Opinion ID: 74370
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Urbina’s Sentencing Appeal

Text: Pursuant to section 4A1.1(c) of the Guidelines, Urbina was assessed one criminal history point for a two-count conviction in 1996 for driving with a suspended license and possessing marijuana, both misdemeanors. Urbina, unrepresented by counsel, pleaded guilty to both counts and served one day in jail. Urbina was also assessed three other criminal history points, which, without the additional point for the 1996 conviction, would have placed him in criminal history category II, rather than in category III. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 5, pt. A (1997) (Sentencing Table). Urbina objected to the assessment of this additional point for the 1996 conviction, arguing the Government had not alleged in his pre-sentence investigative report that Urbina had waived his right to counsel in pleading guilty to the 1996 changes, thus rendering this conviction “presumptively invalid” and unable to be considered in a sentencing proceeding. Cf. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115, 88 S. Ct. 258, 262 (1967) (“To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense is to erode the principle of that case.”) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). Generally, this court does not allow a defendant to collaterally attack the constitutionality of a conviction for the first time in a sentencing proceeding. See 15 United States v. Jackson, 57 F.3d 1012, 1018 (11th Cir. 1995); see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2 cmt. 6 (1997) (“[T]his guideline and commentary do not confer upon the defendant any right to attack collaterally a prior conviction or sentence beyond any such rights otherwise recognized in law . . . .”). “[W]hen a defendant, facing sentencing, [however,] sufficiently asserts facts that show that an earlier conviction is ‘presumptively void,’ the Constitution requires the sentencing court to review this earlier conviction before taking it into account.” United States v. Roman, 989 F.2d 1117, 1120 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (per curiam). This court has suggested that “presumptively void” convictions “are small in number and are perhaps limited to uncounseled convictions.” Id. Although Urbina’s 1996 conviction was indeed uncounseled, the burden was on Urbina “to lay a factual foundation for collateral review on the grounds that the state conviction was ‘presumptively void.’” Id. As the district court remarked, Urbina did not make this threshold showing, thereby precluding collateral review of the 1996 conviction. Consequently, the district court did not err in assessing Urbina the additional criminal history point and placing him in criminal history category III.