Opinion ID: 76792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Liability for Crew Member Assaults

Text: 77 As to the issue of common carriers' special duty to their passengers, there are only three Supreme Court decisions that bear on the issue. New Jersey Steam-Boat Co. v. Brockett, 121 U.S. 637, 7 S.Ct. 1039, 30 L.Ed. 1049 (1887); New Orleans & N.E.R. Co. v. Jopes, 142 U.S. 18, 12 S.Ct. 109, 35 L.Ed. 919 (1891); Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550 (1959). The parties cite these same cases but disagree about their import. We thus begin by analyzing these three decisions. 78 In 1887, the United States Supreme Court first addressed crew member assaults against ship passengers. In Brockett, the passenger was improperly abaft the shaft, an area of the ship forbidden to deck passengers. 121 U.S. at 644, 7 S.Ct. at 1040. A crew member violently removed the passenger from the forbidden area, dislocated his shoulder, and used unnecessary and excessive force. 121 U.S. at 647, 7 S.Ct. at 1042. The Supreme Court upheld the jury's verdict compensating the passenger for his injuries. The Supreme Court concluded that, despite the passenger's presence in a forbidden area, if the passenger's injuries were directly caused by the improper conduct of the carrier's servants, either while acting within the scope of their general employment, or when in the discharge of special duties imposed upon them, [the passenger] is not precluded from claiming the benefit of the contract for safe transportation. Brockett, 121 U.S. at 645, 7 S.Ct. at 1041. Rather, the passenger was entitled to protection against the misconduct or negligence of the carrier's servants. Id. 79 In Brockett, the Supreme Court further stated that the misconduct or negligence of the carrier's servants while transacting the company's business, and when acting within the general scope of their employment, is of necessity to be imputed to the corporation. Id. [I]t makes no difference that the master did not authorize or even know of the servant's act or neglect, or even if he disapproved or forbade it, he is equally liable if the act be done in the course of his servant's employment. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 80 This principle, according to the Supreme Court in Brockett, is peculiarly applicable as between carriers and passengers; for ... a common carrier is bound, as far as practicable, to protect its passengers, while being conveyed, from violence committed by strangers and co-passengers, and undertakes absolutely to protect them against the misconduct of its own servants engaged in executing the contract.  Id. at 645-46, 7 S.Ct. at 1041 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 81 In reaching these conclusions in a ship case, the Supreme Court in Brockett relied exclusively upon prior decisions involving trains, and in effect, treated a ship as a common carrier similar to a train. 12 As shown here and later in this opinion, the federal maritime law essentially relies upon, and incorporates, the federal common law governing a common carrier's liability as its liability standard for crew member assaults on passengers. 82 Given Brockett 's reference to a duty of absolute protection against crew member misconduct, some courts subsequently read Brockett as not allowing a ship-employer to defend an assault claim on the basis that the crew member was acting outside the scope of his employment. See, e.g., Pacific S.S. Co. v. Sutton, 7 F.2d 579, 580 (9th Cir.1925) (citing Brockett for proposition that scope of employment is not required); Forrester v. Southern Pac. Co., 36 Nev. 247, 134 P. 753, 774-75 (1913) (same). In fact, Brockett is ambiguous on this issue because it contains conflicting formulations and leaves open to interpretation whether the wrongful act at issue necessarily must be within the scope of the employment, or merely in the course of employment. 83 In any event, a few years later the Supreme Court applied and clarified Brockett in another common carrier case, New Orleans & N.E.R. Co. v. Jopes, 142 U.S. 18, 12 S.Ct. 109, 35 L.Ed. 919 (1891). Jopes involved a conductor's shooting of a train passenger. The Supreme Court in Jopes appears to have removed any scope-of-employment requirement and concluded that a common carrier is absolutely liable for unlawful assaults by its employees against its passengers. In Jopes, the Supreme Court quoted Brockett 's rule that a common carrier undertakes absolutely to protect its passengers against the misconduct or negligence of its own servants, employed in executing the contract of transportation, and acting within the general scope of their employment. 142 U.S. at 25, 12 S.Ct. at 111 (quoting Brockett, 121 U.S. at 637, 7 S.Ct. at 1039). But after discussing Brockett, the Supreme Court in Jopes noted that courts hold that the liability of a common carrier to his passengers for the assaults of his employees is of a most stringent character, far greater than that of ordinary employers for the actions of their employees [sic]. Jopes, 142 U.S. at 26, 12 S.Ct. at 112. In Jopes, the Supreme Court then cited a legal treatise for the proposition that a common carrier is bound absolutely to see to it that no unlawful assault or injury is inflicted upon [passengers] by their own servants. Id. (citation omitted). 