Opinion ID: 3010150
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prima facie analysis

Text: Because the district court could not conclude as a matter of law that a reduction in force (RIF) did occur, the court could only grant summary judgment for the defendants if it found that Ms. Marzano could not make a prima facie case of discrimination under either applicable legal setting -- i.e., reduction in force or no reduction in force. However, the court did not analyze Ms. Marzano's allegations in the context of a straight layoff (as opposed to a layoff which takes place in a RIF context). In addition, while the court did find that Ms. Marzano could not meet her prima facie burden in the RIF context, it committed legal error in reaching its conclusion.
The district court concluded that Ms. Marzano could not make a prima facie case in the context of a reduction in force. The court correctly articulated the standard governing such situations in the Third Circuit: to demonstrate a prima faciecase '[i]n RIF cases, the plaintiff must show he was in the protected class, he was qualified, he was laid off and other unprotected workers were retained.' DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 723 n.2 (citing Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 777); see also Torre, 42 F.3d at 831; Seman v. Coplay Cement Co., 26 F.3d 428, 431 (3d Cir. 1994); Billet, 940 F.2d at 816 n.3. The only dispute between the parties concerns the fourth prong of the requirement. As the district court explained, Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination because she cannot demonstrate that her employer afforded more favorable treatment to nonpregnant employees. Indeed, several nonpregnant employees were terminated in conjunction with the reduction in force of the AT&T National Business Unit, seemingly refuting plaintiff's claim that she was singled out because of her pregnancy. Plaintiff argues, however, that the relevant inquiry is not whether other persons outside the protected class were terminated, but whether persons not in the protected class were retained. District Opinion, typescript at 5. The district court acknowledged that our opinions on the subject have enunciated the standard in the precise language articulated by plaintiff. Id. However, the court rejected a literal interpretation of our language on the ground that under such a test, every plaintiff in a protected group would be allowed a trial simply because he was discharged during a reduction in force. Id. Presumably to protect the judiciary from a flurry of frivolous discrimination lawsuits by disgruntled laid-off employees, the court adopted a different requirement from that which our explicit language called for: [T]o establish a prima facie case in the context of a work-force reduction, a plaintiff must do more than merely show that unprotected employees were retained in their positions; the plaintiff must produce some additional evidence that he was singled out for discharge because of his protected status. Id., typescript at 5-6. Finding that plaintiff has merely asserted that while she was terminated, other employees were retained, id., typescript at 6, the court concluded that Ms. Marzano had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and that as a result the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Because it departs from the law of this Circuit and because it subverts the analytical framework designed by the U.S. Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas, we reject the requirement of additional evidence imposed by the district court on Ms. Marzano, and hold that the court erroneously concluded that Ms. Marzano had failed to meet her prima facie burden in the reduction-in-force context.
As an initial matter, the district court was not free to depart from the precise language articulated by this court or to decline[] to adopt the literal interpretation of our jurisprudence unless, of course, a more recent Supreme Court case requires such a departure or our own precedent in other cases suggests a modification in certain circumstances. Defendants argue that the additional evidence requirement is consistent with Third Circuit precedent, and point for support to certain portions of our opinion in Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 1994). See Appellees' Brief at 28. However, the discussion in Hook to which they direct our attention concerns the elements required to show employment discrimination in a so-called mixedmotives case, and in no way bears on the elements of a primafacie case in the type of discrimination case that is before us, which is known as a pretext case. See Hooks, 28 F.3d at 375. In other words, Hooks is of no relevance to the instant case.
We reject the additional evidence requirement not solely on hierarchical grounds, however, but also because it subverts the entire analytical framework constructed by the U.S. Supreme Court, this Court and other circuits for the consideration of summary judgment motions in employment discrimination cases.
