Opinion ID: 2636899
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffective-counsel Claims.

Text: Appellant offers several bases other than those rejected above in support of his claim that his trial counsel did not afford constitutionally adequate representation. To establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel under either the state or federal constitutional right to counsel, appellant must demonstrate (1) that his attorney's performance fell below an objective level of reasonableness, i.e., that counsel's performance was not within an objective level of reasonableness and thus did not meet the standard to be expected of a reasonably competent attorney, and (2) that he suffered prejudice as a result of that failure. Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's errors, the result would have been different. ( Lockhart v. Fretwell (1993) 506 U.S. 364, 371, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180; Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052; People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 414, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442.) We have applied these standards in rejecting several of appellant's ineffectiveness of counsel claims. In addition, however, when the reason for counsel's action or inaction is apparent on the record, the court will determine whether that reason reflects reasonably competent performance by an attorney acting as a conscientious and diligent advocate. If no explanation appears, an ineffective counsel claim will be rejected unless the attorney was asked for and did not offer an explanation, or there can be no satisfactory explanation. ( People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 700-701, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640.) In other cases the appellant is left to his remedy on habeas corpus where evidence outside the record may shed light on the reason for the attorney's action. In any assessment of trial counsel's conduct of a criminal defense we are mindful of the admonition of the United States Supreme Court that we must make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.) The burden is on an appellant who challenges the competence of his or her trial counsel to overcome the presumption that counsel's conduct is within the range of reasonably professional assistance. ( Ibid.; People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 896, 85 Cal. Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15.) With these standards in mind, we address the remainder of appellant's ineffective counsel claims and conclude that none has merit.
To make a showing of constitutionally inadequate representation by counsel when failure to seek suppression of evidence on a Fourth Amendment ground is asserted as the basis for the ineffective counsel claim, the party must establish that the Fourth Amendment claim had merit and that it is reasonably probable that a different verdict would have been rendered had the evidence been excluded. ( Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986) 477 U.S. 365, 375, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305; Mason v. Godinez, supra, 47 F.3d at p. 855.) Appellant's claim that counsel should have argued that the FBI manufactured an emergency in order to avoid getting a warrant lacks merit. The evidence confirms that there was no unjustified delay in seeking a warrant. As of the time the FBI agents broke into appellant's trailer, only three days after the victims had been reported missing, one of the investigating agents had contacted a Sacramento agent who acted as legal adviser, described the available information, and obtained the legal adviser's opinion that probable cause to obtain a warrant existed. The agent had then been instructed, according to FBI procedure, to contact the office of the United States Attorney to obtain a formal legal opinion on probable cause. Instructions had been given to contact the United States Magistrate in the South Lake Tahoe area to see if he would be available to execute a warrant and if application could be made to him. The call to the United States Attorney was not made only because ensuing developments led the FBI agents to conclude that an immediate entry was necessary. The FBI did not precipitate or manufacture those developments.
Appellant argues that undoubtedly trial counsel had a copy of FBI Agent McKevitt's report regarding his interview with Allen Hacker in which, McKevitt testified, Allen Hacker told McKevitt that appellant often read The Anarchist Cookbook and seemed interested in killing women. Therefore, he argues, counsel should have anticipated, before calling Allen Hacker as a defense witness, that the prosecution would offer McKevitt's statement in rebuttal. Counsel should have sought a ruling on the admissibility of McKevitt's testimony before Hacker took the stand. This argument is no more than an invitation to second-guess trial counsel's tactics. As appears above, their primary defense was an effort to persuade the jury that the murders were not premeditated. They obviously believed that Allen Hacker's testimony was important to dispel any implication to that effect in the prosecutor's opening statement. We will not engage in this type of second-guessing. We cannot say on this record that the tactic chosen was one that competent counsel would not elect. Moreover, in light of the extensive evidence of premeditation, even were we to conclude otherwise it is not reasonably probable that a different verdict would have been reached had Hacker's and McKevitt's testimony not been heard by the jury.
