Opinion ID: 449257
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: references to defendants' failure to testify

Text: 40 Direct reference by a prosecutor to a defendant's decision not to testify at trial is always a violation of the defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965); United States v. Rodriguez, 627 F.2d 110, 111 (7th Cir.1980). Indirect references to the defendant's failure to testify are constitutionally impermissible if the language used was manifestly intended to be or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505, 509 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Lysczyk v. United States, 393 U.S. 846, 89 S.Ct. 131, 21 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968) (citing United States v. Wright, 309 F.2d 735 (7th Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 929, 83 S.Ct. 873, 9 L.Ed.2d 733 (1963)). In United States v. Fearns, 501 F.2d 486 (7th Cir.1974), this court held that two prosecutorial references to undisputed testimony were indirect references to the defendant's failure to testify where [t]here were no persons other than the defendants who could have disputed the [prosecution witness'] testimony apart from alibi witnesses. Id. at 490. Similarly, in United States v. Handman, 447 F.2d 853 (7th Cir.1971), we held that a prosecutor's argument that government testimony remained intact, unchallenged and uncontradicted constituted an indirect reference to the defendant's failure to testify. Id. at 855. In United States v. Buege, 578 F.2d 187, 189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 871, 99 S.Ct. 203, 58 L.Ed.2d 183 (1978), we found error where a prosecutor repeatedly depicted testimony as uncontradicted where it was highly unlikely that at least a portion of the testimony could have been contradicted by anyone other than the defendant. Id. at 189. Finally, this court has even recognized that closing arguments regarding uncontradicted testimony which could have been contradicted by either the defendant or another witness were nonetheless impermissible because they could have called attention to [defendant's] failure to testify on any issue--and thus to his failure to contradict much of the testimony which could not have been contradicted by anyone but him. United States v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir.1967). Cf. United States v. Shue (7th Cir.1984) (prosecutor violated defendant's due process rights by referring in his closing arguments to the defendant's post-arrest silence and implying that the silence was inconsistent with a claim of innocence). 41 While the bulk of our cases regarding prejudicial prosecutorial remarks have involved federal cases and federal prosecutors, we think the principle at issue applies equally to state cases, such as the one at issue here. In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), the Supreme Court held that direct comments by a California state prosecutor regarding the accused's silence violated the accused's fifth amendment rights. Moreover, other circuits have granted writs of habeas corpus on the grounds that closing remarks by state prosecutors on a defendant's failure to testify were unconstitutional and so prejudiced the defendant's trial as to be beyond the doctrine of harmless error. See, e.g., Hearn v. Mintzes, 708 F.2d 1072 (6th Cir.1983); Calloway v. Wainwright, 409 F.2d 59 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 909, 89 S.Ct. 1752, 23 L.Ed.2d 222 (1969); Schultz v. Yeager, 403 F.2d 639 (3d Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 961, 89 S.Ct. 1309, 22 L.Ed.2d 562 (1969). See also Hall v. Wainwright, 733 F.2d 766 (11th Cir.1984) (upholding the propriety of federal appellate review of state prosecutor's comments on petition for writ of habeas corpus, but finding comments at issue were not errors of constitutional magnitude). 42 Seven indirect references to a failure to testify, made after explicit cautionary advice from the presiding judge to stay away from such arguments, lead us to conclude that the prosecutor manifestly intended to make a comment about the defendants' failure to testify. Moreover, there is little doubt that this case comes within the confines of the rule requiring that indirect references naturally and necessarily will be taken by the jury as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. Lyon, 397 F.2d at 509. No one other than the defendants could have satisfactorily denied or contradicted the government's witnesses. Only Olbrot, for instance, could have contradicted Von Ahn's testimony as to his alleged California conversation with Olbrot. It is true that the two customers who fled the drugstore at the time of the robbery might have been called to contradict Hannum's testimony as to who was in the drug store, but, as the state admitted during oral argument, there is nothing on the record to indicate that either side knew the identity of these individuals. Moreover, because the jury had only heard two passing references to these individuals, it is unlikely that these customers would have come to mind as possible providers of contradictory evidence or that they had been the force behind the prosecutor's uncontradicted remarks. 43 Furthermore, while the fifth amendment is not in fact implicated by Olbrot's failure to exhibit his back, therefore making statements about Olbrot's alleged scar less egregious in themselves than the continual reference to undenied testimony, we do not think that ends the matter. Remarks about the scar or regarding who was in the drugstore might have been contradicted by Olbrot's nontestimonial exhibition of his back or by securing the testimony of the two fleeing customers. Nonetheless, these remarks primarily call attention to the testimony which could have been contradicted only by Olbrot's and Burke's testimony. The crucial inquiry in evaluating the prejudice conveyed by indirect reference to a failure to testify is a consideration of how the jury would view the closing argument as a whole. A juror is unlikely to be aware of the distinctions between testimonial and nontestimonial evidence, so that the obvious conclusion to be drawn from the prosecutor's remarks regarding the scar was that the defendant's failure to show his back was indicative of guilt. Such indirect references to a failure to testify violate the defendant's fifth amendment rights and are clearly improper. Similarly, repeated references to uncontradicted testimony also is likely to cause the jury to view the closing argument as a commentary on the defendant's failure to testify and as a suggestion to view that failure to testify as indicia of guilt. This, too, is improper.