Opinion ID: 2199758
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The refusal to permit further interrogation of a sworn juror or to permit such juror to be challenged peremptorily.

Text: Defendant Rios assigns as error the refusal of the trial court either to permit him to conduct a further voir dire examination of the juror Nix or to exercise a peremptory challenge to this juror after he had already been found acceptable to defense counsel and sworn. Assuming, arguendo, under R.R. 3:7-2( b ) a re-examination of a juror already sworn may be had, the allowance of such a re-examination, however, rests solely in the discretion of the trial court. Without reciting the factual situation which prompted the court's ruling here, we are agreed from the record there was no abuse of discretion shown. Defendant also urges R.R. 3:7-2( b ) has effected a change in our long-standing rule that peremptory challenges cannot be made after a juror is sworn. State v. Lyons, 70 N.J.L. 635 ( E. & A. 1904); State v. Schmieder, 5 N.J. 40 (1950); State v. Grillo, 16 N.J. 103 (1954). Our rule in this respect was the common-law rule and is today the prevailing practice among the majority of American jurisdictions. See DeCarlo v. Frame, 134 Conn. 530, 58 A. 2 d 846 ( Sup. Ct. Err. 1948); 31 Am. Jur. 699; 3 A.L.R. 2 d 504, 512. State v. Grillo, supra , was decided after the adoption of R.R. 3:7-2( b ), but in so far as it appears from the opinion, the effect of the new rule was not argued or considered there. Be that as it may, we find nothing in the language of R.R. 3:7-2( b ) warranting a departure from our prior practice with respect to the timing of peremptory challenges. The context clearly shows that only challenges for cause may, within the discretion of the court, be made after the juror has been sworn, and there are sound reasons underlying the distinction drawn. Were we to sanction peremptory challenges after the swearing of the jurors, it would soon become standard practice for counsel to withhold their peremptory challenges until a full panel had been sworn, doubtlessly hoping thereby to gain the advantage of an observation made after the entire panel had been selected. Such a procedure would lead to but further and needless delay in the selection of a jury and would not serve to advance the ends of justice.