Opinion ID: 4524801
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inference Stacking

Text: ¶20 In Tate, 247 P.2d at 671–72, we addressed a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a second degree murder conviction. The defendant was the former wife of the victim. Id. at 667. Although the couple had divorced, they continued living together in the family home, and it was undisputed that there was no difficulty between them and that the defendant had provided constant care to the victim, who had suffered from medical problems. Id. ¶21 One day, the defendant returned home and found the victim tied to a chair, having been shot in the head with an automatic pistol nested in a nearby “contraption.” Id. at 668. Notably, the record indicated that the victim had experienced suicidal thoughts in the past and, in fact, had attempted suicide before. Id. at 667. Allegedly panic stricken, the defendant took the body out, dug a shallow grave and buried it, poured fuel oil all over the body and the dirt, covered the grave with a sheet of corrugated iron, and then piled pieces of lumber, posts, and other such material on the grave and placed a chicken coop on top of it. Id. at 668. The defendant then thoroughly cleaned the room in which she had found the victim’s body. Id. ¶22 The defendant was subsequently charged with and tried for the victim’s murder. Id. at 666. At trial, the defendant denied killing the victim and argued that he had committed suicide. Id. at 670. This position was supported by the 10 testimony of the autopsy physician, who testified that the wounds causing death could have been self-inflicted and therefore the case could have been one of suicide. Id. The jury nonetheless convicted the defendant, and she appealed, arguing, among other things, that no evidence supported her conviction. Id. at 666–67. ¶23 At the time Tate was decided, the applicable law allowed proof by circumstantial evidence, but if all of the evidence was circumstantial, then the evidence had to “exclude every reasonable hypothesis except guilt.” Id. at 670. After reviewing the record in light of these standards, we perceived no evidence to support a jury finding of willfulness, deliberation, or premeditation, deeming the record “wholly barren of the slightest indication of these essential elements of the crime charged.” Id. at 671. We further opined that any finding in this case of deliberation, premeditation, willfulness, or any of the other elements of either first or second degree murder could only have been based on an initial suspicion-based presumption followed by a further presumption. Id. at 672. We concluded that such evidence was insufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction because “[p]resumption and inferences may be drawn only from facts established, and presumption may not rest on presumption or inference on inference.” Id. ¶24 Two years later, in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139–40 (1954), the Supreme Court considered the proper standards to be applied in determining 11 sufficiency of the evidence claims. As pertinent here, the Court concluded that (1) circumstantial evidence is “intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence” and (2) when only circumstantial evidence is presented, to sustain a conviction, the evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt. Id. Instead, in the case of both testimonial and circumstantial evidence, the jury must use its experience with people and events to weigh the possibilities. Id. at 140. The Court then opined, “If the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can require no more.” Id. ¶25 Based on Holland and its progeny in the federal courts, we ultimately adopted the substantial evidence test as the proper means for addressing sufficiency of the evidence claims on appellate review. Bennett, 515 P.2d at 469. As noted above, this test requires us to determine “whether the relevant evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In adopting this test, we noted that it “affords the same status to both direct and circumstantial evidence.” Id. We thus “cast aside as outmoded and as confusing” the requirement that when the prosecution’s evidence is wholly circumstantial, the prosecution must exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt. Id. 12 ¶26 In light of this evolution of our test for sufficiency of the evidence claims, the question becomes what role, if any, inference stacking plays in deciding such a claim. For several reasons, we conclude that it is one factor that a court may consider in determining whether the evidence satisfied the prevailing substantial evidence test for evidence sufficiency. ¶27 First, concluding that stacked inferences are absolutely prohibited, as the division below seemed to suggest, is inconsistent with our substantial evidence test and with the above-described development of our law. As noted above, the inference-upon-inference prohibition was premised on now-outdated law requiring the prosecution to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt in cases premised solely on circumstantial evidence. See Tate, 247 P.2d at 670. Our substantial evidence test, however, does not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence. Bennett, 515 P.2d at 469. Rather, it allows jurors to draw reasonable inferences from both direct and circumstantial evidence. See Perez, ¶ 24, 367 P.3d at 700; Clark, 232 P.3d at 1291; Bennett, 515 P.2d at 469. ¶28 Second, following the modern trend signaled in Holland, 348 U.S. at 139–40, numerous courts have rejected an absolute prohibition on stacked inferences, concluding instead that the question is simply whether the direct and circumstantial evidence, including the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, together warrant a jury’s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 13 See, e.g., United States v. Shahane, 517 F.2d 1173, 1177–78 (8th Cir. 1975) (rejecting the view that stacked inferences are necessarily invalid or impermissible and concluding that the proper question is whether the evidence was sufficient to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Harris, 435 F.2d 74, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“The rule is not that an inference, no matter how reasonable, is to be rejected if it in turn, depends upon another reasonable inference; rather, the question is merely whether the total evidence, including reasonable inferences, when put together is sufficient to warrant a jury to conclude that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (quoting DeVore v. United States, 368 F.2d 396, 399 (9th Cir. 1966)). ¶29 This is not to say, however, that the reliance on stacked inferences is irrelevant to the analysis of a sufficiency of the evidence claim. As the Tenth Circuit observed in United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 