Opinion ID: 527829
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the questions of liability

Text: 19 The Union, Carlock, Babin, Schiro, and Laird (collectively the defendants) argue on appeal that the district court erred in holding them liable under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 401-531 (1985 and Supp.1986) (LMRDA). The defendants also challenge the district court's conclusion that Union hiring hall procedures violated the duty of fair representation under the Labor Management Relations Act section 9(a), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 159(a) (1973) (LMRA). Further, the defendants argue that Guidry failed to exhaust his internal union remedies, and therefore, his case should have been dismissed.
20 Guidry argued below, and the district court found, that his rights under sections 101(a)(1), (2) of the LMRDA had been abridged, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 411(a)(1), (2), and that he had been wrongfully disciplined under sections 101(a)(5) and 609, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 411(a)(5) 2 and 529. 3 The court concluded that the defendants' manipulation of the hiring hall procedures to the detriment of Guidry and the other plaintiffs constituted violations of these provisions. It also concluded that Guidry's expulsion from the Union was violative of the LMRDA. The defendants assert that the evidence presented at trial does not support this portion of the verdict and that, therefore, the district court's factfinding is clearly erroneous for two reasons: (1) that there was no evidence to support the conclusion that Guidry exercised rights guaranteed him by the LMRDA, and (2) that there was no evidence to support the conclusion that the Union acted to retaliate against Guidry for having exercised those rights. Additionally, the defendants argue that even if the evidence supports the district court's underlying fact findings, its legal conclusion that the manipulation of hiring hall procedures constitutes discipline within the meaning of the statutes is erroneous. We address these arguments in order. 21 1) Did Guidry Oppose Union Leadership? 22 The district court found that Guidry [had] a long history of opposing incumbent Union officers. 669 F.Supp. at 772. The defendants challenge this finding as clearly erroneous and unsupported by the evidence and assert that Guidry failed to show either that he actually opposed Union leadership or that his opposition of that leadership was known. They characterize the evidence as demonstrating that Guidry opposed the Union leadership only until 1972, 4 and as failing to show--aside from Guidry's own testimony that he had opposed every administration since 1956--that his opposition continued beyond 1972. The defendants cite Chapa v. Local 18, 737 F.2d 929, 932 (11th Cir.1984), for the proposition that a plaintiff's bald assertion that he opposed union leadership and that the union retaliated is insufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff on an LMRDA wrongful discipline claim. 23 We begin by noting that the defendants are urging us to review the district court's factfinding. Our review is limited by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which provides that we may not set aside such findings unless clearly erroneous. This standard of review has been interpreted to mean: 24 [that] [i]f the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. 25 Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). Applying this standard, we conclude that the district court's factfinding is not clearly erroneous. The defendants' characterization of the record is incomplete. Far from simply containing Guidry's conclusory assertions that he generally opposed Union management, the record contains Guidry's specific testimony of particular instances of his opposition to the Union. 26 Guidry described in detail the circumstances of his decision in 1979 to go to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with evidence of Union corruption. Guidry made that decision after discussing his position with fellow Union members. Guidry testified that when Carlock and Laird discovered that he had gone to the FBI, they came on the job site at which Guidry was employed as master mechanic and sought to force his employer to discharge him. Guidry ultimately filed charges against Carlock with the Union's executive board. Although these events occurred outside the one-year prescriptive period applicable to Guidry's LMRDA claim, see infra at section IV.A, they are not too remote in time to have been found by the district court to have triggered Union retaliation. 27 Guidry's testimony is replete with examples of challenges he levelled against the Union leadership's operation of the hiring hall. These include a challenge to the hiring methods on a job for which he was asked to steward--Guidry openly complained that men who had never worked for the company before were hired as regular employees. Guidry also challenged the hiring hall when he discovered that his name had been left off the out-of-work list as a result of a new rule that required him to choose between the building trades and the pipeline lists. 