Opinion ID: 822847
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: , 201 P.3d at 503; L.G., 14 P.3d at 953-54.

Text: 30 In support of her allegation, Thea cites an online publication of the Native American Rights Fund. That publication contains a “Practice Tip” discouraging the use of an employee of an agency seeking termination of parental rights as an expert witness for ICWA purposes, but the practice tip explicitly concedes that using such an employee as an ICWA expert is “not prohibited by the ICWA.” N ATIVE A M . RIGHTS FUND , A P RACTICAL G UIDE TO THE INDIAN CHILD W ELFARE A CT (online ed. rev. Sept. 2011) Practice Tip at Topic 14, Expert W itnesses, Question 14.7, http://narf.org/icwa/faq/expert.htm#Q7 (emphasis added). -14- 6742 deemed waived.31 2. The superior court’s finding that the children would suffer harm if returned to Thea’s custody was supported by sufficient evidence. Thea argues that the superior court’s finding that her continued custody would likely result in serious harm befalling the children was not supported by sufficient evidence. She limits her argument to complaints about Morrison’s expert testimony, averring specifically that the testimony was defective because (1) Morrison based her testimony on a review of the OCS file and trial exhibits, having had no personal interactions with Thea or the children, and (2) Morrison’s testimony was “overly generalized” and not grounded in the specific facts and issues of this case. Both arguments are based on this court’s decision in C.J. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services32 and its companion case, J.J. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Division of Family & Youth Services.33 Neither argument has merit. As to the first argument, it is well settled that an ICWA expert may testify based on a review of documents in the record, without having had any personal contact with the parties, as long as the witness’s testimony is grounded in the facts and issues specific to the case before the court.34 Thea’s argument is based on an erroneous interpretation of our decisions in C.J. and J.J. and is an argument that we have repeatedly 31 See Frank E. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 77 P.3d 715, 719 n.14 (Alaska 2003) (citing Martinson v. ARCO Alaska, Inc., 989 P.3d 733, 737 (Alaska 1999)). 32 18 P.3d 1214 (Alaska 2001). 33 38 P.3d 7 (Alaska 2001). 34 See, e.g., Sandy B. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 216 P.3d 1180, 1192 (Alaska 2009); Ben M. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 204 P.3d 1013, 1020 (Alaska 2009). -15- 6742 rejected in the past.35 As to the second argument, the expert’s testimony in this case was grounded in the specific facts and issues facing this family. Witnesses other than Morrison established that Thea struggled with a longstanding alcohol abuse problem that was sometimes coupled with domestic violence; that she was locked in a repetitive cycle of abusing substances, participating in treatment, experiencing a period of sobriety, and relapsing; that she had twice been convicted of driving while intoxicated with her children in her car; and that her potential for future relapses into abusive behaviors was high. Thea does not challenge this testimony. Morrison then testified that children living with a parent who exhibited this conduct were at risk of harm. She testified that such a lifestyle is particularly alarming for children who are present when their parent is arrested for DUI or who witness the parent’s involvement in domestic violence, both of which occurred in this case. She noted that issues facing children who live with such parents include not “know[ing] when their mom’s going to be sober, if the mom’s going to be able to take care of them, if they’re going to be safe, if mom’s going to make sure they have all their needs met.” In addition, because parents who are in denial about an unsafe situation are unlikely to protect their children from the dangers it poses, Morrison expressed particular concern about Thea’s recent statement that she did not require treatment. In summary, Morrison testified that given this family’s history, if Zach and Abbie were returned to Thea’s care, they would be likely to suffer serious emotional or physical harm. In reviewing a trial court’s finding that a parent’s continued custody poses a future risk of harm to a child, we are mindful that “ICWA does not require that the 35 E.g., Ben M., 204 P.3d at 1020; Marcia V. v. State, Office of Children’s Servs., 201 P.3d 496, 507 (Alaska 2009); J.A. v. State, DFYS, 50 P.3d 395, 401 (Alaska 2002). -16- 6742 experts’ testimony provide the sole basis for the court’s conclusion; ICWA simply requires that the testimony support that conclusion.”36 Regarding expert testimony in particular, “the issues are whether the expert disregarded or was unaware of contrary evidence, and whether the testimony was so vague and generalized that the trial court clearly erred in according weight to it.”37 Thea points to no evidence to contradict the lay testimony establishing her ongoing substance abuse and her relapse potential, and her conclusory statement that Morrison’s