Opinion ID: 198212
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Scope of the Plea Agreement

Text: 4 Before addressing the merits, we turn to Burns' motion to strike the government's brief on appeal. Burns insists that the government cannot be heard to contend on appeal that the district court correctly imposed the very sentencing enhancement which the government, pursuant to the plea agreement, agreed to refrain from recommending at sentencing, see Plea Agreement p 3. 5 We acknowledge concerns regarding the government's ambivalence, especially since a commonsense understanding of the language of the plea agreement itself offers little hint that the parties mutually contemplated that the government remained free to advocate a two-level enhancement on appeal. As we repeatedly have made clear, moreover, [b]ecause plea bargaining requires defendants to waive fundamental constitutional rights, we hold prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining to 'the most meticulous standards of both promise and performance.'  United States v. Velez Carrero, 77 F.3d 11, 11 (1st Cir.1996) (citation omitted). See United States v. Clark, 55 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir.1995); Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir.1973). We think the message is clear, therefore, that significant plea-agreement terms should be stated explicitly and unambiguously so as to preclude their subsequent circumvention by either party. See United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263, 269 (1st Cir.1992) (noting that the government not only is forbidden from any explicit repudiation of [its] assurances, but from end-runs around them); United States v. Garcia, 698 F.2d 31, 37 (1st Cir.1983) ( 'A plea agreement is not an appropriate context for the Government to resort to a rigidly literal approach in the construction of language.' ) (citation omitted). Thus, defense counsel too must be alert to the need for clear and explicit articulation of all pertinent terms in any plea agreement negotiated with government counsel. 6 In the instant case, however, it is not necessary to determine whether the government breached its plea agreement, as we would be obliged in all events to consider whether the district court correctly imposed the sentencing enhancement at issue in this case, with or without the benefit of the government's advocacy on appeal. Accordingly, we now turn to the language of § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F), which we construe de novo. See United States v. Nicholas, 133 F.3d 133, 134 (1st Cir.1998).