Opinion ID: 4036099
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Revising allotments under KRS 48.620.

Text: The first question is whether reducing an allotment, without increasing other allotments by an equal amount, is a permissible revision of the allotment under KRS 48.620(1). This Court concludes that the statute does not give the Governor the authority to revise allotments in this way. We reach this conclusion after examining the statute in context, both that within KRS 48.620(1) itself and that in other provisions of KRS Chapter 48. When the statute speaks of revising allotments, it refers to the schedule of allotments, that is, the timing of the payments throughout the fiscal year. Not only does KRS 48.620(1) refer expressly to revising the schedule, other provisions of KRS Chapter 48 and the budget bill itself require that the allotment conform to the General Assembly's appropriations. The only way for 26 this to happen is if the full amount appropriated is included in allotments over the year. Moreover, this reading is compelled by an examination of the statutory—as opposed to legislative—history of KRS Chapter 48, which shows that allotment revision has always been about revising the schedule of allotments. a. The language of the statute in context requires revision of allotments to refer to scheduling, not just the amount, of the allotments. Again, we begin with the language of the statute: Allotments shall be made as provided by the allotment schedule, and may be revised upon the written certification of the Governor, the Chief Justice, and the Legislative Research Commission for their respective branches of government. No revisions of the allotment schedule may provide for an allotment or allotments in excess of the amount appropriated to that budget unit in a branch budget bill, or for expenditure for any other purpose than specified in a branch budget bill. KRS 48.620(1). Although the statute does not group the words together as a single term, it is clear that we are concerned generally with the meaning of an allotment revision. 6 Allotment is not a statutorily defined term. Its meaning, however, is fairly clear: a share or portion of a thing that is given to someone or something. Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). It is [s]omething allotted, and allot, in turn, means [t]o parcel out; distribute or apportion or [t]o assign as a portion; allocate. American Heritage Dictionary of the English 6 We note that KRS 48.620(1) starts with the word allotments, which, as the Governor points out, is modified by a clause beginning with the words may be revised. Thus, there is little question that the statute is addressed to allotment revision, and that the Governor claims to have made such a revision. 27 Language (5th ed. 2011). In this context, it means a portion of a given appropriation. Allotments are made on a quarterly basis, rather than the full amount of each appropriation being made available at the beginning of the fiscal year. This reflects the dual reality that expenses do not arise all at once, and that the state is rarely flush with sufficient cash to pay all those expenses at once and must instead rely on the revenue stream from taxes. In short, the quarterly allotment system is a means of coordinating revenues with expenditures. Revise means No alter or edit (a text). Id. An act ... of revising is a revision. Id. The Governor reduced the fourth-quarter allotment for the Universities by 2%. In a sense, this is a revision—in that it is literally an alteration of the allotment amount. The Governor claims that his action was allowed by the statute, as its only express limits are on revisions that would provide for an allotment or allotments in excess of the amount appropriated to that budget unit in a branch budget bill, or for expenditure for any other purpose than specified in a branch budget bill. KRS 48.620(1). This, he claims, allows for revisions of allotments down—a reduction without a corresponding increase of other allotments—under the doctrine of expressio unius (otherwise known as the negative-implication canon). In other words, because the statute expressly includes a limit on revision, other limits are not included. The Attorney General instead claims that the statute is about the timing of payments, not in the literal sense of whether the payment should be on the first or the fifteenth of a month, but in the sense of in which quarter any given 28 penny is allotted. In other words, according to the Attorney General, the power to revise an allotment is simply the power to move a penny from one quarter to another, either by advancing money to one allotment or putting it off to another. The Governor responds that the plain language of KRS 48.620(1) says nothing about the revision going to the schedule of allotments because allotments, in the first sentence, are what may be revised. And the allotment is the amount of money available in any given quarter. But allotment revision is not the only description of revision in the statute. The second sentence of KRS 48.620(1) refers to revisions of the allotment schedule. That sentence cannot be ignored because statutes must be read as a whole and in context with other