Opinion ID: 767218
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Sentencing of Tocco

Text: 116 The district court sentenced Tocco according to the recommendation in the presentence report, finding those calculations to be accurate and correct. The report assigned Tocco a base offense level of 19, which is the minimum level for RICO convictions pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1(a)(1). Three points were added pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, which sets out the enhancements due to the grouping of the various counts, making the adjusted offense level 22. The court agreed with the report's conclusion that no other enhancements were applicable, so the total offense level remained at 22. The district court then determined that this case was an extraordinary case, outside the heartland category of cases, and departed downward 10 levels from the guideline range based on Tocco's overwhelming community service (4 levels), Tocco's age and debilitating health (4 levels), and Tocco's wife's poor health (2 levels). Consequently, the final total offense level was 12, and with a criminal history category of I, the court noted that the applicable guideline range was 10 to 16 months. The court sentenced Tocco to 12 months and one day for each of the three counts of conviction, to be served concurrently, followed by two years of supervised release, and recommended a community corrections center as the place of confinement. In addition, the court ordered Tocco to complete 705 hours of community service and imposed a fine of $75,000 plus and amount equal to the cost of incarceration and supervision (approximately $20,000). The district court deniedthe government's request for a forfeiture judgment. 10 117 The government now appeals, claiming that the district court erred in applying the § 2E1.1(a)(1) minimum base offense level of 19 rather than the offense level applicable to the underlying racketeering activity of extortion pursuant to § 2E1.1(a)(2). The government also claims that the district court should have enhanced Tocco's sentence for his role in the conspiracy, and for specific characteristics of the extortion crime including the use of threats, the discharging of a firearm, and because the total loss was in excess of $10,000. According to the government, Tocco's offense level should have been 36, calculated pursuant to § 2B3.2, for a guideline range of 188-235 months. Furthermore, the government contends that the district court erred in departing downward ten levels. We will discuss each argument below. 118 At the outset, we note that we can recall no presentence report comparable to the one pertaining to Tocco in the instant case, containing what might well be construed as arguments that Tocco was not involved in most of the criminal activity of which he was convicted. The report takes pains to discredit the testimony of Angelo Polizzi, a key witness for the government, referring to his criminal offenses, the loss of his license to practice law, and his receiving a sentence of probation in connection with his testimony. 119 It also makes reference to the affidavit of Tocco's deceased former attorney and to the statements of other defense attorneys who maintain that Tocco has been under constant FBI surveillance, and that certain past events justify any feelings of harassment that he may hold against the government. The probation officer concluded that surveillance never produced a single instance where JACK WILLIAM TOCCO was observed committing a crime or overheard discussing a crime, and then added that [n]o evidence was introduced that JACK WILLIAM TOCCO has ever been in the company of all of the six men who are alleged by the Indictment to be 'capos' of the alleged Detroit organized crime group. Also along those lines, the report criticizes the government for its longstanding pursuit of Tocco, stating that Tocco has been under investigation for thirty years and for some reason, the government waited until 1996, or until the defendant was aged and infirm, to indict him. 120 Overall, the probation office appears to have been preoccupied with expressing its concern that Tocco was unjustly pursued by the government or that his conviction was based on evidence that was not credible. We have addressed the concerns regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, and we will not reconsider those concerns at this juncture. Rather, we must focus on whether Tocco was lawfully and appropriately sentenced pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines with reference to the record in this case, keeping in mind the three counts on which Tocco was convicted. 121 We now turn to the government's assignments of error. 122 (1) The proper base offense level 123 First, the government contends that the district court erred in determining the base offense level for Tocco's RICO conviction. Because the proper application of the guidelines is a question of law, we will review this issue de novo. United States v. Bazel, 80 F.3d 1140, 1141 (6th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Morgano, 39 F.3d 1358, 1378 (7th Cir. 1994). 124 The appropriate offense level should be determined by reference to U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1, which provides that the base offense level for unlawful conduct related toracketeer influenced and corrupt organizations is either 19 or the offense level applicable to the underlying racketeering activity, whichever is greater. Here, the district court concluded, consistently with the recommendation in the presentence report, that 19 was the appropriate base offense level in this case. The report reviewed all of the overt acts of Tocco and determined that the guideline for the underlying offense was § 2E3.1, relating to gambling offenses, which requires a base offense level of 12. Because the RICO minimum is 19 was higher, the court used that number as the base offense level for sentencing purposes. 