Opinion ID: 39534
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dismissal of Claims Against United States

Text: Guile argues that the district court erred in applying the discretionary function exception to the FTCA to dismiss his non- 7 This was in contrast to several particular acts or omissions of others than Dr. Cruz which Dr. Meyer individually identified as a cause of Mrs. Guile’s death. For example, Dr. Meyer agreed that “regardless of everything that occurred. . . Mrs. Guile would not have died but for Mario Padilla not doing his job that night” and that “the nursing staff [having] allowed the belt on the ward” was one of “[t]he three most important factors in Emiko Guile’s suicide,” the other two being “Mrs. Guile’s failure to listen to the allied help” and “the milieu . . . of PHP on II West . . . the environment of lisisity [explained as “lassitude”].” Also, “. . . the last straw was her phone conversation with her husband in which he said you’re not coming home until you are better.” 13 medical claims against the United States. The United States has sovereign immunity from suit except as it waives this immunity by consent. United States v. Sherwood, 61 S.Ct. 767, 769 (1941). One example of such a waiver is the FTCA, which provides that the United States may be sued “for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).8 There are multiple exceptions to liability of the United States under the FTCA, however, one of which is known as the discretionary function exception. Liability under the FTCA does not apply to claims “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 8 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) provides: “(1) Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. (2) No person convicted of a felony who is incarcerated while awaiting sentencing or while serving a sentence may bring a civil action against the United States or any agency, officer, or employee of the Government, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of a physical injury.” 14 2680(a).9 The Supreme Court has described the purpose of the discretionary function exception as being to protect policy-based legislative and administrative decisions from “judicial ‘secondguessing.’” United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 2765 (1984); United States v. Gaubert, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 1273 (1991). Guile argues that the United States failed to properly supervise PHP, failed to provide safe premises, failed to protect the safety of hospital patients, and failed to ensure that PHP had the malpractice insurance required by its contract with the Army.10 Guile’s reasons for arguing that the discretionary function exception does not apply to these claims appear to be that (1) when the government retains safety oversight authority over a contractor, enforcement of safety obligations is not a discretionary function; (2) that medical judgments are not covered 9 28 U.S.C. § 2680 provides in relevant part: “The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to— (a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. . . . .” 10 Guile does not appear to argue that the United States should be liable for the breaches of PHP personnel, apart from liability for its own alleged breaches. This vicarious liability would be barred by the independent contractor exception to the FTCA. See Broussard v. United States, 989 F.2d 171, 175 (5th Cir. 1993). A retained right of inspection does not defeat the independent contractor exception unless the government actually supervises the contractor’s day-to-day activities. See Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 306–07 (4th Cir. 1995); Brooks v. A.R. & S. Enters., Inc., 622 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1980). 15 by the discretionary functions exception; and (3) that the government’s negligence in this case was too egregious to be rooted in the policy considerations that the discretionary function exception is intended to protect. Guile cites a Ninth Circuit case holding the United States liable for injuries to workers on a post office construction project. Camozzi v. Roland/Miller & Hope Consulting Group, 866 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1989). The workers were injured falling through uncovered openings in metal decking. Id. at 288. In its contract with the construction contractor, the Postal Service specifically required that metal deck openings be covered, and a contract with a company hired to supervise construction required daily inspections of 35 listed items, including “floor openings.” Id. at 288–89. The court held that the Postal Service’s negligence in not discovering and remedying the uncovered openings was not a policy choice warranting protection by the discretionary function exception but rather “a failure to effectuate policy choices already made and incorporated in the contracts.” Id. at 290. Other courts have distinguished Camozzi and held that the discretionary function exception did apply in cases where contracts were less specific regarding the safety violations proscribed and the mechanics of the inspection authority retained by the government. See Clark v. United States, 805 F. Supp. 84, 88–89 (D.N.H. 1992); Moody v. United States, 753 F. Supp. 1042, 1055 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1990). The contract between the Army and PHP includes a general requirement that “contractor personnel shall comply with all safety procedures and practices associated with the facility,” but has no specific safety requirements for patient rooms. Moreover, the government “inspections” authorized by the contract refer to inspections of services provided, not of facilities, and are to be accomplished through review of medical records and procedures. We do not believe that this contract language creates a nondiscretionary duty on the part of the government to ensure the safety of patient rooms in the PHP-operated inpatient ward. Guile’s argument that governmental medical judgments are not covered by the discretionary function exception is not applicable to his claims against the government, since the claims do not involve governmental medical judgments at all. Dr. Anderson is the only government employee who could have applied any medical judgment with respect to Emiko Guile, and Guile does not appeal the jury’s finding that he incurred no liability because there was no doctor-patient relationship. Guile’s argument that the government’s negligence was too egregious to be protected by the discretionary function exception appears to be in reference to the government’s alleged failure to ensure that PHP had insurance. There are cases denying application of the discretionary function exception when extreme negligence was exhibited by government employees, on the theory that such negligence could not be grounded 17 in any legitimate policy consideration. See Glickman v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 171, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Orlikow v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 77, 82 (D.D.C. 1988) (both involving CIA drug experiments on unwitting subjects). Even if we assume that hiring an uninsured contractor constitutes this degree of negligence, there was no evidence presented that PHP was uninsured, much less that the government was aware of such a situation. Guile’s claims against the United States largely involve negligent supervision of PHP, with respect to either safety in patient rooms or insurance coverage. Supervision of a contractor’s work, including the degree of oversight to exercise, is inherently a discretionary function. Kirchmann v. United States, 8 F.3d 1273, 1276–77 (8th Cir. 1993). Similarly, a decision to hire a contractor and the choice of contractor are policy-based discretionary decisions. Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 310 (4th Cir. 1995). To the extent that Guile claims that one or more United States employees were involved in placement of the armoires in Mrs. Guile’s room,11 this is also a discretionary function involving balancing of considerations such as patient safety, patient privacy, and patient convenience with regard to storage space. There was no evidence presented of a statute, 11 The trial record does not reveal exactly how or when the armoires got into Mrs. Guile’s room. There was testimony that PHP’s head nurse learned that the units were available and expressed interest in obtaining them for the patient rooms. The armoires, like all of the furniture on the ward, were owned by the government, so it is possible that some government employee approved transfer of the armoires to PHP’s use, or even helped to move or place them. 18 regulation or policy giving specific direction as to any of these functions in a way that would make them non-discretionary.12 See Gaubert, 111 S.Ct. at 1273 (act is non-discretionary if a “‘federal statute, regulation or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow’”). Because the complained-of actions by the United States were discretionary functions, the district court was correct to dismiss Guile’s non-medical claims against the United States under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The United States therefore cannot be liable for torts that would otherwise apply in Texas, and we do not reach Guile’s arguments regarding Texas premises liability law.13