Opinion ID: 2595006
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Unconstitutional Overbreadth

Text: The State also challenges the district court's ruling that I.C. § 18-7008(8) is overbroad as applied to public property as an alternative basis chosen by the district court to uphold the magistrate's dismissal of the trespass charge against Korsen. The State argues that, as with the vagueness analysis, the district court improperly used a hybrid test intertwining the facial analysis and the as applied analysis in reviewing the constitutional scope of I.C. § 18-7008(8). The statutory crime with which Korsen was charged consists of a refusal to leave real property after being notified to depart by the owner or authorized agent of the owner. Korsen argues that the district court correctly interpreted the statute as seeking to curb constitutionally protected speech, specifically his right to petition the government for redress of grievances (regarding his child support obligations), as provided by the express language of the First Amendment. [4] He asserts that I.C. § 18-7008(8) sweeps too broadly and includes otherwise lawful activities and speech traditionally accorded protection in public places. The question of whether a statute regulates constitutionally protected conduct should begin the court's analysis of an overbreadth challenge. See State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 589, 798 P.2d 43, 48 (1990). If the answer to this first step is in the affirmative, then the next step asks whether the statute precludes a significant amount of the constitutionally protected conduct. See id. The overbreadth doctrine is aimed at statutes which, though designed to prohibit legitimately regulated conduct, include within their prohibitions constitutionally protected freedoms. State v. Leferink, 133 Idaho 780, 785, 992 P.2d 775, 780 (1999), citing State v. Richards, 127 Idaho 31, 896 P.2d 357 (Ct.App.1995). When a statute may deter protected speech only to some unknown extent, we cannot justify invalidating the statute and thereby prohibit the government from regulating conduct within its power to proscribe. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2917, 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 841 (1973). If the overbreadth is `substantial,' the law may not be enforced against anyone, including the party before the court, until it is narrowed to reach only unprotected activity, whether by legislative action or by judicial construction or partial invalidation. State v. Leferink supra , citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503-04, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 2801-02, 86 L.Ed.2d 394, 405-06 (1985). Overbreadth, however, is not substantial if, despite some possibly impermissible application, the `remainder of the statute ... covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable ... conduct....' State v. Leferink, supra . The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the overbreadth doctrine should be applied sparingly. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra , the Court said: [F]acial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and ... its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conducteven if expressivefalls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Id. at 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2917, 37 L.Ed.2d at 842. A statute that is found to be overbroad may not be enforced at all, even against speech or conduct that could constitutionally be prohibited by a more narrowly drawn statute. Id. at 613, 93 S.Ct. at 2916, 37 L.Ed.2d at 840. However, a statute will not be invalidated for overbreadth merely because it is possible to imagine some unconstitutional applications. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers of Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2126, 80 L.Ed.2d 772, 783 (1984). Rather, there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court ... Id. at 801-02, 104 S.Ct. at 2126, 80 L.Ed.2d at 784. Therefore, the Supreme Court has developed a requirement that the overbreadth must be substantial before the statute will be held unconstitutional on its face. Id. Only if the statute intrude[s] upon a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct may it be struck down for overbreadth. State v. Newman, 108 Idaho at 11, 696 P.2d at 862 ( citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 368 (1982)). As with its vagueness analysis, the district court did not find I.C. § 18-7008(8) unconstitutional under a strictly as applied analysis, which requires an examination of the statute as it applied to Korsen's particular conduct in this case. The court did not find that Korsen's speech was wrongfully suppressed, that he was a victim of discrimination because of his viewpoints, or that he otherwise suffered a violation of a freedom protected by the First Amendment. Nor did the court use a purely facial overbreadth test, examining the statute in toto. Instead, the court applied a hybrid analysis, applying the analysis for facial overbreadth (determining whether the statute is unconstitutional in a substantial portion of the cases to which it applies) but only in its application to public, not private, property. The district court failed to determine, under the correct facial analysis, whether the statute, which makes no distinction between