125 The government argues that the extortion of Ramzi Yaldoo produced the highest base offense level as that level would have been calculated under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2, which pertains to extortion by force or threats. According to the government's calculations, that extortion would dictate a base offense level of 18 and would be increased by 10 levels because that crime involved an express or implied threat of death, bodily injury, or kidnapping (increase of 2 levels, § 2B3.2(b)(1)), a loss in excess of $10,000 (increase of 1 level, § 2B3.2(b)(2)), and the discharge of a weapon (increase of 7 levels, § 2B3.2(b)(3)(A)(i)). 11 In addition, as we will discuss below, the government advocates an increase of 3 levels for Tocco's supervisory role pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). Finally, the government argues that a 5-level enhancement for grouping the offenses is appropriate under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3. Thus, if the enhancements included by the government were applicable, Tocco's offense level applicable to the conduct related to the underlying racketeering activity would be 36 [18 + 2 + 1 + 7 + 3 + 5 = 36]. According to the government, the minimum base offense level of 19 under subsection (a)(1) would produce an offense level of 22, adding only the 3-level enhancement for a supervisory role to the base offense level of 19 [19 + 3 = 22]. Thus, because using the offense level applicable to the racketeering activity produces a higher adjusted level, the government argues that the court must use that number. 12 126 We must determine, then, whether the district court erred in applying the base offense level of 19 pursuant to § 2E1.1(a)(1) or whether, according to § 2E1.1(a)(2), the court should have used the offense level applicable to the underlying racketeering activity. The question becomes, then, what conduct must be considered in determining what constitutes the underlying racketeering activity. 127 In this case, Tocco was convicted based on more than one underlying offense. The government claims that those offenses include, but are not limited to, (1) the extortion conspiracy (Count Six), (2) the illegal gambling operation, (3) & (4) the involvement in the Edgewater and the Frontier Hotels, (5) obstruction of justice, and (6) the Harry Bowman murder conspiracy. Application Note 1 to § 2E1.1 states that [w]here there is more than one underlying offense, [the court should] treat each underlying offense as if contained in a separate count of conviction for purposes of subsection (a)(2). Id. In addition, that Application Note 1 directs the sentencing court to apply the adjustments contained in Chapter 3 of the guidelines to determine if the underlying offense would produce an offense level greater than 19. 128 Tocco claims that the government's argument must fail because there was no evidence adduced at trial to show that Tocco, himself, committed, aided, abetted,counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused the criminal activity that the government seeks to use against him, or that the acts of his co-conspirators were reasonably foreseeable in furtherance of a jointly undertaken criminal activity. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1). Tocco argues that the government impermissibly relies on the charges in the indictment, rather than what conduct was proven at trial, in determining the relevant conduct for sentencing. Tocco relies on the application notes of § 1B1.3(a)(1): 129 In the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, subsection (a)(1)(B) provides that a defendant is accountable for the conduct (acts or omissions) of others that was both: 130 (i) in furtherance of the jointly undertaken activity; and 131 (ii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity. 132 Because a count may be worded broadly and include the conduct of many participants over a period of time, the scope of the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant (the jointly undertaken criminal activity) is not necessarily the same as the scope of the entire conspiracy, and hence relevant conduct is not necessarily the same for every participant. In order to determine the defendant's accountability for the conduct of others under subsection (a)(1)(B), the court must first determine the scope of the criminal activity the particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake (i.e., the scope of the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the defendant's agreement). The conduct of others that was both in furtherance of, and reasonably foreseeable in connection with, the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant is relevant conduct under this provision. The conduct of others that was not in furtherance of the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant, or was not reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity, is not relevant conduct under this provision. 133 In determining the scope of the criminal activity that the particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake (i.e., the scope of the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the defendant's agreement), the court may consider any explicit agreement or implicit agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and others. 