Opinion ID: 776953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Andrade Opinion

Text: 26 In Andrade, this court held that the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law when it held that a sentence of life without possibility of parole for 50 years for two petty theft convictions did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 270 F.3d at 747. 27 Andrade was convicted of two separate counts of petty theft for shoplifting a total of nine videotapes valued at $153.54 from two different K-mart stores, on occasions two weeks apart. Because he had a prior theft conviction, Andrade was charged with a felony for each of the two petty theft counts. The offenses were tried together (although they need not have been). The resulting petty theft convictions were counted as Andrade's third and fourth strikes under Three Strikes, as Andrade had at least two prior serious felony convictions — specifically, three prior residential burglary convictions. Three Strikes mandated a sentence of 25 years to life, with no eligibility for parole for at least 25 years, for each petty theft conviction. The judge ordered, pursuant to a Three Strikes provision, § 667(e)(2)(B), that the sentences run consecutively, so Andrade would not be eligible for parole for at least 50 years. 270 F.3d at 746. 28 After reviewing the relevant Supreme Court law on the Eighth Amendment, Andrade concluded that three objective criteria... guide proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment: (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id. at 756 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S.Ct. 3001). Nevertheless, this court recognized that under the rule of Harmelin  articulated in Justice Kennedy's controlling opinion in that case, the Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are `grossly disproportionate' to the crime. Id. at 754 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). A court, therefore, need not consider the second and third prongs of Solem 's test if the first factor — a comparison of the punishment to the offense — does not raise an inference of gross disproportionality. Id. at 758. 29 Comparing the sentence in the case before it to those in the most closely analogous Supreme Court Eighth Amendment cases, Andrade found that the penalties in that case — two consecutive life sentences, each without possibility of parole for 25 years—were much harsher penalties than the sentence in Rummel, because Rummel would have been eligible for parole in 12 years or less. Id. at 264, 100 S.Ct. 1133. 6 The court analogized the penalty instead to the sentence of life without possibility of parole in Solem. 7 Because Andrade would not be eligible for parole until age 87, ten years beyond the life expectancy of a 37 year old male, the court referred to his sentence as the functional equivalent of... life in prison without possibility of parole. Id. at 759. 30 Recognizing that harsher punishments for recidivists are justified, Andrade stressed that the enhanced punishment imposed for the [present] offense is not to be viewed as ... [an] additional penalty for the earlier crimes, but instead as a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one. Id. (quoting Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 132 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995)). Focusing on the latest crime, Andrade concluded that shoplifting nine videotapes was comparable to the offense in Solem of uttering a no-account check. Id. Andrade also noted that the core conduct of petty theft is not conduct traditionally punishable as a felony but as a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine or a jail sentence of six months or less. Id. Since the core conduct for which Andrade was sentenced is, in the first instance, classified as a misdemeanor rather than a felony, 270 F.3d at 760, using petty theft with a prior theft conviction, ordinarily punishable by up to three years in prison, §§ 666, 18, to serve as the third strike creates a unique quirk, allowing a defendant's recidivism to be double counted. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 759-60. Further, noted Andrade, deference to legislative judgments concerning the appropriate extreme sentences is less pronounced when the offense is not classified as a felony. Id. at 760; see also Riggs, 525 U.S. at 1114, 119 S.Ct. 890 (Stevens, J., memorandum opinion respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari). 31 Andrade concluded that the threshold comparison of the harshness of the penalty to the gravity of the crimes led to an inference of gross disproportionality and that Andrade's criminal record did not dissipate that determination. 270 F.3d at 761. 32 In light of its conclusion that the first Solem factor raised an inference of gross disproportionality, Andrade proceeded to the second factor — whether the sentence is excessive in comparison to sentences imposed on other criminals in California. 270 F.3d at 761. Andrade again noted that petty theft is ordinarily punished by no more than six months in jail, or, if committed after a prior theft conviction, by a term of up to three years in prison (if charged as a felony) or up to one year in jail (if charged as a misdemeanor). See id.; see also § 666, 18. And violent offenses such as second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and sexual assault carry much less serious penalties than Andrade's Three Strikes sentence. 270 F.3d at 761-62. 33 The State argued in Andrade, as it does here, that the indeterminate life sentence was in line with sentences imposed on other recidivist petty theft offenders under Three Strikes. The court in Andrade was not persuaded by that argument, stating: Although we agree that comparisons to other sentences for other recidivists are relevant, the problem with the State's argument is that it attempts to justify the constitutionally-suspect application of a statute by pointing to other applications of the same statute. We find this approach less than convincing. Id. at 762. Andrade concluded that the intrajurisdictional comparison supported the inference that Andrade's sentence was grossly disproportionate. Id. 34 Applying the final prong of the Solem analysis, Andrade found only four other jurisdictions where the triggering offense (petty theft with a prior) could qualify for recidivist sentencing: Rhode Island, West Virginia, Texas, and Louisiana. Id. at 763. Looking closely at the law in those jurisdictions, Andrade concluded that the Rhode Island recidivism statute applies only to thefts of more than $100; West Virginia does not count non-violent priors; Texas has a liberal parole policy, so the minimum sentence is much less than in California; and, while Louisiana might have, at the time, imposed a comparable sentence to the one Andrade received, there was a distinct possibility, unlike in California, that a Louisiana court might have invalidated such a sentence as excessive under the state constitution. Id. at 763-65. The possibility of a comparable sentence in only one other jurisdiction, held Andrade, strengthened rather than undermined the conclusion that the sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crimes. Id. at 765. 35 Having decided that the California Court of Appeal's holding was erroneous, Andrade further concluded that the result was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court law, entitling Andrade to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Id. at 766-67. Andrade held that the law governing the application of the Eighth Amendment to non-violent offenders sentenced to life imprisonment was clearly established and that a proper proportionality analysis requires a comparison to Rummel, Solem, and Harmelin. Id. at 766. The California Court of Appeal had questioned the validity of Solem after Harmelin and focused its analysis exclusively on Rummel, concluding that Andrade's sentence was not disproportionate when his crimes and criminal history were compared with that of Rummel. Id. at 766. Andrade held that the California Court of Appeal's disregard for Solem results in an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law and that [i]ts conclusion that Andrade's sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment is irreconcilable with the Supreme Court's decision in Solem and thus constitutes clear error. Id. at 766-67. 36