Opinion ID: 1739694
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the post conviction relief act

Text: Irving first alleges that any errors not asserted on direct appeal should not be procedurally barred by Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-1, et. seq, also known as the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act. To do so, according to Irving, would unconstitutionally limit this Court's review. Furthermore, as the Act was passed well after Irving's trial, he argues that it cannot constitutionally be applied retroactively to him. He argues that traditional review under the writ of error coram nobis should be applied to his case, particularly since he is laboring under a sentence of death. As the State argues, the Post-Conviction Relief Act is not a new concept in Mississippi jurisprudence; it merely codifies existing constraints on review traditionally practiced by this Court. In recent cases, it has been repeatedly upheld as mandating that issues not raised on direct review are waived, and issues addressed on direct review are res judicata; both, procedurally barred. Stringer v. State, 485 So.2d 274 (Miss. 1986); Dufour v. State, 483 So.2d 307 (Miss. 1985); Tokman v. State, 475 So.2d 457 (Miss. 1985); Leatherwood v. State, 473 So.2d 964 (Miss. 1985). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the States have legitimate reasons for procedurally barring certain claims. In Murray v. Carrier, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986), speaking in the context of failure to raise an objection at trial, the Court said that the defendant attempting to justify a procedural default must show cause and prejudice. The standard rests not only on the need to deter intentional defaults but on a judgment that the costs of federal habeas review `are particularly high when a trial default has barred a prisoner from obtaining adjudication of his constitutional claim in the state courts.' Engle [ v. Isaac ], 456 U.S. [107] at 128 [102 S.Ct. 1558, at 1572, 71 L.Ed.2d 783]. ___ U.S. at ___ 106 S.Ct. at 2645, 91 L.Ed.2d at 407. The Court went on to hold that showing cause for the default rests not on the type of error made by counsel, as long as counsel was effective under the Strickland standard. Instead, we think that the existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule. ___ U.S. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2646, 91 L.Ed.2d at 408. Citing Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984), the Court held that the same standard applied when the claim was defaulted on appeal, rather than at trial. The result was affirmed in Smith v. Murray, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986). There, the Court went further than Carrier in delineating what constitutes cause for a procedural default. This case will be discussed more fully in a later section of this opinion dealing with whether Irving can show cause here for his failure to assert certain claims on appeal. Suffice it to say at this point that procedural bars have been recognized by the United States Supreme Court as valid tools for focusing the attention of state appellate courts on all relevant issues that the defendant may raise at the time of his direct appeal. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, has recently reversed a death penalty case on grounds that the invocation of procedural bars by this Court has not been evenhanded or regular. Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621 (5th Cir.1986). The Court made the following finding: In the years immediately preceding Wheat's appeal the Mississippi Supreme Court routinely reviewed claims made for the first time on writ of error coram nobis. The first case where the court expressly declares that it will not consider claims raised for the first time on writ of error coram nobis is the case involving Wheat's petition. Wheat v. Thigpen, 431 So.2d 486 (Miss. 1983). In a series of cases following Wheat the court repeatedly held that it would not consider claims raised for the first time on writ of error coram nobis. [cites omitted] Yet, on at least one occasion following the court's announcement that it would not consider claims not raised on the direct appeal, the court has addressed the merits of a claim raised for the first time after the direct appeal. Caldwell v. State, 481 So.2d 850 (Miss. 1985)... . We are therefore persuaded that the Mississippi Supreme Court had not clearly announced or strictly or regularly followed the procedural bar at the time of Wheat's direct appeal. Thus, no independent and adequate state grounds exist to prevent federal review of Wheat's claim concerning the prosecutor's closing argument. 793 F.2d at 625-27. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21 (Supp. 1985) allows this Court to consider matters normally procedurally barred upon a showing of cause and actual prejudice... . In light of the discretion granted to this Court by statute, and practiced by the United States Supreme Court pursuant to its decisions, and in view of the likelihood that these issues will be reached by the Federal courts, this opinion will, where possible, give alternate grounds for resolution of the issues presented, other than procedural bar. As to Irving's claim that the Act cannot be applied retroactively to him, this Court has, under some circumstances refused to apply the Post-Conviction Relief Act retroactively. However, the cases in which this occurred involved strictly procedural questions. Perkins v. State, 487 So.2d 791 (Miss. 1986); Odom v. State, 483 So.2d 343 (Miss. 1986). The State argues here that Irving's claim is grounded on a substantive portion of the Act, under which his rights have not really changed. We adopt the State's argument, that the issue of whether the Act may be applied here retroactively may be answered affirmatively.