Opinion ID: 2113737
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Restitution Testimony

Text: Lastly, defendant contends that the trial justice erroneously allowed into evidence the prejudicial testimony of David regarding restitution David had paid to his uncle. At trial, Pio testified that he had received $3,000 to $4,000 in restitution from David since he had reported the theft. The defendant objected to Pio's testimony about restitution on the grounds of relevance. [10] The trial justice ruled that the testimony was relevant to prove conspiracy and thus admissible. Subsequently, David also testified that he paid restitution to his uncle, though he said he had paid between $5,000 and $6,000. The defendant did not object to the introduction of this testimony by David. On appeal, defendant argues that this restitution testimony unfairly prejudiced the jury against him because the jurors may have faulted defendant for exercising his right to a trial. He contends that the trial court should have excluded the evidence because it was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. The state argues, instead, that because defendant objected to the restitution testimony only on grounds of relevance, he waived any argument on appeal that the evidence was highly prejudicial. Additionally, the state argues that this testimony was relevant to the conspiracy charge in that it tended to prove that there was, in fact, a coconspirator. It is well established that this Court will not disturb a trial justice's ruling on an evidentiary issue unless that ruling `constitutes an abuse of the justice's discretion that prejudices the complaining party.' Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d at 1015 (quoting State v. Gomez, 848 A.2d 221, 232 (R.I.2004)). Proffered evidence is considered probative and relevant `when it renders the existence of the fact sought to be proven more or less probable than it would have been without the evidence.' State v. Snell, 892 A.2d 108, 121 (R.I.2006) (quoting State v. Wilding, 740 A.2d 1235, 1242 (R.I.1999)); see R.I. R. Evid. 401. [U]nless evidence is of limited or marginal relevance and enormously prejudicial, the trial justice should not act to exclude it. State v. Graham, 941 A.2d 848, 862 (R.I.2008) (quoting Wells v. Uvex Winter Optical, Inc., 635 A.2d 1188, 1193 (R.I.1994)); see R.I. R. Evid. 403. Here, defendant was charged and convicted with conspiracy to commit larceny. The state had the burden to prove that defendant had conspired with another person to commit a larceny. The testimony offered by Pio that his nephew had paid him money as restitution is relevant to show that David also conspired with respect to the theft of the money. Additionally, we note that, [w]ith respect to evidentiary rulings, when one side objects to the introduction of evidence for only one specific reason, any other ground for objection, even if later raised at the appellate level, is deemed to have been waived. Day, 925 A.2d at 979. At trial, the defendant objected to Pio's testimony about David's payment of restitution on grounds of relevancy only. He never raised the issue of unfair prejudice under Rule 403. Therefore, the defendant's argument that the potential prejudice of the evidence to the defendant outweighed its probative value is deemed waived. [11] Accordingly, we hold the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in allowing this testimony.