Opinion ID: 775822
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims 1, 2, and 14: Accomplice Arguments

Text: 35 In claims 1, 2, and 14 of his petition, Petitioner raised a number of arguments concerning his accomplices, Barrett and Eckstrom. The district court rejected all those claims. We granted a COA on two issues -whether the jury instructions on accomplice liability deprived Petitioner of a fair trial and whether the accomplices' plea agreements were unduly coercive. 36
37 Petitioner argues that the trial court's guilt-phase instruction concerning accomplice liability deprived him of a fair trial. Specifically, he contends that the trial court's instruction precluded the jury from giving any meaningful evidentiary consideration to Petitioner's guilt phase defense -in effect, a verdict was directed against him on the issue of actual perpetration of the homicide. 38 As noted, Petitioner's primary guilt-phase argument was that Barrett had killed Van Zandt. Barrett and Eckstrom testified that Petitioner had killed Van Zandt. Petitioner requested the following jury instruction concerning accomplice liability: 39 An accomplice is a person involved in the commission of the offense charged against the defendant whether by directly committing the act constituting the offense or aiding and abetting in its commission. A person can be an accomplice even though the acts were committed at a different time and place than the acts charged against the defendant. 40 The district court declined to give that instruction. Instead, the court instructed the jury as follows on the issue of accomplice testimony (the particular instruction to which Petitioner objects is underlined): 41 An accomplice is one who is subject to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial. 42 To be an accomplice, the person must have aided, promoted, encouraged or instigated by act or advice the commission of such offense with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the person that committed the offense and with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging or facilitating the commission of the offense. 43 A defendant cannot be found guilty based upon the testimony of an accomplice unless such testimony is corroborated by other evidence which tends to connect such defendant with the commission of the offense. 44 To corroborate the testimony of an accomplice there must be evidence of some act or fact related to the offense which, if believed by itself, and without any aid, interpretation or direction from the testimony of the accomplice tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense charged. 45 However, it is not necessary that the evidence of corroboration be sufficient in itself to establish every element of the offense charged or that it corroborate every fact to which the accomplice testified. 46 In determining whether an accomplice has been corroborated, you must first assume the testimony of the accomplice has been removed from the case. You must then determine whether there is any remaining evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. 47 If there is not such independent evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, the testimony of the accomplice is not corroborated. 48 If there is such independent evidence which you believe, then the testimony of the accomplice is corroborated. 49 The required corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice may not be supplied by the testimony of any or all of his accomplices, but must come from other evidence. 50 Merely assenting to or aiding or assisting in the commission of a crime without knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator is not criminal. And a person so assenting to or aiding and assisting in the commission of a crime without such knowledge is not an accomplice in the commission of such crime. 51 If the crimes of robbery and murder were committed by anyone, the witness' [sic], Avette Barrett and Allison Eckstrom, were accomplices as a matter or law, and their testimony is subject to the rule requiring corroboration. 52 The testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust and received with care, caution and suspicion for the reason that its very source is tainted. 53 Petitioner argues, as he has throughout these proceedings, that the emphasized part of the instruction explicitly and impliedly told the jurors that Barrett and Eckstrom were witnesses and assistants to Petitioner -in other words, they were to give no consideration to Petitioner's argument that they killed Van [Zandt], and that he did not.  That is, he reads the phrase the witness' [sic], Avette Barrett and Allison Eckstrom to refer to the two as witnesses at the crime scene, rather than as witnesses at trial. 54 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court concluded that the challenged instruction was not erroneous and that, even if the instruction was erroneous, the error was harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of Petitioner's guilt. Morris, 807 P.2d at 983. In this proceeding, the magistrate judge concluded that the instruction was not improper, and the district court adopted the magistrate judge's conclusion. 55 When considering an allegedly erroneous jury instruction in a habeas proceeding, an appellate court first considers whether the error in the challenged instruction, if any, amounted to constitutional error. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998). If so, the court then considers whether the error was harmless. Id. at 145, 119 S. Ct. 500. 56 The test for constitutional error is set out in Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990). To determine whether constitutional error occurred, an appellate court askswhether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. Id. That inquiry also can be described as having two parts: (1) whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood an assertedly ambiguous instruction to mean what the defendant suggests it means; and (2) if so, whether the instruction, so understood, was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant.  