Opinion ID: 1973434
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Criminal Conspiracy

Text: The applicable standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of evidence is well-settled. We must determine whether, viewing all the evidence at trial, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury could have found that each element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Both direct and circumstantial evidence can be considered equally when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 429-31, 555 A.2d 1264, 1267 (1989); Commonwealth v. Ogin, 373 Pa.Super. 116, 540 A.2d 549 (1988) (en banc). Appellant contends that the evidence of conspiracy fails to satisfy this standard because the Commonwealth failed to establish a conspiratorial agreement among the parties. It is clear that essential to the crime of conspiracy is a common understanding and agreement that a crime will be committed. See Commonwealth v. Derr, 501 Pa. 446, 462 A.2d 208 (1983); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 381 Pa.Super. 1, 552 A.2d 1064 (1988). It is equally plain that direct proof of such an agreement is rarely available, nor is it necessary. Thus, proof of a criminal partnership is almost invariably extracted from the circumstances that attend its activities. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 353 Pa.Super. 178, 180-81, 509 A.2d 394, 395 (1986) (quoting Commonwealth v. Strantz, 328 Pa. 33, 43, 195 A. 75, 80 (1937)). An agreement can be inferred from a variety of circumstances including, but not limited to, the relation between the parties, knowledge of and participation in the crime, and the circumstances and conduct of the parties surrounding the criminal episode. These factors may coalesce to establish a conspiratorial agreement beyond a reasonable doubt where one factor alone might fail. See Commonwealth v. Lamb, 309 Pa.Super. 415, 429, 455 A.2d 678, 685-86 (1983). Appellant argues that the Commonwealth's evidence proved only a spontaneous, impulsive confrontation between appellant, her cohorts and the police, and the evidence therefore was insufficient to show conspiracy. She relies on Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 499 Pa. 389, 453 A.2d 927 (1982). However, Kennedy is distinguishable. In Kennedy, the Supreme Court found insufficient evidence of a conspiracy where the defendant and his alleged co-conspirator assaulted the landlord of the building in which defendant lived. The court found nothing in the relationship of the parties to indicate an implicit or explicit agreement to engage in an assault and found that although the parties acted simultaneously, they nevertheless acted independently. Here, on the other hand, all the co-conspirators acted as a group in concert. Before the police arrived, they acted together to commit an assault on the lone black man. They were told as a group to disperse but instead they decided, as a group, to stay and engage in joint criminal conduct in which each was spurring the others on toward a common criminal purpose. It is unnecessary to prove an explicit and formal agreement between the conspirators. The agreement necessary to support a conspiracy conviction can be wholly tacit so long as the surrounding circumstances confirm that the parties have decided to act in concert. In this case, the actors' relationships and their conduct before, during and after the criminal episode established a unity of criminal purpose sufficient for the jury to find conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.