Opinion ID: 783238
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discriminatory discharge theory of liability

Text: 24 Russell next argues that the District Court erred in concluding that it cannot reasonably be inferred that TG Missouri's proffered reasons for her termination were a pretext for a discriminatory discharge based upon her disability. 8 Brief for Appellant at 38-54. In support of this argument, Russell relies upon Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 152 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir.1998) ( Young ) (reversing summary judgment for employer on disability discrimination claim under the ADA where the plaintiff met his prima facie burden and the employer's discredited and inconsistent reasons for terminating the plaintiff gave rise to genuinely disputed issues as to pretext and, ultimately, intentional discrimination.). In this context, to survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must: (1) present evidence creating a fact issue as to whether the employer's proffered reason[] [is] pretextual; and (2) present evidence that supports a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination. Id. at 1023. Russell maintains that she presented sufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment. The evidence shows, for example, that TG Missouri made the decision to terminate her on Friday, October 22, 1999; however, after she did not come to work on the following Saturday, TG Missouri altered its documentation of its reasons for her termination to include insubordination based upon her failure to appear for work that Saturday. Russell contends that the evidence further shows that two similarly situated, non-disabled employees were not discharged under similar circumstances, and that TG Missouri did not follow its own policies when it terminated her without adequate prior warning. All this evidence, she concludes, supports the inference that TG Missouri's proffered reasons are not worthy of credence and are mere pretexts for discrimination based upon her disability. We disagree. 25 The evidence does show that, on October 22, 1999, TG Missouri made the decision to terminate Russell for leaving her shift without permission and that, on the same day, Darren Blankenship filled out a Status Change form for Russell and checked the box for resignation as the reason for change. See Appellant's Appendix at 263 (Status Change form). In his deposition, Blankenship readily admitted that the decision to terminate Russell was made on Friday, October 22, and that the status change form was altered after Russell did not show up for work on Saturday, October 23. He explained that he initially construed Russell's voluntary departure on that Friday as a resignation, but was subsequently instructed to change the checked box to termination. Blankenship further explained that the date was changed because, despite their attempts to contact Russell over the weekend, they were unable to notify Russell of her termination until Monday, October 25, and, moreover, that was the day on which they obtained all the necessary signatures. Appellant's Appendix at 280-83 (deposition of Darren Blankenship). Addressing the reference to Russell's insubordination on the Status Change form, 9 Blankenship testified: [T]he day in question, Friday the 22nd, when she left, that was the reason that we had ended her employment. 26 What I will say, though, is because she also did not come in Saturday — because we were not able to contact her,... she already knew that she was scheduled to come in — when she left Friday around noon, she had already been told that she was going to be expected to come in Saturday.... We were not able to contact her before that Saturday came around about the fact that her employment had ended Friday. So because she didn't come in Saturday, that was not the reason she was terminated, but it did — it did add to our case or did add to the fact that she had chosen not to return to work. 27 Id. at 280-81 (deposition of Darren Blankenship). 28 In Young, the employer initially told the plaintiff that he was being discharged for performance deficiencies, but later abandoned the performance deficiencies rationale and instead claimed that the plaintiff had been laid off due to a lack of available work. This Court observed that the plaintiff produced evidence indicating that [the employer's] characterizations [of his alleged deficiencies] were at best carelessly inaccurate and at worst willfully exaggerated and that the lack-of-work rationale was never mentioned to the plaintiff at the time of his dismissal. 152 F.3d at 1023. Under such circumstances, there was a genuine issue of fact regarding pretext. This Court explained: 29 This evidence not only supports an inference that [the employer] has abandoned its initial stance, but also supports a reasonable inference that the company's current explanation is contrived. 30 .... 31 We conclude that a trier of fact could conclude from the foregoing evidence that Young's discharge was due neither to performance deficiencies, as [the employer] initially told him, nor to lack of available work, as the company now claims. When an employer has offered different explanations for an adverse employment action and when evidence has been presented that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to disbelieve each explanation, the trier of fact may reasonably infer that the employer is hiding something — that is, that the true explanation is unlawful discrimination. 32 Id. at 1023-24. 33 By contrast, in the present case, it is undisputed that Russell left her post in the middle of her shift on Friday, October 22, 1999, after specifically being told that doing so would result in an unscheduled absence. TG Missouri relied upon Russell's unscheduled departure from work as the basis for its initial decision to terminate her and did not abandon that rationale when it additionally cited her failure to show up for work on Saturday as another ground for her discharge. Each of the two justifications was asserted as soon as the underlying events occurred, and there is no issue of fabrication as to those underlying events. In sum, although Russell's failure to report for work on that Saturday was not a basis for TG Missouri's initial decision to terminate her (made the day before), we cannot reasonably construe TG Missouri's subsequent reliance upon that ground as evidence of pretext or discriminatory motive. 