Opinion ID: 781300
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The second prong — adverse effect

Text: 102 In order for Attorney Murphy's conflicts of interest to be of a constitutional magnitude, Sullivan requires that the petitioners demonstrate that the successive representations adversely affected Attorney Murphy's performance. Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1243 (holding that the petitioner specifically must demonstrate that the conflicts affected the counsel's performance, as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.). The showing must be that counsel was influenced in his basic strategic decisions by the interests [of the former client], as where the conflict prevents an attorney ... from arguing the relative involvement and culpability of his clients in order to minimize the culpability of one by emphasizing the other. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). See also Thomas, 818 F.2d at 481 (The Appellants... must demonstrate that the attorney made a choice between possible alternative courses of action, such as eliciting (or failing to elicit) evidence helpful to one client but harmful to the other.); See also Amiel v. United States, 209 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir.2000) (To show a lapse in representation, a defendant need not demonstrate prejudice — that the outcome of her trial would have been different but for the conflict — but only `that some plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic might have been pursued but was not and that the alternative defense was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to the attorney's other loyalties or interests.') (Citation omitted). 103 The petitioners advance separate arguments regarding adverse effect, and we address each in turn. Kohn's allegations of adverse effect 104 Kohn alleges that the successive representations adversely affected Attorney Murphy's ability to explore plea negotiations because Attorney Murphy knew that any plea offer would require Kohn to testify against Moss. Kohn specifically alleges that Attorney Murphy's failure to explore plea negotiations precluded him from receiving a plea agreement similar to that received by Jaeger, which resulted in a sentence of thirty-six months, rather than the 188 month sentences that Kohn actually received. 105 The district court considered Kohn's claim of adverse effect and determined that Attorney Murphy's unwillingness to explore plea negotiations did not derive from successive representation, but, rather, resulted from Kohn's desire to pursue a defense of innocence. The district court expressly determined, any choice by Attorney Murphy to forgo initiating plea negotiations was not harmful to the [Kohn] because [Kohn] would not have entertained the idea of pleading guilty and testifying against co-defendant Moss. Furthermore, the district court discredited Kohn's testimony that he was willing to plead guilty and cooperate with the government. The district court stated, the [c]ourt is mindful of the fact that [Kohn] acknowledged that when it was in his interest to do so, he gave false testimony under oath at trial. 106 The record supports the district court's finding. For instance, Kohn testified and maintained his innocence at trial. In addition, Attorney Murphy testified: 107 [Kohn] had a relationship with Mr. Moss, an ongoing relationship with Mr. Moss as I recall .... they had been friends and had a business relationship of some sort for many years, ... early on [Kohn] says, This is my relationship with Bob Moss. I don't know what these guys are talking about. They are not telling the truth. I didn't do anything like that. So how's he going to cooperate. So I didn't think early on that there was going to be a possibility he could cooperate with the government. As you know that's a position that's fluid. 108 .... 109 Mr. Kohn in every instance where I broached the subject said he would never cooperate against Mr. Moss. 110 Attorney Murphy further testified that, [i]f Mr. Kohn had expressed his desire to cooperate, I would have been knocking on Mr. Janice's door the next morning. 111 On appeal, Kohn accounts for his perceived unwillingness to enter into a plea agreement by alleging that his disinclination derived from Attorney Murphy's misadvice regarding his sentencing exposure. Kohn specifically alleges: (1) that Attorney Murphy immediately rejected a 5 year plea offer from AUSA Janice; (2) that Attorney Murphy stated, a five year plea offer would amount to no offer at all because that's all [Kohn's] exposure is [sic] would be five years; and (3) Kohn elected to go to trial because Attorney Murphy's advice led him to believe that his sentencing exposure was similar whether he pleaded or was convicted at trial. 112 Kohn's argument is a modified version of the Lack of Advice Sentencing Exposure claim presented in his initial § 2255 motion. The district court rejected this claim based, in significant part, on its finding that AUSA Janice never extended a plea offer. In so doing, the district court reasoned that Kohn failed to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland, in that Attorney Murphy's allegedly incorrect advice could not have influenced [Kohn's] decision to accept a plea offer, because, as the [c]ourt has already indicated, there was never any plea offer to accept. 