Opinion ID: 1737949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court committed error by summarily dismissing the contract dispute of the parties through summary judgment.

Text: ¶ 12. Dockins asserts that there are factual disputes as to the number of hours actually worked by Allred & Donaldson and himself. He argues that he established that he worked a total of 2, 711.75 hours or more. However, Dockins provides no documentation for these additional hours that he purports to have worked, other than a letter written by him to Allred wherein he states that he worked many hours without billing O'Keefe in order to avoid placing [O'Keefe] in further financial peril. This statement in his letter to Allred and his sworn testimony that he worked 2,711.75 hours is the only evidence in the record that would support his contentions. The only credible evidence of time committed to the O'Keefe case is the bills submitted to and paid by the clients. While Dockins is to be commended for his generosity to his client, we cannot and will not award attorney fees based on unbilled hours claimed by Dockins after his percentage of the fee was determined to be less than he had hoped for. ¶ 13. Additionally, he contends that based on the original agreement date of November 30, 1993, Allred & Donaldson worked a total of only 2, 240.3 hours or less. However, 2,240.3 is the number of hours that Allred, himself, worked on the case. It is Dockins's assertion that Allred & Donaldson should be limited to that amount. He argues that the agreement was that the percentage would be determined by the number of hours worked by himself and Allred individually, and the number of hours worked by the associates of their respective firms would not be included in the calculation. Therefore, he claims that he is entitled to at least half of the 16% fee that was to be divided between Allred and himself. There is no evidence in the record to support his argument. The retainer letter specifically states that the hours spent on the O'Keefe case by the associates would be included in the calculation of percentages. This letter was signed by Dockins once on December 1, 1993, and again, as amended on March 3, 1994. In addition to the language of the retainer letter, the letter which Dockins refers to as the initial agreement, the November 30, 1993 letter, contains the following language: ... the contingent fee will be equitably adjusted in proportion to time spent, but not beyond a 75%-25% split between the two firms.  The letters formed a clear and unambiguous contract that specified that the work of the associates of the firms would be included in the calculation of the hours committed to the case by each attorney. ¶ 14. In addition, Dockins argues that the contractual agreement is ambiguous due to the language, vary substantially from equal amounts of work. However, it is clear that any interpretation of the words vary substantially would show that 4,255.1 hours worked varies substantially from 1,693.5 hours. ¶ 15. Dockins also claims that Allred included time billed to O'Keefe prior to the November 30, 1993, agreement in his calculation of time used to determine the percentage of his fee pursuant to the contingent agreement. While this assertion is true, Dockins fails to note that the trial court took this fact into consideration when ruling on the motion for summary judgment and reduced Allred's final calculation of hours worked by the amount of hours showing prior to the November 30, 1993, date of the contract. Dockins presents no issue of triable fact under this assertion of error. This issue is without merit. II. WHETHER, BASED UPON THE FRAUDULENT AND DECEITFUL ACTS OF THE PLAINTIFFS, THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE BOUND TO ANY AGREEMENT WHICH WAS NOT ORIGINALLY INTENDED BY THE PARTIES. III. WHETHER DEFENDANT, DOCKINS'S COUNTERCLAIMS PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. ¶ 16. Dockins asserts that Allred substituted slightly different language into the middle of the agreements and did not discuss the changes made to the provisions of the Professional Undertaking and Association Agreements. He claims that Allred fraudulently and deceitfully slipped additional language into the fee allocation provisions (titled Association) of these agreements, while Dockins was under the impression that these were professional association and undertaking agreements with their client whereby the provisions would incorporate the prior fee allocation agreements made between Allred, Cavanaugh and Dockins via the November 30, 1993 Letter Agreement. The complained of language was as follows: Dear Hal and Mike: I enclose the original and three copies of a Retainer Letter and Assignment Agreement. We have agreed, with respect to our contingent fee under the Assignment: In the representation of the Plaintiffs, we will divide the contingency fee to be earned, if any, twenty percent (20%) to Michael F. Cavanaugh; forty percent (40%) to Halbert E. Dockins, Jr., and forty percent (40%) to Michael S. Allred; provided, however, that as between Dockins and Allred, if either of them does a disproportionate amount of the work on an hourly basis, the contingent fee will be equitably adjusted in proportion to time spent, but not beyond a 75%-25% split between the two firms. Cavanaugh will have twenty percent (20%) without adjustment based on time. If you agree, please sign this letter to evidence our agreement. As stated, the retainer letter to O'Keefe was included as an enclosure with this initial agreement. This letter to the other two attorneys simply restates what is carefully laid out for them in the retainer letter to O'Keefe. The retainer letter stated as follows: In this litigation, the three of us are associated together. Nevertheless, we will each bill all expenses advanced and hourly fees separately. We will divide the contingent portion of the fees to be earned hereunder on this ratio: twenty percent (20%) to Michael F. Cavanaugh; forty percent (40%) to Halbert E. Dockins, Jr., and forty percent (40%) to Michael S. Allred, except that as between Halbert E. Dockins, Jr. and Michael S. Allred, if the hours worked by each of them and their associated lawyers vary substantially from equal amounts of time, the contingent fees will be equitably adjusted between them to a pro rata share based upon time committed, provided that neither of them shall receive less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the contingent fee even though the ratio of time committed would result in less. All three attorneys signed the initial letter and this retainer letter with the and their associated lawyers language. However, Dockins claims that he did not know that Allred had changed the language from the original letter to include this language concerning the associated lawyers. ¶ 17. Although we find no evidence in the record of fraud or deceit, had Allred slipped in additional language as Dockins claims, Dockins cannot assert that he did not have notice of what was in the agreement or that he was surprised by the different language when he signed the agreement, not once, but twice. The trial court was correct in finding that Dockins demonstrated a course of conduct whereby he accepted the terms of the attorneys' fee contract as binding upon him and entered into a definite and unequivocal course of conduct disclosing that he acceded and assented to the contract and his conduct constituted an acceptance and ratification of the contract which precludes a claim of fraud. Edwards v. Wurster Oil Co., Inc., 688 So.2d 772 (Miss.1997). Therefore, this issue is without merit. Having found no merit to any of the assignments of error presented to this Court by Dockins, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. ¶ 18. AFFIRMED. PRATHER, C.J., PITTMAN, P.J., McRAE AND SMITH, JJ., CONCUR. COBB, J., CONCURS IN PART. BANKS, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY SULLIVAN, P.J., AND COBB, J. WALLER, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.