testimony was “overly generalized” is not supported by the record. Aggregating the testimony of all the witnesses, substantial evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that Thea’s pattern of substance abuse was unlikely to change, and that those behaviors would place a child in Thea’s custody at serious risk of physical or emotional damage. Thus, the superior court did not err in finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Zach and Abbie would likely suffer serious physical or emotional damage if Thea were to retain custody of them. C. The Superior Court Did Not Err In Finding That Termination Of Thea’s Parental Rights Was In Zach’s And Abbie’s Best Interests. Alaska Statute 47.10.088(c) requires that a court considering whether to terminate a parent’s parental rights must “consider the best interests of the child.” Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rule 18(c)(3) provides that before a court may terminate a parent’s rights, the court must find “by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child.” Neither the statute nor the rule defines best interests, but guidance is found in AS 47.10.088(b), which lists five factors “relating to the best interests of the child” that a court may evaluate in determining whether a parent has timely remedied conduct or conditions that endanger 36 E.A. v. State, Div. of F amily & Youth Servs., 46 P.3d 986, 992 (Alaska 2002). 37 Ben M., 204 P.3d at 1020. -17­ 6742 a child.38 The factors are not exclusive, nor is consideration of each factor mandatory. In addition, we have noted that the “best interests” finding required by AS 47.10.088(c) and CINA Rule 18(c)(3) requires a more comprehensive judgment than does determining whether the parent has timely remedied endangering conduct or conditions.39 Nevertheless, in an appropriate case, the factors listed in AS 47.10.088(b) provide a logical beginning for a trial court’s consideration of best interests under AS 47.10.088(c). Here, the trial court addressed each of the listed factors. First, given Thea’s history, the court found little likelihood that the children could be returned to her care “within a reasonable time based on their age and need.”40 Second, the court found that although Thea had participated in substance abuse treatment programs multiple times 38 AS 47.10.088(b) provides: In making a determination under (a)(2) of this section, the court may consider any fact relating to the best interests of the child, including (1) the likelihood of returning the child to the parent within a reasonable time based on the child’s age or needs; (2) the amount of effort by the parent to remedy the conduct or the conditions in the home; (3) the harm caused to the child; (4) the likelihood that the harmful conduct will continue; and (5) the history of conduct by or conditions created by the parent. 39 Karrie B. ex rel. Reep v. Catherine J., 181 P.3d 177, 186 (Alaska 2008). 40 In making this determination, the court took into account that the treatment program Thea began during the trial would require 90 days of residential treatment, followed by nine months of aftercare. -18- 6742 over the course of the case, her motivation was “simply to make the Court happy.” She disagreed with the recommendations of her current treatment provider, her probation officer, and OCS that she required residential treatment, and she was in denial about the period of sobriety she had demonstrated leading up to the termination trial. Third, the court found that Thea’s behaviors had harmed the children by causing them trauma, subjecting them to removal from their home three different times, requiring them to experience their mother’s incarceration, experiencing physical danger at the hands of an intoxicated driver, and, at least as to Zach, being exposed to domestic violence. Fourth, the court analyzed Thea’s history and found that Thea had neither remedied, nor made significant progress in remedying, her substance abuse addiction and that given her history, “there [was] a . . . strong likelihood that this harmful conduct [would] continue.” Finally, the superior court recounted in detail Thea’s history of harmful conduct. We have held that “a superior court may consider ‘any fact relating to the best interests of the child’ in its best-interests analysis,”41 and that the superior court need not accord a particular weight to any given factor.42 The superior court’s analysis in this case conformed to this approach. The court did not stop its analysis with the AS 47.10.088(b) factors but went on to note that Zach and Abbie, who had been traumatized and were in need of trusting relationships, were presently living with Thea’s sister and her husband in a safe and protective preadoptive relationship. The court observed that the children were reported to be doing well in this home. The court noted 41 Hannah B. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 289 P.3d 924, 932 (Alaska 2012) (quoting Doe v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 272 P.3d 1014, 1025 (Alaska 2012)). 