parts of the law. Lewis v. Jackson Energy Co-op. Corp., 189 S.W.3d 87, 92 (Ky. 2005). This is the whole-text canon, which calls on the judicial interpreter to consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012). The canon recognizes that discrete statutory language falls within a larger context, and that [c]ontext is a primary determinant of meaning. Id. And the second sentence of KRS 48.620(1) greatly affects the statute's meaning. It literally says that the revision allowed by KRS 48.620 will be to the allotment schedule. Given this context, allotment revision in the first sentence cannot be read to mean that any change constitutes a permissible revision under the statute. Just as the Governor would have us consider the second 29 sentence's prohibition on allotments exceeding appropriations, so too must we consider its use of revisions of the allotment schedule. With this context in mind, we conclude that revision of an allotment in KRS 48.620(1) refers to revising the schedule of allotments. Obviously, the statute allows a reduction of an allotment. It also allows an increase in an allotment. But when an allotment is revised up or down, there must be a corresponding revision of at least one other allotment. If the fourth-quarter allotment is reduced by 2%, then other allotments must be increased to balance the reduction, so that the sum of the quarterly allotments reflects the appropriated amount. If the revision is attempted too late, so that the other allotments cannot be revised, then revision is not allowed.? This allows the allotments to comply with the requirements of KRS 48.610, which commands: Allotments shall conform with the appropriations in the enacted branch budget bills or other appropriation provisions. This reading also allows compliance with the 2014 Executive Branch Budget Bill itself, which commands that laillotments within appropriated sums for the activities and purposes contained in the enacted Executive Budget shall conform to KRS 48.610. 2014 Ky. Acts Ch. 117, Part III, § 4. 8 KRS 48.610, of 7 This understanding of the operation of allotments within appropriations is also consistent with prior decisions governing the legislative appropriation authority. See generally James v. State University, 114 S.W. 767 (Ky. 1908) (suggesting that the executive (there the auditor) cannot alter how (and to whom) appropriations are paid out so as to make it impractical, through exhaustion of the treasury funds, to pay some of them at the end of the budget term); Rhea v. Newman, 156 S.W. 154 (Ky. 1913) (requiring Treasurer to pay out all appropriated sums despite protestations that would result in a deficit). 8 Interestingly, that same provision also commands that [a]llotments within appropriated sums for the activities and purposes contained in the enacted Executive 30 course, requires that allotments conform to appropriations, but it also creates the schedule of quarterly allotments of appropriations for each budget unit of the branch. KRS 48.610. Allotments can only conform to KRS 48.610 if they conform to the quarterly allotment schedule. Only by having the full schedule of allotments comport with the appropriation can this be accomplished. Under the Governor's proposed reading of KRS 48.620(1), it cannot. Not only is KRS 48.610 an additional element of context in which KRS 48.620(1) is to be considered, it is a direct command that allotments are to conform to the appropriations made by the General Assembly. That command cannot be ignored. This reasoning carries with it the weight of logic and considers the effect of other statutory references to allotments. It thus offers a sounder basis for interpreting the statute than relying on expressio unis as applied to the appropriation-maximum qualification in KRS 48.620(1). Although that is unquestionably a legitimate principle of statutory interpretation, it should be Budget ... may be revised pursuant to KRS 48.605 and this Act. 2014 Ky. Acts Ch. 117, Part III, § 4. A broad application of the expressio unius canon would suggest that KRS 48.620, which is not mentioned as a means by which an allotment may be revised, is not applicable to revising allotments under this bill. But that canon must be applied with great caution, since its application depends so much on context. Scalia & Garner, supra, at 107. Indeed, it properly applies only when the unius (or technically, unum, the thing specified) can reasonably be thought to be an expression of all that shares in the grant or prohibition involved. Common sense often suggests when this is or is not so. Id. Nothing in the bill suggests that KRS 48.620 was intended not to apply to the 2014 Executive Branch Budget Bill (unlike the one passed in 2016, at least with respect to the Universities). Common sense, especially in light of how the allotment-revision statute works, as explained in this opinion, suggests that it was in effect and could be used to revise allotments. This same limit on expressio unius, however, shows why the Governor's reliance on it to read only an upward limit to revisions is untenable. 