Opinion ID: 1347493
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: During trial of the case some housewives, mothers, and one husband-father, testified as to the reasonable value of the services of plaintiff's decedent as a wife and mother.

Text: Some of these witnesses were closely acquainted with Mrs. Henneman and had visited in her home. Others had not been socially in contact with her for sometime. One or two of them had never been in her home. However all had known, seen or visited with her, and knew of her commendable community activities and skill as a homemaker. Defendants contend there was not sufficient foundation upon which to permit such opinion evidence. In dealing with this type of testimony as it related to the matter of speed of an unseen motor vehicle, we previously held the opinion of a qualified expert on a proper subject is not objectionable because it invades the province of the jury. But, the witness should be qualified and the facts on which he bases his opinion should be sufficient to enable him to express more than a conjecture. See Hardwick v. Bublitz, 254 Iowa 1253, 1256-1261, 119 N.W.2d 886. On the other hand this court said in Mundy v. Olds, 254 Iowa 1095, 1104, 120 N.W.2d 469, as follows: The receipt of opinion evidence, lay or expert, rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial court. Waterloo Sav. Bk. v. Waterloo, C. F. & N. R., 244 Iowa 1364, 1374, 60 N.W.2d 572, and cases cited. Also see, for a complete discussion of the law and authorities on such opinion evidence, Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 342, 5 N.W.2d 646, 654. It is true generally that an opinion is not to be received upon an ultimate issue of fact if the jury is itself equally qualified to pass upon such an issue. McKeever v. Batcheler, 219 Iowa 93, 97, 257 N.W. 567; Danner v. Walters, 154 Neb. 506, 48 N.W.2d 635. However, considerable leeway is allowed in this field of evidence for the reason that no matter how the opinion question is phrased or formulated, it remains an opinion which the jury is at liberty to reject. Therefore, only in clear cases of abuse would an admission of such evidence be found prejudicial. Such does not appear in the case before us. It is well settled in Iowa that if a witness is possessed of special training, experience, or knowledge in respect to the matter under investigation, and if his opinion based on evidentiary facts will be of aid to the jury in reaching a correct conclusion, and if the opinion expressed does not bind the jury to accept it, but leaves the ultimate conclusion to be determined by the judgment of the jurors themselves, such testimony is not improper nor prejudicial. (Authorities cited). Also, McCormick on Evidence, section 11, page 23, makes this statement: It is believed that the standard actually applied by the trial judges of today approaches more nearly the principle espoused by Wigmore, namely that the opinion should be rejected only when it is superfluous in the sense that it will be of no value to the jury. See Wigmore, Evidence, section 1918. Approving testimony similar to that here challenged, this court said, in Bridenstine v. Iowa City Elec. R. Co., 181 Iowa 1124, 1134, 165 N.W. 435, 439: The services of a competent wife or mother cannot be weighed in the scales of the money changer. And indeed it would seem almost frivolous to call witnesses to estimate their monetary value. The best that can be done is to prove the facts and circumstances of the woman's life and service in these capacities, her age, health and strength, her expectancy of life, and all that may appear to enlighten the minds and aid the judgment of the jurors, and leave them to assess such recovery within the statutory limit as they find and believe to be just. See also Nolte v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 165 Iowa 721, 725-728, 147 N.W. 192. We are not here dealing with that which necessarily stands in the field of expert testimony. Furthermore it would appear the existence or nonexistence of strong qualifications to testify, regarding the value of services of a wife and mother, really goes to the weight rather than admissibility of the evidence. See Nicholson v. City of Des Moines, 246 Iowa 318, 327-328, 67 N. W.2d 533. This is a matter resting largely in the administrative discretion of the trial court, and we fail to find it was here so manifestly abused as to constitute prejudicial error. See Marean v. Petersen, Iowa, 144 N.W.2d 906, 910. XII. Defendants, by way of another assignment of error, assert as follows: The trial court erred in failing to sustain defendants-appellants' motions to strike certain allegations and claims contained in plaintiff's petition and subsequent amendments thereto. This is nothing more nor less than an omnibus statement with no applicable authority cited to sustain it. Furthermore, little or nothing is to be gained by attempting any operational process of dissecting and analyzing the various pleadings, motions, orders and rulings, to which reference is generally made in defendants' written argument. An assignment of error constitutes appellants' pleading in the appellate court. 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1217, page 34. Each error must be separately and distinctly stated. Rule 344(a) (3), R.C.P.; Allerton-Clio-Lineville Com. S. D. v. County Bd. of Ed., 258 Iowa 846, 140 N.W.2d 722, 723; Parks v. Brown, Alaska, 368 P.2d 220; 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1260(c), page 112; and 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, section 694, page 139. Under no circumstances could the various matters here apparently involved be resolved with any reasonable degree of certainty. See Keefe v. Price, (Not contained in Iowa Reports), 282 N.W. 309, 311-312, and Luther v. National Inv. Co., 222 Iowa 305, 317, 268 N.W. 589. We accord no recognition to this alleged assignment.