Opinion ID: 1311325
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court's Consideration of New Evidence

Text: As a threshold issue, the parties disagree about the evidence that we may consider in evaluating this claim. The state contends that the district court erred in considering Christensen's declaration about what her testimony would have been if the trial judge had not sustained the state's objection. McGehee responds that the state waived any objection to the new evidence because it did not specifically raise the issue until it filed its reply brief in the present appeal. He asserts that the state never once contended below that the district court was required to disregard the exhibits attached to [his] Petition. We disagree with McGehee's characterization of the state's arguments and conclude that the district court erred in considering evidence never presented in state court. The new evidence in McGehee's district court petition was not presented in conjunction with his argument that mitigation testimony was improperly excluded; instead, he relied on the new evidence to support his claim that he was improperly denied psychiatric assistance. He first incorporated the new evidence as a part of his mitigation claim in his brief filed in opposition to the state's appeal from the grant of habeas relief. The state's response to McGehee's petition did not address the merits of the psychiatric assistance claim because it was the state's position that the claim was procedurally defaulted. But the state did assert that the AEDPA precludes a petitioner from presenting any evidence, testimonial, or otherwise, until he has made the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254. J.A. 262. Moreover, nothing in the state's filings in the district court or before us could be construed as a concession to the consideration of new evidence. The state did not cite to the additional evidence, treating it as irrelevant. In the facts section of its opening brief, the state discussed only the evidence that was before the Arkansas Supreme Court, and most of its argument was devoted to establishing that the Arkansas Supreme Court's affirmance of the trial court's rulings was not an unreasonable application of the law to the facts of this case. The state also made numerous references to § 2254(d), which requires federal courts to assess state court decisions in light of the record the [state] court had before it. Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652, 124 S.Ct. 2736, 159 L.Ed.2d 683 (2004). McGehee's contention that the state waived its objection to the new evidence is therefore untenable. See Williams v. Norris, 576 F.3d 850, 860 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that the state did not waive its objection to an evidentiary hearing where its motion included a general statement that incorporated the fundamental purpose behind the restrictions on evidentiary hearings in § 2254(e)(2)); cf. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 257 n. 15, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (discussing, without deciding, whether the state may have waived its objection to consideration of new evidence where it (1) proposed that the court consider the material, (2) failed to reference the AEDPA provision limiting consideration of new evidence, and (3) relied on the evidence to support its argument); Richey v. Bradshaw, 498 F.3d 344, 351-52 (6th Cir.2007) (holding that the state waived its objection to the court's reliance on new evidence where (1) the state urged the district court to consider the evidence, (2) the district court found the petitioner had been diligent in attempting to develop the evidence in state court, and (3) the state did not challenge the district court's ruling on appeal). Under § 2254(e)(2), a habeas petitioner is generally barred from receiving an evidentiary hearing unless he has been diligent in attempting to develop the factual basis of his claim in state court. Michael Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 440, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Those same restrictions apply a fortiori when a prisoner seeks relief based on new evidence without an evidentiary hearing. Holland, 542 U.S. at 653, 124 S.Ct. 2736. McGehee did not argue in the district court, and he does not argue here, that the new evidence in Christensen's declaration satisfies the diligence requirements or any exception to § 2254(e)(2). Our review of the record satisfies us that there was no state court ruling or other state-created impediment that prevented McGehee from developing the facts surrounding Christensen's testimony. Williams, 576 F.3d at 862. McGehee's counsel had the opportunity to make a proffer of evidence in the trial court, and the trial judge even suggested that the witness could make the proffer herself. McGehee has long been aware of the significance of Christensen's testimony because it formed the basis of one of his arguments on direct appeal. Nevertheless, McGehee did not develop the additional facts that he sought to introduce in the district court. The state court record makes it clear that McGehee failed as a matter of law to meet the mandatory restrictions on the admission of new evidence in a habeas proceeding. Accordingly, we focus our analysis on the evidence that was available to the Arkansas Supreme Court. See Id. at 862-63.