Opinion ID: 2550938
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is the Disbarment Imposed in Washington Void Because Everard Was Denied Due Process of Law in those Disciplinary Proceedings?

Text: The formal complaint was filed in the Washington disciplinary proceedings on April 6, 1998. The complaint was served upon Everard by mail, and he responded by preparing and filing a written acknowledgement of service stating, I agree that service was deemed personally served upon me on Thursday, April 9, 1998. (Emphasis in original.) His acknowledgement of service also stated, An Answer must therefore be filed on or before Wednesday, April 29, 1998. (Emphasis in the original.) Everard did not answer the complaint, and on May 11, 1998, he was mailed a notice of motion for an order of default and a copy of the motion for an order of default. He still did not file an answer. On June 11, 1998, the Washington disciplinary counsel sent a letter to the hearing officer stating that Everard had failed to answer the complaint. A copy of that letter was sent to Everard. On June 18, 1998, the hearing officer entered Everard's default. A copy of the order of default was sent to Everard, and he received it on June 25, 1998. On July 30, 1998, the hearing officer held a default hearing. On August 21, 1998, he issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and a recommendation that Everard be disbarred. On November 20, 1998, the Disciplinary Board (Washington Board) issued an order unanimously approving and adopting the hearing officer's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation. The Washington Rules for Lawyer Discipline (RLD) provide two methods by which a disciplined lawyer can seek judicial review of the Washington Board's decision. RLD 7.1(a). If the Washington Board's decision provides for suspension or disbarment, the lawyer can file an appeal as a matter of right to the Washington Supreme Court. Such appeal must be filed within fifteen days of service of the decision of the Washington Board on the lawyer. RLD 7.2(b). A lawyer may also seek discretionary review of the Washington Board's decision by the Supreme Court by filing a petition for review within twenty-five days of service of the Washington Board's decision upon the lawyer. RLD 7.3. The Board's decision was served by mail upon Everard on November 23, 1998, but he did not file an appeal to the Washington Supreme Court, nor did he seek discretionary review of the decision. On January 21, 1999, Everard, through his attorney, asked the Washington Supreme Court to stay the disciplinary proceedings. Everard agreed to an immediate disability suspension, and by order dated March 2, 1999, the Washington Supreme Court entered an order suspending him from the practice of law in Washington during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings. On May 21, 1999, Everard's attorney moved to set aside the default. Rule 4.10A of the RLD provides that default can be set aside on the following grounds: (i) Mistakes, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or irregularity in obtaining default; (ii) For erroneous proceedings against a respondent who was, at the time of the default, incapable of conducting a defense; (iii) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been previously discovered; (iv) Fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (v) The order of default is void; (vi) Unavoidable casualty or misfortune preventing the respondent from defending; or (vii) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the default. Everard's motion sought relief based upon grounds (i), (ii), and (vi) listed above. In support of those grounds, it alleged that at the time of the default, Everard was impaired from the traumatic, and untreated, brain injuries which he had received in an automobile accident in 1995. On February 8, 2000, the hearing officer denied Everard's motion to set aside the default. Everard appealed that denial to the Washington Board, which denied his appeal on July 14, 2000. On August 10, 2000, Everard's attorney asked the Washington Supreme Court to grant discretionary review of both the order denying his motion to set aside default and the Washington Board's affirmance of that order. On October 11, 2000, the Court refused his request. On October 19, 2000, Everard filed a pro se motion to the Court asking it to reconsider, which the Court denied on October 26, 2000. On December 7, 2000, the Washington Supreme Court considered the Washington Board's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of disbarment, and on December 12, 2000, it issued an order disbarring Everard from the practice of law, effective immediately. On December 22, 2000, Everard filed a pro se motion with the Washington Supreme Court asking it to reconsider the order disbarring him from the practice of law. He submitted a brief arguing that there were various procedural irregularities that denied him due process. The Court denied Everard's motion for reconsideration by order issued on March 7, 2001. In the reciprocal disciplinary proceedings instituted in Idaho, Everard contends that the Idaho Board could not rely upon the findings in Washington because there were various procedural errors in the Washington disciplinary proceedings that deprived him of due process. The Idaho Board found that Everard was not denied due process in the Washington disciplinary proceedings, and we agree. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution compels the states to give preclusive effect to the facts found by an administrative tribunal and court decisions of another state as long as the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause have been met. University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). An essential principle of due process is notice of the issues to be considered and the opportunity for an appropriate hearing before being deprived of a significant property interest. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Everard was given notice of the issues to be considered in the Washington disciplinary proceedings. The complaint consisted of sixteen pages that set forth in detail the facts supporting the allegations of misconduct. Although he contends that he was not notified that disbarment was a possible remedy, the complaint prayed for imposition of discipline which Everard admits could include disbarment. Rule 5.1 of the RLD clearly provides that upon a finding of misconduct, the sanctions can include disbarment. Everard also had an opportunity for a hearing. He simply failed to avail himself of that opportunity by not filing an answer to the complaint. He likewise did not avail himself of the opportunity to appeal the Washington Board's decision to the Washington Supreme Court. The fact that he failed to avail himself of the full procedures provided under Washington law does not constitute a sign of their inadequacy. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). Due process also requires an impartial hearing officer. Hortonville Dist. v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 96 S.Ct. 2308, 49 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976). Everard contends that he was denied due process because he was deprived of the opportunity to seek to disqualify the hearing officer in the Washington disciplinary proceedings. Rule 4.2(b) of the RLD provides that the lawyer who is the target of the disciplinary proceedings may seek to disqualify the hearing officer for cause by filing an appropriate request within twenty days of service on the lawyer of the name of the officer. Everard was served with the name of the hearing officer on June 9, 1998, and his default was entered June 18, 1998. He contends he was denied due process because he did not have the full twenty days to move to disqualify the hearing officer before default was entered. Everard was served with the name of the hearing officer on June 9, 1998, and he had until July 2, 1998, to file a motion for disqualification. [1] The hearing officer did not hold the default hearing until July 30, 1998, and he did not issue his proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction until August 21, 1998. Long before the hearing officer acted on the merits of the complaint, Everard could have moved to set aside the default and to disqualify the hearing officer, but he did not do so. Everard could have appealed this issue to the Washington Supreme Court, but he declined to do so. Although Everard's attorney later filed a motion seeking to set aside the default, Everard states that his attorney failed to raise these procedural errors in that motion. Everard's failure to avail himself of the full procedures provided under Washington law does not constitute a sign of their inadequacy. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). Everard did raise this due process argument in the motion for reconsideration that he submitted pro se to the Washington Supreme Court, but the Court refused to reconsider its order of disbarment. It apparently was not convinced that its order was void based upon this alleged irregularity.