Opinion ID: 1788580
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Traywick's Testimony

Text: ¶ 20. The majority correctly acknowledges that the trial judge erred in taking his personal opinion into account as to the weight and credibility of Traywick's testimony. It also correctly acknowledges that it was Columbus Country Club, not Kindred, which had the duty to disclose Traywick in pretrial discovery in response to Kindred's interrogatory. However, the majority then determines that because Kindred's attorney did not move for a continuance when given the opportunity, he waived his right to complain of the exclusion of Traywick's testimony on appeal. On this point I part company with the majority. ¶ 21. When Kindred's lawyer was offered the opportunity by the court to continue the case and mistry it and give them a chance to depose [Traywick], he elected not to move for a continuance, and instead made an offer of proof with Traywick's testimony. After that proffer, two other rebuttal witnesses testified before the jury, and one additional motion regarding McCoy was heard. Then just prior to finally resting, Kindred's lawyer conferred briefly with his client and the following exchange occurred: BY MR. WAIDE: Your Honor, the purpose of this inquiry, your Honor indicated earlier that you would consider granting a continuance. In view of your Honor's ruling on the motion  that rebuttal evidence [sic] and I just needed a minute to confer with my client to determine whether he wants me to ask for one or not. BY THE COURT: No. No. No. I'm not going to continue the matter. There may be  if there's a continuance required it's going to be a mistrial involved in this case and I would have to address those issues when they were presented to me. BY MR. WAIDE: All right, sir. BY THE COURT: But I'm not going to continue the matter just  BY MR. WAIDE: I understand. All right. Your Honor, in that event the plaintiff finally rests. ¶ 22. In my view, this was not a waiver in the true sense of the word. But even if we presume, arguendo, that it was a waiver, that still does not eliminate additional concerns. ¶ 23. The majority opinion states that [t]his Court has often enforced waivers when there has been no request for a continuance and cites four cases to illustrate this. However, the cases cited by the majority can easily be distinguished from the case sub judice. The majority cites Galloway v. State, 604 So.2d 735, 738 (Miss.1992), Roberson v. State, 595 So.2d 1310, 1316 (Miss.1992), Holland v. State, 587 So.2d 848, 868 (Miss.1991), and Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 675 (Miss.1991). All four of these cases are old criminal cases, and the waiver issues in those cases were dealt with under the former Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice (UCRCCP) Section 4.06 which, inter alia, codified the Box [1] procedure. In 1995, the current Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice (URCCC) were adopted. Interestingly, although the new URCCC combined the rules of both criminal and civil practice in the circuit courts, the rule regarding discovery remained in that portion of the rules which are designated as applicable only to criminal proceedings. See URCCC 6.01. The former 4.06 provisions are now found in Rule 9.04, which clearly states what the prosecution must disclose to each defendant and what is required [i]f the defendant requests discovery under this rule. [2] ¶ 24. Certainly the criminal cases cited by the majority cannot apply in this, a wrongful death case. However, even if we were to set aside the fact that the basis for deciding these criminal cases cannot be applied in this case, there remain additional distinguishing circumstances between the facts of those cases and the case sub judice. ¶ 25. In the first place, this issue has been presented, argued, and decided as though there was a discovery violation by the plaintiff, when, in fact, the issue we have before us is determination of the proper procedure to be followed when, in the midst of a trial, an unknown, surprise witness comes forward and offers to testify as a fact witness. Traywick was totally unknown to the plaintiff prior to the day he showed up at the courthouse, on the fourth day of the trial. The rules and cases cited and argued at trial and on appeal, all address how to proceed when there has been a true discovery violation, in which a party with knowledge of a potential witness fails to properly and timely disclose that potential witness. I have found no case in our state, and only a few from other jurisdictions, which address even a somewhat comparable situation as in the present case. ¶ 26. Should this Court decide to adopt a rule to be applied in cases where a previously unknown witness appears and offers to testify on behalf of either party, then it certainly has the authority to do so. In my view, it should not make the mistake of applying, in this civil case before us, a rule which governs failure to disclose a known witness (or other evidence) in a criminal case. ¶ 27. That being said, it is necessary to point out the fallacies of the procedure which was followed. In the four criminal cases cited by the majority, the party (the defendant) who did not want the testimony admitted was found to have waived the right to complain of the exclusion on appeal for failure to move for continuance. In the present case, the majority suggests that Kindred's lawyer should have moved for a continuance in order to give the other side a chance to depose Traywick. But why should he be required to move for a continuance so that counsel for the Country Club could depose a witness that they failed to disclose in pretrial discovery? That is illogical. Further, later in the trial when it appeared that Kindred's lawyer might want move for a continuance, the trial court made it ultimately clear that there would be no continuance. ¶ 28. Kindred simply wanted to have Traywick's testimony admitted into evidence. When that request was denied, Kindred's attorney acted properly by proffering Traywick's testimony outside the presence of the jury. He should not have been required to move for a continuance, further delaying his client's interests in litigation that had commenced more than two years earlier. ¶ 29. It is true that when initially offered the opportunity, Kindred's attorney did not move to continue or mistry this case. However, the Country Club's attorney did not move for a continuance either. It would seem that if the attorneys for the Country Club really needed to depose Traywick in order to obtain some basis for impeachment, then they would have taken the trial court up on its offer to continue or mistry the case. Though trial strategy probably played a part in their decision, the attorneys for the Country Club did not move for a continuance, and it should not have been Kindred's responsibility to do it for them. ¶ 30. In my view, it was inherently unfair for the trial court to refuse to allow Traywick to provide rebuttal testimony. Kindred had already completed his case in chief, and three of the Country Club's witnesses had testified, when the court recessed at the end of the third day of the trial. It is undisputed that Kindred did not know about Traywick until the fourth day of the trial. Furthermore, had Columbus Country Club accurately responded to Kindred's discovery requests, Traywick would have been known to, and certainly listed as a witness by, Kindred. In my view, the trial court punished Kindred for the Country Club's oversight. Kindred should have been allowed to call Traywick as a rebuttal witness, and the jury (rather than the trial court or this Court) should have been allowed to judge his credibility.