Opinion ID: 807595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion Claims

Text: Jones argues that both his initial exclusion from the courtroom and the trial court’s subsequent refusal to allow him to return to the courtroom violated clearly established Supreme Court precedent under Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). The Connecticut Supreme Court adjudicated these questions on the merits. See State v. Jones, 916 A.2d at 32-34 (initial exclusion); id. at 34-37 (subsequent exclusion). Thus, our first task is 13 determining whether either of the state court’s rulings “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,” Allen or other “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or whether either determination “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2).
The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court’s initial order to exclude Jones did not violate Allen because Jones had voluntarily consented to removal. See State v. Jones, 916 A.2d at 32-34. We find that this holding rests on an “unreasonable determination of the facts” within the meaning of § 2254(d)(2), but that any Allen error in excluding Jones was nonetheless harmless. This claim therefore provides no basis for granting the writ. The Connecticut Supreme Court determined that the trial court had ordered Jones removed because Jones had requested to leave, and not because he was disruptive. Id. With respect, we find that this holding cannot reasonably be reconciled with the trial transcript.1 On the morning of February 3, before the jury arrived, Jones’s counsel indicated that Jones disputed the court’s ruling of the previous day regarding Minnifield’s 1 The trial transcript is the same evidence upon which the state supreme court relied. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (providing that a writ “shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding” (emphasis added)). 14 testimony. After the court declined to reconsider the ruling and Jones had a chance to consult with his counsel, counsel stated: Mr. Jones is indicating to me, Your Honor – and I’ve tried to explain to him that as a result of what he considered to be this – the prejudicial impact of Miss Minnifield’s testimony that as a result of that he would choose personally at this point not to go further with the proceedings. Counsel also indicated that he had told Jones that there was “no legal way to interrupt, continue, stop the proceedings.” Jones interrupted, stating, “Your Honor, I – I don’t even want to be here then.” The court then engaged Jones in a discussion about whether he actually wished to remove himself from the courtroom. The court warned Jones that “[t]he case is going to proceed, you know, without you,” that Jones was “going to be prejudiced by this,” and repeatedly asked if Jones understood what he was doing. The colloquy, which spans more than four transcript pages, culminated in the following exchange, which we quote again in full due to its importance: THE COURT: Mr. Jones, you understand that you’re going to be prejudicing yourself by leaving today; you understand that? Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Well, I want to – I’m going to put a motion in to dismiss counsel, then. THE COURT: No, it’s – THE DEFENDANT: For the record. THE COURT: No, Mr. Jones, we’re proceeding – THE DEFENDANT: And I’ll take my case myself. THE COURT: – we are proceeding – THE DEFENDANT: I’ll take my case myself, Your Honor. THE COURT: – that’s denied, Mr. Jones. THE DEFENDANT: I have a right, Your Honor. That’s my 15 Constitutional right. THE COURT: All right. THE DEFENDANT: You’re laughing, but I’m serious. THE COURT: Marshals, remove Mr. Jones. A MARSHAL: Let’s go, Mr. Jones. THE DEFENDANT: I’m not going nowhere, man. A MARSHAL: Come on. THE DEFENDANT: No, I’m not going nowhere. A MARSHAL: Let’s go. THE DEFENDANT: Don’t touch me. The transcript then breaks off as a “scuffle ensued” in the courtroom. After order was restored, the trial court made a record that “Mr. Jones had to be physically restrained by a number of marshals.” Reviewing the transcript, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that “it was not the defendant’s conduct that precipitated his removal,” but rather that “the trial court ordered the defendant’s removal because the defendant had requested that he be permitted to leave the courtroom, which, although inadvisable, was the defendant’s right.” State v. Jones, 916 A.2d at 32. The high court noted that Jones “never explicitly stated that he had changed his mind about absenting himself from the courtroom,” and observed in a footnote that “it does not appear that the trial court perceived the defendant’s request to dismiss counsel and represent himself to be a sincere one.” Id. at 33 & n.17. Respectfully, we find the Connecticut Supreme Court’s finding of fact unreasonable.2 When Jones asserted that he would like to leave, the trial court did not 2 The Connecticut Supreme Court characterized its holding on this point as a finding of fact based on the transcript. See State v. Jones, 916 A.2d at 32 (“We reject this claim because it is predicated on a faulty factual premise. The record reflects that the trial court did not warn the defendant that he would be removed from the courtroom if he persisted in 16 accede to that request. Rather, it engaged him in a discussion of the consequences of a decision to absent himself from the trial. That was entirely proper, and indeed necessary, since a waiver of the right to be present at trial, “as the waiver of any constitutional right in a criminal proceeding, must be knowing and voluntary.” Polizzi v. United States, 926 F.2d 1311, 1319 (2d Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Tureseo, 566 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 2009) (at least in federal cases, “[t]o establish waiver, the District Court must conduct a record inquiry to determine whether the defendant’s absence was ‘knowing and voluntary’”). A criminal defendant, who is not an expert in criminal procedure or constitutional law, must generally be advised of the consequences of waiving his rights, and be found by the court to have made a knowing and voluntary waiver, before being permitted to waive such an important right as presence at trial. