Opinion ID: 2035764
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Duty of Due Care

Text: We next consider whether the appellate court properly affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of count I of plaintiffs' complaint. In their motion to dismiss, defendants alleged that they owed a duty of due care only to their clients and not to plaintiffs. The trial court agreed and dismissed count I of plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. The appellate court disagreed, holding that defendants owed plaintiffs a duty of due care in the preparation of the letter of opinion. Defendants here do not dispute the existence of a duty of due care as defined by the appellate court and that issue is, therefore, not before us. Plaintiffs assert that once the appellate court found a duty of care existed, it should have reversed the trial court and remanded the cause for further proceedings. The appellate court, however, considered the scope of the defendant's duty of care to relate to the accuracy of those matters expressed in the letter of opinion. The appellate court found that plaintiffs' complaint failed to allege any portion of the defendants' opinion letter was untrue. The appellate court, therefore, affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice on the basis that plaintiffs failed to properly plead a breach of duty. Plaintiffs claim that the only issues properly before the appellate court were whether a fiduciary duty or a duty of due care existed between defendants and plaintiffs. Plaintiffs assert that because the issue of breach of duty was not raised in the trial court, the appellate court should not have considered this issue. We agree. Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (134 Ill.2d R. 366(a)(5)), provides that [i]n all appeals the reviewing court may, in its discretion, and on such terms as it deems just,    enter any judgment and make any order that ought to have been given or made, and make any other and further orders and grant any relief    that the case may require. However, the appellate court should not consider different theories or new questions not raised in the trial court if they might have been refuted or overcome had they been presented below. ( Hux v. Raben (1967), 38 Ill.2d 223, 225, 230 N.E.2d 831.) Further, the appellate court should take care that litigants are not deprived of an opportunity to present argument. ( Hux, 38 Ill.2d at 225, 230 N.E.2d 831.) We believe that it was inappropriate here to affirm the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice on the basis of a correctable pleading defect not raised in the trial court where it was likely that plaintiffs would have been granted leave to amend their complaint if the pleading defect had been found below. See Cutsinger v. Cullinan (1979), 72 Ill.App.3d 527, 533, 29 Ill.Dec. 18, 391 N.E.2d 177. Defendants raised the issue of breach of duty for the first time in their appellate brief. Plaintiffs were not on notice that the sufficiency of their complaint would be attacked on the grounds that it did not properly allege a breach of duty. Neither defendants' motion to dismiss nor the trial court proceedings addressed plaintiffs' allegations concerning breach of duty. The appellate court's affirmance of the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice, therefore, denied plaintiffs any meaningful opportunity to either defend or amend their complaint. Remanding this cause to the trial court will give plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint to properly allege a breach of the duty of due care that the appellate court found defendants owed to plaintiffs. Because it has been determined that defendants did owe plaintiffs a duty of due care in the preparation of the letter of opinion, plaintiff should now be given an opportunity to properly allege a breach of that duty. We, therefore, reverse the appellate court's affirmance of the trial court's dismissal of count I of plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.