28 According to Guidry's testimony, as well as that of Union members, Guidry's opposition to the Union leadership was hardly a secret. Charles Lovett, a member of the Union who was called to testify for the plaintiffs, noted that Guidry had been bucking the system at the Union for twenty-five years and had gained nothing. 29 The Union challenges this testimony as inadequate because it fails to show that Guidry either sought a Union office after 1972 or openly campaigned against the Union leadership in an election after 1972. The defendants argue that all of Guidry's political activity in the Union is too remote in time to support a claim of retaliation occurring in 1980-83. The flaw in the defendants' argument is their assumption that in order to assert a violation of section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA, a plaintiff must show that he or she spoke out in opposition to Union leadership in the context of an election. We read the statute to contain a much broader protection of speech. 30 The statute itself speaks of the right of every union member to express any views, arguments or opinions, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 411(a)(2), supra n. 2, and does not limit such expression to one occurring in the context of a union election. In fact, the statute refers separately to a union member's right to express his views upon candidates running for union office. Id. 31 The Supreme Court has characterized the LMRDA as the product of congressional concern with widespread abuses of power by union leadership. Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 435, 102 S.Ct. 1867, 1870, 72 L.Ed.2d 239 (1982). The Bill of Rights portion of that legislation was aimed at enlarged protection for members of unions paralleling certain rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. Id. at 435, 102 S.Ct. at 1870. Congress recognized that democracy would be assured only if union members are free to discuss union policies and criticize the leadership without fear of reprisal. Sheet Metal Workers' Intern. Ass'n v. Lynn, --- U.S. ----, ----, 109 S.Ct. 639, 645, 102 L.Ed.2d 700 (1989) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 112, 102 S.Ct. 2339, 2346, 72 L.Ed.2d 707 (1982)). 32 The defendants do not cite, nor have we found, any cases that limit the free speech rights protected by the LMRDA's Bill of Rights to speech relating directly to an election within the union. While we agree with the defendants' position that the evidence adduced at trial does not support the conclusion that Guidry formally opposed Union leadership after 1972 in the context of a Union election, we conclude that the district court was not clearly erroneous in its finding that Guidry openly opposed Union leadership at least up to the time that he filed this suit. 33 2) Did the Union Act to Retaliate Against Guidry for Exercising Free Speech Rights? 34 The district court found generally that hiring hall procedures were abused and threats of retaliation in the form of economic and physical injury were used to control Union members and to enrich those members who supported the leadership. 669 F.Supp. at 769. The court also enumerated the instances of such reprisals that specifically related to Guidry. In addition to discrimination in the hiring hall, the district court found that the Union retaliated against Guidry for his opposition to leadership by denying him a gold Union membership card recognizing his thirty years of service. Also, the district court found that Union economic pressure forced Guidry to violate Union rules and cross a picket line. The court found that when Guidry faced charges for having crossed the picket line, Laird telephoned supporters of the leadership to ensure that they would attend the meeting at which the membership was to vote on Guidry's fate--thus, making his expulsion almost certain. 35 The defendants challenge these factfindings as clearly erroneous. They argue that even if Guidry did show that he had been discriminated against in hiring hall referrals, he failed to show that such discrimination was connected to his exercise of rights protected under the LMRDA. They argue that the other union acts found by the district court to have been discriminatory were justified by long-standing Union rules. 36 The record contains abundant evidence, both in the form of testimony and documentation, of the procedures followed by Union leadership in referring applicants to jobs through the hiring hall. The court found twenty-one specific instances in which Union leadership manipulated the hiring hall procedure by employing one of the means outlined above. This resulted in direct harm to Guidry. See Taliaferro, 669 F.Supp. at 781-86 (Appendix). The district court concluded that each improper referral had been used to penalize Guidry (and the other plaintiffs) for their refusal to support the defendants. Id. at 776. 5 We do not find clear error in this conclusion. 37 The defendants argue that Guidry failed to show in each case of hiring hall discrimination that the intent of Union leadership was discriminatory. We disagree. Guidry (and the other plaintiffs) provided substantial evidence, particularly in the testimony of Laird, of the attitude of Carlock toward those members who had voted wrong in prior elections, and of the control Carlock exercised over the out-of-work list. This evidence, coupled with the clear evidence of Guidry's dissent from Union leadership, is sufficient to support a conclusion that the discrimination was intentional. Even though the evidence is largely circumstantial, it is sufficient to support the verdict. See Vandeventer v. Local 513 of Int'l Union of Op. Eng., 579 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir.) (holding that primarily circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support verdict that union had taken retaliatory action), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984, 99 S.Ct. 576, 58 L.Ed.2d 656 (1978). 