Opinion ID: 1170652
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidentiary Support for Board's Findings

Text: As noted above, the Board entered separate, adverse findings regarding the operation of the Rollerbowl and denied petitioners' renewal applications based on each of these adverse findings, separately considered, and on the further and separate grounds that the granting of this permit will not comport with the public health, safety, welfare, and good morals of the community. (Italics added.) The individual findings set forth separate grounds for denying the applications, including petitioners' 1967 conviction for violating a criminal ordinance for failure to provide adequate parking, petitioners' present failure (apart from the violation of ordinance) to provide parking, their failure to control their patrons and prevent disturbances in and near the premises, and their making a false statement on the 1968 application regarding ownership of the Rollerbowl. Respondent Board has not challenged the trial court's determination that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding regarding the alleged false statement. Moreover, a serious question arises whether petitioners' inadequate parking conviction in 1967, being based upon a nolo contendere plea, properly could constitute grounds for administrative discipline. (See Pen. Code, § 1016, subd. 3; Grannis v. Board of Medical Examiners, 19 Cal. App.3d 551, 557-560 [96 Cal. Rptr. 863], and cases cited.) However, from our examination of the voluminous record herein, and its emphasis upon events occurring in 1968 and 1969, it is beyond question that the Board's decision rested primarily and alternatively upon petitioners' continuing failure to provide adequate parking facilities for Rollerbowl patrons and to control those patrons and prevent major disturbances in the area. It is inconceivable to us that the Board would have granted petitioners' renewal applications but for the 1967 conviction and the alleged false statement (regarding ownership of the Rollerbowl). (10) Accordingly, since the Board's decision rested upon the foregoing alternative grounds, that decision should be sustained if its findings on those grounds were supported by the evidence, without remanding the cause to the Board for reconsideration. (See Sica v. Board of Police Commissioners, 200 Cal. App.2d 137 [19 Cal. Rptr. 277].) (11, 12) Before turning to the evidence, we briefly review the applicable rules governing review of the decisions of a local administrative agency such as the Board. In conducting the hearing, the board acts as a local administrative tribunal, and it has power to make final adjudications of fact in connection with matters properly submitted to it. ( English v. City of Long Beach, 35 Cal.2d 155, 158 [217 P.2d 22, 18 A.L.R.2d 547].) Upon review by the trial court, its inquiry is confined to determining whether there was substantial evidence before the board to support its findings; the court may not reweigh the evidence. ( Thompson v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal.2d 235, 240 [259 P.2d 649]; Walker v. City of San Gabriel, 20 Cal.2d 879, 881 [129 P.2d 349, 142 A.L.R. 1383]; Upton v. Gray, 269 Cal. App.2d 352, 359 [74 Cal. Rptr. 783].) [7] Similarly, appellate review of agency proceedings is limited to a determination whether substantial evidence exists to support the Board's findings. ( Sultan Turkish Bath v. Board of Police Comrs., supra, 169 Cal. App.2d 188, 193; see Cal. Administrative Mandamus (Cont. Ed. Bar 1966), § 15.26, p. 281; Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subds. (b) and (c).) a. Failure to provide adequate parking  There was ample evidence introduced to establish that petitioners furnished inadequate parking facilities for their patrons, and that as a result their operations failed to comport with the peace, health, safety, convenience ... and general welfare of the public. [8] Officer Trojanowski testified that he had visited the Rollerbowl approximately twenty times and had observed no off-street parking facilities; six of his visits were made while processing petitioners' 1968 renewal application. Sergeant Kilgo testified that, beginning in May 1968, he toured the Rollerbowl area at least once a night, and that in my perusal of the area I have seen no parking lot or designated parking lot for the skating rink in the area. Mr. Woodward, chief investigator with the department of building and safety, testified that he inspected the premises in January 1969, observed no parking facilities for Rollerbowl patrons, and was informed by its manager that Rollerbowl had no public parking whatever, having lost the use of certain lots previously leased from private owners. Petitioners' own evidence confirmed their inability to provide adequate parking facilities. Rollerbowl's president, Mr. Decker, testified that as of January 23, 1969, Rollerbowl maintained only one parking area, in an alleyway to the immediate south side of the rink, with space for only 25 to 30 cars. Because of the confined space (the area is 19 1/2 feet wide) and the possibility of blocking private access, it was necessary to employ a