Opinion ID: 2373395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prosecutor's Cross-Examination of Mr. Dorsey

Text: Carlos Dorsey was the only witness for the defense. He admitted that he had purchased heroin on the day of his arrest  in fact, he had pleaded guilty to the second count of the indictment, which charged him with possession of heroin  but he said that the person who had sold it to him was not appellant Carter, and that he had never seen either Carter or Day before he was arrested. On cross-examination the prosecutor asked him: Q. You know the consequences of jeopardizing a supply of heroin, don't you, if you testify against someone? ... You know the practice on the street, don't you? A. The practice on the street? Q. In terms of knowing where to get your drugs, isn't that true? A. Yes. Q. And you usually go to [a] regular person, don't you? A. Generally. Q. That's right. In your neighborhood? A. Right. Q. And you know that ... there's a lot of street talk on the street between dealers; isn't that true? A. True. Q. And you know that if you were to testify against someone, and the word got around, that maybe it would jeopardize your future supply; isn't that true? A. Not  no, not really. Q. Or that maybe the word would get around to other people, or maybe something would happen  At this point Day's counsel objected. The court overruled the objection, but suggested that the prosecutor rephrase the question to make it a little more precise.... What you need to do is take that last question and put it directly to the witness, ask him directly what you mean. The questioning then resumed: Q. I'm just saying that if you were in court or in a situation where you had to identify somebody and say, you know, they're the ones, they're the ones who are guilty. That you would be afraid in some way that that might jeopardize your supply of heroin, or that you might face other consequences in the street, that you know that people talk in the streets; isn't that true? A. In some cases it's like that. Carter now claims that this line of questioning clearly implied that the witness was testifying because he was threatened by the defendant or that the defendant suborned perjury. Since there was no factual predicate for the questions, he contends, the trial court erred in allowing them to be asked. He also argues that these questions impermissibly placed evidence of other crimes before the jury, contrary to the teaching of Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 15-16, 331 F.2d 85, 89-90 (1964). Carter places great reliance on Ali v. United States, 520 A.2d 306 (D.C.1987), which at first glance appears to be quite similar to this case. In Ali the prosecutor questioned a defense witness about a conversation in the hallway of the courthouse in which the witness was supposedly overheard saying that [the defendant] had asked him to testify falsely.... Id. at 315. The witness denied saying this, and there was no other evidence that such a conversation ever took place. Later, during his rebuttal testimony, a detective said that he had seen the defendant in the courthouse cafeteria walking up to his witnesses and putting his face right up and say[ing], `Now remember this.' The detective added, however, That's the only thing I overheard. Id. We held that the detective's observations constituted a slim reed upon which to hang the inferences of [the defendant's] misconduct which the prosecutor placed before the jury in his closing argument, and that asking these apparently baseless questions relating to the alleged hallway conversation constituted prosecutorial misconduct. Id. This case is different from Ali in one critical respect. In Ali the prosecutor, through questioning and argument, insinuated without foundation that the defendant, by intimidating the witness, was striving to undermine the very fairness and integrity of the judicial process.... Id. at 316; see also Menzies v. Procunier, 743 F.2d 281, 289 (5th Cir.1984) (prosecutor improperly suggested, through questioning and closing argument, that defendant was involved in attempt by other persons to frighten witness into dropping charges). In the case at bar, however, the prosecutor's questions did not imply in any way that either defendant had tried to intimidate Dorsey into testifying falsely. The questions referred only to other people on the street without identifying anyone in particular. To the extent that the prosecutor may have pointed an accusing finger, it was pointed at Dorsey's usual supplier of drugs, his regular person. [7] We find a useful analogy here in the case law that has evolved under Drew v. United States, supra . Drew prohibits the admission of evidence of prior bad acts by the defendant unless such evidence is relevant to certain specific issues, such as motive or intent. We have held, however, that in order to be characterized as Drew -type evidence, the acts portrayed must be minimally in the nature of a criminal offense. Wheeler v. United States, 470 A.2d 761, 769 (D.C.1983); accord, e.g., Bigelow v. United States, 498 A.2d 210, 212 (D.C. 1985). Conduct that is merely strange or suspicious, but not criminal, does not meet the Wheeler test. Williams v. United States, 549 A.2d 328, 332 (D.C.1988). Using the same analysis, we hold that cross-examination of a defense witness by a prosecutor suggesting that the witness has been intimidated into testifying falsely does not come within the Ali prohibition unless there is some minimal reason to suspect that the defendant was involved in the intimidation. [8] Because the prosecutor's questions here did not do that, we find no basis in Ali for reversal. [9] This is not to say, of course, that the prosecutor's questions were entirely proper. The Ali case merely applies to a particular situation the general rule that a cross-examiner must have some sort of factual predicate for a potentially prejudicial question. See, e.g., Sherer v. United States, 470 A.2d 732, 738 (D.C.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931, 105 S.Ct. 325, 83 L.Ed.2d 262 (1984). The government argues that no factual predicate was needed here because the prosecutor's questions were intended to explore Mr. Dorsey's possible bias. This is too sweeping an argument. Although bias is always an appropriate subject of cross-examination, Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 855 (D.C.1978), the right to probe for bias on cross-examination is not absolute. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). The party posing the question must proffer to the court some facts which support a genuine belief that the witness is biased in the manner asserted ... that there is a specific personal bias on the part of the witness ... and that the proposed questions are probative of bias. Porter v. United States, 561 A.2d 994, 996 (D.C. 1989) (citations omitted); accord, Hayward v. United States, 612 A.2d 224, 227 (D.C. 1992). Thus the fact that the prosecutor's questions may have sought to establish bias does not nullify the requirement that such questions must have a factual basis. On the other hand, case law in the District of Columbia is fairly lenient in describing how that requirement may be met. Although an attorney attempting to show a witness' bias may not ask questions that are `totally groundless' ... a question based on a `well reasoned suspicion' rather than an `improbable flight of fancy' is permissible. McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 44-45 (D.C.1991) (citations omitted). We note also that some courts have allowed questions about intimidation of a witness to be asked without a factual predicate. See Wycoff v. Nix, 869 F.2d 1111, 1116 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 863, 110 S.Ct. 179, 107 L.Ed.2d 135 (1989); United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1111-1112 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971, 106 S.Ct. 336, 88 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985); Commonwealth v. Floyd, 494 Pa. 537, 545-46, 431 A.2d 984, 989 (1981). Whether these and similar cases can be reconciled with Porter and Hayward, however, is by no means an easy question to answer. We conclude in this case that we need not answer it. Regardless of whether the prosecutor's questions had a sufficient factual basis, we are satisfied that they did not prejudice Carter because they did not state or imply that he was in any way involved in the supposed street talk or in any threat to jeopardize [Dorsey's] supply of heroin or to inflict other consequences. Thus, even if the questions were improper (which we do not decide), they do not require reversal.