Opinion ID: 6107706
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sonic I and Sonic II Decisions

Text: Sonic I and Sonic II addressed the validity of predispute agreements requiring wage claim arbitration. Sonic I held that it is against public policy for an employer to require employees to waive their Berman rights as a condition of employment, and that an arbitration agreement effectively waiving Berman rights is substantively unconscionable as a matter of law. ( Sonic I , supra , 51 Cal.4th at pp. 684-687, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 58 , 247 P.3d 130 .) However, in construing the agreement to attempt to harmonize the competing policies at issue, Sonic I also held that parties could proceed to binding arbitration after they had completed a Berman hearing. ( Id . at p. 675, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 58 , 247 P.3d 130 .) In other words, instead of pursuing a de novo appeal in superior court, a party dissatisfied with the Labor Commissioner's ruling could petition to compel arbitration. ( Id . at p. 676, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 58 , 247 P.3d 130 .) Sonic I 's holdings were short-lived. Two months later, on a related question, Concepcion , supra , 563 U.S. 333 , 131 S.Ct. 1740 abrogated our holding from Discover Bank v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 148 , 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 76 , 113 P.3d 1100 that class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts are unconscionable. ( Concepcion , at pp. 341-344, 131 S.Ct. 1740 .) The high court explained that the overarching purpose of the FAA ... is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings. ( Id . at p. 344, 131 S.Ct. 1740 .) Because Discover Bank 's classwide arbitration rule interfered with  the fundamental attributes of arbitration, such as efficiency and informality, it was preempted as inconsistent with the FAA. ( Concepcion , at p. 344, 131 S.Ct. 1740 .) Thereafter, the court vacated the Sonic I judgment and remanded for our consideration in light of Concepcion . ( Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2011) 565 U.S. 973 , 132 S.Ct. 496 , 181 L.Ed.2d 343 .) On remand, we acknowledged the Supreme Court's admonition that states cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons. ( Concepcion , supra , 563 U.S. at p. 351, 131 S.Ct. 1740 ; see Sonic II , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 1141, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .) Because the court identified efficiency as a hallmark of arbitration under the FAA, Concepcion taught that courts cannot impose unconscionability rules that interfere with arbitral efficiency, including rules forbidding waiver of administrative procedures that delay  arbitration. ( Sonic II , at p. 1141, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 ; see Concepcion , at pp. 344-345, 131 S.Ct. 1740 .) Accordingly, Sonic I 's categorical rule prohibiting a waiver of Berman procedures was preempted. ( Sonic II , at pp. 1139-1141, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .) Nevertheless, we noted that unconscionability remains a valid defense to enforcement, even after Concepcion . The overarching unconscionability question is whether an agreement is imposed in such an unfair fashion and so unfairly one-sided that it should not be enforced. Arbitration agreements could not be deemed categorically unconscionable simply because they entail a waiver of the Berman proceedings. ( Sonic II , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 1146, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .) However, we provided that an employee's Berman waiver, while not dispositive, remains a significant factor in considering  unconscionability. An agreement's failure to provide an employee with an accessible and affordable arbitral forum for resolving wage disputes may support a finding of unconscionability. As with any contract, the unconscionability inquiry requires a court to examine the totality of the agreement's substantive terms as well as the circumstances of its formation to determine whether the overall bargain was unreasonably one-sided. ( Ibid . ) The Sonic II majority opinion focused repeatedly on the need for accessible and affordable arbitration, reasoning that these were key benefits of the Berman process that parties to an arbitration agreement had decided to forgo. We stopped short of defining the requirements for an acceptable arbitration framework, however, and emphasized that arbitration can be structured in various ways so that it facilitates accessible, affordable resolution of wage disputes, without necessarily replicating Berman protections. ( Sonic II , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 1147, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .) So long as the arbitral procedure is relatively low-cost ( ibid . ) and provides a forum for wage claimants to pursue their claims effectively ( ibid . ), its adoption in lieu of the Berman process will not, in itself, be considered unconscionable ( id . at pp. 1147-1148, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 ). In short, when an adhesion contract requires arbitration, the unconscionability inquiry focuses on whether the arbitral scheme imposes costs and risks on a wage claimant that make the resolution of the wage dispute inaccessible and unaffordable, thus effectively blocking every forum for redress including arbitration itself. ( Id . at p. 1148, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .) We did not decide whether the Sonic II agreement was substantively unconscionable under this standard. Recognizing that unconscionability is a fact-specific  defense, we remanded for the trial court to examine additional evidence regarding the particulars of the arbitration process set out in the agreement. ( Sonic II , supra , 57 Cal.4th at pp. 1147-1148, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .)  