Opinion ID: 203074
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing to Challenge MOGO

Text: The City of Augusta argues on appeal, as it did below, that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge any part of the MOGO. We agree. For standing to challenge the constitutionality of a particular municipal ordinance such as the parade ordinance or the MOGO, plaintiffs had to show an objectively reasonable possibility that the ordinance would be applied to their own activities. See Osediacz v. City of Cranston, 414 F.3d 136, 143 (1st Cir. 2005). In the case of the parade ordinance, under which Sullivan sought and actually received a parade permit and Dansinger sought, but did not obtain, a parade permit, plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing. But we find no similar showing sufficient to establish standing to challenge the MOGO, the City's mass outdoor gathering ordinance. Plaintiffs did not acquire or seek a MOGO permit. They did not allege, and there was no evidence in the record that anyone connected with the City ever indicated to plaintiffs, that they would be required to obtain a permit under the MOGO as a prerequisite to conducting their proposed street marches, nor was there evidence or even allegations that, in addition to a parade permit, plaintiffs needed, or reasonably believed they needed, a permit under the MOGO in order to conduct such activities in conformity with existing municipal policy and law. As the district court recognized, the relaxation in First Amendment cases of certain prudential standing requirements does not mean that plaintiffs can dispense with the need to meet core Article III standing principles. Osediacz, 414 F.3d at 141; see Sec'y of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956-57, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984) ([I]n the area of freedom of expression, an overbroad regulation may be subject to facial review and invalidation, even though its application in the case under consideration may be constitutionally unobjectionable, but Munson still must satis[fy] the requirement of `injury-in-fact' and whether it can be expected satisfactorily to frame the issues in this case [i.e., its case must be `ripe'].). Injury-in-fact has been described by the Court as an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) `actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.' Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of showing that they have sustained any injury-in-fact on account of the MOGO. Without suffering such an injury, they lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of various provisions of that ordinance. The district court recognized that plaintiffs were required to show injury-in-fact relative to the MOGO, and that to establish such injury in the present circumstances, they must show an objectively reasonable possibility they would need a permit under that ordinance in order to engage lawfully in their intended street marches. See Osediacz, 414 F.3d at 143. The court believed that such a showing had been made here. It construed the language of the MOGO as overlapping with that of the parade ordinance. It believed that marches such as plaintiffs sponsored or proposed, while covered by the parade ordinance, could also be considered to be mass outdoor gatherings if held with the intent to attract or with the understanding that the gathering may attract two hundred (200) or more persons; and that under the language of the MOGO, Augusta might (although it did not) require a separate MOGO permit as well as a parade permit. In the district court's view, the undefined phrase in the MOGO, mass gathering, could well include a parade. The City might want the sponsor of a large parade to furnish the health and safety items specified in the MOGO, i.e., adequate medical facilities, adequate and satisfactory water supply and sewer facilities, and refuse storage and disposal facilities. The court believed that sewer facilities could be interpreted to mean portable toilets and that other terms could likewise be read in a way relevant to parades and marches. The district court believed that the deposition testimony of Deputy Police Chief Major Gregoire, rendered on October 6, 2004, indicated the City's ambivalence about the MOGO's role. Asked whether a parade of 3,000 people for a mile down a City street was a mass gathering, Gregoire replied: That'sI mean, that's an interpretation. I don't know. I would have to review what the ordinance said. They are moving and that type of thing. They could be considered a parade. It's a matter of interpretation. In the court's opinion, this reply was inconsistent with, perhaps even contradictory of, Gregoire's subsequent affidavit, dated March 15, 2005, in which Gregoire stated positively, the City interprets the Mass Outdoor Gathering permit to only apply to a gathering which occurs at a fixed location. The two, as it believed, inconsistent statements by Gregoire led the district court to conclude, if Major Gregoire changed his mind once, he could do so again, and to find that when plaintiffs applied for their permits, there was a reasonable possibility that the City might interpret the MOGO to apply to their conduct. The court ruled that in light of Major Gregoire's changing testimony and in the absence of a long-standing municipal practice, this Court finds the City of Augusta has not adopted an authoritative interpretation so as to eliminate its application to marches or parades. With respect, we do not agree with the district court's analysis. We do not think plaintiffs have shown a realistic likelihood that, in addition to a parade permit, the City might have required them to receive a MOGO permit for the marching activities reflected in this record. Textually, we do not read the two ordinances as requiring persons like plaintiffs proposing an ordinary street march on the City's public streets to obtain more than a parade permit. And, if there were any question about this, Gregoire's affidavit as to the City's interpretation, uncontradicted by anything shown in the record, and supported by the City's consistent willingness to allow these plaintiffs to march without requiring more than a parade permit, is entitled to be credited as reflecting the City's authoritative view that a MOGO permit was not needed. [2]
