Opinion ID: 70996
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The RLUIPA Free-Exercise Claims

Text: The core of this appeal is Thunderhorse’s contention that certain policies of the TDCJ violate his rights, under RLUIPA, to freely exercise Native American Shamanism. Specifically, he complains that the TDCJ prohibits him from growing his hair and from performing religious pipe ceremonies in his cell. He also complains that the TDCJ prohibits him from wearing a colored headband.
RLUIPA mandates that [n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person- (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 4 Case: 08-40821 Document: 00511023468 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/09/2010 No. 08-40821 (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). “RLUIPA thus protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government’s permission and accommodation for exercise of their religion.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005). An inmate-plaintiff seeking relief under RLUIPA bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the challenged prison policy substantially burdens his exercise of religion. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a)-2000cc-2(b). To meet this burden, the plaintiff must show (1) that the burdened activity is a “religious exercise,” and (2) that the burden is substantial. RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” as “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). In Adkins v. Kaspar, we defined “substantial burden” as follows: [A] government action or regulation creates a “substantial burden” on a religious exercise if it truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior and significantly violate his religious beliefs . . . . [T]he effect of a government action or regulation is significant when it either (1) influences the adherent to act in a way that violates his religious beliefs, or (2) forces the adherent to choose between, on the one hand, enjoying some generally available, non-trivial benefit, and, on the other hand, following his religious beliefs. 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). This inquiry “requires a case-by-case, fact-specific inquiry to determine whether the government action or regulation in question imposes a substantial burden.” Id. at 571. If the plaintiff satisfies this threshold requirement, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the challenged policies are the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 124 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In making this determination, the court must give due deference “to the experience and 5 Case: 08-40821 Document: 00511023468 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/09/2010 No. 08-40821 expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005) (citation omitted). RLUIPA “is not meant to elevate accommodation of religious observances over the institutional need to maintain good order, security, and discipline or to control costs.” Baranowski, 486 F.3d at 125 (citation omitted). Thunderhorse’s primary contention here is that the magistrate judge failed to analyze his claims under RLUIPA’s compelling-interest, leastrestrictive-means standard of review.
The magistrate judge properly found that Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69 (5th Cir. 1997), and Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2007), foreclosed Thunderhorse’s RLUIPA claim against the TDCJ’s hair-length policy. In both cases, the plaintiffs, like Thunderhorse, were prisoners who, for religious reasons, sought permission not to cut their hair. Diaz, 114 F.3d at 70 (following the religious practices of the Aztecs); Longoria, 507 F.3d at 900-01 (practicing his religion as a Mexica Nahua Native American). In both cases, we found that the policy substantially burdened (or the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded that the policy substantially burdened) a religious exercise. See Longoria, 507 F.3d at 903; Diaz, 114 F.3d at 72-73. But we upheld the policy as the least restrictive way to serve a compelling governmental interest—prison security. In Diaz, which arose under RLUIPA’s predecessor statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), we explained that prisoners may hide weapons and other contraband in their hair. 114 F.3d at 73 In addition, requiring short hair makes it more difficult for an escaped prisoner to alter his appearance from the photographs that the TDCJ periodically takes of each 6 Case: 08-40821 Document: 00511023468 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/09/2010 No. 08-40821 inmate. Id.2 In light of these concerns, we held that “the security interest at stake cannot meaningfully be achieved appropriately by any different or lesser means than hair length standards.” Id. In Longoria, 507 F.3d at 904, we affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Longoria’s RLUIPA claim even though the district court did not determine whether the policy was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. We explained that such a determination was unnecessary because we had previously evaluated the same policy under RFRA. Id. at 901, 904 (citing Diaz, 114 F.3d at 73). Because RLUIPA and RFRA shared the least-restrictivemeans, compelling-interest test, we held that the district court was not required to reexamine the TDCJ’s hair-length policy to conclude that Longoria had failed to state a claim under RLUIPA. See id. at 904. Consistent with these decisions, we affirm the dismissal of this RLUIPA claim.3
