Opinion ID: 70234
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: U.S.S.G. Sec. 2B3.1(b)(2)(A)

Text: 37 The robbery guideline provides the base offense level for carjacking, and is found at section 2B3.1(a). Section 2B3.1(b) lists several specific offense characteristics for robbery offenses, including a seven-level increase [i]f a firearm was discharged. U.S.S.G. Sec. 2B3.1(b)(2)(A). Williams objected to the application of this offense characteristic, arguing that he did not fire his gun until after Donaldson began driving away; therefore, he only fired after the commission of the carjacking. Initially, the district court found that the offense level increase was proper based on these shots, thereby rejecting Williams's attempt to separate them from the offense. Later, in response to Williams's request for a specific finding, the district court reasoned that Williams drew his firearm, which then caused Donaldson to discharge his firearm during the commission of the carjacking. 38 In Sentencing Guidelines cases, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its application of law to those facts de novo. See United States v. Salemi, 26 F.3d 1084, 1086 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 612, 130 L.Ed.2d 521 (1994). The district court found that Donaldson fired his firearm as Williams was committing the carjacking, and that seconds later, Williams fired shots as Donaldson was driving away. These findings of fact are not clearly erroneous; indeed, both parties agree that this is what transpired. We, therefore, must apply the guidelines to these facts de novo. 39 Neither section 2B3.1(b)(2)(A), nor its commentary, precisely specify who must discharge the firearm or when it must be fired. Specific offense characteristics, however, shall be determined on the basis of all acts and omissions committed [or] induced ... that occurred during the commission of the offense ... or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(1). We read this language as supporting both of the district court's reasons for applying the offense level increase. 40 First, we find that Williams discharged his firearm during the commission of the offense. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(1). Crimes involving robbery cannot be completed without some form of flight or attempted flight, the crime is more naturally understood to include the act of fleeing and the immediate consequences of such flight. United States v. Muhammad, 948 F.2d 1449, 1456 (6th Cir.1991) (affirming increase pursuant to section 2B3.1(b)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1119, 112 S.Ct. 1239, 117 L.Ed.2d 472 (1992). Thus, although Williams argues otherwise, the commission of the carjacking did not magically cease the moment he backed away from Whitehead's truck; therefore, the shots he fired were discharged during the commission of the carjacking. Furthermore, we also find that Williams discharged his weapon in an effort to avoid detection or responsibility. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(1). In firing his weapon, in any direction, Williams made certain that Donaldson continued to drive away, so that he could then make a clean departure from the scene of the crime. 41 Finally, we also agree with the district court's second explanation for the increase. When Williams attempted the carjacking with his weapon drawn, he induced Donaldson to fire his weapon; thus, Donaldson's act of shooting is attributable to Williams for purposes of the offense level increase. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(A).