Opinion ID: 2435986
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Heading: Right to a Jury Trial for Contribution Claim

Text: Mrs. Ehney claims that the trial court erred in hearing this case in equity without a jury. She argues that contribution is a legal claim for a money judgment as to which she has a constitutional right to a jury trial. A careful analysis of the development of the law on this issue indicates that Mrs. Ehney is incorrect. Normally when distinguishing between legal and equitable actions one looks to the remedy requested. A money judgment is a legal remedy whereas some other type of court order is equitable. This distinction is not always controlling. 47 Am. Jur.2d Jury § 34 (1995). This Court has recognized that courts sitting in equity may grant money judgments. Craig v. Jo B. Gardner, Inc., 586 S.W.2d 316, 325 (Mo.banc 1979); State ex rel. Willman v. Sloan, 574 S.W.2d 421, 422 (Mo.banc 1978). We must look to the essential nature of the action, not merely the remedy sought, to determine if contribution is equitable or legal. 47 Am. Jur.2d Jury § 34 (1995). Contribution between co-debtors originated as an equitable action in Missouri. The doctrine of contribution is not founded on contract, but is based on the principle that equality of burden as to a common right is equity, and that wherever there is a common right the burden is also common. Missouri District Telegraph Co. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 338 Mo. 692, 93 S.W.2d 19, 23 (1935). The doctrine of contribution finds its basis in general principles of equity and of natural justice rather than contract. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 457 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Mo.App. 1970). The ultimate money judgment is awarded only after the court has determined that it is equitable to share the burden of the debt when no actual contract existed between the co-debtors. Missouri courts have also developed a legal claim for contribution between co-obligors. Dysart v. Crow, 170 Mo. 275, 70 S.W. 689, 690 (1902); Jeffries v. Ferguson, 87 Mo. 244, 245 (Mo.1885); Van Petten v. Richardson, 68 Mo. 379, 380 (Mo.1878); Hoerrman v. Latham, 71 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Mo.App.1934); Hanna v. Hyatt, 67 Mo.App. 308, 313 (1896); Wilkerson v. Sampson, 56 Mo.App. 276, 280 (1893). This new action has arisen both in common law under the theory of implied contract and by the creation of a statutory right to contribution. [1] Dysart, 70 S.W. at 690 (statute); Van Petten, 68 Mo. at 380 (implied contract). Generally, equity will not intercede if there is an adequate remedy at law. Harris v. State Bank and Trust Co. of Wellston, 484 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Mo.1972); Umphres v. J.R. Mayer Enterprises, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Mo.App.1994). An exception to this theory, however, exists for claims which originated in equity prior to the recognition of a legal claim. For such claims concurrent jurisdiction in both equity and law exists. As explained in 1 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 182 (1941): Whenever equity originally acquired jurisdiction over any particular subject-matter, right, or interest, because the law either did not recognize the existence of the right or interest, or could not furnish an adequate remedy for its protection, and the scope of the common law has since become enlarged, so that it now not only admits the particular primary right or interest to be legal, but also furnishes a legal remedy by its actions, which may even be adequate under ordinary circumstances, still the equitable jurisdiction is not in general thereby destroyed or lessened, although it is made to be concurrent, and although the special reasons for its continued exercise namely, the inadequacy of the legal remedymay no longer exist. This exception has been recognized generally. The cases over which the courts have concurrent authority are exceptions to the rule which precludes the equity court from hearing a cause where the law affords a remedy. 27 Am.Jur.2d Equity § 88 (1966). It has also been recognized in Missouri. [W]hen concurrent jurisdiction exists, i.e. law and equity, equitable principles can be invoked despite the existence of an adequate remedy at law. Estate of Cantonia v. Sindel, 684 S.W.2d 592, 595 (Mo.App.1985). Thus, the subsequent creation of a legal claim for contribution in Missouri by common law and statute did not extinguish the equitable action, but simply created concurrent jurisdiction in both law and equity for contribution claims. 18 Am.Jur.2d Contribution § 84 (1985); 72 C.J.S. Principal and Surety § 280 (1987). Missouri courts, as well as others, have recognized that contribution between co-debtors may be brought as either an equitable or a legal action. Dysart, 70 S.W. at 690; Hoerrman, 71 S.W.2d at 72; Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Corp., 306 Pa.Super. 