Opinion ID: 808641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Javier

Text: Javier raises three claims on appeal, two of which relate to his conviction and one of which relates to his sentence.
His first challenge is to the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. “[W]e review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 217 (4th Cir. 2008). Trooper Scott Cash, of the Virginia State Police, testified that he pulled over a Chevy Avalanche driven by Javier because of three separate traffic violations. The trooper approached the vehicle, asked for Javier’s license and 18 registration, and noticed several things about Javier’s demeanor: “he was extremely nervous[,] . . . his hands were shaking, his body was shaking, his chest was rapidly increasing[,] . . . [and w]hile talking to him he always looked back towards the two passengers in the rear [of the vehicle] looking for guidance in answers to the questions.” J.A. 91. When the front passenger opened the glove compartment to retrieve the registration, Trooper Cash noticed within that compartment a large amount of U.S. currency bundled up in rubber bands. During this exchange, Trooper Cash also noticed that the vehicle had a single key in the ignition and that three air fresheners were visible in the vehicle, one of which was located in the glove compartment on top of the cash. Trooper Cash believed the air freshener in the glove compartment was meant to mask drug odors on the cash. When the front passenger saw that the cash was visible, he quickly scooped it out of the glove compartment with his hand and threw it on the floorboard of the vehicle. After Trooper Cash checked the license and registration in his patrol car, he returned to the Avalanche and asked Javier to exit the vehicle and come back to the patrol car parked behind the Avalanche. Javier complied and sat in the front passenger seat of the patrol car. In response to an inquiry about the cash in the glove compartment, Javier stated 19 that he worked in construction and that the money belonged to his boss. Trooper Cash, however, noted that Javier’s “hands were extremely soft,” which was inconsistent, in Cash’s experience, with the hands of a construction worker. J.A. 98. Trooper Cash explained to Javier that he was receiving a verbal warning and told him he was free to leave. When Javier opened the patrol car door and placed both feet on the ground, Trooper Cash asked Javier if he would mind speaking with him further. Javier agreed to speak further with Trooper Cash, placing his left foot back in the vehicle but leaving the door ajar. Trooper Cash then asked a variety of questions using a Spanish language guide, which contained Spanish and English versions of various questions. Using this guide, Trooper Cash would read a question aloud in English and Javier would then read the Spanish translation to himself and respond to the question aloud in English. One question posed in this fashion was “‘May I search your vehicle,’” to which Javier responded “‘Yeah.’” J.A. 102. Trooper Cash then searched the Avalanche with the aid of other state troopers who had since arrived on the scene. In the rear of the vehicle, they found $55,642 in U.S. currency hidden within a box of detergent. Javier does not challenge the initial traffic stop, but he does contend that Trooper Cash unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop and that his consent to the search was not 20 voluntary. These contentions are without merit. “If a police officer seeks to prolong a traffic stop to allow for investigation into a matter outside the scope of the initial stop, he must possess reasonable suspicion” of other criminal activity, United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 507 (4th Cir. 2011), a showing of which must include “specific and articulable facts that demonstrate at least a minimal level of objective justification for the belief that criminal activity is afoot,” United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Javier’s demeanor, combined with the cash in the glove compartment, the passenger’s attempt to hide the cash, the placement of the air fresheners, the single key in the ignition, and the perceived lie about the source of the money amounted to reasonable suspicion. Thus, assuming without deciding that the conversation following termination of the traffic stop was not a consensual one, Trooper Cash had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, so his continued investigation was not unlawful. With regard to the voluntariness of Javier’s consent to have the Avalanche searched, we consider the totality of the circumstances to determine if the district court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous. See United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 938 (4th Cir. 1990). In contending that his 21 consent was involuntary, Javier argues that he did not understand his rights and that the environment was coercive. The former argument does not help Javier because Trooper Cash never suggested that Javier was required to consent to the search and, in any event, “the government need not demonstrate that the defendant knew of the right to refuse to consent for the search to be deemed a voluntary one.” Id. As to the latter argument concerning coercion, Trooper Cash sought Javier’s consent in Javier’s first language of Spanish, knowing that Javier might understand that language better, and Javier unequivocally gave his consent. The door to the patrol car’s passenger seat, where Javier was sitting, was ajar at the time. And the additional troopers at the scene did not exit their vehicles until after Javier gave his consent. Given these facts, we find that the district court did not clearly err in deeming the consent voluntary. Therefore, the district court did not err in admitting the money seized from this traffic stop.
Javier’s second argument on appeal is that the district court erred in admitting evidence of drug activity in Virginia. Because Count 1 of the indictment restricts the geographic scope of the charges in that count to “the District 22 of South Carolina,” J.A. 18, and does not include the language “and elsewhere,” Javier contends that evidence of conduct outside of South Carolina is inadmissible because it would be irrelevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. We disagree. The evidence at issue revealed a conspiracy to distribute marijuana in the Virginia area between several people, and this evidence made the existence of a conspiracy between some of the same persons in South Carolina “more . . . probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401(a). The facts revealed through this testimony were also “of consequence,” Fed. R. Evid. 401(b), because their “existence . . . provide[d] the fact-finder with a basis for making some inference, or chain of inferences, about an issue that is necessary to a verdict,” United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1190 (10th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the evidence was relevant and admissible.
Finally, Javier challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that the district court erred by considering opportunities for rehabilitation. At sentencing, the district court adopted the government’s § 3553(a) analysis, in which the government stated that certain 23 sentences “would provide [Javier] with much needed educational and vocational rehabilitation.” J.A. 819. In light of the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncement that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) “precludes federal courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term in order to promote a criminal defendant’s rehabilitation,” Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2385 (2011), Javier contends that the district court’s alleged consideration of rehabilitation requires resentencing. We disagree. As the Court explained in Tapia, a sentencing court may consider and discuss “the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs,” but the “court may not impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation.” Id. at 2392-93. The government’s statement—a clear reference to § 3553(a)(2)(D), which requires consideration of “needed educational or vocational training”—was little more than an acknowledgment of the services that might be beneficial to Javier while incarcerated, and we find nothing in the record indicating that the district court imposed the sentence or lengthened the sentence term for the purpose of furthering some rehabilitative goal. Thus, there was no Tapia error. See United States v. Tolbert, 668 F.3d 798, 803 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding no Tapia error where district court suggested defendant could benefit 24 from mental health treatment but otherwise relied on § 3553(a) factors and “failed to make the kind of statements that were made by the district court in Tapia”).