Opinion ID: 3181497
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Easements in the Perimeter Path

Text: [¶35] At trial, the neighboring property owners claimed that they held deeded easements over a path located near the shorefront perimeter of the properties owned by the Gravisons, Titcomb, and the Edwardses. The bases of these rights, they claimed, were the references in their source deeds to the Blackinton Plan. [¶36] In adjudicating the neighboring property owners’ easement claims to the perimeter path, the trial court distinguished between the pre-record owners, whose pre-1924 source deeds grant use of the “streets laid out” on the Blackinton Plan “as laid out in June 1882,” and the post-record owners, whose post-1924 source deeds grant “rights of way shown” shown on the Blackinton Plan “dated June, 1882.” The court concluded that the pre-record source deeds could not “be construed to create record rights to the use of the perimeter path” because those deeds incorporated the original plan, and the pre-record owners had failed to prove that the perimeter path was depicted on the original plan. The court determined that the post-record source deeds incorporated the recorded plan, and construed the dotted lines shown near the shorefront perimeter on the recorded plan as a “way” within the meaning of the post-record deeds’ grant of “rights of way.” It accordingly concluded that the post-record owners benefit from easements over a perimeter path located on the properties owned by the Gravisons, 18 Titcomb, and the Edwardses. The court further determined that the easements over the perimeter path had been abandoned in the area covered by the Edwardses’ home, and that the easements do not allow access to the beach. [¶37] Before examining the trial court’s conclusions as to the existence and scope of the easements over the perimeter path, we review the principles that govern the interpretation of the deeds at issue. When a deed conveys property by reference to a plan depicting lots, streets, and ways, the deed gives rise to an implied easement in those streets and ways, appurtenant to the property conveyed by reference to the plan. See D’Alessandro v. Town of Harpswell, 2012 ME 89, ¶ 6, 48 A.3d 786. Under these circumstances, easement rights are implied to secure to the grantee and subsequent purchasers of property shown on the plan “those benefits, the promise of which, it is reasonable to infer, has induced them to buy portions of a tract laid out on the plan indicated.” Arnold v. Boulay, 147 Me. 116, 121, 83 A.2d 574 (1951) (quotation marks omitted). [¶38] When a deed distinctly refers to a plan, the plan is incorporated into the deed by that reference. Sleeper v. Loring, 2013 ME 112, ¶ 13, 83 A.3d 769; Chesley v. Holmes, 40 Me. 536, 546 (1855). The plan is then interpreted pursuant to the same rules that govern the construction of the deed. Chesley, 40 Me. at 546. [¶39] “The first step in any analysis of the language in a deed is to give words their general and ordinary meaning to see if they create any ambiguity. 19 If the words create no doubt, the deed is clear and unambiguous,” and it will guide the court’s construction of the parties’ intent. Green v. Lawrence, 2005 ME 90, ¶ 7, 877 A.2d 1079 (quotation marks omitted). The court may consider extrinsic evidence in determining the parties’ intent only if the deed’s language is ambiguous. Id. The construction of a deed and incorporated plan, including the determination of whether these documents are ambiguous, is ordinarily a question of law that we review de novo. See Testa’s, Inc. v. Coopersmith, 2014 ME 137, ¶ 11, 105 A.3d 1037. However, if a deed and plan are ambiguous, their interpretation is a question of fact that we review only for clear error. See id. 1. Construction of the Pre-Record Owners’ Source Deeds [¶40] The source deeds to the properties held by the Johnsons, the Fishers, and Moulton (the pre-record owners) unambiguously convey rights in the “streets laid out” on the “plan of Cooper’s Beach as laid out in June 1882,” thus incorporating by distinct reference the Blackinton Plan as it appeared in June of 1882. The language of these deeds could have created easements over the perimeter path only if that path was a street laid out on the original Blackinton Plan. Because the original Blackinton Plan was not in evidence at trial, the meaning of Cora’s pre-record conveyance of rights in the “streets laid out” on the plan “dated June 1882,” cannot be determined as a matter of law. Notwithstanding their contentions to the contrary, the pre-record owners bore the burden of proof on 20 all factual issues pertaining to their claim, including