Opinion ID: 374716
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A Subterranean Excursion: The Subfacial Challenge to the Affidavit

Text: 34 Martin next argues that Agent Kizer failed to disclose to the magistrate certain material facts within his knowledge which would have affected her assessment of the informants' reliability and thus her determination that the affidavit established probable cause for Martin's arrest. Specifically, he argues that Agent Kizer should have disclosed that he initiated the interviews with Kral and Rodriquez, that he used a yes and no questioning format which did not ensure the informants' truthfulness, 12 and that Rodriquez had been granted immunity from prosecution based on the information he gave. He at least implies that these omissions were intentional. 13 The district court, at the suppression hearing, allowed Martin to present evidence regarding omissions from the affidavit. Having examined the evidence at that hearing, we believe the district court was correct in finding that the omissions from the affidavit did not vitiate the magistrate's finding of probable cause. 35 In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), the Supreme Court for the first time recognized the viability of subfacial challenges to affidavits presented in support of a warrant and defined the circumstances in which such an attack could prevail. 14 The court summarized its holding as follows: 36 (W)e hold that, where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit. 37 Id. 98 S.Ct. at 2676-77. While Franks dealt only with misstatements, Judge Coleman in United States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754, 758-59 (5th Cir. 1976), recognized that allegations of material omissions were to be treated essentially similarly to claims of material misstatements. Accord United States v. House, 604 F.2d 1135, 1141 & n. 9 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Collins, 549 F.2d 557, 561 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 940, 97 S.Ct. 2656, 53 L.Ed.2d 259 (1977); United States v. Lewis, 425 F.Supp. 1166, 1173 (D.Conn.1977); Morris v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.App.3d 521, 129 Cal.Rptr. 238 (1976). 38 Since the district court allowed Martin to present evidence regarding the omissions at the suppression hearing, we do not face the issue of whether or not a hearing on the omissions was required. Rather, we must examine the record of the suppression hearing to determine whether or not Martin proved by a preponderance of the evidence, first, that the omissions were in fact made, and, second, that they were made intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the accuracy of the affidavit. If Martin carried this burden, we would be required to determine whether, if the omitted material had been included in the affidavit, the affidavit would still establish probable cause for Martin's arrest. If it would not, we would be required to void the warrant and suppress the evidence seized pursuant to it. See Franks v. Delaware, supra, 98 S.Ct. at 2676-77; United States v. House, supra, 604 F.2d at 1141. 39 The record of the hearing establishes both that Agent Kizer initiated the interviews with Kral and Rodriquez and that he used the yes and no questioning format of which Martin has complained. It does not establish, however, that Rodriquez had been granted or promised immunity at the time he made his statement to Agent Kizer. In fact, Martin never contended at his hearing that Rodriquez had been promised immunity; apparently he discovered the promise only at trial (Trial Transcript at 173), and did not at that time renew his motion to suppress in light of this information. Furthermore, at oral argument the Government stated that it was not certain that Rodriquez had been promised immunity until after he made the statement upon which the affidavit was based. 15 Thus, since the record at the hearing does not establish that Agent Kizer failed to disclose that Rodriquez had been promised or granted immunity, we cannot further consider this alleged omission. 40 Under Franks, a proven misstatement can vitiate an affidavit only if it is established that the misstatement was the product of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth . . . . Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient. 98 S.Ct. at 2685. By analogy, it must be proven that the omissions were made intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the accuracy of the affidavit; negligent omissions will not undermine the affidavit. See United States v. House, supra, 604 F.2d at 1141. 41 Here, there is no evidence in the record directly illuminating the state of mind of the affiant, Agent Kizer, when he omitted from the affidavit the facts that he had initiated the interviews with Kral and Rodriquez and had used a yes and no questioning format, for Martin proved little more than that these omissions were made. Doubtless it will often be difficult for an accused to prove that an omission was made intentionally or with reckless disregard rather than negligently unless he has somehow gained independent evidence that the affiant had acted from bad motive or recklessly in conducting his investigation and making the affidavit. Nevertheless, it follows from Franks that the accused bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the omission was more than a negligent act. It is possible that when the facts omitted from the affidavit are clearly critical to a finding of probable cause the fact of recklessness may be inferred from proof of the omission itself. Ours, however, is not that case. 42 Agent Kizer's failure to reveal the fact that he initiated contact with Kral and Rodriquez and the nature of his questioning format does not, in the circumstances of this case, give rise to the inference that he acted with reckless disregard for the accuracy of the information he presented to the magistrate. As is clear from our analysis of the facial sufficiency of the affidavit, these facts were not so central as to warrant the inference that Agent Kizer's actions were reckless. For this reason, we hold that Martin failed to carry his burden of showing that the omissions were more than negligent.