Opinion ID: 2794234
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: On appeal to this Court, Floyd argues that the trial court erred by allowing Ball to raise the affirmative defense of adverse possession at trial without having previously pled this defense. In response, Ball argues that our jurisprudence does not require him to plead adverse possession as an affirmative defense to a boundary dispute. Ball relies on our holding in Bradshaw where we stated that a defendant who raises a general defense to an ejectment action does not need to raise adverse possession as an affirmative defense. 129 Va. at 34, 105 S.E. at 560. In making this argument, Ball points out that this Court has previously recognized that actions to establish boundary lines and ejectment actions “are governed by the same legal principles.” Bulifant v. Slosjarik, 221 Va. 983, 986, 277 S.E.2d 151, 152 (1981). 2 During the pendency of the appeal, Mrs. Howard passed away. By order dated February 9, 2015, Floyd, individually and in his capacity as executor of Mrs. Howard’s estate, was substituted as the appellant in this case. 4 Ball’s argument must necessarily fail, however, because we have since abolished the use of such general defenses. See Rule 3:8(a) (“A general denial of the entire complaint or plea of the general issue shall not be permitted”). Indeed, this Court has repeatedly admonished that, just as a plaintiff must give a defendant notice of its specific claims, a defendant must give a plaintiff notice of its specific defenses. It has long been required that a party raise specific defenses (just as a plaintiff must give notice of claims) so that surprise and prejudice at trial from late revelation of unanticipated legal theories is avoided. This has generally led to a requirement that affirmative defenses must be pled in order to be relied upon at trial. Monahan v. Obici Med. Mgmt. Servs., 271 Va. 621, 632, 628 S.E.2d 330, 336 (2006) (citations omitted). Therefore, to the extent Bradshaw can be interpreted to allow a party to rely on adverse possession as an affirmative defense without expressly pleading it in an ejectment action or an action to establish boundary lines, it is overruled. That said, however, this Court has recognized certain exceptions to the general requirement that a party must plead affirmative defenses. These exceptions include situations “where the issue addressed by an affirmative defense was not disclosed in a plaintiff’s pleading, and only became apparent as the evidence was being received at trial;” where the affirmative 5 defense is “addressed by statute,” either expressly requiring that a particular defense be pled or obviating the need to do so; or where the affirmative defense does not constitute “an absolute bar to the plaintiff’s claim.” Monahan, 271 Va. at 632-33, 628 S.E.2d at 336-37. Here, Ball failed to plead the affirmative defense of adverse possession. In his singular responsive pleading, Ball did not mention or indicate that he intended to rely on adverse possession to dispute Floyd’s claim; rather, he disagreed with the location of the property boundary based on his interpretation of a conflicting deed. Further, none of the recognized exceptions apply to the present case. There was no evidence received at trial that raised an issue not addressed by Floyd’s complaint, nor is there a statute that addresses adverse possession as a defense to a suit to establish boundary lines. Further, proving that he adversely possessed the property would establish that Ball owned the disputed property and render the present action moot, thereby constituting an absolute bar to Floyd’s claim. 3 Accordingly, the trial court erred in allowing 3 The trial court’s final order awarding de facto ownership of the disputed property to Ball was particularly problematic in the present case, because the trial court was never asked to decide ownership of the disputed property. This Court has repeatedly admonished that “a court is not permitted to enter a decree or judgment order based on facts not alleged or on a right not pleaded and claimed.” Jenkins v. Bay House Assocs., L.P., 266 Va. 39, 43, 581 S.E.2d 510, 512 (2003). Indeed, in an 6 Ball to rely on the affirmative defense of adverse possession without having first raised the defense in a responsive pleading. 4