Opinion ID: 1913355
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 28

Heading: Should the trial court have awarded an allowance for prejudgment interest?

Text: On cross-appeal, Kelleys claim that the trial court erred in disallowing prejudgment interest. Although determining the point of time from which interest is to be computed varies in the different states, South Dakota only allows prejudgment interest when the exact amount of damages is known or readily ascertainable. State v. Ed Cox & Son, 81 S.D. 165, 180, 132 N.W.2d 282, 290-91 (1965). Prejudgment interest is not to be awarded if the damages are uncertain until determined by the trier of fact. Arcon Const. Co. v. S.D. Cement Plant, 349 N.W.2d 407, 416 (S.D.1984). Thus, the test for awarding interest is not whether liability was clear, but whether (assuming liability) the damages were reasonably ascertainable by reference to prevailing markets. Cole v. Melvin, 441 F.Supp. 193, 210 (D.S.D.1977). The denial of prejudgment interest is especially appropriate in a condemnation proceeding, because the proceeding may be voluntarily dismissed by the condemnor after a verdict is rendered in favor of the condemnee, but prior to the entry of judgment upon the verdict. City of Aberdeen v. Lutgen, 273 N.W.2d 183 (S.D.1979). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Kelleys' motion for prejudgment interest. In conclusion, we affirm the award of just compensation as determined by the jury, but reverse and remand to the trial court for a determination of reasonable expert witness and attorney fees consistent with this opinion. WUEST, J., concurs. SABERS, J., and STEELE, Circuit Judge, concur in part and dissent in part. HENDERSON, J., dissents in part and specially concurs in part. STEELE, Circuit Judge, sitting for MILLER, C.J., disqualified.