Opinion ID: 2998073
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion for an Extension of Time

Text: We consider first Brosted’s claim that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for an extension of time for discovery. The district court originally set a discovery deadline of March 31, 2004. Brosted requested an eight-week extension, which the district court granted, establishing a new deadline of May 31, 2004. During late February and early March, Brosted initiated discovery requests, seeking the production of documents and noticing depositions for three individuals—two representatives of Unum and a Vice President of Dreisilker. On April 7, 2004, the defendants filed a motion for a protective order, seeking to limit discovery to the administrative record developed during Brosted’s appeal of the benefits determination through the Plan appeal process. This effectively put the discovery on hold because the district court did not rule on the defendants’ motion until July 1, 2005, at which time the district court denied the defendants’ motion for a protective order. That same day, and apparently before the district court entered its order on the protective order motion, 2 Brosted filed a motion to enlarge the discovery deadline. 2 Brosted’s motion to enlarge time is file stamped July 1, 2004, and notes that “the Motion to Bar Discovery is still pending.” The district court’s Minute Order denying the defendants’ motion for (continued...) 6 No. 04-4317 On July 12, 2004, the district court denied as moot Brosted’s motion to enlarge time and reset discovery. On appeal, Brosted claims that the district court erred in denying his motion for an extension of time as moot because he still needed to depose three witnesses. Brosted further asserts that he needed to wait until the district court ruled on the protective order before proceeding with these depositions, and that the district court should have, therefore, granted him an extension of time to complete discovery. This court reviews the district court’s decision to deny an extension of time to conduct discovery for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Campania Management Co., Inc. v. Rooks, Pitts & Poust, 290 F.3d 843, 850-51 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to extend discovery filed nine days after the close of discovery). In this case, in his motion Brosted sought an extension of time in order to obtain responses from the defendants to “discovery previously requested.” Prior to ruling on that motion, the district court denied the defendants’ request for a protective order. Without a protective order prohibiting discovery, the defendants were forced to respond to the discovery requests that Brosted had filed before the discovery deadline. This, as the district court recognized, made the request for an extension of time to obtain responses for discovery previously requested moot. However, Brosted’s attorney failed to take the depositions of the three witnesses before the discovery deadline, instead writing to the defendants’ attorney, stating that those 2 (...continued) a protective order is stamped filed, July 1, 2004, 4:09 p.m., and the order is stamped as docketed July 2, 2004. No. 04-4317 7 depositions were continued. On appeal, Brosted justifies this failure by arguing that he needed access to the documents being withheld before he could depose the three witnesses. That may well be true. Perhaps when Brosted belatedly requested an extension of time for discovery, had he argued that he needed additional time to depose the witnesses because he had yet to receive the documents, the court might have granted his request. But the primary problem with his motion is that he did not seek an extension until a month after the discovery deadline had passed. Thus, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2), Brosted was required to show excusable neglect for failing to comply with the 3 discovery deadline. But in seeking an extension of time, Brosted did not argue that excusable neglect existed, nor did he claim that he could not have deposed those witnesses within the discovery time period because of the pending motion for the protective order. On appeal, Brosted also fails to argue that he satisfied the excusable neglect standard established by Rule 6(b). Given that Brosted had already received one extension, waited until one month after the extended discovery deadline expired to file a motion to 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) provides: “When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action under Rules 50(b) and (c)(2), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.” 8 No. 04-4317 further extend the deadline, and failed to claim excusable neglect for missing the deadline, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request. Campania Management, 290 F.3d at 850.