Opinion ID: 2095304
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: legally inconsistent verdicts

Text: Socha also argues that Redmond should not be heard to complain that the verdicts are legally inconsistent when it was his instruction that gave the jury the option of rendering such verdicts. She cites McGrath v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 190 Ill.App.3d 276, 279, 137 Ill.Dec. 725, 546 N.E.2d 670 (1989), for the proposition that it is too late to declare a mistrial after the jury has already returned its verdicts. In McGrath, one plaintiff was a passenger in a car driven by her father, the other plaintiff, when she was injured. Defendant called the father as an adverse witness and questioned him about a settlement he reached with his daughter. The daughter objected to these questions and the trial court found that the questioning was improper. McGrath, 190 Ill.App.3d at 278, 137 Ill.Dec. 725, 546 N.E.2d 670. Plaintiff's counsel moved for judgment against the defendant. The trial court stated that it would reserve judgment on the motion, which it characterized as a motion for mistrial, but counsel did not press the point or ask for an immediate ruling. McGrath, 190 Ill.App.3d at 278, 137 Ill.Dec. 725, 546 N.E.2d 670. After the jury returned with a verdict for the defendant, plaintiffs renewed the earlier motion. McGrath, 190 Ill.App.3d at 279, 137 Ill.Dec. 725, 546 N.E.2d 670. The appellate court explained that a motion for mistrial is a procedural tool designed to cut short a trial for legal reasons which preclude a verdict and judgment. McGrath, 190 Ill.App.3d at 279, 137 Ill.Dec. 725, 546 N.E.2d 670. A motion for mistrial prevents parties from getting two chances at a verdict and, thus, can be made only before the jury returns its verdict. McGrath, 190 Ill.App.3d at 279, 137 Ill.Dec. 725, 546 N.E.2d 670. If the motion is not made before the verdict, the party seeking a new trial has waived the mistrial issue. McGrath, 190 Ill.App.3d at 279, 137 Ill.Dec. 725, 546 N.E.2d 670. The McGraths' conduct, first in failing to ask for a ruling when the judge first referred to the possibility of a mistrial and, second, in failing to renew the motion (if indeed there was a mistrial motion to renew) before the jury verdict, constituted waiver of mistrial as a basis for a new trial. McGrath, 190 Ill.App.3d at 280, 137 Ill. Dec. 725, 546 N.E.2d 670. McGrath, therefore, does not stand for the proposition that a verdict can never be set aside and a new trial ordered once the jury in a civil case has reached a verdict. Rather, it stands for the proposition that an error at trial that would be a sufficient basis for declaring a mistrial must be asserted in a timely manner. According to Black's Law Dictionary, a mistrial is either a trial that the judge brings to an end, without a determination on the merits, because of a procedural error or serious misconduct occurring during the proceedings, or a trial that ends inconclusively because the jury cannot agree on a verdict. Black's Law Dictionary 1023 (8th ed.2004). If a jury is deadlocked, a mistrial must be declared. When the jury returns a unanimous verdict, a motion for mistrial is untimely and inappropriate. However, even when a jury has rendered a unanimous verdict, making a motion for mistrial improper, a party may still seek a new trial on the basis of legally inconsistent verdicts or on the basis that the verdicts are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Such motions must necessarily be made after the jury has returned its verdict. See Joe & Dan International Corp. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 178 Ill.App.3d 741, 745-46, 127 Ill.Dec. 830, 533 N.E.2d 912 (1988) (motion for mistrial based on inconsistent verdicts is not timely because a motion for mistrial must be made before a verdict is entered; however, party's motion for directed verdict and motion for new trial adequately preserved the issue of inconsistent verdicts for appeal). Thus, the appellate court was not entirely accurate when it stated that [i]f the jury was unable to determine which of the parties was negligent, a mistrial should have been declared and a new trial ordered. 352 Ill.App.3d at 1055, 288 Ill.Dec. 398, 817 N.E.2d 1048. We conclude that Redmond did not forfeit his ability to seek a new trial on either of these grounds by submitting the jury instruction. The errors he asserts did not arise until the jury rendered its verdicts. These issues were preserved for appeal by his filing of a timely posttrial motion and were, therefore, properly considered by the trial court and the appellate court. This court last considered the effect of legally inconsistent verdicts in the context of civil litigation in Wottowa Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Bock, 104 Ill.2d 311, 84 Ill.Dec. 451, 472 N.E.2d 411 (1984), in which the plaintiff insurance agency sued two individuals who were attorneys and officers of two businesses that owed it over $27,000. The agency proceeded under two alternative theories of liability. First, Wottowa