Opinion ID: 6322835
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: [8] It is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it, irrespective of whether the issue is raised by the parties. 22 No party challenges this court’s jurisdiction, and we agree that the appeal is properly before us. It is a rare occasion when a case involving a special proceeding under § 32-624 (or its predecessor statute) comes before this court 23 in contrast with a single justice of this court. But the infrequency is likely driven by the small window of time to seek review rather than a perceived lack of jurisdiction. As we explained in dismissing the appeal in Nebraska Republican Party v. Gale, 24 “no relief may be afforded to the party from [a judge’s] order after the 55th day” preceding the election. Here, the district court judge admirably resolved the matter quickly, leaving time for the aggrieved party to seek appellate review. Because in Nebraska Republican Party we recognized “uncertainty in our case law and orders of this court in appeals from such proceedings” and “assume[d] without deciding that subject matter jurisdiction does exist,” 25 we take this opportunity to resolve any jurisdictional uncertainty. [9,10] We start by recalling fundamental principles of our jurisdiction. Except in those cases wherein original jurisdiction is specifically conferred by Neb. Const. art. V, § 2, the Nebraska Supreme Court exercises appellate jurisdiction. 26 In order for this court to have jurisdiction over an appeal, 22 North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stewart, ante p. 33, ___ N.W.2d ___ (2022). 23 See, Nebraska Republican Party v. Gale, 283 Neb. 596, 812 N.W.2d 273 (2012); State, ex rel. Quinn, v. Marsh, 141 Neb. 436, 3 N.W.2d 892 (1942); Porter v. Flick, 60 Neb. 773, 84 N.W. 262 (1900). 24 Nebraska Republican Party v. Gale, supra note 23, 283 Neb. at 599, 812 N.W.2d at 276. 25 Id. at 599, 812 N.W.2d at 275. 26 Heckman v. Marchio, 296 Neb. 458, 894 N.W.2d 296 (2017). - 172 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports NEBRASKA REPUBLICAN PARTY v. SHIVELY Cite as 311 Neb. 160 appellate jurisdiction must be specifically provided by the Legislature. 27 In other words, unless a statute provides for an appeal, such right does not exist. 28 Section 32-624 authorizes a special, summary proceeding before a judge of the district court. When an objection to a candidate filing form is made and the filing officer has determined the validity of the objection, an application can be made to a judge of, among other identified courts, the district court. 29 The judge’s order “may be made summarily upon application of any political party committee or other interested party and upon such notice as the court or judge may require.” 30 In Porter v. Flick, 31 we addressed our appellate jurisdiction while construing a statute 32 similar to § 32-624. Although the precise language of some of the statutes and constitutional provisions has changed since this court’s decision in 1900, we find the analytical path in Porter to be instructive. [11] In Porter, we started with the presumption that the Legislature intended to enact a constitutional law. We explained that the law would be unconstitutional if it conferred upon the judiciary a nonjudicial power. We recognized that Neb. Const. art. II, § 1 (now art. II, § 1(1)), divides the powers of the government into three departments—legislative, executive, and judicial—and dictates that “no person or collection of persons being one of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others except as expressly directed or permitted in this Constitution.” We stated that there was no express direction or permission that would make the power in the statute an exception to the general rule. 27 Id. 28 Id. 29 See § 32-624. 30 Id. 31 Porter v. Flick, supra note 23. 32 See Comp. Stat. 1899, ch. 26, § 137. - 173 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports NEBRASKA REPUBLICAN PARTY v. SHIVELY Cite as 311 Neb. 160 In Porter, we determined that the power given by the statute similar to what is now § 32-624 was judicial in nature. We reasoned that the Legislature intended to give the judicial officers identified in the statute an authority that the judge might lawfully exercise. We further recognized that courts in other states with similar statutes had exercised a “revisory jurisdiction” over the decisions of ministerial officers charged with preparing the official ballot. 33 For the same reasons set out in Porter, we conclude that the order of the district court judge under § 32-624 was a judicial decision. [12] As a judicial decision, this court has the power to review the judge’s order under § 32-624. Under Neb. Const. art. V, § 23, “The several judges of the courts of record shall have such jurisdiction at chambers as may be provided by law.” That provision empowers the Legislature to confer power in chambers. While § 32-624 does not use the word “chambers” expressly, it impliedly does by referring to a judge. As to an appeal, Neb. Const. art. I, § 23, mandates “one appeal to the appellate court created pursuant to Article V, section 1, of this Constitution or to the Supreme Court” as a matter of right. In view of this provision, the intent of § 32-624 could not have been to exclude orders made in the special proceeding from appellate review. 