Opinion ID: 1954101
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Negligence Claims Against Jack and Evans Furniture.

Text: A. Imputation of the child's alleged negligence. The final amended petition alleged that the negligence of the child in starting the fire was attributable to Jack and Evans Furniture. Mastland's Rule 179(b) motion asked the court to enlarge its findings and decide this issue. The district court responded this way: The court specifically finds that the negligence of Nick Evans was not proved in this case. A two-year-old child playing with a lighter is not negligent. The court, we think, was saying that a child of such tender years does not have the capacity to be negligent. For reasons that follow we agree. In Peterson v. Taylor, 316 N.W.2d 869 (Iowa 1982), this court articulated the standard of care applicable to children in negligence and contributory negligence cases. The court adopted the standard set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 283A: If the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances. Peterson, 316 N.W.2d at 873 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283A (1965)). Any presumptions regarding the capacity of children were apparently swept away by Peterson. Id. This court said that the question of a particular child's capacity is an issue of fact to be determined on the basis of evidence of the child's age, intelligence and experience. Id. In applying the above quoted Restatement standard of care for children, this court adopted the following two-step approach: [T]he jury's first inquiry is a subjective one: What was the capacity of this particular childgiven what the evidence shows about his age, intelligence and experienceto perceive and avoid the particular risk involved in this case? Once this has been determined, the focus becomes objective: How would a reasonable child of like capacity have acted under similar circumstances? The particular child in question can be found negligent only if his actions fall short of what may reasonably be expected of children of similar capacity. Id. In Peterson, a seven-year-old boy was severely burned when he was playing with matches and gasoline. The evidence showed that the child knew he could be burned if he played with this combination of dangerous items. That was enough evidence to allow a factual determination on the question of the child's contributory negligence under this two-step approach. Here we have a child of tender years two years and nine months. Should the rule be different in such a case? This court in Peterson referred to that scenario and suggested the following approach: Under this approach [the question of a child's capacity for negligence is a question of fact], a particular child's incapacity for negligence may be determined by the court as a matter of law only if the child is so young or the evidence of incapacity so overwhelming that reasonable minds could not differ on that issue. Id. (emphasis added). The Restatement correctly points out that [a] child may be so young as to be manifestly and utterly incapable of exercising any of those qualities of attention, perception, knowledge, experience, intelligence, and judgment which are necessary to enable him to perceive a risk and to realize its unreasonable character.... Undoubtedly there is a minimum age, probably somewhere in the vicinity of four years, below which negligence can never be found .... Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283A cmt. b (1965) (emphasis added). We think at least as to three years of age and under, a child is incapable of negligence. Because the child here was of such tender years, he was not capable of negligence. For that reason there was no negligence to impute to Jack and Evans Furniture. B. Imputation of Angela's alleged negligence. Mastland also charges that Angela was negligent in her supervision of Nick and that this negligence should be imputed to Jack and Evans Furniture. As to parents' duty to control the conduct of their child, the rule is that parents are under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control [their] minor child as to prevent [the child] from intentionally harming others or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent[s] (a) know[ ] or [have] reason to know that [they have] the ability to control [their] child, and (b) know[] or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 316 (1965); Smith v. Shaffer, 395 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Iowa 1986) (citing with approval Restatement (Second) of Torts section 316 on issue of parents' failure to supervise children). Comments b and c to section 316 of the Restatement are relevant here and they pertinently provide: b. The duty of ... parent[s] is only to exercise such ability to control [their] child as [they] in fact [have] at the time when [they have] the opportunity to exercise it and know[ ] the necessity of so doing.... c. In order that the parent[s] may be liable under the rule stated in this section, it is not necessary that the actions of the child which [the parents] fail[ ] to prevent or control are such as to make the child ... subject to liability. The child may be so young as to be incapable of negligence, but this does not absolve the parent[s] from the performance of [their] duty to exercise reasonable care to control the child's conduct. Indeed, the very youth of the child is likely to give the parent[s] more effective ability to control [the child's] actions and to make it more often necessary to exercise it. Jack and his fiancee testified that Angela was an overly protective mother. The evidence revealed that Jack, his fiancee, and Angela smoked and used cigarette lighters. All three adults testified that the cigarettes and cigarette lighters were never left in the open or lying about in the Evans' home precisely because Angela's children were present. They also testified that they always carried their cigarettes and cigarette lighters on their person. The three testified they never saw Nick play with a cigarette lighter. There was no evidence that Nick at any time had easy access to or was allowed to play with lighters while in his mother's care. Neither was there any evidence as to how the lighter came to be in Nick's possession. Angela testified that immediately before Nick was put down for his nap, he was fussy and reached for her. As she picked him up, she saw nothing in his hands. He had no place to hide a lighter because he was wearing a tank top and shorts with no pockets. When Angela laid Nick in his crib, she saw no lighter or matches there. The district court correctly concluded that the foregoing evidence was not sufficient to establish that Angela was negligent in her supervision of Nick. So there was no negligence on the part of Angela to impute to Jack and Evans Furniture.