Opinion ID: 1193476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Plain View Seizure.

Text: Finally, the People contend that since Officer Mueller could lawfully look into the appellee's automobile, he was entitled to seize the pliers and pillowcases visible to him. We agree. The plain view doctrine is limited by the nature of the items seen in plain view. This court has previously recognized that an item need not be illegal per se  in order to validate a plain view seizure. People v. Mangum, Colo., 539 P.2d 120 (1975). Rather an officer need only have good reason to believe that the article to be seized is incriminating evidence. Alire v. People, 157 Colo. 103, 402 P.2d 610 (1965). This reasonable belief may be based either on the article's intrinsic nature or on the officer's knowledge and experience as they relate to the facts presented in the particular case. E. g., State v. Cook, 115 Ariz. 188, 564 P.2d 877 (1977). We hold that in this case the suspicious circumstances surrounding the investigatory stop, combined with Officer Mueller's knowledge and experience regarding the items visible in the car were sufficient to justify seizure of those items pursuant to the plain view rule. The appellee's evasive actions raised a reasonable suspicion of some criminal activity, and Officer Mueller was aware that several burglaries recently had occurred in that vicinity at that time of day. Upon signalling the appellee to stop his car, Officer Mueller observed the appellee's apparently furtive attempt to hide something under the front seat. When, in addition to these observations, he saw the large pair of pliers and the bulging pillowcases which his police experience told him were probably the instrument and fruits of a burglary, he had the requisite good reason to believe that the items were incriminating evidence. See Alire v. People, supra . Cf. Martinez v. People, 168 Colo. 314, 451 P.2d 293 (1969). At that point, he was entitled to seize and inspect the pliers as he did. Finally, his observation of the metallic shavings on the pliers and the presence of the jewelry box in the pillowcase were sufficient, when combined with his other observations and rational inferences, to constitute probable cause to arrest the appellee for investigation of burglary. In summary, we conclude that the police actions at each step of this investigation were based on reasonable inferences drawn from the facts presented analyzed in the light of the officers' knowledge and experience. The minimal intrusions on the appellee's privacy were amply justified by the circumstances. In short, the officers' actions constituted alert and thorough police work and did not violate the appellee's constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Accordingly, the trial court's suppression ruling is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. LEE and ERICKSON, JJ., dissent. HODGES, J., does not participate.