Opinion ID: 1533871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: Cross-examination of Appellant During Penalty Hearing

Text: Appellant avers that, during the cross-examination of Appellant at the penalty phase, the prosecutor was permitted to ask questions beyond the scope of the direct examination of Appellant. Specifically, Appellant argues that the prosecutor should not have asked him whether or not Appellant dated; whether or not Appellant got along with people in his neighborhood; how the Green family came to live in his house; whether or not Appellant's father gave him his house; and whether or not Appellant was handing out circulars for his employer's business on the date of the murder. Although a defendant is entitled to testify and present witnesses to prove the mitigating circumstances, the Commonwealth is also entitled to cross-examine those witnesses and the defendant if he testifies, to establish whether they are to be believed. As we have explained: Following the presentation of evidence, counsel are permitted to argue to the sentencing body for or against the death sentence. It is apparent from the structure provided that this evidentiary hearing is intended to serve as part of the truth-determining process to enable the sentencer to discern and apply the facts bearing on the determination of the appropriate sentence. Implicit in the fact that the statute assigns to the defendant the burden of proving mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of evidence is the understanding that the jury is to assess the evidence for credibility. It must be left open for the Commonwealth to challenge the veracity of facts asserted and the credibility of the person asserting those facts, whether that person is a witness or the defendant. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 555 A.2d 846, 857-858 (1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 215, 112 L.Ed.2d 175 (1990). At the penalty hearing, Appellant presented the testimony of Dr. Ganime, who stated, among other things, that Appellant had difficulties with peer relationships, difficulties in school, difficulties in working. N.T. 10/9/96 at 32. The doctor attributed these problems to the psychologically unstable nature of Appellant's mother who repeatedly attempted to institutionalize Appellant until his father obtained custody, after which Appellant had only limited contact with his mother. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. Ganime whether his relationship with his mother would have made him hate women. The doctor responded that he did not think that Walter expressed any strong feelings like that. He talked more about [that] he didn't trust women, he was afraid that if he married, he would marry a woman like his mother, and that he would go through the same troubles his father went through. Id. at 40. Then the prosecutor asked whether Appellant had ever dated. Dr. Ganime responded affirmatively and stated that he had some relationships with women. Id. Appellant was not prejudiced by this testimony, which was a fair comment on the evidence presented on direct examination. The prosecutor also asked Appellant whether he had dated and Appellant responded that he had. Id. at 69. This question was a reasonable follow-up on the testimony of Appellant and his psychiatrist that Appellant had difficulties in peer relationships and in no way did it prejudice Appellant for the jury to hear that he had dated women. Similarly, there was no error when the prosecutor asked Appellant whether or not Appellant got along with people in his neighborhood; how the Green family came to live in his house; and whether or not Appellant's father gave him his house. As to the question of whether or not Appellant was handing out circulars on the date of the murder, Appellant's attorney timely objected and the court sustained the objection before Appellant answered. Id. at 74. Appellant suffered no prejudice there. Appellant argues that many of the statements of the prosecutor in closing were attempts to prove non-statutory aggravators. We disagree. None of the statements demonstrate that the prosecutor sought to prove non-statutory aggravators and, thus, Appellant is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing. It is also clear from the record that the Commonwealth only sought to prove one aggravator, that the murder was committed during the commission of a felony, and the trial court only charged the jury with that aggravator. N.T. 10/9/96 at 98. The prosecutor did not seek to prove that Appellant tortured the victim as an aggravator; she merely described the act of repeatedly hitting a child on the head with a metal object, as torture. This comment falls within the rhetorical latitude afforded to prosecutors. This statement does not rise to the level of attempting to prove an aggravator or prosecutorial misconduct. [29] The prosecution is entitled to discuss the evidence Appellant has presented to the jury and to comment fairly on it. Commonwealth v. Marshall, 534 Pa. 488, 633 A.2d 1100 (1993). The following statements Appellant complains of were fair comments on the testimony Appellant and his witnesses presented during the penalty hearing because Appellant did present testimony consistent with the statements of the prosecutor that: the mother of Appellant was afraid of him (N.T. 10/9/96 at 20); other prisoners don't like Appellant (Id. at 61); the mother of Appellant tried to have Appellant put away years ago because she was afraid he might try to kill her (Id. at 17, 20); he did not get along with his neighbor (Id. at 70); he did not get along with his roommate (Id. at 43, 71); he didn't like his dog (Id. at 44); and, from the time he was little he fought (Id. at 18, 47-48, 66-67). Appellant presented testimony designed to gain sympathy with the jury. The prosecution responded by pointing out that Appellant did not apologize and cited to the facts of the case that included evidence that Appellant was not remorseful at the time of the crime because he returned home and masturbated. Despite the fact that this statement was somewhat inflammatory, it accurately described the facts of the case and the prosecutor was entitled to refer to them. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 555 A.2d at 858. Appellant also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by stating that the jury should not think more of Appellant than the people in jail, whom Appellant indicated thought he occupied the lowest rung in the prison hierarchy because of the nature of his crime. Appellant also objects to the following statement of the prosecutor that responded to the argument of Appellant that life in prison would be hell for him: if he doesn't like the life in prison, then maybe he shouldn't have committed the crime. If he doesn't like life in prison, well, we can take care of that and he won't have to do it. N.T. 10/9/96 at 85-86. While the statements are hardly dispassionate ones, we have repeatedly stated that a prosecutor is entitled to engage in rhetorical flair and must have reasonable latitude in fairly presenting a case to the jury and must be free to present his or her arguments with logical force and vigor. Commonwealth v. Brown, 551 Pa. 465, 711 A.2d 444, 454 (1998). The conduct of the prosecutor falls within the reasonable latitude that is accorded prosecutors in making their closing arguments and clearly does not have the unavoidable effect ... [of] ... prejudic[ing] the jury, [and] ... prevent[ing] them from properly weighing the evidence and rendering a true verdict. Commonwealth v. Jones, 546 Pa. 161, 683 A.2d 1181, 1199 (1996). Therefore, the comments do not warrant the grant of a new sentencing hearing, nor do they constitute prosecutorial misconduct.