Opinion ID: 3155903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Eligibility for Sentence Reduction

Text: The district court did not explain the reason for its denial of Vaughn's motion. It is unclear whether the district court found that Vaughn was ineligible for a sentence reduction or whether it thought he was eligible but exercised its discretionary power under § 3582(c)(2) to deny the reduction. We believe from the circumstances that the denial was based on ineligibility.2 Because we conclude that Vaughn was ineligible for the sentence reduction, we affirm the result. We resolve the problem on the plain language of the relevant statutes and guideline provisions. Vaughn is ineligible for relief under Amendment 782 because he has already served the entirety of his otherwise eligible sentence. Because the applicable policy statement provides that [i]n no event may the reduced term of imprisonment be less than the term of imprisonment the defendant has already served, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(C), no reduction is available to him. The sentence he is currently serving is a separate sentence for his second crime that is not eligible for a reduction under Amendment 782. Vaughn argues that he is nonetheless eligible for a sentence reduction because he is serving an aggregate sentence of 2 We encourage the district courts to give some explanation for such orders, so as to avoid questions about the grounds on which they are based. - 6 - 288 months that should be considered a single, undivided whole. He relies principally on 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c), which provides that [m]ultiple terms of imprisonment ordered to run consecutively or concurrently shall be treated for administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment. He also points to the probation officer's statement at his 2013 sentencing hearing that BOP will aggregate the entire sentence. Section 3584(c) does not support Vaughn's position because it specifies that aggregation is for administrative purposes, and the issue at hand is judicial, not administrative. The BOP is responsible for administration of sentences. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992) (After a district court sentences a federal offender, the Attorney General, through the BOP, has the responsibility for administering the sentence. (emphasis added)). A sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2), on the other hand, involves discretionary decision-making by the district court and cannot be described as administrative. Applying § 3584(c) to this situation would essentially rewrite the statute to extend aggregation to all purposes. Vaughn also relies on case law from the Seventh Circuit and various district courts that have, in limited circumstances, aggregated consecutive sentences for the purpose of a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction. See United States v. Clarke, 499 F. App'x 579, 582 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Kaman, No. 3:09-CR-141, - 7 - 2015 WL 2226213, at  (E.D. Tenn. May 12, 2015); United States v. Brown, No. 2:04-cr-00088, 2013 WL 1819795, at –6 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2013); United States v. Wilkerson, No. 00-cr-10426, 2010 WL 5437225, at –3 (D. Mass. Dec. 23, 2010); United States v. Martin, 602 F. Supp. 2d 611, 614–15 (E.D. Pa. 2009); United States v. Bolin, No. 2:02-cr-176-1, 2008 WL 928397, at –3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 2008). But see United States v. Yarber, No. 00-CR-20031, 2008 WL 695362, at –4 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2008). To the extent that those cases relied on § 3584(c)'s direction to the BOP to aggregate consecutive sentences for administrative purposes, their reasoning is unpersuasive as to our problem, for the reason stated above. Furthermore, those cases are distinguishable on the basis that each of them concerned consecutive sentences that were imposed at the same time by the same judge. Even supposing that simultaneously imposed consecutive sentences could be aggregated for the purpose of a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction -- an issue that we do not decide here -- this case is different because Vaughn's sentences were imposed separately. Simultaneously imposed consecutive sentences often do not make clear in what order the sentences should be served, so fairness concerns may be raised by a denial of a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction on the basis that the only eligible part of the total time of imprisonment has already been served. See Brown, 2013 WL 1819795, at  (expressing concern that it was impossible to discern the order of the - 8 - sentences); cf. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 386 (1989) (There is no indication that the order of the sentences was of the slightest importance to the sentencing judge, and there is no reason constitutional adjudication should turn on such fortuities.). There is no such fairness concern when, as here, a defendant commits a crime while incarcerated and receives an additional consecutive sentence while he is already serving the first sentence. In fact, other courts that have considered a sentence reduction for the first of two separately imposed consecutive sentences have rejected Vaughn's argument. See United States v. Parker, 472 F. App'x 415, 417 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Gamble, 572 F.3d 472, 473–75 (8th Cir. 2009). Vaughn also makes an unpersuasive textual argument. Relying on the district court's reasoning in Bolin, Vaughn begins with the premise that a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction when he is serving a term of imprisonment, and the guideline range applicable to that defendant has subsequently been lowered. Bolin, 2008 WL 928397, at  (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1)). Vaughn argues that § 1B1.10 refers simply to 'a' term of imprisonment, not to any specific portion of the consecutive or continuous term of imprisonment impacted by the amendment. Id. But that argument assumes its own conclusion. The fact that § 1B1.10 uses a singular a says nothing about - 9 - whether Vaughn is serving one single term of imprisonment or two separate back-to-back terms of imprisonment for purposes of § 3582. Finally, Vaughn analogizes to Supreme Court precedent in habeas cases concerned with the in custody requirement. In Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39 (1995), the Supreme Court held that a habeas petitioner remained in custody and could challenge a state conviction underlying the first of two consecutive sentences even after the technical expiration of the first sentence because the consecutive sentences compos[ed] a continuous stream. Id. at 41. The Court relied on its earlier decision in Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), which held that prisoners incarcerated under consecutive state court sentences could apply for federal habeas relief from sentences they had not yet begun to serve. Id. at 55. However, it is far from certain whether Garlotte applies to separately imposed consecutive sentences. The Court in Garlotte placed weight on the portion of the sentencing hearing in which the prosecutor expressed indifference about the order of the two consecutive sentences and the defense counsel did not argue the issue. 515 U.S. at 41–42. The Court expressed its concern that it was mere happenstance that the sentences were not in inverse order such that the petitioner would have been granted relief under Peyton. Id. at 44–45. It is not clear whether it was necessary to the Court's holding that the consecutive sentences - 10 - there were simultaneously imposed.3 Even if Garlotte does apply to separately imposed consecutive sentences, federal habeas is a unique context and the in custody requirement has traditionally received a liberal construction that may be fairly viewed as sui generis. See id. at 45 (recognizing that the Court has very liberally construed the 'in custody' requirement for purposes of federal habeas (quoting Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989) (per curiam))); see also Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 752 (1975) (recognizing special constitutional status resulting from unique interest in maintaining the availability of habeas). As such, we decline to rely on the habeas analogy.