Opinion ID: 106310
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the document production questions.

Text: Intelligent understanding of the document production questions presented requires a brief statement of their basis. They arose in connection with the testimony of Government witnesses Sullivan and Ondrejka. On direct examination, Sullivan testified that he joined the Communist Party in 1948 at the request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and in October 1949 transferred his membership from Cincinnati, Ohio, to Madison, Wisconsin, where, by secret means, he made contact with local leaders of the Communist Party and became active in its affairs. In those activities, he met petitioner in December 1949. Petitioner was then the section organizer for the Party in Madison. Thereafter, Sullivan attended a number of secret Communist Party group meetings in Madison in 1949 and 1950 at which petitioner was present and acted as the spokesman and leader. Sullivan testified that he gave written reports to the F. B. I. respecting Party meetings and activities soon after they occurred. At the close of Sullivan's direct testimony, petitioner moved for production, for use in cross-examination, of all statements given by the witness to the F. B. I. relating to his direct testimony. The narrative statements were produced to the judge, in camera, who, after excising the parts that did not relate to the witness' direct testimony, handed them to petitioner's counsel. On cross-examination, Sullivan testified that he was paid stipulated monthly amounts for his services, and was reimbursed for his expenses incurred in Communist Party activities, by the F. B. I., and that when he received the money he signed a receipt for it. His connection with the F. B. I. terminated in 1952. After completing the cross-examination of the witness, petitioner again moved for production of all statements made by the witness to the F. B. I., without excision. The Government objected to the motion on the grounds that it had produced all of the witness' statements that related to his direct testimony, and that there was no showing that the witness had given any other statements to the Government that related to his direct testimony. Thereupon, the court denied petitioner's motion. Petitioner then moved to strike the testimony of the witness, and that motion, too, was denied. On direct examination, Ondrejka testified that he joined the Communist Party at the request of the F. B. I. in October 1949 and remained a member of the Party until November 1953. He met petitioner at a Communist Party meeting in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in January 1951, and thereafter attended many secret Communist Party meetings in Milwaukee where petitioner was present and active, and also participated with petitioner in numerous Party activities, until August 1953, and knew petitioner to be a member of the Communist Party throughout that period. Ondrejka testified that he gave written reports to the F. B. I. respecting Party meetings and activities soon after they occurred. At the conclusion of Ondrejka's direct testimony, petitioner moved for production, for use in cross-examination, of all statements given by the witness to the F. B. I. The court ordered the Government to produce to the judge. in camera, all statements that in any way affect the direct examination of the witness. Accordingly, all of the narrative statements given by the witness to the Government relating to his direct testimony were produced to the judge, who, after excising such parts as did not relate to the witness' direct testimony, delivered them to petitioner's counsel. Petitioner then moved for production of all statements relating to the testimony of the witness, without excision. That motion was denied. On cross-examination, Ondrejka testified that he was paid stipulated monthly amounts in cash for his services by the F. B. I., and, in addition, was reimbursed by the F. B. I. for his expenses, such as Communist Party dues, literature, contributions and travel, which he orally reported to an F. B. I. agent, who made notes thereof and later reimbursed him in cash. The court sustained the Government's objection to a question asking whether Ondrejka signed receipts for the moneys paid to him in reimbursement for his expenses. Petitioner then moved for production of all statements given by the witness to the F. B. I., whether written by the witness or by an F. B. I. agent as the result of interviews with the witness, which related to the witness' testimony on cross-examination, including particularly reports by the witness of his reimbursable expenses and the receipts which he signed evidencing reimbursement for those expenses. The Government opposed production of the documents on the ground that they did not relate to the direct testimony of the witness. It further objected to producing Ondrejka's reports of expenses, and the receipts he had signed when reimbursed for those expenses, on the grounds that they were administrative records of the F. B. I. and were immaterial and irrelevant, but the Government offered to produce a list showing the dates and amounts of the payments and whether they were for services or expenses. Petitioner refused to receive that proffered list. Thereupon, the court denied the motion. Petitioner then