Opinion ID: 2599628
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the Motion an Offer?

Text: The district contends that the school board did not make an offer when it passed the April 2 motion. Rather, it argues, the school board was instructing the superintendent and the superintendent's staff to make an offer. Thus, there could have been no offer subject to acceptance until the administrative staff communicated one to the teachers. The teachers contend, and the superior court held, that the April 2 motion was an offer, made in accordance with the power and practice of the school board. Was the motion an offer, or did it merely authorize district administrators to make an offer?
Restatement (Second) of Contracts sections 24 and 26 (1981) delimit what can be considered an offer. Section 24 defines an offer as the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it. [7] Section 26 informs us that [a] manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not an offer if the person to whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know that the person making it does not intend to conclude a bargain until he has made a further manifestation of assent. [8] Two factors are relevant: the language of the motion, and the teachers' understanding of the board-administration relationship. According to one leading municipal corporations treatise, the language of a motion has the following contractual significance: [A]n ordinance granting a right, accepted and acted upon by the grantee, becomes an irrevocable contract. But an ordinance or resolution authorizing the mayor, or other officers[,] to enter into a contract does not of itself create a contract, if not acted upon. [9] The Oregon Supreme Court quoted this language in Winklebleck v. City of Portland. [10] That case illuminates the issues presented here. The city condemned Winklebleck's property in order to extend a road; Winklebleck learned from city officials that the city needed only some of his property. [11] He lobbied for return of the rest of his property, and the city council passed a motion directing the city auditor to return the disputed land if Winklebleck filed a release. [12] The motion stated that upon the execution and filing of such document with the City Auditor [the property] shall be released. [13] The city then realized that it had erred, and a city attorney told Winklebleck's attorney that Winklebleck could not reclaim the land. [14] The council repealed its earlier ordinance, but before it did so, Winklebleck accepted the offer and delivered a declaration of compliance with the requirements of the ordinance; he apparently also delivered a release. [15] The court reasoned that the ordinance did not contemplate that the auditor and the plaintiff should execute some contract before the language could be closed ... but that the lot owner should demonstrate his right to secure [the land] by waiving the privilege of an appeal, and taking other actions commensurate with ownership. [16] The court held that the ordinance was a valid offer, and that because Winklebleck had accepted the offer, he was entitled to his land. [17] The Winklebleck court held a motion fairly capable of construction as an offer to be an offer. [18] But even if a motion is fairly capable of being construed as an offer, the issue is not conclusively resolved. For example, if a person had a history of dealings with a municipality, and had reason to know that the municipality did not intend to make an offer (whatever the language of its ordinance), a court should apply Restatement section 26, and should not treat the ordinance as an offer. [19] Accordingly, when a board motion is expressed in terms of a delegation, it should be considered a delegation and not an offer; but when it is couched in terms of an offer, further inquiry may be required. When there is a continuing relationship like the employment relationship here, the language of the motion must be considered in context of the contracting parties' relations. [20] The commentary to Restatement section 26 includes language to this effect: If the addressee of a proposal has reason to know that no offer is intended, there is no offer even though he understands it to be an offer. Reason to know depends not only on the words or other conduct, but also on the circumstances, including previous communications of the parties and the usages of their community or line of business. [21] One writer notes: That the alleged offeree has reason to know that no offer has been made depends not solely on the words used but also on the circumstances surrounding the communication. Thus, if the parties have dealt with one another before ... or if the custom in a particular location or trade suggests that an offer is intended ... an offer will be found. [22] This leaves us with the following process. First, courts must look to the language of the motion. If the motion is not expressed in terms of an offer, there is no offer. If the motion is expressed in terms of an offer, courts must look to the underlying context. If the context suggests that the legislative body normally acts as an offeror, there is a valid offer. But if the context suggests that the legislative body normally delegates the role of making the offer, a presumption arises that the motion is not an offer, but a delegation of power to make an offer. For a motion to be an offer, then, its language must be clear enough to overcome this presumption. This approach answers the district's public policy argument that it should not automatically be bound every time its board passes a motion. The school board can prevent itself from being bound merely by incorporating into its motions appropriate delegation language, such as the board delegates the authority to carry out specific tasks. We deal below with the other part of the district's public policy questionwhat happens when a school board makes a mistake and the district's administrators realize it.
