Opinion ID: 1716621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Community Property Claim

Text: At the time of Montgomery's death he was married to Goldie Greig. The separation suit, although pending, had not been reduced to judgment. The community regime, then, was viable and in full force and effect. Joint tax returns for the years 1958 to the date of Montgomery's death indicate the earnings of both spouses increased during the marriage, the wife being employed as a librarian at Southeastern Louisiana University. She and Monty George, the son of the second marriage, both contend that all funds in both plans belonged to the community of acquets and gains and should be divided one-half to Goldie Greig and one-fourth each to Thomas III and Monty George. It is fair to say from our resume of the plans that they represent compensation from the employer to the employee diverted to a trust fund and held for payment on death, retirement or disability. Inducements to adopt these plans usually arise because an employer has received loyal service over an employee's productive lifetime, and the employer may feel constrained by human or moral considerations to offer him additional support during retirement years, or a trade union may seek and obtain these benefits as an additional compensation for services, a fringe benefit. Only the employer contributes to the plans, but the contribution is not without reciprocal contribution on the part of the employee, although these are intangible and difficult to evaluate. It is a reward by the company to promote loyal and efficient service on the part of the employee. The plans are, moreover, an inducement to employees to remain in the service of the company to enjoy the benefits the plans promised. In short, the contribution of the employer is not a purely gratuitous act, but it is in the nature of additional remuneration to the employee who meets the conditions of the plan. The employer expects and receives something in return for his contribution, while the employee, in complying, earns the reward. The benefits to the employee are, therefore, earned incomeproperty within legal contemplation. Langlinais v. David, 289 So.2d 343 (La.App.1974); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 258 So.2d 661 (La.App.1972); Laffitte v. Laffitte, 232 So.2d 92 (La.App.1970). In both plans the employer retains considerable control by its authority to amend the trust agreement; to remove the trustee and appoint his successor; and by the appointment of the committee member who administers the plans. Significantly, however, once the employer's contributions to the plans are made they become irrevocably dedicated to the employee and, according to a schedule, vested in the employee. On the facts of this case, 100% of the account designated to Montgomery, because of the length of his service and his pay, was vested in him at the time of his death. The value of the proceeds at his death are the sums deposited in the registry of court. There is no dispute on this issue. Any resolution of the problem must take into consideration the principles of community property so fundamental to Louisiana law. For [e]very marriage contracted in this State, superinduces of right partnership or community of acquets or gains, if there be no stipulation to the contrary. La.Civil Code art. 2399. The partnership extends so far as to include nonresident married persons who acquire property in this State. La.Civil Code art. 2400. Other principles established by the Civil Code are: This partnership or community consists of the profits of all effects of which the husband has the administration and enjoyment, either of right or in fact, of the produce of the reciprocal industry and labor of both husband and wife, and of the estate which they may acquire during the marriage, either by donations made jointly to them both, or by purchase, or in any other similar way, even though the purchase be only in the name of one of the two and not of both, because in that case the period of time when the purchase is made is alone attended to, and not the person who made the purchase. . . . La.Civil Code art. 2402. At the time of the dissolution of the marriage, all effects which both husband and wife reciprocally possess, are presumed common effects or gains, unless it be satisfactorily proved which of such effects they brought in marriage, or which have been given them separately, or which they have respectively inherited. La.Civil Code art. 2405. The effects which compose the partnership or community of gains, are divided into two equal portions between the husband and wife, or between their heirs, at the dissolution of the marriage; and it is the same with respect to the profits arising from the effects which both husband and wife brought reciprocally in marriage, and which have been administered by the husband, or by husband and wife conjointly, although what has been thus brought in marriage, by either the husband or the wife, be more considerable than what has been brought by the other, or even although one of the two did not bring anything at all. La.Civil Code art. 2406. When the separate property of either the husband or the wife has been increased or improved during the marriage, the other spouse, or his or her heirs, shall be entitled to the reward of one half of the value of the increase or ameliorations, if it be proved that the increase or ameliorations be the result of the common labor, expenses or industry; but there shall be no reward due, if it be proved that the increase is due only to the ordinary course of things, to the rise in the value of property, or to the chances of trade. La.Civil Code art. 2408. These articles of the Civil Code represent distinctive and enduring principles of our Civil Law system, a highly developed and more evolved concept of the rules regulating