Opinion ID: 2747225
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sanction Against Judge Wilfong

Text: The overriding goal of judicial discipline is to preserve public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. “The purpose of judicial disciplinary proceedings is the preservation and enhancement of public confidence in the honor, integrity, dignity, and efficiency of the members of the judiciary and the system of justice.” Syllabus, In the Matter of Gorby, 176 W.Va. 16, 339 S.E.2d 702 (1985). “Under Rule 4.12 of the Rules of Judicial Disciplinary Procedure [1998] the Judicial Hearing Board may recommend, or this Court may impose, one or more of the following sanctions for each violation by a justice, judge, or magistrate of the Code of Judicial Conduct: (1) admonishment; (2) reprimand; (3) censure; (4) suspension without pay for up to one year; (5) a fine of up to $5,000; or (6) involuntary retirement in limited circumstances. Additionally, this Court can assess the cost of the disciplinary proceedings against a justice, judge, or magistrate.” Syllabus Point 6, In re Watkins, 233 W.Va. at 172, 757 S.E.2d at 596. “[I]t is clearly within this Court’s power and discretion to impose multiple sanctions against any justice, judge or magistrate for separate and distinct violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and to order that such sanctions be imposed consecutively.” Syllabus Point 5, In re Toler, 218 W.Va. 653, 625 S.E.2d 731 (2005). “Under our Constitution, only the Legislature has the power to remove a [circuit] court judge from office, and it may do so only by impeachment.” In re Watkins, 27 233 W.Va. at 174, 757 S.E.2d at 598.13 “This Court has the inherent power to inquire into the conduct of justices, judges and magistrates, and to impose any disciplinary measures short of impeachment that it deems necessary to preserve and enhance public confidence in the judiciary.” Syllabus Point 8, In re Watkins, 233 W.Va. at 173, 757 S.E.2d at 597. The limited constitutional power of this Court includes the authority to suspend a judge from office for a period of years that may equal or exceed the remainder of his or her term. The sexual conduct of a judge in his or her private life may constitute a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct when that conduct undermines the public’s confidence in the judiciary. See, e.g., In re Lee, 336 So.2d 1175 (Fla. 1976) (disciplining judge for engaging in sexual activities in an automobile on a public parking lot with a woman who was not his wife); Matter of Fournier, 325 S.C. 194, 480 S.E.2d 738 (1997) (disciplining judge who regularly met with a woman and engaged in sexual activity in his car in a business’s parking lot); In re Snyder, 336 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1983) (judge disciplined for adulterous relationship, a misdemeanor offense). When the sexual misconduct of a judge occurs in the judge’s chambers or courtroom, it is usually unquestionable that the judge’s actions have impaired the honor, 13 We repeatedly noted in Watkins that removal of a circuit or family court judge may only be accomplished through impeachment by the Legislature. See W.Va. Const., Art. VIII, §§ 8 & 16. A circuit or family court judge “who is impeached is not only removed from office but is also disqualified from holding any future ‘office of honor, trust or profit, under the State’” and also “forfeits all rights to a state pension.” In re Watkins, 233 W.Va. at 179, 757 S.E.2d at 599. 28 integrity, dignity, and efficiency of the judiciary. The judge’s actions violate the Code of Judicial Conduct. See, e.g., In re Toler, 218 W.Va. 653, 625 S.E.2d 731 (2005) (magistrate disciplined after being charged with sexual abuse of individuals in his office); Matter of Hey, 193 W.Va. 572, 457 S.E.2d 509 (1995) (judge disciplined for sexually harassing female court employees, including unwanted and unwelcome touching, unwanted and unwelcome kissing, making crude sexual comments, and asking for sexual favors). Many judges have been disciplined for engaging in sexual relationships during court hours, on court premises,14 with court employees,15 or with individuals who appeared before the judge in the exercise of his or her official duties.16 “A judge’s conduct is held to a higher standard than that of the average citizen, and must be beyond reproach, at least when that conduct is directly connected to his professional office and 14 See, e.g., In re Hammond, 224 Kan. 745, 585 P.2d 1066 (1978) (judge disciplined for having sexual relations in his chambers with one female employee, demanding sexual relations with another, and making sexual relations a condition of continued employment); In re Harrelson, 376 S.C. 488, 657 S.E.2d 754 (2008) (judge disciplined after engaging in sexual encounters with two different married administrative assistants employed by the court). 