Opinion ID: 1162526
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Judicial and Congressional Proceedings

Text: In addition to the specific matters discussed above, the procedural history of Judge Claiborne's case raises disturbing questions about whether or not he received a full and fair opportunity to present his defense. As noted, prior to respondent's first trial, Judge Hoffman denied a series of pretrial motions filed by the defense. Respondent immediately appealed those rulings to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829, 105 S.Ct. 113, 83 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). As Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit has explained: At the time of the pre-trial appeal, the case against Judge Claiborne still included the charges relating to his alleged acceptance of a bribe intended to influence the results in an appeal before one of our panels. We as a court agreed, although in a rather informal manner, to recuse ourselves from hearing Judge Claiborne's pretrial appeal. The Chief Justice then specially selected a panel of three judges from other circuits to hear it. The special panel affirmed the pretrial rulings of the specially assigned district judge. 727 F.2d 842, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829, 105 S.Ct. 113, 83 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). See United States v. Claiborne, 781 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir.1986) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Upon the entry of the judgment of conviction in the second trial, Judge Claiborne again appealed to the Ninth Circuit. In explaining the Ninth Circuit's actions respecting that appeal, Judge Reinhardt stated: This time we took no action to recuse ourselves. In fact, we did nothing at all. Although the bribery charges that indirectly involved our court in the proceedings were no longer a part of the case, we simply failed to consider, formally or informally, the question whether we now had an obligation to hear the appeal or whether a new special panel should be appointed. Apparently acting on the assumption that our prior recusal was a continuing one, the Chief Justice specially selected another panel of three judges from other circuits to hear the appeal. Id. Noting that an overwhelming majority of the judges of the appellate court believed that they were not required to recuse themselves from voting on a critical aspect of the proceedings on appeal, Judge Reinhardt went on to explain why in his view the Court of Appeals had committed a serious error with serious consequences. Id. Judge Reinhardt wrote: Specifically, we erred when we failed to consider whether we should hear Judge Claiborne's appeal from his conviction or whether, instead, the appointment of a second special panel was required. Because of our error, outside judges were appointed to hear an appeal that we had an obligation to hear ourselves. Our court system is structured so that a defendant will normally have his trial and any appeals heard by judges residing in the circuit in which the charged crime was allegedly committed. Here, we erroneously, albeit inadvertently, deprived Judge Claiborne of this feature of our laws; en banc consideration of the Judge's case would have been a proper means of at least partially remedying our mistake. Rehearings en banc provide a means for ensuring that the law of our circuit is applied not only consistently but correctly. Here, as a result of our failure to act, judges from other circuits, not as familiar as we are with the precedents of our court, considered a case that we had a duty to hear. Judge Claiborne's appeal raises several issues of importance. In disposing of at least one of those issues, the special outside panel cited no authority from any appellate court, let alone a decision by the judges of this court. The special panel also stated that it was not following the result reached in two of the three district court opinions that it cited. 765 F.2d at 794-95. In my view, when a substantial question of law not previously decided by the judges of this court is decided by a panel of outside judges and we subsequently recognize that we have erred in failing to decide that question ourselves, it is our responsibility to grant en banc reconsideration. Id. at 1330-31 (footnotes omitted). In Judge Reinhardt's view, the fact that Judge Claiborne was, at that time, a United States District Judge from the Ninth Circuit may have figured in the decision of some of the judges of the Ninth Circuit to deny Judge Claiborne a rehearing en banc, because to do so might have raised an appearance of impropriety. In this regard, Judge Reinhardt stated: The fact that Harry Claiborne is a United States District Judge does not mean that he is less entitled than any other individual to the full benefit of the orderly procedures of this court. Those procedures, including en banc consideration, have been established to ensure that justice is done. Our en banc process is also designed, as I noted earlier, to ensure that the law of this circuit will be applied uniformly to all defendants. Judge Claiborne has just as much right to have his case considered en banc as any other defendant. En banc proceedings are different in one critical respect, however, from all other proceedings this court conducts: only the judges of our court can hear a case of ours en banc. There is no procedure in current law for obtaining an out-of-circuit en banc panel. This is true even when an appeal is heard initially by a specially selected panel of out-of-circuit judges. Thus, if in fact an appearance of impropriety existed here, the rule of necessity would apply, and we would be required to disregard that appearance. Accordingly, if a factor in our decision to deny Judge Claiborne en banc consideration of his case was our concern over an appearance of impropriety, we have, in my view, seriously misconstrued our duty as judges of this circuit. In doing so, we have, unfortunately, also denied Judge Claiborne equal justice. Id. at 1331-32. Moreover, in Judge Reinhardt's view, an equally significant appearance of