Opinion ID: 663689
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Independent Counsel's Response

Text: 49 The Rule 6(e) objection is a powerful one. We have accepted response from the Independent Counsel on this subject. First, he contends that Rule 6(e) does not apply to Independent Counsels at all. He points first to the language of Rule 6(e) for the proposition that the secrecy the rule imposes is not absolute. He argues that 50 the rule applies only to 51 [a] grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes the recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, [and government personnel assisting a government attorney]. 52 Submission of Independent Counsel (quoting FED.R.CRIM.P. 6(e)(2)). This argument avails him little if anything. That list of the only people to whom the rule applies encompasses everyone who should know the contents of the grand jury material in the first place except for the witness himself, and it is well established that a witness is not bound to secrecy as to his own testimony. In re Sealed Motion, 880 F.2d at 1370-73. Indeed, the theory of the grand jury  'privilege is that the witness is guaranteed against compulsory disclosure; the privilege ... therefore [is] that of the witness, and rest[s] upon his consent.'  Id. at 1372 (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE EVIDENCE, Sec. 2362 (McNaughton Rev. 1961) (emphasis omitted)). More to the point, even if we viewed the category of persons bound by the secrecy requirements as limited, rather than as unlimited but for the witness, this still would not support the conclusion that the Independent Counsel is not covered. The language of Rule 6 expressly binds attorneys for the government, and the Independent Counsel is one. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 594(a). Thus, from the words of the Rule and the nature of his office, it would appear that the Independent Counsel is generally covered by Rule 6(e). 53 The Independent Counsel argues further that because his office is sui generis the grand jury secrecy rules governing ordinary criminal proceedings do not apply. In support of this proposition, he citesIn re Sealed Motion, 880 F.2d at 1368, wherein we noted the sui generis nature of the office. However, in that case we were dealing not with the power of the Independent Counsel to make general disclosure of grand jury material, but rather with the right of a witness before the grand jury to obtain a transcript of his own testimony over the objection of the Independent Counsel. In that same case, we held that the Special Division has the power to rule on motions for disclosure of grand jury material in matters involving the Independent Counsel as opposed to the general rule that motions seeking release of such transcripts must, necessarily, be directed to the empaneling court. Id. at 1373. But nowhere did we hold that the secrecy requirement of Rule 6(e) does not apply to Independent Counsels. 54 The Independent Counsel further argues that the policy reasons normally served by grand jury secrecy are not applicable to the Final Report because the grand jurors are not identified. The subject matter of the report has received extensive public attention. So have the persons under investigation by the grand jury. So also, have most of the witnesses. Submission of the Independent Counsel at 4. None of these arguments affects the applicability of Rule 6(e), nor even greatly weakens the policy reasons for its existence. Grand jurors are not commonly either more or less identified than those in this investigation. It is not uncommon for the subject matter of grand jury investigations to have received extensive public attention, indeed, it is commonplace. The same is true as to the identity of witnesses and persons under investigation. Again, it is not apparent that Rule 6(e) does not apply by its terms. 55 However, the Independent Counsel makes two more arguments that carry more weight, the second of which ultimately carries the day. First, he notes that the Act requires the Independent Counsel in the Final Report to set forth fully and completely a description of [his] work ... including ... the reasons for not prosecuting any matter within the prosecutorial jurisdiction of such independent counsel.... 28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(b) (1982). He argues, in effect, that this must have worked a pro tanto repealer of the 6(e) obligation for him to include as much as necessary of the grand jury material in order to comply with this duty. While repeals by implication are disfavored, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1017, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 2880, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984) (internal quotations omitted), this argument is not without force. Given the overwhelming likelihood that matters within his prosecutorial jurisdiction not taken to indictment have nonetheless been the subject of grand jury inquiry, Congress might have intended by this statutory mandate to release the Independent Counsel from the normal obligations of Rule 6(e). We do not so hold. 56