Opinion ID: 3010644
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sentencing for Distribution of Cocaine Near

Text: a School The Government argues that the district court erred by refusing to sentence Riddick pursuant to USSG S 2D1.2, the Sentencing Guideline applicable for drug offenses occurring near a school.7 Section 2D1.2 should have been applied, the Government argues, because the Sentencing Guidelines require the use of the highest offense level within a group of counts. The standard of review of the district court's interpretation and application of the _________________________________________________________________ 6. There were recordings made prior to December 1993, but they were made with the consent of one of the parties to the conversation and Riddick has not addressed these specifically. 7. Riddick argues that the Government has waived its right to appeal the court's failure to apply USSG S 2D1.2. Riddick relies on the Government's statement at the sentencing hearing, that regardless of whether the court sentenced Riddick under the CCE statute or the conspiracy statute the end result would be a life sentence, as evidence that the Government did not raise this guideline provision as an alternative sentencing option before the district court. This argument is without merit. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing the district court stated [t]he Government urges that the counts involving distribution near a school are not lesser included offenses to the continuing criminal enterprise count, and therefore, I would have the option . . . to sentence to the higher amount, suggesting quite clearly that the Government raised the issue below. 8 Sentencing Guidelines is plenary. United States v. Hallman, 23 F.3d 821, 823 (3d Cir. 1994). The Government's argument is meritorious. Section 3D1.2(d) of the Sentencing Guidelines states that multiple counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into a single Group. Counts involve substantially the same harm . . . when the offense level is determined largely on the basis of . . . the quantity of a substance involved. USSG S 3D1.2(d). Offenses covered by the USSG S 2D1.2 (distribution near a school) and USSG S 2D1.5 (continuing criminal enterprise offenses) are to be grouped together. USSG S 3D1.2(d). Moreover, in cases of grouping under S 3D1.2(d), the offense guideline that results in the highest offense level is used. USSG S 3D1.2 comment. (n.6). Applied here, the counts for distribution of cocaine near a school (21 U.S.C. S 860(a)) and for operating a CCE (21 U.S.C. S 848) are properly grouped together. See USSG S 3D1.2(d). The counts for distribution of cocaine near a school result in a higher offense level than the CCE count. While Riddick's offense level for CCE count is 42 pursuant to S 2D1.5,8 Riddick's offense level for distribution of cocaine near a school is 43. Specifically, the provision applicable for violations of S 860(a), USSGS 2D1.2, directs the court to add one offense level to the offense level from S 2D1.1 applicable to the total quantity of controlled substances involved in the offense. USSG S 2D1.2(a)(2). Riddick's offense level from S 2D1.1 is 38 because the total quantity involved in the offense was more than 150 kilograms of cocaine. Thus, the base offense level would be 39, plus a 4-level increase under USSG S 3B1.1(a) for Riddick's role as leader or organizer of criminal activity involving five or more people.9 The total offense level is 43, _________________________________________________________________ 8. Sentencing Guideline S 2D1.5 applies to the CCE count. Here, the base offense level is 4 plus the offense level fromS 2D1.1, for a total of 42, mandating a sentence of 360 months to life. 9. Riddick did not contest the four level increase pursuant to USSG S 3B1.1(a) on appeal. Riddick, however, appealed the sufficiency of the CCE conviction involving the same facts. In part IB, supra, we concluded that there was sufficient evidence on this point to sustain the jury's verdict. 9 mandating a sentence of life imprisonment. Thus, under USSG S 3D1.2(d), the district court should have applied S 2D1.2 and sentenced Riddick to life imprisonment. The district court, however, sentenced Riddick on the CCE count based on its perception that operating a continuing criminal enterprise constituted a more serious offense than the offense of distributing cocaine near a school or playground and thus the distribution count merged with the CCE count for sentencing purposes. The district court's perception of the seriousness of the crime does not provide a basis on which the court may disregard the explicit instructions of the Sentencing Guidelines. The Guidelines do not direct the court to make a subjective determination of which count is the most severe or onerous in determining the sentence. See USSG S 3D1.2(d). Rather, the Guidelines suggest that the severity of the offense is fully accounted for in the court's calculation of the offense level. Thus, the district court erred. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that it is improper to impose a higher penalty for a lesser included offense than for the more serious offense, substantive predicate offenses involved in a CCE conviction, such as Riddick's violation of 21 U.S.C. S 860(a) for distributing cocaine in the vicinity of a school, are not lesser included offenses of the CCE count. The issue of whether one count is the lesser included offense of another arises when the court is confronted with two distinct statutory provisions applicable to the same criminal act. In such a situation, the court will look at whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). The traditional test does not apply, however, where there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent. United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 154 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 367 (1983)). As the Supreme Court stated in Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985), [t]he language, structure, and legislative history of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse, Prevention and Control Act of 1970, . . . show in the plainest way that Congress intended the CCE provision to be a separate criminal offense which was punishable in addition to, and not as a substitute for, the predicate offenses. 10 Further, the language of Garrett is not contradicted by Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 300 (1996), in which the Court held that conspiracy to distribute controlled substances is a lesser included offense of the CCE offense because the conspiracy count does not require proof of any fact that is not also an element of the CCE count. Thus, a sentence for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in addition to a concurrent CCE offense sentence amounted to an improper cumulative second punishment. Id. at 302-03. Rutledge, however, explicitly distinguished Garrett as a caseadher[ing] to our understanding that legislatures have traditionally perceived a qualitative difference between conspiracy-like crimes and the substantive offenses upon which they are predicated. . . . In contrast to the crime[ ] [of importing marijuana] involved in Garrett, this case involves two conspiracy-like offenses directed at largely identical conduct. Id. at 301 n.12. As various Courts of Appeals decisions recognize, the Supreme Court has made clear that while a defendant may not be sentenced, even concurrently, to both a conspiracy conviction and a CCE conviction because one is the lesser included offense of the other, the same rule does not apply when the predicate offense is a separate substantive offense. Substantive predicate offenses do not merge with the CCE count. See United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 287 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating in dicta that under Garrett, the Double Jeopardy clause does not bar cumulative punishments for CCE and underlying substantive predicate offenses); Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d at 154 (finding no constitutional impediment to the imposition of cumulative sentences on the CCE count and on the predicate substantive count of aiding and abetting); United States v. Morrow, 929 F.2d 566, 568 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that the manufacture of methamphetamine count was not the lesser included offense of the CCE count, court affirmed sentence imposed on manufacture count); United States v. Jones, 918 F.2d 909, 909-10 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that [w]hen the predicate act is a substantive violation of the narcotics laws, as distribution is, the substantive violation does not merge into the CCE count). 11 Thus, the district court was not precluded from sentencing Riddick on the counts for distribution of cocaine near a school. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred by failing to sentence Riddick to life imprisonment pursuant to USSG S 2D1.2 for his conviction under 21 U.S.C. S 860(a) and for his role as an organizer pursuant to USSG S 3B1.1(a). Riddick's challenge to the district court's factualfindings does not affect the court's conclusion. Riddick argues that even if the court concludes that he is to be sentenced under USSG S 2D1.2, he should not receive a life sentence. Riddick bases this claim on his belief that the court made the erroneous factual finding that 150 kilograms of cocaine were attributable to him. With an accurate assessment of the quantity of cocaine a lower base offense level would apply and would preclude a sentence of life in prison. As proof of the inaccuracies, Riddick states that the court added quantities for which there was no record evidence presented or dates setting forth when the transactions occurred. Even allowing for the 75 kilograms assessed to him in 1993, Riddick argues that the Government can prove that he distributed no more than 108.75 kilograms of cocaine and even this amount was based on improperly drawn inferences from testimony of a man who was in prison for at least part of the time he was allegedly making sales to Riddick. Finally, Riddick contends that any conclusion that he was responsible for the total quantity of drugs involved in the CCE was in error because the district court did not make a finding that it was reasonable to impute knowledge of all the conspiracy's criminal conduct to him. As indicated previously, however, the district court made clear factual findings based on equally clear reasoning. Riddick has presented nothing to suggest that the court's detailed factual finding that he was responsible for 150 kilograms of cocaine, an estimate significantly lower than either that of the Government or of the probation officer, is clearly erroneous. 12