Opinion ID: 798871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Officers Used Excessive Force in Shooting Phillips Four Times with the SL6 Weapon

Text: Even if the officers acted reasonably in treating the arrest as a high-risk stop because of uncertainty surrounding the license plates, the force they used to apprehend Phillips exceeded the level that was reasonable under the circumstances. At trial, the officers stated repeatedly that they believed Phillips was drunk. Officer Hoffman testified that he initially suspected Phillips was passing in and out of consciousness, though he later dismissed this idea after seeing her move intermittently within the car. Regardless of whether they believed Phillips was conscious throughout the entire incident, the officers knew they were dealing with an arrestee of diminished capacity. It is also clear that Phillips was never actively resisting arrest, a touchstone of the Graham analysis. 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Phillips never exhibited any sort of aggressive behavior toward the officers before or after they located her car, nor did she make any attempt to escape. [9] The officers argue that Phillips demonstrated continuous defiance by failing to follow their commands to exit the vehicle. This characterization strains credulity given the circumstances. But viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants, we presume that the officers reasonably believed that Phillips heard their orders and chose not to obey. Even so, leaving oneself exposed to repeated police fire does not represent active resistance. To the extent that Phillips's perceived conduct could be considered resistance at all, it would have been passive noncompliance of a different nature than the struggling that we have found warrants escalation of force. Indeed, in Smith, we noted this distinction, finding that what the officers perceived as willful noncompliance was not the same as actively resisting but instead a passive resistance requiring the minimal use of force.  295 F.3d at 771 (emphasis added); see also Cyrus, 624 F.3d at 863 (no evidence suggesting that the plaintiff violently resisted officers even if plaintiff refused to release arms for handcuffing); Estate of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 780-81 (7th Cir.2010) (plaintiff threatening suicide was not actively resisting arrest even though he said he was intoxicated, had a gun, and had barricaded himself in his room and refused to come out for three hours); Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 450 (9th Cir.2011) (en banc) ([W]e draw a distinction between a failure to facilitate an arrest and active resistance to arrest.); Griffith v. Coburn, 473 F.3d 650, 653, 659 (6th Cir.2007) (use of chokehold on plaintiff who was leaning back but resisting only passively by trying to put arms behind his back and refusing to cooperate with officer's commands was unreasonable). The officers have argued that Phillips continued to present a potential threat while she remained in the car because they believed the vehicle was running and could be used as a weapon. We have recognized this risk, Smith, 295 F.3d at 770, and agree that officers were entitled to use force to remove Phillips. But we have never suggested that any level of force is permissible to extinguish such a threat. See McAllister, 615 F.3d at 885-86. To the contrary, [f]orce is reasonable only when exercised in proportion to the threat posed. Cyrus, 624 F.3d at 863 (citing Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 907 (11th Cir.2009)). We must view the severe force that officers used on Phillips in light of the fact that any threat she presented had already been substantially contained. The officers had her vehicle surrounded with seven squad cars, and behind the vehicle there was a steep drop-off. There was nowhere for Phillips to go. Officer Hoffman himself told the dispatch that the driver was secured, not in handcuffs, but stabilized in the car. The scene was secured at least fifteen minutes before officers shot Phillips. During that time, Phillips had given no indication that she intended to harm the officers or anyone else. This is not to say that officers had entirely eliminated all danger after they surrounded the car. But the desire to resolve quickly a potentially dangerous situation is not the type of government interest that, standing alone, justifies the use of force that may cause serious injury. Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1281. The threat Phillips presented cannot be characterized as immediate. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. When the officers decided to use the SL6, Phillips was sprawled across the front seat with her legs outside of the car and both feet on the ground. Even to move into a position to drive the car, Phillips would have had to, at a minimum, sit up, bring her feet in, close the car door, and press the gas pedal. Phillips never gave the officers a reason to believe that she was about to do any of these things, even after the officers fired a warning shot at her car door. Cf. Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230, 233 (7th Cir.1993) (finding officers improperly used deadly force and were not entitled to qualified immunity even though escaping arrestee recklessly drove stolen taxicab toward them). Other than taking her legs from the window and putting them outside the car's door, there was no escalation or change in circumstances that called for immediate action on the officers' part. Under the totality of the circumstances, it is a close question whether officers acted reasonably in hitting Phillips with the first SL6 round. But the multiple shots fired certainly exceeded the level of force permissible to effectuate the arrest. Phillips gave no reaction to the first warning shot which put a baseball-sized dent in the car. Then, after the first physical blow, Phillips continued to remain in the same position, only yelling in pain after being injured. She did nothing to escalate the situation by actively resisting or attempting to flee. Although the officers waited little before firing additional shots, it was not because the circumstances called for rapid action. Since Phillips's only response had been to reach down to her leg and cry out in pain, the officers had time to pause and reevaluate the level of force needed to arrest her. See Mattos, 661 F.3d at 445 (noting that use of less-lethal force was unwarranted because there were no exigent circumstances and officers were able to proceed[] deliberately and thoughtfully); cf. Brockington v. Lamont Boykins, 637 F.3d 503, 507 (4th Cir.2011) (although initial use of deadly force was reasonable, there was no indication that additional force was necessary after the plaintiff had been shot, was on the ground, and wounded). This was simply not the kind of tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving situation that required split-second judgment calls. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865. As discussed above, the officers had already been put on notice that Phillips's car was not the same color, make, or model as the one reported stolen. When the car was located, according to the officers' testimony and the evidence in the record, Phillips appeared to be very drunk. Phillips never actively resisted or even responded to the officers' initial use of force. Under the circumstances, it was objectively unreasonable to shoot Phillips four times with the SL6 when she posed no immediate threat and offered no active resistance. There is a commonsense need to mitigate force when apprehending a non-resisting suspect, particularly when the suspect is known to have diminished capacity. An arrestee may be physically unable to comply with police commands. See Smith, 295 F.3d at 770; see also Cyrus, 624 F.3d at 863 (noting that officer was aware of [arrestee's] mental illness); McAllister, 615 F.3d at 883 (finding knowledge of arrestee's diabetic condition relevant to excessive force analysis); Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 904 (6th Cir.2004), (The diminished capacity of an unarmed detainee must be taken into account when assessing the amount of force exerted.). Here, we must respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleague who suggests that the force used was appropriate because Phillips failed to comply when officers ordered her to exit the car. Like the dissent, we accept the officers' testimony that their ultimate goal in using the SL6 was to gain compliance and control, rather than to hurt or punish Phillips gratuitously. But this goes principally to the question of intent. The officers' intent in using force is irrelevant in a Fourth Amendment case. Only its reasonableness matterswhich means whether it was excessive in the circumstances, because if it was, it was unreasonable. . . . Richman v. Sheahan, 512 F.3d 876, 882 (7th Cir.2008) (citations omitted); see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (An officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.). The dissent notes that officers stopped firing after Phillips obeyed and slid out of the car. But the fact that Phillips eventually complied after she was shot has no bearing on whether the force exercised on her was reasonable. We concur with our dissenting colleague's statement that the reasonableness of force [cannot be] measured by whether it is successful at gaining compliance. Dissent Op. at 536. But we believe the dissent's analysis of the officers' use of force effectively sanctions this invalid approach. That the officers had a reasonable goal and used (arguably) non-deadly force to accomplish it does not make their actions reasonable. It is true that the officers said they were trained to use the SL6 in an overload fashion meant to overpower a subject by repeatedly striking the same area of the body. But as the dissent observes, the SL6 was reserved for resistive, assaultive, or otherwise dangerous behavior. Phillips never exhibited any of the active resistance or assaultive behavior that would have warranted use of the overload tactic. Even when officers' goals are eminently reasonable, there are definite limits to the force officers may use to prod arrestees into obeying commands. A rule that pins reasonableness on whether officers used the force necessary to secure compliance would be a rule that requires officers to beat non-resisting arrestees into submission. Moreover, we believe the dissent misapprehends the circumstances that warranted escalation of force in our prior cases. We have held that increased force may be reasonable when used in response to an arrestee's active struggling and in proportion to the threat presented. Thus, in Padula, we found that [i]t was . . . reasonable to use mace to attempt to control [the plaintiff] under the circumstances, which involved a physical struggle both before and after placing him in handcuffs. 656 F.3d at 603. The force used was carefully calibrated to the arrestee's active resistance: as a means of imposing force, pepper spray is generally of limited intrusiveness. Id. Similarly, [t]he Officers' use of batons was also reasonable. . . . [The] baton strikes were `stern,' but not `severe,' which was appropriate in response to [the plaintiff] kicking and flailing his arms. Id. Our decision in Clarett v. Roberts followed the same rationale. 657 F.3d 664 (7th Cir.2011). There, an officer testified that he used three taser deployments because the arrestee was kicking and flailing at him and continued this assaultive behavior when he tried to arrest her. Id. at 675; see also Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1105 (6th Cir.1997) (Here, [the officer] used only a single burst of pepper spray to get plaintiff on the stretcher, unlike the allegation in [a separate case] that the plaintiff was unnecessarily sprayed a second time after he was subdued. (emphasis added)). Permitting substantial escalation of force in response to passive non-compliance would be incompatible with our excessive force doctrine and would likely bring more injured citizens before our courts. Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the force used surpassed the level permissible under the Fourth Amendment to effectuate Phillips's arrest.
