Opinion ID: 1926830
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Requested Jury Instructions on Motive

Text: The defendant first argues that the trial justice erred when he instructed the jurors that they could not consider defendant's lack of motive in deciding defendant's guilt or innocence. Further, defendant argues that the trial justice also committed reversible error when he refused to clarify his instructions pertaining to motive. The trial justice instructed the jurors: The state does not have to prove motive. The fact that they do not prove a motive is not to be considered by you. It's not a lack of evidence. They do not have to prove motive. That's the law in the State of Rhode Island. The defendant's attorney objected to this statement. He argued that the jurors would infer that they could not even consider motive. The trial justice replied that [t]hey can't. Motive is not an issue.The state doesn't have to prove it. The defendant's attorney then requested that the trial justice clarify his remarks by telling the jurors that you should not consider [motive] as an element that the state must prove but you, of course, may consider motive or the lack of one in deliberating on the facts of this case. The trial justice stated that he disagree[d] with that theory of law and denied the request. We have said in prior cases that [c]onviction of crime never requires proof of motive, and the absence of motive, by itself, does not raise a reasonable doubt of guilt. State v. Houde, 596 A.2d 330, 334 (R.I.1991) (quoting State v. Caruolo, 524 A.2d 575, 584 (R.I.1987)). In Houde, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred by refusing to give an instruction on the absence of motive for him to have committed the crime. There, the proffered instruction stated that [i]f you find that there is no evidence [of] motive to commit the crime charged, then you may consider the absence of a motive to be a factor in determining whether the state has met its burden in proving its case against the accused. Houde, 596 A.2d at 334. We upheld the trial justice's refusal to give this instruction, noting that the trial justice's instruction that the state was not required to prove motive as an element of the crime was an accurate statement of the law in this jurisdiction. See id. In Caruolo, 524 A.2d at 584, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred by declining to instruct the jury that the absence of proof of motive is a strong circumstance favoring acquittal. We upheld the trial justice's decision. We noted that jury instructions, that assign a particular weight to the presence or absence of motive, ought to be avoided because a trial justice may comment upon the evidence only in an impartial manner, and the weight of evidence relating to motive will vary depending on each case's circumstances. See id. at 584-85. Nevertheless, a trial justice may tell the jury that motive is not essential to proving guilt. See id. at 585. In both Caruolo and Houde we cited with approval State v. Bahre, 456 A.2d 860 (Me.1983). There, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine noted that the state is not required to prove a motive for a crime in order to obtain a conviction. Therefore, reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt does not arise when the evidence does not establish motive. A defendant will not be entitled to acquittal when his motive in committing the offense remains undiscovered. See id. at 868. The proper place for motive to be discussed is during counsels' arguments before the jury, not during the trial justice's charge. See id. ; see also Houde, 596 A.2d at 334 (following the suggestion in Bahre that motive is a proper matter for counsel's argument). In the instant case, the trial justice did not err in instructing the jurors that absence of evidence of motive would not create reasonable doubt. In Williams v. State, 840 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), the Court of Appeals of Texas observed that [c]rimes the most horrible are often committed without apparent motive save an insatiate deviltry which mocks at social restraint and recklessly defies the laws of God and man. Id. at 460 (quoting Preston v. State, 8 Tex. Crim. 30, 38 (1880)). The facts of the case at bar fit this enunciation of principle. As noted in Houde, the fact that we suggested in Caruolo that a jury may be instructed that the presence or absence of evidence of motive may be considered in conjunction with other evidence, is not the equivalent of holding that such an instruction must be given. Houde, 596 A.2d at 334. The trial justice in the instant case was under no duty to give defendant's proffered instruction, and his refusal to do so does not constitute error.