Opinion ID: 384934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: plain error and the malice instructions

Text: 18 In several cases, this court has applied the plain error standard to appeals from convictions based on erroneous malice instructions. In Belton v. United States, 382 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the trial court had instructed the jury that the law inferred malice from the use of a deadly weapon. 10 This court found no plain error and affirmed the conviction because of a conjunction of factors. First, the error involved only a single phrase that, in context, was unlikely to mislead the jury. Second, the court in Belton reasoned that the jury's verdict of first degree murder necessarily implied a finding of premeditation and deliberation, which in turn meant that the jury found malice despite the faulty malice instruction. See also Howard v. United States, 389 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (affirming a second degree murder conviction, where the jury was given the same erroneous instruction as in Belton, on the grounds that the evidence of malice was strong and the error was partly cured by a subsequent instruction). 19 The holdings in Belton and Howard turned on the over-all factual situations in those cases. Green v. United States (Green I), 405 F.2d 1368, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1968). In Green I the trial court gave both of the defective malice instructions that were given in the present case. On appeal, this court reversed the defendant's first degree murder conviction. The reversal in Green I was obviously militated by the multiple errors in the instructions give to the jury; in noting these errors, the court observed that 20 we cannot know whether the jury were guided by the correct or the incorrect portion of the instructions. 21 Id. at 1370. In short, the court in Green I found that the instructional errors raised substantial doubts that the jury's finding of premeditation necessarily implied malice. 22 In United States v. Wharton, 433 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1970), this court reversed a second degree murder conviction when the trial judge had give both of the erroneous malice instructions that were given in Green I and in the present case. 11 The court in Wharton found plain error because the trial judge had issued two erroneous instructions and the evidence of malice was equivocal. The court thus concluded that it could not determine whether the jury found the defendant guilty of murder despite or because of the faulty instructions. Id. at 461. 23 We conclude that here also the trial judge committed plain error in issuing the two aforecited erroneous malice instructions. This conclusion is reinforced by the decision in United States v. Green (Green II), 424 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 997, 91 S.Ct. 473, 27 L.Ed.2d 447 (1971), in which this court affirmed the defendant's conviction after retrial, even though the trial judge had given one of the erroneous malice instructions given in this case. The court expressly distinguished Green II from Green I, which had two erroneous instructions. Id. at 913. See also Mitchell v. United States, 434 F.2d 483, 488 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S 867, 91 S.Ct. 109, 27 L.Ed.2d 106 (1970) (noting that the cumulative effect of two erroneous malice instructions is absent and following the distinction set forth in Green II ); Logan v. United States, 411 F.2d 679, 681 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (distinguishing Green I in part because it involved a combination of errors). 24 In addition to the case law in this circuit, the facts in this case and the policies underlying Rules 30 and 52(b) support our conclusion that the trial judge committed plain error affecting the appellant's substantial rights. We reiterate that the instructions given by the trial judge may well have precluded the reasonable juror from considering manslaughter as a possible verdict. Were the evidence of malice overwhelming, the error might seem harmless. But here, the evidence of malice was equivocal. 12 Based on the verdict after trial, the jury obviously concluded that the robbery was not part and parcel of the killing. 13 Moreover, the evidence at trial indicated that the appellant did not enter the victim's house armed; he killed the victim with a weapon of chance-a piece of furniture. A manslaughter verdict-a finding that the killing was without malice-would have been consistent with this evidence. Since the trial judge was apparently satisfied that the evidence in the record warranted a jury instruction on manslaughter, it would be anomalous for us to uphold a conviction that may well have resulted from instructions foreclosing the jury from considering the alternative charge of manslaughter. 14 25 We reject the Government's contention at oral argument that the erroneous instruction on presuming malice from a weapon was sufficiently qualified by other instructions. In fact, the trial judge told the jury that the weapon is always to be taken into consideration (Tr. at 806). This instruction was followed immediately with the trial judge's contested statement that the law presumes malice from the use of a weapon. His instructions did not qualify that presumption. 15 26 We also reject the Government's argument that, as in Belton, a finding of premeditation implies a finding of malice. Because the trial judge in this case compounded his errors by giving more than one plainly erroneous instruction, we are simply unable to tell whether the jury followed the correct or incorrect portion of the instructions. See Green v. United States (Green I), 405 F.2d at 1370. 27 Under these circumstances, it can hardly be doubted that the appellant was denied a substantial right. Because of the equivocal evidence at trial, and in light of all the instructions, we find the appellant suffered prejudice from the faulty instructions given by the trial judge. See United States v. Pinkney, 551 F.2d 1241, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (plain error standard required the appellate court to consider the instructions as a whole and to review the record to see whether the appellant was prejudiced by the instructions). A clear miscarriage of justice has occurred if appellant was guilty of manslaughter but is now serving the penalty for murder. See Bearden v. United States, 403 F.2d 782, 787 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1111, 89 S.Ct. 920, 21 L.Ed.2d 808 (1969) (holding that Rule 30 does not bar invocation of Rule 52(b) where instructions have resulted in a miscarriage of justice). 28 While the purpose of Rule 30 is to allow the trial judge to correct trial errors before the jury retires, United States v. Williams, 521 F.2d 950, 956(D.C. Cir. 1975), no legitimate purpose would be served by denying the appellant's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in this case. At the time of his trial, the erroneous instructions were standard. Thus, appellant's counsel had every right to assume that any objection to the instructions would have been futile. To rule otherwise would be to suggest that trial counsel should object to all jury instructions in anticipation of changes in the constitutionality of jury instructions. 16 Such a suggestion borders on the absurd. 29 We must, therefore, look to Rule 52 (b) for guidance in this case. Rule 52(b) is designed to protect the criminal defendant and the integrity of the judicial process. Herzog v. United States, 235 F.2d 664, 666 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844, 77 S.Ct. 54, 1 L.Ed.2d 59 (1956). The rule is properly invoked whenever an appellant's substantial rights to a fair trial, as here, are threatened. In the instant case, it is axiomatic that the integrity of the judicial process will suffer if we refuse to review an appellant's claims when he may, in fact, have been convicted of the wrong crime. 17