Opinion ID: 184950
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alwin's Objection to the Remedy

Text: 41 The Board endorsed the ALJ's finding that Alwin had engaged in egregious conduct, and adopted the ALJ's proposed remedy requiring Alwin to reimburse the union for the costs and expenses the union incurred in negotiating the new CBA, in undertaking the strike, and in litigating Alwin II before the Board. The Board likewise required Alwin to reimburse the General Counsel for his costs of litigating this matter. In this court, Alwin contends that the remedy is not justified and is beyond the Board's authority. 42 The Board noted in its decision that Alwin had not excepted to the remedy, and thus would be barred from seeking review of it in a court of appeals. Nonetheless, the Board discussed its rationale for the remedy and its authority for ordering it. The Board cited the ALJ's finding that Alwin's conduct frustrated the bargaining process and depleted the Union's resources, so that extraordinary remedies to restore the status quo ante were warranted. The Board also found that Alwin's bad faith in negotiations, by insisting on its terms even after they were found to be unlawful in Alwin I, and in litigating Alwin II, justified an award of litigation costs to the union and the General Counsel. In ordering these remedies, the Board relied on section 10(c) of the Act and its inherent authority to control its own proceedings. 43 Member Brame dissented from this portion of the Board's decision, suggesting that an award of strike costs was unprecedented and insufficiently justified, and that Alwin did not engage in unusually aggravated misconduct until the Board decided Alwin I and the company still refused to change its negotiating position significantly. Thus, Member Brame indicated he would only award the union its costs for the August 1994 negotiating session. 44 Section 10(e) of the Act requires the Board to seek enforcement of its order in a court of appeals, but provides that no objection that has not been urged before the Board ... shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); see also 29 C.F.R § 102.46 (1998) (specifying how to except properly to an ALJ decision). The Supreme Court has indicated that section 10(e) bars review of any issue not presented to the Board, even where the Board has discussed and decided the issue.A court of appeals altogether lacks jurisdiction to review objections that were not urged before the Board. Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 665-66 (1982) (where Board raises issue sua sponte, aggrieved party must seek reconsideration by Board before seeking judicial review);International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276, 281 n.3 (1975) (same); see also Local 900, IUE v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ([T]he statute requires objection to the Board, and not discussion by the Board, before an issue may be presented in court.). 45 We find no extraordinary circumstances present here, so the question is whether Alwin properly presented its objection to the remedy to the Board. 13 Our cases suggest that the critical question in satisfying section 10(e) is whether the Board received adequate notice of the basis for the objection. See Parsippany Hotel Management Co. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 413, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (ground for exception must be evident if not explicit); Consolidated Freightways v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 790, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Cases interpreting section 10(e) look to whether a party's exceptions are sufficiently specific to apprise the Board that an issue might be pursued on appeal.). 46 Alwin's exceptions to the decision and order of the ALJ do not mention the remedy proposed by the ALJ. In the introduction to its brief in support of exceptions, Alwin included the following language: 47 Despite the weight of record evidence to the contrary and applicable law inconsistent with the ALJ's Decision, the Judge incorrectly concluded that Respondent violated Sections 8(a)(1), (3), (4) and (5) of the Act. As a result, the Judge proposed extraordinary and unduly burden-someremedies against Respondent. It is from these findings and conclusions that Respondent excepts, offering the instant Brief in Support . 48 J. A. at 38. In the remaining 48 pages of the brief, Alwin does not mention the remedy. 49 This language clearly states that Alwin objects to the ALJ's allegedly incorrect findings and conclusions. However, it would be a strain to read that sentence as stating a separate objection to the remedy, in the event the Board agreed with the ALJ that Alwin violated the Act. More importantly, even if a separate objection to the remedy could be located in that language, the language does not provide any hint as to the basis for Alwin's objection to the remedy. 50 Where a party explicitly excepts to a remedy, and offers some explanation for its objection in its brief, we have held that there is sufficient notice to the Board to satisfy section 10(e). See Capital Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 999, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1998). We have also held that an exception to an issue can be sufficient to preserve an issue, even without briefing, if the exception sufficiently highlights the specific issue being contested. See Davis Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 2 F.3d 1162, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Where, however, a party excepts to the entire remedy, and provides no indication of the basis for its objection, the exception alone provides insufficient notice to the Board of the party's particular arguments to satisfy section 10(e). See Quazite v. NLRB, 87 F.3d 493, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1996). It follows, a fortiori, that where a passing objection to the remedy is made in the introduction to a brief, and not in the exceptions, the Board has not received sufficient notice of the party's arguments to satisfy section 10(e). 14 Accordingly, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider Alwin's objections to the Board's remedy.