Opinion ID: 1924787
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: The Alleged Testimonial Nature of the Conversation

Text: The defendant argues that the above-quoted dialogue between Floyd and defendant while both were in adjacent cells was testimonial in nature. The defendant contends that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated because he had no opportunity to cross-examine Floyd regarding the statement. We disagree. The United States Supreme Court has stated that not all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment's core concerns. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Confrontation Clause applies only to `witnesses'    who `bear testimony.' Id. The Supreme Court in Crawford defined testimony as [a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact. Id. (quoting 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)); see also Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2274; Feliciano, 901 A.2d at 642. In this case, a sheriff guarding the cells in which defendant and Floyd were being held overheard a conversation between them, during which they discussed who would be going down for the crimes that had been committed a few days before. It is our opinion that the statement by Floyd was not testimonial. It was not made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact; indeed, it is not clear to us from the record that Floyd even knew that Sheriff Keeley was within hearing range. Consequently, the Confrontation Clause does not apply in this situation, and we must analyze the admissibility of Floyd's statement only in light of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law   .).