Opinion ID: 1925336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Hidden danger, generally

Text: The law of hidden danger applicable to licensees springs from the rule that a licensee may expect only that a possessor of premises will refrain from willful or wanton injury. Willful and wanton conduct exceeds mere inadvertence or lack of attention characteristic of ordinary negligence, and means that the possessor consciously disregards a known, serious danger. Dry v. Ford, 238 Miss. 98, 102, 117 So.2d 456, 458 (Miss. 1960). Consistent with that general rule, the rule of hidden danger requires the possessor of premises not to set traps for [a licensee] by exposing him to hidden perils. Marlon Investment Co. v. Conner, 246 Miss. 343, 353, 149 So.2d 312, 315 (Miss. 1963). Thus, the possessor of land owes a licensee no duty to maintain land in a safe condition, but only to disclose to the licensee any concealed, dangerous conditions on the premises of which the owner has knowledge, and to exercise reasonable care to see that the licensee is aware of the danger. 149 So.2d at 316. In this state, the question of children's capacity to perceive danger has arisen in the context of contributory negligence and attractive nuisance questions. Instructively, this court has held that the attractive nuisance doctrine does not apply to obvious, natural dangers; an occupant may assume that a child's guardians will have warned the child about readily apparent dangers. McGill v. City of Laurel, 252 Miss. 740, 173 So.2d 892, 898 (Miss. 1965); see also Gordon v. C.H.C. Corp., 236 So.2d 733, 735 (Miss. 1970) (child should be aware of danger of falling from a height); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339. Some jurisdictions have established a special foreseeability rule for injury to a minor caused by a dangerous condition on the premises: the possessor of the premises bears the duty to protect against injuries where the possessor knows or should know minors frequent the premises and where a dangerous condition on the premises could cause injury. The possessor bears no duty, however, where the minor generally would be expected to understand and avoid an obvious risk present in a dangerous or defective condition. See Barrett v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County, 228 Ill. App.3d 975, 171 Ill.Dec. 170, 173, 593 N.E.2d 990, 993 (1992) (sixteen-year-old in wet shoes should have known not to swing on 30-foot rope over deep ravine); Sampson by Sampson v. Zimmerman, 151 Ill. App.3d 396, 104 Ill.Dec. 349, 502 N.E.2d 846, 848 (1986) (no duty where child allowed to be at large would understand, appreciate, and avoid obvious risk); cf. Bell v. City of Bay St. Louis, 467 So.2d 657 (Miss. 1985) (city bore non-delegable duty to maintain reasonably safe sidewalks; fact that debris was open and obvious would not necessarily exonerate city). Contributory negligence doctrine also subsumes the question of a child's capacity to perceive danger. Over a hundred years ago, in Mayor of Vicksburg v. McLain, 67 Miss. 4, 14, 6 So. 774, 775-76 (1889), this Court examined a case in which the defendant had allowed a hill near a playground to be cut away, leaving a 30-foot, ungraded bluff, which collapsed on and killed an eight-year-old child. The court held that, due to presumed incapacity, a child of tender years could not exercise judgment and discretion. The Court noted that the presumption could be rebutted by proving exceptional capacity and a capability of exercising judgment and discretion. 67 Miss. at 14, 6 So. at 776. See also Coleman v. Associated Pipeline Contractors, Inc., 444 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. [Miss.] 1971); Glorioso v. Young Mens Christian Ass'n of Jackson, 556 So.2d 293 (Miss. 1989) (exceptional capacity supports contributory negligence and rebuts presumption of non-negligence in child between ages of 7 and 14).