Opinion ID: 6343342
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpol Is Immune from Suit Under the IOIA.

Text: The IOIA, first enacted in 1945, provides that “[i]nternational organizations . . . shall enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.” 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b). For the purposes of the IOIA “international organization” is defined as: [1] a public international organization [2] in which the United States participates pursuant to any treaty or under the authority of any Act of Congress authorizing such participation or making an appropriation for such participation, and [3] which shall have been designated by the President through appropriate Executive order as being entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided in this subchapter. 22 U.S.C. §288. The parties do not dispute that Interpol satisfies the second and third criteria. Congress has provided statutory authorization for the United States to participate in Interpol, 22 U.S.C. § 263a, and President Reagan issued an Executive Order designating Interpol as an organization entitled to certain immunities and privileges under 7 the IOIA. See Exec. Order No. 12,425, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,069 (June 16, 1983) (“[T]he International Criminal Police Organization . . . is hereby designated as a public international organization entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions and immunities conferred by the International Organizations Immunities Act . . . .”). That designation was reaffirmed by Presidents Clinton and Obama when each expanded the scope of the IOIA immunities and privileges to which Interpol was entitled. See Exec. Order No. 12,971, 60 Fed. Reg. 48,617 (Sep. 15, 1995); Exec. Order No. 13,524, 74 Fed. Reg. 67,803 (Dec. 16, 2009). The parties disagree, however, about whether Interpol is a “public international organization” within the meaning of § 288, and is thus eligible to receive the privileges, exemptions, and immunities conferred by the IOIA. Accordingly, the first issue we must address is whether Interpol qualifies as a “public international organization” under § 288. A. Public International Organizations Under the IOIA “Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). To determine that ordinary meaning, courts may look to contemporary dictionary definitions. See id. at 176. If the text of the statute “is not entirely clear, we then turn to the broader statutory context and its history.” Khalid v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 2018). 8 Starting with the text, the district court found that the term “public” ordinarily means “of or provided by the state rather than an independent, commercial company.” El Omari, 2021 WL 1924183, at . That is generally consistent with dictionary definitions that existed at the time the IOIA was adopted. See, e.g., Public, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933) (“Of or pertaining to the people as a whole; that belongs to, affects, or concerns the community or nation”). The term “public” was also defined as being the antithesis of “private.” See, e.g., Public, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933) (“In general, and in most of the senses, the opposite of Private.”). During the same time period, “international” was defined as concerning relations between nations, and “organization” referred to a coordinated entity. See, e.g., International, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933) (“Existing, constituted, or carried on between different nations; pertaining to the relations between nations.”); Organization, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933) (“An organized structure, body, or being . . . .”). Those definitions suggest that a “public international organization” must be a coordinated product of states and governments acting to serve their public interest. Interpol thus meets the straightforward dictionary definition of a public international organization. To the extent there is any ambiguity about the meaning of a “public international organization” under the IOIA, the legislative history confirms that a public international organization includes any organization whose membership is composed of governments. As explained in the House Report for the IOIA: 9 The term “international organization” as used in the bill and generally in this report is specifically limited to public international organizations, i. e., those which are composed of governments as members—and of these, to those of which the United States is a member and which shall have been designated by the President by Executive order as being entitled to enjoy the benefits of the bill. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 1 (1945) (“House Report”) (emphasis added). In other words, the House Report explicitly defined “public international organizations” in the context of the IOIA as organizations “which are composed of governments as members.” Id. That definition is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the language and removes any ambiguity about the proper interpretation of the statutory text. Id. That understanding is further confirmed by its adoption by the executive branch. The first executive order designating Interpol as entitled to IOIA protections was issued after President Reagan sought and obtained legal advice from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”). OLC responded to President Reagan with a January 1983 memorandum concluding that Interpol qualified as a “public international organization” because it is “composed of governments as members.” Joint App’x 566-68, quoting House Report. OLC’s 1983 conclusion tracked the requirements contained in the State Department’s 1946 guidance for applicants seeking designation under the IOIA. See 14 State Department Bulletin No. 348, at 348-49 (Mar. 3, 1946). The decision by the State Department and, in turn, OLC to adopt the definition from the House Report, and 10 the decisions by successive Presidents to rely on that analysis, are entitled to considerable persuasive weight. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 268-69 (2006) (noting that the persuasiveness of the Executive Branch’s interpretation of statutes outside of the rulemaking context depends, inter alia, on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration” and “its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements”). On appeal, El Omari proposes several alternative criteria that he argues should be required to qualify an entity as a “public international organization” within the meaning of the IOIA. First, he argues that Interpol is not “public” because it is not a government actor. Second, he argues that “public” is a term of art within United States tax law, and thus Interpol cannot be “public” because it would not qualify as tax exempt public charity under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), as evidenced by the fact that it accepts donations though its affiliate the Interpol Foundation rather than receiving donations directly. Finally, he points to dicta in Jam v. International Finance Corp. identifying examples of public international organizations entitled to IOIA immunity, “includ[ing] the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank,” and asks us to infer from those examples that IOIA protections may be extended only to organizations formed by international treaty.4 139 S.Ct. 759, 765 (2019). All of those arguments are unavailing. 4 El Omari also argues that the decision in Steinberg v. International Crim. Police Org., 672 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1981), which found that Interpol was subject to the personal jurisdiction of that court, demonstrates that Interpol is not entitled to IOIA immunity. Steinberg was decided in 1981, before President Reagan signed the first 11 There is no persuasive basis, textual or otherwise, for limiting a “public international organization” under § 288 to entities that are part of a single government. Similarly, there is no basis for construing the term “public” as incorporating portions of the United States Tax Code. The portion of the code defining tax-exempt organizations, which by its terms applies only for domestic tax purposes, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), (c), has no conceivable relevance to questions of international organization immunity. Indeed, the exemplary organizations identified by the Supreme Court in Jam – which El Omari concedes are proper examples of organizations entitled to IOIA immunity – would fail to satisfy those proposed criteria.5 executive order granting Interpol immunity under the IOIA, and thus at a time when Interpol lacked immunity under the IOIA because it had not yet been “designated by the President through appropriate Executive order” to enjoy such immunity, 22 U.S.C. § 288. That decision, which did not discuss whether Interpol qualifies as a “public international organization” under the IOIA, has no bearing on whether a court may exercise jurisdiction over Interpol today, in view of the intervening executive orders. 5 The United Nations, for example, is neither a government actor nor a public charity. Rather, it is a forum for nations to conduct intergovernmental business. Similar to Interpol, the United Nations does not directly receive donations, but solicits funds through a variety of affiliated groups. See, e.g., How to Donate to the United Nations System, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/how-to-donate-to-the-un-system (last visited May 16, 2022) (inviting donations to affiliated organizations such as the UN Human Rights Office, the UN Central Emergency Response Fund, the UN World Food Programme, the United Nations Children’s Fund, and the UNESCO World Heritage Center). For similar reasons, we reject El Omari’s passing argument that public international organizations must be restricted to agencies or instrumentalities of foreign governments based on the definition of “foreign state” under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-03. See Appellant’s Br. 14-15. 12 We also disagree that Jam limits “public international organizations” to bodies that have been formed through international treaties. In Jam, the Supreme Court held that the IOIA “grants international organizations the same immunity from suit as is enjoyed by foreign governments at any given time.” 139 S.Ct. at 772 (internal quotations omitted). As part of its discussion, the Supreme Court identified the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Health Organization as examples of organizations entitled to immunity under the IOIA, and noted that the scope of that immunity can be curtailed by either the terms of the organization’s founding charter or by the President acting pursuant to the authority delegated by the IOIA to withhold or withdraw the immunity of otherwise qualified public international organizations. See id. at 764-765. The Jam opinion did not address the proper interpretation of “public international organizations” under § 288, nor did it explain what specific characteristics of the listed organizations qualified them for that designation. It would not be appropriate for us to divine some limiting principle for what qualifies as “public” based solely on the organizations mentioned in the Jam opinion as examples of that category. And while Jam states that an organization’s charter may in some cases override the IOIA’s default rules regarding immunity, id. at 771, it did not suggest that all “public international organizations” must be formed pursuant to such a charter. Moreover, the text of the IOIA itself refutes El Omari’s contention that a “public organization” must be one created by treaty. “It is a cardinal principle of statutory 13 construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The IOIA explicitly extends its protections to otherwise eligible organizations “in which the United States participates pursuant to any treaty or under the authority of any Act of Congress authorizing such participation.” 22 U.S.C. § 288 (emphasis added). The use of the word “or” suggests that IOIA protections may extend to organizations where United States participation is authorized by statute, rather than by a treaty.6 Accordingly, based on the statutory language, the broader statutory context, the legislative history, and the consistent practice of the Executive Branch, we conclude that a “public international organization” as used in § 288 includes, at minimum, any international organization that is composed of governments as its members, regardless of whether it has been formed by international treaty. B. Interpol Qualifies as a Public International Organization. We next turn to whether Interpol is properly categorized as a “public international organization” under that definition, and is thus eligible for designation by the President to receive the privileges and immunities conferred by the IOIA. El Omari’s complaint 6 For example, President George W. Bush designated the ITER International Fusion Energy Organization as protected under the IOIA, see Exec. Order No. 13,451, 72 Fed. Reg. 65,653 (Nov. 19, 2007), in which the United States participates pursuant to a statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 16312(c). 14 alleged that Interpol is composed of “member countries.” Joint App’x 9. Interpol seemingly agrees with that characterization, describing itself throughout its brief as being composed of “member countries.” See, e.g., Appellee’s Br. 1. More technically, however, Article 4 of Interpol’s Constitution specifies that membership in Interpol is conferred on government agencies rather than on the nations they represent. Article 4 provides that participating countries “may delegate as a Member to the Organization any official police body whose functions come within the framework of activities of the Organization.” Joint App’x 93 (emphasis added). Therefore, membership in Interpol formally belongs to the delegated “official police body” of each participating country.7 Interpol’s extending membership to police organizations, combined with the fact that Interpol was not formed by international treaty, has led some to question whether Interpol is truly an international organization.8 But to qualify as a “public international 7 For example, the United States participates in Interpol through a dedicated agency within the Department of Justice, the Interpol-U.S. National Central Bureau (“USNCB”). See 28 C.F.R. § 0.34. It is thus presumably the USNCB, rather than the United States itself, that is formally an Interpol member. 8 The proper classification of Interpol has been a topic of debate among international law scholars, with some arguing that it is a non-governmental organization that cannot technically qualify as an international organization as that term is used in international law, and others arguing that it has long-since achieved the status of a de facto intergovernmental organization whose membership is composed of central government organs. Compare, Andreas Gallas, Interpol, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 187, 187 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1983) (arguing that Interpol is not an international organization) with Sabine Gless, Interpol, in 6 THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 252, 255 (Rüdinger Wolfrum ed., 2012) (arguing that Interpol is such an organization). See also Giulio Calcara, A Transnational 15 organization” under the IOIA, it is sufficient that membership in Interpol is restricted to official government actors whose involvement is controlled by the particular participating nations. The political branches may authorize a government-controlled agency to represent the interests of the United States within an organization. In the case of Interpol, Congress explicitly authorized the Attorney General “to accept and maintain, on behalf of the United States, membership in the International Criminal Police Organization, and to designate any departments and agencies which may participate in the United States representation with that organization.” 22 U.S.C. § 263a. That the United States acts through a specific government agency does not alter the fact that it is still the United States, subject to Congressional authorization and Executive control, that participates in Interpol. Similarly, the “official police bod[ies]” designated by the other participating nations are, for all relevant purposes, agents of their respective nations. CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION -INTERPOL, Art. 4 (2021), Joint App’x 93; see also id. Art. 45, Joint App’x at 98 (indicating that the official police bodies Police Network Co-operating Up to the Limits of the Law: Examination of the Origin of Interpol, 11 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 521, 536-37 (2020) (summarizing the majority view that Interpol is a de facto intergovernmental organization but noting that “a minority of scholars, until very recently, still claimed that [Interpol] is an NGO”). There is no indication that this academic debate, which post-dates the IOIA by at least several decades, was part of the contemporary “ordinary meaning,” Gross, 557 U.S. at 175, when Congress in 1945 authorized immunity for “public international organization[s]” that meet the statutory criteria. We thus have no need to arbitrate between the competing academic theories. 16 “represent[]” the countries to which Interpol’s Constitution applies). Because Interpol is functionally restricted to governments as members, acting through their chosen delegates, we conclude that it qualifies as a “public international organization” within the meaning of § 288.