Opinion ID: 562148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Effect of the Reprisal Claim

Text: 22 In his petition for Board review, Cruz recognized that his reprisal claim rested on the absence of reasonable grounds for proposing his removal: 23 In the absence of sustainable charges and substantive documentation, and in the presence of so many procedural violations, it can only be concluded that there was another reason for the agency's actions; and that reason is my prior EEO involvement. 24 The opposite of Cruz' scenario is present here, where there was strong evidence that the charges constituted good cause, there was substantive documentation, and his resignation precluded all procedures on the proposal. We repeat that the only agency action here was the notification of intent to remove in view of serious charges. The AJ found and the Board affirmed the finding that the Navy fully believed the charges would be sustained. Under such objective circumstances the Navy would have been remiss if it had condoned Cruz' conduct by failing to bring the charges it brought. In cases properly before this court, i.e., those not involving discrimination, the Board's jurisdiction over an allegedly involuntary resignation has been determined by an evaluation of objective facts without exploration of the subjective motivation of either the employee or the agency. Indeed, this court's evenhanded approach has been to ignore assertions of allegedly evil agency motives in finding resignations voluntary, and to ignore allegedly proper motives in finding resignations involuntary. See Christie, 518 F.2d at 587; Scharf v. Dept. of the Air Force, 710 F.2d 1572, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1983); Covington v. Department of Health and Human Services, 750 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed.Cir.1984). To look to motive in this case would thus be contrary to clear precedent. 25 It must be remembered that the asserted act of reprisal here is the Navy's bringing of the charges. The sole issue here is the Board's jurisdiction, and that issue resolves into whether Cruz' resignation was voluntary or involuntary because obtained by coercion, deception or the like. All evidence of involuntariness must be considered, but the reprisal assertion, if the Board had independent jurisdiction over it, would be subsumed by the findings of no coercion, or deception, or other improper agency act. 5 Though we obviously do not here decide whether reprisal may or may not have been among the motives of Cruz' supervisors, we cannot hold that the bringing of numerous, valid, serious and sustainable charges of conduct that destroys the efficiency of the service constitutes coercion to resign. To so hold would be contrary to precedent and to common sense. This court has repeatedly held that the imminence of a less desirable alternative does not render involuntary the choice made. Sammt v. United States, 780 F.2d 31, 32 (Fed.Cir.1985); Schultz v. United States Navy, 810 F.2d 1133, 1136 (Fed.Cir.1987); Griessenauer v. Department of Energy, 754 F.2d 361, 364 (Fed.Cir.1985); Covington v. Department of Health and Human Services, 750 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed.Cir.1984) (dicta); Taylor v. United States, 591 F.2d 688, 692, 219 Ct.Cl. 86 (1979); Christie v. United States, 518 F.2d 584, 587-88, 207 Ct.Cl. 333 (1975). 26 Cruz' primary assertion in his appeal here is that the Board should have decided his reprisal claim and notified him of a right to appeal that decision to the EEOC or a district court because the agency's January 29, 1988 letter was in reprisal for filing his 1987 EEOC complaint. 6 But that mere assertion does not provide a basis for Board jurisdiction in this voluntary resignation case. First, a petitioner's mere assertion cannot create jurisdiction. Second, as above indicated, bringing charges, for whatever reason, is not in itself an agency action appealable to the Board. Nor are discriminatory acts in themselves agency actions appealable to the Board. A statute, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2302(b), makes reprisal a prohibited personnel practice, but that statute is not an independent source of Board jurisdiction. Wren v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 681 F.2d 867, 871-73 (D.C.Cir.1982). 27 Nor would a source of jurisdiction be created by accepting, arguendo, Cruz' label for his reprisal assertion: Title VII claim of discrimination. The Board has not been granted jurisdiction over Title VII claims per se, i.e., over pure or naked Title VII claims unaccompanied by an appealable action over which the Board does have jurisdiction. Cruz on this appeal attempts to convert his attempted appeal under Title 5, U.S.C. to a suit for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. As above indicated, when discrimination is asserted in an appeal from a removal or other appealable adverse agency action over which the Board has jurisdiction, the case is a mixed case and the Board must decide the merits of the appealable action and whether it was a discriminatory act. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7702. In such cases, the Board routinely notifies appellants of a right to EEOC review. Where, as here, it has been found that there never was an appealable adverse agency action, the case is not a mixed case, Sec. 7702 is not involved, and the Board correctly determined that it was without jurisdiction to consider Cruz' claim of procedural error or his reprisal assertion, or any other claim beyond the Board's jurisdiction. That holding and our affirmance break no new ground. See Manning v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 742 F.2d 1424 (Fed.Cir.1984) (jurisdiction lacking over reassignment, no jurisdiction to consider allegation reassignment was in reprisal for exercise of First Amendment rights); Synan v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 765 F.2d 1099, 1101 (Fed.Cir.1985) (rejecting reliance on Sec. 7702 because suspension was not an appealable action and refusing to transfer discrimination claims to district court where Board lacked jurisdiction over suspension of 14 days or less: Reliance on Sec. 7702(a)(1) is of no help to petitioner either, because the discrimination-based action must be one that is appealable.); Sammt v. United States, 780 F.2d 31 (Fed.Cir.1985); and Wren, supra. For the same reason, the Board correctly declined to refer to any right of EEOC review and Cruz' motion for transfer of this case to a district court must be denied. 28 In Wren v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 681 F.2d 867 (D.C.Cir.1982), a case in which the agency action was a removal, Wren, a probationary employee, was removed for unsatisfactory performance, uncooperativeness, and failure to attend performance seminars. She appealed to the Board and also sought an investigation by the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) of her assertions of reprisal for her alleged whistle blowing. Her appeal to the Board was based on her claim that her removal was in reprisal for the same whistle blowing. The Board dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over appeals filed by probationary employees removed during the probation period. Wren appealed the Board's dismissal to the court, but argued that the court should remand with instructions that the Board order OSC to complete an investigation of Wren's reprisal assertions. Though it criticized OSC's apparent failure to perform its statutory duty, the court affirmed the dismissal. Circuit Judge, later Chief Judge, Wald stated: 29 The only matter properly before this court is the Board's decision that it had no jurisdiction over Wren's appeal from the Army's adverse personnel action. We find that decision a correct one. Accordingly, we must affirm the decision of the Board. 30 681 F.2d at 869. 31 Therefore, if the OSC fails to perform its statutory duties, as here, relief--if it lies at all--must be sought in a separate action in the district court to compel the OSC to perform its statutory duties. 32 681 F.2d at 872. 33 However, the proper remedy for the OSC's failure cannot be an appendage to this appeal from a legally correct decision of the Board that it had no jurisdiction to consider petitioner's appeal from her job termination. 34 681 F.2d at 875. 35 Lack of jurisdiction is lack of jurisdiction. If, as in Wren, a claim that a removal was an act of reprisal cannot be an appendage to an appeal from a Board dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over a probationary employee it is at least difficult to see how a claim that the mere bringing of charges was an act of reprisal can be an appendage to this appeal from a Board dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over a voluntary resignee. 36 Here, as it was in Wren, the question is not whether a reprisal claim should be heard but where and under what conditions it should be heard. As the court did in Wren, we hold only that it can't be heard as part of a case over which the Board has no jurisdiction.