Opinion ID: 2244953
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Reference to Invocation of Right to Remain Silent

Text: Taylor next asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear an alleged reference to Taylor's decision to assert his right to remain silent. During redirect, the prosecutor asked Detective Stacey whether the manner in which Shane Delagrange was ultimately arrested [was] any different than the manner in which Chad Taylor was arrested. Stacey responded: Yes, due to the fact that [Delagrange] came in and voluntarily gave a statement or a confession of his involvement in this murder. Taylor characterizes this question and answer as an improper reference to Taylor's exercise of his right to remain silent. He claims that the only logical inference from this testimony is that because he waited to come into the police station until he heard that police were looking for him he must have had something to hide. It is plainly improper for a prosecutor to comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence. See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). However, Stacey's reference to Taylor's independent decision of when to initiate contact with police cannot be construed as a reference to Taylor's assertion of his right to remain silent. Although the relevance of the exchange on redirect is questionable, there is no ascertainable prejudice to Taylor and the detective's statement is not fairly understood by the jury to imply or comment on the defendant's silence.