Opinion ID: 803385
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Opportunity to Challenge

Text: Furthermore, the proposition that the ALJ was required to inquire into Brault’s objection, whether or not the ALJ discussed it on the record, is dubious. Currently, such a “duty to inquire” exists only in the Seventh Circuit. In Donahue, the Seventh Circuit drew inspiration from Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert. See 279 F.3d at 446. While recognizing that Rule 702 does not apply in disability proceedings, the court held that the spirit of Rule 702 did. In that court’s view, “the idea that experts should use reliable methods . . . plays a role in the administrative process because every decision must be supported by substantial evidence,” and thus evidence is per se not substantial if “vital testimony has been conjured out of whole cloth.” Donahue, 279 F.3d at 446. Therefore in the Seventh Circuit, if the basis of a vocational expert’s conclusions is questioned, “the ALJ should make an inquiry 8 (similar though not necessarily identical to that of Rule 702) to find out whether the purported expert’s conclusions are reliable.” Id. McKinnie built upon this precedent by requiring that a VE make his or her data “available on demand” if it is challenged. 368 F.3d at 911. Lawrence reemphasized the rule of McKinnie but explained that the failure to provide data is subject to harmless error review. See 337 F. App’x at 586. The Donahue rule, however, has not been a popular export. See Babb v. Astrue, 2:10CV-49-DBH, 2010 WL 5465839, at  (D. Me. Dec. 29, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, CIV. 10-49-P-H, 2011 WL 672438 (D. Me. Feb. 16, 2011) (disagreeing with Donahue); Pritchett v. Astrue, No. 5:09-CV-144 (CAR), 2009 WL 4730326, at - (M.D. Ga. Dec. 4, 2009) (same); Masters v. Astrue, No. 07-123-JBC, 2008 WL 4082965, at  n.8 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 29, 2008) (same). And the Ninth Circuit’s Bayliss decision, while not explicitly rejecting Donahue, reached a conclusion necessarily in conflict with it. See 427 F.3d at 1218 (“A VE’s recognized expertise provides the necessary foundation for his or her testimony. Thus, no additional foundation is required.”). In fact, no court outside the Seventh Circuit has agreed with Donahue and its offspring. And there appear to be good reasons to question Donahue’s approach. Donahue relied heavily on the principles, if not the actual authority, of Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert, 509 U.S. 579. See Donahue, 279 F.3d at 446. But Congress has provided, quite clearly, that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in Social Security proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (“Evidence may be received at any hearing before the Commissioner of Social Security even though inadmissible under rules of evidence applicable to court procedure.”); see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1971) (“[S]trict rules of evidence, applicable in the courtroom, are not to operate at social security hearings . . . . [A]dministrative procedure, and these hearings, should 9 be understandable to the layman claimant, should not necessarily be stiff and comfortable only for the trained attorney, and should be liberal and not strict in tone and operation. This is the obvious intent of Congress so long as the procedures are fundamentally fair.”). It is unclear, therefore, why the Seventh Circuit would acknowledge in Donahue that ALJs are not bound by the Rules of Evidence, but then turn around and require ALJs to hew so closely to Daubert’s principles. It is also unclear, given our standard of review, why a Daubert-like hearing is even useful. As deferential as the “substantial evidence” standard is, it is also extremely flexible. It gives federal courts the freedom to take a case-specific, comprehensive view of the administrative proceedings, weighing all the evidence to determine whether it was “substantial.” Other federal courts have proven the validity of this approach—while declining to impose a strict Daubert rule, reviewing the entirety of a VE’s testimony, including the expert’s methods, to make sure it rose to the level of “substantial” evidence. See, e.g., Palmer v. Astrue, No. 1:10CV-151-JGM, 2011 WL 3881024, at  (D. Vt. Sept. 2, 2011). Galiotti v. Astrue, 266 F. App’x 66 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order), while nonprecedential, makes the same point.5 There, the claimant challenged the credibility of a VE’s testimony because the expert was unable to fully explain how he arrived at the number of certain jobs in the economy. Id. We explained that the VE, while not providing the specific information the claimant wanted, “identified the sources he generally consulted to determine such figures.” Id. We also noted the marked absence of any “applicable regulation or decision of this Court requiring a vocational expert to identify with greater specificity the source of his figures or to 5 We are, of course, permitted to consider summary orders for their persuasive value, and often draw guidance from them in later cases. See United States v. Payne, 591 F.3d 46, 58 (2d Cir. 2010). 10 provide supporting documentation.” Id. We thus affirmed, not on any Daubert basis, but instead on typical “substantial evidence” grounds. We do the same here.6
Yet, although we harbor doubts about the Seventh Circuit’s approach, the extent to which an ALJ must test a VE’s testimony is best left for another day and a closer case. We do not hold that an ALJ never need question reliability, and we agree with the Seventh Circuit that evidence cannot be substantial if it is “conjured out of whole cloth.” See Donahue, 279 F.3d at 446. There is no need to fully resolve the matter now, however, because, assuming arguendo Brault had a right to have the ALJ consider his challenge to the VE, that is exactly what the ALJ did. At the beginning of the hearing, the ALJ asked the VE to affirm that he would impartially evaluate the vocational evidence, and that, in the event of conflict between his testimony and the DOT, he would advise the ALJ “of the differences and the basis for [his] opinion.” The ALJ also identified a specific issue in Brault’s case where such a conflict might arise. Further, the ALJ sought and received a stipulation from Brault’s counsel regarding the VE’s expertise and 6 For the same reason, we reject Brault’s argument that the ALJ erred by allowing the VE to provide employment numbers that might have included part-time positions (he offers no proof at all that the VE’s numbers actually included such positions). We decline to create a per se rule prohibiting an ALJ from considering part-time positions. See Liskowitz v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736, 745 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A] VE may . . . testify as to the numbers of jobs that a claimant can perform without specifically identifying the percentage of those jobs that are part-time.”). The ALJ did not need to find specific numbers of jobs—all he was required to do was find that “substantial” positions exist. There was substantial evidence supporting that finding. Brault argues Liskowitz is in conflict with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999). We disagree. See Liskowitz, 559 F.3d at 745 (“Our conclusion is not at odds with [Kelley].”). Kelley specifically declined to “confront the issue of whether part-time work, as opposed to full-time work, will prevent a claimant from being found disabled at Step Five of the sequential analysis.” 185 F.3d at 1215. And although Kelley stated in dicta that “a claimant could pass Step Five and be entitled to benefits even though capable of working on a part-time basis,” id., it never stated part-time work could never count at step five, and certainly “did not say that a VE may testify only as to the existence of full-time jobs,” Liskowitz, 559 F.3d at 745. 11 qualifications. When Brault’s counsel cross-examined the VE, he was given a full opportunity to explore the limitations of the SOC-to-DOT mapping methodology, including challenging some of the expert’s specific numbers. After cross-examination, the ALJ permitted counsel to submit briefing questioning the VE’s “flawed” process. In sum, Brault’s attorney had a full opportunity to explain his objections in significant detail. Nothing more was required.