Opinion ID: 2330409
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Firearms

Text: Next, we address the petitioner's argument that the trial court did not have authority under RSA 458:16 to deprive him of his firearms and that such deprivation violated his right to bear arms under the Federal Constitution and Part I, Article 2-a of the New Hampshire Constitution. The trial court's final order continued the restraining order issued in March 2005. The March 2005 order stated: The Court, after having received Offers of Proof by counsel for the Respondent and by the Petitioner, rules and finds that: (a) The Petitioner represents a credible threat to the physical safety of the Respondent. . . . . Accordingly, pending final hearing, [the Petitioner]: (a) Is restrained from interfering with the person or liberty of [the Respondent], or [the parties' daughter]. . . . (e) Shall not make verbal or non-verbal threats to [the Respondent] or [the parties' daughter]. The restraining order also ordered the petitioner to relinquish all firearms and deadly weapons and prohibited him from purchasing or obtaining any firearms . . . during the pendency of this Order. The order did not cite an authorizing statute and did not contain an expiration date. The petitioner argues that the restraining order appears only to be an RSA 458:16 order as opposed to an RSA chapter 173-B order. A restraining order issued pursuant to RSA chapter 173-B must order the defendant to relinquish his firearms for the duration of the order. RSA 173-B:5, I. RSA 458:16, however, provides no such explicit direction, although that statute does provide that the superior court may issue orders with such conditions and limitations as the court deems just. RSA 458:16, I. The petitioner argues that there is no authority under RSA 458:16 for the dispossession of firearms. We find, however, that the petitioner is bound by federal law. Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000) provides, in pertinent part: It shall be unlawful for any person . . . (8) who is subject to a court order that (A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate; (B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and (C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; . . . to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). As used in this provision, [t]he term `intimate partner' means, with respect to a person, the spouse of the person, a former spouse of the person, an individual who is a parent of a child of the person, and an individual who cohabitates or has cohabited with the person. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(32) (2000). The March 2005 restraining order was issued by the trial court after having received offers of proof from both parties. This order was continued in the court's final divorce order, which was preceded by four days of testimony during which the petitioner fully participated. Further, the order prohibits the petitioner from making verbal or non-verbal threats to the respondent or the parties' daughter. Finally, the order specifically states that [t]he Petitioner represents a credible threat to the physical safety of the Respondent. As a matter of law, therefore, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) prohibits the petitioner from possessing firearms and ammunition during the pendency of the restraining order. See State v. S.A., 290 N.J.Super. 240, 675 A.2d 678, 684 (1996). Accordingly, the trial court was within its discretion to prohibit the petitioner from possessing firearms since 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) requires such a result. We also find that the petitioner failed to raise his constitutional arguments in a manner that would have afforded the trial court the opportunity to consider them. State v. Howe, 145 N.H. 41, 43, 750 A.2d 48 (2000). The record before us is devoid of any mention of the Second Amendment to the Federal Constitution or Part I, Article 2-a of the New Hampshire Constitution. The petitioner never raised his right to bear arms during trial and the record does not contain a motion to reconsider filed by the petitioner which raises this issue. Because we will not review on appeal constitutional issues not presented below, we decline to review the constitutional dimension of the petitioner's arguments. Id.
Finally, we address whether the trial court properly ordered the petitioner to sell his firearms. In the final divorce order, the trial court ordered [a]ll of [the petitioner's] firearms and other weapons shall be sold forthwith, and the proceeds thereof shall be awarded to [the petitioner]. The petitioner argues that under RSA 458:16-a, the trial court is authorized to distribute marital property, but cannot order a sale . . . just for the sake of the sale. We agree. In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the legislature's intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. State v. MacMillan, 152 N.H. 67, 70, 872 A.2d 1031 (2005). When examining the language of a statute, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used. In the Matter of Beal & Beal, 153 N.H. 349, 350, 897 A.2d 993 (2006). The plain language of RSA 458:16-a authorizes trial courts to distribute marital property between the parties. Id. The trial court's order requiring the sale of the firearms, however, was not for purposes of dividing the proceeds between the parties. See Hazen v. Hazen, 122 N.H. 836, 838, 451 A.2d 398 (1982) (master ordered sale of marital residence with proceeds divided between the parties). Instead, the trial court awarded the proceeds in their entirety to the petitioner. This is beyond the scope of the trial court's authority under RSA 458:16-a. Cf. Beal, 153 N.H. at 350, 897 A.2d 993 (holding trial court cannot order sale of assets to pay creditors). In so holding, however, we do not foreclose any other disposition of the firearms, necessary for the proper division of the assets, consistent with this opinion and state and federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Accordingly, we reverse and remand the portion of the trial court's order requiring the petitioner to sell the firearms. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded.