Opinion ID: 1399686
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr. McPherson's Testimony Regarding A.R.'s Injuries

Text: Over the defense's objection, Dr. McPherson testified regarding the definition of an acute injury and the characteristics of A.R.'s injuries that led him to believe that her injuries were not acute. Two Elk argues that there was no indication or testimony that [Dr. McPherson's] opinion was based upon a reasonable medical certainty. [13] As in Kenyon, however, Two Elk does not appear to have challenged Dr. McPherson's expertise. See Kenyon, 481 F.3d at 1061. Rather, Two Elk suggests that the district court must ensure that everything a medical expert says on the stand is individually supported by reasonable medical certainty. In support, Two Elk cites Graham v. Ozark Mountain Sightseeing, Inc., 181 F.3d 924, 926 (8th Cir.1999), for the propositions that medical experts ... must testify to a reasonable medical certainty and that [e]xpert testimony that defendants `probably' or `likely' caused the harm is insufficient.... Two Elk's reliance on Graham is misplaced. In Graham, the court addressed expert testimony offered to prove an element of a state tort cause of action. Id. In that particular situation, Erie compelled that Rule 702which generally is a procedural ruleyield to a state substantive rule requiring medical experts to testify to a reasonable medical certainty regarding causation. Cf. id. (citing Missouri case-law). In the federal criminal context we confront here, however, the Larson rule (which is derived from Rule 702 and Daubert ) applies. And there is little doubt that Dr. McPherson's testimony was reliable under Larson. Dr. McPherson explored the difficulties inherent in assessing how acute A.R.'s injuries were, but concluded that they were not acute. [14] As the district court determined, this testimony was likely to assist the trier of fact. At that point, it was up to the opposing party to examine the factual basis for the opinion in cross-examination. Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 481 F.3d 619, 627 (8th Cir.2007) (quotation omitted); cf. Kudabeck v. Kroger Co., 338 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir.2003) ([N]othing in Rule 702, Daubert, or its progeny requires that an expert resolve an ultimate issue of fact to a scientific absolute in order to be admissible. (quotation omitted)). Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony; it follows that the court did not plainly err in doing so either.