Opinion ID: 2087446
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Estopped Party Is in Privity with the Party to the Prior Adjudication

Text: There is significant disagreement over factor three, whether the estopped party the statewas a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudicationthe Commissioner of Public Safety. Lemmer argues that we need not determine whether the State of Minnesota, as represented by the Scott County Attorney, and the Commissioner of Public Safety are in privity because the two entities are actually the same partythe State of Minnesota. The state contends that it was not in privity with the commissioner because it had no control over the litigation and had no authority to seek appellate review of the implied consent determination. The state also emphasizes that commonality of interest alone is not sufficient to find privity and suggests that the differing functions of the Commissioner of Public Safety and the state weigh against finding privity. We will address both parties' arguments in turn. First, we reject Lemmer's argument that the state and the Commissioner of Public Safety are the same party. In State, Department of Public Safety v. House, we concluded that a prosecuting attorney, who represented the state in the criminal DWI prosecution, did not have the authority to execute a plea bargain dismissing the subsequent implied consent proceeding, which was brought by the Commissioner of Public Safety. 291 Minn. 424, 425-26, 192 N.W.2d 93, 94-95 (1971). House examined the distinctions between the two proceedings, noting that the Commissioner of Public Safety was the individual party to the implied consent action, based upon the commissioner's statutory duties. 291 Minn. at 426, 192 N.W.2d at 95. In contrast, the county attorney acts as the attorney for the state in all criminal matters within the county and has no authority to act in civil cases, such as implied consent proceedings, in which the state is a party. Id. at 425, 192 N.W.2d at 95. These statutory distinctions remain today. See Minn.Stat. § 8.06 (2006) (granting the authority to act for state officers, such as the Commissioner of Public Safety, to the Attorney General); Minn.Stat. § 169A.43, subd. 2 (2006) (establishing that prosecution of DWI offenses is the responsibility of the attorney within the jurisdiction where the offense occurred); Minn.Stat. § 388.051 (2006) [6] (outlining the duties of the county attorney, which include prosecuting felonies, and to the extent prescribed by law, gross misdemeanors, misdemeanors, and petty misdemeanors). After examining the implied consent proceeding and the criminal DWI prosecution, we stated that the two proceedings were related only to the extent that they both generally grow out of the same set of facts and noted that the parties to the proceedings are not the same. House, 291 Minn. at 425, 192 N.W.2d at 94-95. We conclude that the reasoning of House remains sound and, therefore, conclude that the state and the commissioner are not the same party. Because we reject Lemmer's argument that the state and the Commissioner of Public Safety are the same party, we must now consider whether the Commissioner of Public Safety and the State of Minnesota are in privity. To determine whether privity exists, we carefully examine the circumstances of each case. Margo-Kraft Distribs., Inc. v. Minneapolis Gas Co., 294 Minn. 274, 278, 200 N.W.2d 45, 47 (1972). Commonality of interests alone is insufficient to establish privity. Pirrotta v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 347, 396 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Minn.1986); see also State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114, 124 (1995) (stating that privity is not established merely because parties are interested in the same question or proving the same facts); State v. Fritz, 204 Conn. 156, 527 A.2d 1157, 1165 (1987) (same), overruled on other grounds by State v. Crawford, 257 Conn. 769, 778 A.2d 947 (2001). Rather, when determining whether privity exists, the proper focus is on whether the legal rights of the party to be estopped were adequately represented by the party to the first litigation. Fritz, 527 A.2d at 1166; see also Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 403, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940) (noting that officers of the same government may be in privity, but that the crucial point [in determining whether privity exists] is whether or not in the earlier litigation the representative of the United States had authority to represent its interests in a final adjudication of the issue in controversy). This court bases its privity determination on whether the party to be estopped (1) had a controlling participation in the first action, (2) had an active self-interest in the previous litigation, County of Ramsey v. Stevens, 283 N.W.2d 918, 924 (Minn.1979), or (3) had a right to appeal from a prior judgment, Kaiser v. N. States Power Co., 353 N.W.2d 899, 904 (Minn. 1984). A party to be estopped has control of the first action if it has a choice about legal theories and proofs to be advanced on behalf of the party to the action and control over the ability to obtain review of the judgment. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 39, cmt. c; see Freeman v. Lester Coggins Trucking, Inc., 771 F.2d 860, 864 n. 3 (5th Cir.1985). Although the general rule is that litigation by one state agency is binding on other agencies of the same government, exceptions may be warranted if there are important differences in the authority of the respective agencies. 18A Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4458, at 560 (2d ed.2002). Collateral estoppel will not apply between the two government agencies [i]f the second action involves an agency or official whose functions and responsibilities are so distinct from those of the agency or official in the first action that applying preclusion would interfere with the proper allocation of authority between them. