Opinion ID: 2450462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Validity of the Blue Springs Grandparent Clause

Text: This Court must resolve whether the particular clause of § 590.115.2 governing Blue Springs is an unconstitutional special law. The determination whether a statute is a special law rests on whether it is open-ended. O'Reilly v. City of Hazelwood, 850 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Mo. banc 1993); School District of Riverview Gardens v. St. Louis County, 816 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Mo. banc 1991). Classifications based on population may be open-ended. O'Reilly , slip op. at 5, 850 S.W.2d at 99; Riverview Gardens, 816 S.W.2d at 222. Such classifications are open-ended when it is possible that a political subdivision's status under the classification could change. The clause covering Blue Springs differs from other population-based laws because it relies on population at a specific time before the enactment of the clause. The 1980 census is an unchanging historical factmaking it completely impossible that the status of a political subdivision under this classification could change. Therefore, it is an immutable characteristic similar to geography or constitutional status. Cf. Riverview Gardens, 816 S.W.2d at 222. As a special law, the clause in question is unconstitutional if a general law could be made applicable. Mo. Const. art. III, § 40(30). Unconstitutionality of a special law is presumed. State ex rel Public Defender Commission v. County Court of Greene County, 667 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Mo. banc 1984). The party defending the statute must demonstrate a substantial justification for the exclusion of other political subdivisions. O'Reilly, 850 S.W.2d at 99. Blue Springs has proved no reasons for a peace-officer-training clause that covers only the City of Blue Springs. Thus, it failed to carry its burden of proof, and the clause is unconstitutional. [2]