Opinion ID: 1930681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Puiatti's Penalty Phase

Text: Puiatti challenges his sentence of death by asserting five reversible errors during his penalty proceeding. First, he claims that the trial court's denial of a severance in the penalty phase prejudiced him, arguing that Glock presented antagonistic arguments on the aggravating circumstance of substantial domination and that the jury was exposed to improper instructions and prosecutorial argument relating to the non-existence of the mitigating factor of no significant prior criminal history. We hold that a severance was not required in the penalty phase of the trial. As to the alleged conflict concerning which defendant dominated the other, our decision in McCray disposes of this contention. In McCray we stated: [T]he fact that the defendant might have a better chance of acquittal or a strategic advantage if tried separately does not establish the right to a severance. Nor is hostility among defendants, or an attempt by one defendant to escape punishment by throwing the blame on a codefendant, a sufficient reason, by itself, to require severance. If the defendants engage in a swearing match as to who did what, the jury should resolve the conflicts and determine the truth of the matter. 416 So.2d at 806 (citations omitted). See also Dean v. State, 478 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1985). Further, we find the mere fact that only one of two codefendants has a significant prior criminal history does not require, in and of itself, a severance in the trial's penalty phase. The critical question is whether the jury was able to consider evidence presented by each defendant during the penalty phase and apply the law without being unduly confused or prejudiced. We find that, under the circumstances of this case, the jury could properly apply the facts to the law without confusion or prejudice. Second, Puiatti claims that the trial court erred in considering the murder as cold, calculated, and premeditated. The undisputed facts reflect that there was not just one attack on the victim, but three separate assaults. Puiatti and Glock were methodic in their continued return to and pursuit of the victim. We conclude that the trial court correctly found this aggravating circumstance. See Johnson v. State, 465 So.2d 499 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 186, 88 L.Ed.2d 155 (1985); Mills v. State, 462 So.2d 1075 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 3538, 87 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985); Preston v. State, 444 So.2d 939 (Fla. 1984). Third, Puiatti maintains that the trial court erred in failing to consider the mitigating circumstances that Puiatti was under the influence of extreme mental and emotional distress, that he acted under the substantial domination of Glock, that he lacked the capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, that he functions at a child's emotional level, that he confessed and cooperated with the police, that he possessed the potential for rehabilitation, and that he had a strong family background. Our review of this record reveals that the trial court considered these mitigating factors and concluded that they failed to rise to a sufficient level to be weighed as mitigating circumstances. The trial court committed no error. Fourth, Puiatti asserts that the trial court erroneously refused to instruct the jury on several non-statutory mitigating circumstances. The record reflects that Puiatti was permitted to proffer any relevant mitigating evidence, and his counsel was allowed to argue such evidence. In accordance with the standard jury instructions, the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider any aspect of the appellant's character or of the record in addition to the statutory mitigating circumstances in making its sentence recommendation. We find no trial court error. Finally, Puiatti argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury and receiving its penalty recommendation on Sunday. According to Puiatti, a judge has no authority to hold court on Sunday. We find no reversible error. No sentence or judgment was actually imposed on Sunday, and Puiatti never complained about the Sunday proceedings to the trial court. Furthermore, we note that Florida's procedural rules envision the possibility of holding at least some criminal proceedings on Sunday by implicitly mandating first appearance proceedings and by explicitly allowing additional jury instructions and the verdict's receipt on Sunday. See Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.130; 3.540.