Opinion ID: 172456
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Overbreadth or Particularity of Warrant Issue

Text: Mr. Timley suggests, as he did before the district court, that paragraph five of the search warrant is overly broad because the affidavit did not support the seizure of computer hardware, security equipment, firearms, and documents indicating ownership of real estate, bank accounts, vehicles, firearms, and other property from residences and storage buildings. The government admits part of paragraph five is overly broad but only with respect to security equipment and “other property from residences and storage buildings.” It suggests that once those portions of the paragraph are severed, the remainder of that paragraph, together with the rest of the warrant, is sufficiently particularized and supported by probable cause to support the seizure of the items taken as evidence from Mr. Timley’s home. We agree. -20- To begin, “[t]he Fourth Amendment requires that warrants describe both the place to be searched and the things to be seized with particularity. The search should be confined in scope to particularly described evidence relating to a specific crime for which there is demonstrated probable cause.” United States v. Brown, 984 F.2d 1074, 1077 (10 th Cir. 1993) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “The issue of whether a warrant is overbroad is subject to de novo review by this court.” Id. Under the severability doctrine, “the infirmity of part of a warrant requires the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to that part of the warrant, but does not require the suppression of anything described in the valid portions of the warrant ....” Id. (quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). In determining if the severability doctrine is applicable, we “divide the warrant into individual phrases, clauses, paragraphs, or categories ....” United States v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148, 1155 (10 th Cir. 2006). If parts of a warrant may be “meaningfully severed” and its: valid portions make up the greater part of the warrant, then we sever those portions, suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the portions that fail to meet the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and admit all evidence seized pursuant to the valid portions or lawfully seized during execution of the valid portions. Id. at 1151. As a result, “[w]here ... each of the categories of items to be seized describes distinct subject matter in language not linked to language of other -21- categories, and each valid category retains its significance when isolated from [the] rest of the warrant, then the valid portions may be severed from the warrant.” Id. at 1158 (relying, in part, on Brown, 984 F.2d at 1078 (holding that “[a]lthough one sentence in the warrant may have been overbroad, the infirm portion may be isolated and severed from the constitutionally adequate part”)). In this case, paragraph five of the search warrant may be meaningfully severed from the rest of the search warrant because the items sought therein, primarily pertaining to documents or records, are distinct from those in the rest of the search warrant, dealing with seizure of the actual physical drugs or drug paraphernalia. Similarly, portions of paragraph five may be severed because they are directed at different categories of items with little overlap, making them distinguishable from each other. For instance, while paragraph five primarily refers to documents or records, its subparts refer to items very distinct from one another, including firearms, computer equipment, and security equipment. Thus, while Deputy Clemmons’s affidavit does not support seizure of security equipment or records regarding other residences and storage buildings, as the government admits, it did support a search for the other items to which paragraph five refers. For example, paragraph five of the search warrant is directed not only at -22- documents regarding firearms but the search and seizure of firearms themselves. Correspondingly, Deputy Clemmons stated in his affidavit that individuals who use and sell illegal substances commonly have in their possession firearms and other weapons used to protect and secure their property, drugs, and money and that Mr. Timley had a history of prior use or possession of firearms. He also averred that narcotics dealers are known to possess records which reflect drug transaction information, including computer disks and computer hard drives. As a result, his affidavit supported the search and seizure of any firearms and documents or records in paragraph five pertaining to firearms or the listed computer items. Deputy Clemmons’s affidavit also provided information Mr. Timley resided at the Scotland Avenue residence, where its trash indicated ongoing drug-related activities, and that Mr. Timley drove a green minivan during at least one drug transaction, which he parked at the residence to be searched, and that narcotics dealers often transact drug sales from their vehicles. Thus, the affidavit sufficiently supported the search for and seizure of documents verifying his residence and ownership of the minivan, which were reasonably believed to be directly related to his suspected criminal activities. Finally, Deputy Clemmons avowed narcotics dealers often retain records reflecting amounts of drugs sold or fronted and proceeds from drug sales, so that documents relating to bank records, -23- as indicated in the search warrant, were amply covered by the affidavit. These valid portions of paragraph five, together with the other valid paragraphs of the search warrant, clearly make up the greater part of the warrant and support seizure of the items listed, including the drug scales, 114 grams of marijuana, and 67.5 net grams of crack cocaine discovered at Mr. Timley’s residence, which are referred to in the constitutionally-valid paragraphs one, two, and four of the search warrant. Applying our standard of review and the applicable legal principles to the circumstances presented and the issues raised on appeal, we conclude the district court did not err in denying Mr. Timley’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained at his residence. Accordingly, the search warrant and affidavit in support thereof did not violate Mr. Timley’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 4 4 A review of the cases cited by Mr. Timley in support of his arguments on appeal does not otherwise convince us the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We further note the cases cited in support of his staleness issue are especially unpersuasive as they are based on factual circumstances which differ from those presented here. -24-