Opinion ID: 1687725
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Statutory Question

Text: In order to reach the state and federal constitutional questions, the district court first had to address the issue of whether the consultant's papers were public records within the meaning of section 119.011(1). [4] In the course of holding that the consultant's papers were public records, the district court in effect said that section 119.011(1) applies to almost everything generated or received by a public agency. The initial briefs submitted by the parties on the certified question were not directed to the district court's interpretation of section 119.011(1). Subsequent to oral argument, however, we directed the parties to submit additional briefs on this point. The petitioners argue that the district court's broad interpretation comports with the legislature's intent and, thus, is the correct construction of the statute. Respondents contend that section 119.011(1) refers only to those documents which can be characterized as final or formal and that the district court's finding that the consultant's handwritten notes fall within the statutory definition of public records is erroneous. We conclude that the district court's interpretation of section 119.011(1) is too broad. Prior to the enactment of section 119.011(1) in 1967, this Court, in Amos v. Gunn, 84 Fla. 285, 343, 94 So. 615, 634 (1922), said: A public record is one required by law to be kept, or necessary to be kept in the discharge of a duty imposed by law, or directed by law to serve as a memorial and evidence of something written, said, or done. This limited definition obviously embraced very few documents, most of which could be found in the official record book at the courthouse. In enacting section 119.011(1), the legislature broadened the class of public records. Notwithstanding the expansion of the concept, however, the legislature based its policy determination on the term public records. That definition limits public information to those materials which constitute records  that is, materials that have been prepared with the intent of perpetuating or formalizing knowledge. [5] To give content to the public records law which is consistent with the most common understanding of the term record, we hold that a public record, for purposes of section 119.011(1), is any material prepared in connection with official agency business which is intended to perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge of some type. To be contrasted with public records are materials prepared as drafts or notes, which constitute mere precursors of governmental records and are not, in themselves, intended as final evidence of the knowledge to be recorded. Matters which obviously would not be public records are rough drafts, notes to be used in preparing some other documentary material, and tapes or notes taken by a secretary as dictation. Inter-office memoranda and intra-office memoranda communicating information from one public employee to another or merely prepared for filing, even though not a part of an agency's later, formal public product, would nonetheless constitute public records inasmuch as they supply the final evidence of knowledge obtained in connection with the transaction of official business. It is impossible to lay down a definition of general application that identifies all items subject to disclosure under the act. Consequently, the classification of items which fall midway on the spectrum of clearly public records on the one end and clearly not public records on the other will have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. In this case, we have examined the consultant's papers sealed by the circuit judge and we conclude that the letters, memoranda, resumes, and travel vouchers made or received by the consultant in the course of his contract with JEA were intended to formalize the information contained in them. Therefore, these materials constitute public records under section 119.011(1). The handwritten notes of the consultant, however, made during or shortly after his interviews with job prospects, are merely preliminary materials intended to aid the consultant when he later formalized the knowledge gained during the interviews. Accordingly, the decision of the district court is quashed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. BOYD, SUNDBERG and McDONALD, JJ., concur. OVERTON, J., concurs specially with an opinion. ENGLAND, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. ADKINS, J., dissents with an opinion.