Opinion ID: 2176551
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Severe Bodily Injury

Text: Defendant's first argument is that the trial court erred in imposing a consecutive sentence for the attempted first degree murder conviction. The governing statute on this point is section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections, which at the relevant time stated: The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, unless, one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury    in which event the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively. (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1996). According to defendant, the imposition of consecutive sentences in this case is unwarranted because, although attempted first degree murder is undeniably a Class X felony, the record does not support the trial court's finding that defendant inflicted severe bodily injury upon Jose Sanchez. As a preliminary matter, we must determine the appropriate standard of review for a trial court's determination that, for consecutive sentencing purposes, a bodily injury is severe. Defendant argues that such review requires interpreting the statutory phrase severe bodily injury and that a de novo standard is therefore warranted. [2] The State responds that whether a particular injury is severe is a question of fact and that a manifest weight standard is therefore warranted. We agree with the State. In People v. Crespo, 203 Ill.2d 335, 344, 273 Ill.Dec. 241, 788 N.E.2d 1117 (2001), this court held that what constitutes great bodily harm under the aggravated battery statute (see 720 ILCS 5/12-4(a) (West 2006)) is a question properly left to the fact finder. We see no reason to treat the question of what constitutes severe bodily injury any differently. If the fact finder can be trusted to sort out which bodily harms are great, it can certainly be trusted to sort out which bodily injuries are severe. Accordingly, we hold that a trial court's determination that a bodily injury is severe for purposes of consecutive sentencing may be reversed only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. In re D.F., 201 Ill.2d 476, 498, 268 Ill.Dec. 7, 777 N.E.2d 930 (2002). Under the manifest weight standard, we give deference to the trial court as the finder of fact because it is in the best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the parties and witnesses. D.F., 201 Ill.2d at 498-99, 268 Ill.Dec. 7, 777 N.E.2d 930. A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the evidence, or the inferences to be drawn. D.F., 201 Ill.2d at 499, 268 Ill.Dec. 7, 777 N.E.2d 930. Here, the evidence is more than sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Sanchez sustained a severe bodily injury. One of defendant's fellow gang members testified that defendant shot Sanchez in the chest from a distance of approximately three feet. The photographs introduced by the State reveal a bullet wound to the left center of Sanchez's chest. Sanchez testified that, after being shot, he felt a burning in [his] chest. And while the photographs do not depict an exit wound, the State asked Sanchez three different times, and in three different ways, whether the bullet passed through his body and exited through his back. Each time, he responded yes. Given this evidence, the trial court was entirely justified in concluding that Sanchez was struck through the chest, that the bullet went through his chest and in fact exited his back, and that such an injury is sufficiently severe to justify a consecutive sentence. In opposition to this result, defendant makes two arguments. First, defendant points to the following exchange between the prosecutor and Sanchez: Q. Where did the bullet go through your body? At what point did it come out? A. It came out  it didn't go all the way through because I had a sweater. When I got out on the street, it started running down. I got it in my hand when I got out of the car. According to defendant, Sanchez's statement that it didn't go all the way through because I had a sweater confirms that the bullet did not pass through Sanchez's body but instead only graz[ed] his chest. Consequently, defendant argues, the trial court's findings that Sanchez was struck through the chest and that the bullet went through his chest and in fact exited his back are not supported by the evidence. Defendant reads too much into this isolated, and at best ambiguous, piece of testimony. According to defendant, when Sanchez stated that it didn't go all the way through because I had a sweater, Sanchez must have meant that the bullet did not go all the way through his body. But it is also possible that Sanchez meant that the bullet did not pass through his sweater. Indeed, Sanchez was asked not only where the bullet had passed through his body, but also where the bullet had come out. Sanchez's response begins with the statement It came out. Only then does Sanchez add that it didn't go all the way through because I had a sweater. It is certainly reasonable to read this answer as saying it came out of my body but was caught by my sweater, which, after all, comports with Sanchez's three unequivocal affirmations that the bullet did in fact pass through his body and exit his back. At the very least, we cannot say that the foregoing exchange renders the trial court's understanding of Sanchez's testimony unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. Second, defendant argues that Sanchez's behavior after being shot confirms that he did not sustain a severe bodily injury. Specifically, defendant points out that, despite his gunshot wound, Sanchez was able to drive away from the scene, notice an ice cream truck surrounded by children, get himself to a nearby gas station, collect the bullet from his sweater, enter the gas station and ask for help, and wait for the police to arrive. Moreover, defendant notes that, although Sanchez was taken to the hospital for the treatment of his gunshot wound, the State presented no evidence concerning the length of his hospital stay, the nature of his treatment, or the intensity of his pain. According to defendant, these facts confirm that Sanchez's injury was not the type of debilitating or extreme injury contemplated by the legislature that warrants the mandatory imposition of consecutive sentences. We disagree. We have already concluded that the evidence adequately supports the trial court's findings that Sanchez was struck through the chest and that the bullet went through his chest and in fact exited his back. Irrespective of the victim's postshooting behavior, we would have no difficulty affirming that a wound of that nature constitutes severe bodily injury. That said, defendant's argument on this point is severely undermined by this court's decision in People v. Johnson, 149 Ill.2d 118, 171 Ill.Dec. 401, 594 N.E.2d 253 (1992), which the State cites and defendant does not address. In Johnson, this court found that severe bodily injury was sufficiently proven where, after being shot once in the shoulder, the victim walked out of the apartment where the shooting occurred, flagged down a passing motorist, told the driver there had been a robbery and a shooting, and had the motorist drive him to a hospital. See Johnson, 149 Ill.2d at 128-29, 159, 171 Ill.Dec. 401, 594 N.E.2d 253. Sanchez's postshooting behavior is not materially different from the Johnson victim's, and there is no reason to believe that Sanchez's gunshot wound was any less severe than the Johnson victim's gunshot wound. Accordingly, we reject any suggestion that Sanchez's postshooting conduct renders benign his through-and-through gunshot wound to the chest.