proving that the Blackinton Plan depicted the perimeter path in June of 1882. See LaBelle v. Blake, 1998 ME 165, ¶ 9 n.3, 714 A.2d 145. The record does not compel a result contrary to the court’s finding that the pre-record owners failed to carry this burden. [¶41] No evidence in the record establishes the contents of the original plan. Markings on the recorded plan entered in evidence plainly demonstrate that the plan was altered in the period between its creation in 1882 and its recording in 1924, and the trial court found that the differences between the recorded plan’s depiction of the perimeter path and its depiction of other ways called the evolution of the perimeter path into “considerable dispute.” Given the lack of evidence as to which features of the recorded plan were also features of the original plan, we affirm the finding that the pre-record owners failed to carry their burden of proof, and affirm the conclusion that the pre-record owners do not hold easements in the perimeter path. See Amodeo v. Francis, 681 A.2d 462, 466 (Me. 1996). 2. Construction of the Post-Record Owners’ Source Deeds [¶42] The record establishes that the Massimis, Roy and Watrous, Bolan, Long, Perkins, Lawrence, and Paul (the post-record owners) derive title, at least in part, through a common 1934 source deed from Cora Perry to V.F. Studley (Studley’s deed) that conveyed “all rights of way shown on plan of Coopers Beach made by A.D. Blackin[]ton, Surveyor, dated June, 1882.” Before examining 21 Studley’s deed, we first address the argument, made by Titcomb and the Edwardses, that Cora lacked the capacity to encumber their properties by way of Studley’s deed because she conveyed their properties before she executed Studley’s deed.7 This contention rests upon the fundamental proposition of law that a grantor can encumber property only while he or she owns it. See Warchalowski v. Brown, 417 A.2d 425, 428 (Me. 1980). [¶43] The record demonstrates that Cora conveyed the property now owned by Titcomb by way of two deeds, one executed in 1929 and the other in 1930, and that she conveyed the property now owned by the Edwardses through three deeds, all executed in 1927. The earliest of the Edwardses’ source deeds (McKusick’s deed) was granted by Cora to Evelyn McKusick on August 2, 1927, and described the property conveyed as follows: [A] certain lot or parcel of land at Cooper’s Beach, Owls Head, Maine, being one of the cottage lots indicated but not numbered on plan of Cooper’s Beach dated June 1882 by Blackin[]ton, surveyor (Knox Registry, Book 3, Page 81) and being the northern most of a tier of lots lying westerly of a 30 feet right of way and opposite lots 19 to 24 inclusive; this lot being more specifically bounded as follows: Beginning at a point in the westerly line of the 30 foot right of way above referred to, said point being 253.7 feet northerly from the north-east corner of W.R. Lufkin’s cottage lot; thence westerly at a right angle to said line of right of way seventy-five (75) feet; thence northerly, parallel to the line of right of way, ninety (90) feet more or less to the southerly line of right of way along the shore; thence 7 The Gravisons, who derive title through Studley’s deed, do not join in this argument. 22 southeasterly and southerly by said right of way to place of beginning. Together with[]all rights of way appurtenant thereto. [¶44] Construing the foregoing language de novo, as a matter of law, we have no difficulty concluding that McKusick’s deed conveyed property by distinct reference to the recorded Blackinton Plan and therefore incorporated that plan into the deed. In view of the plan’s depiction of numbered lots, ways of access, and a way running along the shore, we also have no difficulty concluding that McKusick’s deed gave rise to an implied easement over the perimeter path, appurtenant to the property shown on the plan of development.8 [¶45] Cora thus created an implied easement over the perimeter path, for the benefit of the property shown on the plan, as early as August 2, 1927, when she executed McKusick’s deed. This occurred before Cora executed the remaining source deeds to the properties now owned by Titcomb and the Edwardses. [¶46] Having concluded that Cora effectively burdened the perimeter path located on the properties owned by Titcomb and the Edwardses, we now consider whether she effectively granted benefits in that path as appurtenances of the 8 In 1878, we explained that [w]hen the owner of land . . . divides it into streets and building lots, and makes a plan of the land thus divided, and then sells one or more of the lots, by reference to the plan, he thereby annexes to each lot sold a right of way in the streets, which neither he nor his successors in title can afterwards interrupt or destroy. Bartlett v. Bangor, 67 Me. 460, 464-65 (1878) (emphasis added). 