Opinion ID: 757097
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Propriety of Joinder with Respect to Clark

Text: 61 Clark asserts joinder under Rule 8(b) was improper because the Indictment alleges three separate conspiracies as opposed to one overall scheme. Clark contends the government links the three conspiracies solely through an overlap in personnel and a common objective of making money, and such connections are an insufficient basis for joinder. See Clark Br. at 39-40. Clark also claims the government's assertions that Clark, Rawley, and Wadena engaged in the non-election conspiracies to misapply tribal funds, and Clark and Rawley engaged in the election conspiracy to further that objective, are unsupported by the indictment and factually impossible. Id. at 40-41. This is because Clark ran unopposed in the 1994 election, and according to the Indictment, the non-election conspiracies were complete in March 1994--three months before the June 1994 election. 62 We disagree with Clark's contentions. In this case, the government charged Clark with all of the offenses relating to both the non-election conspiracies and the election conspiracy. The government asserted Clark joined in the non-election conspiracies to misapply tribal funds for his personal gain. The government also contended Clark joined in the election conspiracy to ensure his and others' elections and his continued access to tribal funds. On its face, the Indictment alleges more than a mere overlap in personnel and the common objective of making money. We deem it clear that the Indictment alleges Clark participated in a series of acts or transactions with the sole purpose of furthering a common scheme of using his and others' positions in tribal government to access tribal funds and misapply those funds for his personal gain. Thus, joinder of all counts was proper under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b). 25 63 Moreover, were we to find joinder improper with respect to Clark, such error would not require reversal. See Lane, 474 U.S. at 449, 106 S.Ct. 725. Clark contends reversal is required because he has made a showing that there was a misjoinder that had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict. Specifically, Clark claims the government used a regrettable parade of cumulative witnesses, most of whom merely testified that they did not vote in the last tribal election, to show his bad character and impermissibly influence the jury's determination of guilt with respect to the non-election charges. See Clark Br. at 42. 64 We disagree with Clark's contentions for several reasons. First, during trial, the government presented evidence of the charged conspiracies in three discrete phases. Second, although the government presented numerous witnesses who testified they did not vote in the last tribal election, it is difficult to see how this testimony, which was specific to the election conspiracy, influenced the jury's findings with respect to the construction conspiracy and Commissions conspiracy. Third, the district court instructed the jury that each defendant was entitled to be treated separately, and the jury must return a separate verdict for each defendant and for each crime charged. See, e.g., Jury Inst. 12, United States v. Wadena, No. 3-95-102 (D. Minn. June 24, 1996). The jury ultimately acquitted one defendant of all charges and acquitted Clark and Rawley of one charge each. Finally, the government presented potent evidence of Clark's guilt of the charges for which he was convicted. In sum, we conclude that any alleged misjoinder did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict with respect to Clark. See Lane, 474 U.S. at 449, 106 S.Ct. 725. 65