Opinion ID: 776355
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bailey Issue

Text: 8 Johnson contends that his section 924(c) conviction for using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence should be vacated because the jury instruction allowed the jury to reach a verdict of guilt if it found merely that a firearm was available to aid in the commission of the bank robbery. Ten months after Johnson's conviction, but several weeks before his sentencing, the Supreme Court decided Bailey, 516 U.S. at 143, 116 S.Ct. 501, holding that the mere availability of a firearm at a crime scene was an insufficient basis upon which to convict a defendant. Bailey held that evidence of more active conduct, such as brandishing or displaying the firearm, is required for a conviction under the statute. Id. at 148, 116 S.Ct. 501. Johnson argues his conviction should be reversed because the jury instruction was improper. 9 The government and the district court concede that the jury instruction used for Johnson's trial did not satisfy Bailey 's requirements. However, Johnson did not raise this argument at sentencing or on direct appeal, which means he procedurally defaulted on the Bailey issue. See Swedzinski v. United States, 160 F.3d 498, 500 (8th Cir.1998). In order to obtain collateral review of a procedurally defaulted issue, Johnson must show either cause and actual prejudice, or that he is actually innocent. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) (citations omitted). 10 Leaving aside the issue of cause, it is clear that Johnson was not actually prejudiced by the failure to give the jury an instruction in accordance with Bailey. To establish actual prejudice, Johnson must show that the erroneous jury instruction worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1981). Johnson must also show a substantial likelihood that a properly instructed jury would have acquitted him of violating section 924(c). See id. at 172. There is not a substantial likelihood that a properly instructed jury would have acquitted Johnson of violating section 924(c). Bailey defined use of a firearm to include only those instances whereby the defendant actively employs a firearm, which includes brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and, most obviously, firing or attempting to fire a firearm. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 148, 116 S.Ct. 501. Under this definition, `the silent but obvious and forceful presence of a gun on a table can be a use,' and `a reference to a [hidden] firearm calculated to bring about a change in the circumstances of the predicate offense' can be a use. McNeal v. United States, 249 F.3d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bailey, 516 U.S. at 148, 116 S.Ct. 501) (alterations in original). 11 The record is clear that Johnson used a firearm in a manner consistent with Bailey 's definition of the term. The bank teller testified that she saw the butt of a gun in Johnson's bag. She further testified that after he told her to put the money in the bag he reached in like he was holding the gun in my direction and he had his hand in the bag with the gun. It is clear from this undisputed testimony that Johnson not only displayed a gun, he used the gun in an effort to get the teller to comply with his demand to give him the money. Johnson's use of the weapon fits squarely within Bailey 's definition of displaying a firearm, as well as using the firearm to bring about a change in the circumstances of the predicate offense. 2 Bailey, 516 U.S. at 148, 116 S.Ct. 501. 12 For similar reasons, Johnson cannot establish that he was actually innocent of the section 924(c) offense. To establish actual innocence, petitioner must demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623, 118 S.Ct. 1604 (internal citations and quotations omitted). This is a strict standard; generally, a petitioner cannot show actual innocence where the evidence is sufficient to support a section 924(c) conviction. McNeal 249 F.3d at 749-50 (citing United States v. Sorrells, 145 F.3d 744, 751 (5th Cir.1998)). The evidence at Johnson's trial was clearly sufficient to support a section 924(c) conviction, even under Bailey 's more restricted definition of use. Given the unrebutted testimony of the bank teller, we find that Johnson cannot demonstrate that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him of the section 924(c) offense if given the proper instruction.