Opinion ID: 2621923
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: imperfect self-defense and extreme emotional distress manslaughter

Text: ¶13 Low's first assignment of error is that the district court improperly instructed the jury on extreme emotional distress manslaughter and imperfect self-defense manslaughter. Because extreme emotional distress manslaughter and imperfect self-defense manslaughter are both affirmative defenses under Utah law, Low argues that the choice of whether to assert them belongs to the defendant. Low contends that the district court committed reversible error by including the manslaughter instructions over his objection. We conclude that the district court did not err by including the imperfect self-defense instruction, but we agree with Low that the court did err by including the extreme emotional distress manslaughter instruction. We accordingly reverse Low's manslaughter conviction and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶14 During Low's first trial, the State asked for an imperfect self-defense manslaughter instruction. The district court noted that Low had done nothing to advance . . . imperfect self-defense as an affirmative defense and, accordingly, that such an instruction was potentially a substantial violation of [Low's] constitutional right to prepare and present a defense. The court therefore denied the State's motion to include the imperfect self-defense manslaughter instruction. [1] ¶15 At Low's second trial, the State again asked that the jury be instructed on manslaughter. Specifically, the State asked for both an extreme emotional distress manslaughter instruction and an imperfect self-defense manslaughter instruction. Low objected to the imperfect self-defense manslaughter instruction, arguing that the jury would confuse it with his claim of perfect self-defense and that there was no evidence to show that his actions were legally unjustifiable. Low also objected to the extreme emotional distress manslaughter instruction, arguing that there was no factual basis for it. The district court overruled Low's objections and included both instructions.
¶16 The State argues that Low failed to preserve the claim he urges on appeal with respect to the inclusion of the manslaughter instructions. Low argues on appeal that the manslaughter instructions were erroneously given because extreme emotional distress and imperfect self-defense are affirmative defenses toand not lesser included offenses ofmurder. The State contends that this objection is different from the objections he raised in the district court. We agree. ¶17 `Generally speaking, a timely and specific objection must be made [at trial] in order to preserve an issue for appeal.' State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ¶ 14, 128 P.3d 1171 (quoting State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ¶ 45, 114 P.3d 551) (emphasis added) (alteration in original). Utah courts require specific objections in order to bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where there is no clear or specific objection and the specific ground for objection is not clear from the context[,] the theory cannot be raised on appeal. State v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 3, ¶ 13, 129 P.3d 282 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, if a party makes an objection at trial based on one ground, this objection does not preserve for appeal any alternative grounds for objection. See, e.g., State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986); State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79, ¶¶ 9-13, 67 P.3d 1005. ¶18 In this case, Low objected to the imperfect self-defense manslaughter instruction in the district court, claiming that the jury would confuse it with his claim of perfect self-defense and that there was no evidence to show that his actions were legally unjustifiable. Low objected to the extreme emotional distress manslaughter instruction on the ground that there was no factual basis for it. However, Low never objected to the manslaughter instructions for the reason that he now urges as grounds for reversal: that these two forms of manslaughter are affirmative defenses and that [c]ourts have no authority to force affirmative defenses upon criminal defendants. Because Low did not raise this specific objection before the district court, he failed to preserve it for appeal.
¶19 When a party fails to preserve an issue for appeal, we will address the issue only if (1) the appellant establishes that the district court committed plain error, (2) exceptional circumstances exist, or (3) in some situations, if the appellant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve the issue. State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, ¶ 18, 122 P.3d 566; State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, ¶ 21 n. 2, 61 P.3d 1062. Because Low failed to preserve his claim regarding the manslaughter instructions in the district court, we can review it only for plain error, exceptional circumstances, or ineffective assistance. ¶20 As discussed below, we hold that it was plain error for the district court to instruct the jury on extreme emotional distress manslaughter. To prevail under plain error review, a defendant must demonstrate that `[1] an error exists; [2] the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and [3] the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome.' State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, ¶ 17, 174 P.3d 628 (quoting State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ¶ 26, 128 P.3d 1179). We discuss each of these elements in turn.
¶21 We begin our plain error analysis by considering whether the district court erred when it instructed the jury on extreme emotional distress manslaughter and imperfect self-defense manslaughter. To make this determination, we look to the Utah Criminal Code and conclude that extreme emotional distress and imperfect self-defense are affirmative defenses to murder, rather than lesser included offenses of murder. We then consider whether a court may instruct the jury regarding an affirmative defense over the objection of a criminal defendant. We then apply these rules to Low's case and determine that although the district court properly instructed the jury on imperfect self-defense manslaughter, it improperly instructed the jury on extreme emotional distress manslaughter.