34 We now turn to Russell's pretext argument based upon a disparate treatment theory. She maintains that two similarly situated employees of TG Missouri, Lance Evans and Brad Drew, were disciplined less severely for engaging in violations of comparable seriousness to hers. See Brief for Appellant at 50-52. 35 In order to create a reasonable inference of pretext on this disparate treatment theory, Russell must show, among other things, that, at the time of their respective violations, she and Evans, or she and Drew, were similarly situated in all relevant respects and yet she received a more severe punishment for committing substantially the same offense. See Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir.1994) (Employees are similarly situated when they `are involved in or accused of the same offense and are disciplined in different ways.') (quoting Boner v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 674 F.2d 693, 697 (8th Cir.1982)). As Russell suggests, it is not necessary that she prove that the violations were identical, just that they were of comparable seriousness. See Lynn v. Deaconess Med. Ctr.-W. Campus, 160 F.3d 484, 488 (8th Cir.1998) (To show that employees are similarly situated, a plaintiff need only establish that he or she was treated differently than other employees whose violations were of `comparable seriousness.' To require that employees always have to engage in the exact same offense as a prerequisite for finding them similarly situated would result in a scenario where evidence of favorable treatment of an employee who has committed a different but more serious, perhaps even criminal offense, could never be relevant to prove discrimination. Common sense as well as our case law dictate that we reject such an approach. (citations and footnote omitted)). 36 The record contains uncontradicted evidence demonstrating that Evans and Drew each received a warning for their respective infractions after committing offenses that were less egregious than Russell's. Evans left work early after he obtained permission to leave from one of his supervisors; a different supervisor was unaware of that fact and considered it an unscheduled absence. See Appellant's Appendix at 138 (deposition of Darren Blankenship) ([Evans] claimed that his manager gave him permission to be off that day, or at least part of the day. So when he came in to work, I believe his expectation was that he could have off at least part of the day. And when we looked into it, we did talk to the manager who he claimed to have gotten permission from. That manager did state that she gave him permission to take off, she just never had it written down in the books.); 153 (Investigation Summary by Missouri Commission on Human Rights in Russell v. TG Missouri Corp., MCHR Case No. E-12/99-19847 (MCHR Investigation Summary)) (stating same). By contrast, Russell left early without obtaining permission from any of her superiors. Drew refused to work an overtime shift; however, the overtime was to follow directly after a full eight-hour shift, which he did complete. See id. at 153 (MCHR Investigation Summary) ([TG Missouri] states that it did not fire [Drew] because he had worked a full shift, eight hours, but left after eight hours because he was upset that no one had told him in advance that he would have to work overtime.). By contrast, not only did Russell refuse to work overtime on that Saturday, October 23, she did not even complete her regular shift on Friday, October 22. Thus, we cannot reasonably conclude that Russell's infraction, and those committed by Drew and Evans, were of comparable seriousness. Russell's disparate treatment argument does not establish a genuine dispute regarding pretext. 10 37 We next consider Russell's pretext argument based upon the claim that TG Missouri failed to follow its own policies when it terminated her for leaving early without permission on Friday, October 22. Russell maintains that, consistent with TG Missouri's own definitions, her early departure from work without permission was an unscheduled absence, not job abandonment. She contends that under TG Missouri's written progressive disciplinary policy addressing absences, see Appellant's Appendix at 255-61, she should have received a written warning (step three), having previously in 1999 received no more than one documented oral warning (step two). Moreover, she points out, the policy does not provide for termination until the eighth incident of unplanned/unscheduled absence within a twelve-month period, id. at 260-61, and hers was at most the third such incident. Russell also argues that there is a very well known verbal policy that three days `no-call no-show' will result in termination, Brief for Appellant at 48 (citing Appellant's Appendix at 196-97 (deposition of Taunya Russell)), and yet she was terminated after committing an infraction that was far less serious than a three-day absence without notice. These discrepancies between company policies and the manner in which she was actually treated, she concludes, provide sufficient evidence that her unauthorized departure from work on Friday, October 22, was not the true reason for her termination but was merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination. 38 We agree with Russell that an employer's deviation from its own policies can, in some instances, provide evidence of pretext. However, in the present case, TG Missouri's written policy governing unscheduled absences allowed for the disciplinary action that was taken against Russell. In its opening paragraph, the written policy on absenteeism makes clear that the step-by-step procedures set forth therein are guidelines and that there are no fixed rules governing the treatment of absenteeism. The policy provides: 39 Managing absenteeism is one of the more difficult job performance issues facing supervisors and managers. These are not the kind of issues that can be controlled by the stringent application of fixed rules and regulations. Each case must be reviewed on its own merits, therefore, generally prohibiting the use of a finite formula. Absence control requires a high degree of supervisory/managerial judgment coupled with appropriate counsel from the Human Resources Department. 40 The following guidelines can be a useful tool and standard which, when utilized by management, should provide a reasonable level of consistency and equity when confronted with these kinds of problems. 41