Opinion ID: 375962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: transcript of suppression hearing

Text: 25 In the course of his pre-trial motions, Rosales-Lopez moved to suppress certain evidence, and Judge Thompson conducted an evidentiary hearing on February 5, 1979. At the close of the hearing, counsel for Rosales-Lopez moved to obtain a copy of the hearing transcript at government expense on the ground that his client was indigent. Judge Thompson denied the motion to provide the transcript and, though the record here is ambiguous, 3 apparently referred the matter to the magistrate. On February 13, Magistrate Infante granted the motion to produce the transcript and signed a standard CJA Form 21 voucher. On February 21, however, Judge Thompson issued a memorandum denying defense counsel's request for the transcript, citing the failure to demonstrate any 'particularized need' for it. Judge Corcoran, to whom the case was assigned for trial, refused to overrule Judge Thompson on the transcript question. 26 Rosales-Lopez asserts that the allegedly irregular method of reviewing the magistrate's ruling requires reversal, and raises both constitutional and statutory issues on the denial of the transcript. Because we find that the denial of the transcript was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we find it unnecessary to address the procedural question raised by Rosales-Lopez. 27 While we are convinced that Rosales-Lopez was not prejudiced by the government's failure to provide him with a transcript, we feel some comments on the issue of providing trial aids to indigents are in order. The duty of the government to provide an indigent criminal defendant with the essential tools of trial defense is of both a constitutional and statutory dimension. See generally Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 92 S.Ct. 431, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971); 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A. Under certain circumstances, a transcript of a prior proceeding related to a criminal prosecution may be an item which the government is required to furnish to the indigent. See Britt v. North Carolina, supra; Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 194, 19 L.Ed.2d 41 (1967). Where a mistrial has occurred, courts have generally regarded a transcript of the prior trial as a tool 'reasonably necessary' to an effective defense and have deemed it error to refuse to provide the defendant with such a transcript, provided that a timely request is made for its production. See e. g., United States v. Johnson, 584 F.2d 148 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom., Monger v. United States, 440 U.S. 918, 99 S.Ct. 1239, 59 L.Ed. 469 (1979); United States v. Jonas, 540 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Baker, 523 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Acosta, 495 F.2d 60 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Young, 472 F.2d 628 (6th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Wilson v. McMann, 408 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1969); Peterson v. United States, 351 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1965); But see United States v. Brown, 443 F.2d 659, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 244 (D.C.Cir. 1970); Forsberg v. United States, 351 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1965). 28 Where, however, the indigent defendant requests a transcript of a preliminary proceeding, courts have been less willing to find error in the failure to so provide. In Roberts v. LaVallee, supra, the Supreme Court struck down per curiam on equal protection grounds a New York statute which required all criminal defendants to pay five cents for every hundred words of requested transcripts of preliminary proceedings. The Court, however, did not address the limits of the indigent's right to a free transcript in such cases. Circuit courts considering the issue have generally shown a greater inclination to examine the actual prejudice to the defendant resulting from the denial of a transcript of a preliminary hearing than has been shown in cases involving the denial of a trial transcript. In United States ex rel. Moore v. People of the State of Illinois, 577 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 919, 99 S.Ct. 1242, 59 L.Ed.2d 471 (1979), the court found error in the failure to provide a transcript of a preliminary hearing at which an allegedly suggestive confrontation took place between the defendant and a rape victim, but held the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In United States ex rel. Cadogan v. LaVallee, 428 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914, 91 S.Ct. 887, 27 L.Ed.2d 813 (1971), failure to provide a transcript of a suppression hearing was held to be not prejudical where alleged discrepancies between testimony given at the hearing and at trial were 'trivial.' 29 While the standard of reasonable necessity in the area of free transcripts remains imprecise, the court below applied a standard which we find to be incorrect. The Supreme Court in Britt v. North Carolina, supra, ruled out 'particularized need' as the applicable test for necessity. See 404 U.S. at 228, 92 S.Ct. at 434. We find, however, that the application of an erroneous legal sttandard in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Rosales-Lopez claims prejudice in that two Immigration Service agents gave testimony at the suppression hearing which would have been useful in impeaching their testimony at trial. The defense, however, can point to only two minor inconsistencies between the testimony at the suppression hearing and the testimony given at trial. 4 Given the overall strong consistency between the lengthy testimony given by the witness at the hearing and the trial, we find beyond a reasonable doubt that the lack of a copy of the suppression hearing transcript did not prejudice the ability of the defense to cross-examine effectively and thereby present an adequate defense at trial.