Opinion ID: 1825990
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: are the two letters capable of a defamatory meaning?

Text: [1] In an action for libel, on demurrer, if both malice and falsity are alleged, both malice and falsity must be considered facts which are presumed to be true for the purposes of the demurrer. [1] Here the plaintiffs have alleged both malice and falsity, and at the demurrer stage both malice and falsity must be accepted as facts. It follows that the demurrer was properly overruled unless, as a matter of law, the statements complained of are incapable under the circumstances pleaded of being defamatory. [2] [2, 3] Under the law of this state, a communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or deter third persons from associating or dealing with him. [3] If the statements complained of are capable of a nondefamatory meaning as well as a defamatory meaning, then a jury question is presented. [4] Only if the communication cannot reasonably be considered defamatory or be so understood can the demurrer be sustained. [5] [4-8] As the trial court here held, words spoken of an individual or a corporation which charge dishonorable, unethical or unprofessional conduct in a trade, business or profession are capable of a defamatory meaning. [6] The charge of patent infringement has been held to be libelous per se. [7] A statement is also defamatory if, in its natural and ordinary sense, it imputes to the person charged commission of a criminal act. [8] In this state, the theft of trade secrets is a criminal offense. [9] We agree with the trial court that the charge contained in the two letters, that Kidd had misappropriated confidential information and misappropriated trade secrets, presented a jury question as to whether they were defamatory or nondefamatory. It is true that the letters contained words such as apparently and appear to be. This changes nothing. The authorities agree that communications are not made nondefamatory as a matter of law merely because they are phrased as opinions, suspicious or beliefs. [10] As this court has held: One may be libeled by implication and innuendo quite as easily as by direct affirmation. [11]