Opinion ID: 3065761
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Interact

Text: DFEH appeals the district court’s conclusion that Lucent’s interaction with Carauddo was sufficient under California law. Lucent III, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98960, at -40. For the following reasons, we agree with the district court. [12] Under the FEHA,14 “[i]t is an unlawful employment practice . . . [f]or an employer . . . to fail to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee . . . to deter13 Although Carauddo’s only substantive claim on appeal is his common law claim of wrongful termination, we will consider the substance of his arguments regarding the FEHA, as his wrongful termination claim is entirely reliant on a finding of discrimination under the FEHA. See Lucent III, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98960, at -42. 14 “[F]ederal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.” Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Because of the similarity between state and federal employment discrimination laws, California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying [its] own statutes.” Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1113 (Cal. 2000). Nevertheless, “because FEHA provides protections independent from those in the [ADA] and afford[s] additional protections [than thereof, the ADA] . . . state law will part ways with federal law in order to advance the legislative goal of providing greater protection to employees than the ADA.” Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 874, 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 5370 DFEH v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES mine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee . . . with a known physical or mental disability.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(n). “[T]he interactive process requires communication and good-faith exploration of possible accommodations between employers and individual employees with the goal of identify[ing] an accommodation that allows the employee to perform the job effectively.” Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 219 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). [13] During Carauddo’s disability period, he was in contact with at least two Lucent employees, Utermahlen and his immediate supervisor, Claudine Strange, yet failed to bring to Lucent’s attention any possible accommodations that it had not considered. Any failure to interact adequately, therefore, was caused by Carauddo and, as a result, Lucent cannot be held liable. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[C]ourts should attempt to isolate the cause of the breakdown [in the interactive process] and then assign responsibility so that liability . . . ensues only where the employer bears responsibility for the breakdown.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), rev’d on other grounds, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). Thus, this undisputed evidence fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to DFEH’s failure to interact claim.15 15 Although Carauddo did not participate in any of Lucent’s internal conversation regarding available accommodation, this does not render Lucent in violation of the FEHA, as Carauddo never expressed a desire to return to work with accommodation. See Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1115. Furthermore, the law affords employers the ability to have some internal discussion. See id. (“The interactive process requires that employers analyze job functions to establish the essential and nonessential job tasks.”). DFEH v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES 5371