Opinion ID: 2159212
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Identification Testimony of Diana Bossard

Text: Defendant challenges the trial court's decision to admit the testimony of Diana Bossard, a surprise witness who came forward with identification testimony just prior to the close of the State's case. Ms. Bossard's story was that she had been at the Surprise Store in the Morris County Mall during the second or third week in October 1982 at about 8:45 p.m. While there, she saw an unkempt-looking older man talking in a loud voice to a young Oriental girl with long hair. The man and the young girl were on opposite sides of a clothing rack; the girl was staring straight ahead into the Mall while the man was trying to impress this girl by talking of dirt bikes, motorcycles, racing, something of that nature. The man, she recollected, had on a tan jacket, vinyl or thick leather, and jeans, and was tall, had light brown to dirty blond, and sharp features (his cheekbones were high, like his cheeks were sunken. He was balding around the forehead). Ms. Bossard identified the girl as Amie, and the man as the defendant. On cross-examination, Ms. Bossard acknowledged having seen pictures of both the victim and defendant in the newspaper, having read about the case in the newspapers, and having only recently come forward. She also admitted that her observation of the man and girl was a quick look or a glance, and stated, on voir dire, that she would be surprised [if] he had a beard and that she had learned the previous winter that he was in prison for murder. Before the trial court permitted Ms. Bossard to testify, defense counsel argued that her testimony should be inadmissible because (1) she admitted that the observation was a quick glance, and (2) she admitted having been exposed to the mass hysteria surrounding the death of Amie Hoffman and to the publicity surrounding defendant's arrest. In fact, defendant argued that but for Ms. Bossard's exposure to the publicity, she would not have identified defendant as the man in the Surprise Store. The trial court found that there was no improper conduct on behalf of the State in producing the surprise witness. Defendant does not now challenge that finding. The trial court stated that just because a witness shows up with information late in the proceedings does not mean that that witness must automatically be barred. The court then ruled on whether there was anything suggestible about Ms. Bossard's testimony: The second [issue] is whether or not there is anything suggestible about her testimony. It appears to me, by any measure of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, clear and convincing; any lesser burden of proof, that there has been nothing which has been done externally that would be suggestible, that would be  that would make her testimony influenced or changed by outside sources or forces.         Now, that is not anything which approaches suggestibility which would tend to taint any evidence presented as to identification.... It is certainly rare, in the absence of a finding of suggestibility, the violation of a person's constitutional rights, that identification and the value of that evidence should not be submitted to the jury, would not be submitted to the jury for their ultimate evaluation. Defendant now claims that the admission of this testimony violated his due-process rights because Ms. Bossard's admitted exposure to pretrial publicity  including photographs of the victim and defendant  was so suggestive as to taint her recollection. The standards for assessing whether pretrial encounters with a defendant will taint the testimony of an eyewitness are set forth in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed. 2d 140 (1977): [R]eliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.... The factors to be considered ... include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal ... the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainly demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself. [ Id. at 114, 97 S.Ct. at 2253, 53 L.Ed. 2d at 154.] Ms. Bossard's in-court identification of the defendant was not the product of any impermissibly suggestive law-enforcement procedures. Rather, the issue before us is whether the pictures she saw of the defendant in the newspaper tainted her recollection of the incident in the Surprise Store. In other words, could seeing the defendant's picture in the newspaper have caused Ms. Bossard mistakenly to identify defendant as the man she saw interacting with Amie Hoffman at the Surprise Store? An affirmative response to that question would certainly have affected the reliability of Ms. Bossard's testimony. Also of potential harm to her credibility was the fact that she took months to come forward with her identification. We believe, however, that it was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances to commit the issue of Ms. Bossard's credibility to the jury: We are content to rely upon the good sense and judgment of American juries, for evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some questionable feature. [ Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, 432 U.S. at 116, 97 S.Ct. at 2254, 53 L.Ed. 2d at 155.] Thus it was proper for the trial court to treat the issue as one of weight rather than admissibility. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making that evidentiary ruling.