Opinion ID: 1122547
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Special instruction G: voluntary intoxication

Text: (30) Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury pursuant to defendant's special instruction G (set forth in fn. 28), which would have directed the jury to consider the effect of intoxication upon defendant's mental state. [28] The instruction was a modified version of CALJIC Nos. 4.21 and 8.77. At trial, defendant argued that the instruction was warranted on two grounds. First, defendant argued that there was sufficient evidence of defendant's voluntary intoxication to require that the jury be instructed on this subject. Second, even if there was insufficient direct evidence to warrant the giving of this instruction, other evidence establishing defendant's habitual cocaine usage supported an inference that, because defendant freebased cocaine during the morning shortly after the Bautistas were killed, he would have been freebasing cocaine during the evening (or early morning) when these crimes were committed. In response, the prosecution argued that the evidence was insufficient to justify the giving of defendant's proffered special instruction, and that the instruction was inconsistent with the third-party-culpability defense presented by the defendant. After considering the parties' arguments, the trial court rejected special instruction G on the basis that there is not sufficient evidence regarding voluntary intoxication at the time of the alleged homicide. For the jury to be instructed on that aspect, it would be inviting the jury to speculate and the Court deems that to be inappropriate. The trial court further ruled that defense counsel would not be permitted to argue to the jury that defendant's voluntary intoxication at the time of the killings could negate the mental state required to establish first degree murder. The trial court, indicating it would allow argument as to whether defendant's cocaine usage had a bearing upon whether defendant did in fact act with premeditation and deliberation, stated that defense counsel could argue the cumulative effect of using cocaine over a period of time[,] should the jury consider whether that had any bearing on [defendant's] conduct. On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's finding that there was insufficient evidence to warrant the giving of special instruction G. Defendant cites the testimony of witnesses who described his prodigious use of cocaine. He also links the testimony of Harlyn Codd, who stated that defendant would become paranoid when engaged in freebasing cocaine, with the testimony of Larry Tom Whittington, who stated that defendant appeared to be exhibiting signs of paranoia when Whittington visited defendant at Patricia Shepard's apartment on the night of the killings. Defendant also links Susan Rambo's testimony that defendant was hyper when he freebased cocaine, with her testimony that defendant was very nervous, hyper, very excited when he sped into her backyard in September of 1984 and confessed the killings to her. According to defendant, the collective testimony of Codd, Whittington, and Susan Rambo establishes an inference that defendant must have been using cocaine at or shortly before the time of the killings. We disagree with defendant's characterization of the evidence. There was no evidence introduced at trial that defendant had ingested cocaine at or shortly before the time of the killings. Moreover, Susan Rambo and Larry Tom Whittington each testified that defendant often went several days without consuming cocaine, thereby refuting defendant's argument that his cocaine usage had been so habitual as to warrant an inference he had ingested cocaine at a time relevant to the Bautista killings. On this record, the trial court was not obligated to instruct the jury in the manner requested by defendant. (See People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1178-1181 [270 Cal. Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965]; see also People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1115-1117 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588].) Evidence that a defendant has ingested a drug at some point in time does not equate to usage at the time of the killings. ( People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1127, 1143 [245 Cal. Rptr. 635, 751 P.2d 901].) Nor does such evidence suggest that defendant suffered impairment related to previous ingestion of cocaine. The paranoia exhibited by defendant concerning snitches, at the time Larry Tom Whittington visited him at Patricia Shepard's apartment, did not establish that defendant then was ingesting cocaine; the record suggests that defendant was obsessed with snitches, without regard to whether he was suffering the effects of cocaine intoxication. That defendant may have been hyper on the morning he sped into the Rambos' yard, and may have freebased cocaine after his arrival there, similarly does not establish that he had ingested cocaine shortly before the killings (which could have occurred several hours earlier). Thus, the trial court's ruling was correct. Evidence of defendant's alleged voluntary intoxication was `too insubstantial to require submission of the defense to the jury.' ( People v. Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1143 [citing the cases].)