Opinion ID: 2291751
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Szelenyi's Appeal from Phase I

Text: In Phase I of the trial, the jury heard the following evidence: On January 29, 1983 at about 6:40 a.m. Therese Miller collapsed while on duty as a nurse's aide at the Benda Hospital of the Pineland Center. Within one minute of her collapse Darlene Turner, R.N., had started cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Within another minute or two, nurses Doris Babbidge and Arlene Sprague also arrived on the scene. An ambulance from Gray Ambulance Service was immediately called to transport Mrs. Miller to the Maine Medical Center, which had much better emergency facilities. At this point she was not breathing on her own and she had no carotid pulse. Nevertheless, her pupils responded to light indicating that her brain still retained oxygen. At some point several minutes into the resuscitation effort Mrs. Miller took several breaths on her own. While CPR was being continued, Babbidge wheeled up a crash cart that contained a defibrillator, or electric shock machine, used to facilitate CPR. Dr. Szelenyi arrived on the scene 10 or 15 minutes after Mrs. Miller's collapse. Szelenyi's shift as an on-call physician at the hospital was due to end at 8 o'clock that morning, and Szelenyi had been asleep just prior to the emergency. For the most part, Szelenyi simply watched the resuscitation effort from the nurses station. He did, however, 1) pronounce Mrs. Miller dead within a matter of minutes from his arrival and without any genuine physical examination of her, 2) prevent any use of the electric shock machine, stating his insurance did not cover his treatment of Pineland employees, and 3) urge that she be moved to a bed, though CPR, which requires a hard surface, was still being performed. The Gray ambulance arrived 35 or 40 minutes after Mrs. Miller's collapse. At Maine Medical Mrs. Miller was defibrillated and she momentarily regained a voluntary heartbeat, but was eventually pronounced dead. Szelenyi's deposition was read in toto to the jury in lieu of his in-court testimony. In his deposition Szelenyi maintains that the defibrillator was never required because Therese Miller was dead before she went down from the chair. Moreover, he stated he did not even think about insurance, let alone prevent use of the defibrillation machine on that basis. Szelenyi put on only one witness, nurse Arlene Sprague. Sprague testified that she did not recall Szelenyi making any reference to insurance.
Szelenyi first contends that the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial. During jury selection voir dire, the court inquired if any panel member had ever been employed at a state mental institution or prison. Panel member number 86 stated that she had done consulting work at both the Augusta Mental Health Institute and the Pineland Center. Later the panel was asked whether any one of them had ever experienced serious dissatisfaction with his own medical treatment and, if so, would it be difficult to remain fair and impartial in the case at hand. In response, number 86 indicated that it would be difficult for her to remain impartial because she and her family had a lot of problems in communication [with doctors], and that she had been [i.e., worked] in institutions similar to Pineland and ... [had] a somewhat jaded view of physicians that have been hired in institutions. Szelenyi moved for a mistrial based upon the prejudicial effect of number 86's statements on the other panel members. We review the Superior Court's ruling on a motion for mistrial only for an abuse of discretion. Brubach v. Almy, 520 A.2d 334, 340 (Me.1987). Olsen v. French, 456 A.2d 869, 876 (Me.1983). Here, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion. Following the motion for mistrial number 86 was asked no further questions in open court. At a chambers conference with counsel present, number 86 recounted her answers given in open court [4] and stated that she had not discussed her views in private with other panel members. There-upon, the trial court excused number 86 from future service on the case. Unlike the panel member in Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1127 (Me.1980), on being excused number 86 did not remain in the courtroom or answer additional questions in open court. Moreover, the court specifically asked the remaining panel members whether number 86's statements had influenced them or would prevent any of them from being fair and impartial. There was no response, and the court told the panel that he understood the silence to mean there was no problem. Thus, the composite inference ( id. ) here is that there was no resulting prejudice, and the denial of the mistrial was not an abuse of discretion.
Szelenyi next claims that plaintiffs' counsel improperly discussed facts not in evidence and gave his personal opinion of the evidence. Szelenyi's first argument is directed primarily to the opening statement of plaintiffs' counsel in which he referred to an alleged cover-up by the supervisory defendants designed to prevent dissemination of the facts surrounding Mrs. Miller's death. Immediately following the opening statement, Szelenyi's counsel objected and requested a curative instruction. The court overruled the objection and no curative instruction was given. The trial court has discretion to determine both the prejudicial effect of any claimed improper conduct by counsel and what corrective measures should be taken. Minott v. F.W. Cunningham & Sons, 413 A.2d 1325, 1333 (Me.1980). In an opening statement counsel should properly outline for the jury only evidence that he intends in good faith to introduce and that he reasonably believes will be admitted. 75 Am. Jur.2d Trial §§ 208, 209 (1974); Smith v. Covell, 100 Cal.App.3d 947, 959, 161 Cal. Rptr. 377, 384 (1980); Schwedler v. Galvan, 46 Ill.App.3d 630, 639-640, 4 Ill.Dec. 891, 898, 360 N.E.2d 1324, 1331 (1970). Here, the trial court had provisionally ruled that the plaintiffs' claim of conspiracy could remain in the case. [5] It was only after several days of trial of the plaintiffs' case, but before any evidence of conspiracy had been offered, that the court ruled finally that the conspiracy issue had been untimely raised and evidence concerning it would not be permitted. Plaintiffs' counsel could not have foreseen this ruling. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to give a curative instruction at the time it was requested by Szelenyi. Szelenyi also argues that plaintiffs' counsel improperly commented on the evidence during closing statement. Counsel may comment on evidence at trial if such commentary is within [the] bounds of fairness. Young v. Carignan, 152 Me. 332, 338, 129 A.2d 216, 219 (1957). Szelenyi did not object at trial, and we review the issue only for obvious error. M.R.Evid. 103(d). Our review of the record does not indicate that the contested remarks were so prejudicial as to affect Szelenyi's substantial rights. See, e.g., Werner v. Lane, 393 A.2d 1329, 1332-33, 1338 (Me.1978) (trial court should have sua sponte corrected defense counsel's charge that plaintiff's case was a fraud and a bingo game).
