Opinion ID: 1830817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Because J.J. and the children have refused to submit to court ordered blood tests, the court should enter judgment against them and for W.H.W in this action.

Text: ¶ 5. Although the facts of the present case involve a number of difficult ethical issues, the present appeal centers around a more narrow issue of statutory interpretation. At issue in the present case is whether a trial court has the discretion under Miss.Code Ann. § 93-9-21 (Supp.1998) to decline to enforce a previously issued order for blood testing to establish paternity. § 93-9-21(2) provides that a trial court shall issue such an order for blood testing, with no discretion granted to the trial court as to the issuance of such an order: (2) The court, on its own motion or on motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, shall order the mother, the alleged father and the child or children to submit to blood tests and any other tests which reasonably prove or disprove the probability of paternity. If any party refuses to submit to such tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity against such party or enforce its order if the rights of others and the interest of justice so require. JJ notes, however, that § 93-9-21 provides that (i)f any party refuses to submit to such tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity against such party or enforce its order if the rights of others and the interest of justice so require. JJ argues that, by setting forth the may language in § 93-9-21, the Legislature intended to leave the enforcement of the blood testing order within the discretion of the trial court. This Court finds this argument unpersuasive. ¶ 6. We conclude that the better view is that the may language in the second sentence of § 93-9-21 indicates that the trial court has two available options from which to choose. Specifically, § 93-9-21(2) gives a chancellor the option of either issuing a default judgment against the refusing party or, alternatively, enforcing the order for blood tests if the rights of others and the interests of justice so require. In interpreting § 93-9-21, it is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature did not contemplate that court orders would be issued frivolously and with no expectation of compliance. A court order is, as suggested by its name, a mandatory directive for parties to comply with the dictates of the court and the Legislature, and an order would be ultimately meaningless without provisions for its enforcement. ¶ 7. Our conclusion in this regard is strengthened by a previous decision directly on point. In Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218 (Miss.1994), this Court interpreted § 93-9-21 and concluded that: The operative word of § 93-9-21 is  shall.  A basic tenet of statutory construction constrains us to conclude that, unlike the discretionary nature of may, the word shall is a mandatory directive.... As a consequence, in a proceeding to establish paternity, upon motion by either the plaintiff or defendant for an order requiring blood tests, the trial court must grant the motion; no discretion is afforded the trial judge. Ivy, 644 So.2d at 1221. This Court held unequivocally in Ivy that a chancellor has no discretion to decline to order blood tests to establish paternity, and this holding is binding authority in the present case. Absent the enforcement of an order for blood tests, the putative father is denied the opportunity to rebut the presumption of legitimacy, in contravention of Ivy. We conclude that a chancellor has no discretion to, in effect, bar the courthouse doors to a putative father and thereby deny him the opportunity to overcome the very strong, but rebuttable, presumption of legitimacy [1] . ¶ 8. This appeal is concerned solely with the issue of whether WHW has the legal right to attempt to overcome the rebuttable presumption that the twins are the children of JJ. We conclude that WHW does in fact have such a right. The ruling of the trial court is accordingly reversed, and this case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion. ¶ 9. REVERSED AND REMANDED. SULLIVAN AND PITTMAN, P.JJ., BANKS, SMITH, MILLS AND WALLER, JJ., CONCUR. McRAE, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.