We have rejected appellant's misconduct claims above. To the extent that any of the instances cited as misconduct might be considered so, however, we note that mere failure to object to prosecutorial argument ... rarely establishes incompetence on the part of defense counsel in the absence of some explanation on the record for counsel's action or inaction. ( People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 855, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) That is true here.
The same objective standard for assessing the competence of counsel applied at the guilt phase is applied to a claim of ineffective assistance at the subsequent phases of a trial. ( People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 855, 64 Cal. Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) Dr. Mills testified on cross-examination by the prosecutor at the sanity phase that Carol Wiseman, a former girlfriend of appellant's, told him that appellant was sometimes physically intimidating when angry and had frightened her. The claim of incompetent representation is based solely on trial counsel's failure, after the court had ruled they could do so, to bring out that Wiseman had also said with regard to the charged crimes that the person she knew would not have done them and appellant must have been insane if he did them. The record offers no explanation for counsel's decision not to proceed in that manner, and thus is not a basis for concluding that counsel had no satisfactory reason. In any event, there could have been no prejudice. All of the expert witnesses testified that the incidents with Wiseman or Cluff had no relevance to their diagnoses.
Again appellant, with the benefit of hindsight, asks the court to second-guess counsel. It was not enough they attempted to dissuade appellant from absenting himself from the penalty phase argument, asked the court to counsel appellant, and conferred with appellant again after the court did so. Counsel should have done more. They should have asked the court to engage appellant in a dialogue, and should have objected that the court was presenting appellant with an unconstitutional and unnecessary choice. The court should have been asked to restrain the prosecutor's inflammatory style and appellant should have been offered the opportunity to remain and request a recess if that became necessary. The record confirms that the court and counsel did all that could reasonably be expected in this situation. The assumption that appellant had not been told by counsel that a recess could be requested if he became too upset to control himself is not supported by the record. The prosecutor's style of argument did not exceed permissible bounds and was not subject to the type of prior restraint now suggested by appellant simply to avoid upsetting him.
We have reviewed the penalty phase argument and do not agree with appellant that it fell short of the quality demanded by the Sixth and Eighth Amendments. For the most part his argument here is only that a better or different penalty phase argument could have been made. This is not a basis for finding constitutionally ineffective assistance. ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 471, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388.) Appellant also complains that trial counsel did not make it clear that the absence of prior violent criminal conduct in his past could be considered mitigating even if he had committed nonviolent criminal acts or that mental illness that was not extreme could be considered. But counsel did argue that unlike many capital cases, appellant had no prior felony convictions. With respect to mental illness, counsel acknowledged that the jury had found that appellant was not legally insane and argued that the jury could nonetheless say that he was crazy when he committed the crimes and urged the jury to remember that all five psychiatrists believed that he suffered a severe and prolonged mental defect absent which the crimes would not have occurred. Appellant received adequate representation in the penalty phase argument.
Trial counsel agreed that the court should delete factors (f) and (g) from the instructions describing the aggravating and mitigating factors. Factor (f) directs the jury to consider [w]hether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct. Factor (g) asks [w]hether or not the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. The record does not suggest that counsel could not have had a reasonable tactical reason for that decision. Since the factor is mitigating only if the defendant reasonably believes the conduct is morally justified, counsel may have concluded that reference to that factor would be harmful. Even assuming counsel had no tactical reason for the decision, however, we fail to see how appellant was prejudiced by the omission of these factors from the instructions.
When the jury returned its verdict of death, the court asked counsel whether they wanted the juror polled. Defense counsel responded simply [N]o. The court asked if the answer was no and counsel responded No. He did not request that the jury be polled when the earlier verdicts were returned. Appellant contends that this omission and the failure to poll the jurors when they returned guilt, special circumstances, and penalty phase verdicts requires reversal since a defendant has an absolute right, conferred by section 1163, to have the jury polled at the request of either party. Polling, he argues, is necessary to safeguard a defendant's right to a unanimous jury, to ensure that no juror has been coerced, and to ensure that the verdict is not mistaken. As appellant recognizes, this claim is actually an assertion that counsel's failure to request a jury poll constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. He is unable to establish prejudice, however, as this record does not reflect that any of the dangers polling seeks to avoid actually occurred.