Opinion ID: 1487913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: general statute versus specific statute

Text: We now turn to the independent reason cited by the Superior Court panel majority for upholding the trial court's quashal order i.e., that, pursuant to 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933 of the Statutory Construction Act, Sections 3302 and 3303 of the Crimes Code are in irreconcilable conflict and that the more specific statute, Section 3303, controls here and therefore precludes prosecution under the more general, Section 3302. We note at the outset that the trial court never passed upon the general-specific question. The Superior Court panel majority, however, cited to the doctrine and held that the Commonwealth was barred from prosecuting appellees for the general crime of risking a catastrophe because their conduct was also covered by the more specific crime of failure to prevent a catastrophe. The panel majority reasoned as follows: This is not a case where one or both of the crimes contains elements that the other does not. Although the two crimes on their face do not conflict, as alleged in this case they do. It is simply a matter of how one characterizes what the defendants did (or did not do). . . . [O]ne can just as easily say that the defendants did not act when they should have, as state that they failed to prevent a catastrophe. Since we can recharacterize the defendants' alleged acts to fit into the actus reus of either crime, we find the statutes in conflict. Because the Assembly specifically criminalized failing to prevent a catastrophe, we cannot presume that the legislature intended under these facts that the prosecution be able to proceed under either or both statutes. Karetny, at 837 A.2d at 478-79. On appeal to this Court, the Commonwealth notes that the enactment of 42 Pa. C.S. § 9303 has abrogated operation of the Section 1933 general-specific rule of statutory construction in the context of criminal prosecutions. [9] In the alternative, the Commonwealth argues that the crimes of risking a catastrophe and failure to prevent a catastrophe are not in irreconcilable conflict because each contains an element that the other does not. [10] Appellees respond that Section 9303, which went into effect following the commencement of the prosecution in this case, cannot apply retroactively here because the General Assembly indicated no intention for it to operate retroactively or, in the alternative, because applying the statute retroactively would violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws found in both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. [11] Because this Court seeks to avoid constitutional issues if the claim may be resolved on alternative grounds, see Commonwealth v. Hughes, 865 A.2d 761, 783 n. 24 (Pa. 2004); In re Fiori, 543 Pa. 592, 673 A.2d 905, 909 (1996), we will put aside the question of the applicability of Section 9303 and appellees' responsive ex post facto argument and examine first whether, under the state of our jurisprudence at the time appellees were charged, a proper application of the general-specific construction principle would have prevented the Commonwealth from proceeding upon charges of both risking a catastrophe and failure to prevent a catastrophe. For the following reasons, we conclude that the Commonwealth was, and is, empowered to prosecute appellees under both provisions of the Crimes Code. The general-specific construction principle is set forth in the Statutory Construction Act as follows: Whenever a general provision in a statute shall be in conflict with a special provision in the same or another statute, the two shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both. If the conflict between the two provisions is irreconcilable, the special provisions shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision shall be enacted later and it shall be the manifest intention of the General Assembly that such general provision shall prevail. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933. This precept of construction was not aimed primarily, or only, at criminal statutes, but at all statutes. By its terms, Section 1933 does not speak to the propriety of government pursuing prosecutions under concurrently-applicable criminal statutes. That consequence of the provision has arisen solely from the case law. In Commonwealth v. Brown, 346 Pa. 192, 29 A.2d 793 (1943), the two defendants circulated nominating papers of the Communist Party and allegedly appended false affidavits to them. [12] The defendants were tried separately and convicted of several counts of perjury under the former Penal Code, 18 P.S. § 4322, and false statements under the former Election Code, 25 P.S. § 3513f. The defendants' appeals were consolidated, and the Superior Court affirmed, reasoning that the Commonwealth was permitted to prosecute under both statutes, just as it is permitted to charge lesser and greater included offenses in separate counts of the same indictment with the proviso, of course, that in case of conviction, only one sentence may be pronounced, alluding