Opinion ID: 2033351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Test Refusal.

Text: Bloomer contends the court misinterpreted the implied-consent provisions of Iowa Code sections 321J.6(2) and 321J.11 when it overruled his motion to suppress the State's proof that he refused a breath test. When a determination of admissibility of evidence turns on statutory interpretation, our review is for the correction of errors at law. State v. Adams, 554 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Iowa 1996). Under Iowa law, a person who operates a motor vehicle under circumstances giving rise to a reasonable belief that the person is intoxicated is deemed to have given consent to withdrawal of a specimen of blood, urine or breath to determine alcohol concentration. Iowa Code § 321J.6(1). The implied consent procedures provide that a peace officer shall determine which of the three substances, breath, blood or urine, shall be tested. Refusal to submit to a chemical test of urine or breath is deemed a refusal to submit.... Id. § 321J.6(2). Proof of a defendant's test refusal may be submitted in evidence at trial. Iowa Code § 321J.16. Bloomer claims his test refusal under the implied consent procedures was invoked by [the trooper] without merit. He rests this argument on section 321J.11. The statute states, in pertinent part: The person may have an independent chemical test or tests administered at the person's own expense in addition to any administered at the direction of a peace officer. The failure or inability of the person to obtain an independent chemical test or tests does not preclude the admission of evidence of the results of the test or tests administered at the direction of the peace officer. Id. § 321J.11 (emphasis added). Our court of appeals explained the scope of this statutory entitlement in State v. Mahoney, 515 N.W.2d 47 (Iowa App.1994). In Mahoney, the court found that a person arrested for OWI must submit to the officer's requested test before being entitled to take an independent breath, blood or urine test. Mahoney, 515 N.W.2d at 50; accord State v. Wootten, 577 N.W.2d 654, 655 (Iowa 1998). The court's holding rested on evident legislative intent: use of the words in addition to in section 321J.11 makes clear that a defendant must submit to a state-administered chemical test before being allowed to demand an independent test. Mahoney, 515 N.W.2d at 50. Because section 321J.11's entitlement to an independent test is only applicable when a defendant has submitted to a requested test, a reviewing court must determine from the facts whether a defendant has attempted to assert his right to independent testing without actually refusing the test requested by an officer. In Ginsberg v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 508 N.W.2d 663 (Iowa 1993), this court considered an alleged test refusal in this context. We observed that factors bearing on the decision included the defendant's and the officer's words and conduct as well as the surrounding circumstances. Ginsberg, 508 N.W.2d at 664. In Ginsberg, as here, officers asked the defendant to submit to a breath test following his arrest for operating while intoxicated. Id. Ginsberg, having said he wanted a blood or urine test, was then asked if that meant he was refusing to take the breath test. Ginsberg reportedly stated that he was not refusing to take the breath test but that he wanted his blood or urine tested as well.  Id. (emphasis added). The officers treated this as a refusal and this court reversed, concluding that the record revealed Ginsberg's attempt to assert his right to independent testing rather than a refusal of the requested test. Id. We nevertheless reiterated the rule that anything less than unqualified, unequivocal consent is a refusal. Id. (quoting Ferguson v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 424 N.W.2d 464, 466 (Iowa 1988)). The record before us, though similar to Ginsberg, contains important differences. The trooper first testified that Bloomer insisted on a urine test instead of a breath test. But he conceded on cross-examination that Bloomer stated he did not refuse the officer's test. Bloomer, testifying on his own behalf, essentially agreed with this characterization of their conversation. Importantly, however, the record reveals that Bloomer's actions spoke louder than his words. After forty-five minutes of discussion, Bloomer had neither signed the form nor given a breath test. The officer treated the impasse as a test refusal. On appeal, Bloomer seeks to justify his inaction on the ground that the trooper never told him he could take an independent test in addition to the requested breath test. The officer, however, was not required to convey that information. Wootten, 577 N.W.2d at 655. Bloomer exercised his statutory right to consult with counsel. See Iowa Code § 804.20. Although Bloomer now complains about Trooper Konecne's emphasis on his right to choose the test, the record reveals no denial by the trooper of any request by Bloomer to take an independent test. Cf. Casper v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 506 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Iowa App.1993) (dicta suggesting that proof of denial would require suppression of police-administered chemical test). Under this record, we find no error by the court in refusing to suppress proof of Bloomer's test refusal. Bloomer neither consented to the test chosen by the peace officer, nor did he invoke his statutory right to an independent test. Thus the court committed no error in admitting evidence of his refusal to submit to the requested breath test.