Opinion ID: 1910042
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jury instructions on witness identification.

Text: ¶ 5. Before trial, counsel for Cousar submitted jury instruction D9-A, which read as follows: The Court instructs the jury that whether DONALD RAMIRO COUSAR was the person who committed the crime as alleged and charged in the indictment in this case is a matter for you to decide. The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. If you are not convinced from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that DONALD RAMIRO COUSAR was the person who committed the crime, you must find him not guilty. Identification testimony is an expression of belief or impression by the witness. Its value depends on the opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at the time of the offense and to make a reliable identification later. In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider the following: a) the opportunity that the witness had to view the defendant when the crime occurred; b) the witness's attention at the time; c) the accuracy of any prior descriptions of the defendant by the witness; d) the witness's level of certainty at the initial post crime confrontation, and e) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. If after considering all of the above you have a reasonable doubt that DONALD RAMIRO COUSAR is the person who committed the crime as alleged by the State of Mississippi, it is your sworn duty to find him not guilty. ¶ 6. The State objected to factor c (accuracy of any prior descriptions of the defendant by the witness) stating that it did not apply to the facts of the case because none of its witnesses had given any prior descriptions of the defendant, and it would confuse the jury to leave that provision in the instruction. In response, counsel for Cousar pointed out that Officer McGowan's report did reflect a physical description of Coop [2] and that it could be established by inference that the description must have come from Officer Stegall. The trial judge, however, recalled that on cross-examination, Stegall had specifically [been asked] if he provided that description and he said no. Defense counsel then acknowledged that the description might have come from the informant. The trial court concluded that it was never established who provided a physical description of the person known as Coop as being 5'11 and 200 pounds. Therefore, provision c was redacted. ¶ 7. The trial court further concluded that any inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony were covered by instruction C-2, which read as follows: You, as jurors, are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight their testimony deserves. You should carefully scrutinize all the testimony given, the circumstances under which each witness has testified, and every matter in evidence that tends to show whether a witness is worthy of belief. Consider each witness' objectivity, state of mind, demeanor and manner while on the stand. Consider the witness' ability to observe the matters as to which he or she has testified, and whether he or she impresses you as having an accurate recollection of these matters. Consider the extent to which it is contradicted by other evidence in the case. Inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of a witness, or between the testimony of different witnesses, may or may not cause the jury to discredit such testimony. Two or more persons witnessing an incident or a transaction may see or hear it differently; and innocent misrecollection, like failure of recollection, is not an uncommon experience. In weighing the effect of a discrepancy, always consider whether it pertains to a matter of importance or an unimportant detail, and whether the discrepancy results from innocent error or intentional falsehood. After making your own judgment, you will give the testimony of each witness such credibility, if any, as you may think it deserves. Redacted instruction D-9A, as well as C-2, were given as jury instructions. ¶ 8. Citing Davis v. State, 568 So.2d 277 (Miss.1990), Cousar argues that the trial court erred in redacting factor c from his proposed jury instruction 9-A, because the revised instruction failed to fully instruct the jury as to all the elements required for proper identification. His reliance on Davis is misplaced, however. The instruction at issue in Davis originally read as follows: The Court instructs the Jury that in reaching your verdict you are to consider all of the evidence concerning the entire case and the circumstances surrounding the crime. One of the issues in this case is the identification of George Lee Davis as the perpetrator of the crime. As with each element of the crime charged, the State has the burden of proving identity beyond a reasonable doubt, and before you may convict George Lee Davis you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification of George Lee Davis. If, after considering all of the evidence concerning the crime and the witness' identification of George Lee Davis as the person who committed the crime, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he is the person who committed the crime, then you must find him not guilty. Identification testimony is an expression of belief or impression by the witness. You must judge its value and reliability from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the crime and the subsequent identification. In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider the following: 1) Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to observe the offender? 2) Did the witness observe the offender with an adequate degree of attention? 3) Did the witness provide an accurate description of the offender after the crime? 4) How certain is the witness of the identification? 5) How much time passed between the crime and the identification? If, after examining all of the testimony and the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt that George Lee Davis was the person who committed the crime, then you must find George Lee Davis not guilty. Id. at 280 (emphasis in original). ¶ 9. Cousar claims that this Court approved the above instruction in Davis, but that is not correct. To the contrary, this Court found that the trial judge's decision to strike the italicized portion of the above instruction was not erroneous, and affirmed. While it is true that this Court found the five factors in the italicized portion of the instruction correctly states our case law and could have been granted, id. (emphasis added), we clearly did not require that all five factors must be found in every case. Id. at 280. ¶ 10. The general rule is that an instruction is not to be given if it is not supported by evidence. Haggerty v. Foster, 838 So.2d 948, 955 (Miss.2002) (citing Dennis v. State, 555 So.2d 679, 683 (Miss. 1989); Moffett v. State, 540 So.2d 1313 (Miss.1989); Nicolaou v. State, 534 So.2d 168 (Miss.1988)). Granting instructions not supported by evidence is error. Id. The trial court found that a physical description of Cousar was not provided by Officer Stegall and that the source of the description mentioned in Officer McGowan's testimony was unclear, and thus concluded that the reference to prior description of the defendant by the witness was not supported by the record and should not be given. Therefore, based upon the record, the trial court did not err in redacting factor c from jury instruction 9A under the facts of this case. ¶ 11. Cousar's reliance upon Warren v. State, 709 So.2d 415, 421 (Miss. 1998), is also misplaced. In Warren, reversible error was found because no identification instruction was given. Id. In the present case, unlike Warren, the record reflects that the jury was given proper instructions for identification testimony, given the facts of the case. Jury instruction C-2 covered not only inconsistencies or contradictions in the testimony of a single witness or between different witnesses, but also the conflicting testimony about the significance of a description given for someone else. The credibility of a witness is a question of fact for the jury to resolve. ¶ 12. When determining whether reversible error lies in the granting or refusal of various instructions, the instructions actually given must be read as a whole to determine whether a jury has been incorrectly instructed. When so read, if the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found. Haggerty, 838 So.2d at 953 (citing Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 782 (Miss.1997)). It is not proper to consider excerpts from jury instructions or to evaluate portions of jury instructions out of context, since jury instructions must be considered with the other instructions given. Id. at 954. ¶ 13. This issue is without merit.