Opinion ID: 204669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Vallar's Motions for Judgment of Acquittal and for a New Trial

Text: Vallar argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal and a new trial on the theory that there was insufficient evidence to find that he had a conspiratorial relationship with Iniguez, as opposed to merely a buyer-seller relationship. We review de novo a district court's denial of a motion for acquittal, United States v. Fassnacht, 332 F.3d 440, 447 (7th Cir.2003), and we review the district court's denial of a new trial for abuse of discretion, United States v. Kosth, 257 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir.2001). When evaluating a sufficiency of the evidence claim, [w]e consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, making all reasonable inferences in its favor, and affirm the conviction so long as any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant to have committed the essential elements of the crime. United States v. Paneras, 222 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Masten, 170 F.3d 790, 794 (7th Cir. 1999)). Only if, from this vantage point, the record contains no evidence from which the jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, is reversal appropriate. Kosth, 257 F.3d at 718. Proving that no such evidence exists presents a nearly insurmountable hurdle to the defendant. Fassnacht, 332 F.3d at 447 (quoting United States v. Hach, 162 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir.1998)). To convict a defendant of conspiracy, the government must prove that (1) two or more people agreed to commit an unlawful act, and (2) the defendant knowingly and intentionally joined in the agreement. United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir.2010). Attaining a conviction for conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the relevant charge on appeal, requires proving that the defendant knowingly agreedeither implicitly or explicitlywith someone else to distribute drugs. Id. But when the alleged coconspirators are in a buyer-seller relationship, we have cautioned against conflating the underlying buy-sell agreement with the drug-distribution agreement that is alleged to form the basis of the charged conspiracy. To support a conspiracy conviction, there must be sufficient evidence of an agreement to commit a crime other than the crime that consists of the sale itself. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, to prove a conspiracy, the government must offer evidence establishing an agreement to distribute drugs that is distinct from evidence of the agreement to complete the underlying drug deals. Id. at 755. Merely providing evidence that a buyer and seller traded in large quantities of drugs, used standardized transactions, and had a prolonged relationship, without more, is inadequate to prove a conspiracy. Id. Otherwise, the law would make any `wholesale customer of a conspiracy . . . a co-conspirator per se.' Id. (quoting United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir.2008)). The following are examples of evidence that would distinguish a conspiracy from a nonconspiratorial buyer-seller relationship: [S]ales on credit or consignment, an agreement to look for other customers, a payment of commission on sales, an indication that one party advised the other on the conduct of the other's business, or an agreement to warn of future threats to each other's business stemming from competitors or law-enforcement authorities. Id. at 755-56. Importantly, not all credit sales can support an inference that there was an agreement to distribute. Id. at 756 n. 5. We have explained that a supplier who extends credit to an individual who purchases a small quantity of drugs for personal consumption does not create a conspiracy. Id. But when a credit sale is coupled with certain characteristics inherent in an ongoing wholesale buyer-seller relationshipi.e., large quantities of drugs, repeat purchases or some other enduring arrangementthe credit sale becomes sufficient evidence to distinguish a conspiracy from a nonconspiratorial buyer-seller relationship. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Once the government has offered some distinguishing evidence, the jury may rely on [the following] factors . . . to buttress an inference that there was an agreement to distribute drugs: whether the transactions involved large quantities of crack . . . whether the parties had a standardized way of doing business over time . . . whether the parties had a continuing relationship. . . whether the seller had a financial stake in a resale to the buyer; and. . . whether the parties had an understanding that the drugs would be resold. Id. at 758. Vallar argues that the government's evidence established a buyer-seller relationship between Vallar and Iniguez, but not a conspiracy. He claims that the district court erred by characterizing two kilograms attributed to him as a large quantity. He also argues that he had no long-term agreement with Iniguez to deal drugs. Although Vallar knew Iniguez for at least ten years, he claims that wiretaps presented at trial demonstrated that they were involved in drug dealing together for a period of less than two months. Vallar concedes that there was evidence at trial that he purchased drugs from Iniguez on credit. But he attempts to minimize this by arguing that Iniguez trusted Vallar due to their friendship, and that the government failed to prove that the friendship was of a business nature. Vallar also concedes that the evidence may indicate that he and Iniguez had a standardized way of doing business. We reject Vallar's argument. It is undisputed that he purchased drugs on credit from Iniguez. Our review of the record indicates that these purchases occurred on at least two and likely three occasions. This distinguishes the conspiracy from a buyer-seller relationship. See id. at 755-56, 758. There is also evidence indicating that Vallar would not pay Iniguez until Vallar resold the drugs. Despite Vallar's argument that his relationship with Iniguez renders the sales on credit less meaningful, it is well-settled that repeated sales on credit, coupled with the fact that Vallar and Iniguez had a standardized way of doing business and evidence that Vallar would not pay Iniguez until he resold the drugs, permits the inference that Vallar conspired with Iniguez. See, e.g., id. at 756 n. 5; United States v. Rock, 370 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir.2004). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we affirm the judgment of the district court.