Opinion ID: 19557
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 2261(a)(1)

Text: 19 Lankford also challenges the constitutionality of the statute he is charged with violating in Count 1 of his indictment. In the main, he asserts that in enacting 2261(a)(1), 2 Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, 8. 3 We review for plain error because this challenge is made for the first time on appeal. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993); United States v. Knowles, 29 F.3d 947, 950-51 (5th Cir. 1994). In order to reverse, we must find that the district court committed an error; that error was plain - i.e., clear or obvious; that the plain error affected Lankford's substantial rights; and that it seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 736). 20 In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Court set forth three broad categories of activity Congress may regulate consistent with its Commerce Clause power: (1) the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) those activities substantially affecting interstate commerce. 514 U.S. at 558-59. Intrastate activities falling within the third category could be regulated if those activities were economic in nature, id. at 559-61,115, S.Ct. 1624, or if Congress included a jurisdictional element that allowed for case-by-case assessment of whether the regulated activities substantially affected interstate commerce. Id. at 561. Lankford asserts that 2261(a)(1) punishes conduct that is purely intrastate, private, and noncommercial, and that has no substantial effects on interstate commerce. He also characterizes the provision as an attempt to regulate purely local activities in a manner contrary to the principles of federalism. In making these arguments, it is clear that Lankford defines the regulated conduct as domestic violence and places that conduct in the third of Lopez's categories. 21 We find that Congress was well within its Commerce Clause power in enacting 2261(a)(1). The provision properly falls within the first of Lopez's categories as it regulates the use of channels of interstate commerce - i.e., the use of the interstate transportation routes through which persons and goods move, United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1226 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1995)), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 866 (1998) - to further or facilitate domestic violence. See S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 43 (1993) ([T]itle II creates a Federal remedy for interstate crimes of abuse including crimes committed against spouses or intimate partners during interstate travel and crimes committed by spouses or intimate partners who cross State lines to continue the abuse.); id. at 62 (This section creates a new chapter in the Criminal Code to punish spouse abusers who cross State lines to continue abuse.). It has long been held that Congress may forbid or punish the use of channels of interstate commerce to promote immorality, dishonesty, or the spread of any evil or harm to the people of other states from the state of origin, Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436 (1925). See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964)('[T]he authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.')(quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917); North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946)(Congress may impose relevant conditions and requirements on those who use the channels of interstate commerce in order that those channels will not become the means of promoting or spreading evil, whether of a physical, moral or economic nature.). As a result, that violence against a spouse is a private or noncommercial activity is of no moment. 22 Other courts confronted with challenges to various provisions within VAWA's 40221(a) have similarly found that those provisions fall within Lopez's first category and are valid exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause power. See United States v. Page, 167 F.3d 325, 334 (6th Cir. 1999)(Because the triggering factor of 2261(a)(2) is the movement of the victim across state lines, this statute falls into the first category and is a valid exercise of Congress's power to regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.)(internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Gluzman, 154 F.3d 49, 50 (2d Cir. 1998)(adopting holding of court below that 2261(a)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power), cert. denied,___ U.S. ___ 119 S. Ct. 1257 (1999); United States v. Von Foelkel, 136 F.3d 339, 341 (2d Cir. 1998)(upholding 2262(a)(1) as it falls within Lopez's first category); United States v. Wright, 128 F.3d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1997)(upholding 2262(a)(1) as it falls within Congress's authority to 'keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses.')(quoting Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 491), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1376 (1998); United States v. Gluzman, 953 F. Supp. 84, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)(upholding 2261(a)(1) as itfalls within Lopez's first category), aff'd, 154 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1998); cf. United States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758, 766 (4th Cir.)(relying on Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 491, and Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946), to find 2261(a) constitutional), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 240 (1997). The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom., United States v. Morrison, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 11, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (1999), cited by Lankford in support of his challenge, is not to the contrary. The Brzonkala court faced a challenge to 42 U.S.C. 13981(b), and specifically noted that 2261 was not in issue in that case. Id. at 827. Because we view 2261(a)(1) as a regulation of the use of channels of interstate commerce, we need not address whether domestic violence substantially affects interstate commerce, as required under Lopez's third prong. 4 See United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669, 671 (1995) (per curiam). Because 2261(a)(1) is within Congress'Commerce Clause power, there is no error in convicting Lankford of violating that statute. 23