Opinion ID: 2131663
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: constitutionality of alimony statute

Text: The appellant strongly asserts that the statute of this State as to alimony (§ 14-05-24, N.D.C.C.) is unconstitutional because it is based necessarily, in part, upon the statute as to support during marriage (§ 14-07-03, N.D.C.C.) which contains an impermissible discrimination based upon sex. He cites generally as to sex-based discrimination Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973); the North Dakota statute as to wage discrimination because of sex (§ 34-06.1-01, N.D.C.C.); and the special concurrence in Jordana v. Corley, 220 N.W.2d 515 (N.D.1974), which suggests that presumptions that a parent of one sex or the other is entitled to custody of children at certain ages may be unconstitutional. The argument then proceeds in this way: (1) that the North Dakota statute on support during marriage, Section 14-07-03, N.D.C.C., is discriminatory because it requires a husband to support his wife out of his property or by his labor, while it requires a wife to support her husband out of her separate property, [only] when he has no separate property and he is unable from infirmity to support himself; (2) that the duty to pay alimony is a continuation of the duty to support, citing Nugent v. Nugent, 152 N.W.2d 323 (N.D.1967), and Webster v. McGauvran, 8 N.D. 274, 78 N.W. 80 (1899); and (3) that although the North Dakota statute as to alimony, Section 14-05-24, N.D.C.C., may be neutral as between the sexes, since it speaks only of the distribution of property of the parties and the circumstances of the parties, it still is infected with the unconstitutionality of Section 14-07-03, supra, because alimony is a continuation of the discriminatory requirements of the latter section. While these arguments are supported by some of the case law cited and the appellant's syllogism is impeccable, we cannot agree with his conclusion because we do not agree, under the circumstances of this case, with the second proposition (that the duty to pay alimony is a continuation of the duty to support). Webster v. McGauvran, supra , does not relate to alimony, but it does make the distinction between the duty of the wife to a husband and the duty of a husband to support a wife, similar to that described in (1) above. It makes this distinction in the course of a discussion of duties of support of an unmarried brother or sister by another sibling. See also State v. Whitver, 71 N.D. 644, 3 N.W.2d 457 (1942). Nugent v. Nugent, supra , makes the statement relied upon by appellant by quoting from a Maine case asserting that The award of alimony is a continuance under the order of the court of the husband's obligation to support the wife, . . . but it does so in the context of a discussion of whether payment of alimony by the husband should be cut off after the wife remarries. Although the language quoted is also included in the syllabus, we believe it was not an essential holding in the case. The essential holding, to which we adhere, was that public policy is opposed to requiring payment of alimony by a former husband, after remarriage of the former wife, in the absence of exceptional circumstances. We note that other courts have held that alimony is a continuation of the right to support during marriage. Guinter v. Guinter, 72 S.D. 554, 37 N.W.2d 452 (1949); Panarella v. Panarella, Sup., 134 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1954); Lum v. Lum, 138 N.J.Eq. 198, 47 A.2d 555 (1946); Kontner v. Kontner, 103 Ohio App. 360, 139 N.E.2d 366 (1956); McNaughton v. McNaughton, 258 S.C. 554, 189 S.E.2d 820 (1972). We believe, however, that the right to support of one spouse by the other during marriage is, as defined by our statutes and interpreted by our cases, a right which is entirely independent of the right of one spouse to alimony, to be paid by the other, after the marriage is ended. Any attempt to integrate the one into the other, we believe, will only lead to confusion. We believe that the trend in modern domestic-relations law is to treat alimony as a method for rehabilitating the party disadvantaged by the divorce. This seems to be the basis of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, adopted in at least four States, not including North Dakota. Under this view, we need not examine the constitutionality of Section 14-07-03, N.D.C.C., relating to support of married persons, since the result in this case would be unaffected by any determination of unconstitutionality of that statute. As to the constitutionality of the alimony statute, Section 14-05-24, N.D. C.C., there can be no question. As noted above, it is neutral in terms as between the sexes, speaking only of the duty of parties to each other, and the power of the court to decree alimony and property as between the parties. Appellate cases involving the recognition of the right of the husband to alimony payable by the wife are not unknown in this jurisdiction. Sixty-five years ago, in Hagert v. Hagert, 22 N.D. 290, 133 N.W. 1035, 38 L.R.A.,N.S., 966 (1911), an action for separate maintenance by a husband against a wife, the court concluded (even in the absence of an authorizing statute) that the courts had the right to give relief in the form of temporary alimony to a husband suing for separate maintenance a wife who had substantial assets. And in McLean v. McLean, 69 N.D. 665, 290 N.W. 913 (1940), a wife was ordered to pay the equivalent of temporary alimony, and the propriety of permanent alimony was strongly indicated. We therefore hold that Section 14-05-24, N.D.C.C., is neutral as between the sexes and is constitutional. In so holding, we do not mean to indicate that we do not recognize the possibility of the existence of sex as a suspect classification as in Reed, supra, and Frontiero, supra . We recognized such a possibility in Tang v. Ping, 209 N.W.2d 624 (N.D.1973). And in the different context of physical and mental defects, we have recognized the suspect classification approach. In Interest of G. H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D.1974). Affirmed. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and PEDERSON, PAULSON and SAND, JJ., concur.