Opinion ID: 7119194
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was the delivery sufficient to comply with the requirements of the statute of frauds

Text: The statute provides: ot: Wat constitutes delivery. “Except when otherwise specially provided, no evidence of the following enumerated contracts is competent, unless it be in writing and signed by the party charged or by his authorized agent: 1. Those in relation , ,, i _o i , i , to the sale ox personal property, when no part of the property is delivered and no part of the price is paid.” Code Section 4625. The statute of frauds is a rule of evidence. It does not -void the contract, but simply makes it nonprovable upon the trial, if the party seeking to avoid its terms interposes proper objections when it is sought by the adverse party to offer its terms and provisions in evidence. In cases of this character, both parties must intend to transfer the title, and the vendor must surrender and the purchaser must accept complete dominion and control over the subject-matter of the sale. The trial court so instructed. True, the corn was not weighed, but the defendant purchaser was to haul it away. The intent is the ultimate test; and under the evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that the vendor surrendered dominion over the corn, and the vendee understood that he, then and there, had possession thereof, and was to remove same from the premises as soon as possible. The act in the instant case constitutes a constructive delivery, since the subject-matter of the verbal agreement for sale is pointed out to the purchaser, and he is given authority to take it when he wishes. Under such circumstances, there is a compliance with the statute. Brown v. Wade, 42 Iowa 647; Smith & Son v. Bloom, 159 Iowa 592; Cable Co. v. Miller, 162 Iowa 351; Allen v. Elmore, 121 Iowa 241; Harris v. Beebe, 144 Iowa 735. In Welch v. Spies, 103 Iowa 389, a crib of corn was placed at the disposal of the purchaser after a verbal sale, and the vendor had agreed to shell part of the corn and haul it to a .place designated by the purchaser. It is held that the title passed to the purchaser, and that it was his loss when the corn burned. Delivery does not imply a physical change of location, but is to be determined by the intent of the parties at the time of the sale to transfer to the vendee the dominion and control over the thing purchased. II. Was the court in error in submitting to the jury the question of the sufficiency of the delivery for the purpose of passing title and the satisfying of the provision of the statute of frauds? ' error: harmless able, chance for vei 1C ‘ The question of intent is always a fact, question. 38 Cyc. 1525. The intent may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence, or both. It is the province of the jury to draw inferenees from the facts in evidence. Even though the trial court was justified in directing a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant in this case is not in a position to claim prejudicial error, for the reason that the court gave him another chance by submitting the question to the jury. The evidence warranted the finding of the jury, and therefore no prejudice results. See Doyle v. Emerson, 145 Iowa 358.