Opinion ID: 3135205
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wisslead

Text: In 1983, this court gave the proportionate penalties clause a dramatically different reading. See People v. Wisslead , 94 Ill. 2d 190 (1983). In Wisslead , for the first time, this court used the proportionate penalties clause to strike down a statutory penalty based on a comparison of that penalty with a penalty for a different offense. The defendant was charged with unlawful restraint (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 10–3(a)) and armed violence predicated on unlawful restraint (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 10–3(a), 33A–2). Prior to trial, the trial court held that the penalty for armed violence predicated on unlawful restraint violated the due process and proportionate penalties clauses of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§2, 11). The State appealed directly to this court. The defendant’s argument that the penalty for armed violence predicated on unlawful restraint with a category I weapon (Class X felony) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 33A–1(b), 33A–3(a)) violated the due process and proportionate penalties clauses was based on a comparison of that penalty with the penalties for aggravated kidnaping (Class 1 felony) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 10–2(a)(5), (b)(2)) and forcible detention (Class 2 felony) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 10–4(a)(1), (b)). The defendant’s argument was similar for both challenges. He argued that armed violence predicated on unlawful restraint was a less serious offense than the similar offenses of aggravated kidnapping and forcible detention, yet these other offenses were punished less harshly. This court simply accepted the defendant’s argument without a discussion of the legal standards applicable to such an argument and affirmed the circuit court’s decision. Wisslead , 94 Ill. 2d at 195-97. This court’s conclusion drew a sharp dissent from three members of the court. See Wisslead , 94 Ill. 2d at 197-200 (Simon, J., dissenting, joined by Ryan, C.J., and Underwood, J.). The dissent pointed out that the State can always charge armed violence when an unenhanced felony is committed with a gun. Thus, the defendant’s challenge to aggravated kidnapping was meaningless, because a prosecutor could always charge a defendant who commits a kidnapping with a gun with armed violence instead of aggravated kidnapping and, in that case, the penalty would be equal to that of armed violence predicated on unlawful restraint. Similarly, the dissent pointed out that one who committed armed violence predicated on unlawful restraint would not be encouraged to commit a more serious crime in order to receive a lesser punishment, because he could still be charged with the Class X felony of armed violence based on unlawful restraint. The dissent found that the sentencing structure comported fully with the legislature’s intent to provide the maximum disincentive for the carrying of dangerous weapons during felonies. Wisslead , 94 Ill. 2d at 197-200 (Simon, J., dissenting, joined by Ryan, C.J., and Underwood, J.) Wisslead was problematic in additional ways not mentioned by the dissent. First, the court never mentioned the standard under which the court had always reviewed proportionate penalties challenges. This court had consistently said that it would interfere with the legislature’s judgment only where the penalty was cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. Gonzales , 25 Ill. 2d at 240. In striking down the penalty for armed violence predicated on unlawful restraint, this court failed to determine if the penalty met this standard. Second, the court never explained from where it was deriving the notion that a proportionate penalties challenge could be based on the comparison of the penalty for one offense to the penalty for a different offense. The court simply addressed the defendant’s due process and proportionate penalties arguments together and said that the policy underlying both clauses would be violated if “the penalty prescribed for an offense is not as great or greater than the penalty prescribed for a less serious offense.” Wisslead , 94 Ill. 2d at 196. The court’s citation for this proposition was a “ Cf .” cite to People v. Bradley , 79 Ill. 2d 410 (1980), and People v. Wagner , 89 Ill. 2d 308 (1982). See Wisslead , 94 Ill. 2d at 196. The problem with this citation is that both Bradley and Wagner are solely due process cases. Neither one addressed the proportionate penalties clause. In Bradley , this court found a violation of the due process clause when possession of a schedule IV controlled substance was punished as a Class 3 felony, subjecting the offender to a prison term of 1 to 10 years, while delivery of the same substance was punished as a Class 4 felony, with a possible sentence of 1 to 3 years. The court noted that the standard under which a due process challenge to a penalty is evaluated is whether “ ‘the statute is reasonably designed to remedy the evils which the legislature has determined to be a threat to the public health, safety and general welfare.’ ” Bradley , 79 Ill. 2d at 417, quoting Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Electric Manufacturing Co. , 6 Ill. 2d 152, 159 (1955). In other words, the test “focuses on the purposes and objectives of the enactment in question.” Bradley , 79 Ill. 2d at 417. The court found that punishing the lesser-included offense of possession of a schedule IV controlled substance more harshly than the delivery of the same substance violated the due process clause because such an outcome was contrary to the legislature’s stated purpose in the Illinois Controlled Substances Act. The legislature codified a statement of intent in which it specifically stated that its intent was to punish those who traffic in controlled substances more harshly than the mere unlawful user. Punishing the delivery of a controlled substance less harshly than the lesser-included offense of possession of the same substance was directly contrary to the legislature’s stated intent, and therefore violated the due process clause. Bradley , 79 Ill. 2d at 418. (footnote: 3) In Wagner , this court relied on Bradley to invalidate the penalty for delivery of a noncontrolled substance represented to be a controlled substance because it was harsher than the penalty for