Opinion ID: 1670498
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: position of the defendant

Text: The defendant relies heavily upon the case of State v. Bentley, 239 Kan. 334, 721 P.2d 227 (1986), which case was cited favorably in State v. Tidwell, supra . The defendant argues that in Bentley the Supreme Court of Kansas dealt squarely with the identical issue presented in this case and held that while threats against victims of child abuse may be an effective way to keep children from reporting such offenses, crimes against the person by their very nature cannot be concealed; therefore, the existence of such threats cannot constitute acts of concealment of the fact of the crime sufficient to toll the running of the statute of limitations. The defendant, in response to the State's reliance upon Crider v. State, 531 N.E.2d 1151 (Ind. 1988), and upon State v. Danielski, 348 N.W.2d 352 (Minn.App. 1984), discussed hereinafter, points out that the Indiana concealment statute attaches to concealment of evidence of the offense while the Tennessee statute addresses concealment of the fact of the crime; and that Danielski, supra , is not controlling, because Minnesota has no concealment exception to its statute of limitations and the court in that case held that the prosecution was not barred because the offense was a continuing one and the existence of a position of authority and improper use of that authority over the child victim were essential elements of the crime charged. The defendant also strongly argues that the legislature of Tennessee has already established a comprehensive remedy to the problem of child sex abuse which includes special limitations provisions for victims of such assaults. T.C.A. Section 40-2-101(c), now T.C.A. Section 40-2-101(d), provides, as heretofore noted, that prosecutions for any offense committed against a child shall be commenced no later than the date the child obtains the age of majority or within four years next after the commission of the offense, whichever occurs later. The argument is made that any expansions of those protections is for the legislature to address, not the courts; and that if the opinion of the court of Criminal Appeals is followed, in every case where the victim alleges that he or she was afraid of the accused that nothing would prohibit the State from bringing a criminal charge forty years or more after the alleged offense. Defendant argues that the concealment exception to the statute of limitations was meant to apply to situations in which the fact that a crime had been committed was concealed through some act of the accused, a concealment that prevents the victim from learning that he or she has been victimized.