Opinion ID: 3158704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Individual Immunity Under State Law

Text: 11 Case: 14-15319 Date Filed: 11/30/2015 Page: 12 of 16 Turning to Plaintiff’s state law claims—and the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on those claims—our jurisdiction is limited to appeals from “final decisions” of the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Ordinarily, a district court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment does not qualify as a final decision. See Schmelz v. Monroe Cnty., 954 F.2d 1540, 1542 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Generally, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable final order.”). However, the courts have recognized a “small class of interlocutory orders, referred to as ‘collateral orders,’ which are offshoots of the principal litigation, and which are immediately appealable without regard to the posture of the underlying case.” Id. (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (citation and quotation marks omitted)). An order denying summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity falls into this category. Id. at 1543 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985)). As the Supreme Court has explained, qualified immunity protects public officials from the burden of litigation rather than just liability. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. This protection is “irretrievably lost” when a district court denies qualified immunity, justifying an immediate appeal prior to the entry of a final judgment. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2019. We have, in several instances, extended the above principle to permit the immediate appeal of an order denying summary judgment on the ground of official 12 Case: 14-15319 Date Filed: 11/30/2015 Page: 13 of 16 immunity under state law. See Griesel v. Hamlin, 963 F.2d 338, 341 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding jurisdiction to review an order denying a motion for summary judgment based on sovereign immunity under Georgia law). The critical inquiry in determining the appealability of such an order is whether the state law confers “immunity from suit rather than simply a defense to substantive liability.” Id. at 340. Assuming the former, we have held that an order denying official immunity under state law is immediately appealable. Id. at 341. See also Sheth v. Webster, 145 F.3d 1231, 1238 (11th Cir. 1998) (exercising appellate jurisdiction over an order denying “discretionary function” immunity under Alabama law). We have not yet considered whether an order denying immunity under Florida Statute § 768.28(9)(a) is immediately appealable, but based on the language of the statute and the case law interpreting it, we conclude that it is.4 Section 768.28(9)(a) states that: No officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any of its subdivisions shall be held personally liable in tort or named as a party defendant in any action for any injury or damage suffered as a result of any act, event, or omission of action in the scope of her or his employment or function, unless such officer, employee, or agent acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. 4 In Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1293 (11th Cir. 1999), we held that the denial of sovereign immunity under Florida law was not immediately appealable, because “Florida sovereign immunity is immunity only from liability or damages but not from suit itself.” Jones did not consider the immunity granted by § 768.28(9)(a), and thus does not govern our decision here. 13 Case: 14-15319 Date Filed: 11/30/2015 Page: 14 of 16 Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) (emphasis added). The Florida Supreme Court recently confirmed that § 768.28(9)(a), as suggested by its plain language, provides immunity from suit rather than simply liability. See Keck v. Eminisor, 104 So. 3d 359, 366 (Fla. 2012) (“if a defendant who is entitled to the immunity granted in § 768.28(9)(a) is erroneously named as a party defendant and is required to stand trial, that individual has effectively lost the right bestowed by statute to be protected from even being named as a defendant”). Thus, under the reasoning of Griesel and Sheth, we will assume that we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s order denying immunity under § 768.28(9)(a) for the state law claims.
As quoted above, § 768.28(9)(a) protects an officer from personal liability for acts within the scope of his employment, unless the officer “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). In determining whether an officer is entitled to summary judgment as a result of the immunity provided by § 768.28(9)(a), the relevant inquiry is “whether a reasonable trier of fact could possibly conclude that the [officer’s] conduct was willful and wanton, or would otherwise fall within the exceptions to the statute.” Furtado v. Yun Chung Law, 51 So. 3d 1269, 1277 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citation and quotation marks 14 Case: 14-15319 Date Filed: 11/30/2015 Page: 15 of 16 omitted). See also Thompson v. Douds, 852 So. 2d 299, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“Because the record shows that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the officers acted with wanton and willful disregard of [the arrestee’s] rights and safety, the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the basis of statutory immunity was improper.”). There is sufficient evidence in this case to raise a question of fact as to whether Defendant acted willfully or with malice. Following Plaintiff’s arrest, Defendant completed an offense report indicating that Plaintiff had committed disorderly conduct by violently threatening Defendant as he tried to deescalate the disturbance at the Claridy residence, and that Plaintiff had then committed battery on a law enforcement officer by pushing Defendant with both of his hands. Plaintiff contends that Defendant fabricated critical parts of the report, most importantly the allegation that Plaintiff had threatened and pushed Defendant. His contention is supported by testimony in the record. The evidence suggests that the State Attorney relied on Defendant’s report in deciding to prosecute Plaintiff, and in defining the charges against him. Assuming the report was fabricated, a jury might reasonably find that Defendant acted willfully or with malice. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. Valladares, 141 So. 3d 714, 718 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (noting that a person who reports a crime acts maliciously when he “knows the report is false or recklessly disregards whether the report is 15 Case: 14-15319 Date Filed: 11/30/2015 Page: 16 of 16 false”); Lloyd v. Hines, 474 So. 2d 376, 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (suggesting that an officer’s use of fraud or corrupt means to obtain a warrant gives rise to individual liability under § 768.28(9)(a)). Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on the state law claims based on immunity provided by § 768.28(9)(a).