Opinion ID: 799445
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sentencing Reform Act

Text: The SRA gave the Sentencing Commission the power to issue binding policy statements with regard to the retroactive application of Guidelines amendments. The starting point is 28 U.S.C. § 994(u), which states that [i]f the Commission reduces the term of imprisonment recommended in the guidelines applicable to a particular offense or category of offenses, it shall specify in what circumstances and by what amount the sentences of prisoners serving terms of imprisonment for the offense may be reduced. Section 994(u) does not specify which form the Commission's retroactivity determination should takewhether in the form of a guideline or policy statementbut it establishes the Commission's duty to specify whether any amendments are retroactive. Other provisions of the SRA make clear that the Commission is to voice these determinations through policy statements. Section 994(a)(2)(C) requires the Commission to promulgate general policy statements regarding application of the guidelines. . . including the appropriate use of the sentence modification provisions set forth in section[] . . . 3582(c) of title 18. This section can only be read as a directive for the Commission to issue policy statements regarding the retroactivity of Guidelines amendments, though it does not by its terms make these policy statements binding. The binding effect of the policy statements is mandated in turn by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which empowers a district court to retroactively reduce a defendant's sentence based on a subsequent reduction in the Guidelines only if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. The use of the word if indicates that the district court's power is conditioned upon the Commission's policy statement. As the Dillon Court stated, A court's power under § 3582(c)(2) thus depends in the first instance on the Commission's decision not just to amend the Guidelines but to make the amendment retroactive. Dillon, 130 S.Ct. at 2691. In sum: § 994(u) requires the Commission to specify whether an amendment is retroactive, § 994(a)(2)(C) requires that this specification be in the form of a policy statement, and § 3582(c)(2) makes those policy statements binding. The structure of § 994(a) supports this conclusion. In that section, Congress considered the difference between guidelines and policy statements, and directed the Commission to use each in different situations. Congress opted to have the Commission promulgate general policy statements with regard to the retroactive application of guidelines. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(C). In contrast, in the same section of the statute, Congress directed the Commission to promulgate guidelines only in three scenarios: (1) for use of a sentencing court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case; (2) regarding the appropriate use of the provisions for revocation of probation; or (3) for modification of the term or conditions of supervised release and revocation of supervised release. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) & (3). Congress expressly contemplated what action it wanted the Commission to take, and directed the Commission to promulgate a policy statement to control the retroactivity of an amendment instead of a guideline. This conclusion is consistent with, and may be compelled by, this court's interpretation of the SRA in Horn II. We have already held that district courts are bound, as a matter of statutory interpretation, by the pronouncements of the Commission with regard to retroactivity. See Horn II, 612 F.3d at 527-28. Further, this court specifically rejected Horn's argument that the SRA does not authorize the Commission to issue binding policy statements under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(u). See Horn II, 612 F.3d at 527-28. This comports with a recent case from the Fifth Circuit, where the court agreed that the text of § 3582(c)(2) evinces a congressional intent that Commission policy statements regarding retroactivity be binding: A common-sense reading of the above-quoted phrase if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements indicates that, regardless of whether Congress wanted policy statements to be binding in the sentencing context, it wished them to be binding in § 3582(c) proceedings. If a sentence reduction is inconsistent with a policy statement, it would violate § 3582(c)'s directive, so policy statements must be binding. United States v. Garcia, 655 F.3d 426, 435 (5th Cir.2011). Recently, the Third Circuit reached the same conclusion. See United States v. Smith, 459 Fed.Appx. 99 (3rd Cir.2012). In urging the opposite conclusion, Horn misinterprets the conditional language of § 3582(c)(2). Horn contends that the phrase consistent with in § 3582(c) means that policy statements are not binding. In support of this argument, Horn relies on a First Circuit case that discusses the meaning of consistent with in a now-repealed statute governing Department of Labor grants for the training of migrant farmworkers. Maine v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 770 F.2d 236, 239 (1st Cir.1985) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1672(c)(1)(repealed)). The statute in Maine required that the procedures for awarding grants be `consistent with' the government's `standard procurement policies.' Id. The court held that consistent with did not mandate literal compliance with the government's standard procurement procedures, but rather allowed more flexibility. Id. at 239. From this, Horn concludes that the phrase consistent with does not mandate strict compliance with a binding rule in all contexts. This is true, but irrelevant. Regardless of the meaning of the term consistent with in the context of migrant farm workers, this court has already determined that consistent with requires literal compliance with the Commission's policy statements in the context of a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. We rejected a similar argument in Horn II, where we held that [a] court's power under § 3582(c)(2) thus depends in the first instance on the Commission's decision not just to amend the Guidelines[,] but to make the amendment retroactive. 