Opinion ID: 724045
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior Crimes of Violence

Text: 11 Farnsworth first contests the district court's enhancement of his sentence based on two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence. In calculating Farnsworth's sentence, the district court applied U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). That Guideline mandates an enhanced base offense level of 24 if the defendant had at least two prior felony convictions of ... a crime of violence. The district court, relying on the presentence report, found two such prior crimes of violence: (1) a 1972 conviction for possession of an unregistered destructive device; and (2) a 1984 conviction for vehicular manslaughter. On appeal, Farnsworth asserts that the 1972 conviction for possession of an unregistered destructive device was too ancient to be counted under the Guideline. We agree. 12 The Commentary to § 2K2.1(a)(2) directs that when determining the number of prior convictions under that subsection, the court is to count any such prior conviction that receives any points under § 4A1.1 (Criminal History Category). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, comment., n. 5. The definitions for purposes of computing criminal history under § 4A1.1 are contained in Section 4A1.2(e), which provides that [a]ny prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month that was imposed within fifteen years of the defendant's commencement of the instant offense is counted, as well as any sentence of the requisite length that resulted in the defendant being incarcerated during any part of such fifteen-year period. (emphasis added). Farnsworth's sentence for possession of an unregistered destructive device was imposed on December 18, 1972, and his sentence expired in 1976. The government concedes that, according to the commentary to § 2K2.1, the 1972 conviction should not have been counted because it was outside the fifteen-year period for receiving criminal history points under § 4A1.1. Indeed, the presentence report added no criminal history points for this conviction. 13 The government urges us, however, to disregard the commentary. Commentary interpreting the sentencing guidelines is binding on the federal courts unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with the guideline it interprets. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44-45, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 1918-19, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993). The government argues that the commentary at issue is inconsistent with Guideline § 2K2.1 because the express language of the guideline--providing an enhanced base offense level where the defendant has been convicted of two prior felony crimes of violence--does not contain the limitation that only prior convictions receiving Criminal History points are to be counted. 14 This contention is without merit. In Stinson, the Supreme Court noted that, unlike an agency's construction of a federal statute, where the agency's interpretation is relied upon only if the statute's silence or ambiguity has left a gap for the agency to fill, commentary to the sentencing guidelines explains the guidelines and provides concrete guidance as to how even unambiguous guidelines are to be applied in practice. 508 U.S. at 44, 113 S.Ct. at 1918 (citation omitted). Absent a situation where commentary and the guideline it interprets are inconsistent in that following one will result in violating the dictates of the other, id., the commentary should not be found to contradict the guideline, see id. We see no such inconsistency here, and thus find the commentary binding. 15 Although Farnsworth timely objected that possession of an unregistered destructive device was not a crime of violence for purposes of the Guidelines, he did not raise until this appeal the objection that the 1972 conviction is too ancient to be counted. Our review is thus limited to plain error. See Nelson, 36 F.3d at 1003; Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b) (Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.). We have held that basing a sentence on the wrong Guideline range constitutes a fundamental error affecting substantial rights within the meaning of Rule 52(b). United States v. Smith, 919 F.2d 123, 124 (10th Cir.1990). The district court's erroneous use of an ancient felony conviction to raise Farnsworth's base offense level thus amounts to plain error, and we remand his case to the district court for resentencing. 16 Farnsworth also challenges the use of his 1984 vehicular manslaughter conviction to enhance his sentence under § 2K2.1. Farnsworth argues that vehicular manslaughter is not a crime of violence. The Commentary to § 2K2.1 references the definition of crime of violence found in § 4B1.2, which provides, in relevant part: 17 (1) The term crime of violence means any offense under federal or state law punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that-- 18 (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or 19 (ii) ... otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. The commentary to this section provides: 20 Crime of violence includes murder, manslaughter, [and other enumerated offenses]. Other offenses are included where (A) that offense has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (B) the conduct set forth (i.e. expressly charged) in the count of which the defendant was convicted involved use of explosives (including any explosive material or destructive device) or, by its nature, presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 21 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, n. 2 (emphasis added). 22 For purposes of evaluating whether a prior offense constituted a crime of violence for purposes of § 4B1.2, we look first to the statutory basis of conviction. If the statute is ambiguous, or broad enough to encompass both violent and nonviolent crimes, a court can look beyond the statutory count of conviction in order to resolve a patent ambiguity caused by a broad state statute. United States v. Smith, 10 F.3d 724, 733 (10th Cir.1993). The range of this extra-statutory examination is limited, however, to the charging papers, judgment of conviction, plea agreement or other statements by the defendant for the record, presentence report adopted by the court, and findings by the sentencing judge. Id. at 734. 23 Farnsworth was convicted of vehicular manslaughter, in violation of California Penal Code § 192(c)(3), which at that time prohibited the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice, by: 24 Driving a vehicle in violation of Section 23152 or 23153 of the Vehicle Code and in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence; or driving a vehicle in violation of Section 23152 or 23153 of the Vehicle Code and in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence. 25 Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 192 (historical and statutory notes) (West.Supp.1996). Section 23152 of the Vehicle Code provided, in relevant part, that it is unlawful for any person under the influence of alcohol or drugs to drive a vehicle. Cal. Veh. Code Ann. § 23152 (West 1987). Section 23153 provided that it is unlawful for a driver to cause bodily injury to another while driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Cal. Veh. Code. Ann. § 23153 (West 1987). Farnsworth, therefore, was convicted of killing a human being while driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol and with gross negligence. We have no difficulty in concluding that this clearly was conduct that present[ed] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1)(ii). Accord United States v. Fry, 51 F.3d 543, 546 (5th Cir.1995). We agree with the Seventh Circuit that:[t]he dangers of drunk driving are well-known and well documented. Unlike other acts that may present some risk of physical injury, ... the risk of injury from drunk driving is neither conjectural nor speculative.... Drunk driving is a reckless act that often results in injury, and the risks of driving while intoxicated are well known. This is sufficient to satisfy the serious risk standard of the otherwise clause [of § 4B1.2(1)(ii) ]. 26 United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 376-77 (7th Cir.) (holding that vehicular assault by a drunk driver is a crime of violence), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 323, 133 L.Ed.2d 224 (1995). Because we conclude that the crime of grossly negligent driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, comment., n. 2, clause B, we do not reach the government's argument that all vehicular manslaughter is manslaughter, and therefore a crime of violence, for purposes of the Commentary to § 4B1.2. 27 Farnsworth argues that the statute under which he was convicted is ambiguous, so that only by looking to the underlying offense conduct could it be determined whether his crime was one of violence. He relies on United States v. Gacnik, 50 F.3d 848, 856 (10th Cir.1995), in which we found Colorado's criminally negligent homicide statute to be ambiguous. The statute in Gacnik criminalized causing the death of another through criminal negligence, defined as gross negligence. We held that [t]o label any and all conduct resulting in a charge of criminally negligent homicide as a 'crime of violence' ... may sweep too broadly. Id. We find Gacnik inapposite. The statute under which Farnsworth was convicted does not encompass all grossly negligent conduct that causes the death of another; rather, it criminalizes causing death by driving while under the influence of drugs or alcohol and with gross negligence. As stated above, we believe this describes conduct that by its nature, presents a serious potential risk of injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, comment., n. 2. 5 28