Opinion ID: 2419959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: reformation of the injunction

Text: In addition to enjoining the Commissioner, Houston I.S.D., and Houston Teachers Association from pursuing further administrative review of the order creating Westheimer I.S.D., the trial court judgment also enjoined the parties from interfering in any way with the operation of the Westheimer Independent School District, except by way of appeal of such judgment. The court of civil appeals concluded that the trial court's order precluded the parties from challenging the validity of the school district's creation in the appropriate district court, and the injunction was reformed so as to permit such a challenge. Westheimer I.S.D. argues to this court that the injunction should not have been so reformed, and we agree. In leaving open the possibility of an action in the district court, the court of civil appeals apparently relied on its determination that the validity vel non of the October 7 order was not put in issue in the injunctive proceedings in the district court. 546 S.W.2d at 835. The parties are in dispute before this court as to whether the issue of Westheimer I.S.D.'s validity has been tried in this case. Westheimer I.S.D. argues that the pleadings, the evidence, and the arguments of counsel show that the issue was tried and resolved in the district court. The Final Order of the district court contains the following finding: I find that the Westheimer Independent School District was and is legally created and is entitled to begin operations without further hindrance from anyone. While this is strong support for Westheimer's position, it is unnecessary for this court to decide whether the issue of the school district's validity was resolved below. Even if such issue was not resolved, we hold that it is now too late, as a matter of law, for the parties to file a suit in the district court to challenge the administrative order which created the Westheimer Independent School District. Section 11.13(c) of the Texas Education Code is the provision giving persons aggrieved by orders of the State Board of Education the right to appeal such orders to the district court in Travis County. When administrative procedures within the state educational system have been exhausted, an appeal under this provision becomes the appropriate method of seeking further review. As discussed at length above, the administrative remedies concerning the creation of Westheimer I.S.D. were exhausted on October 7, 1972, with the final order of the State Board of Education. At that time the parties could have appealed the order to the district court in Travis County. The fact is undisputed that they did not make such an appeal, and they have not done so to this day. Section 11.13(c) of the Texas Education Code does not prescribe a time limit within which an aggrieved party must file an appeal in the district court. However, Texas law is firmly established that, when the statute fails to prescribe such a time limit, an appeal must be taken within a reasonable time. Midas Oil Co. v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 142 Tex. 417, 179 S.W.2d 243 (1944); Board of Water Engineers v. Colorado Municipal Water District, 152 Tex. 77, 254 S.W.2d 369 (1953); Railroad Commission v. Aluminum Company of America, 380 S.W.2d 599 (Tex.1964); Harkness v. Hutcherson, 90 Tex. 383, 38 S.W. 1120 (1897). There is ample authority for holding that the undisputed delay in this case is unreasonable as a matter of law. The decision most frequently cited in support of this type of holding is Board of Water Engineers v. Colorado Municipal Water District, 152 Tex. 77, 254 S.W.2d 369 (1953). That case involved a seven month delay in appealing an administrative order creating a water district. In declaring the order invalid, the trial court impliedly found that the delay in bringing the appeal was not unreasonable. This court set aside the trial court judgment and dismissed the case, holding that the facts demonstrated an unreasonable delay as a matter of law. Among the factors persuasive to the court were the fact that the parties tacitly recognized the district's existence and the fact that the parties could have filed and prosecuted their appeal immediately after the order was entered. In the present case, the parties' recognition of Westheimer I.S.D.'s existence was more than tacit. Counsel for both parties represented to the Federal Court in 1973 that, the administrative procedures ... for the establishment of the Westheimer Independent School District were exhausted and ... the Westheimer Independent School District became established. It was at least partially in reliance on this stipulation that the Federal Court issued its injunction. And, as noticed above, the parties in this suit could well have prosecuted their appeal in 1972 when the order was entered. Another significant case is Railroad Commission v. Aluminum Company of America, 380 S.W.2d 599 (Tex.1964), in which this court was faced with what was, in effect, an attempt in 1960 to appeal orders entered by the Railroad Commission in 1956. The trial court and the court of civil appeals had sustained the attack on the orders and enjoined their enforcement. This court reversed the judgments below and sustained the Railroad Commission's contention that the evidence showed, as a matter of law, that the appeal was barred by unreasonable delay. The court stated the rule that one appealing from any order of the Railroad Commission must proceed with reasonable diligence, and Alcoa was held to have a right to seek revision of the orders only