Opinion ID: 6349253
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extraordinary Judicial Deference

Text: In the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Congress codified the highly deferential substantial evidence test and established what should be our court’s guiding star in the review of immigration decisions: that “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 34 FLORES MOLINA V. GARLAND INA § 242(b)(4)(B) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added)). Congress later amended the INA by passing the REAL ID Act, further reining in our role and discretion as a reviewing court and stripping federal courts of jurisdiction to hear certain immigration claims. See Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1698 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Over time, however, this court’s decisions have chipped away at these statutory standards—broadening the scope and standard of our review far beyond the limited and deferential posture that Congress unmistakably set out in the INA. See id. To properly apply our deferential standard of review, we are supposed to scour the record to answer a single question: could any reasonable adjudicator have agreed with the agency’s result, or does the record as a whole compel a different conclusion? See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (explaining that substantial evidence review requires that we review “the record considered as a whole” and reverse the agency only if no reasonable factfinder could agree with its conclusion); see also Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing Elias-Zacarias as “the touchstone” and “definitive statement of ‘substantial evidence’ in the context of . . . factual determinations in asylum cases”). On its face, this is an exceptionally deferential standard of review. But there’s more.