Opinion ID: 804288
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Direct Evidence of Racial Discrimination

Text: An employer becomes liable under Title VII when the plaintiff “establish[es] that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive for taking a job-related action.” Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985-86 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff may show this discriminatory intent through the use of either direct or circumstantial evidence. Whether a plaintiff’s evidence may be properly categorized as direct or circumstantial is of importance, because a direct-evidence claim is removed from the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Instead, the plaintiff’s case-in-chief is met, and “the burden shifts to the employer to 7 No. 10-5306 Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am. Page 8 prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision absent the impermissible motive.” DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 415 (6th Cir. 2004). Chattman argues that the district court erred in applying the McDonnell-Douglas analysis because he presented direct evidence of Defendant’s discriminatory intent. He offers the three racist statements made by Tullock as direct evidence of discrimination. See supra at 2. The statements are particularly troubling because they include both racist language and the threat or suggestion of violence or death based on race. No inference is required to gleam from those statements that Tullock harbored racial animus towards African Americans. We have previously held that similar “racist comments” constitute direct evidence of discriminatory intent and Tullock’s statements do so here. See Talley v. Bravo Pitino Rest., 61 F.3d 1241, 1249 (6th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009); Dicarlo, 358 F.3d at 416 (supervisor’s use of slur was direct evidence of national-origin discrimination).7 There is some tension in our precedent on the issue of when direct evidence can be based on discriminatory statements that are not temporally proximate to an employment decision. See Blair v. Henry Filters, Inc., 505 F.3d 517, 525-26 (6th Cir. 2008) (discussing tension), overruled on other grounds by Gross, 557 U.S. 167. Subsequent to our holdings in Talley and Dicarlo, we have held that when managers make age-biased statements outside the context of the decision to discharge the plaintiff, the statements are not direct evidence of age discrimination. Rowan v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., 360 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2004). Even if we assume that these cases are in conflict, we are bound by Talley and DiCarlo, which were both decided before Rowan. Blair, 505 F.3d at 526; see also 6 Cir. R. 206(c) (“Reported panel opinions are binding on subsequent panels.”). However, we need not determine the extent of any 7 The statements in Talley and Dicarlo were made by decisionmakers, while the statements in this case were made by a nondecisionmaker, Tullock. Whether evidence of Tullock’s racial animosity can be imputed Toho will be addressed below. 8 No. 10-5306 Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am. Page 9 potential conflict here. As shown below, even if we analyze Chattman’s claims using a circumstantial-evidence test, the claims survive summary judgment.