Opinion ID: 786872
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Title VII Employment Discrimination

Text: 22 Fonseca may establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework by showing that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 604 (9th Cir.2004); see also Raad, 323 F.3d at 1195-96 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)). 23 Sysco does not dispute that Fonseca is a member of a protected class and was adequately performing his job. Instead, it argues that Fonseca did not suffer an adverse employment action, and was not treated less favorably than those outside his protected class. Sysco's assertion that there was no disparate treatment ignores the evidence substantiating Fonseca's claim, and its adverse employment action argument is unsupported by our precedent.
24 We define adverse employment action broadly. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1241 (9th Cir.2000); see also Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir.2000) (collecting cases). We have recognized that an adverse employment action exists where an employer's action negatively affects its employee's compensation. See Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that a reduction in base monthly pay was an adverse employment action even though with commission and bonuses it might have equaled the same net pay); cf. University of Hawai'i Prof'l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1105-06 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that receiving pay even a couple of days late can seriously affect an employee's financial situation and constitutes substantial impairment under the Contracts Clause). A warning letter or negative review also can be considered an adverse employment action. Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir.1987) (Transfers of job duties and undeserved performance ratings, if proven, would constitute `adverse employment decisions....'). 25 The evidence, if we credit it as we must for summary judgment, shows that Fonseca was adversely and disparately treated. In less than a one year period, there were between ten and thirteen times when a Sysco supervisor called at least one white employee to work overtime that should have been assigned to Fonseca because he had seniority. Mendoza stated in a declaration that his supervisor also assigned overtime shifts to white employees with less seniority. 26 There is record evidence of only one occasion on which white employees were similarly passed over. On that occasion, Peterson immediately arranged for the white employees to be paid. One week later, when Fonseca was wrongly denied an overtime opportunity, he complained to Peterson, as the white employees had, but Peterson told Fonseca that the loss of overtime was Fonseca's fault, and refused compensation. Fonseca filed and won several grievances regarding unfair overtime allocation, but testified that he was never paid for the successful grievances within 48 hours, as required by the CBA. Instead, there is evidence that Fonseca has waited months for such pay, while white employees were routinely compensated in their next paychecks. 27 Finally, Fonseca was disciplined for accidentally dropping a pallet of zucchini someone else had improperly loaded. Although Fonseca's suspension was reduced to a warning letter in his file through the grievance procedure, the warning letter still constitutes an adverse employment action, particularly since Sysco publicizes all discipline to all its employees. At least two white employees caused similar or worse damage to warehouse goods, but did not receive any sort of discipline; indeed, they were later promoted. 28 Citing Brooks, 229 F.3d at 930, Sysco argues that giving Fonseca's overtime shifts to white workers with less seniority was not an adverse employment action because Fonseca filed several successful grievances and was therefore compensated for the missed opportunities. In Brooks, we noted that a successful grievance could change the adverse nature of an employment action, such as where an employee was assigned to less favorable shifts and vacation days, but the employer accommodated her preferences after she complained. Brooks, 229 F.3d at 930. 29 Brooks is inapplicable for several reasons. First, while the plaintiff in Brooks made one complaint to remedy her adverse shifts, Fonseca filed five successful grievances. Because Fonseca was forced to file repeated grievances to remedy disparate treatment, he had to spend a significant amount of extra time simply to receive compensation to which he was clearly entitled. 30 Second, these grievances brought Fonseca to his supervisors' attention in a negative light. This is reflected in Peterson's response when Fonseca asked to be paid the overtime due for one of his successful grievances: We're not going to waste three hours today to issue one check for you. Fonseca testified that on another occasion, he chose not to file a grievance at least partly because he did not want to get in trouble with Peterson. 31 Finally, Fonseca did not file grievances for all of the times he was skipped for overtime. There were up to six occasions when Fonseca was deterred from filing any grievance, which means that when the amount of lost overtime was relatively minor, or Fonseca felt that he would get in trouble for filing a grievance, he was simply denied compensation. We hold that it is an adverse employment action when an employer knows its employees are entitled to certain opportunities, but forces only employees of a certain race to use the grievance procedure to obtain them. The fact of successfully grieving an adverse employment action does not preclude an employee from pursuing a claim of discrimination. 32
