Opinion ID: 2552051
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: statement of stipulated facts

Text: ¶ 9 State Farm argues the trial court exceeded its permitted range of discretion by denying its request to strike the statement of stipulated facts. Although seeking to strike the entire stipulation, State Farm's objection focuses on paragraph 47 of the stipulation and the use of that statement made by Rivera in arguing for partial summary judgment against State Farm. Paragraph 47 says: 47. For purposes of insurance coverage by State Farm, the parties stipulate that it does not matter whether Amy Motuapuaka or Phillip Toledo were driving Linda Motuapuaka's car at the time of the accident. ¶ 10 State Farm claims that because it failed to anticipate that Rivera would assert Amy Motuapuaka was driving the vehicle at the time of accident, the stipulation should be set aside. We cannot agree. The position now taken by State Farm is inconsistent with its argument before the trial court on the motions for summary judgment. ¶ 11 A stipulation is an admission which may not be disregarded or set aside at will. DLB Collection Trust v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593, 595 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (citations omitted). However, a court may set aside a stipulation for inadvertence or justifiable cause if the mistake is not due to failure to exercise due diligence and it could not have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care. State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1265 (Utah 1983). We note that there is an institutional hesitancy to relieve a party from a stipulation negotiated and entered into with the advice of counsel. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah Ct.App. 1989); see also Dove, 710 P.2d at 171. ¶ 12 In this case, State Farm's counsel drafted the original statement of stipulated facts and then sent it to Rivera's counsel for review. After negotiation and numerous revisions, a final version was agreed to by the parties, completed, and presented to the trial court. There is no indication that State Farm did not understand or agree to the stipulation. Furthermore, in oral argument before the trial court, both parties relied on the stipulation. Counsel for State Farm presented the first argument. In the course of that presentation, counsel stated: Your Honor, we believe that based upon the language of the policy that was issued, that we can establish that there is no coverage available because the driver of the vehicle, whoever that might have been, was not an insured at the time of the accident. I think, Your Honor, all facts would indicate that Mr. Toledo was the driver. My understanding, however, based upon counsel'sfor Rivera's pleading that they may argue that Amy was the driver. And I think, Your Honor, we can establish either way that it would not matter because there is not factsthere is not coverage for either. (Emphasis added.) Later in the same argument, State Farm's counsel argued: There is limited evidence, Your Honor, asagain, as to who was driving. The depositions that were taken, as I indicated, seem to indicate that Toledo was. But even under the argument that if Amy was driving at the time of the accident, she was driving without the permission of her mother. And even though she may have been an insured under the policy, she was driving without the consent, and therefore it takes it outside of coverage. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 13 Rivera's attorney argued that under the facts as stipulated to by State Farm, Amy, as an insured under the policy, could have been driving. If so, State Farm would be liable for Rivera's injuries and claims. Thereafter, State Farm's counsel argued further: [Counsel for Rivera has argued] indicating that regardless of whether or not she [meaning Amy] has permission or not, she's covered. And we dispute that. . . . In the context of the overall case, Your Honor, for purposes we were trying to get the stipulation here so that the Court can make a ruling. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 14 State Farm made no objection before the trial court to Rivera's claim that Amy was driving, for purposes of determining liability under the policy. In fact, State Farm specifically stated that it did not want to back out of the stipulation. Although State Farm now argues that it could not reasonably foresee that Rivera would assert that Amy was driving the car at the time of the accident, State Farm accepted that as a fact for purposes of arguing the motions for summary judgment. State Farm clearly took the position that Amy could have been driving, but that under the policy language she would not have coverage anyway. The trial court took State Farm at its stipulated word and concluded that the application of the policy language to those stipulated facts amounted to liability for State Farm. ¶ 15 State Farm's stipulation that it did not matter who was driving at the time of the accident was only a mistake because the trial court disagreed with State Farm's interpretation of the policy language. State Farm's error in agreeing to the stipulated language arose from a misjudgment of its legal position, not from a misunderstanding of what it was stipulating to, as a matter of fact. It could clearly have been avoided by simply exercis[ing] due diligence and . . . ordinary care. Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1265; see also United Factors v. T.C. Assocs., Inc., 21 Utah 2d 351, 354, 445 P.2d 766, 769 (1968) (refusing to set aside stipulation where a lack of full knowledge of the facts . . . was plainly due to [the] failure to exercise due diligence to ascertain them). ¶ 16 The trial court accepted the stipulation, and we see no reason to relieve State Farm from the stipulation. The stipulation simplified the proof on a contested factual question and did not purport to bind the court on a point of law. Although State Farm's claim that its inadvertence in entering into the stipulation empowered the trial court to exercise its discretion to void the stipulation, the trial court's refusal to do so was not an abuse of discretion. In other words, it did not exceed the range of discretion given the trial court under these circumstances. See Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir.1991) (stating trial courts are vested with broad discretion in determining whether to hold a party to a stipulation or whether the interests of justice require that the stipulation be set aside). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order denying State Farm's motion to strike the stipulated facts.