Opinion ID: 2538992
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Execution on Hertz's Prisoner Trust Account Was Invalid Because the State Failed To Properly Serve Him.

Text: The State argues that it was in technical compliance with AS 09.38.085(a)(1) because it served Hertz with a notice of levy, a claim of exemptions form, a creditor's affidavit, and a judgment debtor's handbook. But the State misses the crux of Hertz's argument. Hertz's challenge is not to the sufficiency of the documents served; he challenges the State's method of service. Several statutes and rules describe the notice the State was required to provide Hertz before levying on his trust account. Alaska Statute 09.38.080(c) requires that [b]efore, at the time of, or within three days after the levy, the creditor shall serve on the individual [debtor] a notice under AS 09.38.085. Alaska Statute 09.38.085 describes the content of the required notices, and AS 09.38.500, the definitions section of the Alaska Exemptions Act, specifies the method for serving the notices. The term serve notice in AS 09.38.080(c) means to give the person to be served a written personal notice in the same manner a summons in a civil action is served, or to mail the notice to the person's last known address by first-class mail and by using a form of mail requiring a signed receipt. [13] Hertz was served personally, not by mail, so we turn to the civil rules. Civil Rule 4 identifies the permissible methods for serving a summons in a civil action. It requires service to be made by a peace officer, by a person specially appointed by the Commissioner of Public Safety for that purpose or, where a rule so provides, by registered or certified mail. The rule defines peace officer as any officer of the state police, members of the police of any incorporated city, village or borough, United States Marshals and their deputies, other officers whose duty it is to enforce and preserve the public peace, and . . . persons specially appointed. Special appointments shall only be made by the Commissioner of Public Safety after a thorough investigation of each applicant. [14] After the State's counsel learned that the trooper had failed to serve Hertz as instructed, she faxed the documents to SCCC. A prison guard delivered them to Hertz on June 19, 2008. But the State did not argue, and the record does not show, that the prison guard who served Hertz was a peace officer or a person specially appointed to serve process within the meaning of Civil Rule 4. We agree with the superior court that the delay in service was not prejudicial to Hertz, but the State was still required to use an authorized method of service. The record does not show that the State complied with Civil Rule 4. [15] We are mindful that our ruling regarding service may appear to elevate form over substance because Hertz had actual knowledge of the levy by June 16, 2008. But we are loathe to carve out exceptions to the important rules for service of process. These rules enable courts to verify that service has actually been made; they are vital to ensuring that litigants receive the due process to which they are entitled, and they are broadly applicable. Creating an exception merely to avoid requiring the State to properly serve Hertz is fraught with precedential danger. Such an exception, though seemingly narrow, could be applied in future cases to relax the notice requirements for litigants who might not have received the actual notice Hertz enjoyed. This danger would be especially acute in cases involving requests for entry of default judgment. Given the serious consequences of execution, i.e., the involuntary confiscation of a debtor's property, we must insist on strict compliance with the legislature's statutory scheme and the service requirements of Civil Rule 4. [16]