Opinion ID: 2281447
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court Is Without Authority To Vindicate A Reversed Judgment.

Text: In ruling that Appellants' petition did not satisfy the writ standard, the Court of Appeals relied on Newell Enterprises, Inc. v. Bowling, 158 S.W.3d 750 (Ky.2005), in which we denied a petition for a writ to prohibit a contempt hearing and noted that Appellants have not been held in contempt. They petitioned the Court of Appeals before the circuit court held the scheduled contempt hearing. 158 S.W.3d at 757. Apparently understanding this passage as foreclosing relief in all contempt cases until a finding of contempt has been made, the Court of Appeals rejected Appellants' petition as premature. In Newell, however, the petitioner sought relief under the second prong of the writ standard, which requires a showing of irreparable injury were the writ denied. The quoted passage was part of our discussion of how that requirement could not be met until the petitioner had been found contemptuous. In the very next paragraph we observed that the petitioner might well have fared better under the first prong of the writ standard, the outside-of-its-jurisdiction prong, as the show-cause order at issue appeared to be outside the trial court's jurisdiction to render the particular judgment sought, or as is sometimes said, jurisdiction of the particular case. Id. Because Appellants here are proceeding under the first prong of the writ standard, not the second, the Court of Appeals' reliance on Newell was misplaced. The Court of Appeals further held, however, that the petitioners had failed to demonstrate that the circuit court was proceeding outside its jurisdiction. Citing Shelby Petroleum Corp. v. Croucher, 814 S.W.2d 930 (Ky.App.1991), and Akers v. Stephenson, 469 S.W.2d 704 (Ky.1970), the Court of Appeals observed that a trial court enjoys wide discretion in the use of the contempt power to enforce its own judgments and remove any obstructions to such enforcement. Akers at 706. As does this case, Shelby Petroleum involved claims that a judgment creditor had incurred costs and damages attempting to enforce a judgment against a recalcitrant judgment debtor. On the basis of that similarity, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had authority to invoke contempt proceedings whenever there were allegations that a party had attempted to obstruct enforcement of a judgment. Again, however, the Court of Appeals read the case law too broadly. While we have no quarrel with the general proposition that trial courts enjoy broad contempt authority to vindicate their judgments, that authority does not exist if there is no judgment to vindicate. Akers and Shelby Petroleum both involved the enforcement of viable judgments. Here, on the other hand, the trial court is presuming to vindicate a judgment that has been reversed. It has long been the law in Kentucky that the complete reversal of a judgment nullifies it and returns the parties to the positions they occupied before it was rendered. A judgment which has been reversed is as though it had never been, and the court should not allow the party who procured it to retain an advantage gained by reason of it. Knight's Admr. v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 143 Ky. 418, 136 S.W. 874, 875 (1911); Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758, 57 S.W.2d 969 (1933) (same); Baker's Heirs v. Duff, 238 S.W.2d 841 (Ky.1951) (no rights can be derived from a reversed judgment). The Halpins' 2005 complaint rests entirely on rights derived from the 2005 judgment. The reversal of that judgment nullified those rights, rendered them as though they had never been, and thus mooted the Halpins' claims based on them. The trial court's invocation of potential contempt sanctions for Appellants' alleged breach of those rights is a blatant attempt on the one hand to address moot questions and on the other to disregard, in a backdoor fashion, the effect of the Court of Appeals' reversal of its 2005 judgment. Considered in either light, the trial court is proceeding outside its jurisdiction. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 873 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1994) (mootness typically arises from a change in circumstance that vitiates the action, and when it does it abrogates the court's jurisdiction to address the action); Buckley v. Wilson, 177 S.W.3d 778 (Ky. 2005) (trial court must give effect to appellate court rulings). Stated simply, the trial court has no authority to vindicate a judgment that has been reversed and thus rendered nonexistent. The Court of Appeals erred by ruling otherwise. While it may be unfortunate that the Halpins incurred costs attempting to enforce the 2005 judgment, they were on notice that the judgment could be or had been appealed and was subject to reversal, and so must be deemed to have proceeded at their own risk.