Opinion ID: 2547207
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is the introduction of Davis's prior unsworn statement prohibited by Crawford when Davis testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination?

Text: ¶ 13. Relying on Crawford v. Washington , the Court of Appeals found that the introduction of Davis's statements violated Smith's Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser. The Court of Appeals reasoned that, although Davis testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination, the `Davis' who testified at Smith's trial was no longer the accusing witness against Smith. Smith, 2008 WL 4482521, at . The Court of Appeals instead found that Smith's true accusing witness was the `Davis' of December 29, 2004. Id. According to the Court of Appeals, Smith must have been provided with an opportunity to cross-examine Davis at the time the statements were given in order for the statements to be admissible under Crawford. Because Smith had no such opportunity, the Court of Appeals found that admission of the statements violated Smith's constitutional right to confront his accuser. Smith, 2008 WL 4482521, at . We find this reasoning to be flawed. ¶ 14. In Crawford, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth guidelines for the admission of a prior testimonial statement of a witness who does not testify at trial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Pertinent to today's analysis, Crawford clearly provided that [w]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (emphasis added). In other words, the analysis of whether prior testimonial statements must be excluded under the Crawford rule is necessary only when a witness does not appear for cross-examination at trial. ¶ 15. The Court of Appeals further found that Davis was not subject to cross-examination at trial because he was deemed unavailable to testify as a witness due to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement. Smith, 2008 WL 4482521, at . The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the distinction between unavailability for confrontation purposes and unavailability for hearsay purposes, holding that whether a witness is deemed unavailable to testify due to memory loss has no bearing on whether that witness should be regarded as subject to cross-examination on the witness stand. U.S. v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 562, 108 S.Ct. 838, 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988). In Owens, a prison guard was attacked and beaten, resulting in a fractured skull and severely impaired memory. Id. at 556, 108 S.Ct. 838. At some point after the attack, he was able to identify his attacker to investigators. Id. However, at trial, he was unable to remember the identity of his assailant. Id. The Supreme Court found that his statement of identification was properly admitted pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. [4] Id. at 564, 108 S.Ct. 838. ¶ 16. The Supreme Court explained that [o]rdinarily, a witness is regarded as `subject to cross-examination' when he is placed on the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to questions. Id. at 561, 108 S.Ct. 838. The Court continued: [T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. . . . that opportunity is not denied when a witness testifies as to his current belief but is unable to recollect the reason for that belief. It is sufficient that the defendant has the opportunity to bring out such matters as the witness' bias, his lack of care and attentiveness, his poor eyesight, and even . . . the very fact that he has a bad memory. If the ability to inquire into these matters suffices to establish the constitutionally requisite opportunity for cross-examination when a witness testifies as to his current belief, the basis for which he cannot recall, we see no reason why it should not suffice when the witness' past belief is introduced and he is unable to recollect the reason for that past belief.. . . The weapons available to impugn the witness' statement when memory loss is asserted will of course not always achieve success, but successful cross-examination is not the constitutional guarantee. Id. at 559, 108 S.Ct. 838 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2664, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987)). ¶ 17. The rule set forth by the Supreme Court in Crawford neither conflicts with nor abrogates its earlier holding in Owens. Crawford considered the admissibility of a prior statement made by a declarant who was absent from trial, while Owens considered the admissibility of a prior statement made by a declarant testifying at trial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354; Owens, 484 U.S. at 556, 108 S.Ct. 838. ¶ 18. In the instant case, Davis's appearance on the witness stand at trial provided Smith with the opportunity to confront and cross-examine him, which is all that is required by the Confrontation Clause and Crawford. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. We find that Smith's Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser, therefore, was not violated by the admission of Davis's statements, and that the Court of Appeals erred in so finding.