Looking first at the text of the parade ordinance, it requires a permit thereunder for an intended parade, march or other use of public ways within the City  precisely the events the plaintiffs intended and for which they sought, and in Sullivan's case received, parade permits. Plaintiffs never sought, nor were they advised by anyone to obtain, a MOGO permit, presumably because the parade ordinance alone referred specifically to parades and marches on the City's public ways, while the MOGO said nothing about moving events of this character. Rather, the MOGO addresses the licensing of what it calls, without further definition, a mass outdoor gathering with the intent to attract two hundred (200) or more persons. The MOGO thus addresses an undefined (except for the 200-person benchmark) generic class of mass gatherings without any limits as to type or place. In comparable circumstances  given two ordinances, one specific and the other general  Maine's courts, like federal and other state courts, have followed the interpretive rule that specific statutory provisions take precedence over general provisions. Ziegler v. American Maize-Prod. Co., 658 A.2d 219, 222 (Me. 1995) (quoted with approval in Camps Newfound/Owatonna Corp. v. Town of Harrison, 705 A.2d 1109, 1115 (Me.1998)). See also Armstrong v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 2000 WL 33675379 (Me.Super., Dec.31, 2000) (applying foregoing principle to Cape Elizabeth zoning ordinance). See generally Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406, 100 S.Ct. 1747, 64 L.Ed.2d 381 (1980) (A more specific statute will be given precedence over a more general one. . . .). Under this interpretive rule, the parade ordinance, which regulates in haec verba the very type of conduct in which plaintiffs intended to engage, i.e., a march on public ways, would seem likely to be construedas in fact it has been by the City  to take precedence over the more general MOGO, which makes no particular mention of conduct of this sort. It seems unlikely, therefore, that the two ordinances would be construed in pari materia, viz. as both applying equally to plaintiffs' proposed marches and as calling for dual permits and dual fees, [3] and, in fact, no such construction has ever been advanced by anyone on behalf of the City. One can speculate, to be sure, as did the district court, that giant parades or unusually large or lengthy street marches might give rise to public health concerns similar to those upon which the MOGO focuses. Such hypothetical events, indeed, might even require fixed staging areas, in which case the MOGO might become applicable. But there are neither allegations in plaintiffs' amended complaint nor evidence in the stipulated record that plaintiffs' marches implicated gatherings of over 200 persons, that fixed staging areas or the like were contemplated, or that plaintiffs' marches were so large or of such duration as to give rise to public health considerations that might even arguably implicate a second permit under the MOGO. Sullivan's application for his march on March 20, 2004 stated it was to last only one and a half hours. Little else can be discerned from the record about the actual characteristics of plaintiffs' marches other than that, in Sullivan's case, the march occurred and that no suggestion was ever made by anyone that a MOGO permit, in addition to the parade permit, was required. Indeed, plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff [Sullivan] was not required in this instance to obtain a Mass Gathering Permit and also states, The only barrier to Sullivan exercising his right to free speech and assembly in the traditional public forum of Augusta's streets and sidewalks is his inability to pay over $2,000 for police salaries, police squad car use, and event insurance [all items connected with his application for a parade permit at the time he applied]. Dansinger's march did not occur, but, again, there is nothing whatever in the record to suggest that, in his case, anyone, including the Police Department and Dansinger himself, felt the parade ordinance was by itself insufficient to meet all the City's and the public's regulatory requirements. It is worth noting that paragraph (d) of the parade ordinance allows the Police Chief to impose reasonable conditions including, but not limited to [certain conditions spelled out in the ordinance] (emphasis supplied). Under paragraph (d), the Police Chief, without recourse to a separate MOGO permit, could presumably condition issuance of a parade permit on provision of specified facilities he thought reasonably necessary to safeguard public health should he believe the circumstances of a particular parade or march so required. Looking simply at the text of the two ordinances, therefore, we think it far less likely than did the district court that they would ever be read as requiring anything but a parade permit for the marches for which plaintiffs requested permits. [4] Significantly, the only allegation in the amended complaint regarding the MOGO's possible relevance is that it employs legally identical requirements on applicants for mass outdoor gatherings as does the parade ordinance and is subject to the same constitutional objections. No concrete facts of any kind are alleged showing how or why the MOGO, in addition to the parade ordinance, would apply to plaintiffs' street march activities so as to cause them to suffer injury-in-fact from that ordinance.
