Opinion ID: 3010187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Grace Period under Pennsylvania Law

Text: Plaintiffs also argue retroactive application of the Amendments Act's choice of law provision does not require dismissal of the Mississippi actions. They assert the choice of law provision incorporates all Pennsylvania law as federal law, including a century-old line of Pennsylvania cases that holds due process requires a grace period when the legislature retroactively curtails a statute of limitations. See Kay v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 65 Pa. 269 (1870); Byers v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 18 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 187 (Allegheny Co. 1896); Philadelphia B. & W.R. Co. v. Quaker City Flour Mills Co., 127 A. 845 (Pa. 1925); Ferki v. Frantz's Transfer Co., 31 A.2d 586 (Pa. Super. 1943); Wilson v. Central Penn Indus., Inc., 452 A.2d 257 (Pa. Super. 1982). The district court declined to follow this line of cases, doubting its vitality in light of intervening developments in property law relating to vested rights, and refusing to read broad due process rights into the Pennsylvania Constitution on such a weak precedential basis. In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, No. 88-1452, slip. op. at 17-19 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 1993). Even if the grace period doctrine retains force under the Pennsylvania Constitution, we do not believe the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply it under the facts of this case. None of the Pennsylvania grace period cases addresses a situation in which Pennsylvania plaintiffs failed to sue within the time period allotted by the Pennsylvania statute of limitations and brought suit in another state's courts to avoid Pennsylvania's time bar. We believe the Pennsylvania borrowing statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 5521 (1981), accurately reflects current state policy against forum shopping by applying to claims arising in another state either the other state's statute of limitations or the Pennsylvania statute of limitations, whichever is shorter. Pennsylvania's borrowing statute unequivocally [evinces] the legislative intent to prevent a plaintiff who sues in Pennsylvania from obtaining greater rights than those available in the state where the cause of action arose. Gwaltney v. Stone, 564 A.2d 498, 503 (Pa. Super. 1989). We believe Pennsylvania courts would not look favorably on plaintiffs here who missed Pennsylvania's statute of limitations, although Pennsylvania is the state where the accident occurred, and brought suit in Mississippi. Even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would require a grace period when the Pennsylvania legislature retroactively shortens a statute of limitations, we do not believe they would require a grace period in this case.