Opinion ID: 2208277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Respondent's Challenges to the Findings of Fact

Text: Respondent's brief sets out nine findings of fact contained in the Review Board's report that he considers to be incorrect and unsupported by the evidence. After reviewing the evidence in light of respondent's contentions, we consider it necessary to discuss only two of these nine allegedly egregious errors, because only these two could bear significantly on our judgment of respondent's conduct; therefore, we want to make our view of them clear. As to the other findings, either they are supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record, or, although they are errors, they are immaterial to our analysis of the ethical impropriety of respondent's conduct. The two significant findings made by the Review Board are: (1) that Randolph advised respondent on January 9, 1986, one day before he redeemed the last certificate of deposit for $40,275, that she was revoking the trust and discharging respondent as attorney; and (2) that respondent knew that Ms. Randolph had mislaid the passbooks evidencing ownership. When judging the ethical nature of a respondent's conduct and assessing a sanction, this court defers to findings of fact made by the Hearing Board as the trier of fact, unless the findings are not supported by clear and convincing evidence. ( In re Harth (1988), 125 Ill.2d 281, 287; In re Enstrom (1984), 104 Ill.2d 410, 416.) The Review Board's findings of fact must meet the same test before we will adopt them. In re Mitan (1979), 75 Ill.2d 118, 124. Regarding the Hearing Board's finding that respondent learned on January 9, 1986, that Randolph had discharged him, we agree with respondent that it is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent's answer to the Administrator's request to admit facts is the sole evidence of when respondent received the document revoking the trust and demanding a return of all trust assets and an accounting (which we assume was the equivalent of a discharge although respondent denies he was discharged); respondent's answer stated that he received the document in the mail on January 14, 1986. There is no evidence that respondent learned of his discharge earlier by any other means. Thus there is no clear and convincing evidence that when respondent redeemed a certificate of deposit for $40,275 on January 10, 1986, as part of his fee he did so knowing Randolph had discharged him the day before. As a result, we do not consider this as fact when we judge the ethical nature of respondent's conduct. We also agree with respondent that there is no clear and convincing evidence supporting the Review Board's finding that respondent knew that Randolph had mislaid the certificates of deposit, for respondent, the only possible source of such evidence, never admitted that he knew this. Moreover, the Review Board could not have based this finding of fact on its impression of respondent's demeanor as a witness because respondent never testified before the Review Board. Yet looking at the Review Board's use of the word knew in context, we think that it simply made a poor choice of words, not an egregious error as respondent claims. In its report the Review Board seemed to say that because respondent had learned by the end of September that all of the funds represented by the certificates of deposit were accounted for, and because no adverse claims were ever made, respondent knew that Randolph, an 84-year-old woman recently hospitalized, had mislaid the certificates of deposit and that they had not been stolen. While we cannot say that respondent knew this, he certainly should have considered it to be a distinct possibility. We, therefore, do not base our judgment on respondent's knowing for a fact that the certificates were mislaid. Next, we discuss in greater detail the propriety of the fee which respondent charged Randolph, and the subject of contingent fees in general.