Opinion ID: 2675341
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Objections to the Testimony of George Varela

Text: Codefendant Salvador Varela’s brother George was a key witness for the prosecution. Defendant contends the trial court erred in overruling two of his evidentiary objections relating to George’s testimony.
George testified that, on the day after the murder, he was driving defendant home when defendant bragged to George about how he shot Walker. George initially disbelieved defendant’s story, but changed his mind when his friend, Victor Dominguez, came up to the car and told George, “You’re riding around with a 187,” a reference to section 187, our state’s murder statute (“187”). Later, George, defendant, and Dominguez went inside defendant’s home where George heard defendant tell his father, “I had to do it. I ain’t gonna let four vatos go down for some white boy.” 62 Prior to this portion of George’s testimony, defendant had objected on hearsay grounds to the admission of Dominguez’s “187” statement. 27 After the prosecutor explained that the statement was being offered not for its truth, but to explain George’s subsequent conduct, the trial court overruled the objection and instructed the jury that “the next statement is entered only for the purpose of explaining this witness’s further action.” Defendant concedes an out-of-court statement can be admitted for the nonhearsay purpose of showing that it imparted certain information to the hearer, and that the hearer, believing such information to be true, acted in conformity with such belief. (People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 987.) The nonhearsay purpose must also be relevant to an issue in dispute. (People v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, 585; 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay § 41, p. 835; 1 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (4th ed. 2012) § 1.34, pp. 25-26 [trial judge should not sustain a hearsay objection when evidence has a relevant nonhearsay use, even if its probative value appears to be very slight].) Defendant contends George’s reaction or state of mind after hearing the “187” statement shed no light on any issue in the case and that therefore Dominguez’s statement should not have been admitted. We conclude George’s reaction to the statement was relevant to a disputed issue at trial, namely, how and why George came to be inside defendant’s home and came to hear defendant make his “four vatos” statement. Trial counsel for all four defendants treated the “four vatos” statement as one of the most incriminating pieces of evidence against defendant. That this statement was made in front of 27 Defense counsel previously had made an unsuccessful objection to the prosecutor’s reference to the “riding around with a 187” comment during the prosecutor’s opening statement. 63 several witnesses, including defendant’s own father, made it particularly important.28 The parties engaged in detailed questioning of George’s account of the sequence of events leading up to his hearing the “four vatos” statement, beginning with George’s reaction to Dominguez’s “187” comment. Much of the questioning focused on George’s prior statements. Before trial, George had been interviewed by an investigator who worked for the attorney representing George’s brother. The interview was made available to all parties before trial and was played to the jury. In the interview, George recounted that, after Dominguez made the “187” comment, George realized defendant had committed the murder. Shocked, George ordered defendant out of his car. George parked at Dominguez’s house, but became curious and walked back to defendant’s house with Dominguez. Once in defendant’s house, George and Dominguez heard defendant tell his father, “I ain’t gonna let four vatos go down for some white boy.” Defendant acknowledges Dominguez’s “187” comment might have been relevant to George’s conduct if, as recounted in the investigator’s interview, George ordered defendant out of his car after hearing it. Defendant argues the “187” statement was inadmissible because George’s account during direct examination by the prosecutor differed from his statements in the earlier interview. George testified on direct examination that he did not order defendant out of his car, and that, after he parked, he, defendant, and Dominguez went directly to 28 Defendant’s father, who had not been shown to be unavailable as a witness, was not called by the defense to refute George’s account of what defendant had said. As noted previously, the prosecutor argued at both the guilt and penalty phases that the jury could infer from the defense’s failure to call defendant’s father that his testimony would have been adverse to defendant’s position. 64 defendant’s house. During cross-examination by counsel for one of the codefendants, George said his account in the interview was the correct one. Whichever version the jury decided to credit (see Evid. Code, § 1235), George’s reaction to the “187” statement was relevant because it related to the plausibility of George’s account of the sequence of events resulting in his hearing defendant make the “four vatos” statement to defendant’s father. We conclude the trial court did not err by admitting the “187” statement for a relevant nonhearsay purpose. (See 1 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook, supra, § 1.36, p. 27.)
