Opinion ID: 2405482
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officer Chandler's Legal Advice

Text: After Stade expressed concerns about losing his license, [6] Officer Chandler told Stade that he could obtain a license for work purposes. Following the lead of the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287 (1st Cir.1995), the trial court applied both the procedural due process test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), and a substantive due process, fundamental fairness test to reach the conclusion that Officer Chandler's errant advice made Stade's submission to the breath test fundamentally unfair. This reliance on Roberts is misguided factually and legally. In Roberts, the defendant appealed from the imposition of an unwarned mandatory minimum period of incarceration imposed because of his refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test. Roberts, 48 F.3d at 1289. Although the police officer read Roberts the implied consent form, the standard warning in the form failed to inform Roberts that refusing the test would inevitably result in his incarceration. Id. Furthermore, during the implied consent process, the officer refused to permit Roberts to contact his attorney, despite Roberts' repeated requests to do so. Id. After receiving the incomplete warning, and without the help of an attorney, Roberts refused to take the blood-alcohol test and ultimately was sentenced to the minimum two-day period of incarceration for this refusal. Id. Recognizing the unique situation presented by the Roberts case, the First Circuit emphasized that the incomplete implied consent warning, by failing to inform Roberts of a mandatory, irrevocable and irrebuttable sentencing consequence, created a significant likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of his liberty. Id. at 1291-92, 1295. Moreover, Roberts was denied the opportunity to seek the advice of legal counsel who might have been able to correct misleading information provided by the state before Roberts was required to make an irrevocable decision that was crucial to his subsequent sentencing. Id. at 1293-94. The First Circuit concluded that it was fundamentally unfair to impose a mandatory minimum sentence on a person for his refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test when that person was required to make that refusal decision, with its attendant irrevocable consequences for his liberty, on the basis of inaccurate information and without the aid of requested legal counsel. Id. at 1295-96. None of the factors that the First Circuit found so compelling in Roberts are present in this case. The information on the work-restricted license, unlike the deficient warning in Roberts, did not induce Stade to make an irrevocable decision affecting his liberty interests. [7] Stade did not request, and therefore was not refused, the opportunity to consult an attorney to assist him in making his decision. Finally, unlike the information provided to Roberts as a result of the deficient standard warning form, Officer Chandler's errant legal advice was not a part of any prescribed arrest and testing procedure. The trial court characterized Officer Chandler's advice about the possibility of obtaining a work-restricted license from the Secretary of State as false. The Court characterizes it as an affirmative misrepresentation. Officer Chandler's advice does not deserve these harsh characterizations. Title 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2501 (1996) states in pertinent part: 1. Eligibility. Unless otherwise provided, the Secretary of State may issue a restricted license to a first-time OUI offender if A. Two thirds of the suspension period has expired; and B. The Secretary of State has received notice that the person has completed the alcohol and drug program. 2. Restrictions. A restricted license issued pursuant to subsection 1 is subject to the following conditions and restrictions; A. Use is limited to travelling to a treatment program or to employment for a minimum of 90 days after the original suspension date; and B. Any other conditions or restrictions the Secretary of State considers advisable for the safety of the public and the welfare of the operator. The officer gave Stade inaccurate information only in the sense that he apparently suggested that Stade would immediately be eligible for a work-restricted license. Instead, a first-time OUI offender may obtain a work-restricted license only after two-thirds of the suspension period has expired and the applicant completes certain other administrative requirements. [8] Despite this inaccuracy, the officer was certainly right that Stade was better off submitting to the test than refusing to submit. First, a refusal guaranteed Stade a six-month loss of license. 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2521(6) (1996). Second, Stade was no less subject to prosecution for the OUI charge without the results of the blood-alcohol test than he was with the results. In fact, Stade had a greater opportunity to retain his driving privileges by taking the test and then challenging the tests results at trial than he did by refusing to take the test. Third, Stade faced a shorter period of suspension of his license if he was convicted of OUI based on the blood-alcohol test results than if he were convicted of OUI and had refused to submit to a blood-alcohol test. The typical suspension for a first-time OUI conviction is 90 days. 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2451(3) (1996). Hence, if convicted of OUI on the basis of the results of the blood-alcohol test, Stade would be eligible for a work-restricted license 60 days after his conviction. 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2501(1) (1996). If Stade was convicted of OUI and had refused to submit to a blood-alcohol test, he faced a mandatory period of suspension of 270 days with no possibility of obtaining a work-restricted license during the first 180 days. 29-A M.R.S.A. §§ 2451(3) & (4); 2501(3); 2521(5) & (6) (1996). The Supreme Court has relied on the Due Process Clause's guarantee of fundamental fairness to exclude evidence and overturn convictions when the challenged governmental conduct is so contrary to the law of the land that it offend[s] those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples.... Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17, 65 S.Ct. 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029 (1945). Although I agree that law enforcement officers should read the implied consent form to a suspect and refrain from providing legal advice, and that in some circumstances the provision of such advice may violate a defendant's constitutional rights, I also conclude that the conduct of Officer Chandler in these circumstances falls far short of the type of misconduct that so chocks the sensibilities of civilized society as to necessitate exclusion of the evidence. Officer Chandler did nothing that constitutes the type of oppressive and deceptive conduct proscribed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To hold that such conduct deprives Stade of his rights within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment would trivialize the centuries-old principle of due process of law. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332, 106 S.Ct. 662, 665, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). I would vacate the trial court's suppression order. WATHEN, C.J., and GLASSMAN, J., concur.