38 Additionally, the plaintiffs introduced testimony and exhibits regarding the specifics of each wrongful referral found by the district court. After reviewing the evidence supporting each of the twenty-one wrongful referrals, which involved jumping over Guidry's name on the out-of-work list, this court is convinced that the district court's factfinding is correct and supported by substantial evidence. We, therefore, do not disturb the district court's conclusion that discrimination in the hiring hall referrals took place and was used in retaliation for Guidry's failure to support Union leadership. 39 3) Does the Manipulation of Hiring Hall Procedures Constitute Discipline within the Meaning of Sections 101(a)(5) and 609 of the LMRDA? 40 The defendants challenge the district court's holding that the wrongful hiring hall referrals constitute discipline within the meaning of sections 101(a)(5) and 609 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 411(a)(5) and 529. They argue that according to Finnegan v. Leu, supra, the term discipline in section 609 refers to actions taken by the union that diminish the membership rights of a union member. Hiring hall discrimination does not qualify, according to the defendants, because hiring hall referrals must be made available to non-union members. United Ass'n of Journeymen, Local 198 v. NLRB, 747 F.2d 326 (5th Cir.1984); National Labor Relations Act, Sec. 8(b)(1)(A), (b)(2), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(b)(1)(A), (b)(2). 41 The issue presented here--whether proof that a union has retaliated against one of its members for his exercise of a right protected under section 101 of the LMRDA constitutes discipline within the meaning of section 609 of that act--has been addressed by a number of courts with apparently contradictory results. We conclude, however, that the cases can be harmonized, and we hold that under the facts presented here, Guidry has made out a proper claim for wrongful discipline in violation of the LMRDA. In Miller v. Holden, we held: 42 Union action which adversely affects a member is discipline only when (1) it is undertaken under color of the union's right to control the member's conduct in order to protect the interests of the union or its membership, and (2) it directly penalizes him in a way which separates him from comparable members in good standing. 43 535 F.2d 912, 915 (5th Cir.1976). We decided that the claim brought in Miller--that the plaintiff's discharge from his employment by a trust established by, but separate from, his union--did not state a cause of action under the LMRDA because the discharge did not constitute discipline under the statute. In determining the meaning of discipline we looked first to the statute and its legislative history, id. at 914 n. 5 (citing 1 Legislative History of LMRDA of 1959, 338, 516, 619, 687, 858 (NLRB ed. 1959)), but concluded that neither was enlightening on the issue. We, therefore, applied the principal of statutory construction of ejusdem generis and construed the general term discipline to conform to the essential character of the three specific types of discipline listed in the statute: fine, expulsion, and suspension. Id. at 914-15. Our result required, as quoted above, that the union action separate the plaintiff from other union members in good standing to constitute discipline. 44 We followed the holding in Miller to find that manipulation of hiring hall referrals to the detriment of the plaintiff constituted discipline within the meaning of LMRDA in Keene v. International Union of Op. Eng., Local 624, 569 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir.1978). In that case, the plaintiff had unsuccessfully run for union office. He showed that after his loss in the election he received virtually no referrals through the union's hiring hall and that over two hundred people with less priority on the out-of-work list received referrals in preference to him. We held that a jury could reasonably conclude that such discrimination in referrals constituted discipline for exercising rights protected under the LMRDA. 45 The question, however, is not so easily resolved. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of what constitutes discipline under section 609 of the LMRDA in a different, but related, context in Finnegan v. Leu, supra. In that case, the plaintiffs sued under the LMRDA after they were discharged from their employment as union business agents following the election of Leu as president of the union. The plaintiffs had openly supported Leu's rival, the incumbent president, in the campaign. At trial, Leu explained that he had discharged the plaintiffs because he felt that they were loyal to the incumbent and would be unable to implement his policies. The Court held that the term discipline in section 609 refers only to retaliatory actions that affect a union member's rights or status as a member of the union. 