Opinion ID: 672929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Mr. Looby's Testimony.

Text: 22 We first must determine whether Allstate has waived its right to challenge the district judge's exclusion of Mr. Looby's testimony. Allstate did not list this particular ruling in its statement of the issues in the initial brief. Instead, Allstate phrased the issue as Whether the lower court erred in directing a verdict on Allstate's misrepresentation claim where the insured misrepresented his occupation on his application for insurance. Allstate's initial brief seems to suggest that there was sufficient evidence, independent of Mr. Looby's testimony, to create a jury issue on Allstate's misrepresentation claim. However, Allstate also extensively discussed the exclusion of Mr. Looby's testimony in its initial brief. Allstate quoted verbatim the question posed to Mr. Looby, the exchange between the district judge and counsel contemporaneous with the court's exclusion of the evidence, and Allstate's proffer of Mr. Looby's anticipated testimony. Although Allstate's initial brief does not contain citations to legal authority pertaining specifically to the evidentiary ruling, the brief at least raises the suggestion that the trial court erred in excluding Mr. Looby's testimony. Moreover, after the Swanns' counsel noted, almost in passing, in the answer brief that Allstate had not attacked the evidentiary ruling, Allstate filed a reply brief that directly challenged and discussed the ruling. 23 Issues that clearly are not designated in the initial brief ordinarily are considered abandoned. FSLIC v. Haralson, 813 F.2d 370, 373 n. 3 (11th Cir.1987). However, briefs should be read liberally to ascertain the issues raised on appeal. Id.; United States v. Milam, 855 F.2d 739, 743 (11th Cir.1988) (citing Haralson ); Kincade v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 504 (5th Cir.1981). 24 Viewed liberally, Allstate's initial brief raised the issue of the propriety of the district judge's exclusion of Mr. Looby's testimony. Allstate preserved the issue of the evidentiary ruling in the lower court, extensively discussed the circumstances of the ruling in its initial brief, and specifically argued the point in its reply brief. Under these circumstances, application of the waiver rule would be unduly harsh. 25 Having determined that the evidentiary ruling is before us, we next address whether the trial court erred in excluding Mr. Looby's testimony on the basis of the best evidence rule. Evidentiary rulings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Sherrin v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 2 F.3d 373, 377 (11th Cir.1993). 26 Rule 1002, Federal Rules of Evidence, states 27 To prove the content of a writing, ... the original writing ... is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress. 28 Though somewhat expanded, Rule 1002 is otherwise a conventional restatement of the so-called 'best evidence' rule. 5 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 1002, at 1002-3 (1993). Except as provided in Rule 1002, there is no general rule that proof of a fact will be excluded unless its proponent furnishes the best evidence in his power. Id. Rule 1002 requires production of an original document only when the proponent of the evidence seeks to prove the content of the writing. See United States v. Howard, 953 F.2d 610, 612 & n. 1 (11th Cir.1992); United States v. Tombrello, 666 F.2d 485, 491 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2279, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982). It does not, however, require production of a document simply because the document contains facts that are also testified to by a witness. United States v. Finkielstain, 718 F.Supp. 1187, 1192 (S.D.N.Y.1989). 29 The district court abused its discretion in excluding Mr. Looby's testimony pursuant to the best evidence rule. The question posed to Mr. Looby did not seek to elicit the content of any writing; therefore, Rule 1002 was not implicated. Although Mr. Looby testified that he was familiar with Allstate's underwriting guidelines, and his answer to the question undoubtedly would have been based in part on the contents of those guidelines, Mr. Looby would not necessarily have been required to state the contents of the guidelines in order to answer the question. 30 We next address the question whether the district judge's error was harmless. The harmless error standard applies to erroneous evidentiary rulings. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Gosdin, 803 F.2d 1153, 1159 n. 12 (11th Cir.1986). 31 Generally, the Swanns contend that entry of directed verdict was nevertheless proper because Allstate did not present any evidence on one or more of the necessary elements of its misrepresentation claim. For the necessary elements of an insurer's misrepresentation defense (in this case, actually a misrepresentation claim) under Alabama law, the Swanns cite Dempsey v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 717 F.2d 556 (11th Cir.1983). In Dempsey, this court listed the following elements of such a defense: 32 (1) the statements were false and made with intent to deceive; 33 (2) the statements related to matters materially affecting the risk; and 34 (3) the insurer relied upon the statements to its detriment. 35 Dempsey, 717 F.2d at 560. 36 The Swanns concede that Allstate presented some evidence that a misrepresentation was made in the application. They maintain, however, that Allstate did not introduce any evidence that the misrepresentation materially affected the risk, or that Allstate relied on the misrepresentation to its detriment (elements 2 and 3 of the Dempsey test). 37 Allstate characterizes Dempsey as merely stating one way an insurer may void a policy based on an insured's misrepresentations. Allstate argues that it was not required to prove the second and third Dempsey elements in order to establish a prima facie misrepresentation defense under Alabama law. To support this argument, Allstate cites Ala.Code Sec. 27-14-7 (1993). In pertinent part, that statute provides: 38 (a) All statements and descriptions in any application for an insurance policy or annuity contract, or in negotiations therefor, by, or in behalf of, the insured or annuitant shall be deemed to be representations and not warranties. Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment of facts and incorrect statements shall not prevent a recovery under the policy or contract unless either: 39 (1) Fraudulent; 40 (2) Material either to the acceptance of the risk or to the hazard assumed by the insurer; or 41 (3) The insurer in good faith would either not have issued the policy or contract, or would not have issued a policy or contract at the premium rate as applied for, or would not have issued a policy or contract in as large an amount or would not have provided coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss if the true facts had been made known to the insurer as required either by the application for the policy or contract or otherwise. 42 Allstate also relies on Stephens v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 742 F.2d 1329 (11th Cir.1984). In Stephens, this court stated: 43 [Section] 27-14-7 furnishes three separate grounds for the rescission of a policy. The most innocent misrepresentation will afford a reason to rescind if the truth is either material to the risk or, even if immaterial, would have caused the particular insurer acting in good faith to have declined coverage in the amount and at the rate obtained by the applicant. 44 Id. at 1333 (footnote omitted). 45 Stephens, rather than Dempsey, controls. Dempsey does not even mention the Alabama statute, while the more recent Stephens case directly, and correctly, construes it. Moreover, Stephens relies on a 1982 Alabama Supreme Court decision 2 construing the statute, while Dempsey cites older Alabama cases. Finally, Stephens is more analogous because it, like the instant case, involved an alleged misrepresentation in an application for insurance. Dempsey, by contrast, involved a post-loss misrepresentation. Accordingly, Allstate is correct in maintaining that it was not required to introduce evidence that the Swanns' misrepresentation was material to the risk, or that Allstate relied on the misrepresentation to its detriment, in order to make out a prima facie misrepresentation claim. 3 Rather, Allstate need only have presented evidence that the Swanns made the misrepresentation, and that Allstate would not have issued the homeowners policy had it known the actual facts. 46 The district court excluded the only evidence Allstate offered to support its position that the company would not have insured the Swanns but for the misrepresentation. Had that evidence been admitted, Allstate would have made out a prima facie misrepresentation claim, requiring submission of that claim to the jury. Since the district judge's ruling precluded Allstate from establishing a prima facie claim, it cannot be characterized as harmless error. 47