Opinion ID: 1130834
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: guilt phase error murder count

Text: (18) Cummings contends that the evidence regarding his threat to Dwayne Norton on the afternoon before the murder was inadmissible under subdivision (a) of Evidence Code section 1101 as evidence of prior bad acts. [28] The evidence was not, however, offered as evidence of Cummings's character or to prove his conduct at the time of the murder, and it was highly relevant. Evidence that Cummings was in possession of a handgun and had threatened to kill any policeman who got in his way went to his motive for shooting Officer Verna and thus to the elements of intent, premeditation and deliberation. It was also relevant to the purpose element of the special circumstance of killing to avoid arrest. The time frame was such that a jury could reasonably infer that the intent to kill police officers stated at that time still existed at the time of the killing. ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1014-1015 [264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627]; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 636-637 [250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189].) Cummings also argues that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. (Evid. Code, § 352.) He did not expressly object on that ground. The trial court apparently inferred that this objection was encompassed in the stated objection and argument of counsel and made an express ruling, in overruling the objection, that the threats and possession of the gun were highly probative. Assuming that the objection was properly made, we agree that the evidence was highly probative.
(19) Cummings objected to the testimony of Deputy LaCasella regarding the incriminating statements by Cummings which LaCasella had overheard. LaCasella had been acting as a courtroom bailiff prior to the decision to call him as a witness. Cummings objected to admission of his testimony on grounds that admitting the testimony of a trusted court officer, who had been involved in seating and escorting the jurors and relaying juror messages to the court, would deny due process and a fair and impartial trial. Neither Turner v. Louisiana (1965) 379 U.S. 466 [13 L.Ed.2d 424, 85 S.Ct. 546], nor Gonzalez v. Beto (1972) 405 U.S. 1052 [31 L.Ed.2d 787, 92 S.Ct. 1503], on which Cummings relies, supports the broad rule he would invoke. In Turner, the principal prosecution witnesses were two deputies who had investigated the homicide for which Turner was on trial and who acted as courtroom deputies during the trial and deliberations. They freely mingled and conversed with the jurors in and out of the courthouse. The court had not directed the deputies to cease their association with the jurors. On those facts the Supreme Court held that the right to trial by jury had been compromised. It would have undermined the basic guarantees of trial by jury to permit this kind of an association between the jurors and two key prosecution witnesses who were not deputy sheriffs. But the role that [the deputies] played as deputies made the association even more prejudicial. For the relationship was one which could not but foster the jurors' confidence in those who were their official guardians during the entire period of the trial. And Turner's fate depended upon how much confidence the jury placed in those two witnesses. ( Turner v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. at p. 474 [13 L.Ed.2d at pp. 429-430].) Gonzalez v. Beto, supra, 405 U.S. 1052, was a summary reversal. The concurring opinion of Justice Stewart, in which Justices Douglas and Marshall joined, reveals that the facts were similar to those in Turner and reversal was predicated on the same reasoning. The key prosecution witness was a county sheriff who also served as courtroom deputy. His testimony on cross-examination was interrupted so that he could retire the jury, and he continued to serve in his role as bailiff through the end of the trial and deliberations. The trial court carefully considered LaCasella's involvement in courtroom activities and ruled that his association with the jurors was so minimal and so professional that the probative value of his testimony outweighed any prejudice to Cummings from his status. We agree. Cummings cannot claim an immunity for his extrajudicial statements on the ground that it happened to be a bailiff who overheard the statements. [29] The court did not err in admitting the testimony. The events in this case are clearly distinguishable from those in Turner v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 466 and Gonzalez v. Beto, supra, 405 U.S. 1052. Deputy LaCasella had no role in the investigation of the case and was not identified prior to trial as a possible witness in the case. He was not the principal or key prosecution witness. He had relatively little direct contact with members of the jury and was promptly relieved of his courtroom duties when he became a witness. The jury was admonished that all witnesses' testimony was to be judged on the same basis and that no greater weight should be accorded to LaCasella because he had been a deputy in the court. Neither defendant's right to a fair trial, nor his right to jury trial was undermined by the admission of LaCasella's testimony.
