Opinion ID: 1099739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Improper vouching for witnesses and expressing personal opinions of the guilt of the brothers.

Text: ś 71. The brothers claim that the prosecution improperly vouched for witness at trial and expressed his personal opinions. The standard of review that appellate courts must apply to lawyer misconduct during opening statements or closing arguments is whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument is to create unjust prejudice against the accused so as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created. Sheppard v. State, 777 So.2d 659, 661 (Miss. 2000). ś 72. The brothers cite many examples, all of which were part of the prosecution's closing argument to the jury. It must be remembered that an instruction number 1 was given, which stated that the closing arguments are not evidence and if a statement is made that is not based on evidence, then, the jury should disregard the statement. Most of the examples cited by the brothers dealt with statements prefaced by the prosecution saying I think, I know it, I don't think and comments that reference whether Doc was lying. In Bell v. State, 725 So.2d 836, 861-62 (Miss.1998), this Court held that: It has been held that a prosecutor may not use his personal beliefs and the prestige attendant to his office to bolster his argument or the witnesses or evidence which he deems most damaging to a defendant. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 5, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); Dunaway v. State, 551 So.2d 162, 164 (Miss.1989); Tubb v. State, 217 Miss. 741, 745, 64 So.2d 911 (1953). He is, however, entitled to argue his case drawing all rational inferences which come from the evidence presented in the courtroom. Davis, 684 So.2d at 656 (quoting Shell, 554 So.2d at 900.) Bell's argument is similar to that made by the prosecutor in Chase, where we found statements such as I think that Terry Washington told you the truth about everything she knew. I don't think she tried to hold anything back, and I believe that I have proved to you beyond a reasonable doubt ... that that man... shows absolutely no remorse, to be permissible deductions drawn from the evidence. Chase, 645 So.2d at 855. Such deductions are to be distinguished from personal opinions which are not drawn from the evidence at trial. We cannot say that by introducing these observations with phrases such as I think, or we believe, the State spoils otherwise acceptable argument. See Knox v. State, 502 So.2d 672, 675 (Miss. 1987). This Court has stated that [i]t is not improper for a prosecutor to comment that the defendant was lying when the contention is supported in the record. Hull v. State, 687 So.2d 708, 720 (Miss.1996)(citing Shell v. State, 554 So.2d 887, 899-900 (Miss.1989); Simpson v. State, 497 So.2d 424, 431-32 (Miss.1986)). This Court has also held the following: Shell next contends that the prosecution improperly called him a liar during closing arguments. There are several references by the prosecution in which they characterize Shell as a liar. However, case law in this State runs directly contra to Shell's position. In Simpson v. State, 497 So.2d 424 (Miss.1986), the prosecutor made multiple references to the defendant as a liar. Id. at 431. In upholding the appellant's conviction, this Court held the following: In this case, the comment by the prosecutor was that the defendant was not telling the truth about the events of March 4, 1982. That can hardly be said to be an extraneous issue, since, if the State believed Simpson's story, he would not have been tried. There is no error here. 497 So.2d at 432. Shell v. State, 554 So.2d 887, 899 (Miss.1989)(overruled on other grounds); See Simpson v. State, 497 So.2d 424 (Miss. 1986). In light of the above referenced cases and the fact that attorneys have wide latitude in closing arguments, this issue is without merit.