Opinion ID: 1850677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wright's continuing objection to hearsay testimony

Text: ¶ 25. Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. M.R.E. 801(c)(2005). If the significance of a statement is merely that it was made and there is no issue about the truth of the matter asserted, then the statement is not hearsay. Tanner v. State, 764 So.2d 385, 406 (Miss.2000)(citing Mickel v. State, 602 So.2d 1160, 1162 (Miss.1992)). Wright asserts that the trial court erred by improperly admitting hearsay evidence during the testimony of Darryl Hampton. Wright's first objection was to Hampton's statement regarding the telephone call he received from Pope immediately after the rape: Q: What was the tone of her voice when she called you? A: She was upset when she called me. And, basically, she was like, Would you please come and pick me up right now and take me to my mother's house? Although the trial court sustained this objection, subsequently in Hampton's testimony, he was asked: Q: Okay. And just to show your feelings about this, did you do anything before you left or did you immediately go get in your car and leave? A: I mean, I was at home when she called. And like I spoke earlier, she sounded upset and she said, I need you to come here immediately. The trial court overruled Wright's objection to this comment. The point of this testimony was merely to show why Hampton was at Pope's home. Hampton's statement was not intended to prove the truth of the matter asserted, thus it was not hearsay and was admissible. Wright further objected to Hampton's recitation of his conversation with Pope regarding the rape. Noting that Pope had already testified and been cross-examined by Wright, the trial court overruled the objection. See M.R.E. 801(d)(1). ¶ 26. In addition, Rule 803(1) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence provides that a statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter is not excluded by the hearsay rule. The comment to 803(1) states that spontaneity is the essential ingredient. This court has explained that the question of spontaneity is to be decided upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case and such a determination is a question for the trial court. Evans v. State, 547 So.2d 38, 41 (Miss.1989). When such statements are admitted, the action of the trial court should not be reversed unless the comment could not, under a reasonable interpretation of the facts presented, be spontaneous. Id. Also, M.R.E. 803(3), which provides that a statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition is not excluded by the hearsay rule, is applicable. Here, the prosecution had established through Hampton's testimony that Pope was upset and crying when she made the statements, and that he had arrived between 30 and 35 minutes from the time the rape occurred. The testimony was admissible under M.R.E. 803(1) and (3), and this issue is without merit.