Opinion ID: 2451219
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Appropriate Test in This Case

Text: We hold that instead of choosing between the Martinelli and Stone tests, trial courts should apply a comprehensive frameworkincorporating, as appropriate, the principles from both teststo all discovery requests implicating the right to privacy. The party requesting the information must always first prove that the information requested is relevant to the subject of the action. Next, the party opposing the discovery request must show that it has a legitimate expectation that the requested materials or information is confidential and will not be disclosed. If the trial court determines that there is a legitimate expectation of privacy in the materials or information, the requesting party must prove either that disclosure is required to serve a compelling state interest or that there is a compelling need for the information. If the requesting party is successful in proving one of these two elements, it must then also show that the information is not available from other sources. Lastly, if the information is available from other sources, the requesting party must prove that it is using the least intrusive means to obtain the information. In this case, M/M requested a broad category of documents regarding Judd's compensation, specifically: (1) Each and every DOCUMENT that identifies Judd's compensation from RWO for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007; and (2) Each and every DOCUMENT that describes the methodology by which RWO determined the amount of compensation it paid to JUDD for the years 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. (emphasis in original). Despite M/M's contentions, this broad discovery request likely includes tax returns as well as other financial documents and potentially confidential information regarding Judd and RWO. We hold that, based on the broader protection that we have afforded to financial records in other contexts, see, e.g., Leidholt v. Dist. Court, 619 P.2d 768, 770 (Colo.1980) (in the context of punitive damages), these documents fall under the umbrella of the right to privacy and necessitate analysis under the framework discussed above. Therefore, M/M must prove that the requested financial information is relevant to the subject of the actionlegal malpractice and breach of fiduciary dutyand that there is a compelling need for the documents. Further, because M/M has requested all potential documents that contain the desired information, M/M must prove that it is using the least intrusive means to obtain the information contained therein. We have repeatedly held that it must be apparent from the order that the trial court performed the required balancing test. See Stone, 185 P.3d at 160-61; Corbetta, 975 P.2d at 721; Martinelli, 199 Colo. at 175, 612 P.2d at 1092. Here, the trial court provided minimal analysis in its order granting M/M's motion to compel. The trial court, in relevant part, stated: Plaintiffs claim Mr. Judd continued to represent Plaintiffs despite conflicts of interest in order to increase fee revenues. They further allege Mr. Judd's conduct in collecting legal fees violated his fee agreement with Plaintiffs. Thus, information related to Mr. Judd's compensation is directly relevant to this case. The Court finds Defendants have failed to show good cause for protecting the information from discovery. It is clear to us from this statement that the trial court did not consider whether there is a compelling need for the information or whether M/M is using the least intrusive means to obtain the information. Further, the trial court placed the burden on Judd and RWO to show good cause for protecting the information where the burden should be on M/M to show a compelling need for the information.