Opinion ID: 2806671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Overarching Principles

Text: The Injunction Order in this case prohibited Guyton from “[e]ntering or visiting [Varel’s] residence, including yard and garage.” The words “residence” and “yard” are not defined in the Injunction Order. The primary issue is the meaning of the phrase “residence, including yard” and whether it encompasses the area in which Arnold observed Guyton. In LeMay v. Leander, 92 Hawaiʻi 614, 994 P.2d 546, (2000), this court held that to hold a party in civil contempt, 13 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER “there must be a court decree that sets forth in specific detail an unequivocal command that the contemnor violated.” 92 Hawaiʻi at 625, 994 P.2d at 557. While LeMay involved a civil contempt violation, its requirement of particularity and clarity in the language of an order applies with at least the same force to injunction orders prohibiting harassment, especially since the violation of such an injunction order exposes the defendant to a one-year jail sentence, see HRS §§ 604-10.5(h), 706-663 (1993)-- a consequence of greater seriousness than that carried by a civil contempt citation. See Murray v. Murray, 60 Haw. 160, 162, 587 P.2d 1220, 1222 (1978) (“The significant and essential characteristic of a sanction imposed for civil contempt is that the penalty can be avoided by compliance with the court order.”). Thus, a prerequisite to punishing a person for violating an injunction order issued under HRS § 604-10.5 that protects against harassment is a court order that is “clear and unambiguous,” LeMay, 92 Hawaiʻi at 625, 994 P.2d at 557, so as to allow a person of ordinary intelligence to “ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden,” id. (quoting Dystar Corp. v. Canto, 1 F. Supp. 2d 48, 54 (D. Mass. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This requirement is no more than a rule of reason because, as it is for statutes, fairness and due process dictate that a court 14 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER order must be sufficiently particular and definite so as to clearly identify the conduct that it prohibits. See United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 659 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that criminal contempt sanctions may be levied only if predicated on a violation of “the specific and definite terms of a court order”); 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt § 140 (stating that a court order that could support a contempt sanction is one that describes, in “certain, clear, and definite terms[,] . . . the duties thereby imposed or the actions required or forbidden”); cf. State v. Xiao, 123 Hawaiʻi 251, 261, 231 P.3d 968, 978 (2010) (Acoba, J., concurring and dissenting) (reasoning that statutes must be construed in a manner as to clearly enunciate “what conduct is prohibited” so that individuals subject to them “may choose between lawful and unlawful conduct”). 10 B. The plain meaning of the words “residence” and “yard” The phrase “residence, including yard” in the Injunction Order is clear and unambiguous on its face. As such, it leaves no room for interpretation, and its plain language must control. Shade v. Kirk, 420 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Neb. 1988) (“When the language of a . . . decree is plain and unambiguous, 10 See also In re Doe, 96 Hawaiʻi 73, 82, 26 P.3d 562, 571 (2001) (stating that before a minor could be held in criminal contempt of court, the “terms and operation” of the underlying court order must be readily understandable to the minor). 15 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER there is no room for construction . . . .”); Callan v. Callan, 468 P.2d 456, 458 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) (accord); 50 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 744-45 (accord); see Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Products, 86 Hawaiʻi 214, 259, 948 P.2d 1055, 1100 (1997) (according “plain meaning” to this court’s remand order in construing its scope). In effectuating its plain language, the words “residence, including yard” must “be taken in their ordinary and familiar signification, and regard is to be had to their general and popular use.” See In re Taxes of Johnson, 44 Haw. 519, 530, 356 P.2d 1028, 1034 (1960) (quoting Advertiser Publ’g Co. v. Fase, 43 Haw. 154, 160 (Haw. Terr. 1960)); see Sierra Club v. Castle & Cooke Homes Haw., Inc., 132 Hawaiʻi 184, 191—92, 320 P.3d 849, 856—57 (2013) (noting that courts must “give words their ordinary meaning unless something in the statute requires a different interpretation” (quoting Saranillo v. Silva, 78 Hawaiʻi 1, 10, 889 P.2d 685, 695 (1995)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); see also HRS § 1-14 (2009) (“The words of a law are generally to be understood in their most known and usual signification.”). 11 11 This court explained that looking to the common usage of words when they are clear and unambiguous reflects a rule of common sense, for it must be supposed that the legislature, in enacting a statute, intended that the words used therein should be understood in the (continued. . .) 16 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER In conducting a plain meaning analysis, “this court may resort to legal or other well accepted dictionaries as one way to determine the ordinary meaning of certain terms not statutorily defined.” State v. Pali, 129 Hawaiʻi 363, 370, 300 P.3d 1022, 1029 (2013) (quoting State v. Kikuta, 125 Hawaiʻi 78, 96, 253 P.3d 639, 658 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Travelocity.com, L.P. v. Dir. of Taxation, 135 Hawaiʻi 88, 106—07, 346 P.3d 158, 175—76 (2015) (considering dictionary definitions in conducting a plain meaning analysis). The Oxford Dictionaries defines “residence” as “[a] person’s home; the place where someone lives.” 