84 More importantly, in Jopes, the Supreme Court further explained that the defense most often raised by an employer in a case involving an employee's assault upon a passenger was that the employee's act was a wanton and willful act on his part, outside the scope of his employment, and therefore something for which his employer was not responsible. Id., 142 U.S. at 27, 12 S.Ct. at 112. The Supreme Court acknowledged that if the act was of that character, the general rule is that the employee alone, and not the employer, is responsible. Id. However, the Supreme Court in Jopes continued,  [b]ut owing to the peculiar circumstances which surround the carrying of passengers, as stated, a more stringent rule of liability has been cast upon the employer; and he has been held liable although the assault was wanton and willful, and outside the scope of the employment.  Id. (emphasis added). 13 85 The Supreme Court in Jopes further stated that this liability rule is extremely broad and encompasses unlawful acts plainly not done in furtherance of the carrier's business as follows: 86 Recent cases state this liability in the broadest and strongest language; and, without going beyond the actual decisions, it may be said that the carrier is liable for every conceivable wrongful act done to a passenger by its train hands and other employees while they are engaged in transporting him, no matter how willful and malicious the act may be, or how plainly it may be apparent from its nature that it could not have been done in furtherance of the carrier's business. 87 Id., 142 U.S. at 26, 12 S.Ct. at 112 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 88 In both Brockett and Jopes, the Supreme Court spoke of common carrier liability in general, and was unconcerned with whether the specific mode of transport was a ship or a train. 14 As noted earlier, Brockett, a ship case, cited and discussed train cases. In turn, Jopes, a train case, cited and discussed Brockett. 15 89 After noting in Jopes that a common carrier is liable for its employee's assault on a passenger outside the scope of his employment, the Supreme Court then dealt with the narrow issue of whether an employee's conduct must be unlawful before it triggers this stringent liability imposed on the common carrier employer. The Supreme Court concluded that if the conductor-employee's shooting the passenger was in self-defense and therefore lawful, the employee was not liable and in turn the common-carrier employer was not liable. Id., 142 U.S. at 27, 12 S.Ct. at 112. 16 90 It is noteworthy that Jopes relied upon the carrier-passenger relationship and the peculiar circumstances which surround the carrying of passengers. Id. A common carrier's strict liability to a passenger for crew member assaults during transit rests upon its special implied duty of protection and safe transport that it owes as a common carrier through its employees to its passengers, and not for the reason that the act is incident to a duty within the scope of the crew member's employment. See, e.g., Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Willsie, 224 F. 908, 911 (8th Cir.1915) (acknowledging the absolute nature of the carrier's duty to protect passengers from assaults by its employees and stating that [t]he carrier is liable in such cases because the act is violative of the duty and a breach of the obligation it owes through the servant to the passenger, and not upon the idea that the act is incident to a duty within the scope of the servant's employment). In other words, the rationale for imposing strict liability on the common carrier employer is the carrier-passenger relationship and the corresponding existence of an implied duty of protection and safe transport free from assault by the carrier's employees during transit. In terms of tort liability, this becomes, in effect, a special non-delegable duty owed by the carrier to the passenger. 17 91 As plaintiff points out, a comment to the Restatement (Second) of Agency explains how a duty to protect may be imposed by law by virtue of and as incident to the carrier-passenger relationship, as follows: 92 A master or other principal may be in such relations to another that he has a duty to protect, or to see that due care is used to protect, such other from harm although not caused by an enterprise which has been initiated by the master or by things owned or possessed by him. This duty may be created by contract, as where one agrees to protect another, or may be imposed by law as incident to a relation voluntarily entered into, as the relation of carrier and passenger, or by statute.... [T]he fact that the one to whom the performance of the duty is delegated acts for his own purposes and with no intent to benefit the principal or master is immaterial. 