Opinion ID: 2978945
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant LaBo

Text: Defendant LaBo was granted summary judgment on the constitutional claims because the district court found that he was not a state actor. “We conduct de novo review of decisions granting summary judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Schs., 433 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations and quotations omitted). LaBo was the director of the Teen Peace program that YKR was required by court order to attend. Plaintiffs argue that since YKR was required to attend Teen Peace based on a court order from the state, and LaBo had responsibilities under the court order to report noncompliance by YKR, LaBo was a state actor. Plaintiffs must satisfy one of three tests to show that LaBo is a state actor: (1) the public function test; (2) the state compulsion test; or (3) the symbiotic relationship or nexus test. See Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825, 833 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc). It is unclear on appeal what test or tests Plaintiffs believe they can satisfy. They argue: “Teen Peace existed for the purpose of providing this service to the Court, became an integral part of the Court order, was compelled to report to the Court, and had the power to have children and parents incarcerated for failure to comply with their restrictions.” (Pls. Br. at 34-35). Since we cannot discern under what theory Plaintiffs believe LaBo is a state actor, we review all three tests. Under the public function test, a private party is a state actor if he exercises powers traditionally reserved exclusively to the state. Chapman, 319 F.3d at 833. “The public function test has been interpreted narrowly. Only functions like holding elections, exercising eminent domain, and operating a company-owned town, fall under this category of state action.” Id. (citations omitted). Providing counseling services to teenagers is not a power reserved exclusively to the state. Even if LaBo’s involvement were read more broadly to include providing court-ordered services to delinquents, the Court “conducts a historical analysis to determine whether the party has engaged in an action traditionally reserved to the state, and the plaintiff bears the burden of making that showing.” Wittstock v. Mark A. Van Sile, Inc., 330 F.3d 899, 902 (6th Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs have made no such historical argument in this case. LaBo is also not a state actor under the state compulsion test. “The state compulsion test requires that a state ‘exercise such coercive power or provide such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that in law the choice of the private actor is deemed to be that of the state.’” Lansing v. City of Memphis, 202 F.3d 821, 829 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992)). No evidence in the record indicates that LaBo is coerced by the state in his provision of services. Undoubtedly, LaBo was providing a service for the state, but the state did not control his actions in such a manner that it is responsible for his conduct. Plaintiffs have come forward with no evidence about the relationship between LaBo/Teen Peace and the state, the extent to which the state dictates to Teen Peace what services it must provide, the percentage of Teen Peace’s money that it receives from the state, or any other factor that would indicate the possibility of state coercion. See Wilcher v. City of Akron, 498 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that to satisfy the state compulsion test, “a plaintiff must allege and prove that state officials coerced or participated” in a company’s decision-making). Finally, LaBo is not a state actor under the nexus test. “Under the nexus test, the action of a private party constitutes state action when there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself.” S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Co., 499 F.3d 553, 565 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation omitted). The Supreme Court has found state action based on “pervasive entwinement” between a private actor and the state. Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001). In this case, the alleged actions of LaBo were not in any way connected with the state. Most prominently, Plaintiffs allege that LaBo “without jurisdiction or authority took the minor child out of the group setting under which he was ordered to conduct [sic].” (Amen. Compl. ¶ 75). The state had no role in how LaBo conducted his evaluations and certainly was not involved in the decision to take YKR out of the group setting. To support their claim that LaBo was a state actor, Plaintiffs merely assert that “Labo was appointed by the Court for a specific purpose, therefore he served in an extra-judicial capacity in which he was required to perform specific acts and report directly to the Court. As an extra-judicial personnel, Labo had a duty to protect the constitutional rights of the litigants.” (Amen. Compl. ¶ 75). Plaintiffs cite no cases to support their proposition that when a private not-for-profit receives cases from the juvenile court, they automatically become a state actor. LaBo’s actions simply do not have a sufficient nexus to the state. LaBo met with YKR on four occasions. He submitted two reports to the juvenile court. The first recounted YKR’s allegations of abuse, as mandated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-403. The second report merely stated that YKR had stopped attending Teen Peace meetings. While not binding authority on this Court, we agree with analysis from the Ninth Circuit in a case alleging constitutional violations by a court-appointed guardian ad litem. Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2003). In considering the “nexus test,” the Court found: [T]here are significant links between the position of the guardian and the government. As [plaintiff] observes, the guardian is appointed by a state actor, is paid by the state, and is subject to regulation by state law. But there the nexus ends. Where the guardian reports to the court, she reports as an independent investigator. Where the guardian acts as an advocate of the child, she occupies a role distinct from the court before which she advocates. Id. at 1095. See also Holley v. Deal, 948 F. Supp. 711, 715 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (guardian ad litem is not a state actor where “state exercised no coercive power over [defendant’s] independent judgment . . .”). We further agree with the Ninth Circuit that “it is conceivable that a more expansive type of guardianship role could satisfy the nexus test.” Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1095. We can imagine that some court-appointed programs for juveniles could be sufficiently intertwined with state functions that the participants can be found to be state actors. Here, however, the only nexus presented by Plaintiffs is that the juvenile court ordered YKR into the Teen Peace program, and LaBo had reporting requirements back to the juvenile court. Plaintiffs have not cited, and we are not independently aware of, any case where the mere referral to a private entity confers state actor status on an otherwise private entity. While Plaintiffs’ complaint makes allegations that LaBo had control over what happened to YKR in the juvenile court proceedings, she has come forward with no evidence that the reports of a private individual had a binding impact on the court. These referral and reporting requirements are insufficient to make LaBo’s personal actions in providing counseling services through Teen Peace state action, and summary judgment for LaBo was therefore appropriate.