Opinion ID: 1281444
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Expressions of legislative intent in related statutes

Text: (8) Defendant next contends that an intent to exempt prayer treatment from conduct within the reach of sections 192(b) and 273a(1) is implied by a number of other civil and criminal measures relating to the provision of prayer in lieu of medical care to children. She first cites a plethora of statutes exempting prayer practitioners and their facilities from medical licensure requirements [9] or variously accommodating individuals who choose to rely on such treatment for their own care. [10] These accommodative provisions, however, evince no legislative sanction of prayer for the treatment of children in life-threatening circumstances. (9a) More useful are statutes dealing with the definition of neglected or abused children for purposes of the state's child welfare services program (Welf. & Inst. Code, ง 16500 et seq.), the activities of the Office of Child Abuse Prevention ( id. ง 18950 et seq.), and a criminal provision requiring certain individuals to report instances of suspected child abuse (Pen. Code, ง 11165 et seq.). Utilizing substantially similar language, each of these three statutes provides that children receiving treatment by prayer shall not for that reason alone be considered abused or neglected for its purposes. (Welf. & Inst. Code, งง 16509.1 (hereafter W&I section 16509.1) and 18950.5 (hereafter W&I section 18950.5); Pen. Code, ง 11165.2 (hereafter section 11165.2).) Defendant cites these provisions as evidence that the Legislature does not consider prayer treatment to be a threat to the health of children, and thus that the imposition of criminal liability for the results of its use is inconsistent with legislative intent. The Attorney General urges a different construction of the statutory language. He contends that the phrase for that reason alone  (italics added) denotes that a child receiving prayer treatment can still fall within the reach of the statutory definitions if the provision of such treatment, coupled with a grave medical condition, combine to pose a serious threat to the physical well-being of the child. [11] While defendant contends the phrase merely indicates that a child receiving prayer treatment can come within the purview of the statutes for other reasons, her construction renders the use of the word alone surplusage and thus must be rejected under the rule that `[e]very word, phrase and provision employed in a statute is intended to have meaning and to perform a useful function....' ( White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 681 [183 Cal. Rptr. 520, 646 P.2d 191], quoting Clements v. T.R. Bechtel Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 227, 233 [273 P.2d 5].) The code section immediately preceding W&I section 16509.1 in the child welfare services chapter strongly corroborates the interpretation offered by the Attorney General. That section reads: Cultural and religious child-rearing practices and beliefs which differ from general community standards shall not in themselves create a need for child welfare services unless the practices present a specific danger to the physical or emotional safety of the child. (Welf. & Inst. Code, ง 16509 (hereafter W&I section 16509).) (10) It is fundamental that the language of a particular code section must be construed in light of and with reference to the language of other sections accompanying it and related to it with a view to harmonizing the several provisions and giving effect to all of them. ( Johnson v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal. App.3d 573, 582 [205 Cal. Rptr. 605].) The provision of prayer treatment in lieu of medical care to a gravely ill child doubtless constitutes a religious child-rearing practice which differ[s] from general community standards.... Nor is there any question that W&I sections 16509 and 16509.1 are related and intended to express a unified statutory objective. To harmonize their provisions accordingly, the use of the word alone in W&I section 16509.1 must be construed to signify that treatment by prayer will not constitute neglect for purposes of the child welfare services chapter except in those instances when such treatment, coupled with a sufficiently grave health condition, presents a specific danger to the physical ... safety of the child. [12] While section 11165.2 and W&I section 18950.5 lack similar companion provisions, there are persuasive reasons why we should interpret them in the same manner. First, each employs the words for that reason alone in a context identical to the use of the phrase in W&I section 16509.1. Identical language appearing in separate provisions dealing with the same subject matter should be accorded the same interpretation. ( Ford Dealers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1982) 32 Cal.3d 347, 359 [185 Cal. Rptr. 453, 650 P.2d 328].) Because each statute deals with the relationship of prayer treatment to the definition of child neglect or abuse, we are obliged to construe their shared language in a consistent fashion. ( Dieckmann v. Superior Court (1985) 175 Cal. App.3d 345, 356 [220 Cal. Rptr. 602].) Second, both section 11165.2 and W&I section 18950.5 explicitly refer to the language of W&I section 16509.1 to define the conduct excepted from their definitions of neglect and abuse. [13] This fact further suggests that the Legislature intended the several statutes to share a common meaning. Finally, the most telling indication that the statutes should be construed together in the manner urged by the Attorney General is their mutual interrelation with the child dependency provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 (hereafter W&I section 300). Furnishing the state with its most powerful tool to intercede on behalf of children threatened at the hands of their parents, W&I section 300 delineates the circumstances under which a child can be removed from parental custody and declared a dependent of the court. Section 11165.2 and W&I sections 16509.1 and 18950.5 are each components of separate acts connected in some significant fashion to the child dependency proceedings outlined in W&I section 300. In sum, the three acts (1) require that suspected instances of child abuse or neglect be reported to the agency responsible for initiating child dependency proceedings under W&I section 300 (Pen. Code, ง 11166, subds. (a), (b), & (g)); (2) provide services to neglected or abused children identified through dependency proceedings (Welf. & Inst. Code, งง 16506, subd. (a), 16507, 16508, subd. (a)); and (3) fund child-abuse prevention projects in cooperation with local welfare agencies responsible for supervising dependency proceedings (Welf. & Inst. Code, ง 18964, subd. (f)(3)). This intimate interrelation of statutory objectives, revolving around the identification and enforcement provisions of W&I section 300, counsels us to interpret the language of the related acts with reference to the provisions of the dependency statute to achieve a uniform and consistent legislative purpose. ( Isobe v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Bd. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 584, 591 [116 Cal. Rptr. 376, 526 P.2d 528]; People v. Caudillo, supra, 21 Cal.3d 562, 585.) On September 30, 1987, the Governor signed into law Senate Bill No. 243, 1987-1988 Regular Session, which revised W&I section 300 in its entirety. (Stats. 1987, ch. 1485, ง 4 [No. 5 Deering's Adv. Legis. Service, pp. 5779-5780].) Although the legislation will not take effect until January 1, 1989, its provisions dealing with the relationship of prayer treatment to dependency proceedings are critically significant to our interpretive task insofar as they represent the Legislature's most recent and detailed articulation of the protection to be assured seriously ill children receiving such care. Newly amended W&I section 300 provides in pertinent part: Any minor who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the court.... [ถ] (b) The minor has suffered, or there is substantial risk that the minor will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, ... by the willful or negligent failure of the parent ... to provide the minor with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment.... Whenever it is alleged that a minor comes within the jurisdiction of the court on the basis of the parent's ... willful failure to provide adequate medical treatment or specific decision to provide spiritual treatment through prayer, the court shall give deference to the parent's ... medical treatment, nontreatment, or spiritual treatment through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination by an accredited practitioner thereof and shall not assume jurisdiction unless necessary to protect the minor from suffering serious physical harm or illness.  (Italics added.) (9b) Thus in any circumstance involving the threat of serious physical harm or illness, the Legislature has empowered the juvenile court to intercede and assume custody for the express purpose of assuring medical care for a child whose parent is furnishing spiritual treatment by prayer alone. The expression of legislative intent is clear: when a child's health is seriously jeopardized, the right of a parent to rely exclusively on prayer must yield. This intent is implicit in the enumeration of necessities a parent must furnish to avert a dependency proceeding under W&I section 300; conspicuously absent from the list is any substitute for adequate medical treatment. It follows that the only tenable construction of the related provisions defining the relationship of prayer treatment to child neglect or abuse is the analysis offered by the Attorney General. While dependency proceedings are civil rather than criminal, their relevance to our inquiry is plain. Parents possess a profound interest in the custody of their children. ( In re Carmaleta B. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 482, 489 [146 Cal. Rptr. 623, 579 P.2d 514]; Holt v. Superior Court (1960) 186 Cal. App.2d 524, 526-527 [9 Cal. Rptr. 353].) Custody embraces the sum of parental rights with respect to the rearing of a child, including its care. It includes ... the right to direct his activities and make decisions regarding his care and control, education, health, and religion. ( Burge v. City & County of San Francisco (1953) 41 Cal.2d 608, 617 [262 P.2d 6].) The United States Supreme Court has termed this constellation of parental interests essential ( Meyers v. Nebraska (1923) 262 U.S. 390, 399 [67 L.Ed. 1042, 1045, 43 S.Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446]), among the basic civil rights of man ( Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) 316 U.S. 535, 541 [86 L.Ed. 1655, 1660, 62 S.Ct. 1110]), and [r]ights far more precious ... than property rights ( May v. Anderson (1953) 345 U.S. 528, 533 [97 L.Ed. 1221, 1226, 73 S.Ct. 840]). Consistent with the gravity of the prerogative at stake, parents involved in W&I section 300 proceedings are assured notice and a due process hearing ( In re Robert P. (1976) 61 Cal. App.3d 310, 318 [132 Cal. Rptr. 5]) while those who are indigent receive appointed counsel ( In re Christina H. (1986) 182 Cal. App.3d 47, 49 [227 Cal. Rptr. 41]; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 1334(c), 1363(c)). The Legislature's willingness to intrude on a parental interest of such magnitude to assure that children receiving prayer treatment are spared serious physical harm certainly evinces no contrary intent with respect to the application of the penal laws, which in significant respects constitute a less intrusive method of advancing the state's paramount interest in the protection of its children. Defendant's argument by analogy to civil neglect and dependency provisions therefore corroborates rather than refutes our previous determination that the Legislature has created no exemption under sections 192(b) and 273a(1) for parents who are charged with having killed or endangered the lives of their seriously ill children by providing prayer alone in lieu of medical care. The legislative design appears consistent: prayer treatment will be accommodated as an acceptable means of attending to the needs of a child only insofar as serious physical harm or illness is not at risk. When a child's life is placed in danger, we discern no intent to shield parents from the chastening prospect of felony liability.