Opinion ID: 1745422
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rachel's loss of society and companionship

Text: The second issue presented involves whether a minor child has a separate cause of action for loss of society and companionship when medical malpractice causes the death of one parent and the decedent is survived by his or her spouse. As an element of common law, the doctrine permitting recovery for loss of society and companionship was initially created and developed by courts of law. Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 401, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975). Thus, this is an area where either this court or the legislature may act. Id. In Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967), we declared for the first time that a woman could maintain an action for the loss of her husband's consortium. We stated at 551-52: The genius of the common law is its ability to adapt itself to the changing needs of society. Because the bases on which the old common-law rule which denied to the wife the right of recovery for loss of her husband's consortium rest on historical concepts which long ago disappeared, we deem the rule of Nickel v. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. should be overruled. . .. In Shockley, 66 Wis. 2d at 401, we concluded for the first time that the law should recognize the right of parents to recover for loss of aid, comfort, society and companionship of a child during minority when such loss is caused by the negligence of another. The Shockley decision focused upon the changes in the family relationship which occurred since 1925, when the court found that parents could recover only for the loss of the minor's earning capacity and reasonable medical and nursing expenses during minority. Id. at 396-97 (citing Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., 188 Wis. 376, 380, 206 N.W. 198 (1925)). In rejecting the argument that if such a change is to be made, it should be made by the legislature and not the courts, we reiterated that the common law is a developing body of law and that it is as much the court's responsibility as the legislature's to make changes in the law where the common law rule no longer fits present-day social realities. Shockley at 397-99. In Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 527, 344 N.W.2d 513 (1984), we were faced with the reverse situation of that found in Shockley, namely whether the minor children of an injured parent could maintain an action for loss of society and companionship. We stated that it was only logical that the next step in this progression is to protect the child's interest in the parent-child relationship. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 519. We recognized that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue refused to recognize the cause of action. However, we noted an emerging trend towards recognition, and were persuaded by the rationale found in those decisions. Id. at 520. Accordingly, we did not await legislative creation of a cause of action, but rather held that a child may bring a cause of action for the loss of a parent's society and companionship resulting from another's negligence. Id. at 527. The defendants argue that Theama is distinguishable on the grounds that the case involved an injury to the parent, rather than death as in the present case. When death results, the defendants insist that the provisions of sec. 895.04(2), Stats., disallow a child an independent cause of action when the deceased parent is survived by his or her spouse. In support of their argument, the defendants cite Hanson v. Valdivia, 51 Wis. 2d 466, 475, 187 N.W.2d 151 (1971), where in applying sec. 895.04(2), this court stated: [S]urviving children do not have a cause of action for the wrongful death of one of their parents when the decedent is survived by his or her spouse . . .. When there is a surviving spouse the action must be brought by or on behalf of that spouse, and the only special protection afforded the children is that the court may, in its discretion, impose a lien in favor of the children on the amount recovered, not in excess of 50 percent of the recovery. We disagree that sec. 895.04(2), Stats, prevents recovery in the case presently before us. Rachel's claim originates under ch. 655 rather than the general wrongful death statutes. Chapter 655 controls all claims for injury or death on account of medical malpractice . . .. Section 655.007. As stated previously, by singling out medical malpractice claims in such a manner, the legislature intended to set medical malpractice cases involving death apart from other death cases to which the general wrongful death statute applies. Therefore, sec. 895.04(2) does not prevent a minor child from maintaining a cause of action for loss of society and companionship when medical malpractice causes the death of a parent. [3] We thus conclude that the reasons expressed in Theama for recognizing a minor child's cause of action for loss of society and companionship in cases involving injury to the parent apply with equal force to cases where medical malpractice causes death. Chapter 655, Stats., recognizes that there is no logical distinction between injury and death claims arising out of medical malpractice. Once medical malpractice produces a loss, a remedy exists regardless whether the consequence is injury or death. We further conclude consistent with Theama, that recovery under this cause of action is limited to the child's minority, since the minor is the one whose relationship is most likely to be severely affected by negligent injury or death to the parent. Id. at 527. [1] Because the trial court precluded Rachel's claim for loss of her mother's society and companionship, and the court of appeals affirmed that determination, the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on this issue.