Opinion ID: 2615788
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Joplin Case

Text: Here we find both parties relying upon the same case in support of their several positions. Both cite Joplin v. Ten Brook et al., supra, 124 Or 36, which construes the charter of the city of Astoria. Generally speaking, the city employs it as being supplemental to the doctrine of Kadderly v. Portland, supra, 44 Or 118, whereas plaintiff interprets it as an exception deviating from the principle of the Kadderly case, at least when applied to city ordinances in contradistinction to state legislation. The city limits the application of the Joplin case to legislation which, on its face, discloses that the  declaration of an emergency is contradictory to the ordinance's avowed purpose or false as a matter of law. Plaintiff's position concerning the applicability of the Joplin case is comprehended in the following statement taken from his brief: We read the Ten Brook case [124 Or 36] as announcing the rule that a court may inquire into the existence of an emergency where a city ordinance is involved   . That part of the Portland charter mandating the inclusion of a statement of facts and reasons in an emergency ordinance has never been construed by this court. The only charter which we have reviewed here with a somewhat similar provision is the charter of the city of Astoria, which reads: An emergency ordinance may be enacted upon the day of its introduction, providing it shall contain the statement that an emergency exists, and specify the reason constituting such emergency. Whereas the comparable provision of the Portland charter required a statement of facts and reasons, the Astoria charter goes no further than to direct a specification of the reason constituting the emergency. In the Joplin case we held, in essence, that it was palpably evident from a reading of the controverted Astoria ordinance that no emergency in fact existed and that the ordinance to which the emergency clause was appended was absolutely void. The importance which the parties and the circuit court in its opinion attach to the Joplin case merits its analysis, especially with reference to the facts, in order to understand correctly the scope and significance of that holding. To that end we have again examined the record in that case.  In June, 1927, the city of Astoria in its municipal and business life continued to labor under serious financial exigencies that were a logical aftermath to the catastrophic fire which that community had sustained a few years before. The city council, to induce the influx of new capital and the expansion of industry, proposed an amendment to the city charter. This was designed to enable the city to cancel and discharge city liens theretofore levied against real property situated within its boundaries. The ordinance placing this proposal on the city ballot was ordinance No. 27-83. At the same time and as a part of the same design, the city council adopted ordinance No. 27-82. The two ordinances were in every sense companion and co-ordinate enactments. Ordinance No. 27-82, construed by the Joplin case, had for its purpose the establishment of an election date for voting on the proposed charter amendment covered by ordinance No. 27-83 and the repeal of an existing ordinance which governed the manner and time of city elections. This amendment of the local election law became necessary, among other reasons, in order to shorten the time required by previous ordinances for the calling of a special election. Ordinance No. 27-82 sought to accelerate the opportunity of the electors to vote on the charter amendment proposed by ordinance No. 27-83. Section 1 of ordinance No. 27-82 declared the purpose of the election was to vote upon a proposed amendment    to the Charter. This was followed by a specific and detailed statement of the charter amendment proposed by ordinance No. 27-82. Ordinance No. 27-83 concluded with an emergency clause reading (from appellant's abstract of record in the Joplin case):    Inasmuch as the objects of this ordinance will be of great benefit to the people of the  City of Astoria, and there exists and is an urgent necessity that this ordinance should take effect as soon as possible so that the health, peace and safety of the inhabitants of the City of Astoria may be preserved, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this ordinance therefore shall be in full force and operative immediately after its passage by the unanimous vote of all the members of the Common Council present, and not less than four members thereof. Shortly prior to our decision in Joplin v. Ten Brook et al., supra, the constitutionality of the charter amendment submitted by ordinance No. 27-82 had been challenged in the case of Hauke v. Ten Brook et al., 122 Or 485, 259 P 908, and the proposed charter provision was there held null and void as in violation of both the letter and spirit of Art I, § 20 of the Oregon constitution. Thus when the Joplin case came to this court's attention, the ordinance which was the subject of that suit disclosed on its face the anomalous proposition of the declaration of the existence of an emergency which sprang solely from a desire to quicken the adoption of an unconstitutional charter provision. The holding of the court in the Joplin case was stated by Mr. Justice McBRIDE in these words (124 Or 40): We hold in this case and in all cases, where the action of the city council is involved, if upon the face of the ordinance it reasonably appears that an emergency exists, or might seem to a reasonable mind to exist, that a general statement that the immediate effect of the ordinance is necessary for the peace, health or safety of the community, such declaration will be binding on the courts even though the courts might differ as to the urgency so declared. But, where it is apparent upon the face of the ordinance that there is no urgent necessity for its passage and going into  effect immediately, and it is apparent that the real reason for such declaration of urgency is to avoid the invocation of referendum upon the proposed measure, the court will scrutinize the declaration and, if no seeming emergency actually exists, it will declare the ordinance ineffective. Citing Ex parte Hoffman, supra, [155 Cal 144, 99 P 517] and Morgan v. City of Long Beach, 57 Cal. App. 134 (207 Pac. 53)   . (Italics ours.) Let it be observed at the outset that the court in the Joplin case did not travel outside the record found within the four corners of ordinance No. 27-82. It set up no standard to test the sufficiency of the charter-mandated statement of facts. Its determination involved no recognition of facts other than there disclosed. The ordinance itself revealed a set of unambiguous facts which enabled the court in that instance to say without argument or recourse to other evidence that the declaration of an emergency there found was a meaningless and invalid pronouncement. Indeed, even if the court had not previously declared the charter amendment proposed by ordinance No. 27-83 unconstitutional, as it had in Hauke v. Ten Brook et al., supra, there was a sufficient statement of the substance of the charter amendment in ordinance No. 27-82 to have warranted the same conclusion earlier made in the Hauke case. We also find in Kadderly v. Portland, supra, authority for the very position taken by Mr. Justice McBRIDE in the Joplin case. There we read (44 Or 148):    It is the duty of the courts, after a law has been enacted, to determine in a proper proceeding whether it conflicts with the fundamental law   . It would, indeed, be a futile gesture to attach an emergency clause to an act which proposed legislation inhibited by the organic law of the city or state proposing  it or which it otherwise had no authority to enact, either with or without an emergency clause. No matter how persuasive or plausible the recited facts or how cogent the reasons for emergency action, want of legislative power to promulgate the legislation proposed would gain no vitality by reason of such recitals or urgency declarations. 2. Read in the background of the facts occasioning and warranting the pronouncement in the Joplin case, it is our considered conclusion that that case holds and was intended only to hold: When a given city ordinance discloses on its face that the claim of an existent emergency is false and contradicts other matter apparent on the face of the ordinance or that the legislation proposed thereby is contrary to the organic law of the state or city or is otherwise beyond the scope of its authority, the emergency declaration will be declared void. 3. When we apply the rule in the Joplin case to the instant case, we find nothing on the face of ordinance No. 94552 which enables us to say that the declaration that an emergency exists is rendered false and contradictory by any other matter appearing therein, nor can we say from such examination that the proposed legislation is not within the ambit of the Portland city council's authority to legislate thereon.