Opinion ID: 610128
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Balancing test in discretionary asylum decisions

Text: 17 Assuming arguendo that Rybicki had established refugee status through past persecution, the immigration judge and the Board held that any past persecution was not so severe that a return to Poland would be inhumane. Rybicki argues that this decision was in error because the Board failed to give consideration to all relevant factors, both favorable and unfavorable, when exercising its discretion. Although a closer issue in this case, the factors considered were sufficient to conclude that denial of asylum for humanitarian reasons was not an abuse of discretion. 18 Once an applicant for asylum establishes statutory eligibility as a refugee as a result of past persecution, a rebuttable presumption arises in favor of granting asylum. Skalak, 944 F.2d at 365 (citing In re Chen, Int.Dec. 3104 at 4). The burden then shifts to the INS to present evidence militating against a favorable exercise of discretion. Id. In determining whether discretion should be favorably exercised, the immigration judge must review the record as a whole and conduct a balancing of the positive 4 with the adverse factors. 5 Shahandeh-Pey v. Ins, 831 F.2d 1384, 1387 (7th Cir.1987) (citing In re Marin, 16 I & N Dec. 581, 586 (BIA 1978)). Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the Board's decision will be upheld unless it was made without a rational explanation, it inexplicably departed from established policies, or it rested on an impermissible basis. Osuch v. Ins., 970 F.2d 394, 396 (7th Cir.1992); Shahandeh-Pey, 831 F.2d at 1387. 19 Review of the Board's decision here reveals that it considered only whether the persecution suffered was sufficiently severe to warrant a discretionary grant of asylum for humanitarian reasons. Neither the Board's opinion nor that of the immigration judge mention any factors favorable for asylum such as petitioner's family ties in the United States, evidence of hardship to Rybicki or his family if deported, and the length of his period of residence in the United States. However, it does appear that a number of factors were considered, albeit most of them negative. The fact that Rybicki surreptitiously came into the country and did not seek asylum for two years worked against him. Also unfavorable was the fact that although gainfully employed throughout the duration of his stay, Rybicki was technically an illegal employee. These factors, coupled with the fact that any past persecution was not so severe as to warrant humanitarian relief, are sufficient to conclude that a denial of asylum was not an abuse of discretion. 20 This holding comports with the reasoning in Skalak, that where past persecution alone is in issue, the balance will tip in the alien's favor only if the past persecution was atrocious. Defining the term persecution as such arguably serves the function of asylum, that is: to identify persecution so severe that perhaps a person should not be forced to return to the country in which [ ]he underwent it even if the danger of recurrence is negligible. Skalak, 944 F.2d at 365. In this regard, Rybicki's request that the Board engage in a more thorough balancing test is unwarranted, because he failed to establish that it would be inhumane to return him to Poland.