Opinion ID: 2971548
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Williams’s Taped Statement to Police Officers

Text: Petitioner first argues that the district court erred in concluding that he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily confessed to the police. “Statements made by a defendant in response to interrogation while in police custody are not -8- No. 03-1059 Williams v. Jones admissible unless the defendant has first been [apprised] of the constitutional right against selfincrimination and has validly waived his right.” United States v. Cole, 315 F.3d 633, 636 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79)). In determining whether a suspect who has received a Miranda warning has validly waived his rights, courts are instructed to consider the following factors: First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the investigation” reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). “Whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent is determined by the particular facts and circumstances of the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Machacek v. Hofbauer, 213 F.3d 947, 954 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). The government bears the burden of proving the voluntariness of the waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Miggins, 302 F.3d 384, 397 (6th Cir. 2002). Williams argues that the record supports his claim that he failed to understand his Miranda rights. He focuses on his age (fifteen), education level (ninth grade), and inexperience with the police at the time of his arrest, and he reiterates his claim that he was high on marijuana at the time of his interrogation. He also points to the officers’ failure to inform him that he was being treated as an adult. The Michigan Court of Appeals considered these same arguments and found that -9- No. 03-1059 Williams v. Jones petitioner was advised of his constitutional rights prior to custodial interrogation, that he understood those rights, and that he agreed to waive them. This determination was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The court considered Williams’s age, education level, and physical condition at the time of the interrogation. His Miranda rights were read to him as he followed along, and the officers explained his right to counsel to him when asked to do so. Whether a defendant understood his Miranda rights is a question of fact underlying the question of whether his waiver of those rights was knowing and intelligent. Thus, on federal habeas review, a federal court has to presume that the state court’s factual finding that a defendant fully understood what was being said and asked of him was correct unless the petitioner shows otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. See Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 2000). Williams has not provided any further evidence, clear and convincing or otherwise, to rebut the findings by the Michigan Court of Appeals that he understood the rights that were read to him. That court did not err in concluding that Williams knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to giving his statement. Williams also asserts the related claim that his subsequent confession to the police was involuntary. The Supreme Court has said that “certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985). In deciding whether a confession was voluntarily made, this court considers the following factors: “(1) the time between the defendant’s arrest and arraignment; (2) whether the defendant knew the nature of the charged or suspected - 10 - No. 03-1059 Williams v. Jones offense; (3) whether the defendant was advised that he was not required to make any statements and that his statements could be used against him; (4) whether the defendant was advised of his right to the assistance of counsel before being questioned; and (5) whether the defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned.” United States v. Doe, 226 F.3d 672, 679 (6th Cir. 2000). “In effect, the court considers the totality of the circumstances to evaluate whether a confession was voluntarily made.” Id. A confession is involuntary only if there is police coercion or overreaching that overbore the accused’s will and caused the confession. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1986). Williams argues that the officers’ refusal to allow his parents to be present and failure to advise him that he was being charged as an adult precluded him from fully understanding the consequences of his statements. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the Michigan Court of Appeals considered these arguments and other relevant factors in assessing the voluntariness of his confession. As the court noted, the absence of a juvenile defendant’s parent does not per se render the defendant’s confession involuntary because voluntariness depends upon the totality of the circumstances. See Doe, 226 F.3d at 679-80. In assessing the totality of the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s confession, the court of appeals found that he “was questioned only once” and that “the entire process, from arrival at the police station to completion of the statement, took only two and a half hours. There was no evidence that [Williams] was not in good health and he admitted that he was not mistreated.” At the suppression hearing, the trial court specifically found that Williams was treated “courteously” by the officers. Petitioner knew the nature of the charge or suspected offense because the officers told him they wanted to speak to him about “the murder - 11 - No. 03-1059 Williams v. Jones of Karen King.” He was informed of his right to remain silent and of his right to an attorney. In short, the court of appeals identified the appropriate standard for assessing the voluntariness of petitioner’s confession and did not apply that standard in an unreasonable way. B. Williams’s Statement to the Juvenile Detention Officer Williams next argues that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Miranda warnings were not required before Mayo asked the petitioner, “What’s up?” and “What do you mean by that?” Miranda warnings are required when police question a suspect in a custodial interrogation. United States v. Bowers, 739 F.2d 1050, 1055 (6th Cir. 1984). “Custodial interrogation means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody.” Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990) (internal quotations omitted). Interrogation, for purposes of Miranda, refers to express questioning and to any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). When deciding whether a suspect has been interrogated, courts should “carefully scrutinize the factual setting of each encounter.” United States v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1025 (6th Cir. 1983). “Even a relatively innocuous series of questions may, in light of the factual circumstances and the susceptibility of a particular suspect, be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Id. However, “[a]ny statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.” Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478). The parties do not dispute that Williams was in custody for purposes of Miranda at the time - 12 - No. 03-1059 Williams v. Jones of his statement to Mayo, but disagree as to whether Mayo’s conduct amounted to police-initiated interrogation. The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded, and the district court agreed, that Miranda warnings were not required before Mayo began his conversation with petitioner because Mayo was not a police officer, nor was he working with or at the request of the police. In reaching this decision, the court relied on People v. Anderson, 531 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), which held that a juvenile probation officer was not a police officer for purposes of Miranda because (1) she did not wear a badge, carry any type of weapon, or wear a uniform, (2) her duties did not include the interrogation of criminal suspects, and (3) she did not have the authority to arrest or detain anyone. The mere fact of imprisonment does not mean that all of a prisoner’s conversations are official interrogations that must be preceded by Miranda. United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1988). Rather, [f]idelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, [and] only in those types of situations in which the concerns that empowered the decision are implicated. Thus, [this court] must decide whether a [given curtailment of freedom of action] exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984). We do not need to reach the question whether Mayo’s questions amounted to interrogation for purposes of Miranda because we agree with the district court and the Michigan Court of Appeals that Miranda warnings were not required. Mayo is not a police officer, he does not wear a uniform or a badge, and he does not carry any type of weapon. His duties do not include the interrogation - 13 - No. 03-1059 Williams v. Jones of criminal suspects. Miranda was concerned with the danger of coercion resulting from the interaction of custody and official interrogation. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297. Miranda warnings are not required any time a suspect is in custody in a technical sense and converses with someone who happens to be a government agent. Id. The court of appeals thus did not err in concluding that Williams’s statement to Mayo was admissible. C. Testimony Concerning Out-of-Court Statements Made by August Williams Finally, petitioner argues that Sergeant Howie’s testimony at trial that August had “brought [petitioner’s name] into it” violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. A non-testifying co-defendant’s statements that implicate a defendant are presumptively unreliable and their admission violates the Confrontation Clause unless the statement bears adequate “indicia of reliability.” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-66 (1980); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). Williams argues that the trial court erred in allowing Sergeant Howie to refer to August’s statement to the police while the officer was testifying about the circumstances leading up to Williams’s confession. In making this argument, petitioner relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), in which the Court held that one defendant in a joint trial was denied his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation due to the admission into evidence of - 14 - No. 03-1059 Williams v. Jones his co-defendant’s confession that implicated both of them in the crime. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that it was not error for the trial court to have admitted Howie’s testimony because (1) Williams and August were not tried together; (2) August’s statement itself was not admitted into evidence; and (3) the jury was not advised that August had actually implicated petitioner in the crimes. The district court agreed with this analysis. Insofar as the decisions of the Michigan Court of Appeals and the district court suggest that any Confrontation Clause issues can be solved by separate trials, they are contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent. A criminal defendant may make a motion to have his trial separated from that of his co-defendant in order to minimize the potential that his non-testifying codefendant’s statements implicating him in the crime will be admitted into evidence against him. Separation of the trials does not automatically cure all Confrontation Clause issues; it merely makes it less likely such issues will arise in the first place. A non-testifying co-defendant who has invoked his privilege against self-incrimination is just as unavailable to testify when he is tried with another co-defendant as when he is not. The Supreme Court has repeatedly found Confrontation Clause issues to exist in cases where the defendants were tried separately. See, e.g., Douglas, 380 U.S. at 419. However, neither the Michigan Court of Appeals nor the district court rested its decision solely on the fact that the petitioner and August Williams were tried separately. Both courts also noted that August’s statement was not admitted into evidence and the jury was not advised that August had actually implicated him in the crime. Petitioner vigorously disputes the latter point and argues that the jury was informed that August had implicated him. Sergeant Howie did in fact - 15 - No. 03-1059 Williams v. Jones testify that August’s statement to the police had implicated Williams in the crime, but we note that this testimony was in response to a question asked by Williams’s own counsel. Moreover, even if the admission of this testimony violated Williams’s constitutional rights, a constitutional error that implicates trial procedures must be considered harmless unless it had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). In light of the fact that August’s statement was not itself admitted into evidence and considering the substantial amount of additional evidence of Williams’s guilt introduced at trial – including his 50-minute taped confession to police, eyewitness statements that they had seen him driving the white Blazer and putting a gun to the victim’s head, and eyewitness testimony that he was walking around with the victim’s cell phone shortly after the crime – we cannot say that this brief reference to statements made by his codefendant had a substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Any error in admitting this portion of Sergeant Howie’s testimony was therefore harmless.