Opinion ID: 2417351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Develop Penalty Phase Mitigation

Text: Tokar claims that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to provide an adequate and consistent mitigation case during the penalty phase. Under Strickland , Tokar has failed to present any evidence that proves his trial attorneys were deficient in this regard. During mitigation, the defense called Tokar's mother, his aunt, and one of his first cousins to explain how Tokar began drinking alcohol in his early teen years and that Tokar acted very different and paranoid after he had been drinking. Then the defense called a clinical toxicologist to explain the effects of drinking alcohol on persons generally. Finally, the defense called Dr. Daniel, who discussed Tokar's HIV-positive status, his parents' divorce, his father's alcoholism, sexual abuse inflicted upon Tokar as a child, multiple trauma in his life, Tokar's elevated paranoia scale, and the influence of alcohol in causing him to become full-blown paranoid. Tokar relies primarily upon Dr. Smith, a clinical psychologist, whose deposition was presented at the post-conviction relief hearing. Dr. Smith said that he felt strongly that the defense counsel had failed to adequately utilize their experts in providing information regarding Mr. Tokar's background. He continued: There were a number of things in Mr. Tokar's documents that were not adequately expanded upon during trial that I feel would be important in consideration of the penalty phase. There is a presumption that counsel's alleged omissions were sound trial strategy. Sidebottom v. State, 781 S.W.2d 791, 795 (Mo. banc 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032, 110 S.Ct. 3295, 111 L.Ed.2d 804 (1990). Tokar has not overcome this presumption. During the penalty phase, the defense focused primarily on the theory that, without alcohol, Tokar was not aggressive or dangerous. If the jury believed this argument, they could have sentenced Tokar to life in prison, where he would not have access to alcohol and would be docile. It cannot be said that this was an illogical or inappropriate strategy choice on the part of Tokar's counsel. Although Dr. Smith insisted that it would have been better, in his opinion, to focus on Tokar's family background, his opinion is not persuasive in two respects. First, Smith is not a lawyer, nor does he possess sufficient experience in death penalty litigation to be competent to express opinion evidence on such strategic choices. In fact, certain portions of his testimony reveal his lack of understanding of practical strategic considerations. The following exchange took place when Dr. Smith was cross-examined about his opinion that trial counsel should have emphasized the effect upon Tokar of his father's death: Q. [State's attorney]: I think you indicated that you felt that the witnesses at Mr. Tokar's actual trial should have emphasized the fact that Jeffrey wasand again I think I'm quoting youcrushed when his father died; is that correct? A. [Dr. Smith]: I felt that the defense counsel should have asked more about the impact of various life events upon Jeffrey's development. Q.: And among those I think was the fact that Jeffrey's father's death, his natural father's death, had an impact on Jeffrey's development? A. Yes. Q. And I think you even testified on direct examination that you thought that that was one of those significant events in Jeffrey's life and that some changes were noted in his behavior after his father died? A. Yes. Q. And the point I'm leading to is at the trial Mr. Tokar was accused of killing a father in front of his two young children. Do you understand that? A. Yes. Q. And do you see the irony in asking the jury to have some sympathy for Mr. Tokar because he lost his father when Mr. Tokar is standing accused of killing a father in front of two young children? A. No. Second, even if Dr. Smith was competent to express an opinion in this regard, he did not. The opinions he expressed constitute little more than second guessing, which is insufficient to meet the Strickland requirements. The trial court's determination on this issue was not clearly erroneous. The point is denied.