Opinion ID: 786737
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Likelihood of Confusion Claims

Text: 15 The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the trademark infringement, tradename infringement, unfair competition, and breach of contract claims because AutoZone failed to show that there existed a genuine issue of material fact concerning the likelihood of confusion. When evaluating the likelihood of confusion, we analyze and balance the following factors:

16 6.likely degree of purchaser care 7.the intent of Radio Shack in selecting the POWERZONE mark 17 8.the likelihood of expansion of the product lines. 18 Frisch's Rests., Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir.1982); see also Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562, 568 (6th Cir.2000) (applying the Frisch factors); Daddy's, 109 F.3d at 280 (same). These factors imply no mathematical precision, but are simply a guide to help determine whether confusion is likely. They are also interrelated in effect. Each case presents its own complex set of circumstances and not all of these factors may be particularly helpful in any given case.... The ultimate question remains whether relevant consumers are likely to believe that the products or services offered by the parties are affiliated in some way.  Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1107 (6th Cir.1991) (emphasis added). A focus on the ultimate question is critical when we review a district court's grant of summary judgment; a genuine dispute of material fact on any one of the eight factors does not demonstrate that a grant of summary judgment was improper when there is not enough total evidence for a jury to conclude that the junior mark is likely to confuse consumers. See id. (To resist summary judgment in a case where the likelihood of confusion is the dispositive issue, a nonmoving party must establish, through pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits in the record, that there are genuine factual disputes concerning those of the [] factors which may be material in the context of the specific case.). 19 Neither party disputes three of the eight Frisch factors — marketing channels used, likely degree of purchaser care, and likelihood of product-line expansion. First, the marketing channels used factor looks at the parties' predominant customers and their marketing approaches. Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623, 636 (6th Cir.2002). Where the parties have different customers and market their goods or services in different ways, the likelihood of confusion decreases. Id. As national retail outlets, both AutoZone and Radio Shack cater to the same general public and use the same marketing channels. Second, in analyzing the likely degree of purchaser care, the standard used by the courts is the typical buyer exercising ordinary caution. Daddy's, 109 F.3d at 285 (quotation omitted). Customers are unlikely to use any more than ordinary caution when purchasing the items offered by Radio Shack and AutoZone. Both of the above factors weigh in favor of the likelihood of confusion. Third, a strong possibility that either party will expand [its] business to compete with the other or be marketed to the same consumers will weigh in favor of finding that the present use is infringing. Homeowners, 931 F.2d at 1112 (quotation and citation omitted). Neither party intends to expand its business into the other's sphere. This factor accordingly weighs against the likelihood of confusion. 1. Strength of Senior Mark 20 The district court had resolved this factor in AutoZone's favor, concluding that as a matter of law, the AUTOZONE mark was strong. The strength of a mark is a factual determination of the mark's distinctiveness. The more distinct a mark, the more likely is the confusion resulting from its infringement, and therefore, the more protection it is due. A mark is strong and distinctive when the public readily accepts it as the hallmark of a particular source; such acceptance can occur when the mark is unique, when it has received intensive advertisement, or both. Daddy's, 109 F.3d at 280 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In general, [t]he stronger the mark, all else equal, the greater the likelihood of confusion. Homeowners, 931 F.2d at 1107. Trademarks are generally categorized as fanciful, arbitrary, suggestive or descriptive. Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Pizza Caesar, Inc., 834 F.2d 568, 571 (6th Cir.1987). Fanciful and arbitrary marks are considered to be the `strongest' or most distinctive marks.... `Suggestive' and `descriptive' marks either evoke some quality of the product ( e.g., Easy Off, Skinvisible) or describe it directly ( e.g., Super Glue). Such marks are considered `weaker,' and confusion is said to be less likely where weak marks are involved. Id.; see also Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1116-17 (6th Cir.1996) (A term for which trademark protection is claimed will fit somewhere in [a] spectrum which ranges through (1) generic or common descriptive and (2) merely descriptive to (3) suggestive and (4) arbitrary or fanciful. (quotations and citations omitted)). AUTOZONE is either a suggestive or a descriptive mark because it either suggests some quality of the AutoZone chain (Fulfill all your automotive needs here!) or describes the AutoZone stores (Enter a Zone filled with all things auto!). The mark is weaker than a fanciful mark (Exxon) or an arbitrary mark (Starbucks), particularly because it uses a word — ZONE — that is commonly found in other trademarks. See Daddy's, 109 F.3d at 281 ([T]he more common a word or phrase is, the less inherent trademark strength it may have, even when the mark has an arbitrary relation to the good or service to which it applies.); see also Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 260 (5th Cir.1980) (noting that although application of DOMINO to sugar is arbitrary, the mark faces limited protection outside the food-products industry because DOMINO is relatively common word). 21 Even though AUTOZONE is a suggestive or descriptive mark, and thus is less likely to cause confusion, there is no dispute that AUTOZONE is incontestable. Incontestable trademarks — those that have not been successfully challenged within five years of registration, see 15 U.S.C. § 1065 — are presumed to be strong marks. When a mark is incontestable, an infringement action may not be defended on the ground that the mark is merely descriptive. Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d 419, 422 (6th Cir.1999) (quotation omitted). While Jet prevents Radio Shack from arguing that AUTOZONE is weak simply by virtue of its descriptive or suggestive nature, Radio Shack can rebut the presumption of AUTOZONE's strength by proving extensive third-party use of similar marks. Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir.1998) ([A] mark is weakened outside of the context in which it is used if there is third-party use of the mark.). 22 Radio Shack contends that extensive third-party use of ZONE-related marks saps the strength of the AUTOZONE mark. Radio Shack presented evidence that 745 trademarks registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) use the term ZONE in various combinations. Sixteen registered marks use ZONE in the automotive-goods-and-services industry. Furthermore, in excess of forty websites use ZONE for a variety of services. [M]erely showing the existence of marks in the records of the [PTO] will not materially affect the distinctiveness of another's mark which is actively used in commerce. Homeowners, 931 F.2d at 1108. Rather, to be accorded weight a defendant must show what actually happens in the marketplace. Id. at 1108. Radio Shack has succeeded in showing widespread use of ZONE by presenting nearly 200 pages of evidence highlighting the active use of ZONE in a variety of industries. 23 While ZONE may be used pervasively in the marketplace, Radio Shack has not demonstrated that AUTOZONE is so similarly employed. [T]he validity and distinctiveness of a composite trademark is determined by viewing the trademark as a whole, as it appears in the marketplace. Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1392 (9th Cir.1993). The unit of analysis in considering the strength of the mark is the entire mark, not just a portion of the mark. There is scant evidence that AUTOZONE is a commonly used mark. Indeed, AutoZone has spent hundreds of millions of dollars in advertising its mark, and there is widespread consumer recognition of AutoZone's use of the mark, as even Radio Shack concedes. Thus, Radio Shack has failed to overcome the presumption that incontestable marks are strong. The district court properly concluded that AutoZone's mark was strong. 24 AutoZone asserts that the district court erred by not giving enough weight to the strength-of-mark factor in the overall eight-factor test. AutoZone suggests that the court did not accord AUTOZONE the broad protection to which strong marks are entitled, AutoZone Br. at 38, because the court failed to evaluate the other factors in light of the ruling that AUTOZONE was a strong mark. AutoZone's contention is baseless; AutoZone has not pointed to any case in which we have stated that the strength-of-mark factor predominates over the other seven Frisch factors. Contrary to AutoZone's position, the fact that a mark is strong does not impact our analysis of the similarity of the marks, the relatedness of the products and services, or any of the other factors in the likelihood-of-confusion test. 