Opinion ID: 74654
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Substantial Factor in Termination

Text: 47 Under Bryson, we next determine whether Chadwick terminated Stanley in 1997 in substantial part because of Stanley's statements to the GBI in 1993. The district court correctly concluded that Stanley's evidence created a jury question regarding whether his protected speech was a substantial factor in Chadwick's employment decision. We have stated that plaintiff's burden in this regard is not a heavy one. See Walker v. Schwalbe, 112 F.3d 1127, 1131 (11th Cir. 1997); Beckwith v. City of Daytona Beach Shores, 58 F.3d 1554, 1564 (11th Cir. 1995). Further, [i]t is neither possible nor desirable to fashion a single standard for determining when an employee has met her initial burden of demonstrating that a retaliatory intent was a `substantial' or `motivating factor' behind a government employment decision. Beckwith, 58 F.3d at 1564. Rather, we examine the record as a whole to ascertain whether Stanley presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that his protected speech was a substantial motivating factor in the decision to terminate him. Id. 20 48 In this case, Stanley is not able to show any inference of causation from temporal proximity. Indeed, there was an almost four year gap between his protected speech and his termination, which arguably defeats causation. Nonetheless, we have stated that gaps of time, standing alone, do not preclude [a plaintiff] from producing enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that protected speech was a substantial factor in the decision to terminate him. Beckwith, 58 F.3d at 1567 (fourteen-month lapse in time); Schneider v. Indian River Comm. College Found., Inc., 875 F.2d 1537, 1543 n.9 (11th Cir. 1989) (ten-month lapse in time). Although the gaps of time in these cases were significantly shorter than the four year gap here, Stanley is not precluded from producing other evidence to establish causation. 49 Stanley's evidence shows that Chadwick confronted Stanley about his statements to the GBI and challenged the basis for Stanley's suspicions. When Chadwick became Chief, he transferred Stanley without asking his preference of assignments as he did others. Chadwick also failed to follow departmental policy in advertising an available promotion and promoted another employee even though Stanley was eligible for consideration for the promotion. In 1994, Chadwick ordered an investigation of the buy fund and reprimanded Stanley even after he passed a polygraph test. Tellingly, Chadwick also asked Stanley how it felt to be put under the microscope of suspicion. In 1997, Chadwick reprimanded only Stanley and not Cooper even though the internal investigation faulted both of them. Chadwick then discharged Stanley after the Coker incident. Although a close call, we conclude that Stanley presented sufficient evidence to create a jury question on causation.