Opinion ID: 2632884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Proposed Penalty Instructions

Text: Defendant proposed several special instructions to cover various aspects of his defense. Defendant cites case law requiring the court to instruct on the defense theories of the case, either where the defendant clearly relies on such defenses, or where substantial evidence exists to support them. (See People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 159, 167 Cal.Rptr. 844, 616 P.2d 826; People v. Stewart (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 140, 127 Cal.Rptr. 117, 544 P.2d 1317.) The Attorney General observes, however, that the court has no duty to give argumentative, duplicative, incomplete, or erroneous instructions. (E.g., People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 805, fn. 12, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330; People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1135-1137, 248 Cal.Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049; People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1021, 245 Cal.Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342.) As will appear, each of the proposed instructions at issue falls into one or more of these categories. 1. Death as a less severe punishment than life imprisonment without parole Defendant proposed to instruct the jury that they would violate their duties if they viewed the death penalty as a less severe penalty than life imprisonment without parole. Defendant contends this instruction would have clarified to the jurors that they could not properly consider death a more merciful option. But other sentencing instructions (see, e.g., CALJIC No. 8.88), coupled with the jurors' own common sense, clearly indicated that death was always the ultimate punishment. The proposed instruction was argumentative, duplicative, and unnecessary. 2. Considering the first degree murder and special circumstance findings Defendant proposed to instruct the jurors that they could not consider the guilty verdict and special circumstance findings as aggravating factors. The court properly refused the proposed instructions as unnecessary in light of the other instructions, and as inconsistent with CALJIC No. 8.85, which allows the jurors to consider all the evidence in the case, including the circumstances of the crime and the existence of any special circumstances found true. (See People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 581, fn. 11, 247 Cal.Rptr. 729, 754 P.2d 1306.) We observed in Siripongs that, although the jury could not properly impose the death penalty merely because the defendant had committed a murder, the jury was not instructed it could consider the crime itself, but only the circumstances surrounding the crime, as an aggravating circumstance. ( Ibid. ) Defendant also proposed an instruction barring the jurors from considering as an aggravating factor any fact used in finding defendant guilty of first degree murder, unless that fact establishes something in addition to an element of the crime. The court properly refused this instruction as unnecessary in light of an instruction actually given, which told the jurors not to consider the same facts more than once in determining the presence of aggravating factors. We find no error. 3. Defining mitigating circumstances Defendant proposed several instructions on the subject of mitigating evidence. His proposed instruction No. 12 explained that mitigating evidence could include the circumstances surrounding the defendant's crime, the defendant's background and character, and any other circumstance that extenuated the gravity of the crime, even though not a legal excuse. The proposed instruction then gave as examples of mitigating evidence the defendant's lack of sophistication or professionalism, that the defendant did not threaten witnesses, try to escape, or use force to avoid arrest, and that defendant committed several crimes within the same time period, indicating a single period of aberrant behavior. Defendant's proposed instruction No. 14 included within the category of mitigating factors any sympathetic or compassionate aspect of the defendant's background, character, or social, psychological, or medical history, whether or not related to the crimes. The proposed instruction then gave as examples such factors as whether the defendant's psychological growth and development affected his adult personality, whether he suffered from a low sense of self esteem, learning disabilities, low intellect, or brain dysfunction, whether he was subjected to cruelty as a child, and whether his family upbringing contributed to his criminal conduct. Defendant's proposed instruction No. 16 simply recited evidence showing defendant was physically abused as a child and was not treated for his hyperactivity or dental problems and that these may be considered mitigating factors. As the trial court ruled, all these instructions were flawed. These were not legitimate pinpoint instructions focusing on the defense's legal theories; they were instead improper attempts to highlight particular items of evidence. (See, e.g., People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 172-174, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357; People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 886, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15; People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 648, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160.) The court had no obligation to give an instruction containing only a partial list of mitigating factors. ( People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 678, fn. 21, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351.) The standard instructions the court gave here, including modified CALJIC No. 8.85, factor (i), adequately conveyed the full range of mitigating evidence to be considered by the jury. ( People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 173-174, 109 Cal. Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357.) 4. One mitigating factor sufficient Defendant proposed to instruct the jury that one mitigating factor alone could justify a verdict of life imprisonment without parole. As we held in prior cases, the court correctly refused the instruction. ( People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 316-317, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585;. People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1322, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221.) The other standard instructions (e.g., modified CALJIC No. 8.85, factor (i); modified CALJIC No. 8.88) amply covered the point. (See, e.g., People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 569-570, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137.) Moreover, the instruction was misleading, because it wrongly implied that at least one mitigating factor was needed to justify a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. (See People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 52, 23 Cal. Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673.) 5. No unanimity required for mitigating factor Defendant requested an instruction telling the jurors they could decide for themselves individually whether mitigating factors existed, and that unanimity was not required. We have previously considered and rejected this argument, reasoning that the standard instructions (CALJIC No. 8.88, which was also given here) adequately covered the point. ( People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 639, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302; People v. Breaux, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 314-315, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585.) The Attorney General observes that defendant declined the court's offer to instruct that no requirement exists for unanimity on any particular aggravating circumstance or mitigating circumstance. (Italics added.)