Opinion ID: 837889
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: land division act[2]

Text: I respectfully dissent from the holding that the LDA does not grant courts the power to alter substantive property rights. I think that the majority that reached that holding errs in addressing this issue in this case. I also think that its reasoning is flawed and that its conclusion is too broad. Most importantly, I do not think that it is necessary for this Court to reach this issue in this case. The lead opinion states that [i]n this case, the LDA did not create new substantive property rights when the circuit court altered the plat to reflect that the central easement encompasses utility access because [t]his right existed with respect to the central easement since its inception.... Ante at 186. I agree. Accordingly, it is irrelevant to the outcome of this case whether, as a general proposition, the LDA allows courts to alter the underlying substantive rights of the property owners. Therefore, this Court does not need to address this issue. Nonetheless, as I am forced to discuss it, I tend to disagree with the lead opinion's conclusion that the LDA was never intended to enable a court to establish an otherwise nonexistent property right. Ante at 186. I think that there are some flaws in the lead opinion's reasoning and that this conclusion is too broad. Both MCL 560.221 and 560.226(1) state that courts may vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat. Section 226(1) lists several exceptions to this power, but otherwise does not explain when or why courts should vacate, correct, or revise a plat. The lead opinion reasons that the LDA's grant of power to the courts to vacate, correct, or revise a plat is not a substantive power because the act defines a plat as a map, and everybody knows that revising a map does not automatically revise the underlying substantive property rights. Regardless of whether the majority on this issue is correct in concluding that the LDA does not permit courts to alter property rights, I do not think that its reasoning is focused on the proper question. The relevant question is not whether a plat is a map; rather, the question is whether the Legislature intended to give courts the power to alter substantive property rights by revising a map under the circumstances in a given case. The lead opinion gives as an example that [i]f one `revises' a map of the United States to show Michigan encompassing half of the country, it does not make it so. Ante at 186. This statement is of course true of the average judge sitting at home with a book of Rand McNally maps and a permanent marker. But, if a duly empowered Legislature passed a statute stating that when a court revises the boundaries of a map, that revision has the legal effect of changing the boundaries, then a court's revision of a map would indeed create a substantive change. [3] If the lead opinion's conclusion is correct, the reason it is correct cannot be that a revision to a map, by definition, can never alter substantive property rights. In addition to disagreeing with the lead opinion's reasoning, I tend to think that the lead opinion's statement that the LDA never permits courts to alter property rights through its power to vacate, correct, or revise a plat is too broad. [4] Instead, I would state that the Legislature intended MCL 560.221 and 560.226(1) to permit courts to alter property rights in at least some circumstances. I will not attempt to exhaustively determine when the LDA grants courts the power to alter property rights because the facts of this case do not present a suitable basis for analyzing these issues. Regardless, I believe that this Court's approach to this issue should be more cautious, nuanced, and case-specific than the approach taken by the lead opinion.