valet to accommodate any more than 20 cars. Valet parking was not initiated until after January 1969. Decker testified that Rollerbowl had, for a period of time, other parking facilities but he admitted that the valet parking area was the only parking lot accessible as of January 1969. According to Decker, the Rollerbowl had the use of one lot, accommodating 40 to 60 cars, at the northwest corner of Sunset Boulevard and St. Andrews Avenue, but that this facility terminated in May 1968. A larger lot at the rear of 1515 Northwestern Avenue, holding 72 to 120 cars was available from April 1967 to April 1968, but terminated when Rollerbowl's lease thereto expired. At the January 1969 hearings, Decker testified that Rollerbowl was negotiating for additional parking space and had appealed an adverse zoning decision affecting the proposed lot. At the subsequent hearings in June 1969, however, petitioners' counsel admitted that the Los Angeles Board of Zoning Adjustment had sustained the decision of its zoning administrator denying petitioners' application for a variance, and that petitioners still had no additional parking area. (13) Thus, the uncontradicted evidence shows that from May 1968 through June 1969 when the hearings concluded, petitioners had, at most, only one parking area and could accommodate only 20 to 30 automobiles. This evidence indicated that petitioners may have violated applicable Los Angeles ordinances requiring the maintenance of off-street parking. [9] We need not decide that question, however, for the central question before the Board throughout these lengthy hearings was not whether petitioners had violated an applicable parking ordinance but whether the parking facilities which petitioners did provide were too inadequate to comport with the peace, health, safety, convenience ... and general welfare of the public. Our review of the record discloses substantial evidence to support such a finding. Sergeant Kilgo testified that he had received numerous complaints from neighborhood businesses to the effect that petitioners' patrons parked their cars on private property without the owners' consent and blocked traffic by double parking; Kilgo's own investigations confirmed these complaints. Witnesses Grimes and Dollarhide testified that they had observed substantial traffic congestion caused by Rollerbowl patrons making U-turns, double, triple, or other illegal parking, or exiting from parking spaces in a hazardous manner; Grimes himself had seen patrons park on private property on 40 to 50 different occasions. Lieutenant Gleb testified concerning traffic congestion occurring when the Rollerbowl closed for the evening, and upward of 300 people are released from the rink. As Gleb stated, the lack of parking facilities is a tremendous problem here.... The Rollerbowl has no [adjoining parking] facility.... They have no parking and this disgorges all of the people via the front door, so we have this built-in potentially volatile situation just because of the sheer number of people who are leaving.... Officer Perry, testifying in January 1969, confirmed testimony regarding the substantial illegal parking in the Rollerbowl area; he personally issued 10 to 15 traffic citations every Sunday night. Perry noted that On Sunday and Tuesday nights, the parking situation is a complete mess.... Numerous vehicles parked in the red zones, in front of fire hydrants, blocking driveways around the area, double parking, ... parking on [a] private parking lot.... Sunset Boulevard, at that time, on Sundays and Tuesdays is completely congested and the movement of traffic at numerous times [is] brought to a complete standstill. Officer Seybert likewise testified concerning numerous parking violations, congestion and traffic diversion attributable to the Rollerbowl and its patrons. He estimated that there were from 250 to 300 cars in the area of the rink on Sunday nights. Other witnesses, including Rollerbowl personnel, estimated that on popular nights such as Tuesday and Sunday, the Rollerbowl would attract a crowd of from 700 to 800 people. In summary, it seems fair to conclude that substantial evidence was introduced to support the determination that Rollerbowl furnished insufficient off-street parking for its patrons, and that the public safety, convenience and welfare was thereby threatened or impaired. Petitioners point out that the foregoing evidence related to conditions from 1968 through January 1969, and refer us to certain testimony by Rollerbowl officers and employees in June 1969 that the parking problems were diminishing by that time. [10] Petitioners therefore assert that no evidence was introduced to show that inadequate parking existed at the time the Board made its findings in September and October 1969. As noted above (fn. 2, ante ), the hearing examiner acknowledged some improvement in conditions in the area but nevertheless concluded that Rollerbowl's operations failed to comport with the general welfare of the public. That conclusion seems reasonable. First of all, the evidence showed that as of June 1969 when the hearings concluded, Rollerbowl maintained only one parking area for 30 cars at most to