Opinion ID: 1133622
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Prim Unadjudicated Criminal Activity

Text: Defendant challenges the admissibility of evidence regarding two incidents of unadjudicated criminal activity offered pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b): The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. The court conducted a preliminary inquiry, outside the presence of the jury, regarding the admissibility of evidence of a 1973 robbery. (See People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72, fn. 25, 222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423 (plur.opn.).) At this hearing, John Cavins testified on direct examination that he was robbed at his tavern by defendant and another man. On cross-examination, Cavins could not positively identify defendant, who was seated in the courtroom, as one of the men who had robbed him in 1973, nor could Cavins recognize defendant from booking and newspaper photographs taken in 1970. Cavins explained that he knew defendant because defendant had come into his tavern approximately five or six times during the 1960's, and defendant's brother had done some work at the tavern. Under further examination by defense counsel, Cavins explained that he had not seen defendant for six or seven years prior to the robbery. In response to a question from the court, however, Cavins stated that he knew defendant's name when defendant came into the tavern on the night of the robbery. Defense counsel then impeached Cavins with a police report indicating Cavins said he thought he knew one of the subjects, but could not think of his name at that time. Cavins responded that the police report was inaccurate. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that Cavins's testimony was sufficient to identify defendant as the individual who committed the robbery. At trial, Cavins testified that he knew defendant in 1973 because defendant had been in the tavern a few times before, and defendant's brother had done some work at the tavern. Cavins proceeded to testify concerning the circumstances of the robbery, indicating that defendant was one of the two perpetrators. On cross-examination, Cavins responded affirmatively to defense counsel's questions whether, on the night of the robbery, Cavins knew defendant. Counsel did not impeach Cavins with either the police report or his testimony from the hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury. Defendant contends that evidence of the 1973 robbery should not have been admitted, because Cavins's testimony at the hearing was legally insufficient to show that defendant was one of the men who committed the robbery. Defendant claims that the testimony was unreliable and violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. As we have explained, however, the plurality opinion in Phillips did not impose a requirement of a preliminary inquiry to determine whether the prosecution's evidence of prior criminal activity is substantial. ( People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 677-678, 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705; see also People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 398-399, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) The trial court's decision to admit evidence of prior criminal activity is reviewable for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1167, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1; People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 676, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.) When testimony regarding the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the prior criminal act is equivocal, that circumstance affects the credibility of the witness, not the admissibility of his or her testimony. The trial court does not abuse its discretion if, [v]iewing the totality of the evidence presented, a rational jury could conclude that defendant was the one who committed the act. ( People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1168, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) In the present case, Cavins had difficulty identifying defendant at the hearing, but he also stated that he knew who defendant was at the time of the robbery. Any inconsistencies in his testimony, or conflict with the police report prepared at the time, were matters affecting Cavins's credibility, not the admissibility of the testimony. At trial, Cavins testified without contradiction that defendant was one of the two perpetrators of the robbery. The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the robbery. Defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object to Cavins's testimony at trial or to impeach Cavins with prior inconsistent statements regarding his ability to identify defendant. Because the court already had ruled the testimony admissible following the hearing, however, any objection would have been futile, and counsel therefore was not ineffective in failing to object to the testimony. ( People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 937, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388, overruled on another point in People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 823, fn. 1, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) Assuming, for the sake of argument only, that counsel's failure to impeach Cavins constituted deficient performance, we find no reasonable probability that, but for counsel's omission, the result of the proceeding would have been different. (11 Cal.4th at p. 936, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388.) Despite counsel's efforts to impeach Cavins at the hearing, Cavins insisted that he knew who defendant was when he came into the tavern on the night of the robbery. Cavins also testified that one of the two perpetrators asked about defendant's brother. Under these circumstances, it is not likely that the jury would have disbelieved Cavins's identification of defendant. Even if the jury had disbelieved his testimony, considering the circumstances of the crimes against Cheryl and the other instances of defendant's prior criminal activity, it is not reasonably probable that the jury's penalty determination would have been different. Defendant also challenges the admission of evidence concerning his arrest for robbery in 1968. At the hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, Paul Neblett testified that in 1968 he was a sheriffs department investigator in Tennessee. Defendant and defendant's brother were suspects in an armed robbery. The brother had been arrested and was in custody, but defendant still had not been apprehended. By posing as an ordinary citizen who wanted to post part of the bail for defendant's brother, Neblett arranged to meet defendant at the bonding company. Neblett asked defendant to step outside into an alley. Defendant kept his right hand in his jacket pocket, and in an attempt to get defendant to remove his hand, Neblett extended his right hand to introduce himself. Defendant hesitated a few moments and extended his left hand instead; Neblett then grabbed defendant's right hand, which was holding a loaded revolver. At that point, defendant just kind of wilted, and Neblett disarmed defendant, placed him under arrest, and handcuffed him. Defendant did not resist arrest. He later tried to escape from Neblett's vehicle but did not assault Neblett. Neblett's testimony at trial was substantially the same as that presented at the hearing. Defendant contends, as he did at trial, that this testimony of prior criminal activity was inadmissible as aggravating evidence because his mere possession of a concealed weapon did not involve the use or attempted use of force or violence or... the express or implied threat to use force or violence. (§ 190.3.) We have found an implied threat of violence, however, when the evidence permits an inference that the defendant possessed a dangerous weapon with the purpose of using it to avoid apprehension and successfully escape the scene of a crime; the circumstance that the defendant chose not to act upon his plan could not negate the implied threat to use the weapon against anyone who might interfere. ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 676-677, 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.) Similarly, in the present case, the jury could infer an implied threat of violence from defendant's failure to remove his hand from the loaded weapon kept hidden in his jacket while he was attempting to avoid arrest. (Cf. People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1235-1236, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254 [[A] defendant who arms himself after having escaped from custody can be presumed to be in possession of a gun to assist his continued flight rather than for legitimate self-defense or some other lawful purpose.].) Defendant was free to present any additional evidence regarding the incident that would have suggested he possessed the handgun for a lawful purpose. ( Id. at p. 1236, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) The trial court properly admitted the evidence concerning the circumstances of defendant's 1968 arrest. Finally, defendant challenges the admission of evidence regarding these prior incidents on the ground they were so remote in time that requiring him to defend against the claims violated his constitutional rights to due process of law and a speedy trial, as well as his Eighth Amendment rights. Defendant failed to raise such an objection in the trial court, however, and he acknowledges that we repeatedly have rejected these and other challenges to the use of evidence of prior unadjudicated criminal activity under section 190.3, factor (b). (E.g., People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 335, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374; People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 312-313, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890; People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 863, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2; People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 401-402, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 69-70, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224, and cases cited therein.) Defendant offers no persuasive reason for us to reconsider these decisions.