31 used cautiously and simply cannot control here as explained in footnote 8. The other approach discussed provides a better indication of meaning here. b. The meaning of allotment revision throughout the statute's history also requires it to be read as referring to the scheduling of allotments, and not just amounts. The whole-text canon—as applied to the immediate context of the statute—is not the only one showing that KRS 48.620(1) allows only revision of the schedule of allotments. An examination of the statute's history 9 also demonstrates that it has always been concerned with revising the allotment schedule, rather than reducing a single allotment. Thus we apply the fixed-meaning canon. This canon would have words be given the meaning they had when the text was adopted. Scalia 86 Garner, supra, at 78. KRS 48.620 was adopted in 1982, and the language at issue in subsection (1) has not changed since that time. Thus, it bears the same meaning that it had at that time. But KRS 48.620 does not exist in a vacuum, nor did it in 1982. Indeed, the statutory scheme at issue here has a long history and includes more than the provision allowing revision of allotments. Some understanding of the larger existing scheme, and how it came to be (in terms of amendments), sheds light on what allotment revision in KRS 48.620 meant in 1982 and now. We thus 9 Here, we refer to the history of the statutory language over time in light of amendments. This is quite separate from legislative history, Scalia 86 Garner, supra, 'at 256, which concerns committee reports, floor speeches, and other instances of legislative activity that are not reflected in the language of the statute. Statutory history is part of the context of the existing statutory language and is amore reliable indicator of the statute's meaning. 32 also apply the principle that [s]tatutes in pari materia are to be interpreted together as though they were one law. Scalia & Garner, supra, at 252. KRS 48.400 to .810 address general monitoring and revision of the budget during the course of the biennium. Included in this scheme is KRS 48.620 allowing the Governor to revise allotments. It also includes KRS 48.605, which allows revisions of allotments at the request of the head of a budget unit. Also included in this scheme is express authorization for the Governor to reduce an appropriation under certain circumstances. See KRS 48.600. Generally speaking, this statute very narrowly and specifically grants the Governor the authority to reduce appropriations when there is an estimated or actual revenue shortfall in the general fund of 5% or less. KRS 48.600(1). Even then, the Governor is not given free rein. Instead, he may reduce appropriations only in accordance with the budget reduction plan included in the enacted branch budget bill, id., and no reductions under the plan are permitted in excess of the actual or projected revenue shortfall, KRS 48.600(2). And if the shortfall exceeds or is expected to exceed 5%, then action can only be taken by the General Assembly. See KRS 48.130(3) (Any revenue shortfall in the general fund or road fund of greater than five percent (5%) shall require action by the General Assembly.). On its face, the Governor's claim to broad authority under KRS 48.620(1) to change the amount of money available to the Universities when there is a budget surplus is inconsistent with his needing legislative authorization to do the same thing when there is an actual or anticipated budget shortfall under KRS 48.600. And when the statutes' history is reviewed, it is evident that they 33 are, in fact, very different powers, and that only one has been given to the Governor. From 1982 to 2009, when faced with budget shortfalls, the Governor could not reduce appropriations.m Rather, he could reduce allotments under those circumstances. See KRS 48.600(1) (1982) (commanding the Governor to make any allotment reductions for the budget units that were necessary). He was also required to take any steps to revise allotments for [his] respective branch[] that [we]re necessary to prevent a cash deficit. Id. KRS 48.620, the allotment-revision statute, also existed at that time. Its first two sections read much as they do now: (1) Allotments shall be made as provided by the allotment schedule, and may be revised upon the written certification of the Governor, the Chief Justice, and the Legislative Research Commission for their respective branches of government. No revisions of the allotment schedule may provide for an allotment or allotments in excess of the amount appropriated to that budget unit in a branch budget bill, or for expenditure for any other purpose than specified in a branch budget bill and a budget memorandum provided for by KRS 48.300. (2) Revisions of allotments under this section shall be reported and reviewed as provided by subsection (4) of KRS 48.500. KRS 48.620 (1990). 11 But the pre-2009 version included two additional provisions: (3) When the actual tax receipts accruing to the general fund or road fund, as appropriate, do not permit all the allotments provided for by the schedules of allotments of all branches of 10 Before 1982, these matters were handled under a different set of statutes. Those were repealed in 1982 and replaced by KRS 48.400 to .810. 