accommodate its hundreds of patrons. The Board and its examiner could reasonably conclude that under such circumstances the incidence of illegal parking and congestion were likely to continue, especially with the approach of summer vacation. Second, at hearings before the Board itself in September 1969, witness Klein, a property owner across the street from the Rollerbowl, testified that we still are not able to use our parking lot at nighttime. It hasn't changed.... We have our own private parking lot, and we still are not able to use it, and we still have trouble with these youngsters. Finally, the scope of the prolonged hearings was confined to the question whether petitioners were entitled to renewed permits for the years 1968 and 1969. Since substantial evidence was introduced that, at least through January 1969, petitioners' facilities were inadequate, thereby adversely affecting the public welfare, the Board had the authority to rule that petitioners were not entitled to operating permits for those years. If, as petitioners claim conditions in the area have substantially improved, we see nothing which would prevent them from filing a new application for permit. As stated in section 103.38 of the ordinance in question, When an application for a permit is denied for cause, no new or other application for a permit from the same person shall be accepted within one year after denial, unless the applicant can show a material change in his situation which would justify the issuance of such permit. Petitioners contend that they were never informed by the Board that one of the conditions imposed by the Board in originally granting an operating permit for Rollerbowl was that petitioners must provide adequate parking facilities for their patrons. The contention is without merit. First of all, petitioners were forewarned by sections 103.29, subdivision (c), 103.31, subdivision (b), and 103.35, subdivision (j), of the Municipal Code that a renewed permit could be denied if their operations failed to comport with the peace, health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the public, or constituted a public nuisance. Secondly, petitioners were, of course, charged with knowledge of the provisions of section 12.21 of the Municipal Code pertaining to off-street parking (see fn. 9, ante ). (14) But aside from the notice charged to petitioners by reason of the foregoing ordinances, it is an accepted rule of law (and one with which petitioners may be deemed familiar) that a business permit may be revoked by a municipality if the permittee either fails to comply with the conditions expressed in its permit or if there exist a compelling public necessity justifying revocation, as where the conduct of that business constitutes a public nuisance. ( Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 315 [295 P. 14]; O'Hagen v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, supra, 19 Cal. App.3d 151, 158-159.) (15) As this court stated in Jones (at p. 316), once an undoubted menace to public health, safety, or morals is shown, the method of protection [available to a municipality] may be drastic. Private businesses may be wholly prohibited, where their danger is sufficiently great; and other businesses, no matter how well established and how great the resulting loss, may be excluded from certain districts where, by reason of the circumstances, their maintenance has become a public nuisance in those districts. In these cases, the public welfare demands even the destruction of existing property interests. (Italics added; accord, O'Hagen v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, supra . ) (16) In the instant case, the Board expressly found that due to insufficient parking facilities for the permitted activity, the operation of the business constituted a menace to the detriment of the neighborhood and, as such, does not comport with the public health, safety and welfare. (Italics added.) Under the circumstances, petitioners cannot complain that they had no notice that they were expected to maintain adequate parking facilities for their patrons. (17) Petitioners also claim that they were not afforded notice by the Board that they were charged with failing to provide adequate parking. The original notice of intention to deny permit issued by the Board in October 1968 charged, among other things, that applicant had, on March 1, 1967, violated a municipal ordinance in that applicant had failed to provide sufficient parking facilities for its premises (italics added), that on July 22, 1968, applicant violated its probation relating to this prior violation in that applicant continuously refuses to provide adequate parking for its premises (italics added), that letters of protest from interested persons have been received which reflected that Rollerbowl's proposed operations would not comport with the peace, health, safety, convenience, good morals and general welfare of the public, and that operation of the premises has required numerous man-hours and police patrols of the premises to prevent and control major disturbances. Taken as a whole, the notice seems adequate to advise petitioners that one ground