Opinion ID: 548468
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conflicting Intent Instructions

Text: 9 The district judge gave the following instructions on intent. The deadly weapon instruction was proposed by Sanchez, and stated: 10 a deadly or dangerous weapon is any object which, as used or attempted to be used, may endanger the life or inflict great bodily harm to a person. If you find that the defendant used an automobile, intending to endanger the life of or inflict great bodily harm upon another, then his car or automobile is a deadly weapon for purposes of this statute, under which the defendant is charged. 11 (Emphasis added.) An instruction on the intent required under Sec. 111, proposed by the government, followed shortly thereafter: 12 It is not necessary for the government to prove or show that the defendant intended to injure the border patrol agent. Intent to injure is not an element of the offense charged. 13 (Emphasis added.) Sanchez argues that these instructions were conflicting, confusing and misleading, because the first instruction told the jury that Sanchez had to intend to injure Macias to be guilty of using the car as a deadly weapon, while the second indicated that Sanchez did not have to intend to injure Macias to be guilty of assault on a federal officer. 14 Sanchez's counsel objected to the government's instruction on the intent required under Sec. 111 on the grounds that [i]t's not an element. It's not--we're not going to allege that because the agent is not injured. There is no evidence he was injured. There is nothing about that. I think it's confusing and unnecessary. Moments earlier, Sanchez's counsel had agreed that Sec. 111 did not require a specific intent to injure. The objection does not specify that defense counsel saw a conflict in the intent required by the instructions. Because Sanchez's counsel failed to object properly by distinctly stating the grounds for the objection, we review the combination of the two instructions for plain error. Kessi, 868 F.2d at 1102. 15 The government's instruction is correct under current Ninth Circuit law; no intent to injure is required for the offense of assaulting a federal officer. United States v. Jim, 865 F.2d 211, 214-15 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 93, 107 L.Ed.2d 58 (1989). While Sec. 111 provides for enhanced penalties when a deadly or dangerous weapon is used, it does not define deadly weapon. Courts interpreting Sec. 111 have adopted the commonly accepted definition of a deadly or dangerous weapon as stated in the instructions: any object which, as used or attempted to be used, may endanger the life of or inflict great bodily harm on a person. See United States v. Aceves-Rosales, 832 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (automobile), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1077, 108 S.Ct. 1056, 98 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1988); United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163, 1166 (8th Cir.1988) (mouth and teeth); United States v. Bey, 667 F.2d 7, 11 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (mop handle, not a dangerous weapon under the circumstances); United States v. Loman, 551 F.2d 164, 169 (7th Cir.) (walking stick), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 912, 97 S.Ct. 2982, 53 L.Ed.2d 1097 (1977). That definition does not specify whether the defendant must intend to injure the victim. We note that the aggravated assault guideline under which Sanchez was sentenced requires the use of a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm (i.e., not merely to frighten). United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual Sec. 2A2.2 (Application Note 1) (Oct. 15, 1987, and as amended through October 15, 1988) (hereinafter Guidelines ). 2 16 We need not decide whether specific intent to injure is required to find that a defendant used an object, such as a car, as a deadly weapon in an assault on a federal officer. Even if the jury construed the instructions to require such an intent, no prejudice to Sanchez resulted. This interpretation of the instructions would have required the prosecution to show not only that Sanchez drove at and rammed Macias' vehicle, but also that he intended to inflict great bodily harm or death. 3 17 The jury also could have believed that no specific intent to injure was required to find that the car was used as a deadly weapon when the underlying crime, assault on a federal officer, did not require an intent to injure. This alternative would have operated to Sanchez's disadvantage if his defense at trial had been that although he had driven his car towards Macias, at no time did he intend to use his car to injure Macias. 18 Sanchez, however, did not testify that he had driven at Macias inadvertently or merely to frighten him. Instead, he testified that he had never driven toward or rammed into the Ram Charger, and he introduced expert testimony to that effect. The pivotal issue was therefore not what Sanchez intended when he drove toward Macias, but whether he drove toward him at all. Thus the required intent was almost immaterial to the defense. The jury, by returning a guilty verdict, must have accepted Macias' description of the incident, and disbelieved Sanchez. 19 Because neither of the two possible interpretations of the instructions was highly prejudicial and likely to have materially affected the jury's verdict, there was no plain error. See Kessi, 868 F.2d at 1102-03.