34 Further, the Legislature has given this court “appellate and final jurisdiction of all matters of appeal and proceedings in error which may be taken from the judgments or decrees of other courts in all matters of law, fact, or equity.” 35 [13,14] Section 25-1911 authorizes appellate review of a “final order made by the district court.” The word “court” as used in § 25-1911 “has always been construed to mean, not only the tribunal over which a judge presides, but the judge 33 Porter v. Flick, supra note 23, 60 Neb. at 776, 84 N.W. at 263. 34 See State, ex rel. Meissner, v. McHugh, supra note 17. 35 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-204 (Reissue 2016). - 174 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports NEBRASKA REPUBLICAN PARTY v. SHIVELY Cite as 311 Neb. 160 himself [or herself] when exercising, at chambers, judicial power conferred by statute.” 36 Jurisdiction of the appellate courts is further addressed in § 24-1106. Under § 24-1106(1), an appeal from a district court order in a case such as this would be to the Nebraska Court of Appeals. However, § 24-1106(3) specifies that “[c]ases may be removed from the Court of Appeals for decision by the Supreme Court for any one or more of the reasons set forth in subsection (2) of this section or in order to regulate the caseload existing in either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.” At least two of the reasons contained in subsection (2) apply here: The case involves a novel legal question and is one of significant public interest. 37 Having concluded that we may exercise jurisdiction over this appeal, we turn to the substantive issues raised by the parties. Discovery The objectors argue that the district court erred in prohibiting discovery and holding that the proceeding under § 32-624 was limited to the record before the commissioner. Before resolving the issue, we dispose of an argument presented for the first time in briefing to this court. The objectors recognize that “the parties and the Court during the proceedings below assumed, based on past caselaw and the pre-filing deadline timing of the objection proceedings, that the jurisdictional deadline for relief under § 32-624 was March 16, 2022.” 38 Even the objectors’ March 3 notice of appeal requested “an expedited briefing and argument schedule in order for relief to be provided before the statutory jurisdictional deadline [of] March 16.” (Emphasis omitted.) But with the passing of the March 1 filing deadline and the absence 36 Porter v. Flick, supra note 23, 60 Neb. at 775, 84 N.W. at 262. 37 See § 24-1106(2)(a) and (e). 38 Brief for appellants at 38. - 175 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports NEBRASKA REPUBLICAN PARTY v. SHIVELY Cite as 311 Neb. 160 of any other Democratic candidate for county attorney, they suggest that under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-811(1)(b) (Reissue 2016) “the deadline for relief under § 32-624 may actually be sometime in September.” 39 [15-17] There are at least three problems with the objectors’ newly asserted position. First, a party cannot complain of error which the party has invited the court to commit. 40 Having goaded the court into making its order on an expedited basis, the objectors cannot now contend that the court erred in doing so. Second, appellate courts do not generally consider arguments and theories raised for the first time on appeal. 41 Third, the objectors did not assign error concerning the court’s belief as to the deadline, and an appellate court does not consider errors which are argued but not assigned. 42 Seeing no error plainly evident from the record, 43 we decline the objectors’ invitation to find plain error and “remand[] for a threshold determination of the actual period for potential relief and further corresponding proceedings.” 44 The objectors argue that discovery is available in a special statutory proceeding. They direct our attention to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2225 (Reissue 2016): Where, by general or special statute, a civil action, legal or equitable, is given and the mode of proceeding therein is prescribed, this code shall not affect the proceedings under such statute, until the Legislature shall otherwise provide; but in all such cases, as far as it may be consist­ ent with the statute giving such action, and practicable under this code, the proceedings shall be conducted in 39 Id. 40 Seid v. Seid, 310 Neb. 626, 967 N.W.2d 253 (2021). 41 In re Estate of Graham, 301 Neb. 594, 919 N.W.2d 714 (2018). 42 Moore v. Nebraska Acct. & Disclosure Comm., 310 Neb. 302, 965 N.W.2d 564 (2021). 