Opinion ID: 775727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Derry Evans

Text: 5 Derry Evans was convicted under the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a), of knowingly persuading, inducing, or enticing an individual to travel in interstate commerce to engage in prostitution; under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), of three counts of transporting an individual under the age of 18 in interstate commerce with the intent that the individual engage in prostitution; and under 18 U.S.C. § 371, of conspiracy to violate the Mann Act. He also was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) of money laundering and under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) of conspiracy to launder money. In addition, he was convicted under 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) of fraudulent use of a social security number. 6 Following his conviction, the District Court sentenced Derry Evans to 85 years in prison. Based on a total offense level of 43 and a criminal history category of VI, the imprisonment range under the Sentencing Guidelines was life. However, the statutory maximum punishment for the crimes of which he was convicted was 85 years. Therefore, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5G1.2(d) (1998), the District Court imposed consecutive sentences to the extent of the combined statutory maximum to achieve a sentence as close as possible to the Guidelines' result. The length of the sentence is not an issue on appeal. 7
8 Derry Evans argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to remove a juror who, following his exposure to other jurors' misconduct, refused to give unequivocal assurances that he could be fair and impartial. 9 On the fourth day of trial, in response to the complaint of one of the jurors--juror 15--about the conduct of certain members of the jury, the Court conducted a voir dire of the jury. In the voir dire, juror 8 testified that he had overheard conversations among other jurors concerning the lack of professionalism and lack of interest of defense counsel, and concerning television coverage of the trial. During his examination by the government's lawyer, the following colloquy took place: 10 Q: [Y]ou indicated that some of the jurors or a couple of the jurors had made comments about some of the lawyers. Has that affected your ability to be fair and impartial here today? 11 A: No. 12 Q: And as you said, you have an open mind completely on this case? 13 A: I'm not sure I can say that. 14 Q: Let me ask you this. In the beginning, you were instructed not to make a decision until you've heard all the evidence and the entire case is closed. 15 A: Uh-huh. 16 Q: Are you to the point now where you can't--let me rephrase that. Are you to the point where you no longer have a completely open mind? 17 A: Some of the content has affected me more than I thought it would. 18 Q: But have you--is it going to impact your ability to render a fair and impartial verdict? 19 A: I would certainly hope not. 20 Q: Have you made a decision as you sit right now on guilt or innocence? 21 A: That would not be fair. No. 22 Q: So you haven't done that? 23 A: No. 24 Q: And you're going to reserve making a decision on guilt and innocence until all the evidence is done? 25 A: To the best of my ability. Excerpt of Hearing In Re Jurors at 86-87 (emphasis added). 26 Later, during examination by defense counsel, the following exchange occurred. 27 Q: [A]s you sit now--and we have a long way to go maybe-- 28 A: Uh-huh. 29 Q: --in listening to more evidence--do you have any concerns or qualms about being able to maintain an open mind through the rest of the evidence? 30 A: I will do my best. 31 Id. at 90-91 (emphasis added). 32 Citing Thompson v. Altheimer & Gray, 248 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2001), and United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000), Derry argues that the District Court's failure to remove juror 8, despite juror 8's equivocal responses to questions about his impartiality and his ability to keep an open mind, was error. 33 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to trial by an impartial jury. Impartiality is presumed so long as the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 184 (1986). Although removal of a juror is appropriate if a juror has formed an opinion as to the issue to be tried, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878), [i]t is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his [pretrial] impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961). District courts have substantial discretion in conducting voir dire, so our review is for abuse of discretion. United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799, 805-06 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1984 (2001) ([I]n federal criminal cases, we will not overturn the district court's finding that a prospective juror can put aside any pretrial opinion and render a verdict based upon the evidence at trial 'unless the error is manifest.') (quoting United States v. McNally, 485 F.2d 398, 403 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974)); United States v. Jones, 193 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 1999). 34 In Thompson, a race discrimination case brought by an employee against her employer, the Seventh Circuit considered the district court's failure to remove a juror who expressed a belief that some plaintiffs' claims against their employers are spurious and that her background as an owner of a business would cloud and sway her judgment in the case. 248 F.3d at 624, 626. The court expressed its concern that, in response to questioning, the juror said she would try to be fair, but she expressed no confidence in being able to succeed in the attempt. Id. at 626. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the district judge had not pushed hard enough to determine whether [the juror] could relinquish her prior beliefs for purposes of deciding the case. Id. In Gonzalez, a criminal case in which the defendant was convicted for distributing cocaine, the Ninth Circuit considered the district court's failure to remove a juror who, after being asked three times if she could put aside her personal experiences and serve fairly and impartially, responded equivocally with answers such as, I'll try. 214 F.3d at 1111. The juror had testified on voir dire that she had been married to someone who regularly bought and sold cocaine, had a child with that person, and then divorced him on account of his involvement with drugs, all within approximately five years of sitting on the jury. As the court noted, the activities of the juror's husband, which led to her divorce and the break-up of her family, resembled the fact pattern in the case in which she served. Id. at 1114. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial. 35 The Thompson and Gonzalez courts both concluded: When a juror is unable to state that she will serve fairly and impartially despite being asked repeatedly for such assurances, we can have no confidence that the juror will 'lay aside' her biases or her prejudicial personal experiences and render a fair and impartial verdict. Thompson, 248 F.3d at 627 (quoting Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1114). 36 Despite persistent questioning, juror 8 did not state unequivocally that he would be able to keep a completely open mind, remain impartial, and reserve a determination of guilt or innocence until the conclusion of trial. However, unlike Thompson and Gonzalez, in which there was testimony concerning both the prior beliefs of the jurors in question and the jurors' inability to set aside those beliefs in the case they were to consider, here there is no evidence of any prior bias. Nor is there any evidence that juror 8 learned any extrinsic information that would have prejudiced him. Instead, any doubts that the juror may have expressed on voir dire are traceable to the testimony that he had already heard. Unlike pretrial voir dire, the voir dire in question in this case occurred on the fourth day of trial, after several days of testimony. Not only is there nothing wrong with juror 8's being influenced by such prior testimony, he is supposed to be. This testimony is necessarily going to be a factor in a competent juror's determination of guilt or innocence. Therefore, we conclude that the District Court's decision to accept the juror's assurance of impartiality as sufficient was within its discretion. 37
38 Derry Evans argues that the government did not present sufficient evidence of money laundering because it failed to establish that his purchase of a used car--a 1987 Mercury Topaz--on June 4, 1997, had any effect on interstate commerce. Relying on United States v. Grey, 56 F.3d 1219, 1224 (10th Cir. 1995), and United States v. Levine, 41 F.3d 607, 614 (10th Cir. 1994), Derry contends that the effect on interstate commerce must occur either at the time of the transaction or later. Moreover, he argues, citing United States v. Monholland, 607 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1979), his driving the car only within Missouri is insufficient to affect interstate commerce. 39 In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government's case, reversing only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Shoff, 151 F.3d 889, 890 (8th Cir. 1998). 40 We put aside the questions of whether we should disregard any pre-purchase effects on interstate commerce and whether Derry's use of the car after the purchase actually affected interstate commerce, because it is clear that the purchase itself had an effect on interstate commerce. To come under the statute, the purchase need only in any way or degree affect[ ] interstate... commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4). Derry bought a car titled in the state of Illinois from a Missouri dealer, and then completed a Missouri application for title. More important, the transaction--the purchase of an automobile from a commercial used car dealer--is sufficient, by itself, to have an effect on interstate commerce. Cf. Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 862 (1985) (stating that rental of real estate is unquestionably activity that affects interstate commerce); United States v. Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1192 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that purchase of two cars with proceeds from cocaine sale affects interstate commerce), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1119 (1998). 41
42 The District Court gave instruction number 43, a supplemental instruction on money laundering based on Eighth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 6.18.1956J. That instruction omitted the necessity of finding an effect on interstate commerce. After failing to object below, Derry Evans now argues that the District Court committed plain error by giving the model instruction. 43 On plain-error review, we have discretion to reverse only if there is an error that is obvious and that affects a defendant's substantial rights. United States v. Campa-Fabela, 210 F.3d 837, 840 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, ___U.S.___, 121 S. Ct. 1739 (2001). Even in such circumstances, we should not exercise our discretion to correct forfeited error unless the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (citations omitted). 44 The jury instruction reads as follows:It is not necessary for the government to show that a defendant actually intended or anticipated an effect on interstate commerce, or that commerce was actually affected. All that is necessary is that the natural and probable consequences of a defendant's actions would be to affect interstate commerce no matter how minimal. 45 Brief of Derry Evans at 11a (jury instruction number 43) (emphasis added); Judicial Committee on Model Jury Instructions for the Eighth Circuit, Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the Eighth Circuit 6.18.1956J (2000) (modified). 