Opinion ID: 2037499
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: SPAULDING v LESCO INT'L CORP

Text: Allan Spaulding was rendered quadriplegic as a result of diving into and striking his head on the bottom of an aboveground swimming pool at the home of his friend, Richard Henwood. The pool measured twenty-four feet in diameter by four feet in height and the depth of water varied from approximately three and one-half feet at the sides to approximately four feet at the center. [43] Mr. Henwood estimated the water depth in the center to be about forty-six or forty-seven inches. On the day in question, plaintiff dived from a small eighteen-inch by eighteen-inch wooden platform that sat a few inches above the lip of the Henwood pool at the top of an A frame metal ladder that provided access to the pool. No warnings against diving were displayed on any part of the pool or the ladder. [44] At the time of the accident, plaintiff was thirty-six years old, six feet tall, weighed 215 pounds, and considered himself to be a good swimmer. He had received some instructions in diving, could not recall any specifics, but had been in the Henwood pool on at least one prior occasion, and was in the pool at least fifteen to twenty minutes on the day of the accident. Mr. Spaulding testified that he stood upright in the pool and was aware that the depth of the water was somewhere around his chest level, and that during the time that he was in the pool on August 5, he got in and out of the pool about ten to fifteen times, jumped from the platform into the pool, and dived headfirst from the platform into the pool two to four times. Plaintiff sued the defendants, claiming they breached duties owed him under a number of theories including negligent design, manufacture, and warning, and breach of express and implied warranties of fitness and safety. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants, essentially finding in pertinent part regarding all defendants no duty to warn of the open and obvious danger of diving into shallow water. Spaulding v Lesco Int'l Corp, supra at 289-290. Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Disagreeing with the Horen and Glittenberg panels, the Spaulding Court concluded: [A] manufacturer still has no duty to warn of obvious and patent dangers when a simple product is involved. We believe that the above-ground pool in this case was a simple product and that the dangers of making a deep dive into the pool were obvious. Moreover, we agree with the circuit court's conclusion that the failure to warn in this case was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff knew how deep the water was, how tall he was, and the dangers of making a deep dive into shallow water, including breaking his neck. [ Id. at 293.] The trial court in each case granted the defendants' motion for summary disposition on the basis that the danger of diving into shallow water was open and obvious and that the defendants therefore owed the plaintiffs no duty to warn of the danger. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court in Glittenberg v Wilcenski and in Horen v Coleco Industries, Inc , and affirmed the trial court ruling in Spaulding v Lesco Int'l Corp . This Court's plurality result in Glittenberg v Doughboy Recreational Industries, Inc , led to rehearing and consolidation with Horen and Spaulding. 437 Mich 1224 (1991). LEVIN, J. ( dissenting ). The question presented is whether summary disposition was properly granted defendant manufacturers and sellers of aboveground swimming pools on the basis that the danger of diving in a shallow aboveground swimming pool is open and obvious. We would hold that the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact whether the danger is open and obvious, and would remand these cases for trial. The plaintiff in each of these cases became quadriplegic as the result of diving in an aboveground swimming pool, and commenced an action claiming that the manufacturer and seller was negligent in failing to provide a warning concerning the dangers of diving in such a pool. The majority holds, as a matter of law, that the dangers of diving in shallow pools are open and obvious, and there is no duty to warn. We would adhere to the approach outlined in Glittenberg v Doughboy Recreational Industries, Inc, 436 Mich 673, 699; 462 NW2d 348 (1990) ( Glittenberg I ), where, in remanding to the circuit court for further factual development, I joined in saying that a manufacturer's duty to warn is not automatically excused when the risk of harm is obvious. This Court remanded Glittenberg I for further factual development so that the question whether there was an obligation to warn of the dangers of diving in an aboveground pool would not be answered in a vacuum. [1] The plaintiffs in the instant cases, consolidated on appeal, proceeded to develop a factual record that contains substantial evidence tending to show that users of aboveground pools do not perceive the risk of quadriplegic injury from diving, that they do not know how to dive in shallow water safely, and that it is possible to effectively warn of the risks of diving in shallow pools. The majority adopts an analysis that ignores that evidence. In that vacuum, the majority concludes that because the shallowness of an aboveground pool is obvious, and the general risk of diving in such a pool is also obvious, there is no obligation to warn of the specific risk of shallow diving and catastrophic diving injury. [2] The majority effectively immunizes manufacturers and sellers of aboveground swimming pools from liability, and is regressive because it invites the swimming pool industry to take a step back on safety issues.
