Opinion ID: 407570
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Vagueness and ambiguity in section .105(a)

Text: 34 Willson next claims that it lacked proper notice of the requirements imposed by the standards. This challenge is premised upon the inconsistent, confusing interpretation attempted to be thrust upon (steel erectors) under (section) .105(a) by the enforcement authorities in the District of Columbia. Brief for Petitioner at 30. Willson's argument in this regard is limited to the portion of the citation that alleged a violation for failure to maintain perimeter netting. 35 The Secretary argues that Willson is required under section .105(a) to provide continuous fall protection by means of a combination of the fall protection methods listed therein. The Secretary thus contends that a structural steel employer is required to maintain perimeter safety nets if safety belts cannot provide fall protection at all times. In order for the Secretary's interpretation to prevail, we must find that the inability to use belts at all times renders them impractical. See 29 C.F.R. § 1926.105(a), supra note 4. 36 The Secretary's interpretation is entirely consistent with the well-settled principle that the Act is to be construed liberally to effectuate its purpose of assur(ing) so far as possible ... safe ... working conditions .... 29 U.S.C. § 651(b). See Bristol Steel, 601 F.2d at 721; Southern Railway Co. v. OSHRC, 539 F.2d 335, 338 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999, 97 S.Ct. 525, 50 L.Ed.2d 609 (1976). Unfortunately, this interpretation is not consistent with section .105(a) itself which suggests that if safety belts are practical then safety nets are not required. 37 Section .105(a) has been the subject of conflicting interpretations since its promulgation. 25 In an early case, the Fifth Circuit upheld the Commission's view that section .105(a) does not require safety nets if one of the devices listed therein is used, even if the device is not effective in preventing falls. See Brennan v. OSHRC & J. W. Bounds, 488 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). In another case, however, the same court rejected the Commission's construction that if any of the devices listed in the section was practical, even if not utilized, then no safety nets were required. See Brennan v. Southern Contractors Service, 492 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1974). 38 In Brennan v. OSHRC & Ron M. Fiegen, Inc., 513 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1975), some employees were working sixty-five feet above the ground on an unguarded roof, and others worked at the same level on scaffolds. The Secretary there urged that because the roof, which was considered a temporary floor, and the scaffolds did not serve the function of preventing falls, the employer was not relieved of its duty under section .105(a) to install safety nets. The Commission reversed the citation and the Eighth Circuit upheld the Commission, reasoning that (the) regulation, as presently formulated, does not necessarily make illegal a failure to use safety nets where employees are working on a scaffold or temporary floor, regardless of the safety features of such a floor or scaffold. Id. at 715. Thus the Commission has interpreted section .105(a) to mean that nets are not required if one of the devices listed therein is used, even if the device does not in fact provide fall protection. More relevant for our purposes is another case involving section .105(a) wherein the Fifth Circuit upheld a safety net citation upon a finding that the alternative safety devices, the safety belts and lanyards, were not and could not be used during a substantial portion of the work day. Marshall v. Southwestern Industrial Contractors and Riggers, Inc., 576 F.2d 42, 44 (5th Cir. 1978). 39 As in the cases cited above, our concern is with the term impractical. Although urged many times to clarify the meaning of this term, the Secretary has neither sought amendment of section .105(a) nor issued any clarifying order. We agree with the Southwestern Industrial court that, given the interpretation of the word impractical to mean both not practical and not actually used, the Secretary's position is a reasonable one, at least as a general proposition. Thus we believe that there is a point at which the amount of time during a work day that safety belts cannot be used renders them impractical as a means of fall protection. 40 The word impractical as used in section .105(a) is ambiguous. We do not believe that it is reasonable to interpret the standard to mean that the inability to use belts at all times, even if the period of non-use is short, renders them impractical. This interpretation of the word impractical is so far from its ordinary meaning that we find it does not provide adequate notice to employers of their duties under the Act. When the interpretation derives little support from the language of the regulation, it would be fundamentally unfair to impose upon an employer civil penalties for its violation. Fiegen, 513 F.2d at 716. 41 In promulgating section .105(a), the Secretary may have intended to mandate that when safety belts cannot provide fall protection at all times, perimeter nets are also required. This is not, however, what the regulation says. It is well settled that regulations cannot be construed to mean what an agency intended but did not adequately express. Kent Nowlin, 593 F.2d 368 at 371. See Diamond Roofing v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 645, 649 (5th Cir. 1976). 