Opinion ID: 1119473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Law of Self-defense

Text: The statutory basis for self-defense, as described in Penal Code sections 197 and 198, permits killing to prevent great bodily injury or death when there is reasonable ground to believe such harm is threatened and imminent danger of the threat being accomplished.... (Pen. Code, § 197.) Nevertheless, [a] bare fear of the commission of [great bodily injury] is not sufficient to justify it. But the circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person, and the party killing must have acted under the influence of such fears alone. (Pen. Code, § 198.) Accordingly, self-defense may be analyzed as having two requirements: (1) the defendant's acts causing the victim's death were motivated by an actual (also referred to as `genuine' or `honest') belief or perception that (a) the defendant was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury from an unlawful attack or threat by the victim and (b) the defendant's acts were necessary to prevent the injury; and (2) a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have had the same perception and done the same acts. ( People v. Aris (1989) 215 Cal. App.3d 1178, 1186 [264 Cal. Rptr. 167].) Or, as reduced to the common shorthand: self-defense requires both actual subjective belief and objective reasonableness.... ( Ibid. ) Justification does not depend upon the existence of actual danger but rather depends upon appearances; it is sufficient that the circumstances be such that a reasonable person would be placed in fear for his safety and that the defendant acted out of that fear. [Citations.] ( People v. Clark (1982) 130 Cal. App.3d 371, 377 [181 Cal. Rptr. 682].) The defendant may well be mistaken in his assessment of the circumstances; but if reasonably so, he is nevertheless entitled to the defense. ( People v. Semone (1934) 140 Cal. App. 318, 327 [35 P.2d 379]; see People v. Toledo (1948) 85 Cal. App.2d 577, 580 [193 P.2d 953].) In the words of Justice Holmes, Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife. ( Brown v. United States (1921) 256 U.S. 335, 343 [65 L.Ed. 961, 963, 41 S.Ct. 501, 18 A.L.R. 1276].) In defending himself, however, a person may use only that force which is necessary in view of the nature of the attack.... [Citation.] ( People v. Clark, supra, 130 Cal. App.3d at p. 377.) The law thus recognizes that the objective component is not measured by an abstract standard of reasonableness but one based on the defendant's perception of imminent harm or death. Because his state of mind is a critical issue, he may explain his actions in light of his knowledge concerning the victim. ( People v. Davis (1965) 63 Cal.2d 648, 656 [47 Cal. Rptr. 801, 408 P.2d 129]; see People v. Lee Chuck (1887) 74 Cal. 30, 34-35 [15 P. 322].) Antecedent threats as well as the victim's reputation for violence, prior assaults, and other circumstances [are] relevant to interpreting the attacker's behavior. ( People v. Aris, supra, 215 Cal. App.3d at p. 1189; see People v. Moore (1954) 43 Cal.2d 517, 527-529 [275 P.2d 485]; People v. Lee Chuck, supra, 74 Cal. at pp. 34-35; People v. Brophy (1954) 122 Cal. App.2d 638, 647-648 [265 P.2d 593].) While such considerations alone do not establish a right of self-defense (see People v. Fitch (1938) 28 Cal. App.2d 31, 45-46 [81 P.2d 1019]), they illuminate and reflect on the reasonableness of defendant's perception of both the imminence of danger and the need to resist with the degree of force applied. (See People v. Moore, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 528.) They may also justify the defendant in acting more quickly and taking harsher measures for her own protection in the event of assault, whether actual or threatened, than would a person who had not received such threats. ( People v. Bush (1978) 84 Cal. App.3d 294, 302-303 [148 Cal. Rptr. 430].) Imminence is a critical component of both prongs of self-defense. A previous threat, unaccompanied by any demonstration of an immediate intention and ability to carry it out, will not justify an assault. The defendant is, however, entitled to corroborate his testimony that he was in [immediate or imminent] fear for his life by proving the reasonableness of such fear through evidence of his own frame of mind. ( People v. Davis, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 656.) The jury must evaluate such perceptions in context, i.e., the same or similar circumstances as those in which the defendant acted. (See People v. Kermott (1939) 33 Cal. App.2d 236, 242-243 [91 P.2d 215].) Therefore, if they would induce a well founded belief in the mind of a reasonable person that his adversary was on the eve of executing the threat and that immediate defense against the impending danger was the only means of escape from great bodily injury or death, the law of self-defense justifies use of whatever force is necessary to avert the threatened peril. ( People v. Scoggins (1869) 37 Cal. 676, 683-684; People v. Aris, supra, 215 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1186-1189.)