Opinion ID: 2484942
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of the Smiths' Claims

Text: Rule 41(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides: For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against the defendant. Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. The Smiths argue that, although a trial court has the power to dismiss a plaintiff's action for failure to prosecute, such a sanction is a severe one and should not be employed merely for a prolonged period of inactivity by the plaintiff. Indeed, this Court has stated that, since dismissal with prejudice is a drastic sanction, it is to be applied only in extreme situations and that, as a result, appellate courts will carefully scrutinize such orders and occasionally will find it necessary to set them aside. Smith v. Wilcox County Bd. of Educ., 365 So.2d 659, 661 (Ala.1978). This Court also has stated, however: Although dismissal with prejudice is a harsh sanction that should be used only in extreme circumstances, there nevertheless comes a point in every action when the interest of the trial court in controlling its calendar and its interest in avoiding risk to the defendant outweigh the interest in disposing of litigation on the merits. Henderson v. G & G Corp., 582 So.2d 529, 531 (Ala.1991). This Court also has observed that dismissal of a plaintiff's action under Rule 41(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., is warranted where there is a `clear record of delay, willful default or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.' Selby v. Money, 403 So.2d 218, 220 (Ala.1981). Because the trial judge is in the best position to assess the conduct of the plaintiff and the degree of noncompliance, his decision to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute will be accorded considerable weight by a reviewing court. Jones v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 604 So.2d 332, 341 (Ala.1991). The Smiths contend that there is no evidence of intentional delay or contumacious conduct in this case. The only evidence is that the Smiths and their counsel failed to appear for the trial setting of May 12, 2008, and that their failure was simply due to the fact that the Smiths' counsel did not receive notice of either the Cowarts' motion to set the case for trial or the trial court's order setting the case for trial on that date. The Smiths argue that, at most, this constitutes excusable neglect by their previous counsel that did not warrant the harsh sanction of dismissal of their claims. In their brief to this Court, the Cowarts state that on no less than four of the six occasions on which this case was rescheduled for trial before the final setting of May 12, 2008, the Cowarts and their counsel appeared in court, but the Smiths and their counsel failed to appear. As noted in the rendition of the facts, the Cowarts also charge that the Smiths failed to appear for scheduled depositions four separate times. The Smiths do not directly deny either of these charges. Instead, they state that the record fails to support these claims. As to the Cowarts' assertions regarding the Smiths' failure to appear for trial settings on four occasions before the May 12, 2008, hearing, the Cowarts initially made this claim in the trial court in their response in opposition to the Smiths' June 1, 2009, motion to set aside the trial court's previous orders. The Smiths did not dispute this claim before the trial court, and, as indicated, they do not directly deny it before this Court. The trial court expressly found in its May 12, 2008, order that the Smiths had failed to prosecute their claims. With respect to the May 12, 2008, hearing, in particular, the trial court explicitly concluded in its April 22, 2009, order denying the August 4, 2008, motion filed by the Smiths' previous counsel that [t]he clerk's record indicates that all parties received notice of the trial setting, pursuant to this Court's order. We find no evidence to the contrary in the record before us. In addition, our review of the record reveals that the case-action summary contains an entry for February 15, 2008, that makes note of the filing of the Cowarts' motion to set the case for trial. The case-action summary also contains an entry dated March 14, 2008, stating that the trial court had ordered that the case be set for trial on May 12, 2008. It is the prevailing rule in Alabama `that a litigant ... has responsibility for keeping track of his case and knowing its status.' D. & J. Mineral & Mining, Inc. v. Wilson, 456 So.2d 1099, 1100 (Ala.Civ.App.1984). Therefore, a trial court `owes no duty to notify a party of the setting of a case or to continue a case because of the absence of a party....' D. & J. Mineral, 456 So.2d at 1100-01. Burleson v. Burleson, 19 So.3d 233, 239 (Ala.Civ.App.2009). The Smiths' action had been pending in the trial court for nine years before that court entered its order of dismissal. The case-action summary indicates that the action languished in the trial court for up to eight years without any activity by the Smiths. Henderson, 582 So.2d at 531. Under the totality of the particular circumstances presented in this case, we cannot say that the trial court exceeded its discretion in dismissing the Smiths' claims and denying the Smiths' motion to alter or vacate that dismissal.