Opinion ID: 214896
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Intentional Harm to Property Interest

Text: The District Court held that Glenn failed to establish his claim for intentional harm to property interest (also known as a “prima facie tort” claim) because it found that the evidence at trial “did not establish that Dunlop’s sole purpose in recording documents against the Property was to injure Glenn or the Trust”; instead, “all signs indicate that Dunlop’s motivation in investigating his family’s purported interest in the Property was to safeguard that interest.” 2009 WL 482481, at . Leaving aside the question of whether the record supports those findings (discussed in connection with the slander-of-title claim above), the District Court applied an improperly burdensome legal standard to Glenn’s claim. The Restatement provides that the “intent” element of the offense is satisfied where the defendant (1) desires to bring about harm as a consequence of his act, or (2) knows or believes that harm is certain, or substantially certain, to result from his actions, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 870 cmt. b; it does not require a plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted solely out of an intent to harm. 6 6 The District Court cited another case from the District of the Virgin Islands in which the court quoted and applied the “sole motivation” requirement to a prima facie tort claim. See 2009 WL 482481, at  (quoting Gov’t Guarantee Fund of Republic of Finland v. Hyatt Corp., 955 F. Supp. 441, 463 (D.V.I. 1997)). That case does not control our analysis, however, because it relied in part on New York law, which has adopted 11 At the same time, however, we note that prima facie tort claims typically provide relief only where the defendant’s conduct “does not come within the requirements of one of the well established and named intentional torts.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 870 cmt. a. In keeping with this principle, courts in the Virgin Islands have dismissed prima facie tort claims that they deem insufficiently “distinct” from plaintiffs’ other, more established tort claims. See, e.g., Moore v. A.H. Riise Gift Shops, 659 F. Supp. 1417, 1426 (D.V.I. 1987); Gov’t Guarantee Fund of Republic of Finland v. Hyatt Corp., 955 F. Supp. 441, 463 (D.V.I. 1997) (“[N]o claim for prima facie tort lies if the action complained of fits within another category of tort.” (citation omitted)). In this case, there appears to be significant potential for overlap between the slander-of-title and prima facie tort claims. Thus, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment on the intentional-harmto-property-interest claim and remand for the District Court to determine whether it duplicates the slander-of-title claim. In other words, to the extent that the District Court determines that Glenn is entitled to relief on the slander-of-title claim, it should deny relief on the intentional-harm-to-property-interest claim if it concludes the claims are one and the same. 7 more stringent standards for liability on prima facie tort claims than the Restatement requires. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 870 cmt. a. 7 If the District Court determines that Glenn is not entitled to relief on the slander-of-title claim, then it should consider whether he has established his intentional-harm-toproperty-interest claim. 12