Opinion ID: 787590
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Act 64's Expenditure Limitations

Text: 54 Buckley v. Valeo remains the seminal case governing the constitutional review of campaign finance reform efforts, including expenditure limitations. 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). The Buckley Court considered and rejected a variety of expenditure limitations, including a ceiling on independent, campaign-related expenditures, a ceiling on a candidate's use of personal or family resources, and a ceiling on a candidate's campaign expenditures. Like the federal statute reviewed in Buckley, Act 64 limits the total amount of campaign funds that a candidate may spend. 55 Although the clear language of Buckley requires that courts should review expenditure limits with exacting scrutiny, the District Court in this case (and it is by no means alone) apparently felt that Buckley categorically prohibits expenditure limitations. See, e.g., Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 366 F.3d 900, 914-21 (10th Cir.2004); Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 918-19 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1001, 119 S.Ct. 511, 142 L.Ed.2d 424 (1998); see also post at 151, 152, 159, 172, 185 (Winter, dissenting). We disagree. The Buckley Court's rejection of particular federal campaign expenditure limitations was rooted in Congress' purported reasons for such legislation and the failures of those interests to demonstrate any need for expenditure limits. 424 U.S. at 55-58, 96 S.Ct. 612. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the federal government had failed to assert any sufficiently important interest that its expenditure limitations served. See id. at 55, 96 S.Ct. 612. 56 Examining the federal government's interest in eliminating corruption from federal elections, the Buckley Court concluded that the government's asserted rationale only applied to large contributions — that is, eliminating large contributions fully satisfied the government's anti-corruption interest. See id. at 56-57, 96 S.Ct. 612. The federal government claimed that expenditure limitations were necessary to make contribution limitations easier to enforce, arguing that when candidates cannot spend large quantities of money, they have a weaker incentive to accept illegally large contributions. But the Court concluded that the contribution limitations promised to be sufficiently effective on their own. See id. Based on the Court's review of the record, [t]here [was] no indication that the substantial criminal penalties attached to violations of contribution limits, as well as the political repercussion of such violations, would not suffice to realize this anti-corruption interest. Id. 57 Nor was the Court persuaded that the federal government had a sufficient interest in utilizing expenditure limitations to equalize the financial resources of candidates competing for office. See id. at 56-57, 96 S.Ct. 612. The contribution limits would assure that any difference in resources var[ies] with the size and intensity of the candidate's support. Id. at 56, 96 S.Ct. 612. Finally, the Court addressed the argument that expenditure limitations served the federal government's interest in reducing the allegedly skyrocketing costs of political campaigns. Id. at 57, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court rejected the idea that the state had a sufficient interest in setting the appropriate scope of the quantity and range of debate on public issues in a political campaign. Id. In other words, Buckley held that large campaign expenditures, in and of themselves, are not inherently suspect. 58 We conclude, then, that Vermont cannot sustain Act 64 by asserting a need to control excessive campaign spending per se. But critically, the Buckley Court did not conclude that the Constitution would always prohibit expenditure limits, regardless of the reasons asserted and the record supporting the limitations. It simply held that based on the record before it, [n]o governmental interest that has been suggested is sufficient to justify the federal expenditure limits. Id. at 55, 96 S.Ct. 612. Accordingly, after Buckley, there remains the possibility that a legislature could identify a sufficiently strong interest, and develop a supporting record, such that some expenditure limits could survive constitutional review. 59 We are not alone in concluding that Buckley does not permanently foreclose any consideration of campaign expenditure limitations. In Shrink, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and Stevens all recognized that our post- Buckley experiences with campaign finance have demonstrated that we need a flexible approach to the constitutional review of campaign finance rules. Justice Breyer, who was joined by Justice Ginsburg, concluded that courts must resist a static reading of Buckley 's mandate, which may require reinterpretation in light of subsequent experience, including a legislature's political judgment that unlimited spending threatens the integrity of the electoral process. 528 U.S. at 403-04, 120 S.Ct. 897 (Breyer, J., concurring). Legislatures may protect the electoral process not only from quid pro quo corruption, but also from the threat that campaign funding may pose to the integrity of the electoral process. Id. at 401, 120 S.Ct. 897. Justice Stevens also articulated the need for a fresh reexamination of Buckley, and concluded that Money is property; it is not speech. Id. at 398, 120 S.Ct. 897 (Stevens, J., concurring). And although Justice Kennedy argued from a different perspective that the post- Buckley experience requires a wholesale abandonment of the approach adopted in Buckley, he too left open the possibility that Congress, or a state legislature, might devise a system in which there are some limits on both expenditures and contributions thus permitting officeholders to concentrate their time and effort on official duties rather than on fundraising. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 897 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 745 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (indicating by implication that Buckley did not make expenditure limits per se invalid). 6 60 Indeed, some judges have noted that reconsideration might be required were a court faced with compelling evidence that unlimited expenditures posed great dangers to the very political process that Buckley sought to safeguard. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg have supported the constitutionality of spending limits on political parties for, among other reasons, the likelihood that such limits would improve, rather than inhibit, a flourishing political system: 61 It is quite wrong to assume that the net effect of limits on contributions and expenditures — which tend to protect equal access to the political arena, to free candidates and their staffs from the interminable burden of fundraising, and to diminish the importance of repetitive 30-second commercials — will be adverse to the interest in informed debate protected by the First Amendment. 62 Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 649-50, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996) ( Colorado Republican I ) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In part, they reached this conclusion because of the comparative competency of the different branches of government: Congress surely has both wisdom and experience in these matters that is far superior to ours. Id. at 650, 116 S.Ct. 2309. Moreover, one judge sitting on the Sixth Circuit has pointed out that Buckley was decided on a slender factual record and that a fuller record might satisfy the constitutional requirement that expenditure limits be narrowly tailored to a compelling interest. Kruse, 142 F.3d at 919 (Cohn, J., concurring); cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-27, at 1133 n.1 (2d ed. 1988) (One consequence of th[e] expedited review [in Buckley ] was that the Supreme Court, working in a factual vacuum, was forced to indulge in more than a little empirical speculation about such issues as the circumvention of expenditure limits and the impact of those limits on campaign speech.); Burt Neuborne, One Dollar-One Vote: A Preface to Debating Campaign Finance Reform, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 30 (1997) (Since the Buckley Court's judgment was made without the benefit of a factual record, critics have argued that it is time for a factually based study of the potential for corruption inherent in large, independent expenditures.); David R. Lagasse, Note, Undue Influence: Corporate Political Speech, Power and the Initiative Process, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1347, 1357 (1995) (The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Buckley v. Valeo without either party to the action having the opportunity to develop a strong factual record on which the Court could base its ultimate decision. Thus, the Court faced the issue of Congress's power to regulate campaign expenditures purely on theoretical grounds, without the benefit of developing an adequate factual record.) (citing BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 469-70 (1979)). 63 The academic literature also contains persuasive analyses that our post- Buckley understanding of campaign finance requires a careful evaluation of the evidence in support of expenditure limits. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Beginning of the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1765-69 (2001) (arguing that fair and competitive elections may require some form of expenditure limitations); Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1288-89 (1994) (noting that changed circumstances and never-before considered governmental interests, including the protection of candidates' time, might be sufficiently compelling to support expenditure limits). 64 Although we recognize that there is considerable dissatisfaction with Buckley 's approach, we still premise our conclusions on the assumption that Buckley continues to govern the constitutional review of campaign finance laws. However, we do not accept an unyielding interpretation of Buckley that expenditure limits are per se unconstitutional, because such a static approach to Buckley 's import would require us to ignore not only Buckley 's own language, but also over three decades of experience as to how the campaign funds race has affected public confidence and representative democracy. 7 In sum, like the federal expenditure limitations considered in Buckley, Act 64's expenditure limitations rise or fall on whether they have been narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest. It is to that question that we now turn.
