Opinion ID: 1630580
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Danger of Reoffense

Text: To establish that G.H. was a dangerous sex offender under SOCA, the State was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence and that he is substantially unable to control his criminal behavior. [13] In this context, [l]ikely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence means the person's propensity to commit sex offenses resulting in serious harm to others is of such a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of the public. [14] Similarly, [s]ubstantially unable to control ... criminal behavior means having serious difficulty in controlling or resisting the desire or urge to commit sex offenses. [15] G.H. argues that the results of the actuarial risk assessment instruments do not provide a sufficient basis for Lukin's opinion that G.H. would pose a danger if released without treatment. G.H. contends that the results measure actuarial chance but provide no insight on the specific question of whether he would reoffend if released without treatment. But as G.H. acknowledges in his brief, Lukin did not rely exclusively on the results of the STATIC-99, Stable 2000, and SORAG assessments in forming his opinions. Lukin also considered the history he obtained from G.H. and the clinical interview he conducted. Lukin testified that the risk assessment instruments were peer reviewed and generally accepted in the field of psychology as a means of assessing the risk that a convicted sex offender will reoffend. We have noted in a different but related context that the nonexistence of an instrument which will perfectly predict future conduct does not preclude the use of rationally based instruments developed and validated by mental health professionals. [16] In a recent SOCA case, [17] we concluded that a psychologist's evaluation which included STATIC-99 and SORAG scores was sufficient and probative of the fact that a sex offender remained a danger to society. Although, in the instant case, the Stable 2000 and SORAG instruments were administered several months before the hearing, there is no indication in the record that this affected the validity of the results as a means of assessing the risk of recidivism at the time of the hearing. We are satisfied that there was adequate foundation for the actuarial risk assessment scores and conclude that they were properly considered by the Board and the district court as part of the basis for Lukin's opinions. G.H. also argues that Lukin's opinion of dangerousness, expressed entirely in terms of risk, is insufficient to support a finding that G.H. is a dangerous sex offender. G.H. contends that Lukin's opinions establish nothing more than an increased risk or possibility that he will reoffend without treatment. According to G.H., this is insufficient under cases holding that in order to support civil commitment in civil mental health proceedings, a medical expert must establish that the subject poses a danger to others to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. [18] This is the same standard that we require for expert medical opinion to establish causation under tort law. In that context, we have held that although expert medical testimony need not be couched in the magic words reasonable medical certainty or reasonable probability, it must be sufficient as examined in its entirety to establish the crucial causal link between the plaintiff's injuries and the defendant's negligence. [19] Medical expert testimony regarding causation based upon possibility or speculation is insufficient; it must be stated as being at least probable, in other words, more likely than not. [20] Applying the same principle here, the question is whether Lukin established a probability that G.H. would commit repeat acts of sexual violence. Lukin testified that in his professional opinion, G.H. fell within the statistical range of sexual and violent reoffense predicted by his SORAG scores, i.e., a 58-percent chance of sexual or violent reoffense, or both, within 7 years and a 76-percent chance of sexual or violent reoffense, or both, within 10 years. Asked if the conditions he diagnosed made G.H. likely to engage in repeat acts of violence, Lukin testified, Yes. It increases his risk. Lukin further testified that G.H. attributed his commission of sex offenses to alcohol, but that to Lukin's knowledge, G.H. had never undergone inpatient alcohol treatment. Based upon his clinical interview and review of records and actuarial risk assessments, Lukin opined that G.H. would be at high risk to sexually and/or violently reoffend compared to other individuals who have already committed sexual or violent crimes. Lukin further testified that due to the diagnosed mental and personality disorders, G.H. was substantially unable to control his behavior with regard to sexual offenses. We conclude that this testimony, viewed in its entirety, was sufficient as a matter of law to support the findings of the Board and the district court that G.H. was a dangerous sex offender for purposes of SOCA.