Opinion ID: 1651813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the admission of evidence over the objection of the appellant to the failure of the state to comply with section 41-29-501 through section 41-29-537 dealing with the interception, recording, and admissibility of oral communications was error

Text: ¶ 27. Ott argues that sections 41-29-501 to -537 of the Mississippi Code titled, Interception of Wire or Oral Communications, prevents introduction of any evidence of the oral communications transmitted over the body wires worn by Agent Harvey and Marlon Knox. As authority, Ott cites the statute itself. Section 41-29-501(j) defines oral communication as an oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying that expectation. Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-501(j) (Supp.1997). ¶ 28. According to Ott's interpretation of these sections of the Mississippi Code, Ott had an expectation that his conversations with Agent Harvey and Marlon Knox were not subject to interception and that any interception and use of information from the interception was barred by § 41-29-503. Section 41-29-503 states: The contents of an intercepted wire, oral or other communication and evidence derived from an intercepted wire, oral or other communication may not be received in evidence in any trial, hearing or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States or of this state or a political subdivision of this state if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this article. The contents of an intercepted wire, oral or other communication and evidence derived from an intercepted communication may be received in a civil trial, hearing or other proceeding only if the civil trial, hearing or other proceeding arises out of a violation of the criminal law of this state. Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-503 (Supp.1997) (emphasis added). ¶ 29. Ott argues it was reversible error for the court below to ignore the letter of these statutes and allow evidence related to the transmitted communications. For that reason Ott argues his conviction should be overturned and a new trial ordered. ¶ 30. The State argues that a proper interpretation of §§ 41-29-503(j) and 503(k) would allow evidence obtained from the transmissions of the conversations of Agent Harvey and Marlon Knox. These two sections provide: (j) Oral communication means an oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying that expectation. (k) Other communication means any transfer of an electronic or other signal, including fax signals, computer generated signals, other similar signals, or any scrambled or encrypted signal transferred via wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric or photooptical system from one party to another in which the involved parties may reasonably expect the communication to be private. Miss.Code Ann. §§ 41-29-501(j) & (k) (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). ¶ 31. In overruling Ott's motion to exclude the communications, the trial judge found and ruled as follows: My opinion about the effect of this act as it relates to the fact circumstances of this situation is that the act is not applicable and the reasons for my opinion of that is that one of the parties to this interception is a consenting party and that no person who is out on the streets dealing drugs to unknown people and accepting money for drugs should have a reasonable expectation that what they say is private, that when they are in that business dealing drugs if that is in fact what they are doing they run the hazards of dealing with undercover law enforcement officers, and they cannot reasonably expect in my mind that their communications will not be recorded in some fashion electronically. The trial judge's conclusion is well founded. ¶ 32. Under the terms of § 41-29-501(j), the circumstances of the drug buy did not justify an expectation that the conversations would not be intercepted. Ott sold marijuana to an unknown person in a public parking lot. The circumstances of the sale can not be said to justify an expectation that Ott's conversation with the drug buyers was not subject to interception. More importantly, the explicit terms of § 41-29-501(k) require the involved parties ... reasonably expect the communication to be private. ¶ 33. It is clear from a reading of the definitions and terms of the Act that the Act was intended to regulate recordings by the State of two or more parties without the knowledge of any of the parties. The Act was not intended to prevent police officials from outfitting police agents or confidential informants with body wires for use during police investigative activities. ¶ 34. This assignment has no merit.