B. Unconscionability of the Arbitration Agreement California law strongly favors arbitration. Through the comprehensive provisions of the California Arbitration Act ( Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq. ), the Legislature has expressed a 'strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution.'  ( Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1 , 9, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183 , 832 P.2d 899 ( Moncharsh ).) As with the FAA ( 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. ), California law establishes a presumption in favor of arbitrability. ( Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951 , 971, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 843 , 938 P.2d 903 .) An agreement to submit disputes to arbitration is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 1281 ; see 9 U.S.C. § 2 .)  '[G]enerally applicable contract defenses, such as ... unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening' the FAA or California law. ( Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223 , 246, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 514 , 282 P.3d 1217 ( Pinnacle ); see Concepcion , supra , 563 U.S. at p. 339, 131 S.Ct. 1740 .) Unconscionability can take different forms depending on the circumstances and terms at issue. However, the doctrine's application to arbitration agreements must rely on the same principles that govern all contracts. ( Sonic II , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 1133, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .) The degree of unfairness required for unconscionability must be as rigorous and demanding for arbitration clauses as for any other contract clause. ( Ibid . ) The general principles of unconscionability are well established. A contract is unconscionable if one of the parties lacked a meaningful choice in deciding whether to agree and the contract contains terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party. ( Sonic II , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 1133, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .) Under this standard, the unconscionability doctrine  'has both a procedural and a substantive  element.'  ( Ibid . ) The procedural element addresses the circumstances of contract negotiation and formation, focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power. [Citations.] Substantive unconscionability pertains to the fairness of an agreement's actual terms and to assessments of whether they are overly harsh or one-sided. ( Pinnacle , supra , 55 Cal.4th at p. 246, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 514 , 282 P.3d 1217 .) Both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be shown for the defense to be established, but they need not be present in the same degree. ( Armendariz , supra , 24 Cal.4th at p. 114, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 , 6 P.3d 669 .) Instead, they are evaluated on  'a sliding scale.'  ( Ibid . ) [T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to conclude that the term is unenforceable. ( Ibid . ) Conversely, the more  deceptive or coercive the bargaining tactics employed, the less substantive unfairness is required. ( A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 473 , 487, 186 Cal.Rptr. 114 ( A & M Produce ); see Carlson v. Home Team Pest Defense, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 619 , 635, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 29 ;  Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car Wash, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 74 , 85, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 42 ( Carmona ).) A contract's substantive fairness must be considered in light of any procedural unconscionability in its making. ( Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899 , 912, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 812 , 353 P.3d 741 ( Sanchez ).) The ultimate issue in every case is whether the terms of the contract are sufficiently unfair, in view of all relevant circumstances, that a court should withhold enforcement. ( Ibid . ) The burden of proving unconscionability rests upon the party asserting it. ( Sanchez , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 911, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 812 , 353 P.3d 741 ; Sonic II , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 1148, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .) Where, as here, the evidence is not in conflict, we review the trial court's denial of arbitration de novo. ( Pinnacle , supra , 55 Cal.4th at p. 236, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 514 , 282 P.3d 1217 .) 