Opinion ID: 1609069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Strict Scrutiny Standards

Text: As we have explained, since the confidentiality rule created by La. S.Ct. Rule XIX, § 16(A) and (I) is properly classified as a content-based restriction of speech, binding Supreme Court precedent requires this Court to subject the rule to the most exacting constitutional scrutiny. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321-322, 108 S.Ct. at 1164. The confidentiality rule may only be sustained if it satisfies the well-established two-part strict scrutiny test. This test requires the state to prove: (1) that the regulation serves a compelling governmental interest, [62] and (2) that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest. [63] Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-775, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 2534, 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (2002); Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. at 813, 120 S.Ct. at 1886; Burson, 504 U.S. at 198, 112 S.Ct. at 1851; R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395-396, 112 S.Ct. at 2549-2550; Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 118, 112 S.Ct. at 509; Boos, 485 U.S. at 321-322, 108 S.Ct. at 1164; Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 540, 100 S.Ct. at 2335 (the government must show that the regulation is a precisely drawn means of serving a compelling state interest). We must approach the strict scrutiny analysis with the posture the Supreme Court has long prescribed for this inquiry: `it is the rare case in which . . . a law survives strict scrutiny.' Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 763 n. 14 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting Burson, 504 U.S. at 211, 112 S.Ct. at 1857); See also Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. at 818, 120 S.Ct. at 1889 (It is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.). A law subject to strict scrutiny because it regulates speech based on its content is presumptively invalid, and the Government bears the burden to rebut that presumption. Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. at 817, 120 S.Ct. 1878. We will first review the standards governing each prong of the strict scrutiny analysis, and then we will proceed to subject the confidentiality rule to strict scrutiny.
The first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis requires the identification of a compelling governmental interest which is served by the regulation in question. The state's role in this inquiry is to assert an interest served by the regulation at issue and to submit evidence to establish the compelling nature of that interest. The court must then determine whether the record effectively demonstrates that the asserted interest qualifies as a compelling one as a matter of law. As noted above, the first component of the compelling interest analysis requires the government to assert an interest served by the regulation in question, such as the need to address a perceived problem, protect a group from harm, or cure some ill in society. However, [m]ere speculation of harm does not constitute a compelling state interest. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 543, 100 S.Ct. at 2336. The state must effectively demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction [of speech] will in fact alleviate them to a material degree Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. at 817, 120 S.Ct. at 1888 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-771, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 1800, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993)). The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny . . . will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391, 120 S.Ct. 897, 906, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000). Once the state has asserted its interest and presented its evidence, the court must determine whether the asserted state interest qualifies as a compelling interest. However, [p]recisely what constitutes a `compelling interest' is not easily defined. White, 416 F.3d at 749; See also Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-189, 99 S.Ct. 983, 992, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (I have never been able fully to appreciate just what a `compelling state interest' is.); Eu v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 234, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (same). `[N]owhere in the text of the Constitution, or in its plain implications, is there any guide for determining what is a `legitimate' state interest, [compelling or otherwise].' White, 416 F.3d at 749 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 181, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 1410, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). [W]hile decisions of the Supreme Court and opinions of various members of the Court have frequently described or treated governmental interests as compelling, few have explained why. Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L.Rev. 917, 932 (1988). Attempts to define the term have inevitably used equally vague, superlative terminology. White, 416 F.3d at 749. Indeed, the Court's treatment of [compelling] governmental interests has become largely intuitive, a kind of `know it when I see it' approach similar to Justice Stewart's explanation of pornography. Gottlieb, supra at 937. Thus, unless the Supreme Court has provided some guidance through prior decisions as to whether a particular state interest is compelling, a court has few standards to direct its decision in this regard. A small measure of guidance may be obtained by contrasting compelling interest with the other standards utilized by the Court during constitutional review. The compelling interest required under strict scrutiny is generally something more than the substantial or important interest required under intermediate scrutiny, which is greater than the legitimate interest required under a rational basis review. See generally John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 14.3, 687-690 (7th ed.2004). [64] Though each of these additional terms are also purposefully vague, the hierarchal scheme is somewhat useful for our present analysis. A state actor cannot rely on legitimate or even important or substantial justifications for its regulation to survive strict scrutiny; it must demonstrate a compelling reason for restricting speech. The Court communicates this same concept when it describes compelling interests as interests of the highest order. White, 536 U.S. at 780, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (quoting The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541-542, 109 S.Ct. 2603, 2613, 105 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Finally, the court's analysis under the narrowly tailored inquiry may inform the court's decision as to the compelling interest question. One of the factors to be considered under the narrowly tailored analysis is whether a regulation is underinclusive. [65] That is, whether the regulation fails to restrict a significant amount of speech that harms the government interest to about the same degree as does the restricted speech. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U.Penn. L.Rev. 2417, 2423 (1996) (collecting cases). If the court finds that a regulation is underinclusive, this weighs against a finding that the rule satisfies either prong of strict scrutiny. This is because underinclusiveness often raises serious doubts that the state is in fact serving the significant interest which the state invokes in support of affirmance. The Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 540, 109 S.Ct. at 2612-2613; See also City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52-53, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 2044, 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994) (Exemptions from an otherwise legitimate regulation of a medium of speech . . . may diminish the credibility of the government's rationale for restricting speech in the first place.). [66] We note that in several cases, a finding that a regulation was underinclusive as to a particular interest led the Court to hold that the state could not rely on that particular interest to justify the regulation under strict scrutiny. The Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 540-541, 109 S.Ct. at 2612-2613; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 2292-2293, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980). As the Court expressed in White: [A] law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order, and thus as justifying a restriction upon truthful speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited. 536 U.S. at 780, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (quoting The Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541-542, 109 S.Ct. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring)); See generally White, 416 F.3d at 750-751, 757-763 (discussing the underinclusive doctrine, citing several Supreme Court cases). [67]
If the government sets forth an interest which qualifies as a compelling interest under strict scrutiny, we must then analyze whether the law in question is precisely drawn or narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest. As these terms imply, this is an examination of the tightness of fit between the regulation and the state interest. The purpose of the analysis is to ensure that speech is restricted no further than necessary to achieve the [state's] goal . . . Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666, 124 S.Ct. at 2791. Toward this end, the Supreme Court has indicated that courts conducting this inquiry should consider several closely related factors. A narrowly tailored rule must actually advance the interest asserted. Eu, 489 U.S. at 228, 109 S.Ct. at 1022-3 (finding that the state had failed to present any evidence that proved that a ban on party primary endorsements actually served the state's interest in preventing fraud and corruption in the political process). Second, a rule is not narrowly tailored unless it is reasonably necessary to serve the state interest. White, 536 U.S. at 775, 122 S.Ct. at 2534-5 (In order for respondents to show that the announce clause is narrowly tailored, they must demonstrate that it does not `unnecessarily circumscrib[e] protected expression.') (citation omitted); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395-396, 112 S.Ct. at 2550 (The dispositive question in this case, therefore, is whether content discrimination is reasonably necessary to achieve St. Paul's compelling interests. . .); Burson, 504 U.S. at 199, 112 S.Ct. at 1852 (. . . however, a State must do more than assert a compelling state interest-it must demonstrate that its law is necessary to serve the asserted interest). [68] Third, as previously discussed, if the rule is underinclusive, that is, if it leaves appreciable damage to the supposedly vital state interest unprohibited, this weighs against a finding that the rule is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. White, 536 U.S. at 779-780, 122 S.Ct. at 2537; See also White, 416 F.3d at 750-751, 757-763 (citing several Supreme Court cases). Fourth, a narrowly tailored regulation cannot be overinclusive; the regulation cannot suppress more speech than is necessary to accomplish the compelling goal. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 121, 112 S.Ct. at 511 (finding New York's Son of Sam law was significantly overinclusive). Finally, we note that a rule is not narrowly tailored if there are less-speech restrictive alternatives available that would serve the compelling state interest at least as well. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 665-666, 124 S.Ct. at 2791 (. . . the court should ask whether the challenged regulation is the least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.); Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. at 815, 120 S.Ct. at 1887 (. . . if a less restrictive means is available for the Government to achieve its goals, the Government must use it.); Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 2836, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989) (The Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395, 112 S.Ct. at 2550 (The existence of adequate content-neutral alternatives thus `undercut[s] significantly' any defense of a [facially content-based] statute . . .) (citation omitted). See generally White, 416 F.3d at 751 (citing several Supreme Court holdings and noting the various elements of the narrowly tailored analysis). [69]