2. Similarity of the Marks 25 The similarity of the senior and junior marks is a factor of considerable weight. Daddy's, 109 F.3d at 283. When analyzing similarity, courts should examine the pronunciation, appearance, and verbal translation of conflicting marks. Id. A side-by-side comparison of the litigated marks is not appropriate, although naturally the commonalities of the respective marks must be the point of emphasis. Instead, courts must determine whether a given mark would confuse the public when viewed alone, in order to account for the possibility that sufficiently similar marks may confuse consumers who do not have both marks before them but who may have a general, vague, or even hazy, impression or recollection of the other party's mark. Id. (quotations omitted). 26 Radio Shack distorts this analysis slightly: it requests that we delete ZONE because of the word's common usage and consider only the similarity between AUTO and POWER, of which there is none. By doing so, Radio Shack asks us to violate the anti-dissection rule, whereby we view marks in their entirety and focus on their overall impressions, not individual features. Id.; see also Therma-Scan, 295 F.3d at 633; 3 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:41, at 23-123 (2003) (hereinafter McCarthy) (Conflicting composite marks are to be compared by looking at them as a whole, rather than breaking the marks up into their component parts for comparison.... The rationale for the rule is that the commercial impression of a composite trademark on an ordinary prospective buyer is created by the mark as a whole, not by its component parts.). 27 The AUTOZONE and POWERZONE marks have some visual and linguistic similarities, but ultimately their differences outnumber their similarities such that the likelihood of confusion is small. For both, the mark appears as a single word, with the first letter and the Z in ZONE capitalized. They each have three syllables, although the pronunciation of the first two syllables is not similar. Additionally, both marks are generally featured with a series of slanting lines bookending the main word. That is where the similarities end. Aside from the clear differences in the accentuation of the first syllables, the AUTOZONE font (soft-edged or rounded) is distinct from the POWERZONE font (more angular). The word AUTOZONE is slanted whereas POWERZONE is not. When viewed in conjunction with the slanted lines of decreasing thickness that emanate from the word AUTOZONE, the entire design gives an impression of momentum or speed. By contrast, the slanted lines on either side of the word POWERZONE are all of the same size, perhaps symbolizing the flow of power. Occasionally, POWERZONE appears without the slanted lines. POWERZONE is almost always featured on a cylindrical object that closely resembles a battery, particularly given the clear depiction of a battery's positive node on the right side of the object. AUTOZONE has no such aspect in its design. For the AUTOZONE mark, the word AUTOZONE appears in red and the slanted lines of decreasing width appear in orange. POWERZONE generally appears in black and white, but when it is in a color advertisement, POWERZONE is written in white, the slanted lines are black, and the battery is a coppery-yellow color. 28 Several cases provide points of comparison. In Jet we ruled that the marks JET and AEROB-A-JET were dissimilar. We noted that the two marks differed visually and verbally, partially because the first syllables of the marks received distinct emphasis. Jet, 165 F.3d at 423-24 (The most prominent part of AEROB-A-JET is not the shared term JET but the initial syllables AEROB-A....). In Daddy's, we ruled that Daddy's Junky Music Store and Big Daddy's Family Music Center were similar because both firms often advertised using only the nickname Daddy's and because Daddy's was not just a component of the mark, but was in fact the mark itself. Daddy's, 109 F.3d at 283-84. This case is more similar to Jet than to Daddy's: if both AutoZone and Radio Shack often used the nickname Zone or the Zone, Daddy's might control, but instead the differences between the first syllables of POWERZONE and AUTOZONE cannot be ignored, particularly giving the ubiquity of ZONE. See also Little Caesar, 834 F.2d at 571-72 (LITTLE CAESARS and PIZZA CAESAR are dissimilar because Caesar is often used in selling Italian food and because of the differences in sound and appearance); Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739 (2d Cir.1998) (finding a dissimilarity between STREETWISE and STREETSMART when both were used to sell maps), Gruner & Jahr USA Publ'g v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 1079-80 (2d Cir.1993) (PARENTS magazine and PARENT'S DIGEST magazine not confusingly similar). 