Opinion ID: 2243413
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Judge

Text: The trial judge's advice to defendant that only defendant individually and not his defense counsel could decide whether to have the jury instructed on second degree murderwas incorrect. Courts have recognized only four decisions that a criminal defendant has the ultimate authority to make, after full consultation with defense counsel: what plea to enter, whether to waive a jury, whether to testify on his or her own behalf, and whether to take an appeal. Jones v. Barnes (1983), 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3312, 77 L.Ed.2d 987, 993; People v. Ramey (1992), 152 Ill.2d 41, 54, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d 275. Beyond these four decisions, however, trial counsel has the right to make the ultimate decision with respect to matters of tactics and strategy after consulting with his client. ( Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 54, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d 275.) Such decisions are binding on the client. People v. Bowman (1990), 138 Ill.2d 131, 141, 149 Ill.Dec. 263, 561 N.E.2d 633. Specifically, the decision whether to tender a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense is uniquely one of trial strategy. ( People v. Gilyard (1992), 237 Ill.App.3d 8, 23-24, 177 Ill.Dec. 163, 602 N.E.2d 1335; People v. Palmer (1989), 188 Ill.App.3d 414, 428, 137 Ill.Dec. 90, 545 N.E.2d 743.) Thus, I am of the opinion that the decision lies within the control of defense counsel. ( Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 54, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d 275; Bowman, 138 Ill.2d at 141, 149 Ill.Dec. 263, 561 N.E.2d 633; accord 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 208, at 355 (1980); but see, contra, 1 Standards for Criminal Justice 4-68 (2d ed. 1980).) Consequently, the trial judge's advice to defendant in the present case was erroneous. I now address whether the trial judge's error deprived defendant of the effective assistance of counsel. The sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel. ( People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill.2d 329, 337.) [T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 684, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 691; accord People v. Lee (1989), 185 Ill.App.3d 420, 424-26, 133 Ill.Dec. 536, 541 N.E.2d 747. Ordinarily, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove that: (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) counsel's substandard representation so prejudiced defendant as to deny him a fair trial. To prove actual prejudice, a defendant must show that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. People v. Horton (1991), 143 Ill.2d 11, 23, 155 Ill.Dec. 807, 570 N.E.2d 320, quoting Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698. However, there are some circumstances where Strickland's two-part test does not apply. The most obvious circumstance is the complete denial of counsel. A criminal trial is presumed unfair if the defendant is denied counsel at a critical stage of the trial. ( United States v. Cronic (1984), 466 U.S. 648, 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2047, 80 L.Ed.2d 657, 668.) Specifically, no showing of prejudice is required where defense counsel was prevented from assisting defendant during a critical stage of the proceedings. ( Cronic 466 U.S. at 659 n. 25, 104 S.Ct. at 2047 n. 25, 80 L.Ed.2d at 668 n. 25; see Perry v. Leeke (1989), 488 U.S. 272, 280, 109 S.Ct. 594, 600, 102 L.Ed.2d 624, 633.) Whether a defendant has reached a critical stage of criminal proceedings depends on a pragmatic assessment of the usefulness of counsel to the accused at the particular proceeding, and the dangers to the accused of proceeding without counsel. Patterson v. Illinois (1988), 487 U.S. 285, 298, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 2398, 101 L.Ed.2d 261, 276; accord People v. Taylor (1965), 32 Ill.2d 165, 169, 204 N.E.2d 734. Applying these principles to the present case, I conclude that the trial judge denied defendant counsel at a critical stage of the trial. Initially, it is clear that a jury instruction conference is a critical stage of criminal proceedings. Arguably, the charge to the jury is that part of the whole trial which probably exercises the weightiest influence upon jurors. ( Andres v. United States (1948), 333 U.S. 740, 765, 68 S.Ct. 880, 892, 92 L.Ed. 1055, 1070 (Frankfurter, J., concurring, joined by Burton, J.).) The function of jury instructions is to guide the jury in its deliberations and to help it reach a proper verdict through the application of correct legal principles according to the law and the evidence. ( People v. Hester (1989), 131 Ill.2d 91, 98,136 Ill.Dec. 111, 544 N.E.2d 797, citing People v. Gambony (1948), 402 Ill. 74, 81-82, 83 N.E.2d 321.) Especially in criminal cases with conflicting evidence, it is highly essential that a jury be correctly instructed so that it may properly consider the facts. ( People v. Edwards (1945), 389 Ill. 563, 566, 60 N.E.2d 100.) Appropriate and proper instructions to a jury are essential for a fair trial. 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1302, at 207 (1989). Also, it is clear from the record that the trial judge prevented defense counsel from assisting defendant at this critical stage of the trial. The trial judge did not ask defendant if he would like to have the jury instructed on second degree murder. Rather, the judge repeatedly told defendant that only he and not his defense counsel could decide. The trial judge explicitly stated that defense counsel could not participate in the decision, thereby forcing defendant to appear pro se on this issue. The majority simply ignores the law as explained by the United States Supreme Court. The majority states that the trial judge fully informed defendant (albeit initially incorrectly) about the separate instructions for first and second degree murder. The majority concludes that defendant, with his attorney present, made the choice voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly. 158 Ill.2d at 493-94, 199 Ill.Dec. at 723-724, 634 N.E.2d at 1077-78. However, when a court interferes with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the defense, the court denies the defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel. ( Perry, 488 U.S. at 280, 109 S.Ct. at 599, 102 L.Ed.2d at 633, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d at 692.) The constitutional right to be represented by counsel includes defendant's right to conference with an attorney. Such right to confer is at no time more important than during the progress of a trial. ( State v. Larmond (Iowa 1976), 244 N.W.2d 233, 236.) I conclude that the trial judge prevented defense counsel from assisting defendant during a critical stage of the proceeding.