Opinion ID: 2179322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trusts and trustees.

Text: a. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection ... the administration of express trusts where the administration of the court is invoked by the trustee, beneficiary, or any interested party.... This section was in effect at the time Kirkebys original claim and the original final report were filed. The Trust claims the trial court misapplied this subsection because Kirkeby did not have the authority to invoke the jurisdiction of the court under subsection d. Iowa Code section 633.10(4)( d ) (2001) states in relevant part: d. A trust that is administered solely or jointly by an individual trustee or trustees is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court unless jurisdiction is invoked by a trustee or beneficiary, or if otherwise provided by the governing instrument.... This argument confuses subject matter jurisdiction with the court's authority to hear a particular case. By 2001 when the Executors filed their amended final report and Kirkeby filed its amended claim, the legislature added Iowa Code section 633.6101 to the code. It stated: 1. The court has exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings concerning the internal affairs of a trust. 2. The court has concurrent jurisdiction of actions and proceedings to determine the existence of a trust, actions and proceedings by or against creditors or debtors of trusts, and other actions and proceedings involving trustees and third persons. By the time of trial in September of 2002, section 633.6101 had been amended effective July 1, 2002. As amended it stated: The district court has exclusive jurisdiction of proceeding concerning the internal affairs of a trust and of actions and proceedings to determine the existence of a trust, actions and proceedings by or against creditors or debtors of a trust, and any other actions and proceedings involving a trust and third persons. Iowa Code § 633.6101 (2003). At the time of the July 1, 2002 amendment to Iowa Code section 633.6101, the legislature also added Iowa Code section 633.7101. It provided: Notwithstanding any Code provision to the contrary, the provisions of this division shall prevail over any other applicable Code provision. Iowa Code 633.7101 (2003). Section 633.6101 prevails over section 633.10 because it is in the same division of the code as section 633.7101. At all times during the proceedings the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over Kirkeby's claim. Iowa Code section 633.10(4)( a ) conferred subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court when the original claim and final report were filed. When the amended claim and amended final report were filed and heard, Iowa Code section 633.6101 conferred subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court. Iowa Code section 633.10(4)( d ), if at all applicable, merely provides the procedural mechanism for granting the court authority to hear a particular case. The Trust's contention that the trial court misconstrued section 633.10 only goes to the court's authority to hear the case, making the judgment voidable not void. A voidable judgment is not subject to a collateral attack. Alternatively, the Trust contends it did not receive the required notice of Kirkeby's claim under Iowa Code section 633.418, which effectively deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. If the trial court entered judgment on defective notice, the Trust cannot attack it collaterally unless there was what in law amounts to no notice. Allen v. First Nat'l Bank, 191 Iowa 492, 495, 180 N.W. 675, 676 (1920). The trial court issued letters of appointment to the Executors on October 31, 1995. The Trust filed its Petition to Set Aside the Will on November 27, 1995. The Trust voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court by filing its petition. Morse v. Morse, 247 Iowa 1113, 1122-23, 77 N.W.2d 622, 627-28 (1956). The filing of its petition gave the trial court jurisdiction over the Trust for any purpose or for any cause of action properly joined in the proceedings. Jack & Toner v. D.M. & Ft. D. R., 49 Iowa 627, 627 (1878). Kirkeby filed its claim in duplicate with the clerk on January 24, 1996. The clerk mailed the claim to the Executors as required by Iowa Code section 633.418. Iowa Code section 633.418 did not require the clerk to give notice to the Trust or its attorney of record. On April 9, 1996, the trial court granted the Trust's motion for summary judgment and terminated the administration of the estate under the 1988 will. Even though the court terminated the administration of the estate, the court could not discharge the Executors until the Executors served notice of the final report or an application for discharge on all interested parties. Iowa Code § 633.478 (2003). On July 9, 1996, the Executors filed their final report. The final report listed Kirkeby's claim as being unpaid. See Iowa Code § 633.477(12) (2003) (requiring statement in the final report specifying compliance with statutory requirements pertaining to claims and whether all claims, including charges, have been paid ...). The Executors mailed the final report to the Trust's attorney of record. The Trust filed objections to the final report but did not make any objections to Kirkeby's claim. The Executors filed an amended final report in January of 2001. The amended report listed Kirkeby's claim as unpaid. The Executors mailed a copy of the amended final report to the attorney of record for the Trust. The Trust filed further objections to the amended report but did not make any objections to Kirkeby's claim. The court held the trial on the objections to the amended final report on September 20, 2001. There is no indication in the record that the Trust was surprised the trial included Kirkeby's claim. Kirkeby and the Trust appeared at trial. Kirkeby presented evidence on its claim. The Trust chose not to offer any evidence. The Trust did not raise an objection that it did not have notice the trial on the claim was being held on September 20. The Trust's post-trial brief did not raise any issues regarding Kirkeby's claim. On November 9, 2001, the trial court found the Trust was subject to its jurisdiction and allowed Kirkeby's claim against the Trust. The Trust chose not to file a motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2). The Trust chose not to appeal the allowance of Kirkeby's claim when it appealed the fee award. It is well-settled law when a party appears at trial in person or by counsel with actual notice of the trial, this is sufficient notice for judgment to be entered against that party. This rule applies even if a claim had not been served on the party and a prayer for relief had not been made in any application. Soppe v. Soppe, 232 Iowa 1293, 1296-97, 8 N.W.2d 243, 245 (1943). Under these circumstances a party cannot collaterally attack a judgment on the grounds it did not receive proper notice of the claim. Id. Even though a judgment may be erroneous, if the court has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the judgment is conclusive on collateral attack. Edgerly v. Sherman, 252 Iowa 352, 359, 107 N.W.2d 72, 76 (1961). The Trust's notice of Kirkeby's claim was sufficient notice to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. The Trust appeared at trial and participated in the proceedings. When a party is present in court or represented by counsel, an order allowing a claim is a final adjudication unless corrected on appeal. See In re DePenning's Estate, 244 Iowa 690, 702, 58 N.W.2d 9, 15 (1953). Any errors committed by the trial court were subject to a direct appeal by the Trust. The Trust cannot collaterally attack any deficiencies in the trial court's ruling.