Opinion ID: 419924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Motion To Add Defendants

Text: 27 Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that [a] party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served .... So far as we are able to determine from the record before us and from the district court docket entries, Washington's May 14, 1981 request to amend the caption to add Meekins and Wilkinson as defendants was his first attempt to amend his complaint. 3 Since the Board did not answer the complaint until August 26, 1981, Washington was entitled on May 14, 1981 to amend his complaint as a matter of right, and his request at that time should have been granted. See Le Grand v. Evan, 702 F.2d 415, 417 (2d Cir.1983). 28 It is not clear whether or not Washington was prejudiced by the nonrecognition of his right to amend. We cannot conclude that a lack of prejudice is established simply by the district court's ruling that the evidence of a Board policy or practice was insufficient to submit the Sec. 1983 claim to the jury. Such a conclusion would be based on speculation that the questions to and answers by the Board's two key witnesses--as well as the assessment of their testimony by the trier of fact--would have been precisely the same if Meekins and Wilkinson had been testifying as defendants rather than as witnesses with no exposure to individual liability. Further, we note that although the court took the Sec. 1983 claim away from the jury, it intimated that there was perhaps some evidence of a discriminatory policy or practice, as it stated that it may not be accurate to say that there is no evidence of a policy or practice .... (Aug. 4, 1982 Tr. at 226). And we note that the decision of Washington's other claims turned solely on the credibility of the witnesses. In all the circumstances, we cannot reject the possibility that Washington may have been prejudiced by not having Meekins and Wilkinson as defendants on his Sec. 1983 claim. 29 Nor does the record suggest that the Board would have been unfairly prejudiced by the addition of those individuals to the case when Washington's newly-appointed counsel moved for their addition. In denying the motion the court cited the Board's objection that the newly added defendants would have the right to reopen discovery, which would delay the trial and the City wished to proceed to trial which had been set once before and postponed. (Aug. 3, 1982 Tr. at 2.) We note, however, that actual notice of Washington's May 1981 attempt to add Meekins and Wilkinson as defendants had been given to the Board on May 12, 1981. As the Board was represented by counsel, it should have known (better than did Washington, who was pro se) that, since the Board had not then answered the complaint, Washington had the right to amend his complaint without leave of the court. Further, the Board's plaint of delay in response to Kelly's motion came just days after the court had noted that ... defendant has been tardy in responding to plaintiff's discovery requests with no explanation offered to either Washington or the court. (Order dated July 26, 1982.) 30 Moreover, it is hardly certain that the addition of Meekins and Wilkinson would substantially have delayed proceedings, for despite the fact that Washington's proposed amended caption was never used and the apparent fact that Meekins and Wilkinson were never served with summons and complaint, Washington had proceeded to treat them as defendants, by so characterizing them in various papers he filed with the court, by addressing numerous interrogatories to them, and by serving a document demand addressed to Meekins. It appears that at least Meekins had a substantial role in responding to Washington's questions, for it was he who verified the Board's answers to all eight sets of interrogatories. It thus seems unlikely that Washington would have required additional discovery of the new defendants. Nor is it clear what additional discovery, if any, the individuals would have required of Washington. The Board apparently served one set of interrogatories on Washington (an inference we draw from the presence in the record of Washington's answers); since the Board apparently did not file these interrogatories with the court, we do not know their precise contents, but they apparently constituted adequate discovery for the Board's purposes. There is no basis for surmising that the questions there asked would not have covered the discovery needs of Messrs. Meekins and Wilkinson as well. In any event, it is evident from the record that the individuals whose actions Washington principally challenged were Meekins and Wilkinson, that at least one of them played a substantial role in the Board's defense of the action, and that both were key witnesses for the Board at the trial. 31 Given the nonrecognition of Washington's right to amend the complaint as requested on May 14, 1981, the Board's knowledge of his attempt--and his right--so to amend at that time, the Board's unexcused delay until less than a week before trial in responding to interrogatories, and the lack of any certainty that the addition of Meekins and Wilkinson would cause serious delay, the record does not reveal any basis for the court's conclusion that the addition of the two defendants would be just not fair to the City. (Aug. 3, 1982 Tr. at 5.) 32 In all the circumstances, we conclude that the denial of the pretrial motion to add the individual defendants to the Sec. 1983 claim constituted an abuse of the court's discretion. Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal of the Sec. 1983 claim and remand that claim for further proceedings. 33