claimed that defendants should be required to pay the debts of the corporations because they had personally guaranteed payment. Second, Wottowa alleged that the individuals had fraudulently induced the agency to grant extensions of credit to the businesses. Wottowa, 104 Ill.2d at 312-13, 84 Ill.Dec. 451, 472 N.E.2d 411. The jury found that the guarantee agreement was executed by the defendants in their capacity as corporate officers and, thus, created a corporate obligation rather than a personal obligation. As for the fraud count, the jury found that the defendants, as individuals, had committed fraud. Wottowa, 104 Ill.2d at 316, 84 Ill.Dec. 451, 472 N.E.2d 411. Citing earlier decisions of the appellate court, this court stated that [i]n the same action, where verdicts are returned which are legally inconsistent with each other, the verdicts should be set aside and a new trial granted. Wottowa, 104 Ill.2d at 316, 84 Ill.Dec. 451, 472 N.E.2d 411. Because the jury had determined that the corporations were liable for the debt owed to Wottowa, it was legally inconsistent for the jury to also find that the individual defendants (as opposed to the corporation) were liable for fraud. This court found the two verdicts to be irreconcilably inconsistent ( Wottowa, 104 Ill.2d at 316, 84 Ill.Dec. 451, 472 N.E.2d 411) and ordered a new trial. In Wottowa, this court did not expressly state that it was engaging in de novo review. However, it is implicit in our analysis in Wottowa that legal inconsistency is a question of law. We relied on the law of agency to determine that the individual defendants could not be acting both as individuals and as officers of the debtor corporations when they signed the guarantee agreement. Wottowa, 104 Ill.2d at 316, 84 Ill.Dec. 451, 472 N.E.2d 411, citing Knightsbridge Realty Partners, Ltd-75 v. Pace, 101 Ill.App.3d 49, 53, 56 Ill.Dec. 483, 427 N.E.2d 815 (1981). Thus, the two verdicts  one of which found the defendants not liable because they were acting as agents of the corporations, and one of which found them liable as individuals for fraud for the same transaction  were legally inconsistent. In effect, the jury determined that agency both did and did not exist. This result is legally inconsistent. See also Boasiako v. Checker Taxi Co., 140 Ill.App.3d 210, 212-13, 94 Ill.Dec. 673, 488 N.E.2d 672 (1986) (if same jury, on same set of facts and circumstances, reaches two different factual conclusions as expressed by their verdicts, such verdicts will not support a valid judgment unless they are reconcilable under an applicable rule of law). We, therefore, hold that whether two verdicts are legally inconsistent is a question of law. As a result, a trial court's order granting or denying a new trial based on a claim of legally inconsistent verdicts is subject to de novo review. P.R.S. International, 184 Ill.2d at 233-34, 234 Ill.Dec. 459, 703 N.E.2d 71. This conclusion is supported by the well-established principle that although a trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial will generally not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion, legally inconsistent verdicts must be set aside and a new trial granted. Tedeschi, 282 Ill.App.3d at 448, 217 Ill.Dec. 953, 668 N.E.2d 138. If a new trial must be granted upon a finding of legally inconsistent verdicts, no exercise of discretion is involved and, therefore, no deference is due. We note at least two lines of cases on the question of legally inconsistent verdicts in civil cases. The first line of cases consists of those involving a single claim in which the single verdict is alleged to be internally inconsistent or inherently self-contradictory (75B Am.Jur.2d Trial § 1805, at 563 (1992)), as when the damages awarded are not reasonably related to the liability found. See, e.g., Galloway v. Kuhl, 346 Ill.App.3d 844, 850, 282 Ill. Dec. 276, 806 N.E.2d 251 (2004) (jury's verdict imposing liability and awarding damages for disfigurement and pain and suffering was legally inconsistent with failure to award reasonable expenses of medical treatment received by plaintiff); Hinnen v. Burnett, 144 Ill.App.3d 1038, 99 Ill.Dec. 76, 495 N.E.2d 141 (1986) (jury's verdict awarding damages for the expense of pain medication and physical therapy was inconsistent with failure to award any damages for pain and suffering). The second line of cases involves those in which multiple claims are made by one or more parties and where a verdict as to one claim is alleged to be inconsistent with the verdict as to another. See, e.g., Wottowa, 104 Ill.2d at 316, 84 Ill.Dec. 451, 472 N.E.2d 411 (verdict in favor of defendants on basis that they were acting as agents of corporations was legally inconsistent with verdict that they were liable, as individuals, for fraud based on same transaction); Action Construction & Restoration, Inc. v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., 322 Ill. App.3d 181, 183-84, 255 Ill.Dec. 120, 748 N.E.2d 824 (2001) (jury verdict finding that defendant breached oral contract necessarily required the jury to find that