Opinion ID: 199502
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Roberto Garraton

Text: We analyze González's new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence of allegedly perjured testimony by Garraton under the traditional Rule 33 probability of acquittal standard, as González does not raise any colorable claim that the government knew Garraton's testimony to be false, assuming it was false. No inference of government knowledge of perjury arises from the mere fact of a convict's hearsay report that a material witness recanted testimony. The district court cited two infirmities in González's claim. First, the court viewed with considerable skepticism González's evidence of Garraton's recantations, which consisted of affidavits by an inmate to whom Garraton allegedly confessed his perjury. More important, the court doubted Garraton's recantation because his testimony as to González's role in the drug trafficking conspiracy was corroborated by other trial witnesses, including law enforcement officers, and by documentary evidence. The substantial amount of evidence supporting González's conviction described above, apart from the testimony of Garraton, means we cannot say that the district court manifestly abused its discretion in denying González's motion for a new trial on the basis of evidence that Garraton testified falsely at González's trial. The district -14- court has broad power to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of both the witness who testified at trial and those whose testimony constitutes 'new' evidence. United States v. Montilla-Rivera, 115 F.3d 1060, 1067 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Wright, 625 F.2d at 1019). González argues that the court, at least, should have held a hearing on the question whether the witnesses' testimony was false. But in similar circumstances, we have said that a hearing on postconviction motions is not necessary where a defendant's claim is conclusively refuted as to the alleged facts by the files and records of the case. United States v. Carbone, 880 F.2d 1500, 1502 (1st Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).2 Here, as the district court found, ample evidence supports the jury's verdict, and so González has failed to show that the alleged new evidence of perjury, under either standard, warrants a new trial. C. The Alleged Withholding of Evidence/Prosecutorial Misconduct González's alternative theory in support of his motion for a new trial is that the government failed to disclose the extent of Giraldo's cooperation with prosecutors in a case in the Southern 2 We also note that González waited to file his motion until one of the alleged perjurers was no longer within the reach of the court. It appears that the conversations reported were shortly after the 1996 trial, but no motion was filed until June of 1999, three years after trial. (This was also over a year after this court affirmed González's conviction in his appeal from an earlier unsuccessful new trial motion, which was based on, inter alia, faulty jury instructions. See United States v. González-González, 136 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1998)). González is in a poor position to complain about a lack of a hearing. -15- District of Florida, violating its obligations under Brady to produce to defendants exculpatory and impeachment evidence in its possession. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676; Josleyn, 206 F.3d at 151. González also charges the prosecution with misconduct based on inaccurate statements made to the district court about Giraldo's cooperation. The record in this case as to the government's conduct, dubious perjury allegations aside, is not exemplary. The district court had good reason for its assumption that the evidence withheld by the government qualifies as Brady material. Secondly, as discussed below, the prosecutor was either careless or made a misrepresentation to the court. Giraldo testified against González at his trial in February, 1996. Giraldo had entered into a proffer immunity agreement with the Southern District of Florida United States Attorney's Office on June 29, 1995, as to her criminal conduct in Florida; she was debriefed on June 30 and July 6, 1995, which debriefing the FBI summarized in a 302 report on July 8, 1995; and on August 22, 1996, Giraldo entered into a cooperation/plea agreement with the government. The government did not disclose Giraldo's proffer agreement or the FBI report,3 evidence 3 Not only did the government fail to voluntarily produce the information to González, but also it did not produce the 302 report to the district court (although it did, in a footnote to its reply, offer to produce it for in camera review). Instead, the government submitted an affidavit of an FBI agent stating that the report was limited to -16- González could have used in an effort to impeach Giraldo's testimony. Undisclosed impeachment evidence, if powerful enough, could constitute grounds for a new trial. United States v. Dumas, 207 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2000). The question, then, is whether there is a reasonable probability that the jury, had it known the true extent and earlier date of Giraldo's cooperation with the government, would have reached a different verdict. We think not. The jury knew that Giraldo was cooperating with authorities in Florida. As the district court found, González thoroughly cross-examined [Giraldo] as to her cooperation with the prosecutor's office in Miami and her credibility was impeached by questioning about her expectations of lenient treatment. United States v. González- González, 106 F. Supp. 2d 269, 275 (D.P.R. 2000). Thus, the undisclosed evidence was cumulative. Although the FBI report should have been turned over to González, the fact that it was not did not deprive him of a fair trial, understood as a trial Giraldo's debriefing relative to the Florida indictment. Inexplicably, the government persisted in its contention that the report was not Brady/Giglio material, and at the time of oral argument before this court, still had refused to produce it to González, although the government was unable to identify any reason why the report should not be disclosed. It took an order from this court before the government turned the report over. A criminal defendant is entitled to exculpatory evidence, including impeachment evidence, in the government's possession, and is not expected to take the government at its word as to the materiality of that evidence. Having viewed the report for ourselves, we are satisfied that Giraldo's debriefing was limited to the Florida investigation. -17- resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted). That does not end our inquiry, however, as González also makes a troubling charge of prosecutorial misconduct. The same government prosecutor who on June 30, 1995, had filed a motion notifying the court of Giraldo's scheduled debriefing, told the court on February 7, 1996, during González's trial, that Giraldo has not yet been debriefed [in the Florida case] as of yet to my knowledge. Yet at the time of this statement Giraldo had been debriefed some seven months earlier. Moreover, González claims that the same prosecutor failed to correct Giraldo's inaccurate testimony about the timing and extent of her interactions with the government, which González says the prosecutor knew to be false. González's complaint is not frivolous; the prosecution, at the least, was careless. But the remedy of a new trial is not necessarily in order whenever a court finds misconduct. The determination of whether prosecutorial misconduct has so poisoned the well that a new trial is required involves the weighing of several factors: (1) the severity of the misconduct; (2) the context in which it occurred; (3) whether the judge gave any curative instructions and the likely effect of such instructions; and (4) the strength of the evidence against the defendant. United States v. Rodriguez-De Jesus, 202 F.3d 482, 485 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and -18- citations omitted). Taking a balanced view of the evidence in the record, id., we think that the misinformation about the extent and timing of Giraldo's cooperation, which at best would have provided further impeachment evidence, did not deprive González of a fair trial given the volume of evidence in support of his conviction. The denial of González's motion for a new trial is affirmed. -19-