Opinion ID: 1176393
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: False Statements and Suppression of Evidence.

Text: The jury was instructed that a false or deliberately misleading statement by defendant concerning the charge upon which he was being tried (CALJIC No. 2.03) or an attempt by defendant to suppress evidence against himself such as by destroying evidence or by the intimidation of a witness (CALJIC No. 2.06) could be considered to prove a consciousness of guilt but was not sufficient of itself to prove guilt and that its weight and significance, if any, were matters for the jury's determination. (25) Defendant raises several contentions concerning these instructions, the first being that the phrase regarding intimidation of a witness should have been stricken because there was no evidence of such conduct. We disagree. Rodolfo Moreno testified that after defendant had requested Moreno's help in disposing of the victims' bodies, defendant had voiced a suspicion that Moreno just wanted to turn [defendant] in. Moreno insisted this was not true, and defendant reportedly replied: Remember, you promise to help me. Follow me. And don't let anybody  don't trick me because if you trick me  you promise to help me, so if you trick me I got nothing to lose. I already killed. I have nothing to lose. This was evidence that defendant attempted to intimidate Moreno to prevent him from reporting defendant to the authorities, and was a sufficient basis for the instruction. ( People v. Rance (1980) 106 Cal. App.3d 245, 251 [164 Cal. Rptr. 822].) (26) Next defendant contends the trial court was required to limit the instructions to the murder charges because there was no evidence of false statements or attempts to suppress evidence relating to the kidnapping and assault charges. The instructions do not assume the existence of evidence relating to each charge; they merely instruct the jury on the use of such evidence should it be found to exist. Accordingly, the instructions were neither erroneous nor irrelevant. If defendant desired limitation or clarification of the instructions, it was incumbent upon him to request it. (See People v. Forbs (1965) 62 Cal.2d 847, 854 [44 Cal. Rptr. 753, 402 P.2d 825].) Defendant's remaining arguments focus on the phrase consciousness of guilt. A defendant's guilt being the ultimate determination of the truth or falsity of the criminal charges, the jury might, according to defendant, view consciousness of guilt as equivalent to a confession, establishing all elements of the charged murder offenses, including premeditation and deliberation, though defendant might be conscious only of having committed some form of unlawful homicide. The instructions thus permitted the jury, defendant maintains, to draw an impermissible inference, without foundation in reason or experience, concerning his mental state at the time of the homicides, thereby violating his federal due process rights. (See Sandstrom v. Montana (1979) 442 U.S. 510 [61 L.Ed.2d 39, 99 S.Ct. 2450]; Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975) 421 U.S. 684 [44 L.Ed.2d 508, 95 S.Ct. 1881]; United States v. Gainey (1965) 380 U.S. 63 [13 L.Ed.2d 658, 85 S.Ct. 754].) Defendant's fear that the jury might have confused the psychological and legal meanings of guilt is unwarranted. A reasonable juror would understand consciousness of guilt to mean consciousness of some wrongdoing rather than consciousness of having committed the specific offense charged. The instructions advise the jury to determine what significance, if any, should be given to evidence of consciousness of guilt, and caution that such evidence is not sufficient to establish guilt, thereby clearly implying that the evidence is not the equivalent of a confession and is to be evaluated with reason and common sense. The instructions do not address the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense and do not direct or compel the drawing of impermissible inferences in regard thereto. No error appears in the giving of CALJIC Nos. 2.03 and 2.06.