Opinion ID: 4118870
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excusal of Prospective Juror E.I.

Text: Next, defendant claims the court erred in excusing Prospective Juror E.I., both because voir dire was inadequate and because her views on the death penalty would not have substantially impaired her ability to serve. E.I.‘s questionnaire responses indicated she was ―[m]oderately in favor‖ of the death penalty. She explained, ―it is acceptable punishment for certain crimes but,‖ because of the ―heavy responsibility‖ in imposing it, the defendant ―had better be guilty and the jury had better be sure.‖ She said she had been opposed to capital punishment in college but ―became for it again‖ after learning about some horrific crimes. She agreed that California should have a death penalty because ―[s]ome crimes are so serious that there are no second chances for the person who committed them. Why spend huge amounts of money on imprisoning these people.‖ Asked whether she would always vote for death if the victim was intentionally killed for the purpose of a robbery by defendants with substantial criminal histories, E.I. responded that an ―intentional‖ killing warranted the death penalty but she did not agree it was ―always‖ appropriate. In voir dire, when asked if she could realistically consider both sentencing options, E.I. stated that, while both were possible, ―it would have to be really, really aggravating circumstances for me to choose the death penalty over life in prison, because that is the most serious thing you can do.‖ When the court probed further, E.I. said she probably would have voted for the death penalty in notorious cases involving serial murder or ―incredibly violent‖ murders like decapitation. 16 The court responded with a general description of the facts here: ―In this case the allegation is one person has been killed. There aren‘t a number of victims like the Yosemite case or Ted Bundy. One victim. [¶] There was no mutilation involved, such as cutting the head off of the victim, things of this nature. That did not occur. [¶] There was no sexual assault involved in the commission of the murder.‖ Given these features of the case, the court asked whether the death penalty would be a realistic sentencing option for E.I. She responded, ―It doesn‘t seem to be the kind of case where I would vote for the death penalty.‖ The court indicated it was inclined to excuse the juror but allowed the attorneys to question her first. The prosecutor added that the victim had been ―involved in marijuana dealing‖ and described the murder as a kind of ―drug deal gone bad,‖ after which the victim was strangled, stabbed and robbed. E.I. responded that she had not heard anything about the case to make the death penalty a possible sentencing option. She noted, ―I would have to hear something really different to make the people so incredibly dangerous and deranged that it would have to be death as opposed to life in prison.‖ The murder of a single victim would have to be extremely violent for her to vote for the death penalty. In an effort to rehabilitate the juror, Patterson‘s attorney gave her more details about the case: The victim was a 20-year-old woman, and two men entered her apartment with the intention of robbing her. They did rob her, and also ―stabbed her repeatedly‖ and ―[c]hoked her with a belt and killed her.‖ He stressed, ―There is no question that it was an intentional murder.‖ E.I. said she would not automatically find the death penalty appropriate for an intentional killing, nor would she automatically vote for life imprisonment without parole in all cases not involving serial murder. She stated, ―I do believe in the death penalty in most cases, but for the most part, life in prison will handle it.‖ When asked about hypothetical cases, E.I. stated, ―I can‘t say that I absolutely wouldn‘t, wouldn‘t vote for the death penalty. But, you know, I—it would definitely have to really be some reason for me to do that.‖ 17 After a brief chambers conference, defendant‘s attorney examined E.I. He explained in some detail that penalty would be decided after a second trial in which the parties presented aggravating and mitigating evidence. Following this lengthy explanation, counsel said, ―All I‘m asking you, [is] would you wait and listen to the evidence in the second phase, and can you conceive that depending on what the aggravation is that you might return a verdict of death?‖ E.I. responded, ―I don‘t want to send anybody to death.‖ Counsel asked if she was saying she would not vote for death. She said, ―I‘m beginning to think more and more—as I‘m more and more on the spot, I don‘t want to live with my conscience.‖ When counsel asked again, ―Are you telling me that you would not want to return a verdict of death,‖ E.I. answered, ―No.‖ The court dismissed E.I. for cause, remarking it had formed a ―definite impression‖ from the courtroom voir dire that E.I.‘s views on capital punishment would substantially impair her ability to serve. E.I. clearly described the types of cases in which she would consider voting for death, i.e., those involving multiple killings or mutilation, circumstances not present in this case. Moreover, it appeared that, over the course of her questioning, E.I.‘s views had become ―crystalized that she could never return a verdict of death.‖ ―A prospective juror may be excluded for cause without compromising a defendant‘s right to trial by an impartial jury if the juror‘s views on capital punishment ‗would ―prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.