Opinion ID: 2974773
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Misstatements of the evidence

Text: -7- No. 07-5330 United States v. Watts The alleged misstatements that Watts points to all arise out of attempts by the prosecutor to convey the information that Watts purportedly provided to Agent Kidd during their unrecorded conversation. Watts claims that these statements by the prosecutor represent either inaccurate or completely fabricated accounts of Kidd’s testimony. Specifically, Watts objected to the following statement by the prosecutor of what Watts purportedly told Agent Kidd: Yeah, I downloaded child pornography. In fact, I downloaded child pornography on both computers. I looked at normal pornography, I looked at child pornography. I searched for child pornography. In fact, I knew it was on there. In fact, I knew there were several videos on there, at least a couple of which I knew contained child pornography. What Watts takes issue with are the prosecutor’s contentions that Watts actively “searched” for child pornography and that there were “at least a couple” of videos containing child pornography stored on the computer. A review of Kidd’s testimony, however, supports the propriety of the prosecutor’s statement. Kidd testified about the two different computers used by Watts in chronological order. With respect to the first—the home-built computer—Kidd testified that Watts acknowledged to me that he did in fact use that computer to surf the Internet and to access pornographic Websites and to download both adult and child pornography. He told me he would delete these images, he would look at them a couple times and then delete them. Watts allegedly told Kidd that he “thought he had erased all of the pornographic images from the specific computer.” According to Kidd, Watts then told him that with the second, eMachine computer he would actually come in late at night, sometimes after midnight, would be drinking, would get on the computer and would surf the -8- No. 07-5330 United States v. Watts Internet, again looking for porn to include adult and child pornography. He would go to the LimeWire program and type in words such as “young” and “video,” just to see what was out there and what would pop up. And images of child pornography would come up. He would download those, along with the adult pornography. Again, he would look at those a couple of times, and then he would delete those off the computer. In this instance, with the eMachine, however, he told me there would be in fact probably be 12 to 13 short video clips that he did not have time to erase. And there should be one, if not two short video clips containing child pornography, and that would be saved under—I think the path he gave me was computer, programs, LimeWire, and then was saved under magnet and root in the subfiles. The prosecutor asked whether this meant that Watts actually told Kidd “how you would get to the images on the computer?” Kidd responded: “Correct, he told me what was on there and where it would be found.” Although Watts correctly points out that Kidd never explicitly said that Watts “searched” for child pornography and that Kidd actually said that there would be “one, if not two” videos, rather than “at least a couple,” we conclude that the prosecutor’s statements were not improper. When she used the word “searched” and stated that there were “at least a couple” of videos, the prosecutor was “merely paraphrasing the meaning of the conversation” between Kidd and Watts. See United States v. Stover, 474 F.3d 904, 915 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the prosecutor’s statement was not improper where it was presented as a quotation, even though it was not actually said during the conversation at issue). -9- No. 07-5330 United States v. Watts In Stover, this court held that the prosecutor’s paraphrasing was not improper because, “[a]lthough it is not the only conceivable meaning [of the conversation], it is a meaning that is supported by the evidence.” Id. Both of the statements objected to by Watts in the instant case represent meanings that are strongly supported by Kidd’s testimony. Kidd did not use the word “searched,” but he did say that Watts confessed to using the home-built computer to “surf the Internet and to access pornographic Websites and to download both adult and child pornography,” and on the eMachine computer Watts would “get on the computer and would surf the Internet, again looking for porn to include adult and child pornography. He would go to the LimeWire program and type in words such as ‘young’ and ‘video,’ just to see what was out there and what would pop up.” A highly supportable meaning of these statements is that Watts was searching for child pornography. Moreover, the difference between “at least a couple” of videos (what the prosecutor said) and “one, if not two” videos (Kidd’s testimony) is negligible in the overall context of the trial. Although “at least a couple” could lead one to believe that there were more than two videos to be found on Watts’s computer, it does not so overstate Kidd’s testimony (that Watt’s told him there would be “one, if not two” videos) as to be unsupported by the evidence. See Stover, 474 F.3d at 915 . We thus conclude that neither of these statements was improper. Watts also takes issue with the following six statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument: (1) “Yeah, I downloaded child pornography. In fact, I downloaded child pornography on both computers,” (2) “Yeah, when I looked at pornography, including child pornography, I used LimeWire,” (3) “When I downloaded child pornography or any pornography, I would save it using the file path,” (4) “I searched for child pornography. I was just curious. I - 10 - No. 07-5330 United States v. Watts wanted to know what was out there. I typed words such as ‘young,’ such as ‘video,’” (5) “I didn’t just look at child pornography using the eMachine computer . . . . I looked at it on the previous one, too,” and (6) “Yeah, I used it to look at child pornography. I think I deleted it, but I’m not sure. You may still find it on there, but I believe I deleted it.” According to Watts, “[i]f one were to listen to the prosecutor’s version of what the defendant said, every phrase the defendant stated would begin with ‘Yeah, when I look at child pornography.’” As with the “searched” and the “at least a couple” statements addressed earlier, the prosecutor in each of these six objected-to statements was paraphrasing the testimony of Agent Kidd. Each of the six statements, moreover, is supported by the evidence presented in Kidd’s testimony. According to that testimony, Watts told Kidd that (1) he downloaded child pornography on both computers, (2) he used LimeWire to find the pornography, (3) he used a specific file path to save the pornographic files he found, (4) he would type in the words “young” and “video” in order to “see what was out there,” (5) he used both of the computers to look at pornography, and (6) he deleted some of the files, but thought there might still be some on the eMachine computer. Although she occasionally prefaced her statements with an introductory comment similar to “when I looked at child pornography,” all of the prosecutor’s statements presented “meaning[s] that [are] supported by the evidence.” See Stover, 474 F.3d at 915. We therefore conclude that none of the prosecutor’s alleged misstatements regarding Watts’s confession to Kidd were improper. 