Opinion ID: 1875320
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hinneberg's Burden of Proof

Text: In order to prevail on a reasonable accommodations claim, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the accommodation she seeks is reasonable on its face. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401-02, 122 S.Ct. 1516, 152 L.Ed.2d 589 (2002) (applying ADA). The burden is on the plaintiff to show that her requested accommodation is (1) linked to her disability-related needs, (2) necessary to afford her an equal opportunity to enjoy Section 8 benefits and (3) possible to implement. Huberty v. Washington County Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 374 F.Supp.2d 768, 773 (D.Minn.2005). Another way to formulate this test is by focusing on three key elements: necessity, equal opportunity, and reasonableness. Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc., 300 F.3d at 784. If the plaintiff satisfies these requirements, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circumstances. US Airways, 535 U.S. at 402, 122 S.Ct. 1516.
Hinneberg submitted as evidence notes from her doctors giving their opinions that it would be medically advantageous  i.e., necessary  for her to remain in Hopkins because of its proximity to her team of specialists and support groups that have worked with her for years to treat her complex mix of disabilities. At the administrative hearing, Big Stone County HRA briefly argued that there are sufficient medical facilities in Big Stone County to support Hinneberg's medical needs. But on appeal before this court, Big Stone County HRA does not dispute Hinneberg's claimed necessity. Therefore, we hold that Hinneberg satisfied her burden of showing that her disability renders it necessary for her to live in Hopkins near her health care providers.
The court of appeals focused primarily on the equal opportunity element, holding that Big Stone County HRA's residency policy did not disadvantage Hinneberg in comparison to a non-resident, non-disabled applicant. Hinneberg, 2004 WL 2986536, at -4. In this context, Hinneberg takes issue with the court of appeals' reliance on Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 105 S.Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985), because, she argues, Alexander was only a disparate impact case, and thus inapposite. We agree with the court of appeals that Alexander is controlling, but disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that Big Stone County HRA's residency policy treats disabled nonresidents the same as nondisabled nonresidents. In Alexander, Tennessee Medicaid recipients challenged a policy by state Medicaid directors that reduced from 20 to 14 the number of inpatient hospital days that would be covered under the plan. 469 U.S. at 290, 105 S.Ct. 712. The plaintiffs argued that this policy constituted unlawful discrimination in violation of Section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which prohibits disability discrimination in programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. 469 U.S. at 290, 105 S.Ct. 712. The Supreme Court rejected this argument because the same benefit of 14 days of health coverage was equally accessible to both handicapped and nonhandicapped persons. Id. at 309, 105 S.Ct. 712. Although Hinneberg is correct that Alexander was primarily a disparate impact case, the Supreme Court did discuss whether meaningful access under the Rehabilitation Act required Tennessee to modify its policy and single out the handicapped for more than 14 days of coverage. Id. at 302-03, 105 S.Ct. 712. The Court also treated meaningful access and reasonable accommodations as being equivalent as applied. Id. at 301, 105 S.Ct. 712. Thus, the holding in Alexander on meaningful access is fully applicable to reasonable accommodations claims made under the ADA and FHAA. Under Alexander, the first step in an equal opportunity analysis is to determine the relevant benefit. The Supreme Court in Alexander rejected the plaintiffs' reasonable accommodations argument as simply unsound because their argument presumed that the relevant benefit is the amorphous objective of `adequate health care.' Id. at 303, 105 S.Ct. 712. Instead the Court characterized the relevant benefit as being more specific: 14 days of inpatient coverage. Id. The Court then applied the equal opportunity element to this relevant benefit holding that because [t]he State has made the same benefit    equally accessible to both handicapped and nonhandicapped persons, the State is not required to assure the handicapped `adequate health care' by providing them with more coverage than the nonhandicapped. Id. at 309, 105 S.Ct. 712. The relevant benefit that Hinneberg seeks is portability of her housing voucher. The issue thus is whether Big Stone County HRA's residency policy affords equal access to such portability. Both parties confirmed at oral argument that the residency policy requires physical residency within Big Stone County before an applicant can be admitted to the program and continued residency in the county for 12 months before vouchers become portable. If a nonresident applicant does not establish residency in Big Stone County, she will not be admitted to the program and cannot ever use the Big Stone County HRA voucher elsewhere. As thus interpreted, Hinneberg does not have equal opportunity to enjoy the portability of her voucher because her disability prevents her from moving to Big Stone County to establish residency. A nondisabled, nonresident applicant would theoretically have the ability to move to Big Stone County to establish residency and could thereby obtain both the immediate benefit of the use of the voucher and the ultimate benefit of the portability of the voucher. Thus, Hinneberg's proposed accommodation is necessary to afford [her] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
