Opinion ID: 2204818
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Statutory or Precedential Authority

Text: The parties agree that there is no statutory authority that would require the lower court to consider giving defendant sentencing credit for the time he spent on probation. The parties also agree that there is no precedent for the appellate court's actions. In fact, the State argues that the appellate court's decision to remand the matter for consideration of such credit stands in direct conflict with previous decisions of this court and cites to People v. Wade, 116 Ill.2d 1, 107 Ill.Dec. 63, 506 N.E.2d 954 (1987), People v. Arna, 168 Ill.2d 107, 212 Ill.Dec. 963, 658 N.E.2d 445 (1995), and People v. Judd, 396 Ill. 211, 71 N.E.2d 29 (1947), as support. Defendant counters that these cases are distinguishable and irrelevant to the issue presented in this case. We disagree with defendant's contention that the cases cited by the State have no bearing on the case before us. Both Arna and Judd set forth general legal principles that can be applied to the issue we now face. In Arna, the defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment when consecutive sentences were mandatory pursuant to statute. Arna espouses the rule that a sentence which is contrary to a statutory requirement is void and can be corrected at any time. Arna, 168 Ill.2d at 113, 212 Ill.Dec. 963, 658 N.E.2d 445. In Judd, the defendants were sentenced under an invalid statute and served four years in prison. The defendants were resentenced, but were not given credit for the time they had already served because there was no statute then in effect allowing for such credit. Judd, 396 Ill. at 212, 71 N.E.2d 29. The law which guided Judd' s outcome has since been changed and defendants are now entitled to credit for time spent in prison upon resentencing for the same offense. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-7 (West 2004); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). Nevertheless, the Judd opinion sets forth the relevant legal principle that courts are bound by the laws in effect when fashioning judgments. The Judd court stated: [T]his court cannot make laws. It is authorized only to interpret them. Judd, 396 Ill. at 212-13, 71 N.E.2d 29. Wade provides more specific guidance to this court, as it presents a factual scenario that is similar to the one now before us. In Wade, the defendant pled guilty to robbery and received probation. Several months later, it was discovered that the defendant was ineligible for probation because of his criminal background. The trial court vacated the probation order and the defendant withdrew his plea and was convicted. Wade, 116 Ill.2d at 4, 107 Ill. Dec. 63, 506 N.E.2d 954. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in failing to give him sentencing credit for the time he spent on probation. The appellate court concluded that the defendant was not entitled to credit because his probationary sentence was void. People v. Wade, 137 Ill.App.3d 878, 882, 92 Ill.Dec. 581, 485 N.E.2d 392 (1985). The defendant did not appeal the appellate court's judgment regarding sentencing credit to this court. Instead, the defendant argued that the trial court lost jurisdiction over him 30 days after imposing the sentence of probation and was without authority to vacate his sentence months later when the State realized its error. This court rejected the defendant's claim and affirmed the appellate court, finding that the defendant's sentence could be set aside at any time because it was void. Wade, 116 Ill.2d at 5-6, 107 Ill.Dec. 63, 506 N.E.2d 954. The Wade court stated: The legislature has authority to define crimes and establish the nature and extent of criminal penalties, and a court exceeds its authority if it orders a lesser sentence than is mandated by statute, unless `the [mandated] penalty shocks the conscience of reasonable men.' Wade, 116 Ill.2d at 6, 107 Ill.Dec. 63, 506 N.E.2d 954, quoting People ex rel. Ward v. Salter, 28 Ill.2d 612, 615, 192 N.E.2d 882 (1963). Wade makes clear that defendant's sentence of probation is void. Wade also reinforces the notion that courts are not authorized to fashion sentences that do not conform to statutory guidelines. Because defendant's original sentence of probation is void, and because there is no statute that permits courts to give credit for time spent on a void probation, it would seem defendant is not entitled to any consideration toward his current prison sentence for the time he spent on probation. Our analysis cannot stop there, however, because the appellate court found this resolution to be fundamentally unfair and an encroachment upon defendant's right to equal protection, and remanded the matter for the trial court to consider whether defendant should receive some credit. The State asserts that the appellate court's order amounted to an unauthorized use of supervisory power because there is no constitutional dimension to this case. Defendant disagrees, and asserts that the trial court violated his constitutional right to equal protection under the law when it failed to consider the credit issue.