Opinion ID: 2656165
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Amendments to the Counts of Conviction

Text: Cano first argues that the district court erred by making substantive changes to his judgment in response to the government’s Rule 36 motion. We note that with regard to the changes to the counts of conviction, including the dismissal of Count 13, Cano himself requested the district court make these changes and argued that they were clerical. We conclude that the district court did not err in correcting Cano’s counts of conviction because the changes were clerical in nature. The amended judgment 4 Case: 12-16202 Date Filed: 03/11/2014 Page: 5 of 11 entered by the district court changed the counts of conviction so that they accurately reflected the jury’s verdict and this Court’s vacatur of Count 13. Cano, 289 F.3d at 1366–67. These amendments did not make a substantive change or alteration to Cano’s sentence, which because of the number of concurrent life sentences remained the same. 2 See Portillo, 363 F.3d at 1164. Cano’s term of supervised release stayed the same, 3 and the reduction of the special assessment from $3,800 to $3,400 followed mechanically from the reduction in the number of counts of conviction.4 In reaching this conclusion, we reject Cano’s argument that this Court’s vacatur of Count 13, as reflected in the amended judgment, required a resentencing to determine whether Cano’s remaining convictions could serve as predicates to support his Continuing Criminal Enterprise conviction (Count 1) under 21 U.S.C. 2 The original judgment set forth the following term of imprisonment: “LIFE as to Counts 1 through 13, to run concurrently with each other. 240 months as to each Count 14 through 76 to run concurrently with each other and sentences i[m]posed as to Counts 1 through 13.” Similarly the amended judgment set forth the term of imprisonment as: “LIFE as to Counts 1 through 12, to run concurrently with each other. 240 Months as to each of Counts 14 through 26, 28 through 31, and 38 through 76, to run concurrently with each other and with the sentences imposed for Counts 1 through 12.” 3 Cano’s original judgment described his term of supervised release as “5 years as to each Counts 1 through 13. 3 years as to each Counts 14 through 76, all to run concurrently with each other.” The amended judgment describes it similarly as: “Five years as to each of Counts 1 through 12. Three years as to each of Counts 14 through 26, 28 through 31, and 38 through 76. All to run concurrently with each other.” 4 The government concedes that the assessment in the amended judgment was miscalculated and should be $3,350, not $3,400, with 67 counts of conviction. However, Cano does not raise this issue in his appeal. The issue may be moot because 18 U.S.C. § 3013(c) provides that the “obligation to pay an assessment ceases five years after the date of the judgment.” 5 Case: 12-16202 Date Filed: 03/11/2014 Page: 6 of 11 § 848. The Fourth Superseding Indictment charged Cano specifically with twelve predicate offenses and the jury unanimously found Cano guilty of all twelve. The fact that one of these twelve convictions was vacated did not render his CCE conviction invalid. See United States v. Corona, 885 F.2d 766, 774 (11th Cir. 1989) (RICO conviction upheld despite fact that seven of the eleven counts alleging predicate acts were dismissed or reversed because four valid predicate-act convictions remained). Notably, in the opinion deciding Cano’s direct appeal and vacating Count 13, this Court considered and rejected Cano’s related argument that “the district court committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury that, to convict the defendant on [the CCE count], it had to find unanimously that the defendant committed a continuing series of at least three violations of federal narcotics laws.” Cano, 289 F.3d at 1357 n.4. Due to the number of predicate-act convictions that are still viable for Cano, we therefore affirm on this issue.