Opinion ID: 1489278
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr. Woodyear

Text: Coulter first sought to present standard-of-care testimony by Dr. Woodyear, whom Coulter offered as an expert with respect to, inter alia, the handling of breast cancer complaints by primary care physicians and the scheduling of diagnostic procedures. After Coulter's counsel had questioned Dr. Woodyear at length during voir dire, the court ruled that he would not be permitted to testify. Coulter now complains that the trial court obstructed her effort to establish Dr. Woodyear's qualifications by disallowing questions and answers pertinent to his qualifications and by harassment. We reject that claim as well as Coulter's claim that the trial court improperly precluded Dr. Woodyear from giving standard-of-care testimony. It is true that the trial court sustained many of the steady barrage of objections that defendants' lawyers raised to questions that Coulter's counsel posed to Dr. Woodyear. But, the transcript shows, those rulings were occasioned by questions that persistently were vague or ambiguous, or that lacked foundation, called for speculation, had already been asked and answered, or sought answers about legal concepts, [21] or that attempted to lead the witness toward the definition [of standard of care] that he couldn't give in his deposition. [22] The court also struck a number of Dr. Woodyear's answers because they were non-responsive or because, in his answers, Dr. Woodyear gave expert opinions before he had been accepted to testify as an expert. But the court also overruled a number of defense counsel's objections (stating, e.g., that Coulter's counsel has to start somewhere) [23] and several times the court attempted to assist Coulter's counsel, instructing him to fix [his] question or to make it more specific or to take another stab. On this record, we cannot agree that the court improperly obstructed Coulter's presentation of evidence. Judge Combs Greene provided a detailed explanation of her ruling that Coulter had failed to establish a foundation for Dr. Woodyear to give standard-of-care testimony. [24] We need not discuss all aspects of her ruling. It suffices to note that, although Dr. Woodyear described his extensive experience in performing breast examinations and referring patients with breast cancer complaints, nothing in his testimony established that he attended national conferences, or kept current with pertinent medical literature, from which he would be familiar with the national standard of care. [25] Cf. Nwaneri, supra, 931 A.2d at 471 (referring to attendance at national meetings and keeping current with the state of the medical art as a minimally sufficient foundation for giving standard-of-care testimony) (quoting Hawes, supra, 769 A.2d at 808). Accordingly, the trial judge did not err in ruling that he would not be permitted to offer standard-of-care testimony. Nor  in light of the trial court's wide latitude in the admission or exclusion of expert testimony, Hawes, supra, 769 A.2d at 801  can we say that the trial judge abused her discretion in ruling that although Dr. Woodyear could perhaps qualify as an expert in family care medicine, his inability to give standard of care testimony would confuse the jury and call for the jury to speculate since what would happen is he would be called upon to opine about Dr. Taylor's actions or inactions or his care... but he wouldn't be able to talk about whether that fell below the standard required.