Opinion ID: 1333537
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant's property interests in uninterrupted employment

Text: Appellant alleges that her suspension by the hospital superintendent violated procedural due process because she was deprived of property without a right to a hearing and an opportunity to present evidence or otherwise contest the reasons given for such a suspension. It is clear from the Supreme Court decision in Roth, supra, that the Constitution protects property interests beyond the traditional concept of real or personal property. The Court indicated that a benefit which merits protection as a property interest must be one to which there is more than a unilateral expectation. 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d at 561. Rather, there must exist rules or understandings which allow the claimant's expectations to be characterized as a legitimate claim of entitlement to [the benefit]. Ibid. Appellant contends that her interest in continued uninterrupted employment meets the standards set out in Roth. However, the situation here is not akin to that of the teacher in Roth who argued that a hearing was necessary before the University could refuse to rehire him. Here, no question arises as to the right of appellant to her position. Appellant was suspended for ten days, after which she resumed her position. Thus, the question is whether appellant has a legitimate claim of entitlement to remain on her job and earn a salary, part of which was denied her by virtue of the suspension. Although there is no direct pronouncement by this Court concerning a public employee's claim of entitlement to continued uninterrupted employment, a property interest clearly can be found in appellant's acknowledged status as a permanent employee entitled to security of tenure. State ex rel. Karnes v. Dadisman, 153 W.Va. 771, 781, 172 S.E.2d 561, 568 (1970). [6] It should be emphasized that the finding of a property interest on behalf of a permanent or covered civil service employee does not mean that such employee can never be suspended from employment. The consequence is that the suspension must be accomplished under appropriate due process procedures. Having found that appellant's interest in uninterrupted employment to be a property interest, we must consider whether a ten-day suspension is so minimal that due process protection need not be afforded. The de minimis concept was specifically discussed in Goss v. Lopez, supra , and the Court held that a ten-day suspension from school was not such a minimal deprivation that no due process procedure need be afforded. In North v. Board of Regents, supra , we adopted the Goss rule in interpreting our State's Due Process Clause. There, we concluded, as did Goss, that the extent of the deprivation would be a relevant consideration in determining the extent of the due process procedures afforded. We conclude that a ten-day suspension is not so minimal a deprivation of appellant's property interest in continued uninterrupted employment to require no due process procedural protection.