Opinion ID: 1465135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Emotional Outburst

Text: After the testimony of Clarke, Jr., the last witness to testify before the parties rested, the transcript states: (There was an outburst in the courtroom from the plaintiff, Armand Silva.) The court admonished Silva and the following exchange then took place: Mr. Silva: He's a big liar. The Court: I suggest you're not doing your own case any good, sir. Mr. Silva: Sir, I'm hurt. The trial justice thereupon directed the jury to ignore these remarks. The defendant did not move to pass the case at that time and is precluded from urging on appeal that the trial justice erred in failing to pass the case on his own motion. The defendant further argues, as we have already indicated, that the cumulative effect upon the jury of these several extraordinary events was so prejudicial that it interfered with the right to a fair trial, and consequently required that the case be passed. Although defendant cites no authority to support its position, we surmise that it is probably relying on State v. Pepper, 103 R.I. 310, 318, 237 A.2d 330, 335 (1968). In that case we held that a series of rulings, none of which standing alone was prejudicial, could nonetheless have a combined effect that was sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial. But each of the rulings in Pepper was erroneous, whereas the rulings complained of in this case were not only nonprejudicial but also not even erroneous. We are unable to comprehend how several rulings which individually are not erroneous can cumulatively constitute prejudicial error. The defendant's final contention is that the trial justice erred in denying its motion for a new trial. That contention is based upon two grounds, the first of which according to defendant's brief is that [t]he trial justice refused to instruct the jury as to the law of Cardente v. Maggiacomo, supra, and defendant submits therefore that it is entitled to a new trial. Under our procedure, however, a trial justice's refusal to charge is not a proper basis for a motion for a new trial and can be assigned as a ground of appeal only if a request was made to charge differently or if objection was made to the charge as given. Roland Bileau Transportation Co. v. Lodie Brien, Inc., 100 R.I. 723, 727, 219 A.2d 401, 403 (1966); Grassi v. Gomberg, 81 R.I. 302, 305, 102 A.2d 523, 525 (1954); 1 Kent, R.I.Civ. Prac. § 51.4 at 377, § 59.6 at 443 (1969). In this case neither the request nor the objection was made. The second ground is that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Instead of supporting that ground by pointing to evidence which the trial justice overlooked or misconceived, defendant urges in effect that its evidence was the more weighty and its witnesses the more credible, and that therefore the trial justice erred in not granting its motion for a new trial. Those arguments were in the first instance for the jury, and then for the trial justice; doubtlessly they were addressed to both; they have no place in appellate proceedings. Marstan Corp. v. Centreville Realty Co., 106 R.I. 36, 38, 256 A.2d 26, 27 (1969). The defendant's appeal is denied and dismissed, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court. PAOLINO, J., participated in the decision but retired prior to its announcement.