Opinion ID: 2570367
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Colorado Sentencing Separate Ranges

Text: We determine that the prosecution's attempt to characterize Colorado's scheme as a simple range system is foreclosed or rejected by Apprendi and Blakely. In support of its simple range argument, the prosecution relies on the Phillips characterization of Colorado's sentencing scheme as a spectrum beginning at one-half the presumptive minimum and extending to twice the presumptive maximum. 652 P.2d at 581. The prosecution also argues that the determination that particular facts are extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances is a legal determination that must be made by the trial court. This must be so, the prosecution argues, because the same facts that support a presumptive range sentence may be legally characterized as extraordinary to support an aggravated sentence. Furthermore, the prosecution points out that the abuse of discretion standard of review applied to sentencing decisions shows that these determinations are issues of law and not fact. First and most importantly, despite the language in Phillips which characterizes sentencing judges' options as one inclusive spectrum, it is apparent from Blakely that the necessary inquiry into the sentencing system is one of functionality, not labeling. The Supreme Court defines the statutory maximum, for Sixth Amendment purposes, as the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.  Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2538 (emphasis in original); see also Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 756 (statutory maximum is the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict). When we examine the section 18-1.3-401(6) provision for aggravated sentencing, we must consider the Supreme Court's formulation of statutory maximum for Sixth Amendment purposes. Rather than looking only to the highest sentences in the aggravated range authorized by this statute as the statutory maximum, we must examine the trial court's role. Section 18-1.3-401(6) aggravated sentencing results in imposition of a sentence that is within the presumptive range, unless the court engages in the aggravating circumstances analysis. In some instances, this analysis may involve additional fact-finding by the trial judge. If it does, the rule of Blakely applies. Labeling Colorado's system as a simple range system ignores this critical point. Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the prosecution's argument that the trial court must make the purely legal determination that certain facts are extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The Supreme Court expressly rejected this argument in Blakely. The focus of the Sixth Amendment inquiry is on the process of finding those facts and whether it sufficiently complied with the defendant's constitutional jury trial protections. Washington State made a similar argument in support of its statute. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2538 n. 8. The Court rejected the argument, explaining that the Washington judge's legal determination that certain facts present a compelling ground for an aggravated sentence does not change the analysis because the judge cannot make that judgment without finding some facts to support it beyond the bare elements of the offense. Id. [12] Any such facts must be Blakely -compliant or Blakely -exempt. The subsequent determination that those facts are extraordinary aggravators is a legal determination that remains in the discretion of the trial court as long as it is based on permissible facts. See Watkins, 684 P.2d at 238. We also note that section 18-1.3-401(6) does not mandate increased sentences based on extraordinary aggravating factors, but authorizes them. This distinction has no effect on the Blakely analysis because the Supreme Court rejects this feature as one that authorizes judicial fact-finding for aggravated sentencing. See 124 S.Ct. at 2538 n. 8 (clarifying that mandatory and discretionary aggravated sentencing systems that allow for judicial fact-finding are no different for purposes of the rule in the case). For these reasons, we reject the prosecution's characterization of section 18-1.3-401(6) sentencing as a simple range. Our statute includes the possibility of aggravated range sentences based on facts that are not Blakely -compliant or Blakely -exempt; sentences that are outside the statutory maximum, as defined by Blakely, in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Therefore, it cannot be termed a simple range system.