Opinion ID: 1351145
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Sanctions for the loss of vaginal swabs

Text: As noted above, the prosecution produced evidence that a pathologist found semen in Rhoda Scheffler's vagina and on her panties, and that the semen samples were of a type A antigen of the AOB system, from a positive secreter such as defendant (and unlike Scheffler's husband). This evidence, together with other testimony, tended to show that defendant raped and killed Scheffler. After the prosecution expert testified to the above, defendant moved under People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal.3d 641 [117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 527 P.2d 361] to dismiss the case against him because one of the two samples  the vaginal swab  had been completely used, and was not available for testing by defendant's expert. (See People v. Nation (1980) 26 Cal.3d 169, 177 [161 Cal. Rptr. 299, 604 P.2d 1051] [police duty to preserve semen samples].) He conceded the sample on the panties was available for testing, but maintained that only the vaginal swab would allow his experts to conduct accurately a PGM test to help determine the donor, or a Peptase A test, to determine whether the donor was Black or White. The trial court took testimony on the issue. The prosecution's expert testified that he had not conducted PGM or Peptase A testing on the body when it was discovered in 1978 because (i) the swab sample was a mixed sample of sperm and vaginal secretions, (ii) there was a putrefaction problem (because of decomposition of the body) and (iii) given these factors, and the state of the art and the laboratory's experience and abilities at the time with such tests, he would have had no confidence in the tests, and so did not attempt them. The trial court found the prosecution expert had used the sample for purposes of conducting his tests, and the destruction of the swab was not malicious. It also found the evidence cumulative because defendant was still able to test the semen sample from Scheffler's panties, although he could not successfully conduct a PGM or Peptase A test on that sample, because it was by then four years old and had not been frozen. The court ruled defendant would be allowed to introduce into evidence the fact that the defense was unable to independently test the vaginal samples. (32a) Defendant asserts the court erred in failing to grant his motion to dismiss, or to impose more severe sanctions, such as instructing the jury that (i) the swab, which as noted above had not been tested for PGM, in fact revealed PGM activity that matched neither the victim nor defendant, or (ii) the donor of the semen was not the same race as defendant. (33) As we held in People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1234 [255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047], Hitch's articulation of the prosecution's duty to preserve (see 12 Cal.3d at pp. 649, 652-653) was superseded by California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479 [81 L.Ed.2d 413, 104 S.Ct. 2528], in which the high court established the following standard: Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality [citation], evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. ( Id., at pp. 488-489 [81 L.Ed.2d at p. 422], fn. omitted.) (32b) We conclude defendant's objection was not timely, and thus he may not press it now. People v. Taylor (1977) 67 Cal. App.3d 403 [136 Cal. Rptr. 640] and People v. Mayorga (1985) 171 Cal. App.3d 929 [218 Cal. Rptr. 830], involved similar delayed objections to the prosecution's destruction of evidence. The Taylor court stated, once the evidence which a successful assertion of a Hitch issue would suppress, has been received without objection, it is too late (67 Cal. App.3d at p. 409) and concluded, defendant would have been entitled to no more than suppression of police testimony which might have been contradicted [by the lost evidence]. The testimony, however, was received entirely without objection. Thus defendant waived any Hitch claim he might have had. ( Id., at p. 410.) Mayorga, supra, 171 Cal. App.3d 929, followed Taylor, supra, and held a defendant may not use a new trial motion to raise a Hitch claim for the first time. (171 Cal. App.3d at pp. 939-941.) Mayorga stated there are three methods by which a Hitch motion may be brought and preserved for appeal: (i)  the most preferable method  by motion before trial; (ii) by objection to the admission of evidence at trial; and (iii)  the least preferred method  by motion to strike testimony. ( Id., at pp. 938-939.) Because defendant waited until after the expert testified and the prosecution rested on rebuttal, it was obviously too late for the court to suppress the testimony. We conclude the issue is waived. In any event, the record establishes defendant was still able to test the semen sample on the panties, and there is evidence that his own expert felt that sample would be more useful to defendant's case than the vaginal swab sample, because decomposition of the body made the swab untrustworthy. Under these circumstances defendant cannot establish the second element of the Trombetta test, i.e., inability to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. ( California v. Trombetta, supra, 464 U.S. at p. 489 [81 L.Ed.2d at p. 422].) We would thus reject the claim on its merits.