Opinion ID: 2589857
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Prior settlements

Text: The district court allowed Dean Witter to present evidence demonstrating the reconveyance of three parcels of real property to Elfreda's estate pursuant to the Jack Gardner Settlement. Dean Witter was also allowed, through the testimony of Sue Gardner, to inform the jury that the property returned to the Estate was worth more at the time it was deeded back than when it was purchased. In sum, the district court permitted evidence of the return of certain real and personal property totaling $1,570,858.00, which included the Hummel figurines, model trains, furniture, gold coins, and money spent by Jack on the acquisition of various pieces of real property. Dean Witter contends that the restitution evidence was relevant to mitigate the damages sustained by the Estate. In making this contention, Dean Witter refers us to our statement in Bader that [t]he return of the property converted does not nullify the conversion[, but can] serve to mitigate damages. Bader, 96 Nev. at 356, 609 P.2d at 317. Alternatively, Dean Witter asserts that if the district court erred in admitting this evidence, any error was harmless. [8] We disagree. Although the fact that the Estate had settled its liability claims against Jack and Sue Gardner was not disclosed to the jury, the district court admitted evidence that real and personal property had been returned to the Estate. It did so under Bader 's statement that, in a conversion case, damages may be reduced or mitigated by payments or return of the converted property by the tortfeasor. The district court's ruling on the admissibility of the restitution by Jack and Sue Gardner is problematic because of the context within which such evidence is admissible under Bader, and because of our subsequent ruling in Moore v. Bannen, 106 Nev. 679, 680-81, 799 P.2d 564, 565 (1990). Our statement in Bader that evidence of restitution is admissible for the purpose of showing mitigation of damages was made in reference to a matter where a single defendant charged with civil conversion had restored the property to the alleged victim of the conversion. The restitution in Bader was not, as here, made by a third party. Also, the evidence of mitigation in Bader, the restoration or release of a cattle brand back to the original owner, was relevant to show that consequential damages, i.e., loss of use stemming from the original conversion, were not as great as alleged. Therefore, return of converted property would only mitigate consequential damages attendant to the loss of use of the converted property. Here, the sole measure of damages sought by the Estate was the value of the securities at the time of conversion plus interest. The Estate made no claim for consequential damages other than loss of interest. Here, the district court, rather than the jury, assessed the interest to which the Estate was entitled. We therefore conclude that the district court erred in admitting evidence of the conveyance and return of personal and real property because this restitution did nothing to mitigate consequential damages; rather, it allowed the jury to consider evidence of the value of property that was returned as an offset to the value of the property taken, i.e., non-consequential damages. This, we also conclude, runs afoul of our ruling in Moore v. Bannen . In Moore, we held that, where there has been a settlement between a plaintiff and one of several defendants, the jury may not be informed as to either the fact of the settlement or the sum paid. Moore, 106 Nev. at 680-81, 799 P.2d at 566 (emphasis added). Consistent with our decision in Moore, we now conclude that evidence of a portion of the consideration paid in settlement by third parties creates the same potential for confusion and speculation in the minds of the jurors as does evidence of the total consideration paid. We therefore hold that the restitution evidence was admitted below in error. Thus, to the extent that Bader would allow admission of such evidence in mitigation of non-consequential damages, it is hereby expressly overruled. [9] An examination of the record clearly shows that the mitigation evidence unduly influenced the outcome. Again, the court's ruling limited the extent of damages to $4,173,079.00. The jury then awarded compensatory damages in the sum of $2,600,000.00. The net result was a compensatory damage verdict in an amount substantially less than the minimum damages actually sustained by the Estate. Accordingly, we conclude the district court erred in admitting the restitution evidence.