Opinion ID: 2508322
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of the Attempted Murder of Olin Davis

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his attempted murder of Olin Davis, because such evidence was impermissible character evidence (Evid.Code, § 1101, subd. (a)), and because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value (Evid.Code, § 352). He also claims that its admission violated his federal constitutional right to a fair trial.
In addition to the Thompson/Robinson murders, defendant was originally charged in a third count with the attempted murder of Olin Davis, but the trial court granted defendant's motion to sever the attempted murder count from the two murder counts. The court noted that if the prosecution wanted to offer evidence relating to the attempted murder in the double murder trial, it could seek a hearing on its admissibility under Evidence Code section 1101. At a later hearing regarding the admissibility of evidence of the attempted murder, the prosecutor proffered evidence that, two days after the double murder, Robert Williams overheard defendant tell Richard Johnson at Davis's house that he was planning to kill Davis because Davis knew defendant had killed Thompson and Robinson and because Davis had been known to provide information to the police. The prosecutor acknowledged he had not told the trial court of this evidence at the severance hearing. The court responded it had earlier ruled that Davis could testify about the circumstances that led him to give the police information about the two murders, and it ruled that Williams could testify about the conversation between defendant and Johnson. Moreover, because the prosecutor planned to present evidence that defendant's alleged motivation to kill Davis was clearly related to the two homicides, the court said it was having a hard time thinking of any reason to limit any of the evidence in the third count. The court further stated that the extent to which the prosecutor wished to prove the attempted murder was something that we can deal with witness by witness and objections at the time.
Relevant evidence includes evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness ..., having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action. (Evid.Code, § 210.) In determining the credibility of a witness, the jury may consider, among other things, [t]he extent of his capacity to perceive, to recollect, or to communicate any matter about which he testifies, [t]he existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive, and the witness's attitude toward the action in which he testifies or toward the giving of testimony. ( Id., § 780, subds. (c), (f), (j).) The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by any party, including the party calling him. ( Id., § 785.) But evidence of the good character of a witness is inadmissible to support his credibility unless evidence of his bad character has been admitted for the purpose of attacking his credibility. ( Id., § 790.) And [e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible. ( Id., § 351.) Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), generally prohibits the admission of a criminal act against a criminal defendant when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion. Subdivision (b), however, provides that such evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity...). To be admissible, such evidence `must not contravene other policies limiting admission, such as those contained in Evidence Code section 352.' [Citation.] ( People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 404, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757.) Under Evidence Code section 352, the probative value of the proffered evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. (Evid.Code, § 352; People v. Ewoldt, supra, at p. 404, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757.) We review for abuse of discretion a trial court's rulings on relevance and admission or exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352. (See People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1195, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811; People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 637, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.) Defendant here contends that evidence of the attempted murder of Olin Davis was irrelevant, and that the prosecutor used it in violation of Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) to show defendant was of bad character and thus must have committed the double murders. He asserts this was precisely what the prosecutor argued to the jury. But, as the Attorney General notes, whether evidence was erroneously admitted does not depend on counsel's later argument to the jury. [2] Here, evidence of defendant's attempt to murder Davis was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) to prove his identity as the killer of Thompson and Robinson. Davis testified that a day or two after Thompson and Robinson were killed, defendant admitted to Davis that he killed them. And Robert Williams testified that a few days after the murders, he overheard defendant tell Richard Johnson that he (defendant) should kill Davis. Under these circumstances, defendant's attempt, a week after the double murders, to kill Davis  to whom he had admitted the murders  was probative of defendant's consciousness of guilt, which in turn was probative of his identity as the perpetrator of the charged offenses. (See People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 940, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212; see also People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 154, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 127-128, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) The evidence of defendant's attack on Davis also bolstered the credibility of Davis's testimony that defendant told him he had killed Thompson and Robinson, because it explained why, after the attack, Davis told the police about defendant's admission, when he had not previously done so. (See Evid.Code, § 210 [credibility evidence is relevant].) Defendant argues that even if evidence of his attempted murder of Davis was admissible to show consciousness of guilt, the probative value of this evidence, which was detailed and extensive, was substantially outweighed by its undue consumption of time and the probability of substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. (Evid.Code, § 352.) To preserve a claim that a trial court abused its discretion in not excluding evidence under Evidence Code section 352, a party must make a timely and specific objection when the evidence is offered. ( People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1014, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248; accord, People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 108, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296.) At trial, defendant objected both to the admission of photographs of Davis after he was shot by defendant and to the admission of the videotaped reenactment of the drive to the park as unduly prejudicial, but he otherwise posed no objections to the detailed testimony of the attempted murder. On appeal, defendant argues additional objections would have been fruitless. We disagree. At trial, when the court and the parties discussed the admissibility of evidence of the attempted murder of Davis, they appeared to agree that no specific objection or ruling could be made until a witness was ready to testify or a specific question on the matter was posed to a witness. Thereafter, defendant made no objection other than to the photograph of the injured Davis at the hospital and to the videotaped reenactment. Defendant alternately argues he could not have objected under Evidence Code section 352 to the voluminous evidence of the attempted murder until all of the evidence had been admitted, at which point an objection and admonition would have been futile. Defendant's argument is specious. The purpose of a timely and specific objection to the admission of evidence is to prevent just such a result. Even had defendant objected, the trial court would not have abused its discretion in admitting the evidence of the attempted murder of Davis. Davis testified at length about the events of May 4, 1987, including the fight with Robert Williams, his visit to defendant that night, his car trip with defendant and defendant's brother Gino, his struggle with defendant, his escape, and his discussions later with the police at the hospital. There was, however, no substantial danger of undue prejudice to defendant, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. The court repeatedly instructed the jury it could not consider the evidence relating to the attempted murder of Davis as evidence of defendant's bad character or as showing he had a propensity to commit murders. During the opening statement of the defense, the court instructed the jury that defendant was not charged with the May 4, 1987, shooting of Davis, but that there would be evidence of that incident, which the jury was to consider in light of the instructions the court would give at the end of the trial. Before Davis testified on this subject, the court again instructed the jury that defendant was not charged with a crime relating to the May 4 incident, and that it should not consider the evidence in determining defendant's guilt of the charged double murder of Thompson and Robinson or as showing he was a person of bad character. The court further explained that such evidence was admitted for a limited purpose that included assisting the jury in evaluating Davis's testimony and fleshing out the relationship between Davis and defendant. Still later in Davis's testimony, in response to a juror's question, the court reiterated to the jury that the only issues to be decided were two counts of murder, and that the incident involving Davis on May 4, 1987, was admitted for a limited purpose, to be explained in detail later. Last, after the close of evidence, the court instructed that if the jury found defendant had tried to suppress evidence against himself in this matter, such as by intimidating a witness or attempting to eliminate a witness, that attempt might be considered by the jury as a circumstance tending to show a consciousness of guilt, but that such conduct was not by itself sufficient to prove guilt. The court also told the jury that certain evidence had been admitted for a limited purpose and the jury could not consider such evidence for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted.