Opinion ID: 2360366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Traficking in Cocaine Over 100 grams

Text: 16 Del. C. § 4753A(a)(2) defines trafficking in cocaine: Any person who, on any single occasion, knowingly sells, manufactures, delivers or brings into this State, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, 10 grams or more of cocaine or of any mixture containing cocaine, as described in § 4716(b)(4) of this title, is guilty of a class B felony, which felony shall be known as trafficking in cocaine. If the quantity involved . . . [i]s 100 grams or more, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 8 years and to pay a fine of $ 400,000. The State contends that a rational jury could have found Jan guilty of Trafficking in Cocaine over 100 grams because she actually possessed 4.63 grams of pink cocaine in her right sock and constructively possessed the additional 177 grams [5] of cocaine found in the master bedroom walk-in closet. Jan does not dispute that she actually possessed the 4.63 grams of pink crack cocaine found in her sock. She contends, however, that no rational jury could have found that she constructively possessed the 177 grams of white powdered cocaine found in the walk-in closet based on the circumstantial evidence admitted at trial. The required showing to establish constructive possession is well settled: [T]o establish constructive possession, the State must present evidence that the defendant: (1) knew the location of the drugs; (2) had the ability to exercise dominion and control over the drugs; and (3) intended to guide the destiny of the drugs. . . . Evidence of a defendant's constructive possession may be proven exclusively through circumstantial evidence since this Court no longer distinguishes between direct and circumstantial evidence in a conviction context. [6] Here, no rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Jan exercised dominion and control over, or intended to guide the destiny of, the white powdered cocaine found in the walk-in closet. Jan was only a temporary guest at, not a resident of, her son's home. She had stayed there for several weeks and left all of her belongings on the master bedroom floor. The chief investigating officer's testimony, moreover, is consistent with only one conclusionthat Jan never had dominion and control over the walk-in closet. The CIO testified that the entire master bedroom, including the smaller closet for lack of a better term was a mess. He also stated, however, that the walk-in closet was orderly. This testimony leads to the conclusion that after Jan came to her son's apartment to recover from surgery, she used only the master bedroom and the small closet. While the facts establish Jan's use of the master bedroom, the evidence does not establish that she exercised dominion and control over the walk-in closet or its contents. Not a single item found in the walk-in closet could be identified as hers, nor did any physical evidence establish that she had ever entered that closet. This finding is consistent with our ruling in Holden v. State [7] that mere proximity to, or awareness of drugs is not sufficient to establish constructive possession. In Holden, the police stopped a vehicle owned and operated by Holden based on an informant's tip. [8] Defendant Brown was the front passenger, and Defendant Griffith was one of two back seat passengers. [9] During a search of the vehicle, the police found on the back seat a paper bag in which there was a container of Chinese food. Buried in the food was a plastic bag containing `uncut' heroin weighing 25 1/2 grams . . . [10] A search of Holden revealed a large amount of cash. [11] The police also found several small scales, generally used for weighing drugs, in Holden's seat. [12] Holden, Griffith, and Brown all testified that they were in New York for the day for amusement and that none used heroin nor knew anything about the heroin in the food. [13] A jury found Griffith guilty of possession of heroin and found Holden and Brown guilty of possession with intent to sell heroin. [14] They appealed, claiming that the State presented insufficient evidence to establish that they possessed the heroin. [15] We reversed Griffith's and Brown's convictions and stated: The State's evidence fails to meet that burden of proof in the cases against Brown and Griffin. The evidence shows only that Brown and Griffin were passengers in the automobile sitting close to the concealed drugs. Such evidence, without more, is insufficient to establish the possession prohibited by the Law. While it may be inferred from the evidence that Brown and Griffin were aware of the presence of the drug in the car, there is nothing to show that they had any dominion, control, and authority over the drug or the automobile in which it was found. The circumstances may have created a strong suspicion that Brown and Griffin were more than passengers; but mere suspicion, however strong, is insufficient for criminal conviction. [16] We also found that the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Holden of possession with intent to sell heroin and stated: Holden was the owner and operator of the automobile in which the drugs were found. The law places a heavier burden upon the custodian of the automobile than upon a mere passenger in this respect. This Court has held that the custodian of an automobile is presumed, by reason of his status as custodian, to have dominion and control of contraband found in the automobile; and that if, under the totality of the circumstances, such dominion and control may be found to be a conscious dominion and control, the evidence is sufficient to warrant the conclusion of possession as to the custodian. [T]he evidence adduced by the State was sufficient to support the conviction of Holden. The totality of the circumstances his car, his trip to New York, the unexplained large sum of money on his person, the unexplained drug scales in his seatwere sufficient to justify the finding of conscious dominion and control and resultant possession. All of this, plus the evidence of the large quantity of drugs found in the possession of a nonuser, was sufficient evidence to justify the jury's verdict of guilt of possession with intent to sell. [17] Attempting to distinguish Holden, the State suggests that here sufficient circumstantial evidence established more than Jan's mere proximity to the drugs. The State points to the following evidence as sufficient circumstantial proof to allow a rational jury to conclude that Jan exercised actual dominion and control over the cocaine in the walk-in closet and that she intended to guide the destiny of the white powdered cocaine: (i) Jan was standing in front of the walk-in closet when the police executed the search warrant; (ii) there was cocaine residue on a dresser in the master bedroom; (iii) Jan had a spoon and a scouring pad in her bag in the master bedroom and a homemade crack pipe in the small closet in the master bedroom; (iv) there was a pot with white untested residue in James's kitchen sink; (v) there was a digital scale in a food box in James's kitchen; (vi) Jan provided a false name to the police; and, (vii) Jan had individually packaged pink crack cocaine (different from the white powdered cocaine in the closet) in her sock. We disagree. Inferences from circumstantial evidence are not limitless. The cocaine residue on the dresser, the spoon and scouring pad, and the homemade crack pipe in the master bedroom she temporarily occupied, are all consistent with personal drug use rather than drug trafficking. That evidence certainly supports the probability that Jan used crack cocaine. But, no rational jury could use that evidence to conclude that she exercised dominion and control over, and intended to guide the destiny of, the 177 grams of white powdered cocaine found in the walk-in closet. A police officer's testimony that such a large quantity of cocaine was consistent with drug sales, and the presence of a digital scale in James's food box and a pot in James's sink with untested white residue does nothing more than establish that Jan may have seen, or had access to, paraphernalia that James used in his ongoing drug operation. That Jan had eight individual bags of pink crack cocaine in her sock and that she was found standing in the bedroom where she slept in front of that bedroom's walk-in closet, does not establish that she had dominion and control over the contents of that walk-in closet. The State argues that a rational jury could have drawn a connection between the white powdered cocaine in the walk-in closet and the pink crack cocaine found in Jan's right sock, and then inferred from that relationship that Jan exercised dominion and control over, and intended to guide the destiny of, the white powdered cocaine that police found in the walk-in closet. We cannot agree that a rational jury could fairly infer any logical connection between the 4.63 grams of pink crack cocaine found in Jan's sock [18] and the 177 grams of white powdered cocaine found in the walk-in closet. In suggesting that a rational juror could infer that Jan recently took 4.63 grams of cocaine from the closet, cooked and dyed it in the pan found in her son's kitchen sink and transformed it into pink crack cocaine as a part of a larger drug trafficking operation, the State asks too much. From that inference the State then proceeds to suggest that a juror could fairly conclude that Jan had access to, knowledge of, and dominion and control over and an intent to, guide the destiny of the contents of the walk-in closet. Although a police officer testified that drug sellers sometimes cook and then dye drugs with food coloring, the police found no food coloring in the house and no traces of food coloring in or on the pot during their exhaustive search of James's home. In fact, all that the police found was white `untested' residue in the pot. Thus, no rational jury could fairly infer a connection between the white powered cocaine in the walk-in closet, her son's pot with unidentified white residue, and the pink crack cocaine in Jan's sock, as a basis to establish that Jan either constructively possessed the white powdered cocaine in the walk-in closet or engaged in a conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. The State also claims that the jury could have reasonably concluded that Jan exercised dominion and control over the drugs in the walk-in closet because she was standing in front of that closet when the police arrived and because that by giving a false name she demonstrated consciousness of guilt. Only proximity to the 177 grams of white powdered cocaine can be established from Jan's presence in front of the walk-in closet. The fact that she gave a false name demonstrates no more than Jan's consciousness of guilt of possessing the pink crack cocaine in her sock. Viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, Jan's use of a false name and her proximity to the walk-in closet could not lead a rational jury to conclude at all, much less beyond a reasonable doubt, that she exercised dominion and control over and intended to guide the destiny of white powdered cocaine found in a walk-in closet that belonged to James and Russell and that neither contained any of Jan's belongings nor revealed any evidence she had ever entered it. The master bedroom and the small closet therein (all places where Jan did exercise control) were a mess. The walk-in closet, however, was neatly organized. The circumstances may have created a strong suspicion that Jan knew the contents of and that she had access to the walk-in closet; but mere suspicion, however strong, is insufficient for a criminal conviction. [19] Even circumstantial evidence must give rise to inferences that raise more than mere suspicion. In reaching our conclusion we have reviewed our earlier drug cases involving challenges to the sufficiency of evidence for constructive possession. After we compared the evidence of constructive possession presented in these earlier cases where we found sufficient evidence to find that a defendant constructively possessed drugs beyond a reasonable doubt to the evidence presented in this case, we conclude the State's case against Jan for trafficking in cocaine is exceptionally thin. [20] In sum, no juror could reasonably find that Jan exercised dominion and control over and intended to control the destiny of the large quantity of white powdered cocaine found in the walk-in closet. [21] The circumstantial evidence presented might have enabled a rational jury to conclude that it was more likely than not that Jan knew there was cocaine in the walk-in closet [22] but no rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that she exercised dominion and control over it. Accordingly, we conclude that Jan's conviction for Trafficking in Cocaine over 100 grams must be vacated.