Opinion ID: 768198
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Authority of the Schenectady County Sheriff

Text: 45 The County contends that, although the sheriff is its final policymaker with respect to matters of law enforcement, he has no final policymaking authority with respect to matters of personnel. (County brief on appeal at 18-19.) In granting summary judgment in favor of the County, the district court agreed that the sheriff has no such authority with respect to municipal employment policy. 20 F.Supp.2d at 421. The court found the present case to be similar to Praprotnik [which] dealt with plaintiff's allegations that his First Amendment rights were violated through a retaliatory transfer to a new position, 20 F.Supp.2d at 420. It noted that the Praprotnik Court had 46 characterized the retaliatory actions as involving matters of 'personnel administration' and 'employment policy,' [485 U.S.] at 128-29, ... and found that the city officials were not authorized under the city charter to establish employment policy for the municipality, and were therefore merely exercising discretion rather than formulating municipal policy. 47 20 F.Supp.2d at 421. 48 We view the district court's analysis in terms of general personnel and employment matters as insufficient to identify the policymaker with respect to the particular issue involved here, McMillian, 520 U.S. at 785. The principal area in question in this suit involves the duties and obligations of the sheriff's staff members toward each other with respect to their exercise of First Amendment rights in breach of the Jail's code of silence. The following review of New York State (State) law leads us to the conclusion that the Schenectady County sheriff was the County's final policymaker with respect to most of the conduct that plaintiffs challenge. 49 Under New York law, the sheriff of Schenectady County, as in most of the State's counties, is an elected official. See N.Y. Const. art. XIII, 13(a) (McKinney Supp. 1999); N.Y. County Law 400, subd. 1 (McKinney 1991). In addition to requiring the sheriff to perform such additional and related duties as may be prescribed by law and directed by the board of supervisors or the county legislature, N.Y. County Law 650, subd. 1 (McKinney 1991), State law specifies that, except in two counties not relevant here, [e]ach sheriff ... shall have custody of the county jails, N.Y. Correct. Law 500-c (McKinney Supp. 1999). 50 In addition to the statutory powers and duties which a Sheriff now has[,] he also has those duties which were fixed at common law and which have not been abrogated by statute. Isereau v. Stone, 207 Misc. 941, 948, 140 N.Y.S.2d 585, 592 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 3 A.D.2d 243, 160 N.Y.S.2d 336 (4th Dep't 1957). The powers, duties and obligations of a Sheriff under common law, as under 500-c of the Correction Law, include the care and maintenance of the county jail and its inmates. Id. at 949, 140 N.Y.S.2d at 593-94 (internal quotation marks omitted). 51 Matters pertaining to inmate conditions at the local jails, such as inmate care, custody, discipline, health, safety, employment, and grievances, are subject to some supervision and control by officials and agencies of State, rather than county, government. See N.Y. Correct. Law 45 (McKinney 1987). For example, the State Commission of Correction (Correction Commission) has the power and the duty to, inter alia, 52 [v]isit, inspect and appraise the management of correctional facilities with specific attention to matters such as safety, security, health of inmates, sanitary conditions, rehabilitative programs, disturbance and fire prevention and control preparedness, and adherence to laws and regulations governing the rights of inmates. 53 Id. 45, subd. 3. The Correction Commission is required to [p]romulgate rules and regulations establishing minimum standards for the care, custody, correction, treatment, supervision, discipline, and other correctional programs for all persons confined in correctional facilities. Id. subd. 6. If, in the judgment of the Correction Commission, there is an imminent danger to the health, safety or security of the inmates or employees of [a] correctional facility or of the public, it may place a monitor in the facility. Id. subd. 7. The Correction Commission may also, if it believes necessary, establish a training program for jail personnel [f]or the purpose of providing for adequate care, custody, correction, treatment, supervision, discipline and other correctional programs for all persons confined in correctional facilities. Id. subd. 9; see also id. subd. 9-a (for the same purposes, Correction Commission is to promulgate rules and regulations for the certification of parttime local correctional officers employed by local correctional facilities who have satisfactorily completed an in-service correctional training program sponsored by the local correctional facility). However, nothing in these provisions, informs or circumscribes the sheriff's authority with respect to the duties and obligations of his staff members toward each other. 54 With regard to the sheriff's authority over his staff, New York law provides that [t]he sheriff may ... appoint keepers, guards, clerks and employees as may be authorized by the board of supervisors and such appointees shall serve during his pleasure. N.Y. County Law 652, subd. 2 (McKinney Supp. 1999). This power of appointment and termination is somewhat circumscribed by the current version of the New York Constitution, which has the effect of placing a sheriff's appointees under the civil service system. Prior to 1990, the State Constitution provided that the county shall never be made responsible for the acts of [its] sheriff. N.Y. Const. art. XIII, 13(a) (McKinney 1987), amended by N.Y. Const. art. XIII, 13(a) (McKinney Supp. 1999). As a result of that provision, a sheriff's appointees were considered to be employees of the sheriff himself, rather than of the city or county in which he operated, see, e.g., Enstrom v. City of New York, 258 A.D. 672, 676, 17 N.Y.S.2d 964, 968 (2d Dep't 1940); Reck v. County of Onondaga, 51 Misc.2d 259, 261, 273 N.Y.S.2d 146, 150 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), and most were regarded as beyond the scope of the civil service system, see, e.g., Flaherty v. Milliken, 193 N.Y. 564, 86 N.E. 558 (1908), superseded by N.Y. Const. art. XIII, 13(a) (McKinney Supp. 1999); Grifenhagen v. Ordway, 218 N.Y. 451, 113 N.E. 516 (1916), superseded by N.Y. Const. art. XIII, 13(a) (McKinney Supp. 1999). After the State Constitution was amended in 1990 to delete the provision relieving counties of liability for the acts of their sheriffs, see N.Y. Const. art. XIII, 13(a) (McKinney Supp. 1999), the amendment was interpreted by the State legislature and the State courts to mean that all sheriffs' employees are to be included in the civil service system. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law 59, subd. 1 (legislative finding that the 1990 amendment to the New York State constitution brings appointees of a county sheriff into the classified service of the civil service); Thoubboron v. New York State Department of Civil Service, 79 N.Y.2d 982, 584 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1992), aff'g 175 A.D.2d 443, 572 N.Y.S.2d 494 (3d Dep't 1991). 55 According to Schenectady County Manager Robert D. McEvoy, the functions of the County's Civil Service Commission with respect to appointments by the sheriff consist of what Civil Service Commissions normally do. (Deposition of Robert D. McEvoy (McEvoy Dep.) at 19.). Referring to the person who was personnel administrator for the County, McEvoy testified as follows: 56 He's the staff to the Civil Service Commission as they do testing, as they do job descriptions, job placements, job categories, whether they're examined or competitive, non-competitive, that's what Civil Service Commissions normally do, he directs the staff; then his role as Personnel Director, he does recruiting, he does labor contract negotiations, he does all the matters that go along with the labor contract administration, he also runs the welfare, the work programs that we have, because we have all that merged together in one unit, he supervises that because that's employment, we have all employment activity in one place. 57 (Id.) None of these areas within the normal scope of civil service supervision has any bearing on the existence of a code of silence at a correctional facility or the custom of enforcing that code by harassing and intimidating jail staff members who exercise their rights under the First Amendment to reveal wrongdoing by fellow workers. 58 Nor does local County law provide any indication that there is any final policymaker other than the Schenectady County sheriff with respect to operations at the Jail. The Schenectady County Manager is the municipality's chief executive official, chosen by the County legislature. See Charter of County of Schenectady 3.00. The County Manager appoints and [e]xercises supervision and control over the heads of all departments ... except such officers required to be elected and their subordinates. Id. 3.01, subd. 2-3 (emphasis added). Since under State law the sheriff is required to be elected, he and his subordinates, as a matter of law, are not controlled or supervised by the Schenectady County Manager. 59 Nor is the sheriff, or his management of his subordinates, controlled or supervised by the County Manager in practice. In his deposition in this case, County Manager McEvoy, far from suggesting that the County supervised the sheriff in the operation of the Jail, testified that the County Manager's office would meet with the sheriff's staff only as desired by the sheriff and would never give any substantive direction. [W]e are a service organization to the jail and our people meet with him or his agents because we are just servicing .... Since it's strictly a service function, there is no need for me to meet with him, unless he wanted to .... (McEvoy Dep. at 20.) The County Manager stated that he would [n]ever, never have substantive conversations with Sheriff Barnes about the sheriff's work because the sheriff is a constitutional officer. (Id. at 21.) Citing the advice he had received many times from the County's attorneys with respect to the sheriff (id. at 21-22), the County Manager testified, I have nothing to do with his work responsibility, he's autonomous.... He runs the jail on his own .... (Id. at 21.) Although the County argues that McEvoy was referring only to the sheriff's law enforcement function (see, e.g., County brief on appeal at 18), that argument is belied by the testimony itself. With respect to the sheriff and jail operations, McEvoy stated succinctly, he's in charge and has the authority for the jail, which we do not .... (Id. at 15.) 60 In sum, State law requires that the Schenectady County sheriff be elected; County law provides that elected officials are not subject to supervision or control by the County's chief executive officer; there is only routine civil service supervision over the sheriff's appointments; State law places the sheriff in charge of the Jail; and the County's chief executive officer, advised by the County's attorneys, treats the sheriff, insofar as Jail operations are concerned, as autonomous. 61 We could agree with the view that the sheriff is not the final policymaker for purposes of 1983 analysis if the complaint were simply that plaintiffs had been subjected to unwarranted formal discipline or changes in job assignments. But their claims go farbeyond these routine classes of personnel actions within the domain of a civil service commission. The bulk of plaintiffs' claims center on harassment, intimidation, threats, and endangerment of their lives. The County has pointed us to no provision of State or local law that requires a sheriff to answer to any other entity in the management of his jail staff with respect to the existence or enforcement of a code of silence. We conclude that Sheriff Barnes was, as a matter of law, the County's final policymaking official with respect to the conduct of his staff members toward fellow officers who exercise their First Amendment rights to speak publicly or to inform government investigators of their co-workers' wrongdoing. 62