Opinion ID: 1447761
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Dr. Caillier's Letter of June 22, 2006

Text: Finally, Simila argues that the district court should have remanded because Dr. Caillier's June 22 letter constituted new and material evidence. A district court may order that additional evidence be taken before the Commissioner upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). New evidence is that which is not in existence or available to the claimant at the time of the administrative proceeding. Perkins v. Chater, 107 F.3d 1290, 1296 (7th Cir. 1997). Further, [n]ew evidence is `material' if there is a `reasonable probability' that the ALJ would have reached a different conclusion had the evidence been considered. Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir.2005). We review the district court's decision not to remand on these grounds de novo. Johnson v. Apfel, 191 F.3d 770, 776 (7th Cir.1999). Simila argues that the June 22 letter was new and material, because it was an immediate response to the ALJ's concerns about Dr. Caillier's original report. Simila roots this argument in his belief that the ALJ should have recontacted Dr. Caillier to clarify his report. The June 22 letter thus provided the necessary, though unsolicited, clarification. Hence, Simila argues that the letter is new because it did not exist prior to the ALJ's decision and is material because it contradicts the ALJ's prior interpretation. But our prior decisions teach that the June 22 letter was hardly new for § 405(g) purposes. E.g., Perkins, 107 F.3d at 1296; Sample v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1138, 1144 (7th Cir.1993). Instead, the letter was merely derivative evidence, because Dr. Caillier based his conclusions entirely on evidence that had long been available. Perkins, 107 F.3d at 1296. Dr. Caillier did not reexamine Simila or conduct new psychological tests; rather he elaborated on his previous report and responded to Simila's attorney's questions about the ALJ's concerns. This was precisely the scenario we addressed in Perkins : [A] critique of the ALJ's opinion, which obviously could not have been done before the opinion issued, does not amount to good cause; such a rule would amount to automatic permission to supplement records with new evidence after the ALJ issues a decision in the case, which would seriously undermine the regularity of the administrative process. Id. Section 405(g) does not provide occasion for a physician to submit an unsolicited clarification of his prior opinion. The ALJ has mechanisms to procure additional evidence, including recontacting medical sources, if the evidence was inadequate to reach a decision. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(e); 404.1527(c)(3). Because the evidence was adequate, however, the ALJ need not have invoked those procedures here.