Opinion ID: 77514
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Court-Appointed Counsel's Conflict of Interest

Text: 31 Lynd's final argument is that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his court-appointed counsel had a conflict of interest resulting from his previous representation of the victim and her ex-husband in a bankruptcy proceeding. Lynd argues that, by appointing the attorney, the trial court compelled him to waive the conflict of interest in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 8 32 The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel encompasses the right to counsel untainted by conflicts of interest. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978). This right is violated when the defendant's attorney has an actual conflict of interest that adversely affects the lawyer's performance. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708; United States v. Rodriguez, 982 F.2d 474, 477 (11th Cir.1993). 33 This issue likewise was addressed and rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court: 34 Lynd also argues that the attorney appointed by the court was laboring under a conflict of interest. Years previously, the appointed attorney had represented the victim's ex-husband in a bankruptcy or something. The attorney testified that he likely had represented the victim also, but he could not remember her. The victim's husband presently resides in Melbourne, Florida, according to the record, and did not testify in this case. The appointed attorney stated to the court that he was merely bringing the matter to the court's attention. Neither he nor the retained attorney suggested to the court how there was either an actual or serious potential for a conflict of interest. See Mitchell v. State, 261 Ga. 347, 405 S.E.2d 38 (1991). 35 Lynd, 414 S.E.2d at 10. 36 In denying this claim on the merits, the Georgia Supreme Court did not find the existence of an actual or even potential conflict. Lynd has presented no argument demonstrating that the Georgia Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law nor any evidence to rebut the court's factual finding that no conflict existed. After reviewing the record, we find no misapplication of federal law and no evidentiary support for the existence of an actual conflict of interest. Accordingly, this Court cannot find that the Georgia Supreme Court erred when it denied this claim. 37 For all of the foregoing reasons, Lynd's petition is DENIED.