Opinion ID: 2137160
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Heading: Last Clear Chance Instruction.

Text: Bokhoven requested the following instruction: PROXIMATE CAUSELAST CLEAR CHANCE The Defendant, Klinker, asserts that the Plaintiff was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of his injury and damage, as explained in instruction No. ___, but Plaintiff asserts that under the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence his own negligence, if any, was not a proximate cause. If you find from the evidence (1) that just prior to the accident Plaintiff was in a position of peril by reason of his own negligence, (2) that Defendant had knowledge of Plaintiff's presence, (3) that Defendant realized or in the exercise of reasonable care should have realized that Plaintiff was in a position of peril, and (4) that thereafter Defendant had the time and ability to avoid the collision through the exercise of ordinary care and failed to do so, then under such circumstances any negligence of the Plaintiff would not be a proximate cause of his injury and damage. The court refused the request. The court conceded that, under the facts, a last clear chance instruction would have been applicable but for the adoption of comparative fault in Iowa. The court concluded the doctrine of last clear chance was subsumed by the adoption of comparative fault. It is error for the court not to give a requested instruction when the instruction states a correct rule of law having application to the facts of the case and the concept is not otherwise embodied in other instructions. Smith v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc., 464 N.W.2d 682, 685 (Iowa 1990). Bokhoven relies upon our decision in Stewart v. Madison, 278 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 1979), as support of the submission of his requested instruction. In Stewart, we abolished last clear chance as a separate doctrine but provided the elements previously applied as part of the last clear chance doctrine shall, in all cases where they are applicable, be submitted as issues of proximate cause. Id. at 293. At that time, we also declined to adopt the doctrine of comparative negligence. Id. Prior to Stewart, the elements of last clear chance could be submitted to the jury as issues apart from and additional to proximate cause. The doctrine of last clear chance has often been considered by us. There was some confusion as to the theory of this doctrine in Iowa. Vreugdenhil v. Kunkel, 256 Iowa 460, 464, 127 N.W.2d 630, 632-33 (1964). We said the last clear chance doctrine is an exception to the rule barring recovery to one who has been guilty of contributory negligence. Id. We also held to the causation theory for the doctrine's support. Id. Under the latter view, the doctrine refers to negligence after negligence and is a phase of proximate cause. Id. Prior to 1965, a plaintiff was required to plead and prove freedom from negligence which contributed in any way or in any degree directly to the accident. Proof of proximate cause was not involved. Schultz v. Gosselink, 260 Iowa 115, 120-21, 148 N.W.2d 434, 437-38 (1967). The burden shifted under Iowa Code section 619.17 (1965), and the burden was then on the defendant to plead and prove that plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of the injury. We held the changes brought about by section 619.17, did not render the last clear chance doctrine inapplicable; rather, liability under circumstances where the doctrine is applied may properly be determined by a legitimate application of the modern concepts of proximate cause. Ackerman v. James, 200 N.W.2d 818, 829 (Iowa 1972). We subscribed to the view of legal cause expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 (1964). Id. However, the Iowa State Bar Association uniform jury instruction defining proximate cause was not changed to fully reflect the substantial factor requirement until after our opinion in Jones v. City of Des Moines, 355 N.W.2d 49 (Iowa 1984). Two years after Stewart, by judicial decision, we adopted the comparative negligence doctrine in its pure form. See Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 754 (Iowa 1982). We recognized Iowa had experienced more than 100 years of judicial and legislative efforts, including the adoption of the doctrine of last clear chance, to ameliorate the harshness of the doctrine of contributory negligence. Id. at 753. We recognized that the court must reform common-law doctrines that are unsound and unsuited to present conditions. Id. In 1984, Iowa adopted, by legislative action, a modified comparative fault act. 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1293, codified at Iowa Code ch. 668. Iowa's modified comparative fault provides, if the claimant's percentage of fault is more than fifty percent, the claimant cannot recover damages. Iowa Code § 668.3(1). The doctrine of last clear chance, which originated as a mechanism for avoiding the harsh effects of the contributory negligence doctrine, has been abolished by most jurisdictions which have adopted comparative negligence. W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 67 (5th ed. 1984); 1 A. Best, Comparative Negligence § 4.10[2][c] (1991); V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 7.2 (2d ed. 1986); Annotation, Modern Development of Comparative Negligence Doctrine Having Applicability to Negligence Actions Generally, 78 A.L.R.3d 339 (1977 & 1991 Supp.). Courts have reasoned that the doctrine fails to serve any further purpose and indeed conflicts with the basic principles of comparative negligence. We conclude the doctrine of last clear chance, even when considered a part of proximate cause, has no further function to perform where contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to plaintiff's recovery. We abolished last clear chance as a separate doctrine in Stewart. The contributory negligence doctrine was supplanted by the adoption of comparative negligence in Goetzman. The last clear chance doctrine was no longer part of our law. The adoption of chapter 668, a modified comparative fault act, did not resurrect the doctrine. It was not necessary for the legislature to specifically abandon the doctrine, as in the Model Act, for the doctrine had been abolished by our judicial action in Goetzman. We also recognize that the definition of proximate cause has been revised since our decision in Jones. Iowa Civil Jury Instruction 700.3 (1991), defines proximate cause as: The conduct of a party is proximate cause of damage when it is a substantial factor in producing damage and when the damage would not have happened except for the conduct. Substantial means the party's conduct has such an effect in producing damage as to lead a reasonable person to regard it as cause. The district court submitted this instruction to the jury. It states the correct rule of law having application to the facts of the case. Therefore, no additional instruction was necessary.