George twice was permitted to testify over defendant’s objection that, after hearing Dominguez’s “187” remark, George realized defendant had been telling the truth about shooting Walker rather than just making up a story. Defendant contends this testimony was “implicitly a lay opinion about Dominguez’[s] veracity,” and that “[l]ay opinion about the veracity of particular statements by another is inadmissible on that issue.” (People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 744.) As discussed above, Dominguez’s “187” statement was not admitted for its truth but to explain George’s conduct based on his reaction to the statement. That reaction, coming to believe defendant had shot Walker, and George’s subsequent conduct, were relevant to how and why George came to be present when defendant made his “four vatos” statement to his father, a sequence of events about which George was closely questioned by all parties. We conclude the “187” statement was not admitted as lay opinion supporting the truth of Dominguez’s statement. 65 D. Objections to Portions of Kimberly Speck’s Testimony Kimberly Speck testified for the prosecution regarding defendant’s actions the night of Varela’s birthday party and the statements defendant made the following day concerning the murder. Defendant objected to certain testimony by Speck that he viewed as alluding to statements Varela had made to her that incriminated defendant. Defendant contends the admission of Speck’s testimony over objection violated his Aranda/Bruton Sixth Amendment confrontation rights and state evidentiary principles concerning the admissibility of lay opinion. Alternatively, he claims the evidence should have been excluded under Evidence code section 352. 1. Background At the preliminary hearing, a police officer testified Varela had told the police that defendant was the one who shot Mark Walker. Speck testified at the same hearing that, during the morning after the shooting, Varela had told her defendant shot Walker. Before trial, defendant successfully challenged the admission of codefendant Varela’s out-of-court statements concerning the shooting, as well as the prosecutor’s proposed redacted version of Varela’s statements, on the basis that they incriminated defendant and were barred under Aranda/Bruton. The court initially gave the prosecution the choice between severing Varela’s trial from his codefendants or proceeding in a joint trial without using Varela’s statements. The court ultimately approved a third option, empanelling a separate jury for Varela. Besides hearing the evidence the jury for defendant and the other codefendants had heard, Varela’s separate jury additionally heard Varela’s out-of-court statements to the police about the shooting. On direct examination by the prosecutor, Speck testified Varela took his van’s keys and left his own birthday party with defendant. When Varela returned 66 about 10 minutes later, he looked troubled. Based on something Varela told her, she and Varela went to a donut shop the morning after the party to buy a newspaper. They were looking for a report on a particular subject. Speck found what they were looking for, an article that said police had found a car off of Palisades Drive with a dead person in the back of it. When they returned to the apartment, Varela showed defendant the article. Defendant looked at it and then said to her, in a joking tone of voice, “Can you believe they’re trying to pin this on me?” On cross-examination, Speck said that, when defendant made that remark, he also said, “Man I don’t believe it, I didn’t kill that kid.” On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked whether Speck had responded to defendant’s statements. She stated she did not remember making any response. The trial court overruled a defense objection that the question had been asked and answered. The prosecutor then asked why Speck had not responded. She answered, “Because I knew.” Defendant moved to strike that response on relevance and Evidence Code section 352 grounds. The trial court overruled the objection. Outside the presence of the jury, defendant’s counsel renewed his objection to the admissibility of the statement that Speck did not respond to defendant because she “knew.” Counsel argued admission of this statement violated Aranda/Bruton because, by implication, it referred to a statement Varela had made to Speck indicating defendant had shot the victim. Defense counsel moved to have the statement stricken from the record or, alternatively, for a mistrial. The prosecutor said his questioning sought to explain Speck’s actions in response to defendant’s statements and were not offered for their truth, and therefore did not violate Aranda/Bruton. The trial court agreed with the prosecutor, finding defense counsel’s interpretation of Speck’s “because I knew” statement unreasonable. It denied defendant’s motion to strike and motion for mistrial. 67 2. Analysis
