Opinion ID: 1159053
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Circuit Court's Failure To Instruct The Jury Regarding The Included Offense Of Assault In The Third Degree Constituted A Plain Error Or Defect Affecting Kupau's Substantial Rights.

Text: In its decision, the ICA noted that [in] this case, [Kupau] neither requested an [included offense] instruction nor objected to the [circuit] court's instructions as read. Kupau, at ___, 879 P.2d at 563 (footnote omitted). Therefore, the ICA correctly deemed itself unable to consider the alleged error on appeal unless the failure of the [circuit] court to give the instruction, sua sponte, constituted plain error or a defect affecting [Kupau's] substantial rights.... Id. (citing, inter alia, HRPP 52(b)). Footnoting to Territory v. Joaquin, 39 Haw. 221 (1952), State v. Sneed, 68 Haw. 463, 465, 718 P.2d 280, 282 (1986), and State v. Ferreira, 8 Haw.App. 1, 4-5, 791 P.2d 407, 409, cert. denied, 71 Haw. 668, 833 P.2d 901 (1990), the ICA then began its analysis with the observation that [the] Hawai'i case law has not determined the issue ... whether, under HRPP Rule 30(e), [7] a trial court commits plain error when it fails, sua sponte, to give an [included offense] instruction reasonably warranted by the evidence. Kupau, ___ Hawai`i at ___ & n. 4, 879 P.2d at 563 & n. 4. [8] Accordingly, the ICA looked to other jurisdictions to resolve the issue. We note that recent case law of this court is pertinent to the ICA's holding that the circuit court in the present case was obligated, even absent a request by either party, to instruct the jury regarding the included offense of assault in the third degree and that the circuit court's failure to do so [therefore constituted] plain error. Kupau, at ___, 879 P.2d at 565. In State v. Pinero, 75 Haw. 282, 859 P.2d 1369 (1993), we recently articulated the general proposition that Ordinarily, instructions to which no objection was made at trial may not be raised as error on appeal. [Hawai'i] Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 30(e). An appellate court may presume that an instruction correctly stated the law if no objection to the allegedly erroneous instruction was made at trial.... Where an erroneous instruction affected the substantial rights of a defendant, however, we may notice the error as plain error and remand for corrective action. HRPP Rule 52(b); State v. Kelekolio, 74 Haw. 479, 515, 849 P.2d 58, 74-75 (1993); State v. Agrabante, 73 Haw. 179, 184, 830 P.2d 492, 495 (1992); State v. Fox, 70 Haw. 46, 55-57, 760 P.2d 670, 675-76 (1988). Id. at 291-92, 859 P.2d at 1374 (emphasis in original and footnote omitted). Given the plain language of HRPP 30(e), [9] construed in conjunction with HRPP 52(b), [10] the proposition applies equally to jury instructions that, for whatever reason, the circuit court fails to give under circumstances where the omission affects a defendant's substantial rights. Kelekolio, cited with approval in Pinero, is also instructive with respect to the issue before us. In that case, the defendant [urged] ... that the jury instructions as a whole were prejudicially insufficient because the [trial] court never instructed the jury on the issue of the voluntariness of [his] confession, thus depriving the jury of the opportunity to make the ultimate determination of whether [his] confession was freely and voluntarily made. ... Specifically, [the defendant] complains that the jury was never ... told that it could reject [his] confession if it found the confession to be involuntary. ... When jury instructions or the omission thereof are at issue on appeal, the standard of review is whether, when read and considered as a whole, the instructions given are prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading. State v. Halemanu, 3 Haw.App. 300, 306, 650 P.2d 587, 592 (1982) (citing, inter alia, State v. Reiger, 64 Haw. 510, 644 P.2d 959 (1982)). We note that [the defendant] never requested an instruction on the issue of voluntariness; he therefore alleges plain error on appeal. This court's power to deal with plain error is one to be exercised sparingly and with caution because the plain error rule represents a departure from a presupposition of the adversary system  that a party must look to his or her counsel for protection and bear the cost of counsel's mistakes. State v. Fox , 70 Haw. [at] 55-56, 760 P.2d [at] 675-76.... Nevertheless, where plain error has been committed and substantial rights have been affected thereby, the error may be noticed even though it was not brought to the attention of the trial court. Id. at 55, 760 P.2d at 675; see also State v. Grindles, 70 Haw. 528, 530, 777 P.2d 