Opinion ID: 3039072
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Consideration of Reasonable Alternatives

Text: under NEPA Strategic planning and the Army’s metamorphosis are the Army’s business, not the courts’. What involves us, however, is NEPA’s requirement that the Army prepare an EIS to examine what effects any plans will have on the environment (the extreme example would be a plan for nuclear testing that would require extensive analysis). Here, the Army assumes that it has an obligation to comply with NEPA. That is not at issue. At issue is whether its compliance was adequate.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, commonly known as NEPA, “is our basic national charter for protection of the environment.” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2006). The regulations implementing NEPA have developed procedures to “insure that environmental information is available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made and 17466 ILIO‘ULAOKALANI COALITION v. RUMSFELD before actions are taken. The information must be of high quality. Accurate scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and public scrutiny are essential to implementing NEPA.” Id. § 1500.1(b). [2] Congress passed NEPA “to protect the environment by requiring that federal agencies carefully weigh environmental considerations and consider potential alternatives to the proposed action before the government launches any major federal action.” Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). “NEPA requires that a federal agency consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action . . . [and] inform the public that it has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process.” Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1300 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]o accomplish this, NEPA imposes procedural requirements designed to force agencies to take a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences.” Id. NEPA does not, however, mandate any substantive outcome. Lands Council, 395 F.3d at 1026. Under NEPA, all federal agencies, including the Army, must prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) for all “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). That EIS “shall provide full and fair discussion of significant environmental impacts and shall inform decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1.
We review de novo the district court’s summary judgment in appellees’ favor. Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 865 (9th Cir. 2004). In so doing, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellants and determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied ILIO‘ULAOKALANI COALITION v. RUMSFELD 17467 the substantive law. Envtl. Coal. of Ojai, 72 F.3d at 1414. An agency decision may be set aside if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). In reviewing the sufficiency of an EIS, we employ “a rule of reason” standard of review “that inquires whether an EIS contains a reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences.” Cal. v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This “rule of reason” standard is not materially different from arbitrary and capricious review. Lands Council, 395 F.3d at 1026 n.5. “We make a pragmatic judgment whether the [Environmental Impact Statement’s] form, content and preparation foster both informed decisionmaking and informed public participation.” City of CarmelBy-The-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Block, 690 F.2d at 761) (internal quotation marks omitted). To discharge our duty, we must be satisfied that the agency has taken a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of a decision. Id. at 1151.
The Army adopted a “tiered” approach to its compliance with NEPA, preparing a programmatic EIS followed by a sitespecific EIS. NEPA regulations encourage agencies to “tier” their environmental impact statements in some situations. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20. “Tiering” refers to the coverage of general matters in broader environmental impact statements (such as national program or policy statements) with subsequent narrower statements or environmental analyses (such as regional or basinwide program statements or ultimately site-specific statements) incorporating by reference the general discussions and concentrat17468 ILIO‘ULAOKALANI COALITION v. RUMSFELD ing solely on the issues specific to statement subsequently prepared. Id. § 1508.28. Tiering is “encouraged . . . to eliminate repetitive discussions of the same issues and to focus on the actual issues ripe for decision at each level of environmental review.” Id. § 1502.20. Here, where the agency is moving from “a program, plan, or policy environmental impact statement to . . . a site-specific statement or analysis,” id. § 1508.28(a), tiering is appropriate. In the context of national forest management, we defined the programmatic stage as the level “at which the [agency] develops alternative management scenarios responsive to public concerns, analyzes the costs, benefits and consequences of each alternative in an environmental impact statement (“EIS”), and adopts an amendable forest plan to guide management of multiple use resources.” Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 192 F.3d 922, 923 n.2 (9th Cir. 1999). Following the programmatic stage is the “implementation stage during which individual site specific projects, consistent with the forest plan, are proposed and assessed.” Id. A programmatic EIS must provide “sufficient detail to foster informed decision-making,” but an agency need not fully evaluate sitespecific impacts “until a critical decision has been made to act on site development.” Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Norton, 348 F.3d 789, 800 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Lujan, 961 F.2d 886, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation marks omitted)). The Army’s PEIS reached a deeper level of specificity than is usual in that it named several specific units that will transform in the Interim Phase and indicated that such transformation will take place “on-site.” Although the PEIS names the 2nd Brigade in Hawaii as one of these units set for transformation on-site, it does not undertake any analysis of the enviILIO‘ULAOKALANI COALITION v. RUMSFELD 17469 ronmental impacts associated with that transformation. Following its PEIS, which designated the 2nd Brigade in Hawaii as one the units to be transformed and committed to on-site transformation, the Army undertook a SEIS for the Hawaii transformation of that unit. Based on the PEIS’s determination that transformation of the 2nd Brigade was to take place in Hawaii on Oahu, the SEIS considered three alternatives, all of which involved transformation of the 2nd Brigade in Hawaii on Oahu — the proposed action, a reduced-landacquisition alternative, and a no-action alternative. Appellants argue that the Army’s tiered NEPA analysis failed to consider reasonable alternatives, particularly the transformation of the 2nd Brigade outside of Hawaii.
[3] An EIS must describe and analyze alternatives to the proposed action. Indeed, the alternatives analysis section is the heart of the environmental impact statement. The agency must look at every reasonable alternative within the range dictated by the nature and scope of the proposal. The existence of reasonable but unexamined alternatives renders an EIS inadequate. Friends of Southeast’s Future v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (stating that consideration of alternatives is the “heart of the environmental impact statement.”); Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional Forrester, 833 F.2d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that “an environmental impact statement must consider every reasonable alternative” and that “the range of alternatives must be sufficient to permit a reasoned choice.”), rev’d on other grounds, 490 U.S. 332 (1989), aff’d on remand, 879 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1989). 17470 ILIO‘ULAOKALANI COALITION v. RUMSFELD
[4] We first consider whether the Army should have undertaken analysis of the impacts of transforming the 2nd Brigade in Hawaii in the PEIS. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982), sets the foundation for our review of the PEIS’s consideration of alternatives. It guides the determination of when site-specific analysis must occur where there is a programmatic EIS: The detail that NEPA requires in an EIS depends upon the nature and scope of the proposed action. The standards normally applied to assess an EIS require further refinement when a largely programmatic EIS is reviewed. The critical inquiry in considering the adequacy of an EIS prepared for a large scale, multi-step project is not whether the project’s site-specific impact should be evaluated in detail, but when such detailed evaluation should occur. NEPA requires that the evaluation of a project’s environmental consequences take place at an early stage in the project’s planning process. This requirement is tempered, though, by the statutory command that we focus upon a proposal’s parameters as the agency defines them. The requirement is further tempered by the preference to defer detailed analysis until a concrete development proposal crystallizes the dimensions of a project’s probable environmental consequences. When a programmatic EIS has already been prepared, we have held that site- specific impacts need not be fully evaluated until a “critical decision” has been made to act on site development. This threshold is reached when, as a practical matter, the agency proposes to make an “irreversible and irretrievable commitment of the availability of resources” to a project at a particular site. Id. at 761 (internal citations