Opinion ID: 2624966
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Three Prong, Lawton v. Steele, Substantive Due Process Test

Text: ¶ 53 The only reason to require driver's licenses in general, and commercial driver's licenses in particular, is to make the highways as safe as possible by requiring each potential operator to demonstrate a knowledge of rules and regulations of the road, a history of compliance with those rules and regulations, and the physical ability to safely operate a motor vehicle. State v. Clifford, 57 Wash.App. 127, 132, 787 P.2d 571 (1990). ¶ 54 Similarly, Washington's Uniform Commercial Driver's License Act, chapter 46.25 RCW, states the purpose of the chapter is to reduce or prevent commercial motor vehicle accidents, fatalities, and injuries by ... [d]isqualifying commercial drivers who have committed certain serious traffic violations, or other specified offenses. RCW 46.25.005(1)(b). See Merseal v. Dep't of Licensing, 99 Wash.App. 414, 418-19, 994 P.2d 262 (2000) (holding the Uniform Commercial Driver's License Act is liberally construed to protect the public from alcohol impaired drivers of commercial vehicles and that public safety is a sufficient basis for distinguishing between commercial drivers and the general public). ¶ 55 Just as initially granting or withholding a driver's license must at least be rationally related to promoting the safety of the streets and highways, revocation of that license must similarly be necessary to achieve that goal. State v. Hopkins, 109 Wash.App. 558, 564, 36 P.3d 1080 (2001) (A long line of Washington cases holds that revocation of a driver's license is ... designed solely for the protection of the public in the use of highways.). Moreover, licenses are remedial (i.e., protecting highway safety), not punitive. State v. McClendon, 131 Wash.2d 853, 868, 935 P.2d 1334 (1997); State v. Griffin, 126 Wash.App. 700, 705, 109 P.3d 870, 873 (2005) ([T]he general rule in Washington has long been `the suspension or revocation of a driver's license is not penal in nature and is not intended as punishment, but is designed solely for the protection of the public in the use of the highways.). ¶ 56 Before enactment of the statute at issue, the governing statutory authority to suspend driver's licenses set forth six grounds for license revocation. These were all related to the traffic safety: (1) Has committed an offense for which mandatory revocation or suspension of license is provided by law; (2) Has, by reckless or unlawful operation of a motor vehicle, caused or contributed to an accident resulting in death or injury to any person or serious property damage; (3) Has been convicted of offenses against traffic regulations governing the movement of vehicles, or found to have committed traffic infractions, with such frequency as to indicate a disrespect for traffic laws or a disregard for the safety of other persons on the highways; (4) Is incompetent to drive a motor vehicle under RCW 46.20.031(3); or (5) Has failed to respond to a notice of traffic infraction, failed to appear at a requested hearing, violated a written promise to appear in court, or has failed to comply with the terms of a notice of traffic infraction or citation ...; or (6) Has committed one of the prohibited practices relating to drivers' licenses defined in RCW 46.20.336. Former RCW 46.20.291 (1993) (emphasis added). ¶ 57 However the challenged amendment to RCW 46.20.291 added a seventh ground, unrelated to traffic safety: (7) Has been certified by the department of social and health services as a person who is not in compliance with a child support order or a residential or visitation order as provided in RCW 74.20A.320. Former RCW 46.20.291 (1997). [8]
¶ 58 To determine whether the means are necessary to achieve the end, we must look to the purpose and lawful justification of requiring driver's licenses in the first place, i.e., the license requirement must be justified by a legitimate exercise of the police power. Any attempt to revoke the license must similarly be tied to that same legitimate exercise of the police power. ¶ 59 The police power is a power reserved by the states to protect the health and safety of its citizens. Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 754-55, 4 S.Ct. 652, 28 L.Ed. 585 (1884). Wash. Const. art. I, § 1 (All political power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and are established to protect and maintain individual rights.). ¶ 60 States may require a variety of licenses to protect health, safety, and welfare. For example, medical licenses are required to protect the public to ensure that doctors have achieved the requisite training prior to practicing medicine. [9] Similarly, states require licenses for those engaging in the business of cosmetology, barbering, manicuring, and aesthetics because they involve the use of tools and chemicals which may be dangerous when mixed or applied improperly.... [10] ¶ 61 However, the power to regulate by granting or revoking licenses is not unlimited. To legitimately exercise the police power, the means of the regulation must have a real and substantial relation to the legitimate reason for licensing the activity. See Chi., B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 593, 26 S.Ct. 341, 350, 50 L.Ed. 596 (1906) (If the means employed have no real, substantial relation to public objects which government may legally accomplish; if they are arbitrary and unreasonable, beyond the necessities of the case, the judiciary will disregard mere forms and interfere for the protection of rights injuriously affected by such illegal action.). ¶ 62 Cornwell is instructive. Cornwell