Opinion ID: 2218276
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: conduct of the defendants as a nuisance

Text: In their third assignment of error, the defendants claim that the trial court erred in determining that their conduct constituted a public nuisance under Nebraska constitutional or statutory law. A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B at 87 (1979). Circumstances that may sustain a holding that such interference is unreasonable include whether the conduct is proscribed by statute. Id.; Prosser and Keaton on the Law of Torts, Nuisance § 90 at 643-44 (5th ed. 1984) (public nuisance comprehends a miscellaneous and diversified group of minor criminal offenses, based on some interference with the interests of the community [and] includes interferences with ... public morals). This court has consistently held that establishments performing gambling-related offenses can constitute public nuisances. See, City of Omaha v. Danner, 186 Neb. 701, 185 N.W.2d 869 (1971) (establishment was public nuisance because of various activities, including gambling); State ex rel. Carlson v. Hatfield, 183 Neb. 157, 158 N.W.2d 612 (1968) (establishment was a gathering place for gamblers); State ex rel. Johnson v. Hash, 144 Neb. 495, 13 N.W.2d 716 (1944) (places where gambling is publicly and continuously permitted are public nuisances); State, ex rel. Hunter v. The Araho, 137 Neb. 389, 289 N.W. 545 (1940) (a place kept for gambling purposes is a public nuisance); Hill v. Pierson, 45 Neb. 503, 63 N.W. 835 (1895) (a gambling house is a public nuisance). The defendants contend that no criminal offenses were committed because their conduct did not violate § 28-1107(1). Repeated again, that section provides: A person commits the offense of possession of a gambling device if he or she manufactures, sells, transports, places, possesses, or conducts or negotiates any transaction affecting or designed to affect ownership, custody, or use of any gambling device, knowing that it shall be used in the advancement of unlawful gambling activity. The elements relative to the defendants, and those which the State must prove exist by a preponderance of the evidence, see Uhing v. City of Oakland, 236 Neb. 58, 459 N.W.2d 187 (1990), are that the defendants (1) possessed a gambling device (2) knowing it would be used in the advancement of unlawful gambling activity. In regard to the first element, the defendants do not dispute that they possessed the devices in question, but, rather, they claim that the machines in question are not gambling devices. As relevant to the machines seized in this action, gambling device is defined as any device, machine, paraphernalia, writing, paper, instrument, article, or equipment that is used or usable for engaging in gambling, whether that activity consists of gambling between persons or gambling by a person involving the playing of a machine. Gambling device shall also include any mechanical gaming device, computer gaming device, electronic gaming device, or video gaming device which has the capability of awarding something of value.... § 28-1101(5). This definition necessarily requires further deference to the definition of gambling, which is defined in pertinent part as when [a] person ... bets something of value upon the outcome of a future event, which outcome is determined by an element of chance.... § 28-1101(4). Defendants argue that players of these devices do not bet something of value on the future outcome of an event, but, rather, a player merely buys the right to possess the machine according to certain terms, one of which is the possibility of longer play depending upon the outcome of the machine's operation. Brief for appellants at 26. A similar argument was rejected in State v. Two IGT Video Poker Games, 237 Neb. 145, 152, 465 N.W.2d 453, 459 (1991), wherein this court stated: The 25 cents used to activate the machines is clearly something of value. The free replay credits awarded by the machines are a credit or promise involving extension of a service or entertainment and are something of value. [Citations omitted.] The player of the game is betting his or her 25 cents (or accumulated replay credits) on the outcome of the play, while the machine is betting an extension of entertainment. Both parties are therefore betting something of value on the outcome, which is determined by an element of chance. None of the remaining exceptions to § 28-1101(4) are relevant here. Absent an exception, the seized devices are gambling devices within the meaning of the statute. The final element of § 28-1107(1) is whether the defendants knew the devices were being used in the advancement of unlawful gambling activity. The existence of a required intent, knowledge, or other state of mind may be established through circumstantial evidence. Two IGT Video Poker Games, supra ; State v. Ayres, 236 Neb. 824, 464 N.W.2d 316 (1991). As stated in Two IGT Video Poker Games, playing these machines qualifies as engaging in gambling activity. The fact that the devices were seen in bars being played by patrons evidences a knowledge that the defendants knew that these machines, having no other purpose except as gambling devices, were used in gambling activity. The evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendants violated § 28-1107(1).