Opinion ID: 2262031
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: How much time is reasonable?

Text: Since, in determining whether the officers were constructively refused admittance, we engage in a highly contextual analysis, see discussion at page 120, supra, a comparison of the delay of approximately thirty seconds in this case with shorter and longer periods in other cases can take us only so far. Although prior decisions may of course provide some useful guideposts, precise case matching may be no more feasible in knock and announce cases than it is in Fourth Amendment litigation. See Gomez v. United States, 597 A.2d 884, 889 (D.C.1991). Nevertheless, we note that no authority has been cited to us in which a delay of only thirty seconds has been held sufficient in the absence of some suspicious activity following the arrival of the police, or some other circumstance which the court viewed as equivalent thereto. In those cases in which forced entry was upheld without such a circumstance, the police waited considerably longer than here. For example, in United States v. Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.1991), in which the police use of a battering ram to break down a door at 6 a.m. was upheld by the court, the ramming occurred approximately a minute and a half after the officers first announced themselves and began the far less destructive activity of attempting to pry open a screen door. Id. at 374. In United States v. Woodring, 444 F.2d 749 (9th Cir.1971), in which the execution of a search warrant in the daytime or early evening [21] was upheld by the court, the officers, who had reason to believe that someone was in the house, announced their authority and purpose and waited approximately one minute before breaking in. Id. at 751. See also United States v. Viale, 312 F.2d 595, 602 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 903, 83 S.Ct. 1291, 10 L.Ed.2d 199 (1963) (delay of one to two minutes). None of these cases is comparable to the present one, in which the police waited no more than thirty seconds in the middle of the night. See also Annotation: 21 A.L.R. FED. 820, 834-42 (1974 & Supp.1992). More in point is the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Newman, supra . In that case, police detectives executed a search warrant in the middle of the day. They banged on the door and announced loudly that they were the police. When there was no response within about twenty seconds, they broke in the door with a sledge hammer. In holding on several grounds that the forced entry was unlawful, the court stated: Surely a mere twenty second delay in answering the door cannot constitute support for a belief that evidence was being destroyed (or in terms of 18 U.S.C. § 3109, a refusal of admittance). In Ametrane, [22] supra, the delay was a full minute, yet the district court did not find any exigent circumstances justifying a forceful entry made without proper notice. The court pointed out that Ametrane was on the second floor and might have had countless legitimate reasons for taking a minute to answer the door. 276 F.Supp. at 559. Although it is doubtful that a different result would obtain even if Newman had been on the first floor, Newman, too, was on the second floor.... The fact that some lottery paraphernalia [are] easily destroyed does not justify the suspension of the Fourth Amendment in all lottery prosecutions. 429 Pa. at 448, 240 A.2d at 798. Given the night-time context of the present case, the reasoning of Newman applies a fortiori. The authorities relied on by the government in which police officers waited for less than thirty seconds are distinguishable upon the common ground that, in each, there were additional suspicious circumstances justifying a reasonable belief on the part of the officers that immediate action was required. In Masiello v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 58, 317 F.2d 121, 122 (1963), for example, the officers hear[d] sounds which indicat[ed] to them that the evidence sought by the warrant [might] be in [the] process of destruction; the court, speaking through Judge (later Chief Justice) Burger, approved the entry on narrow grounds after an earlier remand, emphasizing that close cases will receive careful scrutiny. Id. at 59, 317 F.2d at 123. In United States v. Davis, 199 U.S.App. D.C. 95, 98, 617 F.2d 677, 695 (1979), officers who were executing a search warrant at 2:20 a.m. observed lights on in the house which indicated that someone inside was awake; when there was no response in a period of fifteen to thirty seconds, they gained entry with a battering ram. In Wood, supra, 279 U.S.App.D.C. at 85-87, 879 F.2d at 931-33, a DEA agent executed a search warrant at 2:55 p.m. and waited for fifteen to thirty seconds after knocking and announcing before entering; entry was accomplished by turning the door knob, and without breaking down the door. In United States v. Ciammitti, 720 F.2d 927, 932-33 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 970, 104 S.Ct. 2342, 80 L.Ed.2d 816 (1984), in which a search warrant was executed shortly after midnight, the officers observed the light on in a basement room, and knew that odors associated with the production of drugs had been detected coming from the basement on previous nights when the light was on; a majority of the court held, over a powerful dissent by Judge Jones, that the officers were justified in breaking down the door after half a minute. [23] In United States v. DeLutis, 722 F.2d 902 (1st Cir.1983), the officers, knowing that the defendants had entered their house a short time earlier with a police informant, that the house was occupied, and that the residents were awake, [24] id. at 904, forced entry more than twenty seconds after knocking on the door and announcing that they were executing a search warrant. Id. at 908-09. See also United States v. Ruminer, 786 F.2d 381, 383 (10th Cir.1986) (brief wait sufficient where officers saw someone run out of the bedroom). [25] See also note 14, supra, distinguishing this case from James and Bonner.