Opinion ID: 2234677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Counts I and II

Text: Based upon our review of the entire record in this case, we cannot conclude that the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to counts I and II (child abuse resulting in death and manslaughter, respectively); i.e., that Trotter's guilty verdict on counts I and II was surely unattributable to the admission of his ex-spouses' testimony. While the evidence properly admitted at trial would be sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict on counts I and II, it is not undisputably so. In fact, the evidence concerning Christopher's death was in significant dispute. Both Trotter and Tammy stated that they were not in the room when Christopher was fatally injured, and both say that they did not see the other abuse Christopher. In effect, the State's entire case against Trotter was circumstantial in nature since no one testified that they saw Christopher being abused. Whether the jury believed Trotter's statement that he did not commit the crime, as the jury heard in a taped interview with police which was played at trial, or Tammy's testimony at trial that she did not commit the crime was critical to the ultimate verdict. By presenting evidence giving rise to the inference that Trotter was the kind of person who was prone to abuse other people, the State was able to cast substantial doubt on Trotter's credibility. Faced with such evidence, the jury could have been tempted to infer bad character and action taken in conformity with that character and, thus, could have reached a verdict on an improper basis. See State v. McManus, 257 Neb. 1, 594 N.W.2d 623 (1999). Absent the evidence regarding Trotter's ex-spouses, the jury would have been left with little character evidence other than evidence of Tammy's history with her other children. Evidence was presented at trial tending to show that Tammy had a history of neglecting or mistreating her children. Tammy's mother testified that Tammy voluntarily gave her and her husband guardianship of Tammy's first child, A.C., after A.C. had been removed from Tammy's care when a babysitter noticed marks on A.C. and called the police. Tammy's mother testified that Tammy's second child, K.L., had been living with Tammy and three other people in Otoe, Nebraska, when Tammy left the house one day, thinking there was a babysitter for K.L. The others in the house decided they no longer wanted K.L. with them, and so they called K.L.'s paternal grandparents to come for him. Tammy had a third child before Christopher was born, but gave the child up for adoption at the hospital shortly after giving birth. In late 1994, Tammy lived with Delmar Robbs and his 3-year-old son, M.R., for a few months in a basement apartment of a house in Omaha, Nebraska. During this time, Robbs was working the night shift at a trucking company installing tires. Robbs testified that he had Tammy watch M.R. while Robbs was at work. While at work one evening, Robbs got a call from the upstairs neighbor, and when Robbs arrived, M.R. had bruises and scratches all over his body. The neighbor testified that she had heard screaming and shouting from the downstairs apartment that evening for approximately 30 minutes. The neighbor banged on the door to the basement apartment, and Tammy eventually came to the door. The neighbor stated that she entered the apartment and discovered Tammy sweating, red faced, and tense and heard Tammy threaten M.R. The neighbor also testified that she did not see M.R.'s injuries the day before when M.R. had come upstairs to visit her. The day after the incident, Robbs had the neighbor babysit M.R. The neighbor then took M.R. to the hospital where photographs were taken of his injuries. Virginia Childers, Tammy's cousin and the stepdaughter of Tammy's friend, testified that Tammy was at Childers' father's home on a particular occasion and that Childers saw Tammy slap Childers' young stepbrother. The above evidence, in and of itself, is not sufficient for a jury to conclude that Tammy was responsible for Christopher's death. This type of evidence, however, which was admitted without a rule 404 objection, is sufficient to potentially cast a reasonable doubt whether Trotter was responsible for Christopher's death. On this record, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the improperly admitted evidence did not materially influence the jury in reaching its verdict on counts I and II. In other words, we cannot conclude with any confidence that the actual guilty verdicts rendered on counts I and II were surely unattributable to the improperly admitted testimony of Trotter's ex-spouses. Therefore, we must reverse the judgment of the district court and the convictions of Trotter on the charges of manslaughter and child abuse resulting in death. Further, because the State has not raised the issue either at trial or on appeal, we do not comment on whether the evidence of Tammy's past conduct was consistent with rule 404.