Opinion ID: 874886
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constructive Amendment and Variance

Text: Johnson asserts that the charging document did not support a jury instruction on aiding and abetting, and that consequently, the jury instruction constituted an impermissible variance or a constructive amendment. [1] Whether there is a variance or constructive amendment is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. See State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 565, 861 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Ct.App.1993). A variance between the charging document and the verdict is fatal when the record suggests the possibility that the defendant was misled or embarrassed in the preparation or presentation of his defense. State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 418, 716 P.2d 1182, 1190 (1985) (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82-84, 55 S.Ct. 629, 630-31, 79 L.Ed. 1314, 1318-19 (1935)). Johnson argues there is a variance because the facts the jury would have to find to convict Johnson of aiding and abetting differ from the facts alleged in the indictment. Johnson further argues this variance was fatal because it prejudiced her in the preparation and presentation of her defense. A constructive amendment occurs when the charging terms of the charging document have been altered literally or in effect. United States v. Dipentino, 242 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir.2001). The constructive amendment doctrine springs from the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215-16, 80 S.Ct. 270, 272-73, 4 L.Ed.2d 252, 255-56 (1960). The Fifth Amendment right to an indictment by a grand jury is not a due process right that applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 n. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2660 n. 25, 33 L.Ed.2d 626, 643 n. 25 (1972). Nonetheless, the Idaho Constitution contains a provision with similar wording to the Fifth Amendment, on which the constructive amendment prohibition is based. [2] See Idaho Const. art I, § 8. The Idaho Court of Appeals has appropriately applied the constructive amendment analysis to this Idaho constitutional provision. See Colwell, 124 Idaho at 566, 861 P.2d at 1231. Johnson argues that in Idaho the charging document must contain facts showing the defendant aided and abetted, and that the failure to charge aiding and abetting in the indictment was a violation of due process.
Johnson asserts there was a constructive amendment because the jury was asked to determine whether the State proved an element not charged in the indictment. Johnson argues that aiding and abetting contains a separate mens rea elementa community of purpose in the unlawful undertakingand a separate actus reus element proof that the defendant participated in or assisted, encouraged, solicited, or counseled the crime. However, this argument overlooks Idaho's statutory abolition of the distinction between accessories and principals. Idaho Code § 19-1430 provides: Distinction between accessories and principals abolished.The distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal and between principals in the first and second degree, in cases of felony, is abrogated; and all persons concerned in the commission of a felony, whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, though not present, shall hereafter be prosecuted, tried, and punished as principals, and no other facts need be alleged in any indictment against such an accessory than are required in an indictment against his principal. Thus, Idaho, consistent with many other jurisdictions, has abolished the distinction between principals and aiders and abettors, and instead treats aiding and abetting as a theory under which first-degree murder can be proved and not as a separate offense or a crime of a different nature. See State v. Ayres, 70 Idaho 18, 25, 211 P.2d 142, 145 (1949) (holding the information charges one offense (involuntary manslaughter) and that it was sufficient to put defendant on trial upon either the theory that he was a principal or the theory that he was an aider and abettor); see also, e.g., United States v. Ginyard, 511 F.3d 203, 211 (D.C.Cir.2008) (Aiding and abetting is not a separate offense; it is only a theory of liabilityone ground upon which the jury may find him liable for the charged offense.); United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d 377, 383 (2d Cir.1999) (holding aiding and abetting is not a discrete criminal offense); Londono-Gomez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 699 F.2d 475, 476 (9th Cir.1983) ([T]he aiding and abetting statute does not define a separate offense but rather makes punishable as a principal one who aids or abets another in the commission of a substantive offense.). However, Johnson argues the last clause of I.C. § 19-1430, which states that it is unnecessary to allege facts other than what is required in a charging document against a principal, is procedural, is in conflict with I.C.R. 7, and thus, is of no effect. Idaho Criminal Rule 7(b) provides that [t]he indictment or the information shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. When a statute and rule can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no conflict between them, they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way that results in a conflict. See State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 543, 700 P.2d 942, 946 (1985) (Bakes, J., dissenting). Here, the statute and the rule, I.C. § 19-1430 and I.C.R. 7, can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no conflict between them. Idaho Criminal Rule 7(b) requires the charging document be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. Idaho Code § 19-1430 then provides that in the case of aiding and abetting, the essential facts are only those facts that are required in charging the principal. Thus, the rule and the statute can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no conflict between them. Furthermore, even if a conflict did exist between I.C.R. 7 and I.C. § 19-1430, the statute would prevail. When there is a conflict between a statute and a criminal rule, this Court must determine whether the conflict is one of procedure or one of substance; if the conflict is procedural, the criminal rule will prevail. State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 863, 828 P.2d 891, 892 (1992). Although a clear line of demarcation cannot always be delineated between what is substantive and what is procedural, the following general guidelines provide a useful framework for analysis. Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct and punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates, defines, and regulates primary rights. In contrast, practice and procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are effectuated. Id. at 863-64, 828 P.2d at 892-93 (emphasis removed) (quoting Currington, 108 Idaho at 541, 700 P.2d at 944 (quoting State v. Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498, 527 P.2d 674, 676-77 (1974))). [L]egislation is a constitutional exercise of the Legislature's power to enact substantive law [and] that legislation is to be given due deference and respect. In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 614, 623 (1995). Johnson argues that although the first part of I.C. § 19-1430 is substantive, the last clause stating no other facts need be alleged in any indictment against such an accessory than are required in an indictment against his principal, is procedural. However, the last clause pertains more than to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts; it is defining and regulating the mechanism for giving the defendant notice when that defendant committed a felony as an accessory. The statute abrogates the distinction between principals and accessories and mandates the defendant be prosecuted, tried, and punished as [a] principal[].... I.C. § 19-1430. A conclusion that the entire statute is substantive is further supported by I.C. § 18-204, which defines principals as: [a]ll persons concerned in the commission of a crime ... whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense or aid and abet in its commission.... Together, I.C. § 18-204 and I.C. § 19-1430 show a legislative intent to consider defendants as principals whether they directly committed the crime or aided and abetted in the commission of the crime. The Legislature's definition of principal and abolishment of the distinction between principal and accessories does not pertain to mechanical operations of the courts; the Legislature is creating, defining, and regulating primary rights. Thus, I.C. § 19-1430 is substantive and does not overlap with this Court's power to create procedural rules. Therefore, even if I.C. § 19-1430 and I.C.R. 7(b) were in conflict, the statute would prevail. In conclusion, we hold that there is no conflict between I.C. § 19-1430 and I.C.R. 7(b), that I.C. § 19-1430 is substantive, and that in Idaho, it is unnecessary to allege any facts in the charging document other than what is required in a charging document against a principal.
Johnson also asserts her due process rights were violated by the lack of reference to aiding and abetting in the charging document. First, relying on Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993 (9th Cir.2007), Johnson argues the notice required by the Fourteenth Amendment must come from the charging document itself. Gautt recognizes the Sixth Amendment's and Fourteenth Amendment's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the charges made in order to adequately prepare a defense. Id. at 1002-03. The Ninth Circuit expressed doubt that sources outside the charging document could provide the necessary notice. However, Gautt does not actually hold sources outside the charging document cannot ever provide the necessary notice. Id. at 1010 ([F]or purposes of our analysis today, we will assume-without deciding-that such sources can be parsed for evidence of notice to the defendant....). Moreover, in Gautt, the Ninth Circuit was looking at notice of the actual underlying charge and not a theory of liability; the Ninth Circuit observed that a court can look to sources outside the charging document to determine whether a defendant had adequate notice of a particular theory of the case. Id. at 1009 (citing Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 953-54 (9th Cir.2001), in which the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant charged with first-degree murder was provided constitutionally sufficient notice to support a felony murder jury instruction). Here, aiding and abetting was not the actual underlying charge, it was a theory of liability. [3] See Ayres, 70 Idaho at 25, 211 P.2d at 145. Second, Johnson argues the facts constituting the crime of aiding and abetting are elements, and thus, must be charged in the charging document in order to meet due process requirements. Johnson asserts the charging document must contain the elements of the offense and that a defendant must be put on notice of all of the elements of the crime essential to the punishment sought to be inflicted. For support Johnson cites to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 510-18, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2373-2377, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, 466-471 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring), and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 232, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 1218, 143 L.Ed.2d 311, 319 (1999), where the Court stated: Much turns on the determination that a fact is an element of an offense rather than a sentencing consideration, given that elements must be charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt. The Tenth Circuit considered and rejected