Opinion ID: 4019158
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Expert Testimony on Footwear Impressions

Text: The defendant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State’s expert witness to testify that his shoes could have made footwear impressions found at the scene of the crimes. Expert testimony is admissible under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 702 “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” N.H. R. Ev. 702. The condition that scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge assist the trier of fact goes primarily to relevance. See United States v. Ford, 481 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing similar language in Federal Rule of Evidence 702). “Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) (quotation omitted). The decision to admit expert testimony “rests, in the first instance, within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Dow, 168 N.H. 492, 501 (2016) (quotation omitted). We reverse its determination “only if the appealing party can demonstrate that the ruling was untenable or unreasonable and that the error prejudiced the party’s case.” Id. (quotation omitted). Prior to trial, the defendant moved to exclude expert testimony that certain footwear impressions found at the scene could have been made by a specified footwear. He contended that the technique employed by the footwear identification examiner was unreliable and that the examiner’s opinion would not be helpful to the jury because she was not able to positively identify the footwear as the source of any impression. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, ruling that the methodology employed by the examiner was reliable and that the testimony “qualifies as a piece of circumstantial evidence, 15 which[,] in conjunction with other evidence[,] will be of assistance to the jury in determining who was present at the scene of the crime.” At the hearing, Emily Rice, a level II criminalist in the identification unit of the New Hampshire State Police Forensic Laboratory, testified regarding footwear comparison. She stated that footwear comparison involves comparing an unknown footwear impression to the outsoles of known footwear and rendering a conclusion about whether the known footwear is the source of the unknown impression. She stated that, in rendering those conclusions, she relies upon what is known as “class characteristics” and “individual characteristics.” “[C]lass characteristics” are features that are “shared by two or more items of footwear” that can be used to “eliminate a large number of shoes as having made an impression.” “[I]ndividual characteristics” are those “accidental, random characteristics” that can be used to separate “items from other items in the same class.” Rice testified that, in this case, she examined two different known shoes as well as unknown crime scene prints. She stated that she was not able to “assess any individual characteristics” in the crime scene prints. She agreed with defense counsel that her conclusion in this case with respect to the known shoes was that “they could have produced the” crime scene prints. She further agreed that, based upon her comparisons, her conclusion was that there was “a significant association of class characteristics.” It is undisputed on appeal that one of the known shoes examined by Rice was the defendant’s. The defendant contends that, because the expert could not conclusively identify his shoes as the cause of the footwear impressions, her testimony was of little assistance to the jury and should not have been allowed. We disagree. The overall purpose of Rule 702 is to ensure that a factfinder is presented with reliable and relevant evidence, not flawless evidence. State v. Langill, 157 N.H. 77, 87 (2008). “[A]n expert need not have an opinion on the ultimate question to be resolved to satisfy the relevance requirement.” United States v. Allen, 390 F.3d 944, 949 (7th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). Questions about the weight and credibility of expert testimony are left to the fact finders. See State v. Whittaker, 158 N.H. 762, 773 (2009) (“Provided that the trial court finds that the expert’s methodology is reliable, it is up to the fact finder to determine the weight and credibility to be accorded the expert’s testimony.”); see also Baker Valley Lumber v. Ingersoll-Rand, 148 N.H. 609, 615-16 (2002). Here, it was highly relevant that the defendant’s shoes contained a “significant association of class characteristics” to the impressions at the crime scene. Whether the defendant’s shoes could have made the impressions found at the scene of the crimes was probative of the defendant’s participation in the crimes. What Rice brought to the case that a lay jury could not was her general knowledge of footwear comparisons, and her ability to examine the 16 known and unknown shoeprints and identify any similar characteristics. Thus, Rice’s testimony that the shoes could have made the questioned impressions at the crime scene was relevant evidence because it made a fact of consequence more probable than it would be without the evidence. See N.H. R. Ev. 401. We conclude, therefore, that expert testimony on this issue satisfied the purpose of Rule 702 by providing evidence that could “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” N.H. R. Ev. 702. Our conclusion is consistent with the decisions of courts in other jurisdictions. See Ford, 481 F.3d at 218, 218-20 (concluding that district court properly found that expert shoeprint testimony that defendant’s shoes could not be ruled out as source of prints in question “would aid the jury in making comparisons between the soles of shoes found on or with the defendant and the imprints of soles found on surfaces at the crime scene”); United States v. Lloyd, 462 F.3d 510, 517 (6th Cir. 2006) (concluding that, despite fact that expert did not identify shoeprint as definitely matching defendant’s shoe, probative value of shoeprint evidence was high where defendant was arrested a short distance from crime scene wearing shoes with same tread design and dimensions of shoeprint left by suspect at crime scene); People v. Henne, 518 N.E.2d 1276, 1282 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (“[T]he fact that defendant’s boots, which he admits wearing [on the night of the crime] could have made the print is relevant.”). We conclude that the defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court’s decision to allow Rice’s testimony was untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion by admitting it. Finally, any issues raised in the defendant’s notice of appeal that he has not briefed are deemed waived. See State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (2003). Affirmed. DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, LYNN, and BASSETT, JJ., concurred. 17