Opinion ID: 2636899
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Irresistible impulse instruction.

Text: The court instructed the jury: If a person knows and understands the nature or quality of his act or that it was wrong, then it is not a defense that he committed the act with which he is charged under an uncontrollable or irresistible impulse. [30] Appellant claims this was error, arguing that the instruction could cause a reasonable juror to believe that his defense, that he acted on what he believed were commands from God, involved irresistible impulse. He had objected to an irresistible impulse instruction on that basis during an earlier discussion of sanity phase instructions. The court ruled that an instruction on irresistible impulse would be given, explaining that there was evidence that appellant had not always obeyed the signs he believed were from God, and there was no evidence that he could not refuse. 175, 76] We do not agree that the court erred. While the court's reason for giving the instruction does not support it, the instruction correctly stated the law insofar as irresistible impulse might be offered as a defense at the sanity phase and the instruction was responsive to the evidence. [31] Irresistible impulse does not demonstrate that the defendant is unable to understand the nature and quality of an act or that he does not know that the act is wrong. Section 28, subdivision (c) does not, as appellant argues, forbid any instruction on irresistible impulse, even an instruction that irresistible impulse is not an insanity defense. The instruction limited the purpose for which the psychiatric evidence that appellant believed he was acting under signs or commands from God could be used, but it did not, as appellant argues, suggest that appellant's insanity defense was an irresistible impulse defense. With the restoration of the M'Naghten test of legal insanity, irresistible impulse no longer affords the basis for an insanity defense. It does not follow that, when psychiatric evidence suggests that a defendant acted under an irresistible impulse, the court may not instruct the jury that irresistible impulse is not legal insanity. The other instructions on insanity and the arguments of counsel made it clear to the jury that the psychiatric evidence should be considered in deciding whether appellant's mental illness resulted in failure to know that his acts were wrong, the only disputed issue. Moreover, if he believed that this instruction might mislead the jury, appellant could have, but did not, request a clarifying instruction tailored to the evidence and its relevance to his theory of insanity. A party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language. ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627.) The claim has been waived. ( People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 622, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683.) [32] Appellant also argues, somewhat inconsistently, that the court erred because irresistible impulse may have a legitimate role in an insanity defense. Section 28, subdivision (c) does, as appellant notes, provide that the ban on use of diminished capacity, diminished responsibility, or irresistible impulse contained in subdivision (b) of that section does not apply in an insanity hearing held pursuant to section 1026 or 1429.5. To the extent that section 28, subdivision (c) might have been read to authorize consideration of irresistible impulse at the trial on a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, however, it was impliedly repealed pro tanto by section 25, subdivision (b), which reinstated the M'Naghten test of insanity. Nothing in the instruction given would have precluded consideration of evidence of irresistible impulse to the extent that the evidence suggested that appellant did not know his acts were wrong.