Opinion ID: 1577535
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Viability of Gilmer's Wrongful-Supervision, Negligence, and Wantonness Claims

Text: The main opinion correctly explains why Gilmer's breach-of-contract claim, suppression claim, and tort-of-outrage claim, though each is ultimately dependent for its success on the fact that the embalmer was not properly licensed, do not constitute per se causes of action for the violation of the licensing statute, § 34-13-112, Ala. Code 1975. I do not see why the same reasoning the main opinion applies to these three claims does not apply with equal force and effect to Gilmer's claim that Crestview and Jones engaged in negligent or wrongful supervision [4] and that, as a result, someone in their employ who was not licensed to perform embalming services embalmed the body of Gilmer's husband. The gravamen of this latter claim, insofar as the damages aspect, is not that the embalming necessarily was done incompetently, but rather that Gilmer has suffered mental anguish from the uncertainties and doubts, including the loss of trust and peace of mind, resulting from knowing that someone embalmed her husband's body who was not properly licensed to do so. Crestview and Jones's wrongful supervision, according to this claim, allowed this to happen. The main opinion relies on the fact that, in the normal negligent or wrongful-supervision claim, the act that directly causes injury to the plaintiff is the incompetent performance of employment duties by an employeethus the principle espoused in the main opinion that, in order to make out a negligent-supervision claim, the employer must have known (or reasonably should have known) of the employee's incompetence. 35 So.3d at 596 (citing Armstrong Bus. Servs., Inc. v. AmSouth Bank, 817 So.2d 665, 682 (Ala.2001)). Here, because the direct cause of injury to Gilmer is not that the embalming was done incompetently, but rather that it was done by someone not properly licensed, what must be shown is that the employer knew (or reasonably should have known) that the employee performing the embalming was not licensed. To the same extent Crestview and Jones knew or should have known this fact for purposes of the tort theories of suppression and outrage, as to which the main opinion reverses the judgment for the defendants, they knew or should have known this fact for purposes of the wrongful-supervision theory. I am of the same view with respect to what the main opinion refers to as Gilmer's claim of negligence and/or wantonness. Clearly, this claim also arises from common-law principles and not per se from the violation of the licensing statute. In addition, unlike the main opinion, I conclude that Gilmer's brief sufficiently presents the viability of these claims to this Court. Gilmer argues that she does not assert any private cause of action based solely on Barry Taul's non-licensure status. In the section of her brief titled Crestview's `Legal' Arguments, she takes on and exposits numerous cases cited by Crestview for the proposition that Gilmer is merely claiming `negligence per se' for the statutory violations. Much of Gilmer's discussion of these cases and the cases she discusses in the section of her brief titled More Applicable Case Law supports the view that her negligence/wantonness claim is based on well-established common-law principles and is not a per se cause of action derived merely from the fact that the embalmer was not licensed under the statute. Among other things, Gilmer discusses Knight v. Burns, Kirkley & Williams Construction Co., 331 So.2d 651 (Ala.1976), and Murray v. Alabama Power Co., 413 So.2d 1109 (Ala.1982), for the proposition that, while a statutory violation usually does not create a new remedy or constitute negligence per se, a statutory violation ... may aid in showing the wrongfulness of a party's conduct. (Emphasis added.) For example, Gilmer cites Knight for the proposition that [a]s to a traditional common-law negligence-based cause of action, the federal regulations at issue in that case could be admissible in determining the standard of care. She then concludes that references to applicable statutory provisions may assist the jury in deciding the wrongfulness of a party's conduct under the particular circumstances and that statutory references establish that Crestview and the individual defendants fully appreciated the wrongfulness of their conduct in allowing Barry Taul to embalm Jack Gilmer's body and the outrageousness of the attempted cover-up. Based on the foregoing, I dissent as to the main opinion's disposition of Gilmer's wrongful-supervision claim and her claims alleging negligence and wantonness. Consequently, I also dissent from the main opinion's decision to affirm the judgment in favor of Jones [i]n light of [its] earlier disposition of the negligent-supervision claim. 35 So.3d at 596.