Opinion ID: 1136887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did the trial court err by failing to require the state to name a specific date in the indictment?

Text: Prior to trial, Fisher filed a Motion to Quash the Indictment. He gave as his grounds the vagueness of the four month period of time covered by the indictment from between the 14th day of April 1990 and the 1st day of September in the year of our Lord, 1990 ... The trial court denied his motion, but instructed the State to narrow the time frame as much as possible. The State then amended the indictment to show the time frame as between the first day of July, 1990 and the first day of August, 1990. Fisher then filed a Motion to Compel a Definite Statement of Essential Facts and a Notice of Intent to Claim Alibi. The trial court denied the Motion and allowed the State to proceed on the indictment as amended. Fisher now claims that the thirty day period was too oppressive to alibi. Fisher cites Mississippi Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice, rule 2.05 [1] which requires the indictment to be a ... plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts charged, and to fully notify the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Fisher claims that it was essential that the prosecution provide him a specific date so he could maintain an alibi defense. Fisher also cites Van Norman v. State, 365 So.2d 644 (Miss. 1978), where the Court held that the state was required, since the defense was one of alibi, to prove the specific day of the crime. The indictment charged Van Norman with adultery. After the state's case concluded, the defense introduced evidence to show that he had an alibi for that day. The state was allowed to amend the indictment to show another date. The Court noted that adultery was not a continuing offense, and each act constituted a separate offense, therefore, the amendment constituted a new offense. Id. at 647. This case is factually distinguishable; Fisher knew well in advance the time covered by the indictment. Additionally, Fisher cites Wilson v. State, 515 So.2d 1181 (Miss. 1987). Wilson was convicted of capital rape and raised as an issue on appeal the fact that the state had not narrowed the time of the crime to a specific date. The Court declined to reverse but said: However, we note that in cases of this nature, it is important that a defendant be given the specific date or dates of the alleged acts if at all possible. [cite omitted] In all fairness, notice of a specific date is often essential to the preparation of a defense-especially where an alibi defense is relied on. Id. at 1183. The law is clearly with the State on this issue. In fact, we disposed of a factually similar issue in Morris v. State, 595 So.2d 840 (Miss. 1991). Morris claimed, as does Fisher, that the wide period of time in the indictment (three months) kept him from presenting an alibi defense to the sexual battery charge. Morris filed a Motion to Compel A Definite Statement of Essential Facts Morris citing Wilson for the proposition that notice of a specific date is essential to the preparation of a defense, especially an alibi defense. Justice Hawkins, speaking for the Court, stated that the indictment was sufficient in advising the defendant and in giving a time frame within which these (events) were supposed to have happened. Justice Hawkins pointed out that traditionally time and place requirements have been viewed as not necessitating specificity, because they ordinarily do not involve proof of an element of the crime. Morris, 595 So.2d at 842 (citing 2 W. LaFave & L. Israel, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.2 (1984)). He further noted that Wilson requires the defendant be given the specific date only if possible. Id.