Opinion ID: 794361
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Divisible Penal Statutes

Text: 27 Despite this general prohibition against inquiry into the factual circumstances of the crime underlying a removal order, a limited review of the record may be warranted where the statute of conviction is divisible. A criminal statute is divisible if it encompasses multiple categories of offense conduct, some, but not all, of which would categorically constitute aggravated felonies under the INA. See Abimbola v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d at 177; Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d at 48; Kuhali v. Reno, 266 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2001). In reviewing a removal petition based on a conviction under a divisible statute, a court applying the categorical approach may look beyond the language of the statute to the record of conviction for the limited purpose of determining whether the alien's conviction was under the branch of the statute that permits removal. Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d at 48-49. The record of conviction includes the charging document, plea agreement, a verdict or judgment of conviction, and a record of the sentence or plea transcript. Abimbola v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d at 177 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B)).
28 Applying these principles to this case, we conclude that New York's first-degree manslaughter statute, N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20, is divisible. The first two subsections of that statute require the defendant's conduct to have been committed with the specific intent to cause serious physical injury or death to some person. See N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1) and (2). Two other subsections identify first-degree manslaughter in circumstances causing death without regard to any specific intent to kill or cause serious physical injury: when certain abortional acts cause, however unintentionally, the death of the mother, see id. § 125.20(3); or when a person over the age of eighteen intent on causing some physical injury to a child under the age of eleven engages in reckless conduct resulting in the child's death, see id. § 125.20(4). 29 Vargas's judgment of conviction does not specify the subsection of § 125.20 under which he was convicted. In light of the very different conduct and intent specified in the statutory subsections, however, it is certainly conceivable that a categorical determination whether Vargas committed an aggravated felony could vary depending upon the subsection of conviction. See Ming Lam Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d at 118 (concluding that [b]ecause it [was] conceivable that determination of whether petitioner committed aggravated felony under INA would vary depending on whether he or she had been convicted alternatively of making, possessing, or uttering, counterfeit securities, court could look to charging documents to determine proscribed activity at issue); see generally In re Vargas-Sarmiento, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 654 (observing that first-degree manslaughter as defined in subsection (3) of N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20 does not involve inherent substantial risk of force and, therefore, may not be a crime of violence). 5 In these circumstances, we treat N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20 as a divisible statute for purposes of § 16(b) analysis. c. Vargas's First-Degree Manslaughter Conviction Was Pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1) or (2) 30 The parties do not dispute the divisibility of § 125.20. Indeed, they appear to concur that Vargas's first-degree manslaughter conviction is pursuant to either subsection (1) or (2) of § 125.20 and that those sections should be the focus of our § 16(b) analysis. We agree. 31 The second-degree murder indictment against Vargas charged that on or about October 9, 1982, in the county of Kings, with intent to cause the death of Miriam M. Molina, [Vargas] caused the death of Miriam M. Molina by stabbing her with a sharp instrument and thing, thereby inflicting divers wounds and injuries from which she died. Indictment No. 5626/1982. This pleading makes plain that Vargas's conviction for the lesser-included crime of first-degree manslaughter was necessarily pursuant to either (a) subsection (1) of § 125.20 because, although Vargas caused Ms. Molina's death, his specific intent was only to cause her serious physical injury; or (b) subsection (2) because, although Vargas caused Ms. Molina's death with the specific intent to do so, he satisfactorily demonstrated that he acted under an extreme emotional disturbance. Nothing in the record would support a conclusion that Vargas's first-degree manslaughter conviction involved the abortional acts specified in subsection (3) or a child victim as specified in subsection (4). Indeed, subsection (4) was not even added to § 125.20 until 1990, almost six years after the jury returned its verdict against Vargas. See N.Y. Laws 1990 ch. 477, § 3 (creating N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(4)). 32 Having thus identified the relevant statutory sections of conviction, we turn to the critical issue raised by Vargas's petition: whether first-degree manslaughter as defined in N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1) or (2) categorically qualifies as a crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). 