Opinion ID: 1060043
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Competency of Child Witness to Testify Concerning Speed

Text: Our decisions follow the mainstream of authority which holds that expert knowledge is not required for a witness to be considered qualified to make an estimate of speed. As we said in Moore: An estimate of the speed at which an automobile was moving at a given time is generally viewed as a matter of common observation rather than expert opinion, and it is accordingly well settled that any person of ordinary experience, ability, and intelligence having the means or opportunity of observation, whether an expert or nonexpert, and without proof of further qualification may express an opinion as to how fast an automobile which came under his observation was going at a particular time. The fact that the witness had not owned or operated an automobile does not preclude him from so testifying. Speed of an automobile is not a matter of exclusive knowledge or skill, but anyone with a knowledge of time and distance is a competent witness to give an estimate; the opportunity and extent of observation goes to the weight of the testimony. Moore, 201 Va. at 525, 111 S.E.2d at 790 (citations omitted). However, [i]n order to be competent to testify on the subject the witness must have had a reasonable opportunity to judge the speed of the automobile. Id., 111 S.E.2d at 791. Accordingly, before any witness, regardless of age or driving experience, is permitted to offer an opinion concerning the speed of a vehicle, the record must show both that the witness has sufficient knowledge of time and distance to determine speed, and that the witness observed the vehicle in motion over a period of time and distance adequate to make that determination. Once these threshold qualifications are established, the witness' degree of knowledge and the duration and quality of the witness' observations become matters of credibility, not competence. Thus, in Moore we held that the testimony of an adult witness who was just learning to drive and had many years experience of automobile travel as a passenger was admissible for such weight as the jury thought it should have. Id. We have not previously considered the standard of competency required for a child witness to offer an opinion as to the speed of a vehicle. In Meade v. Meade, 206 Va. 823, 147 S.E.2d 171 (1966), we did not reach the question whether a 14-year-old boy was competent to offer an opinion as to a vehicle's speed because the evidence showed that he had not actually seen the vehicle in motion prior to the accident, but had only heard the sound of the vehicle. Accordingly, the boy's lack of a reasonable opportunity to judge the vehicle's speed, not his youth, was the basis for finding his testimony incompetent. Id. at 828-29, 147 S.E.2d at 175. As a general proposition, however, we have long held that a child is competent to testify if he or she possesses the capacity to observe, recollect, communicate events, and intelligently frame answers to the questions asked of him or her with a consciousness of a duty to speak the truth. Cross v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 62, 64, 77 S.E.2d 447, 449 (1953). Similarly, we have held that: The competency of a child as a witness to a great extent rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge whose decision will not be disturbed unless the error is manifest. It is the duty of the trial judge to determine such competency after a careful examination of the child. In deciding the question the judge must consider the child's age, his intelligence or lack of intelligence, and his sense of moral and legal responsibility. Hepler v. Hepler, 195 Va. 611, 619, 79 S.E.2d 652, 657 (1954). In the present case, it was not asserted that the child witness did not have a reasonable opportunity to observe the movement of Greenway's vehicle prior to the accident, or that he could not truthfully recollect or communicate what he had observed. To the contrary, the defense relied upon Justin's testimony that Greenway's vehicle was swerving to support its argument that Greenway had fallen asleep while driving. Greenway's only objection was that Justin was not competent to estimate speed because he was not himself a driver and, thus, lacked sufficient knowledge of time and distance to form a reliable estimate of speed. Prior to eliciting Justin's estimate of the speed of Greenway's vehicle, the Commonwealth's Attorney only asked Justin whether he had been in cars all [his] life as a passenger. This was the extent to which the Commonwealth attempted to establish that Justin had sufficient knowledge of time and distance as these concepts relate to a determination of the speed of a motor vehicle. When asked whether he knew or had an opinion as to the vehicle's speed, Justin stated that he did not, but then offered an estimate of ninety miles per hour. While arguably Justin merely intended to say that he could not be sure of the exact speed, his testimony was at best equivocal as to how he arrived at his estimate. Upon this record, we cannot say that the Commonwealth laid a foundation that Justin had sufficient knowledge of time and distance to give a reliable estimate of the speed of Greenway's vehicle. Accordingly, it was error to admit that evidence. This error, however, does not require reversal if the error was harmless. Improper admission of evidence does not create reversible error when it is merely cumulative of other competent evidence properly admitted. Freeman v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 301, 316, 288 S.E.2d 461, 469 (1982). Contrary to an assertion made during oral argument on appeal by Greenway's counsel, Justin's testimony was not the sole basis upon which the trial court could have determined the issue of Greenway's speed. Hawick testified that Greenway's speed was ninety miles an hour ... [m]aybe faster, and Justin's mother estimated Greenway's speed at a minimum of eighty-five miles per hour. This evidence supports the trial court's finding that Greenway was travelling at an extremely high speed. Thus, the evidence improperly admitted was merely cumulative and did not deprive Greenway of a fair trial. See Code § 8.01-678; Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 203, 208, 454 S.E.2d 725, 728 (1995).