Opinion ID: 2600188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶ 17] Lopez disputes that the State presented sufficient evidence on these elements of second degree murder: 1) that he killed purposely and maliciously and 2) that the single open hand slap caused Herman's death. The elements of second degree murder are: Whoever purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the second degree[.] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104 (LexisNexis 2003). [¶ 18] When used as an element of second degree murder, purposely means intentionally or deliberately. State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1138 (Wyo.1993). As so used in the second degree murder statute, `purposely' is a general-intent element that `describes the act to be committed and not an intention to produce a desired, specific result.'  Id. (quoting Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42, 54 (Wyo.1986)). Because second degree murder is a general-intent crime, the evidence to support a conviction for second degree murder must demonstrate the defendant acted with deliberation, but it does not require evidence that he deliberately killed. Keffer, 860 P.2d at 1138 (quoting Ramos v. State, 806 P.2d 822, 830 (Wyo.1991)). See also Young v. State, 849 P.2d 754, 761-62 (Wyo.1993). It follows that `purposely' distinguishes the act from one committed `carelessly, inadvertently, accidentally, negligently, heedlessly or thoughtlessly.' Keffer, 860 P.2d at 1138 (quoting Dean v. State, 668 P.2d 639, 642 (Wyo.1983) (quoting Matter of Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d 73, 76 (Wyo.1982))). [¶ 19] Second degree murder requires proof of express, implied, constructive or legal malice. Keffer, 860 P.2d at 1138-39. The State must prove circumstances from which legal malice might be justly inferred. Nunez v. State, 383 P.2d 726, 729 (Wyo.1963). This form of homicide is a killing that cannot be justified under the law of self-defense, and requires murderous mens rea. See Keats v. State, 2003 WY 19, ¶ 28, 64 P.3d 104, ¶ 28 (Wyo.2003) (maliciously gives a statute a mens rea element, without which it would reach innocent conduct). The required state of mind for a murder conviction is that degree of mental disturbance or aberration of the mind that is wicked, evil and of unlawful purpose, or of that willful disregard of the rights of others which is implied in the term malice. Keffer, 860 P.2d at 1139. Where malice is absent, the crime is manslaughter even if the act that caused the death was done purposely. Id. [¶ 20] The State contends that sufficient evidence was presented when witnesses testified that Lopez had intentionally struck Herman. This evidence satisfies the element of purposely; however, for the element of maliciously, we have only the State's bald assertion that Lopez acted with a wicked mind when he struck Lopez. In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, we look at all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Estrada-Sanchez, ¶ 6. Our review of the record confirms that Lopez struck Herman once in sudden anger. Lopez claims that his sudden anger was caused by his concern that his friend would be harmed by drinking whiskey. That irony aside, precedent dictates that the evidence of Lopez' actions and motivations must be reviewed to determine his state of mind. Eagan v. State, 58 Wyo. 167, 201-10, 128 P.2d 215, 227-30 (Wyo.1942). [¶ 21] In the past, we have upheld murder convictions where death was not caused by a weapon but only with fists. Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483, 495-96 (Wyo.1975); see also Coca v. State, 423 P.2d 382, 387-88 (Wyo.1967). Those cases are distinguishable from this case because, in those cases, numerous vicious blows by a fist were inflicted. Id. Here, we have one open hand slap, not a blow or blows by a fist. In Wharton's Criminal Law, the statement is made that malice is not to be inferred by a blow with the hand. 2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 141, at 252, 255 (15th ed.1994). LaFave makes the general statement that it would be ridiculous to find murder because of a slap. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 14.2(b), at 432 (2d ed.2003). In an overview of the general state of law, it has been said: Since death is not the natural or probable result of a blow with the hand, it seems that no intent to kill will, under ordinary circumstances, be inferred, although death results from an assault thus committed. M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Inference of Malice or Intent to Kill Where Killing is by Blow Without Weapon, 22 A.L.R.2d 854, at 857 (1952). Death caused by the repeated use of fists or feet or boots does present evidence of malice. [I]n appropriate cases, generally involving big men attacking small, frail men or women or children, and generally involving the repeated use of hands and feet, an inference of an intent to kill may properly be drawn. LaFave, supra, § 14.2(b), at 432 (emphasis added). [¶ 22] Both Colorado and Utah have recognized that there is a line of authority that since death is not the natural or probable result of a blow with the hand, no malice will ordinarily be inferred although death results from the assault. State v. Wardle, 564 P.2d 764, 765-66 (Utah 1977); Pine v. People, 168 Colo. 290, 455 P.2d 868, 869 (1969). These courts reason that the malice necessary to constitute a murder is presumed where the act is deliberate and is likely to be attended with dangerous or fatal consequences. Death or great bodily harm must be the reasonable or probable consequence of the act to constitute murder. The striking of a blow with the fist on the side of the face or head is not likely to be attended with dangerous or fatal consequences, and no inference of malice is warranted by such proof. Id. Both states, however, have recognized that an assault with hands or feet may support a conviction for second degree murder where the circumstances show that death resulted from a violent or brutal beating or blows inflicted to victims susceptible because of age or known infirmity. Id. Based on this precedent concerning fists, we believe it reasonable to conclude that these courts would not permit an inference of malice because a slap was delivered by an open hand. [¶ 23] We observe then that, generally, evidence that death caused by an open hand slap without more is insufficient evidence of malice and, therefore, is not murder. We must then review the record to see what other evidence exists from which we might infer malice. We first note that the record does not show any evidence that Lopez knew that Herman's condition was so frail that Lopez could cause Herman to die with just one slap to his head. The evidence shows that, in addition to the one slap, Lopez shoved Herman down onto a couch. We do not see where a harmless shove could reasonably be seen as the equivalent of repeated blows. The evidence also shows that Lopez became irrationally angry upon seeing that Herman was drinking; however, we have previously held that sudden anger that arises upon provocation is the provocation or lack of malice which makes a homicide manslaughter instead of murder. Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 919 (Wyo.1984). [¶ 24] Having reviewed the evidence, we see that Lopez delivered one open hand slap and a man later died. Lopez acted purposely; however, the only evidence of malice is the single open hand slap, and we agree with long standing precedent that, without more, malice cannot be inferred from this minimal act. We hold that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law that Lopez acted maliciously. Insufficient evidence to support an element of the charged offense amounts to a judgment of acquittal on that charge, and retrial is barred. Sarr v. State, 2004 WY 20, ¶ 7, 85 P.3d 439. [¶ 25] In Eagan v. State, 58 Wyo. 167, 128 P.2d 215 (Wyo.1942), Justice Blume examined evidence of malice and made a similar conclusion that the evidence was lacking. In the conclusion, he expressed well the sentiments we feel at coming to our conclusion, and we believe it bears repeating: After a most painstaking examination of the record before us, and consideration of the questions involved herein, we have, regrettable as the terrible tragedy was, and hesitant as we are to interfere with the verdict of the jury, come to the conclusion under the rules of law heretofore mentioned and the facts, that the defendant was clearly guilty of criminal carelessness, or, at least, that there was ample evidence for the jury to so find. There is, however, such serious doubt as to the defendant's guilt of a greater crime, that the jury should have resolved that doubt in his favor; that, accordingly, the verdict of the jury should be set aside as to murder in the second degree[.] Id., 58 Wyo. at 210, 128 P.2d at 230. [¶ 26] We, too, conclude that Lopez' second degree murder conviction must be set aside. In Eagan, the court sustained as to manslaughter, which was included in the verdict form, and ordered that the trial court re-sentence defendant for manslaughter. Lopez' verdict form also included voluntary manslaughter; however, we must examine whether the State proved that the slap caused Herman's death, and we must also examine the various ineffectiveness of counsel issues submitted. We now address those matters.