33 E. First-Degree Manslaughter in Violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1) or (2) Is, By Its Nature, a Crime of Violence Under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) 34 1. The Plain Language of § 16(b) Requires that a Felony Offense Present a Substantial Risk of the Intentional Use of Physical Force, not the Invariable Use of Such Force, to Constitute a Crime of Violence under § 16(b) 35 In determining whether a felony offense constitutes a crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), we necessarily begin with the plain language of that statute. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004) (citing Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995)). As we previously observed, § 16(b) defines crime of violence as any felony ... that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Preliminarily, we note that this provision sweeps more broadly' than § 16(a), Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. at 10, 125 S.Ct. 377, which defines non-felony (as well as felony) offenses as crimes of violence only if they have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (emphasis added); see Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 188, 196 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that misdemeanor crimes cannot be violent felonies under § 16 unless they have as an element the use of force). No such element requirement is specified in § 16(b). See Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d at 196 (noting this distinction between § 16(a) and § 16(b)). Rather, the plain language of § 16(b) instructs courts to focus on the nature of the felony at issue to determine if it inherently presents a substantial risk that the perpetrator may use physical force in the commission of the crime. See Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d at 51 (holding that, even if none of the elements of unlawful imprisonment under N.Y. Penal Law § 135.10 expressly require the use of physical force, the offense still satisfies 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) because, by its nature, the felony involves a substantial risk that force may be used  (emphasis in original)). 36 We have broadly defined physical force for purposes of § 16 as `power, violence, or pressure directed against a person or thing.' Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d at 50 (quoting Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d at 192, and rejecting argument that force referenced in § 16(b) must be  violent force applied directly to the person of the victim (emphasis in original)). For a particular felony, by its nature, to present a substantial risk of the use of such physical force, a court need not conclude that commission of the crime requires the invariable application of such force. As the Supreme Court stated in Leocal v. Ashcroft, the language of § 16(b) defines as a crime of violence those felony offenses that naturally involve a person acting in disregard of the risk that physical force might be used against another in committing an offense. 543 U.S. at 10, 125 S.Ct. 377 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court observed that physical force need not actually be applied in the commission of the charged felony for it to qualify as a crime of violence under § 16(b). Id. at 11, 125 S.Ct. 377; Jobson v. Ashcroft, 326 F.3d at 374 (noting that an offense need not require an actual use of force to come within section 16(b)'s reach). The critical categorical inquiry is whether, inherent in any commission of the felony is a substantial risk that the perpetrator may use such force. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. at 10, 125 S.Ct. 377; accord Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d at 51 (noting that § 16(b) inquiry is necessarily broad and flexible, asking not whether it is conceivable that the felony could be committed without the use of force but whether the crime is one that by its nature involves a substantial risk that force may be used (emphasis in original)). 2. Section 16(b) References a Substantial Risk of the Intentional Use of Force 37 In construing § 16(b) to require a substantial risk of the use of physical force, rather than the invariable application of such force, this court has ruled that the contemplated risk refers to intentional, rather than merely negligent or accidental, use of force. As explained in Dalton v. Ashcroft, this is because § 16(b) contemplates only intentional conduct and refers only to those offenses in which there is a substantial likelihood that the perpetrator will intentionally employ physical force, ... not [to] an accidental, unintended event. 257 F.3d at 208 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Jobson v. Ashcroft, 326 F.3d at 374; see also Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 611 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that physical force that may be used pursuant to § 16(b) must be accompanied by intent to use that force); United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921, 926 (5th Cir.2001) (noting that language of § 16(b) suggests a willingness to risk having to commit a crime of specific intent (internal quotation marks omitted)). This construction finds some support in Leocal v. Ashcroft, wherein the Supreme Court observed that, because the ordinary meaning of the word `use' requires active employment, § 16(b)'s reference to a risk of the use of physical force in the commission of the charged felony most naturally suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct. 543 U.S. at 9-11, 125 S.Ct. 377. 