43 See State v. Kipple, 310 Neb. 654, 968 N.W.2d 613 (2022). 44 Brief for appellants at 39. - 176 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports NEBRASKA REPUBLICAN PARTY v. SHIVELY Cite as 311 Neb. 160 conformity thereto. Where the statute designates by name or otherwise the kind of action, but does not prescribe the mode of proceedings therein, such action shall be commenced and prosecuted in conformity to this code; where the statute gives an action, but does not designate the kind of action, or prescribe the mode of proceeding therein, such action shall be held to be the civil action of this code and proceeded in accordingly. The objectors emphasize the last sentence of the statute, contending that it provides authorization for discovery. The premise of the objectors’ argument is flawed. Their premise is that § 32-624 does not prescribe the mode of proceedings. But it does. Section 32-624 intended a limited statutory procedure. It provides that the court’s order “may be made summarily upon application.” 45 And when a statute prescribes the mode of proceeding, § 25-2225 provides that “this code shall not affect the proceedings under such statute.” A summary review proceeding is inconsistent with discovery. The primary purpose of the discovery process is to explore all available and properly discoverable information to narrow the fact issues in controversy so that a trial may be an efficient and economical resolution of a dispute. 46 A proceeding under § 32-624 is not a trial, and the issue is limited to the validity of a candidate filing form. In considering objections, the filing officer is not confined to mere formal matters relating to the certificate of nomination and may consider extrinsic evidence. 47 But “when presented to a judge or court, the proceeding, being in the nature of a summary review, is essentially appellate.” 48 And upon appellate review is not the proper place to make a record. 49 45 § 32-624. 46 Eddy v. Builders Supply Co., 304 Neb. 804, 937 N.W.2d 198 (2020). 47 State v. Allen, 43 Neb. 651, 62 N.W. 35 (1895). 48 State, ex rel. Brazda, v. Marsh, 141 Neb. 817, 822, 5 N.W.2d 206, 210 (1942). 49 See State v. Rust, 247 Neb. 503, 528 N.W.2d 320 (1995). - 177 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports NEBRASKA REPUBLICAN PARTY v. SHIVELY Cite as 311 Neb. 160 [18] In overruling the discovery requests, the district court was mindful of the short timeframe it had to make a decision. It noted that after the objectors filed their application, only 34 days remained for “the final word” and that the objectors also wished to reserve some of that time for an appeal. We review the court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of dis­ cretion occurs when a trial court’s decision is based upon reasons that are untenable or unreasonable or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason, and evidence. 50 We find no abuse of discretion by the court in denying discovery. Meaning of “Practiced Law Actively” We now turn to the merits of the objection to Morfeld’s candidacy. The objectors asserted that he did not qualify under the language of § 23-1201.02(1). We disagree. [19] Before turning to statutory interpretation, we recall the rule of liberal construction regarding statutes relating to election law: “[I]t is the duty of the courts, in construing statutes providing for printing the names of candidates of both old and new political organiza­tions upon the ballot,” to do so in light of the constitutional principle that “all elections shall be free; and there shall be no hindrance or impediment to the right of the qualified voter to exercise the elective franchise.” 51 In other words, statutes relating to election law must be liberally construed so as to promote, rather than defeat, candidacy for the primary election. 52 [20,21] Statutory interpretation begins with the text, and the text is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. 53 An 50 Lombardo v. Sedlacek, supra note 15. 51 Davis v. Gale, 299 Neb. 377, 381, 908 N.W.2d 618, 623 (2018), quoting Morrissey v. Wait, 92 Neb. 271, 138 N.W. 186 (1912); Neb. Const. art. I, § 22. 52 See Davis v. Gale, supra note 51. 53 State ex rel. Peterson v. Shively, 310 Neb. 1, 963 N.W.2d 508 (2021). - 178 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports NEBRASKA REPUBLICAN PARTY v. SHIVELY Cite as 311 Neb. 160 a­ ppellate court will not resort to interpretation of statutory language to ascertain the meaning of words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. 54 For the reader’s convenience, we again quote the statute: No person shall seek nomination . . . for the office of county attorney . . . , unless he or she has been admitted to the practice of law in this state for at least two years next preceding the date such person would take office and has practiced law actively in this state during such twoyear period . . . . 