Szelenyi next claims that the Superior Court improperly denied his motion in limine to exclude all references to his insurance coverage. This contention requires us to construe M.R.Evid. 411 to determine what discretion the trial court has under the rule to admit or exclude evidence of lack of insurance. By denying Szelenyi's motion in limine, the trial court ultimately allowed in evidence Szelenyi's testimony that he directed that Mrs. Miller not be defibrillated because his malpractice insurance did not cover his treatment of Pineland employees. We hold that under the unusual facts of this case the court's ruling admitting evidence of Szelenyi's lack of insurance was not an abuse of its discretion. Rule 411 states that [e]vidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. The rule, which became effective in 1976, is in accord with Maine law. M.R.Evid. 411 advisers' note, reprinted in Field & Murray, Maine Evidence 135 (1987). Pre-rule Maine case law, cited in the advisers' note, recognizes that the prohibition against insurance evidence is not absolute, that the [d]ecision of whether to permit it ... must repose in the discretion of the presiding Justice, guided by the general standard that it is to be avoided unless extraordinary special circumstances require it. Duguay v. Pomerleau, 299 A.2d 914, 916 (Me.1973). The advisers' note to Rule 411 explicitly recognizes the trial court's discretion to admit or exclude insurance evidence when that evidence is relevant for a purpose other than the issue of liability. M.R.Evid. 411 advisers' note, reprinted in Field & Murray, Maine Evidence 135 (1987). Even when insurance evidence may affect the issue of liability, however, we do not read Rule 411 as a flat prohibition admitting of no discretion whatsoever. Rather, Rule 411 is a codification of the general standard that insurance evidence should be excluded, unless extraordinary special circumstances require it. Duguay, 299 A.2d at 916. The trial court denied the motion in limine and admitted the evidence apparently on the theory that the evidence was admissible for another purpose other than liability in that it explained or provided a motive for Szelenyi's action or lack of action. The court instructed the jury that it could consider the evidence in order to understand the motivation of the parties, but not to determine whether or not somebody is responsible because he might have insurance or might not have insurance. At that time, the court had not bifurcated the case. Thus, the jury could properly consider this evidence in connection with the plaintiffs' section 1983 claims, for which they sought punitive damages. Whether punitive damages should be awarded depends largely on the defendant's motive. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361 (Me.1985). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Szelenyi's motion in limine.
We find no merit in Szelenyi's contention that the court erred in admitting evidence of Szelenyi's prior negligent acts. Because all of the challenged evidence was admitted in Phase II and could have had no impact on the jury's verdict in Phase I, there was no reversible error in the admission of the evidence.
Finally Szelenyi contends that the court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict on the wrongful death action against him for lack of notice to him as required by the Maine Tort Claims Act, 14 M.R.S.A. § 8107(1) (1980). [6] When reviewing the denial of a motion for directed verdict, we determine whether the verdict can be sustained by any reasonable view of the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the verdict was rendered. Buchanan v. Martin Marietta Corp., 494 A.2d 677, 678 (Me.1985); Cyr v. Michaud, 454 A.2d 1376, 1379-80 (Me.1983). Notice under section 8107 of the Tort Claims Act is required only if the defendant is a governmental entity or governmental employee. [7] The Act defines employee as follows: a person acting on behalf of the governmental entity in any official capacity ... but the term employee shall not mean a person or other legal entity acting in the capacity of an independent contractor under contract to the governmental entity. 14 M.R.S.A. § 8102(1) (1980). Here the only evidence introduced in Phase I on the issue of Szelenyi's employment status would support a finding that Szelenyi was an independent contractor, not a state employee. Szelenyi's one-year contract states, inter alia, that the agreement is between the State of Maine and Ernest Szelenyi, M.D. hereinafter called Contractor. The type of organization of the Contractor is ... an individual doing business as Ernest Szelenyi, M.D. ... [t]he parties hereto agree that the Contractor, and any agents and employees of the Contractor, ... shall act in an independent capacity and not as officers or employee or agents of the State. In his deposition, read in toto to the jury, Szelenyi states: I was not a State employee anymore, a regular. I was on contract as a private doctor. Thus, the court properly denied Szelenyi's motion for a directed verdict.