Opinion ID: 170192
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Environmental Impact

Text: SOC also argues the permitting decision was arbitrary and capricious for failure to consider important environmental consequences. It claims the Forest Service insufficiently analyzed the risk to other forest users from WPG's explosives and the effect on other users of helicopter noise. In particular, SOC argues the discussion of these issues in the most recent EIS relied on the 1999 EIS, and that backcountry use had increased so dramatically that the Forest Service needed to develop a new analysis of patterns of backcountry use, and the Forest Service needed to develop a more comprehensive analysis of helicopter noise patterns. Under NEPA, the EIS should take a hard look at the impacts of a proposed action. Friends of the Bow v. Thompson, 124 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 1997); see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4. But NEPA's hard look does not necessarily require the agency to develop hard data. Ecology Center, 451 F.3d at 1190. The Forest Service meets the hard look requirement by present[ing] the environmental impacts of the proposal and the alternatives in comparative form, thus sharply defining the issues and providing a clear basis for choice among options. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. [O]nce environmental concerns are adequately identified and evaluated by the agency, NEPA places no further constraint on agency actions. Friends of the Bow, 124 F.3d at 1213 (quotation omitted). The EIS in this case adequately identified and evaluated (1) increasing recreational use of backcountry areas, (2) the impact of WPG's operations on the safety of other forest users, and (3) the noise impacts of WPG's helicopters in the permit area. The Forest Service thus complied with NEPA's hard look requirement.
The Forest Service identified and evaluated as an important issue increasing usage of backcountry recreation areas. The EIS for the 2005 permit recognized that use of the backcountry for winter recreation has been increasing, but [r]eliable estimates of the number of individuals recreating in the Central Wasatch backcountry during the winter are still not available. The question can be addressed at one level by looking at national trends, which show that . . . alternatives to resort skiing have gained significant popularity over the past decade. ER 589. Based on trends in equipment sales, calls to the Utah Avalanche Forecast. Center, and observations by Forest Service personnel, WPG employees, and backcountry users themselves, the EIS concluded, most of the anecdotal information reviewed for this analysis suggests that winter backcountry use is high and growing, and that the trend is likely to persist. Some incremental shifts in the types and patterns of backcountry recreation other than heli-skiing may have occurred but cannot be reliably documented. ER 590-91. Accordingly, the EIS adopted the 1999 EIS's analysis of backcountry usage patterns, while allowing for an overall increase in usage. ER 591. [2] In response to public comments on the absence of hard data, the Forest Service concluded the updated but still largely qualitative information on other backcountry use in the permit area considered in this analysis is sufficient for public disclosure and informed decision making. ER 680. [T]he Forest Service acknowledges that the backcountry sees relatively high levels of recreation use, [and] such use is likely to increase over time. . . . However, the EIS provides adequate information to make the decision at hand and is consistent with the requirements of NEPA. ER 680. Although the Forest Service acknowledged backcountry use had increased since the 1999 EIS, the Forest Service concluded with regard to safety, kilo new circumstances or information has developed since the 1999 analysis that would alter the[ ] conclusions from the 1999 EIS. ER 572, 573. Thus the Forest Service specifically considered whether its data was sufficient and concluded that it was. The information the Forest Service gathered supports its conclusion that additional data was unnecessary to its decision. In particular, the Forest Service concluded that if it anticipated that heli-skiing would be curtailed at some specific level of backcountry use, more and better data might be relevant. ER 680; see also ER 703 (noting further study might be appropriate if the Forest Plan directs that recreation use be capped at certain levels, or if agency direction requires some uses to be given preference over others). Given the Forest Service's goal of balancing recreational opportunities, the qualitative information it obtainedspecifically that nonmotorized backcountry use was increasing and was heaviest in areas nearest to population centers and on weekendsenabled it to craft permit terms to minimize conflict between user groups. For example, the Forest Service considered alternatives and adopted permit terms limiting WPG operations in the most heavily used area on weekends. In short, the information the Forest Service gathered was sufficient to sharply define] the issues and provid[e] a clear basis for choice among options. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14.
