Opinion ID: 2514109
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Statutes Governing Distribution of State Aid to Community Colleges

Text: [¶ 16] We turn, therefore, to the statutes that are the focus of dispute. We review a district court's statutory interpretation on a de novo basis. Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. Catchpole, 6 P.3d 1275, 1285 (Wyo.2000); Corkill v. Knowles, 955 P.2d 438, 440 (Wyo.1998). In interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the legislature's intent. Fontaine v. Board of County Comm'rs, 4 P.3d 890, 894 (Wyo.2000); State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo.1983). Legislative intent must be ascertained initially and primarily from the words used in the statute. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo. 1991); Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834, 837 (Wyo.1991). When the words are clear and unambiguous, a court risks an impermissible substitution of its own views, or those of others, for the intent of the legislature if any effort is made to interpret or construe statutes on any basis other than the language invoked by the legislature. Allied-Signal, 813 P.2d at 219. Moreover, [a]ll statutes must be construed in pari materia; and in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or hav[ing] the same general purpose must be considered and construed in harmony. Fontaine, 4 P.3d at 894 (citing State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d at 735). [¶ 17] Therefore, in performing our review, we look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words to determine if the statute is ambiguous. Olheiser v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 866 P.2d 768, 770 (Wyo.1994) (citing Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Wyo.1993)). A statute is clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability. Parker Land & Cattle, at 1043. Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. Id. We have said that divergent opinions among parties as to the meaning of a statute may be evidence of ambiguity. Basin Electric Power Co-op. v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d 557, 561 (Wyo.1978). However, the fact that opinions may differ as to a statute's meaning is not conclusive of ambiguity. Ultimately, whether a statute is ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the court. Allied-Signal, 813 P.2d at 219. [¶ 18] If we determine that the statute is ambiguous, we resort to general principles of statutory construction to determine the legislature's intent. Petroleum Inc. v. State ex rel. State Bd. of Equalization, 983 P.2d 1237, 1240 (Wyo.1999) (citing Parker Land & Cattle Co., 845 P.2d at 1044). [I]n ascertaining the legislative intent in enacting a statute ... the court ... must look to the mischief the act was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conditions of the law and all other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances that would enable the court intelligently to determine the intention of the lawmaking body. Parker Land & Cattle Co. at 1044 (quoting Carter v. Thompson Realty Co., 58 Wyo. 279, 131 P.2d 297, 299 (1942)). In addition, if a statute is ambiguous, we will give some deference to an interpretation by the agency charged with execution of the statute unless its interpretation is clearly erroneous. Parker Land & Cattle Co., 845 P.2d at 1045; Mowry v. State ex rel. Wyoming Retirement Bd., 866 P.2d 729, 731 (Wyo.1993). However, we are not bound by an agency's interpretation; the final construction of an ambiguous statute is a question for the court. Parker Land & Cattle Co., at 1045. [¶ 19] The district court determined that the Commission's action in distributing $1,385,176 of state aid other than through the distribution formula was a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-18-202(a)(xiv) (Lexis 1999) which it found mandates that all appropriated state assistance to community colleges be distributed through the Commission's distribution formula established pursuant to the section. The subsection on which the district court relied is found under the title  Power and duties of the commission  and provides: (a) The commission shall: ... (xiv) On or before January 2, 1991, establish a formula for distribution of state assistance to community colleges which is approved by a majority of commission members and which provides that no institution solely as a consequence of its implementation, shall have its total budget reduced by more than two percent (2%) in any fiscal year from the preceding approved total budget[.] [¶ 20] In response, the Commission and appellant community colleges contend that the Commission's action in distributing the $1,385,176 in salary enhancement funds outside the distribution formula is authorized by statutes that grant it discretion in the distribution of funds appropriated by the legislature. Moreover, they justify any departure from the formula as a good faith attempt to effectuate the legislative objective which formed the basis for the appropriation: that staff salaries at each community college reach 90% of the comparator groups. In particular, appellants point to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-18-202(a)(vii), similarly found under the title,  Powers and duties of the commission.  This subsection provides: (a) The commission shall: ... (vii) Administer the program of state support for the community college system including distribution of amounts authorized by the legislature. Budgets filed with the commission under W.S. 16-4-111 shall be open for public review. [¶ 21] Appellants further rely upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-18-205 (Lexis 1999) entitled,  Appropriation and distribution of state funds; restrictions; budget authority.  The statute in pertinent part provides: (c) State funding for the assistance of community colleges shall be appropriated to the community college commission unless otherwise specified by law. Funds appropriated for each biennium shall be distributed as follows: (i) Distribution shall be made by the commission to the community colleges at times and in amounts to be determined by the commission based upon the amount determined to be necessary to maintain services for the particular college[.] [¶ 22] This court's responsibility in interpreting the above statutes is to follow the rule that statutes in pari materia should be compared and harmonized, if possible, and, if not susceptible of a construction which will make all of their provisions harmonize, they are made to operate together so far as possible consistently with the evident intent of the latest enactment. Huber v. Thomas, 45 Wyo. 440, 19 P.2d 1042, 1044 (Wyo.1933) (quoting Burton v. Union Pacific Coal Co., 18 Wyo. 362, 107 P. 391, 397 (Wyo. 1910)). [¶ 23] First, we find that the three statutory subsections are in pari materia because all concern the distribution of state assistance to the community colleges by the Commission. Clearly, the plain language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-18-202(a)(vii) and 21-18-205(c)(i) grant broad discretion to the Commission to distribute appropriated funds at times and in amounts to be determined by the commission based upon the amount determined to be necessary to maintain services for the particular college. These sections were enacted as part of the Wyoming Community College Code of 1985, a comprehensive amendment responsible for creating the modern-day community college system. 