Opinion ID: 1404841
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Accomplice Witness Instruction, Sufficiency of Evidence, and Due Process.

Text: {70} Defendants argue that the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction cautioning the jury to carefully weigh the immunized testimony of Lucero. As Defendants concede, we do not require courts to give instructions specifically cautioning a jury in considering immunized accomplice testimony. Rather, we only require that the trial court instruct the jury generally with respect to witness credibility. State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 575, 817 P.2d 1196, 1217 (1991). The trial court so instructed the jury, using UJI 14-5020 NMRA 1998 (You alone are the judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the testimony of each of them. In determining the credit to be given any witness, you should take into account [the witness'] truthfulness or untruthfulness, [the witness'] ability and opportunity to observe, his [or her] memory, his [or her] manner while testifying, any interest, bias or prejudice [the witness] may have and the reasonableness of [the witness'] testimony considered in the light of all the evidence in the case.). We conclude that the trial court did not err by refusing to give an additional jury instruction specifically relating to the credibility of accomplice witnesses. {71} We recently declined to require a cautionary instruction concerning accomplice testimony in State v. Sarracino, 1998-NMSC-022, ¶ 17, 125 N.M. 511, 964 P.2d 72. In Sarracino, we discussed the rationale of other states and the federal government in requiring or approving an instruction cautioning the jury to more closely scrutinize accomplice testimony. Id. ¶¶ 14-16. We noted that accomplice testimony has been viewed, historically, with suspicion, and we emphasized the due process requirement that there be sufficient evidence to support, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element essential to the crime charged. Id. ¶ 14. We concluded in Sarracino that, under the facts of that case, the general witness credibility instruction adequately informed the jury of its responsibility in reviewing the accomplice testimony. Id. ¶ 17. {72} We believe the majority of Defendants' arguments on appeal reinforce our emphasis on due process and sufficiency of the evidence in Sarracino. The essence of Defendants' appeal concerns the fact that the State relied so heavily on the accomplice testimony of Spikes and Lucero. Defendants separately attack the immunity of both accomplices (claiming Lucero's to be coercive and Spikes' to be without authority), the State's attempts to bolster the accomplices' testimony (claiming the prior consistent statements related by Satomba, O'Grady, and Jimenes to be hearsay), and, finally, the blocked attempts to attack the credibility of prosecution witnesses (focusing on the inability to introduce Lucero's prior arrests and Spikes' opinion about other witnesses' truthfulness). We believe that, viewing these arguments in combination, Defendants basically contend that Spikes' and Lucero's testimony is not sufficiently reliable to constitute sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of due process. {73} As we concluded in Sarracino, however, we believe there is sufficient evidence corroborating the accomplice testimony in this case to satisfy the dictates of due process. Both Spikes and Lucero testified to a similar sequence of events, even though both were involved in different aspects of the crime and had limited contact with each other prior to the crime and before the trial. Additionally, the physical evidence discovered by the police at Lucero's house corroborated many details of Lucero's testimony and was consistent with the condition in which the police found Younger's body. Defendants had, and employed, every opportunity to cross-examine both Lucero and Spikes. They then argued in closing that neither witness was credible. Defendants have not shown any persuasive reason to change the rule we currently have. We hold the jury was sufficiently instructed.