Opinion ID: 1827061
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: was the sentence of death imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice and/or other arbitrary factors?

Text: Wiley contends that the sentencing jury acted under the influence of passion, prejudice, and arbitrariness  in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-105(3)(a). [1] He raises three arguments: (A) that the trial judge improperly told the venire during voir dire about the possibility of parole should Wiley receive a life sentence; (B) that the prosecutor made an improper comment during closing arguments; and (C) that the trial judge incorrectly refused to give a diminished capacity instruction.
Wiley first contends that the jury was improperly told about the possibility of parole, should he be sentenced to life in prison. The record reflects that the trial judge was repeatedly questioned by the veniremen during voir dire regarding the possibility of parole in the event that a life sentence should be imposed. Wiley bases his argument on the following interactions with the venire during voir dire: Q. [BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY:] But the point is under state law sentencing is individualized. Okay? You've got to hear the evidence, good and bad, about this man and what he did to Mr. Turner in August of 1981 before you can weigh it. There's no automatic death. There may be cases where the death penalty is not the proper punishment. There may be cases where it is. But in order to comply with state law, those elements have to be weighed by a jury. Okay? Yes, Sir? A. [Prospective Juror No. 32]. Could you be a little more specific as to what process you're going to go through to have us arrive at this decision?       [BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY:] We're going to have to show you the proof. Otherwise, I don't know how you could make a decision. Does that answer you? A. Thank you. Q. Yes, ma'am? A. (Unidentified Prospective Juror) I have a question. Is this life with no parole or do they  will there be an opportunity for this jury to distinguish no parole as opposed to the death penalty? THE COURT: The law says life in prison. The courts or the juries have absolutely nothing to do with parole laws. If the jury finds this person guilty, which has been done, if the jury sentences him to life, we don't know whether it's life with or without because that's up to the executive department. When a jury speaks and when the Court sentences, we're through with that part of it. BY [THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: Q. Ma'am, does that  A. I didn't know if there was an alternative of no parole. A. (Unidentified Prospective Juror) So he could get out after 20 years? THE COURT: I think the jury must  I can't answer those type questions. I think the jury is just going to have to approach it as the prosecutor has been saying  take this, take this and weigh it and make your decision based upon the way you see the evidence, not upon some uncertainty unknown down the road which you have no control over and I have no control over and just call it the way you see it at the conclusion of the trial. That's the only thing we can do. All those contingencies, I don't know what the answers are, nor does anyone else. I would go back just a minute. I think [the District Attorney] is about to wind down here. If you went back 20 or 30 years ago, the Legislature in Jackson determined what cases carried the death penalty. That didn't make any allowance for local feelings or decisions. Now, if a certain offense falls within this category, then it's up to the people in DeSoto County up here to determine whether that's a vote death penalty case or a life in prison case. It individualizes rather than a big body like the Legislature trying to speak for the state as a whole. It gives the local people an opportunity to take into consideration the crimes and also take into consideration the defendant himself and everything that can be legally admissible about him where you can make the decision based upon all the evidence that can be made available to you rather than just having a category. I don't know whether that helped you or not, but it will never be taken away from you. You will be the ultimate decision makers.       [BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: Anybody else having problems with the death penalty? Yes, Ma'am? A. [Prospective Juror] No. 183. Q. [No. 183]? A. I just have a question. If the jury decides  does not unanimously decide for the death penalty and life imprisonment is the decision, who  when is  when is it justified  when would it ever be decided that it would definitely be life without parole? I was under the impression that decision could be made in lieu of the death penalty. And what I'm understanding you to say is that the death penalty is not the choice  there is a possibility that he would be given life imprisonment with parole as a possibility. Is that what you're saying? THE COURT: That's a possibility, yes. PROSPECTIVE JUROR [No. 183]: But no jury has the right to say that it's life without parole? THE COURT: The current status of the law is I'll instruct you as to exactly what the law says now, and that is if you prescribe death, that's your decision; if you prescribe life in prison, that's your decision. Those are the two options that I'll be  PROSPECTIVE JUROR [No. 183]: So that is an option? THE COURT: Yes. It will be in clear black and white print just like I said it just then. A. [Prospective Juror No. 182] Is that like a hole in the law? To me  I don't know the circumstances of the case or what happened, and if I look at this case and see that I think this man would be a menace to society for the rest of his life and I don't vote for the death penalty but life imprisonment, I would be inclined more to vote for the death penalty because I don't know if he's going to get out. Is this a  THE COURT: What is your number ma'am? PROSPECTIVE JUROR [No. 