Opinion ID: 185156
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: EPA's Interpretation of Reservation

Text: 53 Given that EPA correctly interpreted S 7601(d) to expressly delegate jurisdiction to otherwise eligible tribes over all land within the exterior boundaries of reservations, including fee land, the next question is what areas are covered by a reservation. EPA interprets reservation as used in three different statutory provisions (42 U.S.C. SS 7410(o), 7474(c), 7601(d)(2)(B)) to mean formally designated reservations as well as trust lands that have been validly set apart for the use of a tribe even though the land has not been formally designated as a reservation. Tribal Authority Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7258. This includes what EPA terms Pueblos and tribal trust land. Pueblos are villages, primarily located in New Mexico, held by tribes in communal fee-simple ownership, originally acquired under grants from Spain and Mexico, and confirmed by Congress in the late 1800s. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 38-39 (1913). Petitioners ignore the status of Pueblos and concentrate their attack on EPA's interpretation of reservation to include tribal trust land. 54 The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to acquire land in trust for a tribe under 25 U.S.C. S 465 (1994), and such land can only formally be designated a reservation via the process provided by 25 U.S.C. S 467 (1994). Petitioners claim that EPA's interpretation contravenes the Act's plain language and renders 25 U.S.C. S 467 superfluous by ignoring the distinction between trust lands and reservations. EPA counters that the statute is ambiguous, and that its reasonable interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference. 55 We start with Chevron step one and rely on traditional principles of statutory construction to determine whether EPA's interpretation contravenes congressional intent as manifested by the 1990 Amendments. Significantly, the Act nowhere defines reservation. Therefore, we look to the term's ordinary and natural meaning, and the context in which the term is used. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-30 (1993). And we must remain cognizant of the rule that courts construe federal statutes liberally to benefit NativeAmerican nations. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985). 56 The dictionary defines reservation to be a tract of public land set aside for a particular purpose (as schools, forest, or the use of Indians). Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1930 (1993). This definition surely encompasses both trust lands and formally designated reservations. Nothing in the United States Code is clearly to the contrary, for the term reservation has no rigid meaning as suggested by petitioners. See 7 U.S.C. S 1985(e)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. IV 1998) (defining reservation to include land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States, ... trust or restricted land located within the boundaries of a former reservation of a federally recognized Indian tribe in the State of Oklahoma[,] ... [and] all Indian allotments the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished if such allotments are subject to the jurisdiction of a federally recognized Indian tribe); id. S 2012(j) (1994) (defining reservation as the geographically defined area or areas over which a tribal organization ... exercises governmental jurisdiction); 25 U.S.C. S 1452(d) (1994) (defining reservation to include Indian reservations, public domain Indian allotments, former Indian reservations in Oklahoma, and land held by incorporated Native groups, regional corporations, and village corporations under the provisions of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act); id. § 1903(10) (1994) (defining reservation to be Indian country as defined in section 1151 of Title 18 and any trust land not encompassed by S 1151); id. S 3103(12) (1994) ( '[R]eservation' includes Indian reservations established pursuant to treaties, Acts of Congress or Executive orders, public domain Indian allotments, and former Indian reservations in Oklahoma); 33 U.S.C. S 1377(h)(1) (defining Federal Indian reservation to mean all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including rights-of-way running through the reservation). 57 These varying definitions of reservation lay to waste petitioners' argument. Petitioners appear to assert that, in the absence of any specific definition, reservation as used in the 1990 Amendments to the Act can only mean the formal reservation contemplated by 25 U.S.C. S 467. This is a specious contention. First, S 467 does not purport to offer an exclusive definition of reservation; it simply defines the terms under which federal land is formally designated a reservation. Second, if Congress had wanted to limit the term reservation as petitioners suggest, Congress could have done so. Indeed, Congress on many occasions has defined reservation in terms of other statutes. See 12 U.S.C. S 4702(11) (1994) (defining reservation according to 25 U.S.C. S 1903(10)); 22 U.S.C. S 2124c(m)(1) (1994) (defining Indian reservation with reference to 25 U.S.C. S 1452(d)); 25 U.S.C. S 1903(10) (defining reservation with reference to 18 U.S.C. S 1151, as well as trust land); 26 U.S.C. S 168(j)(6) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (defining Indian reservation with reference to 25 U.S.C. S 1452(d) and 25 U.S.C. S 1903(10)); 42 U.S.C. S 10101(19) (1994) (defining reservation to include communities referred to in 18 U.S.C. S 1151(a), (b)); id. S 11332(a) (1994) (defining reservation according to 25 U.S.C. S 1452(d)). Moreover, given the varying definitions of the term used throughout the Code, it would be a curious result indeed for this court to insist that the absence of a definition requires EPA to advance the most restrictive definition as put forth by petitioners. 58 Aside from the statute's plain meaning and its context, other sources of statutory interpretation offer no insight into congressional intent with respect to the meaning of reservation. The Report of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works refers to the authority ofIndian tribes to administer and enforce the Clean Air Act in Indian lands, as well as enforcement of the Act in Indian country. S. Rep. No. 101-228, at 79, 80 (1989), reprinted in Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, at 841920. These terms are arguably broader than the definition of reservation urged by petitioners, and simply confirm the term's ambiguity as used by Congress. 59 Accordingly, we turn to step two of the Chevron inquiry. That is, did the Agency reasonably interpret the term reservation to include formal reservations, Pueblos, and trust lands? EPA supported its interpretation of reservation by looking to relevant case law, in particular Supreme Court precedent holding that there is no relevant distinction between tribal trust land and reservations for the purpose of tribal sovereign immunity. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 511. This view is consonant with other federal court holdings that an Indian reservation includes trust lands. See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649 (1978) (finding no apparent reason why lands held in trust should not be considered a reservation under S 1151(a)); HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224, 1249-54 (10th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 1986) (considering tribal trust land to be Indian country under either S 1151(a) as a de facto reservation or S 1151(b) as a dependent Indian community); United States v. Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816, 822-23 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that trust land is a reservation under S 1151(a)). 60 Petitioners note that, for several years, EPA has defined reservation, for the purposes of the PSD program, to be any federally recognized reservation established by Treaty, Agreement, executive order, or act of Congress. 40 C.F.R. 52.21(b)(27) (1999). Given the Agency's reasoned justification for a broader definition of reservation in the Tribal Authority Rule, and its proposal to amend the PSD definition to ensure consistency with the Tribal Authority Rule, EPA's departure from the PSD definition does not preclude this court from upholding EPA's new definition. In light of the ample precedent treating trust land as reservation land in other contexts, and the canon of statutory interpretation calling for statutes to be interpreted favorably towards Native American nations, we cannot condemn as unreasonable EPA's interpretation of reservations to include Pueblos and tribal trust land. 61