Opinion ID: 1518773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether alleged evidentiary errors asserted during the guilt phase warrant reversal?

Text: Appellant asserts three evidentiary errors merit reversal of his convictions. He first contends that it was error to admit into evidence two photographs of the victims' bodies taken after their discovery because the photos lacked relevance and were more prejudicial than probative in value. The Commonwealth responds that the photos were relevant to demonstrate the location at which the bodies were found and to illustrate the measures taken to conceal their whereabouts. The general rule that photos, otherwise admissible, do not become inadmissible simply because they are gruesome and the crime is heinous loses considerable force when the condition of the body has been materially altered by . . . decomposition or other extraneous causes, not related to commission of the crime, so that the pictures tend to arouse passion and appall the viewer. Clark v. Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 793, 794 (1992). The determination of admissibility begins by considering whether the photos are relevant. Relevant evidence is defined as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. KRE 401. While it is true that Foley stipulated that the victims died of gunshots, we believe that the photos were indeed relevant to demonstrate the location of the bodies and the measures taken to conceal them, both factors that were consistent with the testimony of prosecution witnesses and thus corroborative of their testimony. Thus, the photos have relevance as they tend to support the testimony of an eyewitness to the crime. Having found them relevant, we have reviewed the two photographs and do not consider them to be unduly gruesome; in fact, it is somewhat difficult to discern the particulars of the bodies depicted due to the quilts wrapped around them and the concrete, lime, and dirt covering them. In effect, these are basic crime scene pictures that do not show blood, decomposition or other gory or gruesome features. Further, the photos were shown only briefly, and were not emphasized in any way, unlike those at issue in Clark, supra . There was no reversible error in admitting the photographs. The second evidentiary argument concerns the court's ruling that certain testimony from two witnesses which could have cast doubt on the veracity of Phoebe Watts, one of the prosecution's more important witnesses, was inadmissible. The first prohibited testimony would have come from Ed Gross, yet another relative of Murph Gross. Gross would have testified that he saw Watts in October of 1991, around the time of the discovery of the bodies, and that Watts told him she was leaving Kentucky because she did not want to get stuck with what David and Gordon done. The Commonwealth objected to the introduction of this testimony on dual grounds: that it was hearsay and that the defense had previously released Watts as a witness without asking her about this exchange with Gross. The defense argued that because Watts had testified that she left Kentucky out of fear of Appellant, the statement made to Gross was an inconsistent prior statement. Initially, the court overruled the Commonwealth's objection, but upon questioning at sidebar and determining the exact nature of the proposed testimony, sustained it. In a similar vein, the trial court refused to allow Louise Bridges to testify that Phoebe Watts had spoken with Bridges following Appellant's prior murder trial and had asked Bridges whether she would be testifying in the next trial. Watts purportedly stated that she, Watts, would think of something for Bridges to say at the next trial. Appellant contends that this testimony is admissible and relevant to demonstrate Watts' bias in favor of self-protection and motivation to lie. Again, the Commonwealth objected to the introduction of the testimony because it constituted hearsay and because the defense had already released Watts as a witness without having confronted her with the alleged statements. KRE 613(a) provides as follows: Before other evidence can be offered of the witness having made at another time a different statement, he must be inquired of concerning it, with the circumstances of time, place, and persons present, as correctly as the examining party can present them. . . . Clearly, the foundation required by KRE 613 for the admission of a prior inconsistent statement of a witness was not laid by Appellant as to the testimony of Gross. While Watts testified that she left Kentucky out of fear of Appellant, Gross's testimony puts a different motivation behind her act. Watts was released as a witness by the defense without having been confronted with that statement and allowed the opportunity to explain it. There was no error in the trial court's refusal to admit the testimony of Gross under these circumstances. The testimony of Bridges merits similar treatment, though Appellant does not contend that Bridges' recitation of Watts' alleged words is in any way contradictory to Watts' actual testimony. Not having been given the opportunity to deny the testimony of Bridges, it cannot be said that her testimony is an inconsistent prior statement by Watts that would be admissible as an exception to the rules of hearsay. Again, no foundation was laid as required by KRE 613 and there was no error.