93 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 214 cmt. e (1958) (emphasis added). 18 94 Further, we reject the defendants' claim that the Supreme Court abandoned the Jopes rule in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550 (1959). In Kermarec, the plaintiff was not a passenger, but was visiting a crew member. While on board the ship, the plaintiff fell on a staircase allegedly due to the improper way a runner was attached to the stairs. The plaintiff sued for personal injury due to the ship owner's negligence. Id. at 626-27, 79 S.Ct. at 407-08. The district court in Kermarec concluded that the ship owed a lower standard of care to the plaintiff as a gratuitous licensee under the laws of New York. Id. at 629, 79 S.Ct. at 409. 95 The Supreme Court in Kermarec decided that admiralty law need not import the land-based common law distinctions between invitees and licensees, id. at 631, 79 S.Ct. at 410, and concluded that the owner of a ship in navigable waters owes to all who are on board for purposes not inimical to his legitimate interests the duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of each case. Id. at 632, 79 S.Ct. at 410. In analyzing the ship's liability to the visitor, the Supreme Court in Kermarec also stated that, [i]t is a settled principle of maritime law that a shipowner owes a duty of exercising reasonable care towards those lawfully aboard the vessel who are not members of the crew. Id. at 630, 79 S.Ct. at 409. 96 While this reasonable care language in Kermarec is broad, the Supreme Court was answering only a narrow question of law regarding whether the distinction between licensees and invitees imposed a lower standard of care on ship owners in a slip-and-fall case. 97 More importantly, Kermarec did not involve an assault or any intentional tort committed by a crew member on a passenger. Rather, Kermarec was a common, garden variety negligence case no matter how it is characterized. Indeed, Kermarec addressed the standard of care owed by common carriers in a situation where a person sustained personal injuries due to the physical condition of the ship. Further, Kermarec did not cite or discuss Brockett or Jopes. Quite simply, there is no indication in Kermarec that the Supreme Court intended to eliminate the more stringent rule in Jopes imposing liability on a common carrier for its employees' assaults of passengers. 19 98 Although we agree with the defendants that the age of the Brockett and Jopes decisions and the intervening decision in Kermarec suggest that the Supreme Court might well reconsider its former rulings were an opportunity to arise, the defendants fail to persuade us that Kermarec overruled Brockett and Jopes, either explicitly or implicitly. Instead, we agree with Doe that Brockett and Jopes represent the current state of the controlling federal law as to crew member assaults on passengers. 20 Our precedent, as well as the decisions of other circuits, support this conclusion.
99 While we can locate no post- Kermarec decision in our Circuit involving a crew member assault on a passenger, there is a slip-and-fall decision that mentions in dicta the unconditional responsibility a common carrier has for its employees' misconduct. Tullis v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of New York, 397 F.2d 22, 23 (5th Cir.1968). 21 In Tullis, this Court concluded that negligence was the applicable liability standard for the slip and fall in that case and cited Kermarec. This Court in Tullis, however, also noted that in an admiralty action involving liability to ship passengers, [t]he liability basis is negligence with the only apparent exception being the unconditional responsibility of the carrier for the misconduct of the crew toward the passengers.  Id. at 23(emphasis added). 100 Our other slip-and-fall cases apply the Kermarec standard of reasonable care under the circumstances. Everett v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 912 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir.1990) (passenger tripped over metal threshold cover in a doorway); Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir.1989) (passenger slipped and fell in a cruise ship disco). A fourth decision also involves defects in the ship's physical condition and adopts Kermarec 's negligence standard. Kornberg, 741 F.2d at 1334 (11th Cir.1984) (in case involving failure of cruise ship's sanitary system, court stated [a] carrier by sea ... is not liable to passengers as an insurer, but only for its negligence) (citing Kermarec ). 22 None of these four physical-condition cases cites Jopes or Brockett, and none involves a crew member assault on a passenger. 101 In sum, while our precedent applies Kermarec 's negligence standard in slip-and-fall and other physical condition cases as did Kermarec itself, our decision in Tullis acknowledged the unconditional responsibility exception for crew member misconduct toward a passenger. 23 Our precedent thus does not, and indeed could not, alter Jopes ' strict liability rule for such assaults.
