Opinion ID: 1173304
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The City's Preclusion from Interfering with Pardee's Vested Right.

Text: The city is precluded from applying the growth ordinance to Pardee not only by the express terms of the judgment, but also because the judgment gave Pardee a vested right to develop its property with which the city may not interfere. It has long been the rule in this state and in other jurisdictions that if a property owner has performed substantial work and incurred substantial liabilities in good faith reliance upon a permit issued by the government, he acquires a vested right to complete construction in accordance with the terms of the permit. ( Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Com. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 785, 791 [132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 553 P.2d 546].) `[T]he Legislature is without power to impair or destroy the obligations of contractual or vested rights....' ( Pardee Construction Co. v. California Coastal Com. (1979) 95 Cal. App.3d 471, 479 [157 Cal. Rptr. 184], quoting Estate of Thramm (1947) 80 Cal. App.2d 756, 765 [183 P.2d 97].) In the past, a developer had to obtain a building permit and expend substantial sums in reliance thereon in order to invoke the vested rights doctrine. But Several decisions intimate that a building permit may no longer be the sine qua non of a vested right if preliminary public permits are sufficiently definitive and manifest all final discretionary approvals required for completion of specific buildings. ( Raley v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (1977) 68 Cal. App.3d 965, 975, fn. 5 [137 Cal. Rptr. 699].) In determining which governmental permits other than a building permit may possibly afford the developer a vested right, some courts have applied the final discretionary approval test while others have disregarded whether the final act is discretionary or ministerial and simply looked to the final governmental approval. ( Tosh v. California Coastal Com. (1979) 99 Cal. App.3d 388, 394 [160 Cal. Rptr. 170]; see also Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Com., supra, 17 Cal.3d 785, 794; Billings v. California Coastal Com. (1980) 103 Cal. App.3d 729, 735 [163 Cal. Rptr. 288]; South Central Coast Regional Com. v. Charles A. Pratt Construction Co. (1982) 128 Cal. App.3d 830, 841-845 [180 Cal. Rptr. 555]; Aries Dev. Co. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com. (1975) 48 Cal. App.3d 534, 544 [122 Cal. Rptr. 315].) Paragraph 17 of the judgment constitutes the city's guarantee that upon request Pardee will receive any permits  for building and all other purposes  necessary for the completion of the development. The wording of paragraph 17 makes clear the parties' intent to remove all discretion from the city by providing that the city shall issue all permits upon [Pardee's] request. This guarantee  fully and fairly bargained for by parties in litigation  exemplifies governmental approval that is the equivalent of a building permit for the purpose of a vested rights inquiry. And plaintiff's good faith expenditure of over $13.5 million for onsite and offsite improvements, incurred in reliance on the judgment, finishes the inquiry. Since Pardee thus had a vested right to complete its development, the city could not interfere. [2] The order of the trial court should have been reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to issue the restraining order as prayed, thus preventing the application of the ordinance to Pardee.