Opinion ID: 1810383
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether starns's fifth amendment right was violated by admitting secretly recorded statements made by starns to investigator bill east.

Text: ¶ 8. Starns's first assignment of error centers around two conversations with investigator East, which she alleges were recorded in violation of her Fifth Amendment rights. She argues that East secretly recorded the conversations in an attempt to elicit incriminating information that East could use to build a case against her. Further, Starns argues that she was misled by East when he told her he was sent by his boss to talk to [her] and see what happened on that night and maybe put some closure to this thing. Starns also alleges that she was told that she was not a suspect. East testified that Starns was the target of his investigation at the time the two conversations took place. ¶ 9. Starns relies on Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976), for the proposition that a person who is the target of an investigation must be informed of his or her Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination. In Beckwith, an IRS criminal tax fraud case, the target of the investigation claimed that his conversation with IRS agents led to him incriminate himself, and because he was the focus of that investigation, Miranda warnings should have been given. The United States Supreme Court, however, declined to extend Miranda to non-custodial investigations, and thus Starns's reliance on Beckwith is misplaced. ¶ 10. Starns also relies on Hunt v. State, 687 So.2d 1154, 1159 (Miss.1996), in which the defendant voluntarily went to the sheriff's office to file a missing person's report on her husband. The sheriff, noting that the description fit that of a man found dead near Holly Springs, had Hunt identify the body. She identified the body as that of her husband, and she was then asked to repeat the information which she had originally given the sheriff, to an investigator. At that time, the investigator noticed inconsistencies in her story, and she was given her Miranda rights. On appeal, Hunt argued that her Fifth Amendment right to counsel was violated, but this Court held that she voluntarily submitted herself to the sheriff's department and that she properly waived her rights under Miranda. ¶ 11. Starns argues that this Court allowed Hunt's pre- Miranda warning statement because it had been voluntarily given and she was not identified as a suspect. However, Starns's argument is flawed. Although it is true that Hunt was not the target of an investigation nor a suspect in her husband's murder at the time she voluntarily entered the sheriff's department, this Court did not evaluate Hunt's change from a non-suspect to a suspect in determining whether her Fifth Amendment right to counsel was violated. In fact, what this Court considered was whether Hunt was properly given Miranda warnings and whether she was in custody at that time. Id. at 1160. Thus the fact that East told Starns his inquiry was only to put closure to this matter and that she was not a suspect does not change our holding that no violation occurred. There is no doubt that East had decided before he went to interview Starns that she was the primary suspect, the target of his investigation. However, the mere fact that an investigation has focused on a suspect does not trigger the need for Miranda warnings in non-custodial settings. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1144, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984). Starns's Fifth Amendment rights were not violated by admitting her secretly recorded conversations with East.