Opinion ID: 1216974
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Oral Assignment

Text: Rice also claims priority based on the alleged oral assignment of the insurance proceeds to the extent necessary to cover attorney's fees for the criminal cases. The applicable rule to determine priority in this case [7] is expressed in § 342 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981): Except as otherwise provided by statute, the right of an assignee is superior to that of a subsequent assignee of the same right from the same assignor, unless (a) the first assignment is ineffective or revocable or is voidable by the assignor or by the subsequent assignee... . See also J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 18-19, at 655 (1977); 4 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 902, at 615 (1951). In the present case, Van Hatten could have discharged Rice from representing him on the yet to be filed criminal cases as of the date of the court order to assign, March 26, 1981. See Alaska Code of Prof. Resp. DR 2-110(B)(4). [8] In this event, Rice would have been obligated to relinquish any interest in the insurance claim to the extent he had not performed services before learning of his termination. See Alaska Code of Prof.Resp. DR 2-110(A)(3). [9] The oral assignment was thus revocable as of March 26, 1981, and hence Rice is not entitled to priority based on this assignment except for services rendered on the criminal cases before Rice received notice of the court order to assign. [10] The question of when Rice received notice of the court order, and the extent of services performed by it prior to this date are to be determined on remand.