Opinion ID: 4531068
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the fst policy

Text: Baisden focuses her briefing on the issue of policy coverage. Specifically, she argues that the district court erred in its finding that Grange is not liable under the FST policy. “We review a summary judgment ruling de novo, viewing the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Essex Ins. Co. v. Barrett Moving & Storage, Inc., 885 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Shaw v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 353 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003)). We also review de novo the interpretation of an insurance 11 Case: 18-13555 Date Filed: 05/01/2020 Page: 12 of 25 contract. James River Ins. Co. v. Ground Down Eng’g, Inc., 540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008). Moreover, we “may affirm [the district court’s] judgment on any ground that finds support in the record.” Wetherbee v. S. Co., 754 F.3d 901, 905 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001)). As the Supreme Court has explained, Rule 56[] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as to any material fact,” since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). Here, there is no genuine issue of material fact because Defendants did not establish an essential element of their case on which the district court concluded they would bear the burden of proof at trial: that a lease existed giving T&G “exclusive use rights” at the time of the accident. The facts indicate that FST was using the truck at the time of the accident. Because FST owned the truck, the parties accepted the premise that there had to be some change in the truck’s legal status, presumably via a lease providing T&G exclusive use rights, for FST to 12 Case: 18-13555 Date Filed: 05/01/2020 Page: 13 of 25 “borrow” back the truck from T&G.6 Defendants’ failure to produce any evidence that T&G had exclusive use rights means that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that Grange was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id. at 323 (The “standard [for granting summary judgment] mirrors the standard for a directed verdict . . . .” (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)). But there are some problems with the district court’s order. Baisden correctly points out that the order appears to be internally inconsistent. In its finding on the T&G policy, the district court remarked, “The evidence before the Court all indicates the truck was being leased by T&G, and thus was not an ‘owned’ auto.” It further stated that it was “undisputed that T&G leased the truck.” Later, of course, the district court found there was not enough evidence that the lease agreement would establish T&G’s exclusive use rights. The court stated, “the evidence in the record indicates that no legal lease agreement between FST and T&G existed in 2015.” (Emphasis added.) At that point in its analysis, the court was considering whether there was a genuine issue of material fact not 6 We note that neither party has argued that it was unnecessary for T&G to have exclusive use rights to the truck in order for FST to borrow back a truck that it already owned. Thus, any argument by Defendants on that point is waived. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2011). 13 Case: 18-13555 Date Filed: 05/01/2020 Page: 14 of 25 just about whether a lease existed but also about whether a “legal lease agreement” granting exclusive use rights existed. Any discrepancy, however, is inconsequential. First, a big-picture point: The T&G policy holding is not at issue in this appeal. And we are reviewing de novo whether there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the FST policy. As for the substance of the district court’s order: The T&G policy holding was based entirely on the fact that the truck in question was “Any ‘Auto’.” The district court expressly noted that it did not matter whether the truck “was owned, rented, borrowed, leased, etc.” Baisden tacitly acknowledges this point: “The district court found that by the policy’s designating ‘any auto,’ it covered this Mack dump truck. Baisden does not challenge this conclusion on appeal.” In the T&G policy analysis, then, the district court’s remarks about the lease were dicta, nonessential to the holding that the truck was “Any ‘Auto’” under that policy. In contrast, in the FST policy analysis, any contrary remarks about the missing lease were central to the holding. Baisden also makes much of the district court’s invoking Georgia’s statute of frauds.7 Baisden contends the statute of frauds is a “personal defense,” so any argument based on the statute “would not inure to Grange, who was neither 7 The statute provides that to make certain “obligations binding on the promisor, the promise must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or some person lawfully authorized by him or her.” O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30(a). 