Opinion ID: 4020381
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Lift Stay

Text: We first consider the district court’s denial of Murata’s motion to lift the stay with regard to the Additional Patents. We hold that the district court did not err in refusing to lift the stay entered in this case. The ability to stay cases is an exercise of a court’s inherent power to manage its own docket. See Procter & Gamble, 549 F.3d at 848–49 (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936)). Thus, we review the district court’s refusal to lift a stay pending IPR for an abuse of discretion. See id. at 845. A court may lift a stay if the circumstances supporting the stay have changed such that the stay is no longer appropriate. Canady v. Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH, 271 F. Supp. 2d 64, 74 (D.D.C. 2002). District courts typically analyze stays under a three-factor test: “(i) whether a stay would unduly prejudice or present a clear tactical disadvantage to the non-moving party; (ii) whether a stay will simplify the issues in question and trial of the case; and (iii) whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date has been set.” Nokia Corp. v. Apple Inc., No. C.A. 09-791, 2011 WL 2160904, at  (D. Del. June 1, 2011) (quoting Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 69 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406 (W.D.N.Y. 1999)). Murata’s principal argument is that the district court should have relied on this threefactor test and that it abused its discretion by considering an additional, fourth factor—the burden of litigation on MURATA MACHINERY USA, INC. v. DAIFUKU CO., LTD. 7 the court and the parties—that Murata itself urged the court to adopt earlier in the case. In support of its position, Murata points out that Congress has specifically required district courts to apply the four-factor variant of the test—i.e., to include the “burden of litigation” factor as part of their analysis—for stay requests pending covered business method (“CBM”) review by the Board. See America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011). Congress did not likewise prescribe a set of factors that district courts must consider when they decide whether to stay a case pending IPR. The inference Murata would have us draw is that the “burden of litigation” factor is “applicable solely to stays pending CBM review . . . .” Appellant Br. 48. Put another way, Murata argues that the CBM statute imputes a negative restriction on district courts, prohibiting them from considering the burden of litigation unless Congress has explicitly required that they do so. Thus, Murata argues it was legal error for the district court to have considered the burden of litigation in this case as the stay centered around IPRs rather than CBM reviews. We disagree. Besides the fact that it was Murata that first advocated that the court consider the “burden of litigation” factor, we nonetheless hold that consideration of this factor is well within the district court’s discretion. “The Supreme Court has long recognized that district courts have broad discretion to manage their dockets, including the power to grant a stay of proceedings.” Procter & Gamble, 549 F.3d at 848–49 (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55); see also Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 705 F.2d 1340, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Indeed, we have noted that with respect to a similar PTO post-grant proceeding, reexamination, the authorizing statute need not even grant district courts the power to stay related proceedings because “‘such power already resides with the Court’[,] . . . including the authority to order a stay pending conclusion of a PTO reexamination.” Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 8 MURATA MACHINERY USA, INC. v. DAIFUKU CO., LTD. 1422, 1426–27 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 6463). Attendant to the district court’s inherent power to stay proceedings is the court’s discretionary prerogative to balance considerations beyond those captured by the three-factor stay test. The burden litigation places on the court and the parties when IPR proceedings loom is one such consideration that district courts may rightfully choose to weigh. See, e.g., NFC Tech. LLC v. HTC Am., Inc., No. 2:13-cv-1058, 2015 WL 1069111, at  (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2015) (Bryson, J.) (noting that “whether a stay will reduce the burden of litigation on the parties and the court [] is a consideration that courts often take[] into account in determining whether to grant a stay pending inter partes review”). The AIA § 18(b)(1) requirement that district courts must consider the burden of litigation when faced with a CBM stay request does not bar courts from choosing to consider it in the IPR context. Indeed, legislative history confirms that “Congress’s desire to enhance the role of the PTO and limit the burden of litigation on courts and parties was not limited to the CBM review context.” Id. (citing AIA legislative history). As such, district courts might consider this factor relevant and therefore do not abuse their discretion by weighing it as part of an IPR-based stay determination. We have considered Murata’s remaining arguments that the district court abused its discretion in analyzing the traditional three factors and find them unpersuasive. Having determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its overall analysis or by considering the burden of litigation, we do not disturb the district court’s decision not to lift the stay with respect to the Additional Patents.