102 Only the Ninth Circuit has squarely answered the question of whether, post- Kermarec, a cruise line, as a common carrier, remains strictly liable for crew member assaults on passengers. Morton v. De Oliveira, 984 F.2d 289 (9th Cir.1993). As explained below, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Kermarec did not overturn the general maritime rule that a ship, like other common carriers, is absolutely liable for crew member assaults on its passengers during transit. Id. at 292. 103 In Morton, the plaintiff was alone in her cabin when a crew member delivered wine and raped her. 24 The plaintiff sued, asserting absolute liability on the part of the cruise line for crew member assaults on passengers. Id. at 290. The plaintiff conceded that she was unable to show any negligence by [the defendant cruise line] in hiring or supervising its crew member. Id. The district court determined that the strict liability standard for assaults was superseded or over-ruled by Kermarec.  Id. 104 Reversing, the Ninth Circuit determined that  Kermarec cannot be read to overrule the maritime tort principle that a common carrier owes a duty to protect passengers from assaults by its crew members and is absolutely liable for such assaults. Id. at 292. The Ninth Circuit noted that this absolute liability rule for crew member assaults cannot be traced to obsolete concepts, but that it is a widely adopted rule that common carriers owe such an absolute duty to their passengers. Id. at 291-92 (citing St. Michelle v. Catania, 252 Md. 647, 250 A.2d 874, 876-78 (1969) (carrier vicariously liable for assaults committed by employees even outside their employment during the contract for transportation); Whittle v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 306 S.C. 163, 410 S.E.2d 575, 575 (S.C.Ct.App.1991) (same); Nazareth v. Herndon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 467 So.2d 1076, 1078 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.) (same), review denied 478 So.2d 53 (Fla.1985)). 105 The Ninth Circuit in Morton also relied upon this observation, by a leading torts treatise, explaining the non-delegable duty of protective care: 106 Where the deliberate or willful wrong was not done to further the master's business the tendency has been to deny vicarious liability, but here too there have been many qualifications. The relationship between master and plaintiff may be such as to put on the master a duty of protective care that he may not delegate. Thus a carrier is liable to its passengers for assaults by employees prompted by purely personal motives. 5 Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr., & Oscar S. Gray, The Law of Torts § 26.9, at 53 (2d ed.1986). 107 Morton, 984 F.2d at 292 (emphasis added). 25 108 The defendants argue that a circuit split is created by the First Circuit's decision in Muratore v. M/S SCOTIA PRINCE, 845 F.2d 347 (1st Cir.1988), and the Second Circuit's decision in Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. Rivers, 211 F. 294 (2nd Cir.1914). We disagree and explain why. 26 109 In Muratore, the First Circuit is equivocal, but appears to have followed the absolute liability rule. There, crew photographers harassed the plaintiff passenger, disregarded her request not to be photographed, and repeatedly took her picture. Muratore, 845 F.2d at 349-50. The First Circuit rejected the defendant ship's contention that even if the photographers' conduct constitutes intentional infliction of emotional distress, defendant cannot be held legally responsible for the photographers' conduct. Id. at 353. Affirming the ship's vicarious liability, the First Circuit concluded, a maritime carrier has an unconditional responsibility for the misconduct of its people toward the passengers. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 27 110 We also agree with Doe that the Second Circuit in Rivers did not necessarily adopt a negligence/scope-of-employment rule for crew member assaults on passengers. In Rivers, a crew member hid in the plaintiff's cabin, waited for her return, and attacked her. After a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed, claiming error because the district court had charged the jury that the defendant was bound to an obligation `of the very highest degree of care to protect its passengers.' 211 F. at 298. The district court, however, had also instructed the jury that the defendant was not an absolute insurer against assaults and that a passenger could not recover unless there was some negligence by the carrier. Id. The district court also pointed out the difference between an assault by an employee when carrying out the orders of his employer and a wanton one, committed when off duty. Id. 111 In affirming the verdict for the plaintiff, the Second Circuit in Rivers cited Jopes and The MINNETONKA, and remarked that the district court had instructed more favorably to defendant than some of the authorities indicate. Rivers, 211 F. at 298 (emphasis added). The MINNETONKA, like Jopes, imposed a strict liability rule. Indeed, the Second Circuit in The MINNETONKA stated that [t]he archaic doctrine that the moment a servant of a carrier commits a wanton assault upon a passenger he acts outside the scope of his authority and thus releases his employer from liability was long ago renounced by the great preponderance of authority. 146 F. at 513. 28 Given Rivers 's reliance on Jopes and The MINNETONKA for stating that the jury charge was more favorable to the defendant than indicated, we do not read Rivers as necessarily establishing a negligence/scope-of-employment standard for crew member assaults on passengers. 29 At worst, the import of Rivers is unclear. 30 112 Having canvassed the relevant Supreme Court and circuit precedent, we now turn to the liability issues on appeal in this case.
