Opinion ID: 621511
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: .Reimbursement of Attorneys' Fees

Text: We next consider whether the district court erred in ordering Moore to repay his court-appointed attorneys' fees under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. The interpretation of a statute, like the meaning of § 3006A(c) and (f) in the case at bar, is reviewed de novo. United States v. Weaver, 659 F.3d 353, 356 (4th Cir.2011) ([An] issue of statutory interpretation is one that we review de novo. ) (citation omitted). In the context of sentencing, we review the district court's legal determinations de novo, and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Osborne, 514 F.3d 377, 387 (4th Cir.2008). In reviewing the district court's application of the factual findings, as in the reimbursement order here, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., United States v. Holman, 532 F.3d 284, 288 (4th Cir.2008) (conditions of supervised release are reviewed for an abuse of discretion); cf. United States v. Leftwich, 628 F.3d 665, 667 (4th Cir.2010) (district court's restitution order is reviewed for abuse of discretion). In actual practice, this division of standards of review is not always easy to differentiate and is of limited practical import where the district court commits an error as a matter of law. [8] The district court made such an error in this case which requires the sentencing order, as it relates to the attorney fee reimbursement, be vacated and remanded.
The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (CJA), requires the government to provide adequate legal representation for criminal defendants unable to pay for such services when, like Moore, they are charged with a federal felony offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(1)(A). There is no issue in this case that Moore was, in fact, indigent and qualified for a court appointed attorney under the CJA. That statute also provides that [i]f, at any time after the appointment of counsel. . . the court finds that the person is financially able to obtain counsel or to make partial payment for the representation, it may . . . authorize payment as provided in subsection (f), as the interests of justice may dictate. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c). Subsection (f) further authorizes a court to order repayment of attorneys' fees under certain circumstances: Whenever . . . the court finds that funds are available for payment from or on behalf of a person furnished representation, it may authorize or direct that such funds be paid to the appointed attorney. . . or to the court for deposit in the Treasury as a reimbursement to the appropriation, current at the time of payment, to carry out the provisions of this section. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f). Moore argues that the order requiring him to repay his attorneys' fees during his supervised release term is unlawful because § 3006A(f) only allows a court to order reimbursement when it determines the defendant has funds that are currently available for payment. He points to the use of the present tense (funds are available) in the statute's language to support that argument, as well as to out-of-circuit authority. Because the district court's order was based on a speculative ability to pay in the future, Moore argues that the order violates § 3006(A)(f). The government concedes that, in this circuit, there are no published cases upholding a reimbursement order based on future payments from assets not currently accessible. It relies on two unpublished cases, however, which upheld such forward-looking reimbursement orders. See United States v. Jackson, 1998 WL 386109 (4th Cir. June 19, 1998) (unpublished); United States v. Moore, 1998 WL 85296 (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 1998) (unpublished). In neither of these cases was there an explicit finding that funds were then available to the defendant for a reimbursement payment. The government also argues that forward-looking reimbursement orders are authorized because the CJA generally vests significant discretion in district courts for sentencing purposes. Thus, the government concludes, the order here should not be overturned. In analyzing the district court's order, we start with the plain language of the statute. Weaver, 659 F.3d at 356 (The starting point for any issue of statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself. It is well established that when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts . . . is to enforce it according to its terms.) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In the case at bar, subsection (f) allows the recovery of the cost of court-appointed attorneys' fees if the court finds that funds are available for payment from or on behalf of a person furnished representation. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f). When read in conjunction with subsection (c), then, which authorizes repayment under subsection (f) after the court finds that the person is financially able . . . to make partial payment for the representation, the statute clearly requires a finding of a defendant's ability to make payments as a condition precedent to an order of reimbursement. Any such finding must be based on evidence before the court, and thus in the record, and not on speculation or hypothesis. Given the statute's plain language, then, we are compelled to hold that the district court must base the reimbursement order on a finding that there are specific funds, assets, or asset streams (or the fixed right to those funds, assets or asset streams) that are (1) identified by the court and (2) available to the defendant for the repayment of the court-appointed attorneys' fees. Our holding requiring a specific finding of ability to pay and identification of the source of payment is in accord with similar conclusions of our sister circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 597 F.3d 353, 358 (6th Cir.2010) (A thorough inquiry into the defendant's finances, though not a full adversarial hearing, should precede any order requiring a repayment of attorneys' fees); United States v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054, 1076-77 (9th Cir.2003) (affirming order denying reimbursement of fees where district court could not make any definitive finding as to [the defendant's] ability to pay); United States v. McGiffen, 267 F.3d 581, 589 (7th Cir.2001) (requir[ing] that a district court make appropriate findings of availability[,] such as whether the contribution would impose an extreme hardship on the defendant, whether it would interfere with his obligations to his family, and whether there were third parties with valid claims to the funds[,] and noting that [o]ur sister circuits similarly require that there be evidence that the district court made specific inquiries into the defendant's financial circumstances and obligations before requiring a defendant to repay funds pursuant to § 3006A(f)); United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 252 n. 8 (3d Cir.1998) (before entering a reimbursement order, a district court has a responsibility to inquire into the defendant's current financial status); United States v. Fraza, 106 F.3d 1050, 1056 (1st Cir.1997) (reversing order of reimbursement where the district court failed to make findings as to defendant's financial viability). [9] The Sixth Circuit's decision in Wilson is a case in which the district court made the required CJA findings. In Wilson, the defendant was ordered to repay $52,305 in attorneys' fees after his acquittal, having received free representation throughout his criminal proceedings, including a six-week trial. 