Opinion ID: 203894
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Finality Prong

Text: Plaintiffs satisfy the first, finality prong. First, Plaintiffs have a sufficient property interest in the duplicate premiums to support their takings claim. For purposes of the Takings Clause, the existence of a property interest is determined by reference to `existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.' See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164, 118 S.Ct. 1925, 141 L.Ed.2d 174 (1998) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)). Here, Puerto Rico law plainly establishes that Plaintiffs have a sufficient property interest in the duplicate premiums. By regulation, JUA must segregate those premiums collected that are thought to be duplicate premiums, and Puerto Rico's insurance law concerning unclaimed funds apply to the duplicate premiums collected. See Flores Galarza, 484 F.3d at 8 & n. 5. Furthermore, upon transfer to the Secretary, Law 230 requires the Secretary to hold the duplicate premiums in a fiduciary capacity. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 26, §§ 8055(1) (The Secretary of the Treasury shall retain these funds as trustee ....) (emphasis added). Finally, Law 253, Law 230, and Law 414 all provide for reimbursement of the duplicate premiums. Thus, like funds held in trust in an IOLTA account or an interpleader account, the funds held by JUA or the Secretary are clearly the private property of Plaintiffs for purposes of the Takings Clause. See Phillips, 524 U.S. at 164, 118 S.Ct. 1925 (All agree that under Texas law the principal held in IOLTA trust accounts is the `private property' of the client.); see also Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161, 101 S.Ct. 446, 66 L.Ed.2d 358 (1980) (holding that funds deposited in interpleader fund for benefit of creditors are the property of creditors); cf. Flores Galarza, 484 F.3d at 30 (finding that the duplicate premiums `constitute a double payment for the same insurance,' and, therefore, do not belong to JUA, but rather belong to private insured motorists. ) (quotations omitted and emphasis added). [9] Second, the Secretary's appropriation of the duplicate premiums constitutes a final decision for purposes of the finality prong. [T]he finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury. Id. at 15 n. 18 (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 193, 105 S.Ct. 3108) (emphasis added). As we stated in Flores Galarza, The case law addressing the first hurdle focuses on whether the administrative body responsible for applying the challenged regulations has completed discretionary review of the plaintiff's particular situation. Here, there is no pending administrative process that could, through a variance, waiver or other discretionary decision, modify the statute's impact on the JUA. Id. at 15. The same is true here, as there is no pending process that would modify the statute's impact on Plaintiffs.