Opinion ID: 173048
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Indictment and Instructions

Text: The one potential objection discussed in counsel’s Anders brief concerns the use of a formalistic bare-bones indictment to prosecute six particularized -4- time-specific incidents of criminal conduct. The six counts of aggravated sexual abuse provided few actual facts and involved lengthy, partially overlapping time frames from three to six years. 2 Thus, on its face, the indictment might well raise concerns about the notice as to the nature of the charges. But any such concerns were allayed by the government’s open-file discovery policy, which gave defendant access to evidence pinpointing the time and location of each incident to be proven at trial. Defense counsel repeatedly affirmed on the record that this discovery policy provided ample notice of the charges. In his Anders brief, counsel does not focus on defendant’s pretrial notice of charges. Instead, counsel focuses on the government’s case at trial, suggesting the possibility of a “variance” from the indictment, in that much of the factual basis developed at trial in support of the charged counts had not been specified in the indictment. Nevertheless, counsel opines, and we agree, that this line of argument is clearly foreclosed by the record. 2 For example, compare count eight: “On or about between August 20, 2000, and August 19, 2004, in the District of Wyoming and within Indian Country, the Defendant, TRAVIS J. McGILL, an Indian, did knowingly engage in a sexual act, to-wit, contact between the penis and the vulva, with ____, a person who at the time had not yet attained the age of twelve (12) years”; with count nine: “On or about between August 20, 2001, and August 19, 2004, in the District of Wyoming and within Indian Country, the Defendant, TRAVIS J. McGILL, an Indian, did knowingly engage in a sexual act, to-wit, contact between the penis and vulva, with ____, a person who at that time had not yet attained the age of twelve (12) years.” R. Vol. 1 at 57. -5- Where, as here, the new facts shown at trial do not so deviate from the charged offense as to constructively amend the indictment by establishing a different crime, a factual variance does not undermine the conviction unless substantial rights of the defendant were otherwise prejudiced. United States v. Sells, 477 F.3d 1226, 1237 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hamilton, 992 F.2d 1126, 1129-30 (10th Cir. 1993). Such prejudice can occur “either because [the defendant] cannot anticipate from the indictment what evidence will be presented against him, or because the defendant is exposed to the risk of double jeopardy. [3]” United States v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002). The first type of prejudice is negated here for the same reason pretrial notice concerns were allayed: as counsel readily admitted, the government’s cooperation in discovery left the defense fully able to anticipate and prepare for the evidence presented in support of the charged offenses at trial. Nor is there a risk of double jeopardy exposure: defendant cannot be mistakenly retried for the conduct actually underlying his conviction here, given the explicit one-to-one linkage of the charged counts with the particular incidents proven at trial (the implementation of this linkage, through jury instructions, is discussed below). 3 Regarding this risk, we have explained that “a variance can be so great as to violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy because a conviction based on the indictment would not bar a subsequent prosecution” for the conduct actually underlying the offense of conviction as found by the jury. United States v. Stoner, 98 F.3d 527, 536-37 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted) adhered to in relevant part on rh’g en banc, 139 F.3d 1343 (1998). -6- We have repeatedly stressed that “‘it is the judgment and not the indictment alone which acts as a bar, and the entire record may be considered in evaluating a subsequent claim of double jeopardy.’” Hamilton, 992 F.2d at 1130 (quoting United States v. Whitman, 665 F.2d 313, 318 (10th Cir. 1981) (further quotations omitted)). Given the careful framing of the jury instructions here, “[t]he record in this case eliminates any possibility that [defendant] could be reprosecuted for the acts supporting his conviction. Accordingly, no fatal variance occurred.” Whitman, 665 F.2d at 318. The use of generic, facially indistinguishable counts with broad overlapping time frames could potentially raise additional double-jeopardy and jury-unanimity concerns. As for double jeopardy, the jury could be misled into convicting the defendant on more than one count for the same conduct; as for jury-unanimity, different jurors might vote to convict on the same count on the basis of different conduct. Both of these concerns, however, were obviated by instructions, approved by the prosecution and defense alike, that linked specific counts with particular incidents identified by unique factual circumstances. For some counts, the unique identifier was a particular type of sexual act (already specified in the indictment) that the evidence showed had occurred only once; for others, the identifier was the particular location of the offense, which had been associated with just one of the incidents described (in additional detail) by the victim in her testimony. See generally R. Vol. 3 at 1515-28. And the government -7- reinforced these instructions during closing argument by highlighting the specific incidents linked to each count, see id. at 1454-56, and underscoring for the jury that “[t]he important thing you must all agree on are what facts support each count,” id. at 1454. Accordingly, we discern no grounds on which a non-frivolous challenge could be made to defendant’s conviction on the basis of the indictment, variance between the indictment and the proof at trial, or the manner in which the counts of conviction were presented to the jury.