Opinion ID: 1405659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Quick-Ruben Failed to Meet His Burden in a Private Quo Warranto Action

Text: In order to sustain a private quo warranto action, the petitioner must plead and prove a special interest in the office which is the subject of the action. In State ex rel. Dore v. Superior Court for King County, 167 Wash. 655, 9 P.2d 1087 (1932), we affirmed the trial court's dismissal of a quo warranto action by the mayor-elect of Seattle to unseat the interim mayor because the mayor-elect lacked standing to maintain the action: It seems essential that the relator should plead some right or title in himself to the unexpired term, in order to be heard. Unless he has some interest, he can not maintain the action under the statute. It is no doubt true that, when the sovereign, the state or its proper officer, brings an action in the nature of quo warranto, alleging that one is wrongfully usurping an office which belongs to another, the common law rule places the burden on the respondent to show his title to the office. But when a private individual seeks to recover an office in his own right, we think he must plead and prove title thereto in himself. ... . . . . The language of the statute, whenever he claims an interest in the office, would seem to demonstrate the necessity for pleading title in the one bringing the action and seeking relief. We know of no reason why an individual plaintiff in actions of this kind, ... should not assume the burden of showing his title to that which he seeks to recover. A mere citizen, a voter or a taxpayer has no right to maintain such an action. It must be brought under the statute officially by the prosecuting attorney, or it must be brought by a person who claims an interest in the office; and the relator, having failed to allege facts showing that he was elected to fill the unexpired term of Mayor Edwards, has failed to show an interest in the office which he seeks. He, as mayor-elect for the regular term to begin on the first Monday of June, 1932, has no right to question the title of Mayor Harlin to the office of mayor in the interim. That can only be done by the prosecuting attorney or by some one who asserts an interest in the particular term now enjoyed by Mayor Harlin. Dore, 167 Wash. at 657-59, 9 P.2d 1087 (some emphasis ours). Thus, Quick-Ruben had to prove a present special interest in the Pierce County Superior Court Department 1 position to which he claimed title in order to sustain a private quo warranto action. The basis of Quick-Ruben's asserted title to the superior court position is his claim that he is constitutionally entitled to the office under the following rationale: At the time of filing for the office of superior court judge, Quick-Ruben was a qualified candidate for the superior court and Verharen was not because he was not a resident of Pierce County; as no election is required under CONST. art. IV, § 29, for a race with only one qualified judicial candidate, [5] he is entitled to the office without an election. Quick-Ruben's assertion of title in the superior court position is as illusory as his analysis is confused. In his reply brief to this Court and in oral argument, Quick-Ruben appears to suggest that the gravamen of his case is that Verharen was ineligible to file for the office of superior court judge because he was not a Pierce County resident. Quick-Ruben contends he never challenged Verharen's right to complete his existing term of office, and notes his right to challenge Verharen's eligibility to run under RCW 29.65.010. Quick-Ruben's attempt to transmute a private quo warranto action into a statutory challenge under RCW 29.65.010 plainly fails. RCW 29.65.010 allows any registered voter to contest the right of a person declared elected to an office to receive the certificate of election. Presumably, Quick-Ruben bases his argument on RCW 29.65.010(2): Because the person whose right is being contested was not at the time he was declared elected eligible to that office. Contests under RCW 29.65.010 are governed by the procedures of RCW 29.04.030. RCW 29.04.030(6) requires that for a challenge to the issuance of a certificate of election due to error or omission, an affidavit of an elector must be filed with the court no later than 10 days following the issuance of the election certificate. [6] Verharen apparently received a certificate of election to the office of superior court judge. There is no evidence whatsoever in this record Quick-Ruben invoked the provisions of RCW 29.65.010 or RCW 29.04.030 below, or timely complied with the statutory procedures. We decline to treat this action as one challenging Verharen's eligibility to seek the office of judge, as Quick-Ruben would belatedly have us do. In fact, had Quick-Ruben successfully challenged Verharen's eligibility to file for the superior court, it would have also affected Verharen's entitlement to serve the remainder of his term in office. If Quick-Ruben were correct that Verharen was no longer a Pierce County resident and such residency was constitutionally mandated, the result of such disqualification would be a vacancy in the office at the time Verharen ceased to be a Pierce County resident. See RCW 42.12.010(4) (providing that an elective office shall become vacant upon the incumbent ceasing to be a legally registered voter of the county from which he or she shall have been elected). WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 5, provides that such vacancy on the superior court shall be filled until the next general election by appointment by the governor, not by allowing the election loser to assume such office. See also RCW 2.08.120. Cf. State ex rel. Forstell v. Otis, 131 Wash. 455, 459-60, 230 P. 414 (1924) (noting the removal of a councilman from the ward for which he was elected creates a vacancy in such office). Quick-Ruben points to no authority which would confer the office on an opponent who was defeated in the prior election by a candidate who failed to meet constitutional eligibility standards. Instead, Quick-Ruben's electoral defeat actually deprived him of any argument he had a special interest in the office. In People ex rel. Duncan v. Beach, 294 N.C. 713, 242 S.E.2d 796 (1978), the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the same entitlement to office theory advanced by Quick-Ruben here, and held the result of the vote favoring the petitioner's opponent, while not effective to give the opponent legal entitlement to the office due to his age ineligibility, was nonetheless legally effective in excluding the petitioner from entitlement to that office; noting the one clear result of the election was that the voters rejected the petitioner. Having thus been defeated in the election, the petitioner had no legal right to assume office by virtue of the election. Duncan, 294 N.C. at 716-721, 242 S.E.2d at 798-801. See also 29 C.J.S. Elections § 243, at 676-77 (1965 & Supp.1997) (collecting cases at n. 93) (noting when a majority or plurality of votes are cast for an ineligible candidate, the fact that the winning candidate is ineligible and not qualified to take office does not entitle the runner-up to be declared elected to the contested office). [7] Quick-Ruben failed to show any special interest in the office of Pierce County superior court judge. Having failed to establish such special interest, he has thus failed to meet his burden to sustain the private quo warranto action he chose to pursue. [8]