Opinion ID: 783116
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: High-Speed Police Chase

Text: 76 The dissent contends that a need to prevent a dangerous high-speed police chase justified Brosseau's decision to use deadly force. Brosseau stated that she was concerned about Haugen's erratic driving, but she never stated that she shot to prevent a dangerous high-speed chase, and has not argued to us that a potential chase justified her use of deadly force. In this respect, this case to some extent resembles Garner, where the police officer had initially justified his use of deadly force based only on the need to prevent Garner's escape but asserted later-apparently through counsel-that deadly force was justified by Garner's dangerousness. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 21, 105 S.Ct. 1694. We know from Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), that the `reasonableness' inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are `objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them. The relevant facts and circumstances are those known to the officer at the time she acts. [A]n officer's use of force must be objectively reasonable based on [her] contemporaneous knowledge of the facts. Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1281. We examine the objective facts and circumstances known to Brosseau at the time she acted to determine whether she had probable cause to believe that a potential high-speed chase pose[d] a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3, 105 S.Ct. 1694. 77 At the time Brosseau shot Haugen, it was clear that he intended to flee in his Jeep and that a number of non-lethal measures had failed to prevent him from doing so. But it is equally clear that Brosseau and her fellow officers did not need to kill Haugen in order to avoid a dangerous high-speed chase. They could either have discontinued a chase if it became too dangerous, or could have forgone a chase entirely. Haugen had already remained at large for several months while his no-bail warrant was outstanding, and there is no reason that the events of February 20 and 21 suddenly made his freedom an immediate threat to public safety. The cost to society of allowing criminals to flee is great, but the Supreme Court has held that this cost does not always justify deadly force. It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape. Id. at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694. 78 Because Brosseau has made no argument based on the danger of a potential high-speed chase, there is nothing in the record to tell us whether, under the Puyallup Police Department policies or other applicable rules, it would have been appropriate for the officers to initiate or continue a high-speed chase that posed a significant danger to others. We note, however, that under Washington law, police officers in pursuit must drive with due regard for the safety of others. See Wash. Rev.Code § 46.61.035. Officers in Washington may be held liable for injuries caused during high-speed chases, and, to comport with their state law duty of care, they must recognize that at times it would be more prudent to cease a pursuit in order to protect the public. Mason v. Bitton, 85 Wash.2d 321, 534 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1975). 79 Different states and localities have different laws and policies regarding police pursuit. Many have recognized that officers have duties of care in relation to vehicular pursuits, and that officers may be unreasonable in initiating or continuing high-speed chases depending, among other things, on the nature of the suspect's crimes. 1 Unusual circumstances may make it reasonable for police to initiate or continue high-speed chases, but such conduct is not justified unless the end itself is of sufficient social value. Haynes v. Hamilton County, 883 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tenn.1994). The decision to initiate or continue pursuit may be negligent when the heightened risk of injury to third parties is unreasonable in relation to the interest in apprehending suspects. Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 99 (Tex.1992). A ruling that allowed officers to use deadly force to prevent all vehicular escapes would have the paradoxical result that officers could reasonably shoot to kill even when, under state law, they could not reasonably initiate or continue a chase. 80 The dissent concludes that a justifiable means of eliminating the danger of a possible high-speed chase in this case is to shoot the suspect before he begins to drive away. The dissent relies on an article, not cited by the parties, attesting to the danger of police chases. See dissent at 10622, n. 5 (citing John Hill, High Speed Police Pursuits: Dangers, Dynamics, and Risk Reduction, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 14 (July 2002)). But the article reaches quite a different conclusion from the dissent. Even after a suspect has fled and a pursuit has been initiated, 81 [t]he most effective way to reduce risks is to terminate a pursuit. Clearly, too many pursuits continue that officers obviously should have terminated. Research on pursuit data and statistics show that termination dramatically could reduce traffic accidents, fatalities, and injuries. Police must reevaluate their thinking and mission. Agencies rarely can justify endangering the public to pursue a violator. 82 Hill, supra, at 16 (endnote omitted). Thus, just as Garner instructs that, to comply with the Fourth Amendment, an officer must sometimes forgo or discontinue deadly force and allow a suspect to escape, see 471 U.S. at 11-12, 105 S.Ct. 1694, state tort laws and police practice experts instruct that an officer must sometimes forgo a chase and allow a suspect to escape. 83 It is no less true in potential high-speed chases than in other circumstances that an officer may appropriately use deadly force if necessary to prevent an escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. Id. at 3, 105 S.Ct. 1694. But because officers can often eliminate or reduce the danger of a high-speed chase by forgoing or discontinuing a chase, we reject an approach that would allow officers to shoot a suspect simply because he is fleeing, or is about to flee, in a vehicle. Such an approach would essentially limit the Supreme Court's holding in Garner to cases where a suspect flees on foot. The Court's opinion contains no such limitation, and we decline to read such a limitation into it. 84 To support its contention that the possibility of a dangerous high-speed chase justified Brosseau's use of deadly force in this case, the dissent cites general statistics of the dangers of car chases. These statistics have not been supplied by the parties, and perforce have not been relied on by Brosseau or responded to by Haugen. Moreover, even if we could properly take judicial notice of statistics of car chases, the Supreme Court already has rejected this kind of general statistical approach to prove dangerousness in an individual case. In Garner, Tennessee attempted to justify its use of deadly force on a fleeing burglar by noting that 3.8% of burglaries involved violent crime, accounting for literally millions of incidents of violence. See id. at 21-22 & n. 23, 105 S.Ct. 1694. But the Supreme Court held that the general statistical probability alone cannot justify deadly force. A generalized assessment of dangerousness of burglars could not, without regard to the other circumstances, automatically justify the use of deadly force. Id. at 21, 105 S.Ct. 1694. 