¶22 Prior to 1999, extreme emotional distress manslaughter and imperfect self-defense manslaughter were listed in Utah's manslaughter statute as types of manslaughter. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1) (1995). [2] In 1999, extreme emotional distress and imperfect self-defense were removed from the manslaughter statute and inserted into the murder statute as affirmative defenses to murder. Id. § 76-5-203(3) (1999). The current version of the murder statute provides in part: It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of another: (i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse; or (ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances. Id. § 76-5-203(4)(a) (Supp. 2007) (emphasis added). Under the statute, the assertion of a successful affirmative defense of either extreme emotional distress or imperfect self-defense reduces murder to manslaughter or attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. Id. § 76-5-203(4)(d). The manslaughter statute now reads: Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor . . . commits a homicide which would be murder, but the offense is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-203(4). Id. § 76-5-205(1)(b) (2003). ¶23 Under our rules of statutory construction, we look first to the statute's plain language to determine its meaning. State v. Gallegos, 2007 UT 81, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 426 (internal quotation marks omitted). We presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning. State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, ¶ 16, 137 P.3d 726. ¶24 Under the plain language of Utah's murder and manslaughter statutes, extreme emotional distress manslaughter and imperfect self-defense manslaughter are affirmative defenses to murder. They are no longer lesser included offenses of murder. For this reason, we do not discuss whether the State was entitled to jury instructions for extreme emotional distress manslaughter and imperfect self-defense manslaughter based upon our prior case law regarding lesser included offenses. Rather, we are bound by the legislature's decision to categorize extreme emotional distress manslaughter and imperfect self-defense manslaughter as affirmative defenses to murder. We now address when a court may properly instruct the jury regarding such affirmative defenses.
¶25 When a criminal defendant requests a jury instruction regarding a particular affirmative defense, the court is obligated to give the instruction if evidence has been presentedeither by the prosecution or by the defendantthat provides any reasonable basis upon which a jury could conclude that the affirmative defense applies to the defendant. See State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah 1985) ([W]hen there is a basis in the evidence, whether the evidence is produced by the prosecution or by the defendant, which would provide some reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that a killing was done to protect the defendant from an imminent threat of death by another, an instruction on self-defense should be given the jury.); State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980) (stating that a party is entitled to have the jury instructed on the law applicable to its theory of the case if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it). ¶26 We have applied this rule with respect to the affirmative defenses of imperfect self-defense manslaughter and extreme emotional distress manslaughter. See State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ¶¶ 16, 23, 152 P.3d 315; State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ¶¶ 13, 14, 63 P.3d 94. For example, in Spillers, we held that a criminal defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense manslaughter because the evidence presented by the defendant could have been interpreted by the jury to establish imperfect self-defense. 2007 UT 13, ¶ 23. We also held that the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on extreme emotional distress manslaughter because a rational jury could, adopting Defendant's version of events, find that he was experiencing extreme emotional distress for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse when he shot [the victim]. Id. ¶ 16. This rule does not apply in this case, however, because Low, unlike the defendants in Spillers and Shumway, did not request that the jury be instructed on extreme emotional distress manslaughter and imperfect self-defense manslaughter. In fact, Low strongly opposed the manslaughter instructions. We must, therefore, determine when a court may include jury instructions regarding affirmative defenses over a defendant's objection. ¶27 A court may properly instruct the jury as to an affirmative defense, even if the defendant objects to the instruction, if the defendant has presented evidence supporting the affirmative defense at trial. The court has a duty to instruct the jury on the relevant law, and the court may, even over the defendant's objection, give any instruction that is in proper form, states the law correctly, and does not prejudice the defendant. State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986). If a defendant presents evidence of an affirmative defense, the defendant is not prejudiced when the jury is instructed regarding that defense. Thus, the court may give the affirmative defense instruction as long as it is in proper form and correctly states the law. ¶28 But when a defendant presents no evidence relating to an affirmative defense, a court may not instruct the jury on that affirmative defense. Indeed, when a criminal defendant expresses his intent to not assert an affirmative defense, the prosecution should not be allowed to present evidence of that defense and subsequently request a jury instruction regarding the defense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-504 (2003) (Evidence of an affirmative defense . . . shall be presented by the defendant.). To allow the prosecution to do so would effectively foist an affirmative defense upon the defendant. This would be improper because, as a general rule, a defendant cannot be forced to assert an affirmative defense. See State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ¶ 84, 63 P.3d 731 (holding that a pro se defendant could not be forced to present mitigating evidence because the court has no means to compel a defendant to put on an affirmative defense (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Tremblay v. Overholser, 199 F. Supp. 569, 570 (D.D.C. 1961) (stating the court's opinion that it is a deprivation of a constitutional right to force any defense on a defendant in a criminal case or to compel any defendant in a criminal case to present a particular defense which he does not desire to advance); State v. Jones, 664 P.2d 1216, 1220 (Wash. 1983) (stating that courts do not impose affirmative defenses, such as a valid alibi or legitimate self-defense, on an unwilling defendant). ¶29 In summary, a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction regarding an affirmative defense whenever there is evidence providing a factual basis for the defense. The prosecution is entitled to a jury instruction regarding an affirmative defense if the defendant has presented evidence supporting that defense. But the prosecution is not entitled to an affirmative defense instruction if the defendant has proffered no evidence in support of that affirmative defense.
