Opinion ID: 2546552
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Selvidge

Text: ¶ 32 In Selvidge, the trial court found that (1) Selvidge violated a position of trust, (2) his presumptive sentence was too lenient because Selvidge had more than nine points from prior convictions, which would allow his second current offense/conviction to have no punishment, and (3) he would not benefit from rehabilitation. There can be no doubt that factors one and three required judicial factual findings that violated Selvidge's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as defined in Blakely. There is still a question, however, as to whether the second factor fits within the Apprendi/Blakely exception allowing judges to find facts of prior convictions for exceptional sentencing purposes. Although the same aggravating factor provision at issue in Anderson, RCW 9.94A.535(2)(i), is at issue here, Selvidge raises a situation not present in Anderson where, because of the number of prior convictions, the presumptive sentence would leave one new offense with no punishment. It presents the question of whether a judge can determine that leaving an offense with no punishment is too lenient as a matter of law. ¶ 33 This court has held that the factual inquiry required to find a presumptive sentence clearly too lenient is automatically satisfied whenever `the defendant's high offender score is combined with multiple current offenses so that a standard sentence would result in `free' crimescrimes for which there is no additional penalty.' State v. Smith, 123 Wash.2d 51, 56, 864 P.2d 1371 (1993) (quoting State v. Stephens, 116 Wash.2d 238, 243, 803 P.2d 319 (1991)). Selvidge argues that the too lenient conclusion in free crime cases still requires factual findings under Batista. He posits that this court did not consider the constitutional issues now presented by Blakely when it decided Smith, and that its conclusion that `free crimes' automatically equal egregiousness or extraordinary culpability usurps factual findings that are properly before the jury. Pet'r Supp. Br. at 8. Selvidge, therefore, asks this court to overrule Smith to the extent that it finds free crimes automatically satisfy the too lenient requirement of RCW 9.94A.535(2)(i). ¶ 34 Amicus Curiae Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys (WAPA) argues that Batista does not apply to prior convictions because that case involved current offenses. Instead, they posit that the free crime conclusion only requires two factual findingsSelvidge's prior criminal history and his current offensesboth of which the judge can find under Blakely. In support of its position, WAPA cites Van Buren, where the Court of Appeals made a similar conclusion: Free crime analysis is a function of determining the defendant's offender score from the record of his prior and current criminal convictions. It does not require weighing evidence, determining credibility, or making a finding of disputed facts. Thus, it is not affected by the Blakely requirement that factual issues used to impose an exceptional sentence must be pleaded and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Van Buren, 123 Wash.App. at 653, 98 P.3d 1235 (footnote omitted). ¶ 35 The court reached that conclusion by discussing this court's reasoning in Smith. It quoted our holding on free crimes as: This inquiry [whether there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence] is automatically satisfied whenever the `defendant's high offender score is combined with multiple current offenses so that a standard sentence would result in free crimes  crimes for which there is no additional penalty.' Id. at 652-53, 98 P.3d 1235 (quoting Smith, 123 Wash.2d at 56, 864 P.2d 1371 (quoting Stephens, 116 Wash.2d at 243, 803 P.2d 319)). The Court of Appeals noted that Blakely did not relieve the sentencing judge of the duty to make a judgment as to whether properly found aggravating facts were `substantial and compelling' reasons requiring an exceptional sentence. Id. at 651-52, 98 P.3d 1235 (quoting Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2540). Because the court reasoned that a judge could make factual findings on current convictions and offender score, and could make the substantial and compelling legal conclusion, it held that the conclusion that a free crime was too lenient was a Blakely exception and could be determined by a judge. See id. ¶ 36 That conclusion, though, is premised on an incorrect interpretation of this court's ruling in Smith. Instead of holding that the inquiry into whether there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence was automatically satisfied by finding a free crime, as Van Buren reasons, Smith actually held that the inquiry into whether under former RCW 9.94A.390(2)(f) (1993) [6] there is `some extraordinarily serious harm or culpability resulting from multiple offenses which would not otherwise be accounted for in determining the presumptive sentencing range,' was automatically satisfied. Smith, 123 Wash.2d at 55-56, 864 P.2d 1371 (emphasis added) (quoting Fisher, 108 Wash.2d at 428, 739 P.2d 683). The inquiry that the Van Buren court referred to, whether there were substantial and compelling reasons for an exceptional sentence, is a legal conclusion that the trial court is still allowed to make following Blakely. But the inquiry actually analyzed in Smith was the same that was defined by this court in Batista to require two factual findings. The conclusion that allowing a current offense to go unpunished is clearly too lenient is a factual determination that cannot be made by the trial court following Blakely. We overrule Smith to the extent that it allows the too lenient conclusion to be made by judges and vacate Selvidge's exceptional sentence.