134 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, note 2. 135 We agree with the government that the offense level applicable to the conduct involved in the underlying racketeering activity may exceed the offense level produced by the § 2E1.1(a)(1) minimum level of 19, depending on what conduct is considered. The difficulty in this case is that the district court failed to make any specific findings on what conduct may be considered, and it failed to make any comparisons of the resulting offense levels from the underlying racketeering offenses. As we have stated, this case involves more than one underlying offense, and the district court must treat each underlying offense as if contained in a separate count of conviction of the purposes of (a)(2). U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1, note 1. 136 We agree with Tocco that he can only be held responsible for actions of his co-conspirators that were in furtherance of the jointly undertaken activity and that were reasonably foreseeable in connection with that activity. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. He is, however, potentially liable for the foreseeable criminal acts of others in furtherance of th[e criminal] enterprise even though he did not personally participate in them. United States v. Carrozza, 4 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir. 1993). The district court made no findings whatsoever as to what criminal activities were in furtherance of the conspiracy and what activities were reasonably foreseeable by Tocco. We remand these issues to the district court, and we instruct the district court to determine which underlying offenses may properly be attributable to Tocco for purposesof sentencing him under § 2E1.1. The court should then determine the offense levels applicable to those offenses and make the appropriate adjustments under Parts A through D of Chapter Three of the guidelines, using the [alternative] base offense levels in turn, and compare the results. United States v. Sarault, 975 F.2d 17, 18 (1st Cir. 1992) (determining that the district court properly followed the protocol of comparing the offense levels to determine whether it should use the minimum level of 19 or the offense level attributable to the underlying racketeering activity in sentencing the defendant); see also United States v. Damico, 99 F.3d 1431, 1436-37 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that parties agreed on four groups of underlying racketeering activity). 137 The district court should note that any enhancement for grouping pursuant to § 3D1.3 would be added to the offense level calculation in § 2E1.1(a)(2), but not to the minimum offense level calculation in § 2E1.1(a)(1) for purposes of determining which equation produces the greater result. See Damico, 99 F.3d at 1435 (finding that 4-level adjustment under § 3D1.4 caused the subsection (a)(2) calculation to exceed the calculation using the minimum level in subsection (a)(1)); United States v. Boggi, 74 F.3d 470, 473 (3d Cir. 1996) (reasoning that the (a)(2) calculation is greater because only the subsection (a)(2) offense level will receive a four-level adjustment under section 3D1.4). When the court arrives at the alternative adjusted offense levels, it must apply the highest adjusted offense level in sentencing Tocco. 138 (2) Enhancements 139 As we have indicated, the district court rejected the government's contentions that Tocco's offense level should have been increased because of the threat of death, bodily injury, or kidnapping (2 levels, § 2B3.2(b)(1)); because the loss exceeded $10,000 (1 level, § 2B3.2(b)(2)); for the discharge of a weapon (7 levels, § 2B3.2(b)(3)(A)(i)); and for his supervisory role in the offense (3 levels, § 3B1.1(b)). The court also rejected the government's contention that a 5-level enhancement was appropriate under the grouping provisions of § 3D1.3. Whether Tocco's offense level should be enhanced by the first three items, which are specific offense characteristics of extortion, will depend on whether the district court ultimately sentences Tocco pursuant to § 2B3.2 or some other guideline. The court did not address those issues below because it used the minimum of 19 as the base offense level and did not refer to the specific offense characteristics in § 2B3.2(b), nor did it enhance the offense level for Tocco's supervisory role. On remand, depending upon the district court's review of the application of the extortion guideline, the court must reconsider whether any enhancements under that guideline would apply under the circumstances. 140 At sentencing, after the district court announced that none of the government's requested enhancements were applicable to Tocco's offense level, the prosecutor asked whether the court adopted the presentence report's conclusion that none of the threats or acts of violence were reasonably foreseeable as part of the conduct involved. The district judge made no response or explanation to this pertinent question. We find that the foreseeability of the threats and acts of violence may be critical to the district court's analysis on remand, and we direct the district court to make specific findings with respect to that issue. 