Opinion ID: 1225460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion on Disqualification

Text: Respondent moved that Justice Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., disqualify himself from further participation in this case. In the alternative, respondent moves that the permanent members of this Court, or the special panel, whichever the Court deems proper, disqualify Justice McGraw pursuant to the Court's authority under Article VIII, Section 8 of the West Virginia Constitution. Respondent cites bias, prejudice, partiality, and due process violations as reasons for disqualifying Justice McGraw. Upon review and consideration of the record as presented, including particularly respondent's motion, supported by his affidavit and exhibits, together with the memorandum of law in support thereof, Justice McGraw affirmed that he knew of no good and valid reasons why he was disqualified to hear and decide the issues in this controversy in a fair, just and impartial manner, consistent with his commission, responsibility and oath of office as an elected member of the Court. Accordingly, he has declined to disqualify himself. Thereupon the Court entered its order of May 17, 1978, directing the motion to disqualify Justice McGraw in the first instance to the permanent members of the Court for their ruling thereon, consistent with the language of the motion. The designated Court deferred any action on or disposition of the motion, awaiting a ruling thereon by the permanent members of the Court. By order of May 19, 1978, the permanent members of the Court, Justices Harshbarger and McGraw abstaining, being of the opinion that they have recused themselves for all purposes, redirect said motion to the designated Court for consideration in the light of State ex rel. Matko v. Ziegler, Judge, 154 W.Va. 872, 179 S.E.2d 735. In the Matko case, decided in 1971, the Court denied a motion to disqualify Judge Chauncey H. Browning, holding that: ... A majority of this Court, Judge Browning not participating, denies that motion for the reason that the question whether Judge Browning should participate in the consideration and decision of this proceeding should be decided by him and not by this Court. The designated Court, with Justice McGraw abstaining, entered its order of May 24, 1978, denying respondent's motion to disqualify Justice McGraw for reasons to be stated in the written opinion hereinafter to be filed if one is deemed necessary. Counsel for respondent, in their memorandum of law, cite two developments which they contend would require a ruling on the disqualification issue different from the position noted in State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, W.Va., 207 S.E.2d 421 (1973). They contend that Louk v. Haynes, W.Va., 223 S.E.2d 780 (1976), requires Justice McGraw to disqualify himself. The decision in that case recognizes that disqualifying interests cannot be defined with precision and that circumstances and relationships must be considered. Further, counsel, quoting from the decision, reasons that a judge should recuse himself if he cannot hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused in a criminal case. In the context of the case now before the Court, we have no reason to disagree with the Louk decision. We adhere to and apply the principles enunciated in Canon 3 of the Judicial Code of Ethics governing the West Virginia judiciary, in the Matko case ruling on the disqualification issue, and in syllabus, point 3, in State ex rel. Monongahela Valley Traction Co. v. Beard, 84 W.Va. 312, 99 S.E. 452 (1919), which holds: At the common law, as now administered in England and in the United States, bias or favor, not the result of interest or relationship, is not supposed to exist, and in the absence of legislative prohibition, when the judge in a particular case is not called upon to pass on the facts, he is not thereby disqualified to preside at a trial, but he may properly, of his own will, retire from a case under such circumstances. Justice McGraw, in his own judgment and discretion, has declined to recuse himself. With Justice McGraw abstaining, we have carefully reviewed and considered the record and the law relevant thereto, and find no power or authority lodged in this Court on which to disqualify him from participation in hearing this cause and in the determination of the issues involved. Counsel for respondent contend that another development since the Brotherton decision in 1973, the adoption of the Judicial Reorganization Amendment to the Constitution in 1974, gives to the Court, in the language of Article VIII, Section 8, of the Amendment, the power and authority to disqualify a justice from acting in a particular case. The language of that Amendment authorizes the Court to censure, suspend and retire justices and judges in accordance with procedures and requirements therein detailed, but does not authorize and empower the Court to disqualify summarily a justice from participation in a particular case as contended by counsel for respondent. The Court is empowered to construe, interpret and apply provisions of the Constitution, but may not add to, distort or ignore the plain mandates thereof. The administration of justice requires a clear definition and a just and prompt resolution of issues in litigation. As above noted, the basic issue for decision herein is whether the Legislature decreased five line items in the Judiciary's 