Opinion ID: 1214398
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: I.R.C.P. 60(b) MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

Text: A. Timeliness of Motion Haller initially asserts that the district court was without jurisdiction to grant Miller's motion for relief from judgment because the motion, although timely served, was not filed within the required time frame. A motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) shall be made within a reasonable time, and ... not more than six (6) months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. I.R.C.P. 60(b) (emphasis added). Although the time when some actions must be taken can often be enlarged by the district court sua sponte, the time requirement set forth in Rule 60(b) is jurisdictional and may not be extended except to the extent and under the conditions stated in the Rule itself. I.R.C.P. 6(b). Rule 60(b) explicitly provides that a motion must be made within six months of the entry of judgment but does not set forth how a motion is, in fact, made in order to satisfy the time requirements of the statute. In this case, Miller's motion was served September 9, 1994, within six months of the entry of judgment, which occurred April 1. Miller failed to file the motion with the court, however, until October 28, 1994. Haller insists that made is synonymous with filed, citing our opinion in Gordon v. Gordon, 118 Idaho 804, 800 P.2d 1018 (1990), where we stated that [a] party seeking relief from a final judgment under the provisions of I.R.C.P. 60(b) must file a motion within six months after entry of the judgment. Id. at 806, 800 P.2d at 1020. We were not faced in Gordon, however, with the situation presented here in which the motion was served within the applicable time period but filed after the six months had expired. A more reasonable interpretation of the Rule, which still is consistent with our statement in Gordon, is that made as used in Rule 60(b) contemplates either filing or service, such that a motion is timely made if it either is filed prior to the six month time limit or is served within that time period and then filed within a reasonable time thereafter. I.R.C.P. 5(d)(1). Miller's motion, thus, was timely made because it was served within six months of the entry of judgment and then filed approximately forty-five days later. B. Standard of Review An aggrieved party may obtain relief from a final judgment by making a motion to the trial court under I.R.C.P. 60(b). Such a motion should not be used, however, as a substitute for a timely appeal. Johnston v. Pascoe, 100 Idaho 414, 420, 599 P.2d 985, 991 (1979) (citations omitted). For that reason, although the court is vested with broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a Rule 60(b) motion, its discretion is limited and may be granted only on a showing of unique and compelling circumstances justifying relief. Matter of Estate of Bagley, 117 Idaho 1091, 1093, 793 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Ct.App.1990) (citing Puphal v. Puphal, 105 Idaho 302, 669 P.2d 191 (1983)). In evaluating whether the trial court has abused its discretion on any issue, an appellate court must determine (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistent with any applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)). Absent a manifest abuse of discretion, the trial court's order granting relief from judgment must be upheld. Johnston, 100 Idaho at 420, 599 P.2d at 991. Haller contends on appeal that Miller's motion for relief from judgment was granted erroneously because Miller failed to demonstrate unique and compelling circumstances justifying such extraordinary relief. In its memorandum opinion, the district court concluded that evidence of juror misconduct, if otherwise admissible, could be the basis for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), even though it was not presented to the court until after the 14-day time limitation imposed by Rule 59. The court then articulated the test it would apply to make that determination as whether the evidence was unknown to movant and no lack of diligence has been raised or shown in bringing the matters to light. The district court then reviewed the facts and noted that the evidence of juror misconduct was revealed well after a Rule 59 motion could have been brought and that Miller's counsel acted diligently in making the Rule 60(b) motion based on the alleged misconduct. Based on this analysis, the court proceeded to determine the admissibility of the affidavits of juror misconduct. The district court did not apply the unique and compelling standard in determining whether the circumstances justified considering the Rule 60(b) motion. Failure to apply the correct legal standard in evaluating Miller's motion amounts to a clear abuse of the district court's discretion. See Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., 119 Idaho at 94, 803 P.2d at 1000. We, thus, are compelled to remand this case to allow the district court to determine whether unique and compelling circumstances exist to warrant the district court's consideration of Miller's motion. C. Admissibility of Juror Affidavits In its consideration of Miller's Rule 60(b) motion, the district court ruled that portions of two juror affidavits presented by Miller to support his motion were admissible. Idaho Rule of Evidence 606 provides, in pertinent part: (b) Inquiry to validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon the juror's or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes, but a juror may