Opinion ID: 1484666
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Retiree Presumption

Text: [¶ 11] We first examine whether the retiree presumption in 39-A M.R.S. § 223 applies to Damon. Pursuant to section 223, an employee is presumed not to be eligible for workers' compensation benefits when two conditions are met. The employee must (1) terminate[] active employment, and (2) receiv[e] nondisability pension or retirement benefits under either a private or governmental pension or retirement program ... that was paid by or on behalf of an employer from whom weekly benefits under [the Workers' Compensation Act] are sought. 39-A M.R.S. § 223(1). The parties do not dispute that the second condition is satisfied here. The issue is whether Damon terminate[d] active employment. [¶ 12] The hearing officer found that Damon did not terminate active employment. That finding involves a mixed question of fact and law. The factual findingsthat Damon did leave full-time employment with the mill and take retirement benefits but also moved directly to full-time employment at the School Department, and that the full-time employment at the School Department represents Damon's current earning capacityare fully supported on this record, and we do not disturb them. See 39-A M.R.S. § 318. [¶ 13] S.D. Warren contends, however, that the hearing officer erred as a matter of law because the factual finding that Damon ceased employment with S.D. Warren, the company that is responsible for Damon's retirement benefits, necessarily triggers the conclusion that Damon terminated active employment. In essence, S.D. Warren contends that an employee always terminates active employment when the employee retires from a job that the employee was actively performing and from which the employee receives retirement benefits, see Bowie v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 661 A.2d 1128, 1131 (Me.1995), regardless of whether the employee terminates all active employment. We are thus presented with the question that we expressly left open in Pendexter v. Tilcon of Maine, Inc. : whether the retiree presumption of section 223 applies to an employee who retires from one employment and immediately commences new employment. See 1999 ME 34, ¶ 10, 724 A.2d 618, 621. [¶ 14] A plain reading of the statute does not support S.D. Warren's contention. In setting forth the first condition of the presumption, section 223 unambiguously provides a presumption against [a]n employee who terminates active employment, without any qualifying language that ties active employment to a specific employer. See 39-A M.R.S. § 223(1). By contrast, section 223 limits the second condition to pension or retirement benefits that are paid by or on behalf of an employer from whom weekly benefits under this Act are sought. See id. If the Legislature had intended for the presumption to apply in every instance where the employee terminates active employment from the employer from whom workers' compensation benefits are sought, it could have included specific language to that effect. Instead, the Legislature provided that the presumption applies to an employee who terminates active employment. Thus, when deciding whether an employee terminates active employment, the hearing officer is not restricted by law to considering only the employee's actions with regard to the employer from whom workers' compensation benefits are sought. [¶ 15] Here, we accept the hearing officer's factual finding that, upon retirement from S.D. Warren, Damon immediately transitioned to full-time employment as a custodian at his full, post-injury earning capacity, continu[ing] to work steadily without a break in employment. Based on the plain language of section 223, we conclude that the hearing officer did not err as a matter of law in determining that Damon, who prepared for his departure from S.D. Warren by seeking another full-time job at his highest earning capacity, did not terminate active employment for purposes of triggering the retirement presumption.