42 We find, however, that interpreting the standard to mean that the inability to use safety belts during a significant period of the work day renders them impractical within the meaning of section .105(a) is reasonable. In Southwestern Industrial the safety net violation was upheld only upon a finding that the belts could not be used during a substantial portion of the work day or during a significant portion of (the employees') work activities. 576 F.2d at 44-45 n.2. There was evidence in that case that the employees used belts approximately fifty percent of the time. Id. at 43 n.1. By contrast, in the present case the Secretary produced no evidence that demonstrated Willson's employees did not use safety belts during a substantial portion of the work day. As noted above, the inspection only lasted one hour, and the compliance officer stated that she observed the employee on the ninth level for only ten minutes. 26 This is not a case where the evidence establishes that the nature of the work precluded the use of safety belts most or even some of the time. In fact, on the initial visit, the compliance officers apparently accepted Willson's assurances that its employees could be tied off at all times because the work on this particular steel structure progressed from the inside out; thus there was always an adequate stationary object to which the employees could tie off. 27 Accordingly, while there may be some point at which safety belts become impractical within the meaning of section .105(a), the Secretary has not established that, under the circumstances of this case, that point was reached. 43 In addition, we note that the record shows some disagreement on this issue between the compliance officers who conducted the inspection of Willson's worksite. It is uncontested that during the initial visit in February the OSHA officers informed James Willson that if either safety belts or safety nets were utilized he would be in compliance with the Act. 28 At the hearing, however, one of the officers testified that both nets and safety belts were required. 29 This apparent conflict is presumably premised on the compliance officer's belief that it is not possible for structural steel employees to tie off at all times. Willson should not be penalized for deviation from a standard the interpretation of which, in relationship with kindred standards, cannot be agreed upon by those who are responsible for compelling compliance with it and with oversight of the procedures for its enforcement. Kent Nowlin Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 593 F.2d 368, 371 (10th Cir. 1979). 44 Of course the Commission is not bound by the representations or interpretations of OSHA compliance officers. Western Steel Manufacturing Co., OSHRC No. 3528, 4 OSHC (BNA) 1640 (1976). Such representations, however, are relevant in a particular case to whether an employer has adequate notice of what is required under the Act. These considerations are particularly relevant where, as in the present case, the regulations involved teeter precariously on the edge of the wall that divides adequate notice from impermissible vagueness. 45 Although we believe that the Secretary's interpretation of section .105(a) to provide the most comprehensive continuous fall protection possible is admirable, we do not believe that the standard supports the Secretary's interpretation. The Act clearly contemplates specific standards that are to be expressed in terms of objective criteria and the performance desired. S.Rep.No.1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 5177, 5184. Section .105(a) does not adequately express to employers the performance that the Secretary apparently desires, i.e., nets and belts; nor does it contain sufficiently objective criteria, i.e., when nets are required in addition to belts, to guide employers' conduct. 46 If safety belts cannot be safely utilized at all times and the Secretary feels nets are required in addition to belts, the proper course is to promulgate standards setting forth those requirements. Indeed, if the peculiarities of fall protection in structural steel erection separate it from other segments of the construction industry, then the specific standards in Subpart R should address those peculiarities. Alternately, the Secretary should issue a program directive or interpretative rule to clarify a structural steel employer's duties. See Skyline Crane Service, Inc., OSHRC No. 80-1622 (1981). 47 Accordingly, we will reiterate what other courts have said: 48 If the Secretary desires by (section .105(a) ) to achieve certain goals which he deems consistent with the purpose of (the Act) but which the wording of the regulation, as interpreted by the Commission, will not justify, he should amend or clarify it. 49 Fiegen, 513 F.2d at 716. 50 We remind the Secretary once again ... that (the) worthy purposes (of the Act) are in danger of slipping through even the most protective judicial safety net when embodied in imprecisely worded regulations. 51 Southwestern Industrial, 576 F.2d at 45. 52 The final order of the Commission on the willful violation is reversed.