Opinion ID: 2610600
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: loaned employee

Text: The truck which ran over decedent Wise was owned and maintained by Williams Trucking Co., and the driver of the truck, defendant Sander, received his salary from Williams. Williams provided the use of the truck and driver at a flat rate of $16.00 per hour to the general contractor who had contracted with the state to build the road. The general contractor made arrangements for the site from which the road materials were to be obtained and told the drivers where to pick up the materials, where the job site was, and where and when to dump their loads. The general contractor told the drivers when they were through for the day and when they were needed the next day. The job foreman testified that it was his job to see that the plans of the state were complied with and, more particularly, to see that the trucks were operated safely on the job. He also testified that he had on previous occasions given instructions to the drivers of the trucks relative to their driving on the highway and job site. Defendant Sander testified that he felt obligated to comply with directions given him by the job foreman, particularly with respect to whether he backed his truck up on the job. Based on this factual situation, defendant Williams contends that even though Williams Trucking Co. owned the truck and paid the driver, the degree of control which the general contractor exercised over the truck and driver, especially at the jobsite, was sufficient to bring defendant Sander under the loaned servant doctrine so as to make the general contractor liable for the accident under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The issue raised here is discussed comprehensively in an annotation at 17 A.L.R. 2d 1388 entitled Liability Under Respondeat Superior Doctrine For Acts of Operator Furnished With Leased Machine or Motor Vehicle. The annotation deals at some length with the specific question of who is liable for injury or damage caused by a truck owned by one party but loaned or hired out to another and operated by an employee of the owner. There is a great variety in the treatment of the cases, depending on the particular factual situation and the policy of the particular jurisdiction. The annotation states the well-settled rule that a servant directed or permitted by his master to perform services for another may become the servant of such other in performing the services. Restatement of Agency, Second, § 227. However, as the annotation points out, it is only in certain instances that a servant's shift from the service of one master to that of another, with the accompanying shift of responsibility under the respondeat superior doctrine, occurs. The question to be answered, then, is that of what factors must be present in such instances. The key word is control, which relates to the right of control over the performance of the work to the extent of prescribing the manner in which it is to be executed. It is the right to control, rather than the actual exercise of control, that points to the one having that right as master. The existence of the relationship is generally said to be one of fact for the jury, from whose findings appellate courts will depart only in extreme cases, rather than one of law for the court. In their briefs the parties have cited three Arizona cases as authority on the loaned servant question. Those cases are Lee Moor Contracting Co. v. Blanton, 49 Ariz. 130, 65 P.2d 35 (1937); Larsen v. Arizona Brewing Co., 84 Ariz. 191, 325 P.2d 829 (1958), and Throop v. F.E. Young & Co., 94 Ariz. 146, 382 P.2d 560 (1963). The first two cases deal specifically with the loaned servant question; the third does not deal specifically with that question but does discuss in some detail the question of the degree of control which is necessary in order to hold an employer liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. As to the question of whether the issue of employment should have been submitted to the jury as a question of fact rather than being decided by the court as a question of law, we refer to Lee Moor Contracting Co. v. Blanton, supra, wherein this Court stated that: While, perhaps, there is no conflict in the evidence as to whose servant Wilson was at the time of the accident in which Blanton was injured, we think the evidence leaves this issue in so much doubt that reasonable persons might well come to different conclusions as to who had the control or right of control at the time. When such is the case its solution, under proper instructions, is for a jury. The annotators in Densby v. Bartlett, supra, 42 A.L.R. 1418, say: `Ordinarily, the relation of master and servant is left for the jury to determine under proper instructions, though, as will be observed from some of the cases, the determination of that relationship may become one for the court, where the evidence is clear and uncontradicted.  ' The evidence is not clear. The company's motion for an instructed verdict at the close of the case was properly denied. 49 Ariz. at 140-141, 65 P.2d at 39. In Larsen v. Arizona Brewing Co., supra, on the other hand, this Court held that: The trial court correctly granted Larsen Brothers' motion for a directed verdict on the first cause of action because there was no conflict in the evidence on the question of whether a master-servant relationship existed between Larsen Brothers and Eason, and as a matter of law the evidence did not establish such a relationship. 84 Ariz. at 199, 325 P.2d at 834. However, it should be kept in mind that in reaching the above conclusion, we stated that: In the instant case no one presented any evidence to the effect that Larsen Brothers exercised any control whatsoever over Eason in his performance of driving the truck from the gravel pit to the resurfacing site. 84 Ariz. at 198, 325 P.2d at 834. In the case at bar defendant Williams presented evidence to the effect that the general contractor did exercise control over defendant Sander, particularly as to his handling of the truck at the jobsite. We have found it necessary to remand this case for a new trial on the grounds stated elsewhere in this opinion. At the new trial the evidence presented on the loaned servant issue may shed additional light on the subject. At the new trial, therefore, if the evidence presented leaves the issue in so much doubt that reasonable persons might well come to different conclusions as to who had the control or right of control at the time of the accident, the issue should be submitted to the jury. If the evidence is clear and uncontradicted, the issue should be decided by the court.