182]: Oh, I'm sorry, 182. THE COURT: [No. 182], let me try to help you if I can. I don't know whether I can or not. PROSPECTIVE JUROR [No. 182]: That kind of bothers me. THE COURT: I understand that, but you're just exactly like I am and just like the lawyers on both sides. We have to take the law as we find it today, and we have to work with it as we find the law today. PROSPECTIVE JUROR [No. 182]: So even if we vote for life imprisonment, we're not guaranteed life in prison. THE COURT: No, ma'am. You'll be doing exactly what the law says. That's what the law says. If there's parole down the road somewhere, I don't have any control of it. I can't guess. I can't second guess it nor can you. PROSPECTIVE JUROR [No. 182]: Okay. That's somebody else's job. THE COURT: The Legislature prescribes the punishment, and once we do that, our job ends, and I'm not a soothsayer; I don't know what's down the road nor do you. We'll just follow the law as the Legislature and the Supreme Court tells us it is today and do the best we can. BY [THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: Q. Anybody else? Yes, sir? PROSPECTIVE JUROR [No. 52]: No. 52... . In other words, what you're saying, Your Honor, is that if given the choice of life imprisonment or the death penalty, if the jury went with life in prison, the defendant could get out tomorrow, he could be paroled tomorrow technically? THE COURT: Well, not tomorrow. PROSPECTIVE JUROR [No. 52]: Well, as soon as the trial is over, as soon as he goes back to jail? THE COURT: Well, at some point in time, possibly yes, I don't know. The sentencing statute says life in prison. After the State concluded voir dire, and outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved to quash the jury panel and for a mistrial. Wiley contends that the jury pool was tainted because the trial judge informed them that there was a possibility of parole if Wiley were sentenced to life imprisonment. Under the sentencing statute in effect at that time, jurors were forbidden to consider parole  except in habitual offender cases, where a sentence of life imprisonment would automatically be without possibility of parole. [2] See Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1195-96 (Miss. 1996); Mackbee v. State, 575 So.2d 16, 40-41 (Miss. 1990). The seminal case on this issue is Walter Williams, Jr. v. State, 445 So.2d 798, 812-14 (Miss. 1984) (hereinafter Williams ). In Williams, this Court held that: A jury should have no concern with the quantum of punishment because it subverts a proper determination of the sentencing issue. Reference to the possibility of parole should the defendant not be sentenced to die are wholly out of place at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial for two additional reasons. First, such references inevitably have the effect of inviting the jury to second guess the Legislature. The Legislature has declared that persons sentenced to life imprisonment may under certain circumstances become eligible for parole. It is no more proper for the jury to concern itself with the wisdom of that legislative determination that it is for the jury to consider the Legislature's judgment that death in the gas chamber be an authorized punishment for capital murder. Second, parole is not automatic. No person sentenced to life imprisonment has any right to parole. Allowing argument or testimony regarding the possibility of the defendant some day being paroled is in effect inviting the jury to speculate how ten years in the future the parole board may exercise its legislatively granted discretionary authority. This would introduce into the sentencing proceedings an arbitrary factor proscribed by [Miss. Code Ann.] section 99-19-105(3)(a). Williams, 445 So.2d at 813 (citations omitted). See also Jessie Derrell Williams v. State, 544 So.2d 782, 798 (Miss. 1987); Cabello v. State, 471 So.2d 332, 346 (Miss. 1985). Most of the cases dealing with this issue have arisen in the context of closing arguments, jury instructions, or witness's testimony. See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 557 So.2d 542, 553 (Miss. 1990); Jessie Derrell Williams, 544 So.2d at 798; Williams, 445 So.2d at 813. The State argues that these cases should be distinguished, because the trial court in the case sub judice: ... steadfastly maintained that the sentencing statute stated that life in prison was the punishment. He further told the jury not to speculate about what would be done in the future as that was not their concern in considering sentence. This situation is totally different than the prosecutor making an argument that a defendant should be given the death penalty because a sentence of life imprisonment would result in parole. The State would submit that this is not an error requiring reversal of this third death sentence. The trial court gave accurate information to the three prospective jurors who asked questions regarding parole eligibility, and those three jurors did not serve on the jury. The jury was never instructed to consider parole eligibility in determining the sentence to be imposed. This Court is persuaded by the State's reasoning, and finds that the case sub judice is factually distinguishable from Williams and its progeny; for this reason, the analysis expressed in those cases will not be extended to apply to this factual situation. See Williams, 445 So.2d at 813; Griffin, 557 So.2d 542; Jessie Derrell Williams, 544 So.2d 782; Cabello, 471 So.2d 332. The trial judge followed this Court's instructions to not speculate on parole. He emphasized that the trial court and the jury had no control over parole. When further pressured by the veniremen for a more exact answer, the trial judge gave a truthful response. Moreover, at the close of the presentation of evidence, the trial judge properly instructed the jury regarding the options of life and death. The trial judge's actions in this case did not constitute reversible error; therefore, Wiley's claim on this point is without merit.
