Opinion ID: 572467
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Common Grounds

Text: 16 The defendants collectively claim that certain egregious events occurred at trial, each one amounting to reversible error. They claim that: (a) the trial contained an instance of gross prosecutorial misconduct; (b) the court should have declared a mistrial for all the defendants when a defendant in this action had his cause severed and his attorney disqualified after the trial had begun; (c) the prosecutor deliberately made erroneous, misleading, and prejudicial remarks to the jury in his closing argument; (d) the court failed to give the defendants' requested jury instruction relating to their theory of defense; (e) the court failed to give a jury instruction to the effect that evidence of a buyer-seller relationship in drugs is insufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy; (f) the government did not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Southern District of Illinois was the proper venue; (g) the defendants were denied examination of relevant presentence reports for exculpating information; and, (h) the prosecutor committed misconduct in the presentation of his case to the grand jury. Each argument will be explored seriatim.
17 During the trial a confrontation occurred between Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Carr, who was prosecuting the case on behalf of the government, and Canino's defense attorney Joel Hirschhorn. Hirschhorn was questioning a key government witness about some inconsistent testimony the witness delivered at an earlier criminal trial not involving any of the defendants in the present litigation. Hirschhorn was reading to the witness from the previous trial's transcript when Carr objected that Hirschhorn was misstating and distorting what appeared in the transcript. Hirschhorn said he was reading word for word. Carr kept asserting his charge against Hirschhorn. Finally the judge asked Hirschhorn: 18 The Court: ... were you paraphrasing? 19 Mr. Hirschhorn: No, I'm reading word for word. 20 The Court: He's saying you are not. 21 Mr. Hirschhorn: He's lying. I'm reading word for word. 22 The court permitted Hirschhorn's question as asked, overruling Carr's objection. 23 During a recess and out of the presence of the jury, Carr, outraged at being called a liar in front of the jury, approached Hirschhorn and in a hostile manner called Hirschhorn a sleaze and indicated that Hirschhorn was in serious trouble and that he would get [him]. Carr reportedly also said that if Hirschhorn called him a liar before the jury again he would break [his] nose. The discourse did not end here, however. Carr reportedly told Hirschhorn: You are a pussy, Don't talk to me, and You have no balls. The defense claims that these highly provocative comments were intimidating to a degree that compromised defense counsels' ability to vigorously advocate their clients' cause, thus impinging on the defendants' right to have a fair trial. 24 Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are generally rooted in the due process clause. United States v. Weaver, 882 F.2d 1128, 1140-41 (7th Cir.1989). The basis for such a claim is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). Therefore, the prosecutor's conduct is viewed not in isolation but in the context of the whole trial in order to determine if it was so inflammatory and prejudicial that it deprived a defendant of a fair trial. United States v. Dahdah, 864 F.2d 55, 59 (7th Cir.1988). 25 We will give substantial weight to a district court's determination that a prosecutor's misconduct did not affect the trial. United States v. Mazzone, 782 F.2d 757, 763 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 838, 107 S.Ct. 141, 93 L.Ed.2d 84 (1986). Although certainly inappropriate, Attorney Carr's comments could not have affected the jury's ability to judge the evidence or develop a prejudicial bias since the comments were not made in the jury's presence. Inappropriate prosecutorial comments, standing alone without a showing of adverse prejudicial impact on the jury, do not justify a reviewing court reversing a criminal conviction obtained in an otherwise fair trial. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 13-14, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1045-1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). The district court judge was alerted to what transpired, and confidently permitted trial to proceed. 26 Additionally, the trial record does not reflect any undesirable chilling of the defense counsels' advocacy as a result of Carr's remarks. Advocacy by all four defense counsel at trial seemed suitably intense and vigorous. Indeed, lawyers for the defense were bold enough to file a Motion for Disqualification of Attorney Carr (which the court denied). Carr apologized both privately and publicly for his improper comments and his regrets were accepted by Hirschhorn. In fact, Hirschhorn (despite the Motion for Disqualification) indicated to the trial court that there was no problem in his ability to litigate the case. During oral argument on appeal, Hirschhorn mentioned that he had argued many criminal cases in several federal circuits. It is highly unlikely that this brief verbal encounter had any effect on this very experienced attorney's ability to defend his client. Unfortunately this is not the first trial in which Hirschhorn and Carr faced off with each other (in the same court) and where similar accusations of prosecutorial misconduct were made. See United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890 (7th Cir.1988). In Mealy, Carr and Hirschhorn were cautioned by this court to refrain from engaging in histrionic or written personal attacks against each other. Id. at 904. We refer them again to Judge Wood's admonishment and sound advice. But this intimidation argument has become a hollow refrain. There is no excuse for the outburst, but the outburst (unlike Mealy, not in the presence of the jury) is no excuse for demanding a new trial. The contention that the defendants were deprived of a fair trial because of their attorneys' fear that they themselves would be the target of prosecutorial reprisals has no merit. Carr's indignant reaction in the heat of battle was wrong, but other than resulting in an opportunity for tactical posturing by the defense, it had no effect on the trial. The court was correct in dismissing the defendants' motion to disqualify Carr, and we find no reversible error stemming from Carr's behavior under the circumstances.
