Opinion ID: 469456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Offset Requirements

Text: 21 The language of section 3304(a)(15)(A)(i) specifies that if a base period employer contributes to social security, then unemployment benefits must be offset by social security benefits. The language of the statute is clear and does not contain any qualification which would prevent its application when an employee qualifies for social security benefits while working for a different employer than his base period employer. The language of the statute, standing alone, compels only one interpretation: that social security benefits offset unemployment benefits if the base period employer makes social security contributions. 22 The district court qualified the language of the statute by restricting its application to a base period employer who contributed to the social security benefits of the unemployment compensation applicant prior to retirement. This was accomplished by finding the language of the statute ambiguous, then analyzing the legislative history, discerning the statute's underlying purpose or intent, concluding that the literal meaning of the statutory language and congressional intent are at odds, and then qualifying the statute so as to accommodate the perceived legislative intent. 23 We have reviewed the language of the statute and find it clear and unambiguous. This conclusion is shared by every other circuit that has interpreted this statute to date. See Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 893 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099, 104 S.Ct. 1591, 80 L.Ed.2d 124 (1984); Bowman v. Stumbo, 735 F.2d 192, 197 (6th Cir.1984); and Watkins v. Cantrell, 736 F.2d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir.1984); see also Mayberry v. Adams, 745 F.2d 729 (1st Cir.1984) (per curiam) (adopting the rationale of Watkins v. Cantrell). 6 The district court's analysis, therefore, was flawed from the outset. It is a well established law of statutory construction that, absent ambiguity or irrational result, the literal language of a statute controls. United States v. Richards, 583 F.2d 491, 495 (10th Cir.1978). When the meaning of the statute is clear, it is both unnecessary and improper to resort to legislative history to divine congressional intent. 7 As recently noted by the Supreme Court, we must start with the assumption that legislative purpose is reflected by the ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute. United States v. Locke, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 1793, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985). The district court erred by placing such heavy reliance on legislative history when the literal meaning of the words used are clear and the plain language does not lead to an irrational result. 24 Because we conclude that Sec. 3304(a)(15)(A)(i) is clear and unequivocal on its face, we find no need to dwell on its legislative history. The legislative history is fully reviewed in the district court's order. 602 F.Supp. at 365-69. See also Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d at 892-93; Bowman v. Stumbo, 735 F.2d at 197-98; Watkins v. Cantrell, 736 F.2d at 939-43. Although the district court characterized defendant's interpretation of the statute as harsh, 602 F.Supp. at 368, we are aware that the judiciary is not licensed to attempt to soften the clear import of Congress' chosen words whenever a court believes those words lead to a harsh result. Locke, 105 S.Ct. at 1793. Thus, Sec. 3304(a)(15)(A)(i) means that social security benefits are to offset unemployment benefits if the base period employer makes social security contributions.