the parties had a meeting of the minds, which finding was legally inconsistent with verdict that defendant obtained plaintiff's agreement by perpetuating a common law fraud). The present case falls into the second category. In both categories of cases, the same general rules apply: the court will exercise all reasonable presumptions in favor of the verdict or verdicts, which will not be found legally inconsistent unless absolutely irreconcilable; further, the verdict or verdicts will not be considered irreconcilably inconsistent if supported by any reasonable hypothesis. Tedeschi, 282 Ill. App.3d at 448-49, 217 Ill.Dec. 953, 668 N.E.2d 138. In the second category of cases, it has been observed that [a]lthough causes of action may be consolidated for trial, they remain distinct causes of action. 75B Am.Jur.2d Trial § 1805, at 562 (1992). Thus, the plaintiff in each cause must meet his burden of proof with respect to each element of his claim, without regard to whether the opposing party has or has not met his burden of proof in the competing claim. Further, only when a judgment rests on some particular finding for its validity and support will inconsistencies between two findings treating of the same essential matter necessitate a new trial. 75B Am.Jur.2d Trial § 1805, at 652 (1992). See also IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.04, Comment (A plaintiff's burden of proving the issues raised by the complaint cannot be distinguished from a defendant's burden of proving the issues made by the counterclaim. The two pleadings are of equal dignity in that they embody separate causes of action and must be resolved by verdicts). Such was the case in Wottowa, where the jury found in one count that defendants were not acting in their individual capacities, but as corporate officers, yet found, on the same set of underlying facts, that with regard to the other count, the same individuals were personally liable. Wottowa, 104 Ill.2d at 316, 84 Ill.Dec. 451, 472 N.E.2d 411. Socha argues that, unlike the verdicts in Wottowa, the verdicts in this case are not legally inconsistent because they are supported by the reasonable hypothesis that the jury found that both parties failed to meet their burden of proof. She argues further that the appellate court's decision conflicts with the decision of another appellate district in Barrick, and with a decision within the same appellate district in Boasiako. Support for her first proposition is found in the Illinois pattern jury instructions themselves. The applicable instruction in this case (IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.04) specifically authorizes such an outcome and incorporates the elements of negligence from instruction B21.02 (IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.02). Instruction 21.01, which was also given, defines burden of proof: the jury must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, that the proposition on which he has the burden of proof is more probably true than not true. IPI Civil (1995) No. 21.01. Socha argues that the appellate court's decision in this case essentially means that instruction B21.04 does not accurately state the law in a case in which there is no evidence of an intervening cause or condition. The approach taken by the appellate court would mean that in such cases, neither party has to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. So long as the parties are involved in an accident under conditions that do not clearly demonstrate an intervening cause, the jury would be required to impose liability on one, or the other, or both  without regard to whether they had met their respective burdens of proof. As the comment to the instruction makes clear, however, even when there is a complaint and a counterclaim based on the same set of facts, a party must prove each element of his or her claim in order to prevail. IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.04, Comment. The approach taken by the appellate court in this case was rejected in Boasiako, which involved a claim and counterclaim arising from a collision between two taxicabs. The jury found for the plaintiff, but determined that he was 40% at fault. However, on the counterclaim, the jury again found for the plaintiff. Because the same individual was found 40% at fault in one verdict, but not negligent in the other, defendants argued that the verdicts were legally inconsistent and could not stand. Boasiako, 140 Ill.App.3d at 212, 94 Ill.Dec. 673, 488 N.E.2d 672. The appellate court held that the two verdicts were reconcilable. Noting that the principles of comparative negligence do not relieve [counter] plaintiff of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the essential elements of an action in negligence, the appellate court determined that the jury could have decided that the defendants failed to prove one or more elements of their counterclaim, even though it had already decided that the plaintiff's damages should be reduced by his comparative negligence. Boasiako, 140 Ill. App.3d at 213, 94 Ill.Dec. 673, 488 N.E.2d 672. We agree and, therefore, conclude that because the law demands that a plaintiff meet the burden of proving every necessary element of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence, a jury may find against both the plaintiff and the counter-plaintiff in a negligence action, even when the evidence suggests that the sole cause of the accident was the negligence of either or both parties. The appellate court in the present case both overlooked its own previous decision in Boasiako and declined to follow the reasoning of the Barrick court. 