Opinion ID: 2602317
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: dram shop liability asserted against hillcrest health center

Text: ¶ 11 In Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, 1986 OK 41, 725 P.2d 300, 304, this Court rejected the common law rule of non-liability for tavern owners with respect to injured third parties, holding that one who sells intoxicating beverages for on the premises consumption has a duty to exercise reasonable care not to sell liquor to a noticeably intoxicated person. Brigance clearly limited the liability exception to commercial vendors of alcohol. Id. ¶ 12 Plaintiffs argue that the teachings of Brigance and its progeny should be extended under the unique facts of this case to make a non-commercial provider of alcoholic beverages liable to injured third parties for serving liquor to one who was then known, or should have been known, to be intoxicated. Plaintiffs concede that Hillcrest did not hold a license to sell alcoholic beverages, but argue Hillcrest engaged in an activity on the day in question that was business-related, as well as social. Plaintiffs point out that Hillcrest intended to apply funds in excess of tournament costs, including donations, to its continuing medical education program. Plaintiffs also stress that Hillcrest charged each participant $60.00 to defray the costs of the tournament, including the alcohol. In essence, Plaintiffs argue that by sponsoring the golf tournament and reception, Hillcrest engaged in an activity that was sufficiently business-related in nature that Hillcrest should be considered a commercial provider for purposes of dram shop liability. ¶ 13 In support of its argument that it is not a commercial provider, Hillcrest points out that it is a hospital which does not hold a license to sell alcoholic beverages of any kind nor does it have the concomitant right of profit from the sale of alcohol. In Tomlinson v. Love's Country Stores, Inc., 1993 OK 83, 854 P.2d 910, 912, we acknowledged the profit potential for liquor vendors as one of the driving reasons for imposing dram shop liability against the commercial vendor of alcohol: The Legislature has placed on every vendor who holds a license to furnish alcoholic beverages and a concomitant right of profit from its sale the responsibility to refrain from supplying those beverages to minors or to intoxicated persons. This Court made a similar acknowledgment in Busby v. Quail Creek Golf and Country Club, 1994 OK 63, 885 P.2d 1326, 1331, [t]he public regulates and licenses commercial vendors to sell and distribute alcohol for profit. The public has a right to demand that a commercial vendor act more prudently and with greater duty towards minors than is asked of a private person who hosts a party. ¶ 14 Although this Court has not directly addressed the issue of whether a non-commercial provider who has a business interest in furnishing alcoholic beverages to its guests loses its status as a social host, it has suggested that this is not the case. See Kellogg v. Ohler, 1992 OK 18, 825 P.2d 1346, 1348. Citing with approval Solberg v. Johnson, 306 Or. 484, 760 P.2d 867, 870 (1988), this Court defined a social host as one who receives guests, whether friends or associates, in a social or commercial setting, in which the host serves or directs the serving of alcohol to guests. (citations omitted, emphasis added). This definition suggests that a non-commercial vendor does not lose its status as a social host simply because it receives its associates in a commercial setting. ¶ 15 In our view, if a distinction between a social host and a commercial provider is to be made, the basis for that distinction is whether the provider sells or intends to make a profit from the sale of alcohol. Our earlier dram shop cases have acknowledged the profit potential for liquor vendors as the substantial reason for imposing dram shop liability against the commercial vendor of alcohol. Tomlinson v. Love's Country Stores, Inc., 854 P.2d 910; and Busby v. Quail Creek Golf and Country Club, 885 P.2d 1326. Other jurisdictions have also adopted this distinction, irrespective of how they ultimately decided the social host liability issue. See Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash.2d 457, 716 P.2d 814, 830 (Wash.1986) (J. Durham dissenting). Accordingly, we view a business that sponsors an event for employees or associates as a social host, providing the business does not sell or intend to make a profit from the sale of alcohol. ¶ 16 Hillcrest undoubtedly furnished alcohol on the golf course on June 20, 1997. However, Hillcrest was not in the business of selling alcohol for profit. It did not hold a license to sell alcoholic beverages of any kind nor was it regulated by the state for that purpose. The fact that Hillcrest charged participants $60.00 to defray costs of the tournament does not make it a commercial provider of alcoholic beverages. Koehnen v. Dufuor, 590 N.W.2d 107 (Minn.1999) (host of party did not lose her status as social host because she took money from guests to defray liquor costs); D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76, 524 N.Y.S.2d 1, 518 N.E.2d 896 (1987) (employee association which had its members contribute to buy food and alcohol for a picnic did not become a commercial seller of alcohol within the meaning of the Dram Shop Act). Similarly, the possibility that its employees' morale may have been enhanced or that its continuing medical education program may have received some donations as a result of the tournament, does not place upon Hillcrest the duty of care the law imposes upon a commercial provider of alcohol. Hillcrest occupied the status of social host in sponsoring the tournament and reception. ¶ 17 In other jurisdictions where commercial vendor liability has been recognized, there has still been a reluctance on the part of the courts to expand the concept of commercial vendor, even where the setting is a commercial one. See, Mulvihill v. Union Oil Co. of California, 859 P.2d 1310 (Alaska 1993) (Company sponsored a Christmas party, court determined company was a social host and could not be held liable for injuries resulting from furnishing alcoholic beverages to intoxicated person later involved in accident); Meany v. Newell, 367 N.W.2d 472, 51 A.L.R.4th 1039 (Minn.1985) (employer held Christmas party, employee became intoxicated, court determined that because employer was not a commercial vendor of alcohol that the employer did not fall under