Opinion ID: 196676
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Assignability of Certificate of Title

Text: D. Assignability of Certificate of Title One National contends that it acquired the right to proceed against Antonellis through assignment of the certificate.6 Specifically, it states that because Milford 6 In fact, it proves difficult to determine the intended scope of ONB's assignment argument. Before the court below, it contended that as assignee of the mortgage it had all the rights of Milford Savings Bank once the mortgage was assigned and duly recorded . . . which would include all rights against the -16- entered into a contract with Antonellis for the issuance of the title certificate and then assigned the fruits of the contract to ONB, ONB has the right to proceed against Antonellis. The crux of the issue, it claims, is whether the certificate was transferrable by Milford to ONB. Essentially, ONB asks that we allow it to step into Milford's shoes as a client merely because it was assigned the certificate that was the product of the attorney-client relationship. Noting that the disclaimer barred reliance by a title insurer, not assignment, it argues that although the transferability of a certificate of title has apparently not been addressed by the Massachusetts courts, they would hold the assignment valid. ONB makes its argument by analogy to the law's general favor towards assignability of contracts and contract rights, and the fact that Massachusetts allows assignments of many types of claims, including contract damages. See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 106 2-210(2). It also makes an analogy to other jurisdictions' acceptance of assignments of certifying attorney Antonellis. (Appdx. at 50). It did not specify which rights it referred to. In its brief to this court, ONB argued that the gist of the tort of legal malpractice is the lawyer's breach of contract, and that ONB acquired a legal malpractice claim with the certificate, stating that if Milford's assignment to ONB is treated as an assignment of a malpractice claim, the Supreme Judicial Court would hold the assignment valid. (Brief of Appellant at 27). Of course, since ONB did not raise below a claim that a legal malpractice claim was assigned, they cannot do so here. See Ondine Shipping Corp. v. United States, 24 F.3d 353, 355 (1st Cir. 1994); Clauson v. Smith, 823 F.2d 660, 666 (1st Cir. 1987) (collecting cases). However, in its reply brief ONB states that it was not arguing that the action involved an assignment of a malpractice claim, but rather the real issue was whether the certificate was transferable. Since we deem that this real issue was included within the scope of its argument below, we address their claim. -17- legal malpractice claims. See, e.g., Oppel v. Empire Mutual Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 1305, 1306-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Thurston v. Continential Casualty Co., 567 A.2d 922, 923 (Me. 1989). One National recognizes that others might object to selling the product of legal services as inconsistent with the personal and fiduciary character of the attorney-client relationship. See Dunne v. Cunningham, 125 N.E. 560, 561 (Mass. 1920) (commenting on the highly fiduciary relationship between attorney and client). Without citing any direct authority in its support, ONB contends that the assignment illustrates the inherently weak nature of the relationship where the attorney merely plays a standardized role of reporting the state of the public records. See Fall River Savings Bank v. Callahan, 463 N.E.2d 555, 561 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984) (noting the standardized nature of passing on a title); 1 Mallen & Smith, supra, at 25.8 (setting out the process and describing potential liabilities). Thus, since the purpose of the relationship is not to give advice or counselling but to produce a formal certificate, ONB maintains, the transfer would not jeopardize any public policy favoring the attorney-client relationship. The district court addressed ONB's assignment contention within the context of its discussion of Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93, 70. It rejected One National's position that an assignee should have the same fiduciary relationship with the assignor's attorney as the assignor, the original mortgagee, enjoyed, on two bases. We address the first, which draws on the -18- language of section 70, in our discussion of that section, infra. The district court's second basis for rejecting ONB's position was that ONB's argument does not arise out of the common law governing the unique attorney-client relationship -- a personal relationship, voluntarily assumed, which is governed by disciplinary rules. Under de novo review, we also find that the attorney-client relationship between Antonellis and Milford plays a crucial role in determining whether the certificate was transferable. Massachusetts case law offers little specific guidance on this issue, but we find that an analysis of their treatment of the attorney-client relationship in the context of claims for negligent certification of title proves illustrative. First, as was noted above, the nature of the attorney-client relationship, including the obligation of confidentiality and application of the disciplinary rules, has consistently been cited by the Massachusetts courts within this context. See, e.g., Spinner, 631 N.E.2d at 545. This indicates that the courts do not see the attorney-client relationship in this context as inherently weak, as ONB suggests. Significantly, in Hendrickson v. Sears, which involved a suit by the purchasers of real estate against the attorney they hired for the title search, the Court noted the differences between legal and medical malpractice actions in its analysis, 310 N.E.2d at 134, and commented that [t]he client is not an expert; he cannot be expected to recognize professional negligence if he sees it, and he should not be expected to watch over the -19- professional or to retain a second professional to do so. The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary in its nature. Id. at 135. Nowhere does the Court's language suggest that the fiduciary relationship of an attorney and client is diminished because the services the attorney rendered were highly standardized. Similarly, in Schlecht v. Smith, the district court addressed the attorney's failure to record the mortgage, at his client's request, within the context of the disciplinary rules. Schlecht, 1994 WL 621594 at  5. Again, nothing suggests that the rules' force is somehow diminished. Second, in Fall River Savings Bank v. Callahan, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts noted the standardized nature of title searches. 463 N.E.2d at 561 (There may be no definite rules which prescribe a right or wrong way to conduct a deposition but certain rules have evolved for passing on a title.). The court found that fact significant in deciding that a court may use commentaries to establish the standard of care in the land conveyance context, since that is an area of law practice which lends itself particularly to formulation through decisional law and commentary as to what are appropriate procedures. Id. But even as it recognized the standardization of this area, the Court treated the attorney-client relationship as it would in any other context, as carrying with it all the attendant duties and responsibilities. Id. This approach makes intuitive sense. Even though the practices for searching title are standardized, the disciplinary -20- rules apply as they would in any attorney-client relationship, and the attorney is subject to liability for malpractice. The duties attendant to the fiduciary relationship between the attorney and client are in full force. See Dunne, 125 N.E. at 561 (noting that the principles relating to an attorney's fiduciary duties are recognized as binding in all their amplitude.). Thus the unspecified public policy concerns that ONB tells us would not be jeopardized -- presumably, protecting the attorney's ability to function effectively, client confidentiality, the integrity of the bench and bar, and the ethical administration of justice, see Berman v. Coakley, 137 N.E. 667, 670-71 (Mass. 1923) (Public policy hardly can touch matters of more general concern than the maintenance of an untarnished standard of conduct by the attorney at law toward his client.); 1 Mallen & Smith, supra, at 11.5, 11.12, 12.4, 13.2 -- are still implicated. In sum, since the case law clearly indicates that the Massachusetts courts do not consider the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship to be attenuated in this certificate of title context, and in the absence of further guidance from the Massachusetts courts, we refuse to allow a third party, of whom the attorney does not know, to assume the rights of a client through assignment. We therefore find that One National did not acquire the right to proceed against Antonellis through assignment of the certificate of title.