Opinion ID: 2612406
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to exclude narcotics evidence.

Text: (5) Defendant argues that both the circumstances leading to the warrant and the paraphernalia and pistol found in the search should also have been excluded as irrelevant and prejudicial. He claims the warrant and the seized items were never directly connected to him, and were thus pertinent only for the improper purpose of suggesting he was a bad person who associated with narcotics traffickers. (See Evid. Code, § 352; People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 906-907 [184 Cal. Rptr. 165, 647 P.2d 569]; cf. Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) [4] The warrant affidavit, which detailed the facts supporting the search, was received without objection at the conclusion of the prosecution's case-in-chief. The court then inquired on its own motion whether the affidavit contained any material more prejudicial than probative. The following colloquy ensued: MR. BOWERS [the prosecutor]: I don't think there is any mention about Mr. [Gonzalez] in the search warrant at all. His name is not mentioned and it's entirely revolving around Stevie Martinez; is that correct? [¶] MR. BENCANGEY [defense counsel]: Yes. [¶] THE COURT: All right. [¶] So I assume for that purpose you would want it in also, then, Mr. Bencangey ? [¶] MR. BENCANGEY: Yes. I don't think it harms my client at all. (Italics added.) With the agreement of both counsel, the court admonished the jury that the affidavit was admitted not for its truth, but only to explain the officers' presence and conduct at the time of the shooting. Defendant later objected under Evidence Code section 352 when, in its rebuttal case, the prosecution proffered testimony by Officer Lira about the controlled buy leading to the search warrant. The prosecutor urged that the evidence was pertinent to rebut defendant's professed ignorance of narcotics activity on the premises. Defense counsel responded that the warrant evidence showed at most an ambiguous transaction outside the house, and was highly prejudicial. The court responded that similar evidence was already before the jury in the affidavit, and was relevant to rebut defendant's apparent claim that the police had dreamed up an excuse to raid the house. The court asked if the defense would stipulate that the May 29 raid was legal. Apparently intending to preserve his objection to the validity of the warrant, counsel responded, No. Accordingly, the court overruled defendant's objection to Lira's testimony, but again warned the jury to consider the proffered evidence only for its bearing on why the officers raided the house. Lira then briefly described the controlled buy. Defendant never objected below that the fruits of the search were irrelevant. Nor did he ask the trial court to exclude the fruits as more prejudicial than probative. Assuming he may nonetheless raise the fruits issue on appeal as one of ineffective assistance of counsel, we find no basis for reversal in any of these related contentions. First, any error in admitting the warrant affidavit was invited. In response to the trial court's pointed inquiry, defense counsel indicated he want[ed the affidavit] in because it tended to show that suspicion of narcotics activity was focused on Martinez, not on defendant. This was a plausible tactic, given defendant's central claim that he had no reason to expect the police, and it is manifest on the record. ( People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 229 [207 Cal. Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121]; cf. People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 334-335 [185 Cal. Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311].) Even if counsel later changed his mind, the court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that brief live testimony about the controlled buy was not more useful than prejudicial. In any event, evidence of narcotics activities on the premises was admissible under the circumstances of this case. Defendant cites Cardenas, supra, 31 Cal.3d 897, for the proposition that narcotics evidence must be excluded as unduly prejudicial unless it is directly pertinent to the charges. Cardenas, however, is inapposite. There the issue was whether the accused was the perpetrator of a 7-Eleven robbery. To buttress its theory that Cardenas was the robber, the prosecution sought to prove he needed money to support his drug habit. We confirmed that because of its prejudicial impact, an accused's addiction to narcotics may not be admitted as remote evidence of his motive for stealing something other than drugs. (31 Cal.3d at pp. 906-907; see generally People v. Davis (1965) 233 Cal. App.2d 156, 161 [43 Cal. Rptr. 357].) Otherwise, every addict charged with robbery or theft would face exposure to the jury of his loath[some] character flaw. Here, by contrast, defendant conceded he shot a police officer engaged in executing a search warrant. However, he claimed mistaken self-defense and denied having any reason to expect a visit from the police. He thereby placed his knowledge, intent, and motive in dispute. Evidence of narcotics activities in and around defendant's residence suggested, contrary to his claim, that the police raid may not have been a surprise. This is particularly so considering that Martinez, the actual narcotics suspect, was in the house at the time of the shooting. Thus, the narcotics evidence was more than remotely relevant to the issues of preparation, plan, knowledge, absence of mistake or accident, premeditation, deliberation, malice, and knowing murder of a peace officer. (Cf. Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) Finally, admission of the narcotics evidence was clearly harmless. The court twice emphasized to the jury that it could consider the controlled-buy evidence only to explain the officers' presence. Moreover, the People's overall case was strong and the defense weak. The surviving raiders insisted they knocked and announced themselves clearly, awaited admittance, forced entry only when the sounds within aroused their suspicions, and displayed their badges as they came through the door. There was convincing evidence that the officers did not resemble gang warriors in appearance or tactics. Counsel conceded in argument that the prosecution had probably disproven any reasonable basis for defendant's asserted belief in a gang attack. Moreover, defendant showed defiance even after he knew the officers' identity, and he later blurted out that he had seen the cops approach. It does not appear reasonably probable that any error affected the outcome. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].)