Opinion ID: 6110715
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Extreme-Emotional-Disturbance-Manslaughter Jury Instruction

Text: For his sole point on appeal, Douglas argues that the circuit court erred in denying his claim--without a hearing--that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present the proper jury instruction on extreme emotional disturbance manslaughter. Specifically, Douglas argues that trial counsel did not proffer the correct AMI Crim. 2d instruction explaining how the jury was to determine extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter. Based on trial counsel's failure to proffer the correct instruction, Douglas contends that he was prejudiced. Pursuant to Strickland , Douglas must demonstrate that trial counsel's failure to proffer AMI Crim. 2d 1004-A amounted to deficient performance that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness that so prejudiced Douglas as to deprive him of a fair trial. In Sims v. State , we explained that [t]o show prejudice under Strickland based on trial counsel's failure to request a specific instruction, the United States Supreme Court has held that an appellant must establish that it was 'reasonably likely that the instruction would have made any difference [in the outcome of the trial] in light of all the other evidence of guilt.' Berghuis v. Thompkins , 560 U.S. 370 , 390, 130 S.Ct. 2250 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010). 2015 Ark. 363 , at 10, 472 S.W.3d 107 , 115. Further, there must be a rational basis in the evidence to warrant the giving of an instruction. Allen v. State , 326 Ark. 541 , 932 S.W.2d 764 (1996). A party is entitled to an instruction on a defense if there is sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact or if there is any supporting evidence for the instruction. Yocum v. State , 325 Ark. 180 , 925 S.W.2d 385 (1996). Here, the relevant portion of the manslaughter statute provides that a person commits manslaughter if [t]he person causes the death of another person under circumstances that would be murder, except that he or she causes the death under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable excuse. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-104 (a)(1)(A) (Repl. 2013). The language previously used in this statute to describe the extreme emotional disturbance was the heat of passion. Bowden v. State , 2014 Ark. 168 , 4, 2014 WL 1515871 (citing Bankston v. State , 361 Ark. 123 , 205 S.W.3d 138 (2005) ). The grade of a homicide may be reduced from murder to manslaughter by reason of a passion caused by a provocation apparently sufficient to make the passion irresistible. Bowden , 2014 Ark. 168 , at 4-5 (citing Collins v. State , 102 Ark. 180 , 143 S.W. 1075 (1912) ). A jury instruction on extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter under § 5-10-104(a)(1) requires evidence that the defendant killed the victim following provocation such as physical fighting, a threat, or a brandished weapon. Boyle v. State , 363 Ark. 356 , 362, 214 S.W.3d 250 , 253 (2005) (quoting Kail v. State , 341 Ark. 89 , 94, 14 S.W.3d 878 , 881 (2000) ). At Douglas's trial, the extreme emotional disturbance formulation of manslaughter was proffered and rejected. The AMI Crim. 2d 1004 manslaughter jury instruction was proffered as follows: Courtney Douglas is charged with the offense of manslaughter. To sustain this charge the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (a) [Courtney Douglas caused the death of Terrance Billings under circumstances that would be murder, except  that he caused the death under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable excuse. You should determine the reasonableness of the excuse from the viewpoint of a person in Courtney's situation under the circumstances as he believed them to be.] However, Douglas argues that he was entitled to a separate instruction-AMI Crim. 2d 1004-A-which was added in response to this court's decision in Fincham v. State , 2013 Ark. 204 , 427 S.W.3d 643 . AMI Crim. 2d 1004-A provides: 1 The law provides that if a person commits the offense of murder, but does so under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable excuse, that person has committed the offense of manslaughter rather than murder. You must determine reasonableness from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as he believed them to be. ( Defendant ), in asserting the defense of extreme emotional disturbance, is required only to raise a reasonable doubt in your minds. Consequently, if you believe that this defense has been shown to exist, or if the evidence leaves you with a reasonable doubt as to his guilt of murder rather than manslaughter, you may find him guilty only of manslaughter. Whatever may be your finding as to this defense, you are reminded that the State still has the burden of establishing the guilt of ( defendant ) upon the whole case beyond a reasonable doubt. Douglas contends that had trial counsel properly presented AMI Crim. 2d 1004-A, he would have been entitled to an instruction on extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter. Yet the circuit court did not reject Douglas's proffered instruction because it was the incorrect version of the jury instruction. Instead, the circuit court refused to allow the instruction because there was no rational basis to so charge the jury even if trial counsel had presented the correct jury instruction on the lesser offense. For the reasons that follow, we cannot say that the circuit court clearly erred in denying Douglas's petition for postconviction relief. Here, the record demonstrates that Douglas and Billings got into a dispute at Douglas's home. After the dispute had fully concluded, Billings returned to his home. Douglas retrieved his firearm and initiated a second encounter with Billings at Billings's home. Douglas and Billings began arguing on the porch. Billings placed Douglas in a headlock. Pursuant to testimony presented at trial, Billings attempted to flee from Douglas by running back inside the house, at which point Douglas began shooting at him. This testimony was supported by the testimony of Sergeant Sanders who testified that there appeared to be bodily fluid inside the threshold, but not on the threshold itself. Yet there did not appear to be any blood, tissue, or