Opinion ID: 1999504
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial court's examination of defendant.

Text: After examination of the defendant by both the defense counsel and the state, the court asked her a series of questions about her family background and marital status. The state objected to this line of questioning on the grounds that it was irrelevant and immaterial. The court then asked defense counsel what his position was on the matter. Defense counsel stated that he agreed with the prosecutor but if the court felt it wanted the information and it would be helpful to the jury, he would go along with it. Defendant urges that the outcome of the trial depended largely upon the credibility of the defendant and that the questions did not serve to clarify her testimony but rather sidetracked the jury in this determination. Furthermore, it is argued that the questions were inherently prejudicial. While the testimony elicited was unnecessary to clarify previously received testimony, Flowers v. State (1969), 43 Wis.2d 352, 364, 168 N. W.2d 843, and under the circumstances was unnecessary to aid in the discovery of the truth, Lemerond v. State (1969), 44 Wis.2d 158, 164, 170 N. W.2d 700, it cannot be said that the questioning demonstrated a lack of impartiality by the trial court. Neither can it be said that the testimony was inherently prejudicial. See State v. Herrington (1969), 41 Wis.2d 757, 767, 165 N. W.2d 120. This is not a situation where the trial court pursued a course of extensive examination indicating a premonition of guilt. See United States v. Fry (7th Cir. 1962), 304 Fed. 2d 296. We would again state that the jury was instructed to disregard any impression of the trial court as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. In Flowers v. State, supra, pages 364, 365, the court held: . . . While, at an optimum, a trial judge should abstain from all comments or questions that would give the appearance of a prejudgment of guilt or hostility toward the defendant or his counsel, we see nothing herein of that nature which would require a reversal. . . . Likewise, from our examination of the entire record in this case, we find nothing of the nature that would require reversal. The defendant has not been denied a fair and impartial trial, and it is not probable that justice has been miscarried. Therefore, no basis exists for granting a new trial in the interest of justice, pursuant to sec. 251.09, Stats. See Woodhull v. State (1969), 43 Wis.2d 202, 168 N. W.2d 281. By the Court. Judgment affirmed.