Opinion ID: 2451115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Attorney General Exercises Broad Discretion In Representing the Legal Interests of State Officers

Text: ¶ 29 The office of attorney general is established under article III, section 21 of the Washington Constitution. That provision states that [t]he attorney general shall be the legal adviser of the state officers, and shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law. Const. art. III, § 21. As an independently elected officer, the attorney general does not serve at the will of other executive officers. Rather, he answers to the people. The attorney general's independence under our constitutional scheme reflects a conscious decision by the framers of the Washington Constitution to counter the accumulation of executive power in any single official. See State v. Gattavara, 182 Wash. 325, 332-33, 47 P.2d 18 (1935). This unique constitutional role as the legal adviser of the state officers is complemented by statutes prescribing the attorney general's duties in particular circumstances. See, e.g., RCW 43.10.030(2) (stating that the attorney general shall . . . [i]nstitute and prosecute all actions and proceedings . . . which may be necessary in the execution of the duties of any state officer), .040 (stating that the attorney general shall also represent the state. . . in the courts . . . in all legal or quasi legal matters). ¶ 30 The majority declares that this case may be resolved by looking only to a handful of statutes. Majority at 1097. Specifically, the majority finds dispositive that RCW 43.12.075 uses the word shall in describing the attorney general's role vis-a-vis the commissioner of public lands. But this interpretation of RCW 43.12.075 ignores our long-held recognition that the attorney general may exercise broad discretion as the state official charged with directing the course of litigation. Blue Sky Advocates v. State, 107 Wash.2d 112, 118-19, 727 P.2d 644 (1986); Boe v. Gorton, 88 Wash.2d 773, 776, 567 P.2d 197 (1977); Berge v. Gorton, 88 Wash.2d 756, 761, 567 P.2d 187 (1977). It defies common sense to suggest that RCW 43.12.075 eliminates the attorney general's discretion to decide whether to pursue an appeal. How can the attorney general adequately fill his constitutional role as legal adviser of the state officers yet be utterly powerless to guide litigation? ¶ 31 A long line of cases starting with State ex rel. Rosbach v. Pratt, 68 Wash. 157, 122 P. 987 (1912), confirms that the attorney general does, and must, have discretion. Pratt involved a mandamus action to compel the attorney general to recover unpaid fees from a company under the industrial insurance act. The statute defining the attorney general's responsibilities, which is nearly identical to RCW 43.12.075, stated, `The attorney general shall be the legal adviser of the department, and shall represent it in all proceedings, whenever so requested by any of the commissioners [of the Industrial Insurance Commission].' Id. at 158, 122 P. 987 (quoting Laws of 1911, ch. 74, § 20). We explained that we could find no requirement [in the statute] of absolute duty on the part of the commission or attorney general to bring actions against each and every delinquent employer. Id. Focusing specifically on the language of the statute, we said that [a]uthority to commence such actions is conferred, but not compelled. Id. We held that commencement of actions at law to enforce the payment of delinquent assessments, against whom and when they shall be brought, are matters resting wholly within the discretion of the commission and the Attorney General, a discretion which cannot be controlled by mandamus. Id. ¶ 32 Since Pratt, we have consistently recognized that the duty imposed by statute on the attorney general is to represent state agencies; but the attorney general retains broad discretion in doing so. In other words, the statutes require the attorney general to exercise his discretion. See Gattavara, 182 Wash. at 330, 47 P.2d 18 (noting that the attorney general must exercise his judgment on whether to initiate action to collect industrial insurance premiums); Berge, 88 Wash.2d at 761, 567 P.2d 187 (explaining that statute stating the attorney general shall bring action imposed only a duty to `exercise discretion'); Boe, 88 Wash.2d at 775, 567 P.2d 197 (same); Young Ams. for Freedom v. Gorton, 91 Wash.2d 204, 210, 588 P.2d 195 (1978) (recognizing that the attorney general may exercise broad discretion in the exercise of his duties); Blue Sky Advocates, 107 Wash.2d at 119, 727 P.2d 644 (noting that because the attorney general has discretion in performance of duties, his actions are reviewable only for abuse of discretion). ¶ 33 In addition to misreading this line of precedent, the majority wrongly interprets RCW 43.12.075 as establishing a traditional attorney-client relationship between the attorney general and the commissioner. Majority at 1107 n.5, 1102-03. Yet both Washington's Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct recognize that the attorney general's unique responsibilities alter the traditional attorney-client framework: Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory and common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers may include authority concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in the client in private client-lawyer relationships. For example, a lawyer for a government agency may have authority on behalf of the government to decide upon settlement or whether to appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authority in various respects is generally vested in the attorney general and the state's attorney in state government, and their federal counterparts, and the same may be true of other government law officers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these officers may be authorized to represent several government agencies in intragovernmental legal controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer could not represent multiple private clients. These Rules do not abrogate any such authority. RPC scope [18] (emphasis added); Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct scope [18] (2011) (emphasis added). As discussed above, under Washington's constitutional and statutory framework, it is the attorney general and not some other state official who is charged with directing the course of litigation. Though the Rules defer to the attorney general's unique responsibility to represent the public interest, the majority eliminates any such deference by casting the attorney general in the role of any other private-sector lawyer.