15 See In re Miller, 949 So.2d 379 (La. 2007) (judge removed from office for adulterous sexual relationship with his court secretary, fathering a child with the secretary, and later presiding over his secretary’s divorce proceedings). 16 See In re Gerard, 631 N.W.2d 271 (Iowa 2001) (judge disciplined for having secret intimate relationship with assistant county attorney who appeared before him on a daily basis); In re Chrzanowski, 465 Mich. 468, 636 N.W.2d 758 (2001) (judge disciplined after appointing attorney, with whom she was having an intimate relationship, as counsel for indigent criminal defendants); In re Adams, 932 So.2d 1025 (Fla. 2006) (judge disciplined for entering into romantic relationship with lawyer who practiced before him, and then continuing to preside over matters in which the lawyer appeared as counsel). 29 functions.” In re Flanagan, 240 Conn. 157, 190, 690 A.2d 865, 881 (1997) (judge disciplined for engaging in a consensual affair with a married court reporter assigned to his courtroom).17 The commentary to Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct best summarizes the guideline: Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. A judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge must therefore accept restrictions on the judge’s conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. The prohibition against behaving with impropriety or the appearance of impropriety applies to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge. In this case, the Hearing Board concluded that Judge Wilfong eventually agreed not to contest the six violations of Canons 1, 2A and 2B of the Code of Judicial Conduct “because it was not credible to do so[.]” The Hearing Board found the evidence established five violations of Canons 3(C)(1), 3(C)(2), 3E(1), and 4A. Her multiple, 17 As another court said, Judges, like Caesar’s wife, should always be above suspicion. An impartial and disinterested trial judge is the foundation on which the military justice system rests, and avoiding the appearance of impropriety is as important as avoiding impropriety itself. United States v. Berman, 28 M.J. 615, 616 (A.F.C.M.R. 1989) (reversing six criminal convictions after discovery trial judge had intimate relationship with trial counsel). 30 irresponsible improprieties undermined public confidence in the integrity, dignity, and efficiency of the judiciary in Randolph County. Judge Wilfong intertwined her private misconduct and professional acts to such a degree that even the lawyer for the county commission viewed her activities as “stunningly inappropriate, particularly regarding her abuse of her authority.” “Always mindful of the primary consideration of protecting the honor, integrity, dignity, and efficiency of the judiciary and the justice system, this Court, in determining whether to suspend a judicial officer with or without pay, should consider various factors, including, but not limited to, (1) whether the charges of misconduct are directly related to the administration of justice or the public’s perception of the administration of justice, (2) whether the circumstances underlying the charges of misconduct are entirely personal in nature or whether they relate to the judicial officer’s public persona, (3) whether the charges of misconduct involve violence or a callous disregard for our system of justice, (4) whether the judicial officer has been criminally indicted, and (5) any mitigating or compounding factors which might exist.” Syllabus Point 3, In re Cruickshanks, 220 W.Va. 513, 648 S.E.2d 19 (2007). Applying the Cruickshanks analysis, we first find that Judge Wilfong’s misconduct impacted directly upon the administration of justice and withered the public’s perception of the administration of justice in Randolph County. Second, although her misconduct initially may have begun as a private sexual relationship, because of the way she elected to conduct that relationship it became intertwined with her official duties and the public’s perception of Judge Wilfong. Third and fourth, while Judge Wilfong’s 31 misconduct did not involve violence and did not involve criminal activity, it did involve an arrogant degree of insensitivity to her staff, to courthouse personnel, to the duties of the prosecuting attorney, and to local lawyers. Finally, mitigating and aggravating factors exist which should be considered in weighing the discipline we should impose. The Hearing Board noted the following mitigating factors: the five complaints in this case are the first disciplinary complaints filed against