omitted). ILIO‘ULAOKALANI COALITION v. RUMSFELD 17471 [5] The agency’s challenge and ours is to find the right balance between the efficiency benefits of tiering, described in 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20, deference to the agency’s definition of the purpose and need of the proposed action, and the recognition that the PEIS constrains future decision-making and must therefore analyze alternatives in sufficient detail to prevent foreclosure of options with insufficient consideration. Id. at 762-63. Appellants argue that the PEIS made the decision to commit resources to a particular site — the transformation of the 2nd Brigade in Hawaii. The Army counters that it did not commit to transform the 2nd Brigade until the issuance of the SEIS ROD, and that even though the PEIS identified the 2nd Brigade as targeted for transformation during the Interim Phase, the Army reserved judgment until completion of the SEIS. Fed. Appellees’ Resp. Br. at 32. The comments of the Army’s own experts indicate otherwise. [6] The minutes of a June 2002 post-PEIS, pre-SEIS Army planning meeting indicate that the Army’s own experts recognized that the decision to commit resources to transformation of the 2nd Brigade in place was made during the PEIS and therefore that site-specific analysis should have been undertaken in the PEIS. The conclusions articulated in the PEIS ROD as to in-place transformation of the 2nd Brigade had little support in the document and no analysis of alternative sites, requiring the SEIS to provide analysis supporting a decision made in the PEIS. Paul Martin, of the U.S. Army Environmental Center, commented on the draft PEIS: Interim Force considerations are ripe for reasonably detailed analysis. . . . Interim Force development is an imminent proposal requiring a near term decision and commitment of Army resources that will have on the ground impacts within the next five to eight years. . . . Paragraph screams that the Army plans to make a Major [sic] resource allocation decision on 17472 ILIO‘ULAOKALANI COALITION v. RUMSFELD the Interim Force without consideration of alternatives. Comments on Draft PEIS at 4, AR 0004465. In addition, the SEIS explicitly ruled out consideration of alternatives that stationed the 2nd Brigade outside of Hawaii on the grounds that this would be inconsistent with the PEIS. Once the PEIS was issued, there was no longer a question of whether the 2nd Brigade would transform in Hawaii, only a matter of how. Appellees also argue that all Army units are scheduled to transform under the thirty-year plan and therefore that the 2nd Brigade is no different from any other Brigade in terms of the Army’s decision to transform in-place. Fed. Appellees’ Resp. Br. at 35. The problem with this argument is that the 2nd Brigade is scheduled to transform much sooner than most other Brigades — the site-specific plans for the 2nd Brigade are more crystallized than those for the brigades that will not undergo transformation until the Final Phase. The Army’s own experts realized that the Army made sitespecific decisions in the PEIS without analysis of their impacts or consideration of reasonable alternatives, as required by NEPA. Despite this, the Army argues that it was appropriate to defer analysis until the SEIS, using the principles of “tiering” as its crutch. The Army settled on transformation of the 2nd Brigade in Hawaii in the PEIS; however, it reached this decision with no analysis of the environmental impacts or of reasonable alternatives to such a transformation. While there is nothing per se improper about reaching these decisions at the programmatic stage, it is improper to do so without undertaking the analysis required by NEPA when those decisions are made.
Without having considered alternatives to transformation of the 2nd Brigade in Hawaii in the PEIS, the Army had an obliILIO‘ULAOKALANI COALITION v. RUMSFELD 17473 gation to consider such alternatives in the SEIS. The Army argues that the scope of reasonable alternatives to be considered in the SEIS was bound or limited by the PEIS’s decision to transform in Hawaii as articulated in the SEIS purpose and need statement. The way the Army would have it, it was neither required to examine alternatives to transformation in Hawaii in the PEIS (because the site-specific threshold had not yet been crossed) nor in the SEIS (because on-site transformation of the 2nd Brigade was mandated by the PEIS as articulated in the SEIS purpose and need statement). The Army can’t have it both ways. Either it needed to explain in the PEIS its decision to transform the 2nd Brigade in Hawaii and consider reasonable alternatives in the PEIS or it needed to explain that decision in the SEIS, but the Army cannot simultaneously argue that the decision had been made in the PEIS and that it had not. Somewhere, the Army must undertake site-specific analysis, including consideration of reasonable alternatives.
