Opinion ID: 222763
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: An indictment is sufficient if it sets forth the elements of the offense charged, puts the defendant on fair notice of the charges against which he must defend, and enables the defendant to assert a double jeopardy defense. United States v. Gama-Bastidas, 222 F.3d 779, 785 (10th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Dashney, 117 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir.1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1092 (10th Cir.2007); see Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962) (noting that the two principal criteria by which the sufficiency of an indictment is measured are, first, whether the indictment contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and, secondly, in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense[,] whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction (quoting Cochran & Sayre v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 290, 15 S.Ct. 628, 39 L.Ed. 704 (1895)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as `those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.' (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612, 26 L.Ed. 1135 (1882))). The test of the validity of the indictment is not whether the indictment could have been framed in a more satisfactory manner, but whether it conforms to minimal constitutional standards. Gama-Bastidas, 222 F.3d at 785 (quoting United States v. Fitzgerald, 89 F.3d 218, 222 (5th Cir.1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, when evaluating an indictment's sufficiency, we employ practical rather than technical considerations. Id. (quoting Dashney, 117 F.3d at 1205) (internal quotations marks omitted); accord United States v. Avery, 295 F.3d 1158, 1174 (10th Cir.2002). Moreover, when an appellant challenges an indictment for failure to state an offense for the first time on appeal, as is the case here, the countervailing interest in judicial efficiency requires that tardily-challenged indictments be construed in favor of validity. Gama-Bastidas, 222 F.3d at 786 (quoting United States v. Bullock, 914 F.2d 1413, 1414 (10th Cir.1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. ([A]fter a verdict or plea of guilty, every intendment must be indulged in support of the indictment.... (alteration in original) (quoting Clay v. United States, 326 F.2d 196, 198 (10th Cir.1963)) (internal quotations marks omitted)); see also United States v. Willis, 102 F.3d 1078, 1081 (10th Cir.1996) (Although we generally review the sufficiency of an indictment de novo, when a defendant fails to raise a timely challenge, `we will liberally construe an indictment in favor of validity.' (quoting United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 400 (10th Cir.1995))). In particular, [i]f a defendant does not challenge an indictment until after a verdict or guilty plea, and if he `does not assert prejudice, that is, if he had notice of the crime of which he stood accused, the indictment is to be read with maximum liberality. ' Gama-Bastidas, 222 F.3d at 786 (emphasis added) (quoting Fitzgerald, 89 F.3d at 221). In this instance, Mr. Washington does not assert that he was prejudiced by the alleged deficiency in the indictment. That is, he has not argued that he had no notice of the charge against him  namely, witness tampering through his attempted murder of Lt. Stark, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A). And we find nothing in the record indicating that Mr. Washington received insufficient notice of the charge against him. [9] Accordingly, in line with our precedent, we will read the indictment with maximum liberality and construe it in favor of validity. Under this approach, [w]e will find the indictment sufficient unless it is so defective that by any reasonable construction, it fails to charge the offense for which the defendant is convicted. Avery, 295 F.3d at 1174 (emphasis added) (quoting Gama-Bastidas, 222 F.3d at 786) (internal quotation marks omitted). Following this liberal construction rule, an indictment challenged for the first time post-verdict [e.g., on appeal] may be found sufficient, even though that indictment would have been found wanting had it been challenged pre-verdict. Id. Viewing Mr. Washington's indictment with maximum liberality, and construing it in favor of validity, we conclude that the indictment adequately pleaded the witness-tampering offense. First, the indictment sufficiently sets forth the elements of the offense charged. Barrett, 496 F.3d at 1092. The body of the indictment cites the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A), and recites the two elements of the witness-tampering offense: (1) Mr. Washington  attempt[ed] to kill Lieutenant Bryan Stark, and (2) his attempt to shoot [Lt. Stark] was done with the intent to prevent [his] attendance or testimony ... in federal court proceedings against [Mr. Irving]. R., Vol. I, at 24 (emphasis added). [10] Furthermore, the caption of the indictment recites the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A), and indicates that the indictment charges Tampering With A Witness. Id. Although [w]e recognize that this court and others have held on occasion that the caption is not a controlling part of the indictment, we also have concluded that, in analyzing whether an offense was sufficiently charged, we can us[e] the caption to supplement and clarify the charging intent of the grand jury that is expressed in the body of the indictment. Gama-Bastidas, 222 F.3d at 787. In addition, as discussed above, Mr. Washington does not dispute that the indictment put him on fair notice of the charge[] against which he must defend. Barrett, 496 F.3d at 1092. Lastly, we have no problem concluding that the indictment enable[d] [Mr. Washington] to assert a double jeopardy defense. Id. He makes no argument to the contrary, nor could such an argument fairly be made. United States v. Boston, 718 F.2d 1511, 1515 (10th Cir.1983). This is especially true because the entire record, not just the indictment, may be referred to in order to protect against double jeopardy if a subsequent prosecution should occur. Id.; accord United States v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 430 n. 3 (10th Cir.1988). In this regard, we note, for example, that the jury instructions clearly charged Mr. Washington with attempting to kill Lt. Stark to preclude his attendance at Mr. Irving's proceedings. See R., Vol. I, at 150-53; see also supra note 9 (explaining that the jury instructions provided notice as to the nature of the witness-tampering offense). Accordingly, viewing the indictment with maximum liberality and construing it in favor of validity, we hold that the indictment was sufficient to charge the offense for which Mr. Washington was convicted  viz., witness tampering through the attempted murder of Lt. Stark.