11 These provisions essentially read as they did when enacted in 1982. In 1990, they were amended slightly to add branch budget bill instead of joint budget resolution. And they were later amended to delete the language and a budget memorandum provided for by KRS 48.300 from subsection (1), and to change the cross-reference in subsection (2). Otherwise, the language has been stable. 34 government, the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet shall notify all branches of government and each branch shall take appropriate action concerning allotments. (4) This subsection shall not apply in the event of a projected or an actual deficit in tax receipts of the general or road funds as determined by KRS 48.130. KRS 48.620 (1982). 12 These provisions are important indicators of the meaning that allotment revision had when the first subsection was originally enacted. Subsection (3) required the Finance and Administration Cabinet to give notice when actual tax receipts would not permit all of the allotments, and the affected branches of government were to take appropriate action, presumably, by revising allocations as allowed under subsection (1). On its surface, insufficient actual tax receipts sounds like a budget deficit, but subsection (4) stated that KRS 48.620 was not to apply in the event of a projected or actual deficit. Instead, upon such an occurrence, assuming the deficit was less than or equal to 5%, KRS 48.600 went into effect. Again, under the version of that statute then in effect, the Governor was allowed to make both allocation reductions and allocation revisions. But the two were unquestionably different acts, as the former was only allowed in the event of a deficit. So when was the revision process laid out in KRS 48.620 to be implemented? When the actual tax receipts accruing to the general fund or road fund, as appropriate, d[id] not permit all the allotments, KRS 48.620 12 These provisions were not amended until repealed in 2009. 35 (1982), but not when there was a projected or actual deficit. What is the difference between the two scenarios? An actual deficit is when the state has literally run out of money for the year, but still has unpaid expenses. A projected deficit is when the state is projected to run out of money before the end of the year while still having projected expenses. But tax receipts can be insufficient temporarily to pay out an allotted amount without there being an expected deficit overall for the year. Just as the Commonwealth does not receive all its anticipated receipts on the first day of the fiscal year, Aff. of Kathleen Marshal1 13 at 4, it is possible that anticipated receipts may not be received on the day they are actually expected or simply do not coincide with the timing of an allotment. That is when KRS 48.620 was set to go into effect. If, for example, actual tax receipts in the first quarter were insufficient to pay a full allotment, but the funds were expected to be available in the second quarter, then the allotments could be revised to reflect the reality of, and expectations about, the state's revenue stream. This indicates that revision of allotments, as allowed under subsection (1), was about changing the schedule of payments. Moreover, the version of KRS 48.600 then in effect demonstrates that a reduction of an allotment, which was allowed when there was a deficit, was different from a revision of an allotment. Revision of an allotment was also allowed when there was a deficit, but short of a deficit, only a revision was allowed, not a reduction. 13 Ms. Marshall is an Analyst in the Office of the State Budget Director. 36 Under the fixed-meaning canon, the meaning of allotment revision, thus, must still refer to changing the schedule of the allotments. If one allotment goes down, another must go up, resulting in the same overall appropriated amount being allotted over the course of the fiscal year. Revision, in this context, differs from reduction, which means a departure down from the appropriated amount. Reduction was allowed in 1982 only when there was a deficit; the same holds true now. The obvious response to this analysis is that subsections (3) and (4) are no longer the law, having been repealed in 2009. That, however, does not mean that subsection (1)'s meaning was changed. Unquestionably, a significant change in language is presumed to entail a change in meaning. Scalia 8; Garner, supra, at 256. But the language in subsection (1) was not changed, even though the overall statute was amended. Indeed, that subsection (1)'s language was left intact suggests that its meaning remained fixed intentionally. And, as explained above, as used before 2009, revision of an allotment necessarily meant something different from reducing an allotment. Thus, even if allotment revision were ambiguous under the current statutes, it is fair to argue that giving an ambiguous term one meaning rather than another would cause it to make no sense as used in an earlier-enacted statute ... so that such an interpretation should be rejected. Id. at 323. The Governor's proposed reading of the statute would not have made sense under the pre-2009 version of the statute, even though the language in question has not been changed. For that reason, that interpretation must be rejected. 