‖ ‘ (Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424; [citation].)‖11 (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1243.) ― ‗Generally, the qualifications of jurors challenged for cause are matters within the wide discretion of the trial court, seldom disturbed on appeal. [Citations.] There is no requirement that a prospective juror‘s bias against the 11 Citing no governing authority, defendant argues the familiar Wainwright v. Witt standard is ―inconsistent with modern Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.‖ We decline defendant‘s invitation to ignore this long-standing binding precedent. 18 death penalty be proven with unmistakable clarity. [Citations.] Rather, it is sufficient that the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law in the case before the juror. [Citations.] ―On review, if the juror‘s statements are equivocal or conflicting, the trial court‘s determination of the juror‘s state of mind is binding. If there is no inconsistency, we will uphold the court‘s ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.]‖ [Citation.]‘ [Citation.]‖ (Virgil, at pp. 12431244.)12 The record supports the conclusion that E.I.‘s finally expressed views made her unqualified to serve. ―A prospective juror is properly excluded if he or she is unable to conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate. [Citations.]‖ (People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1246.) Defendant complains the court ignored questionnaire responses showing support for the death penalty in favor of E.I.‘s ambiguous statements in voir dire that did not clearly show she was unqualified to serve. Defendant mischaracterizes the record and misconstrues our standard of review. Even if a prospective juror‘s questionnaire responses express a willingness to consider the death penalty, an excusal for cause is appropriate if oral questioning establishes that the juror‘s views on capital punishment would, in fact, substantially impair her ability to return a death sentence. (See, e.g., People v. Virgil, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1244.) Here, E.I.‘s questionnaire responses showed moderate support for capital punishment, noting it was appropriate for ―some crimes.‖ However, she clarified her beliefs during voir dire, consistently expressing the view that only the most violent kinds of killings warrant death. Defendant characterizes these responses as ambiguous because E.I. left room for 12 Defendant argues this deference is inconsistent with Gray v. Mississippi (1987) 481 U.S. 648 and Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38. As defendant notes, we have rejected this argument before. (See People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 263.) 19 the possibility that she could vote for death. However, in each instance, she emphasized that the murder would have to be particularly brutal. ― ‗The real question is ― ‗ ―whether the juror‘s views about capital punishment would prevent or impair the juror‘s ability to return a verdict of death in the case before the juror.‖ ‘ ‖ ‘ [Citations.]‖ (People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 719-720.) When E.I. was given a general outline of the facts, she candidly admitted it did not sound like the kind of case in which she could vote for the death penalty. Defendant now complains the court and prosecutor gave the juror a sanitized, ―sugarcoat[ed]‖ version of the incident. Yet, two defense lawyers expanded on those descriptions and on the process for determining penalty. Patterson‘s attorney stressed that the victim was only 20 years old and was killed in her own apartment by two men who intended to rob her. They choked and stabbed her repeatedly in what he stressed was unquestionably an intentional killing. With that preface, he asked whether such a murder could be sufficient to support a death verdict. Once again, E.I. hedged in responding, stating only that an intentional killing would ―sort of ma[ke] that more of a possibility,‖ but consistently emphasized that she would be able to vote for death only in extreme cases. We determined similar views supported a removal for cause in a previous death penalty case involving the same trial judge. (People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399.)13 In Martinez, a prospective juror stated that a crime would have to be ― ‗particularly heinous‘ ‖ or involve other circumstances like recidivism to warrant the death penalty. (Id. at p. 428.) The prospective juror in Martinez conceded there was a possibility she could vote for death, depending on the facts, but ― ‗it would have to be something that would push me beyond the way I normally feel about the death penalty.‘ ‖ (Id. at p. 429.) We concluded these 13 We repeatedly commented on the careful and thoughtful voir dire Judge Horner conducted in Martinez. (People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 433, 437.) The thoroughness of his voir dire in this case is similarly commendable. 