Opinion ID: 2575795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sufficiency of Oral Arrest and Detain Order

Text: Our resolution of the issues above leaves only Sackhoff's oral arrest and detain order as possible authority for Anderson's arrest. K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 75-5217(a) sets out several methods for arresting an individual in violation of conditional release. The Secretary of Corrections may issue a warrant for the individual's arrest or may personally serve the individual with a notice to appear and answer the charged violation. In the alternative, a parole officer may arrest the individual without a warrant or a parole officer may deputize another officer to arrest the individual by giving such officer a written arrest and detain order setting forth that the released inmate, in the judgment of the parole officer, has violated the conditions of the inmate's release. The written arrest and detain order delivered with the released inmate by the arresting officer to the official in charge of the institution or place to which the released inmate is brought for detention shall be sufficient warrant for detaining the inmate. K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 75-5217(a). Anderson argues that the plain and unambiguous language of this statute required that an arrest and detain order be (1) in writing and (2) in the physical possession of the arresting officer before he could be placed in custody. The State argues the statute does not require the police to actually possess a written arrest and detain order at the time of arrest, only that a written order be issued and delivered to the jail where the defendant is taken. The State focuses on the statute's giving requirement, suggesting such giving can be constructive. It supports its argument by citing the dictionary definition of give, including to make a present of, . . . to grant or bestow by formal action; . . . to put into the possession of another, . . . or to commit to another as a trust or responsibility. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 486 (1976). As the Court of Appeals noted, this definition hurts the State's argument more than it helps it, as it references putting the thing given into possession of a recipient. See Anderson, 34 Kan. App. 2d at 394. In other words, giving an arrest and detain order to an officer would entail putting the order into the officer's possession. In addition, the statute's inclusion of the word written is clear and significant. Sackhoff was authorized to deputize a law enforcement officer to arrest Anderson by giving such officer a written arrest and detain order setting forth that the released inmate, in the judgment of the parole officer, has violated the conditions of the inmate's release. K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 75-5217(a). Sackhoff's oral authorization during a telephone call did not meet the requirement of a written order put into the possession of the officers. His promise to execute a written order and leave it to be picked up at his home later also did not cure this defect. Although we need look no further than this to resolve this case, we note that our insistence that the order be in writing is consistent with the legislative history. K.S.A. 75-5217 was enacted in 1973 as part of a new penal code, and its language was nearly identical to that of then-existing statutes in at least four other states. See Idaho Code § 20-227(1) (1947); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 439.430(1) (1956); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 47-7-27, 47-7-37 (1944); Mo. Rev. State. § 217.541 (1987), § 217.720 (1982), § 559.036 (1977). The legislature did not adopt languageand has not since amended the statuteto echo provisions in other jurisdictions allowing oral arrest and detain orders. See Mont. Code Ann. §§ 46-23-1012, 46-23-1023 (1955) (once similar to Kansas language; § 46-23-1012 amended in 1999 to state that any probation officer may orally deputize any other officer with power of arrest to do so by giving the officer oral authorization and within 12 hours delivering to the detention center a written statement); Fla. Stat. § 948.06 (1941) (amended in 1989 to remove provision allowing probation officer to request law enforcement officer make arrest without warrant). Rather, our statute continues to explicitly require written authorization. The legislature is presumed to know the law. See In re J.M., 273 Kan. 550, 44 P.3d 429 (2002). Had it intended to allow oral authorization to support arrest of a conditional release violator, it would have said so. The district judge's factual finding that there was no written arrest and detain order at the time the officers first attempted to arrest Anderson is supported by substantial competent evidence. His legal conclusion that Sackhoff's later oral authorization was a sufficient substitute was error. The drug evidence seized as a result of the attempted unlawful arrest must be suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963); State v. Canaan, 265 Kan. 835, Syl. ¶ 3, 964 P.2d 681 (1998). We do not reach Anderson's further substantive or procedural arguments, including that the written order had to remain in the physical possession of the arresting officer at the time of arrest or that he never violated the conditions of his release, because it is unnecessary to do so. We also do not reach the State's arguments about practical complications; those arguments should be addressed to the legislature. Finally, we do not reach the State's argument that Anderson's flight, in and of itself, justified his arrest. This theory was not pursued before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the district court is reversed. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.