Opinion ID: 891695
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonable minds could differ regarding whether Defendant (1) acted with willful disregard for Victim's safety and (2) was subjectively aware of the danger or risk his actions posed to Victim, so he thereby acted with criminal negligence.

Text: {17} The State argues that the evidence adduced at trial reveals no act ascribed to Defendant that would allow any rational jury to conclude that the most culpable mens rea Defendant possessed was criminal negligence. According to the State, the evidence supports only two conclusions regarding Defendant's mental state: (1) that Defendant killed Victim intentionally, or (2) that Victim's death was an accident. As the State points out, neither of these conclusions comports with a mind-set of criminal negligence. However, our review indicates that sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to allow reasonable minds to differ regarding whether Defendant possessed the required criminal negligence to support giving an involuntary manslaughter instruction. {18} In New Mexico, the State must show at least criminal negligence to convict a criminal defendant of involuntary manslaughter. Yarborough, 1996-NMSC-068, ¶ 20, 122 N.M. 596, 930 P.2d 131. Because involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional killing, we only attach felony liability where the actor has behaved with the requisite mens rea. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. This Court has made clear that the criminal negligence standard applies to all three categories of involuntary manslaughter. State v. Salazar, 1997-NMSC-044, ¶ 54, 123 N.M. 778, 945 P.2d 996 ([I]nvoluntary manslaughter, whether premised upon a lawful or unlawful act, requires a showing of criminal negligence.). Criminal negligence exists where the defendant act[s] with willful disregard of the rights or safety of others and in a manner which endanger[s] any person or property. Henley, 2010-NMSC-039, ¶ 16, 148 N.M. 359, 237 P.3d 103 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); UJI 14-133 NMRA. We also require that the defendant must possess subjective knowledge of the danger or risk to others posed by his or her actions. Henley, 2010-NMSC-039, ¶ 17, 148 N.M. 359, 237 P.3d 103. {19} Reasonable minds could differ regarding whether Defendant's scuffle with Victim was a criminally negligent act. As we have discussed, Defendant and Victim engaged in a verbal quarrel that escalated into a physical confrontation in which Defendant's actions caused Victim's fall and subsequent death. Ample evidence was provided to support the view that Defendant engaged in the dispute and behaved in a fashion that exposed Victim to danger without intending her death. Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably have concluded that Defendant demonstrated a willful disregard of Victim's safety. In addition, Defendant's subjective knowledge of the danger posed by his conduct could be inferred by a rational jury from the evidence presented. See State v. McCrary, 100 N.M. 671, 673-74, 675 P.2d 120, 122-23 (1984). Even though Defendant contended at trial that he was unaware of the danger posed by his actions, a jury could infer from the circumstances that Defendant possessed the required subjective knowledge. As the State suggested at trial, a jury could conclude that Defendant was aware of the danger or risk to others posed by his ... actions when he caused Victim to fall on the hard asphalt, a commonly understood peril. See Henley, 2010-NMSC-039, ¶ 17, 148 N.M. 359, 237 P.3d 103. {20} The State's contention that no act ascribed to Defendant would enable any rational jury to conclude that he committed an act of criminal negligence once again disregards the standard applicable to the review of denied jury instructions. The State's view of the evidence that Defendant tracked [the Victim] down, rousted her from her hiding place, knocked her to the ground and, when she tried to get up, forcefully threw her headfirst into the asphalt is better suited to argue a sufficiency of the evidence challenge where we view the evidence in a light most favorable to a conviction. State v. Romero, 2005-NMCA-060, ¶ 18, 137 N.M. 456, 112 P.3d 1113. However, as we have explained, when considering the propriety of a denied jury instruction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the giving of the requested instruction[s]. Boyett, 2008-NMSC-030, ¶ 12, 144 N.M. 184, 185 P.3d 355 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {21} For the foregoing reasons, we determine that sufficient evidence has been presented to allow reasonable minds to differ regarding whether Defendant acted with criminal negligence during his scuffle with Victim. Rudolfo, 2008-NMSC-036, ¶ 27, 144 N.M. 305, 187 P.3d 170.