2. Statements regarding Watts’s right not to testify Watts also asserts that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when she allegedly made two statements regarding his right not to testify. Specifically, during her initial closing argument, the - 11 - No. 07-5330 United States v. Watts prosecutor said: “Ladies and gentlemen, every other witness that came up here says they absolutely didn’t download child pornography. You know what the defendant said? Yeah, I downloaded child pornography.” Then, during her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor said: Ladies and gentlemen, you heard me ask every single one of those other people who came up there whether they were the ones that were downloading child pornography on the computer. And you heard their responses: “Absolutely not. Absolutely not.” That is not what the defendant said. He said “Absolutely, yes, I did.” Watts now argues that these two statements, which compared the content of his conversation with Agent Kidd to the trial testimony of the witnesses, “could mislead a jury . . . as to when and if [the] defendant testified, or if they, the jury, were not privy to some testimony.” Viewing these two comments “within the context of the trial as a whole,” Watts’s argument is meritless. See United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, 543-44 (6th Cir. 2004) (examining the context surrounding allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in rejecting the defendant’s claims). Throughout her closing and rebuttal arguments, the prosecutor made repeated reference to what Watts told Agent Kidd. The closing argument as a whole makes clear that the statements that Watts now objects to were the prosecutor’s attempt to paraphrase Kidd’s testimony, which in turn represented the only evidence of what Watts had said regarding the crime in question. Moreover, in light of the fact that the trial lasted only one and a half days, it is implausible that the jury was somehow misled about whether there was some other testimony that the jury did not get to hear. The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The typical claim of prosecutorial misconduct with respect to a defendant’s right not to testify arises when the prosecutor - 12 - No. 07-5330 United States v. Watts uses that silence as substantive evidence against the defendant. See Girts v. Yanai, 501 F.3d 743, 756, 758 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding misconduct sufficient for reversal where the prosecutor made three statements that “attached a negative connotation to the exercise of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent”). In Girts, this court concluded that the prosecutor’s statements “were improper, misleading and highly prejudicial because they implied that [the defendant] was obligated to testify and to speak to the police.” Id. at 756. No such implication arises from the prosecutor’s statements in the instant case. In paraphrasing what Watts actually told Agent Kidd, the prosecutor did not “attach[] a negative connotation to” Watts’s Fifth Amendment right. See id. Instead, the statements made by the prosecutor were supported by the evidence of Kidd’s testimony and represent not silence, but rather admissions on the part of Watts. We conclude that Watts’s challenge to the statements that allegedly implicate his right not to testify is without merit. 3. Statements regarding Watts’s honesty Watts further alleges that the prosecutor improperly vouched for his honesty during her rebuttal closing argument. Specifically, he objects to the prosecutor’s statement that when Watts spoke with Agent Kidd, “[h]e was being very cooperative, and he was telling the truth. I have to commend him for at least telling the truth to Special Agent Kidd when he came to ask the questions.” The government replies by pointing out that the prosecutor’s statement was in direct response to Watts’s closing argument, wherein his trial counsel said: People, why would anybody confess to a federal felony to a cop when they walked in. “Hey FBI. I’m going to ask you some questions.” “Oh, yeah, I did it.” - 13 - No. 07-5330 United States v. Watts It’s ludicrous to believe that the gentleman confessed to anything. I told you in [my] opening statement that I believe the government, specifically Special Agent Kidd, he drew some conclusions early on to some very specific questions. According to the government, the prosecutor’s statement was not improper vouching, but was a permissible response to the attempt to attack Agent Kidd’s credibility. “Improper vouching occurs when a prosecutor supports the credibility of a witness by indicating a personal belief in the witness’s credibility[,] thereby placing the prestige of the office of the United State Attorney behind that witness.” United States v. Jackson, 473 F.3d 660, 670 (6th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The full context of the prosecutor’s statement is as follows: Why would someone confess to a federal crime? It makes no sense, says Mr. Benge. Why in the world would anybody say, “Yeah I was looking at child pornography on the computer” when the FBI comes and asks if you know anything about anything improper that might be on the computer? Why in the world would you do that, he says? The reason that you do that is because you’re guilty of doing that. Now, you or I can’t sit there and say what was going through his head. He was being cooperative, and he was telling the truth. I have to commend him for at least telling the truth to Special Agent Kidd when he came to ask the questions. Why would you confess? You would confess because that’s what you did. A review of the prosecutor’s statement indicates that she was responding to Watts’s direct attack on the credibility of Kidd’s testimony and the sufficiency of Kidd’s investigation. The statement was not “founded upon an implication that the prosecutor personally believed [Watts] or - 14 - No. 07-5330 United States v. Watts knew of evidence not before the jury that demonstrated [his] truthfulness.” See Jackson, 473 F.3d at 672. Rather, the statement was founded on the fact that Watts, through his closing argument, had placed Agent Kidd’s testimony and the accompanying veracity of Watts’s confession at issue. Moreover, we are not aware of any authority prohibiting the prosecutor from vouching for the credibility of what is purportedly the defendant’s own testimony, as opposed to that of a witness for the prosecution. We conclude that the prosecutor’s statement regarding the truthfulness of Watts’s confession to Kidd was not improper vouching.