Opinion ID: 835814
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: use of hospital blood alcohol test

Text: On the merits, the state and defendant offer conflicting views as to how the two statutes at issue, ORS 813.320(2)(a) and ORS 813.160, should be interpreted in relation to one another. ORS 813.320 provides, in part: (1) The provisions of the implied consent law, except ORS 813.300, shall not be construed by any court to limit the introduction of otherwise competent, relevant evidence in any civil action, suit or proceedings or in any criminal action other than a [DUII] violation   . (2) The provisions of the implied consent law shall not be construed by any court to limit the introduction of otherwise competent, relevant evidence of the amount of alcohol in the blood of a defendant in a prosecution for [DUII] if: (a) The evidence results from a test of blood taken from the defendant while the defendant was hospitalized or otherwise receiving medical care, whether or not the defendant consented to the drawing of blood or to the test; or (b) The evidence is obtained pursuant to a search warrant. ORS 813.160 provides, in part: (1) To be valid under ORS 813.300: (a) Chemical analyses of a person's blood shall be performed by an individual shown to be qualified to perform such analyses and shall be performed according to methods approved by the Health Division. For purposes of this paragraph, the Health Division shall approve methods of performing chemical analyses of a person's blood that are satisfactory for determining alcoholic content. For the sake of clarity, we explain briefly the statutory scheme for DUII prosecutionsin particular, the relationship between ORS 813.300, 813.160, and 813.320before addressing the parties' arguments. ORS 813.300(2) sets out the percentage of alcohol in a person's blood that constitutes being under the influence of intoxicating liquor. ORS 813.300(2) (stating that .08 percent constitutes being under the influence of intoxicating liquor). ORS 813.160 provides how a chemical analysis of a person's blood must be performed for that analysis [t]o be valid under ORS 813.300[.] The issue here is whether ORS 813.320 provides an exception to the specific requirements set out in ORS 813.160. ORS 813.320 has a complicated history. In 1973, the legislature created the statutory predecessor to ORS 813.320, former ORS 483.648 (1973). That statute provided, in part: The provisions of the implied consent law, ORS 483.634 to 483.646 [  ] shall not be construed by any court to limit the introduction of otherwise competent, relevant evidence in any civil action, suit or proceedings or to any criminal action other than a [DUII violation] or [driver license suspension for refusing a breath test]. (Emphasis added.) Former ORS 483.648 (1973) expressly included the statutory predecessor to ORS 813.160 as a provision[] of the implied consent law. See former ORS 483.644 (1973), renumbered as ORS 487.815 (1983), renumbered again as ORS 813.160 (1985). In cases decided before 1999, this court had interpreted that set of statutes i.e., the earlier versions of ORS 813.300, ORS 813.160, and ORS 813.320to mean that evidence of a defendant's blood alcohol content that did not satisfy the provisions of the implied consent law must be suppressed in DUII prosecutions, even though that same evidence could be admissible with respect to other kinds of criminal charges against the same defendant. See, e.g., State v. Moylett, 313 Or. 540, 547-48, 553, 836 P.2d 1329 (1992) (allowing evidence of chemical blood analysis in regard to assault and criminal mischief charges but suppressing same evidence in regard to DUII charge because evidence had not been obtained pursuant to ORS 813.140); see also State v. Heintz, 286 Or. 239, 254, 594 P.2d 385 (1979) (to similar effect under predecessor statute). In 1999, the legislature amended ORS 813.320 by adding subsection (2)(a). The issue before us is whether that subsection now permits the state to introduce evidence in a DUII prosecution that does not satisfy the specific requirements of ORS 813.160 that the test and the person administering it comply with Health Division rules and qualifications. The state argues that, for purposes of ORS 813.320(2)(a), ORS 813.160 is a provision[ ] of the implied consent law and thus cannot be construed to limit the introduction of otherwise competent, relevant evidence of the amount of alcohol in the blood of [the] defendant[.] Based on its contention that the chemical analysis of defendant's blood in this case was otherwise competent, relevant evidence, the state argues that the trial court properly admitted that evidence, even though the state did not prove that that analysis complied with the specifications set out in ORS 813.160. In response, defendant maintains that the evidence proffered by the state was not otherwise competent under ORS 813.320(2)(a) because it did not satisfy the specific requirements of ORS 813.160. For that reason, defendant argues, the trial court erred in admitting the evidence. [8] The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by admitting that evidence because, in the Court of Appeals view, the phrase otherwise competent in ORS 813.320(2)(a) required the state to demonstrate compliance with the specifications in ORS 813.160(1)(a). Snyder, 187 Or.App. at 654, 69 P.3d 802. The state had asserted that the evidence of the amount of alcohol in defendant's blood was rendered otherwise competent by the state's introduction of the certified hospital record, in conjunction with testimony that the blood had been taken from defendant while he was hospitalized, and that the latter testimony demonstrated that the evidence complied with ORS 813.320(2)(a). In rejecting that argument, the Court of Appeals stated that, [i]f mere satisfaction of other conditions specified in subsection (2)(a) could themselves render chemical blood analysis evidence `otherwise competent,' the latter requirement would be superfluous. 