Opinion ID: 3134662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 30

Heading: Death Sentence Excessive

Text: Next, defendant maintains that his death sentence is excessive and should be vacated. At the outset, we note that appellate counsel did not raise this issue on direct appeal. Thus, waiver applies. Defendant maintains, however, that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise this issue on appeal. Consequently, we consider this issue on the merits. In determining whether a death sentence is proper in a particular case, we must consider the character and record of the individual offender. Shatner , 174 Ill. 2d at 161; People v. Towns , 182 Ill. 2d 491, 519 (1998). Each capital case is unique and must be evaluated on its own facts, focusing on whether the circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant are such that the deterrent and retributive functions of the ultimate sanction will be served by imposing the death penalty. Johnson , 128 Ill. 2d at 280. As such, this court has determined that, when reviewing a death sentence, it will make a separate evaluation of the record, but it will not lightly overturn the jury’s findings made during the aggravation and mitigation phase of the death sentencing hearing when they are amply supported by the record. Pasch , 152 Ill. 2d at 201; Christiansen , 116 Ill. 2d at 122. The record shows that Lillian LaCrosse had complained that, over a two-month period preceding her death, defendant had been harassing her by asking her for dates. She was afraid of defendant. On the evening of April 17, 1985, the outer door to Lillian LaCrosse’s apartment building was open because Commonwealth Edison personnel were working on restoring the electricity. Defendant entered Lillian LaCrosse’s apartment without authorization. Bloodstains on the front door of the apartment and defense wounds on her hands evinced a struggle between Lillian LaCrosse and defendant. Defendant, armed with two different weapons, stabbed Lillian LaCrosse at least 25 times in the ear, shoulder, throat, chest, arms and back. Defendant also strangled and sexually assaulted Lillian LaCrosse. She died from a loss of blood. Defendant, thereafter, stole Lillian LaCrosse’s purse, a movie camera she had borrowed from her parents and a pair of her jeans. Lillian LaCrosse’s husband discovered her body on the dining room floor when he returned home from work. Her three children, ranging in age from 2 to 4 years, were crying in their bedroom; the phone had been taken off the hook. The State also introduced evidence of defendant’s criminal record at the aggravation-mitigation stage of the hearing. He had twice been adjudicated delinquent and his juvenile criminal history included theft from school lockers after cutting the locks off; setting his school on fire; residential burglary; auto theft; burglary of a church; and possession of a firearm. His adult criminal activity included burglary of a laundromat in May 1980; a second burglary in May 1981; attempted auto theft; possession of a stolen motor vehicle; and unlawful possession of a weapon. On behalf of the State, two women (footnote: 3) testified regarding previous contacts with defendant. Sharon Williams was 16 years old in August 1980 when she agreed to go on a date with defendant, then 19 years old. Defendant, along with two male friends, picked her up. She got into the back seat of the car with defendant, who subsequently forced her, at knife point, to have sexual intercourse. Defendant was charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Sandra Sender stated that defendant, a friend of her ex-husband, came to her apartment on May 26, 1983, on the pretext of talking with her about her car. After she let him inside, he pulled a knife and strangled her. She passed out. When she regained consciousness, defendant took her to the bedroom, threw her onto the bed and strangled her again. She passed out once more. When she regained consciousness, defendant was having sexual intercourse with her. Subsequently, she distracted defendant long enough to flee the building and obtain help. Defendant was charged with attempted murder and unlawful restraint and pled guilty to aggravated battery. The State also presented evidence regarding defendant’s behavior in prison. Several witnesses testified regarding defendant’s gang affiliation and various infractions of prison regulations. Attorney Zellner testified that, while meeting with a client at Pontiac in the fall of 1991, she observed defendant hit his wife in the face and force her to perform oral sex on him in the prison visiting room. Defendant’s prison behavior also included beating another inmate, and throwing hot liquid on the head, face and forearm of a prison guard. In mitigation, defendant presented evidence of his difficult childhood. His natural father left the house when he was a child. His mother remarried when he was 10 years old. Defendant was beaten by his stepfather, and not disciplined by his mother. He grew up in a low-income, high-crime neighborhood in Chicago and began to use drugs and alcohol at a relatively young age. When defendant was about 16 years old, his mother moved and he then lived with an