Opinion ID: 2329816
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act

Text: The Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Statute provides as follows: (a) General rule.  In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his legal representative where such negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought but any damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff. (Emphasis supplied.) (b) Recovery against joint defendant; contribution.  Where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of his causal negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed. The plaintiff may recover the full amount of the allowed recovery from any defendant against whom the plaintiff is not barred from recovery. Any defendant who is so compelled to pay more than his percentage share may seek contribution. The appellant asserts that under the provisions of the Comparative Negligence Act, if a plaintiff's negligence is greater than that of a defendant from whom recovery is sought, the plaintiff may not recover from that defendant. The appellant faced with the language of the Act which provides that the negligence of the plaintiff is to be compared to the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought, attempts to explain away the General Assembly's inclusion of the plural defendants. Appellant argues that, the use of the plural `defendants,' is simply recognition by the Pennsylvania Legislature that actions are often brought against multiple defendants (Appellant's Brief, p. 8). We are not persuaded by appellant's argument. The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions. Statutory Construction Act of 1972, Dec. 6, No. 290 § 3, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921. In ascertaining the intent of the Legislature certain presumptions must be given appropriate recognition, among them being, that the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain. Id. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922. We must assume that the Legislature intends every word of the statute to have effect. Commonwealth v. Driscoll, 485 Pa. 99, 401 A.2d 312 (1979). To say that the use of the plural defendants is simply legislative recognition that lawsuits are often brought against more than one defendant is to ignore that construction guide. If the Legislature's use of the plural defendants is to have any meaning, then the proper construction of the statute is that the plaintiff's negligence is to be compared to the combined negligence of all defendants. To hold otherwise would be to ascribe no meaning to the plural defendants. The appellant argues that if the Legislature intended the plaintiff's negligence be compared to the negligence of all defendants it would have adopted language similar to the language of the Connecticut statute (Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann., 52-572h) which specifically provides that plaintiff's negligence will not bar recovery if it was not greater than the combined negligence of the person or persons against whom recovery is sought. We disagree with appellant. There are many ways to express the idea that plaintiff's negligence is to be compared to the total negligence of all defendants. The language used in the Connecticut statute is one way. The language of the Pennsylvania statute is another. And as we shall see infra, statutes in other jurisdictions follow the same rule with language different from both the Connecticut statute and the Pennsylvania statute. [4] The appellant asserts that the interpretation of the plural defendants it urges this court to adopt is supported by section (b) of the statute. As we have noted above, section (b) provides: Where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of his causal negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed. The plaintiff may recover the full amount of the allowed recovery from any defendant against whom the plaintiff is not barred from recovery. . . . (Emphasis supplied.) 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102. Appellant argues that the language of Section (b) distinguishes Defendants, `against whom recovery is allowed' and . . . `against whom the plaintiff is not barred from recovery,' from those [defendants] against whom the plaintiff is precluded from recovering (Appellant's Brief, p. 9). The appellant contends that Section (b) refers to a situation exactly as exists here, namely, where the plaintiff's negligence exceeds the negligence of a defendant. From this premise the appellant concludes that recovery by a plaintiff against a lesser negligent defendant is not allowed. Appellant maintains that a lesser negligent defendant is a defendant against whom the plaintiff is barred from recovering. Appellant's argument begs the question. It assumes that Section (b) is referring to a lesser negligent defendant as a defendant against whom recovery is not allowed and against whom recovery is barred. Appellant attempts to demonstrate that Section (b) refers to lesser negligent defendants by citing the language to be construed as authority for the construction it urges. [5] A more reasonable interpretation of Section (b) of the Act leads directly to the conclusion that the legislature intended that the language  all defendants against whom recovery is allowed  means all defendants found to be guilty of a portion of the negligence causing the injury and who have not settled with the plaintiff and are not immune from liability. The language  recovery from any defendant against whom the plaintiff is not barred from recovery  is reasonably interpreted to exclude recovery from defendants who have settled with plaintiff prior to verdict or who are otherwise immune from liability even if causally negligent. The appellant acknowledges that the phrases  all defendants against whom recovery is allowed  and,  against whom the plaintiff is not barred from recovery  would include a negligent defendant who is immune from liability. Appellant argues though that it is unlikely that the legislature would use such broad language to describe a narrow class of tort immune defendants. In support of its argument and to demonstrate how narrow the immune class is, the appellant points to this Court's decision in Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 433 A.2d 859 (1981) where we abolished inter-spousal immunity, and the Superior Court's opinion in Kelly v. Carborundum Company, 307 Pa.Super 361, 453 A.2d 624 (1982) aff'd 504 Pa. 238, 470 A.2d 969 (1984) which held that an employer may not be joined in a comparative negligence lawsuit for purposes of apportioning negligence. [6] The appellant chooses to lightly brush aside the fact that at the time the Comparative Negligence Act was passed (April 28, 1978, effective June 27, 1978), inter-spousal immunity was the law and there was no clear decision on whether an employer, who is statutorily immune from tort liability, could be joined to assess negligence.