Opinion ID: 4528737
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpreting the Verdict

Text: Petitioner also contends that the circuit court’s finding of sexual motivation is at odds with the jurors’ verdict. According to Petitioner, he “contested and opposed a finding of sexual motivation” and he “prevailed when the jury failed to find that . . . [he] committed either [sexual assault or sexual abuse] beyond a reasonable doubt.” We disagree. The court instructed the jury that it could return a verdict of sexual abuse in the first degree as a lesser included offense. A person commits sexual abuse in the first degree when he “subjects another person to sexual contact who is physically helpless[.]” W. Va. Code § 61-8B-7(a)(2) (2006). “Sexual contact” is any intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the breasts, buttocks, anus or any part of the sex organs of another person, or intentional touching of any part of another person’s body by the actor’s sex organs, where the victim is not married to the actor and the touching is done for the purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of either party. W. Va. Code § 61-8B-1(6) (emphasis added). Sexual gratification was, thus, an express element of one of the crimes considered by the jury. Moreover—and as Petitioner correctly observes—jurors were instructed that they could find Petitioner guilty on either of two theories: first, that he, himself, subjected the victim to sexual contact or, second, that he aided and abetted another person who subjected the victim to sexual contact. Thus, the question of any person’s sexual gratification was before the jury, not just the question of Petitioner’s own sexual gratification or that of the victim. This was the same issue before the sentencing judge pursuant to W. Va. Code § 15-12-2(j): “‘sexually motivated’ means 19 that one of the purposes for which a person committed the crime was for any person’s sexual gratification.” 19 We cannot agree, however, with Petitioner’s premise that he prevailed on the issue of sexual motivation. Petitioner believes that his acquittals on the charges of sexual assault in the second degree and sexual abuse in the first degree mean that the jury agreed with his view of the evidence and that, therefore, the State was somehow estopped from arguing at sentencing that his battery was sexually motivated. 20 We have held that “[t]he principle of collateral estoppel applies in a criminal case where an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment. In such case, that issue may not again be litigated between the State and the defendant. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 19 In reaching this conclusion, we affirm the circuit court’s written finding that Petitioner “had actual notice to defend against a sexual charge . . . and clearly understood that he had to defend against the allegation that his motives were sexual in nature.” 20 We assume this because Petitioner refers us to United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156, 117 S. Ct. 633, 637, 136 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1997) and its holding that “an acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the Government from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof.” Id. (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 349, 110 S.Ct. 668, 672, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990)). Dowling discussed and applied Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1970), which elevated the doctrine of collateral estoppel in criminal cases to a principle of federal constitutional law. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445, 90 S. Ct. at 1195, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469. Petitioner believes, in particular, that the State may not relitigate an issue unless the standard of proof is lower for the second litigation. This argument—if correct—might warrant reversal, because we have held that “[t]he evidentiary standard for a finding of ‘sexual motivation’ pursuant to W.Va.Code, 15–12–2(c) [2001] is proof beyond a reasonable doubt[.]” Syl. Pt. 2, in part, State v. Whalen, 214 W. Va. 299, 588 S.E.2d 677 (2003). On the facts of this case, however, no reversal is warranted, because the jurors’ verdicts cannot be said to have “determined” whether Petitioner’s battery was sexually motivated. Furthermore, because the jurors did not decide this issue, Petitioner has no ground to suggest that the circuit court based its decision on evidence that the jurors rejected. 20 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970).” Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Porter, 182 W. Va. 776, 392 S.E.2d 216 (1990). However, when, as here, the question is not a subsequent trial on an offense but instead a matter at sentencing, an acquittal of specific charges which include sexual motivation does not estop the court from determining whether Petitioner’s actions for which he was convicted were, in fact, sexually motivated pursuant to the statute requiring registration as a sex offender. We have held that [i]n determining whether collateral estoppel bars retrial of a defendant following a trial where a jury acquitted the defendant on one or more charges, but deadlocked on other charges, a court must examine the record of the prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, jury charge, and all other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict of acquittal upon an issue other than the issue which the defendant seeks to bar from reprosecution. Syl. Pt. 4, State ex rel. Taylor v. Janes, 225 W. Va. 329, 693 S.E.2d 82 (2010) (emphasis added). After careful review of the record, we find that “a rational jury could have grounded its verdict of acquittal” on the charges of second degree sexual assault and first degree sexual abuse “upon an issue other than” a finding that the Petitioner’s actions were not sexually motivated. Syl. Pt. 4, in part, Taylor, 225 W. Va. 329, 693 S.E.2d 82. 21 21 Following precedent, we attach no significance to the jurors’ inability to reach a verdict on the conspiracy count. See Syl. Pt. 5, in part, Taylor, 225 W. Va. 329, 693 S.E.2d 82 (“[C]ourts are not to consider [a] deadlocked charge in deciding whether collateral estoppel (continued . . .) 21 Simply put, the jury may very well have believed that Petitioner’s actions were sexually motivated and at the same time have believed that battery was the appropriate charge of which to convict Petitioner. The two are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, while we agree that testimony touching on sexual motivation was before the jury, we cannot agree that Petitioner’s sexual abuse (or sexual assault) acquittal barred the circuit court from making is own independent, statutory determination that Petitioner’s battery was sexually motivated. As we have said, “West Virginia Code § 15–12–2(c) places the responsibility for determining the sexual nature of criminal motivation squarely in the hands of the sentencing judge.” State v. Shearer, No. 16-1209, 2018 WL 1659488, at  (W. Va. Apr. 6, 2018) (memorandum decision). Here, the circuit judge did not abuse her discretion in finding that Petitioner’s actions were sexually motivated.