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 208, § 1. Were these the only applicable sections, we might agree with the Commission that so long as its actions in distributing state assistance to community colleges were not an abuse of discretion they would almost certainly be upheld. However, four years later, in 1989, the legislature enacted Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-18-202(a)(xiv). 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 248, § 2. The plain language of this section states that the Commission shall on or before January 2, 1991, establish a formula for distribution of state assistance to community colleges which is approved by a majority of commission members.... This court stated nearly 72 years ago: It is a familiar and elementary rule of statutory construction that if it is not possible to reconcile inconsistent statutes, the dates of their enactment will be consulted in determining the legislative meaning and effect given to the later one. Marsh v. Aljoe, 41 Wyo. 119, 282 P. 1055, 1057 (Wyo.1929). [I]f the conflict cannot be reconciled so that the provisions can stand together, then the later provision will prevail over the prior one, and the prior law is considered amended by implication only to the extent of the conflict. Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 568 P.2d 908, 913 (Wyo.1977). [¶ 24] Reading the applicable statutes in pari materia, we conclude that the Commission's discretion in distributing state assistance to Community Colleges is abrogated solely to the extent that the Commission must establish a formula for the distribution of state assistance that is approved by a majority of the Commission which ensures that no institution's budget is reduced by more than 2% of the preceding fiscal year's total budget. [4] [¶ 25] Since the formula's implementation, this has consistently been the reading given to the statute by the Commission and the community colleges. The Commission generally allocates funds through its detailed formula pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-18-202(a)(xiv) and distributes them at times and in amounts it determines pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-18-205(c)(i). However, in 1998 the Commission faced a decision that is the true crux of this case. The Commission, with the cooperation of the community colleges, had approached the governor and the legislature with a specific budget request for a salary enhancement appropriation of $1,385,176 which would ensure that each college could reach the agreed-upon salary goal. The legislature's Joint Appropriation Committee, after much discussion, appropriated exactly that amount for salary enhancement funding. Unfortunately, in the final appropriation the funds were not separated or earmarked in any way but were rather included within the Commission's general appropriation. The Commission was then left with a difficult choice: distribute funds according to each college's requested need in order to effectuate the legislative salary enhancement objective, or distribute funds through the formula and most likely thwart the very purpose for which the funds were granted. The Commission ultimately determined that utilization of the distribution formula was inadequate to effectuate the legislative purpose behind the appropriation of the salary enhancement funds of $1,385,176. It then used the discretion granted to it as the agency charged with administering state support to community colleges to distribute the special purpose funds outside of the distribution formula. [5] [¶ 26] Reading the statutes in pari materia under the specific facts of this case, where ample evidence exists in the record to support the undeniable conclusion that the legislature appropriated funds for a specific purpose, we believe Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-18-202(a)(vii) and 21-18-205(c)(i) give the Commission the discretion to determine that its general distribution formula is inadequate to effectuate the precise legislative purpose behind the particular appropriation. Thus, the Commission could determine to distribute the $1,385,176 other than through the Commission's detailed general distribution formula and according to each college's individualized need. [¶ 27] However, we believe the legislative intent behind the requirement of a distribution formula, i.e. to ensure equitable distribution of state assistance among the seven community colleges, necessarily maintains its validity even when the Commission exercises its discretion to distribute funds other than through the general distribution formula. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1991) defines formula as a prescribed or set form or method. Id. at 485. Indeed, the Commission itself recognized this responsibility when it stated in its budget narrative request for the biennium at issue that one of its objectives is [t]o ensure the equitable distribution of, and accountability for, state aid dollars utilized in community college instructional and support programs. To even greater effect, the plain language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-18-202(a)(ix) mandates that the Commission shall ... insure uniform accounting of full-time equivalency and financial data of the community colleges. (Emphasis added.) Consequently, the Commission violated Wyoming statute when it distributed the funds according to budget requests that were not generated by a uniform methodology thus insuring a uniform accounting of the community colleges' salary enhancement data. No two colleges calculated their need for salary enhancement in precisely the same manner. Striking disparities in requested funds are found among those colleges that averaged their own salaries and compared those salaries to the comparator groups, and those colleges which did not average salaries. It would appear to this court to be a fundamental tenet of the concept of equitable distribution that while individual need may vary, the method used to calculate that need may not.