Opinion ID: 3065342
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Right to View the Redacted Affidavit

Text: Exhibit C provided information about a confidential informant referred to as “CS.” Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 governs government disclosure of information, stating: Upon a defendant’s request, the government must permit the defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph books, papers, documents, data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions of any of these items, if the item is within the government’s possession, custody, or control and:
defense;
in its case-in-chief at trial; or
to the defendant. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E). In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 2518 states that the fruits of a wiretap may not be used in court unless a copy of the court order and the wiretap application are furnished to each party: The contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter or evidence derived therefrom shall not be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding . . . unless each party . . . has been furnished with a copy of the court order, and accompanying application, under which the interception was authorized or approved. Id. § 2518(9). UNITED STATES v. FORRESTER 325 [15] The district court denied Forrester’s motion for specific discovery of Exhibit C. It found that the items sought were not discoverable under Rule 16 because they were not material to the presentation of the defense. The question is whether 18 U.S.C. § 2518, which mandates disclosure of the wiretap application, allows the government to redact some information in the application. This is a question of first impression in our circuit, though one that has been addressed by other courts. Forrester asks us to adopt the reasoning of the district court in United States v. Arreguin, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (E.D. Cal. 2003). That court held that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9), a defendant has a right to all wiretap application materials, including unredacted copies of affidavits in support of the application. It reasoned that 18 U.S.C. § 2518 “was enacted to provide greater [privacy] protection than that mandated by the Constitution under then-existing precedent,” id. at 1060 (citing Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48 n.7 (1972)), and noted that “[t]he statutory requirements for wiretap authorization are far more burdensome than those mandated by the Constitution,” id. at 1060-61. Similarly, the court noted that 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(b) provides that wiretap applications can not be unsealed absent a showing of good cause and gives judges discretion in determining what to disclose. Id. at 1061. Section 2518(9), on the other hand, requires that each party receive a copy of the wiretap application before evidence may be received—it does not include any of the discretionary language found in § 2518(8)(b). Id. The district court considered this to be “a judgment by Congress that the good cause requirement is satisfied where the government plans to use evidence derived from a wiretap.” Id. at 1061-62. Under that reasoning, the court required the government to disclose wiretap applications in their entirety before using the evidence derived from the wiretaps. Id. at 1062-63; see also United States v. Manuszak, 438 F. Supp. 613, 619, 625 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (“Unlike Section 2518(8)(d) . . . which gives the court discretion to deny access to the order and application, Section 326 UNITED STATES v. FORRESTER 2518(9) mandates that these items be made available to a party facing any proceeding[.]” (internal quotation marks omitted)). [16] We find the reasoning in United States v. Danovaro more persuasive. 877 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1989). In that case, the Seventh Circuit held that a defendant does not have a right to redacted portions of a wiretap application if the government is able (and willing) to defend the warrant without relying on the redacted information. Id. at 588. The court determined that such a rule was consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) because “[s]tatutes requiring disclosure, but silent on the question of privilege, do not override customary privileges.” Id. (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397-98 (1981)). Furthermore, the privilege to withhold information in order to protect informants is well-established. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).7 The Danovaro court held that the information excised in that case, which had been examined in camera, was not essential to support the warrant or to show that a wiretap was necessary. 877 F.2d at 588. Because the redacted portions were not necessary, the Seventh Circuit declined to determine whether the government can redact information (with in camera review) when the information is essential to the validity of the warrant. Id. We adopt as the rule of this Circuit the Seventh Circuit’s narrow rule from Danovaro,8 but we also decline to 7 The Arreguin court, in contrast, held that the statutory disclosure requirement of § 2518(9) always trumps the informant privilege set forth in Roviaro. See Arreguin, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1061. 8 At least two other district courts have also found Danovaro more persuasive than Arreguin. See United States v. Coles, No. 05-440, 2007 WL 2916510, at  (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2007) (“The Arreguin court’s analysis has the appeal of simplicity, as it confines its assessment to the statutory text and draws its conclusions based on what it regards as clear Congressional intent. We do not agree with the Eastern District of California, however, that Congressional intent on this question is so self-evident. Moreover, we are concerned that the Arreguin court and the Defendant, to the extent he urges the adoption of its analysis, embraces a sort of formalistic approach UNITED STATES v. FORRESTER 327 determine whether the government can redact information when that information is essential to the validity of the warrant. The preamble to Exhibit C states: “As noted in Exhibit B, none of the information set forth in this supplemental pleading is being submitted to establish either probable cause or necessity for the requested wiretap.” The rest of the two-and- a-half page document is redacted. Exhibit B explains that [d]ue to the nature of the CS’s cooperation with law enforcement officers and the risk to the safety of the CS if his/her identity is disclosed, I am submitting details regarding the CS’s background and knowl- edge in [Exhibit C]. For the purpose of establishing probable cause for the requested wire intercept, I am not submitting the facts and circumstances in Exhibit C; rather, I am providing the Court with the information in Exhibit C to substantiate my belief that the CS is a reliable source of information and, as addressed below, to show the limitations of the CS with respect to law enforcement’s ability to achieve the goals of this investigation without the requested wiretap authorization. Because, as discussed below, the unredacted parts of the wiretap application were more than sufficient to establish necessity, we find that the district court did not err in denying Forrester’s motion for specific discovery. to Title III that has been rejected by the Third Circuit.”); United States v. Freeman, No. 06-205-03, 2008 WL 879966, at -3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2008) (“Like the court in Coles, I find it unwise to rely solely on the textual peculiarities of Title III to conclude that Congress’s intent was that the informer’s privilege not apply to disclosures pursuant to § 2518(9). Consequently, I disagree with the reasoning and conclusion of Arreguin. Moreover, I find persuasive the reasoning of the . . . Seventh Circuit in Danovaro . . . .”). 328 UNITED STATES v. FORRESTER