Opinion ID: 205620
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Personal Jurisdiction in the Internet Context

Text: A number of circuits have addressed personal jurisdiction in the internet context, considering whether, when, and how such peculiarly non-territorial activities as web site hosting, internet posting, and mass emailing can constitute or give rise to contacts that properly support jurisdiction over the host, poster, or sender. The basic problem with relating such activities directly to the general principles developed pre-internet is that, in a sense, the internet operates in every state regardless of where the user is physically located, potentially rendering the territorial limits of personal jurisdiction meaningless. As the Fourth Circuit explained in an early effort to address the matter: Applying the traditional due process principles governing a State's jurisdiction over persons outside of the State based on Internet activity requires some adaptation of those principles because the Internet is omnipresentwhen a person places information on the Internet, he can communicate with persons in virtually every jurisdiction. If we were to conclude as a general principle that a person's act of placing information on the Internet subjects that person to personal jurisdiction in each State in which the information is accessed, then the defense of personal jurisdiction, in the sense that a State has geographically limited judicial power, would no longer exist. The person placing information on the Internet would be subject to personal jurisdiction in every State. ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002). To avoid this untenable result, it is necessary to adapt the analysis of personal jurisdiction to this unique circumstance by placing emphasis on the internet user or site intentionally directing his/her/its activity or operation at the forum state rather than just having the activity or operation accessible there. A good example is ALS Scan 's test for specific jurisdiction arising out of internet activity: [A] State may, consistent with due process, exercise judicial power over a person outside of the State when that person (1) directs electronic activity into the State, (2) with the manifested intent of engaging in business or other interactions within the State, and (3) that activity creates, in a person within the State, a potential cause of action cognizable in the State's courts. Under this standard, a person who simply places information on the Internet does not subject himself to jurisdiction in each State into which the electronic signal is transmitted and received. Such passive Internet activity does not generally include directing electronic activity into the State with the manifested intent of engaging business or other interactions in the State thus creating in a person within the State a potential cause of action cognizable in courts located in the State. Id. at 714. Actually, as ALS Scan acknowledges, this emphasis on intentionally directing internet content or operations at the forum state has its grounding in the express aiming requirement the Supreme Court developed in Calder to deal with the somewhat analogous question of specific jurisdiction based on content in nationally distributed print media. See id. Thus, while this court has yet to flesh out a comprehensive position in a published opinion dealing with omnipresent internet activity like web sites and posts, the ALS Scan approach, which is fairly representative of most circuits that have addressed the matter, is compatible with our discussion of personal jurisdiction in Dudnikov. [4] This approach and its counterparts in other circuits have some immediate implications that are relevant here. The maintenance of a web site does not in and of itself subject the owner or operator to personal jurisdiction, even for actions relating to the site, simply because it can be accessed by residents of the forum state. See, e.g., Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir.2010); Carefirst of Md. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 401 (4th Cir.2003); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471-76 (5th Cir.2002); cf. Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1297, 1298 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding operation of web site insufficient for general jurisdiction; web site not considered in analysis of specific jurisdiction because claims were not related to it). Similarly, posting allegedly defamatory comments or information on an internet site does not, without more, subject the poster to personal jurisdiction wherever the posting could be read (and the subject of the posting may reside). See, e.g., Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d at 797; Revell, 317 F.3d at 475-76; Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 258-59, 262-64 (4th Cir.2002). Consistent with the thrust of the Calder -derived analysis for specific jurisdiction in the internet context discussed above, in considering what more could create personal jurisdiction for such activities, courts look to indications that a defendant deliberately directed its message at an audience in the forum state and intended harm to the plaintiff occurring primarily or particularly in the forum state.