Opinion ID: 1702553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Oakley's Invocation of the Litigation Process

Text: As the first defendant to respond to the complaint, Oakley filed an Acceptance of Service, Answer and Counterclaim. He took no further action in the case, as far as the record reveals, until three months later when he filed his joinder in the motions to compel arbitration filed by Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley. Lewis argues to us that Oakley, by asserting a counterclaim predicated on the Purchase Agreement, conceded that the dispute ... arose out of that agreement and showed his intent to abandon any right to arbitration. The burden was on Lewis to prove that Oakley had substantially invoked the litigation process, in order to show a waiver by Oakley of his right to compel arbitration. Blue Ribbon Homes Super Center, Inc. v. Bell, 821 So.2d 186 (Ala.2001). Our cases continue to make it clear that, because of the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, a waiver of the right to compel arbitration will not be lightly inferred, and, therefore, that one seeking to prove waiver has a heavy burden. Mutual Assurance, Inc. v. Wilson, 716 So.2d 1160, 1164 (Ala.1998). Even if we were to conclude that Oakley had substantially invoked the litigation process, which we do not, Lewis has not met his burden of showing that he was substantially prejudiced thereby. See Jericho Mgmt., Inc. v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 811 So.2d 514, 515 (Ala.2001). Lewis asserts in his brief to this Court that he was prejudiced by having to pay attorneys' fees in answering the counterclaim and submitting discovery requests associated therewith. We see in the record, however, that Lewis's answer to the counterclaim consisted of essentially a onepage set of general denials, and the discovery he references was a three-category set of document production requests and 12 interrogatories, all of which appear directed to the issues raised by the complaint, as opposed to the counterclaim. We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in implicitly finding that Oakley had not substantially invoked the litigation process and/or that Lewis was not substantially prejudiced by the level of the litigation process that was invoked.