Opinion ID: 2511875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pretrial Third-Party Subpoenas Duces Tecum

Text: We next review the scope and proper application of Crim. P. 17(c) in this case. The rule provides: In every criminal case, the prosecuting attorneys and the defendant have the right to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of tangible evidence by service upon them of a subpoena to appear for examination as a witness upon the trial or other hearing. . . . (c) For Production of Documentary Evidence and of Objects. A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents, photographs, or other objects designated therein. The subpoenaing party shall forthwith provide a copy of the subpoena to opposing counsel (or directly to the defendant if unrepresented) upon issuance. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers, documents, photographs, or objects designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents, photographs, or objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys. Crim. P. 17. Crim. P. 17(c) is the means by which the prosecution and defendant may compel third parties to produce evidence for use at trial. It additionally permits pretrial inspection of that evidence under the supervision of the court in order to facilitate and expedite trials involving voluminous documents, not to grant additional discovery. United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367, 369 (D.D.C.1954) (citing Advisory Committee notes to the drafts of the federal rule which, in addition to restating preexisting law, included this new provision permitting a court to require a subpoena duces tecum to be returned prior to trial). Crim. P. 17's procedure for compliance thus requires a witness to produce the evidence at trial or other hearing in connection with examination. With respect to subpoenas duces tecum returnable before trial, as were issued in this case, Crim. P. 17(c) requires in-court production. This controlled method of disclosure protects the third party from unreasonable search and seizure. See Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1060 n.27 (Colo.2002) (describing the Crim. P. 17(c) subpoena duces tecum as a less invasive technique than a search warrant); People v. Mason, 989 P.2d 757, 761 (Colo.1999) ([A] subpoena duces tecum invokes procedural safeguards that even the issuance of a warrant cannot provide.); A v. Dist. Ct., 191 Colo. 10, 17-18, 550 P.2d 315, 321 (1976) (in a grand jury subpoena, holding that no Fourth Amendment issue was raised where there was no actual invasion of the home, the office, the person, nor any seizure of the private papers of the petitioners against their will, and where Crim. P. 17(c) placed the court between the order of the subpoena and its enforcement); see also 2 Charles Alan Wright & Peter J. Henning, Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal Rules § 275 (4th ed. 2009) (Unlike a search warrant, a subpoena duces tecum does not disturb the recipient's possession of property or the right to privacy. The person to whom the subpoena is directed must have the papers with him at the designated time and place so that they may be used in evidence, but he is not required to surrender possession of them, unless they have been subpoenaed by a grand jury.); United States v. Re, 313 F.Supp. 442, 448 (S.D.N.Y.1970) (explaining that the refusal to comply with the subpoena cannot be disregarded and the documents cannot be seized). As the rule and the cases make clear, the party issuing the subpoena cannot search and retrieve evidence in a third-party witness's possession. Rather, it is the witness who must comply with the subpoena by producing the evidence in court. When the witness appears in response to a subpoena and in good faith asserts full compliance to the extent the evidence exists, the subpoena process is at an end. Crim. P. 17(c) requires a court, on motion, to block the enforcement of an unreasonable or oppressive subpoena by modifying or quashing the subpoena. Although the rule itself does not further define what is unreasonable or oppressive, the nature of the court's inquiry necessarily turns on the facts and circumstances of the case. With respect to pretrial subpoenas, the four-part test adopted by the Supreme Court in Nixon, 418 U.S. at 699-700, 94 S.Ct. 3090, has become the standard. Before pretrial production may be required, the Nixon test requires the party issuing the subpoena to show: (1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevent; (2) that they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a general `fishing expedition.' Id. The Court further explained: Against this background, [the subpoenaing party], in order to carry his burden, must clear three hurdles: (1) relevancy; (2) admissibility; (3) specificity. Id. at 700, 94 S.Ct. 3090. Because the Nixon test addresses and prevents potential abuse of the rule as a broad discovery tool, we adopt a substantially similar standard, adding an initial element to make explicit what is otherwise inherent. Accordingly, when a criminal pretrial third-party subpoena is challenged, a defendant must demonstrate: (1) A reasonable likelihood that the subpoenaed materials exist, by setting forth a specific factual basis; (2) That the materials are evidentiary and relevant; [2] (3) That the materials are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by the exercise of due diligence; (4) That the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and (5) That the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a general fishing expedition. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 699-700, 94 S.Ct. 3090; Mason, 989 P.2d at 761 (requiring the prosecution to demonstrate probable cause to obtain the defendant's protected bank and telephone records from third parties by showing (1) a reasonable likelihood that the evidence exists and (2) a nexus between the materials and the charges against the defendant). The first two elements incorporate Crim. P. 17's limited scopesubpoenas are for the production of evidence. Crim. P. 17; see Mason, 989 P.2d at 761 (describing Crim. P. 17(c) as authorizing the prosecutor to obtain evidentiary materials). The remaining elements recognize the limited, practical purpose for which a pretrial subpoena duces tecum is intended. