Opinion ID: 711707
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Confrontation and Compulsory Process.

Text: 13 LaPierre argues that the trial court's refusal to allow questioning about a bar grievance against the prosecutor in the first LaPierre trial violated his Sixth Amendment rights. See Washington v. Texas, 38 U.S. 14 (1967). The trial judge excluded the evidence based on the following reasoning: 14 THE COURT: I think that both counsel understand what I want to keep out of this trial, and that is the whole side issue of the trial of Bryan Schuler because I'm sure you'll agree that if Bryan Schuler were tried and all the evidence in the world were brought in and it was proved conclusively that Mr. Pattison was lying about Mr. Schuler, you would be the first one, and I would agree with you, that it does not mean that he's not telling the truth about what he saw on that night. 15 MR. DEWEY: That's true. 16 THE COURT: So that's why I think that the Schuler trial is irrelevant, because whether or not Bryan Schuler misconducted himself has got very little to do with whether this witness is telling the truth if the jury chooses to believe him. 17 Although the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to an accused of 'compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor' prevents the state from arbitrarily excluding testimony, state courts have a strong interest in prompt and efficient trials. Jordan v. Ducharme, 983 F.2d 933, 938 (9th Cir.1993) (internal citations omitted). 18 The right to present relevant testimony is not without limitation. The right may in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. We have explained for example, that trial judges retain wide latitude to limit reasonably a criminal defendant's right to cross-examine a witness based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. 19 Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149 (1991) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In determining whether Sixth Amendment compulsory process claims have been violated we apply a balancing test, weighing the interest of the defendant against the state interest in the evidentiary rule. Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir.1983). LaPierre must, however, present unusually compelling circumstances ... to outweigh the strong state interest in administration of its trials. Id. at 1452. 20 The cab driver testified more favorably to LaPierre in the second trial, more favorably to the prosecution in his police statement, grand jury testimony, and the first LaPierre trial. The prosecutor was permitted to use the inconsistencies to impeach the cab driver in the second trial. LaPierre's attorney sought to rehabilitate by eliciting testimony that (1) the prosecutor had threatened the cab driver with prosecution if he testified to what the cab driver said was the truth, (2) the cab driver had filed a bar grievance against the prosecutor, and (3) the prosecutor had been suspended from the bar and had left the state after a shoplifting conviction. He requested a subpoena, at the end of the trial after the judge limited cross examination of the cab driver, to require the former prosecutor to fly in from out of state and testify. The judge let the defense rehabilitate by eliciting the threat, but no more, and denied permission to subpoena the former prosecutor. The unresolved bar grievance by the cab driver and the shoplifting affair would lead to a side trial of the prosecutor in the former case, the judge felt, which would not contribute much to determining whether the cab driver was telling the truth in LaPierre's trial. 21 We are not a state appellate court, and have no authority to review this evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion, though there is no reason to doubt that it was a permissible exercise of discretion. The limitations on cross examination of the cab driver fell within the wide latitude to limit reasonably a criminal defendant's right to cross-examine a witness based on concerns about ... confusion of the issues. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149. The denial of defendant's request that the former prosecutor be subpoenaed was a permissible balancing of interests, because of the marginal relevance of the former prosecutor's testimony. Nothing for which the former's prosecutor's testimony was sought would directly exculpate LaPierre, and there are no unusually compelling circumstances ... to outweigh the strong state interest in administration of its trials. Perry, 713 F.2d at 1452. 22 AFFIRMED.