Opinion ID: 1852109
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the gwin firm's suit for breach of a contingent fee contract is a suit at law, to which poole is entitled to trial by jury.

Text: ¶ 9. We disagree with Poole's characterization of the law firm's claim as being one for breach of contract. It is a settled rule that because of the special relationship of trust and confidence between attorney and client, the client may terminate the relationship at any time, with or without cause. 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 220, at 387-90 (1980). A client's discharge of his attorney is not a breach of contract because it is a basic term of the contract, implied by law into it by reason of the special relationship between the contracting parties, that the client may terminate the contract at will. Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal.3d 784, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385, 494 P.2d 9, 13 (1972). The law firm may recover the reasonable value of its services upon termination of its employment under the contingent fee contract with Poole. See Kroff v. Larson, 167 Cal. App.3d 857, 860, 213 Cal.Rptr. 526, 527 (1985); Wegner v. Arnold, 305 Ill.App.3d 689, 238 Ill.Dec. 1001, 713 N.E.2d 247, 250 (1999); Clerk of Superior Court of Guilford County v. Guilford Builders Supply Co., 87 N.C.App. 386, 361 S.E.2d 115, 118 (1987). Because a court is called upon to decide what reasonable compensation might be and because the amount sought is not liquidated, it is appropriate that a chancery court, sitting in equity, make these determinations. ¶ 10. Many jurisdictions hold that a contingent fee contract may amount to an equitable assignment of a prospective settlement. See Annotation, Agreement for Contingent Fee as Assignment of Interest in Judgment, 19 A.L.R. 99; Annotation, Attorney's Contract for Contingent Fee as Amounting to an Equitable Assignment of Interest in Cause of Action, or Proceeds of Settlement Thereof, 124 A.L.R. 1508, 1509 (1940). See also De Winter v. Thomas, 34 App.D.C. 80, 84 (1909); Lewsader v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., 296 Ill.App.3d 169, 230 Ill.Dec. 560, 694 N.E.2d 191, 196-99 (1998); Clerk of Superior Court of Guilford County, 361 S.E.2d at 117. This Court has held that any order or assignment, oral or written, to pay out of a particular fund ... does operate as an equitable assignment. Anaconda Aluminum Co. v. Sharp, 243 Miss. 9, 136 So.2d 585 (1962) (quoting Annotation, 32 A.L.R. 955). The employment contract provides that Poole assign[s] and set[s] over ... [a percentage of the] proceeds thereof recovered to the law firm. Therefore, the employment contract creates an equitable assignment under Mississippi law. Chancery courts have jurisdiction over actions to enforce equitable assignments. Billy G. Bridges & James W. Shelson, Griffith's Mississippi Chancery Practice, § 24, at 19 (2000). ¶ 11. With respect to Poole's claimed violation of right to jury trial, there is no right to trial by jury in chancery court. [T]he Constitution and the rules pertaining to jury trial have no effect in Chancery Court unless a particular statute requires a jury. Id. § 597 at 438 (footnote omitted). See also Tillotson v. Anders, 551 So.2d 212, 214 (Miss.1989). ¶ 12. We find that the contingent fee agreement created an equitable assignment to the Gwin firm of a portion of Poole's interest in Drouet's Estate, that the chancery court has jurisdiction over this matter, and that the Gwin firm's claims are not based on breach of contract.