187 Or.App. at 655, 69 P.3d 802. The state asserts that the Court of Appeals statutory interpretation conflicts with the text and context of ORS 813.320(2)(a). The state argues that, by referring to  otherwise competent evidenceas opposed simply to competent evidencethe legislature intended not to exclude chemical blood analysis results as incompetent solely for failure to comply with ORS 813.160 or other provisions of the implied consent law. In the state's view, if defendant was hospitalized or otherwise receiving medical care when the blood was taken and the state could prove that the evidence was otherwise competent, ORS 813.320(2)(a) allowed that evidence to be admitted, even if the specific requirements of ORS 813.160(1)(a) had not been met. Moreover, the state contends that the Court of Appeals interpretation amounts to a determination that, if the state cannot show compliance with ORS 813.160, then chemical blood analysis results are never admissible, regardless of whether the defendant was hospitalized or otherwise receiving medical care at the time that the sample was taken or tested. Because such an interpretation would render ORS 813.320(2)(a) meaningless, the state argues that otherwise competent must mean that the evidence be competent in a manner unrelated to the implied consent lawfor example, by satisfying chain of custody requirements or meeting foundational requirements established by case law. Defendant adopts the reasoning of the Court of Appeals that, in the context of evidence resulting from a chemical blood analysis, only evidence that satisfies ORS 813.160(1)(a) is otherwise competent evidence under ORS 813.320(2)(a). On appeal, defendant's only challenge to the evidence offered by the state was that the state failed to comply with ORS 813.160(1)(a). ORS 813.320(2) provides that, if evidence offered to show a DUII defendant's blood alcohol content is  otherwise competent, a court shall not construe other provisions of the implied consent law to limit its introduction, provided that the circumstances in subsection (2)(a) are satisfied. [9] As we explained above, we accept that ORS 813.160 is considered part of the implied consent law for purposes of ORS 813.320(2)(a). See ___ Or. at ___, 97 P.3d 1170. The determinative word in ORS 813.320(2) is otherwise, and, as both parties recognize, it is a word of common usage that has a plain and natural meaning. See Smoldt v. Henkels McCoy, Inc., 334 Or. 507, 511, 53 P.3d 443 (2002) (otherwise is word of common usage that has plain and natural meaning). Otherwise is a comparative word; that is, to construe properly the meaning of the word that otherwise is modifying, we must examine the concept or word to which that modified word is being compared. See, e.g., Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1598 (unabridged ed 1993) (defining otherwise, inter alia, as in a different way or manner, in different circumstances: under other conditions, and in other respects). See also Smoldt, 334 Or. at 511, 53 P.3d 443 (similarly defining word otherwise as used in statute). Here, ORS 813.320(2) states that it is the provisions of the implied consent law that shall not be construed to limit the introduction of otherwise competent, relevant evidence of the amount of alcohol in the blood of a defendant in a [DUII] prosecution[.] (Emphasis added.) It is apparent from the inclusion of the word otherwise in that provision that the legislature intended that the evidence in question be competent in a different way or manner than as provided by the implied consent law, as long as the circumstances in subsection (2)(a) or (2)(b) are satisfied. To read the statute in the manner that defendant advocatesthat, despite the presence of the term otherwise, ORS 813.320 nonetheless requires the state to satisfy a provision of the implied consent law, ORS 813.160(1)(a), for the evidence it offers to be competentwould impermissibly omit or fail to give meaning to a term that the legislature has included in the statute. See ORS 174.010 (in interpreting statutes, courts may not omit words that legislature has inserted). Such an interpretation also would conflict with the mandate that we should attempt to give effect to all provisions or particulars of the statute when construing it. See id.; Moustachetti v. State of Oregon, 319 Or. 319, 326, 877 P.2d 66 (1994) (citing statute). Defendant argues that the words otherwise competent do have meaning under his proposed interpretation because other provisions of the implied consent law, such as ORS 813.100(1) and ORS 813.140, no longer can be used to exclude chemical blood analysis evidence taken under the circumstances of ORS 813.320(2)(a). [10] Assuming without deciding that defendant's assertion is correct, defendant offers no persuasive explanation why ORS 813.160 should be construed differently than the other implied consent law provisions that defendant claims are affected by subsection (2)(a), except his contention that that statute is a foundational requirement. Further undermining defendant's argument is the fact that the legislature could have, but did not, create an exception for ORS 813.160 from the shall not be construed    to limit directive. Cf. ORS 813.320(1) (creating express exception for ORS 813.300). Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the text and context of ORS 813.320(2) demonstrate that, in enacting that statute, the legislature intended to remove ORS 813.160 as a barrier to introducing evidence of a blood alcohol test taken while a defendant was hospitalized or receiving medical care, provided that the evidence meets competency requirements that are based on a source of law outside of the implied consent law. We wish to emphasize what we do not decide in this case. The parties have raised no issue, and we have no occasion to determine, what other competency requirements might apply respecting evidence of the kind offered in this case. Defendant did not challenge in the Court of Appeals the competency of the evidence that the state offered on any grounds other than its noncompliance with ORS 813.160(1)(a). We can say that we reject the state's suggestion that ORS 813.320(2)(a) in some way relaxes the ordinary foundational requirements that the case law establishes for the admission of blood alcohol test results. But our holding is limited to the conclusion that, when the prerequisites of ORS 813.320(2)(a) are met, the state need not also demonstrate that the blood test results meet the requirements of ORS 813.160(1)(a). We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that, for purposes of ORS 813.320(2)(a), the state must demonstrate compliance with ORS 813.160(1)(a) for evidence to be otherwise competent to prove a defendant's blood alcohol content and that, because the state did not comply here, the trial court erred in admitting the chemical blood analysis evidence. However, because the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court on different grounds, we affirm that disposition. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.