Opinion ID: 2599848
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Using Aggravated Battery as the Predicate to Felony Murder Violated the Collateral-Felony Doctrine

Text: {9} In New Mexico, our felony-murder statute serves to elevate second-degree murder to first degree when the murder occurs during the commission of a dangerous felony. See State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 563, 817 P.2d 1196, 1205 (1991). In concert with the general trend in America of limiting its reach, New Mexico has placed five limitations on felony murder. See State v. O'Kelly, 2004-NMCA-013, ¶¶ 22-24, 135 N.M. 40, 84 P.3d 88. One of the limitations is the collateral-felony doctrine, which precludes the State from using a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder as the predicate to felony murder. Id. ¶ 24 (citing Campos, 1996-NMSC-043, ¶ 19, 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266). {10} The collateral-felony doctrine derived from our concern that the prosecution may be able to elevate improperly the vast majority of second-degree murders to first-degree murders by charging the underlying assaultive act as a predicate felony for felony murder. Campos, 1996-NMSC-043, ¶ 19, 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266. Thus, the doctrine requires the predicate felony to be collateral to the murder, which, in turn, precludes the State from using a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder as a predicate felony. See id. ¶¶ 10, 19. Moreover, applying the strict-elements test in the abstract, see State v. Vallejos, 2000-NMCA-075, ¶ 13, 129 N.M. 424, 9 P.3d 668, it is clearly not possible to commit second-degree murder without also committing some form of aggravated assault or aggravated battery. Thus, aggravated assault and aggravated battery may never be used as predicate felonies to felony murder even though some statutory elements of those two crimes differ from second-degree murder. Campos, 1996-NMSC-043, ¶ 23, 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266. Ultimately, the doctrine's purpose is to further the legislative intent of holding certain second-degree murders to be more culpable when effected during the commission of a felonythereby elevating them to first-degree murderswhile maintaining the important distinction between the classes of second- and first-degree murders. Id. ¶ 22. {11} Analysis under the collateral-felony doctrine is not to be confused with a double jeopardy analysis. First, under a collateral-felony analysis we consider whether the predicate felony is a lesser-included offense of second -degree murder. Under a double jeopardy analysis, we consider whether the predicate offense is a lesser-included offense of first -degree murder. Id. ¶ 22 n. 3. Furthermore, when the collateral-felony doctrine is violated, the defendant's felony-murder conviction is vacated, whereas when double jeopardy is violated, the conviction of the predicate felony is vacated. See id. Finally, when two charges violate double jeopardy because the conduct underlying each is unitary, the collateral-felony doctrine is not necessarily violated. See id. ¶ ¶ 25, 48 (holding that first-degree criminal sexual penetration was a proper predicate felony under the collateral-felony doctrine notwithstanding the fact that double jeopardy was violated because the conduct was unitary). As was stated in Vallejos, [t]he two doctrines are distant cousins if anything, and one acts at one's peril in drawing superficial parallels between the two. 2000-NMCA-075, ¶ 12, 129 N.M. 424, 9 P.3d 668. Double jeopardy is not at issue in this case. {12} Since it is not possible to commit second-degree murder without also committing some form of aggravated battery, Campos's conviction of felony murder would be legally void if the jury used aggravated battery with a deadly weapon as the predicate felony. We meant what we said in Campos : all forms of aggravated assault and aggravated battery will always be deemed to be non-collateral. 1996-NMSC-043, ¶ 23, 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266. On certiorari, the State concedes as much, stating in its answer brief: If . . . the only predicate felony for the felony murder charge was aggravated battery, the collateral felony doctrine would clearly apply. However, since the predicate felonies were submitted to the jury as alternates and we do not know which the jury relied upon, we are left with the question of whether aggravated burglary was an appropriate predicate and, if so, whether this cured any error.