony by a mother of statements made to her by her daughter the day following a sexual molestation the previous night in their home. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the trial court to determine whether the testimony was admissible under that state's Rule 803(2), which is the same as ours: (2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. Because Michigan had no counterpart to our Rule 803(24), the Supreme Court specifically pointed out that it had no occasion to determine whether this testimony would have been admissible under this 24th exception, which appears in the Federal Rules of Evidence and in the Mississippi rules. We cannot even hold the possibility, as did the Michigan Supreme Court, that the statements made by the victim some six weeks later qualified under 803(2). Statements made by her some six weeks later simply cannot qualify as having been made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event. Mitchell v. State, 539 So.2d at 1369-70; Hall v. State, 539 So.2d at 1342. Nor did such statements qualify under Rule 803(3): (3) Then Existing Mental, Emotion, or Physical Condition. A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. See Hall v. State, 539 So.2d at 1342. Our Rule 803(24) provides for additional, residual exceptions: (24) Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. We note at the outset that the State failed to give Leatherwood's counsel advance notice prior to trial that it planned on offering this evidence, as required by the Rule. Just as the trial court in People v. Kreiner, supra , did not address the admissibility of the hearsay statements under Rule 803, but looked solely to the Michigan pre-rules tender years exception, the circuit judge in this case did not consider whether the victim's statements were admissible under Rule 803, but resorted only to our tender years exception of Williams, supra . This is understandable, the MRE having been in effect only one month at the time of trial. Even the State's brief does not address the admissibility of these hearsay statements under Rule 803, confining its argument as to admissibility solely to the tender years exception of Williams, supra . There being no specific tender years exception set out in Rule 803, and the circuit court having never addressed the question of whether the statements made by the victim to her teachers and family were embraced in Rule 803(24), it is necessary that we reverse. Mitchell v. State, 539 So.2d at 1369-71. It was incumbent upon a trial judge from the court proceedings before him to first make a determination and finding that hearsay testimony not otherwise admissible under Rule 803 could qualify under the residual exceptions of 803(24). See: Hall v. State, 539 So.2d at 1342-43; Cummins v. State, 515 So.2d 869, 873 (Miss. 1987). Even if the circuit court had made an evaluation as to whether these hearsay statements were admissible under Rule 803(24), it is clear from the record made that the statements and handwritten note of the victim made May 20 to Mrs. Blackmon were not competent under Rule 803(24), as we will discuss below, and it was reversible error to admit them, upon the record made. What follows are some basic, generalized guides for the circuit judge on remand which we do not suggest are all inclusive. We have discussed these points in Mitchell v. State, 539 So.2d at 1370-71 and in Hall v. State, 539 So.2d at 1342-43, but take this occasion to elaborate further. The Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, as interpreted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, indicate that hearsay statements made by a sexually abused child are admissible under that state's Rule 803(24). Mitchell v. State, 84 Wis.2d 325, 332, 267 N.W.2d 349, 352 (1978); Bertrang v. State, 50 Wis.2d 702, 184 N.W.2d 867 (1971). Also, in U.S. v. Cree, 778 F.2d 474 (8th Cir.1985), the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals found that statements of a four-year-old child to a social worker were admissible under 803(24) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. That court held: A statement not specifically covered by [the exceptions in Fed.R.Evid. 803(1) to (23)] but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness [is not excluded by the hearsay rule even if the declarant is available as a witness], if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of [the Fed Rules of Evidence] and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. Fed.R.Evid. 803(24). Thus, [t]here are five requirements for admission under Rule 803(24): (1) trustworthiness; (2) materiality; (3) probative value; (4) the interests of justice; and (5) notice. Moffett v. McCauley, 724 F.2d 581, 583 (7th Cir. 1984); see also J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, ¶ 803(24)(01), at 803-372 to -381 (1984). The trial court is entitled to a `considerable measure of discretion' in deciding whether to admit hearsay evidence under Rule 803(24), 724 F.2d at 583, and its determination of admissibility of evidence under Rule 803(24) will not be overturned on appeal except for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Friedman, 593 F.2d 109, 118 (9th Cir.1979). [Brackets in original opinion] 778 F.2d at 476-77. A detailed examination of the factors to be considered under Rule 803(24) are set forth in J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, ¶ 803(24)(01), at 803-369  383 (1984), which should be studied by any trial judge confronted with admitting testimony such as involved in this case. The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence recognized that something more than the 23 specific exceptions set forth in Rule 803 was needed, and the residual exception of 803(24) was created for situations not clearly embraced in the others. Rule 803(24) as promulgated by the Supreme Court represented a compromise. It recognized that not every contingency can be treated by detailed rules, that the hearsay rule has never been a closed system and should not be (for it would be pre-sumptuous to assume that all possibilities and new developments have been foreseen), and that, in a particular case, hearsay evidence which does not fall within one of the exceptions may have greater probative value than evidence which does. Weinstein, 803-369. That authority further states: Rule 803(24) requires five findings by the trial court. They should be made explicitly on the record, unless there is a waiver explicitly, or by silence, or the basis for the ruling is obvious. Weinstein, 803-373. In summary, these five findings by the trial court are: 1. The statement must have circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those in Rules 803(1) to (23). Under this heading, Need is a proper factor to be considered because of the basic assumption underlying the hearsay rule that statements made directly in the courtroom are more reliable. Id., XXX-XXX-XXX. 2. The statement is offered as evidence of a material fact. Id., 803-378. 3. The statement must be more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts. Id., 803-378. 4. Admissibility must accord with the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice. 5. The proponent must give notice of his intention to offer the statement sufficiently in advance of trial or hearing to provide ... afair opportunity to meet it ... and the particulars ... including the name and address of the declarant. Id., 803-379  380. As we noted above, even if this Court could somehow hold from the record that the statements made by the victim on April 30 and May 1 somehow qualified as an 803(24) exception  which we cannot  it is clear the present record shows the victim's statements and handwritten note on May 20 to Mrs. Blackmon did not qualify under Rule 803(24). There was no showing of need for such hearsay evidence, or that the evidence was more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts. The admittedly difficult analysis encompassed in 803(24) does not end with this rule, even. The Sixth Amendment right of an accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him must be observed. U.S. Constitution, Amendments VI and XIV; Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972); Coy v. Iowa, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988); see also Miss. Const. Art. 3, § 26 (1890). We see no confrontation clause problem in this case because the victim did testify. Such problem might very well occur if she failed to testify upon remand, however. On the sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness of the victim's hearsay statements, a proper consideration for the court will be the behavior of the victim and her own mental and emotional condition as indicative of having undergone some severe emotional trauma such as sexual abuse. In considering the admissibility of testimony of this nature, a court must be extremely careful that on the one hand the rights of a defendant are protected under the witness confrontation clauses of the federal and state constitutions and our rules of evidence, and, on the other hand, that testimony which on balance should be admitted under the framework of our rules of evidence is not excluded. The victim's statements were made under a variety of circumstances. Determining the admissibility of each of these statements unquestionably will be difficult for the circuit court. We know of no way to make the circuit judge's task easier, however. The circuit court must carefully apply the standards given to each hearsay statement that the State offers in evidence, following the required advance notice by the State to the defense of which statements it plans to offer during trial.