Opinion ID: 546101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Attorneys' Fees Award and Alizadeh's Ability to Pay

Text: 15 Alizadeh argues that the district court abused its discretion by not considering her impecunious circumstances when setting the attorneys' fees award. 5 16 Section 1988 gives the district court the discretion to award the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. The Supreme Court has never intimated that a party's financial condition is a proper factor to consider in determining whether to award attorneys' fees against that party 6 ; nor has this court. We hold it is not. See Miller v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617, 621 n. 5 (9th Cir.1987); Durrett v. Jenkins Brickyard, Inc., 678 F.2d 911, 917 (11th Cir.1982). Further, deterring suits without reasonable foundation, a purpose of the attorneys' fees provision, Christiansburg Garment Co., 98 S.Ct. at 700, is not subserved by creating an exception for frivolous suits by the impecunious. However, several courts of appeals have ruled that in appropriate circumstances a district court should consider a nonprevailing plaintiff's inability to pay when determining the amount of the attorneys' fees to be awarded against that party. See generally Miller at 621; Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 697-98 (7th Cir.1985); Charves v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 711 F.2d 462, 465 (1st Cir.1983); Durrett at 917; Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Co., Inc., 607 F.2d 1025, 1028 (2d Cir.1979). We have not been cited to, nor has our own research disclosed, any contrary authority. 17 In Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.1980), we had occasion to consider the issue in respect to a nonprevailing defendant. There, plaintiff, a prisoner, settled his section 1983 lawsuit with defendants, officials of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The court considered plaintiff to be a prevailing party and ordered defendants to pay his attorneys' fees. On appeal, defendants argued that the district court should have reduced the award because of their difficult financial condition. The Knighton Court observed, we are not prepared to say that a nonprevailing defendant's financial condition is totally irrelevant to setting the amount of the award, and went on to rule that, [c]onsidering the relatively modest sums involved, the district court correctly refused to reduce the fees on account of the defendants' financial problems. Id. at 799-800. 18 Setting an attorneys' fees award that is clearly wholly beyond any present or prospective ability of the losing party to pay has little tendency to advance section 1988's general goal of compensating the prevailing party for legal expenses incurred as a result of the litigation. See S.Rep. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5908, 5913. We hold that the financial condition of a nonprevailing plaintiff charged with attorneys' fees under section 1988 is a factor that, although not controlling, a court should consider when fixing the amount of such an award. 7 However, we do not now address whether or to what extent such a factor should be considered where the suit has been brought in actual bad faith or malice. 8 Cf. Christiansburg Garment Co., 98 S.Ct. at 701 (bad faith suit provides very strong basis for charging party with attorneys' fees); Faraci, 607 F.2d at 1028 (plaintiff's vindictiveness is factor to weigh when setting attorneys' fees award). Because it appears that the district court did not at all consider Alizadeh's financial condition when fixing the amount of the attorneys' fees award, see note 5, supra, we remand for such a consideration.