Opinion ID: 700972
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of Immunized Statements and Testimony

Text: 5 In his pro se submissions to the court, Salcedo argues that his indictment was improperly obtained. He asserts that at least some of the information presented to the grand jury may have derived from his proffers to federal authorities and his prior testimony in open court under a grant of immunity. 1 In addition, he further contends that his present counsel provided ineffective assistance by not pursuing this claim. If Salcedo made statements or gave testimony under a grant of immunity, the government may not use the information against him in subsequent criminal proceedings -- to do so would violate federal law as well as his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460-61 (1972); United States v. Eliason, 3 F.3d 1149, 1152 (7th Cir. 1993); 18 U.S.C. Sec. 6002. 6 To raise a claim of immunity, Salcedo must demonstrate that he gave compelled testimony or made statements under a grant of immunity. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460; Eliason, 3 F.3d at 1153. The government must then show that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460. On the basis of the record before us, Salcedo cannot raise a claim of immunity. Salcedo must present relevant evidence that he gave compelled testimony or made statements under a grant of immunity. Eliason, 3 F.3d at 1152. He asserts that his Pennsylvania plea agreement contained a grant of immunity. The plea agreement, however, is not included in the record, and the portions that Salcedo cites in his pro se submissions make no reference to immunity. The current record provides no basis for an immunity claim; thus, any appeal on this issue would be frivolous. 7 If Salcedo indeed made statements under a grant of immunity, his counsel's failure to raise the issue may fall outside the wide range of professionally competent representation and thus constitute ineffective assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). The record, however, is insufficiently developed to support a claim that Salcedo's attorney failed to raise a viable immunity defense. Thus, a direct appeal based on ineffective assistance would be frivolous. 2