(20) Defendants argue that the court abused its discretion in permitting the prosecution to use a mannequin to illustrate the paths of the six bullets through the body of Officer Verna. Using dowels to demonstrate those paths, the prosecution attempted to assist the jury in understanding the testimony of the expert witnesses, forensic pathologists. The prosecution expert had testified that the path of bullet number 6 was consistent with a bullet shot from within the car as the victim leaned over and into the car. The defense expert, who disagreed with the prosecution expert on one of the shots, did not dispute the theory that the first shot, number 6, could have been fired in that manner. Cummings also argues that it was improper to admit photographs of defendants and a bailiff posed in and next to a car to illustrate the prosecution's theory that the first shot could have been fired from the backseat of the car without depositing gunshot residue on the headrest of the front seat and other areas within the car. Gay failed to object to the simulations. In any event, the court did not err. Mannequins may be used as illustrative evidence to assist the jury in understanding the testimony of witnesses or to clarify the circumstances of a crime. ( People v. Robillard (1960) 55 Cal.2d 88, 99-100 [10 Cal. Rptr. 167, 358 P.2d 295, 83 A.L.R.2d 1086]; People v. Fitzgerald (1972) 29 Cal. App.3d 296, 316 [105 Cal. Rptr. 458].) Photographs of an accurate reconstruction of an event in issue are also admissible. ( People v. O'Brien (1976) 61 Cal. App.3d 766, 780 [132 Cal. Rptr. 616].) The issues to which this evidence was relevant were hotly disputed. The expert testimony was confusing at times. The probative value of the evidence clearly outweighed any prejudice to Cummings. [30]
Cummings objected to the admission of a record made by Detective Holder of Holder's interview with Michael Kanan. During the interview Kanan told Holder that Cummings said that he and Gay had discussed killing a police officer if they were stopped while driving a stolen car and were wanted for robbery. (21)(See fn. 32.) He objected on grounds that the evidence was hearsay, [31] the admission of which denied him his right to confront and cross-examine Kanan, [32] and that the evidence was not admissible under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule. (Evid. Code, § 1237.) [33] Kanan had initiated contact with the detective while an inmate in the county jail. He said that his conversation with Cummings occurred while both were being transported to court appearances. Kanan testified that he had no recall of the conversations with Cummings or Holder, had been undergoing detoxification, was sometimes delusional, and was still having drug-related problems at the time of trial. He testified, however, that what he told Holder was the truth. He admitted that his motive for talking to Holder was to arrange a deal to get out of jail. Other snitches taught him how to inform. The record of Kanan's statement made by Detective Holder was authenticated by Holder who testified regarding the method of its preparation and by Kanan who testified that he was unable to recall the content of his conversation with Cummings, but he had truthfully reported it to Holder while it was fresh in his mind. At an in camera hearing on a motion by Cummings to strike Kanan's testimony [34] made subsequent to admission of Kanan's statement, counsel for Cummings testified that Kanan had called him a few hours after testifying, wanted to recant his entire testimony, and wanted to appear to explain the entire snitch system. Kanan failed to keep two appointments, however, and all attempts to locate Kanan thereafter were futile. The motion to strike was denied, but the Cummings jury was instructed that Kanan had indicated an intent to recant his testimony and had then intentionally and purposely avoided efforts by the court and the parties to have him appear. (22) Cummings argues that the foundation for admission of the statement was inadequate since Kanan could not testify that his statement to Holder was a true statement of fact. Kanan had no recollection either of Cummings's statement to him or of his own statement to Holder. He had no recall of even talking to Holder. The record does not support this claim. Kanan testified that he spoke to Holder a few days after the bus ride with Cummings, that the conversation he related was then fresh in his mind, and that he told Holder the truth. On cross-examination he accurately described the location in the bus where Cummings was seated and the special security provisions that segregated and secured Cummings, a high power prisoner, in a special holding area. As the trial judge recognized, whether an adequate foundation for admission of Kanan's statement to Holder had been established turned on whether Kanan's testimony that his statement was true was reliable. (Evid. Code, § 1237; People v. Parks (1971) 4 Cal.3d 955, 960 [95 Cal. Rptr. 193, 485 P.2d 257]; People v. Simmons, supra, 123 Cal. App.3d 677, 682-683.) Defendant argues that, like the witness in Simmons, Kanan could not reliably testify that his statement was true. Simmons is distinguishable, however. There, the witness had amnesia and could not recall any of the events in his statement, making it, or any circumstances surrounding the statement. He testified only that he had no reason to lie when he made the statement. Here, by contrast, Kanan had sufficient recall of the events that the trial court had a sufficient basis for concluding that his testimony was reliable. The judge was aware that Kanan had testified that he was delusional and did not know what the facts were, and had said that he did not recall, but, after extensive argument, admitted the evidence. We cannot conclude that she abused her discretion in doing so. She heard the testimony and had the best opportunity to assess the credibility of the witness. Her conclusion that Kanan testified truthfully and reliably when he said that his statement to Holder was true is supported by the record. We also reject Cummings's claim that the court erred in denying the motion to strike Kanan's testimony. Hearsay evidence that a witness wishes to recant does not mandate striking prior testimony of that witness.
(23) Gay contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Robin had been tried and convicted of being an accessory after the murder of Officer Verna. (§ 32.) [35] He argues, with merit, that the evidence was not relevant to any issue, and that if it was introduced as evidence of his guilt, it was inadmissible hearsay. We agree that the evidence was irrelevant. The People suggest only that the conviction of Robin as an accessory to murder and as a robber tended to show that Pamela's testimony had a basis in fact. If the evidence was admitted for that purpose it was also hearsay, however ( People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 300 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d 938]), and lacked relevance for purposes of corroboration. The conviction reflected only the view of a judge or jury that evidence presented in a different case established that Robin had assisted the defendants or either of them after the murder. It did not come within any exception to the hearsay rule applicable to judgments. (See Evid. Code, §§ 788, 1300 et seq.) [36] Furthermore, although Gay objected to introduction of the evidence on grounds of hearsay (Evid. Code, § 1200), relevance (Evid. Code, § 210), and prejudice (Evid. Code, § 352), the trial court did not rule on the objection that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. It clearly was. Although Robin's assistance to either her husband or Cummings could have been the basis for the conviction, it is inconceivable that the jury would not understand the evidence to reflect guilt of aiding her husband who, by necessary implication, had committed a murder. We agree with the People, however, in light of the overwhelming evidence of Gay's guilt, the error in admitting this evidence was harmless. [37]
Beasley's preliminary hearing testimony  that she saw a very light-skinned man, six feet tall, with a gericurl, shoot Officer Verna four times  was admitted over hearsay and Sixth Amendment-based objections by Gay after the court found that the People had used due diligence in attempting to locate her. Although she had been subpoenaed and had stated she would appear, she could not be located at the time her prior testimony was admitted. Efforts to serve a body attachment warrant on her had been unavailing. [38] Beasley appeared prior to the conclusion of the People's case-in-chief, but counsel were unprepared to question her. She was ordered to return, but was not called as a witness subsequently. (24a) Gay now contends that the court erred in concluding that the People had made sufficient efforts to locate Beasley to warrant the court's ruling that she was unavailable within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1291, and that admission of her preliminary hearing testimony therefore denied him his constitutional rights to confrontation and cross-examination. As the People note, however, Beasley was ultimately produced. Gay had the opportunity to, but did not, cross-examine her. He argues that the error was not cured by producing Beasley some eight days after her preliminary hearing testimony was read since cross-examination at that late date would reinforce rather than undermine her direct testimony. Gay offers no authority for the proposition that the Constitution mandates that cross-examination be available no later than the close of the witness's direct testimony. We see no reason to conclude that the opportunity to cross-examine Beasley at the time she was located did not satisfy constitutional demands. Even if there were merit to that argument, however, his initial claim fails. The evidence was properly admitted. (25) A person is unavailable as a witness within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1291 if he or she is [a]bsent from the hearing and the proponent of his or her statement has exercised reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his or her attendance by the court's process. (Evid. Code, § 240, subd. (a)(5).) The proponent of the evidence, here the People, has the burden of establishing unavailability by competent evidence. ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th 324, 424.) We have stated that whether due diligence was demonstrated is a factual question to be determined by the trial court according to the circumstances in each case; under familiar rules the trial court's ruling will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion appears. ( People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 312 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149].) More recently, however, we have indicated that independent review might be appropriate. (See People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th 424; People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 563 [244 Cal. Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776]; People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 984-989 [232 Cal. Rptr. 110, 728 P.2d 180].) (24b) We have undertaken an independent review of this record. It amply demonstrates due diligence. Beasley had testified at both the grand jury hearing and the preliminary hearing. Attempts were made to locate her thereafter beginning in January 1984, more than a year before her testimony was needed. Notwithstanding 22 unsuccessful attempts to locate the witness and 1 successful service of subpoena, [39] the court refused to admit the prior testimony at an April 10 hearing, and suggested that a body attachment should be ordered by the court and entered into the countywide computer network making it available to all peace officers. The body attachment was issued and was entered into the computer system. The prosecutor also agreed to have a patrol car go by Beasley's home every night during the trial in an attempt to serve her. That was done for seven days. An officer on the evening watch went by four times without stopping and stopped on ten occasions during that period. He never saw any indication that Beasley was home or that anyone had been living there. Another officer on the morning watch also attempted unsuccessfully to serve Beasley. The aid of the apartment manager and neighbors was enlisted. None called to report Beasley's return. Her car was never in the parking lot. The investigator went again to the home of Beasley's mother and showed her the body attachment. He had checked her last employer, believed she was now unemployed and on welfare, and listed at the address the officers had been checking. That was the address on Department of Motor Vehicles records also. Her automobile was registered at her mother's address. The trial court found due diligence. We find due diligence. That additional efforts might have been made or other lines of inquiry pursued does not affect this conclusion. ( People v. Guiterrez (1991) 232 Cal. App.3d 1624, 1641 [284 Cal. Rptr. 230].) It is enough that the People used reasonable efforts to locate the witness. They did. [40]
Cummings objected to the presence of numerous uniformed peace officers among the persons attending the trial. [41] Gay objected only on the ground that the presence of the officers affected him personally. Some of those officers were motorcycle officers whose dress was identical to that worn by Officer Verna at the time of his death. These officers occasionally occupied seats in the front row of the audience. The judge considered the objection and, although expressing doubt that the presence of the officers would have undue influence on the jury, attempted to accommodate Cummings's concern, suggesting that, when possible, officers attending the trial wear civilian clothes. She also ruled that if more than two or three uniformed officers were present at the same time the motion could be renewed. [42] The matter was not raised again during the trial. [43] (26a) Defendants argue on appeal that the court abused its discretion in permitting any uniformed officers to attend the trial as spectators. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. (27) The right to a public trial is not that of the defendant alone. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 29; Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1986) 478 U.S. 1, 7 [92 L.Ed.2d 1, 9, 106 S.Ct. 2735].) The public policy in favor of open judicial hearings was emphasized in this court's opinion in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 772, 779-780 [209 Cal. Rptr. 360, 691 P.2d 1026]. (See also Tribune Newspapers West, Inc. v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal. App.3d 443, 449 [218 Cal. Rptr. 505].) Only if restriction is necessary to preserve a defendant's right to a fair trial may the court restrict attendance by members of the public. Because a First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings is also recognized, they may not be closed unless specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that `closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.' ( Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 478 U.S. 1, 13-14 [92 L.Ed.2d 1, 13].) (26b) In this case there was no effort to close the proceedings. Nonetheless, Cummings sought to exclude a segment of the public. As members of the public, the police officers had both common law and constitutionally based rights to attend the trial. Exclusion of any group on the basis of the members' status would be impermissible. The trial court sought to balance the rights of those officers whose duty assignments precluded attendance in civilian clothes against the possibility that seeing large numbers of uniformed officers among the spectators would somehow influence the jury. The concerns expressed by Cummings were not sufficient to establish that excluding all uniformed officers was essential to a fair trial, and the record does not support his claim of actual prejudice.
