Opinion ID: 3163110
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Alleged Plain Error Under Thomas

Text: To demonstrate error in the removal of a deliberating juror for cause under Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b), Spruill must show that the district court abused the considerable discretion it is accorded in this area. See United States v. Simmons, 560 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2009); cf. United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 168 (2d Cir. 2011) (according district court “broad flexibility” in handling alleged juror 17 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill misconduct, “mindful that addressing juror misconduct always presents a delicate and complex task, particularly when the misconduct arises during deliberations” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).6 Such discretion extends to decisions whether, and to what degree, to question a deliberating juror regarding circumstances that may give cause for removal. See United States v. Baker, 262 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2001). Such questioning must be pursued cautiously, however, so as not to intrude on one of the cornerstones of our jury system: preservation of the secrecy of jury deliberations. See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 618 (observing that “delicate and complex task” of investigating reports of juror misconduct or bias becomes “particularly sensitive” where court investigates allegations of juror misconduct during deliberations). Spruill’s claim that Juror 11’s removal was Thomas error ignores a critical context difference. The concern here was juror partiality or bias attributable to 6 We have observed that where a juror is the “lone holdout for acquittal” that juror’s removal must be “meticulously scrutinized.” United States v. Hernandez, 862 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1988); accord United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 624–25. But even in such cases, what the removal is scrutinized for is abuse of discretion. See United States v. Baker, 262 F.3d 124, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying abuse of discretion standard in rejecting Thomas challenge to apparent holdout juror). 18 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill an extrinsic cause: the juror’s employment experience. In Thomas, the concern was possible juror nullification, i.e., a purposeful refusal to consider the evidence and the court’s instructions on the law in reaching a verdict. See id. at 614. Thomas stated that “a juror who intends to nullify the applicable law is no less subject to dismissal than is a juror who disregards the court’s instructions due to an event or relationship that renders him biased or otherwise unable to render a fair and impartial verdict.” Id. At the same time, Thomas recognized that where “no allegedly prejudicial event or relationship” is at issue, id. at 621, juror disregard of the law is “a particularly difficult allegation to prove and one for which an effort to act in good faith may easily be mistaken,” id. at 618. Thus, a court presented with a claim of nullification during deliberations confronts a serious dilemma. Without an adequate inquiry, the court may remove a juror who is simply unpersuaded by the Government’s case, which would deny the defendant his right to a unanimous verdict. See id. at 621. But to conduct such an inquiry of a deliberating juror suspected of nullification necessarily gives rise to an “especially pronounced” conflict between a trial court’s “duty to dismiss jurors for misconduct” and its duty to “safeguard[] the secrecy of jury 19 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill deliberations.” Id. at 618. It was to balance these concerns properly that Thomas pronounced a strict limitation on the removal of a deliberating juror “in any case where the juror allegedly reuses to follow the law”: “if the record evidence discloses any possibility that the request to discharge stems from the juror’s view of the sufficiency of the government’s evidence, the court must deny the request.” Id. at 621–22 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).7 It was because the record in Thomas admitted such a possibility that we concluded that the district court erroneously removed the juror. See id. at 624. 7 The first quotation belies our dissenting colleague’s assertion that “[n]othing in Thomas . . . suggests that the ‘any possibility’ standard applies only in the juror nullification context.” Dissenting Op., post at [4]. Indeed, Thomas makes the point again in pronouncing the standard “an imperfect rule” that, while “leav[ing] open the possibility that jurors will engage in irresponsible activity . . . outside the court’s power to investigate or correct,” nevertheless serves a system of justice where “the judge’s duty and authority to prevent nullification and the need for jury secrecy co‐exist uneasily.” United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 622 (emphasis added). The Thomas footnote cited by the dissent itself makes clear that nullification is the concern of the any possibility rule: “Accordingly, if the record raises any possibility that the juror’s views on the merits of the case, rather than a purposeful intent to disregard the court’s instructions, underlay the request that he be discharged, the juror must not be dismissed.” United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 622 n.11 (emphasis omitted and emphasis added). 