Opinion ID: 1349791
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Threshold Showing of Prejudice

Text: Regarding the initial threshold showing required of the defendant, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a seminal opinion by Judge Henry Friendly, stated that [t]he touchstone of decision ... is thus not the mere fact of infiltration of some molecules of extra-record matter, with the supposed consequences that the infiltrator becomes a witness and the confrontation clause automatically applies, but the nature of what has been infiltrated and the probability of prejudice. [ United States ex rel Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 818 (C.A.2, 1970).] Thus, generally, to impeach a verdict, the defendant must first establish the existence of the extraneous influence. Even with this burden met, however, the defendant will not be entitled to a new trial unless there is some further showing of prejudice. Williams-Davis, supra at 733; United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 258 (C.A.1, 1990). [6] The extraneous matters will not meet the initial threshold unless there is a `reasonable possibility' that such material could have affected the verdict. Williams-Davis, supra at 734, quoting United States v. Ortiz, 942 F.2d 903, 913 (C.A.5, 1991). Courts have articulated guidance, but have not created bright line rules for determining when the real and substantial possibility of prejudice standard is met. There is no magic formula for deciding whether extrinsic material disclosed in the jury room was reasonably prejudicial. The determination in each case in which such an issue is presented must be evaluated in light of its own unique circumstances. [ United States v. Gaffney, 676 F.Supp. 1544, 1553 (M.D.Fla., 1987).] The Ninth Circuit and other courts have set forth several factors relevant to determining whether extrinsic materials could reasonably have been prejudicial. For example, in State v. Watkins, 526 N.W.2d 638 (Minn.App., 1995), the court considered the following factors, among others, in estimating the probable prejudicial effect of racial slurs on the jury:(1) the nature and source of the prejudicial matter, (2) the number of jurors exposed to its influence, and (3) the likelihood that curative measures were effective in reducing the prejudice. [ Id. at 641]. The Ninth Circuit has identified similar factors, including: (1) whether the extrinsic material was actually received and if so how, (2) the length of time it was available to the jury, (3) the extent that the jurors discussed and considered it, (4) whether it was introduced before a verdict was reached and if so at what point during the deliberations, and (5) the length of time the jury deliberates after exposure to the extrinsic material. [7] Regarding this last factor, if the jury was deliberating for a significant time before exposure to the extrinsic evidence and then quickly rendered a verdict after the exposure, the information likely affected the verdict. The Ninth Circuit does not consider any one factor as being determinative in any given case. Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 406 (C.A.9, 1988). [8] 2