Opinion ID: 2127232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of an Extrinsic Offense

Text: Appellant next contests the admission of evidence of an extrinsic offense, the Ohio murder of Tonnie Storey, during the guilt phase of her trial. [2] Evidence of crimes extrinsic to the one for which a defendant is on trial is generally inadmissible in Indiana. Malone v. State (1982), Ind., 441 N.E.2d 1339. Long-recognized exceptions to this rule, however, provide that [e]vidence of other criminal activity may be admissible in certain cases to prove an accused's identity, knowledge, intent or motive, or to demonstrate the common plan or scheme of criminal activity from which the accused originated the charged crime. Id. at 1346. Because such evidence can often be unduly prejudicial, however, exceptions to the rule are to be applied cautiously. Gibbs v. State (1989), Ind., 538 N.E.2d 937; Penley v. State (1987), 506 N.E.2d 806. The parties to this litigation argue the admissibility of the Storey evidence on two recognized exceptions to the extrinsic offense exclusionary rule. One exception allows in evidence of extrinsic crimes shown to be part of a larger preconceived plan that includes the charged offense. Gibbs, 538 N.E.2d at 939; Penley, 506 N.E.2d at 809. The second category allows admission of extrinsic evidence to prove identity by showing the defendant committed other crimes with a similar modus operandi. Penley, 506 N.E.2d at 808-09. Brown argues that evidence of the extrinsic offense admitted at trial falls within neither category of exceptions. Because we find that the uncharged crime satisfies the identity/modus operandi exception to the general rule, we need not address Brown's claim that the State did not prove the charged and uncharged crimes were part of a larger preconceived plan. The use of modus operandi evidence to prove identity requires the State to show that the similarities between the two crimes are so strong and the method so clearly unique that it is highly probable that the perpetrator of both is the same person. Penley, 506 N.E.2d at 809. The mere repetition of similar crimes will not suffice to qualify as an exception to the general rule. Gibbs, 538 N.E.2d at 939; Malone, 441 N.E.2d at 1346. Instead, this Court requires a strong showing that the different criminal actions were so similarly conducted that the method of conduct can be considered akin to the accused's `signature.' Malone, 441 N.E.2d at 1346; Gibbs, 538 N.E.2d at 939. The facts of the Ohio murder and the Gary incident were sufficiently similar to constitute signature crimes. Tonnie Storey, like A.H. and Tamika Turks, was a young black female. Storey was last seen alive in Ohio walking down the street with a man identified as Alton Coleman and a slender woman, lighter in complexion than Coleman, with her hair in braids with beads. Record at 2684-89 (testimony of Yvette Lewis). A.H. had also described the pair she and Tamika walked with in Gary as Alton Coleman and a skinny black female, lighter in complexion than Coleman, with her hair in French braids. Tamika and A.H. were walked a distance away from where they met Brown and Coleman to an isolated area for the attack. The body of Storey was found in a gutted building in a deserted area six blocks from where Storey was last seen. Record at 2698-99 (testimony of Officer Dianne Arnold). Once at the wooded area in Gary, the attackers removed Tamika's pink shirt and Brown cut it into strips of cloth with a knife. Strips were used to bind the hands, legs, and mouths of the children. Record at 2470-71 (testimony of A.H.). Pink cloth pieces were recovered by police in the woods near the body of Tamika. A ripped blue blouse was also found near the shirtless body of Tonnie Storey. Ripped strips of blue fabric, some of them knotted, were found at the scene. These strips of fabric appeared to be the same material as the ripped top. Record at 2731-33. Tamika died of asphyxia by strangulation. She was strangled with an elastic strip of a bedsheet. Storey also died from asphyxia by strangulation. A white sheet and strips of that sheet, some of them possibly knotted, were found at the vacant building. Record at 2734. Also found at the building was a Michael Jackson button with Brown's fingerprint on it; Tamika's Michael Jackson medallion was found near her corpse in Gary. Taken all together, the evidence supports a finding that the Indiana and Ohio crimes are distinctive enough to constitute signature crimes rather than the mere repetition of similar crimes. Brown argues that there was insufficient evidence presented to show that it was she who committed the murder of Tonnie Storey. For evidence of an extrinsic offense to be admissible under the modus operandi exception, the defendant must have committed the extrinsic offense. Gibbs, 538 N.E.2d at 939-40. Circumstantial evidence can suffice to show the defendant committed the extrinsic offense. Gibbs, 538 N.E.2d at 940; Foust v. State (1981), Ind., 428 N.E.2d 776. The evidence outlined above was sufficient to tie Brown to the extrinsic murder. [3] Brown further contends that evidence of the extrinsic offense was not needed to prove identity at her trial. Normally, evidence which is merely cumulative is not grounds for reversal. Sharp v. State (1989), Ind., 534 N.E.2d 708, cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1481, 108 L.Ed.2d 617 (1990). In the case of extrinsic offenses, however, we have held that if identification of an accused can be proved by other evidence or if an accused's identity is not a material issue, then the admission of evidence of other criminal activity is improper to establish identity. Malone, 441 N.E.2d at 1346. Identity was a material issue in this case. Brown argues that the extrinsic offense should not have been admissible because the State had A.H.'s eyewitness testimony, the defendant's oral confession, and some circumstantial evidence to prove identity. The principal direct evidence identifying Brown as the assailant in Gary was Brown's oral confession and A.H.'s testimony. The admissibility of both of these pieces of evidence was strongly contested by the defendant at both the trial and appellate level. Because identity was still at issue, it was proper to admit evidence of the extrinsic offense to establish identity. Brown last charges that the probative value of the extrinsic offense evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial nature. In support of this argument, however, appellant merely restates the proposition that as a general rule evidence of extrinsic offenses is prejudicial and thus not admissible unless within one of the narrow categories of exceptions discussed above. See, e.g., Porter v. State (1979), 272 Ind. 267, 270-71, 397 N.E.2d 269, 272; Brief of Appellant at 82-84. We have already found that the facts presented fall within an admissible exception to the general rule.