Opinion ID: 1186734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: 3. The doctrine of separation of governmental powers under the California Constitution provides both independent judgment and substantial evidence review of administrative decisions.

Text: In considering the appropriate standard of judicial review we begin our analysis with two constitutional provisions. Article III of the California Constitution provides for the separation of powers among the three branches of state government: The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution. [7] Section 1 of article VI states that: The judicial power of this State is vested in the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, municipal courts, and justice courts. All except justice courts are courts of record. (5) The separation of powers doctrine articulates a basic philosophy of our constitutional system of government; it establishes a system of checks and balances to protect any one branch against the overreaching of any other branch. (See Cal. Const., arts. IV, V and VI; The Federalist, Nos. 47, 48 (1788).) (6) Of such protections, probably the most fundamental lies in the power of the courts to test legislative and executive acts by the light of constitutional mandate and in particular to preserve constitutional rights, whether of individual or minority, from obliteration by the majority. ( Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175-178 [2 L.Ed. 60]; People v. Wells (1852) 2 Cal. 198, 213-214; see Myers v. United States (1926) 272 U.S. 52, 293 [71 L.Ed. 160, 242, 47 S.Ct. 21] (dissenting opn. of Brandeis, J.); Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review (1952) 66 Harv.L.Rev. 193, 199, 202-204.) Because of its independence and long tenure, the judiciary probably can exert a more enduring and equitable influence in safeguarding fundamental constitutional rights than the other two branches of government, which remain subject to the will of a contemporaneous and fluid majority. (See Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921) 92-94; Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization in The Spirit of Liberty (1959) 118-126.) [8] Possibly the most significant structural change in our government since the date of its founding has occurred in the twentieth century development of a huge administrative bureaucracy. To deal with the manifold problems of modern society these administrators have been delegated substantial quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicative powers. (Stone, The Twentieth Century Administrative Explosion and After (1964) 52 Cal.L.Rev. 513; Molinari, California Administrative Process: A Synthesis Updated (1970) 10 Santa Clara Lawyer 274.) Initially, the courts reacted to this executive expansion with the suspicion and fear that the burgeoning bureaucracy would endanger the prevailing concepts of individual rights. (See United States v. Butler (1936) 297 U.S. 1 [80 L.Ed. 477, 56 S.Ct. 312, 102 A.L.R. 914]; Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (1922) 259 U.S. 20 [66 L.Ed. 817, 42 S.Ct. 449, 21 A.L.R. 1432].) Yet troubled times forced the courts to recognize that the new administrative tools were essential to cope with new complexities. (See Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin (1937) 301 U.S. 1 [81 L.Ed. 893, 57 S.Ct. 615, 108 A.L.R. 1352]; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937) 300 U.S. 379 [81 L.Ed. 703, 57 S.Ct. 578, 108 A.L.R. 1330]; cf. Dandridge v. Williams (1970) 397 U.S. 471, 519-521 [25 L.Ed.2d 491, 521-523, 90 S.Ct. 1153] (dissenting opn. of Marshall, J.).) Since the 1930's the courts have redefined their role in the protection of individual and minority rights. The courts have realized that in the area of economic due process the will of the majority as expressed by the Legislature and its delegated administrative agencies must be permitted to meet contemporary crucial problems. (Cf. Weaver v. Jordan (1966) 64 Cal.2d 235, 257-259 [49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 411 P.2d 289] (dissenting opn. of Mosk, J.).) Hence the court has intervened only if the questioned legislation lacks the support of any rational basis. Concomitantly, in order to permit the Legislature and the executive branch to resolve the economic and social dilemmas of the day, the courts have given less emphasis to outmoded rights of property and to shibboleths of freedom of contract. (See State Board v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners (1953) 40 Cal.2d 436, 449-450 [254 P.2d 29] (dissenting opn. of Traynor, J.).) Courts have explained that powerful economic forces can obtain substantial representation in the halls of the Legislature and in the departments of the executive branch and thus do not impel the same kind of judicial protection as do the minorities: the unpopular religions, the racial subgroups, the criminal defendants, the politically weak and underrepresented. (Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, supra, 66 Harv. L.Rev. 193, 203-204; see Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) 397 U.S. 254, 262-264 [25 L.Ed.2d 287, 295-297, 90 S.Ct. 1011]; Huntley v. Public Util. Com. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 67, 73 [69 Cal. Rptr. 605, 442 P.2d 685].) By carefully scrutinizing administrative decisions which substantially affect vested, fundamental rights, the courts of California have undertaken to protect such rights, and particularly the right to practice one's trade or profession, from untoward intrusions by the massive apparatus of government. [9] (7) If the decision of an administrative agency will substantially affect such a right, the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo. [10] (8) If the administrative decision does not involve, or substantially affect, any fundamental vested right, the trial court must still review the entire administrative record to determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the agency committed any errors of law, [11] but the trial court need not look beyond that whole record of the administrative proceedings.