27 James J. Marren was indicted, along with the other defendants in this action, for conspiracy to distribute marijuana. Attorney Stephen J. Finta entered his appearance on behalf of defendant Marren. Trial against Marren, together with the other defendants in this action, commenced on November 15, 1988. Three days later the court declared a recess until November 29. 28 On November 29, 1988, the government filed a Motion for Disqualification of Attorney Finta and for severance of defendant Marren from the others on trial with him. The motion alleged that during the court's recess credible government witnesses indicated that Finta might be tied into [the] conspiracy that's alleged [in this case] or the overall [Lanier] conspiracy. Consequently, the government asserted that disqualification and severance were required because defendant Marren ha[d] a built-in conflict, and a built-in reversal based on his attorney's critical conflict of interest. Indeed, there was evidence suggesting that Finta had been operating as a front man for Marren, making arrangements for the importation and stashing of marijuana. Marren was ordered to obtain new counsel and got a new trial. 29 The court disqualified Finta and severed Marren's cause for separate adjudication. Marren and Finta appealed. This court reviewed that decision of the district court and affirmed. United States v. Marren, 919 F.2d 61 (7th Cir.1990). In so holding, this court found that Finta was properly disqualified because identifiable improprieties involving him were shown and because public suspicion would outweigh any interest in his continuing representation. Id. at 63. This court also affirmed Marren's mistrial based on manifest necessity, finding that Finta's necessary disqualification from the case would have an unacceptabl[e] [e]ffect upon the jury. This court affirmed the district judge in his belief that the proceedings would be tainted by Finta's replacement by another counsel, or in the alternative, by his double role as counsel and unsworn witness. Id. 30 The defendants in the present case asked the court that a general mistrial be declared for all the defendants when their co-defendant Marren was removed from the trial. The defendants believe that the district court's refusal to grant a mistrial for everyone caused them to suffer distinct prejudice. Essentially, the defendants feel that the Finta disqualification and Marren mistrial prejudiced the jury against the remaining defendants. 31 Denial of a motion for a mistrial is subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. United States v. Fulk, 816 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Phillips, 640 F.2d 87, 91 (7th Cir.1981). In deciding whether the court abused its discretion, we assume that a trial judge is in the best position to determine whether an incident was so serious as to warrant a mistrial. United States v. Liefer, 778 F.2d 1236, 1245-46 (7th Cir.1985). We have previously upheld a trial court's exercise of discretion in issuing a cautionary instruction, rather than declare a mistrial, to cure any potential prejudice. See Fulk, 816 F.2d at 1205-06; Liefer, 778 F.2d at 1246. The district court in this case was careful to announce cautionary instructions immediately after the jury was called in following the day-long hearing and resolution of the disqualification and severance matter conducted out of the jury's presence. The jury was instructed not to concern itself with the absence of defendant Marren, and to decide the case against each defendant based on the evidence introduced against the individual defendant. 32 Moreover, this court has already ruled on the timeliness of the government's motion for Finta's disqualification, and the adequacy of the notice to Marren and his opportunity to be heard on the disqualification and severance issue. We found that the government acted properly in bringing its motion to disqualify Finta as soon as the evidence against him became known to the government. Marren, 919 F.2d at 62. We also held that Marren had a hearing on the issue and an opportunity to move for a continuance (which he did not do) for further research and briefing. Id. at 63. In Marren we rejected the claim that Finta's and Marren's dismissal from this case was the product of prosecutorial abuse or manipulation or that the district court's decision to grant the government's motion for disqualification and severance was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 63-64. We therefore reject the same claim presently urged by the current defendants for the same reasons. 33 We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial where the interest of justice required the removal of a tainted lawyer and his adversely affected client from the proceedings, and where any possible prejudicial effects of such removal on the jurors' minds, with respect to the remaining defendants, was cured by the court with an immediate cautionary instruction and a jury instruction at the trial's conclusion reminding them of their duty to consider separately the evidence against each defendant. Cf. United States v. Barrientos, 758 F.2d 1152, 1157 (7th Cir.1985) (Failure to instruct a jury regarding a co-defendant's mid-trial absence ... has rarely been found to be plain error.). 34
35 The defense claims that the district court erred when it failed to correct a purported prejudicial mistake in the government's rebuttal to defense's closing argument. In closing, defense counsel argued that while appellants may have committed substantive drug offenses in other judicial districts, they were not guilty of the charged conspiracy. In effect, the defense was claiming that the defendants should be acquitted here (since they did not purposefully avail themselves of the Southern District of Illinois in the commission of their misdeeds) and instead should be charged with criminal offenses in the areas of the country where the bulk of their illegal conduct occurred. 36 In this rebuttal, Assistant U.S. Attorney Carr said: 37 Let them be charged in Pennsylvania. Mr. Malkin said, let them be charged in Pennsylvania. Mr. Sheppard [Marcum's attorney] said, let them be charged in Florida or Pennsylvania but not here. Well this is it, folks. The plea agreements that they have talked about where they say they can be charged in all these other counts (sic) [It should read courts], there is a section in the plea agreement that they didn't read out loud that's underlined. It says to the extent that the double jeopardy clause applies. 38 Well what does that mean? That means this is the trial. You only have to go to trial once for the charge. It's right here. The idea let them be charged in Philadelphia or Florida, that's gone. The double jeopardy clause applies. It's in all the plea agreements. Those other people can't be charged for some offense in Missouri that this same conspiracy is charged. It's unconstitutional and they know it. 39 The defense accuses Attorney Carr of trying to misinform the jury that if appellants were acquitted of the conspiracy charge, the doctrine of double jeopardy would bar prosecution for substantive acts, such as possession with intent to distribute marijuana or distribution of marijuana, in other districts. Based on their interpretation of Attorney Carr's statement, the defendants objected to what they thought was a misstatement of the law since double jeopardy does not bar successive trials on conspiracy and the underlying substantive counts. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11, 74 S.Ct. 358, 364, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954); United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 485 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Cortwright, 528 F.2d 168, 176 (7th Cir.1975). The defense thus made a request for a curative instruction. The district court declined to give a curative instruction. The defense claims on appeal that they were prejudiced when the prosecutor's erroneous remarks were allowed to stand, giving the jury an added sense of urgency to convict the defendants in the present proceeding notwithstanding the applicable legal standards. 40 The prosecutor's statement, in its context, was not an erroneous statement of the law. Drug offenses committed in Pennsylvania constituted the basis of the conspiracy charged in the Southern District of Illinois. If the government brought a subsequent conspiracy charge in Pennsylvania, then the Double Jeopardy Clause would intervene because in that case defendants would be prosecuted for the same offense. The prosecutor's comment, on its face, cannot seriously be understood to mean that charges concerning the lesser-included offenses constituting a conspiracy in this case could never be brought against the defendants if they are acquitted. The prosecutor only acknowledged the well-understood rule that the government could not charge another conspiracy against the defendants based on the same conduct used to prove this conspiracy. 41 If we thought that the prosecutor's statement could be construed as the defendants construe it, a question arises as to whether the prosecutor accurately described what the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits. In Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), the Supreme Court held that 42 the Double Jeopardy Clause bars any subsequent prosecution in which the government, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted.... The critical inquiry is what conduct the state will prove, not the evidence the state will use to prove that conduct. 43 Id. 110 S.Ct. at 2093. Two circuits have construed this language broadly, essentially holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars successive prosecutions not only for the same offense but also for the conduct or actions that contributed to that offense. United States v. Felix, 926 F.2d 1522 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir.1990). This approach would probably bar subsequent prosecutions for the substantive crimes underlying the conspiracy in this case. Other circuits have construed Grady in a way that probably would allow subsequent prosecutions for the substantive crimes here. United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 639 (4th Cir.1991); United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir.1991); see also Felix, 926 F.2d at 1532-35 (Anderson, J., dissenting). We do not need to take sides in this dispute, 2 however, since we have held that the jury was unlikely to construe the prosecutor's statement in context as referring to anything other than a subsequent prosecution for the conspiracy charged in this case. 44 Even if it was error for the court to refuse a curative instruction or an explanation to the jury concerning the various remaining criminal charges which could be brought against the defendants and the remaining suitable jurisdictions for prosecutions, the error is harmless. Under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, any error which does not affect substantial rights should be disregarded, and designated as harmless. In considering whether a non-constitutional error is harmless, [o]ur task is to gauge 'what effect the error had or reasonably may have had upon the jury's decision.'  