Opinion ID: 1907203
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3e As Amended

Text: In Marshall II, we determined that N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3e, as amended, would not apply to defendant's case because his appeal was pending at the time the amendment took effect on May 12, 1992. 130 N.J. at 119, 613 A. 2d 1059. Under the pre-1992 proportionality review provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3e, we held that the appropriate universe from which to choose similar cases included not only all cases in which the death penalty had been imposed, or had been sought, but also clearly death eligible homicides in which the prosecutor elected not to seek the death penalty. Id. at 137, 613 A. 2d 1059. We chose the larger universe in order to consider the possibility that a jury had imposed a disproportionate sentence, id. at 133-34, 613 A. 2d 1059, or that a prosecutor had misused his or her discretion, id. at 134, 613 A. 2d 1059, and, in order to prevent `any impermissible discrimination in imposing the death penalty,' id. at 135, 613 A. 2d 1059 (quoting Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 327, 524 A. 2d 188). In the three cases following Marshall II, we continued to make use of a universe of death-eligible homicides. DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 162-63, 662 A. 2d 442; Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 23, 651 A. 2d 949; Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 343-44, 645 A. 2d 685. In each of these cases, the 1992 statutory amendment limiting our review to death-sentenced cases was inapplicable because the appeals in these cases were pending as of the effective date of the amendment. DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 163, 662 A. 2d 442; [4] Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 23, 651 A. 2d 949; Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 343-44, 645 A. 2d 685. In this case, defendant was not convicted until July 8, 1994, more than two years after the effective date of the 1992 statutory amendment. [5] For that reason, we now consider whether we must conform our proportionality review methodology to the 1992 amendment thereby limiting proportionality review to a comparison of similar cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3e.
Comparing a death-sentenced defendant's case to other similar cases enables us to consider whether the death penalty has been imposed arbitrarily on the defendant. Moreover, proportionality review may be the only mechanism that permits system-wide evaluation of both prosecutorial and jury decision making so as to determine whether there has been racial or other impermissible discrimination. These considerations weigh heavily when a life is at stake. It is a mark of our humanity that, no matter how heinous the crime, we focus, finally, on individual defendants, their acts and their lives. We seek to administer the most extreme penalty in a fair and consistent manner by comparing the defendant to others who have committed like crimes, thereby to decide whether there is a societal consensus that the defendant before us should be put to death. In our constitutional system, this Court is entrusted with that ultimate decision. The source of the Supreme Court's appellate review authority can be found in Article VI, Section 2, Paragraph 2 of the 1947 Constitution: The Supreme Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction in the last resort in all causes provided in this Constitution. As defined by Article VI, Section 5, Paragraph 1, the Court hears appeals: (a) In causes determined by the appellate division of the Superior Court involving a question arising under the Constitution of the United States or this State; (b) In causes where there is a dissent in the Appellate Division of the Superior Court; (c) In capital causes; (d) On certification by the Supreme Court to the Superior Court and, where provided by rules of the Supreme Court, to the inferior courts; and (e) In such causes as may be provided by law.