Opinion ID: 1771702
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Curtailment of Defendant's Attempt to Impeach the Surviving Witness

Text: Defendant also contends that the court erred by limiting impeachment of the store manager as to anti-psychotic medication she allegedly was taking. Defense counsel questioned the manager in detail about medications prescribed for her after the incident. The manager listed antianxiety medication, sleeping pills, and antidepressant medication taken for about a year after the murder. She stopped using the sleeping medication, but she began taking Prozac for depression about six months prior to trial. When defense counsel asked if she took some medications in doses larger than prescribed, the prosecutor objected. The court held a bench conference during which the prosecutor asserted that this line of questioning was irrelevant. Defense counsel responded that the witness first gave a description that did not describe Broadway and one year later identified Broadway as one of the robbers. The court ultimately sustained the objection, explaining: The jury has had the benefit of her description prior to her treatment. They've also had the benefit of her description subsequent to that treatment. They've had the benefit of the testimony regarding the medication that she's taking, and that's enough for the jury to make whatever decisions they're going to make about it. And again, that's all viewed against the backdrop that the description that you're talking about doesn't apply to your client. As a general rule, a party may attack the credibility of a witness by examining him or her concerning any matter having a reasonable tendency to disprove the truthfulness of his or her testimony. La. Code Evid. art. 607 C. The subject matter of the attack, however, is limited by the relevancy standard of La.Code Evid. art. 403. Moreover, while La. Code Evid. art. 607 D provides that extrinsic evidence to show a witness' bias, interests, corruption, or defect of capacity is admissible to attack the credibility of the witness, a witness cannot be cross-examined as to a fact which is collateral or irrelevant to the issue at hand merely for the purpose of contradiction or impeachment. State v. Vessell, 450 So.2d 938 (La.1984) (decided under former La.Rev.Stat. 15:494). [5] Finally, a trial court's ruling on the scope and extent of cross-examination should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Coleman, 406 So.2d 563 (La.1981). In the instant case, defense counsel cross-examined the store manager extensively about the medications prescribed for her after the murder. The judge's ruling also correctly noted the manager identification did not directly implicate defendant in the crime, and defense counsel did not object to the identification at trial. Under these circumstances, defendant fails to show any prejudice resulting from the court's ruling which prevented him from questioning the manager further regarding the prescribed medications.