Opinion ID: 1155865
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Counsel's closing argument comments

Text: Petitioner also argues the PCR court erred in not finding counsel ineffective for certain comments made during closing argument. We agree. During closing argument, Newell essentially tried to point out the inconsistencies and improbabilities in Garrett's account. However, he also offered his own characterization of petitioner's testimony, as follows: But what it comes down to is two different stories ... The victim told a story. And his story was that there was an armed robbery. And in the course of that armed robbery he was taken to his parents' home, let out, escaped, and then called the police. My client's story is, and he admitted, I deal drugs. I admit that I'm a criminal in that respect, but I did not do this armed robbery. I came there to collect some money I was owed. The guy had built up an account, I mean, and it was getting too big. And I wanted my money. And I brought along a little muscle.... I brought along a little muscle with me. Two against one, hey, we're going towe want our money. You owe us money. We want our money. A little bit of leaning, not necessarily beating him up. But I'm standing there, two big guys, I need my money. Okay. (Emphasis added). At the PCR hearing, petitioner testified that Newell repeatedly pounded his right fist into his left palm in a display of use of force to the jury. According to petitioner, Newell pounded his fist as he said, I brought along a little muscle. Petitioner further maintained he told Newell that he did not rob or kidnap Garrett and had not threatened Garrett in any way; petitioner specifically denied he had told Newell he went with some muscle. In addition, petitioner stated that Newell's comments, coupled with the fist-pounding, gave the jury the impression that petitioner used force, which is an element of kidnapping. [3] The PCR court found that Newell's comments were not improper as he was simply presenting to the jury an alternate explanation of events that was implied from [petitioner's] own testimony. In our opinion, there is no probative evidence to support the PCR court's findings on this issue. While Newell's comments were not an outright admission of kidnapping, they significantly departed from petitioner's own testimony which was that Garrett volunteered to go to his people's home to get some money. The pounding of Newell's fist into his palm only served to highlight the inference that petitioner and the other man had threatened the use of force. This form of argument did not advocate in petitioner's favor, but rather tended to support the State's theory on kidnapping. Therefore, we hold Newell's closing argument comments were improper and constituted deficient performance. We further find petitioner was prejudiced by Newell's closing argument. Both petitioner and Garrett testified that they went from the warehouse to Garrett's parents' home in the truck. Thus, the elements at issue were petitioner's intent, force, and the victim's consent. Petitioner's credibility was crucial as to these elements. The jury clearly struggled with whether petitioner was guilty of kidnapping as evidenced by its requests for a recharge on kidnapping and the replaying of petitioner's testimony. Yet, petitioner's own counsel damaged the defense case because the closing argument did not support petitioner's account of what had happened. Cf. Ingle v. State, 348 S.C. at 472, 560 S.E.2d at 403 (where defense counsel put up a witness who gave testimony contradictory to the petitioner's defense and was therefore quite damaging to the defense, the Court found ineffective assistance of counsel). In other words, we find there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's improper closing argument comments, the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, supra .