1187, 1189 (1989); State v. Tiedemann, 7 Haw. App. 631, 635, 790 P.2d 340, 342 (1990); [HRPP] 52(b) (1989) .... Kelekolio, 74 Haw. at 514-15, 849 P.2d at 74-75 (emphasis added). While Kelekolio does not expressly address plain error in the context of omitted included offense instructions, it does address plain error in the context of omitted jury instructions. Thus, being a relevant tile in the mosaic of this jurisdiction's evolving jurisprudence, we believe it to be a significant element of the analytical resolution of the present appeal. In the specific context of included offense instructions, it is also the established law of this jurisdiction that the prosecution as well as [the] defendant may request an instruction on a lesser included offense, Sneed, 68 Haw. at 465, 718 P.2d at 282, and that such an instruction may be given over both the prosecution's and the defendant's objection. Ferreira, 8 Haw.App. at 4-5, 791 P.2d at 409. However, prior to the present matter, no appellate decision in this jurisdiction has expressly addressed the question whether, under any circumstances, a defendant can, as a tactical matter, legitimately seek to preclude the trial court from giving included offense instructions. We note that when a jury is instructed only with respect to the charged offense ( e.g., assault in the second degree) and unanimously agrees that the prosecution has failed to prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant must be acquitted and cannot subsequently be prosecuted for an included offense. See HRS §§ 701-109(4) and 701-111(1). If, however, included offense instructions are given, the jury can properly convict the defendant of an included offense although the defendant would then stand acquitted of the offense charged. Accordingly, it is possible that some jurors, although not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of any offense and therefore unwilling to enter a guilty verdict as to the offense charged, might nevertheless be tempted to convict the defendant of an included offense in order to achieve an unjustified compromise. See United States v. Harary, 457 F.2d 471 (2d Cir.1972). [11] For this reason, the defendant may perceive a tactical disadvantage in according the jury the chance to opt for conviction of an included offense based on the trial court's instructions. On the other hand, if a jury is instructed only with respect to the offense charged and one or more of the jurors believe that the defendant has committed some crime, but not necessarily the one charged, the absence of included offense instructions could cause them to convict the defendant [of] the greater charge in order not to let the defendant go free or cause a mistrial. State v. Yamashiro, 8 Haw.App. 595, 607, 817 P.2d 123, 130 (1991). If instructed as to relevant included offenses and thus afforded additional conviction options, those jurors not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt as to the offense charged would presumably have a heightened incentive to remain steadfast in their beliefs and refuse to accede to a guilty verdict on the original charge. For this reason, the defendant could well perceive a tactical advantage in presenting the jury with included offense instructions. A defendant who believes that the disadvantages of presenting the jury with included offense instructions outweigh the advantages may not want the instructions to be given. The ICA's opinion in the present case, citing United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1171 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1034, 108 S.Ct. 2018, 100 L.Ed.2d 605 (1988), and Walker v. United States, 418 F.2d 1116, 1119 (D.C.Cir.1969), noted that some jurisdictions consequently subscribe to the view that a defendant should be entitled to forego an [included offense] instruction for strategic reasons. Kupau, ___ Hawai`i at ___ _ ___, 879 P.2d at 563-564 (emphasis added). However, because the prosecution has a legitimate interest in having included offense instructions given, see Sneed, 68 Haw. at 464, 718 P.2d at 281, we have rejected this position and have held that the prosecution ... may request an instruction on [an] ... included offense, id. at 465, 718 P.2d at 282, and when it does so, the instruction must be given over ... the defendant's objection, see Ferreira 8 Haw.App. at 4-5, 791 P.2d at 409, where it is supported by the evidence. Given the language of People v. Wickersham, 32 Cal.3d 307, 323-24, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 444-45, 650 P.2d 311, 319-20 (1982), cited with approval by the ICA in Kupau, ___ Hawai`i at ___ _ ___, 879 P.2d at 564-565, we note that the trial court is