Opinion ID: 902003
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Application of SDCL 43-46-2

Text: [¶ 12.] SDCL 43-46-2 provides: Unless a settlement is made with the surviving joint owner or owners, a creditor or personal representative of the deceased joint owner may institute an action in any court of competent jurisdiction, within six months after the death of the deceased joint owner, against the surviving joint owner, or owners, setting forth such claim. The Home argues this statute, as interpreted by the circuit court, would permit it to file an action against a surviving spouse in the future, regardless of whether the spouse received probate property of the member. The Home contends this would create a conflict in the procedure to be followed between SDCL 43-46-2, which requires filing a claim within six months after the death of the deceased joint owner, and SDCL 33-18-16, which requires deferring any claims against the decedent until after the death of the decedent's spouse. This argument, however, creates a false dichotomy. [¶ 13.] SDCL 33-18-16 provides the procedure for filing a claim if the decedent member of the Home dies with an estate. Alternatively, SDCL 43-46-2 provides the procedure for making a claim against a joint property owner. Therefore, if the deceased member has an estate, SDCL 33-18-16 would apply. However, if a decedent's jointly owned property was not part of his estate subject to probate, SDCL ch. 43-46 would apply. [¶ 14.] These two statutes can be read and interpreted harmoniously. Moss, 2008 SD 64, ¶ 38, 754 N.W.2d at 638 (citing Lewis & Clark Rural Water Sys. v. Seeba, 2006 SD 7, ¶ 64, 709 N.W.2d 824, 841). In Moss, we stated, [w]here statutes appear to conflict, it is our responsibility to give reasonable construction to both, and if possible, to give effect to all provisions under consideration, construing them together to make them harmonious and workable. Id. (citations and quotations omitted). The Home missed its opportunity to file a claim within six months as required by SDCL 43-46-2 because it chose to follow the procedure outlined by SDCL ch. 33-18. Had the Home timely filed a claim under SDCL 43-46-2 against Mildred, it would not have been barred. Under a reasonable construction, these two statutes can be read and applied without conflict. Therefore, the circuit court was correct in concluding that the Home's remedy in this case was found in SDCL 43-46-2. [¶ 15.] Affirmed. [¶ 16.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP, ZINTER and SEVERSON, Justices, concur.