Opinion ID: 3013806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the officers entered the residence for the

Text: purpose of executing an arrest warrant, and Agnew first argues that the District this finding has not been challenged. Court erred in finding that the officers’ Indeed, Duncan testified that he was entry into 2740 Ludwig Street was assigned to the Fugitive Task Force justified by exigent circumstances. We charged with serving arrest warrants, and review the denial of a suppression motion Agnew testified that he was aware that for clear error as to the underlying facts, there was “a warrant out for [his] arrest” at but exercise plenary review as to its the time of the arrest. Moreover, the legality in light of the court’s properly police had probable cause to believe that found facts. United States v. Givan, Agnew was in the home because they saw 320 F.3d 452, 458 (3d Cir. 2003). We may him through the window. affirm on any ground supported by the record. United States v. Jasin, 280 F.3d We note that Payton only addresses 355, 362 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. entry by officers into the residence of the 947 (2002); United States v. Belle, 593 subject of the warrant, 445 U.S. at 603, F.2d 487, 499 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc) and that there was no testimony at the (affirming denial of suppression motion on suppression hearing about whether 2740 3 Ludwig Street was Agnew’s residence. As the Ninth Circuit observed: However, whether the home was Agnew’s residence is ultimately irrelevant because A person has no greater under any of the possible alternatives the right of privacy in another’s entry pursuant to the arrest warrant did not home than in his own. If an violate Agnew’s Fourth Amendment arrest warrant and reason to rights. believe the person named in the warrant is present are If Agnew resided at 2740 Ludwig sufficient to protect that Street, his arrest was lawful under Payton person’s fourth amendment because the police acted pursuant to an privacy rights in his own arrest warrant. See id. at 602-03. If home, they necessarily Agnew did not reside at 2740 Ludwig suffice to protect his privacy Street, he may have lacked a privacy rights in the home of interest in the residence and would have no another. standing to challenge the police officers’ entry. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, The right of a third party not 95-97 (1990) (holding that only a person named in the arrest warrant with a reasonable expectation of privacy in to the privacy of his home a residence—like an overnight guest—may may not be invaded without complain that an entry into the residence a search warrant. But this was unlawful). In any event, even if right is personal to the home Agnew, although not a resident at 2740 owner and ca nnot be Ludwig Street, did have a privacy interest, asserted vicariously by the the entry did not violate his privacy rights. person named in the arrest The Supreme Court held in United States warrant. v. Steagald, 451 U.S. 204, 211-14 (1981), that the Fourth Amendment does not United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d permit police to enter a third person’s 482, 484 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc) home to serve an arrest warrant on a (citations omitted); see also United States suspect. But Steagald protected the v. Kaylor, 877 F.2d 658, 663 n.5 (8th Cir. interests of the third-party owner of the 1989) (“Steagald addressed only the right residence, not the suspect himself. See id. of a third party not named in the arrest at 212 (stating the issue to be “whether an warrant to the privacy of his or her home. arrest warrant—as opposed to a search This right is personal to the homeowner warrant— is adequate to protect the Fourth and cannot be asserted vicariously by the Amendment interests of persons not person named in the arrest warrant.”). named in the warrant, when their homes Thus, even if Agnew was a non-resident are searched without their consent and in with a privacy interest, the Fourth the absence of exigent circumstances”). Amendment would not protect him from 4 arrest by police armed with an arrest Rule [of Evidence] 403 objection and its warrant. reasons for doing so are not otherwise apparent from the record, there is no way Because the officers entered the to review its discretion. In such cases, we residence armed with a warrant for need not defer to the reasoning of the Agnew’s arrest, and had probable cause to district court.” Id. at 781 (citation believe that he was inside, the District omitted). Agnew asks us to extend this Court properly denied the motion to principle to decisions under Rule 609. The suppress. District Court stated, “I have read the [government’s] motion and your brief. I