Opinion ID: 1822646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Questioning About [S]tormy [R]elationship

Text: Rhonda McKenzie testified for the State at Lotter's trial. McKenzie was Lotter's girl friend at the time of the homicides. During recross-examination, Lotter's counsel asked, Now, you and [Lotter] have had kind of a stormy relationship, and you've had your arguments. He's yelled at you. Right? McKenzie responded Correct. Lotter's counsel then asked if Lotter had gotten mad at her because he did not think she was telling the truth, to which McKenzie also responded affirmatively. On redirect, the State asked, Now, this stormy relationship is a nice euphemism for the physical abuse he's inflicted on you ... isn't it? Lotter's counsel immediately objected that the comment was improper, prejudicial, and irrelevant, and the trial judge immediately sustained the objection. In his direct appeal, Lotter assigned that the above question relating to physical abuse by Lotter constituted prosecutorial misconduct that should result in a mistrial. Noting that Lotter's counsel did not move for a mistrial, we held that he had waived the right to assert on appeal that the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial. Lotter now asserts that the failure to move for a mistrial was ineffective assistance of counsel. At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that he had not moved for a mistrial after the stormy relationship question because he did not regard the question itself as damaging at that point in his trial strategy. He admitted that he did move for a mistrial at other times during the trial and was aware of the importance of making the motion, but he noted that to continually move for a mistrial in circumstances where the motion was unlikely to be granted is sometimes counterproductive. In determining whether counsel's performance was deficient, the standard is whether an attorney, in representing the accused, performed at least as well as a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the defense of a criminal case. State v. Billups, 263 Neb. 511, 641 N.W.2d 71 (2002). When considering whether a counsel's performance was deficient, there is a strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably. State v. Faust, 265 Neb. 845, 660 N.W.2d 844 (2003); State v. Al-Zubaidy, supra . Trial counsel is afforded due deference to formulate trial strategy and tactics. When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellate court will not second-guess reasonable strategic decisions by counsel. State v. Al-Zubaidy, supra . The district court determined that Lotter's trial counsel made a sound tactical decision not to move for a mistrial in this circumstance, because it was improbable that a mistrial would have been granted and the motion would have highlighted the comment further from the jury's perspective. We agree with this analysis and conclude that the decision not to move for a mistrial at this juncture of the trial did not constitute deficient performance on the part of defense counsel.