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (“[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and [] we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis added); cf. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (citing Zerbst and holding that a waiver of constitutional confrontation rights must be knowing misbehaving for the simple reason that it was not the defendant’s conduct that precipitated his removal.”). 17 and voluntary); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 484-87 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (collecting cases holding that waiver must be knowing and voluntary).3 If the trial court had concluded its colloquy, and Jones had still wished to leave the courtroom after understanding the consequences, the state supreme court’s reading of the situation would be correct. But the transcript indicates that the colloquy instead caused Jones to rethink his decision to leave the trial. Indeed, reconsideration was the intended effect of the colloquy. The trial court was correct that leaving would have prejudiced Jones by, for example, preventing him from participating in his own defense, and the entire point of advising a defendant about the consequences of a waiver is to give him the opportunity to decide whether, in light of those consequences, he persists in his desire to waive. Once the warnings had their intended effect, Jones indicated he wanted to fire his attorney and represent himself, a desire plainly inconsistent with waiving his presence in court. At a minimum, the record does not indicate that Jones had made any final decision to waive his right to be present at trial at the time the court ordered the marshals to “remove Mr. Jones.” Although the Connecticut Supreme Court correctly noted that Jones “never explicitly stated that he had changed his mind about absenting himself from the courtroom,” State v. Jones, 916 A.2d at 33, that observation cannot reasonably support a 3 Indeed, even a constructive waiver of the right to be present through disruptive behavior must in effect be knowing; in Allen, the Supreme Court held that a defendant must ordinarily be “warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior” before he may be removed. 397 U.S. at 343. 18 finding that Jones’s departure was voluntary. Indeed, to require the defendant expressly to revoke his earlier request, at least on the facts presented here, puts the burden in the wrong place. For Jones’s attempted waiver to be valid, the trial court was required to make sure that he understood the consequences of his decision, and that his waiver was knowing and intelligent. Polizzi, 926 F.2d at 1319; Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464. The trial court clearly understood this obligation, and proceeded to ask Jones whether he did indeed understand what he was doing. Since there is no indication that Jones’s initial request was knowing and intelligent, a voluntary waiver could not be sustained unless Jones reiterated his request after he was properly advised by the court. He never made such a request. To the contrary, Jones’s words and actions made clear that he did not wish to leave the courtroom. Jones’s comment about proceeding pro se, whether or not it was a “serious” request that could not be summarily denied without further inquiry, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), at a minimum indicated that Jones had rethought his decision to leave the courtroom. And certainly, the circumstances surrounding his exit do not show a man voluntarily departing. The immediate cause of his exit was the trial court’s order to the marshals, the execution of which Jones violently resisted. We therefore hold that the state supreme court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.4 4 The Supreme Court has not yet clarified the precise relationship between § 2254(d)(2), which provides that relief is only available if the state court decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 19 That Jones did not expressly waive his right to be present, however, does not dispose of the case. In addition to express waiver, a defendant may constructively waive his rights to be present at trial by disruptive behavior. Allen, 397 U.S. at 343. But the record here presents difficulties in assessing any contention that Jones was properly removed on that basis. The transcript shows a defendant who insisted on speaking personally with the court despite being represented by counsel and who persisted in arguing with the court about its rulings – behavior that, while contentious and improper, would not in itself warrant the extreme response of involuntary exclusion. Nevertheless, caution is appropriate in assessing the trial judge’s response to the interaction. Absent specific record findings by the judge about what occurred in the courtroom, a cold transcript provides no insight into tone of voice, body language, or possible overtly threatening behavior that might cast mere spoken words in a different light. The actual situation facing a judge in the real world is not limited to the words that a court reporter can transcribe. Cf. Harris v. Kuhlmann, 346 F.3d 330, 354 (2d Cir. 2003). In any event, State court proceeding,” and § 2254(e)(1), which provides that “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” See Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 848-49 (2010) (declining to reach the question). Our Circuit has also not yet decided the question. See Green v. Travis, 414 F.3d 288, 298 n.6 (2d Cir. 2005), citing Channer v. Brooks, 320 F.3d 188, 194 (2d Cir. 2003). We assume, without deciding, that § 2254(d)(2)’s unreasonableness standard is the proper one for review of this claim. We may so assume because even if “presumed to be correct” consistent with § 2254(e)(1), the state court’s conclusion cannot be supported by the transcript, which we find to be “clear and convincing evidence,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), contrary to the state court’s conclusion. Moreover, as we also hold, any error is harmless. Thus, the standard under which the state court’s findings are reviewed does not decide this case. 20 Jones’s violent resistance to the court’s removal order also supported a decision to continue the exclusion at least until he could comport himself appropriately, which purpose is implicit in the trial judge’s decision to declare a three-hour recess. It is not necessary, however, for us to decide whether AEDPA deference applies to our review of the trial court’s decision to exclude Jones5 or whether the exclusion was proper, because any error in the initial decision to remove Jones from the courtroom was harmless.6 See Lucky, 569 F.3d at 108 (stating that harmless error applies to erroneous 5 It is not clear that the trial court’s decision would receive heightened AEDPA deference, since it was not the final state adjudication of the exclusion claim on the merits. See Stenhouse v. Hobbs, 631 F.3d 888, 894-95 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Our court has not directly addressed whether, if the reasoning of the state appellate court cannot pass muster under AEDPA, the rationale of the state trial court also merits deference under § 2254(d).”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 308 (2011) . The usual rule, as stated by the Ninth Circuit, is that “[w]hen more than one state court has adjudicated a claim, we analyze the last reasoned decision,” Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005), and also defer only to that last reasoned decision, see id. at 1092-93 (declining to consider an intermediate state appellate court’s decision). See also Brian R. Means, Postconviction Remedies § 29:4 (2011); cf. Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44-45 (2011) (for retroactivity purposes, relevant state decision is the ultimate merits determination by a state court). We have previously discussed and deferred to both a state trial court’s initial decision and an appellate court’s affirmance thereof, see McKinney v. Artuz, 326 F.3d 87, 89, 100-01 (2d Cir. 2003), but that was in a case where, under the Ninth Circuit’s taxonomy, “the last reasoned decision adopted or substantially incorporated the reasoning from a previous decision and, as a result, it was reasonable for the reviewing court to look at both decisions to fully ascertain the reasoning of the last decision,” Barker, 423 F.3d at 1093. Nonetheless, because of our harmless error determination, we do not decide this question today. We note, however, that even on direct review, “a district court’s determination of whether the defendant waived his right to be present at a particular stage of trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Tureseo, 566 F.3d at 83. Thus, even without AEDPA deference, we would review the trial court’s decision here under a deferential standard. 6 Our finding of harmless error obviates the need to decide the first question in the certificate of appealability, i.e., whether Jones should have been warned before he was excluded. 21 exclusion from the courtroom); cf. Spears v. Greiner, 459 F.3d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 2006) (declining to decide whether to apply AEDPA deference because claim failed even without deference). Under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, a defendant has the right to be present at trial to confront the witnesses against him. See, e.g., Faretta, 422 U.S. at 816; Allen, 397 U.S. at 338. This right extends as a matter of due process to “critical stages” of the trial beyond the presentation of evidence when the defendant’s “presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Tureseo, 566 F.3d 77 at 83. No further trial proceedings occurred on February 3 after Jones was excluded. Immediately after the exclusion, the trial court ordered a three-hour recess to permit Jones to cool off and discuss his situation with defense counsel. After a colloquy with both the prosecution and the defense about how to proceed in light of Jones’s behavior, the trial court decided to dismiss the jury for the rest of the day and resume proceedings on the following day. The minimal proceedings conducted in Jones’s absence on February 3 did not bear on Jones’s “opportunity to defend against the charge,” Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745, but only on the entirely collateral issue of how the court should deal with Jones’s own dangerous and disruptive behavior. This was not a critical stage of the trial: the jury did not hear evidence, no motions were argued, jurors were not selected. Any argument that Jones had a right to be present during the discussion of the consequences of his own 22 violent and disruptive behavior would be circular, and would imply that a court could never exclude a defendant under Allen. In sum, Jones’s exclusion for the remainder of February 3 was not an exclusion from a critical stage and did not prejudice Jones. Jones’s initial exclusion thus provides no basis for federal habeas corpus relief.