3 46 Derry Evans argues that the instruction erroneously permitted the jury to find him guilty of money laundering even if the transaction at issue--the purchase of an automobile from a used-car dealer in Missouri--arguably did not affect interstate commerce. He cites to United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1387 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1239 (1997), for the proposition that the giving of an instruction that negates the need for the jury to find an essential element of the offense causes structural constitutional error that automatically requires reversal. The government contends that this instruction was not reversible error because, taken as a whole, the instructions made clear that to convict, the jury must find at least a minimal effect on interstate commerce. 47 The government's position is untenable. The express language of the instruction informed the jury that it was not necessary to find that Derry Evans's transactions affected interstate commerce to convict him of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a). Thus, the instructions were reasonably likely to have understated the government's burden of proof. 48 There is no doubt that the model instruction is incorrect. An effect on interstate commerce is an essential element of the offense of money laundering. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4). The question remains, however, whether an instruction that eliminated the necessity of a jury finding of that element constituted plain error in this case. A jury instruction that omits a single element of the offense can be subject to harmless error review. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1999) (distinguishing cases involving omission of single instruction from cases in which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence... and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)); see also United States v. Ben M. Hogan Co., 809 F.2d 480, 481 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822 (1987) (deciding that jury instruction giving conclusive evidentiary presumption of effect on interstate commerce can be harmless error and finding that because the evidence was so dispositive of the issue of effect on interstate commerce, we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the conclusive presumption that interstate commerce was affected). 49 Other circuits have held that a court's giving erroneous instructions virtually identical to the one given here does not create reversible error. See United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 755 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 894 (1999) (holding that giving of instruction virtually identical to Model Jury Instruction 6.18.1956J was not plain error because substantial evidence supported effect on interstate commerce); United States v. Allen, 129 F.3d 1159, 1164 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that when evidence establishing effect on interstate commerce is overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted omission of element from jury instruction is not reversible error). Cf. United States v. Ables, 167 F.3d 1021, 1030 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1027 (1999) (holding that parties' stipulation that designated financial institution was engaged in activities which affected in some way or degree interstate commerce sufficed to establish interstate-commerce nexus, despite erroneous jury instruction). 50 We hold that the error was harmless. Underlying the charge for money laundering was the allegation that Derry Evans used proceeds generated from prostitution to purchase a used car. Derry disputes only that the purchase had any effect on interstate commerce. But--as was discussed previously--the purchase of a car necessarily has an effect on interstate commerce. Therefore, the erroneous jury instruction was not plain error. 51
52 Derry Evans also argues that the government failed to offer sufficient evidence that he conspired to launder money. To convict Derry of conspiracy to launder money, the government must establish that he knowingly joined a conspiracy to launder money and that one of the conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of that conspiracy. United States v. Hildebrand, 152 F.3d 756, 762 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1033 (1998). At base, there must exist an agreement to achieve an illegal purpose. United States v. Agofsky, 20 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 909 (1994). 53 Derry is correct that the government has not produced sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to launder money with his co-defendants. However, the charge under the indictment was not limited to conspiracy among the defendants. Rather, count 44 of the indictment charged that all of the defendants did unlawfully and knowingly combine, conspire, confederate and agree together and with each other, and with others known and unknown to the Grand Jury to launder money in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. (Emphasis added). And the government has produced evidence regarding a conspiracy to launder money between Derry and his prostitutes. Eleana Garcia, one of Derry's prostitutes, testified that she wired money to Derry on several occasions (using aliases) and gave money to Derry from her prostitution earnings, and that he used that money to buy the Mercury Topaz and to pay for their travel expenses. She also testified that when she worked for escort agencies, she had to pay those agencies a fee out of the proceeds of prostitution. Those agencies promoted prostitution activities. These joint activities necessarily presuppose an agreement between Derry and Ms. Garcia regarding the handling of the proceeds of prostitution. Therefore, viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there was sufficient evidence to convict Derry of conspiring to launder money.
