Opinion ID: 3030997
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Induced Plea

Text: Any misimpression about there being some possibility of concurrent sentences cannot be said to have “induced” Powell’s plea unless there was a causal connection between the plea and that possibility – i.e., unless knowledge of the absence of such a possibility would have resulted in his going to trial. See Clemmons v. United States, 721 F.2d 235, 238 (8th Cir. 1983) (although the court mistakenly advised petitioner that it had the power to impose concurrent sentences, his involuntary plea claim failed because the mistaken advice was not “a substantial motivating factor as far as Clemmons was concerned”). As we have explained, Powell entered his plea knowing that his sentence would very likely run consecutively to any back-time sentences, and he does not claim before us that he would have acted differently had he known that possibility was nonexistent rather than remote.