Opinion ID: 867191
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discussion of Relevant Conduct Findings

Text: In recounting Jones’s participation in the fraudulent scheme, the PSR detailed only the incident that formed the basis of her conviction. Again, that incident involved Crystal Moore providing Jones a fraudulent identification card, which Jones used in her effort to cash a forged check against the victim’s account. Beyond that, the PSR merely explained that Jones was a runner, and that each runner “acted independently from the other, as their agreement for the jointly undertaken criminal activity was only entered into with [the Moores].” Similarly, the PSR addendum stated that “[a]lthough [she] did not jointly undertake any criminal acts with [various co-conspirators] . . ., Jones entered into a jointly undertaken agreement to commit theft and fraud with [the Moores].” There was no indication in the PSR or its addendum, however, that Jones or the Moores personally stole mail from the collection boxes, or that such conduct was known or reasonably foreseeable to Jones. Nevertheless, in discussing during the sentencing hearing Jones’s objections to the PSR’s references to mail theft, the district court stated that “the theft of the mail was part of the jointly undertaken criminal activity” in which Jones engaged, and it therefore “constituted relevant conduct.” Likewise, when Jones specifically objected to the application of this enhancement, the court concluded that she “agreed to jointly undertake the activity of cashing checks that were obtained through the theft from the mail, and so she’s accountable, as relevant—through relevant conduct for the quantity that is presumed to have—of victims that is presumed to have been involved.” 8 Case: 12-10599 Document: 00512238188 Page: 9 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 No. 12-10599 From these statements, the district court appears to have been suggesting that the mail was stolen in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity in which Jones agreed to participate. See United States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 679 (5th Cir. 1997) (a district court may infer “from the evidence the scope of the criminal activity to which [a defendant] agreed”); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2 (“In determining the scope of the criminal activity that the particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake . . . the court may consider any explicit agreement or implicit agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and others.”). While such a conclusion appears to be supported by the record, it nonetheless is insufficient on its own to support the further conclusion that the mail theft constituted Jones’s relevant conduct. As the Guidelines commentary makes clear, a defendant’s relevant conduct only includes the conduct of others that is “in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,” and is “reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2. Here, the district court did not state whether Jones knew or reasonably could have foreseen that the check-cashing scheme involved mail theft. Nor, by extension, did it enter findings explaining what evidence would support such a conclusion. As best we can discern, the district court simply inferred that, because Jones participated in a scheme to use fake identification cards to cash fraudulent checks, she reasonably should have foreseen that the personal information contained in those items might be derived from mail stolen from USPS collection boxes. To be sure, the Guidelines commentary certainly encourages a court analyzing reasonable foreseeability to consider the nature of the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2(b)(1); see also United States v. Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Ordinarily, one co-conspirator’s use of a firearm will be foreseeable because firearms are ‘tools of the trade’ in drug conspiracies.”). 9 Case: 12-10599 Document: 00512238188 Page: 10 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 No. 12-10599 Nevertheless, it simply cannot categorically be said—as the government implies—that all, or even most, fraudulently obtained personal information is acquired by stealing mail from collection boxes. To the contrary, experience has shown that the means by which personal information might be obtained for fraudulent purposes are limited only by the imaginations of those intent on obtaining it. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 420 F. App’x 414, 419 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (personal information purchased by businessperson from her clients and the homeless); United States v. Perkins, 287 F. App’x 342, 345 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished) (personal data stolen from military personnel who checked out vehicles using their military licenses); United States v. Tisdale, 264 F. App’x 403, 405 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (personal information culled from obituaries and credit reports obtained through defendants’ employment); United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 2007) (personal data stolen via computer hacking). Indeed, even here, we note that the PSR stated that the personal information used in Jones’s scheme was, in some instances, purchased illegally by the Moores from a check-cashing business. Given the vast array of avenues by which the personal information used to perpetrate Jones’s scheme might have been acquired, we are unable to rely simply on the nature of Jones’s offense to conclude that her co-conspirator’s mail theft was reasonably foreseeable to her. Moreover, having independently reviewed the record, we have found no evidence to substantiate the conclusion that Jones knew or reasonably could have foreseen that the scheme in which she was engaged involved stealing mail from USPS collection boxes. Because the government failed to carry its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that such conduct was known or reasonably foreseeable to her, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that, to the extent the district court entered a finding of fact to the contrary, that finding was mistaken. See 10 Case: 12-10599 Document: 00512238188 Page: 11 Date Filed: 05/10/2013 No. 12-10599 Rodriguez, 630 F.3d at 383. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s application of the enhancement set forth in § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C).2