65 As a regulation of the amount that a candidate can spend on speech made for the purpose of influencing an election, Vermont's expenditure limits are a content-based restriction on speech. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992) (treating election provision as content-based because whether individuals may exercise their free speech rights ... depends entirely on whether their speech is related to a political campaign). 8 Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992), and the government bears the burden of rebutting that presumption. United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000). To uphold a content-based restriction on speech, the government must prove the existence of a compelling state interest to support the restriction, and that the restriction is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. 66 In the context of expenditure limits, then, the level of scrutiny applied is akin to the strict scrutiny standard frequently employed in the equal protection context, in terms of the required degree of fit between means and ends. Cf. Guido Calabresi, Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. Rev. 80, 112-13 n.94 (citing cases) (noting that, traditionally, judicial review has been at its strongest in protecting against infringement on First Amendment rights). Our application of this standard is informed both by the particular First Amendment right implicated by the challenged restrictions, as well as by the degree of deference owed to the supporting legislative findings. 67 Turning to the first of these factors, there is no doubt that [p]olitical speech is the primary object of First Amendment protection. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S.Ct. 897 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Moreover, in our representative democracy, the free exchange of political information should receive the most protection when it matters the most — during campaigns for elective office. Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 897. However, the precise object of First Amendment protection in this case, for most plaintiffs, is the ability to spend money on political speech — not the speech itself. See Shrink, 528 U.S. at 400, 120 S.Ct. 897 (Breyer, J., concurring) (money is not speech; it  enables speech). To be sure, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the expenditure of money is so critical in enabling political speech in today's mass society, that it should receive the same First Amendment protection as the speech itself. We do not question this proposition — and indeed apply it in this case — but, particularly in light of at least one Supreme Court Justice's willingness to rethink the money equals speech equation (J. Stevens concurring in Shrink, 528 U.S. at 398, 120 S.Ct. 897), think it important to define the protected interest as precisely as possible. 68 Although most of the plaintiffs are persons or organizations that want to spend money on speech, plaintiff Marcella Landell is a voter who wants to receive political speech. Her First Amendment right to receive such speech is the equivalent of the right of the speakers. See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976) (the First Amendment protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both). As Landell describes her interest in her brief, she does not wish her ability to cast a wise and informed vote to be restricted by the State of Vermont imposing a direct barrier on the amount of candidate speech she may receive. Restrictions of political speech that hamstring[ ] voters seeking to inform themselves about the candidates and the campaign issues are unconstitutional. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989). Plaintiffs argue that this high level of protection, as applied in Buckley, dictates that the expenditure limit provision must automatically be struck down. 69 On the other hand, Vermont appears to argue that deference to the legislature — on whether the interests asserted in favor of expenditure limits are compelling, and whether expenditure limits are necessary to achieve these goals — is warranted. Vermont cites several Supreme Court cases in support of its view of legislative deference, including Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210, 103 S.Ct. 552, 74 L.Ed.2d 364 (1982) (it is improper to second-guess a legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil feared); Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) ( Turner I ) (courts must accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of the legislature); Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 196, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997) ( Turner II) (We owe Congress' findings an additional measure of deference out of respect for its authority to exercise the legislative power.); and Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330-31 n. 12, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 87 L.Ed.2d 220 (1985) (Congress' factual findings are entitled to a great deal of deference, inasmuch as Congress is an institution better equipped to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing on an issue). Indeed, the District Court concluded that [a]lthough legislative findings are not entirely isolated from review, it was required to exercise considerable deference to such findings. 118 F.Supp.2d at 476 (citing Turner II ). Accordingly, the court adopted the fifteen official findings excerpted supra and in the District Court opinion, but made clear that it was also considering the other evidence presented at trial. Id. at 468-74. 70 As to plaintiffs' position, we disagree that the high level of protection accorded political speech or the money enabling it dictates that the provision must automatically be struck down. Cf. McConnell, 540 U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 706 (Many years ago we observed that `[t]o say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard ... an election from the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self protection.') (quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545, 54 S.Ct. 287, 78 L.Ed. 484 (1934)); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729-30, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) (compelling interest in the integrity and stability of the election process means that every substantial restriction on the right to vote or to associate should not automatically be invalidated). In our view, this level of protection is the starting point, not the endpoint, for scrutiny of Vermont's expenditure limits. 71 Indeed, the Supreme Court has been clear in its rejection of the view that strict scrutiny is `strict in theory, but fatal in fact.' Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)) (explaining that [w]hen race-based action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the `narrow tailoring' test this Court has set out in previous cases). This observation has proven true in the First Amendment context, as the Supreme Court has validated a number of electoral regulations against First Amendment challenge even while applying strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding state ban on electioneering activity near polling places); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990) (upholding statute restricting independent expenditures by corporations on campaigns). Careful analysis is particularly important in applying strict scrutiny, where, as Justice Breyer has put it, a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally protected interests in complex ways. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 402, 120 S.Ct. 897 (Breyer, J., concurring). As we will explain, this is a case where constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal equation, preventing a simple equation of strict scrutiny with constitutional infirmity. Id. at 400, 120 S.Ct. 897; see also, e.g., Burson, 504 U.S. at 199, 112 S.Ct. 1846 (plurality opinion) (recognizing compelling interest in preserving integrity of electoral process); id. at 213, 112 S.Ct. 1846 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ([T]here is a narrow area in which the First Amendment permits freedom of expression to yield to the extent necessary for the accommodation of another constitutional right.); Storer, 415 U.S. at 736, 94 S.Ct. 1274 (allowing some restrictions on ballot access in order to further the State's interest in the stability of its political system). 72 Nor should we adopt total legislative deference as the appropriate level of scrutiny. Deference to legislative findings may well be warranted on certain issues relating to the constitutionality of election-related laws, such as the precise level of contribution limits, as in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612, or whether 100 feet, as opposed to 50 or 75 feet, is an adequate radius surrounding a polling place to ban electioneering, as in Burson, 504 U.S. at 209-10, 112 S.Ct. 1846. Some degree of deference on the issue of whether there are state interests that justify legislative changes to the State's electoral system may also be appropriate. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) ([D]eference to legislative choice is warranted particularly when Congress regulates campaign contributions, carrying as they do a plain threat to political integrity and a plain warrant to counter the appearance and reality of corruption and the misuse of corporate advantages.). But total deference is not warranted on the core questions of whether those interests are truly compelling enough, in a constitutional sense, to justify the expenditure limits, and whether this regulation places an undue burden on the First Amendment rights of those who bring this challenge. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 519, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981) (plurality opinion) ([I]t has been this Court's consistent position that democracy stands on a stronger footing when courts protect First Amendment interests against legislative intrusion, rather than deferring to merely rational legislative judgment in this area.); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939) (This court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as fundamental personal rights and liberties.... [T]he delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts ... to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights.). 73 We read the District Court opinion as consistent with this view. It gives considerable deference to the legislative findings on the need for the law only, but not to the legislature's assessment of whether its solution is narrowly tailored. Cf. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978) (Powell, J.) (Political judgments regarding the necessity for the particular classification may be weighed in the constitutional balance, but the standard of justification will remain constant), quoted in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224-25, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995). This approach is consistent with Justice Breyer's concurrence in Shrink, where he indicated that the Court should defer to [the Missouri legislature's] political judgment that unlimited spending threatens the integrity of the electoral process, but not with respect to whether its solution, by imposing too low a contribution limit, significantly increases the reputation-related or media-related advantages of incumbency and thereby insulates legislators from effective electoral challenge. 528 U.S. at 403-04, 120 S.Ct. 897. 74 Although we bear in mind Justice Breyer's observations in Shrink, we cannot adopt his conclusion, in light of the extensive Supreme Court precedent to the contrary, that the interests must be balanced here, and that there is therefore no place for a strong presumption against constitutionality of the sort often thought to accompany the words `strict scrutiny.' Id. at 400, 120 S.Ct. 897. Such a presumption is proper, at least until the Supreme Court tells us otherwise, and it means that the burden of persuasion at trial was on the State to defend Act 64 — i.e., to establish that there was a compelling state interest to support the expenditure limit provision and that the provision was narrowly tailored to advance that interest. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 226, 112 S.Ct. 1846 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by O'Connor and Souter) (noting that a core premise of strict scrutiny is that the heavy burden of justification is on the State ). But this burden does not excuse the courts from actually applying the scrutiny that the First Amendment demands, and the State of Vermont deserves. 75 Therefore, although we do not question the validity of the factual findings developed by the legislature in support of Act 64, 9 our system of judicial review provides plaintiffs the opportunity to present competing evidence, assigns to the District Court the responsibility for making findings of fact and conclusions of law after weighing the evidence, and leaves to the Court of Appeals the independent responsibility to assess the legal significance of these factual findings. This responsibility is particularly important here, where, as plaintiffs claim, complete deference to the legislature could risk such constitutional evils as permitting incumbents to insulate themselves from effective electoral challenge. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 402, 120 S.Ct. 897 (Breyer, J., concurring). 76 Put differently, this level of scrutiny is a serious barrier for expenditure limits, but it is not impenetrable. Rather, an independent court must be convinced that the legislature was serving the people's interest and not its own. See, e.g., Burson, 504 U.S. at 213, 112 S.Ct. 1846 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing the use of the compelling-interest test as one analytical device to detect, in an objective way, whether the asserted justification is in fact an accurate description of the purpose and effect of the law), quoted in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992); Cf. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, 109 S.Ct. 706 (noting in the equal protection context that the purpose of strict scrutiny is to `smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool, with the narrow tailoring analysis helping to ensure that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate).
