Opinion ID: 1953479
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Business Account Agreement, Sole Proprietorship Resolution Form, Checks and Money Orders

Text: The trial court's application of the business records exception to the seven checks and two money orders deposited into the account and the two checks written from the account was unnecessary because these documents, as well as the signatures contained therein, are not hearsay. `Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. N.H.R. Ev. 801(c). However, as one court has explained in the context of the identical federal rule of evidence, out-of-court statements that are offered as evidence of legally operative verbal conduct are not hearsay. They are considered `verbal acts.' Checks fall squarely in this category of legally-operative verbal acts that are not barred by the hearsay rule. United States v. Pang, 362 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 943, 125 S.Ct. 372, 160 L.Ed.2d 256 (2004). Therefore, the checks and money orders made out to JHE and the checks drawn from the GVB account are legally operative statements that were admissible as such. Likewise, the business account agreement and the sole proprietorship resolution form were themselves admissible as legally operative verbal conduct for the limited purpose of establishing that some individual submitted the forms to GVB. Cf. United States v. Marrinson, No. 85 CR 225, 1986 WL 2123, at  (N.D.Ill. Feb. 3, 1986) (mem.) ([A]n [account] application may be admitted to prove that an individual submitted the application to the particular business.); see also Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 540 (5th Cir. 1994) (Signed instruments such as wills, contracts, and promissory notes are writings that have independent legal significance, and are nonhearsay. (quotation omitted)). The defendant further argues, however, that the information contained within these records, such as the signature Wal[ly] Beede, is inadmissible hearsay because it consists of out-of-court statements that were made by the person who completed the forms and were offered to prove the truth of the matter[s] asserted, i.e., that the account's owner was Walter Beede. This argument addresses two types of information: (1) that which is written or typed on the records; and (2) the signatures contained within the records. We assume, without deciding, that the information written and typed on the records is hearsay. We next address the signatures contained in these records. While we question whether a signature can be considered a statement under the definition of hearsay, we recognize the overwhelming weight of authority from the federal courts, interpreting the identical federal rule of evidence, holding that it is. See, e.g., United States v. Vigneau, 187 F.3d 70 (1st Cir.1999); United States v. Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904 (10th Cir.1994). For purposes of this case, therefore, we proceed under the assumption that a signature can be considered hearsay unless it falls under an exception to the hearsay rule. We find that the signatures contained within the checks and money orders constitute party-opponent admissions under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) and are therefore admissible. The defendant argues that since the records were admitted under the business records exception to the hearsay rule and the prosecution did not raise Rule 801(d)(2) below, it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. We disagree, because where [the] trial court reaches [the] correct result on mistaken grounds, we will affirm if valid alternative grounds support the decision. Cohoon v. IDM Software, 153 N.H. 1, 4, 891 A.2d 552 (2005); see also State v. Berry, 148 N.H. 88, 93, 803 A.2d 593 (2002) ([E]ven though the trial judge did not conduct [the correct evidentiary] analysis . . . its decision to admit the evidence reached the correct result and reversal is not warranted.). A signature falls under the exception in Rule 801(d)(2) if it is otherwise authenticated such as through independent evidence that the writer was [the defendant]. Vigneau, 187 F.3d at 74-75. New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 902(9) provides that [c]ommercial paper, signatures thereon, and documents relating thereto to the extent provided by general commercial law do not require [e]xtrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility. Accordingly, the signatures contained within the checks and money orders, which are commercial paper, are self-authenticating under Rule 902(9) and therefore satisfy the above test to be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule as a party-opponent admission. See N.H.R. Ev. 801(d)(2). The State argues that the signatures on the business account agreement and the sole proprietorship resolution form also constitute admissions under Rule 801(d)(2) because there was sufficient independent evidence to prove the defendant had signed the records. We disagree. Upon review of the record, we can find no such evidence. The State argues that there were several records admitted without objection that contain the defendant's signature and that this was sufficient to prove that it was also the defendant's signature on the account agreement and the sole proprietorship resolution form. The record, however, does not reveal that such a comparison was ever made at trial by any witness. We find, therefore, that the signatures in these records do not meet the party-opponent admission exception under Rule 801(d)(2). Redacting the statements and signatures contained in the business account agreement and sole proprietorship resolution form before admitting them would have cured this problem; however, since the trial court admitted the records in their entirety based erroneously upon the business records exception, this information was not redacted. However, as we discuss below, the admission of the statements and signatures on these records was harmless error.