Opinion ID: 1652032
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court erred in allowing into evidence hearsay testimony.

Text: ¶ 9. Carter argues that the testimony of Darryl Williams and Deputy Patton as to Cooley's statements that his crazy sister shot Hundley were inadmissible hearsay. `Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Miss. R. Evid. 801(c). The testimony in question falls under the definition of hearsay, making it inadmissible unless it falls under a recognized exception. Miss. R. Evid. 802. The State's position is that Cooley's statements were admissible under the excited utterance exception. An excited utterance is [a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. Miss. R. Evid. 803(2). Carter responds that these statements do not qualify as excited utterances, because they were prompted and not spontaneous, because Cooley had time to cool off before making the statements, and because Cooley did not witness the shooting. ¶ 10. Spontaneity is the essential ingredient to the underlying theory supporting admission of an excited utterance. Davis v. State, 611 So.2d 906, 913-14 (Miss.1992) ( quoting Miss. R. Evid. 803(2) cmt.). Here, Cooley's statements that Carter shot Hundley were prompted by Williams's and Deputy Patton's questions about what happened. However, under the excited utterance exception the fact that questions are asked, while relevant to spontaneity, does not ipso facto demonstrate a lack of spontaneity in every case. Sanders v. State, 586 So.2d 792, 795 (Miss.1991). Where the excited utterance is prompted by a simple question, even from an officer, such as What happened? or What's wrong? we have still found the statement to fall under the exception. Id.; Davis, 611 So.2d at 908, 913-14. ¶ 11. Carter also argues that Cooley had time to cool off before making the statements, removing them from the definition of excited utterances. The key question is whether Cooley was still in an excited state when he made the statements. Miss. R. Evid. 803(2) cmt. The issue of spontaneity must be determined in a case by case analysis, and the length of time between the incident creating the excitement and the statement can vary widely. Owens v. State, No. 94-CT-00537-SCT, 716 So.2d 534, 1998 WL 105776, at  (Miss. Mar.12, 1998). Here, Cooley's statements were made to the first person on the scene during the 911 emergency call and to the first officer on the scene. See Clark v. State, 693 So.2d 927, 932 (Miss. 1997) (911 call transcript admissible as excited utterance). Cooley made his statement to Williams only moments after the shooting, and spoke to Officer Patton about ten minutes after the shooting. Although Officer Patton stated that Cooley wasn't hysterical and was calm in a way, he also said that Cooley was upset and crying and spoke in an excited manner, and Williams talked about the confusion when he arrived. Based upon the short amount of time between the shooting and Cooley's statements, we find that they were spontaneous enough to fall under the excited utterance exception. ¶ 12. Carter also takes exception with the admission of Cooley's statements, because Cooley did not witness the shooting. The declarant need not be a participant but only an observer of the event which triggered the excitement. Miss. R. Evid. 803(2) cmt. Cooley was an observer in the sense that he discovered his girlfriend's body and witnessed the events leading up to and immediately following the shooting. Although he may not have actually seen Carter pull the trigger, he heard the gunshot and was obviously traumatized by what he discovered upon exiting the truck. We uphold the trial court's ruling on this issue.