Opinion ID: 179980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: clisby error

Text: In Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir.1992) ( en banc ), this Court, exercising its supervisory power over the district courts in this circuit, instructed them to resolve all claims for relief raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ..., regardless [of] whether habeas relief is granted or denied. Here, the district court expressly declined to reach the merits of Puiatti's penalty-phase claims other than his severance claim. The district court attempted to distinguish Clisby by reasoning that (1) the district court did not `reserve' judgment on Puiatti's other penalty-phase claims, as the district court had in Clisby, but actually rendered [them] moot; and (2) the district court in Clisby already had held an evidentiary hearing, but here the district court had not, and so Clisby 's judicial economy concerns were supported by declining to reach the merits of Puiatti's penalty-phase claims. The district court's reasoning and its resulting decision are contrary to the dictates of Clisby. Clisby 's instruction to district courts was clear and contained no limitation or exception based on why a district court left some claims unresolved. In fact, in two of the five published decisions cited by the Clisby Court as examples of the growing number of cases in which we are forced to remand for consideration of issues the district court chose not to resolve, the unresolved claims were mooted by the district court's grant of the writ as to one or more claims. See Clisby, 960 F.2d at 935-36 (citing, inter alia, Wilson v. Kemp, 777 F.2d 621 (11th Cir.1985); Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523 (11th Cir. 1985)); Wilson, 777 F.2d at 622 (district court denied all claims as to guilt phase, granted habeas relief as to sentence based on prosecutorial-comment claim, and declined to reach other claims as to sentencing phase); Blake v. Zant, 737 F.2d 925, 926 (11th Cir. 1984) (district court granted writ based on claims of ineffective assistance at guilt and penalty phases and did not decide other claims), opinion vacated by Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d at 523. Further, Clisby 's instruction to district courts does not turn on whether an evidentiary hearing may be required. Instead, Clisby focused on concerns of piecemeal litigation, the important interests of comity and finality implicated in federal habeas review of state convictions and sentences, and the disruptive effect federal habeas review has on a state's criminal justice system until all federal habeas claims are resolved. Clisby, 960 F.2d at 935. Such policy considerations clearly favor the contemporaneous consideration of allegations of constitutional violations grounded in the same factual basis, id. at 936, and that is true regardless of whether an evidentiary hearing in district court may be required on some, but not all, claims. Thus, the district court erred in refusing to address the merits of all of Puiatti's claims. Nevertheless, in the interest of avoiding further delay in a case that has already lingered far too long (Puiatti filed his federal habeas petition over eighteen years ago), we elect to address the State's appeal on the penalty-phase severance claim rather than vacate the district court's judgment without prejudice and remand for full resolution. [14]