Opinion ID: 478353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Change in Conditions

Text: 8 The term change in conditions has been interpreted to mean a change in the employee's physical condition. See, e.g., Verderane v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 772 F.2d 775, 780 (11th Cir.1985); General Dynamics Corp. v. Director, OWCP, 673 F.2d 23, 25 n. 6 (1st Cir.1982) (per curiam). Further, a section 22 petition for modification is the only means by which to reopen a final compensation award order. Verderane, 772 F.2d at 780 n. 8. Clearly, in this case, Dixon suffered a change in condition. If, after that change in condition, the employer was entitled to section 8(f) relief, such a request for relief could be considered in the section 22 modification proceeding unless it had been otherwise waived. See General Dynamics, 673 F.2d at 25-26. 9 The Director argues that Minte's claim is devoid of merit because it seeks to piggyback on the claim of the employee. The Director appears to contend that an employer must independently satisfy the section 22 requirements by asserting a change in condition other than a claimant's asserted change in his level of disability. We reject this argument as a specious reading of section 22. Minte relied on a change in Dixon's condition that would affect its liability. The employer did not seek to invoke section 22 as an afterthought to justify a belated request for 8(f) relief. Rather, after Dixon petitioned for increased compensation, Minte raised section 8(f) to limit increases in liability brought about by the employee's request for a modification of his award. Courts applying section 8(f) in the context of a defense to liability have, in general, viewed it as subject to the same principles of fairness and efficiency as are embodied in Rules 8 and 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Verderane, 772 F.2d at 778; American Bridge Division, U.S. Steel Corp. v. Director, OWCP, 679 F.2d 81, 84 (5th Cir.1982). Here, where Dixon has properly opened up the compensation order to seek additional compensation, it is also proper to allow Minte to raise an 8(f) defense in response to Dixon's claims. 10 This is not a situation in which a party seeks to reopen a proceeding based solely on a change of law. Although section 8(f) was substantially amended in 1972, 8 this change in law is not the principal basis of the employer's request for 8(f) relief; the critical precipitating event here was the change in Dixon's level of disability. 11 It is also clear that this is not a situation in which the employer is claiming that, because the 8(f) claim was never raised during the initial compensation proceedings in 1966, the deputy commissioner somehow made a mistake in a determination of fact. In short, there is no attempt here to relitigate matters that properly should have been raised and resolved by the Board in 1966.