456 U.S. at 437, 102 S.Ct. at 1871 (emphasis added). It concluded that the discharge of the plaintiffs from their appointive union positions was not within the scope of other discipline contemplated by section 609. Id. at 439, 102 S.Ct. at 1872. 6 The Court reasoned that the LMRDA was intended to protect rank-and-file union members, rather than union officers or employees. Therefore, while the plaintiffs' right to campaign against a candidate for union president was protected, such campaigning did not immunize them from discharge at the pleasure of the new president from their jobs as union employees. 46 In cases not involving the loss of employment within the union itself, an apparent conflict in interpreting Finnegan has arisen. In Hackenburg v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, Local 101, 694 F.2d 1237 (10th Cir.1982), the court followed Finnegan to hold that union members who were benched--that is they received no referrals--following a wildcat strike had not been otherwise disciplined within the meaning of the LMRDA. 47 In Hackenburg, the union, following the terms of its collective bargaining agreement with an employer, deprived the plaintiffs of any job assignments for ninety days as a result of their involvement in a wildcat strike. The plaintiffs sued, arguing that they had been otherwise disciplined within section 101(a)(5) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 411(a)(5), without the procedural protections afforded by that section. The court determined that the sanctions imposed were employment related rather than internal union related, 694 F.2d at 1240, and, relying on Finnegan, held that the procedural safeguards of section 101(a)(5) were not available because the punishment was not related to the union members' rights or status as members. Id. at 1239. 48 Turner v. Local Lodge # 455 of the Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 755 F.2d 866 (11th Cir.1985), involves circumstances very similar to those in Hackenburg. The plaintiffs in Turner also suffered a ninety-day benching pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement as a result of their refusal to cross an illegal picket line. The court first noted that the plaintiffs' contention that the benching had actually occurred in retaliation for their exercise of rights protected by sections 101(a)(1) and (2) of the LMRDA had been properly taken away from the jury because of the lack of evidentiary support. It then addressed the plaintiffs' contention--which was identical to that in Hackenburg--that the benching had violated section 101(a)(5) because proper procedures had not been followed before the union imposed the sanction. 49 The court considered the broad language in section 101(a)(5) and stated that the sweeping language ... cannot be read out of context, but must be taken as backing and support for union members exercising their 'Bill of Rights' and that any union disciplinary measure unrelated to the 'Bill of Rights' is not covered. Turner, 755 F.2d at 869. Therefore, the absence of any claim of retaliation by the union was fatal to the plaintiffs' LMRDA claim. The court then went on to state that under the interpretation of discipline found in Finnegan, the benching in the case before it did not constitute discipline, because it did not affect the plaintiffs' rights as members of the union in as much as union membership is not a requirement in order for one to be carried on the out-of-work list and receive employment referrals. Id. In concluding, however, the court noted that the case might be different if there had been evidence of, for example, retaliation for exercise of a protected right. Id. at 870. 50 Such a different result was reached by the Sixth Circuit in Murphy v. International Union of Op. Eng., Local 18, 774 F.2d 114 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017, 106 S.Ct. 1201, 89 L.Ed.2d 315 (1986), in which the court found that a denial of work assignments through a hiring hall to a union member in retaliation for his opposition of union leadership could be considered discipline within the meaning of section 101(a)(5). Murphy, 774 F.2d at 122. The court went on to uphold the district court's conclusion that although the union's actions were not discipline, they were nevertheless actionable as violative of sections 101(a)(1) and (2). The court distinguished Finnegan on the ground that the Finnegan court had been concerned with union employees and the right of a union leader to choose people to help him run the union. Id. at 123. The court stated: Plainly, the Supreme Court in Finnegan did not intend to rule out [29 U.S.C.] section 411 as a protection against manipulative discrimination on behalf of an ordinary union member seeking to exercise his right of expression at union meetings. Id. The court also distinguished Turner and Hackenburg simply by noting that the unions involved in both had acted pursuant to collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 122 n. 5. The court did not address the question of whether the language in Turner, which states that a refusal to refer a member to employment does not affect his rights as a member, 755 F.2d at 869, precluded a determination that such a refusal could constitute discipline in any circumstances. 