Opinion ID: 1897530
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: LAD Exceptions

Text: Boy Scouts claims that even if it is a place of public accommodation, it is nonetheless exempt from the LAD under three express exceptions: (1) the distinctly private exception; (2) the religious educational facility exception; and (3) the in loco parentis exception. N.J.S.A. 10:5-5 l . Because we determine that these exceptions do not apply to Boy Scouts, we hold that Boy Scouts is subject to the LAD. While this Court has been scrupulous in its insistence that the [LAD] be applied to the full extent of its facial coverage, it has never found such coverage to exist in the face of an unambiguous exclusion. Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 68, 389 A. 2d 465 (1978) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, despite our adherence to statutory exceptions expressly and unambiguously set forth by the Legislature, we are mindful that [e]xemptions from remedial statutes should generally be narrowly construed. Poff v. Caro, 228 N.J.Super. 370, 379, 549 A. 2d 900 (Law Div.1987) (citing Service Armament Co. v. Hyland, 70 N.J. 550, 559, 362 A. 2d 13 (1976)). We begin with the distinctly private exception. The LAD provides that [n]othing herein contained shall be construed to include or to apply to any institution, bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly private. N.J.S.A. 10:5-5 l . Boy Scouts' status as a bona fide club has not been questioned. Our focus is, therefore, on the meaning of distinctly private. We agree with the New York Court of Appeals that this language, found in both the New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 292, and in the LAD, is intended as a narrowly drawn statutory exclusion. Power Squadrons, supra, 465 N.Y.S. 2d 871, 452 N.E. 2d at 1204 (stating that this exception does not refer simply to private clubs or establishments closed to the public but uses more restrictive language excluding from the statute's provisions only clubs which are `distinctly private'). Boy Scouts bears the burden of proving that it fits within this narrow exception. Cf. Spragg v. Shore Care & Shore Mem'l Hosp., 293 N.J.Super. 33, 51, 679 A. 2d 685 (App.Div.1996) (holding burden of proof on defendant-employer to prove bona fide occupational qualification exception to LAD). In deciding whether Boy Scouts is a place of public accommodation, we considered the organization's public solicitation activities. Solicitation of a broad membership base is closely related to the issue of selectivity in membership, which may explain why various courts have considered both factors in their analyses of both place of public accommodation and the distinctly private exception. See, e.g., Kiwanis, supra, 806 F. 2d at 476 (stating that distinctly private exception represents the other side of the `public accommodation' coin .... because of the emphasis placed on `selectivity' as the standard for determining `public accommodation,' as well as for determining if a club is `distinctly private'). We have reviewed the multiple ways in which Boy Scouts reaches out to the public and, therefore, will consider the selectivity issue as the principal determinant of distinctly private status. See Power Squadrons, supra, 465 N.Y.S. 2d 871, 452 N.E. 2d at 1204 (stating that the essence of a private club is selectivity in its membership). Thirty-three years ago, in Clover Hill Swimming Club, Inc. v. Goldsboro , we said that not every establishment using the `club' label can be considered `distinctly private.' Self-serving declarations by ... an accommodation are not determinative of its character. 47 N.J. at 34, 219 A. 2d 161. Although the swimming club had represented to the public that all applications [for membership] would be subject to approval by club officials, it appeared that Clover Hill was only selective when black families applied. Ibid. The Court refused to accept bogus representations concerning the private nature of the club when it was quite clear that membership was generally open and had to do with a family's interest in recreation and not much else. Ibid. Little League, citing Clover Hill, primarily relied on the baseball league's open [invitation] to children in the community at large, with no restriction (other than sex) whatever as a basis for the court's finding that the league was a public accommodation. 127 N.J.Super. at 531, 318 A. 2d 33. The lack of any membership selectivityexcept for the prohibition against the admission of girls weighed in the public accommodation calculus; it also bears upon the distinctly private exception. Kiwanis International v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club is the only case to hold a club exempt under the distinctly private exception. 806 F. 2d at 477. The Third Circuit, relying on Little League, applied a selectivity analysis to determine whether Kiwanis Ridgewood was a public accommodation and, therefore, not distinctly private. Id. at 476-77. The court found that the local club was selective based on its membership practices, which were described as follows: The Ridgewood club is small, comprised of only twenty-eight members. Ten individuals have been members for over twenty years. Indeed, Kiwanis Ridgewood has admitted no more than twenty members over the course of the past decade. Each new member had to be sponsored by a current member, and formally voted in by the Ridgewood Board of Directors. The sponsorship of the existing member acted as a primary screening mechanism in the maintenance of the quality of membership. In addition to national membership requirements, Kiwanis Ridgewood established