Opinion ID: 783194
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Regarding Punitive Damages

Text: 10 Onyx asserts that there was insufficient evidence to warrant the imposition of punitive damages. The question of whether Onyx is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue is subject to de novo review, with the evidence and all reasonable inferences taken in the light most favorable to Lampley. Mathur v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 207 F.3d 938, 941 (7th Cir.2000). More specifically, we ask whether no rational jury could have found for the plaintiff. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 11 A plaintiff may recover punitive damages under Title VII if three requirements are satisfied. 6 Specifically, the plaintiff must establish that the employer acted with knowledge that its actions may have violated federal law and that the employees who discriminated against him are managerial agents acting within the scope of their employment. Bruso v. United Airlines, 239 F.3d 848, 857-58 (7th Cir.2001) (citing Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 535, 543, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999)). However, even if these two prongs are met (and Onyx concedes that a jury could find that they are in this case), the employer may avoid liability for punitive damages if it can show that it engaged in good faith efforts to implement an antidiscrimination policy. Id. (citing Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545, 119 S.Ct. 2118). Onyx claims that it has engaged in good faith efforts, and thus the district court's decision to let the jury assess punitive damages was in error. 12 We are unpersuaded by Onyx's argument. Onyx allegedly had a formal anti-discrimination policy, although it is difficult to ascertain the contours of this policy without physical evidence of its existence. But even assuming that the policy included appropriate procedures, we explained in Bruso that although the implementation of a written or formal anti-discrimination policy is relevant to evaluating an employer's good faith efforts at Title VII compliance, it is not sufficient in and of itself to insulate an employer from a punitive damages award. Id. at 858. Here, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to believe that Onyx failed to engage in good faith efforts at Title VII compliance after it became aware of Lampley's retaliatory discharge claim. 13 Specifically, Lampley provided statistics prepared by Wheeler that showed that Lampley was meeting (and at times greatly exceeding) company expectations. This data flatly contradicts the statistics that Strater and Hokanson presented to the EEOC to establish that Lampley was a poor performer and that this was the cause of his termination. The jury could have reasonably believed that the numbers Onyx provided (which Hokanson claimed were verified before she sent them to the EEOC) were doctored solely to discredit Lampley. Additionally, when Hokanson failed to produce evidence of the written reprimand that she insisted she had seen in Lampley's personnel file, the jury could have reasonably believed that no such reprimand existed. It could have instead determined that the reprimand was merely a trumped-up charge designed to mislead the EEOC into believing that Onyx had planned to terminate Lampley long before he complained to the agency. Indeed, the jury specifically found that Onyx had no plans to terminate Lampley prior to the filing of his initial EEOC complaint. 7 In Bruso, we found that evidence of a sham investigation designed to discredit the plaintiff was sufficient to defeat the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to a punitive damages claim. Id. at 861. Here, we have a similar situation. Because a jury could have found that Onyx engaged in a cover-up rather than a good faith investigation of Lampley's retaliatory discharge claim, we find that the punitive damages issue was properly before the jury. 8