Opinion ID: 466309
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jenkins' motion to suppress his grand jury testimony

Text: 30 Jenkins argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his grand jury testimony without an evidentiary hearing. 6 Jenkins argues that, prior to his appearance before the grand jury, he was misled by a letter from the government attorney who prosecuted this case. In the letter, Jenkins was told that the grand jury had no substantial evidence linking him to the commission of a crime and that he was not a putative defendant. A false sense of security created by the letter, Jenkins argues, induced him to testify in a self-incriminating manner. Thus, use of his testimony would have violated his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the due process requirement of fundamental fairness. Jenkins apparently objects to both the denial of his suppression motion and the denial of an evidentiary hearing. 31 Motions to suppress statements on fifth amendment voluntariness grounds deserve a fair hearing and a reliable determination. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 391, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1788, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). But this requirement applies only if substantial facts are in dispute. See id. The magistrate who initially considered the motion to suppress found that there were no factual disputes, and this finding is wholly supported. 32 Jenkins' real complaint is that the suppression motion was denied. We find the denial proper. Jenkins was under subpoena to testify before the grand jury. While the government attorney's letter to him did indicate that he was not then a putative defendant, the letter also clearly stated that he was a subject of a federal grand jury investigation. Moreover, the letter said that he could become a target of the investigation at any time. Most important, the letter detailed Jenkins' rights to refuse to answer incriminating questions and to retain counsel. The letter stated, Anything you do say may be used against you by the Grand Jury or in a subsequent legal proceeding. 33 As we have already pointed out, appearance before a grand jury or other proceeding pursuant to subpoena does not constitute compulsion within the meaning of the fifth amendment. Because Jenkins failed to assert his fifth amendment privilege during the grand jury proceedings, he is deemed to have waived his rights. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427-29, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1142-43, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984); United States v. Swacker, 628 F.2d 1250, 1252-53 (9th Cir.1980).