Opinion ID: 853414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Wrongful Death Statute and Punitive Damages

Text: The plaintiffs advance a number of policy considerations supporting their claim that punitive damages should be allowed under Indiana's wrongful death statute. The defendants respond that the issue is one of statutory interpretation and, because it is well settled that punitive damages are not recoverable under the wrongful death statute, any change in the law is a decision for the legislature, not this Court. The Court of Appeals undertook a statutory analysis, examined precedent holding that punitive damages are barred, and concluded that despite concerns as to both, public policy advised in favor of allowing punitive damages in the wrongful death action. At common law, a cause of action was extinguished by the death of the plaintiff. Because the victim was viewed as the only person wronged by a negligent killing, even a defendant whose negligence caused the plaintiff's death was insulated from liability. This inequity gave rise to wrongful death statutes, first in England in 1846, and soon thereafter in every United States jurisdiction. Durham, 722 N.E.2d at 357-58; accord In re Estate of Pickens v. Pickens, 255 Ind. 119, 125-26, 263 N.E.2d 151, 155 (1970). The wrongful death action is entirely a creature of statute. Northern Indiana Power Co. v. West, 218 Ind. 321, 329, 32 N.E.2d 713, 716-17 (1941), overruled on other grounds by State v. Larue's, Inc., 239 Ind. 56, 154 N.E.2d 708 (1958). Indiana's statute was first adopted in 1852, 2 G. & H. 330, sections 782-84 (1870), then again in 1881, Laws of the State of Indiana, ch. 38, sections 6-29 (1881). It has since been amended on nine different occasions, most recently in 1998. Ind.Code § 34-23-1-1 (1998). In all of its different versions, the general wrongful death statute has never specifically addressed punitive damages. In contrast, the 1999 statute dealing with the wrongful death of unmarried adults with no dependents explicitly bars punitive damages. Id. § 34-23-1-2 (Supp.2000). A third statutory treatment of this issue is found in the 1987 child wrongful death statute, which provides a list of recoverable damages that does not include punitive damages. Id. § 34-23-2-1 (1998). Plaintiffs contend that, although the wrongful death action is a creature of statute, the disallowance of punitive damages is a judicially engrafted rule that can be judicially removed. They cite to Chief Justice Shepard's concurrence in Miller v. Mayberry, 506 N.E.2d 7, 12 (Ind.1987) (Shepard, C.J., concurring in result), superseded by Ind.Code § 34-1-1-8 (1987), in which he disagreed with the majority's view that separation of powers concerns prohibit the judiciary from changing its interpretation of a statute. Plaintiffs also insist that Lindley v. Sink, 218 Ind. 1, 30 N.E.2d 456 (1940), has been mistakenly cited for the proposition that punitive damages are prohibited under the wrongful death statute. They point out that Lindley turned on the unrelated issue of whether the contributory negligence of one beneficiary precludes recovery by all of the beneficiaries. 218 Ind. at 11-12, 30 N.E.2d at 460. Plaintiffs contend that reliance of subsequent cases on Lindley is also misplaced. The goal of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Sales v. State, 723 N.E.2d 416, 419-20 (Ind.2000); accord Collier v. Collier, 702 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Ind. 1998); Sullivan v. Day, 681 N.E.2d 713, 717 (Ind.1997). We agree that there is no constitutional bar to revisiting judicial authority interpreting a statute. But if a line of decisions of this Court has given a statute the same construction and the legislature has not sought to change the relevant parts of the legislation, the usual reasons supporting adherence to precedent are reinforced by the strong probability that the courts have correctly interpreted the will of the legislature. Heffner v. White, 221 Ind. 315, 318-19, 47 N.E.2d 964, 965 (1943) ([S]uch construction should not then be disregarded or lightly treated.); accord Loeb v. Mathis, 37 Ind. 306, 312 (1871). Finally, because the wrongful death statute is in derogation of the common law, it is to be construed strictly against the expansion of liability. Ed Wiersma Trucking Co. v. Pfaff, 643 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ind. Ct.App.1994). Plaintiffs argue, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that it is significant that the legislature, in all its amendments to the general wrongful death statute, has never explicitly excluded punitive damages, even though it has expressly provided that punitive damages are not recoverable under the unmarried adult with no dependents statute and provided a list of recoverable elements of damages under the child wrongful death statute. I.C. §§ 34-23-1-2, -2-1. Plaintiffs also note the language of the statute itself, which leaves open-ended what damages are recoverable under the statute: [D]amages shall be in such an amount as may be determined by the court or jury, including, but not limited to, reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses, and lost earnings of such deceased person resulting from said wrongful act or omission. Id. § 34-23-1-1. This language, according to plaintiffs, leaves this Court free to allow punitive damages. Although the general wrongful death statute does not mention punitive damages, the legislature has made some changes to the wrongful death legislation that are noteworthy. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, in 1987, the legislature changed the child wrongful death statute to explicitly allow recovery for loss of services and loss of companionship and affection. At the same time, the legislature added a list of recoverable elements that does not include punitive damages. [1] Durham, 722 N.E.2d at 358, 363. This was done only a few months after this Court's decision in Mayberry, which held that a damage award for loss of love and affection in a child wrongful death action violated the pecuniary damage rule, 506 N.E.2d at 11. This change was also close on the heels of the Court of Appeals' holding that neither punitive damages nor recovery for love and affection for the death of a child was a compensable element of recovery under the statute. Andis v. Hawkins, 489 N.E.2d 78 (Ind.Ct.App. 1986), trans. denied. Although, as the dissent points out, this was not a decision of the Supreme Court, that decision preceded the 1988 constitutional amendment that substantially freed this Court to address civil law issues. By the end of World War II, and continuing through 1988, this Court had been virtually precluded from entertaining civil litigation. At that time, the Court of Appeals sat in fixed panels of three judges for each of three geographical districts. As a practical matter, Court of Appeals decisions were regarded as likely to be the last word on the subject, at least for the district. [2] We do not think it likely that the 1987 legislature was unaware of the Court of Appeals ruling, or regarded it as insignificant. The Court of Appeals opinion in this case cites the 1987 amendment to the wrongful death statute as support for the proposition that the legislature has rejected the pecuniary damage rule, that is, the notion that only strictly pecuniary losses are recoverable under the wrongful death statute. We think the lesson of the 1987 legislation is rather that the legislature can act swiftly if our interpretation of its statute is incorrect. In contrast to its elimination of the prohibition against recovery for a child's love and companionship, the legislature has never responded to the courts' pronouncements on the punitive damages issue. This legislative silence is in the face of a number of decisions that have construed the general wrongful death statute to preclude punitive damages. See Kuba v. Ristow Trucking Co., 508 N.E.2d 1, 2-3 (Ind.1987) (The confines and limitations inherent in a statutorily based wrongful death action do not permit a claim for treble damages.); Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 557 N.E.2d 1045, 1056-57 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (punitive damages are not recoverable in wrongful death action) (citing Andis, 489 N.E.2d at 82-83); accord Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 297 (7th Cir. 1979) (punitive damages are not allowed where purpose of statute remains compensatory). When it disagrees with judicial rulings, the legislature can act. It amended the statute to allow the loss of love and companionship of a child to be a compensable element of damages under the child wrongful death statute. This is consistent with Indiana's longstanding pecuniary loss rule. In Herriman v. Conrail, Inc., 887 F.Supp. 1148, 1154-55 (N.D.Ind.1995), the court interpreted Indiana case law since the 1987 amendment and concluded that Indiana continues to adhere to the pecuniary loss rule, despite inclusion of loss of services and loss of love and companionship. Loss of love and companionship are often included among pecuniary damages, even if they are not pecuniary in the strict sense of the word. 22A Am.Jur.2d Death § 225 (1988) (where damages are limited to pecuniary losses, recovery for loss of comfort and society are not prevented). As discussed later, in Indiana the pecuniary damage rule has also not precluded recovery of intangible loss of consortium damages under the wrongful death statute. Failure to address punitive damages cannot be attributed to legislative indifference to the wrongful death statute. The legislature has amended the wrongful death statute approximately once a decade since the 1930s. [3] But despite these many other changes to the Act, the legislature has never amended it to address explicitly the availability of punitive damages. We can only conclude that the legislature is content with the consistent line of cases finding punitive damages unavailable. Finally, where the legislature has explicitly spoken to this issue in other contexts, its attitude is hostile to punitive damages, either prohibiting them or setting forth an exhaustive list of recoverable items that does not include punitive damages. The net effect of the Court of Appeals' decision is to disregard a long line of case law finding the purpose of the wrongful death statute to be compensatory, and concluding that punitive damages are therefore not recoverable. This doctrine is first found in Louisville, New Albany, & Chicago Railway Co. v. Goodykoontz, 119 Ind. 111, 113, 21 N.E. 472, 472-73 (1889), where this Court stated that the wrongful death action is intended to afford compensation for those who have sustained pecuniary loss by the death, and not for the benefit of the decedent's estate. Id.; accord Pickens, 255 Ind. at 126, 263 N.E.2d at 155 (The purpose of the statute then is to create a cause of action to provide a means by which those who have sustained a loss by reason of the death may be compensated.). At the time these cases were decided, punitive damages were rarely sought. These early statements may