Opinion ID: 2171503
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Certification Procedure

Text: The statute requires the trial court to include in the order of commitment the certification that the defendant is a habitual child sex offender. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 222(A).) Although this certification was not included in the order of commitment, this error was harmless and resulted in no prejudice to the defendant. At the time of sentencing, it is incumbent upon the trial court to recognize the pertinent criminal history of the defendant in preparation for compliance with the Registration Act. Such recognition must necessarily take place after the prosecution has brought the defendant's criminal history to the court's attention. The record reveals that, although the State did not directly connect the defendant's previous child sex offense to compliance with the Registration Act, the information was conveyed to the court during the sentencing hearing. Furthermore, the State did request the court to order the defendant to sign a form directly relating to the Registration Act, and the defendant did, in fact, sign the form. The statute provides that anyone convicted a second or subsequent time of any of the offenses designated in sections 12-13 through 12-16 of the Criminal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 222(A)) shall be required to register under the provisions of the statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 223). The defendant's record makes him subject to this provision of the Registration Act. This language allows for no discretion on the part of the trial court in determining whether a defendant may or may not be required to register under the statute. As the appellate court recognized, once a defendant has been sentenced and placed into the custody of the Department of Corrections, the court rendering judgment and imposing sentence loses jurisdiction over the case and is without power to vacate, set aside or modify the judgment. (198 Ill.App.3d at 77, 144 Ill.Dec. 402, 555 N.E.2d 761.) However, compliance with the Registration Act requires none of the above actions by the court. Whether a judgment is vacated, set aside, or modified is subject to the discretion of the court. Compliance with the Registration Act, in an instance such as this where both convictions took place in Illinois, requires no discretion but merely the ministerial function of carrying out the statute's requirements. Even though the trial court failed to include the certification order pursuant to the Registration Act, all necessary findings with respect to the statute were made at the time of sentencing and the defendant was required to sign the habitual child abuse offender form. When the court subsequently certified the defendant in August 1988, it was doing so only to make the record reflect that which had been previously ascertained during the sentencing hearing. The omission of the certification order was merely an administrative oversight having no effect on any substantive right enjoyed by the defendant. Although not so designated, the order signed in August of 1988 was essentially a nunc pro tunc order. This type of order is designed to allow the record to reflect that which was already done previously, but which was omitted from the record. ( In re Estate of Young (1953), 414 Ill. 525, 112 N.E.2d 113.) The record from the December 1987 sentencing hearing shows that all necessary facts were recorded to bring the defendant within the Registration Act's requirements, and that the defendant was required to sign and did sign a form designating him as a habitual child sex offender. All that was missing was the certification order itself. Since a trial court does not lose jurisdiction to correct its records ( People v. Glenn (1962), 25 Ill.2d 82, 182 N.E.2d 670), the failure by the trial court to include the certification in the order of commitment was harmless error and does not affect the defendant's duty to comply with the Registration Act. Additionally, even were we to find that the trial court erroneously delayed the certification, it would not influence the out come. Although the statute specifies the time for certification as the sentencing hearing, we find the essential requirement concerning certification is that the registrant be advised of his duty to register before the time for registration occurs. Absent action prejudicial to the defendant, errors before this point are harmless. The apparent purpose behind requiring certification upon sentencing is merely judicial economy. Although this economy was obviously missing here, its failure is not cause for preventing the statute's application. For the above reasons, we find the Registration Act constitutional, and the defendant is required to comply with its provisions. The judgments of the appellate and circuit courts are therefore affirmed. Judgments affirmed.