Opinion ID: 2295512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: compensability of the may 22 injuries

Text: The question for review is whether as a matter of law an injury suffered by an employee while en route to or from a place where he has received medical treatment for a prior compensable injury may itself be compensable as an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment within the meaning of the Maine Workers' Compensation Act, 39 M.R.S.A. § 51. Although the factual findings of the Commission will not be disturbed if supported by credible evidence, the application of erroneous principles of law to the facts found is reversible on appeal. Gilbert v. Maheux, Me., 391 A.2d 1203, 1205-06 (1978). Section 51 creates dual statutory requirements both of which must be satisfied for an injury to be found compensable. Wolfe v. Shorey, Me., 290 A.2d 892, 893 (1972). This Court has defined these requirements for workers' compensation: The `arising out of' factor means that `the injury, in some proximate way, had its origin, its source, its cause in the employment,' while the concept of an injury `in the course of' the employment `refers to time, place and circumstances.' Blackman v. Harris Baking Co., Me., 407 A.2d 21, 23 (1979), quoting Gilbert v. Maheux, supra 391 A.2d at 1205. The critical inquiry here is whether the injury occurred in the course of the employment, that is, whether the injury occurred while the employee was fulfilling the duties of employment or engaged in an activity incidental to the employment at a place where she reasonably might be. Babine v. Lane Construction Corp., 153 Me. 339, 342, 138 A.2d 625, 627 (1958); Fournier's Case, 120 Me. 236, 240, 113 A. 270, 272 (1921). As a general rule, injuries incurred by an employee while on a public way going to or from work do not occur in the course of employment because typically there is an insufficient nexus between his presence on the highway and the employment relation. Waycott v. Beneficial Corp., Me., 400 A.2d 392, 394 (1979). Nevertheless, this Court has recognized several exceptions to the public street or going and coming rule where a more significant relationship exists between injury and employment, given the facts of the case and the terms of the employment contract. Id.; see, e.g., Abshire v. City of Rockland, Me., 388 A.2d 512, 514-15 (1978) (special errand exception); Brown v. Palmer Construction Co., Me., 295 A.2d 263, 266 (1972) (traveling employee exception); Sargent v. Raymond F. Sargent, Inc., Me., 295 A.2d 35, 42 (1972) (dual purpose rule). Now we must determine whether to recognize another exception which would allow an employee compensation for an injury received while en route to or from securing medical treatment for a prior industrial injury. The majority of those jurisdictions that have considered this issue hold that the second injury arises in the course of employment, even though the prior compensable injury did not itself contribute to the second injury. E.g., Laines v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 48 Cal.App.3d 872, 877, 122 Cal.Rptr. 139, 142 (1975); Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130, 135, 379 P.2d 217, 221 (1963); Charles N. Clark Associates Ltd. v. Robinson, 357 So.2d 924, 929 (Miss. 1978); Immer and Company v. Brosnahan, 207 Va. 720, 722, 152 S.E.2d 254, 256 (1967). See generally 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 13.13 (1978). Contra, Kiger v. Idaho Corp., 85 Idaho 424, 430, 380 P.2d 208, 211 (1963) (highway collision constituted independent intervening cause). These courts reason that the provisions commonly found in the workers' compensation statutes requiring that employers provide, and employees accept, medical services for compensable injuries are implied into the contract of employment and that an employee en route to or from a place of medical treatment is therefore fulfilling a duty of his employment contract. Thus, an injury sustained in the discharge of this duty occurs in the course of employment. E.g., Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., supra, 191 Kan. at 135, 379 P.2d at 221; Immer and Company v. Brosnahan, supra, 207 Va. at 724, 152 S.E.2d at 257. Guided by the legislative mandate that the Workers' Compensation Act be liberally construed in favor of the employee, Gilbert v. Maheux, supra, 391 A.2d at 1205; 39 M.R.S.A. § 92, we find persuasive the rationale of those courts that permit compensation for an injury sustained en route to or from securing medical treatment for a prior compensable injury. [2] Section 51 of the Act obliges an employer to furnish medical services to an employee who has suffered a compensable injury. Section 52 allows the employee to choose his own physician to perform these services at the employer's expense. Section 65 requires the employee to accept this medical treatment at the risk of waiving his right to compensation under the Act. These statutory provisions, imposing correlative duties on the