Opinion ID: 1119859
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Contentions Related to the Rape Charges

Text: One of the defense theories at trial was that defendant first acquired the intent to have intercourse with the victims after they were dead. Over defense objection, the court gave the following nonstandard instruction to the jury in addition to the standard instructions:  It is legally possible to rape a dead body. Where a defendant attempts to coerce his victim into intercourse with him, fails to accomplish the purpose while she is alive and kills her to satisfy his desires with her corpse, the killing falls within the felony murder rule. (Italics added.) Defendant contends that the emphasized language was erroneous, that the error was prejudicial as to the rape and attempted rape charges, that it invalidated the rape-felony-murder theory so as to require reversal of the first degree murder charges, and that the rape special-circumstance findings must be reversed. We agree that the emphasized sentence was error requiring reduction of the rape conviction to attempted rape. However, the error does not affect the attempted rape conviction, the related firearm-use enhancements, the validity of the rape-felony-murder theory of first degree murder, or the rape special circumstances. (10) Rape requires a live victim. Rape must be accomplished with a person, not a dead body. It must be accomplished against a person's will. A dead body cannot consent to or protest a rape, nor can it be in fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury [as required by section 261, former subdivision (2)]. Penal Code section 263 provides, `[t]he essential guilt of rape consists in the outrage to the person and feelings of the victim of the rape....' A dead body has no feelings of outrage. ( People v. Sellers (1988) 203 Cal. App.3d 1042, 1050 [250 Cal. Rptr. 345], fn. omitted; see also People v. Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 604-605, fn. 15 [114 Cal. Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058]; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 552 [257 Cal. Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244]; People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1176 [270 Cal. Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965] [applying a similar rule to the crime of sodomy].) This does not, however, mean that intercourse after death negates the felony-murder rule, the rape special circumstance or the rape weapon enhancements. Felony murder includes a killing committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, ... rape.... (ง 189, italics added.) As relevant here, the rape special circumstance applies to a murder committed while the defendant was engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of, [or] attempted commission of  rape. (ง 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(iii)), italics added.) The firearm-use enhancement applies to the attempted commission of a felony. (ง 12022.5, subd. (a).) In People v. Quicke (1964) 61 Cal.2d 155 [37 Cal. Rptr. 617, 390 P.2d 393], the defendant attempted to rape his victim, but strangled her when he met resistance. He drove the body to another location where he had intercourse with it. We held these facts supported a finding that the killing was done in the perpetration of rape. ( Id. at p. 158.) Similarly, in People v. Goodridge (1969) 70 Cal.2d 824 [76 Cal. Rptr. 421, 452 P.2d 637], the defendant beat and stabbed the victim while attempting to rape her. After the stabbing, either immediately before or after death, he had intercourse with the body. We rejected a claim that since it is impossible to rape a dead body, the trial court should not have instructed on the felony-murder rule. In language which formed the second sentence of the special instruction now challenged, we stated, Where a defendant attempts to coerce his victim into intercourse with him, fails to accomplish his purpose while she is alive, and kills her to satisfy his desires with her corpse, the killing is first degree murder. ( Id. at p. 838; see also People v. Booker (1977) 69 Cal. App.3d 654, 666 [138 Cal. Rptr. 347] [When a conviction of first degree murder is based on the theory of killing during an attempted rape, it is irrelevant whether the victim was already dead at the time of penetration.].) Since the rape special circumstance applies to a killing while engaged in the commission or attempted commission of rape (see People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 951 [248 Cal. Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917]), it also does not matter whether actual penetration did not occur until after death for purposes of the special circumstance. In sum, a person who attempts to rape a live victim, kills the victim in the attempt, then has intercourse with the body, has committed only attempted rape, not actual rape, but is guilty of felony murder and is subject to the rape special circumstance. (11) We now examine the instructions to determine whether this law was correctly conveyed to the jury. Once we have ascertained the relevant law, we determine the meaning of the instructions in this regard. Here the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the charge as the defendant asserts. ( Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. ___, ___ [116 L.Ed.2d 385, 400, 112 S.Ct. 475]; Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 380 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 328, 110 S.Ct. 1190]; People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 801.) In addressing this question, we consider the specific language under challenge and, if necessary, the charge in its entirety. [Citation.] Finally, we determine whether the instruction, so understood, states the applicable law correctly. ( People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 471, 487 [247 Cal. Rptr. 172, 754 P.2d 218].) [7] (12) The first sentence of the challenged instruction โ It is legally possible to rape a dead body. โ is erroneous. A dead body cannot be raped. But this does not mean the jury would have misunderstood the law regarding