Opinion ID: 628610
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Individual with Handicaps

Text: 10 The relevant definition of the term handicap is critical to determining when a person can recover under the Act. For employment purposes, the Act defines an individual with handicaps as a person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment. 11 The plaintiffs argue both that they are handicapped under subsection (i) and that the City treated them as being handicapped under subsection (iii). Predictably, the City takes the opposite position on both of these claims. 11 Although the Act contains a definition of handicap, it does not define the terms used in that definition. We are not without guidance, however, for the Supreme Court directs us to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) regulations intended to implement the Act. 12 Those regulations define a physical impairment as 12 any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfiguration, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal, special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine. 13 13 Major life activities are defined as functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 14 14 According to these same regulations, a person is regarded as having an impairment that would constitute a handicap if he 15 (A) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated by [an employer] as constituting such a limitation; 16 (B) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or 17 (C) has none of the [above described impairments] but is treated by [an employer] as having such an impairment. 15 18
19 This court has previously held that a person is not handicapped if his vision can be corrected to 20/200. 16 Clearly, if vision that can be corrected only to 20/200 does not constitute a handicap, neither does vision that can be corrected to 20/60. Further, Maddox himself testified at length that his impaired vision did not substantially limit any of his major life activities. As Maddox failed to establish that his impaired vision substantially limits one or more of his major life activities, he is not handicapped under the first prong of the statutory definition of an individual with handicaps. 17 20
21 The City contends that Chandler is not handicapped because he failed to establish that his insulin dependent diabetes substantially limits any of his major life activities. Indeed Chandler himself testified that he did not consider his diabetes to be a substantial limitation on his major life activities. Given this testimony and the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we hold that Chandler failed to establish that he was handicapped by his insulin dependent diabetes. 22 Chandler advances an alternative argument that insulin dependent diabetes should be considered a handicap per se. Neither this nor any other circuit court has addressed whether insulin dependent diabetes constitutes a handicap per se. No explicit guidance is available from the Act itself or the DHHS regulations as neither expressly discusses diabetes. Chandler therefore bases his argument on language contained in the commentary to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations promulgated to implement the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA). 23 The ADA defines a disability in substantially the same terms as the Act defines an individual with handicaps (now an individual with a disability). 18 Stressing the similarities between the Act and the ADA, Chandler urges us to look to the ADA and the regulations promulgated under that act for additional guidance as to what constitutes a handicap under the Act. 24 The EEOC's implementing regulations for the ADA became effective on July 26, 1992. 19 In them, the EEOC uses the same definitions for key terms as does the DHHS in its regulations implementing the Act. 20 25 The EEOC also included an appendix to 29 C.F.R. part 1630 entitled Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act. In the Interpretive Guidance, the EEOC notes that the ADA term disabilities is substantively equivalent to the term handicaps in the Act. 21 Of particular significance to the instant case is another statement in this appendix. In its discussion of the term substantially limits, the EEOC states that a diabetic who without insulin would lapse into a coma would be substantially limited because the individual cannot perform major life activities without the aid of medication. 22 26 Thus, the EEOC apparently considers that any insulin dependent diabetic has a disability per se under the ADA. The issue remains whether this statement mandates that such a person also has a handicap per se under the Act. Nonetheless, we need not decide that issue today because even if we assume arguendo that Chandler is handicapped for purposes of the Act, he has failed to establish that he was otherwise qualified for Primary Driver jobs. 23 27
28 Maddox and Chandler in the alternative argue that they are handicapped under the third prong of the statutory definition because the City regards them as having such impairments. 24 They insist that the City regarded them as handicapped because it excluded them from Primary Driver jobs based on their impairments. According to the plaintiffs, this exclusion, by itself, constitutes a substantial limitation on one of their major life activities, i.e., working. 29 The issue of how limiting an employer must consider an employee's impairment to be before the employer is held to regard the employee as handicapped has been addressed by several courts. In Forrisi v. Bowen, 25 the Fourth Circuit considered the case of an employee with acrophobia (a fear of heights) who was discharged from his job because he could not climb ladders or stairs to certain heights, an integral part of his job. The employee subsequently sued under the Act, claiming that he was handicapped solely because the employer perceived him as being handicapped. The Fourth Circuit held that the employer did not regard the employee as handicapped simply because it found that he could not meet the demands of this particular job. The statutory reference to a substantial limitation indicates instead that an employer regards an employee as handicapped in his or her ability to work by finding the employee's impairment to foreclose generally the type of employment involved. 26 30 The Sixth Circuit held in Jasany v. United States Postal Service that, as a matter of law, an employee with strabismus (commonly known as crossed eyes) was not regarded an handicapped when he was fired from a position which his strabismus prevented him from properly performing. 27 The court suggested that a number of factors should be considered in determining whether a given impairment substantially limits an individual's employment potential. These factors included the number and type of jobs from which the individual was disqualified, the geographic area to which he has reasonable access, and the individual's employment qualifications. 28 The court concluded, An impairment that affects only a narrow range of jobs can be regarded either as not reaching a major life activity or as not substantially limiting one. 29 31 This court also has previously addressed this subject, albeit in abbreviated form. In an unpublished opinion, we affirmed the district court's determination in Elstner v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 30 that Southwestern Bell did not regard Elstner as handicapped. Elstner was employed by Southwestern Bell as a service technician, a job in which he was required to climb telephone poles as an integral part of his job. After Elstner injured his knee, he could no longer climb poles. As a result, he was demoted to a lower paying job that did not require him to climb poles. Elstner filed suit against Southwestern Bell alleging, inter alia, violation of the Act. The district court found that Elstner failed to establish that he was handicapped; that his impairment did not substantially limit a major life activity, and he was not regarded as handicapped by Southwestern Bell on account of his impairment. 31 The district court found that even though Elstner had an impairment, it did not substantially limit his ability to work or Southwestern Bell's perception of his ability to work. Instead, Elstner's injured knee disqualified him only from those positions that required climbing. 32 Southwestern Bell's perception that he was able to work in other positions was evidenced by its retention of Elstner in a position that did not require climbing. 33 We subsequently affirmed the district court's conclusion that Elstner was not handicapped: Because the plaintiff presented no evidence that he was substantially limited in [a] major life activity or in performing work-related functions in general, he was not a handicapped person under either federal or state law. 34 32 In the instant case, both Chandler and Maddox appear to have been capable of safely performing all duties of their respective positions except driving. Significantly, the City recognized their ability to perform most of the duties associated with their respective positions. The City was aware of both subjects' impairments when it hired them, but it hired them nonetheless. When their jobs were classified as Primary Driver jobs, the City did not fire or demote them to non-Primary Driver positions. 35 Instead, it retained them in those positions and ensured that another employee would be available to drive for them. Neither did the City bar them from promotional opportunities; they were only disqualified from applying for Primary Driver positions. And, promotional pathways that did not involve such positions remained available to both Chandler and Maddox. 33 An employer's belief that an employee is unable to perform one task with an adequate safety margin does not establish per se that the employer regards the employee as having a substantial limitation on his ability to work in general. The only relevant limitation perceived by the City regarding the plaintiffs' ability to work concerned their abilities to drive City vehicles on the job without risk to themselves or others. Chandler and Maddox failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support a finding that the City regarded them as handicapped. 34