Opinion ID: 1330087
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prior public use

Text: Under S.C.Code Ann. § 4-9-30(4) (Supp.2002), a county may exercise powers of eminent domain for county purposes except where the land is devoted to a public use. In bringing this action, GDOT claimed the property is presently put to public use, and therefore not subject to condemnation, because it is encumbered by use easements held by the USACE for dredge material containment areas. In ruling for County, the trial court found the dredging activity is merely an indirect benefit to the public and not a public use. In the alternative, he found County's taking would not destroy the prior public use. Generally, the prior public use doctrine is applicable between entities with equally delegated powers of eminent domain. See Florida East Coast Rwy. Co. v. City of Miami, 372 So.2d 152 (Fla.App.1979); Greater Clark County Sch. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Co., Indiana, Inc., 179 Ind.App. 331, 385 N.E.2d 952 (1979); State v. Union County Park Comm'n, 89 N.J.Super. 202, 214 A.2d 446 (Law Div.1965). The rationale is to prevent condemnation back and forth between competing condemnors. Florida East Coast Rwy. Co., supra ; Greater Clark County Sch. Corp., supra . As stated by one court: The doctrine of prior public use does not clothe the court with power to weigh the communal benefit of the proposed use against the present use of property sought to be condemned. It is, rather, a rule of law limited to controversies between two [entities] each possessing a delegated, general power of eminent domain. Bd. of Educ. of Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Pace College, 27 A.D.2d 87, 276 N.Y.S.2d 162, 165-66 (2 Dept.1966). When the resisting landowner possesses no such power, the question does not arise. Id. [1] Consistent with this line of cases, we conclude the prior public use doctrine should be limited to those cases involving competing condemnors. It is for the condemning entity to determine whether privately owned property, although presently used for public benefit, should be condemned for a competing public use. The difficulty of injecting the judicial branch into the arena of competing public uses is in fact demonstrated by the one case in which this Court attempted to apply the doctrine of prior public use. In Tuomey Hosp. v. City of Sumter, 243 S.C. 544, 134 S.E.2d 744 (1964), we addressed a condemnation by a municipality whose delegated power of eminent domain was subject to an exception for property previously devoted to public use. The property to be condemned was a charitable hospital. We noted the difficulty of defining the term public use: mere benefit to the public is not enough; the public must have some definite and fixed use that is protected by law. Without deciding whether the use in question actually qualified as a public use, we found it was a factual issue to be determined at trial. [2] We hereby overrule Tuomey to the extent it allows application of the prior public use doctrine in situations other than between entities with equal powers of eminent domain. Here, although GDOT is an arm of a sovereign state, it has no power of eminent domain in South Carolina. Because GDOT is in the posture of a private landowner in this case, we decline to apply the doctrine of prior public use.