Opinion ID: 622568
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Are Ayala's and Andrade-Quesada's statements admissible?

Text: Having concluded that Hernandez's post-arrest confession must be suppressed, we must now address whether Ayala's and Andrade-Quesada's statements are admissible against Hernandez. The Government argues that the witnesses' statements are admissible because there was a reasonable probability that the officers would have lawfully encountered Ayala and Andrade-Quesada and obtained their cooperation. We have recognized that evidence that would inevitably have been discovered without the aid of the illegally obtained evidence need not be excluded as the fruit of the poisonous tree. Singh, 261 F.3d at 535 (citation omitted). However, [t]o satisfy the inevitable discovery exception to suppression, there must have been a reasonable probability that the evidence would have been discovered from an untainted source. Id. The Government has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.... Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). Additionally, under our precedent, the Government must also show that it was actively pursuing a substantial alternate line of investigation at the time of the constitutional violation. United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 579 (5th Cir.2008). Indeed, [f]or the inevitable discovery exception to apply, `the alternate means of obtaining the evidence must at least be in existence and, at least to some degree, imminent, if yet unrealized.' Id. at 580 (quoting United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1205 n. 10 (5th Cir.1985)). Here, the Government has offered nothing more than pure speculation that Ayala's and Andrade-Quesada's statements would have been inevitably obtained. The Government first argues that [o]nce Hernandez admitted her criminal conductthat she was harboring at least one alienICE had probable cause to arrest her, and there is at least a reasonable probability that they would have lawfully encountered the other occupants.... However, we have already rejected the argument based upon Hernandez's statement at the house. The Government cites to no evidence, either in the form of testimony or otherwise, to sustain its burden on this issue; therefore, we conclude that it has not met the test for the inevitable discovery exception. Additionally, applying the factors set out above, we conclude that Ayala's and Andrade-Quesada's statements were not sufficiently attenuated from the Fourth Amendment violation to render them admissible. First, the record indicates that the witnesses made their statements almost immediately after the illegal search, and the Government offered no evidence of any intervening circumstances that might have dissipated the taint of the constitutional violation. These facts weigh in favor of exclusion. See United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 280 (5th Cir.1998). Further, during the illegal search, the officers discovered incriminating evidence. This discovery likely vitiated any incentive on [Ayala and Andrade-Quesada's] part to avoid self-incrimination, Brown, 422 U.S. at 605 n. 12, 95 S.Ct. 2254, which weighs in favor of finding that the witnesses did not make the statements of their own free will. Although they were Mirandized, this fact is insufficient to justify admission. Cf. id. at 603, 95 S.Ct. 2254. Finally, we must consider whether the purposes of the exclusionary rule would be served by excluding the evidence. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 277-78, 98 S.Ct. 1054. If we were to rule the statements admissible, police officers would be encouraged to perform illegal searches in hopes of finding incriminating evidence against witnesses who would, in turn, have a reduced incentive to avoid confessing. Cf. Brown, 422 U.S. at 605 n. 12, 95 S.Ct. 2254. We therefore find no break in the causal chain between the statements and the constitutional violation sufficient to warrant admission of the evidence. Because neither the attenuation nor the inevitable discovery exceptions to the exclusionary rule apply, we hold that the district court erred in not excluding the testimony of Ayala and Andrade-Quesada.