Opinion ID: 1835229
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Postconviction Requirements.

Text: In order to prevail in this postconviction proceeding, Mayer must prove both that his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty and that prejudice resulted from counsel's failure. State v. Hill, 449 N.W.2d 626, 628 (Iowa 1989); State v. Miles, 344 N.W.2d 231, 233-34 (Iowa 1984) (citing Snethen v. State, 308 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Iowa 1981)). In examining the prejudice element, we are guided by the following principle: The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1984). In Strickland the Supreme Court stated that even a professionally unreasonable error made by counsel does not warrant setting aside a judgment if the error had no effect on the judgment. Id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 696. Mayer's confrontation claim must of course now be viewed in its postconviction context, not as it would have been if raised on direct appeal. In this proceeding he made a showing that his counsel in the direct appeal passed the confrontation issue only because there had been no trial objection, and hence the matter was not preserved for review. Mayer thinks the failure to preserve error on this crucial constitutional question denied him effective assistance of counsel, and that we should therefore consider the error at the postconviction stage. Such a view finds some support in our earlier postconviction opinions. Cf. State v. Goff, 342 N.W.2d 830, 838 (Iowa 1983) (counsel ineffective because of failure to object to marshaling instruction). In State v. White, 337 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa 1983), we determined that ineffective assistance of appellate counsel will provide sufficient reason to permit the issue of ineffective trial counsel to be raised for the first time in the postconviction proceeding. Our postconviction opinions have undergone an evolution and now embrace the two-step analysis of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984). See, e.g., Snethen v. State, 308 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Iowa 1981). Our changed view on the question was spelled out frankly in State v. Broughton, 450 N.W.2d 874 (Iowa 1990), where we qualified Goff: [I]neffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, based on failure to preserve error, are not to be reviewed on the basis of whether the claimed error would have required reversal if it had been preserved at trial. It is incumbent on a convicted person seeking relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to demonstrate within the totality of the trial the dual elements of (a) breach of an essential duty, and (b) prejudice. Id. at 876. Our review of this issue of constitutional significance is de novo. Whether we call such a review de novo or a review under the totality of circumstances our function is the same. We consider anew all the matters presented to, and which should have been considered by, the trial court and reach our own conclusion on whether the constitutional safeguard was violated. It makes no practical difference whether such a review is called de novo or one under the totality of circumstances. Kellogg v. State, 288 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Iowa 1980).