Opinion ID: 1987358
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: exculpatory agreement.

Text: On April 10, 1998, Hargis signed the following document prepared by Baize: RELEASE It is hereby agreed and acknowledged that I am a self-employed independent contractor. Therefore, I am not required to carry Worker's compensation according to Kentucky Law. I accept responsibility for my own property and person and release ALLEN BAIZE, d/b/a GREENVILLE LOG & LUMBER CO., BAIZE FOREST PRODUCTS, INC., GRAPEVINE LUMBER CO., A R LUMBER CO., AND JORDAN LOGGING, INC., and forever hold him harmless for any property damage/bodily injury sustained by me or any other person I authorize to be on the working premises while performing services for said contractor. I agree that my relationship with him will be strictly as a subcontractor and not an employee, which makes me ineligible for any employee benefits under said contractor's insurance programs or state requirements. ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIVING A COPY OF THIS RELEASE ON 4/10/98 AND AM IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH ITS CONDITIONS. /s/ Darrell Hargis (Emphasis added.) This document does not exculpate Baize from liability for Hargis's death because (1) the Release does not explicitly purport to release Baize from liability for his own negligence and does not identify the type of injury or damage for which liability is being released; and (2) as applied to the facts of this case, the Release purports to transfer to Hargis duties that were assigned to Baize by a safety statute. An exculpatory contract for exemption from future liability for negligence, whether ordinary or gross, is not invalid per se. Cobb v. Gulf Refining Co., 284 Ky. 523, 145 S.W.2d 96, 99 (1940); Greenwich Ins. Co. v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 112 Ky. 598, 66 S.W. 411, 413 (1902); Jones v. Hanna, 814 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Ky. App.1991); Louisville Bear Safety Serv., Inc. v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 571 S.W.2d 438, 440 (Ky.App.1978); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195(2) cmt a (1981); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B cmt a (1965). However, such contracts are disfavored and are strictly construed against the parties relying upon them. City of Hazard Mun. Hous. Comm'n v. Hinch, 411 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Ky.1967); Cobb, 145 S.W.2d at 99. The wording of the release must be so clear and understandable that an ordinarily prudent and knowledgeable party to it will know what he or she is contracting away; it must be unmistakable. 57A Am.Jur.2d, Negligence § 52 (2004) (citations omitted). Specifically, a preinjury release will be upheld only if (1) it explicitly expresses an intention to exonerate by using the word negligence; or (2) it clearly and specifically indicates an intent to release a parry from liability for a personal injury caused by that party's own conduct; or (3) protection against negligence is the only reasonable construction of the contract language; or (4) the hazard experienced was clearly within the contemplation of the provision. Id. at § 53 (citations omitted). Thus, an exculpatory clause must clearly set out the negligence for which liability is to be avoided. Id. (citations omitted). The Release signed by Hargis satisfies none of these alternatives. It does not mention the word negligence and does not explicitly release Baize from liability for personal injury caused by his own conduct. Nor is protection of Baize against his own acts of negligence the only reasonable construction of the contract language. The language could reasonably be construed to release Baize only from workers' compensation liability to Hargis and any of his employees or subcontractors for injuries caused by their own negligence, and vicarious liability for damages caused by Hargis to one of his subcontractors. Finally, there is no reason to believe that injury or death resulting from a failure to secure a load of logs before the binders were released was specifically within the contemplation of the provision. A party cannot contract away liability for damages caused by that party's failure to comply with a duty imposed by a safety statute. Boyer v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 34 Ill.App.2d 330, 181 N.E.2d 372, 375 (1962) (exculpatory provision in free pass to use railroad did not relieve railroad of liability for injury caused by its violation of Safety Appliance Act); D.H. Davis Coal Co. v. Polland, 158 Ind. 607, 62 N.E. 492, 495-96 (1902) (provision in contract of employment by which employee relieved employer of duty to provide safeguards required by statute held unenforceable); Warren City Lines, Inc. v. United Refining Co., 220 Pa.Super. 308, 287 A.2d 149, 151 (1971) (exculpatory clause in contract for lease of gasoline pump did not relieve lessor of liability for explosion caused by lessor's violation of safety regulation: Any attempt by a negligent party to exculpate himself for a violation of a statute intended for the protection of human life is invalid.); Metz v. Medford Fur Foods, Inc., 4 Wis.2d 96, 90 N.W.2d 106, 108 (1958) (hold-harmless agreement in contract of sale was unenforceable where damages were caused by seller's violation of statute prohibiting sale of adulterated foods). Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Muhlenberg Circuit Court with directions to vacate the summary judgment granted to Baize, to grant Appellants a partial summary judgment on the issue of Baize's liability, and to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion. LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES, SCOTT, and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur. KELLER, J., dissents by separate opinion, with JOHNSTONE, J., joining that dissenting opinion.