Opinion ID: 2427524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Shah's Recorded Conversations with the Informant and the Undercover Were Admissible Under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E)

Text: We review the district court's decision to admit Shah's recorded conversations as co-conspirator statements under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) only for clear error. See United States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139, 173 (2d Cir.2008). In urging such error, Sabir submits that the recordings were inadmissible because he did not participate in the conversations at issue and was not mentioned in the course thereof. The argument is flawed in two respects. First, it misstates the facts. Shah's recorded conversations with Saeed and Soufan repeatedly referenced Sabir both by his first name Rafiq, see, e.g., GX 801T at 1; GX 812T at 1, and by his profession as a doctor, see, e.g., GX 807T at 3; GX 902T at 23-24. Second, and more important, it misstates the standard for admissibility under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Rule 801(d)(2)(E) states that out-of-court declarations are not excludable as hearsay if they are made by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. To admit an out-of-court declaration under this rule, the district court must find by a preponderance of the evidence (a) that there was a conspiracy, (b) that its members included the declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered, and (c) that the statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d at 173 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). Where, as here, Shah and Sabir are the only alleged conspirators, the district court was required to find that Shah made the statements at issue in furtherance of a then-existing conspiracy between these two men. [35] Such a finding was amply supported by the recorded statements of both defendants. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. at 175-76, 107 S.Ct. 2775; United States v. Tellier, 83 F.3d 578, 580 (2d Cir.1996) (observing that hearsay statements may themselves be considered in determining admissibility under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), provided there is some independent corroboration of defendant's participation in conspiracy). At the very start of his first recorded meeting with Saeed, on September 20, 2003, Shah identified Rafiq as his partner, a term implying some agreement between the two men to pursue a common objective. GX 801T at 1 (explaining that me and Rafiq are real tight and you always would see me with Rafiq); see Trial Tr. at 600. Shah made plain that the partnership extended to Shah's martial arts efforts, explaining that Sabir owned the building in Harlem where Shah operated his martial arts training center. See id. Thereafter, in recorded conversations with Saeed and Agent Soufan about joining al Qaeda, Shah repeatedly emphasized his partnership with Sabir and indicated that the two men would come to the terrorist organization as a package . . . me and a doctor. GX 807T at 3-4; see GX 902T at 23 (stating I come like with a pair, me and a doctor). Shah explained that he knew Sabir's intentions and did not need to speak further with him to make this commitment, a statement suggestive of an existing agreement between the two men. See GX 902T at 23. Moreover, on May 20, 2005, when Sabir met with Agent Soufan, he provided independent and explicit confirmation for what Shah had been saying to the informant and undercover agent: that Sabir and Shah had long discussed and agreed to support terrorists' pursuit of jihad. UC: And, I'm, I will offer you that [the oath of allegiance to al Qaeda], brother, but it is up to you. SABIR: So, you know this brother [Shah] here and I, I think, we have, I have to go with my brother because we have, we have talked about this for a long time, and because we have talked about it a long time, I feel it, uh, uh, not just that my spirit is with it, . . . but that if I didn't do it I will be abandoning my brother. And the very thing we agreed upon it in the first place. . . . [W]e are partners. GX 906T at 110 (emphasis added). [36] This record plainly supports the district court's finding that, as of the time of the first recorded conversation at issue in 2003, Shah and Sabir had already reached a tacit understanding to use their respective professional expertise to support jihad, and that Shah's statements before the May 20, 2005 meeting, like Sabir's statements at that meeting, were made in furtherance of that agreement. Sabir submits further that Shah's recorded statements were inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) because they were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy, but instead were idle chatter. United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386, 390 (2d Cir.1986). We are not persuaded. Shah was plainly seeking to persuade someone whom he thought could admit him to al Qaeda that he and Sabir were trustworthy and would, in fact, provide material assistance to that organization. That Shah's statements were sometimes vague and rambling does not alter the fact that, in their entirety, they were made in furtherance of an agreement with Sabir to provide material support for terrorism. In any event, Sabir does not show that any possible digressions from the conspiratorial purpose in Shah's statements were prejudicial. See United States v. Mercado, 573 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir.2009).