¶30 Having laid out the standards for when a court may properly instruct a jury regarding an affirmative defense over a defendant's objection, we now apply the standards to the facts of Low's case.
¶31 We first consider whether the district court properly included the imperfect self-defense jury instruction over Low's objection. We conclude that the imperfect self-defense jury instruction was proper. ¶32 As previously noted, the prosecution is entitled to a jury instruction regarding an affirmative defense if the defendant has presented evidence supporting that defense. And when a defendant presents evidence of perfect self-defense, he necessarily presents evidence of imperfect self-defense because for both perfect and imperfect self-defense, `the same basic facts [are] at issue.' Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ¶ 23 (quoting State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 95 (Utah 1982)) (alteration in original). Indeed, perfect self-defense and imperfect self-defense require the defendant to present the same evidence: that the defendant was justified in . . . using force against another . . . to the extent that he or she reasonably believe[d] that force [was] necessary to defend himself . . . against such other's imminent use of unlawful force. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1) (2003). ¶33 The difference between perfect self-defense and imperfect self-defense is the fact-finder's determination of whether the defendant's conduct was, in fact, legally justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances. Id. § 76-5-203(4)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2007). If the fact-finder determines that the defendant subjectively believed that his actions were necessary to defend himself and that a reasonable person would have considered the actions necessary, it is perfect self-defense. If, however, the fact-finder concludes that the defendant subjectively believed that his actions were necessary to defend himself, but that a reasonable person would not have considered the actions necessary, it is imperfect self-defense. Perfect self-defense requires not only that the killer subjectively believed that his actions were necessary for his safety but, objectively, that a reasonable [person] would so consider them. Imperfect self-defense, however, requires no more than a subjective honest belief on the part of the killer that his actions were necessary for his safety, even though, on an objective appraisal by a reasonable [person], they would not be found so. Burch v. State, 696 A.2d 443, 458 (Md. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original); see also State v. Gomaz, 414 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Wis. 1987) ([P]erfect self-defense and imperfect self-defense differ only in regard to the factual determination of `reasonableness'. . . . ). ¶34 In sum, when a defendant presents evidence of perfect self-defense, he necessarily presents evidence of imperfect self-defense, and the prosecution is entitled to a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense, even over the defendant's objection. Were it otherwise, a defendant could tactically raise the issue of self-defense so that a jury could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed murder, but could then prevent that same jury from convicting him of imperfect self-defense manslaughter simply by objecting to an imperfect self-defense instruction. We are unwilling to interpret the Utah Criminal Code in a manner that would give defendants such an unfair tactical advantage. ¶35 In this case, the district court properly instructed the jury on imperfect self-defense manslaughter because Low introduced evidence, including his own testimony, that he shot Hirschey in self-defense. Low testified that he fired the gun only after Hirschey charged him and that he was in fear for his life when he fired the gun. Because Low presented evidence of self-defense, we find that there was a reasonable basis for the district court to instruct the jury regarding imperfect self-defense.
¶36 We next consider whether the district court properly included the extreme emotional distress manslaughter instruction over Low's objection. We conclude that it was error for the court to include the instruction. ¶37 The State argues that the jury instruction was proper because there was evidence that defendant may have killed Hirschey while suffering extreme emotional distress. The State points to testimony from Low, McCall, and Touchette that Hirschey had teased, manhandled, and assaulted Low. This evidence, the State argues, raises the question of whether Low was suffering from extreme emotional distress when he shot Hirschey. We disagree. ¶38 Although there was evidence presented by both the prosecution and by Low that Hirschey had mistreated Low throughout the evening of the shooting, there was no evidence that Low was experiencing extreme emotional distress as a result of the mistreatment. Low never testified that he was angered or upset by the mistreatment. And the other witnesses testified that Hirschey's mistreatment did not cause Low to become angry or emotionally distressed. Touchette testified that Low took the mistreatment in stride and was not angry. McCall testified that Low just kind of shrugged it off and that, mere seconds before the shooting happened, Low did not appear mad at Hirschey. ¶39 By including the instruction over Low's objection, the district court foisted upon Low the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress, which Low did not wish to assert. Because Low did not introduce any evidence of extreme emotional distress, it was error for the district court to include a jury instruction for extreme emotional distress manslaughter. ¶40 We find support for our decision in the case of People v. Bradley, 669 N.E.2d 815 (N.Y. 1996). In Bradley, a defendant charged with second degree murder asserted the affirmative defense of not responsible by reason of a mental disease or defect. Id. at 816. The State asked the trial court to provide a first degree manslaughter instruction based on extreme emotional disturbance, and the court included the instruction over the defendant's objection. Id. The jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter. Id. The Court of Appeals of New York held that it was error for the trial court to include the manslaughter instruction because the defendant's position at trial was that he suffered from a progressive mental illness that prevented him from appreciating the moral and legal import of his actions, not that he suffered a temporary loss of control. Id. The appellate court concluded that the defendant's right to chart his own defense had been infringed when the trial court instructed the jury regarding the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance over the defendant's objection and reversed the conviction. Id. ¶41 In this case, Low's consistent position at trial was that he acted out of self-defense. Low did not present any evidence that his actions were due to a temporary loss of control caused by extreme emotional distress. It was therefore error for the district court to submit a jury instruction regarding extreme emotional distress, an affirmative defense that Low did not raise. This error satisfies the first prong of the plain error standard.
