Opinion ID: 1488269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refusal to admit the testimony given by Rassa at the trial of Kanaras

Text: Deno Kanaras was the alleged accomplice of Huffington in the incidents here in question. Kanaras was convicted by a Kent County jury of felony murder, theft, and daytime housebreaking. See Kanaras v. State, 54 Md. App. 568, 460 A.2d 61, cert. denied, 297 Md. 109 (1983). At Kanaras' trial Stephen Rassa testified in rebuttal as a State's witness. Prior to that rebuttal testimony Kanaras had testified that he had been free from drugs for some time before the homicides in question. The purport of Rassa's testimony was that a few days before the incident in question Kanaras was still involved with drugs. Rassa told of a visit made by him and Kanaras to the homicide victims for the purpose of purchasing cocaine. At Kanaras' trial Rassa testified that Kanaras said he wouldn't mind robbing Joe Hudson and killing him. Rassa said that five days before Hudson and Becker, the victims in the case at bar, were actually killed, when Rassa and Kanaras approached Hudson's trailer for the purpose of purchasing cocaine, Kanaras entered first armed with a gun and with a knife. After laying a foundation of unsuccessful attempts to subpoena Rassa as a witness, Huffington offered the record of Rassa's testimony at the Kanaras trial in Kent County. He sought its admission as prior evidence to establish that Kanaras might have killed the victims in the case at bar. The trial judge denied admission, stating: The whole thrust of the cases in this area is that the right of cross-examination be fully afforded, and if it has not been afforded, then it is not only a violation of Article 21 of the Maryland Constitution but also before [sic] the amendment to the United States Constitution. It's clear from the proffered testimony in this case, and I find as a fact, that in the trial in which the Rassa transcript is sought to be used, Mr. Rassa was the State's witness, and accordingly, to grant your motion I would be depriving the State of its right to cross-examine fully Mr. Rassa in this case, which is a different case from the present case. The case in which the transcript is from, as I understand it, is the State v. Kanaras rather than the State v. Huffington, and so the situation is entirely different from the situation which caused me to grant the State's motion in connection with the Bognani testimony. Accordingly, the motion is denied. There is no dispute here on the issue of Rassa's availability as a witness. The rule applicable to prior testimony was set forth for the Court by Chief Judge Murphy in Crawford v. State, 282 Md. 210, 383 A.2d 1097 (1978): Our predecessors have consistently held that testimony taken at a former trial may as a general rule be admitted at a subsequent trial where it is satisfactorily shown that the witness is unavailable to testify. Contee v. State, 229 Md. 486, 184 A.2d 823 (1962); Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 (1955); Hendrix v. State, 200 Md. 380, 90 A.2d 186 (1952). These cases generally recognize that where an opportunity was afforded to the accused to cross-examine the witness at the former trial, there is no violation of the state or federal constitutional right of confrontation. The rule has generally been applied without distinction between the admissibility of testimony given at a former trial and testimony given at a preliminary hearing since, as Professor McCormick states: `If the accepted requirements of the administration of the oath, adequate opportunity to cross-examine on substantially the same issue, and present unavailability of the witness, are satisfied then the character of the tribunal and the form of the proceedings are immaterial, and the former testimony should be received....' McCormick, Evidence § 258 (2d ed. 1972). Other text writers are in accord. See 2 Jones on Evidence § 9.22 (6th ed. 1972); 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 650 (13th ed. 1973). 282 Md. at 214-15, 383 A.2d at 1100. The rule was recognized ninety years ago in a criminal context by the Supreme Court. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895). The Court discussed such testimony in the context of a claim that admission of testimony would violate the constitutional provision relative to confrontation of witnesses: The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief. There is doubtless reason for saying that the accused should never lose the benefit of any of these safeguards even by the death of the witness; and that, if notes of his testimony are permitted to be read, he is deprived of the advantage of that personal presence of the witness before the jury which the law has designed for his protection. But general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case. To say that a criminal, after having once been convicted by the testimony of a certain witness, should go scot free simply because death has closed the mouth of that witness, would be carrying his constitutional protection to an unwarrantable extent. The law in its wisdom declares that the rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused. 156 U.S. at 242-43, 15 S.Ct. at 339-40, 39 L.Ed. at 411. On the issue in question see Annot., 15 A.L.R. 495 (1921), and the supplements thereto, 79 A.L.R. 1392 (1932), 122 A.L.R. 425 (1939), and 159 A.L.R. 1240 (1945). Obviously, as pointed out in 15 A.L.R. at 559, there can be no constitutional objection to admission of evidence on behalf of an accused in a criminal proceeding. The further observation is made that in admitting testimony