Opinion ID: 2007185
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: constitutionality of classifying marijuana as a schedule i drug

Text: Ennis' final contention is that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss on the basis that classifying marijuana in Schedule I of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, Chapter 19-03.1, N.D.C.C., violates his Fifth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process. Defendant's constitutional challenge is premised on the theory that, pursuant to statutory definition, it is permissible to classify marijuana as a Schedule I drug only if it has [a] high potential for abuse and has no accepted medical use ... or lacks accepted safety for use in treatment .... [6] Specifically, Ennis asserts that classifying marijuana as a Schedule I drug is arbitrary and irrational as the classification no longer bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest because: (1) governmental studies conducted subsequent to the enactment of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act reveal that marijuana does not have a high potential for abuse; and, (2) marijuana is currently used safely in the treatment of cancer and glaucoma. Ennis relies upon case authority which stands for the proposition that: the constitutionality of a statute predicated upon a particular state of facts may be challenged by a showing to the court that those facts have ceased to exist. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153, 58 S.Ct. 778, 784, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938). Recent studies may have dispelled the myths that marijuana is an addictive narcotic and generally a stepping-stone to more serious drugs. [7] See, Nat. Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Bell, 488 F.Supp. 123, 129 (1980). However, as the United States District Court said in Nat. Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Bell : Studies indicate that marijuana may impair the circulatory, the endocrine, and the immunity systems of the body, alter chromosomes and change cell metabolism. [8] 488 F.Supp. at 136. Furthermore, a recent bulletin from the United States Department of Justice reveals that a fourth of all burglaries and roughly a fifth each of all robberies and all drug offenses were committed under the influence of marijuana. Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Prisoners and Drugs (March 1983). Thus, without attempting to restate all the arguments pro and con on this subject, we conclude, based on the record before us and our research, that the experts strongly disagree as to whether or not marijuana has [a] high potential for abuse. Furthermore, we do not believe that the questions of whether or not marijuana has no accepted medical use ... or lacks accepted safety for the use in treatment can be resolved by the simple fact that some states may now be experimenting with the use of marijuana as a prescriptive drug under very limited circumstances. See, State v. Whitney, 96 Wash.2d 578, 637 P.2d 956 (1981). [9] In Carolene Products Co., the United States Supreme Court unequivocally said that when a court is asked to review the judgment of a legislative body, it should exercise a policy of judicial restraint: [I]nquiries, where the legislative judgment is drawn in question, must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for [the classification]. Here the demurrer challenges the validity of the statute on its face and it is evident from all the considerations presented to Congress, and those of which we may take judicial notice, that the question is at least debatable.... As that decision was for Congress, neither the findings of a court arrived at by weighing the evidence, nor the verdict of a jury can be substituted for it. 304 U.S. at 154, 58 S.Ct. at 784-85. Our court has on prior occasion recognized and followed this policy of judicial restraint: This court will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body which has the primary duty and responsibility of determining a question where the question is fairly debatable. State v. Boushee, 284 N.W.2d 423, 432 (N.D.1979). Accordingly, because the issue of whether or not marijuana is properly classified as a Schedule I drug is fairly debatable, we will not usurp the legislature's factfinding function. In essence, we conclude as did the three United States District Judges in Nat. Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Bell , that [t]he continuing questions about marijuana and its effects make the classification rational. [10] 488 F.Supp., supra at 136. Finally, pursuant to Section 19-03.1-02, N.D.C.C., [11] the North Dakota State Laboratories Department has the authority to reclassify marijuana. This statutory provision provides a sensible mechanism for ... dealing with a field in which factual claims are conflicting and the state of scientific knowledge is still growing. United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 357 (2d Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 831, 94 S.Ct. 165, 38 L.Ed.2d 65 (1973). As the Second Circuit further stated in Kiffer : ... [T]he very existence of the statutory scheme indicates that, in dealing with this aspect of the `drug' problem, Congress intended flexibility and receptivity to the latest scientific information to be the hallmarks of its approach. This ... is the very antithesis of the irrationality appellants attribute to Congress. 477 F.2d, supra at 357. Incidentally, a reasonable argument can be made and has been made that the statutory criteria asserted by Ennis are not intended to be exclusive. [12] We conclude that it cannot reasonably be said that classifying marijuana as a Schedule I drug bears no rational relationship to the legitimate State interest of controlling drug abuse. Boushee, supra, 284 N.W.2d at 432. In accordance with the foregoing opinion, we reverse Ennis' conviction for possessing marijuana with the intent to deliver and affirm the remaining four convictions. VANDE WALLE, PEDERSON and PAULSON, JJ., concur.