33 The evidence we have already described supports an inference of disparate treatment. Additionally, there is evidence in the record of ethnically biased remarks from a person in... a position of authority, which is sufficient to allege the connection necessary ... to survive summary judgment. Mustafa v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1180 (9th Cir.1998). 34 In September 2000, Peterson pretended not to understand and mocked Fonseca's accent. 3 This derision is particularly relevant because it was within a month of two incidents of disparate treatment: on September 22, 2000, Peterson saw the zucchini accident and suspended Fonseca, and on October 8, 2000, Peterson passed over Fonseca for an overtime opportunity in favor of a white employee, then refused to pay Fonseca even though he had immediately arranged to compensate the two white employees who came to him with the exact same complaint one week earlier. 35 Rhodes' comment about Fonseca's accent is similarly related to the allegedly discriminatory treatment of Fonseca. Rhodes disparaged Fonseca's accent in June or July of 2000. Earlier that year, on April 20, 2000, Rhodes was most likely the supervisor who skipped Fonseca on the seniority list and gave overtime to a white employee instead. Rhodes skipped Fonseca again on October 11, 2000. The inference in favor of Fonseca is that Rhodes' discriminatory comment was related to his decisions to deny Fonseca overtime opportunities. 36 Fonseca repeatedly was denied overtime opportunities and timely compensation in violation of the CBA while whites were not, and he was disciplined for an accident while whites who caused similar accidents were not. Taking into consideration the evidence of animus and drawing inferences in Fonseca's favor, we hold that this is more than sufficient to establish a prima facie case. See Cordova v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 124 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir.1997) (The requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case for Title VII ... on summary judgment is minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.) (quoting Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.1994)). 37
38 Fonseca has established a prima facie case for summary judgment purposes, and, therefore benefits from a presumption of unlawful discrimination, which Sysco can rebut only if it offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1112 (9th Cir.2002). If Sysco provides a legitimate reason for disciplining or refusing to pay Fonseca, the burden shifts to Fonseca to show that the reason given is a pretext. See Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 746 (9th Cir.2003). 39 Sysco offers only one reason for one instance of disparate treatment, besides its conclusory and irrelevant assertion that any disparate treatment was inadvertent. Regarding the zucchini incident, Sysco argues that Bill Zink, who saw Fonseca's zucchini accident, determined that Fonseca intentionally damaged the goods, and therefore discipline was appropriate. 40 [A] plaintiff can prove pretext either `(1) indirectly, by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is `unworthy of credence' because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable, or (2) directly, by showing that unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the employer.' Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1113 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220-22 (9th Cir.1998)). 41 Fonseca argues that the zucchini damage demonstrably was not his fault, and further that it would have been ridiculous for Zink or Peterson to conclude that Fonseca would intentionally damage goods in front of four supervisors. This is supported by Fonseca's testimony that no one conducted any investigation into the incident, and that Fonseca successfully grieved his suspension. In addition, while Zink's declaration states that he recommended discipline, Peterson was the person who ordered Fonseca's suspension. Given the evidence of Peterson's discriminatory animus, Fonseca has shown sufficient evidence of pretext to rebut the one explanation that Sysco produced. See Chuang v. Univ. of California Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1127 (9th Cir.2000) ([A] disparate treatment plaintiff can survive summary judgment without producing any evidence of discrimination beyond that constituting his prima facie case, if that evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding the truth of the employer's proffered reasons.). 42 There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Sysco's adverse employment actions against Fonseca constituted disparate treatment on the basis of race or ethnicity. We reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment.