Opinion ID: 492734
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instruction as to Source

Text: 29 Even if Fuddruckers trade dress is protectable, in order to constitute an infringement, Doc's use may be likely to confuse consumers. The trial court asked the jury to determine whether there was a likelihood that consumers would believe that Doc's was owned and franchised by Fuddruckers. Fuddruckers claims this instruction was too narrow, and argues that the likelihood of any mistaken consumer belief that the two operations had the same source constitutes infringement. We agree. 30 Likelihood of confusion  'exists when customers viewing the mark would probably assume that the product or service it represents is associated with the source of a different product or service identified by a similar mark.'  Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir.1984) (Lindy Pen I ) (quoting Alpha Industries, 616 F.2d at 443) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188, 105 S.Ct. 955, 83 L.Ed.2d 962 (1985); see also id. at 1246 (test for likelihood of confusion embraces confusion between the goods or sponsorship of the allegedly infringing goods). Nothing in the Lindy Pen I definition suggests that actionable likelihood of confusion should be limited to consumer belief that the infringer is being operated by the original user. The potential for harm is equally great if the consumers believe that the infringer runs the original user. For example, if consumers believe that Doc's runs Fuddruckers, and they are disappointed with the quality of Doc's food or service, they may be deterred from patronizing Fuddruckers. Doc's points to no cases that hold that one type of confusion is more actionable than the other. 10 The court's instruction was error. 31 Doc's asserts that the error is harmless. We disagree. There was considerable evidence of actual confusion as to source. Fuddruckers' primary witness on the issue testified that perhaps one hundred times a week, consumers asked if Fuddruckers was owned by the same people who own Doc's. Another witness testified that people asked if Fuddruckers is associated with Doc's and if they are the same restaurant or not. Doc's witnesses testified that consumers occasionally asked if Doc's was affiliated with Fuddruckers. There was little or no evidence presented, however, that consumers asked specifically whether Doc's was owned or franchised by Fuddruckers. The jury might well have discounted the evidence of actual confusion because it did not precisely fit what the court instructed them to look for. 32 The factual elements that make up likelihood of confusion include evidence of actual confusion, the defendant's intent in adopting the mark, similarity of marks, similarity of goods and marketing channels, and the strength of the mark. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 782 F.2d 1508, 1509 (9th Cir.1986); Lindy Pen I, 725 F.2d at 1243; Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 646 F.2d 347, 349-50 (9th Cir.1980). The factors are not weighted evenly. Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir.1984); Golden Door, 646 F.2d at 351. 33 Evidence of actual confusion is persuasive proof that future confusion is likely. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 352 (9th Cir.1979); see Falcon Rice Mill, 725 F.2d at 347-48; Chevron, 659 F.2d at 704; Golden Door, 646 F.2d at 351. A showing that the defendant intended to adopt the plaintiff's trade dress is also entitled to great weight because a defendant is presumed able to accomplish this purpose. 11 Golden Door, 646 F.2d at 351 (citing AMF, 599 F.2d at 354); see M. Kramer Mfg. Co., 783 F.2d at 448 n. 24 (courts almost unanimously presume a likelihood of confusion based on a showing of intentional copying) (citing 2 McCarthy at Secs. 23:34-35)); see also Sno-Wizard Manufacturing Co. v. Eisemann Products Co., 791 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir.1986) (intent alone may be enough to support finding of likelihood of confusion) (quoting Chevron, 659 F.2d at 704); but see Lois Sportswear, USA, Inc. v. Levi-Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d at 867, 875 (2d Cir.1986) (intent is largely irrelevant in determining if consumers likely will be confused as to source). Fuddruckers presented credible evidence of both actual confusion and intent to copy. 34 In addition, the products and marketing channels of the parties were nearly identical, so a finding by the jury that the marks were very similar would have been sufficient to support a verdict for Fuddruckers on this issue. See Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 796 F.2d 254, 256-57 (9th Cir.1986) (Lindy Pen II ); Park 'N Fly, 782 F.2d at 1509; Golden Door, 646 F.2d at 351; New West Corp. v. NYM Co., 595 F.2d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir.1979). At least judging from the testimony and the photographs in evidence, the trade dresses were very similar. See Appendix I. 35 Incorrect instructions given in a civil trial require reversal unless the jury's verdict is more probably than not untainted by the error. Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720, 730 (9th Cir.) (citing Haddad v. Lockheed California Corp., 720 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir.1983)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 324, 93 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986). Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the verdict was more probably than not untainted by the error and must reverse the verdict on likelihood of confusion. See Jenkins, 785 F.2d at 730.