Opinion ID: 867532
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: constitutionality analysis

Text: ¶ 11 Statutes are presumed constitutional and the burden of proof is on the opponent of the statute to show it infringes upon a constitutional guarantee or violates a constitutional principle. State v. Wagstaff, 164 Ariz. 485, 494, 794 P.2d 118, 127 (1990). The federal and state due process clauses contain nearly identical language and protect the same interests. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 4; see also State v. Melendez, 172 Ariz. 68, 71, 834 P.2d 154, 157 (1992) (The touchstone of due process under both the Arizona and federal constitutions is fundamental fairness.). Although this court, when interpreting a state constitutional provision, is not bound by the Supreme Court's interpretation of a federal constitutional clause, those interpretations have great weight in accomplishing the desired uniformity between the clauses. Pool, 139 Ariz. at 108, 677 P.2d at 271; see State v. Noble, 171 Ariz. 171, 173, 829 P.2d 1217, 1219 (1992) (identical federal and state constitutional clauses interpreted similarly). ¶ 12 In Martin, the Supreme Court held that an Ohio statute requiring a defendant to prove self-defense did not violate the federal due process mandate, as declared in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970), that a defendant may not be convicted except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The dissent in Martin pointed out that the requirement that the state prove premeditation, defined as calculated intent, could conflict with the self-defense requirement that the danger be sudden. Nevertheless, the majority upheld the statute, stating that the jury could be properly instructed. Accordingly, section 13-205 does not violate the federal due process clause. ¶ 13 Under the due process clause of Arizona's constitution, fundamental fairness is still the touchstone. Melendez, 172 Ariz. at 71, 834 P.2d at 157. Requiring the defendant to prove self-defense or other affirmative defenses is not fundamentally unfair. See Martin, 480 U.S. at 236, 107 S.Ct. at 1103, 94 L.Ed.2d 267. We see no compelling reason to interpret the state due process clause differently in this context from the federal clause. See Noble, 171 Ariz. at 173, 829 P.2d at 1219; Pool, 139 Ariz. at 108, 677 P.2d at 271. Moreover, the conflict between the premeditation element of murder and the components of self-defense that troubled the dissenters in Martin does not exist with respect to the offense of aggravated assault. As relevant here, a defendant commits aggravated assault by committing assault and causing serious physical injury to another or committing assault using a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. A.R.S. § 13-1204(A). The state therefore was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Casey had intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly shot the victim. A.R.S. §§ 13-1203, 13-1204. Casey was then required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason he shot the victim was to prevent the victim from causing serious physical injury to him or his pregnant girlfriend. See A.R.S. §§ 13-205, 13-404, 13-405, 13-406. Casey was not required to disprove any element of the offense and the potential conflict found in murder cases does not exist here. ¶ 14 Furthermore, our courts have found that the legislature did not violate defendants' due process rights by placing the burden of proving other affirmative defenses, such as entrapment under A.R.S. section 13-206 and insanity under A.R.S. section 13-502, on the defendant. See State v. Moorman, 154 Ariz. 578, 586, 744 P.2d 679, 687 (1987) (defendant may be required to prove insanity defense); State v. Preston, 197 Ariz. 461, 4 P.3d 1004 (App.2000) (defendant may be required to prove entrapment defense under clear and convincing standard). A self-defense claim also justifies conduct which would otherwise be criminal, and it is appropriate to treat similar defenses in the same fashion from a constitutional standpoint. ¶ 15 Therefore, based on the legislature's constitutional authority to define crimes and defenses, the meaning of the federal due process clause and the desired uniformity with it, and the legislature's treatment of other defenses, which we have held constitutional, we hold section 13-205 does not violate the due process clause of Arizona's constitution.