Opinion ID: 393800
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Probable Cause for Searches

Text: 85 Theresa Lucas and Myrtle Lynch contend that evidence obtained from their respective residences that was admitted at trial should have been suppressed because the searches were unconstitutional in that probable cause was not shown in the affidavits supporting the search warrants. 19 They both suggest that statements in the affidavits attributed to unidentified informants could not demonstrate probable cause because the standards of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), were not met. Lynch, in addition, urges that the information in the affidavit supporting the search warrant executed at her home was stale. Finally, both argue that the searches as warranted were overbroad. The Government responds that the searches were in all respects conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. 1. Information from Informants 86 When an affidavit relies on hearsay from police informants, 87 the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant ... was credible or his information reliable. 88 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). This dual test consists of, first, a basis of knowledge requirement predicated upon the revelation of facts which permit the judicial officer making the probable cause determination to reach a judgment as to whether the informant had a basis for his allegations ... that evidence of crime would be found at a certain place, and, second, a showing of veracity, which requires that facts ... be brought before the judicial officer so that he may determine either the inherent credibility of the informant or the reliability of his information on this particular occasion. 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3, at 501-02 (1978) (emphasis in original) (quoting Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 Mercer L.Rev. 741, 755, 773 (1974)). 89 These principles must be applied to test the affidavits accompanying the warrants for the searches of the Lynch residence, 2509 St. Clair Drive, Hillcrest Heights, Maryland, and the Lucas residence, 4714 9th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 90 a. St Clair Affidavit. 91 This affidavit was prepared by Detective Larman of the Washington Metropolitan Police Department. Government's Brief at 97-100 (app.). To establish probable cause Larman's affidavit recites statements of two unidentified informants. In the affidavit Larman described the first as a previously reliable source of information, who has proven to be reliable in narcotics cases in the past. Government's Brief at 98 (app.) (emphasis added). The second informant is referred to as another previously reliable source who has provided accurate information on numerous occasions. Id. (emphasis added). These statements meet the credibility and reliability requirements of Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114, 84 S.Ct. at 1514. As we said in United States v. Watts, 540 F.2d 1093 (D.C.Cir.1976): 92 Although a bare recital that an unnamed defendant is credible or reliable or prudent, without offering any factual basis for that conclusion is plainly inadequate, the assertion that the source had previously given correct information concerning narcotics violators is entitled to weight as a factor establishing previous reliability. The affidavit in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 n.2, 80 S.Ct. 725, 734, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), contained a similar recital, and the Jones affidavit has been cited by the Court in subsequent decisions as a suitable benchmark for judging what quantum of information is necessary to support a brief that an unidentified informant's information is truthful. Most lower courts have followed the example of Jones in permitting magistrate reliance on a recital that the informant had previously given correct information, without requiring further factual elaboration of past reliability. 93 Of course, such a recital, standing alone, may not be enough. In Jones the informant's tip, reciting that he had purchased narcotics from defendant in his apartment, was corroborated by other sources .... 94 540 F.2d at 1097-98 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 580, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2080, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971) (plurality opinion)). 95 In this case we have two previously proven reliable sources and ample corroborating information. First, since both informants stated that Carl Lynch showed them a display of narcotics at the St. Clair residence, the statements were mutually corroborative. In addition, Larman swore that he had learned from three persons who worked for or with Lynch in the narcotic business 20 and from reviewing the minutes of grand jury proceedings that Carl Lynch had been heavily involved in a multi-state drug trafficking operation for the past six years. Finally, Larman related other, less-reliable information corroborating the stories of the two critical informants. In our view the magistrate properly concluded from the statements that the two principal informants had provided reliable information in the past and the fact that the principal informants' statements were corroborated by the other statements in the affidavits, that the credibility of the informants and the reliability of this particular information was sufficiently established. 96 As for the basis of knowledge aspect of the Aguilar test, it is satisfied if the affidavit discloses some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. at 114, 84 S.Ct. at 1514. This requirement is easily satisfied here. The affiant states that the first informant was told by Carl Lynch that he maintained, in his home, a sample of every type of pill he has distributed, along with other drug paraphernalia, in a display cabinet. Government's Brief at 98 (app.). The affidavit also indicates that this source visited Carl Lynch in the Summer of 1977 at this residence and was shown such a display cabinet, which contained many Preludin as well as other types of pills. This source was also told by Lynch that he keeps the revenue from his Preludin sales in his home. The second informant similarly had seen the display cabinet at the St. Clair residence in the late Summer or early Fall of 1977. The basis-of-knowledge requirement was thus satisfied in one of the most effective ways by the informants' assertions of their visual observation of evidence of crime at a certain place. 1 W. LaFave, supra, § 3.3, at 536-37. 97 b. 9th Street Affidavit. 