¶42 The second element a defendant must establish to prevail under plain error review is that `the error should have been obvious to the trial court.' Ross, 2007 UT 89, ¶ 17 (quoting Lee, 2006 UT 5, ¶ 26). An error is obvious when the law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made. State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ¶ 16, 95 P.3d 276. An error may be obvious if a review of the plain language of the relevant statute reveals the error. See State v. Portillo, 914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). ¶43 Under the plain language of Utah Code section 76-5-203(4)(a), extreme emotional distress manslaughter and imperfect self-defense manslaughter are affirmative defenses to murder. Because extreme emotional distress is clearly listed as an affirmative defense to murder, it was obvious error for the district court to force the affirmative defense on Low by including the extreme emotional distress manslaughter instruction over Low's objection. This satisfies the second prong of the plain error standard.
¶44 The final element a defendant must demonstrate to establish plain error is that the error was harmful. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ¶ 22. An error is harmful if it is of such a magnitude that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This harmfulness test is equivalent to the prejudice test applied in assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. ¶45 The State argues that even if the manslaughter jury instructions were improper, there was no harm because the jury necessarily found Low guilty of murder and then reduced the murder charge to manslaughter based on the affirmative defenses. The State therefore argues that Low would necessarily have been convicted of murder had the jury not been instructed on manslaughter. We disagree. ¶46 A necessary element of a murder conviction is the absence of affirmative defenses. It is fundamental that the State carries the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of an offense, including the absence of an affirmative defense once the defense is put into issue. State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-502 (2003) (requiring the prosecution to negate an affirmative defense by proof if the defendant has presented evidence of the defense). The murder instruction in this case was erroneous because it lacked the necessary element that the State show the absence of the affirmative defenses of extreme emotional distress and imperfect self-defense. Because the absence of affirmative defenses is an element of murder, we are unpersuaded by the State's argument. ¶47 Moreover, even if the murder instruction had not been erroneous, the plain language of the jury instructions did not require the jury to find all the elements of murder before it could consider whether to reduce the murder conviction to manslaughter, as the State contends. Rather, there was a jury instruction listing the elements of first degree murder and a separate jury instruction stating that the jury may also consider whether the defendant has committed the offense of Manslaughter. Because the jury was not instructed to first find all of the elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt and thenand only thendetermine whether to reduce the murder conviction to a manslaughter conviction, the State's harmlessness argument fails. ¶48 The district court's error was harmful because we do not know whether the jury convicted Low for manslaughter based on the extreme emotional distress instruction or on the imperfect self-defense instruction. If the jury convicted Low of imperfect self-defense manslaughter, there would be no harm in light of our holding that the district court properly instructed the jury on imperfect self-defense. If, however, the jury convicted Low of extreme emotional distress manslaughter, Low's conviction is based upon an erroneous instruction, and the giving of that instruction was obviously harmful. The difficulty is that the verdict form in this case contains insufficient information for us to determine whether the jury convicted Low of imperfect self-defense manslaughter or extreme emotional distress manslaughter. ¶49 The verdict form instructed the jury to determine whether Low was (1) guilty of first degree murder, (2) guilty of manslaughter, or (3) not guilty. In the event that the jury found Low guilty of manslaughter, the verdict form did not require the jury to specify whether it was convicting Low for imperfect self-defense manslaughter or extreme emotional distress manslaughter. There is a reasonable possibility that the jury convicted Low of extreme emotional distress manslaughter. Had the district court not erroneously instructed the jury on this form of manslaughter, there is a reasonable likelihood that Low may not have been convicted at all. It is this reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome that makes the error harmful, Dean, 2004 UT 63, ¶ 22, and satisfies the third prong of the plain error standard. ¶50 In summary, we conclude that the district court erred by including an extreme emotional distress manslaughter instruction over Low's objection, that the error was obvious based on the plain language of the Utah Criminal Code, and that the error was harmful. Because the district court committed plain error, we reverse Low's conviction.