moved to strike all of Ondrejka's testimony, and that motion, too, was denied. Petitioner contends that his general demands for all statements, as well as his specific demand for the reports and receipts made by Ondrejka, encompassed, and the trial court erred to his prejudice in denying his motion to require the Government to produce, (1) the notes made by the F. B. I. agents covering Ondrejka's oral reports of expenses and (2) the receipts signed by Sullivan and Ondrejka for moneys paid to them in reimbursement for expenses. He supports these contentions with an elaborate argument which we need not delineate because the Solicitor General now concedes that the F. B. I. notes of Ondrejka's oral reports may have been statements within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 3500 (e) (2), [3] and he flatly concedes that the receipts signed by Sullivan and Ondrejka were statements within the meaning of § 3500. However, the Solicitor General contends that on the actual factsmany of which are not incorporated in the record before uspetitioner is not entitled to, and that we should not on this incomplete and imperfect record order, a new trial, because the true facts are that the F. B. I. agents' notes covering Ondrejka's oral reports of expenses were not in existence at the time of the trial, and the receipts signed by Sullivan and Ondrejka do not relate to their direct testimony as required by § 3500, or, if it may be said that any of them do relate to their direct testimony, that the same information, in much greater detail, was given to petitioner in the witnesses' narrative statements that were produced and delivered to his counsel at the trial, and hence if there was any error it was harmless. More specifically, the Solicitor General tells us in his brief that, although the nature of the Government's objections in the courts below implied that the agents' notes were in existence, his interrogation of the F. B. I. agents has disclosed that, after they incorporated the data contained in their notes of Ondrejka's oral reports into the receipts to be signed by him, the agents destroyed the notes in accord with their normal practice, and hence those notes were not in existence at the time of either of petitioner's trials. Although the receipts are not contained in the record before us, the Solicitor General says that there are 124 of them and that a careful examination of them reveals that none of Sullivan's receipts contains any itemization whatever of the nature of the reimbursed expenses, and thus they do not relate to anything mentioned in his direct testimony. With respect to Ondrejka's receipts, the Solicitor General says that, although the Government inadvertently represented to the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the list, proffered to petitioner at the trial and showing the dates and amounts of payments made to Ondrejka, gave all of the information that was contained in the receipts, his examination has disclosed that nine of Ondrejka's receipts do contain some itemization of the nature of his reimbursed expenses, but that only two of the nine can be said to relate to anything mentioned by Ondrejka on his direct examination, and that the same information, in greater detail, was contained in Ondrejka's narrative statements that were produced and delivered to petitioner's counsel at the trial. For these reasons, the Solicitor General contends that, viewed upon the now known and readily available actual facts, no error, at least no prejudicial error, resulted from the nonproduction of the F. B. I. notes and the Sullivan and Ondrejka receipts at the trial. However, the Solicitor General recognizes that petitioner is not bound to accept his statement that the F. B. I. notes of Ondrejka's oral reports of expenses were destroyed in accord with normal practice long prior to the trial, and that petitioner is entitled to an opportunity to examine the F. B. I. agents and other responsible Government officials on these matters which, of course, can be done only in the District Court. He recognizes, too, that his contentions with respect to the receipts signed by Sullivan and Ondrejka necessarily involve a detailed examination and comparison of the lengthy direct testimony of Sullivan and Ondrejka, the 124 receipts, the list showing the dates and amounts of payments to Ondrejka that was proffered to petitioner by the Government at the trial, and the numerous narrative statements by Sullivan and Ondrejka that were produced and delivered to petitioner at the trial, and he submits that this cannot appropriately be done in this Court, especially since neither the receipts nor the proffered list is contained in the present record, but can properly be done only in the District Court. He therefore asks us to vacate the judgment and remand the case to the District Court to hear these issues and to determine whether a new trial should be ordered or the judgment should be reinstated with the right in the petitioner, of course, to appeal from any such judgment to the Court of Appeals. In opposition, petitioner argues that the claimed destruction of the agents' notes admits the destruction of evidence that may have been helpful to him and deprives him of his rights under § 3500 and to due process of law, and therefore the judgment should be reversed. Alternatively, he argues