Opinion ID: 781039
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Cumulative Effect of Counsel's Acts and Omissions

Text: 99 We now assess the aggregate effect of these alleged errors to determine whether their cumulative weight rises to the level of constitutionally deficient conduct. See Pavel, 261 F.3d at 216; Lindstadt, 239 F.3d at 202. This was not a case where defense counsel failed at all points to provide adequate representation. Cf. Pavel, 261 F.3d at 216-17 (finding ineffective assistance because, in part, defense counsel opted not to prepare a defense); Lindstadt, 239 F.3d at 201 (granting writ where [d]efense counsel made no challenge to the prosecution's only physical evidence). We note, for example, that the defendants' attorneys elicited key acknowledgments from the prosecution witnesses and offered some testimony refuting the girls' stories. Yet, as discussed above, defense counsel's performance at numerous key points of trial raises serious constitutional concerns. 100 While it is fundamental that acts and omissions that could be considered sound trial strategy do not rise to the level of deficient performance under Strickland, we cannot presently conclude that Eze's counsel's actions were grounded in trial strategy. This does not mean, however, that no trial strategy could have justified counsel's actions. Rather, it is that with the record before us, we are unable to assess with confidence whether strategic considerations accounted for Eze's counsel's decisions. As we know from previous cases, sometimes no adequate justification exists. In Pavel, for instance, counsel's strategy boiled down to a desire to avoid extra work. 261 F.3d at 217-18. Conversely, there may have been legitimate strategic considerations that came into play that are not transparent on a cold record. If, for instance, Eze's counsel had thoroughly investigated Dr. Lazoritz's medical conclusions and interviewed potential expert witnesses, the decision not to call an expert would not necessarily constitute constitutionally deficient performance. See id. at 225 (quoting Holsomback v. White, 133 F.3d 1382, 1388 (11th Cir. 1998)). 101 [A] district court facing the question of constitutional ineffectiveness of counsel should, except in the highly unusual circumstances, offer the assertedly ineffective attorney an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence, in the form of live testimony, affidavits, or briefs. Sparman v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam). Therefore, the usual practice [is] to remand Strickland cases to the district court to permit the attorney in question to testify and explain her actions. Jackson v. Leonardo, 162 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir.1998). Only in the highly unusual case where no plausible explanation for an attorney's actions exists do we grant the writ without an evidentiary hearing because, in such a case, a remand would be a waste of judicial time. Id. This is not one of those rare cases. 102 We therefore remand to the District Court to afford Eze's trial counsel the opportunity to explain the following acts and omissions: 103 1) Why counsel did not introduce evidence of Nnedi's 1988 medical examination, which revealed similar findings to Dr. Lazoritz's 1992 examination of Nnedi; 104 2) Why counsel did not call a medical expert to refute Dr. Lazoritz's conclusions regarding, inter alia, the significance of hymen attenuation and the significance of the lack of other injuries to the girls; 105 3) Why counsel did not call an expert to refute Henry's testimony regarding the behavioral patterns of sexually abused children; 106 4) Why counsel did not impeach Henry on the basis that her testimony concerning the greater probative value of inconsistent child testimony was self-serving — that is, that such testimony was proffered here to justify the inconsistencies in the testimony that she herself elicited from the children; 107 5) Why counsel did not offer evidence of the girls' prior statements to Henry, in particular their question about whether Eze knew what their father was doing to them; 108 6) Why counsel did not object to Nichols's mention of the objection to Eze's supervision or elicit testimony explaining the nature of that objection; 109 7) Why counsel did not object to the prosecution's use of Eze's wife's affidavit to impeach his credibility regarding his withdrawn citizenship application; and 110 8) Why counsel did not argue in her closing argument or through examining the witnesses that the prosecution failed to offer any scientific or forensic evidence that linked Eze to the alleged sexual abuse. 111 It does not appear that offering any of this evidence or advancing any of these arguments would have interfered with the defense's ability to make other arguments. See Jackson, 162 F.3d at 85 (finding ineffective assistance where appellate counsel failed to make a sure winner argument that would not have interfered with making other arguments). Notwithstanding the rigors of the Strickland standard, counsel's inability to justify her actions by some plausible trial strategy could very well lead to the conclusion that her performance was constitutionally deficient under Strickland 's first prong. See Jackson, 162 F.3d at 85 ([R]elief may be warranted when a decision by counsel cannot be justified as a result of some kind of plausible trial strategy.) (citing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986)); see also Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528, 533 (2d Cir.1994) ([A] petitioner may establish constitutionally inadequate performance if he shows that counsel omitted significant and obvious issues while pursuing issues that were clearly and significantly weaker.). 112