Opinion ID: 340928
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Murder Charge Against Sierra.

Text: 7 Sierra came before the trial court on three occasions before pleading guilty. At the first hearing, on December 4, 1973, the court did little more than appoint counsel. No inquiry was made about Sierra's understanding of the charges against him. During the second hearing, which took place on December 7, the court recited to Sierra the informations charging him with first degree murder and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. 4 Again, no colloquy occurred between Sierra and the court regarding Sierra's understanding of the nature of the charges. Finally, on December 14, Sierra appeared before the court and entered pleas of guilty to two charges second degree murder and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. 5 At this proceeding the court did question Sierra briefly regarding Sierra's understanding of the charges: 8 (THE COURT:) Now first of all, do you fully understand the charges against you? 9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Are you entering these pleas of guilty freely and voluntarily? 11 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Are you entering these pleas of guilty because you did do as charged in these Informations, one, kill Ovidio de Jesus Marin, a human being; and two, possess approximately 20 pounds of marijuana in violation of the law? 13 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 14 The court asked Sierra other questions before accepting the pleas, but the portion of the record quoted above shows the whole of the inquiry into understanding of the charges. 15 We think the court should have done more. The court referred to the murder charge as being embodied in the information read at the December 7 hearing, but that information charged Sierra with first degree murder. Moreover, in its questioning the court gave only one element of second degree murder the act of killing. No inquiry at all was made regarding intent to kill. When mens rea is such a crucial element of an offense, the district court must determine, on the record by personally addressing the defendant, that the defendant understands the nature of the mental element. McCarthy, supra; cf. Henderson v. Morgan, --- U.S. ----, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976) (failure to apprise defendant of nature of mental element of second degree murder) (habeas corpus). 16