Opinion ID: 1476860
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Dr. Raggio's Expert Testimony

Text: DCYF challenges both the trial justice's decision to admit Dr. Raggio's testimony and his reliance on that testimony to support his finding that DCYF did not sustain its burden of proving that Mackenzie's fractures were caused by physical abuse. First, DCYF avers that the trial justice erred in admitting the testimony of Dr. Raggio based on her failure to establish a valid methodology to test her theories, including her inability to test her theory, paucity of peer review, unknown rate of error, lack of general acceptance in the orthopedic community[,] and the fact that her unique opinions, which she as a published researcher has never submitted to any journal, was created merely for purposes of testifying. In admitting Dr. Raggio's testimony, the trial justice first cited Dr. Raggio's superb credentials in her field, and noted that there is no indication before this Court that novel theories or junk science is being proposed. The trial justice interpreted the thrust of Dr. Raggio's testimony as applying the known scientific principles of bone development and disease to the facts of this case including the signs and symptoms that we have found this child to have in the past and    developing at the present, as well as the family history. The trial justice concluded that in combining all of these factors, [Dr. Raggio is] in a position to now conclude on the basis of a known scientific diagnosis where it applies in this case. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a trial justice, in admitting expert testimony, acts as a gatekeep[er] to ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but [also] reliable. This Court has recognized the applicability of Daubert to situations in which scientific testimony is proposed in Rhode Island state courts. Raimbeault v. Takeuchi Manufacturing Ltd. (U.S.), 772 A.2d 1056, 1061 (R.I.2001). Rule 702 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence governs the admission of expert testimony in Rhode Island courts. Rule 702 provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of fact or opinion. The purpose of expert testimony is to aid in the search for the truth. It need not be conclusive and has no special status in the evidentiary framework of a trial. Owens, 838 A.2d at 890 (quoting Morra v. Harrop, 791 A.2d 472, 477 (R.I.2002)). The primary function of the trial justice's gate-keeping role is to assure that the proposed expert testimony, presented as a scientifically valid theory, is not mere `junk science.' Id. at 891. As a result, the trial justice must ensure that the parties present    only expert testimony that is based on ostensibly reliable scientific reasoning and methodology. Id. If a party seeks to introduce novel or highly complex scientific or technical expert testimony, Owens, 838 A.2d at 891, the trial justice may admit the expert testimony only if the expert proposes to testify `to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact.' Id. (quoting DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 687). [2] In addressing the first part of the inquiry, often referred to as the reliability test, the trial justice examines four non-exclusive factors in determining whether expert testimony about novel or technically complex theories or procedures possesses scientific validity. They are: (1) whether the proffered knowledge has been or can be tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been the subject of peer review and publication; (3) whether there is a known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the theory or technique has gained general acceptance in the scientific community.    Satisfaction of one or more of these factors may be sufficient to admit the evidence and each factor need not be given equal weight in the analysis.    The court may also consider the qualifications of the expert in determining whether the underlying methods are reliable. Owens, 838 A.2d at 891-92 (citing DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 689). In addressing the second part of the inquiry, the trial justice examines whether the expert's testimony is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the [fact-finder] in resolving a factual dispute. Id. at 891 n.3 (quoting DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 689). If the testimony `logically advances a material aspect of the proposing party's case,'    the court may deem it relevant and admissible. Id. (quoting DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 689). A trial justice's ruling on the admissibility of an expert witness's proffered testimony `will be sustained provided the discretion has been soundly and judicially exercised, that is, if it has been exercised in the light of reason applied to all the facts and with a view to the rights of all the parties to the action,    and not arbitrarily or willfully, but with just regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law.' Owens, 838 A.2d at 890 (quoting Morra, 791 A.2d at 476-77). Here, a factual dispute existed about the cause of the child's fractures, and Dr. Raggio was qualified, based on her impressive credentials, to opine about the cause of those injuries. Doctor Raggio based her opinion about the child's disorder and the cause of her fractures on: a review of scientific literature; a physical examination of the child; the medical history of the child and her family, including the child's recent diagnosis of tenosynovitis and joint laxity along with indications of intrauterine crowding caused by a short umbilical cord and a fibroid tumor; and the results of her own research on bone disorders and laxity. The trial justice noted that Dr. Raggio's testimony did not involve any new and esoteric medical conditions, but rather, involved a better understanding and knowledge of existing conditions and their impact upon the patient. The trial justice found that the testimony of Dr. Raggio appears to be scientifically sound and methodologically reliable. In this case, we conclude that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in admitting Dr. Raggio's testimony. The trial justice reviewed Dr. Raggio's credentials and the method through which she arrived at her opinion and found them to be scientifically sound and methodologically reliable. As we have noted, [t]rial justices are not required to become scientific experts in determining the admissibility of expert testimony. Owens, 838 A.2d at 892. The proponent of the evidence need only show that the expert arrived at his or her conclusion in what appears to be a scientifically sound and methodologically reliable manner. Id. The trial justice's focus is not on the ultimate conclusion of the expert, but rather, whether the reasoning used in forming the expert conclusion was sound. Id. at 896 (citing DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 689-90). Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. Id. at 892 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786). Moreover, it is clear that Dr. Raggio's opinions were sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that they would aid the trial justice in resolving the factual dispute about the cause of the child's fractures. As we previously have stated, [t]he purpose of expert testimony is to aid in the search for the truth. Owens, 838 A.2d at 890 (quoting Morra, 791 A.2d at 477). If the testimony `logically advances a material aspect of the proposing party's case,'    the court may deem it relevant and admissible. Id. at 891 n.3 (quoting DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 689). Consequently, we conclude that the trial justice soundly and judicially exercised his discretion in the light of reason applied to all the facts, with a view to the rights of all the parties to the action, and with just regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law.