1. Procedural Unconscionability The Court of Appeal observed that the arbitration agreement's execution involved an extraordinarily high degree of procedural unconscionability. We agree. A procedural unconscionability analysis begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one of adhesion. ( Armendariz , supra , 24 Cal.4th at p. 113, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 , 6 P.3d 669 .) An adhesive contract is standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by the party with superior bargaining power on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. ( Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237 , 1245, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 7 , 367 P.3d 6 ( Baltazar ); see Armendariz , at p. 113, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 , 6 P.3d 669 .) Arbitration contracts imposed as a condition of employment are typically adhesive (see Armendariz , at pp. 114-115, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 , 6 P.3d 669 ; Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 695 , 704, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 506 ), and the agreement here is no exception. The pertinent question, then, is whether circumstances of the contract's formation created such oppression or surprise that closer scrutiny of its overall fairness is required. (See Baltazar , at pp. 1245-1246, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 7 , 367 P.3d 6 ; Farrar v. Direct Commerce, Inc. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1257 , 1267-1268, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 785 .)  '  Oppression occurs where a contract involves lack of negotiation and meaningful choice, surprise where the allegedly unconscionable provision is hidden within a prolix printed form. '  ( Pinnacle , supra , 55 Cal.4th at p. 247, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 514 , 282 P.3d 1217 , italics added; see De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 966 , 983, 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 353 , 422 P.3d 1004 .) This record reveals both oppression and surprise. The circumstances relevant to establishing oppression include, but are not limited to (1) the amount of time the party is given to consider the  proposed contract; (2) the amount and type of pressure exerted on the party to sign the proposed contract; (3) the length of the proposed contract and the length and complexity of the challenged provision; (4) the education and experience of the party; and (5) whether the party's review  of the proposed contract was aided by an attorney. ( Grand Prospect Partners, L.P. v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc. (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1332 , 1348, fn. omitted, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 235 .) With respect to preemployment arbitration contracts, we have observed that the economic pressure exerted by employers on all but the most sought-after employees may be particularly acute, for the arbitration agreement stands between the employee and necessary employment, and few employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration requirement. ( Armendariz , supra , 24 Cal.4th at p. 115, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 , 6 P.3d 669 .) This economic  pressure can also be substantial when employees are required to accept an arbitration agreement in order to keep their job. Employees who have worked in a job for a substantial length of time have likely come to rely on the benefits of employment. For many, the sudden loss of a job may create major disruptions, including abrupt income reduction and an unplanned reentry into the job market. In both the prehiring and posthiring settings, courts must be particularly attuned to the danger of oppression and overreaching. ( Armendariz , at p. 115, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 , 6 P.3d 669 ; see Baltazar , supra , 62 Cal.4th at p. 1244, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 7 , 367 P.3d 6 .) The circumstances here demonstrate significant oppression. The agreement was presented to Kho in his workspace, along with other employment-related documents. Neither its contents nor its significance was explained. One Toyota admits that Kho was required to sign the agreement to keep the job he had held for three years. Because the company used a piece-rate compensation system, any time Kho spent reviewing the agreement would have reduced his pay. Moreover, as the Court of Appeal explained, Not only did One Toyota provide no explanation for its demand for his signature, it selected a low-level employee, a 'porter,' to present the Agreement, creating the impression that no request for an explanation was expected and any such request would be unavailing. By having the porter wait for the documents, One Toyota conveyed an expectation that Kho sign them immediately, without examination or consultation with counsel. One Toyota protests that Kho did not ask questions about the agreement, but there is no indication that the porter had the knowledge or authority to explain its terms. (See Carmona , supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 84-85, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 42 .) Similarly, although One Toyota is correct that Kho did not attempt to negotiate, a complaining party need not show it tried to negotiate standardized contract terms to establish procedural unconscionability. ( Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227 , 244, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 332 ; see  Sanchez , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 914, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 812 , 353 P.3d 741 .) By its conduct, One Toyota conveyed the impression that negotiation efforts would be futile. Finally, Kho was not given a copy of the agreement he had signed. 