Opinion ID: 1443906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sex Offender Registration Laws in Other States

Text: A review of the laws of other states concerning sex offenders and their public disclosure provisions, if any, is helpful in considering the constitutionality of KSORA as applied to Myers. All 50 states have enacted sex offender registration laws of varying scope. For a listing of 50 states and their sex offender registration laws see People v. Ross, 169 Misc.2d 308, 646 N.Y.S.2d 249 (N.Y. Sup. 1996). Although the laws in a heavy majority of the states still require that the registry information be kept confidential and made available for use only by law enforcement agencies, some of the more recently enacted registration laws (such as in Iowa, North Carolina, and Vermont) show a trend toward limited public disclosure. For example, the Iowa and North Carolina statutes allow disclosure of registry information for a specifically requested name to the person making the request. Iowa Code Ann. § 692A.13(6) (West 1996 Supp.); N.C. Gen Stat. § 14-208.10(a) (1995 Supp.). In Vermont, when the newly enacted statute becomes effective on September 1, 1996, certain authorized employers can request registry information when necessary to protect the public. 1996 Vt. Laws P.A. 124, § 1 (to be codified at Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 5402 [3]). Many registration laws apply to persons committing sex offenses before the effective dates of the laws. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 28.723 (West 1996 Supp.) (sex offenders convicted after October 1, 1995, or convicted on or before that date but on probation or parole or in jail on that date required to register). In a few states, such as New Jersey and New York, the laws provide for community notification concerning certain registered sex offenders, depending on the risk level of the offender. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C: 7-6, 7-8 (West 1995); N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-1(6) (McKinney 1996 Supp.). The New Jersey provisions apply to persons committing certain sex offenses whose conduct is characterized by compulsive, repetitive behavior, regardless of when the offenses were committed. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C: 7-2(b)(1) (West 1995). See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 423 Mass. 1201, 668 N.E.2d 738 (1996), in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts answered questions concerning the constitutionality of pending S.B. 2276 proposing a sex offender community notification law modeled after New Jersey's. In Pennsylvania, the newly enacted community notification provisions expressly apply only to persons committing sex offenses after the effective date of the law, thus avoiding an ex post facto challenge. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9793 (1996 Supp.). Myers points out that, besides the Kansas statute, only the Georgia and South Dakota statutes allow unrestricted public access to registrant information and South Dakota does not permit publication of the information. Ga. Code Ann. §§ 42-9-44.1(e) (1994); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 1-27-1 (1996 Supp.); and S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 22-22-40 (1996 Supp.). Also, Georgia's statute applies only to child sex offenders, Ga. Code Ann. § 42-9-44.1(a) (1994), and South Dakota limits the offender's duty to register to fewer crimes than does Kansas. S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 22-22-30 (1996 Supp.). Myers contends he would not have been required to register under either the Georgia or South Dakota acts. We observe that Illinois has enacted a child sex offender community notification law which became effective June 1, 1996. Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. ch. 730, 152/101 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1996 Supp.). That law provides for retroactive application, limited community notification, and public access to registry information on child sex offenders. Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. ch. 730, 152/125(c) (Smith-Hurd 1996 Supp.). Myers suggests that KSORA's disclosure provision is the broadest in the country. The State characterizes KSORA, which allows public access as opposed to mandating dissemination of such information, as being in the middle regarding disclosure. We have found no other state's disclosure statute to be broader than KSRA's. The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution Myers contends that KSORA is criminal in nature because it is punitive in both purpose and effect. Because KSORA is punitive, Myers reasons, its application to him is ex post facto and unconstitutional. Myers' offense occurred before April 14, 1994, the date KSORA took effect. See L. 1994, ch. 107, § 10. The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law; thus, we exercise an unlimited, de novo standard of review. See State v. Mertz, 258 Kan. 745, 748, 907 P.2d 847 (1995). We are mindful of the frequently stated rules applied when a statute is questioned as unconstitutional: The constitutionality of a statute is presumed. All doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity, and before the act may be stricken down it must clearly appear that the statute violates the constitution. In determining constitutionality, it is the court's duty to uphold a statute under attack rather than defeat it. If there is any reasonable way to construe the statute as constitutionally valid, that should be done. A statute should not be stricken down unless the infringement of the superior law is clear beyond substantial doubt. State v. Bryan, 259 Kan. 143, Syl. ¶ 1, 910 P.2d 212 (1996). Our focus is upon the application of KSORA to Myers' factual situation. Article I, Section 10, of the United States Constitution provides: No State shall... pass any ... ex post facto Law. The Ex Post Facto Clause encompasses: 1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed.3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L. Ed. 648 (1798). The Calder categories were rephrased in Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 70 L. Ed. 216, 46 S. Ct. 68 (1925): [A]ny statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done, which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto. (Emphasis added.) In Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 50, 111 L. Ed.2d 30, 110 S. Ct. 2715 (1990), the Court re-adopted the Calder categories, as rephrased in Beazell. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 228-29, 27 L. Ed. 506, 2 S. Ct. 443 (1882), was overruled to the extent Kring had broadened those categories to include any change which alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage. Our analysis in Myers' case concerns whether KSORA makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission. Ex post facto laws are particularly objectionable because they deprive their object of all notice. See, e.g., Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429-30, 96 L. Ed.2d 351, 107 S. Ct. 2446 (1987); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30, 67 L. Ed.2d 17, 101 S. Ct. 960 (1981). These [including the Ex Post Facto Clause] are towering constitutional provisions of great importance to individual dignity, freedom, and liberty. John Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 43, 662 A.2d 367 (1995). James Madison emphasized their fundamental role in our Constitution: `Bills of attainer, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligations of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation. The two former are expressly prohibited by the declarations prefixed to some of the State Constitutions, and all of them are prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. Our own experience has taught us nevertheless, that additional fences against these dangers ought not to be omitted. Very properly therefore have the Convention added this constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights.' [The Federalist No. 44, at 301 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).] 142 N.J. at 113 (Stein, J., dissenting). The constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by them. Collins, 497 U.S. at 41. In State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 219, 768 P.2d 268 (1989), we applied the following two-step analysis prescribed in Graham, 450 U.S. at 29, for determining whether a statute is an ex post facto law: `For a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto, two elements must be present: the law must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it. [Citations omitted.]' The State concedes that the statute applies retroactively to Myers. Thus, we concentrate on the penal element of the ex post facto test as modified by Collins: Does KSORA impose punishment on Myers? The Court in De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1109, 80 S. Ct. 1146 (1960), held that a statute barring certain unions on the New York waterfront from collecting dues if any union officers or agents were ex-felons was not an ex post facto law, reasoning: The question in each case where unpleasant consequences are brought to bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation.... If the legislative intent of the statute is to punish, then the inquiry is ended. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95-96, 2 L. Ed.2d 630, 78 S. Ct. 590 (1958) (statute revoking citizenship for military desertion held invalid as cruel and unusual punishment). We turn now to an examination of legislative intent.