23 properties held by the post-record owners. For this purpose, we consider the following provision of Studley’s deed: “Conveying also all rights of way shown on plan of Coopers Beach made by A.D. Blackin[]ton, Surveyor, dated June, 1882[.]” Our analysis, informed by the parties’ contentions, concerns three issues: First, whether Studley’s deed incorporated the recorded plan; second, whether Cora effectively annexed to Studley’s land appurtenant benefits over the perimeter path; and third, whether the perimeter path allows access to the beach. [¶47] In construing Studley’s deed, the first issue is whether that deed incorporated the recorded plan. The trial court found that Cora’s post-record conveyances, which include Studley’s deed, incorporated “the plan as it was recorded rather than as it appeared on some earlier date,” based upon the inference that Cora was involved in, or had actual or constructive notice of, the plan’s recording. The record evidence supports this finding. The language of McKusick’s deed establishes that Cora knew where the Blackinton Plan was located in the registry in 1927. From this it follows that she had this same knowledge and referred to the recorded plan when she executed Studley’s deed in 1934. We therefore affirm the trial court’s determination that the post-record owners derive title through a deed that refers to the recorded plan. [¶48] The second issue in the interpretation of Studley’s deed concerns the meaning of that deed’s grant of “rights of way.” Considering that grant de novo, in 24 light of the dotted lines of the perimeter path and the solid lines of the other access ways shown on the recorded Blackinton Plan, we conclude that the meaning of the grant of “all rights of way” in Studley’s deed is ambiguous. To resolve this ambiguity, the trial court considered the difference between the pre-record deeds’ conveyance of an easement over the “streets laid out on [the] plan” and the post-record deeds’ conveyance of an easement over the “rights of way shown on [the] plan.” Comparing the dotted lines of the perimeter path with the plan’s more formal depiction of other access ways, the court found that the perimeter path was a “right of way” granted “for purposes that appear to be recreational and that are tied to the appeal of the land, which is its proximity to the water.” This interpretation of the perimeter path as a “right of way” within the meaning of Studley’s deed is consistent with Cora’s reference to a “right of way along the shore” in McKusick’s deed. We therefore affirm the trial court’s conclusion that when Cora executed Studley’s deed and referred to the recorded plan therein, she effectively annexed to Studley’s property “all rights of way” shown on the recorded plan, including rights in the perimeter path. [¶49] Having concluded that Cora created easements over the perimeter path benefiting the properties held by the post-record owners, we now consider the third issue in the interpretation of Studley’s deed—whether the trial court erred in determining the easements’ scope. In adjudicating the scope of the easements over 25 the perimeter path, the trial court ruled that the dominant owners could not cross over the servient owners’ land located between the path’s seaward boundary and the high-water mark in order to access the beach. The neighboring property owners argue that the recreational nature of the perimeter path easements and the path’s close proximity to the high-water mark both indicate that the easements include the incidental right to access the beach. Construing the Blackinton Plan’s depiction of the perimeter path as a matter of law, we affirm the trial court’s declaration regarding the easements’ geographic scope. Because the conveyances of the perimeter path easements are explicitly delimited by the path’s boundaries as shown on the plan, and the path’s seaward boundary at no point abuts the high-water mark, the dominant owners are entitled to use only the land within those boundaries, and may not use their path easements to access the beach. See Rotch v. Livingston, 91 Me. 461, 472, 40 A. 426 (1898) (“[T]he grantees of a right of way of a specified width have an easement in the way to the . . . extent of its dimensions.”); cf. Arnold, 147 Me. at 117-19, 83 A.2d 574 (concluding that a road allowed access to the lake shore when a development plan established the shorefront line of numbered lots eighty feet from the shore and designated the area in between that shorefront line and the high-water mark of the lake as “Lake Shore Road”). 