Opinion ID: 1106371
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: R.A.P 17(a)(1)(2)(3).

Text: ¶ 58. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals decision should be final and non-reviewable. The record before this Court clearly reveals this case fails to meet any of the aforementioned prerequisites, and therefore, this petition fails to satisfy the standard of review required under Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 17(a). Johns was charged with aggravated assault (Count I) and shooting into a motor vehicle (Count II). The jury was unable to reach a verdict on Count II of the indictment, and convicted Johns of Count I only. The verdict of the Pike County Circuit Court was unanimously affirmed on direct appeal by the Court of Appeals. The denial by the trial court of Johns's motion for post-conviction relief was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals without dissent. ¶ 59. The majority fails to address this fatal flaw. The petitioner never sought to establish, and the majority fails to reveal, good cause to suspend the requirements or procedures of these rules. See M.R.A.P. 2(c). We are bound to follow our rules, notwithstanding we may disagree with a lower court in the result. This Court should find the Writ of Certiorari was improvidently granted, as the requirement for a review under M.R.A.P 17(a)(1) is nonexistent, and alone should be dispositive.
¶ 60. Johns asserts his case is analogous to Payton v. State, 708 So.2d 559 (1998). However, this case is clearly distinguishable from Payton. As such, the Court of Appeals' decision is not in conflict with Payton. Payton satisfied the appellate court he was prejudiced due to the lack of any pre-trial investigation, based on uncontroverted testimony that no pretrial investigation was conducted. Id. at 561. In this case, the testimony is in conflict. Johns alleges prior to trial he presented to his attorney, Jackson, the names of three witnesses. At the postconviction relief hearing, Jackson testified that he determined the witnesses were not credible and that if he called the witnesses, their testimony could well be perjurous.
¶ 61. The victim of an aggravated assault, Kendall Jefferson, testified that in the weeks prior to the shooting, his life had been threatened by Johns. Jefferson further testified after this incident, he and Johns were involved in a fight. Johns countered that he had been threatened by Jefferson. ¶ 62. According to Jefferson, prior to the shooting incident, he went to Johns's place of employment to speak to Johns to work out their differences. Jefferson stated that Johns told him, [w]e ain't leaving nothing alone and tell your grandma she ain't got to worry about keeping you out after you dead. Just tell her you're already dead. ¶ 63. On March 28th, the date of the shooting, Jefferson and Johns had encountered each other on two separate occasions, at local convenience stores. One of these convenience stores was B.J.'s, where Jefferson testified he was again threatened by Johns. Johns's alleged witnesses testified at the PCR hearing that Johns went to B.J.'s on the evening of March 28th. ¶ 64. Accompanying Jefferson to B.J.'s and witnessing the conversation between Jefferson and Johns was Rushard Haynes. Haynes's testimony conformed with Jefferson's testimony that at approximately 8:00 p.m., March 28th, Johns, in his vehicle, followed Jefferson's car from B.J.'s and that multiple gun shots [5] were fired from Johns's vehicle at and into Jefferson's vehicle. The victim, Jefferson, and the eyewitness, Haynes, testified conclusively they were certain Johns was the driver of the following vehicle. However, neither Jefferson nor Haynes testified they could be certain Johns fired the shots. A passenger in Jefferson's vehicle was wounded, but he disappeared after the incident and was never found. No weapon was found. The trial court found the state put on a prima facie case Johns's vehicle was the source of the shots. ¶ 65. At trial, Johns denied he followed Jefferson and further denied anyone from his car fired a shot. Johns testified he was home with his daughter at the time of the shooting. This conflicting evidence was presented to a Pike County Circuit Court jury, which convicted Johns of aggravated assault, but did not convict Johns of shooting into a motor vehicle. Johns fails to highlight this outcome and the dichotomy it presents when claiming the ineffectiveness of his counsel, who evidently succeeded in convincing a jury Johns was not responsible for firing the actual shots. ¶ 66. Johns asserted in his PCR his conviction was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The burden of proof rests upon Johns. The actions of Johns's attorney must be measured within the totality of the circumstances. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). ¶ 67. Johns asserted Jackson was ineffective because he failed to interview his alibi witnesses. Jackson testified he never received an actual list, but that Johns furnished him names of putative alibi witnesses. Jackson further testified he interviewed these people prior to trial. At the PCR hearing, approximately seven years after the trial, he was unable to recall their names. When Jackson interviewed the first witness, prior to trial, Jackson stated this witness told him, I'm gonna say what you want me to say. When presented with inconsistencies and the offer to manufacture testimony, Jackson was faced with the decision of whether or not to use these witnesses in Johns's trial. Jackson testified after meeting with these people, he determined their testimony would have essentially been useless. A review of the original trial record, the affidavits of these putative witnesses and their conflicting testimony at the PCR hearing, satisfies this Justice the decision of Jackson was clearly sound trial strategy. ¶ 68. Johns's ineffective assistance claim is totally reliant on Jackson's failure to present evidence of an alibi through these putative witnesses. At trial, Johns testified he was at home with his daughter at the time of the shooting; however, his alleged eyewitnesses offer a different and varying version of the events of that evening. Prior to the PCR hearing, Johns's alibi witnesses offered affidavits Johns was not at home with his daughter as he asserted, but rather he was walking around the neighborhood. At the PCR hearing, these putative witnesses testified to the same, which conflicts with Johns's testimony. ¶ 69. The testimony of the putative witnesses also conflicts with the testimony of Jackson. These putative witnesses claimed they were not contacted by Jackson. Contrastingly, Jackson testified at the PCR hearing that these putative witnesses were going to offer perjured testimony, and that as an officer of the court, he determined they should not called. ¶ 70. The majority opinion that Jackson was deficient in not calling these witnesses rests upon a conflict in testimony. The circuit court judge in this matter is in the best position to resolve these conflicts, and it is our duty to afford him deference. This Court has held, a circuit court judge sitting without a jury is accorded the same deference with regard to his findings as a chancellor, and his findings are safe on appeal where they are supported by substantial, credible, and reasonable evidence. Chantey Music Pub., Inc. v. Malaco, Inc., 915 So.2d 1052, 1055 (Miss.2005) (citations omitted). Assuming the truthfulness of Jackson's testimony, which the trial court and Court of Appeals did, the Rules of Professional Conduct require the action taken by Jackson. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. See False Evidence Comment to M.R.P.C. 3.3(c). ¶ 71. Even if this Court were to ignore this prohibited conduct, and further consider the Strickland test, Johns fails the second prong of the test. Under Strickland, in order to show ineffective assistance of counsel, one must also show that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. ¶ 72. Applying Strickland to the case before us, the question becomes: would the result of Johns's trial have been different if Jackson put on the putative alibi witnesses with their varying testimony? Reviewing each putative alibi witness' testimony at the PCR hearing, then comparing the testimony to their affidavits, and finally considering the contrasting trial testimony of the defendant, Johns, leads me to conclude the result of this proceeding would not have been different. In support of this conclusion, pertinent portions of the testimony and affidavit statements of each of the three alleged witnesses is discussed infra.
¶ 73. Reginald Nunnery stated he is a friend and used to do work for Johns. Nunnery did not tell anyone he had information regarding Johns's whereabouts until after Johns had been charged with the crime. Johns's mother allegedly informed Nunnery not only that he was charged with the crime, but also when and where the crime occurred. Upon learning this information, Nunnery did not offer to share the knowledge with the police or district attorney that he had seen Johns at the time the crime occurred at a place other than the crime scene. ¶ 74. In his affidavit, attached to the PCR, Nunnery claimed he saw Johns in the early evening hours of March 28th, when he told Johns he would be cooking out and invited Johns to dinner. Nunnery claimed Johns arrived at his home a little bit after eight, about 8:12, 8:15. Nunnery then sent Johns to B.J.'s store to purchase beer, and Johns was gone fifteen to twenty minutes. Portions of this testimony comport with that of the victim, Jefferson, and the eyewitness, Haynes, who both testified they saw Johns at B.J.'s on March 28th. Nunnery stated at the PCR hearing he always starts his fire [for grilling] at 8:00, which he repeated a second time, always at 8:00. Earlier, Nunnery stated that around 8:15 p.m., he was busy with my fire, getting it started for my grill. Nunnery swore in his affidavit, that the food would be ready at 9:30 p.m. at the latest.
