Opinion ID: 2604170
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fair and Effective Representation.

Text: That the equal protection clause protects the rights of voters to an equally meaningful vote has been inferred from Reynolds in which the Supreme Court said that the achieving of fair and effective representation for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment. [27] 377 U.S. at 565-66, 84 S.Ct. at 1383, 12 L.Ed.2d at 529. While the Reynolds court stated that the overriding objective [of apportionment] must be substantial equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State, id. at 579, 84 S.Ct. at 1390, 12 L.Ed.2d at 537, it subsequently acknowledged that multi-member districts may be vulnerable, if racial or political groups have been fenced out of the political process and their voting strength invidiously minimized. [28] Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. at 754, 93 S.Ct. at 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d at 312 (1973). Redistricting intended to achieve a rough approximation of the strengths of political groups in state legislatures, rather than fencing out such groups, is permissible. Id. at 752, 754, 93 S.Ct. at 2331, 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d at 311, 313. [29] Employing a multi-member district to achieve a rough sort of proportional representation for rural areas in the legislature would thus be permissible under the equal protection clause in light of Gaffney. If, however, the creation of such a district instead was purposefully used to exclude a certain group from political participation, it is more suspect. [30] In Bandemer, the Supreme Court addressed a claim that Indiana's 1981 legislative apportionment plan unconstitutionally diluted the votes of Indiana Democrats. [31] The Bandemer Court rejected the claim, with a plurality of four justices taking the position that plaintiffs were required to prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group. ___ U.S. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2808, 92 L.Ed.2d at 102. The plurality explained in part: In cases involving individual multi-member districts, we have required a substantially greater showing of adverse effects than a mere lack of proportional representation to support a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution. Only where there is evidence that excluded groups have less opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice have we refused to approve the use of multi-member districts. In these cases, we have also noted the lack of responsiveness by those elected to the concerns of the relevant groups. ... . As with individual districts, where unconstitutional vote dilution is alleged in the form of statewide political gerrymandering, the mere lack of proportional representation will not be sufficient to prove unconstitutional discrimination. Again, without specific supporting evidence, a court cannot presume in such a case that those who are elected will disregard the disproportionately underrepresented group. Rather, unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole. Although this is a somewhat different formulation than we have previously used in describing unconstitutional vote dilution in an individual district, the focus of both of these inquiries is essentially the same. In both contexts, the question is whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political process. In a challenge to an individual district, this inquiry focuses on the opportunity of members of the group to participate in party deliberations in the slating and nomination of candidates, their opportunity to register and vote, and hence their chance to directly influence the election returns and to secure the attention of the winning candidate. Statewide, however, the inquiry centers on the voters' direct or indirect influence on the elections of the state legislature as a whole. And, as in individual district cases, an equal protection violation may be found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to influence the political process effectively. In this context, such a finding of unconstitutionality must be supported by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political process. Id. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2810, 92 L.Ed.2d at 104-06 (emphasis added and citations omitted). Thus, under the plurality's view, a showing of purposeful disproportionality alone can not support a challenge to a legislative apportionment plan; a consistent degradation of a minority's voting power must be demonstrated. Moreover, [r]elying on a single election to prove unconstitutional discrimination does not satisfy this threshold condition in stating and proving a cause of action. Id. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2799, 92 L.Ed.2d at 107. Both the one person, one vote and the fair and effective representation prongs of equal protection necessitate the use of neutral and legitimate criteria in redistricting. Id. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2828, 92 L.Ed.2d at 127-28 (Powell, J., dissenting). As observed by Justice Powell in his Bandemer dissent, exclusive or primary reliance on `one person, one vote' can betray the constitutional promise of fair and effective representation by enabling a legislature to engage intentionally in clearly discriminatory gerrymandering. Id. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2829, 92 L.Ed.2d at 129. Justice Powell would test the constitutionality of an apportionment plan according to a number of neutral criteria, [t]he most important of [which] ... are the shapes of voting districts and adherence to established political subdivision boundaries. Other relevant considerations include the nature of the legislative procedures by which the apportionment law was adopted and legislative history reflecting contemporaneous legislative goals. To make out a case of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, the plaintiff should be required to offer proof concerning these factors, which bear directly on the fairness of a redistricting plan, as well as evidence concerning population disparities and statistics tending to show vote dilution. No one factor should be dispositive. Id. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2831-32, 92 L.Ed.2d at 131-32 (Powell, J., dissenting, citing with approval Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 753-61, 103 S.Ct. 2653, 2671-75, 77 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring)). [32] In summation, proof of purposeful discrimination alone is insufficient to state a cause of action for political gerrymandering. The plurality in Bandemer would require additional proof that the group has been consistently and substantially excluded from the political process, denied political effectiveness over a period of more than one election, in order to raise a constitutional claim. With these principles in mind, we turn to the specific allegations made by Crawford and Kenai in this case. We can summarily dispose of Crawford's claim that the Board's improper motivation in discriminating against the Republican Party renders the apportionment plan unconstitutional. Crawford conceded in his reply brief that [r]eferences to identifiable political groups, and any adverse impact on any group's ability to effectively participate in the political process, are references to a gerrymandering claim, which is not involved in this case. In light of the constitutional doctrine just outlined, Crawford obviously has not stated a claim for violation of the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution. [33] In regard to Kenai's claim of impermissible discrimination against Anchorage voters, we find that Kenai has not made the requisite demonstration under Bandemer that the Board attempted to consistently and substantially deny them representation. Although the Board did seek to prevent another Anchorage senate seat, proportionality was the Board's expressed goal in redistricting: the suggested purpose for the creation of Senate District E was to insure that there would be a far better balance of interests in the legislature. Moreover, at least eleven of the twenty state senators represent urban areas, and of these, eight are from Anchorage. If senate representation were mathematically proportional to population, Anchorage would be entitled to 8.51 senators. [34] Anchorage has a population as calculated for apportionment purposes of 42.6% of the state's total population and has received 40% of the state's senate seats; given an additional senator, for a total of nine, it would then have 42.6% of the population and 45% of the senate seats. (Kenai itself argues that the facts show another Anchorage seat would not be created by severing Senate District E into two districts.) We think the effect of this disproportionality is de minimus in a traditional system of winner-take-all representation. Therefore, we hold that Senate District E does not violate the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution.