Opinion ID: 726574
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Remand to the trial court for a new sentencing proceeding.

Text: 127 ... 128 F. Sentence review shall be in addition to appeals, if taken, and review and appeal may be consolidated. 129 That this section addresses only direct review is self-evident. See Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460, 357 S.E.2d 500, 508 (In death penalty cases, ... a defendant is afforded a direct, full review as a matter of right. Code § 17-110.1. (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933, 108 S.Ct. 308, 98 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987). As part A provides, the section is operative only upon the judgment [of a sentence of death] becoming final in the circuit court. A sentence of death does not become final when a subsequent court denies a writ of habeas corpus; it becomes final upon the entry of the judgment by the trial court. Likewise, the proportionality review and independent examination of the sentence for arbitrariness provided for in part C occur on direct review, not habeas. And the remedies provided in part D--affirm[ing] the sentence of death, commut[ing] the sentence of death, and remand[ing] to the trial court --are not available at all to a court reviewing a denial of habeas; they are possible only on direct review. 130 Finally, part F makes absolutely clear that the entire section is addressed only to direct review of the death sentence itself (as even the title of the section sets forth), not even to the underlying conviction for capital murder. That underlying conviction may be, but, under this section need not necessarily be (if taken), consolidated with the direct review of the death sentence. Indeed, under Rule 5:22, that consolidation is automatic: The case shall thereupon stand matured as if an appeal had been awarded to review the conviction and the sentence of death.... 131 Thus, the Virginia statutory scheme is not at all ambiguous. As a general rule, a petition for appeal must be filed in every case for which review is sought by the Virginia Supreme Court. For direct review of death sentences and their accompanying capital convictions, Rule 5:22 (itself, denominated a special rule) creates an exception, providing that assignments of error should instead be filed. But nowhere in that exception, or in section 17-110.1(B) to which it refers, is there any possible reference to appeals from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus. The only relevant reference to denials of writs of habeas corpus is in section 17-116.05:1, which provides merely that jurisdiction shall lie in the Supreme Court. And that section makes no reference to the form those appeals should take; so the general rule requiring a petition of appeal necessarily obtains. 132 We recognize that Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, questioned whether the Virginia Supreme Court's dismissal of these claims as untimely constituted a state ground adequate to bar federal habeas review. See O'Dell, 502 U.S. at 997-98, 112 S.Ct. at 619-20 (Blackmun, J.). Justice Blackmun commented that the ground may not be adequate under James and Ford because of the ambiguity of the Virginia statute. We believe, however, that upon closer inspection, there is no ambiguity at all. 22 Therefore, we hold that the Virginia Supreme Court's dismissal of O'Dell's appeal from the denial of the writ of habeas corpus as untimely was a state ground adequate to bar federal habeas review. 2. 133 Although the district court did not agree, J.A. at 288, Justice Blackmun also commented that the Virginia Supreme Court's rejection may not have been independent, in that it fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3476, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), because, as in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1092, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), the State has made application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law. Justice Blackmun observed, 134 the Virginia Supreme Court's rejection may not be based on an independent state ground because Tharp v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 1, 175 S.E.2d 277 (1970), requires the Virginia Supreme Court to consider whether a constitutional right was abridged before denying an extension of time for filing a petition for appeal. 135 O'Dell, 502 U.S. at 998, 112 S.Ct. at 619-20. 136 Justice Blackmun then noted that this case may be distinguishable, id. at 998 n. 5, 112 S.Ct. at 620 n. 5, from Coleman, which rejected a nearly identical claim, because here the Virginia Supreme Court was considering an untimely petition for appeal rather than the untimely notice of appeal at issue in Coleman. See also J.A. at 292 n.7 (federal district court distinguishing Coleman on same ground). But this possible distinction is refuted by the express language of Coleman. As Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court, 137 Ake was a direct review case. We have never applied its rule regarding independent state grounds in federal habeas. But even if Ake applies here, it does Coleman no good because the Virginia Supreme Court relied on an independent state procedural rule. 138 ... 139 We are not convinced that Tharp stands for the rule that Coleman believes it does. Coleman reads that case as establishing a practice in the Virginia Supreme Court of examining the merits of all underlying constitutional claims before denying a petition for appeal or writ of error as time barred. A more natural reading is that the Virginia Supreme Court will only grant an extension of time if the denial itself would abridge a constitutional right. That is, the Virginia Supreme Court will extend its time requirement only in those cases in which the petitioner has a constitutional right to have the appeal heard. 140 Coleman, 501 U.S. at 741-42, 111 S.Ct. at 2560 (first and second emphases added). 23 141 We agree that the rule of Ake concerning the state procedural rules and underlying federal claims does not apply in the habeas context, and, regardless, because we read Tharp the same way that the Court in Coleman did, we hold that the Virginia Supreme Court's application of Va. S.Ct. Rule 5:17(a)(1) was also an independent state ground sufficient to bar federal habeas review. 3. 142 Because the Virginia Supreme Court's application of Rule 5:17(a)(1) was an adequate and independent state ground, federal habeas review of O'Dell's defaulted claims, which are meritless in any event, 24 is barred absent cause and prejudice. That the default was only procedural, does nothing to insulate the claims from this bar. As Justice O'Connor explained for the Court in Coleman, 143 we [have repeatedly] emphasized the important interests served by state procedural rules at every stage of the judicial process and the harm to the States that results when federal courts ignore these rules:  ... 'Each State's complement of procedural rules ... channel[s], to the extent possible, the resolution of various types of questions to the stage of judicial process at which they can be resolved most fairly and efficiently.'  144 501 U.S. at 749, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 490-91, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2646-47, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 2907, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984))). Nor does the fact that O'Dell's failure to timely file the required petition for appeal was almost certainly unintentional insulate him from the consequences of that failure: 145 By filing late [petitioner] defaulted his entire state collateral appeal. This no doubt an inadvertent error, and [Virginia] concedes that [petitioner] did not understandingly and knowingly forgo the privilege of state collateral appeal.... [Nonetheless] federal habeas review of the claims is barred [absent cause and prejudice]. 146 Id. at 749-50, 111 S.Ct. at 2564-65.