Opinion ID: 1554436
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Opinion regarding the ultrasound.

Text: ¶ 43. Dr. Fuselier also testified that Dr. Mills had breached the standard of care by failing to perform an ultrasound on May 27, 2002. Dr. Morrison testified that the standard of care did not require Dr. Mills to perform an ultrasound. Thus, the trial court was presented with contradictory opinions from two qualified experts. This presents what has been described above as the classic battle of the experts as to the ultrasound. ¶ 44. At the Daubert hearing on Dr. Mills's motion for summary judgment, Dr. Mills's counsel stated: Now, it is contended that on that occasion Dr. Mills, even though he performed a pelvic exam, he should have performed an ultrasound. That is not before the Court today. That is a matter in dispute and while certainly it will be our position and our expert's testimony that that was not a deviation from the standard of care, that does come under rival opinions of experts and is not a subject of a Daubert motion. Dr. Mills, while denying that failure to perform the ultrasound constituted negligence, argues that the unrebutted scientific literature clearly establishes that it would have made no difference, that is, the pregnancy could not have been prolonged. However, Dr. Mills does not allege that the scientific literature contradicts Dr. Fuselier's opinion. ¶ 45. Dr. Mills's position is that, because Hill's baby could not have been saved, performing the ultrasound would have made no difference. However, this argument overlooks Hill's claims of damages which are unrelated to her wrongful-death claim. We glean from the complaint, the discovery, and Hill's presentation at oral argument that she claims Dr. Mills's failure to perform an ultrasound and discover that she was still pregnant deprived her of her right (despite the insurmountable odds) to try everything remotely possible to save her pregnancy. She also argues that Dr. Mills's failure to perform the ultrasound further deprived her of the option of choosing a less traumatic method of terminating the pregnancy, and that the events which occurred on the way to, and in, the emergency room on June 8, 2002, caused her avoidable mental anguish and emotional distress. ¶ 46. Specifically, she claims thatbelieving she was no longer pregnantshe vomited blood and was bleeding from her nose, and that she feared for her life on June 8. She claims that, while waiting for treatment in the emergency room (as opposed to the delivery suite in the hospital), she delivered a live, nineteen-week fetus, weighing 205 grams, and that she suffered mental anguish and emotional distress associated with being mentally and emotionally unprepared to deliver a live baby, only to have it die minutes later. Her theory is that, had Dr. Mills told her she was still pregnant on May 27, 2002even if he had told her there was no hope for the pregnancyshe would have had the option of preparing herself for the termination of the pregnancy and, even if she had chosen not to do so, she would have been prepared for what was to occur in the emergency room. ¶ 47. Without commenting on the merits of her claims, and given what was presented to the trial judge at the Daubert hearing, [10] we find Hill has articulated a cause of action for negligence which is separate and apart from her wrongful-death claim. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial judge committed reversible error in holding that Dr. Fuselier could not testify that Dr. Mills had breached the standard of care by failing to perform an ultrasound. Consequently, the trial judge erred in granting summary judgment to Dr. Mills on this issue.
¶ 48. The final issue asserted by Hill concerns the matter regarding the trial judge's failure to recuse himself. Hill asserts thatunder Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 16A, [11] Rule 1.15 of the Uniform Circuit and County Court Rules, [12] and Cannon 3(E) of the Code of Judicial Conduct [13] the trial judge should have recused himself. Hill further asserts that the trial judge should have recused himself because his father had been a practicing physician in the area, and had at one point practiced at King's Daughters. ¶ 49. This Court has held that the decision to recuse or not is one left to the sound discretion of the judge. Collins v. Joshi, 611 So.2d 898, 901 (Miss.1992) (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Evans, 553 So.2d 1117, 1119 (Miss.1989)). The test set forth in determining whether a judge should recuse is: Would a reasonable person, knowing all of the circumstances, harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality? Copeland v. Copeland, 904 So.2d 1066, 1071 (Miss.2004) (quoting In re Conservatorship of Bardwell, 849 So.2d 1240, 1247 (Miss.2003); Bredemeier v. Jackson, 689 So.2d 770, 774 (Miss.1997)). ¶ 50. Hill has failed to produce any evidence regarding either allegation of impropriety. This Court has more than once held that the party requesting the judge's recusal must produce evidence that would demonstrate a reasonable doubt as to a judge's impartiality. Id. ( quoting Dodson v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 839 So.2d 530, 533 (Miss.2003)). ¶ 51. Hill produced no evidence that the court administrator had any material input into the court's judicial decisions. The relationship between a court administrator and a judge differs from one to the next, and Hill submitted no evidence that the relationship between the trial judge in this case and his court administrator was anything more than a typical employer/employee relationship, or that his court administrator influenced his judicial decisions. ¶ 52. Additionally, Hill argues that recusal was necessary because the trial judge's father's had a previous professional relationship with King's Daughters. Hill argues that the trial judge's family connection to the local medical community could make a reasonable person believe bias exists. However, at the time of the hearing, King's Daughters was no longer a named defendant in the suit against Dr. Mills. [14] In addition, the trial judge's father had retired from practicing medicine in 1998, and Hill failed to show any reason why a reasonable person could see a potential bias after ten years. ¶ 53. For these reasons, it is the opinion of this Court that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Hill's motion for recusal.