37 Still other changes made in 2009 suggest that revision of an allotment continues to mean a change in the timing of payments, rather than a reduction. KRS 48.600 was amended at that time so that reductions in the event of a deficit (now revenue shortfall) were to be made to appropriations, rather than allotments. And instead of allowing these reductions to be made as deemed necessary by the head of the branch of government, they are now to be made in accordance with the budget reduction plan included in the enacted branch budget bill. At the same time, subsections (3) and (4) of KRS 48.620 were repealed. These provisions were no longer necessary to clearly establish the difference in when KRS 48.600 and .620 were to be used because the reduction-revision distinction was clarified. But that was because the distinction between a revision of an allotment and what had been called a reduction of an allotment (now a reduction of an appropriation) had been clarified. In light of this statutory history, it is evident that KRS 48.620(1) has always been addressed to revising the schedule of allotments. Nothing in the amendments in 2009 suggests that this language means something different now. 2. Withholding allotments when there are trust and agency funds under KRS 45.253(4). As an alternative, the Governor claims that his action, in substance, was permitted by KRS 45.253(4), which allows the Secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet to withhold allotment of general fund appropriations to the extent trust and agency funds are available. As noted above, the 38 Governor presented evidence that the Universities had available adequate trust and agency funds to cover the reductions he made, and thus there would be nothing unlawful about the Secretary withholding allotment of 2% of the fourth quarter's general-fund appropriations. The problem with the Governor's position, however, is that the financial administration of state universities is governed by KRS 164A.555 to .630. 14 AndKRS164.30(2)staepciflyh[]noterpvisfKRS Chapter[] ... 45 ... to the contrary notwithstanding, KRS 164A.555 to 164A.630 shall govern the financial management of higher education. 15 Thus, to the extent that KRS Chapter 45, including 45.253(4), is inconsistent with KRS 164A.555 to .630, the latter set of provisions controls. The Governor argues that there is no inconsistency and, that to the extent there could be one, any conflict should be resolved in favor of reading these statutes in harmony if possible. It is unquestionable that where two statutes are in apparent conflict, their inconsistencies should be reconciled if possible. Commonwealth v. Martin, 777 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Ky. App. 1989); see also Scalia 86 Garner, supra, at 180 (The provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible, not contradictory.). The question is whether the statutes can be read in harmony. 14 Technically speaking, these provisions require the Universities to have opted into their governance. KRS 164A.560. The Universities all appear to have done so. 15 That statute includes an exception not applicable to this case: with the exception of KRS 45.990 and 45A.990 having to do with penalties which shall be applicable to violations of KRS 164A.555 to 164A.630. 39 The Governor notes that the financial-management provisions of Chapter 164A are about the internal financial management of the Universities, whereas KRS 45.253(4) applies to the Finance and Administration Cabinet. Because they govern different entities, goes the argument, they cannot be in conflict. This is largely correct, as most provisions of KRS 164A.555 to .630 are directed to the internal financial management of the Universities. But not every provision is. Indeed, the very first provision, KRS 164A.555, is instead directed at the Finance and Administration Cabinet. It states: The secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet shall issue warrants authorizing the Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Kentucky to pay to the treasurer of each institution any amounts due by virtue of the state appropriations for that institution, or transfer the amount due electronically if electronic transfer is authorized by statute. The transfer of funds shall be handled in a manner to assure a zero (0) balance in the general fund account at the university. KRS 164A.555. This statute specifically directs the secretary to bypass the ordinary process of issuing warrants to the Treasurer to pay expenses on behalf of a government body and to instead issue warrants to the Treasurer to pay any amounts due directly to the Universities. The Governor argues that this statute accomplishes only one thing: it allows the Universities to pay their own bills, rather than relying on the Finance and Administration Cabinet and the Treasurer as each bill comes due. It certainly has that effect, but that is not all the statute does. It is a direct command to the Secretary of Finance and Administration Cabinet to pay any amounts due by virtue of the state appropriations for that institution. 