Opinion ID: 1690384
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: national consensus against execution of juveniles and the mentally retarded

Text: To determine whether the application of the death penalty to juveniles constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, it is helpful to examine the Supreme Court's decisions in prior cases addressing the execution of juveniles and of the mentally retarded.
1. Thompson v. Oklahoma . In Thompson, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988), the Supreme Court determined that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the execution of those who were 15 years old or younger at the time of their crimes. Using an approach similar to that which he would utilize in Atkins some fourteen years later, Justice Stevens, in the principal opinion, said that in determining what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, judges should be guided by the `evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' Id. at 821, 108 S.Ct. 2687, quoting, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958). Such standards cannot remain static, but must `acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by humane justice,' for `a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gives it birth.' Id. at 821 n. 4, 108 S.Ct. 2687, quoting, Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373, 378, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910). To determine current standards of decency, Thompson examined: (a) relevant legislative enactments, and (b) evidence of how juries viewed the propriety of execution of the mentally retarded. It also considered (c) the views of respected national and international organizations. Finally, in light of the above and other factors, (d) the Supreme Court made its own judgment as to the propriety of such executions and explained why these indicators of contemporary standards of decency confirm our judgment that such a young person is not capable of acting with the degree of culpability that can justify the ultimate penalty. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822-23, 108 S.Ct. 2687. a. Legislative Enactments. In reviewing statutes governing punishment of children, Thompson found that [t]he line between childhood and adulthood is drawn in different ways by various States. Id. at 824, 108 S.Ct. 2687. Fourteen state legislatures then barred capital punishment altogether. Id. at 826, 108 S.Ct. 2687. In nineteen other states, the legislature permitted capital punishment, but state statutes failed to expressly state the minimum age for its imposition. Id. at 826-27, 108 S.Ct. 2687. Eighteen remaining states set a minimum age, varying from 16 to 18. Id. at 829, 108 S.Ct. 2687. No legislature had adopted a statute explicitly permitting the execution of those under age 16. Id. b. Imposition of the Death Penalty. Thompson also found that juries rarely imposed the death penalty on those under 16, that only eighteen to twenty such persons had been executed in the 20th century, and only one since 1948. Id. at 832, 108 S.Ct. 2687. Between 1982 and 1986, only five persons age 15 or younger were sentenced to death in the United States, leading the Court to conclude that, these five young offenders have received sentences that are `cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.' Id. at 833, 108 S.Ct. 2687, quoting, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (quoting Stewart, J., concurring). c. National and International Views. As a part of its discussion of legislation, the Supreme Court considered the views of respected national religious, social, and professional organizations, including the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American Law Institute, both of which it said have formally expressed their opposition to the death penalty for juveniles. Id. at 830, 108 S.Ct. 2687. And, stating that it had previously recognized the relevance of the views of the international community in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, id. at 830 n. 31, 108 S.Ct. 2687 (citations omitted), the Court also considered the sentencing practices of European and other countries, stating: Although the death penalty has not been entirely abolished in the United Kingdom or New Zealand (it has been abolished in Australia, except in the State of New South Wales, where it is available for treason and piracy), in neither of those countries may a juvenile be executed. The death penalty has been abolished in West Germany, France, Portugal, The Netherlands, and all of the Scandinavian countries, and is available only for exceptional crimes such as treason in Canada, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. Juvenile executions are also prohibited in the Soviet Union. Id. at 830-31, 108 S.Ct. 2687 (footnote omitted). d. Independent Analysis. Lastly, Thompson analyzed the culpability of juveniles as compared to adults and considered whether application of the death penalty to juveniles measurably contributed to the social purposes it was intended to serve. After noting broad agreement on the proposition that adolescents as a class are less mature and responsible than adults and the special mitigating force of youth, the Court concluded that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile. Id. at 834-35, 108 S.Ct. 2687. As to the social rationales of the death penaltyretribution and deterrenceit found them unacceptable for 15-year-old offenders because of the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender and because deterrence would not be jeopardized if the execution of those under 16 were prohibited. Id. at 836-37, 108 S.Ct. 2687. In light of all of these factors, Thompson concluded that a national consensus existed that execution of persons under 16 at the time of their crimes constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. 