Opinion ID: 2184643
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Guidance on Risk Assessment

Text: Hyatt contends that the Court of Appeals failed to provide the circuit court with adequate guidance to hold a constitutionally sufficient risk assessment hearing upon remand. We disagree. The argument by Hyatt that the Court of Appeals did not address the argument that the definition of sex offender contained in the 1998 version of KRS 17.550(2) presumed that he was a sex offender even before he appeared for the risk assessment hearing is without merit because he never raised such a claim of error before the Court of Appeals. Consequently, that court had no responsibility to address the claim of error. However, by pleading guilty to second-degree rape and second-degree sodomy and upon notification of his impending release from prison, he was properly assessed for the sex offender registration program although he now argues he does not fit the definition. KRS 17.510(2) reads as follows: Any person eighteen (18) years of age or older at the time of the offense or any youthful offender who has committed or attempted to commit a sex crime shall, within ten (10) days after his release by the court, the parole board, or the cabinet, register with the appropriate local probation and parole office in the county in which he resides. This definition is used only for the purpose of actual risk assessment determinations. KRS 17.510(2) relates to which persons are required to register. Hyatt also claims that the Court of Appeals failed to specify the exact nature of the burden of proof. However, once again, he failed to raise the issue in the Court of Appeals and thus the court had no opportunity or duty to address the question. KRS 17.500 et seq. sets out the guidelines for the trial court to follow upon rendering a risk assessment determination. The trial judge is required to review all evidence presented by both sides. The trial judge did follow such a requirement and there is no error. The issue regarding the reliability of the evidence submitted during the risk assessment test was not properly presented to the Court of Appeals. It is our view on the merits of the question that the trial judge correctly exercised his authority in accepting the results of the risk assessment evaluation without qualifying the tests pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) or Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). The trial judge is not required to hold an actual hearing in order to comply with Daubert ; Kumho, supra, at 152, 119 S.Ct. at 1176, 143 L.Ed.2d at 252; Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 243 F.3d 244, 249 (6th Cir.2001). The Court of Appeals correctly held that Hyatt did not have the right to confront his victim because such a right has generally been held to only apply to trials as distinguished from a risk assessment hearing. We recognize the fact that Hyatt on direct appeal to the Court of Appeals did not raise the issues of whether he was entitled to prehearing discovery or that the Commonwealth must devise a notification plan that accounts for the actual level of risk that is posed to the community. Finally, Hyatt can cite no authority that supports his argument that the Commonwealth must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the high risk classification, as well as its proposed notification plan are justified. The statute sets out specific guidelines for the trial judge to follow in making a determination of the risk. The statute does not place a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof element on the Commonwealth. It is the decision of this Court that the opinion of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in all respects which means that a remand is necessary because the procedural due process rights of Hyatt were violated. The Act is constitutional as applied.