Opinion ID: 2976539
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Eastman’s Spreadsheets to Prove Pretext

Text: Finally, Scott argues that Eastman’s own spreadsheets provide evidence establishing that Eastman’s articulated, non-discriminatory reason for not promoting her to Team Manager for either the Polymers Division or the CM&S Division in 1996/97 was pretextual. As discussed below, we disagree. The Team Manager selections for the Polymers Division in 1996/97 were made using TMDS, a process that assessed candidates’ scores on four different components: the objective PPT, and three subjective tests, the PCA, the Team Exercise (“TE”), and the Structured Interview (“SI”). Each component was evaluated by different managers. First, Eastman selected twenty-two finalists based on their scores on the PPT and the PCA.6 The finalists then completed the TE and SI. Each of the four components was made up of several sub-components, which, in turn, each tested a different skill 6 Scott admits that, during this stage, Eastman sometimes adds additional candidates as finalists, in the interest of diversity. Scott herself benefitted from this action in certain years. However, in the 1996/97 Polymers Division selection, her score was sufficiently high to earn her a place as a finalist. 21 set (e.g., oral communication, managerial skills). Some of the skill sets were tested in multiple components (for example, oral communication was tested in both the PCA and SI). After scoring the four components, Eastman then performed two additional calculations, called Candidate Final Assessed Value and Strength Factors, which averaged the scores of the previously tested skill sets. After these additional calculations, the finalists received Total Points and were then ranked. From this intricate process, Eastman selected six Team Managers based on the candidates’ final rankings. Scott points to the fact that, according to the TMDS spreadsheets for the 1996/97 Polymers Division Team Manager selection process, she scored higher on the objective PPT than many men who were promoted. However, although Scott scored higher than four of the six selectees on the PPT, she ranked only ninth among the twenty-two finalists on this component. The skill sets that the PPT measured were Reading Comprehension, Graphic Arithmetic, and Following Policies and Procedures. While these skill sets are undoubtedly important, they represent only a few of the many skills evaluated by TMDS. Therefore, Scott’s argument that her performance on this component should be representative of her performance on other components or in the overall selection process is not well-taken. Scott argues that the overwhelmingly subjective nature of the test discriminated against female employees, but she has failed to present evidence suggesting any bias in the way the test was conducted. While Scott did poorly on two of the subjective components (scoring near the bottom on both the PCA and the SI), she did well on the other subjective component (scoring first among all the finalists in the TE).7 As such, the finalists’ scores on the subjective components do not 7 The EEOC determination letter refers to multiple objective components, and states that Scott performed well on all objective portions and performed poorly on all subjective portions. Thus, it appears that the EEOC characterized the TE, on which Scott ranked first, as objective. 22 indicate any manipulation on the part of Eastman to disfavor female candidates. Scott challenges the SI component in particular, arguing that her total score dropped significantly after this component. Again, we note that faring well or poorly on an individual component of the TMDS does not, in itself, indicate pretext. Furthermore, we note that when the raw scores for the four components are totaled, prior to the additional calculations, Scott had a “raw score” of 143, which was the ninth highest raw score. Scott scored lower than all of the six selectees, who had scores of 150, 150, 149, 147, 146, and 146. Consequently, the record indicates that Scott’s score was simply not as high as those who were selected for promotion. There is also no evidence that the additional calculations masked discrimination. For example, Scott points out that she received varying scores within a particular skill set; however, this is explained by the fact that different managers evaluated each component. For the same reason, the fact that her scores on particular subsets changed from year to year does not, without more, indicate pretext. In addition, Scott points out that some of the selectees’ individual sub-component scores were lower than hers, but that after the “re-ranking” these candidates were selected instead of her. However, the court notes that TMDS (in particular, the additional calculations) was designed to identify the candidates’ average score. None of these facts suggest that Eastman’s selection process was a disguise for discrimination. Nor does the fact that the evaluators used a Special Selection form to do these calculations indicate pretext. In sum, Scott has not presented evidence to support her contention that she was better qualified than the people selected instead of her. However, because the TE consisted of managers grading candidates’ performances on group tasks, we find that this component is subjective. 