Opinion ID: 3001539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Michele Nelson

Text: Counsel’s Anders brief is facially adequate, and Nelson has not responded to counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Cir. R. 51(b). We limit our discussion to the two potential issues identified in counsel’s brief. See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973‐74 (7th Cir. 2002). Counsel first considers whether Nelson could challenge the district court’s drug‐ quantity calculation on the ground that it was based in part on her self‐incriminating statements to police. At sentencing her attorney argued that the probation officer’s reliance on those statements contravened U.S.S.G. § 1B1.8. The government responded that § 1B1.8 is inapplicable because it protects only the statements a defendant makes after entering into a plea agreement. Without specifically ruling on the objection, the district court determined that, based on Nelson’s “unprotected statements” and her drug associates’ corroborating statements, she was responsible for more than 5 kilograms but less than 15 kilograms of methamphetamine. Section 1B1.8 applies only if a defendant enters into a cooperation agreement in which the government promises that self‐incriminating information will not be used against the defendant. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.8(b)(1); United States v. Clemons, 349 F.3d 1007, 1008 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Rutledge, 900 F.2d 1127, 1131 (7th Cir. 1990). But on this record Nelson was never promised that her statements to investigators prior to entering her plea agreement would not be used against her. And the probation officer did not obtain—let alone rely on—any statement Nelson made after she entered into the plea agreement. Thus, counsel rightly concludes that challenging Nelson’s sentence on this ground would be frivolous. Counsel next considers whether Nelson could challenge the reasonableness of her 262‐month sentence. Counsel notes that the district court properly calculated Nelson’s advisory guidelines range: with a base offense level of 36, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2), increased by two levels because she possessed guns in furtherance of the conspiracy, see id. Nos. 06‐3633, 06‐3726 & 06‐3851 Page 6 § 2D1.1(b)(1), and reduced by three levels because she accepted responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1, Nelson’s total offense level was 35. With a criminal history category of V, her advisory guidelines imprisonment range was 262 to 327 months. See id. Ch. 5, Pt. A. The court sentenced Nelson to 262 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. The district judge explained that she chose a sentence at the bottom of the guidelines range to hold Nelson accountable for her serious criminal conduct, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), to protect the community, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(C), and to provide Nelson with the opportunity to participate in substance‐abuse treatment and mental health counseling, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). The court’s explanation is adequate, see Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2468, and counsel cannot identify an argument for a lower sentence. Thus, we agree that it would be frivolous to challenge Nelson’s sentence on this ground.