v. Cal. Bd. of Barbering & Cosmetology, 962 F.Supp. 1260, 1263 (S.D.Cal.1997). There an African hair braiding association brought suit against California state agencies and officials arguing the licensing requirements of the Barbering and Cosmetology Act (Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 7301), as applied to the hair braiders, violated due process because hair braiders were required to attend 1,600 hours of instruction at cosmetology school at a cost of between $5,000 and $7,000 where hair braiding was not even mentioned. Id. (citing Cal.Code Reg. § 950.2). ¶ 63 Because cosmetology schools did not teach African hair styling techniques as part of the required curriculum and did not include instruction in African hair styling, natural hair care, braiding, twisting, weaving, locking, or cornrowing, the court found that [n]inety-six percent of the curriculum would be irrelevant to the occupation for which they would be seeking licensure. Id. at 1273. ¶ 64 The court held the license requirement violated due process, observing, if [we] were to assume that these 65 hours [of instruction in health and safety] are rationally related to the state's interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens, this education is one small part of a curriculum which plaintiff contends is 96% useless to [hair braiders]. Id. The court noted the irrationality of the license requirement: To take an extreme example, the state could rationally believe that food preparers need instruction on hygiene, sanitation and disinfection prior to being allowed to prepare food in public schools. It would be irrational however, to require them to go to cosmetology school, even though they might benefit from the 65 hours related to health, hygiene and sanitation. Ninety-six percent of the curriculum would be irrelevant to the occupation for which they would be seeking licensure. Id. ¶ 65 In sum, the police power to revoke licenses must be rationally related to the goal or purpose of requiring the particular license in the first place. We do not revoke pet licenses for traffic infractions, nor do we deny driver's licenses to those who fail to license their pets (or pay their child support). ¶ 66 People v. Lindner, 127 Ill.2d 174, 180, 535 N.E.2d 829, 129 Ill.Dec. 64 (1989) applied this principle to driver's licenses. There the Illinois Supreme Court struck down a section of the Illinois Vehicle Code which required mandatory driver's license suspension of defendants convicted of various felonies, including sex and drug offenses. Applying the rational relationship test the court concluded that the means chosen by the Illinois legislaturelicense suspensionwas not a reasonable method to accomplish the goal of the licensing statutethe safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles: Under the rational-basis test, a `legislative enactment must bear a reasonable relationship to the public interest intended to be protected, and the means adopted must be a reasonable method of accomplishing the desired objective.' Id. (quoting People v. Wick, 107 Ill.2d 62, 65-66, 89 Ill.Dec. 833, 481 N.E.2d 676 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accord State v. Gowdy, 64 Ohio Misc.2d 38, 40, 639 N.E.2d 878 (1994) (relying on Lindner, 127 Ill.2d 174, 129 Ill.Dec. 64, 535 N.E.2d 829, holding the statutory provision mandating license suspension for drug offenses does not bear a reasonable relationship to the statute's purpose of providing for the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles). ¶ 67 Professional license revocation also requires a rational relationship between the revocation of the license and the applicant's fitness or capacity to conduct that particular profession. For example, in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957) the board of bar examiners refused to permit the petitioner to take the bar examination on the ground that he had not shown good moral character because of his previous membership in the Communist Party. The Supreme Court held: A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. Id. at 239, 77 S.Ct. 752. See also In re Revocation of License to Practice Dentistry of Flynn, 52 Wash.2d 589, 594, 328 P.2d 150 (1958) (holding that there must be a rational connection between the acts giving rise to the license revocation and Flynn's fitness and capacity to practice dentistry to constitute a valid reason for the revocation). ¶ 68 Justice Madsen once forcefully and articulately argued driver's license revocations must be rationally related to a driving offense to satisfy due process. State v. Shawn P., 122 Wash.2d 553, 569, 859 P.2d 1220 (1993) (Madsen, J., dissenting). [11] In Shawn P. the majority upheld the validity of a statute that revoked or denied driver's licenses to minors of a certain age who had been found guilty of possessing or consuming alcohol, regardless of whether the minor drove while possessing or after consuming. See RCW 66.44.365; RCW 13.40.265. Both the majority and the dissent recognized the same approachthat the license revocation must have a necessary relationship to driving. The majority upheld the statute, relying on legislative findings supported by `voluminous statistical data' demonstrating that a disproportionate number of juveniles drive while impaired and that they thus pose a serious risk to the safety of themselves and others. Shawn P., 122 Wash.2d at 562 & n. 33, 859 P.2d 1220 (quoting Michael S. Vaughn, Victor E. Kappeler & Rolando V. del Carmen, A Legislative and Constitutional Examination of Abuse and Lose Juvenile Driving Statutes, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 411, 427 (1992)).