Opinion ID: 480353
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: possession of explosives

Text: 23 Blunk and Rosenberg also suggest that the court improperly pyramided their sentences by imposing consecutive sentences for Counts 2 and 5. Count 2 charged both defendants with the possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 5861(d) (1982), specifically the possession of blasting caps, switches, wire, and one hundred and ninety-nine sticks of dynamite. 9 Count 5 charged defendants with carrying explosives during the commission of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(h)(2) (1982). The underlying felonies for this count were the possession of the sawed-off shotgun and the Uzi semi-automatic rifle which were the subject of Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment. 24 Courts are reluctant to impose two penalties for the same criminal conduct absent clear congressional intent otherwise, reasoning that doubts in the interpretation of criminal statutes will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 84, 75 S.Ct. 620, 622, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955). Thus, in United States v. Gomez, 593 F.2d 210 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 948, 99 S.Ct. 2172, 60 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1979), we held that consecutive sentences could not be imposed under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute and for the actual distribution when the convictions stemmed from the same transaction. In so doing, we observed that consecutive sentences in that case would undermine the Act's detailed penalty scheme and violate the established rule of construction that 'ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.'  Gomez, 593 F.2d at 214, quoting Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 98 S.Ct. 909, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978). Similarly, in United States v. Gomberg, 715 F.2d 843 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1078, 104 S.Ct. 1440, 79 L.Ed.2d 760 (1984), we determined that cumulative sentences for a continuing criminal enterprise pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848 (1982) and the substantive offenses comprising the enterprise could not be imposed under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act because the structure of the penalties in the Act showed that Congress intended section 848 to operate exclusively for sentencing purposes. Gomberg, 715 F.2d at 851. 25 We find neither an ambiguity nor evidence of congressional intent prohibiting cumulative sentences in the instant case. Instead, we find that the language and legislative history of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(h)(2) clearly authorize the sentences here. The legislative history for this provision indicates that Congress intended to extend the stringent provisions of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c) (1982), a nearly identical statute that provides for increased punishment for felons who carry or use a gun during the commission of a felony, to the area of explosives. See H.Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.Cong. & Ad.News 4007, 4046. Section 924(c) provides for enhanced sentences unless the underlying substantive offense was one that already provided for enhanced punishment where the felony was committed with a dangerous weapon. See Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 403, 100 S.Ct. 1747, 1751, 64 L.Ed.2d 381 (1980) (assault with a firearm); Simpson, 435 U.S. at 13 (bank robbery with a dangerous weapon). The Supreme Court's interpretation in these two cases rests in part on statements by the Act's sponsor that Sec. 924(c) would not extend to the particular offense in question. See Busic, 446 U.S. at 406, 100 S.Ct. at 1752; Simpson, 435 U.S. at 13, 98 S.Ct. at 913. Congress neither provided for enhanced penalties in the underlying offense for carrying an explosive device while possessing an unregistered firearm, nor expressed an intention in the legislative history that Sec. 844(h)(2)'s scope would not extend to such felonies. We therefore hold the consecutive sentences to be proper. 10
26 Appellants maintain that their conviction on Count 5, for carrying explosives during the commission of a felony (possession of firearms), must be reversed. Appellants contend reversal is justified because no specific connection was shown between the carrying of the explosives and the felony. Because this issue implicates the interpretation and application of a statute, our review is plenary. Universal Minerals, 699 F.2d at 101-02. 27 The basis for Count 5, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(h)(2), prohibits the carr[ying of] an explosive unlawfully during the commission of any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States.... No court has explicitly decided whether the statute requires the government to prove a connection between the explosive and the underlying felony. Cases involving Sec. 844(h)(2) indicate varying results. See United States v. Lopez, 586 F.2d 978, 979 (2d Cir.1978) (per curiam) (felony was assault and no indication explosives were connected to assault), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 923, 99 S.Ct. 1251, 59 L.Ed.2d 476 (1979); United States v. Tiche, 424 F.Supp. 996, 1000 (W.D.Pa.) (in general discussion of statute, court stated All that is required is that the explosives were used in the commission of a felony....), aff'd mem., 564 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.1977); United States v. Pliskow, 354 F.Supp. 369, 370 (E.D.Mich.) (defendant apparently used explosives in an attempted aircraft hijacking),aff'd mem., 480 F.2d 927 (6th Cir.1973). 28 The legislative history of Sec. 844(h) is similarly unilluminating. The section was part of Title XI of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. The impetus for Title XI was the recurring bombs and bomb threats during that period. Congress stated that: The absence of any effective State or local controls clearly attest to the urgent need to enact strengthened Federal regulation of explosives. H.R. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4007, 4013. Title XI also was intended to strengthen federal criminal law with respect to the illegal use, transportation, or possession of explosives. Id. at 4011. Section 844(h) itself carries over to the explosives area the stringent provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968 relating to the use of firearms and the unlawful carrying of firearms to commit, or during the commission of a Federal felony. Id. at 4046. 29 Both sides rely on cases interpreting the Gun Control Act provision. Prior to its amendment, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c) prohibited carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony. As amended (now Sec. 924(c)), 11 the statute now prohibits carrying a firearm during and in relation to the commission of a felony. 30 In United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538 (9th Cir.1985), relied on by appellants, the court required a specific connection between the firearm and the underlying felony. The basis for the court's decision was that the legislative history to the 1984 amendment strongly implie[d] that the in relation to phrase did not affect the scope of the statute as originally written. Id. at 539-40. The court decided that the amending Congress recognized that the earlier Congress had intended to require such a relation. Id. at 540. The second case advanced by appellants, United States v. Robertson, 706 F.2d 253 (8th Cir.1983), is inapposite. The court reversed the conviction, not because the government failed to prove a connection between the firearm and the felony, but because the proof did not establish that the defendant was even carrying a gun on his person. 31 We find that the Stewart court's analysis of Sec. 924(c) is not helpful to our analysis of Sec. 844(h)(2). First, we do not find that the legislative history to the 1984 amendment strongly implied that the in relation to language did not affect the scope of the statute as originally drafted. At most, we find that the legislative history fails to explain why the in relation to phrase was added to the statute. See S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 312-14, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Cong. & Ad.News 3182, 3490-92. Second, even if the Stewart court was correct in its analysis of why Congress amended Sec. 924(c), Congress has not seen fit to modify Sec. 844(h) in the same manner. Thus, even if Congress's subsequent pronouncements clarify previously enacted statutes, Congress's decision to amend Sec. 924(c), but not Sec. 844(h), is, at best, open to a multiplicity of interpretations. 32 Finding the legislative history to the 1984 amendment in this state, we return to the plain language of Sec. 844(h). Section 844(h)(2) by its terms only requires that the government show that the defendant unlawfully carried an explosive during the commission of any felony. The plain everyday meaning of during is at the same time or at a point in the course of. See, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 703 (1961). It does not normally mean at the same time and in connection with.... It is not fitting for this court to declare that the crime defined by Sec. 844(h)(2) has more elements than those enumerated on the face of the statute. If Congress sees fit to add a relational element to Sec. 844(h)(2), it is certainly free to do so, in the same manner that it added a relational element to Sec. 924(c). Until such time, we will hold that Sec. 844(h)(2) has no relational element, and accordingly, we now hold that the district court correctly denied the defendants' motion to dismiss Count 5.