Opinion ID: 2295437
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Type of Defense

Text: We first consider the defendant's assertion that the court erred by considering the type of defense he raised at trial. A defendant has a constitutional right to be fully heard in his defense, by himself, and counsel. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15. This encompasses the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies, as well as the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, and the right to present [one's] own witnesses to establish a defense. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); see State v. Guaraldi, 127 N.H. 303, 306-07, 500 A.2d 360 (1985). Here, we conclude that the trial court's comments imply that the court may have penalized the defendant for his attorney's trial strategy. We have never before addressed the extent to which a court may penalize a defendant for his attorney's trial strategy and have found scant authority from other jurisdictions on this question. We find State v. Gribble, 248 Wis.2d 409, 636 N.W.2d 488 (Wis.Ct.App.2001), informative. The defendant in Gribble was convicted of first-degree homicide arising from the death of a twenty-month-old child resulting from severe head injuries caused by either shaken-baby syndrome or shaken-impact syndrome. Gribble, 636 N.W.2d at 495. The defendant's defense at trial was that he did not inflict the fatal injuries on the child, but that the child's mother did so. Id. Toward this end, defense counsel attacked the mother's credibility and raised questions about her ability to care for her children. Id. The defense also elicited testimony to demonstrate that the mother had difficulty controlling her temper and had previously thrown and shaken her children. Id. The defendant testified at trial and, although he did not directly accuse the mother, his testimony was the foundation of the defense strategy, because without it there was no evidence [the mother] had access to the child in the relevant time period. Id. at 510. When sentencing the defendant, the trial court explained that a significant aggravating factor upon which it relied was that the defendant had pursued a defense of putting [the mother's] past life and troubles on trial and asserting that she killed her child. This, in the court's view, victimized [the mother] further. Id. at 509. Specifically, the trial court stated that it was satisfied . . . that the line of defense offered by [the defendant] was false, although not perjurous per se. Id. (quotation and brackets omitted). The court explained that it considered the defendant's defense as an aggravating factor because it subjected [the mother] and her family to essentially being further victimized and further aggravat[ed] the nature of the offense which they suffered. Id. (quotation omitted). On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court had improperly held him responsible for his counsel's trial strategy. Id. The appellate court disagreed, stating that it was satisfied based upon its review of the record that the trial court had properly considered the defendant's own testimony and considered the defense strategy only insofar as it was based on that testimony, which was within [the defendant's] control. Id. at 510. In the instant case, some of the trial court's comments likewise suggest that the court merely considered the defendant's own testimony and actions. For instance, the trial court chided the defendant for choosing to destroy in any way he can this victim through his interactions with his family and by accusing her repeatedly of lying and coming up with a variety of reasons why she lied, accusing her in front of this jury of being promiscuous. The trial court focused, as well, upon the defendant's choice to sexually abuse [J.H.] in the very, very tender years of her adolescence and for allowing her to crash and burn as a teenager. The court also stated that the defendant chose to call [J.H.], in all intent, a whore, a liar, somebody who made such a terrible lie up simply because she was trying to help his ex-wife in a divorce, and those are the reasons that he provided to us for her lies. However, other comments by the trial court suggest that the court was focusing upon the defendant's attorney's trial tactics. For instance, the trial court stated: But there's a difference between making the State prove [its] case, prove whether or not the person is guilty or not guilty, and the type of defense that's lodged against those sorts of attacks by the State. The trial court further referred to what this defendant did, in his choice, in terms of the defense he raised in this case. Based upon our review of the record, we are not satisfied that the trial court considered the defense strategy only insofar as it was based upon the defendant's own testimony. See id. ; see also State v. Davenport, 941 So.2d 629, 633 (La.Ct.App.2006) (trial court erred in concluding that defense counsel's strategy of attempting to introduce evidence of victim's condition immediately before accident equated to a lack of remorse on the part of the defendant). Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court considered defense counsel's trial tactics in its sentencing determination, the trial court erred.