We are not persuaded by the People’s contention that, because there was one jury for codefendant Varela and another for defendant and the other codefendants, there could be no Aranda/Bruton error based on Speck’s statement. The only difference in the evidence heard by the two juries was with regard to Varela’s outof-court statements to police concerning the shooting. Speck’s testimony was heard by both juries, and defendant contends Speck’s “I knew” statement was tantamount to her saying, “Varela told me Montes killed Walker.” However, Speck never testified to such an out-of-court statement, and her “I knew” statement was not tantamount to saying, “Varela told me Montes killed Walker.” “[A] defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when the facially incriminating confession of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only against the codefendant.” (Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200, 207.) We conclude Speck’s “I knew” statement is not facially incriminating; it does not name defendant or refer to him directly. We similarly find meritless defendant’s argument that the “I knew” statement is incriminating through inference based on Speck’s other testimony. The class of inferentially incriminating statements under Bruton is limited to “obvious” ones, “inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial.” (Gray v. Maryland (1998) 523 U.S. 185, 196.) Speck’s “I knew” statement does not fall into the class of obvious inferences defined by Gray. The most that can be inferred from Speck’s entire testimony is that, before they looked for the newspaper article, Varela told her something about defendant’s involvement in the shooting. From Speck’s testimony, the jury could not have inferred the specifics of what Varela told her 68 about defendant’s involvement or whether defendant had been the shooter. We conclude the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to strike or his motion for mistrial under Aranda/Bruton.
Defendant next contends the “I knew” statement was inadmissible because it implied Varela had told Speck defendant shot Walker and suggested she believed in the truth of Varela’s statement. Defendant contends any testimony to the effect that Speck believed in the truth of Varela’s statement was improper lay opinion. (People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 744.) The prosecutor’s question did not ask Speck to assess the truth of any previous statements Varela made to her. Instead, it sought to determine how Speck perceived and reacted to defendant’s comments about his lack of involvement in the shooting mentioned in the article. Her perception of his denial as a joking statement, rather than a credible and sincere denial, and her lack of a response were relevant to establishing that point.
Defendant additionally contends the trial court should have sustained his objection to the “I knew” statement on relevance and Evidence Code section 352 grounds. As discussed above, the statement was relevant for the purpose of explaining how Speck perceived and reacted to defendant’s comments about his lack of involvement in the shooting mentioned in the article. Her brief remark had little potential harmful effect to defendant. She did not elaborate upon how she “knew” defendant was involved. As discussed above, the trial court had excluded from defendant’s jury any evidence regarding Varela’s statement to Speck implicating defendant. As to an Evidence Code section 352 objection, a trial court’s discretionary ruling under that statute “ ‘ “must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, 69 capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. [Citations.]” ’ ” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 634-635.) We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling. E. Exclusion of Gallegos’s Statements That He Knew the Victim Defendant sought to introduce codefendant Gallegos’s statements to the police that Gallegos had known the victim and had played football with him for several years. In response to Gallegos’s objection, the trial court excluded the statements as irrelevant and, alternatively, as inadmissible under Evidence Code 352. Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Gallegos’s statements. 1. Background Defendant moved to admit Gallegos’s statements made to Detective Anderson during an interview as party statements under Evidence Code section 1220. Defendant offered the statements to show Gallegos had a motive to kill Walker to prevent him from identifying Gallegos as one of the carjackers. Pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, counsel for Gallegos sought to exclude the statements, arguing their admission would force him to disprove the statements. He said he would do so by subpoenaing people from Gallegos’s high school who would testify Gallegos and Walker went to different high schools to show Gallegos had not played football at Walker’s high school. Counsel for Gallegos added that he also would call Walker’s mother and friends to testify they did not know Gallegos. The trial court excluded Gallegos’s statements as irrelevant to motive. It found they were not admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule. It also excluded the statements under Evidence Code section 352, finding them substantially more prejudicial than probative. 