Opinion ID: 2204777
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Subsequent Intoxicated Condition Inference

Text: As indicated earlier in this opinion, at the time of the attack a jury could reasonably find (1) Doe was intoxicated and (2) Shagnasty's sold and served her alcohol. If one also bears in mind the commonsense inference that the solitary beer in Doe's hand at the time of the attack did not solely cause her intoxication, then an inference arises that at the time of service Shagnastsy's knew or should have known Smith was or would become intoxicated. In affording Smith all legitimate inferences, we simply recognize that if (1) one beer does not a drunk make, (2) Shagnasty's sold and served Doe a beer, and (3) Doe was shortly thereafter in a visibly intoxicated condition, then it stands to reason that (4) Doe was also noticeably intoxicated at the time of service. Moreover, if a patron was likely visibly intoxicated at the time of service, a jury could find (5) the bar knew or, at the very least, should have known of her intoxication. As the Indiana Court of Appeals recently recognized, when viewed most favorably to the nonmoving party, the fact that [a bar] served even one beer to a person who shortly thereafter was in a state of serious intoxication gives rise to a question of fact whether [the intoxicated person] was visibly intoxicated at the time [of service]. Ward v. D & A Enters. of Clark County, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 728, 730 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (emphasis added). But see Richard Smith, Note, A Comparative Analysis of Dramshop Liability and a Proposal for Uniform Legislation, 25 J. Corp. L. 553, 559 (2000) ([T]estimony of the intoxicated person's demeanor at the time of injury is often held insufficient to establish the person's condition when the dramshop sold the alcohol.). We recognize that such a subsequent intoxicated condition inference might not be appropriate in every case, but in this case the inference is warranted because of the presumably short timeframe between service and the attack: for at the time of the attack, Doe was still in the bar, holding a beer, in a visibly intoxicated state. In this case, the inference tends to show that when Shagnasty's sold and served Doe the beer in question, Shagnastsy's knew or should have known she (1) was already intoxicated or (2) would become intoxicated.