Opinion ID: 6349520
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Right to engage in one’s chosen profession

Text: Ms. Blackford contends the district court abused its discretion when it concluded the right to engage in one’s chosen profession is not a fundamental right that would subject the PHO to strict scrutiny. As she says, the Supreme Court has stated people have a right to work in common occupations. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) (“It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the Amendment to secure.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (noting the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes “the right . . . to engage in any of the common occupations of life”).5 However, this court has explicitly held the “right to practice in [one’s] chosen profession . . . does not invoke heightened scrutiny” if subject to reasonable health and safety regulations. Guttman v. Khalsa, 669 F.3d 1101, 1118 (10th Cir. 2012); cf. Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999) (holding the “right to choose one’s field of private employment” is “subject to reasonable government regulation” but suggesting the “complete prohibition of the right to 5 Ms. Blackford also cites Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979), to support her assertion that she has a fundamental right to pursue her chosen profession. That reliance is misplaced. In Barry, the Supreme Court considered whether a regulation governing the licensure of horse trainers violated procedural due process and the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 61–62. The Court held the horse trainer’s license was a property interest that warranted a post-deprivation hearing to satisfy the procedural due process requirements. Id. at 66. The Court also concluded that the horse training regulation did not violate equal protection even though the laws treated thoroughbred and harness racing differently. Id. at 67. The Court did not conclude the horse trainer had a fundamental right to pursue his chosen profession of horse training. 12 Appellate Case: 21-2105 Document: 010110696466 Date Filed: 06/14/2022 Page: 13 engage in a calling” may be unreasonable). The district court properly relied upon this binding precedent in finding Ms. Blackford did not have a fundamental right to work unvaccinated in a hospital or congregate care facility. The district court therefore did not make a legal error and did not abuse its discretion when it concluded the PHO would not be subject to strict scrutiny even if it implicates the right to pursue a chosen profession.