Opinion ID: 889885
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Level 3 Designation

Text: ¶ 66 Lastly, for purposes of future cases, I express my concern with the State's argument in support of the Level 3 tier designation in Holt's burglary sentence. ¶ 67 Section 46-23-509(2), MCA (2005), states: Prior to sentencing of a person convicted of a sexual offense, the department or a sexual offender evaluator shall provide the court with a sexual offender evaluation report recommending one of the following levels of designation for the offender. . . . Section 46-23-509(3), MCA, in turn, states: Upon sentencing the offender, the court shall . . . review the sexual offender evaluation report, any statement by a victim, and any statement by the offender; [and] designate the offender as level 1, 2, or 3. . . . As Holt points out, burglary is not a sexual offense. See § 46-23-502(6), MCA. Thus, a tier level designation should not have been included in his burglary sentence. Opinion, ¶ 21. ¶ 68 The State's contrary argument proceeds as follows. First, the State notes that the definition of sexual offense includes any violation of a law of another state . . . that is reasonably equivalent to a violation listed in subsection (6)(a). Section 46-23-502(6)(b), MCA. The State then points out that Holt was previously convicted of violating a law of Louisiana that is reasonably equivalent to one of the crimes listed in subsection (6)(a) (namely, sexual assault on a minor). Consequently, the State reasons that he is a person convicted of a sexual offense for purposes of § 46-23-509(2), MCA. In other words, the State argues that whenever `a person convicted of a sexual offense' is sentenced for any crime (emphasis added), the judge must impose a tier level designation. Hence, if a person was convicted of a sexual offense in Kentucky and is now being sentenced for running a red light in Montana, the judge must order a sexual offender evaluation report and impose a tier level designation on the defendant's sentence for the traffic violation. ¶ 69 While this construction of the statutory scheme is certainly inventive, it ultimately must be rejected. Statutory construction should not lead to absurd results if a reasonable interpretation can avoid it. State v. Letasky, 2007 MT 51, ¶ 11, 336 Mont. 178, 152 P.3d 1288. The notion that sentencing judges are supposed to impose tier level designations and sexual offender treatment programs upon convictions for speeding, shoplifting, possession of stolen property, inciting a riot, arson, and the like is, frankly, absurd. Section 46-23-509(2) and (3), MCA, must be interpreted as applying when the judge is sentencing an offender upon conviction of a sexual offense. Indeed, the language of other statutes which cross-reference § 46-23-509, MCA, make it clear that this was the interpretation intended. See e.g. §§ 46-18-207, -255, MCA (2009).