Opinion ID: 2639408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Trial court's failure to request special jury finding on intent to kill

Text: Because the Thompson and Salgado murders were committed during the window period between our decisions in Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131, 197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862 and People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306, in order to find true the robbery-murder specialcircumstance allegations in this case the jury had to find that defendant intended to kill the victims. (See also People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 328-329, 208 Cal.Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669 [pre-Anderson decision holding multiple-murder special circumstance required intent to kill].) Accordingly, the trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.80, setting forth such intent requirement. Defendant asserts this instruction conflicted with the instructions defining the robbery-murder and multiple-murder special, circumstances, CALJIC Nos. 8.81.17 and 8.81.3, and contends the jury's special circumstance findings in his case are fatally flawed in the absence of specific written findings that he possessed the intent to kill. We reject both contentions as a matter of state law: Read together, the instructions adequately informed the jury that it had to find intent to kill for a true finding on either special circumstance allegation ( People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 974, 281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131), and no written findings on the point were required (งง 1150 [generally requiring jury to reach general verdict], 190.4, subd. (a) [containing no requirement of specific written findings of intent on special circumstance allegations]; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 157-158, 51 Cal. Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980 [provided jury is properly instructed, special findings on each fact or element underlying a special circumstance verdict are not required]). Although in an appropriate case the trial court may protect the record by requiring the jury to explain, in special findings, which of several alternate theories was accepted in support of a general verdict ( Arias, supra, at p. 158, 51 Cal. Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980, citing People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 446-447, 285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273), in this case the defense never requested such findings, and defendant cites no authority requiring the trial court sua sponte to direct the jury to make such findings. Because defendant cites no authority dictating a different conclusion under the federal Constitution, We reject his contention that the absence of a special finding on intent to kill violated his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, due process of law, and a reliable special circumstance and penalty determination.

Defendant contends that the admission, during the penalty phase of trial, of assertedly irrelevant and prejudicial gang evidence violated state law and deprived him of his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, a reliable penalty determination and due process of law. During her redirect examination of Deputy Frank Plass, the senior sheriffs deputy assigned to the custody division at the men's central jail, the prosecutor asked him whether he saw any other Kitchen Crips in the courtroom that day, and Plass answered in the affirmative. Over defense counsel's relevancy objection, the trial court allowed the evidence in order to show Plass's familiarity with the gang. Defendant also argues that the trial court's expression of concern that no members of the audience should sit directly behind the jurors contributed to an atmosphere of fear in the courtroom and to the denial of his constitutional rights. Because defendant objected at trial only to the question asked Plass, and to that only on relevancy grounds, he forfeited the constitutional claims he now seeks to raise. ( People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 884, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15.) Even were the claims properly preserved for appeal, we would find they lack merit. As the trial court ruled, the questioning was relevant in response to the defense crossexamination of Plass with respect to his expertise in the field of gangs. Defendant argues that the testimony, coupled with the court's concern over seating arrangements in the courtroom, implicated cases dealing with courtroom security arrangements, in which courts have held some practices to be inherently prejudicial. (E.g., Estelle v. Williams (1976) 425 U.S. 501, 503-504, 512, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 [fair trial right requires that defendant not be forced to wear prison clothing when appearing before a jury]; Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 [requiring disruptive defendant to appear before the jury bound and gagged should be considered only as a last resort, due in part to concomitant reduction in the defendant's ability to communicate with counsel, an important incident of the right of presence]; Kennedy v. Cardwell (6th Cir.1973) 487 F.2d 101, 108 [presence of a security force inside the courtroom may deny a fair trial by creating a prejudicial impression that defendant is dangerous].) We disagree with defendant that the challenged redirect examination of Deputy Plass may be so categorized. The questioning was brief and noninflammatory, and went unmentioned in the parties' respective closing arguments, and thus was not inherently prejudicial. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony. As for the trial court's directive regarding courtroom audience seating, the Attorney General correctly observes that the record contains no indication whether the persons asked to move were gang members or whether the jury likely would have inferred such membership; nor does the record suggest the move would have been interpreted as a security measure. Consequently, on this record defendant fails to establish that an error of constitutional dimension occurred.