29 Furthermore, the POWERZONE mark's consistent proximity to Radio Shack's house mark is significant. The use of a challenged junior mark together with a house mark or house tradename can distinguish the challenged junior mark from the senior mark and make confusion less likely. 3 McCarthy § 23:43, at 23-129; see Nabisco, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 220 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir.2000) ([Defendant]'s prominent use of its well-known house brand therefore significantly reduces, if not altogether eliminates, the likelihood that consumers will be confused as to the source of the parties' products.); Luigino's, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 831 (8th Cir.1999) ([T]he prominent display of the house marks convey[s] perceptible distinctions between the products.). The co-appearance of a junior mark and a house mark is not dispositive of dissimilarity, but it is persuasive. See 3 McCarthy § 23:43, at 23-130. POWERZONE almost never appears without its accompanying Radio Shack house mark. The Radio Shack mark appears on the battery slightly above the POWERZONE mark. The only deviation from this pattern is a webpage for RadioShack.com. However, multiple references to RadioShack.com and Radio Shack accompany this slightly different use of the POWERZONE mark, such that it would nearly impossible for an internet user to see POWERZONE without simultaneously recognizing its connection to Radio Shack. 30 In conclusion, the marks are not similar enough to create a likelihood of confusion. There are considerable visual and linguistic differences. Furthermore, the use of the Radio Shack house mark in proximity to POWERZONE reduces the likelihood of confusion from any similarity that does exist. 3. Relatedness of Goods or Services 31 The parties vigorously dispute the relatedness of their goods and services. We have employed three criteria for testing the relatedness factor: 32 First, if the parties compete directly, confusion is likely if the marks are sufficiently similar; second, if the goods and services are somewhat related, but not competitive, then the likelihood of confusion will turn on other factors; finally, if the products are unrelated, confusion is highly unlikely. 33 Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 624 (6th Cir.2003). The relatedness inquiry therefore focuses on whether goods or services with comparable marks that are similarly marketed and appeal to common customers are likely to lead consumers to believe that they come from the same source, or are somehow connected with or sponsored by a common company. Therma-Scan, 295 F.3d at 633 (quotation omitted). In a variety of other cases, we have held that bulk car wash products and car wash franchises, see Wynn II, 943 F.2d at 600, two slightly different types of oxygenating septic filters, see Jet, 165 F.3d at 422, and sit-down and carry-out pizza establishments, see Little Caesar, 834 F.2d at 571, are related enough to create a likelihood of confusion. However, infrared thermal-imaging devices and ear thermometers, see Therma-Scan, 295 F.3d at 623, and real-estate brokers and marketing services for real-estate brokers, see Homeowners, 931 F.2d at 1108-09, are not related enough to cause a likelihood of confusion. In Toucan Golf, Kellogg claimed that a golf-equipment manufacturer infringed the famous Toucan Sam trademark when the golf firm used a mark that featured a toucan perched upon a golf iron alongside the word Toucan Gold. Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d at 621-22. Kellogg asserted that even though it primarily manufactured breakfast cereal, its products were related to the golf industry because it offered golf balls and golf shirts featuring the visage of Toucan Sam and because it had run advertisements featuring Toucan Sam on a golf course. Id. at 624. We ruled that Kellogg's connection with the golf industry was tenuous, and consequently confusion was unlikely: We find that no consumer would associate Kellogg with top-line golf equipment based on Kellogg's extremely limited licensing of its characters of novelty items. Id. at 625. 