113 Kohn again relies on Attorney Murphy's purportedly erroneous advice regarding sentencing exposure, but re-characterizes the claim as one arising from a conflict of interest. Kohn now contends that he failed to express a willingness to enter into a plea agreement because a conflicted Attorney Murphy provided erroneous advice regarding sentencing. 114 Kohn's re-characterization of the claim is of significant analytical import because, by couching his claim in terms of a conflict of interest, Kohn invokes an entitlement to the Sullivan presumption of prejudice. 115 In Thomas, 818 F.2d 476, this Court observed that [j]ust as the Strickland standard has to be adapted to the guilty plea context, so must the Cuyler [v. Sullivan] standard be adapted. 22 Id. The Court determined that, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of a conflict of interest, a petitioner who has entered a guilty plea must establish: (1) that there was an actual conflict of interest; and (2) that the conflict adversely affected the voluntary nature of the guilty plea entered by the defendants. 23 Thomas, 818 F.2d at 480 (citation omitted). 116 It is a reasonable extension of Thomas to hold that, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner who asserts a conflict of interest caused his counsel to recommend rejecting a plea, must demonstrate: (1) that counsel labored under a conflict of interest; and (2) that the conflict of interest adversely affected counsel's recommendations regarding the plea. Cf. Hall, 200 F.3d at 966 (finding an actual conflict of interest where counsel jointly representing two brothers rejected a plea offer granting one brother a minimal sentence and the other brother a life sentence with possibility of a downward departure); Turner, 858 F.2d at 1205-06 (expanding the Hill Court's modified Strickland standard to claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel arising from counsel's advice to reject a plea offer). 117 Kohn's claims require an additional modification of Thomas. The standards provided in Thomas and its corollary direct the court's inquiry into whether the conflict of interest adversely affected counsel's advice regarding a specific plea offer. Here, as we repeatedly have acknowledged, there was no plea offer. However, as we further have acknowledged, the non-existence of a plea offer does not preclude the court from inquiring into whether the conflict of interest adversely affected counsel's ability to explore plea negotiations with the government. Therefore, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a petitioner alleging that a conflict of interest prevented his attorney from exploring plea negotiations must demonstrate (1) there was a conflict of interest; and (2) that the conflict of interest prevented the attorney from exploring plea negotiations. 118 We recognize that we must be cautious and careful in imposing appropriate burdens not to give defendants easy avenues to obtain a second bite at the apple at the penalty stage once they have acknowledged guilt or it has been determined by the factfinders. We further recognize that the foregoing standard may engender concerns as to whether defendants will be encouraged to direct counsel to forgo plea negotiations and then seek to overturn the sentence on the basis of counsel's alleged failure to explore plea negotiations. Three safeguards alleviate any potential windfall to defendants. 119 First, the foregoing standard applies only in the limited context of counsel's failure to explore plea negotiations as a result of a conflict of interest. The standard derives from that established in Sullivan, which the Mickens Court determined was exclusively limited to situations of joint representation (and the hybrid successive representation presented at bar). In all other circumstances, a petitioner alleging that his counsel failed to explore plea negotiations must fulfill the Turner standard: (1) deficient performance on the part of counsel; and (2) but for counsel's advice, there is a reasonable probability that he would have pleaded guilty. Turner, 858 F.2d at 1205-06. 120 Second, as discussed supra, Holloway provides an additional safeguard in that the petitioner must demonstrate that the government was willing to accept or extend an invitation to plea negotiations. 121 Finally, our standard does not lower the petitioner's burden under Sullivan. A petitioner who alleges that a conflict of interest compelled his counsel to refrain from exploring plea negotiations still must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest caused his counsel to forgo plea negotiations. See Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1245 ([T]he Sullivan mandated inquiry does not reduce the petitioner's burden of proof; it was at least necessary, to void the conviction, for the petitioner to establish that the conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel's performance.). This causative language of Sullivan requires that the defendant demonstrate a nexus between the conflict and the adverse effect on counsel's performance. See Riggs, 209 F.3d at 833 (Riggs has not explained any causal connection between Cox's failure to request the instruction and his prior AUSA position, his representation of Driskell's ex-wife, or his sharing office space with Kamenish and Chandler.); Hopkins, 43 F.3d at 1119 (Defendant's failure to accept the plea was unrelated to the dual representation.). 