What makes an employer's personnel action unlawful discrimination is the intent behind that action. See U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (The 'factual inquiry' . . . is '[whether] the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.') (citation omitted). For obvious reasons, it is extremely difficult -- not to say impossible -- to establish directly the motivation of one's employer, or that of any third party. See id. at 716 (All courts have recognized that the question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult. . . . There will seldom be 'eyewitness testimony as to the employer's mental processes.). There are exceptions, of course, such as when a plaintiff can produce the proverbial smoking gun -- for instance, an internal memorandum instructing the personnel director not to hire persons belonging to a certain protected class. But our legal scheme against discrimination would be little more than a toothless tiger if the courts were to require such direct evidence of discrimination. As we explained in Chipollini, we do not require direct proof of . . . discrimination because it is often unavailable or difficult to find. . . . 'Even an employer who knowingly discriminates on the basis of [protected status] may leave no written records revealing the forbidden motive and may communicate it orally to no one.' 814 F.2d at 899 (citing LaMontagne v. American Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir. 1984)). As a result, most employment discrimination lawsuits seek to prove intent through inference. In the typical case, the plaintiff attempts to establish the employer's motivation by a process of elimination. In other words, because plaintiffs generally cannot present evidence affirmatively pointing to their employer's actual reason for taking certain action against them, they must instead try to show that no reason other than discrimination is plausible, and that accordingly discrimination must have been the reason. To enable a jury to reach this conclusion, plaintiffs must establish three elements: (1) that their employer took an adverse employment action against them; (2) that the facts of the case are compatible with discrimination being the reason; (3) that the employer is unable to provide an alternative nondiscriminatory reason for the action, or that its stated reason is false. Since there must be some reason for the employer's action and since no reason other than discrimination has been shown to be plausible, this scheme allows a jury to infer that discrimination must be the reason. The burden-shifting analysis enunciated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas and developed and refined in subsequent judicial forays into the subject is designed to ensure that plaintiff has enough evidence to construct the chain of inferences described in the previous paragraph, and therefore get to trial. In the first instance, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case. The evidentiary burden at this stage is rather modest: it is to demonstrate to the court that plaintiff's factual scenario is compatible with discriminatory intent -- i.e., that discrimination could be a reason for the employer's action. As we have held on numerous occasions, this initial burden is not intended to be onerous. Sempier, 45 F.3d at 728 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253); see also Torre, 42 F.3d at 829 (describing prima facie case as relatively simple); McKenna v. Pacific Rail Service, 32 F.3d 820, 825 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); Massarsky, 706 F.2d at 118 (describing prima facie case as easily made out). Jumping over this first hurdle, however, has important consequences. By meeting his or her prima facie burden, the plaintiff earns the right, as in a poker game, to require the employer to show its hand -- that is, to offer an explanation other than discrimination why the employee suffered an adverse employment action. It is as if plaintiff told the employer, I cannot get into your mind to prove with certainty that you acted against me based on a discriminatory motive. You, on the other hand, know the reason why you acted against me. I have done the best I can, which is to show that discrimination could have been the motive. Therefore, it is your turn to prove me wrong by articulating the non-discriminatory reason for your action. If the employer is unable to proffer a nondiscriminatory reason, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law, as the case may be; if the employer proffers a reason and the plaintiff can produce enough evidence to enable a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the proffered reason is false, plaintiff has earned the right to present his or her case to the jury. In the context of a reduction in force, we have held that to demonstrate a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show he was in the protected class, he was qualified, he was laid off and other unprotected workers were retained. DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 723 n.2; Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 777. The third element, that plaintiff was laid off, establishes that he or she suffered an adverse employment action. The second and fourth elements, that plaintiff was qualified and that other unprotected workers were retained, establishes that plaintiff was treated differently from his or her colleagues, and introduces a question: Why? In other words, it raises the question of what is distinctive about plaintiff that caused the employer to treat him or her differently from his or her colleagues. The first element, that she was in the protected class, identifies one possible answer, one condition in which she differs from her colleagues who were retained: her protected status. It does not necessarily demonstrate that her protected status is the reason why she was treated differently; but it makes it a plausible explanation, one that is compatible with the facts of the case. At that point, the burden switches to the employer, who must proffer an alternative explanation for treating the plaintiff differently from those unprotected employees who were retained. Chief Justice (then Justice) Rehnquist explained the reason for placing that burden on the employer as follows: A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors. And we are willing to presume this largely because we know from our experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race. Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978); see also Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 897. When the employer proffers a reason for treating the plaintiff differently from his or her colleagues that the factfinder rejects, McDonnell Douglas and its progeny allow the factfinder to conclude that since the employer was unable to give any satisfactory reason for its action, the discriminatory reason suggested by the plaintiff must be the one. As noted earlier, the district court rejected the primafacie test that we articulated in Armbruster on the ground that every plaintiff in a protected group would be allowed a trial simply because he was discharged during a reduction in force, District Opinion at 5, and therefore held that Ms. Marzano needed to produce additional evidence to meet her prima facie burden. Id. at 6. In so concluding, the court committed reversible legal error.
