Opinion ID: 1060573
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior Inconsistent Statements as Substantive Evidence

Text: Because the sufficiency of the evidence question turns on the effect given to C.S.'s prior statements, the first issue we must resolve is whether the prior inconsistent statements in this case could have been considered by the jury as substantive evidence of the appellee's guilt. As with any evidence, a prior inconsistent statement may be offered for any purpose at all, although its admissibility may be limited to certain issues depending upon the purpose for which it is offered. It is an elementary principle of evidence law that certain types of evidence may be admissible for some purposes but not for others. See Tenn. R. Evid. 105; see also, e.g., Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b), 406-409, 801. Our cases have consistently held that a prior inconsistent statement is admissible under the Rules of Evidence when the prior statement is used to impeach the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., Jones v. Lenoir City Car Works, 216 Tenn. 351, 356, 392 S.W.2d 671, 673 (1965) (stating that prior inconsistent statements of a witness are admissible for the purposes of impeachment and testing the credibility of the witness). On the other hand, the restriction on hearsay evidence limits the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements when a party offers the prior statements as evidence to prove the matter asserted in the statement, or as substantive evidence. See id. (stating that prior inconsistent statements are not to be considered as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter asserted therein); see also Rhea v. State, 208 Tenn. 559, 563, 347 S.W.2d 486, 488 (1961) (stating that any prior contradictory statements shown are not to be taken as evidence of the facts therein stated but are simply limited to the function of discrediting the witness). [6] Upon timely objection, the trial court should exclude a prior inconsistent statement when offered as substantive evidence of guilt or innocence, and upon request, the court should instruct the jury that the prior statement may only be considered as reflecting upon the credibility of the witness. See Tenn. R. Evid. 105 (stating that [w]hen evidence which is admissible . . . for one purpose but not admissible . . . for another purpose is admitted, the court upon request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly). A trial court, however, generally has no duty to exclude evidence or to provide a limiting instruction to the jury in the absence of a timely objection. A party may consent to the admissibility of evidence which is otherwise prohibited by the Rules, so long as the proceedings are not rendered so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process of law. Cf. Clarke v. State, 218 Tenn. 259, 402 S.W.2d 863, 869 (1966). As early as 1885, this Court has stated that parties may admit illegal evidence, if they don't choose to object. If they do not want to admit it, they should object as soon as it is offered, or its illegality appears. See Baxter v. State, 83 Tenn. (15 Lea) 657, 665 (1885) (allowing statements of victim identifying the defendant, though inadmissible under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule, because the defendant chose not to object to the statements). See also Harless v. State, 189 Tenn. 419, 422, 225 S.W.2d 258, 259 (1949) (No objection being interposed to the testimony of the officer as to what a bystander said[,] it may properly be considered and given its natural probative effect as if it were in law admissible.). This same principle is reflected today in Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1), which requires that a timely objection be made to preserve an error, and it is also reflected in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(a), which requires that a party take any action reasonably available so as to prevent an error or to mitigate its harm. When a party does not object to the admissibility of evidence, though, the evidence becomes admissible notwithstanding any other Rule of Evidence to the contrary, and the jury may consider that evidence for its natural probative effects as if it were in law admissible. State v. Harrington, 627 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tenn.1981). If a prior inconsistent statement does not fall within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule, for example, it is certainly subject to objection as hearsay and limitation under the Rules of Evidence. Merely being subject to objection, however, does not mean that such evidence cannot be considered for its substantive value when no objection is raised. In cases of hearsay evidence in particular, this Court has stated that when such evidence is admitted without objection, it is, therefore, rightly to be considered as evidence in the case and is to be given such weight as the jury think[s] proper. State v. Bennett, 549 S.W.2d 949, 950 (Tenn. 1977). Indeed, in Casone v. State, 193 Tenn. 303, 315-16, 246 S.W.2d 22, 28 (1952), this Court went so far as to say that it has been held almost universally that when hearsay testimony is admitted without objection[,] it may probably be considered and given its natural probative effect as if it were in law admissible, the only question being with regard to how much weight should be given thereto. (emphasis added). See also In re Estate of Parsley, 864 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1988) (The general rule is that hearsay, unobjected to, may be considered and given its natural probative effect. . . .). We are simply unable to conclude that the prior inconsistent statements of C.S., although subject to objection and limitation, could not be used as substantive evidence of the appellee's guilt when the appellee made no objection to the State's repeated use of the statements. As our cases make clear, a failure to object to otherwise inadmissible evidence will allow that evidence to be considered as if it were, in fact, fully admissible under the law of evidence. We decline to depart from this long standing rule in this case. We note that a growing number of jurisdictions have adopted the position that prior inconsistent statements may be used as substantive evidence of the matters asserted therein, particularly when the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination. [7] Our holding today does nothing to change our now minority position that such statements are inadmissible hearsay if offered as evidence of the facts to which the prior statement relates, although we do continue to allow the parties to waive this objection if they so choose.