The EIS discussed the risks and benefits of WPG's explosives use and determined any risk was minimal. The information gathered in the EIS and incorporated from the 1999 EIS supports the conclusion that WPG's operations present minimal risk beyond the general risk presented by increased backcountry use. ER 148; see also ER 80-81 (noting the probability of accidents and injuries involving backcountry recreationists increases with the number of people involved, simply because all backcountry users risk triggering avalanches). First, the Forest Service described the risk presented by WPG's operations. WPG uses explosives only to test for slope stability; WPG does not use explosives to trigger avalanches or control avalanche slide paths. ER 118-119, 685. Furthermore, WPG uses explosives only when all other measures of slope stability have proven inconclusive. ER 118. Using this approach, WPG triggers very few avalanches. ER 118, 130. Second, the Forest Service imposed additional restrictions on WPG to minimize the risk to others from any potential avalanches. WPG must conduct testing before 9:00 a.m. or as early as practical, fly over the area before testing, and test only when visibility is at least .5 miles. ER 121, 147, 566, 684, 700. These measures have been effective at mitigating any safety hazard: WPG in its more than thirty years of operation has never released an avalanche that injured another recreationist; nor have any injuries been associated with WPG's explosives use, even as backcountry use has increased. ER 572-73. Finally, the Forest Service recognized WPG's positive impact on avalanche safety through input to the Utah Avalanche Forecasting Center, the provision of guides trained in avalanche risk to relatively inexperienced skiers, contributions to other organizations' avalanche control work, and rescue assistance. ER 149. The. Forest Service concluded WPG's efforts serve not only to make WPG's operation as safe as possible, but to help minimize the avalanche risk to all other users of the Wasatch backcountry. ER 119. Eliminating explosives use would involve removal of one tool used to safeguard helicopter skiers, as well as those sharing terrain with them, from avalanches; and some decrease in the quality of the slope stability information WPG provides to the resorts, UDOT, and UAFC. ER 168. Although the Forest Service recognize[d] that explosives testing has undesireable side effects, it allowed WPG up to 300 charges per year to retain the cited benefits while capping the risks at current levels. ER 168. This discussion of explosives use articulate[s] a rational connection between the facts found and the decision to permit WPG limited explosives use. Olenhouse, 42 F.3d at 1574.
Lastly, the Forest Service also adequately identified and evaluated the noise generated by WPG's operations. The EIS identified WPG's noise impact as the most commonly reported complaint among other backcountry users and ranked alternatives in terms of potential for noise generation. ER 532-34, 569. The Forest Service identified the number of helicopters in operation as the major factor affecting noise generation and incorporated the analysis of the 1999 EIS concluding that noise levels are highest in close proximity to a helicopter and when a backcountry user is present in the same drainage as a helicopter. ER 116, 569, 581. The Forest Service concluded the degree of impact depends on several factors, including: spatial and temporal proximity to the helicopter, the type and location of the other recreational activities occurring, the sensitivity of the people involved. ER 621. We think this constitutes sufficient information to evaluate the noise impact of the WPG permitting decision. Particularly, the Forest Service recognized permit restrictions as a means of mitigating noise and reducing conflicts with other backcountry users related to noise. The Forest Service recognized that noise impacts vary by the type of heli-ski permit restrictions in place (e.g., structured restrictions resulting in more predicatable, more localized, and more intensive impacts v. flexible restrictions associated with less predictable, more widespread, less intensive impacts). ER 621. [S]ome level of impact on other recreationists is unavoidable, but the terms of the heli-ski permit provide the means of managing these impacts. ER 569. The Forest Service also recognized that WPG had managed to reduce conflicts with other users under terms of the 2000 permit. ER 569, 598. Accordingly, the Forest Service continued to apply permit terms allowing other backcountry users to avoid WPG's operations if they so desired and to require WPG to notify the public of its operating plans a day in advance through the Utah Avalanche Center recorded information line and website, WPG's website, and the Wasatch-Cache National Forest website. ER 624, 701. WPG also must avoid flying through passes and along ridges occupied by other users when possible. ER 623, 701. SOC argues the Forest Service's decision was arbitrary and capricious because it did not have the benefit of empirical data mapping noise distribution in the permit area and did not have the benefit of comments from other federal agencies with expertise relating to aircraft noise. We agree with the Forest Service that [w]hile more information could be collected on any particular issue, the EIS provides a sufficient basis for making an informed decision, taking into account how noise impacts might vary by alternative. ER 683. The Forest Service was not required to base its decision on a conclusion that some particular level of noise was either acceptable or unacceptable. Cf. Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 998 F.2d 1523, 1533 (10th Cir.1993) (finding agency failure to develop evidence arbitrary and capricious when agency was required to determine whether noise would significantly impact parks users' recreational experiences). Instead, the Forest Service was required to meet the mandates of its forest plans by providing quality helicopter skiing opportunities while seeking to minimize conflicts between heli-skiing and other winter recreational uses. ER 521. To address this problem, the Forest Service identified an effective means of minimizing conflict by giving other users means to avoid WPG operations by imposing permit restrictions that make predictable WPG's operations and consequent noise impacts. Additional empirical data would not assist the Forest Service in sharply defining the issues and providing a clear basis for choice among options for minimizing user conflict. 40 C.F.R. 1502.14.