Opinion ID: 2089325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial Was Abuse of Discretion Husband Demonstrated Good Cause

Text: The record reflects that the notice of the rescheduled hearing on the Wife's petition was sent to one of the restaurants owned by the Husband. Although the Husband claims that he did not receive the notice and he was out of the country at the time, the notice was not returned by the postal authorities as undelivered. Thus, the record reflects a dispute over whether the Husband had actual notice of the November 17, 1994 hearing. However, even if the Husband had received actual notice, the notice describes the nature of the proceeding to be a hearing on a Motion & Affidavit to Modify Custody Order. It makes no mention of the Wife's Petition for a Rule to Show Cause regarding the Husband's alleged contempt of the ancillary proceeding judgment. The default judgment entered against the Husband concerned the contempt allegation, although the only notice sent to the Husband had nothing to do with that subject matter. A motion to open a default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Reynolds v. Reynolds, Del.Supr., 595 A.2d 385, 389 (1991) (citing Battaglia v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc., Del.Supr., 379 A.2d 1132, 1135 (1977)). When determining whether there has been an abuse of such discretion, this Court considers two questions: (1) did the defaulting party make some showing that, if relief is granted, the outcome of the action may be different from what it will be if the default judgment is allowed to stand?; and (2) will substantial prejudice be caused the non-defaulting party by granting the motion? Reynolds v. Reynolds, 595 A.2d at 389 (quoting Battaglia v. WSFS, 379 A.2d at 1135). Family Court Civil Rule 60(b) is accorded a liberal construction because of the underlying policy favoring a trial on the merits rather than a default judgment. Id. The first question this Court must address is whether the Husband made a showing that, if his motion were granted, the outcome of the action may be different than if the default judgment were permitted to stand. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 595 A.2d at 389. The record reflects that, in his Motion for Relief from Judgment, the Husband asserted that the buyer of the restaurant had defaulted, and that he had indeed paid to the Wife her share of the monies actually received. Thus, the Husband made a sufficient showing that the outcome of the contempt hearing may be different if his motion were granted and he was permitted to present evidence on the merits. Id. The second question we must address is whether substantial prejudice will be caused to the non-defaulting party by granting the motion. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 595 A.2d at 389. The Husband has deposited the full amount of money claimed by the Wife into an interest-bearing escrow account. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Wife would be prejudiced by the granting of the Motion for Relief from the Default Judgment. Instead, it appears that the Husband has been prejudiced. The Husband has never had an opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the contempt allegation. He has been required to serve weekend prison sentences. He has also relinquished control of the amount of money in dispute pending the outcome of these proceedings. Accordingly, we conclude that the Family Court abused its discretion by denying the Husband's Motion for Relief from the Default Judgment entered against him. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 595 A.2d at 389.