Opinion ID: 2176137
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: henry's absence from several bench conferences

Text: Henry next contends that the trial judge denied or chilled his right to be present at some bench conferences during trial. He claims that his counsel could not waive his right to be present at the bench conferences and that the trial judge, expressly or impliedly, indicated that Henry was not welcome at the conferences, thereby effectively chilling Henry's exercise of the fundamental constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of his trial. By this characterization, we assume Henry is referring to his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Henry claims that his counsel unequivocally wanted Mr. Henry present with him at bench conferences and that even if we interpret some of his counsel's actions as constituting a waiver, his counsel did not have the authority to execute such a waiver. Henry had no federal or state constitutional right to be present at bench conferences that were not critical stages of the trial. See Porter v. State, 289 Md. 349, 424 A.2d 371 (1981); Brown v. State, 272 Md. 450, 325 A.2d 557 (1974). The right of a defendant to be present has been held not to extend to ... brief bench conferences with attorneys conducted outside the defendant's hearing, and to various other conferences characterized as relating only to the resolution of questions of law. (Emphasis added.) W. LaFave and J. Israel, 3 Criminal Procedure § 23.2(c) at 3 (1984, 1991 Cum.Supp.). See People v. Teitelbaum, 163 Cal. App.2d 184, 329 P.2d 157, 172, (1958), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 206, 79 S.Ct. 738, 3 L.Ed.2d 759 (1959) (appellant's presence at bench conference would not have been of any aid to his counsel since the topics discussed were questions of law); State v. Peters, 146 Mont. 188, 405 P.2d 642, 647 (1965). See generally W. LaFave and J. Israel, 3 Criminal Procedure § 23.2 (1984 & 1991 Cum. Supp.); Annotation, Right of Accused to be Present at Suppression Hearing or at Other Hearing or Conference between Court and Attorneys Concerning Evidentiary Questions, 23 A.L.R.4th 955, 1008-11 (1983). Henry stresses in his brief that, according to Hughes v. State, 288 Md. 216, 421 A.2d 69 (1980), under common law, a defendant has a right to be present at every critical stage of trial and that this right is personal, incapable of being waived by counsel. In Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 438 A.2d 1301 (1981), however, we modified this common law rule for all future cases. Today, with the complexity of many criminal trials and the absolute right of counsel if there is a danger of incarceration, our system proceeds upon the assumption that it is primarily counsel's function to assert or waive most `rights' of the defendant. Unless a defendant speaks out, normally he must be bound by the trial decisions, actions and inactions of counsel. Otherwise, the system simply would not work. (Citations omitted.) Id. at 218, 438 A.2d at 1309, quoted in Noble v. State, 293 Md. 549, 555, 446 A.2d 844, 847 (1982). We proceeded to revise the rule: [A]n effective waiver of the defendant's right to be present at every stage of the trial will not always require a personal waiver by the defendant. Where the right of confrontation is not implicated, and where there is involved no other right requiring intelligent and knowing action by the defendant himself for an effective waiver, a defendant will ordinarily be bound by the action or inaction of his attorney.       [I]f the defendant himself does not affirmatively ask to be present at such occurrences or does not express an objection at the time, and if his attorney consents to his absence or says nothing regarding the matter, the right to be present will be deemed to have been waived. Williams, 292 Md. at 219-20, 438 A.2d at 1310, quoted in Noble v. State, 293 Md. at 556, 446 A.2d at 847. Maryland Rule 4-231 speaks directly to the issue of presence of the defendant at trial. [2] Under Rule 4-231, a defendant does not have a right to be present at a bench conference if the subject matter being discussed is a question of law or if the conference is not considered a stage of the trial. In addition, a defendant's counsel may, through acquiescence, waive the defendant's right to be present. Id. There were numerous bench conferences throughout the trial, some of which Henry refers to in his brief when discussing the chilling of his right to be present at all stages of his trial. [3] Henry, through his counsel and in accordance with Md.Rule 4-231, waived his right to be present at several of the bench conferences. An example of this waiver is illustrated in the following colloquy regarding the anticipated testimony of Ms. Sellers: DEFENSE COUNSEL: I think [the State's Attorney] had something to display to the jury. After he does that I would request to come to the bench before the next witness comes up. THE COURT: Come on up now. (At the Bench.) STATE'S ATTORNEY: Do you want your client at these bench conferences? DEFENSE COUNSEL: No. Similarly, the defense sought to preclude Kenneth Clee from testifying to statements made by the defendant after the murders. THE COURT: Come on up, gentlemen. (At the Bench.) STATE'S ATTORNEY: Do you want your client up here? DEFENSE COUNSEL: No. THE COURT: I don't need his client. Why do you keep