Opinion ID: 78179
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of Attorney's Fees Claim

Text: Fitel also challenges the district court's decision to dismiss Fitel's attorney's fees claim as a sanction for Fitel's failing to produce its attorney's fee agreement and attorneys' bills incurred in the instant case. The district court found that there was a complete and willful failure by Fitel to provide EBG with the required documents given that Fitel expressly sought to recover its attorney's fees incurred in this case. The district court imposed the sanction pursuant to Rule 37(d) and 37(b)(2)(C). Rule 37(d) states that if a party fails ... to serve a written response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(d). In turn, Rule 37(b)(2)(C) lists dismissal as a permitted sanction, stating that the court may issue [a]n order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default .... Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added). Thus, these rules permit dismissal as a sanction for failure to produce documents. Construing these same rules, this Court concluded, where appropriate, a court is authorized to strike pleadings, stay proceedings, dismiss the action or any part thereof, or render a judgment by default against a disobedient party. United States v. Certain Real Prop. Located at Route 1, Bryant, Ala., 126 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir.1997). [23] However, we also indicated that a district court may impose the severe sanction of dismissal of a claim with prejudice only where the party's non-compliance is willful or in bad faith. Id. at 1317-18. [24] As to Fitel's attorney agreement and attorney's bills, there is record evidence to support the district court's finding of a complete and willful failure to comply with EBG's discovery requests. The documents responsive to EBG's Document Request were directly relevant to Fitel's claim for attorney fees. In its answer to the Document Request, Fitel first agreed to produce the responsive documents (redacted to protect privilege), as follows: [Fitel] objects to Request Number 32 to the extent that it improperly seeks privileged communications between [Fitel] and its counsel. [Fitel] further objects to Request Number 32 to the extent that it seeks information that is not relevant to any claim or defense asserted in the action. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objection and the General Objections above, [Fitel] will produce documents responsive to Request Number 32 that reflect the amounts of attorneys fees billed to and paid by [Fitel] in this action (redacted, if necessary, to protect privileged information). Nevertheless, despite repeated entreaties, Fitel produced nothing at all. Instead, Fitel (1) decided unilaterally that a summary of its counsel's billsrather than the documents EBG requested and Fitel stated it would provide with redactionswould be sufficient, and then (2) told EBG that even the summary would not be produced until EBG agreed not to challenge the sufficiency of Fitel's production. At the time of the motions hearing and court's sanctions ruling, Fitel still had produced nothing at all, not even the summary or the underlying agreement. The district court also found that Fitel's conduct evinced a strategy by Fitel and/or its counsel of we're going to make the judge order us to produce the attorney's fees documents. [25] In sum, Fitel's conduct as to its attorney's fee agreement and the attorney bills is starkly different from its cooperative conduct as to Rafuse's written expert report. Further, while we may have chosen a different sanction (such as awarding EBG its costs in filing its motion to compel), the district court's choice of sanctiondismissal of the attorney's fee claimwas within its range of options under Rule 37(d) and 37(b)(2)(C) given its finding of a complete and willful failure to comply with EBG's Discovery Request. Thus, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in its dismissal of Fitel's attorney's fees claim pursuant to Rule 37(d) and 37(b)(2)(C).