Opinion ID: 788213
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Washington's Seizure Was Unconstitutional

Text: 37 A seizure premised on reasonable suspicion, such as a Terry -stop, is not per se unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, so long as it is sufficiently brief and minimally intrusive. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (examining, under Terry, whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion). Here, Washington's detention by the six RPD officers violated the Fourth Amendment because it was not sufficiently brief and not minimally intrusive. 38 In United States v. Miles, [247 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir.2001),] we described the test for determining when a Terry -stop becomes an arrest: whether the detention exceeded a brief stop, interrogation and, under proper circumstances, a brief check for weapons. Then, if the stop proceeds beyond these limitations, ... an arrest occurs ... if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude that he was not free to leave after brief questioning. 39 United States v. Bravo, 295 F.3d 1002, 1011 n. 8 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Miles, 247 F.3d at 1012). 40 After Washington left his room and entered the hallway, he voluntarily consented to Officer Sceirine's request for a brief check for weapons. Id. (quoting Miles, 247 F.3d at 1012). The pat-down revealed no weapons or evidence of drug manufacturing or distribution. Officer Sceirine then asked Washington whether he had a methamphetamine lab in his room and whether he was selling drugs. Washington emphatically and unequivocally denied that he was running a methamphetamine lab in his room or involved in methamphetamine distribution. The officers' encounter with Washington should have ended there, but it did not. See Ganwich v. Knapp, 319 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir.2003) (A seizure becomes unlawful when it is `more intrusive than necessary.' The scope of a detention `must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.' (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 504, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983))). Instead, the officers continued to press Washington into allowing them to enter his room and, notwithstanding their failure to obtain permission to do so, entered it in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 9 41 The officers'underlying justification for initially detaining Washington was to question him about whether he was involved in producing and/or distributing methamphetamine. See id. But the officers' extended detention of Washington was more intrusive than necessary because the officers' actions—in particular, their repeated attempts to gain entry into Washington's room—were not carefully tailored to the detention's underlying justification. Id. Rather, we find that the officers' actions were calculated to circumvent the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant be obtained to search an individual's home. See Lalonde, 204 F.3d at 954 (The Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from making a warrantless entry into a person's home, unless the officers have probable cause and are presented with exigent circumstances. (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371; United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350 (9th Cir.1978))). Thus, the officer's extended seizure of Washington was beyond the scope of any permissible detention under the Fourth Amendment. 42