Opinion ID: 1691905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: was trial counsel's representation ineffective because he failed to request an accomplice instruction?

Text: Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we hold that trial counsel did not ineffectively represent Woods by failing to require an accomplice instruction. We must reach into the factual background to determine Garcia's role in this criminal scenario. On November 7, 1983, at noon, Woods, all by himself, committed burglary at the home of James Everett and stole three rifles, one pistol, a duffel bag, a camera, and a pair of binoculars. Thereupon, Woods returned to Rapid City, South Dakota, and called one Ruben Garcia, a 14-year-old boy, to inform him that he had something to show him. Garcia's father despised Woods, so Woods, telephonically, set up a meeting with the boy to show him the pistol which he had stolen from Everett, and which pistol would be later on used to kill James Everett in cold blood. Woods persuaded Garcia to go with him back to the Everett residence to steal a few more things and the two of them arrived at about five o'clock that evening. Woods wanted Garcia to go into the house with him and burglarize the house. Garcia refused, stating, at that time, he did not have gloves and his fingerprints were on record (from juvenile probation). So Woods entered the house alone. Enter Everett on the scene. Woods was now in the house and Garcia, seeing the headlights, ran into the trees to hide. Garcia then watched Woods run out of the front door to join him in the trees. It was then and there, that Woods initiated in his mind, an intent to kill Everett, which intent to kill was neither initiated nor condoned by Garcia. By now, Garcia was a very frightened boy and he told Woods, Let's get in the car and take off. However, Woods would have nothing of it. Rather, he, Woods, decided to stay and told Garcia, No, he's already got my license number. Garcia wanted to get away from the Everett residence but Woods persisted in staying and expressed, Well, I don't want to get caught so we're going to have to shoot him. (Emphasis supplied.) Woods, who had initiated the burglary initially, and initiated the thought of killing Everett, then asked the 14-year-old boy to commit the crime of murder. Whereupon, the frightened boy replied, I can't. At that time, Woods decided to implement his premeditation and expressed to Garcia, Well, I'm going to have to do it. The scene then changes as Woods now walks up to the steps of Everett's home and peeks in the window. Garcia was back in the trees. Woods waited for the proper moment to kill Everett and when he saw Everett in a standing position whereby he could kill Everett, Woods swung the door open, stepped forward, and fired the shot ending his life. Again, the scene changes. Woods and Garcia now flee the scene and, while returning to Rapid City, Woods rolls his car into the ditch. Later that evening, after the two had hidden the rifles which Woods had stolen earlier, a telephone call was made to Garcia's home that he, Garcia, might have a ride home. Woods later reported his car as being stolen. During the course of three interviews, Woods admitted to the officers that he had killed Everett. Miranda warnings were given before each interview. Woods consented to a search of his home, whereby the murder weapon was found. Under the settled law of this state, can this Court hold that Garcia is liable to a prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial, namely, premeditated murder? We think not. See State v. Jackson, 371 N.W.2d 341 (S.D.1985). In Jackson, we held that [a]n accomplice is one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial. Id. at 344 (quoting State v. Johnson, 81 S.D. 600, 606, 139 N.W.2d 232, 236 (1965)). Woods was convicted of premeditated murder. Woods was not charged with murder by reason of death while engaged in a felony. We do not believe that Garcia knowingly, voluntarily, and with a common intent with the principal offenderunited in the commission of the crime of premeditated murder. See 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 786(1) (1961). [2] Rather, all facts defy such a conclusion. Garcia wanted to leave the scene after Everett arrived. Garcia did not generate, within his mind, the intent to kill Everett. Woods generated the criminal intent and suggested to Garcia that he shoot and kill Everett. To this, the 14-year-old boy replied, I can't. It was Woods, not Garcia, who stalked the house, peeked, and then fired a pistol which he, Woods, had stolen. We are not suggesting that Garcia is free from wrong. Surely, when he helped Woods (and it is obvious that he was acting under the influence of an older man) hide the rifles that Woods had earlier stolen after the car rolled, it was wrong. Per the trial transcript, Garcia tried to talk Woods out of killing Everett. Garcia hindered discovery of criminal conduct in hiding the rifles. Garcia was, per SDCL 22-3-5, an accessory to the crime of burglary. [3] We do not believe that Garcia aided, abetted, or advised Woods in his commission of the crime of premeditated murder as contemplated by SDCL 22-3-3 and SDCL 22-3-3.1. [4] Garcia did not promote or facilitate the crime of premeditated murder. He did not aid, abet, or advise Woods to kill Everett. Neither did he plan the crime of premeditated murder or commit it; thus, we hold that he was not a principal to the crime of murder. In State v. Johnson, 81 S.D. at 606-07, 139 N.W.2d at 236, we expressed: If a person after the commission of a felony, conceals or aids the offender with knowledge that he has committed a felony and with intent that he may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment, he is an accessory, SDC 13.0203, but not an accomplice. [We note that SDC 13.0203 exists under our current statutes, SDCL 22-3-3 and SDCL 22-3-5.] We therefore hold that Attorney Pugh's failure to request an accomplice instruction, under all of the facts and circumstances of this case, was not ineffective assistance of counsel, as contemplated by our previous decisions and the mandates of S.D. Const. art. VI, § 7, and U.S. Const. amend. VI. The evidence in this case was totally overwhelming that Woods committed murder of an innocent man without the slightest justification or provocation. He used deception, on the telephone, to take a 14-year-old boy back to the scene of a burglary, which he had committed, to then have the boy witness the murder. It cannot be overemphasized that it was Woods who did the killing and who had the premeditation and not the 14-year-old boy. We therefore hold, as Garcia was not Woods' accomplice in the crime of premeditated murder, Attorney Pugh need not have requested an accomplice instruction. Affirmed. WUEST, C.J., and FOSHEIM, Retired Justice, concur. MORGAN, J., concurs in result. SABERS, J., dissents. MILLER, J., not having been a member of the Court at the time this action was submitted to the Court, did not participate.