Opinion ID: 164658
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Development of the administrative record

Text: Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed error by failing to obtain records from the psychiatrist and endocrinologist to whom she was referred by Dr. Russell and a mental health center that had evaluated her. She also asserts that, “[t]o make the record absolutely complete, the Appeals Council should have obtained -6- [Dr. Cheek’s] office notes of Dr. Cheek or engaged in further inquiry when they received his assessment.” Aplt. Br. at 15. The burden to prove disability in a social security case is on the claimant, and to meet this burden, the claimant must furnish medical and other evidence of the existence of the disability. Bowen v. Yuckert , 482 U.S. 137, 146 (1987). A social security disability hearing is nonadversarial, however, and the ALJ bears responsibility for ensuring that “an adequate record is developed during the disability hearing consistent with the issues raised.” Henrie v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs ., 13 F.3d 359, 360-61 (10th Cir. 1993). Generally, “[a]n ALJ has the duty to develop the record by obtaining pertinent, available medical records which come to his attention during the course of the hearing.” Carter v. Chater , 73 F.3d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, “the ALJ should ordinarily be entitled to rely on the claimant’s counsel to structure and present claimant’s case in a way that the claimant’s claims are adequately explored” and “may ordinarily require counsel to identify the issue or issues requiring further development.” Hawkins v. Chater , 113 F.3d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff’s counsel did not indicate or suggest to the ALJ that any medical records were missing, nor ask for the ALJ’s assistance in obtaining any such records. The ALJ had before him Dr. Russell’s records (referencing the -7- specialists), the records of plaintiff’s psychologist, and also those of the consulting physicians. We conclude that there was an adequate record by which the ALJ could decide this case. B. Evaluation of plaintiff’s subjective complaints In her second argument, plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff’s allegations of subjective complaints were not fully credible. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ (1) overstated her ability to perform daily activities and her mental impairment and (2) improperly discounted Dr. Russell’s opinion and her testimony about her difficulty standing and walking due to burning in her feet. She also suggests that the ALJ failed to consider other evidence crucial to a disability determination, such as her prior work record, her regular seeking of medical treatment, her compliance with doctor’s orders, and the variety of medications she takes. But the ALJ did not dispute the presence of her impairments nor did he fail to acknowledge that claimant is limited by them. The ALJ concluded that the claimed severity of plaintiff’s limitations was inconsistent with the medical record and her own statements at the hearing. The ALJ’s “[f]indings as to credibility [were] closely and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings.” Huston v. Bowen , 838 F.2d 1125, 1133 (10th Cir. 1988). -8- “Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.” Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). Plaintiff essentially disagrees with the weight the ALJ gave to various facts. Nevertheless, our review of the record reveals no reversible error in the ALJ’s assessment of plaintiff’s credibility. C. Assessment of plaintiff’s RFC Plaintiff’s third issue relates primarily to the ALJ’s failure to incorporate Dr. Russell’s opinion about plaintiff’s limited use of her hands and feet in the RFC determination. However, the ALJ noted that he rejected only the portions of Dr. Russell’s opinion that were not supported by the other evidence. See Castellano , 26 F.3d at 1029. For instance, the ALJ referred to plaintiff’s testimony that she could stand for a couple of hours before experiencing burning in her feet. Additionally, the RFC adequately accounted for plaintiff’s mental impairments by limiting her RFC to work that does not require interaction with the public or more than a one to two step operation. D. Finding that plaintiff can perform other jobs in the national economy Plaintiff’s final contention is related to her RFC argument. She asserts that the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert was flawed because it did not include all the limitations found by Dr. Russell. The ALJ analyzed the -9- medical evidence and concluded that the evidence supported a finding that claimant could perform the requirements of light unskilled work, with restrictions on lifting, complexity of operation, and interaction with the public. The ALJ included these restrictions in his hypothetical question to the vocational expert. See Decker v. Chater , 86 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 1996) (hypothetical questions to the vocational expert need only reflect impairments and limitations that are borne out by the evidentiary record). The vocational expert then identified jobs which plaintiff could perform. The ALJ rejected Dr. Russell’s assertion that she could not use her hands and feet for repetitive motions and, consequently, the ALJ was not required to accept the vocational expert’s response to a hypothetical including this unsupported limitation. See Talley v. Sullivan , 908 F.2d 585, 588 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that the ALJ is not bound by the vocational expert’s opinion in response to a hypothetical question which includes impairments that are not accepted as true by the ALJ). Again, we may not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Casias , 933 F.2d at 800. The vocational expert’s testimony provided substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s denial of benefits. -10-