Opinion ID: 2211822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: parole eligibility information

Text: ¶ 54. Having affirmed the circuit court's determination that Byrge was competent to stand trial, we next address the third issue, namely whether a circuit court, before accepting a plea of guilty or no contest, must inform a defendant that it possesses the authority to fix the parole eligibility date. Byrge contends that his pleas were not knowingly and intelligently entered because the circuit court did not warn him that the maximum penalty was not merely a life sentence, but a life sentence without the possibility of parole. ¶ 55. We begin by noting that the standard of review for this issue differs from the standard that we have applied thus far in this case. Whether a plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently presents a question of constitutional fact. State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 283, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) (citing Miller, 474 U.S. 104). We will not disturb a circuit court's findings of historical, evidentiary facts unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶ 13, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199. However, we review the application of the law to the historical facts independently. Id. Under this standard, an appellate court may look to the entire record in the course of its review. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 283. [20-22] ¶ 56. When a circuit court sentences a defendant to life imprisonment, it must make a parole eligibility determination. As it applied to Byrge, Wis. Stat. § 973.014 required the sentencing court to exercise one of two options by: 1) determining that the defendant is eligible for parole under Wis. Stat. § 304.06, or 2) setting a parole eligibility date. Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)-(2). [22] In this case the circuit court exercised the second alternative under Wis. Stat. § 973.014(2) and set Byrge's parole eligibility date at July 2, 2095. The court noted that on that date, Byrge would be 120 years old. [23] Although the circuit court engaged in an extensive colloquy with Byrge at the plea hearing, it did not inform Byrge about its options regarding the setting of parole eligibility or its authority to fix a parole eligibility date. [23] ¶ 57. It is well established that a criminal defendant must enter a plea of guilty or no contest knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶ 15. When a defendant is not aware of the potential punishment, the plea is not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and the result is a manifest injustice. State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 635-36, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998). ¶ 58. Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08 governs the plea colloquy procedure a circuit court must follow to ensure that a plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The circuit court must [a]ddress the defendant personally and determine that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the potential punishment if convicted. Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a). [24] ¶ 59. The issue here effectively requires us to decide whether parole eligibility directly reflects a potential punishment under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a). If it does, then the circuit court should have addressed parole eligibility in its plea colloquy with Byrge. When a defendant makes a prima facie showing that the circuit court did not conform with the statutory procedures of § 971.08, and the defendant alleges that he or she did not know or understand the information that the court should have provided at the plea hearing, the burden shifts to the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant nonetheless entered the plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274. [25] ¶ 60. Defendants have a due process right to be notified about the direct consequences of their pleas. See Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶ 16. A direct consequence of a plea is one that has a definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on the range of a defendant's punishment. Id. If a defendant is not aware of the direct consequences of a plea, he or she is not appraised of the potential punishment under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a). [26-28] ¶ 61. Information about collateral consequences of a plea, by contrast, is not a prerequisite to entering a knowing and intelligent plea. Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 636. Collateral consequences are indirect and do not flow from the conviction. For example, collateral consequences may be contingent on a future proceeding in which a defendant's subsequent behavior affects the determination. Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 637-38 (citing State v. James, 176 Wis. 2d 230, 243-44, 500 N.W.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1993)). Sometimes a collateral consequence is one that rests not with the sentencing court, but instead with a different tribunal or government agency. State v. Kosina, 226 Wis. 2d 482, 486, 595 N.W.2d 464 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 236 (8th Cir. 1988)). The distinction between direct and collateral consequences essentially recognizes that it would be unreasonable and impractical to require a circuit court to be cognizant of every conceivable consequence before the court accepts a plea. Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 638-39. ¶ 62. Byrge contends that his pleas were not knowing or intelligent because the information about the parole eligibility date affected the range of his punishment and therefore constituted a direct consequence of his pleas. The State maintains that the circuit court's power to set the parole eligibility date represents only a collateral consequence of the plea, and therefore Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a) did not obligate the circuit court to notify Byrge. ¶ 63. In its review of this case, the court of appeals held that the circuit court's failure to inform Byrge about parole eligibility did not render the plea defective. Byrge, 225 Wis. 2d at 718. The court relied in part on Birts v. State, 68 Wis. 2d 389, 398-99, 228 N.W.2d 351 (1975), in which we held that a circuit court is not required to notify defendants about parole rights. Byrge, 225 Wis. 2d at 716. The court also turned to a decision by the Supreme Court, Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985), which concluded that a defendant is not constitutionally entitled to be forewarned about parole eligibility. Byrge, 225 Wis. 2d at 715-16. The court of appeals noted that both Birts and Hill were decided at a time when the parole decision was left to the parole board, before Wis. Stat. § 973.014(2) authorized the sentencing court to engage in the threshold parole decision. [24] Id. at 716. Nonetheless, the court reasoned that the holdings of those cases were still efficacious because Wis. Stat. § 973.014 does not mandate the sentencing court to fix a parole eligibility date but rather allows the court to leave the decision to set the eligibility to the parole board. Id. at 716-17. ¶ 64. The court of appeals also dismissed Byrge's reliance on State v. Bentley, 195 Wis. 2d 580, 536 N.W.