Opinion ID: 808245
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CTR’s Motion to Stay and Compel Arbitration

Text: We review de novo a district court’s “determination of arbitrability.” Gold v. Deutsche Aktiengesellschaft, 365 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2004). The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 16, “establishes a national policy favoring arbitration when the parties contract for that mode of dispute resolution.” Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349 (2008). To determine whether an action should be dismissed in favor of arbitration, we consider four factors: (1) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; (2) the scope or the arbitration agreement; (3) whether, if federal statutory claims are asserted, Congress intended those claims to be nonarbitrable; and (4) whether, if some but not all of the claims in the case are arbitrable, the case should be stayed pending arbitration. JLM Indus., Inc. v. StoltNielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2004). When he was hired, McAllister initialed and signed an agreement (the “Arbitration Agreement”), which provided, in relevant part, as follows: The Company and You mutually consent to resolve through the CTR Resolution program including final and binding arbitration all claims or controversies (“claims”) past, present or future, whether or not arising out of your employment (or its termination) . . . . The claims covered by this Agreement include, but are not limited to: . . . claims for discrimination (including, but not limited to, race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, national origin, age, marital status, physical or mental disability or handicap, or medical condition). 4 (CTR Resolution Agreement, CTR Motion to Stay Proceedings and Compel Arbitration, Ex. A at 1.) McAllister does not contest the validity of the Arbitration Agreement, and we reject his suggestion that its terms were nullified by a severance agreement he later received from (but did not enter into with) CTR. McAllister concedes that he did not enter into the severance agreement; accordingly, neither he nor CTR is bound by its terms. See Bridgeport Pipe Eng’g Co. v. DeMatteo Constr. Co., 268 A.2d 391, 393 (Conn. 1970). As the plain language of the Arbitration Agreement provides, the parties agreed to resolve their disputes by arbitration, and their agreement covered the claims McAllister asserts in the Complaint. See JLM Indus., 387 F.3d at 169. Those claims arise under “employment discrimination statutes[,] and, as a general matter, ‘courts have consistently found that such claims can be subject to mandatory arbitration.’” Ragone v. Atl. Video at Manhattan Ctr., 595 F.3d 115, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Gold, 365 F.3d at 147). For these reasons, the district court correctly granted CTR’s motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration.2 2 In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, “the court applies a standard similar to that applicable for a motion for summary judgment.” Bensadoun v. Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2003). In our circuit, pro se litigants who oppose motions for summary judgment are entitled to notice of the consequences of failing to support their opposition with evidence. Vital v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 620 (2d Cir. 1999). We do not address whether such a rule might also apply when a pro se litigant is opposing a motion to dismiss in favor of arbitration because, although McAllister appears not to have received such notice, the “record otherwise makes clear that the litigant understood the nature and consequences” of CTR’s motion. Id. at 621. 5 We have considered all of McAllister’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 6