rape-felony-murder or the rape special circumstance. A reasonable juror would have understood that for the felony-murder rule and the special circumstance to apply, the defendant must have been attempting to rape the victim at the time of the killing; it would not suffice if, after the killing, defendant acquired the intent to have intercourse with the dead body. The second sentence of the challenged instruction, which clearly was intended to explain the first, correctly stated the rule. In addition, the remaining instructions correctly informed the jury that the felony-murder rule requires that the killing occur during the commission or attempt to commit the felony; that there must be in the mind of the perpetrator the specific intent to commit the felony; that rape must be accomplished against [the victim's] will by means of force, violence, or fear of immediate unlawful bodily injury; that an attempt requires the specific intent to commit the crime; that the rape special circumstance requires that the murder be committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a rape; and that the special circumstance is not established if the attempted rape was merely incidental to the commission of the murder. The arguments of counsel also correctly explained the relevant law. (See People v. Lee (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666, 677-678 [238 Cal. Rptr. 406, 738 P.2d 752].) The district attorney stressed, It must be demonstrated that the defendant had the intent, the intent to commit these particularly felonies, rape and robbery, at the time of the deaths of these women. He argued that the question is what was Mr. Kelly's intent when he was approaching the victims. Although he stated that it is possible to rape a dead person, he based his entire argument on the necessity of proving an intent to rape at the time of the shooting. Defense counsel argued, If she was killed and there was no intent to do anything sexual until afterward, and that intent was formed after her demise, it may not be criminal. In light of this, we conclude that it is not reasonably likely the jury misunderstood the law regarding the felony-murder rule and the rape special circumstance. People v. Sellers, supra, 203 Cal. App.3d 1042, which reversed a first degree murder conviction, is distinguishable. There, the defense version of the facts, which was supported by evidence, was that defendant killed the victim and then left the apartment.... Defendant went home, then returned to the scene after an hour or two, washed the victim's body, laid it back on the bed and had intercourse with it. ( Id. at p. 1049.) The appellate court found that the instructions erroneously allowed the jury to apply the felony-murder rule based solely on the later intercourse with the body, and that the error was prejudicial. ( Id. at pp. 1050-1055.) Even Sellers recognizes, however, that if the victim dies during an attempted rape which is only consummated after death, the felony-murder rule is fully applicable. ( Id. at p. 1054.) Here, unlike Sellers, the jury was not misled regarding the murder charge. [8] (13) There was, however, error regarding the rape charges. If the jury found that defendant killed the victims while trying to rape them, and had intercourse afterwards, it could find only attempted rape, not completed rape. It is reasonably likely that the jury, told that it is possible to rape a dead body, would conclude otherwise, and believe defendant was guilty of the completed crimes. The error is clearly harmless as to victim Reed because the jury convicted defendant only of attempting to rape her (apparently because of the evidence that the semen found in her body did not come from defendant). The jury, however, convicted defendant of raping victim Houser. Because the jury was misinstructed on an element of the offense of rape, reversal of this rape conviction is required unless we are able to conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 628 [276 Cal. Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376].) We are unable to so conclude as to Houser. This issue was not conceded, and the jury did not resolve it in another context. ( Ibid. ) Although far from conclusive, the physical evidence suggested the possibility of intercourse after death. The evidence showed that the body was probably killed at one place (the pool of blood), then dragged to another spot where it was found. The victim's underclothes were found near the seminude body, not where the killing occurred. It is true that defendant repeatedly insisted that he had sex with both victims before death, not after. But the verdict of attempted rape as to Reed shows the jury did not necessarily believe this claim. For these reasons, we reverse the rape conviction as to Houser. (14) The error would not, however, have affected a conviction of the lesser included offense of attempted rape. When a greater offense must be reversed, but a lesser included offense could be affirmed, we give the prosecutor the option of retrying the greater offense, or accepting a reduction to the lesser offense. (E.g., People v. Edwards (1985) 39 Cal.3d 107, 118 [216 Cal. Rptr. 397, 702 P.2d 555] [district attorney could retry murder conviction or accept reduction to involuntary manslaughter].) Here, outright reversal of the rape charge would probably require reversal of the accompanying rape special circumstance ( People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 17-18 [249 Cal. Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843]), and possibly the murder charge itself. (See People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 69.) In light of our ultimate affirmance of the judgment of death, it is unlikely the district attorney would prefer to retry the case rather than have the rape charge reduced to an attempt. Therefore, unless the People inform us in a petition for rehearing that they desire to retry the rape charge, we will exercise our authority under section 1260, and simply reduce the rape conviction to attempted rape. The related firearm-use enhancements, the murder, and the rape special circumstances will not be affected.