Coleman, 525 U.S. at 147. 57 If the court finds constitutional error, then it applies the test for harmless error from Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). Under Brecht, the appellate court considers whether the error had a  `substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'  Id. at 637, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (quoting Katteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). If we are in grave doubt as to whether the error had such an effect, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. Coleman v. Calderon, 210 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2000). 58 Turning to the bedrock requirement of constitutional error, Petitioner argues that the challenged instruction was reasonably likely to be understood by the jury to declare that, as a matter of law, Barrett and Eckstrom were assistants and witnesses during the murder of Van Zandt. Therefore, Petitioner argues, the instruction precluded the jury from considering his defense that Barrett and Eckstrom actually beat Van Zandt to death. 59 We agree with the magistrate judge and the district court that the jury was not reasonably likely to interpret the instruction in that manner. A single instruction is not viewed in isolation, but in the context of the overall charge. United States v. Harrison, 34 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 1994). The challenged instruction was one in a long series of instructions about accomplice testimony. In context, it is reasonably apparent that the series of instructions referred to the trial testimony of Barrett and Eckstrom; there was no other witness at trial who reasonably could be viewed as Petitioner'saccomplice. In context, the most reasonable construction that the jury could have given to the trial court's phrasethe witness' [sic], Avette Barrett and Allison Eckstrom  was the two women who appeared as witnesses in this trial and whose testimony I am in the middle of talking to you about, Avette Barrett and Allison Eckstrom. Petitioner's proffered construction of that phrase -the witnesses to the crime, Avette Barrett and Allison Eckstrom -does not fit with the surrounding instructions and is not reasonably likely in view of the charge as a whole. 60 Nor is it reasonably likely that the jury understood the instruction to mean that they were required to view the two women as assistants and Petitioner as theactual perpetrator. Petitioner substitutes the word assistant for accomplice, but the instructions do not use the wordassistant. Rather, the instructions state, among other things, that an accomplice is one who is subject to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant; that a person may be an accomplice as the result of having aided, promoted, encouraged or instigated by act or advice the commission of such offense; that an accomplice must have the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging or facilitating the offense; and that, if the crimes of robbery and murder were committed by anyone, Barrett and Eckstrom were accomplices, and their testimony required collaboration. (Emphasis added.) Viewing the instructions as a whole, the instructions do not state that the jury was required as a matter of law to view the two women as assistants. Rather, they correctly instruct that if the two women had any active role in the crime -including, of course, actually killing Van Zandt -their testimony required corroboration. There is no reasonable likelihood that any juror would have understood the challenged instruction in the manner Petitioner proposes, as directing a verdict against him on the issue of actual perpetration of the homicide. Accordingly, there was no error, and a fortiori, no constitutional error. 61
62 Petitioner argues that Barrett's and Eckstrom's plea agreements rendered his conviction unconstitutional. According to Petitioner, the agreements required Barrett and Eckstrom to give specific testimony implicating Petitioner, regardless of the truth or falsity of that testimony. 63 Barrett signed a plea agreement in January 1986. That agreement originally contained eight conditions: (1) that Barrett's representation that she did not personally injure Van Zandt was true; (2) that Barrett would be released on her own recognizance; (3) that Barrett would agree to waive time for the commencement of the . . . action pending against her in county court; (4) that Barrett would make herself available to receive subpoenas and to take a polygraph examination; (5) that Barrett would testif[y] completely and truthfully at all proceedings including preliminary examination and trial concerning all the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and death of Rick[e]y Van Zandt; (6) that Barrett would not exercise her right to remain silent during the proceedings; (7) that Barrett would take and pass a lie detector test; and (8) that Barrett would remain in California and inform the district attorney of her address. The agreement provided that if condition No. 1 were not met, or if Barrett violated any condition of the agreement, the agreement would be void. If Barrett complied with the terms of the agreement, the district attorney agreed that, after Petitioner's trial, all charges against Barrett would be dropped, with the exception of a single count of felony vehicle theft to which Barrett would plead guilty. 64 Eckstrom's plea agreement was similar but not identical. She received transactional immunity in exchange for her testimony. The other major difference between her agreement and Barrett's was that Eckstrom's agreement did not require her to take a polygraph test. 65 Before Barrett testified, the state amended her agreement to remove the condition that she not have personally inflicted any injuries on Van Zandt. That condition remained in Eckstrom's agreement. 