Opinion ID: 1439775
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limiting the Scope of Mindombe's Cross-Examination of Dr. Davis

Text: Mindombe also argues on appeal that the trial judge violated his Sixth Amendment rights by improperly curtailing his cross-examination of Dr. Davis when he attempted to examine her regarding the suggestibility of children's memories. The trial court is entrusted with a large measure of discretion to control the introduction of evidence[.] Baker v. United States, 131 U.S.App. D.C. 7, 36, 401 F.2d 958, 987 (1968). Although the opportunity to cross-examine a witness is a fundamental right, which is guaranteed in a criminal trial through the [C]onfrontation [C]lause of the Sixth Amendment,[] Singletary v. United States, 383 A.2d 1064, 1073 (D.C.1978) (citations omitted), the extent and scope of cross-examination of a witness . . . is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Morris v. United States, 389 A.2d 1346, 1352 (D.C. 1978). [T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defendant might wish. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, once a party has had an opportunity substantially to exercise the right of cross-examination, the extent of further interrogation is within the sound discretion of the trial court and reversal by an appeals court is warranted only where an abuse of discretion leads to prejudice. Singletary, 383 A.2d at 1073 (citations omitted). In this case, the trial court ruled that Mindombe's questions regarding the concept of the suggestibility of children was beyond the scope of Dr. Davis' direct testimony, and therefore, an impermissible line of questioning on cross-examination. Dr. Davis testified on direct examination specifically about children's fragmented memories, their range of reactions to intra-family sexual abuse, and the possibility that their reports of abuse may be delayed. On cross-examination, Mindombe attempted to question on the growing area of research on suggestibility in children. The trial court expressed that although Dr. Davis may be aware of the debate in the substantive studies on suggestibility, the line of questioning was improper unless it was somehow related to Dr. Davis' testimony on direct. After repeated attempts by Mindombe to question the doctor on suggestibility, the trial court reaffirmed that Dr. Davis did not comment on what factors affect or influence children's memories. A bench conference then ensued after Mindombe tried to question Dr. Davis on a specific scientific book. At this point, the trial court explained that if there were opinions expressed in the book that contradicted Dr. Davis' testimony on direct, that questioning in that regard would be appropriate. However, the trial court expressed that the book addressed the manner in which the styles of questioning children affect their memories, and was beyond the scope of Dr. Davis' direct testimony. The trial court further explained that while Dr. Davis discussed certain aspects of children's memories, any information related generally to the memory of children could not be introduced on cross-examination. Our review of the record reveals that Dr. Davis' testimony addressed the fact that children have accurate memories, but that they cannot recall events as easily as adults. Dr. Davis testified that it is vital to evaluate the manner in which you ask questions of children, and that it may be necessary to use memory cues to access their memories. [10] Arguably, the concept of suggestibility  how children's memories may be influenced by the questions asked of interviewers  is related to Dr. Davis' testimony on direct examination as to children's ability to access their memories. We do not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, however, because the record reflects that the trial court permitted defense counsel extensive leeway to question Dr. Davis generally as to the suggestibility of children. In fact, the record reflects that defense counsel successfully had Dr. Davis acknowledge that children's memories can be manipulated by suggestion, that the concept of suggestibility is a new area of research that is seriously debated, and that a biased interviewer who repeatedly questions a child can be suggestive and add information that [did not] happen to that child's memory. In addition, Dr. Davis acknowledge that in reference to cuing a child's memory there may be some concern regarding the impact of inappropriate questions on a child's memory. Finally, Dr. Davis acknowledged that a biased interviewer could impact a child's memory, and that there was no consensus in the psychological community regarding the right way to ask appropriate questions of children to preserve their memories. Here, defense counsel was allowed to question Dr. Davis generally on the suggestibility of children and was able to use Dr. Davis' testimony to effectively argue in her closing statement that J.M.'s testimony was improperly manufactured as she was influenced by her mother and other government officials. [11] Thus, although Dr. Davis' direct examination did not explicitly discuss the concept of suggestibility, her testimony regarding accessing children's fragmented memories, may have generally raised the issue of suggestibility. The extent of examination by Mindombe on this issue, however, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In light of the fact that the trial court allowed defense counsel the opportunity to effectively establish her main point, that suggestibility can influence the accuracy of children's memories, on this record we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by disallowing some of the more specific questions asked of Dr. Davis by Mindombe on cross-examination.