77 In Shrink, the Court indicated that [t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised. 528 U.S. at 391, 120 S.Ct. 897. For example, the Court in Shrink accepted a relatively minimal evidentiary showing of Missouri's interest in preventing corruption or the appearance thereof, because in its view, there was little reason to doubt that sometimes large contributions will work actual corruption of our political system, and no reason to question the existence of a corresponding suspicion among voters. Id. at 395, 120 S.Ct. 897; see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 661 (The idea that large contributions to a national party can corrupt or, at the very least, create the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and officeholders is neither novel nor implausible.). Similarly, the Shrink Court relied in large part on Buckley 's conclusion on the fit between contribution limits and the anti-corruption interest, to decide that the contribution limits in Missouri were sufficiently tailored and not so different in kind as to raise essentially a new issue about the adequacy of the Missouri statute's tailoring to serve its purposes. 528 U.S. at 395, 120 S.Ct. 897. 78 With Shrink 's guidance on the quantum of empirical evidence needed in mind, we turn then to the interests asserted by Vermont in support of Act 64's expenditure limits to assess whether any of the interests might be sufficiently compelling to support this regulation of political speech. Vermont offers five interests that it argues are sufficiently compelling to support the spending limits on candidates: (1) avoiding the reality and appearance of corruption in elective politics and government; (2) assur[ing] that candidates and officeholders will spend less time fund-raising and more time interacting with voters and performing official duties; (3) promoting electoral competition and in protecting equal access to political participation; (4) bolster[ing] voter interest and engagement in elective politics; and (5) enhanc[ing] the quality of political debate and voters' understanding of the issues. 79 Defendants-intervenors appear to rely primarily on the first two of these interests to support the spending limits — describing those interests as (1) deterring corruption and the appearance of corruption; and (2) permitting candidates and officeholders to spend less time fund-raising and more time interacting with voters and performing duties. Defendants-intervenors also argue that the third interest asserted by the State — protecting political equality — should be recognized as an additional basis to support the spending limits on candidates. 10 80 We now consider the interests asserted by the defendants.
81 The Supreme Court has recently clarified that the anti-corruption interest, in the campaign finance context, is not confined to bribery of public officials, but extend[s] to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 389, 120 S.Ct. 897; see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 660. Moreover, the Shrink Court reiterated that, in addition to the actual influence of campaign contributions on politicians' behavior, the perception of corruption was an important part of this compelling state interest because it could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 897 (citing United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562, 81 S.Ct. 294, 5 L.Ed.2d 268 (1961) (democracy works only if the people have faith in those who govern)). 82 In terms of the quantum of empirical evidence needed, we note that although the interest in avoiding corruption and the appearance thereof is well-established as sufficiently important in the context of contribution limits, the rejection in Buckley of the anti-corruption interest as a constitutional justification for spending limits dictates the need for considerable evidence to demonstrate that unlimited spending is part of the corruption problem, and that spending limits are a necessary and plausible solution. 83 In this case, the District Court found that Vermont had proven that the reality and perception of corruption in its political system was a legitimate concern. Specifically, it found that [e]vidence at trial overwhelmingly demonstrated that the Vermont public is suspicious about the effect of big-money influence over politics, and it appears they have reason to feel that way, 118 F.Supp.2d at 468, concluding that [t]he record suggested that large contributors often have an undue influence over the legislative agenda. Id. In light of Shrink, this undue influence over the legislative agenda is properly considered part of the anti-corruption interest. See 528 U.S. at 389, 120 S.Ct. 897. 11 For the reasons that follow, our independent review of the evidence supports these findings by the District Court. 84 First, citizens in Vermont have consistently demonstrated a belief that the attention of their public representatives may be available for a price. As a result, public faith in the democratic system has declined. The General Assembly described the effects of a need to raise ever growing amounts of funds: Robust debate of issues, candidate interaction with the electorate, and public involvement and confidence in the electoral process have decreased as campaign expenditures have increased. 1997 Vt. Laws P.A. 64 (H. 28) (finding No. 4). Large contributions and large expenditures by persons or committees, other than the candidate and particularly from out-of-state political committees or corporations, reduce public confidence in the electoral process and increase the appearance that candidates and elected officials will not act in the best interests of Vermont citizens. Id. (finding No. 9). At trial, one expert witness, Celinda C. Lake, concluded that [v]oters are extremely concerned about the influence of special interests in the political process. In fact, according to polling data, nearly 75 percent of Vermont voters say that ordinary voters do not have enough influence over Vermont politics and government, and more than two thirds believe that large corporations and wealthy individuals have too much influence. (expert report of Celinda C. Lake). 85 Testimony by Vermont's elected officials revealed that this disenchantment and loss of public faith played a critical role in their belief that expenditure limits are necessary. One sponsor of Act 64, Representative Karen Kitzmiller, presented the Vermont House of Representatives with evidence showing that 94 percent of Vermonters believe that too much money is spent in politics, and 76 percent believe that ending private contributions would reduce the power of special interest groups. Another state legislator, Gordon Bristol, testified at trial about his concern about the regular guy on the street, and I think if they feel that candidates are spending a modest amount of money, that they are going to get candidates in there who are representing issues and not a special interest. . . . According to another legislator, citizens have reported that they do not vote because `[a]ll the big money controls everybody in Montpelier anyways.' . . . They think it's all wrapped up and that the special interests control it and, quite frankly, they aren't that wrong. (testimony of Elizabeth Ready). Another legislator said: [I]t's the monied interests that control the process, and that cynicism ... it keeps people from participating, from engaging. . . . (testimony of Donald Hooper). 86 Second, because of the limited number of campaign contributors and the constant concern of being outspent, candidates and elected officials are significantly influenced in deciding positions on issues by a belief that they are unable to oppose too many special interests, no matter how unpopular, because they will be cut off from funds. The General Assembly described the effects of a need to raise ever growing amounts of funds: Increasing campaign expenditures require candidates to seek and rely on a smaller number of larger contributors, often outside the state, rather than a large number of small contributors. 1997 Vt. Laws P.A. 64 (H.28) (finding No. 5). If legislation alienates one major special interest group, officials are reluctant to alienate others because the number of entities and people making political contributions is finite and small. One state legislator admitted that, when considering a piece of legislation, You have to initially consider it as whether or not you want to risk losing the financial support or, in the worst case, having that financial support go to a primary opponent or to a person who opposes you in a general election. (testimony of Peter Smith). One candidate recalled being told by another lawmaker: We've already lost the drug money [because of the pharmacy bill], and I don't need to lose the food manufacture money too. So I'm not going to sign the bill. (testimony of Cheryl Rivers). 87 Third, and perhaps most perniciously, the demands of fundraising also affect the behavior of elected officials in the context of agenda-setting, since officials pay attention to which contributor wants what to happen in terms of language of the bill, in terms of calendaring the bill, in terms of writing the rules. (testimony of Peter Smith). That same witness also noted that a crucial part of any deliberation on a bill involves speculation about the reaction of contributors because they control the money: politicians are forever asking what's the industry position, what's the union position, what's — you know, and what they're talking about is where [is] the money behind the issue, what does the money want, where is the conflict between and among the power brokers. Senator Rivers testified that campaign contributors, by virtue of their role as contributors, can dominate the attention of party leadership or a committee chair, and thereby influence the legislature's agenda. In her words, there is kind of an atmosphere that is created that there is [an] assumption that phone calls [of contributors] will get taken and [their] policy issues will be considered. Another senator, Elizabeth Ready, recognized that there is an agenda out there that is pretty much set by folks that are not elected. 12 Candidates, often with great reluctance, accept the bargain with contributors so that they do not lose large sources of potential fundraising for the arms race in which they feel compelled to participate. 88 The evidence at trial established that candidates for public office rely on special interests for financial support, produced directly or by way of bundling smaller contributions from a particular company or industry. 13 The Buckley Court seemed to assume that many small contributions could not raise the specter of corruption. If a senatorial candidate can raise $1 from each voter, what evil is exacerbated by allowing that candidate to use all that money for political communication? 