Opinion ID: 710490
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Yontz's Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: 8 The first issue involves the court's denial of summary judgment. We review a district court's grant [or denial] of summary judgment de novo. Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1041 (6th Cir.1992) (citing Vollrath v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 899 F.2d 533, 534 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 940 (1990)). Yet this interlocutory appeal presents questions of qualified immunity which are conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff's claim. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985). As a result, the sole issue facing the court in Forsyth appeals is whether the legal norms allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions. Id. at 528; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1981). 9 Once a Sec. 1983 defendant has claimed qualified immunity, the plaintiff carries the ultimate burden of proving that the claimed right is clearly established so as to defeat the defendant's qualified immunity claim. Wegener v. Covington, 933 F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir.1991). In doing so, the plaintiff may draw from: i) Supreme Court precedent; ii) Sixth Circuit precedent; or iii) cases from other circuits which point unmistakenly to the unconstitutionality of the conduct and be so clearly foreshadowed by applicable direct authority as to leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable [official] that his conduct was unconstitutional. Mumford v. Zieba, 4 F.3d 429, 432-33 (6th Cir.1993). 10 In order to determine whether a Sec. 1983 defendant violated a clearly established right, the reviewing court must employ an objective reasonableness test. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Under this test, the contours of the [claimed] right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Id. In other words, in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. Id. Consequently, [i]f officials of reasonable competence objectively could disagree on the law, immunity should be recognized. Cameron v. Seitz, 38 F.3d 264, 272 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Mumford, 4 F.3d at 432). 11 Applying these principles to the case at bar, the relevant inquiry for the purposes of our qualified immunity analysis is whether the law clearly established supervisory liability on principals for the unconstitutional actions of their subordinates at the time that the alleged incidents occurred. We believe that it did. In Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833 (1982), this court held that Sec. 1983 claimants may maintain a cause of action against a supervisory official if they can prove that at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers. Id. (emphasis added); quoted in Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990). The Third Circuit, moreover, specifically authorized supervisory liability claims against principals for the abusive conduct of teachers in Stoneking v. Bradford Area School Dist. (Stoneking II), 882 F.2d 720, 730 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990). Therefore, the law has been clearly established since at least 1982 that Yontz could be held liable as a supervisory official for the constitutional torts of his subordinates. Id.; Hays, 668 F.2d at 874. 12 In order for an official to be held liable under a theory of supervisory liability, the underlying conduct of his subordinate must violate clearly established law. Hays, 668 F.2d at 874. In Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir.1980), the Fourth Circuit held that the substantive due process rights of students are violated when a teacher applies force which cause[s] injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience. This circuit adopted the Hall standard in Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1158-59 (6th Cir.1987). Thus, Hall and Webb explicitly state that the Fourteenth Amendment proscribes the abusive conduct which Plaintiffs allege against Kaech. Consequently, Kaech's conduct could result in supervisory liability against Yontz if it is proven at trial that he was deliberately indifferent to such conduct. Hays, 668 F.2d at 874. Yontz, however, contends that Plaintiffs have not produced sufficient evidence to establish genuine issues of material fact as to whether Kaech unconstitutionally abused her students or whether Yontz was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs' complaints. This court, however, may not address sufficiency of the evidence claims on appeal. Johnson v. Jones, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 2157 (1995). The Johnson Court noted that Forsyth appeals involve a pure question of law; thus, an appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant's claim of immunity need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff's version of the facts, nor even determine whether the plaintiff's allegations actually state a claim.'  Id. at 2156. The court reasoned that an interlocutory appeal concerning [factual issues] ... makes unwise use of the appellate courts' time, by forcing them to decide in the context of a less developed record, an issue very similar to one they may well decide anyway later, on a record that will permit a better decision. Id. at 2158. Therefore, we may not consider Yontz's fact-related arguments in this appeal. Id. 13 Because Plaintiffs have asserted violations of clearly established law against Yontz, and because Yontz's factual arguments are not properly addressed on appeal, we uphold the district court's denial of Yontz's Motion for Summary Judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. 14