Opinion ID: 158744
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Futility Instruction

Text: 41 Denver next contends the district court incorrectly instructed the jury that plaintiffs need not have requested reassignment if they knew the employer had a policy forbidding it. Denver argues that this instruction erroneously relieved plaintiffs of their obligation to initiate the interactive process envisioned by the ADA. 8 Plaintiffs do not dispute the importance of the interactive process in accommodating employees but assert that when the employer has an established policy against reassignment, the ADA does not require employees to engage in the futile gesture, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 366 (1977), of requesting reassignment. 42 In Teamsters, the Supreme Court recognized that [a] consistently enforced discriminatory policy can surely deter job applications from those who are aware of it and are unwilling to subject themselves to the humiliation of explicit and certain rejection. Id. at 365. For example, [i]f an employer should announce his policy of discrimination by a sign reading Whites Only on the hiring-office door, his victims would not be limited to the few who ignored the sign and subjected themselves to personal rebuffs. Id. Therefore, [w]hen a person's desire for a job is not translated into a formal application solely because of his unwillingness to engage in a futile gesture he is as much a victim of discrimination as is he who goes through the motions of submitting an application. Id. at 365-66. In order for a nonapplicant plaintiff to merit relief, he has the not always easy burden of proving that he would have applied for the job had it not been for [the employer's discriminatory] practices. Id. at 368. 43 Significantly, the legislative history of the ADA specifically indicates that the futile gesture doctrine enunciated in Teamsters applies to employment actions. See H. Rep. No. 101-485 (II) at 82-83 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 365; S. Rep. No. 101-116 at 43 (1989). The logic of Teamsters similarly applies to ADA cases in which an employer has a set policy against a particular type of reasonable accommodation, or against such accommodation generally. If a disabled employee actually knows of an employer's discriminatory policy against reasonable accommodation, he need not ignore the policy and subject himself to personal rebuffs by making a request that will surely be denied. 9 44 Although the futile gesture doctrine is applicable in the ADA context, the burden is typically on the employee to initiate the interactive process. Only in the rare case where an employer has essentially foreclosed the interactive process through its policies or explicit actions will the futile gesture doctrine apply. Cf. Butelmeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Schs., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996) (excusing mentally ill plaintiff from requesting reasonable accommodation because he may have thought it was futile to ask, after [his employer] told him he would not receive any more special treatment.). We emphasize that an employee's subjective belief about the futility of initiating the interactive process will not, by itself, relieve him or her of that obligation. See Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 178 F.3d 731, 739 (5th Cir. 1999). 45 Here, all three plaintiffs were well aware of Denver's policy of refusing to reassign disabled police officers to Career Service positions. At the same time, DPD could not keep plaintiffs in their existing jobs because they could not fire weapons or make forcible arrests. Consequently, the policy against transferring to Career Services positions foreclosed the only reasonable accommodation that could have assisted plaintiffs reassignment. Under such circumstances, plaintiffs could rely on the futile gesture doctrine. 46 Indeed, Ms. Clair's 10 experience illustrates why this doctrine must be a part of the ADA framework. She not only was aware of Denver's policy against reassignment but was also explicitly told by Sargent Maes that the city would not help her find another position. Both Denver's set policy and Sargent Maes' comment effectively indicated that the city had no intention of engaging in the interactive process in good faith with Ms. Clair. Her failure to inquire about reassignment was a logical result of the city's position. Denver cannot preempt the interactive process with its policy and actions and then escape liability by claiming Ms. Clair did not properly initiate the process. Cf. Beck v. University of Wisconsin Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996) ([N]either party should be able to cause a breakdown in the process for the purpose of either avoiding or inflicting liability.). 47 The district court instructed the jury that [t]he employee is not required to request reassignment or transfer if he or she is aware that an employer has a policy of not providing that form of reasonable accommodation, Aplt. App. at 1445, and that the plaintiffs bore the burden of showing [t]hat [he or she] asked to be reassigned, or but for his or her knowledge of the employer's 'no-reassignment' policy, would have asked to be reassigned, id. at 1448. Those instructions correctly explained the futile gesture doctrine.