Opinion ID: 2629057
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Obligation to Defend a Suit

Text: Ameron contends that Foster-Gardner is not applicable here because the IBCA proceeding was a suit as a reasonable insured would understand the term, in contrast to the pollution remediation order for which the insured sought coverage in Foster-Gardner. Ameron points out that the IBCA is a quasi-judicial administrative agency board, proceedings before which require the filing of notice and a complaint setting forth simple, concise, and direct statements of each claim. (43 C.F.R. § 4.107(a) (2009).) During hearings before the IBCA, parties may subpoena witnesses and introduce evidence; the IBCA swears in witnesses, and party representatives may cross-examine them; and all evidence is subject to the generally accepted [federal] rules of admissibility. In addition, administrative law judges on the IBCA are empowered to grant the same relief that would be available to a litigant asserting a contract claim in the Federal Claims Court. As the United States Supreme Court noted, the role of the administrative law judge within this framework is comparable to that of a trial judge. [The judge] may issue subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence, regulate the course of the hearing, and make or recommend decisions. ( Butz v. Economou (1978) 438 U.S. 478, 513 [57 L.Ed.2d 895, 98 S.Ct. 2894]; see also 5 U.S.C. § 556(c).) Therefore, in order to determine whether proceedings before the IBCA are a suit we must decide if the concerns that led us to conclude that issuance of a pollution remediation order was not a suit also apply to hearings before a federal administrative adjudicative body. In conducting this analysis, we compare the IBCA's complaint requirements to those of the Code of Civil Procedure. We also look briefly both to Congress's intent in setting up the IBCA, and to the structure of IBCA proceedings themselves.