Opinion ID: 1188992
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: excusing a juror

Text: K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4624 provides in part: (2) [U]pon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of murder in the first degree based upon the finding of premeditated murder, the court upon motion of the county or district attorney, shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be required to serve a mandatory term of imprisonment of 40 years. The proceeding shall be conducted by the trial judge before the trial jury as soon as practicable. If any person who served on the trial jury is unable to serve on the jury for the sentencing proceeding, the court shall substitute an alternate juror who has been impaneled for the trial jury. If there are insufficient alternate jurors to replace trial jurors who are unable to serve at the sentencing proceeding, the trial judge may summon a special jury of 12 persons which shall determine the question of whether a mandatory term of imprisonment of 40 years shall be imposed.... .... (5) If, by unanimous vote, the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4625 and amendments thereto exist and, further, that the existence of such aggravating circumstances is not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances which are found to exist, the defendant shall be sentenced pursuant to K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4628 and amendments thereto; otherwise, the defendant shall be sentenced as provided by law. The jury, if its verdict is a unanimous recommendation of a sentence of a mandatory term of imprisonment of 40 years, shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman of the jury, the statutory aggravating circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. If, after a reasonable time for deliberation, the jury is unable to reach a verdict, the judge shall dismiss the jury and impose a sentence of imprisonment for life with eligibility for parole and shall commit the defendant to the custody of the secretary of corrections.  (Emphasis added.) The State sought imposition of the hard 40 sentence for both murder convictions. The jury which heard the guilt determination phase of Stafford's trial continued to hear the hard 40 determination phase. The following aggravating circumstances were submitted to the jury: That the defendant was previously convicted of a felony in which the defendant inflicted death on another; [t]hat the defendant knowingly or purposely killed more than one person; and [t]hat the victim was killed because of the victim's prospective performance of the victim's duties as a witness in a criminal proceeding. The jury deliberated from 11:37 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to sometime before 1:55 p.m. At that time, two of the jurors requested to be excused. Judge Macnish met with both of these jurors separately, and then beginning at 1:55 p.m. each juror met with Judge Macnish, the defendant, counsel for the defendant, and counsel for the State. Juror Widner requested to be excused but after discussion agreed to continue deliberating. Immediately after Juror Widner rejoined the jury, the parties met with Juror Tuttle and addressed her request to be excused. Juror Tuttle indicated that her emotional make-up was such that she could not continue deliberating. She stated that she was becoming physically ill. She responded affirmatively when asked if she felt that the other members were set on one side and she was set on the other side, and she added that she did not feel like the jury had a choice as to the decision to make. Juror Tuttle did not think that she would be able to follow the instructions the court had given the jury, and she thought that the jury misunderstood the instructions. Juror Tuttle indicated that she thought either she or the rest of the jurors were confused about the instructions, but she did not feel that she could discuss the matter with the other jurors or that submitting a question to the court would help. Juror Tuttle stated that in her mind she was unable to serve as a juror. The district court concluded that Juror Tuttle was unable to serve and dismissed her. After Juror Tuttle left the room, defense counsel stated: For the record, I would like to voice my objection to releasing of Mrs. Tuttle. I don't think, based upon the responses to the questions that were propounded to her by both the  both Mr. Debenham and the Court and myself, that there was sufficient information to show that she was unable to serve. I think what Ms. Tuttle  based upon what  My understanding of what she said is that she didn't  did not want to serve; she had her own convictions and she may have had some questions or something of that nature but there was nothing about her appearance, to me, that indicated that she was physically unable to serve, the more so that  and moreover, that she did not want to serve. She did not want to make that difficult decision. That would be my objection. The State responded that Juror Tuttle did appear physically distressed and that she is  simply wouldn't make a decision even though it appears that she knows what decision has to be made in her mind, she will not make  that opinion. The trial judge stated: I feel that she did fully understand that [she had the prerogative to not make a decision] and that  and that she simply, in her own words, was  was unable to serve, and there was an adamancy in her demeanor and her voice and her responses; and, for those reasons, Court found her to be unable to serve. An alternate juror was then selected. The court instructed the jury: [Y]ou may now resume your deliberations; and Ms. Tuttle is unable to continue and Ms. Heller is now a member of the jury with a full voice in discussions and a vote on the issues. The jury retired to the jury room at 2:25 p.m. At 3:15 p.m., the jury presented a question and took a break before resuming its deliberations at 3:50 p.m. At 4:33 p.m., the following question was presented: Kathy Widner [the juror who had previously requested to be excused] does not feel she can carry out her duties in this matter and respectfully requests to be excused. Before the court responded to this communication, the jury informed the court it had reached a verdict. The jury found on both counts of murder two aggravating circumstances which outweighed any mitigating circumstances and recommended that the hard 40 sentence be imposed on both counts. The jury was polled, and each juror, including Juror Widner, indicated he or she was satisfied with the verdicts. Stafford contends that excusing Juror Tuttle was an abuse of discretion because there was not reasonable cause to excuse her. He also suggests that her comments indicate that the jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision and therefore the court should have dismissed the jury