26 3. Whether the Perimeter Path Easements have been Terminated [¶50] An easement can be terminated in multiple ways, including (1) through acquisition of the servient estate by a bona fide purchaser who lacks notice of the encumbrance, and (2) by an act or omission of the dominant owner evidencing a clear intent to abandon the easement. Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69, ¶ 42, 770 A.2d 592. On appeal, the parties who own the land covered by the perimeter path assert that the easements over that path were terminated by acquisition of the servient property for value and without notice, and by abandonment. Titcomb and the Edwardses advance the lack of notice issue;9 the Gravisons and the Edwardses advance the abandonment issue. [¶51] Neither Titcomb nor the Edwardses made any arguments regarding termination of the easements for lack of notice in their pre- or post-trial pleadings. The parties failed to present the notice issue to the trial court for decision and consequently failed to preserve the issue for appeal. See Davis v. Picciandra, 662 A.2d 898, 899 (Me. 1995). We therefore confine our discussion to the argument advanced by the Gravisons and the Edwardses—both at trial and on appeal—that the easements over the perimeter path have been terminated in their entirety by abandonment. 9 The Edwardses’ extend their lack of notice contentions to the easements over the perimeter path and the beach. Our conclusion with respect to this issue applies equally to both encumbrances. 27 [¶52] The party asserting abandonment of an easement has the burden of proving either “1) a history of nonuse coupled with an act or omission evincing a clear intent to abandon, or 2) adverse possession by the servient estate.” Canadian Nat’l Ry. v. Sprague, 609 A.2d 1175, 1179 (Me. 1992). The proponent of abandonment must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence, establishing each fact to a high degree of probability. Stickney, 2001 ME 69, ¶ 51, 770 A.2d 592. For the purposes of the act or omission variant of abandonment at issue here, the necessary intent to abandon may be demonstrated only by an unequivocal act or failure to act that is “decisive and conclusive” and “inconsistent with the further assertion of rights associated with the existence of the easement.” Canadian Nat’l Ry., 609 A.2d at 1179 (quotation marks omitted). An easement holder’s intent to abandon may be inferred from a “failure to object to the erection of a permanent structure that prevents the enjoyment of the rights granted by the easement.” Chase v. Eastman, 563 A.2d 1099, 1102 (Me. 1989). However, if a structure obstructs only part of an easement and the easement holder continues using other unobstructed parts of the easement, failure to object to the structure may support a finding that the easement holder only abandoned the part of the easement that the structure obstructs. See id. at 1102-03. [¶53] Here, the court found no evidence that anyone objected to the construction of the Edwardses’ home on part of the perimeter path, and concluded 28 that this failure to object constituted abandonment as to that part of the perimeter path. The court also found that “there has been at least occasional use of the land that is located approximately where the path is shown on the Blackinton Plan,” and concluded that the easements over the perimeter path consequently “remain in effect except for the portion of the path where the Edwardses’ house is located.” [¶54] Contrary to the contentions of the Gravisons and the Edwardses, the court’s finding regarding use of the perimeter path is amply supported by the evidence that the neighboring property owners presented at trial. The record establishes that the Edwardses’ predecessors constructed a cottage that obstructs part of the perimeter path approximately seventy years ago, and later, in the late 1970s, attached an addition to that cottage that also obstructed part of the perimeter path located on the Edwardses’ property. Despite this construction, use of the perimeter path has continued in the areas of the path that remain unobstructed. On these facts, the trial court was not compelled to find that the easement holders’ failure to object to the Edwardses’ construction resulted in a complete abandonment of the easements over the perimeter path. See Chase, 563 A.2d at 1102-03. We therefore affirm the trial court’s determination that the easements over the perimeter path have been abandoned to the extent that the path is covered by the Edwardses’ home, and the easements otherwise remain in effect. 29