During closing arguments, the prosecutor commented that the jury did not know whether Wiley's violent actions in this case were a one-time thing. Wiley argues that, by making these statements, the prosecutor implied that Wiley had a prior criminal record, and that such an implication was not supported by the record. The State argues that the comment was supported by the evidence, and that, furthermore, it was made in response to the following remark made during defense counsel's closing argument: [BY MR. JONES]: All the things we have established corroborate what I'm saying about this man not being a killer by instinct. But, again, he did kill. Add that up to him using bird shot. This was a one-time thing, as bad as it is, and I know it's bad, but it's not characteristic of this person. As a general rule, attorneys are to be given wide latitude in making their closing arguments. Jimpson v. State, 532 So.2d 985, 991 (Miss. 1988) (citing Johnson v. State, 477 So.2d 196, 209 (Miss. 1985)); Shook v. State, 552 So.2d 841, 851 (Miss. 1989). Given the latitude afforded an attorney during closing argument, any allegedly improper prosecutorial comment must be considered in context, considering the circumstances of the case, when deciding on their propriety. Ballenger v. State, 667 So.2d 1242, 1270 (Miss. 1995); Davis v. State 660 So.2d 1228, 1248 (Miss. 1995). The comment of the prosecutor that the jury could not know whether Wiley's violent criminal activity was a one-time thing was supported by the evidence. The medical experts testified that, if he were under the influence of alcohol, Wiley could perpetrate another violent crime. They further testified that Wiley had alcoholic tendencies, and that the success rate for recovering substance abusers was very low. Moreover, the prosecutor's comment rebutted the statement made by defense counsel that this violent crime was a one-time thing. It appears that given the context in which the [prosecutor's] statement was made, taken with the supporting evidence in the record, the statement did not amount to reversible error. See Ballenger, 667 So.2d at 1271. Wiley's argument to the contrary is without merit.
Wiley also contends that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a diminished capacity instruction. The trial judge ruled that such an instruction was not supported by the evidence. Diminished capacity or substantial impairment of [t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law is a statutory mitigator under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(6)(f). Furthermore, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-103 provides, in pertinent part, that [t]he statutory instructions as determined by the trial judge to be warranted by the evidence shall be given in the charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberation. Thus, Wiley was entitled to an instruction on the statutory mitigator of diminished capacity  if such an instruction had been supported by the evidence. Indeed, [i]nstructions should be given only if they are applicable to the facts developed in the case. Williams, 445 So.2d at 814. In the case sub judice, doctors testified that Wiley is borderline mentally retarded; there was also evidence of his poor performance in school. Furthermore, there was ample evidence of Wiley's alcohol addiction, which, according to one doctor, caused Wiley to have a diminished cerebral activity, cerebral ability at the time of the crime. Based on this evidence, Wiley argues that he was entitled to an instruction on the statutory mitigator of diminished capacity. This Court holds that the diminished capacity instruction was not supported by the evidence in this case; therefore, Wiley was not entitled to such an instruction. See In re Hill, 460 So.2d 792, 799 (Miss. 1984); Williams, 445 So.2d 798 at 814; see also Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824 (Miss. 1995). In Hill, a somewhat factually similar case, the defendant also argued that the jury should have been given a diminished capacity. This Court held: At trial a guidance counsellor from Hill's high school testified that his IQ was about 70, that he was a slow learner, and scored low on achievement tests. She also stated that he had had a car accident in which a friend was killed in 1972. In that car accident Hill sustained a head injury. Thereafter he returned to school and excelled in carpentry work. He went on to graduate and got a college football scholarship. Hill's high school coach testified that after the accident Hill seemed withdrawn. On the basis of this evidence, we find that there was nothing presented which would have warranted an instruction on Hill's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct as required by the statute at the time the murder took place. There is no merit to this assignment of error. Hill, 460 So.2d at 799. As in Hill, Wiley had a low IQ and trouble in school. He also had suffered a head trauma and had lost someone close to him (his grandfather). Like Hill, Wiley had thereafter been a productive member of society. Furthermore, there is no evidence that any of these problems caused either of these defendants to suffer diminished capacity at the time of the crime. The difference between Wiley and Hill is that Wiley became addicted to alcohol and drugs. The only evidence of Wiley's alleged diminished capacity at the time of the crime is the doctor's testimony that Wiley's substance abuse problem caused Wiley to suffer a diminished cerebral activity, cerebral ability at the time of the crime. However, there is no evidence that Wiley was substantially impaired in his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Because the evidence did not support a diminished capacity instruction, the trial judge did not commit reversible error by refusing Wiley's instruction on this statutory mitigator. Wiley's argument to the contrary is without merit.