Opinion ID: 3032281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Reasonableness Test

Text: [5] We conclude that the entry was reasonable in this case, even though a literal knock was not made. First, there was UNITED STATES v. COMBS 7189 reason for the officers to be concerned for their safety. The house was equipped with security cameras and flood lights. Windows were papered over, suggesting that the occupants of the home were concerned with protecting their illegal methamphetamine laboratory. See U.S. v. Cline, 349 F.3d 1276, 1289-90 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding the presence of surveillance cameras a factor in favor of the reasonableness of law enforcement’s method of entry). In addition, after arriving at the scene, Lieutenant Smith noticed smoke coming from the chimney and what he thought to be an open flame at a window, indicating that the occupants may have been cooking methamphetamine—a dangerous process of mixing several highly explosive chemicals over an open flame.4 Given these circumstances, it was reasonable for Lieutenant Smith to limit the amount of time his officers spent outside but within arm’s reach of the house.5 [6] Second, the officers announced their presence to the extent possible given their legitimate safety concerns. They parked in front of the house in a marked police car with the overhead lights flashing. Lieutenant Smith repeatedly announced over a loudspeaker, “Anchorage Police with a warrant for 1502 West 32nd Avenue.” Given the small size of the house, the time of day, the officer’s knowledge that there was at least one occupant awake in the house, and that officers on the other side of the house heard the announcement, the district court’s finding that “the residents of Combs’ small home heard the police announce their presence and demand 4 See Methamphetamine Laboratory Identification and Hazards, United States Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs7/7341/#hazards (brochure describing hazards involved in producing methamphetamine). 5 We take care to note that “[t]he officers’ concerns were not based on generalizations or stereotypes of drug dealers or narcotics investigations, but rather on particularized, articulable, and reliable information.” U.S. v. Bynum, 362 F.3d 574 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, our analysis is in line with the Supreme Court’s rejection of categorical exceptions for drug cases. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997). 7190 UNITED STATES v. COMBS entry and disregarded that request” was not clearly erroneous. Moreover the occupants of the home could have had no doubt that the police had arrived to search their residence as the announcements repeatedly gave the street address of their home. Given these circumstances, we find that law enforcement’s actions were reasonable and the warrant’s execution complied with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. We do not suggest that the absence of any of these factors would compel a contrary conclusion. The factors we have listed are simply part of our “case by case” examination. Just as it is not permissible to “turn[ ] the notion of a reasonable time under all the circumstances into a set of sub-rules,” likewise it is not appropriate to turn the knock and announce requirement “into a set of sub-rules.” Banks, 540 U.S. at 41. “[A] categorical scheme on the general reasonableness analysis threatens to distort the ‘totality of the circumstances’ principle, by replacing a stress on revealing facts with resort to pigeon holes.” Id. at 42. III. Our original opinion did not address Combs’ assertion of Sixth Amendment error. Because Combs did not challenge his sentence on Sixth Amendment grounds in the district court, we grant a “limited remand” pursuant to United States v. Ameline, No. 02-30326, slip op. at 6368-71 (9th Cir. June 1, 2005) (en banc). AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.