Opinion ID: 748605
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Spiller's Section 1983 Claims Against Texas City and Its Police Department

Text: 16 As the above discussion demonstrates, the district court erroneously predicated its dismissal of Spiller's Section 1983 claims against Texas City and its police department on its finding that her complaint failed to state a claim for the violation of her constitutional rights by Spurgeon. We must therefore consider whether the dismissal of these claims should nonetheless be affirmed because, as these two defendants argue, her complaint fails to link Spurgeon's misconduct to a specific government policy or custom. 17 In order to hold a municipality or a local government unit liable under Section 1983 for the misconduct of one of its employees, a plaintiff must initially allege that an official policy or custom was a cause in fact of the deprivation of rights inflicted. Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir.1994). To satisfy the cause in fact requirement, a plaintiff must allege that the custom or policy served as the moving force behind the [constitutional] violation at issue, Meadowbriar Home For Children, Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 533 (5th Cir.1996), or that her injuries resulted from the execution of the official policy or custom, Fraire v. Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1277 (5th Cir.1992). The description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation, moreover, cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts. Id. at 1278. 18 The allegations of municipal liability contained in Spiller's complaint do not meet these requirements. Her assertion that Texas City is liable because Spurgeon was acting in compliance with the municipality's customs, practices or procedures is insufficient because it is conclusory. Equally deficient are her allegations regarding the liability of the Texas City Police Department. To begin with, Spiller fails to allege that the three departmental policies she identifies were causally connected to Spurgeon's misconduct. Instead, she merely asserts that these three policies have led to unspecified unconstitutional arrests and confinements. In addition, the first departmental policy she identifies--indiscriminately requesting identification of citizens--is not implicated by the circumstances of her arrest. Further, her allegation that the department also operate[s] in a manner of total disregard for the rights of African American citizens is insufficient because it is conclusory. Finally, her contention that the department has a third policy of engag[ing] in conduct toward African American citizens without regard to probable cause to arrest is both vague and conclusory. 19 Notwithstanding Spiller's contention that she is entitled to remedy these defects by amending her complaint on remand, an affirmance of the district court's dismissal of her municipal liability claims is required. This is because a plaintiff is not entitled to an opportunity to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of municipal liability cases when she simply declares the adequacy of [her] complaint in response to the motion to dismiss. Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792-93 (5th Cir.1986); see also Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 479 (5th Cir.1994) (affirming a district court's refusal to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint because he declared the sufficiency of his pleadings and did not offer a sufficient amended complaint in response to the defendant's motion to dismiss). In this case, Spiller responded to the defendants' motion to dismiss by asserting that her pleadings in their present posture sufficiently alleged liability on the part of Texas City and its police department. 20 Spiller may not avoid the implications of this perfunctory response by noting that she also responded to the motion to dismiss by requesting leave to amend her complaint within a reasonable period of time. This request rings hollow in light of her failure to amend her complaint as a matter of right and her failure to furnish the district court with a proposed amendment during the two months following the filing of the motion to dismiss and the order granting that motion. See Babb, 33 F.3d at 479. Questioning at oral argument, moreover, revealed that Spiller still cannot adequately allege a basis for municipal liability and that remanding the case to allow another pleading would do nothing but prolong the inevitable. Jacquez, 801 F.2d at 793.