Opinion ID: 2637056
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consolidation of petty theft with homicide and related charges

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in granting the prosecution's motion to consolidate the charge of petty theft from Woolworth with those for the murder, robbery and vehicle taking committed at the Volunteers of America apartments. The error, he asserts, deprived him of his rights to due process of law, a fair trial, trial by jury, confrontation and cross-examination, presentation of a defense, assistance of counsel, equal protection, and reliable guilt and penalty phase verdicts in a capital case, guaranteed under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, and article I, sections 7, 15 and 17 of the California Constitution. An accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, or two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes. (ง 954.) Offenses falling within this description, but charged in separate pleadings, may be consolidated for trial in order to promote judicial efficiency (see People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 935, 277 Cal.Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950), and a trial court's rulings on joinder are reviewed for abuse of discretion ( People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1283-1284, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1). Defendant complains the requirements of section 954 were not met in his case because petty theft and murder are offenses of different classes, and the Woolworth's theft and the Martinez homicide were not connected in their commission. Further, he argues, evidence of the two offenses was not cross-admissible, and the theft charge served only to prejudice him in the jury's eyes by casting doubt on his veracity. He contends that had the trial court denied joinder, it is reasonably probable he would have achieved a more favorable result at trial. Defendant was charged, inter alia, with robbery and vehicle taking in the Volunteers of America incident, and petty theft in the Woolworth matter. Although no case directly so holds, we may reasonably conclude these offenses fall within the same class, in that they share the common characteristic of the wrongful taking of another's property. (See People v. Leney (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 265, 269, 261 Cal. Rptr. 541 [interpreting ง 954 to permit joinder of offenses possessing common characteristics or attributes]; cf. People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544 [theft as lesser included offense of robbery].) As such, their joinder was proper. Defendant, therefore, can establish error only on a clear showing of prejudice. ( People v. Mason, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 933, 277 Cal.Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950.) This he fails to do. Although the evidence of the two sets of offenses was not cross-admissible, the petty theft was of relatively minor seriousness, and nothing about the incident suggested defendant readily engaged in criminal violence. The trial court, moreover, instructed the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 17.02 to decide each count separately. Although defendant complains the petty theft charge served only to cast doubt on his veracity with respect to the murder charge, in light of the extensive criminal history defendant acknowledged on cross-examination, the petty theft could not have affected significantly the jury's assessment of his credibility. Defendant complains the robbery charge was only secondary to the murder charge, but he fails to cite authority for his implicit proposition that joinder is proper only when the charge to be consolidated is of the same class as the principal charge, here the murder. We thus conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the prosecution's consolidation motion, and defendant's derivative claims of constitutional error lack merit. [4]