Opinion ID: 1099739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the appellants were represented by counsel with a conflict of interest in violation of their right to counsel.

Text: ś 26. The brothers argue that their joint representation by one attorney was a conflict of interest because their defenses were mutually antagonistic. ś 27. In Stringer v. State, 485 So.2d 274, 275 (Miss.1986), this Court held: This Court readily recognizes the rule that effective assistance of counsel encompasses the right to representation by an attorney who does not owe conflicting duties to other defendants as set forth in Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). However, the Court has repeatedly held that joint representation of co-defendants is not per se violative of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426, (1978); Beran v. U.S., 580 F.2d 324 (8th Cir.1978); U.S. v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98 (8th Cir.1977). In Armstrong v. State, 573 So.2d 1329, 1333 (Miss.1990), this Court held that: It is well-settled that requiring or permitting one attorney to represent co-defendants, commonly referred to as joint representation, is not per se violative of the constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel; however, prejudice is presumed if the defendant demonstrates that counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3120, 97 L.Ed.2d 638, 650 (1987) (emphasis added). This Court adopted the above standard in Stringer v. State, 485 So.2d 274 (Miss.1986), where it was held [i]n order to demonstrate a violation of his Sixth Amendment Rights, a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Id. Indeed, this Court has recognized that one attorney may actually meet the needs of multiple defendants more effectively and the attorney can accomplish this task without violating any duty to his clients. Smith v. State, 666 So.2d 810, 813-14 (Miss.1995)(citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1178, 55 L.Ed.2d 426, 433 (1978)). When reviewing such a claim as asserted here, this Court has set out a number of precautions to consider in evaluating an attorney's performance as follows: Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. Cf. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 133-134 [102 S.Ct. 1558, 1573-1575, 71 L.Ed.2d 783] (1982). A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. See Michel v. New York, Supra, [350 U.S. 91] at 101 [76 S.Ct. 158 at 164, 100 L.Ed. 83]. There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 477 (Miss. 1984). ś 28. The brothers rely in part on Carol v. State, 540 So.2d 1330, 1333 (Miss.1989), in which testimony by two defendants jointly represented were in conflict. This Court in Carol held that [t]he test is whether their defenses are in conflict with each other. This is important in determining both whether their trials should be severed and whether or not an attorney is placed in an unethical position having to represent them both. Id. The Court further held that [o]bviously, if the defenses are in conflict their trials should be separated and each defendant should have his own independent counsel. Id. ś 29. The brothers cite Carol as a classic conflict example where both defendants blame the other. The brothers impart on a lengthy explanation as to what trial counsel could have argued and that it would be in Doc's and Crimm's best interests to blame the other for Pool's death. The State argues that its theory of the case was that all the brothers were guilty of murder. In addition, the State maintains that the defense's theory of the case is that none of the defendants were guilty. This Court agrees that the defense theory was none of the three brothers had any wrongdoing in the case. There was no proof of an actual conflict. At the severance hearing, there was no indication that there was any conflict by counsel as to the brothers, much less any argument that their defenses were mutually antagonistic, as later suggested by the brothers in their brief before this Court. As this Court warned in Stringer, 454 So.2d at 477, an attorney's actions must be presumed to be within the wide range of professional assistance and it is far too easy to judge those actions throughout the proceedings in hindsight. The brothers in this instance have failed to demonstrate that their trial attorney's actions were anything other than sound trial strategy. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.