Defendant contends the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process of law, a fair trial, a reliable penalty determination and equal protection, as well as applicable state sentencing law (ง 190.3, factors (b), (c)), by permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine certain defense witnesses concerning defendant's juvenile court record and aspects of his custodial history not falling within the statutory aggravating factors. Under well-established law, evidence of a defendant's background, character or conduct that is not probative of any specific sentencing factor is irrelevant to the prosecution's case in aggravation and therefore inadmissible. ( People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 773-774, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) As will appear, assuming for argument's sake the claim is cognizable on this appeal, we conclude it lacks merit. The issue arises in the following context: The defense called Roy W. Roberts II, the executive director of the boys and girls club defendant had attended between the approximate ages of seven and 12, to testify that defendant was an energetic child who enjoyed sports and did not cause problems at the club. On a number of occasions, Roberts testified, defendant had told him he wanted to stay in school, do well and make his mother proud of him. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Roberts if he was aware of defendant's various juvenile adjudications and confinements, including a robbery and a car theft at age 12; an incident, occurring when defendant was still age 12, in which he was found to have thrown rocks at some people; an incident in which defendant was found to have possessed ammunition; a 1982 robbery adjudication; an adjudication for stealing a bike a couple of months after his release from a youth camp; [11] defendant's Youth Authority commitment at age 14 for a robbery he admitted doing; his commission of another robbery only a month after his release from the Youth Authority; his return to custody in September 1985 on a Youth Authority hold; another return to custody in December of that year; and his conviction of selling cocaine at a school campus in Woodland Hills and consequent return to custody until a mere two months before the commission of the capital offenses. During the course of cross-examination, the defense objected: Your Honor, I believe the witness answered that he lost contact [with defendant around age 12], and I will object to reading off every contact that Mr. Carter has had with law enforcement because I think it's improper and I think it gives the jury the wrong impression. [ถ] I think it's intentionally misleading them. The prosecutor responded: [The witness] has essentially been called as a character witness for Mr. Carter and has indicated that he has knowledge of Mr. Carter. [ถ] I think I'm entitled to a very broad cross-examination as to what in fact he knows about Mr. Carter and some of the stuff he has indicated that he had heard about and some of the stuff he has indicated he hasn't heard about. [ถ] The stuff he hasn't heard about I think the jury should be entitled to consider when weighing his opinion and how much weight to give it. I think this is the typical cross-examination of any kind of character witness. The trial court sustained the defense objection only to the extent the prosecutor had referred to a robbery without specifying whether it had led to a sustained petition, a probation violation or some other disposition. The Attorney General argues, preliminarily, that defendant failed to preserve fully, with timely and specific objections at trial, the claim he currently raises and fails here to demonstrate, by citations to relevant authority, how the alleged error implicates the state or federal Constitution. Our review of the record reveals that defense counsel objected to the just-quoted line of cross-examination only on the grounds that the prosecutor was, in effect, misleading the jury by incorrectly referring to convictions instead of juvenile adjudications, by cross-examining the witness as to defendant's record despite the latter's acknowledgment that he had lost contact with defendant by age 12, and by failing to specify the nature of the disposition of one robbery allegation. The defense objection did not cite any of the constitutional grounds to which defendant's briefing now alludes, nor did it assert that this pattern of cross-examination questions and answers constituted nonstatutory aggravation. We therefore conclude that, apart from the contention that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to inquire about the witness's awareness of defendant's juvenile convictions, defendant failed to preserve for appeal the claims he now asserts. Even were the claims cognizable, they would lack merit. Contrary to defendant's current argument, it is apparent that Roberts was indeed called as a character witness and accordingly testified that, as a child, defendant did not cause problems at the boys and girls club and wanted to stay in school and make his mother proud of him. The prosecution thus was entitled to rebut this evidence with other evidence suggesting a more balanced picture of his personality ( People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 791, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113), even if some of it fell outside the scope of section 190.3, factor (b) (evidence of criminal activity involving force or violence) or factor (c) (prior felony convictions) ( In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 209, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 892 P.2d 1287; People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1072-1073, 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 230, 824 P.2d 1277). The prosecutor's cross-examination of Roberts did no more than was proper. [12] Defendant also challenges on the same basis the crossexamination of his mother and other relatives. The direct testimony of defendant's mother (and other relatives) was, as defendant suggests, in part foundational as to his background and upbringing; but it also, in part, conveyed opinions about his character. Defendant also suggests he was denied his constitutional rights by the prosecutor's cross-examination of defendant concerning his disciplinary violations while in pretrial custody, but he failed to preserve the claim by contemporaneous objection below. ( People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 884, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15.) The latter claim also lacks merit, as the particular cross-examination was proper to impeach defendant's direct testimony that, apart from the incident involving Elster and Oropeza, he had no problems in county jail. Contrary to defendant's assertion, therefore, the challenged evidence was not irrelevant, even had defendant not forfeited the claim by his failure to object on this ground at trial. ( Ibid. ) Because the cross-examination of which defendant complains was not improper, his derivative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object (or to move for a Phillips hearing; see People v. Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 72, fn. 25, 222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423) likewise lacks merit.