Opinion ID: 1856106
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Assertion of Defendant's Right to a Speedy Trial

Text: ¶ 18. The next factor we consider is the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial. On July 7, 1997, counsel for Johnny Birkley filed with the Washington County Circuit Clerk a letter of demand for discovery and a speedy trial. Even if this demand was premature, this weighs heavy in Johnny Birkley's favor. As this Court found in Perry: In the Barker case, this factor [the defendants assertion of his right to a speedy trial] is afforded strong evidentiary weight.... A state may not neglect the defendant's request. Perry at 199. ¶ 19. It appears from the record that the defense did directly contribute to at least ninety-one (91) days of delay by: a) Motion for Severance by Johnny Birkley-August 5, 1997 (even though it was later withdrawn); b) Order of Continuance granted to Dennis Birkley-August 12, 1997; and c) defendants granted a mistrial-December 3, 1997. There is no record that the defense asked for a speedy trial at any of these times. Only after the December 3 mistrial did defense file any motion which included the argument of lack of a speedy trial. The new trial date was set for January 20, 1998. Johnny Birkley's Motion to Dismiss was filed on December 23, 1997, and Dennis Birkley's similar Motion was filed on December 31, 1997, both less than one month before the trial. Both Motions to Dismiss were considered and overruled on January 16, 1998, four days before trial. However, those Motions sought dismissal, not a trial. Perry v. State, 637 So.2d 871, 875 (Miss.1994); see Adams, 583 So.2d at 170. We weigh this factor against the Birkleys. ¶ 20. This case can be compared to Simmons v. State, 678 So.2d at 687, where the defendant's right to a constitutional speedy trial was not violated: ... although 21-month delay between arrest and trial was presumptively prejudicial, where significant portion of delay was due to defendant's request for psychological evaluation, defendant did not bring motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds for over a year, and defendant did not demonstrate any prejudice. Thus, this factor favors the State, but only slightly because the primary burden is upon the State. ¶ 21. In DeLoach v. State, 722 So.2d 512, 518 (Miss.1998), DeLoach failed to file a motion to dismiss until after one year and seven months from the date of his arrest, and this Court found that this factor favored the State only slightly, citing Simmons at 687. ¶ 22. In Barker the Court applied this third factor in close relationship to the other factors already mentioned: Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to the other factors we have mentioned. The strength of his efforts will be affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the reason for the delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not always readily identifiable, that he experiences. The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain. The defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial. Barker at 531-32, 92 S.Ct. 2182. ¶ 23. In analyzing these specific facts to the present case, these factors weigh slightly in favor of the State, but only slightly. Even though Johnny Birkley did make the court aware of his desire for a speedy trial in July of 1997, neither his actions nor Dennis Birkley's actions indicate that it was a meaningful demand. Therefore, this factor weighs only slightly in favor of the State, which still has the burden of bringing the defendants to trial in a timely manner and because of the facts of this case did not show a wilful intention to do otherwise.