Opinion ID: 1869071
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: equal protection due process analysis

Text: Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification which does not proceed along suspect [10] or semi-suspect lines, [11] nor infringe on fundamental rights, [12] need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976). Similarly, the crux of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is protection from arbitrary and unreasonable action and when the ordinance or statute does not affect fundamental rights, but rather is merely economic or social regulation, it need only have a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Id. Acting pursuant to the Evangeline Parish Police Jury Ordinance, the Police Jury has in effect a single operator system thereby depriving Med Express of the freedom to contract with potential customers and the freedom to engage in a lawful business on a parish wide basis in Evangeline Parish. The medical emergency ambulance business has shown disparate levels of service between emergency and non-emergency cases. The non-emergency services generate more revenue for the companies. Therefore, in many areas, citizens have experienced delays in delivery of emergency services. This is a national trend and therefore one could argue that the smaller towns would experience an even greater hardship. As a result of this, a public utility model was created. This model in essence creates a monopoly for one emergency service provider in return for what is basically a fixed or guaranteed contract. This serves the public benefit in that expensive equipment which is needed for emergency services are available and remain the property of the Parish. The problem in this instance according to the trial court is that the ordinance is being applied in an arbitrary fashion. Med Express was granted permission to operate in Ville Platte, LA which is located within Evangeline Parish, but not throughout the Parish. Therefore, the Court reasoned that Med Express should be allowed to operate parish wide in Evangeline. This Court reasons that the ordinance does not discriminate against a suspect or semi-suspect class, nor does it impinge on a fundamental right. There is no absolute right to contract free of state regulation under the police power. See e.g., New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 106-07, 99 S.Ct. 403, 410-11, 58 L.Ed.2d 361 (1978). Therefore, the rational relationship test is the appropriate standard to employ to scrutinize the Evangeline Parish ordinances. Under this level of scrutiny, the ordinance is presumed constitutional. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303, 96 S.Ct. at 2517, 49 L.Ed.2d 511. Protecting the public health, safety and welfare of its citizens is certainly a legitimate governmental interest. Med Express offered no evidence to show that the ordinances, which are presumed constitutional, are not rationally related to this legitimate government interest. Moreover, this court cannot say that the ordinances which allow the Police Jury to deny permits to applicants based on the criteria listed in the ordinances, including the requirement of obtaining a certificate from the Emergency Medical Service Advisory Board that the public convenience and necessity require the proposed additional ambulance service, are not rationally related to furthering legitimate governmental interests. Therefore, we uphold the constitutionality of the ordinances under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the federal constitution. The rights guaranteed under our state constitution are not always synonymous with federal constitutional rights. Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So.2d 305 (La.1986). In Sibley v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 477 So.2d 1094 (La.1985), this court rejected the three-tiered federal system standard of equal protection review for interpreting and applying the equal protection clause of our state constitution found in Article I, § 3. [13] Interpreting Art. I, § 3, this court held in Sibley that: Article I, Section 3 commands the courts to decline enforcement of a legislative classification of individuals in three different situations: (1) When the law classifies individuals by race or religious beliefs, it shall be repudiated completely; (2) When the statute classifies persons on the basis of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations, its enforcement shall be refused unless the state or other advocate of the classification shows that the classification has a reasonable basis; (3) When the law classifies individuals on any other basis, it shall be rejected whenever a member of a disadvantaged class shows that it does not suitably further any appropriate state interest. Sibley, 477 So.2d at 1107-08. Under the third level of scrutiny, the law creating the classification is presumed constitutional and the party challenging the constitutionality of the law has the burden of proving it unconstitutional. Manuel v. Louisiana, 95-2189, p. 5 (La.7/2/96), 677 So.2d 116, 120. The ordinances create advantages for existing ambulance service operators by requiring the police jury to notify existing operators of the need for additional services and giving the existing operators time to fulfill such needs before a public convenience and necessity certificate will be issued to applicants seeking permits to provide additional or new services in Evangeline parish on a parish wide basis. The disadvantage created by the ordinance is not based on any classification enumerated in Article I, § 3. Therefore, the ordinance must be upheld unless Med Express shows it does not further an appropriate governmental interest. Since Med Express offered no evidence to meet this burden, the ordinances are presumed constitutional under Article I, § 3 of our state constitution. The health, safety, and welfare of citizens are appropriate government interests. It seems reasonable to believe that the ordinances regulatory scheme and application process, including requiring a certificate of public convenience and necessity, would further these interests. See, Gold Cross Ambulance and Transfer v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir.1983)(discusses how a single provider system eliminates the incentive created by free-market delivery of ambulance service by private companies to neglect emergency ambulance service in favor of more profitable nonemergency business). Therefore, we hold that the ordinances do not violate Article I, § 3 of our state constitution. Similarly, since the ordinances do not affect a fundamental right and do not constitute arbitrary and unreasonable action, bur rather are rationally related to a legitimate government interest, they do not violate Article I, § 2's due process protections. See, PANO v. City of New Orleans, 94-1078, p. 16 (La.1/17/95), 649 So.2d 951, 963.