Opinion ID: 2973479
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Request for Booker Remand

Text: George and Twine also appeal their respective sentences, and the government agrees that the defendants should be resentenced in light of Booker. Because neither defendant raised his current objections at the time of sentencing, this court reviews each sentence for plain error. Booker, 543 U.S. at 268. A district court commits plain error by treating the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory in determining a defendant’s sentence. United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 527 (6th Cir. 2005). Both George and Twine received sentences that included imprisonment, supervised release, a special assessment, and restitution. Booker does not apply to restitution orders, United States v. Sosebee, 419 F.3d 451, 461-62 (6th Cir. 2005), and thus the defendants are not entitled to recalculation of that portion of their respective sentences. Special assessments, like restitution, are mandated by federal statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 3013, and therefore the defendants’ special assessments likewise are unaffected by Booker. The defendants’ sentences of supervised release were calculated under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines and are governed by Booker. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.1(a) (2004) (mandating imposition of term of supervised release to follow any sentence of imprisonment of more than one year). Both George and Twine are entitled to recalculation of the length of their terms of supervised release, irrespective of whether they have completed their terms of imprisonment. See United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 280-81 (2d Cir. 2006) (remanding for recalculation of term of supervised release where sentence of imprisonment was complete). - 13 - Nos. 04-3633, 04-3722 United States v. Katuramu The defendants’ sentences of imprisonment, however, present a rare Booker issue in that one of the defendants, George, has already completed his prison sentence, and the other, Twine, may very likely complete his sentence before this court’s mandate issues.2 We therefore must address whether the length of the defendants’ sentences would continue to present a live case or controversy after those sentences are complete. “We are not in the business of pronouncing that past actions which have no demonstrable continuing effect were right or wrong.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18 (1998). When an individual with a criminal conviction seeks to challenge his conviction in federal court after he has already completed his prison term, he is generally required to demonstrate some collateral legal consequences arising from the conviction in order to satisfy Article III jurisdictional requirements. This formal requirement has given way to a practical presumption that a criminal conviction will carry collateral legal consequences, because of the limitations in employment, voting, jury service, firearm possession, and the like which our society often places on individuals with a criminal history. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 8, 12. Although recognizing that collateral consequences are now often assumed for those challenging the underlying conviction itself, the Supreme Court has declined to extend this assumption into other contexts, such as when a released prisoner challenges the revocation of his parole, and has instead required petitioners to demonstrate a concrete injury in fact. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 12-14; Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982). 2 Twine’s counsel represents to the court that Twine will complete his prison term on March 31, 2006. Although we find it curious that Twine continues to pursue his Booker claim when so little time remains on his original sentence, Twine’s counsel confirmed at oral argument that this appeal does in fact continue to reflect his client’s wishes. - 14 - Nos. 04-3633, 04-3722 United States v. Katuramu Here, the defendants seek a remand for the recalculation of the length of their sentences. We conclude that the reasoning of Spencer and Lane controls, and we will not presume that the defendants will suffer a collateral legal consequence if their completed sentences are not recalculated post-Booker. Rather, the defendants must show some concrete harm that will arise from the fact that longer and not shorter sentences of imprisonment appear in their respective criminal records. See United States v. Hamdi, 432 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 2005) (requiring alien seeking postrelease resentencing to show concrete and continuing injury resulting from earlier incarceration); United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2001) (same). The law is clear that the time the defendants have served in prison, even if it were now found to be in excess, could not be credited to their time of supervised release, see United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 57 (2000), a fact which counsel does not dispute. Counsel suggested at oral argument that a shorter prison sentence, even if only reflected on paper, could affect the defendants’ future deportation proceedings and any reentry requests made at a later date. Assuming that the defendants, if deported, would seek reentry, it is not for us to speculate under what provision of U.S. immigration or asylum law they would do so. The defendants do not point to any portions of the Immigration and Nationality Act or any other law that support the argument that the length of a defendant’s prior sentence controls deportation or reentry decisions. The defendants have offered no argument specific to the facts of their case regarding how an adjustment in their respective sentences would specifically influence a decision to deport them or to deny their reentry. The defendants’ vague and hypothetical arguments present “a possibility rather than a certainty or even a probability,” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14, and we are not persuaded that - 15 - Nos. 04-3633, 04-3722 United States v. Katuramu there are any collateral legal consequences to the recalculation of portions of defendants’ sentences that they have already fully served. The Booker challenge to George’s completed prison sentence is moot. We remand this case for a recalculation of the defendants’ periods of supervised release, and, if Twine has not completed his prison sentence, for recalculation of that portion of his sentence.