public and private property, is unconstitutional in a substantial portion of public and private property cases. The district court ruled that I.C. § 18-7008(8) is unconstitutionally overbroad as it applies to all public property, regardless of the conduct or speech in which a particular defendant is engaging on that property. By finding the statute overbroad, not as applied to Korsen's conduct, but as to all applications on public property, the district court erroneously combined the facial and as applied standards of overbreadth. As with vagueness claims, these standards cannot be combined. To find that a statute is facially overbroad, and therefore unenforceable as to everyone, and not just the defendant, requires a determination that it is invalid in toto and therefore incapable of any valid application. Newman, 108 Idaho at 11 n. 7, 696 P.2d at 862. When a criminal statute contains a general prohibition that makes no distinction among different applications of the prohibition, a court cannot conclude that a statute is facially overbroad only in one particular application, but not overbroad in another. See Schwartzmiller, 752 F.2d at 1346. By not choosing either the facial or the as applied analysis, but instead improperly combining them both to reach its conclusion that I.C. § 18-7008(8) is overbroad, the district court erred as a matter of law. Having reached that conclusion, this Court will determine the issue de novo. In Broadrick, the Supreme Court observed that where conduct is involved, the overbreadth of a statute must be both real and substantial when judged in relation to its legitimate sweep, and whatever problems exist should be cured in a particular case by case analysis of the fact situation to which the statute's sanctions, assuredly, may not be applied. 413 U.S. at 614-15, 93 S.Ct. at 2917-18, 37 L.Ed.2d at 841-42. Idaho's trespass statute is not aimed at regulating speech or communication in any form. Contrary to the district court's ruling, in light of the statute's plainly legitimate sweep in regulating conduct, it is not so substantially overbroad that any overbreadth that may exist cannot be cured on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 615-16, 93 S.Ct. at 2917-18, 37 L.Ed.2d at 841-42. As an example of the statute's reaching constitutionally protected speech, the district court pointed out the situation of people entering the Capitol to meet with legislators, asserting that, because the threat of prosecution under the trespass statute potentially chills such clearly protected activity, the Court finds that the statute is unconstitutional in a substantial portion of the cases to which it applies. This conclusion, however, illustrates the district court's erroneous application of the facial overbreadth doctrine. A statute will not be invalidated for overbreadth merely because it is possible to come up with a hypothetical situation in which the statute is unconstitutional as applied. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 800, 104 S.Ct. at 2126, 80 L.Ed.2d at 783. Rather, there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court.... Id., at 801-02, 104 S.Ct. at 2126, 80 L.Ed.2d at 784. Not addressed by the district court is the statute's application, without constitutional implications, to private property or to cases involving purely conduct and not speech. Physical presence in a public building dedicated to public uses other than that of a public thoroughfare, even presence for the purpose of communicating ideas, is not pure speech. Not all conduct claimed to have communicative purpose is protected as speech by the First Amendment. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555, 85 S.Ct. 453, 464, 13 L.Ed.2d 471, 484 (1965). The statute is also capable of constitutional application to government-owned nonpublic forums, such as government office buildings or portions of college campuses that, unlike traditional public forums such as a public street, public park or sidewalk, or the steps of the state Capitol building, are not open to the public for expressive activities. [5] See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954-956, 74 L.Ed.2d 794, 804-805 (1983); Bader v. State, 15 S.W.3d 599, 604-05 (Tex.App.2000). The facts in Korsen's case do not provide a situation where the exercise of free speech was impinged. Rather, Korsen showed up at the Health and Welfare office to conduct legitimate business, i.e., to discuss his child support obligation with the agency charged with overseeing collection of child support. When it appeared that his desire to obtain modification of the obligation could not be obtained at that office but, as he was informed, was a matter that properly should be addressed to the court where the obligation was established, the purpose of his visit to the Health and Welfare office came to an end. Assuming that a criminal trespass prosecution is filed pursuant to I.C. § 18-7008(8) against a person on public property who is exercising his or her free speech rights, the statute could be attacked as applied to that constitutionally-protected conduct. This does not render the statute substantially overbroad. A reasonable reading of I.C. § 18-7008(8) shows that the statute does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. The district court therefore committed reversible error in determining that the statutory language is overbroad.