54 Derry Evans raises a variety of other arguments, none of which has merit. Derry argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he conspired with the other defendants to violate the Mann Act. However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), the trial revealed sufficient evidence of an agreement to violate the law. In the course of promoting prostitution, Derry traveled with and stayed in hotels with other defendants. In addition, Ms. Garcia testified that she received referrals for prostitution from Tonya May, one of LeVorn Evans's prostitutes, and that she and Ms. May participated in two-girl calls, in which they engaged in sex for money and shared the proceeds. Ms. May and Julia Wilson, one of Monroe Evans's prostitutes, testified that they drove Ms. Garcia on prostitution calls. Finally, Deanna Kirkman, one of Terrance Roberts's prostitutes, testified that, following Ms. Wilson's arrest on state charges of prostitution, she witnessed a meeting involving all of the defendants concerning a statement that Ms. Wilson had made implicating the defendants. This evidence suffices to uphold Derry's conviction of conspiracy to violate the Mann Act. 55 Derry also argues that the District Court erred in admitting evidence of a gang rape. We review the Court's decision for abuse of discretion, which is particularly broad in conspiracy cases. United States v. Davis, 882 F.2d 1334, 1343 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990). Here, Latoya Madison, an acquaintance of Ms. Garcia, testified that she took a message to Derry Evans. After arriving to deliver the message, she was directed to a back room, where Derry asked her if she would work for him as a prostitute. When she refused, he had her raped by three men, after which he again asked if she would work for him. When she again refused, he said that he would have people continue to rape her until she agreed. Derry asserts that the Court should have disallowed this testimony as character evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and that, under Rule 403, the prejudicial effect of allowing the evidence far outweighed its probative value. 56 Derry misconstrues this testimony as character evidence to be evaluated under Rule 404(b) when, in fact, it is direct evidence of the Mann Act violations and the conspiracy. The rape--along with various other violent acts introduced into evidence--were actions taken to recruit, control, and discipline prostitutes. Regarding exclusion under Rule 403, substantial discretion is given to the District Court in weighing probative evidence--which this testimony clearly was--against prejudicial effect--which is also present here. The Court did not abuse this discretion. 57 Derry Evans was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a), which states that whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces an individual to travel in interstate commerce to engage in prostitution, violates that section. However, his indictment charged only that he knowingly persuaded, induced and enticed an individual to travel in interstate commerce, omitting the reference to coercion. The Court's jury instruction reinstated the coercion element not charged in the indictment, asking whether the defendant persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced an individual to travel in interstate commerce. Derry argues that by submitting evidence on coercion and inserting the coercion element into the instruction, the government and the District Court constructively amended the indictment in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Because Derry failed to object to the instruction, our review is for plain error. There is none. Adding coerced to the instruction had no effect on the case other than, perhaps, to raise the government's burden of proof. If the jury found Derry to have violated the statute by coercing his victims to travel in interstate commerce, then he necessarily induced them to do so. 58 Derry next argues that the District Court committed plain error by submitting jury instructions that failed to identify the victims of the Mann Act violations by name. This Court has upheld indictments, like the ones at issue here, that failed to identify victims by name. See, e.g., United States v. Gay, 577 F.2d 465, 466 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding description of victims as campers to be sufficiently specific). Derry asserts, however, that lack of specificity in a jury instruction is different from lack of specificity in an indictment. Citing Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111, 116 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001 (1968), he argues that jury instructions are erroneous and prejudicial if they result in substantial jury confusion, and that, in this case, there is substantial record evidence of jury confusion. There is some evidence of juror confusion early in the proceedings. In addition, the jury asked several questions during the deliberation stage (such as requests for the testimony of several witnesses, confusion as to who various prostitutes were and their ages, and the submitted question, who is with who?). However, this evidence is insufficient to overcome--on plain error review--the presumption that the jury has followed the instructions, United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 997 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, ___U.S.