Opinion ID: 1928806
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Capped Fee Schedule

Text: In 1998, the Legislature enacted sections 27.710 and 27.711 which, as previously explained, provide for the maintenance of a registry of private attorneys to represent indigent death row defendants in postconviction proceedings, and establish the fee schedule and other guidelines which must be adhered to by these private attorneys, respectively. The purpose of this program was to alleviate ... CCRC's backload of capital cases which have not been assigned to an attorney. Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. Just., CS for SB 1328 Staff Analysis 1 (Mar. 3, 1998) (on file with comm.). Of particular contention in this case is the language in section 27.711(3), which dictates that [t]he fee and payment schedule in this section is the exclusive means of compensating a court-appointed attorney who represents a capital defendant. (Emphasis supplied.) The fee schedule is in turn set forth in subsection (4). [7] The contract which the registry attorneys must sign upon appointment tracks the language in section 27.711(3)-(4), and incorporates the entire compensation scheme by reference. Thus, both the contract and the statutory language indicate that the compensation scheme outlined in the legislation constitutes the exclusive means of compensation. Olive's particular contention is that by agreeing that the fees and costs schedule established in section 27.711 encompasses the exclusive means of compensation, he would be waiving any further compensation to which he may be entitled. His concern is based on a series of cases from this Court which, in short, provide that statutory maximum fees may be unconstitutional when they are inflexibly imposed in cases involving unusual or extraordinary circumstances because these caps interfere with the trial court's inherent power to ensure adequate representation and the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. See Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla.1986); see also White v. Board of County Commissioners of Pinellas County, 537 So.2d 1376 (Fla.1989). For example, in Makemson, the Court addressed the constitutionality of section 925.036, Florida Statutes (1981), setting fee caps on compensation provided to attorneys who represented defendants at trial and first appeal as a matter of right. The Court held that, although the statute was not unconstitutional on its face, the statute was unconstitutional when applied in such a manner as to curtail the court's inherent power to ensure the adequate representation of the criminally accused. Makemson, 491 So.2d at 1112. The opinion added: [I]t is within the inherent power of Florida's trial courts to allow, in extraordinary and unusual cases, departure from the statute's fee guidelines when necessary in order to ensure that an attorney who has served the public by defending the accused is not compensated in an amount which is confiscatory of his or her time, energy and talents. Id. at 1115. The Makemson Court also focused greatly on a defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, reasoning: Most fundamentally ... [a mandatory fee cap] interferes with the sixth amendment right to counsel. In interpreting applicable precedent and surveying the questions raised in the case, we must not lose sight of the fact that it is the defendant's right to effective representation rather than the attorney's right to fair compensation which is our focus. We find the two inextricably intertwined. Id. at 1112. Overall, the Makemson decision strongly suggests that a mandatory fee cap interferes with the right to counsel in that: (1) It creates and economic disincentive for appointed counsel to spend more than a minimum amount of time on the case; and (2) It discourages competent attorneys from agreeing to a court appointment, thereby diminishing the pool of experienced talent available to the trial court. Bottoson v. State, 674 So.2d 621, 626 (Fla. 1996) (Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Subsequent to the Makemson decision, we decided White wherein we further elucidated: We find that all capital cases by their very nature can be considered extraordinary and unusual and arguably justify an award of attorney's fees in excess of the current statutory fee cap. 537 So.2d at 1378. On the issue of the relationship between attorney compensation and a defendant's right to counsel, we noted: It must be remembered that an indigent defendant's right to competent and effective representation, not the attorney's right to reasonable compensation, gives rise to the necessity of exceeding the statutory maximum fee cap. The relationship between an attorney's compensation and the quality of his or her representation cannot be ignored. It may be difficult for an attorney to disregard that he or she may not be reasonably compensated for the legal services provided due to the statutory fee limit. As a result, there is a risk that the attorney may spend fewer hours than required representing the defendant or may prematurely accept a negotiated plea that is not in the best interests of the defendant. A spectre is then raised that the defendant received less than the adequate, effective representation to which he or she is entitled, the very injustice appointed counsel was intended to remedy. Id. at 1179-80. The year after White was released, we decided Remeta v. State, 559 So.2d 1132 (Fla.1990), where we extended the reasoning of Makemson and White to a case involving the statutory right to counsel, as opposed to a constitutional right to counsel. In that case, a private attorney