Opinion ID: 2611370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Violation of other rights under the Montana Constitution

Text: Finally, Langford argues that Article II, Sections 3, 4, 16, 17, 18, 19, 24 and 34 of the Montana Constitution protect his right to seek federal relief from his conviction and sentence and that the amendment to § 46-19-103, MCA, violated these constitutional provisions by denying him the ability to present his Eighth Amendment claim to the Supreme Court. He does not present substantive arguments under each delineated constitutional section, but merely directs his arguments in a general manner to his overall contention that the State should be enjoined from executing him under the current version of § 46-19-103, MCA. We address the arguments accordingly. A large portion of Langford's brief in support of his petition is devoted to discussing the role of the AG in the 1997 amendment to § 46-19-103, MCA. It is undisputed that the AG was a major proponent of the amendment and presented testimony during the legislative hearings. Langford infers that the AG's support of the amendment arose from the AG's recognition that Langford was likely to succeed on his Eighth Amendment claim in the Supreme Court and that his successful claim would preclude the State from executing him under the old version of § 46-19-103, MCA. Therefore, according to Langford, the AG advised the Legislature to amend the statute to ensure that he would be denied the opportunity to make his Eighth Amendment argument. Langford's argument in this regard is not persuasive. First, neither the transcripts of the legislative hearings nor any other evidence of record supports Langford's inference regarding the AG's motives vis-a-vis the 1997 amendment to § 46-19-103, MCA. While the transcripts reveal that the AG believed the amendment would reduce the available issues for appeal in death penalty cases, it is also clear that the AG's desire to reduce available appeal issues was based on an interest in reducing the time and money expended by the State in death penalty appeals and collateral proceedings rather than on a concern that hanging might be found to be unconstitutional. If there are fewer issues available to appeal, death penalty cases can be resolved more quickly and with less expense to the State. Moreover, Langford's contentions to the contrary notwithstanding, the transcripts contain no admission by the AG that hanging is cruel and unusual punishment. While Mike Mahoney, warden of the Montana State Prison, made several statements during the legislative hearings to the effect that lethal injection is more humane than hanging, no one testifying on behalf of the AG made such statements. Furthermore, a statement that hanging may be less humane than another execution method does not equate to an admission that hanging is cruel and unusual punishment. The transcripts of the legislative hearings on the amendment simply do not support Langford's assertions that the AG, acting on behalf of the State, either admitted that hanging is cruel and unusual punishment or was concerned that an Eighth Amendment claim regarding hanging would be successful in the Supreme Court. Additionally, the legislative hearing transcripts establish that, while the AG supported the amendment to § 46-19-103, MCA, the AG did not initiate the bill which resulted in the amendment. In the House Judiciary Committee hearing, Representative Bob Clark stated that he was sponsoring the bill at the request of the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC). Furthermore, Warden Mahoney testified that the reasons the DOC proposed the amendment were, first, that the preparatory work and technical expertise required to carry out an execution by hanging far exceeds that necessary for the preparation of a lethal injection; second, that human error is a greater factor in execution by hanging; and third, that there is greater expense associated wit the preparation for, and execution of, a hanging than with a lethal injection. Thus, not only was the AG not the initiator of the amendment, the record indicates that the DOC proposed the amendment for primarily practical reasons and that those reasons were not related to Langford in particular or to his pending Eighth Amendment claim in federal court. Langford's claims regarding the AG's motives for supporting the amendment of § 46-19-103, MCA, are not supported by the record before us. Thus, they do not buttress his overall claim that we should enjoin the State from executing him under the current version of § 46-19-103, MCA. Langford's final argument in support of his petition for injunctive relief is that, by mooting his Eighth Amendment claim prior to its presentation to the Supreme Court, the amendment to § 46-19-103, MCA, rendered the time spent in pursuing that claim retroactively useless and, therefore, the time he has spent on death row while arguing that claim should be charged to the State as a form of cruel and unusual delay. In support of this argument, he cites the dissenting opinion of Ninth Circuit Judge James R. Browning in McKenzie v. Day (9th Cir.1995), 57 F.3d 1493, 1494, in which Judge Browning stated that a stay of execution should be granted to allow the trial court to consider McKenzie's argument that a 20-year delay in executing his death sentence was, in itself, cruel and unusual punishment. A dissenting opinion is not precedent and does not provide support for Langford's argument here. Moreover, while nearly nine years have passed since Langford was sentenced to the death penalty in 1989, this lapse of time does not begin to approach the 20-year delay which occurred in the McKenzie case. Furthermore, we observe that Langford's Eighth Amendment claim was not the only claim he pursued in his federal court habeas corpus proceeding. He also asserted that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas because he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the pleading and sentencing phases of his case. Both the federal trial court and the Ninth Circuit addressed Langford's ineffective assistance claim on the merits and Langford apparently included it in his petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Thus, the time spent on death row while Langford pursued his state and federal court remedies was not spent entirely on his Eighth Amendment claim and cannot be charged to the State as cruel and unusual delay relating to the 1997 amendment to § 46-19-103, MCA. We conclude that Langford has not established that the 1997 amendment to § 46-19-103, MCA, violated his rights under Article II, Section 3, 4, 16, 17, 18, 19, 24 or 34 of the Montana Constitution by impermissibly denying him the ability to present his Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment argument to the Supreme Court. The Court having accepted jurisdiction of this original proceeding and having concluded that Langford has not established a violation of any of the provisions of the Montana Constitution on which his petition is grounded, IT IS ORDERED that Langford's petition for writ of injunction is DENIED. TURNAGE, C.J., and TRIEWEILER, REGNIER, NELSON and LEAPHART, JJ., concur.