Our principal disagreement with the majority is with its failure to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. As set forth in the majority opinion, [t]he gravamen of each of the plaintiff's argument is that the danger presented is not open and obvious because the specific harm of paralysis or death is not generally recognized. Plaintiffs Horen and Spaulding add the argument that the danger is not open and obvious because the average user does not generally recognize that the laws of physics, biomechanics, and hydrodynamics can transform a miscalculated shallow dive into a deep dive that is recognized as dangerous. [3] Dr. Gabrielson offered the following data: The National Spinal Cord Injury Data Research Center, through its publications estimates that 800 diving injuries occur each year resulting in paralysis; further that as many as 25% of these injuries occur in pools. The majority dismisses this evidence with the observation that the fact of injuries does not establish the latency of the danger alleged. [4] Putting aside that the majority concludes that the danger of diving in shallow water is open and obvious as a matter of law without considering the evidence, the frequency of such injuries suggests both the latency of danger and that it is not open and obvious. A reasonable person, viewing the plaintiffs' evidence as a whole, could conclude that a significant number of catastrophic injuries occur, that the swimming pool industry has been aware of the potential for such injuries for a number of years [5] and in many instances provided warnings with the product, and that the likely consuming public does not appreciate either the general risk of diving in shallow water in an aboveground swimming pool or the specific risk of quadriplegic injury occurring during a shallow dive assumed by the uninformed diver to be safe. The majority acknowledges that Dr. Lawniczak testified that the general public is not aware of and does not appreciate the grave risk of serious spinal cord injury when diving, [6] and that James Richardson testified that the average person does not appreciate the fact that diving in shallow water carries the potential for life-threatening injuries. [7] Lawniczak testified that diving in shallow water is not necessarily an open and obvious danger to a recreational swimmer. Richardson, diving coach at the University of Michigan, testified that divers do not really understand the potential for serious injury when diving in a shallow pool: the general public just does not understand about entering the water and what can happen, even at depths that appear to be, to everybody concerned, safe depths .... It's just a lot more going on there than people understand and can imagine is going on.  (Emphasis added.) The majority argues that [t]he fact that all plaintiffs acknowledged the necessity to perform a shallow dive simply underscores the conclusion that the risk of diving in shallow water is open and obvious. [8] Performance of a shallow dive, while it is evidence that the diver recognizes a need to modify his actions in response to a perceived danger, is also evidence that divers incorrectly perceive that execution of a shallow dive is sufficient protection from the danger presented by diving in a shallow aboveground swimming pool. Viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiffs, we would conclude that they offered sufficient evidence both of the latency of the specific risk of catastrophic injury, and that divers are unaware of the risks posed by diving in shallow water, to pose a genuine issue of material fact whether the specific risk is open and obvious.