impropriety would have existed regardless of whether Judge Claiborne's appeal was heard by the members of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, or by a panel of out-of-circuit judges. In Judge Reinhardt's opinion, the failure of the Ninth Circuit judges to grant an en banc rehearing allowed the record to rest with the appearance that Judge Claiborne may have been the object of adverse special treatment and, thus, the victim of injustice. Id. at 1332 (emphasis in original). Further, Judge Reinhardt concluded: Judge Claiborne is one of the few criminal defendants in the Ninth Circuit, if not in the nation, whose case has been handled, both in the District Court and in the Court of Appeals, exclusively by judges specially and specifically chosen to hear that particular case. There is, in my opinion, a rather substantial appearance of injustice when a defendant who claims he is the victim of a vendetta on the part of various branches and agencies of the Department of Justice is deprived of the opportunity to be judged by those who would normally preside over his case and instead is tried and convicted before, and has his appeal heard by, judges all of whom are specially selected for their assignments. There is no doubt that every step taken in appointing the specially designated judges fully complied with all existing statutes and rules. Moreover, there is no suggestion in this case that there was in fact anything improper about the designation of the judges, or that any of the judges involved in the selection process acted with anything less than the utmost integrity. Nevertheless, in a case in which the defendant contends that he is the object of a prosecutorial vendetta, in which the judges who heard the case were all specially selected under a process that permits the selector total discretion to choose whom he wishes, and in which we as a court erred in permitting the specially selected panel to hear the appeal, I believe that an en banc hearing is required  if for no other reason than to ameliorate, to the extent possible, the appearance of injustice. En banc consideration by the judges of this court, judges who were not specifically selected to hear Judge Claiborne's appeal, would have gone a considerable way towards accomplishing that objective. Unfortunately, as events unfolded, only an en banc review by this court or a hearing by the United States Supreme Court could have afforded Judge Claiborne consideration of his case by a tribunal that had all the appearances of fairness. All courts that have previously heard his case are open to the charge that they were specially selected for the purpose of ensuring the desired governmental objective. In my opinion, the proceedings thus far afforded Judge Claiborne fall far short of meeting the appearance of justice standard. Because of our obligation to administer justice in a manner that maintains confidence in the fairness and objectivity of the judicial system, I believe that it was our duty and responsibility to hear his case en banc. Id. at 1332-33 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). Although it is not our intention to invade the province of the federal courts, we are in sympathy with the views expressed by Judge Reinhardt. As detailed above, from the very inception of this case, there has been, at the very least, an appearance that respondent was unfairly targeted for investigation, unfairly indicted and unfairly tried and convicted. Further, as Judge Reinhardt indicates, there is also an appearance of injustice relating to the conduct of the appellate proceedings which suggests that respondent may well have received adverse special treatment and may well have been denied the full measure of his procedural rights solely on account of his office and position. Moreover, it appears that anomalous and arguably unfair procedures were imposed upon Judge Claiborne during the United States Senate impeachment proceedings. Specifically, for the first time in history, the Senate utilized an impeachment procedure whereby a twelve-member special committee was formed to receive evidence on behalf of the full Senate. See S.Res. 481, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), Senate Hearings, supra note 15, Pt. 1 at 2-3 (providing for the appointment of a committee to receive and to report evidence with respect to articles of impeachment against Harry E. Claiborne). [261] In recent remarks before the American Judicature Society, Senator Howell T. Heflin discussed the federal impeachment process in light of his experience during the impeachment proceedings involving Judge Claiborne. [262] Senator Heflin explained his perceptions of the special procedures invoked in Judge Claiborne's case, in part, as follows: In 1935, in an attempt to modernize the Senate impeachment process, the Senate adopted Rule 11 of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials... . Reportedly, this rule was adopted because of the high level of absenteeism among senators during the protracted trial of Judge Harold Louderback in 1933. This committee was first utilized by the Senate in the fall of 1986 to compile an official record of information and hear the testimony of Judge Claiborne and other witnesses. However, the committee was not allowed to make any recommendation whatsoever in regards to whether or not Judge Claiborne should be removed from office. The legitimacy of the committee was, itself, questioned  a challenge that I feel was indicative of the overall problems of the current impeachment process. I believe, however, that there is no question that the Senate was authorized to form such a committee. Constitutional justification for the creation of the Select Impeachment Committee lies in Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 of the Constitution, which states that, Each House (of Congress) may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.... Yet, even with the existence of the committee, there were tremendous problems in the overall impeachment process. One problem was that while the 12 senators on the select impeachment committee were well aware of the facts and issues in the