Opinion ID: 2072798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiff's petition alleged defendants were negligent in violating two provisions of both the federal and state safety standards statutes (OSHA and IOSHA).

Text: Subparagraph 4c asserted defendants were negligent [i]n violating section 88.4 of the Code of Iowa and 29 USC, § 654(a)(1)(2). Subparagraph 4d asserted defendants were negligent [i]n violating federal occupational safety and health standards, § 1518.601(b)(4)(i)(ii) 36 Fed.Reg. 7386 (April 17, 1971) and Iowa departmental rules, bureau of labor 10.1(88). Evidence of these standards was excluded during trial. At the close of evidence the trial court sustained defendant's motion to strike the claimed violation of the standards as specifications of negligence. In his second assignment plaintiff contends violations of the standards are negligence per se, or, in the alternative, evidence of negligence. The trial court did not explain the basis for the rulings so we have no way of knowing their basis. The trial court may have believed OSHA and IOSHA standards did not bear on the question of defendant's negligence. The trial court may have believed no foundation was laid for their introduction. Of course if either view supports the trial court the assignment is without merit. We believe the standards were material and relevant on the question of defendant's negligence but the evidence was properly excluded and the specifications were properly stricken because there was no competent evidence of their violation. The OSHA standards articulated in both federal and state provisions are identical. They provide: No employer shall use any motor vehicle equipment having an obstructed view to the rear unless: (i) the vehicle has a reverse signal alarm audible above the surrounding noise level or: (ii) the vehicle is backed up only when an observer signals that it is safe to do so. These standards formed the basis for the specification of negligence alleged in paragraph 4d of plaintiff's petition. We proceed then to consider whether violation of the standards was evidence of defendants' negligence. Violation of the OSHA standard would not directly give rise to a cause of action for plaintiff because decedent was not an employee of Manatt's Transportation Co., the alleged tort feasor. [1] Jeter v. St. Regis Paper Co., 507 F.2d 973 (5 Cir. 1975); Russell v. Bartley, 494 F.2d 334 (6 Cir. 1974); Skidmore v. Travelers Insurance Company, 356 F.Supp. 670 (E.D.La.1973); Hare v. Federal Compress and Warehouse Co., 359 F.Supp. 214 (N.D.Miss.1973). IOSHA should be interpreted similarly to OSHA under the principle federal interpretations are persuasive when a state statute is patterned after a federal statute. See Saxton v. State, 206 N.W.2d 85, 86 (Iowa 1973) and authorities. We have never been called upon to consider the effect on nonemployees of OSHA or IOSHA violations. But general principles have long been settled:    [I]f a statute lays down a rule or regulation of conduct specifically designed for the safety and protection of persons or property, injuries proximately resulting from its violation to one who, under the circumstances of the case, is within its purview, and free from contributory negligence, would be actionable, as for negligence per se. Such a violation of a positive statutory enactment need not involve the element of willfulness. It is of itself negligence. (Authorities). Cases of another class are illustrated by those holding that the violation of statutory or municipal regulations constituting `the law of the road' is prima facie, but not conclusively negligence. (Authorities). Generally speaking, the harm for which the action is brought must be of the kind which the statute was intended to prevent; and the person injured, in order to recover, must be within the class which it was intended to protect. (Authorities). But even though the injury complained of is not within the purview of the statute, the disregard of statutory duty may be a material fact, and evidence of negligence. (Authorities). A general statutory duty is ordinarily for the benefit of all persons who are likely to be exposed to injury from its non-observance. (Authorities). Hansen v. Kemmish, 201 Iowa 1008, 1011-1012, 208 N.W. 277, 279 (1926). We quoted Hansen with approval in Peters v. Lyons, 168 N.W.2d 759, 766 (Iowa 1969). We said: This is not the situation considered in Lattner v. Immaculate Conception Church, 255 Iowa 120, 129, 121 N.W.2d 639. There defendant urged the violation of a statute does not amount to negligence unless the plaintiff was a member of the class the statute is designed to protect and the harm is one the statute is designed to prevent. We recognized the rule has much support but declined to follow it, primarily on the authority of Hansen v. Kemmish, 201 Iowa 1008, 1012, 208 N.W. 277, 279; 45 A.L.R. 498, where the Iowa rule is stated: `A general statutory duty is ordinarily for the benefit of all persons who are likely to be exposed to injury from its nonobservance.' As between an injured party and the violator of a statute or ordinance, we adhere to those precedents.   . Although we recognize our holdings on this question are not shared in all states they are not without support. See Prosser, Law of Torts, Fourth Ed., § 36, pp. 200-202; The Restatement of Torts Second, § 288B, Comment d. Under these general principles we hold violation by an employer of an OSHA or IOSHA standard is negligence per se as to his employee. Such a violation is evidence of negligence as to all persons who are likely to be exposed to injury as a result of the violation. Plaintiff's decedent, though not an employee, was exposed to injury from the alleged violation in the instant case. Hence a violation of OSHA and IOSHA standards was evidence of negligence on the part of Manatt's Transportation Co. Assuming a proper foundation had been laid the trial court should have received the evidence and instructed the jury accordingly. Defendant next argues there was no competent evidence the standards were violated and hence there was no foundation for admission of the testimony. We agree. It will be noted the specific standards are alternative. They can be satisfied by either of two means: (1) providing a reverse signal alarm audible above surrounding noise level; or (2) providing an observer to signal the driver it is safe to back up. The parties agree no observer was provided. Defendant complied with the standard, if at all, by providing a reverse signal alarm. Defendant insists that every witness called at trial by either side testified there were back-up bells on the truck which were audible above the surrounding noise level. Plaintiff on the other hand points to the testimony of one witness, Robert Lawrie, as showing a violation of the signal alarm requirement. Lawrie's testimony on the subject was as follows: Q. Do you recall immediately prior to Dave Koll's death hearing a bell on Mike Manatt's truck? A. No. Q. What experience, if any, did you have with back-up bells on the construction site? A. There were back-up bells on the construction site. Q. When would you hear these? A. Constantly. There wereevery vehicle to my knowledge had back-up bells on them and they were a constant clatter.    Q. How would you describe the noise level? Was it low, high, average? A. It was probably medium level, constant noise level. Q. With that noise level were you able to discern one backing truck from another backing truck, the back-up bells I'm referring to   ? A. Yes. Due to relative intensity of the ringing sound. You could tell how close you were to a certain vehicle because of the volume of the bell. Lawrie's statement he did not recall hearing a bell on Michael Manatt's truck immediately prior to the accident is the only evidence upon which plaintiff can rely to show a violation. Courts have long wrestled with questions relating to the relative merits of positive and negative testimony. See II Wigmore on Evidence, Third Ed., § 664, pp. 777-782; 30 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 1092, pp. 252-254. We considered the problem in many early cases including Lockridge v. Railway Company, 161 Iowa 74, 84-85, 140 N.W. 834, 837-838 (1913). In order for negative evidence to qualify as sufficient it must be shown the witness was so situated that in the ordinary course of events he would have heard or seen the fact had it occurred. Lawrie's statement lacks this necessary foundation. Indeed it is highly doubtful Lawrie's statement even amounts to negative testimony at all. He did not testify the bell was not sounded nor that it was inaudible. He did not even testify directly he did not hear the bell. He merely testified he did not recall having heard the bell immediately prior to the accident. Most of all there is nothing to indicate the absence of recollection on the part of Lawrie would in any way indicate the bell was not sounded or was not audible. Under these circumstances we hold evidence of OSHA and IOSHA standards was properly excluded not because they would not constitute evidence of negligence, but because no foundation was laid for their admission. Plaintiff alternatively argues the trial court erred in striking specifications of OSHA and IOSHA standards relating to the general duty clause. Any evidence showing a violation of these standards related to the specific standards on backing a truck. Under both OSHA and IOSHA standards, where a specific section applies, the general duty clause ordinarily is inapplicable. American Smelting & R. Co. v. Occupational S. & H. R. Com'n, 501 F.2d 504, 512 (8 Cir. 1974). Manatt's Transportation Co. could not be deemed to violate the general duty clause by reason of violation of specific standards. Plaintiff's second assignment is without merit. III. Plaintiff separately complains of a denial of his application to amend his pleadings to conform with proof. This assignment need not be considered because it relates to a matter not likely to recur upon remand. REVERSED AND REMANDED.