Opinion ID: 566219
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Motion to Disqualify

Text: 24 Defendant moves to disqualify Grisham and Lawless pursuant to the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 16-307 because attorney Grisham is listed as a witness for plaintiff in the present federal action and Rule 16-107 based on a conflict of interest in representing adverse parties simultaneously. 25 Rule 16-307 provides that [a] lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where (1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue, or (2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case. Neither exception applies in this case. The rule goes on to state that an associate attorney may act as trial advocate unless precluded by Rule 16-107, which addresses representation of adverse clients. In this case, although Mr. Grisham may be called as a witness, his associate Mr. Lawless will act as trial advocate. The pertinent question, therefore, is whether a conflict exists under Rule 16-107 as alleged by defendant. 26 The standard applied to a motion to disqualify based on simultaneous or prior representation of an adverse party is whether a substantial relationship exists between the two actions. Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir.1985). Substantiality is present if the factual context of the two representations are similar or related. Id. (quoting Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir.1980)). If a substantial relationship is found, a presumption arises that a client has revealed facts to the attorney that require his disqualification. Smith v. Whatcott, supra at 1100. The purpose is to protect client confidentiality and to avoid the appearance of impropriety. Id. 27 A substantial relationship appears to exist between the two actions in question. Both arise, to some extent, from the motor vehicle accident and subsequent events. However, keeping in mind that the underlying purpose of the rule is to protect client confidences, careful examination of this unusual set of circumstances distinguishes this case from Smith v. Whatcott and reveals no possibility of confidences being breached. Having died in the crash, Mr. Fragua revealed nothing to Grisham and Lawless that could be used against his estate in the state court action. Furthermore, the interests of Fragua's estate are in fact the interests of the Hermans in the present federal action, that is, to assure that any judgment in the Hermans' favor in the state court action is covered completely by Dairyland Insurance Company. Though highly unusual, I see no conflict that should preclude the Hermans' and Fragua's estates from being represented by Grisham and Lawless.