Opinion ID: 770975
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prejudicial Extraneous Information

Text: 227 Gall argues that the post-conviction testimony of another juror (Palmer) demonstrates that Gall's death sentence was unconstitutional. In a post-conviction questionnaire and again at a deposition conducted as part of Gall's habeas petition, Palmer indicated that he was aware of Gall's parole status when he committed the crime. (Gall alleges that Barton informed other jurors, including Palmer, of that fact). Palmer also indicated that the question of parole--the fact that he committed the crime while on parole, and the potential for parole from a life sentence--played an important role in the jury's decision to render a death sentence. Indeed, the jury explicitly asked the judge during deliberations if Gall could be paroled if given a life sentence. The judge responded: the Court cannot advise you as to either parole or pardon. J.A. at 1638-39. Gall argues that the jury's consideration of his parole status violated both Kentucky law and Gall's constitutional rights. 228 The Commonwealth offers several counter-arguments. First, the Commonwealth contends that statements in the penalty phase of the trial by both of Gall's parents referred indirectly to Gall's parole status, so that it was not extraneous information. The Commonwealth next avers that the evidence is not admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), pointing to the magistrate court's conclusion to that affect and to Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987), which discussed FRE 606(b). Third, the Commonwealth argues that Gall has not made a valid argument under habeas review because there is no constitutional rule prohibiting juries from considering the possibility of parole as part of their weighing of the death penalty. See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983). Further, the claim that the jury's consideration of parole violated Kentucky law is not cognizable on habeas review.
229 Gall is certainly correct when he argues that post-conviction hearings are permissible means to investigate and remedy actual juror bias. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982) (holding that the Court has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias); United States v. Herndon, 156 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that [w]here a colorable claim of extraneous influence has been raised, a hearing is necessary to provide an opportunity to show actual bias). The critical task is determining what evidence can be considered in assessing a claim of jury partiality. In doing so, we find most of Palmer's statements to be inadmissible; nevertheless, we find some of his most crucial statements admissible. 230 Federal Rule of Evidence 606 establishes what evidence pertaining to jury deliberations a court may consider. 231 [A] juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations orto the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith . . . . [A] juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. 232 Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). Tanner further clarified the distinction between internal and external matters. Examples of impermissible internal influences 'include the behavior of jurors during deliberations, the jurors' ability to hear or comprehend trial testimony, and 'physical or mental incompetence of a juror'--generally, the 'internal processes of the jury.' Herndon, 156 F.3d at 634-35 (quoting Tanner, 483 U.S. at 118, 120). Misapprehension of instructions is also internal in nature. See Warden v. Gall, 865 F.2d 786, 788 n.2 (6th Cir. 1989). Examples of outside influences include a juror in a criminal trial who had previously applied for a job in the district attorney's office; a bribe attempt on a juror; and the entry of newspaper articles and media attention into deliberations. See Herndon, 156 F.3d at 635. This Court further sharpened the definition of external influence: 233 [W]e distill the principle that an extraneous influence on a juror is one derived from specific knowledge about or a relationship with either the parties or their witnesses. This knowledge or relationship is such that it taints the deliberations with information not subject to a trial's procedural safeguards. These types of influences, moreover, may well deny the litigants their constitutional right to have the case heard by a fair and impartial jury. 234 Id. at 636. Finally, even when a juror testifies as to external evidence, that testimony must be parsed of all references regarding the effect of that information on the juror's mental processes or the jury's deliberations. Bibbins v. Dalsheim, 21 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1994). 235 Using these standards in looking at Palmer's deposition and questionnaire, we conclude that very few of his statements are admissible. First, almost all questions and answers on the questionnaire involved inadmissibleinternal considerations because they involved the effect of the knowledge of parole on the jury's deliberations. For instance, the questionnaire asked of [t]he role parole played in your deliberation? Palmer answered: [A] big part. J.A. at 1168. The questionnaire then asked: How important was the fact that Gall was on parole? The answer Very important. The form then questioned the role publicity played in deliberations, the possible alternative sentences under different hypotheticals, and asked what convinced [Palmer] of different conclusions. J.A. at 1168-69. In short, most questions involved paradigmatic internal considerations--the effect of parole and other factors upon Palmer's or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict. Fed. R. Evid. 601(b). Nevertheless, since Gall's parole status was never addressed at trial, see infra, the one question that is admissible as a purely external matter is--Did you as a juror know Gall was on parole? Answer: Yes. J.A. at 1168. Similarly, nearly all of Palmer's deposition comprised inadmissible statements of his and the jury's internal considerations at trial--questions concerning the effect the possibility of parole had on the jury's deliberations. J.A. at 1151-62. The only testimony that involved exclusively external influences was Palmer's acknowledgment, after having looked at his completed questionnaire, that he had known that Gall was on parole when he committed his crime. J.A. at 1155. He also stated that another juror had made him aware of that fact, a statement that was also admissible. J.A. at 1166.
