Opinion ID: 883122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Did Sheriff Rhodes' trial testimony concerning Flathead County's policies and procedures contradict his deposition testimony to Buhr's detriment?

Text: Buhr submitted interrogatories to Flathead County requesting, among other things, information about its policies and procedures pertaining to Health Intake Screening and Administration of Medicine at the time Joshua was detained in the soft cell. In response, the County referenced a policy manual written after the events at issue, but containing the policies routinely used by Sheriff's Department personnel at the time those events occurred. Rhodes referred to the same manual during his later deposition. Among other things, Rhodes stated that the manual was the result of successive drafts. At trial, Buhr examined Rhodes about the health screening and medication policies. Rhodes responded by stating that, at the time Joshua was detained, his department did not have any written policies. He further responded that the manual used in his deposition contained current policies and that the earlier interrogatory answer identifying the manual as containing the policies in effect when Joshua was detained was not quite accurate. Buhr moved for admission of the written policies and procedures. Rhodes' counsel objected on the basis of relevancy and lack of foundation and the District Court sustained the objection. Buhr continued his examination of Rhodes. On appeal, Buhr argues that the change in Rhodes' testimony relating to medical policies prejudiced his case and entitles him to a new trial on his claims against Flathead County. We disagree. Section 25-11-102(3), MCA, provides that a new trial may be granted on the application of a party aggrieved by accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. We previously have determined that a party moving for a new trial under this subsection must show that: 1) the moving party was actually surprised; 2) the facts causing the surprise had a material bearing on the case; 3) the verdict or decision resulted mainly from these facts; 4) the surprise did not result from the moving party's inattention or negligence; 5) the moving party acted promptly and claimed relief at the earliest opportunity; 6) the moving party used every means reasonably available at the time of the surprise to remedy it; and 7) the result of a new trial without the surprise would probably be different. Donovan v. Graff (1988), 231 Mont. 456, 459, 753 P.2d 878, 880. Each of these criteria must be met before a party is entitled to a new trial on the basis of surprise. Boyd v. State Medical Oxygen & Supply, Inc. (1990), 246 Mont. 247, 254, 805 P.2d 1282, 1287. It is apparent from the interrogatory answers and Rhodes' deposition and trial testimony that the fact which surprised Buhr was that the detention center's written manual did not contain the identical medical policies used at the time Joshua was detained. Buhr offers no argument regarding how this fact had a material bearing on his case. Indeed, after reviewing Buhr's thorough questioning of Rhodes about the intake procedures and administration of medications in the detention center when Joshua was detained, we cannot conclude that this surprise had a material bearing on Buhr's case, that the verdict in favor of Flathead County resulted from it, or that the result of a new trial would have been different. Our review of the record also reveals that Buhr did not satisfy the fifth criterion. At the point when the alleged surprise occurred, Buhr neither objected to Rhodes' testimony nor claimed that the change in Rhodes' testimony detrimentally impacted his ability to present his case. It was only after the jury returned a verdict adverse to Buhr that he claimed surprise based on the change in Rhodes' testimony. We conclude, therefore, that Buhr failed to act promptly and claim relief from the surprise at the earliest opportunity. Furthermore, we agree with Rhodes that Buhr could have taken steps to remedy any effect of the alleged surprise, including a motion for a continuance or a request for a court order making a transcript of Rhodes' testimony available for Buhr's witnesses. The record does not establish any effort by Buhr to remedy the surprise; thus, the sixth criterion was not satisfied. Buhr clearly did not meet the criteria required for entitlement to a new trial under § 25-11-102(3), MCA. We conclude, therefore, that the District Court did not err in denying Buhr's motion for a new trial based on surprise.