Opinion ID: 2518827
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: United States Supreme Court and Federal Circuit Court Cases

Text: ¶ 19 The United States Supreme Court has analyzed two cases with different facts that are relevant to our constitutional analysis. In Williams, 425 U.S. at 530, 96 S.Ct. 1691, the State forced a defendant to wear an orange prison jumpsuit in front of the jury. The court held this action was inherently prejudicial and denied defendant due process. A contrasting opinion, Holbrook v. Flynn , held that the courtroom presence of four uniformed and armed state troopers, who sat directly behind the defendants for the duration of the trial, did not deny defendants due process. 475 U.S. at 571, 106 S.Ct. 1340. These two cases can be used as bookends to demonstrate the range of impermissible and permissible courtroom behavior. Note that both cases involved direct action by the state, unlike the private spectator buttons at issue in the instant case. ¶ 20 When courtroom conduct is challenged as inherently prejudicial to the defendant, we must determine whether `an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play' to affect the jury. Flynn, 475 U.S. at 570, 106 S.Ct. 1340 (quoting Williams, 425 U.S. at 505, 96 S.Ct. 1691). A reviewing court must consider the courtroom scene presented to the jury and determine whether it was  so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to defendant's right to a fair trial. Flynn, 475 U.S. at 572, 106 S.Ct. 1340 (emphasis added). As the language indicates, some small risk of inherent prejudice is not automatically fatal as long as inherent prejudice does not pose an unacceptable threat to the outcome. [10] ¶ 21 In Flynn, the United States Supreme Court held that the presence of the uniformed and armed state troopers did not deny due process because of the wider range of inferences that a juror might reasonably draw from the officers' presence. Id. at 569, 106 S.Ct. 1340. Here, picture buttons worn by the spectators more closely resembles the circumstances in Flynn than those in Williams. The natural reaction of grieving for a family member or friend is one of the wider range of inferences that can be derived reasonably from a picture button in the spectator gallery. Id. Many immediate analogues come to mind; the common tradition of wearing black clothing or armband to mourn resonates as the most obvious. The jury would understand this as a sign of loss, but not automatically find it inherently prejudicial or as urging conviction of defendant. ¶ 22 Another important distinction in this case is the difference between the prejudicial effect of State or litigant behavior versus restrictions necessary on private spectator behavior. [11] Our courtrooms are constitutionally required to be open to the public, thereby eschewing a tightly controlled, sterile trial environment in favor of open public access. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. ¶ 23 United States Supreme Court cases have considered various state actions, such as requiring a defendant to appear in court wearing shackles or prison clothes or positioning armed and uniformed state troopers in the courtroom. [12] The Court has never held or even suggested it is a constitutional violation to allow picture buttons to be worn in the courtroom by private citizens. The Court has instead expressly allowed state appellate courts to determine and follow their own constitutional precedent regarding spectator buttons. See Carey v. Musladin, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006). We do so today. ¶ 24 Lord claims that the mere presence of picture buttons in the courtroom denied him a fair trial. He does not argue, nor does the record support, that he suffered actual prejudice. Instead, he asserts that the buttons were an inherently prejudicial factor. See Reply Br. of Appellant at 9. Lord based his argument on Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals cases that are neither controlling nor persuasive. The Washington State Supreme Court has the same duty and authority as a federal circuit court to apply the United States Constitution and United States Supreme Court opinions in criminal matters. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). [13] ¶ 25 Lord first cites Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 830 (9th Cir.1990), overruled in part by Musladin, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482, where spectators wore buttons with the phrase Women against Rape  for the entire trial, sold refreshments outside the courtroom, and had contact with jurors in the elevator and restrooms. The actions of those spectators were held to be inherently prejudicial because the wording on the buttons implied the defendant was guilty. Id. at 830. ¶ 26 The circuit court opinion in Norris is otherwise distinguishable. Here, we do not have buttons with an overt message underlined with a bold red stroke. Instead, the photographs here had no words and portray an ambiguous message that would be reasonably understood as a show of sympathy and support for the victim's family. In-life photographs of the victim are not considered inherently prejudicial in Washington, and photos of victims are often admissible, discussed infra. The Lord buttons were removed by the trial judge after the third day of a 31 day trial. This is also in contrast with Norris where supporters wore the Women Against Rape  buttons throughout the trial, inside and around the courtroom, including the elevator the jury used. ¶ 27 Lord also argued that Musladin v. LaMarque, 427 F.3d 647, 651 (9th Cir.2005) vacated sub nom. Carey v. Musladin, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 supported his claim. In Musladin, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on a habeas corpus review had reversed a decision by California courts that allowed courtroom spectators to wear buttons bearing a photograph of the deceased. Id. at 648. Three members of the victim's family wore buttons similar to those worn in the instant case, throughout multiple days of the trial, and in plain view of the jury. Id. ¶ 28 The United States Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit Court decision in Musladin. See ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482. The Court held that the California State Court of Appeals decision allowing spectator buttons was an appropriate interpretation of established law as determined by the United States Supreme Court and that a federal circuit court may not overturn such a state court decision. This ruling confirms that this court appropriately follows our own carefully considered jurisprudence. See, e.g., Woods, 154 Wash.2d 400, 114 P.3d 607. ¶ 29 It is separately notable that two Supreme Court justices writing in Musladin favorably cited this court's decision in Woods, and also cited the Washington Court of Appeals opinion below in State v. Lord, as reasonable state court applications of established constitutional precedent regarding spectator conduct. Musladin, 127 S.Ct. at 654; see also id. at 658 (Souter, J., concurring).