Opinion ID: 796150
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Triestman's submissions, liberally construed

Text: 18 Throughout this case, Triestman has manifestly argued that FCI Ray Brook's staffing policy was itself negligent. He has not, however, expressly articulated the separate argument that FCI Ray Brook employees were negligent in their enforcement of this policy. Nevertheless, under the circumstances of this case, the majority of this panel believes—in light of the special solicitude that is appropriately accorded to pro se litigants, see Ruotolo, 28 F.3d at 8—that Triestman's submissions can be read to assert the latter claim, i.e., that the officer on duty when the incident occurred failed to patrol or respond diligently to an emergency situation out of laziness or inattentiveness. Indeed, our court has, in a similar case, read such a negligent guard theory into a pro se complaint that was susceptible to various readings. See Coulthurst v. United States, 214 F.3d 106, 109 (2d Cir.2000) (construing a pro se complaint as alleging negligence due to a BOP employee's failure to perform a diligent inspection out of laziness, hastiness, or inattentiveness, in addition to a claim that the BOP's inspection policy was itself negligent). 19 As in Coulthurst, the language in Triestman's submissions is broad enough to cover the negligent guard theory. Coulthurst, 214 F.3d at 110. Triestman's appellate brief asserts that his injuries would have been prevented had [the BOP] adhered to its own regulations,  and, broadly, that the BOP is liable for neglecting its duty of care.  This language must be liberally construed. See Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir.2005) (applying a liberal reading to plaintiff's  pro se appellate brief); Wright v. Comm'r., 381 F.3d at 44 ([W]e construe pro se appellate briefs and submissions liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.) (citation omitted); Ortiz v. McBride, 323 F.3d 191, 194 (2d Cir.2003) (This court construes appellate briefs submitted by pro se litigants liberally and reads such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.) (citation omitted). 20 Similarly, Triestman's complaint uses broad language in its assertion that the BOP [f]ailed to institute and enforce proper staffing and patrolling for each wing of the housing units during lockdown, and thus did not provide due diligence and emergency response [sic] when such emergency occurred. . . . The words institute and enforce quite plainly suggest two separate but complimentary arguments: (1) that FCI Ray Brook's staffing policy fell so far outside the range of appropriate judgment that it can no longer be viewed as an exercise of discretion in attempting to comply with the BOP's policy statement; and (2) that FCI Ray Brook also enforce[d] that policy inadequately, due to the negligent actions of its employees. 5 21 It is true that Triestman, during oral argument before this panel, did not articulate the negligent guard theory for himself. But that is of no moment, as it was the obligation of the district court below to interpret Triestman's complaint to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. Pabon, 459 F.3d at 248 (citation omitted). 22