Opinion ID: 2613240
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: timeliness: proximity to trial

Text: RCW 4.12.040 sets forth a mandatory nondiscretionary rule granting parties the right to a change of judge upon the timely filing of an affidavit of prejudice. RCW 4.12.050 provides that an affidavit is timely so long as it is filed and called to the attention of the judge before he shall have made any ruling whatsoever in the case, ... and before the judge presiding has made any order or ruling involving discretion .... The State argues that Parra's affidavit was not timely because it was filed so near the time of trial. The State cites State v. Hansen, 42 Wn. App. 755, 714 P.2d 309, aff'd, 107 Wn.2d 331, 728 P.2d 593 (1986), for this proposition. The State's reliance on Hansen is misplaced. In Hansen, the defendant filed an affidavit of prejudice minutes before jury selection was scheduled to begin. Defense counsel admitted that its sole purpose in filing an affidavit was to obtain a continuance in order to gain ample opportunity to prepare briefs and to drop back and have an omnibus hearing which had been missed. Hansen, 107 Wn.2d at 333. The trial judge offered to change places with another judge to accommodate the defendant's affidavit, but the defendant refused. The judge then denied the affidavit. The Court of Appeals held that RCW 4.12.050 is a mandatory nondiscretionary statute that must be honored unless [it] would lead to an absurd result. Hansen, 42 Wn. App. at 758 (citing Marine Power & Equip. Co. v. Department of Transp., 102 Wn.2d 457, 465, 687 P.2d 202 (1984)). The Court of Appeals agreed, however, with the trial court and denied the defendant's affidavit as untimely because using an affidavit of prejudice to obtain a continuance would result in a flagrant abuse of legislative intent. Hansen, 42 Wn. App. at 760. [1] This court accepted review of Hansen and chose not to reach the abuse of legislative intent issue. This court emphasized the fact that Washington courts had long stressed the mandatory, nondiscretionary nature of affidavits of prejudice. Hansen, 107 Wn.2d at 333. It noted that absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances a party meeting the requirements of RCW 4.12.050 is entitled to a change of judge. Hansen, 107 Wn.2d at 333 (citing Marine Power, at 465). The court specifically declined to address the question of whether the results of the case were extraordinary enough to justify departure from the statute. Instead, the court held that the petitioner waived his right to a change of judge when he rejected Judge Buckley's offer to trade places with Judge Kristianson. Hansen, 107 Wn.2d at 334. Hansen is distinguishable from the instant case on several points. First, in Hansen, the defendant had good reason to know more than 3 weeks before trial which judge in a 2-judge, 3-county judicial district would preside. Second, in Hansen, the court made efforts to accommodate the defendant by offering to exchange judges. Third, the defendant in Hansen admitted that his use of affidavit was strategic. Finally, the defendant in Hansen refused the offer to exchange judges. In this case, all three judges in the Whatcom County Superior Court had presided over Parra's case at different times. Parra insisted that he did not know who the presiding judge would be until the morning of the trial. Furthermore, there is no allegation in this case that Parra was attempting to manipulate the system or circumvent established procedures. As Parra told Judge Swedberg on November 8, 1991, I wasn't aware you [were] going to be the trial judge until the day we came in and started trial ... [o]therwise I would have filed an affidavit prior to that day. Report of Proceedings (Feb. 3, 1992), at 5. Moreover, the State does not cite any extraordinary circumstances which would justify departing from the requirements of the statute in order to avoid an absurd result. Marine Power, at 465. The Court of Appeals' decision holding Parra's affidavit timely does not conflict with either this court's or the Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Hansen, supra . Furthermore, this court has held twice that it will not impose additional timeliness requirements. In re Marriage of Lemon, 118 Wn.2d 422, 423, 823 P.2d 1100, 1100-01 (1992) (holding that a local court rule which conflicted with the time criteria of RCW 4.12.050 was invalid and that there is no authority that allows a local rule to restrict the time criteria of RCW 4.12.050); Harbor Enters., Inc. v. Gudjonsson, 116 Wn.2d 283, 293, 803 P.2d 798, 804 (1991) (holding that a local rule cannot restrict the valid exercise of RCW 4.12.050). That defendant Parra filed his affidavit within 45 minutes of trial in no way indicates that his motion was untimely. The Court of Appeals' reasoning is correct on this point.