6 3. Identifying Crimes that Categorically Present a Significant Risk of the Intentional Use of Physical Force 38 Applying these principles to various felony offenses, courts have concluded that, among the crimes categorically presenting a serious risk of the intentional use of physical force are burglary, see id. at 10, 125 S.Ct. 377 (observing that burglary is a classic crime of violence  not because the offense can be committed in a generally reckless way or because someone may be injured, but because burglary, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that the burglar will use force against a victim in completing the crime (emphasis in original)); the solicitation of murder for hire, Ng v. Attorney General, 436 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir.2006) (holding that solicitation of a murder naturally presents a substantial risk that physical force will be used against another, regardless of whether the risk develops or harm actually occurs); unlawful imprisonment of a competent adult, see Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d at 51 (observing that, even where competent adult is restrained by deception, . . . the offense will either involve the use of force to effectuate the restraint, or by its nature involve a substantial risk that force may be used); and statutory rape, see Chery v. Ashcroft, 347 F.3d 404, 408 (2d Cir.2003) (observing that statutory rape cases can be imagined where a defendant's conduct does not create a genuine probability that force will be used, but the risk of force remains inherent in an offense to which the victim cannot consent (emphasis in original)). See also United States v. Jackson, 301 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir.2002) (holding that escape qualifies as a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because escape invites pursuit; and the pursuit, confrontation, and recapture of the escapee entail serious risks of physical injury to law enforcement officers and the public 7 ); United States v. Gay, 251 F.3d 950, 953-55 (11th Cir.2001) (collecting cases concluding that even a non-violent, walk-away escape constitutes a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 because of risk inherent in nature of escape that the escapee, intent on securing freedom, may use force to avoid recapture); United States v. Danielson, 199 F.3d 666, 671-72 (2d Cir.1999) ( per curiam ) (holding that weapons possession in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 265.03 is violent felony within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) where jury was required to find that defendant's conscious aim or objective [was] to use a loaded firearm against another); United States v. Kaplansky, 42 F.3d 320, 324 (6th Cir.1994) (holding that attempted kidnapping is violent felony for purposes of enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) because, even if deception is used to effect crime, that does not erase ever-present possibility that victim may discover plan and resist, requiring perpetrator to use force to achieve objective). Although it is possible to hypothesize circumstances under which each of these crimes could be committed without the actual use of physical force, these courts have found that, under the relevant statutes, their inherent nature always presents the requisite substantial risk of the intentional use of force. 39 By contrast, courts have declined to recognize as a crime of violence within the meaning of § 16(b) a felony offense for driving under the influence of alcohol. In so holding with respect to Florida's felony DWI statute, the Supreme Court explained that a person who unintentionally causes injury while driving under the influence of alcohol cannot reasonably be said to have `use[d] physical force against another.' Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. at 9-10, 125 S.Ct. 377. In earlier reaching the same conclusion with respect to a comparable New York statute, this court observed that a person may be convicted of driving while intoxicated in New York even when asleep at the wheel of a car that has never moved and whose engine is not running, in short, under circumstances presenting no risk that force may be used. Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d at 205. 8 Indeed, Dalton foreshadowed Leocal in concluding that, even when drunk driving involves the operation of a vehicle on the roadways resulting in injuries to persons, one cannot [say that the driver intentionally] use [d] force in an accident. Id. at 206 (emphasis in original). This is because `use implies intentional availment,' and `[n]o availment of force in order to achieve an end is present in a drunk driving accident.' Id. (quoting United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 372-73 (7th Cir.1995)). 40 In Jobson v. Ashcroft, this court concluded that these principles compelled a conclusion that recklessly caus[ing] the death of another person, second-degree manslaughter under N.Y. Penal Law § 125.15(1), did not qualify as a crime of violence under § 16(b). 326 F.3d at 372. Jobson summarized the two essential requirements of § 16(b): (1) that the felony offense inherently pose[] a substantial risk that a defendant will use physical force, and (2) that the risk contemplate an intentional use of force. Id. at 374 (emphasis in original). Jobson concluded that second-degree manslaughter could not satisfy either of these requirements because, under New York law, the crime could be committed by passive conduct or omissions. Id. at 373; see, e.g., People v. Stubbs, 122 A.D.2d 91, 504 N.Y.S.2d 235 (2d Dep't 1986) (holding that failure to feed child satisfied § 125.25(1)). Jobson explained that, as a consequence, second-degree manslaughter encompasses many situations in which the defendant applies no physical force to the victim, and more importantly, situations that do not involve any risk that the defendant will