Opinion ID: 1134905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: admissibility of evidence under transaction with deceased person statutete

Text: Under RCW 5.60.030, [52] the transaction with deceased person statute, sometimes referred to as the dead man's statute, [53] as a party in interest, [54] Petitioner Frances A. Himes is precluded from testifying on her own behalf about any transactions [55] or conversations with Victor P. Himes, the deceased. In vacating the dissolution decree for fraud, the trial court considered the following evidence offered by Petitioner Frances A. Himes, finding the evidence was not precluded by the statute: a. Wife # 1 has had the same permanent address and residence for 21 years. b. Wife # 1 remained a medical dependent with the Navy until 1994, and the Navy knew her address. c. Husband's sister, who has been Wife # 1's neighbor for 23 years, was not contacted by Husband in an attempt to locate Wife # 1. d. Husband and Wife # 1's daughter, who was in contact with both parents, was never asked by Husband about Wife # 1's whereabouts. e. Wife # 1's residence address is the same address Husband put in his Navy transfer request in 1973. Respondent argues that the only admissible evidence offered by Petitioner is Victor P. Himes' transfer request to the Navy which, standing alone, has no probative value and is irrelevant. Respondent asserts that all other evidence offered by Petitioner is prohibited by RCW 5.60.030, the transaction with deceased person statute, because if Victor P. Himes were living he could contradict the evidence. [56] Respondent contends the purpose of the statute is to prevent interested parties from giving self-serving testimony regarding conversations or transactions with a decedent. [57] Citing Hampton v. Gilleland, [58] Respondent asserts that the statute precludes the third-party declarations of Ms. Robyn E. Himes and Ms. Keitha Hetrick. According to Respondent, this Court determined that the transaction with deceased persons statute precludes testimonial evidence offered by a party in interest even though the person testifying is merely a witness and not an interested party. In Hampton, the father deeded land to his seven children. Upon his death, the children filed a partition action. One daughter resisted the partition, asserting that the father promised her all the land in return for caring and providing for him. She called as a witness her brother, who was one of the grantees and therefore an adverse party. The trial court excluded his testimony under RCW 5.60.030 and this Court upheld the decision, ruling that if the evidence offered describes transactions with, or relates statements made by, the deceased grantor to the witness, or in the latters' presence, such evidence was properly excluded provided it was offered by one whose interest or claims were adverse to the decedent, or, we should add, to persons claiming under the decedent's deed. [59] Petitioner distinguishes Hampton because the witness was a party in interest. She argues that RCW 5.60.030 precludes only the testimony of parties in interest about a transaction with decedent and therefore the trial court properly admitted the declarations of Ms. Robyn E. Himes and Ms. Keitha Hetrick, third parties who are not parties in interest, citing Tegland, 5A Washington Practice, Evidence, § 213: [60] ... [RCW 5.60.030] bars testimony by a party in interest or to the record about a transaction with the deceased ....the courts ... have held that the statute bars only the testimony of an interested party. In general, a witness is considered an interested party (1) if the witness stands to either gain or lose as a direct result of the judgment, or (2) if the record may be used as evidence against the witness in some other action. The witness will be considered interested only if a witness's interest is present, certain, and vested. An interest that is uncertain, remote or contingent is insufficient to bar the witness's testimony. The trial court properly determined the transaction with deceased person statute does not preclude the declarations of Ms. Robyn E. Himes and Ms. Keitha Hetrick. [61] The record supports the trial court's finding that Petitioner Frances A. Himes had the same address for 21 years, the address which Victor P. Himes noted on his Navy transfer request in 1973, and Frances A. Himes remained a Navy dependent until 1994 when the Navy contacted her at that address. There was sufficient evidence upon which the trial court could conclude that Victor P. Himes fraudulently obtained the 1987 default dissolution decree by filing a false affidavit of service.