the sole source of all definitions and statements of law applicable to an issue to be resolved by the jury. State v. Williamson, 72 Haw. 97, 103, 807 P.2d 593, 596 (1991) (emphasis added). Moreover, [it] is the duty of the circuit judge to see to it that the case goes to the jury in a clear and intelligent manner, so that they may have a clear and correct understanding of what it is they are to decide, and he [or she] shall state to them fully the law applicable to the facts. State v. Feliciano, 62 Haw. 637, 643, 618 P.2d 306, 310 (1980) (quoting People v. Henry, 395 Mich. 367, 373-74, 236 N.W.2d 489, 492 (1975)) (emphasis added). And faced with inaccurate or incomplete instructions, [the] trial court has a duty to, with the aid of counsel, either correct the defective instruction or to otherwise incorporate it into its own instruction. State v. Riveira, 59 Haw. 148, 155, 577 P.2d 793, 797 (1978) (emphasis added and citations omitted).... In other words, the ultimate responsibility properly to instruct the jury... [lies] with the circuit court and not with trial counsel. Briones v. State, 74 Haw. 442, 472-73, 848 P.2d 966, 980 (1993) (Levinson, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). [12] Under some circumstances, however, the prosecution may not desire included offense instructions for its own legitimate tactical or strategic reasons. We recognize, for instance, that if a jury convicts a defendant of an included offense, the defendant is acquitted of the offense charged. HRS § 701-110 (1985) (A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense[.]). Thus, if included offense instructions are given, the defendant may obtain an acquittal of the offense charged and be convicted of an included offense notwithstanding that the jurors did not agree unanimously that the defendant was not guilty of that offense. In order to avoid this eventuality, the prosecution may not want included instructions to be given in every case. Accordingly, where the prosecution has not sought included offense instructions and the defendant has expressly objected, for his or her own tactical reasons, to the submission of such instructions to the jury, we are unwilling to impose a per se obligation upon the trial court to give all possible included offense instructions supported by the evidence; as we have indicated, a defendant may also have a legitimate interest in seeking to avoid them. This is not to say, however, that the trial court does not have the discretion to give included offense instructions that are supported by the evidence; the trial court is simply not required to give them. To say a trial court does not have a duty to instruct is considerably different from saying [that] the giving of such an instruction is forbidden. To quote the Attorney General's brief, The courts do not live in T.H. White's ant society ... [`The fortress was entered by tunnels, and over the entrance to each tunnel, there was a notice which said: EVERYTHING NOT FORBIDDEN IS COMPULSORY BY NEW ORDER'] White, T.H., The Book of Merlin, Ch. 7.) People v. Barton, 23 Cal.App.4th 400, 412, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 649, 656-57 (Weiner, Acting P.J., concurring), petition for review granted, 847 P.2d 1030, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 814 (1993). Thus, in order to reconcile the competing interests of the prosecution and defendants, as well as to ensure that juries are appropriately instructed in criminal cases, we hold as follows: The trial judge must bring all included offense instructions that are supported by the evidence to the attention of the parties. The trial judge must then give each such instruction to the jury unless (1) the prosecution does not request that included instructions be given and (2) the defendant specifically objects to the included offense instructions for tactical reasons. [13] If the prosecution does not make a request and the defendant makes a tactical objection, the trial judge must then exercise his or her discretion as to whether the included offense instructions should be given. The trial judge's discretion should be guided by the nature of the evidence presented during the trial, [14] as well as the extent to which the defendant appears to understand the risks involved. In the present case, Kupau did not expressly object to the trial court instructing the jury regarding the included offense of assault in the third degree. On the record before us, we therefore hold that the circuit court was obligated, even absent a request by either party, to instruct the jury regarding the included offense of assault in the third degree and that its failure to do so constituted plain error.