Opinion ID: 852646
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Seizure and Viewing of Tapes Found in the House

Text: David brings a separate challenge to the seizure and viewing of the 369 tapes found by police in the house. David concedes that Melissa had actual authority to permit police entry into the house because she lived there and had mutual use and control of the house for most purposes. He nonetheless argues that Melissa's consent to the search of the house was ineffective to justify the seizure and warrantless viewing of the tapes police found in the home. As to the seizure, third party consent to search of a residence also justifies warrantless seizure of evidence found therein. United States v. Falcon, 766 F.2d 1469, 1474-75 (10th Cir.1985). Of course, warrantless seizure of evidence from the home based on third party consent is limited by the scope of the consent given by the third party and any limitations on the third party's authority. In this case, Melissa consented to a search of the home for video equipment and electronic devices/computer disks located at basement studio and surrounding area(s) to include main floor area(s). The VHS tapes are clearly video equipment and are within the scope of the consent given by Melissa. David nonetheless argues that the warrantless seizure and viewing of the tapes was unlawful because Melissa's common authority over the house generally did not extend to the tapes. Specifically, he argues that unlabeled VHS tapes are closed containers under his exclusive control, that screening of their contents constitutes a separate search, and that the seizure of the tapes and the additional search effected by viewing them required the additional consent of their owner (David) or a third party with authority. Following Matlock, courts have consistently recognized the principle that persons sharing premises may nonetheless retain areas or objects within their exclusive control that are not subject to search based on consent of one of the co-occupants. See 3 LaFave, supra at § 8.3(f), p. 738; United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir.1978); State v. Harris, 642 A.2d 1242, 1248 (Del.Super.Ct.1993); State v. Williams, 48 Or.App. 293, 616 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1980). David contends that the tapes here fell within this exception to that doctrine. David's argument relies heavily on our decision in Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957 (Ind.2001). In Krise, a man and woman jointly occupied a house and the man consented to a search of the premises for drugs. Id. at 959-60. Officers found a woman's purse in the bathroom, searched it, and found a leather pouch containing a small wooden case which in turn contained marijuana and methamphetamine. Id. at 960. We concluded that because the man and woman shared the home, the man could consent to search of the common areas of the house, including the bathroom. Id. at 967. However, we held that the man could not consent to the search of the purse because inspection of closed containers that normally hold highly personal items requires the consent of the owner or a third party who has authorityactual or apparentto give consent to the search of the container itself. Id. at 969. David claims that unlabeled VHS tapes are closed containers for this purpose because the images recorded on the tapes are not visible to the naked eye and cannot be revealed without the use of a VCR. He also contends that VHS tapes, like purses or wallets, normally hold highly personal items. David's reliance on Krise is misplaced. First, we are not convinced that a VHS tape is a container though we note that the law in this area is sparse and unsettled. See, e.g., Runyan, 275 F.3d at 458 (assuming without deciding that computer disks are containers); State v. Munro, 339 Or. 545, 124 P.3d 1221, 1223 (2005) (under state and federal constitutions, assuming without deciding that viewing of a videotape on a VCR constitutes a search because a videotape does not announce its contents). Even if we assumed that a VHS tape is a container, we do not agree that it normally contains personal items closely identified with a given individual. VHS tapes record and store video images. Although some images may be private in nature, VHS tapes frequently contain commercially available motion pictures, family videos, and other material that is not regarded as reserved to a single individual and is not deemed private. Krise, on the other hand, dealt with a woman's purse, which is uniquely related to a given individual and is not ordinarily accessible by a man. The mere fact that an object might be characterized as a container because it conceals its contents from view does not compel the conclusion that the container cannot be opened by another occupant. The relevant question is whether co-occupants exercise joint control and mutual use of the object for most purposes such that any occupant could permit inspection in his own right. If so, the nonconsenting occupant assumed the risk of such inspection. A co-occupant may deny joint access over an object by keeping it in a place devoted to the owner's exclusive use [3] or where the object is one over which only one person normally exercises control and authority [4] or which normally hold[s] highly personal items. Krise, 746 N.E.2d at 970. Similarly, a nonconsenting co-occupant may take steps to deny access to co-occupants to a designated area or object. [5] But in the absence of any such steps, a co-occupant may have mutual use and joint access to many items in the premises. David makes two additional claims. He argues that because he owned the tapes, he retained exclusive control over them and Melissa lacked common authority over the tapes. He also claims that because Melissa had not previously viewed the 369 tapes, she did not have joint access or control for most purposes. Neither ownership nor prior access is critical. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. 988 (Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere property interest a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and legal refinements, ... but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes ...). In the absence of any steps taken by David to protect the tapes from examination by Melissa, Melissa had access to the tapes even if that access had not previously been exercised by the act of watching the tapes. See, e.g., United States v. Duran, 957 F.2d 499, 505 (7th Cir.1992) (wife's consent extended to separate building on farm property husband used as a gym; wife's testimony that she could have gone in whenever she wanted shows authority, notwithstanding the fact she neither used that building nor left any of her effects there, as [o]ne can have access to a building or a room but choose not to enter); State v. Ford, 83 Ill.App.3d 57, 38 Ill.Dec. 281, 403 N.E.2d 512, 517-18 (1980) (wife could consent to search of husband's tools in basement, as [t]he basement was not locked and the wife was not instructed not to handle the tools and the mere fact that the defendant alone may have used these tools does not indicate that his wife was denied mutual use, access to, or control over them). David contends that although Melissa had common authority over the basement, the 369 tapes removed from the ground floor were kept in three bedrooms that he specifically instructed Melissa not to enter. At the hearing on David's motion to suppress evidence, Melissa was asked whether David ever told her not to go into the bedrooms. She responded that she had unrestricted access to one of the bedrooms and that she also had access to the other two bedrooms but that David preferred that I didn't [go in them] because they were mostly his stuff and they were messy. She further testified that she went into those two bedrooms approximately once a month, not because of any direction from David, but because they were extremely cluttered and she found the messiness upsetting. Melissa, Sergeant O'Donnell, and Dectective Towasnicki each testified that the three bedrooms in which the tapes were found were unlocked. They testified that the rooms were extremely messy, with labeled and unlabeled VHS tapes, clothing, overflowing cardboard boxes, magazines, and loose papers covering the surfaces of furniture and the floor. The trial court found that Melissa had actual and apparent authority over the bedrooms. This finding is supported by the record. We conclude that Melissa had access to and control over the tapes because she could have viewed the tapes at any time, even if she had not previously done so. Therefore her consent was sufficient to authorize the warrantless seizure and screening of all of the tapes the police removed from the home.