Opinion ID: 773563
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: arbitrability of timeliness

Text: 11 Our role as a federal court in labor disputes has been settled since 1960 when the Supreme Court decided the Steelworkers Trilogy. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co, 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (Steelworkers I); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (Steelworkers II); United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (Steelworkers III). We are limited to determining substantive arbitrability only -- that is, which subjects the parties have agreed to arbitrate, according to the terms of their CBA. Steelworkers II, 363 U.S. at 582-83. Settling disputes under a collective bargaining agreement is exclusively within the purview of the arbitrator, a policy designed to minimize labor tensions and the threat of strikes. Id. Therefore, we have jurisdiction only to decide which subjects should be arbitrated. 12 We are presented with the question of whether AK Steel is required to process and arbitrate an untimely grievance. AEIF argues that timeliness is a procedural matter to be determined during arbitration of an otherwise substantively arbitrable grievance. AK Steel maintains that the requirement to arbitrate is not only limited by the definition of a grievance, but also by the procedural requirements set forth in the CBA. The district court found that, because the grievance was untimely, the union was barred from demanding arbitration. 13 If a court decides that the subject matter is properly arbitrable, then potential procedural bars to arbitration are matters for the arbitration itself. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 556-58 (1964). Thus, courts determine onlysubstantive arbitrability while arbitrators determine procedural arbitrability. Wiley specifically held that the question of whether a grievance is time-barred under a collective bargaining agreement is to be determined in arbitration itself. See id. at 556, 84 S. Ct. 909. Accordingly, AK Steel must submit the grievance to arbitration for a determination of whether the grievance was timely. 14 AK Steel makes essentially two arguments in support of its position. First, it contends that substantive arbitrability and procedural arbitrability are no longer distinguishable in light of the Supreme Court's decision in AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643 (1986). Second, AK Steel argues that even assuming such a distinction persists, our decisions in General Drivers, Local Union 89 v. Moog Louisville Warehouse, 852 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1988), andRaceway Park, Inc. v. Local 47, Service Employees International Union, 167 F.3d 953 (6th Cir. 1999), suggest that timeliness is a question of substantive arbitrability, properly presented to a federal court and not to an arbitrator.
15 AK Steel relies heavily upon AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643 (1986), arguing that it erases the distinction between substantive and procedural arbitrability announced in Wiley. In AT&T, the Court held, Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator. Id. at 649, 106 S. Ct. 1415. AK Steel contends that this language mandates that federal courts determine both substantive and procedural arbitrability. This is an unfaithful reading of AT&T. This case is a reaffirmation of the Steelworkers principles that arbitration is the preferred method of settling labor disputes and that a court's only role should be determining whether disputes over the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement are subject to the arbitration provision. Id. at 651-52, 106 S. Ct. 1415. Courts have no authority to construe collective-bargaining contracts and arbitration clauses, or to consider any other evidence that might unmistakably demonstrate that a particular grievance was not to be subject to arbitration. Id. at 651-52, 106 S. Ct. 1415. That the power of federal courts is limited to interpreting the substantive scope of the arbitration clause is undisputed. AT&T merely clarifies that the responsibility for this decision rests squarely on our shoulders and that we may not delegate it to the arbitrator. See id. 16 AT&T does not mention the distinction between substantive and procedural arbitrability. The dispute in AT&T arose over whether the defendant-company was required to arbitrate a grievance concerning the propriety of massive lay-offs. As this Court has noted previously, Whether disputes over layoffs should be arbitrated is clearly a matter of substantive arbitrability of the very sort which the Steelworkers Trilogy requires the courts to determine. Raceway Park, Inc. v. Local 47, Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 167 F.3d 953, 961 (6th Cir. 1999). AT&T did not erode the Wiley distinction between substantive and procedural arbitrability, as it did not confront that issue. See id. (AT&T Technologies in no way whatsoever alters the import of the Supreme Court's prior decision in John Wiley & Sons.). The Wiley distinction is still valid and continues to be recognized by other circuits post-AT&T. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Communications Workers, Local 13000, 164 F.3d 197, 200-02 (3d Cir. 1999); Local 285, Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. Nonotuck Res. Assocs., Inc., 64 F.3d 735, 739 (1st Cir. 1995); Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 47 F.3d 750, 753-54 (5th Cir. 1995); Local Union No. 637, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Davis H. Elliot Co., 13 F.3d 129, 131 (4th Cir. 1993).
