Opinion ID: 1937621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: should petitioner's amended petition for writ of habeas corpus have been dismissed pursuant to sdcl 21-27-16.1? [2]

Text: The scope of review is limited in a state habeas corpus proceeding because the remedy is in the nature of a collateral attack upon a final judgment. Goodroad v. Solem, 406 N.W.2d 141 (S.D.1987). A writ of habeas corpus will provide relief for a petitioner if any of the grounds of SDCL 21-27-16 are met. This court will not overturn the factual findings of the circuit court unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. at 145. SDCL 21-27-16.1 is the statute which both parties cite in support of their position: All grounds for relief available to a petitioner under this chapter shall be raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground not raised, finally adjudicated or knowingly and understandingly waived in the proceedings resulting in his conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding that the applicant has taken to secure relief from his conviction, or sentence, may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds grounds for relief asserted which for reasonable cause were omitted or inadequately raised in the original, supplemental or amended application. (emphasis added). [3] In Gregory III, we noted petitioner's burden of proof of reasonable cause but did not feel it necessary to go into an in-depth discussion of what this standard required of a habeas petitioner. Respondent argues that the reasonable cause requirement of SDCL 21-27-16.1 should be interpreted in accordance with the United States Supreme Court's cause and prejudice standard of review. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). Petitioner asks that such a standard be rejected and opts for a reasonable man standard. The circuit court applied the cause and prejudice test advanced by respondent. However, having done so, it concluded that petitioner had apparently met such a standard and denied respondent's motion to dismiss. [4] The seminal case concerning the cause and prejudice test is Wainwright v. Sykes, supra . This standard was adopted therein, but the United States Supreme Court felt it unnecessary to define its specific elements. It did, however, adopt a general rule that for a habeas petitioner to avoid dismissal of a subsequent petition for failure to raise the issue in a prior proceedings, the petitioner must show: 1. Cause for his omission or failure to previously raise the grounds for habeas relief; and 2. Actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. Later, in Murray v. Carrier, supra , the Supreme Court set forth an in-depth analysis of what constitutes cause: We think, then, that the question of cause for procedural default does not turn on whether counsel erred or on the kind of error counsel may have made. So long as a defendant is represented by counsel whose performance is not constitutionally ineffective under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, supra, we discern no inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of attorney error that results in a procedural default. Instead, we think that the existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule. Without attempting an exhaustive catalog of such objective impediments to compliance with a procedural rule, we note that a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel or that some interference by officials made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause under this standard. (citations omitted). 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. at 2645, 91 L.Ed.2d at 408. In addressing the second prong, that being prejudice, the Supreme Court noted that [t]he habeas petitioner must show `not merely that errors at ... trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.' Id., 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S.Ct. at 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d at 412. [5] (emphasis original). This cause and prejudice standard has also received increasing acceptance among the various state jurisdictions dealing with this issue. See Valeriano v. Bronson, 12 Conn.App. 385, 530 A.2d 1100 (1987); Cherry v. Abbott, 258 Ga. 517, 371 S.E.2d 852 (1988); Polly v. State, 355 N.W.2d 849 (Ia. 1984); [6] Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305 (Miss.1986); Passanisi v. Dir. Nev. Dept. of Prisons, 769 P.2d 72 (Nev.1989); Wells v. Shulsen, 747 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1987); Epperly v. Booker, 235 Va. 35, 366 S.E.2d 62 (1988); Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257 (Wyo.1988). This court is well aware that in recent years, habeas petitioners have sought relief from the federal and state courts of South Dakota in a manner which has these proceedings going to and from each court on a frequent basis. The case at bar is an example in point. With the adoption of the cause and prejudice doctrine in all federal courts, the use of the same criteria by this court would facilitate the task of federal courts in the examination of these issues when raised in a federal post-conviction proceeding in which review is sought of a state court conviction in South Dakota. Cutbirth, supra at 1262. Likewise, a previous federal determination under the same standard as adopted by this court would avoid attempted relitigation of the same issue in a subsequent state proceeding. For the foregoing reasons, we adopt the cause and prejudice standard as the reasonable cause showing that a habeas corpus petitioner must make under SDCL 21-27-16.1. The issues raised by petitioner in his first habeas petition and its subsequent evidentiary hearing are set forth in Gregory I. However, that decision resulted in a partial reversal and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. The parties to this appeal vigorously argue over the effect of SDCL 21-27-16.1 on the subsequent proceedings. After the remand from this court for further findings in Gregory I, petitioner's then attorney, Mr. Mueller, believed that the state did not have sufficient evidence in the record to successfully overcome petitioner's habeas challenge. He informed petitioner of this opinion. Mueller also wrote the habeas court and argued against reopening the record. After Mueller's departure, petitioner's new attorney, Mr. Jackley, talked to Mueller, reviewed the court file and came to the same conclusion. On two occasions, Jackley wrote petitioner and advised him of this opinion and requested a response. Petitioner wrote back to Jackley and concurred with this trial tactic. Apparently the state was also somewhat nervous about the quality of its existing record as it sought an additional evidentiary hearing. Jackley, on behalf of petitioner, opposed this request. (See the Appendix for excerpts of this correspondence.) Attorney Jackley testified at petitioner's most recent habeas hearing that he reviewed the entire record and agreed with Mueller's conclusion that petitioner has received competent representation prior to and at this arraignment. This was a second reason that Jackley saw no benefit to reopen the habeas record to allege ineffective assistance by trial counsel. A third reason Jackley did not want the record reopened was that it would give the state a chance to introduce a private deposition given by petitioner to his trial attorneys in which petitioner admitted certain matters of his legal knowledge concerning the lack of possibility of parole from a life sentence; this knowledge was diametrically opposed to his current legal position and testimony. Jackley felt that this deposition could destroy petitioner's credibility and veracity with the habeas court. The circuit court sided with petitioner and opted not to hold any further evidentiary hearings. However, this strategy backfired on petitioner. The circuit court ruled in favor of the state. This court affirmed in Gregory II. The above clearly shows that petitioner, with the concurrence of his counsel, made an informed and calculated decision not to raise these issues when he had a chance to do so. [7] Such a scenario is clearly well short of the establishment of cause, as set forth in Smith v. Murray, supra . [8] An examination of the second requirement, that being prejudice, also shows that petitioner's claim is found wanting. The circuit court, after this court's remand in Gregory III, entered the following findings: The Court finds that Attorney Smit repeatedly explained the elements of the crime of conspiracy to Gregory.       It is therefore the finding of this Court that the Petitioner knew the nature of the charges against him, and that the same were explained to him by counsel and that the Petitioner was specifically aware of the nature and elements of the conspiracy charge to which he pled. In making such findings, the circuit court chose the credibility of attorney Smit over that of petitioner and found that petitioner's testimony was open to question in regards to his entire testimony. The court further found that his memory of conversations with his trial counsel was extremely limited and that petitioner specifically conspired with co-defendant Archambult to effect the death of Michael Young. Based on an examination of the record, these findings are not clearly erroneous. Goodroad, supra at 145. Any claim of prejudice is further negated by looking to the reason petitioner pled guilty in the first place. He knowingly entered a guilty plea to the conspiracy charge with a recommended life sentence to avoid the 99-1 chance his trial counsel predicted that he could be convicted by a jury of murder and the possible imposition of the death penalty. Gregory v. Solem, 774 F.2d at 316. Therefore, it is this court's conclusion that petitioner has failed to establish prejudice in that there is no showing that he sustained actual and substantial disadvantage infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.