Opinion ID: 415491
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of Habeas Corpus Relief

Text: 19 Martin-Trigona chose to challenge the bankruptcy court's order imprisoning him for civil contempt with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court appropriately viewed the petition as an ill-suited vehicle for raising the question .... The better procedure might have been for petitioner to appeal the contempt order, but he has not done so. 19 B.R. at 1001. Judge Daly's decision, although recognizing the problem, did not cure the procedural infirmity. We hold that absent extraordinary circumstances, which are not present here, all available routes of appeal must be exhausted before a person imprisoned for civil contempt by a bankruptcy court can avail himself of habeas corpus relief. 20 Prior to the Reform Act, the district courts had original jurisdiction, ... of all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1334 (1976), replaced by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1334 (Supp. II 1978). Under the new system created by the Reform Act, the district courts have appellate jurisdiction over bankruptcy court proceedings. Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1334(a) (Supp. IV 1980), the district court has jurisdiction of appeals from all final judgments, orders, and decrees of bankruptcy courts. The district court also has jurisdiction to entertain appeals from interlocutory orders and decrees of bankruptcy courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1334(b) (Supp. IV 1980), provided that an appeal from an interlocutory order or decree must be by leave of the district court to which the appeal is taken. See International Horizons, Inc. v. Committee Of Unsecured Creditors (In re International Horizons, Inc.), 689 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (11th Cir.1982). 21 An order of civil contempt is generally thought to be interlocutory and unreviewable until a final judgment has been entered. International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 493 F.2d 112, 114-15 & 117 (2d Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995, 94 S.Ct. 2409, 40 L.Ed.2d 774 (1974). Consequently, most courts have held that the jurisdiction of the court entering an order of imprisonment for civil contempt could properly be challenged through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Watkins v. Rives, 125 F.2d 33, 41 (D.C.Cir.1941) (habeas corpus may properly be used to challenge jurisdiction of a court, it cannot be used to review inconsistencies or even errors of law committed by a court of competent jurisdiction) (footnote omitted); United States ex rel. Emanuel v. Jaeger, 117 F.2d 483, 487 (2d Cir.1941) (Relator has appealed from neither the commitment nor the contempt order; he therefore can raise here [on habeas corpus] the issue of jurisdiction only.); United States ex rel. Paleais v. Moore, 294 F. 852, 855 (2d Cir.1923) (only matter which can now be considered [on habeas corpus] is the matter of the lower court's jurisdiction at the time it made the order adjudging the relator in contempt), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 581, 44 S.Ct. 331, 68 L.Ed. 860 (1924); United States ex rel. Birnbaum v. Henkel, 185 F. 553, 554 (2d Cir.1911) (Habeas corpus, however, does not review the regularity of the order, but only the validity of the commitment.). 22 Although habeas corpus traditionally has been accepted as the proper vehicle to challenge the constitutionality of an order of imprisonment from which there is no route of appeal, Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 183, 67 S.Ct. 1588, 1593, 91 L.Ed. 1982 (1947); Ex parte Steiner, 202 F. 419, 421 (2d Cir.1913); Patterson v. Lumbard, 16 F.R.D. 140 (S.D.N.Y.1954), habeas corpus is not a substitute for an appeal, Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 277, 44 S.Ct. 103, 106, 68 L.Ed. 293 (1923). 23 This proceeds on the theory that the erroneous decision of a court which has a right to dispose of a controversy on the merits, as well as a decision where the court has no jurisdiction to dispose of the question at all may be corrected directly by appeal or writ of error. There is ordinarily no necessity for a writ of habeas corpus. 24 Ex parte Steiner, 202 F. at 421. In United States ex rel. Sutton v. Mulcahy, 169 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 956, 69 S.Ct. 1526, 93 L.Ed. 1755 (1949), the district court was forced to commit a recalcitrant witness for civil contempt. The contemnor bypassed his right to appeal. Instead, he filed a writ of habeas corpus in the district court alleging that the court that entered the contempt order lacked jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the petition and this Court affirmed relying on the Supreme Court's restrictive approach to appeals disguised as habeas corpus petitions. 25 [T]he situations in which habeas corpus has done service for an appeal are the exceptions. Thus where the jurisdiction of the federal court which tried the case is challenged or where the constitutionality of the federal statute under which conviction was had is attacked, habeas corpus is increasingly denied in case an appellate procedure was available for correction of the error. 26 Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 179, 67 S.Ct. 1588, 1591, 91 L.Ed. 1982 (1947) (footnote omitted), quoted in United States ex rel. Sutton v. Mulcahy, 169 F.2d at 96; see also Henry v. Henkel, 235 U.S. 219, 228-29, 35 S.Ct. 54, 56-57, 59 L.Ed. 203 (1914). 27 We recognize and adhere to the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a substitute for a regular route of appeal. The district court could have heard an appeal from the order imprisoning Martin-Trigona for civil contempt. See In re International Horizons, Inc., 689 F.2d at 1000. An appeal from an interlocutory order of the bankruptcy court is permitted with leave of the district court under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1334(b) (Supp. IV 1980). If Martin-Trigona questioned the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, he had a remedy, but that remedy was to seek leave to appeal, not to petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Cf. Maiorino v. Branford Savings Bank, 691 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir.1982). A habeas corpus petition is the avenue of last resort, always available to safeguard the fundamental rights of persons wrongly incarcerated. Ex parte Steiner, 202 F. 419, 421 (2d Cir.1913). 28 Where, as here, a regular route of appeal exists, habeas corpus will be allowed in only exceptional cases. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 274-75, 63 S.Ct. 236, 239-240, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942) (habeas corpus appropriate for appeal on jurisdiction question where trial transcript unavailable for appeal on other grounds); Riggins v. United States, 199 U.S. 547, 548-49, 26 S.Ct. 147, 148-149, 50 L.Ed. 303 (1905) (Ordinarily the writ will not be granted when there is a remedy by writ of error or appeal, yet in rare and exceptional cases it may be issued, although such remedy exists.). In Walker v. Chitty, 112 F.2d 79 (9th Cir.1940), two criminals convicted in the federal district court and sentenced to imprisonment filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging, in part, the jurisdiction of the district court. Although an appeal from the judgments of conviction was available, the prisoners opted to seek the writ instead. The district court dismissed the petition and the court of appeals affirmed: 29 In the scheme of things, order requires that under the great majority of cases certain regular procedure be followed, to the end that the instruments provided accomplish the greatest good for the greatest number. The normal method of reviewing a judgment of a court is by the prosecution of an appeal, and this is the course which must be followed save in rare and exceptional circumstances. 30 Id. at 82. 31 A similar situation is presented in the instant case. We understand that in rare circumstances a litigant may be unsure whether there is an open avenue of appeal. This is not such a case. If Martin-Trigona questioned the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, his first resort should have been to seek leave to appeal. See Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F.2d 642, 644-45 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 678, 62 S.Ct. 184, 86 L.Ed. 543 (1941). We recognize his pro se status and appreciate the problems inherent in occupying that position, but we will not stretch the rules to accommodate a person who, like Martin-Trigona, is a law school graduate and who has amply demonstrated his familiarity with the bankruptcy law and the rules of procedure. See Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 177, 67 S.Ct. 1588, 1590, 91 L.Ed. 1982 (1947) (It cannot be said that absence of counsel made the appeals unavailable as a practical matter.); note 4 supra. There are no special circumstances revealed by the record, other than those caused by Martin-Trigona's own conduct, to justify a departure from regular procedure. Because Martin-Trigona filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus without seeking leave to appeal, his petition should have been dismissed by the district court. 12