20 statements reserving the possibility of a death verdict did not necessarily mean the juror was qualified: ―The trial court was justified in concluding that the prospective juror‘s responses, rather than suggesting she could set aside her own personal views, constituted merely a grudging acknowledgment that those views might include some narrow exception—or at least an abstract possibility she would consider the statutory penalty of death. But the mere theoretical possibility that a prospective juror might be able to reach a verdict of death in some case does not necessarily render the dismissal of the juror an abuse of discretion. [Citations.] Excusal for cause is not limited to a juror who ‗ ―zealously opposes or supports the death penalty in every case.‖ ‘ [Citation.]‖ (Id. at p. 432.) Echoing the dissent in Martinez, defendant argues the dismissal was improper because E.I. was not asked whether serial killings and murders involving mutilation were the only types of cases in which she could consider the death penalty. (See id. at p. 461 (conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J.).) However, a court is certainly capable of discerning bias without hearing a prospective juror‘s speculation about all the potential circumstances that might support death. E.I. did not limit her discussion to serial killings or mutilations but consistently made clear that, in her view, only an especially violent murder could warrant punishment by death. Defendant also complains the court did not allow adequate voir dire because it prevented defense counsel from telling E.I. about aggravating evidence that would likely be introduced at the penalty phase. We have repeatedly cautioned that death-qualification voir dire ―must not be so abstract that it fails to identify jurors whose death penalty views would prevent or substantially impair their performance as jurors‖ but also ―must not be so specific as to require prejudgment based on a summary of potential [aggravating and mitigating] evidence. (People v. Cash[, supra,] 28 Cal.4th [at pp.] 721-722.)‖ (People v. 21 Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 586.)14 The trial court has considerable discretion in striking this balance. (Leon, at p. 586; People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 722.) The ruling here was well within that ample scope. The attorneys had already given E.I. a detailed preview of how and why the murder was committed. The court reasonably concluded that voir dire questions describing particular evidence likely to be offered in aggravation would come too close to requiring E.I. to prejudge penalty. A defendant has no right to ask prospective jurors to predict how they would decide penalty based on a summary of aggravating or mitigating evidence. (People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1326-1327 (Carasi); People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 865.) In any event, the aggravating evidence here, which primarily consisted of violent outbursts while defendant was in custody, was not nearly as shocking as Beeson‘s murder. A description of this evidence would not have caused a reasonable juror to change her views about the appropriateness of death as a penalty. Moreover, E.I.‘s response to defense counsel‘s final questioning removed any doubt about her inability to serve. Defendant‘s attorney explained that if the case reached a penalty phase, the parties would present aggravating and mitigating evidence about the crime and the backgrounds of the offenders and the victim. He then asked whether E.I. could simply wait to hear that evidence and, if the aggravating evidence was appropriate, consider possibly returning a verdict of 14 In supplemental briefing, defendant argues People v. Leon supports reversal because E.I.‘s questionnaire responses indicated she could consider a death sentence, and she only changed her mind due to the prosecutor‘s ―misleading‖ voir dire. What happened here is precisely the opposite of the situation that led to reversal in Leon. There, three jurors‘ questionnaires stated unequivocally that they could set aside their opinions about the death penalty and apply the law. (People v. Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 590-591.) Thus, they were presumptively qualified to serve. (Id. at p. 592.) Because the court‘s cursory voir dire was not sufficient to undermine this presumption, the record did not support their dismissal for cause. (Id. at pp. 592-593.) By contrast, the probing and thorough voir dire here amply supports E.I.‘s dismissal. 22 death. E.I. responded that she had thought more about the issue and realized she could not live with her conscience if she sent anyone to death. She gave this answer when proceedings resumed after an in-chambers conference. As the court observed, E.I.‘s views had apparently ―crystalized‖ over the course of her questioning and perhaps during the break.15. Her candid admission that she could not vote for death under any circumstances revealed views that would ― ‗prevent or substantially impair‘ ‖ her ability to perform as a capital juror. (Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424.) A refinement of views often occurs during voir dire. When panel members are sent to a courtroom, they learn for the first time that they have been called for a capital case. Then, appropriately, their opinions are probed in depth. These questions touch on matters of conscience, morality, social policy, and individual ability that panelists may never have considered in practical detail. The process encourages panelists to think deeply and seriously about their views. It falls to the discerning trial judge to carefully evaluate each panelist‘s state of mind on these weighty issues. The able trial court did so here. There was no error.