on behalf of an accused courts generally have followed the rules which they have adopted with respect to permitting or rejecting testimony in favor of the prosecution. On the problem at hand E. Cleary, McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence, § 254 (3d ed. 1984) states: Usually called `former testimony', this evidence may be classified, depending upon the precise formulation of the rule against hearsay, as an exception to the hearsay prohibition on the one hand, or as a class of evidence where the requirements of the hearsay rule are complied with, on the other. The former view is accepted generally by the courts, rules, and textwriters; the latter was espoused by Wigmore. Id. at 759-60. On cross-examination McCormick states in § 255: More important, and more often drawn in question, is the requirement that the party against whom the former testimony is now offered, or a party in like interest, must have had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine. Actual cross-examination, of course, is not essential, if the opportunity was afforded and waived. The opportunity must have been such as to render the conduct of the cross-examination or the decision not to cross-examine meaningful in the light of the circumstances which prevail when the former testimony is offered. Id. at 761-62. McCormick also mentions another frequent issue in § 256, that of identity of parties: [T]he natural next step is to recognize, as progressive courts have done, that neither identity of parties nor privity between parties is essential. These are merely means to an end. Consequently, if it appears that in the former suit a party having a like motive to cross-examine about the same matters as the present party would have, was accorded an adequate opportunity for such examination, the testimony may be received against the present party. Identity of interest in the sense of motive, rather than technical identity of cause of action or title, is the test. Id. at 765. The importance of cross-examination is explained by Martin, The Former-Testimony Exception in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 Iowa L.Rev. 547 (1972): Given the faith which the Anglo-American adversary system places in the efficacy of cross-examination, it is not surprising that the most important feature of the former-testimony exception is that which requires such testimony to have been given in a situation where an opportunity existed to utilize that truth-testing device. The former-testimony exception to the hearsay rule is unique in this respect, as no other exception makes cross-examination a requirement for admissibility, and it is not usually discussed in connection with evidence admitted under other exceptions. It was this opportunity to cross-examine which led Wigmore to characterize former testimony as unobjectionable under the hearsay rule, rather than as admissible as one of its exceptions. In order to ensure the reliability of former testimony, the proposed Federal Rules retain the requirement that the opponent be given the opportunity to develop the testimony by cross-examination. Id. at 553-54. Professor Martin says, [The] crucial question is whether, given that the opponent can not now cross-examine the witness, the examination on the prior occasion was fairly equivalent to cross-examination in the present situation. Id. at 556. Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1) states: (b) Hearsay exceptions.  The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: (1) Former testimony.  Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. The issue of cross-examination is discussed in J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 1 Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 804(b)(1)[02]: The prime guaranty of reliability in the case of prior testimony or depositions resides in their having been subjected to cross-examination prior to the present trial. When this condition and the requirement of an oath are met, the character of the tribunal before which the former trial was held is immaterial. `If the tribunal was empowered to compel cross-examination, or did in fact compel cross-examination, the prior testimony should be admissible.' Similarly in the case of depositions, the condition of cross-examination is satisfied if the deposition is taken `before an officer authorized by law to take depositions and empowered to compel cross-examination.' If the opportunity to cross-examine was lacking the prior testimony must be excluded. Even should it be determined that the tribunal conducting the original hearing lacked jurisdiction, admission of the prior testimony should depend on `whether the sworn statements of the witness, now dead or unavailable, about the facts of which he had knowledge, were made under such circumstances of opportunity and motive for cross-examination as to make them sufficiently trustworthy to be used in the effort to ascertain the truth.' Actual cross-examination is not required, `but merely an opportunity to exercise the right to cross-examine if desired.' Respresentation by the same counsel at both trials is not required. If the party against whom the previous statement is now offered is the party against whom the testimony was previously offered, it is usually compatible with fair practice to make him bear the consequences of any deficiencies in the cross-examination or decision not to exercise that right. But situations may arise where because of particular circumstances, the existence of an opportunity to cross-examine would not have resulted in any testing of the reliability of the previous