Opinion ID: 2144956
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Possibility of Recovery if Decedent Found to be the Driver.

Text: A second issue is raised, one that will likely be faced if a jury finds that Jacobsen was the driver. The issue is whether the driver's estate may recover against Miller for the negligent entrustment of the pickup to a drunk driver, in this case the plaintiff's own decedent. See 7A Am.Jur.2d Automobiles & Highway Traffic § 646, at 645 (1980) (One who entrusts a motor vehicle to a person who is intoxicated, under circumstances charging him with knowledge of that condition, is, as a matter of reasonable prudence and experience, liable for injury or damage proximately resulting.). The plaintiff concedes that her decedent was intoxicated; in fact, she relies on her decedent's intoxication in arguing that Dwayne was negligent in entrusting the vehicle to him. In Cole v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 766 (Iowa 1981), we held that the plaintiff, who had murdered her ex-husband, could not sue her psychiatrist for failing to prevent her from doing so. In Pappas v. Clark, 494 N.W.2d 245 (Iowa App.1992), the court of appeals held that a spouse could not recover on a consortium claim arising out of her husband's illegal drug addiction and related death. Both cases were based on public policy grounds. Pappas, 494 N.W.2d at 247-48; Cole, 301 N.W.2d at 768. The plaintiff distinguishes Cole and Pappas on the basis that those cases involved major crimes, while, in this case, we are concerned with a traffic offense. The negligence of a drunk driver should only be compared to that of the defendants, she claims, and should not be a total bar. For the reasons discussed below, however, it is not the seriousness of the offense that determines if the plaintiff's case will be barred. Our public policy does not bar recovery in all cases in which the plaintiff has violated a law. Our comparative fault statute, Iowa Code ch. 668 (1995), demonstrates that; it allows a plaintiff to sue even if the plaintiff has violated the law. For example, a plaintiff who was exceeding the speed limit may recover against another negligent party if the plaintiff's culpability is not over fifty percent. In the hypothetical speeding case, the plaintiff's violation of the law would be raised as a defense against the plaintiff's claim, and the plaintiff would resist the proof tending to establish that. This is quite different from cases, like the present one, in which the plaintiff must establish his own violation of the law as a necessary element of his claim. When it is necessary for a plaintiff to prove his own criminal act as a part of his claim, public policy intervenes. The general rule is that a person cannot maintain an action if, in order to establish his cause of action, he must rely, in whole or in part, on an illegal or immoral act or transaction to which he is a party, or to maintain a claim for damages based on his own wrong or caused by his own neglect, ... or where he must base his cause of action, in whole or in part, on a violation by himself of the criminal or penal laws.... Cole, 301 N.W.2d at 768 (quoting 1 C.J.S. Actions § 13, at 996-97 (now found at 1A C.J.S. Actions § 29, at 386 (1985))); accord Tate v. Derifield, 510 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Iowa 1994); Pappas, 494 N.W.2d at 247; Veverka v. Cash, 318 N.W.2d 447, 449 (Iowa 1982). We agree with the district court on this issue and reject the plaintiff's argument that his estate may recover against Dwayne for negligent entrustment of a vehicle to the plaintiff's decedent. We therefore affirm on the second issue. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; CASE REMANDED.