Opinion ID: 50003
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendants’ Entrapment Defense

Text: Both defendants argue that the district court erroneously denied them judgments of acquittal, claiming that the government insufficiently rebutted their affirmative defense of entrapment. We review this preserved claim de novo, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Rodriguez, 218 F.3d 1243, 1244 (11th Cir. 2000). Once the Jean-Baptistes produced some evidence of inducement, it was for the government to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that they were predisposed to 2 commit the offense. United States v. Ryan, 289 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 2002). Predisposition is a “fact-intensive” and subjective inquiry, and a jury’s credibility assessments are critically important to gauging “the defendant’s readiness and willingness to engage in the charged crime absent any contact with the government’s . . . agents.” United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 624-25 (11th Cir. 1995). Predisposition may be demonstrated by “the defendant’s ready commission of the charged crime [or] evidence that the defendant was given opportunities to back out of illegal transactions but failed to do so.” Id. at 625. The evidence was clearly sufficient under these standards to convince a reasonable jury that the Jean-Baptistes were predisposed to commit the planned crimes prior to contact with the government’s confidential informant (CI). The evidence showed that Marie gave the CI instructions on the best way to murder their victim and gain access to hidden drugs, including specific direction on how to “persuade” a different victim to reveal the drugs’ location. There was also evidence that Sophia herself initiated contact with the CI and expressed independent concern that a drug theft accompany the murder. On the basis of these facts, the jury was entitled to find predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt. II. Outrageous Conduct by Government against Sophia Jean-Baptiste Citing her onetime romantic relationship with the CI, Sophia argues that the 3 government’s conduct in securing her conviction was outrageous as to violate due process under United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 164243, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973). We disagree. Looking to the totality of the circumstances, we do not find that the government’s use of the CI in this case shocks the “universal sense of justice,” as required by our caselaw. United States v. Edenfield, 995 F.2d 197, 200-01. The many recorded conversations between the CI and the Jean-Baptistes provided substantial evidence that Sophia was a willing participant in the planned crimes, quite apart from her prior intimate involvement with the CI. III. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Sophia Jean-Baptiste’s Conspiracy Conviction Sophia claims that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that she knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracies.1 She argues that the government failed to prove her knowledge of the essential nature of the conspiracy, including the specific purpose of the alleged robbery. On the basis of Apprendi v. 1 To sustain a conviction under § 1951(a) & (b)(1), the government must prove that: (1) two or more persons agreed to commit a robbery or extortion encompassed by the statute; (2) the defendant knew of the conspiratorial goal; and (3) the defendant voluntarily participated in helping to accomplish the goal. United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1084 (11th Cir. 2001). To sustain a conviction on the § 846 conspiracy count, the government must prove that: (1) there was an illegal agreement to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine; (2) Sophia knew about it; and 3) she knowingly and voluntarily joined the agreement. United States v. Charles, 313 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002). 4 New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), she further argues that the government was obligated but failed to show that she had specific knowledge of the five kilograms of cocaine to be stolen. These arguments fail for at least two reasons. First, the same evidence which refutes Sophia’s entrapment defense adequately demonstrates her willing and knowing participation in the charged conspiracies. Second, Sophia’s Apprendi argument is clearly foreclosed by the well settled rule that “in the context of federal drug cases, drug type and quantity do not have to be charged in the indictment or submitted to the jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” except where a defendant’s sentence would exceed the prescribed statutory maximum. United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1100 (11th Cir. 2002).