Opinion ID: 1390081
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: scope of search incident to arrest: exigent circumstances

Text: The permissible scope of such a search is a different and more difficult question. Our early cases discuss searches for evidence of crime within the arrestee's possession and control. State v. Deitz, supra ; State v. Hughlett, supra . They hold that an automobile falls broadly within that criterion. Two important exigent circumstances mandate allowing a search which encompasses the interior of an automobile following the arrest of a driver or passenger. The first is the fact of an automobile's mobility. Due to an automobile's mobility, what may be an unreasonable search of a house may be a reasonable search of an automobile. State v. Cagle, 5 Wn. App. 644, 647, 490 P.2d 123, review denied, 80 Wn.2d 1003 (1971); accord, State v. Jones, 2 Wn. App. 627, 632, 472 P.2d 402 (1970). Discussing warrantless searches based upon probable cause, this court recently stated: Because of the inherent mobility of a motor vehicle, it is impracticable in many situations to obtain a warrant prior to a vehicle search. State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 183, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980); accord, State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 149, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980). If the police are not allowed to search for evidence of crime at the time of an arrest, the automobile may be moved or incriminating evidence removed from it by accomplices of those arrested. State v. Burgess, 43 Wn. App. 253, 263-64, 716 P.2d 948 (1986); State v. Pate, 12 Wn. App. 237, 241-42, 529 P.2d 875 (1974), review denied, 85 Wn.2d 1005 (1975) ( Burgess and Pate both upheld warrantless automobile searches based upon probable cause). Second, public safety considerations require that the police be allowed to search for weapons and other contraband to make the automobile secure following an arrest. [8] Protection of the public from these dangers has been recognized by this court as a valid and important purpose in a discussion of inventory searches of automobiles. See Houser, at 154 n. 2. In addition to protecting the public, the police must also be able to protect themselves against tort claims for failing to ensure that such hazards are removed from a vehicle left on the roadside. [9] There are conceptual difficulties for courts, as well as practical difficulties for the police, in applying Ringer 's case-by-case analysis of the permissible scope of an automobile search incident to arrest. The Ringer test allowed a search post facto only to remove weapons which might have been used by the arrestee to resist arrest or escape and to avoid the destruction of evidence of the crime for which the person was arrested. State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 699, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983). If searches are allowed only when such actions are possible, then obviously police could search an automobile only when the arrestee is still inside or is standing near an open door. The police should not be required to place themselves in danger in order to conduct a search. And the exigencies mentioned above mandate that some type of search be allowed upon an arrest. The Ringer opinion relied heavily on the availability of telephonic warrants and held that they must be considered in determining the existence of exigent circumstances. However, considerations about the ease of obtaining a warrant are irrelevant in the context of a search incident to an arrest. Ringer first decided that neither of the two searches in that case were justified as incident to an arrest. It then discussed whether the exigent circumstances exception applied to the search of Ringer's van, for which there was probable cause, and dealt with the availability of telephonic warrants at length. Ringer, at 699-703. Also, Ringer appears to have overlooked the fact that telephonic warrants may be truly easy to obtain only during normal working hours in or near urban areas. The encounter with Stroud and Caywood, however, occurred at approximately 5 a.m., several miles south of Chehalis. Finally, Ringer 's purpose of invoking the protection of the warrant procedure would not be well served by requiring telephonic warrants anyway. Such warrants, without the involvement of prosecutors or legal advisors in the application process, are substantially less likely either to meet constitutional standards or to provide meaningful protection. Nock, Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory: Article I, Section 7, 8 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 331, 356 (1985). At any rate, Ringer 's case-by-case approach to search and seizure questions appears, upon reflection, to be theoretically unsound. I agree with the majority that a clearer set of rules is needed to aid the police. Majority opinion, at 150-51. The privacy interests protected by Const. art. 1, § 7 can only be realized if the police are able to make a correct determination beforehand as to the justification for a search. See LaFave, Case-by-Case Adjudication Versus Standardized Procedures: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 127, 142 (discussing U.S. Const. amends. 4, 14). In brief, adopting a case-by-case approach instead of a set of rules to guide police conduct accords too much discretion to the police. Nock, 8 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. at 339. Washington's traditional per se rule allows the police to search the passenger compartment of an automobile upon the arrest of a driver or passenger. The propriety of the search depends upon the legality of the arrest. See State v. Miller, 151 Wash. 114, 115, 275 P. 75 (1929).