Opinion ID: 2076678
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the prosecutor's calling the deceased's widow to the witness stand

Text: At stage one of the sentencing hearing, the prosecution called Karen Koumoundouros, the widow of the deceased, to the witness stand. The widow was sworn and gave the following testimony: Q. Miss Witness, would you state your full name, please and spell your last name for the ladies and gentlemen of the jury. A. Mrs. Karen Koumoundouros K-O-U-M-O-U-N-D-O-U-R-O-S. Q. Mrs. Koumoundouros, on September 7, 1977, were you married? A. Yes. Q. To whom were you married? A. James Koumoundouros. At this point in the proceeding, defense counsel objected and asked for a sidebar during which he argued that there was no purpose to be served by calling the deceased's widow as a witness except to engender sympathy in the jury. Defense counsel argued that the only purpose Mrs. Koumoundouros could possibly serve would be for life and death purposes and that life and death were not at issue in the sentencing hearing. Throughout the entire sidebar, Mrs. Koumoundouros remained on the witness stand. During the sidebar, the trial judge sustained defense counsel's objection. The prosecutor then asked to be heard in chambers. The trial judge refused the request, stating, The objection is sustained. I don't know if she's going to make the distance. The judge's statement was made during the sidebar, outside the hearing of the jury. The court then recessed for lunch. After the jury left, the witness stepped down from the stand. This court has dealt with the issue of the admissibility of evidence relating to a victim's family in a murder trial many times. This court has held: It is axiomatic that a defendant's guilt must be established by competent evidence uninfluenced by bias and prejudice, and that therefore evidence that a murder victim has left a spouse or children is inadmissible since it does not enlighten the trier of fact as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant or as to the punishment he should receive, but only serves to prejudice and inflame the jury. Generally, the rule is that `   where testimony in a murder case respecting the fact the deceased left a spouse and family is not elicited incidentally, but is presented in such a manner as to cause the jury to believe it is material, its admission is highly prejudicial and constitutes reversible error unless an objection thereto is sustained and the jury instructed to disregard such evidence. In like manner, we have held that jury argument by the prosecution which dwells upon the decedent's family or seeks to relate a defendant's punishment to the existence of family is inflammatory and improper.' ( People v. Bernette, at 371.) That case also held that `   the irrelevancy and highly prejudicial nature of such evidence is so well established, that it was the duty of the court in a murder case to have refused it on its own motion.' Bernette at 372. People v. Jordan (1967), 38 Ill.2d 83, 91. In the instant case it is not clear for what purpose the deceased's widow took the stand. The defense argues it was to engender sympathy. The State contends that it was for a valid purpose, but that since the trial judge sustained the defendant's objection, it was never able to set forth its purpose in calling the widow. The State does not give any reason in its brief to explain why Mrs. Koumoundouros was called to the stand. The State's brief reads, The People will not speculate as to the motive behind calling Ms. Koumoundouros to testify but neither should defendant speculate that every action of the prosecution is designed to deprive defendant of a fair trial. As the defendant asserts, before the sentencing hearing began the defendant had already been convicted of murder and attempted armed robbery by the trial court. The defendant's certified statement of conviction was read into the record. The only issues before the sentencing jury in stage one, during which Mrs. Koumoundouros testified, was whether the deceased was killed in the course of another felony and whether the defendant was 18 or more at the time of the offense. Since the deceased's widow was not present during the offense, she could not offer any testimony as to whether her husband's death occurred during the course of a forcible felony. She also did not know the defendant, so she could not offer any evidence as to the defendant's age. And since the trial had established that the defendant had committed the murder of the deceased, it was not necessary for her to be called as a life/death witness. We agree that the deceased's widow had no evidence of probative value to contribute to the establishment of the two factors the State was seeking to prove in stage one of the sentencing hearing. The State has not offered any valid purpose which was served by calling Mrs. Koumoundouros to the stand. The general rule, as we quoted previously, deals with testimony in a murder case that is elicited incidentally or evidence which is presented in such a manner as to cause the jury to believe it is material. In the instant case, the prosecutor specifically called the deceased's widow to the stand and asked her about her husband. Mrs. Koumoundouros testified that she was married to the deceased on September 7, 1977, the date of the murder. We believe that the admission of this testimony was error because, even though defense counsel's objection was sustained, the testimony was purposely presented in such a manner as to cause the jury to believe that the fact that the deceased left a widow was material to the determination of his eligibility for the death penalty.