Opinion ID: 4315143
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: K9 force

Text: Plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating that Officer Cook violated a “clearly established law at the time the challenged conduct occurred.” 36 Plaintiffs do not provide any legal authority to demonstrate that Officer Cook violated clearly established law by releasing the K9. Instead, they contend generally that Shumpert had a constitutional right to be free from excessive force. This court has previously rejected such general contentions. 37 32 Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 740). 33 Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 753–54 (5th Cir. 2005). 34 Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting alKidd, 563 U.S. at 742). 35 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)); see also Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198–99 (“[T]here is no doubt that Graham v. Connor clearly establishes the general proposition that use of force is contrary to the Fourth Amendment if it is excessive under objective standards of reasonableness. Yet that is not enough. Rather, we emphasized in Anderson [v. Creighton] ‘that the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been “clearly established” in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense . . . .’” (citation omitted) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001))). 36 Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 501 (5th Cir. 2008). 37 See Cass v. City of Abilene, 814 F.3d 721, 732 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Appellants’ entire argument on this second prong of the qualified immunity test is that ‘it is clearly established in the law that citizens are protected against unjustified, excessive police force.’ This general statement is insufficient to meet Appellants’ burden.”); see also al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742 (“We have repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality. The general proposition, for example, that an unreasonable search or seizure 11 Case: 17-60774 Document: 00514655230 Page: 12 Date Filed: 09/25/2018 No. 17-60774 Even if Plaintiffs had included case law to support their argument, they would still be unable to demonstrate that Officer Cook’s conduct violated clearly established law. At the time of the challenged conduct, neither the United States Supreme Court nor this court had addressed what constitutes reasonable use of K9 force during an arrest. 38 After that date, this court decided Cooper v. Brown, which addressed the issue. 39 In Cooper, the police initiated a traffic stop based on a suspected DUI. 40 The suspect stopped, but then ran from the police and into a residential neighborhood. 41 The officer who initiated the stop notified officers in the area about the fleeing suspect. 42 Officer Brown, along with his police K9, responded, and the K9 located the suspect and bit him on the leg. 43 The dog continued to bite Cooper for one to two minutes. 44 Cooper did not attempt to flee, did not strike the dog, and Officer Brown could see Cooper’s hands and “appreciate[d] violates the Fourth Amendment is of little help in determining whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.”) (citations omitted). 38 Other courts had found the use of K9 force justified in similar circumstances. See Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding use of K9 force during arrest—including 31 dog bites—was reasonable because arrestee was suspected of committing serious crimes, actively fled from police, and police thought he might be armed); Miller v. Clark Cty., 340 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2003) (use of K9 force was justified against suspect who had fled from police and was hiding in woods); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1051 (6th Cir. 1994) (use of K9 force was reasonable when suspect fled into the dark woods after a traffic stop, making it easier for suspect to ambush the officers); Robinette v. Barnes, 854 F.2d 909, 913 (6th Cir. 1988) (use of deadly K9 force was warranted when suspected felon was hiding inside dark building, had been warned that a dog would be used, and still refused to surrender). 39 See Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517 (5th Cir. 2016). Because Cooper had not been decided at the time of the conduct at issue, it cannot define clearly established law for this case. Nonetheless, a discussion of Cooper is helpful in fully explaining the issues in this case, so we include it in our analysis. 40 Id. at 521. 41 Id. 42 Id. 43 Id. Importantly, the initial bite was not at issue in Cooper, as the record indicated that Officer Brown did not give a bite command. Instead, the excessive force claim was based on the duration of the dog bite and the officer’s failure to intervene. 44 Id. 12 Case: 17-60774 Document: 00514655230 Page: 13 Date Filed: 09/25/2018 No. 17-60774 that he had no weapon.” 45 Despite these facts, Officer Brown did not order the K9 to release the bite until he had finished handcuffing Cooper. 46 Cooper filed a § 1983 claim against Officer Brown in his individual capacity, and Officer Brown moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. 47 The court determined that Officer Brown’s use of K9 force was clearly excessive and unreasonable given the facts and circumstances of that case, so he was not entitled to qualified immunity. 48 The court explained that “[n]o reasonable officer could conclude that Cooper posed an immediate threat to Brown or others.” 49 There was no indication he was, or would be, violent. Officer Brown knew that Cooper did not have a weapon. Once Officer Brown found him, Cooper did not resist arrest or further attempt to flee. Rather, he complied with Officer Brown’s instructions. Officer Brown, however, did not stop the use of K9 force. Because Officer Brown did not attempt to negotiate and “subjected Cooper to a lengthy dog attack that inflicted serious injuries, even though he had no reason to believe that Cooper posed a threat,” the court held that the use of force was clearly excessive and unreasonable. 50 Thus, under Cooper, the law is now clearly established that when “[n]o reasonable officer could conclude that [a suspect] pose[s] an immediate threat to [law enforcement officers] or others,” it is unreasonable to use K9 force to subdue a suspect who is complying with officer instructions. 51 Even if Cooper were applicable, Officer Cook’s conduct would not violate clearly established law. We emphasized in Cooper that “[o]ur caselaw makes 45 Id. 46 Id. 47 Id. 48 Id. at 522. 49 Id. 50 Id. at 523. 51 Id. 13 Case: 17-60774 Document: 00514655230 Page: 14 Date Filed: 09/25/2018 No. 17-60774 certain that once an arrestee stops resisting, the degree of force an officer can employ is reduced.” 52 Because the officer in Cooper continued to use force and even increased its use while the threat to officers decreased, he violated clearly established law. By contrast, Officer Cook did not use or increase the use of force after Shumpert was subdued; instead, Shumpert ignored Officer Cook’s instructions and retreated further under the home, preventing Officer Cook from determining whether he was armed. While caselaw establishes that it is unreasonable to use force after a suspect is subdued or demonstrates compliance 53 this court has repeatedly held that the “measured and ascending” use of force is not excessive when a suspect is resisting arrest—provided the officer ceases the use of force once the suspect is subdued. 54 Because it is undisputed that Shumpert was violently resisting arrest and that Officer Cook did not know whether he was armed, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of demonstrating that—under the discrete facts of this case—Officer Cook’s use of K9 force was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. 55 The district court properly determined that Officer Cook was entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.