the marriage relation than almost any other body of laws on the subject. The Civil Law ideal of the marital relation, far kinder than the Common Law notion of a merged personality represented by the husband, has throughout the regulations of the community kept a more perfect balance between the rights of the spouses in their accumulations through the years. Furthermore, the strong framework which supports the community property edifice will permit of the minor adjustments necessary for perfect alignment with changing conditions. Daggett, The Community Property System of Louisiana. Chapter 1 (La.State Univ.Press 1945). Until now, of the community property systems existing in the United States, that of Louisiana seems most basically sound, most equitable in its variations, possibly because it is true parent stock and has been least weakened by the influence of the Common Law idea of marital rights. Daggett, ibid. Some historians believe the principle of community property originated in the ancient Germanic tribes when women fought by the side of men and for that reason were believed to be entitled to part of the spoils of war. Even if the ancient causes which brought about the community property system as it exists in Louisiana no longer exist and are incompatible with the stresses for change, the existence of these stresses would not authorize courts of justice to refuse giving effect to the law. But fortunately this is not the case. Indeed, in this day and time women have to a great extent, because of economic and social changes, entered into industry and business, often sharing the burden of providing for the needs of the marital partnership. This change provides a cause, more prevalent than before, attesting to the relevance, and supporting the continuation and preservation, of the community property system. In a case involving a controversy between a husband and wife over a partition in kind of shares of stock standing in the husband's name, the husband contended the stock should not be divided in kind, but that he should be allowed to retain all of the stock and pay to his wife one-half of its book value. To support his contention he refers to a provision of the charter of the company issuing the stock which requires that before the stock is transferred it be first offered to the shareholders of the company or its officers, a provision designed to restrict ownership of the shares to the employees and officers of the company. In denying the husband the right to the stock to the exclusion of the wife, and after quoting Articles 2399 and 2402 of the Civil Code, this Court in Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So.2d 169 (1956), said: There is nothing more fundamental in our law than the rule of property which declares that this community is a partnership in which the husband and wife own equal shares, their title thereto vesting at the very instant such property is acquired. (citations omitted). We have repeatedly adhered to the doctrine that the half ownership of the wife in the community effects, its status not resting upon the mere gratuity of the husband, is entitled to a dignity equal to that of the husband's; and upon its dissolution and liquidation the wife is entitled to secure the delivery of this one-half right and ownership into her own exclusive management and control; and the courts have no discretion or power whatever to award her less. Our codal laws also declare that after the marriage the spouses can do nothing to alter the effect between themselves of our community laws. LSA-C.C. 2329. The case also stands for the proposition that the restrictive provisions of the company charter cannot affect the status of the stock purchased during the existence of the community or the rights of the wife which flow from the partnership or community of acquets and gains created by the marriage, the Court saying: Such a restriction cannot negative the wife's present interest as a co-owner, and as a co-owner in community she is clearly entitled to be recognized as such and obtain the exclusive management and control of her vested interest. This holding means that in the case at bar the stipulations of the plans cannot alter the wife's rights as a partner in community. The Messersmith Case also involved classification of an individual employee's certificate issued by Equitable Life Assurance Society, the certificate being identified with a group annuity plan of the company. Notwithstanding that the certificate had no cash surrender or loan value on the date of dissolution of the community, and would never have a cash or loan value until resignation, retirement or death of the employee, this Court found the certificate to be an asset of the community, an incorporeal moveable from which benefits flow, which must be inventoried and in time partitioned between the spouses. In Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127, 51 S.Ct. 64, 75 L.Ed. 252 (1930), the United States Supreme Court recognized that under the law of Louisiana the wife is not only vested with the ownership of half of the community property from the moment it is acquired, but is likewise the owner of half of the community income. See also Succession of Wiener, 203 La. 649, 14 So. 2d 475 (1943). Article 2334 of the Civil Code reinforces the doctrine expressed in the articles and decisions already referred to: The property of married persons is divided into separate and common property. Separate property is that which either party brings into the marriage, or acquires during the marriage with separate funds, or by inheritance, or by donation made to him or her particularly. . . . . . . Common property is that which is acquired by the husband and wife during marriage, in any manner different from that above declared. . . . Although the husband is, by the articles of the Code, placed at the head