Opinion ID: 1980188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Case law under the FJSSA.

Text: In their comprehensive briefs, the parties have cited no decisions, and we are aware of none, addressing the standard under the DCJSA for determining whether a criminal defendant who seeks to challenge the jury pool or venire from which his or her jury was selected is entitled to pre-motion discovery, and, if so, the scope of such discovery. Appellants rely on the case law that has been developed under the FJSSA, and they assert that the federal precedents apply with equal force to proceedings in the Superior Court. We first discuss the federal case law and then turn to the questionnot an easy one whether that case law applies by analogy to the appeals presently before us. The leading authority construing the federal statute is Test v. United States, 420 U.S. 28, 95 S.Ct. 749, 42 L.Ed.2d 786 (1975) (per curiam). John E. Test, who had been charged with distribution of LSD, filed a Jury Motion in which he claimed that the master lists from which his grand jury had been selected, and from which his petit jury would be chosen, disproportionally excluded blacks, Latinos, and students. In support of his motion, he filed an affidavit by his counsel regarding testimony in another case which, according to Test, supported his challenge. Test requested leave to copy the jury lists pertaining to grand and petit juries in the instant indictment. The District Court denied both the motion and Test's request to copy the relevant documents. Test was convicted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction without perceiving any need to address the jury selection issue. United States v. Test, 486 F.2d 922 (10th Cir.1973). [6] The Supreme Court granted certiorari, however, and before that Court, the United States agreed that [Test] was erroneously denied access to the lists, 420 U.S. at 29, 95 S.Ct. 749. The government urged that the case be remanded with appropriate instructions. The Supreme Court, in a terse per curiam opinion addressing what turned out to be an uncontested issue, likewise agreed with the appellant. After quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1867(f), which provides that [t]he parties in a case shall be allowed to inspect, reproduce and copy such records or papers [pertinent to a challenge to the court's jury selection procedures] at all reasonable times during the preparation and pendency of such a motion, the Court stated: This provision makes [it] clear that a litigant has essentially an unqualified right to inspect jury lists. It grants access in order to aid parties in the `preparation' of motions challenging jury-selection procedures. Indeed, without inspection, a party almost invariably would be unable to determine whether he has a potentially meritorious jury challenge. Thus, an unqualified right to inspection is required not only by the plain text of the statute, but also by the statute's overall purpose of insuring `grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross-section of the community.' 28 U.S.C. § 1861. Id. at 30, 95 S.Ct. 749 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). The Court further held that it was unnecessary to determine whether the affidavit by Test's attorney in support of his motion had established a prima facie case of jury exclusion thereby entitling him to inspection under 28 U.S.C. § 1867(d), for Test had an unqualified right to inspect under § 1867(f). Id. at 29-30 n. 2, 95 S.Ct. 749. The federal appellate courts have faithfully followed the Supreme Court's decision in Test. Most recently, in United States v. Stanko, 528 F.3d 581 (8th Cir. 2008), the court stated: The Supreme Court has explained that under section 1867(f), a litigant has essentially an unqualified right to inspect jury lists. Test v. United States, 420 U.S. 28, 30, 95 S.Ct. 749, 42 L.Ed.2d 786 (1975). To avail himself [or herself] of [the] right of access to otherwise unpublic jury selection records, a litigant need only allege that he [or she] is preparing a motion challenging the jury selection procedures. United States v. Alden, 776 F.2d 771, 773 (8th Cir.1985) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Layton, 519 F.Supp. 946, 958 (N.D.Cal.1981)). A defendant may not be denied this unqualified right even when he fails to allege facts which show a `probability of merit in the proposed jury challenge,' id. at 774 (quoting United States v. Beaty, 465 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir.1972)), because [g]rounds for challenges to the jury selection process may only become apparent after an examination of the records. Id. at 775. A fair reading of Stanko's motions shows that he was questioning the composition of the grand and petit juries and was seeking information he believed was necessary to challenge the jury selection process. Id. at 587 (emphasis in original). The court went on to hold that the District Court erred in denying Stanko's request to review grand jury and petit jury records when it ruled against Stanko on the basis of a lack of showing of particularized need, for no such showing was required. Id. See also, e.g., United States v. Royal, 100 F.3d 1019, 1024-25 (1st Cir.1996) (containing lucid explanation of the holding in Test ); Gov't of Canal Zone v. Davis, 592 F.2d 887, 889 (5th Cir.1979) (Since the appellants' right to inspection was unqualified, whether or not the accompanying affidavit established a prima facie case of [a] defective jury selection process is of no import) (citing Test ). Under the federal case law, while the right to inspection is unqualified, the scope of that right is not unlimited with respect to the materials sought to be made available or inspected. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 658 (2d Cir.1997) (defendant has right of access only to records and papers already in existence [;][w]e see nothing that entitles defendants to require the jury administrator to analyze data on their behalf); United States v. Curry, 993 F.2d 43, 44 (4th Cir.1993) (Section 1867(f) did not entitle [defendant] to juror qualification questionnaires without some demonstration of necessity) (citation omitted). The relevant authorities are summarized in United States v. Rice, 489 F.Supp.2d 1312, 1316-17 (S.D.Ala.2007): Despite recognizing defendants' near-absolute right to inspect jury lists under Test, federal courts have uniformly declined to allow unfettered access to all jury-related documents and records. See, e.g., [ United States v. ] Diaz, 236 F.R.D. [470,] 482 [(N.D.Cal.2006)] (The right to discovery [authorized] by the Act and Test is not limitless.); United States v. Carlock, 606 F.Supp. 491, 493 (E.D.La.1985) (the right of access involved here is not without limitations); United States v. Gotti, 2004 WL 2274712,  (S.D.N.Y. Oct.7, 2004) ( Gotti II ) (defendant making § 1867(f) request is not entitled to unencumbered access to juror information); United States v. Causey, 2004 WL 1243912, ,  (S.D.Tex. May 25, 2004) (collecting cases for proposition that while a criminal defendant has an essentially unqualified right to inspect master list from which members of his grand and/or petit jury were selected, access to other jury records can be restricted); United States v. Gotti, 2004 WL 32858,  (S.D.N.Y. Jan.6, 2004) ( Gotti I ) (Moving defendants do not have an absolute right of access to all materials relating to the grand jury selection....). The Act is not a license for litigants to rummage at will through all jury-related records maintained by the Clerk of Court. Indeed, as one appellate court has explained, § 1867(f) provides that the contents of records or papers used by the clerk shall not be disclosed unless those records' contents are shown to be `necessary'[ [7] ] for the preparation of a motion alleging substantial failure to comply with the Act. United States v. Davenport, 824 F.2d 1511, 1515 (7th Cir.1987); see also Diaz, 236 F.R.D. at 482 (While a defendant has a statutory right to data required for a proper assessment of the composition of the panel, the [Act] does not automatically permit disclosure of other jury information without a sworn statement showing particularized need). Under that reasoning, then, if certain records or papers are not reasonably necessary for preparation of a motion under the Act, then the Act does not authorize access to those records or papers.