employer and employee with regard to compensable injuries, constituted part of the appellant's employment contract with Zayre. If the May 2 injury were compensable, therefore, in traveling from the physician's office after receiving medical treatment the employee was at a place where she had a right to be while engaged in an activity incident to her employment. It is immaterial that the appellant's journey did not begin or end at the workplace. Cf. Laines v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at 879, 122 Cal.Rptr. at 143; Pedersen v. Maple Island Inc., 256 Minn. 21, 22, 97 N.W.2d 285, 286 (1959). At the time of the second injury, there was a subsisting employment relationship between the appellant and Zayre. See Bankers Inv. Co. v. Boyd, 560 P.2d 958, 961 (Okl. 1977). Although the appellant testified that she gave prompt notice of her hand injury to her employer, there is no evidence that Zayre directed or authorized her to seek medical attention for the injured hand. [3] It is the fact of compensability and not that of permission which triggers the application of the reciprocal statutory obligation to secure and to pay for medical attention. Contra, Snowbarger v. M.F.A. Cent. Co-op., 328 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. App. 1959), aff'd, 349 S.W.2d 224 (Mo. 1961). We reach this conclusion for several reasons: First, the employee's right to receive medical services at the expense of the employer vests upon the happening of the industrial accident. Norton v. Penobscot Frozen Food Lockers Inc., Me., 295 A.2d 32, 34 (1972); White's Case, 126 Me. 105, 106, 136 A. 455, 456 (1927). Second, reasonable transportation costs necessarily incident to receiving medical treatment are compensable without regard to whether the employer has authorized the trip. See Chaples v. Gilco Inc., Me., 280 A.2d 546, 547 (1971). Third, securing medical attention for an industrial injury is of mutual benefit to the employer and the employee. Fourth, in requiring the employer to pay for medical services necessitated by an industrial injury, Section 52 requires the employee receiving such services to give prompt notice to the employer. The section thus recognizes instances where the employee without permission or authorization procures medical treatment for a compensable injury. Since at the time of injury the appellant was in the course of her employment, we must next consider whether the injury arose out of her employment. This is essentially a question of causation. See Oliver v. Wyandotte Industries Corp., Me., 360 A.2d 144, 147 (1976); Wolfe v. Shorey, supra, 290 A.2d at 893. The issue may be analyzed in terms of foreseeability. Petersen's Case, 138 Me. 289, 291, 25 A.2d 240, 241 (1942). The risk of injury from the ordinary hazards of operating an automobile is a foreseeable risk to an employee who is on the highway in the course of employment. When such an employee sustains an injury in an automobile collision, the injury arises out of the employment. The language of the Commission's decision manifests a misunderstanding of the legal principles applicable to this case and of the factual findings it was required to make. The Commission predicated its conclusion on the fact that the May 2 injury had never been found to be compensable. The crucial factual determination, however, was not whether there had been a prior formal finding that the hand injury was compensable but whether, as a subsidiary finding necessary to the resolution of the appellant's claim, the May 2 injury was compensable. As to this inquiry, it is immaterial that the appellant had not petitioned for benefits for the hand injury or entered into an approved agreement for compensation. See Charles N. Clark Associates Ltd. v. Robinson, supra, 357 So.2d at 929. Because the allegations of the petition were sufficient to put the appellees on notice as to the applicable legal theory, [4] we vacate the pro forma decree and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Richardson v. Robbins Lumber, Inc., Me., 379 A.2d 380, 383-84 (1977). Upon the record as amplified by additional evidence, the Commission should determine, inter alia : 1) whether the May 2 injury is a qualifying compensable injury, 2) whether the medical services procured by appellant for the hand injury were reasonable and proper within the meaning of Section 52, and 3) whether by applying the principles enunciated herein the May 22 injuries arose out of and in the course of the appellant's employment. The entry is: Motion to dismiss appeal denied. Appeal sustained. Judgment of the Superior Court vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court which shall remand to the Workers' Compensation Commission for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein. It is further ordered that the appellees pay to the appellant an allowance for counsel fees in the amount of $550, together with her reasonable out-of-pocket expenses, for this appeal. POMEROY and ARCHIBALD, JJ., did not sit.