Opinion ID: 880411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Show up Identification

Text: Rudolph asserts that the conviction was based solely on the show up identification held that night and that procedure violated his due process rights by being impermissibly suggestive. We disagree. The importance of the eyewitness identification is underscored, Rudolph asserts, by the lack of corroborating evidence and inconsistencies in the State's case. All accounts of the incident state that the two assailants proceeded south along Pattee Street walking on the east sidewalk. However, the victim's wallet was found the next day across the street from the attack on the west side of Pattee Street. Witness Thieler admitted losing sight of them momentarily while she looked both ways for traffic at the intersection. The State argued that it must have been just long enough for one of them to dispose of the wallet. The second inconsistency deals with the money stolen from the victim. Jasperson testified that only a small amount of money was stolen: five to eight dollars. However, when stopped just moments after the attack, Rudolph had less than two dollars in his possession. Thirdly, Rudolph's clothing, a dark green ski jacket, black cap, blue jeans and boots, were not retained by the police for evidence because Rudolph asked to keep his clothes, stating that he had no other clothes with him in Missoula. Thus, when he was released from jail, he was given his clothes. He was then unable to produce them at trial; however, all witnesses, as well as Rudolph, agree to the description of his apparel that night. Therefore, it was not possible to check the clothing for blood or hair samples, although no blood stains were noted in the police report. The officers testified that they did not recall any blood on Rudolph's clothes or boots that night. Lastly, at trial Gonzales and Thieler were unable to identify Rudolph by means of a facial photo lineup. Each stated that their identification was based, not on a view of the faces, but rather on stature (height, weight and build), hair (color, length and facial hair), and clothing (style, color, and the cap). Thus, the identification became a key factor in the prosecution's case. To pass constitutional muster, a pretrial identification must not be (1) impermissively suggestive, nor (2) have such a tendency for misidentification under the totality of the circumstances that it violates due process rights. This two-prong test was set forth in State v. Lara (1978), 179 Mont. 201, 587 P.2d 930, and is controlling on this issue. In State v. Lara , defendant participated in a show up wherein he was identified by the victim as the armed robber involved in a one person robbery of a Laurel food store. The Laurel police apprehended Lara within fifteen to twenty minutes of the robbery and he was identified by the victim at the scene of the arrest shortly thereafter. Regarding that identification, we stated: Considering the totality of the circumstances we conclude that while the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, it did not create a situation in which there was a substantial likelihood of misidentification and therefore not violative of due process. Lara, 587 P.2d at 933. We also find Neil v. Biggers (1972), 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401, instructive on this issue. Biggers sets forth five factors relating to the circumstances under which pretrial identifications are made. Trial courts should consider the following in evaluating the risk or likelihood of misidentification: ... the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200, 93 S.Ct. at 382-383. Thieler's testimony regarding her identification certainly passes any test set up by the Lara case and by the Biggers factors. Thieler stated that she was concerned the attackers would see her watching them, so she drove forward slowly and then proceeded to watch them for several minutes in her rearview mirror. Thus, her opportunity to view the attackers was good, even if she did not view their faces specifically. Her attention was keen and her description to the police was accurate regarding the assailants' gender, size, hair color and length, and clothing style and color. Also lending credibility to the validity of the identification was the very close proximity in time and distance from the crime scene. The suspects were apprehended just blocks away from the scene and only moments after the police arrived. Further, all witnesses testified that the downtown streets were deserted that particular winter night, shortly after 9:00 p.m. Not only did they fit the description, the two suspects detained were also the only two pedestrians within many blocks of the crime scene. Rudolph's own testimony regarding his actions on that night was incredible. Although in the immediate vicinity, Rudolph testified that he had no knowledge whatsoever of the crime, including the fact that he heard no cries for help, no sirens, and saw no lights flashing from emergency help vehicles. The State concedes that the identification process was suggestive by the mere fact that the two people were stopped so close to the scene, so soon, and that only those two were shown to the witnesses. Indeed, a show up identification requiring a yes or no answer is a far less desireable situation than positively picking out a person from an anonymous lineup. Biggers, supra; State v. Lara, supra; State v. Campbell (1985), 219 Mont. 194, 711 P.2d 1357, cert. denied (1986), 475 U.S. 1127, 106 S.Ct. 1654, 90 L.Ed.2d 197. As we cautioned in Campbell, [l]aw enforcement agencies [are] ill advised to rely solely on one-to-one showups in identifying suspects with a crime. Campbell, 711 P.2d at 1362. Suggestive as it was, based on Lara and the factors set forth in Biggers, we conclude that this identification did not have such a tendency for misidentification so as to violate Rudolph's due process rights under the immediate circumstances of this case. We conclude the Biggers factors were also met by eyewitness Gonzales and that his identification was also constitutionally-sound. Gonzales did not view them as long as Thieler and his identification seemed apprehensive initially. However, Gonzales passed the suspects on a narrow sidewalk near the crime scene and observed them long enough and carefully enough to notice their gender, size, clothing and what they were doing. His opportunity to view them and the attention he displayed lend reliability to his identification. Also helpful is the close proximity which was discussed above regarding witness Thieler. We find no error in admitting into evidence the results of this show up identification. We note here that witness Furnish did not participate in the identification that night, but he did testify at trial as to what he observed that night. Lastly, we are not disturbed by the minor discrepancies in the witnesses' descriptions which were asserted by defense counsel. These discrepancies go more to the credibility of each witness and the weight the jury will give their testimony, rather than to the constitutionality of admitting the identification based on varying testimony of other witnesses. See Campbell, supra.