Opinion ID: 1197869
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the jury instruction on damages was improper

Text: Jury instruction 17a allowed the jury to compensate Paul for reasonable past and future medical expenses and for past and future physical and mental pain, suffering, anguish, and disability. Imperial argues that there was insufficient showing of future damages of any kind to allow the jury to award such damages, so the district court properly granted a new trial. We disagree. Imperial asserts that the only evidence of future pain, suffering, and disability came from Paul's testimony. It argues that this is insufficient under the law, citing Gutierrez v. Sutton Vending Serv., 80 Nev. 562, 397 P.2d 3 (1964), and Lerner Shops v. Marin, 83 Nev. 75, 423 P.2d 398 (1967). Gutierrez was a personal injury case with an appellant who complained of headaches up to the time of trial. Appellant's testimony was not competent to allow damages for future pain and suffering. Where, as here, the disability is subjective in character (headaches, etc.) and not demonstrable to others, expert testimony that the disability will probably continue is needed before an award for future damage is permissible. Gutierrez, 80 Nev. at 565-66, 397 P.2d at 4 (citation omitted). Had the appellant's disability been readily observable by the jurors, objective in nature rather than subjective, an award for future pain and suffering might have been permitted without supporting medical opinion evidence. Id. at 566, 397 P.2d at 5. Lerner was a false imprisonment case where the appellant sought damages for future pain and suffering. The court again stated that in cases involving subjective physical injury, ... the claim must be substantially supported by expert testimony to the effect that future pain and suffering is a probable consequence rather than a mere possibility. Lerner, 83 Nev. at 79-80, 423 P.2d at 40. Contrary to Imperial's assertion, Paul's testimony was not the only evidence of her future pain, suffering, and disability. The doctor testified in his deposition regarding her disability and, to some extent, her pain and suffering, and Paul demonstrated her disability to the jury. Because of this supporting evidence and because Paul's disability was not subjective, Gutierrez and Lerner are distinguishable from this case. Paul provided sufficient evidence of future pain, suffering, and disability to allow the jury to award such damages. Imperial also claims that Paul agreed not to argue the issue of future damages, but then did so. This is not correct. Imperial actually acknowledged in its opening statement that Paul suffered continuing disability, and it objected only to instructing the jury on future medical expenses and future pain and suffering. Paul never agreed not to argue for future damages for disability. The district court's ruling in regard to future pain and suffering was not so clear. The court directed Paul not to argue specific figures in regard to future medical expenses and perhaps future pain and suffering. Both concepts came up, and the court did not distinguish them. Regardless of the court's intentions, it is clear that Paul's counsel only agreed not to argue a specific figure for any future medical expenses: he specifically agreed to raise only the need to buy aspirin and Tylenol and not to argue that more surgery was contemplated. These are matters of medical expenses, not pain and suffering. In his closing argument, he conformed to that agreement, confining his discussion of future medical expenses to aspirin and Tylenol. He then argued for future damages for pain, suffering, and disability and suggested a figure of $200,000.00. This argument was proper given both the district court's ruling and the facts presented. Moreover, Imperial did not object to this argument, which suggests that it did not feel that Paul's counsel had violated the court's ruling. We conclude that jury instruction 17a regarding future damages was proper, that Paul argued properly under the instruction, and that the district court erred in ordering a new trial on this basis.