2. Stanford v. Kentucky . The following year, in Stanford, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306, Justice Scalia stated in the principal opinion that, by contrast, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments did not prohibit imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed at age 16 or 17. Id. at 370-77, 109 S.Ct. 2969. In so holding, Justice Scalia agreed that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment must be determined by current standards rather than by those in effect in 1789. Id. But, he said, current standards are almost entirely to be determined by reference to statutes passed by society's elected representatives, id. at 370, 109 S.Ct. 2969, and specifically by state legislatures. He then noted that, while the majority of states did not permit the execution of juvenile offenders, that count included the fourteen states that then barred capital punishment altogether. Id. at 370 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 2969. If one considered only those states permitting capital punishment, then the majority of that subgrouping approved the execution of those who were 16 or 17 at the time of their offense. Id. at 370, 109 S.Ct. 2969. And, although Stanford recognized that juries sentence substantially fewer juveniles than adults to death, it said this did not provide a reason to prohibit such death sentences entirely. Id. at 373-74, 109 S.Ct. 2969. Stanford also rejected, as irrelevant, the many state statutes barring those under 18 years old from engaging in various activities, such as voting, drinking, or driving. Id. at 374-77, 109 S.Ct. 2969. Similarly, although a year earlier Thompson had said the views of social, professional, and religious groups, as well as the sentencing practices of other countries, were relevant to determining current standards of decency, Stanford stated that the views of national organizations were an uncertain foundation on which to base constitutional law and that international practices were simply irrelevant to whether a national consensus existed. Id. at 369 n. 1, 377, 109 S.Ct. 2969. After so limiting its inquiry, Stanford concluded that there was no national consensus against executing offenders who were 16 or 17 at the time of the offense. Id. at 370-72, 379-80, 109 S.Ct. 2969.
1. Penry v. Lynaugh. The same day that the Supreme Court held in Stanford that there was no national consensus against imposition of the death penalty on juveniles, it held in Penry, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256, an opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, that there was also no national consensus against imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded. Like Thompson and Stanford, Penry recognized that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is not a static concept, immutably tied to what punishments would have been included within the reach of the Eighth Amendment when the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1789. Id. at 330, 109 S.Ct. 2934. Rather, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments also recognizes the `evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' Id. at 330-31, 109 S.Ct. 2934, quoting, Trop, 356 U.S. at 101, 78 S.Ct. 590. And, like Stanford, Penry looked to statutes passed by state legislatures as the best type of objective evidence of how our society views a particular punishment today. Id. at 331, 109 S.Ct. 2934. Penry also said that the Court looked to the data concerning the actions of sentencing juries. Id. a. Legislative Action. When Penry was decided in 1989, only Georgia, Maryland, and the federal government had statutes barring the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded. Id. at 334, 109 S.Ct. 2934. The Supreme Court concluded that the two state statutes prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded, even when added to the 14 States that have rejected capital punishment completely, do not provide sufficient evidence at present of a national consensus. Id. (emphasis added). b. Other Factors. Mr. Penry was unable to provide evidence that juries chose not to sentence mentally retarded defendants to death. In addition, on the record before it, the Supreme Court said it could not conclude that all mentally retarded people, by definition, can never act with the level of culpability associated with the death penalty. Id. at 338-39, 109 S.Ct. 2934. For these reasons, the Court determined that at present, there is insufficient evidence of a national consensus against executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses for us to conclude that it is categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 335, 109 S.Ct. 2934. 2. Atkins v. Virginia. In 2002, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of capital punishment of the mentally retarded in the case of Daryl Atkins, an allegedly mentally retarded man whose death sentence had been affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court based on Penry ' s determination that there is no national consensus against the execution of the mentally retarded. In a principal opinion by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court reversed Mr. Atkins' death sentence and remanded for a determination of his mental status. Atkins, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335. In so holding, Atkins reaffirmed that whether capital punishment is barred for certain classes of offenders is necessarily part of a fluid, rather than a static, process and that as our standards of decency evolve, so will the determination of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 312, 122 S.Ct. 2242. Atkins ' analysis more closely resembles that in Thompson than that in Stanford. Atkins : (a) first looked at the objective evidence of legislative intent provided by state legislation barring the death penalty. (b) Like