Opinion ID: 183141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: suppression of brady material (claim 10)

Text: As a final matter, we address Lopez's Brady claim with respect to an unrelated sexual assault. [10] Less than a week after Holmes' death, Lopez was arrested for the sexual assault of Cecilia Rodriguez. See supra p. 1207-08. Although Lopez's trial counsel received police reports documenting the incident, the government failed to provide Lopez with a handwritten note that was later discovered in a police file. The note, whose author is unknown, opines that there was an insufficient factual basis to support a conviction of Lopez for the assault and that the victim was not credible. Specifically, the note states that there were no findings by a physician indicating sexual assault; that the victim's claims were not corroborated by [the] physician's report; and that the victim had a previous consensual sexual relationship with Lopez. Lopez was never charged with a crime as a result of the incident. However, the note was not made available to Lopez until his habeas claims were pending in federal court, long after the state court proceedings. Lopez, who introduced evidence of the sexual assault to corroborate his pathological intoxication mitigation defense, now claims that the note, which undermines the sexual assault allegation, would have been favorable to his defense. He argues that the government's failure to disclose the note violated his constitutional due process rights under Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. The district court concluded that because Lopez failed to present the issue in state court and no state remedy remained available, the claim was technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted, but that Lopez had shown no prejudice to overcome the default. Lopez argues on appeal that there is cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default and that habeas relief must be granted. We conclude that there was no constitutional violation under Brady; it likewise follows that Lopez is unable to establish prejudice to excuse the procedural default. Under Brady, the prosecution must disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant if it is material either to guilt or to punishment. 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. However, [f]ailure to disclose information only constitutes a Brady violation if the requested information is `material' to the defense. Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir.1995). Materiality rests on a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). The handwritten note fails the materiality test in several respects. To begin, the note offers no new factual evidence. Evidence that is merely cumulative is not material. United States v. Strifler, 851 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir.1988). The note included underlying facts regarding the alleged sexual assault and legal opinions of the unknown author. The facts laid out in the note were merely cumulative of the facts contained in the police reports, which were available to Lopez and submitted by Lopez's counsel at the 1990 resentencing. Accordingly, this information was not material for Brady purposes. See Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th Cir.2005) (new evidence that very nearly replicated evidence already admitted into evidence is not material under Brady ); United States v. Vgeri, 51 F.3d 876, 880 (9th Cir.1995) (same). To the extent the note included legal opinions, we have previously held that a prosecutor's opinions and mental impressions of the case are not discoverable under Brady unless they contain underlying exculpatory facts. Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 742 (9th Cir.2006). Applying the same rationale here, we conclude that the legal opinions contained in the note do not constitute Brady material required to be provided to Lopez. Lopez also fails to demonstrate that the note was material in that had the [note] been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. Lopez argues that the note provided important exculpatory evidence which would have rebutted non-statutory aggravating evidence relied upon by the prosecution and considered by the trial court as outlined above. However, Arizona does not recognize non-statutory aggravating evidence, see Ariz. Rev.Stat. § 13-703(F), and there is no indication that the trial court considered such evidence at Lopez's sentencing. As Lopez acknowledges, the trial court found only one statutory aggravating factor that Holmes' murder was committed in a cruel, heinous, or depraved manner. Lopez II, 857 P.2d at 1264. Lopez identifies no evidence indicating that the trial court considered the unrelated sexual assault in finding this aggravating factor. Nor has Lopez, who relied on the existence of the alleged assault to corroborate his mitigation defense, demonstrated how this exculpatory evidence as to the unrelated assault would have influenced the state court's findings as to mitigation. Indeed, to the extent that the note would have influenced the sentencing proceeding, it would have undermined Lopez's foundation of pathological intoxication. We conclude that the handwritten note is not material for Brady purposes. The facts contained in the note were cumulative of information previously available in the police reports and Lopez has not remotely shown that had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. Accordingly, the district court appropriately denied relief on Lopez's Brady claim. AFFIRMED.