Opinion ID: 2048220
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trauma Fund

Text: The final charge which the appellate court determined was subject to the presentencing incarceration credit is the $100 Trauma Fund charge. The statutory authority for this charge is found in section 5-9-1.1(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(b) (West 2004)), which provides as follows: (b) In addition to any penalty imposed under subsection (a) of this Section [which mandates imposition of a fine at least equivalent to the street value of the drugs seized], a fine of $100 shall be levied by the court, the proceeds of which shall be collected by the Circuit Clerk and remitted to the State Treasurer under Section 27.6 of the Clerks of Courts Act for deposit into the Trauma Center Fund for distribution as provided under Section 3.225 of the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(b) (West 2004). There is no question that the $100 Trauma Fund charge is a fine. Not only is it called a fine, it is also referred to as an addition to a penalty, and it is clearly not intended to reimburse the state for any expense of prosecution or investigation. Moreover, section 5-9-1.1(b) does not contain any provision to the effect that the Trauma Fund charge is not subject to setoff. The State concedes all of these points. Nevertheless, the State contends that the legislature did not intend for this fine to be subject to reduction for time served prior to sentencing. The State bases its argument on the reference to section 27.6 of the Clerks of Courts Act. That section provides in pertinent part as follows: (c) In addition to any other fines and court costs assessed by the courts, any person convicted for a violation of [ inter alia, the Illinois Controlled Substances Act] shall pay an additional fee of $100 to the clerk of the circuit court. This amount, less 2½% that shall be used to defray administrative costs incurred by the clerk, shall be remitted by the clerk to the Treasurer within 60 days after receipt for deposit into the Trauma Center Fund. This additional fee of $100 shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing. (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 105/27.6(c) (West 2004). The State contends that section 27.6(c) of the Clerk of Courts Act, along with its explicit direction that the $100 charge is not subject to reduction for presentencing incarceration, is incorporated by reference into section 5-9-1.1(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections. In two recently published decisions the appellate court has agreed with this argument, and concluded that the $100 Trauma Center Fund charge is not subject to offset for presentencing incarceration. See People v. Jones, 366 Ill. App.3d 666, 304 Ill.Dec. 114, 852 N.E.2d 364 (2006); People v. Squire, 365 Ill. App.3d 842, 303 Ill.Dec. 189, 851 N.E.2d 87 (2006). Defendant raises a compelling response to this analysis, however. Defendant notes that sections 5-9-1.1(c) and 5-9-1.10 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(c), 5-9-1.10 (West 2004)) not only refer to section 27.6 of the Clerks of Courts Act but also expressly state that the charges assessed therein are exempt from presentencing credit offset. Defendant argues that to conclude that the reference to section 27.6 of the Clerks of Courts Act is sufficient to preclude offset would render the anti-offset language in these other statutes redundant and superfluous. The State responds, essentially, that these other statutes are irrelevant because the legislature's intent is perfectly clear. We find defendant's argument convincing. Sections 5-9-1.1(c) and 5-9-1.10 not only provide that the charges assessed therein are to be remitted pursuant to section 27.6 of the Clerks of Courts Act but also explicitly state that the charges are not subject to offset. If the legislature intended the mere reference to the Clerks of Courts Act to suffice to exempt the charges from offset, as the State argues, then the anti-offset language contained in sections 5-9-1.1(c) and 5-9-1.10 would be entirely redundant and superfluous. We reject the State's contention that we should ignore this fact; our rule that we construe statutes as a whole is intended to avoid just such a situation as the defendant brings to our attention, where one possible construction would render another statutory provision meaningless or superfluous. See Jones, 214 Ill.2d at 193, 291 Ill.Dec. 663, 824 N.E.2d 239; Bonaguro, 158 Ill.2d at 397, 199 Ill.Dec. 659, 634 N.E.2d 712. This is not to say that defendant's construction is clearly correct; his argument that the Trauma Fund charge imposed by section 5-9-1.1(b) is subject to offset would seem to render meaningless the anti-offset language in the Clerks of Courts Act. Neither construction is perfect, and it is not clear which construction the legislature would prefer. In such circumstances, we are guided by the rule that ambiguity in criminal statutes must be resolved in that manner which favors the accused. Davis, 199 Ill.2d at 140, 262 Ill.Dec. 721, 766 N.E.2d 641; Brooks, 158 Ill.2d at 264, 198 Ill.Dec. 851, 633 N.E.2d 692. Accordingly, we conclude that the Trauma Fund charge is subject to setoff. We invite the legislature to clarify this ambiguity. Unless and until it does so, however, we must agree with the appellate court that the Trauma Fund charge is subject to setoff. To the extent that the decisions in Jones, 366 Ill.App.3d 666, 304 Ill.Dec. 114, 852 N.E.2d 364, and Squire, 365 Ill.App.3d 842, 303 Ill.Dec. 189, 851 N.E.2d 87, conflict with our holding, they are overruled.