Opinion ID: 221476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Restoration of Foster's Right to Bear Arms?

Text: At trial, Foster stipulated that he had previously been convicted of a felony. After his conviction and on appeal, however, he argued that he could not have violated the felon-in-possession statute because his civil rights were restored following his most recent release from state prison. Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for a person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to possess any firearm or ammunition. A conviction for which a person has had his civil rights restored, however, does not count as a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year unless the restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). After his conviction, Foster moved to dismiss the indictment and to vacate the guilty verdict, claiming that he recalls a letter being sent to his mother's house following his release from custody in March 2004, which he understood to have restored all of his civil liberties in Illinois. In purported reliance on this letter, Foster claims, he voted in elections in 2006 and 2008 and appeared for jury duty in 2005. In support of these allegations, Foster attached his affidavit and copies of his 2004 Illinois voter registration, a voting history report, and a certificate of jury service. The district court denied Foster's motion, finding that there has really been no actual evidence that [Foster's] rights were restored and concluding that, even if Foster had presented such evidence, he waived this argument when he stipulated that he had been convicted of a felony. We agree with the district court as to both waiver and the merits. The waiver was clear through the stipulation here. On the merits, Foster's argument turns on whether, to obtain a conviction under section 922(g)(1), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Foster's rights had not been restored in the manner described in section 921(a)(20). Although we have not explicitly addressed this precise issue, we have decided a closely related question, holding that a defendant relying on the civil rights restoration provision in section 921(a)(20) to challenge his classification as an armed career criminal at sentencing must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his civil rights have been restored. See Gant v. United States, 627 F.3d 677, 682 (7th Cir.2010). Other circuits have held that a conviction under section 922(g)(1) does not require the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's civil rights have not been restored. United States v. Bartelho, 71 F.3d 436, 440 (1st Cir.1995); United States v. Jackson, 57 F.3d 1012, 1016-17 (11th Cir.1995); United States v. Flower, 29 F.3d 530, 535 (10th Cir.1994). Requiring such proof by the government would impose an onerous burden, seeing that a defendant ordinarily will be much better able to raise the issue of whether his ... civil rights have been restored. Flower, 29 F.3d at 535; see Bartelho, 71 F.3d at 440 (refusing to require the government to refute every possibility that criminal defendants have had their prior convictions nullified or their civil rights restored). Consistent with our decision in Gant, we agree with the reasoning of those decisions and conclude that a defendant's claim that his civil rights have been restored is essentially an affirmative defense to a criminal charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See Bartelho, 71 F.3d at 440. It is a defendant's responsibility to raise this issue and to produce evidence showing that his civil rights have been restored before the matter may be presented to the jury for resolution. Id.; Jackson, 57 F.3d at 1017; Flower, 29 F.3d at 535-36; see United States v. Vitrano, 405 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir.2005) (adopting similar interpretation of section 921(a)(20) in context of armed career criminal sentencing enhancements under section 924(e)(1)). Because the civil rights restoration exception in section 921(a)(20) is not an element of the offense described in section 922(g), Foster's indictment on that charge was sufficient without alleging that Foster's civil rights had never been restored, and the government had no obligation to present any evidence on the topic. If Foster wanted to claim that the State of Illinois had restored his right to carry firearms, he was obligated to present evidence indicating that fact either prior to or during his trial. The district court correctly denied Foster's post-judgment motion to dismiss the indictment and vacate his conviction.