Opinion ID: 1130765
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Construction of AS 09.16.010(c)

Text: The Alaska legislature adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in 1970. [11] Ch. 80, § 1, SLA 1970 (codified as amended at AS 09.16.010-.060). Alaska Statute 09.16.010(c) (1983) provides: There is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death. We hold that this statutory bar applies only to tortfeasors who act with the specific intent to cause the resultant harm. [12] We adopt this interpretation of intentional for two reasons. First, the legislature deleted the wilfully or wantonly language contained in the uniform act from which AS 09.16.010(c) was drawn. [13] In the absence of any legislative history indicating otherwise, we believe that this omission indicates that the legislature rejected a broader application of the statutory bar. See 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 48.04, at 22 (1992) (where specific language is omitted by the legislature, this is an indication that the legislature rejected this language). Second, we conclude that an expansive interpretation of intentional is incompatible with the comparative negligence principles introduced into the law of contribution by the enactment of the Tort Reform Act in 1986. Alaska Statute 09.17.900 defines fault to include acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to strict tort liability. (Emphasis added). In allocating a percentage of the total fault to each potentially liable party, AS 09.17.080(b) directs the trier of fact to consider  the nature of the conduct of each party at fault as well as the degree of the causal tie between the conduct and the damages claimed. (Emphasis added). The Tort Reform Act clearly contemplates a relative allocation of fault between all unintentional tortfeasors, whether negligent, grossly negligent or wilful and wanton. [14] When two statutes deal with the same or related subject matter, we strive to construe them as harmoniously as possible. See State, Dep't of Highways v. Green, 586 P.2d 595, 602-03 & n. 24 (Alaska 1978) (interpretation of one statutory provision is properly influenced by content of another provision addressing similar purposes or objects); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266-67, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1677-78, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981) (although the more recent of two inconsistent statutes may govern, statutes are not to be read as being inconsistent unless the sense and purpose of each statute cannot be preserved otherwise). By construing AS 09.16.010(c) to bar only intentional tortfeasors from seeking contribution, we preserve the sense and purpose of both acts. We conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that Borg-Warner, as a wilful and wanton tortfeasor, was barred from seeking contribution under AS 09.16.010(c).