Opinion ID: 352547
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inadequate Assistance of Counsel.

Text: 68 As with most criminal appeals these days, appellants claim they did not receive the effective assistance of trial counsel who were different from appellate counsel. They contend counsel did not represent them on motions as they stated they did (Tr. 199) and that they did not adequately prepare or conduct their defense. In considering these claims, it should always be recognized that all counsel were retained and paid by appellants. Also Anthony Vecchiarello was a disbarred lawyer and apparently not ignorant of court proceedings though some of his claims here have been obviously devoid of supporting evidence. 69 As to the motions, the court file record and the docket entries show that a single lawyer was originally retained on January 22, 1970 and that the lawyers whom appellants claim did not file the motions they said they did were joined as counsel on February 4, 1970 and May 28, 1970. The latter two lawyers tried the case. The lawyer who first joined original counsel was listed as co- counsel on the Motion for a Bill of Particulars on February 27, 1970. Thereafter three motions were filed before the third counsel was appointed. Thereafter he appeared on May 28, 1970 on the renewal of the motion for (1) trial continuance, and (2) to dismiss and (3) to sever. On June 4, 1970 the two trial counsel (without initial counsel) appeared on the argument for severance and for dismissal. Original counsel withdrew on June 8, 1970 when the trial started. 70 It thus appears that appellants were incorrect in their complaints about motions. 71 As for the conduct of the trial the claims are numerous. Appellants attack counsel's preparation in numerous aspects, that they did not object to inadmissible testimony, and that they failed to put in any witness or to present any defense. 72 The claim concerning the admission of inadmissible testimony centers chiefly around Dr. Humberto Castro who testified with respect to activities in the medical school at the University of Yucatan, Mexico. Appellants claim that Dr. Castro was not the person he represented himself to be and that some undisclosed Jencks Act material would have so proved. The claim as to his lack of bona fides was based, as most of appellants' arguments were, on a partial consideration of a fact, i. e., Dfts. Ex. 5, at the hearing. The claim was that the reference on this exhibit to the results of an examination implicitly showed that Dr. Castro was not a doctor, and that he could not have been the Dr. Castro from Yucatan because the exhibit indicated he was in Washington, D.C., when he testified he was in Yucatan. Not so. The exhibit indicated that a subsequent test examination was scheduled, that his pay was raised shortly after the earlier date, and that he continued as a Resident until 5/13/62 or possibly 7/1/62. This was not inconsistent with his testimony that he returned to Yucatan thereafter, became Secretary to the Medical School in September, 1965, and was presently occupying that position (Tr. June 10, 1970, 501). As for the Jencks Act claim that was disposed of in our prior opinion, it suffices to say that appellants did not demonstrate the existence of any such Jencks Act material as they requested. Their reasoning in this respect is far-fetched. 73 As to the conduct of the trial by the defense lawyers, it should be noted that the trial began on June 4, 1970 and continued until June 16, 1970. Appellants were represented by two very experienced criminal trial lawyers. Their conduct of the actual trial demonstrates their experience. One counsel was from the District of Columbia. He is a member of the Indiana and D.C. Bars and has practiced here since 1958 (Tr. 109, 133). In 1970 when this trial occurred, he had acted as counsel in hundreds . . . of criminal trials. I had 100 felonies going at one time in this Court under the Criminal Justice Act (Tr. 133). The other lawyer from New York was not called as a witness by appellants. He carried the laboring oar at trial. He had also, prior to the criminal trial, successfully represented appellants in a Civil Action in the District Court which sought an injunction against their continuing to practice medicine. That case involved some of the facts that were subsequently in issue in appellants' criminal trials. The Court decided that the injunction would not be granted until a further time (Tr. 832). Appellants do not single out this lawyer for any special condemnation. 74 Naturally appellants claim their lawyers did not adequately prepare the case, but, recognizing the kind of a case that they had, the proof is to the contrary. The lawyers obtained full discovery from the Government (Tr. 117, 119, 122) and thoroughly interviewed all the defendants on all phases of the case and on all possible theories of any affirmative defense (Tr. 117). They spent two entire weekends cooped up with all appellants in a hotel room completely canvassing the evidence and issues in the case. They discussed potential witnesses with appellants (Tr. 121) and they were given a list of numerous character witnesses. 75 In the last analysis the lawyers made a decision tactically not to offer any witnesses and not to put the defendants on the stand. Some of the defendants wanted to pursue a different course (Tr. 119). Counsel considered that their only affirmative defense was themselves (Tr. 135) but because of previous activities (they) didn't think any of you (defendants) should take the stand and that was a tactical decision that was made. (Tr. 118). They also decided against calling any character witnesses who didn't know (the) full backgrounds (of appellants). (Tr. 121). They considered such witnesses could not be beneficial because they would be cross-examined on defendants' past activities and that would be devastating (Tr. 130). If the defendants took the stand they concluded from their interviews that they would be impeached by other crimes . . . and by other locations . . . they might have been some place else when they were supposed to be in (medical) school (Tr. 136). Mr. Vecchiarello, (which one was not stated) was in fact incarcerated during one period when he was allegedly in school in Mexico . . . (and) Mr. Maturo was (incarcerated) in Florida (Tr. 136). Defendants' counsel successfully kept the testimony as to their incarceration from the jury (Tr. 136). 76 With such facts facing them, defense counsel advised defendants that they would not put them on the stand as witnesses and the defendants just went along with us (counsel) (Tr. 142). Thereafter, counsel prepared a full defense and put it in by cross-examining Government witnesses and oral motions in court, and by objections and deciding not to put the defendants on the stand (Tr. 141). As in many criminal cases, particularly where some defendants have prior criminal records, the best and only defense in counsel's judgment is to put the Government strictly to its proof and to argue that the high burden of proof was not satisfied by the evidence. We see nothing improper in such handling of this case. Had appellants taken the stand, it would appear that any testimony that was exculpatory would have added perjury to their offenses, which would have justified a more severe sentence than the reduced sentence the trial judge eventually imposed. It was counsel's judgment that they should have the plea bargained (and probably) could remain on the street . . . but (Anthony) Vecchiarello definitely wanted to go to trial in this matter (Tr. 134-135). It thus appears that he, and his co-defendants, would have been well advised to accept the advice of counsel who had very considerable experience in criminal trials. 77