Opinion ID: 2329146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: questioning by the trial court

Text: We next address the defendant's claim that his due process right to a fair trial was violated by the trial court's questioning of two witnesses. The defendant contends that by virtue of that questioning, the trial court failed to maintain the appearance of impartiality by acting as an advocate for the state. The defendant failed to object to the trial court's examination of the witnesses and, therefore, seeks to prevail on his claim under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). [14] We conclude that he cannot prevail on that claim because he has failed to establish that the alleged constitutional violation exists. The following additional facts are necessary for a resolution of this claim. As part of the victim's testimony, the trial judge questioned the victim on two separate occasions. First, with respect to the victim's allegation that the defendant had touched her vagina [15] with his penis, the court interjected as follows: The Court: Would you clarify your question? You said, `How many times did this happen?' How many times did what happen? [Assistant State's Attorney]: How many times did [the defendant] bother you? [The Victim]: Three times. [Assistant State's Attorney]: Okay. The Court: ... [W]hen you say [the defendant] bothered you three times, do you mean that he used his tortola to clean your tortola three times? Is that what you mean? [The Victim]: Yes. The Court: All right. Could you pick up that doll with the dress on  No, the other one  and point to what you call your tortola. Where would it be on that doll? (The [victim] pointed.) The Court: Okay. Point  Hold it up, please. (The [victim] pointed.) The Court: She's pointing to the area of the vagina on the doll. Proceed. Okay. Second, after both parties had examined the victim, the trial court engaged in the following colloquy with her in an effort to clarify the specific manner in which the victim testified that the defendant had touched her: The Court: You said that [the defendant] cleaned his tortola with your tortola? Is that what you said? [The Victim]: Yes. The Court: Okay. Could you tell me what you mean by that. [The Victim]: Yes. The Court: Okay. Please tell me. [The Victim]: That mean that's not very good, when hombres do that for the girls. [The Interpreter]: It's not very good when men do that with girls. The Court: Okay. Did part of his body touch your tortola? [The Victim]: Yes. Yes, almost. The Court: Almost? [The Victim]: Yes, almost. But it didn't not. The Court: Tell me where his  Show me on the doll where his tortola touched your tortola. [The Victim]: Right here, inside tortola. (The [victim] demonstrated.) [The Victim]: And now  Now  Then his tortola right here now. (The [victim] demonstrated.) [The Victim]: And then  The Court: Okay. [The Victim]: And now that's him. Now here's his tortola. (The [victim] demonstrated.) The Court: Okay. [The Victim]: Now mine is right here. (The [victim] demonstrated.) The Court: Okay. You're pointing  She's pointing to the vagina. Are you saying that his tortola, which is this part, the penis  (The court demonstrated.) The Court:  are you saying that it touched your tortola, which you pointed to, and  Is that what you're saying? [The Victim]: Yes. The Court: Did it go inside? [The Victim]: Yes. The state's next witness was the victim's mother, who was called as a constancy of accusation witness. After both parties concluded their examination of the witness, the court engaged in the following colloquy with her: The Court: Ma'am, is it your testimony that [the victim] told you about a sexual encounter between herself and [the defendant], is that what you're saying? [The Victim's Mother]: Yes. The Court: And that's apart from the kiss that you mentioned? [The Victim's Mother]: No, no. No, that day that when she told me. I was with my siblings. That was the first time that she told me. And then afterward was when she told me all the rest of it. The Court: Well, I'm trying to understand what you're indicating. Are you saying that [the victim] told you about this kiss that you mentioned? [The Victim's Mother]: Yes. And  The Court: Wait a minute. And are you also saying she told you about some other sexual contact  or some sexual contact? [The Victim's Mother]: No, but not that same time. The Court: I'm not saying when she  when she told you. I'm saying, did she tell you about some sexual contact and that was a separate thing she told you from what she told you about the kiss? [The Victim's Mother]: Yes. Neither party objected to the trial court's questioning of the victim or her mother during the course of direct examination. Additionally, in its instructions to the jury at the close of evidence, the trial court stated: Now, my actions during the trial, in