of the partnership, the status of the wife as a partner and her ownership of half of the community property from the instant of its acquisition is unaffected. Succession of Wiener, supra. As expressed in Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S.Ct. 58, 75 L. Ed. 239 (1930), The law's investiture of the husband with broad powers, by no means negatives the wife's present interest as a co-owner. The theory of this community partnership is that necessity and order require that it be placed in charge of a managing partner. For one thing, dealings with third persons, when community property is involved, had to be protected from the nullifying actions of the other spouse, or the stalemate otherwise resulting from disagreement between the partners. In effect, the confusion resulting from dual control had to be avoided. It is obvious, therefore, that the wife's interest in the community property in Louisiana does not spring from any fiction of the law or from any gift or act of generosity on the part of the husband but, instead, from an express legal contract of partnership entered into at the time of the marriage. Succession of Wiener, supra. Notwithstanding that the husband is by law the head and master of the marital relationship and is charged with the management and control of the community of acquets and gains, the wife's one-half interest is at all times real, vesting in her the right to dispose of her interest by will and giving her the right to demand her one-half interest upon dissolution of the marriage for any cause, even though she is at fault in the separation or divorce. It must be recognized, therefore, that plans or devices between employer and employee cannot have the effect of nullifying the wife's rights. There is no intimation in the case at bar, however, that the employer sought by the profit-sharing or retirement plan to nullify the law designed for the protection of the wife or of forced heirs. To the contrary, it seems apparent that the plans recognize the contribution the wife makes to the employee's contentment, stability and efficiency in his employment, and the design of the plan is to foster and encourage the employee's security. Expediency or simplicity of procedure in the settlement of the benefits upon the beneficiary at the death of the employee is the objective of the designation of beneficiary provision of the plans and the reason for granting authority to the committees to make the distribution in the absence of a designated beneficiary. But, as we have seen, this Court has heretofore decided, that restrictive provisions in corporate charters, and, by analogy, in profit-sharing and retirement plans of the employer, cannot negative the wife's present interest as a co-owner. Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So.2d 169 (1956) Demands for efficient and expeditious settlement under these plans cannot outweigh or have the effect of nullifying the strongly entrenched and viable community property system existing in this State. These demands overlook fundamental principles of our law, which, if disregarded, can only lead to the erosion and eventual nullification of community property and forced heirship principles. Piecemeal adjudications based upon demands for expediency and freedom of disposition will result in confusion and instability in the law. If this result is to be brought about, the Legislature must undertake the change, not courts. Moreover, nothing in the community property system is found which encumbers or deters the operation of the plans before us. When questions arise over the disposition of the proceeds after the death of the employee or upon termination of the marriage, the matter can be resolved as in other cases of controversy which are resolved by the courts. In the case at bar the employer properly provoked this concursus to resolve the question. We recognize the prior jurisprudence of this Court, and its incorporation in Section 647 of Title 22 of the Revised Statutes, which holds, in life insurance cases, that the right to receive benefits is an incorporeal thing, La.Civil Code art. 770, and the proceeds of life insurance are therefore payable to an insured's estate as separate property if the policy was brought into the marriage, In re: Moseman's Estate, 38 La.Ann. 219 (1886), or community property if the policy was acquired during the marriage. Sizeler v. Sizeler, 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930); Succession of Rabouin, 201 La. 227, 9 So. 2d 529 (1942); Succession of Buddig, 108 La. 406, 32 So. 361 (1902). It is the reasoning in these cases that this right to receive benefits constitutes an interest in the insurance contract which becomes vested at the moment the contract comes into existence. Succession of Verneuille, 120 La. 605, 45 So. 520 (1908). Nevertheless, when the insured names a beneficiary, the proceeds do not form any part of the insured's estate at his death. Succession of LeBlanc, 142 La. 27, 76 So. 223 (1917); Succession of Mendoza, 288 So.2d 673 (La.App.1974) (Lemmon, Jr., concurring). However, life insurance has always been treated as sui generis in this State. For this reason this Court has established a theory that the rules of law found in our Civil Code and the principles of forced heirship found in our Constitution and in the Civil Code do not apply to life insurance. The concept, as already pointed out, has been embodied in our statutory law. La.R.S. 22:647; Oppenheim, The Donation Inter Vivos, 43 Tul.L.Rev. 737 (1969). Clearly the theory of these cases establishing the proposition that the proceeds of an insurance policy are not subject to collation make it possible to favor one forced heir over another, La. Const. art. IV, 116 (1921); La.Const. art. XII, § 5 (1974); Vinson v. Vinson, 105 La. 30, 29 So. 701 (1901), and sanction a life insurance device which