Opinion ID: 1034195
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: JeCarlos—Counts 2,4,6,7,10

Text: JeCarlos argues that his convictions on Counts 2, 4, 6, 7, and 10 are not supported by sufficient evidence. In Counts 2, 7, and 10, JeCarlos was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of powder cocaine on May 6, 2010 (Count 2), July 13, 2010 (Count 7), and July 18, 2010 (Count 10), all in violation of §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(ii). In Counts 4 and 6, he was convicted of possession with intent to distribute a detectable amount of powder cocaine on June 3, 2010 (Count 4) and July 2, 2010 (Count 6) in violation of §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). Because the quantities alleged in Counts 2, 7, and 10 involved 500 grams or more of cocaine, that quantity triggers a sentence enhancement pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii), and the Government must prove possession of 500 grams or more of cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt. See Gamez-Gonzalez, 319 F.3d at 699-700. JeCarlos argues that we should overturn these convictions because the Government failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the quantity of cocaine involved in the transactions alleged in Counts 2 and 7 was 500 grams or more, and (2) failed to offer sufficient evidence that a detectable quantity of cocaine was involved in the transactions alleged in Counts 4 and 6. JeCarlos argues with respect to Count 10 that the Government failed to satisfy its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the cocaine on the date set forth in the indictment. We find all of these arguments unpersuasive. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold that a rational juror could find that JeCarlos was guilty of possession with 26 Case: 12-30413 Document: 00512310475 Page: 27 Date Filed: 07/17/2013 No. 12-30413 intent to distribute powder cocaine as described in the challenged counts. The evidence supporting JeCarlos’s convictions on these counts is as follows. With respect to Count 2, evidence shows that on May 6, 2010, Pugh received a shipment of cocaine from Thomas; at trial, Pugh testified that he thought the shipment was 27 ounces—approximately 756 grams. A recording of his phone conversation with Furlow on May 6 confirms the amounts to which Pugh testified at trial. With respect to Count 4, the Government presented evidence obtained through direct surveillance and wire intercepts that on June 3, 2010, JeCarlos was in Shreveport while Thomas was delivering cocaine to various dealers. Evidence from wire intercepts also reveals that JeCarlos and Thomas were picking up drug money. The pole camera placed outside Pugh’s residence recorded Thomas arriving at Pugh’s house, and Pugh testified at trial that Thomas delivered some cocaine to him that day. With respect to Count 10, the Government presented evidence that law enforcement officers recovered powder cocaine with a net weight of 784.5 grams from Pugh’s residence after he was apprehended and began to cooperate with officers following a drug delivery from Thomas. Wire intercepts of phone calls between Pugh and JeCarlos confirm that Thomas delivered the drugs as per JeCarlos’s request. And JeCarlos’s argument with respect to Counts 6 and 7 fails for the same reasons that Thomas’s argument failed. See supra II.A.4. While JeCarlos was careful not to touch the drugs, because constructive possession is possession under § 841,24 we find that the considerable evidence 24 Possession may be actual or constructive, and a defendant who “knowingly has ownership, dominion or control over [drugs] or over the premises in which [drugs are] concealed” has constructive possession of the drugs at issue. United States v. Arnold, 467 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 27 Case: 12-30413 Document: 00512310475 Page: 28 Date Filed: 07/17/2013 No. 12-30413 linking JeCarlos to the charged offenses supports the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we affirm JeCarlos’s convictions as to all of the substantive counts.