141 The government argues that the evidence supported a finding that Tocco was the boss of the enterprise and that he had a supervisory role over five or more persons, and that consequently a 3-level enhancement was warranted pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) 13 . The governmentpoints out that in the sentencing of Nove Tocco and Paul Corrado the court followed the recommendations of different probation officers in holding the two accountable for a two-level increase for each one's role in the offense as an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). Nove and Corrado managed John Sciaratta, John Jarjosa, and others who collected the street taxes for them. The government argues that adding the four other defendants in this case easily supports the claim that Tocco supervised five or more participants. 142 We find from a review of the record that the district court committed clear error in concluding that Tocco did not have a supervisory role in this case. As the government points out, the district court ignored the fact that the jury found Tocco guilty on Count Six, the Hobbs Act violation. The government's theory of the case was that Nove and Corrado could not engage in their extortionate activities without the permission of Tocco. The wiretapped conversations between Nove and Corrado showed that Tocco was the boss and that he had control over the extortionate activities of his underlings. The jury found Tocco guilty of conspiring to commit those extortionate activities in Count Six, indicating that they found Tocco to be the boss or manager or supervisor. Under these circumstances, we instruct the district court on remand to apply the three-level enhancement for Tocco's supervisory role in the offense pursuant to U.S.S.G. §3B1.1(b). 143 (3) Downward departure 144 As we stated above, the district court departed downward 10 levels based upon Tocco's overwhelming community service and support (4 levels), Tocco's age and debilitating health (4 levels), and Tocco's wife's poor health (2 levels). A district court's decision to depart downward from the applicable guideline level is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 91 (1996). Whether a stated ground for departure is a permissible basis is a question of law reviewable de novo. See id. at 98. Before a departure is authorized, the circumstances of the case must be sufficiently unusual and outside the heartland of cases to warrant such a departure. See United States v. Crouse, 145 F.3d 786, 788-89 (6th Cir. 1998). If we determine that the departure was not based on impermissible factors, we must still determine whether the departure was reasonable in terms of the amount and the extent of the departure in light of the reasons for the departure. See id. at 789. In other words, we must find that the reasons justify the magnitude of the departure. See id. 145 Based on our conclusion that the district court must revisit the sentence imposed under the guidelines, we further instruct the court to reconsider its decision to depart from the guideline range once that range has been redetermined. We discuss below our views regarding the downward departure in this case to guide the district court's decision on remand. 146 In Koon, supra, the Supreme Court discussed what factors may or may not be considered by a district court in determining whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted. The Court discussed some encouraged factors, which are those 'the Commission has not been able to take into account fully in formulating the guidelines.' Koon, 518 U.S. at 94 (citing U.S.S.G.§ 5K2.0). The court also discussed discouraged factors, which are those 'not ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.' Id. at 95 (quoting 1995 U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. H, intro. comment.). Examples of those discouragedfactors include a defendant's civic contributions and his family ties and responsibilities. Though those factors are not necessarily inappropriate, the Court noted, they should only be relied on as a basis for departure in exceptional cases. Id. 147 The guidelines list certain factors that may never for the basis for departure. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10 (race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, socio-economic status); § 5H1.4 (drug or alcohol dependence). With the exception of those factors, the guidelines do not limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, intro. comment. 148 The district court in this case applied discouraged factors in departing downward, emphasizing insistently its view that this was an extraordinary case. The court stated that this case was outside of the heartland of cases, presenting an extraordinary set of facts and is highly infrequent and rare. . . . It can be no rarer. The Court's [sic] never [departed in this manner] before and the Court does not contemplate doing it again soon. Then the court noted that the case has spanned over three decades and related to criminal activity that occurred over that entire period of time. The court also made the determination that Tocco did not have the type of absolute power that would justify him being held responsible for any and all criminal acts that the members or associates of his criminal enterprise may have committed or conspired to commit. Thus, the court was generally of the view that a downward departure was necessary. 149 With that as a preface, the court turned to the three specific factors on which it relied in making the 10-level downward departure in Tocco's sentence. We now discuss those three factors. 