Opinion ID: 1669598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Defendant's Conduct was Culpable

Text: The third factor that we must consider is whether Royal's failure to respond to Crowne's complaint was the result of the former's culpable conduct. In Kirtland, we defined a culpable party as one that conducted itself wilfully or in bad faith, further explaining that [n]egligence by itself is insufficient. Kirtland, 524 So.2d at 607. Willful conduct and bad faith are characterized by incessant and flagrant disrespect for court rules, deliberate and knowing disregard for judicial authority, or intentional nonresponsiveness. 524 So.2d at 608. This is the definition of culpability for purposes of setting aside a default judgment under Rule 55(c). In the case before us, Royal has presented evidence, which Crowne has not challenged, that the complaint initiating Crowne's action against it arrived in Royal's legal department and that it was sent via a robotic mail system to Thomas Crowley. Crowley was the individual assigned the task of contacting lawyers to ensure that complaints initiating legal proceedings were answered. That other people at Royal may have seen the complaint before Crowley would have seen it is irrelevant, because they would simply have assumed that Crowley received the complaint and that he was making appropriate arrangements for a defense. For some unknown reason, Crowley never received the complaint, which had been sent via the robotic mail system. However, once Crowley received notice that a default judgment had been entered against Royal, he immediately contacted a lawyer to involve the company in the case. We hold that Royal has presented sufficient evidence indicating that its conduct was in no way culpable, but was, at worst, negligent.