Opinion ID: 1448036
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: aggravating factors justifying an exceptional sentence

Text: In the event Hammond is retried and found guilty, we will comment on the sentencing issue he raises. Hammond maintains the trial court erred in relying on his absconding from Washington as an aggravating factor justifying the imposition of an exceptional sentence. We agree. A court may depart from the presumptive sentence range if the offense involves substantial and compelling circumstances. See RCW 9.94A.120(2). On appeal, we review the legal sufficiency of the reasons given as a matter of law. State v. Nordby, 106 Wn.2d 514, 518, 723 P.2d 1117 (1986) (interpreting RCW 9.94A.210(4)(a)); State v. Allert, 117 Wn.2d 156, 163, 815 P.2d 752 (1991). The Court of Appeals correctly concluded the trial court's reliance on Hammond's absconding could not be used to lengthen his sentence for indecent liberties. RCW 9.94A.370(2) prohibits facts establishing the elements of an additional crime from being used to deviate from the presumptive range, subject to exceptions which are inapplicable here. Hammond's absconding constitutes an additional crime, see RCW 9A.76.170, bail jumping, for which he was sentenced. [2] The trial court therefore erred in relying on this fact to lengthen his sentence. Because CrR 3.4 does not authorize beginning a trial without the defendant under the circumstances presented here, Hammond's conviction is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ANDERSEN, C.J., and BRACHTENBACH, DURHAM, SMITH, GUY, JOHNSON, and MADSEN, JJ., concur.