Opinion ID: 25431
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Meade’s Section 1983 Claim Against Simon

Text: Meade argues on appeal, as she did in the district court, that there is evidence of joint action, or “collusion” between Ratliff, a Simon’s employee, and Walker, who Meade contends was acting under the color of state law when the incident occurred. Meade asserts that Ratliff willfully 3 A municipality cannot have § 1983 liability based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Further, “[e]very circuit court to consider the issue has extended the holding to private corporations as well.” Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1129-30 (11th Cir. 1992) (collecting cases). 7 participated with Walker in a typical police action in a depart ment store, searching for stolen merchandise and trying to investigate and apprehend a theft suspect. Therefore, Meade concludes that Simon and Dillard’s were acting under the color of law for purposes of § 1983. The district court did not elaborate in its ruling denying Meade’s claim. Further, no cases in the Fifth Circuit or the Supreme Court have found that a private party was acting under the color of state law in the circumstances alleged by Meade. Simon argues that this court’s holding in White v. Scrivner Corp., 594 F.2d 140, 142-45 (5th Cir. 1979), is controlling in the case at bar. In White, this court stated that the function of a private entity could be attributed to the state only when the function is exclusively reserved to the state. Id. at 142. This court held that “a merchant’s detention of persons suspect ed of stealing store property simply is not an action exclusively associated with the state,” and a subsequent search of a suspect was merely an extension of the detention for shoplifting. Id. at 142-43. This court concluded that such actions are not to be considered to be taken under color of law for § 1983 purposes. Id. at 144. However, White did not involve a circumstance in which a private party relies on a police officer’s official authority to deprive another of constitutional rights, as the case at bar does. In fact, this court has distinguished White on this very basis. In Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 764 F.2d 381, 388 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1985), this court reversed a FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of a § 1983 claim where the allegations would permit a finding that a private party has participated in joint action with an agent of the state. Thus, White does not apply to this case. The joint action required to impose § 1983 liability on a private actor requires a “substantial degree of cooperative action” between the private actor and government officials. Collin v. Womanacre, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989). Walker’s alleged discussions with Ratliff and his 8 consent to stand nearby while Ratliff investigated Meade were insufficient to constitute substantial interaction for § 1983 purposes. D. Meade’s False Imprisonment Claim Against Dillard’s. Under Texas law, false imprisonment is the “direct restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another, without adequate legal justification” and without the person’s consent. Such restrain may “be effected by violence, or by threats or by any other means, which restrains a person from moving from one place to another.” Reicheneder v. Skaggs Drug Ctr., 421 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1970). “Liability for false imprisonment extends to anyone who directs, requests, or participates in a detention.” Smith v. Sneed, 938 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Tex. App. 1997). Meade argues that she was illegally restrained by Ratliff and Walker, who were acting in concert. Further, she contends that her second illegal detention was a direct result of false reports from Dillard’s’ employees. Regarding the first detention, the district court stated that Walker did nothing more then stand within five feet of Meade while she was being investigated by Ratliff and did not join in the detention. Accordingly, the district court found that Dillard’s was entitled to summary judgment on Meade’s false imprisonment claim. It is undisputed that Dillard’s did not play a primary role in the detention of Meade. However, in opposition to the summary judgment motion, Meade presented the affidavit of Calvin E. Lee (“Lee”), an expert witness. Lee stated that because Walker was in full police uniform and was standing in close proximity to Meade while Ratliff questioned her and examined her purse, Walker was involved in the incident by virtue of his “commanding presence.” Texas jurisprudence does not provide clear guidance as to whether substantial, active participation is required to bring about liability for false imprisonment, or whether minimal, passive participation is sufficient. Nonetheless, 9 this court need not reach this issue because the “[m]ere conclusory allegations” of Meade’s expert witness “are not competent summary judgment evidence, and . . . are therefore insufficient to defeat or support a motion for summary judgment.” Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that Dillard’s is not liable for false imprisonment because it did not directly participate in Meade’s detention. Further, the district court also rejected Meade’s assertion that she had been identified by Dillard’s employees, making Dillard’s liable for the alleged subsequent false imprisonment. The district court found that an employee who merely reports an alleged crime, and identifies the offender, is not liable for any subsequent false imprisonment. Lewis v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 686, 702 (S.D. Tex. 1999). The district court properly found t hat there was no evidence that the Dillard’s employees directed or requested that Meade be arrested. Thus, although the Dillard’s employees may have identified Meade as the perpetrator of the offense, this could not defeat summary judgment because an inference that the employees directed the detention would be based on speculation. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that Dillard’s played no part in either of the alleged unlawful detentions of Meade. E. Denial of Meade’s Motion for Reconsideration. Meade filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s denial of her Motion for Reconsideration. However, Meade did not discuss this issue in the body of her brief. Likewise, her notice of appeal encompasses the grant of summary judgment for Dillard’s on her assault claim, however; Meade does not discuss the assault claim in her brief. Therefore, Meade has waived these issues on appeal. Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). 10