Opinion ID: 4502219
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lenity is Inapplicable

Text: Finally, Johnman argues the “rule of lenity” requires resolving any statutory ambiguities in his favor. “[T]he touchstone of the rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity.” Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980) (internal quotation 8 Johnman looks to overcome the language of § 3014 with comments from members of Congress. For instance, Johnman cites remarks by one of the JVTA’s legislative sponsors—made two years after the law’s enactment— explaining that the JVTA “also allows a federal judge to impose an additional assessment of up to $5,000.” (Opening Br. at 9 (quoting 163 Cong. Rec. H4564 (daily ed. May 24, 2017)).) Generally, “[p]ost-enactment legislative history is not a reliable source for guidance” in assessing the ordinary meaning of a statute. Pa. Med. Soc’y v. Snider, 29 F.3d 886, 898 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 698–99 (3d Cir. 2016). And in any event, those remarks fight the text of the statute: the JVTA is not permissive and does not “allow” judges to impose an assessment “up to” $5,000. Rather, the assessment is mandatory. See 18 U.S.C. § 3014(a) (“the court shall assess an amount of $5,000” (emphasis added)). So these comments lend Johnman no support, for we “must presume that Congress ‘says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’” Rotkiske, 140 S. Ct. at 360 (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)). 14 marks omitted). But invoking the rule “requires more than a difficult interpretative question.” United States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252, 270 (3d Cir. 2010). Rather, the rule “comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.” United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438, 455 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961)).9 And it may be applied only where we are left with “grievous ambiguity” after applying all other traditional tools of statutory interpretation. United States v. Diaz, 592 F.3d 467, 474–75 (3d Cir. 2010). Johnman sees ambiguity not in the text, but in the application of § 3014(a), citing inconsistencies in the assessments imposed by district courts in this Circuit.10 But that is not enough, for “[a] statute is not ambiguous for purposes of lenity merely because there is a division of judicial authority over its proper construction.” Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 64–65 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). 9 We inverted this order in Donaldson, considering, and rejecting, the rule of lenity before turning to the “normal canons of statutory construction.” 797 F.2d at 127–28. That path has been repudiated by later case law, and neither party suggests we must apply it here. 10 Compare United States v. Porter, No. 2-16-cr-00036 (E.D. Pa.) (imposing a $5,000 JVTA assessment based on two qualifying convictions), with United States v. Leroy, No. 2-16cr-00243 (W.D. Pa.) (imposing a $20,000 JVTA assessment based on four qualifying convictions), and United States v. Johnman, No. 2-17-cr-00245 (E.D. Pa.) (imposing a $15,000 JVTA assessment based on three qualifying convictions). 15 Because we find the statute clear, the rule of lenity does not affect our review.11 The $5,000 assessment under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act applies to each qualifying count of conviction. We will thus affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court. 11 Even assuming we found the assessment under the JVTA ambiguous, for the rule of lenity to apply we would need to assess whether the statute imposes a criminal rather than civil sanction—an issue we do not reach today. 16