55 The objectors concede, as they must, that Morfeld was “admitted to the practice of law in this state” for the requisite period. They focus instead on the requirement that he had “practiced law actively” in Nebraska for such period. The parties agree that what Morfeld did during the period occurred in this state. They dispute, however, whether he “practiced law actively.” These three words join two concepts: (1) an activity, “practiced law,” and (2) a level of activity, “actively.” We view the objectors as disputing both. These three words have been in § 23-1201.02 since it was first adopted in 1969. 56 Regarding the meaning of “practiced law,” the objectors suggest that we should look to two rules of this court. One, relating to admission of attorneys, defines “[s]ubstantially engaged in the practice of law.” 57 The other, which is perhaps more helpful, defines “to practice law,” in the context of the unauthorized practice of law, as the “application of legal principles and judgment with regard to the circumstances or objectives of another entity or person which require the knowledge, 54 Id. 55 § 23-1201.02(1) (emphasis supplied). 56 See 1969 Neb. Laws, ch. 142, § 1, p. 664. 57 Neb. Ct. R. § 3-101(P) (rev. 2020). - 179 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports NEBRASKA REPUBLICAN PARTY v. SHIVELY Cite as 311 Neb. 160 judgment, and skill of a person trained as a lawyer.” 58 This definition also includes a nonexclusive list of activities. 59 [22] But neither of these rules existed in this form in 1969, when the Legislature adopted the three key words of § 23-1201.02(1). Thus, we are reluctant to characterize those rules as demonstrative of the plain and ordinary meaning in 1969 of the words “practiced law actively.” The U.S. Supreme Court recently stated, “‘[I]t’s a “fundamental canon of statutory construction” that words generally should be “interpreted as taking their ordinary . . . meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the statute.”’” 60 Last year, we assumed without deciding that this proposition applied to the interpretation of a statute enacted by our Legislature. 61 We now decide that it does. Thus, it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that words generally should be interpreted as taking their ordinary meaning at the time the Legislature enacted the statute. We turn to contemporaneous sources for definitions, first for “practice law.” One general dictionary defined “practice” as “[t]o work at, especially as a profession: practice law.” 62 Another general dictionary defined “practice” as “to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually” or “to put into practice; to use one’s knowledge of; to work at, especially as a profession.” 63 A legal dictionary defined “practicing law” by reference to “practice of law,” which it defined as follows: Rendering the services peculiar to the profession. The work of an attorney at law in the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special 58 Neb. Ct. R. § 3-1001. 59 See § 3-1001(A) to (E). 60 New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539, 202 L. Ed. 2d 536 (2019). 61 See In re Adoption of Yasmin S., 308 Neb. 771, 956 N.W.2d 704 (2021). 62 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1028 (1969) (emphasis in original). 63 Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged 1413 (2d ed. 1956). - 180 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports NEBRASKA REPUBLICAN PARTY v. SHIVELY Cite as 311 Neb. 160 proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and, in general, advising clients and taking action for them in matters connected with law. . . . Inclusive of counseling as well as trial work. . . . The giving of such advice or the rendition of such service as requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill. 64 Another legal dictionary defined “practice of law” to mean: Not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embracing the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. . . . It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. 65 Next, we look to definitions regarding “actively.” A general dictionary defined “active” as “[e]ngaged in activity; contributing; participating . . .” or “[c]haracterized by energetic action or activity; busy.” 66 Another general dictionary described “actively” as “in an active manner; by action; nimbly; briskly.” 67 A legal dictionary defined “active” as “[t]hat is in action; that demands action; actually subsisting; the opposite of passive.” 68 The objectors observe that we defined the term “actively” in Hall v. Progress Pig, Inc. 69 and urge application of that definition here. The issue in Hall was whether a shareholder was 64 Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 972 (3d ed. 1969). 65 Black’s Law Dictionary 1335 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). 66 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 13 (1969). 67 Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged 20 (2d ed. 1956). 68 Black’s Law Dictionary 52 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). 69 Hall v. Progress Pig, Inc., 259 Neb. 407, 610 N.W.2d 420 (2000). - 181 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports NEBRASKA REPUBLICAN PARTY v. SHIVELY Cite as 311 Neb. 160 “actively engaged in the day-to-day labor and management of [a] farm.” 70 Breaking down that clause into its component parts, we stated that “the terms ‘actively engaged,’ ‘day to day,’ ‘labor,’ and ‘management’ should be given their most natural and obvious meaning.” 71 Consulting a dictionary, we defined “actively” to mean “‘constantly engaged.’” 72 We reasoned that “to be actively engaged in the day-to-day labor and management of the farm or ranch requires that such person be involved on a daily or routine basis in all aspects of the farm or ranch activities, be it labor or management.” 73 We conclude, as did the district court, that “actively” refers to the frequency or extent of involvement. [23] Returning to the phrase “practiced law actively,” we perceive no ambiguity in the use of these words. Putting the words together and giving them their plain and ordinary meanings, as used in § 23-1201.02(1), “practiced law actively” means engaged in giving advice or rendering such service as requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill and doing so on a daily or routine basis. One can be engaged in the practice of law in a multitude of different ways. Considering Morfeld’s employment with Civic Nebraska in light of the plain and ordinary meaning of “practiced law actively,” we conclude it falls within the definition. His day-to-day activities, and not his title as “Executive Director,” drive our conclusion. In a sworn affidavit, Morfeld set out his employment activities. According to his affidavit, he provides legal advice, direction, and supervision to Civic Nebraska, on a routine basis, in a variety of areas. He stated that on a routine basis, he provides Civic Nebraska the type of legal advice that in-house 70 Id. at 415, 610 N.W.2d at 428. 71 Id. at 414, 610 N.W.2d at 427. 72 Id. at 414, 610 N.W.2d at 428. 73 Id. at 415, 610 N.W.2d at 428. - 182 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports NEBRASKA REPUBLICAN PARTY v. SHIVELY Cite as 311 Neb. 160 counsel provides in other companies, including ongoing legal advice to Civic Nebraska regarding contracts, leases, nonprofit compliance, and matters of employment law. In connection with Morfeld’s employment, he routinely uses his legal knowledge and skill. And he is not giving legal advice to himself— he is providing counsel to an organization and its employees. In doing so, he practices law actively. To the extent the objectors’ argument could be understood to mean that an attorney employed as in-house counsel does not practice law because the attorney does not provide legal services to “clients,” we soundly reject it. [24] Because Morfeld’s providing legal advice on a routine basis regarding various matters to Civic Nebraska satisfies the “practiced law actively” requirement, we need not determine whether his activities with the ballot question committee or his service as a senator in the Legislature also constitute “practic[ing] law actively.” An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before it. 74 [25] The objectors argue that the district court erred by interpreting “practiced law” to be determined by “the nature of the act” rather than “the forum or object of the act.” In making that determination, the district court relied on a case involving the unauthorized practice of law 75 and noted that we reaffirmed the broad definition of “practice of law” in a case decided 8 years prior to the enactment of § 23-1201.02. 76 As foreshadowed above based on the plain and ordinary meaning of practice of law, we agree with the district court that the nature of the activity is key. By advancing the notion that “the forum or object of the act” is controlling, it appears the objectors wish to have us read words into the statute that are not there. Neither is it 74 Schmid v. Simmons, ante p. 48, ___ N.W.2d ___ (2022). 75 State, ex rel. Johnson, v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 295 N.W. 381 (1941). 76 See State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Assn. v. Butterfield, 172 Neb. 645, 111 N.W.2d 543 (1961). - 183 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports NEBRASKA REPUBLICAN PARTY v. SHIVELY Cite as 311 Neb. 160 within the province of the courts to read meaning into a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of a statute. 77 Section 23-1201.02 contains no requirement that the attorney have courtroom litigation experience or that the practice be prosecutorial in nature. An individual who meets the qualification requirements of § 23-1201.02 is eligible to be a candidate for election as county attorney. The appropriate audience for a political party’s contention that a candidate’s expe­ rience is lacking and undeserving of a vote is the electorate.