Opinion ID: 1113463
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: disclaimer clause

Text: Rexham also argues that paragraph 4.07 of the purchase agreement included not only a merger clause, but also what Rexham describes as a disclaimer clause, which provides that ESI relied upon no representations made by Rexham other than those actually contained in the agreement. [7] It argues that, as a matter of law, the existence of a general disclaimer clause prevents ESI from justifiably relying on any representations not contained in the contract. This Court recently addressed this issue in Downs v. Wallace, supra, noting that this Court has never held that an integration clause such as the one contained in the Downses' purchase agreement [which includes what Rexham describes as a `disclaimer clause'] renders a party's reliance on oral representations unjustifiable, or unreasonable, as a matter of law. 622 So.2d at 341. The Court in Downs noted: This holding ensues from the rule that when an agreement has been induced by deliberate fraud, the written document reciting that agreement is void and is `of no more binding efficacy ... than if it had no existence, or were a piece of waste paper.' Downs, 622 So.2d at 341 (citations omitted). Therefore, the existence of a general disclaimer clause in the purchase agreement does not, as a matter of law, preclude ESI from justifiably relying on alleged oral representations that were not contained in the contract. Nevertheless, this Court has held that we will affirm a summary judgment if it was properly granted, notwithstanding the fact that the trial court gave the wrong reasons for granting it. Boyd v. Brabham, 414 So.2d 931 (Ala.1982); Bank of the Southeast v. Koslin, 380 So.2d 826 (Ala.1980). McMillan, Ltd. v. Warrior Drilling & Eng'g Co., 512 So.2d 14, 26 (Ala.1986). Therefore, a partial summary judgment would have been proper if Rexham had made a prima facie showing, by admissible evidence, that there was no genuine issue of material fact and if ESI had not rebutted that showing with substantial evidence. Rule 56, Ala.R.Civ.P. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that Rexham has not carried [its] burden of making a prima facie showing, by admissible evidence, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that [it] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d at 797-98; Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-12. Accordingly, the trial court improperly entered the summary judgment against ESI's claim that Rexham misrepresented the value of certain contract rights and the probability of acquiring those rights. The judgment is therefore due to be reversed and the cause remanded. REVERSED AND REMANDED. ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. MADDOX, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., dissent.