Opinion ID: 2581607
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legislative Direction: Unit of Prosecution

Text: The People argue that each instance of sexual contact could constitute a separate violation of the statute, and that every distinguishable act of sexual contact constitutes an allowable unit of prosecution. The defendant, on the other hand, argues that the entire incident constituted one offense. By those two theories, the defendant could be guilty of twenty five offenses or one offense, respectively. In Woellhaf, No. 03SC664, 105 P.3d at 215, we determined that in proscribing the crime of sexual assault on a child, the general assembly did not authorize multiple punishments for each discrete act of touching. We derived that result by measuring the unit of prosecution allowed by the relevant statute, section 18-3-405. Unit of prosecution refers to the extent to which the relevant statute permits the prosecution to separate the defendant's conduct into discrete acts for purposes of prosecuting multiple offenses. Id. at 214. The statute's plain language determines its unit of prosecution. Id. at 215. As delineated by the general assembly under section 18-3-405(1), sexual assault on a child is proscribed in the following manner: Any actor who knowingly subjects another not his or her spouse to any sexual contact commits sexual assault on a child if the victim is less than fifteen years of age and the actor is at least four years older than the victim. Sexual contact is separately defined as: The knowing touching of the victim's intimate parts by the actor, or the actor's intimate parts by the victim, or the knowing touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's or actor's intimate parts if that sexual contact is for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse. § 18-3-401(4). In Woellhaf, No. 03SC664, 105 P.3d at 215, we concluded, in substance, that in punishing the crime of sexual assault on a child, the legislature only authorized a single punishment for all discrete acts of touching that occur within a single incident of sexual assault on a child. We noted that the unit of prosecution for sexual assault on a child is any sexual contact, observing that any modifies sexual contact to include a multitude of types of sexual contacts. Id. Moreover, we rejected the argument that the use of the disjunctive or in the definition of intimate parts denotes the creation of a new offense for each act of knowing touching. [3] Id. at 216. Finding the identification of categories not to be dispositive, we analogized to other statutes interpreting the use of the disjunctive or as merely specifying alternative means of committing the particular crime of sexual assault on a child. Id. at 217. Accordingly, we concluded that the plain language of the statute indicates that the act of sexual assault may be committed by several different means; in essence, each touching is not axiomatically a separate offense. Despite our conclusion to that effect, however, we made clear that the prosecution may assert multiple charges under the sexual assault on a child statute if the evidence adduced in support of each count justifies the charging of distinct offenses. Id. at 218-219.