Opinion ID: 3151464
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Colorado Sentencing Law

Text: Â¶9Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Colorado divides felonies into six classes, with class one being more serious than class two, and so on. See Â§ 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A), C.R.S. (2015). Each class has a presumptive sentencing range. For example, the presumptive range for a class three felony runs from four to twelve years. Id. If a court sentences a defendant to prison, it typically does so by selecting a definite number of years within the presumptive range. In extraordinary cases, courts have leeway to depart upward to twice the presumptive maximum or downward to half the presumptive minimum. See Â§ 18-1.3-401(6).
Â¶10Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Those convicted of a sex offense, who committed their crimes after November 1, 1998, are subject to the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act (âLSAâ). See Â Â§Â§ 18-1.3-1001 to -1012. The LSA authorizes lifetime treatment and supervision of felony sex offenders. See Â§ 18-1.3-1001. Courts must sentence violent sex offenders to the custody of the Department of Corrections for an indeterminate term, see Â§ 18-1.3-1004(1), but some non-violent sex offenders are eligible for probation, see Â§Â§ 18-1.3-1004(2), -1007. See generally Vensor, 151 P.3d at 1276â77 (discussing the LSAâs effects on the prior sentencing system). Â¶11Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â An indeterminate sentence has a minimum term and a maximum term. The minimum term is a specific number of years selected by the sentencing court from an applicable range. Â§ 18-1.3-1004. The maximum term is the offenderâs natural life. Id. Â Thus, a court imposing an indeterminate sentence will arrive at a sentence of some minimum number of years to life. After the minimum term is served, release depends not on the passage of time but on the offenderâs rehabilitation and whether he constitutes a continuing threat to society. See Â§Â§ 18-1.3-1006, -1009 (establishing procedures and criteria for release).
Â¶12Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Crimes of violence form another category of offenses. There is a statutory definition of âcrime of violenceâ that involves specified offenses with aggravating facts. See Â§ 18-1.3-406(2). These crimes are âdefinedâ crimes of violence. Other crimes are treated as crimes of violence even though they do not meet the statutory definition. These âper seâ crimes of violence have been designated by the legislature in certain statutes defining offenses. See Terry v. People, 977 P.2d 145, 149 (Colo. 1999) (Terry II) (citing People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374 (Colo. 1990) (Terry I)) (identifying per se crimes of violence as those where the legislature requires a court to sentence a defendant âin accordance withâ the crime of violence statute); see also Hunsaker, Â¶Â¶ 14, 18 n.2 (citing People v. Banks, 9 P.3d 1125, 1130 (Colo. 2000)). Â¶13Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Crimes of violence receive enhanced sentences according to a scheme found in section 18-1.3-406(1). Section 406(1)(a) requires sentencing courts to use a heightened range that begins at the midpoint of the presumptive range and ends at twice the presumptive rangeâs maximum. This sectionâ406(1)(a)âdeals with crimes of violence generally, while section 406(1)(b) concerns sex offenses that also âconstitute[]â crimes of violence. Â§ 18-1.3-406(1)(b). Section 406(1)(b) provides in relevant part: [A]ny person convicted of a sex offense, as defined in section 18-1.3-1003(5), committed on or after November 1, 1998, that constitutes a crime of violence shall be sentenced to the department of corrections forÂ an indeterminate term of incarceration of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range specified in section 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A) up to a maximum of the personâs natural life, as provided in section 18-1.3-1004(1). Id. Both defined crimes of violence and per se crimes of violence âconstituteâ crimes of violence under section 406(1)(b). Hunsaker, Â¶Â¶ 14, 18â19. Â¶14Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The lowest possible minimum term for the enhanced range is the midpoint of the presumptive range. Â§ 18-1.3-406(1)(b). The statute is ambiguous as to what marks the high end for a minimum term, but this is the precise question we answered in Hunsaker (which was decided after the parties submitted their briefs in this case but before we heard oral arguments). In Hunsaker, we read section 406(1)(b) alongside section 406(1)(a) and the relevant legislative history, and we concluded that the enhanced range for the minimum term tops out at double the presumptive rangeâs upper limit. See Hunsaker, Â¶Â¶ 14, 22â27 (â[I]n enacting the LSA, the General Assembly did not intend to change mandatory sentencing for violent sex offenses.â). Â¶15Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Thus, a court sentencing a defendant for a sex offense that is also a per se crime of violence still imposes an indeterminate sentence with a maximum term of the offenderâs natural life, but the crime-of-violence enhancement boosts the minimum term.