Opinion ID: 2590289
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Under the GTCA, the City is Immune from Liability for Claims of Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship Committed By its Employees.

Text: ¶ 12 The City argues that, under the GTCA, it is immune as a matter of law from liability for any claim of tortious interference with a business relationship because bad faith is a necessary element of the tort. The appellants respond that neither malice nor bad faith is a requisite element to the cause of action, and the City is not immune from claims of tortious interference with a business relationship. ¶ 13 When a tort cause of action sued upon requires proof of an element that necessarily excludes good faith conduct on the part of employees, there can be no liability against a political subdivision in a suit based on the GTCA. [29] This is because the GTCA explicitly excludes bad faith action from its definition of the scope of employment, and a political subdivision is relieved from liability for tortious conduct committed by its employees outside the scope of employment. [30] We must determine whether the elements of tortious interference with a business relationship necessarily involve some degree of bad faith. ¶ 14 One has the right to prosecute a lawful business without unlawful molestation or unjustified interference from any person, and any malicious interference with that business is an unlawful act and an actionable wrong. [31] The elements of a claim for malicious interference are: 1) interference with a business or contractual right; 2) malicious and wrongful interference that is neither justified, privileged, nor excusable; and 3) damage proximately sustained as a result of the interference. [32] The element of malice, for malicious interference, is defined as an unreasonable and wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or excuse. [33] This element clearly requires a showing of bad faith. Because the element of malicious and wrongful interference necessarily involves some degree of bad faith, a political subdivision is not liable for malicious interference with a business relationship committed by its employees because bad faith actions are specifically excluded from the GTCA's definition of the scope of employment. ¶ 15 The appellants argue that they are not bringing a claim of malicious interference, but instead a claim of tortious interference, which they cast as a tort that requires no showing of bad faith on the part of the tortfeasor. The appellants rely on Instruction 24.1, Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction-Civil, which provides the elements of Interference with Contract or Business Relationship. [34] This instruction, which calls the tort intentional interference, requires a showing of intentional action using unfair or improper means. These elements contain some degree of bad faith on the part of the tortfeasor. The terms malicious interference, intentional interference, and tortious interference with contract or business relations have been used interchangeably in Oklahoma jurisprudence, and do not designate distinct torts, as urged by the appellants. [35] The trial court did not err by dismissing the appellants' claim for tortious interference with a business relationship because the tort requires a showing of bad faith and thus cannot be committed within the scope of employment by an employee of a political subdivision.