Opinion ID: 1226896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Motion to Suppress Letters

Text: Prior to trial, defendant moved to exclude more than 24 letters he had written and sent to his wife Allison. As relevant here, he claimed a privilege under Evidence Code section 980 to refuse and prevent the disclosure of the letters as confidential marital communications. Evidence Code section 980 declares in pertinent part that a spouse ... has a privilege during the marital relationship and afterwards to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a communication if ... the communication was made in confidence between him and the other spouse while they were husband and wife. The People opposed the motion. They denied the claim of privilege. At issue (among other questions) were whether defendant intended nondisclosure of the letters' contents, and whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy therein. The trial court conducted a hearing. Defendant called Detective Landry as a witness. The People introduced three of the letters into evidence. The following facts were established beyond dispute: defendant wrote the letters in question to his wife Allison while he was incarcerated in the Tokyo Detention House, and sent them to her from that location; in the letters introduced at the hearing, he revealed a belief that Japanese and/or United States authorities were intercepting all his mail and reading its contents; indeed, in those letters he directed comments to such readers; Allison received the letters and voluntarily turned them over to Detective Landry in Japan on January 15, 1981. The trial court rejected the claim of privilege and denied the motion. At trial, the People introduced portions of three letters that had not been presented at the hearing for two purposes: (1) to show that around the time of the murder of Hanson and Blount, defendant and Allison were experiencing difficulties in their financial situation, and that defendant came to California from Japan to alleviate that condition; and (2) to corroborate the testimony of Edward Rogers on that point. I am really glad Frank [Plunk, Allison's former husband,] came through, just think he might have loaned us the money all of the time. My trip to Cal wasn't in vain. I finally found out you truly loved me and you got your bills paid. That is a pretty good haul for both of us. I would sacrifice everything for you. Hell, look I have. Actions speak louder than words. You got the money you wanted and now you ignore my need. (13a) Defendant now contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion. (14) It appears that a ruling on a motion such as the present, which concerns the admissibility of evidence, is subject to review for abuse of discretion. (Cf. United States v. Marashi (9th Cir.1990) 913 F.2d 724, 729 [holding to that effect under federal standard-of-review principles].) The underlying determinations, of course, are scrutinized in accordance with their character as purely legal, purely factual, or mixed. (13b) We are of the opinion that the ruling of the trial court is sound under any standard. The letters did not come within the privilege for confidential marital communications. The record establishes that the documents were not written or sent in confidence. To make a communication in confidence, one must intend nondisclosure (see People v. Gomez (1982) 134 Cal. App.3d 874, 879 [185 Cal. Rptr. 155]; People v. Carter (1973) 34 Cal. App.3d 748, 752 [110 Cal. Rptr. 324]), and have a reasonable expectation of privacy (see North v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 301, 311 [104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 502 P.2d 1305, 57 A.L.R.3d 155]). Apparently, defendant did not have the required intent. Certainly, he did not have the necessary expectation. The court made a determination to that effect. For purposes of the privilege, the existence vel non of a reasonable expectation of privacy appears to be a predominantly factual mixed question. (See People v. Rodriguez (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 706, 715 [173 Cal. Rptr. 82] [to similar effect].) As such, its resolution is subject to review for substantial evidence. But even if scrutinized de novo, the court's determination is plainly correct. Defendant had no expectation of privacy, reasonable or otherwise. As noted, he believed that the Japanese and/or United States authorities were intercepting all his mail and reading its contents. Defendant argues against our conclusion, but to no avail. In substance, his attack is against the trial court's reasoning. But of course, we review the ruling, not the reasoning. And as we have explained, the ruling was sound. In any event, the reasoning was substantially similar to that set out above. Defendant asserts that the court misallocated the applicable burdens of proof. We are not persuaded. (15) As a general matter, the claimant of the confidential marital communication privilege has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to sustain the claim. (1 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (2d ed. 1982) § 25.2(p), p. 715 [speaking generally of claimants of privileges].) He is aided by a presumption that a marital communication was made in confidence. (Evid. Code, § 917.) The opponent has the burden to prove otherwise ( ibid. ) by a preponderance of the evidence (see id., § 115). Although the court could have dealt with the burdens more explicitly, any deficiency under these circumstances was certainly not fatal.