Opinion ID: 2571564
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Heading: Constitutionality of California's Death Penalty

Text: Bonilla raises a series of challenges to the constitutionality of California's death penalty. We have rejected each challenge before. As Bonilla offers no compelling arguments in favor of reconsidering any of these rulings, we do so again. California homicide law and the special circumstances listed in section 190.2 adequately narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty. ( People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 43, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229.) While Bonilla contends the ballot arguments in favor of Proposition 7 (approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978)), which became the current death penalty law, reflect an intent to expose every murderer to the death penalty, we have rejected that assertion as a misconstruction of the ballot arguments. ( People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 237, fn. 23, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496.) Section 190.3, factor (a), which permits the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime in deciding whether to impose the death penalty, does not license the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-976, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750; People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 373, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 554,107 P.3d 229.) Nothing in the state or federal Constitution requires that the penalty jury (1) issue written findings, (2) unanimously agree on any particular aggravating circumstances, or (3) find true any particular aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. (E.g., People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 40, 43, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229; People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 126, 132 Cal. Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1217, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) While Bonilla argues we should reconsider these conclusions in light of Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, which impose procedural constraints on fact finding in criminal trials, that argument rests on a misconception concerning the nature of California's capital sentencing scheme. [T]he ultimate determination of the appropriateness of the penalty and the subordinate determination of the balance of evidence of aggravation and mitigation do not entail the finding of facts that can increase the punishment for murder of the first degree beyond the maximum otherwise prescribed. Moreover, those determinations do not amount to the finding of facts, but rather constitute a single fundamentally normative assessment [citations] that is outside the scope of Ring and Apprendi. ( People v. Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 595, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344; accord, Snow, at p. 126, fn. 32, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) The trial court is not constitutionally required to instruct the jury on a burden of proof; in California, at the penalty phase there is no burden of proof, only a normative judgment for the jury. (E.g., People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 40, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229; People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 43-44, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591; People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 573, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1,108 P.3d 182.) Comparative proportionality review, also known as intercase proportionality review, is not required to render California's sentencing scheme constitutional. (E.g., People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 44, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229; People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 237, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1042, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.) Likewise, consideration by the jury of unadjudicated criminal conduct at the penalty phase does not violate the state or federal Constitution. (E.g., People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 43, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229; People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 236, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496.) Nor do Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, require the jury to unanimously agree beyond a reasonable doubt on any prior criminal conduct before considering it; as previously discussed, these decisions are inapplicable to California's capital sentencing scheme. ( People v. Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 595, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344; People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126, fn. 32,132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) The inclusion of the adjectives extreme and substantial in the list of mitigating factors (ง 190.3, factors (d) & (g)) does not impermissibly constrict consideration of mitigating evidence and is consistent with the state and federal Constitutions. ( People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 642, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) The trial court was not constitutionally required to instruct the jury that section 190.3's mitigating factors could be considered only as mitigating factors and that the absence of evidence supporting any one of them should not be viewed as an aggravating factor. (E.g., People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 236, 33 Cal. Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496; People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 465-466, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 341-342, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374.) The equal protection clause does not require that California include in its capital sentencing scheme the same disparate sentence review previously provided noncapital convicts under the Determinate Sentencing Act. ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 466, fn. 22, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) Bonilla's argument that the use of capital punishment `as regular punishment for substantial numbers of crimes' violates international norms of human decency and hence the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution fails, at the outset, because California does not employ capital punishment in such a manner. The death penalty is available only for the crime of first degree murder, and only when a special circumstance is found true; furthermore, administration of the penalty is governed by constitutional and statutory provisions different from those applying to `regular punishment' for felonies. (E.g., Cal. Const., art. VI, ง 11; งง 190.1-190.9, 1239, subd. (b).) ( People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 43-44, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229.)