98 This affidavit, also prepared by Detective Larman, Government's Brief at 91-96 (app.), follows the pattern of the St. Clair affidavit. The affiant described Carl Lynch's involvement as a major drug trafficker in the Washington area based on Larman's review of sworn grand jury testimony and his interviews with numerous persons. Government's Brief at 93 (app.). The probable cause for the search of the described premises is predicated upon statements attributed to two informants, designated S-1 and S-2. We do not find it necessary to scrutinize under Aguilar the statement of the informant designated S-1 because we find that the statements attributed to S-2 clearly constitute probable cause. 99 Larman described S-2 as a source who has been reliable on narcotic cases in that it has been responsible for obtaining search warrants in both narcotics and weapons cases. This source has never been found to be unreliable. Government's Brief at 94 (app.). The sworn statement that the source has been responsible for obtaining search warrants on prior occasions and has never been found to be unreliable is sufficient to establish veracity. Fairly read, 21 this suffices to enable the magistrate to determine the credibility of the informant. The corroborative information cited in the affidavit, which includes documented evidence, bolsters the view that this particular information from the source is reliable. 100 Lucas concedes that with respect to S-2 the affidavit meets the basis-of-knowledge requirement, and, we might add, with good reason. The affidavit indicated that within the past seven days S-2 had been in the dwelling on 9th Street, in which S-2 claimed Lynch stored his drugs, and while there had seen drugs and a photograph of a doctor in a compromising position, which was being used by Lynch to blackmail the doctor into prescribing ever-larger quantities of Preludin. This clearly shows the informant's basis for his belief that the photograph and drugs would be in the dwelling. 101 We thus conclude that both affidavits are sufficient under Aguilar. 2. Staleness 102 Myrtle Lynch argues that the affidavit supporting the warrant for the search of her home contained stale information which did not justify a finding of probable cause. Both sides agree that the crucial question is whether there was probable cause for the search at the time the warrant was issued. See Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210-11, 53 S.Ct. 138, 140, 77 L.Ed. 260 (1932); Schoeneman v. United States, 317 F.2d 173, 177 (D.C.Cir.1963). The search warrant was approved by the magistrate on January 6, 1978. The affidavit indicated that one source had seen a drug display cabinet at the St. Clair residence in the Summer of 1977, and that another had seen the same cabinet at the residence in the late Summer or early Fall of 1977. Government's Brief at 98 (app.). 103 In determining the likelihood that certain items will still be located in a place where they have earlier been seen, the following analysis is appropriate. 104 The likelihood that the evidence sought is still in place is a function not simply of watch and calendar but of variables that do not punch a clock: the character of the crime (chance encounter in the night or regenerating conspiracy?), of the criminal (nomadic or entrenched?), of the thing to be seized (perishable and easily transferable or of enduring utility to its holder?), of the place to be searched (mere criminal forum of convenience or secure operational base?), etc. 105 Andresen v. State, 331 A.2d 78, 106 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1975), aff'd, 427 U.S. 463, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976). 106 The affidavit indicated that Carl Lynch had been involved in an interstate drug operation for six years, and that he had been selling drugs on the street in the District of Columbia for that period. The St. Clair address was described as his residence. The affidavit indicated that Lynch had told one of the affidavit's two principal informants that he had maintained (the drug display cabinet) since he started selling drugs and would continue to put new pills in it as he started dealing in them. Government's Brief at 98 (app.) (emphasis added). Thus, the affidavit described a cabinet used to display drugs at the home of a longtime resident of the Washington, D.C. area who had been heavily involved in a multi-state drug conspiracy for many years. This cabinet according to Lynch's own statement had been in his home for several years and it had been seen in the residence some four to five months prior to the time the affidavit was presented to the magistrate. Most importantly, the affidavit indicated that Lynch intended to keep the drug display cabinet as long as he dealt drugs. This, when coupled with the reasonable inference from the background information in the affidavit indicating that Lynch had been involved in a major drug conspiracy for over six years that the conspiracy continued to exist, made it ultimately reasonable for the magistrate to find there was probable cause to believe that the display cabinet containing the contraband drugs was still within the St. Clair residence at the time he issued the warrant. 3. Overbreadth 107 Myrtle Lynch and Theresa Lucas also contend that the warrants were overbroad, claiming the supporting affidavits alleged insufficient facts to support the seizure of anything but contraband and photographs. Besides permitting the seizure of Preludin and other drugs, the warrants permitted the seizure of drug paraphernalia, including that which might be used in the preparation of Preludin for distribution, and evidence of the identities of members of the conspiracy and persons who might have control over the searched premises. 108 Both affidavits contain statements of reliable informants who had seen drugs on the premises named in the search warrants. The affidavits also showed that the drugs in the residences were there as a result of a drug trafficking conspiracy. Giving the affidavits a sensible and pragmatic reading, 22 we conclude they adequately justified the magistrate in issuing warrants to search the premises for paraphernalia necessary to a drug distribution network and for evidence of the participants in the conspiracy or persons in control of the premises. J. Sentencing 109 Carl Lynch and Emma Jean Ward argue that their cases must be remanded to the district court for resentencing because of a recent Supreme Court case. In Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980), the Court held that a special parole term may not be imposed as a penalty for a conspiracy conviction under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. The Government agrees that Bifulco requires the vacation of any sentence on the conspiracy count which included a special parole term. Government's Brief at 90 n.106. We thus remand to the district court so that Lynch and Ward, as well as any other appellant who might have received a sentence prohibited by Bifulco, can be resentenced on the conspiracy count.