Opinion ID: 2773704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the court of appeals correctly affirmed the

Text: DISTRICT COURT’S AWARD OF FEES ¶30 When reviewing an award of attorney fees under section 78B-5-825 of the Utah Code, we apply a statutorily mandated, twopart test. Matthews v. Olympus Const., L.C. (In re Olympus Const., L.C.), 2009 UT 29, ¶ 29, 215 P.3d 129. Section 78B-5-825 provides that “[i]n civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith.” “Whether a claim is without merit is a question of law and we review it for correctness.” In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 10 Cite as: 2015 UT 9 Opinion of the Court 3, ¶ 45, 86 P.3d 712 (internal quotation marks omitted) (reviewing an award of fees under the precursor to section 78B-5-825). Whether a claim was brought in good faith is a question of fact that we review for clear error. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the award of fees because it concluded that Mr. Migliore’s renewed rule 60(b) motion was without merit and brought in bad faith. We agree and affirm.4 A. Mr. Migliore’s Renewed Rule 60(b) Motion Was Without Merit ¶31 “To determine whether a claim is without merit, we look to whether it was frivolous or of little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact.” Matthews, 2009 UT 29, ¶ 30 (internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed above, the basis of Mr. Migliore’s renewed rule 60(b) motion was that the original summary judgment order was void for lack of due process. But Mr. Migliore had actual notice of Livingston’s claims against him and ample opportunity to present evidence in his defense. See supra ¶¶ 27–29. Mr. Migliore’s renewed rule 60(b) motion reflects nothing more than his disagreement with the propriety of the original summary judgment ruling. And we have already established that mistakes in the underlying proceedings are insufficient to render a judgment void. Because we conclude that there was no factual basis upon which Mr. Migliore could claim that he lacked notice or an opportunity to be heard, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that his renewed rule 60(b) motion was without merit. 4 The court of appeals has previously held that courts may not award attorney fees pursuant to section 78B-5-825 on the basis of a frivolous motion. Dahl v. Harrison, 2011 UT App 389, ¶ 42, 265 P.3d 139. Rather, it has reasoned that the “plain language of section 78B-5-825 expressly limits the award of attorney fees to situations where a party prevails with regard to an ‘action.’” Id. (noting that “‘action’ is a term of art, basically meaning a lawsuit, and a motion—an optional part of a lawsuit—clearly does not equate to an ‘action’”). Though this holding would seem to preclude an award of statutory fees for the filing of a frivolous rule 60(b) motion, Mr. Migliore did not raise such an argument below. Neither did he raise a plain error claim here. See State v. Peterson, 881 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to consider a claim when party did not argue plain error). Accordingly, we express no opinion with regard to the applicability of section 78B-5-825 to frivolous motions. 11 MIGLIORE v. LIVINGSTON FIN ., LLC Opinion of the Court B. Mr. Migliore’s Claim Was Not Brought in Good Faith ¶32 The second requirement for a statutory award of attorney fees is that the action was brought in bad faith. UTAH CODE § 78B-5- 825; In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, ¶ 48. A finding of bad faith requires “a factual determination of a party’s subjective intent.” Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315–16 (Utah 1998). To find that a party acted in bad faith, the court must conclude that at least one of the following factors existed: (i) The party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (ii) the party intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) the party intended to or acted with the knowledge that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or defraud others. Id. at 316. We will uphold a district court’s factual determination of bad faith “if there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that at least one of these three factors applies.” Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, ¶ 13, 122 P.3d 556. ¶33 The district court found that Mr. Migliore’s renewed rule 60(b) motion “was brought to hinder or delay [Livingston] in the efforts to collect” on its judgment. Mr. Migliore argues that the district court failed to make sufficient factual findings on the record to support this conclusion. But we do not require specific factual findings to support an award of fees under section 78B-5-825. See Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 316. In Valcarce, the district court found that the claim was pursued for “no other apparent reason than to harass [the opposing party] and/or to drive up the costs of litigation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Though the district court failed to make further factual findings, we affirmed its award of fees because there was evidence from which the court could have reasonably come to its conclusion. Id. ¶34 Similarly, in this case, there was evidence in the record from which the district court could have concluded that Mr. Migliore brought his renewed rule 60(b) motion for the purpose of hindering Livingston’s efforts to collect on its judgment. Mr. Migliore waited nearly two years to bring a collateral challenge to a judgment he never directly appealed. And the renewed rule 60(b) motion lacked any legal or factual basis. See supra ¶ 31. We agree with the court of appeals that an “obvious result of filing the renewed motion was to 12 Cite as: 2015 UT 9 Opinion of the Court further delay Livingston’s ongoing efforts to collect on the judgment.” Livingston Fin., LLC v. Migliore, 2013 UT App 58, ¶ 9, 299 P.3d 620. ¶35 Mr. Migliore also suggests that the district court could not infer that he brought the renewed motion to delay Livingston’s collection efforts because Livingston’s efforts were not, in fact, delayed. In particular, Mr. Migliore notes that Livingston continued to pursue collection, even after the renewed motion was filed. But Mr. Migliore’s argument misstates the applicable standard. The relevant inquiry concerns the moving party’s subjective intent to delay or hinder, not whether the party succeeded in doing so. See Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 315–16. The district court could have reasonably concluded that Mr. Migliore’s renewed motion, filed without legal merit and in light of Livingston’s active efforts to collect its judgment, was intended to delay those efforts. ¶36 On these facts, the district court’s finding of bad faith was not clearly erroneous. Because we agree that Mr. Migliore’s renewed rule 60(b) motion was without merit and because the district court’s factual finding of bad faith was supported by sufficient evidence, we hold that the court of appeals correctly affirmed the award of fees.