Opinion ID: 693413
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arbitration Clause

Text: 12 Coors first seeks to distinguish Mitsubishi by arguing that the Coors-Molson arbitration clause is more narrow than the Mitsubishi arbitration clause and does not cover the arbitration of antitrust disputes. Coors points to cases discussing the differences between general and narrow contractual arbitration clauses. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir.1988). Coors argues that while the arbitration clause in Mitsubishi is a general arbitration clause which covers all disputes arising out of the contract, the Coors-Molson arbitration clause is a narrow arbitration clause covering only any dispute arising from the implementation, interpretation, and enforcement of the agreement. 13 However, Coors does not cite any authority holding that the arbitration clause at issue is a narrow arbitration clause or that this antitrust dispute does not arise from the implementation, interpretation, and enforcement of the agreement; it merely asserts that the instant clause is a narrow one. In addition, Coors does not make an interpretive argument or suggest any intuitive reason why the Coors-Molson arbitration clause does not cover antitrust disputes. Without a persuasive argument explaining why the parties meant this apparently broad language to exclude antitrust disputes, the comprehensive nature of the terms implementation and enforcement in the arbitration clause, the agreement to arbitrate all matters involving the interpretation of the agreement, and the public policy in favor of arbitration compel us to read the arbitration clause to include antitrust disputes. We therefore conclude that the language any dispute arising in connection with the implementation, interpretation or enforcement in the Coors-Molson arbitration clause covers antitrust disputes in this case, provided that those disputes are within the scope of the agreement.