The final element that Hinneberg must establish is reasonableness. The Supreme Court has endorsed the relatively undemanding standard that a plaintiff need only show that an `accommodation' seems reasonable on its face, i.e. ordinarily or in the run of cases. US Airways, 535 U.S. at 401-02, 122 S.Ct. 1516. This is akin to merely showing that the accommodation is feasible or plausible for the defendant to implement. Id. The accommodation that the plaintiff in US Airways proposed was reassignment to a less physically demanding mailroom duty after he suffered a back injury at work. Id. at 394, 122 S.Ct. 1516. The Court noted that normally such a request would be reasonable because the relevant statute specifically stated that  `reasonable accommodation' may include `reassignment to a vacant position.' Id. at 403, 122 S.Ct. 1516 (citing 42 U.S.C § 12111(9) (2000)). Similarly, Hinneberg's request for a policy modification is a type of accommodation that the FHAA and ADA specifically mention. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) ([D]iscrimination includes    a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability   .). And it is theoretically possible for Big Stone County HRA to make this exception to itsresidency policy for Hinneberg. Therefore it could be argued that the reasonableness element of Hinneberg's burden has been satisfied. US Airways went on to explain that some circumstances warrant a more demanding showing of reasonableness by the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that although the plaintiff's proposed accommodation of reassignment to a vacant position would normally be reasonable, the specific facts of the case warranted a higher burden because the accommodation would violate the defendant's seniority system. Id. at 405-06, 122 S.Ct. 1516. Although the Court explained the special significance of seniority policies  providing important employee benefits by creating, and fulfilling, employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment  it did not provide guidance for future determinations of what other policies might constitute a special circumstance that imposes an increased burden on the plaintiff. Id. at 404, 122 S.Ct. 1516. If Big Stone County HRA's residency policy is a circumstance that imposes the increased burden on Hinneberg, we would conclude that she did not meet that burden. The Supreme Court gave two examples of how a plaintiff could meet this higher burden. Both examples involve the plaintiff showing that the policy was insignificant under the particular facts of the case, such as where the employer commonly made exceptions to it, or the policy was already so riddled with exceptions that one more would not make a difference. US Airways, 535 U.S. at 405, 122 S.Ct. 1516. Hinneberg has made no such showing here.
We note that the line between the plaintiff's burden to prove reasonableness and the shifting of the burden to the housing authority to prove undue hardship is a fine one that the Court does not clearly delineate. As Justice O'Connor commented in her concurring opinion: In Part II of its opinion, the Court correctly explains that a plaintiff/employee (to defeat a defendant/employer's motion for summary judgment) need only show that an `accommodation' seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases. Ante, at 401, 122 S.Ct. 1516. In other words, the plaintiff must show that the method of accommodation the employee seeks is reasonable in the run of cases. See ante, at 402, 122 S.Ct. 1516 (quoting Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1187 (CADC 1993)). As the Court also correctly explains, [o]nce the plaintiff has made this showing, the defendant/employer then must show special ... circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the context of the particular employer's operations. Ante, at 402, 122 S.Ct. 1516. These interpretations give appropriate meaning to both the term reasonable, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), and the term undue hardship, ibid., preventing the concepts from overlapping by making reasonableness a general inquiry and undue hardship a specific inquiry. When the Court turns to applying its interpretation of the Act to seniority systems, however, it seems to blend the two inquiries by suggesting that the plaintiff should have the opportunity to prove that there are special circumstances in the context of that particular seniority system that would cause an exception to the system to be reasonable despite the fact that such exceptions are unreasonable in the run of cases. Id. at 410-11, 122 S.Ct. 1516. For purposes of this appeal, we will assume without deciding that Hinneberg has satisfied her burden of proving that her requested accommodation was reasonable because we ultimately conclude that Big Stone County HRA satisfied its burden of proving that the requested accommodation would result in undue hardship.