apply force to the victim. Jobson v. Ashcroft, 326 F.3d at 373 (emphasis added). The court ruled that a felony could not be identified as a crime of violence under section 16(b) unless its commission invariably present[s] a substantial risk of the intentional use of force. Id. at 374 (rejecting argument that an offense satisfies section 16(b) as long as many (but not all) convictions involve a substantial risk of the use of force (emphasis in original)); see also Chery v. Ashcroft, 347 F.3d at 408. To present such an invariable risk, Jobson concluded that the predicate offense itself had to involve intentional conduct. It explained that [o]n this view, a defendant must, in pursuing his intended criminal activity, risk having to intentionally use force to commit the offense. By contrast, a defendant who is convicted of second-degree manslaughter, like other offenses of pure recklessness, may lack any `intent, desire or willingness to use force or cause harm at all.' Jobson v. Ashcroft, 326 F.3d at 374 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 866 (3d Cir.1992)). 41 4. Inherent in the Specific Intent Requirements of N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1) or (2) Is a Substantial Risk that a Person Committing First-Degree Manslaughter May Intentionally Use Physical Force 42 Applying Jobson 's reasoning, as well as the principles derived from Leocal and our other § 16(b) precedents to this case, we conclude that first-degree manslaughter in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1) or (2) is categorically a crime of violence because inherent in the nature of that offense is a substantial risk that the perpetrator may intentionally use physical force in committing the crime. First-degree manslaughter, as defined in § 125.20(1) and (2), is readily distinguishable from second-degree manslaughter in that the former is a specific intent crime. To be found guilty under § 125.20(1) or (2), the accused must cause a human death while acting with the specific intent to do so or, at least, with the specific intent to cause serious physical injury. In short, first-degree manslaughter cannot be committed through mere reckless passivity or omission, circumstances identified in Jobson as presenting no risk of the intentional use of force. See Jobson v. Ashcroft, 326 F.3d at 373-74. Rather, as the government correctly observes, to carry out the specific intent detailed in § 125.20(1) or (2), an accused will generally intentionally use the most egregious forms of physical force: shooting, see, e.g., People v. Paredes, 251 A.D.2d 14, 673 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1st Dep't 1998); People v. Valverde, 205 A.D.2d 444, 614 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1st Dep't 1994); stabbing, see, e.g., People v. Gill, 20 A.D.3d 434, 798 N.Y.S.2d 507 (2d Dep't 2005); People v. Cobbs, 174 A.D.2d 751, 571 N.Y.S.2d 576 (2d Dep't 1991); beating, see, e.g., People v. Peralta, 1 A.D.3d 115, 767 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1st Dep't 2003); or some combination of the above, see, e.g., People v. Bell, 111 A.D.2d 926, 490 N.Y.S.2d 820 (2d Dep't 1985). Whatever other means a person might conceive to commit first-degree manslaughter, when his intent is to take a life, or at least to inflict serious physical injury — action likely to meet vigorous resistance from a victim — we can confidently conclude that inherent in the nature of the crime is a substantial risk that the perpetrator may intentionally use physical force to achieve his criminal objective. The fact that a perpetrator might accomplish his homicidal or seriously injurious objective before a victim could mount any resistance warrants no different conclusion. The nature of the objective and the possibility of discovery and resistance are enough to establish the requisite inherent risk that the perpetrator might intentionally use physical force. Cf. Chery v. Ashcroft, 347 F.3d at 408 (recognizing that where consent is not — or cannot be — given to rape, the crime  inherently involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used in its commission (emphasis in original)); Jobson v. Ashcroft, 326 F.3d at 373 (observing that burglary is a crime of violence even though no force is used in a particular instance, because a burglar of a dwelling risks having to use force if the occupants are home and hear the burglar (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)); United States v. Kaplansky, 42 F.3d at 324 (observing that possibility that unwitting kidnapping victim will discover plot and resist makes perpetrator's use of force an ever-present risk in the commission of the crime); United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir.1994) (concluding that escape is properly deemed a violent crime because it can be analogized to a powder keg, which may or may not explode into violence ..., but which always has the serious potential to do so (emphasis in original)). 43 Accordingly, we conclude that first-degree manslaughter in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1) or (2) qualifies as a crime of violence within the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). 9 5. Vargas's Hypotheticals Warrant No Different Conclusion 44 Vargas nevertheless insists that first-degree manslaughter should not be deemed a crime of violence under § 16(b) because he can hypothesize two circumstances in which the crime could be committed without any risk of the intentional use of physical force. First, he posits that a woman might intentionally kill her husband by poisoning food that she expects him to eat in her absence. Second, Vargas suggests that a wife, intent on causing her husband serious physical injury, might wear down the brake pads on a car to be driven by her spouse, resulting in his death in an automobile accident. Vargas submits that, in both these circumstances, the perpetrator uses no physical force against the victim. Further, he insists that in neither circumstance is there any risk that the perpetrator will use such force because she is not even on the scene at the time of death. Vargas's argument is flawed in at least two respects. 