Opinion ID: 2976318
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Issue Being Relitigated

Text: To succeed in his double jeopardy claim, Petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that “the issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the first proceeding.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350 (1990). The government argues that Petitioner has not met his burden because, even though the Supreme Court of Ohio found that Petitioner is mentally retarded on direct appeal of his death sentence, “there was no definition of mental retardation for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment,” at the time of this decision. (Reply Br. at 1) According to the government, Petitioner can only establish his mental retardation for Eighth Amendment purposes by demonstrating in a post-conviction proceeding that he is mentally retarded under the standard described in State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011 (Ohio 2002). In Lott, the Supreme Court of Ohio described the test Ohio courts use for determining whether a person is mentally retarded and therefore ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins. Id. at 1014. This decision was necessary because, although Atkins held that the mentally retarded could not be executed, it simultaneously “le[ft] to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.” 536 U.S. at 317 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)). The government contends that, because Petitioner’s direct appeals were decided before Atkins and Lott, the courts hearing those appeals could not have applied the same standard articulated in Lott to determine that Petitioner is mentally retarded. The record reveals otherwise. Although Atkins did not mandate that states follow a specific procedure in determining whether or not a capital defendant is mentally retarded, it cited favorably to the clinical definition of mental retardation established by the American Association on Mental Retardation and the American Psychiatric Association. Id. at 309 n.3. Under that definition: The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C). Id. (quoting Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 41 (4th ed.2000) (“DSM-IV”)). In Lott, the court held that Ohio courts should apply this clinical standard in determining whether a capital defendant is mentally retarded. See 779 N.E.2d at 1014 (“Clinical definitions of mental retardation, cited with approval in Atkins, provide a standard for evaluating an individual’s claim of mental retardation.”). While the government conceded at oral argument that Lott does nothing more than restate the clinical definition of mental retardation, it also claims in its brief that this established a new rule in Ohio. Neither past Ohio decisions nor the record in this case support that claim. Prior to Lott, Ohio courts judging whether an individual is mentally retarded often relied on the clinical definition of mental retardation. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 595 N.E.2d 884, 901 (Ohio 1992) (crediting the diagnosis of a clinical psychologist in determining that a capital defendant is No. 06-3471 Bies v. Bagley Page 8 mentally retarded);. State v. Trent, No. 17705, 1999 WL 1243352 at  (Ohio Ct. App. December 23, 1999) (unpublished decision) (describing an individual as mentally retarded because he fit the clinical definition under the DSM-IV). Moreover, the record in this case indicates that the state supreme court applied the same clinical definition of mental retardation in its determination that Petitioner is mentally retarded as it did in deciding Lott.6 The Supreme Court of Ohio’s finding that Petitioner is mentally retarded was based solely on the diagnosis of Dr. Donna Winter, a licensed clinical psychologist. Bies, 658 N.E.2d at 761. Furthermore, it is clear from Dr. Winter’s testimony at Petitioner’s trial that she applied the same clinical method of diagnosing mental retardation which was described by the court in Lott. According to Lott, a person must display three traits in order to be diagnosed with mental retardation: “(1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, (2) significant limitations in two or more adaptive skills, such as communication, self-care, and self-direction, and (3) onset before the age of 18.” 779 N.E.2d at 1014; see also DSM-IV 41 (describing the same test)7. Other adaptive skills listed by the clinical definition of mental retardation include “home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources . . . functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (quoting DSM-IV 41). In testifying as to Petitioner’s mental retardation, Dr. Winter found each of the three traits required for a diagnosis of mental retardation present in Petitioner. The first criteria for a diagnosis of mental retardation is “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.” DSM-IV 49. This prong is established by “an IQ of approximately 70 or below on an individually administered IQ test.” Id. Dr. Winter testified that Petitioner has an IQ of 69. Similarly, Dr. Winter testified that Petitioner has significant limitations in several adaptive skills. Dr. Winter testified as to Petitioner’s limited functional academic skills, noting that he is unable to read, that he suffers from “developmental academic disorder,” and that he functions at a “third to 6 The fact that Petitioner was determined to be mentally retarded by the Supreme Court of Ohio on appeal, rather than by the trial court, makes no difference to this Court’s consideration of this case. In Sattazahn, the Supreme Court held that double jeopardy attaches when a judge or jury “enter findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the life sentence.” 