40 KRS 164A.555. The amounts due by virtue of the state appropriations is exactly that: the amount appropriated—the full amount. Again, the Governor disputes that this requires the full amount, and argues that any amounts due simply refers to any amount up to the appropriated amount. He notes again his argument that an appropriation is only a ceiling and that not every penny must be spent. Again, this is true but is not the full story. An appropriation is also an authorization for the expenditure of funds. More importantly, KRS 164A.555 is simply not ambiguous. To the extent an amount is authorized by an appropriation, KRS 164A.555 recognizes that amount is due to the Universities. Although the word due has many uses and meanings, its relevant meaning here—in the context of an amount of money—is [playable immediately or on demand or [o]wed as a debt; owing. American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2011). Indeed, the usage example offered for this latter definition is the amount still due. Id. Although the first use is more common in modern English, see Bryan A. Garner, Garner's Dictionary of Legal Usage 300 (3d ed. 2011), both meanings , demonstrate that whatever amounts are due under the appropriations are amounts to which the Universities are entitled, whether immediately or as a debt. Either way, the statute orders the Secretary of Finance and Administration to issue warrants for those amounts. (Due is limited here to some extent by the statutes requiring quarterly allotments; in other words, the full amount does not become due at the beginning of the fiscal year.) 41 And the word any further confirms this understanding that the full amount must be paid. Although it has multiple senses, the word as used here means every or all. See American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2011) (Every: Any dog likes meat.); Bryan A. Garner, Garner's Modern English Usage 57 (4th ed. 2016) (noting that any has six uses as an adjective but that [i]n affirmative sentences, it means 'every' or 'all' ... ). Thus, the statute cannot mean that an amount less than the full appropriation can be paid to the Universities. Instead, a warrant for all of the amount or every amount due must be issued by the Secretary. Any action less would not comport with the directive of KRS 164A.555. 16 And that the full amount is due is further confirmed by the budget bill itself. Specifically, the 2014 Executive Branch Budget Bill commanded that the Executive Branch shall carry out all appropriations and budgetary language provisions as contained in the State/Executive Budget. 2014 Ky. Acts Ch. 117, Part III, § 27. The only way to do so was to comply with KRS 164A.555. In short, the conflict between KRS 164A.555 and 45.253(4) is inescapable. The two cannot be read together without ignoring the plain meaning of the language in KRS 164A.555. Because KRS 164A.630(2) 16The proof in this case included an affidavit from Kathleen Marshall, an analyst in the Office of the State Budget Director, stating that the Universities do not actually draw their full allotment at the beginning of each quarter, though it is ordinarily available to them. Our reading of the statute does not render this practice unlawful. As long as the appropriated funds are made available, the statute is complied with. 42 commands that the provisions of KRS Chapter 164A control over KRS Chapter 45 if there is a conflict, KRS 164A.555 must control. Thus, the Finance and Administration Cabinet cannot withhold the Universities' allotments even if they have sufficient trust and agency funds to cover their expenses. Any concerns the Governor raises about an appropriation not requiring the expenditure of the full amount—of every penny—are alleviated by the fact that any funds paid to the Universities on the Secretary's warrant but not spent will lapse back to the general fund. See KRS 164A.565(2) ( Any uncommitted state general funds remaining after the close of business on the last day of the fiscal year shall lapse and be returned to the Treasury of the Commonwealth.). 17 Thus, it is evident that the Universities, like any other state agency with discretion in how it spends money, are not required to expend every penny appropriated to them. Nor is that money lost to the state, as it is returned if not spent. B. The Governor's authority to decline to spend appropriated funds is statutorily limited with respect to the Universities. The Governor has not explicitly claimed the inherent authority to require the Universities not to spend their funds. But this understanding of executive power is implicit in his argument. Indeed, he emphasizes in his brief that while the power of the purse belongs to the legislature, administering an appropriation and spending money is an executive function. And he claims that he has acted within that realm, having taken the purse of money provided 17 Funds appropriated for capital construction are excluded from this lapse. KRS 164A.565(6). 