Judge Wilfong since her judicial service began in 2003. She has performed her official duties in a satisfactory manner, and was involved in a number of initiatives to improve the judicial system. No litigant complained that Judge Wilfong’s inappropriate relationship influenced her discretionary rulings. She has the support of some individuals in the community and her family, including her husband. And finally, after a period of two years, Judge Wilfong did self-report. The Board noted the following aggravating factors: Judge Wilfong compromised individuals with whom she worked and/or over whom she had power as the only circuit judge in Randolph County, including members of the local bar. By privately disclosing the existence of the relationship while implicitly and/or expressly requesting these individuals keep her secret, Judge Wilfong patently created and fostered obvious and multiple conflicts of interest. She also used her power as a circuit judge to further her improper relationship with Mr. Carter. Moreover, Judge Wilfong was well-aware of the ethical implications of her two-year-plus relationship with Mr. Carter before she self-reported. She repeatedly represented to court employees, officers, and attorneys who were genuinely concerned 32 about her and the ethical quandary arising from her conduct, that she was ending or had ended the relationship – and then, she either continued or resumed the relationship without telling those employees, officers or attorneys she had done so.18 Judge Wilfong demonstrated, over a two-year period, a fundamental lack of candor, judgment, integrity, and fairness. As another aggravating factor, the Hearing Panel found that Judge Wilfong only self-reported her conduct after being told by Chief Counsel that the Judicial Investigation Commission had learned of her relationship with Mr. Carter, and after being told by Mr. Jory that local lawyers were contemplating filing official complaints. The Hearing Board also noted the administrative and financial burdens she imposed on the judiciary, including the recall of senior status judges to do her job, engendered as a result of her disqualification from all cases handled by the prosecuting attorney and several local lawyers. Further, the Hearing Board noted the potentially irreversible damage to her relationships with the local bar, county officials, and members of the public. And finally, while Judge Wilfong conceded to many of the factual allegations in the April 2014 statement of charges in her response, she persisted in her denial of any violations of 18 We note that, in her brief, Judge Wilfong insists that she is not really at fault because she intended to break off the relationship but was driven to continue because Mr. Carter wanted to continue or resume the relationship. At oral argument, her lawyer insisted she had been “seduced” by Mr. Carter. These claims are directly contrary to her statements that she takes full responsibility for her actions – which, we are reminded, occurred over at least 24 months, if not longer. 33 the Code of Judicial Conduct until only a few days before the August 2014 hearing before the Hearing Panel. In light of Judge Wilfong’s eleven violations of seven Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Hearing Board unanimously recommended that this Court censure Judge Wilfong for each of the eleven violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct; suspend her for three years without pay; fine her the sum of $20,000; and order that she pay the costs of this proceeding. After careful consideration, we modify the sanctions recommended by the Hearing Board. First, this Court must “take care to respect and observe the people’s categorical right to choose their own judges, and to avoid interfering with that right except for manifest violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.” In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Turco, 137 Wash. 2d at 245, 970 P.2d at 740. When members of this Court questioned whether Judge Wilfong’s three-year suspension could continue beyond her theoretically winning an election in 2016, special counsel conceded that Judge Wilfong’s sanction could fairly be reduced to cover only her remaining time in office. See, e.g., In re Watkins, 233 W.Va. at 183, 757 S.E.2d at 607 (suspending judge without pay “until his present term of office ends on December 31, 2016”).19 19 We note, however, that “[t]here is ample precedent for suspending a judge beyond his present term of office.” Matter of Del Rio, 400 Mich. 665, 672 n.4, 256 N.W.2d 727, 729 n.4 (1977). See In re Toler, 218 W.Va. 653, 625 S.E.2d 731 (2005) (magistrate was elected while criminal charges were pending; following acquittal, this Court suspended magistrate for four years for misconduct in prior term, “effectively suspending magistrate beyond his present term in office”). See also, In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Turco, 137 Wash. 2d 227, 970 P.2d 731 (1999) (suspending judge (continued . . .) 