Opinion ID: 2161403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: 660 The Jury Matron.

Text: The jury matron in this case was a Mrs. Sapp. She was the wife of one of the prosecution witnesses. Her husband also had been one of the investigating officers. Although no objection was made on this score until motions for new trials were presented, we consider that this constituted an error at the trial, and we must determine whether there was a prejudicial effect. There are several decisions in this state which make it clear that the practice of permitting a prosecution witness to act as jury bailiff is improper even in the absence of proof of actual or attempted influence upon the jury. State v. Cotter (1952), 262 Wis. 168, 54 N. W. (2d) 43; Surma v. State (1952), 260 Wis. 510, 51 N. W. (2d) 47. See also La Valley v. State (1925), 188 Wis. 68, 205 N. W. 412. In the Cotter Case, the conviction was reversed, with the court stating the following, at page 173: Even though no prejudice was shown and even though the instructions by the trial judge would tend to eliminate prejudice, if any in fact existed, a trial must be free not only from prejudice but from the appearance thereof, and the rule must be adhered to in this case. Other Wisconsin cases which have considered the problem of the stigma which attaches to the administration of justice when there is an appearance of impropriety in connection with the jury are O'Connor v. Brahmstead (1961), 13 Wis. (2d) 432, 435, 436, 108 N. W. (2d) 920, Rasmussen v. Miller (1955), 268 Wis. 436, 440, 68 N. W. (2d) 16, and State v. Sawyer (1953), 263 Wis. 218, 226, 56 N. W. (2d) 811. To Lord Coke is attributed the following comment: It is the worst oppression, that is done by colour of justice. The United States supreme court recently explored this problem and reached the same conclusion which this court had adopted in the Cotter Case and in the Surma Case.  Said the United States supreme court in Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 466, 85 Sup. Ct. 546, 13 L. Ed. 424. Mr. Justice HOLMES stated no more than a truism, when he observed that `Any judge who has sat with juries knows that, in spite of forms they are extremely likely to be impregnated by the environing atmosphere.' Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, at 349 . . . (dissenting opinion). The main distinction between the case at bar and the Turner Case is, of course, that Mrs. Sapp was not herself a witness but was, instead, merely the wife of one. There is no showing that any actual impropriety with the jurors took place; more importantly, the record does not reflect that there was an awareness by the jury of Mrs. Sapp's identity. In a case in which the witness himself serves as the bailiff, his identity is necessarily known to the jurors, and all the subtle evils inherent in that situation may ripen so as to taint the verdict. In the instant case, the trial judge ruled that there was nothing to indicate to the jury that Mrs. Sapp was the wife of one of the prosecution's witnesses, and we find no contradiction of this conclusion in the record. Another distinction which also tends to lessen the impact of this error is the relatively short period during which the jury may have been subjected to Mrs. Sapp's influence. In the instant case, the period was about three hours, which is a remarkable contrast to the period of three days in the Turner Case. The significance of this time factor is suggested by the following language of the United States supreme court in the Turner Case: We deal here not with a brief encounter, but with a continuous and intimate association throughout a three-day trialan association which gave these witnesses an opportunity . . . to renew old friendships and make new acquaintances among the members of the jury. A further distinction between the instant case and the Turner Case is that in the latter case the testimony that had been given by the two prosecution witnesses was crucial to  conviction. This cannot be said with reference to Mr. Sapp's testimony. He testified concerning his delivering two of the arrested men from Springfield, Illinois, and he also described how certain evidence was turned over to him. We conclude that the trial court erred in permitting a witness' wife to serve as jury matron, but, upon this record, we find that there was no prejudice.