to the principle of merger, which protects a defendant's double jeopardy rights. Id. This Court reversed, reasoning as follows: There is no reason why these general terms [of the perjury provision in the former Penal Code] should be made available for the prosecution of these [defendants], for the offense charged against them was the offense specifically provided for in ... the Election Code. It is not to be presumed ... that the legislation intended to provide for two different prosecutions for the same identical offense, prosecutions which provide widely divergent penalties in the event of convictions. The same act which is a misdemeanor in the Election Code is made a felony under the Penal Code, if that code is held to be applicable to specific cases such as this. . . . To hold that defendants charged as were these [defendants], are for the same act, subject to prosecutions under penal provisions of both these two separate acts is to eschew the ideal of precision in criminal law and criminal penalties. . . . Id. at 796. The Court expressly rejected the rationale of the Superior Court regarding lesser-included offenses and sentencing merger and commented that the question is ... not one of criminal law pleading but one of the construction of statutes. Id. Over forty years later, in Commonwealth v. Warner, 504 Pa. 600, 476 A.2d 341 (1984), this Court revisited the general-specific issue raised in Brown, and took a somewhat different approach. In Warner, the defendant applied for welfare and represented truthfully that she was at the time unemployed. The defendant secured employment four months later, yet continued to cash her welfare checks and did so for approximately four months thereafter, at which point the local board of assistance undertook to re-evaluate her eligibility. At the initial re-evaluation interview, the defendant expressly denied that she was earning any income and repeated that denial at two subsequent hearings held over the course of the next year. The defendant was charged with theft by deception under of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(a), as well as making false statements under a former version of what is now Section 481 of the Public Welfare Code, 62 P.S. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that she could be prosecuted only under the more specific public welfare statute. The Superior Court affirmed. On appeal to this Court, we noted that, [o]nly if the conflict between the general and specific provisions is irreconcilable does the special provision prevail and act as an exception to the general provision under 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933. Warner, 476 A.2d at 343. Reversing the Superior Court, we held as follows: Theft by deception and the false statements section of the Welfare Code involve distinct elements. There is no irreconcilable conflict between them on their face, and any actual conflict between them can only be determined when the facts of the case are fully developed. It may well appear that the same acts on [the defendant's] part constituted violations of both statutes. If so, prosecution under the [more specific provision under the] Welfare Code alone is permitted. On the other hand, different acts by [the defendant] may have violated each statute independently. In either case, post-trial motions in arrest of judgment are an adequate vehicle for challenging the propriety of the prosecutions. Id. at 345-46. In a still later case, Lussi, 562 Pa. 621, 757 A.2d 361, this Court followed Brown. The defendant in Lussi, a locally elected township tax collector, was tried and convicted of both theft by failure to make required disposition of funds under the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3927, and embezzlement under the Local Tax Collection Law, 72 P.S. § 5511.39. The Superior Court affirmed, finding no bar to the Commonwealth prosecuting the defendant for both crimes. This Court reversed, noting the policy announced in Brown that the law does not permit prosecutions under the general provisions of a penal code when there are applicable special penal provisions available. Id. at 362. The Lussi Court held that the two statutes at issue were irreconcilably in conflict, that the local tax law was more specific, and that prosecution under the theft provision of the Crimes Code was, accordingly, barred. [13] Although the Lussi Court did not cite or discuss, much less purport to overrule or disapprove of the decision in Warner, it did take issue with the approach in Warner. Thus, the Lussi Court reasoned: In determining how to effectuate the policy articulated in Brown where the same set of facts constitute more than one criminal offense, an analysis that focuses solely on the distinguishing elements of the various penal provisions misses the mark. A comparison of statutes, element by element, is a review more appropriate to application of the merger doctrine for purposes of sentencing. See, Commonwealth v. Anderson, 538 Pa. 574, 650 A.2d 20 (1994). Instead, the focus should be on whether or not the Legislature in proscribing certain conduct has chosen to set forth a particular and specific penal provision which addresses a distinct subset of circumstances within a general category of criminal activity. 