older sister. Several witnesses testified regarding the laundromat burglary on May 6, 1980. Defendant was bitten by a police dog when police responded to the burglary. Defendant suffered a tear to the foreskin of his penis, and a puncture wound to his thigh. Defendant married Lydia Smith on June 14, 1980. She testified that defendant did not have normal intercourse with her for several months after the dog-bite incident. He became very aggressive, short-tempered, subdued, and his drug use increased. Lydia Smith stopped living with defendant in 1983, when he was incarcerated for a burglary. She divorced defendant in 1985. Although defendant did not pay child support, he maintained regular contact with his two children. Defendant and his current wife, Christine Simms, married while he was in prison. According to her, defendant has changed for the better in the past few years and is very loving and supportive of her and her daughter. Christine Simms denied that defendant hit her on any of her visits to the prison, or forced her to perform oral sex in the visiting room. Defendant also presented mitigation evidence that he had assisted in a program for juvenile delinquents. On four occasions, he spoke to groups of youth offenders and encouraged the youths to stay out of trouble. According to the program director and a juvenile who heard him speak, defendant’s participation has had a positive influence on the juveniles. While in prison, defendant got his GED and showed interest in taking college courses. Dr. Wahlstrom examined defendant in September 1993. He testified that in 1985 defendant suffered from an antisocial personality disorder, as well as from post-traumatic stress disorder, in partial remission, stemming from the dog-bite incident. Defendant also suffered from drug and alcohol dependence. Finally, Dr. John Sturman testified that defendant had changed for the better while in prison. In light of the mitigation presented, defendant maintains that his sentence must be vacated, consistent with this court’s holding in Johnson , 128 Ill. 2d 253, People v. Buggs , 112 Ill. 2d 284 (1986), and People v. Carlson , 79 Ill. 2d 564 (1980). We disagree. The decisions to vacate the defendants’ death sentences in those cases were based on mitigating factors that are not present in this case. Thus, in Johnson , the defendant returned to his place of employment nine days after he was fired to collect his final paycheck. The defendant was told that there was no paycheck for him. The defendant shot the supervisor who had fired him, shot and stabbed one of his former coworkers, and shot and killed another former coworker. On the day of the offenses, the defendant had used alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana laced with the drug “PCP.” This court vacated the defendant’s death sentence because of his good character, steady employment history, and insignificant criminal record. The court found that an isolated stressful event led to the crimes, concluding that the crimes had occurred only because the defendant had just been fired and believed that he had been deprived of his final paycheck. See Johnson , 128 Ill. 2d 253. In Buggs , the defendant and his wife argued after she received a telephone call from one of her boyfriends. During the argument, she told the defendant that he was not the father of two of her sons. The defendant became outraged; poured gasoline on his wife, the hallway and the stairway; threw a lit match on the stairs; and fled. The defendant’s wife and son died in the fire. This court vacated the defendant’s death sentence because he had served 21 years in the military and been honorably discharged; he had no history of serious criminal activity; he had a drinking problem; and he had been experiencing marital difficulties which, in fact, triggered the dispute leading to the murders. Buggs , 112 Ill. 2d at 293-95. In Carlson , the defendant, recently divorced, had moved out of the marital home, but continued seeing his former wife with a view to remarriage. The defendant had not contested the divorce upon his former wife’s agreement not to entertain men at the marital home. On the day of the murders, the defendant and his former wife argued over her relationship with other men. The defendant shot his former wife, poured gasoline throughout her house, and set the house on fire. The defendant then went to a bar and tried to contact his daughter by telephone so he could give her money for his son’s support. Since he was unable to contact her, he gave a coworker a large sum of money in an envelope with instructions to give the envelope to the daughter for the son’s use. When the police arrived to arrest him at the bar, the defendant killed one of the officers. This court found that the defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity, and had acted under an extreme emotional disturbance exacerbated by his very poor physical and emotional health. This court also stated that the defendant’s concern for his son was a mitigating factor. Carlson , 79 Ill. 2d at 587-91. The mitigating factors in Johnson , Buggs , Carlson are absent in the present case. Thus, we are not inclined to vacate defendant’s death