Opinion ID: 2298009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Question Eight: Motion for a New Trial

Text: To support his motion for a new trial, Grandison makes the same three arguments before this Court that he raised at the Circuit Court: 1. The State used perjured testimony of Cheryl Piechowicz and James Savage, 2. The State knowingly suppressed exculpatory evidence that showed Etta Horne, Charlene Sparrow, and Helen Kondilidis committed perjury, and 3. The mental [disorder] of Helen Kondilidis at the time of the 1984 trial [was undisclosed]. The Circuit Court denied his motion on all three grounds. The Circuit Court also denied Grandison's claim that he is entitled to a new trial because his capital sentencing procedure should have been bifurcated. Maryland Rule 4-331 governs motions for new trial. A Circuit Court may grant a new trial at any time in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity. Maryland Rule 4-331(b). Additionally, the rule provides: The court may grant a new trial or other appropriate relief on the ground of newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence [within ten days of the verdict] ... on motion filed at any time if a sentence of death was imposed and the newly discovered evidence, if proved, would show that the defendant is innocent of the capital crime of which the defendant was convicted or of an aggravating circumstance or other condition of eligibility for the death penalty actually found by the court or jury in imposing the death sentence[.] Maryland Rule 4-331(c). In examining a circuit court's denial of a motion for a new trial, this Court has generally used the abuse of discretion standard. See Merritt v. State, 367 Md. 17, 28-29, 785 A.2d 756, 763-64 (2001). When an alleged error was committed during a trial, and the losing party, without fault, does not discover the alleged error during the trial, but instead raises the issue in a motion for new trial, we have used a standard of whether the denial of such motion was erroneous. Id. at 30-31, 785 A.2d at 764. Under either standard, Grandison's argument before this Court fails. Regarding the testimony of Piechowicz and Savage, Grandison does not specifically identify what newly discovered evidence would entitle him to a new trial. He does not demonstrate how such evidence could demonstrate his innocence for the crime for which he had been convicted, as required by Rule 4-331(c). He also does not argue that the Circuit Court's ruling was an abuse of discretion or erroneous. Furthermore, Grandison already raised such claims in Grandison II and Grandison III, and they were rejected. See Grandison II, 305 Md. at 736-39, 506 A.2d at 606-07 (reviewing the claim with respect to Savage); Grandison III, 341 Md. at 205-10, 670 A.2d at 412-15 (reviewing the claim with respect to Piechowicz). Regarding the testimony of Horne, Sparrow, and Kondilidis, this issue was already raised, and decided, in Grandison V. See Grandison V, 390 Md. at 423-37, 889 A.2d at 372-381. The Circuit Court found no persuasive evidence ... to retreat from the previous and most current interpretation of this claim, and we agree. It was not an abuse of discretion to deny Grandison's motion on this ground. Regarding the mental health of Kondilidis, the Circuit Court found Grandison's assertions to be baseless, bald allegations. We agree. Grandison fails to articulate how the Circuit Court's ruling was either erroneous or an abuse of discretion. There is simply no evidence to support Grandison's claim in a way that would satisfy Rule 4-331. Finally, Grandison argues that his capital sentencing proceeding should have been bifurcated because State used victim impact evidence. The Circuit Court denied this claim, relying on our holding in Grandison III. See Grandison III, 341 Md. at 229-30, 670 A.2d at 424 (making clear that capital sentencing issues are to be resolved in a single proceeding, leaving no discretion with the trial court to permit a bifurcated proceeding). Grandison does not explain why this Court should revisit this issue, let alone why it necessitates a new trial. We therefore reject Grandison's claims for a new trial and affirm the Circuit Court's decision.