Opinion ID: 2538288
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Standard for Sentencing Manipulation Proposed by the Court of Appeal is Rejected.

Text: It is unnecessary for us to decide in this case whether we accept the doctrine of sentencing manipulation because the conduct of the police here was not overreaching by any reasonable standard. However, we reject the standard of sentencing manipulation adopted by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal stated: We do not believe a showing of `outrageous' conduct is required in order to establish sentence manipulation. As discussed ... [above], outrageous police conduct is a complete defense to the prosecution. Thus, in cases where outrageous conduct has occurred there would be no need to reach the issue of sentencing. Furthermore, we surely need not wait until we find the sentence-manipulation equivalent of forced stomach pumping before we declare a violation of due process has occurred. Rather, we believe defendants establish sentence manipulation for purposes of the quantity enhancement when they show the police selected the amount of drugs for no legitimate law enforcement purpose but solely to maximize the defendants' sentence.  The federal circuit courts that accept the doctrine of sentencing manipulation, as well as those that reject it, caution against the adoption of such a standard. The First Circuit Court of Appeals entertains claims of sentencing manipulation. However, [i]t is no accident, the First Circuit observed, that statements condemning sentencing factor manipulation are usually dicta. A defendant cannot make out a case of undue provocation simply by showing that the idea originated with the government or that the conduct was encouraged by it [citation], or that the crime was prolonged beyond the first criminal act [citation], or exceeded in degree or kind what the defendant had done before. [Citation.] What the defendant needs in order to require a reduction are elements like these carried to such a degree that the government's conduct must be viewed as `extraordinary misconduct.' [Citation.] [¶] The standard is high because we are talking about a reduction at sentencing, in the teeth of a statute or guideline approved by Congress, for a defendant who did not raise or did not prevail upon an entrapment defense at trial. The standard is general because it is designed for a vast range of circumstances and of incommensurable variables. [Citation.] ( Montoya, supra, 62 F.3d at pp. 3-4.) Because of the diversity of circumstances, the court of appeals continued, we have declined to create detailed rules as to what is or is not undue manipulation [citation], but we think it is useful now to be very candid in saying that garden variety manipulation claims are largely a waste of time. ( Id. at p. 4.) Another panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals admonished: By their nature, sting operations are designed to tempt the criminally inclined, and a well-constructed sting is often sculpted to test the limits of the target's criminal inclinations. Courts should go very slowly before staking out rules that will deter government agents from the proper performance of their investigative duties. ( United States v. Connell (1st Cir.1992) 960 F.2d 191, 196.) The Fourth Circuit, which has not yet decided whether it accepts the doctrine of sentencing manipulation, reiterated this admonishment. ( Jones, supra, 18 F.3d at p. 1155.) The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also appears to accept the doctrine of sentencing manipulation. However, it rejected the notion that governmental conduct should be subject `to a special brand of scrutiny when its effect is felt in sentence, as opposed to offense, determination.' [ United States v. ] Cotts [(7th Cir.1994)] 14 F.3d [300,] 306, [fn.]2.] Indeed, `[i]f we are willing to accept the assumption apparently approved by Congress that dealing in greater quantities of drugs is a greater evil, it is not clear to us what the precise legal objection to governmental behavior based on cognizance of relative penal consequences in this area could be (so long as it does not rise to the level of true entrapment or conduct so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes[)].' Id. (quoting United States v. Russell [(1973)] 411 U.S. 423, 431-[4]32 [93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366]). ( Tremelling, supra, 43 F.3d at p. 152.) In Shephard, supra, 4 F.3d 647, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, while accepting the doctrine of sentencing manipulation, declined the task effectively undertaken by the Court of Appeal here, that is, fashion[ing] a code of conduct for sting operations. ( Id. at p. 649.) In Lacey, supra, 86 F.3d 956, in the course of rejecting the defendant's claim of sentencing manipulation, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that although it recognized the viability of the outrageous conduct defense, it had never been presented with governmental conduct sufficiently egregious to warrant a dismissal. The strict nature of the outrageous conduct inquiry is due in primary part to the reluctance of the judiciary to second-guess the motives and tactics of law enforcement officials. [Citation.] Government involvement is essential in the context of sting operations, which are often the only effective way to detect and to develop proof of illegal drug activity. To be sure, there is a point at which excessive government zeal may warrant judicial intervention. However, prior to that point, the courts will not fine tune conduct of law enforcement officials that does not `offend the universal sense of justice.' [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 964.)