(28) Defendants contend that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's special circumstance finding that the murder was committed for the purpose of preventing lawful arrest. They also contend that the instructions failed to adequately define that special circumstance. We disagree. Not only was there strong circumstantial evidence to support the finding, but there was also testimony that Cummings had stated more than once that he was not going back to jail and would shoot any police officer who stopped him. Defendants argue, however, that the evidence did not establish that they were under arrest or that arrest was imminent. Their reliance on People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 752 [209 Cal. Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994, 64 A.L.R.4th 723], for the proposition that a suspect must have been arrested or that the officer must have formed an intent to arrest before the special circumstance is applicable is unwarranted. We found insufficient evidence and held that arrest must be imminent in Bigelow where the defendant killed a robbery victim. The prosecutor theorized that he had done so to prevent the filing of a report and possible identification of the defendant. On those facts we said that the theory was totally speculative and was also an unreasonably expansive reading of the special circumstance of avoiding arrest, a reading which would cause that circumstance to overlap extensively with felony murder. We believe the special circumstance of avoiding arrest should be limited to cases in which the arrest is imminent. ( People v. Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d 731, 752.) In People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112 [255 Cal. Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32], as in Bigelow, there was no proximity between the murder and a possibility of arrest. The murder victim was shot as she attempted to escape from defendant, was blocked at the door by defendant, and yelled to a neighbor to call the police. In each case, the victim may have been killed to prevent the police from being summoned. The defendant's long-range goal may have been avoidance of arrest, but the immediate goal was simply to prevent the possibility that the police would eventually learn of the crime and the defendant's relation to it, and then arrest the defendant. Here, by contrast, defendants had been detained by the police officer victim under circumstances which would lead them and any objective observer to believe that an arrest was highly likely. Arrest was or appeared to be imminent. [44] Each jury was instructed that to find this special circumstance true it must have been proved that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest. Thus, the juries necessarily found that defendants believed that Officer Verna would arrest them and that they killed him to avoid arrest. Defendants argue, however, that imminent arrest is an element of the special circumstance and, following People v. Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d 751, failure to instruct on that element withdraws the element from the jury. This, they contend, denies due process. Our Bigelow opinion did not alter the statutory elements of the special circumstance defined in section 190.2, subdivision (a)(5). It construed the section and concluded that the evidence in that case was insufficient to sustain the jury finding. The trial court instructed on each element of the special circumstance. Had the possibility of arrest been more remote, i.e., had there been no peace officer present or less reason to believe the defendant feared arrest, a supplemental instruction might have been appropriate, but the failure to give one here was not error, let alone error of constitutional dimension. [45]
(29) Cummings claims that during closing argument the prosecutor improperly referred to his failure to testify thereby violating the command of Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 110, 85 S.Ct. 1229], forbidding either direct or indirect comment upon the failure of the defendant to take the stand. Such comment undermines a defendant's exercise of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The statements on which defendant relies for this claim do not reflect reversible error. On one occasion the prosecutor clearly misspoke, doing so in a way the jury could not reasonably have understood to be a comment on Cummings's failure to take the stand. He urged the jury to bear in mind that Cummings expressed pride at causing the death of Officer Verna and to [b]ear that in mind when you evaluate his testimony. Cummings now argues that because he had not testified the jury would necessarily understand the statement to be a comment on that failure. We agree with the trial court, which denied Cummings's motion for mistrial based on this statement. The jury would most certainly understand the prosecutor's reference to be to the defense put on by Cummings including testimony offered on his behalf. Even were there some question, reversal would not be required. ( People v. Hovey, supra, 44 Cal.3d 543, 572.) The second statement was the prosecutor's exhortation to the jury to judge Cummings as he was portrayed by the evidence, rather than by his courtroom appearance. During this part of his argument the prosecutor said: You are not judging what Mr. Cummings does as he sits here in his tennis outfit. That is what these lawyers would like you to think. Clean shaven. He looks nice. Never says anything. Real quiet, et cetera. Again, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury could have understood the statement that Cummings never says anything to be a comment on his failure to take the stand. The context of the statement made it clear that the reference was solely to Cummings's appearance and demeanor in court as contrasted with the picture painted by the evidence. There was no Griffin error and no impropriety. ( People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 571.)