asking him that? STATE'S ATTORNEY: I just want to prevent a claim later on that he didn't get to participate in some bench conference that was affecting his rights. As long as they are willing to waive his presence I will stop asking. THE COURT: Is there some case that says he is entitled to be up here? STATE'S ATTORNEY: There is a case that says he is entitled to be present at every critical stage of the proceeding. THE COURT: Anything else? STATE'S ATTORNEY: I assume a bench conference sometimes falls within that category. THE COURT: Is there a case that says a bench conference is a critical stage? STATE'S ATTORNEY: I think there may be, yes. THE COURT: Is there a case that says voir dire  never mind. What do you want? Henry was specifically invited to be present at some of the bench conferences. For instance, the trial judge expressly directed Henry to approach the bench in order to firmly establish the validity of Henry's election not to testify. The judge concluded his inquiry and the following occurred: THE COURT: Anything else that you wanted to tell me, Mr. Henry? [HENRY]: No, Your Honor. [Apparently counsel and Henry returned to their seats.] THE COURT: All right, fine. Come on back up now and leave Mr. Henry there. At this point, the judge had a discussion with counsel concerning jury instructions. On more than one occasion, the trial judge made it clear that he did not want Henry to participate in a particular bench conference. For example, during the testimony of Ms. Chambers, the following took place: THE COURT: Come on up. (At the Bench.) STATE'S ATTORNEY: Do you want your client up here? DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes. THE COURT: I don't want him up here. DEFENSE COUNSEL: That's fine. STATE'S ATTORNEY: He waives his presence to be here? THE COURT: He doesn't have any right to be here, all right? Go ahead. (Emphasis added.) Although we do not condone the action of the trial court in making it clear that Henry wasn't welcome at bench conferences, Henry has not demonstrated that the judge committed reversible error. There is no reason why Henry's counsel could not have objected for the record whenever he thought the court was unfairly barring his client from participating in any specific bench conference. Counsel's silence and Henry's acquiescence may be taken as a waiver of any right Henry might have had to participate in the various bench conferences, unless his due process rights required his presence. The Supreme Court discussed a defendant's due process right to be present in Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987). The Court explained that even in situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him, he has a due process right `to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.' Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-106, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934). Although the Court has emphasized that this privilege of presence is not guaranteed `when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow,' id. at 106-107 [54 S.Ct. at 332-333], due process clearly requires that a defendant be allowed to be present `to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence,' id. at 108 [54 S.Ct. at 333]. Thus, a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.  (Emphasis added.) Id. 482 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. at 2667, 96 L.Ed.2d at 647. See also United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526-27, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 1484-85, 84 L.Ed.2d 486, 490-91 (defendant's absence from judge's in camera discussion with juror held not violative of due process right), reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1112, 105 S.Ct. 2350, 85 L.Ed.2d 865 (1985). In his brief, Henry argues that the court's initial act of barring him from the bench conference improperly chilled his right to participate in subsequent bench conferences. He does not argue or establish that his presence at any specific bench conference would have contributed to the fairness of the procedure. [4] We caution trial judges not to exclude a defendant from any bench conference where the defendant's presence could contribute to the fairness of the proceedings or from any bench conference that could constitute a critical stage of the proceedings unless the defendant's presence is waived. But we also reiterate what we have previously stated: We are fully cognizant of the necessity of conferences between the court and counsel  either before or during a trial  for the purpose of discussing scheduling, other collateral matters of procedure, to hear arguments of law on evidentiary rulings, to confer on proposed instructions to the jury, and the like. Under the authorities hereinbefore cited such conferences have not been held to be a part of the trial. To require that all such conferences be conducted in open court, or that the defendant be present in chambers, or at a bench conference, on each occasion would create administrative burdens, diminish the decorum of the proceedings, and in many instances involve security risks  none of which can be balanced by any gain from the defendant's presence. Trials must, however, not only be fairly conducted but must, to the defendant, give every appearance of so being conducted. (Footnote omitted.) Brown v. State, 272 Md. at 479-80, 325 A.2d at 572-73.