Opinion ID: 511547
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Principles of Political Affiliation Cases

Text: 43 In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), various ministerial employees of the Sheriff's office (e.g., process servers and bailiffs) were fired by a newly elected Democratic Sheriff because they were Republicans. The Court held that the dismissals were barred by the First Amendment. The three-member plurality thought patronage dismissals impaired freedom of belief and association and damaged the electoral process. The plurality admitted that the government had a legitimate interest in ensuring that representative government not be undercut by tactics obstructing the implementation of policies of the new administration.... 427 U.S. at 367, 96 S.Ct. at 2686. This interest could be met, according to the plurality, by [l]imiting patronage dismissals to policymaking positions. Id. Courts could determine whether an employee occupies a policymaking position by examining the nature of his responsibilities, particularly whether the employee acts as an adviser or formulates plans for the implementation of broad goals. Id. at 368, 96 S.Ct. at 2687. Two members concurred on the ground that a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee could not be discharged for political belief. Id. at 375, 96 S.Ct. at 2690 (Stewart, J., concurring). 44 In Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980), assistant public defenders were dismissed by a newly appointed Democratic Public Defender because they were Republicans. The Court followed Elrod 's holding that party affiliation is usually an illegitimate basis for dismissal, but qualified its definition of the exception to the general rule: 45 the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label policymaker or confidential fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. 46 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. at 1295. The Court gave one example of a position for which affiliation is an appropriate requirement: 47 [T]he Governor of a State may appropriately believe that the official duties of various assistants who help him write speeches, explain his views to the press, or communicate with the legislature cannot be performed effectively unless those persons share his political beliefs and party commitments. 48 Id. The Court concluded that although the work of assistant public defenders was confidential and policymaking in one sense, party affiliation was irrelevant to the effective performance of their jobs. 49 The First Circuit, after surveying the lower courts that have interpreted Elrod and Branti, distilled a two-part test for determining whether an employee may be dismissed because of political affiliation. Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 241-42 (1st Cir.1986) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1888, 95 L.Ed.2d 496 (1987). First, and as a threshold matter, it asks whether the position 50 relates to partisan political interests.... [or] concerns. [Branti,] 445 U.S. at 519 [100 S.Ct. at 1295]. That is, does the position involve government decisionmaking on issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals or their implementation? 51 Id. See also Shondel v. McDermott, 775 F.2d 859, 864 (7th Cir.1985) (employee may be dismissed for affiliation if his job performance has a political dimension in the sense that it cannot be evaluated solely on the basis of neutral, apolitical criteria of professional competence); Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir.1981) (does position involve government decision-making on issues where there is room for principled disagreement on goals or their implementation?), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021, 102 S.Ct. 1719, 72 L.Ed.2d 139 (1982). 52 Second, Jimenez Fuentes directs us to examine the particular responsibilities of the position to determine whether it resembles a policymaker.... 807 F.2d at 242. Even though, after Branti, policymaker carries no talismanic significance, it remains a convenient shorthand for the type of employee for whom political affiliation is an appropriate requirement. 807 F.2d at 240; see also Brown v. Trench, 787 F.2d 167, 168-69 (3d Cir.1986); Grossart v. Dinaso, 758 F.2d 1221, 1227 n. 4 (7th Cir.1985). We must focus on the powers inherent in the office, even if a particular incumbent has not exercised all of his authority. Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 242. Among the relevant indicia of policymaking authority are vague or broad responsibilities, relative pay, technical competence, power to control others, authority to speak in the name of policymakers, public perception, influence on programs, contact with elected officials, and responsiveness to partisan politics and political leaders. Id. (quoting Ecker v. Cohalan, 542 F.Supp. 896, 901 (E.D.N.Y.1982), and Elrod, 427 U.S. at 368, 96 S.Ct. at 2687). See also Brown, 787 F.2d at 169-70. 53