Opinion ID: 1821559
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Representation Before PERC Constitutes the Practice of Law

Text: The difficulty inherent in defining the practice of law was noted recently, in The Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So.2d 1186, 1191 (Fla. 1978), where we reiterated the broad guidelines by which each person's conduct must be gauged: ... if the giving of such advice and performance of such services affect important rights of a person under the law, and if the reasonable protection of the rights and property of those advised and served requires that the persons giving such advice possess legal skill and a knowledge of the law greater than that possessed by the average citizen, then the giving of such advice and the performance of such services by one for another as a course of conduct constitute the practice of law. Sperry, supra, 140 So.2d at 591. The Bar contends that ULP charges affect important legal rights surrounding the management-union relationship. We agree. These are serious allegations which mandate a hearing upon the finding of a prima facie violation. Section 447.503(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1975). As a result of evidence produced at the hearing PERC may enter a cease and desist order or require positive action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay. Section 447.503(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1975). These orders are subject to appellate review in the district courts of appeal. Section 447.503(5), Florida Statutes (1975). They are enforceable by petition to the district courts which may also provide injunctive relief based on the agency action. Section 447.503(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1975). In the instant proceeding PERC in fact ordered the Board take affirmative steps and the order was affirmed by the First District Court of Appeal. School Board of Escambia County v. PERC, supra. Respondent's actions as the Board's representative affected the progress and outcome of the hearing and thus affected the Board's legal rights under Chapter 447. Next, the Bar contends that because of the applicable procedures, representatives at ULP hearings must possess legal skill and knowledge beyond that of the average citizen in order to protect a party's legal rights. This hearing was governed by the APA, chapter 120, Florida Statutes (1975). Under the provisions of the APA, where substantial interests of a party may be determined by an agency and there are disputed issues of material fact, a so-called formal proceeding is required. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1975). The Bar has detailed at great length the procedural similarities between formal administrative hearings and a civil action in the judicial system. While it is true that these proceedings are comparable to court proceedings in many ways, State ex rel. Department of General Services v. Willis, 344 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), and have been described as trial-type hearing[s], McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569, 578 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), the law is well settled that they are not actions at law in the judiciary. Canney v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, 278 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1973) (on rehearing). Furthermore, our focus must be on the character of the services rendered and acts performed rather than the nature of the agency or forum. The Florida Bar v. Sperry, supra. A cursory examination of respondent's activities reveals what appear to be the classic functions of an attorney. To some extent these actions were governed by procedures outlined in Florida's APA which ostensibly require some legal knowledge to understand and apply. See, e.g., sections 120.57(1)(b) 2a, c, Florida Statutes (1975). Nonetheless, the draftsmen of the 1974 revision of chapter 120 clearly intended to increase flexibility and informality in the administrative process by expanding public access to agency rationale and action, consistent always, however, with minimal administrative due process rights for those whose rights are affected by agency action. Reporter's Comments on the Proposed Administrative Procedure Act for the State of Florida, March 9, 1974, at pp. 3, 5. Under the APA, a party or its representative must have some knowledge of jurisdiction and supporting legal authority to file the initial notice. Section 120.57(1)(b)2b, Florida Statutes (1975). Similarly, one must be prepared to apply and interpret the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure as they relate to discovery. Section 120.58(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1975). The judicial rules of evidence may not be in full force, but the concept of hearsay must be understood as its use is limited to corroboration unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions. Section 120.58(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975). In obvious recognition of the legal nature of the processes and their ramifications, the APA itself extends authority for party representation by non-lawyers only to qualified lay representatives. Section 120.62(2), Florida Statutes (1975). Certainly it is arguable that a person need not have three years of legal education to master subjects such as jurisdiction, hearsay, and discovery for the limited purpose of representation at a formal hearing on ULP charges. A modicum of competent instruction might well lead to competent representation. This is not the situation under the facts at bar, however. Respondent was not required by any rule or regulation to demonstrate that his knowledge of these, or other legal concepts, was any greater than that of the average citizen or unique for ULP matters. Respondent does not seriously contest the fact that he represented the Board's interests in an adversary administrative proceeding. He urges us to consider other factors such as his expertise in the labor relations field and concomitant legal knowledge; the fact that all legal decisions were made by the Board's house counsel or specially hired labor law firm; and the economic impediments to requiring attorneys at these proceedings. Similarly, amici argue that trained labor relations specialists who are more familiar with the collective bargaining process and the law of the shop make better advocates in ULP proceedings than do attorneys. Amici contend that denying specialized lay representation affects constitutional rights and is economically unfeasible. It is true that mere application of the Sperry definition will not suffice. The practice of law touches upon virtually every economic and social facet of our lives today. This is especially true in the administrative arena where more and more of our rights are being determined initially. Other jurisdictions have considered the question of what constitutes the practice of law before administrative bodies. In Re: Unauthorized Practice of Law, 175 Ohio St. 149, 192 N.E.2d 54, 2 A.L.R.3d 712 (1963); Denver Bar Association v. Public Utilities Commission, 154 Colo. 273, 391 P.2d 467, 13 A.L.R.3d 799 (1964). These decisions reflect the line drawing which courts must engage in when governed by broad definitional guidelines such as ours in Sperry. One commentator's denomination of the question as controversial more than forty years ago is equally accurate today. Robinson, Appearances by Laymen in a Representative Capacity before Administrative Bodies, 5 Law and Contemp. Prob. 89, 89 (1938). These thorny questions need not trouble us, however, in light of Florida's constitutional and statutory approach to administrative agencies. At this juncture in our analysis it is sufficient to observe that the representation of a party in a contested ULP proceeding does constitute conduct which is the practice of law. We pause in analysis, however, to note two asserted constitutional bases for lay representation in ULP proceedings which must be rejected. Respondent maintains that article I, section 6 of the Florida Constitution mandates a right to lay representation. This reading goes too far. An employee's right to bargain collectively by and through a union or other labor organization is not abridged by requiring competent, responsible representation at formal hearings on ULP charges. We are not dealing with a party's right to self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Respondent admits he appeared in a representative capacity for the Board. Cf. Nicholson Supply Co. v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association, 184 So.2d 438 (Fla.2d DCA 1966) (right of self-representation does not allow non-attorney corporate officers to represent their corporation). Nor does the first amendment support a right to lay representation. [C]ollective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment... . [T]hat right would be a hollow promise if courts could deny association of workers or others the means of enabling their members to meet the costs of legal representation. United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576, 585-86, 91 S.Ct. 1076, 1082, 28 L.Ed.2d 339 (1971) (emphasis supplied). Similarly, the freedom of speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments gives [the Union] the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights. UMW of America v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22, 88 S.Ct. 353, 355, 356, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967) (emphasis supplied). Reliance on these decisions is misplaced. The Court speaks only to the employees' ability to retain legal counsel to protect constitutionally guarded rights; at no point does the Court acknowledge a right to unfettered lay representation.