Opinion ID: 2539046
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Penalty-Phase Issues Likely to Arise on Resentencing

Text: In light of our holding that Miller is entitled to resentencing due to the erroneously admitted victim-impact testimony, we touch upon the remaining assertions of alleged error in the penalty phase to the extent they are likely to arise upon resentencing.
Here, Miller challenges for the first time on appeal remarks made by the prosecuting attorney that Miller contends were improper comments on the death sentence and remarks that were misstatements of the law concerning his alleged diminished capacity. Miller contends that these remarks, when coupled with improper guilt-phase closing argument, deprived him of his due-process right to a fair trial and fair sentencing proceeding. The first of these specific remarks in question were made in the context of the prosecuting attorney's summarization of the evidence of mitigating circumstances, and were to the effect that the jury had already rejected the evidence of Miller's mental retardation, paranoid schizophrenia, and of his mental disease or defect. Miller also challenges the prosecutor's comments that some crimes ... are so horrific, so awful, so heinous, that the only just verdict is the ultimate penalty and that is the payment of the Defendant's life for the victims. First, we note that Miller did not object at all during the penalty-phase closing argument. Absent a contemporaneous objection at trial, we will not review alleged errors in the State's closing argument unless they rise to a level that warrants the trial court to sua sponte declare a mistrial or admonish the jury. See Anderson, 357 Ark. 180, 163 S.W.3d 333; see also Bowen v. State, 322 Ark. 483, 911 S.W.2d 555 (1995). We cannot say the remarks at issue here rise to that level as they were not misstatements of the law but rather argument on the evidence. Second, we note that this court has previously declined to comment on an alleged error in sentencing-phase closing argument, as it determined such was not an issue that was likely to arise on remand. Daniels v. State, 373 Ark. 536, 285 S.W.3d 205 (2008), superseded by statute, Act 460 of 2009, as recognized in Heard v. State, 2009 Ark. 546, 354 S.W.3d 49.
Miller contends for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred in submitting the model instruction on mitigating circumstances (Form 2) because it included all six of the circumstances listed in the statute, Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-605 (Repl.2006), when there was no evidence presented that some of these factors were present. As an example, he points out that there was no evidence of accomplice liability in his case, that his age was thirty years so there was no evidence of his youth presented, and that since he did have a criminal record, it worked against him to have the absence of a criminal record listed as a mitigating circumstance on the instruction form. He points out that defense counsel below did not submit an instruction on mitigating circumstances that was individualized to fit his case. He contends that the instruction given should have been individualized for him to include diminished capacity, special education, and low intelligence quotient as mitigating circumstances. Ordinarily, this argument would be precluded from appellate review as it is raised for the first time on appeal; however, we conclude that Rule 10(b)(ii) and Wicks, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366, require our review of this issue as one concerning whether the trial court failed in its obligation to bring to the jury's attention a matter essential to its consideration of the death penalty. See Anderson, 357 Ark. 180, 163 S.W.3d 333 (concluding that the erroneous completion of sentencing forms in a death case involves a matter essential to the consideration of the death penalty). Accordingly, we address this issue to the limited extent that it is likely to arise on resentencing. In support of this argument, Miller relies on Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), stating that it is error to refuse to consider mitigating circumstances when evidence of them is presented, and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), stating that to be constitutional, a state statute must not preclude a jury from considering any mitigating evidence that is offered by a defendant. We read these cases to speak in terms of precluding a jury from considering evidence of mitigating circumstances that was presented, rather than, as Miller contends, imposing an affirmative obligation on the part of a trial court to draft an individualized instruction for a defendant when none is proffered by his counsel. The State responds that the model instruction at issue gives the jury an openended option to find as many other mitigating circumstances as any of the jurors believed existed. Thus, continues the State's response, when the model Form 2 was used, the jury was not necessarily precluded from considering Miller's diminished capacity, special education, and low intelligence quotient as mitigating circumstances. In Dansby v. State, 319 Ark. 506, 893 S.W.2d 331 (1995), this court relied on language from Sheridan v. State, 313 Ark. 23, 852 S.W.2d 772 (1993), and concluded that the submission of Form 2 to a jury instead of a form proffered by the defendant was not an impermissible exclusion of relevant mitigating factors when the judge instructed the jury that they could consider any other mitigating circumstances they saw fit and write them in the blank spaces on the form. We likewise conclude that no error occurred in the giving of the model instruction in the present case. Whether prudential considerations counsel against the giving of the model instruction rather than an individualized one proffered by defense counsel will of course be a matter for both counsel to determine according to the facts and evidence as they exist on resentencing.
Miller contends that the jury erroneously completed the sentencing forms because it did not find that his diminished mental capacity, special education classes, and low intelligence existed as a mitigating factor. We conclude that our review is required under Rule 10(b)(ii) and Wicks, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366, as this is an issue involving a matter essential to the jury's consideration of the death penalty. See Anderson, 357 Ark. 180, 163 S.W.3d 333 (concluding that the erroneous completion of sentencing forms in a death case involves a matter essential to the consideration of the death penalty). Accordingly, we address this issue to the limited extent that it is likely to arise on resentencing. Because we reverse and remand the death sentences on other grounds and remand for resentencing, and because there is the possibility that during that resentencing Miller may again present evidence on his claim of diminished mental capacity and low intelligence to a new jury, we need not address in detail whether the jury in the present appeal erred in rejecting Miller's claim of mental retardation. We do note, however, that [a] jury is not required to find a mitigating circumstance just because the defendant puts before the jury some evidence that could serve as the basis for finding the mitigating circumstance. Williams v. State, 369 Ark. 104, 115, 251 S.W.3d 290, 298 (2007) (quoting Bowen, 322 Ark. at 497, 911 S.W.2d at 561). We also note further that Miller's reliance on Giles v. State, 261 Ark. 413, 549 S.W.2d 479 (1977), overruled on other grounds by Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003), is misplaced. In Giles, this court reversed a death sentence because there was undisputed evidence of mental disease or defect and the jury found no mitigating circumstances. In the present case, however, despite Miller's assertion to the contrary, the evidence of Appellant's diminished mental capacity and intelligence was disputed by the experts. This court has previously held that the jury alone determines what weight to give the evidence, and may reject it or accept all or any part of it the jurors believe to be true. Williams, 369 Ark. 104, 251 S.W.3d 290. Given this broad authority in the jury for determining whether mitigating circumstances exist, and given the conflicting evidence as to diminished capacity and low intelligence that was presented in this case, we cannot say that the jury erred here by failing to conclude that a mitigating circumstance existed.