Opinion ID: 2521087
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutionality of K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 79-201j(a).

Text: On appeal, Wabaunsee County raises numerous constitutional issues. These issues were not raised before BOTA by Wabaunsee County. Clearly ... BOTA is not vested with the authority to determine the constitutionality of a statute. Zarda v. State, 250 Kan. 364, 370, 826 P.2d 1365, cert. denied 504 U.S. 973 (1992). A challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is a question of law. Our scope of review is, accordingly, unlimited. [Citation omitted.] State v. Ponce, 258 Kan. 708, 709, 907 P.2d 876 (1995). Where there are no issues raised which lend themselves to administrative determination and the only issues present either require judicial determination or are subject to judicial de novo review, it follows that plaintiffs should be permitted to seek court relief without first presenting the case to the administrative agency. Zarda, 250 Kan. 364, Syl. ¶ 2. Because the constitutional issues presented do not lend themselves to administrative determination and are subject to de novo review, they are properly before this court even though they were not first argued before BOTA. Therefore, we will consider each constitutional challenge raised by Wabaunsee County in its turn. Wabaunsee County contends that if this court endorses BOTA's broad construction of farm machinery and equipment, the core operative terms of K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 79-201j(a) will have no settled meaning, rendering the statute void for vagueness. The constitutionality of a statute is presumed, all doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity, and before the statute may be stricken, it must clearly appear the statute violates the constitution. In determining constitutionality, it is the court's duty to uphold a statute under attack rather than defeat it, and if there is any reasonable way to construe the statute as constitutionally valid, that should be done. See State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov. of Wyandotte Co./Kansas City, 264 Kan. 293, 300, 955 P.2d 1136 (1998). `A statute will not be declared void for vagueness and uncertainty where it employs words commonly used, previously judicially defined, or having a settled meaning in law. [Citation omitted.] At its heart the test for vagueness is a commonsense determination of fundamental fairness.' J.G. Masonry, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 235 Kan. 497, 502, 680 P.2d 291 (1984). In its brief, Wabaunsee County implies that because tax statutes impose monetary penalties and criminal liability, this court should review tax statutes using the same standard of review for vagueness used for criminal statutes. However, the statute in question is one granting tax exemption, not imposing a tax penalty. Because K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 79-201j does not prescribe any penalty or criminal liability, it is not criminal or quasi-criminal; rather, it is a civil statute. Decisions from the United States Supreme Court, Tenth Circuit, and United States District Court for the District of Kansas indicate that civil statutes are subject to a less stringent vagueness review than criminal or quasi-criminal statutes. See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffmann Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 495-96, 71 L. Ed.2d 362, 102 S. Ct. 1186 (1982); In re Higginbotham, 111 Bankr. 955, 965-966 (Bankr. N.D Okla. 1990); In re Heller, 160 Bankr. 655 (D. Kan. 1993). Where 1st Amendment freedoms are not concerned, the rule is that a statute is unconstitutionally vague `not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. 160 Bankr. at 661 (citing Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 71 L. Ed.2d 214, 91 S. Ct. 1686 [1971], and Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495). The tax exemption granted by article 11, § 1(b) of the Kansas Constitution and K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 79-201j(a) sets forth a right or privilege, not a penalty. Therefore, the statute is unconstitutionally vague only if it is so unspecific as to expose taxpayers to judicial whim without guidance or constraint. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 367, 30 L. Ed. 220, 6 S. Ct. 1064 (1886). K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 79-201j(a) exempts [a]ll farm machinery and equipment. The term `farm machinery and equipment' means that personal property actually and regularly used in any farming or ranching operation.... The term `farming or ranching operation' shall include the operation of a feedlot and the performing of farm or ranch work for hire. The Constitution does not require the legislature to incorporate Webster's into each statute in order to insulate it from vagueness challenges. In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 916 (9th Cir. 1988). We find the language of K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 79-201j(a) describes the exemption for farm machinery and equipment sufficiently to withstand constitutional scrutiny for vagueness. Wabaunsee County also maintains that K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 79-201j(a), together with K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 79-213(1)(1), create a statutory scheme delegating unilateral power to confer tax exemptions on unelected county appraisers in violation of the separation of powers doctrine of the Kansas Constitution. A challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law, and our review is de novo and unlimited. State v. Bryan, 259 Kan. 143, 145, 910 P.2d 212 (2000). K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 79-213 generally describes the process through which a taxpayer may request an exemption from the payment of ad valorem property taxes that have already been assessed. It also sets forth the procedure for filing an appeal of the county appraiser's determination of exemption to BOTA. Subsection (1) states: The provisions of this section shall not apply to: (1) Farm machinery and equipment exempted from ad valorem taxation by K.S.A. 79-201j, and amendments thereto. K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 79-213(1). Wabaunsee County asserts that under K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 79-213(1), where farm machinery and equipment already has or gains exempt status by virtue of the county appraiser's determination, no one may file for an appeal of that determination to BOTA. Wabaunsee County presents a tortured argument that in the absence of a procedural remedy for other taxpayers who must bear a heavier tax burden when property receives an exemption, the legislature must provide reasonably definite standards in the exemption statute. K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 79-201j provides tax exemption for all farm machinery and equipment that is personal property actually and regularly used in any farming or ranching operation including the performing of farm or ranch work for hire. Great latitude is