14 Case: 18-13555 Date Filed: 05/01/2020 Page: 15 of 25 promisor nor promisee to the lease contract.” Moreover, there are exceptions to the statute, including part performance. O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31. We need not address the statute of frauds. The district court did not need to address it either. The court took Natalie Atkinson “at her word” that she could not find the written agreement that she testified existed.8 As Baisden acknowledges, “The fact of a writing – even a missing writing – satisfies any statute of frauds concerns.” The real problem for Defendants is not the statute of frauds but the best evidence rule. The best evidence rule provides, “An original writing . . . is required in order to prove its content unless these rules or a federal statute provides otherwise.” Fed. R. Evid. 1002. Under the specific circumstances of this case, Defendants needed to prove the content of the lease: they needed to show that there was “a contractual relationship giving exclusive use rights to T&G” at the time of the accident. At the summary judgment stage—the relevant focus here— Defendants did not introduce evidence that any exception to the best evidence rule applies. For instance, Rule 1004 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides, “An 8 Grange brings up, apparently for the first time on appeal, various federal regulations. Those regulations independently require a written agreement. Baisden disputes whether the regulations apply. But the dispute does not matter: we accept, as the district court did, that a writing existed. Natalie Atkinson testified to that fact, and at the summary judgment stage we accept that testimony as true. Accepting that a written lease existed, however, is not the same as accepting that the lease granted exclusive use rights, which is required under the particular circumstances of this case. 15 Case: 18-13555 Date Filed: 05/01/2020 Page: 16 of 25 original is not required and other evidence of the content of a writing . . . is admissible if: (a) all the originals are lost or destroyed, and not by the proponent acting in bad faith; [or] (b) an original cannot be obtained by any available judicial process.” True, Natalie Atkinson testified that she was “not sure where to find” the lease agreement. But that testimony does not come close to saying “all the originals [were] lost or destroyed.” Atkinson’s later testimony that she could not find the original—and had concluded the physical and electronic versions may have been destroyed—came as part of the motion to reconsider. In that motion, Defendants cited to Rule 1004 and argued that Atkinson’s new affidavit excused them from the requirements of best evidence rule. But as discussed below, the motion to reconsider was not the place to bring up this testimony, which could have been addressed at summary judgment. In addition to the absence of the written lease, there was no evidence of lease payments, testimony regarding the length of the lease or its terms, or consideration T&G provided for the right to use the truck. Baisden believes the district court overstated the lack of evidence. The truck was on T&G’s policy, and T&G “paid a total premium of $4,965 to Grange to insure just that dump truck – almost 10% of the total auto premium under that policy.” Baisden argues that T&G’s making premium payments “was consistent with a commercial lease.” It is a facially compelling point: why would T&G be 16 Case: 18-13555 Date Filed: 05/01/2020 Page: 17 of 25 paying premiums on a truck it was merely borrowing without any exclusive use rights? So, the argument seems to go, a reasonable juror might conclude there was a lease agreement. But the premise is false, as whether an enforceable contract exists is a legal, not a factual, determination. See generally Lee v. Green Land Co., Inc., 538 S.E.2d 189 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). Facts are certainly crucial to making the legal determination—and those facts are missing here. For example, we still do not know what consideration T&G gave FST for use of its truck. We know T&G paid insurance premiums. But it is not obvious how T&G insuring the truck benefits FST, especially since T&G would presumably be insuring the truck for its own use.9 We might imagine an agreement where, as consideration, FST is able to borrow the truck at any time while T&G pays the insurance premiums. But we should not have to—and at this stage cannot—imagine anything. Cf. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56[], its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” (footnote omitted)). 9 Atkinson further testified that T&G had not done work for more than two years. Because we do not know when this lease began or its terms, we do not know whether T&G originally leased the truck to do work with it. 17 Case: 18-13555 Date Filed: 05/01/2020 Page: 18 of 25 In sum, the dispositive question in the particular circumstances of this case is whether an enforceable lease granting exclusive use rights existed. At the summary judgment stage, there was not a genuine issue of material fact that such a lease existed. Natalie Atkinson testified that the lease had been reduced to writing but not that all originals had been lost or destroyed. The best evidence of the content of the lease is the writing itself. And even if an exception to the best evidence rule applied, there was not enough evidence of the writing’s contents at the summary judgment stage to conclude an enforceable lease granting exclusive use rights existed.