Opinion ID: 2622529
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Lakewood City Council Unlawfully Took Action in Executive Session

Text: The majority asserts the city council took no prohibited action during the December 13 executive session. Majority at 476. This claim is apparently based on the misapprehension that the council's activities behind closed doors did not constitute a vote as the term is used in the Open Public Meetings Act. Majority at 476. Wrong for two reasons: First, by concluding the city council did not vote, the majority impermissibly weighed the truth of petitioners' charges. When reviewing the factual and legal sufficiency of recall petitions, a court shall not consider the truth of the charges. RCW 29.82.023; Chandler, 103 Wash.2d at 274, 693 P.2d 71. We must accept the facts as alleged by the petitioners. Petitioners here allege council member Humphrey, when asked what happened during the December 13 executive session, responded: That vote was in Executive Session. CP at 8 (emphasis added). Mayor Harrison is quoted as suggesting concerned citizens of Lakewood `contact each individual councilmember and ask them how they voted.' Br. of Appellants, App. B at 10 (emphasis added). Accepting these declarations on their face, as we must under RCW 29.82.023, if not their reasonable inferences, the Lakewood City Council indeed voted. Second, regardless of whether or not the city council actually voted, the majority's conclusion the council took no prohibited action is the result of another misreading of the OPMA. Contrary to what the majority suggests, the open meetings requirement does more than merely prohibit voting in executive session; it prohibits all forms of action behind closed doors. See RCW 42.30.030,.020(4). Action includes activities such as discussions, considerations, reviews, [and] evaluations. RCW 42.30.020(3). Whether or not a formal vote took place, there can be no doubt the Lakewood City Council discussed, considered, reviewed, and evaluated, and ultimately decided to join, the I-695 litigation. The council members candidly admit they discussed the pros and cons of challenging I-695 and reviewed potential alternatives. Each council member exchanged his or her individual views on whether the city manager should get the city involved in the litigation, after which agreement, or consensus, was reached between them that the city should indeed intervene in the pending litigation. Both the definition of action and the exception at issue in this proceeding refer to discussions. Compare RCW 42.30.020(3), with RCW 42.30.110(1)(i). All discussions that constitute action must be taken at a public and open meeting. RCW 42.30.030. But a discussion with legal counsel may take place in executive session if having it in public is likely to result in adverse legal or financial consequences. RCW 42.30.110(1)(i). Thus, the question arises: Was the Lakewood City Council's activities behind closed doors a discussion with legal counsel that may properly take place during an executive session, or was it a discussion other than with legal counsel which must take place at an open and public meeting? Answering this question requires us to read the OPMA, chapter 42.30 RCW, in pari materia. In so doing, it becomes apparent any discussion that does not meet the requirements of the executive-session exception expressed in RCW 42.30.110(1)(i) is a discussion to which RCW 42.30.020(3) refers. There is no middle ground. There is no third category of discussion. A discussion either fits within the exception or it does not. If not, it is a discussion to which RCW 42.30.020(3) refers. Such a discussion constitutes action and must take place at an open and public meeting. RCW 42.30.030. This exception only permits a governing body to discuss litigation matters with legal counsel. RCW 42.30.110(1)(i) (emphasis added). It does not permit discussions with anyone other than legal counsel. Nor does it permit secret discussions among the various members of the governing body (simply because they are in the presence of legal counsel), or secret decisions to follow a course of action. See Laws of 2001, ch. 216, § 1. Once any discussion begins among members of the governing body regarding what action is to be taken based upon advice from counsel, the justification for an executive session held pursuant to RCW 42.30.110(1)(i) ends. See City of Prescott v. Town of Chino Valley, 166 Ariz. 480, 803 P.2d 891 (1990); Smith County Educ. Ass'n v. Anderson, 676 S.W.2d 328 (Tenn.1984). Such a discussion is not one with legal counsel, but rather one between different members of the governing body. As such, it falls outside the scope of the exception and into the general definition of action in RCW 42.30.020(3). Here, the Lakewood City Council did not limit its activities to those within the scope of the exception. Behind closed doors the city council members engaged in a discussion in which they individually gave their views on the city manager's proposal to join the I-695 litigation. This discussion eventually resulted in an agreement or consensus to join in. Such is not merely a discussion with legal counsel; it is a discussion with each other resulting in a decision to commit tax resources to defeat I-695. Such activities are not authorized by RCW 42.30.110(1)(i) to take place in executive session. Aside from discussion, action also includes making a decision. RCW 42.30.020(3). In Miller we rejected a claim that an informal vote was exempt from the open meeting requirement of RCW 42.30.030. We held only the [activity] explicitly specified by the exception may take place in executive session. Miller, 138 Wash.2d at 327, 979 P.2d 429. A governing body must take care to strictly limit its conduct in executive session to that authorized by the relevant exception. Id. at 327, 979 P.2d 429; cf. Steele v. Honea, 261 Ga. 644, 409 S.E.2d 652, 654 (1991); St. Cloud Newspapers, Inc. v. District 742 Cmty. Schs., 332 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Minn.1983); Multimedia Publ'g of N.C., Inc. v. Henderson County, 136 N.C.App. 567, 525 S.E.2d 786, 791 (2000). Whether or not the Lakewood City Council formally voted during the December 13 executive session, there is no doubt it took action. As a result of the council's activities behind closed doors, the City of Lakewood became committed to join the I-695 litigation and city resources were diverted to fund the challenge. Cf. Miller, 138 Wash.2d at 336, 979 P.2d 429 (Madsen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (indicating the type of activity during an executive session that is prohibited by the OPMA is one that commits the agency to a course of action). Since this action was taken behind closed doors, it establishes a third prima facie violation of the OPMA, and therefore serves as a third independent basis to require a recall election.