Opinion ID: 2092304
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of Defendant's October 11 Consent

Text: Defendant argues that his consent was ineffectual, even though the Miranda warnings were given, because he was not advised that a search could not be made without his consent unless a warrant was issued, that an impartial magistrate must issue the warrant, and of the difference in scope between a warrant search and a consent search. Generally speaking, a warrantless search and seizure is unreasonable per se and violative of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 1963 Const, art 1, § 11 of the state constitution. However, it is quite clear that the right to be secure from warrantless searches may be waived by defendant's valid consent. Martucci v Detroit Commissioner of Police, 322 Mich 270; 33 NW2d 789 (1948). We said in People v Kaigler, 368 Mich 281, 294; 118 NW2d 406 (1962): [S]uch waiver or consent must be proved by clear and positive testimony and there must be no duress or coercion, actual or implied, and the prosecutor must show a consent that is unequivocal and specific, freely and intelligently given. (Emphasis in original case.) Whether a consent is valid is a matter of fact based upon the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from it. [11] The trial judge, exercising his discretion, found that the consent was valid. We hold that his decision was not clearly erroneous. In People v Zeigler, 358 Mich 355, 364-365; 100 NW2d 456 (1960) this Court stated: And so, with respect to incriminating evidence, other than confessions, obtained by search and seizure, under a conceivable showing of facts, such as, inter alia, that the accused was first advised of his rights, informed that he need not submit to a search and that, if he did, the fruits thereof would be used in evidence against him, his consenting to the search and seizure may well, in the absence of contrary indications, be held to be voluntary, not an involuntary act secured under coercion, and, hence, a waiver of his constitutional rights, rendering such evidence admissible. As stated above, the defendant was given the Miranda warnings informing him of his rights. He stated that he understood these rights. [12] Further, the written consent verifies that defendant was informed of his constitutional right not to have a search made of the premises hereinafter mentioned without a search warrant and of his right to refuse to consent to a search. [13] Defendant was informed as to the purpose of the search and that the fruits of the search might be used against him in evidence. [14] The record is also replete with evidence that the consent was freely, voluntarily, and unequivocally given with no hint of coercion or duress. [15] As to this first search, the wife's consent was irrelevant due to the valid consent of the defendant and we need not pass upon its validity. Thus the consent was valid and the evidence seized on October 11, 1967 was admissible. [16] The trial judge committed no error.