Opinion ID: 836625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: plain error affecting substantial rights

Text: Recognizing that the prosecution's use of defendant's silence constituted error under Doyle, we must now decide whether that error merits reversing defendant's conviction. Both parties agree that this case involves an unpreserved claim of constitutional error. This Court determines whether this type of error warrants reversal under the plain-error standard of review articulated in People v. Grant, 445 Mich. 535, 547-553, 520 N.W.2d 123 (1994), and People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 765-766, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). [8] There are four steps to determining whether an unpreserved claim of error warrants reversal under plain-error review. Carines, 460 Mich. at 763, 597 N.W.2d 130. First, there must have been an error. Id. Second, the error must be plain, meaning clear or obvious. Id. Third, the error must have affected substantial rights. Id. This generally requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings. [9] Id. The defendant bears the burden of establishing prejudice. Id. Fourth, the error must have resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.... Id. (quotation marks and brackets omitted). In this case, as noted, a Doyle violation occurred, which equates to a legal error. Therefore, the first plain-error element is met. The second plain-error element is also met because this Doyle violation was clear and obvious. Indeed, absent an exception, a prosecutor is not permitted to use a defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence against him. In this case, the prosecutor clearly and obviously used the defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence against him. This error was plain. The third plain-error element, however, is not met in this case because defendant cannot prove that the error affected his substantial rights by causing him prejudice. We acknowledge that it is difficult for an appellate court to know what effect the prosecutor's use of defendant's post- Miranda silence might have had on the jury. Nonetheless, we hold that defendant has not shown that the error is prejudicial, considering (1) the extent of the prosecutor's comments, (2) the extent to which the prosecution attempted to tie defendant's silence to his guilt, and (3) the relative strength of the other evidence against defendant. [10] In contrast to Shafier, in which we apply these same factors, the Doyle error in this case does not support a finding of prejudice. First, in this case, the prosecutor's references to defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence, while numerous, were not pervasive. The prosecutor only referred to defendant's silence under the mistaken believe that defendant had raised the subject in his fleeting mention of having tried to tell his exculpatory story while being escorted to the police car. The prosecutor also referred to defendant's silence in closing argument, but it, again, was only an attempt to impeach defendant's exculpatory story. In comparison, in Shafier, the prosecutor was the first party to broach defendant's silence, bringing it up in the opening statement, and it played a major role throughout the prosecution's case-in-chief. The second element also shows that a less prejudicial Doyle error occurred in this case than that in Shafier. Again, the prosecutor in this case used the defendant's silence to argue that defendant's exculpatory story should not be believed. This use of silence did not obviate the prosecutor's need to independently prove that defendant committed the crime. And the prosecutor here presented compelling, largely consistent, untainted evidence to prove this defendant's guilt. In contrast, the evidence in Shafier consisted entirely of a credibility contest between the defendant and his accuser; although the accuser's sisters also testified on her behalf, their testimony contained numerous inconsistencies. Thus, the prosecution in that case, in addition to using the defendant's silence to impeach his claim of innocence, argued that the defendant was guilty because he did not verbally protest in the face of accusations of heinous crimes. [11] In contrast, the prosecution in this case did not overtly tie defendant's post-arrest, post- Miranda silence to its argument that defendant was guilty of the charged crime. Finally, in evaluating the third element, we note that the compelling, untainted evidence against defendant shows how strong the prosecution's case was. First, the testimony of Kessler (the victim) is substantial in its probity regarding defendant's guilt. It is uncontested that she looked right at her assailant from an arm's length distance when he robbed her. She then chased him in the direction of where defendant was later found. She described what her assailant was wearing, which generally matched defendant's clothing when he was arrested shortly thereafter. We acknowledge that Kessler's description of her assailant did not perfectly match defendant's appearance when he was arrested. [12] Yet, much of her general description of her assailant did match defendant, a Caucasian with brown hair who was wearing a blue jacket with red stripes, a hooded sweatshirt underneath the jacket, and blue jeans. Further, Kessler made numerous identifications of defendant as her assailant. She unequivocally identified defendant as her assailant as he was being escorted from the abandoned building. [13] Kessler was also able to identify defendant as her assailant when he drove past her and yelled a self-incriminating obscenity at her. [14] Here, again, Kessler made an unequivocal identification that the driver was both her assailant and defendant. This was corroborated by a bystander with whom Kessler was talking at the time. Finally, Kessler made two unequivocal in-court identifications of defendant as her assailant. We also note the uniquely incriminating aspect of the blue van driver's statement to the victim. This is the equivalent of an open confession to the crime. And, with two witnesses corroborating it, we accept as true that someone drove by the victim and shouted the obscene confession. It strains reason to contemplate who, other than the actual assailant, would have done such an act. This makes the victim's unwavering identifications of defendant as both the driver and her assailant more credible. Finally, the circumstances leading to defendant's apprehension are also highly incriminating. Shortly after the robbery, defendant was found crouching in the corner of an abandoned building that was only a few blocks from the crime scene. The building is located in the direction that the assailant fled from the crime scene. Moreover, after being robbed, Kessler cried for help and a bystander attempted to follow the assailant. The bystander was later found waiting outside the abandoned building where defendant was found. [15] Each of these pieces of evidence is untainted and independent from the Doyle violation in this case. And, in the aggregate, they stand in stark contrast to the sometimes inconsistent evidence that was presented against the defendant in Shafier. There, the only evidence against the defendant was the testimony of his adopted daughters, who were shown to be children caught in a parental dispute. Moreover, the daughters' allegations were somewhat incongruous. Thus, in comparison to the case against the defendant in Shafier, the strength of the evidence against this defendant is substantial. In sum, after analyzing these three factors, we conclude that defendant has not met his burden of proving prejudice under Carines. [16] Without proof of prejudice, analysis of the plain-error element is irrelevant; therefore, defendant is not entitled to appellate relief under Carines. [17] It is, nevertheless, important to make clear that the prosecutor's violation of Doyle in this case is not taken lightly. Doyle violations are constitutional violations, and prosecutors commit an offense against the constitution and its principles by misdeeds such as those seen in this case. Had it not been for the wealth of incriminating evidence against defendant (which begs the question of why a prosecutor would even risk a Doyle violation), the prosecutor's trial victory would not be affirmed. To be clear, the prosecutor has not won this appeal; rather, the defendant has lost it because he has not proven that the Doyle violation entitles him to a new trial under the plain-error doctrine.