Opinion ID: 163802
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Design-defect Claims

Text: 40 Plaintiff asserts two design-defect claims. He alleges that the tractor and loader were defective because Deere (1) fail[ed] to install on the tractor a ROPS when it was manufactured and (2) fail[ed] to include self-leveling on the [front-end loader]. Aplt. Br. at 36. 41 In Lester v. Magic Chef, 230 Kan. 643, 641 P.2d 353, 361 (1982), the Kansas Supreme Court declared that design-defect claims should be assessed using the consumer expectations test described in Comment i to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Restatement Second) (1965). Comment i defines an unreasonably dangerous product as one which is `dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.' Delaney, 999 P.2d at 944 (quoting the comment). The Kansas courts have continually reaffirmed that the consumer expectations test is the test in Kansas with regard to design defects. Id. Thus, Deere might have sought to affirm summary judgment on the design-defect claims on a ground quite similar to the ground that largely prevailed with respect to the warning-defect claims—that is, that the equipment was no more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would consider it to be. 42 Deere's sole argument on appeal, however, is that Plaintiff's design-defect claims are barred because the equipment had undergone a substantial modification. Deere argues that Plaintiff fundamentally altered the character of the product when he welded bale-fork attachments onto the bucket of the front-end loader. Aple. Br. at 51. This alteration enabled Plaintiff to carry large round bales. Deere terms it obvious that Plaintiff's accident could not have happened absent his capacity to lift large round bales with the loader. Aple. Br. at 31. 43 Deere maintains that [a] showing that the tractor/loader had undergone a substantial change precludes recovery for design claims under Kansas law. Aple. Br. at 32. It points out that the Kansas pattern jury instruction for products-liability claims states that an element of the cause of action is that [t]he product was expected to reach and did reach the hands of the plaintiff without substantial change in the condition in which it was (manufactured) (sold). Pattern Instructions Kansas Civil 3d § 128.18. (This pattern instruction follows Restatement Second § 402A(1)(b), which states as a requirement for a strict-products-liability claim that the product is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.) Deere also cites opinions from other jurisdictions which adhere to the view that a lack of substantial change is an essential element of the plaintiff's case. See, e.g., Glass v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 789 F.2d 612, 613 (8th Cir.1986) (because Missouri follows § 402A, plaintiff needed to prove ... that the product was expected to and did reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold). 44 The question that remains, however, is whether a particular change is substantial. The opinions of the Kansas appellate courts provide no guidance on this issue. Comment p to Restatement Second § 402A largely left the matter to further development. It said: 45 p. Further processing or substantial change. Thus far the decisions applying the rule stated have not gone beyond products which are sold in the condition, or in substantially the same condition, in which they are expected to reach the hands of the ultimate user or consumer. In the absence of decisions providing a clue to the rules which are likely to develop, the [American Law] Institute has refrained from taking any position as to the possible liability of the seller where the product is expected to, and does, undergo further processing or other substantial change after it leaves his hands and before it reaches those of the ultimate user or consumer. 46 It seems reasonably clear that the mere fact that the product is to undergo processing, or other substantial change, will not in all cases relieve the seller of liability under the rule stated in this Section. If, for example, raw coffee beans are sold to a buyer who roasts and packs them for sale to the ultimate consumer, it cannot be supposed that the seller will be relieved of all liability when the raw beans are contaminated with arsenic, or some other poison. Likewise the seller of an automobile with a defective steering gear which breaks and injures the driver, can scarcely expect to be relieved of the responsibility by reason of the fact that the car is sold to a dealer who is expected to service it, adjust the brakes, mount and inflate the tires, and the like, before it is ready for use. On the other hand, the manufacturer of pig iron, which is capable of a wide variety of uses, is not so likely to be held to strict liability when it turns out to be unsuitable for the child's tricycle into which it is finally made by a remote buyer. The question is essentially one of whether the responsibility for discovery and prevention of the dangerous defect is shifted to the intermediate party who is to make the changes. No doubt there will be some situations, and some defects, as to which the responsibility will be shifted, and others in which it will not. The existing decisions as yet throw no light upon the questions, and the Institute therefore expresses neither approval nor disapproval of the seller's strict liability in such a case. 47 In our view, whether a change is substantial must depend on whether the product's design was defective prior to the change. In particular, a product is not defectively designed just because the danger of the product, as modified after sale, exceeds what consumers would expect. In that circumstance, the modification is substantial. But if before the modification the product's danger exceeded consumer expectations, then the product was defectively designed under Kansas law; whether that defect leads to liability depends upon whether the defect was a proximate cause of the injury at issue. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 15 cmt. b (1998) (treating modification issue as a question of causation); William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 102 (4th ed.1971) (same). 48 On appeal Deere has not argued that the design defects alleged by Plaintiff were not defects. It has argued only that Plaintiff's modifications relieve it of liability. As we analyze the matter, this argument amounts to an argument that the pre-modified design was not a proximate cause of the injury. 49 For the causation issue arising from modification of a product, we have circuit precedent interpreting Kansas law, Burnette v. Dow Chemical Co., 849 F.2d 1269 (10th Cir.1988). The test we applied in that case was reasonable foreseeability. Burnette concerned a products-liability claim involving a chemical storage tank that exploded. The company using the tank had converted it from an atmospheric tank, designed to hold chemicals under certain levels of pressure, to a pressure tank, designed to hold chemicals at a higher pressure. Id. at 1271. Having observed that the accident appeared to be attributable to the changes made to the tank, Burnette stated that the manufacturer could be held liable for a design defect only if it should have foreseen the possibility that this tank would be modified in this way. Id. at 1274. The court concluded that there was essentially no evidence to show that [the manufacturer] should have foreseen the conversion of its atmospheric tank into a pressure tank equipped with a malfunctioning pressure valve or that the tank would be subject to extreme internal pressure. Id. at 1275. Burnette held that the plaintiffs had therefore failed to establish a design-defect claim. 50 Here, Deere contends that it could not reasonably have foreseen the modifications made by [Plaintiff] to add large round bale forks ... [to] the bucket of the loader when large round bales were either not invented or not widely known. Aple. Br. at 45. The tractor was sold in 1964 and the loader was sold in 1972. Large round bales did not begin to be used until late 1972 or early 1973. 51 Plaintiff responds by calling Deere's foreseeability analysis myopic, Aplt. Reply Br. at 18, because Deere focuses only on whether the particular object that fell onto Plaintiff was in use at the time the front-end loader was sold. He asserts that in promoting its tractors and loaders, Deere has emphasized the versatility of the equipment and the variety of items that can be carried. He points to a 1957 brochure for a front-end loader that said: Though the principal purpose of the manure loader is to handle manure, it can oftentimes be used for a variety of other jobs. It saves the farmer the hard work of lifting on many other jobs ... moving hog houses, fencing, feed bunks, sacked feed, bales, rocks, logs, and any other materials which do not overload the tractor or loader. Furthermore, the loader is quickly adapted for other jobs as well, simply by replacing or adapting the bucket. 52 App., Vol. II, at 463-64. Plaintiff takes the position that Deere could reasonably foresee that users would put front-end loaders to a broad range of uses and that farmers might adapt the equipment to facilitate carrying different types of materials. 53 On the record before us, we believe that foreseeability is a fact issue for the jury. Although Deere could not have anticipated large round bales, it may have reasonably been able to foresee analogous uses of the equipment. Accordingly, we reverse summary judgment on Plaintiff's design-defect claims.