Opinion ID: 2391243
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: R.S. 2:103-1 provides:

Text: all other offenses of an indictable nature at common law, and not expressly provided for by statute, shall be misdemeanors. The appellants contend this clause cannot be invoked because the common-law crime here relied upon was superseded by statute. It is not intended, they contend, that there should exist side by side both a common-law and a statutory proscription of the same conduct, pointing out that the following three statutes supersede the alleged common-law offenses: (1) R.S. 2:156-2 declares: Every building or place where the law is habitually violated is hereby declared to be a nuisance, and R.S. 2:156-3 provides that any person who maintains such nuisance shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; (2) R.S. 2:135-3 provides that any person who keeps a place to which persons may resort for gambling in any form shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and (3) R.S. 2:171-3 expressly deals with the liability of telegraph companies with respect to carrying messages. Before a statute supersedes the common law, there must be some express or specific statement to that effect. When the common law and a statute differ, the common law gives place to the statute, only where the latter is couched in negative terms, or where its matter is so clearly repugnant that it necessarily implies a negative. (Citation.) It is a rule of exposition that statutes are to be construed in reference to the principles of the common law, for it is not to be presumed that the legislature intended to make any innovation upon the common law further than the case absolutely required. The law rather infers that the act did not intend to make any alteration other than what is specified, and besides what has been plainly pronounced, for if the parliament had had that design, it is naturally said they would have expressed it. State v. Norton, 23 N.J.L. 33 ( Sup. Ct. 1850). The rule is followed in State v. Loog, 13 N.J. Misc. 536 ( Sup. Ct. 1935), where it is held unless negative or exclusive words are used or an expression specifically abolishing the common law, such will not be its interpretation. Affirmed on the opinion below in State v. Henry, 117 N.J.L. 442 ( E. & A. 1937). In State v. Berman, 120 N.J.L. 381 ( Sup. Ct. 1938), the court said: While we find no definition of a disorderly house at common law, nor in our statute, yet under the cases in our state any house which a jury finds to be open to and frequented by persons who so conduct themselves there as to violate law and good order may be a disorderly house. Russell on Crime (9 th ed. ) 1381; State v. Williams, 30 N.J.L. 102; Brown v. State, 49 Id. 61; Bindernagle v. State, 60 Id. 307. The acknowledgment of the existence of both the statutory and common-law offense and the distinction between the two was dwelt upon by this court in the recent case of State v. Costa, 11 N.J. 239 (1953), where Mr. Justice Brennan said: It is true that the statutory offense requires proof of an additional ingredient not necessary to be shown upon an indictment for keeping a disorderly house. The common law offense is established when it is proved that the defendant permitted his place to be used by persons whose conduct to his knowledge rendered the place disorderly, whatever his intent may have been. Proof of the statutory offense, however, must reach beyond, to his intent, and support the inference that the defendant intended that persons should resort to the place for the purpose of gambling. State v. Ackerman, 62 N.J.L. 456 ( Sup. Ct. 1898); State v. Griffin, 85 N.J.L. 613 ( E. & A. 1914); State v. Terry, 91 N.J.L. 539 ( E. & A. 1918), reversing 89 N.J.L. 522 ( Sup. Ct. 1916)   .