424 U.S. at 56 n. 64, 96 S.Ct. 612 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the reality of campaign financing in Vermont is a far cry from this idyllic vision of political fundraising, in large part because not every voter has the financial ability to participate by giving campaign contributions. [T]he average Vermonter has been, to some degree, disenfranchised because the average Vermonter cannot afford the price of admission. Senate J. of the State of Vt., at 1338 (Biennial Session, 1997) (statement of William T. Doyle). 89 Vermont has a compelling interest in safeguarding its political process from such contributor dominance, because it corrupts the process for achieving accessibility and accountability of state officials and candidates. The evidence at trial demonstrated that money — and the special interests that wield it — has a great influence on candidate behavior in Vermont, at the expense of the electorate as a whole, since candidates depend on it in order to run for office. Where access and influence can be bought, citizens are less willing to believe that the political system represents the electorate, exacerbating cynicism and weakening the legitimacy of government power. See Jacobus v. Alaska, 338 F.3d 1095, 1113 (9th Cir.2003) (describing the phenomenon of access-peddling and explaining that it creates a danger of corruption and the appearance of corruption). The accessibility and accountability of public officials — and the public's faith that Vermont's government is accessible and accountable — are fundamental to any democratic system. 90 In our view, such influence of campaign contributors is pernicious because it is bought. Certain private citizens and organizations should not be given greater access to public office holders — and thus greater influence — on account of those citizens' ability and willingness to pay for candidates' campaigns. Even with contribution limits, the arms race mentality has made candidates beholden to financial constituencies that contribute to them, and candidates must give them special attention because the contributors will pay for their campaigns. Quid pro quo corruption is troubling not because certain citizens are victorious in the legislative process, but because they achieve the victory by paying public officials for it. 91 In short, we believe, based on the District Court's findings and our own independent review of the record, that Vermont has proven the strength of this interest, and its relationship to unlimited campaign spending. And we believe that the factual record developed by Vermont in support of the anti-corruption interest, through the legislative process and at trial, may be sufficient to distinguish Buckley. Cf. Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 617-18, 116 S.Ct. 2309 (plurality opinion) (indicating that the lack of coordination between the candidate and the source of the expenditure... prevents us from assuming, absent convincing evidence to the contrary, that a limitation on political parties' independent expenditures is necessary to combat a substantial danger of corruption of the electoral system.) (emphasis added); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863-64, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (citing West Coast Hotel and Brown v. Board of Education as examples of applications of constitutional principle to facts as they had not been seen by the Court before). Nonetheless, given Buckley 's holding rejecting the anti-corruption interest as inadequate to support the expenditure limits at issue in that case, we are reluctant to conclude that the same general interest, standing alone, is sufficiently compelling to support Act 64's expenditure limits. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-48, 96 S.Ct. 612; see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 647. We turn then to the second interest asserted by defendants.
92 Vermont also submits that it has a compelling interest in assur[ing] that candidates and officeholders will spend less time fundraising and more time interacting with voters and performing official duties. Indeed, the District Court found that the need to solicit money from large donors at times turns legislators away from their official duties. 118 F.Supp.2d at 468. The District Court also indicated that the State proved that this concern exists, and that Vermont's expenditure limits addressed this interest, among others. Id. at 482-83. 93 Again, we are mindful of Shrink 's guidance that [t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised. 14 528 U.S. at 391, 120 S.Ct. 897. On this score, the time protection rationale has been recognized as compelling, although not in the context of candidate spending limits. Indeed, the Buckley Court considered this interest in assessing, and deemed it sufficiently important to support, the public financing scheme for Presidential election campaigns — a provision it upheld. See 424 U.S. at 96, 96 S.Ct. 612 (Congress properly regarded public financing as an appropriate means of relieving major-party Presidential candidates from the rigors of soliciting private contributions) (citing Senate Rep. No. 93-689); 424 U.S. at 91, 96 S.Ct. 612 (Congress was legislating for the `general welfare' . . . to free candidates from the rigors of fundraising.). See also Republican Nat'l Committee v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F.Supp. 280, 284-86 (S.D.N.Y.) (three-judge District Court) (upholding constitutionality of expenditure limits as condition of accepting presidential public financing in part on ground that it would give candidates the opportunity to lessen the `great drain on (their) time and energies' required by fundraising `at the expense of providing competitive debate of the issues for the electorate') (quoting Senate Rep. No. 93-689), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 955, 100 S.Ct. 1639, 64 L.Ed.2d 231 (1980). 94 Moreover, other circuits have more recently recognized the compelling nature of the time-protection interest in similar contexts. See Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1553 (8th Cir.1996), cert denied, 520 U.S. 1229, 117 S.Ct. 1820, 137 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1997) (upholding Minnesota's voluntary public financing scheme because the government has a compelling interest in reducing the time candidates spend raising campaign contributions, thereby increasing the time available for discussion of the issues and campaigning); Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 39 (1st Cir.1993) (holding that statute survives exacting scrutiny because Rhode Island has a valid interest in having candidates accept public financing because such programs `facilitate communication by candidates with the electorate' [and] free candidates from the pressures of fundraising.) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91, 96 S.Ct. 612). Indeed, the Rosenstiel court determined that it is well settled that this interest is compelling. 101 F.3d at 1553 (collecting cases). 95 The Buckley Court, in determining that the expenditure limits in that case were unconstitutional, alluded to this time-protection interest only in passing. 424 U.S. at 91, 96, 96 S.Ct. 612 (mentioning generally Congress' desire to relieve political candidates from the rigors of soliciting and fundraising); see also Blasi, supra, at 1285-86 & n. 15 ([D]uring the public and legislative debates that led to the passage in 1974 of mandatory spending limits for congressional races, and during the Buckley litigation which resulted in the invalidation of those limits, candidate time protection was almost wholly ignored as a justification for campaign spending limits.). Only Justice White, concurring in part and dissenting in part, observed that imposing expenditure ceilings would ease the candidate's understandable obsession with fundraising, and so free him and his staff to communicate in more places and ways unconnected with the fundraising function. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 264-65, 96 S.Ct. 612 (There is nothing objectionable — indeed it seems to me to be a weighty interest in favor of the provision — in the attempt to insulate the political expression of federal candidates from the influence inevitably exerted by the endless job of raising increasingly large sums of money.). One commentator explains that candidate time protection was not at the center of either the reform agenda or the constitutional analysis because Buckley was decided [b]efore the advent of pervasive war chests and candidate-PAC merchandizing bazaars. 15 Blasi, supra, at 1287. 96 Plaintiffs argue that this interest is no different than the goal of reducing the skyrocketing costs of political campaigns, rejected by Buckley as an insufficiently compelling interest to support expenditure limits. 424 U.S. at 57, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Sixth Circuit agreed in Kruse, reasoning that [t]he need to spend a large amount of time fundraising is a direct outgrowth of high costs of campaigns. However, because the government cannot constitutionally limit the cost of campaigns, the need to spend time raising money, which admittedly detracts an officeholder from doing her job, cannot serve as a basis for limiting campaign spending. 142 F.3d at 916-17. We are unpersuaded by this reasoning. 97 Indeed, we think the language of Buckley, as well as an examination of the Buckley briefs, oral argument, and subsequent commentary from judges and scholars, precludes such an interpretation. In its discussion of the federal campaign expenditure ceilings at issue in Buckley, the Buckley Court explained that the limits appear to be designed primarily to serve the governmental interests in reducing the allegedly skyrocketing costs of political campaigns, and cited the statistics put forward by appellees and appellants on how the percentage increase in campaign spending in recent years compared to the rise in the consumer price index, gross national product, and total expenditures for commercial advertising over the same time period. 424 U.S. at 57, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court concluded that, regardless of the import of such statistics, the mere growth in the cost of federal election campaigns in and of itself provides no basis for governmental restrictions on the quantity of campaign spending and the resulting limitation on the scope of federal campaigns. Id. (emphasis added). Particularly in light of the recent statements of three Justices indicating that this time protection rationale may be a compelling interest, see supra at 108 (quoting Shrink, 528 U.S. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 897 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)); and Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 649-50, 116 S.Ct. 2309 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting), we see no reason to read Buckley more broadly than its language indicates. 