Opinion ID: 788670
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Pickering/Connick balancing test.

Text: 28 The thrust of the Hospital's argument on this second step of our test is that the dress code policy is entitled to deference because it is critical to the Hospital's mission in that it creates an appearance of impartiality and promotes uniformity, discipline, and esprit de corps among the hospital's employees. 36 Although the Hospital lifts this argument almost verbatim from this circuit's precedent on non-adornment policies similar to the one here at issue, that precedent deals in large part with public employers that are law enforcement agencies or other paramilitary organizations. Thus, that precedent is inapposite and provides scant — if any — support for the Hospital's argument. 29 In Daniels v. City of Arlington, 37 for example, we explained that: 30 [T]he city ... has the right to promote a disciplined, identifiable, and impartial police force by maintaining its police uniform as a symbol of neutral government authority, free from expressions of personal bent or bias. The city's interest in conveying neutral authority through that uniform far outweighs an officer's interest in wearing any non-department-related symbol on it. 38 31 This reasoning rests almost entirely on the key fact that a police force, as the only arm of municipal government that is authorized to use force on citizens, must avoid any appearance of favoritism or bias and — just as important — any signal that might cause confusion as to who is and who is not a law enforcement officer. This reasoning was also the foundation of a case cited by the Daniels panel (and misguidedly cited by the Hospital here), U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Federal Labor Relations Authority. 39 There, we explained that the border patrol .... is a para-military law enforcement unit, and as such, has many of the same interests as the military in regulating its employees' uniforms. 40 Because of this similarity of mission and means between the military and the INS, our FLRA panel held that the border patrol's anti-adornment policy was similarly entitled to deference. 41 32 This reasoning simply does not apply to the instant situation, despite the Hospital's close emulation of the language from FLRA in an apparent effort to bolster its claim that its dress code policy is entitled to such deference. The paramilitary reasoning of our FLRA opinion cannot be stretched to apply to the non-medical, non-administrative, maintenance and clerical staff of a public hospital. The wearing of a pin by a carpenter and other Integrated Services employees, who are merely seen by, but do not interact extensively with, members of the public, cannot be seriously said to undermine (1) the public's perception of neutrality and impartiality among the Hospital's professional and quasi-professional medical and administrative staff, or (2) the esprit de corps among these kinds of employees. 42 As Plaintiffs accurately note, this case lacks the unique circumstances and requirements of para-military and law enforcement organizations. Even though the Hospital's carpenters, plumbers, janitors, and other maintenance staff are glimpsed from time to time by patients, family members, and visitors, they do not interact directly with them; neither are such employees ever called on to enforce or administer the health care laws of the state. The Hospital's efforts to obscure the clear line between these classes of employees by painting with too broad a brush is feckless. 33 The other cases relied on by the Hospital are similarly distinguishable, and equally inapposite. In Smith v. U.S., 43 for example, we found no constitutional violation when a psychologist at a Veteran's Administration hospital was discharged after he refused to remove a pin depicting a dove (a ubiquitous peace or anti-war symbol) superimposed on an American flag. That incident occurred at the close of the Vietnam War, and the case was decided on the basis of trial testimony that some of the Vietnam veterans who were being treated personally by the psychologist were quite likely to find the pin upsetting, which in turn would be detrimental to such patients' welfare. 44 This is a circumstance unique to the treating psychologist/patient relationship and obviously cannot be analogized to apply to a carpenter who has no meaningful contact with patients or their families. Again, the bright line between medical staff and blue collar maintenance employees cannot be crossed. 