Opinion ID: 750665
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: supreme court law on ripeness

Text: 200 The majority correctly chose the two-part test of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) to determine the ripeness of the LaGrands's claim. This test requires the court to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. Id. at 149, 87 S.Ct. at 1515. The majority is mistaken, however, in its conclusion that this case is not ripe under Abbott Laboratories.
201 The majority insists on relying on the doctrine of ripeness as a justification for its delay in addressing the constitutionality of the Arizona death penalty statute. The majority's decision is inconsistent with the rationale of Abbott Laboratories and Thomas. In Abbott Laboratories, the Court found that where the issue tendered is a purely legal one, the first prong of the ripeness test is satisfied. Id. As was true in Abbott Laboratories, the LaGrands's challenge presents a purely legal issue: Is Arizona's death penalty statute constitutional? In Thomas, the Court held that an issue is ripe if the issue will not be clarified by further factual development. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods., 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 3333, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985). Because the issue in this case will not be clarified by further factual development, the LaGrands's challenge is purely legal and is therefore fit for judicial review. 202 No interest is served by delaying the resolution of the LaGrands purely legal claim. Whether or not the LaGrands ultimately chose lethal gas as the method of their execution will have absolutely no effect on the constitutional question that the LaGrands have raised.
203 Withholding court consideration will cause hardship to all parties involved--including, incidently, this court. 204 What should the LaGrands do after reading the majority's opinion? The lesson appears to be that if the LaGrands, like Campbell, consistently maintain that they will elect an arguably unconstitutional method of execution, then the LaGrands can challenge that method. Therefore, the obvious course for the LaGrands is to begin to consistently maintain that they will choose gas. (They need not actually choose gas.) The LaGrands's claim will then be ripe and will someday return to our court. 1 205 Postponing review of the LaGrands's Eighth Amendment challenge will cause hardship to the LaGrands as well. Instead of receiving this court's deliberate and thoughtful consideration of their challenge, the LaGrands will be forced to present their claim in a last-minute habeas petition. 206 Nor does Arizona gain anything from the majority's reluctance to address the issue. In fact, the majority's decision frustrates Arizona's alleged interest in executing the LaGrands without undue delay by providing another ground for a future last-minute appeal. 207 Finally, I note the prudential concern in addressing the LaGrands's claims now. The majority opinion conflicts with the federal policy to resolve habeas petitions as early as possible. The majority's decision defeats this policy by postponing a decision on the merits until after the LaGrands choose to be executed by lethal gas. Do we want to see the LaGrands's challenge to lethal gas presented by a flurry of faxes as the hour of execution looms? Do we wish to make an important decision in harried circumstances? 208 Under the majority's decision, Arizona has successfully accomplished exactly what we feared in Campbell: it has cloaked an unconstitutional punishment in the mantle of choice. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 680. Because the majority has offered no satisfactory explanation why Cambell's claim was justiciable while the LaGrands's claim is not, I respectfully dissent.