Opinion ID: 214218
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Consultation under the Endangered Species Act

Text: Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires consultation prior to any agency action that may affect a listed species or its habitat: Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency (hereinafter in this section referred to as an  agency action ) is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical[.] 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (emphasis added). Regulations implementing Section 7 provide: Each Federal agency shall review its actions at the earliest possible time to determine whether any action may affect listed species or critical habitat. If such a determination is made, formal consultation is required[.] 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a) (emphasis added). I discuss the agency action and may affect requirements in turn.
Congress intended the term agency action to have a broad definition. [T]here is little doubt that Congress intended to enact a broad definition of agency action in the ESA[.] . . . Following the Supreme Court's lead in [ Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978)], we have also construed `agency action' broadly. Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1054, 1055 (9th Cir.1994) (statutory citations omitted); see also Western Watersheds Project v. Matejko, 468 F.3d 1099, 1108 (9th Cir.2006) ([T]he term `agency action' is to be construed broadly[.]); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir.1998). The regulations defining agency action make clear the breadth of the term: Action means all activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United States or upon the high seas. Examples include, but are not limited to: (a) actions intended to conserve listed species or their habitat; (b) the promulgation of regulations; (c) the granting of licenses, contracts, leases, easements, rights-of-way, permits, or grants-in-aid; or (d) actions directly or indirectly causing modifications to the land, water, or air. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (emphases added). Section 7 and the requirements of this part apply to all actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control. Id. at § 402.03 (emphasis added). The question before us is whether Forest Service approval of the NOIs at issue was an action[ ] in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control, such that the Forest Service's approval was agency action within the meaning of Section 7. This circuit has a well-established body of law on discretion and agency action under Section 7 of the ESA. In Turtle Island v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 340 F.3d 969 (9th Cir.2003), we held that Section 7 required the Fisheries Service to consult within its own agency when issuing fishing permits under the High Seas Fishing Compliance Act (the Compliance Act). Because the Fisheries Service had discretion whether to issue the permits, the issuance of the permits was agency action. The Service was therefore required to consult under Section 7. We wrote, Whether the Fisheries Service must condition permits to benefit listed species is not the question before this court, rather, the question before us is whether the statutory language of the Compliance Act confers sufficient discretion to the Fisheries Service so that the agency could condition permits to benefit listed species. We hold that the statute confers such discretion. Id. at 977 (emphasis in original). In National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 524 F.3d 917 (9th Cir.2008), we reviewed a biological opinion prepared as part of the consultation process under Section 7. We wrote, When an agency, acting in furtherance of a broad Congressional mandate, chooses a course of action which is not specifically mandated by Congress and which is not specifically necessitated by the broad mandate, that action is, by definition, discretionary and is thus subject to Section 7 consultation. Id. at 929. In Washington Toxics Coalition v. Environmental Protection Agency, 413 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir.2005), we held that the EPA had to consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service under Section 7 before approving pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). We wrote, EPA retains discretion to alter the registration of pesticides for reasons that include environmental concerns. Therefore, EPA's regulatory discretion is not limited by FIFRA in any way that would bar an injunction to enforce the ESA. Id. at 1033 (statutory citation omitted). In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir.1998), we held that the Bureau of Reclamation had to consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service under Section 7 before renewing contracts with farmers for water from the federal Central Valley Project because there was some discretion available to the Bureau during the negotiation process leading up to the renewals. Id. at 1126. Finally, in Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir.1994), we held that the Forest Service was required to consult under Section 7 before allowing projects under the Land and Resource Management Plans for particular national forests. If an agency performs an act that does not involve the exercise of discretion, that act is not agency action within the meaning of Section 7. For example, in National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 127 S.Ct. 2518, 168 L.Ed.2d 467 (2007), the Supreme Court held that the EPA was required only to find that nine statutory criteria specified in the