Opinion ID: 423
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court's Dismissal of Revell's Complaint

Text: Erickson moved to dismiss Revell's claims and the Port Authority moved for judgment on the pleadings. [7] They argued, among other things, that probable cause existed for the arrest because § 926A was inapplicable, given Revell's overnight stay in New Jersey. They also argued that Erickson was entitled to qualified immunity. The District Court noted that its first task was to determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 926A created an enforceable personal right, an issue of first impression. (App. at 44.) The Court answered that question by holding that, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), Revell was required to frame his § 1983 claim in terms of the Fourth Amendment, as opposed to § 926A, because he sought damages for an allegedly improper arrest. In other words, the Court concluded that, [b]ecause individuals already have a method of recovering damages pursuant to § 1983 if they are arrested or charged without probable cause, [i.e., a claim under the Fourth Amendment,] it is unnecessary and, indeed, improper ... to conclude that § 1983 provides a separate or alternative remedy for a violation of § 926A. (App. at 49.) The Court thus dismissed Revell's § 1983 claim for the alleged violation of § 926A, but it granted him leave to file an amended complaint stating a Fourth Amendment claim. The Court also dismissed Revell's procedural due process claims for damages and injunctive relief. [8] The Court, relying on Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), explained that, if constitutionally adequate state procedures were available to remedy the deprivation of Revell's property, he could not succeed on his due process claim. Since Revell neither availed himself of state law remedies nor explained why those remedies would be futile or constitutionally inadequate, the Court dismissed that claim. However, it granted Revell leave to amend his complaint to allege that the Port Authority's postdeprivation remedies for the return of seized property are constitutionally inadequate. (App. at 53.) On June 29, 2007, the District Court entered an order dismissing Revell's complaint and allowing him leave to amend pursuant to the memorandum opinion.