Opinion ID: 1788754
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: improper conduct of judge

Text: Juanita Sistrunk Mitchell, the first to arrive at the scene of the accident December 14, 1984, found Mrs. Jackson fully conscious because she told us too many things. In describing how the accident occurred, Mrs. Jackson told her, Well, suddenly, it seemed like I run into some real deep gravel and I had no control, or could not control the car. Vol. XXII, 1453-54. Thereafter, when Chiddester was on the witness stand, and as a predicate to asking him an opinion, defense counsel asked him if he had heard Mrs. Mitchell's testimony. Plaintiffs' counsel objected, and defense counsel responded that Mitchell's testimony related to Mrs. Jackson being off on the shoulder of the road. She obviously could not have run into some real deep gravel on the paved surface. Plaintiffs' counsel responded that all Mrs. Mitchell had testified was that she said Linda Jackson described to her that when she felt the bump, that it felt like the left rear was off the road. (Emphasis added.) The record shows that Mitchell testified to no such thing. Yet the circuit judge commented: That's what I remember her saying. (Emphasis added.) Defense counsel then informed the court accurately what Mitchell had testified, and was in the process of asking Chiddester another question when the court interrupted: BY THE COURT: Just a moment. We won't take Mr. Yerger's statement as necessary to being what the testimony was. You all know what the testimony was. You are the judges of the facts. If we are wrong and if I'm wrong, you are right on the facts. That's just the way it is. Now, my recollection as to the last part of that may not go along with Mr. Yerger's, but I am going to allow him to ask that question and let the jury remember what, in fact was said. (Emphasis added.) Vol. XXIII, 1682-83. The judge distorted the actual testimony. He had no business whatever telling the jury what he remembered, and in this case it was wrong. The jury went into deliberations with a mental conflict. The circuit judge had flatly said that what in truth was accurate was in accurate.
Jack Henry Davidson lived at the scene of the accident. On cross-examination defense counsel handed him a photograph to identify. Davidson replied, It's a westerly view of my driveway, mailbox and pond. Then the following: Q. (BY MR. YERGER) Was that a view that existed as of the date of the accident? A. Yes, sir. BY MR. YERGER: I would like to offer this as an exhibit. It's already offered. BY THE COURT: Just a moment. I need you to further limit that, because of the problems with the other ones. I want you to ask questions as to whether that's just a view, or does it have any significance as far as the surface. I want the jury to understand that this is not necessarily  as I understand it, that exhibit is not necessarily accurate as to the surface of the road. BY MR. YERGER: Your Honor, we are offering it as to what it represents. BY THE COURT: I want you to qualify it with that witness, too. Vol. XVIII, 608. Again, the circuit judge injected himself into the case. For what purpose?
When Mrs. Jackson deposition was taken, she was asked, Do you know when you lost control of the vehicle, whether your vehicle was partially on the shoulder, or was it in the westbound lane? She answered, I don't have any knowledge. (Emphasis added.) At trial she was asked on cross-examination, Is your testimony that as you felt this bump, that  and the vehicle went out of control, is your testimony that you were in the lane of travel headed west at that time? She answered, When I felt the bump, yes. After that the vehicle went out of control, ... (Emphasis added.) Vol. XVIII, 701. Defense counsel then read her what she had testified in the deposition, as above related, and asked her if this was correct. She replied, That's correct. Plaintiffs' counsel then stated, Your Honor, in all fairness, he needs to read the rest of it. Then the court added: BY THE COURT: Well, I don't see any inconsistency so far in the testimony today and the testimony then. Is there something I missed? Vol. XVIII, 702. The circuit judge found no inconsistency between not knowing whether or not the car was on the pavement and knowing it was when she lost control. [6]
The complaint was filed November 8, 1985. On December 19 a petition was filed to remove the action to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, and with it an answer raising numerous defenses. The answer denied the axle was defective. General Motors had not had the time or opportunity to examine the damaged vehicle prior to December 19, the date of filing its answer. It did examine the vehicle some time in 1986, and throughout trial maintained the axle was not defective. The denial in the answer was the position General Motors consistently maintained throughout. On cross-examination Chiddester was asked: Q. Why, sir, would General Motors file a formal answer in this case, without any investigation, denying that this axle failed in normal use? BY MR. YERGER: Now, we object to that. That is a legal matter and not a matter involved in this particular area as to this expert. It's a matter that is a legal decision that is made, and is improper for him to go into that particular point as to why the answer was filed, of denial, and it speaks for itself. Plaintiffs' counsel then argued that Chiddester was a representative of General Motors under Rule 30(b)(6). Defense counsel attempted to protest, but the court responded: BY THE COURT: So what? Number one, I don't know what difference it would make, but number two, I don't necessarily see the direct relevance whatsoever. The question here is can they be impeached because this individual spoke as General Motors, and apparently, they are trying to get an inconsistent position taken by Mr. General Motors. (Emphasis added.) [7] BY MR. YERGER: Your Honor, there has been no inconsistent position taken here. The position is  BY THE COURT: That's your judgment. We will see whether the jury has a different judgment. Overruled. (Emphasis added.) What is an attorney representing a defendant to do? He has a limited time to plead, the due date of the answer frequently being  as here  before there has been an opportunity to get all the facts of the case. Yet, if he denies, even though his subsequent investigation proves the denial was completely accurate, his client can still be chastised in court for the attorney's filing a general denial prior to knowing all the facts. The brazen unfairness of this can be seen by reversing the situation. Let us suppose that when Mr. or Mrs. (or both) Jackson were testifying, on cross-examination they had been asked why they alleged in their complaint that the axle broke before the Jimmy turned over when their own expert Marcosky said it did not? Suppose they had been further asked if it was not true that their court counsel were the third or fourth set of lawyers they had employed? And, finally, why was it that they would continue to solemnly allege the axle had broken before impact when they never got an expert to say so until six months before trial, and some three years after they had filed their lawsuit? This was a very cheap shot by a lawyer who certainly knew better, and condoned by a judge who should have known better. Add to this the judge again injected himself into the case. [8]
