Opinion ID: 4540115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Remaining Counterclaims

Text: We turn now to the counterclaims raised by Janiskee that were not the focus of the limited bench trial. Janiskee argues that the district court erred by simply employing its finding of inadvertence to dismiss his other claims, which included: (1) other violations of the Federal Wiretap Act and (2) the common-law invasion of privacy tort claims. The court did not err in dismissing Janiskee’s claims under the Federal Wiretap Act because its finding that the City inadvertently, not intentionally, recorded Line 3407 is dispositive of those claims. See Obron Corp. v. Barr, 990 F.2d 861, 863–64 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that using tapes obtained under a § 2511 exemption did not violate the Federal Wiretapping Act); see also First, 234 F.3d 1268, at  (“To prevail on a use or disclosure claim, there must be an illegal interception.”); In re High -7- No. 19-1716, City of Grand Rapids, Mich. v. Grand Rapids Police Officers, et al. Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 216 F.3d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Section 2511 exempts the conversations covered by it from the entirety of Title III. ‘Since . . . the interception in the case was not obtained in violation of the Act, its subsequent use and disclosure was not a violation of the Act.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Meredith v. Gavin, 446 F.2d 794, 799 (8th Cir. 1971))). We turn to the tort claims. “The tort of invasion of privacy is based on a common-law right to privacy,” which protects against, among others, intrusion upon an individual’s seclusion and public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about an individual. Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824, 828 (Mich. App. Ct. 1995). Janiskee brought a claim under each of these theories. The court did not err in dismissing Janiskee’s claim for intrusion upon seclusion based on its inadvertence finding. See Doe, 536 N.W.2d at 832 (clarifying “that an action for intrusion does not exist where ‘[t]he only aspect of the contemplated disclosure offensive to the plaintiffs is the fact of disclosure, not the method by which it was obtained.’” (quoting Tobin v. Mich. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 331 N.W.2d 184, 190 (Mich. 1982))); see also Geiling v. Wirt Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 14– 11027, 2014 WL 8473822, at  (E.D. Mich. 2014) (interpreting Michigan law to find that “defendants who inadvertently receive [private] information have not intruded” upon another’s seclusion); Johnson v. Northshore Univ. Judge Presiding Healthsystem, No. 1–10–0399, 2011 WL 10069086, at  (Ill. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2011) (finding that defendants who obtained private information based on an “inadvertent error” did not engage in “offensive prying”). Janiskee’s privacy claim based on public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, however, raises issues distinct from inadvertence. This claim was never addressed by the district court. It requires Janiskee to show “(1) the disclosure of information, (2) that is highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (3) that is of no legitimate concern to the public.” Id. at 828. As -8- No. 19-1716, City of Grand Rapids, Mich. v. Grand Rapids Police Officers, et al. demonstrated by these elements, the court’s determination on inadvertence is not dispositive of this claim. The court erred in dismissing Janiskee’s invasion of privacy common law tort claim. “This court can affirm a decision of the district court on any grounds supported by the record, even if different from those relied on by the district court.” Wallace v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 954 F.3d 879, 886 (6th Cir. 2020) (alterations omitted) (quoting Brown v. Tidwell, 169 F.3d 330, 332 (6th Cir. 1999)). Indeed, given the facts alleged in Janiskee’s countercomplaint and the facts developed in the record, we struggle to see how Janiskee could prove that Grand Rapids disclosed private facts that were of no legitimate concern to the public. We recognize, however, that the record here is limited—the district court granted limited discovery and held a limited-purpose bench trial. It never listened to the five recorded calls at issue because their content was irrelevant to the issue of inadvertence. But without a record of the calls, we cannot determine whether the calls concerned private facts that were of no legitimate concern to the public. Because the record is insufficient, we remand to the district court for consideration of this claim in the first instance.