Opinion ID: 3197570
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Offense Level Adjustment

Text: Appellant claims that the record does not support the district court's conclusion that he was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, § 3B1.1(a), and that therefore the fourlevel adjustment was applied in error. We review the district court's factfinding for clear error. See United States v. Delgado, 288 F.3d 49, 52 (1st Cir. 2002). We also review role-in-the-offense determinations, which are innately fact-specific, for clear error. See United States v. Colón-Muñoz, 318 F.3d 348, 364 (1st Cir. 2003). The district court made two necessary findings before applying § 3B1.1(a): that appellant was an organizer or leader, and that the criminal activity was sufficiently extensive.2 Those 2 Criminal activity is sufficiently extensive under § 3B1.1(a) if it either involved five or more participants, or was otherwise extensive. See United States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 1991). Here, the district court found the conspiracy to be otherwise extensive. - 4 - findings had to be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See Delgado, 288 F.3d at 52. In making those findings, the court was permitted to rely on undisputed facts from the PSR. See United States v. Prochner, 417 F.3d 54, 65-66 (1st Cir. 2005). We see no clear error in either finding. The district court based its conclusion that appellant was a leader or organizer on his direction of the scheme at Regency Mart, and his control over the finances of both stores. The undisputed facts adequately support this finding. Appellant admitted that he was the sole owner of Regency Mart, authorized his employees to conduct fraudulent transactions there, and claimed substantially all of the $293,000 in illicit proceeds from that location. See United States v. Aguasvivas-Castillo, 668 F.3d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 2012) (identifying factors to be considered in determining the role-in-the-offense to include authority exercised over others, and the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4)). With regard to Corner Store, appellant did not dispute the PSR's statement that SNAP credits flowed from both stores into bank accounts he controlled, including all proceeds of the illicit transactions at Corner Store. Further, the money laundering counts to which he pled guilty were based on transactions he personally conducted using Corner Store's SNAP account. See id. (emphasizing the significance of defendant's control over the bank accounts of - 5 - stores engaged in SNAP fraud, and concluding that he exercised a leadership role in the fraud); see also U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2 (authorizing a role-in-the-offense adjustment for defendants who exercise[] management responsibility over the property[] [or] assets . . . of a criminal organization). Additionally, it is undisputed that the criminal activity here involved store employees and numerous SNAP beneficiaries, and the illicit transfer of over $1.9 million in SNAP credits over roughly three years. The district court's finding that this activity was sufficiently extensive under § 3B1.1(a) was not clear error. See Dietz, 950 F.2d at 53-54 (finding criminal activity otherwise extensive under § 3B1.1(a) based on the number of participants -- including minor participants -- and the width, breadth, scope, complexity, and duration of the scheme); U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.3 (In assessing whether an organization is 'otherwise extensive,' all persons involved during the course of the entire offense are to be considered.).