Opinion ID: 4541778
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the ICA err in affirming the circuit court’s

Text: judgment on the pleadings? 2. Can an individual seek circuit court review of an OIP Sunshine Law opinion under HRS § 92-12? The Law Center also filed an amicus brief with this court, presenting the following question: Is a member of the public entitled to de novo judicial review of an adverse OIP decision pursuant to HRS § 9212(c) “for the purpose of requiring compliance with or preventing violations of [the Sunshine Law?]” The Law Center provides greater detail of the legislative history of the Sunshine Law than it did in its amicus brief before the ICA. It again argues that HRS § 92-12 provides “any person” a right to review of an OIP Opinion as stated in Kauaʻi v. OIP, and that the legislature’s enactment of HRS § 92F-43, which limits an agency’s right to appeal an OIP decision, does not affect an individual’s right to appeal. Therefore, the Law Center argues that “the public is entitled to de novo judicial review of adverse OIP decisions,” as opposed to a “palpably erroneous” standard of review under HRS § 92-12 or HRS § 91-14. The Law Center alleges that requiring OIP opinions be precedent (. . . continued) Court Certified and Reserved Questions of Law, as Amended, Filed on February 24, 2016,” filed on June 16, 2016. In re OIP, SDO at 8–9. 16  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  unless palpably erroneous makes the opinion “analogous to binding arbitration for Sunshine Law appeals,” and bars the public “from any de novo judicial review of an adverse OIP decision.” In its response to the Application, OIP asserts there is no inconsistency with Kauaʻi v. OIP, as the ICA had explained why that case is distinguishable from this one. In its response to the Law Center’s amicus brief, OIP emphasizes that its opinions are purely advisory and “cannot be used to force an agency to comply” with either the Sunshine Law or the UIPA. Because of this fact, OIP argues that the public is entitled to seek “direct recourse” against the “offending agenc[y]” instead of OIP as: (1) no relief is granted by seeking an appeal of an OIP opinion, and (2) it would be contrary to judicial economy to have two separate lawsuits “when one lawsuit would suffice to address the alleged wrongdoing by the agency.” With respect to Kauaʻi v. OIP, OIP points out that the facts in that case differed, as the County of Kauaʻi had filed suit for declaratory relief to protect the release of its minutes, contrary to a decision by OIP. OIP argues that the legislature carved out “different paths to relief” for government agencies and the public, and that a suit against the offending agency is the “most efficient and expeditious means of affording relief to the public or agency violations of the Sunshine Law[.]” 17  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER