Opinion ID: 1355753
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Disadvantages for the news media

Text: It has become apparent in the years since New York Times, supra, 376 U.S. 254, was decided that a malice standard of fault carries significant burdens as well as benefits for the news media. (34) Under that standard, liability requires proof of knowing falsehood or a subjective awareness of probable falsity. A plaintiff is therefore allowed wide ranging access to discovery regarding the editorial process. ( Herbert v. Lando (1979) 441 U.S. 153 [60 L.Ed.2d 115, 99 S.Ct. 1635].) [M]any lawyers acknowledge that, by setting a standard of `actual malice,' and forcing plaintiffs to focus on the inner workings of the editorial process, it [ New York Times ] also made libel cases longer and more costly. (Stille, supra, National L.J. (Oct. 24, 1988) p. 32, col. 4 to p. 33, col. 1.) One comprehensive study of libel law found that [T]he frequency of damage awards  much less large ones  is exceedingly rare.... The largest cost to the media is the insurance premium, and these seem largely related to the cost of defending in litigation, rather than the cost of damage awards. (Bezanson, supra, p. 301, fn. 130, italics added; Franklin, supra, 18 U.S.F.L.Rev. p. 19.) The Libel Reform Project recently concluded, Ironically, the costs [of libel litigation] are increased by special rules designed to protect the defendants and preserve freedom of the press.... (Libel Reform Project, supra, p. 9.) In short, it has become widely recognized that the expense of defamation suits the news media seek to avoid appears to be in large measure the result of the very privilege they insisted they must have to avoid expensive litigation. There may be another, more subtle effect of a constitutional-malice standard that works against the news media. Some observers have suggested that the news media, given the protections of New York Times, supra, 376 U.S. 254, and its progeny, have been reluctant to correct factual error. (Bezanson, supra, pp. 26-28; Franklin, supra, 18 U.S.F.L.Rev. p. 32.) [38] In such cases, the defamation victims, faced with a refusal to correct the record, may have little choice but to litigate in order to clear their reputations. The constitutional protections themselves have been blamed for spawning conduct that leads to the expensive litigation the news media seek to avoid. [39] Similarly, it appears that the number of defamation actions against media defendants has increased since the high court's development of constitutional protection for falsehoods. As another state supreme court has noted, this increase may reflect the fact that litigants and juries often send warning signals regarding a need to redress grievances or injuries not otherwise tended to in society. ( Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, supra, 398 N.W.2d 245, 265, fn. 27.) Several news media observers have also surmised that a popular perception of journalistic arrogance may be the reason why juries often rule against libel defendants. (Franklin, supra, 18 U.S.F.L.Rev. at p. 9.) Excessive protection for defamation may result in a popular antipathy toward the press that manifests itself in lawsuits and jury verdicts. [40] The burdens that the New York Times malice standard has apparently imposed on defendants as well as plaintiffs weigh against judicially expanding section 47(3) to require private-figure plaintiffs to show malice.