Opinion ID: 853931
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Back to Calvary

Text: In this case, the trial court applied controlling precedent from this Court, Calvary Baptist Church, 522 N.E.2d 371, in granting summary judgment for the defendants. Hanson, 682 N.E.2d at 1316. We now choose to accept the invitations of the Courts of Appeals [4] and revisit the rule of Calvary.
As a general rule, a member of an unincorporated association [5] may not sue the association itself for injuries suffered as a result of the tortious acts of the association or its members. Calvary, 522 N.E.2d at 374. The rule rests upon the doctrine of imputed liability. Under the theory of imputed liability: [M]embers of an unincorporated association are engaged in a joint enterprise. The negligence of each member in the prosecution of that enterprise is imputable to each and every other member so that the member who has suffered damages through the tortious conduct of another member of the association may not recover from the association for such damage. It would be akin to the person suing himself as each member becomes both a principal and an agent as to all other members for the actions of the group itself. Id. at 374-75. The imputed liability doctrine requires that the association's membership is engaged in a joint enterprise. 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 158 (1966). The requirement that the members of an unincorporated association be engaged in a joint enterprise does not mean, however, that at the time of the accident at issue the members must be engaged in some specific group activity, such as repairing the church's roof. Biereichel, 693 N.E.2d at 637. This requirement is generally satisfied in the church congregation setting in that the congregation's members are thought to be engaged in the joint enterprise of worship and/or maintaining a premises for worshiping. See Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Liability for Personal Injury or Death Allegedly Caused by Defect in Church Premises, 8 A.L.R.5th 1, 31-35, 1992 WL 767605 (1992) (citing cases involving church member-plaintiffs engaged in the joint enterprise of maintaining the building in which they worshipped, and engaged in the joint enterprise of worshipping God in fellowship together). Applying the common law rule, we held in Calvary that a church member who had been injured when he fell off a ladder while repairing the church's roof could not sue the church in its own name. 522 N.E.2d at 372. The plaintiff in Calvary argued that the common law doctrine, which insulated unincorporated associations from suit by their members, was based on the historical and obsolete idea that such associations were not legal entities, and that the passage of Indiana Trial Rules 17(B) and (E) permitted suits such as his. [6] Id. The Court rejected this argument, noting that Rules 17(B) and (E) were directed to the suability of unincorporated associations as parties and did not change the substantive rule of nonliability of unincorporated associations to their members. [7] Id. at 373.
While the common law rule is followed by many American jurisdictions, [8] several states have recognized an exception to the rule, the wisdom of which this Court acknowledged but declined to adopt in Calvary. There, the Court stated: Although we recognize the wisdom of applying an exception to the general rule in the case of large unincorporated associations such as labor unions having a hierarchy of structure that drastically changes the relationship of membership to association and the control that a member has in its affairs, we find it clearly demonstrated that no such question was presented in regard to the Calvary Baptist Church and its members. 522 N.E.2d at 375. The establishment of an exception to the general rule is frequently attributed to the California case of Marshall v. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, 57 Cal.2d 781, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211, 371 P.2d 987 (Cal.1962), in which the California Supreme Court allowed a union member to bring a tort action against the union. The court said that the justifications underlying the traditional rule no longer represented the reality of certain modern associations, [9] such as some labor unions. In that instance, the member and the union are distinct, with the union representing the common or group interests of its members, as distinguished from their personal or private interest. Structurally and functionally, a labor union is an institution which involves more than the private or personal interests of its members. It represents organized, institutional activity as contrasted with wholly individual activity. . . . The union engages in a multitude of business and other official concerted activities, none of which can be said to be the private undertakings of its members. Id. at 989 (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701-02, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944)). The court concluded that the common law rule barring suits by members against their associations should not apply when: 1) the unincorporated association has a legal existence separate from its members; and 2) the members do not exercise control over the operations of the association. See id. at 990-91. While the Marshall decision limited its holding to the case of labor unions, id. at 991 n. 1, the court later extended the application of the exception to different types of unincorporated associations that satisfy the Marshall criteria. White v. Cox, 17 Cal.App.3d 824, 95 Cal.Rptr. 259 (1971). In the present case, the Court of Appeals found that Hanson's relation to St. Luke's warranted the application of the Marshall exception. After examining facts such as the size of the church's congregation, the hierarchy of the church's government, and the existence of a set of by-laws guiding the church's decisionmaking, the court concluded: that the reasons supporting the general rule, including the prevention of collusive lawsuits and the avoidance of suits by a member against herself, do not apply in this case. Thus, we believe that the time is ripe to apply an exception to the general rule and to permit Hanson to maintain her claim against St. Luke's. Hanson, 682 N.E.2d at 1320.
