Opinion ID: 1361767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Chaudhry's motion to amend

Text: Finally, Chaudhry argues that the district court should have let him amend his complaint after granting Nucor's motion to dismiss. The district court granted Nucor's motion to dismiss Chaudhry's first complaint and simultaneously entered final judgment, which eviscerated Chaudhry's ability to amend his complaint. Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286, 1289 (7th Cir.1995) (If final judgment is entered dismissing the case, however, the plaintiff loses [his right to amend].). Although Chaudhry quickly filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint two days after the court granted Nucor's motion to dismiss, he did not invoke Rule 59 or 60 until he filed his reply brief two weeks later, when he asked the court to construe his motion to amend as a timely filed motion to reopen. The district court, relying on the filing date of the reply brief (rather than the filing date of the original motion to amend), held that the motion was too late for Rule 59 purposes. The district court could have construed Chaudhry's motion to amend as a timely filed Rule 59 motion but it chose not to do so. See Camp, 67 F.3d at 1290 (district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting amended complaint to be filed following dismissal of original action and treating such motion as a properly filed motion for relief from judgment). The district court also declined to find justification to reopen the case under Rule 60. Because we are remanding the case, Chaudhry may refile his motion to amend (which we assume he will do) so we need not consider whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Chaudhry's motion to reopen. But we note the district court's treatment of this case. First, terminating a case on the same day that a court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint is a somewhat unorthodox practice. See Foster v. DeLuca, No. 05-1491, 545 F.3d 582, 584, 2008 WL 4378173, at  (7th Cir. Sept.29, 2008). Second, although a district court is not compelled to treat a motion to amend as a motion to reopen, see Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Services, Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 784 (7th Cir.1994), it seems a bit hyper-technical for the court to have denied Chaudhry's motion on that basis. Paganis v. Blonstein, 3 F.3d 1067, 1074 (7th Cir.1993) (Cudahy, J. concurring). Although we appreciate that Chaudhry had three months after Ledbetter was issued to amend his complaint with a section 1981 claim, Chaudhry acted expeditiously after the dismissal, the record indicates that discovery had barely begun, and it is not clear that his amendment would have been futile.