Opinion ID: 686425
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: relationships among counts of the amended complaint

Text: 28 Appellants, at various points, both in oral argument and in briefs before this court, have seemed to suggest that the judgment against them in this case is somehow flawed because of some aspect of the relationships among the different theories alleged and tried before the jury. We address specific aspects of this suggestion in Part III, infra. We address the suggestion more broadly here. 29 The district court considered five different theories (asserted in five different counts) that are relevant to this inquiry: three claims of RICO substantive violations, one claim of RICO conspiracy, and one non-RICO conspiracy claim. 30 First. Count VII, a RICO substantive violation under Sec. 1962(c) alleging an association-in-fact enterprise. This theory was dismissed from the case in the trial court. 31 Second. Count VIII, a RICO substantive violation under Sec. 1962(c) alleging Aetna as the enterprise. The jury found that this claim was proved against all individual Arsenal appellants. 32 Third. Count VI, a RICO substantive violation under Sec. 1962(c), alleging Arsenal Auto as the enterprise. The jury found that this claim was proved against all individual Arsenal appellants. 33 Fourth. Count IX, alleging a RICO conspiracy under Sec. 1962(d). The jury found that this claim was proved against all individual Arsenal appellants. 34 Fifth. Count X, common law civil conspiracy. The jury found that this claim was proved against all the appellants, including Arsenal Auto and Arhaggelidis. 35 The judgment against the individual Arsenal appellants jointly and severally in the amount of $2,359,901.72 is supported by the jury's finding of liability on Counts VIII and IX. Therefore, if we determine that either the finding on Count VIII or that on Count IX is supported by sufficient evidence, the judgment must stand. In fact, as we explain below, we find that the evidence was sufficient for the jury reasonably to find liability on both Count VIII (the RICO substantive violation with Aetna as the enterprise) and Count IX (the RICO conspiracy). 36 The Arsenal appellants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the jury's finding of liability on Count VI or on Count X. The only argument raised by appellants with respect to Count VI is an argument regarding pleading deficiency that we have rejected as wholly without support. Moreover, because we have determined that the judgment against the individual Arsenal appellants is supported by jury findings on Count VIII and Count IX, we have no reason to consider whether appellants are independently liable under Count VI, Count X, or both. 37 The judgment against Arsenal Auto Repairs, Inc. which is also an appellant in this action, is supported by the jury's finding of liability on Count X, the civil conspiracy theory. Arsenal Auto has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's finding with respect to its liability under Count X. The judgment against Arsenal Auto is affirmed for the reasons stated in other parts of this Opinion. 38 The judgment against appellant Arhaggelidis is supported by the jury's finding of liability on Count X, the civil conspiracy theory. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding against Arhaggelidis on Count X. 39 From this summary, it is clear that one of appellants' assertions is true: the relationships among transactions, defendants, and legal claims are complex both legally and factually. A question remains, however, as to how, if at all, any of those complexities or all of them taken together bear upon any of the issues before this court on appeal. 40 Nowhere in the trial record, or in their briefs before this court, except in a passage from their brief that is quoted in Part III, infra, and an argument that the consolidated case was too complex for a jury to understand, App. Brief at 59-61, did the appellants ever clearly formulate an argument or set of arguments based upon their hints and innuendos about complexity. 41 Nevertheless, we have read with special care all parts of the briefs containing such hints or suggestions. We have done so, first, to be certain we have not overlooked any argument presented and, second, to assure that we have taken into account any cited cases that might bear upon the issues presented by a fact pattern as complex as that before us, with interlocking personal, family, and institutional relationships. 42 Entirely apart from the complexities added by RICO, a risk of confusion has long existed because of relationships among different legal and factual theories of conspiracy that might be invoked by the parties or by a court. The law bearing upon the potential consequences of invoking different theories of conspiracy is more extensively developed in criminal cases than in civil. Even with respect to the criminal context, however, relevant statutes and precedents provide only limited guidance for structuring factual and legal analysis. 43 In criminal cases, issues arise often with respect to whether a case should be viewed as one involving: 44 (1) a single conspiracy of many parties, multiple objectives, and broad sweep; 45 (2) multiple independent conspiracies; or 46 (3) a nest of interlocking conspiracies that may involve overlapping conspiracies or smaller, discrete inner conspiracies of fewer persons and smaller scope that are tied in with a larger conspiracy whose members include some but not all of the members of the discrete inner conspiracies. 47 See, e.g., United States v. Glenn, 828 F.2d 855 (1st Cir.1987). 48 One result of this range of possible interpretations of the evidence in a particular case is that a question concerning legal theory and arguments based upon it, and concerning instructions explaining the law to the jury, is difficult and is probably not susceptible to an abstract answer unrelated to context. 