Opinion ID: 854149
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional doctrine from other states

Text: Finally, Ajabu points to decisions of other state supreme courts construing similar provisions of their own constitutions in factually similar circumstances. We have looked to other state constitutional doctrine in interpreting the self-incrimination right under the Indiana Constitution. See, e.g., Noelke v. State, 214 Ind. 427, 15 N.E.2d 950 (1938); Ule v. State, 208 Ind. 255, 194 N.E. 140 (1935); cf. Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 414 n. 19 (Ind.1991) (noting that Tennessee Supreme Court had similarly construed Tennessee analog to Indiana constitutional provision proscribing demand of services without just compensation). A number of state appellate courts, both before and after Burbine, have addressed on independent state grounds whether a waiver of the right to be free from self-incrimination was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under facts similar to those present here. As of this writing, at least Michigan, Oregon, and Oklahoma have held the confession to be inadmissible under their state constitutions. [13] In contrast, Colorado, Maryland, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin have essentially followed Burbine in interpreting their constitutional self-incrimination provisions. [14] Some courts have found the waiver invalid on other state grounds, including due process and right to counsel under their constitutions. [15] However, the result in this case must be driven by what is most appropriate under the Indiana Constitution. We affirm the trial court's conclusion that Ajabu knowingly, intelligent, and voluntarily waived his state constitutional right to be free from self-incrimination, and conclude that Article I, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution does not bar use of the resulting confession.