Opinion ID: 203230
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Commonwealth's NEPA and APA Claims

Text: The Commonwealth makes a claim for immediate injunctive relief from claimed statutory violations by the NRC. [11] The NRC and Entergy are correct that the Commonwealth's claims that the agency violated the NEPA and the APA by failing to consider the pool fire contention, regardless of the path followed, is not reviewable at this time. The Commonwealth's claim that the agency committed statutory violations by rejecting its hearing request fails because it does not meet the basic prerequisite that a petitioner for judicial review of an agency action first exhaust administrative remedies. P.R. Assoc. of Physical Med. & Rehab., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 46, ___, 2008 WL 787972, at  (1st Cir.2008) (citing Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938)); see also 33 Wright & Koch, Federal Practice & Procedure: Judicial Review § 8398, at 397 (2006). The administrative exhaustion requirement gives agencies a fair and full opportunity to adjudicate claims presented to them by requiring that litigants use all steps that the agency holds out, and do[] so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits). Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2385, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir.2002)) (internal quotation mark omitted). Otherwise, court review might interrupt the administrative process, impinge on the discretionary authority granted to the agency by the legislature, and squander judicial resources where continued administrative proceedings might resolve the dispute in the petitioner's favor. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969). Those concerns are involved here. The Commonwealth argues that when the NRC dismissed it from the license renewal proceedings without addressing the NEPA claims, the NRC conclusively established the Commonwealth's rights and . . . eliminate[d] the Commonwealth's right to challenge the agency's compliance with NEPA. . . . Pet'r Reply Br. 6. The availability of interested state status under § 2.315(c) and the request for suspension mechanism in § 2.802(d) undermine that position. There has not yet been such a conclusive order. We cannot at this point in the administrative proceedings predict how the agency would respond on the merits to a § 2.802(d) request from the Commonwealth, let alone evaluate the agency's ultimate compliance with NEPA should the Commonwealth follow that procedure. The Commonwealth argues separately that the NRC violated NEPA and acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it refused to ensure that the results of the rulemaking would apply to the Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee licensing proceedings. This argument merely repackages the Commonwealth's claims regarding its dismissal from the licensing proceedings and recasts them in the context of its rulemaking petition. We cannot review the NRC's treatment of that petition, however, because the agency has not issued a final order regarding the rulemaking petition. The NRC decision which the Commonwealth attempts to construe as a final refusal to tie the results of the rulemaking back into the individual proceedings was no such thing; it was a final order only insofar as it affirmed the agency's dismissal of the Commonwealth's hearing requests in the re-licensing proceedings. See Vt. Yankee III, 65 N.R.C. at 214. Further, by their express language, the Commission's decisions did not purport to rule out a possible future order suspending the Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee proceedings. The Commission merely observed that it would be premature to consider such action at a time when there were other, unrelated issues involved in the licensing proceedings that would require significant time to resolve. Vt. Yankee II, 65 N.R.C. at 22 n. 37. The NRC's statements about the rulemaking within its decisions to dismiss the Commonwealth's hearing requests are merely tentative and do not determine any legal rights or consequences. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177-78, 117 S.Ct. 1154. The petitions for review are denied. No costs are awarded.