was appointed to represent Remeta at his executive clemency proceeding. After the representation, the attorney sought fees in excess of those delineated by statute. See § 925.035(4), Fla. Stat. (1987). On appeal, the State argued that, [s]ince Makemson and White establish rules to protect the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel ... neither case applies here because there is no such `right' at issue, constitutional or otherwise. Id. at 1134. The Court, in rejecting the State's argument, reasoned that it is clear that this state has established a right to counsel in clemency proceedings for death penalty cases, and this statutory right necessarily carries with it the right to have effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 1135. We ultimately extended the rationale underlying Makemson and White, indicating: The concerns we addressed in Makemson and White were to ensure effective assistance of counsel for indigent defendants through adequate compensation for time-consuming court-appointed public service, and to prevent confiscatory compensation of counsel. These concerns weigh just as heavily in executive clemency proceedings, especially where a defendant's life is at stake. Id. We further noted: The appointment of counsel in any setting would be meaningless without some assurance that counsel give effective representation. As we said is Makemson, our focus must be on the defendant's right to effective representation rather than the attorney's right to fair compensation. Unfortunately, the link between compensation and the quality of representation remains too clear. Id. (quoting Makemson, 491 So.2d at 1114) (citation omitted) (alteration in original). It is on the foundation of these decisions that Olive asserts that he may not be forced to sign a contract waiving further potential compensation which exceeds the statutory fee cap. Respondents/appellees candidly conceded during oral arguments that Makemson, White, and Remeta were applicable to the present case and that, accordingly, in capital cases where extraordinary or unusual circumstances exist, trial courts are authorized to award fees in excess of the statutory schedule set out in section 27.711(4). That Makemson and its progeny control this issue is expressly noted in a staff analysis forming part of the legislative history of section 27.711. Specifically, the Staff Analysis to SB 2054, which ultimately became chapter 99-221, Laws of Florida, amending sections 27.710 and 27.711, indicates the following under the heading Other Constitutional Issues: Section 27.711(4), F.S., provides for the hourly rate and maximum compensation of registry attorneys. In Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla.1986), the Florida Supreme Court held that a statute which set a maximum fee limitation for compensation to attorneys who were appointed by the court to represent indigent criminal defendants was constitutional, on its face. However, the Court stated that such a statute may be unconstitutional when applied in such a manner as to curtail the court's inherent power to ensure the adequate representation of the criminally accused. Id. According to the Court, statutory maximum fees, as inflexibly imposed in cases involving unusual or extraordinary circumstances, interfere with the defendant's sixth amendment right `to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.' Id[.] (citation omitted). Consequently, where unusual or extraordinary circumstances exist, the fees caps established by s.27.711(4), F.S., and increased by the provisions of this bill, do not prevent a court from ordering payment above the maximum authorized. Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. Just., CS for SB 2054 Staff Analysis 7 (March 17, 1999) (on file with comm.) (emphasis supplied); see also Arvelaez v. Butterworth, 738 So.2d 326, 328 (Fla.1999) (Anstead, J., specially concurring) (discussing 1999 amendments to section 27.711 and noting that the staff analyses from both the Senate and the House specifically indicate that the legislature is concerned about compliance with this Court's decision in Makemson. ). Accordingly, although section 27.711 indicates that the fee schedule set forth in subsection (3) is the exclusive means of compensation, the legislative history and staff analysis clearly contemplate, and indeed accommodate, fees in excess of the statutory schedule in cases where unusual or extraordinary circumstances exist. In doing so, it is obvious that the legislative process patently acknowledged that unless room is made to allow compensation in excess of the fee caps, a statutory framework may run afoul of this Court's precedent in Makemson and its progeny. Thus, as to this issue, we conclude, consistent with Makemson, White, Remeta, the legislative history of section 27.711, and respondents/appellees' concessions, that trial courts are authorized to grant fees in excess of the statutory schedule where extraordinary or unusual circumstances exist in capital collateral cases. To be sure, by so concluding, we do not purport to hold that fees in excess of the statutory cap will always be awarded to registry attorneys in capital collateral cases. Obviously, the Makemson standard clearly envisions an as applied analysis. Instead, we simply hold that by accepting an appointment, a registry attorney is not forever foreclosed from seeking compensation should he or she establish that, given the facts and circumstances of a particular case, compensation within the statutory cap would be confiscatory of his or her time, energy and talent and violate the principles outlined in Makemson and its progeny.