88, 452 A.2d 16, 18 (1982); Cooper v. Greenberg, 191 Va. 495, 61 S.E.2d 875, 878 (1950). Contribution may still be brought in equity. Tindall v. Holder, 892 S.W.2d 314, 324 (Mo.App.1994); Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., 646 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Mo.App.1982) (Contribution is an equitable duty rather than contractual and is enforceable where one party is required to pay more than his share of common liability ...); Citizens State Bank v. Bossard, 733 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Mont.1987). For the proposition that contribution is now solely a legal claim, Mrs. Ehney relies on Equity Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 238 Mo.App. 4, 175 S.W.2d 153, 158 (1943), which states that [i]n modern jurisprudence contribution is a law action. However, the sole case on which Equity Mutual relies does not state that contribution is exclusively a law action. Missouri District, 93 S.W.2d at 22. In fact, that case implies that an action in contribution, particularly one not based on statute, could be brought in law or equity. Id. To the extent that Equity Mutual implies an action for contribution may only be brought in law, it should not be followed. It should also be noted that Equity Mutual and Missouri District were personal injury tort cases. Equity Mutual, 175 S.W.2d at 154-55; Missouri District, 93 S.W.2d at 21. Historically, Missouri enforced contribution between co-debtors, but not between joint tort-feasors, assuming that by relieving a person committing a tortious act from full responsibility courts would encourage these acts. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466, 469, 473 (Mo.banc 1978); 18 Am.Jur.2d Contribution § 40 (1985). The right to contribution among joint tort-feasors was created by statute. Whitehead & Kales, 566 S.W.2d at 473; § 537.060, RSMo 1994. At the time Equity Mutual and Missouri District were decided, joint tort-feasors only had a legal, statutory remedy and equitable contribution did not exist outside the scope of the statute. [2] State ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, 213 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Mo.banc 1948), overruled by Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo.banc 1978); State ex rel. McCubbin v. McMillian, 349 S.W.2d 453, 458 (Mo.App. 1961). Although contribution among joint tort-feasors is based upon the same basic concern for fairness as supports equitable claims among co-debtors, it was a right created and considered to be grounded in law. State ex rel. General Electric Co. v. Gaertner, 666 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Mo.banc 1984) (questioning applicability of laches). On the other hand, contribution between joint debtors originated in equity. Any subsequent legal remedy created by statute or devised by courts under the legal theory of an implied contract is additional to the original equitable remedy and does not preclude it. In Comstock v. Keating, 115 Mo.App. 372, 91 S.W. 416 (1905), a co-suretor argued that the right to contribution was purely statutory and therefore no equitable action existed. The court disagreed, stating If the right of contribution existed solely by virtue of statutory provisions, the position of the appellants would be better. But it is a right which courts of equity originally enforced.... Id. 91 S.W. at 418. In short, the statement in Equity Mutual simply does not apply to claims between co-guarantors where concurrent equitable jurisdiction exists.
Mrs. Ehney claims she has a constitutional right to a jury trial. [3] Citizens of Missouri are entitled to a jury trial in all actions to which they would have been entitled to a jury when the Missouri Constitution was adopted. Mo. Const. art. I, § 22(a); Vannoy v. Swift & Co., 356 Mo. 218, 201 S.W.2d 350, 354 (1947); State ex rel. Tolbert v. Sweeney, 828 S.W.2d 929, 933 (Mo.App. 1992). This cutoff for the right to a jury trial is based on explicit language in the constitution. The right of a trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate ... Mo. Const. art. I, § 22(a) (emphasis added). Particularly, the phrase as heretofore enjoyed has been interpreted to mean that the constitution protects the right as it existed when the constitution was adopted and does not provide a jury trial for proceedings subsequently created. State v. Hadley, 815 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo.banc 1991); DeMay v. Liberty Foundry Co., 327 Mo. 495, 37 S.W.2d 640, 648 (1931); Sweeney, 828 S.W.2d at 933; State ex rel. Missouri Com'n on Human Rights v. Lasky, 622 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Mo. App.1981). The heretofore language was first adopted in the 1875 constitution. Mo. Const. art. II, § 28 (1875); Gentry, by Gentry v. Douglas, 744 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Mo.banc 1988). Nevertheless, the court in Lasky indicated that the protection only applied to procedures ... in existence prior to the adoption of the 1945 Constitution. Lasky, 622 S.W.2d at 763; see also Sweeney, 828 S.W.2d at 933. However, this Court has stated multiple times that the right applied to actions that existed at common law before the adoption of the first constitution, in 1820. Goodrum v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 824 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Mo.banc 1992) ( quoting Miller v. Russell, 593 S.W.2d 598, 605 (Mo.App. 1979)); Adams v. Children's Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 907 (Mo.banc 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 991, 113 S.Ct. 511, 121 L.Ed.2d 446 (1992). As to this issue, the decisions of this Court, not Lasky or Sweeney control. There was no absolute right to a jury trial for an equitable claim for contribution between co-debtors before the adoption of our constitution in 1820 or at any time thereafter. Mrs. Ehney had no right pursuant to the Missouri Constitution to a trial by jury for this equitable action. [4]