The City's own interpretation of the MOGO, as expressed in Gregoire's affidavit, has been consistent with the above textual reading. And while this interpretation was formally stated only after this litigation began, plaintiffs have neither alleged nor produced any evidence that the City, before Gregoire's affidavit, requested or received from anyone similarly situated to plaintiffs (much less plaintiffs themselves), a MOGO permit in addition to a parade permit. In other words, the City's actions have at all times been consistent with the City's interpretation stated in Gregoire's affidavit that the MOGO applies only to mass gatherings at fixed locations. Deputy Chief Gregoire, who handled both types of permits for many years, testified to much experience with parades but very few mass gatherings, from which it would appear that the MOGO was not widely employed, and, one might infer, was not employed in duplicate fashion with parades. The fact that Sullivan's March 20, 2004 march took place with only a parade permit, issued without suggestion from the Police Department that he also needed a MOGO permit (which, like the parade permit, is handled by the Police Department), strongly supports the City's position, asserted in Gregoire's affidavit, that it interprets the MOGO to apply only to mass gatherings at fixed locations, not to parades and marches. It is plaintiffs' burden to establish injury-in-fact as an essential part of their standing  not the City's burden to disprove it. See, e.g., FW/PBS v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (holding that standing must affirmatively appear in the record and it is the burden of the party seeking the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute). See also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130; Osediacz, 414 F.3d at 139. Here the evidence the district court saw as indicative of an ambivalent City policy to require a MOGO permit in addition to a parade permit was Gregoire's early deposition testimony, responding to a question whether a parade of 3,000 people for a mile down the street was a mass gathering. Gregoire's response was That'sI mean, that's an interpretation. I don't know. I would have to review what the ordinance said. Gregoire then went on to say, in the same response, They are moving and that type of thing. They could be considered a parade . . . (emphasis supplied). Six months later, the City submitted to the court Gregoire's affidavit stating unequivocally, The City interprets the Mass Outdoor Gathering permit to only apply to a gathering which occurs at a fixed location. Between Gregoire's earlier deposition testimony and his later affidavit stating the City's final position, we see no discrepancy such as to warrant the district court's finding that he had a change of mind. His deposition response came in answer to a question that could easily have caught Gregoire by surprise, about whether an enormous hypothetical 3,000 person parade extending for a mile would be a mass gathering. Gregoire said, in effect, he didn't know  he would have to review what the MOGO said. Even so, he then suggested that, They could be considered a parade. In the six months that followed, Gregoire had the opportunity to review the issue, to reread the ordinances, and to consult with the Police Chief and other City officials, after which his affidavit was filed stating unequivocally the City's interpretation of the MOGO. That he consulted with superiors and spoke for the City, not just himself, can be inferred from the fact that in the affidavit he purported, under oath, to speak for the City; it is only reasonable to assume that a ranking officer like Gregoire would not have purported to speak for the City in important litigation of this type without first obtaining authorization. While he was not the Police Chief or City Manager, he was the second in command in the Police Department, the agency empowered by the two ordinances to issue both parade and mass outdoor gathering permits, and, subject to the Chief, was in charge of reviewing and acting upon applications to hold parades and marches in Augusta. As we say, we can see no contradiction between Gregoire's guarded reply during his earlier deposition and his later affirmative affidavit. The earlier response at most suggests uncertainty. He said nothing directly contrary to what he later represented in his affidavit was the City's interpretation. That the City interpreted a MOGO permit to apply only to a gathering which occurs at a fixed location fits reasonably within the language of the two ordinances, supra, is consistent with the City's practices as reflected in this record, and is entitled to be taken as an authoritative representation of the City's interpretation of its own ordinance. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 131, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992) (In evaluating respondent's facial challenge, we must consider the county's authoritative constructions of the ordinance, including its own implementation and interpretation of it). This is not a case where the agency's interpretation during a lawsuit repudiates its earlier interpretation, suggesting the later-announced interpretation might be a ploy to end the lawsuit and leave the agency free to return subsequently to the very practices that caused the plaintiff to sue. There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that Gregoire's affidavit of the City's interpretation constituted a repudiation of or departure from some earlier different practice of the City, nor have plaintiffs so alleged. Compare Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (observing that defendants' cessation of challenged practice during course of litigation did not guarantee they would not return to practice after dismissal). The district court criticized the City for not establishing that Gregoire's assertion of its interpretation reflected a longstanding municipal practice, but the City's treatment of these plaintiffs has from the start been entirely consistent with the interpretation of the MOGO stated in Gregoire's affidavit, and plaintiffs, whose burden it is, have produced no evidence of any inconsistency at any time in the City's treatment of others. We see no reason not to accept the City's asserted interpretation under these circumstances. We hold that plaintiffs did not meet their burden of establishing a reasonable possibility that, in applying to hold their street marches along City streets, they were or would be held subject to the MOGO as well. We conclude, therefore, that plaintiffs lack standing to litigate the various issues they raise concerning the alleged defects in the MOGO as distinct from those in the parade ordinance. We vacate the district court's judgment insofar as it relates to any of the provisions of the MOGO. Because plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the MOGO, we need not examine the ripeness of their MOGO claims. Without standing, plaintiffs' challenges to the MOGO provisions must be dismissed.