Opinion ID: 3134725
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Richard Jackson’s Sentence and Sentences Imposed in Other Cases

Text: In addition to arguing that his death sentence is excessive based on the evidence presented at the aggravation-mitigation stage of sentencing, defendant contends that a comparison of his sentence to sentences received by Richard Jackson and defendants in other cases demonstrates that the death penalty is inappropriate in defendant’s case. Defendant claims that his death sentence is “grossly disproportionate” to Jackson’s 60-year term of imprisonment. Defendant argues that Jackson’s role in the offenses against Ray and Byrd was equal to, if not more culpable, that defendant’s. Defendant asserts that Jackson “came up with the idea” of using the scissors to stab Ray and Byrd, held them at gun point, and helped throw them into the burning bedroom. In addition, defendant bases his disproportionality argument on Jackson’s criminal record, which includes violent crimes, and Jackson’s poor disciplinary record in prison. In light of this evidence of Jackson’s conduct and his own, good conduct in prison, defendant argues that his death sentence must be vacated and his cause remanded for a sentence other than death to be imposed. While a disparity in the sentences of codefendants does not, in itself, show a violation of fundamental fairness, “[a]rbitrary and unreasonable disparity between the sentences of similarly situated codefendants is impermissible.” People v. Caballero , 179 Ill. 2d 205, 216 (1997). In reviewing the sentences of codefendants, this court considers the following factors: “the nature of the offense, each defendant’s relative involvement or culpability, his character and background, including any criminal record, and his potential for rehabilitation.” Kliner , 185 Ill. 2d at 175-76. Under these factors, we find that defendant’s death sentence is not unreasonably disparate. Defendant’s and Jackson’s criminal backgrounds are comparable. Evidence in the record shows that, prior to his incarceration for the offenses against Ray and Byrd, Jackson was convicted of robbery and unlawful use of a weapon. While in prison in 1981, Jackson stabbed a prison guard and was convicted of aggravated battery and armed violence. Defendant has convictions for grand theft, robbery, and receiving and possessing money stolen from a federal bank. Also, like his brother, defendant has a criminal history involving violent offenses, such as armed robbery and unlawful use of a weapon to commit felonies. Defendant correctly observes that his behavior in prison is better, by far, than his brother’s. Whereas defendant has had essentially no disciplinary problems, Jackson’s prison record from 1980 to 1984 shows that he had repeated disciplinary violations involving violence, including possession of a weapon, attacking prison staff members, and fighting. While their behavior in prison suggests that defendant’s potential for rehabilitation may be greater than that of his brother, this is only one factor we consider in determining whether a defendant’s capital sentence is disproportionate to his codefendant’s sentence. We must also consider the relative culpability of defendant and Jackson in the crimes against Ray and Byrd. We disagree with defendant’s assertion that Jackson’s role in these crimes was equal to or greater than his own. While we do not minimize Jackson’s responsibility for these offenses, we believe that defendant was clearly the more culpable participant in these crimes. Defendant arranged to meet with Ray, defendant initiated the armed robbery by pointing a gun at Ray and Byrd, defendant tied Ray and Byrd with electrical cord, defendant removed items from the apartment, defendant stabbed Ray and Byrd, and defendant set the fire in the bedroom. Jackson assisted defendant in committing the crimes by holding Ray and Byrd at gunpoint, suggesting a weapon for the stabbings, and helping to carry Ray and Byrd into the bedroom, but defendant performed the primary role in the crimes. Based on defendant’s greater involvement and culpability in the crimes, we find his greater sentence was justified. Defendant also argues that a comparison of his sentence to sentences received by defendants in other cases demonstrates that his sentence is excessive. Defendant claims that the circumstances surrounding his offense are much less egregious than those in other cases in which this court has upheld the imposition of the death penalty for murder during the course of an armed robbery. See People v. Munson , 171 Ill. 2d 158 (1996); People v. Ashford , 168 Ill. 2d 494 (1995). In support of his argument that the death penalty is excessive in his case, defendant also relies on other decisions in which this court has vacated the defendants’ death sentences. See People v. Smith , 177 Ill. 2d 53 (1997); People v. Buggs , 112 Ill. 2d 284 (1986); People v. Carlson , 79 Ill. 2d 564 (1980). Although comparative proportionality review is not required by the federal constitution or the Illinois death penalty statute, this court has nevertheless exercised its discretion to address comparative sentencing arguments by defendants in other capital cases. See, e.g. , People v. Palmer , 162 Ill. 2d 465, 491 (1994). In this case, we also choose to consider defendant’s comparison of his sentence to sentences received by defendants in other capital cases. A comparison of the facts of defendant’s case to those in People v. Munson , 171 Ill. 2d 158 (1996), and People v. Ashford , 168 Ill. 2d 494 (1995), however, does not demonstrate that the death penalty was an excessive sentence in defendant’s case. In those cases, as in defendant’s, the death penalty was imposed for murders that occurred in the course of an armed robbery. In Munson , the defendant robbed the victim at gunpoint, kidnapped him, fatally shot the victim because he was afraid the victim would identify him, and then set the victim’s car on fire. Munson , 171 Ill. 2d at 167-73. In Ashford , the defendant fatally shot four individuals during an armed robbery because he did not want to leave any witnesses. Ashford , 168 Ill. 2d at 497-99. According to defendant, unlike Munson and Ashford , his case did not involve a planned, premeditated attack. Thus, defendant asserts, the death penalty is excessive in his case. We cannot agree. There was evidence in the case at bar that defendant did indeed plan the armed robbery of the lounge. If the murders in Munson and Ashford were more horrific than those in defendant’s case, such fact does not demonstrate that the facts of defendant’s case are not, in themselves, sufficiently aggravating to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. As stated, defendant killed Byrd in a ruthless and brutal fashion. We find that defendant’s comparison of his case to Ashford and Munson does not indicate that the death penalty was inappropriate in his case. Defendant’s comparison of his case to Smith , Buggs , and Carlson , also does not demonstrate that his death sentence is excessive. Our decisions to vacate the defendants’ death sentences in those cases were based on mitigating factors that are not present in defendant’s case. See, e.g. , Smith , 177 Ill. 2d at 100-01 (the defendant had no criminal record, the murder was motivated by the defendant’s husband’s affair, and the murder was an isolated incident); Buggs , 112 Ill. 2d at 294-95 (the defendant had no history of criminal activity, the murder was a product of marital disharmony, and the murder was an isolated incident); Carlson , 79 Ill. 2d at 588-90 (the defendant had no criminal record and the murders occurred while the defendant was under an extreme emotional disturbance). Accordingly, these cases fail to show that the death penalty is excessive in defendant’s case. See People v. Thomas , 178 Ill. 2d 215, 249-50 (1997).