Opinion ID: 2394054
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Our Plain Error Jurisprudence

Text: There is no reason not to give effect to this statutory command. It is true that, unlike the federal system, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 52, [3] Georgia has no statute or rule providing generally for plain error appellate review in criminal cases, and this Court has been chary about establishing plain error review by judicial decision. See Smith v. State, 288 Ga. 348, 349 703 S.E.2d 629 (2010). See also id. at 357-360, 703 S.E.2d 629 (Hunstein, C.J., dissenting) (arguing for a broader plain error doctrine). This is a sensible approach, because plain error doctrine reflects a policy balance between requiring timely and specific objections at trial, to provide trial courts the opportunity to correct errors before judgment, and ensuring that criminal defendants whose lawyers failed to raise meritorious objections are not thereby deprived of a fair trial (recognizing that the failure to raise a valid objection that actually prejudices the defendant may also be correctable through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment). If plain error appellate review is to be provided more generally, it seems appropriate to do so not by judicial decree but by formal court rule or, more in keeping with Georgia's usual approach to such criminal procedure matters, by legislation. That said, the two areas where this Court applied plain error review before the enactment of OCGA § 17-8-58 were where statutes charged us with that duty. Thus, even absent proper objection, we will review alleged errors in the sentencing phase of a trial resulting in the death penalty, based on this Court's statutory mandate to determine [w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, OCGA § 17-10-35(c)(1). See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 256 Ga. 715, 730, 352 S.E.2d 762 (1987) ([E]ven if improper arguments have not been timely objected to at trial, reversal is required if `there was a reasonable probability that the improper arguments changed the jury's exercise of discretion in choosing between life imprisonment or death.' (citations omitted)). Even more analogous to OCGA § 17-8-58 is the immediately preceding section of the criminal procedure code, OCGA § 17-8-57, which prohibits judges in criminal cases from intimating [an] opinion as to what has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused. That statute then provides that, [s]hould any judge violate this Code section, the violation shall be held by the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals to be error and the decision in the case reversed.  Id. (emphasis added). In accordance with that clear text, we have applied a sort of super-plain error review, holding not only that no objection at trial is required to assert a violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 on appeal, but also that if a violation is found, the conviction will be reversed without further consideration of the effect of the error on the defendant's substantial rights or the fairness and integrity of the proceeding. See State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 634, 690 S.E.2d 164 (2010). See also Paul v. State, 272 Ga. 845, 849, 537 S.E.2d 58 (2000) (holding, seven years before enactment of OCGA § 17-8-58, that we will apply the plain error rule to death penalty cases, and other criminal cases in which the trial court violates OCGA § 17-8-57).