Opinion ID: 1168029
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Errors in the Conduct of the Trial

Text: One error charged by defendant's counsel was the refusal of the trial court to exclude witnesses from the courtroom until after they had been sworn, the swearing having taken place immediately following the prosecution's opening statement. No authorities are cited to substantiate the claim of error which seems to be founded in the fact that the witnesses, by hearing the opening statement, would know the prosecution's theory of the case prior to the time they were called upon to testify. They point to the evidence regarding defendant's sobriety and say that the testimony was just too pat to have been spontaneous and uninfluenced. Counsel admit that the exclusion of witnesses is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and they do not insist that such discretion was abused. We think that whenever exclusion of witnesses is indicated, the better practice is to make the exclusion at the beginning of the trial. However, defendant's arguments fail to convince us either that the court's discretion was abused or that defendant was prejudiced. It is argued that the court erred in permitting Mike Barquin to testify He [defendant] was not drunk in response to the question, Do you have an opinion whether he was drunk or not? Although a lay witness may be allowed to testify as to his opinion on the sobriety of an individual if he states the facts upon which the opinion is based, [1] the witness' answer in the instant situation was unresponsive and therefore should have been stricken upon the request of defendant's counsel. Nevertheless, the facts regarding defendant's behavior had been recited previously by Barquin; and even without the expression of his opinion, the jury was informed of his reaction as to defendant's behavior. Accordingly, there would seem to have been no prejudicial error. It is insisted that the court erred in overruling an objection to a question asked defendant in which there was an allusion to a discrepancy between his testimony at the trial and at the preliminary hearing. The contention that the ruling was improper is not supported by a reason. A witness may properly be cross-examined regarding both judicial and extrajudicial statements which he has made on material matters. State v. McCarroll, 123 Or. 173, 261 P. 411; McCann v. State, 20 Ariz. 489, 182 P. 96; People v. Walker, 140 Cal. 153, 73 P. 831; People v. Pete, 123 Cal. 373, 55 P. 993; People v. Popovich, 295 Ill. 491, 129 N.E. 161; People v. Biloche, 414 Ill. 504, 112 N.E.2d 162, certiorari denied 346 U.S. 878, 74 S.Ct. 131, 98 L.Ed. 385; 348 U.S. 846, 75 S.Ct. 69, 99 L.Ed. 667; Morris v. State, 100 Fla. 850, 130 So. 582; Shaw v. State, 136 Miss. 1, 100 So. 519; 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12 ed., §§ 891, 943. Error is charged because the prosecuting official in cross-examination undertook to show inconsistencies between defendant's testimony and his prior conversations in the jail cell, tape recorded without his knowledge. The jury did not hear the recording which was played to defendant in the presence of the court; however, defendant before the jury was repeatedly confronted with quotations purporting to come from his recorded conversations. Defendant's counsel to substantiate the charge of error say that the hiding of a microphone anywhere is not looked upon with favor, citing two law review articles, [2] neither of which is primary authority. Although we too look with disfavor upon surreptitious listening, the lack of argument showing it to be error in this case makes discussion of the point unwarranted. Defendant also complains of certain other statements by court and prosecuting counsel, especially questions on voir dire concerning the views of the chief executive on punishment, urging that such views might have had some effect upon the jurors. No cogent argument and no authorities are presented in substantiation of the claimed improprieties, and we do not think they merit discussion here.