Opinion ID: 169275
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did Boles Allege a Constitutional Violation?

Text: 10 In taking the first step of the Saucier analysis, we are mindful of the delicate balance that has been recognized between prisoners' constitutional guarantees and the legitimate concerns of prison administrators. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987), the Supreme Court acknowledged that although [l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, id. at 348, 107 S.Ct. 2400 (quotation omitted), convicted prisoners nonetheless retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion, id. (citation omitted). The Court emphasized, however, that in evaluating a challenged prison regulation, appropriate deference must be afforded to prison administrators who are actually charged with and trained in the running of the particular institution under examination. Id. at 349, 107 S.Ct. 2400 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, the Court distinguished prison regulations from other laws alleged to violate fundamental constitutional rights, holding that the former must be judged under a less restrictive reasonableness test: `[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.' Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987)). 11 The same year it decided O'Lone, the Court decided Turner, which, in part, struck down as unreasonable a prison regulation banning inmate marriages. It was clear after Turner that the question of whether a prison regulation reasonably curtails constitutional rights requires close examination of the facts of each case, the specific regulation under review, and the alleged justifications for it. To assist the lower courts in making the reasonableness determination, the Court identified the following factors: 4 12 (1) whether a rational connection exists between the prison policy regulation and a legitimate governmental interest advanced as its justification; (2) whether alternative means of exercising the right are available notwithstanding the policy or regulation; (3) what effect accommodating the exercise of the right would have on guards, other prisoners, and prison resources generally; and (4) whether ready, easy-to-implement alternatives exist that would accommodate the prisoner's rights. 13 Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir.2002) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254). As other courts have pointed out, the first Turner factor is actually more of an element than a factor in the sense that it is not simply a consideration to be weighed but rather an essential requirement. Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 274 (2d Cir.2006); see also Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 253 (3d Cir.2003) (The first factor is foremost in the sense that a rational connection is a threshold requirement. . . .) (quotation omitted). To satisfy the first Turner factor, the prison administration is required to make a minimal showing that a rational relationship exists between its policy and stated goals. Beerheide, 286 F.3d at 1186. 14 This framework established in Turner and O'Lone, which seeks to balance prisoners' constitutional rights against the valid concerns of prison administrators, is sharply at odds with the test formulated three years later in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). There the Supreme Court held that the free exercise clause does not exempt an individual from complying with a valid and neutral law of general applicability even if the law impinges on that individual's religious practices. Id. at 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595. Smith was not a prison case and it did not purport to limit or overrule Turner and O'Lone, but many courts have questioned its effect, if any, on the standard for evaluating prisoner free exercise claims articulated in those cases. Some courts that have addressed the issue have concluded that the proper standard to apply in prisoner cases challenging restrictions on the free exercise of religion is supplied by the Supreme Court's decision in Turner, not by [ Smith ]. Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 481 (6th Cir.2001); see also Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993) (seeing no reason to depart from Turner ); Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168, 1171 n. 7 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that Smith did not affect analysis). Other courts have recognized the possible implications of Smith in the prison context, but have gone on to utilize the Turner/O'Lone balancing framework because the defendant did not argue for Smith's applicability. Levitan v. Ashcroft, 281 F.3d 1313, 1318-19 (D.C.Cir.2002) (collecting cases); Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 274 n. 3; Hakim v. Hicks, 223 F.3d 1244, 1247 n. 13 (11th Cir.2000). We are aware of only one case in which the court analyzed a prisoner's free exercise claim under Smith, and even in that case, the court also held that the challenged regulation passed scrutiny under O'Lone. See Hines v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., 148 F.3d 353, 357 (4th Cir.1998). This court has yet to address the issue squarely, but like our sister circuits we have continued to employ the Turner/O'Lone balancing framework in prison cases even after Smith. See Beerheide, 286 F.3d at 1184-86; Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir.2001). In this case, both parties appear to agree that the Turner/O'Lone standard governs as neither of them has argued for Smith's application. Accordingly, without deciding the issue, we will apply the Turner/O'Lone balancing framework to Boles's First Amendment claim. 15 With this backdrop we return to the first Saucier question: has plaintiff alleged facts showing the violation of a constitutional right? To meet his burden at this stage, Boles had to show that Warden Neet's conduct substantially burdened his sincerely-held religious beliefs. Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 274-75. If so, Warden Neet then bore the relatively limited burden of identifying the legitimate penological interests that justif[ied] the impinging conduct. Id. at 275. We think Boles made the requisite showing at step one. His Amended Complaint alleged that according to the code of Jewish Law, Jewish males are required to wear a head covering at all times, Aplt.App. at 44, and that observant Jews may not walk even as much as four cubits (approximately six feet) without wearing [the Tallit Katan], id. He further alleged that the observance of these commandments is of cosmic or life and death importance, id., and does not interfere with prison security, see id. at 45. 16 Therefore, the burden shifted to Warden Neet to identify the legitimate penological interests served by his decision to forbid Boles from wearing his religious garments. Warden Neet has identified nothing, however, and we could find no evidence in the record of any penological objectives served by his actions. 5 On appeal, Warden Neet cites several cases upholding against constitutional challenges prison regulations restricting the use of religious clothing out of concern that the clothing could be used to smuggle contraband. See Muhammad v. Lynaugh, 966 F.2d 901, 902-03 (5th Cir.1992) (upholding regulation restricting Muslim inmates' wearing of Kufi caps); Young v. Lane, 922 F.2d 370, 376 (7th Cir.1991) (yarmulkes); Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 579 (2d Cir.1990) (Rastafarian crowns); Butler-Bey v. Frey, 811 F.2d 449, 451 (8th Cir.1987) (fezes); Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1216 (8th Cir.1982) (prayer caps and robes). But in each of those cases, the court made its decision based on the prison's evidence that its regulation responded to valid security concerns. In Muhammad, for example, the Fifth Circuit upheld a regulation restricting the use of Kufi caps only after a lengthy evidentiary hearing, 966 F.2d at 901, at which senior corrections officers testified that prison security was the impetus behind the challenged regulation. They testified that weapons, such as shanks and razor blades, could easily be secreted inside a Kufi cap. Id. at 902. The court was persuaded that the evidence introduced at the hearing established that the regulations restricting the use of Kufi caps . . . bear a reasonable relationship to the legitimate penological interest of prison security. Id. Likewise, in Butler-Bey, the Eighth Circuit noted with approval the testimony of prison officials that smuggling contraband was a problem at the prison and that religious headgear could be used for smuggling. 811 F.2d at 451. 17 Warden Neet cannot base his entitlement to qualified immunity purely on the outcome of these other cases. While his actions may have been motivated by a legitimate concern that Boles's religious garments could be used to smuggle contraband into and out of the prison, he points to nothing in the record to that effect, and our own review of the record failed to reveal such evidence. As the Salahuddin court noted when faced with similar circumstances, [n]either the district court nor this court can manufacture facts out of thin air. 467 F.3d at 275. Without record support, we cannot conclude that Warden Neet's actions were justified by security concerns or any other valid penological objectives. We recognize that Warden Neet may adduce additional facts in support of a later summary judgment motion or at trial. At this stage of the litigation, however, the uncontroverted factual allegations viewed in the light most favorable to Boles show that Warden Neet placed substantial burdens on Boles's free exercise rights with no valid penological justification. Boles therefore met his burden at the first step of the Saucier analysis. 18