case, this is not true for the rest of the Senate. The transcript of the Claiborne hearing totaled over 3500 pages, and it is highly improbable that many senators had time to review this material thoroughly. Not surprisingly, at the time of the actual trial on the Senate floor, a majority of the Senate had neither the benefit of the information in the report, nor the time to prepare properly for deciding Judge Claiborne's fate. Furthermore, after the committee finished its work and the matter went before the full Senate, the Senate leadership decided not to rehear committee witnesses but to accept the committee's written record, and to only allow the House managers, Judge Claiborne and his attorneys to make statements on the floor. During these statements on the Senate floor, approximately 40 members were not present in the Senate chamber during any portion of Judge Claiborne's closing statement and I estimate that at least 35 senators were never on the floor during the presentations by the prosecution and defense. Though other senators had some very important business to attend to, their absence from the proceedings (I hesitate to call it a trial) was not, in my judgment, fair to Judge Claiborne. While I believe that the Senate satisfied its constitutional responsibilities in the impeachment trial of Judge Harry Claiborne, I believe the process can, and should, work better. In the future  even, perhaps, in the immediate future  the Senate may be faced with a number of impeachment trials. A United States Senator cannot carry out his impeachment responsibilities if he neither participates in the committee hearing nor has an opportunity to gain knowledge of the case from a full trial on the Senate floor. (Emphasis added.) [263] Other Senators have also expressed criticism of the manner in which the Senate proceeded in Judge Claiborne's case. Senator Daniel J. Evans observed, for example, that [i]n prior impeachment cases, the full Senate had an opportunity to receive all the evidence directly. No committee was appointed to serve as a buffer between the accused and those responsible for making the final judgment. [264] Senator Evans further remarked: Our vote was the final word on Judge Claiborne's career. We were the trial court and the appellate court at the same time. It was thus incumbent upon us to take the utmost care to ensure that our proceedings were proper. I believe we lost sight of the fact that the procedures of justice are often more important than the substance of the laws in creating the perception of fairness. (Emphasis added.) [265] Senator Carl M. Levin also criticized aspects of the process employed during respondent's impeachment trial and noted that the full Senate deprived itself of a crucial feature of the fact-finding process, the opportunity to evaluate first-hand the demeanor and credibility of witnesses. Commenting that only the twelve members of the Senate comprising the impeachment panel had such an opportunity, Senator Levin observed: The rule 11 committee did an excellent job of developing a record. I have the greatest respect for the members and staff of the committee  they had a difficult job and they discharged it with dignity and devotion. The record they developed is essential to understanding the case. But, in my view, it was not adequate to let the Senate make findings in those disputed areas where witness demeanor or credibility is critical to the process of determining what the facts are. The Senate, as a finder of fact, did not hear or see a single witness. And, as a result, our ability to fairly reach decisions, when the facts were in dispute, was restricted. To reach a judgment on issues involving disputed facts where the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses are important, I believe the Senate needed to see the witnesses  as the rule 11 committee did  and not just see a record or even tapes of witnesses testifying. When we voted not to hear any additional witnesses, we set up a process which made it impossible for the Senate, as the finder of fact, to fully and fairly evaluate the credibility of witnesses. [266] (Emphasis added.) Thus, whether or not one is persuaded that respondent's conviction and his removal from office were justified by the facts, there can be little doubt that an appearance and atmosphere of procedural impropriety has plagued his case from its inception. An additional circumstance contributing to the general perception and appearance of injustice surrounding this matter warrants our discussion. Following the first trial, respondent's counsel filed motions seeking the recusal or disqualification of Judge Hoffman from further participation in the case. [267] The initial motion alleged that bystanders and courtroom observers had reported that Judge Hoffman appeared to be partial towards the prosecution, and biased against the Defendant. Therefore, defense counsel requested Judge Hoffman to deliberately and consciously assess his state of mind with reference to the foregoing matters and determine whether or not: (a) his impartiality might reasonably be questioned; (b) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning the Defendant; (c) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning the Defendant's counsel; or (d) he has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning a proceeding. [268] In subsequent supplemental pleadings, defense counsel alleged specific instances wherein Judge Hoffman had purportedly demonstrated bias and prejudice toward respondent. On June 22, 1984, Judge Hoffman filed a thirty-six page order denying respondent's motion and responding to each factual allegation suggesting bias or the appearance of bias or prejudice on Judge Hoffman's part. [269] Again, following the second trial, respondent filed post-conviction motions (1) to vacate his judgment of conviction and sentence; (2) for evidentiary hearings; (3) for discovery proceedings; and (4) for a new trial. [270] On July 15, 1986, Judge Hoffman entered an order apprising the parties that on July 8, 1986, Chief Justice Burger had designated him to continue as the presiding judge in any further