Opinion ID: 1122968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: requested jury instructions relating to sympathy for defendant

Text: Defendant's next assignment of error concerns the trial court's refusal to give four of defendant's requested jury instructions, all of which pertained to juror sympathy toward defendant. We review a trial court's refusal to give a requested jury instruction for error as a matter of law. State v. Brown, 310 Or. 347, 355, 800 P.2d 259 (1990). However, we review a trial court's choice among requested jury instructions that supply the same information for abuse of discretion. State v. McDonnell, 313 Or. 478, 496, 837 P.2d 941 (1992) ( McDonnell II ). Defendant's first requested instruction drew a distinction between the role of juror sympathy in the guilt and penalty phases of defendant's trial and further instructed the jury that a decision that death is not appropriate may be made on the basis of sympathy for the Defendant if that sympathy is based on mitigating evidence.  (Emphasis added.) Although the trial court did not give that instruction, the court properly instructed the jury about the impact of sympathy for defendant based upon mitigating evidence, as set forth in ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B). [18] Because the court so instructed the jury, we conclude that it neither erred nor abused its discretion in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction. See State v. Tucker, 315 Or. 321, 332, 845 P.2d 904 (1993) (stating that [i]t is not error for a trial court to refuse to give a requested instruction if the instruction given by the court, although not in the form requested, adequately covers the subject of the requested instruction). Defendant's other requested instructions stated that, in determining the appropriate sentence, the jurors may be influenced by feelings of sympathy or mercy toward defendant, even if those feelings were not based upon any mitigating evidence. Defendant contends that the requested instructions properly explained that sympathy for the defendant is an appropriate consideration in the penalty phase. The state argues that, under Moen, 309 Or. at 45, 786 P.2d 111, in which this court approved an anti -sympathy instruction, defendant's requested instructions were improper. We agree with the state. In Moen, this court approved a jury instruction that stated, in part, that the jurors were not to allow any bias, sympathy, or prejudice any place in [their] deliberations. 309 Or. at 87, 93, 786 P.2d 111. In finding that instruction to be proper, this court specifically discussed whether it was permissible for a penalty-phase instruction to appeal generally to the jurors' sympathy and concluded that such an instruction would be impermissible. Id. at 91-93, 786 P.2d 111. In doing so, the court stated that general sympathy, or any emotionalism, has no place in a capital sentencing decision, just as it has no place in the jury's deliberations during the guilt phase. Id. at 92, 786 P.2d 111. Rather, any instruction that appeals to the jurors' sympathies also must instruct the jurors that such sympathy must be based upon the mitigating evidence before them. Id. at 93, 786 P.2d 111. Although Moen concerned an anti-sympathy instruction, its reasoning is applicable here. Consequently, we conclude that, as a matter of law, the trial court properly refused to give defendant's requested instructions.