1978-1979 budget in violation of the West Virginia Constitution. Despite the statements attributed to Justice McGraw in respondent's motion and affidavit, including newspaper exhibits reporting criticism of legislative leadership and action, decision of the basic constitutional issue now before the Court clearly depends on the language and meaning of the Constitution and whether the action of the Legislature is in violation thereof. The controlling issue, thus defined and refined, can readily be decided on bases of well-established principles of constitutional law. Contamination of the balances through personal feelings, bias, prejudice or partiality is foreign to the decisional process in such cases. The charges asserted as bases for disqualification of Justice McGraw are, in the context of this case, inappropriate, extraneous and not well-taken. Many years ago the American Bar Association, in Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, admonished: It is the duty of all judges in the United States to support the federal Constitution and that of the state whose laws they administer; in so doing, they should fearlessly observe and apply fundamental limitations and guarantees. Canon 3 of the Judicial Code of Ethics, as above referenced, asserts: A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. He should be unswerved by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism. The Canon does not prohibit judges from making public statements in the course of their official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of the court. Further, the Canon admonishes that: A judge should diligently discharge his administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilities of other judges and court officials. The Judicial Reorganization Amendment, Article VIII, Section 3, of the Constitution, placed heavy responsibilities on this Court for administration of the state's entire court system. The mandate of the people, so expressed, commands the members of the Court to be alert to the needs and requirements of the court system throughout the state. Acts of omission and commission adversely affecting the administration of justice need to be detected and corrected and may at times require a justice or judge to diligently discharge his administrative responsibilities consistent with the admonition in Canon 3 of the Judicial Code of Ethics. Justices and judges are not obliged to separate and isolate themselves from the people they serve and remain silent when needs and crises arise incident to the judiciary and the administration of justice. Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution provides: All power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people. Magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them. The justices and judges must firmly and forthrightly hear and decide issues involving the sensitive areas of life, liberty and property and to do so must maintain the human touch and sustain the right of the people to know. Ecclesiastes 3:7 instructs us that there is a time to keep silence, and a time to speak. Some are more vocal than others. When a plain provision of the Constitution, proposed by a previous Legislature and adopted by the voters of the state, is violated by action of the Legislature despite a sworn obligation to support the Constitution, some of the more vocal people, including justices, judges, patriots or students of government, may feel compelled to raise their voices in protest. Few among us today would want to still the voice of a Patrick Henry or dry up the pen of a Harriet Beecher Stowe. All persons within the jurisdiction and reach of the state's courts have interests in this litigation. The two attorney petitioners are recognized to have substantial interests to justify their standing to commence and prosecute the action. The justices, judges and magistrates are interested in the adequate and orderly administration of justice through the judicial system. It may be properly noted at this point that the salaries of justices and judges and the retirement income of retired justices and judges are not at issue in this litigation. The salaries of justices and judges are fixed by statute, apart from the budget bill, and remain unchanged. Line item 3 of the Judiciary's budget request for Judges' Retirement System is the one line item not reduced or modified in the legislative process of enacting the 1978-1979 fiscal year budget bill. Judicial salaries are not involved, fixed or determined in this case. The monetary interests in the due process of law violations asserted by respondent are nonexistent in this litigation, making inapplicable the decisions in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927), and Williams v. Brannen, 116 W.Va. 1, 178 S.E. 67 (1935), and their progeny. Despite the many and varied interests justices and judges may have in litigation, they have a commitment to the people, a responsibility for administration of justice, and sworn obligation to support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of West Virginia and to faithfully discharge the duties of their office. Abdication of these responsibilities is not to be taken lightly. See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 93 S.Ct. 7, 34 L.Ed.2d 50 (1972), a case wherein Justice William H. Rehnquist refused to disqualify himself from participation in litigation before the United States Supreme Court.