Opinion ID: 1358585
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Heading: Protection Afforded by the First Amendment

Text: The First Amendment of the United States Constitution is binding upon the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925). See Colo.Const. Art. II, Sect. 10. Moreover, the First Amendment and Article II, Section 10 of the Colorado Constitution afford protection to all forms of communications, including moving picture films, which attempt to convey a thought or message to another person. In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Conduct, 132 Colo. 591, 296 P.2d 465 (1956); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 12 L. Ed.2d 793 (1964); Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777, 96 L.Ed. 1098 (1952). Obscene material does not enjoy the protection afforded by the First Amendment. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). However, the mere allegation that a film contains obscene material is not sufficient to remove the protection afforded by the First Amendment, so as to justify seizure of the film. The difficult problem of defining and proscribing obscenity within First Amendment constitutional boundaries obviously requires procedural safeguards to maintain and protect freedom of speech and the press without the prior restraint or the chilling effect of oppressive governmental regulation. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L. Ed.2d 919 (1952); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940); Gitlow v. New York, supra . As a result, allegedly obscene materials may not be subjected to search and seizure by government authorities until an adversary hearing has been held and the materials have been adjudged to be obscene. People v. Harvey, 176 Colo. 447, 491 P.2d 563 (1971); Marcus v. Search Warrant, supra . See A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 84 S.Ct. 1723, 12 L.Ed.2d 809 (1964); Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 83 S.Ct. 631, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1965); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 77 S.Ct. 1325, 1 L.Ed.2d 1469 (1957); Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969); Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1969); Metzger v. Pearcy, 393 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1968). See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 283, 38 L.Ed.2d 128 (1973); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L. Ed.2d 649 (1965). The question of obscenity in the first instance is one of law, not one of facts. Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra . As a result, the purpose of the adversary hearing is to decide the obscenity question based upon the tests set forth in the statute before any materials are seized. 1969 Perm.Supp. C.R.S.1963, 40-28-1. If the court determines, after an adversary hearing, that the materials are obscene, the obscenity issue is for the trier of the fact. Marcus v. Search Warrant, supra . If the court concludes that the materials are not obscene as a matter of law, the charges must be dismissed. In Colorado, our legislature has spoken and has declared that it is unlawful to promote or possess with intent to promote obscene material or obscene performances. 1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40-28-2. A procedure for obtaining purported obscene material for the purpose of an adversary hearing was provided to ensure that every right guaranteed by both the United States Constitution and the Colorado Constitution would be protected. 1969 Perm.Supp., C. R.S.1963, 40-28-6. See also Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, supra . In our view, the use of a subpoena duces tecum to obtain the materials for the purpose of an adversary hearing affords an accused the right to have the obscenity issue determined in limine before the film is seized. The procedure which was followed permits the use of a film until an adversary hearing is held and guarantees an immediate determination of the obscenity issue. It is important to note that the films which were subject to the subpoena duces tecum in this case were not seized and did not have to be produced until the time that the adversary hearing was set. Some means had to be devised to obtain and preserve the moving picture films for the purpose of conducting an adversary hearing to determine whether the films were obscene as a matter of law. Here, the contents of the films were described in such factual detail in the affidavit which buttressed the motion for the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum that the tests for the issuance of a search warrant were met. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 93 S.Ct. 2789, 37 L.Ed.2d 745 (1973); Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636, 88 S.Ct. 2103, 20 L. Ed.2d 1313 (1968). In this case, the procedures were designed to meet the requirements we laid down in People v. Harvey, 176 Colo. 447, 491 P.2d 563 (1971). The use of the subpoena duces tecum allowed the films to be used and displayed by Houston until the adversary hearing could be held. If the films were not obscene as a matter of law, Houston would have had the films returned to him. If the films were obscene, the films would be seized. In our view, the procedure followed complied with the mandate cast upon us by Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, supra , and the later refinements which the Supreme Court has made. Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, supra ; Heller v. New York, supra .