Opinion ID: 582662
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Possible analogies

Text: 64 Because Streit was already in category VI, the district court could not readily engage in this type of departure by analogy in his case for the simple reason that there were no higher criminal history categories left. The guidelines do not tell us where to look for analogies in such situations. Examination of the sentencing table reveals that a district court generally may move to a higher sentencing range either by increasing a defendant's criminal history category and thereby moving horizontally along the sentencing table from left to right, or by increasing the defendant's offense level and moving vertically down the table. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A, at 5.2. Other circuits that have considered the question have invoked both types of analogies in reviewing category VI departures. 65 The Seventh and Tenth Circuits have endorsed efforts to extrapolate along the horizontal axis of criminal history categories. In United States v. Schmude, 901 F.2d 555 (7th Cir.1990), the court held that the reasonableness of the degree of a departure from category VI may be reviewed by reference to the structure of the Sentencing Table. Id. at 560. Observing that for any given offense level, the recommended sentencing ranges increase roughly ten to fifteen percent from one criminal history category to the next higher category, the Seventh Circuit concluded that [i]n the case of a Category VI defendant, a sentencing judge can use this ten to fifteen percent increase to guide the departure. Id. Relying on Schmude, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc), held that a sentencing court departing from category VI may assign points to the elements of a defendant's criminal history that warrant a departure to derive a new criminal history score, and then calculate an analogous sentencing range by referring to the increments between categories in the Guidelines sentencing table. Id. at 993. 6 66 The Seventh Circuit also has voiced its approval of departures beyond category VI based on vertical analogies to higher offense levels. In United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir.1990), Judge Easterbrook noted that the vertical increments on the sentencing grid are identical to the horizontal increments and concluded that [a] judge who runs out of criminal history levels may read down to find the next higher range. Id. at 1062; see also United States v. Scott, 914 F.2d 959, 965 (7th Cir.1990). A number of circuits have condemned this resort to vertical analogies on the ground that the guidelines nowhere recommend it and that [a]rbitrarily moving to a new offense level when the highest criminal history category proves inadequate would skew the balancing of factors which the Commission created in the Sentencing Table. United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 607-08 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 861, 110 S.Ct. 175, 107 L.Ed.2d 131 (1989); see also United States v. Molina, 952 F.2d 514, 521-22 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1992); United States v. Thornton, 922 F.2d 1490, 1494 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Russell, 905 F.2d 1450, 1456 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 267, 112 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990). 67 Finally, some courts have abandoned the search for suitable analogies in favor of what might be called a pure common law approach to reasonableness. Under this approach, the district court states reasons for the degree of its departure, and the appellate court relies solely on its own judgment as to whether the sentence imposed is proportional to the crime committed, in light of the past criminal history. United States v. Bernhardt, 905 F.2d 343, 346 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330, 337 (1st Cir.1990). The apparent hope is that an initial batch of appellate pronouncements on reasonableness eventually will generate a body of rules to circumscribe the discretion of trial courts departing in these circumstances. 68 While we do not believe the Sentencing Commission intended to impose any particular mechanical formula on trial judges who exercise their discretion to depart upward from category VI in appropriate circumstances, we also do not believe that Congress's goal of bringing uniformity and proportionality to the sentencing process would be well served were we to abandon our requirement that sentencing departures be guided, so far as possible, by articulated analogies to other provisions of the guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (6); Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d at 749 (The reasonableness of sentences determined without reference to identified standards would not be susceptible to rational review.). 69 We decline to mandate that sentencing judges adhere to any one particular approach to departures beyond category VI. We do require, however, that the sentencing court follow some reasonable, articulated methodology consistent with the purposes and structure of the guidelines. 70