Opinion ID: 218873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: “We review de novo both the district court’s grant of summary judgment and its holdings on questions of statutory interpretation.” Phoenix Mem’l. Hosp. v. Sebelius, 622 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). When no issues of fact are raised, and both parties move for summary judgment, we review the issues raised as matters of law. See Conrad v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 532 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2008). Our review of the Board’s decision is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, see id., which provides that the agency’s decision will be set aside only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . or unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E). “Courts must give substantial deference to the Secretary’s interpretation of Medicare reimbursement regulations. Under this standard of review, the agency’s interpretation must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. In other words, we must defer to the Secretary’s interpretation unless an alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by other indications of the Secretary’s intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation.” Robert F. Kennedy Med. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 526 F.3d 557, 561562 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).