ruling on motions or objections by counsel, or in comments to counsel, or in questions to witnesses, or in setting forth the law in these instructions, are not to be taken by you as any indication of my opinion as to how you should determine the issues of fact. The defendant justly relies upon you to consider carefully all of the evidence, and to find him not guilty if the facts and the law require such a verdict. The defendant rightfully expects fair and just treatment at your hands. (Emphasis added.) Well established principles regarding the responsibilities of the trial judge in conducting a criminal trial guide our resolution of the defendant's claim. Due process requires that a criminal defendant be given a fair trial before an impartial judge and an unprejudiced jury in an atmosphere of judicial calm.... In a criminal trial, the judge is more than a mere moderator of the proceedings. It is [the trial judge's] responsibility to have the trial conducted in a manner which approaches an atmosphere of perfect impartiality which is so much to be desired in a judicial proceeding.... Consistent with his [or her] neutral role, the trial judge is free to question witnesses or otherwise intervene in a case in an effort to clarify testimony and assist the jury in understanding the evidence so long as [the trial judge] does not appear partisan in doing so.... Thus, when it clearly appears to the judge that for one reason or another the case is not being presented intelligibly to the jury, the judge is not required to remain silent. On the contrary, the judge may, by questions to a witness, elicit relevant and important facts. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gonzalez, 272 Conn. 515, 535-36, 864 A.2d 847 (2005). One of the chief roles of the trial judge is to see that there is no misunderstanding of a [witness'] testimony.... A trial judge can do this in a fair and unbiased way ... [and his] attempt to do so should not be a basis of error. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 536, 864 A.2d 847. Whether or not the trial judge shall question a witness is within his sound discretion ... [and][i]ts exercise will not be reviewed unless he has acted unreasonably, or, as it is more often expressed, abused his discretion. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bember, 183 Conn. 394, 401, 439 A.2d 387 (1981). The trial judge can question witnesses both on direct and cross-examination.... [I]t may be necessary to do so to clarify testimony as [the judge] has a duty to comprehend what a witness says ... [and] to see that the witness communicates with the jury in an intelligible manner .... While no precise theorem can be laid down, we have held that it is proper for a trial court to question a witness in endeavoring, without harm to the parties, to bring the facts out more clearly and to ascertain the truth ... and [intervene] where the witness is embarrassed, has a language problem or may not understand a question. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Velasco, 253 Conn. 210, 238, 751 A.2d 800 (2000); State v. Fernandez, 198 Conn. 1, 12-13, 501 A.2d 1195 (1985). Whe[n] the testimony is confusing or not altogether clear the alleged jeopardy to one side caused by the clarification of a [witness'] statement is certainly outweighed by the desirability of factual understanding. The trial judge should strive toward verdicts of fact rather than verdicts of confusion. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gonzalez, supra, 272 Conn. at 536, 864 A.2d 847. With the standards previously set forth as a guide, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by briefly questioning the victim at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we agree with the state that, at times, the victim's testimony was confusing and difficult to follow. [16] Indeed, defense counsel went so far as to acknowledge this reality during closing arguments when counsel observed: I found it difficult to follow much of what [the victim] said. At some points she seemed to say no part of [the defendant's] body ever touched hers, at other points she said he cleaned her private part with his private part after she peed. In particular, the victim's testimony was vague and unclear regarding the details of the alleged sexual abuse. Moreover, the victim's use of the term tortola to describe both her and the defendant's genitals created confusion and required repeated demonstrations using anatomically correct dolls in an attempt to clarify her allegations. Additionally, at the time of trial, the victim was still learning English and required the assistance of a Spanish interpreter. At times, her responses were disjointed and even appeared to answer a different question than the one posed by counsel. Similarly, the trial court also did not abuse its discretion in questioning