Opinion ID: 2399105
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Purchase and Sale Contract

Text: ¶ 13. Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the parties entered into a contract for the purchase and sale of defendant's farm on July 11, 1999. Specifically, defendant asserts that letters written by attorneys for both parties characterizing their agreement as an offer to sell are persuasive evidence that the Purchase and Sale Contract constituted only an offer by defendant. According to defendant, the attorneys' letters are far superior to potentially falsified testimony in establishing the parties' construction of the [agreement]. Defendant is incorrect. ¶ 14. Generally, construction of a contract is a matter of law. Housing Vt. v. Goldsmith & Morris, 165 Vt. 428, 430, 685 A.2d 1086, 1088 (1996). If a court finds a writing ambiguous, however, the proper interpretation becomes a question of fact, to be determined on all relevant evidence. New England P'ship v. Rutland City Sch. Dist., 173 Vt. 69, 77, 786 A.2d 408, 415 (2001) (internal quotations omitted); Bixler v. Bullard, 172 Vt. 53, 58, 769 A.2d 690, 694 (2001) (intent to be bound by contract is question of fact); Housing Vt., 165 Vt. at 430, 685 A.2d at 1088 ([W]here the meaning of a contract is uncertain, the intent of the parties becomes a question of fact.); see also Isbrandtsen v. N. Branch Corp., 150 Vt. 575, 579, 556 A.2d 81, 84-85 (1988) (when ambiguity found, court may then rely on subordinate rules of construction in order to interpret the meaning of the disputed terms). In this case, the trial court found the Purchase and Sale Contract ambiguous on its face. The court concluded that: [o]n its face, the defendant accepted the [plaintiffs'] $180,000 offer to buy the property on July 11, 199[9]. But, also, on the contract's face, the [plaintiffs] signed the contract stating the date of the offer was on July 22, eleven days after the acceptance. Furthermore, there was a provision that the offer was to remain open until August 11, and another provision which entitled the [plaintiffs] to be refunded their $5000 deposit if they chose to revoke their offer. Again, since the defendant's acceptance apparently occurred as soon as the contract was created, it is unclear what these provisions were meant to accomplish. ¶ 15. After assessing the credibility of witnesses and weighing the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the trial court made findings regarding the ambiguities of the writing. These findings are entitled to substantial deference. Housing Vt., 165 Vt. at 430, 685 A.2d at 1088; Kanaan v. Kanaan, 163 Vt. 402, 405, 659 A.2d 128, 131 (1995) (trial court is granted wide deference on review because it is in a unique position to assess credibility of witnesses and weight of evidence presented). We will not set aside a trial court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous, nor will we disturb conclusions that are reasonably supported by the findings. V.R.C.P. 52; New England P'ship, 173 Vt. at 77, 786 A.2d at 415 (citations omitted). ¶ 16. Specifically, the court found that the parties had negotiated all material terms and intended to be bound by them on July 11. With regard to the ambiguous clause of the agreement stating that [i]f purchaser revokes offer the $5000.00 will be refunded, the court, after assessing contradictory testimony concerning the intent of this provision, found that the purpose of this clause was to clarify that if plaintiffs discovered defects in title, or any other encumbrances not represented by defendant which would prevent conveyance of marketable title, plaintiffs would not forfeit their deposit. The court concluded that there was no reliable evidence, including defendant's contrary testimony, suggesting an alternative interpretation of this ambiguous provision. ¶ 17. The court's findings support the conclusion that the Purchase and Sale Contract constituted plaintiffs' offer to purchase 100 acres of defendant's 150 acre farm for $180,000, which defendant accepted and signed on July 11. As a result, plaintiffs created a contract they were entitled to enforce against defendant. [2] See 12 V.S.A. § 181 (under the Statute of Frauds, a contract for the sale of land enforceable if signed by the party to be charged); Starr Farm Beach Campowners Asso'n v. Boylan, 174 Vt. 503, 505, 811 A.2d 155, 158 (2002) (mem.) (enforceable contract demonstrates a meeting of the minds of the parties: an offer by one of them and an acceptance of such offer by the other). That the attorneys for the parties erroneously characterized the agreement in their subsequent correspondence does not alter this conclusion. See New England P'ship, 173 Vt. at 77, 786 A.2d at 415 (trial court's findings upheld even if substantial contradictory evidence exists if credible evidence supports those findings). Defendant's claim therefore fails. [3] ¶ 18. Defendant also avers that the trial court erred in concluding that the parties' agreement was supported by consideration. Defendant argues that because plaintiffs could revoke their offer to purchase the farm according to the terms of the contractwhich, if done, would require defendant to return plaintiffs' $5000 depositthe consideration provided was illusory. Again, defendant is incorrect. ¶ 19. The existence of sufficient consideration for a contract is a question of law and is evaluated at the time the contract was formed. Lloyd's Credit Corp. v. Marlin Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 158 Vt. 594, 598-99, 614 A.2d 812, 814-15 (1992). Either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee is sufficient consideration for a contract. Id. at 598, 614 A.2d at 814. Mutual promises, `in each of which the promisor undertakes some act or forbearance that will be, or apparently may be, detrimental to the promisor or beneficial to the promisee, and neither of which is void, are sufficient consideration for one another.' H.P. Hood & Sons v. Heins, 124 Vt. 331, 337, 205 A.2d 561, 565 (1964) (quoting 1 Williston on Contracts § 103, at 395-96 (3d ed. 1957)). In this case, the trial court's findings demonstrate that plaintiffs promised to purchase defendant's farm for $180,000 and, in return defendant promised to sell the farm to plaintiffs for that price. This bargained for exchange of mutual promises was sufficient consideration to support the contract. See Ragosta v. Wilder, 156 Vt. 390, 393-94, 592 A.2d 367, 369 (1991) (to constitute consideration, a return promise must be bargained for); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71(2) (1981) (A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.). Further, as the trial court noted: the giving of ... [a bank draft for] $5,000.00 amounted to a transfer of the use of funds to [defendant]. The fact that [defendant] had not negotiated the check is irrelevant ... [plaintiffs] directed their bank to pay him $5000.00 of their money upon demand, and thereby deprived themselves of the use of that money. This by itself is sufficient consideration. Therefore, defendant's claim that consideration was illusory fails.