Opinion ID: 2625402
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Res Judicata Bars the Alliance's Complaint.

Text: Res judicata bars a subsequent action when a judgment in a prior action was (1) a final judgment on the merits, (2) from a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) in a dispute between the same parties (or their privies) about the same cause of action. [13] The alliance argues that under Alaska Civil Rules 41(b) and 52(a), res judicata cannot apply because the superior court in AWA I did not issue a reasoned decision. The alliance also claims that the dismissal of AWA I was based on jurisdictional grounds rather than on the merits. Finally, it claims that AWA I and AWA II involved different defendants and claims for relief. The state argues that the superior court dismissed AWA I on the merits under Rule 41(b) and that res judicata therefore bars the AWA II complaint. The state also argues that the two complaints involved the same parties and causes of action.
The superior court in AWA I did not issue findings of fact or conclusions of law when it dismissed the complaint. The alliance argues that res judicata should not bar AWA II because there was no reasoned decision in AWA I. The alliance uses the reasoned decision shorthand to refer to an opinion containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. For simplicity we accept the alliance's terminology in our discussion, but in doing so, we do not intend to suggest that Judge Michalski's decision in AWA I was not reasoned, despite its lack of findings of fact or conclusions of law. The alliance bases its argument on its reading of the interplay between Alaska Civil Rules 52(a) and 41(b). Rule 52(a) states in part: If an opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41(b). Rule 41(b) states in part: If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal ... other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party ... operates as an adjudication upon the merits. The alliance argues that for a Rule 12 dismissal to be a judgment on the merits under Rule 41(b), the court must issue findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52(a). We do not read Rules 41(b) and 52(a) to require a court to issue findings of fact or conclusions of law for a dismissal decision to be on the merits. Rule 52(a) states that findings of fact and conclusions of law are not necessary for decisions made under Rule 12, except as provided in Rule 41(b). Rule 41(b) states that if a court renders a judgment on the merits, it shall make findings as required by Rule 52(a). But Rule 52(a) does not require findings of fact for Rule 12 dismissals. Furthermore, Rule 41(b) states that unless the court otherwise specifies or the decision is based on a lack of jurisdiction, a dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits. Here, the court did not otherwise specify, and, for reasons we will discuss, the dismissal was not based on a lack of jurisdiction. The dismissal of AWA I was an adjudication on the merits, notwithstanding the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law does not prevent the application of res judicata to the AWA I dismissal. The alliance invokes Usibelli Coal Mine, Inc. v. State, Department of Natural Resources in support of its argument that res judicata cannot apply in the absence of a reasoned decision. [14] We held in Usibelli that res judicata did not apply if a prior decision did not address or consider one of the plaintiff's arguments. [15] We relied on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS and identified several indicia that a prior judgment was final: that the parties were fully heard, that the court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, [and] that the decision was subject to appeal or was in fact reviewed on appeal. [16] The alliance emphasizes the reasoned opinion factor. But Usibelli did not say that all the factors had to be present for res judicata to apply. Moreover, Usibelli listed those factors to determine whether a decision is final, not whether it was on the merits. The alliance also looks to federal case law. The federal courts typically require trial courts to issue reasoned decisions explaining their rulings. The alliance points to Couveau v. American Airlines, Inc., in which the plaintiff appealed a grant of summary judgment for the defendant. [17] Res judicata was not an issue. The defendant moved for summary judgment on several grounds, and the trial court granted summary judgment without explaining its reasoning or indicating which of the defendant's arguments it found persuasive. [18] The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained that when multiple grounds are presented by the movant and the reasons for the district court's decision are not otherwise clear from the record, [we] may vacate a summary judgment and remand for a statement of reasons. [19] But the court in Couveau did not say that a reasoned decision must be issued in order for a decision to be treated as being on the merits. Moreover, a review of the entire record here permits us to ascertain the basis for the superior court's dismissal in AWA I. In most cases involving dismissal or summary judgment, the grounds for the superior court's ruling can be discerned from the parties' motion papers. As we noted above, findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56. [20] We agree with the implied reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Couveau that a trial court addressing multiple theories for dismissal or summary judgment should always identify the grounds for its ruling with sufficient clarity to permit meaningful appellate review. But here, even though the AWA I dismissal order did not explain the reason for dismissal, we can infer the court's reasons for the AWA I dismissal from its subsequent opinion denying the state's attorney's fees motion. We do not want to discourage superior courts from explaining their reasons for granting relief under Rule 12(b)(6). But in this case, Judge Michalski's attorney's fees order in AWA I permits us, in considering whether res judicata barred AWA II, to determine why the superior court dismissed AWA I.
Alaska Civil Rule 41(b) states that [u]nless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal ... other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction ... operates as an adjudication on the merits. [21] The court's order in AWA I did not specify that it was not a dismissal on the merits. The alliance argues that the court dismissed AWA I for raising a political question, and that this basis for dismissal is jurisdictional. The alliance correctly notes that we have taken a broad view of the meaning of jurisdiction in context of Rule 41(b). In Blake v. Gilbert we interpreted jurisdiction to include preconditions and other initial bars to suit, where the defendant has not yet incurred any significant prejudice. [22] A claim implicates the political question doctrine when there is (1) a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the impossibility of a court's undertaking an independent resolution of the case without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government; and (3) the need for adherence to a political decision already made. [23] We also consider whether there are any judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue. [24] The alliance argues that the political question doctrine is a jurisdictional matter because [i]t cares not about the substantive merits of a lawsuit. But in Baker v. Carr the United States Supreme Court classified the political question doctrine as an issue of justiciability. [25] The Court then distinguished jurisdiction from justiciability: In the instance of nonjusticiability, consideration of the cause is not wholly and immediately foreclosed; rather, the Court's inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded. In the instance of lack of jurisdiction the cause either does not arise under the Federal Constitution, laws or treaties (or fall within one of the other enumerated categories of Art. III, § 2), or is not a case or controversy within the meaning of that section; or the cause is not one described by any jurisdictional statute.[ [26] ] We agree that the political question doctrine is more than jurisdictional and is instead a substantive basis for a dismissal. Although we give a broad meaning to jurisdiction for purposes of Rule 41(b) involuntary dismissals, that view is designed to allow plaintiffs to remedy defects that prevent a court from reaching the merits of a complaint. [27] But when the merits raise a political question, the defect is not curable. The superior court's dismissal of AWA I was not a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Under Rule 41(b), the dismissal was an adjudication on the merits.
Res judicata applies when two cases involve the same parties or their privies and the same causes of action. [28] The alliance argues that the differences between the AWA I and AWA II defendants and claims for relief were sufficient to avoid res judicata. The alliance first asserts that the parties are different because it sued the Board of Game and the Commissioner of Fish and Game in AWA I but it did not sue those defendants in AWA II. But in AWA II the alliance simply replaced lesser state entities with the State of Alaska. And in both cases the alliance sued the Governor of Alaska. Res judicata is not defeated by substituting one state entity for another when the claim is based on the same conduct, and when the same defense of non-justiciability applies regardless of which specific state entity is named as a defendant. The alliance next argues that the causes of action in the two cases differed considerably because the alliance dropped its request that the court transfer the board's regulatory authority to the Commissioner of Fish and Game until the defendants re-constituted the board's membership. But the court in AWA I dismissed all of the alliance's causes of action and claims for relief, not merely the request for injunctive relief. The remaining claims in AWA II are the same as in AWA I. Deleting one request for relief did not alter the underlying causes of action.