Opinion ID: 370969
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Back Pay Awards.

Text: 8 Appellant next contends that the awards of back pay were improper since neither Marks nor Johnson applied for reinstatement at the Holiday Inn. We have on numerous occasions stated that (o)nce a court has determined that a plaintiff or complaining class has sustained economic loss for a discriminatory employment practice, back pay should normally be awarded unless special circumstances are present. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Co., 494 F.2d 211, 252-53 (5th Cir. 1974); Accord, Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 575 F.2d 1374, 1391 (5th Cir. 1978); James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 357 (5th Cir. 1977), Cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034, 98 S.Ct. 767, 54 L.Ed.2d 781 (1978); Carey v. Greyhound Bus Co., 500 F.2d 1372, 1378 (5th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court has itself indicated that the trial court's authority to deny back pay is narrow: backpay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2373, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975) (footnote omitted). Appellant has cited us to no authority in this Circuit to support its position that an award of back pay is improper unless reinstatement was sought by the discharged employees. Neither has appellant suggested any special circumstances which would make an award of back pay improper in this case. 9 While the district court's decisions to award back pay was correct, we conclude that the court erred in its determination of the amount of the award. Back pay awards in Title VII suits are governed by 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g), which provides that (i)nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence . . . shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. (emphasis added). Since the district court's order merely recites the total amounts awarded to appellees, we have no way of knowing whether and to what extent interim earnings and amounts earnable with reasonable diligence were considered by the court in computing the awards. Accordingly, we remand so that the district court may hold a hearing and enter a more detailed order with respect to the amount of back pay due appellees. 10