Opinion ID: 2016122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim.

Text: The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) An act by defendant amounting to extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent on the part of defendant to cause plaintiff severe emotional distress; (3) the defendant's conduct was the cause in-fact of plaintiff's injuries; and (4) the plaintiff suffered an extreme disabling emotional response to defendant's conduct. Groseth, 410 N.W.2d at 169 (emphasis original). In Wangen v. Kuudson, 428 N.W.2d 242 (S.D.1988), we modified the above test and stated: Section 46(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which this court has previously cited with approval provides in part that one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress is subject to liability for such emotional distress.... (Emphasis supplied.) Liability may attach where a defendant engages in reckless conduct, conduct which constitutes a deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress will follow. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment (i). The actions of defendants sufficiently demonstrate a reckless disregard of a high probability that Wangen would suffer emotional distress. Under these circumstances, Wangen was only required to show that defendants intentionally or recklessly acted in a manner which would create an unreasonable risk of harm to him, and that they knew or had reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize that such actions would create the harm that occurred. Id. at 248 (citations omitted); see also, Ruane v. Murray, 380 N.W.2d 362 (S.D. 1986); Ruple v. Brooks, 352 N.W.2d 652 (S.D.1984). In French v. Dell Rapids Community Hosp., 432 N.W.2d 285, 289 (S.D.1988), where we reversed summary judgment for hospital on intentional infliction of emotional distress, we stated: It is for the trial court to determine, in the first instance, whether a defendant's conduct may be reasonably regarded as so extreme and outrageous so as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. When reasonable minds may differ, it is for the jury to determine whether the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability. Id. (citations omitted). Petersen based her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Hospital on the conduct of Karel. She alleged that Karel was extreme, outrageous and unreasonable by: calling her to his office on approximately 10 occasions to discuss the complaints and her absenteeism; confronting her in an abrupt and accusatory manner; refusing to disclose the names of her co-workers who complained; raising the death of her child as a possible explanation for her behavior; encouraging her to disclose her medical problems with her co-workers in hopes of ending strife; sending her to the personnel department regarding the personality conflicts with her co-workers; arranging the September meeting with Chase and others without informing her; and by allowing them to confront her directly with their complaints. Petersen states by affidavit that these conversations were extremely stressful to her, making her very nervous and upset. Hospital urges this Court to use all of Petersen's testimony, including trial testimony, when reviewing the trial court's summary judgment ruling on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. It is true that a party cannot claim a version of the facts more favorable to her claim than her own testimony. Trammell, 473 N.W.2d at 463; Waddell v. Dewey County Bank, 471 N.W.2d 591, 595 n. 3 (S.D.1991); Miller v. Stevens, 63 S.D. 10, 256 N.W. 152, 155 (1934). However, Petersen has not yet testified on emotional distress. In fact, Petersen's trial testimony on wrongful termination was not a part of the record at the time the court ruled on the emotional distress issue. Petersen correctly asserts that this testimony should not be considered when reviewing the trial court's ruling on this issue. In Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812 (1st Cir.1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1100, 106 S.Ct. 879, 88 L.Ed.2d 916 (1986), the First Circuit Court of Appeals refused to consider later trial testimony in reviewing a grant of partial summary judgment, which also occurred approximately one year prior to the trial on the remaining issues. Our review is confined to an examination of the materials before the court at the time the rulings were made. Neither the evidence offered subsequently at the trial nor the verdict is relevant. Id. at 817. See also Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1036 (D.C.Cir. 1988); Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33, 37 (D.C.Cir.1987). Thus, we limit our review to the same evidence that was before the trial court at the time of the ruling. [1] Nothing in the record reflects that Karel was intentionally extreme or outrageous. Hospital argues that everything Petersen alleges as extreme or outrageous was done by Karel in hopes of resolving perceived difficulties within the pharmacy department. However, when viewing the evidence most favorably to Petersen, the failure to warn her as to the nature of the September meeting could be considered reckless, given Karel's knowledge of Petersen's fear of confrontational group meetings. Petersen argues that this and other conduct was intentional and reckless in view of her nature and condition. Where reasonable minds differ, it is for the jury to determine, not the circuit court nor this Court. French, 432 N.W.2d at 289. Therefore, we reverse and remand for trial on this issue.