Opinion ID: 2309520
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant John Kapcsos' Appeal

Text: The record fully supports the orphans' court decree terminating John's parental rights. He fled from Pennsylvania in March 1973, and took no affirmative action to contact his two children or to preserve his parental rights until he opposed welfare services' petition in the orphans' court eighteen months later. The only contacts with welfare services while John and Rochelle were in New York City were made by Rochelle and concerned Jonathan. Neither parent expressed any interest in Josephine's or Michael's welfare or any desire to be reunited with them during their absence from Pennsylvania. John never informed welfare services of his location either while in New York or while in prison in Cambria County. He made no effort to arrange visits with the children while he was in jail, although the children were nearby. Finally, when he was first informed of the petition to terminate his parental rights, he expressed indifference toward the two children and denied that he was Michael's father. John's conduct during this eighteen month period evinces a total disregard for his responsibilities as a parent. As this Court stated in Appeal of Diane B., 456 Pa. 429, 433, 321 A.2d 618, 620 (1974) (quoting Adoption of JRF, 27 Somerset L.J. 298, 304-05 (Pa.C.P. 1972)): `Parenthood is not . . . a mere biological status, or passive state of mind which claims and declines to relinquish ownership of the child. It is an active occupation, calling for constant affirmative demonstration of parental love, protection and concern.. . . [A parent] must exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child's life, and must exercise reasonable firmness in declining to yield to obstacles. Otherwise, he cannot perform the job of parent, and the parent-child relationship will deteriorate as the absent parent more and more gives his thoughts, attentions, concerns and priorities to his own life and associates.' Thus, a parent has a duty to love, protect and support one's children and to maintain communication and association with them. McCray Adoption Case, 460 Pa. 210, 331 A.2d 652 (1975); Appeal of Diane B., supra; see McAhren Adoption Case, 460 Pa. 63, 331 A.2d 419 (1975); Wischmann Adoption Case, 428 Pa. 327, 237 A.2d 205 (1968). A temporary failure or inability to perform parental duties due to a parent's personal crisis precludes a finding of abandonment. Re: Adoption of M.T.T., supra; see McCray Adoption Case, supra. However, a parent must exercise reasonable firmness in declining to yield to obstacles so that the parent-child relationship is maintained. Re: Adoption of M.T.T., supra; McCray Adoption Case, supra; Appeal of Diane B., supra. John's actions here over a period of eighteen months fail to meet these minimal standards and fully support a finding of abandonment under section 311(1). John also argues that the hearing court erred by not appointing counsel to represent the two children. This contention is raised for the first time on this appeal. He relies on Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), for the proposition that his children have a constitutional right to counsel in termination proceeding. This argument misconstrues the Gault decision and the nature of termination cases. In Gault the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that, in juvenile delinquency proceedings, the state seeks to deprive the child of substantial freedoms not only to further the child's interest but also to protect the public. Thus, they are adversary proceedings which cannot be distinguished from adult prosecutions, and due process requires that the child be given assistance of counsel to insure that he is not wrongfully deprived of any substantial right. Id. at 34-42, 87 S.Ct. at 1447-51. In termination proceedings, unlike delinquency proceedings, the child's interest is usually represented by the contending parties. His interest is, of course, to be provided adequate parental care and subsistence. He has a right to remain with a natural parent who is providing that care and who wishes to continue the parent-child relationship. In such a case, the parent represents the child. The child has a right to the state's intervention to provide alternative care if the natural parent abandons him. In such a case, the party opposing the natural parent represents the child. Thus, in every termination proceeding, both parties purport to represent the child. Moreover, the court is also required to represent the interests of the child, and the court's resolution of the parties' dispute is necessarily based on insuring that the child's right is protected. Many commentators argue that separate counsel for the child in custody and adoption proceedings would be beneficial in protecting the child's interests. [3] The Legislature, recognizing the potential benefits of counsel for the child, requires representation for juveniles in all juvenile court proceedings including dependency hearings. Juvenile Act, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1464, § 20, 11 P.S. § 50-317 (Supp. 1975); see Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Service, 228 Pa.Super. 371, 324 A.2d 562 (1974). In contested dependency hearings, as in termination hearings, the court must determine whether the natural parent or the Commonwealth truly represents the child. However, the Legislature has chosen not to extend the statutory right to counsel for children to termination of parental rights proceedings under the Adoption Act. This Court has not been referred to any authority which argues that such representation is constitutionally required. In most cases, such a rule would simply provide an unnecessary co-counsel to one side. We therefore decline to hold that there is a constitutional right to counsel for the child in the context of termination proceedings provided that the child's interest is adequately protected by the court and the parties in the case. The court may, of course, appoint counsel or a guardian for the child on its own motion or on motion of a party if it determines such representation is necessary or beneficial. Here, nothing in the record indicates that the children's interests were not adequately represented. We cannot say that the court erred in not appointing counsel for the children on its own motion. We therefore affirm the orphans' court decree terminating John's parental rights to Josephine and Michael.