upon a showing of changed conditions. As this court has done earlier in the present opinion, the court in the Alcoa case determined that the allegations relating to changed conditions were matters that could have been raised at the time of the original hearing. Public policy was viewed as prohibiting judicial interference with the long-standing orders of the Railroad Commission. A holding quite similar to that in the Alcoa case is Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 335 S.W.2d 425 (Tex.Civ.App.Austin 1960, writ ref'd n. r. e.). In 1959 the Railroad Commission entered an order refusing to revise certain allocation formulas that had been fixed in 1956. Upon Pan American's appeal of the Commission's order, the Commission argued that Pan American's failure to take prior legal action to set aside the 1956 orders was an unreasonable delay as a matter of law. The court of civil appeals agreed, noting, There is no dispute as to the relevant facts in the time and sequence in which the events occurred. 335 S.W.2d at 428. Similarly, there is no dispute in the present case that the order which the parties would be attacking, if a suit were filed in the district court, was entered in October of 1972. Thus a delay of more than five years would necessarily be involved. Other decisions which have held a delay in appealing an administrative order to be unreasonable as a matter of law include Combs v. State, 526 S.W.2d 648 (Tex.Civ. App.Austin 1975, writ ref'd n. r. e.). The court in that case held, Appellant's delay of three years, three months, and eighteen days from the date of the entry of the special order to the date of filing of his petition in the district court is, as a matter of law, unreasonable. 526 S.W.2d at 651. Another example is Heaberlin v. Joaquin Independent School District, 95 S.W.2d 1339 (Tex.Civ.App.Beaumont 1936, no writ), which involved an appeal to a county school superintendent from an order dismissing the appellants from their teaching positions. The court held, The attempted appeal of appellants 150 days after the order of dismissal was, as a matter of law, an unreasonable delay, came too late, and the refusal of the county superintendent to consider same was correct. 95 S.W.2d at 1341. Finally, the following language in the court of civil appeals' opinion in the present case should be noted: Though Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 11.13(c) fixes no time limit during which the aggrieved party must file an appeal, such an appeal must be brought within a reasonable time. [citations omitted]. The order of the State Board of Education is now final because a delay of four years is, as a matter of law, unreasonable. While the court's conclusion following this holding was that further administrative proceedings were precluded, § 11.13(c) is the provision for appeals to the Courts ; the holding should also preclude further judicial proceedings. In addition to cases in which the courts have found unreasonable delays as a matter of law, there are a number of holdings which have upheld trial court findings of unreasonable delay. In Midas Oil Co. v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 142 Tex. 417, 179 S.W.2d 243 (1944), this court held that, in light of a jury finding that four months was an unreasonable delay, the party had lost its right to prosecute a suit to set aside a Railroad Commission order. In Red Arrow Freight Lines v. Missouri-Pacific Freight Transportation Co., 166 S.W.2d 747 (Tex.Civ.App.Austin 1942, writ ref'd), a trial court finding that nine months was an unreasonable delay was upheld. Similar holdings have been made in cases involving appeals from decisions of school system officials. For example, in Watkins v. Huff, 63 S.W. 922 (Tex.Civ.App.1901, writ dism'd 94 Tex. 631, 64 S.W. 682), the court sustained the trial court's finding that a two week delay in appealing a decision of the state superintendent of public education was too long. Other cases which have given indications as to what is an unreasonable delay in appealing decisions of school system officials are Harkness v. Hutcherson, 90 Tex. 383, 38 S.W. 1120 (1897) (four months); Los Angeles Heights Independent School District v. Chestnut, 287 S.W. 693 (Tex.Civ.App.San Antonio 1926, no writ) (two weeks); and Bear v. Donna Independent School District, 85 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ.App.San Antonio 1935, writ dism'd) (eight months). In the present case, the trial court made the following findings with reference to the State Board of Education's order of October 7, 1972: I find that the order has not been appealed from within the time provided by statute and has not been appealed from under the provisions of Article 11.13 of the Education Code. I find that the petition for review filed by the Houston Independent School District comes too late.... These holdings, though termed findings of law, demonstrate at least an implied finding by the trial court that the parties had delayed unreasonably in seeking further administrative review of the order in question. The same rationale which leads to such a conclusion by the trial court also leads inevitably to the conclusion that it is now too late to bring an appeal to the courts. This result is demanded by the strong public policy favoring an end to litigation. There are rarely circumstances which would justify an appeal, in 1978 or later, from an administrative order entered in 1972; and the record before us adequately demonstrates that such circumstances are not present in this case. The judgment of the court of civil appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.