Opinion ID: 6320161
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Additional Six Factors

Text: The uncertainty identified at the law-to-fact step of analysis is not removed by the additional six factors that Kelley and Craig list as relevant to identifying quasi-judicial proceedings. The Connecticut Supreme Court has plainly stated that “a quasi-judicial body need not possess all six powers” referenced in these factors to be identified as quasi-judicial. Craig v. Stafford Const., Inc., 271 Conn. at 94-95, 856 A.2d 372 (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted). 31 Nevertheless, because “the more [such] powers it possesses, the more likely the body is acting in a quasi-judicial manner,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), it is important for us to understand just how the Connecticut Supreme Court would apply those factors in the circumstances of this case. As earlier noted, we understand the six factors enumerated in Kelley and Craig to apply in addition to an initial law-to-fact requirement. Thus, we assume the factors are properly considered in light of that requirement. In short, we understand the first two factors to ask whether a hearing entity has the power (1) to “exercise judgment and discretion” in applying law to fact, and (2) to “hear and determine or to ascertain facts and decide” how the law applies to those facts. Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. at 567, 606 A.2d 693. If that understanding is, indeed, correct, we cannot weigh these two factors without first knowing whether the Connecticut Supreme Court would consider Yale to be applying law to facts in conducting a UWC hearing. If the court would so conclude, then these discretion and decision factors would weigh in favor of finding a UWC hearing a quasi-judicial proceeding. If the court would not so conclude, then these factors would weigh against such a finding. For reasons already stated, we cannot predict the Connecticut Supreme Court’s conclusion on that preliminary question. Similarly, as to the third, fourth, and sixth factors (whether the body has the power to “make binding orders and judgments,” “affect the personal or property rights of private persons,” and “enforce decisions or impose penalties”), it may be important to know how, if at all, the Connecticut Supreme Court understands Yale to be 32 applying law in a UWC proceeding. Compare Craig v. Stafford Const., Inc., 271 Conn. at 89, 856 A.2d 372 (identifying internal affairs inquiry as quasi-judicial proceeding because, inter alia, police chief could himself act on inquiry’s recommendations), with Preston v. O’Rourke, 74 Conn. App. 301, 314, 811 A.2d 753 (App. Ct. 2002) (equating arbitration award to binding order and judgment because it could be converted to a court judgment). Further, we cannot predict how the Connecticut Supreme Court would weigh the fifth factor (whether the body may “examine witnesses and hear the litigation of the issues on a hearing”) without knowing whether, in light of Kelley and Craig, the court contemplates that “witnesses” in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings will be under oath and/or subject to cross-examination, and that the “litigation of the issues on a hearing” will occur with persons under investigation being present throughout the hearing, represented by counsel who can speak on their behalf, and afforded some opportunity for a closing statement. See Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. at 567, 606 A.2d 693.