several local membership requirements, which included, among others, the candidate's willingness to pray at meetings and to recite the pledge of allegiance. Although Kiwanis International has encouraged large-scale membership solicitation in the past, the suggested membership roundup mailings were sent only to those prospects already known by current members. These individuals would be invited to a Kiwanis meeting to determine their compatibility with the organization's goals and members. The scope of these membership drives was limited. Not only did every solicited individual have to be known by an existing member, but every applicant out of that group of solicited individuals would have to be sponsored by an existing member. [ Id. at 475.] Unlike Kiwanis Ridgewood, which used sponsorship [by an] existing member ... as a primary screening mechanism in the maintenance of ... quality membership, Boy Scouts does not require new members to be sponsored by a current member. Ibid. Nor does Boy Scouts limit its recruiting, or invitations to the public, to individuals who are known by an existing member. To the contrary, Boy Scout publications indicate that the organization seeks a broad membership base. In a booklet, entitled A Representative Membership, [8] Boy Scouts states that its national objective, as well as for regions, areas, councils, and districts is to see that all eligible youth have the opportunity to affiliate with the Boy Scouts of America. Id. at 1 (emphasis added). The booklet is emphatically inclusive: We have high hopes for our nation's future. These hopes cannot flower if any part of our citizenry feels deprived of the opportunity to help shape the future. How can you persuade other Scouters to accept a commitment to a representative membership? Consider these facts: 1. Our federal charter sets forth our obligation to serve boys. Neither the charter nor the bylaws of the Boy Scouts of America permits the exclusion of any boy. The National Council and Executive Board have always taken the position that Scouting should be available for all boys who meet the entrance age requirements. .... 4. Another aim of Scouting is the development of leadership. Leadership in America is needed in all sections of the country and in all economic, cultural, and ethnic groups. 5. To meet these responsibilities we have made a commitment that our membership shall be representative of all the population in every community, district, and council. [ Id. at 2 (emphasis added).] Boy Scouts' large membership further undercuts its claim to selective membership. Nationally, over four million boys and one million adults were Boy Scout members in 1992. [9] Since its inception, over 87 million people have joined Boy Scouts. In 1991, Monmouth Council alone had over 8400 youths and over 2700 adult members. The New York Court of Appeals, construing distinctly private in United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Board, has suggested that an organization's failure to limit its maximum membership, in and of itself, demonstrates that the club is not private: Organizations which routinely accept applicants and place no subjective limits on the number of persons eligible for membership are not private clubs. 465 N.Y.S. 2d 871, 452 N.E. 2d at 1204. We note only that the size of the Boy Scout organization certainly implies an open membership policy. Boy Scouts argues, however, that it is distinctly private because its Scout Oath and Scout Law constitute genuine selectivity criteria. In support of its position, Boy Scouts relies on Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, wherein the Seventh Circuit stated: Although the Scouts intentionally admit a large number of boys from diverse backgrounds, admission to membership is not without exercise of sound discretion and judgment. This is evident from the Constitution and By-laws as well as the Boy Scouts' Oath and Scout Law. ... We hold therefore that the Scouts organization not only is selective, but that its very Constitution, By-laws and doctrine dictate that it remain selective. [993 F. 2d at 1276-77.] We acknowledge that Boy Scouts' membership application requires members to comply with the Scout Oath and Law. We do not find, however, that the Oath and Law operate as genuine selectivity criteria. To the contrary, the record discloses few instances in which the Oath and Law have been used to exclude a prospective member; in practice, they present no real impediment to joining Boy Scouts. Joining requirements are insufficient to establish selectivity where they do not function as true limits on the admission of members. See Power Squadrons, supra, 465 N.Y.S. 2d 871, 452 N.E. 2d at 1204 (requiring examination for basic boating course was not selective where club place[d] no subjective limits on the number of persons eligible for membership). Here, there is no evidence that Boy Scouts does anything but accept at face value a scout's affirmation of the Oath and Law. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3251, 82 L.Ed. 2d 462, 473 (1984) (finding group unselective where new members are routinely recruited and admitted with no inquiry into their backgrounds). Most important, it is clear that Boy Scouts does not limit its membership to individuals who belong to a particular religion or subscribe to a specific set of moral beliefs. Boy Scouts asserts that [t]here is a close association between the Boy Scouts of America and virtually all religious bodies and denominations in the United States, and that each member's concept of moral fitness should be determined by his courage to do what his head and heart tell him is right. See supra at 575-76, 734 A. 2d at 1203. Moreover, Boy Scouts encourages its members to respect and defend the rights of others whose beliefs may differ. Scoutmaster Handbook, supra, at 561. By its own teachings then, Boy Scouts is inclusive, not selective, in its membership practices. Boy Scouts also argues that it is distinctly private because it is selective in its adult membership. In addition to the Scout Oath and Law requirements, adult members are bound by the Declaration of Religious Principle, and are subject to evaluation according to informal criteria designed to select only individuals capable of accepting responsibility for the moral education and care of other people's children in accordance with scouting values. Several of the Troop 73 leaders who were involved in Dale's adult membership approval have said that they would not have approved Dale's application had they known that Dale was an avowed homosexual, thus lending support to BSA's position. The Appellate Division's analysis of Boy Scouts' adult membership selectivity dispels the notion that an open membership organization can claim the distinctly private exception because it is selective as to a small subset of the larger group: We reject the suggestion that the BSA organization as a whole is not a place of public accommodation because more stringent membership criteria are applied to a single component of the organization, its adult members. Such a result is clearly inconsistent with the remedial purposes of the LAD. Acceptance of the argument would mean that public clubs in Clover Hill and Fraser, are not places of public accommodation because their member-counselors or lifeguards are subject to more stringent, enhanced training criteria. An extension of defendants' argument would be that the BSA is not a place of public accommodation because of the demanding standards that must be met to become an Eagle Scout. [ Dale, supra, 308 N.J.Super. at 538, 706 A. 2d 270 (citations omitted).] See also Brounstein, supra, 839 F.Supp. at 1107-08 (stating that [t]he fact that an organization is selective with respect to the privileges and benefits it accords to members does not exempt that organization from the proscriptions of the LAD if it is otherwise a `public place of accommodation'). Boy Scouts accepts boys who come from diverse cultures and who belong to different religions. It teaches tolerance and understanding of differences in others. It presents itself to its members and to the public generally as a nonsectarian organization available to all boys who meet the entrance age requirements. Its Charter and its Bylaws do not permit the exclusion of any boy. Boy Scouts is not distinctly private because it is not selective in its membership. Boy Scouts claims, however, that it is exempt from the LAD because it is an educational facility operated or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution. N.J.S.A. 10:5-5 l . This claim deserves little discussion. Boy Scouts repeatedly states that it is nonsectarian. Its Bylaws declare that no member shall be required to take part in or observe a religious ceremony distinctly unique to a church or other religious organization. Boy Scouts emphasizes that religious instruction is better reserved for the home and the organization or group with which the member is connected. Further, the Scoutmaster Handbook instructs its leaders that scouting is identified with no particular faith, encourages no particular affiliation, nor assumes functions of religious bodies. We cannot say that Boy Scouts is a bona fide religious or sectarian institution in the face of the organization's clear pronouncements on this subject. [10] Finally, Boy Scouts argues that requiring it to admit Dale frustrates the right of a natural parent or one in loco parentis to direct the education and upbringing of a child under his control. N.J.S.A. 10:5-5 l . The right of a parent to provide for the custody, care, and nurturing of a child is well-established. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 1280, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195, 203 (1968). In limited cases, that right is also extended to persons, like a stepparent, whose intent it is to assume the parental relationship. A.S. v. B.S., 139 N.J.Super. 366, 369, 354 A. 2d 100 (Ch.Div.1976). Boy Scouts does not qualify as one in loco parentis. Our prior decisions indicate that the status of in loco parentis is reserved for individuals who function as a parent. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 162, 478 A. 2d 351 (1984) (recognizing stepparent may have in loco parentis relationship); In re M.S., 73 N.J. 238, 243-44, 374 A. 2d 445 (1977) (finding juvenile shelter for delinquents stands in loco parentis ). Characteristics of that relationship include the responsibility to maintain, rear and educate the child, Miller, supra, 97 N.J. at 162, 478 A. 2d 351, as well as the duties of supervision, care and rehabilitation, In re M.S., supra, 73 N.J. at 242, 374 A. 2d 445; see also A.S., supra, 139 N.J.Super. at 369, 354 A. 2d 100 (defining role as one who means to put himself in the situation of the lawful father with reference to the father's office and duty of making provision for the child). Boy Scouts does not assume those responsibilities or those duties. It does not maintain or rear children. A Boy Scout leader may function as a supervisor of children for limited periods of time; he does not have the responsibility to maintain, rear and educate children such that he stands in the place of a parent. We hold that Boy Scouts is a place of public accommodation and is not exempt from the LAD under any of the statute's exceptions.