Jones was also absent from the courtroom on February 4. We must therefore decide whether this continued exclusion was proper, particularly in light of any efforts by Jones to reclaim his right to be present.7 The Connecticut Supreme Court held that even if Jones did attempt to return to the courtroom, the trial court’s subsequent exclusion of Jones on February 4 was not an abuse of its discretion under Allen. We hold that the high court’s conclusion did not represent an unreasonable application of Allen. Even if the trial court erroneously removed Jones on February 3, Jones’s own violent and disruptive actions thereafter prevented him from returning on February 4. Cf. Norde v. Keane, 294 F.3d 401, 413 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The fact that [the § 2254 petitioner’s] conduct may have been based on what he believed to be a compelling reason . . . does not excuse his misconduct. Allen makes clear that a defendant does not have the right to disrupt the trial proceedings.”). Although Allen permits a court to find that a defendant has constructively waived his right to be present at his own trial, the Supreme Court also expressly made clear that 7 This is the second question referred to in the certificate of appealability. 23 “[o]nce lost, the right to be present can, of course, be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings.” 397 U.S. at 343. Thus, Jones is correct that once the trial court excluded Jones on February 3, it was required to permit him to return – but only if Jones satisfactorily demonstrated that he would not be violent or disruptive. The record shows not only that Jones failed to do so, but also that he engaged in further violent behavior that independently supported his exclusion from the courtroom, without regard to whether the initial removal was proper. On the morning of February 4, the court specifically cited Allen and noted that it believed it was permissible to exclude Jones based on his intervening misconduct. But as the Connecticut Supreme Court noted, the trial court was initially ready to permit Jones’s return on the morning of February 4. See State v. Jones, 916 A.2d at 35. However, after assessing Jones in person, a marshal reported to the court that Jones was being “somewhat confrontational toward” the marshals, and that in his “better judgment” the marshal “[could not] say that the defendant should be present in court during the proceedings.” The marshal also said that he could not “guarantee that a possible outburst won’t happen again” and that he did not “believe that Mr. Jones should be in these proceedings while they’re going on for the safety of everybody involved.” In discussion with the court, the marshal confirmed that Jones was agitated and was “still talking about yesterday.” In light of the earlier events and the marshal’s assessment, the court then “reconsider[ed]” its ruling and found that Jones, “by his disruptive behavior, 24 [had] waived any right to be present during the proceedings.” The court reiterated its concerns that bringing Jones back would be unsafe and disruptive. The Connecticut Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Jones, and we cannot find that conclusion unreasonable.8 Initially, we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s guidance that “evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable [under AEDPA] requires considering the rule’s specificity,” and that “[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). Although the right to be present at one’s own trial is a right of paramount importance, appellate courts – let alone courts considering a case on collateral review many years later – lack the direct perception of the situation that informs the trial court’s judgment. This distance from courtroom realities explains why we review decisions to exclude a defendant for abuse of discretion. When that fact-specific standard of review is viewed through the additionally “deferential lens of § 2254(d),” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 121 n.2 (2009), the bar to relief is a high one. See Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 8 The Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision is the “last reasoned decision,” Barker, 423 F.3d at 1091, on the question of Jones’s subsequent exclusion, and we therefore review whether the high court’s affirmance of the trial court was unreasonable. Of course, the Connecticut Supreme Court’s ruling necessarily depended in large part on facts found and judgments made in the first instance by the trial court. Thus, the instant case presents a scenario in which “the last reasoned decision adopted or substantially incorporated the reasoning from a previous decision and, as a result, it [is] reasonable for the reviewing court to look at both decisions to fully ascertain the reasoning of the last decision,” id. at 1093, even while we formally review only the final determination. See note 5, supra. 25 1855, 1865 (2010) (noting the “dual layers of deference required by AEDPA” and an underlying standard asking “whether the [trial] judge exercised sound discretion”). Applying that deferential standard to this case, we conclude that the state high court reasonably determined that the trial court had a valid basis to exclude Jones on February 4, even if he wished to return. The Connecticut Supreme Court offered three reasonable considerations to support its conclusion. See State v. Jones, 916 A.2d at 3536. First, and most importantly, it noted that Jones had reacted with serious physical violence to the court’s previous exclusion order on February 3. Id. at 35. In addition to its personal observations of Jones’s violence on the previous day, the trial court was also aware that after a previous adverse pretrial ruling, Jones had punched his hand through a Plexiglas window. Though Jones had been placed in restraints on February 4, we do not think the trial court’s concern for the safety of the lawyers, jurors, and witnesses was misguided. Second, the Connecticut Supreme Court noted that Jones had demonstrated no ability to control his temper and seemed unwilling to comply with court rulings or orders from the marshals. Id. at 35-36. This conclusion was supported by the marshal’s observation that Jones remained agitated and “confrontational,” and by the marshal’s concern that he could not guarantee the safety of courtroom personnel. Third, the Connecticut Supreme Court noted that the alternative – permitting Jones in the courtroom only in full-body restraints – presented its own difficulties. Id. at 36. As the Allen Court held, the “sight of shackles and gags might have a significant effect on the jury’s feelings about the defendant.” 397 U.S. at 344. Moreover, contrary to Jones’s argument in our 26 Court, it was not clear that Jones had consented to being shackled; his attorney had reported to the court that Jones ignored the “issue of restraints” in his discussions with counsel that morning. We conclude that the Connecticut high court’s decision was reasonable under § 2254(d). The trial court was faced with a violent and unpredictable defendant. Putting aside the evidence that he had violently assaulted Minnifield and shot Williams to death, Jones had reacted violently (albeit outside the courtroom) to one adverse ruling, and had in the court’s presence violently resisted the removal order, requiring numerous marshals to restrain him, at least one of whom was injured in the fray. He then continued his obstreperous behavior once removed, threatening the marshals and “kicking or pounding [the] walls.” Jones manifestly waived his right to be present based on the extraordinary violence he had displayed during the preceding removal. Even if the court had erred in ordering that Jones be removed from the courtroom, Jones’s proper recourse was to comply with the order and seek his return through legal argument, not to offer violent resistance. Cf. Norde, 294 F.3d at 413 (“The fact that [the § 2254 petitioner’s] conduct may have been based on what he believed to be a compelling reason . . . does not excuse his misconduct.”). All of the behavior related above was either known to, or had been personally observed by, the trial judge. Moreover, the court was entitled to rely on the marshal’s assessment that, whatever Jones might say, he remained volatile and confrontational, and continued to present a danger to persons in the courtroom. On this 27 record, we cannot say that the Connecticut Supreme Court unreasonably applied Allen in affirming the trial court.9 The case on which Jones principally relies, United States v. Ward, 598 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2010), is not to the contrary. During pretrial proceedings in that case, the defendant expressed a wish to speak for himself and speak with his lawyer aloud, rather than communicate with the court through counsel and with counsel through written notes, as the court had asked him to do. Id. at 1057. The court ordered him involuntarily removed. Id. He was then excluded for the rest of his trial because defense counsel could not guarantee to the court that the defendant would remain quiet. Id. The Eighth Circuit vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial, finding problematic both the defendant’s initial exclusion and the trial court’s reliance on the representations of 9