Opinion ID: 174627
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Building’s Security

Text: The Government also argues that “Carriger is distinguishable because [the] common area of that building was secure,” while “[t]he rear entrance door [of the Alms Hill Apartments] was - 16 - No. 07-4060 United States v. Kimber equipped with a key pad security lock that was easily and frequently circumvented with a shove or kick.” Appellee Br. at 14-15. In Carriger, we held that the tenant of a locked apartment building possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy even though the officer used no force at all to enter; in that case, the officer accessed the building by waiting for two workmen to enter and following them inside before the door closed. 541 F.2d at 548. We observed that “[w]hether the officer entered forcibly . . . or by guile through a normally locked entrance door, there can be no difference in the tenant’s subjective expectation of privacy, and no difference in the degree of privacy that the Fourth Amendment protects.” Id. at 551. In other words, the appropriate inquiry was not whether it was physically possible for an officer to gain entry, but rather, whether the tenant would have expected him to do so and whether society would regard such expectation as reasonable. Cf. United States v. Dillard, 438 F.3d 675, 682 (6th Cir. 2006) (“A person has [a legitimate] expectation of privacy if he has a subjective expectation of privacy, and if society is prepared to recognize that expectation as objectively reasonable.” (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring))). If it was subjectively unexpected and objectively unreasonable for the officer in Carriger to circumvent a lock by following workmen into the building, it was certainly no less so for Grubbs, Stewart, and their colleagues to circumvent a lock by forcing open the door in this case. With regard to Kimber’s subjective expectation of privacy, there is no evidence that Kimber knew or should have known that the lock could be circumvented in this manner. Nothing in the record suggests that the lock’s fallibility was common knowledge to residents and guests of the Alms Hill Apartments. To - 17 - No. 07-4060 United States v. Kimber the contrary, Grubbs testified that when he had visited the building the previous week, he was unable to gain entry until an unidentified person (not necessarily a resident or guest) demonstrated the dooropening technique to him. This is affirmative evidence that the lock’s fallibility was not open and obvious, and therefore, that it had no bearing on Kimber’s subjective expectation of privacy. The government’s assertion that the lock was “frequently circumvented” has no basis in the record.10 Further, we have no doubt that society would recognize Kimber’s subjective expectation of privacy as reasonable. The Anglo-American tradition has long regarded the forcing open of locked doors by law enforcement officials with special disapproval (even where, unlike here, the police have a warrant supported by probable cause). See Semayne’s Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195-96 (K.B. 1603) (“[T]he law . . . abhors the destruction or breaking of any house (which is for the habitation and safety of man) by which great damage and inconvenience might ensue . . . .”); see also Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-34 & n.2 (1995) (discussing common-law and colonial authorities). Accordingly, we cannot affirm on this alternative basis, either. 10 We do not mean to imply that the mere existence of a lock mechanism will always create a subjective expectation of privacy. In United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1966), a case that we distinguished in Carriger, the Second Circuit found no reasonable expectation of privacy where “[t]he apartment building had a hall door which was meant to be kept locked, but there was testimony that the door was often open, and even if closed, its lock was broken . . . .” Carriger, 541 U.S. at 549 (citing Conti). Similarly, in United States v. Miravalles, 280 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2002), the Eleventh Circuit distinguished Carriger, noting that the officers had entered through a door that was “designed to be locked and function with an electronic card mechanism,” but the lock “at times did not work and was not working when the officers arrived,” such that “[t]here was nothing to prevent anyone and everyone who wanted to do so from walking in . . . .” Id. at 1329, 1333. In those cases, the total, habitual lack of security would have been obvious to all residents, thus precluding any subjective expectation of privacy. Here, by contrast, the record does not suggest that residents (or guests) would have had any reason to believe that the lock was compromised. - 18 - No. 07-4060 United States v. Kimber