Opinion ID: 2327680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Trial Court's Application of Associated Builders & Contractors

Text: In relying on Associated Builders & Contractors when granting the defendants' motions to dismiss ECI's claim with respect to the competitive bidding statutes, the trial court initially acknowledged that none of the plaintiffs in that case had satisfied the threshold requirement of demonstrating that they had bid on the project or would have bid on the project but for the PLA requirement. The trial court then concluded that the court in Associated Builders & Contractors had reached the merits of the plaintiffs' claim by considering whether inclusion of the PLA requirement in the prebid specifications had `effectuated fraud, corruption, favoritism or other acts undermining the objective and integrity of the bidding process' through the imposition of costs on nonunion contractors that made it economically unfeasible for them to bid. Referring to the statements in Associated Builders & Contractors that cost considerations were not `[at] the top of the list of appropriate considerations for public contract specifications' and that the defendant's decision to use a PLA was nondiscriminatory and within its discretion, the trial court determined that, because ECI had raised a virtually identical claim, the analysis of the claim on the merits in Associated Builders & Contractors was applicable and dispositive of the nonstate defendants' motions to dismiss in the present case. [15] We disagree with the trial court's interpretation of Associated Builders & Contractors and the nonstate defendants' claim that the holding in that case is dispositive of their motions to dismiss. As previously discussed, the principal issue in Associated Builders & Contractors was whether nonbidding contractors and subcontractors ha[d] standing to challenge a bid specification for a municipal project that require[d] the successful bidder to agree to abide by a [PLA]. (Emphasis added.) Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. at 170-71, 740 A.2d 813. The court ultimately determined that the plaintiffs had not shown that any of the association's general contractor members had bid on the project or would have bid on the project under the first part of the test, and, therefore, it could not invoke the standing of its general contractor members as a basis for its own standing to pursue its challenge to the validity of the [PLA] requirement. Id., at 186, 740 A.2d 813. The court nonetheless proceeded to consider whether the plaintiffs could have prevailed under the second part of the test. See id., at 186-87, 740 A.2d 813. It is that portion of the analysis on which the trial court in the present case relied to resolve the standing issue. Its reliance, however, was misplaced for the following reasons. First, any consideration of the second part of the test in Associated Builders & Contractors was unnecessary following the court's dispositive holding that the association lacked standing under the first part of the test. Accordingly, the court's conclusion in Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. at 186-87, 740 A.2d 813, that the plaintiffs could not prevail under the second part of the test and the reasoning on which its conclusion was based were nothing more than dicta. [16] See, e.g., Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232, 246, 558 A.2d 986 (1989) (Once it becomes clear that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' complaint, any further discussion of the merits is pure dict[um]. . . . When the trial court concluded . . . that subject matter jurisdiction was missing, the remainder of its [ruling was] merely advisory. . . . [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]). Second, we disagree with the trial court and the non-state defendants that the court in Associated Builders & Contractors considered the merits of the plaintiffs' complaint or ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the PLA requirement had a potentially discriminatory effect on nonunion contractors due to increased costs. Although the court's reference to whether the plaintiffs had produced sufficient evidence of fraud, corruption or favoritism may have suggested that it was considering the merits of the defendant's decision to impose a PLA requirement, the court itself rejected such a notion when it stated that [t]he general rule of standing . . . is not inconsistent with the particular standard applicable to disappointed and would-be bidders: By requiring [the plaintiffs] to produce evidence that the bidding process was undermined by fraud, corruption or favoritism, the court is simply forcing the party challenging the competitive bidding process to make a colorable claim of injury that it is within the zone of interests protected by the competitive bidding laws. . . . Although the plaintiffs were not required to prove the merits of their claim, they did have the lesser burden of establishing a colorable claim.  [17] (Emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. at 181-82, 740 A.2d 813. Consistent with this view, the dissent in Associated Builders & Contractors observed multiple times that the majority had not reached the merits, stating that [t]he court, in a hyper-technical ruling on standing, avoids a substantive issue that . . . we should review; id., at 193, 740 A.2d 813 ( Berdon, J., dissenting); [t]he public interest should compel this court to address this issue; id. ( Berdon, J., dissenting); [t]he majority avoids [the plaintiffs'] substantive claims by narrowly ruling that the plaintiffs have no standing; id., at 194, 740 A.2d 813 ( Berdon, J., dissenting); and that, [b]y declining to afford the plaintiffs standing, the majority. . . simply ducks the issue of whether [PLA] requirements for a public construction contract violate state and local competitive bidding statutes. Id., at 201, 740 A.2d 813 ( Berdon, J., dissenting). In addition, the court stated on several occasions that its conclusion that the association lacked standing was based on deficiencies in the record; see id., at 187 n. 12, 188, 189, 740 A.2d 813; and that the plaintiffs had failed to make a colorable factual showing in support of their claim. Id., at 187, 740 A.2d 813. Thus, neither the majority nor the dissent in Associated Builders & Contractors believed that the plaintiffs' claim had been decided on its merits, and the