Qualified immunity protects an officer from liability if a reasonable officer could have believed that the action taken was lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the officer possessed at the time. Omdahl, 170 F.3d at 733. In determining whether a right is `clearly established,' we look first to controlling precedent on the issue from the Supreme Court and from this circuit. Estate of Escobedo, 600 F.3d at 781. If such precedent is lacking, we look to all relevant case law to determine whether there was such a clear trend in the case law that we can say with fair assurance that the recognition of the right by a controlling precedent was merely a question of time. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Even dicta, although we do not rely on it here, in certain cases, can clearly establish a right. See id. at 786 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). In undertaking this analysis, we take care to look at the right violated in a particularized sense, rather than at a high level of generality. Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 858 (7th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But a case directly on point is not required for a right to be clearly established and officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). Therefore, we ask whether it was clearly established on November 11, 2005 that multiple trauma-inducing shots would constitute excessive force when used to secure a non-resisting, intoxicated arrestee. We conclude that the right to be free from this amount of force was clearly established on the date of Phillips's arrest. The officers contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity because, on the date of the arrest, no case from the Supreme Court or from this circuit had held use of the SL6 unconstitutional. They argue that if the law had clearly established that use of an SL6 was unlawful, police departments would no longer retain the weapon in their arsenal. The defendants misconstrue the qualified immunity analysis. [T]here is no need that the very action in question [have] previously been held unlawful. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 129 S.Ct. 2633, 2643, 174 L.Ed.2d 354 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Every time the police employ a new weapon, officers do not get a free pass to use it in any manner until a case from the Supreme Court or from this circuit involving that particular weapon is decided. See Sallenger v. Oakes, 473 F.3d 731, 741-42 (7th Cir.2007) (no qualified immunity for officers' use of hobble given totality of circumstances, even where other circuits had held that use of a hobble was not clearly established as constitutionally suspect). Even where there are notable factual distinctions, prior cases may give an officer reasonable warning that his conduct is unlawful. Estate of Escobedo, 600 F.3d at 781; see also Griffith v. Coburn, 473 F.3d 650, 659 (6th Cir.2007) ([T]he [c]ourt can consider more than merely the factual context of a prior case: `the general reasoning that a court employs' also may suffice for purposes of putting the defendant on notice that his conduct is clearly unconstitutional. (citation omitted)). The officers also argue that qualified immunity is warranted because Smith affirmatively authorized use of force to remove an unresponsive driver from a car. 295 F.3d at 771. But the reliance on Smith is misplaced. As we explained in McAllister, Smith does not stand for the proposition that an officer may use any amount of force on an unresponsive driver. 615 F.3d at 885-86 (distinguishing Smith and denying qualified immunity to police officers because the degree of force the officers intended to apply in Smith was significantly less than the force allegedly used by [the officer in this case]). To the contrary, Smith permitted only minimal force to remove a non-responding intoxicated driver from his car. 295 F.3d at 771. As stated above, [f]orce is reasonable only when exercised in proportion to the threat posed. Cyrus, 624 F.3d at 863 (citing Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 907 (11th Cir.2009) (discussing clearly established law as of 2004)). Force also becomes increasingly severe the more often it is used; striking a resisting suspect once is not the same as striking him ten times. Cyrus, 624 F.3d at 863. By the time of the arrest, circuit precedent had given the officers notice that the force used on Phillips was excessive. Smith indicated that only minimal force was warranted to remove a driver perceived to be intoxicated and passively resisting. 295 F.3d at 771. Omdahl referenced the substantial quantum of force inflicted by a bean-bag shotgun, treating it as either deadly force or a higher level of force along a ladder of escalating force. 170 F.3d at 733; see also Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1279-80. Prior to Phillips's arrest, the Eleventh Circuit held in Mercado that officers had used excessive force in deploying an SL6 weapon against an arrestee wielding a knife and threatening to commit suicide. 407 F.3d at 1154-55. One of the two SL6 rounds fired hit the arrestee in the head injuring him. Id. The Eleventh Circuit rejected qualified immunity for the officers even though there was no prior case law that was materially similar. Id. at 1159. Though the circumstances surrounding the use of force differ from the current case, Mercado recognized that the SL6 could be deployed in a clearly unlawful manner even though it was categorized as less lethal. Id. at 1157. [10] Even assuming a lack of clarity about the propriety of shooting Phillips with the SL6 once, the officers should have known that it was unlawful to escalate force by shooting Phillips three more times when she was unresponsive, presented no immediate threat, and made no attempt to flee or even avoid police fire. That is, it was clearly established in November 2005 that officers could not use such a significant level of force on a nonresisting or passively resisting individual. Rambo v. Daley, 68 F.3d 203, 207 (7th Cir.1995) (denying qualified immunity where police forced a handcuffed, drunk driving suspect who was verbally resisting arrest into a police car by breaking the suspect's ribs); St. John v. Hickey, 411 F.3d 762, 772-75 (6th Cir. 2005) (denying qualified immunity to officers who injured a disabled plaintiff while placing him in police cruiser because, although the plaintiff was cursing, yelling, and passively resisting, he was not violent or attempting to flee); Hill v. Miller, 878 F.Supp. 114, 116 (N.D.Ill.1995) ([I]t is well established that the use of any significant force . . . not reasonably necessary to effect an arrestas where the suspect neither resists nor flees or where the force is used after a suspect's resistance has been overcome or his flight thwartedwould be constitutionally unreasonable. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We therefore conclude that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity, and that Phillips is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on her excessive force claim. [11]