612 F.3d at 527 (quoting Dillon, 130 S.Ct. at 2691-92). Further, Horn's suggested comparison of 28 U.S.C. § 994(u) to (t) does not compel a different conclusion. [1] Horn correctly notes that § 994(u), on its own, does not require the Commission to make its determinations of retroactivity through policy statements. He contrasts this with § 994(t), which requires the Sentencing Commission to promulgate general policy statements regarding the sentencing modification provision in [18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)]. Horn argues that because policy statements are mentioned in § 994(t) but not in § 994(u), the Commission need not enforce its retroactivity decision via policy statements. Horn's argument then runs up against the statutory language set forth above. He acknowledges that § 994(a)(2)(C) requires the issuance of policy statements pertaining to § 3582(c)(2) proceedings, which appears to destroy his contrast between § 994(u) and § 994(t). He then argues that nothing in § 994(a)(2)(C) requires the policy statement to be binding, but he again disregards the fact that the district court is bound by any retroactivity policy statement under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). This language demonstrates that differences between § 944(t) and § 944(u) are immaterial. Similarly, Horn's assertion that § 994( o ) authorizes the issuance of guidelines with regard to retroactivity is wrong. Section 994(o) directs the Commission to periodically . . . review and revise . . . the guidelines promulgated pursuant to the provisions of this section. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o). However, § 994(o) does not broaden the definition of the term guideline or displace the division between guidelines and policy statements set forth in § 994(a). Moving away from the plain language of the SRA, Horn analogizes the SRA to the APA. However, this analogy is flawed in light of the express statutory language discussed above. [2] Horn relies on the fundamental premise that when the SRA was passed, Congress was legislating on the heels of four decades of experience and litigation under the Administrative Procedure Act. From this historical context, Horn argues that Congress intended to import the APA concepts of legislative rules, interpretative rules, and policy statements into the SRA. Regardless of whether this is true, an inferred intent, premised on historical context, does not stand in the face of explicit statutory language. Horn's argument proves too much. Because Horn concedes that Congress was legislating with full knowledge of the APA, the fact that Congress specifically directed the Commission to issue a binding policy statement was no accident. Unless unconstitutional, Congress is free to change the rules by which an agency plays. Horn then parses language from Justice Stevens's dissent in Dillon, 130 S.Ct. at 2694-2705, to support his statutory argument. In doing so, Horn ignores a critical footnote in which Justice Stevens recognized that the SRA authorizes the Commission to determine the retroactive effect of sentence reductions. Id. at 2703 n. 8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens distinguished the power to determine retroactivity from the power at issue in Dillon, noting that Congress has instructed the Commission to perform a gate keeping function by determining which individuals are eligible for relief pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). Id. The district court's interpretation of the SRA is untenable. The district court reasoned that the SRA requires the Commission to issue either non-binding policy statements or guidelines regarding retroactivity. However, in the context of retroactivity, a non-binding policy statement could never issue. As this court held in Horn II, § 3582(c)(2)'s conditional clause requires compliance with the Commission's policy statements regarding retroactivity. Even if the Commission were to attempt to promulgate a non-binding policy statement, district courts would still be bound to follow that policy statement under the express language of § 3582(c)(2). The district court also contended that the Commission should enact guidelines, as opposed to policy statements, to enforce its retroactivity determination. Were this court to adopt such a requirement, however, it would unnecessarily impinge upon the powers of the Commission. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the Commission has the unusual explicit power to decide whether and to what extent its amendments reducing sentences will be given retroactive effect. Braxton, 500 U.S. at 348, 111 S.Ct. 1854. Because of this power, district courts must follow the policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission regarding the retroactivity of Guidelines amendments. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Section 3582(c)(2) says nothing about a district court's obligation to follow the Commission's guidelines regarding retroactivityit only mentions policy statements. Accordingly, were this court to require the Commission to issue guidelines instead of policy statements, it is conceivable that a district court would not be bound by such guidelines. This would rob the Commission of the very power recognized by the Supreme Court.