other bodily fluids on the porch or door. The State contends that a defendant cannot claim an extreme emotional disturbance from a provocation he or she prepared or precipitated. Stated differently, a  defendant charged with murder may not reduce the killing to extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter when the defendant arms himself in anticipation of a conflict or, having done so, initiates the conflict that leads to the provocation. To support its position, the State cites Smith v. State , 216 Ark. 1 , 223 S.W.2d 1011 (1949). In Smith , Smith was convicted of first-degree murder for the shooting death of his ex-wife, Sallie Barner. Id. at 2 , 223 S.W.2d at 1012 . According to Smith's statement, Smith and Sallie were married in Texas. Id. at 3 , 223 S.W.2d at 1012 . Smith had been married previously but he was under the impression that he and his first wife had obtained a divorce. Id. at 3 , 223 S.W.2d at 1013 . When Sallie learned that Smith was not divorced from his first wife, Sallie obtained an annulment of their marriage. Id. Smith was charged with bigamy, he entered his plea of guilty, and he was sentenced to three years' imprisonment in a Texas penitentiary. Id. After his release from prison, Smith came to Little Rock to recover personal property he had left with Sallie for safekeeping while he was in prison. Id. Sallie told Smith that she did not have the items, but she would collect the items and asked that Smith come back later. Id. A few days later, Smith went to Sallie's home in North Little Rock but learned that she had moved. Id. Because Smith was unable to locate Sallie's new residence, Smith went to a location in close proximity to Sallie's work and waited for her. Id. at 3-4 , 223 S.W.2d at 1013 . According to Smith's statement, Smith and Sallie began arguing. Id. at 4 , 223 S.W.2d at 1013 . Sallie told Smith that she was not going to return his property and was going to call the police. Id. Smith stated that he went haywire and he pulled the gun out and shot Sallie in the back. Id. at 5 , 223 S.W.2d at 1013 . On appeal, Smith argued that the circuit court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on five requested instructions. Id. at 11 , 223 S.W.2d at 1017 . Relevant to the present appeal was requested-instruction No. 2, which reads as follows: You are instructed that if you find that the defendant was provoked to commit the assault on the deceased which he did commit by a passion consisting either of anger or fear to such an extent that he was unable to resist or to refrain from the committing of such assault, then he would be guilty of one of the degrees of manslaughter which has just been defined to you, and he would not be guilty of murder in the first degree. Id. In rejecting Smith's argument, we explained that a person cannot take advantage of a provocation invited and brought about by his own unlawful aggression in order to reduce the grade of his crime from murder to manslaughter when he has not, in good faith, attempted to retire from the encounter. Id. at 12-13 , 223 S.W.2d at 1017-18 (citing Noble v. State , 75 Ark. 246 , 87 S.W. 120 (1905) ). Further, this court explained, Instruction No. 2, requested by appellant, entirely ignored the idea of malice and permitted the jury to reduce the crime to manslaughter even though they found that appellant brought on the difficulty maliciously and with the specific intent to kill. As this court said in Price v. State , 114 Ark. 398 , 170 S.W. 235 , 239 : 'The omission is an important one, for if defendant sought the difficulty with malice against the deceased and assaulted the latter, or used opprobrious epithets towards him for the purpose of bringing on the difficulty, he cannot claim the benefit of a sudden passion, aroused by an assault made by the deceased in consequence of the appellant's own conduct.' We find no error in the court's  refusal to give the requested instructions. Id. at 13, 223 S.W.2d at 1018 . We find Smith helpful to our ineffective-assistance-of-counsel analysis in this case. As in Smith , Douglas cannot take advantage of a provocation invited and brought about by his own unlawful aggression, in order to reduce the grade of his crime from murder to manslaughter[.] Id. at 12 , 223 S.W.2d at 1017 . Although Billings may have been the initial aggressor, the record demonstrates that the initial dispute had fully concluded, with Billings leaving the scene and returning to his home. After the conclusion of the initial argument, Douglas, with a firearm in tow, initiated a second encounter at Billings's home. Thus, pursuant to Smith , Douglas cannot take advantage of a provocation he invited-here, through the initiation of the second encounter with a firearm-in order to reduce his crime from murder to manslaughter. Because Douglas invited the provocation that ensued between him and Billings, we hold that Douglas was not entitled to a jury instruction on extreme emotional disturbance. Accordingly, trial counsel's failure to proffer the proper version of extreme-emotional-disturbance manslaughter is of no moment. With regard to the first Strickland prong, because Douglas was not entitled to the extreme-emotional-disturbance-manslaughter instruction, trial counsel did not render unreasonably deficient performance in his failure to proffer AMI Crim. 2d 1004-A. However, even if we were to assume that trial counsel was deficient, Douglas has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's error. Pursuant to Sims , supra , in light of all the other evidence of Douglas's guilt, he has failed to establish that it was reasonably likely that the AMI Crim. 2d 1004-A instruction would have made any difference in the outcome of his trial. Under the facts of the present case, there is no evidence Douglas caused Billings's death under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable excuse. Simply put, we are not persuaded by Douglas's position that he demonstrated an extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable excuse when Billings placed him in a headlock during the second dispute that Douglas initiated. Accordingly, the circuit court's decision to deny his petition for Rule 37 relief was not clearly erroneous, and we affirm. Because we affirm on this basis, we decline to address Douglas's remaining arguments. Affirmed. Hart, J., dissents.