the victim's mother. The purpose of the mother's testimony was to serve as a constancy of accusation witness in order to verify that the victim initially reported two allegations of sexual abuse at the hands of the defendant. Due at least in part to similar language barriers, the mother's testimony was unclear as to whether the victim only described an incident where the defendant kissed her on the mouth, or whether she also reported a second incident of sexual abuse. The trial court's questioning sought to clarify this discrete issue and was quite brief within the context of the mother's overall testimony, amounting to only five questions in total. See State v. Lopes, 78 Conn.App. 264, 277-78, 826 A.2d 1238 (no abuse of trial court's discretion where court's questioning was not extensive), cert. denied, 266 Conn. 902, 832 A.2d 66 (2003). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's questioning did no more than clarify confusing testimony from the victim and her mother, or, alternatively, facilitate the witnesses' more complete understanding of a question. We find nothing improper in these actions of the trial court. See State v. Robertson, 254 Conn. 739, 772, 760 A.2d 82 (2000) ([a court's] attempts to facilitate a witness' understanding of a question are not improper... [and fulfill] its function of ensuring that the witness answered the state's question [citation omitted]); State v. Mack, 197 Conn. 629, 641, 500 A.2d 1303 (1985) ([a court's] comments or questions for the purpose of clarifying ... testimony are permissible and often necessary). The defendant contends that neither the testimony of the victim nor her mother needed clarification and that the trial court's questions demonstrated partisanship in favor of the state's case. We disagree. As we have recently noted, [u]nlike an appellate court, the trial court is able to observe the testimony of witnesses firsthand and, therefore, is better able to assess the relative clarity  or lack thereof  of any particular testimony. State v. Gonzalez, supra, 272 Conn. at 536, 864 A.2d 847. On the basis of the printed record alone, we cannot say that the testimony of the victim and her mother was so clear and straightforward that the trial court's questioning of [them] was wholly unnecessary or inappropriate. Id. Quite the contrary, the printed record suggests that portions of both the victim's and her mother's testimony were a source of confusion for all of the participants at trial. With respect to the issue of partisanship, the defendant points to the fact that the trial court's questions attempted to confirm and establish the elements of the charged crimes. Additionally, the defendant claims that the trial court's questions prompted responses from the victim and her mother that were largely repetitive regarding the type of sexual activity alleged to have taken place, thus serving to bolster the credibility of the victim. Both of these contentions are without merit. [T]he court's questioning of a witness is not necessarily improper [merely] because it draws attention to the strengths or weaknesses of a party's case. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 537, 864 A.2d 847; State v. Smith, supra, 200 Conn. at 550, 512 A.2d 884. The court must refrain, however, from making improper remarks which are indicative of favor or condemnation, or which disparage a defendant before the jury. State v. Echols, 170 Conn. 11, 14, 364 A.2d 225 (1975). Additionally, we have held that questions and answers that essentially consisted of restatements of a witness' testimony were properly viewed as clarifying in nature, and not an attempt to inappropriately bolster the credibility of the witness. See State v. Gonzalez, supra, 272 Conn. at 537, 864 A.2d 847. In the present case, none of the questions posed by the trial court contained a suggestion of advocacy, disparaged the defendant, or suggested that the trial court considered the witnesses' clarified testimony to be truthful. Specifically, [t]he judge took no position of advocacy regarding the outcome of the case, and made no improper comments on the significance of the evidence presented. At no time did the judge convey to the jury his opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. State v. Gordon, 197 Conn. 413, 425-26, 504 A.2d 1020 (1985). In addition, at the close of evidence the court instructed the jury that it was the sole finder of facts, and that it was not to draw any inferences on the basis of questions that the court may have asked the witnesses. Such curative instructions are entitled to great weight and ordinarily prevent an appellate court from finding that the trial court committed reversible error. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Youdin, 38 Conn.App. 85, 94, 659 A.2d 728 (1995); State v. Fernandez, supra, 198 Conn. at 17, 501 A.2d 1195.