20 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill Thomas itself recognized that where concerns as to a deliberating juror’s continued ability to serve arise in a context other than nullification—for example, juror unavailability or incapacitation—its strict “any possibility” rule is not required because a trial judge can “conduct a thorough examination of the basis for removal” and “make appropriate findings of fact,” including juror credibility, “without any inquiry into the juror’s thoughts on the merits of the case.” Id. at 620 (emphasis in original). Thomas observed that “[t]he need to protect the secrecy of jury deliberations begins to limit the investigatory powers where the asserted basis for a deliberating juror’s possible dismissal is the juror’s alleged bias or partiality in joining or not joining the views of his colleagues.” Id. at 620– 21 (emphasis added). But Thomas did not apply the “any possibility” rule to all such claims. Rather it recognized that where the claimed bias or partiality is attributable to an extrinsic event, a judge might well be able to determine its prejudicial likelihood “without intrusion into the deliberative process.” Id. at 621; see United States v. Egbuniwe, 969 F.2d 757, 762–63 (9th Cir. 1992) (cited approvingly in Thomas) (upholding removal of deliberating juror whose girlfriend had been arrested and mistreated by police); United States v. Ruggiero, 21 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill 928 F.2d 1289, 1300 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding dismissal of deliberating juror subjected to intimidation by two men in driveway); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1186–87 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding dismissal of deliberating juror whose daughter received threatening phone call). In short, by contrast to cases of alleged nullification, where “the judge may well have no means of investigating the allegation without unduly breaching the secrecy of deliberations,” in cases of possible bias from extrinsic factors, “the presiding judge can make appropriate findings and establish whether a juror is biased or otherwise unable to serve without delving into the reasons underlying the juror’s views on the merits of the case [because] an event or relationship itself becomes the subject of investigation.” United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 621. Thus Thomas mandated its “any possibility” rule in the former circumstance but not in the latter. See id. at 623 (stating that it adopted rule in nullification context because where “duty and authority to prevent defiant disregard of the law or evidence comes into conflict with the principle of secret jury deliberations, we are compelled to err in favor of the lesser of two evils—protecting the secrecy of 22 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill jury deliberations at the expense of possibly allowing irresponsible juror activity”). Since Thomas was decided, this court has reiterated that its strict “any possibility” rule does not reach beyond nullification to other forms of juror misconduct. Notably, in United States v. Baker, 262 F.3d at 131–32, we identified a “subtle, but important,” distinction between a juror “determin[ed] to vote without regard to the evidence” and a juror who admittedly “refused to participate in deliberations as required by her obligations as a juror,” such that the “stringent rule announced in Thomas” applied in the former circumstance but not in the latter. See id. (explaining that “stringent rule announced in Thomas . . . is based on the difficulty in detecting the difference between a juror’s illegal act of nullification . . . and the juror’s failure to be convinced of the defendant’s guilt”; where “juror refused to participate in deliberations as required by her obligations as a juror, the rule of Thomas does not apply . . .”). Thus, we held that the district court acted within its discretion in removing a juror who had “improperly made up her mind prior to the beginning of 23 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill deliberations and refused to engage in deliberations with the other jurors.” Id. at 130. Our sister circuits also have recognized that the Thomas rule does not apply where a district court can safely distinguish between instances of actual juror misconduct and a juror’s views on the merits, such as in cases involving partiality or bias that can be assessed without reference to the jury’s deliberations. See United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1087 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing between allegations that go to “quality and coherence” of juror’s views on merits, which require strict Thomas‐based standard of dismissal, and questions of juror bias or competence that focus on some identifiable event or relationship, which