12 “Yard” is defined by the Oxford Dictionaries as “[a] piece of ground (. . .continued) sense in which they are ordinarily and popularly understood by the people, for whose guidance and government the law was enacted, unless there is something in the statute showing that the words in question were used in some other sense. In re Taxes of Johnson, 44 Haw. at 530, 356 P.2d at 1034 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 12 Oxford Dictionaries, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/residence (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). In a similar manner, Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “residence,” in relevant part, as “the place where one actually lives as distinguished from one’s domicile or a place of temporary sojourn” or “a building used as a home.” Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/residence (last visited Apr. 24, 2015). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “residence” as “[t]he place where one actually lives”; “[a] house or fixed abode; a dwelling.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1502 (10th ed. 2014); see Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 738 A.2d 403, 404—05 (Pa. 1999) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of residence). 17 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER adjoining a building or house” or “[a]n area of ground surrounded by walls or buildings.” 13 Based on its plain and generally known meaning, it is clear that the phrase “residence, including yard,” as it is used in the Injunction Order, is the house in which Varel lives and the adjacent area surrounding it. 14 13 Oxford Dictionaries, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/yard#yard-2 (emphasis added) (last visited April 13, 2015). Yard may also refer to “[a]n area of land used for a particular purpose or business,” e.g., a storage yard or a dump yard. Id. This variation of the definition of yard is not applicable in this case. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines yard as “a small usually walled and often paved area open to the sky and adjacent to a building”; “the grounds of a building or group of buildings”; or “the grounds immediately surrounding a house that are usually covered with grass.” Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/yard (last visited Apr. 13, 2015). At trial, the State defined “yard” for the district court as “the grounds immediately surrounding a house” in accordance with the Merriam-Webster Dictionary. 14 This result is the same regardless of whether the word “including” is interpreted as a word of expansion or a word of limitation. See Hawaiian Ass’n of Seventh—Day Adventists, 130 Hawaiʻi 36, 46, 305 P.3d 452, 462 (2013). As previous cases from this court have recognized, “including” means either “an enlargement and has the meaning of and or in addition to, or merely specifies a particular thing already included within the general words theretofore used.” Id. (quoting Lealaimatafao v. Woodward— Clyde Consultants, 75 Haw. 544, 556, 867 P.2d 220, 226 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). If “including” were taken to mean as merely specifying “a particular thing already included within the general words theretofore used,” the definition of residence--the house where Varel actually lives--would serve as the outer limit of what “yard” means, which would exclude the outer ridges of Varel’s property where Guyton was seen. On the other hand, if “including,” in this context, were taken to mean “and or in addition to,” “yard” would be in addition to “residence”; however, the plain meaning of “yard” would nonetheless exclude the outer ridges of Varel’s property in which Guyton was present. Additionally, under the “and or in addition to” definition of “including,” “yard and garage” may be illustrative of other places that could be added to “residence.” Id. This latter interpretation is the most farreaching and would render the phrase “residence, including yard and garage” ambiguous in that it could encompass unidentified or remote locations on an expansive property. Faced with ambiguity in such an instance, the phrase (continued. . .) 18 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Accordingly, an interpretation that would place the entire 1,000 acres of Varel’s property within the ambit of the phrase “residence, including yard” would run contrary to its “ordinary and familiar signification,” and such application is therefore erroneous. In re Taxes of Johnson, 44 Haw. at 530, 356 P.2d at 1034. 15 C. The interpretation by the district court of the phrase “residence, including yard” was incorrect. The district court and the ICA applied a strained and unnatural interpretation to the phrase “residence, including yard” instead of applying its plain meaning. Consequently, the words “residence, including yard” were interpreted to encompass even the ridges located at the outer limits of Varel’s 1¼square-mile property, which could be accessed either by hiking from within the property or by motorcycle through the neighboring property. Rather than enforcing the clear and unambiguous language of the Injunction Order, the district court’s interpretation expanded the meaning of “residence, including yard” well beyond the ordinary and familiar signification of (. . .continued) “residence including yard” should be interpreted consistent with the known and usual signification of these terms. See infra Part IV.B 15 The State’s use of the word “premises” in its complaint against Guyton--a word that does not appear in the Injunction Order, see supra note 4--may be an implicit acknowledgement that the phrase “residence, including yard” does not encompass the area in which Arnold observed Guyton. 19 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER these words. 16 The district court’s interpretation deviated from, rather than furthered, the requirement of specificity and clarity in court orders, particularly because the violation involved could carry criminal sanctions. See LeMay, 92 Hawaiʻi at 625, 994 P.2d at 557. Because the phrase “residence, including yard” is clear, the duty of the district court was to enforce, and not to overextend, its plain meaning. See State v. Palama, 62 Haw. 159, 161—62, 612 P.2d 1168, 1170 (1980) (explaining that “when the language is plain and unmistakable, the court is bound by” it, leaving “no room for judicial construction”). Even if we were to assume that the phrase “residence, including yard” is ambiguous, the district court’s interpretation was erroneous under comparable principles of statutory interpretation used in resolving ambiguities within a statute. The first of such principles states that “[w]here the meaning of a word is unclear in one part of a statute but clear in another part, the clear meaning can be imparted to the unclear usage on the assumption that it means the same thing 16 The preprinted, standard form used for the Injunction Order provided a space for “[s]pecial conditions or modifications,” which would have allowed the district court to indicate that the entire 1,000 acres of Varel’s property were intended to be within the scope of the Injunction Order. 