Opinion ID: 780514
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Freddie Mac's Post-Argument Representations

Text: 57 At oral argument, counsel for both parties essentially conceded that they could not distinguish our recent decision in Verzilli, nor could they identify reasons supporting the district court's Rule 54(b) certification. Presumably, seeing the writing on the wall, counsel for Freddie Mac requested in open court, after oral argument had ended, that we not issue any order concerning our jurisdiction for three days so that he could consult with his clients. We granted his request. 58 On the third day after we had heard oral argument, counsel for Freddie Mac sent the Court a letter in which it dismissed Counts Two and Three with prejudice. This letter stated, in relevant part, [W]e write on behalf of ... [Freddie Mac] to advise this court that my clients are dismissing Counts II and III of the Complaint ` with prejudice ' in order to remove the jurisdictional impediments raised by the panel during the oral argument. Letter from Hanson to Court of 12/13/2002, at 1 (emphasis in original). An order to this effect was entered by the district court on December 23, 2002. 59 In light of the district court's after-the-fact order dismissing Counts Two and Three with prejudice, we acknowledged that the previously non-final Consent Judgment now constitutes a final, appealable order. See, e.g., Erie County, 220 F.3d at 201-02 (holding that, notwithstanding the plaintiff-appellants' dismissal before the district court without prejudice of one of the federal claims involved in the case, court would exercise appellate jurisdiction where plaintiffs-appellants represented on appeal that they withdraw finally and with prejudice the relevant claim). 9