Opinion ID: 2445976
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Respondent's Criminal Conviction Matter Should be Dismissed as Moot

Text: Lastly, respondent contends that he is entitled to address the Hearing Committee now on the matter of whether his criminal conviction, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, involved moral turpitudeas defined in D.C.Code § 11-2503(a). [15] We disagree. Where we impose disbarment as reciprocal discipline, we may dismiss a criminal conviction matter as moot and forego the moral turpitude inquiry. See In re Gailliard, 944 A.2d 1109, 1111-12 (D.C.2008) (citing In re Novick, 619 A.2d 514 (D.C. 1993)) (holding that where a discipline proceeding involves both a criminal conviction and a reciprocal discipline matter, the court may impose reciprocal discipline without engaging in a moral turpitude inquiry on the criminal conviction if the resulting discipline would be the same if a moral turpitude inquiry had been conducted). Bar Counsel recommended to the Board that we adopt this approach here. The Board proceeded by recommending reciprocal discipline and dismissal of the criminal conviction matter as moot. Here, we do not adopt the Board's recommendation that we impose the greater reciprocal discipline of disbarment for intentional misappropriation, but instead impose discipline that is functionally identical to that imposed in New York and suspend respondent from the practice of law for five years, with his reinstatement contingent upon a showing of fitness. And because respondent's potential reinstatement in the District of Columbia is conditioned upon him demonstrating his fitness to practice law, we dismiss the proceedings stemming from respondent's criminal conviction as moot. See Gailliard, supra, 944 A.2d at 1111 (explaining that if respondent ever seeks reinstatement, he will have to confront then, and the Board will have to resolve, the issue of whether his underlying conviction involved moral turpitude on its facts).