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 36, cmt. f. We conclude that in this case the differing functions and responsibilities of the Commissioner of Public Safety and the State of Minnesota are sufficiently distinct to support the conclusion that the parties are not in privity. It is undeniable that at one level there is a connection between the State of Minnesota and the Commissioner of Public Safety; the latter directs an agency of the former. But we do not believe that alone is determinative. See Huelsman v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue, 267 Kan. 456, 980 P.2d 1022, 1025 (1999) (noting that the fact that a city exists by virtue of laws adopted by the state is not determinative in deciding whether a city prosecutor and state administrative agency are in privity). The Department of Public Safety, which is headed by the commissioner, was established for the purpose of regulating drivers' licensing and safety responsibility. See Minn.Stat. § 171.015 (2006). That purpose is separate and distinct from the prosecution of crimes, which is the function that the state is serving in the DWI prosecution. The state specifically delegates the duties of prosecuting crimes to the offices of county attorneys and city attorneys. See Minn.Stat. § 388.051 (outlining the duties of the county attorney); Minn.Stat. § 487.25, subd. 10 (2004) (outlining the authority of attorneys of municipalities and statutory or home rule cities to prosecute certain crimes) (current version at Minn.Stat. § 484.87, subds. 2-3 (2006)); Minn.Stat. § 488A.10, subd. 11 (2004) (outlining the authority of attorneys of municipalities and statutory or home rule cities within Hennepin County to prosecute certain crimes) (current version at Minn.Stat. § 484.87, subds. 2-3 (2006)); Minn.Stat. § 488A.27, subd. 11 (outlining the authority of attorneys of municipalities and statutory or home rule cities within Ramsey County to prosecute certain crimes) (current version at Minn. Stat. § 484.87, subds. 2-3 (2006)). With respect to the prosecution of crimes, the state acts almost exclusively through county attorneys or city attorneys. The attorney general plays only a limited role in criminal prosecutions and then only at the request of the county attorney or the governor. Minn.Stat. § 8.01 (2006) (Upon request of the county attorney, the attorney general shall appear in court in such criminal cases   . Whenever the governor shall so request, in writing, the attorney general shall prosecute any person charged with an indictable offense, and in all such cases may attend upon the grand jury and exercise powers of a county attorney.). Therefore, although the Commissioner of Public Safety may have been an agent of the state in the license revocation proceeding, the commissioner's role and responsibilities are so distinct from the responsibilities of the state as represented by the county attorney that applying collateral estoppel would interfere with the proper allocation of authority between the commissioner and the state. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 36, cmt. f; see Cook v. State, 921 So.2d 631, 643-44 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005) (concluding that the different responsibilities of the Florida Department of Education, Education Practices Commission, whose purpose is to discipline educators, and the state, as represented by the state attorneys for the purpose of prosecuting crimes, supported a finding that the parties were not in privity). Moreover, the different functions of an implied consent proceeding and a DWI prosecution underscore the state's inability to establish controlling participation in the implied consent proceeding. In this case, the Commissioner of Public Safety and the state both have an interest in establishing that Lemmer was intoxicated. But this common interest is insufficient to establish controlling participation. See Pirrotta, 396 N.W.2d at 22 (holding that even though the school board's interests were similar to those of the appellant teacher where the school board acted on its own behalf without accountability to the teacher, there was no privity and collateral estoppel does not apply). The state has no authority over decisions made by the commissioner in implied consent proceedings and vice versa. See State, Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Mulvihill, 303 Minn. 361, 368, 227 N.W.2d 813, 818 (1975) (noting that license revocation is imposed by the commissioner regardless of the outcome of the criminal proceeding); House, 291 Minn. at 425-26, 192 N.W.2d at 95 (concluding that the county attorney has no authority to litigate implied consent proceedings without receiving permission from the attorney general). Because the state had no input into litigation strategy, the state cannot be said to have exercised controlling participation in the litigation. See Miller, 459 S.E.2d at 125 (concluding that privity did not exist between the prosecuting attorney and government agency because the prosecuting attorney's interest in having guilt or innocence determined is not met in an administrative proceeding where the prosecuting attorney has no control over the timing, substance, or litigation of charges); Fritz, 527 A.2d at 1166-67 (concluding that the department of consumer protection, which had the authority to investigate licensing complaints and could bring administrative proceedings to deal with license violations, and the division of criminal justice, which governed the state's attorneys who investigated and prosecuted criminal matters, were not in privity because the state's interest in having guilt or innocence determined is not adequately served in an administrative proceeding because    the state's attorney has no control over the timing, substance or litigation of charges lodged against the defendant by the department of consumer protection). [7] The lack of controlling participation by the state, combined with the state's lack of interest in the outcome of the hearing and the state's inability to appeal an adverse ruling against the commissioner in an implied consent proceeding, supports our conclusion that the differing functions and responsibilities of the Commissioner of Public Safety and the State of Minnesota weigh against the existence of privity. We conclude that privity does not exist between the Commissioner of Public Safety and the state in these circumstances.