Opinion ID: 1169785
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The concurrences of Chief Justice Durham and Justice Dolliver assert for the first time anywhere, anytime, Nelson's action is statutorily barred for lack of prior notice to the attorney general. [16] However, the meaning and/or applicability of RCW 42.17.400 is not properly before us. The claim has neither been raised nor briefed by the parties. We are hesitant to decide it; although we posit the concurrence has rushed to decide it wrongly. This court has never held RCW 42.17.400 applies (much less exclusively) to an action maintained pursuant to RCW 42.17.680, nor has it held section .400 is jurisdictional in any action brought under that chapter, much less every one. But the chiefs concurrence not only assumes RCW 42.17.400 applies exclusively to every and any action brought to enforce any legal right referenced in the entire chapter RCW 42.17, it also concludes Nelson's possible failure to notify the attorney general necessarily strips the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Concurrence (Durham, C.J.) at 1. Were this view correct, no court would ever have jurisdiction to decide any private action arising under or pertaining to any provision of the entire chapter absent compliance with section .400. Notwithstanding, there are many examples to the contrary. [17] Subject matter jurisdiction is the court's power to hear and determine cases of the general class or category to which proceedings in question belong. Black's Law Dictionary 1425 (6th ed. 1990). See also State v. Pritchard, 79 Wash.App. 14, 19-20, 900 P.2d 560 (1995) (subject matter jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine the class of action to which a case belongs, not the authority to grant the relief requested, or the correctness of the decision), review denied, 128 Wash.2d 1017, 911 P.2d 1342 (1996). The superior court clearly has general jurisdiction pursuant to Const. art. IV § 6 (amend. 87). Were this not sufficient to hear most everything brought before it, RCW 42.17.400 expressly invokes the same court's jurisdiction to hear cases of the same general class or category as Nelson's. We have held the section .400 requirement regarding the attorney general notification relates to standing, not jurisdiction. Bare v. Gorton, 84 Wash.2d 380, 382, 526 P.2d 379 (1974) specifically holds RCW 42.17.400 defines standing. ([P]rivate citizen has filed demand on the Attorney General to take action against plaintiff for violation of the act and, in addition, gave notice of his intent to bring a citizen's action under RCW 42.17.400(4) if the Attorney General fails to proceed. Plaintiff therefore meets the requirements of standing ....) (emphasis added). Cf. Donald v. City of Vancouver, 43 Wash.App. 880, 886 n. 3, 719 P.2d 966 (1986) (attorney general notification is a prerequisite to taxpayer standing unless such notification would have been useless). Standing is not jurisdiction. DeWeese v. City of Port Townsend, 39 Wash. App. 369, 372, 693 P.2d 726 (1984) (standing is a substantive, not jurisdictional, question) (citing Hoskins v. City of Kirkland, 7 Wash. App. 957, 961, 503 P.2d 1117 (1972)). [18] Parties may not raise standing challenges for the first time on appeal. State v. Grundy, 25 Wash.App. 411, 416, 607 P.2d 1235 (1980) (By not raising the issue below, the State never challenged the Grundys to prove their standing and never gave the trial court an opportunity to rule.). This case presents even less reason to address standing than Grundy as Grundy concerned a party who at least argued lack of standing, albeit first on appeal. But here no party has even done that. It is inadvisable for an appellate court to address an issue not considered below and nowhere briefed or argued, particularly an issue of first impression, as this would be. Herberg v. Swartz, 89 Wash.2d 916, 925, 578 P.2d 17 (1978); see also RAP 12.1(a) ([T]he appellate court will decide a case only on the basis of issues set forth by the parties in their briefs.). Other jurisdictions estop any consideration of standing at this juncture. For example, the Illinois Appeals Court held lack of standing is not jurisdictional, but rather is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and proven. People ex rel. Vuagniaux v. City of Edwardsville, 284 Ill.App.3d 407, 219 Ill.Dec. 725, 731, 672 N.E.2d 40, 46 (1996) (It is the defendant's burden to show that the plaintiffs do not have standing to sue.). Similarly, in Washington, affirmative defenses must be pleaded or lost. CR 8(c). But no defect in standing was pleaded here. See Answer of Defendant, CP at 10-17. The Pennsylvania court found it error for the appellate court to rule on standing sua sponte because defendant did not raise and/or preserve that issue for appeal. Society Created To Reduce Urban Blight (SCRUB) v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 682 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa.Commw.Ct.1996). See also Statewide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Convention Ctr. Auth., 160 Pa. Commw. 544, 635 A.2d 691, 698 n. 13 (1993) (holding that, even though plaintiff probably lacked standing to sue, the appellate court could not raise the issue sua sponte because it was not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction and defendants failed to raise standing in their preliminary objections). However, it is unnecessary to consider Nelson's standing because (1) the meaning or applicability of RCW 42.17.400 is not properly before us as it was neither raised nor briefed by the parties; and (2) we affirm the dismissal on independent and dispositive grounds.