45 First, Vargas appears to misapprehend the essence of the categorical inquiry under § 16(b). Whether a crime, by its nature, presents a substantial risk that the perpetrator may intentionally use physical force is not answered in the negative simply because cases can be imagined where a defendant's conduct does not create a genuine probability that force will be used. Chery v. Ashcroft, 347 F.3d at 408 (holding statutory rape a crime of violence even though defendant may be convicted where no actual force is used). Where a person's specific intent is to kill another human being or, at least, to cause him serious physical injury, there is necessarily a significant risk inherent in the nature of the crime that, if the perpetrator cannot initially achieve his objective without physical force, he may ultimately resort to force to do so. See Benjamin v. Bureau of Customs, 383 F.Supp.2d 344, 346-47 (D.Conn.2005) (making same observation in holding that first-degree manslaughter under Connecticut law, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-55(a)(1), is a crime of violence under § 16(b)). 46 Second, in Vargas's hypotheticals, the perpetrator does, in fact, intentionally use physical force in the commission of first-degree manslaughter. As we have previously observed, the physical force referenced in § 16(b) includes any power, violence, or pressure directed against a person or thing. Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d at 50. A perpetrator need not himself apply such force to a victim to make use of it; he need only `intentional[ly] avail[]' himself of force in the commission of the crime. Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d at 206 (quoting United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d at 372-73). Thus, in Dickson, we concluded that, when a perpetrator lures a person voluntarily to enter a room, only then to lock the door behind the person, the perpetrator has intentionally used physical force to commit the crime of imprisonment. This is because, even though there has been no application of violent force [directly to the victim], the [perpetrator] has unquestionably, by locking the door, imposed physical barriers of forcible restraint. Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d at 49. 47 So in Vargas's first hypothetical, when the perpetrator poisons food that she intends her spouse to eat, she engages in no mere passive act or reckless omission. Rather, she intentionally avails herself of the physical force exerted by poison on a human body deliberately to kill her husband. First, she affirmatively exercises power over the contents of her husband's food to transform it into an agent of forcible destruction. Then she avails herself of that force to asphyxiate her husband (or otherwise destroy his vital bodily functions). That the wife may not herself administer the poison, that she may employ deceit to prompt her spouse's unwitting ingestion, and that she may not be present when the poison forcibly kills do not alter the § 16(b) conclusion. The fact remains that she deliberately set in motion a chain of events specifically intended to use the force of poison to kill her husband. See id. at 50 (holding that § 16(b) does not reference only force applied directly to the person of the victim). The risk of physical force referenced by § 16(b) can be the act of an agent (human or not) as long as there is, inherent in the crime, a substantial risk that the perpetrator may intentionally avail himself of that force. See id.; see generally Ng v. Ashcroft, 436 F.3d at 397 (holding that person who solicits another to perform murder himself commits crime of violence under § 16(b)). We would hardly conclude that a bomber does not intentionally use physical force when he deliberately kills scores of people simply because he rigs his deadly device to detonate only upon some act by one of his unsuspecting victims while the bomber himself is miles away. Thus, we are not persuaded by Vargas's argument that first-degree manslaughter is not a crime of violence when it is committed by a person who intentionally poisons the food of an unwitting victim rather than by a person who directly injects the poison into his victim's arm. In either situation, the killer has intentionally availed himself of the forceful physical properties of poison to cause death. See Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d at 206. 10 48 Similarly, in Vargas's second hypothetical, the wife undoubtedly intends to avail herself of physical force to inflict serious physical injury on her husband. The agent of that force is her automobile. Toward that end, she intentionally exerts physical force on the vehicle to convert it from an ordinary means of transportation into what is, effectively, a weapon that will forcibly inflict intended serious injury on her husband without any need for the wife's presence or further action. See Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d at 194 (drawing distinction between causation of an injury and an injury's causation by the `use of physical force'). 49 In sum, Vargas's hypotheticals fail to support his argument that first-degree manslaughter is not a crime of violence within the plain language of § 16(b).