The majority frames the analysis by distinguishing design defect cases from failure to warn cases for the purpose of applying the open and obvious, or patent danger rule. The majority, while acknowledging that the decision of this Court in Owens v Allis-Chalmers Corp, 414 Mich 413; 326 NW2d 372 (1982), abrogated the patent danger rule in design defect cases, holds that the open and obvious/patent danger rule still governs in failure to warn cases. [9] A The patent danger rule was abrogated in Owens, supra, because, in part, the rule removed the incentive for adopting safer product designs. [10] The correlative rationale applies to a failure to warn; a manufacturer should provide warnings that make a product safer to use. [11] To be sure, there is no legal obligation to supply superfluous warnings, warnings that are by definition unneeded. A superfluous warning is not required because a warning is required only when it would make the product safer to use. We all agree that a product warning that does not apprise a consumer of anything of which he is not already aware does not make a product safer to use. The plaintiffs in the instant cases do not claim that the defendants should have warned of obvious dangers associated with aboveground swimming pools. The plaintiffs claim rather that there is a risk of catastrophic injury, quadriplegia, that may result from diving in shallow aboveground pools, that this risk is not obvious, and that such pools would be safer to use if manufacturers provided a warning concerning the risk of catastrophic injury. A jury might properly conclude from the plaintiffs' evidence that the asserted danger is latent, and that a warning would make the product safer to use. Such a warning would not, on such a finding, be superfluous.
The majority attaches considerable significance to what it describes as the simple character of aboveground pools. The majority argues that because an aboveground pool is a simple product its inherent characteristics and features ... are readily apparent or easily discernible upon casual inspection. [12] This description of simple product begs the question, since it assumes that all characteristics of a simple product are universally known, and therefore such products cannot present a latent danger. Under the majority's approach, a latent danger could never be found, and a warning never would be needed with a simple product because the characteristics of such products are, by definition, universally known. At some point simplicity and complexity come full circle. If simple products require no warnings because their characteristics are universally known, so too complex products because their characteristics are universally un known, and consumers should reasonably treat them with caution. If a car battery is not a simple product, then it can be argued that it is mysterious enough to warrant extreme caution in its use. But surely the majority would not suggest that this universally known latency of risk obviates any obligation to warn. The simplicity or complexity of a product is not controlling on a warning issue. The pertinent inquiry is whether a danger is latent. If a simple product can never in principle present an obvious risk to users, then the definition of simple product merely expresses the prejudgment that no latent risk inheres. But at that point the inquiry should focus on the basis for making that prejudgment. The claim that there is nothing enigmatic about such pools is not accurate. [13] The plaintiffs presented evidence of properties inherent in a shallow aboveground pool that are indeed enigmatic and not observable upon casual inspection. The testimony of the expert witnesses negatives defendants' claims that the pools are comprised only of universally known characteristics. [14] Undeniably the shallowness of aboveground pools is readily apparent. [15] It does not follow that because the condition creating that danger is readily apparent, all dangers created by the obvious condition are readily apparent or discoverable upon casual inspection. The majority assumes that the bare observation of shallow water fully reveals all dangers inherent in shallow water. It is precisely plaintiffs' contention that at least some danger, the risk of quadriplegic injury, is not discoverable upon casual inspection of a shallow pool, and there is substantial evidence in the record supporting that contention. [16]
At the heart of the majority's analysis is the assertion that there is no need to warn of a specific risk if the general risk is open and obvious. Since the general risk of diving in shallow waters is, according to the majority, open and obvious, it is of no importance that the specific risks of quadriplegia, paralysis and the consequences are not generally recognized. [17] Although the plaintiffs acknowledged that they knew diving in shallow pools was dangerous, they offered evidence to support their claim that they did not appreciate the risk of quadriplegic injury. A Under the analytical framework adopted by the majority, if there is an obvious general danger associated with using a product, the manufacturer does not have an obligation to warn of any latent specific risk in using a product. The obligation to warn of a risk in using a product does not, however, depend on whether the risk is general or specific. The essential question respecting an obligation to warn is whether the risk complained of is obvious. Failure to warn cases that consider the interplay of patent, latent, general, and specific characteristics of product-related dangers present these issues in a variety of contexts. [18] But they share a common thread: whether there is an obligation to warn depends on the latency of the specific risk, not the general risk. If there is a specific latent risk, there is an obligation to warn, even if there is a more general obvious risk. In numerous cases, courts have rejected claims that mirror the arguments adopted by the majority. In Hopkins v E I DuPont de Nemours & Co, 199 F2d 930 (CA 3, 1952), a workman was killed by a dynamite explosion during an excavation project, and his widow brought a negligent failure to warn claim against the maker of the explosives. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed: Defendant tells us that everybody knows that dynamite is dangerous and that there is no need to warn against the obvious. But plaintiff's theory does not go to the generally dangerous character of dynamite.... Everybody knows that dynamite should not be thrown in a fire, but apparently most construction workers do not know that it should not be placed in a hole under the conditions existent in this case. [ Id. at 933. Initial emphasis added.] In East Penn Mfg Co v Pineda, 578 A2d 1113, 1122 (DC App, 1990), a mechanic was injured by a car battery that exploded. The manufacturer of the battery argued that the mechanic's experience had acquainted him with the particular risks associated with batteries, and thus there was no duty to warn of the dangers. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the manufacturer had a duty to warn of the specific risk that the battery might explode during charging, even though the mechanic clearly knew that a person should exercise care around batteries because they produce explosive gases. In Whitehead v St Joe Lead Co, 729 F2d 238 (CA 3, 1984), the plaintiff claimed that lead poisoning was caused by long-term exposure to lead in the plant owned by the defendant. The defendant argued that lead contamination was a generally known danger, and thus there was no duty to warn. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit responded: We cannot conclude that lead exposure in the workplace is a generally known risk requiring no warning as a matter of law. Our concern is not with whether it is generally known that lead can be harmful if deliberately consumed. Rather, we consider whether safe exposure limits to airborne lead are generally known, and whether it is generally known that these levels were exceeded in plants like Alpha's. [ Id. at 254. Emphasis added.] In Haberly v Reardon Co, 319 SW2d 859 (Mo, 1958), a boy helping his father paint, was blinded in one eye when cement-based paint accidentally lodged in his eye. The defendant paint manufacturer argued that there was no duty to warn of the specific danger of paint entering the eye because everyone knows that paint of any kind will cause problems if lodged in the eye. In rejecting this claim the Missouri Supreme Court said: It is certainly common knowledge ... that foreign substances ... should not be lodged in an eye.... [E]veryone knows that, generally speaking, a foreign substance in an eye ... sometimes will result in pain and ... possibly serious consequences. It does not follow ... from the fact that such is common knowledge that a specific warning [of the tragic consequences of paint in the eye] would not alert one to act far differently than otherwise he would have acted.... [ Id. at 867. Emphasis added.] In Leonard v Uniroyal, Inc, 765 F2d 560, 566 (CA 6, 1985), where one truckdriver was injured and another killed when an underinflated truck tire blew out, the plaintiff secured a favorable jury verdict on a claim that Uniroyal was negligent in failing to warn of the dangers of tire underinflation. Uniroyal argued that the jury should have been instructed that there was no duty to warn since truckdrivers generally knew of the dangers from underinflated tires. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Uniroyal was not entitled to a no duty instruction since it produced no evidence to establish that danger from underinflated tires is common knowledge among professional truckdrivers. In Long v Deere & Co, 238 Kan 766; 715 P2d 1023 (1986), a worker, injured when a crawler loader rolled over, claimed that the defendant should have warned of the necessity of wearing a seat belt while operating the loader. Deere argued that since the risks of not using seat belts are generally known, a warning would have been futile. The Kansas Supreme Court held that it could not say as matter of law that because of the common use of seat belts in passenger vehicles that the risks associated with the loader were commonly known, and that a warning would have been futile. In Brune v Brown Forman Corp, 758 SW2d 827, 831 (Tex App, 1988), the Texas Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment in favor of a liquor manufacturer in an action brought by a survivor after her daughter died from acute alcohol poisoning. In holding that the failure to warn claim was improperly dismissed, the court said: [T]he fatal propensities of acute alcohol poisoning cannot be readily categorized as ordinary common knowledge. Although there is no question that drinking alcoholic beverages will cause intoxication and possibly even cause illness is a matter of common knowledge, we are not prepared to hold, as a matter of law, that the general public is aware that the consumption of an excessive amount of alcohol can result in death. We realize that there is no clear line between what is and is not common knowledge, but where facts, as shown by appellant's summary judgment proof, show how easily disputed the knowledge of the fatal propensities of alcohol may be, we will not recognize it as common knowledge as a matter of law. [Emphasis added.][ [19] ] B The majority further characterizes the plaintiff's claims regarding the specific risk of quadriplegic injury as claims not about the danger presented by the pools, but, rather, only about the specific consequences or degree of harm from the danger. [20] It would, indeed, be unreasonable, probably impossible, to require a manufacturer to warn consumers about every conceivable injury that might result from the use of a product, and the law assuredly does not impose such an obligation. [21] While we agree that there is no obligation to warn of a particular danger simply because it is conceivable, the plaintiffs do not argue that there is an obligation to warn of all conceivable dangers associated with aboveground pools. The plaintiffs argue that there is a specific significant danger for which a warning should be supplied because that danger is latent, and a warning would reduce the number of occurrences of significant injury.
