Opinion ID: 1395415
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Gallardo Voluntarily Consented to the Search

Text: The government bears the burden of proving the voluntariness of a suspect's consent to a search by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Willie, 462 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir.2006). We review a district court's finding of voluntary consent for clear error, id., taking the totality of all the circumstances into consideration. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). This case presents the threshold question of whether Goltz effectively communicated a request for Gallardo's consent to search the truck. Viewed out of context and looking only at the translated transcript of the conversation, one could understand Goltz's words  I, I police, I police search the car  to carry one of at least two different messages. Those words could constitute a declaration of Goltz's intention to search Gallardo's truck, regardless of Gallardo's consent or non-consent. If said with the proper inflection, however, they could alternatively constitute a request for permission to search Gallardo's truck. The district court looked at Goltz's words in the context of the conversation, as well as examining the audio and video recordings of the entire encounter to determine Goltz's tone and manner of delivery. After doing so, the district court found that Gallardo would have (and did) interpret those words as a request for consent to search the truck. We have made the same examination, and we are satisfied that the district court's characterization of Goltz's message to Gallardo was not clearly erroneous. Goltz's mannerisms and the tone and delivery of his words clearly indicated that he was seeking a response from Gallardo; Goltz was not simply informing Gallardo of his imminent plans. The fact that Gallardo immediately responded affirmatively to Goltz  OK, go ahead  suggests that he viewed Goltz's words as a question rather than a declaration. This interpretation is further supported by the context of the conversation. Goltz followed up on his initial question by asking Gallardo if he understood and by twice asking Gallardo for confirmation that Gallardo had no problems with it. Gallardo told Goltz that he understood, and that he had no problem at all. Gallardo never expressed any doubts as to what Goltz was asking, and Gallardo's responses were clear and unequivocal. In sum, the totality of the circumstances provide support for the district court's determination that Gallardo understood Goltz's communication as a request for consent to search Gallardo's truck. Having reached that conclusion, we turn now to the question of whether Gallardo's consent was voluntary. This analysis requires an examination of a number of factors, [s]ome relat[ing] to the characteristics and behavior of the defendant, . . . [o]thers relat[ing] to the environment surrounding the defendant at the time he gave his consent, . . . [and s]till others relat[ing] to the interaction between police and the defendant in the encounter. Willie, 462 F.3d at 896. No one factor is dispositive. Id. As to those characteristics of Gallardo relevant to the voluntariness inquiry, we note that there is nothing in the record to suggest that Gallardo had knowledge of his constitutional rights at the time he consented to the search. Further, Gallardo's ability to communicate with Goltz was limited by the language barrier. These two facts weigh against a finding of voluntariness. See id. (noting that a defendant's knowledge of his constitutional rights (whether from Miranda warnings in the encounter at issue or from previous interactions with police) is a factor in determining voluntariness); United States v. Guerrero, 374 F.3d 584, 588-89 (8th Cir. 2004) (upholding a district court finding of involuntary consent when the defendants were unable to communicate effectively and [the officer] was aware of the communication barrier). Nevertheless, other characteristics make it unlikely that Gallardo's will ha[d] been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired at the time he gave consent to the search. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (quotation omitted, alteration in original). Gallardo was fifty-four years old. He had little formal education, but he held a job and supported his family. Gallardo did not appear intoxicated or impaired during his interaction with Goltz. In addition, Gallardo proved unafraid to assert himself or ask questions during the encounter; he asked Goltz not to ticket him for failing to display any license plates, he asked about alternatives to a ticket, and  after Goltz had voided the citation  he asked how to properly fill out follow-up paperwork after he received his plates. Taken together, Gallardo's relevant characteristics do not suggest an especially high vulnerability to police coercion. In addition, the environment of the encounter was not inherently coercive. Although the discussion did take place in a squad car while Gallardo was arguably detained, that car was parked on the shoulder of a well-traveled Interstate highway during the middle of a summer day. This is far from a secluded or threatening location. Furthermore, the interaction with Goltz was straightforward and brief. Goltz's tone was serious but not aggressive. He made no intimidating gestures or statements and no promises or misrepresentations. Goltz did not break down Gallardo's will through incessant questioning over a long period of time; Goltz first asked for consent a mere twenty-five minutes into the initial stop, and Gallardo immediately agreed to allow the search. Looking at the totality of these circumstances, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Gallardo's consent to the search was voluntary.