do not demand strict standard); see also United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 303 n.25 (3d Cir. 2007) (observing that strict no‐reasonable‐ possibility rule does not apply in “many instances” of alleged juror bias where district court can “focus on the existence of a particular act that gives rise to the bias”). Applying these principles here, we observe that even if the record suggests that Juror 11 was a holdout, it raises no nullification concern as in Thomas. To 24 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill the contrary, the record indicates that Juror 11 understood and accepted the duty to base a verdict on the evidence and the law, but that she herself voiced concern about her ability to perform that duty in light of an extrinsic factor: her work in the state prison system, which may have been causing a bias in favor of defendant. This is not a circumstance akin to Thomas, where an excusal inquiry necessarily risked intrusion on jury deliberations as to require application of a strict “any possibility” standard to the district court’s removal decision. Rather, it is a circumstance where the removal inquiry and decision could, and did, focus on the extrinsic matter identified. This is not to ignore the challenges confronting the district court in making a decision to excuse Juror 11. As the able trial judge recognized, initially the juror herself was not clear as to whether she was, in fact, operating under an actual bias favoring defendant, or whether she simply possessed a conscientious view of the evidence at odds with her fellow jurors. See App. 539 (observing that Juror 11 either “has a conscientious view that differs from everybody else or she’s having difficulty deliberating as she would wish to do because of what might be thought of as sympathy for Mr. Spruill”). Compare id. at 536 (stating, 25 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill in jury note, that “I had concerns during jury selection about being in a position where I have involvement with similar cases when working with individuals with similar charges,” and that “[a]fter hearing deliberations, I’m finding my ‘gut feeling’ is potentially creating a bias”), with id. at 542 (“I’m trying to look at the evidence and trying to make a decision on all that, and I feel like in some ways I kind of am.”). Judge Chatigny, however, was careful to resolve that ambiguity with minimal inquiry of the juror, and certainly without any inquiry into the juror’s views of the evidence. Cf. United States v. Baker, 262 F.3d at 132 (observing, in upholding dismissal of deliberating juror, that “it is often difficult to steer such interviews clear of revealing the jurors’ views”). He commendably afforded the juror additional time to consider for herself whether she was “able to be a fair and impartial judge of the case or whether it’s really not a suitable case for you given the work that you do.” App. 547; see generally United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 202–03 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is important that a juror who has expressed doubts about his or her impartiality also unambiguously assure the district court, in the face of these doubts, of her willingness to exert truly best 26 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill efforts to decide the case without reference to the predispositions and based solely on the evidence presented at trial.” (emphasis in original)). Moreover, he ensured that the juror would feel no pressure to make a hasty decision, emphasizing that she should not be concerned with the amount of time needed or any possible inconvenience. See App. 546–47. After taking some time, Juror 11 reported to Judge Chatigny that she was having “some difficulty in making a decision on a verdict based on feelings of sensitivity toward individuals who have similar cases to Mr. Spruill.” Id. at 617 (emphasis added). On this record, and with no intrusion whatsoever on jury deliberations, the district court was able to determine—and both prosecution and defense counsel agreed—that Juror 11 needed to be removed for extrinsic bias. These circumstances are thus distinguishable from Thomas, and not controlled by its “any possibility” rule. See United States v. Baker, 262 F.3d at 131–32. Accordingly, Spruill cannot show error, let alone plain error, in the dismissal of Juror 11. See generally United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d at 1300 (observing that appellate court “would be rash indeed to second guess the conclusion of the experienced trial judge, based in large measure upon personal 27 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill observations that cannot be captured on a paper record, that [the juror] was disabled by fear from continuing to participate in the jury’s deliberations”); see also United States v. Baker, 262 F.3d at 129, 131 (upholding dismissal where record indicated deliberating juror was not removed for “nonconforming view of the evidence,” notwithstanding her insistence that views were “based on the evidence”). In any event, Spruill confronts an even higher hurdle than plain error, because, as we explain in the next section, his challenge to Juror 11’s removal is precluded by waiver. B. Spruill’s Waiver of Any Challenge to Inquiry and Removal of Juror 11 Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), this court has discretion to correct errors that were forfeited because not timely raised in the district court, but no such discretion applies when there has been true waiver. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–34 (1993); United States v. Kon Yu‐Leung, 51 F.3d 1116, 1121 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that “forfeiture does not preclude appellate consideration of a claim in the presence of plain error, whereas waiver necessarily ‘extinguishes’ the claim altogether”). Forfeiture occurs when a defendant, in most instances due to mistake or oversight, fails to assert an 28 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill objection in the district court. See United States v. Kon Yu‐Leung, 51 F.3d at 1122 (“If a party’s failure to take an evidentiary exception is simply a matter of oversight, then such oversight qualifies as a correctable ‘forfeiture’ for the purposes of plain error analysis.”); see also United States v. Nouri, 711 F.3d 129, 138 (2d Cir. 2013) (reviewing jury instruction for plain error where defendant failed to make timely objection at trial); United States v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 42 (2d Cir. 1998) (observing that defendant’s failure to present timely argument or objection to merger issue amounted to forfeiture). By contrast, waiver can result only from a defendant’s intentional decision not to assert a right. See United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 321 n.21 (2d Cir. 2007) (defining waiver as “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right” (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 282 (2d Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Zubia‐Torres, 550 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2008) (observing that “waiver is accomplished by intent, but forfeiture comes about through neglect” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)). We here identify such intentional action by Spruill with respect to the district court’s inquiry and removal of Juror 11. 29 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill Various circumstances can manifest a defendant’s intentional relinquishment of a known right. For example, this court has recognized waiver where a party actively solicits or agrees to a course of action that he later claims was error. See, e.g., United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d at 320–22 (stating that defendants who solicited and agreed to erroneous jury instruction that, if death penalty were not imposed, life imprisonment was mandated, could not later claim that imposition of life sentence was plain error); United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1561 (2d Cir. 1991) (concluding that defendant who welcomed admission of evidence relating to gang membership waived right to appeal admission of that evidence); see also United States v. Teague, 443 F.3d 1310, 1316 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that when defendant, through counsel, proposed and agreed to conditions of supervised release, defendant could not later appeal conditions). We have identified waiver where a party asserts, but subsequently withdraws, an objection in the district court. See, e.g., United States v. Weiss, 930 F.2d 185, 198 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that defendant who withdrew objection to exclusion of documents waived right to appeal exclusion); see also United States v. Zubia‐Torres, 550 F.3d at 1205 (“We typically find waiver in cases where . . . a 30 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill party attempts to reassert an argument that it previously raised and abandoned below.”); United States v. Denkins, 367 F.3d 537, 543–44 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that defendant waived any competency challenge to guilty plea where counsel secured competency evaluation but later abandoned competency argument and withdrew any previous objections). We have also recognized waiver where a party makes a “tactical decision” not to raise an objection. United States v. Kon Yu‐Leung, 51 F.3d at 1122–23 (holding that, where defendant objects to certain evidence as irrelevant and prejudicial but opts, as tactical matter, not to object to other evidence, such inaction “constitutes a true ‘waiver,’ which will negate even plain error review”); accord United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d at 321. In each of these circumstances, the record has supported the critical determination that the defendant, through counsel, acted intentionally in pursuing, or not pursuing, a particular course of action.8 8 Judge Pooler observes that Spruill did not personally waive any objection to the removal of Juror 11. See Dissenting Op., post at [10]. To be sure, personal waiver is required for certain rights; a defendant “has the ultimate authority to determine whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.” Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). But while “there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive 31 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill The record in this case convincingly demonstrates that Spruill, through counsel, also acted intentionally when he affirmatively agreed to and, at times, even recommended the actions he now challenges with respect to the removal of Juror 11. Thus, his Thomas argument is not simply forfeited without plain error, but waived. From the start of trial, and long before jury deliberations commenced, Spruill was aware that Juror 11’s employment might affect her jury service. Indeed, during voir dire, Spruill initially exercised, but then withdrew, a peremptory challenge to Juror 11 based on concern that she might be “jaded” because of her work. App. 116. Thus, when, during jury deliberations, Juror 11 expressed concern about a possible conflict based on her work, Spruill without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer has—and must have—full authority to manage the conduct of the trial. The adversary process could not function effectively if every tactical decision required client approval.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417–18 (1988) (footnote omitted). Spruill has nowhere argued that his consent to the removal of a deliberating juror had to be personal rather than through counsel to foreclose a challenge on appeal. Nor has the dissent cited any authority supporting that conclusion. As the cited cases show, most waivers are effected through counsel. And as we observe infra at [37–39], a defendant who thinks his attorney’s waiver of a point was unreasonable and prejudicial may have a Sixth Amendment claim for ineffective representation. 32 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill specifically urged the district court to undertake the very inquiry of Juror 11 that he now challenges. I think the Court would need to inquire of her whether she can set aside the bias and deliberate, and I suppose also the nature of the bias so that we can know if it’s something that is truly a bias in terms of jury deliberations. . . . I think the Court needs to inquire of her individually. Id. at 537–38. A colloquy ensued in which the district court remarked that it was “reasonable to infer that the jury has taken a vote on the merits and Juror 11 is alone in opposing the other jurors,” either because she had a “conscientious view that differs from everybody else” or because “she’s having difficulty deliberating as she would wish to do because of what might be thought of as sympathy for Mr. Spruill.” Id. at 538–39. Even after hearing these observations—which anticipate the argument he makes on appeal—Spruill expressed only support for, not opposition to, the district court’s questioning of Juror 11. Notably, when Judge Chatigny advised the parties that he wished, “with your consent,” to inquire further of Juror 11, Spruill’s counsel provided that consent: “Yes, Your Honor, thank you.” Id. at 540. At this juncture, Spruill could have objected to the inquiry he now challenges. His decision not to object, but rather to 33 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill encourage further inquiry, was an intentional, tactical decision that we deem a true waiver of any Thomas challenge to the inquiry. Our conclusion is only reinforced by Spruill’s subsequent actions. For example, rather than argue that Juror 11 should not have been questioned, Spruill’s counsel indicated agreement both with how the court conducted its minimal inquiry, and with its suggestion that Juror 11 take more time to consider her ability to deliberate fairly and impartially. When specifically asked if Spruill had “[a]ny objection to anything that happened just now,” defense counsel replied, “No, Your Honor,” and stated, “I think we just need to give her a few minutes . . . . [W]e just have to recess and . . . be nearby . . . .” Id. at 548. Most important, when Juror 11 sent her next note expressing “difficulty in making a decision on a verdict based on feelings of sensitivity toward individuals who have similar cases to Mr. Spruill” and proposing that she be excused, id. at 549, Spruill voiced no objection but, rather, agreed that the juror needed to be excused: “The Court: Are you [a]greed that I need to excuse her? Mr. Weingast: Yes, Your Honor,” id. at 550. 34 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill In sum, the record reveals that (1) from voir dire forward, Spruill recognized Juror 11’s potential work‐related bias; (2) when, during deliberations, juror notes were ambiguous as to the reason jurors could not reach a verdict, Spruill encouraged further instructions, specifically agreeing to the district court’s “conscientious view” and “conflict of interest” instructions; (3) when Juror 11 herself expressed a conflict concern, Spruill encouraged and agreed to a district‐court inquiry as to the nature and extent of any bias; (4) when, upon such inquiry, Juror 11 expressed uncertainty about her ability to deliberate fairly and impartially, Spruill supported the court’s decision to give the juror time to consider the matter further; and (5) when Juror 11 reported that it may be best to excuse her—because she would have difficulty returning a verdict, due