Opinion ID: 1868000
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Limitation on Discretion of Officers Operating Checkpoint

Text: The checkpoint in this case also fails the third prong of the Downey test: that to be constitutionally reasonable, a roadblock must be established and operated in accordance with predetermined operational guidelines and supervisory authority that minimize the risk of arbitrary intrusion on individuals and limit the discretion of law enforcement officers at the scene. 945 S.W.2d at 104. We clarified in Hicks : the most important attribute of a reasonable roadblock is the presence of genuine limitations upon the discretion of the officers in the field. Two facts are critical to finding that the officers' discretion on the scene was properly limited: (1) the decision to set up the roadblock in the first instance cannot have been made by the officer or officers actually establishing the checkpoint, and (2) the officers on the scene cannot decide for themselves the procedures to be used in operating the roadblock. In all cases, therefore, the State must show that some authority superior to the officers in the field decided to establish the roadblock, particularly as to its time and location, and that the officers adhered to neutral standards previously fixed by administrative decision or regulation. To be clear, these factors are so essential to a reasonable roadblock that the absence of either of them will necessarily result in the invalidation of the stops. 55 S.W.3d at 533 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Later in the Hicks decision we stressed that active and careful supervision is critical to the constitutional reasonableness of any roadblock.... Id. at 536. In this case, it is unclear whose decision it was to set up the checkpoint in the first instance. Officer Brown indicated that the checkpoint was operated pursuant to a special mandate from the CHA and that the checkpoint plan was formulated by Chief Hazelwood. However, Officer Brown also indicated that the checkpoints were operated at random times, usually in the late afternoons. The trial court found that there was no evidence regarding who was responsible for deciding the precise location(s), frequency, and times of checkpoints. Even without definitive proof that it was Officer Brown who both decided to establish this particular checkpoint and then established it, the checkpoint fails constitutional muster because of the utter lack of supervision over his methodology in conducting the checkpoint. In this case, the only predetermined operational guideline in place regarding this checkpoint was that it could be operated only on streets owned by the CHA. As to its actual operation, Officer Brown testified: What I do, I'd wait till they got on the housing property. The first thing I would do is what I call a greeting, How are you doing. Good afternoon. Then after that I'd say, I'm Ralph Brown, criminal investigator for Chattanooga Housing Authority. Then I would tell them the reason why I stopped them, I'm checking IDs, see if you live here in this residenceI mean this housing development. After that I'd ask for a form of identification, a driving license, and after that point sometimes I'd ask for registration and insurance, and after that I would make a final decision on what I was going to do. (emphasis added). Officer Brown's own testimony indicates that he determined, in his discretion, what documentation he would request and then determined, in his discretion, what he would do about the particular visitor to the development. [10] This discretion was, so far as the record indicates, unfettered. Where the officers actually conducting the checkpoint [have] virtually complete discretion to decide for themselves the procedures to be used in its operation, id. at 535, the checkpoint fails to pass muster under our Constitution. Id. at 536. Finally, there are elements of subterfuge evident in the operation of this entry identification checkpoint. First, Officer Brown testified that, upon stopping a person seeking entrance into Poss Homes, he would check and see if they had an ID to live in that residence. [11] Also we would check their driving license. (emphasis added). If the checkpoint was being operated solely to establish a legitimate connection between the would-be entrant and the community, however, Officer Brown had no reason to also demand the person's driver's license if he or she had already produced a Poss Homes identification badge. Second, Officer Brown testified that, in addition to seeking multiple forms of identification from people trying to enter Poss Homes, he sometimes sought vehicle registration and proof of insurance documents. Because persons may legitimately drive vehicles belonging to others, however, a vehicle registration document is of questionable value in determining the identity of the driver. Proof of insurance is relevant to nothing other than determining compliance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated chapter twelve. See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 55-12-101-140. Those provisions have no logical connection to deflecting would-be trespassers from public housing developments. We disagree, therefore, with the intermediate court's conclusion that the checkpoint stops were aimed solely at ascertaining the person's connection to the neighborhood. If that were the case, Officer Brown would not have requested these latter documents, even sometimes. Since checking vehicle registration and proof of insurance have nothing to do with the State's claimed interest in the instant entry identification checkpoint, we may infer that Officer Brown was pursuing investigatory agendas that were wholly distinct and apart from the State's claimed interest. Hicks, 55 S.W.3d at 537. As we stated in Hicks , and reiterate here, [w]hen police officers are permitted, either through administrative design or supervisory neglect, to actively engage in suspicionless investigation of criminal activity wholly unrelated to the purposes of the roadblock, the constitutional protections afforded by [a]rticle I, section 7 are rendered utterly without effect or meaning. Id. at 538. Accordingly, a checkpoint designed or operated to further illegitimate law enforcement practices under the pretext of a lawful purpose is unreasonable under [a]rticle I, section 7, irrespective of other indicia of reasonableness. Id. at 536. Therefore, we hold that the instant checkpoint fails to pass constitutional muster for this reason, as well.