Opinion ID: 2784705
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ismael’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

Text: Ismael argues the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on all three counts. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). According to Ismael, the -10- evidence was strong that Jose was guilty of the crimes charged, but the evidence “was utterly and totally lacking that [Ismael] too participated in the criminal activity.” “We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor.” United States v. Vore, 743 F.3d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 2014). “We will not lightly overturn the jury’s verdict and will reverse only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. No Neck, 472 F.3d 1048, 1052 (8th Cir. 2007).
To convict Ismael of conspiracy as charged in count one, “the Government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that there was a conspiracy (an agreement to possess with intent to distribute the drugs); (2) that [Ismael] knew of the conspiracy; and (3) that [Ismael] intentionally joined the conspiracy.” United States v. Shaw, 751 F.3d 918, 920 (8th Cir. 2014). The government maintains it met its burden with direct and circumstantial evidence of Ismael’s active involvement in the conspiracy to distribute drugs with Jose. See, e.g., United States v. Ojeda, 23 F.3d 1473, 1476 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Because a jury rarely has direct evidence of a defendant’s knowledge, it is generally established through circumstantial evidence.”). The government highlights the informant’s testimony that Jose introduced Ismael as his “partner,” and explained he was “just showing [Ismael] the ropes” so Ismael could take over delivering drugs to Des Moines. In response, Ismael asserts the informant “was the only testifying witness that had anything other than a hunch to offer that [Ismael] was involved in anything and his testimony was sketchy at best.” In Ismael’s view, the informant’s testimony “was not supported by any of the testifying officers.” -11- But Ismael raised that argument at trial, and the jury reasonably rejected it. See United States v. Listman, 636 F.3d 425, 430 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding “it was the jury’s prerogative to believe” a co-conspirator who testified the defendant knew he was transporting drugs because “‘[t]he jury is the final arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility, and we will not disturb that assessment’” (quoting United States v. Hayes, 391 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir. 2004))). To the extent there were any “conflicts or contradictions in [the] testimony,” the jury is responsible for resolving them, “and we resolve any credibility issues in favor of the verdict.” United States v. Ali, 616 F.3d 745, 755 (8th Cir. 2010). The government adduced sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find Ismael intentionally conspired to distribute illegal drugs.
To prove possession of methamphetamine and heroin with intent to distribute as charged in counts two and three, respectively, “the Government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Ismael] knowingly possessed the methamphetamine [and heroin] in the truck with the intent to distribute it.” Vore, 743 F.3d at 1180; see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). “‘Possession can be actual or constructive. Actual possession is the knowing, direct, and physical control over a thing.’” United States v. Brown, 634 F.3d 435, 439 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. SerranoLopez, 366 F.3d 628, 634 (8th Cir. 2004)). “Constructive possession is defined as knowledge of [the] presence of the contraband plus control over the contraband.” United States v. Wright, 739 F.3d 1160, 1168 (8th Cir. 2014). Ismael contends “evidence that [he] possessed either the methamphetamine or the heroin is equally lacking” given the absence of direct incriminating evidence like finger prints or “statements of ownership.” Relying on United States v. Pace, 922 F.2d 451 (8th Cir.1990), Ismael argues his “proximity to contraband” and his “mere presence at the scene of concealed illegal activity is not enough” to convict. -12- Ismael’s arguments simply run out of gas. In Pace, we concluded the government failed to adduce sufficient evidence that the defendant driver of a vehicle knowingly possessed the illegal drugs concealed in his passenger’s bags in the back of the car. See id. at 452-53. At trial, the driver and passenger both testified the driver was unaware of the hidden drugs. See id. Noting there was no evidence the driver opened the passenger’s bags or knew of the “criminal nature of the trip,” we determined “it [was] merely conjecture to conclude [the driver] knew what those packages contained.” Id. at 453. Unlike Pace, “this is not a case in which the government could not prove, even by inference, that the defendant was anything more than present in the vehicle or physically proximate to the contraband.” United States v. Johnson, 18 F.3d 641, 648 (8th Cir. 1994). Ismael again ignores the informant’s testimony and the other strong evidence that Ismael knowingly and actively worked with his “partner” Jose to conceal, transport, and deliver the drugs hidden in the truck’s gas tank. See United States v. Patterson, 886 F.2d 217, 219 (8th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (“Constructive possession need not be proved by direct evidence, but rather may be premised upon circumstantial evidence, which we recognize as being ‘intrinsically as probative as direct evidence.’” (quoting United States v. Holm, 836 F.2d 1119, 1122 (8th Cir. 1988))). Ismael unsurprisingly points his finger at his brother Jose, claiming Ismael was just innocently and ignorantly along for the ride. But “[p]ossession may be joint; it need not be exclusive.” United States v. Smart, 501 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 2007). And the evidence supporting Ismael’s convictions “need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, but simply be sufficient to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.” United States v. McGuire, 45 F.3d 1177, 1186 (8th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Burks, 934 F.2d 148, 151 (8th Cir. 1991) (“If the evidence rationally supports two conflicting hypotheses, the reviewing court will not disturb the conviction.”). Based on the record evidence, a -13- reasonable jury could find Ismael and Jose jointly possessed the drugs with intent to distribute. The district court did not err in denying Ismael’s motion for judgment of acquittal.