Opinion ID: 462747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Steinwachs

Text: 15 Steinwachs asserts several assignments of error including the claim that the district court did not conduct an appropriate Fed.R.Crim.P. 44(c) inquiry and that his trial attorney labored under an actual conflict of interest. Because we agree with Steinwachs that these errors mandate reversal of his conviction, we do not reach the other issues raised by him. Fed.R.Crim.P. 44(c) provides: 16 Whenever two or more defendants have been jointly charged pursuant to Rule 8(b) or have been joined for trial pursuant to Rule 13, and are represented by the same retained or assigned counsel ..., the court shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint representation and shall personally advise each defendant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation. Unless it appear that there is good cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall take such measures as may be appropriate to protect each defendant's right to counsel. 17 (emphasis added). 18 This rule requires the district court to make a probing inquiry into the nature of a potential conflict of interest and to specifically advise defendants of their right to separate representation. United States v. Mers, 701 F.2d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir.1983). A technical violation of this rule, however, will not lead to reversal in every case. A defendant must demonstrate the existence of an actual conflict of interest before he is entitled to a reversal of his conviction. Id. at 1326-27. See also United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1536-37 (11th Cir.1984). 19 Steinwachs claims that the district court never fully apprised him of the facts underlying the alleged conflict of interest or that he had a right to separate counsel. The government, on the other hand, contends that the district court met its Rule 44(c) obligations by pointing out the potential conflict of interest on three different occasions. The record, however, supports Steinwachs' position. 20 The first significant discussion between the district court and Steinwachs concerning a potential conflict of interest occurred on the first day of trial. 4 The trial judge discussed at length the possible conflicts inherent in a joint representation and asked both defense counsel and the prosecution if they perceived any potential conflicts. He also asked the defendant's attorney if he had discussed the matter with his clients. The lawyer answered as follows: 21 I've gone over all of the testimony with them, Judge. I haven't gone into specific detail on a conflict situation. They're aware of what's involved. Their testimony is identical on all aspects of the case. They're either both guilty or they are both innocent. 22 Record on Appeal, Vol. III at 4. 23 Following this response, the judge asked each defendant if they were satisfied that there was no conflict of interest. Both answered that they were satisfied and that they wanted their trial attorney to represent them. 24 Although the court discussed the possible conflict of interest problems with Steinwachs, he failed to specifically advise him that he had the right to separate counsel. This omission violates the clear wording of Rule 44(c). See Carter, supra, at 1536. 25 After the closing arguments, the trial judge again inquired of both defendants if they believed that their attorney labored under any conflicts of interest. Both men replied no and told the judge that they felt they had been adequately represented by their attorney. Once again, however, Steinwachs was not advised that he had the right to separate counsel. 26 Steinwachs also maintains that he was never informed in detail as to his attorney's conflict of interest. He says that had it not been for the joint representation, he could have pursued a shifting blame defense by arguing that Romero and World Tropical were responsible for the cocaine and that he (Steinwachs) was merely a low level employee with no prior knowledge that the barrels contained cocaine. He claims that the unified defense theory pursued by the attorney was prejudicial because there was considerably more evidence against Romero than against him. Moreover, it was revealed during the trial that his lawyer also represented Edwin Golstein in various civil matters and as a representative of World Tropical in a forfeiture action related to this case. Steinwachs reasons that this dual representation created an actual conflict of interest with consequences that were never discussed with him. 27 Although the trial judge made efforts to inform Steinwachs of the potential conflict of interest, we hold that these efforts do not satisfy the dictates of Rule 44(c). Steinwachs was never told that he had a right to independent counsel and he was never informed of the specific facts and possible consequences of the dual representation. Without being aware of these facts, Steinwachs was unable to make a knowing decision whether to retain his trial attorney despite the potential conflicts of interest. 5 28 Having concluded that the trial judge did not comply with Rule 44(c), we must now determine whether Steinwachs has proven that his attorney labored under an actual conflict of interest. We will not find such a conflict unless the defendant can point to specific instances in the record to suggest an actual conflict of interest. United States v. Mers, 701 F.2d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir.1983). A mere hypothetical conflict will not suffice. Rather, Steinwachs must make a factual showing of inconsistent interests and must demonstrate that the attorney made a choice between possible alternative courses of action, such as eliciting (or failing to elicit) evidence helpful to one client but harmful to the other. Id. at 1328. 29 To support his allegation that his lawyer actually labored under a conflict of interest, Steinwachs maintains that the attorney could not have pursued a shifting blame defense without infringing upon the rights and interests of Romero, Golstein and World Tropical. The failure to adopt a strategy of shifting blame may well give rise to an actual conflict of interest, but to do so the strategy must have been an option realistically available to trial counsel. Carter, supra, at 1537. In the present case, the evidence discloses that Romero held a managerial position in World Tropical whereas Steinwachs was merely a truck driver and machine operator. Record on Appeal, Vol. III at 350-351. According to the government's own witness, Steinwachs worked by words from Romero. Id. at 160. Furthermore, on the day the barrels of cocaine arrived from Colombia, Romero made several phone calls to JES to check on the barrels while Steinwachs testified that he did not learn about the shipment until an hour before its arrival. 6 Based on these facts, Steinwachs urges that a shifting blame defense was not only realistically available but was the best defense available to him. 30 Steinwachs' defense counsel's simultaneous representation of Romero, Steinwachs and Golstein 7 made it impossible for him to pursue a shifting blame defense. It also precluded a successful examination of Golstein who testified that he had no knowledge of the cocaine. We agree that Steinwachs' status as a low level employee made a shifting blame defense extremely feasible and that such a defense was completely foreclosed to him because it would have implicated his codefendant and another client of his attorney. 31 Steinwachs also points to other examples in the record where his attorney's performance was hindered by his conflict of interest. For example, the anti-bugging device found at World Tropical was admitted into evidence solely on the basis of Romero's managerial position at World Tropical. Defense counsel, however, failed to object to its introduction against Steinwachs and even failed to seek an instruction limiting the evidence to Romero. This failure is easily explained by the attorney's approach to this case that the defendants were either both guilty or they're both innocent. Record on Appeal, Vol. III at 4. 32 The conflict also manifested itself at the sentencing stage of the trial. Had there been no such conflict, Steinwachs' attorney could have argued Romero's greater involvement in the events leading up to the arrest and emphasized Steinwachs' relatively minor role in those events. He was unable to present such an argument, however, in light of his obligations to Romero. 33 For the foregoing reasons, we find there was an actual conflict of interest inherent in the dual representation. Because of this conflict, and the district court's failure to comply with the dictates of Fed.R.Crim.P. 44(c), Steinwachs' conviction must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 34 Accordingly, we AFFIRM Romero's conviction and REVERSE Steinwachs' conviction.