Opinion ID: 854693
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petitioner Fails to Meet His Burden

Text: On appeal, Gonzalez-Cervantes has not met his burden of showing the California courts have applied § 243.4(e) to conduct falling outside the generic federal definition of moral turpitude. See Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193; Ortiz-Magana, 542 F.3d at 660. Though Gonzalez-Cervantes cites three cases in arguing California has applied § 243.4(e) to conduct that did not rise to the level of “depraved, base, and vile,” in each case the defendant actually inflicted harm upon the victim with the specific intent to commit sexual abuse. See In re Shannon T., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 564 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); In re A.B., No. G043493, 2011 WL 193402 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2011); In re Carlos C., No. B233338, 2012 WL 925029 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2012). 1 The dissent contends that the BIA’s decision “does not reflect the current state of California law” because the BIA “relied solely on cases in which sexual arousal or gratification was a necessary element of a § 243.4(e) offense.” Dissent at 14. But the BIA correctly defined § 243.4(e) as “a specific intent crime that consists of touching an intimate part of another against the victim’s will, committed for the purposes of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse.” This is precisely the definition of § 243.4(e) used in all of the cases petitioner cites. See In re Shannon T., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 564, 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); In re A.B., No. G043493, 2011 W L 193402, at  (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2011); In re Carlos C., No. B233338, 2012 W L 925029, at  (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2012). As the BIA correctly stated the law as we apply it here, we do not find that the grounds supporting our opinion represent a “new theory,” nor that the BIA applied a different understanding of the statute in concluding that § 243.4(e) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. See Dissent at 14. 8 GONZALEZ-CERVANTES V . HOLDER In In re Shannon T., for instance, the minor defendant pinched the breast of the minor victim, causing her emotional distress and resulting in a significant bruise. 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 565, 567. The court found that the defendant inflicted a sexual battery under § 243.4(e) with the specific purpose of sexual abuse because he first told her, “Get off the phone. You’re my ho,” and when the victim responded, “whatever,” and walked away, the defendant pursued her, slapped her face, grabbed her arm, and pinched her breast. Id. at 566–67. In In re A.B., the court found the minor defendant committed sexual battery when he poked the center of the victim’s buttocks, penetrating about an inch. 2011 WL 193402, at . The court stressed that the term sexual abuse included conduct beyond that which caused physical injury or pain because otherwise the sexual battery statute “would permit a perpetrator to intentionally humiliate or intimidate a woman by an unwanted touching of her genitalia or breasts without violating section 243.4.” Id. at . Because the defendant laughed with his companions as he touched the victim and used derogatory language, the court found the evidence demonstrated the defendant’s purpose was sexual abuse. Id. at . Finally, in In re Carlos C., the court found there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant acted with the specific purpose to embarrass and humiliate the victim when, upon seeing two of his friends slap the victim’s rear end, he “smack[ed]” the victim’s crotch area, laughed, and ran away. 2012 WL 925029, at , 3. Based on “the act itself together with its surrounding circumstances,” the defendant had the specific intent to sexually abuse the victim when he touched her. Id. at  (quoting Shannon T., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 566). GONZALEZ-CERVANTES V . HOLDER 9 Though Gonzalez-Cervantes argues these cases show the conduct at issue did not rise to the level of “depraved, base, and vile,” in each case the defendant actually inflicted harm upon the victim by sexually abusing her. Moreover, it is precisely because the defendants in these cases had the specific intent to cause the victim psychological harm that the courts found the elements of § 243.4(e) were satisfied. Of course, specific intent alone will not render a crime morally turpitudinous if the acts at issue are “trivial,” see GaleanaMendoza v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2004)), or “mere [] provocation, bad taste, [or] failed humor,” Nunez, 594 F.3d at 1138. However, we do not find that pinching another’s breasts to the point of bruising, shoving a finger into another’s rear end, or smacking another’s crotch is easily characterized as merely provocative, in bad taste, or humor gone awry. The dissent argues that the psychological harm the victim experienced in In re Carlos C.—embarrassment and humiliation—does not constitute the type of “actual harm” required under Nunez to elevate § 243.4(e) to a crime categorically involving moral turpitude.2 Dissent at 17. But this assumes that the non-consensual touching of an intimate part itself is not an actual harm. Analyzing harm solely from a post-actus reus perspective ignores the violation that occurs 2 The dissent also asserts that “Nunez demonstrates that actual harm is not always sufficient to find that a sexual crime involved moral turpitude,” and cites two examples of indecent exposure referenced in Nunez. Dissent at 15–16. But it was precisely because these two examples involved conduct which the Court described as “relatively harmless” that the Court found the acts were not “base, vile, and depraved.” Nunez, 594 F.3d at 1138. Thus, we cannot agree that Nunez stands for the proposition the dissent asserts. 10 GONZALEZ-CERVANTES V . HOLDER during the sexual act. And only considering the severity of the psychological harm a victim may experience incorrectly focuses the inquiry on what a victim may be able to endure rather than on the morally reprehensible nature of the act itself. Sexually abusive battery necessarily inflicts actual harm on the victim.