Opinion ID: 2253638
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Scope of Penal Code Section 11165.6

Text: In order to provide guidance to the trial court, we also resolve Respondent's claim that the provisions of Penal Code section 11165.6 are only applicable to persons who are in some kind of caretaking role of the child victim. We find no support for Respondent's position. As it read in 2003, when the charged offense was alleged to have been committed in this matter, Penal Code § 11165.6 stated: As used in this article, the term `child abuse or neglect' includes physical injury inflicted by other than accidental means upon a child by another person, sexual abuse as defined in Section 11165.1, neglect as defined in Section 11165.2, willful cruelty or unjustifiable punishment as defined in Section 11165.3, and unlawful corporal punishment or injury as defined in Section 11165.4. `Child abuse or neglect' does not include a mutual affray between minors. `Child abuse or neglect' does not include an injury caused by reasonable and necessary force used by a peace officer acting within the course and scope of his or her employment as a peace officer. (Pen.Code § 11165.6, as amended by Stats.2001, ch. 133, § 2.) Under a plain reading of Penal Code section 11165.6 and the other statutes referenced therein, with the exception of Penal Code section 11165.2, there is no language limiting the conduct described in section 11165.6 only to persons responsible for the care or welfare of the child. Consequently, section 11165.6's definition of child abuse or neglect includes sexual abuse of any child, nonaccidental physical injury inflicted upon any child, the willful cause, infliction, or allowance of any child to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or the infliction on any child of cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or injury resulting in a traumatic condition committed by any person. Respondent can point to no statutory law, case law, or legislative history which would indicate otherwise. The trial court, in concluding that the Legislature intended to limit Penal Code section 1377, subdivision (g) to situations where there was some sort of custodial relationship between the victim and the defendant, might have relied on the following 1997 Assembly Committee on Public Safety analysis for the bill, which added subdivision (g) (Stats 1997 ch. 243 § 1 (Senate Bill No. 97) and related legislation in ch. 18 § 1 (Senate Bill No. 115).). The analysis quoted the author of Senate Bill No. 97, Senator Alpert: `An example of a crime where civil compromise works is vandalism. Typically a perpetrator may publicly apologize and agree to pay for the damages caused. Examples of crimes where it isn't appropriate, but is currently allowed, are child and elder abuse. Domestic violence, child abuse and elder abuse offenses almost always involve victims, who because of their status or condition, or relationship to the defendant, may be unduly influenced to civilly compromise. `We can no longer allow civil compromise in these cases. The message that civil compromise continues to broadcast is that abuse of those closest to us is not a serious crime, only a civil dispute or a personal matter to be taken care of quietly, with a monetary payoff or apology. That message is the cause of countless tragedies in San Diego County.' (Assem. Com. On Pub. Safety, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 97 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.), as amended June 17, 1997, pp. 1-2.) However, [t]he general rule is that, in construing a statute, we do not consider the motives or understandings of either its author or the individual legislators who voted for it. ( Bravo Vending v. City of Rancho Mirage (1993) 16 Cal. App.4th 383, 402, fn. 11, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 164, citing In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 589 [128 Cal.Rptr. 427, 546 P.2d 1371], and California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 699-700 [170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856].) This is true even where the statement is from the bill's author because no guarantee can issue that those who supported his proposal shared his view of its compass. ( In re Marriage of Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 589-590, 128 Cal.Rptr. 427, 546 P.2d 1371.) However, a legislator's statement can be relevant to statutory interpretation where the statement is a reiteration of legislative discussion and events leading to adoption of proposed amendments rather than merely an expression of personal opinion. ( California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist., supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 700, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856.) In the legislative histories of Senate Bill No. 97 or the related legislation of Senate Bill No. 115 (authored by Sen. Burton), there is nothing indicating that Senator Alpert's personal opinion formed part of the Legislature's discussion or subsequent amendments to the bill regarding the bill's applicability to caretaking or familial relationships. Therefore, the above quoted statements reveals only the author's personal opinion and is not a proper subject for consideration in determining the Legislature's intent in amending Penal Code section 1377, subdivision (g) in 1997. Except where so expressly stated, there is no requirement that child abuse, as defined by Penal Code section 11165.6, contains a requirement that the abuse be inflicted by a person in whose care the child was entrusted as a caretaker, custodian, or family member for purposes of the prohibition against civil compromise found in Penal Code Section 1377, subdivision (g). As a result, the trial court, on remand, is directed to conduct its hearing consistent with the definitions described, ante. Since we reverse on the grounds that the trial court might not have had jurisdiction to apply the civil compromise and remand for further proceedings, we need not address the remaining issues of whether hearsay evidence and the police report were properly admitted or considered in allowing the civil compromise.