Opinion ID: 727723
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the constitutionality of aldridge's plea bargain

Text: 9 Contrary to Aldridge's claim, we find that the plea bargain was not involuntary. The return clause was not inserted by the judge but was a part of the plea agreement negotiated between the prosecutor and the defense. The judge merely discussed the clause with Aldridge to ensure that Aldridge understood its implications. The verbal exchange in which the judge discussed the return clause with Aldridge during the plea colloquy did not amount to mental coercion that overbore Aldridge's will. See Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 866-68 (9th Cir.1986). 10 We further decline to grant relief on Aldridge's allegation that the state court judge failed to inform Aldridge of his right to appeal. First, under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), relief can be granted only if the right asserted was clearly established at the time Aldridge's conviction became final. No constitutional right existed in this circuit at the time Aldridge's conviction became final which imposed a duty on state court judges to inform defendants entering into a plea agreement of their right to appeal. Second, consistent with several other circuits, no such federal requirement exists even now in the Ninth Circuit. See Gairson v. Cupp, 415 F.2d 352, 353 (9th Cir.1969); Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781, 783 (5th Cir.1975); Barber v. United States, 427 F.2d 70, 71 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 867, 91 S.Ct. 108, 27 L.Ed.2d 106 (1970); United States ex rel. Green v. Pate, 411 F.2d 884, 888-89 (7th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1018, 90 S.Ct. 584, 24 L.Ed.2d 510 (1970), cited in United States v. Frazier, 705 F.2d 903, 908 n. 8 (7th Cir.1983); contra United States ex rel. Smith v. McMann, 417 F.2d 648, 654 (2d Cir.1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925, 90 S.Ct. 929, 25 L.Ed.2d 105 (1970). 11 We further find no constitutional violation in the use of the return clause. The constitutional validity of a plea agreement rests on whether the defendant freely and intelligently consented to it, and whether the state upheld its end of the bargain. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); see United States v. Anderson, 993 F.2d 1435, 1437 (9th Cir.1993). The state court judge did not proceed with the guilty plea colloquy until the agreement had been repeated by both the court and a prosecutor. The trial judge specifically asked and Aldridge confirmed that he understood the plea agreement to include the return clause, and Aldridge indicated that he still wished to enter the plea. Thus, review of the record indicates that Aldridge reasonably believed and understood that the plea agreement included the return clause. 12 Finally, we find no merit to Aldridge's claim that he should have been able to withdraw his plea when the court sentenced him to more than the eleven year, ten month sentence agreed to if Aldridge had appeared for sentencing. Due process requires that a defendant be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea when the guilty plea is not voluntary and intelligent, or when the government breaches the plea agreement. Stone v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 724, 726 (9th Cir.1978). As discussed supra, the record clearly indicates that the guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent, and the government did not breach the plea agreement. 13