Opinion ID: 2025144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Effect of the April 1996 Dismissal Order.

Text: Meyer claims the dismissal order of April 16, 1996, was a final order and that the district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to vacate it. She urges that the only proper method to challenge the dismissal was by appeal. The parties agree the district court had the authority to dismiss the case as abandoned. The dispute centers upon the district court's authority to reinstate the case. Judge Fautsch's May 8, 1996 order stated: Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 215.1 states in part as follows: The case shall not be dismissed if there is a timely showing that the original notice and petition have not been served and that the party resisting dismissal have used due diligence in attempting to cause process to be served. This court is satisfied that plaintiffs have used due diligence in attempting to cause process to be served. It is also clear from the case law that discretion is given to the trial court in this regard and that trial on the merits is favored. Rule 215.1 requires that the clerk of court give notice to counsel of record prior to August 15 of each year in cases that were filed more than one year prior to July 15. The notice must state that such case is subject to dismissal if not tried prior to January 1 of the next succeeding year. All such cases are to be assigned and tried or be dismissed unless satisfactory reasons for want of prosecution or grounds for continuance be shown by application and ruling thereon after notice and not ex parte. The rule further provides: The trial court may, in its discretion, and shall upon a showing that such dismissal was the result of oversight, mistake or other reasonable cause, reinstate the action or actions so dismissed. Application for such reinstatement, setting forth the grounds therefor, shall be filed within six months from the date of dismissal. We conclude rule 215.1 is not applicable to a dismissal entered by the court ten months after the petition was filed. It is generally recognized trial courts may sua sponte dismiss a case where the case has not been diligently prosecuted. Rush v. Sioux City, 240 N.W.2d 431, 438-39 (Iowa 1976), overruled on other grounds by Hoffert v. Luze, 578 N.W.2d 681, 685 (Iowa 1998). While the trial courts in Iowa have the authority to sua sponte dismiss a case, the courts should exercise this authority sparingly. Teleconnect Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 366 N.W.2d 515, 519 (Iowa 1985). If the court has the power to dismiss the action, then it also must have the power to reinstate the action. The two powers go together, otherwise the court could not undo what it may have done by inadvertence or mistake. A district court's power to correct its own perceived errors has always been recognized by this court, so long as the court has jurisdiction of the case and the parties involved. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Lagle, 430 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1988). We adhere to the general rule that a district court judge may review and change a prior interlocutory ruling of another district judge in the same case. See Hoefer v. Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Ins. Trust, 470 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 1991). This general rule enhances the court's integrity by refusing to give either party a vested right to require the court to perpetuate its mistake. Id. In the absence of statute or rule of practice fixing the time for applying to have an order of dismissal set aside, a party must show that he was reasonably diligent in seeking a reinstatement of the case. 24 Am. Jur.2d Dismissal, Discontinuance, and Nonsuit § 78 (1983). Once the action was dismissed for abandonment, the McCormicks acted promptly to have the dismissal vacated. We find the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to reinstate the action.