Opinion ID: 1273939
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Voluntary Nature of the Extrajudicial Statements:

Text: [6] The contention is that Robinson's extrajudicial statement should have been excluded because it was involuntary. [18] Such contention overlooks the manner in which the statement was admitted. The trial judge allowed the parties to produce evidence in a voir dire proceeding before determining whether he would allow the extrajudicial statement to be read into evidence. He advised the jury that the evidence thus to be produced was received for the sole purpose of determining whether the alleged statement was voluntary or involuntary. The evidence so produced was in direct conflict, and the trier of fact certainly had the right to accept either the prosecution's version or that of Robinson and his witnesses. This constituted a simple factual issue. At the conclusion thereof, the trial judge expressed to counsel, and out of the presence of the jury, his disbelief of Robinson's claims. Under proper instructions he allowed the jury to determine whether or not the statement was voluntary. The parties, in their briefs, argue the merits of the facts testified to by the various witnesses. But we are not concerned with that question. [19] That was the sole concern of the jury. The cases on which appellants rely deal with claims of coercion in which the facts were not in dispute. While it is true that the prosecution has the burden of proving that the alleged confession was voluntary ( People v. Rogers, 22 Cal.2d 787 [141 P.2d 722]), the trial court here required the prosecution to produce such evidence before allowing the confession to go before the jury. It is the function of the jury, and not of this court, to choose between the conflicting testimony of the parties. The extrajudicial statements and confessions of the various defendants were properly admitted. If the jury believed any one or more of them to have been involuntarily made, it must be deemed to have rejected the same under the court's instructions to that effect. It was also instructed that any statement which it believed to have been voluntarily made was to be considered only as against the particular defendant who made the same. Thus, Robinson's statement was either rejected by the jury on the ground that they believed it to have been made under coercion, or it was accepted and considered only as against him. In no event could the jury have considered that statement in determining the question of Drivers' guilt. Insofar as Robinson's appeal is concerned, there was no error in the refusal to exclude his statement.