70 2. Analysis Assuming Gallegos’s statements claiming acquaintance with Walker were admissible under Evidence Code section 1220 and were relevant to show Gallegos had a possible motive to kill Walker, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the statements under Evidence Code 352. Defendant has not shown that the trial court “ ‘ “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Williams, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 634-635.) Here, the court had been advised by counsel for Gallegos that, if Gallegos’s statements were admitted, he would call witnesses to testify that Gallegos did not go to Walker’s school, that Gallegos never played football on Walker’s school team, and that Gallegos was unknown to Walker’s friends and family. It was probable the excluded testimony would have necessitated an “undue consumption of time” on a collateral issue and would have created substantial danger of “confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) As Gallegos counsel’s argued, Gallegos’s statements to Detective Anderson that he knew Walker and played football with him for several years appeared to be a misguided attempt to exculpate himself in the hope he would be released by the police. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s exclusion of Gallegos’s statements under Evidence Code section 352. F. Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct “A prosecutor’s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process. Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the trial court or the jury.” (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44.) Here, we consider defendant’s claim that the prosecutor committed 71 prejudicial misconduct at the guilt phase by improperly vouching for Kimberly Speck’s testimony in closing argument. Speck testified defendant had made incriminating admissions. During crossexamination by defense counsel, Speck stated that two years before her testimony, she had been arrested for being under the influence of drugs and had agreed to attend a drug diversion program. She said she had failed to attend the program, and had failed to appear in court for a traffic citation, but that, in the week before her testimony at defendant’s trial, the prosecutor went to court with her to help her get reinstated to the drug diversion program and to help her obtain a dismissal of her traffic citation. In closing argument, defense counsel argued Speck had lied in her testimony because she received a deal from the prosecutor in these matters. In his rebuttal, the prosecutor addressed this defense argument by arguing the jury could determine Speck was not lying because she had made the same statements about defendant before she received her deal. The prosecutor also argued the disposition Speck received for her citation was what she would have received had she not failed to appear. Defense counsel objected that the prosecutor had misstated the facts and asked for an admonition. The trial court sustained the objection and said it would give an appropriate admonition at a later time. At the conclusion of the prosecutor’s rebuttal, the court gave a general admonition that arguments of the attorneys were not evidence, that jurors are the sole judges of what had been proven by the evidence, and that if their recollection of the evidence differed from what the attorneys said in argument, they should follow their own recollection. Defendant contends he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s reference to facts not in the record because the improper argument vouched for Speck’s credibility. We disagree. The trial court properly sustained defendant’s objection to the statement, and later admonished the jury to disregard the arguments of counsel if 72 not supported by the evidence. Defendant’s claim that this admonishment was too general and too removed from his specific objection is unpersuasive. In any event, the prosecutor’s argument for Speck’s credibility mainly was predicated on the fact that Speck had made the same statements incriminating defendant before and after the deal she received in her own case. We conclude there was no prejudice from the prosecutor’s brief reference to a fact outside the record. G. Discharge of Two Jurors The trial court discharged Juror No. 7 near the conclusion of the guilt phase. It discharged that juror’s replacement, Alternate Juror No. 2, after the guilty verdicts were rendered but before the penalty phase began. Defendant contends the trial court discharged the jurors without good cause and thereby violated his right to a trial by jury and to due process of law under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. “If at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or her duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefor, the court may order the juror to be discharged . . . .” (§ 1089.) Removal of a juror under section 1089 is committed to the discretion of the trial court, and we review such decisions by asking whether the grounds for such removal appear in the record as a “ ‘demonstrable reality.’ ” (People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 474; see People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 821.) 