Opinion ID: 167809
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Posttermination R etaliation

Text: M s. Saurini argues that the district court erred by excluding her testimony regarding “post non-renewal retaliation” by the defendants. The defendants objected to such testimony because it was irrelevant to what they asserted to be the only claim at issue in the case— whether her contract was nonrenewed in retaliation for her protected speech. The district court sustained the defendants’ objection, stating that it didn’t “want surprises,” Aplt. App. at 1434, and ruling -14- that the posttermination claim “really hasn’t been raised . . . sufficiently,” id. at 1470. W e review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision whether to permit an amendment to the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b). See Green Country Food M kt., Inc. v. Bottling Group, LLC, 371 F.3d 1275, 1280 (10th Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs are not permitted “to wait until the last minute to ascertain and refine the theories on which they intend to build their case.” Id. at 1279. “This practice, if tolerated, would . . . unfairly surprise defendants, requiring the court to grant further time for discovery or continuances.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). At trial M s. Saurini argued that the defendants were on notice of a posttermination retaliation claim because of (1) the claims in the second amended complaint and the pretrial order; (2) an answer in M s. Saurini’s deposition, and (3) an affidavit by M s. Saurini that was attached to her response to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In our view , the notice was minimal, if not nonexistent. M s. Saurini’s second amended complaint contains no mention of retaliation that occurred after the School District nonrenewed her contract. Paragraph 25 of the general allegations of the second amended complaint states only that the School District “did not renew Plaintiff’s employment contract in retaliation for her disclosure of harassment, discrimination, and illegal practices regarding -15- apparent child abuse occurring at Huron M iddle School.” A plt. App. at 50. In her First Amendment claim, Paragraph 49 states, “Plaintiff’s exercise of her protected rights was a substantial factor in H inson and [the School District’s] decision to reprimand Plaintiff and terminate her employment.” Id. at 53. The pretrial order speaks only generally of retaliation, reciting no specifics. It states: All the Defendants retaliated against M s. Saurini for exercising her freedom of speech rights regarding the reporting of abuse of a child(s), in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First Amendment. Further, all the Defendants violated M s. Saurini’s procedural and substantive rights guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 212. It listed 17 witnesses for M s. Saruini; the summaries of their expected testimony make no mention of posttermination retaliation. Somewhat more helpful to M s. Saurini is one of her replies during her deposition: Q: Now, after you were nonrenewed, you applied for some other positions in the school district, correct? A: Correct. Q: And you’re alleging that you were denied those positions out of retaliation? A: Yes, I believe so. Id. at 540. W hen defense counsel pursued this answer, however, she provided no evidence of First Amendment retaliation, certainly none attributable to the School -16- District or M r. Hinson. She mentioned that she was not offered a job at W estlake M iddle School because of negative comments made about her personality, but she could not identify who made such comments. She also claimed that Lynn Albi, a School District employee, had made false statements about her in a letter, but she could only speculate that M r. Albi would have done so because she had “talk[ed] to the union” and “go[ne] to the Board of Education.” Id. at 541. Her deposition testimony would give the defendants’ attorney no reason to think a posttermination retaliation claim would be raised against them. As for M s. Saurini’s affidavit, it stated merely, “Linda Curry’s poor references have prevented me from getting several jobs available in Adams County School District No. 12 and in a middle school in Brighton.” Id. at 209. Like her deposition responses, this statement does not allege that the “poor references” were meant as retaliation for protected speech, nor does it implicate either of the defendants w ho went to trial. In addition to M s. Saurini’s failure to show that she provided notice of a posttermination claim, she also failed to show the district court that she had any relevant evidence to produce at trial. W hen she sought to be allowed to testify about posttermination retaliation, the following exchange occurred: THE COU RT: W hat are you going to show? Tell me. [M S. SAURINI’S COUNSEL]: Judge, this is a First Amendment retaliation case. -17- THE COURT: I know what it is. Tell me what you are going to show. [M S. SAURINI’S COUNSEL]: W hat I am going to show is that she applied for jobs. She applied— she has been applying for three or four years and still can’t get a position back in her chosen career. Something is going on. We are not really sure what. Id. at 1432-33 (emphasis added). The district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that a claim of posttermination retaliation had not been raised before trial and that the issue could not be addressed at trial.