and imposed a life sentence with parole eligibility in 15 years. Moreover, Stafford argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury after impaneling the alternate juror. A defendant has no right to any particular juror or to the original 12 jurors who are impaneled to hear a case. State v. Stallings, 246 Kan. 642, Syl. ¶ 1, 792 P.2d 1013 (1990); State v. Haislip, 237 Kan. 461, Syl. ¶ 1, 701 P.2d 909, cert. denied 474 U.S. 1022 (1985); State v. Heck, 8 Kan. App.2d 496, 504, 661 P.2d 798 (1983). Likewise, a defendant has no right to have the same 12 jurors who determine his or her guilt also determine whether to recommend the hard 40 sentence. K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4624(2). This court has not considered the discharge of a juror from hard 40 deliberations after the deliberations have begun. No statute deals specifically with replacing a juror with an alternate juror after hard 40 deliberations have begun. However, K.S.A. 22-3412 does provide for discharging a juror and substituting an alternate juror during deliberations. Subsection (3) provides in part: If the alternate jurors are not discharged on final submission of the case and if any regular juror shall be discharged from jury service in any such action prior to the jury reaching its verdict, the court shall draw the name of an alternate juror who shall replace the juror so discharged and be subject to the same rules and regulations as though such juror had been selected as one of the original jurors. Here, there were two alternate jurors impaneled prior to trial. They were not discharged upon final submission of the guilt determination phase of trial nor were they discharged upon final submission on the hard 40 determination phase. Nothing in K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4624 et seq. prohibits substituting a juror during the sentencing phase after deliberations have begun. The provision in K.S.A. 22-3412(3) for replacing a juror thus is not limited to juries determining guilt; that statute also applies to a jury determining whether to recommend the hard 40 sentence. Likewise, case law concerning substitution of a juror during the guilt determination phase applies to substitution of a juror during the hard 40 determination phase. Stafford argues that the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury after the alternate juror was substituted. The court instructed the jury, [Y]ou may now resume your deliberations; and Ms. Tuttle is unable to continue and Ms. Heller is now a member of the jury with a full voice in discussions and a vote on the issues. Stafford failed to object to this instruction and thus is barred from raising a claim of error on appeal. In any event, this instruction does not amount to reversible error. Stafford points out that in Haislip, 237 Kan. at 469, the trial court after replacing a juror instructed the jury to begin its deliberations anew; this court stated: This instruction was necessary as a defendant has a right to a verdict reached only after full participation of all the jurors who ultimately return the verdict. After replacing a juror, the trial court should instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew. Though the jury here was instructed to resume its deliberations rather than begin anew its deliberations, the instruction given by the trial court did inform the jury that the substitute juror was to fully participate in discussions and vote on the verdict. This instruction, while not recommended, does not amount to reversible error, particularly in light of what follows. The trial court's excusal of Juror Tuttle is troublesome. This court has stated the standard of review of a trial court's substitution of a juror after deliberations during the guilt determination phase have begun: The decision to discharge a juror and substitute an alternate juror lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Stallings, 246 Kan. 642, Syl. ¶ 1; Haislip, 237 Kan. 461, Syl. ¶ 3. The defendant has a burden of showing substantial prejudice before an appellate court will find an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Stallings, 246 Kan. at 646. Dismissing one juror and replacing that juror with an alternate is not an abuse of discretion where `reasonable cause' exists. Stallings, 246 Kan. 642, Syl. ¶ 2. See Haislip, 237 Kan. 461, Syl. ¶ 2. In Stallings, a juror was discharged because of religious convictions. The juror did not indicate his religious concerns during voir dire. Although he indicated he was the deciding vote, he also indicated that he could not make a judgment because of his religious beliefs. This court found that there was reasonable cause to discharge the juror and that the defendant had failed to show substantial prejudice; thus, there was no abuse of discretion. 246 Kan. at 647-48. In Haislip, a juror was excused without examination. The juror wrote a note requesting to be excused indicating that she was not the deciding vote but that she could not handle the fact that it was a murder trial. The trial court discharged the juror for incapacity, finding that she was `simply not up to the stress of a decision.' 237 Kan. at 467. The defendant claimed prejudice because a hung jury might have resulted had the juror not been discharged. This court rejected that argument because the defendant had no right to the original 12 jurors impaneled. After reviewing portions of the juror's voir dire examination, this court went on to find no abuse of discretion in discharging the juror. This case differs somewhat from prior cases in which a juror has been replaced. For a jury determining guilt, a hung jury results in the defendant being neither convicted nor acquitted; a hung jury leaves the case undecided and subject to retrial. In the hard 40 context, a hung jury is not an undecided jury. By statute (K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4624[5]), a hung jury results in a sentence of imprisonment for life with eligibility for parole. Thus, to replace a juror who may cause a jury to be unable to reach a unanimous vote to recommend the hard 40 sentence is to deprive the defendant of a verdict. Our prior cases holding that a possible hung jury is insufficient to show prejudice are not applicable to hard 40 proceedings. The trial court cannot replace a juror during hard 40 sentencing deliberations unless it has reasonable cause and makes findings of a valid legal reason to excuse the juror other than the juror's reluctance to recommend the hard 40 sentence. Here, the trial court made a finding that the juror is at this point unable to further serve. The record and findings do not set forth an adequate reason to justify excusing the juror in this case. Defendant's sentences are vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing. The hard 40 sentence may not be imposed on the first-degree murder charges.