1. Juror No. 7 a. Background On September 30, 1996, midway through the guilt phase, Juror No. 7 informed the trial court he had been denied unemployment payments he had 73 expected to receive during the time he served as a juror. Outside the presence of the jury, Juror No. 7 said he wished to remain as a juror, and the trial court agreed to make scheduling accommodations the juror requested to pursue job interviews. On October 30, 1996, the bailiff informed the trial court that some jurors had reported that Juror No. 7 had been looking at flash cards during witness testimony. Questioned by the court, Juror No. 7 stated he had flash cards on medical terminology for a class in which he had an upcoming test. He claimed he had paid attention to the trial testimony and had looked at the cards only when a witness used the term “enzyme.” The court admonished him not to consult his flash cards or any other outside source of information. The prosecutor moved to excuse Juror No. 7 based on his inattention during witness testimony. Another juror, Juror V., told the court Juror No. 7 had been reviewing flash cards during over two hours of witness testimony. The trial court denied the prosecutor’s request to excuse Juror No. 7. The next day, the prosecutor renewed his concerns about Juror No. 7, stating that the juror had made loud noises and acted in a disruptive manner during witness testimony. The bailiff said Juror No. 7 was snorting and constantly moving around. The court acknowledged Juror No. 7 had exhibited some idiosyncratic behavior, and agreed to watch him more carefully. On November 4, 1996, the prosecutor again unsuccessfully moved to remove Juror No. 7 based on the flash card incident and his contention that Juror No. 7 had not taken any notes in court. On November 13, 1996, the day closing arguments began, Juror No. 7 told the court he had received an offer of employment scheduled to start five days later. When the trial court said the case could go to a penalty phase that likely would not conclude until December 6, Juror No. 7 said he had not been aware of that possibility. 74 During a recess, the trial court called the employer, who confirmed Juror No. 7 was to start training in five days. Although the employer preferred that start date, the company was willing to postpone the juror’s start date for an additional week. Counsel for defendant and the codefendants asked that Juror No. 7 remain on the jury through the guilt deliberations. The prosecutor argued Juror No. 7 should be excused because the employer’s deadline could affect the juror’s guilt phase deliberations. The trial court took the matter under submission. At a further hearing that afternoon, the prosecutor renewed his motion to remove Juror No. 7 on the grounds previously stated. The court asked Juror No. 7 whether he would suffer financial hardship from losing a week’s pay by starting his new job a week later than expected. Juror No. 7 said the delayed start was manageable, but he could not serve beyond November 25, 1996. The trial court found that good cause existed for immediately dismissing Juror No. 7, and that the November 25 employment start date would create an “atmosphere of time urgency” that would substantially impair the juror’s ability to perform his duties. The court alternatively found good cause for the dismissal based on misconduct when the juror had read the enzyme flash card, and for his perceived “inattentiveness” and “erratic and questionable behavior.” The jury subsequently rendered guilt phase verdicts on November 22, 1996. b. Analysis Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing Juror No. 7. He argues the record did not support the court’s finding that the impending employment date would affect Juror No. 7’s ability to deliberate because the court failed to question the juror further on his ability to remain fair and impartial during deliberations despite the impending employment date. However, as the trial court noted, Juror No. 7 already had stated his desire to stay on the jury until his work 75 began. Therefore, it was unnecessary to question him further regarding his subjective belief as to what effect the employment deadline would have on him. The trial court properly considered that Juror No. 7 knew the date beyond which he could no longer serve and the objective effect of that impending deadline. The court correctly recognized the impending employment date could consciously or unconsciously pressure Juror No. 7 to try to conclude the guilt phase deliberations within his time frame, and that the deadline could create an atmosphere of urgency. (See People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 632 [the trial court “ ‘should refrain from placing specific time pressure on a deliberating jury’ ”].) Regardless of Juror No. 7’s subjective intent, we are “confident that the trial court’s conclusion is manifestly supported by evidence on which the court actually relied” (People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1053), and that the grounds for the removal appear in the record as a demonstrable reality. (People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 821.) The fact that the guilt phase deliberations concluded three days before Juror No. 7 would have had to report to his new job does not call into doubt the correctness of the trial court’s ruling. At the time of the ruling, the trial court could not have known with certainty when the jury would complete its guilt phase deliberations. It properly reached its decision based on the information before it. Because we find no error in the trial court’s determination of good cause based on time pressure, we need not review the trial court’s alternative basis for the ruling based on the juror’s alleged inattentive and disruptive behavior. 