Opinion ID: 2317022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Grandison's Eligibility for the Death Penalty

Text: Grandison argues that he is not death-eligible because he was found guilty of first degree murder as an accessory before the fact. We disagree. In Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 835 A.2d 1105 (2003), Judge Harrell, writing for this Court, summarized the history of Maryland's death penalty statute: In response to the Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence in this area, Maryland's death penalty statutory scheme has undergone multiple changes in the last thirty-[three] years. Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 413, provided in relevant part that [e]very person convicted of murder in the first degree ... shall suffer death, or undergo a confinement in the penitentiary of the State for the period of their natural life. This version of Art. 27, § 413 was found to be unconstitutional as regards the death penalty in Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175, 297 A.2d 696 (1972), in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Furman [ v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972)]. It was replaced by Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 413, applicable to offenses committed on or after 1 July 1975, which in turn was found to be unconstitutional in Blackwell v. State, 278 Md. 466, 365 A.2d 545 (1976). The statute declared unconstitutional in Blackwell was replaced by renumbered Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl.Vol., 1978 Cum.Supp.), Article 27, § 412, applicable to offenses committed on or after 1 July 1978. This version has remained substantively unchanged and is the first version of the current Maryland death penalty scheme, along with Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl.Vol., 1978 Cum.Supp.), [Article 27], § 413 and 414, containing the additional sentencing and review elements at issue in the present case. Additional minor amendments were made in 1995 and 1996. Article 27, §§ 412, 413, and 414 were repealed by Ch. 26, Acts 2002, effective October 1, 2002 and re-enacted without substantive change as Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol., 2003 Supp.), Criminal Law Article, §§ 2-101, 2-201, 2-202, 2-203, 2-301, 2-302, 2-303, and 1-401. Oken, 378 Md. at 194-95, 835 A.2d at 1114 (alterations added). Because Grandison was convicted prior to the 2002 re-enactment of the Code, we shall address his argument referring to the Code sections as they existed prior to the 2002 re-enactment. Section 412 of Article 27 of the Maryland Code stated the punishment for murder, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) Designation of degree by court or jury.  If a person is found guilty of murder, the court or jury that determined the person's guilt shall state in the verdict whether the person is guilty of murder in the first degree or murder in the second degree. (b) Penalty for first degree murder.  A person found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced either to death or to imprisonment for life. The sentence shall be imprisonment for life unless (1) the State notified the person in writing at least 30 days prior to trial that it intended to seek a sentence of death, and advised the person of each aggravating circumstance upon which it intended to rely, and (2) a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with § 413. In Grandison's sentencing and re-sentencing proceedings after he had been convicted of first degree murder as an accessory before the fact, the jury found that the prosecution proved the aggravating factor of contractual murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 413 of Article 27 of the Maryland Code defines the contractual murder aggravating circumstance as follows: (d) Consideration of aggravating circumstances.  In determining the sentence, the court or jury, as the case may be, shall first consider whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, any of the following aggravating circumstances exist:    (7) The defendant engaged or employed another person to commit the murder and the murder was committed pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration.    (e) Definitions.  As used in this section, the following terms have the meanings indicated unless a contrary meaning is clearly intended from the context in which the terms appear: (1) The terms defendant and person, except as those terms appear in subsection (d)(7), include only a principal in the first degree. When attempting to ascertain the meaning of a statute, we first look to the normal, plain meaning of the language.... If that language is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the provision's terms.... Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 536, 873 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2005); Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604, 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004). Moreover, when the meaning of a word or phrase in a constitutional or statutory provision is perfectly clear, this Court has consistently refused to give that word or phrase a different meaning on such theories that a different meaning would make the provision more workable, or more consistent with a litigant's view of good public policy, or more in tune with modern times, or that the framers of the provision did not actually mean what they wrote. Bienkowski, 386 Md. at 537, 873 A.2d at 1134. Grandison, under the definition of first degree principal provided in Johnson v, State, 303 Md. 487, 510, 495 A.2d 1, 12 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093, 106 S.Ct. 868, 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986), could not have been convicted as a first degree principal because he did not actually commit a crime, either by his own hand, or by an inanimate agency, or by an innocent human agent. Id., quoting State v. Ward, 284 Md. 189, 197, 396 A.2d 1041, 1046 (1978). Nor could he have been convicted as a second degree principal because he did not aid[], counsel[], command[] or encourage[] the commission of the crime in his presence. Id. Therefore, Grandison must be considered an accessory before the fact because he is guilty of felony by reason of having aided, counseled, commanded or encouraged the commission thereof, without having been present either actually or constructively at the moment of perpetration through his employment of Evans to kill the witnesses against him. Ward, 284 Md. at 197, 396 A.2d at 1046-47. As we stated in Evans v. State, 382 Md. 248, 855 A.2d 291 (2004), the language of Section 413(e)(1) specifically exempts Section 413(d)(7) from the limitation that only a principal in the first degree to first degree murder is death-eligible and does not state that the term defendant as used in Section 413(d)(7) only denotes first or second degree principals. Id. at 263, 855 A.2d at 299-300. The aggravating circumstance of employing another person to murder in exchange for remuneration clearly contemplates the inclusion of accessories before the fact because the individual employing the person did so prior to the commission of the murders and generally is not present at the time of the killings. Id. Had the General Assembly intended to limit the application of the death penalty to participants in contractual murder who qualify as principals under the law, it could have done so. Because, however, the Legislature made the blanket statement that Section 413(d)(7) is not limited to first degree principals, we determine that it intended to include accessories before the fact involved in contractual murder within the class of death eligible defendants. Id. Grandison, however, relies in large part on dicta in this Court's opinion in Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175, 198, 670 A.2d 398, 409 (1995), which states: Under our statutory scheme only those convicted as principals in the second degree of first degree murder who engaged or employed another person to commit the murder and the murder was committed pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration, Art. 27, § 413(d)(7), may be considered for the death penalty. That aggravating circumstance meets the narrowing requirement of the Eighth Amendment. The above-quoted language, however, is an incomplete statement of the law governing eligibility under Maryland's death penalty statute because accessories before the fact are clearly those who engage or employ another person to commit murder pursuant to a contract. It is entirely consistent with the Eighth Amendment's narrowing requirement to include accessories before the fact who satisfy the terms of Section 413(d)(7) within the class of those eligible for the death penalty and obviously within the plain meaning of the statute. Grandison also relies on language from Gary v. State, 341 Md. 513, 520, 671 A.2d 495, 498 (1996) to support his argument that he is not eligible for the death penalty, where we stated: [P]ursuant to the Maryland death penalty statute, only principals in the first degree to first degree murder are eligible for the death penalty in Maryland. A principal in the first degree is `one who actually commits a crime, either by his own hand, or by inanimate agency, or by an innocent human agent.' In addition, under the statute, one who employs another person to kill is also considered a principal in the first degree for purposes of the death penalty. Since a conviction for conspiracy to murder does not itself establish that the defendant committed the crime by his own hand, by inanimate agency, by an innocent agent, or employed another person to kill, the death penalty is generally unavailable for conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Id. (internal citations omitted and emphasis in original). The above-quoted language in Gary is consistent with our conclusion based on the plain meaning of Sections 413(d)(7) and (e)(1). The language in Gary merely stands for the proposition that, although the death penalty is generally limited to those who have been determined to be principals in the first degree of first degree murder, those individuals who participate in contractual murder are likewise death-eligible. [7]