Opinion ID: 449639
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the standard for our review of the district court's decision

Text: 9 TCI's first contention on appeal is that reversal is required because the District Court erroneously considered materials outside the pleadings in considering the motion to dismiss. The Air Force does not disagree with the proposition that the District Court had such external materials before it at the time it was contemplating the motion to dismiss; the Air Force explains this phenomenon by noting that TCI's request for a preliminary injunction was before the court at the same time and that the Air Force presented extra-pleading materials in opposing that motion. See brief for appellees at 5 n. 3. The Air Force apparently contends, however, that the District Court did in fact, in its review of the motion to dismiss, take all the facts alleged in TCI's complaint as true. See id. at 5. Based on this interpretation of the District Court's decision, the Air Force disagrees with TCI's contention that reversal is mandated. The Air Force also contends in the alternative that if the District Court did consider materials outside of TCI's complaint, the District Court's decision should be affirmed as a summary judgment. See id. at 5 n. 3. 10 We conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, the dismissal cannot properly be treated as a summary judgment, even if materials outside of TCI's complaint were considered by the District Court. We also conclude, however, that although consideration of external materials is improper under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, reversal based on such consideration alone would serve no useful purpose. Where such consideration has occurred, rather, normal 12(b)(6) review will be in order. 11
12 The normal course of action when materials outside the complaint are considered is for a nominal motion to dismiss to be treated as a motion for summary judgment. As Rule 12(b) states, If, on a [Rule 12(b)(6) motion], matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56. See also Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 92 S.Ct. 1232, 31 L.Ed.2d 569 (1972) (per curiam ); Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Md., 595 F.2d 711, 719 n. 41 (D.C.Cir.1978); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Thomas, 521 F.2d 941, 949 (D.C.Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 910, 96 S.Ct. 1507, 47 L.Ed.2d 761 (1976). 13 There are constraints on a court's ability to thus transform a motion to dismiss, however. Specifically, Rule 12(b) provides further that, if a motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for summary judgment, all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all materials made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. See also Gordon v. Nat'l Youth Work Alliance, 675 F.2d 356, 360 (D.C.Cir.1982). Under Rule 56 such materials include affidavits and documentary evidence that would show that a genuine issue of material fact existed. Rule 56 contains a similar but more explicit constraint: The motion [for summary judgment] shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing [on the motion]. Rule 56(c). 14 Thus a reviewing court should not automatically treat a dismissal where external materials were not excluded as a summary judgment, although such treatment may be the most common result of such a situation. Rather, the reviewing court must assure itself that summary judgment treatment would be fair to both parties in that the procedural requirements of the applicable rules were observed. 15 Here, treatment of the dismissal as a summary judgment would not be appropriate. The motion was served on TCI on December 23, 1983, and argument was heard on December 27, 1983--a mere four days later. This scheduling complies with neither the explicit 10-day requirement of Rule 56(c) nor the reasonable-period-for-response requirement of Rule 12(b). (The four-day period, as TCI notes in its brief, spanned a weekend and included Christmas and Christmas Eve.) Consequently, the motion cannot properly be recast as a motion for summary judgment, and the District Court's decision must stand or fall as a pure Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. 16
17 As recently reaffirmed by this court, Dismissal for failure to state a claim for relief is proper only when 'it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' All factual doubts must be resolved and all inferences made in favor of the plaintiff[ ]. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1506 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc ) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (emphasis added by the Ramirez court; footnotes omitted)). Further, as implied by the summary judgment discussion above, a Rule 12(b)(6) disposition must be made on the face of the complaint alone. 18 Consideration of external materials, which would normally initiate conversion of the motion to one for summary judgment, cannot properly take place under a dismissal for failure to state a claim. This limitation cannot be avoided simply because the party against whom the dismissal was granted desired an expeditious disposition of a concurrent motion for a preliminary injunction. Such reasoning would allow circumvention of the Rule 12/Rule 56 constraints whenever a claim was joined with a request for preliminary relief. This is not a result allowable under the Federal Rules. 19 As noted above, TCI contends that any action by the District Court that was inconsistent with the Rule 12 requirements makes that court's dismissal automatically reversible. Thus TCI apparently would have us reverse and remand if the District Court failed to take the facts as alleged in TCI's complaint and considered materials outside of its pleading. We do not believe that this course would serve the interests of justice or of judicial economy. Although it is clearly improper for a District Court to fail to comply with the technical and substantive requirements of the applicable federal rules, we do not see what purpose would be served by remanding a case to the District Court for a purely legal determination that we are fully competent to make ourselves. We note that this is proper only where no factual determinations need be made, that is, where the question is entirely one of law. Such is the case with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Consequently, where we determine that the District Court has improperly failed to follow the strictures of Rule 12, we will determine whether the dismissal was appropriate in any case under Rule 12 as properly applied rather than remand for such a determination in the District Court. 20 In reality, therefore, our review in a case in which the District Court improperly considered materials outside of the complaint is similar to normal review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals: For this court to affirm such a dismissal, it must be self-evident from the face of the complaint, resolving all doubts and drawing all inferences in favor of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. Our review will differ only in that we must be especially careful to scrupulously avoid making factual assumptions which appear reasonable or even obvious from the record but which cannot properly be drawn from the plaintiff's complaint. With this in mind, we turn to the specific claims raised by TCI and dismissed by the District Court.