Opinion ID: 388113
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutrix's Interrogation.

Text: 4 In patently improper questioning, the government's attorney began the cross-examination of Ylda by asking: 5 Now, Mr. Ylda, the story you told today, this is the first time you ever told the investigators this story, isn't it? 6 An immediate objection was made and sustained. The court instructed the jury to disregard the question but overruled Ylda's motion for a mistrial. 7 The prosecutrix's comment on the accused's silence was improper. An accused has a right to remain silent and comment on the silence of the accused impinges on that right. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, 98 (1976) (in a state trial comment on accused's silence violates the due process clause of fourteenth amendment); United States v. Meneses-Davila, 580 F.2d 888, 890 (5th Cir. 1978) (in federal court comment on silence of accused is prohibited by fifth amendment). 8 However, this constitutional violation is not fatal if the prosecution can show that the error was legally harmless. United States v. Meneses-Davila, 580 F.2d at 890; Chapman v. United States, 547 F.2d 1240, 1248 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 1705, 52 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977). In Chapman we described the following categories into which we assumed all cases of this type could be classified for purposes of determining whether the improper comment on the accused silence constitutes harmless error: 9 (1) When the prosecution uses defendant's post-arrest silence to impeach an exculpatory story offered by defendant at trial and the prosecution directly links the implausibility of the exculpatory story to the defendant's ostensibly inconsistent act of remaining silent, reversible error results even if the story is transparently frivolous. 10 (2) When the prosecutor does not directly tie the fact of defendant's silence to his exculpatory story, i. e., when the prosecutor elicits that fact on direct examination and refrains from commenting on it or adverting to it again, and the jury is never told that such silence can be used for impeachment purposes, reversible error results if the exculpatory story is not totally implausible or the indicia of guilt not overwhelming. 11 (3) When there is but a single reference at trial to the fact of defendant's silence, the reference is neither repeated nor linked with defendant's exculpatory story, and the exculpatory story is transparently frivolous and evidence of guilt is otherwise overwhelming, the reference to defendant's silence constitutes harmless error. 12 Chapman v. Unites States, 547 F.2d at 1249-50 (citations and footnote omitted). 13 Like the parties in United States v. Dixon, 593 F.2d 626, 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 861, 100 S.Ct. 126, 62 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979), the defendant contends that this case falls within the second category while the government argues that the third classification is applicable. Like the Dixon panel, we find the Chapman categories unhelpful in a case such as the one presented here in which the exculpatory story is not totally implausible, yet the indicia of guilt are substantial. Moreover, because the Chapman tripartite analysis is based on decisions of this court in cases in which the prosecutor's question evoked testimony regarding the accused's silence, we cannot apply that analysis directly in this case in which no such testimony was elicited. The objection to the prosecutrix's question was made and sustained before Ylda responded. 14 Therefore, we do not simply apply the Chapman litmus but analyze directly the facts of this case. United States v. Dixon, 593 F.2d at 629; United States v. Davis, 546 F.2d 583, 594-95 & n. 31 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1701, 52 L.Ed.2d 391 (1977). It is doubtful that the mere asking of the question caused any prejudice to appellant in the minds of the jury. There was neither an answer by Ylda nor impeaching testimony concerning his post-arrest silence. The inquiry was a brief, isolated incident at trial and the prosecutrix did not again mention the argument. There was no attempt by the government to capitalize on this testimony. Moreover, there was substantial testimony that Ylda took bribes. Any slight prejudice that may have resulted was cured by the trial court's prompt action. The prosecutrix's inferential comment on the accused's silence, though improper, constitutes harmless error and does not require reversal in this case. See United States v. Dixon, 593 F.2d at 629-30. 15 Yet we deem it our duty once again to comment on the paradoxical situation created when a United States attorney deliberately injects inadmissible evidence and then, having attempted to gain improper advantage, seeks absolution on the basis that the result was, after all, harmless. United States v. Cross, 638 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1981). See United States v. Rice, 550 F.2d 1364, 1372 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., 434 U.S. 954, 98 S.Ct. 478, 54 L.Ed.2d 312 (1977) (expressly disapproving of the government's deliberate interjection of inadmissible testimony which exhibited a lack of appropriate sensitivity to the defendants' substantive rights, but finding the error harmless); Handley v. Pitts, 623 F.2d 23, 28 (6th Cir.1980) (finding of harmless error less appropriate where prosecution deliberately introduces inadmissible evidence). See also United States v. Edwards, 576 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir.1978) ((C)omment upon silence of the accused is a crooked knife and one likely to turn in the prosecutor's hand. The circumstances under which it will not occasion a reversal are few and discrete. We suggest that it be abandoned as a prosecutorial technique.). Here the prosecutrix started her cross-examination with a carefully contrived question deliberately designed to invade a well-defined constitutional right. Because the impropriety of this conduct should not go unmentioned, we purposefully call it to the attention of the district judge and the United States attorney for the imposition of such sanction as may be appropriate. 16