20 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER throughout the statute.” Kam v. Noh, 70 Haw. 321, 325, 770 P.2d 414, 416 (1989). This means that, “[i]n the absence of an express intention to the contrary, words or phrases used in two or more sections of a statute are presumed to be used in the same sense throughout.” Id. at 325—26, 770 P.2d at 417 (quoting Gaspro, Ltd. v. Comm’n of Labor & Indus. Relations, 46 Haw. 164, 172, 377 P.2d 932, 936 (1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, paragraph 3(a) of the Injunction Order restrained and enjoined Guyton from contacting, threatening, or physically harassing Varel “and any person(s) residing at [Varel’s] residence.” (Emphasis added). To reside at one place means “to live in a particular place” or “to exist or be present.” 17 The phrase “reside at” contemplates living, existing or being present in a specific and identifiable physical structure, as compared to the phrase “reside in,” which is used to refer to a general area or locality within which a person lives. 18 Id. 17 Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/residing (last visited April 13, 2015). 18 These examples are provided by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary: He resides in St. Louis. He still resides at his parents’ house. Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/residing (last visited May 26, 2015) (emphases omitted). 21 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Thus, it is clear from the phrase “person(s) residing at [Varel’s] residence” that paragraph 3(a) specifically refers to “residence” as a structure in which one could reside, such that “[Varel’s] residence” could only mean the house where Varel actually lives in--and not the entire 1,000 acres of property within which his house is located. Under the rule elucidated by Kam, therefore, the meaning of “residence,” as it is used in the phrase “residence, including yard,” in paragraph 3(c) of the Injunction Order is the same as the meaning of “residence” in paragraph 3(a)-–the house in which Varel actually lives. Cf. Kam, 70 Haw. at 325—26, 770 P.2d at 417 (holding that the word “use” has the same meaning throughout the statute). In addition, “the instant case arises under the penal law, where the basic canons of statutory construction counsel in favor of a less expansive definition” according to the rule of lenity. State v. Bayly, 118 Hawaiʻi 1, 15, 185 P.3d 186, 200 (2008). This longstanding precept of statutory interpretation states that “[w]here a criminal statute is ambiguous . . . the statute must be strictly construed against the government and in favor of the accused.” State v. Shimabukuro, 100 Hawaiʻi 324, 327, 60 P.3d 274, 277 (2002); see Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994). The rule of lenity can be considered as a natural extension of the principle that the language of a court order must be sufficiently particularized, clear, and 22 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER unequivocal before its violation could be punished. See supra Part IV.A. If the court order is ambiguous and not readily understandable, its language should be construed in favor of the defendant. See State v. Sakamoto, 101 Hawaiʻi 409, 413 n.3, 70 P.3d 635, 639 n.3 (2003) (stating that a criminal statute will not be interpreted expansively so as to increase the penalty “when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what the legislature intended” (quoting Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15 (1978)) (internal quotation mark omitted) (alteration omitted)). In NBA Properties, Inc. v. Gold, 895 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1990), for example, the court stated that ambiguities or omissions in a court order will be read in favor of the person charged with contempt. Hence, any ambiguity in the language of the Injunction Order must be resolved in favor of Guyton. See State v. Woodfall, 120 Hawaiʻi 387, 396, 206 P.3d 841, 850 (2009) (concluding that an ambiguous statute must be strictly construed against the government and in favor of the accused); State v. Aiwohi, 109 Hawaiʻi 115, 129, 123 P.3d 1210, 1224 (2005) (accord). Applying the rule of lenity, the meaning of the phrase “residence, including yard”--construed in favor of Guyton-- should be the same as its plain and popularly understood meaning--i.e., the place in which Varel actually lives and its 23 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER immediate vicinity, and not inclusive of Varel’s entire 1,000acre property, particularly as to the remote area of the property in which Arnold observed Guyton. Thus, even if the phrase “residence, including yard” is considered to be ambiguous, the district court’s unduly expansive interpretation of the phrase was erroneous in light of the principles embodied by both Kam and the rule of lenity. D. The conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, State v. Kalaola, 124 Hawaiʻi 43, 49, 237 P.3d 1109, 1115 (2010), and according appropriate deference to the district court’s credibility determinations, Monteil, 134 Hawaiʻi at 368, 341 P.3d at 574, the record demonstrates that Guyton was observed by Arnold on the outer limits of Varel’s 1,000-acre property. This area is outside of the meaning of “residence, including yard,” which, interpreted under its plain meaning or under principles of statutory construction, encompasses only the house where Varel lives and the area directly adjacent to it. See supra Part IV.A-C. Therefore, the conviction in this case was not supported by sufficient evidence and must be reversed. State v. Silver, 125 Hawaiʻi 1, 9, 249 P.3d 1141, 1149 (2011); State v. Bannister, 60 Haw. 658, 660, 594 P.2d 133, 135 (1979). 24 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER