Opinion ID: 458689
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did the district court have jurisdiction over appellants' mandamus and apa claims?

Text: 38 Alternatively, appellants contend that the district court had jurisdiction over this dispute as an action in the nature of mandamus, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1361, and as an action brought pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Secs. 701-06, and the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. 19 39 On the basis of this jurisdiction, appellants allege that the Administrator acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rejecting their funding application. The ground of this claim is appellants' contention that EPA unlawfully applied new affordability guidelines or updated parameters when deciding to deny Northern York's Step III application and that the Administrator should be estopped from rejecting the application in reliance on these guidelines. As we understand appellants' contention, Northern York had been preparing its Step III application with a view to conforming to earlier, less onerous affordability guidelines, and appellants claim that EPA surprised Northern York with the imposition of the new standards. 20 We turn to the jurisdictional question. 40 We may dispose of appellants' claim of mandamus jurisdiction summarily, for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1361 is entirely inappropriate to this case. Mandamus as a remedy to compel an executive officer to perform his duty is appropriate only when the applicant lacks any adequate alternative remedy. Grant v. Hogan, 505 F.2d 1220 (3d Cir.1974); see also Nova Stylings, Inc. v. Ladd, 695 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir.1983). As we explain further in this section, appellants have a remedy under the Administrative Procedure Act. 41 EPA maintains that district court jurisdiction over appellants' APA claim is precluded by the Tucker Act, codified in relevant part at 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1491. 21 By the Tucker Act, the United States waives its immunity from non-tort money claims against the sovereign, United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983), but by the terms of that waiver, vests exclusive jurisdiction for claims exceeding $10,000 in the United States Claims Court. Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581, 586 (3d Cir.1985). 22 EPA insists that this suit must be viewed as a monetary claim against the United States because the real purpose behind appellants' action is to force the government to disburse funds. 42 A number of courts, including this one, have considered various aspects of this vexing problem of jurisdiction over a suit brought to review agency action when that action allegedly resulted in the wrongful denial of federal funds. Concerned about the integrity of the Tucker Act, the courts have developed what may be called the prime objective doctrine of Claims Court jurisdiction: if victory for the plaintiff in the suit would be tantamount to a release of the funds in excess of $10,000, then the Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the suit, even if the action is styled as one for injunctive or declaratory relief. Thereby the courts have guarded against the possibility that plaintiffs will evade Claims Court jurisdiction by creative drafting of complaints. 23 The jurisprudence of the Tucker Act does not limit the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Claims Court to suits against the sovereign for money damages as a result of some past act, but to any claim in excess of $10,000. (Emphasis added). According to EPA, this suit is a claim in excess of $10,000 because appellants will stand to gain $14,000,000 if their application is approved. 43 EPA is not correct. Appellants' claim under the APA cannot be characterized as a money claim for the simple reason that appellants will not receive the federal funds which they seek even if they prevail in district court on that claim. If the district court resolves appellants' only viable claim in their favor, by concluding that EPA acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in applying the new affordability guidelines to Northern York's application, the court has the authority only to set aside EPA's disapproval as having been based on improper standards. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706. Assuming arguendo that the application of these standards was unfair, there must have been some other guidelines along which EPA could have properly evaluated Northern York's application. The record does not currently disclose (and appellees do not allege) that Northern York's application would have satisfied these older criteria if EPA had adhered to them. Nor would the district court be competent to assess Northern York's conformability to the proper criteria in the first instance; the necessary expertise is found, of course, in EPA. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir.1965). 44 Thus, even if the district were to conclude that EPA improperly applied the new guidelines, that court would only be able to determine which guidelines were the appropriate ones for EPA to use, and to direct EPA to reconsider Northern York's Step III application based on the proper standards. Northern York will still have to convince EPA that its application should have been approved under the proper criteria before it receives any of the federal assistance grant for which it applied. 45 Moreover, we are not certain, after our review of the record, briefs, and oral argument, that Northern York would automatically have received the federal funds for which it was applying even if EPA had approved its application. According to EPA regulations, 40 C.F.R. Sec. 35.903(a), the Regional Administrator may not award grant assistance unless ... he has made the determinations required by [40 C.F.R.] Sec. 35.925 et seq. In turn, 40 C.F.R. Sec. 35.925, entitled Limitations on Award, provides inter alia that a Step III application must meet the requirements of NEPA, as we noted above, at 520. To ensure the conformability of Step III applications with NEPA, the Regional Administrator must have prepared an EIS or determined that one is not necessary. 40 C.F.R. Sec. 35.925-8. This task cannot be delegated to a state agency. 40 C.F.R. Sec. 35.1030-3. 46 At oral argument, counsel for EPA expressed uncertainty, as do we, as to whether the preparation of the EIS occurs before, after, or at the same time as the submission of a Step III application to EPA. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 35. Commentary to EPA regulations states that for NEPA compliance to be most effective, environmental issues must be addressed in conjunction with planning the project, and traditionally that has been done during Step 1. 47 Fed.Reg. 20,452. This remark would suggest that the required environmental impact analysis is usually complete by the time a Step III application is approved or disapproved. On the other hand, the record in this case suggests the opposite; in his May 26, 1982, letter to DER, appellee Greene Jones, Director of the Water Management Division of Region III of EPA indicated that EPA had not yet prepared an EIS as to the proposed Northern York sewage plant even though Northern York had already submitted its Step III application. 47 Although we cannot say with certainty whether the preparation of the EIS must be completed before a sewage authority's application for federal funds is approved, or whether the approval of such a grant application is conditional, subject to the outcome of the determinations which are nondelegable duties of EPA, we are certain that the outcome of an environmental impact analysis can hardly be a foregone conclusion, and counsel for EPA conceded that preparation of an EIS can be very time-consuming. If appellants must still face the requirement of an EIS or other nondelegable determinations after their application is approved by EPA, then their suit against EPA can hardly be considered a money claim.