Opinion ID: 1394049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of ICPC

Text: ADHS contends that the trial court violated the ICPC when it caused Ms. Huff's children to be sent to Colorado without Colorado's approval. The validity of this argument depends upon whether the ICPC applies in situations where a trial court is returning custody of children to an out-of-state natural parent. Appellate courts review chancery courts de novo on the record, but a decree is not reversed unless the chancellor's findings are clearly erroneous. Terry v. Lock, 343 Ark. 452, 37 S.W.3d 202 (2001). At issue here, according to ADHS, is Article III of the ICPC, which describes the conditions for placement under the ICPC. Article III states, in relevant part: (a) No sending agency shall send, bring, or cause to be sent or brought into any other party state any child for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption unless the sending agency shall comply with each and every requirement set forth in this article and with the applicable laws of the receiving state governing the placement of children therein. .... (d) The child shall not be sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought into the receiving state until the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state shall notify the sending agency, in writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary to the interests of the child. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-29-201(III) (Repl. 1998). As in McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474 (3d Cir.1991), the question before us is whether the ICPC applies when a court in one state directs that a child be taken from foster care and sent to a natural parent in another participating state. ADHS incorrectly contends that this is an issue of first impression in Arkansas. This court addressed the applicability of the ICPC in Nance v. Ark. Dep't Human Servs., 316 Ark. 43, 870 S.W.2d 721 (1994). In that case, a mother living in Arkansas appealed an order of the juvenile court placing custody of her daughter with her former husband in Texas. The question before this court was whether the juvenile court, having found a child to be dependent-neglected, had the authority to make an award of custody of the child as between two competing parents. Id. On appeal, Ms. Nance argued that the mandatory provisions of the ICPC were not complied with when custody was placed with her husband in another state. Id. This court held that subsection (a) of Article III of the compact makes it clear that it is meant to deal with children who are sent from a sending state into a receiving state `for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption.' Id. at 52-A, 870 S.W.2d at 725. Similarly, in McComb v. Wambaugh, supra , the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that the ICPC does not apply when a court in one state directs that a child be taken from foster care and sent to a natural parent in another participating state. The McComb court focused on Article III(a) of the Compact, quoted above, and held that, by its plain language, the scope of the Compact is limited to foster care or dispositions preliminary to an adoption. [1] Id. The federal appellate court noted the definition of placement in Article II(d): the arrangement for the care of a child in a family, free or boarding home or in a child-caring agency or institution but does not include any institution caring for the mentally ill, mentally defective or epileptic or any institution primarily educational in character, and any hospital or other medical facility. Id. at 480. See Ark.Code Ann. § 9-29-201(II)(d) (Repl.1998). The court acknowledged that the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (AAICPC) adopted what is known as Regulation 3, stating that `placement' as defined in Article II(d) includes the arrangement for the care of a child in the home of his parent, other relative, or non-agency guardian in a receiving state when the sending agency is any entity other than a parent, relative, or non-agency guardian making the arrangement for care as a plan exempt under Article VIII(a) of the Compact. McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d at 481. A regulation contrary to the statute under which it was promulgated cannot be upheld. See Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Richard's Honda Yamaha, 344 Ark. 44, 38 S.W.3d 356 (2001). The McComb court concluded that the regulation expands the scope of the Compact beyond that set out in Article III. [2] McComb v. Wambaugh, supra . We agree. Based upon this court's holding in Nance v. Ark. Dep't Human Servs., supra , and the federal appellate court's holding in McComb v. Wambaugh, supra , as well as the plain language of the statute, we hold that the Compact, read as a whole, was intended only to govern placing children in substitute arrangements for parental care, such as foster care or adoption. [3] As summarized by the McComb court: the Compact does not apply when a child is returned by the sending state to a natural parent residing in another state. The language in Article III is unambiguous.... McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d at 482. Accordingly, the trial court's finding that custody of the children should be returned to Ms. Huff without Colorado's approval was not clearly erroneous. Affirmed.