Opinion ID: 195973
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment and Qualified Immunity

Text: 14 The central question presented by this appeal is whether the district court properly concluded that the record demonstrated genuine issues of material fact regarding Broderick's entitlement to immunity and, therefore, that Broderick was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Broderick argues on appeal that the record in this case substantiates his entitlement to qualified immunity and that the district court erred when it concluded that genuine issues of material fact were generated through the parties' submissions on the motion. Although Broderick has raised other issues in this appeal, our resolution of this primary matter eliminates our need to reach these other issues. 4 15 The inquiry for a district court's resolution on a motion for summary judgment brought by an official seeking qualified immunity is whether a reasonable official could have believed his actions were lawful in light of clearly established law and the information the official possessed at the time of his allegedly unlawful conduct. Id. at 91 (quoting McBride v. Taylor, 924 F.2d 386, 389 (1st Cir.1991)). Although, as with any summary judgment determination, all facts and reasonable inferences are construed in favor of the nonmoving party, the analysis employed to determine whether an official is entitled to summary judgment is quite generous. A reasonable, although mistaken, conclusion about the lawfulness of one's conduct does not subject a government official to personal liability. Cookish v. Powell, 945 F.2d 441, 443 (1st Cir.1991). This Court has observed that the qualified immunity standard 'gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by protecting 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'  Rivera v. Murphy, 979 F.2d 259, 263 (1st Cir.1992) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534, 537, 116 L.Ed.2d 589, 596 (1991) (per curiam)). Under this analysis, A court must look to the 'objective legal reasonableness' of an official's conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law. Mariani-Giron, 877 F.2d at 1116. Therefore, since even erroneous decisions by officials may be entitled to qualified immunity, the analysis employed to determine entitlement to qualified immunity warrants an entirely different approach from that employed to evaluate the merits of Plaintiffs' underlying claims. Id.; Morales v. Ramirez, 906 F.2d 784, 787 (1st Cir.1990). 16 Although the district court here correctly observed at the outset that Broderick was entitled to summary judgment if a reasonable police officer could have believed he had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, it is clear from the court's subsequent remarks that its true focus was the merits of Plaintiffs' underlying case when it determined whether a genuine issue of material fact existed on this record. Appendix at 776. Without reaching the issue of whether the state court Findings constituted a proper form of supporting documentation for consideration on a summary judgment motion, 5 this Court concludes that the district court was in error when it relied upon certain conclusions of the state court to determine the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding Broderick's entitlement to summary judgment. 17 The portion of Broderick's affidavit pertinent to this motion states: 18 I then attempted to answer Attorney Lowinger's questions regarding the person he identified as his client. Within a short time after I started doing so, I observed that Attorney Lowinger had the tape recorder cupped within his hands. Despite this, I observed a red light illuminated on the recorder, and that the tape was turning in the recorder. 19 App. at 40. It is beyond dispute that this statement by Broderick, standing alone, establishes a reasonable belief on his part that he was being secretly recorded without his permission in violation of a state criminal statute. 6 The state court Findings considered by the district court to generate a factual dispute on this motion were: Lowinger then stepped back turned on the recorder to dictate a memo to himself regarding the refusal to allow him to see Quinn, and By stipulation the tape recorder contained, relative to this whole incident, on tape a very few words indicating that the two young men with Lowinger leave the building. App. at 61, Findings Nos. 9 and 12. 20 These Findings, however, do nothing to refute the observations by Broderick in the above-quoted portion of his affidavit. Instead, the Findings address the merits of Lowinger's criminal case and, thus, do not create a genuine issue of material fact germane to the summary judgment analysis for qualified immunity here. While subsequent investigation and adversarial fact-finding hearings may have established that, in fact, Lowinger was not secretly taping his conversation with Broderick, such a conclusion does not contradict the assertion by Broderick that, based upon his observations at the time, he thought that Lowinger was making such a recording. 7 Similarly, the discovery that the tape did not contain a recording of that conversation does not negate what Broderick had previously reasonably concluded based upon all of the circumstances, but merely supports Lowinger's position before the Massachusetts District Court that he was not guilty of intercepting communications. 21 The district court attached great significance to its conclusion that a genuine dispute exists as to whether Broderick was speaking at the time of the recording. Broderick's affidavit suggests that he was speaking, but the district court drew the inference that he was not, based upon the Finding submitted by Plaintiffs that only a very few words were on the recording. The basis for such an inference is not plainly apparent to this Court. 8 More importantly, however, whether Broderick was speaking at the precise moment he noticed the recorder in operation is not determinative of whether he had the reasonable belief that Lowinger was taping their conversation. Plaintiffs did not produce any evidence to directly refute Broderick's affidavit on this point. There is no indication, for example, that Broderick knew how long the recorder was on or that he knew at that time that none of his words had been or would be recorded--he only perceived that the recorder was in close proximity and that it was recording. That perception, which was unchallenged in the proceedings below, establishes a reasonable belief on Broderick's part that Lowinger was attempting to secretly tape their conversation without Broderick's authorization in violation of Massachusetts law. 22 Lowinger also argues that the contents of the tape are relevant to this motion since they present[ ] a challenge to Broderick's credibility. Brief of Appellee at 23. As noted already, the tape's contents do nothing to challenge Broderick's current position regarding his perceptions and beliefs at the time the recording was made. 9 At most, such evidence demonstrates that Broderick may have been mistaken in such perceptions and beliefs but, as explained above, such errors are irrelevant to the preliminary determination of entitlement to qualified immunity. In short, while the parties' submissions are conflicting with respect to certain facts, they do not create a dispute regarding Broderick's reasonable beliefs. Accordingly, since there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, judgment should be entered in favor of Defendant William T. Broderick on the basis of his qualified immunity from judgment. 23 Reversed and remanded with directions to enter summary judgment for Defendant Broderick on the claim made under 42 United States Code Section 1983 and to dismiss without prejudice the claims based on state law.