Opinion ID: 770808
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Construction of the Distance Sufficient Limitation

Text: 114 Moore contends that the district court erroneously construed the distance sufficient limitation of claim 1 of the '798 patent as constrained by the particular specifications of the IBM 3800 printer. Moore emphasizes that claim 1 recites a printer used to process the mailer during pausing of the printer, and not an IBM 3800 printer. Moore argues that the district court, by requiring that the distance sufficient be more than one quarter inch, improperly imported a limitation from the written description into the claim in contravention of multiple decisions of this court, including SRI International v. Matsushita Electric Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 227 USPQ 557 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). The district court's reliance on the title of the '798 patent, Pressure Seal Adhesive Pattern for IBM 3800 Printers, Moore maintains, was also unjustified, because there is no case in which the title of a patent was used to read a term into the claims. 115 Moore argues that, contrary to the district court's belief, nothing in the prosecution history requires reading the particular specifications of the IBM 3800 printer into the claims. According to Moore, the prosecution history in fact overwhelmingly militates against such a construction. During the prosecution of the '798 patent, the applicant responded to the examiner's indefiniteness rejection with respect to the distance sufficient limitation by declaring: 116 It is respectfully pointed out that regardless of the fact that different printers have different spacings, the invention is entitled to a scope that covers all printers. The fact that a claim is broad does not mean that it is vague or incomplete. 117 (emphasis added). In response to the examiner's continued rejection that claim 1 was indefinite because it is impossible to determine the distance claimed in the last paragraph, the applicant again responded: 118 [The distance sufficient limitation] is a functional description, providing a complete, definite and accurate statement of what the spacing should be. The fact that the spacing is not in numerical terms is irrelevant since a functional term such as this, so long as it is itself definite, is entirely appropriate. This is exactly what In re Halleck [166 USPQ 204 (C.C.P.A. 1970)] holds. In Halleck, the exact numerical amount of chemical added to the animal feed was not critical or specified, but rather the functional term an effective amount for growth stimulation. That is the same situation here. The exact numerical spacing is not critical, and will vary from printer to printer, just as the effective amount of growth hormone in Halleck varied from animal to animal. . . . 119 . . . 120 It is impossible for the applicant to anticipate printers with pauses that come out on the market in the future, and measure the exact distance that is necessary for such printers with pauses in the future, but that does not mean that applicant should be denied the rights to his invention. Anyone can determine whether or not they infringe by comparing their product with the functional recitation of claim 1, which is entirely definite. . . . 121 . . . 122 Claim 1 is not indefinite, merely broad enough to protect the applicant's real invention. 123 Moore maintains that these excerpts from the prosecution history, coupled with the examiner's subsequent allowance of the claims, clearly reveal the applicant's intent and the examiner's understanding that distance sufficient is not limited to the particular specifications of the IBM 3800 printer. 124 Notably, SRC does not dispute that the distance sufficient limitation is not limited to the IBM 3800 printer for claim construction purposes (though it contends otherwise for infringement purposes). In fact, SRC goes so far as to suggest that the district court did not assum[e] that the only printer that the limitations of the claim[s] could relate to is an IBM 3800 printer, as Moore maintains. SRC concedes that: 125 [i]t is obviously possible that, in the future, some other company will put out a printer that functions in the same way as the IBM 3800 printer or that IBM will put out another printer that functions in that same way. If that occurs, and if SRC were to put out a form designed for use with that printer in the fashion specified by the claims in the '798 patent, then those forms would infringe. 126 We agree with the parties that the distance sufficient limitation is not limited to the particular specifications of the IBM 3800 printer. We first note that the plain language of claim 1 recites a printer generally, and nowhere mentions the IBM 3800 printer. The preamble, for example, refers to a printer having rollers, and operated to occasionally pause. '798 patent, col. 6, ll. 50-51. 127 While the written description refers repeatedly to the IBM 3800 printer, it clarifies that a form for use on an IBM 3800 printer is only the preferred embodiment. See '798 patent, col. 1, ll. 40-41 (discussing the present invention and referring generally to a printer used to process the mailers); id., col. 1, ll. 52-56 (discussing one aspect of the present invention and referring to the use of an IBM 3800 printer having fuser and backup rollers). Such [r]eferences to [the] preferred embodiment . . . are not claim limitations. See Laitram, 863 F.2d at 865, 9 USPQ2d at 1299. That the title also refers to an IBM 3800 printer does not change our analysis, since the bar on importing limitations from the written description into the claims applies no less forcefully to a title. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1312, 51 USPQ2d 1161, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ([I]f we do not read limitations into the claims from the specification that are not found in the claims themselves, then we certainly will not read limitations into the claims from the patent title.). 128 The prosecution history further informs our analysis. The examiner's indefiniteness rejection with respect to the distance sufficient limitation reveals the examiner's belief that the limitation was not restricted to any particular printer. The applicant's responses to these rejections clearly demonstrate a similar understanding on his part. That the examiner yielded to the applicant's arguments by allowing the claims does not, as the district court suggested, establish that the distance sufficient limitation must be limited to the particular specifications of the IBM 3800 printer. On the contrary, the examiner's acquiescence indicates his acceptance of the distance sufficient limitation as functionally claimed and as properly definite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. We note that there is nothing wrong with defining the dimensions of a device in terms of the environment in which it is to be used. See Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1575-76, 1 USPQ2d 1081, 1087-88 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that the limitation that the claimed wheelchair have a front leg portion . . . so dimensioned as to be insertable through the space between the doorframe of an automobile and one of the seats thereof was not indefinite). 129 While SRC implies that the district court's claim construction is consistent with the preceding discussion, we cannot agree. The district court plainly concluded that the 'distance sufficient' limitation in claim 1 is in reference to the IBM 3800 printer. Moore I, slip op. at 8; see also id. at 6 (In other words, the 'distance sufficient' limitation, according to plaintiff, would be a variable that depends on the type of printer used. The court disagrees.). Despite SRC's attempt to disavow this statement, we agree with Moore that the district court must have meant what it said, and consequently erred. As we explain below, however, this error was entirely harmless.