Opinion ID: 1685078
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Continued Detention After Execution of the Warrant

Text: [13] ¶ 70. After 10:30, the status quo that the Task Force sought to preserve, changed. Amerie Becker was taken into room 229. Her handcuffs were removed and she used the bathroom. When she indicated she was thirsty, she was given a plastic cup of water. Several times throughout the evening, Becker was advised that she was not under arrest. She testified that the officer told her over and over again that I was being detained, but I was not under arrest. Objectively, she never was arrested in the sense that she was taken to the police station or the jail, and she never was charged with any offense involving Cory Cramer or room 230. ¶ 71. After the warrant had been executed, Becker was given Miranda warnings and asked if she would answer questions. She was told that police were present at the motel on a drug investigation and that they had found drugs. Becker agreed to answer questions about the day's activities, which included sharing a blunt with Vorburger, and she spoke about their occasional drug use at the apartment. During this discussion, Becker consented to a search of her purse. After police advised Becker that Vorburger had told them there were marijuana stems and buds at the apartment, she consented to a search of the apartment. Becker calculated whether consent to a search would be preferable to a search warrant, which police probably could have obtained based upon her own admissions, and she made a choice. ¶ 72. Becker never refused to answer questions, never asked for an attorney, never withdrew her consent. When she was driven to her home in Fitchburg by officers, she instructed them what door to enter so as not to attract the attention of neighbors. ¶ 73. The record indicates that Becker gave her consent to search the apartment within 40 minutes of being taken into room 229 and within 20 to 30 minutes after the onset of questioning. [14] ¶ 74. A police officer can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot, even if the officer lacks probable cause. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). [15] ¶ 75. The length of an investigative detention is one of the factors to weigh in determining whether a lawful detention has escalated into an arrest. In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493 (1983), two officers stopped Royer in an airport because he fit the profile of a drug courier. They asked him for identification and his airline ticket, and when he gave them his driver's license and ticket, they took him into a police interrogation room 40 feet away for questioning. Id. at 494. They retrieved his luggage without consent, then searched his suitcases with consent and found drugs. Id. Royer's detention lasted approximately 15 minutes. Id. at 495. ¶ 76. The Supreme Court affirmed Royer's motion to suppress the drug evidence, concluding that, What had begun as a consensual inquiry in a public place had escalated into an investigatory procedure in a police interrogation room, where the police, unsatisfied with previous explanations, sought to confirm their suspicions. Id. at 503. The court noted that the officers had Royer's ticket, identification, and luggage, and that they never informed him he was free to leave. Id. It concluded that, As a practical matter, Royer was under arrest. Id. The Royer court summed up the law as follows: The predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable cause is that law enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal security of the suspect. The scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each case. This much, however, is clear: an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time. Id. at 500 (citations omitted). ¶ 77. The Royer decision was followed by two other airport cases, United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), and Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1. Sokolow appears to have neutralized some of the impact of Royer's plurality opinion as to what constitutes reasonable suspicion. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. [16] ¶ 78. All three cases are distinguishable from the facts here. First, unlike the three airport cases that involved only suspicion that the defendants were drug couriers, this case involved unquestionable evidence that someone had committed a felony. When the warrant was executed, police found approximately 14 pounds of marijuana in Cramer's room, together with a digital scale and plastic bags, evidence with all the hallmarks of major drug dealing. Second, unlike the three airport cases, this case involves a search warrant. The purpose of Becker's continued detention, after execution of the warrant, was to determine what she knew about the major felony across the hall. ¶ 79. On the one hand, Becker could have been a party to the felony, present at the motel to make a major drug purchase. On the other hand, she could have been a mere witness who could explain her presence and tell authorities what she knew about Cory Cramer. Peter Kokoros may have intended to remove all marijuana from the room when he stopped by the motel at 5:45. If he had done so, Vorburger and Becker would have had no known connection with the drugs. Police were entitled to try, in a reasonable follow-up to the search, to verify or dispel their suspicions about Becker's involvement. Becker ultimately disavowed any knowledge of the marijuana in room 230 and was never charged with any offense in connection with that room.