8 The facts also support the trial court's finding of surprise. The agreement is a paragon of prolixity, only slightly more than a page long but written in an extremely small font. The single dense paragraph covering arbitration requires 51 lines. As the Court of Appeal noted, the text is visually impenetrable and challenge[s] the limits of legibility. The substance of the agreement is similarly opaque. The sentences are complex, filled with statutory references and legal jargon. The second sentence alone is 12 lines long. The arbitration paragraph refers to: the California Fair Employment and Housing Act; title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; other unspecified local, state or federal laws or regulations; the National Labor Relations Act; the California Workers' Compensation Act; California Small Claims actions; the Department of Fair Employment and Housing; the Employment Development  Department; the Equal Opportunity Commission; the federal and California arbitration acts;  and six different sections of California's Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure. A layperson trying to navigate this block text, printed in tiny font, would not have an easy journey. With respect to arbitration costs, the agreement states: If CCP § 1284.2 conflicts with other substantive statutory provisions or controlling case law, the allocation of costs and arbitrator fees shall be governed by said statutory provisions or controlling case law instead of CCP § 1284.2. Code of Civil Procedure section 1284.2 states a default rule that, unless the agreement specifies otherwise, parties to an arbitration will bear their own expenses. However, Armendariz created an exception to this general rule for arbitrations of employment-related disputes. (See Armendariz , supra , 24 Cal.4th at pp. 110-111, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 , 6 P.3d 669 .) 9 Although the agreement anticipates that the controlling case  law of Armendariz would prevail over the statutory default rule, One Toyota's obligation to pay arbitration-related costs would not be evident to anyone without legal knowledge or access to the relevant authorities. It is difficult to envision that Kho would have had any idea what the cited code section says or that a 13-year-old case creates a relevant exception to it. This example illustrates the difficulty a layperson would have in deciphering key terms. It would have been nearly impossible to understand the contract's meaning without legal training and access to the many statutes it references. Kho had neither. Under these circumstances, Kho's signature attesting to have read and understood the agreement appears formulaic rather than informed. We agree with the Court of Appeal that the agreement appears to have been drafted with an aim to thwart, rather than promote, understanding. The document itself and the manner of its presentation did not promote voluntary or informed agreement to its terms. Arbitration is favored in this state as a voluntary means of resolving disputes, and this voluntariness has been its bedrock justification. ( Armendariz , supra , 24 Cal.4th at p. 115, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 , 6 P.3d 669 ; see Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 233 , 252, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 359 , 376 P.3d 506 .) Arbitration contracts are vigorously enforced out of respect for the parties' mutual and voluntary agreement to resolve disputes by this alternative means. (See, e.g., Moncharsh , supra , 3 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183 , 832 P.2d 899 .) However, an inference of voluntary assent can be indulged only so far and must yield in the face of undisputed facts that undermine it. Where an employee is induced to sign an arbitration agreement through sharp practices and surprise (see Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443 , 469, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 , 165 P.3d 556 ( Gentry )), 10 the consent rationale carries less force.  [A]rbitration 'is a matter of consent, not coercion.'  ( Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp. (2010) 559 U.S. 662 , 681, 130 S.Ct. 1758 , 176 L.Ed.2d 605 ; see Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela (2019) --- U.S. ---- [ 139 S.Ct. 1407 , 1415], 203 L.Ed.2d 636 .) On this record, it is virtually impossible to conclude that Kho knew he was giving up his Berman rights and voluntarily agreeing to arbitration instead. 2. Substantive Unconscionability Substantive unconscionability examines the fairness of a contract's terms. This analysis ensures that contracts, particularly contracts of adhesion, do not impose terms that have been variously described as '  'overly harsh'  ' ( Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1519 , 1532 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 138 ] ), ' unduly oppressive ' (  Perdue v. Crocker National Bank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 913 , 925 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 702 P.2d 503 ] ), ' so  one-sided as to 'shock the conscience'  ' ( Pinnacle [, supra ,] 55 Cal.4th [at p.] 246 [ 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 514 , 282 P.3d 1217 ] ), or 'unfairly one-sided' ( Little [ v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) ] 29 Cal.4th [1064,] 1071 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 63 P.3d 979 ].) All of these formulations point to the central idea that the unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with 'a simple old-fashioned bad bargain' [citation], but with terms that are 'unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party.'  ( Sonic II , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 1145, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .) Unconscionable terms  'impair the integrity of the bargaining process or otherwise contravene the public interest or public policy'  or attempt to impermissibly alter fundamental legal duties. ( Ibid .) They may include fine-print terms, unreasonably or unexpectedly harsh terms regarding price or other central aspects of the transaction, and terms that undermine the nondrafting party's reasonable expectations. ( Ibid . ; see Sanchez , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 911, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 812 , 353 P.3d 741 .) These examples are illustrative, not exhaustive. Substantive terms that, in the abstract, might not support an unconscionability finding take on greater weight when imposed by a procedure that is demonstrably oppressive. Although procedural unconscionability alone does not invalidate a contract, its existence requires courts to closely scrutinize the substantive terms to ensure they are not manifestly unfair or one-sided. ( Gentry , supra , 42 Cal.4th at p. 469, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 , 165 P.3d 556 .) We hold that, given the substantial procedural unconscionability here, even a relatively low degree of substantive unconscionability may suffice to render the agreement unenforceable. ( Carmona , supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 85, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 42 ; A & M Produce , supra , 135 Cal.App.3d at p. 487, 186 Cal.Rptr. 114 ; see Armendariz , supra , 24 Cal.4th at p. 114, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 , 6 P.3d 669 .) Kho and the Labor Commissioner do not focus on the fairness of specific, isolated terms in the agreement. Rather, they contend One Toyota's arbitral process is so inaccessible and unaffordable, considered as a whole, that it does not offer an effective means for resolving wage disputes. (See Sonic II , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 1146, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .) 11 This is a close question, which cannot be resolved in the abstract. It is important to stress that the waiver of Berman procedures does not, in itself, render an arbitration agreement unconscionable.  However, a substantive unconscionability analysis is sensitive to the context of the rights and remedies that otherwise would have been available to the parties. ( Sanchez , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 922, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 812 , 353 P.3d 741 .) We must examine both the features of dispute resolution adopted as well as the features eliminated. ( Sonic II , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 1146, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .) As to accessibility, Kho first observes that, unlike in Berman proceedings, the agreement does not explain how to initiate arbitration. Industrial Welfare  Commission (IWC) wage orders, required by law to be posted at the jobsite ( Lab. Code, § 1183, subd. (d) ), direct employees to contact the Labor Commissioner about wage-related violations, providing for this purpose both the Department of Industrial Relations website and a list of local labor commissioner offices. (See, e.g., IWC wage order No. 4-2001 ( Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11040 ); IWC wage order No. MW-2019 ( Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11000 ).) An employee can start the Berman process by filling out a simple form found on the website and in local offices. The form is rendered in many languages, and detailed instructions explain how to complete and file it. In contrast, One Toyota's agreement does not mention how to bring a dispute to arbitration, nor does it suggest where that information might be found. 12 Commercial arbitration  providers, for example, frequently provide standardized forms to start the process. Employees can also contact the provider for information on claim initiation. The agreement here, however, identifies no commercial providers. In fact, it does not mention that such providers exist. It mandates that the arbitrator be a retired California Superior Court Judge but gives no indication how an employee might find such a person, let alone one willing to arbitrate a wage claim. Although some employees might pursue other avenues for relief and reach arbitration after encountering a motion to compel, these additional steps will inevitably increase the delay and expense involved. Other employees may be so confused by the agreement that they are deterred from bringing their wage claims at all. 13 Kho also contends it would be difficult for an unsophisticated, unrepresented wage claimant to effectively navigate the agreement's arbitral procedure. In the Berman process, a claimant need only fill out a complaint form, possibly assisted by a deputy labor commissioner, then attend a settlement conference and, in some cases, a hearing. (See Sonic II , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 1128, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .) By contrast, in the arbitration provided for here, the complaint must be framed in a legal pleading, and the claimant must respond to discovery demands and dispositive motions. Whereas a Berman  hearing is conducted by a deputy labor commissioner, who can explain terminology and assist with witness examination (see ibid . ), the arbitration here must be conducted by a  retired superior court judge, with procedures similar to a formal civil trial. Evidence must conform to technical rules of evidence, whereas all relevant evidence is typically admitted in Berman hearings. (See ibid . ; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 13502.) 