Opinion ID: 1476684
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Broad Based Challenges:

Text: We first dispense with PCR counsels' suggestion that Call's personal feelings about Harris interfered with his ability to fulfill his investigative duties. Despite PCR counsels' assertion that Call didn't trust Mr. Harris [from] the day [he] met him, and that Call described Harris as anti-social to the nth degree, we find this argument meritless. The reasonableness of counsel's assistance does not depend on his personal feelings about defendant. See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693-94. (reviewing court must evaluate the conduct  of counsel, in light of an objective standard of reasonableness) (emphasis added). Our attention is, and must be, fixed on evaluating counsels in respect of their performance, strategy, and investigation. The objective standard in Strickland guides our analysis.
As further support for his claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance, defendant points to Call's having had only ten months to prepare, during which time he was overburdened with another capital trial and a complex criminal case. There is no dispute that Call and Scully took over the case in the fall of 1994, [7] at which point prior counsel had not conducted an investigation. Jury selection began in October 1995, and the trial commenced in January 1996. According to Call, Fairchild never asked for more time for preparation of a social history for defendant, although she later told Nardone that there wasn't much time before trial was to begin and that she already had a full case load when assigned to Harris's case. Citing her workload, a serious health problem, and lack of assistance, Fairchild told Nardone that she definitely could have used more time. At the PCR hearing, Scully testified to being unimpressed with work done by Harris's previous attorneys when he received the file, but asserted that he and Call had adequate time. Call similarly testified that the defense team did have adequate time to prepare. In addition, the record reveals that Call did ask for an extension of time because of his other cases. However, Call's other burdens were lifted when one matter ended in a plea and he was removed from representation in the other because of a conflict. As noted, we must determine whether defendant received representation that was objectively reasonable. If Call's representation of defendant fell below objectively reasonable standards, then his inadequate time to prepare might be an explanation. However, that Call had only ten months to prepare is not outcome determinative in this application. The argument is analogous to defendant's previous argument. Defendant contends that Call's efforts were minimal because of his attitude towards defendant and inadequate time. However, the actual question that we must consider is whether Call's efforts, in fact, were so minimal that his performance fell below objective reasonableness. Accordingly, we turn to the alleged specific deficiencies in the penalty phase.