Opinion ID: 2442743
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Elrich's Juvenile Delinquency Finding

Text: Finally, Elrich asks us to review, on the merits, his earlier delinquency finding. He contends that the lower court erred in denying his motion to vacate for two reasons, the first being that the State failed to introduce evidence sufficient to prove all requisite elements of the crime of Arson in the First Degree. According to Elrich, at most, he set fire to various objects within the building, but never `set fire to' the building itself and that a `mere scorching' of the wall is, as a matter of law, insufficient to establish a burning. Alternatively, Elrich claims that the lower court erred in not addressing or resolving [his] claims of ineffective assistance [of counsel], and vacating the delinquency due to previous counsel's ineffective assistance. The State, on the other hand, presents several reasons why the lower court properly denied Elrich's request. First, the State asserts that Elrich's motion was no longer supported by any competent evidence once the lower court struck the Affidavit, and that even if the Affidavit had been admitted, it did not define how [Elrich] was at all prejudiced by the alleged misconduct of his attorney. Second, the State contends that Elrich is improperly attempting to litigate the sufficiency of the evidence in a collateral action rather than availing himself of his right to direct appeal. Finally, the State claims that Elrich engaged in first-degree arson, or at a minimum attempted first-degree arson, when he set fire to the papers inside the lobby mailbox. Thus, the lower court did not err in denying his motion to vacate because it properly determined that, either way, Elrich had committed an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult. When addressing the parties' specific arguments, we are mindful that the General Assembly has enacted statutes carefully crafted to address the specific needs of adolescents and children. In re Keith W., 310 Md. 99, 106, 527 A.2d 35, 38 (1987). The Juvenile Causes Act, codified at Md.Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol., 2008 Cum.Supp.) § 3-8A-01 et. seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJP.), grant[s] jurisdiction in juvenile courts over young offenders and establish[es] the process for treating them, to advance its purpose of rehabilitating the juveniles who have transgressed to ensure that they become useful and productive members of society. Lopez-Sanchez v. State, 155 Md.App. 580, 598, 843 A.2d 915, 926 (2004). The Act is to be liberally construed to effectuate [its] purposes. CJP § 3-8A-02(b). Under the Act, juveniles who, in the absence of the juvenile justice system, would be prosecuted in, and punished by, the adult criminal justice system, are instead afforded supervision and treatment, with the aim to achieve rehabilitation. Thus, a juvenile found by the juvenile court to have committed a delinquent act, that is, an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime, is adjudicated a delinquent; and in disposition, the court will fashion a plan of supervision, treatment, and rehabilitation appropriate to the juvenile and serving the rehabilitative goals of the Act. Lopez-Sanchez, 155 Md.App. at 598, 843 A.2d at 926. Accordingly, juvenile proceedings are civil, rather than criminal in nature. See In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 69, 763 A.2d 136, 146 (2000). Once a juvenile court has pronounced a child to be delinquent, the court's order may be reviewed on appeal, or by an action pursuant to Rule 11-116. The latter course may be initiated by a court on its own motion, or by the petition of any party or other person, institution or agency having supervision or custody of [the juvenile]. Md. Rule 11-116(b). As we indicated above, a juvenile court order may be modified or vacated if the court determines that such action is in the best interest of the child or the public. Md. Rule 11-116(a). When making this decision, the juvenile court has discretion whether to hold a hearing, [16] and even if it chooses to do so, the rules of evidence are relaxed. See Md. Rule 11-116(c) & (d). Here, the juvenile court proceeded with a hearing, recessed, and then months later, determined that no further hearing in this matter is warranted. It then denied Elrich's motion to vacate without deciding whether Elrich's delinquency counsel had, in fact, provided effective assistance of counsel. Instead, it predicated its decision on the belief that, if the court were to grant Elrich's requested relief, there would be a strong argument that re-trial would be barred by the Double Jeopardy clause. The Circuit Court reasoned that, while Elrich's motion attacked his counsel's failure to mitigate the seriousness of the charge against him, it never suggested that he was innocent of committing a delinquent act. Thus, it concluded, [i]t would not be in this child's best interests to simply terminate these proceedings with no further supervision or services. Nowhere in its opinion, however, did the court address whether the evidence was sufficient to show that Elrich had engaged in an act of arson or even attempted arson. Without opining whether the evidence supported a finding that delinquency counsel was effective or that Elrich committed a delinquent act, we believe that the juvenile judge abused her discretion when she denied Elrich's motion without deciding either issue. Clearly the judge was aware that her primary consideration, according to Rule 11-116, was Elrich's best interest. We do not see, however, how her cursory denial of his motion facilitated that end. Elrich's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, if true, would cast enough doubt on his earlier delinquency proceedings to compromise the very foundation of his confinement. At the earlier hearing, the parties agreed to proceed on a set of stipulated facts, meaning that Elrich waived his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, call witnesses in his own defense, [or] to testify in his defense. Thus, delinquency counsel's failure to contest the voluntariness of Elrich's confession or the sufficiency of the State's evidence may have been a critical error. [17] Consequently, in the subsequent Rule 11-116 hearing, the critical error was the judge's decision not to investigate, at all, Elrich's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Upon striking the Affidavit, the court should have deferred decision until new counsel was appointed, or until it was satisfied that DeSimone's continued representation would not perpetuate the coercive circumstances. Once the court surmounted that obstacle, it should have determined whether Elrich had been denied his right to counsel. Cf. Md. Rule 11-106(a) ([A juvenile] is entitled to be represented in all [juvenile court] proceedings ... by counsel retained by him, his parent, or appointed....); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ([T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.). We are not persuaded by the State's assertion that the juvenile court properly rejected Elrich's motion because it determined that there was no evidence to suggest that Elrich was innocent of committing any delinquent act, even if he had not engaged in first-degree arson. If the charge underlying a juvenile's confinement is not proven, it is not appropriate or in the child's best interest to compound the error by requiring the child to remain in State custody. Ultimately, if the court believed that Elrich should remain under State supervision because he committed a delinquent acteither first-degree arson or attempted first-degree arsonit should have made some findings as to that fact. Accordingly, we hold that the juvenile court's failure to consider whether Elrich was denied effective representation or whether the evidence showed that he committed a delinquent act was contrary to Elrich's best interests, and thus, constituted an abuse of discretion.