Opinion ID: 1689505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: f. hamblen, inc. v. owens

Text: On review before this Court, petitioner argues that the Fourth District erred in extending the rule in C.F. Hamblen, Inc. v. Owens, 127 Fla. 91, 172 So. 694, 696 (1937), to the instant scenario so that a previous tortfeasor may be liable for the harm caused by a subsequent tortfeasor if the jury cannot apportion the injury between the two. Petitioner also advocates that this Court should adopt the rough apportionment method of dividing damage where a jury cannot apportion by a preponderance of the evidence. We disagree with petitioner on both counts. The reasoning in support of Hamblen and its progeny also supports the application of the Hamblen rationale to the instant circumstance. Hamblen recognized the settled law that where injuries aggravate an existing ailment or develop a latent one, the person whose negligence caused the injury is required to respond in damages for the results of the disease as well as the original injury. In such cases the injury is the prime cause which opens the way to and sets in motion the other cause and the latter cannot be regarded as an independent cause of injury, nor can the wrongdoer be allowed to apportion the measure of responsibility to the initial cause. The defendant must be responsible in damages for such part of the diseased condition as his negligence has caused and if there can be no apportionment, or it cannot be said that the disease would have existed apart from the injury, then he is responsible for the diseased condition. 127 Fla. at 95-96, 172 So. at 696. The Fourth District in Washewich v. LeFave, 248 So.2d 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971), applied Hamblen to an instance of successive accidents and held that where the evidence reveals two successive accidents, and the defendant is only responsible for the second accident, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove to the extent reasonably possible what injuries were proximately caused by each of the two accidents. The jury should be instructed to make an apportionment of the damages as between the two accidents insofar as it may be reasonably possible to do so, but if an apportionment is impossible, the jury may be authorized to charge the defendant with all damages flowing from the entire injury. Washewich, 248 So.2d at 672-73. The Washewich court relied on what it found to be the purpose of the Hamblen court's decision against apportionment: The rule of Hamblen v. Owens has as its purpose the prevention of a subsequent wrongdoer from escaping responsibility where his conduct contributed to the creation of the situation in which the problems of apportionment arose. Washewich, 248 So.2d at 673. An additional purpose in support of the Washewich decision is that the injured party should be able to recover for his or her injuries and the recovery should not be diminished because of a jury's inability to apportion injury between wrongdoers. In the present case, we have the reverse of Hamblen and Washewich, i.e., the prior tortfeasor is sued, but the concerns are the same. In keeping with Hamblen 's principle of making the plaintiff whole, we conclude that where the plaintiff sues the first of two successive tortfeasors and establishes liability, but the jury cannot apportion the injury between the two after both parties have had the opportunity to present evidence on the issue, the first tortfeasor will be liable for the entire injury. The requirement of proving proximate cause as it relates to the issue of apportionment is relaxed so as to allow recovery for the indivisible injury. See id. at 672. Furthermore, a tortfeasor should not escape responsibility when two independent causes both proximately contribute to cause an ultimate injury and plaintiff has done everything that could reasonably have been expected of her to segregate the damages as between the two accidents. Gross, 721 So.2d at 307 (internal quotation marks omitted). In such an instance, prior tortfeasors will be liable for whole injuries just as subsequent tortfeasors have been liable for entire unapportionable injuries, thereby providing full relief for proven injuries suffered by victims of negligence. Imposition of liability for the indivisible injury upon the prior tortfeasor mirrors the like imposition on subsequent tortfeasors imposed by Hamblen.