Opinion ID: 1821211
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Joint Affidavit of Rueger and Bolkcom

Text: That the only additional agreement which they as lessors and Lull as lessee had made other than the written lease was contained in a letter dated December 28, 1954, which in substance set forth that if the real estate taxes due and payable in 1955 exceeded the amount of $90 on the property the lessee would reimburse them for that portion that exceeded $90; That at the times mentioned in the affidavits of Lamb and Anderson, April 29, 1957, and February 8, 1957, there had been certain conferences at which no agreements of any kind had been made which would change the term of the original lease; that no new agreement either orally or in writing had ever been made; and that the written lease and letter referred to contain all agreements between the parties. On appeal it is contended that the affidavits created a fact issue as to whether there was any oral modification of the lease which gave Lull a compensable interest in the premises. 1. In condemnation proceedings the owner of an interest in premises to be taken thereunder is entitled to compensation for such interest at its fair market value. Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary Dist. v. Fitzpatrick, 201 Minn. 442, 277 N.W. 394, 124 A.L.R. 897. Ordinarily such value is determined as of the date of the taking rather than as of the date of the institution of the condemnation proceedings, Housing and Redevelopment Authority of City of St. Paul v. Greenman, 255 Minn. 396, 96 N.W. (2d) 673; and the former is generally held to be that upon which the commissioners appointed by the court file their award of damages in the proceedings. State, by Peterson, v. Bentley, 231 Minn. 531, 45 N.W. (2d) 185; Ford Motor Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 143 Minn. 392, 173 N.W. 713. 2. From the foregoing it follows that Lull can claim compensation from the state in these proceedings only if he owned a compensable interest in the premises described on February 15, 1957, the date the commissioners' award was filed. The record before us clearly indicates that he failed to establish any such interest as of that date. By the terms of the lease, upon which he must depend to establish such a compensable interest, the frame structures described were designated personal property, and the only right therein reserved to him was the right to remove them upon termination of the lease. As indicated above, this occurred December 31, 1956, several weeks before the date of the filing of the commissioners' award on February 15, 1957. Accordingly, it must follow that on the latter date Lull's only right in the premises was to remove the structures from the premises within a reasonable time and for such right of removal the commissioners made due allowance in their award. 3. There is nothing in the statutes relating to condemnation in eminent domain proceedings which prohibits the inclusion of a condition of this kind in an award or which requires that the state purchase personal property which is to be removed upon the termination of a lease. State, by Attorney General, v. Riley, 208 Minn. 6, 293 N.W. 95; State, by Attorney General, v. Riley, 213 Minn. 448, 7 N.W. (2d) 770; Korengold v. City of Minneapolis, 254 Minn. 358, 95 N.W. (2d) 112. As this court stated in the first Riley case (208 Minn. 8, 293 N.W. 96):    the only inference possible as to McCarthy's rights is that    he occupied the property [taken in condemnation proceedings] under revocable license and with unconditional right to remove it if the license were revoked. If that is the situation, it is impossible to see any basis for a claim by him to any part of the fund. His house was not taken. The condemnation revoked his license to occupy the ground. He removed his building, which was his only right. So he was not damaged,   . In Korengold v. City of Minneapolis, supra , we held that a lessee had no compensable interest in property taken in condemnation proceedings where the landlord and tenant relationship terminated upon appropriation of the real property by the city. There it was said (254 Minn. 363, 95 N.W. [2d] 116): Since appellant can and is free to remove his equipment and fixtures and the condemnor has not appropriated said fixtures or equipment, the lessee's rights are in that respect the same as if the lease in question had terminated naturally,   . 4. Nor do the affidavits submitted by Lamb and Anderson, taken at their face value, establish modification of the written lease to the extent of creating any additional rights in the premises for Lull. They relate to conversations occurring long prior to the written lease and not incorporated therein when it was executed. These conversations, if the affidavits are true, establish nothing more than that there was a collateral agreement made by the fee owners and Lull providing that, if the leased premises, including all structures thereon, were sold, the proceeds of such a sale would be divided between them in proportion to the value of their respective interests. But of at least equal force therewith is the clause in the written lease that upon its expiration the only interest which would survive in Lull was his right to remove his structures from the premises. The state's acquisition of the real property on February 15, 1957, after the lease had expired, can scarcely be regarded as a sale of the premises such as was contemplated by the claimed oral agreement. Since there was no such sale, this provision never came into effect. Jimmerson v. Troy Seed Co. 236 Minn. 395, 53 N.W. (2d) 273; Doyle v. Wohlrabe, 243 Minn. 107, 66 N.W. (2d) 757. The right-of-removal clause, however, did remain in effect after the lease expired and was recognized by the commissioners. This is the most that could be required of the state in such a situation. Affirmed.