granted to the legislature to delegate certain functions to the administrative branch of government. Courts start with the presumption that the legislature and the people have the right to assume that public officials will exercise their express and implied powers fairly, honestly, and reasonably. While standards must accompany a delegation of authority, great leeway should be allowed the legislature in setting forth guidelines or standards, and the use of general rather than minute standards is permissible. When the standard expressed in the statute is merely a finding of necessity, such a determination of need is constitutionally adequate when coupled with the assumption that it will be made fairly, honestly, and reasonably. State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, 265 Kan. 779, Syl. ¶ 12, 962 P.2d 543 (1998). County appraisers are public officials, and, therefore, the legislature has the right to assume that a county appraiser will exercise his or her express and implied powers fairly, honestly, and reasonably. We find that the legislature has sufficiently expressed the standards to be used in determining the farm machinery and equipment tax exemption under K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 79-201j(a) to be constitutionally adequate. Wabaunsee County also presented the following issue for our review: If article 11, § 1(b) requires farm machinery and equipment to be used exclusively for such purposes to qualify for tax exemption, did the amendment of the Kansas Constitution in 1985 effect an implicit repeal of all or part of K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 79-201j(a) to the extent that the statute confers an exemption for a class of property broader than the constitutional exemption? As noted above, article 11, § 1(b) does not impose the requirement that farm machinery and equipment be used exclusively for those purposes. Therefore, because we have answered the premise of this particular issue in the negative, there is no need to address the implicit repeal challenge. Therefore, we proceed to the final unanswered constitutional challenge. Wabaunsee County challenges K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 79-201j(a) as inconsistent with the Kansas Constitution and argues that it must be stricken as unconstitutional. Wabaunsee County contends the statute is inconsistent with article 11, § 1(b) in three ways. `The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution and further the exercise of constitutional right to make it more available.... `It is clear that legislation which would defeat or even restrict a self-executing mandate of the constitution is beyond the power of the legislature.' Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 247 Kan. at 659. First, Wabaunsee County makes the statement that the statute is narrower than the constitutional exemption and must be stricken. Wabaunsee County offers no explanation, however, of what particular aspect of the statute is narrower than the constitutional exemption. Nor is any further argument or authority presented. While the constitutionality of a statute may be raised for the first time on appeal, if the issue is not adequately briefed to challenge the presumption of constitutionality, it is deemed abandoned. McKissick v. Frye, 255 Kan. 566, 578, 876 P.2d 1371(1994). Kansas Human Rights Comm'n v. Dale, 25 Kan. App.2d 689, 694-95, 968 P.2d 692 (1998). Second, Wabaunsee County states that since the statute excludes passenger vehicles, trucks, trailers, etc., from the definition of farm machinery and equipment, these exclusions are inconsistent with the self-executing constitutional amendment. K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 79-201j(a) states that [t]he term `farm machinery and equipment' shall not include any passenger vehicle, truck, truck tractor, trailer, semitrailer or pole trailer, other than a farm trailer, as the terms are defined by K.S.A. 8-126 and amendments thereto. The definition of farm trailer in K.S.A. 8-126(z) includes every trailer and semitrailer designed and used primarily as a farm vehicle. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, i.e., the inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of another, may be applied to assist in determining actual legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest, although the maxim should not be employed to override or defeat a clearly contrary legislative intention. [Citation omitted.] Under this rule, when legislative intent is in question, we can presume that when the legislature expressly includes specific terms, it intends to exclude any items not expressly included in the specific list. [Citation omitted.] In re Marriage of Kalman, 264 Kan. 33, 42, 955 P.2d 1228 (1998). Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 682 (1981) defines machinery as machines in general or as a functioning unit, and equipment is defined as the implements used in an operation or activity. Taken together, these terms indicate legislative intent to exempt those machines and implements, including farm trailers, used in a farming or ranching operation. The terms, however, do not indicate an intent to exempt vehicles generally used for personal transportation or for the transportation other than of farm machinery or equipment. Therefore, the statute's exclusion of passenger vehicles, trucks, and other trailers that are not farm trailers from the definition of farm machinery and equipment does not conflict with article 11, § 1(b). We find that the exclusions contained in K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 79-201j(a) are in harmony with the constitutional exemption of farm machinery and equipment. Wabaunsee County's assertion of constitutional violation fails. Third, Wabaunsee County argues that the 1999 statutory amendment expanded the exemption to include a natural gas distribution system, which is arguably beyond the meaning of farm machinery and equipment as used in the Kansas Constitution. K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 79-201j(a)(1) exempts [m]achinery and equipment comprising a natural gas distribution system which is owned and operated by a nonprofit public utility ... operated predominantly for the purpose of providing fuel for the irrigation of land devoted to agricultural use. `While the constitution provides that certain property shall be exempt from taxation, it does not declare that other exemptions may not be made, but does provide that property subject to taxation shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate. So it has been held that the enumerated exemptions must be made, but that more exemptions may be made by the legislature. [Citations omitted.]' Woman's Club of Topeka v. Shawnee County, 253 Kan. 175, 187-88, 853 P.2d 1157 (1993). The statutory exemption for natural gas distribution systems used predominantly to provide fuel for agricultural irrigation is not in conflict with the constitutional exemption for farm machinery and equipment. The legislature has the power to create further tax exemptions and Wabaunsee County's assertion of error in this regard fails.