Opinion ID: 2216446
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of judicial scrutiny.

Text: A threshold issue is the appropriate standard of judicial scrutiny to be applied in analyzing plaintiffs' claims of due process and equal protection violations. Plaintiffs assert defendant city should be required to defend its regulation by showing a compelling state interest, or at least a substantial rational relation to an articulated state purpose. Defendant contends the constitutionality of the ordinance should be examined under the rational basis test because neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification is involved. Plaintiffs' claim that defendant must show a compelling state interest is posited on Cianciolo v. Members of the City Council, City of Knoxville, 376 F.Supp. 719, 723 (E.D.Tenn.1974), and Corey v. City of Dallas, 352 F.Supp. 977, 981 (N.D.Tex.1972), rev'd, 492 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1974) (reversed on standing). But both of those decisions were centered on regulations prohibiting any person from administering a massage to a person of the opposite sexobviously a classification based on sex and potentially suspect. They have been criticized otherwise as a return to the discredited substantive due process concept developed in an era when the Court thought the Fourteenth Amendment gave it the power to strike down laws `because they may be unwise, improvident or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.' Dandridge [ v. Williams ], 397 U.S. [471,] 484, 90 S.Ct. [1153,] 1161 [, 25 L.Ed.2d 491, 501 (1970)]. Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002, 1012-13 (5th Cir. 1978). See Andrus v. Allard, ___ U.S. ___, ___ n.25, 100 S.Ct. 318, 328, 62 L.Ed.2d 210, 224 (1979). No suspect classification is involved in Davenport ordinance 18.05. Under its provisions a licensed masseur or masseuse may administer a massage to a patron of either sex. In any event, more recent cases have called into question the continued vitality of the Cianciolo and Corey holdings. As noted in Tomlinson v. Mayor of Savannah, 543 F.2d 570, 571 (5th Cir. 1976): In Smith v. Keater [ sic, Keator ], 419 U.S. 1043, 95 S.Ct. 613, 42 L.Ed.2d 636 (1974), dismissing for want of a substantial federal question, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203 [(1974)]; Rubenstein v. [ Township of ] Cherry Hill, 417 U.S. 963, 94 S.Ct. 3165, 41 L.Ed.2d 1136 (1974), dismissing for want of a substantial federal question, No. 10,027 (N.J.Sup.Ct. Jan. 29, 1974) [(unreported)]; and Kisley v. City of Falls Church, 409 U.S. 907, 93 S.Ct. 237, 34 L.Ed.2d 169 (1972), dismissing for want of a substantial federal question, 212 Va. 693, 187 S.E.2d 168 (1972), the Supreme Court dismissed appeals from state court decisions upholding the constitutionality of ordinances prohibiting heterosexual massages. Appellants in those three cases contended in the Supreme Court that the ordinances established invidiously discriminatory sex-based classifications in violation of the equal protection clause, worked an unreasonable abridgement of the right to pursue a legitimate livelihood; and created an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption that all massages lead to illicit sexual behavior. The Supreme Court ruled that these challenges did not raise a substantial constitutional question. Based upon the Supreme Court's discussion of the precedential effect of a dismissal for want of a substantial federal question in Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 2289, 45 L.Ed.2d 223, 236 (1975), the Tomlinson court held the dismissals of the Smith, Rubenstein, and Kisley appeals foreclosed reconsideration of identical constitutional challenges. Accord, Hogge v. Johnson, 526 F.2d 833, 835 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 913, 96 S.Ct. 3228, 49 L.Ed.2d 1221 (1976); Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 524 F.2d 571, 575-77 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 913, 96 S.Ct. 3228, 49 L.Ed.2d 1222 (1976); Cullinane v. Geisha House, Inc., 354 A.2d 515 (D.C.), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923, 96 S.Ct. 3234, 49 L.Ed.2d 1226 (1976); City of Indianapolis v. Wright, 267 Ind. 471, 476-77, 371 N.E.2d 1298, 1301, appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 439 U.S. 804, 99 S.Ct. 60, 58 L.Ed.2d 97 (1978); State v. Black, ___ Ind.App. ___, ___ 