Opinion ID: 423691
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Standard As Interpreted

Text: 18 Section 1910.94(d)(7)(iii) provides that [t]wo or more operations shall not be connected to the same exhaust system where either one or the combination of the substances removed may constitute a fire, explosion, or chemical reaction hazard in the duct system. In our prior opinion we rejected the Commission's position that section 1910.94(d)(7)(iii) is violated whenever there exists the mere possibility of a fire, explosion, or chemical reaction hazard. We relied on the legislative history of OSHA as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 100 S.Ct. 2844, 65 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1980) (plurality opinion), which indicates that OSHA was intended only to guard against significant risks, not ephemeral possibilities. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft v. Secretary of Labor, 649 F.2d at 104. Neither the Secretary by regulation nor the Commission by decision can extend the scope of OSHA beyond the boundaries defined by Congress. See Insurance Company of North America v. Gee, 702 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir.1983) (this Court will not interpret an agency regulation to thwart a statutory mandate); Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d at 50 ( '[A]n agency may not bootstrap itself into an area in which it has no jurisdiction by repeatedly violating its statutory mandate.'  (quoting FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745, 93 S.Ct. 1773, 1785, 36 L.Ed.2d 620 (1973))). We left to the Commission on remand the task of applying the significant risk test to the facts of this case. 4 19 On remand, the Commission interpreted the cited standard at section 1910.94(d)(7)(iii), when applied under the 'significant-risk' test[,] to encompass the protection of employees from fire, explosion or chemical reaction hazards that are unusual or infrequent. J.App. at 193. Pratt & Whitney complains that the Commission misinterpreted the significant risk test. We disagree. Unusual or infrequent hazards undoubtedly can in some circumstances pose a meaningful possibility of injury and the Commission's conclusion that section 1910.94(d)(7)(iii) may encompass those types of risks is unassailable. The Supreme Court has instructed that the significance of a potential hazard is not solely a function of mathematical probability. Industrial Union Department, 448 U.S. at 655, 100 S.Ct. at 2870. Likewise, the significance of a potential hazard is not solely a function of the gravity of harm that would result if the hazard were realized.