98 At trial, Vermont presented powerful evidence concerning the time pressures which the prospect of unlimited expenditures places on candidates for office. In particular, there is strong evidence that unlimited expenditures have compelled candidates to engage in lengthy fundraising in order to preempt the possibility that their political opponents may develop substantially larger campaign war chests. The Vermont General Assembly found that such fundraising by candidates requires an inordinate[] amount of time. 1997 Vt. Laws P.A. 64 (H. 28) (finding No. 1). The large, and growing, campaign war chests in Vermont have created strong pressures on elected officials to ensure that they can raise funds comparable to any opponent. One witness, former State Senator and Lieutenant Governor Peter Smith, described the stampede or nuclear arms race mentality that we currently have, which is just keep building the bank because you never know what's going to happen. Under the current system, Vermont candidates feel like you had two races you were running. The first was for the money. . . . (testimony of Donald Hooper). 99 Although there may be no inherent problem with candidates competing to raise large quantities of funds, the evidence in Vermont is clear that the pressure to raise large sums of money greatly affects the way candidates and elected officials spend their time. Special interests, well placed to take advantage of candidates' fear of losing this fundraising war, dominate candidates' time and thereby have been able to exercise substantial control over the information that passes to candidates. They do this by increasingly consuming the opportunities candidates have for meeting with constituent groups and forcing candidates to choose contributors over private citizens who make small or no contributions. This command of available time, inherent in endless fundraising, drastically reduces opportunities that candidates have to meet with non-contributing citizens. 16 100 Legislators explained at trial that officials are more likely to return donors' phone calls. If I have only got an hour at night when I get home to return calls, I am much more likely to return [a donor's] call then I would [a non-donor's] .... [W]hen you only have a few minutes to talk, there are certain people that get access. (testimony of Elizabeth Ready). A former candidate for Congress and current lobbyist in Vermont, Anthony Pollina, described the process: 101 [C]andidates and policymakers ... can only talk to so many people in a day. They can only respond to so many phone calls. The governor can only have so many meetings in a day. And if in fact large contributors are using their contributions to buy access to the governor or other policymakers ... then that means that the policymaker, the governor and others are not spending their time talking to other people who have not provided other large contributions.... 102 Nor is this just a theoretical concern. One widely reported case involved the differing access that state officials granted to interested groups as the state government considered whether to label milk produced using genetically engineered hormones. Major dairy companies, who in the past had been contributors, were able to arrange meetings with critical state leaders, whereas local farmer organizations that lacked importance as contributors could not arrange similar meetings. 103 By giving money, contributors haven't bought the person, but they have certainly bought a piece of that time there where they have that person's attention. (testimony of Elizabeth Ready). Even if candidates receive valuable information during every hour spent fundraising, their time is being controlled by those with campaign cash, and this effect is corrosive. The Vermont legislature considered one article in the Burlington Free Press stating that [m]oney not only threatens to corrupt the process, it sabotages the political dialogue as well. Candidates spend too much time begging for dollars and too little time talking issues.... See Democratic Process Relies on Reform, Burlington Free Press, Oct. 6, 1997 at 6A. 104 Public officials testified at trial that the financial necessity imposed by fundraising, and bred by the arms race mentality in campaigns with unlimited spending, requires that elected officials spend time with donors rather than on their official duties. One state Senator testified that legislators have to spend time at party fundraising events to give donors access to elected officials. (testimony of Cheryl Rivers). Another Senator explained how spending limits would affect her time: 105 If I can go out and raise what I have to raise and know that those limits are in place, I can spend the whole rest of my campaign, once I have raised that money, out with the public, okay. I can go door-to-door. I can go around to local events. I can go to the county fairs. I can have a little booth, you know, and be talking to people. I am not going to be locked away, you know, in the Democratic Party somewhere or in my own office somewhere making fundraising calls. (testimony of Elizabeth Ready). 106 Simply put, every hour spent drumming up financial contributions is an hour that cannot be spent independently studying legislative proposals or meeting with constituents who may not be likely donors. And the public understands this reality: at trial, Vermont presented survey data that 85% of Vermonters are concerned that political fundraising took away time from important government business. (testimony of Celinda C. Lake). 107 Indeed, although we do not balance interests, the fact that this time-protection interest is itself fundamental to our representative democracy, and related to First Amendment values, cannot be ignored. As one First Amendment scholar put it, the quality of democratic representation suffers when legislators continually concerned about re-election are not able to spend the greater part of their workday on matters of constituent service, information gathering, political and policy analysis, debating and compromising with fellow representatives, and the public dissemination of views. Blasi, supra, at 1282-83. 108 Unfortunately, without spending limits, the contribution limits would exacerbate the time problem. A lobbyist who supports Act 64 noted that contribution limits coupled with unlimited expenditures would require that candidates continue to spend more time and energy raising those smaller contributions to see who could raise the most money and outspend their opponent and therefore win the race. So the spending limits, tied to the contribution limits, create a situation where the candidates simply don't have to spend as much time and energy raising money.... [The limits] change the way campaigns are run, in a sense, and make them more people oriented or voter oriented as opposed to fundraising oriented.... (testimony of Anthony Pollina). Cf. McConnell, 540 U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 656 (The `overall effect' of dollar limits on contributions is `merely to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons.') (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21-22, 96 S.Ct. 612). That same lobbyist also explained that with contribution limits alone, the unfortunate thing is that candidates would feel compelled to look for those other sources because they would still be trying to outspend... their opponents, and that would cause them to then spend more time and more energy into looking for those other sources of funding. It might then encourage the bundling practices that were referred to earlier, and ... it would not address the problem that we are hoping to address. (testimony of Anthony Pollina). 17 109 In sum, our independent review of the evidence adduced at trial supports the District Court findings that the Vermont public perceives, legitimately, that candidates frequently spend an excessive amount of time fundraising and not enough time interacting with voters, and that the need to solicit money from large donors at times turns legislators away from their official duties. 118 F.Supp.2d at 468, 470. So long as the danger remains that a political opponent might severely outstrip a candidate's financial resources, candidates have continued to feel it necessary to raise ever larger sums of money. For elected officials, this will mean giving more time to contributors over non-contributors, and expending more effort on relatively generous contributors over less important ones.
110 Faced with this evidence and the resulting findings of the District Court, we conclude that Vermont has established at least two interests in maintaining campaign expenditure limits: preventing the reality and appearance of corruption, and protecting the time of candidates and elected officials. In this case, Vermont's well-documented interest in time-protection is particularly compelling when considered in tandem with the State's firmly-rooted interest in preventing corruption (or the appearance thereof). Cf. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 921, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995) (leaving open question whether compliance with the [Voting Rights] Act, standing alone, can provide a compelling interest independent of any interest in remedying past discrimination). 18 Regardless of whether one finds Vermont's justifications novel, the quantum of evidence demonstrating the depth of the problem in Vermont campaigns is great. The drive for campaign funds has created a situation where candidate time is effectively for sale. As a democracy, Vermont has a compelling interest in ensuring that its representatives' time is not available only — or mostly — to the people who are willing and able to pay for it. Fundamentally, Vermont has shown that, without expenditure limits, its elected officials have been forced to provide privileged access to contributors in exchange for campaign money. Vermont's interest in ending this state of affairs is compelling: the basic democratic requirements of accessibility, and thus accountability, are imperiled when the time of public officials is dominated by those who pay for such access with campaign contributions. 111 Because we conclude that Vermont has established two interests that, taken together, are sufficiently compelling to support its expenditure limits, we need not consider the other interests asserted by the State. Specifically, we need not consider whether the interest in encouraging electoral competition and protecting the ability of non-wealthy Vermonters to run for state office in Vermont is sufficiently compelling. And we do not need to reach the question of whether Vermont has sufficiently compelling, independent interests in (1) bolstering voter interest and engagement in elective politics; and (2) encouraging public debates and other forms of meaningful constituent contact in place of the growing reliance on 30-second commercials. We do note that the first of these interests is properly considered part of the anti-corruption interest, and the second relates to the time-protection rationale.