23 With regard to the 1996/97 Team Manager selection for the CM&S Division, Plaintiff argues in a footnote that because the spreadsheets for the 1996/97 CM&S Team Manager selection were not in the record before the district court (due to an oversight by Defendant), summary judgment should be reversed and the case should be remanded on this claim. We disagree. The district court properly found that Plaintiff had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext based on the evidence before it, including the lack of adverse inference and the EEOC determination letter, as discussed above. Nothing in the spreadsheets would change that determination. The spreadsheets indicate that Scott did not score high enough on the first two components to earn a spot as a finalist. Her score of 49 was much lower than the scores of the eighteen finalists, who ranged from 56 to 62. (CM&S 1996 TMDS Process Data, App. Br., Addendum 6.) As such, Scott has failed to show that Eastman’s process for selecting Team Managers for the Polymers and CM&S Divisions in 1996/97 was either not credible or motivated by discriminatory animus. Therefore, we find that Scott has failed to put forth sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Eastman’s articulated, non-discriminatory reasons were pretextual for the 1996/97 Team Manager selections for the Polymers and CM&S Divisions. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s finding that Scott failed to prove pretext on her claim for discriminatory failure to promote to Team Manager in 1996/97. Furthermore, we AFFIRM the district court’s finding that Scott failed to prove pretext on her claim for discriminatory failure to promote to Team Manager in 1997/98 and 1998/99 because Scott has failed to come forward with competent evidence to support these claims. C. Scott’s Retaliation Claims Decided on the Merits 24 The district court concluded in regard to Scott’s retaliation claims growing out of her EEOC charge that Scott failed to produce evidence that Eastman decisionmakers knew that she filed an EEOC charge in 1997. Scott, 2005 WL 1325014, at . Scott argues the district court erred for two reasons. First, because the element of employer knowledge is not always an element for establishing a prima facie case of retaliation in the Sixth Circuit; sometimes it is part of the causal connection analysis. Second, Scott argues that she did produce evidence, either direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could infer that decisionmakers knew of her protected activities. 1. The Element of Employer Knowledge Regarding the element of employer knowledge, the district court concluded, The undisputed facts reflect that the only supervisory employee who had knowledge of the plaintiff’s charge was Don Sanders, who testified that he told no one about the charge. No allegation is made that Mr. Sanders engaged in retaliatory conduct. Plaintiff has failed to establish that each of the decision-makers, as to each alleged adverse employment action that she contends was in retaliation for the filing of her charge, had knowledge of the charge. Because the plaintiff has failed to pinpoint facts sufficient to establish a material dispute as to whether the decision-makers had knowledge of her charge, she cannot prove a prima facie case of retaliation. Id. at . Scott argues that the district court prematurely terminated the analysis of her retaliation claim at the prima facie stage, when some decisions in this Circuit treat knowledge as a consideration in assessing a causal connection, and not as a stand-alone element. In the Sixth Circuit, many cases list “employer knowledge” as the second element of the prima facie case. See Canitia v. Yellow Freight Sys., 903 F.2d 1064, 1066 (6th Cir. 1990) (listing the elements of a prima facie case for retaliation as “(1) that he engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) that this exercise of his protected civil rights was known to defendant; (3) that defendant thereafter took an employment 25 action adverse to the plaintiff; and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”). Yet in White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 796 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc), the court did not list knowledge as an independent element of a prima facie case. [T]o support a claim for retaliation under Title VII a “plaintiff must establish: (1) that he engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) that he was the subject of adverse employment action; and (3) that there exists a casual [sic] link between his protected activity and the adverse action of his employer.” Id. (citing Jackson v. RKO Bottlers of Toledo, Inc., 743 F.2d 370, 375 (6th Cir. 1984)); see also Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 638 (6th Cir. 1987) (same); Harris v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 80 F.3d 1107, 1118 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that some cases subsume the element of employer knowledge into the causal connection analysis). Regardless of whether employer knowledge is a stand-alone element of a prima facie case of retaliation, it is fairly clear from Sixth Circuit case law that employer knowledge of a plaintiff’s protected activity is required. As Eastman asserts, even to prove a causal connection, Scott must establish that the decisionmakers involved in the promotions at issue had knowledge of the protected activity, as one cannot retaliate against an employee for engaging in protected activity unless he knew the employee had done so.