upon which Board proposed to deny their renewal application was petitioners' failure to provide adequate parking for their patrons. True, the issue was phrased in terms of a prior conviction and violation of probation, yet petitioners must have known that the Rollerbowl's off-street parking facilities were at issue in the case. Indeed, the record indicates that petitioners were not misled by the notice; counsel permitted the introduction of adverse testimony on the question without objection and actively litigated the matter throughout the hearings. (See Kirby v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. App. Bd., 3 Cal. App.3d 209, 216-217 [83 Cal. Rptr. 89]; Vaughn v. Board of Police Comrs., 59 Cal. App.2d 771, 777-778 [140 P.2d 130].) As these hearings extended from December 1968 to June 1969, petitioners had ample time in which to prepare their defense. (18) In a related argument, petitioners contend that the notice does not raise the issue of whether appellants are presently providing sufficient parking facilities. The only reference ... as to parking facilities relates to the ... parking situation as of March 1, 1967.  (Italics added.) As petitioners' counsel himself acknowledged during the Board hearings, however, The issue presented by that Notice of Intention is whether the  at least on the face of it  is whether the operation will not comport with the peace, health, safety, convenience, good morals, and general welfare of the public. That issue is to be determined, I submit, at the time that the decision is made by the Commission, by the Board, and not as of the time that the Notice of Intention was submitted. ... [A]nd it seems to me that ... evidence of what has transpired right up until the present time, at the very least, is admissible. (Italics added.) We conclude that evidence pertaining to petitioners' operations subsequent to March 1967 was within the scope of the Board hearings, and that such evidence furnished a proper basis upon which the hearing examiner and Board could refuse to renew petitioners' operating permit for the years 1968 and 1969. b. Failure to control patrons and prevent disturbances  The Board found that petitioners had conducted the Rollerbowl in a manner contrary to the general welfare of the public, in that said operation has resulted in batteries against police officers, assaults with deadly weapons, drunks, robberies, thefts from motor vehicles, disturbing the peace  which acts have caused numerous arrests for these offenses. The Board also found that, by reason of the foregoing problem, the city police were required to spend numerous man-hours and efforts on the part of patrol, in the setting up of command posts, assignment of men to special details and special patrols of the premises to prevent and to control major disturbances. The foregoing findings were supported by substantial evidence. Various officers testified regarding a substantial incidence of crime in the immediate vicinity of the Rollerbowl and attributable to its patrons. Thus, Sergeant Kilgo testified that he was called to the area on six specified dates in August 1968 and once in October 1968. For example, on August 4, at 10:20 p.m., he responded to a citizen's complaint and observed a crowd of 300 to 500 people at the rink's entrance, throwing rocks and bottles, breaking windows with their roller skates, and assaulting and harassing police officers. On this night, 28 persons were arrested for felonies, including motor vehicle burglary, assault with deadly weapons, robbery and drug offenses. On August 25, at 10:30 p.m., Kilgo observed 400 to 600 persons milling around in front of the rink; by 11:15, there were approximately 200 persons on each side of the street. Traffic was blocked and a fight started at the rink's entrance; two assault victims had to be removed by ambulance. Kilgo further testified that three strong-armed robberies had been committed by juveniles in the immediate vicinity of the rink, that at least one assault with a deadly weapon had occurred inside the premises, and that Kilgo had personally observed numerous persons exiting the rink in a drunken or drugged state, fighting and arguing. Witness Rocklus, owner of a nearby motel, testified that incidents of fighting and other loud disturbances in the area of the Rollerbowl and involving 100 to 200 persons occurred 52 Sundays out of a year. Lieutenant Gleb testified that there had been a large increase in complaint calls from private citizens, and an increase in crime in the Rollerbowl area; in a six-month period in 1968, the Hollywood Division alone expended 3,200 man-hours in special assignments in the area. [11] Gleb further testified that 20 additional policemen would be required to control the Rollerbowl crowds on Tuesday and Sunday nights. Other evidence was introduced to show that, at least until January 1969, Rollerbowl released its hundreds of patrons at closing time through a single exit in front of the rink, and that these patrons frequently loitered at the entrance, fighting with themselves, attacking police officers and guards who were attempting to disperse crowds, assaulting drivers of cars, and interfering