2. Alternate Juror No. 2 a. Background Alternate Juror No. 2 took the place of Juror No. 7, and participated in the guilt phase deliberations and verdicts. Before the penalty phase, the bailiff 76 informed the trial court the alternate juror wished to discuss being relieved as a juror. In the presence of defense counsel and the prosecutor, the trial court discussed the matter with Alternate Juror No. 2. She stated she had been having nightmares throughout the trial but had thought she would be strong enough to complete it. She now believed she did not have the mental strength to do so. She could not get the faces of the victim and the defendants out of her mind. She had spent the previous week in bed feeling sick and depressed, and she was having trouble sleeping. Although she believed there was overwhelming evidence of guilt and she had made the right decisions in her guilt phase deliberations, she stated that she could not vote for the death penalty. The defense objected to excusing Alternate Juror No. 2, arguing it might be the evidence in the case, not personal incapacity, that led to her expressed inability to impose the death penalty. The trial court excused Alternate Juror No. 2, finding her ability to function as a juror was substantially impaired. b. Analysis Defendant contends the trial court did not question Alternate Juror No. 2 sufficiently to determine the basis of her stated inability to sentence defendant to death. He argues the record does not establish to a demonstrable reality that her stated inability to sentence defendant to death was based on an absolute inability to impose a death sentence, rather than her view, based on the guilt phase evidence, that death was not the appropriate punishment for defendant. The record does not support defendant’s argument. Alternate Juror No. 2’s description of her mental anguish was not focused on lingering doubt from her guilt phase verdict as to defendant. Rather, she mentioned being haunted by the faces of both the victim and the defendants. She believed there was overwhelming evidence supporting her guilt phase verdict, but her anguished mental state prevented her from being 77 able to impose a sentence of death. The grounds for her removal exist in the record as a demonstrable reality. (People v. Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1053.) H. Kidnapping Special Circumstance as a Lesser Included Offense The jury found true all three special circumstances alleged against defendant: murder in the commission of (1) a robbery (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(i), now subd. (a)(17)(A)); (2) a kidnapping for robbery (id., former subd. (a)(17)(ii), now subd. (a)(17)(B)); and (3) a kidnapping (ibid.). The substantive offense of simple kidnapping is a lesser included offense of kidnapping for robbery. (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 518.) Defendant contends the simple kidnapping special circumstance should be reversed because multiple convictions may not be based on necessarily included offenses arising out of a single act or course of conduct. He then argues the death judgment must be reversed because the jury wrongly considered three, rather than two, special circumstances at the penalty phase. He claims the inclusion of the third special circumstance allegation made a death sentence more likely. “In California, a single act or course of conduct by a defendant can lead to convictions ‘of any number of the offenses charged.’ [Citations.] . . . [A] judicially created exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses. [Citations.]” (People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034.) But defendant cites no case in which a special circumstance finding has been reversed for being necessarily included within another special circumstance. He provides no reason for bringing special circumstances under the necessarily included offense rule beyond the unfounded assumption that special circumstances should be treated as being identical to criminal offenses in all contexts. We have stated, however, that “special circumstances are sui generis — 78 neither a crime, an enhancement, nor a sentencing factor.” (People v. Garcia (1984) 36 Cal.3d 539, 552.) The penalty consequence of a true finding on a special circumstance allegation is that a defendant becomes eligible for the death penalty. (See § 190.2; Brown v. Sanders (2006) 546 U.S. 212, 221.) Defendant became eligible for the death penalty on the basis of the jury’s finding true either of the two special circumstances not challenged on appeal. He faced no additional punishment merely as a result of the finding on the simple kidnapping special circumstance allegation. Therefore, because special circumstances are a unique class created by statute (§ 190.2), we decline to extend to them a judicially created rule that has previously been applied only to crimes. Accordingly, we will not modify the judgment to strike the simple kidnapping special circumstance nor overturn the penalty judgment on this basis. Additionally