(30a) Cummings also argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during his closing guilt phase argument to the Cummings jury by impugning the honesty and integrity of defense counsel. [46] The argument, he contends, led the jury to believe that counsel was engaged in deception. If there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would understand the prosecutor's statements as an assertion that defense counsel sought to deceive the jury, misconduct would be established. ( People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705].) It is possible that, taken alone, the prosecutor's argument might have been so understood. However, any implication in the argument that defense counsel engaged in deception was removed by the trial court's admonition, after a defense objection was sustained, that the court was certain that counsel were not trying to impugn the integrity of any parties to the proceedings. (31)(See fn. 47.) Although the prosecutor again accused the defense of attempting to hide the truth, and used his ink from the octopus metaphor several times during closing argument, the context was such that the jury certainly would understand it to be nothing more than urging the jury not to be misled by defense evidence. [47] (30b) Indeed, Cummings did not renew his objection. Therefore, even assuming any impropriety, the issue was not preserved for appeal. ( People v. Miller (1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 997 [269 Cal. Rptr. 492, 790 P.2d 1289]; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 34 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) The same is true with respect to Cummings's claim that the prosecutor falsely accused defense counsel of coercing testimony and suborning perjury in cross-examining Oscar Martin. There was no objection. [48] An objection would not have been well founded in any case. The prosecutor's statement that a skillful lawyer, a lawyer that is persuasive as Mr. Rucker is, could maybe get Oscar Martin to say almost anything, was a comment on Oscar's obvious confusion and difficulty in understanding and responding to questions. It reflected on Oscar's lack of recall or comprehension, and cannot reasonably be understood as an assertion that defense counsel sought to elicit perjured testimony from the boy. An objection was made and the jury was admonished adequately with respect to the prosecutor's argument that Pamela's testimony at trial regarding the reenactment of the murder in the Gays' apartment differed from what she gave at the preliminary hearing. The prosecutor argued that she had done so because Cummings's lawyers had to explain why Cummings would say that he shot Officer Verna. (32)(See fn. 49.) The court reprimanded counsel on both sides, told them to confine argument to the evidence, not what opposing counsel had done, and told the jury that the arguments of the parties were not implications that any of the attorneys had caused the witnesses to change or fabricate testimony. [49] (30c) The prosecutor also told the jury that he was not saying the lawyers had done anything wrong, and then argued the problem posed by the evidence that Cummings claimed not to have shot anyone even though there was evidence that in the apartment he said that he had. Any impropriety and misimpression the earlier argument might have left was cured by the admonition.
On several occasions during the trial the court passed to counsel notes from the jurors asking questions that had not been answered to the jurors' satisfaction by the evidence. Gay's attorney objected to the practice without stating grounds. (33a) He now contends that in at least three of these instances he was prejudiced because the notes were passed on. After Oscar Martin testified that Gay did not look like the person he had identified at the lineup (No. 4), a juror on Gay's jury submitted a note asking: Why no one tell Gay to remove his glasses. Over objection by Gay's attorney, the court allowed all counsel to see the note, stating that this was her usual practice and that it was within the discretion of counsel to decide whether the question should be asked. At the request of Cummings's counsel, Gay was asked to stand and remove his glasses. Oscar then testified that he looked like the man designated number 4 in the lineup. After Cummings's expert testified regarding gunshot residue tests he had performed on the automobile in which defendants were riding when Officer Verna was shot, a member of Cummings's jury asked whether barium and antimony were found. On redirect, Cummings's counsel asked the question and the witness answered that those elements were not found combined with the lead. Prior to the jury participation in the demonstration with the automobile a member of the Cummings jury asked if it was necessary to unlatch the driver's seat to let a person in the rear seat get out. After the unreported demonstration, counsel for Cummings asked that the record reflect that there was no latch, the seat could be pushed forward, and would return to its erect position by itself. He also sought a stipulation from the prosecutor that