Opinion ID: 2506634
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: plain language, purpose and intent of the statute, and public interest

Text: ¶ 11 Reasonable is a term that by its ordinary meaning connotes flexibility and a range of permissible conduct. Thus, as used in section 78A-6-117, reasonable could permit the court to impose a wide range of orders on parents whose children are adjudicated delinquent. Its reach is limited, however, by the purpose and intent of the statute stated in other provisions of the Juvenile Court Act. For example, section 78A-6-102(5)(b) states that the purpose of the juvenile court is to order appropriate measures to promote guidance and control, preferably in the minor's own home, as an aid in the prevention of future unlawful conduct and the development of responsible citizenship. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-102(5)(b) (2008). Additionally, section 78A-6-102(5)(g) provides further that the purpose of the juvenile court is to, consistent with the ends of justice, act in the best interests of the minor in all cases. Id. § 78A-6-102(5)(g). ¶ 12 In State v. Schofield, we held, As a tribunal geared toward the special needs of youth offenders, the juvenile court ... is not designed to deal with adults charged with crimes. When adults do become involved with the juvenile court, its statutory jurisdiction over them is appropriately very limited. 2002 UT 132, ¶ 17, 63 P.3d 667. Court orders in such cases cannot exceed the limited grant of statutory authority. Hardinger v. Scott (State ex rel. B.B.), 2004 UT 39, ¶ 13, 94 P.3d 252. A practical way to gauge the reasonableness of conditions imposed under subsections 78A-6-117(2)(p)(i) and (t) is to account for them in light of the likelihood that they would further the goals of the Act stated in section 78A-6-102. ¶ 13 The stated purpose of the Act requires that orders under 78A-6-117(2)(p)(i) and (t) must have behavioral reform of the minor as the sole motivation. Therefore, for reasons set out below, juvenile court orders may not be aimed at punishing the parent, and there must be some nexus between the actions of the parent that are to be constrained by the court's conditions, the behavior of the minor that led to her adjudication as delinquent, and the order imposed by the court. A nexus between the actions of the parent, the misbehavior of the child, and the order of the court ensures that the court's order will advance the statute's goal of reforming the minor's behavior. ¶ 14 Because the juvenile court's purpose is rehabilitation of minors, juvenile court orders must first have goals other than punishing the parent. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-102(5)(b); Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ¶ 16, 63 P.3d 667. In determining whether an action is punishment, we [f]irst ... determine whether a statute indicates an express or implied preference for a civil or criminal penalty. Second, where a statute is intended to establish a civil penalty, we must inquire further to determine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention. State v. One 1980 Cadillac, 2001 UT 26, ¶ 10, 21 P.3d 212 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 15 In One 1980 Cadillac, we were called upon to determine if the imposition of a civil fine was a punishment such that it would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause if imposed after a criminal conviction. Although the question in this case does not concern double jeopardy, the test used to determine whether the civil fine in One 1980 Cadillac was a punishment is suitable for guiding the analysis of whether ordering Mr. Moreno to undergo drug testing in the context of his daughter's delinquency proceeding is punitive. ¶ 16 The second component of a test of a condition's reasonableness is whether there is a logical connection between the parent's conduct, the minor's conduct, and the court order. If the court order is premised on a belief that there may be drug use in the home, then there must be, at minimum, sufficient evidence to suggest that drug use is in fact occurring in the home. Finally, if the goal of the order is to reform the minor's drug use, the order must be related to drug use rather than to another aspect of the parent's behavior unrelated to drugs. By requiring that to be reasonable the conditions imposed by the court order bear some relationship to the behavior of both the minor and the adult, the test we announce today ensures that court-ordered restrictions and expectations conform to generally accepted parenting norms. A court order requiring a parent to complete drug testing that has no connection with the circumstances of the case would not be reasonable. ¶ 17 An example of the connection required can be found in child welfare cases. In those cases, before a parent's parental rights may be terminated, sufficient record facts must be presented to satisfy the statutory elements for termination, including that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the minor. M.G. v. M.S.H. (In re T.H.), 2007 UT App 341, ¶ 11, 171 P.3d 480. In M.T.M. v. State (State ex rel. T.M.), the court determined that a father's parental rights were correctly terminated because there was a connection between the court order terminating his rights and facts material to his relationship with the child, such as his past incidents of domestic violence that occurred in front of the children, his use of methamphetamine in the presence of the children that caused the children to test positive for methamphetamine residue, his failure to stay in drug treatment, and his refusal to stop leaving the children in the care of their mother, who was a habitual methamphetamine user. 2006 UT App 435, ¶ 18, 147 P.3d 529. An analogous standard can be applied in child delinquency cases. The greater the nexus between the order and reformatory goal, the more likely an order and the conditions it imposes will be reasonable. ¶ 18 While a connection between the facts of the case, the court order, and the rehabilitative goal is necessary for an order imposing conditions on the parent to be reasonable, this does not mean that court orders directed at parents require probable cause to believe that the parent is engaging in undesirable behavior in order to be reasonable. Nor does it require that there be probable cause to believe that the parent's alleged behavior caused the delinquent behavior of the child for the order to be reasonable. Rather, where the condition imposed by the juvenile court does not impair the parent's constitutional rights, an order will be reasonable if it is based on a more than wholly speculative belief that the parent is engaging in behavior that is likely contributing materially to the minor's delinquent behavior. ¶ 19 Consideration for the parent's constitutional rights brings us to the final step of our interpretation of reasonable condition. Because we must construe statutes to be constitutional whenever possible, Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah 1991), even if an order meets the two tests for reasonableness articulated above, it will not be reasonable if it violates established constitutional rights of the parent.