113 The principal liability issue is which standard governs the defendants' liability to its passenger Doe for crew member assaults: (1) strict liability or (2) reasonable care under the circumstances. 114 For the reasons we have detailed at some length, we conclude that the defendants owe a non-delegable duty to protect their passengers from crew member assaults and thereby safely transport their cruise passengers, that the Supreme Court's decisions in Brockett and Jopes remain binding precedent, that Kermarec did not overrule Brockett or Jopes, and thus that the district court did not err in concluding that the defendants are strictly liable for crew member assaults on their passengers during the cruise. We add that Kermarec 's reasonable care standard does not apply to a crew member's sexual assault on a passenger. Tullis, 397 F.2d at 23. 115 We turn, then, to the defendants' alternative argument that even if the strict liability standard governs crew member assaults on passengers during a cruise, that standard cannot apply factually to this particular case because (1) the sexual battery occurred while Aydin was off duty and off the ship and (2) the special carrier-passenger relationship was severed when Doe and Aydin left the ship's premises. 116
117 The case precedent establishes that, due to the special carrier-passenger relationship, the defendants had a non-delegable duty to protect and safely transport Doe during the cruise, and thus are liable if a crew member assaulted her during the cruise. There is no dispute that this carrier-passenger relationship has a temporal limit based on the duration of the cruise. This sexual battery occurred on July 19, 1999, and undisputedly fell within the seven-day time period of the cruise from July 17 to July 24, 1999. 118 The next issue is whether the common carrier-passenger relationship has a strict spatial limit so that the common carrier-passenger relationship was severed when Doe and Aydin left the ship's premises. For the reasons outlined in the jurisdiction section above, we conclude that the carrier-passenger relationship continued between the defendants and Doe during her interaction with Aydin in this scheduled port-of-call. 119 In this regard the defendants emphasize that Aydin was not only on shore, but also off-duty. This argument ignores the defendants'tipping system, an integral part of the carrier-passenger relationship that encouraged Aydin to socialize with and escort his assigned dinner passengers while off-duty in the ship's scheduled port-of-call. As discussed above, Doe was assigned to Aydin's dinner table each night, and was provided envelopes for tipping Aydin. Aydin's job thus involved daily interaction with a particular set of passengers. Indeed, the defendants expressly permit socialization between crew members and passengers on shore at the Oasis. Aydin admits that his off-duty, on-shore interaction with his passengers enhances his tips. To some extent, defendants arguably have a pecuniary interest in off-duty crew members socializing with and escorting passengers in a port-of-call because it promotes the success of the defendants' tipping system as a way to pay Aydin for his services to the defendants. 120 It is further undisputed that on the very night in question Aydin, while on duty and serving in his role as a crew-member waiter, directed his dinner guest passengers to his favorite nightspot — the Oasis — within a short walking distance of the ship, and that Aydin was at the Oasis when Doe arrived. Although off-duty, Aydin admits escorting one of Doe's friends back to the ship before coming back to the Oasis and then escorting Doe ultimately back to the ship. While Aydin and Doe dispute whether he was taking her ostensibly to a bathroom first or to the park for sex, Aydin undisputedly had offered to help Doe in her distress. Aydin even referred to Doe as his passenger, and there is ample evidence in the record that Doe allowed Aydin to escort her only because he was trusted as her waiter-crew member on the ship. 121 Accordingly, under all of the circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude that the interaction between Aydin and Doe is outside the scope of the on-going carrier-passenger relationship or, as explained earlier, the scope of the on-going cruise. Thus, when crew member Aydin sexually battered passenger Doe, the non-delegable duty owed by a common carrier to protect its passengers from crew member assaults during the cruise was breached.
