Opinion ID: 2997428
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jordan’s Claims Under the Direct Method

Text: To prove discrimination via direct evidence “essentially requires an admission by the decision-maker that his actions were based on the prohibited amicus.” Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 616 (7th Cir. 2000). It should not be surprising that in today’s politically correct workplace environment such admissions are rarely, if ever, made or encountered. See id. Therefore, a plaintiff may also “prevail under the direct method of proof by constructing a ‘convincing mosaic’ of circumstantial evidence that ‘allows a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.’ ” Rhodes v. Ill. Dept. of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004); Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1994). Nonetheless, under the direct method, circumstantial evidence “must point directly to a discriminatory reason for the employer’s action.” Id. (quoting Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2003)). Jordan argues that circumstantial evidence concerning Thompson’s disparate treatment of two other older women— Geraldine Steele, 62, and Pearlena Hammond, 65—at the Gary Health Department evinces his discriminatory state of mind and would allow us to infer his intent to discriminate against her. Jordan alleges that Thompson intentionally required Steele and Hammond to work together despite his knowledge that there was latent animosity between the two. Also, Jordan claims that, in order to make things tougher 10 No. 03-3772 on these women, Thompson rearranged their lab without informing them prior to doing so, denied them budgeted salary increases, treated them rudely and eventually transferred one of them, Steele, to a “trivial job” without cause. While we feel inclined to acknowledge that the circumstances described by Jordan are indeed suspect, and under other conditions may induce a finding of discriminatory intent on Thompson’s part, they did not occur in a vacuum; rather, they took place at a time when the Department was undergoing managerial, as well as structural, changes which undoubtedly frustrated and confused a number of employees. During the time period in which Jordan claims that she (as well as the other women) were discriminated against, conditions in the HSS and the Health Clinic were in a state of flux. As mentioned above, Thompson was in the process of instituting a number of changes to improve the functionality and professionalism in the division. Although it is true that Steele, Hammond and Jordan were required to undergo changes in their routines that may have been distasteful to them, other employees were also required to make adjustments. For example, Jodie Pryor, a 37-year-old female was terminated and three other females, Kimberly Peterson, 35, Tracey Roberts, 39, and Joanna Grimes, 52, all left the HSS during this period. This is not to mention the fact that Aleisa James, who was replaced by Ida Parker and Roland Carey, was not given her former position back after she returned from her leave of absence. The circumstances Jordan cites certainly describe a working situation which was anything but stable. In addition, the record certainly suggests that Thompson was not making many friends through his management style and the reorganization policies that he was instituting. Nevertheless, we are unpersuaded that the circumstantial evidence which Jordan points to under the direct method, especially when one considers the fact that the Health Clinic was in a period of transition, would allow a reasonable jury to infer intentional discrimination on No. 03-3772 11 Thompson’s part. See Sartor v. Spherion Corp., 388 F.3d 275, 278 (7th Cir. 2004).