Opinion ID: 1255464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Questionable Commentary and Injection of Personal Opinion

Text: During a search of Bennett's house, evidence described as poetry or lyrics of some sort were seized and determined by an expert to be in Bennett's handwriting. On direct appeal, Bennett challenged the admissibility of the poetry. We concluded that the search giving rise to the seizure of the poetry was lawful because Bennett's father voluntarily let the police officers inside the house. Bennett, 106 Nev. at 140, 787 P.2d at 800. Moreover, the police entry and search were lawfully conducted pursuant to a properly executed search warrant. Id. Because the police officers were lawfully present where the poetry was seen, and the discovery of the poetry was inadvertent, the seizure of the poetry was justified pursuant to the plain view doctrine, even though it was not listed in the search warrant. Id. Bennett renewed his challenge to the admissibility of the poetry in his petition for post-conviction relief, and for the same reasons expressed in our opinion on direct review, we again reject Bennett's position. In his petition, Bennett challenged various prosecutorial arguments based on the content of the poetry. Relevant extractions from the poetry read as follows: (1) There's a problem in this country and has a lot to do with being white. There's too many people with ugly skin. (2) I need to kill somebody or tear someone apart. I got to satisfy my need, cure this thirst for blood. So as I make the sacrifice by doing it just for you and kill this child, for it is a first born, I'm giving you my soul, Satan. Where is my reward? My thirst for blood is now calm, but it shall rise again. My power is so strong I need to cause some death. For Lucifer's inside of me, and I don't want to let him out. I look in the mirror, I see him in my eyes. I feel his heart beating in my chest, and I know it is not mine. For I feel so privileged for I'm with number one. I'm so f----' powerful and my reigning has just begun as I kill and kill again. I feel my rewards come on. My power's growing even greater. I'm so f----' strong for I am the devil's right-hand man. I carry out his every chore. I make this sacrifice in his name, Lucifer the Great, blood splattered on my face from the kill I've just done. (3) Someone gonna, someone's gonna die. Based on the subject matter of the poetry, the prosecutor argued that in my perspective, in light of victim Derrick Franklin, who is black, the poetry indicates an attitude of white supremacy. The prosecutor also argued that the murder committed by Bennett was a random, ritualistic, satanic execution. Finally, the prosecutor also argued that Bennett's own words condemned him, commenting that the jurors have it within their power to make sure that the defendant's prophecy that someone is going to die is never fulfilled again. Unrelated to the poetry, the prosecutor also commented: Our society doesn't like loose cannons like this running around on our streets. Furthermore, the prosecution suggested that the victim's brain had been turned into pulp and that, although Bennett did not have to look at what he had done except to gloat, Bennett picked up her head and said he could see all the way through it. Finally, the prosecution declared to the jury, In a real sense, I represent Michelle Moore [the victim]. Bennett contends that the above prosecutorial arguments were inflammatory, prejudicial, and not supported by the evidence, the cumulative effect of which mandates a new penalty hearing. However, the State insists that the comments were appropriate. Specifically, (1) the in my perspective remark was merely rhetorical, and the poetry seized in Bennett's room indeed supports an inference of a white supremacist attitude and a ritualistic, satanic connection; (2) the likelihood that Bennett might kill again and the argument referring to the jury's power to see that Bennett does not was supported by the evidence; (3) the loose cannon and pulp/gloat comments were appropriate based on the evidence presented at trial; and (4) the comment that the State represents the victim was insignificant  as the defense diligently tries to turn everything upside down and portray the accused as the victim, someone needs to represent the victim and someone needs to reiterate that the case at bar is being tried because the victim was murdered. In our view, the above prosecutorial comments were not improper. Even assuming that the in my perspective prelude to the prosecutor's white supremacist comment and the comment concerning the State's representation of the victim were improper, which is arguable, [1] they were nevertheless harmless. As this court noted on Bennett's direct appeal, where, as here, a guilty verdict is `free from doubt, even aggravated prosecutorial remarks will not justify reversal.' Bennett, 106 Nev. at 141, 787 P.2d at 800 (quoting Yates v. State, 103 Nev. 200, 206, 734 P.2d 1252, 1256 (1987)). Our reasoning applies equally to the propriety of the imposition of the death sentence, which, on the basis of the compelling array of evidence before the jury, is clearly justified, despite what may be viewed as some questionably proper remarks by the prosecutor. Moreover, the challenged interpretations of the evidence by the prosecutor does not lend support to Bennett's cause. First, the poetry seized in Bennett's room does, in fact, support an inference that Bennett had white supremacist tendencies and that the murder committed by Bennett was ritualistic and satanic. Second, this court concluded on Bennett's direct appeal that the prosecutor's comment, You possess the power to guarantee that Edward Bennett will never again make a healthy, vibrant, caring woman into a corpse, was not improper because there was evidence in the record to support an inference of future dangerousness. See Bennett, 106 Nev. at 141, 787 P.2d at 801. The prosecutor's argument at issue in this appeal remains the same argument that we have previously determined to have been proper. Third, referring to Bennett as a loose cannon, to the victim's head as pulp, and to Bennett's act of gloating over the deceased victim, was a proper interpretation of the evidence presented at trial and not otherwise improper or prejudicial. Failure to Explore Mitigating Factors Bennett contends that his trial counsel failed to investigate and present experts dealing with [his] mental, and psycho-social state thereby resulting in an inadequate consideration of the mitigating circumstances. He also argues that his counsel failed to present any evidence of the possibility of his rehabilitation. Of course, such claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be reviewed under the reasonably effective assistance standard articulated by the Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which requires a defendant to show that counsel's assistance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. The State contends that there is simply no legal standard that requires a psycho-social evaluation of the defendant in every capital case. The State also notes that Bennett's father gave emotional and convincing testimony concerning his son's background, and that the jury determined that Bennett had established three mitigating factors: (1) no prior criminal history, (2) his youthful age, and (3) alcohol and drug usage. As the State observes, the jury did consider Bennett's psycho-social status in terms of these mitigating factors. The strategy of Bennett's trial counsel conformed to the standard set forth in Strickland. Bennett's counsel elicited poignant mitigating testimony and, even absent a psycho-social evaluation of Bennett, counsel's representation was not deficient. As the Strickland Court noted: Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential... . A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Bennett's counsel performed effectively in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt and aggravating circumstances. It is difficult to imagine what Bennett's counsel could have done differently in order to obtain a more favorable verdict. We therefore conclude that there is no merit to Bennett's contentions regarding the failure of his trial counsel to present the aforementioned mitigating factors to the jury.