Opinion ID: 673837
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence for jones's conviction of

Text: USING OR CARRYING THE FIREARM DURING OR IN RELATION TO DRUG TRAFFICKING 9 Jones argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for using and carrying the shotgun that the police found in the closet. The sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict is a question of law that we review de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Harris, 20 F.3d 445, 452 (11th Cir.1994). The inquiry is whether a factfinder could find the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or find guilt to be the only reasonable conclusion. United States v. Garcia, 13 F.3d 1464, 1473 (11th Cir.) (citing United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 740 (11th Cir.1989)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2723, 129 L.Ed.2d 847 (1994). 10 The government argues that a jury could reasonably conclude that the shotgun was used as part of a larger scheme to protect the drugs and the money generated by the drugs. To support that inference, the government points to evidence that the apartment, unlike others in the complex, had burglar bars on all the doors and windows; that there was a deadbolt lock on the bedroom door; and that the illegally sawed-off shotgun was found, loaded and easily accessible, in a closet only a few feet from the drugs. Jones argues that there is no evidence that he actually possessed the firearm, and that the evidence of his control over the premises was too weak to support a constructive possession theory. In addition, Jones argues that there was neither proof that the shotgun was used or carried during and in relation to the drug offense, as required by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1), nor proof that Jones had the requisite intent to use the weapon to facilitate drug trafficking. Jones disagrees that a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the weapon was used to facilitate drug transactions, particularly given that he was not even in the apartment; he observes that the shotgun was not a 'spring-gun' ...; it could not protect the drugs by itself. 11 To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1) in this circuit, the government must show the defendant (1) either actually or constructively possessed the firearms, and (2) used or carried the firearms during and in relation to the drug trafficking offense. United States v. Smith, 957 F.2d 835, 835 (11th Cir.1992), aff'd, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993). As Smith clearly states, the government may satisfy the first requirement by producing evidence of constructive possession. In a recent case reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction for drug possession, we held that [t]he government may prove constructive possession if it shows a defendant maintained dominion or control over the drugs or over the premises where the drugs are located. United States v. Harris, 20 F.3d 445, 453 (11th Cir.1994). The same rule applies to the possession of a firearm; if a jury could reasonably infer, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Jones had dominion or control over the premises in which the shotgun was found, then the government has met its burden of establishing constructive possession. 12 In United States v. Derr, 990 F.2d 1330 (D.C.Cir.1993), the Court held that the government had proven that the defendant constructively possessed a handgun found in a closet by showing that the defendant slept in the room where the closet keys were found, that the defendant reached for the keys, and that the defendant's birth certificate was in the closet with the handgun. Id. at 1332, 1337. In this case, the government produced evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones had dominion and control over the apartment in general and the bedroom in particular. Jones listed the apartment as his address on numerous occasions; the police found bills on the bed addressed to the defendant at the apartment; and the police found a photograph of the defendant wearing a jacket that was found in the closet with the shotgun. Jones argues that others had access to the apartment, but [c]onstructive possession need not be exclusive. United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1392 (11th Cir.1989). 13 Because there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive possession, the question becomes whether the government satisfied its burden of proving that Jones used or carried the firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. Use of a firearm may be established by evidence of possession ... 'if possession is an integral part of and facilitates the commission of the drug trafficking offense.'  Smith, 957 F.2d at 837 (quoting Poole, 878 F.2d at 1393). Jones argues that the evidence shows merely that the firearm was present, and that the mere presence of a firearm is insufficient to show that it was used to facilitate his possession of the drugs. Among the cases Jones cites is United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d 250, 254 (2d Cir.1988), in which the Second Circuit rejected the proposition that the intent to use the firearm must be presumed from the fact that a loaded gun was found in the same room as drug paraphernalia during the course of a search pursuant to a warrant. However, this Circuit has rejected Feliz-Cordero. See Poole, 878 F.2d at 1394. 14 The law in this Circuit is that [t]he presence of weapons in a location that the defendant used to distribute a significant quantity of illegal drugs is sufficient to submit to the jury the issue of whether the defendant used the firearm in connection with a drug trafficking crime. United States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079, 1095 (11th Cir.) (citing Poole, 878 F.2d at 1393), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2979, 119 L.Ed.2d 597, modified on other grounds, 977 F.2d 538 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1619, 123 L.Ed.2d 178 (1993). The theory behind this rule is that having firearms easily accessible is using those firearms to protect drugs. In Poole, guns were found in a utility room in a house in which cocaine and drug paraphernalia were also found. 878 F.2d at 1394. In that case, we held that the following sequence of inferences supported the defendant's conviction for using firearms during and in relation to his possession of cocaine with intent to distribute: defendant was engaged in selling cocaine; the guns were used to protect the house members and the cocaine; and defendant knew the guns were readily accessible in the utility room. Id. The sequence of inferences in this case is materially identical, because the jury could conclude that: Jones sold crack cocaine and he possessed it in the apartment; the shotgun was used to protect those who used the apartment and were involved with the drugs; and Jones knew the shotgun was readily accessible in the closet of the bedroom he occupied. 15 Jones disputes the government's contention that the shotgun was part of a larger plan to protect the apartment. Cf. United States v. Matra, 841 F.2d 837, 842 (8th Cir.1988) (holding that the use of firearms found in a house with drugs may be inferred if the jury could conclude that the guns were  'part of a tight security operation to protect large quantities of cocaine'  (quoting United States v. Grant, 545 F.2d 1309, 1312 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103, 97 S.Ct. 1130, 51 L.Ed.2d 554 (1977))). However, under Poole, there is no requirement that the firearm be part of a larger security system; whether one firearm was used to protect drugs is not dependent upon whether additional firearms or other security measures were used to protect the drugs as well. According to Poole's deferential standard of review of jury verdicts, 878 F.2d at 1394, the evidence supporting Jones's conviction under Sec. 924(c)(1) is sufficient. 1 16