the same argument Johnson makes here. See United States v. Alexander, 447 F.3d 1290, 1298-99 (10th Cir.2006), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 315, 166 L.Ed.2d 236 (2006). In Alexander the Tenth Circuit considered Jones and Apprendi and held that a charge of the predicate crime puts defendant on notice that the jury may be instructed on aiding and abetting, thus satisfying any due process concerns. Id. at 1299; see also United States v. Creech, 408 F.3d 264, 273 (5th Cir.2005) (holding Apprendi does not upset the long-standing practice of giving aiding and abetting jury instructions even when that theory is not charged in the indictment; thus, there is no Fifth Amendment violation). Johnson asserts Alexander is unpersuasive because it distinguishes Jones and Apprendi on the basis that those cases addressed what is required to increase a punishment. However, Alexander's holding did not depend upon that distinction; it held that due process was satisfied because the defendant had notice of the predicate crime and because aiding and abetting is not a separate offense but is a variant of the underlying offense. 447 F.3d at 1299. In Idaho there is no distinction between principals and aiders and abettors, and it is unnecessary the charging document allege any facts other than what is necessary to convict a principal. I.C. § 19-1430. Johnson contends that in light of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, Ayres and its progeny should be overruled because Ayres, which bases its ruling on I.C. § 19-1430, in essence, holds that the Idaho Legislature can legislate away the rights of individuals protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Many jurisdictions have held that it is unnecessary to charge aiding and abetting in the charging document and that there is no due process violation when a court gives an aiding and abetting jury instruction even when aiding and abetting is not charged in the charging document. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 400 F.3d 816, 820 (9th Cir. 2005) (We have also held a number of times in different contexts that aiding and abetting is embedded in every federal indictment for a substantive crime.); United States v. Dodd, 43 F.3d 759, 762 n. 5 (1st Cir.1995) (stating it is not necessary to plead an aiding and abetting charge because that charge is implicit in all indictments for substantive offenses); United States v. Clark, 980 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir.1992) (It is well established that a defendant may be convicted of aiding and abetting even though he was not charged in that capacity. Aiding and abetting is an alternative charge in every count, whether implicit or explicit.) (citation omitted); United States v. Iglesias, 915 F.2d 1524, 1528 (11th Cir.1990) (One who has been indicted as a principal may be convicted on evidence showing only that he aided and abetted the offense.); Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir.1980) ([T]he giving of an aiding and abetting instruction does not violate due process where the state has abolished the distinction between principals and accessories, and where there is evidence before the jury to support the instruction.); United States v. Beardslee, 609 F.2d 914, 919 (8th Cir.1979) (rejecting the argument that defendant's due process rights were violated by an aiding and abetting instruction when the indictment did not explicitly charge him with aiding and abetting); Glass v. United States, 328 F.2d 754, 756 (7th Cir.1964) (holding there was no error in giving an instruction on aiding and abetting when defendant was not charged with aiding and abetting because [a]iders and abettors ... are chargeable directly as principals.); People v. Garrison, 47 Cal.3d 746, 254 Cal.Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419, 433 n. 12 (1989) ([I]n California the definition of a principal has historically included those who aid and abet ... and notice as a principal is sufficient to support a conviction as an aider or abettor.); Hoskins v. State, 441 N.E.2d 419, 425 (Ind.1982) (One can be charged as a principal and convicted on proof that he aided or abetted another in committing the crime.); State v. Satern, 516 N.W.2d 839, 843 (Iowa 1994) (holding it was not a surprise or unfair to the defendant for the state to pursue a theory of aiding and abetting at trial when the charging document did not refer to aiding and abetting); State v. Pennington, 254 Kan. 757, 869 P.2d 624, 629 (1994) (holding defendant's due process rights were not violated by a jury instruction on aiding and abetting; it is unnecessary for the State to charge aiding and abetting in the charging document in order to pursue that theory at trial); People v. Rivera, 84 N.Y.2d 766, 622 N.Y.S.2d 671, 646 N.E.2d 1098, 1099 (1995) (Traditionally, it has been permissible to charge and admit evidence convicting a defendant as an accessory where an indictment charges only conduct as a principal); State v. Johnson, 272 N.W.2d 304, 305 (S.D. 1978) (It is settled law that a conviction may be supported by proof that the defendant was an aider and abettor even though the charging instrument charges him as a principal.). Therefore, because Idaho has abolished the distinction between principals and aiders and abettors, and because it is well-established in Idaho that it is unnecessary to charge the defendant with aiding and abetting, we hold there was no variance, constructive amendment, or due process violation. Moreover, even if there were a variance, Johnson was not prejudiced in the preparation of her defense. First, the State did not introduce evidence of a possible third party shooter; rather, it was Johnson who argued that she could not have been the actual shooter. Second, the State's proposed jury instructions submitted before trial included a jury instruction on aiding and abetting. Thus, Johnson was not misled or embarrassed in the preparation of her defense.