and independently of his argument that the necessarily included offense rule applies to special circumstances, defendant contends that the simple kidnapping special circumstance violated his constitutional rights because it “artificially inflated” the number of special circumstances for the jury to weigh against him at the penalty phase. We have addressed similar arguments in the context of multiple felony-murder special circumstances that “might artificially inflate the weight to be given the underlying offenses as aggravating factors if considered more than once for exactly the same purpose . . . .” (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 955.) We reject defendant’s claim here for the same reason expressed in People v. Bean: “[N]othing in the record suggests that the jury in this case might have been led by the court’s instructions to simply count the special circumstances and weigh them mechanically rather than consider the nature of the conduct underlying those special circumstances.” (Ibid.) Nor did the prosecutor urge the jurors to “double count” the simple kidnapping special circumstance against defendant. (People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 769.) We therefore 79 conclude that defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated because of the simple kidnapping special circumstance. I. Asserted Failure to Limit CALJIC No. 2.15 to Theft-related Offenses Defendant’s jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 2.15, which permits an inference of guilt of a theft-related offense based on a defendant’s possession of recently stolen property, but only if the theft-related offense is corroborated by other evidence. Defendant contends the trial court erred in giving CALJIC No. 2.15 without limiting it to the theft offenses. Although he did not object below to the giving of the instruction on this precise ground, we assume the claim is preserved for appeal. (See People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 1130.) We find the trial court erred, but the error was harmless. As relevant here, the trial court instructed with CALJIC No. 2.15, as follows: “If you find that the defendant was in conscious possession of recently stolen property, the fact of such possession is not by itself sufficient to permit an inference that the defendant is guilty of the crimes or the allegations as charged in the Amended Information. Before guilt may be inferred, there must be corroborating evidence tending to prove the defendant’s guilt. However, this corroborating evidence need only be slight and need not by itself be sufficient to warrant an inference of guilt.” (Italics added.) We have held it is error for a court to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 2.15 for nontheft offenses. (People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 249.) Defendant contends the jury could have understood the instruction to mean only slight corroboration was needed to find defendant guilty of all the charged offenses, including the nontheft offense of murder and the attendant special circumstances. We previously have rejected defendant’s argument that the instructional error had the effect of relieving the prosecution of its burden of proving defendant guilty of 80 the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus violating his rights to due process and to a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. “[T]he error is one of state law only, subject to the miscarriage of justice test under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243 (Watson ) — whether defendant has established there exists a reasonable probability he would have obtained a more favorable result if the error had not occurred.” (People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1130.) Here, there was no reasonable probability the jury would have reached a different result had the court limited the permissive inferences described in CALJIC No. 2.15 to theft offenses. Although the instruction mentioned “the crimes or the allegations as charged in the Amended Information,” it is unclear whether the jury would have applied the instruction to anything but the theftrelated offenses, given that they were the offenses to which the instruction most clearly related. Defendant’s claim to the contrary, the prosecutor’s references to CALJIC No. 2.15 did not direct the jury to improperly apply the “slight corroboration” requirement. Instead, the prosecutor reviewed evidence that supported the theory that the murder was committed during the commission of robbery or carjacking, each of which has a theft element to which the “slight corroboration” requirement of CALJIC No. 2.15 was applicable. Therefore, the prosecutor properly asked the jury to apply CALJIC No. 2.15 to the circumstances related to the theft elements of robbery or carjacking, that would, in turn, support a theory of felony murder. In any event, in view of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt and the panoply of other instructions that correctly guided the jury’s consideration of the evidence, we find no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for defendant had the instruction not been given. (People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 101.) 81