delivery of a schedule IV or V controlled substance. The court found that, as in Bradley , the less serious crime carried a harsher punishment than a crime that created a greater threat. The court noted that the plain purpose of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act was to deter the traffic in controlled substances, and held that it was not logical to punish one who delivers a noncontrolled substance more severely than one who delivered a controlled substance. Accordingly, the court found that the penalty for delivery of a noncontrolled substance represented to be a controlled substance violated the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution . Wagner , 89 Ill. 2d at 313. Wagner was a 4-3 decision, and the dissenters persuasively argued that the majority had misunderstood and misapplied Bradley . The dissenters argued that the reason this court knew in Bradley that possession was less serious than delivery was that the legislature specifically stated so in a codified statement of legislative intent. By contrast, there was nothing in the Illinois Controlled Substances Act to indicate the legislature’s view of the relative seriousness of delivery of a controlled substance and delivery of a look-alike substance. Wagner , 89 Ill. 2d at 314-15 (Ryan, C.J., dissenting, joined by Underwood and Goldenhersh, JJ.). Chief Justice Ryan pointed out that, in keeping with the legislature’s expressed intent, the legislature had divided up penalties for controlled substances based on possession or delivery, the type of controlled substance, and the amount of controlled substance. With respect to look-alike substances, however, the legislature merely ascribed one penalty for any look-alike substance, no matter what it is represented to be. Chief Justice Ryan noted that, in doing so, the legislature was addressing a different problem than controlled substance offenses. Wagner , 89 Ill. 2d at 315 (Ryan, C.J., dissenting, joined by Underwood and Goldenhersh, JJ.). Chief Justice Ryan also foresaw the types of problems inherent in a court trying to second-guess the legislature’s judgment as to which of two offenses was more serious: “It makes an appealing argument to say, as the majority opinion does, that the defendant here was subject to a greater penalty for the delivery of .4 grams of a ‘harmless brown powder’ than a person would be who actually delivered any amount of a schedule IV or V controlled substance. However, we do not know the magnitude of the problem or the evils associated with the delivery of a substance represented to be a controlled substance. In the space of one set of briefs filed in this case we cannot hope to be adequately informed as to the nature of the problems the legislature was seeking to resolve. The legislature has the means of informing itself, and it has seen fit to make this classification, which I am unwilling to arbitrarily say was not rational. We must presume the classification to be valid. We just are not in a position to say whether the evil sought to be remedied by section 404 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act is not as great a threat to the public as is the delivery of certain controlled substances. Contrary to the assumption in the majority opinion, the legislature has not determined that the delivery of controlled substances is a greater threat to the public than is the delivery of a substance represented to be a controlled substance.” Wagner , 89 Ill. 2d at 316-17 (Ryan, C.J., dissenting, joined by Underwood and Goldenhersh, JJ.). Chief Justice Ryan went on to discuss the growing problem of look-alike drugs and how it presented a different set of problems than those presented by controlled substances, and argued that a majority of the court was improperly substituting its judgment for that of the legislature. Wagner , 89 Ill. 2d at 316-17 (Ryan, C.J., dissenting, joined by Underwood and Goldenhersh, JJ.). In a separate dissent, Justice Underwood persuasively argued that the defendant did not even have standing to raise the due process argument because he was not charged with delivering a substance represented to be a schedule IV or V substance. Rather, he was charged with delivering a substance represented to be a schedule I controlled substance, and for that offense there was clearly no due process problem. Wagner , 89 Ill. 2d at 317-21 (Underwood, J., dissenting, joined by Ryan, C.J., and Goldenhersh, J.). With the simple insertion of the two letters “ Cf .” in the Wisslead cite, and no accompanying analysis, the cross-comparison method of these due process cases became part of this court’s proportionate penalties jurisprudence. The Bluebook explains the citation signal “ Cf .” as follows: “Cited authority supports a proposition different from the main proposition but sufficiently analogous to lend support. Literally, ‘ cf .’ means ‘compare.’ The citation’s relevance will usually be clear to the reader only if it is explained. Parenthetical explanations , however brief, are therefore strongly recommended.” The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation R. 1.2(a), at 47 (18th ed. 2005). Wisslead ’s use of the citation signal “ Cf .” was correct in that Bradley and Wagner stood for a different proposition than the main one, but incorrect in that they were not sufficiently analogous to lend support. The only parenthetical explanation provided by the Wisslead court was the following for Bradley : “a more serious penalty should not be provided for a less serious offense.” Wisslead , 94 Ill. 2d at 196. The court never explained, however, why it was taking what had been solely a due process challenge and turning it into both a due process and a proportionate penalties challenge, all without discussing this court’s proportionate penalties jurisprudence and how a comparison between two statutes fit into that jurisprudence. It had never been stated before Wisslead that the proportionate penalties clause allowed a defendant to claim that the penalty for the offense for which he was charged was invalid when compared to the penalty for a different offense. Instead, we had stated that we would invalidate a penalty only if it met the “cruel or degrading” standard. Thus, with a questionable citation and no analysis, a century’s worth of case law was fundamentally altered and what had been a due process challenge became part of this court’s proportionate penalties jurisprudence.