Opinion ID: 2304352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether Reasonable Suspicion Existed

Text: In assessing whether a tip from a C.I. is sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. [18] A C.I.'s credibility, reliability and basis of knowledge are all highly relevant in determining the value of his information. [19] Here, the probation and parole officer who ordered the search did not speak directly with the C.I. In fact, Cronin testified that the C.I.'s identity was never communicated to him and that he did not know whether the C.I. was past proven reliable. On the other hand, Cronin emphasized that the C.I. was an identified person (as opposed to an anonymous informant) and that the DOJ employee had the ability to assess [the C.I.'s] credibility and hold [the C.I.] accountable should th[e] information prove to be false. Cronin further testified that he would assume that [the C.I.] had involvement with substance abuse, ... had a criminal history and may have inducements to produce th[e] information. The record of the suppression hearing does not reflect any information about the C.I.'s credibility, reliability and basis of the C.I.'s knowledge. [20] Sierra argues that Delaware law requires that an informant's reliability be established or, alternatively, that the informant's information be corroborated. Sierra bases that argument on title 11, section 4321(d) of the Delaware Code, which incorporates by reference Probation and Parole Procedure No. 7.19. Sierra's argument is supported by our recent decision in Culver v. State. [21] In Delaware, probation officers may conduct searches of individuals under probation and parole supervision in accordance with Department procedures.  [22] In Sierra's case, the probation officers' failure to adhere to the procedural requirements of Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19 was not harmless. [23] The record reflects the procedural failures in Sierra's case violated the substantive protection that those regulations provide to probationers, as described by this Court's recent decision in Culver v. State. [24] In Culver, we held that Procedure 7.19 makes it plain that probation officers must rationally assess the facts made known to them before reaching the critical conclusion that there is a reasonable basis to search a probationer's dwelling. [25] As this Court noted in Culver, Procedure 7.19 requires that probation officers assess the reliability of informants and provides a four-part test with which to judge the merits of an informant's tip: [26] In evaluating reliability of information, was [1] the information detailed, [2] consistent, [3] was the informant reliable in the past, and [4] consider the reason why the informant is supplying information. As in Culver, the facts of Sierra's case fail to satisfy these inquiries. First, the information was not sufficiently detailed. Officer Cronin received the tip from an unidentified DOJ employee, not from the informant. At the suppression hearing, Officer Cronin did not reveal the identity or position of this individual from the DOJ. Additionally, on the pre-search checklist, Sierra's probation officer, Officer Lingafelt, checked the box on the search checklist indicating that the information from the informant was not corroborated. The record of Officer Cronin's testimony does not reflect whether the C.I. learned first hand of the delivery or whether the C.I. heard of the delivery from someone else. Second, the tip provided only observable information. The other information the C.I. provided is similar to that involved in LeGrande v. State, [27] where this Court noted that the police had only confirmed the defendant's identity, location, probationary status, and the fact that his neighbor was wanted. Here, no evidence was presented as to why the C.I. knew of the drug delivery. As in Culver [28] and LeGrande, [29] the information provided by the C.I. did not show that the informant had actual knowledge of illegal activity. Third, the record of the suppression hearing provides no indication that the C.I. was past proven reliable. Officer Cronin did not specify whether the unidentified DOJ employee had indicated that the informant had proven reliable in the past and Officer Cronin did not undertake his own investigation into the C.I.'s reliability. The record reflects no indication that Officer Cronin inquired into the C.I.'s reliability, but instead indicates that he focused on the reliability of the unidentified DOJ employee. In Culver, this Court held that probation officers must not rely on police officers vouching for anonymous callers with no proven track record for supplying credible, reliable information. Rather, police officers must provide probation officers sufficient facts so that the probation officers can independently and objectively assess the reasonableness of the inferences to be drawn from the caller's tip. [30] The same rationale applies in Sierra's case. The DOJ employee could not simply vouch for the C.I. without providing Officer Cronin with sufficient facts enabling him to assess independently the reasonableness of the tip. Fourth, in considering the reason why the C.I. is supplying the information, Officer Cronin testified that when he is assessing a tip and is unaware of the C.I.'s motives, he assumes the informant has something to gain by providing the tip. We also assume arguendo, as did Officer Cronin, that the C.I. had something to gain. [31] In light of the uncorroborated nature of the allegations and the C.I.'s lack of past proven reliability, however, this self-interested tip alone was insufficient to establish a basis for a search.