112 Our analysis next requires a determination as to whether the particular limits are narrowly tailored to serve the compelling interests offered. Because mandatory expenditure limits are so rare, and the Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals that have considered the constitutionality of expenditure limits have found no compelling interests sufficient to support them, no court has reached the narrow tailoring question in this context. Thus, we are in largely uncharted waters. 113 Plaintiffs argue that even if there is a compelling interest to support Act 64's spending limits, the spending limits are not narrowly tailored. They argue that the spending limits are too serious an impingement on First Amendment rights, without significantly advancing the interests asserted by the State. Because the District Court held that mandatory spending limits are per se unconstitutional under Buckley, it never fully reached the narrow tailoring inquiry, although it did address the subsidiary question of whether candidates could run effective campaigns under the rubric of narrow tailoring. 118 F.Supp.2d at 470-72. 114 The parties present the narrow tailoring issue as whether the expenditure limits are sufficiently high to allow candidates to run effective campaigns. Indeed, in our initial consideration of this case, we assumed that the parties were correct in focusing the narrow tailoring question on the ability of a candidate to run an effective campaign. We now believe, however, that the narrow tailoring inquiry is broader, and that answering the question requires remand to the District Court. We write further to explain the nature of the narrow tailoring inquiry required. 115 The narrow tailoring inquiry examines the fit between means and ends. Here, the question is whether mandatory spending limits will significantly advance the State's time-protection and anti-corruption interests, without severely burdening the First Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. Where at all possible, government must curtail speech only to the degree necessary to meet the particular problem at hand, and must avoid infringing on speech that does not pose the danger that has prompted regulation. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 265, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986). 116 In order to satisfy the narrow tailoring standard, the government must also prove that the mechanism chosen is the least restrictive means of advancing that interest. See, e.g., Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 816, 120 S.Ct. 1878 (When a plausible, less restrictive alternative is offered to a content-based speech restriction, it is the Government's obligation to prove that the alternative will be ineffective to achieve its goals.); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 450 (2d Cir.2001) (Content-based restrictions are permissible only if they serve compelling state interests and do so by the least restrictive means available.). 19 When the First Amendment demands strict scrutiny, [i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative. Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. at 813, 120 S.Ct. 1878; Sable Communications of Cal., Inc., v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989) (The Government may ... regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988) (concluding that government regulation at issue was not narrowly tailored because a less restrictive alternative is readily available); California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 585-86, 120 S.Ct. 2402, 147 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000) (observing, in dicta, that California's blanket partisan primary system was not a narrowly tailored means of furthering asserted state interests because a nonpartisan blanket primary would advance the same interests without severely burdening a political party's First Amendment right of association). 117 Accordingly, answering the narrow tailoring question requires addressing three different issues: (1) the extent to which the State's interests are advanced by the regulation; (2) the extent to which candidates can conduct effective advocacy under the limits; and (3) whether the government has proven the absence of less restrictive alternatives that are as effective in advancing its compelling interests, while impinging less on First Amendment rights. 118
119 Plaintiffs argue that the spending limits do not actually advance the interests asserted by the State because the limits are set at the equivalent of current levels of spending, and when considered in combination with the contribution limits, actually force candidates and elected officials to spend more time and attention on fundraising, not less. For the reasons that follow, we disagree and conclude that the spending limits are likely to advance both the time-protection and anti-corruption interests asserted by the State. 120 First, we do note the apparent tension between seeking to reform the political process by imposing expenditure limits, yet setting limits based on current candidate expenditure patterns in an effort to approximate the spending needs of such candidates. We believe, however, that this tension is more apparent than real. Indeed, plaintiffs' argument misunderstands the driving force behind the spending limits. The evidence at trial, including the evidence from legislative hearings, indicated the widespread presence of an arms race mentality. The record in Vermont demonstrates that often it is this potential of being vastly outspent that creates powerful and deleterious pressures to raise funds. The significance of the spending cap lies not in reducing the amount of money spent on campaigns, but rather in eliminating this potential of being vastly outspent that leads to the arms race mentality among candidates and elected officials. 121 Limiting the arms race promises to have a direct impact on the time of candidates and elected officials. Indeed, the witnesses' testimony at trial supported the idea that reducing the arms race mentality, spending limits would allow candidates and elected officials to focus more time on issues. One elected official shared her sense of how spending limits will liberate public officials: [The spending limit] lessens the pressure.... I am not going to be locked away ... in the Democratic Party somewhere or in my own office somewhere making fundraising calls. (testimony of Elizabeth Ready). Another State Senator, and a sponsor of Act 64, testified that I would hope that it's going to give folks running for office more of an opportunity to go out and engage the voters on the issues. (testimony of Cheryl Rivers). And William T. Doyle, another senator, testified that without the need to raise such large sums of money there will be increased time for real debate ... candidates will be able to concentrate more on issues rather than raising public money. 122 The arms race mentality—and its effect on the behavior of candidates and elected officials—is also quite relevant to the anti-corruption interest, and helps explain why the spending caps also address this threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 389, 120 S.Ct. 897. The evidence presented at trial indicated that the agenda of candidates and elected officials is affected by the perceived need to raise increasing amounts of funds. Because the sources of campaign money are necessarily limited, candidates are reluctant to alienate potential fundraising constituencies. This affects what issues are put on the agenda, what issues are taken off, and how certain issues are addressed. With spending caps, this calculus changes to a certain extent. For example, with a limit on how much money can be spent, elected officials testified that they would be more willing to take a position which a particular industry opposed. (testimony of State Sen. Cheryl Rivers; testimony of former Congressman and Lt. Governor Peter Smith). 123 Plaintiffs also argue that Act 64's expenditure limits do not advance the interest in reducing the time dedicated to fundraising because Act 64, as a whole, actually forces candidates to devote more time to fundraising, not less. Defendants essentially do not dispute that lower contribution limits increase the amount of time that candidates must spend on fundraising. Instead they argue that this makes the interest in time-protection more compelling, not less, with respect to expenditure limits. In essence, plaintiffs argue that rather than address both the anti-corruption interest with contribution limits, and the anti-corruption and time-protection interests with expenditure limits, the State of Vermont must address just one interest, or else resign itself to the state of affairs post- Buckley. After Buckley, when the Court upheld the contribution limits but not spending limits, Congress' regulatory scheme fell prey to precisely this problem: candidates have been forced to spend increasing amounts of time fundraising under a regime with contribution limits but no spending limits. We reject the notion that Vermont cannot try to address both interests—anti-corruption and time-protection —at once. 124 Finally, plaintiffs argue, as the Buckley plaintiffs did for contribution limits, that the limitations work such an invidious discrimination between incumbents and challengers that the statutory provisions must be declared unconstitutional on their face. 424 U.S. at 30-31, 96 S.Ct. 612. We agree with plaintiffs—and with our dissenting colleague, see post —that election laws, written by legislators who are, at least in part, necessarily self-interested, must be scrutinized for indications that the limits unduly benefit incumbents or otherwise create dangerous distortions of the electoral system. See Shrink, 528 U.S. at 402, 120 S.Ct. 897 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting the need for courts to scrutinize legislative judgments that risk such constitutional evils as, say, permitting incumbents to insulate themselves from effective electoral challenge.). It should be recognized, however, that a legislature's inaction may maintain such barriers more easily than reforms create them, and review of legislation should not amount to a presumption against the fairness of spending limits simply because elected officials have an interest in the reforms they are enacting. See Frank I. Michelman, The Constitutional Question, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 17, 22 (2000). 125 Indeed, there is considerable evidence in Act 64 itself that incumbent protection was not the legislature's motive. Act 64 permits challengers to outspend incumbents, partially neutralizing the advantages that incumbents often enjoy from free media exposure. Specifically, incumbent candidates for statewide office may only spend 85 percent of the amount permitted challengers. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2805a(c). Incumbents in the General Assembly may spend 90 percent. See id. These are rare types of provisions in state campaign finance laws; if the legislature wanted to achieve incumbent protection, it seems unlikely that they would have inserted such provisions. Moreover, defendants presented evidence at trial that the disparity between challenger and incumbent spending is what most frequently disadvantages challengers, and reduces electoral competition—a disparity that spending limits would inevitably reduce. (testimony of Donald Gross). In short, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that challengers will be disproportionately harmed by the spending limits. Like the Buckley court, we see no evidence in the record sufficient to overcome the presumption that a court should generally be hesitant to invalidate legislation which on its face imposes evenhanded restrictions. 424 U.S. at 31, 96 S.Ct. 612. 126 In sum, because Vermont has demonstrated that the time-protection and anti-corruption interests are advanced, and plaintiffs have not succeeded in demonstrating impermissible legislative motives, we conclude that the State has met its burden on this aspect of narrow tailoring— that the spending limits actually advance these asserted interests. 127
