Opinion ID: 793355
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issues Specific to Armstrong's Disability Discrimination Claim

Text: 52
53 The District Court instructed the jury that, to establish a prima facie case on his disability discrimination claim, Armstrong had to show that he was discharged because of [his] handicap.  (Emphasis added.) Armstrong only needed to show he was discharged, however, and did not need to show it was because of his handicap, to establish his prima facie case. Nonetheless, because Armstrong did not raise this issue to the District Court in his objections to the instructions and interrogatories, and also did not raise the issue on appeal, it is waived. 54
55 As previously discussed in the age discrimination context (see Part IV.B.2 above), Armstrong argues that the District Court's instruction on his disability discrimination claim incorrectly stated the asserted legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing Armstrong that the Defendants gave at trial. We know from the jury's answers to the disability discrimination interrogatories and age discrimination interrogatories (which show, inter alia, that the jury found that Armstrong was discharged and that the Defendants sought someone to perform the same work after he left) that: (1) Armstrong established a prima facie case for disability discrimination; (2) the Defendants articulated a legitimate reason for discharging Armstrong; and (3) that reason was not a pretext for discrimination. Thus, assuming the jury understood the Judge's instructions to mean what they plainly and literally mean, 18 the jury found that the Defendants discharged Armstrong because he was unable to do the essential functions of the job and not because of discrimination. The problem is that was not enough for the Defendants to prevail. 56 The jury instructions stated that the legitimate business reason the Defendants gave for discharging Armstrong was the belief that Armstrong could not physically perform the essential functions of the job assigned to him because of his handicap. In this context, the burden should have shifted to the Defendants. See Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 110 N.J. 363, 541 A.2d 682 (1988) (explaining that when the employer defends [after the establishment of a prima facie case] by asserting... that the handicap prevented the employee from working, the burden of proof ... shifts to the employer to prove that it reasonably concluded that the employee's handicap precluded performance of the job); see also Ensslin v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 275 N.J.Super. 352, 646 A.2d 452, 457 (1994) (Where, as here, an employer maintains that it has reasonably concluded that the employee's handicap precluded performance of the job, and has terminated the employee for that reason, the burden of proof is on the employer.). Because the District Court did not require the Defendants to satisfy this burden—and therefore the jury was not properly instructed that the Defendants' belief that Armstrong could not do the job because of his physical limitations had to be reasonable and that the burden of proving this was on the Defendants—we reverse and remand for a new trial of Armstrong's disability discrimination claim. 19 57