statement, where the conduct of the cross-examination or the decision not to cross-examine is not `meaningful in the light of the circumstances which prevail when the former testimony is offered.' Id. 804-74 to -76. (Emphasis in original.) The case relied upon by the State that is closest to the factual situation before the Court is Commonwealth v. Meech, 380 Mass. 490, 403 N.E.2d 1174 (1980). There the defendant attempted to introduce at his trial testimony given by a witness for the prosecution before the grand jury. The court said: The common model for the exception is one where the prior testimony was given by a person, now unavailable, in a proceeding addressed to substantially the same issues as in the current proceeding, with reasonable opportunity and similar motivation on the prior occasion for cross-examination of the declarant by the party against whom the testimony is now being offered.... The usual formula would not be fulfilled if grand jury testimony were subsequently offered against the indicted defendant, for he would not have had a chance to cross-examine. See United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112, 115 & n. 3 (2d Cir.1971), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 [93 S.Ct. 1510, 36 L.Ed.2d 181] (1973). Nor is it nominally fulfilled where, as here, the defendant offers the testimony against the Commonwealth, for the Commonwealth was not in the position of a cross-examiner at the grand jury hearing; rather it was presenting the testimony through direct examination. However, it has been recommended by commentators, and on occasion held by courts, that a party's having tendered the testimony on direct should serve as the equivalent for the present purpose of his having cross-examined upon it. There is some support for this view as to grand jury testimony on the theory, perhaps, that the government should be considered bound to the trustworthiness of the evidence it chose to present to the grant jury as a basis for an accusation of crime. (See, however, note 12 infra. ) But even if the proposition were accepted that the defendant might in some circumstances use the grand jury testimony of a now unavailable witness at trial, McDonald's testimony would still be of dubious acceptability. For it is an important ground of this hearsay `exception' that there be substantial identity between the issues at the earlier and later proceedings  this to ensure `that the former handling of the witness was the equivalent of what would now be done if the opportunity were presented.' Where this similarity is absent, the testimony will not be fortified in the material respect  that is, in its relation to the particular proposition sought to be proved in the later proceeding. See United States v. Wingate, 520 F.2d 309, 316 (2d Cir.1975); State v. Augustine, 252 La. 983, 999 [215 So.2d 634] (1968). The problem is encountered here. The Commonwealth's purpose in examining McDonald before the grand jury was not to inquire into the defendant's criminal responsibility; it was to provide eyewitness proof about the defendant's possession of the supposed murder weapon in the vicinity of the crime near the time of death. 380 Mass. at 494-96, 403 N.E.2d at 1177-78. United States v. Atkins, 618 F.2d 366 (5th Cir.1980), is instructive. The court there said: Admission of Inglet's testimony, given during government cross-examination of him in a December 19, 1978, James [ [1] ] hearing, also was not erroneously denied. Fed. R.Evid. 804(b)(1) permits admission of former testimony if the declarant is unavailable at trial and `if the party against whom the testimony is now offered ... had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.' The defendant sought to use Inglet's testimony that his source of cocaine in Miami was a man named Robert, whose last name he did not know, in order to establish that Inglet was dealing with someone other than Robert Atkins, whose name was known to Inglet. Defense counsel for Atkins did not participate in the James hearing, and the hearing did not concern Atkins but only some of his codefendants. In addition, the government did not contend that Atkins was the Miami supplier being discussed by Inglet in the James hearing but rather that he was the contact man. Thus, the government did not have the motivation to question Inglet in order to make him acknowledge that the Robert of whom he spoke in the James hearing was in fact Atkins. Accordingly, Inglet's former testimony did not meet the requirements of 804(b)(1) for admission, and his challenge to its exclusion by the judge is without merit. See, e.g., Peterson v. United States, 344 F.2d 419, 425 (5th Cir.1965). 618 F.2d at 373. We find Atkins persuasive. It follows along with the authorities we have heretofore quoted. When the State presented the testimony of Rassa at Kanaras' trial it was in a different context and for a different purpose from that for which Huffington desires to offer it in the case at bar. [2] The motivation on the part of the State for questioning Rassa was entirely different at that trial from the motivation the State would have had to question Rassa on cross-examination at Huffington's trial had Rassa been present as a live witness to offer the testimony sought to be introduced. Much has been written on the importance of cross-examination. In the words of the federal rule the party against whom the testimony is now offered did not have at the time of Kanaras' trial a similar motive in developing the testimony of Rassa. Given the wide discretion which trial judges have in admitting evidence, we find no error on the part of the trial judge.