352 Ill.App.3d at 1055, 288 Ill.Dec. 398, 817 N.E.2d 1048. In Barrick, a collision between a car and a truck resulted in a claim by the driver of the car for personal injury and property damage and a counterclaim by the driver of the truck for property damage. Barrick, 308 Ill.App.3d at 307, 241 Ill.Dec. 825, 720 N.E.2d 280. After hearing conflicting testimony regarding which driver violated a red light, the jury entered verdicts for the defendant and the counterdefendant. Barrick, 308 Ill.App.3d at 309, 241 Ill.Dec. 825, 720 N.E.2d 280. The trial court denied Barrick's motion for a new trial based on inconsistent verdicts and the appellate court affirmed. The verdicts were not inconsistent, according to the appellate court, because the jury could have determined that neither party proved its case. In addition, the jury might well have felt that the evidence of which vehicle had the green light was so conflicting, inconclusive, and unsatisfactory that it simply could not determine from the evidence presented which party was negligent. Barrick, 308 Ill.App.3d at 310, 241 Ill.Dec. 825, 720 N.E.2d 280. In the present case, the appellate court, without attempting to distinguish the two cases, described the Barrick verdicts as irreconcilably inconsistent, and stated that a new trial should have been ordered. 352 Ill. App.3d at 1055, 288 Ill.Dec. 398, 817 N.E.2d 1048. At oral argument, Redmond attempted to distinguish Barrick from the present case on the basis that neither party in Barrick raised the defense of comparative negligence. Both claims were all or nothing and, as a result, the jury was asked to impose complete liability for the accident on one party or the other. In the present case, he argues that because the jury was offered the option of apportioning liability between the two parties, Barrick is not applicable. We are not persuaded that this difference is significant. The appellate court in Barrick based its conclusion on how the jury might reasonably have viewed the evidence. The same rationale applies in the present case. Even though it is clear in the present case that 100% of the responsibility for the accident must rest, in some unknown proportion, upon either or both of the parties, it is still possible that the jury found the evidence so conflicting, inconclusive, and unsatisfactory that it simply could not determine from the evidence presented ( Barrick, 308 Ill.App.3d at 310, 241 Ill.Dec. 825, 720 N.E.2d 280), whether Redmond was negligent and, if so, to what degree, and whether Socha was negligent and, if so, to what degree. We conclude that Barrick and Boasiako are consistent with each other and with this court's decision in Wottowa, and that these cases offer support for Socha's position that the verdicts in this case are not legally inconsistent. At oral argument, Redmond offered the additional authority of Millette v. Radosta, 84 Ill.App.3d 5, 39 Ill.Dec. 232, 404 N.E.2d 823 (1980), in support of his contention that someone must be found liable in this case. In Millette, the plaintiff's injuries were caused by the negligence of one or more of three defendants, one of whom counterclaimed against the other two. The trial court held, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent and instructed the jury that it must find for the plaintiff and against one or more of the defendants. No verdict form was submitted that would have allowed the jury to find all three defendants not liable. Millette, 84 Ill.App.3d at 26, 39 Ill.Dec. 232, 404 N.E.2d 823. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff against all defendants and in favor of the counter-plaintiff against the other two defendants. All defendants appealed. Millette, 84 Ill. App.3d at 7, 39 Ill.Dec. 232, 404 N.E.2d 823. The appellate court affirmed, noting that there was no evidence of any intervening cause or act of God and that the real issue for the jury to determine was which of the defendants caused the [plaintiff's] injury. Millette, 84 Ill.App.3d at 26, 39 Ill.Dec. 232, 404 N.E.2d 823. The court posited that when two vehicles collide, `thereby injuring an innocent party,' a `presumption of negligence' arises. Millette, 84 Ill.App.3d at 26-27, 39 Ill.Dec. 232, 404 N.E.2d 823, quoting Krump v. Highlander Ice Cream Co., 30 Ill.App.2d 103, 105, 173 N.E.2d 822 (1961). In such cases, the court stated, once the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of negligence, the burden is on any non-negligent defendant to `make the required proof of exculpation.' Millette, 