Opinion ID: 774919
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 12 Viezca's first claim on appeal alleges that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. sec. 846. We have explained that a defendant who attacks the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction faces a nearly insurmountable burden. United States v. Phillips, 239 F.3d 829, 842 (7th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). In reviewing Viezca's claim, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. See United States v. Gardner, 238 F.3d 878, 879 (7th Cir. 2001). Additionally, we will overturn the jury's verdict only if the record contains no evidence from which the jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Jefferson, 252 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). 13 To prove that Viezca was a part of a conspiracy, the government had to demonstrate that a conspiracy existed and that Viezca knowingly agreed to join it. See United States v. Albarran, 233 F.3d 972, 976 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the government must show that there is substantial evidence that the particular defendant in question knew of the illegal objective of the conspiracy and agreed to participate in its achievement.) (quotation omitted). The government may prove these elements entirely by way of circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Pagan, 196 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2000) (All that is necessary is enough circumstantial evidence to support, beyond reasonable doubt, an inference that the defendants agreed among themselves to distribute drugs.) (quotation omitted). Furthermore, the requisite agreement between co-conspirators need not be explicit and no overt act is required. See United States v. Sanchez, 251 F.3d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 2001) ([I]n the murky world of illicit drugs, conspiracies are, by necessity, loosely-knit associations.). 14 Viezca contends that the evidence presented by the government at his trial established nothing more than the fact that he was an intermediary between a willing buyer, Terry Albrecht, and a willing seller, Ronald Mendoza. Alternatively, Viezca argues that the only possible conspiracy established by the government's evidence was one between himself and Albrecht, but that because Albrecht was acting as a government agent, no such conspiracy is legally recognizable. We do not agree with either of these arguments. 15 From the initial meeting between Viezca and Albrecht in November of 1996, to their final conversation in April of 1997, Viezca's role exceeded that of simply bringing together a buyer and seller of cocaine. Despite Viezca's comment at the initial meeting that he did not do shit right now, the evidence collected from the extensive government surveillance conducted in this case demonstrated to the jury that Viezca made repeated efforts to establish, maintain, and facilitate what he and his brother both thought would be a long term illegal business relationship with Albrecht. Thus, we find that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Viezca and Mendoza forged an agreement to distribute cocaine to Albrecht, and that therefore, Viezca was guilty of conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine.