Opinion ID: 895327
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Petropouloses' Appraisal Expert

Text: The State first argues that Smith's testimony was irrelevant because he only testified to the pre-taking value of the whole property and the proper method of determining damages required evidence of both the value of the part taken and the damage to the remainder. However, the State does not dispute that at least part of an acceptable method of calculating partial-taking damages requires determining the market value of the entire tract before the taking. See Westgate, Ltd. v. State, 843 S.W.2d 448, 457 (Tex.1992). It follows that Smith's testimony as to the property's pre-taking value was relevant, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony. See TEX.R. EVID. 401 (`Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex.1995). The State also challenges the reliability of Smith's opinion. The State argues there was no evidence Smith's appraisal technique was generally accepted. We disagree. Smith used the comparable sales approach to determine the pre-taking value of the whole. We have recognized that this is a traditional method for determining land value. City of Harlingen v. Estate of Sharboneau, 48 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tex.2001). Finally, the State argues that because Smith based his value on the specific use of a car wash and lube facility instead of considering all reasonable uses, his testimony was unreliable under City of Austin v. Cannizzo, 153 Tex. 324, 267 S.W.2d 808, 815 (1954), which states that it is proper to admit evidence of the uses to which it is reasonably adaptable and for which it either is or in all reasonable probability will become available within the reasonable future. According to the State, Smith's testimony was speculative because the Petropouloses had not been approached by buyers seeking to acquire the land for a car wash and lube facility. But in his testimony, Smith described the practice in the appraisal profession of conducting a feasibility analysis to determine an appropriate highest and best use. He also testified that he adhered to that practice and considered four factors: what is legally permissible; what is physically possible; what is financially feasible; and what is the most productive use of the property. These are the same factors upon which Hornsby, the State's expert, based his highest and best use testimony. Smith then discussed his analysisincluding assessing properties comparable to the Petropouloses' propertyand determined a value estimate for the property under its various possible uses. As a result of his feasibility analysis, Smith determined the fair market value of the Petropouloses' property based on what he considered its highest and best use. A trial court has broad discretion to determine the admissibility of expert testimony. See, e.g., Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 499 (Tex.2001). Under the record before us, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Smith's testimony. [1]