Opinion ID: 2507273
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Equal Protection Clause and Section 6601(a)(2)

Text: Smith argues that section 6601(a)(2), if construed as the People argues it should be, would violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and its California equivalent. To determine the soundness of that position, we first review some basic principles: In resolving equal protection issues, the United States Supreme Court has used three levels of analysis. Distinctions in statutes that involve suspect classifications or touch upon fundamental interests are subject to strict scrutiny, and can be sustained only if they are necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. Classifications based on gender are subject to an intermediate level of review. But most legislation is tested only to determine if the challenged classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. ( People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1200, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 821, 129 P.3d 29.) Under California law, `[s]trict scrutiny is the appropriate standard against which to measure [equal protection] claims of disparate treatment in civil commitment. [Citations.]' ( People v. Hubbart (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1217, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 490.) This statement can be traced back to In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457, 149 Cal.Rptr. 491, 584 P.2d 1097, a case involving a civil commitment under the MDSO Act, in which this court stated: Because petitioner's personal liberty is at stake, the People concede that the applicable standard for measuring the validity of the statutory scheme now before us requires application of the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection analysis. Accordingly, the state must establish both that it has a `compelling interest' which justifies the challenged procedure and that the distinctions drawn by the procedure are necessary to further that interest. [Citation.] At the very least, persons similarly situated must receive like treatment under the law. ( In re Moye, at pp. 465-166, 149 Cal.Rptr. 491, 584 P.2d 1097; see also Conservatorship of Hofferber (1980) 28 Cal.3d 161, 171, 167 Cal.Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836.) The United States Supreme Court and this court have placed significant constitutional limitations, based on the equal protection clause, on the ability of the government to distinguish between various types of civil committees. In Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 ( Jackson, ) Jackson was charged with two robberies, but was found to be incompetent to stand trial. Under Indiana law at the time, a criminal defendant could be civilly committed if found incompetent, and could be held in such commitment indefinitely. On the other hand, under Indiana's general civil commitment statutes, a mentally disordered person could be held in civil commitment only if he was a danger to others or in need of custodial care and treatment. The United States Supreme Court concluded that this double standard violated the equal protection clause. [W]e hold that by subjecting Jackson to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses, and by thus condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for commitment or the opportunity for release afforded by [Indiana's general civil commitment statutes], Indiana deprived petitioner of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. (406 U.S. at p. 730, 92 S.Ct. 1845.) In arriving at this conclusion, the court relied in part on Baxstrom v. Herold (1966) 383 U.S. 107, 86 S.Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620, in which the court had held that it was a violation of equal protection to deprive a state prisoner of a jury trial and a finding of dangerousness when the state sought to civilly commit him at the end of his prison term, given that these protections were available to other persons civilly committed. As the Jackson court put it: Baxstrom held that the State cannot withhold from a few the procedural protections or the substantive requirements for [civil] commitment that are available to all others. ( Jackson, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1845.) Rejecting the State's argument that Baxstrom's conviction and sentence constituted adequate justification for the difference in procedures, the Court said that `there is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all other civil commitments.' ( Jackson, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 724, 92 S.Ct. 1845.) The Jackson court then concluded that [i]f criminal conviction and imposition of sentence are insufficient to justify less procedural and substantive protection against indefinite commitment than that generally available to all others, the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot suffice. ( Ibid. ) We applied and clarified Jackson's holding in Conservatorship of Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d 161, 167 Cal.Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836 ( Hofferber. ) As that opinion explained, California had a civil commitment statute for incompetent criminal defendants similar to the Indiana statute invalidated in Jackson. This court in In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798, 106 Cal.Rptr. 178, 505 P.2d 1018 held that such individuals found to be incompetent to stand trial could be civilly committed only for a reasonable time for purposes of evaluation and recovery, after which they must either be released or subject to commitment as gravely disabled under California's general civil commitment statute, the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act). (§ 5000 et seq.) The definition of gravely disabled up to that point had been a condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter. (§ 5008, former subd. (h)(1), as amended by Stats.1970, ch. 516, § 5, p. 1002; see now § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) In response, the Legislature amended the definition of gravely disabled, to permit a person to be found gravely disabled on the additional grounds that he (1) is charged by indictment or information with a felony involving death, great bodily harm, or a serious threat to the physical well-being of another, and (2) is incompetent to assist in his defense because of a mental disorder. (§ 5008, former subd. (h)(2), as amended by Stats.1974, ch. 1511, § 12, p. 3321; see Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 171, 167 Cal.Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836.) The petitioner in Hofferber contended that the new statutory scheme was a transparent and unsuccessful evasion of Jackson and Davis. (Hofferber, at p. 170, 167 Cal.Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836.) Although agreeing in part with petitioner, the court opined that we do not regard those cases as holding that the fact of criminal incompetency may never be a basis for involuntary confinement prescriptions. ( Id. at p. 171, 167 Cal.Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836.) We began the analysis in Hofferber with the observation that [t]he state has compelling interests in public safety and in humane treatment of the mentally disturbed. [Citation.] It may adopt more than one procedure for isolating, treating, and restraining dangerous persons; and differences will be upheld if justified. [Citations.] Variation of the length and conditions of confinement, depending on degrees of danger reasonably perceived as to special classes of persons, is a valid exercise of state power. [¶] California laws have long followed that premise. For certain purposes they properly classify, separately, those mentally ill persons against whom a judicial determination of criminal conduct has been made since such persons, at least initially, have demonstrated particular danger. [Citations.] ( Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 171-172, 167 Cal. Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836; italics added, fn. omitted.) We continued by surveying the various ways in which involuntary civil commitments may occur in this state: The California scheme permits long-term, renewable commitments of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity (Pen.Code, § 1026 et seq.), mentally disordered sex offenders (MDSO's) (§ 6300 et seq.), and those committed to the Youth Authority (§ 1800 et seq.; People v. Smith (1971) 5 Cal.3d 313, 317, 96 Cal.Rptr. 13, 486 P.2d 1213)in each case on proof that they remain dangerously disturbed. On the other hand, violent persons not adjudicated under the criminal justice system are subject only to the short-term LPS Act procedure for `imminently dangerous' persons. They, unlike those criminally committed, may not be confined indefinitely on psychiatric opinion alone. (§§ 5300, 5304.) ( Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 172, 167 Cal.Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836.) This court explained the probable sources of such disparate treatment: Those distinctions have two apparent bases. First, the Legislature apparently concluded that short-term civil confinement is preferable for most violent incidents caused by mental disturbance and that only seriously dangerous persons should be subject to the trauma and stigma of longer-term confinement. [Citation.] On the other hand, it was considered that acts serious enough for criminal treatment justify a continuing special interest in a person's nonpenal confinement for purposes of public safety. [Citations.] Weighing the compelling interest in avoiding confinement whenever possible against the equal need to protect society from the seriously dangerous mentally ill, the Legislature has naturally concluded that statutory distinctions must be made on the basis of degree of danger presented. ( Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 172-173, 167 Cal.Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836, italics added.) We further clarified the high court's language in Jackson that [i]f criminal conviction and imposition of sentence are insufficient to justify less procedural and substantive protection against indefinite commitment than that generally available to all others, the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot suffice. ( Jackson, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 724, 92 S.Ct: 1845.) We concluded that [r]ead in context, Jackson stands only for the proposition that consideration of prior criminal conduct as a basis for distinguishing among dangerous persons must be reasonable. ( Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 173, fn. 10,167 Cal.Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836.) Applying these principles, we reasoned that separate treatment of permanently incompetent criminal defendants formally charged with violent felonies is justified. Allegedly they have engaged in violence so critical that serious criminal charges were believed appropriate. Magistrates or grand juries have found substantial evidence that the alleged conduct actually was committed as alleged. Those determinations of probable cause establish strong grounds to believe that, by concrete acts, the incompetent defendants already have seriously imperiled public safety and thus are particularly dangerous. Yet because of permanent incompetence they cannot be evaluated and confined for continuing dangerousness under the criminal processes usually applied to serious violent conduct. ( Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 173-174,167 Cal.Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836.) The Hofferber court nonetheless found section 5008, former subdivision (h)(2), constitutionally inadequate under equal protection because it did not impose a requirement of a finding beyond a reasonable doubt, after a hearing, that the person represented a current danger to others as a result of a mental disorder, as similar criminal insanity commitment statutes required, and implied such a requirement in order to render the statute constitutional. ( Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 176-178,167 Cal.Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836.) The basic principles of Jackson and Hofferber may be summarized as follows: (1) generally speaking, no individual or group when being civilly committed may be denied substantive or procedural protections that are provided to the population as a whole; (2) on the other hand, the Legislature may make reasonable distinctions between its civil commitment statutes based on a showing that the persons are not similarly situated, meaning that those who are reasonably determined to represent a greater danger may be treated differently from the general population; (3) in particular, those who are criminally convicted, and those indicted of criminal charges but incompetent to stand trial, may be distinguished, at least initially, from the general population for civil commitment purposes, because their criminal acts demonstrate that they potentially pose a greater danger to society than those not in the criminal justice system. With these principles in mind, we consider whether Smith in the present case is being treated differently from those who are subject to our state's general civil commitment statute, the LPS Act, and, if so, whether that differential treatment is reasonable. We begin this inquiry with a brief review of the LPS Act. The LPS Act `limits involuntary commitment to successive periods of increasingly longer duration, beginning with a 72hour detention for evaluation and treatment ([Welf. & InstCode,] § 5150), which may be extended by certification for 14 days of intensive treatment([Welf. & Inst. Code,] § 5250); that initial period may be extended for an additional 14 days if the person detained is suicidal. ([Welf. & Inst.Code,] § 5260.) ... [T]he 14-day certification may be extended for an additional 30-day period for further intensive treatment. ([Welf. & InstCode,] § 5270.15.) Persons found to be imminently dangerous may be involuntarily committed for up to 180 days beyond the 14-day period. ([Welf. & InstCode,] § 5300.) After the initial 72-hour detention, the 14day and 30-day commitments each require a certification hearing before an appointed hearing officer to determine probable cause for confinement unless the detainee has filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. ([Welf. & InstCode,] §§ 5256, 5256.1, 5262, 5270.15, 5275, 5276.) A 180-day commitment requires a superior court order. ([Welf. & InstCode,] § 5301.)' ( People v, Allen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 91, 106-107, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 124, 164 P.3d 557.) The LPS Act provides that longer-term civil commitment will be authorized only after a rigorous showing. In order to be subject to the initial 72-hour, 14-day, and 30-day commitments, an individual must be found to be either a danger to self or others or gravely disabled, initially according to the observations of a peace officer or other designated professional (§ 5150) and later by the observations of the professional staff of the agency or treating facility (§§ 5260, 5270.15). In order to receive the 180-day commitment under the LPS Act, as one court has summarized it, a person, `as a result of mental disorder or mental defect, [must] present[ ] a demonstrated danger of inflicting substantial physical harm upon others'; and must have attempted, inflicted, or made a serious threat of substantial physical harm upon another after having been taken into custody for evaluation and treatment, or must have attempted or inflicted physical harm upon another and that act resulted in his being taken into custody, or must have expressed a serious threat of substantial physical harm upon another within seven days of being taken into custody and that threat at least in part resulted in his being taken into custody. (§§ 5300, subds. (a)-(c), 5304, subd. (a)(1), (2), (3).) ( People v. Buffington (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1161-1162, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, italics and underscoring omitted.) In order to be subject to renewable one-year conservatorships under the LPS Act, one must be found to be gravely disabled either by being manifestly unable to take care of oneself or being in custody on a criminal charge and found incompetent to stand trial and having a mental disorder causing one to be dangerous to others. (§§ 5350, 5008, subd. (h), 5361; see People v. Karriker (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 763, 774-775, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 412.) As discussed above, under the SVP Act those currently in prison with the requisite convictions for sexually violent offenses can be subject to continued civil commitment solely on the basis of findings that an individual has a mental disorder that makes it likely he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior. (§§ 6601-6604.) On the other hand, those not in prison, including those who also have prior convictions for sexually violent offenses, can be subject to long-term civil commitment only when, as explained, they are determined to be gravely disabled or to have a mental disorder and to be a danger to self and others as shown by recent acts. Stated another way, a person convicted of prior sexual offenses who is currently not in prison, and who has not done anything to manifest grave disability or recent dangerousness based on mental disorder, may not be civilly committed in California. We have no doubt that such a distinction between those who are and are not in prison custody, in general, passes muster under the equal protection clause. As discussed, the Legislature may separately classify mentally ill persons against whom a judicial determination of criminal conduct has been made since such persons, at least initially, have demonstrated particular danger. ( Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 172, 167 Cal.Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836.) Although Hofferber's pronouncement was made in the context of violent criminal conduct, the Legislature could legitimately conclude in the context of the SVP Act that any felonious criminal conduct would warrant a finding of greater danger and a separate classification. Individuals in prison with felony convictions have yet to demonstrate their capacity or willingness to keep their conduct within the bounds of the law and to break old criminal habits, and the Legislature could legitimately conclude that such felons who have prior sexually violent offenses represent a particular danger to society that justifies a separate system of civil commitment. Such a conclusion would be an extension of the basic principle underlying our parole system that those newly released from prison, who have not yet proven their ability to be lawabiding citizens, deserve particular scrutiny. (See Cohen, The Law of Parole & Probation (2d ed.2000) § 1.20, p. 1-29.) But the justification for differential treatment is less clear when, as here, the conviction that was the basis of prison custody has been reversed. In terms of potential dangerousness, a person whose felony conviction has been reversed is in the same position as someone who was charged with, but not convicted of, a felony offense, yet it is undisputed that the latter could not be subject to SVP proceedings. Nor does it appear that those whose convictions were reversed relatively early in their prison term, before SVP proceedings were commenced, could be subject to such proceedingsection 6601(a)(2) by its plain terms applies to prevent dismissal of petitions already filed, not the initiation of new petitions. It is true that Smith in the present case was the subject of a preliminary determination by mental health professionals that he may be an SVP. But that distinction does not appear to be decisive. A person who has had the same criminal history as Smith, and who, for whatever reason, becomes civilly rather than criminally committed, will be subject to intensive psychiatric evaluation to determine whether as a result of a mental disorder he is a danger to others. (See §§ 5213, subd. (a), 5250, subd. (a), 5300.) During this evaluation, mental health professionals may well conclude that the individual has a diagnosis substantially similar to Smith's in the present case, or they may make other predictions about his future dangerousness. But as discussed above, under the LPS Act, those diagnoses and predictions alone cannot be the basis of an extended civil commitment. One could be subject to such commitment only on the basis of a finding of grave disability or recent dangerousness, as discussed above. It is only Smith's status as a prisoner that makes him eligible for continued civil commitment based on past criminal history and diagnoses and predictions of future dangerousness alone. That differential treatment is justifiable in equal protection terms if Smith's most recent conviction were valid. It is not clear such treatment is justifiable when that conviction is reversed. (See Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 172, 167 Cal.Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836.) Our common practice is to construct ] statutes, when reasonable, to avoid difficult constitutional questions. ( he Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1105, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 249, 112 P.3d 636.) Consistent with that practice, we construe section 6601(a)(2) not to apply to someone in Smith's position, whose conviction that was the basis of his prison custody at the time SVP proceedings were initiated has been reversed, and who has not been retried and reconvicted. Such a construction would still allow the state to proceed against those whose initial prison custody was valid, but who might evade SVP commitment due to erroneous parole revocations or extensions of sentence, the groups of prisoners against whom section 6601(a)(2) was targeted. (See, e.g., Whitley II, supra, 68 Cal. App.4th 1383, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 189; Garcetti v. Superior Court (Lyles), supra, 68 Cal. App.4th 1105, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 724; People v. Wakefield, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th 893, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 221.) Subjecting these classes of prisoners to SVP proceedings does not raise the equal protection problems discussed in the present case. It is certainly justifiable in equal protection terms, for the reasons discussed above, to treat convicted prisoners differently for purposes of civil commitment from the general population, even when those prisoners stand to evade the statutory time limits for initiating SVP proceedings due to good-faith factual or legal error. Moreover, a prisoner on parole remains in constructive custody (Pen.Code, § 3056; see 3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Punishment, § 631, pp. 828-829), and is not similarly situated, for purposes of the equal protection issue posed by this case, to a prisoner whose conviction that was the basis of his or her custody is reversed due to prejudicial error. Our present holding would affect only those in Smith's unusual circumstances, i.e., a prisoner who has obtained an appellate reversal of his conviction late in his prison term after an SVP petition has been filed, and who has not been retried and reconvicted. As the above implies, our holding means that if the People seek to continue SVP proceedings against someone whose present conviction has been reversed, it must retry and reconvict him. We regret that this requirement imposes an additional burden on the People, particularly when the person has already served his prison sentence. We interpret the statutory scheme to impose this burden due to the constitutional concerns articulated above. [6] We emphasize that we agree with the People that the state has a compelling interest in timely initiating SVP proceedings for prisoners who appear to be eligible for SVP commitment. Nothing we say in the present opinion should be interpreted as requiring the responsible authorities to wait until a defendant has exhausted his appeals before initiating SVP proceedings against him. [7] Nor do we foreclose the possibility that the Legislature could amend the SVP Act so that it would constitutionally apply to someone in Smith's position. We hold only that, in light of the constitutional concerns discussed above, we do not construe the statute as currently written to so apply.