Opinion ID: 2222943
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: psychological principles

Text: The psycho-legal fundamentals in this case derive from the tension between four factors involved in eyewitness identification in criminal cases. The four factors are: 1. The natural and usually necessary reliance on eyewitness identification of defendants by the police and prosecution; 2. The scientifically and judicially recognized fact that there are serious limitations on the reliability of eyewitness identification of defendants; 3. The scientifically and judicially recognized fact that frequently employed police and prosecution procedures often (and frequently unintentionally) mislead eyewitnesses into misidentification of the defendant; 4. The historical and legal fact that a significant number of innocent people have been convicted of crimes they did not commit and the real criminal was left at large. The first factor, the reliance on eyewitness identification of defendants by the police and prosecution, is too well understood to require review or comment. Since the United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized each of the other factors, this Court can reasonably take judicial notice of them. [10] However, these four factors and the United States Supreme Court discussions based on them have such widespread and deep-rooted impact on everyday police work, prosecution and criminal procedure rules that this opinion must briefly consider the scientific and historical data behind the last three factors in order to promote the fullest understanding and acceptance of the resulting rules of law. For the purpose of our decision, rather than unduly extend this opinion with elaborate examination and documentation of the scientific support for the limitations on the reliability of eyewitness identification and the significant legal record of proven misidentification, we will discuss the matter only briefly. If, however, anyone has questions about these propositions or wants to study the scientific and historical background of these propositions further, the results of our research, particularly the extensive references and bibliography, are annexed to this opinion as Appendix A. The second factor, the scientific fact that there are serious limitations on the reliability of eyewitness identification of defendants, was specifically recognized by the United States Supreme Court when it said: The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification. Wade, 228. The conclusions of Wade rested on writings that depend either upon scientific analysis or the earlier works of scientists in the field which demonstrate the serious limitations of eyewitness identifications by the results of experiments. These results may at first blush be surprising but on just a little reflection make sense and fall right into line with everyday experience. Here follows a description of just one of many actual experiments and the startling results which indicate that identification of individuals  however earnest  is often unreliable. This experiment was conducted at Dartmouth College and was designed to evaluate the impact of even slight suggestibility in a lineup identification upon witnesses who were relatively sophisticated in nuances of psychology, Brown, An Experience in Identification Testimony, 25 J Crim L & C 621 (1934-1935). By pre-arrangement and without warning, a workman entered a classroom in session, walked across it, paused in front of the instructor's desk, tinkered with the radiator, made an inquiry about the heat and finally left unobtrusively. The incident was treated casually by the instructor and none of the students were forewarned of the experiment. After a lapse of two weeks, the workman was again brought into the class with five other workmen of the same general dress and appearance. Lineups were then conducted separately before four different groups of students who were asked to indicate their selection of the workman they had previously seen as well as their degree of confidence in this judgment. 1) The first group consisted of 30 persons studying legal psychology who were familiar with surprise psychological tests of this nature (many of them suspected a test when the man first walked in). Of this group 23 or 76.6% correctly identified the workman, 3 were unable to identify, 1 thought it was a hoax, 2 identified the wrong man, and 1 would have been willing to swear in court that the man was not in the lineup. One of the two who made the wrong identification also expressed his willingness to swear in court that his identification was correct. 2) The second group consisted of 64 students with no experience in surprise tests but some did suspect a test when the man first walked in. Of these, 42 or 65.6% made correct identifications but 11 or 17.1% were unable to make a correct identification. 3) The third group consisted of 16 random students. The questionnaire upon which they were to indicate their identification was worded to provide the slightest suggestion that the correct man was probably in the lineup (e.g., which of the men rather than are any of these men). Only five men were shown to these students and the man who had actually entered the classroom was excluded from the lineup. The amazing result is that 62.5% positively identified the wrong man. Two persons were too unsure to make an identification and only four correctly stated that the original man was not in the lineup. 4) The fourth group of 17 students had not witnessed the original incident at all. While 12 correctly stated that they did not remember the incident, the remaining 29.4% recalled an incident that they had never witnessed and attempted to identify one of the men. [11] Actual legal cases support the same conclusion. For example, in one Massachusetts case 12 witnesses identified the wrong man as the culprit. See P. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases 12 (1965, 2nd printing 1971). The author references other examples of erroneous identification by 13, 14, and 17 witnesses noting that these are by no means the most extreme examples   . Id. The classic British case of Adolph Beck resulted in a British Government Committee impaneled by royal command to present a report to Parliament. As the result of a complaint to the police by a prostitute that Beck was the man that had defrauded her, Adolph Beck was convicted and incarcerated. No sooner did he leave prison on the first charge than he was fingered, convicted and imprisoned again in a similar incident. Years later the real culprit confessed after committing many more crimes. The British Government Committee in their report to Parliament reached the following conclusion: [E]vidence as to the identity based on personal impressions, however bona fide, is perhaps of all classes of evidence the least to be relied upon, and therefore, unless supported by other facts, an unsafe basis for the verdict of a jury. [12] Despite the reputation the British have for no-nonsense handling of criminal cases, British law is so concerned with the fallibility of eyewitness identification and the possibility of unfounded accusations in rape cases that corroborating evidence is required by statute and case law in some cases. Even where it is not required, the courts insist upon instructions to the jury of the great dangers of such identifications, even if the complainant's evidence is clear and convincing. [13] Pre-lineup display of photographs in any case is so distrusted in England that it has long been grounds for quashing the conviction. See Rex v Haslom, 19 Crim App R 59, 60; 134 LT R 158 (1925). The third factor, the scientific fact that frequently employed police and prosecution procedures often mislead eyewitnesses into misidentification of defendants, was clearly recognized by Justice Brennan speaking for the United States Supreme Court when he wrote: A major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification. A commentator has observed that `[t]he influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor  perhaps it is responsible for more such errors than all other factors combined.' Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases 26. Wade, 228-229. Improper suggestion commonly comes about because of three things. First, the witness when called by the police or prosecution either is told or believes that the police have apprehended the right person. Second, if the witness is shown only one person or a group in which one person is singled out in some way, he is tempted to presume that he is the person. Third, as the second factor just discussed above shows, eyewitness identification has inherent weaknesses from the standpoint of the witness's problems of sensation, retention, etc., and the similarity in appearance of people. The fourth factor, the historical and legal fact that all too many innocent people have been convicted of crimes they did not commit and the real criminal who committed the crime was consequently protected and left at large, was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in the quotation we set forth above but repeat here with the emphasis on the last clause: The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification. Wade, 228. (Emphasis added.) [14] In Borchard, Convicting the Innocent (1932), the author discusses some 50 of the best known cases of mistaken convictions. In the introduction the author singles out erroneous eyewitness identification as the one greatest source of error: Perhaps the major source of these tragic errors is an identification of the accused by the victim of a crime of violence. This mistake was practically alone responsible for twenty-nine of these convictions. Juries seem disposed more readily to credit the veracity and reliability of the victims of an outrage than any amount of contrary evidence by or on behalf of the accused, whether by way of alibi, character witnesses, or other testimony. These cases illustrate the fact that the emotional balance of the victim or eyewitness is so disturbed by his extraordinary experience that his powers of perception become distorted and his identification is frequently most untrustworthy.    How valueless are these identifications by the victim of a crime is indicated by the fact that in eight of these cases the wrongfully accused person and the really guilty criminal bore not the slightest resemblance to each other, whereas in twelve other cases, the resemblance, while fair, was still not at all close. In only two cases can the resemblance be called striking. Id, xiii. (Footnotes omitted, emphasis added.) A number of other authors have collected cases where there have been convictions based on mistaken eyewitness identification. See, e.g., Du Cann, Miscarriages of Justice (1960); Frank & Frank, Not Guilty (1957); Gardner, The Court of Last Resort (1952); Hale, Hanged in Error (Penguin ed 1961); Ram, A Treatise on Facts as Subjects of Inquiry by a Jury (4th Amer ed 1890); Rolph, Personal Identity (1957); Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases (1965); Watson, The Trial of Adolph Beck (1924); Wigmore, The Science of Judicial Proof § 254 (3d ed 1937); Wilder and Wentworth, Personal Identification (1918); Williams, The Proof of Guilt (3d ed 1963). For a number of obvious reasons, however, including the fact that there is no on-going systematic study of the problem, the reported cases of misidentification are in every likelihood only the top of the iceberg. The writer of this opinion, for example, was able to turn up three very recent unreported cases right here in Michigan in the course of a few hours' inquiry. (See the cases of Charles Clark, Lewis Nasir, and Charles Edward Richardson in Appendix A.) The excerpted material above is intended only to suggest a flavor of the consistent findings by researchers. Briefly, we find that there are serious problems concerning the accuracy of eyewitness identification and that real prospects for error inhere in the very process of identification completely independent of the subjective accuracy, completeness or good faith of witnesses. For almost 100 years these problems have occupied the energy of some very astute judges, prosecutors and scholars who have consistently identified the problems. We cannot blink at the evidence of the problem and must make a forthright effort to insure that evidence of eyewitness identification is as reliable as possible.