Opinion ID: 2595617
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does RCW 51.12.102 extend the general provisions of the WIIA to LHWCA-covered workers?

Text: ¶ 20 Gorman and Helton argue that section 102 abrogated the exclusionary language of section 100 and brought LHWCA-covered workers within the general provisions of the WIIA. Therefore, they contend, as WIIA-covered workers, they may maintain a suit under RCW 51.24.020. Lockheed and Todd respond that RCW 51.12.102 did not abrogate the language excluding workers covered by the LHWCA from WIIA coverage, but merely created a narrow exception to that exclusion, which only allows for provision of temporary, interim benefits to maritime workers until federal benefits are obtained. ¶ 21 What effect the enactment of section 102 had on section 100 is not entirely clear. By their plain terms, these sections are in conflict in that section 100 completely excludes workers covered by the LHWCA from the WIIA and section 102 extends at least some WIIA benefits to such workers. In construing conflicting statutory language, the primary objective of the court is to ascertain and carry out the intent and purpose of the legislature in creating it. Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wash.2d 224, 239, 59 P.3d 655 (2002). Where [this court is] called upon to interpret an ambiguous statute or conflicting provisions, [it] may arrive at the legislature's intent by applying recognized principles of statutory construction. State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003). ¶ 22 Two principles of statutory construction are applicable in the instant case. First, apparently conflicting statutes must be reconciled to give effect to each of them. Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wash.2d 201, 211, 5 P.3d 691 (2000). Generally, `[s]tatutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous.' Davis v. Dep't of Licensing, 137 Wash.2d 957, 963, 977 P.2d 554 (1999) (quoting Stone v. Chelan County Sheriff's Dep't, 110 Wash.2d 806, 810, 756 P.2d 736 (1988)). Second, [t]o resolve apparent conflicts between statutes, courts generally give preference to the more specific and more recently enacted statute. Tunstall, 141 Wash.2d at 211, 5 P.3d 691. Furthermore, in interpreting conflicting statutory language, a court may ascertain legislative intent by examining the legislative history of particular enactments. Timberline Air Serv., Inc. v. Bell Helicopter-Textron, Inc., 125 Wash.2d 305, 312, 884 P.2d 920 (1994). ¶ 23 Gorman and Helton contend that because section 102 is the later-enacted statute, it should be interpreted as completely abrogating the exclusionary language of section 100. While this contention is consistent with the principle of statutory construction that calls for preference to be given to later-enacted statutory language, it would violate the principle that effect must be given to all statutory language. See Tunstall, 141 Wash.2d at 211, 5 P.3d 691. Under Gorman and Helton's reading, subsection (1) of section 100 would be rendered `meaningless [and] superfluous.' Davis, 137 Wash.2d at 963, 977 P.2d 554 (quoting Stone, 110 Wash.2d at 810, 756 P.2d 736). On the other hand, Lockheed and Todd's interpretationthat section 102 did not abrogate section 100 except to the extent necessary to provide temporary, interim benefitsis consistent with both of the aforementioned principles of statutory construction. First, preference is given to the later-enacted language, as section 102 overrides section 100's total exclusion of LHWCA-covered workers to the extent necessary to allow some benefits to be afforded such workers under the WIIA. Second, meaning is given to both section 100 and section 102, as LHWCA-covered workers are not extended general benefits under the WIIA except those limited temporary, interim benefits specifically provided by section 102. ¶ 24 Moreover, both the language of section 102 and its legislative history belie Gorman and Helton's proffered interpretation. As discussed above, section 102, by its plain language, directs DLI to provide WIIA benefits to certain workers who develop illness as a result of asbestos exposure who may be covered by the LHWCA. RCW 51.12.102(1). However, if the worker is covered by the LHWCA, these benefits are temporary only. Id. If DLI determines that such a worker is covered by the LHWCA, DLI assists the worker in obtaining LHWCA benefits; once such benefits are obtained, the WIIA benefits cease. RCW 51.12.102(1), (4). ¶ 25 The legislative history of section 102 reflects that the legislature was concerned that workers who could be covered by either the WIIA or the LHWCA might for a time be trapped in jurisdictional limbo, with neither compensation program providing relief until it is conclusively established which program is responsible for providing benefits: Workers who contract ... occupational diseases frequently have work histories indicating exposure to asbestos in several different employments. These employments may be covered for workers' compensation purposes under more than one jurisdiction, such as the Washington industrial insurance law or the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. If a dispute arises over which jurisdiction is responsible for coverage, a worker's claim may not be accepted by either jurisdiction until the liability question is settled. 1987-88 FINAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT, 50th Wash. Leg., at 70. ¶ 26 If the legislature had intended to abrogate completely the exclusionary language of section 100, it could have done so: the bill creating section 102 also amended section 100. See LAWS OF 1988, ch. 271, § 2. The legislature did not, however, avail itself of the opportunity to amend the exclusionary language of section 100. Instead, it left that language unchanged. This suggests that in creating section 102 the legislature did not intend to abrogate the exclusionary language of section 100, except to the extent necessary to provide interim, temporary benefits under section 102. ¶ 27 The plain language of section 102 and its legislative history suggests to us that the legislature intended to create a mechanism to provide temporary, interim benefits to cover the needs of maritime workers who develop illness as a result of exposure to asbestos until it is conclusively determined whether the state or federal workers' compensation program is responsible for providing benefits to such a worker. The legislature did not, we believe, intend to extend the whole panoply of WIIA coverage to those workers eligible for benefits under the LHWCA. ¶ 28 Because LHWCA-covered workers are not covered by the general provisions of the WIIA, they may not maintain a suit under RCW 51.24.020. A suit under RCW 51.24.020 is not a benefit provided to WIIA-covered workers under Washington's workers' compensation scheme. Instead, RCW 51.24.020 allows a WIIA-covered worker, injured by his or her employer's deliberate, intentional act, to pursue a common law tort claim against such employer outside of the WIIA,  as if [the WIIA] had not been enacted.  RCW 51.24.020 (emphasis added). Because the opportunity to maintain a suit under RCW 51.24.020 is outside the WIIA, it is not one of the benefits provided under [the WIIA] that are afforded to those workers specified in section 102. Furthermore, the ability to maintain a common law tort claim pursuant to RCW 51.24.020 is not the type of temporary, interim benefit the legislature intended to provide LHWCA-covered workers when it created section 102. Maintenance of a common law claim against an employer is neither necessary nor related to the provision of the temporary, interim benefits created in section 102.