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996). In that case, the court of appeals suggested that parole eligibility constitutes a direct, not a collateral, consequence of the sentence. Byrge, 225 Wis. 2d at 717 (citing Bentley, 195 Wis. 2d at 590). While noting that this court reversed Bentley only on other grounds, the court concluded that Bentley does not govern here because it was decided in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. ¶ 65. We agree with the court of appeals that its decision in Bentley is not germane to this case. The core of the parole eligibility discussion in Bentley centered on misadvice in the ineffective assistance context, namely, the defense counsel's failure to advise a client about parole eligibility. Bentley, 195 Wis. 2d at 589-90. Bentley did not address whether Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a) obligates a sentencing court to inform defendants about parole eligibility as a direct consequence of the plea. Moreover, we reversed Bentley on other grounds, and, because we do not address an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this case, we decline to reassess Bentley here. [29] ¶ 66. Like the court of appeals, we also find it significant that Birts and Hill were decided before Wis. Stat. § 973.014 authorized the sentencing court to take part in the threshold parole decision. See Byrge, 225 Wis. 2d at 716. Although § 973.014 does not mandate the sentencing court to fix the parole eligibility date, § 973.014(2) grants the court that authority. If the circuit court declines to exercise the option and allows the parole board to set the date, the parole right becomes contingent on a future proceeding, subject to a determination by a different government agency. The decision of the parole board then may turn on the defendant's future behavior, a factor that would be impractical for the circuit court to divine. See Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 638-39. When a parole board makes an eligibility determination at a date after the sentencing order, parole eligibility is not an immediate and largely automatic result of the conviction. Hence, if the circuit court leaves the decision to another agency, the parole eligibility information is a collateral consequence of the plea, and failure to notify the defendant about parole eligibility does not compromise the plea. ¶ 67. We find, however, that a different set of considerations arises in the limited circumstances in which a sentencing court itself sets the parole eligibility date. If a circuit court elects to exercise the statutory option set forth in Wis. Stat. § 973.014(2), as it did in this case, the parole eligibility date links automatically to the period of incarceration, which in turn has a direct and automatic effect on the range of punishment. At Byrge's plea hearing, the circuit court expressly acknowledged this reality when it selected a parole eligibility date that exceeded Byrge's anticipated life span. [30] ¶ 68. We therefore hold that in the narrow circumstance in which a circuit court has statutory authority under Wis. Stat. § 973.014(2) to fix the parole eligibility date, the circuit court is obligated to provide the defendant with parole eligibility information before accepting a plea. Parole eligibility in this discrete situation implicates punishment and constitutes a direct consequence of the plea. Because the circuit court did not inform Byrge about a potential direct consequence of his conviction, we conclude that Byrge has made a prima facie showing that the plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent according to the requirements outlined in Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a). ¶ 69. Having found that Byrge has made a threshold showing that the plea colloquy was defective, we now examine whether the State nonetheless has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Byrge nonetheless entered the plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274. If we find that the State has met this burden by showing that Byrge was aware of the parole eligibility possibilities, we will not disturb the pleas Byrge entered. See id. at 274-75. ¶ 70. In making its showing, the State may rely on any evidence, including testimony from defense counsel, to prove that a defendant possessed the requisite information to make the plea knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. In this case the State offers the testimony that Byrge's trial counsel, Norby, provided at a post-conviction motion hearing. Although we recognize that Norby made his observations in the context of defending himself in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we nonetheless find his testimony pertinent to the State's burden. When reviewing a plea, we do not focus on `ritualistic litany' of formal elements but instead consider whether the defendant received real notice about the implications of the plea. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 282-83 (internal quotations omitted). ¶ 71. Norby testified that Byrge appeared to understand what his options were before the plea was entered, and he explained to Byrge that a conviction for first-degree intentional homicide carried a mandatory life sentence. Norby said that Byrge understood that the court could set a parole eligibility date sufficiently far enough into the future that Byrge would have no realistic opportunity of being released during his lifetime. According to Norby, Byrge never expressed any confusion or lack of knowledge about the plea or the likely penalties. ¶ 72. Byrge told the court at his change of plea hearing that he understood that the charge of first-degree intentional homicide carries a punishment of life imprisonment. He also testified at the post-conviction motion hearing. When asked if Norby discussed a parole eligibility date with him, Byrge said, He never talked to me about going to prison at all for that. Byrge, however, added that he knew what parole eligibility meant. He also recognized that by entering the plea, the court would find him guilty of first-degree intentional homicide. Moreover, Byrge stated that he understood that the penalty for the crime was a mandatory sentence of life in prison. ¶ 73. The circuit court issued a written decision denying Byrge's motion for post-conviction relief. The court made the following finding: [T]he Defendant was advised that he faced life imprisonment as punishment for his crime and the Defendant testified that he understood. Trial counsel discussed with the Defendant that the court could set parole eligibility so far into the future that he would not be released during his lifetime and that the Defendant understood that possibility. Under these circumstances, this court finds that the Defendant was advised of the maximum penalty and that he faced life without the possibility of parole. We do not disturb this finding of fact because we conclude that the circuit court's determination was not clearly erroneous. The testimony of Norby supported the court's decision that Byrge knew and understood the parole eligibility possibilities at the time he entered his plea. We therefore conclude that the State has met its burden to prove that Byrge had real notice about the implications of the plea. [31] ¶ 74. We hold that although the circuit court had a duty to inform Byrge about the parole eligibility information before it accepted his plea, the State has met its burden to prove that, despite the deficiency of the plea colloquy, Byrge nonetheless entered the plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.