Opinion ID: 2103389
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: J.W.(Victims' Uncle)

Text: Appellant argues the trial court erred by permitting testimony from the victims' uncle, J.W. The uncle, a prosecution witness, testified that he asked D.Y. what happened, who touched her, and D.Y. pointed to Appellant. Appellant objected, claiming the testimony was hearsay, but the trial court determined the uncle was being asked about what he said and saw, not what a third-party said, and allowed him to testify to his recollection. KRE 801 defines a statement as: (1) An oral or written assertion; or (2) Nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. (Emphasis added). We have no difficulty in concluding that D.Y.'s nonverbal conduct pointing at Appellant following J.W.'s question was the equivalent of a verbal assertion by D.Y. that Fred Colvard touched me. Thus, the nonverbal assertion falls under the normal hearsay rules for the admission of evidence. In support of the statement's admission, the Commonwealth cites us to KRE 801A(a)(3), Preston v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 398, 403 (Ky.1966), and our previous ruling in Owens v. Commonwealth, 950 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Ky.1997), to the effect that once a witness is allowed to testify that he made an identifying statement, further proof by other witnesses that he did in fact make it is just as relevant and competent as would be defensive proof to the effect that he did not make it. (internal citations omitted). KRE 801A(a)(3) provides as follows: Prior statements of witnesses. A statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness, if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is examined concerning the statement, with a foundation laid as required by KRE 613, and the statement is: . . . (3) One of identification of a person made after perceiving the person. (emphasis added). While D.Y. did testify at trial, the Commonwealth fails to cite us to D.Y.'s testimony wherein she was examined concerning the statement she made to her uncle, and our review of the testimony discloses no such examination of the child. Nor do we find compliance with the foundation requirements contained in KRE 613. Further, the uncle testified prior to D.Y. Accordingly, the elements for admissibility under the rule are not met, and the uncle's testimony relating the statement was admitted in error.