Opinion ID: 1658335
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the lower court erred in granting defendant's instruction d-8 over the objection of the appellant.

Text: Instruction D-8 told the jury that, if it believed from a preponderance of the evidence, Massey failed to do certain things which the appellee's evidence showed, then Larry Massey was guilty of negligence and if the jury believed from a preponderance of the evidence that such negligence, if any, was the sole proximate cause of injuries sustained by appellant, then the jury verdict should be for appellee. The appellant contends that the present case is not one for the jury to consider sole proximate cause; that appellee had to be guilty of negligence from the maintenance of its lines across the area in violation of the National Electric Safety Code; and that the language in said instruction, viz, ... and at said time and place Larry Massey knew or should have known of the existence of the Coast Electric Power Company high tension line, but nevertheless directed the raising of the sailboat mast in such a manner that the mast contacted the high tension line, ... was confusing to the jury. Appellant cites Moses v. Central Louisiana Electric Co., 324 F.2d 69 (5th Cir.1963). We are of the opinion that this argument is misplaced and Moses, supra, is not applicable to the facts of this case. In the case sub judice, the instruction presented to the jury appellee's theory of the defense, which was supported by evidence in its behalf, and was a proper instruction. Monroe County Electric Power Ass'n v. Pace, 461 So.2d 739 (Miss. 1984); Alley v. Praschak Machine Co., 366 So.2d 661 (Miss. 1979); Smith v. Walton, 271 So.2d 409 (Miss. 1973). When all the instructions are read together, we think that the jury was adequately and properly instructed on the issues. McKinnon v. Batte, 485 So.2d 295 (Miss. 1986); Jackson v. Griffin, supra .