Opinion ID: 196879
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Section 1151

Text: 21 Definition of Indian Country 22 The obvious question, then, is what constitutes Indian country. Congress has defined the term as including 23 (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, ... (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments.... 24 18 U.S.C. § 1151; see Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123, 113 S.Ct. 1985, 1990-91, 124 L.Ed.2d 30 (1993) (noting broad nature of definition); United States v. Levesque, 681 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir.) (discussing origins of § 1151(b)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1089, 103 S.Ct. 574, 74 L.Ed.2d 936 (1982); Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 1995 WL 462232,  1- 5 (D.Alaska Aug. 2, 1995) (detailing the history of the concept of Indian country). Here, as the housing site is neither part of a formal reservation nor an allotment, the present dispute is over whether it constitutes a dependent Indian community for purposes of subsection (b) of section 1151, a dispute we discuss at length below. 25 Before addressing that issue, however, we recognize that, as the State notes, section 1151 on its face is concerned only with criminal jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the definition provided in section 1151 applies to questions of both criminal and civil jurisdiction. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. at 208, 107 S.Ct. at 1088; see also DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 427, 95 S.Ct. at 1084-85. Elsewhere, the Court has simply defined Indian country in civil cases in terms closely paralleling those of section 1151, while citing to that statute. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 510 U.S. 994, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2214, 2217 n. 2, 132 L.Ed.2d 400 (1995); Sac and Fox, 508 U.S. at 123, 113 S.Ct. at 1990-91. Other circuits have followed suit. See, e.g., Buzzard v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 992 F.2d 1073, 1076 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 510 U.S. 994, 114 S.Ct. 555, 126 L.Ed.2d 456 (1993); Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1390 (9th Cir.1988); Indian Country, U.S.A., 829 F.2d at 973; see also United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 838 n. 3 (8th Cir.1981) (applying § 1151 in determining whether a housing project was a dependent Indian community), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823, 103 S.Ct. 52, 74 L.Ed.2d 58 (1982). It appears manifest that we can, and should, do the same. 26 The State would have us conclude otherwise. First, it calls our attention to Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation v. County of Yakima, 903 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir.1990), aff'd on other grounds, 502 U.S. 251, 112 S.Ct. 683, 116 L.Ed.2d 687 (1992). In that case, the Ninth Circuit refused to apply section 1151 to the question of whether fee patented land could be taxed by the state. The court's refusal was based on the reality that, on its terms, section 1151 is a criminal statute, as well as the fact that the taxing power at issue was governed by a noncriminal federal statutory scheme. Id. at 1215. The Yakima court made its brief analysis without mentioning any of the Supreme Court cases cited above. The State looks to Yakima as support for its argument that to transplant section 1151 into the civil context would go against both the plain meaning of the statute and congressional intent. We reject the State's suggestion that we follow the Ninth Circuit's logic in Yakima, since to the extent that case supports the conclusion that section 1151 only applies in criminal cases, 8 it directly contradicts the guidance of the Supreme Court. See Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at ---- n. 2, 115 S.Ct. at 2217 n. 2; Sac and Fox, 508 U.S. at 123, 113 S.Ct. at 1990-91; Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. at 1087; DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 427, 95 S.Ct. at 1084-85; see also Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1540 (10th Cir.1995) (rejecting argument that definition only applies in criminal cases). 27 Second, the State delves into the Supreme Court cases that provide that section 1151 applies in the civil context, attempting to distinguish them from the present case, questioning their logic and underpinnings, and concluding that the premise that section 1151 is relevant in determining a state's civil regulatory authority is in serious question. We need not address these arguments in detail. See Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1540 n. 10 (rejecting similar arguments). Aside from the fact that the Court reiterated its reliance on section 1151 for questions of civil jurisdiction as recently as 1995, see Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at ---- n. 2, 115 S.Ct. at 2217 n. 2, we see no reason why the Court should not seize on the definition Congress has offered of what constitutes Indian country in the context of criminal jurisdiction to inform its analysis of Indian country in questions of civil jurisdiction. See Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 28 (noting historical and statutory support for Supreme Court application of § 1151 to questions of civil jurisdiction).