Opinion ID: 201381
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Federal Ingredient

Text: Respondents also argue that even in the absence of a claim arising under federal law on the face of plaintiffs' wellpleaded complaint, federal removal jurisdiction is still proper under the Supreme Court's statement in Franchise Tax Board that removal would be appropriate if a well-pleaded complaint established that [the plaintiff's] right to relief under state law requires resolution of a substantial question of federal law. 463 U.S. at 13. Under this federal ingredient doctrine, a case arises under federal law for purposes of removal when the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Id. at 27-28. Federal ingredient jurisdiction remains controversial, Almond, 212 F.3d at 23, because [t]he Supreme Court has periodically affirmed this basis for jurisdiction in the abstract . . ., occasionally cast doubt upon it, rarely applied it in practice, and left the very scope of the concept unclear. Perhaps the best one can say is that this basis endures in -20- principle but should be applied with caution and various qualifications. Id. (internal citations and footnote omitted); see also Metheny v. Becker, 352 F.3d 458, 460 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that federal ingredient doctrine remains vibrant in this circuit but 'should be applied with caution' (quoting Almond, 212 F.3d at 23)). With this caution in mind, we turn to the respondents' argument. Respondents hang their jurisdictional hat on two doctrines that they allege exist in the caselaw of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court. The first stems from the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's statements in a 1964 case that, in accepting the Commonwealth's Bill of Rights, the United States Congress was to presume -- and in fact it is so and ought to be -- that the public powers and the courts of the Commonwealth shall render effective and construe the provisions of the [Puerto Rico] Bill of Rights in a manner consistent with the protection afforded . . . by the same or similar provisions of the Constitution of the United States. R.C.A. Communications, Inc. v. Gov't of the Capital, 91 P.R.R. 404, 414-15 (P.R. 1964). The second comes into play when a federal court certifies a question of state law to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court. According to the Supreme Court: [W]hen the question before us refers to the validity of a state law under a clause of the state constitution that is similar to a clause in the federal Constitution . . . the issue is a mixed question of federal and state rights that must be resolved by the federal court, because the validity of the statute under the -21- federal Constitution necessarily disposes of the question under state law. . . . In these circumstances we must refuse certification, since our decision would be only advisory. Pan Am. Computer Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 112 D.P.R. 780, 793-94 (1982) (translation supplied by this court). According to Respondents, these two provisions mean that the Supreme Court's evaluation of the Suárez Plaintiffs' claims under the due process and equal protection doctrines of the Commonwealth Constitution will require the resolution of a federal question: whether the parallel provisions of the United States Constitution would be violated by the acts in question. Accordingly, Respondents argue, the District Court has removal jurisdiction under the federal ingredient doctrine. These arguments fundamentally misconstrue the federal ingredient doctrine. Whether a state court will adopt as the meaning of the state's constitution the federal courts' interpretation of parallel language in the United States Constitution is a matter of state law. See, e.g., Nieves, 7 F.3d at 274. Federal law does not compel such an outcome. Thus, a determination of whether a violation of the Puerto Rican Constitution's guarantees of due process and equal protection has occurred does not require resolution of whether the conduct complained of would violate the Federal Constitution. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13 (emphasis added); see also Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936) (To bring a case within -22- the [removal] statute, a right or immunity created by the Constitution . . . must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action.) (emphasis added). To decide otherwise would mean that any case brought under a provision of the Puerto Rico Constitution that mirrors the language of the United States Constitution could be removed into federal court. Accordingly, we find that removal jurisdiction over the Suárez action is lacking, and it must be remanded to the Commonwealth court from which it was removed. 28 U.S.C. § 1447.