Opinion ID: 742598
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Claims of Improper Summation

Text: 187 Defendants claim that they are entitled to a new trial because of improper statements by the government in summation. Defendants tried in the Miller Trial contend that the government improperly bolstered the testimony of cooperating witnesses by implying that the trial judge would have intervened if those witnesses were not telling the truth. Coleman and Raymond Robinson contend that the AUSA in their trial improperly expressed belief in their guilt when he concluded his rebuttal summation with the statement, And those two fish right there got caught and they're guilty on all counts (Coleman Trial Tr. at 713). We find no basis for reversal. 188 It is a given that a prosecutor may not personally vouch for the truth of the government's evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (2d Cir.1981) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989, 102 S.Ct. 2269, 73 L.Ed.2d 1284 (1982). We have also held it clearly improper for the government to state that  '[the trial judge] knows [the cooperating witness] is telling the truth,'  United States v. Melendez, 57 F.3d 238, 240 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting prosecutor), although we have indicated that it is not impermissible for the government to state that some time in the future the Judge will have to consider the witness's credibility because sentencing [of the witness] would depend on [the trial judge]'s view of his credibility, id. at 241. In analyzing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we assess the severity of the misconduct, the curative measures taken by the court, and the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct. United States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430, 437 (2d Cir.1994). Only prosecutorial conduct so severe and significant as to result in the denial of ... a fair trial will lead to reversal. United States v. Orena, 32 F.3d 704, 717 (2d Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, we are reluctant to reverse where the transgression was isolated. United States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 98 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 872, 111 S.Ct. 196, 112 L.Ed.2d 158 (1990). An acquittal by the jury on some counts may be evidence that the trial was not unfair. See United States v. Myerson, 18 F.3d 153, 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 855, 115 S.Ct. 159, 130 L.Ed.2d 97 (1994). 189 At the Miller Trial in the present case, the AUSA, unlike the prosecutor in Melendez, did not tell the jury that the trial judge knew the cooperating witnesses were telling the truth; rather she stated that the witnesses would be sentenced by the judge, who might be lenient if the judge believed their testimony. For example, the AUSA stated that Julio Hernandez's sentence is up to Judge Dearie, who sat here just as you did and watched him testify for days on end. If Julio Hernandez gets one day less than 20 years, it will be because Judge Dearie has determined at the appropriate time that is an appropriate sentence. (Miller Trial Tr. at 5270-71; see also id. at 5275 (similar statement with respect to Ina McGriff).) There apparently was no objection to these statements in the district court, and we do not see that there was error, much less plain error. 190 The AUSA's statement at the Coleman Trial that the two defendants tried there were guilty on all counts came after extensive discussion of the evidence against Coleman and Raymond Robinson and of the defense theory of the case. That discussion included the AUSA's urging the jury to decide this case based on the evidence in this case, based upon these tapes, based upon the testimony, based upon the video, based upon the photographs (Coleman Trial Tr. at 695). We doubt that the statement that Coleman and Raymond Robinson were guilty on all counts would have been viewed by the jury as more than an exhortation to find them guilty based on the evidence. 191 In any event, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, and given the jury's acquittal of all defendants except David Robinson on one or more counts, we are convinced that the challenged summation statements had no impact whatever on the jury.