Opinion ID: 1408147
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Board Erred in Dismissing the Lubin Complaint.

Text: As a preliminary matter, Triem argues that Bar Counsel cannot appeal the Board's acquittal of him because attorney disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and an appeal would violate constitutional protections against double jeopardy. Triem's argument against the validity of an appeal by Bar Counsel is unpersuasive. [J]eopardy in either its constitutional or its common law sense[] has a strict application to criminal prosecutions only. A disciplinary proceeding ... is not criminal in nature, but is sui generis, being an exercise of the inherent power and jurisdiction of this court over attorneys as officers of the court. In re Mackay, 416 P.2d 823, 838 (Alaska 1964) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1003, 86 S.Ct. 1907, 16 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1966). Triem argues that In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968), decided after Mackay and holding that attorney discipline proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, dictates that double jeopardy protections apply to such proceedings and thus prohibit Bar Counsel's appeal. Ruffalo, however, dealt with the specific question of what level of due process protection a respondent attorney was owed with respect to notice of the charges against him. Id. at 550-51, 88 S.Ct. at 1225-26. As Bar Counsel points out, commentators and courts treat Ruffalo as being limited to procedural due process concerns. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 8.1:102, at 923 (2d ed. Supp. 1996) (stating that virtually all courts have concluded that the Supreme Court's characterization [of disciplinary proceedings as quasi-criminal] ... was made in the narrower context of assessing the applicability of procedural Due Process concerns, such as entitlement to notice of the charges); see also, Rosenthal v. Justices of the Supreme Court of California, 910 F.2d 561, 564 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1087, 111 S.Ct. 963, 112 L.Ed.2d 1050 (1991) (A lawyer disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal proceeding. As a result, normal protections afforded a criminal defendant do not apply. (citation omitted)); Mississippi State Bar v. Young, 509 So.2d 210, 213 n. 1 (Miss. 1987) (Most states which have addressed the matter have held that disciplinary proceedings are not so criminal in nature as to evoke double jeopardy protections.). Double jeopardy is a substantive due process protection and therefore is not extended to attorney grievances under Ruffalo. [9]
In dismissing Lubin, the Board asserted that procedures, conduct, and delay by the Area Hearing Committee created potential prejudice to Triem which could not be set aside. The Board, however, did not specify what procedures and conduct created potential prejudice. Triem argues a number of due process violations as well as prejudicial delay caused by the committee and Bar Counsel. Over four years passed from the filing of the Lubin grievance to the issuance of the committee's report and recommendation. Bar Counsel did not file a petition for formal hearing until nine months after Triem rejected the proposed discipline in April 1991. Triem filed a number of motions and eventually answered this petition late. After three hearings, the committee requested two extensions and did not issue a report until approximately eleven months after the close of evidence. A five-year statute of limitations governs the filing of attorney grievances. Alaska Bar R. 18. This reflects a judgment that five years is the outer limit of time in which responding attorneys are able to fairly defend themselves against charges, given the loss of memory, evidence, and witnesses that occurs over time. The alleged misconduct in Lubin occurred between October 1989 and January 1990, and the committee completed its adjudication of the complaint within the five years allowed for filing a complaint. This circumstance militates against the contention that the delay so prejudiced Triem's ability to present a defense as to require dismissal. The timing and source of the delays also militate against the dismissal. Triem, by moving for a more definite statement, was partially responsible for some of the prehearing delay. Most importantly, the longest delay, the late issuance of the committee's report, occurred after Triem presented his defense, and thus did not prejudice Triem's ability to offer a defense. This eleven-month delay was unjustified, but the persons most hurt by it were the victims of Triem's alleged misconduct and the public, not Triem. The public's faith in the system is harmed by lengthy adjudications of discipline matters, but dismissing the matter would simply exacerbate the injury to the public interest. Therefore, we hold that the delays in the Lubin proceedings do not warrant dismissal of the complaint. Because we find that the other due process concerns raised by Triem, discussed infra, are either invalid or harmless, we reverse the Board's dismissal and independently review the record for the merits of this complaint.