Opinion ID: 3171275
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Privacy Rationale

Text: The FEC’s final explanation centered on its effort to tailor the regulations such that they both effectuate BCRA’s purpose in disclosure while also minding carefully the constitutional interests in privacy also at stake. The FEC reasoned that the revised purpose requirement is “narrowly tailored to address many of the commenters’ concerns regarding individual donor privacy.” 72 Fed. Reg. at 72901. 24 This explanation is significant. The FEC is “[u]nique among federal administrative agencies,” having “as its sole purpose the regulation of core constitutionally protected activity—the behavior of individuals and groups only insofar as they act, speak and associate for political purposes.” AFLCIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 170 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Thus, more than other agencies whose primary task may be limited to administering a particular statute, every action the FEC takes implicates fundamental rights. By tailoring the disclosure requirements to satisfy constitutional interests in privacy, the FEC fulfilled its unique mandate. And the FEC’s concerns about the competing interests in privacy and disclosure were legitimate. We began this opinion by acknowledging the unmistakable tension that exists in campaign finance law between speech rights and disclosure rules. The Supreme Court has vigorously protected the public’s right to speak anonymously, even recognizing that anonymous speech has “played an important role in the progress of mankind.” Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960). “Anonymity,” the Court elsewhere observed, “is a shield from the tyranny of the majority” and “exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—at the hand of an intolerant society.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995). This is not to say the Court is naïve to the potential downsides that may accompany this right to anonymity. Much to the contrary, the McIntyre Court acknowledged “political speech by its nature will sometimes have unpalatable consequences,” but, vindicating the right to speak anonymously, declared “our society accords greater weight to the value of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse.” Id. 25 And yet, the Court has sanctioned startling intrusions on this right to anonymity by upholding mandatory disclosure requirements. The Court held in Buckley that such requirements “appear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist,” all the while recognizing “public disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties will deter some individuals who otherwise might contribute” and “expose contributors to harassment or retaliation.” 424 U.S. at 68. Ironically, these two values the Buckley Court acknowledged would be harmed by the disclosure requirements were the very same values the McIntyre Court later believed “exemplifie[d] the purpose behind the Bill of Rights and of the First Amendment in particular”—namely, “protect[ing] unpopular . . . ideas from suppression” and “individuals from retaliation.” McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357. But even after McIntyre, the Court upheld the disclosure requirements in McConnell, and again in Citizens United, without much more than a passing citation to McIntyre or any of the Court’s other precedents establishing the right to speak anonymously. 6 As one dissenting justice observed in McConnell, “The Court now backs away from [McIntyre], allowing the established right to anonymous speech to be stripped away based on the flimsiest of justifications.” 540 U.S. at 276 (Thomas, J. dissenting). Both an individual’s right to speak anonymously and the public’s interest in contribution disclosures are now firmly entrenched in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. And yet they are also fiercely antagonistic. The 6 Judge Easterbrook, dubitante in Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 356 (7th Cir. 2004), also noted “the Justices’ failure to discuss McIntyre” and concluded it was therefore “impossible for courts at our level to make an informed decision—for the Supreme Court has not told us what principle to apply.” 26 deleterious effects of disclosure on speech have been ably catalogued. “Disclaimer and disclosure requirements enable private citizens and elected officials to implement political strategies specifically calculated to curtail campaign-related activity and prevent the lawful, peaceful exercise of First Amendment rights.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 483 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (highlighting how mandatory disclosure of contributors to California’s controversial “Yes on Proposition 8” campaign led to their being singled out for ruthless retaliation and intimidation). “[T]he advent of the Internet enables prompt disclosure of expenditures, which provides political opponents with the information needed to intimidate and retaliate against their foes.” Id. at 484 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Disclosure also makes it easier to see who has not done his bit for the incumbents, so that arms may be twisted and pockets tapped.” Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 356 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., dubitante). In addition to these general burdens, the specific disclosure requirement Van Hollen advocates here would present its own unique harms. For instance, an American Cancer Society donor who supports cancer research but not ACS’s political communications must decide whether a cancer cure or her associational rights are more important to her. This is categorically distinct from deciding whether a political issue, such as tax reform, is as important as one’s associational right. Cancer research isn’t a political issue, but disclosure rules of this sort would undeniably transform it into one. These disclosure rules also burden privacy rights in another crucial way: modest individuals who’d prefer the amount of their charitable donations remain private lose that privilege the minute their nonprofit of choice decides to run an issue ad. The Supreme Court routinely invalidates laws that chill speech far less than a disclosure rule that might scare away charitable donors. See Watchtower Bible and 27 Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v. Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (striking a law requiring religious canvassers to obtain a permit before advocating door-to-door on private property). The ones who would truly bear the burden of Van Hollen’s preferred rule would not be the wealthy corporations or the extraordinarily rich private donors that likely motivated Congress to compel disclosure in the first place. Such individuals would have “little difficulty complying” with these laws, as they can readily hire “legal counsel who specialize in election matters,” who “not only will assure compliance but also will exploit the inevitable loopholes.” Majors, 361 F.3d at 357–58 (Easterbrook, J., dubitante). Instead, such requirements “have their real bite when flushing small groups, political clubs, or solitary speakers into the limelight, or reducing them to silence.” Id. at 358. By affixing a purpose requirement to BCRA’s disclosure provision, the FEC exercised its unique prerogative to safeguard the First Amendment when implementing its congressional directives. See AFL-CIO, 333 F.3d at 170. Its tailoring was an able attempt to balance the competing values that lie at the heart of campaign finance law. We therefore do not find this rationale inadequate.