Opinion ID: 3160112
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Vulnerable-Victim Enhancement

Text: A two-level enhancement “applies to offenses involving an unusually vulnerable victim in which the defendant knows or should have known of the victim’s unusual vulnerability.” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1), cmt. n.2. A “vulnerable victim” is “a person . . . who is unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or who is otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.” Id., cmt. n.2. We review the district court’s “findings that the victims were vulnerable . . . for clear error.” United States v. Randall, 162 F.3d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1998). Baker contends that the district court erred in applying the vulnerable-victim enhancement because targeting victims for reloading and successfully reloading them did not make them “vulnerable” under § 3A1.1(b)(1). The district court correctly found, and we have twice held, that when, as here, a defendant “reloads” victims by soliciting more money from those who have already proven susceptible to an investment fraud, including in the telemarketing context, the vulnerable-victim enhancement is appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. Ciccone, 219 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[V]ictims of a ‘reloading’ scheme . . . are vulnerable for the 18 “There is an intracircuit split as to whether the standard of review for application of the Guidelines to the facts is de novo or abuse of discretion.” United States v. Tanke, 743 F.3d 1296, 1306 (9th Cir. 2014). This issue is currently the subject of en banc review. See United States v. Gasca-Ruiz, No. 14-50342, 2015 WL 7067873 (9th Cir. Nov. 12, 2015) (mem.). We would reach the same result under either standard. 84 UNITED STATES V. LLOYD purpose of enhancing a convicted person’s sentence.”); Randall, 162 F.3d at 560 (“[W]hether these persons are described as gullible, overly trusting, or just naive[,] their readiness to fall for the telemarketing rip-off, not once but twice[,] demonstrated that their personalities made them vulnerable in a way and to a degree not typical of the general population.” (emphasis original)). Not only does our precedent make clear that a reloaded investor-victim of a telemarketing scheme is a vulnerable victim, see, e.g., Ciccone, 219 F.3d at 1086; Randall, 162 F.3d at 560, but the record also shows that Baker intentionally targeted several of his investor-victims for reloading because they had a “track record of falling for fraudulent schemes,” Randall, 162 F.3d at 560. The district court specifically identified three individuals, Tranter, Beacham and Houseknecht, as vulnerable victims. Baker solicited investments from each for Forbidden Warrior. Five years after Tranter’s first investment in Forbidden Warrior, Baker successfully reloaded him to invest in Red Water. Baker tried to reload Beacham to invest in From Mexico with Love a few years after convincing him to invest in Forbidden Warrior. Although Baker did not initially succeed, his efforts, combined with those of Lloyd and Agler, convinced Beacham to make the additional investment. Beacham was convinced in part because of Baker’s representations that he would soon see returns on his earlier investment in Forbidden Warrior. Lloyd and Agler had already reloaded Houseknecht when Baker later tried to reload her again, this time without success. Baker received commissions for each successful reloading, including Houseknecht’s reloading by Lloyd and Agler. The record amply supports the district court’s vulnerable-victim enhancement. There was no procedural error. UNITED STATES V. LLOYD 85 B. The Claim of Error in Calculating Baker’s Criminal History Category Baker argues that the district court erred in calculating his criminal history by double-counting the sentences he received when his probation for two prior convictions was revoked. In September 1990, Baker was arrested for forgery, grand theft, and passing bad checks. In January 1991, while on bond for that offense, Baker was arrested for committing grand theft on five separate occasions. On October 9, 1991, Baker was sentenced on both convictions. In the September 1990 case, Baker was sentenced to serve six months on one count of forgery, to be followed by probation. In the January 1991 case, Baker was sentenced to serve six months on one count of grand theft, to be followed by probation for two additional counts. Baker served the custodial sentence, was released, and violated his probation. In August 1992, his probation was revoked in both cases and he was sentenced to serve two 18-month prison terms, to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to his current term of incarceration. The district court followed the presentence report’s recommendation to increase Baker’s criminal history score by six points for the sentences imposed in the September 1990 and January 1991 cases. Baker objected that only three points should have been assessed for the two prior sentences. He objects on appeal as well, but not for the reason he identified at sentencing. At sentencing, Baker pointed to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) to argue that the September 1990 and January 1991 sentences should have been treated as a single sentence. Because the two sentences were separated by an intervening arrest, the district court reasoned that they counted as two separate 86 UNITED STATES V. LLOYD sentences under the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) (“Prior sentences always are counted separately if the sentences were imposed for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest . . . .”). On appeal, Baker argues that adding six rather than three criminal history points was incorrect under Application Note 11 to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k). The Note provides that “[w]here a revocation applies to multiple sentences, and such sentences are counted separately under § 4A1.2(a)(2), add the term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation to the sentence that will result in the greatest increase in criminal history points.