66 After the prosecution and the defense both mentioned the agreements during opening argument, Petitioner sought to have the agreements admitted into evidence. The trial court admitted Eckstrom's agreement and read to the jury Barrett's agreement, which had been modified by the deletion of condition No. 1 (the requirement that Barrett not have injured Van Zandt) and condition No. 7 (the polygraph requirement). 2 At trial, defense counsel cross-examined Barrett and Eckstrom about the agreements and discussed the agreements in jury arguments during both the guilt and penalty phases. 67 Petitioner argued on direct appeal that the agreements were coercive and rendered Barrett's and Eckstrom's testimony unreliable and inadmissible. The California Supreme Court rejected that argument. Morris, 807 P.2d at 970. As to Barrett, the court concluded that the agreement did not taint her testimony because the no-injury condition had been removed from the agreement before trial. The only remaining condition that bore on her testimony was the condition that she testify completely and truthfully, which condition, the court concluded, was neither coercive nor improper. Id. 68 As to Eckstrom, the court declined to reach the question whether the no-injury provision in her agreement rendered the agreement impermissibly coercive. Instead, the court concluded that, even if her testimony was improperly admitted, Petitioner was not prejudiced by the error. In that regard, the court noted that Eckstrom's testimony was not central to the state's case against Petitioner. Instead, the court concluded: [Petitioner's] several detailed pretrial admissions of guilt were the cornerstone of the case against him. Id. The court reasoned: 69 Even if the accomplice testimony is set aside, it remains that [Petitioner] voluntarily and unequivocally confessed his guilt three times: once to a hitchhiker he picked up in Nebraska, once in a detailed statement to Nebraska law enforcement officers, and once in a letter to Avette Barrett. The remaining evidence corroborates the confessions . . . . [T]he evidence of [Petitioner's] guilt was overwhelming and any error in admitting the accomplice testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 70 Id. at 971 n.5. 71 Petitioner argued in his federal habeas petition that the plea agreements induced Barrett and Eckstrom to give false testimony. The magistrate judge rejected that argument, concluding (1) that the deletion of the no-injury clause from Barrett's agreement before trial removed any potentially coercive element from the agreement; and (2) that, although Eckstrom's plea agreement contained the no-injury clause and therefore violate[d] due process in the abstract,  the error in admitting her testimony was harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of Petitioner's guilt. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and rejected Petitioner's claim. 72 On appeal, Petitioner again asserts that the prosecutor bargained for specific testimony about the crime, rather than for the truth. He also argues that the removal of the no-injury condition from Barrett's agreement renders the agreement illusory, because Barrett received all the benefits but none of the burdens of the plea contract. 73 The general rule is that an accomplice who has pled guilty may testify against non-pleading defendants without raising due process concerns. United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1537 (9th Cir. 1988). Generally, such testimony will be admitted if the jury is informed of the exact nature of the agreement, defense counsel is permitted to cross-examine the accomplice about the agreement, and the jury is instructed to weigh the accomplice's testimony with care. Id. Those conditions were satisfied here. In addition, a plea agreement may require an accomplice to testify fully and truthfully without violating the Due Process Clause. Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065, 1078 (9th Cir. 1997). 74 Here, both plea agreements required the accomplices to testify truthfully. But, even assuming that it was error to admit their testimony, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner asserts that his trial boiled down to a swearing contest, with Barrett and Eckstrom blaming Petitioner for the murder, and Petitioner blaming Barrett and Eckstrom. That view of the trial ignores the most damning evidence of Petitioner's guilt: his own admissions. For example, Petitioner told hitchhiker Logan that he had killed Van Zandt in order to steal his van and that he had really rocked and rolled him. Next, Petitioner confessed to police officers that he had hit Van Zandt on the head between 12 and 14 times with a rock that was the size of a softball, might have talked beforehand about killing him so as to steal the van, and had told Barrett and Eckstrom to leave while he finished killing Van Zandt with a stick. Not long after that, Petitioner wrote a letter to Barrett, which proclaimed: I've killed once for you, and if I have to I'll do it again!!! And you know that I can, and I don't need a rock to do it either. Then Petitioner told two fellow inmates that he had hit a man's skull with a rock 13 times. 75 Even if Barrett and Eckstrom had never testified, the jury would have been left to consider those admissions -and the corroborating physical evidence, such as Petitioner's bloodspattered clothing -in the light of Petitioner's proffered explanation that he had lied about committing the crime to protect Barrett. That explanation is particularly specious when applied to the statements that Petitioner made to Barrett herself. As the California Supreme Court majority noted, Petitioner's own admissions were the cornerstone  of the state's case and constitute unusually strong evidence of guilt. Morris, 807 P.2d at 970. 76 In sum, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim. Any error was harmless.