150 (a) Community service and community support 151 First, the court found that Tocco's extraordinary community involvement and community support warranted a 4-level departure. The court noted that Tocco had participated in no less than twelve charitable and civic organizations. A flood of letters poured into the court that strongly supported Tocco and urged leniency in his sentencing. The letters stated, among other things, that Tocco is a dedicated family man and a dependable philanthropist in the community. These circumstances, the court found, helped to show that this case is outside of the heartland of cases. 152 We addressed the propriety of a departure in similar circumstances in United States v. Crouse, 145 F.3d 786 (6th Cir. 1998). Crouse involved the sentencing of a successful businessman much in the same category as Tocco. Though the applicable guideline range for his sentence was 15, the district court departed downward 9 levels based on the defendant's charitable works in order to bring his offense level down to 6 so that the defendant would qualify for home confinement. The court noted that the community contributions consisted primarily of the defendant's time commitments and not monetary contributions. Crouse, 145 F.3d at 792. On appeal, we determined that considering the defendant's charitable works, though a discouraged factor, was a permissible ground for the district court to consider departing downward. See id. at 791. We found, however, that the defendant's community works, while significant, were not unusual for a prominent business man. The works included, but were not limited to, involvement in church activities, service on the boards of various organizations, and involvement in the Rotary Club. We concluded that, while some departure may have been warranted, the 9-level departure was unreasonable because the district court made no reference to the guidelines determining the departure amount. Rather, the district court sought to reach a certain result--no jail time--and it departed the necessary number of levels to reach thedesired result. Consequently, we held that the departure was unreasonable under the circumstances. See id. at 792. 153 In assessing the effect of Tocco's community involvement in this case, we believe that much of Tocco's contributions may have consisted of contributions of money, not time and energy. If that is so, then the factor could really be considered one involving Tocco's socio-economic status, i.e., his wealth and his ability to donate to various civic and charitable causes. Consideration of that factor is prohibited by the guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10. This, perhaps, is an expression of the ancient concept of justice that a man of wealth, position, power, and prestige should not be given special consideration in the law. In any event, a defendant's community involvement is at best a discouraged factor in determining the appropriate departure from the guidelines. 154 On remand, the district court must determine whether the community involvement of Tocco is substantially financial, which would prevent the court from considering that factor in departing from the guidelines on that basis. If, however, the court finds as a matter of fact that the community involvement actually involves significant contributions of Tocco's time and personal skill and involvement, the court may consider the factor in determining the appropriate and reasonable degree of departure if the court concludes that the case presents truly extraordinary circumstances. The district court should be mindful that any departure must be reasonable and must be guided by the structure of the Guidelines. Crouse,145 F.3d at 792; see also United States v. Morken, 133 F.3d 628, 630 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. McHan, 920 F.2d 244, 247 (4th Cir. 1990). 155 (b) Tocco's age and debilitating health 156 The guidelines note that both age and physical condition may be valid grounds for a downward departure. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1 provides in relevant part that although not ordinarily relevant ... [a]ge may be a reason to go below the guidelines when the offender is elderly and infirm and where a form of punishment (e.g., home confinement) might be equally efficient as and less costly than incarceration. With respect to physical infirmity, the guidelines provide that a defendant's [p]hysical condition or appearance, including physique, is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range. However, an extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason to impose a sentence below the applicable guideline range; e.g., in the case of a seriously infirm defendant, home detention may be as efficient as, and less costly than, imprisonment. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4. 157 The district court below determined that Tocco's age, 72 years, and debilitating health, which ordinarily would not be the basis for downward departure, was a basis for departure in this case. The court referred to the presentence report which described all of Tocco's illnesses, including arteriosclerotic disease, coronary artery disease, hypertension, renal insufficiency, labrynthitis, and diverticulosis. The report also mentioned that Tocco's continuing health problems required periodic monitoring. 