First of all, the court is simply wrong when it suggests that our test would open the judicial floodgates and let every plaintiff in a protected group who is discharged go to trial and defeat summary judgment. Rather, the effect of our rule is that in every case where an employee in a protected class is laid off as part of a reduction in force while unprotected colleagues are retained, the employer may be compelled to state the nondiscriminatory reason -- assuming there is one -- for the action. It is true that if plaintiff can then produce evidence to cast doubt on the employer's stated reason, the case should go to trial. But such is the nature of the evidentiary beast. Employment discrimination cases center around a single question: why did the employer take an adverse employment action against plaintiff? Because this is clearly a factual question, Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 899, summary judgment is in fact rarely appropriate in this type of case. Simply by pointing to evidence which calls into question the defendant's intent, the plaintiff raises an issue of material fact which, if genuine, is sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Id. See Sempier, 45 F.3d at 732-33 (cases in which plaintiff attacks employer's stated reasons for adverse employment action must be resolved by a jury and cannot be resolved on summary judgment). To require plaintiff to produce additional evidence of discrimination at the prima facie stage, as the district court did in this instance, would be a cure worse than the disease. It would topple the complex evidentiary edifice constructed by the Supreme Court, and impose on plaintiff the very burden that McDonnell Douglas sought to avoid -- that of uncovering a smoking gun. The defendants contend that the standard articulated by the court does not require, as plaintiff suggests, a 'smoking gun.' Appellees' Brief at 29. As to what other type of evidence might satisfy the additional evidence requirement that the district court enunciated, however, the Defendants do not say; instead, they cite several cases from other circuits with no comment. None of these cases, however, comes close to offering an answer. See, e.g., Bialas v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 59 F.3d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 1995) (requiring plaintiff to come forward with additional evidence that age was a factor in his termination, without specifying what form this other evidence might take). The Eighth Circuit, in an earlier case, did suggest that [s]uch showing could be made . . . by statistical evidence (as, for example, where a pattern of forced early retirement or failure to promote older employees can be shown) or circumstantial evidence (such as a demonstration of a preference for younger employees in the business organization. Holley v. Sanyo Manufacturing, Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1166 (8th Cir. 1985). However, we find this answer unsatisfactory in the present context. First, except in the largest organizations it might be more difficult to compile meaningful statistics regarding pregnant women than for older employees. Second, we find the imposition of such a requirement overly onerous at the prima facie stage. For this reason, we predict that New Jersey would decline to follow the lead of those federal circuits that have adopted the additional evidence requirement.
Defendants argue that the district court properly required additional evidence, but offer, inter alia, a more nuanced argument than that articulated by the court. They argue that the fourth element of the prima facie case encompasses the requirement that plaintiff show that similarly situatedunprotected employees were retained. Appellees' Brief at 26 (citing Torre, 42 F.3d at 831), and that there were no such similarly situated employees in the AT&T Unit. Appellees' Brief at 27. The implication, the defendants argue, is that because of her unique role, plaintiff cannot establish, as she must, that other similarly situated, unprotected employees were retained. Because plaintiff was unable to show that other similarly situated, unprotected employees were treated more favorably, the District Court correctly ruled that plaintiff must make some additional showing of discrimination . . . . Id. at 27-28. We reject Defendants' argument. First of all, Torre did not create any legal requirement such as the one that Defendants attempt to impose on Ms. Marzano. The Court in that case simply remarked that when Torre was terminated in the reduction in force, other, similarly-situated [sic] but younger employees were retained by Casio. Torre, 42 F.3d at 831. The fact that similarly situated employees were retained certainly strengthens the plaintiff's case, and makes more urgent the employer's task of providing a reason other than discrimination for its different treatment of plaintiff. But the Court did not create a new legal requirement in the process, and Defendants can cite no case in this Circuit, nor do we know of any, where it was described as a requirement. Moreover, we reject Defendants' argument because it would seriously undermine legal protections against discrimination. Under their scheme, any employee whose employer can for some reason or other classify him or her as unique would no longer be allowed to demonstrate discrimination inferentially, but would be in the oft-impossible situation of having to offer direct proof of discrimination. We see no value in, and no mandate in our jurisprudence for, such a requirement. This is not to say that the uniqueness of an employee is irrelevant to the ultimate outcome. Consider, for instance, the situation of an employee who performs tasks in the firm that no one else performs, and whose functions become obsolete. In that case, the employee's uniqueness may explain why he or she, and not an unprotected colleague, was terminated. Such a scenario, however, goes to the employer's reason for its action, and may be presented to the judge after the plaintiff has made his or her prima facie case, when the burden switches to the employer to proffer a nondiscriminatory reason for its action. All employees can be characterized as unique in some ways and as sharing common ground with similarly situated employees in some other ways, depending on the attributes on which one focusses, and the degree of specificity with which one considers that employee's qualifications, skills, tasks and level of performance. The relevant issue for our purposes is not whether there is some way in which an employee can be classified as unique but, rather, whether the employee can be classified as unique in some way relevant to his or her layoff. This question, in turn, cannot be considered independently from the reasons proffered for the employee's termination. Therefore, arguments as to the employee's uniqueness should be considered in conjunction with, and as part of, the employer's rebuttal -- not at the prima facie stage. See Healy, 860 F.2d at 1214 n.1 (noting that because the prima facie case is easily made out, the prima facie case is rarely the focus of the ultimate disagreement. Rather, 'the exigencies of a reduction-in-force can best be analyzed at the stage where the employer puts on evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for the [discharge].) (citing Coburn v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339, 343 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983)).
Because we conclude that the test that this Court has articulated in the past to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination in a reduction-in-force context properly advances the evidentiary scheme devised by the Supreme Court, and because we find that this test satisfactorily protects the interests of employer and employee, we believe that New Jersey would adopt the test articulated by this Court in DiBiaseand Armbruster, and find that the district court erred when it rejected established Third Circuit law.
Furthermore, because we find that the district court improperly concluded that Ms. Marzano could not meet her primafacie burden in the RIF context, and because the court did not consider whether she could meet her burden in a non-RIF context, we hold that the district court erroneously granted Defendants' summary judgment on the discrimination ground and remand for further consideration.