After ten full days of trial, the verdict was rendered at 10:45 at night on Memorial Day, when, according to the trial court itself, the jury was worn-out. Vol. XXV, 2048. In Isom v. State, 481 So.2d 820 (Miss. 1985), this Court reversed a jury verdict where the jury deliberated from 3:21 p.m. until 10:38 p.m. following a one and a half day trial. This Court stated: The physical and mental stamina of the jury in particular, and the Court in addition, was taxed. Although judicial time and economy are of importance, the endurance of a jury requires consideration. This court suggests that this is excessive deliberation time. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 824. See also Grimsley v. Tyner, 454 So.2d 482, 485 (Miss. 1984) (requiring or permitting juries to deliberate on cases during such times may cause their verdicts to become suspect ) (emphasis added); Parker v. State, 454 So.2d 910, 912 (Miss. 1984) (due process requires reasonable hours and circumstances); Edge v. State, 393 So.2d 1337 (Miss. 1981). Here the jury was pressured under more extreme conditions. After saturation with complex facts and exhibits for ten days, on the final day, the Memorial Day holiday, the jury heard testimony from 9:00 in the morning until approximately 5:30 p.m., followed by extensive instructions and two hours' worth of closing arguments. This would have been a feat of endurance for a jury on any day. It was even more arduous because the jurors were being kept away from their families on Memorial Day, in a court house that was not air conditioned most of the afternoon. Vol. XXIV, 1981-82. Then, at 8:15 that night, eleven and three quarters hours after beginning the tenth day of trial, the jury was sent to the jury room to eat a meal and begin deliberations! The jury had to consider numerous photographs, exhibits, and instructions and make an informed decision before the next morning. At 10:45 that night, the jury returned verdicts totaling $7,150,000. There was no reason for the jury to make such an important decision under these conditions. Vol. XXIV, 2049. The jurors should have been allowed to go home at 5:30 p.m., after all testimony was complete, and return Tuesday morning for jury instructions, closing arguments and deliberation. They would have been refreshed, more willing and better able to consider all the issues and evidence. This is exactly what the defendants' attorneys suggested. Vol. XXIV, 1981. The trial court simply refused to listen. A verdict an hour and fifteen minutes before midnight, fourteen hours into the tenth day of a complex trial in an un-air conditioned court house on Memorial Day, is clearly suspect. Judicial time and economy do not warrant forcing a jury to make an important decision that way. Putting this case to the jury under these circumstances was reversible error, regardless of the verdict.
While Chiddester was being questioned on a treatise, the court stated, He can answer, but what I just heard said can be a result of this type of thing. (Emphasis added.) (Injecting himself again.) Vol. XXIII, 1661. When Chiddester said, I didn't say that, the trial court responded, I didn't say you did. That's what I just heard that the book said that. (Emphasis added.) Id. When Chiddester attempted to explain, trial court interrupted: Just a moment. You wait until a question. You can say how it doesn't on Redirect, or when you are explaining. I'm not saying it does or doesn't. The jury doesn't need to misunderstand me. I'm not saying it does or does not say that. I'm saying they may infer that, and you may certainly may explain in your opinion why it does not say that. (Emphasis added.) Vol. IX at 1661-62. This comment clearly indicates the court's opinion of what the treatise stated, which opinion in fact was flat wrong. It effectively told the jury it could infer that the treatise supported plaintiffs; if it didn't draw that inference, the jury would be disagreeing with the court. This was unfair and usurped the jury's decision. During General Motors' cross-examination of Marcus Dean Williams, the trial court stated: I don't see the benefit of going over and asking him what those pictures show, when the pictures do speak for themselves... . that is not a valid purpose in Cross-Examination. Let's get to something that means something. It's not important to know how many pictures a witness can count. Ask him a question that matters in the trial of this case. ... . What difference does it make? (Emphasis added.) Vol. IV, 658-50. Similarly, when plaintiffs' counsel objected that inspections and procedures performed at the Tonawanda Forge plant were not relevant, the trial court stated: That is my inclination to feel the same way. I don't want to cut you off from anything you determine might be beneficial to the jury making its determination; however, time lost can never be regained, and everybody's time is important to them. ... . You open up a whole world of rebuttal. We could start a brand-new case in rebuttal after we got through with this, about whether those are done correctly, and whether they are proper, or whether there are errors in those processes, is what you are doing. ... . I don't see the value of it, but I am going to let you put on your case. (Emphasis added.) Vol. IX, 1715-17. This is like Mississippi Power Co. v. Harrison, 247 Miss. 400, 152 So.2d 892, 901 (1963), where this Court found prejudicial error in the trial court's comment that evidence is not essential here. It is not material and will encumber the record to the extent there will be no end. (Emphasis added.) See Sivley v. Sivley, 96 Miss. 137, 51 So. 457, 458 (1910) (reversible error where trial court said evidence did not amount to anything and did not have anything to do with the issue in this cause.). [9]