Opinion ID: 734905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: failure to control

Text: 16 Failure to control the actions of a dangerous person creates a duty of care to third persons only under limited circumstances. All jurisdictions that have considered the issue impose on a physician the duty to control his patient only if, under a reasonable standard of care, he: (1) should have known that the patient posed a threat to the community, and (2) had the legal right to control the patient. See Sellers v. United States, 870 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir.1989) (Michigan law); Hokansen v. United States, 868 F.2d 372 (10th Cir.1989) (Kansas law); Currie v. United States, 836 F.2d 209 (4th Cir.1987) (North Carolina law); Semler v. Psychiatric Institute of Washington, D.C., 538 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir.1976) (Virginia law); Rousey v. United States, 921 F.Supp. 1550 (E.D.Ky.1996); Moye v. United States, 735 F.Supp. 179 (E.D.N.C.1990); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F.Supp. 185 (D.Neb.1980); Hamman v. County of Maricopa, 775 P.2d 1122 (Ariz.1989); Petersen v. State, 671 P.2d 230 (Wash.1983); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 319 (1965) (One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.). 17 Montana is likely to follow this rule. In Phillips v. City of Billings, 758 P.2d 772 (Mont.1988), the Montana Supreme Court considered whether a police officer had a duty to control the actions of a slightly intoxicated man whom he had observed standing next to a car and who later injured a third person in a traffic accident. The officer lacked probable cause to detain or arrest the suspect. Because he could not control the suspect's actions, he did not owe the injured third party a duty to control him. Id. at 775. 18 Similarly, the VA lacked the legal ability to control Harper's actions. 4 It could obtain an involuntary commitment order only if he was seriously mentally ill. Mont.Code Ann. 53-21-102. A serious mental illness is defined by Montana law as (1) a mental disorder that (2) has resulted in self-inflicted injury or physical injury to another or imminent threat thereof. Mont.Code Ann. § 53-21-102; In re F.B., 615 P.2d 867 (Mont.1980). The party petitioning for commitment must prove these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 19 Lacock has produced no evidence that would have supported a commitment order against Harper. 5 Because the VA lacked the right to control him, it had no duty to do so.