trial court in the present case should not have applied the so-called holding in Associated Builders & Contractors under the second part of the test to decide the issues in the present case. Third, to the extent the trial court and the nonstate defendants regard the court's discussion of cost in Associated Builders & Contractors as resolving the issue of whether a PLA requirement is discriminatory, and thus dispositive of the standing issue in the present case, they misconstrue the court's analysis and fail to consider the subsequent evolution of Connecticut's competitive bidding laws. Associated Builders & Contractors did not conclude that cost was not a factor to be considered in deciding whether the competitive bidding laws were undermined, nor did it evaluate or reach any conclusions regarding the broader question of whether the PLA requirement in that case contravened the competitive bidding laws. The court merely stated that it [knew] of no requirement in the competitive bidding statutes that propels cost considerations to the top of the list of appropriate considerations for public contract specifications and that  cost alone  should not be the determinative factor; (emphasis added) id., at 187-88, 740 A.2d 813; a statement with which ECI's attorney in the present case agreed during oral argument before this court. The court also noted that [a]n increase in costs in one aspect of a project can equally well result in overall cost savings for the project. By avoiding labor disruption and maintaining a supply of skilled workers, as the project construction manager testified the [PLA] was designed to do, the requirement could reduce overall costs. The record . . . does not, in fact, support the association's claim that cost considerations precluded nonunion general contractors from participating in the bidding process. Id., at 187 n. 12, 740 A.2d 813. Accordingly, the court in Associated Builders & Contractors did not conclude, as the trial court concluded and the nonstate defendants claim, that a PLA requirement has no effect on competitive bidding because of increased costs to nonunion contractors and workers. It merely concluded that the determinative factor is whether the requirements of the bidding process have been applied consistently and in good faith, and that the plaintiffs had not made a colorable factual showing that the integrity of the bidding process had been affected by the additional costs allegedly imposed on nonunion contractors and workers by the PLA requirement. Id., at 187-89, 740 A.2d 813. Moreover, following the decision in Associated Builders & Contractors, the legislature enacted General Statutes § 4a-100, also known as the prequalification statute, which requires all bidders on public construction projects to satisfy certain minimum standards in order to bid or perform work on such projects. [18] Thus, given that the competitive bidding laws provide that a contract shall be awarded to the lowest responsible qualified bidder; General Statutes § 10-287(b)(1); the prequalification statute ensures that bidders are both responsible and qualified, and cost necessarily rises to the top of the list [19] of appropriate considerations for public contract specifications. [20] Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. at 187, 740 A.2d 813. Finally, the statement in Associated Builders & Contractors that [t]he trial court's determination that the decision to adhere to a [PLA] was within the defendant's discretion and the bounds of the competitive bidding statutes [and], therefore, did not exceed the limits of our case law; id., at 182, 740 A.2d 813; did not mean that a PLA requirement may never affect the integrity of the competitive bidding process. The court made the foregoing comment in response to the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court improperly had reached the merits of whether the defendant's decision to use a PLA was a proper exercise of its discretion. See id., at 181-82, 740 A.2d 813. In that context, the court merely was observing that the defendant's decision to use a PLA was discretionary and that the trial court had consulted our case law and properly determined that, in order to challenge the PLA requirement, the plaintiffs were required to make a colorable claim of injury by producing evidence that the bidding process had been undermined by fraud, favoritism or corruption. [21] See id., at 182, 740 A.2d 813. The court made a similar observation in Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Anson, 251 Conn. 202, 213-14, 740 A.2d 804 (1999), [22] a companion case released on the same day as Associated Builders & Contractors. In other words, the court in both Associated Builders & Contractors and Anson was referring to the fact that a public agency's discretion to require a PLA in any given circumstance is not unfettered. A balance must be struck between the potentially desirable effects of a PLA, such as the completion of a public project within time and financial constraints, and the public's interest in the fairness and economy associated with the competitive bidding process. Viewed through this lens, the court in Associated Builders & Contractors was attempting to determine whether the plaintiffs' allegations and other evidence in the record were sufficient to support a colorable claim that the integrity of the competitive bidding process would be seriously undermined by the imposition of the PLA requirement. See Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. at 187-89 and n. 12, 740 A.2d 813; see also footnote 17 of this opinion. Similarly, the court in Anson was attempting to determine whether the allegations and other evidence in the record concerning deprivation of the plaintiffs' rights of free speech and association were sufficient to support a colorable claim that the integrity of the competitive bidding process would be seriously undermined by the imposition of the PLA requirement. See Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Anson, supra, 251 Conn. at 213-14, 740 A.2d 804. In neither case was the court considering the claims on their merits. Consequently, for all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that, to the extent the trial court in the present case treated the analysis of the PLA requirement in Associated Builders & Contractors under the second part of the standing test as a decision on the merits, it misunderstood and misapplied that decision. 3