597 F.3d at 355-56. Although the defendant had received free court-appointed representation, the court subsequently learned that Wilson had significant assets at the time of trial. The repayment was based on specific findings that, in the year his trial began, for example, Wilson had income of approximately $134,000 and had spent over $18,000 in restaurant and wine tabs. Id. He also was currently out of prison and earning income. Id. at 357. In reviewing the order of reimbursement, the Wilson court stated the general rule that [a] thorough inquiry into the defendant's finances, though not a full adversarial hearing, should precede an order of reimbursement. Id. at 358. Because the district court had performed the requisite inquiry, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the reimbursement order. In contradistinction to the thorough inquiry conducted by the district court in Wilson, the de minimis findings by the district court regarding Moore's financial capacity and ability to pay are stark. [10] Effectively, the district court made no findings under § 3006A(c) that Moore is financially able . . . to make partial payment for the representation or under § 3006A(f) that funds are available for payment. Instead, the court simply adopted the probation officer's standing $50 a month repayment plan. The record, to the extent there is one, showed Moore had virtually no income over a period of years and had no assets or other things of value. The mere fact that he has a GED and some work training (although no steady work history) does not support a finding that funds are available. Unlike the income stream in Wilson, which was a readily identifiable asset, the theoretical income stream here, years down the road after completion of a fifteen-year sentence, was based purely on speculation with no basis in fact. Of particular note in the case at bar is that the district court specifically found that Moore, who was clearly eligible for a court-appointed attorney, did not have the ability to pay a fine or interest. J.A. 75. Nonetheless, the court accepted the apparently standard and factually unsupported recommendation of the probation office that Moore's GED and training meant he would be able to earn an amount of money sufficient to repay $50 per month, [11] and thus ordered Moore to repay that amount while on supervised release. In so doing, the district court made no finding that there were any identifiable funds or assets available to Moore. To the contrary, the district court expressly adopted the PSR, which states that [Moore] does not appear to have the financial resources to make an immediate monetary payment. J.A. 126. Because the district court failed to make the specific findings required by § 3006A(c) or (f) to support an order of reimbursement, its judgment at sentencing, insofar as it required a reimbursement of attorneys' fees, was in error. To provide additional direction to district courts, we caution that our holding should not be interpreted as imposing an overly restrictive definition of available, such as one that only permits an order of reimbursement if a defendant has cash or funds in a bank account which are immediately available to him to be withdrawn. Put differently, availability is not limited only to currently liquid assets at the time reimbursement is ordered. Instead, a repayment order may be based on identified funds and assets, even if those assets will not become liquid until a future date, such as the escrow payment from an upcoming sale of real property, the scheduled disbursement of proceeds from a trust, or continuing payments under a promissory note or contract. See Wilson, 597 F.3d at 360 (A court . . . might find a defendant `financially able' to pay based on money pending in escrow even though those funds will not become `available for payment' until some future date.); see also Br. of Appellant at 15 (Moore acknowledging a reimbursement order can be based on a defendant's income stream). The crucial factor in complying with the statutory mandates in § 3006A(c) (the court finds that the person is financially able) and § 3006A(f) (the court finds the funds are available for payment) is that the sentencing court indeed make a finding on the record identifying the specific assets available for reimbursement of attorneys' fees and how those assets qualify the defendant as financially eligible to pay. Because the district court did not comply with the statutory mandate here, we vacate that portion of the district court's judgment requiring Moore to repay his court-appointed attorneys' fees, and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion, [12] as to that issue only.
Our holding on the validity of the reimbursement order here is a narrow one; it is not intended to address or resolve all issues of when a defendant's funds are available for payment as that will require a fact-specific analysis in each case. Neither do we address whether the repayment of attorneys' fees as a condition of supervised release is a permitted condition. That issue, one which has led to a split of authority among the United States Courts of Appeals, [13] and which this Court apparently has not yet addressed in a published opinion, [14] was neither briefed nor fully argued by the parties and is therefore not squarely presented in this case. Moreover, because we have found the reimbursement order here improper on other grounds, we need not decide that issue. Similarly, we do not decide today whether the district court in Moore's case could impose repayment of fees at a later date, such as while Moore is actually serving his supervised release term, either as a condition of release or as a separate § 3006A(f) order, assuming it makes the requisite finding that Moore has funds or assets available for repayment. We limit our holding here to the following: on the current record, the district court erred by failing to make the mandatory statutory findings that funds are available to Moore for repayment as required to order reimbursement under the CJA.