380 N.E.2d 1261, 1266-67 (1978). See also Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d at 1010-11. In Black, ___ Ind.App. at ___, 380 N.E.2d at 1268, the Indiana court observed, [B]ecause Cianciolo was previous to Kisley . . . and numerous other cases . . . we must assume that Cianciolo, which invalidated a similar massage parlor ordinance, is now overruled. Accord, Wright, 267 Ind. at 477 n.1, 371 N.E.2d at 1301. As noted in United Health Clubs of America, Inc. v. Strom, 423 F.Supp. 761, 765 (D.S.C.1976), the constitutionality of state statutes which regulate professions or trades invested with a strong public interest have [more recently] been measured against the more lenient rational relationship standard (citing Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239, 77 S.Ct. 752, 756, 1 L.Ed.2d 796, 801-02 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563, 573 (1955); and Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552, 556, 67 S.Ct. 910, 912, 91 L.Ed. 1093, 1097 (1947)). In Green v. Shama, 217 N.W.2d 547, 554 (Iowa 1974), we applied the reasonable relationship test in examining the constitutionality of statutes regulating barbers and cosmetologists. We applied the same test in exploring the constitutionality of a statute barring nudity in liquor-serving establishments. Three K.C. v. Richter, 279 N.W.2d 268, 275 (Iowa 1979). We find no sufficient reason to impose the compelling state interest test in examining the constitutionality of ordinance 18.05. The alternate review standard advanced by plaintiffs would require Davenport to show a substantial rational relation to an articulated state purpose. Here plaintiffs rely on Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971) (in which plaintiffs apparently equate substantiality with rationality), and McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 1059, 35 L.Ed.2d 282, 289 (1973) (articulation). Reed addressed a gender-based preference in estate administration. McGinnis merely equated articulated with legitimate and nonillusory rather than primary in applying the traditional rationality test to prisoners accumulating good-time credit toward parole eligibility. 410 U.S. at 276, 93 S.Ct. at 1062-63, 35 L.Ed.2d at 292. Plaintiffs cite no precedent for harnessing these two concepts in tandem as a standard for review. On the other hand, many courts routinely have applied the traditional rational relationship test to statutes and ordinances regulating massage parlors, their operators and employees. See, e. g., Tomlinson v. Mayor of Savannah, 543 F.2d at 571; Harper v. Lindsay, 454 F.Supp. 597, 601 (S.D. Tex.1978); United Health Clubs of America, Inc. v. Strom, 423 F.Supp. at 765; Rogers v. Miller, 401 F.Supp. 826, 829 (E.D.Va. 1975) (1000 hours training requirement held reasonable); Brown v. Brannon, 399 F.Supp. 133, 148 (M.D.N.C.1975), aff'd mem., 535 F.2d 1249 (4th Cir. 1976); Ex parte Maki, 56 Cal.App.2d 635, 644, 133 P.2d 64, 69 (1943); City & County of Denver v. Nielson, 194 Colo. 407, 410, 572 P.2d 484, 486 (1977) (ordinance prohibiting heterosexual massage held not reasonable under Colorado Constitution); Clevenger v. City of East Moline, 44 Ill.App.3d 168, 357 N.E.2d 719, 2 Ill.Dec. 552 (1976); Wes Ward Enterprises, Ltd. v. Andrews, 42 Ill.App.3d 458, 463-66, 355 N.E.2d 131, 135-37 (1976) (specific rejection of compelling state interest standard); Massage Parlors, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 284 Md. 490, 496-97, 398 A.2d 52, 56 (1979) (specific rejection of compelling state interest standard); Oueilhe v. Lovell, 93 Nev. 111, 114, 560 P.2d 1348, 1349 (1977) (wrestling partners of opposite sex); Smith v. Keator, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203, appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 419 U.S. 1043, 95 S.Ct. 613, 42 L.Ed.2d 636 (1974); Cheek v. City of Charlotte, 273 N.C. 293, 160 S.E.2d 18 (1968); Patterson v. City of Dallas, 355 S.W.2d 838 (Tex.Civ.App.1962), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 372 U.S. 251, 83 S.Ct. 873, 9 L.Ed.2d 732 (1963); Hart Health Studio v. Salt Lake County, 577 P.2d 116 (Utah 1978); Kisley v. City of Falls Church, 212 Va. 693, 187 S.E.2d 168, appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 409 U.S. 907, 93 S.Ct. 237, 34 L.Ed.2d 169 (1972). We hold the rational relationship standard of review utilized in these decisions should apply here.