34 Accordingly, we find that Judge Wilfong should be suspended until her present term of office ends on December 31, 2016. Second, we modify the $20,000 fine imposed upon Judge Wilfong. We generally defer to the analysis and recommendations of the Hearing Board, and we are incensed at the financial burden Judge Wilfong’s misconduct has imposed upon the public fisc. This financial imposition is likely to continue into the future. In her zeal to defend her job, Judge Wilfong fails to recognize that she is now disqualified by the appearance of impropriety from doing most of her job. In fairness to the prosecuting attorney and many other lawyers in Randolph County, Judge Wilfong cannot preside – by her estimate – in over 80% of the cases presented in Randolph County. In addition to until end of term, and prohibiting judge from holding future judicial office without training); Matter of Carrillo, 542 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1976) (removing judge for conduct occurring prior to election); In re Greenberg, 442 Pa. 411, 280 A.2d 370 (1971) (suspending judge for conduct that occurred before judge ascended to bench); Alex B. Long, “‘Stop Me Before I Vote for This Judge Again’: Judicial Conduct Organizations, Judicial Accountability, and the Disciplining of Elected Judges,” 106 W.Va. L. Rev. 1, 28 (2003) (“In states that employ partisan or non-partisan elections to select their judges, the goal of judicial accountability takes precedent over the goal of judicial independence.”); Jeffrey M. Shaman, “Judicial Ethics,” 2 Geo. J. Leg. Ethics 1, 14 (1988). We also note that “the fact that a judge or magistrate is no longer in office does not render a disciplinary proceeding moot.” W.Va. Judicial Hearing Bd. v. Romanello, 175 W.Va. 577, 578, 336 S.E.2d 540, 541 (1985). See also Matter of Probert, 411 Mich. 210, 225, 308 N.W.2d 773, 776 (1981) (“When a judge charged with misconduct removes himself from judicial office to avoid the notoriety and ignominy incident to disciplinary proceedings and the possibility of sanctions, censure, if deserved, may be essential to ‘the preservation of the integrity of the judicial system’ . . . because the alternative, silence, may be construed by the public as an act of condonation.”); In re Steady, 161 Vt. 636, 637, 641 A.2d 117, 118 (Vt. 1994) (“Even after leaving office, an ex-judge retains the status of the judicial office on his resume. The public is entitled to know if the record is tarnished.”). 35 Judge Wilfong’s $126,000 annual salary, in less than six months this Court has thus far had to spend nearly $53,000 of the taxpayer’s money for senior-status judges to travel to Randolph County to perform in her stead. This Court will likely have to continue to pay those costs so long as Judge Wilfong remains a circuit judge. Further, the Randolph County Commission has tallied nearly $50,000 in expenses investigating her affair. However, justice must be mixed with a little mercy.20 We are suspending Judge Wilfong from her job for the remainder of her term without pay. She cannot ethically take pay from any other job while she continues as a suspended judge. Should Judge Wilfong choose to resign her position, she will likely be without pay for some time still. This Court is still requiring that she pay the costs of prosecuting the charges against her, which are currently estimated to be around $8,000. And, of course, her stunningly inappropriate conduct has been revealed to the public, to her obvious embarrassment. We therefore choose to eliminate any fine from her sanction. Judge Wilfong’s conduct seriously demeaned her office, impaired the integrity of the judiciary and substantially undermined public confidence in the administration of justice in Randolph County. Her conduct therefore warrants a substantial sanction. However, this Court is ever mindful that we discipline a judge not for purposes of punishment, vengeance or retribution, but to instruct the public and all judges, ourselves included, of the importance of the function performed by judges in a 20 See Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Brown, 223 W.Va. 554, 562, 678 S.E.2d 60, 68 (2009) (Ketchum, J., dissenting); In re Reinstatement of DiTrapano, 760 S.E.2d 568, 587 (W.Va. 2014) (Ketchum, J., dissenting). 36 free society. “We discipline a judge to reassure the public that judicial misconduct is neither permitted nor condoned.” In re LaMotte, 341 So.2d 513, 517 (Fla. 1977).