Opinion ID: 769703
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Hands-Off Doctrine

Text: 2 In order to understand how the PLRA operates, a sense of the context from which it emerged is helpful. Litigation over prison conditions is a relatively recentaddition to the landscape of federal jurisdiction. As one commentator has observed, The Constitution did not breach prison walls for over 170 years. Indeed, during most of the history of this country, there was some question as to whether prisoners had any constitutional rights at all. Michael Mushlin, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS S 1.02, at 7 (2d ed. 1993). According to a now renowned formulation, prisoners were mere slaves of the state. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt) 790, 796 (1871) 4 . 3 Although asked to intervene on behalf of prisoners, federal courts systematically declined under the so-called hands-off doctrine, a rule of judicial quiescence derived from federalism and separation of powers concerns. As our court once held, it is well settled that it is not the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, but only to deliver from imprisonment those who are illegally confined. Stroud v. Swope , 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951); accord Sarshik v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1944); Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81, 82 (7th Cir. 1944). And as the Supreme Court summed up the doctrine: 4 Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration. In part this policy is the product of various limitations on the scope of federal review of conditions in the state penal institutions. More fundamentally, this attitude springs from complementary perceptions about the nature of the problems and the efficacy of judicial intervention. Prison administrators are responsible for maintaining internal order and discipline, for securing their institutions against unauthorized access or escape, and for rehabilitating, to the extent that human nature and inadequate resources allow, the inmates placed in their custody. The Herculean obstacles to effective discharge of these duties are too apparent to warrant explication. Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative branches of government . . . . Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities. 5 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974), overruled in part, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989). 6 However, in landmark cases in the 1960's and 1970's the Supreme Court changed course, affirming the basic proposition that [t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974), and ratifying the availability of 42 U.S.C. S 1983 as a vehicle for vindicating prisoners' constitutional rights. See Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (reversing dismissal of S 1983 claim challenging discrimination on the basis of prisoner's religious beliefs). The concept of judicial restraint was not jettisoned, just relaxed enough to permit courts to intervene in the event that prison administrators abridge fundamental constitutional rights. As the Court observed in Procunier v. Martinez, a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state institution. When aprison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.  416 U.S. at 405-06 (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969)) 5 . 7 In the litigation which gave rise to and followed these pronouncements on prisoners' rights, 8 [c]lass-action suits by prisoners . . . led the courts to the definition and enforcement of minimum standards of health care, to the establishment of minimum procedural due-process requirements for the imposition of disciplinary punishments, to the equal protection of the laws for different categories of inmates, and to the upholding of the Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments. 9 Norval Morris, The Contemporary Prison: 1865-Present, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 245 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995); see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556 (citing decisions recognizing rights of religious freedom under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, right of access to the courts under the Due Process Clause, protection against racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, and other due process rights). And prison conditions undoubtedly have improved as a result 6