to sensitivity toward persons with similar cases—Spruill’s counsel agreed that she should be excused. Indeed, after Juror 11 was replaced and the jury was instructed to begin its deliberations anew, Spruill’s counsel affirmed that he did not object “to anything that ha[d] transpired.” Id. at 554.9 9 Judge Pooler observes that Spruill challenges Juror 11’s removal, not her questioning, on appeal. See Dissenting Op., post at [5]. Nevertheless, to the 35 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill This record plainly demonstrates that Spruill’s counsel did not “fall asleep at the wheel” with respect to the inquiry or dismissal of Juror 11. United States v. Kon Yu‐Leung, 51 F.3d at 1123. Rather, he actively engaged in the matter and agreed to every action taken by the district court. These intentional actions manifest true waiver of any challenge to the district court’s inquiry and removal of Juror 11. See United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d at 320–23. In urging otherwise, Spruill maintains that his trial counsel’s actions were not a permissible “tactical decision” and, thus, cannot demonstrate waiver. We disagree. As an initial matter, while an identifiable tactical benefit provides some evidence that the relinquishment of a right was intentional, see, e.g., id. at 320– 22, we have not made a tactical benefit a prerequisite to identifying waiver where the totality of circumstances otherwise demonstrate the requisite intentional action, see, e.g., United States v. Celaj, 649 F.3d 162, 170 n.5 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that defense counsel’s agreement to factual stipulation regarding extent waiver is a product of intent, it is appropriate to review the totality of circumstances leading to Juror 11’s removal to determine what intent is evident with respect to removal. See Grayton v. Ercole, 691 F.3d 165, 174–78 (2d Cir. 2012) (examining record as whole to find defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights implicitly waived). 36 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill interstate commerce element of offense waived sufficiency challenge, without identifying tactical benefit of action). In any event, we cannot foreclose a tactical motivation for counsel’s actions regarding Juror 11. Counsel may initially have thought that further inquiry would resolve tension between the first two notes in a way that would secure his client a mistrial. Thereafter, upon observing Juror 11 firsthand and hearing her repeated equivocal responses and uncertainty as to whether she could proceed impartially, counsel may have thought the juror more likely to succumb to the views of other jurors than to maintain an opposing view and, in those circumstances, thought it better to substitute the first alternate and begin deliberations anew. Or counsel may simply have recognized that the juror’s final response acknowledged an extrinsic bias that compelled removal. Whether such determinations—if, in fact, counsel’s view—were objectively reasonable can, like other attorney actions, be raised on a Sixth Amendment challenge to counsel’s representation. Cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); United States v. Best, 219 F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that counsel’s “election to forgo an unsupported argument” reflected sound trial strategy); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 701 (2002) (rejecting habeas 37 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill challenge to state court’s determination that counsel’s waiver of final argument in capital case was legitimate trial tactic); United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 310 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that counsel’s waiver of closing argument on count submitted to jury independently, “while admittedly a gamble,” was reasonable strategic choice where jury had acquitted defendant on all other counts); United States v. Jackson, 918 F.2d 236, 243 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that “counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s remark and to request a curative instruction seems consistent with a reasonable tactical decision to minimize any harm the prosecutor’s remark may have caused, by not inviting further attention to it”). Because such a challenge must generally be brought collaterally to allow adequate development of the record, see Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (recognizing that “in most cases a motion brought under § 2255 is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective assistance”), we express no conclusive view on that matter, although our rejection of Spruill’s Thomas challenge may well bear on a Sixth Amendment claim. As to waiver, we conclude only that a defense action is no less intentional, and thus, no less a “true 38 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill waiver,” merely because a defendant may subsequently claim ineffective assistance of counsel. We therefore conclude that Spruill, through counsel, having intentionally urged the questioning of Juror 11 and specifically agreed to her dismissal, waived the challenges that he now raises on appeal.