757 A.2d at 364. [14] By its terms, Section 1933 is addressed to statutory provisions that are in irreconcilable conflict, and it is clear from the above cases that this Court has enforced the proscription in the criminal arena by way of precluding prosecution under a general provision where two statutes cover the same conduct and one statute is general and the other specific. Brown, Warner and Lussi all involved situations where the defendants were charged with overlapping crimes arising under both the general title governing criminal conduct (the 1939 Penal Code, which was succeeded by the Crimes Code of 1972), and more specialized statutes which were not merely or even primarily criminal in nature, but included penal provisions relating to the specialized topic. See Brown (penal code and election code); Warner (crimes code and public welfare code); and Lussi (crimes code and tax code). In each of these scenarios, the Penal or Crimes Code, of course, was deemed the general statute and the election, welfare, and tax code the specialized provisions. The case sub judice is entirely distinct. Sections 3302 and 3303 are both part of the general criminal statute, the Crimes Code, appearing in sequence. Moreover, the provisions were enacted in the same session of the General Assembly, became effective on the same date, and, as both parties appear to acknowledge, criminalize distinct conduct. The foregoing factors rebut any suggestion that the General Assembly intended one of these two Crimes Code provisions to exist as a specific exception to the other. More fundamentally, we do not believe that these back-to-back provisions of the Crimes Code can be said to be in irreconcilable conflict with one another. The offense of risking a catastrophe requires proof, at a minimum, of the employment of ... other dangerous means, which include any ... means of causing potentially widespread injury or damage. 18 Pa. C.S. § 3302. In contrast, the offense of failing to prevent a catastrophe requires proof of the failure to take reasonable measures to prevent or mitigate a catastrophe if the actor did the act causing or threatening the catastrophe. See 18 Pa. C.S. 3303. By the plain language of the provisions, a person can be guilty of risking a catastrophe even where no catastrophe occurs, while a person can be guilty of failure to prevent a catastrophe only where the catastrophe actually occurs; moreover, as appellees vehemently argue, it appears that the former offense requires something more affirmative than the mere omission which would satisfy the latter. It may well be that the same underlying conduct here can be argued to satisfy both provisions. But that is not unusual under the Crimes Code nor does it mean that separate provisions of the Code should be said to be in facial, irreconcilable conflict with each other. It is not at all uncommon for the Crimes Code to define related criminal conduct according to gradations, which depend upon the actor's mental state and level of culpability, or the severity of the consequence of the criminal conduct. It is not a conflict in the sub-provisions that creates a potential overlap at the charging stage, but the reality that the elements of offenses are subject to factual contest. Indeed, many criminal prosecutions proceed to trial not to establish who was the perpetrator, but for a factfinder to determine exactly what it isthat is, what type or level of offensethat the actor has perpetrated. To deem the inter-related provisions irreconcilable on their face, as appellees would have us do, would require us to lose sight of the practical reality that the General Assembly, in enacting the Code, of necessity attempted to be comprehensive. In this case, the evidence of appellees' advertising, promotion, and opening of their facilities to the public, while taking active measures to conceal the visible evidence of the pier's severe deterioration and concomitant imminent danger, and while failing to provide any warning to their patrons of the danger awaiting them, were facts sufficient to make out a prima facie charge under Section 3302. Certainly, if and when the matter proceeds to trial, appellees are free to argue to the factfinder that that same conduct, at most, proves a failure to prevent a catastrophe. The existence of these provisions does not reveal an act of legislative duplication, but an intent to account for all potentially culpable conduct in this area. Accordingly, we conclude that the Commonwealth is not barred from prosecuting appellees for both risking a catastrophe and failure to prevent a catastrophe, nor is it barred from prosecuting appellees for criminal conspiracy to the extent the object of the conspiracy was to commit either of those crimes. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the Superior Court, vacate the trial court's quashal order, and remand this matter for trial. Jurisdiction is relinquished. Justice NIGRO did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.