United States v. Zapata, 871 F.2d 616, 622 (7th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 723 (7th Cir.1978). Only if we are convinced that the error did not influence the jury or had only a very slight effect, and can so say with fair assurance, should we hold the error as harmless. United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 783 (7th Cir.1984); see also United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 1273, 1280 (7th Cir.1987) (error is harmless unless it results in actual prejudice or  'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict'  (quoting United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449, 106 S.Ct. 725, 732, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986))). Here an examination of the rebuttal, together with the rest of closing arguments and the evidence at trial, convinces us that any error was harmless. The jury was properly instructed as to the nature of the charged offenses and the requirements for conviction. The government's proof satisfactorily supports, and perhaps compels, a jury finding of guilt as to the charged violations without the government's purportedly ambiguous double jeopardy assertion. In light of the strength of the government's case, even if there was error the court's failure to issue a curative instruction referring to the prosecutor's double-jeopardy characterization would have been harmless. We find no prejudicial error in the prosecutor's remarks nor an abuse of trial court discretion in denying the defense's motion for a curative instruction.
45 The defendants claim that the court erred by refusing to give their theory of defense instruction. At issue is the defendants' proposed Instruction No. 14 which stated: 46 The defendant is not on trial for any act or conduct not alleged in the indictment. (Emphasis added.) 47 The district court rejected this formulation and inserted its own instruction, one that gave a more precise focus on the nature of the charge against the defendants (conspiracy) and what is necessary to make a proper finding of guilt. The court's jury instruction read: 48 You may judge the defendants only on the charges alleged in the indictment. You may not convict them of any other alleged conspiracy in the event you should conclude that they have engaged in some other conspiracy. Therefore, if you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular defendant knowingly and intentionally joined the conspiracy alleged in the indictment, you must find that defendant not guilty. 49 Even if you find that a particular defendant knowingly and intentionally joined a conspiracy other than that alleged in the indictment, you should nonetheless find that defendant guilty of the charge alleged in the indictment if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and intentionally joined the single overall conspiracy that is alleged in the indictment and the elements of which are otherwise contained in these instructions. (Emphasis added.) 50 The defense claims in their brief (Joint Brief, pp. 53-56) that the given instruction (in contrast to their proffered instruction No. 14) fails to address the defendants' theory of defense, namely the need for the government to prove that the acts charged in the indictment were committed in the Southern District of Illinois, as opposed to other jurisdictions. The defendants claim that they were entitled to their instruction [No. 14] as worded, since it properly focused attention on the issue and was not merely an isolated sentence of a much larger multiple conspiracy instruction. (Def. Joint Br. 54) 51 The wording of the defendants' proposed Instruction No. 14 does not, as is claimed, actually focus attention on the issue of whether the government failed to prove that acts charged in the indictment were committed in the Southern District of Illinois as opposed to other jurisdictions. Their instruction completely ignores the issue of venue altogether. It is a mystery how the defense believes that Defense Instruction No. 14 legally (or logically) relates to the defendants' venue-based theory of defense at all. 52 In any event, Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a defendant to object to the judge's refusal to tender an instruction and clearly state the reasons for his objection. United States v. Jackson, 569 F.2d 1003, 1009-10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 3096, 57 L.Ed.2d 1137 (1978). Failure to do so constitutes waiver of all but prejudicial plain error. Id.; Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). In this case defendant Flynn completely waived this issue when his attorney asserted that defense instruction No. 14 should be withheld from the jury and urged the use of a modified version instead. Only Canino, Marcum, and Malkin objected to the court's refusal to give instruction No. 14--but none preserved the claim that this instruction was a theory of defense. Thus, we will review the district court's failure to give the defendants' proffered instruction only for plain error. United States v. Green, 779 F.2d 1313, 1319-1320 (7th Cir.1985). 