Opinion ID: 2569354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Attempted Murder of Maloney

Text: Harlan argues that the trial court erroneously failed to merge the conviction for first degree attempted murder of Maloney into the first degree murder conviction. We find that the attempted murder charge, as alleged in the information, is a lesser included offense of the murder charge under the strict elements test set forth most recently in People v. Leske, 957 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Colo. 1998). Therefore, the defendant is not subject to punishment imposed for the attempted murder conviction in addition to that imposed for the murder conviction. Because the charging documents did not identify the attempted murder of Maloney as distinct from a lesser included offense of the murder of Maloney, we vacate the forty-eight year sentence imposed by the trial court for the attempted first degree murder of Maloney.
We begin with a discussion of the principles governing the disposition of this issue. As a broad rule, the General Assembly has provided that [w]hen any conduct of a defendant establishes the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense. § 18-1-408(1), 6 C.R.S. (1999). This principle, however, is subject to several statutory exceptions. See § 18-1-408(1)(a)-(e). Under section 18-1-408(1)(a), a defendant may not be subject to multiple convictions for the same criminal conduct if [o]ne offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection (5) of this section. According to section 18-1-408(5)(a), an offense is included in another if it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged. See also Leske, 957 P.2d at 1036; People v. Garcia, 940 P.2d 357, 360 (Colo.1997); Armintrout v. People, 864 P.2d 576, 579 (Colo.1993); People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 245 (Colo.1983). In addition to this statutory basis, the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal and state constitutions and the judicially created rule of merger bar multiple punishments for greater and lesser included offenses. See Leske, 957 P.2d at 1035. We have, however, traditionally resolved claims similar to the one Harlan presents here on exclusively statutory grounds. See, e.g., Boulies v. People, 770 P.2d 1274, 1281 (Colo. 1989); Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d at 245. To determine whether section 18-1-408(5) is satisfied, we consistently have applied the strict elements test. [21] See Leske, 957 P.2d at 1036. According to this test, if proof of the facts establishing the statutory elements of the greater offense necessarily establishes all of the elements of the lesser offense, the lesser offense is included for the purposes of section 18-1-408(5)(a). Id.; see also Garcia, 940 P.2d at 360; Armintrout, 864 P.2d at 579; Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d at 245; People v. Rivera, 186 Colo. 24, 27, 525 P.2d 431, 433 (1974). While application of the strict elements test begins with an examination of the statutes involved in the case, see Armintrout, 864 P.2d at 579, we also may consider the charging documents or the judgment of conviction to determine if an offense is lesser included. See Leske, 957 P.2d at 1036 n. 8 (citing Boulies, 770 P.2d at 1282); Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d at 245. As a corollary, we do not consider the evidence presented at trial to determine whether the offenses are greater and lesser included. See Leske, 957 P.2d at 1034; Rodriguez, 914 P.2d at 286; Armintrout, 864 P.2d at 579; Rivera, 186 Colo. at 27, 525 P.2d at 433. If we were to examine the evidence adduced by the prosecution during Harlan's trial, then we may have been able to conclude that the attempted murder of Maloney was not a lesser included offense of the murder charge. The evidence supports three possible factually distinguishable acts of attempted first degree murder of Maloney. The gun shots fired at Maloney during the chase that culminated in Creazzo's car crashing onto the Thornton Police Department front lawn may be seen as an attempt to murder both Maloney and Creazzo. [22] However, the severe beating Harlan inflicted on Maloney after he pulled her from Creazzo's car, and prior to killing her, might also comprise an attempt to murder her. Finally, the act of shooting Maloney itself may be viewed as a successful attempt to kill her. All these events occurred on February 12, 1994. Indeed, because these occurrences are indistinguishable in the charging documents, the strict elements test requires merger of the attempted murder and murder charges. An examination of the evidence that might distinguish these scenarios is not part of the strict elements test. If we determine that attempted first degree murder is a lesser included offense under section 18-1-408(5)(a), then, because the General Assembly has not explicitly authorized punishment for both attempted first degree murder and first degree murder, the defendant may not be punished for both offenses. See Armintrout, 864 P.2d at 578.
Applying the strict elements test, we find that the attempted murder of Maloney is a lesser included offense of the first degree murder charge. The attempted murder conviction, therefore, may not form the basis of punishment in addition to that imposed for the murder conviction. We begin with an examination of the relevant statutes. See Armintrout, 864 P.2d at 579. Harlan was convicted of first degree murder after deliberation under section 18-3-102(1)(a). [23] A person is guilty of this offense if [a]fter deliberation and with the intent to cause the death of a person other than himself, he causes the death of that person or of another person. § 18-3-102(1)(a). Under section 18-2-101(1), a person commits criminal attempt if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission of an offense. It is clear that the elements of attempted first degree murder under section 18-2-101(1) are established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the elements of first degree murder after deliberation under section 18-3-102(1)(a). See Leske, 957 P.2d at 1036. The only difference between the two offenses is that first degree murder requires proof of an additional element  namely, that the defendant's actions caused the death of the victim. Examination of the statutory elements of the two offenses, therefore, indicates that attempted first degree murder is a lesser included offense of first degree murder. Turning now to the charging documents and the judgments of conviction, see Armintrout, 864 P.2d at 578, we are satisfied, when our discussion of these documents is combined with the statutory analysis supra, that the strict elements test is met in this case. The prosecution's amended first count alleged that on or between February 12 and 19, 1994, Harlan committed the first degree murder of Maloney. [24] The prosecution alleged in its fourth count that the defendant attempted to murder Maloney on February 12, 1994. [25] Both counts iterated the elements of the respective offenses. The jury instructions repeat the information set forth in the charging documents in virtually identical form. [26] See Trial Phase Instructions 2, 11, and 13. Proof of the elements of first degree murder, as alleged in the amended first count, necessarily proves the elements of the attempted first degree murder charge. See Leske, 957 P.2d at 1036. The issue, under the strict elements test, is not whether evidence actually adduced at trial demonstrates that the attempted murder charge is a lesser included offense of the murder charge. See id. at 1034. The fact that the murder is alleged to have occurred between February 12-19, 1994, while the attempted murder is alleged to have occurred on February 12, 1994, does not undermine this conclusion. Any evidence showing that a murder occurred during the time span alleged could include the occurrence of an attempted murder that falls within the narrower included time frame. In other words, the attempted murder was not charged with sufficient specificity to distinguish it from the murder itself. Under our precedent, the strict elements test applies and the attempted murder charge is therefore a lesser included offense. Consequently, we vacate the forty-year sentence imposed on Harlan for the attempted first degree murder of Maloney.