___, 122 S. Ct. 71 (2001), and the sufficiency of the evidence of guilt in this case. In a long, complicated trial, jurors, like any conscientious observers, may be uncertain of details at some point. This does not mean they did not ultimately come to a reasoned decision. 59 Derry Evans also argues that the District Court erred in refusing to sever his case from the cases of the other defendants under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14. We review for abuse of discretion, asking whether definite prejudice resulted that is sufficient to overcome [t]he [strong] presumption against severing properly joined cases. United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1143 (8th Cir. 1996). That prejudice must be severe or compelling because rarely, if ever, will it be improper for co-conspirators to be tried together. United States v. Warfield, 97 F.3d 1014, 1018 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1110 (1997) (citation omitted). Derry has not met his heavy burden of establishing an abuse of discretion. 60 Derry also argues that the District Court erred in finding that he was a leader under the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1(a) (1998). Section 3B1.1(a) reads: If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels. Because Derry did not object at sentencing, the applicability of this Guideline is reviewed for plain error. There is none. The evidence supports the determination that all five defendants were part of a criminal activity involving interstate transportation for prostitution. With regard to whether Derry was a leader, the evidence indicates his participation in the meeting concerning Julia Wilson's statement. Moreover, he hired a driver, Jessica Richardson, to take Ms. Garcia on prostitution calls, thereby satisfying the requirement that he be the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants. Id., cmt. n.2; § 2G1.1, cmt. n.3 (For the purposes of § 3B1.1 (Aggravating Role), a victim, as defined in this guideline, is considered a participant only if that victim assisted in the promoting of prostitution or prohibited sexual conduct in respect to another victim.); United States v. Jarrett, 956 F.2d 864, 868 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding, under earlier version of Guidelines, that § 2G1.1 prevents prostitutes from being considered participants under § 3B1.1 unless they assisted in unlawful transportation of others). Even though Ms. Richardson worked in that capacity for less than a week, the District Court did not commit plain error. 61 Finally, Derry argues that the District Court erred in refusing to give a multiple-conspiracy instruction that set forth the theory of his defense to the charge of conspiracy to violate the Mann Act. The requested instruction is as follows: 62 The government must convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that each defendant was a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment. If the government fails to prove this as to a defendant, then you must find that defendant not guilty of the conspiracy charge, even if you find that he was a member of some other conspiracy. Proof that a defendant was a member of some other conspiracy is not enough to convict. 63 Brief of Derry Evans at 14a (refused jury instruction D); Eighth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 5.06G. Derry's theory was that he conspired only with his prostitutes, not with his co-defendants. 64 Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain a multiple-conspiracy instruction is a question of law subject to de novo review. United States v. Hall, 171 F.3d 1133, 1149 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1027 (2000) (citation omitted). Although the defendant usually is entitled to receive an instruction on a theory of defense even though the evidentiary basis for that theory is weak, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility, Closs v. Leapley, 18 F.3d 574, 580 (8th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted), failure to give the conspiracy instruction requested here was harmless error. The evidence of a conspiracy between Derry and the other defendants was overwhelming.