post-conviction proceedings arising out of respondent's criminal case. [271] Judge Hoffman's order further observed that counsel for Claiborne had not assigned as error on appeal Judge Hoffman's prior refusal to recuse himself from presiding over the trial. Judge Hoffman concluded, therefore, that any further motions for recusal and specific allegations of bias and prejudice must be confined to acts, words or events occurring since the last order denying recusal was entered. Accordingly, Judge Hoffman allowed defense counsel fifteen days within which: [T]o file any appropriate motion for recusal, specifically alleging facts in support of any charge of bias and prejudice on the part of the undersigned United States District Judge, but such allegations of fact shall be limited to acts, words or events occurring since the entry of the last order denying the motion to recuse, filed in late July, 1984. If such motion is not filed, the Court will assume that no acts, words or events indicating bias or prejudice of the undersigned judge in fact exist. [272] In response, on July 28, 1986, defense counsel filed a Verified Motion for Judicial Disqualification or Recusal. [273] Counsel asserted that Judge Hoffman should recuse himself from further participation in the case because of (1) attitudinal bias and partisanship ... in favor of the prosecution herein and against the Defendant; and (2) [t]he appearance of impropriety. In this regard, defense counsel noted that a motion had been filed on behalf of respondent in the Court of Appeals seeking the designation of a judge from within the Ninth Circuit to preside over any post-conviction proceedings. Further, counsel observed that he had received a letter from Judge Hoffman, dated July 11, 1986, in which Judge Hoffman stated that he had written to Chief Judge Browning of the Ninth Circuit with respect to the need for a new designation if there was any desire for me to hear the post-conviction motions. [274] On October 6, 1986, after further pleadings addressing this issue were submitted, Judge Hoffman entered an order denying the motion of judicial disqualification. [275] Judge Hoffman stated that he entertained no feeling of bias or prejudice against Judge Claiborne as evidenced by the record and transcripts.... [276] We do not suggest that defense counsel set forth sufficient factual allegations of bias or prejudice on the part of Judge Hoffman to warrant the reversal of respondent's conviction; nor do we suggest that Judge Hoffman was, in fact, biased or prejudiced against respondent. We have, however, considered counsel's allegations and Judge Hoffman's conduct of the legal proceedings in the context of the overall atmosphere and appearance of injustice associated with the federal proceedings involving respondent. In this context, we regretfully conclude that a number of Judge Hoffman's rulings may have contributed to a perception that respondent was subjected to anomalous and prejudicial procedures in the course of the proceedings against him. Specifically, we refer to: (1) Judge Hoffman's refusal to allow evidentiary hearings respecting many of respondent's accusations of investigative and governmental misconduct; (2) his rulings relative to the Brady and Jencks Act material; (3) his rulings in connection with the prosecution's demands for notices of alibi; and (4) his denial of the defense motion for a continuance prior to the first trial. We also note that Judge Hoffman ordered the sequestration of a critical defense witness, Judy Ahlstrom, during a recess in the second trial. [277] Respondent's counsel has alleged that up until that point no such action had been taken preventing a witness from communicating with counsel during a recess. Accordingly, respondent has asserted that Judge Hoffman's action unfairly prevented defense counsel from attempting to reassure and calm Ms. Ahlstrom and allow her to collect her thoughts after she was visibly shaken by a particularly grueling cross-examination. [278] Again we stress that although these and similar allegations do not establish actual bias or prejudice against respondent during the conduct of the trial, they do contribute to the aforementioned perception and appearance of injustice and suggest that special adverse and prejudicial procedures were imposed upon respondent. In sum, these circumstances are relevant to our deliberations in two respects. First, we consider them in the context of the punishment thus far exacted during the course of respondent's trials and incarceration. See In re Ross, 99 Nev. 657, 660, 668 P.2d 1089, 1092 (1983). Second, of course, they detract from the weight which we would ordinarily accord a judgment of conviction. In our view, the record suggests that respondent may have been subjected to special adverse treatment restricting his right to established procedures. The imposition of special procedures in respondent's case may well have restricted his ability to present and defend his position fully. Accordingly, these circumstances reflect upon the punishment respondent has suffered, as well as the weight which should be accorded his conviction, for the purpose of assessing disciplinary sanctions. Lastly, we observe that two additional circumstances reflect upon the unusual procedures and the extent of the punishment thus far imposed in the protracted course of this matter. At this court's hearing in Las Vegas on November 24, 1987, for example, more than one witness alluded to the scorn and notoriety attached to the judicial and congressional proceedings and the obvious torment respondent suffered as a result of that notoriety. [279] Unquestionably, as discussed below, the scorn and ignominy respondent has suffered as a result of the protracted federal judicial proceedings and the ensuing impeachment proceedings has been substantial. In June of 1987, following his removal from office and after serving thirteen months in prison, respondent was released from prison to a federally supervised halfway house in Las Vegas to complete his term. [280] In all, respondent served seventeen months of his two-year term before he was fully released from confinement. [281]