Opinion ID: 2637243
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Excusing Two Prospective Jurors for Cause

Text: Defendant contends the court erred in excusing two prospective jurors for cause over his objection. The court excused the first prospective juror because the deputy district attorney who was prosecuting this case had previously prosecuted her son's uncle on rape charges and obtained a conviction. The prospective juror said she did not know what the charges against the uncle had been, but she knew he was in prison at the time of trial. A party may challenge a prospective juror for actual bias, defined as a state of mind that would prevent that person from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party. ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 488, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754.) [T]he qualification of jurors challenged for cause [is a] matter[ ] within the wide discretion of the trial court, seldom disturbed on appeal. ( Odle v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 932, 944, 187 Cal.Rptr. 455, 654 P.2d 225.) We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in excusing this juror. A trial court could reasonably conclude that a prospective juror would be biased against a prosecutor who had personally prosecuted for rape a man who would have been her brother-in-law had she married her son's father. Moreover, any error was harmless. Generally, error in excusing jurors for reasons not related to their views regarding the death penalty does not require setting aside the judgment. ( People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1037, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 988 P.2d 531; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 656, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213). Defendant has a right to jurors who are qualified and competent, not to any particular juror. ( People v. Holt, supra, at p. 656, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) The court excused the second juror because of his views on the death penalty. Unlike error in excusing jurors for cause unrelated to their views on the death penalty, the erroneous exclusion of a prospective juror because of that person's views on the death penalty is reversible per se. ( People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 809, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865, italics omitted, citing Gray v. Mississippi (1987) 481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622.) But we see no error. The trial court may excuse for cause a prospective juror whose view on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties. On appeal, we uphold the trial court's ruling if the record fairly supports it, and we accept as binding the trial court's determination of the juror's true state of mind if the juror has made conflicting or ambiguous statements. ( People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 735, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302.) In this case, the prospective juror said some things suggesting that he could be fair to both sides and could impose the death penalty if appropriate. But, in response to questioning by the district attorney, he also stated that morally I'm opposed to [the death penalty] because I don't think anybody really has a right to take another person's life regardless, and it doesn't make it any more right for the government to do it than it is for an individual to do it. He reiterated, That's morally the way I feel. In response to the district attorney's statement that he, the district attorney, had trouble with the idea that you would abandon your own morality, he said, I have the same trouble. He agreed with the prosecutor that he might not be the best juror for a death penalty case although excellent for any other murder case.... The court excused the juror, stating that the more [the prosecutor] questioned, it's clear to me that [the juror] would never vote for the death penalty. In light of the juror's conflicting and ambiguous statements, we must accept the trial court's determination of his true state of mind. As the United States Supreme Court recently explained, Deference to the trial court is appropriate because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors. ( Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 2224, 167 L.Ed.2d 1014.) No error appears.