Opinion ID: 2352390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: alleged violations of discovery order

Text: Appellant first asserts several errors regarding alleged violations of the trial court's discovery order in this case. He contends the trial court erred when it failed to grant him a thirty-day extension of time or, alternatively, to dismiss the indictment as a sanction for the Commonwealth's failure to timely disclose the identity of the confidential informant pursuant to a previously issued discovery order. Upon Appellant's request, the previously issued discovery order directed the Commonwealth to disclose the identity of the confidential informant at least thirty days prior to trial. The prosecutor argued that he sent a written memorandum to Appellant's counsel shortly after the discovery order was entered (approximately six months prior to trial) disclosing the informant's identity in another case. It was at that time, the prosecutor stated, that he verbally informed Appellant's counsel that she was also the informant in Appellant's case. Appellant's counsel stated that he did not recall having any discussions with the prosecutor regarding this case during the past six months and first recalled being told the name of the confidential informant the Friday before the trial was scheduled to start on a Monday morning. The trial court determined that both sides were at fault and decided to grant Appellant, who had requested a thirty-day extension, a three-day extension of time in order to perform any additional investigation regarding the identity of the confidential informant. The parties returned three days later, and on that morning Appellant filed a pro se motion to dismiss the indictment. Appellant stated that he asked his attorney thirty days prior to trial for the identity of the informant and the attorney stated that he had not yet been provided with the informant's name. Appellant alleged the information was knowingly withheld by the prosecutor, which the prosecutor denied. Appellant's counsel conceded that he did not contact the prosecutor to follow up on the discovery order thirty days prior to trial, but stated that it was incumbent upon the Commonwealth to furnish the informant's identity pursuant to his initial request without further prompting by defense counsel. At this time, the trial judge summarized both parties' versions of what happened and made a finding that the prosecutor had indeed informed Appellant's counsel of the informant's identity six months prior and that such notice was sufficient to comply with his discovery order. Appellant's primary argument is that the trial court erred when it determined that the Commonwealth actually disclosed the information thirty days prior to trial. A trial court's findings of fact regarding motions by the parties are reviewed pursuant to a clearly erroneous standard. CR 52.01. CR 52.01 states that due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. In this case, the trial court made a credibility determination regarding whether the prosecutor actually informed Appellant's counsel regarding the informant's identity despite the attorney's inability to recollect the conversation. The trial court determined that he did and we, in turn, find no clear error in this determination. The trial court also concluded that, under the circumstances, such verbal disclosure was sufficient to comply with the discovery order's notice requirement. Appellant does not present any contrary arguments regarding this conclusion and as such, for the purposes of this appeal, we will assume the trial court's conclusion was correct. See Elwell v. Stone, 799 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Ky.App.1990) (declining to address any issues not presented in accordance with CR 76.12(4)(c)). Given the trial court's undisputed conclusion that verbal disclosure was sufficient to satisfy his discovery order's notice requirement, we find no basis for Appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment due to the Commonwealth's failure to comply with the discovery order. Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion, nonetheless, when it refused to grant him a trial continuance beyond three days in order to further investigate the informant's background. See RCr 9.04 (granting of a [trial] continuance is in the sound discretion of the trial judge). Specifically, Appellant contends he was prejudiced because he did not have enough time to investigate the informant's criminal record or to investigate the existence of any deals or agreements she might have made with the prosecutor. Despite his counsel's failure to remember his conversation with the prosecutor or to follow up earlier regarding the informant's identity, the record indicates that Appellant's attorney had been familiar with this particular informant for more than six months (due to her involvement in another case). Further, the prosecutor stated that no deals or agreements had been made with the informant other than receiving financial compensation for participating in the controlled buys. After considering the totality of the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court when it refused to grant a longer continuance. Likewise, we also reject Appellant's argument that this situation constituted prosecutorial misconduct which rises to the level of depriving him of a fair trial. Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787, 805 (Ky.2001) (Any consideration on appeal of alleged prosecutorial misconduct must center on the overall fairness of the trial.) Appellant also argues that another provision of the discovery order was violated when Appellant was not given the opportunity to view the videotape until three days before the actual trial. This argument was not raised before or ruled on by the trial court and accordingly, we will not address it. Commonwealth v. Maricle, 15 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Ky.2000). Appellant lastly argues that the accumulated errors claimed above, along with other perceived errors claimed during the pendency of the trial, justified a mistrial. A defendant's motion for a mistrial should only be granted where there is a manifest necessity for such an action or an urgent or real necessity. Gosser v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 897, 906 (Ky.2000) (quotation and citation omitted). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Appellant's mistrial motion at the start of trial.