34 AutoZone and Radio Shack do not fit neatly into our tripartite system. On the one hand, common sense suggests AutoZone and Radio Shack do not directly compete: few consumers would make the mistake of traveling to Radio Shack to purchase an oil filter or would enter an AutoZone to buy a DVD player. See J.A. at 950 (Sum. J. Hr'g Tr.) (the district court brusquely, but aptly asking, What idiot who wants to buy an automobile part is going to go to a Radio Shack?). On the other hand, the products offered by AutoZone and Radio Shack are not completely unrelated. AutoZone and Radio Shack compete directly in selling certain products, even though these products comprise less than 1% of AutoZone's total stock and AutoZone does not extensively advertise the types of products also sold in Radio Shack's POWERZONE area. Unlike Kellogg, in which the cereal manufacturer had made only superficial and extremely limited in-roads to the golf industry, AutoZone and Radio Shack, which generally occupy distinct niches, converge in the area of power sources and power connections. We are presented with a competitive context that combines elements of the first and third criteria: the parties compete directly in a very limited fashion, but for the most part, the products offered by each company are unrelated and their marks are not very similar. 35 AutoZone believes the degree of relatedness presents a genuine issue of material fact. AutoZone contends that the district court erred in focusing on the fact that the total overlap between the stores (number of products in common/total number of AutoZone products) was less than one percent when AutoZone offers 40% of the products sold by Radio Shack in its POWERZONE area. There is no factual dispute, however, because both figures are accurate and undisputed. The pertinent question is which method of examining the overlap best describes the relatedness of the products as a matter of law. The reality is that both figures inform the analysis by demonstrating that there is generally no overlap, except when considering a limited subset of products. It is also significant that most of these overlapping products are not unique to either Radio Shack or AutoZone, as batteries and power cords are generally offered by many different kinds of retailers, including grocery stores, pharmacies, and hardware stores. Furthermore, the 40% figure preferred by AutoZone is deceptive. We have no information about the percentage of Radio Shack products sold in the POWERZONE area. We also note that the existence of a high percentage of overlap when considering an extremely small subset of products does not demonstrate a high degree of relatedness: by AutoZone's logic, if POWERZONE stocked only five types of batteries all of which were also sold by AutoZone, the overlap would be 100%, even though in reality Radio Shack and AutoZone would share only five products of the approximately 55,000 offered by AutoZone. 36 In sum, although there is a minuscule overlap between the products offered by AutoZone and Radio Shack, which appears larger when limiting the analysis to only the POWERZONE store-within-a-store, the products offered by the two companies are not related enough such that this factor tilts in AutoZone's direction. 4. Evidence of Actual Confusion 37 Evidence of actual confusion is undoubtedly the best evidence of likelihood of confusion. Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1188 (6th Cir.1988) ( Wynn I ). [A] lack of such evidence is rarely significant, and the factor of actual confusion is weighted heavily only when there is evidence of past confusion, or perhaps, when the particular circumstances indicate such evidence should have been available. Daddy's, 109 F.3d at 284 (quotation omitted). AutoZone has failed to present any evidence of actual confusion. AutoZone and Radio Shack have simultaneously used their marks for three years, but AutoZone has been unable to demonstrate even one instance of actual confusion. AutoZone's reliance upon the study conducted by Michael Rappeport is misguided. Even on the undeserved assumption that Rappeport's study is methodologically sound, 2 the study neither provides evidence of actual confusion nor creates a genuine issue of material fact on the matter. The study ostensibly sought to discern the strength of AutoZone's mark. J.A. at 101 (Rappeport Study) (labeling the study as an attempt to test the strength and perception of the mark AUTOZONE.). No aspect of the study actually tested whether randomly chosen survey participants were confused between the two marks. In fact, the study did not even mention POWERZONE or Radio Shack. Because AutoZone presented no evidence of actual confusion, this factor should not have any bearing on the analysis. 5. Radio Shack's Intent 38 Finally, AutoZone argues that the district court erred because there is a genuine dispute over whether Radio Shack intentionally infringed upon the AUTOZONE mark. Proving intent is not necessary to demonstrate likelihood of confusion, but the presence of that factor strengthens the likelihood of confusion. Wynn II, 943 F.2d at 602; see also Wynn I, 839 F.2d at 1189 (While ... we do consider intention to be relevant when a plaintiff shows that a defendant knowingly copied the contested trademark, ... absent such a showing, intentions are irrelevant.). If a party chooses a mark with the intent of causing confusion, that fact alone may be sufficient to justify an inference of confusing similarity. Homeowners, 931 F.2d at 1111. Circumstantial evidence of copying, particularly the use of a contested mark with knowledge of the protected mark at issue, is sufficient to support an inference of intentional infringement where direct evidence is not available. Therma-Scan, 295 F.3d at 638-39. The intention factor naturally is considered in light of the other factors; a bad-faith intent to infringe upon another mark may not increase the likelihood of confusion if the other seven factors suggest that confusion is improbable. 