may, when properly employed, nullify the effects of the community of acquets and gains. Succession of Geagan, 212 La. 574, 33 So.2d 118 (1947). But this Court has refused to extend the rationale of the cases dealing with life insurance to other problems where the conflict is between the urge to bring about freedom of disposition and the fundamental and elementary principles of forced heirship and the community property system embodied in our Constitution and Civil Code. Thus, where a decedent purchased United States Series G Savings Bonds and designated his brother as payee on death, and upon his death left a widow and posthumous child, and the widow sued for delivery of the proceeds or judgment for the value of the bonds, we granted judgment in favor of the widow, saying the designation of the brother constituted a donation mortis causa, as defined by Article 1469 of the Civil Code. As such it was a gift in contemplation of death and subject to State Inheritance Tax. Winsberg v. Winsberg, 220 La. 398, 56 So.2d 730 (1952). The decision in the Winsberg Case found that, whereas such a gift was a disposition mortis causa, it has no standing under our law as it does not comply with any of the forms prescribed for testaments by Articles 1574-95 of the Civil Code, concluding: Accordingly, it would be absolutely null but for the vitality given it by law under which the bonds were issued. This Federal contract, which is a recognition by the Government of its obligation to the purchaser of the bond for a sum certain in money to be paid on his death to a designated person, is, of course, enforceable between the parties thereto in accordance with the conditions stated therein. And, obviously, we think, Louisiana is without right to change the beneficiary of the contract or to insist that the Federal Government recognize someone other than the payee as the owner of the bonds. . . . But though these contracts are entitled to recognition as another way to dispose of property in prospect of death, it does not follow that they may be employed so as to nullify the laws applicable to the devolution of property or to confer upon the donees greater rights than they would have had if the devise has been in the form of a last will and testament. It is apt to observe that the Federal Government is neither concerned with nor interested in the application and enforcement of State laws respecting succession or inheritance of property. . . . So we say in this case the defendant cannot be accorded greater rights, merely because the donation is in the form of a Federal contract, than he would have had it been by last will and testament as prescribed by our law. And, while Louisiana may not require that bonds be paid to anyone other than the named beneficiary, it undoubtedly has the power, which was reserved to it by the Tenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, to decree that the beneficiary or payee is indebted to the estate of the former owner, or his heirs, in an amount equal to the value of the gift. The principle has been upheld by decisions of our Nation's highest court. They concede that while Federal law may govern as to form, Federal law cannot be used as a means of defrauding heirs under state law. Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306, 84 S.Ct. 742, 11 L.Ed.2d 724 (1964); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 82 S.Ct. 1089, 8 L. Ed.2d 180 (1962). Life insurance is distinctive both in its confection and in its effect. For instance, An examination of the authorities does not warrant the conclusion that an annuity contract is an insurance contract . . . An annuity comprehends few of the elements of an insurance contract. Carroll v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States, 9 F.Supp. 223, 224 (W.D.Mo.1934); Succession of Rabouin, 201 La. 227, 9 So. 2d 529 (1942). Annuity contracts are recognized as investments rather than as insurance. Appleman on Insurance, Section 83. Considering Louisiana's long and steadfast commitment to the principles of forced heirship and community property, this Court is unable, even if it thought a better result would be to consider profit-sharing and retirement plans analogous to insurance, to adopt any theory of decision which would erode those principles, and, under certain circumstances, nullify them. Thus, under the facts of this case, the benefits or proceeds of the profit-sharing and retirement plans are, in effect, and in reality, principally earnings of the deceased employee Montgomery. As such the proceeds of these plans were the produce of the reciprocal industry and labor of both husband and wife. La.Civil Code art. 2402. At the time of the dissolution of the marriage by Montgomery's death, therefore, these benefits were presumed community effects or gains, ibid. art. 2405, and are to be divided into two equal portions between the surviving wife and the heirs of the deceased husband. Ibid. art. 2406. To bring about this result the proceeds of these plans are payable to Goldie Greig as administratrix of the succession of the deceased Montgomery. However, the forced heirs of the decedent and his first wife are entitled to an accounting to support any claim that some value of these benefits existed prior to the second marriage. In the event such a contention is supported, the claims of the forced heirs and the first wife that this value is attributable to the first community must be given effect. This accounting is to be based upon the value, if any, of the account designated for Montgomery which had vested prior to the second marriage. Daigre v. Daigre, 228 La. 682, 83 So.2d 900 (1955), opinion on rehearing, holding that if a pension is part of the consideration for services of the employee, then it unquestionably becomes a community asset. See also Succession of Lewis, 192 La. 734, 189 So. 118 (1939).