Opinion ID: 781269
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Evidentiary Rulings Relating to Counts 1 & 2

Text: 44 a) The Motion to Quash Subpoena Served Upon Opposing Counsel 45 Next, Bogosian contends that the district court made several erroneous rulings at trial. First, she suggests that her due-process rights were violated when the district court (i) quashed her subpoena against opposing counsel, William Grimm, and (ii) barred Bogosian from submitting a proffer as to the substance of Grimm's anticipated testimony. See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(2). 46 Trial court rulings on motions to quash are reviewed only for abuse of discretion. See Town of Norfolk v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1456 (1st Cir.1992). Although not strictly forbidden, the procurement of trial testimony from opposing counsel is generally disfavored. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 946 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir.1991). Among the appropriate factors for consideration by the trial court are the following: whether (i) the subpoena was issued primarily for purposes of harassment, (ii) there are other viable means to obtain the same evidence, and (iii) to what extent the information sought is relevant, non-privileged, and crucial to the moving party's case. See Pamida, Inc. v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 281 F.3d 726, 729-30 (8th Cir.2002); Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., Ltd., 825 F.2d 676, 680 n. 2 (2d Cir. 1987). 47 At trial, Bogosian maintained (i) that she had two internal WRC documents which would show that Mr. Grimm had been a WRC director in 1989-90, (ii) that during this same period WRC had engaged in suspicious business practices, vaguely described by her counsel as the marking-up of its payroll and the mishandling of insurance proceeds; (iii) that these marked-up documents demonstrated that WRC initiated these activities prior to February 1989 ( viz., the date Bogosian was terminated), thus tending to indicate that her brothers had a motive for freezing her out of the company ( viz., in order to conceal their misfeasance from her). We discern no abuse of discretion whatsoever by the district court. 48 As evidence of her apparent intent to harass the defense, we note that Bogosian (i) served the subpoena the day before trial, without the slightest attempt to explain why she had failed to depose opposing counsel during the preceding ten-year period of ongoing discovery, (ii) requested that Mr. Grimm produce eighteen broadly-described categories of corporate documents spanning more than two decades ( i.e., since 1980), (iii) made no showing that she was unable to obtain the evidence from other sources, particularly WRC, their rightful owner, (iv) requested that Mr. Grimm testify at trial solely to the existence[ ] or ... authenticity of the two documents, testimony she obviously could have obtained from any number of witnesses other than Mr. Grimm, (v) sought testimony from Mr. Grimm which was marginally relevant at most, in that the two documents postdated the freeze-out. Finally, the testimony sought from Mr. Grimm — in all likelihood and for the most part — would have been cumulative, since Bogosian herself adduced other evidence that her brothers had frozen her out in order to conceal from her their alleged corporate shenanigans. 49 Accordingly and for the foregoing reasons, the district court ruling quashing the subpoena must be affirmed. 50 b) The Adverse Inference Sought Based On the Failure of Certain Defendants to Appear at Trial 51 Bogosian next contends that the district court erred in declining to infer — from the failure of defendants James and Z. Elaine Woloohojian to appear at trial — that their testimony would have been adverse to the defense. She points to the putative testimony of her process server that these defendants made themselves unavailable to testify by evading service of process. 9 We discern no error. 52 The missing witness rule permits, rather than compels, the factfinder to draw an adverse inference from the absence of a witness, see Niziolek v. Ashe, 694 F.2d 282, 292 (1st Cir.1982), particularly where the factfinder concludes that the party who requested the adverse inference failed to subpoena a witness otherwise available to testify, see Trump Plaza Assocs. v. Poskanzer ( In re Poskanzer ), 143 B.R. 991, 998 (Bankr.D.N.J.1992). As the finder of fact, of course, it was for the district court to determine the credibility of the proffer Bogosian made regarding the process server's testimony. 53 In so doing, the district court simply concluded that James and Z. Elaine Woloohojian had not evaded service of process. As such credibility determinations are within the unique province of the trier of fact, see Carr v. PMS Fishing Corp., 191 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1999), the district court was not compelled to draw the suggested adverse inference from the absence of James and Z. Elaine Woloohojian at trial. 10 54