Opinion ID: 889274
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 50 Did Ankeny's trial counsel provide effective assistance? ¶ 51 Ankeny contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because counsel failed to object to the admission of hearsay statements allegedly made by Carter to Nisbet; the admission of the 9-1-1 tapes made by Nisbet; and the prosecutor's numerous references to her belief in Ankeny's guilt. ¶ 52 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are mixed questions of law and fact that we review de novo. State v. Gunderson, 2010 MT 166. ¶ 66, 357 Mont. 142, 237 P.3d 74 (citing State v. Crosley, 2009 MT 126, ¶ 27, 350 Mont. 223, 206 P.3d 932, overruled in part by Robinson v. State, 2010 MT 108, 356 Mont. 282, 232 P.3d 403; State v. Herrman, 2003 MT 149, ¶ 18, 316 Mont. 198, 70 P.3d 738). Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution guarantee an individual the right to the effective assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions. When this Court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we employ the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Gunderson, ¶ 67 (citing Crosley, ¶ 54; State v. Kougl, 2004 MT 243, ¶ 11, 323 Mont. 6, 97 P.3d 1095). This test requires that the defendant establish (1) that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Gunderson, ¶ 67. ¶ 53 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy both parts of the Strickland test. Gunderson, ¶ 68 (citing Whitlow v. State, 2008 MT 140, ¶ 11, 343 Mont. 90, 183 P.3d 861; Adams v. State, 2007 MT 35, ¶ 22, 336 Mont. 63, 153 P.3d 601). Consequently, if a defendant makes an insufficient showing regarding one part of the test, there is no need to address the other part. Gunderson, ¶ 68. ¶ 54 As to the first part of the test, Strickland provides that a reviewing court `must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance' and the defendant `must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.' Whitlow, ¶ 21 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065). And, as to the second part of the test, we have stated that [a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Crosley, ¶ 55 (quoting State v. Harris, 2001 MT 231, ¶ 19, 306 Mont. 525, 36 P.3d 372, overruled in part by Robinson v. State, 2010 MT 108, 356 Mont. 282, 232 P.3d 403). ¶ 55 Before this Court may reach the merits of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal, we must determine whether the allegations are properly before us. Gunderson, ¶ 70 (citing Hagen v. State, 1999 MT 8, ¶ 11, 293 Mont. 60, 973 P.2d 233). If the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are based on facts of record, they must be raised on direct appeal. But, if the claims cannot be documented from the record, then they must be raised in a petition for postconviction relief. Gunderson, ¶ 70. ¶ 56 We stated in Gunderson that [t]he test to determine if an ineffective assistance claim is properly brought on direct appeal is whether the record contains the answer to `why' counsel took, or failed to take, action in providing a defense. State v. Upshaw, 2006 MT 341, ¶ 33, 335 Mont. 162, 153 P.3d 579 (citing State v. White, 2001 MT 149, ¶ 20, 306 Mont. 58, 30 P.3d 340). If the record on appeal explains why, we will then address the issue on appeal. If, however, the claim is based on matters outside the record on appeal, we may refuse to address the issue on appeal and allow the defendant to file a postconviction proceeding where the defendant can develop a record as to why counsel acted as alleged, thus allowing the court to determine whether counsel's performance was ineffective or merely a tactical decision. Kougl, ¶ 14 (We also pointed out in Kougl that it is sometimes unnecessary to ask why in the first instance as when counsel is faced with an obligatory, and therefore non-tactical, action. The question then is not why but whether counsel acted, and if so, if counsel acted adequately.). Gunderson, ¶ 71. ¶ 57 In the case sub judice, Ankeny complained that his trial counsel failed to object to the admission of hearsay statements allegedly made by Carter to Nisbet; the admission of the 9-1-1 tapes made by Nisbet; and the prosecutor's numerous references to her belief in Ankeny's guilt. Because such claims involve omissions, they are frequently ill-suited for direct appeal. Gunderson, ¶ 77 (citing State v. Taylor, 2010 MT 94, ¶ 21, 356 Mont. 167, 231 P.3d 79). ¶ 58 As to the admission of the hearsay statements allegedly made by Carter to Nisbet, there is a record-based explanation for why counsel did not object. And, as the State points out in its brief on appeal, that record-based explanation actually shows proficient performance by defense counsel rather than deficient performance. After a discussion with the judge on the record, defense counsel conceded that this was not hearsay because it was a prior inconsistent statement. [1] Ankeny now concedes this point in his reply brief on appeal. ¶ 59 As to Ankeny's other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel's failure to object to the admission of the 9-1-1 tapes made by Nisbet and the prosecutor's numerous references to her belief in Ankeny's guilt, the record in this case contains no information on whether counsel's failure to object was reasonable under the circumstances or due to deficient performance. Accordingly, we hold that these claims are best suited for review in a postconviction proceeding and we dismiss these claims without prejudice.