To establish that the TDCJ’s prohibition against colored headbands violates RLUIPA, Thunderhorse must first show that the prohibition substantially burdens his religious exercise. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a)- 2 Defendants introduced similar evidence in this case. Furthermore, the Regional Director of the TDCJ explained that, because altercations between inmates occur with some frequency, the policy prevents inmates from “grab[bing] that handful of hair, [which] becomes a heck of a leverage issue . . . .” 3 Thunderhorse argues that the policy cannot be the least restrictive way to maintain prison security because the TDCJ enforces it in an arbitrary manner and other prison systems, including the Federal Bureau of Prisons, permit long hair. He cites examples of how the TDCJ had previously permitted him and other inmates to have long hair. These contentions find support in Warsoldier v. Woodford, in which the Ninth Circuit issued a preliminary injunction, pursuant to RLUIPA, that prevented the California Department of Corrections from enforcing its hair-length restriction against a Native American inmate. See 418 F.3d 989, 999-1001 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit found that the restriction was not the least restrictive means to maintain prison security, in part, because the prisons run by the federal government, Oregon, Colorado, and Nevada all permit long hair or provide religious exemptions to their hair-length restrictions. See id. at 999 (citations omitted). This court, however, is bound by Diaz and Longoria. 7 Case: 08-40821 Document: 00511023468 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/09/2010 No. 08-40821 2000cc-2(b). The magistrate judge found that Thunderhorse failed to establish that wearing a white cloth headband, which the TDCJ allows, as opposed to a colored headband, which the TDCJ prohibits, substantially burdens his religious exercise. We agree. Thunderhorse’s sole complaint on appeal is that he is unable to purchase the white headbands through the approved vendors or at the TDCJ’s commissaries. He contends that this inability to purchase the white headbands, rather than the policy itself, is the substantial burden. At trial, he admitted that he cannot purchase the white headbands because the only remaining approved vendor mishandles his orders. In response, the Regional Director of the TDCJ promised to attempt to secure more vendors. Based on this evidence, the only fault that the magistrate judge could have attributed to the TDCJ is that it should have selected more competent vendors—an oversight that does not rise to the level of a RLUIPA violation. In sum, Thunderhorse has not shown that the TDCJ’s headband policy substantially burdens his rights under RLUIPA.4 4. Performing Personal Pipe Ceremonies in His Cell The TDCJ’s ban on pipe use within the cell does not violate RLUIPA. Thunderhorse seeks to perform personal pipe ceremonies inside of his cell.5 According to Thunderhorse, Native American Shamans use the pipe to pray. It 4 Thunderhorse does dispute the TDCJ’s justification for the restriction against colored headbands, which the magistrate judge credited. According to the TDCJ, the restriction is the least restrictive way to prevent inmates from using colored accessories to promote gang affiliations. Thunderhorse, however, is in administrative segregation where he spends most of his time alone and in his cell. Neither the magistrate judge nor the TDCJ has explained how allowing him to wear a colored headband while he is alone and in his cell could promote gang violence. But we do not reach this question because Thunderhorse has failed to satisfy his threshold burden of establishing that the white-headband-only policy substantially burdens his religious exercise. 5 The TDCJ allows those in the general population (but not those in administrative segregation such as Thunderhorse) to participate in group pipe ceremonies outdoors. At trial, Thunderhorse made clear that he did not seek to attend those ceremonies. Instead, he only sought to perform personal pipe ceremonies inside of his cell. 8 Case: 08-40821 Document: 00511023468 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/09/2010 No. 08-40821 is undisputed that the pipe ceremony is a religious exercise and that the prohibition on it is a substantial burden. Therefore, the issue is whether Defendants have shown that the prohibition on personal pipe use within the cell is the least restrictive method to achieve a compelling interest. Defendants argue that the compelling interest here is prison security: no inmate may have materials inside of his cell that could be used to start a fire or create an explosive. The magistrate judge properly ruled for Defendants on this basis, stating that “[b]ecause Thunderhorse is in administrative segregation, he does not have access to pipe ceremonies for security reasons, which reasons represent compelling governmental interests.” Maintaining prison security is a compelling interest. Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 334 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Texas obviously has compelling governmental interests in the security . . . of its prisons . . . .”). We find no reason to question the TDCJ’s position that the prohibition on incendiary items within the cell is the least restrictive way to prevent inmates from starting fires in their cells. Hence, the TDCJ’s prohibition on pipe use within the cell does not violate RLUIPA.