128 We must then turn to the question of whether the spending limits prevent effective advocacy by limiting the ability of candidates to communicate adequately with voters, and the ability of voters to receive the information they need to make a choice on election day. This effective advocacy requirement is drawn from the caselaw on whether contribution limits are sufficiently high. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 655-56 (Because the communicative value of large contributions inheres mainly in their ability to facilitate the speech of their recipients, we have said that contribution limits impose serious burdens on free speech only if they are so low as to `preven[t] candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.') (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612); Shrink, 528 U.S. at 395-96, 120 S.Ct. 897 (same). Although the concept of effective advocacy originated with regard to the freedom of association rights rooted in the First Amendment, see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459-60, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958), the Supreme Court has also used this concept in assessing candidates' claims that campaign finance regulations place too great a burden on their First Amendment speech rights. In Shrink, for example, one of the plaintiffs was a candidate for statewide office who argued that Missouri's contribution limits prevented him from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy. 528 U.S. at 396, 120 S.Ct. 897 (quoting Buckley ). We believe that the use of this effective advocacy standard is appropriate here as a threshold consideration in assessing whether the expenditure limits are narrowly tailored, as the parties have argued. 20 129 Discussing the nature of this effective advocacy analysis in the context of contribution limitations, the Court asked in part whether the limitation was so radical in effect as to drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 397, 120 S.Ct. 897; see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 677. The nature of the effective advocacy requirement, then, is that of a constitutional minimum; as long as the regulation does not drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice, based on evidence from past campaigns, then the First Amendment is not violated on this ground. 130 Although the District Court never reached the legal issue of narrow tailoring, it did make findings as to whether effective campaigns could be run under the limits. The District Court found that Vermont's expenditure limitations reflect the actual cost of running for office in Vermont, would not cause a revolutionary change in campaign spending, and would leave candidates fully capable of conducting effective campaigns. 118 F.Supp.2d at 472. These conclusions are subject to a mixed standard of review, consistent with Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but also bearing in mind the obligation in First Amendment cases for appellate courts to make an independent examination of the record as a whole. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984); Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989); Ezekwo v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 780 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1013, 112 S.Ct. 657, 116 L.Ed.2d 749 (1991). 131 Based on the data presented at trial through expert witnesses, the District Court found that the average spending in Vermont House district races during the three election cycles preceding the District Court's opinion was almost uniformly below the limits set pursuant to Act 64. 118 F.Supp.2d at 471. Similarly, multi-member Senate districts all involved average spending below that permitted pursuant to Act 64, with average spending exceeding the Act's expenditure limits only in single-member Senate districts. Id. In addition to reflecting the actual expenditures in Vermont elections, the District Court found that Act 64's expenditure limits are also appropriate given the costs of running for office in Vermont. The District Court credited the testimony of a number of fact witnesses who testified to the details of previous campaigns they had run, including a Senate challenger in Chittenden County and a former Senate candidate in Rutland County, confirm[ing] that fully effective campaigns for the Vermont Senate can be run under the limits established by Act 64. Id. at 472. The court noted that Vermont candidates for legislative office frequently use low-cost campaigning methods, such as community debates, door-to-door campaigning, town barbecues and suppers, advertising placards and the issuance of press releases. Id. Legislative candidates rarely hire campaign staff or purchase expensive mass media. Id. Indeed, the evidence at trial indicated that most Vermont House and Senate candidates do not use television advertising primarily because the lack of congruence between media markets and district boundaries render such advertising an inefficient and ineffective way to communicate with voters. (Ex. AA, Landell Admission # 49; Ex. BB, Randall Admission # 84, # 85; testimony of Neil Randall; testimony of Toby Young; Ex. U-1, Expert Report of Anthony Gierzynski, at 8.) Nonetheless, candidates are able to spend the money needed to ensure that their voice is well above the level of notice necessary for effective advocacy. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 397, 120 S.Ct. 897. 132 Although candidates for statewide office utilize more expensive media and techniques, they are permitted to spend larger amounts and can thus also engage in effective advocacy. In part, this reflects the particular qualities of Vermont, especially the relatively inexpensive cost of television advertising in the State. 118 F.Supp.2d at 472. In reaching this conclusion, the District Court rejected testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses that much larger amounts of money—amounts so large that no Vermont candidate has ever spent them—are required to wage an effective campaign for governor or other statewide offices. See id. (The Court rejects [the witness's] testimony that it is necessary to spend between $800,000 and $1 million to run an effective campaign for Governor of Vermont ... Nor does the Court accept that candidates must spend approximately $500,000 in order to run effective campaigns for Lieutenant Governor and the other lower statewide offices of Secretary of State, Treasurer, Auditor, and Attorney General.). 133 And though conflicting evidence was presented at trial, there was ample evidence aside from the specific statistics and campaigns cited in the District Court opinion to support the District Court's effective campaign findings. For example, plaintiffs' evidence emphasized what they described as the problems under the limits for candidates running for Senate in Chittenden County, a county that includes the city of Burlington, as well as very rural areas. But defendants presented evidence that the average spending in this district was consistently far less than the $16,500 allowed under Act 64. More specifically, defendants presented evidence that in 1994, all six of the victorious candidates in Chittenden County spent at or near the Act 64 spending limits, including two successful challengers. In 1996, all six winners spent at or below the limits, including three successful challengers. And in 1998, three of the six candidates spent below the limits. As to statewide races, one candidate for State Auditor in 2000, Elizabeth Ready, indicated that under the $45,000 limit for her race, she had been able to purchase newspaper and radio ads, and considered using television advertising later in the race. 134 Plaintiffs may not simply rely on the highest-spending races in order to declare the entire statute unconstitutional on its face. In Shrink, the Supreme Court went as far as to assume the truth of plaintiff's claim that the contribution limits affected his ability to wage a competitive campaign, and concluded that nonetheless, a showing of one affected individual does not point up a system of suppressed political advocacy that would be unconstitutional under Buckley.  528 U.S. at 396, 120 S.Ct. 897. Indeed, certain plaintiffs have a particularly difficult time arguing that the spending limits will burden their First Amendment rights. Plaintiff Donald Brunelle's maximum expenditure in any of his past House campaigns was $1,007, and plaintiff George Kuusela has never spent more than $1,550. The new limits allow each of them, as challengers, to spend $3,000 in their House campaigns, significantly more than they have spent in the past. 135 In Shrink, the Supreme Court relied on and quoted the District Court's conclusions, made on cross-motions for summary judgment, that candidates for state elected office [have been] quite able to raise funds sufficient to run effective campaigns, and that candidates for political office in the State are still able to amass impressive campaign war chests. 528 U.S. at 396, 120 S.Ct. 897 (citations omitted). Like the Shrink Court, we affirm the District Court's conclusion, here made after a 10-day bench trial, that candidates can meet the threshold level of effective advocacy when running for office in the State of Vermont. 118 F.Supp.2d at 471-72. After independent review, we agree with the District Court that these expenditure limits are not so radical in effect as to drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice, Shrink, 528 U.S. at 397, 120 S.Ct. 897, and therefore the limits do not prevent candidates from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612. However, as we address in the next section, the inquiry into how much the spending limits impinge First Amendment rights is broader than it was in the Shrink contribution limits context, and therefore must go beyond merely effective advocacy. 136
137 The greater level of scrutiny accorded spending limits, as compared to contribution limits, requires that Vermont must also prove that Act 64's mandatory expenditure limit system is the least restrictive alternative for achieving the State's compelling time-protection and anti-corruption interests. This inquiry is essentially twofold. First, the State must prove that the type of regulation chosen was the least restrictive—that is, that no other type of regulation could have advanced the interests asserted while impinging less on First Amendment rights. Second, the least restrictive alternative inquiry requires scrutiny of the basis for the particular spending limits chosen—an inquiry not undertaken with respect to contribution limits. In evaluating the constitutionality of contribution limits, the Supreme Court has indicated that [i]f it is satisfied that some limit ... is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000, noting that [s]uch distinctions in degree become significant only when they can be said to amount to differences in kind. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612. In the context of expenditure limits, and in light of the legislative history of Act 64, there may well be differences in kind as to the choice of specific spending limits that demand scrutiny.
