Opinion ID: 2634934
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Relevant Case Law

Text: Two years after section 1381 was amended to include speedy sentencing rights for a defendant serving a state prison commitment who has pending a criminal proceeding wherein he or she remains to be sentenced, an appellate court considered the case of defendant Rudman, who, while on felony probation in Orange County with imposition of his sentence suspended, was convicted of a felony in another county and was imprisoned as a result of that felony conviction. ( Rudman v. Superior Court (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 22, 24 [111 Cal.Rptr. 249].) Rudman requested a hearing on his probation revocation in Orange County within 90 days under section 1381, but he did not get one. ( Rudman, at pp. 23-25.) Rejecting the People's claim that the defendant was required to comply with section 1203.2a instead of section 1381, Rudman reasoned that a defendant now has the option as to which procedure he wishes to follow. Under section 1381, he may demand sentencing at which he may appear and defend, in person and with counsel. Under the provisions of section 1203.2a, he may choose to waive his right to be present and represented by counsel and allow the court to impose sentence in his absence and without his being represented by counsel. ( Rudman, at p. 27.) Rudman explained that, although both sections contemplate speedy sentencing, they do not conflict with each other because they `were designed for different purposes.' ( Ibid. ) It concluded that, [s]ince Rudman was not given a hearing under section 1381 within 90 days of his demand and he did not consent to any delay, the violation of probation hearing must be dismissed. ( Ibid. ) The court issued a writ of mandate compelling the superior court to set aside its order revoking probation. ( Id. at pp. 27-28.) Since Rudman, most appellate cases considering the issue have agreed that a defendant placed on probation with imposition of sentence suspended and then incarcerated on a second charge may demand speedy sentencing in a pending probation revocation proceeding under either section 1381 or section 1203.2a. (See, e.g., People v. Johnson (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 510, 514 [240 Cal.Rptr. 748] [section 1381 provides an alternative procedure [to section 1203.2a] under which a probationer imprisoned for a subsequent offense may assert a right to prompt disposition of the earlier offense]; People v. Ruster (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 865 [115 Cal.Rptr. 572] [same], both disapproved on other grounds in In re Hoddinott (1996) 12 Cal.4th 992, 1005 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 706, 911 P.2d 1381].) The majority in People v. Broughton (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 307 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 161] ( Broughton ) disagreed with Rudman when it considered whether probationer Broughton was entitled to demand speedy sentencing under section 1381.5. While on felony probation with the imposition of sentence suspended in state court on two cases, Broughton violated her probation and began serving a federal commitment. While in federal custody, she filed with the district attorney a request for speedy sentencing under section 1381.5. Once she was released from federal custody, she moved to dismiss her state criminal actions based on the district attorney's failure to comply with section 1381.5. The trial court denied the motion and reinstated its previous orders of probation with a county jail condition. The Court of Appeal majority affirmed, holding that the speedy sentencing provisions of section 1381.5 apply only to defendants who have not been ... afforded an initial sentencing hearing following conviction, not probationers awaiting a probation revocation hearing. ( Broughton, at p. 311, italics added.) The majority acknowledged that, if the trial court at a sentencing hearing suspends imposition of sentence and places the defendant on probation, the defendant has not yet been sentenced ( ibid. ), but it reasoned that section 1381.5 was intended to apply only to persons whose cases never had been reduced to a final, appealable order ( Broughton, at p. 322). Noting that an order granting probation is deemed to be `a final judgment' from which an appeal may be taken ( id. at p. 320), Broughton concluded that a defendant who has been placed on probation has already been brought before the court `for sentencing,' ( id. at p. 317) and does not remain to be sentenced within the meaning of section 1381 or section 1381.5 ( Broughton, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp. 319-320). (6) In defendant's case, the Court of Appeal agreed with Rudman and criticized the reasoning of Broughton's majority. For the reasons stated below, we agree with the Court of Appeal and with Rudman that (1) a defendant placed on probation with imposition of sentence suspended who is subsequently imprisoned on another charge may opt to demand speedy sentencing under section 1381 rather than under section 1203.2a, and (2) the consequence for the probationary court's failure to meet the 90-day time limit set forth in section 1381 is only dismissal of the probation revocation proceedings, and not the dismissal of the convictions underlying the grant of probation.