122 Kohn's claim fails because there lacks any nexus between Attorney Murphy's conflicted interests and the alleged erroneous advice regarding sentencing. Kohn merely alleges that Attorney Murphy had conflicting obligations and Attorney Murphy provided erroneous advice regarding sentencing. Kohn fails to provide any specific and credible evidence linking Attorney Murphy's erroneous advice to the conflict of interest. Moreover, the record reveals, in any event, that it was unlikely that Attorney Murphy provided deficient advice to Kohn. The district court questioned Attorney Murphy during the evidentiary hearing: 123 Q. [Did you] discuss with Mr. Kohn the statutory maximum sentence he was facing if he went to trial and was convicted prior to the second superceding indictment? 124 A. Sure we discussed it. 125 Q. You remember it? 126 A. No. I don't remember, but you always discuss it. 127 Q. Based on your usual procedure what would you tell him? 128 A. First of all, I would say usually, Now take it easy. This is the maximum and it's very seldom that you're going to get the maximum, but this is the statutory maximum. This is the most you could get under the worst of all circumstances. I don't think that there is any possible circumstances that would apply to you that would trigger that number, but that's the number. If you go to trial that amount that government proves, within limits, if they prove anything at all, is going to determine what your sentence is. 129 We addressed a similar scenario in Gonzales v. Elo, 233 F.3d 348 (6th Cir.2000). There, the petitioner claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by his attorney's failure to inform him that he could assert the right to testify despite his attorney's advice not to do so. 233 F.3d at 354. The magistrate judge's report, which was adopted by the district court, stated that defense counsel did not have an independent recollection of the specific advice that he rendered to [the petitioner] on the issue of his right to testify. Nonetheless, [defense counsel] was able to testify as to his customary practice with regard to advising his clients of their right to testify in criminal matters. Id. 130 In reaching a decision in Gonzales, this Court noted that the trial court credited the defense counsel's testimony as to his customary practices, and discredited the testimony of the petitioner. Id. at 357. It then went on to find that because this court does not disturb issues of credibility, the magistrate (and therefore the district court) did not clearly err in making his findings, and ... Petitioner's argument thus fails. Id. 131 The ruling in Gonzales compels the same result in the instant case. Attorney Murphy provided testimony regarding his customary practice, and Kohn failed to present any credible evidence challenging Attorney Murphy's assertions. In addition, the district court explicitly questioned Kohn's credibility. Moreover, the record belies Kohn's testimony that he was unaware of his potential maximum exposure because Kohn signed an Acknowledgment of Indictment indicating that the maximum sentence under the initial Indictment was forty years. Kohn, No. 97-CV-72174-DT, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10165 . Attorney Murphy expressly testified that he discussed this Acknowledgment of Indictment with Kohn. Attorney Murphy further testified that he discussed with Kohn the potential increases in sentencing exposure as a result the greater amount of marijuana alleged in the Second Superceding Indictment. Consequently, we are unable to conclude that Attorney Murphy provided erroneous advice to Kohn regarding potential maximum sentencing exposure. 132 Kohn therefore fails to demonstrate that it was Attorney Murphy's successive representations that adversely affected Attorney Murphy's ability to enter into plea negotiations. Rather, the lack of plea negotiations in this case derived from Kohn's protestations of innocence, as well as Kohn's disinclination to testify against Moss in exchange for such an agreement. As such, Kohn failed to demonstrate that Attorney Murphy's conflict of interest deprived him of his constitutionally secured right to effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Kohn's conflict of interest claim. Moss's allegations of adverse effect 133 Moss alleges that Attorney Murphy's successive representations adversely affected his counsel's performance in that: (1) Attorney Murphy failed to explore plea negotiations with AUSA Janice; (2) Attorney Murphy failed to seek severance; and (3) Attorney Murphy failed to pursue a defense of multiple conspiracies. 134 The patent deficiency in Moss's assertions is that, as discussed supra, Attorney Murphy terminated his representation of Moss shortly after the arraignment. 24 Because Moss fails to allege that Attorney Murphy's successive representations adversely affected his representation during the pre-arraignment stage of the proceedings, Moss's conflict of interest claim fails as a matter of law. See, e.g., McNeal v. United States, 17 Fed.Appx. 258 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding no conflict of interest where the defendant's former counsel represented the primary witness against the defendant.) Accordingly, Moss is unable to demonstrate that Attorney Murphy labored under a conflict of interest that adversely affected Attorney Murphy's performance. 135