Opinion ID: 597468
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of County Supervisors' Testimony

Text: 5 Whether appellants are liable for negligence depends in part on the County's purpose in pursuing an alternate disposal system. It is clear that the County sought to deal with its waste disposal requirements in a manner consistent with environmental protection. The County contends, however, and the jury apparently agreed, that its environmental concerns were tempered by its desire to reduce overall disposal costs. To this end, the district court permitted several members of the County's board of supervisors to testify about their motivations in voting for the resolution authorizing the contract with NSP. 6 The parties agree that Wisconsin law applies. Appellants mount a two-pronged attack on the admissibility of this testimony, and we consider each argument separately. 6 Appellants maintain that Wisconsin law prohibits the admission of parol evidence that impeaches or contradicts the records of the proceedings of public bodies. See Grimm v. Bayfield County, 174 Wis. 43, 182 N.W. 466, 467 (1921); Bartlett v. Eau Claire County, 112 Wis. 237, 88 N.W. 61, 62 (1901). We agree, but nevertheless find no error based on this principle. The district court ruled that members of the county board could testify except to the extent that their testimony tends to contradict the language of the resolution. La Crosse County v. Gershman, Brickner & Bratton, Inc., No. 90-C-131-C (W.D.Wis. July 19, 1991) (order denying motion in limine ). The admitted testimony was consistent with this order. The supervisors were not allowed to testify that, although the resolution says X, it really meant Y. Rather, they were allowed to explain why they voted the way they did. The supervisors' testimony that they pursued an alternate disposal system because of the appellants' assurances that it was the least expensive choice did not contradict the language of the resolution at a reasonable cost. This testimony did not impeach the written record but merely supplemented it. 7 Appellants, however, make the related argument that a court may not inquire into the motivations of individual legislators in enacting legislation. The rule in Wisconsin is that a court may not rely upon the testimony of members of a legislative body for the purpose of determining what that body intended when it enacted a particular piece of legislation. 7 Labor and Farm Party v. Elections Bd., 117 Wis.2d 351, 344 N.W.2d 177, 180 (1984); State of Wisconsin v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 72 Wis.2d 727, 242 N.W.2d 192, 198 (1976). The district court properly reasoned that this rule is predicated upon the theory that no individual legislator can explain the votes of the entire body. The court concluded that there was a difference between an individual's testifying in explanation of his or her own motive for voting in a particular way and the same person's explanation of why a piece of legislation was enacted. La Crosse County v. Gershman, Brickner & Bratton, Inc., No. 90-C-131-C (W.D.Wis. Dec. 24, 1991) (order denying postjudgment motions). Although the dichotomy between these types of testimony may be legally cognizable, we believe that in this case it was a distinction without a difference. The jury could have easily interpreted the cumulative testimony of six present or former supervisors--purporting to state individual motives for supporting the resolution--as explanations of the entire body's intent. Indeed, certain supervisors clearly claimed to be presenting the board's collective understanding, despite questioning designed to elicit their individual motivations. See, e.g., Tr. 2-219 to 2-222 (Supervisor Dawson) (Q: What was your basis for determining that this could be done at reasonable cost as a result of which you entered into this resolution or sponsored this resolution? A: Our position was that it would lengthen the life of our landfill, and the tipping fee would cover our expense.) (emphasis added). This sort of testimony is impermissible under Wisconsin law, and its admission was error. 8 Nevertheless, we think that the error was harmless. FED.R.CIV.P. 61. The supervisors' testimony was introduced to prove that the County pursued an alternative disposal system in reliance upon the defendants' advice that such a system would be less expensive in the long run. Although proof of this sort was needed to support the County's theory of liability, there was substantial evidence, other than the challenged testimony, from which the jury could have inferred such reliance. For example, the record contained the official minutes of numerous meetings of the County Board and its committees, at which various County officials opined that Black & Veatch's studies showed a link between a resource recovery disposal system and lower overall costs. E.g., Exh. 15, p. 9; Exhs. 76, 93. The feasibility study Black & Veatch prepared was itself primarily a cost-benefit comparison of the various disposal systems. Exh. 14. This evidence would permit a jury to infer that the County relied upon the appellants' recommendations in selecting a waste disposal system that it believed to be the least expensive choice (in terms of accounting costs) in the long run. Whether this reliance was reasonable was, of course, a question for the jury. But, ignoring the erroneously admitted testimony, there was more than sufficient evidence to support the verdict; consequently, the trial achieved substantial justice notwithstanding the district court's error.