with the operations of an adjoining motel. Sergeant Van Vleck testified that the manager of the Rollerbowl had admitted to him that patrons smoked marijuana inside the rink, particularly in the men's room, that some juveniles at the rink were under the influence of drugs and alcohol, and that this matter had become quite a problem. Other testimony disclosed that fighting between patrons occurred within the rink itself. For example, on one occasion a fight broke out on the skating surface of the rink, and when security guards attempted to break up the fight, a patron grabbed the guard's gun and the guard was forced to strike the patron with his flashlight in order to retrieve his weapon. On another occasion, a guard had to fire a few rounds of ammunition into the air in order to dispel a fight. Witness Rocklus testified that Rollerbowl guards had informed him that Rollerbowl's policy for handling troublemakers was simply to grab them and throw them outside, rather than arrest or detain unruly patrons until they quieted down or sobered up. Sergeant Van Vleck testified that Rollerbowl's manager informed him that if security guards caught anybody with a bottle or can of beer or anything, they were to be ejected. Rollerbowl's own personnel testified that in the event of fighting inside the rink, the participants would be released separately; in the event an adult patron became drunk, he was released in the custody of another adult; if a child were involved, his parents were informed to come pick him up. Petitioners contend that the foregoing evidence largely concerned matters occurring outside of the Rollerbowl or beyond petitioners' reasonable control. They rely upon cases which suggest that ordinarily a lawful business enterprise may not be abated as a public nuisance merely because some of its patrons act improperly. (See Tarbox v. Board of Supervisors, 163 Cal. App.2d 373, 377-378 [329 P.2d 553] [homosexual patrons committing lewd acts in movie theater].) (19) Although as a general rule a licensing agency may not impose upon its licensees the responsibility of governing conditions beyond their control (see Flores v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 55 Cal.2d 736, 743 [13 Cal. Rptr. 201, 361 P.2d 921]; Sultan Turkish Bath v. Board of Police Comrs., supra, 169 Cal. App.2d 188, 197-198), a business catering to the general public may, under certain circumstances, be accountable for the disruptive conduct of its patrons, whether on or off the premises. Crowds of disorderly people who disturb the peace and obstruct the traffic may well impair the free enjoyment of life and property and give rise to the hazards designated in the [public nuisance] statute. ( People v. Lim, 18 Cal.2d 872, 882 [118 P.2d 472] [operation of gambling house]; see O'Hagen v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, supra, 19 Cal. App.3d 151, 163, fn. 6 [drive-in restaurant]; People v. Robin, 56 Cal. App.2d 885, 890 [133 P.2d 436] [cafe]; People v. Montoya, 137 Cal. App. Supp. 784 [28 P.2d 101] [beer hall]; Wade v. Fuller (1961) 12 Utah 2d 299 [365 P.2d 802, 804-805] [drive-in restaurant]; Civ. Code, § 3480 [defining public nuisance as one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons].) But we need not reach the question to what extent a licensee remains accountable for off-premises disturbances beyond his reasonable control, for it seems apparent from the evidence that a substantial portion of the disturbances occurring in the neighborhood of the Rollerbowl were attributable to petitioners' methods of operation and may be said to lie within their reasonable control. The Board could reasonably infer that petitioners' failure to provide adequate parking facilities for their patrons led to the serious traffic congestion, numerous and varied traffic offenses, and thefts and misuse of private property documented in the record. Petitioners' failure to arrange for the orderly dispersal of its hundreds of patrons at closing hour could foreseeably encourage street fighting and mob rioting, as well as enhance traffic congestion. The Board could also conclude that some of the disturbances occurring outside the rink were attributable to petitioners' failure to control or restrain those patrons who, when ejected from the rink for disorderly conduct, were likely to cause further mischief outside the premises. (20) We conclude that the Board's findings regarding petitioners' failure to control its patrons and prevent public disturbances were supported by substantial evidence and constituted sufficient ground to refuse to renew petitioners' operating permit. [12] We emphasize again, however, that our decision (and the Board's findings) pertain only to the question whether petitioners' permit should be renewed for the years 1968 and 1969. Pending our decision, petitioners have continued to operate the Rollerbowl and presumably have the opportunity, under section 103.38 of the ordinance, discussed above, to make a new application for a permit. Thus petitioners may be able to convince the Board that, with the passage of time, the conditions which once justified a denial of their renewal application no longer exist.