Opinion ID: 399121
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Operational Feasibility and Antitrust Matters

Text: 38 Appellants argue that the Commission erroneously failed to consider two factors-operational feasibility and antitrust matters-in deciding the instant applications. We find, however, that the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 does not require the Commission to consider these factors. 39 In the Initial Decision, the ALJ noted that the Commission does not consider operational feasibility, or lack thereof, to be a valid reason for denying an application. Initial Decision at 93. He drew this conclusion from the Commission decision in Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 43), Rules Governing Applications for Operating Authority,-M.C.C.-(1981), which announced the abandonment of operational feasibility as a significant factor in motor carrier operating authority cases: 40 We are aware that the national transportation policies amended by the act provides that energy and economic efficiencies be provided for in our regulation of the industry. Normally, however, operational feasibility will not be a decisive factor in an application proceeding. We arrive at this conclusion for the following reasons. 41 Giving significant weight to operational feasibility evidence would suggest that we can administratively allocate the productive use of resources better than the marketplace; that we can decide which carrier should transport certain percentages of the available traffic; and whether this will be done at the maximum efficiency. Stated differently, it assumes we can decide whether an applicant will operate exactly as it proposes, what response existing carriers will make (such as to compete more aggressively) and whether our powers of predictions are reliable in the long term. We think that in most cases these assumptions are unfounded. 42 The new act gives recognition to this observation. Congress has now recognized that marketplace competition is a better allocation mechanism. Unless there occur reasons in a specific case for believing that the marketplace will not produce the better results, we should not disturb that process. 43 What is most critical, from the administrative point of view, is that deciding cases using operational feasibility as a significant factor in every case results in a blunting of market incentives for existing carriers to reassess the efficiency of their existing operations; it further dulls the cutting edge of competition and its reenforcing tendency to let the most efficient operation rise to the top. In sum, a careful, calculated look at the operating feasibility should only be used as the last resort, where we are suspicious that the marketplace allocation scheme is breaking down. 44 Id. ----. 45 We agree with the Commission's reasoning in Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 43), especially in light of the new law's purpose to offer increased opportunities for new carriers to get into the trucking business and for existing carriers to expand their services. H.R.Rep.No.96-1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in (1980) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2283, 2285. A full analysis of operational feasibility in every case would inhibit this new statutory purpose. In fact, operational feasibility was not a statutory requirement even under the old law. It was announced in a General Policy Statement issued by the Commission on November 15, 1973. See 38 Fed.Reg. 32,865 (1973). The Commission, in response to the new statute, has decided to alter this policy. We cannot say that the Commission should not have done so, or that the ALJ erred in complying with the new Commission position. 9 ] We note, though, that the Commission cannot disregard the statutory mandate to consider fuel and economic efficiencies under the National Transportation Policy. See 49 U.S.C. § 10922(b)(2)(A)(1980). Of course, these factors will not necessarily be determinative: here, for example, the evidence of fuel inefficiency certainly could not have caused a denial of the applications in the face of such strong evidence supporting them. Nevertheless, the Commission should ordinarily engage in explicit consideration of these factors. 10 Our holding simply allows the Commission not to require operational feasibility as a separate standard or controlling factor. 46 Similarly, the Commission does not have to conduct an antitrust analysis of applications for motor carrier operating authority. The cases cited by appellants establish only that the Commission must consider the anticompetitive consequences of its actions. See Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485, 87 S.Ct. 1754, 18 L.Ed.2d 905 (1967); McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 64 S.Ct. 370, 88 L.Ed. 544 (1944). Moreover, these cases rely on the more restrictive old law and its National Transportation Policy. The new law and National Transportation Policy, with their emphasis on increased competition, cannot require more than that the Commission consider the effects that granting an application will have on competition in the transportation market. The ALJ did this, and found that (a) grant of the instant applications will promote in the opinion of this Judge competitive and efficient transportation services to meet the needs of shippers, receivers and consumers affected by the applications. Initial Decision at 99. He also considered the effects of the applicants' proposed services on appellants' existing operations. Again, he found that the impact would not be significantly anticompetitive. This analysis is sufficient under the new law. 47