Opinion ID: 1172452
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due Process and the Zoning Laws

Text: This court has frequently recognized that the most fundamental ingredient of the `due process' guaranteed by our state Constitution is `a meaningful opportunity to be heard.' ( Randone v. Appellate Department, 5 Cal.3d 536, 550 [96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13], and cases cited.) On the other hand, we have acknowledged that `Due process' is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual contexts.... Whether the Constitution requires that a particular right obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding, are all considerations which must be taken into account. ( In re Tucker, 5 Cal.3d 171, 179 [95 Cal. Rptr. 761, 486 P.2d 657], quoting from Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 [4 L.Ed.2d 1307, 1321, 80 S.Ct. 1502]; see Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission, 65 Cal.2d 247, 254 [53 Cal. Rptr. 673, 418 P.2d 265].) Ordinarily, as the majority explain, if a proceeding is legislative rather than adjudicative in character, a hearing of a judicial type is not required by the Constitution. ( Franchise Tax Board v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.2d 538, 549 [225 P.2d 905]; see United States v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 244-246 [35 L.Ed.2d 223, 238-240, 93 S.Ct. 810]; Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445 [60 L.Ed. 372, 375, 36 S.Ct. 141].) Although enactment of a zoning ordinance, contrasted with a grant of an easement or variance, may be characterized as a legislative act, nevertheless A zoning ordinance can and does have a more direct and lasting effect upon property values and property owners within a city than almost any other type of ordinance. What is done with respect to one piece of property of necessity has an effect, good or bad, upon adjacent or nearby property. ( Johnston v. City of Claremont, supra, 49 Cal.2d 826, 837.) Accordingly, our cases have long recognized the constitutional right of affected property owners to notice and hearing before a municipality may enact zoning ordinances which substantially restrict the use or otherwise substantially impair the value, of their property. ( City of Escondido v. Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 8 Cal.3d 785, 790 [106 Cal. Rptr. 172, 505 P.2d 1012]; Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal.3d 541, 549 [99 Cal. Rptr. 745, 492 P.2d 1137]; Gilgert v. Stockton Port District, 7 Cal.2d 384, 391 [60 P.2d 847]; Berrata v. Sales, 82 Cal. App. 324, 327 [255 P. 538]; see Anderson, American Law of Zoning, § 4.03, p. 159, § 4.11, pp. 168-169; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 25.261, pp. 212-213; Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 449, 453, fn. 5.) [2] For example, we have recently stated that Zoning does not deprive an adjacent landowner of his property, but it is clear that the individual's interest in his property is often affected by local land use controls, and the `root requirement' of the due process clause is `that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest, except for extraordinary situations where some valid government interest ... justifies postponing the hearing until after the event....' [Citations.] ( Scott v. City of Indian Wells, supra, 6 Cal.3d 541, 549.) We held in Scott that principles of due process of law required a city to provide notice and a hearing to nonresident adjacent landowners whose property would be affected by municipal zoning measures. [3] Thus, it would appear firmly established in our jurisprudence that the adoption of zoning measures which involve substantial deprivations of property may not take place in the absence of constitutionally adequate provision for prior notice and hearing. I consider, then, the question whether the initiative process affords adequate due process safeguards.