1295 (10th Cir. 2005), “The rule that prohibits the stacking of inference upon inference merely indicates that at some point along a rational continuum, inferences may become so attenuated from underlying evidence as to cast doubt on the trier of fact’s ultimate conclusion.” Accordingly, the court opined that the inference-upon-inference principle “serves as an appropriate signpost, cautioning reviewing courts to measure the ‘gap’ between fact and conclusion before acquiescing in the jury’s leap.” Id. 14 ¶30 In accordance with such reasoning, numerous federal and state appellate courts have concluded that although inference stacking is not absolutely prohibited, the reliance on stacked inferences is pertinent to the analysis of a sufficiency of the evidence claim because a chain of inferences can become so attenuated that reliance on it to sustain a conviction would be unreasonable and would amount to speculation. See, e.g., Shahane, 517 F.2d at 1178 (noting that the chance of a jury’s error or speculation in drawing conclusions from proved facts “increases in proportion to the width of the gap between the underlying fact and ultimate conclusion where the gap is bridged by a succession of inferences, each based upon the preceding one,” but nonetheless rejecting an outright ban on inference stacking because it is “too much to say . . . that an inference is necessarily invalid or impermissible” merely because it is based on a fact established by a prior inference); Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 163 P.2d 470, 476–77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945) (noting that “[t]he only fallacy that may occur in . . . reasoning [based on stacked inferences] is where a deduced fact is based upon circumstantial evidence that is unreliable, is too remote or is too conjectural”); Southworth v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 32, 46 (Ky. 2014) (noting that the modern trend is to abandon rules limiting the use of circumstantial evidence, including the inference-upon-inference rule, and that Kentucky had replaced such an absolute rule with a principle that condemns only inferences that build on inferences in an 15 unreasonable manner); cf. United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196, 1204 n.10 (2d Cir. 1970) (“[W]e reject as untenable the often urged claim that an inference may not be grounded on an inference. The length of the chain of inferences necessary to connect the evidence with the ultimate fact to be proved necessarily lessens the probative value of the evidence, and may therefore render it more susceptible to exclusion as unduly confusing, prejudicial, or time-consuming, but it does not render the evidence irrelevant.”) (citations omitted). ¶31 We agree with the reasoning in these cases and follow that reasoning here. ¶32 Finally, if inference stacking were absolutely prohibited, “then the exercise of logic, which frequently employs inference-derived inferences, would not be allowed to the jury.” Southworth, 435 S.W.3d at 45. We perceive no basis for unnecessarily restricting a jury’s ability to assess the evidence before it in this way. C. Sufficient Evidence Supported Donald’s Conviction ¶33 Having thus determined that the substantial evidence test for sufficiency of the evidence claims does not bar the stacking of inferences, we turn to the question of whether substantial and sufficient evidence supported Donald’s conviction for violation of the bail bond condition prohibiting him from leaving the state without permission. We conclude that it did. ¶34 As noted above, we will affirm a conviction when the evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and 16 sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Clark, 232 P.3d at 1291. ¶35 To establish a violation of bail bond conditions, the prosecution must prove, as pertinent here, that the defendant “knowingly violat[ed] the conditions of the bail bond.” § 18-8-212(1) (emphasis added). ¶36 The criminal code defines “knowingly” as follows: A person acts “knowingly” . . . with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists. A person acts “knowingly”. . . with respect to a result of his conduct, when he is aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause the result. § 18-1-501(6), C.R.S. (2019). ¶37 Accordingly, and as the parties here appear to agree, to establish a violation of bail bond conditions, the prosecution must prove that the defendant had actual knowledge of the bond condition, not merely that he or she should have known of the condition. See §§ 18-1-501(6); 18-8-212(1). Knowledge, however, may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Cf. People v. Phillips, 219 P.3d 798, 800 (Colo. App. 2009) (noting that sufficient circumstantial evidence existed from which the jury could infer that the defendant formed the necessary intent to commit the crime at issue). ¶38 Here, the bondsperson testified that (1) she filled out and signed Donald’s appearance bond, and her employer posted the bond on Donald’s behalf; (2) if 17 Donald signed the paperwork, he would have done so with the deputies at the jail; and (3) “[o]nly on an accident” by the jail would someone be released without signing the paperwork. ¶39 In addition, the prosecution introduced into evidence a copy of Donald’s signed bond paperwork. This document was only one page long, and it stated, under the bolded text “Additional Conditions,” “Party may not leave the state without approval of the Court and the surety.” ¶40 And, as noted above, defense counsel ultimately conceded that Donald had signed the bond paperwork. ¶41 In light of the foregoing evidence and the requirement that we must view the evidence as a whole in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have concluded that Donald had, in fact, signed the bond paperwork. In addition, given that the paperwork consisted of a single page and that the condition at issue was the first condition listed under the bolded heading, “Additional Conditions,” we further conclude that a reasonable jury could have found that Donald saw the condition and therefore was aware of it. The facts that the evidence was disputed (and may even have been thin on the issue of Donald’s knowledge) and that reasonable alternative inferences were possible do not alter our conclusions, given that we must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. 18 ¶42 Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was substantial and sufficient to support Donald’s conviction for violation of the bail bond condition prohibiting him from leaving the state without permission. In light of our foregoing analysis, we need not address whether the officer’s testimony that Donald seemed “nervous” when he was pulled over in Mississippi provided further evidence of Donald’s knowledge of the bail bond condition at issue.