Opinion ID: 2122312
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Improper Use of Impeachment Evidence

Text: Swaney argues that the State committed prosecutorial error by using past-crimes evidence to suggest that he stole a replacement watch. At trial, the State impeached his testimony with his past convictions, many of which were theft crimes. Swaney claims that the State's mention of the evidence you heard in this case was a reference to Swaney's past theft convictions and impermissibly suggested that Swaney stole a replacement watch because he had a propensity to steal. According to Swaney, because a party may use past-crimes evidence only to impeach a witness's character for truthfulness, the State's use of Swaney's past crimes as propensity evidence was prosecutorial error. In response, the State argues that the phrase the evidence you've heard in this case likely referred to evidence that Swaney wore a field ranger watch both before and after the murder even though his watch was found at the contact station. According to the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, past-crimes evidence is only relevant to attack a witness's credibility or character for truthfulness and may be used only to impeach a witness. Minn. R. Evid. 609(a). A party may not use past-crimes evidence to prove a witness has a propensity to steal. After examining the State's statements during closing argument, we conclude that the State did not commit prosecutorial error by using evidence of Swaney's past theft convictions to show he has a propensity to steal. Here, the State did not directly refer to Swaney's past convictions in its closing to support the inference that he stole a replacement watch, or ever indirectly hint that Swaney's past theft convictions should lead the jury to conclude Swaney stole a replacement watch. The State was attempting to explain why Swaney was wearing a field ranger watch after the murder even though it had alleged that Swaney lost his watch while assaulting Nelson and could not prove that Swaney purchased a replacement. The connection between the statement the evidence you've heard in this case and evidence of Swaney's past convictions is too tenuous for us to conclude that the State committed prosecutorial error. To summarize, we conclude that the record does not support Swaney's assertions that the State (1) attacked Swaney's character with improper character evidence, (2) inappropriately speculated about events at the time of the murder, and (3) used impeachment evidence improperly to suggest that Swaney had a propensity to steal. We therefore hold that the State did not commit prosecutorial error.
Swaney's fourth claim of error is that the district court erred when it allowed the State to present rebuttal testimony over Swaney's objection. In State v. Eling, we explained that a determination of what constitutes proper rebuttal evidence rests almost wholly in the discretion of the trial court. 355 N.W.2d 286, 291 (Minn.1984). We review a district court's decision to admit rebuttal evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Gutierrez, 667 N.W.2d 426, 435 (Minn.2003) (The determination of whether or not something is appropriate rebuttal evidence rests within the discretion of the trial court and will only be reversed upon a showing of a clear abuse of discretion.). Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.03, subd. 11(g) (2009), stated the general rule regarding rebuttal testimony. This Rule provided that [t]he prosecution may offer evidence in rebuttal of the defense evidence. Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 11(g). We have explained that [i]n general, rebuttal evidence consists of that which explains, contradicts, or refutes the defendant's evidence. State v. Swanson, 498 N.W.2d 435, 440 (Minn.1993); accord State v. Walker, 306 Minn. 105, 112, 235 N.W.2d 810, 815 (1975). In its case-in-chief, the State presented evidence that a BCA forensic specialist was able to match Swaney's print exemplars to prints found at the park contact station. During Swaney's case-in-chief, the State cross-examined Swaney, asking him about the print exemplars used to make the print identification. State: [referring to exhibit 194, print exemplars] And is your signature on each of those six pieces of paper? Swaney: From April 20? Yes, it is. State: And are these in fact prints of yourinked impressions of your fingers? Swaney: Um, I would assume so. ... State: [referring to exhibit 195, print exemplars] Are these your finger and palmprint impressions on these four pieces of plastic? You can look at them if you want. Swaney: I can only assume because I don't see my signature on there anywhere. Swaney also maintained that he did not visit the contact station around the time of the murder, and he implied that the fingerprints identified as Swaney's could have been Agent Soppeland's fingerprints. The district court then allowed the State to call three rebuttal witnesses to address the possibility created by Swaney's testimony that the prints that were identified were not Swaney's prints but were in fact Soppeland's prints because he was in the building. One rebuttal witness, a forensic specialist with the Sioux Falls police department, testified that he obtained the first set of exemplars from Swaney, which both he and Swaney signed, which provided foundation for the introduction of the first set of exemplars. Another rebuttal witness was the BCA forensic specialist who analyzed and matched Swaney's finger and palm print exemplars with finger and palm prints found at the crime scene. This witness explained that he ultimately used two sets of Swaney's print exemplars to identify prints from the crime scene as Swaney's prints because during his initial analysis, he noticed that parts of Swaney's left thumb print and palm print were not captured completely in the first signed set of exemplars. As a result, Soppeland obtained another set of exemplars from Swaney but failed to have Swaney sign the exemplars. Soppeland also testified as the State's third rebuttal witness and confirmed that he obtained the second set of print exemplars from Swaney. The testimony of the BCA forensic expert and Soppeland provided the foundation necessarily for the second set of print exemplars introduced during rebuttal. Further, the BCA forensic specialist testified that Soppeland's prints did not match the latent prints found at the contact station, and Soppeland testified that he wore gloves during the investigation at the contact station. The rebuttal lasted approximately eleven minutes. Swaney argues that permitting the State to call the three rebuttal witnesses was error because Swaney's case-in-chief and the State's justification for the rebuttal were patently insufficient to warrant rebuttal. Swaney argues that because he did not present any expert evidence in his case-in-chief, the State's rebuttal acted to confirm the State's case-in-chief rather than contradict or refute Swaney's case. The State argues that the rebuttal evidence was necessary to address a clear challenge to the State's fingerprint evidence. We conclude that the State's rebuttal testimony properly refuted Swaney's evidence. The State designed a concise rebuttal to address the suggestion made during Swaney's testimony that the print exemplars that matched previously unidentified prints at the contact station may not have been Swaney's exemplars. Because the State's rebuttal was relevant, concise, to the point, and specifically offered to refute Swaney's testimony that he could only assume the second set of print exemplars were his, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to present the rebuttal testimony.
Finally, Swaney makes twelve other arguments in his pro se supplemental brief. He argues that (1) the district court should have granted his change of venue request; (2) he did not receive a fair trial because the jury was biased against him; (3) the State improperly used personal letters in its case-in-chief even though they were only to be used for impeachment purposes; (4) the court should not have allowed the State to play a tape of his telephone conversation with Dawn Swaney to the jury; (5) the State improperly used parts of a presentence investigation report to suggest Swaney had a gambling problem; (6) the State improperly acknowledged Nelson's father in the courtroom in the presence of the jury; (7) the State improperly coached a witness; (8) the State improperly instructed the jury on premeditation; (9) the State called a witness who was not on its witness list; (10) the State misrepresented a camp visitor's testimony; (11) the State called a witness for the purpose of character assassination; and (12) the State knowingly allowed two witnesses to perjure themselves while testifying. We have examined each claim presented in Swaney's pro se brief and conclude that each claim lacks merit. We therefore hold that there was no error. Affirmed. STRAS, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.