Opinion ID: 1877204
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dudley v. Morrison Industrial Equipment Co. and John Deere Ins. Co.

Text: In Dudley, the magistrate granted an open award of benefits to the complainant after he suffered a back injury. The WCAC reversed for lack of competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record, and because it concluded that the magistrate should not have found the plaintiff to be a credible witness. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the WCAC. We hold that the WCAC exceeded its authority and erred in reversing the decision of the magistrate. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the magistrate. George Dudley began working at Morrison Industrial Equipment Company in April, 1968, as a heavy equipment repairman. He previously spent twenty years in the military repairing forklifts. By his own reports, he was in A-1 condition when he started at Morrison. He injured himself twice, while working on March 4, 1988. The first injury occurred when he reached for his sixty-pound tool box, after parking his truck. When he began to close the door of his truck, his foot slipped and he kicked his back. The next injury occurred later the same day while he was working on a forklift. In the process of checking for the source of an oil leak, he twisted and crawled underneath the lift in such a manner that his back started to hurt, so much so that it took him five minutes to get up. The plaintiff reported the injury to his supervisor and continued to work despite constant pain. The plaintiff sought medical help with his family doctor, Dr. William Hughes. Dr. Hughes prescribed anti-inflammatory drugs and muscle relaxers, and told him to stay home from work and rest. He returned to work on July 18, 1988, and continued to work despite his pain until November 1988, when he reported loss of feeling in his right leg. Plaintiff also indicated that he was still lifting in excess of one hundred pounds. The plaintiff had received spinal injections for one month that relieved some of his pain, but, by May 24, 1989, his last day of work, the pain became so unbearable that he could not bend. This worsened after he lifted a 135-pound transmission from a truck. He did not return to work after this. Mr. Dudley was seen by three doctors who testified by deposition. Dr. Hughes had treated plaintiff in his capacity as family physician for ten years. Dr. Hughes had examined the plaintiff in 1980 and noted that at that time, he had no specific chief complaints. However, during the course of that examination in response to the doctor's inquiries, plaintiff told him that from time to time he experienced back stiffness. This was not a presenting complaint, but were complaints elicited in the process of [the] exam. This stiffness, however, did not keep the plaintiff from work, was not disabling, and was nonacute. The plaintiff was treated by Dr. Hughes on March 8, shortly after his injuries at work. The doctor noted that the aggravating factor was the original work injury and that before the day in question, 3-4-90, he was able to work, and after the day in question, he was unable to work without pain. At that time, Dr. Hughes made two diagnoses: acute lumbar myositis and degenerative lumbar disease. [17] Dr. Hughes took the plaintiff off work temporarily. When the plaintiff went back to work it was with a fifty-pound lifting restriction. He also recommended that the plaintiff do bench work and small engine repair. Dr. Hughes referred the plaintiff to Robert Schneeberger, D.O., to evaluate plaintiff's back. Dr. Schneeberger noted that it is not uncommon for a man plaintiff's age to have some arthritis, and that the strain and sprain he suffered at the time of his injury aggravated the underlying problem, which then became symptomatic. At the defendant's request, Dr. Arnold Eckhouse examined the plaintiff and concurred that he suffered from degenerative arthritis attributable to the aging process and everyday wear and tear. However, Dr. Eckhouse admitted that certain activities, like bending, twisting, reaching, pulling, working in awkward positions, crawling, if frequent and regular, could place additional stress on the spine and contribute to the degenerative process. After considering the depositions and the testimony of the plaintiff, the magistrate granted an open award of benefits, holding: I found Plaintiff to be a credible witness who did work as much as he could following his March 4, 1988 injury. I accept that he could no longer continue working after May 24, 1989 and that he has continuing disabling pain through the present. While Plaintiff did have a specific event injury on March 4, 1988, I find his primary problem is a result [sic, of] 40 years of very heavy labor. I find that this heavy labor he did in the military and at Defendant significantly aggravated and contributed to the wear and tear arthritis in his low back. The WCAC reversed the decision of the magistrate on the basis of lack of competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record for two reasons. First, the WCAC found that plaintiff was not a credible witness because of discrepancies in the histories that he gave to Drs. Hughes and Schneeberger. The plaintiff reported to Dr. Hughes that he developed sudden pain when he tried to get out from under the forklift; he told Dr. Schneeberger that the injury occurred while he was lifting and suffered such pain it threw him to his knees. Second, the WCAC noted that the plaintiff failed to mention previous back difficulty. He did not mention that the first time he saw Dr. Hughes in 1980 he reported some limitation of motion in the lumbar spine. Nor did he mention that on February 17, 1988, one month before his injury, he complained of some mild low back discomfort to Lenny Kurello, D.O., who had treated him for prostate cancer. [18] Plaintiff had monthly visits with Dr. Kurello to monitor his progress after the prostate surgery. During this particular visit, he complained of some paresthesia, a burning sensation of the skin, on his legs. The doctor informed the plaintiff that this was a mild muscle spasm and to treat it with aspirin and a heating pad. The doctor also noted that the [n]eurologic exam of the lower extremities shows entirely normal sensory motor function.... The plaintiff did, however, testify upon questioning that he had some pain in the back once in a while but nothing that was causing any disability, and that he had noticed some numbness and tingling in his legs, but did not think it was excessive, and it did not keep him from working. On the basis of the plaintiff's inconsistent accounts to the doctors and his previous back discomfort, the WCAC found that there was no evidence to support a finding that plaintiff's injury was work-related or that the employment significantly contributed to or aggravated his condition. The WCAC found further that the plaintiff's condition was progressive in nature and that the medical evidence failed to substantiate workplace aggravation and, accordingly, reversed the award. The Court of Appeals agreed and held: Plaintiff's history of the March 4, 1988, injury was inconsistent. Dr. Schneeberger's testimony to the effect that plaintiff's condition was aggravated by the injury was based in large part on the inaccurate history given by plaintiff. Further, the magistrate failed to analyze the impact of plaintiff's preexisting condition on his alleged disability, in spite of the fact that each physician acknowledged the existence of his degenerative arthritis. The WCAC found that, given plaintiff's lack of credibility regarding the March 4, 1988 injury, the evidence supported a finding that plaintiff's condition was related to the aging process. [Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued June 23, 1995 (Docket No. 168027).] We disagree. The WCAC exceeded the scope of its statutory review power and erred in reversing the fact finding of the magistrate. The magistrate found the witness to be credible, noting in his opinion that the plaintiff did have treatment for lower back stiffness in 1980, but that this was not the reason for the doctor visit and did not cause the plaintiff to miss work. The magistrate noted further that the plaintiff had no problems performing fully on the job until after the March 4 injury. Further, the plaintiff indicated that the new pain was in addition to the previously noted back discomfort. In his opinion, the magistrate only noted the injury that occurred when the plaintiff twisted his back getting out from under the forklift, although the record clearly indicates that there might have been a second injury that occurred when the plaintiff grabbed his tool box and kicked his back. The magistrate, relying on the diagnosis of Dr. Hughes, concluded that the heavy labor plaintiff performed in the military and for the defendant significantly aggravated and contributed to the wear and tear arthritis in his low back. In this case, the magistrate chose to rely on Dr. Hughes, the treating physician, [19] and awarded the plaintiff benefits. In reversing, the WCAC noted that it generally defers to the magistrate's finding with regard to the plaintiff's credibility. It then concluded that here it could not do so because his testimony was at times inconsistent and suspect. The WCAC concluded that if the plaintiff was giving inconsistent histories to different doctors, then the credibility of these medical opinions would be undermined. We are cognizant of the fact that the Magistrate need not discuss ever[y] single aspect of the evidence presented below and that he is free to accept the medical testimony he finds most persuasive. However, there must be a rational basis for his reliance upon the same in order for us to affirm.... 1993 Mich. ACO 1295,1297. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the WCAC. We reverse both the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the WCAC, and hold that the WCAC misapplied the substantial evidence standard and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming. In applying our guidelines, we find that, in this case, the WCAC improperly substituted its judgment for that of the magistrate, and we find its conclusion untenable. The WCAC examined the record but ignored certain important factors considered by the magistrate. None of the doctors disputed the fact that there was an underlying arthritic condition. However, they all ultimately concluded, though maybe not all eagerly, that the type of heavy labor that the plaintiff performed on a daily basis certainly could contribute to the condition and cause disabling symptoms where previously there were none. The magistrate noted that the plaintiff worked as much as he could after the March 4 injury and could not work because of disabling pain afterward. Unlike Goff, this case does not present a plaintiff with no objective evidence of a disabling condition. To the contrary, Mr. Dudley is a plaintiff with an underlying arthritic condition that, before the injury, was simply not disabling at all. The medical testimony does provide evidence of significant workplace aggravation of the underlying arthritic condition. The WCAC did not base its decision on the evidence in the record as a whole and improperly substituted its judgment for that of the magistrate. The reliance of the magistrate on Dr. Hughes' opinion as the treating physician was not unreasonable, and the magistrate's finding that the previously nondisabling progressive arthritic disease process was significantly aggravated by plaintiff's work was clearly based on competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record as a whole. [20] The WCAC must be cognizant of the deference due the magistrate. Holden, supra . We find that the WCAC gave only passing lip service to this requirement. It ignored the medical opinions of the treating and examining physicians and rejected the credibility determination of the magistrate in a wholesale manner, in light of objective, palpable, and reliable objective evidence. Consequently, the WCAC both misapprehended and misapplied the substantial evidence standard. Finally, the WCAC did not give an adequate reason grounded in the record for reversing the decision of the magistrate. Its conclusion did not reflect careful consideration of the whole record. Instead, it ignores the physicians' conclusions and rejects the credibility determination of the magistrate. Because the findings of the magistrate were reasonably made on the basis of competent, material, and substantial evidence, they are conclusive, and the WCAC erred in overturning the award and impermissibly substituting its judgment for that of the magistrate. If the magistrate finds the witness to be credible, that judgment should not be overturned because the accounts of the witness' history as reported by the examining physicians are inconsistent merely because the WCAC disagrees. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals merely restated the findings of fact of the WCAC and summarily affirmed the decision of the WCAC. [21] It did not adequately assess whether the WCAC properly exercised its reviewing power. Nor did it properly consider issues of credibility determined by the magistrate, evidence accepted and rejected by both the magistrate and the WCAC, or the care, reasoning, and analysis with which the magistrate and WCAC reached their conclusions. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the WCAC overturning the award of the magistrate.