Opinion ID: 468767
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: evidence of similar accidents

Text: 112 Evidence of similar accidents occurring under substantially similar circumstances and involving substantially similar components may be probative of defective design. See Rush v. Bucyrus-Erie Company, 646 S.W.2d 298 (Tex.Civ.App.--Tyler 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mitchell v. Fruehauf Corp., 568 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir.1978); see also Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railway Co. v. May, 600 S.W.2d 755 (Tex.1980). Insofar as the trial court's order in limine gives abstract expression to these principles it is unobjectionable; but, as applied, the court's order in effect limits similar accidents to those involving the Firestone 5? rim base and the Goodyear LW side ring. At trial plaintiff's expert testified that he was not aware of any other accidents involving those exact components. Appellees conclude rather disingenuously from this that Mr. Jackson's accident was unique, and no other accidents were admissible. Appellees' Brief at 27. We decline to take such a narrow and unrealistic view of the matter. 113 The problem is that the magnitude of the danger of multi-piece rims cannot be proved when the experience with those rims is limited to cases in which an LW ring was put together with a five-degree base. The substantially similar predicate for the proof of similar accidents is defined, again, by the defect (or, as we have also termed it, the product) at issue. If the disputed defect were restricted to the mismatch of these two parts, then the trial court's ruling would have been correct. But if that defect is the danger of all multi-piece parts because of the great risk of poor fit, then some proof of other accidents involving multi-piece rims is admissible on the issue of the magnitude of the danger. See Ramos v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 615 F.2d 334, 338-39 (5th Cir.1980); Mitchell v. Fruehauf Corp., 568 F.2d 1139, 1147 (5th Cir.1978). 114 Even if we take the duty to warn out of the case, see Part X infra, we still have negligence and gross negligence. For purposes of proving other accidents in order to show defendants' awareness of a dangerous condition, the rule requiring substantial similarity of those accidents to the accident at issue should be relaxed. See McCormick on Evidence, Sec. 200 (E. Clearly 2d ed.1972) (other accidents and injuries in negligence and products liability cases); 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 401 (1982) (similar incidents or accidents). Other cases involving multi-piece rims that did not seat and that exploded are sufficiently similar for these purposes. Any differences in the circumstances surrounding these occurrences go merely to the weight to be given the evidence. See Bailey v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 613 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir.) (citing Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Matherne, 348 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.1965)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836, 101 S.Ct. 109, 66 L.Ed.2d 42 (1980). 115 The trial court improperly excluded both testimony and exhibits that would have tended to provide evidence of similar accidents. For example, Plaintiff's Exhibit 69 would have provided evidence of a long series of lock ring accidents involving Firestone employees that had occurred at Firestone's own plants, despite extensive safety measures. At trial, Firestone's Manager of Technical Services testified that he devoted at least three-fourths of his time to the evaluation and examination of multi-piece wheels involved in explosions, but the trial court did not allow him to be cross-examined about accidents involving even the type of rim base at issue in this case: 116 Q. Okay. Well, as a field experienced employee to you as a rim engineer--you at least used to do rim engineering? 117
118 Q. And you have had a lot of field experience in the last six or seven years? 119 A. I have had a lot of field experience over thirty years. 120 Q. But the field experience you have been getting over the last six years is after the fact of investigating accidents, isn't it? 121 A. Generally, yes, sir. 122 Q. Yes, sir. Well, does that lead you to the conclusion that these parts could be safely used on the job? 123 MR. MALONEY: Excuse me, Your Honor. Are you talking about just this case or are we talking about in general? 124 MR. RISJORD: I am talking about the jobs he has experienced. 125 MR. MALONEY: We object on the basis of relevancy. 126 THE COURT: I sustain the objection to the question as asked. 127 Q. (By Mr. Risjord) It is true isn't it that you have evaluated multi-piece ring explosion separations that parts were missing or mismatched? 128 (MR. KIDDER): Your Honor, I am going to object to that and point the Court to Item 5 of the Pre-Trial Order on the Motion in Limine. 129 THE COURT: Sustained. 130 Q. (By Mr. Risjord) What about the 5? parts which you evaluated that have exploded or killed or injured people? 131 MR. KIDDER: We will object to that. 132 THE COURT: Sustained. 133 17 Rec. at 1349-50; see also id. at 1354-55; 14 Rec. at 690-91. 134 Under the principles enunciated in this and the previous sections, supra, we hold that such evidence was improperly excluded.