Opinion ID: 796207
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jurisdiction to hear a special motion to reopen deportation proceedings

Text: 26 Mansour does not dispute that he voluntarily, if unwittingly, entered Mexico in June of 2000, nor does he contest that during that period of time he was subject to a final order of deportation. Like the petitioner in Aguilera-Ruiz, who left the United States for only a few hours in order to buy party supplies in Tijuana, Mexico, Mansour's departure executed his order of deportation. See Aguilera-Ruiz, 348 F.3d at 837-38. The BIA therefore did not abuse its discretion in concluding that because the outstanding deportation order had been executed, it was required to deny Mansour's special motion to reopen in light of the fact that there are no deportation proceedings pending that can be reopened. (emphasis added); see also Palma, 14 I. & N. Dec. at 487. 27 Mansour attempts to avoid this result by characterizing his sojourn into Mexico as a casual, innocent, and brief departure from the United States that does not operate as a bar to seeking relief. This language is taken from the Supreme Court's decision in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 83 S.Ct. 1804, 10 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1963). Fleuti was a legal permanent resident who had been continuously present in the United States since his arrival, except for one brief trip to Mexico. Id. at 450, 83 S.Ct. 1804. The INS attempted to deport Fleuti because it alleged that he was within a statutorily defined class of excludable aliens at the time he returned from Mexico. Id. But an alien in Fleuti's situation could qualify for an exception to the entry requirements of INA § 101(a)(13), thereby gaining lawful reentry to the United States, if he could prove that his departure from the United States was not intended or reasonably to be expected by him. Id. at 452, 83 S.Ct. 1804. The Court held that an innocent, casual, and brief excursion by a resident alien outside this country's borders may not have been `intended' as a departure disruptive of his resident alien status and therefore may not subject him to the consequences of an `entry' into the country on his return. Id. at 462, 83 S.Ct. 1804. 28 Mansour's short trip into Mexico might very well have been innocent, casual, and brief, and he presumably did not intend for it to be disruptive of his resident alien status. His reliance on Fleuti, however, is misplaced. Fleuti was simply an excludable alien, not a deportable one. Mansour, on the other hand, was under a final deportation order. On this point, Mansour's case is indistinguishable from Aguilera-Ruiz, where the Ninth Circuit noted the significant difference between Fleuti and the case before it: 29 Fleuti's situation was, however, significantly different from Aguilera-Ruiz's. While both were legal permanent residents with a good deal at stake, the alien in Fleuti was not deportable, just excludable. Aguilera-Ruiz was inadmissible and removable. Fleuti was not in immigration proceedings when he left the country, whereas Aguilera-Ruiz was subject to an order of deportation. 30 Aguilera-Ruiz, 348 F.3d at 837. 31 Mansour implies that there is some sort of exception in a deportation order for unwitting departures from the country, but he cites no caselaw, statute, or regulation in support of this proposition. Fleuti, in short, does not apply to this case. Because Mansour concedes that he traveled to Mexico, he effectively executed his outstanding deportation order, thus leaving no deportation proceedings to reopen. See Navarro-Miranda, 330 F.3d at 675 ([T]he execution of a removal order resolved any remaining case or controversy between Navarro and the INS.) The BIA therefore did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it had no jurisdiction to grant Mansour's motion to reopen. See, e.g., id. (affirming the decision of the BIA that deportation deprived the [BIA] of any further jurisdiction over motions brought relating to [Navarro's] removal proceedings).