[7] The scope of reasonable alternatives that an agency must consider is shaped by the purpose and need statement articulated by that agency. The Army must consider all reasonable alternatives within the purpose and need it has defined. See Nw. Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides (NCAP) v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 592 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[I]t is the scope of the program that influences any determination of what alternatives are viable and reasonable.”). Appellants ask us to find that the Army defined the purpose and need statement in the SEIS too narrowly.5 We do not see that as the 5 Appellants rely on the principle that while an agency has the discretion to define the purpose and need of a project, it may not “define its objectives in unreasonably narrow terms.” City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 123 F.3d at 1155. Appellants note internal Army commentary before the SEIS was undertaken in support of their argument that the Army defined its objec17474 ILIO‘ULAOKALANI COALITION v. RUMSFELD problem. What is missing is the consideration of alternate ways to accomplish its stated mission. The Army states its mission as follows: “to enable the Army to achieve the force characteristics articulated in the Army Vision in the most timely and efficient manner possible and without compromising readiness and responsiveness. . . . Transformation is needed to address the changing circumstances of the 21st Century.” Final PEIS at 1-2, AR 0003865. It then leaps to the assumption that transformation in Hawaii or no action are the only alternatives. This is where the impermissible “narrowing” takes place. The Army violated NEPA by not considering alternatives that include transformation of the 2nd Brigade outside of Hawaii.6 tives too narrowly in the PEIS. “The PEIS leaves us short on alternatives. The only alternatives we have are no action versus action. The P&N statements are crafted so tightly that we may be restricting ourselves too much.” After Action Report at 5-6, AR 00088104-05. Paul Martin indicates that the framing of the transformation “has foreclosed any rational consideration of alternatives, . . . to meet the stated purpose and need.” Comments on Draft PEIS at 1, AR 0004478. Timothy Julius commented that the “EIS is woefully inadequate: The alternatives are meaningless. Where is the ‘analysis’ of installations as initiated in the NOI? . . . The decision provides no starting point or analysis that would be useful to installations. Based on this document, the Army is forcing the installations to individually justify transformation.” AR 0004485. In addition to describing how the Army’s framing provides no real alternatives for consideration, Julius’ comments also drive home the fact that the Army’s approach here was backwards: rather than making its site decisions with full information about the impacts of choosing those sites, the Army made its site decisions and asked the installations to justify those decisions in their site-specific EISs. These comments, as we see them, simply highlight the Army’s failure to consider reasonable alternatives in either the PEIS or the SEIS. 6 The Army argues that the PEIS limits its framing of the SEIS’s purpose and need to transforming the 2nd Brigade in Hawaii. This argument assumes that the Army made this very decision in the PEIS (i.e., transformation of the 2nd Brigade in Hawaii) in a manner consistent with its obligations under NEPA. We reject this assumption and find that the Army erred by making unsupported site-specific determinations. The Army’s reliance on “tiering” is unhelpful to its claims. ILIO‘ULAOKALANI COALITION v. RUMSFELD 17475 [8] The issue we consider is whether transformation of the 2nd Brigade outside of Hawaii is a reasonable alternative in the context of the Army’s purpose and need: “to enable the Army to achieve the force characteristics articulated in the Army Vision in the most timely and efficient manner possible and without compromising readiness and responsiveness.” Id. This purpose “is not, by its own terms, tied to a specific parcel of land,” Methow Valley, 833 F.2d at 815, indicating that transformation outside of Hawaii is a reasonable alternative. Our sister circuit has held that “[w]hen the proposed action [here the transformation of the 2nd Brigade] is an integral part of a coordinated plan to deal with a broad problem, the range of alternatives that must be evaluated is broadened.” City of Alexandria v. Slater, 198 F.3d 862, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Natural Res. Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1972)) (quotation marks omitted). Between the purpose articulated in the PEIS and that articulated in the SEIS, the Army made the decision to require transformation of the 2nd Brigade in Hawaii. This decision was never explained or justified and foreclosed alternatives that could have been consistent with the Army’s stated mission. Furthermore, the record is unambiguous — compelling our finding that transformation of the 2nd Brigade outside of Hawaii was a reasonable alternative that the Army was required to consider under NEPA. First, the Army’s own experts recognized that the failure to undertake this analysis in the PEIS created a problem under NEPA — an unsupported conclusion needing to be justified in the SEIS was a backdoor path avoiding analysis. Second, the Army had already started transformation of other west-coast brigades, including two in Ft. Lewis, Washington, an alternative location where transformation of the 2nd Brigade could happen at potentially lower cost to the environment, and another brigade, the 2nd Calvary from Louisiana, which was moved for its transformation. 17476 ILIO‘ULAOKALANI COALITION v. RUMSFELD a. Internal Acknowledgment of the Need to Consider Offisland Transformation The record is replete with expressions of concern that the Army never explained its decision to not consider alternatives involving transforming the 2nd Brigade outside of Hawaii. Army personnel and Hawaiians both sought an answer to the question, “Why Hawaii?” See After Action Report at 1, 3, AR 0088100, 0088102. This concern about incomplete information underpinning the decision to transform in Hawaii was raised within the Army during the PEIS process and in preparation for the SEIS, and by the public during scoping for the site-specific EIS. From the outset, Army staff expressed concern about the scope of the PEIS and its failure to explain siting decisions. See supra note 5 (reviewers noted in May 2001 that the framing of the transformation “foreclosed any rational consideration of alternatives, . . . to meet the stated purpose and need,” AR 0004478, the PEIS was “woefully inadequate,” “[t]he alternatives meaningless,” and “the Army is forcing the installations to individually justify transformation,” AR 0004485.). The PEIS never responded to these concerns. Following the completion of the PEIS and in preparation for the SEIS, Army staff comments revealed that “[t]he PEIS leaves us short on alternatives. The only alternatives we have are no action versus action. The P&N statements are crafted so tightly that we may be restricting ourselves too much.” After Action Report at 5-6, AR 0088104-05. The minutes of that meeting read: A major issue that surfaced during group discussion was the fact that the PEIS does not contain specific language about why each of the five sites was selected. It would have been helpful to have it there so that each site could refer to the PEIS when que- ried about reasons for selection. . . . the main issue ILIO‘ULAOKALANI COALITION v. RUMSFELD 17477 now is that the ROD has no supporting analysis in the PEIS. Id. at 3, AR 0088102. Lieutenant Colonel Kozlowski noted that it should be up to the Major Army Commands to explain the siting decisions in their specific EISs — the Headquarters of the Department of the Army (“HQDA”) should have done that. He thought that these questions should be answered by Headquarters outside of the PEIS in a supplemental EIS. Id. In a question and answer session at this meeting, in response to a question asking whether it would be better for Army Headquarters to develop a unified purpose and need statement for each location chosen to transform, Major Army Command attorneys responded: The PEIS is what it is, as is the ROD. HQDA can’t effectively supplement those documents, and that will be a potential weakness. However, it does give installations the right to look at different training site alternatives. LTC Kozlowski will take the issue to the G-3, who will probably put together a task force to correct the mistake of not addressing location selections in the PEIS. Id. at 5, AR 0088104 (emphasis added). In response to a question about whether it is “reasonable for the public to ask why on the siting issue,” the same attorneys answered: Yes; the ROD makes a decision that is not based on any analysis. Installations need a position paper on why the sites were picked, so that we have an admin- istrative record of the decision that can be referenced. . . . either HQDA has to revise the ROD to 17478 ILIO‘ULAOKALANI COALITION v. RUMSFELD address the issue or installations will have to look at stationing alternatives. . . . The only alternatives are to have HQDA bear the burden or have the installa- tions bear it. Installations will probably have to drive on. Id. at 6, AR 0088105. b. The Army’s Rationale for Not Analyzing Alternatives The Army now argues that the record demonstrates that transformation of the 2nd Brigade in Hawaii is of strategic importance, that transformation in Hawaii is critical for the training of soldiers in “conditions that would arise in expected combat situations,” and therefore that transforming outside of Hawaii is not a reasonable alternative. Final SEIS at 1-4, AR 0051275. This argument is undermined by the record. The SEIS purpose and need statement offers three factors to explain why the 2nd Brigade was chosen to transform into a Stryker Brigade: (1) location of the 2nd Brigade within the strategically important Pacific Rim; (2) the terrain and conditions in Hawaii which most closely approximate those likely to be found in the Pacific Rim; (3) proximity to major airbases and seaports makes deployment easier. Unfortunately for the Army, however, the SEIS does not support its own purpose and need statement, or a finding that transformation of the 2nd Brigade in Hawaii is the only reasonable alternative. This finding is undermined by evidence developed in the SEIS. (1) Location in the Pacific Rim and Proximity to Airbases and Seaports [9] As the SEIS’s Statement of Need points out, other locations in the United States with proximity to the Pacific Rim have been designated for early transformation: “There are two other SBCTs on the Pacific coast of the continental United States (Alaska and Washington) to support deployment to the ILIO‘ULAOKALANI COALITION v. RUMSFELD 17479 critically important Pacific Rim . . . .” Final SEIS at 1-5, AR 0051576. Nothing in the record distinguishes Hawaii from Alaska or Washington. Transformation of brigades at Fort Lewis, Washington was part of the Initial Phase of Army Transformation. The Army had already started transformation of these other west-coast brigades, creating alternative locations where transformation of the 2nd Brigade could happen at potentially less detriment to the environment. Furthermore, it is clear that the Army knew that it had the authority to consider moving the 2nd Brigade to Washington or Alaska for transformation. See Dep’t of the Army, Strategic Envtl. Assessment for Army Transformation, Initial Report (Nov. 17, 2000), at 30, AR 0005547 (listing “[r]e-stationing of brigades to take advantage of training assets and opportunities” as a “type[ ] of proposal[ ] that must be considered” in NEPA analysis.). For example, the Army moved another brigade, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment from Louisiana to Fort Lewis for its transformation into a Stryker Brigade Combat Team. See Press Release, Joint Readiness Training Center and Fort Polk Public Affairs Office, Fort Polk to Receive New Infantry Brigade Combat Team (July 23, 2004), AR 0009561. Thus, the Army’s argument that Hawaii is close to the Pacific Rim and has access to seaports and airbases does not answer the question, “Why Hawaii?” (2) The Importance of Hawaii’s Terrain and Conditions The Army also argues that Hawaii’s unique terrain and conditions mandate transformation in Hawaii. At oral argument and in subsequent supplemental briefing, Appellees focused our attention on their argument that Hawaii’s terrain is unique in the United States and most closely approximates tropical terrain in the Pacific Rim and elsewhere in the world. The Army cites a 1997 study on Installation Training Capacity by Army Headquarters, which notes that “[t]raining areas on Oahu, Hawaii are unique in the Army’s training land 17480 ILIO‘ULAOKALANI COALITION v. RUMSFELD inventory. They are the only mountainous jungle setting.” HQDA, Training Directorate, Office of the Dep. Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Installation Training Capacity (ITC) Phase 1 Study Report (Dec. 31, 1997), at 11, AR 0002886. These documents refer to the Kawailoa Training Area (“KLOA”) on Oahu. KLOA consists of 23,348 acres on the western slope of the Ko’olau Mountain Range, of which 5,310 acres are suitable for maneuver training activities. Final SEIS at 7-14, 7-15, AR 0051956-57. “KLOA can support small infantry unit maneuvers and helicopter. The remaining land is considered unsuitable for maneuver training, but can support mountain and jungle warfare training. In these areas, troop deployment is limited to single file, small unit movement on ridgelines.” Id. at 7-15, AR 00551957. Based on this statement in the SEIS, Appellee argues that the Army’s assertion that Hawaii offers unique training areas for the 2nd Brigade once it has been transformed into a Stryker Brigade is “fully consistent with the actual training terrain available.” [10] While the Army may be correct that KLOA provides unique and important mountainous jungle terrain for a light infantry unit, the Army has failed to account for the fact that no Stryker training is proposed for KLOA. In fact, KLOA cannot support Stryker vehicles and is unsuitable for Stryker Brigade training. Stryker vehicles are eight-wheeled, 23-foot long, 9-foot wide, 20-ton combat vehicles. Final SEIS at 2-33, AR 0051318. While the actual vehicle employed by the SBCT “may vary from the current Stryker vehicles as the system is developed,” it “overall will have the same characteristics as the current Stryker.” Id. “Because of the limitations of the Stryker, most mounted movement takes places on roads or unrestricted terrain.” Id. at 2-40, AR 0051325. The SEIS indicates that not a single acre of KLOA is maneuver-acreage for mounted Stryker training. Stryker vehicles would only be appropriate in KLOA along Drum Road in transit to other locations. Id. at 2-37, AR 0051322. Stryker training focuses ILIO‘ULAOKALANI COALITION v. RUMSFELD 17481 on “[u]rban operations training” and will employ “new urban warfare facilities.” Id. at 2-36, AR 0051321. At the time that the Army noted the unique training that KLOA’s mountainous jungle terrain would provide the Army, Stryker brigades did not yet exist. The SEIS indicates that, while that jungle terrain may be unique and important for light infantry brigades like the current 2nd Brigade, KLOA cannot support Stryker vehicles, and no mounted training is envisioned or possible there. The fact that Oahu has jungle terrain does not alone justify the elimination of alternatives involving transformation of the 2nd Brigade outside of Hawaii. [11] Ultimately, the question raised by the Army’s own experts during the PEIS process and following the publication of the ROD based on the PEIS, and by the public in the scoping process for SEIS — “Why Hawaii?” — was never answered. Transformation of the 2nd Brigade outside of Hawaii was a reasonable alternative that the Army was obligated under NEPA to consider. Its failure to do so renders the Army’s EISs inadequate. See Friends of Southeast’s Future, 153 F.3d at 1065.
If we were to accede to the Army’s assertion that its statement of purpose and need, including its site-selection, cannot be challenged, the concept of tiered EISs is meaningless. An agency could avoid consideration of reasonable alternatives by making a binding site-specific decision at the programmatic stage without analysis, deferring consideration of sitespecific issues to a SEIS. Then at the SEIS stage, the agency simply could point back to the analysis-free decision at the programmatic stage, as the Army has done here, and find that the scope of its site-specific analysis is constrained by the PEIS. The SEIS would merely operate to justify a decision made analysis-free at a previous stage. 17482 ILIO‘ULAOKALANI COALITION v. RUMSFELD [12] The result: the Army never undertakes any analysis of alternatives to Hawaii. What is the cure? We conclude that the practical solution is to remand, requiring the preparation of a supplemental SEIS. There is no magic as to which EIS is the vehicle for site-specific analysis. It would have been perfectly appropriate for the PEIS to forgo any decision as to specific sites, leaving the analysis and recommendations to the SEIS. The Army’s mistake here was to commit to the transformation of the 2nd Brigade in Hawaii without considering alternatives in either the PEIS or the SEIS. We conclude that this can now be done most appropriately in a supplemental SEIS. As the Army’s pre-SEIS, June 2002 meeting indicates, the failure of Army Headquarters to explain its decision at the programmatic phase requires each separate installation to consider a broader range of alternatives in its SEIS than would otherwise have been required. Therefore, we reverse and remand for supplemental analysis of alternative locations in a supplemental SEIS. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART. REMANDED. ILIO‘ULAOKALANI COALITION v. RUMSFELD 17483 Volume 2 of 2 17484 ILIO‘ULAOKALANI COALITION v. RUMSFELD