Penry , it considered the frequency with which the death penalty was imposed on the mentally retarded. (c) It then looked to the opinions of national professional, religious, and social organizations, and the approach of other countries to the death penalty for the mentally retarded. (d) Finally, it undertook an independent examination of whether the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under today's evolving standards of decency. Id. at 313, 122 S.Ct. 2242. a. Legislative Action. Atkins found that, in the thirteen years after Penry , fourteen more statesincluding Missourihad adopted legislation barring the application of their death penalty laws to the mentally retarded. And, while New York and Nebraska had each reinstated the death penalty, each had specifically exempted the mentally retarded from the reach of those newly enacted statutes. Id. at 314-15, 122 S.Ct. 2242. When these sixteen new states were added to the two states that had already adopted such legislation in 1989, eighteen states, and the federal government, then prohibited imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded. See id. In addition, the Court noted that the Texas legislature had unanimously adopted a bill barring the execution of the mentally retarded, but the bill was vetoed by the governor on other grounds, and that at least one house of the Virginia and Nevada legislatures had similarly adopted bills barring the death penalty for the mentally retarded. Id. at 315, 122 S.Ct. 2242. [4] While the number of states barring imposition of the death penalty had clearly grown impressively, the Court stated that, It is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). This consistency was further reflected by the fact that, since Penry , no state had adopted a law permitting the execution of the mentally retarded. Id. at 315-16, 122 S.Ct. 2242. The Court found such consistency particularly persuasive given the anticrime atmosphere of the times: Given the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime, the large number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of States passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions) provides powerful evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal. Id. b. Frequency of Imposition of Death Penalty. The Court found that some states, such as New Hampshire and New Jersey, whose statutes nominally authorize the execution of mentally retarded persons, had not carried out executions of any persons in decades, thus removing the incentive to pass legislation barring execution of the mentally retarded in particular. Id. at 316, 122 S.Ct. 2242. And, in those states that still carried out executions, the Court found, the practice of executing mentally retarded offenders had become very uncommon: only five persons who were known to have an I.Q. of less than 70 had been executed in the thirteen years since Penry . Id. The Court concluded that [t]he practice ... has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it. Id. c. National and International Opposition to Death Penalty. Atkins stated that the consensus against the death penalty for the mentally retarded was evident not only from the legislation passed over the prior thirteen years, and the rareness of the application of the death penalty in those states that permitted its use, but also from the opposition to the practice from experts in the field, noting several organizations with germane expertise have adopted official positions opposing the imposition of the death penalty upon a mentally retarded offender, including the American Psychological Association and the American Association of Mental Retardation. Id. at 316 n. 21, 122 S.Ct. 2242. The Court also found the sentiments of this nation's religious communities, and of the world community, to be overwhelmingly opposed to execution of the mentally retarded. Id. Finally, the Court cited to polling data that showed a widespread consensus among Americans, even those who support the death penalty, that executing the mentally retarded is wrong. Id. While the Court stated that the opposition of these groups was by no means dispositive, the Court did find significant their consistency with the legislative evidence, stating that it provided further support to [the Court's] conclusion that there is a consensus among those who have addressed the issue. Id. d. Independent Judicial Determination. Finally, the Supreme Court undertook an independent evaluation of whether such executions should be prohibited. It found that neither the retributive nor the deterrence justifications for the death penalty would be furthered by executing the mentally retarded, stating, If the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution. Id. at 319, 122 S.Ct. 2242. [5] It further concluded, the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make [mentally retarded] defendants less morally culpable ... also make it less likely that they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that information. Id. at 320, 122 S.Ct. 2242. The Court further implicitly rejected the suggestion in Penry that the death penalty could not be barred if any mentally retarded person might theoretically deserve it, so that the effect of mental retardation should instead simply be considered as a mitigating factor. Id. at 318-19, 122 S.Ct. 2242. Rather, it said, the very fact that persons are mentally retarded not only makes them more likely to give a false confession, but also makes them less able to assist their counsel, typically makes them poor witnesses, and may cause them to exhibit a demeanor that is unsympathetic and that may incorrectly imply a lack of remorse. Id. at 320-21, 122 S.Ct. 2242. Its independent evaluation led the Court to conclude that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal. Id. at 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242.