85 In some fairly extreme circumstances, our sister circuits have held that the danger presented by suspects who flee in vehicles can justify deadly force. In Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1992), the Sixth Circuit held that an officer was justified in using deadly force after a suspect had led police on a high-speed chase at speeds over ninety miles per hour, swerved toward police cars several times, and smashed into an officer's car while the officer stood next to it. In Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1330-33 (8th Cir. 1993), the Eighth Circuit held that deadly force was justified where the suspects, driving an eighteen-wheel tractor-trailer, had led police on an extended chase at speeds over ninety miles per hour through heavy traffic, forcing over 100 cars off the road, and had swerved at pursuing police several times. In that case, before using deadly force, the police had attempted roadblocks and had tried to disable the truck by shooting the tires and radiator. In Scott v. Clay County, 205 F.3d 867, 877-78 (6th Cir.2000), the Sixth Circuit held that deadly force was justified where the suspect had swerved off the road, narrowly missed an unmarked cruiser and a sheriff on foot, led police on a twentyminute chase at speeds up to 100 miles per hour, and after losing control, attempted to run down an officer. In Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1281-82 (11th Cir.2002), the Eleventh Circuit held that deadly force was justified where a suspect, already pepper-sprayed after struggling with an officer, led police on an extended high-speed chase, during which he made erratic turns, drove on the wrong side of the road with his headlights off, swerved at oncoming cars, drove through a yard, nearly hit a motorist, and then accelerated toward a patrol car. 86 But our sister circuits have also held that police chases — even high-speed chases — do not always justify deadly force. See Vaughan v. Cox, 264 F.3d 1027, 1031-34 (11th Cir.2001), vacated by 536 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002), reinstated and supplemented on remand at 316 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir.2003); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 946-51 (7th Cir.1994). In Vaughan, officers pursued a vehicle that had rammed a patrol car and then accelerated to eighty or eighty-five miles per hour in an attempt to avoid capture. In an attempt to disable either the truck or [the driver] one of the officers fired three rounds into the truck. One of the bullets struck the passenger in the truck, puncturing his spine. The Eleventh Circuit held, in those circumstances, that a reasonable jury could find that [the suspects'] escape did not present an immediate threat of serious harm to [officers] or others on the road. 264 F.3d at 1034. See also id. at 1034 n. 8 (distinguishing that case from Smith, Cole, and Scott ). In Donovan, the Seventh Circuit held that officers engaged in a high-speed pursuit were not justified in using deadly force — in this case, a road block — to stop a fleeing motorcycle. The court stated that it was very skeptical of an approach that would allow police to use deadly force to end vehicular pursuits in all circumstances, because not every fleeing suspect poses a grave danger. 17 F.3d at 951. In both Vaughan and Donovan, unlike in this case, the suspects already were driving in a dangerous manner without regard for the safety of others. But in those cases, that danger was held to be insufficient to justify deadly force. 87 None of the cases decided by our sister circuits and cited by the dissent even remotely supports a holding in this case that Brosseau was justified in using deadly force. Unlike the dissent, we believe that there is a manifest difference between swerving at cars while driving at ninety miles per hour and then smashing a patrol car with an officer standing next to it, see Smith, 954 F.2d at 347-48; driving an eighteen-wheel truck at ninety miles per hour through heavy traffic, see Cole, 993 F.2d at 1330-31; leading a twenty-minute chase at 100 miles per hour and attempting to run down an officer, see Scott, 205 F.3d at 877-78; and driving at high speeds on the wrong side of the road with headlights off and accelerating toward a patrol car, see Pace, 283 F.3d at 1281-82, on one hand; and getting into a vehicle and fleeing, or preparing to flee, on the other. 88 To the extent that the dissent looks to the particular facts of this case rather than to the general danger of police chases, it does not view the evidence in the light most favorable to Haugen, as we are required to do on summary judgment. For example, to portray Haugen as violent and therefore dangerous, the dissent asserts that he was engaged in a violent brawl when Brosseau arrived on the scene. Dissent at 877. By all accounts, however, Haugen was on the receiving end of the violence. Tamburello stated, [W]hen he seen me he started to run. . . . And I ran over and grabbed him. Got into a little scuffle there. . . . I was on top of him on the ground. Atwood, Tamburello's companion, stated that when Tamburello caught Haugen, he squirmed a little bit. Tried to get away. You know, he begged him, didn't want to go[.] Nocera, Haugen's girlfriend, stated that Tamburello ran up and tackled Ken to the ground, and continued to pounce on him out here by the [car]. Moreover, the brawl (if that is what it was) was finished before Brosseau arrived. 89 Further, to exaggerate the danger of Haugen's escape, the dissent stresses that Haugen had to escape through a narrow passageway and a dangerous obstacle course. Dissent at 879. Haugen said that he was in a small, tight space that was not like a parking lot, but that the driveway was twenty feet wide, giving him plenty of room and a clear, straight shot to get to the street. The photographs of the scene show that Haugen had more than enough room to escape without hitting anything or anyone. Indeed, he was able to drive away safely even after Brosseau shot him. 90 Finally, the dissent characterizes Haugen as deranged and wild, dissent at 10623, 10629, but this characterization is not supported by the record. Brosseau stated that she held her handgun to Haugen's temple, that he yelled you're gonna have to fuckin kill me. But her version of the facts is contradicted by Haugen's version of the facts and by the other witnesses, who saw and heard no such thing. The dissent also asserts that Haugen was behaving suicidally, dissent at 10620, but there is no indication in the record that Haugen intended to harm himself. (Of course, on the dissent's view, fleeing from police in a vehicle was itself suicidal since the police could shoot to kill.) 91