49 United States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d 739, 748 (1st Cir.1994). 50 The persons alleged to be RICO conspirators and civil conspirators in the present case, like those charged under a non-RICO conspiracy theory in Oreto 51 have engaged in a series of transactions that could be viewed as a set of separate conspiracies, or one overall conspiracy embracing numerous wrongful transactions, or ... both an overarching conspiracy and a nest of underlying smaller conspiracies. Partly this is a problem of proof and inference; partly the problem arises from trying to squeeze into the conceptual cubbyhole of an agreement activities that in practice often have the more shapeless character of an evolving joint criminal enterprise. 52 Id. at 748-749 (citations and reference to double jeopardy omitted); 53 see also United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1191 (1st Cir.1993), [cert. denied, Y--- U.S. ----], 114 S.Ct. 2714 [129 L.Ed.2d 840] (1994) ([T]he fact that the organization's methods and tactics evolved over time did not dictate a finding of two, three, or four separate conspiracies.). 54 In a criminal context, the prosecutor is allowed some choice of theory, though the choice may be burdened with consequences, including those incident to the law of double jeopardy. 55 In a civil context, likewise, parties may be allowed some choice of theory. But the choice, in the civil context also, may be burdened with consequences--a point to which we return below. 56 In this case, added layers of complexity incident to relationships among theories exist, not only because of the relationships between different conspiracy counts--Count IX (RICO conspiracy) and Count X (civil conspiracy)--but also because of the relationships among these counts and the counts alleging RICO substantive violations (Counts VII and VIII). Also, as in criminal cases, see, e.g., Oreto, 37 F.3d at 748, an answer as to what significance, if any, the legal and factual theories may have, must be context sensitive. 57 Because procedural law allows alternative contentions, parties to a civil action involving such an array of factual and legal theories as this case presents may be allowed to defer choice at least until late stages of proceedings in the trial court. For example, both plaintiffs and defendants in a civil case may be allowed to maintain alternative contentions at least until the evidence is closed, when the court may require some choices to be made about the form of verdict to be used in submitting the case to the jury--see Fed.R.Civ.P. 49--and about instructions to the jury. When a party does not request either a special question or an instruction submitting a particular theory of conspiracy to the jury, that party makes a choice that has the associated consequence of almost certainly precluding the assertion after verdict of the omitted theory of conspiracy. See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 49. The law (a procedural rule, in this instance) allows choice, but it may limit the scope of choice by defining consequences that are attached to each of the available options, rather than allowing complete freedom of choice. A party making a choice of this kind, among legally defined options only, is making an election in the classic sense. See John S. Ewart, Waiver or Election, 29 Harv.L.Rev. 724 (1916). 58 Of course, a trial court may in some circumstances allow submission to a jury of two or more theories, with appropriate instructions explaining as to each theory the factual elements the jury must find to return a verdict sustaining that theory. The different theories submitted to a jury may be factually compatible--that is, a verdict sustaining all theories submitted may be permissible. Also, however, the evidence and the different theories of conspiracy submitted to a jury in a particular case may be so factually incompatible that the jury's choice is limited to finding one or another of the theories supported, but not all. 59 In the present case, the trial judge, in submitting the case to the jury, used a verdict form that at first glance might appear to be a submission on special questions, with no general verdict, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(a). Closer examination, however, of both the verdict form and the record of colloquies about it, discloses that the court required only a general verdict of the jury, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(b), as to each claim against each defendant, after elimination of claims that were alleged but as to which either the court rejected the claim as a matter of law (the association-in-fact conspiracy theory alleged in Count VII) or Aetna elected not to request submission to the jury. 60 The submission of a separate question requiring the jury to report an answer as to each of at least 122 of the 176 allegedly fraudulent claims was necessary because disputed factual issues were presented not only with respect to whether an alleged RICO conspiracy and the alleged RICO substantive violations existed, and, if so, what defendants were liable under each theory, but also with respect to whether each of the transactions was within the scope of the conspiracy or substantive violation. The answers have a bearing on the terms of the judgment to be entered, even though the trial judge determined (supportably, we have concluded) that no genuine dispute of fact existed as to the amount paid by Aetna on each of the 112 claims the jury found to be fraudulent. 61 In summary, we conclude that the verdicts and judgment for plaintiff against the appellants are supported by the evidence received in this case, and by law.