Opinion ID: 77923
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Other Circuits Post-Turner

Text: Subsequent to Turner, the Fifth Circuit reconsidered Taylor and Guajardo and rejected their holdings under Turner 's reasonably related test. See Brewer, 3 F.3d at 825. The plaintiff-inmates in Brewer complained that their legal mail was opened outside their presence, despite a prison policy requiring otherwise. [23] Brewer involved broad legal mail which the Fifth Circuit described as legal mail from various courts, attorneys, and government officials. Id. at 818. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged prisoners' constitutionally protected right of access to the courts but concluded that what we once recognized in [ Taylor ] as being `compelled' by prisoners' constitutional rightsi.e., that a prisoner's incoming legal mail be opened and inspected only in the prisoner's presenceis no longer the case in light of Turner and Thornburgh.  [24] Id. at 820, 825 (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit stated that Taylor 's requirements of the least restrictive means and a substantial or important government interest appear[ed] to have been modified by Turner 's instruction that when a prison practice impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, whatever those rights might be, such a practice is valid if it is `reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.' Id. at 823-25. The Fifth Circuit noted that the prisoners did not allege that their mail has been censored and they concede that such mail was opened and inspected for the `legitimate penological objective' of prison security, i.e., to detect contraband. Id. at 825. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the violation of the prison regulation requiring that a prisoner be present when his incoming legal mail is opened and inspected is not a violation of a prisoner's constitutional rights. Id. at 825. In contrast, several other circuits post- Turner have concluded that opening properly marked attorney mail outside a prisoner's presence infringes the constitutional right to access to the courts. See Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 877-78 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that no penological interest or security concern justifies opening attorney mail outside prisoner's presence when prisoner requested otherwise); Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1458 (3d Cir.1995) (disagreeing with Fifth Circuit's Brewer, and concluding the pattern and practice of opening inmate's properly marked incoming court mail [25] outside his presence fails the Turner reasonableness standard and violates inmate's rights to free speech and access to courts) ( abrogated in part on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996)); [26] see also Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 686 (7th Cir.2005) (stating, when a prison receives a letter for an inmate that is marked with an attorney's name and a warning that the letter is legal mail, officials potentially violate the inmate's rights if they open the letter outside of the inmate's presence); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351-52 (2d Cir.2003) (noting, [i]nterference with legal mail implicates a prison inmate's rights to access to the courts but concluding two incidents of mail interference are insufficient to state a claim for denial of access to the courts because [the inmate] has not alleged that the interference with his mail either constituted an ongoing practice of unjustified censorship or caused him to miss court deadlines or in any way prejudiced his legal actions); Powells v. Minnehaha County Sheriff Dep't, 198 F.3d 711, 712 (8th Cir.1999) (concluding inmate stated constitutional claim based on officers opening legal mail when he was not present). [27] The Third Circuit in Bieregu noted that although reading legal mail would infringe the right of access more than simply opening and inspecting it, the only way to ensure that mail is not read when opened, and thus to vindicate the right to access, is to require that it be done in the presence of the inmate to whom it is addressed. 59 F.3d at 1456 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2984-85, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)). Although Bieregu involved court mail, the Third Circuit emphasized that interference with attorney mail probably infringes the right of court access even more than interference with court mail. . . . Of all communications, attorney mail is the most sacrosanct. Id. The Third Circuit pointed out that providing inmates with confidential reliable means of communication with their attorneys about grievances releases tension in the prisons and itself advances the state interest in maintaining institutional order and security. Id. at 1457. The benefits of such a safety valve advances, rather than frustrates, state interests. The Third Circuit also concluded that opening legal mail in an inmate's presence places no burden at all on guards, prisoners, and the allocation of prison resources: it is what the [prison] regulations have required since 1985. Id. at 1458. When opening mail in the prisoner's presence, the prison can check for contraband then, which satisfies the state's security interest. The Third Circuit, however, was careful to distinguish between a single, inadvertent opening of properly marked legal mail outside an inmate's presence and a pattern or practice of such actions. Id. The former may not infringe a prisoner's right to free speech, nor his right to court access absent a showing of actual injury. Id. [28] The Sixth Circuit also recently concluded that no penological interest or security concern justifies opening attorney mail outside a prisoner's presence when the prisoner specifically requested otherwise, and that the practice violates the prisoner's First Amendment rights. [29] See Sallier, 343 F.3d at 877-78. [30] Although not explicitly citing Turner itself, the Sixth Circuit articulated Turner 's reasonably related standard and cited to Muhammad v. Pitcher, 35 F.3d 1081 (6th Cir.1994), which did use the Turner factors. Sallier, 343 F.3d at 873, 877; see Muhammad, 35 F.3d at 1084-86 (analyzing procedure of opening inmate's incoming mail from state attorney general outside of his presence and concluding, [a]ll four of the Turner factors indicate that the policy does not pass muster under the First Amendment right).