Opinion ID: 2982770
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Remand is warranted

Text: Having resolved the case on immunity grounds, the district court did not reach the issue decided by the dissent—whether the Administrative Commissioners violated Flying Dog’s clearly 22 No. 12-1984, Flying Dog Brewery v. Mich. Liquor Control, et al. established First Amendment rights. The district court should undertake this inquiry in the first instance. We do not agree with the dissent that the factual record was sufficiently developed and undisputed on summary judgment to entitle Flying Dog to judgment as a matter of law. The dissent recognizes that the Commissioners’ affidavits submitted in connection with the summary judgment motions create issues of fact, particularly with respect to the Commissioners’ asserted reasons for denying the beer label registration and the evidentiary support for those reasons. We disagree with the dissent’s application of the Central Hudson factors at this stage due to the lack of critical evidence and fact-finding by the district court. The record in this civil rights lawsuit is not confined to the few facts developed in the administrative proceedings, nor are we free to find the facts on appeal. As in any other case, the litigants are entitled to the full process that enables the district court to resolve all disputes of fact impacting the Central Hudson analysis. Supreme Court cases provide guidance for the task of assessing the propriety of governmental restrictions on commercial speech by, for example, illustrating methods for answering the Central Hudson inquiry—is there a sufficient “fit” between the regulatory goal and the means chosen to accomplish it. Comparable cases establish that the Commissioners here may be able to justify their restriction on Flying Dog’s speech through various kinds of proof, including reference to empirical data, studies, and anecdotes, and perhaps even through “history, consensus, and simple common sense.” Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); Gibson v. Texas Dep’t of Ins., 700 F.3d 227, 237 (5th Cir. 2012). In both 44 Liquormart, Inc. and Rubin, the Supreme Court had before it factual records developed in the district courts accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of law. In 44 Liquormart, 23 No. 12-1984, Flying Dog Brewery v. Mich. Liquor Control, et al. Inc., the district court made its findings and conclusions after considering videotaped depositions and other evidence presented at a hearing, including “conflicting expert testimony” on whether a regulation was more extensive than necessary to serve a substantial governmental interest. 517 U.S. at 493–94. Similarly, the Rubin case arrived at the Supreme Court on a developed factual record after two appeals in the Tenth Circuit, beginning with Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1991). Rubin, 514 U.S. at 479. In Brady, the Tenth Circuit applied Central Hudson to determine that the government’s asserted interest in banning alcohol content on beer labels was “substantial,” but because “the record provided insufficient evidence to determine” whether the ban on disclosure directly advanced the government’s interest, the court remanded the case for further proceedings to ascertain whether the “fit” requirement was met. Id. After “further factfinding,” the district court upheld a ban for advertising, but invalidated a ban for beer labels. Id. On the subsequent appeal concerning only the labeling ban, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen, 2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993), and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed. Id. at 479–80. Likewise, in Sambo’s Restaurants, we decided the appeal after a trial on the merits in the district court on stipulated facts. Sambo’s Restaurants, Inc., 663 F.2d at 687. We are not certain whether, in this case, the parties had completed discovery by the time they filed the motions for summary judgment or whether additional factual development of the record is warranted. And of course we do not have the benefit of the district court’s opinion examining the Commissioners’ proof on the “fit” requirement to determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact remaining for trial. If there are, then the district court must conduct a bench trial followed by findings of fact and conclusions of law. 24 No. 12-1984, Flying Dog Brewery v. Mich. Liquor Control, et al. In light of the governing Supreme Court authority and our decision to set aside the district court’s immunity rulings, we remand the case to the district court for further proceedings on the issue of whether the Administrative Commissioners violated Flying Dog Brewery’s clearly established First Amendment rights.