Opinion ID: 1454062
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Materially Adverse Employment Action

Text: Despite the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on one element of Lewis's claim, summary judgment is still appropriate if Lewis cannot provide evidence to support all elements of the claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see, e.g., Koszola v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 385 F.3d 1104, 1111 (7th Cir.2004) (citing Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir.2003)). Lewis must also demonstrate a materially adverse employment action that resulted from the alleged discrimination. See Rhodes v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir.2004) (Whether the plaintiff proceeds by the direct or indirect method of proof, [s]he must show a materially adverse employment action.) (citing Haugerud v. Amery Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 678, 691 (7th Cir.2001)). Although we define adverse employment action broadly, not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action. For an employment action to be actionable, it must be a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibility, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. Bell v. E.P.A., 232 F.3d 546, 555 (7th Cir.2000) (citing Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998); Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc., 200 F.3d 507, 511 (7th Cir.1999); Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 440 (7th Cir.1996) (internal quotations omitted)). We have noted that materially adverse employment action can be categorized into three groups of cases involving: (1) the employee's current wealth such as compensation, fringe benefits, and financial terms of employment including termination; (2) the employee's career prospects thus impacting the employee's future wealth; and (3) changes to the employee's work conditions including subjecting her to humiliating, degrading, unsafe, unhealthy, or otherwise significant negative alteration in [her] work place environment. Herrnreiter v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 744-45 (7th Cir.2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The purpose of the adverse employment action requirement is to provide a reasonable limiting principle for the type of conduct actionable under the statute. Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 780 (7th Cir.2006). We use the adverse employment action requirement in order to distinguish meritorious cases from trivial personnel action[s] brought by irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee[s]. Herrnreiter, 315 F.3d at 745 (citations omitted). We do not condone bigotry or hatred, but we are interpreting an employment discrimination statute, not canons of individual virtue. See Hunt v. City of Markham, Illinois, 219 F.3d 649, 653-54 (7th Cir.2000) (citations omitted). Lewis's proposed adverse employment actions are the loss of two days of overtime totaling approximately $1,000 and the loss of the experience of training on the IMF Detail that she claims to be a once in a lifetime training event. The loss of the training opportunity dovetails into an additional argument that Lewis has also lost future employment opportunities because of her exclusion from the IMF Detail. The defendants counter that the amount of lost pay is trivialonly two days of overtimeand that Lewis had no right to the overtime. They also question the value of the IMF Detail training experience in Lewis's career as Lewis was able to participate in other large detail events and did not list these other training events on her resume. Our circuit has not directly addressed the issue of whether a denial of overtime is an adverse employment action sufficient to implicate Title VII. We have held that a denial of a raise can be an adverse employment action while the denial of a more transient payment such as a bonus is not. Barricks v. Eli Lilly and Co., 481 F.3d 556, 559 (7th Cir.2007) (citing Farrell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 2005); Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep't of Natural Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1030 (7th Cir.2003); Hunt, 219 F.3d at 654). The difference is that raises are a normal and expected element of an employee's salary, while bonuses generally are `sporadic, irregular, unpredictable, and wholly discretionary on the part of the employer.' Fyfe v. City of Fort Wayne, 241 F.3d 597, 602 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hunt, 219 F.3d at 654). Depending on the type of work, overtime can be a significant and recurring part of an employee's total earnings similar to a recurring raise or it could be insignificant and nonrecurring like a discretionary bonus. The IMF Detail in Washington, D.C. in September 2002 was a one time event. However, as Chief Maurer's memorandum noted, Chicago had its own IMF meeting scheduled for November 2002. Additionally, large public gatherings requiring significant police presence are recurring events in a large city like Chicago. Lewis can construct from the evidence an argument that by denying her the opportunity to participate in the IMF Detail, she lost her ability to move forward in the component of her career of being a police officer at recurring large scale public gatherings. In turn, she can argue that she has lost the potential to earn many hours of overtime, not just the mere two days that she lost in September 2002. Consequently, we conclude that Lewis can demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she has experienced an adverse employment action. We must add two final points before we conclude our consideration of adverse employment actions. First, as Title VII prohibits discrimination as to compensation, terms, conditions and privileges of employment, it is the material, sufficiently important alterations of the employment relationship that qualify as adverse employment action. Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Illinois, 479 F.3d 908, 916-17 (7th Cir.2007) (citations omitted). A strict adherence to labels leads to a meaningless cry of phrases such as bonus or salary without reaching the critical issue of whether the alleged discrimination caused a material change in the employment relationship. Second, although the adverse employment action requirement is a limiting principle within the statute, we cannot allow the need for a limiting principle to inadvertently create a loophole for discriminatory actions by employers. Adverse employment actions should not be defined so narrowly as to give an employer a license to discriminate. Farrell, 421 F.3d at 614. An employer's actions which deprived [the employee] of compensation which [s]he otherwise would have earned clearly constitute adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII. Bass v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Orange County, Florida, 256 F.3d 1095, 1118 (11th Cir.2001); cf. Phelan, 463 F.3d at 780 (finding an adverse employment action when the employer terminated the employee for four months despite the fact that the employer eventually reinstated the employee and provided full back pay). We seek to avoid both trivial personnel action[s] brought by irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee[s], Herrnreiter, 315 F.3d at 745 (citations omitted), and unlawful discrimination by employers. An employer cannot discriminate against an employee and then hide behind the argument that the employee's deprivation was not material. [T]he `primary objective' of Title VII `is not to provide redress but to avoid harm.' Phelan, 463 F.3d at 780 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998)).