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k), cmt. n.11. The Note gives the following example: A defendant was serving two probationary sentences, each counted separately under § 4A1.2(a)(2); probation was revoked on both sentences as a result of the same violation conduct; and the defendant was sentenced to a total of 45 days of imprisonment. If one sentence had been a “straight” probationary sentence and the other had been a probationary sentence that had required service of 15 days of imprisonment, the revocation term of imprisonment (45 days) would be added to the probationary sentence that had the 15-day term of imprisonment. Id. “The effect of this application note would be to add the additional term of incarceration to only one of [the defendant’s] first two disputed convictions.” United States v. UNITED STATES V. LLOYD 87 Flores, 93 F.3d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 1996). Although “‘the sentencing court can tack the probation revocation sentence to any one’” of the defendant’s underlying sentences, the others would “‘remain unaffected.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Streat, 22 F.3d 109, 111 (6th Cir. 1994)). On appeal, the government concedes that “when multiple probationary sentences are revoked at the same time for the same violation conduct, only one of the new sentences imposed at the revocation hearing can be added to the underlying sentences for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a).” If Note 11 applies, Baker argues that one of his prior sentences would be 24 months, consisting of 6 months for the original prison term, plus 18 months for the term imposed on revocation. The other prior sentence, Baker contends, would be limited to 6 months under Note 11. Because the revocation applied to both the September 1990 and January 1991 probations, the court would “add the additional term of incarceration to only one of [Baker’s] first two disputed convictions.” See Flores, 93 F.3d at 592. One of these two prior sentences would exceed 13 months, and 3 points, not 6, would be added to Baker’s criminal history score. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a); § 4A1.2(e). Baker’s criminal history category would be V, not VI, and his Guidelines range would be 262 to 327 months, not 292 to 365 months. The government argues that plain-error review applies because Baker failed to object on the basis of the Application Note during sentencing.19 But “it is claims that are deemed 19 The government goes on to argue that any error would be harmless because Baker received a below-Guidelines sentence. A below-Guidelines sentence does not avoid or make harmless an error in the Guidelines calculation. See United States v. Bonilla-Guizar, 729 F.3d 88 UNITED STATES V. LLOYD waived or forfeited, not arguments.” United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying de novo, rather than plain-error, review). Although Baker argued at sentencing that the September 1990 and January 1991 sentences should be treated as a single sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2), and on appeal that Application Note 11 meant that the single revocation triggered only a three-point increase, his argument here is “an alternative argument to support what has been his consistent claim from the beginning.” Pallares-Galan, 359 F3d at 1095. The consistent claim is that “for the two sentences imposed on the cases reported in paragraphs 99 and 102 of the Presentence Report, only one 3 point assessment should have been made.” “Once a federal claim is properly presented, a party can make any argument in support of that claim; parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made below.” Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d at 1095 (quoting Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992)). The record does not provide an adequate basis for us to determine whether Baker’s criminal history score should be increased by three rather than six points in light of Note 11 to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k). The government argues that because the revised presentence report referred to the revocation sentencing as taking place on both August 21 and August 24, 1992, it was unclear whether he was sentenced for the two revocations at the same time or on two different dates. There is no requirement in either Flores or the § 4A1.2(k) Application Note that the underlying revocations be sentenced on the same day, and the record makes clear that there was one motion to revoke and a single revocation, 1179, 1188–89 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Kilby, 443 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2006). UNITED STATES V. LLOYD 89 which occurred on August 24, 1992. Read in context, the reference in the presentence report to August 21 is likely a scrivener’s error. The report’s prior paragraph identifies the revocation sentence as “08/24/92: 18 mos.” Two paragraphs in the presentence report refer to the sentencing in the other revocation as taking place on “08/24/92,” and that “[o]n August 24, 1992, Baker admitted violating probation and the 18 month prison sentence was imposed.” It is, however, not clear that both of the probation terms imposed for Baker’s prior sentences were revoked because of the “same violation conduct.” Although the record shows that probation in both cases was revoked and both sentences imposed on the same day, that does not mean that both revocations resulted from the same conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k), cmt. n.11. Because the district court understandably did not account for Note 11 in calculating Baker’s criminal history score, and because the record does not allow us to determine whether the correct score is based on a three- or a six-point increase, we vacate Baker’s sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing, so that the district court can consider whether Note 11 applies, and correctly calculate the criminal history category and Guidelines sentencing range. 90 UNITED STATES V. LLOYD