Opinion ID: 2058306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Advisement of Rights

Text: Fulmer claims that the court erred at the plea hearing in violation of Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-3 (1975), the statute controlling advisement of rights at that time. [3] First, he asserts that the trial court did not inform him of any possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences. Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-3(d) (Burns 1975). This phrase refers only to the sentence which is imposed for the conviction based on the guilty plea. Morlan v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 1084. The life sentence that Fulmer was serving at the time of his conviction of kidnapping did not directly affect the sentence imposed for the kidnapping conviction. [4] Although Fulmer will spend more time in prison than he would have had he not already been in prison, that is a collateral consequence of his conviction of kidnapping and does not warrant advisement of consecutive sentences under the statute. Second, Fulmer alleges that the trial court failed to inform him of the maximum possible sentence and minimum sentence for the offense charged... . Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-3(a) (Burns 1975). At the plea hearing, the judge advised Fulmer that a conviction of armed kidnapping carried a penalty of life imprisonment. This penalty was mandatory and was not expressed as a maximum and minimum in the controlling statute. See Ind. Code § 35-1-55-1 (Burns 1975). The record states: THE COURT: Now, Mr. Fulmer, as I read the statute defining the offense of kidnapping, it carries a potential penalty of imprisonment during your natural life, are you acquainted with the penalty of that charge? DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: And now having your rights in mind and understanding the maximum possible penalty, is it still your desire to plead guilty to the charge? DEFENDANT: Yes. The allegedly omitted advisement of the minimum sentence is the same as the advisement of the maximum sentence. The trial court did not err in omitting an advisement indistinguishable from one already given. Third, Fulmer claims the trial court failed to inform him that the court is not a party to any agreement which may have been made between the prosecutor and the defense and is not bound thereby. Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-3(e) (Burns 1975). The record includes the following exchange: THE COURT: And as I understand it, there is no plea bargaining involved in this plea at all. Is there any agreement that the State has made or that is not apparent here that has not been mentioned in open Court? DEFENDANT: No, there isn't. Where there is no plea agreement the court need not advise the defendant that the court would not have been bound by such an agreement had there been one. The failure of the court to inform the defendant of statutory advisements that have no application to his case cannot affect the voluntariness or intelligence of his plea and does not constitute error. The trial judge complied with the statutory requirements in a manner so as to afford Fulmer his constitutional rights.