Opinion ID: 4024341
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Various tools of statutory construction

Text: further support our determination that the Extender Statute displaces the 1933 Act’s statute of repose. Numerous tools of statutory construction confirm our conclusion. The statutory context and FIRREA’s legislative history clearly indicate that the Extender Statute displaces the 1933 Act’s statute of repose. First, when viewed in the context of FIRREA as a whole, it is apparent that the Extender Statute displaces the 1933 12 NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN Act’s statute of repose. Specifically, FIRREA refers to “statute of limitations” or “statute of limitation” in six provisions including the Extender Statute. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1787(b)(5)(F)(i), (b)(6)(B), (b)(8)(D), (b)(8)(E), (b)(14), (d)(4). Tellingly, three of the six uses refer to limitations periods better characterized as statutes of repose. Those three provisions, which set deadlines for appealing NCUA’s denial of a claim, employ the term “statutes of limitations” but they do not provide for tolling—the hallmark of statutes of repose. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1787(b)(6)(B) (“the claimant shall have no further rights or remedies” after 60 days), (b)(8)(D) (“the claimant shall have no further rights or remedies” after 30 days), (d)(4) (establishing a fixed time limit for appeal that begins to run on the date of the decision being challenged). This suggests that FIRREA uses the term “statutes of limitations” broadly, to include what are technically statutes of repose. See Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1230–31 (explaining that the absence of a provision for accrual or tolling in these three sections suggests that FIRREA uses “statute of limitations” broadly). It follows that the term should be given the same broad meaning when it is used in other places in FIRREA, including in the Extender Statute. And giving the term this broad meaning makes it clear that the Extender Statute displaces any preexisting time limitation in any action by the NCUA as conservator or liquidating agent. FIRREA’s legislative history also supports our conclusion. When submitting FIRREA’s conference report to the Senate, FIRREA’s sponsor stated that the Extender Statute should be “construed to maximize potential recoveries by the Federal Government by preserving to the greatest extent permissible by law claims that would otherwise have been lost due to the expiration of hitherto applicable limitations period.” 135 Cong. Rec. S10205 (Daily Ed. Aug. NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN 13 4, 1989) (statement of Senator Donald W. Riegle, Jr., thenChairman of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and sponsor of FIRREA in the Senate). Indeed, FIRREA’s stated purposes were to “strengthen the enforcement powers of Federal regulators of depository institutions,” FIRREA, Pub.L. No. 101–73, 103 Stat. 183 § 101(9), and to “strengthen the civil sanctions and criminal penalties for defrauding or otherwise damaging depository institutions and their depositors,” id. § 101(10). We have recognized FIRREA reflects a “policy of protecting the government’s right to recovery.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 478, 486–87 (9th Cir. 1991). This policy is best advanced by interpreting the Extender Statute to supplant the 1933 Act’s statute of repose. Thus, we agree with the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that the legislative history clearly “demonstrates Congress meant any ambiguity in the term ‘statute of limitations’ to be construed broadly.” Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1217 (noting also that “[i]t strains common sense to think Congress would have saddled the NCUA with having to comply with multiple federal and state statutes of repose”). Arguing otherwise, Appellees point to the Extender Statute’s instruction to begin the limitations period on the date of a claim’s “accrual” as a sign that the new limitations period must not displace statutes of repose. This is so, according to Appellees, because the concept of “accrual” is irrelevant to a statute of repose, which is generally triggered by the defendant’s act. Appellees’ argument confuses the statute’s use of accrual. The references to accrual simply reflect that the new timeframe for the NCUA to assert claims begins only after a claim accrues. RBS Securities Inc., 798 F.3d at 254; Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1229. Those references do not define the type of limitations period that the 14 NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN Extender Statute replaces. They pertain only to the limitation period that the Extender Statute creates. Thus, the use of this term has no bearing on whether the Extender Statute supplants the 1933 Act’s statute of repose.