158 We conclude that Tocco's age alone should not be considered as a basis for a substantial downward departure. Tocco was portrayed as remaining active in civic and charitable affairs and in carrying on (with family help and support) a number of business interests. The district court did not discuss any basis for consideration of Tocco's age as a basis of downward departure per se, as set out in the judgment. We observe in passing in this regard that eight judges of this court, still in service, are seventy years old or older. Many persons in business continue to serve in important capacities beyond seventy years of age. 159 With respect to the propriety of a downward departure based upon Tocco's physical condition, we note that it is possible that an aged defendant with a multitude of health problems may qualify for a downward departure under § 5H1.4 . . ., [but] such downward departures are rare. United States v. Johnson, 71 F.3d 539, 545 (6th Cir. 1995). In Johnson, the district court had departed downward from the applicable guideline range based on the defendant's medical condition. The defendant in that case had a profile similar to that of Tocco, being a 65-year-old man who suffered from diabetes, hypertension, hypothyroidism, ulcers, potassium loss, and reactive depression. Id. at 544-45. 160 The Johnson court stated that [i]n view of the fact that the defendant will be resentenced, the District Court should make more specific findings as to whether defendant has 'an extraordinary physical impairment,' or combination of impairments, worthy of departure. Id. at 545. We find that this approach is proper in the instant case. To this end, the district court might obtain independent and competent medical evidence to determine the extent of Tocco's infirmities and the prison system's ability or inability to accommodate them. Id. 161 We are concerned about the discrepancy between the district court's actions in Tocco's case and in the case of Anthony Corrado. The district court declined to depart downward due to the medical condition of Corrado, who had undergone seven bypass operations, had circulation problems, and had diabetes. We shall expect the district court to consider the decision in Corrado's case when it determines whether or to what extent to depart in Tocco's case. 162 (c) Tocco's wife's health 163 Pursuant to the guidelines, [f]amily ties and responsibilities . . . are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6. However, [e]xtraordinary family circumstances, i.e., outside of the 'heartland' of cases the Guidelines were intended to cover, can be the basis for a downward departure. United States v. Haversat, 22 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Harrison, 970 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1992)). The district court determined that Tocco qualified for a 2-level downward departure because of his family ties, specifically his need to be with his ill wife, who had cancer and emphysema. 14 The presentence report included an extensive and extremely sympathetic family history of Tocco, including information that his wife had recently undergone an operation, and that their eight children were successful and supportive. 164 Extraordinary and special family circumstances may justify a downward departure in exceptional cases. Usually, this factor is taken into account when a defendant personally is required to take care of a seriously ill spouse or family member. A good discussion of the type of circumstances necessary for such a departure can be found in United States v. Haversat, 22 F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 1994). In that case, the district court had approved of a 5-level downward departure from the guidelines based on the defendant's wife's severe psychiatric problems which had potentially life threatening effects and thus constituted a truly exceptional case. Haversat, 22 F.3d at 797. Though the court found that the defendant's family ties constituted a permissible basis for a downward departure, it concluded that the particular circumstances did not justify the magnitude of the departure. Id. at 798 (citing Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193 (1992)). 165 On remand, we instruct the district court to revisit this issue and to make specific findings regarding Tocco's personal involvement in the care of his wife or other family members. The court should consider whether Maria Tocco has alternate sources of support other than herhusband. On that subject we note that Tocco has eight children, seven of whom live in the area and one of whom is a doctor. 166 We specifically do not adopt the rationale in this regard, and in respect to other factors claimed by Tocco, applied in the case of United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648,652 (2d Cir. 1996), which approved a 10 point downward departure based on physical condition, charitable fund-raising efforts, and civic accomplishments. 167 Thus, we conclude that the sentence imposed upon defendant Tocco was imposed in violation of law and that it was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the guidelines for the reasons stated. We must, therefore, REMAND for re-sentencing in a manner not inconsistent with this opinion. In addition, we order the district court to furnish the government copies of any written recommendations from the probation office that have been and will be used in resentencing. Any confidential reports may be submitted under seal. 168 During the interim before re-sentencing, we direct the district court to consider promptly the government's motions for immediate revocation of Tocco's bond. Furthermore, in connection with resentencing, the district court should reconsider whether a term of supervised release is appropriate, and also consider the place of incarceration and its potential for monitoring Tocco's medical problems.