Opinion ID: 1200964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: taint hearing

Text: Defendant claims fundamental error occurred by the court's failure to sua sponte order a taint hearing to determine if the state's evidence derived from sources independent of his immunized testimony given in Ortega's trial and at a pretrial deposition. Defendant argues the prosecution reviewed exhibits from Ortega's trial that included those testified to by defendant, and complains the record lacks certification by the state of its independent sources of its evidence. This issue is raised for the first time on appeal. See State v. Jaramillo, 85 N.M. 19, 508 P.2d 1316 (Ct.App.) (fundamental error doctrine allows court to reach questions that were not preserved properly for appeal in order to prevent miscarriage of justice when defendant has been deprived of rights essential to the defense), cert. denied, 85 N.M. 5, 508 P.2d 1302, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1000, 94 S.Ct. 353, 38 L.Ed.2d 236 (1973). Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972), is the seminal case addressing the prohibition on prosecutors from using immunized testimony in any respect, direct or indirect, which may lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness.  Kastigar requires that a defendant only show that he has testified under a grant of immunity. The prosecuting authorities then `have the burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted [by exposure to prior immunized testimony] by establishing that they had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence. State v. Munoz, 103 N.M. 40, 42, 702 P.2d 985, 987 (1985) (quoting Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460, 92 S.Ct. at 1665); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1609-10, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964) (defendant must demonstrate he testified under a grant of immunity before burden shifts to prosecution). One raising a claim under [the immunity] statute need only show that he testified under a grant of immunity in order to shift to the government the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461-62, 92 S.Ct. at 1665. It is uncontroverted that defendant, either before, during or after trial, failed to alert the court of his concern that the prosecution's evidence might have been derived from his immunized testimony given in Ortega's trial, nor did he object or question the source of the prosecution's evidence to adduce that it was untainted by his immunized testimony. Nevertheless, despite the lack of a Kastigar hearing, precautions were in place to avoid possible taint arising from defendant's immunized testimony. Two special prosecutors from the Fifth Judicial District, who had no connection to the Ortega trial, were appointed to try defendant's case. See Munoz, 103 N.M. at 45, 702 P.2d at 990 (different prosecutor than one who elicits immunized testimony should handle prosecution of person who gave immunized testimony; steps should be taken to insulate such prosecutor and staff from exposure to immunized testimony); see generally 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 79 (1989). Further, the record indicates that a pretrial conference was held after jury selection wherein the defense attorney, prosecutors, and trial judge recognized that defendant's immunized testimony could not be used in his trial. During the discussions, prosecutor Plath expressed concern with Defendant's use of the fact that he testified against Mr. Ortega to his own benefit in this case, in this trial. Defense counsel stated, and all agreed, that [i]t's clear it [defendant's immunized testimony] shall not be used. Unlike the cases cited by defendant wherein the prosecuting authorities had reviewed the immunized testimony, the record in the instant case suggests no knowledge by the prosecutors of the substance of defendant's immunized testimony, nor that they had access to it or reviewed it. In fact, after Ortega's November 1988 trial, the transcript of proceedings in his trial were not designated for appeal until April 1989, and were received in the supreme court on November 16, 1989. Jury selection in defendant's second trial took place on November 13 with his trial commencing the next day. Absent defendant's failure to raise this issue in the trial court or question the source of the prosecution's evidence, we find no error in the court's failure to hold a taint hearing, and, thus, no fundamental error. The doctrine of fundamental error is one to be applied only under exceptional circumstances and solely to prevent a miscarriage of justice. State v. Escamilla, 107 N.M. 510, 515, 760 P.2d 1276, 1281 (1988).