537 U.S. at 109. Under Ohio law, a state appeals court reviewing a death sentence must conduct an independent review of the aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors relevant to the sentence on review. Bies, 658 N.E.2d at 761. Pursuant to this duty, the state supreme court made a finding that Petitioner is mentally retarded. As this finding is sufficient to establish [Petitioner’s] legal entitlement to a life sentence, Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, the fact that it was made by judges rather than a jury is irrelevant to our inquiry. See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 108. This view is bolstered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 39 (1988), which held that “[b]ecause the Double Jeopardy Clause affords the defendant who obtains a judgment of acquittal at the trial level absolute immunity from further prosecution for the same offense, it ought to do the same for the defendant who obtains an appellate determination that the trial court should have entered a judgment of acquittal.” Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 39 (1988). To distinguish between trial and appellate in such cases would “‘create a purely arbitrary distinction’ between defendants based on the hierarchical level at which the determination was made.” Id. (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. at 1, 11 (1978)). A finding of fact which renders a defendant constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty requires a court to enter a judgment of “acquittal” for double jeopardy purposes. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 109; see supra note 5. In the instant case, the state supreme court made just such a finding. Bies, 658 N.E.2d at 761. We would create a “purely arbitrary distinction” by penalizing Petitioner simply because the finding of fact which requires a judgment of acquittal was made not by a trial judge, but by his or her judicial superiors. Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 39; see also Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 387 (1986) overturned on other grounds by Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 503 n. 7(1987) (“[T]he court must examine the entire course of the state-court proceedings against the defendant in order to determine whether, at some point in the process, the requisite factual finding as to the defendant's culpability has been made.”) 7 Admittedly, the DSM-IV was published two years after Dr. Winter’s diagnosis of Petitioner. Even so, the definition of mental retardation described by Lott was recognized as the clinical standard at least five years prior to Dr. Winter’s testimony. See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 28 (3d ed.1987) (“DSM-III”) (“The essential features of [mental retardation] are: (1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, accompanied by (2) significant deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning, with (3) onset before the age of 18.”). No. 06-3471 Bies v. Bagley Page 9 sixth grade level.” (J.A. 1166, 1168) Dr. Winter testified that Petitioner has significant limitations to his ability to communicate, noting that he had “problems with language at a very early age” (J.A. 1209) Dr. Winter testified that Petitioner has significant limitations to his social and interpersonal skills, noting that he was “violent and uncontrollable” at a very young age, (J.A. 1159), that he was expelled from public school for his disruptive and often violent behavior, and that he was transferred to a “severe behavior handicap class.” (J.A. 1163) Finally, Dr. Winter testified that Petitioner has significant limitations to his ability to care for himself, noting that he had made a number of suicide attempts by the age of 13. Finally, Dr. Winter testified that Petitioner’s limitations began to manifest as early as age 3, thus establishing their onset before the age of 18. Based on Dr. Winter’s testimony—the testimony of a clinical psychologist—it is clear that she relied on the clinical definition of mental retardation in diagnosing Petitioner. Because the Supreme Court of Ohio held that Dr. Winter’s testimony was alone sufficient to establish Petitioner’s mental retardation, Bies, 658 N.E.2d at 761, it is equally clear that the state supreme court found Petitioner to be mentally retarded under the clinical definition of that mental disorder. Accordingly, we conclude that the Supreme Court of Ohio’s post-Atkins decision in Lott did not establish a new method of determining mental retardation for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. Rather, Lott simply restated the same diagnostic method the Supreme Court of Ohio applied to the Petitioner on direct appeal. Therefore, we hold that “the precise issue raised in the present case [was] raised and actually litigated in the prior proceeding.” N.A.A.C.P., 821 F.2d at 330. Inasmuch as the precise issue litigated on direct appeal is now being raised again by the government, we conclude that the first prong of the collateral estoppel test has been met. Id. 2. The Necessity of the State Supreme Court’s Finding The second prong of the four-part collateral estoppel test requires that determination of the issue being relitigated “must have been necessary to the outcome of the prior proceeding.” Id. We believe that this prong has also been established here. Under Ohio law, a sentencing court may not impose the death penalty unless that court has first considered any mitigating factors weighing against a death sentence, Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.04(C), and found those mitigating factors proven by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d 264, 275 (Ohio 1984); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322 (1989) (holding that a jury may not sentence a mentally retarded defendant to death unless it has been allowed to consider the defendant’s mental retardation at sentencing). Furthermore, as the Supreme Court of Ohio expressly acknowledged in Petitioner’s direct appeal, an Ohio court reviewing a death sentence must engage in an independent review of the aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors relevant to the sentence on review. Bies, 658 N.E.2d at 761. When reviewing a sentence of death, “the supreme court shall affirm a sentence of death only if the particular court is persuaded from the record that the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating factors present in the case and that the sentence of death is the appropriate sentence in the case.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.05(A). This independent review of the aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors is far more rigorous than the deferential standard of review which appellate courts normally apply to findings of fact by a trial court—even amounting to de novo review on both issues of law and issues of fact. See State v. Holloway, 527 N.E.2d 831, 837 (Ohio 1988) (“[T]hree opportunities are provided defendants to argue the appropriateness of a sentence less than death to courts which must decide the question de novo.”) Indeed, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s reconsideration of the mitigating factors weighing against a death sentence “parallels that of a jury when the sentence of death is imposed . . . .” Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d at 306. No. 06-3471 Bies v. Bagley Page 10 An Ohio appellate court’s review of a death sentence is not only rigorous, it is sweeping. During the sentencing phase of a capital defendant’s trial, an Ohio jury may not limit its inquiry to considering only those mitigating factors the defendant argues are present in his or her case. Rather, “Ohio law provides that the jury is required to consider as possible mitigating factors the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history, character, and background of the defendant; and any other factors that call for a penalty less than death or that lessen the appropriateness of the death penalty.” State v. Jordan, 804 N.E.2d 1, 16 (Ohio 2004). Each of these factors—including the allencompassing inquiry into “any other factors that call for a penalty less than death or that lessen the appropriateness of the death penalty”—must be considered by the jury even if they are not raised by the defendant at trial. See id. (holding that a trial judge properly instructed a jury that it “must consider” each of the mitigating factors described by statute before imposing the death penalty). Moreover, in considering these factors, the jury is not limited to finding mitigating factors present in the evidence presented during a capital defendant’s mitigation case. Instead, the jury must consider “any evidence” which leads to a conclusion that “any factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death” are present in the defendant’s case. Id.; see also State v. Ashworth, 706 N.E.2d 1231, 1239–40 (Ohio 1999) (holding that a defendant who presents no mitigating evidence to counter-balance aggravating circumstances may still receive a sentence other than death). In other words, before a capital defendant may be sentenced to death, a jury must first examine the entirety of the evidence in the case, and ask whether any parts of that evidence combine to outweigh the prosecution’s case for imposing the death penalty. Because an Ohio appellate court’s review of a death sentence “parallels that of a jury when the sentence of death is imposed,” this far-reaching inquiry must be conducted de novo on appeal. Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d at 306. Due to the broad inquiry an Ohio court must perform before sentencing a person to death, it would be impossible for that court to simply assume without deciding that a particular mitigating factor exists, and then argue that the death penalty may still be imposed because the aggravating circumstances outweigh that factor. Ohio law does not limit a court’s task in imposing the death penalty to simply proving that the mitigating factors proffered by the defendant are insufficient to overcome the prosecutor’s evidence. Jordan, 804 N.E.2d at 16. Rather, because a sentencing court’s inquiry is open-ended, determining which mitigating factors are actually present in a case is a necessary8 first step to determining whether those factors outweigh the aggravating circumstances. Indeed the Supreme Court of Ohio engaged in just such an inquiry before upholding Petitioner’s death sentence. In addition to determining that Petitioner is mentally retarded, the court found numerous other mitigating factors in the evidence presented to the jury at trial. The court found that the fact that Petitioner’s “father was an alcoholic who physically abused Bies's mother before he abandoned the family,” mitigated the seriousness of his offense. Bies, 658 N.E.2d at 761. It determined that his history of mental health problems, disruptive behavior and suicide attempts were mitigating factors. Id. The Court found that Petitioner’s young age at the time of the crime mitigated its seriousness, and it determined that his lack of a prior criminal record was also a mitigating factor. Id. Each of these determinations were a necessary part of the court’s duty to examine the entirety of the facts available to the jury and weigh them against the aggravating factors proven at trial. Jordan, 804 N.E.2d at 16. Such a weighing could not have occurred unless the court first determined what to place on either side of the scale. 8 This reading of Ohio law is bolstered by the plain language of the state’s death penalty statute, which requires a sentencing court to ask whether the “aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating factors present in the case.” § 2929.05(A). Implicit in the requirement that a court consider the mitigating factors “present in the case” is that the court must necessarily determine which mitigating factors are actually present in that case. No. 06-3471 Bies v. Bagley Page 11 Because the Supreme Court of Ohio found that Petitioner is mentally retarded pursuant to a mandatory duty to weigh the aggravating circumstances in his case against any mitigating factors which could be found in the record, we hold that the determination of this issue was “necessary to the outcome” of Petitioner’s direct appeal, and thus the second prong of the collateral estoppel test is met. N.A.A.C.P., 821 F.2d at 330. 3. The Finality of the State Supreme Court’s Judgment Under the third prong of the collateral estoppel test, the proceeding in which Petitioner was found to be mentally retarded “must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.” Id. This prong is easily established here. Petitioner was found to be mentally retarded in final judgment by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Bies, 658 N.E.2d at 761. The Supreme Court of Ohio is the court of last resort in that state; Ohio law does not allow appellate review of its supreme court’s decisions; see Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.02, and the United States Supreme Court denied review of the state supreme court’s decision. Bies v. Ohio, 517 U.S. 1238, 1238 (1996). Accordingly, we hold that the decision which found Petitioner to be mentally retarded led to a final judgment on the merits of his case. 4. The State’s Opportunity to Litigate Petitioner’s Mental Retardation The final prong of the collateral estoppel test requires that “the party against whom estoppel is sought must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.” N.A.A.C.P., 821 F.2d at 330. We conclude that this prong is also established by the record in this case. The government argues against such a conclusion by claiming that the parties “did not really have a fair opportunity before Atkins to litigate” the issue of Petitioner’s mental retardation. (Respondent’s Br. at 35-36) This argument, however, ignores the record. On direct appeal to the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Ohio, Petitioner’s mental retardation was a contested issue. In briefs before both courts, both parties presented arguments and cited evidence in the record regarding whether Petitioner suffers from mental retardation. In both courts, the government contested Petitioner’s claim that he is “supposedly retarded,” and cited evidence to support this claim. (J.A. 789-90, 830-31) Both courts found Petitioner’s arguments more compelling. Bies, 658 N.E.2d at 761; Bies, 1994 WL 102196 at . For the government to now claim that the parties did not have a fair chance to litigate Petitioner’s mental retardation ignores its own zealous advocacy on direct appeal. We find that Petitioner and the government vigorously litigated the issue of his mental retardation during Petitioner’s direct appeals. The government did not claim at any point during those proceedings that they were somehow unfair, or otherwise denied them a full and fair chance to present their arguments against a finding that Petitioner is mentally retarded. Furthermore, this Court has no reason to doubt the fairness of the jurists on the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Ohio, and the government presents no evidence to this Court that the Ohio judges paid insufficient regard to their arguments that Petitioner is not mentally retarded. Accordingly, we conclude that the final prong of the collateral estoppel test has been established in this case. Moreover, as “death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal,” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s determination that Petitioner is mentally retarded is “sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the life sentence.” Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 109. We therefore hold that Petitioner cannot be forced to relitigate the issue of his mental retardation under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443. No. 06-3471 Bies v. Bagley Page 12 5. A Right Limited To The Accused In an attempt to circumvent the Double Jeopardy Clause, the government also claims that double jeopardy does not apply here because two Ohio court decisions have allowed the mental retardation issue to be relitigated. See State v. Lorraine, No. 2003-T-0159, 2005 WL 1208119 at  (Ohio Ct. App. May 20, 2005); State v. Bays, 824 N.E.2d 167, 171 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). Neither of these cases are relevant to the instant matter. In both cases, earlier state proceedings had concluded that a capital defendant was not mentally retarded, and thus it was the government, not the petitioner, who was claiming collateral estoppel. Lorraine, 2005 WL 1208119 at ; Bays, 824 N.E.2d at 171. The Double Jeopardy Clause, however, has never been applied to allow a state to prevent relitigation of an issue. Much to the contrary, it exists for the sole purpose of protecting individual defendants against the power of overzealous state prosecutions. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 445 (“The underlying idea [of the Double Jeopardy Clause] is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense . . . .” (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)). Moreover, insofar as collateral estoppel is a doctrine which exists independent of the Double Jeopardy Clause, see Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443, a state actor may not avail itself of this doctrine in the criminal context. See United States v. Smith-Baltiher, 424 F.3d 913, 920 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 893 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Harnage, 976 F.2d 633, 633 (11th Cir. 1992). Outside of the double jeopardy context, the doctrine of collateral estoppel exists because of concerns over judicial economy and finality—in most cases, a promptly issued decision, not subject to endless appeals and relitigation, is desirable. Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 893; Harnage, 976 F.2d at 634. In criminal cases, however “finality and conservation of private, public, and judicial resources are lesser values than in civil litigation.” Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 893 (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 465 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). This is so, not because economy and finality lose value in the criminal context, but because in a criminal case, the defendant “has at stake interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.”9 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970). As the Supreme Court has explained: [T]he purpose of a criminal court is not to provide a forum for the ascertainment of private rights. Rather it is to vindicate the public interest in the enforcement of the criminal law while at the same time safeguarding the rights of the individual defendant. The public interest in the accuracy and justice of criminal results is greater than the concern for judicial economy professed in civil cases . . . . Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 25 (1980). Because of a criminal defendant’s “interest of transcending value” in vindicating his rights in a criminal case, Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, we join the Third, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits in holding that, in a criminal case, collateral estoppel may only be invoked by the accused. See Smith-Baltiher, 424 F.3d at 920; Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1244; Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 893; Harnage, 976 F.2d at 633. Collateral estoppel’s concern with swift, final adjudication cannot overcome a criminal defendant’s interest in his own life and liberty. Accordingly, we reject the government’s claim that, because Ohio law allows a death-row inmate to relitigate the issue of his mental retardation, Lorraine, 2005 WL 1208119 at ; Bays, 824 N.E.2d at 171, we must apply the same standard when the government seeks to relitigate this same issue. 9 Although a petition for a writ of habeas corpus constitutes a civil, not a criminal, proceeding, a habeas petitioner’s interests in avoiding stigma and preserving his own liberty are no less than those of a criminal defendant. No. 06-3471 Bies v. Bagley Page 13