Opinion ID: 659420
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interest on Awards

Text: 46 Paine Webber asserts that as prevailing party it is entitled to interest on the award of costs from November 24, 1989, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1961 (1992), which provides for interest on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in district court. Section 1961 provides that such 47 interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent (as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury) of the average accepted auction price for the last auction of fifty-two week United States Treasury bills settled immediately prior to the date of the judgment. 48 Paine Webber asserts that the judgment date for calculating interest is November 24, 1989, the date the court entered final judgment in favor of Paine Webber on the merits of BankAtlantic's action. BankAtlantic asserts that interest runs from July 3, 1991, the day the district court adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation, in which the magistrate concludes that Paine Webber is the prevailing party and entitled to reasonable costs and fees. 49 Supreme Court and this circuit's precedent is clear: When a district court taxes costs against a losing party, the award of costs bears interest from the date of the original judgment. Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 855 F.2d 794, 799 (11th Cir.1988). See also Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 1576, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990) (pursuant to section 1961, post-judgment interest properly runs from the date of the entry of judgment). We hold that interest shall accrue on Paine Webber's taxable costs from the date the court entered final judgment in favor of Paine Webber on the merits of BankAtlantic's action, November 24, 1989. 50 BankAtlantic asserts that it also is entitled to post-judgment interest on the district court's remuneration of fees and costs to BankAtlantic as sanctions against Paine Webber and Ruden Barnett, from July 3, 1991 (order awarding specific dollar amounts to parties). BankAtlantic reasons, however, that if this court awards post-judgment interest to Paine Webber from November 24, 1989 (final judgment on the merits), then this court should award post-judgment interest to BankAtlantic from either November 24, 1989, or July 10, 1989 (sanction order). Paine Webber argues that BankAtlantic is not entitled to post-judgment interest because BankAtlantic never requested an award of post-judgment interest in the district court. 51 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 37 (1991), in a civil case money judgment, affirmed on appeal, whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the date the judgment was entered in the district court. Section 1961 has similar mandatory language. BankAtlantic did not waive any right to post-judgment interest. The proper date upon which interest shall be calculated for the sanction amount is July 10, 1989, the date of the sanction order. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) (1993) defines judgment as including a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. Thus, the July 10, 1989, sanction order is a judgment for purposes of the accrual of interest pursuant to section 1961.