Opinion ID: 2273949
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Beyea's Holding Adopted

Text: In Whittington, the Court of Chancery relied on Harris, rather than Beyea's Estate. In assessing the strength of Harris as describing the rule regarding sealed instruments in Delaware, several points must be considered. First, New York law governed the sealed document at issue in Harris. Second, the discussion in Harris regarding the evidence needed to establish a sealed instrument in New York concluded that the result in Delaware would be the same and distinguished Beyea's Estate in a footnote. That footnote in Harris, however, inadvertently referred to the document in Beyea's Estate as a mortgage when in fact it was a promissory note. Third, in reaching its conclusion, the Harris opinion relied on the Third Circuit's decision in Aronow Roofing Co. v. Gilbane Building Co. [50] for its interpretation of Delaware's law on sealed instruments. The Aronow opinion, in turn, interpreted a construction contract under Delaware law, but cited to a District of Maryland case and Corbin on Contracts for the proposition that more than the word seal is required to demonstrate an intent to create a non-mortgage specialty contract. [51] In the absence of legislative guidance, we are persuaded by the decision in Beyea's Estate and adopt that common law holding as the law of Delaware. The opinion in Beyea's Estate provides a bright line standard that is easily applied. Accordingly, we hold that in Delaware, in the case of an individual, in contrast to a corporation, the presence of the word seal next to an individual's signature is all that is necessary to create a sealed instrument, irrespective of whether there is any indication in the body of the obligation itself that it was intended to be a sealed instrument. [52]