Opinion ID: 2427354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voir Dire of Prospective Jurors

Text: Rosario, in a supplemental pro se filing, also argues that the court violated his constitutional rights as well as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 by questioning certain prospective alternate jurors outside of his presence. We disagree. The court's questioning of the prospective jurors outside the presence of the Defendants was justified, and, in any event, Rosario waived any right to be present pursuant to Rule 43 by his failure to object at trial. After selection of twelve jurors and four alternate jurors, the court called counsel to a side bar. The judge told them that he and a security officer observed two of the alternate female jurors laughing and sticking their tongues out at Rosario like, `I know you.' The court determined that it would question the two alternates, and ordered that the Defendants be removed from the courtroom. There was no objection. With counsel for each of the Defendants present, the court questioned the two alternate female jurors, who said that they did not know any of the Defendants. The court decided, nevertheless, to excuse the two alternates. A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). As noted above, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 further provides that a defendant must be present at every trial stage, including jury impanelment and the return of the verdict, Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(a)(2), except at stages where, inter alia, [t]he proceeding involves only a conference or hearing on a question of law, Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(b)(3). Defendants need not be expressly warned of their rights under Rule 43, and a defendant's failure to assert his right to be present or to object to a purported violation of the rule may result in a valid waiver of the right. See United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 529, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985); United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127, 137 (2d Cir.2004); United States v. Brantley, 68 F.3d 1283, 1291 (11th Cir.1995). In Gagnon, a multi-defendant trial, the Supreme Court rejected a claim that a conference attended by one of the defense counsel and a juror, regarding a concern expressed by that juror that one of the defendants had been sketching [portraits of] jury members during the trial, violated the defendants' constitutional right to be present. 470 U.S. at 523, 105 S.Ct. 1482. The Supreme Court recognized that [t]he mere occurrence of an ex parte conversation between a trial judge and a juror does not constitute a deprivation of any constitutional right. Id. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482 (quoting Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 125-26, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (Stevens, J. concurring in the judgment)). The Court explained that the conference at issue, a short interlude in a complex trial[,] ... was not the sort of event which every defendant had a right personally to attend. Id. at 527, 105 S.Ct. 1482. The defendants could have done nothing had they been at the conference, nor would they have gained anything by attending. Id. As in Gagnon, Rosario's absence from the bench conference did not deprive him of any constitutional right. It did not detract from his defense or in any way affect the fairness of his trial. See id. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482 (explaining that due process concerns are implicated [w]henever [the defendant's] presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the [fullness] of his opportunity to defend against the charge ... [and] to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only). Rosario was removed (as were his co-defendants) for only a brief period of time, and his interests were sufficiently protected by his counsel's presence at the conference. See United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1397, 1399-1401 (3d Cir.1994); see also United States v. Collazo-Aponte, 216 F.3d 163, 182 (1st Cir.2000) (finding no Rule 43 violation where the defendant was restricted from full participation in a limited number of sidebar conferences that occurred during voir dire but otherwise was present at, and fully participated in, his trial), vacated on other grounds, 532 U.S. 1036, 121 S.Ct. 1996, 149 L.Ed.2d 1000 (2001). Furthermore, even assuming Rosario had a statutory right to be present under Rule 43 in these circumstances (a proposition we doubt), he waived that right by remaining silent. When the court ordered that the Defendants be removed from the courtroom, Rosario had the opportunity to object, but did not. As in Gagnon, Rosario's total failure to assert [his] right[] to attend the conference with the juror sufficed to waive [it] under Rule 43. Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529, 105 S.Ct. 1482. If a defendant is entitled under Rule 43 to attend certain `stages of the trial' which do not take place in open court, the defendant ... must assert that right at the time ... [and] may not claim it for the first time on appeal from a sentence entered on a jury's verdict of `guilty.' Id.; see Peterson, 385 F.3d at 138; Collazo-Aponte, 216 F.3d at 182.