Opinion ID: 2076227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: counts iii and iv: appellee lesko

Text: We turn next to the merits of appellant's appeal from the orders dismissing Counts III through VI of his complaint. In doing so, we are mindful of our scope of review as set forth in Field v. Philadelphia Electric Company, supra : When preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer are filed, we must accept as true all the well-pleaded material facts set forth in the complaint and all reasonable inferences deducible from those facts. Accepting these facts and inferences, we then determine whether the pleader has failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted, and we will affirm the grant of a demurrer only if there is certainty that no recovery is possible. All doubts are resolved in favor of the pleader. Id. 388 Pa.Super. at 405, 565 A.2d at 1172 (footnote and citations omitted). Appellant argues, first, that the trial court erred in sustaining Lesko's preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer to Count III, which alleged malicious prosecution. [5] In his amended complaint, appellant makes broad allegations that Lesko provided information to Officer Blodgett, the police officer who filed the criminal complaint. Appellant claims that Lesko knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that the information which she provided was false and that her actions were done solely for her benefit and for the anticipated beneficial effect on the pending custody proceedings and not with any reasonable belief that any criminal conduct had actually occurred. Appellant specifically alleges that Lesko falsely informed Officer Blodgett that appellee Burkhart was to testify in the impending custody proceeding and that appellant had sexually molested his daughter. Even accepting as true the allegation that Lesko made these statements to Officer Blodgett, we agree with the trial court that appellant has not pled sufficient facts to support a cause of action for malicious prosecution against Lesko. In order to prevail in an action for malicious prosecution, as noted earlier, the plaintiff must show, inter alia, that the defendant instituted the criminal proceedings against the plaintiff. Appellant was arrested for intimidation of a witness, simple assault, terroristic threats, and harassment. The allegations of Count III do not suggest that Lesko initiated these proceedings against appellant or that she provided information concerning the incident between appellant and Burkhart upon which the criminal charges were based. The only connection between the criminal charges against appellant and the allegedly false statements made by Lesko is Lesko's alleged verification of Ann Burkhart's status as a prospective witness. As the trial court noted, the only criminal conduct that Lesko allegedly attributed to appellant was the sexual molestation of his daughter; appellant has not been charged with such an offense. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not err in dismissing Count III of appellant's complaint. In Count IV of his complaint appellant attempts to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the actions attributed to Lesko in Count III. Appellant cannot recover on such a claim, as noted earlier, unless the conduct complained of was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. The conduct attributed to Lesko  making accusations to a police officer that she knew or reasonably should have known were false  was not of such a character. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Count IV.