Opinion ID: 223257
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Oklahoma Penitentiary Packet

Text: Watson argues that the district court erred in admitting the government's Exhibit 14  the Oklahoma penitentiary packet  because the exhibit was not self-authenticating and, therefore, the admission of the exhibit without calling the custodian of the records to testify violated Watson's right to confront witnesses against him. [3] Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 902, [e]xtrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to... [a] copy of an official record or report or entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a public office, including data compilations in any form, certified as correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make the certification.... Fed.R.Evid. 902(4); see also United States v. McIntosh, 200 F.3d 1168, 1169 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (When an authorized person certifies facts in public records, the records are admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(8) and 902(4).). Here, the penitentiary packet was authenticated by a certificate which stated: I, KEVIN E. MOORE, hereby certify: I am the coordinator of the Offender Records Unit of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, the agency having jurisdiction over all adult corrections facilities of the state of Oklahoma; that in my legal custody as such officer are the original files and records of persons heretofore committed to the Department of Corrections; that the 1) fingerprint card, 2) photograph, and 3) commitment documents attached are copies of the original records of persons heretofore committed to the said Department of Corrections, and who served a term of incarceration/supervision therein; that I have compared the foregoing and attached copies with their respective originals now on file in my office and each thereof contains and is a full, true, and correct copy from its said original. Watson contends that this certificate is so vague, internally contradictory, and confusing that the exhibit failed to be self-authenticating. Specifically, Watson argues that the certificate is inadequate because it fails to identify that the attached records relate to Marcellus J. Watson and because it purports to certify the authenticity of one fingerprint card and one photograph of Watson when, in fact, two fingerprint cards and two photographs were attached. Watson's arguments are specious. The photographs of Watson and his fingerprint cards fall within the self-authentication provisions of Rule 902. As an initial matter, the Secretary of State of the State of Oklahoma certified under seal, pursuant to Rule 902(2), that Moore was authorized to execute the certificate and that Moore's signature was genuine. Further, pursuant to Rule 902(4), the records were certified as correct by Moore, who also stated that he was the legal custodian of the records and that he had compared the certified copies to their originals. This suffices to establish that the records were what they purported to be, fulfilling the purpose of our inquiry into the authentication of the documents in the `penitentiary packet.' United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1073 (9th Cir.2005); Fed.R.Evid. 901(a) (The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.). The records themselves identified Watson by name, date of birth, and Social Security number. There is no reason that the certificate needed to reproduce the information contained within the records whose authenticity it established. Further, the certificate was sufficient to authenticate both fingerprint cards and both photographs contained in the penitentiary packet even though the certificate refers to the fingerprint card and photograph in the singular. The certificate made clear that Moore was certifying all of the documents to which the certificate was attached, and the insignificant discrepancy between the certificate's description and the actual contents of the packet was not so great as to give a reasonable person any doubt as to the authenticity of the exhibit. Rule 902 does not require more than the government provided here. Cf. United States v. Aikins, 946 F.2d 608, 614 (9th Cir.1990) (explaining that Rule 902 relies on the probable trustworthiness of the public officer's statement, and its concern is to avoid the great inconvenience that would be caused to public business if public officers had to be called to court to verify in person every fact they certify). If Watson believed the information contained in the penitentiary packet was incorrect, he was entitled to present evidence to show the certified state court document was incorrect. McIntosh, 200 F.3d at 1169. He did not do so, however, and the fact that rebuttal evidence may exist does not preclude the records from being self-authenticating. Id.; see also United States v. Bisbee, 245 F.3d 1001, 1007 (8th Cir.2001) (That [the defendant] presented evidence tending to contradict the facts in the [public documents admitted pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 902] does not render the properly admitted evidence inadmissible.). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's finding that the records contained in the penitentiary packet were admissible as self-authenticating public records under Rule 902(4).
