Opinion ID: 849345
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Bill [handwritten]

Text: On receipt of that fax, Bandit shipped the chippers to the state of Connecticut and sent invoices to Hobbs. Connecticut paid Hobbs for the chippers, but Hobbs never sent the promised $87,500 to Bandit. When it became clear that no payment would be forthcoming, [2] Bandit sued Hobbs and Mr. Bayles. The present appeal concerns only Bandit's claim that Mr. Bayles is personally liable as a guarantor of Hobbs' obligation to pay for the chippers. [3] Mr. Bayles moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that, as a matter of law, the contents of the fax were insufficient to constitute his personal guarantee. [4] Bandit's response to the motion included an amended complaint, in which it alleged that it had relied on the fax to its detriment, enriching Hobbs by sending the chipperswhich it would not have shipped without the faxto Connecticut. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that there were factual issues in the case and that it was not clear whether the sloppily drafted fax was a personal guarantee. Mr. Bayles later renewed his motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), providing additional factual background concerning the events that preceded the fax. Bandit filed a crossmotion for summary disposition under the same paragraph of the rule. The circuit court again denied the motions for the reason that there exist disputed issues of fact which preclude summary disposition at this time. The circuit court then conducted a bench trial. After hearing the evidence, the court directed the clerk to draft a judgment against Hobbs. The court reserved its ruling with regard to the liability of Mr. Bayles. [5] About a month later, the circuit court issued a written opinion. It said that an assurance is a guarantee and that the key issue was whether Mr. Bayles offered this guaranty contract in his capacity as president of Hobbs, or personally. Regarding that question, the court relied on St. Joseph Valley Bank v. Napoleon Motors Co., 230 Mich. 498, 202 N.W. 933 (1925), for the distinction between a corporate signature and a personal signature. The court then gave an example of the form of signature that would have indicated a corporate guarantee: