Opinion ID: 2602167
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: trial court's reversal of summary judgment

Text: ¶ 17 Brookside appears to argue that the court of appeals misstated the doctrine of surrender and asserts that the trial court's original grant of Brookside's motion for summary judgment should be reinstated. The trial court initially granted Brookside's summary judgment motion based on its understanding that under the doctrine of surrender, no lease existed between Brookside and Peebles and that, therefore, the Residency Act could not apply. The trial court reversed this ruling after Peebles clarified his position by submitting a supplemental affidavit alleging facts which showed that Peebles did not intend to surrender his lease. Brookside argues that under the doctrine of surrender, Peebles had no lease with Brookside as a matter of law and that, because no lease existed, the Residency Act did not apply and summary judgment in favor of Brookside was appropriate. ¶ 18 Appellate courts review a trial court's grant of a motion to reconsider under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Utah 1996). While the court of appeals did not address whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to reconsider, there is no indication that the trial court did so. Trial courts have clear discretion to reconsider and change their position with respect to any orders or decisions as long as no final judgment has been rendered. U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, ¶ 55, 990 P.2d 945; Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). Summary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment is proper as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ P. 56(c). Based on our review of the evidence before the trial court at the time it granted the motion to reconsider, a question of material fact existed, specifically whether Peebles surrendered the lease, and we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's acknowledgment that its previous ruling was in error. ¶ 19 The correctness of the denial of summary judgment for Brookside turns on whether the doctrine of surrender looks at the intent of the parties in determining surrender. The court of appeals correctly stated the doctrine. Brookside, 2000 UT App 314 at ¶ 20, 14 P.3d 105 (quoting Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1989)). As the court of appeals explained, surrender requires that parties intend a surrender. Id. Surrender should not be inferred against the intent of the parties. . . . Belanger v. Rice, 2 Utah 2d 250, 252, 272 P.2d 173, 174 (1954) (internal quotation omitted). Furthermore, [t]he question of whether the acts and circumstances constituted a surrender . . . is one for the fact finder. Mariani Air Prods. Co. v. Gill's Tire Mkt., 29 Utah 2d 291, 293, 508 P.2d 808, 810 (1973). Thus, evidence that showed that Peebles did not intend to surrender his lease created a disputed issue of material fact as to whether a lease existed between the parties, rendering summary judgment inappropriate. Utah R. Civ P. 56(c). The trial court was correct to reverse its earlier summary judgment ruling on this basis and did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to reconsider. We therefore affirm the court of appeals on this issue.