Opinion ID: 2550090
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: trial judge must give an accomplice credibility instruction upon request

Text: Hoskins argues that the trial judge committed plain error in failing to give a specific jury instruction on the credibility of accomplice testimony. In Bland v. State, [22] this Court considered an appeal where a jury convicted two co-defendants of a crime based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of two supposed accomplices. [23] The Bland court reversed the convictions on the ground that the State presented insufficient evidence of the [crime(s)]. [24] But, the Bland court also suggested that courts should give a specific jury instruction when the credibility of an accomplice is a material issue in a case, [25] and recommended the following instruction: A portion of the evidence presented by the State is the testimony of admitted participants in the crime with which these defendants are charged. For obvious reasons, the testimony of an alleged accomplice should be examined by you with suspicion and great caution. This rule becomes particularly important when there is nothing in the evidence, direct or circumstantial, to corroborate the alleged accomplices' accusation that these defendants participated in the crime. Without such corroboration, you should not find the defendants guilty unless, after careful examination of the alleged accomplices' testimony, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that it is true and that you may safely rely upon it. Of course, if you are so satisfied, you would be justified in relying upon it, despite the lack of corroboration, and in finding the defendants guilty. [26] Forty years after Bland, this Court, in Smith v. State, [27] granted a defendant's motion for postconviction relief because his counsel failed to request a Bland -type of instruction. [28] In evaluating the prejudice prong of the postconviction movant's Strickland v. Washington claim, [29] we explained: When a defendant is tied to a crime through the testimony of an accomplice-witness, specific accomplice credibility instructions are required. However, trial counsel's failure to request such an instruction will not always be prejudicial per se. The prejudicial effect depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. [30] Hoskins claims that the first sentence of the preceding quote created a new rule that retroactively applies to his case. Consequently, (Hoskins argues) the trial judge committed plain error in failing to give sua sponte an accomplice credibility instruction at his trial. But, Smith did not create such a broad rule. The quotation above must be read with due regard for the procedural posture of Smith. There, the defendant moved for postconviction relief on the ground that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a Bland -type of instruction. The Smith court held that a trial judge is required to give a Bland -type of instruction, upon request, when accomplice testimony is presented. The Smith court further held that defense counsel's failure to request a Bland -type of instruction will not constitute prejudice per se under Strickland v. Washington. [31] Rather, [t]he prejudicial effect depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. [32] Consequently, Smith does not apply here, and we must deny Hoskins relief on this claim. [33]