51 In Moore v. Local 569 of the Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 653 F.Supp. 767 (S.D.Cal.1987), the court directly addressed the problem avoided in Murphy--that Turner appears to preclude a holding that discriminatory referral procedures affect union members' rights as a member of the union. The court began by analyzing the reasoning in the problematic dicta from Turner that because non-members could take advantage of a union hiring hall, membership rights are not affected by a discriminatory hiring hall. Moore, 653 F.Supp. at 770. The Moore court decided that this language did not preclude a determination that membership rights were ever affected by such discrimination for two reasons. First, the court inferred that in Turner, the plaintiffs no longer had a right to be referred to work because of their involvement in wildcat strikes prohibited under the collective bargaining agreement. Id. Second, and more importantly, the court reasoned that one of the rights of a union member was to receive nondiscriminatory referrals from the union hiring hall. The court concluded that the ability of non-members to place their names on the out-of-work list did not diminish and, in fact, had no relationship to that right. The court, therefore, rejected the union's contention in the case before it that the dicta in Turner regarding the issue of whether benching could constitute discipline should control. It found instead that the plaintiffs' allegations stated a cause of action under section 609 of the LMRDA. Id. at 770-71. 52 We agree with the Moore court's rejection of this dicta from Turner in circumstances such as those before us. It is apparent from the evidence that Guidry's name was repeatedly skipped over on the out-of-work list in retaliation for his outspoken opposition to Union leadership. Here, as in Murphy, and as distinguished from Turner and Hackenburg, there was evidence of a reprisal for exercise of rights protected under the LMRDA. The Turner court itself noted that if there is evidence of union retaliation the case might be different. We also point out that here, as distinguished from Finnegan, the question involves the right to fair treatment of a union member by his union. In Finnegan, the plaintiffs were seeking to retain their employment by the union, not something to which every union member is entitled. Here, on the other hand, the plaintiff simply seeks not to be singled out for unfair treatment by his union. We simply cannot agree with the defendants' contention that the discriminatory administration of the hiring hall does not represent the kind of discipline covered by the LMRDA.
53 The defendants challenge the district court's ruling on the ground that Guidry failed to exhaust his internal union remedies, and, as a result, they argue that his suit should have been dismissed. In his complaint, as well as on brief to this court, Guidry asserts that pursuit of his internal union remedies would have been futile, and therefore, he is not required to exhaust that avenue before filing this suit. The district court did not directly address this question, although it clearly did not find that Guidry's failure to exhaust internal union remedies precluded this suit. 54 Section 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 411(a)(4), allows courts in their discretion to require that a union member exhaust his internal remedies before filing suit. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 411(a)(4); Hammons v. Adams, 783 F.2d 597, 603 (5th Cir.1986); Chadwick v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 175, 674 F.2d 939 (D.C.Cir.1982). 55 Before a union member may bring suit against his union for breach of the duty of fair representation under section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185, the member must either exhaust union remedies or show an adequate reason for not doing so. Clayton v. International Union, 451 U.S. 679, 101 S.Ct. 2088, 68 L.Ed.2d 538 (1981). Here too, courts have discretion to decide whether to require such exhaustion. Id. at 689, 101 S.Ct. at 2095. Factors relevant to the inquiry of whether to require exhaustion are: (1) whether union officials are so hostile to the member that he cannot hope to obtain a fair hearing; (2) whether the union procedures are adequate; and (3) whether requiring exhaustion would unreasonably delay the member in pursuing his rights. Id. Guidry asserts that the first of these exceptions is applicable here. 56 The Union Constitution and Bylaws, admitted into evidence in the court below, provide simply that the local union's determination of any grievance shall be final and binding. Neither provides specific grievance procedures for the type of complaint Guidry asserts. In such absence of procedural requirements, an employee may proceed to file suit after pursuing his contractual remedies. Hammons, 783 F.2d at 602. Additionally, where it is clear, as here, that because the complaint is directed at those officials who would hear Guidry's complaint, the member should be excused for his failure to exhaust internal remedies. Hayes v. Brotherhood of Ry. and Airline Clerks/Allied Servs. Div., 734 F.2d 219 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 935, 105 S.Ct. 336, 83 L.Ed.2d 272 (1984).