Beyond applying an exception to the common law rule, several jurisdictions have chosen to abolish or abrogate the rule entirely. [10] Some of these jurisdictions have chosen to abolish the common law rule by statute. For example, in Crocker v. Barr, 305 S.C. 406, 409 S.E.2d 368 (S.C.1991), the Supreme Court of South Carolina allowed a church member to sue the church for injuries sustained when he fell from some ceiling joists to the floor below while attempting to repair the church's sound system. The court based its decision on a statutory framework, S.C.Code Ann. § 33-55-210 and subsequent sections, which the court said allowed unincorporated associations to be held liable for injuries sustained by a member-plaintiff while performing voluntary labor, and caused by the negligence of fellow members. See Crocker, 409 S.E.2d at 370-71. [11] The court considered important the fact that the statute separated the liability of the church from that of the membership, as well as the belief that the doctrine of imputed negligence would discourage volunteerism by potentially barring suits by volunteers against associations. [12] Id. at 371. The court posed the rhetorical question: Why should a . . . member be precluded from suing an association in tort when a paid workman would be allowed to maintain an action for the very same injury? Id. Other states have also relied upon a statutory scheme abolishing the common law rule to allow these suits. In Furek v. University of Delaware, 594 A.2d 506 (Del.1991), the Supreme Court of Delaware allowed a suit by a fraternity pledge against a fraternity, based on a state statute authorizing suits against unincorporated associations and judgments against association property. In Buteas v. Raritan Lodge No. 61, 248 N.J.Super. 351, 591 A.2d 623 (N.J.Super.A.D.1991), a New Jersey court relied on a state statute which modified the common law to allow a suit by a lodge member against the association. The court stated: [T]he imputed negligence doctrine barring suit by a member against the association itself is based upon an obsolete legal fiction whose time has long since passed. Buteas, 591 A.2d at 628. Finally, in Tanner v. Columbus Lodge No. 11, Loyal Order of Moose, 44 Ohio St.2d 49, 73 O.O.2d 233, 337 N.E.2d 625 (Ohio 1975), the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a state statute overruled previous cases which applied the common law rule. In at least one jurisdiction, a court abrogated the common law rule without a statutory directive. In Cox v. Thee Evergreen Church, 836 S.W.2d 167 (Tex.1992), the Supreme Court of Texas addressed this issue in the context of a church member's suit against the church for injuries sustained in a slip and fall. The court acknowledged that the Texas rule of procedure which allowed unincorporated associations to sue and be sued as legal entities, the counterpart to our Trial Rules 17(B) and (E), did not alter the substantive common law rule of nonliability towards members. Id. at 171. The court then examined the erosion of the common law rule, stating: So what remains of the early common law rules regarding unincorporated associations and the imputed negligence doctrine? Apparently, very little. . . . We allow nonmembers to bring suits, including those for negligence, against unincorporated associations. We allow members to sue unincorporated associations for acts committed that are strictly adverse to the member's interests. . . . Nevertheless, one vestige of the common law survivesour obedience to an ancient precept automatically imputing the negligence of an unincorporated association to an injured member. . . . [W]e perceive no compelling reason for retaining this remnant of the original common law rules. Id. at 173 (citations omitted). The court then held that the member's tort action against the association would be allowed. Id. We think the facts in this case and the arguments of the parties are sufficiently persuasive to warrant abandonment of the common law rule of imputed negligence. We hold that members shall be allowed to bring tort actions against the unincorporated associations of which they are part and overrule Calvary. As Justice Boehm recently pointed out: The notion of imputed negligence has been aptly described as having a very bad name of its own leading to a group of quite unreasonable and rather senseless rules. W. [Page] Keeton [et al.], Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts [§ 74, at] 529 (5th ed. 1984). Although many states have seen fit to abolish the doctrine by legislation, the reasons for overruling Calvary Baptist are no less persuasive in the absence of a statute. These include: (1) it is inherently unfair to require an injured member, who is one of a number of equally faultless members, to bear a loss incurred as a result of the association's activities; (2) there is no reason to limit the availability of the insurance that associations can, and presumably often do, obtain to avoid unexpected liabilities of the members as a result of exposure to third party claims; and (3) contribution is available to avoid unjust allocation of any loss as among the members.