43 by the legislature and having] reasonably decided that the legislature's will can be satisfied without spending all of the money in the purse. We recognize that the Governor has disclaimed the existence of unfettered power to withhold appropriated money and reduce spending, and instead claimed authority for his actions under the statutes addressed above. At the same time, however, he claims, under the guise of laying out a limiting principle on his authority, that he may direct budget units to spend less than the full amount of an appropriation so long as 'he has determined that such a decision will not compromise the achievement of underlying legislative purposes and goals.' (Quoting Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 376 N.E.2d 1217, 1223 (Mass. 1978)). The acknowledgement of this limiting principle, however, contains in it a suggestion of an authority that does not exist with respect to the Universities. The existence and breadth of such an authority generally is not before us. Thus we do not address whether the Governor's exercise of such authority in other areas of the executive budget might create a constitutional challenge as the Attorney General has claimed. Here, the statutory language is clear that the legislature has not given the Governor control over the Universities' appropriated funds regardless of whether such authority exists in regard to other budget units. In suggesting that reducing the Universities' allotments has been essentially a decision not to spend the money, the Governor relies heavily on the notion that an appropriation is a ceiling on spending. There is little question that an appropriation does not mandate the expenditure of all the funds authorized (unless the appropriation says otherwise). Indeed, the budget 44 bill at issue in this case itself notes that [t]here is appropriated ... the following discrete sums, or so much thereof as may be necessary. 2014 Ky. Acts Ch. 117, Part I, § (1). So the question is simple: May the Governor order the Universities not to spend their funds? Or, as the trial court suggested, are [t]he Universities ... under the Governor's control as part of the executive branch? Although the Universities are state agencies and are attached to the executive branch for budgetary purposes, they are not part of the executive branch in the same sense as the program cabinets and boards directly under the Governor's control. Unlike those cabinets and boards, the Universities' boards are separate bod[ies] corporate, with the usual corporate powers. 18 KRS 164.350; see also KRS 164.460 (same for the University of Kentucky); KRS 164.830(1) (same for the University of Louisville). They are expressly excluded from being part of the Department of Education. KRS 164.285. 19 In some ways, they are akin to municipal or public corporations, having a separate existence from the main body of government, although retaining many of the government's characteristics, such as immunity from suit. 18 Indeed, the Governor's counsel emphasized at oral argument, albeit in discussing the standing question, that the Universities were separate corporations from the rest of state government. 19 That statute went so far as to repeal any statute suggesting that the Universities are part of the Department of Education: KRS 156.010 and 64.640 and any other statute, to the extent that they provide that the University of Kentucky, Eastern Kentucky State University, Western Kentucky State University, Murray State University, and Morehead State University shall be included in the Department of Education and constitute a division thereof, are hereby repealed. KRS 164.285. 45 The Universities' boards have close to plenary power over the operation of their respective institutions. For example, they have exclusive control over appointments, qualifications, and salaries of faculty and employees. KRS 164.365(1); KRS 164.220 (UK); KRS 164.830 (U of L). And the Universities are all generally given authority to receive and spend money from all sources. The Universities other than the University of Kentucky and the University of Louisville are given the power to receive and spend money under KRS 164.350(1): Each board may: (a) Receive grants of money and expend the same for the use and benefit of the university or college .... If they opt to proceed under KRS 165.555 to .630, which the Universities have done, they may receive, deposit, collect, retain, invest, disburse, and account for all funds received or due from any source including, but not limited to, state and federal appropriations. KRS 164A.560(2)(a). This grant of authority is even more explicit with respect to the boards of the University of Kentucky and University of Louisville, both of which are expressly given the authority to receive and spend appropriations and allotments. See KRS 164.160 (giving UK board power to receive, hold and administer ... all revenues from ... appropriations, [and] allotments); KRS 164.830(1)(d) (stating powers of U of L board include receipt, retention, and administration ... [of] all revenues accruing from ... appropriations, [and] allotments). There are, of course, some limits on how the boards operate. For example, certain expenditures must be approved by the Finance and Administration Cabinet or the Council on Postsecondary Education. See KRS 164A.575 (requiring cabinet approval for real property purchases); KRS 46 164.020(11)(a) (giving council power to approve certain capital construction projects). But that does not otherwise bring the financial decision-making—the choice whether to spend funds—back within the