Opinion ID: 2330840
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Prosecutorial MisconductStandard of Review

Text: [¶ 29] Our standard of review of claims of prosecutorial misconduct is well settled: Where there has been an objection below, claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed under a harmless error standard. W.R.A.P. 9.04 states that any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded by the reviewing court. Seymore v. State, 2007 WY 32, ¶ 17, 152 P.3d 401, 406 (Wyo.2007). W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and W.R.E. 103(a) contain similar provisions. The test for harmless error is as follows: An error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred. To demonstrate harmful error, the defendant must show prejudice under circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play. Condra v. State, 2004 WY 131, ¶ 7, 100 P.3d 386, 389 (Wyo.2004) (quoting Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 10, 63 P.3d 875, 881 (Wyo. 2003)). [¶ 30] We decide claims of prosecutorial misconduct by reference to the entire record, and where the claim is one of improper argument, we consider it in the context of the entire argument. Law v. State, 2004 WY 111, ¶ 30, 98 P.3d 181, 191 (Wyo.2004). We are reluctant to find plain error in a closing argument lest the trial court becomes required to control argument because opposing counsel does not object. Belden v. State, 2003 WY 89, ¶ 38, 73 P.3d 1041, 1087 (Wyo.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1165, 124 S.Ct. 1179, 157 L.Ed.2d 1212 (2004) (quoting James v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 207 (Wyo. 1994)). The question is whether, based on the entire record, a reasonable possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the accused. Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, ¶ 56, 98 P.3d 143, 157 (Wyo. 2004). The burden of establishing prosecutorial misconduct rests upon the appellant who raises the issue. Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 32, 43 P.3d 80, 94 (Wyo.2002); Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 38, 123 P.3d 543, 554 (Wyo.2005). [¶ 31] Jones identifies four alleged acts of prosecutorial misconduct, the cumulative effect of which allegedly denied him a fair trial: 1. During voir dire, the prosecutor attempted to define reasonable doubt. He told the jury that the judge would define reasonable doubt. He also indicated that reasonable doubt was not beyond all doubt but only beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones argues that the prosecutor was incorrect in saying that the judge would define the term and furthermore that the prosecutor minimized the State's burden of proof. 2. The second alleged error is that the prosecutor stated that the presumption of innocence does not mean Jones is presumed innocent and that evidence would take the presumption away. Jones objected, contending that it was improper for the prosecutor to vouch for the credibility of the State's evidence. 3. Jones also argues that the prosecutor preconditioned the jury to be more sympathetic to inconsistencies between eye witnesses during voir dire in violation of W.R.Cr.P. 24 stating that is the reason that we have trials when all witnesses do not agree. 4. The prosecutor improperly used rebuttal in his closing to develop a new argument. Jones objected to the comment of a neighbor who said nothing about there being something in Jones' hands when he and Bell ran away and that their laughing as they ran off was cold and callous. The same neighbor also saw Jones and Bell flee the wreckage of the van. [¶ 32] In Seymore, ¶ 19, 152 P.3d at 410 we noted: [A]ppellant contends that, even if this Court finds each instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct to have been individually non-prejudicial, the doctrine of cumulative error requires reversal. See Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 93, ¶¶ 30-31, 74 P.3d 699, 711-12 (Wyo.2003) (the doctrine is, indeed, an available tool to address prosecutorial excess). Cumulative error is defined at Black's Law Dictionary 582 (8th ed. 2004) as follows: The prejudicial effect of two or more trial errors that may have been harmless individually. The cumulative effect of multiple harmless errors may amount to reversible error. This Court has considered cumulative error innumerable times. See, e.g., Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 342 (Wyo.1995). Seldom, however, have we reversed a conviction based upon the doctrine. See, e.g., Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 743 (Wyo. 1986); and Browder v. State, 639 P.2d 889, 895 (Wyo.1982). [¶ 33] In Dysthe we state that [T]he propriety of any comment within a closing argument is measured in the context of the entire argument.... [R]eversal is not warranted unless a reasonable probability exists, absent the error, that the appellant may have enjoyed a more favorable verdict. Id., ¶ 22, 63 P.3d at 884 (citing Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 542 (Wyo.2000)). With the above standards in mind, we turn to this case. [¶ 34] After a thorough review of the record, we considered each instance of alleged misconduct both singularly and cumulatively. Jones' first instance of alleged error, which we reviewed for plain error, does not meet the standard. Jones argues that the prosecutor was incorrect in saying that the judge would define the term reasonable doubt and that by doing so, the prosecutor minimized the State's burden of proof. However, the judge never attempted to define reasonable doubt, and furthermore, Jones' argument ignores that the instructions actually given to the jury correctly placed the proper burden upon the prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury is presumed to have followed those instructions. See Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1177 (Wyo.1998). [¶ 35] Jones' second claim is that the prosecutor's comments regarding the presumption of innocence created a strong possibility that the jurors [began] the trial with preconceived notions that [Jones] is guilty. After reviewing the record, we agree with the State that Jones' argument relies on selected portions of the prosecutor's comments which, out of context, suggest a different meaning conveyed when looking at the same comments in context. Moreover, any impropriety was corrected by the district court's instruction to the jury regarding the presumption of innocence, an instruction not contested by the defense. [¶ 36] In his third claim, which is reviewed for plain error because no objection was lodged at trial, Jones argues that during voir dire, the prosecutor improperly commented on inconsistences in the eyewitness testimony that the jury would hear. However, after reviewing the colloquy that occurred during trial, we find no impropriety. The prosecutor never mentioned any particular witness by name, never suggested any witness was more credible than another, and never asked the jury to sympathize with any witness. [¶ 37] Finally, Jones argues that over his objection the prosecutor improperly developed new matters in his rebuttal closing that Jones' attorney had not previously addressed. A review of the trial transcript shows that the prosecutor was simply challenging the extensively argued theory of the case that Jones presented in closing and thus his rebuttal was proper.