Opinion ID: 788144
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rubens Adequately Preserved Her Objection To Fensterstock's Affidavit

Text: 22 The defendants argue that Rubens did not preserve her objection to the admission of Fensterstock's affidavit because the objections she made before the District Court focused on prohibiting Fensterstock from testifying at trial, rather that on striking the admission of his affidavit in support of summary judgment. This argument fails to acknowledge that in deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court may rely only on material that would be admissible at trial. Azrielli v. Cohen Law Offices, 21 F.3d 512, 517 (2d Cir.1994). Thus, any argument that Fensterstock's testimony at trial would be inadmissible was also, necessarily, an argument that his testimony through affidavit in support of summary judgment was inadmissible. 23 Rubens argued for preclusion of Fensterstock's testimony in her opposition to the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and in an affidavit submitted in support thereof. She argued that allowing Fensterstock to testify would be prejudicial because he acted as judge and jury in the arbitration so that a fact-finder in the malpractice case would see Mr. Fensterstock as the person who is supposed to be fair and neutral. She also argued that allowing Fensterstock to testify would usurp the role of the judge and jury in the malpractice suit: it is the job of this judge and jury to make the legal and factual decisions. By these arguments Rubens raised the issue of the admissibility of Fensterstock's testimony sufficiently to preserve it for appeal. Cf. Albany Savings Bank, FSB v. Halpin, 117 F.3d 669, 672 (2d Cir.1997) (appellant adequately raised issue of contract release's ambiguity to preserve for appeal claim that parol evidence should be admitted). 24