53 Plain error must be of such a great magnitude that it probably changed the outcome of the trial, see United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1349 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1111, 105 S.Ct. 792, 83 L.Ed.2d 785 (1985), or if uncorrected, the error results in a miscarriage of justice, id. The court's refusal of Defense Instruction No. 14 was not plain error. First, Instruction No. 14 is not itself an accurate statement of the law in that it suggests that conduct and acts not alleged in the indictment should be excluded from the jury's consideration of the defendants' guilt with respect to the CCE and conspiracy charges. This instruction is at odds with the indictment itself. It is also in conflict with the court's ruling which permits evidence of acts or conduct not charged in the indictment. Such acts and conduct are elements of the CCE count and the conspiracy count and are proper issues for consideration by the jury. Moreover, the instruction offered by the court simply rewords the thrust of the defendants' instruction--clearly indicating that the defendants are on trial for only the charges (i.e., conspiracy or CCE) listed in the indictment, and no others. The tendered instruction was clear and in conformance with the law of this case. The defendants were not denied a fair trial as a result of the court's refusal to give their instruction. 54
55 The defendants also claim that the district court committed error when it refused to give the following recommended instruction to the jury concerning their theory of defense that they were mere purchasers from the conspiracy: 56 Mere proof of the existence of a buyer-seller relationship is not enough to convict a co-conspirator on drug conspiracy charges. Merely purchasing drugs or other property from the conspiracy, standing alone, can never establish membership in the conspiracy. 57 Our cases make clear that merely purchasing or selling drugs or other property from a conspiracy, standing alone, will not establish membership in a conspiracy. See United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1265 (7th Cir.1986); United States v. Keck, 773 F.2d 759, 768 (7th Cir.1985). However, our cases also make clear that a defendant is entitled to have a buyer-seller instruction only if such a theory is supported by the evidence. Each drug conspiracy case must be analyzed according to its specific facts to determine whether a buyer-seller instruction is appropriate. United States v. Douglas, 818 F.2d 1317, 1321 (7th Cir.1987). In an effort to distinguish between those defendants who are purchasers to strictly supply their personal consumption versus purchasers who are drug distributors, 3 Douglas establishes that a court, in deciding whether an instruction is supported by the evidence in a particular case, may choose to consider such factors as: the quantity of drugs involved (in this case truckloads containing hundreds of thousands of pounds); the resale value of the drugs involved (here, millions of dollars' worth); whether the defendants were addicts (no evidence of this in the case); and, whether a jury could reasonably believe the quantity and quality of drugs are generally used for personal consumption (inconceivable in this case). Moreover, the court must consider whether the defendant has put forth the buyer-seller defense at trial. 58 In this case, based on the factors outlined in Douglas, the facts support the exclusion of the defendants' proposed instruction. In addition, the trial transcript is void of any assertion by any of the defendants that they were merely buyers or sellers--their defense was that their activities could not be prosecuted in the Southern District of Illinois. Therefore, the defendants were in no way prejudiced by the court's failure to give a buyer-seller instruction; such an instruction would have been an absurdity given the evidence submitted at trial.
59 The defendants claim that it was error for the court to issue a jury instruction which only required the government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that venue existed in the Southern District of Illinois. The defendants claim that the jury should have been instructed that the government was required to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt. The sole authority cited by defendants in their brief for their contention is United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825 (7th Cir.1985), which states: 60 Defendants ... argue that venue is not proper in the Central District of Illinois. Venue is an essential element of an offense that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 61 Id. at 846. 62 The defense is ill-served by relying upon the above-quoted passage from Andrus as being the law of this circuit. The quoted passage was merely a portion of this court's paraphrase of the defendant's argument in the Andrus case--it was not a holding. A little further along in that decision, in response to the quoted characterization on the law of venue, this court wrote: In United States v. Mayo, 721 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir.1983), this court rejected the argument defendants press here. The law of this circuit is that venue is shown by a preponderance of the evidence, which may include inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence. United States v. Marrinson, 832 F.2d 1465, 1475 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Lewis, 797 F.2d 358, 366 (7th Cir.1986); United States v. Rodgers, 755 F.2d 533, 549 n. 19 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 907, 105 S.Ct. 3532, 87 L.Ed.2d 656 (1985); United States v. Martin, 732 F.2d 591, 593 (7th Cir.1984). The instruction given by the district court requiring that venue be established by a preponderance of the evidence was correct.