Finally, Watson argues that the district court erred in assessing one criminal history point for Watson's Oklahoma conviction for possessing a firearm while committing a felony. [4] Specifically, Watson challenges the district court's determination that his prior conviction was a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e). We review de novo a district court's finding that a prior conviction constitutes a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Craig, 630 F.3d 717, 723 (8th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 4A1.1(e) directs the sentencing court to [a]dd [one criminal history] point for each prior sentence resulting from a conviction of a crime of violence that did not receive any points under [§ 4A1.1] (a), (b), or (c). Section 4A1.1(e) does not itself define the term crime of violence, but Application Note 5 of the commentary to this section states, For purposes of this guideline, `crime of violence' has the meaning given that term in § 4B1.2(a). Section 4B1.2(a), in turn, provides: The term `crime of violence' means any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that  (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Here, the offense of conviction provides that, Any person who, while committing or attempting to commit a felony, possesses a pistol, shotgun or rifle or any other offensive weapon in such commission or attempt ... in addition to the penalty provided by statute for the felony committed or attempted, upon conviction shall be guilty of a felony for possessing such weapon or device, which shall be a separate offense from the felony committed or attempted. 21 Okl. St. § 1287. It is undisputed that Watson's conviction under 21 Okl. St. § 1287 was for possessing a pistol while committing the crime of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, which is a felony under 63 Okl. Stat. 2-401(A)(1). [5] Therefore, our focus is on the crime of possessing a firearm while committing a drug trafficking offense. Because this crime does not involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another and does not constitute burglary of a dwelling, arson, ... extortion, [or the] ... use of explosives, § 4B1.2(a), we must decide whether it qualifies under the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2). Craig, 630 F.3d at 724. To qualify as a crime of violence under the residual clause, Watson's prior conviction must (1) present[] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, and (2) be roughly similar, in kind as well as degree of risk posed, to the offenses listed in § 4B1.2(a)(2). [6] United States v. Boyce, 633 F.3d 708, 711 (8th Cir.2011); see also Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142-43, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008). [A] crime involves the requisite risk when the risk posed by the crime in question is comparable to that posed by its closest analog among the enumerated offenses. Sykes v. United States, ___ U.S. ____, 131 S.Ct. 2267, 2273, 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011) (explaining that the crime of vehicle flight from a law enforcement officer after an order to stop poses risks akin to that of arson and burglary) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). We conclude that possession of a firearm while committing a drug trafficking offense presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, and that such risk is similar, in kind as well as degree of risk posed, to the enumerated offenses. We have previously recognized that [t]he likelihood of violence greatly increases when a firearm is present in connection with illegal drug possession. United States v. Linson, 276 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th Cir.2002); see also United States v. Ruiz, 412 F.3d 871, 881 (8th Cir.2005) ([T]here is a close and well known connection between firearms and drugs. Firearms are tools of the drug trade due to the dangers inherent in that line of work. (internal citation omitted)). The crime of possessing a firearm while committing a drug trafficking offense will not always result in a violent confrontation. However, we think that the crime creates a risk of violent confrontation that is at least as substantial as the risk created by the enumerated crime of burglary. Accord United States v. Fife, 624 F.3d 441, 447-48 (7th Cir.2010) (Given the well-established connection between violent crime and the illegal drug trade, the possession of a weapon while dealing cocaine presents a serious potential risk of physical injury that is certainly similar to, if not substantially greater than, the enumerated crimes of burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving the use of explosives.); cf. Craig, 630 F.3d at 724 ([W]hile the crime itself may be accomplished without violent physical force, the offense may nevertheless be a crime of violence under the residual clause if it creates a substantial risk of a violent confrontation and involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive behavior (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Hennecke, 590 F.3d 619, 623 (8th Cir.2010) (holding that stealing from a person is a crime of violence under the residual clause because it poses the same risk of violent confrontation with the victim or a third person as attempted or completed burglary); United States v. Parks, 620 F.3d 911, 915 (8th Cir.2010) (The enumerated crime of burglary can be accomplished without purposeful violence, but it is a crime of violence because the offender purposefully and aggressively creates a substantial risk of violent confrontation.). Watson contends that, under Begay, the prior offense cannot be similar in kind to the enumerated offenses unless it involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct. However, as the Supreme Court recently explained in Sykes, Watson's position overreads the Court's opinion in Begay. 131 S.Ct. at 2275. The phrase `purposeful, violent, and aggressive' has no precise textual link to the residual clause, which requires only that the prior offense otherwise involv[e] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Id. (quoting § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Thus, provided the felony at issue is not akin to strict liability, negligence, or recklessness crimes, it qualifies as a crime of violence under the residual clause if it is, as a categorical matter, similar in risk to the listed crimes. Id. at 2275-76. That is the case here. Like burglary, carrying a firearm while committing a drug trafficking offense is dangerous because it can end in confrontation leading to violence. See id. at 2273. Firearms are the tools of the drug trade providing protection and intimidation. Linson, 276 F.3d at 1019. When a drug dealer carries a firearm, that behavior indicates that he is prepared to use violence if necessary and is ready to enter into conflict, which in turn creates a danger for those surrounding [him]. Boyce, 633 F.3d at 712 (internal quotation marks omitted). Possession of a firearm while committing a drug trafficking offense is similar, in kind as well as degree of risk posed, to the offenses listed in § 4B1.2(a)(2). Watson's Oklahoma conviction is a crime of violence under the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2). Consequently, the district court did not err in calculating Watson's criminal history category.