Opinion ID: 2519742
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Calculation of determinate sentence

Text: Defendant raises several challenges to the 25-year aggregate determinate term he received in addition to the death penalty. We consider each in turn, finding only one has merit. First, the trial court imposed four 2-year firearm-use enhancements (§ 12022.5) under counts II (murder of Stopher), III (burglary), IV (kidnapping of V.), and VII (attempted murder of Officer Dunavent). At the time of the offenses, the rule of In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330, 130 Cal.Rptr. 719, 551 P.2d 23 applied. [14] The rule provided that even if there were multiple counts involving multiple victims of violent crime, a section 12022.5 enhancement could be imposed only once if all the charged offenses are incident to one objective and effectively comprise an indivisible transaction.... ( Culbreth, at p. 333, 130 Cal.Rptr. 719, 551 P.2d 23.) Since the trial court stayed imposition of the firearm-use enhancements under counts III (burglary) and IV (kidnapping), the court pragmatically complied with Culbreth respecting those counts. (See People v. Rosalez (1979) 89 Cal. App.3d 789-794,153 Cal.Rptr. 65 [ Culbreth error harmless where enhancements run concurrently].) Hence, even were we to find Culbreth error respecting those counts, no modification of the judgment would be required. In contrast, the two section 12022.5 enhancements under counts II (murder) and VII (attempted murder) were ordered to be served consecutively. Accordingly, we must determine whether imposition of both enhancements violated Culbreth. It did not. The murder of Stopher and the attempted murder of Officer Dunavent occurred hours apart. Defendant had ample time to reflect on his conduct between the two offenses, and he manifestly killed Stopher, and attempted to kill Officer Dunavent, for entirely different purposes. Accordingly, [t]he court could properly find no `indivisible transaction' barring imposition of separate weapon enhancements. ( People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 269, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643.) There is no merit to defendant's further claims that sentencing him on the burglary count in addition to terms for the rape and kidnapping convictions constituted double punishment in violation of section 654, or that the trial court gave inadequate reasons for imposing a full, consecutive term for the forcible rape conviction pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (c). However, there is merit to defendant's argument that the court improperly imposed three separate five-year enhancements for his prior felony conviction of assault with a deadly weapon (vehicle) on a peace officer, pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a). The record reflects that section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements were imposed under count I (Jones murder), imposed and stayed under count VII (attempted murder of Officer Dunavent), and imposed on counts III (rape) and IV (burglary) but ordered to be served concurrently under those counts. Although, as a practical matter, defendant's 25-year aggregate determinate prison sentence thus included only one five-year enhancement added into the calculation, only one section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement should have been imposed in connection with the aggregate sentence. (See People v. Tassell (1984) 36 Cal.3d 77, 91, 201 Cal.Rptr. 567, 679 P.2d 1.) Accordingly, we shall order the section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements under counts III, IV, and VII stricken, and the abstract of judgment amended to reflect only one such enhancement imposed under count I.