Opinion ID: 210350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Limited Degree of Success Factor

Text: First, Jacobsen asserts that the Board erred in concluding that he only enjoyed a nominal degree of success. Jacobsen argues that he asked for and was restored all of the military leave days to which he was entitled, namely two. Since he obtained all he requested, Jacobsen asserts, his degree of success is actually entire. Resolution of this issue centers on an examination of the claim Jacobsen presented to the Board. As noted above, Jacobsen failed to allege any specific nonwork days on which he was improperly charged military leave. Rather, Jacobsen merely alleged that he may have been forced to use other leave to fulfill his military obligations over a seven-year period. Because the record is devoid of any specific dates Jacobsen actually engaged in military duty (except for the lone June to July 2000 pay period record), we reasonably construe the claim as alleging that the agency improperly charged him military leave for each year he was obligated to serve. Assuming then that in each year from 1995 to 2001 Jacobsen performed two consecutive weeks of military duty, at least two non-work days (representing the intervening weekend) were improperly charged per year. The record shows, however, 2007-3006 7 that in all seven of the years Jacobsen served, the agency only once improperly charged him with military leave in violation of USERRA, i.e., two days, not fourteen days. Because Jacobsen’s claim is reasonably construed as claiming at least one error per year for each of the seven years he served and the agency only improperly charged him military leave in one on those years, the Board did not err in finding that Jacobsen’s success in relation to the relief he sought was nominal, constituting one-seventh of the implicit claim. Further, because Jacobsen does not contend that the Board’s reliance on Farrar is in error, we hold for the purposes of this opinion that Jacobsen’s degree of success is an appropriate consideration in the Board’s discretion. As such, we must affirm the Board’s denial of attorney fees based upon Jacobsen’s limited success on appeal. B. Failure to Utilize Agency’s Administrative Process Factor Next, Jacobsen argues that the Board erred by considering the fact that Jacobsen chose to file a complaint with the Board rather than go though the agency’s internal administrative process for making retroactive military leave adjustments. We agree that the Board’s reliance on the fact that Jacobsen could have achieved the same result though the administrative process as he did before the Board is in error because USERRA contains no requirement that a petitioner pursue, much less exhaust, his or her administrative remedies prior to bringing an appeal before the Board. Indeed, Congress provided Jacobsen with the right to file his appeal by enacting section 4324(b)(1) which provides that “[a] person may submit a complaint against a Federal executive agency or the Office of Personnel Management . . . directly to the Merit 2007-3006 8 Systems Protection Board if that person has chosen not to apply to the Secretary for assistance . . . .” 38 U.S.C. § 4324(b)(1); see also Butterbaugh, 336 F.3d at 1336; Yates v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 145 F.3d 1480, 1483 & n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Nevertheless, since we hold that the Board properly found that Jacobsen claimed much more than he was awarded and therefore obtained limited success on his claim, the Board’s reliance on the second factor is harmless error.