Opinion ID: 852913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sentence Modification Instruction

Text: The defendant also contends that the trial court erred during the penalty phase of the trial by giving Instruction No. 14: If the defendant files a request to modify the sentence imposed by the judge within three hundred and sixty-five days after the date of sentencing, the judge has discretion to modify the sentence over the objection of the prosecutor. If the defendant files a request to modify the sentence after three hundred and sixty-five days have past since sentencing, the judge does not have any discretion to modify the sentence unless the prosecutor agrees. Appellant's Appendix, vol. II, p. 458. This instruction arises from Indiana Code § 35-38-1-17, which provides in relevant part: (a) Within three hundreds sixty-five (365) days after: (1) the defendant begins serving his sentence; (2) a hearing at which the defendant is present and of which the prosecuting attorney has been notified; and (3) obtaining a report from the department of correction concerning the defendant's conduct while imprisoned; the court may reduce or suspend the sentence. The court must incorporate its reasons in the record. (b) If more than three hundred sixty-five (365) days have elapsed since the defendant began serving the sentence and after a hearing at which the convicted person is present, the court may reduce or suspend the sentence, subject to the approval of the prosecuting attorney.... ... (d) The court may suspend a sentence for a felony under this section only if suspension is permitted under IC XX-XX-X-X. Indiana Code § 35-50-2-2(a) generally provides that the sentencing court may suspend any part of a sentence for a felony. This is limited by subsection 2(b), which states that, with respect to certain enumerated crimes, including murder, the court may suspend only that part of the sentence that is in excess of the minimum sentence. The defendant asserts that Instruction No. 14 correctly states the law, and the State agrees. [6] The defendant, however, contends that giving the instruction over his objection constituted reversible error because it was incomplete and therefore misleading for two reasons. First, he argues that, if the penalty statute, Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9, as amended, is construed to make the jury's recommendation binding upon the court such that the sentence may not be modified pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-38-1-17 (quoted above), then giving the instruction improperly diminished in the jurors' minds the importance and binding effect of their decision favoring life without parole. Second, the defendant urges that the instruction failed to inform the jury that, if he is sentenced to a term of years, the sentence could not be suspended below the minimum sentence provided by statute for the charged offense of murder. He urges that this left the jurors wondering whether, despite their recommendation, the defendant may ultimately walk out on probation. Br. of Appellant at 20. The State responds that Instruction No. 14 did not misstate the law or mislead the jury. It argues that the instruction aided the jury in understanding the full range of sentencing available should the jury not choose life without parole. The State points to other instructions that informed the jury of the minimum sentence for murder and the availability of credit time, and argues there was no basis in the instructions for the jury to speculate that the defendant might eventually be released on probation. The defendant's trial objection to Instruction No. 14, while adequately preserving his claim that the instruction was incomplete, did not assert that the instruction diminished the jurors' sense of the importance and binding effect of their decision. The defendant's stated objection was: that any modification can only be in accordance with law, that is the sentence could not be modified to anything other than in accorother than that which the court could have imposed at the original sentencing and, therefore, may lead the jury to believe that at some time in the future it is possible that a defendant could receive something less than what their recommendation might be. Transcript vol. 6, p. 920. The defendant may not appeal the giving of an instruction on grounds not distinctly presented at trial. Ind. Trial Rule 51(C); Scisney v. State, 701 N.E.2d 847, 849 (Ind.1998) (concluding that appellate review of a claim of error in the giving of a jury instruction requires a timely trial objection clearly identifying both the claimed objectionable matter and the grounds for the objection); Mitchem v. State, 685 N.E.2d 671, 675 (Ind.1997) (waiving one of defendant's alleged errors where defendant failed to distinctly state his objection and the grounds for it at trial). In Luna v. State, 758 N.E.2d 515, 518 (Ind.2001), the defendant made a timely trial objection and identified the claimed objectionable matter but the objection did not clearly identify the grounds for the objection (emphasis added). We held in Luna that a defendant must identify specific grounds in support of an objection to an incorrect jury instruction, particularly where the trial court focuses its attention on the language of a misleading or incomplete proposed instruction. Id. Because the Luna defendant failed to state the ground for her objection that she later asserted on appeal, we considered her argument waived. Similarly, the defendant here may not claim on appeal that the instruction diminished the jury's sense of the importance and binding effect of its decision. Notwithstanding the fact that the defendant's claim is procedurally defaulted by reason of the failure to present this claim at trial, we nevertheless observe that reversal is also unwarranted on the merits of this claim. The Supreme Court in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), held unconstitutional a prosecutor's closing arguments to a jury which misinformed the jury regarding sentencing and thereby undermined the jury's sense of responsibility for the sentence imposed. We do not believe that the jury's sense of responsibility could reasonably have been undermined by the omission of language in Instruction No. 14 explaining the limits on a judge's authority to suspend or reduce a sentence within 365 days of sentencing. The jury was advised in its preliminary penalty phase instructions that their recommendation [was] an important part of the sentencing process and that [t]he law requires that the judge follow [its] sentencing recommendation. Appellant's Appendix at 442. Furthermore, during the final penalty phase instructions, Instruction No. 15, read to the jury immediately following Instruction No. 14 that the defendant challenges, declared: The law requires that [the jury's] recommendation in regard to sentencing be followed by the judge. [7] Id. at 459. We conclude that the relatively insubstantial omission in Instruction No. 14 could not reasonably have led the jury to speculate that the trial judge would reduce or suspend the sentence below the minimum statutory sentence for the offense of murder, thereby improperly undermining their sense of responsibility for their decision. As to the defendant's claim, raised at trial, that Instruction No. 14 misled the jurors regarding whether, if they recommended a term of years, he could be prematurely released, we acknowledge that the instruction did not advise the jury that the trial court may not suspend a sentence for less than the minimum forty-five year statutory sentence for murder. [8] We consider the instructions as a whole and in reference to each other and do not reverse the trial court for an abuse of that discretion unless the instructions as a whole mislead the jury as to the law in the case. Carter v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377, 382 (Ind.2002). An error in a particular instruction results in reversal only where the entire body of instructions misleads the jury as to the law in the case. Edgecomb v. State, 673 N.E.2d 1185, 1196 (Ind.1996). Instruction No. 10 explained the sentencing consequences if life imprisonment without parole is not imposed. It stated that a judge could impose a sentence on the defendant ranging from a minimum of forty-five years if the sentences are ordered served concurrently to a maximum of one hundred and thirty years if the sentences are ordered served consecutively. Appellant's Appendix at 454. Instruction No. 11 related to the reduction of a term of years for earned credit time that could reduce time served to fifty percent of the sentence imposed by the judge. Id. at 455. Taking the instructions as a whole, we are not persuaded that Instruction No. 14, by generally mentioning that the judge has discretion to modify the sentence could reasonably have lead the jury to improperly speculate that the defendant may ultimately walk out on probation as argued by the defendant. There was no significant possibility that the jury was misled to believe that the defendant could be prematurely released.