Opinion ID: 1720801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Chapter 490A, Code of Iowa 1966, is entitled Public Utility Regulation and delegates considerable power and authority to the Commission.

Text: Section 490A.2 provides: Powers-rules. The commission shall have broad general powers to effect the purposes of this chapter notwithstanding the fact that certain specific powers are hereinafter set forth. The commission shall have authority to issue subpoenas and to pay the same fees and mileage as are payable to witnesses in the courts of record of general jurisdiction and shall establish all needful, just and reasonable rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, to govern the exercise of its powers and duties, the practice and procedure before it, and to govern the form, contents and filing of reports, documents and other papers provided for in this chapter or in the commission's rules and regulations. In the establishment, amendment, alteration or repeal of any of such rules and regulations, the commission shall be subject to the provisions of chapter 17A.    (Emphasis added) Chapter 17A mentioned in the statute relates to administrative rules and regulations and submission thereof to the Attorney General and Legislative Departmental Rules Review Committee. There is no issue before us as to the submission and publication of the rules pursuant to Chapter 17A. Section 490A.2 of the 1966 Code of Iowa, quoted supra, authorizes the Iowa State Commerce Commission to make reasonable rules and regulations pertaining to the practice and procedure before the Commission but delegates no power to prescribe procedural rules as to the manner of serving notice of appeal to the district court. Appellee disagrees and argues that Commission rules provided for the method of appeal to the district court. Departmental Rule 15.6(1) provides: a. The Commission will prescribe such notices as are required by law in hearings contemplated in sections 3, 6, and 7 of chapter 490A, Code of Iowa. All other pleadings, including briefs, applications for further hearing or rehearing, and notices of appeal shall be served by the party filing same upon all parties to the proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the commission. Proof of service shall accompany the filing with the commission. b.    c. Unless otherwise provided by the commission, service shall be made by delivering in person or by depositing in the United States mail, properly addressed with postage prepaid, one copy to each party entitled thereto. When any party or parties have appeared by attorney, service upon the attorney shall be deemed service upon such party or parties.    In the case at bar the Notice of Appeal complied with this rule, i. e. there was proof of mailing. Sections 3, 6 and 7 of Chapter 490A, Code of Iowa, referred to in the rule, relate to complaints and investigation as to rates and service by a public utility, change of rates and review by the Commission. They are not germane to our problem. Section 490A.13 of the Code, and the controlling statute provides: Appeal to district court. Any party to any proceeding before the commission who is aggrieved by an order therein may take an appeal by serving a notice of appeal upon the adverse party or parties and the commission and by filing said notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court of any county wherein the order of the commission or some part thereof is to take effect. It should be noted that the only provision for appeal is by serving a notice of appeal. II. In this case the statute and rule use the word appeal. The parties have treated the proceedings as an appeal to the district court and not an original proceeding. Rule 56, Rules of Civil Procedure, relates to original notice and not to appeal but the procedural meaning of the words served, serving and service as indicated therein. The first paragraph of the rule says: Personal notice. Original notices are `served' by delivering a copy to the proper person. Personal service may be made as follows:    The methods of service are then enumerated. Nowhere is there any authority for service by ordinary mail. Jurisdiction where the statute calls for serving a notice is not acquired by mailing a letter. III. Courts do not have authority to sit in judgment upon everything that might come to their attention. Jurisdiction is acquired by statutory procedure. Absent a notice sufficient to meet the statutory requirements there is no jurisdiction even though from other sources there is actual knowledge. Krebs v. Town of Manson, 256 Iowa 957, 962, 129 N.W.2d 744. Compliance with the rules relative to notice is mandatory. Bice v. Incorporated City of Urbandale, 258 Iowa 1013, 1015, 141 N.W.2d 639. The right of appeal is purely a creature of statute. If an appeal is to be taken notice thereof must be given in substantial compliance with the statute. Failure to serve an adverse party within the time provided    is fatal to the jurisdiction of the district court. Merritt v. Interstate Power Company, Iowa, 153 N.W. 2d 489, 492. Section 490A.13, quoted supra, provides for appeal by serving a notice of appeal. Was a notice by mail in the case at bar a serving as required by statute? We have consistently held to the contrary. In Ellis v. Carpenter, 89 Iowa 521, 523, 56 N.W. 678, we said: When service is required it means personal service. In Incorporated Town of Casey v. Hogue, 204 Iowa 3, 7, 214 N.W. 729, 731, this appears: The statute provides that the appeal is to be taken `by serving notice thereof' on the clerk of the municipality. It is to be observed that the direction of the statute is that the notice shall be `served.' When the statutory requirement is that a notice shall be served, and there is no further specific direction in the statute, two things are clearly implied: (1) That the notice shall be in writing; and (2) that it shall be served personally upon the party upon whom service is to be made. It is the general rule that, where a notice is required or authorized by statute in any legal proceedings, it must be in writing. In Harrington v. City of Keokuk, 258 Iowa 1043, 1049, 1050, 141 N.W.2d 633, 637, we quoted from and considered State v. Hansen, 244 Iowa 145, 55 N.W.2d 923 in these words: `The general rule appears to be that unless otherwise provided by statute the service of a notice must be personal. 66 C.J.S. Notice § 18(d); 39 Am.Jur., [Notice and Notices] Section 9.' It was further pointed out that we now have a very definite statement in rule 56 as to the meaning of the term `served', and that a mailed notice would not comply with personal service as set out in rule 56. It was said: `We think that the terms served or caused to be served, especially when used in connection with Official Notices, have acquired the peculiar and appropriate meaning given to service of original notices, in the absence of anything to the contrary appearing. Reaffirming the rule announced in the Hogue case [Incorporated Town of Casey v. Hogue] supra [204 Iowa 3, 214 N.W. 729], and accepting personal service to be such service as is set forth in R.C.P. 56, we hold that mailing of the notice, in the instant case, was not a compliance with Section 103.15   .' Section 4.1, Code of Iowa, provides: Rules. In the construction of the statutes, the following rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the general assembly, or repugnant to the context of the statute: 1.    2. Words and phrases. Words and phrases shall be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, shall be construed according to such meaning.    The words by serving a notice of appeal upon the adverse party    appearing in section 490A.13 of the Code have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in our law. They mean personal service. The words in section 490A.13 mean personal service and in the case at bar there was no personal service. There was no notice of appeal pursuant to section 490A.13. IV. Appellee argues and the trial court held that section 490A.13 is not controlling. It is argued that the promulgation by the Commission of its rule 15.6 was by statutory authority of section 490A.2 and made effective by publication and distribution pursuant to chapter 17A of the Code. It is then argued that it is a proper exercise of legislatively delegated authority for the Commission to prescribe the procedure for appeal to the district court. We think this is a misreading of the statute and an obvious non sequitur. Many citations appear in the trial court's ruling and appellee's brief. We do not find that any of them go so far as to say that under a legislative delegation of power an administrative body may prescribe the rules by which an appeal is taken from its own ruling. Rule 15.6(1) is a proper delegation of authority to the commission to regulate and provide for hearings within its own structure. Section 490A.2, quoted supra, authorizes rules not inconsistent with law. Commission rule 15.1(1) says: Procedure Governed. These rules and regulations are promulgated under chapter 490A, Code of Iowa, as guides for practice and procedure thereunder before the Iowa State Commerce Commission   . (Emphasis added) Rule 15.1(4) authorizes the appointment of examiners and provides for the final determination by an examiner subject to review by the Commission. The word appeal appearing in rule 15.6(1) refers to appeals to the Commission.