Opinion ID: 884960
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 11 Did the District Court err by granting both Defendants' motions for summary judgment on the issue of defamation with respect to the falsity of the statements made? ¶ 12 Appellant Hale argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Billings Police and TCI based on the conclusion that the information Billings Police provided TCI and the information TCI broadcast to the public was either truthful, or, if not truthful, then constitutionally protected, and therefore not defamatory as a matter of law. ¶ 13 Pursuant to § 27-1-802, MCA, defamatory libel is: [F]alse and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy or which causes him to be shunned or avoided or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation. Thus, as a first step toward summary judgment, the moving parties here must establish the absence of genuine issues of material fact relating to the truthfulness of the publications in question. ¶ 14 Montana's Constitution provides a necessary beginning reference point to this discussion, a point not directly raised by the parties but, nevertheless, present within the parties' cited authority. In all suits and prosecutions for libel or slander the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the facts. Art. II, § 7 Mont. Const. (emphasis added). ¶ 15 This Court, however, has distinguished this provision by finding that there is no absolute prohibition against granting summary judgment in libel cases. Williams v. Pasma (1982), 202 Mont. 66, 72, 656 P.2d 212, 215 (citing Griffin v. Opinion Publishing Co. (1943), 114 Mont. 502, 138 P.2d 580). Not since Griffin was decided, however, has the specific interplay between judge and jury been adequately addressed by this Court. In light of the District Court's summary judgment memorandum and order, which include conclusions of law as well as fact on a number of issues that seemingly conflict with Montana's Constitution, it is imperative that we at this time determine the scope of constitutional directives found in Article II, Section 7. ¶ 16 The Restatement (Second) of Torts has been referenced as a reliable authority in myriad defamation cases in Montana, and, in fact, provided the foundation for the rules regarding the roles of judges and juries in Griffin. See, e.g., Griffin v. Opinion Publishing Co. (1943), 114 Mont. 502, 138 P.2d 580, overruled on other grounds by State v. Helfrich (1996), 277 Mont. 452, 922 P.2d 1159; Granger v. Time, Inc. (1977), 174 Mont. 42, 568 P.2d 535; Sacco v. High Country Independent Press, Inc. (1995), 271 Mont. 209, 896 P.2d 411. The Restatement acknowledges that while such states as Montana provide that in libel cases the jury shall determine the law .... it is still the province of the court to determine certain questions of law. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 614 cmt. c. (1977). It is therefore crucial to the determination of the issues before us on appeal that we establish conclusive guidelines that accord with the directives of both Article II, Section 7 and the Restatement for this and future cases. ¶ 17 To this end, we find persuasive the rule that, subject to the control of the court whenever the issue arises, the jury determines whether ... the matter was true or false. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 617. The Restatement provides one caveat to this rule: if the evidence is so overwhelming that any other conclusion would be unreasonable, the court is afforded the discretion to make a proper finding. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 617 cmt. a. In contrast, the Restatement provides that the court, as a preliminary finding, must determine whether a communication is capable of bearing a particular meaning; and ... whether the meaning is defamatory. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 614. ¶ 18 Applying the foregoing to the issue of whether the District Court's conclusion that the information Billings Police provided TCI was essentially truthful, we conclude that Article II, Section 7 of the Montana Constitution, coupled with Sections 614 and 617 of the Restatement, is dispositive. Unless the evidence is so overwhelming that any other conclusion would be unreasonable, the issue of whether the statements were true or false is a determination for the jury alone to make. See also Hickey v. Settlemier (1993), 116 Or.App. 436, 841 P.2d 675, 678 (following Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 617(b), and concluding that the truth or substantial truth of a defendant's statement is a question of fact for the jury and summary judgment is inappropriate). ¶ 19 The record here indicates that Billings Police provided TCI with Hale's name, physical description, photo, and crime charged, all of which at the time  January 9, 1996  was seemingly true information on its face. However, reviewing the evidence in the record as a whole, we cannot agree that any other conclusion as to the truth or falsity of the statements would be unreasonable. ¶ 20 Hale contends, and Respondents do not deny, that the information Billings Police provided to TCI, along with similar information of other persons subject to outstanding arrest warrants, was offered on a sheet upon which the phrase most wanted was printed. Pleadings by Respondent Billings Police indicate that they provided information to create a most wanted list for dissemination to the public. Furthermore, the record indicates that Billings Police, in assisting TCI with its Crimestopper program, were to some extent aware that the broadcast would portray Hale as a potentially armed and dangerous fugitive, who in fact was one of the