Opinion ID: 1889791
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Under the LAD, Punitive Damages Are Recoverable Against Public Entities.

Text: In Abbamont, supra, 138 N.J. 405, 650 A. 2d 958, three members of an equally-divided Court affirmed the majority decision of the Appellate Division, reported at 269 N.J.Super. 11, 634 A. 2d 538 (1993), holding that punitive damages were available against public entities under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -129 (CEPA). In that opinion, Justice Handler explained more fully why punitive damages may be imposed under CEPA. He wrote: The legislative history buttresses the conclusion that punitive damages are recoverable under CEPA. In 1990, the Legislature amended both CEPA and LAD to grant plaintiffs the right to a jury trial and to make available to prevailing parties those remedies available in common-law torts. In so doing, the Legislature expressly reversed Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp., 116 N.J. 433, 561 A. 2d 1130 (1989), in which this Court ruled that a plaintiff bringing a LAD action was neither entitled to a jury trial nor the traditional remedies available in such a trial. Moreover, the failure of the legislation to exclude in CEPA an immunity from punitive damages or to refer to TCA is significant. [ Abbamont, supra, 138 N.J. at 428, 650 A. 2d 958.] We acknowledged the strength of the considerations militating against punitive damages against governmental bodies. Nevertheless, as the Appellate Division observed in Abbamont, the Legislature obviously considered these reasons when it enacted CEPA; yet the legislature made no exception for public entities regarding punitive damages relief. 269 N.J.Super. at 30, 634 A. 2d 538. That same reasoning applies with equal force to the LAD, and we adopt it for the reasons more fully stated in Abbamont. Our holding in Abbamont reflected our understanding of the LAD. In Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 330-32, 537 A. 2d 652, cert. denied sub nom., University of Med. and Dent. of N.J. v. Fuchilla, 488 U.S. 826, 109 S.Ct. 75, 102 L.Ed. 2d 51 (1988), the Court had ruled that the notice provisions of the Tort Claims Act [TCA], N.J.S.A. 59:8-8 and -9, did not apply to LAD actions. The Fuchilla holding was based, in part, on the different purposes of the two statutes. Awards under the LAD are intended to serve not only individual interests but the public interest, whereas the purpose of the TCA is to provide compensation to tort victims without imposing excessive financial burdens on the taxpaying public. Abbamont, supra, 138 N.J. at 430, 650 A. 2d 958 (quoting Fuchilla, supra, 109 N.J. at 335, 537 A. 2d 652). Discrimination claims are dissimilar to claims envisioned by the Legislature to be included within the coverage of the [TCA] in part because [d]iscriminatory conduct actionable under the [LAD] is more akin to the malicious or willful acts exempted from the [TCA] than the negligently or similarly inflicted injuries covered thereby. Ibid. (quoting Fuchilla v. Layman, 210 N.J.Super. 574, 579, 510 A. 2d 281 (1986)). Finally, we observed that the policy concerns regarding the imposition of punitive damages against public entities for LAD violations were addressed, in some measure, by the heightened standard that we adopted in Lehmann for imposing punitive damages. In sum, a sensible and unconstrained reading of the language of the LAD, a consideration of the provisions of the LAD in light of the TCA, a review of the LAD's legislative history, an understanding of the underlying policy concerns in awarding punitive damages and an examination of LAD's remedial purposes persuade us that the LAD allows the award of punitive damages against public entities. We are sustained in that conclusion by the Legislature's five-year acquiescence in the Abbamont interpretation of CEPA. There is ample precedent in New Jersey to support the proposition that, when a statute has been judicially construed, the failure of the Legislature subsequently to act is evidence of legislative acquiescence in the construction given to the statute. See, e.g., Lemke v. Bailey, 41 N.J. 295, 301, 196 A. 2d 523 (1963), Egan v. Erie R.R. Co., 29 N.J. 243, 250, 148 A. 2d 830 (1959); Caputo v. Best Foods, Inc., 17 N.J. 259, 267, 111 A. 2d 261 (1955); Miller v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Hudson Cty., 10 N.J. 398, 413, 91 A. 2d 729 (1952).