14 Collection is also simplified in the Berman context  because the Labor Commissioner is responsible for enforcing the judgment. ( § 98.2, subd. (i).) Or, if the employer unsuccessfully appeals the Labor Commissioner's award, the claimant can collect on a posted bond. ( § 98.2, subd. (b).) In arbitration, a successful claimant must petition to confirm the award and reduce it to an enforceable judgment. ( Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1285, 1287.4.) The Berman process was specifically designed to give claimants a speedy, informal, and affordable method for resolving wage disputes. ( Cuadra , supra , 17 Cal.4th at p. 858, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 687 , 952 P.2d 704 .) 15 The process advances the very objectives of 'informality,' 'lower costs,' 'greater efficiency and speed,' and use of 'expert adjudicators' that the high court has deemed 'fundamental attributes of  arbitration.'  ( Sonic II , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 1149, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 ; see  Concepcion , supra , 563 U.S. at pp. 344, 348, 131 S.Ct. 1740 .) 16 By contrast, the arbitration provided for here incorporates the intricacies of civil litigation. An employee must surrender the benefits and efficiencies of the Berman process but does not gain in return any of the efficiencies or cost savings often associated with arbitration. We observed in Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. , supra , 29 Cal.4th at page 1075, footnote 1, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 63 P.3d 979 , that litigation-like procedures, on their own, are not necessarily so one-sided as to make an arbitration agreement unconscionable. We certainly do not now suggest that a system of statutory and common law carefully crafted to ensure fairness to both sides, and subject to continuous review, is per se unfair. 17 However, that carefully crafted process can be costly, complex, and time-consuming. It is the opportunity to expedite and simplify the process that can motivate informed parties to agree to arbitration. Furthermore, Little 's observation was made in the context of a suit alleging wrongful demotion and discharge. ( Id . at p. 1069, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 63 P.3d 979 .) For such claims, it may well be that an arbitration process closely resembling civil litigation can be as advantageous for the employee as for the employer. (See id . at p. 1075, fn. 1, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 63 P.3d 979 .) There is no Berman-like administrative process for wrongful discharge claims. Our cases have taken a different approach in evaluating the compelled arbitration of wage claims, as compared to the arbitration of other types of disputes. Employees who agree to arbitrate claims for unpaid wages forgo not just their right to litigate in court, but also their resort to an expedient, largely cost-free administrative procedure. We explained repeatedly in Sonic II that, while the waiver of Berman procedures does not in itself render an arbitration agreement unconscionable, the agreement must provide in  exchange an accessible and affordable forum for resolving wage disputes. ( Sonic II , supra , 57 Cal.4th at pp. 1146, 1147-1148, 1150, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .) No specific procedures are required. (See id . at pp. 1147, 1170-1171, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .) But the arbitral  scheme must offer employees an effective means to pursue claims for unpaid wages, and not impose unfair costs or risks on them or erect other barriers to the vindication of their statutory rights. (See id . at pp. 1142, 1147-1148, 1157-1158, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .) When imposed in a procedurally  unconscionable fashion, such barriers to the vindication of rights may become unenforceable. It is true, as One Toyota notes, that the results of a Berman hearing are nonbinding. An appeal by either party will bring the parties to the superior court for de novo review, where litigation formalities may apply. 18 But, as Sonic II explained, the prospect of an appeal does not negate the efficiency or accessibility of the Berman process. ( Sonic II , supra , 57 Cal.4th at pp. 1160-1162, 1167, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .) Appeals are discouraged by the requirement that employers post a bond ( § 98.2, subd. (b) ) and pay the costs and attorney fees on appeal of any employee who recovers even a minimal amount (see § 98.2, subd. (c) ; Lolley , supra , 28 Cal.4th at p. 376, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 571 , 48 P.3d 1128 ). If the employer does appeal, Berman claimants who cannot afford counsel may be represented by the Labor Commissioner. Representation in a de novo appeal is guaranteed for indigent claimants who do not object to the commissioner's final order. (§ 98.4.) Absent the agreement, Kho may well have been represented by the Labor Commissioner in any de novo appeal. Moreover, all claimants will have a better understanding of how to support their wage claims as a result of having the commissioner's assistance during the Berman process. Because the complexity of One Toyota's arbitral process effectively requires that employees hire counsel, there is also force to Kho's argument that the procedure is not an affordable option. An arbitration procedure may not impose such costs or risks on wage claimants that it  'effectively blocks every forum for the redress of disputes, including arbitration itself.'  ( Sonic II , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 1148, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 .) As noted, Armendariz , supra , 24 Cal.4th 83 , 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 , 6 P.3d 669 , requires that employers bear most arbitration costs, which, because they include the arbitrator's  compensation, can be substantial. The Armendariz rule mitigates the unfairness of expecting that employees bear costs of a procedure to which they were required to agree. Attorney fees are different, however, because they are not unique to arbitration. It is true that employees are free to hire counsel, or not, whether they pursue their claims in court or in arbitration. But wage claimants present a somewhat special case. These employees can secure free legal assistance from the Labor Commissioner, both at the Berman hearing and in any subsequent appeal. While all employees would likely benefit from having a lawyer in the litigation-like arbitration process here, only  wage claimants have to pay for representation that was otherwise available to them for free. 19  One Toyota notes that employees who hire counsel for wage-claim arbitrations may be able to recover their legal fees under an applicable fee-shifting statute. (See Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1244 , 1251, 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 173 , 274 P.3d 1160 .) For example, section 218.5, subdivision (a) requires the court to award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party in any action brought for the nonpayment of wages if fees are requested upon the initiation of the action. The parties do not dispute that section 218.5 applies to most of Kho's claims. While section 218.5 permits an award of fees to either employees or employers who prevail (see Kirby , at p. 1251, 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 173 , 274 P.3d 1160 ), employers may recover fees only if the court finds that the employee brought the court action in bad faith. ( § 218.5, subd. (a) ; see Arave v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 525 , 545, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 120 .) Although section 218.5 may mitigate some financial burden, employees still face a risk that they will not be designated the prevailing party, rendering their fees unrecoverable. The prevailing party is the one that succeeds on a ' practical level '  and has  'realized its litigation objectives.'  ( Sharif v. Mehusa, Inc. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 185 , 192, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 644 .) An employer might be deemed the prevailing party on a wage claim if the jury denies most or all of the wages sought, even if the employee prevails on other claims. (See ibid . )  In contrast, the Berman statutes provide fee-shifting to wage claimants who secure any monetary recovery in an employer's appeal. ( § 98.2, subd. (c).) Considering the simplified administrative procedures that can be navigated in propria persona, and the availability of the Labor Commissioner's representation and favorable fee-shifting in a de novo appeal, claimants can successfully complete the Berman process without paying a cent to an attorney. The calculus is significantly different for employees in the arbitration process here, despite section 218.5. Assuming they can find counsel willing to represent them in One Toyota's complex arbitral process, these employees will have to pay the attorney if they do not prevail and may have to pay their employer's attorney fees upon a finding of bad faith. (See § 218.5, subd. (a).) Moreover, since section 218.5, subdivision (a) requires a fee request upon the initiation of the action, employees who hire counsel after filing suit or starting arbitration may unwittingly forfeit their right to fees by failing to make a timely request. Because the arbitration process here is no more complicated than ordinary civil litigation, it might be sufficiently accessible for wage claimants who are sophisticated, or affordable for those able to hire counsel.  But an unconscionability analysis must be sensitive to context. Context includes both the commercial setting and purpose of the arbitration contract and any procedural unconscionability in its formation. ( Sanchez , supra , 61 Cal.4th at pp. 911-912, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 812 , 353 P.3d 741 .) As noted, the procedural unconscionability showing here is exceptionally strong. Although the same contract terms might pass muster under less coercive circumstances, a worker who is required to trade the Berman process for arbitration should at least have a reasonable opportunity to understand the bargain he is making. Had One Toyota set out the terms of its agreement in a legible format and fairly understandable language, or had it given Kho a reasonable opportunity to seek clarification or advice, this would be a different case.  Ultimately, the question is whether Kho, through oppression and surprise, was coerced or misled into making an unfair bargain. (See Gentry , supra , 42 Cal.4th at pp. 469-470, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773 , 165 P.3d 556 ; see also Sanchez , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 912, 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 812 , 353 P.3d 741 .) The substantive fairness of this particular agreement must be considered in terms of what Kho gave up and what he received in return. By signing the agreement, Kho surrendered the full panoply of Berman procedures and assistance we have described. What he got in return was access to a formal and highly structured arbitration process that closely resembled civil litigation if he could figure out how to avail himself of its benefits and avoid its pitfalls. Considering the unusually coercive setting in which this bargain  was entered, we conclude it was sufficiently one-sided as to render the agreement unenforceable. 20