that only he and his counsel could determine the uses that might have been made of the receipts had they been produced, and he concludes that it would not be possible for the District Court, on remand, to find that the failure to produce the receipts was nonprejudicial or harmless error, and that therefore he is entitled to a new trial. As to petitioner's contention that the claimed destruction of the agents' notes admits the destruction of evidence, deprives him of legal rights and requires reversal of the judgment, it seems appropriate to observe that almost everything is evidence of something, but that does not mean that nothing can ever safely be destroyed. If the agents' notes of Ondrejka's oral reports of expenses were made only for the purpose of transferring the data thereon to the receipts to be signed by Ondrejka, and if, after having served that purpose, they were destroyed by the agents in good faith and in accord with their normal practice, it would be clear that their destruction did not constitute an impermissible destruction of evidence nor deprive petitioner of any right. Those are the factual representations made by the Solicitor General. Whether they are true can be determined only upon a hearing in the District Court. It is entirely clear that petitioner would not be entitled to a new trial because of the nonproduction of the agents' notes if those notes were so destroyed and not in existence at the time of the trial. It is equally clear that, notwithstanding the fact that the Sullivan and Ondrejka receipts were statements within the meaning of § 3500 and were demanded under that section, petitioner would not be entitled to a new trial because of the nonproduction of those receipts if in truth they do not relate to the direct testimony of those witnesses inasmuch as § 3500 (c) requires the court [to] excise the portions of [the] statement which do not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness. The Solicitor General represents that 115 of the 124 receipts signed by Sullivan and Ondrejka do not contain any itemization of the nature of the reimbursed expenses nor relate to the direct testimony of those witnesses. If those representations are true, petitioner would not be entitled to a new trial because of the nonproduction of those 115 receipts. Inasmuch as the receipts are not contained in the record before us, whether the Solicitor General's representations are true can be determined only upon a hearing in the District Court. But the Solicitor General finds that two of Ondrejka's receipts may be said to relate to Ondrejka's direct testimony. However, he says that the same information as they contain and much more on the same subjects was contained in Ondrejka's narrative statements that were produced and delivered to petitioner at the trial, and therefore petitioner could not have been prejudiced by the nonproduction of those two receipts and is not entitled to a new trial on that account. It is true, as petitioner argues, that only the defense is in position to determine the precise uses that may be made of demanded documents, Jencks v. United States, 353 U. S. 657, 668, but that is not to say that the harmless error rule is never applicable in respect to the nonproduction of demanded documents. Upon very similar facts, we recently approved a holding that nonproduction of demanded documents was harmless error. Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U. S. 367. We there said: Since the same information that would have been afforded had the document been given to defendant was already in the possession of the defense by way of the witness' admissions while testifying, it would deny reason to entertain the belief that defendant could have been prejudiced by not having had opportunity to inspect the letter. 360 U. S., at 371. While, as we said in the Rosenberg case, supra, a court should not confidently guess what defendant's attorney might have found useful for impeachment purposes in withheld documents to which the defense is entitled . . . , when the very same information was possessed by defendant's counsel as would have been available were error not committed [a court properly can find that] it would offend common sense and the fair administration of justice to order a new trial. 360 U. S., at 371. If it is true, as the Solicitor General represents, that the information contained on the two Ondrejka receipts had already been given to petitioner in Ondrejka's narrative statements covering the same subjects, it is clear that the District Court properly could find that the error in failing to produce those two receipts was harmless. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the cause to the District Court for a hearing confined to the issues raised by the Solicitor General's representations as stated in this opinion. The District Court shall make findings of fact on those issues. If the District Court finds that the Solicitor General's representations are true in all material respects, it shall enter a new final judgment based upon the record as supplemented by its findings, thereby preserving to petitioner the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals. If, on the other hand, the District Court finds that the Solicitor General's representations are untrue in any material respect, it shall grant petitioner a new trial.