Opinion ID: 66507
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Existence of a Duty to Defend

Text: We must first examine whether Smith alleged facts in her complaint that would give rise to a duty to defend under the Policy. The only way that such a duty would not exist is if all of the claims fell under the assault and battery 11 exclusion.10 See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tippett, 864 So. 2d 31, 35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that “if the pleadings show the applicability of a policy exclusion, the insurer has no duty to defend”). This exclusion covered all claims “for ‘bodily injury’ [or] ‘personal injury’” that were “caused by or ar[ose] directly or indirectly out of or from an assault or assault and battery of any nature whatsoever.” R1-1, Exh. A. Florida courts have interpreted the phrase “arising out of” to mean something broader than pure causation and closer to “‘originating from,’ . . . ‘incident to’ or ‘having a connection with.’” Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528, 539 (Fla. 2005). As the district court correctly noted, Smith’s claims can essentially be separated into two different categories — those connected to the assault and battery and those related to the false imprisonment. Of these two groups, only the false imprisonment claims could serve as a potential basis for a duty to defend. The negligence claims connected solely to the assault would necessarily “hav[e] a connection with” that crime and thus would “arise out of” the assault pursuant to how Florida courts have interpreted that phrase. Id. at 539. This interpretation accords with how Florida courts generally have treated negligence claims relating 10 We note that the scope and applicability of this exclusion to these parties is also an issue on appeal. For this portion of the opinion, we will assume that the assault and battery exclusion included in the Policy should control. If First Specialty had a duty to defend under this exclusion, it would obviously also have one under any narrower exclusion. 12 to assaults. See, e.g., Miami Beach Entm’t Inc. v. First Oak Brook Corp. Syndicate, 682 So. 2d 161, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Britamco Underwriter’s, Inc. v. Zuma Corp., 576 So. 2d 965, 965 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). There is one Florida case, Mactown, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 716 So. 2d 289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), which rejected applying an assault and battery exclusion to a negligence claim. That decision, however, was premised on the fact that the exclusion also referenced a number of other intentional torts, which the court read to create ambiguity regarding the exclusion’s applicability to negligence-based torts. See id. at 291–92. Here, though, the exclusion is focused on only one tort and appears to encompass all claims related to that tort, regardless of whether they are intentional or not. Accordingly, if there is a duty to defend in this case, it would have to derive from Smith’s claims relating to the imprisonment. Under the Policy, all false imprisonment claims are covered, subject to any exclusions, as part of the larger category of “personal and advertising injury.” First Specialty contends that Smith’s false imprisonment claims should not be covered because they would fall under the ambit of the assault and battery exclusion as a form of “personal injury” that arose out of an assault or battery. As previously noted, the Policy does not define the term “personal injury.” Since the use of quotation marks around a phrase in an insurance policy identifies it as an official 13 term of that policy, we need to define “personal injury” to discern the full meaning of the Policy. We agree with the district court that there is no ambiguity between the terms “personal injury” and “personal and advertising injury” and that the only plausible interpretation is to treat “personal injury” as part of “personal and advertising injury” rather than as a distinct concept. Based on this reading, the assault and battery exclusion would bar all claims alleging injury arising out of a false imprisonment that are “caused by or aris[e] directly or indirectly out of or from an assault or assault and battery of any nature whatsoever.” R1-1, Exh. A. In determining whether Smith’s claims related to the false imprisonment would fall under this interpretation of the exclusion, we look only at the text of the complaint. See Jones, 908 So. 2d at 443. Appellants assert that the complaint describes the false imprisonment as a separate and distinct event from the assault. In particular, they focus on paragraphs 19 and 20 of Smith’s Second Amended Complaint, which state, in relevant part: 19. On December 31, 2001, . . . Plaintiff FATIMA SMITH . . . was detained in the hallway by the security guard (ALMONTE) who then required her to enter an empty, locked stairwell. This detention was against Plaintiff, FATIMA SMITH’S will. 20. Subsequent to the initial detention Plaintiff FATIMA SMITH was subjected to verbal and physical threats, abuse and indignities. FATIMA SMITH was placed in immediate fear of her person and safety. FATIMA SMITH was sexually assaulted and raped against her will, and in violation of all laws and human decency. 14 R2-40 at 3. They also emphasize that the counts in Smith’s complaint describing her false imprisonment do not reference the assault at all. However, as First Specialty notes, those allegations all discuss pain, suffering, and bodily injury resulting from the false imprisonment, which would seem to have to result logically from some form of assault and battery.11 After examining the underlying complaint, we agree with the district court’s finding that the allegations contained within are sufficient to create a duty to defend. The district court focused principally on the complaint’s description of the sexual assault as an event “subsequent to” the initial false imprisonment, which the court believed showed that these were two separate events and that the false imprisonment could not have arisen out of the assault. Based on our own analysis, we find it reasonable to read the pleadings as depicting Smith’s false imprisonment as a distinct, preceding incident that did not necessarily have to result in her assault and battery, even if that was a potential outcome. In particular, we note that the 11 For example, paragraph 26 states: As a direct and proximate result of Defendant ALMONTE’s false imprisonment, Plaintiff FATIMA SMITH sustained bodily injury and resulting pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement, mental anguish, loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life, expense of hospitalization, medical and nursing care and treatment. The damages, injuries and losses are permanent and continuing in nature and Plaintiff will suffer the losses and impairment in the future. Id. at 4–5. 15 complaint repeatedly discussed the assault as a separate event later in time than the original false imprisonment, as evidenced by the “subsequent to” language referenced by the district court and by references to the assault occurring “at some point after the initial detention.” R1-9, Exh. A at 12. Though temporal displacement does not automatically imply narrative disjunction, it provides a basis for differentiating between the two events, especially since the complaint lacks any clear evidence of connectedness. Accordingly, we find that Smith’s complaint did not allege that her false imprisonment arose out of, originated from, or was connected with an assault or battery, and thus those claims relating to the false imprisonment would not fall under the assault and battery exclusion. We acknowledge that this conclusion is somewhat technical and that alternate interpretations, such as First Specialty’s, also would be reasonable. In particular, we agree that bodily injury typically would not result from an act of false imprisonment absent some form of assault or battery.12 However, a false imprisonment by itself could create a bodily injury, and an assault or battery is not a necessary precondition for such an injury. We thus have a situation in which 12 Smith’s deposition testimony may support this reading, since it seems to describe her interaction with Almonte as one long encounter that included both sexual assault and false imprisonment rather than as separate and discrete incidents. However, the duty to defend derives exclusively from the allegations in the complaint and other pleadings, so these statements do not affect our analysis of that duty, though they would be applicable in determining the existence of a duty to indemnify. See Jones, 908 So. 2d at 442–43. 16 there are plausible readings supporting and rejecting a duty to defend based on the applicability of the exclusion.13 Under Florida law, “[i]f the allegations of the complaint leave any doubt regarding the duty to defend, the question must be resolved in favor of the insured requiring the insurer to defend.” Baron Oil, 470 So. 2d at 814. We therefore conclude that, in the absence of any clear evidence to the contrary, First Specialty had a duty to defend 633 and Baye on all of Smith’s claims, even those unrelated to false imprisonment. See id. at 813–14 (“[I]f the complaint alleges facts showing two or more grounds for liability, one being within the insurance coverage and the other not, the insurer is obligated to defend the entire suit.”).