39 AutoZone has presented no direct evidence of an intent by Radio Shack to infringe upon the AUTOZONE mark. AutoZone does not dispute Radio Shack's assertion that it did not copy the AUTOZONE mark or intend to trade off any of [AutoZone]'s goodwill in AUTOZONE when it chose the POWERZONE mark. J.A. at 784 (Pl. Local Rule 8(b)(7) Statement). Indeed, there is simply no evidence that Radio Shack chose the POWERZONE mark in order to steal customers from AutoZone. Radio Shack apparently selected POWERZONE based solely upon the results of a consumer survey. 40 AutoZone instead argues that circumstantial evidence of copying supports an inference of intentional infringement. As proof that Radio Shack was carelessly or negligently indifferent to AutoZone's trademark rights, AutoZone points to Radio Shack's knowledge of the AUTOZONE mark in conjunction with Radio Shack's failure to consult an attorney knowledgeable in trademark law before adopting POWERZONE. Radio Shack concedes that as a corporation it was aware of the AUTOZONE mark when it chose the POWERZONE mark, which is unsurprising given that Radio Shack itself agreed to the use of AUTOZONE as part of the 1987 Settlement. This circuit has not yet decided whether evidence of carelessness or negligence with regards to searches for preexisting marks suffices as circumstantial proof of an intent to infringe. We do not decide this issue today, although our decision in Daddy's implies the potential difficulty of employing such a standard. See Daddy's, 109 F.3d at 286-87 (Plaintiff is incorrect to the extent that it is suggesting that the mere prior existence of a registered mark demonstrates that the alleged infringer intentionally copied that mark; otherwise, presumably all trademark infringement cases could result in a finding of intentional copying.); see also A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 226, 232-33 (3d Cir.2000) (stating that mere carelessness is not enough to prove intent). Even if we were to assume that carelessness or negligence is sufficient to create an inference of an intent to infringe, there is no evidence that Radio Shack was careless or negligent in choosing POWERZONE. Radio Shack conducted two separate trademark searches — one through a trademark search company (Thompson & Thompson) and another through in-house counsel. Radio Shack chose POWERZONE, even though it knew about the AUTOZONE mark, because it believed that there was no infringement given the dissimilarity of the marks and the unrelatedness of the products offered by each company. 41 AutoZone has not presented any evidence of bad intent. Nor has it presented any circumstantial evidence of negligence or carelessness, if such evidence suffices to create an inference of intent to pilfer the goodwill in the AUTOZONE mark. This factor weighs against the likelihood of confusion.
42 The district court did not err in granting Radio Shack's motion for summary judgment because AutoZone did not present enough evidence for a jury to conclude that there was a likelihood of confusion. Most of the factors weigh against the likelihood of confusion: there is no evidence of actual confusion, the marks are not similar, there is no evidence that Radio Shack intended to cause confusion over the marks, and neither party plans to expand its product lines into the other's at any point in the near future. The relatedness-of-products factor at best does not aid the analysis and at worst suggests that the likelihood of confusion is small, given that AutoZone and Radio Shack offer completely disparate products except for one relatively small portion of their respectively enormous inventories. It is true that AutoZone's mark is strong, that AutoZone and Radio Shack use common marketing channels, and there is a low degree of purchaser care, all of which weigh in favor of a likelihood of confusion. Yet, these factors are not enough to tip the balance. In considering the touchstone question of whether relevant consumers are likely to believe that the products or services offered by the parties are affiliated in some way, Homeowners, 931 F.2d at 1107, AutoZone has simply not presented sufficient evidence that consumers are likely to be confused by Radio Shack's use of POWERZONE.