Most jurisdictions that have addressed similar cases have been unwilling to impose liability on the pool manufacturer or seller.[ [22] ] The results in the swimming pool cases, while consistent with the holding by the majority, are problematic. Closer examination reveals merely coincidental support for the result in the instant cases, and highlights the inadequacy of the approach taken by the majority. A Several of the cases cited differ significantly from the instant cases in that they did not concern injuries resulting from shallow or flat dives into aboveground pools, but, rather, involved injuries sustained from vertical or deep dives. [23] Because these cases did not involve the flat or shallow dives attempted by the instant plaintiffs, there was no expert testimony regarding the industry's awareness of the risk or danger of shallow diving, and that the public was unaware of that risk. [24] B The majority states that it eschews the proximate cause approach [25] in favor of the more difficult duty analysis. [26] As the majority notes, [27] courts that concluded that a failure to warn could not have been a proximate cause of a diving injury typically focused on the testimony presented by the plaintiffs themselves. [28] The courts thus drew their conclusions about the obviousness of the dangers presented by the pools without evidentiary records comparable to those in the instant cases. [29] Other courts, in deciding swimming pool cases, implicitly concluded that a warning would not have altered the conduct of the plaintiff. In contradistinction to the instant cases, those courts were not presented evidence supporting claims that pool users generally are unaware of the risks of shallow diving and catastrophic injury. To the extent that the cited cases involved claims that manufacturers should have given general warnings about the dangers of diving, the claims are inapposite to those now before this Court. C The assertion that swimming pool manufacturers and sellers have not been held subject to liability in similar cases by [m]ost jurisdictions [30] is overstated. [31] Other jurisdictions have not uniformly responded to such claims. [32] In Corbin v Coleco Industries, Inc, 748 F2d 411 (CA 7, 1984), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed a summary judgment on a negligent failure to warn claim granted defendant manufacturer. After reviewing the record of expert testimony, the court said: [E]ven though people are generally aware of the danger of diving into shallow water, they believe that there is a safe way to do it, namely, by executing a flat, shallow dive. If people do in fact generally hold such a belief, then it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the risk of spinal injury from diving into shallow water is open and obvious. Whether a danger is open and obvious depends not just on what people can see with their eyes but also on what they know and believe about what they see. In particular, if people generally believe that there is a danger associated with the use of a product, but that there is a safe way to use it, any danger there may be in using the product in the way generally believed to be safe is not open and obvious.[ [33] ] The result in Corbin is particularly persuasive. The Corbin court, like the majority in the instant cases, employed a duty analysis, [34] and focused on the testimony of experts as well as the plaintiff himself, [35] but reached a result contrary to that of the instant majority. The court did not find that the danger of diving in a shallow aboveground pool was open and obvious, but only that the plaintiff presented evidence sufficient to preclude summary judgment ... on the basis of the open and obvious defense. [36] We would similarly so conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact, and would remand these cases for trial.