Opinion ID: 4195158
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Expert Testimony of Stilson

Text: Toyota also argues that the district court erred in allowing the testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert, John Stilson. “We review a district court’s decision concerning the admission of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion.” Miller v. Baker Implement Co., 439 F.3d 407, 412 (8th Cir. 2006); see Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141–43 (1997). -13- The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702. “The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is . . . a flexible one. Its overarching subject is the scientific validity—and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the principles that underlie a proposed submission.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594–95 (1993) (footnote omitted). The party calling an expert must demonstrate the reliability of the expert’s opinion by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 592 n.10. “This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Id. at 592–93. “[W]here [an expert’s] factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their application are called sufficiently into question . . . the trial judge must determine whether the testimony has ‘a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline.’” Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592). In determining whether expert testimony is admissible, “[t]he focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594–95. Stilson is a mechanical engineer and an independent automotive safety consultant with prior experience working as a product design engineer for Chrysler Corporation and Ford Motor Company. Toyota does not dispute that Stilson is qualified as an expert by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” in the area of automotive engineering. Fed. R. Evid. 702. As a qualified expert, Stilson was permitted to offer an opinion provided it was based on “sufficient facts or data,” and was the “product of reliable principles and methods.” Id. In assessing the reliability of an expert opinion, the court may consider, among other things, whether a given theory or technique has been tested or subjected to peer review and whether a “technique enjoys ‘general acceptance’ within a ‘relevant scientific community.’” Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 149–50 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–94). Toyota argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting Stilson’s opinions -14- under Rule 702 because his testing does not support his theory of defect and because he relied on insufficient evidence in concluding that the alleged defect caused the accident. We disagree. First, Toyota argues that Stilson’s opinions should have been excluded because his testing methodology was faulty and did not analytically support his hypothesis. Stilson testified that he followed protocol and utilized methodology that Toyota itself recommended for testing the heat capacity of the component parts of its 1996 Camry. Cf. Presley v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 553 F.3d 638, 645–46 (8th Cir. 2009) (expert opinion inadmissible when proposed expert conducted no tests and did not reliably apply relevant standards in the field). Though the parties dispute the significance of Stilson’s repositioning the cruise control arm during his thermal testing, Stilson thoroughly explained how he modified the cruise control system and why he did so. He testified that, in his opinion as an engineer, the modification did not affect the validity of the thermal testing because the cruise control system operated independently of the throttle mechanism that was the subject of his testing. He explained that his testing supported the conclusion that the throttle pulleys fused together when subjected to high temperatures. See Shuck v. CNH Am., LLC, 498 F.3d 868, 875 n.3 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that “testing, if performed, must be appropriate in the circumstances and must actually prove what the experts claim it proves” (discussing Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 394 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2005))). To the extent that repositioning the cruise control lever affected Stilson’s testing, he was subject to cross-examination about the significance of this modification. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”) Toyota also takes issue with Stilson’s conclusion that the cause of Lee’s accident was the thermal-induced sticking defect in the accelerator control system. Stilson explained that his testing revealed a stuck throttle at a temperature of between -15- 160 and 165 degrees Fahrenheit.4 Stilson testified that the plastic dust cover encasing the throttle acted like a “sauna,” trapping heat generated from both inside and outside the dust cover. He opined that the dust cover had “gaps” through which heat could enter, but, because the cover was closed on the top, the heat could not easily escape. Stilson also noted that the accelerator control system, housed in the dust cover, was approximately seven inches away from the exhaust manifold—a part of the engine that reached 900 or 1000 degrees Fahrenheit—and that some of this heat would transfer into the dust cover. Finally, Stilson testified that he was able to rule out pedal misapplication as the cause of the accident, based in part on Lee’s account of the incident and in part on mechanical evidence retrieved from Lee’s Camry. “[T]he district court must . . . function as a gatekeeper who ‘separates expert opinion evidence based on good grounds from subjective speculation that masquerades as scientific knowledge.’” Presley, 553 F.3d at 643 (quoting Glastetter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 2001)). However, Stilson’s opinion as to causation need not be a “scientific absolute in order to be admissible.” Bonner v. ISP Tech., Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 929 (8th Cir. 2001). We conclude that Stilson’s opinions represented more than “vague theorizing based on general principles,” Pro Serv. Auto., LLC v. Lenan Corp., 469 F.3d 1210, 1216 (8th Cir. 2006), or “unsupported speculation,” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. The district court did not abuse its broad discretion in allowing Stilson’s expert opinion pursuant to Rule 702.