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 698-99, 94 S.Ct. 3090; Carter, 15 F.R.D. at 369. Each of these requirements ensures that a Crim. P. 17(c) subpoena is not an investigatory tool. The rule does not create an equivalent to the broad right of civil litigants to discovery of all information that is relevant or may lead to the discovery of relevant information. See C.R.C.P. 26(b); Nixon, 418 U.S. at 698, 94 S.Ct. 3090 (explaining that Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(c) was not intended to provide a means of discovery for criminal cases (citing Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 220, 71 S.Ct. 675, 95 L.Ed. 879 (1951))). Instead, pretrial production and inspection expedites criminal proceedings by allowing the parties in advance of trial to obtain and evaluate certain documentary evidence with a view toward determining its possible utility at trial. 2 Barbara E. Bergman & Nancy Hollander, Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 10:9 (15th ed.1998); Nixon, 418 U.S. at 698-99, 94 S.Ct. 3090; Colo. Bar Assoc. Ethics Opinion 102, supra. In addition to this basic test, subpoenas issued for materials which may be protected by a privilege or a right to confidentiality also require a balancing of interests. In such circumstances, the defendant must make a greater showing of need and, in fact, might not gain access to otherwise material information depending on the nature of the interest against disclosure. See Martinelli v. Dist. Ct., 199 Colo. 163, 174, 612 P.2d 1083, 1091 (1980) (in civil discovery, requiring compelling state interest before allowing disclosure of constitutionally confidential information); [3] Stone v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 185 P.3d 150, 159 (Colo.2008) (in civil discovery, requiring compelling need before mandating disclosure of materials established as confidential by public policy); People v. Walker, 666 P.2d 113, 122 (Colo.1983) (in criminal discovery, applying Martinelli test); People v. Dist. Ct., 719 P.2d 722, 727 & n.3 (Colo.1986) (finding psychologist-client privilege absolute absent waiver, but also noting the defendant's failure to make a particularized factual showing). But see People v. Wittrein, 221 P.3d 1076, 1087-88 (Colo.2009) (Martinez, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that, even in the absence of waiver of a privilege, a balancing is necessary of the defendant's due process rights and the need for the privilege). The heightened sensitivity of protected information requires a proportionately greater showing of need before disclosure may be justified. See Edward J. Imwinkelried & Norman M. Garland, Exculpatory Evidence § 2-5 (3d ed.2004) (in discussing the right to present evidence at trial, picturing a sliding scale: [t]he more compelling the accused's showing of need, the stronger the showing of countervailing government interests must be to defeat the accused's asserted constitutional right to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence). Thus, for example, generally inconsistent statements are less likely to be sufficiently probative than specific evidence of recantation. Cf. id., § 2-4.a(3) (discussing the distinction made in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), between evidence of bias and a general attack on credibility). We do not, however, adopt a mandate of in camera review, although such review may in some instances be necessary in the interest of due process. Compare Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (requiring in camera review to determine materiality of confidential information in the possession of a state agency for which there was a statutory exception for certain judicial purposes), with Dill v. People, 927 P.2d 1315, 1323-24 (Colo.1996) (distinguishing Ritchie and not requiring in camera review of privileged psychologist-client records because Dill involved (1) information provided to a private psychologist, not a state agency, and (2) a comparatively narrow legislative exception). Spykstra asserts that her constitutional rights would be violated if her subpoenas were quashed. Specifically, she invokes her right to cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. However, a defendant's due process and Sixth Amendment rights to present exculpatory evidence are not absolute. There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one. . . . Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)). Further, the right to confrontation is a trial right; it is not a constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial discovery. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 52, 107 S.Ct. 989 (plurality opinion). Accordingly, in guaranteeing an opportunity for effective cross-examination, the Confrontation Clause does not guarantee access to every possible source of information relevant to cross-examination. Dill, 927 P.2d at 1322 (citing Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 53-54, 107 S.Ct. 989, and Dist. Ct., 719 P.2d at 726-27); see also People v. Turner, 109 P.3d 639, 646-47 (Colo. 2005). Nevertheless, compulsory process and due process may require pretrial access to evidence which may be material to the defense. As is often the case with constitutional guarantees, competing interests must be balanced. Here, Crim. P. 17(c) strikes the balance between a defendant's right to exculpatory evidence with the competing interests of a witness to protect personal information and of the government to prevent unnecessary trial delays and unwarranted harassment of witnesses. See Lam, 827 N.E.2d at 214; In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 621 (4th Cir.1988) ([Federal] Rule 17(c) implements the Sixth Amendment guarantee that an accused have compulsory process to secure evidence in his favor.).