138 Vermont argues that it had already explored less restrictive alternatives and found them to be ineffective. Specifically, in 1993, the State instituted a system of voluntary expenditure limits. Former Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, §§ 2841-42 (1991) (repealed 1997). Under this system, candidates had the option of signing an affidavit indicating that they would comply with the spending limits and, in exchange, received any favorable or unfavorable publicity from that decision. At trial, Vermont presented evidence that the voluntary spending limits in place from 1993 to 1997 were not working. Participation in the voluntary system fell dramatically each year, with 90 percent of candidates participating in the first year but less than 20 percent in the second year. Witnesses testified that Vermont's voluntary limits did not work because candidates attempted to gain an advantage in the fundraising arms race by ignoring the limits. Most tellingly, by 1998, not a single candidate for statewide office chose to abide by the voluntary expenditure limits. 139 Vermont's voluntary limits were quite different, however, than many of the voluntary spending limits in other states. 21 In Vermont, the only carrot exchanged for the voluntary agreement to the limits was the ability to publicize one's compliance. Most other states (and New York City) offer additional incentives such as public matching funds, a higher contribution limit, or other inducements. See, e.g., WRITING REFORM: A GUIDE TO DRAFTING STATE AND LOCAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS, V-8-19 (Deborah Goldberg ed., Brennan Center 2001) (describing variety of mechanisms used by states to encourage compliance with voluntary limits). And many of these types of provisions have been upheld by the federal courts of appeals in the face of a First Amendment challenge. See e.g. Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1552-53 (8th Cir.1996) (upholding Minnesota's voluntary public financing scheme), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1229, 117 S.Ct. 1820, 137 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1997); see also Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 39 (1st Cir.1993) (holding that Rhode Island's voluntary public financing statute survives exacting scrutiny). 140 Indeed, this type of spending limit— voluntary, but with public funding as an inducement to comply—was in Act 64 as originally introduced in the House, but the provision appears to have been changed to mandatory in one of the House committees. (Ex. A, at E-0001, 0031.) It is unclear from the current record why this change occurred, and the District Court made no findings on this point. Similarly, it is possible that the Vermont legislature could have employed a public financing option for all offices, in addition to the option that was provided for Governor and Lieutenant Governor candidates. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: EARLY EXPERIENCES OF TWO STATES THAT OFFER FULL PUBLIC FUNDING FOR POLITICAL CANDIDATES (May 9, 2003) (GAO-03-453) (assessing initial results of public funding of legislative candidates in Maine and Arizona). Notably, early versions of the bill appear to have contained such funding for a broader range of offices. (testimony of Karen Kitzmiller; Ex. 70, at E-2828.) On the other hand, after the voluntary affidavit system broke down, the legislature may have concluded that only mandatory expenditure limitations, together with contribution limitations, would adequately advance the State's interests. Indeed, there may have been still other reasons—not yet made part of the record—for the legislature's decision not to adopt, for all offices, voluntary expenditure limits with public funding incentives. 141 If Vermont could have utilized some of the same voluntary mechanisms employed by other states, offering either financial or other incentives for compliance with expenditure limits, then Vermont may not be able to prove that it employed the least restrictive alternative. Cf. Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 758, 116 S.Ct. 2374, 135 L.Ed.2d 888 (1996) ([W]e can take Congress' different, and significantly less restrictive, treatment of a highly similar problem at least as some indication that more restrictive means are not `essential' (or will not prove very helpful).) (emphasis in original). On remand, the District Court should make findings as to whether there were less restrictive alternatives available that could have been as effective in advancing the asserted interests. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n. 6, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986) (alternatives should serve the interest `about as well'). Should there be proven another type of regulation that would have similarly advanced the interests asserted, while impinging less on First Amendment rights, the District Court will have a basis to find that the provision is not narrowly tailored.
142 If the District Court finds, however, that mandatory spending limits were the only type of regulation that could sufficiently advance Vermont's time-protection and anti-corruption interests, then the court must also inquire into the basis for the particular amount of the spending limits chosen. There was evidence presented at trial that Act 64's spending limits were intended to map onto existing spending levels from past campaigns. In defendants' proposed findings of fact after trial, defendants indicated that the legislature considered factors such as population, historical information on past spending levels and campaigns, Vermont's previous voluntary spending limits, and the testimony of numerous witnesses concerning the appropriate level for the limits, with the legislature balancing different viewpoints as is necessary with most pieces of legislation. This is consistent with the District Court's findings that the average spending on past races was consistently under the limits imposed by Act 64. 118 F.Supp.2d at 471-472. See also Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Beginning of the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1769 (2001) (suggesting that median spending levels of candidates in recent races could be an appropriate basis for spending limits). 143 Nonetheless, the specific basis for the final limits is not entirely clear from the existing record. Defendants noted that for the Governor's race, the Senate bill would have set a $250,000 limit, while the House bill originally set a $400,000 limit. In the final bill as adopted, the limit was set at $300,000. Similarly, the limits for one-seat Senate races varied in the various committee bills, either $4,000, $5,000 or $6,000, with an additional $2-3,000 for each additional seat in the district. The final limits were those that emerged out of the Senate Finance Committee (the lowest in any of the committee bills)—$4,000 plus an additional $2,500 for each additional seat. Such decisions, of course, could be the product of typical legislative compromise— a process into which we will not intrude. However, plaintiffs also presented evidence that the ultimate decision as to the amount of certain statewide spending limits was motivated by a desire to preserve the public fisc, because of Act 64's public financing option for gubernatorial and Lieutenant Governor candidates. 22 Particularly in the context of expenditure limits, these choices demand greater scrutiny. 144 Thus, in undertaking its least restrictive means analysis on remand, the District Court should make additional findings on the impact of the legislative choices as to the appropriate spending limits on candidates' and voters' First Amendment rights. Even if Act 64's spending limits are sufficiently high to permit effective advocacy as defined in Shrink, as the District Court found and as we have affirmed, the precise level of the limits chosen can have a significant impact on how restrictive the provision is on First Amendment rights. Of course, a $2 million limit for State Senate races is quite unlikely to restrict First Amendment rights, but equally unlikely to impact the arms race mentality and thereby advance the interests asserted. Moreover, there will always be distinctions in degree that could be seen as less restrictive —$305,000 is less restrictive than $300,000; $310,000 less restrictive than $305,000, etc. And such an inquiry has no logical endpoint. 145 However, the specific choices made by the Vermont legislature among the different spending limits contained in various bills may be differences in kind with respect to the impact on the First Amendment rights of candidates and voters. Inquiries into the First Amendment impact of challenged regulations have been undertaken in analogous contexts by other courts, see, e.g., National Black Police Ass'n v. D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics, 924 F.Supp. 270, 277 (D.D.C.1996) (considering a variety of factors in assessing whether the reduction in campaign funds was so substantial that it affected the candidates' ability to reach voters), vacated as moot sub nom. National Black Police Ass'n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346 (D.C.Cir.1997), and, although necessarily speculative here, should be undertaken on remand. If the choice of the lower spending limit—for example, $4,000 for a Senate race as opposed to $6,000—is significantly more restrictive, while no more effective in advancing the interest asserted, then the lower spending limit is not consistent with the First Amendment. Assessing the legislative alternatives, then, requires evaluating both (1) the extent to which the higher spending limit is less restrictive of the First Amendment rights of candidates and voters 23 ; and (2) the extent to which the higher spending limit would be as effective in advancing the anti-corruption and time-protection interests. The answers to these questions will determine whether the spending limits chosen not only allow for effective campaigns but also are the least restrictive alternative, and therefore narrowly tailored.
146 Quite simply, the District Court found that effective campaigns can be waged under Act 64's stated limits, and we agree. But the District Court did not examine, because it found spending limits per se unconstitutional, whether the legislature might have chosen either another type of regulation besides mandatory spending limits, or higher limits, that would still achieve the goals we sanction and yet impinge less on the First Amendment rights of candidates and voters. 24 Cf. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 668, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (remanding, after grant of summary judgment, to permit the parties to develop a more thorough factual record, and to allow the District Court to resolve any factual disputes remaining, before passing upon the constitutional validity of the challenged provisions in part because the record fails to provide any judicial findings concerning the availability and efficacy of `constitutionally acceptable less restrictive means' of achieving the Government's asserted interests) (quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc., v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989)). As to the amount of the limits, there obviously comes a point where limits would be set so high as to have no impact on the interests sought to be protected. We need, however, to hear from the District Court on this fact-intensive question of whether that point is as set in Act 64 or appreciably higher. 147 On remand, the District Court ought consider, along with any other issues relating to narrow tailoring that it and the parties deem relevant: (1) what alternatives were considered by the legislature, including both alternative types of regulations and alternative amounts for the limits; (2) why these alternatives were rejected; (3) whether and how these alternatives would impinge less on First Amendment rights; and (4) whether the alternatives would be as effective as the mandatory spending limits in advancing the time-protection and anti-corruption interests. 25 Based on its fact-finding on these issues, the District Court will be able to draw a legal conclusion as to whether Vermont's legislature chose the least restrictive alternative for advancing its interests, and therefore whether the expenditure limits are narrowly tailored. 26 148 With respect to treating related expenditures as candidate expenditures, see § 2809(b), the District Court did not analyze this question after deciding that candidate expenditure limits were unconstitutional per se. On remand, independent of the constitutionality of expenditure limits, the District Court should evaluate this issue. 149 Because a content-based regulation of speech such as this is presumptively invalid, and the District Court held it unconstitutional, we leave in place the injunction against enforcement of these provisions pending further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 27