Opinion ID: 159988
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: state's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence

Text: 32 Mr. McGregor contends the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence directly pertaining to this murder and evidence that would have further supported his insanity defense, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). To obtain habeas relief, he must establish that the withheld evidence was favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).
33 Mr. McGregor asserts the State failed to disclose a tape recording of a conversation about the murder between him and Edwin Hamilton, a friend of Mr. McGregor's who was acting at the behest of law enforcement officials. Following an evidentiary hearing, the state trial court found that the tape was inaudible and that this conversation had failed to reveal anything relevant to the investigation. This court must presume these factual findings are correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Van Woudenberg, 211 F.3d at 571-72 (applying presumption of correctness to facts underlying Brady claim). Mr. McGregor fails to assert clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Van Woudenberg, 211 F.3d at 572. In light of those findings, any evidence of this conversation between Mr. McGregor and Hamilton would have been neither material nor exculpatory. Mr. McGregor, therefore, was not prejudiced by its suppression. 34 Mr. McGregor also alleges the State failed to disclose his inaccurate statement to police that the victim's body was west of Wetumka, Oklahoma; in fact, authorities found the body east of Wetumka. The government's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence is immaterial if Mr. McGregor has independent knowledge of that evidence. See United States v. Quintanilla, 193 F.3d 1139, 1149 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1442 (2000). In addition, this misstatement was not material to his defense--that is, there is no reasonable probability that, had the State disclosed this evidence to the defense, the result of the trial would have been different. See, e.g., Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280. 35
36 Mr. McGregor contends the State failed to disclose to him his confessions to other crimes. He made these confessions at approximately the same time he confessed to killing Ms. Plumb. Authorities investigated, but found no evidence to verify the accuracy of any of the other confessions. Mr. McGregor now asserts that these false confessions could have bolstered his insanity defense. 37 The record indicates that defense counsel was aware, prior to this trial, that Mr. McGregor had made such statements. See Tr., Apr. 4, 1989 Mot. Hr'g at 31. There can be no suppression by the state of evidence already known by and available to [defendant] prior to trial. United States v. Hernandez-Muniz, 170 F.3d 1007, 1011 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). Further, the government's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence is immaterial if Mr. McGregor has independent knowledge of that evidence. See Quintanilla, 193 F.3d at 1149. 38 In any event, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, in state post-conviction proceedings, held Mr. McGregor had failed to establish that these other confessions were either exculpatory or material. See McGregor, 935 P.2d at 337. That determination was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, see Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1165 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2206 (2000), in light of the detail and accuracy of his confession to Ms. Plumb's murder, and the significant amount of evidence presented to the jury concerning his mental illness.