Opinion ID: 2125990
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: modification requirement

Text: In Davis' second and third assignments of error, he contends that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the stipulation and November 1993 order constituted a § 48-141 judicially approved agreement which modified the February 1993 award on rehearing and Davis' temporary total disability award. Davis further contends that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a § 48-141 application is not required to terminate Davis' benefits. Davis claims error in the Court of Appeals' reversing the review panel's remand of the matter to the single judge to determine and enforce the benefits due under the February award on rehearing. The broad question presented by these assignments of error is whether Crete Carrier complied with the proper procedures when terminating Davis' temporary total disability benefits. [5] Our case law has established that as a general rule, an employer may not unilaterally terminate a workers' compensation award of indefinite temporary total disability benefits absent a modification of the award of benefits. For example, in Starks, [16] we held that an employer was required to pay an employee permanent disability benefits until an application to modify the original award was filed. In Starks, the single judge determined that the employee was permanently and totally disabled. Approximately 2 years later, the employer unilaterally terminated the employee's benefits. The employee filed a motion with the compensation court requesting an order requiring the employer to resume making total disability payments. The employer then filed an application for modification, claiming the employee's disability ceased the day after payments were terminated. We stated on appeal, [A] workers' compensation award is in full force and effect, as originally entered, until the award is modified pursuant to the procedure set forth in § 48-141. . . . [E]mployers are prohibited from unilaterally modifying workers' compensation awards. [17] We concluded that the employer in Starks had unilaterally terminated the employee's benefit payments. We further concluded that the employer owed the employee total and permanent disability payments from the time it unilaterally terminated benefit payments until the date the employer filed an application for modification. Similarly, we held in Hagelstein [18] that an employer had an obligation to pay an injured employee the originally ordered workers' compensation benefits until an application to modify the award of benefits was filed. In Hagelstein, the single judge found that the employee was totally disabled and was entitled to benefits for an indefinite period. Thereafter, the employee filed a petition with the compensation court alleging that his employer had ceased paying total disability and had begun paying permanent partial disability on June 19, 1995. The single judge found that the employee had reached maximum medical improvement on April 24 and ordered the employer to pay reduced benefits as of that date. The review panel reversed the portion of the trial court's order requiring payment of permanent partial disability beginning in April and ordered payments to commence on March 6, 1996, the day on which the employee's petition was filed. On appeal, we treated the employer as the applicant for modification and the date the employer filed its answer as the application date. We explained that it was in its answer that the employer set out its claim requesting a modification of the award of temporary total disability benefits. And we reiterated our statements from Starks, [19] that an employer is prohibited from unilaterally modifying a workers' compensation award and that an employer's unilateral cessation of benefits is not the basis for the modification of an award of benefits. We believe the present case presents a factually distinct case from Starks and Hagelstein. Paragraph III of the February 1993 award on rehearing provided in pertinent part, When [Davis'] total disability ceases, he shall be entitled to the statutory amounts of compensation for any residual permanent partial disability due to this accident and injury. Paragraph XII further provided, When [Davis'] total disability ceases if thereafter the parties cannot agree on the extent of [Davis'] disability, if any, then a further hearing may be had herein on the application of either party. The terms of the February 1993 award on rehearing are clear. Davis, like the employees in Starks and Hagelstein, was awarded temporary total disability benefits for an indefinite period of time. Davis' award on rehearing further provided, however, that when Davis' total disability ceased, he was entitled to any statutory amounts of permanent partial disability benefits due. Under the terms of this award, if Davis and Crete Carrier could not agree on the extent of Davis' permanent partial disability benefits, either party could request a hearing on the matter. Thereafter, as previously noted in this opinion, an order file stamped November 18, 1993, was entered directing Crete Carrier to pay Davis temporary total disability benefits while Davis was undergoing vocational rehabilitation and making satisfactory progress. This order was based upon a stipulation between the parties. On November 23, a treating physician opined that Davis had reached maximum medical improvement. Then, on October 29, 1994, following Davis' completion of his vocational rehabilitation program, Crete Carrier ceased paying Davis temporary total disability payments. At that point, there were only approximately 8 5/7 weeks left of the 300 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits due to Davis, for which he was paid. Based upon the facts of this case, we conclude that no application to modify the award was needed to terminate Davis' temporary total disability benefits and to begin payment of his permanent partial disability benefits. Under the terms of the award, had Davis wished to dispute the termination of his temporary total disability benefits, he could have requested a hearing with the compensation court. WAITING-TIME PENALTIES, INTEREST, AND ATTORNEY FEES In Davis' final assignments of error, he contends that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to award him waiting-time penalties, interest, and attorney fees. Section 48-125 authorizes a 50-percent penalty payment of compensation and an attorney fee where there is no reasonable controversy regarding an employee's claim for workers' compensation benefits. Having determined that Crete Carrier properly terminated Davis' temporary total disability benefits, we conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that a reasonable controversy existed with respect to Crete Carrier's obligation to pay additional indemnity benefits.