Clean Water Act (CWA) had been satisfied before transferring regulatory authority to a state. Under the CWA, the EPA had no discretion, once these criteria were satisfied, to take any action that would benefit or protect any listed species under the ESA. The Court wrote, [T]he ESA's requirements would come into play only when an action results from the exercise of agency discretion. This interpretation [of the CWA and the ESA] harmonizes the statutes by giving effect to the ESA's no-jeopardy mandate whenever an agency has discretion to do so, but not when the agency is forbidden from considering such extrastatutory factors. Id. at 665, 127 S.Ct. 2518. If an agency only has discretion that is unrelated to protecting a listed species, an act by that agency is not agency action within the meaning of Section 7. For example, in Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502 (9th Cir.1995), the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) had entered into an agreement granting a logging company the right to build new logging roads on BLM land subject to BLM approval under specified criteria. None of the criteria was relevant to the protection of protected species under the ESA. Therefore, there was no agency action under Section 7: [W]e conclude that where, as here, the federal agency lacks the discretion to influence the private action, consultation would be a meaningless exercise; the agency simply does not possess the ability to implement measures that inure to the benefit of the protected species. Id. at 1509; see also Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073, 1081 (9th Cir.2001) ([N]owhere in the various permit documents did the FWS retain discretionary control to make new requirements to protect species that subsequently might be listed as endangered or threatened.). Sometimes an earlier act dictates later agency actions such that a later act involves no discretion and therefore does not require consultation. For example, in Western Watersheds Project v. Matejko, 468 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir.2006), private parties had been granted vested rights to divert water for irrigation long before the passage of the ESA. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) announced that it would not interfere with those previously vested rights. We held that so long as the private parties limited their activities to those consistent with their vested rights they did not have to notify the BLM of their activities, and the BLM did not have the ability to regulate their activities. Under these circumstances, we concluded that the BLM had not undertaken any discretionary agency action that would have required it to consult under Section 7. Id. at 1107-08. An out-of-circuit example is Texas Independent Producers and Royalty Owners Ass'n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964 (7th Cir.2005), in which the EPA consulted under the ESA before exercising its discretion to grant a general permit authorizing private operators to discharge stormwater under the Clean Water Act. Id. at 979. The operators then filed individual NOIs to discharge in accordance with the conditions of the general permit. Id. at 968. The Seventh Circuit held that the EPA did not have to consult on the individual NOIs because it had already consulted under the ESA before granting the general permit. The terms of the general permit dictated the manner in which stormwater would be discharged, thereby eliminating any discretion by the EPA in approving or denying an individual NOI.
An agency is required to consult when its action may affect listed species or designated critical habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). An agency can avoid the obligation to consult only if it determines that its action will have no effect on listed species or designated critical habitat. Thomas, 30 F.3d at 1054 n. 8. Once an agency has determined that its action may affect listed species or critical habitat, the agency may proceed with formal consultation or may choose instead to consult informally with the appropriate agency. If the consulting agency determines during informal consultation that the proposed action is not likely to adversely affect any listed species or critical habitat, formal consultation is not required and the process ends. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(b)(1). Thus, actions that have any chance of affecting listed species or critical habitat even if it is later determined that the actions are not likely to do sorequire an agency at least to consult informally. We have previously explained that may affect is a relatively low ... threshold for triggering consultation. California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 575 F.3d 999, 1018 (9th Cir.2009). ` Any possible effect, whether beneficial, benign, adverse or of an undetermined character, triggers the formal consultation[.]' Id. at 1019 (quoting 51 Fed.Reg. 19926, 19949 (June 3, 1986)) (emphasis in Lockyer ). The Secretaries of Interior and Commerce have explained that the threshold for formal consultation must be set sufficiently low to allow Federal agencies to satisfy their duty to `insure' that their actions do not jeopardize listed species or critical habitat under section 7(a)(2). 51 Fed.Reg. at 19949. In response to concerns that the may affect standard is too burdensome, the Secretaries explained that the availability of informal consultations mitigates any burden on the affected agencies. Id. at 19950. The Secretaries therefore rejected the suggestion that the consultation requirement should be triggered on a higher showing than the low may affect threshold. Id. at 19949.