42 Id. at 933 (quoting Doe, 272 P.3d at 1025). -19- 6742 that the children had been in OCS’s custody for 29 months, a significant portion of their lives, and that further delays in permanency would cause them additional trauma.43 The superior court also considered Thea’s conduct, noting that even though she understood that OCS would not tolerate her abuse of substances around her children, she physically endangered the children by driving intoxicated with them in her car. The court noted that not only had Thea failed to remedy her substance abuse behavior but she had made no significant progress toward that end and had demonstrated that she was not inclined to change those behaviors. The superior court observed that Thea’s ongoing abusive behaviors were likely to result in the children suffering serious emotional or physical damage. This case resembles J.H. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,44 in which we affirmed the superior court’s best interests finding based on evidence that the mother had repeatedly returned to using drugs following her unsuccessful attempts at treatment. In J.H., the mother, like Thea, “remained at high risk of returning to substance abuse.”45 There, we noted that there was “little doubt that a relapse by [the mother] would have placed [the child] at risk had she been returned to her mother’s 43 Additional support for the trial court’s finding is provided by social worker Gardner’s testimony that “the children are in dire need of permanency . . . . They should just be happy and peaceful and know a stable lifestyle. Have to worry about little kid problems like studying and stuff instead of where is my mom, is she in jail or is she relapsed,” and by expert witness Morrison’s testimony that the children would be at risk if they did not quickly achieve permanency, because they had been unsettled for so much of their lives, and “when you’re unsettled and you don’t know where you’re going to be, you don’t know if you’re going back, you don’t know if you’re going to stay, you don’t know who your parents are going to be and who’s going to take care of you, that’s a pretty scary situation to be in.” 44 30 P.3d 79, 87 (Alaska 2001). 45 Id. -20- 6742 home.”46 And in Hannah B., we recognized that a child’s need for permanence and stability should not be sacrificed indefinitely in order to allow the child’s parents to rectify circumstances that placed their child in danger.47 The evidence presented to the superior court supported the court’s finding that termination of Thea’s parental rights, in order to free Zach and Abbie for adoption, was in the children’s best interests. The superior court thus did not err in making that finding by a preponderance of the evidence. The dissent argues that the superior court erred because additional evidence, not presented to the court, might have demonstrated that a permanency goal other than adoption — presumably a goal such as guardianship or placement with a fit and willing relative — would have better served the children’s interests. The dissent is correct in noting that state and federal laws allow CINA cases to be resolved through permanency outcomes other than reunification or adoption.48 But as we have held, the law does not require a court, in the context of a termination proceeding, to consider alternative outcomes, “except to the extent that the statute requires the court to order an arrangement that is in the child’s best interest.”49 Indeed, in Dashiell R. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children’s Services,50 we expressly rejected a father’s argument that it was error to find that termination of his parental rights was in his children’s best interests because 46 Id. 47 289 P.3d at 933 (quoting Kent V. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 233 P.3d 597 (Alaska 2010)). 48 See, e.g., AS 47.05.065, .10.080(c) & (l); 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2006). 49 C.W. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 52, 57 (Alaska 2001). 50 222 P.3d 841 (Alaska 2009). -21- 6742 the children would likely remain with their paternal grandparents even if the father’s parental rights were terminated. We concluded that because the grandparents’ custody would be temporary, the children would remain “under the cloud of continuing uncertainty, [and] the children’s need for permanence and security would not be met.”51 Similarly, in Hannah B., we rejected the mother’s argument that the superior court’s best interests finding was erroneous because the child was placed with his maternal grandmother, who supported reunification with the mother.52 In affirming the superior court’s best interests finding, we noted that it was “very uncertain whether Hannah would be able to assume responsibility for Jacob, given the significant amount of treatment remaining and her pattern of relapse following residential treatment.”53 Like Hannah, Thea has demonstrated a repeated pattern of relapse following treatment and, at a minimum, has a significant amount of treatment remaining before reunification could even be considered. Thea asserts that in some cases a child’s best interests require preserving rather than severing ties to an unfit parent. While such cases may exist, this is not one of them. Zach and Abbie have been in OCS’s custody — in effect, in limbo — for nearly two and one-half years, waiting for Thea to act responsibly and step into her role as their parent. These children are not teenagers, on the verge of making their way in the world.54 They are children who require the guidance and direction that is best provided 51 Id. at 851. 