testify on the questions whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror and may be questioned about or may execute an affidavit on the issue of whether or not the jury determined any issue by resort to chance. The district court essentially relied on a single sentence taken from each of the two juror affidavits in granting Miller's motion for relief from judgment. These sentences concerned statements made to the two jurors by another juror, whose husband was a Shoshone County deputy sheriff. The district court concluded that the statements made by the deputy sheriff that plaintiff had beat up his ex-wife to the extent that she had to be hospitalized, which were disclosed to the jury through the deputy sheriff's wife, were both extraneous and obviously prejudicial and were improperly brought to the jury's attention. Evidence offered to impeach a jury verdict must be information that the court determines is both extraneous and prejudicial. I.R.E. 606(b). While we previously have not had an opportunity to define these terms within the context of this Rule, we apply the same standards of construction as are utilized with statutes. We begin with an examination of the literal words of the rule and give the language its plain, obvious and rational meaning. Grand Canyon Dories v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 124 Idaho 1, 5, 855 P.2d 462, 466 (1993). First, in considering whether the information is extraneous, we begin by noting that we expect jurors to bring with them to jury service their background, knowledge and experience. Thus, that kind of information should not be considered extraneous. A specific fact brought to a juror's attention outside of the trial itself, however, should be regarded as extraneous information that must be evaluated further to determine its admissibility. See e.g. Wright & Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6075 (1990). The portions of the affidavits found to be admissible by the district court in this case clearly were specific facts involving the parties to this action and were brought to the jurors outside of the trial. The inquiry is not whether the jurors might have heard the information in trial, as well. It is only the purported extraneous information that we examine to determine if it, indeed, is extraneous, i.e. heard outside of trial, irrespective of whether that same information also might have been heard at trial. Here, the statements were properly termed extraneous. That, however, does not end the inquiry, because, before ruling on the extraneous information's admissibility, the district court must determine whether the extraneous information also was prejudicial. I.R.E. 606(b). The standard in determining whether juror testimony involving the introduction of extraneous information can be admitted to impeach the validity of a verdict is whether prejudice reasonably could have occurred by the introduction of the information. Roll v. City of Middleton, 115 Idaho 833, 837, 771 P.2d 54, 58 (Ct.App.1989). The proper inquiry is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the presence of the extraneous information affected the verdict and, thus, led to a different result than would have occurred at trial. See Wright & Gold, supra, § 6075. Haller argues that the jurors' statements were not prejudicial because they added nothing to the evidence properly presented during the trial. Haller refers specifically to statements made by several witnesses that Miller had battered his wife and that his wife's parents had a restraining order placed on him at one time. In evaluating the admissibility of the juror affidavits, however, the district court did not take into account the trial testimony regarding Miller's conduct. The court, instead, noted in its memorandum opinion that it could not recall any evidence involving Miller's wife beating coming out during the trial and ruled that the jurors' statements were admissible. Although the introduction of the deputy sheriff's statements clearly exposed the jury to allegations about Miller's violent tendencies, it is equally clear that the district court failed to take into account the evidence properly presented at trial that already had demonstrated Miller's intemperance to the jury prior to the time the deputy sheriff's observations were revealed. The trial testimony involving Miller beating his wife and the restraining order that had been placed on him should have been considered by the district court in determining whether the deputy sheriff's statements, although certainly extraneous, were prejudicial, as well. Although the statement that Miller's wife had once been hospitalized is more egregious than the testimony presented at trial, the district court's failure to recall and examine the record evidence to determine whether presentation of the extraneous information reasonably might have resulted in a different result was an abuse of the district court's discretion. When the discretion exercised by a trial court is affected by an error of law, the role of the appellate court is to note the error made and remand the case for appropriate findings. Brazier v. Brazier, 111 Idaho 692, 700, 726 P.2d 1143, 1151 (Ct.App.1986), overruled on other grounds by Swope v. Swope, 112 Idaho 974, 739 P.2d 273 (1987). Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court for a determination as to whether unique and compelling circumstances exist that justify consideration of Miller's motion and, if so, whether the juror affidavits were properly admissible to evaluate the motion's merits.