Opinion ID: 220992
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Armed Career Criminal Act Issue

Text: The Armed Career Criminal Act provides that a person who is guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm and who has three previous convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense shall be imprisoned not less than fifteen years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Smith has two prior convictions for serious drug offenses, but he denies that he has a third predicate conviction, arguing that his 2000 Minnesota conviction for third-degree attempted burglary was not a violent felony. As relevant here, violent felony is defined as any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. . . that . . . is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Attempted burglary is not an enumerated offense, so the question is whether it is a violent felony under the residual otherwise involves clause. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007). When considering whether an intentional crime such as attempted burglary falls within the residual clause, levels of risk divide crimes that qualify from those that do not. Sykes v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2267, 2275, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2011). The residual clause applies when the relevant prior offenses involved a potential risk of physical injury similar to that presented by burglary, extortion, arson, and crimes involving use of explosives. Id. at 2277. Some years ago, we held that the Minnesota crime of second-degree attempted burglary is a violent felony under the residual clause. United States v. Solomon, 998 F.2d 587, 590 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1026, 114 S.Ct. 639, 126 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993). [5] But the Supreme Court's residual clause jurisprudence has changed often in recent years. See Sykes, 131 S.Ct. at 2267-73 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Therefore, we must seriously consider Smith's contention that Solomon has been implicitly overruled by recent Supreme Court decisions. Obviously, the most relevant decision is James, which held that a Florida conviction for attempted burglary qualified as a violent felony under the residual clause. 550 U.S. at 195, 127 S.Ct. 1586. Though the Florida statute at issue in James was more broadly worded, the Court noted that the Florida Supreme Court had narrowed its application by requiring an overt act directed toward entering or remaining in a structure or conveyance and by holding that mere preparation is insufficient. James, 550 U.S. at 202, 127 S.Ct. 1586, quoting Jones v. State, 608 So.2d 797, 799 (Fla.1992). The Court concluded in James that the Florida offense, as so narrowed, fell within the residual clause because the risk [of physical injury to another] arises not from the completion of the burglary, but from the possibility that an innocent person might appear while the crime is in progress. Attempted burglary poses the same kind of risk. 550 U.S. at 203, 127 S.Ct. 1586. We consider here the Minnesota crime of attempted burglary. The Minnesota Criminal Code defines attempt offenses: Whoever, with intent to commit a crime, does an act which is a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for, the commission of the crime is guilty of an attempt to commit that crime. Minn.Stat. § 609.17, subd. 1. The statute's 1963 Advisory Committee Comment stated: The overt acts need not be such that, if not interrupted, they must result in the commission of the crime. They must, however, be something more than mere preparation, remote from the time and place of the intended crime; but if they are not thus remote, and are done with the specific intent to commit the crime, and directly tend in some substantial degree to accomplish it, they are sufficient to warrant a conviction. Minn.Stat. § 609.17, cmt. subd. 1, citing State v. Dumas, 118 Minn. 77, 136 N.W. 311, 314 (1912). Construing this definition of attempt in the context of second-degree burglary, we concluded in Solomon that under Minnesota law only conduct that carries a serious potential risk of physical injury to another may result in a conviction for attempted second degree burglary. 998 F.2d at 590. It is significant that, in James, the Supreme Court noted that every Court of Appeals that has construed an attempted burglary law similar in scope to Florida's has held that the offense qualifies as a `violent felony' under clause (ii)'s residual provision, and cited Solomon as one of those decisions. 550 U.S. at 204-05 & n. 3, 127 S.Ct. 1586 (emphasis added). Smith nonetheless argues that the Minnesota crime of attempted third-degree burglary is not a violent felony under James because an act which is a substantial step toward, and more than preparation for, the crime of burglary need not be the act of entering a building and can be remote in time from the actual event. In such cases, he argues, the crime does not present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. The few reported Minnesota decisions involving attempted burglary offenses do not support this speculative interpretation of the statute. In Dumas, the 1912 decision cited by the Advisory Committee, the Supreme Court of Minnesota concluded that an indictment alleging that the defendant entered a building for the purpose of burning it was sufficient to constitute attempted arson in the third degree. 136 N.W. at 314. More recently, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota has twice stated that the crime of attempted burglary requires proof that the defendant entered or attempted to enter a building. State v. Bodin, 2010 WL 273359, at  (Minn.App. Jan. 26, 2010); State v. Ring, 554 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn.App.1996). [6] We have found no reported decision, and Smith presents no other evidence, that prosecutors in Minnesota ever charge attempted burglary in a situation where the conduct did not include a substantial step creating the same kind of risk present in completed burglaries. In these circumstances, we conclude that the elements of the Minnesota crime of attempted burglary, like the Kansas attempted burglary offense at issue in United States v. Forrest, 611 F.3d 908, 911-12 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 622, 178 L.Ed.2d 451 (2010), involve a level of risk that is indistinguishable from the overt act directed toward entering described in James. We therefore reaffirm our prior decision in Solomon. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.