Opinion ID: 78066
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Douglas's Complaint States a Claim for Relief.

Text: Our conclusion that section 1997e(e) supports a dismissal without prejudice does not end the matter because the district court dismissed Douglas's complaint with prejudice. We must consider whether the district court erred when it concluded that Douglas's complaint fails to allege a constitutional violation by any named defendant. We conclude that the complaint fails to state a claim against Ford, Kelloway, and Terrant, but the complaint states a claim against Yates. We have explained that First Amendment rights to free speech and to petition the government for a redress of grievances are violated when a prisoner is punished for filing a grievance concerning the conditions of his imprisonment. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1112 (11th Cir.2006). To state a retaliation claim, the commonly accepted formulation requires that a plaintiff must establish first, that his speech or act was constitutionally protected; second, that the defendant's retaliatory conduct adversely affected the protected speech; and third, that there is a causal connection between the retaliatory actions and the adverse effect on speech. Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir.2005). Douglas's complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim of retaliation by prison officials that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Douglas's complaint contains plausible allegations of retaliation. The complaint alleges that Douglas was exposed to mental abuse, physical intimidation, harassment, and verbal threats of injury and punishment in retaliation for the grievance that he filed. Douglas's complaint also describes unfounded disciplinary reports that were filed against him, an incident of more severe confinement, and threats, after his release from that confinement, that he would be exposed to more punishment if he continued to pursue his grievance. Although Douglas's complaint alleges that a constitutional violation occurred, the complaint fails to allege facts that associate Terrant, Ford, or Kelloway with that violation. See Pamel Corp. v. P.R. Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33, 36 (1st Cir.1980) (While we do not require technical niceties in pleading, we must demand that the complaint state with some minimal particularity how overt acts of the defendant caused a legal wrong.); 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1234, at 381-85 (3d ed. 2004) ([A] complaint will be held defective ... if [it] fails to connect the defendant with the alleged wrong.). Neither Douglas's complaint nor his attached memorandum contains any allegations that associate Terrant or Ford with any of the retaliatory conduct that Douglas alleged, and neither document mentions Kelloway at all outside of the caption. The memorandum attached to the complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a claim against Yates. As a supervisor, Yates is liable under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the unconstitutional acts of his subordinates if he personally participated in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct or if there is `a causal connection between [his] actions ... and the alleged constitutional deprivation.' West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir.2007) (quoting Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (second alteration in original)). A causal connection can be established when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation and he fails to do so; when the supervisor's improper custom or policy leads to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; or when facts support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so. Id. at 1328-29. Douglas's complaint alleges that his family informed Yates of ongoing misconduct by Yates's subordinates and Yates failed to stop the misconduct. These allegations allow a reasonable inference that Yates knew that the subordinates would continue to engage in unconstitutional misconduct but failed to stop them from doing so. The district court erred when it dismissed Douglas's complaint against Yates with prejudice.