Opinion ID: 2816325
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Petitioner’s Speedy Trial Claim

Text: To determine whether the lapse of time between accusation and trial constitutes a violation of the Sixth Amendment, courts balance “‘whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result.’” United States v. O’Dell, 247 F.3d 655, 667 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651). If the government uses “reasonable diligence” in seeking to bring an accused to justice, a speedy trial claim will generally fail “as a matter of course however great the delay, so long as [the defendant] could not show specific prejudice to his defense.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656. “[O]fficial bad faith in causing delay will be weighed heavily against the government,” resulting in dismissal if the delay is significant. Id. Where delay results from “official negligence in bringing an accused to trial,” the need for the defendant to show prejudice from delay lessens with the length of time elapsed. Id. On the record before us, it is clear that Petitioner has a speedy trial claim that is at least facially viable. More than six years elapsed between the alleged shooting on December 31, 2005 and Mexico’s informal request for his extradition in May 2012, and another year and three months passed before Mexico formalized its extradition request with the delivery of a complete packet in August 2013. The Supreme Court has held that a delay of this magnitude raises a presumption of prejudice that may justify relief. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 658. Additionally, it appears that Petitioner left Mexico without any knowledge that he was charged with a crime, and No. 14-5860 Cruz Martinez v. United States Page 23 there is at least circumstantial evidence of negligence and unjustified failure to prosecute on the part of the Mexican government. We do not, however, have the benefit of a district court decision making factual findings on these issues or analyzing the application of the Barker factors. Nor has the government been asked to present evidence that Mexico diligently sought Petitioner during the period that he was living in the United States. Remand is therefore necessary. The government argues to this Court that it would be infeasible or improper to conduct the fact-finding necessary to adjudicate a speedy trial claim. Resp.’s Br. at 39. Yet, the administrative challenges are not nearly so grave as the government would suggest. Application of the Barker factors in an extradition setting is not likely to result in a searching inquiry into the actions of foreign officials. In most cases, introduction of evidence that the requesting country pursued the suspect with “reasonable diligence” will end the inquiry, since under Doggett a showing of diligence will nearly always defeat a speedy trial claim “however great the delay.” 505 U.S. at 656. In other cases, where the extraditee is alleged to be a fugitive from justice, the speedy trial analysis will be comparable to the analysis already implemented by courts considering claims that the person’s flight from justice tolled the statute of limitations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3290; Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1976). The 1978 Treaty offers a ready mechanism, in the form of Article 12, for the United States to obtain the evidence necessary to make such a showing. That provision anticipates that there may be cases where the executive of the requested country “considers that the evidence furnished in support of the request for extradition is not sufficient to fulfill the requirements of [the] Treaty,” and therefore provides that in such cases the requested country “shall request the presentation of the necessary evidence.” 1978 Treaty, art. 12. It is worth noting that this is not a discovery rule but rather a diplomatic mechanism; there is no risk that Mexico will be forced to offer up evidence of bad-faith delay for review by an American court. Additionally, in light of the relaxed rules of evidence applicable in extradition hearings, proof of Mexico’s diligence may be presented in any reasonably reliable form adequate to document the country’s efforts in seeking Petitioner. No. 14-5860 Cruz Martinez v. United States Page 24 We therefore remand this case to the district court to conduct the Barker analysis in the first instance, after taking such relevant evidence as may be offered by the parties.