Opinion ID: 1721671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: were the shoes taken from shell seized in violation of article 3, section 23 of the mississippi constitution and the fourth amendment of the u.s. constitution?

Text: Shell claims here that his tennis shoes were taken from him in violation of his constitutional rights under Mississippi Constitution Art. 3, § 23, which provides that [t]he people shall be secure in their persons, houses, and possessions, from unreasonable seizure or search; and no warrant shall be issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, specially designating the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. He advances two theories to support his claim that the shoes were illegally seized: the evidence which supported probable cause for the arrest was illegally obtained; and, even if there was sufficient evidence to establish probable cause, the seizure of the tennis shoes without a warrant was illegal. This Court disagrees. Before the trial began, defense counsel filed a written motion to suppress various statements made by Shell, allegedly in violation of his constitutional rights. Shell claimed the statements were obtained in violation of defendant's privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel ... and ... constitute the fruit of an unlawful arrest in violation of defendant's right of privacy ... At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that the appellant had been given his Miranda warnings, that these rights had been voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived each of the four times he was interviewed, that under all the circumstances and applicable law, the arrest was legal and based on probable cause, and that the statements made by the appellant were voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made and were therefore admissible. The trial court's holding was based on the following findings of fact. During the Sheriff's investigation into Mrs. Johnson's death, he found a discrepancy in the appellant's story. The appellant and his wife voluntarily went to the sheriff's office, at the Sheriff's request. Further discussions with the appellant and his wife led to an increase in the discrepancy. The Shells consented to a search of their trailer, after which the appellant voluntarily returned to the Sheriff's office. Although not in custody, Shell was read his Miranda rights, and he read and signed a written waiver of those rights. He gave a statement following the waiver of his Miranda rights, and as the investigation continued, he was given the Miranda warnings on other occasions. On each of those occasions, he waived his rights and gave statements. The trial court further found that the State had produced each person who could have conceivably been present when any threats were made and also found that no coercion had been used. Agee v. State, 185 So.2d 671 (Miss. 1966). The trial court also addressed the issue of right to counsel, which was raised in the motion but not argued. The trial court found there were no constitutional violations in that area. This Court has summed up the requirements for probable cause which would support a warrantless arrest in the following manner: [A] police officer must have (1) reasonable cause to believe a felony has been committed; and (2) reasonable cause to believe that the person proposed to be arrested is the one who committed it. Floyd v. State, 500 So.2d 989, 991 (Miss. 1986). See also, Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1317, 1327 (Miss. 1987); Rule 1.02(3), Miss.Unif.Crim.R.Cir.Ct.Prac. Along these lines, the Court has also held that: The existence of probable cause or reasonable grounds justifying an arrest without a warrant is determined by factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The determination depends upon the particular evidence and circumstances of the individual case. Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1317, 1327 (Miss. 1987) (quoting Swanier v. State, 473 So.2d 180, 186 [Miss. 1985]). To be even more specific, law enforcement officials need not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime has been committed, they need only have a reasonable belief ... a belief rising above mere unfounded suspicion. Alexander v. State, 503 So.2d 235, 238 (Miss. 1987). In this case, the information possessed by the Sheriff's department meets these minimum requirements. Therefore, under the circumstances of this case, there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest. Under the second half of Shell's argument, he maintains that even if there was sufficient probable cause for the warrantless arrest, the seizure of his shoes without a warrant was illegal. The basis of Shell's assertion appears to be a lack of exigent circumstances which would have justified the warrantless seizure of the tennis shoes. This Court disagrees. It is a long-standing rule in this, and other jurisdictions that, pursuant to a lawful arrest, law enforcement officials may seize personal effects and clothing from one who has been arrested. In the instant case the officers took the personal possessions of the defendant after he was arrested. This search is always necessary for many reasons. Among those are: to discover weapons and means of escape; to prevent means of injury to the prisoner and others; to discover necessary medical requirements; to discover evidence in connection with the charge for which accused was arrested; to discover wounds and need for immediate first aid, and to preserve the property of the defendant. Upshaw v. State, 350 So.2d 1358, 1363-64 (Miss. 1977) (quoting Wright v. State, 236 So.2d 408, 411-12 [Miss. 1970]) (Emphasis added). See also, Wright v. Edwards, 343 F. Supp. 792, 798 (N.D.Miss. 1972); U.S. v. Farrar, 470 F. Supp. 128, 131 (S.D.Miss. 1979). This point of law has also been addressed by various legal commentators: Thus, on incident-to-arrest grounds, it has been held that at the station the police may search through the arrestee's pockets, wallet, other containers on the person, and even underclothing, may require the arrestee to strip, and may seize incriminating objects thereby revealed. It is not necessary that there be advance probable cause that such objects will be found. 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 5.3(a), at 479-80 (1987). ( See also, accompanying footnotes and cases cited therein). LaFave, supra, cites several cases from other jurisdictions which have specifically addressed the evidentiary value of the arrestee's clothing. See State v. Brierly, 109 Ariz. 310, 509 P.2d 203 (1973) (bloody clothing); Eberhart v. State, 257 Ga. 600, 361 S.E.2d 821 (1987) (defendant required to remove clothing on which police then discovered victim's blood); State v. Freeman, 297 N.W.2d 363 (Iowa 1980) (bloody shoes and trousers); State v. Pettle, 286 So.2d 625 (La. 1973) (t-shirt, pants, underwear); Commonwealth v. Gliniewicz, 398 Mass. 744, 500 N.E.2d 1324 (1986) (boots worn by defendant with tread similar to that of print at crime scene and with blood on them); State v. Smith, 295 Minn. 65, 203 N.W.2d 348 (1972) (boots); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974) (bloody clothing). In the case at bar, the seizure of Shell's tennis shoes is clearly within the intended scope of the above-cited principles of law. The shoes were removed at the Sheriff's department's request, pursuant to a valid arrest which was based on probable cause. As a consequence, there is no merit to this assignment of error.