Opinion ID: 1105721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the verdict of the jury as to count two of the indictment is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence?

Text: ¶ 11. Wall argues that his conviction was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. He says that there was no credible evidence which would tend to show that he had direct control or constructive possession over the controlled substances found in the vehicle and that the jury's verdict was for that reason against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Wall also states that the fact that a passenger was in the vehicle is enough to trigger the requirement that the State should have to show additional incriminating circumstances to justify a finding of constructive possession. Cunningham v. State, 583 So.2d 960, 962 (Miss.1991). ¶ 12. To determine whether a jury verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, [this Court] views all of the evidence in the light consistent with the verdict and give[s] the State all favorable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. Strong v. State, 600 So.2d 199, 204 (Miss.1992) (citing Corley v. State, 584 So.2d 769, 773 (Miss.1991)). This Court will reverse only when it is convinced that the trial court has abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial. Strong, 600 So.2d at 204. ¶ 13. The theory of constructive possession has been explained in Curry v. State, 249 So.2d 414 (Miss.1971), as follows: [T]here must be sufficient facts to warrant a finding that defendant was aware of the presence and character of the particular substance and was intentionally and consciously in possession of it. It need not be actual physical possession. Constructive possession may be shown by establishing that the drug involved was subject due to his dominion or control. Proximity is usually an essential element, but by itself is not adequate in the absence of other incriminating circumstances. Id. at 416. The theory was further defined in Hamburg v. State, 248 So.2d 430 (Miss. 1971), that one who is the owner in possession of the premises, ... is presumed to be in constructive possession of the articles found in or on the property possessed. Id. at 432. See Jones v. State, 693 So.2d 375, 376 (Miss.1997); Townsend v. State, 681 So.2d 497, 510 (Miss.1996). In other words, the owner of a vehicle is presumed to be in constructive possession. In the case sub judice, Wall was the owner and operator of the vehicle and, thus, is presumed to be in constructive possession. Wall did not present any evidence to overcome this presumption aside of mentioning the fact that there was a passenger present in the vehicle with him. However, it is of no consequence that there was a passenger present in the vehicle with Wall. It is quite possible to have joint constructive possession. Powell v. State, 355 So.2d 1378, 1379 (Miss.1978). The State was not required to establish additional incriminating circumstances. Ferrell v. State, 649 So.2d 831, 835 (Miss.1995). ¶ 14. Furthermore, this case is quite similar to Wolf v. State, 260 So.2d 425 (Miss. 1972). In Wolf, this Court rejected the defendant's argument, stating that the evidence showed that the car belonged to Wolf, that he had been driving it, that the marijuana was found in the immediate proximity of the defendant, and that these circumstances were sufficient to support the jury's finding of guilt. Id. at 432. These are exactly the facts described in the record of the present case. The evidence presented to the jury in the case sub judice was sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict. Therefore, Wall's first assignment of error is without merit.