¶ 75. Patricia Nunnery, Ronald Nunnery's wife, asserted that Johns walked into her backyard at 8:15 p.m. and that the purpose of Johns's visit was to ask her husband to do some work on Johns's wife's car. Patricia stated that Johns's visit took place between 8:15 and 8:30 p.m., the time when we just got through, about to get through with the food on the grill. She also stated Johns went to B.J.'s, but he wasn't even gone ten, fifteen minutes. ¶ 76. Contrary to her husband, Patricia stated twice during testimony she was certain the food was through cooking around 8:15 p.m., because she specifically looked at her watch. Patricia should have been aware her husband always started his grill at 8:00 p.m. She also stated her husband slow cooked the food, which takes about an hour, hour and a half, and the food had been on the grill at least an hour before she spoke with Johns, as the food was finished cooking when Johns came to their house.
¶ 77. Katie Magee stated she and Johns's father were raised together and she has known him all her life. In her affidavit, Magee stated she grew up in the same neighborhood as Johns and they were friendly. Magee stated no one contacted her during the course of Johns's trial. Magee claimed the first time she was aware that she had information which was helpful to Johns was when she was discussing Johns's conviction with his father. Magee did not come forward with this story until after she was contacted by Johns's appeal attorney, but she could not recall when she met this attorney. ¶ 78. At the PCR hearing, Magee stated she saw Johns walk by her backyard with his daughter a little after eight and that she talked to him for 3 or 4 minutes, and she was sure about this time. However, in her affidavit, Magee asserted she first saw Johns around 8:30 p.m. and spoke with him for several minutes. Contrary to the testimony she had given moments before, and contrary to her affidavit, Magee then stated that when she heard from Johns's father about the time the crime took place, she saw Johns hanging around the Nunnery's all that evening and toward the night. ¶ 79. The majority opinion relies on Magee being able to remember the exact date and time, as she was celebrating the birthday of a friend in her backyard. The crime took place on March 28th. At the PCR hearing, Magee stated her friend's birthday was on March 27th. Realizing the contradiction from her own testimony moments before, she then recanted and said there was no birthday party. She then stated she remembered, from approximately seven years before, that on the 28th of March, she just had people over to hang out. Magee admitted she had been drinking the day of March 28th. ¶ 80. The witnesses presented inconsistent statements regarding the time they saw Johns. Each witness's testimony at the evidentiary hearing conflicts not only with their personal affidavits, but with the testimony of each other and most importantly, with Johns's testimony. Each witness stated Johns was at their home the night of March 28th, at the time of the shooting. Johns told the jury he was home with his daughter the entire evening. ¶ 81. According to Strickland, a convicted defendant ... must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Jackson made the professional determination these witnesses would not be credible; therefore, Jackson did not call them as alibi witnesses. Johns states that under Strickland, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigation. Jackson testified at the evidentiary hearing he made the determination prior to trial these witnesses may offer perjured testimony. Under Strickland, counsel has the right to make decisions regarding trial strategy. Id. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Jackson's choice not to call witnesses lacking credibility and offering testimony inconsistent with the accused's testimony can clearly be considered trial strategy. Assuming arguendo Jackson called the witnesses with their inconsistent testimony, due to the overwhelming weight of other evidence presented against Johns, a reasonable juror could have reached a guilty verdict. There has been no showing the outcome of Johns's case would have been different had these witnesses testified. ¶ 82. This case was decided by a jury, and this Court gives jury verdicts great deference. Venton v. Beckham, 845 So.2d 676, 686 (Miss.2003) (citing Ducker v. Moore, 680 So.2d 808, 811 (Miss.1996)). This case was subsequently affirmed by a unanimous Court of Appeals. Johns's motion for post-conviction relief was denied by the trial court after a full hearing. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals without dissent. It is the duty of this Court to give deference to these decisions, and this conviction should not be disturbed. ¶ 83. Johns has clearly not proved an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland. Jackson testified in an evidentiary hearing that in his professional judgment, he believed Johns's alibi witnesses were going to offer false statements. Jackson took into account the surrounding circumstances and made a tactical decision not to call these witnesses. ¶ 84. Johns further failed to prove Jackson's defense prejudiced the outcome of his case. The overwhelming weight of evidence presented against Johns would allow a jury to reasonably conclude that Johns was guilty of the crime committed. Even if these alleged alibi witnesses had testified, a different result would not have occurred. ¶ 85. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.