Opinion ID: 797817
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Gun was Lawfully Seized

Text: 28 The Supreme Court in Terry explained that a search for weapons is justified by the immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him, and that [c]ertainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties. 392 U.S. at 23, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Terry also noted that it would be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm. Id. at 24. 29 Pursuant to Terry, a search for weapons must be objectively reasonable. The Court framed the inquiry as whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger, id. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, and repeatedly acknowledged that each case will have to be decided on its own facts. Id. at 19, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Moreover, in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), the Court noted that the purpose of a limited protective search for weapons is to allow a police officer to pursue his work without fear of violence, and explained that the need for a protective search applies regardless of whether carrying a concealed weapon violates any applicable state law. 30 Here Officer Ferragamo's reasonable suspicion that Orman was carrying a gun, which is all that is required for a protective search under Terry, quickly rose to a certainty when Orman confirmed that he was carrying a gun. Indeed, the retrieval of the gun was less intrusive than the patdown in Terry —Orman pointed to his waistband at which time Ferragamo raised Orman's shirt and retrieved the gun. 31 Officer Ferragamo testified at the suppression hearing that he retrieved the gun for officer safety purposes and that his only concern was that Orman might have a gun. Although he also testified that Orman acted perfectly-very cordial, under Terry and its progeny a reasonably prudent man in Ferragamo's circumstances would be warranted in retrieving the gun for his safety and the safety of the mall patrons. Cf. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) (rejecting argument that public safety exception to the Miranda warning should not be recognized based on officer's subjective motivation revealed at suppression hearing). 32 The gun was readily accessible to Orman, who was standing only inches from Ferragamo. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (holding that a Terry search was reasonable when a police officer frisked a man stopped for driving with an expired license plate when the man stepped out of the car and the officer noticed a large bulge under his jacket, explaining that any man of reasonable caution would likely have conducted the pat down) (internal quotation marks omitted); Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93, 100 S.Ct. 338 (describing the Terry doctrine as allowing for a patdown for weapons that the officer reasonably believes or suspects are then in the possession of the person he has accosted). Furthermore, the mall was crowded and at a minimum, Ferragamo needed to see that the gun was removed from the premises without endangering his safety or the safety of the mall patrons. As in Terry, 33 the record evidences the tempered act of a policeman who in the course of an investigation had to make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger, and took limited steps to do so. 34 329 U.S. at 28, 67 S.Ct. 13.