Opinion ID: 2483089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Bias Against Gang Members

Text: The third point for review is that defendant is entitled to a new trial because he was tried by a juror with a bias against gang members. During the examination of Juror A by defense counsel, the following colloquy ensued: [Defense counsel]: Would the fact that [defendant], our client, was a member of a street gang prevent you from giving him a fair and impartial hearing? [Juror A]: That might, yes. [Defense counsel]: In what way? [Juror A]: Well, my husband used to be involved with gang crimes, and he talked a lot about the different offenders involved and victims and that kind of thing. And soand I do have some views about gang members and that whole [Defense counsel]: I guess the question is, would you be able to put that aside, or are your feelings that strong that you wouldn't be able to put it aside? [Juror A]: I think I could put it aside. Defendant now argues that the trial court committed plain error in seating Juror A because she said she had a bias against gang members; that she only thought she could put the bias aside, and therefore she was not an impartial juror. Because the jury was not impartial, defendant argues he is entitled to a new trial and sentencing hearing. The State argues that the seating of Juror A on the jury did not constitute error. In addressing defendant's plain-error contention, it is appropriate to determine whether error occurred at all. People v. Bannister, 232 Ill.2d 52, 65, 327 Ill.Dec. 450, 902 N.E.2d 571 (2008); People v. Harris, 225 Ill.2d 1, 31, 310 Ill.Dec. 351, 866 N.E.2d 162 (2007). After the above colloquy between Juror A and defense counsel, both the State and defense counsel were given the opportunity to and did pose additional questions to Juror A. Thereafter both the State and defense counsel accepted Juror A without any further discussion or challenge with regard to the now-claimed bias. Defendant does not argue that the court was required, sua sponte, to challenge or decline to seat Juror A. Indeed, in People v. Metcalfe, 202 Ill.2d 544, 557, 270 Ill.Dec. 69, 782 N.E.2d 263 (2002), we held that while a trial court has the discretion to remove a juror sua sponte, it has no duty to do so. Accordingly, the trial judge here did not commit any error in seating Juror A. In any event it is evident, given Juror A's responses, that she would be fair and impartial. Clearly, defendant's trial counsel agreed with that assessment. We find that the trial court did not err in seating Juror A and defendant was not denied his constitutional right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury.