Opinion ID: 765614
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sanzi's Seizure of the Counterfeit Bills

Text: 26 Jones further contends that Sanzi's warrantless seizure of the counterfeit bills that Jones removed from his pocket violated the Fourth Amendment. He argues that Sanzi already had conducted a pat-down search for weapons pursuant to Terry, which allows a frisk for weapons in the interest of the officer's safety, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-31, 88 S. Ct. at 1881-85. Jones reasons that upon completion of the pat-down search, which revealed no object that Sanzi could have determined was a potential threat to his safety, Sanzi could not seize any items from Jones unless he first obtained a warrant. The government does not contend, however, that Sanzi lawfully seized the money pursuant to a Terry frisk for weapons; it argues, rather, that the seizure simply was a reasonable step in the lawful Terry investigation that the troopers conducted to determine whether their suspicions were justified. 27 As we already have concluded, see supra Part II.C., Sanzi's questions to Jones were an appropriate part of the investigative stop. In response to Sanzi's inquiry regarding how Jones paid for his purchases at the convenience store, Jones removed several bills from his pocket and quickly replaced them. The question that Jones's Fourth Amendment challenge presents, therefore, is a narrow one: whether, having briefly seen bills that Jones implicitly claimed related to the purchase of a bottle of water at the convenience store, Sanzi violated the Fourth Amendment by asking Jones to remove the bills from his pocket again and by seizing the money when Jones complied. We conclude that these events did not violate Jones's constitutional rights. 28 The Supreme Court has recognized a general rule that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2306, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990), while simultaneously acknowledging a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to this rule, id. at 133 n.4, 110 S. Ct. at 2306 n.4 (internal quotation omitted). See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735-36, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1540, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983) (plurality opinion) (collecting cases recognizing common-sense exceptions to the warrant requirement, including hot pursuit, exigent circumstances, automobile searches, searches incident to arrest, border searches, and consent). Among these exceptions is the plain view doctrine, the three elements of which the Supreme Court has discussed in a number of cases involving different factual scenarios. We address each of these elements and its application to this case in turn. 29 First, the officer must lawfully have reached the position from which he plainly could view the seized object. See, e.g., Horton, 496 U.S. at 136, 110 S. Ct. at 2308 (an essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure of incriminating evidence [is] that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1153, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1987) (initial warrantless intrusion must be lawful) (citation omitted); Brown, 460 U.S. at 739, 103 S. Ct. at 1542 (plurality opinion) (officers may seize propertywithout a warrant if they perceive it while engaged in a lawful activity). Sanzi's actions unquestionably satisfy this element of the plain view doctrine because, as we already have discussed, reasonable suspicion justified the troopers' decision to stop the car, and Sanzi did not violate the law by directing Jones to exit the vehicle or by questioning him. All of these actions constituted appropriate investigative steps in a lawful Terry stop, a context in which the Supreme Court has recognized that officers may lawfully seize contraband they observe despite the absence of a warrant. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 374, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993) (Police officers, at least under certain circumstances, may seize contraband detected during the lawful execution of a Terry search.); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3481, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983). 30 Second, the seizure must satisfy the probable cause standard see Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 66, 113 S. Ct. 538, 546, 121 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1992); Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326, 107 S. Ct. at 1153, 8 and in the context of a Terry stop, the officer must be acting within the lawful bounds marked by Terry at the time he gained probable cause, Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 377, 113 S. Ct. at 2138. In Brown, the Court expounded upon the requirements of probable cause: 31 Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. 32 460 U.S. at 742, 103 S. Ct. at 1543. In that case, a police officer who had stopped a vehicle at a random license checkpoint saw the driver drop a knotted balloon onto the floor as the officer approached the car. When the driver opened the glove box to look for his license, the officer changed his position to get a better view of the compartment and saw that it contained loose white powder, small plastic vials, and a bag of balloons. The Court held that the officer, who through experience with drug cases knew that offenders frequently used balloons of this type as drug containers, lawfully seized the balloon that the driver had dropped onto the floor of the vehicle. 33 Applying the standard described above to the facts of the case before us, we conclude that at the time Sanzi first saw the bills that Jones removed from his pocket, he had probable cause to believe that they were either contraband or evidence of the counterfeiting crime. At this point, Sanzi knew that the Lexus's occupants, clothing, and contents, and to some extent the car itself, bore a remarkable resemblance to the store clerk's description of the suspects. Calculating for time and distance, Jones's proximity to the convenience store increased the likelihood that he was involved in the crime. Jones's responses to Sanzi's questions about his travels, stops, and recent purchases corroborated Sanzi's growing suspicion, as did Jones's replacement of the bills in his pocket only a brief moment after removing them. On the basis of all of this information, Sanzi had probable cause to believe either that the bills Jones had shown him were counterfeit or that the money was evidence of the crime, 9 thereby satisfyingthe second element of the plain view doctrine. 34 Finally, the plain view exception to the warrant requirement necessitates that the officer have a lawful right of access to the object itself. Horton, 496 U.S. at 138, 110 S. Ct. at 2308. 10 The Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized that officers have a right of access to contraband that they discover while acting within the bounds of a lawful Terry investigation. See, e.g., Long, 463 U.S. at 1050, 103 S. Ct. at 3481 (citing plain view doctrine cases in support of proposition that if, while conducting a legitimate Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the officer should, as here, discover contraband other than weapons, he clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such circumstances.); Brown, 460 U.S. at 738 & n.4, 103 S. Ct. at 1541 & n.4 (noting that police have legal access to property that they come across . . . while acting pursuant to some exception to the Warrant Clause and citing Terry as one example). In the present case, Sanzi acted properly when he asked Jones to remove the bills from his pocket again after Jones had replaced them. Pursuant to this lawful Terry investigation, therefore, Sanzi had legal access to the bills and justifiably seized them. 35 Because Sanzi's seizure of the counterfeit bills satisfied all three elements of the plain view doctrine, it did not violate the Fourth Amendment despite the absence of a warrant. Furthermore, as we have found that the district court did not err in finding the troopers' testimony credible or in ruling that none of their actions violated Jones's constitutional rights, we conclude that the court properly denied Jones's motion to suppress. 36 AFFIRMED.