Opinion ID: 3168859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Offsets of Costs

Text: Defendants contend that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to offset its award of $13,376.85 in costs, by the $16,208.95 in costs paid by the City of Santa Barbara defendants. In refusing to offset costs, the district court held that costs are not akin to attorney fees, for which offsets are required, but rather “are more analogous to damages . . . , and therefore require defendants to pay at least their proportional share.” Whether an award of costs must be offset by costs paid by a settling co-defendant also appears to be an issue of first impression in this circuit. There is little case law directly on point.4 Therefore, we reason from principle and analogy and 4 See Gutierrez v. Vantia Properties, LLC, No. 1:13-CV-00642-LJO, 2014 WL 2106570, at  (E.D. Cal. May 20, 2014) (recommending that damages, attorney fees, and costs be offset by the amount paid by settling co-defendant); In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 6858853, at  (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2013) (denying plaintiffs’ request for costs already BRAVO V. CITY OF SANTA MARIA 15 hold that the Santa Maria defendants are entitled to an offset of costs to the extent that the litigation expenses have already been reimbursed. Contrary to the district court’s holding, costs are not analogous to damages. They are not compensation for loss and, unlike the determination of damages, which is usually left for the jury, the calculation of costs is almost exclusively a function for a judge, see 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2665 (3d ed. 1998). Costs are more analogous to attorney fees. Like attorney fees, costs are a reimbursement for “litigation-related expenses that a prevailing party is entitled to be awarded.” Taxation of Costs, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) (referring to “costs – other than attorney’s fees”); 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2675 (3d ed. 1998) (treating attorney fees as component of costs). We held in Corder that a district court abuses its discretion when it refuses to offset an award of attorney fees by a settling defendant’s payment of those same fees. We reasoned that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows “reasonable” fees and that a second payment for the same billable time is an unreasonable double recovery. 25 F.3d at 840. As Defendants contend, attorney fees are a component of costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985); Fulps v. City of Springfield, 715 F.2d 1088, 1092–93 (6th Cir. 1983). Thus, double recovery of costs other than attorney fees is just as impermissible as double recovery of attorney fees. paid by settling co-defendants, absent evidence from plaintiffs that the requested costs were different expenses). 16 BRAVO V. CITY OF SANTA MARIA The district court’s reasoning that the deterrent principle at the heart of § 1983 allows double recovery of costs is unpersuasive. While the statute is designed to deter civil rights violations and encourage access to the courts to redress often economically unviable injuries to fundamental rights, see generally City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574–77 (1986), that basic principle does not require double reimbursement of identical litigation expenses. The statute does not specifically address this scenario, but it is difficult to imagine Congress intended for litigation expenses to be paid multiple times. Nor would eliminating duplicative payments for litigation expenses significantly influence counsel’s decision to prosecute civil rights suits. Costs are nearly always a smaller prize than fees (which also cannot be double-counted), and “almost always amount to less than the successful litigant’s total expenses in connection with a lawsuit.” 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2666. The decision to pursue a claim does not likely hinge on the prospect of recovering out-of-pocket expenses multiple times for the same litigation activities. The principle of not allowing double recovery of costs under § 1988 is also supported by analogous California law. Under California law, when a pretrial settlement with one defendant covers the very same costs a plaintiff is trying to recover from the non-settling defendant, the plaintiff cannot recover the same costs twice. See Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 62, 76 (Ct. App. 1994). A California statute similarly provides that costs must be reasonable. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1033.5(c)(2), (3); see also 7 Witkin, California Procedure § 118 at 657 (5th ed. 2008). BRAVO V. CITY OF SANTA MARIA 17 Thus, whether this question is analyzed pursuant to federal common law or California law,5 the district court erred by applying the incorrect legal standard. Accordingly, we remand for the district court to determine what amount of costs should be offset.