Opinion ID: 566443
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Ex Post Facto Clause and the Controlled Substance

Text: 52 Analogue Enforcement Act-Counts Two and Eight 53 In Mitcheltree, we discussed the checkered history of scheduling MDMA as a schedule I controlled substance. Id. at 1335-1336. MDMA did not become subject to federal controlled substance penalties until October 27, 1986. Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 811(h), the DEA first sought to schedule temporarily MDMA as a schedule I controlled substance. 50 Fed.Reg. 22,119 (1985). In United States v. Spain, 825 F.2d 1426 (10th Cir.1987), we held that this attempted temporary scheduling was invalid and that an order scheduling the drug had not been timely issued. 5 Id. at 1429. See also United States v. Caudle, 828 F.2d 1111, 1113 (5th Cir.1987) (holding MDMA temporary scheduling procedurally defective). A final rule placing MDMA in schedule I, effective November 13, 1986, 51 Fed.Reg. 36,552 (1986), was vacated for further agency consideration. Grinspoon v. Drug Enforcement Adm'n, 828 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir.1987). Thus, during the period when the scheduling was invalid on procedural grounds, MDMA was not a controlled substance. United States v. Desurra, 865 F.2d 651, 652-53, reh'g denied, 868 F.2d 716 (5th Cir.1989). 54 As a controlled substance analogue, MDMA was treated as a schedule I controlled substance as of October 27, 1986. The Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986, Pub.L. 99-570, tit. I, subtit. E, § 1202, 100 Stat. 3207-13 to 3207-14 (Oct. 27, 1986), provided that a controlled substance analogue intended for human consumption would be treated as a schedule I controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 813. Effective March 23, 1988, however, MDMA was permanently scheduled in schedule I as a controlled substance. 53 Fed.Reg. 5,156 (1988). 55 However, as of October 27, 1986, MDMA, as a controlled substance analogue, was validly included in schedule I. 21 U.S.C. § 813 provides:Treatment of controlled substance analogues 56 A controlled substance analogue shall, to the extent intended for human consumption, be treated, for the purpose of this title and title III as a controlled substance in schedule I. 57 The Act further provides that a controlled substance analogue does not include ... a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(B)(i). 58 Defendant argues that MDMA could not be a controlled substance analogue during the times alleged in the superseding indictment because the government had attempted to schedule it as a regular controlled substance. Once the government tried to schedule MDMA as a controlled substance, defendant contends that it could not be a controlled substance analogue. According to the defendant, it makes no difference that MDMA was not validly scheduled as a controlled substance for two reasons. First, the definition of a controlled substance analogue may not include a controlled substance. Second, the definition of a controlled substance includes a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in Schedule I, II, III, IV or V of part B of this subchapter. 21 U.S.C. § 802(6); thus, because MDMA was included in Schedule I (albeit invalidly) it had to be a controlled substance and could not be a controlled substance analogue. Defendant argues that the above definition permits no inquiry as to whether a substance is properly included in schedule I; once scheduled, always scheduled. Persisting in this argument, defendant claims that any other interpretation would violate the ex post facto clause. 59 For a law to be ex post facto, it must be retrospective, that is it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981) (footnotes omitted). An ex post facto law is more severe than the prior law. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 431, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2451, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987). On the other hand, a procedural change in the law which does not alter substantial personal rights does not violate the ex post facto clause. Id. at 430, 107 S.Ct. at 2451. 60 Defendant's argument brings to mind an old saying: Just because you're standing in a garage doesn't make you a car. Just because MDMA had been scheduled as a controlled substance did not mean that its scheduling could never be challenged and held invalid. In upholding the temporary scheduling provision from an unlawful delegation challenge, the Supreme Court noted that the restriction on judicial review under 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(6) does not preclude an individual facing criminal charges from bringing a challenge to a temporary scheduling order as a defense to prosecution. United States v. Touby, --- U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 1752, 1753, 114 L.Ed.2d 219 (1991). A successful challenge may have the effect of invalidating the scheduling. We are in complete agreement with the Fifth Circuit on this point: once the scheduling was held invalid procedurally, MDMA was not a controlled substance and quite correctly could be considered an analogue within the definition contained in 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(6) and 802(32). Desurra, 865 F.2d at 653. 61 Thus, defendant's ex post facto argument must be rejected. The addition of MDMA to schedule I as a controlled substance analogue was effective October 27, 1986. Defendant was prosecuted under the analogue statute for activities occurring subsequent to this time. Thus, the statute is not being applied retrospectively. Moreover, defendant's argument necessarily presumes that the faulty schedulings were effective; that being the case defendant would be unable to show prejudice arising from the inclusion of MDMA in schedule I pursuant to the analogue statute. 62 AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.