Opinion ID: 23906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The statutes satisfy the requirements of Burger

Text: 14 The district court concluded that the stop and inspection were permissible under Burger's warrant exception for closely or pervasively regulated industries. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03; cf. United States v. Hernandez, 901 F.2d 1217, 1221 n.4 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that the state may regulate commercial trucking). 15 Fort contends, however, that Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) is the controlling authority, rather than Burger. Prouse held that random stops of vehicles involving officers' unconstrained exercise of discretion to check driver's licenses in the absence of articulable suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 662-63, 99 S.Ct. 1391. Fort contends that the random stop of his truck was based upon the unfettered discretion of the officer, and argues that if the Texas statutory scheme confers such discretion, then it does not satisfy the test for warrantless regulatory searches under Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03. We agree with the government that Prouse itself recognized an exception based upon regulatory inspections. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 n.26 (noting that its holding did not cast doubt on permissibility of truck weigh-in stations and checkpoints). 4 We conclude therefore that the Burger analysis is applicable to the stop and inspection of Fort's truck. 16 A warrantless inspection of a pervasively regulated business is valid under Burger if: 1) there is a substantial government interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made; 2) the inspection is necessary to further the regulatory scheme; and 3) the statutory or regulatory scheme provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03. 17
18 Fort initially contends that commercial trucking is not a pervasively regulated industry. Although we have not previously addressed this issue, three of our sister circuits have concluded that Burger does apply to the commercial trucking industry. See United States v. Burch, 153 F.3d 1140, 1141-42 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying Burger test to stop of a semi-tractor/trailer rig); V-1 Oil Co. v. Means, 94 F.3d 1420, 1426-28 (10th Cir. 1996) (analyzing random safety inspection of a commercial vehicle under Burger); United States v. V-1 Oil Co., 63 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying the Burger test to inspection of a facility because its trucks hauled hazardous materials); United States v. Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d 464, 468 (6th Cir. 1991) (concluding that commercial trucking is a pervasively regulated industry). 19 Because commercial trucking is governed by extensive federal and state regulations, the district court correctly concluded that Burger was applicable. See Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d at 468; Hernandez, 901 F.2d at 1221 n.4. 20
21 The district court correctly concluded that the state has a substantial interest in traveler safety and in reducing taxpayer costs that stem from personal injuries and property damage caused by commercial motor carriers. Cf. Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d at 468 (concluding that the safe operation of large commercial vehicles satisfies the substantial interest prong). 22
23 Fort contends that unfettered discretion of officers to stop commercial vehicles is not necessary to promote the State's interest in traveler safety through the regulation of commercial vehicles. As it has been framed, the issue is not whether warrantless inspections are necessary to further the statutory scheme, but taking one step back, whether unfettered discretion in deciding to make the stop in order to perform the inspection is necessary. We reject Fort's importation of the Prouse standard into the Burger analysis. The district court concluded that warrantless stops and inspections are necessary under Burger because Texas must be able to conduct driver and vehicle safety inspections for problems that may not be apparent to officers on patrol. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03. We concur with the district court. 24 Texas undoubtedly has a strong interest in promoting safety and compliance with both federal and state regulations and statutes governing commercial vehicles. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 644.051(c), (d) (allowing the director to adopt all or part of the federal safety regulations and to adopt rules that ensure, inter alia, that commercial motor vehicles are safely maintained, equipped, loaded, and operated and that the physical condition of the commercial vehicle's driver enables the safe operation of the vehicle); see also 49 U.S.C. 31131(a), (b) (indicating that safety regulations concerning commercial vehicles are necessary to promote the safe operation of commercial motor vehicles and to enhance commercial vehicle safety to reduce highway fatalities, injuries and property damage). We agree with the government that random stops are one means to promote Texas's interest in commercial vehicle safety. 25 Commercial trucks pass quickly through states and out of the jurisdictions of the enforcement agencies. See Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d at 469. 5 Because of the transitory nature of the commercial trucking industry, we conclude that the need for warrantless stops and inspections is even more compelling than the warrantless inspections of automobile junkyards upheld in Burger. See id. (recognizing that if the state is to be successful in regulating common carriers in the trucking industry and the types of cargo they transport, the state must be able to inspect trucks and cargo frequently); see also V-1 Oil Co., 94 F.3d at 1426 (noting that random safety inspections may be necessary because drivers can avoid both fixed and temporary checkpoints). 26 We reject Fort's contention that Prouse forbids random, suspicionless stops and inspections of commercial trucks. The concerns that informed the analysis in Prouse have less applicability in the context of statutory or regulatory inspections in the pervasively regulated industry of commercial trucking. In Prouse, the Supreme Court focused on the need to balance the intrusion on an individual's Fourth Amendment privacy interests against the promotion of legitimate government interests, in reaching its conclusion that unconstrained exercises of discretion to spot-check vehicles and drivers was impermissible. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654, 661-63. In contrast, both the Supreme Court and this court have recognized a reduced expectation of privacy for regulated industries, and, thus, the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for a government search has lessened application in this context. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 702; Hernandez, 901 F.2d at 1221 n.4 (noting that because the state may regulate commercial trucking, the Fourth Amendment's guarantees are implicated to a lesser degree in searches of commercial cargo being carried by a commercial truck). 6 27 We conclude that the district court did not err by determining that the random stop and inspection were necessary to promote Texas's statutory and regulatory scheme. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03; Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d at 469. 28
29 Burger requires that the statute's inspection program must: 1) advise the owner of the commercial premises that the search is being made pursuant to law; and 2) limit the discretion of the inspecting officers. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 703. 30 The district court concluded that the Texas statutory scheme met both requirements because Texas law provides property owners with adequate notice that their vehicles may be seized and searched on the highways under section 644.103(a), and limits the discretion of the inspecting officers under section 644.104(b). 31 We agree, even though both statutes could have been more comprehensive and defined. There is enough, however, to permit any owner of a commercial vehicle to be aware that he would be subject to warrantless and suspicionless stops while driving. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 703. Although the sections do appear to limit the discretion of an officer after the stop, see Tex. Transp. Code Ann. 644.103(c) and 644.104(b), they are subject to criticism for failing to provide specific limitations on the officer's discretion in making the decision to stop. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 703. We are satisfied, however, from the background testimony, that this stop met constitutional muster. 32 We conclude that the warrantless stop and inspection of Fort's commercial vehicle were valid under Burger's regulatory exception to the warrant requirement. 33 Given our conclusion that the stop was permissible, we need not address the government's argument that this court should affirm because Officer Scales had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop Fort's truck based on his observation of a regulatory violation. We note, however, that the government waived this argument at the suppression hearing by expressly representing to the district court that it was relying on this evidence only as background and not reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the stop. See Matter of Christopher, 28 F.3d 512, 521 (5th Cir. 1994) (waiver may be demonstrated by a showing that a party intended to relinquish a known right or privilege). As a result of the government's representation, the facts concerning the officer's observation were not developed. The time for doing so has passed. 34