Opinion ID: 510613
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does CONASA control?

Text: 114 In CONASA, as we have seen, the court held that the Commission properly exercised jurisdiction over the Rules. We remanded the case, however, because 115 [t]he Commission did not examine the implications of two recent Supreme Court decisions, [PMA ], which asserts the importance of labor policy in reaching substantive shipping law decisions, 435 U.S. at 57 [98 S.Ct. at 937] ... and [ILA I ], which discusses the role of collective bargaining in resolving the problems created by technological job displacement. In the interests of justice, the FMC should have the opportunity to reconsider its previous determination in light of these two decisions. 116 CONASA, 672 F.2d at 189. 117 On remand, the Commission reaffirmed its decision and terminated the proceedings. We then vacated the Commission's order on remand, concluding: 118 It appears that the Commission is now engaged in a broad scale proceeding examining the lawfulness of practices of numerous carriers ... arising out of the '50-mile rules' contained in the present ... collective bargaining agreements. The Commission has referred that proceeding to an Administrative Law Judge for detailed fact-finding based on a full evidentiary record. 119 Because the information developed in that investigation may shed further light on the shipping law issues involved in [this case], and because action by the Supreme Court [on a petition for certioari in this case] might affect the Commission's jurisdiction over these cases, we vacate the Commission's order that these proceedings be discontinued. The Commission should defer further action [in this case] until it has reached its final decision in its [other investigation] and until the Supreme Court has concluded its action in this case. 120 CONASA, Supplemental Order on Remand, 21 Shpg.Reg.Rep. (P & F) 1057 (D.C.Cir. July 2, 1982). 121 From the order of remand and this supplemental order on remand, petitioners conclude that CONASA clearly mandated consideration of labor factors and therefore precludes the Commission from relitigating the matter. They seize upon two footnotes in our initial opinion in CONASA. In one we said that [a]lthough the legislative standards are different, some of the policy factors germane to the NLRB's decision should also be taken into account by the FMC in its shipping law determination. 672 F.2d at 181 n. 80. In the other, we stated that [t]he necessity of the collective bargaining provisions at issue is a factor that the FMC should consider in making its substantive determination of legality. Id. at 188 n. 135. 122 The doctrine of issue preclusion forecloses relitigation of both issues of law and issues of fact if those issues were conclusively determined in a prior action. United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 464 U.S. 165, 170-71, 104 S.Ct. 575, 578, 78 L.Ed.2d 388 (1984). An issue of law is conclusively determined if, in a prior action between the parties, it has been actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to [that] judgment. Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 91, 98 (D.C.Cir.1987) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS Sec. 27 (1982)); see also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979); National Treasury Employees Union v. IRS, 765 F.2d 1174, 1176 (D.C.Cir.1985). 123 We cannot agree that CONASA precludes the Commission from litigating the question whether it is required to factor labor policies into its substantive shipping law analysis. That this important question under the shipping laws was not actually litigated in CONASA was made plain in our opinion. We explicitly noted that the merits of the FMC's decision [were] not before us upon review. CONASA, 672 F.2d at 179 n. 67; see id. at 179 (Petitioners ... have addressed their briefs solely to the jurisdictional question....). Thus, the court itself neither vetted nor even discussed the implications of PMA and of ILA I in either its initial opinion or its Supplemental Opinion on Remand. We remanded the case, moreover, not because we decided that the Commission had improperly excluded labor policies in its decision on the merits, but because the Commission had not had an opportunity to consider whether intervening Supreme Court decisions required it to accommodate shipping policies to labor policies. Hence, we instructed the Commission to examine the implications, if any, of the Supreme Court's decisions in PMA and ILA I; we did not order the Commission to apply a legal rule that the court itself discerned from those intervening cases. 7 CONASA was, therefore, not a case in which a remand was necessary because intervening legal developments determined, or even clearly affected, the question in issue, viz. whether the Commission is required to factor labor policies into its substantive shipping analysis. 124 In ILA I, for example, the Supreme Court had expressly declined to consider any shipping law considerations. 447 U.S. at 512, 100 S.Ct. at 2317. In PMA, the Court had noted that [b]ecause the Commission also has the power to approve filed agreements [under section 15 of the 1916 Act], even though anticompetitive, the Commission may also take into account any special needs of labor-management relationships in the shipping industry. 435 U.S. at 63, 98 S.Ct. at 940 (emphasis added). Plainly, neither of these decisions resolved the issue presently before us. 125 The petitioners also point to representations the Commission made to this court in its motion for summary affirmance of its order discontinuing the CONASA investigation. In that motion, the Commission argued that the investigation reviewed in CONASA was properly discontinued because the agency's newly instituted investigation in Docket No. 81-11, the action presently before this court, would be a much more appropriate vehicle for any meaningful further action with respect to carriers' implementation of the 50-mile rules. More to the petitioners' point, however, the Commission also stated that [f]ollowing this Court's opinion ... the 'Interim Report and Order' [in Docket No. 81-11] was modified to ensure that 'the parties may present evidence and otherwise address the nature and extent of any labor policy consideration which might affect the lawfulness of the Container Rules under the sections of the Shipping Acts here at issue....'  126 Our Supplemental Opinion on Remand, like the initial opinion, makes clear that we did not determine what standards the Commission was required to apply in its investigation; instead, that opinion reflects only our agreement with the Commission that Docket No. 81-11 was a much more appropriate vehicle for a complete and thorough examination of the question. See CONASA, Supplemental Opinion on Remand, 21 Ship.Reg.Rep. at 1058. That being the case, we vacated the Commission's admittedly less than thorough decision on that issue on remand. The grounds for our decision in both the initial decision and the Supplemental Opinion on Remand were substantially identical; given the importance of the labor policy issue to the administration of the shipping laws, the Commission had not given appropriate or thorough consideration to the question. The Commission, after considering the effect of intervening legal developments, remained entirely free, as far as the court was concerned, to bring its best judgment to bear in the first instance on the argument that labor policy considerations must play an integral part in its shipping law calculus. The appropriate allocation of authority between agencies and the courts demanded no less, and a fair reading of our opinions in CONASA suggests no more. 127 We proceed to consider petitioners' other objections to the Commission's decision. 128