122 While we believe that Jopes and Tullis are the controlling precedent and that we need not reach Florida law, we recognize that the district court premised its pre-trial ruling partly on Florida law, which the defendants argue was erroneous. The defendants further assert that Florida decisions contradict the Kermarec decision, and therefore the district court should not have relied on them. The district court's order is actually unclear because it first seems to apply federal maritime law, but at the end appears to rely on Florida law for its strict liability ruling. 123 Nonetheless, to the extent the district court relied on Florida law, we find no reversible error as Florida law is entirely consistent with federal maritime law and imposes strict liability on a cruise line for crew member assaults on passengers. 124 For example, in Nadeau v. Costley, 634 So.2d 649 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994), the plaintiff passenger sued the crew member Costley and Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., for damages from Costley's sexual assault of the plaintiff in her room. In concluding that the passenger had a cause of action against the defendant cruise line in tort (strict vicarious liability) and in contract, the Florida appellate court explained that Florida holds a common carrier responsible for the willful misconduct of its employees during the entire contractual period, notwithstanding the fact that the employee's actions fall outside the scope of employment. Id. at 652-53. 125 In reaching this conclusion, the Florida appellate court in Nadeau actually analyzed the relevant federal precedent, including the First Circuit's Muratore, the Ninth Circuit's Morton, and the Second Circuit's Rivers. The Florida appellate court determined that the same strict liability principle has been recognized by federal courts applying admiralty law. Id. at 652 (citing Muratore and Morton ). The Florida appellate court in Nadeau discussed Rivers and determined that the language in Rivers requiring negligence on the part of the carrier was dicta and was presented as part of a jury instruction that the Second Circuit believed was actually favorable to the defendant common carrier. Id. at 652 & 652 n. 5. 126 In Nadeau, the Florida appellate court ultimately concluded that [a]t best, admiralty courts are split on the question of whether independent negligence on the part of the shipowner is required to hold the owner liable for an intentional assault by a crew member. Id., at 652-53. Therefore, the Florida court in Nadeau determined (1) that it was free to apply Florida law in the absence of controlling maritime precedent, (2) that under Florida law the common carrier was strictly liable for the assault, and (3) that applying Florida law to the instant facts would in no way alter the uniformity of admiralty decisions. Id. 127 Other Florida appellate decisions apply the same strict liability rule for employee assaults in common carrier-passenger cases. See, e.g., Pelot v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 60 Fla. 159, 53 So. 937, 938 (1910) (train case); Nazareth v. Herndon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 467 So.2d 1076, 1078-79 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985) (ambulance common carrier case); Commodore Cruise Line, Ltd. v. Kormendi, 344 So.2d 896 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977) (cruise line case). 128 Defendants argue that two Florida cases undermine Florida's strict liability rule, citing Rindfleisch v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 498 So.2d 488 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986), and Riddle v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 73 So.2d 71 (Fla.1954). This argument is unavailing. In Rindfleisch, the parties agreed that federal maritime law controlled, and thus the Florida appellate court did not apply Florida law at all. Further, Rindfleisch was a slip-and-fall case, and the Florida appellate court correctly applied Kermarec 's reasonable care standard. Rindfleisch, 498 So.2d at 490-91. In addition, the Florida appellate court in Nadeau distinguished Rindfleisch and applied Florida law and a strict liability standard in a crew member assault case. Nadeau, 634 So.2d at 651 n. 3 & 652. Thus, we conclude that Nadeau is more directly on point. 129 As to the second case, while Riddle did involve Florida law, it concerned a common carrier in moving household goods, and the assault occurred in the plaintiff's home. 73 So.2d at 71. Accordingly, Rindfleisch and Riddle do not alter our conclusion (1) that Florida tort law imposes strict liability on cruise lines for crew member assaults on their passengers, (2) that as to this issue Florida law is consistent with federal maritime tort law, and (3) that to the extent the district court applied Florida law there is no reversible error in this case.