purview of the Governor. The Governor also has some say with respect to the Universities' boards. For example, he gets to appoint most of the members of the boards. See KRS 164.131(1) (e) (UK); KRS 164.821(1) (U of L); KRS 164.321(1) (a) (other universities). And he may remove members for cause. See KRS 63.080(2); KRS 164.131(1)(d) (UK); KRS 164.821(1)(b) (U of L); KRS 164.321(10) (other universities); KRS 164.325 (specifically applying 63.080(2) to boards of regents). These provisions, however, do not undermine the university boards' fundamental independence. A large portion of this independence is financial self-control. The authority over the expenditure of funds appropriated to the Universities has been statutorily lodged with independent boards that head these institutions. Those boards may decline to spend funds appropriated to them, in which case the funds will lapse. 20 But by giving that authority to the boards, the General Assembly has necessarily deprived the Governor of it. We thus conclude that the Governor cannot order the boards of the Universities not to spend funds appropriated to them. The Governor's authority with respect to the boards differs fundamentally from his authority with respect to those state entities and 20 Like the rest of state government, the Universities are subject to a lapse provision if they do no spend state funds before the end of the fiscal year. See KRS 164A.565(2) (providing for lapse of uncommitted state general funds remaining after the close of business on the last day of the fiscal year). 47 employees that answer to him, such as the program cabinets and secretaries who head those cabinets. In this sense, the Universities are much more like private entities. And their authority over spending their money is largely independent of the executive branch. Indeed, this is likely why the Universities, unlike other government entities, are given their own money to be held in their own accounts, rather than relying on the Finance and Administration Cabinet's submitting warrants to the Treasurer, who would then write checks to third parties owed money by the Universities: The secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet shall issue warrants authorizing the Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Kentucky to pay to the treasurer of each institution any amounts due by virtue of the state appropriations for that institution, or transfer the amount due electronically if electronic transfer is authorized by statute. The transfer of funds shall be handled in a manner to assure a zero (0) balance in the general fund account at the university. KRS 164A.555. This illustrates why the Governor's suggestion that he has simply stopped the money from being spent mischaracterizes what he has actually done. Rather than ordering the Universities not to spend money, which he cannot do, and thereby allowing those funds to lapse back to the General Fund at the end of the fiscal year, he has instead effectively intercepted the funds before they became available to the Universities. By reducing the final quarterly allotment, the Governor has essentially frustrated the overall appropriation by the General Assembly. Money that the General Assembly made available to the Universities through its appropriations was made unavailable by the 48 Governor's actions. Simply put, there is a difference between exercising an authority not to spend money once it has been made available and preventing the money from being made available to the entity that has the power to decide not to spend it. Again, this is not to say that every penny appropriated must be spent. As the Governor points out, such a legal requirement would be fiscally irresponsible. And the budget bill itself recognizes this by authorizing the spending of appropriations or so much thereof as may be necessary. But the Governor does not have the power to make that decision for the Universities. And if the Governor does not have discretion over whether to spend the money because the funds were appropriated for an entity over which he does not have control, then the transfer of funds is a ministerial, mechanical, nondiscretionary act. People ex rel. Bakalis v. Weinberger, 368 F. Supp. 721, 726 (N.D. Ill. 1973). Indeed, KRS 164A.555, discussed above, further demonstrates how this is a ministerial act: it commands the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet to issue warrants for the payment of the Universities' any amounts due by virtue of the state appropriations for that institution. That statute also necessarily limits the Governor's authority, as he cannot legally compel the secretary to act contrary to law. And, again, the budget bill itself commanded that the Executive Branch shall carry out all appropriations and budgetary language provisions as contained in the State/Executive Budget. 2014 Ky. Acts Ch. 117, Part III, § 27. This limit makes the Governor's conduct with respect to entities over which he has no control purely ministerial. 49 Consequently, we need not address the constitutionality of the actions the Governor claims he is entitled to make, because our statutory analysis makes it clear that he does not have the legal authority to take such actions.