Opinion ID: 1937305
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standing and waiver

Text: Before proceeding to discuss minimization, several questions of standing and waiver must be addressed. The State has contested the standing of these defendants to challenge this wiretap. According to section 21 of the Wiretap Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-21, only an aggrieved person may raise the issue of minimization. Section 2(k) of the Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2(k), defines an aggrieved person as a person who was a party to any intercepted wire or oral communication or a person against whom the interception was directed. Thus, standing has been denied to persons who were not named as targets in a wiretap order and whose conversations were not intercepted during the course of the wiretap. State v. Barber, 169 N.J. Super. 26, 31-34 (Law Div. 1979); State v. Cocuzza, 123 N.J. Super. 14, 24 (Law Div. 1973). Applying this test to the instant case, we find that Cantania is not an aggrieved person because he was neither named as a target in the wiretap orders nor was he a party to any of the intercepted conversations. He is thus without standing to contest the minimization procedures employed in these wiretaps. The State concedes that Gatto had standing to contest the first wiretap, because he was named as a target in that order. The State argues, however, that Gatto is without standing to contest the second wiretap, and that Elia is without standing to contest either wiretap, because they were party only to incriminating conversations and not to the non-incriminating conversations that arguably should have been minimized. We decline to accept the State's argument and instead hold that any defendant whose incriminating conversations are intercepted during a wiretap has standing to contest the State's failure to minimize its interception of other non-relevant conversations during the same wiretap, even though that defendant was not a party to those other conversations. Our reasons are several. First, the State's position is that every single interception during the wiretap is a separate search and seizure, its validity therefore to be judged independently of the unreasonableness of other interceptions. The conclusion follows that a person who is party to one interception would be barred from contesting another interception that occurred during the same wiretap. We reject that view. To fragment a wiretap into a series of searches and seizures, rather than viewing it as one continuous search and seizure, would allow the State to intercept innocent conversations illegally and then limit its losses by having the result of only those intrusions suppressed, while keeping the results of the other interceptions in evidence. In 1975, the Legislature rejected such a fragmented approach to wiretap law in another context when it addressed the question of what remedy should follow a minimization violation. In State v. Dye, 60 N.J. 518 (1972), we had held that failure by the State to minimize its interception of non-relevant conversations would lead to the suppression of only those conversations, rather than the results of the entire wiretap. 60 N.J. at 539-42. The flaw in this approach was that it would not deter the State from disregarding the minimization provision, because only innocent and non-relevant conversations would be suppressed while the relevant ones would remain admissible. The Legislature responded by amending N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-21 to provide that any minimization violation would result in the suppression of the  entire contents of all ... communications (emphasis supplied). The Legislature concluded that only by avoiding such a fragmented approach to wiretapping such as that espoused by Dye could minimization violations be deterred. See Senate Judiciary Committee Statement to N.J. Senate Bill No. 1417 (1975), sec. 13. That logic is applicable here. In keeping with this legislative desire for a unitary, rather than a fragmented, approach to wiretapping, we conclude that a defendant who was party to at least one conversation, innocent or incriminating, during the course of a wiretap has standing to suppress the entire wiretap results because of the State's failure to minimize its interception of any conversations during the course of that wiretap. Second, a rule which restricted standing to those who were party only to innocent phone conversations would diminish the likelihood that many of the State's minimization procedures would ever be challenged and brought under court scrutiny. Many of the parties to non-incriminating conversations are innocent callers who are not themselves defendants; they cannot bring a pretrial motion to suppress for failure to minimize. Indeed, they may never know their call was tapped. The only persons left to challenge the State's minimization are the defendants themselves, and many of them were party only to incriminating conversations. If they do not have standing to raise the minimization issue, few persons will be left to raise it. Consequently, the minimization procedures employed by the State would completely escape judicial scrutiny in many cases. It would have little motivation to comply with its minimization obligations. We do not believe that the Legislature intended this result. We therefore conclude that both Gatto and Elia have standing to contest the minimization procedures employed by the State during both of these wiretaps. The State has further contended that Gatto and Elia waived their right to raise the issue of minimization by failing to make their suppression motion at least ten days prior to trial, as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-21. That section requires all suppression motions for failure to minimize to be made at least ten days prior to trial unless there was no opportunity to make the motion or the moving party was not aware of the grounds for the motion. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-21. Gatto and Elia gave several reasons at trial why they had not moved earlier to suppress for failure to minimize, and the trial judge assured them that their objection was properly made and that they were protected for the record. We conclude from these remarks that he found their delay in raising the objection excusable under N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-21. Because we find that there was no minimization violation, we need not pass on the correctness of the trial court's ruling. We take this opportunity, however, to admonish that the ten-day deadline must be adhered to and the exemption given by statute is to be granted sparingly. We now proceed to consider the challenge to minimization brought by Gatto and Elia.