Opinion ID: 458564
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: judicial review of nepa threshold decisions

Text: 47 We are of course primarily a reviewing court. As such, we are in every case sensitive to the proper standard of review. In administrative-law cases like this one, where the district court was itself in essence a reviewing court, there are really three standards to identify: (1) the standard to be applied in the first instance by the agency; (2) the standard to be applied by the district court in reviewing the agency's findings; and (3) the standard to be applied by this court in reviewing the district court's decision. See Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 964-68 (5th Cir.1983). Because the parties in this case disagree sharply on what the standards are and on how they should be applied, we shall, before reaching the merits, set forth the standards that govern this case at all three levels.
48 NEPA directs all agencies of the Federal Government to prepare impact statements for every major Federal action[ ] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4332(2)(C). The Act also creates the Council on Environmental Quality. Id. Sec. 4342. The CEQ has promulgated regulations, 40 C.F.R. pt. 1500, designed to tell federal agencies what they must do to comply with the procedures and achieve the goals of [NEPA]. Id. Sec. 1500.1. These regulations are binding on federal agencies. See Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d at 972 (citing Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 356-58, 99 S.Ct. 2335, 2340-41, 60 L.Ed.2d 943 (1979)). The CEQ guidelines provide a broad framework for NEPA compliance, but also direct federal agencies to promulgate their own regulations for implementing the Act. See 40 C.F.R. Sec. 1507.3. The Corps has complied with this mandate. See Policy and Procedures for Implementing NEPA, 33 C.F.R. pt. 230. The CEQ has directed agencies to, among other things, list (1) those actions which normally require preparation of an EIS and (2) those actions which normally do not require preparation of an EA or an EIS. See 40 C.F.R. Sec. 1501.4. If a proposed action fits into neither category, the agency should prepare an EA. Id. Sec. 1501.4(b). The Corps has determined that regulatory permits are actions normally requiring an ... EA but not necessarily an EIS. 33 C.F.R. Sec. 230.7(e); see also 33 C.F.R. pt. 230, App. B. The purpose of an EA is to provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an [EIS]. 40 C.F.R. Sec. 1508.9(a)(1); see also 33 C.F.R. Sec. 230.9(a). An EA, moreover, will result in one of two findings: (1) a finding that an EIS must, because of potentially significant environmental impacts, be prepared for the proposed action or (2) a FONSI--a finding that the proposed action will not have significant effects on the environment. 40 C.F.R. Sec. 1501.4(c)-(e), 1508.13; 33 C.F.R. Sec. 230.10. 49 An EA should be brief. 40 C.F.R. Sec. 1508.9; 33 C.F.R. Sec. 230.9(b) (an EA should not normally exceed 15 pages). An EA should, however, include brief discussions of the need for the proposal, of alternatives ..., of the environmental impacts of the proposed action and alternatives, and a listing of agencies and persons consulted. 40 C.F.R. Sec. 1508.9(b); see also 33 C.F.R. Sec. 230.9(c). While the discussion of these factors should be brief, it should also be sufficient to demonstrate reasoned decision making. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 154 (D.C.Cir.1985) ([s]imple, conclusory statements of 'no impact' are not enough). Moreover, [a]n [EA] that fails to address a significant environmental concern can hardly be deemed adequate for a reasoned determination that an EIS is not appropriate. Id. at 154. 50 Before preparing an EA on proposed action, the Corps must consult with other federal agencies. The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. Secs. 661 et seq., for example, directs federal agencies to consult with USFWS and NMFS before allowing bodies of water to be dredged. Id. Sec. 662(a); see also 33 C.F.R. Sec. 320.4(c) (Corps regulations for coordination under the Act with USFWS and NMFS); 33 C.F.R. Sec. 320.4(b), (c) (Corps regulations for coordination with USFWS and NMFS in cases affecting wetlands). 51 As is readily apparent, the decision whether to prepare an EIS may turn in large part on the definition of the term significantly. The CEQ has defined significantly as follows: 52 Significantly as used in NEPA requires considerations of both context and intensity: 53 (a) Context. This means that the significance of an action must be analyzed in several contexts such as society as a whole (human, national), the affected region, the affected interests, and the locality. Significance varies with the setting of the proposed action. For instance, in the case of a site-specific action, significance would usually depend upon the effects in the locale rather than in the world as a whole. Both short- and long-term effects are relevant. 54 (b) Intensity. This refers to the severity of the impact. Responsible officials must bear in mind that more than one agency may make decisions about partial aspects of a major action. The following should be considered in evaluating intensity:(1) Impacts that may be both beneficial and adverse. A significant effect may exist even if the Federal agency believes that on balance the effect will be beneficial. 55 (2) The degree to which the proposed action affects public health or safety. 56 (3) The unique characteristics of the geographic area such as proximity to historic or cultural resources, park lands, prime farmlands, wetlands, wild and scenic rivers, or ecologically critical areas. 57 (4) The degree to which the effects on the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly controversial. 58 (5) The degree to which the possible effects on the human environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks. 59 (6) The degree to which the action may establish a precedent for future actions with significant effects or represents a decision in principle about a future consideration. 60 (7) Whether the action is related to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts. Significance exists if it is reasonable to anticipate a cumulatively significant impact on the environment. Significance cannot be avoided by terming an action temporary or by breaking it down into small component parts. 61 (8) The degree to which the action may adversely affect districts, sites, highways, structures, or objects listed or eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places or may cause loss or destruction of significant scientific, cultural, or historical resources. 62 (9) The degree to which the action may adversely affect an endangered or threatened species or its habitat that has been determined to be critical under the Endangered Species Act of 1973. 63 (10) Whether the action threatens a violation of Federal, State, or local law or requirements imposed for the protection of the environment. 64 40 C.F.R. Sec. 1508.27 (emphasis added).
