Opinion ID: 3011207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Collective Bargaining Agreement and the

Text: Covenant Not To Compete Durham appeals the dismissal of its claim against Evans for breach of her noncompetition agreement, which was part of her employment contract under the former collective bargaining agreement. Durham also contends that the agreement required Evans to pursue a grievance rather than litigating her harassment complaint as a counterclaim in the lawsuit against her. We reject these arguments because they are contradicted by the District Court's fact findings, which are not clearly erroneous.
The District Court found that Biancardi, the regional vice president who was handling the negotiations with the union, told Evans and others that the covenant not to compete was abrogated and that the union contract, which had incorporated the noncompetition covenant, was not in effect. This finding was not clearly erroneous. The District Court further concluded that Biancardi, as a regional vice president and an official negotiator with the union, had authority to bind Durham by his statement. Evans was entitled to rely on his representation that the covenant no longer bound her. Although Durham argues that the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was in effect, it does not contest this latter finding. Given Biancardi's position of authority, we agree with the District Court that Durham was estopped from enforcing the covenant not to compete against Evans. B. Grievance Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement Durham argues that the CBA remained mostly in effect during the new contract negotiations. Even though the CBA had formally expired, Durham avers, Evans was required to grieve instead of filing suit because both the company and the union treated the CBA as if it were still in effect. The District Court found that the CBA had been abrogated when Durham unilaterally decreased agents' compensation. Durham argues that the union acceded to the change and suggests that, if the District Court had been correct, the union certainly would have filed an unfair labor practice 32 charge.14 There are many reasons the union might not file a charge or grievance it was legally entitled tofile; in the midst of the upheaval caused by Durham's management changes, the union might have preferred to attempt to resolve disputes amicably. The important point is that the District Court did not clearly err when it found that the compensation was not changed by mutual agreement, even though the union ultimately acquiesced. We are also satisfied that the District Court did not clearly err in finding that Biancardi had the authority to bind Durham when he told Evans that the CBA was no longer effective. Employer repudiation generally estops an _________________________________________________________________ 14. Paradoxically, this seems to be a concession that the arbitration clause was no longer in effect, since only then would an unfair labor practice charge be the appropriate remedy for a compensation change. Under Litton Financial Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190 (1991), an arbitration clause does not generally continue in effect after a CBA expires. If the employer makes a unilateral change in benefits instead of bargaining, a union must generally file an unfair labor practice charge rather than arbitrating. The issue is complicated by Luden's Inc. v. Local Union No. 6, 28 F.3d 347, 355-56 (3d Cir. 1994), not cited by the parties. Under Luden's, an arbitration clause in a lapsed CBA will continue in effect until one side clearly indicates through words or conduct that it no longer wishes to be bound. The termination of the CBA does not generally signal an intent to abandon arbitration, and discontent with other aspects of the CBA (such as compensation provisions) does not mean that an arbitration obligation ends when the CBA terminates. See id. at 356. Biancardi's acts take this case out of the ambit of Luden's. We also point out, although the parties have not done so, that it is not clear that the CBA, even if it remained in effect, would require Evans to grieve instead of filing suit. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Alexander has been limited by Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), but that decision did not address the situation in which a CBA, negotiated to enforce collective rights, requires arbitration; it concerned an agreement directly between employer and employee limiting individual statutory rights. See Nieves v. Individualized Shirts, 961 F. Supp. 782, 790-92 (D.N.J. 1997). The Supreme Court recently declined to decide whether an explicit waiver of federal statutory rights could be enforced, see Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998), and, as we resolve the arbitration issue on other grounds, we decline to address the issue today, especially as the parties have devoted no argument to the law in this area. 33 employer from claiming that a plaintiff should have grieved first. See Hendricks v. Edgewater Steel Co., 898 F.2d 385, 388 (3d Cir. 1990); Garcia v. Eidal Int'l Corp., 808 F.2d 717, 722 (10th Cir. 1986) (where, as company ownership was changing, the new company did not explicitly repudiate arbitration but did indicate that the contract no longer existed, an inference of repudiation was justified); Kaylor v. Crown Zellerbach, Inc., 643 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1981) (company's lawyer denied that company was bound by CBA; company was estopped from demanding that plaintiffs grieve before litigating); Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870, 975-76 (3d Cir. 1972) (when the employer first stated that it was working under the old contract and then said no contract existed, it had repudiated the contract and grievance was not required). VI. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Durham argues that the $100,000 awarded for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) is preempted by Pennsylvania worker's compensation law, which provides that worker's compensation is the exclusive remedy for injuries arising in the course of a worker's employment. See 77 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 481(a). The worker's compensation law excepts from its preemptive scope employee injuries caused by the intentional conduct of third parties for reasons personal to the tortfeasor and not directed against him as an employee or because of his employment. See id. S 411(1). Cases interpreting Pennsylvania law are split on the propriety of allowing IIED claims for sexual harassment on the job. Courts have allowed such claims where the injury arose from harassment personal in nature and not part of the proper employer-employee relationship. Hoy v. Angelone, 691 A.2d 476, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), aff'd on other grounds, 720 A.2d 745 (Pa. 1998); see also Schweitzer v. Rockwell Int'l, 586 A.2d 383, 391 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (harassment is personal and not part of the legitimate employer/employee relationship). Other cases, however, have found preemption in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Hicks v. Arthur, 843 F. Supp. 949, 958 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (harassment of a group of black 34 employees did not stem from personal animosity and any black would have been discriminated against, so IIED was preempted). In Winterberg v. Transportation Insurance Co., 72 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 1995), we concluded that egregious misbehavior in handling a worker's compensation claim was preempted because the Pennsylvania law has a broad intent to preempt common law torts in matters arguably connected with work-related injuries. Id. at 322. The attempt to harm Evans, a successful woman, was arguably directed at Evans as an employee, since it stemmed from Evans's success at Durham.15 Evans responds that her IIED claim is not preempted because many of the acts she found so devastating occurred after she left Durham. The District Court considered this quite relevant. Claims for damages arising from post-employment conduct have been found not to be preempted by workers' compensation laws in other jurisdictions.16 We are not convinced, however, that the _________________________________________________________________ 15. We thus suspect that a claim of Evans's sort would be preempted. We understand Pennsylvania law to extend worker's compensation preemption to personal animosity that develops from work-related events. See Hammerstein v. Lindsay, 655 A.2d 597, 601 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (where animosity develops because of work-related disputes, worker's compensation is the exclusive remedy); Shaffer v. Procter & Gamble, 604 A.2d 289 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (where an employee was injured on the job and wrongfully denied treatment, IIED was preempted because it could have happened to any employee who got injured); cf. Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Co., 112 F.3d 710, 723 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing the Delaware Supreme Court's determination that similar IIED suits are preempted under Delaware worker's compensation law). Sexual harassment is a well-recognized workplace problem, the kind of thing employers must be prepared to combat. Because it is like other workplace hazards, we suspect that Pennsylvania would find IIED claims based on this kind of harassment to be preempted. But we cannot be sure, and we express no opinion as to whether an IIED claim for harassment more disconnected from the work situation would be preempted, for example where a supervisor sexually assaulted an employee or stalked her outside of work. Ellerth and Faragher may also have an impact on this area of the law, as those cases to some degree render the distinction between employment-related and purely personal discriminatory motives irrelevant to employer liability. 16. See Caldwell v. Federal Express Corp., 908 F. Supp. 29, 33 (D. Me. 1995); Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, 920 S.W.2d 61, 64 (Ky. 1996); Cagle v. 35 post-employment actions in this case, distinguished from what went before, are sufficiently egregious on their own to rise to the level of IIED, although Durham did not raise this issue in its papers. We need not rule on the sufficiency of the post- employment conduct, however, because we hold that the emotional distress award may be sustained under 42 U.S.C. S 1981a(b)(3), which authorizes compensatory damages under Title VII for emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses. The District Court's findings are adequate to meet the standard for recovery of damages for emotional harm under Title VII.17 At oral argument, counsel for Durham conceded as much. See Murray v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 145 F.3d 143, 157 (3d Cir. 1998) (where the jury's implicit findings were consistent with the correct legal standard despite incorrect instruction, its verdict could be upheld on appeal). 18