Opinion ID: 1254693
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Affected Substantial Rights and the Fairness, Integrity, or Public Reputation of Judicial Proceedings

Text: Although the jury instructions were in error, and the error was plain, the plain error standard is not met unless the error affect[ed] substantial rights. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (internal quotation marks omitted). This means the error was prejudicial in that it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. Id. Even then, however, we retain the discretion to decline to correct an error even if it affects substantial rights. Id. at 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770. The standard applied in making this determination is whether the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). In this matter, for example, had the government adduced sufficient evidence that Davy did, in fact, have contacts with federal agents prior to the beating, the inadequate jury charge might not have affected the defendants' substantial rights, nor would the fairness of the judicial proceedings necessarily be called into question. In contrast, this Circuit has previously held that the failure by the [g]overnment to adduce sufficient evidence... is a defect affecting substantial rights which we may notice under F.R.Cr.P. 52(b). United States v. Kaplan, 586 F.2d 980, 982 n. 4 (2d Cir.1978); see also United States v. Muniz, 60 F.3d 65, 67 (2d Cir.1995) rev'd on reconsideration, on other grounds, 184 F.3d 114 (2d Cir.1997) (A convicted defendant who fails to raise the issue of insufficient evidence in the trial court cannot prevail on that ground on appeal unless it was plain error for the trial court not to dismiss on its own motion.). Thus, we must consider whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain the witness retaliation charges. As already noted, we need not focus on the first two elements of the § 1513(b) retaliation charge. On appeal, Hart and Draper did not contest that they caused Davy bodily injury. Contrary to appellants' contentions, ample trial evidenceLRP's antisnitching motto, Marcano's stated belief that Davy had implicated him in the Thomas murder, accusations of snitching expressed during the Davy assault, and the sheer brutality of Davy's beatingindicates that a reasonable jury could have found that Davy's assailants acted with the intent to retaliate for his cooperation with the law enforcement authorities. See United States v. Vasquez, 267 F.3d 79, 90 (2d Cir.2001) (A conviction challenged on sufficiency grounds will be affirmed if, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reviewing court finds that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (internal quotation marks omitted)). At issue is the third element of the witness retaliation chargeswhether the witness had sufficient contacts with federal agents prior to being attacked. We have not previously had the opportunity to define what constitutes adequate contact with federal agents under this element of the retaliation statute. In Brown the contacts were adequate where the witness was interviewed directly by federal agents. 937 F.2d at 34. Presumably adequate contact might also be established if the witness provides information to a person the witness intends (or perhaps reasonably believes) will pass the information on to federal officials. In this case, the government argues that because Davy provided information to local authorities, which led to Marcano's arrest, and because federal agents were present during Marcano's subsequent interview, where he accused Davy of implicating him in the murder, it is only logical to infer that prior to this interview (or at worst, immediately thereafter), the federal authorities learned of Davy's statements implicating Marcano. But this sequence merely shows that Marcano had contact with federal officers. Only through a tortured reading of the statute could one find Davy to have given information to a federal officer because Marcano later told federal officers that he believed Davy had implicated him in the Thomas murder. It would be a similarly incorrect reading of the statute and our precedent to argue that a witness's interactions with local authorities, which just happen to be eventually reported to federal authorities, provide the requisite federal contacts under the statute. Rather, the statute is clear that the retaliation must be for information given by a person to a law enforcement officer, and that the officer must be federal. 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2). Davy's contacts with federal agents prior to the attack were inadequate to meet that standard. In fact, at trial, Davy testified that his first contact with federal agents occurred on April 10, 2003, two days after the relevant attack, and nothing in the record suggests that he had anticipated such a meeting. Without evidence to the contrary, there is simply nothing to show that, prior to being beaten, Davy had any interaction with federal authorities or passed on any information to someone he believed would inform federal authorities. The evidence was therefore insufficient to sustain the witness retaliation charges. Because Hart and Draper were convicted based on jury instructions that omitted an element of the offense, the government's failure to present any evidence to support that element plainly affected Hart's and Draper's substantial rights. Indeed, had the jury been charged with parsing the government's evidence to ensure that Davy's contacts were explicitly federal, the jury would not reasonably have returned a conviction on the retaliation counts, given that there was no such evidence to parse. Thus, there exists a reasonable probability that, but for [the error claimed], the result of the proceeding would have been different, a finding that implicates substantial rights under the plain error test. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81-82, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). We also believe, again under these circumstances and for the same reasons, that the error seriously affect[ed] the fairness of the proceeding below and exercise our discretion to correct it, having found the error to satisfy the plain error test. Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770.