Opinion ID: 386058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Meaning of the Term Repeatedly in the Occupational Safety & Health Act

Text: 20 Section 17(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 666(a), provides: 21 Any employer who willfully or repeatedly violates the requirements of section 5 of the Act, any standard, rule or order promulgated pursuant to section 6 of this Act, ... may be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation. 22 Section 17(a) provides the maximum penalty under the Act. Congress, unfortunately, did not define the term repeatedly. While other Circuits and the Commission have addressed the meaning of that term, it is a question of first impression in this Circuit. 23 The Third Circuit in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1976), the first to construe repeatedly, relied upon an analysis of the legislative history to arrive at a flaunting conduct test. In Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor (Todd I), 566 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1977), the majority there declined to adopt the Third Circuit's interpretation, but also declined to address the question of what generally constitutes a repeated violation. The dissent, however, would have required deliberate or reckless disregard of the requirements of the Act. Id. at 1332-34. 24 In George Hyman Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 582 F.2d 834 (4th Cir. 1978), the Fourth Circuit rejected the Third Circuit's legislative history analysis and flaunting conduct test. The Fourth Circuit instead required that there only be a prior and factually similar infraction. 7 In Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor (Todd II), 586 F.2d 683, 685-87 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its rejection of the Third Circuit test of flaunting conduct. It agreed with the Fourth Circuit that the Third Circuit, in derogation of the disjunctive or in section 17(a), equates repeated and willful violations. Todd II held that because the two violations involved the same facility, a similar hazard, and a similar condition, the second violation could be characterized as repeated, though the Ninth Circuit, as with the Fourth Circuit, declined to be more specific and pronounce a general interpretation of the term repeatedly. 25 In Potlatch Corp., 7 O.S.H.C. 1061, 3 Empl. Saf. & Health Guide (CCH) P 23,294 (January 22, 1979), a Commission majority finally construed repeatedly. It held that a violation was repeated if, at the time of the alleged repeated violation, there was a Commission final order against the same employer for a substantially similar violation. It then allocated the burden of proof. The Secretary, in making out a section 5(a)(2) prima facie case of similarity, must show that the prior and present citations are for failure to comply with the same standard. The employer may then rebut a prima facie case involving the same general standard with evidence of the (dissimilarity of the) conditions and hazards associated with these violations of the same standard. If the violations are of the same specific standard, rebuttal may be difficult since the two violations almost have to be substantially similar in nature in order to constitute violations of the specific standard. 26 The majority further held that a repeated violation may be based on a prior violation of a different standard or of the general duty clause if the Secretary showed the similarity of the conditions and hazards cited on the past and present violations. Factors such as the employer's attitude, the geographical proximity of and time lapse between the violations, the number of prior violations, and the commonality of supervision were declared irrelevant, however, to the substantial similarity of the past and present violations, though relevant on the employer's good faith and therefore on the assessment of the penalty. 8 The dissenting Commissioner would have required that the Secretary prove the substantial similarity of the conditions and hazards as part of the prima facie case, and would require that any good faith steps to prevent occurrence of the substantially similar violations be taken into account. 27 The Potlatch decision was handed down by the Commission four days before the decision in this case. The ALJ here held that the re-occurrence of violations of the cited standard at Destrehan on three separate occasions during the span of five years should have demonstrated that the methods used by (Bunge) to keep the elevator free of dust and debris required improvement .... It was on this basis that the ALJ held the violations to be repeated. 28 The three citations involved the same standard, but only the first and last involved the same condition dust accumulation. Potlatch did not address a section 5(a)(2) case involving a standard that proscribes condition but not hazard. Although this Court generally agrees with Potlatch, that decision does not strictly apply here. This Court holds that when the same standard is violated more than once, it is a repeated violation if there is substantial similarity of violative elements. In this case condition is the violative element, therefore the violation is repeated if the conditions are substantially similar. Here the dust accumulation condition of the 1973 and 1978 citations under the housekeeping regulation satisfy this test. 9 29 This Court disagrees, however, with the Commission's allocation of the burden of proof in Potlatch. Under 5 U.S.C.A. § 556(d), the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof, except as otherwise provided by statute. Absent a different allocation of the burden of persuasion by the substantive statute, both the burden of production and persuasion remain with the Secretary. Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 107 n.26 (D.C.Cir.1978). The Secretary must therefore show, in the context of a case like this, the substantial similarity of the conditions associated with the past and present violations of the same standard. See B & B Insulation, 583 F.2d at 1372 (Secretary has burden of proving all elements of a violation); 29 C.F.R. § 2200.73(a) (placing on Secretary burden of proof in proceedings commenced, as here, by the filing of a notice of contest). The employer in a case like this would then have the burden of disproving the substantial similarity of the conditions, or proving any affirmative defenses such as impossibility of complying with the prior citation, 10 lack of notice of the prior violation, 11 or lack of a reasonable time to comply with the prior citation. 12 30 As to whether the ALJ properly found the violations below to be repeated violations, it is unclear what standard the ALJ used. It is unnecessary to remand this decision to the Commission, however, because the Secretary showed that the dust accumulation condition was the basis of the 1973 and 1978 citations. 13 Under the standard this Court announces today the Bunge violation on review is a repeated violation. 31 For the aforementioned reasons, this Court affirms the Commission decision. 32 AFFIRMED.