Opinion ID: 774701
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bibbins v. Dalsheim

Text: 36 After his conviction on a state drug charge, petitioner Bibbins had moved for a new trial in state court based on the jury's consideration of extra-record information. Id. at 15. In support of his motion, Bibbins submitted affidavits from two jurors. Juror Krainak averred that, in connection with the jury's consideration of a police officer's testimony identifying Bibbins as the person involved in the drug transaction, she had told the other jurors that there were no open businesses near the location at which the drug transaction took place. Id. Juror Urban's affidavit, among other things, described the effect this extra-record information had on his vote. Id. at 15-16. The trial court denied the motion. Bibbins then filed a federal habeas petition, submitting the same two affidavits in support thereof. Apparently without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the petition. Id. at 16. 37 We began our consideration of the district court's denial by noting that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in federal habeas proceedings. Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 1101(e)). We then noted that although Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) permits jurors to testify `on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention,'.... the juror may not go on to testify about the effect of that information on the juror's mental processes or the jury's deliberations. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)). 2 In other words, `[w]here an extraneous influence is shown, the court must apply an objective test, assessing for itself the likelihood that the influence would affect a typical juror.' Id. (quoting Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1968). Applying this precedent, we held that Urban's affidavit is... inadmissible to the extent that it recounts how Ms. Krainak's disclosure affected the thinking and voting of individual jurors or the deliberations of the jury as a whole, including the tally of votes. Id. Relying on Bibbins, petitioner in this case argues that the district court erred in giving weight to the juror's subjective statements that the rumors had no effect on their votes. 38 Responding to this Bibbins argument, the state argues, first, that Bibbins' holding that Rule 606(b) applies in habeas proceedings is limited to federal habeas evidentiary hearings, and does not extend to federal court review of state court determinations with respect to the effect of extra-record information on the jury's deliberations. 3 We find this interpretation of Bibbins unpersuasive because, as noted, there is no indication that the district court in Bibbins conducted an evidentiary hearing. As we are here, the Bibbins panel was presented with juror testimony that had initially been given in a state court proceeding and then was re-introduced in the federal habeas proceeding. 39 The state argues, second, that, assuming that petitioner's interpretation of Bibbins is correct, Bibbins requires the application of federal evidentiary rules to state court proceedings - thereby essentially federaliz[ing] state evidentiary proceedings - a requirement that is inconsistent with AEDPA's instruction to determine whether the state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 4 40 We agree that Bibbins - a case decided two years prior to the passage of AEDPA - appears to be in some tension with the heightened degree of deference to state court decisions mandated by AEDPA. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 (2000) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) ([I]t seems clear that Congress [in enacting AEDPA] intended federal judges to attend with the utmost care to state-court decisions, including all of the reasons supporting their decisions, before concluding that those proceedings were infected by constitutional error sufficiently serious to warrant the issuance of the writ.). It is one thing to say that Rule 606(b) applies to juror testimony introduced for the first time in a federal habeas evidentiary hearing, but quite another to say that, in reviewing a state court's determination of whether a defendant was prejudiced by the jury's consideration of extra-record information, a federal habeas court should independent[ly] determin[e] whether the petitioner was prejudiced by the extra-record information without the benefit of any juror testimony that offends Rule 606(b) - even if such testimony had been relied upon by the state court. Bibbins, 21 F.3d at 17. This latter claim is difficult to reconcile with AEDPA. See Doan v. Brigano, 237 F.3d 722, 735 n.8 (6th Cir. 2001) (In light of the deference to state proceedings called for by AEDPA, it seems strange indeed that a federal habeas court would apply its own rules of evidence despite a conflicting state rule when it is simply reviewing the state court record in making its determination, rather than holding an evidentiary hearing in federal court.). 41 In other words, Bibbins would appear to permit the following scenario: After a state court, relying on subjective juror testimony, rejects a defendant's Sixth Amendment claim predicated on jury consideration of extra-record information, the federal habeas court, excluding the subjective juror testimony pursuant to Bibbins, then determines that the petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights were violated. Such a result would be consistent with AEDPA only if there existed firmly established Supreme Court precedent providing that a court's consideration of such subjective juror testimony in determining whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were compromised by the jury's consideration of extra-record information is itself a violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). If this were the case, a petitioner could argue that a state court that had rejected his Sixth Amendment claim in reliance on such subjective testimony unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Id. § 2254(d)(1). Because the Supreme Court has not established such a precedent, however, Bibbins appears to be inconsistent with AEDPA. 5