Opinion ID: 2632408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Jesse Smith's Assertion of his Fifth Amendment Right in the Jury's Presence

Text: During the guilt phase, the prosecution called as a witness Jesse Smith, defendant's brother. Jesse answered a few initial questions about the night of the murders, responding that he did not remember a night when his brother and a 14-year-old companion came to his house with a safe. At defense counsel's request, a sidebar conference was held, during which defense counsel expressed concern that Jesse might incriminate himself. The trial court appointed separate counsel to represent Jesse. On advice of counsel, when Jesse was called back to testify, he asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and declined to answer any further questions. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing Jesse to assert, his right against self-incrimination in front of the jury, rather than requiring him to exercise the privilege outside of the jury's presence. This court has noted that permitting the jury to learn that a witness has invoked the privilege against self-incrimination serves no legitimate purpose and may cause the jury to draw an improper inference of the witness's guilt or complicity in the charged offense. ( People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 619, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635; see also People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 992, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 441, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388.) Indeed, we have noted that `it is the better practice for the court to require the exercise of the privilege out of the presence of the jury.' ( People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 743, 280 Cal.Rptr. 440, 808 P.2d 1197, quoting People v. Johnson (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 749, 759, 114 Cal.Rptr. 545.) We have commended that approach because it operates as a means by which to avoid the potentially prejudicial impact of the witness asserting the privilege before the jury. ( People v. Ford (1988) 45 Cal.3d 431, 441, fn. 6, 247 Cal.Rptr. 121, 754 P.2d 168.) We have, however, stopped short of declaring it error for trial courts to fail to adhere to this practice. [7] Even if the trial court erred in allowing Jesse to invoke his right against self-incrimination in front of the jury, defendant has failed to preserve this claim on appeal. A defendant may not challenge, for the first time on appeal, the procedure used by the trial court to find a witness unavailable. ( People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 35, 252 Cal.Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249; People v. Harris (1979) 93 Cal. App.3d 103, 118, 155 Cal.Rptr. 472.) Because he failed to object at trial to the witness's invocation of his Fifth Amendment right in front of the jury, defendant forfeited any argument that the manner in which Jesse invoked his Fifth Amendment right was inappropriate. Assuming arguendo that the claim was not forfeited, defendant has failed to show prejudicial error resulting from Jesse's invocation of his right against self-incrimination in the presence of the jury. Defendant contends that the jurors would speculate as to Jesse's reasons for asserting his right against self-incrimination and would draw inferences unfavorable to defendant. However, the trial court instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.25, that it was not to draw any negative inferences about defendant from a witness's invocation of the right against self-incrimination. [8] We presume the jurors followed this instruction: [t]he crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury is that jurors generally understand and faithfully follow instructions. ( People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84; see also People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th 312, 331,19 Cal.Rptr.2d 529, 851 P.2d 811.) Defendant has failed to persuade us that the instruction in this case was inadequate to prevent any possible prejudice from the alleged error.