Opinion ID: 2352986
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Second Appeal Counterclaim

Text: In its second appeal the appellant first contends that the trial court erred in sustaining appellee's demurrer to the appellant's plea on equitable grounds. This plea was interposed at the beginning of the trial of appellee's counterclaim, and after the trial court had directed a verdict against it in the replevin action. In summary, this plea was that the appellant would be entitled to relief against any judgment obtained against it on equitable grounds because the conditional contract of sale was held by the Trust Company after default by appellee for the mutual benefit of the Trust Company and appellant, the Trust Company acquiescing in and consenting to the assertion of the subrogation pro tanto by appellant, and also because a complete reassignment if requested by the appellant, who had paid four of the notes previously in default to the Trust Company, would thereby vest appellant with all rights as a pro tanto subrogee. The trial court sustained the demurrer to this plea because it ruled that the plea did not establish the necessary requirement that it show such facts that would require the judgment to be set aside in equity. We think his ruling was correct under the facts and circumstances involved in this case. The question as to appellant's right to maintain an action in replevin had already been litigated and determined when the plea was filed. Moreover, as a defense in an action at law it could not be maintained that a court of equity would be required to set aside a judgment rendered against a defendant for wanton, wilful, or malicious trespass and conversion which constituted the appellee's alleged cause of action in the counterclaim. Under the equitable doctrine of clean hands it would not be in a position to seek relief from such a judgment. The appellant was not entitled to possession of the tractor, which was clearly demonstrated by the cases cited in the first appeal. The appellant cites no case, nor have we found any, where such a doctrine has been applied, in a situation similar to that disclosed by the record in this case. The appellant's third and final contention is that in the trial of the counterclaim the lower court (a) erred in permitting the appellee to produce evidence regarding alleged actual damages sustained by him as the result of the replevin and in allowing the jury to award the appellee any amount in excess of nominal damages on his counterclaim; (b) erred in allowing the jury to assess, under the facts in this case, punitive damages against the appellant as justified by any evidence of wanton, wilful, or malicious action on the part of the appellant in seeking to recover the tractor under the conditional sales contract here involved; and (c) that there was no evidence to support a finding of a breach of a subsequent contract on the part of the appellant, or of any wanton, wilful, or malicious action on its part in breach of any such contract. It was not contradicted in the evidence that at the time of filing the suit in replevin on July 17, 1959, appellant did not have the right to possession of the tractor and the trial court so instructed the jury. At that time the right of possession was in appellee and the right to repossession for a condition broken was vested in the Union Trust Company alone. That Company was not a party to the replevin proceeding and took no action of any kind to repossess the tractor. Appellant's action was wrongful and unlawful and there is no doubt that appellee suffered actual damages during the period of time he was deprived of the possession of the tractor. The case of Crabbs v. Koontz, 69 Md. 59, 13 Atl. 591 relied on by appellant is not in point and is not controlling here. In that case the action was on a replevin bond, a bond of indemnity only, and title was in the conditional seller, the plaintiff in the replevin action. Moreover, there was no proof of actual damages. In this case the action was for trespass and conversion, actual damages were shown and no title or right of possession was in appellant. The trial court's instruction authorized the jury to give punitive damages in their discretion, provided they found that there was a wanton, wilful, and malicious course of action and activity on the part of the appellant. That punitive damages are allowed in such cases and that such an instruction is proper is clearly established. The legal principles, as stated in the instruction, in almost identical terms, have been repeatedly sanctioned by the Maryland cases. Superior Construction Co. v. Elmo, 204 Md. 1, 15, 102 A.2d 739; Saunders v. Mullinix, 195 Md. 235, 240, 72 A.2d 720; Nichols v. Meyer, 139 Md. 450, 452, 461, 115 Atl. 786; Medairy v. McAllister, 97 Md. 488, 489, 495, 497, 55 Atl. 461; Sloan v. Edwards, 61 Md. 89, 101; Strasburger v. Barber, 38 Md. 103, 104; Moore v. Schultz, 31 Md. 418, 423; Snively v. Fahnestock, 18 Md. 391, 395; Schindel v. Schindel, 12 Md. 108, 123; see also 1 Poe, supra, § 240; 52 Am. Jur., Trespass, § 10, 842, and § 57, 878; 46 Am. Jur., Replevin, § 139, 75. The appellant in its brief argues that the trial court did not, but should have, defined the nature of malicious and wanton conduct. These words do not require definition. This Court has repeatedly approved such instructions containing these words without further definition. Nichols v. Meyer , Medairy v. McAllister, Strasburger v. Barber, all supra. For cases where punitive damages for wrongful possession or repossession by holder of conditional sales contracts were allowed see 153 A.L.R. 769. In Perlick v. Pacific Discount Corp. (Cal.) 127 P.2d 647, where defendant refused to accept a cashier's check in payment of full amount due, and in Booth v. Peoples Finance Co., (Cal.) 12 P.2d 50, where defendant refused full payment when offered, it was held that these actions furnished a basis for the finding of malice or oppression and the awarding of punitive damages. For other cases involving wrongful withholding or taking by creditors in which punitive damages were recovered, see 54 A.L.R.2d 1375, 1381. Punitive damages are properly a question for the jury in an action for wrongful conversion of personal property where the act of the defendant is accompanied with fraud, ill will, recklessness, wantonness, oppressiveness, wilful disregard of the plaintiff's rights, or other circumstances tending to aggravate the injury. 53 Am. Jur., Trover and Conversion, § 104, 895; 10 Am. Jur., Chattel Mortgages, § 175, 831. Malice, fraud, deceit and wrongful motive are oftenest inferred from acts and circumstantial evidence. They are seldom admitted and need not be proved by direct evidence. Geisey v. Holberg, 185 Md. 642, 643, 45 A.2d 735; Stouffer v. Alford, 114 Md. 110, 119, 78 Atl. 387; 2 Waterman, Trespass, § 1107. There was ample evidence, both factual and circumstantial, from which a jury could find that appellant acted wilfully, wantonly, wrongfully, and maliciously in utter disregard of appellee's rights. It was a reasonable and proper inference that appellant became provoked with appellee's numerous requests that the defective condition of the tractor be corrected and that it determined to put a stop to the complaints by seizing the tractor and forcing the appellee to sign a release of all claims that he might have. The validity of this inference was clear in the light of appellant's insistence that appellee release all claims as a condition for appellant's acceptance of the redemption payment it had demanded of appellee and which it had stated it would accept. The appellant's action in this respect constituted an aggravation of the wrongful act of conversion. This wrongful detention of appellee's tractor following its wrongful seizure, with knowledge of the fact on the part of appellant, could be found by the jury to be wanton and malicious conduct. We find no error in the trial court's instructions to the jury with reference to the appellee's causes of action in tort, nor as to actual or punitive damages. With reference to the court's instructions should it find that a subsequent contract originating from a letter dated July 21, 1959, by Taylor, Comptroller, to the appellee, actually came into existence and was breached by the appellant, the court instructed the jury that it might award only nominal damages of one cent. In so ruling there was clearly no error committed which was prejudicial to the appellant. Finding no reversible error in the trial below, the judgments must be affirmed, but without prejudice to the rights of the parties concerning the notes secured by the conditional contract of sale which were not litigated in these cases. Judgments affirmed, with costs.