Opinion ID: 852115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Bester v. Lake County Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind.2005). We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. We apply a two-tiered standard of review when reviewing findings of fact and conclusions of law in a termination case. We first determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second we determine if the findings support the judgment. Page v. Greene County Dep't of Welfare, 564 N.E.2d 956, 959 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). We set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. In re B.C., 441 N.E.2d 208, 211 (Ind.1982). A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court's conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment. In re R.J., 829 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (Ind.Ct. App.2005). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. A parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). The parent-child relationship is one of the most valued relationships in our culture. Tillotson v. Clay County Dep't of Family & Children, 777 N.E.2d 741, 745 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied. However, parental rights are not absolute, and may be terminated when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. In seeking an involuntary termination of parental rights, the State must prove in relevant part the following: (B) There is a reasonable probability that: i. The conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied; or ii. The continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child; (C) Termination is in the best interests of the child; and (D) There is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child. Ind.Code § 31-35-2-4(b) (2008). The State must prove the allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Ind.Code § 31-37-14-2 (2008). Mother challenges the evidence that supports several of the trial court's findings of fact. Mother first argues that the evidence does not support the finding that [a] diligent inquiry to find and serve Mother was made to no avail, and service of the CHINS action was made upon her by publication. We disagree. As previously discussed, upon learning Mother had been arrested in Utah, FCM 1 contacted jails in Utah and did not find her. By this time, Mother had been transported to Henderson, Kentucky. FCM 1 had no way of knowing Mother would be located there. FCM 1 further checked with the Marion County Jail, Indiana Department of Corrections, two DCS databases, and the local phone directory. When FCM 2 took over the case, he made similar searches as FCM 1 did. At this time, FCM 2 still had no reason to know Mother was located in Henderson, Kentucky. This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's finding. Mother challenges the evidence does not support the finding that Mother sent two more letters to [DCS] with names of possible placement for [Child]. By this time, [Child] was in an appropriate foster home and relatives who were contacted were not interested in going through the process for placement. We agree with the Court of Appeals analysis. The finding is misleading because Child's aunt contacted FCM 2. FCM 2 did not initiate the contact. However, we find that misstatement harmless because the crux of the finding is that the aunt was not interested in going through the process for placement. FCM 2 informed the aunt that she would need to come to Indianapolis and undergo a background check, and she was unwilling to do so. We find the trial court's error to be harmless, and find sufficient evidence to support the finding. Mother challenges the evidence does not support the finding that Mother thinks she will be sentenced to ten (10) years of incarceration. Again, we agree with the Court of Appeals analysis. Mother acknowledged twice that she was told she had a ten-year sentence. Mother first stated, [t]hey told me it was ten years for conspiracy. Later, she again said, I was told that I could be there for ten years for conspiracy. To the best of Mother's knowledge, she would be serving ten years. We find sufficient evidence to support the finding. Mother challenges the trial court's findings regarding Child's therapy. Those findings are 12. [Child] is currently in therapy, working on four issues: 1) processing her sexual abuse, 2) abandonment by her mother, 3) insecurity and 4) adjustment in her current placement. 13. [Child] has made much progress on issues with the exception of the sexual abuse, an issue that she is not ready to address but needs to be in the future. 14. [Child] has been placed with foster parents since April 2008, and the foster parents are willing to adopt her. [Child's] needs are being met, including most importantly, her need for continued therapy. Mother claims Child's therapeutic needs are not being met based on the therapist's qualifications. We disagree. The therapist testified to having limited experience working with child sex abuse victims but felt she could address Child's current therapeutic needs. The therapist also stated if Child needed therapy beyond her ability, she would refer Child to someone else. Therapist testified she planned on continuing to work with Child. We find the evidence supports the trial court's findings that Child's therapeutic needs are being met. Finally, Mother challenges finding 18, which states: Termination of the parent-child relationship is in [Child's] best interests. Reunification is not possible. Termination, providing the opportunity for a subsequent adoption, would accomplish the goal for [Child] to be granted a permanent home in a loving and stable environment, where she has integrated and bonded, and will have her physical and therapeutic needs met. It would be harmful to [Child] if she were removed from her current placement, and could set her back in her therapy. It is not disputed that Mother loves her daughter. However, Mother is unavailable to parent and [Child's] interests in moving forward toward permanency are tantamount to Mother's parental rights being left in tact [sic]. The record reflects FCM 2 stated that giving Mother more time to work toward reunification would not give Child a sense of permanency and would not be in her best interest. FCM 2 further stated Child has bonded with her foster family, and it would be in her best interest for the termination to be granted. Child's Guardian ad litem (GAL) testified that Child needed permanency and granting termination would provide permanency for child. GAL further testified that Child was very bonded with her foster mother. We find the evidence in this case supported the trial court's findings that termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child's best interests.