dram shop act); Johnston v. KFC Nat. Management Co., 71 Haw. 229 788 P.2d 159 (Hawaii 1990) (social host employer was considered a non-commercial supplier of alcoholic beverages and plaintiff could not establish a cause of action against social host defendant); Whitney Crowne Corp. v. George Distributors, Inc., 950 S.W.2d 82 (Tex.App.1997) (awards banquet was in essence a social event). But see Born v. Mayers, 514 N.W.2d 687 (N.D. 1994) (North Dakota Supreme Court said dram shop act creates cause of action against any person who knowingly provides alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated person). ¶ 18 In the alternative, Plaintiffs contend that this Court should extend liability to Hillcrest as a social host under the unique facts of this case, again stressing the quasi-commercial nature of the Hillcrest tournament and Hillcrest's active role in serving drinks, including beer, on the golf course. [3] Plaintiffs argue that the traditional reasons for refusing to impute civil liability to the social host, i.e. the typical social host is less experienced than the commercial vendor in dealing with alcohol and may be less capable of bearing the costs of liability, are not present in this case. ¶ 19 However, the implications of social host liability are very wide sweeping and have the potential to effect every element of our population, while commercial vendor liability implicates those entities most directly benefitting from liquor sale and distribution. See Reynolds v. Hicks, 134 Wash.2d 491, 951 P.2d 761, 764 (Wash.1998). To extend liability to a social host under the facts of this case would be a sweeping and broad expansion of the exception to the rule of non-liability. Plaintiffs have failed to offer sufficient reasons in this case to consider such an expansion. [4]
¶ 20 Plaintiffs next argue that Hillcrest entered into a joint venture agreement with Willow Creek, who Plaintiffs assert is a commercial vendor, and as a result Hillcrest is liable for Plaintiffs' injuries to the same extent as Willow Creek. A joint venture has been defined in Oklahoma as a special combination of two or more persons where in some specific venture a profit is jointly sought without any partnership or corporate designation. Three elements are necessary to establish the existence of a joint venture: 1) A joint interest in property (the contributions need not be equal or of the same character), 2) An express or implied agreement to share profits and losses of the venture, 3) Action or conduct showing cooperation in the venture. LeFlore v. Reflections of Tulsa, 1985 OK 72, 708 P.2d 1068, 1072 (citations omitted). ¶ 21 The summary judgment record is devoid of any evidence indicating Hillcrest and Willow Creek shared an interest in any property. Plaintiffs attempt to circumvent this shortcoming by asserting that the joint enterprise itself is the shared interest. Plaintiffs' interpretation of the first requirement is too broad and would effectively eliminate it as an element of the joint venture test. See Wickham v. Belveal, 1963 OK 227, 386 P.2d 315 (defendant's agreement to furnish horses, feed and facilities, while plaintiff was to care for horses and keep records in return for half of colts born, did not rise to level of a joint venture, it was more properly an employment contract involving an element of profit sharing). This Court is reluctant to find a joint interest in property wherever one party contracts for services with another. ¶ 22 Secondly, the uncontroverted facts demonstrate that there was no agreement that Hillcrest and Willow Creek would in some way share in the profits and losses of this tournament and reception. The billing records show Willow Creek provided and charged for services at a predetermined rate to be paid by Hillcrest. [5] Willow Creek charged Hillcrest for the lunch buffet on a per person basis and for the reception menu on a per tray basis. Willow Creek provided the open bar at the reception and awards ceremony and Hillcrest then compensated it for the drink tickets used by the Hillcrest guests at the club's bar service rate. There is simply nothing in the summary judgment record indicating Willow Creek was prepared to offer its services at a loss or reap additional profits depending on the success or lack thereof of the Hillcrest event. The second element of joint venture is not present. ¶ 23 The absence of any one element is enough to defeat Plaintiffs' contentions of joint venture. Here, two elements are missing. The trial court correctly rejected Plaintiff's claims of joint venture.
¶ 24 Plaintiffs urge that Hillcrest violated 37 O.S.1991 § 247 and that the violation amounted to negligence per se: No holder of a retail license or permit to sell low-point beer, or an employee or agent of a holder of such a license or permit, shall knowingly, willfully and wantonly sell, deliver or furnish low-point beer to an intoxicated person. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment in the county jail for a term of not more than six (6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Such violation shall be additional grounds for revocation of any license or permit for the sale of low-point beer as and in the manner provided by law. There are three elements required in order for a violation of a statute to rise to the level of negligence per se. Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas, Co., 1980 OK 163, 619 P.2d 613, 618. The party asserting negligence per se must establish that the injury complained of 1) was caused by the ordinance's violation, 2) was of the type intended to be prevented by the ordinance and 3) the injured party was one of the class meant to be protected by the ordinance. Id. ¶ 25 The first element requires Plaintiffs to establish that Hillcrest violated 37 O.S. § 247. Section 247 addresses the conduct of a holder of a retail license or permit to sell low-point beer or the employee or agent of a holder of a retail license or permit to sell low-point beer. Hillcrest is not a holder of a retail license or permit to sell low-point beer. Additionally, Plaintiffs offered no evidentiary material to establish that disputed facts exist supporting their assertion that Hillcrest was an agent of Willow Creek, the holder of a retail license or permit to sell low-point beer. ¶ 26 Because the statute does not apply to Hillcrest, Hillcrest did not violate it. The first element of negligence per se is missing. Accordingly, we need not address the remaining elements.