Opinion ID: 1360499
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Agency Law

Text: The majority also reasons that agency law dictates that the qualified immunity of the parole officers not be extended to the State. The general rule upon which the majority relies has not heretofore been the law in this state where governmental liability is at issue, and I believe its adoption in this case is unwise. Initially, this court has extended individual immunity to the governmental employer in a number of cases. Creelman, 67 Wn.2d 882; Guffey, 103 Wn.2d 144; Frost v. City of Walla Walla, 106 Wn.2d 669. The agency principle upon which the majority relies did not require a different result in those cases. Indeed, the decision in Creelman to extend the individual immunity to the governmental employer was made in the face of argument that the immunity of one of two or more persons, who would otherwise be liable for a harm, does not bar recovery against the others. Creelman, 67 Wn.2d at 885 (the argument was based upon 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 880 (1939)). The court rejected the notion that immunity of one person may not be extended to another where the policy reasons for the immunity apply as well to the second person or entity. This conclusion was reached in precisely the kind of case now before the court  where a party is asserting that a general rule be applied to hold that immunity of a state agent does not extend to the State where the State is sued on the basis of respondeat superior. Moreover, in Frost, this court overruled Spencer v. King County, 39 Wn. App. 201, 692 P.2d 874 (1984), where the Court of Appeals had refused to extend individual police officer immunity to the county under the involuntary commitment law. Frost, at 673-74. In Spencer, the court, like the majority in this case, relied in part upon RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 (1958) for its holding. In overruling Spencer, the court said that the decision there contradicted Creelman. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 (1958) was cited in Babcock. First, the court noted the general rule that an agent's immunity generally does not extend to the principal. Babcock, 116 Wn.2d at 620. The court then recognized, however, that personal immunities of some government officials had nevertheless been extended to the government in this state. Babcock, 116 Wn.2d at 621 (citing Creelman and Guffey ). The court distinguished those cases by saying that in each of them the State had committed no acts of its own; the plaintiffs could only sue on the basis of respondeat superior. Babcock, 116 Wn.2d at 621. The court then said that the plaintiffs in Babcock alleged that DSHS's negligent supervision caused injury. To the extent this analysis means that the government may not shield itself from negligent acts which are distinct from those of the immune individuals, this analysis is sound. As the court said in Babcock, 116 Wn.2d at 622, existence of some tort liability would encourage DSHS, the agency there involved, to avoid negligent conduct and enable persons injured by DSHS to recover. More important to this case, where the basis of the suit is respondeat superior, Babcock recognized that our cases have extended individual immunity to the government employer, and have done so despite the general rule of agency law relied on in this case by the majority. Contrary to the majority's implication in this case, Babcock does not stand for the proposition that RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 precludes extension of immunity in this case. In short, as acknowledged in Babcock, and as reflected in our cases, § 217 does not represent the general rule in this State where the governmental employer is sued on the basis of respondeat superior.