Opinion ID: 348787
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the board of appeals' dismissal.

Text: 26 We next consider the determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals. It is a three-line per curiam opinion, stating that the decision of the Immigration Judge is affirmed. Matter of Harris, Interim Decision, 2336 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 1974). The appeal is accordingly dismissed.In Harris, after one month of marriage, the alien-wife filed for status of permanent resident, and swore to it on February 16, 1971. The couple separated four days later and were divorced on June 20, 1972. While her application for permanent resident status was pending, she married another United States citizen. The Immigration Judge held he would not grant the adjustment, because it depended upon the existence of a valid marriage which must remain viable at the time the application for permanent residence is being ruled upon. That decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals decided, was supported by Matter of Lew, 11 I&NS Dec. 148 (1965), where applicant's husband had obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce. In Lew, the District Director found the marital relationship was non-existent. The Board in Harris also relied on an unreported case, Matter of Molcilio, and stated that since a non-viable marriage has been held not to support adjustment under § 245 of the Act, the same rule should apply to 214(d) cases. 27 The Board acknowledges that Blair and Hays, supra, are contrary to its position, but argues that those decisions are not controlling because we are not bound by decisions of the Regional Commissioner. 28 Significantly, the majority opinion of the Board ultimately provides two other reasons why status could not be granted under § 245 because the respondent (petitioner) does not have a valid labor certification; and because respondent's second husband has withdrawn his visa petition on her behalf. 29 Two members of the Board dissented in Harris, and filed a well-reasoned opinion stating that the adjustment requested under § 214(a) was mandatory; that the Service's General Counsel had advised the Board: 30 (a) that the Service has always treated the adjudication of an application filed pursuant to § 214(d) as nothing more than a ministerial act which is required by the statute ; 31 (b) that this conclusion is supported by the legislative history of § 214(d) of the Act; 32 (c) that § 214 provides that the Attorney General is to approve the American citizen's petition to permit his fiancee to obtain a visa 33 only after satisfactory evidence is submitted by the petitioner to establish that the parties have a bona fide intention to marry and are legally able and actually willing to conclude a valid marriage in the United States within a period of 90 days after the alien's arrival. 34 It can thus be seen that no Consular officer will or can issue a fiancee visa until he has received the approval of the Attorney General. The Service, acting on behalf of the Attorney General, has the opportunity to determine and pass on the bona fides of the marital intent before a visa is even issued. Once the Service is satisfied as to the good faith of the parties, the visa is issued, and the marriage is subsequently performed within the time limit. It is not only difficult, but also impossible, to conceive how section 214(d) can be interpreted as permitting the Attorney General to deny the alien's application for permanent residence, even though the original bona fide marriage has deteriorated to the point of dissolution; and 35 (d) that 36 the Service is of the opinion that the specific discretionary power contained in section 245 permits the standard of a viable marriage to be applied in cases under that section. We must assume that Congress deliberately left that same power out of section 214(d). Therefore, because of the distinct difference between the wording and intent of section 214(d) and section 245 the Service submits that it is not proper to judge a marriage under either statute by the same standard. 37 In Bark v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 511 F.2d 1200 (1975) (a § 245 case), this court considered what proof was required to establish a sham marriage, which would prevent adjustment of an alien student visitor's status to that of permanent resident. Although different sections (§§ 203(a)(2), 204, 245) of the Act were interpreted therein, we held that it was error, when a denial of permanent resident status was based solely on an Immigration Judge's conclusion, (affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals), that the marriage was a sham, because the parties had separated after marriage. This court stated, id., at 1201-1202, that the key issue was the intent of the parties to establish a life together at the time of their marriage. See in this regard, Johl v. United States, 370 F.2d 174, 176 (9th Cir. 1966). 38 In the case before us, the decision of the District Director never mentioned, and obviously did not focus on, the intent of the parties when they married. The Immigration Judge never mentioned or inquired concerning the intent of the parties, but confined his opinion as to whether the marriage itself was valid, based upon the age of the respective parties, and the short time which elapsed before the wife left the husband after their marriage. 39 In Bark, supra, this court declined to speculate about the conclusions that would have been reached if the Service had confined itself to evidence relevant to the parties' intent at the time of their marriage. Nor will we. At the same time we are of the firm belief that the petitioner herein did not receive a fair hearing, and that due process was denied petitioner, that the record, on the whole, fails to support by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence, the Board's dismissal of the petition. 40 Under the laws that Congress has enacted to control immigration all judgments and decisions should be made, in the first instance, by those to whom (the Congress has) entrusted these responsibilities. It must be emphasized, however, that when governmental institutions fail to make these judgments and decisions in a manner which comports with the Constitution, the federal courts have a duty to remedy the violation. 7 41 We reverse and remand to the INS. 42