84 Ill.App.3d at 27, 39 Ill.Dec. 232, 404 N.E.2d 823, quoting Krump, 30 Ill.App.2d at 106, 173 N.E.2d 822. Redmond offers Millette as authority for the proposition that, in the present case, verdicts in favor of both the defendant and the counterdefendant cannot stand. We find Millette distinguishable from the present case and from the line of cases involving claims and counterclaims of negligence. Millette involved a plaintiff who was found, as a matter of law, not to have contributed to his own injury. He made a prima facie case that his injuries were caused by the negligence of one or more of the three defendants. The present case involves only two parties, each of whom accuses the other of being primarily responsible for the accident. Applying the case law from the line of cases involving two or more claims, we find that there are several reasonable explanations for the jury's finding that neither the defendant nor the counterdefendant in the present case should be held liable, even in the absence of evidence of any intervening cause or condition for the accident. The jury could have found neither party credible and, thus, found the evidence so conflicting, inconclusive, and unsatisfactory that it could not find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that either party had made its case. The jury might have concluded that one of the parties was not negligent, but that he or she failed to meet the burden of proving that the other party was negligent. It is also possible that the jury found the relative fault of the parties to be more or less equal to their proportion of damages and decided to do rough justice by just leaving each party where it stood. In effect, the jury could have found that Redmond caused his own injuries and Socha caused the damage to her car. We conclude that the jury's verdicts are not legally inconsistent. According to Black's Law Dictionary, a legally inconsistent verdict is one in which the same element is found to exist and not to exist, as when a defendant is acquitted of one offense and convicted of another, even though the offenses arise from the same set of facts and an element of the second offense requires proof that the first offense has been committed. Black's Law Dictionary 1592 (8th ed.2004). Another reference describes legally inconsistent verdicts as two findings treating of the same essential matter. 75B Am.Jur.2d Trial § 1805, at 652 (1992). In the present case, Redmond identifies no such essential matter that the jury in this case found to be proven in one action but not in the other. The same fact or element was not found in one verdict but not the other as would have been the case if the jury had found in favor of both plaintiff and counterplaintiff and found the same party 25% at fault in one verdict but 75% liable in the other. Such verdicts would, indeed, be legally inconsistent because the same fact would have been found both to exist and not to exist. Redmond implicitly acknowledged that his argument was based on the application of logic to a hypothetical closed set of facts, not on the application of law to the actual evidence presented at trial. In his motion for judgment n.o.v., he stated: In apportioning 100% of the fault for this collision, it is impossible for both Plaintiff and Defendant to be more than 50% at fault. Therefore, the only logical conclusion from the jury's verdict is that the jury felt both parties were equally at fault. (Emphasis added.) The trial court also focused on logic, rather than law, when stating that in the closed universe of facts which were elicited in this trial, there has to be a logical result. And the jury has to make a choice. It's not logically possible to find that an accident occurred without [its] being anyone's fault. (Emphases added.) There is, of course, no authority for the proposition that a verdict or verdicts in a civil case must be without any conceivable flaw in logic, only that they must be legally consistent. Tedeschi, 282 Ill.App.3d at 448-49, 217 Ill.Dec. 953, 668 N.E.2d 138. The verdicts in the present case may have been logically inconsistent in the abstract, that is, in the sense that when two parties are involved in an accident that occurs in the absence of any intervening cause, the accident must have been caused by the negligence of either or both. The verdicts are not, however, legally inconsistent because the jury did not find some essential matter proven in one claim but not proven in the other. Instead, the jury, dealing with the evidence presented rather than with abstract concepts, found neither claim proven. We conclude that the trial court erred by granting a new trial on the basis that the jury verdicts were legally inconsistent. We note, however, that Redmond's posttrial motion also sought a new trial on the basis that the verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence. This argument does not rest on a claim that the verdicts are legally inconsistent with each other, but rather stands on the assertion that they are not supported by the evidence presented at trial.