63 The defendants claim as error the failure of the trial court to disclose presentence reports of unindicted co-conspirators who were called into court as witnesses. Generally, presentence reports are helpful in effectively cross-examining witnesses because these reports may contain impeachment material. They may also contain exculpatory material culled from investigations and dealings with co-conspirators. United States v. Anderson, 724 F.2d 596, 598 (7th Cir.1984). 64 Nine months before trial began, the defendants filed a Motion for Production of Presentence Reports of the government's accomplice witnesses and an alternative motion for in camera inspection to determine the possible beneficial contents of such reports. The court entered an order denying the request for production due to the lack of any exculpatory evidence in those reports, but granted the review of such relevant documents in camera for the purpose of finding impeachment material useful in cross-examining the government's witnesses. However, the court required the defendants to notify the court of relevant reports that they especially wished to be reviewed. The district court did make periodic examinations and rulings on the existence of exculpatory or impeachment material in the presentence reports as requested by the defendants. Indeed, the court's decision is in accordance with established precedent in this area. In Anderson, this court held: 65 Defendant's request that we extend Figurski and [United States v.] Cyphers [553 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir.1977) ] to create a duty in the trial courts to disclose presentence reports about witnesses at the mere request of a criminal defendant is rejected. Rather, we uphold [that] ... [w]hen a defendant suspects that a witness' presentence report contains impeachment material, he should request the trial court to make an in camera examination of the report. If the examination reveals no impeachment material, the judge should so state; in that case, the trial judge should reveal no portion of the presentence report to defense counsel. If there is any impeachment material in the report, the judge should reveal to the defendant only the portions of the report that contain the impeaching material. 66 Id. at 598. 67 However, the defendants claim that the district court's review of the witnesses' presentence reports was untimely. The defense claims that the district court very often did not review the presentence reports of the witnesses until well after they had testified--making the in camera review perfunctory and useless. In United States v. Figurski, 545 F.2d 389, 391 (4th Cir.1976), the Fourth Circuit noted that the proper evaluation of the significance of information in the reports involved the appraisal of many factors likely to affect the trier of fact. Under many circumstances a ruling on a request for disclosure must be delayed until proffers of evidence can be made or until the government's case or the entire case has been presented so that the protected information can be examined in context. Id. at 392. 68 While the pretrial order entered by the court granted the defense motion for in camera review of the presentence reports, the court did instruct the defendants to notify the court of relevant reports that must be reviewed. Very often the defendants made their request for review at the last minute or during the cross-examination of the witness. It is no surprise that the results of the court's in camera review was sometimes not synchronized with defense counsel's needs and requirements. Nevertheless, Figurski does not require review of presentence reports prior to cross-examination as the defense argues in its brief. The procedure requested by the defense counsel and followed by the trial judge was identical to the one approved by this court in Anderson, where we held that the trial court's in camera examination of the presentence report, in combination with alternative avenues of impeachment, did not deprive the defendant of an effective defense.
69 The defendants alleged abuse and prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury. The government denied the allegation and provided the grand jury transcript for review by the district court. The defense moved that the transcript be released to them for their inspection. The district court denied the motion. 70 In order for a party to gain access to the normally inaccessible transcripts of proceedings before a grand jury, there must be a showing of particularized need. United States v. Edelson, 581 F.2d 1290, 1291 (7th Cir.1978). Mere unsupported speculation of possible prosecutorial abuse does not meet the particularized need standard. Id. at 1291. To begin with, the defense, in its brief, has not pointed to anything in the record which might suggest that the prosecutor engaged in improper conduct before the grand jury. We are left with only the defense's suspicious hunch, as the following excerpt from the defense's brief revealed: 71 Here, the Government has never denied, nor controverted defendants' allegations of abuse. Appellants have never viewed the grand jury instructions on the law. Appellants reason that based on the indictment itself, which does not contain a single, specific fact, the grand jury could not have been provided with anything other than erroneous, inadequate or misleading instructions on the elements, including venue, of the crimes charged against each defendant. The Government's failure to deny or controvert the defense allegations should be considered as an admission of defendants' allegations. 72 (Joint Br. p. 75.) 73 If a defendant wishes to determine whether the grand jury minutes contain any information inconsistent with the evidence offered by the government, the proper procedure [is] to ask the district judge to examine the minutes in camera and report on the record whether they contained such inconsistent information. Edelson, 581 F.2d at 1292. The defense made the request, and the court made the inspection and found no alleged improprieties. We find no reversible error.