Opinion ID: 1829968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Witherspoon, With a Twist

Text: Hansen argues that the Circuit Court erred when it refused his lawyer's request for voir dire examination of two prospective jurors who had stated their opposition to the death penalty. The issue implicates the familiar rule of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), and progeny, but with a twist. Today's question is not so much whether the Circuit Court erroneously excluded jurors who in law were competent and eligible to serve but whether, procedurally, the Circuit Court had authority to exclude the jurors without allowing defense counsel the opportunity to question them. What happened is this: THE COURT (addressing the entire panel): Do any of you have any conscientious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty when the law authorizes it and allows it as it does in this case, and the facts of the case justify it? Three jurors responded they did. The responses of the two jurors here at issue are as follows: MS. HULITT: Yes, sir. I'm also a nurse, and I don't think I could vote to put someone to death. THE COURT: Are you opposed to the death penalty? MS. HULITT: Yes, sir. ..... THE COURT: Could you set aside  do you think you could set aside those convictions and nonetheless try the case and, if necessary, based upon the facts and the law vote to impose a death sentence? MS. HULITT: No, sir. THE COURT: Under no circumstances? MS. HULITT: If I had to vote for the death penalty, I couldn't. THE COURT: Okay? MS. HULITT: No, sir. ..... THE COURT: Okay. Miss Hulitt, the same question: Are you telling me that you would automatically vote against the death penalty? MS. HULITT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Under any circumstances? MS. HULITT: Yes, sir.       MS. NICHOLS: Sir, I'm just  I'm opposed  I'm against taking somebody else's life. I just couldn't sleep at night or deal with it. THE COURT: Under no circumstances? MS. NICHOLS: Under no circumstance. I'm too scared. THE COURT: At all? MS. NICHOLS: At all. THE COURT: Are you telling me, Miss Nichols, that if you were, in fact, selected to sit on the case and the jury reached a guilty verdict, that you would automatically vote against the death penalty? MS. NICHOLS: Yes, sir, because I'm against the taking of somebody else's life. Following these colloquys, the Circuit Court ordered jurors Nichols and Hulitt excused. Defense counsel immediately spoke up: We would ask an opportunity to voir dire them. The Circuit Court denied the request and finally discharged the jurors. Several of Witherspoon's substantive parameters need be noted. For one thing, exclusion is permissible though the juror's opposition is less than unequivocal, her vote against death less than automatic. The court may exclude the juror where it is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424-25, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852-53, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-52 (1985); Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d at 345. On the other hand, mere personal opposition to capital punishment does not render incompetent a juror who nevertheless states under oath that he or she is temporarily [willing to] set aside ... [his or her] own beliefs in deference to the rule of law. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1766, 90 L.Ed.2d 137, 149-50 (1986). It is in this context that Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45 (Miss. 1985), and other cases have emphasized the importance of voir dire in fully developing a juror's views regarding the death penalty. We have directed that, notwithstanding a prospective juror's scruples, the court should inquire further whether the juror would follow its instructions and a fair verdict render according to the law and the evidence. Gray v. State, 472 So.2d 409, 421 (Miss. 1985), reversed on other grounds, 481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987). Historically, the procedural authority for this inquiry derived in part from Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-69 (1972), which at the time of trial provided: The parties or their attorneys in all jury trials shall have the right to question jurors who are being impaneled with reference to challenges for cause, and for peremptory challenges, and it shall not be necessary to propound the questions through the presiding judge... . [3] We have recognized in Phenizee v. State, 180 Miss. 746, 753-54, 178 So. 579, 581-82 (1938), that this rule means what it says. Of late, we have promulgated procedural rules contemplating voir dire examination by attorneys. See Rule 3.02, Miss.Unif.Cir. Ct. Rules (1979), [4] and Rule 5.02, Miss.Unif. Crim.R.Cir.Ct.Prac. (1979). [5] To be sure, we have directed that the Circuit Court take a substantial role in conducting Witherspoon voir dire of prospective jurors in a capital case, see Gray v. State, 472 So.2d at 421; Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d at 345; Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1317, 1335 (Miss. 1987); Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d at 53-54, but this does not mean counsel have no role. We have considered this issue with some care. There appears no escape from the fact that the Circuit Court erred when it denied counsel's request for voir dire examination of jurors Hulitt and Nichols. See Burns v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297, 1301 (5th Cir.1979), on reh'g, 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc). On the other hand, the answers these two jurors gave are substantially clear, and it appears reasonably certain that each was Witherspoon -excludable. As we may do, we afford a measure of deference on this point to the court that saw and heard these jurors. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 426, 105 S.Ct. at 853, 83 L.Ed.2d at 853; Woodward v. State, 533 So.2d 418, 424 (Miss. 1988). Speculating, but with the aid of a touch of common sense, we regard the likelihood that voir dire examination by defense counsel would have rehabilitated these jurors sufficient to take them out of Witherspoon is, on this record, rather slim. We hold the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that, as such, it does not require reversal. Beyond this, and more substantively, we hold jurors Hulitt and Nichols Witherspoon -excludable. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424-26, 105 S.Ct. at 852-53, 83 L.Ed.2d at 851-53; Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980); Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657, 666-67 (Miss. 1990).