Opinion ID: 791237
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Evidence of Discrimination

Text: 28 In reviewing a Rule 50 challenge to a verdict in favor of plaintiffs on a claim of age discrimination, the three-step McDonnell Douglas analysis applicable to motions for summary judgment provides useful guidance. See Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 76 (2d Cir.2005) (and cases cited therein recognizing that framework established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), for Title VII claims of race discrimination also applies to ADEA claims); see also Alfaro v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 210 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir.2000) (noting that same standard that applies to a pretrial motion for summary judgment . . . also applies to motions for judgment as a matter of law during or after trial pursuant to Rule 50 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Pursuant thereto, the initial burden rests with the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. A plaintiff's establishment of a prima facie case gives rise to a presumption of unlawful discrimination that then shifts the burden of production to the defendant, who must proffer a `legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' for the challenged employment action. Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d at 76 (quoting Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir.2001)). If the defendant satisfies this burden, the presumption of discrimination drops out of the case, and the plaintiff must prove that a defendant's proffered reasons were not the true reasons for its actions but a pretext for discrimination. Roge v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 257 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir.2001). In short, the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving that his age was the real reason for any adverse employment action. Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted); accord Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d at 76. 29 Defendants concede, as they must, that plaintiffs adduced sufficient evidence at trial to satisfy their prima facie burden. They further acknowledge that plaintiffs adduced sufficient proof to permit a jury to reject defendants' claim that plaintiffs were provided training comparable, if not identical, to all other newly appointed Maintainers. Appellants' Br. at 14. Nevertheless, they submit that Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105, compels the conclusion that, as a matter of law, this evidence was insufficient to submit the case to the jury, let alone to support a jury finding that age discrimination was the real reason for the adverse employment actions. We disagree. 30 In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., the Supreme Court considered whether a defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the plaintiff's case consists exclusively of a prima facie case of discrimination and sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its action. 530 U.S. at 137, 120 S.Ct. 2097. The Court concluded that the question admitted no single absolute answer but depended on the totality of the evidence in a particular case. In explaining why an affirmative answer was not always appropriate, the Court explained: 31 Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive. . . . Thus, a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated. 32 Id. at 147-48, 120 S.Ct. 2097. In Schnabel v. Abramson, we recognized that  Reeves prevents courts from imposing a per se rule requiring in all instances that an ADEA claimant offer more than a prima facie case and evidence of pretext. 232 F.3d at 90. 33 At the same time, however, Reeves cautioned that there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory. 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097. For example, if the record conclusively reveals some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred, a defendant might well be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. 34 In sum, Reeves instructs that [w]hether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in any particular case depends on a careful review of the total evidence adduced, including the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered on a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 148-49; accord Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d at 90 ( Reeves clearly mandates a case-by-case approach, with a court examining the entire record to determine whether the plaintiff could satisfy his `ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.' (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097)). 35 Applying these principles to this case, we conclude that the trial evidence was sufficient to support the jury finding of intentional age discrimination. To satisfy their prima facie burden, Cross and Francis demonstrated that they were demoted as provisional Maintainers when younger workers were not. As a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for this disparate treatment, defendants asserted that plaintiffs failed to perform satisfactorily as Maintainers. To show that this was not the true reason for their demotions and that age discrimination was the real cause, Cross and Francis offered evidence (1) that defendants had initially taken steps to avoid promoting the plaintiffs, which defendants were compelled to abandon by union protests; (2) that after reluctantly promoting Cross and Francis, the defendants ensured the plaintiffs' eventual demotion by deliberately denying them the training necessary to perform satisfactorily as Maintainers, while at the same time providing that training to younger counterparts; (3) that defendants made various disparaging comments about older workers, including the plaintiffs; and (4) that after the plaintiffs' demotions, defendants placed their younger replacements in a structured training program for Maintainers. As this court has recognized, a showing of disparate treatment is a common and especially effective method of establishing [an] inference of discriminatory intent. Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 468 (2d Cir.2000). In this case, plaintiffs did not simply show disparate treatment in demotion; they showed that their demotions were the inevitable consequence of disparate treatment in training. Significantly, defendants did not acknowledge or offer a nondiscriminatory explanation for the training disparity. Instead, throughout trial, they insisted that there was no such disparity. 36 For example, defendant Warren testified that the plaintiffs had received the same training as younger provisional Maintainers. To the extent Cross and Francis offered direct evidence to the contrary, a reasonable jury could have concluded not only that there was a disparity in the training received by the plaintiffs compared to younger provisional Maintainers but that Warren deliberately testified falsely on this material fact. As the Supreme Court has observed, when a factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant . . . is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity, those circumstances, together with the elements of the prima facie case, can support a finding of intentional discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (noting that, [i]n appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose). 37 In this case, jury concerns about defendants' dissembling would have been fueled further by Warren's testimony that it was his decision to use seniority as the basis for deciding which Helpers would be promoted to Maintainer positions. Two union representatives, however, testified that Warren initially opposed appointing Maintainers from within the department, seeking to hire from the outside. Once compelled to promote from within, Warren sought discretion to ignore seniority as a promotion criteria, an option that would allow him to bypass plaintiffs. The law recognizes that seniority is not a sufficiently accurate indicator of age that, by itself, can support an inference that adverse actions based on seniority necessarily evidence age discrimination, see Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d at 85; Ludovicy v. Dunkirk Radiator Corp., 922 F.2d 109, 111 (2d Cir.1990); but that principle is not at issue here. The import of a jury finding that Warren testified falsely about his use of seniority—or any factor— that would seemingly have favored plaintiffs' promotion is that such a falsehood could support a jury inference that the defendants, having been compelled to promote the older plaintiffs, made the deliberate decision to ensure that they failed in their new positions by providing them with inadequate training relative to younger counterparts. In short, this is not a case in which the plaintiffs created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason [for their demotion — lack of competency —] was untrue. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097. This is a case in which the defendants' discredited testimony at trial as to the means employed to achieve the discriminatory demotion — discriminatory training — itself strengthened plaintiffs' case. 38 In Reeves, the Supreme Court noted that a defendant might be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively reveal[s] some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the [its employment] decision. Id. Defendants half-heartedly suggest that the record in this case reveals that the plaintiffs' supervising foreman was inclined to favor Maintainers who were Russian, the same nationality as himself. The argument is somewhat incongruous given the plaintiffs' assertion of a race discrimination claim, which was rejected by the jury. No matter. We note simply that the evidence shows that the younger Maintainers were not all Russian and that it was not only Russians who received more training than the plaintiffs. Thus, the jury could reasonably have rejected an argument that discrimination was based on national origin rather than age. 39 Finally, we note that this is not a case in which abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence was adduced showing that no age discrimination had occurred. Id. To the contrary, plaintiffs offered proof of disparaging age-based comments by Transit Authority decision-makers from which the jury could reasonably conclude that defendants' resistance to promoting plaintiffs, their failure to provide plaintiffs with the same training as younger Maintainers, and their ultimate decision to demote plaintiffs were all based on hostility toward their age. For example, Francis testified that his supervisor George linked plaintiff's age to the unlikelihood of further advancement when he stated that Francis was 62 and over the hill and still a Helper. . . hanging around and not going anywhere. Trial Tr. at 157. Cross testified to a similar disparaging remark when he asked George for the training manuals being provided younger provisional Maintainers. George scoffed, After all these years you guys been here, all of a sudden you want to be a Maintainer. Id. at 244. Another comment by George indicated that the failure to provide plaintiffs with training manuals was not inadvertent: Look Cross, I have my boss, I have to follow orders. Id. Francis also testified to a disparaging remark made by Warren regarding another 62-year-old employee. Warren said he didn't know why [that employee] was still hanging around, that he should be gone because [h]e had a number of years on the job, and should be moving on. Id. at 182-83. Such age-hostile statements by the two primary decision-makers in plaintiffs' department, when considered together with all the other evidence in this case required the district court to submit this case to the jury and require us to affirm the denial of defendants' motion for a judgment in their favor notwithstanding the jury finding of age discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. at 151-52, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (specifically noting age-hostile remarks by decision-makers, as well as prima facie case and evidence challenging employer's explanation, in concluding that district court properly submitted case to the jury and that appellate court erred in reversing judgment based on its verdict in favor of plaintiff).