236 Gall's arguments regarding state law violations are not cognizable on habeas review 33 . Nevertheless, Gall does state a colorable constitutional claim, reviewable under § 2254, when he asserts that the juror's consideration of improper extraneous influences violated his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, as well as his right of confrontation and cross-examination. At the time, Kentucky did not permit jurors to consider parole as an aspect of their sentencing decision; nor were counsel allowed to discuss parole in their arguments before the jury. Yet Barton conceded at voir dire that he had previously read about Gall's parole status, and Palmer conceded that he knew of Gall's parole during the deliberations, having heard that fact from another juror. This case is thus better cast as one involving the introduction of improper extraneous information into the trial that may have prejudiced Gall's case. 237 In a habeas petition, when claiming that a trial error violated his constitutional rights, a defendant must show that the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 370 (6th Cir. 1999). A trial judge's finding on the impartiality of a juror or jury is a factual finding, presumed correct under § 2254 review unless Gall proves otherwise by convincing evidence. See Turpin v. Kassulke, 26 F.3d 1392, 1401 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Patton, 467 U.S. at 1036). 238 A defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are put in jeopardy when facts appear before a jury that were not developed at trial. Such extraneous influence may threaten the guarantee of an impartial jury, see Herndon, 156 F.3d at 636; Goins, 605 F.2d at 953, and may trammel a defendant's right to confrontation and cross-examination. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364-66 (1966) (per curiam) (holding that statements by a court bailiff to jurors violated Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights). The Supreme Court has also found a due process violation when a death sentence was imposed, at least in part, on the basis of information which [a defendant] had no opportunity to deny or explain. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977); see also Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 351 (counting among essential legal procedures the requirement that the jury's verdict be based on evidence received in open court, not from outside sources); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722 (stating that a juror's verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial). 239 We find that Gall's parole status was improper extraneous information. Despite the Commonwealth's argument to the contrary, there is no mention in the record that Gall had been on parole when he killed Jansen. The fact that his mother mentioned that he had been previously released did not indicate that he was released on parole. Nor did the lawyers,judge or other witnesses reveal that Gall was on parole at the time he committed the offense. With no sources from within the trial indicating his parole status, Palmer's knowledge of Gall's parole status was clearly extraneous information--as he himself stated under oath. 240 Due to Kentucky rules, counsel never had a chance to explain this crucial fact that came before the jury. Although we are not permitted to note Palmer's testimony that the jury considered that fact very important, we do find that a reasonable juror would have likely considered the extraneous information of Gall's parole status in setting his sentence. See Bibbins, 21 F.3d at 17 (noting that when an extraneous influence is shown, a court must use an objective test to assess the likelihood that the influence would affect the typical juror). Thus, due process was violated because Gall's death sentence was imposed, at least in part, on the basis of information that he had no opportunity to deny or explain. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362; see Herndon, 156 F.3d at 636 (noting that extraneous information taints [a jury's] deliberations with information not subject to a trial's procedural safeguards). 241 Moreover, the trial court's response to the prospect that the jury was tainted was unacceptably weak. He merely advised the jury that it would be error for this Court to instruct you or comment upon the subject of parole. J.A. at 1638. We agree with Gall that when faced with this question, the judge had a duty to admonish the jury more forcefully that it could not consider parole in its sentence determination--which would have reflected Kentucky law at the time. See Brown v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 845, 848 (Ky. 1969). This is particularly important in the context of death penalty cases, where the Supreme Court has clearly attempted to rein in jury discretion to impose death based on any aggravating factors it saw fit. See generally Beck, 447 U.S. at 639. Here, when faced with the clear prospect that the jury was considering an aggravating factor beyond what had been presented at trial, and which the lawyers had been forbidden from discussing, the trial court failed to take all appropriate steps to assure the integrity and dignity of the trial. Goins, 605 F.2d at 953. 242 In short, we believe that the jury's extraneous knowledge of Gall's parole status at the time of the killing, and the trial court's failure to respond appropriately to its question regarding parole, inflicted substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638.