most wanted criminal suspects in Yellowstone County. Unlike circumstances where members of the press access public records, TCI's crime prevention program requested that the Billings Police supply names and information involving their most-wanted fugitives in Yellowstone County, so that ordinary citizens could assist the police in locating these suspects for apprehension. Therefore, the question can be asked, Based on this solicitation, was the information Billings Police provided TCI false? The answer to this question, gathered from the entirety of the record before this Court, is far from conclusive. ¶ 21 The record indicates that Hale's name was chosen randomly from the three-to-five thousand outstanding arrest warrants on file with Billings Police and that his whereabouts were known at all times following the issuance of the arrest warrant, suggesting perhaps that, under any ordinary, plain-meaning definitions of the terms, he was neither a most-wanted suspect, nor a fugitive from justice. It is apparent from the record that the evidence is not so overwhelming that the statements were essentially truthful, so as to preclude a jury from determining otherwise. Thus, we hold that summary judgment as to this issue was improper, and should be determined by the jury, with proper instruction from the court. ¶ 22 As for whether statements made in TCI's broadcast were constitutionally protected opinion  the second conclusion reached on this issue by the District Court  we conclude that this is a matter which a court can and should rightfully determine upon a motion for summary judgment. Such a determination, pursuant to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 617, goes to whether the statement is capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, and whether the meaning is in fact defamatory. ¶ 23 The District Court determined that the information broadcast by TCI, namely the references to may be armed and dangerous, most wanted, and fugitive, if not entirely accurate were, nevertheless, constitutionally protected under First Amendment analysis as statements of opinion as opposed to factual assertions, and therefore could not, as a matter of law, be deemed defamatory. All parties to this action refer this Court's attention to its own analysis in Roots v. Montana Human Rights Network (1996), 275 Mont. 408, 913 P.2d 638, where we established the following rule pertaining to opinion speech derived from the United States Supreme Court decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. (1990), 497 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1: The First Amendment protects statements of opinion on matters of public concern where they do not contain a provable false factual connotation or where they cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual. Roots, 275 Mont. at 412, 913 P.2d at 640 (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-20, 110 S.Ct. at 2705-06). Although crime prevention is certainly a matter of public concern, that the opinion privilege would be raised in this case, and then ruled on as a matter of law by the District Court, necessitates the following elaboration and clarification of our analysis and rule found in Roots. ¶ 24 The origins of constitutionally protected opinion can be traced, of course, to Supreme Court Justice Holmes' notion of the marketplace of ideas. See Abrams v. United States (1919), 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 S.Ct. 17, 22, 63 L.Ed. 1173 (dissenting opinion). Thus, ideas expressed as opinions, although potentially defamatory, may be corrected through discussion rather than by the courts. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), 418 U.S. 323, 339-40, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (stating [h]owever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact). ¶ 25 In reversing summary judgment in favor of an Ohio newspaper, the Milkovich Court reviewed the various protections afforded under its First Amendment jurisprudence and consequently rejected the direction taken by many lower courts, that, under Gertz dictum, opinions as opposed to facts require an additional separate constitutional privilege. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21, 110 S.Ct. at 2707. Two of the protections identified by the Milkovich Court were melded by this Court into the above Roots rule. See, e.g., Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19-20, 110 S.Ct. at 2706 (citing Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., v. Hepps (1986), 475 U.S. 767, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 89 L.Ed.2d 783, for the proposition that statements relating to matters of public concern containing a provably false factual connotation do not receive full constitutional protection; and, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988), 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41, for the proposition that statements reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual  and which are therefore not imaginative expression or rhetorical hyperbole  receive no constitutional protection). ¶ 26 The misguided direction identified by the Milkovich Court was precisely the path followed by the District Court here. The trial court erred in relying on an Illinois appellate court decision that followed a pre- Milkovich federal circuit court decision. See Gist v. Macon County Sheriff's Dep't (1996), 284 Ill.App.3d 367, 219 Ill.Dec. 701, 671 N.E.2d 1154 (following test derived from Ollman v. Evans (D.C.Cir.1984), 750 F.2d 970). ¶ 27 In further reliance on Milkovich as a touchstone, we now conclude that it is error for a court to create an artificial dichotomy by distinguishing statements of opinion from statements of fact, and thereby granting unqualified immunity to the former. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19, 110 S.Ct. at 2706. Such a dichotomy was not our intent in Roots. In order to further clarify the rule stated there, we turn to the Restatement approach and conclude: if an opinion is not based on disclosed facts, and as a result creates the reasonable inference that the opinion is based on undisclosed defamatory facts, such an opinion is not afforded constitutional protection. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 and cmt. c. (1977). ¶ 28 We now apply the Roots rule, along with the foregoing clarification, to the alleged defamatory opinion statements here. In a close paraphrase of the analysis in Milkovich, when the Billings Police and TCI informed the public, essentially, In our opinion, we think Mark Hale is a most wanted fugitive, who may be armed and dangerous, the statement implied a knowledge of facts far beyond those disclosed which may have reasonably led viewers to conclude that Hale was most wanted, was a fugitive, and was possibly armed and dangerous. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19, 110 S.Ct. at 2705-06. Such statements of opinion can cause damage, pursuant to § 27-1-802, MCA, and are actionable, under Roots, if they contain a provably false factual connotation or can reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual. ¶ 29 The term armed and dangerous, although qualified with may be, nevertheless implies to viewers that there are undisclosed, potentially defamatory facts upon which the opinion is based. Had the program stated that Hale was wanted for the commission of a crime involving a weapon, such as armed robbery, or was last seen carrying a sawed-off shotgun, then the statement would have been based on disclosed facts, and therefore could not have been found defamatory. Such is not the case here. Hale never stood accused of using a weapon and, ten months following the issuance of the warrant, Billings Police and TCI apparently had no idea one way or the other whether Hale even possessed a gun, let alone whether he may have been armed. Moreover, their opinion that Hale was dangerous is belied by the undisclosed fact that the Billings Police knew for months Hale's whereabouts and the nature of the offense with which was he charged, but made little effort to apprehend him. Consequently, Hale could demonstrate the falsity of the implied factual connotation created in the viewers' minds. ¶ 30 The term most wanted is offered for public consumption for a similar singular purpose: to warn that the person in question, above all other ordinary wanted persons, is the focus of intense scrutiny by law enforcement personnel, thus providing a clear connotation that the person has been identified as such based on undisclosed facts. This connotation is rendered all the more acute when coupled with the instructions to the public that police should be notified immediately, and that the suspect may be armed and dangerous. Such a factual connotation, in turn, may be proven false. The record indicates that neither the Billings Police nor TCI used any method whatsoever for determining who is or is not deserving of being identified as one of the most wanted criminal suspects in Yellowstone County. Respondents do not deny that names for Yellowstone County's Most Wanted program were chosen entirely at random. ¶ 31 Likewise, the term fugitive suggests but one urgent message to the intended hearer: the suspect has allegedly committed a crime, has eluded capture, and is now fleeing justice. Indeed, this is the essential purpose of all such Crimestopper broadcasts, to legitimately assist the police in apprehending suspects whose whereabouts are unknown. One common definition of the term describes a person who is [r]unning away or fleeing, as from the law. American Heritage Dictionary 538 (2d College ed.1985). Black's Law Dictionary similarly defines fugitive as [o]ne who flees; used in criminal law with the implication of a flight, evasion, or escape from arrest, prosecution, or imprisonment. Black's Law Dictionary 671 (6th ed.1990). Furthermore, a more specific definition of fugitive from justice describes [a] person who, having committed a crime, flees from jurisdiction of court where crime was committed or departs from his usual place of abode and conceals himself within the district. Black's Law Dictionary 671 (6th ed.1990) (emphasis added). Once offered for public consumption, the term inherently connotes that police are in pursuit of the person, and that the person is, with knowledge of the pursuit, actively avoiding confrontation or capture by either fleeing or hiding. Such a factual connotation can be proven as either true or false, and, in order for Respondents to prevail for the purposes of summary judgment here, must be unequivocally resolved in their favor. The record does not bear this out. ¶ 32 As previously stated, the record indicates that Hale's whereabouts were known at all times following the issuance of the arrest warrant, and that he was unaware that a warrant against him had been issued. Furthermore, the post-arrest broadcast contained factual discrepancies; namely, that a valid warrant for Hale's arrest remained in effect, and that Hale remained at large as a most-wanted fugitive. Therefore, providing constitutional protection under the rule stated in Roots to the statements made during TCI's broadcast would be in error. Without such protection, genuine issues of material fact regarding the falsity of the statements made during the broadcast remain in contention, and summary judgment in favor of Respondents was improper.