The language of the motion suggests that the motion was itself an offer. The motion's relevant language reads:  MOTION by Turner and seconded by Kimball to offer a retirement incentive.... The employee must notify the District by April 30, 1996 if they plan to participate. The district nearly concedes this point, noting that whether the motion was an offer turns on whether under the circumstances the Plaintiffs were justified in viewing it as one. Assessing the underlying context of the offer implicates three circumstances: (1) whether and how the offer was conveyed to the teachers; (2) the official structure of the school district; and (3) the history of past dealings. Restatement section 26 is concerned with the state of mind of the recipient of the offer. It asks whether the person to whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know that the person making it does not intend for it to be considered an offer. [23] The district asserts that it was not reasonable to view the motion as an offer. The district contends that the offer was not conveyed to the teachers, although it concedes that those persons attending the meeting, hearing of the meeting, or in possession of the minutes could be said to have received the `offer.' The teachers do not argue that the district conveyed the offer more clearly after the board passed the motion. They contend that at least one of them attended the April 2 school board meeting and heard the board pass the motion, but it is not clear from the record how many of the six teachers were present. The conveyance circumstance slightly favors the district. By publicizing the meeting's agenda in advance, the district might be said to have taken extra steps to convey the offer. But there are other valid reasons the district might have publicized the agenda (e.g., to promote public comment) without intending to convey an offer by passing a motion. And while an offer was not directly conveyed to the teachers merely because the school board passed the motion at a public meeting, it was indisputably made public knowledge. The second circumstance here is the structure of authority in the school system. For purposes of this case, that structure is determined by Alaska statute and board bylaws and manuals. Alaska Statute 14.14.090 contains an incomplete list of school board duties. It empowers school boards, among other things, to set total compensation levels: In addition to other duties, a school board shall ... determine and disburse the total amount to be made available for compensation of all school employees and administrative officers.... [24] The statute governing district bylaws provides that school board policies relating to management and control of the district shall be expressed in written bylaws adopted at board meetings. [25] Alaska Statute 14.14.130 creates the position of the chief school administrator. [26] It empowers the administrator to administer the district, and to control school personnel decisions: (b) [T]he [chief school] administrator shall administer the district in accordance with the policies that the school board prescribes by bylaw. (c) [T]he [chief school] administrator shall select, appoint, and otherwise control all school district employees that serve under the chief school administrator subject to the approval of the school board. [27] The Copper River School District policy manual states that the Board has exclusive responsibility for all school policy. The Superintendent shall have the responsibility for executing the policy of the Board.... The manual also states that the Superintendent is the chief executive officer of the school system and has, under the direction of the Board, general supervision of all of the public schools and of all the personnel ... of the school system. The Superintendent is responsible for management of the schools under the Board's policies, and is accountable to the Board. These provisions support the general conclusion that the superintendent is charged with carrying out the district's executive functions, while the school board acts as a legislative policymaker. Under this scheme, board actions are more likely delegations than offers. This circumstance strongly supports the district. The third circumstance concerns past dealings. There is some dispute about whether teachers had previously negotiated personnel issues with the superintendent and administrators, or with the school board itself. The teachers offered inconclusive affidavits, in which they affied that they had dealt directly with the school district. But these assertions do not explain whether the negotiations were with the school board or with the district's administrators. While there is some evidence that the teachers negotiated with the administrators, the evidence cited by both sides on this point is meager, particularly considering the importance of this issue. In sum, it is unclear to what extent the school board normally delegates executive and negotiating authority to district administrators. If it has been standard practice to require the administrators to take executive action in order for the district to enter into contracts, a statement by the board should be considered a direct offer only if it clearly and specifically rejects or suspends that pattern of action. In this case, the motion to offer the retirement incentive was not accompanied by any such extraordinary language. Ultimately, the relationship between the board, the administrators, and the teachers here is a fact question for the fact finder. Each side cross-moved for complete summary judgment. Each side thus certified that no genuine, material fact disputes precluded favorable summary judgment. Although neither side asserted that genuine fact disputes required denial of the other side's motion, each side advanced an account of the parties' past dealings that was irreconcilable with the other side's account. Under these circumstances, summary judgment was inappropriate because material questions of fact exist as to whether the context of the April 2 motion made it unreasonable for the teachers to consider it an offer. We remand to determine whether there was an offer within the meaning of Restatement sections 24 and 26.