17 AK Steel argues that the Sixth Circuit cases General Drivers, Local Union 89 v. Moog Louisville Warehouse, 852 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1988), and Raceway Park, Inc. v. Local 47, Service Employees International Union, 167 F.3d 953 (6th Cir. 1999), narrow the holding of Wiley. Moog held that a grievance was not properly arbitrable because the union had not submitted its grievance within the time frame dictated in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 873. Moog creates a narrowly crafted exception to Wiley, and is virtually limited to its facts. See Moog, 167 F.3d at 874-75. The language of the collective bargaining agreement in Moog provided: [I]f the Union fails to notify the Company . . . within 15 calendar days after the Company gives its answer [to the grievance] ..., then the Union shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the Company's answer thereto and said grievance shall not thereafter be arbitrable. Id. at 873 (emphasis added). Moogconcluded that this language indicated substantive not procedural arbitrability, and therefore the Wiley doctrine did not apply. See id. at 875 (It will not do to characterize something as 'procedural' and conclude automatically that 'procedural' matters are for the arbitrator if the parties have specified otherwise in the arbitration section itself.). This language, the panel concluded, clearly prohibits submitting untimely grievances to arbitration. 18 Although Raceway Park is superficially one of Moog's progeny, the Raceway panel forthrightly states in the first paragraph of the opinion that Moog is a decision with which we disagree and follows it despite strong misgivings.Raceway Park, 167 F.3d at 954. In the rest of the opinion, the panel staunchly objects to Moog, considering it to be a grave departure from Wiley as well as the basic Steelworkers rules. Id. at 954, 956-61. Nevertheless, Raceway Park found that collective bargaining agreement language similar to that in Moog demanded that a time-barred grievance was not substantively arbitrable. Id. at 954, 956 ([A]ll parties shall be barred from ever submitting [an untimely] grievance, dispute or disagreement to arbitration.). 2 19 Moog, however, does not control in the present case because the CBA does not explicitly provide that an untimely grievance is substantively precluded from arbitration; therefore, it does not fit within the Moog exception. Moog makes clear that unless there is no other possible interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement but that an untimely grievance is not to go to arbitration, then the matter must be submitted to arbitration. Moog reiterates a portion of the following oft-quoted language of the Steelworkers II case: 20 An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage. . . . In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail. . . . 21 Steelworkers II, 363 U.S. at 582-83, 584-85; accord Raceway Park, 167 F.3d at 958-59; Moog, 852 F.2d at 873-74. Therefore, collective bargaining agreement language setting forth time prerequisites to arbitration that is any less specific than the union shall be 'conclusively presumed to have accepted' the company's position 'and said grievance shall notthereafter be arbitrable' should be submitted to arbitration. Moog, 167 F.3d at 874-75 (distinguishing Oil Workers' Int'l Union, Local 4-447 v. Chevron Chem. Co., 815 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1987), because the collective bargaining agreement in that case provided that an untimely grievance would be considered abandoned). 22 The language of the CBA between AK Steel and AEIG reads: [I]n the event appeals are not made to the next higher Step in the grievance procedure within the time limitations specified, . . . the request, complaint or grievance shall be considered settled and no further action may be taken on it. CBA Art. VII § E(4). This language does not unambiguously prevent an untimely grievance from going to arbitration. The language no further action may be taken on it in the CBA is similar to the considered abandoned language from the Chevron case that Moog specifically distinguishes. Moog, 852 F.2d at 874-75 (citing Chevron, 815 F.2d 338). Further, this clause does not specifically mention arbitrability at all or give any indication that such questions are not arbitrable. To the contrary, CBA Art. VII § B(1), the general arbitration clause, provides that questions of arbitrability are themselves to be submitted to arbitration, which we believe was designed to address the precise question before us. Without an express provision in the CBA, we do not have the kind of forceful evidence that would counteract a policy of presumptively submitting labor disputes to arbitration. Steelworkers II, 363 U.S. at 584-85. Accordingly, Wiley's directive to arbitrate procedural questions applies in this case. We find that AK Steel is required to process and arbitrate Grievance No. 98-E-1123, and must submit the question of timeliness to the arbitrator. 23