Opinion ID: 71530
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: coast guard consideration of a propeller guard regulation

Text: 11 In 1988, the Coast Guard directed the Advisory Council to examine the feasibility and potential safety advantages and safety disadvantages of propeller guards. In response, the Advisory Council appointed a Propeller Guard Subcommittee to consider, review and assess available data concerning the nature and incidence of recreational boating accidents in which persons in the water are struck by propellers. National Boating Safety Advisory Council, Report of the Propeller Guard Subcommittee 1 (1989). The Advisory Council also asked the Subcommittee to consider whether the Coast Guard [should] move towards a federal requirement for some form of propeller guard. Id. at Appendix A. 12 The Advisory Council Subcommittee held hearings on three occasions and received information from a variety of individuals and groups interested in the topic of propeller guards. See id. at 2-4. One of the matters on which the Subcommittee received information was propeller guard litigation, and the Subcommittee devoted a section of its report to the topic. Id. at 4. That section states that, at the time of the hearings, propeller guard advocates were petitioning federal and state legislators to mandate propeller guards. According to the Subcommittee Report, a legislative or administrative mandate would necessarily be predicated on the feasibility of guards and establish prima facie manufacturer liability in having failed to provide them; therefore, feasibility was an important question before the Subcommittee. Id. at 5. The report also discusses the theories of liability that were being asserted by propeller guard victims and the defenses used by manufacturers. Id. at 4-5. Immediately following that discussion, the report notes that [m]anufacturers are opposed to mandatory propeller guards. Id. at 5. 13 The Subcommittee also considered the technical issues posed by propeller guards. After reviewing the available scientific data and testimony, the Subcommittee found that propeller guards affect boat operation adversely at speeds greater than 10 miles per hour. Id. at 21. Further, the Subcommittee found that propeller guards would not increase overall safety, because they increase the chances of contact between a blunt object and a person in the water. Id. at 20-21. The Subcommittee Report states: 14 Injuries/fatalities caused by underwater impacts result from a person coming into contact with the propeller or any part of the propulsion unit (i.e., lower unit, skeg, torpedo, anti-ventilation plate, etc.) and even the boat itself. Currently reported accidents make it obvious that all such components are involved in the total picture, and that the propeller itself is the sole factor in only a minority of impacts. The development and use of devices such as propeller guards can, therefore, be counter-productive and can create new hazards of equal or greater consequence.... Although the controversy which currently surrounds the issue of propeller guarding is, by its very nature, highly emotional and has attracted a great deal of publicity, there are no indications that there is a generic or universal solution currently available or foreseeable in the future. The boating public must not be misled into thinking there is a safe device which would eliminate or significantly reduce such injuries or fatalities. 15 Id. at 23-24. The report also states that: 16 boats and motors should be designed to incorporate technologically feasible safety features to avoid or minimize the consequences of inexperienced or negligent operation, without at the same time (a) creating some other hazard, (b) materially interfering with normal operations, or (c) being at economic costs disproportionate to the particular risk. 17 Proponents assert that propeller guard technology and/or availability meets the foregoing criteria and that guards should not be mandated. The Subcommittee does not agree.... 18 Id. at 20. In its conclusion, the Advisory Council Subcommittee Report recommends that [t]he U.S. Coast Guard should take no regulatory action to require propeller guards. Id. at 24. 19 The Subcommittee presented its report to the entire Advisory Council, which accepted the report and adopted the recommendations of the Subcommittee. Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the National Boating Safety Advisory Council 19 (Nov. 6-7, 1989). The Advisory Council then forwarded the report and recommendations to the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard adopted each of the Advisory Council's recommendations, giving explanations of the Coast Guard's position on each matter. See Letter from Robert T. Nelson, Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Chief, Office of Navigation, Safety and Waterway Services to A. Newell Garden, Chairman, National Boating Safety Advisory Council (Feb. 1, 1990). The Coast Guard's position on propeller guards, which is set out in that letter, is as follows: 20 The regulatory process is very structured and stringent regarding justification. Available propeller guard accident data do not support imposition of a regulation requiring propeller guards on motorboats. Regulatory action is also limited by the many questions about whether a universally acceptable propeller guard is available or technically feasible in all modes of boat operation. Additionally, the question of retrofitting millions of boats would certainly be a major economic consideration. 21 The Coast Guard will continue to collect and analyze data for changes and trends; and will promote increased/improved accident reporting as addressed in recommendation 2. The Coast Guard will also review and retain any information made available regarding development and testing of new propeller guard devices or other information on the state of the art. 22 Id. at 1.