Opinion ID: 727597
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act Claim

Text: 26 Howard claims that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on his claims of race discrimination and weight discrimination under the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (MELCRA), which provides that: 27 An employer shall not do any of the following: 28 (A) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status. 29 MICH.COMP.LAWS § 37.2202(1)(a). Howard's race discrimination claim under MELCRA is generally repetitive of his § 1981 claim and his equal protection claim under § 1983. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 617 (6th Cir.1986) (finding that the language of MELCRA essentially tracks the disparate treatment language of Title VII and that the Michigan Civil Rights Commission has issued interpretive regulations indicating that Title VII should be used as a guide in the interpretation of MELCRA), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987), abrogated on other grounds, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). To the extent Howard's MELCRA claim overlaps with his §§ 1981 and 1983 claims, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment for the reasons stated above. However, in contrast to a plaintiff claiming violations of §§ 1981 and 1983, a plaintiff may prove a violation of MELCRA based on a claim of disparate impact or disparate treatment. Singal v. General Motors Corp., 447 N.W.2d 152, 155-56 (Mich.Ct.App.1989) (stating that a prima facie case under MELCRA can be made by showing disparate impact, which requires the plaintiff to show that a facially neutral employment practice burdens a protected class more harshly than others). 30 To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact premised on race discrimination, a plaintiff must show that the application process results in the selection of disproportionately fewer African Americans compared to the pool of applicants or potential applicants. See Smith v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 425 N.W.2d 220, 222 (Mich.Ct.App.1988) (discussing requirements for disparate impact based on race). If the plaintiff states a prima facie case of disparate impact, the employer must then meet the burden of showing that the screening tests or job requirements have a manifest relationship to the employment in question. Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)). Howard has not shown that Southfield hired any white applicant who was similarly situated, i.e., an overweight applicant or someone with the other disqualifying factors Dr. Stock attributed to Howard (immaturity or inability to deal with stress). As indicated above in section III.A., Howard's comparison of his situation to current firefighters is inapposite because requirements for applicants may differ from ongoing requirements for veteran firefighters. Furthermore, since Southfield hired three African-American candidates from the eligibility list, Howard has not successfully shown that Southfield's 1990 application process resulted in the selection of candidates in a racial pattern significantly different from the pool of applicants. Even if Dr. Stock incorrectly assessed Howard's psychological fitness for the position of firefighter, Howard has not shown that the psychological testing process resulted in a disparate impact against African-American applicants. 31 With respect to Howard's weight claim, Howard has not stated a disparate treatment claim because he offered no proof that Southfield intentionally discriminated against him based on his weight. Howard might have been able to prove disparate impact had he shown that Southfield hired only applicants who were not overweight, and/or rejected other applicants who were overweight. Howard presented no evidence regarding the weight of the fifteen firefighters hired. Nor does he present evidence that other overweight applicants were denied employment despite having met the physical requirements of the application process. Although Howard argues that Harman provides another example of weight discrimination, there is not enough in the record on appeal for us to discern whether Southfield discriminated against Harman based on her weight. Crump testified during her deposition that Harman challenged the city's psychological screening process in the hiring of firefighters, J.A. at 239, but Southfield settled the case involving Harman. J.A. at 238. As part of the settlement, Southfield agreed to use preemployment psychological tests or psychological examinations validated for job relatedness, id., but Southfield would not admit that it had not done so in the past. Id. Howard has not presented any testimony from Harman or any evidence documenting the reason that Harman was rated marginally suitable by Dr. Stock. See City of Southfield 1990 Firefighter Recruitment Disposition of All Applicants who were Given Psychological, Exhibit E to Southfield's brief in support of its motion for summary judgment. Because Howard has not stated a claim of discrimination based on race or weight, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on Howard's MELCRA claims. 32