Opinion ID: 610906
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Legal Accuracy of the Instruction on Armed Bank Robbery

Text: 27 When the district judge gave his modified supplemental instruction clarifying that a person can be guilty of aiding and abetting a bank robbery if he participates after the time the bank was robbed but during the escape phase, he also instructed the jury: I would stress to you, however, that if you were to find Mr. James guilty with respect to the armed bank robbery aspect of the case, you must find that he knew that he was aiding and abetting an armed bank robbery as opposed to a simple bank robbery. James argues that this instruction concerning liability for armed bank robbery as opposed to simple bank robbery was incorrect in two ways. First, James argues that the judge did not instruct the jury that to be guilty James must have engaged in a purely voluntary act intended to aid Mackey's use of the weapon. Second, James argues that the judge did not instruct that James must have specifically intended that his act aid Mackey in the use of the weapon. James contends that the judge should have instructed the jury that appellant had to have aided and abetted the robbery with 'aware[ness] of the likelihood that [a gun] would be used'  (quoting our opinion in Grubczak, 793 F.2d at 463 (emphasis added by James)). 28 The flaw in James' contentions is illustrated by the first sentence in his brief addressing this argument. He states, [e]ven if the offense of bank robbery includes the 'hot pursuit' escape phase, a defendant who is unaware of the robbery (and hence of the principal's use of a gun during the robbery) until after it has occurred cannot be held liable for punishment [for armed robbery]. (emphasis added). Because we have held that the crime of bank robbery continues through the escape phase, if a defendant learns of the armed robbery during the escape phase he has learned of it during the robbery. If at that point he aids and abets the crime, he is guilty of aiding and abetting an armed bank robbery. 29 In a footnote in Grubczak we acknowledged the prevailing view that in a prosecution for aiding and abetting armed bank robbery, the government must establish not only that the defendant knew that a bank was to be robbed and became associated and participated in that crime, but also that the defendant ' knew that [the principal] was armed and intended to use the weapon, and intended to aid him in that respect. '  Grubczak, 793 F.2d at 462 n. 1 (citations omitted). James relies on this reasoning to support his argument that the jury should have been instructed that he could be convicted of aiding and abetting armed bank robbery only if the jury found that he acted with intent to aid and abet the assault which occurred inside the bank. James' reliance is misplaced. As we noted above, in Grubczak we also clearly stated that [s]ince the robbery itself was continuing through this escape phase ... defendant's knowledge of a weapon at this point [during the escape phase] was sufficient to support a conviction for aiding and abetting an armed robbery. 793 F.2d at 464 (citations omitted). The district court's modified supplemental instruction properly explained liability for aiding and abetting armed bank robbery in accordance with our reasoning in Grubczak. 30