34 Undaunted, the Hospital nevertheless contends that Herrera had frequent and direct contact with the public, and furthermore that if we were to accept that he did not have such contact, then his speech could not have been on a matter of public concern. In so doing, the Hospital attempts to manufacture a Catch-22 for the Plaintiffs by arguing that they are attempting to have it both ways by arguing that Herrera had enough public contact to make his speech on a matter of public concern, but not enough public contact for purposes of the Pickering / Connick balancing test. On the contrary, it is obviously the Hospital that is trying to have it both ways. In its argument on the public concern element, the Hospital contends that Herrera admits he did not have any significant contact with the public (emphasis added); a point actually conceded by the Hospital in its original Answer when it admitted that Herrera's position of employment with Defendant Hospital does not entail significant interaction with the public (emphasis added). As shall be seen, the difference between contact and interaction is telling. The district court declined to give conclusive effect to that admission because all the parties seemed to have overlooked [it] in their arguments before that court, 45 which nevertheless observed that the admission was highly indicative of the Defendants' stance on this issue before it became critical to the case. 46 The definitive aspect of the Hospital's schizophrenic posturing here is its conflating of two very different aspects of Herrera's presence, vis-a-vis the public: (1) contact that is passive visibility that facilitates speech, and (2) direct interaction which, if present, might affect the public's perception of his employer's neutrality. 35 In stark contrast to the Hospital's flawed comparison, Plaintiffs' position is neither inconsistent nor internally contradictory. They accurately assert that Herrera's position does not entail significant interaction with the public.... [Herrera] worked in patient rooms that had been vacated for repairs or renovation.... [Herrera] only encountered the public in passing, such as brief encounters in the hallways, elevators, or cafeteria (emphasis added). Such contacts, however fleeting, are quite sufficient for Herrera's lapel pin to alert the public to the fact that a labor organizing drive is ongoing, but fall well short of the active, functional interaction (such as that between law enforcement officers and the public or psychiatrists and their patients) needed to affect negatively the Hospital's medical or administrative operations. Passive visibility and active interaction weigh quite differently on the Pickering / Connick balancing beam. The nature of Herrera's performance of his employment as a carpenter, with the frequency of its visibility and the infrequency of its interaction with the public, is such that the Hospital has failed to demonstrate how suppressing the lapel-pin speech of personnel like Herrera was necessary for the efficient providing of Hospital services. 36 The Hospital also argues that Herrera's speech had the effect of workplace disruption, which is a factor to be considered in conducting the balancing test. The Hospital would emphasize the anecdotal incident when Durham instructed Herrera to remove the button and Herrera responded with If you want it off, then you take it off. 47 On this point, the district court ruled: 37 Just as other courts have found that refusing to obey an order that implicates an employee's First Amendment rights is not a sufficient reason for disciplining the employee, this Court holds that an employer's insistence upon enforcing an unconstitutional policy cannot create the very disruption the policy purports to prevent. 48 38 The district court also recognized that the button-wearing speech at issue here caused no workplace disruption, either in the Durham incident or on a prior occasion when approximately 30 Hospital employees wore the buttons. 49 Finally, as the district court observed, there was no evidence that Herrera's productivity suffered as a result of wearing the button; quite to the contrary, he received consistently positive performance evaluations, with the lone exception of the dress code violation. 50 39 The instant situation differs markedly from, for example, Connick v. Myers, in which the speech at issue involved an assistant district attorney's distribution during work hours of a questionnaire that was critical of that professional's supervisors. 51 Here, as emphasized by the district court, Herrera's mute lapel-pin speech was not a public criticism of a close supervisor or a challenge to the Hospital's authority; neither did it pose any threat whatsoever to the efficient performing of the Hospital's medical or administrative functions. 52 Obviously, the particular work environment in Connick was a key factor. The Supreme Court emphasized that maintaining harmonious relationships is essential to efficiency in a district attorney's office, which is, after all, tantamount to a government law firm. A custodial or maintenance worker, such as a carpenter, wearing a pro-union button during his work shift cannot be analogized to a doctor, nurse, technician, or administrator employed by a medical center, just as such a maintenance worker cannot be analogized to an assistant district attorney or deputy sheriff. In sum, Herrera's speech on a matter of public concern outweighs any effect it might have on the Hospital's providing services to the public. Herrera passes the Pickering / Connick balancing test with flying colors. 40