Opinion ID: 2371662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Canal Easement

Text: As described above, a portion of the deed from the Dimelings to Blagbrough conveyed a canal easement, granting rights in a canal that traversed Lots A-21 and A-22. Some of the language concerning the canal easement  particularly the flowage rights therein  had been crossed out. The trial court ruled that this removal of the so-called canal easement language [from the deed conveying Lot A-22 from the Dimelings to Blagbrough] was a mistake and does not have the effect of extinguishing Blagbrough's right to flow, use and maintain the portion of the canal located on the Blagbrough property. On appeal, A & T argues that: (1) removal of the canal easement language from the deed was not a mistake; and (2) easement rights in the old canal merged under the common ownership of the Dimelings, and cannot spring back. With respect to the first argument, we have held that [a] plain error in a deed will be rejected and the deed construed reasonably to conform to the intent of the parties. Reney v. Hebert, 109 N.H. 74, 75, 242 A.2d 72 (1968). The trial court found that there is no dispute that a portion of the canal lays within the Blagbrough property. The trial court then held that since the Dimelings actually did include a portion of the canal in their grant to Blagbrough, the crossed-out and penned-in language contained in the deed cannot be construed as reflective of an intent not to convey a portion of the canal easement to Blagbrough. We agree. As the trial court reasoned, the most sensible construction [of the deed] is that the deletion of the easement was based on the grantors' erroneous belief that the property conveyed to Blagbrough did not include any portion of the canal. After all, the crossed-out language of the deed pertains to flowage rights in the canal and the handwritten portion evinces a belief that no portion of the canal had been transferred. It follows that if the Dimelings had realized that they were still conveying a portion of the canal to Blagbrough, they would have retained specific language in the deed pertaining to the use of, or flowage rights related to, the portion of the canal that was conveyed. No such language appears in the deed. Accordingly, we reject A & T's first argument. As its fallback position, A & T contends that the canal easement was extinguished by operation of the doctrine of merger. Our rules affirmatively require the moving party to demonstrate where each question presented on appeal was raised below. See Sup.Ct. R. 16(3)(b); Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250, 855 A.2d 564 (2004). A & T has pointed to no part of the record indicating that it raised its merger argument before the trial court and we find no specific reference to merger in the transcript. See Sup.Ct. R. 16(3)(d) (moving party's brief shall contain statement of facts material to consideration of questions presented with appropriate references to the appendix or to the record); Sup.Ct. R. 13(2) (The moving party shall be responsible for ensuring that all or such portions of the record relevant and necessary for the court to decide the questions of law presented by the case are in fact provided to the supreme court.). Nor did the trial court discuss the merger argument in its decision. Where a party fails to demonstrate that it raised an issue before the trial court, the issue is not preserved for our review. Bean, 151 N.H. at 250, 855 A.2d 564; see also Broughton v. Proulx, 152 N.H. 549, 555, 880 A.2d 388 (2005). Accordingly, we will not address the merger issue for the first time on appeal.