Opinion ID: 1193874
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judicial Review of Workers' Compensation Decisions

Text: Claims for compensation under Hawaii's workers' compensation law are decided by the director of labor and industrial relations. HRS § 386-86 (1993). The decision of the director is final unless it is appealed to the LIRAB, which may affirm, reverse, or modify the director's decision or remand the case to the director for further proceedings and action. HRS § 386-87 (1993). The decision or order of the LIRAB is directly appealable to this court. HRS § 386-88 (1993). The appeal of a decision or order of the LIRAB is governed by HRS § 91-14(a), the statute authorizing appeals in administrative agency cases. HRS § 91-14(a) authorizes judicial review of a final decision and order in a contested case or a preliminary ruling of the nature that deferral of review pending entry of a subsequent final decision would deprive appellant of adequate relief. For purposes of HRS § 91-14(a), we have defined final order to mean an order ending the proceedings, leaving nothing further to be accomplished. Gealon v. Keala, 60 Haw. 513, 520, 591 P.2d 621, 626 (1979). Consequently, an order is not final if the rights of a party involved remain undetermined or if the matter is retained for further action. Id. Applying the Gealon definition of final order to a workers' compensation appeal, we held that a decision of the LIRAB denying compensation for one of two injuries was not an appealable final order because the amount of compensation for the other compensable injury had not yet been determined. Mitchell v. State of Hawai`i, supra . The ICA has likewise applied the Gealon definition of final order to hold that a decision of the LIRAB finding a workers' compensation claim to be compensable was not an appealable final order because the amount of compensation had yet to be determined. Williams v. Kleenco, 2 Haw.App. 219, 629 P.2d 125 (1981). Other jurisdictions have statutes similar to HRS§ 91-14(a) that require an appeal in a workers' compensation case be taken from a final order. Some of these jurisdictions apply a Gealon definition and determine appealability by whether an order finally ends the workers' compensation case. For example, in Tennessee, an appealable order is one that final[ly] [adjudicates] all of the issues which can be decided under the [workers' compensation] complaint[.] Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Miller, 491 S.W.2d 85, 86 (Tenn.1973). In Idaho, an appealable order is one that finally dispose[s] of all of the claimant's claims[.] Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 118 Idaho 147, 795 P.2d 309, 311 (1990). In New Jersey, an appeal in a worker's compensation case must be taken from a final judgment. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-66; Barry v. Wallace J. Wilck, Inc., 65 N.J.Super. 130, 167 A.2d 181, 185 (1961). Rather than applying a Gealon definition to determine appealability, New Jersey looks to the special nature of a workers' compensation case as a proceeding creating independent rights to awards for medical service, temporary compensation, and permanent disability such that an award for medical expenses and temporary disability benefits is appealable, even though the matter of permanent disability has not been determined. The rationale is as follows: An employee is not required to wait until his permanent disability is fixed and evaluated before applying for relief. Medical attention or temporary compensation may be ordered by the Workmen's Compensation Division in accordance with [New Jersey law]. The statute providing awards for medical service and temporary compensation creates independent rights apart from the statute authorizing an award for permanent total disability. While the remedy of permanent disability is still to be determined, this is an independent right arising from a common remedy of workmen's compensation and is merely a matter of continuing that portion of the case until the results can be measured. ... To conclude otherwise would subject a[n] [employer] to the danger of paying an award of temporary disability and medical service and then being unable to collect back the monies paid to a [claimant] if the reviewing court concluded that the injury was unconnected to [claimant's] employment. This is also in accordance with the policy of prompt payment of workmen's compensation awards[.] It is in the interest of the parties to have the issue of temporary disability determined as soon as possible when either of the parties questions the findings of the [workmen's compensation] Division on this issue. Judah v. General Super Markets, Inc., 99 N.J.Super. 389, 240 A.2d 44, 46 (1968) (citations omitted). Maryland follows the New Jersey rule and permits an appeal of an order that finally decides a benefit under the workers' compensation law. Under this rule, an award of temporary total disability is appealable under the statute authorizing appeals from any final action of an administrative agency, even if other aspects of the workers' compensation case have not been finally decided. Great American Ins. Co. v. Havenner, 33 Md.App. 326, 364 A.2d 95 (1976). We think the term final order or final action, within the ambit of the Workmen's Compensation Law, means an order or award made by the Commission in the matter then before it, determining the issues of law and of fact necessary for a resolution of the problem presented in that particular proceeding and which grants or denies some benefit under the Act. Id. at 99. The benefit rule is specifically codified in the Colorado workers' compensation statute, which authorizes judicial review of any order which requires any party to pay a penalty or benefits or denies a claimant any benefit or penalty. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 8-43-301(2),(10),(11) (1998). This present version of the statute was enacted in 1983, changing the prior version providing for an appeal from the final award allowing or denying said claim [for workers' compensation]. It was under the pre-1983 version of the statute that the Colorado Court of Appeals issued its decision in Gonzales, supra, that an award of temporary benefits is not appealable if the matter of permanent disability has been retained for later determination. The Gonzales court acknowledged that the award of temporary disability was appealable under the 1983 amendment to the workers' compensation statute, but held that the amendment did not apply retroactively to the 1982 award, as the administrative agency concluded. One year after Gonzales, the Colorado Court of Appeals applied the 1983 amendment to hold that an order requiring payment of medical expenses was an appealable final order, even though all other compensation issues had been reserved for determination. American Express v. Industrial Com'n of State of Colorado, 712 P.2d 1132 (Colo.App.1985). The ICA's reliance on Gonzales was not well-founded, inasmuch as Gonzales was effectively overruled by the 1983 amendment to Colorado's workers' compensation statute. Nonetheless, the ICA's position finds support in decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court holding that awards of temporary disability are not appealable final orders where the matter of permanent disability has been reserved for later determination. Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., supra ; Jensen v. Pillsbury Co., 121 Idaho 127, 823 P.2d 161, 161 (1992) ([W]henever the Commission explicitly retains jurisdiction over a matter, that act by its very nature infers that there is neither a final determination of the case nor a final permanent award to claimant.). The retention of jurisdiction to decide future workers' compensation benefits is a common practice in workers' compensation cases. 8 Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 81.53 (1998). Unlike Idaho, other jurisdictions permit appeals of awards of workers' compensation benefits even if jurisdiction is reserved to determine awards of future benefits. For example, in Tube Turns Division v. Logsdon, 677 S.W.2d 897 (Ky.App.1984), the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that an award of medical expenses and temporary total disability benefits was an appealable final award or order, even though the matter of permanent partial disability benefits had been reserved for later determination. In Mike Makemson Logging v. Colburn, 600 So.2d 1049 (Ala.Civ.App. 1992), the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals rejected a jurisdictional challenge to an appeal of a temporary total disability award that reserved the matter of permanent disability benefits for later determination. ... [T]he determination of a judgment's finality ... depends on whether the judgment sufficiently ascertains and declares the rights of the parties. .... ... [T]he trial court's retention of jurisdiction over the award of permanent disability does not bar [] an appeal [of a temporary disability award]. Id. at 1050. In K-Mart Corporation v. Anderson, 163 Ga.App. 493, 295 S.E.2d 186 (1982), the Georgia Court of Appeals held that an award of temporary disability benefits and reimbursement of medical expenses was an appealable final award, even though the tribunal had continuing jurisdiction to award future medical expenses. The fact that there was no final disposition of a potential item covered by the [worker's compensation] Act ... did not nullify the finality of the Board's award.... The fact that the employee may incur additional medical expenses has no impact on the finality of the award made to date. Any other result would render many workers' compensation awards nonreviewable, since the question of liability for future medical expenses is often incapable of ascertainment at the time of the hearing and award. Id. at 187. In Ronshaugen v. Ramsey Engineering Co., 166 Mont. 214, 531 P.2d 1348 (1975), the Montana Supreme Court reviewed an award of medical benefits and nominal disability benefits, even though the tribunal retained jurisdiction to determine further disability benefits in the event there was a subsequent loss of earning capacity.