sentence. Instead, we find ample support for the jury’s verdict in the brutal nature of the murder; defendant’s generous criminal record; his negative sexual contacts with Sandra Sender and Sharon Williams; his gang affiliation; his violent behavior in prison; and the many infractions of prison regulations. In addition, the record contains evidence contradicting some of the mitigation testimony. For example, Lydia Smith testified that defendant drank alcohol in moderation; was not addicted to any particular drug; and chose when to use drugs. Defendant’s sexual contact with Sharon Williams occurred a scant three months after the dog-bite incident, which, allegedly, prevented him from having normal sexual intercourse with Lydia Smith. Various psychiatrists who examined defendant found no evidence of psychopathy, and a report prepared by one psychiatrist noted that defendant denied any psychiatric problems. Lastly, Dr. Wahlstrom could not testify to a direct correlation between the disorders he diagnosed and the murder of Lillian LaCrosse. In light of the record, we decline to overturn the jury’s findings made during the aggravation-mitigation stage of the death sentencing hearing. Accordingly, we find that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. Defendant next argues that the Du Page County State’s Attorney acted arbitrarily in seeking the death penalty in the present case but not in the case of People v. Hernandez , 204 Ill. App. 3d 732 (1990). Defendant invites a comparison of the facts of his case with the facts in Hernandez , and suggests that this court vacate his death sentence in order to rectify “the arbitrariness” evinced by the Du Page County State’s Attorney in seeking the death penalty against him. We note, at the outset, that defendant did not raise this argument in the trial court or on direct appeal. Defendant acknowledges the waiver, but posits that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this claim in the trial court and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Consequently, we consider the issue on its merits. We have repeatedly rejected the argument that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional because of the discretion it gives the prosecutor in deciding whether to seek the death penalty in a particular case. People v. Heard , 187 Ill. 2d 36, 89 (1999); People v. Cloutier , 178 Ill. 2d 141, 173-74 (1997); Kidd , 175 Ill. 2d at 55; Kokoraleis , 132 Ill. 2d at 291. Furthermore, the very fact that the prosecutor is afforded a measure of discretion under the death penalty statute entails that the prosecutor will seek the death penalty in one case and not in another. The prosecutor may decide to do so based upon the strength of the evidence, the circumstances of the crime, the accused’s rehabilitative potential, the availability and credibility of witnesses, and any number of legitimate factors. In the present case, there was a statutory aggravating factor, murder committed in the course of an armed robbery and aggravated criminal sexual assault, to warrant a request for a death penalty hearing. Defendant has not shown that the Du Page County State’s Attorney’s decision to seek the death penalty against him was based on circumstances other than the presence of the statutory aggravating factor, the strength of the evidence against him, his substantial criminal history, and his demonstrated lack of rehabilitative potential as evidenced by numerous prison infractions. Moreover, our review of the record has not uncovered any evidence to support the contention that the State’s Attorney considered impermissible factors in arriving at his charging decision. The only support advanced by defendant for the contention that the State’s Attorney acted improperly is the State’s Attorney’s decision not to seek the death penalty against Hernandez. Such is insufficient, however, to support an inference that the State’s Attorney was improperly motivated in seeking the death penalty in the present case. See McCleskey v. Kemp , 481 U.S. 279, 306-07, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262, 287-88, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1774-45 (1987); People v. Stewart , 121 Ill. 2d 93, 110-12 (1988); People v. Foster , 119 Ill. 2d 69, 90-93 (1987); People v. Free , 112 Ill. 2d 154, 160-63 (1986). Defendant has failed to supply this court with evidence that the State’s Attorney acted improperly in seeking the death penalty against him. Absent such proof, we will not assume that the State’s Attorney’s decision in seeking the death penalty against defendant was “based on whim or caprice or otherwise invoke[d] impermissible considerations.” Stewart , 121 Ill. 2d at 112. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant’s death sentence was not imposed arbitrarily or capriciously. Furthermore, we conclude that defendant’s death sentence was not excessive. In light of these conclusions, we find that trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective for failing to argue that the State’s Attorney acted arbitrarily in seeking the death penalty against defendant, and appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that defendant’s death sentence was excessive.