52 289 P.3d at 933-34. 53 Id. at 934. 54 We note that while Zach was 12 years old at the time Thea’s rights were terminated, he was only nine when Thea’s conduct caused OCS to remove him from her care. -22- 6742 in a loving, stable family headed by functioning, trustworthy parents. After years of living in uncertainty, these children are finally in a position to be adopted into a permanent family with competent, stable parents, a resolution not available to them under any permanency goal other than adoption.55 Preserving Thea’s parental rights, in order to ensure maintenance of the children’s ties to her, would continue to expose the children to Thea’s potentially dangerous behaviors and would deprive them of the chance to become part of a permanent, stable family. As the superior court noted, trust is very important for children, as is a sense of permanency, and the lack of this trust and stability may be traumatic and may heighten the risk that a child will engage in antisocial behaviors. The dissent argues that the superior court lacked pertinent information when it found that termination of Thea’s parental rights was in her children’s best interests. We appreciate the concern that the trial court did not hear about the children from their former or current caregivers or, more importantly, from their therapist. Such testimony, when available, is likely to result in a better-informed decision by a trial court called upon to decide whether to terminate a parent’s rights. But here, the superior court based its decision on a preponderance of all of the evidence presented to it.56 OCS 55 Adoption requires termination of Thea’s parental rights. See AS 25.23.130(a)(1); AS 47.10.088(a). 56 The dissent claims that evidence in the record demonstrates that Zach and Abbie were “strongly” or “extremely” bonded to Thea “just before” the termination trial, and that Zach “continually” expressed a fervent desire that the family be kept together. Yet the evidence cited by the dissent consists primarily of a permanency report authored by the children’s guardian ad litem nearly a year and a half before the termination trial was held. In her more recent report, authored six months before the trial, the guardian ad litem stated that while the children “remain bonded with their mother . . . [t]hey cannot continue to wait” for her to become ready to parent them. This report went on to (continued...) -23- 6742 presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that termination of Thea’s rights would serve her children’s best interests. Thea declined the opportunity to present any contrary evidence despite her current argument that such evidence was indispensable to the trial court’s decision. We thus cannot conclude that based on the record before it, the trial court clearly erred in determining that termination of Thea’s rights was in the best interests of Zach and Abbie. Compelling evidence was presented to the trial court that continued custody of the children by Thea would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage befalling them. Evidence was also presented that termination of their parent’s rights would provide the children with the opportunity to be welcomed into a permanent, stable family. Absent evidence to the contrary, termination of Thea’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The trial court’s finding is affirmed. D. Thea’s Remaining Arguments Are Without Merit. Thea’s brief contains several arguments in addition to those addressed above. She argues that the superior court erred by failing to solicit, sua sponte, 12-year­ old Zach’s preferences regarding termination of Thea’s rights or to appoint counsel to represent Zach in the termination proceedings. But these matters, which are properly within the superior court’s discretion, were not raised in that court. Thea has not alleged or demonstrated that the superior court committed plain error on these matters, so these arguments are not properly before us. 56 (...continued) recommend that Thea’s parental rights be terminated, so that Zach and Abbie could be adopted. In reaching this recommendation, the report stressed that these children “need permanency. They need stability, consistency and to always be safe — they cannot worry if their mother is going to start drinking again and if they are going to be removed from her again.” -24- 6742 Finally, Thea argues that the trial court erred in allowing the children’s guardian ad litem, a non-attorney staff member of the state Office of Public Advocacy, to be “represented” by an OPA staff attorney during the termination proceedings. We reject this argument, noting that OPA, not a named individual, was appointed to act as the children’s guardian ad litem in these proceedings. This is in accord with state law.57 We have reviewed the record and have found no impropriety in the actions of either OPA representative.