Opinion ID: 1755027
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: waiver of right to penalty phase jury

Text: Dessaure argues that he did not execute a valid waiver of his right to a penalty phase jury because he did not know that he had the right to have a jury determine whether the State proved sufficient aggravating circumstances to justify the imposition of the death penalty. The record shows that Dessaure executed a written waiver of his right to a penalty phase jury. The trial court also conducted a colloquy to ensure that Dessaure understood the nature and importance of the rights he intended to relinquish. The court advised Dessaure that the waiver was irrevocable and against the advice of his attorneys. This Court previously addressed a similar claim in Griffin v. State, 820 So.2d 906 (Fla.2002). The Court stated: Consistent with our established practice in dealing with a plea-related voluntariness claim presented on appeal for the first time, we now hold the failure of a capital defendant to first attack the voluntariness of a waiver of a sentencing jury at the trial court precludes review on direct appeal. Hence, because of Griffin's failure to first challenge the waiver at the trial court, we cannot address his claim at this stage as he is restricted to collaterally attack the waiver through a postconviction motion. Id. at 913; see also Spann v. State, 857 So.2d 845 (2003). Dessaure never moved the trial court to withdraw his waiver of a penalty phase jury. Pursuant to Griffin, Dessaure's claim may not be raised on direct appeal but may be raised in a postconviction motion.