Opinion ID: 1852263
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: The sole issue Stutts raises is whether a trial court can order restitution in an amount greater than $250 after a jury, by finding him guilty of third-degree criminal mischief, concluded that he had caused no more than $250 worth of damage to the victim. In its unpublished memorandum the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in ordering Stutts to pay $2,500 in restitution, even after the jury found Stutts guilty of the lesser-included offense of criminal mischief in the third degree, which criminalizes damage to property in an amount not exceeding $250. Relying on the standard that the amount of restitution is a matter that should be left to the discretion of the trial court, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial judge had the authority to impose restitution in an amount he deemed appropriate and that in awarding $2,500 in restitution the court had not exceeded the scope of its discretion. We agree. Here, the jury verdict established that the jury was not convinced that the State established beyond a reasonable doubt that the damage to the vehicle exceeded $250. The burden of proof applied by the jury in a criminal trial  beyond a reasonable doubt  is not the same burden applied by the trial judge at a restitution hearing. At a restitution hearing, the trial judge need be convinced only by a preponderance of [the] evidence. Hagler v. State, 625 So.2d 1190, 1191 (Ala.Crim.App.1993). Thus, the fact that Stutts was effectively acquitted of having caused more than $250 in damage did not preclude the trial court from finding him, based on a preponderance of the evidence, liable for having caused more than $250 in damage at the subsequent restitution hearing. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938): The difference in degree of the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of res judicata. The acquittal was `merely ... an adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.' ... That acquittal on a criminal charge is not a bar to a civil action by the Government, remedial in its nature, arising out of the same facts on which the criminal proceeding was based has long been settled. Moreover, Rule 26.6(b)(2), Ala.R.Crim.P., states that at a sentencing hearing [a]ny evidence that the court deems to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence. Therefore, any evidence that the trial court could not admit during the guilt stage of the trial may be admitted during the sentencing phase of a trial to assist the court in determining the proper sentence, including restitution for the loss suffered by the victim. At the restitution hearing Jeffreys testified to and offered written estimates regarding the amount of damage to his truck caused by Stutts's conduct. Jeffreys estimated the value of his truck to be approximately $4,000. He testified that one mechanic told him the cost to repair the water damage would be at least $2,500. Jeffreys also offered written estimates from two other mechanics: one stated that the cost of repair would exceed the value of the truck, which he said was approximately $4,000, while the other stated that the cost of the necessary repairs would be $10,000. Jeffreys's testimony and the written estimates of the cost to repair the vehicle support the trial court's finding that damage in the amount of $2,500 was established by a preponderance of the evidence; the trial court did not exceed the scope of its discretion in ordering Stutts to pay $2,500 in restitution.