Opinion ID: 1695998
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's First Assignment of Error

Text: In its first assignment of error, FNBJ maintains that the court of appeal improperly applied a manifest error standard of review. It argues that because erroneous jury instructions and other trial court legal errors tainted the verdict, the appellate court should have reviewed the case de novo. First, FNBJ notes that it was held liable on the basis of the jury's answer to a single interrogatorydid the bank breach any contractual or fiduciary obligation made between it and TGA. The bank contends that, as a matter of law, it had no fiduciary obligation to Trans-Global, either as a creditor or as a pledgee holding FNBL's letter of credit as collateral. It concludes that because there is no way to tell which obligation (contractual or fiduciary) the jury believed FNBJ to have breached, its verdict must be disregarded. In addition, the bank contends that the trial court's instruction regarding fiduciary duty was misleading and coercive. [4] A party's right to assign as error the trial court's instructions to the jury is governed by Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1793. Paragraph C of that article provides: A party may not assign as error the giving or the failing to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, or immediately after the jury retires, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. In this case, there is no indication in the record that FNBJ objected to either the instruction regarding fiduciary duty (other than to the words and became worthless in the second line, which is not relevant to its argument concerning the existence of a fiduciary duty), or to the interrogatory submitted to the jury on that issue. [5] Not only did the bank fail to object, but through the testimony of its own witnesses and the argument of its counsel, FNBJ in effect invited the jury instruction it now assigns as error. [6] Moreover, as will be evident in the next section of this opinion, we do not find that the jury instructions or interrogatories in this case contain the kind of plain, fundamental error which might tempt us not to heed the language of article 1793. FNBJ maintains that the trial court committed a second legal error in allowing testimony by banking experts that the bank owed a fiduciary duty to Trans-Global. It contends that the existence of a duty is a legal determination, not a question of opinion, and that opinion testimony regarding ultimate issues of law is prohibited. Again, however, FNBJ failed to object contemporaneously to the testimony, thereby waiving its right to object, on appeal, to the introduction of that evidence. See Temple v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 So.2d 891 (La.1976) (failure to object to prejudicial statements constitutes waiver of right to complain of them on appeal); Succession of Franz, 242 La. 875, 139 So.2d 216 (1962) (appellate court is without right to pass upon the admissibility of evidence which has been offered and received at trial without objection). It might also be noted that the testimony which FNBJ now argues has tainted the jury verdict was elicited from its own expert witnesses, after the fiduciary issue was first raised by its own counsel. Finally, FNBJ asserts that the jury was improperly coerced into reaching its verdict by a prohibited Allen chargelanguage used by the court addressed to the jury [that] ... may have had the effect of coercing them to agree upon a verdict. State v. Nicholson, 315 So.2d 639 (La. 1975). The bank bases this allegation on the following facts: After six days of trial, the jury began its deliberations in this case at approximately 4:00 p.m. on November 22, 1988, two days before Thanksgiving. At approximately 7:30 p.m., the jury returned to the courtroom. Upon being asked by the judge what explanation had been given to the bailiff, the foreman replied that one of the other jurors had mentioned that we were at an impasse, had a few questions and wanted to know if we could get something to eat if we were going to be here much longer. After ascertaining that the jurors did not mean that they had questions to ask of him, but simply wanted to continue to deliberate, the judge responded I'm going to do this. I'm going to send you back. If you do not reach a verdict, as I say, it's now 7:30. If you have not reached a verdict by eight o'clock, then I'm going to bring you back at nine o'clock tomorrow morning and continue your deliberations. Okay? The jury returned its verdict at 7:52 p.m. that night. FNBJ contends that the judge's response to the jurors' request was coercive in that it was given two days prior to Thanksgiving, and that several jurors had apparently planned out of town trips for the next day. Therefore, returning the next morning for further deliberations could require that they miss their Thanksgiving holiday. We do not agree that the trial judge's comments to the jury in this case constitute the equivalent of the Allen charge prohibited by this Court in State v. Rodman, 208 La. 523, 23 So.2d 204 (1945) and State v. Nicholson, 315 So.2d 639 (La.1975). The charges in those cases were directed toward avoiding a mistrial by dynamiting a hopelessly deadlocked jury into achieving a verdict. There is no indication here that the jury was deadlocked, or that the judge was concerned about the possibility of a mistrial. Indeed, given the brevity of the exchange between the judge and the foreman, there is no way to tell what stage the jury had reached in its deliberations. Further, there is nothing in the record to support FNBJ's surmise that some of the jurors had plans to leave town the next day, and therefore had forced a verdict in order to avoid missing the Thanksgiving holiday, two days later. In the absence of a greater showing of possible or likely prejudice, we cannot ascribe an impermissibly coercive effect to the judge's comments in this case. In conclusion, we find no merit in the defendant's first assignment of error, that the trial court legal errors discussed above require this court to conduct a de novo review.