65 An agency's decision to act without preparing an EIS is of course subject to judicial review. The circuits are, however, split on how that review should be conducted. In roughly half of the circuits that have decided the issue, a decision not to prepare an EIS will be overturned only if it is arbitrary and capricious. Other circuits employ a reasonableness standard of review. There are, moreover, considerable variations within these two general categories. See generally Shea, The Judicial Standard for Review of Environmental Impact Statement Threshold Decisions, 9 Envtl.Aff.L.Rev. 63 (1980). This conflict is not merely semantic or academic. Gee v. Boyd, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 2123, 2125, 85 L.Ed.2d 487 (1985) (White, J., dissenting). 5 In fact, three justices of the Supreme Court have recently argued that the full Court should review a case like this one to end the disarray and confusion that exists on this issue. Id. 105 S.Ct. at 2126 (White, J., joined by Brennan, J. & Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari). 66 Since Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir.1973), we have employed the less deferential of the competing standards--the reasonableness test. 6 The reasonableness test is clearly a more rigorous standard ... than the rule of arbitrary and capricious review that ordinarily governs agency actions. State of Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1084 (5th Cir.1985). In Kreger, 472 F.2d at 463, we described the inquiry under the reasonableness test as follows: 67 [T]he court should proceed to examine and weigh the evidence of both the plaintiff and the agency to determine whether the agency reasonably concluded that the particular project would have no effects which would significantly degrade our environmental quality. This inquiry must not necessarily be limited to consideration of the administrative record, but supplemental affidavits, depositions and other proof concerning the environmental impact of the project may be considered if an inadequate evidentiary development before the agency can be shown. 68 Id. at 467 (citations omitted). 69 Admittedly, our decisions applying Kreger have not been entirely consistent or pellucid. Louisiana Wildlife Federation, Inc. v. York, 761 F.2d 1044, 1054 (5th Cir.1985) (Rubin, J., dissenting). We agree with Mitchell that a court applying the reasonableness test does not have unbridled discretion to substitute its judgment for that of the agency responsible for making the decision in the first instance. It may not be possible, without degenerating to a circular definition, to articulate with more precision what an application of the reasonableness standard entails. It is clear, however, that a court applying the reasonableness test may, in certain circumstances, receive and weigh evidence beyond that in the administrative record, see Hiram Clarke Civic Club v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir.1973), and should at least satisfy itself that the agency has taken a hard look at the environmental concerns raised by the plaintiffs and the factors made relevant by the various regulations implementing NEPA. See Vieux Carre Property Owners v. Pierce, 719 F.2d 1272, 1282 (5th Cir.1983). 70 It is also clear that a decision to forego preparation of an EIS may be unreasonable for at least two distinct reasons: (1) the evidence before the court demonstrates that, contrary to the FONSI, the project may have a significant impact on the human environment, see, e.g., Lee, 758 F.2d at 1085, 7 or (2) the agency's review was flawed in such a manner that it cannot yet be said whether the project may have a significant impact, see, e.g., York, 761 F.2d at 1053; Foundation on Economic Trends, 756 F.2d at 154. The appropriate relief, moreover, depends upon which of these findings the district court makes. If the court finds that the project may have a significant impact, the court should order the agency to prepare an EIS. Lee, 758 F.2d at 1085; Kreger, 472 F.2d at 467. If the court finds, on the other hand, that the EA is inadequate in a manner that precludes making the determination whether the project may have a significant impact, the court should remand the case to the agency to correct the deficiencies in its analysis. See York, 761 F.2d at 1053 ([we do] not order [an] ... EIS because the question of whether the Project may have significant adverse impacts is still an open one); 8 Foundation on Economic Trends, 756 F.2d at 154 (until [the agency] completes such an evaluation the question whether the experiment requires an EIS remains an open one). 71
72 The scope of our review of district court decisions, of course, depends on (1) the nature of the question that has been decided and (2) the procedural context in which the decision was made. Mitchell argues that, because the district court granted a motion for summary judgment, we should in effect conduct a de novo review of its decision. The plaintiffs and the Corps have not bothered to address this threshold issue. 73 Generally speaking, we owe substantial deference to a district court's resolution of fact questions, but review de novo its pronouncements on questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact. Mitchell is, of course, correct that, when we review a summary judgment, we apply the same standards that the district court has applied. See, e.g., Galindo v. Precision American Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir.1985). That is because the district court's role in the summary judgment context is simply to identify, not to resolve, questions of fact and to apply correctly the law--matters upon which we owe no special deference to district courts. 74 The scope of our review is not, however, necessarily determined by the label that the parties or the district court have used to characterize the proceedings. See John v. State of Louisiana, 757 F.2d 698, 703 (5th Cir.1985). In fact, we may in certain circumstances disregard those labels altogether and apply the standard that is appropriate for reviewing what has really happened in the district court. See, e.g., Marathon Manufacturing Co. v. Enerlite Products Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 216-218 (5th Cir.1985), slip op. at 6015-16 (A trial procedure which accomplishes what the parties and court intend does not become erroneous merely because it is misnamed.). The problem arises most often when the parties, in a case involving an extensive discovery record, administrative record, or the like, file cross-motions for summary judgment. Not infrequently, the parties in such a case do not really mean to suggest that there are no material questions of fact. Rather, they intend to submit the remaining fact questions to the district court for resolution on the existing record. If the parties and the district court intended to resolve the case in that manner, we will, despite any misnomers to the contrary, review the decision according to what has really happened--a trial on a stipulated record. See, e.g., Marathon Manufacturing, 767 F.2d at 216-218; John, 757 F.2d at 706 n. 4 (collecting cases); Vetter v. Frosch, 599 F.2d 630, 632-33 (5th Cir.1979). 75 The district court expressly found that the summary judgment proof in this case showed an absence of genuine issues of material fact. Nevertheless, we are convinced that this is a case, like Marathon Manufacturing, in which we must disregard the court's label and inquire further. As Marathon Manufacturing makes clear, it is appropriate for us to do so when (1) the district court has in reality decided questions of fact and (2) the parties have effectively agreed to that procedure. See also John, 757 F.2d at 706 n. 4. 76 We note first that, following the submission of summary judgment motions, both sides informed the court that they had submitted all of the evidence that they had to offer. Said the court, in a docket entry: 77 The Court heard argument ... concerning cross-motions for summary judgment. Both parties informed the Court that no significant new evidence would be adduced if the case were to proceed to trial.Accordingly, the Court CANCELLED the trial setting on 12/27/83 and indicated that it would rule on the summary judgment motions in the near future. 78 (Emphasis added.) 79 Moreover, if ever there was a case in which the parties disagree about material questions, this is it. As our extended discussion of the administrative and judicial record should make clear, the parties, each with evidentiary support, surely disagree over at least the following: (1) whether Section 6 may have significant environmental impacts; (2) whether Section 6 is related to other projects on West Galveston Island; (3) whether the Corps' review of cumulative impacts was sufficient; and (4) whether the Corps' ultimate decision not to file an EIS was reasonable. At least the first two of these are questions of fact. See, e.g., Lee, 758 F.2d at 1081; Save Our Wetlands, 711 F.2d at 642; National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh, 721 F.2d 767, 782 (11th Cir.1983) (applying Fifth Circuit precedent). 80 Because the district court may have answered questions of fact, and because the parties effectively consented to that procedure, we will review the court's answers under the clearly erroneous test, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), notwithstanding the district court's view that this is a summary judgment case. That test allows us to reject findings of fact only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). It does not matter that the district court's decision is based on a record consisting primarily of documentary evidence. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, North Carolina, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). We will of course review de novo conclusions of law.