Opinion ID: 58
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 5019 Homestead Street & Stearn's Saliva

Text: It is a closer question whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that the affidavit established probable cause to search Edward Stearn's home at 5019 Homestead. Though not overwhelming, the affidavit contained circumstantial evidence that Stearn was a drug dealer, raising the inference that contraband would be found in Stearn's residence. Notwithstanding this commonsense inference, Burton directs that probable cause is established only if the affidavit contains evidence that (1) the defendant was a drug dealer, (2) the place to be searched was his home and (3) that home had a nexus to the defendant's drug activity. In our view, the affidavit adequately supports the second and third preliminary premises of Burton. It is a close question, however, whether the affidavit contained adequate evidence to support Burton's first preliminary premisethat Stearn was a drug dealerto raise the inference that drugs would be stored at his home. Consequently, we will resolve 5019 Homestead under the Leon good faith exception, and we uphold the search on those grounds. The strongest evidence that Stearn was a drug dealer was the confidential informant's assertion that Stearn was Joseph Doebley's supplier. (App. 88.) Although the affidavit did not directly corroborate this aspect of the informant's tip, the informant's demonstrated accuracy in other regards lends credibility to this assertion. In light of the tip, circumstantial evidence supported the inference that Stearn was a drug dealer, including Joseph and Michael Doebley's access to 5019 Homestead and its apparent centrality to their October 5 shuttling among Homestead Street properties and the Comly gym. ( Id. at 89.) Also relevant were Stearn's three prior drug distribution arrests and 5019 Homestead's apparent relationship to 5028 Homestead and Michael Doebley's vehicle. ( Id. at 88-89.) Indeed, even Stearn's conspicuous association with Joseph Doebley, a known drug dealer, supports the inference that Stearn was involved in the drug trade. See Burton, 288 F.3d at 104 (quoting Whitner, 219 F.3d at 298). Although Burton does not specify the quanta of evidence required to support each preliminary premise, we are mindful that the evidence that Stearn was a drug dealer is weaker than the evidence marshaled against the defendants in Whitner, Hodge, and Burton. In the Whitner affidavit, the affiant stated that the defendant had been arrested as a result of a controlled delivery of 5.75 pounds of methamphetamine. Whitner, 219 F.3d at 298. As described in the Hodge affidavit, on an informant's tip, officers were present at the defendant's scheduled delivery of crack cocaine; when he saw them, he fled, dropped his drugs near a trash can, and was immediately arrested. Hodge, 246 F.3d at 304. Finally, according to the Burton affidavit, a wired, reliable informant attempted to purchase drugs from a drug dealer under investigation, but inadvertently interrupted an apparently major drug transaction between that dealer and the defendant. Burton, 288 F.3d at 94-95. We found probable cause to search the defendant's home based on the informant's account, officers' statements that they observed the defendant deposit a plastic bag in his trunk, and our conclusion that the affidavit furnished probable cause that the defendant was a drug dealer. Id. at 104. Here, by contrast, the affidavit did not directly connect Stearn to an actual drug transaction, and did so only through a confidential informant and circumstantial corroboration. Burton, of course, calls only for evidence supporting [the] preliminary premise[] that the defendant is a drug dealer, of which we certainly have some. Id. at 104. Additionally, we believe Burton's second and third prongs are easily met. Indeed, the affidavit indicated that Stearn was 5019 Homestead's record owner and connected 5019 Homestead to the drug allegations via the informant's tip, the Doebleys' apparent at-will access and 5019 Homestead's peculiar relationship with both 5028 Homestead and Michael Doebley's Jeep. (App. 89.) But wary of carrying our Burton inference too far, we decline to decide whether these facts and the inferences to be drawn from them reasonably could lead a magistrate judge to conclude that [Stearn] was involved in the drug trade. Whitner, 219 F.3d at 298. Because the parties neither briefed nor argued this issue in detail, we will resolve the propriety of the 5019 Homestead search under the good faith exception. Contrary to the District Court's assertion, the affidavit was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable, either across the board or with respect to 5019 Homestead. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d at 436-437. As set forth above, the affidavit contained evidence on all three prongs of Burton, although evidence on the drug dealer prong was weaker than that adduced in Whitner, Hodge and Burton. But even if we determined that the evidence against Stearn was insufficient to invoke Burton, the officers could not be expected to know that the magistrate judge made an erroneous probable cause determination due to insufficient evidence connecting [Stearn's] house to drug dealing. Hodge, 246 F.3d at 309 (citation and quotation omitted). Indeed, the magistrate judge himself could not know whether this Court would ultimately agree with his determination given the unsettled jurisprudence governing cases of this type. Id. Accordingly, we conclude that the search of 5019 Homestead presented a close call. Once the magistrate judge made that call, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to rely on it. Id. Our decision to uphold the search of 5019 Homestead compels us to reject the District Court's conclusion that the warrant for the collection of Stearn's saliva is fruit of the poisonous tree. See Smith, 522 F.3d at 306 n. 2 (In light of the result that we reach here that the seizure and search were lawful, there was no `poisonous tree.'). Because he challenged only the search of 5019 Homestead, it is irrelevant for Stearn whether the warrant for saliva was obtained as a consequence of an illegal entry into another location. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134, 99 S.Ct. 421 ([I]t is proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated to benefit from the [exclusionary] rule's protections.); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (predicating exclusion of evidence as fruit of poisonous tree on the existence of a primary constitutional violation). Because Stearn made no alternative probable cause argument in his motion to suppress, we will reverse the District Court's suppression of Stearn's saliva sample. (See App. 107-108.)