Opinion ID: 2637002
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructions affecting Count IThomas

Text: Vallery raised additional challenges to the jury instructions relating only to the Thomas case. Vallery asserts that she could not be convicted of neglecting Thomas unless the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that she had actual knowledge that Thomas had a specific problem that needed attention and that she failed to address the problem. Vallery objected to the instructions as they related to Count I and requested the following proposed instructions: Before Ms. Vallery may be convicted under Count I for any failure by her to more promptly obtain medical treatment for Mr. Thomas, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Vallery knew or should have known that Mr. Thomas' injuries were serious enough to require immediate medical attention, yet did nothing. . . . . Willfully as used in these instructions means an act or omission which is done intentionally, deliberately or designedly, as distinguished from an act or omission done accidentally, inadvertently or innocently. It means the conscious commission of a wrong. Although the first proposed instruction speaks in terms of knew or should have known, Vallery's points and authorities below, and her briefs on appeal, reveal she intended to narrowly construe that language. Vallery contends that the language means that she observed Thomas' condition, or was actually told that Thomas had an open wound, and that she should have known from observation or the description that medical attention was necessary. Vallery argues that the willfully causes language of the statute requires the State to prove she either intentionally abused Thomas or had actual knowledge he needed medical attention and intentionally failed to seek help for his medical condition. The State contends that the jury was properly instructed because the term willfully causes in a neglect case does not require intentional conduct or actual knowledge. Instead, the State argues it must only prove that an accused had knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable individual to conclude that an older person was at risk of suffering physical pain or mental suffering and that the accused took no action to prevent harm to the older person. The State apparently believed the same interpretation applied to both the 1993 and 1995 versions of NRS 200.5099. [29] The district court instructed the jury based upon the language contained in the 1995 version and did not separately instruct the jury on the Thomas case. In addition, the district court gave the following instruction on the term willfully. The word willfully when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, as used in these instructions, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or to make the omission in question. The word does not require in its meaning any intent to violate the law, or injure another. The State's argument and the jury instructions would be correct for a neglect charge under the 1995 version of the statute. However, the 1993 version of the statute applied to the Thomas case. For an abuse case under any version of the statute, the State must prove intentional infliction of pain, injury or mental anguish or intentional deprivation of necessary items. It need not prove intent to violate the law or the actual injury that resulted. Thus, the definition of the term willfully was an incorrect statement of the law as to an abuse charge. [30] With respect to the neglect allegations, because the jury was only given the 1995 statutory language, they were not properly instructed on the actual knowledge element of the offense present in the 1993 version of the statute. Because of the conflicting testimony concerning the extent of Vallery's knowledge of Thomas' condition and whether that knowledge would indicate to Vallery that Thomas needed medical treatment, as opposed to constructive knowledge that should have led her to take additional steps to verify his condition, we cannot say that the failure to properly instruct the jury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore conclude that the Thomas conviction must be reversed and remanded.