Opinion ID: 626071
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Admission of Kough's Testimony

Text: Constantine first challenges the district court's failure to either grant his motion to strike or declare a mistrial after Kough's testimony. At trial, Constantine phrased his objection in terms of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, but the substance of his argument centers on the government's failure to disclose the fact or content of Kough's testimony before the witness took the stand. We review the district court's evidentiary ruling for clear abuse of discretion, and will not reverse if the error was harmless. United States v. Hyles, 479 F.3d 958, 968 (8th Cir.2007) (citations omitted). Although a district court may order disclosure, criminal defendants have no right in noncapital cases to require disclosure of the list of government witnesses under Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a). United States v. White, 750 F.2d 726, 728 (8th Cir.1984); see also United States v. Krohn, 558 F.2d 390, 394 (8th Cir.1977). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (creating such a right in treason or other capital offense cases). In Krohn, the defendant objected to the government's last-minute change in its witness list. The government had not disclosed the identity of the new witnesses as it was not known whether they would be available to testify until the day before the trial. In that case, we did not find the district court's refusal to strike the testimony to be an abuse of discretion because the defendant had no automatic right to disclosure beforehand. Krohn, 558 F.2d at 394. We also noted that the appropriate remedy [w]hen time is needed to properly utilize new information produced during trial or immediately before trial [is for] the defendant [to] request a continuance. Id. Because this is a non-capital case, Constantine did not have an automatic right to advance disclosure of the government's witnesses. Furthermore, like in Krohn, Constantine did not request a continuance when the government called Kough to testify. Rather, he waited until after Kough's testimony and cross-examination. Only then did Constantine move to either strike the testimony or for a mistrial. The district court was well within its discretion to deny both of those motions. Furthermore, a district court does not abuse its discretion in such circumstances unless the defendant shows the lack of disclosure prejudiced his substantial rights. United States v. Washington, 318 F.3d 845, 857-58 (8th Cir.2003). A district court may avoid substantial prejudice and the necessity of disclosure by either allowing the defendant to review the evidence before trial, id. at 857, or by allowing the defendant ample opportunity for cross-examination. United States v. Barnes, 486 F.2d 776, 779 (8th Cir.1973). Constantine has not shown that the government's failure to disclose its witness caused him substantial prejudice. Like in Barnes, Constantine had a full opportunity to cross-examine Kough. Even if the cross-examination was not as well-prepared or as smooth as it might have been had the government disclosed the substance of Kough's testimony, Constantine was nonetheless still able to impeach Kough's credibility. Constantine specifically highlighted the inconsistencies between Kough's statements and the police report about where the gun was when officers arrested Constantine. While on the stand, Kough claimed he remembered Constantine digging around in the car for the gun, but neither he nor the initial police report had mentioned that detail before. In any event, the issue is not whether the defendant was actually able to effectively cross-examine a government witness, but whether he had ample opportunity to do so. Id. at 779. In this case, Constantine had that opportunity, either by cross-examining the witness on the spot, as counsel chose to do, or by requesting a continuance from the court in order to better prepare a cross-examination. The district court also did not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike Kough's testimony or declare a mistrial. First, the evidence is not inadmissible hearsay. The Federal Rules of Evidence makes hearsay inadmissible, subject to several exceptions. In this case, the District Court found that the key part of Kough's testimony was hearsay, but held that this hearsay was nevertheless admissible under the Excited Utterance exception. The declarant yelled He is digging. He is digging. This statement related to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress or excitement that it caused. Fed.R.Evid. 803(2). The district court was fully within his discretion to make this determination. The evidence is also not inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 403. This rule allows the district court to exclude relevant evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Rule 403 is a discretionary rule, and [w]hen balancing the prejudicial effect and probative value under [R]ule 403, we give great deference to the district court's ruling. United States v. Banks, 553 F.3d 1101, 1107 (8th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, Constantine has failed to point to any unfair prejudice. Thus, the district court was well within its considerable discretion to deny Constantine's motion to exclude this evidence.