there was no latch, but the prosecutor declined. As is apparent from the questions, none was improper. The evidence sought by the jurors was highly relevant. It could have been offered by the prosecution or elicited in questions by the judge. Gay was prejudiced only because additional evidence relevant to his guilt was admitted when counsel for Cummings elected to elicit or present the evidence sought by the jurors. Gay argues, however, that the jurors were permitted to depart from their role as neutral fact finders and detached observers. In his view, jurors are to be passive recipients of the evidence the advocates consider essential to the truth-finding process. He suggests that permitting the inquiries also somehow violated the jurors' obligation not to discuss the case among themselves before the case is submitted to them for decision (§ 1122) and that permitting counsel to see the notes violated counsel's ethical duty not to communicate with jurors during trial. (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 5-320.) Gay also argues, that assuming questions from the jurors are permitted, the judge should first review them and then, out of the presence of the jury, consider objections. Only after doing so should the question be asked, and then by the judge only. The procedure followed here, Gay argues, permitted the attorneys to curry favor with individual jurors. Since only Cummings's counsel responded to inquiries, Gay was prejudiced by the appearance that Cummings's counsel were more trustworthy. Gay's perception that only the parties may determine whether evidence is essential to the truth-finding process is misguided. (34) To the contrary, Evidence Code section 775 expressly authorizes the court to call witnesses, preserving the right of the parties to object and cross-examine in order to ensure that the truth is exposed. The court may do so over the objection and against the will of the parties in furtherance of justice, although the power to do so must be exercised impartially. ( McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 533 [116 Cal. Rptr. 260, 526 P.2d 268]; Roth v. Moeller (1921) 185 Cal. 415, 420-421 [197 P. 62]; Marin Water etc. Co. v. Railroad Com. (1916) 171 Cal. 706, 714 [154 P. 864]. A trial judge may examine witnesses to elicit or clarify testimony. [Citations.] Indeed, `it is the right and duty of a judge to conduct a trial in such a manner that the truth will be established in accordance with the rules of evidence.' [Citation.] The trial judge, however, must not become an advocate for either party or under the guide [ sic ] of examining witnesses comment on the evidence or cast aspersions or ridicule on a witness. ( People v. Rigney (1961) 55 Cal.2d 236, 241 [10 Cal. Rptr. 625, 359 P.2d 23, 98 A.L.R.2d 186].) (33b) For the same reason, the judge has discretion to ask questions submitted by jurors or to pass those questions on and leave to the discretion of counsel whether to ask the questions. Although the issue has rarely arisen in California, the Court of Appeal has concluded that questions by jurors may be asked by the court. In People v. McAlister (1985) 167 Cal. App.3d 633, 644 [213 Cal. Rptr. 271], the court addressed, and disapproved, a procedure of direct questioning by jurors, but recognized that submitting written questions for consideration by the court and counsel before submission to the jury is proper. (See People v. Gates (1979) 97 Cal. App.3d Supp. 10 [158 Cal. Rptr. 759].) We agree with the Court of Appeal that this practice of direct jury questioning of witnesses should not be permitted. The danger of irrelevant and improper questions is high, and were counsel to object, the potential for prejudice is apparent. Submitting the questions to counsel for consideration and permitting counsel to ask the questions avoids this danger. There is no merit to Gay's claim that the court did not exercise control over the procedure. The record confirms that the judge reviewed the questions first and exercised her discretion to pass the question on to counsel, leaving to them the decision whether to ask the questions. Nothing in the record suggests that the jurors who submitted the questions had discussed them with other jurors. The receipt, through the court, of juror questions regarding the evidence during trial is not a communication with a juror which is proscribed by the Rules of Professional Conduct. ( Id., rule 5-320(H).) There is no foundation for the claim that this constitutes unethical conduct.
(35) In an argument relevant to both the murder and robbbery counts, Gay argues that the court erred in adjourning his trial for eight days following the close of evidence. His attorney did not object to the adjournment, however, and the record indicates that it had been discussed earlier. While the court did not explain the necessity for the adjournment, which was actually only three regular trial days, it is apparent from the record that the brief adjournment of the Gay trial was necessary to accommodate proceedings incidental to the submission of the case to the Cummings jury. There was neither error nor abuse of discretion.