therefore not reflect considered rejection of the availability of noncompensatory damages under the wrongful death act. However, the reaffirmation of that notion in more recent cases, coupled with the legislative history already described, is persuasive that the issue has been considered in modern times and resolved against the plaintiffs' position. The Court of Appeals examined Indiana's view of punitive damages and concluded that Indiana is increasingly receptive to imposing exemplary damages and that Indiana no longer uses exemplary damages solely for punishment or retribution. Durham, 722 N.E.2d at 362. Rather, Indiana has come to realize that exemplary damages also serve a deterrent effect. In support of the court's first proposition, it noted that the legislature has expanded the treble damages statute to cover an increasing number of contexts. In support of the latter proposition, the court cited a recent Court of Appeals opinion that was adopted on transfer. Bell v. Clark, 653 N.E.2d 483, 490-91 (Ind.Ct. App.1995), adopted on transfer by 670 N.E.2d 1290 (Ind.1996). We disagree with the Court of Appeals that there is an identifiable trend in Indiana law in favor of expanding access to punitive damages. The legislature has the power to enlarge the scope of punitive damages, including under the wrongful death statute, but has seen fit to reduce the incentive to seek punitive damages. See I.C. §§ 34-23-1-1 to 1-2 & 2-1. And in several instances the legislature has explicitly curtailed their availability altogether. Id. § 25-6.1-8-4 (1998) (recovery from auctioneer fund may not include punitive damages award); § 34-13-3-4 (Tort Claims Act bars punitive damages); § 34-23-1-2 (barring punitive damages under unmarried adult with no dependent wrongful death statute). Nor is the deterrent potential of punitive damages a novel consideration. To the contrary, this Court's rationale for the imposition of punitive damages has long included deterrence as a valid consideration. Indeed, over one hundred years ago, we observed that: Exemplary or punitive damages, the terms exemplary and punitive being synonymous, are damages allowed as a punishment, or by way of example, to deter others from the like offences, for torts committed with accompanying fraud, malice, or oppression. State ex rel. Scobey v. Stevens, 103 Ind. 55, 59, 2 N.E. 214, 216 (1885); accord Husted v. McCloud, 450 N.E.2d 491, 495 (Ind.1983); Art Hill Ford, Inc. v. Callender, 423 N.E.2d 601, 602 (Ind.1981); Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. Stevenson, 173 Ind.App. 329, 341, 363 N.E.2d 1254, 1262 (1977). The Court of Appeals took the view that its opinion in Andis should be reexamined in light of a developing trend in other jurisdictions in favor of allowing punitive damages in wrongful death actions. In Andis, the Court of Appeals referred to the general rule that, in most states, punitive damages are prohibited under the applicable wrongful death statute. 489 N.E.2d at 79-80. The plaintiffs note that twenty-seven states now allow punitive damages in wrongful death cases. However, in eleven of these states the wrongful death statute expressly permits punitive damages. Thus, the majority of states in which the statute is silent as to punitive damages (twenty-two out of thirty-eight) continue to bar punitive damages. 1 Stuart M. Speiser et al., Recovery for Wrongful Death and Injury § 3A:4 (3d ed.1992). Finally, and most persuasively, the plaintiffs argue that it runs contrary to public policy to allow punitive damages in the ordinary personal injury case but not in the wrongful death action. As plaintiffs put it, we cannot have a legal regime in which it is cheaper to kill than to maim. It is obviously correct that legal rules should not encourage or fail to deter fatalities. But it is difficult if not impossible for a defendant to calculate what the measure of damages will be in any given personal injury or wrongful death case. Whether or not punitive damages are recoverable, injuring or causing another's death is no inexpensive matter and will result in very different damage awards depending on variables over which a defendant has little or no control. Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the statutory language leaves open the possibility of punitive damages. As noted earlier, in 1965, the legislature amended the wrongful death statute to include a list of recoverable damages, explicitly providing that its list was nonexhaustive. The significance of this provision has been addressed and resolved in prior cases. Kuba, 508 N.E.2d at 2 (construing but not limited to language as limited to damages evolv[ing] from a deprivation to a survivor as a result of the death); accord Huff, 609 F.2d at 297. Kuba thus took the view that although the legislature left open the statute to allow for other damages, these damages must be compensatory. Huff pointed out the unlikelihood that in 1965 the legislature intended to alter the statute to provide for the possibility of punitive damages. Id. We have no quarrel with the result reached by the Court of Appeals as a matter of policy. If we were writing on a clean slate we would find the Court of Appeals' analysis persuasive. However, where the legislature has spoken, we believe policy setting on an issue such as this is for the elected branch of government. If the legislature disagrees with this longstanding interpretation of the statute, it can correct it. In the meantime, despite any resulting unfairness, punitive damages are not recoverable under the wrongful death statute.