Opinion ID: 3029577
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Classifying the Conflict

Text: Hammersmith contends that under Griffith, the Court must first determine whether there is a “false conflict” between the laws of Pennsylvania and New York. Our review of the case law indicates there is some inconsistency in the way Pennsylvania and federal courts have defined a false conflict.5 rely either on cases that pre-date Griffith, or on Crawford, 221 A.2d 877 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966). In Melville, however, we observed that Crawford “acknowledge[d] the winds of change portended by Griffith” by applying both the traditional lex locus contractus and Griffith approaches in selecting the law to govern a life insurance policy. Melville, 584 F.2d at 1312. 5 At least three district court opinions have recognized this inconsistency in the case law. See Naviant Marketing Solutions, Inc. v. Larry Tucker, Inc., No.Civ.A.00-6036, 2002 WL 15918, at  n.14 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2002) (noting the distinction and concluding that “a ‘false conflict’ arises not where there are no relevant differences in the laws of the two jurisdictions but rather, when there are relevant differences but the court may apply the law of one jurisdiction without affecting the governmental interests of the other jurisdiction”); Air Prod. & Chem., Inc., v. Eaton Metal Prod. Co., 272 F.Supp.2d 482, 490 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (“Though the concepts are distinct, courts in Pennsylvania appear to use the term ‘false conflict’ to mean 14 One line of cases provides that a false conflict exists if there are no relevant differences between the laws of the two states, or the laws would produce the same result.6 If there is a false conflict under this definition, the court does not have to engage in a choice of law analysis, and may refer to the states’ laws interchangeably. Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2006). If the states’ laws do in fact conflict, the court must both a situation in which no conflict at all exists ... and a situation in which only one state’s interests would be harmed....”); Liebman v. Prudential Fin., Inc., No.Civ.A. 022566, 2003 WL 22741415, at  n.3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2003) (“Third Circuit precedent varies slightly on the meaning of ‘false conflict.’”). 6 See Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting if there is no “true conflict,” the district court “may refer interchangeably to the laws of the states whose laws potentially apply”); Berg Chilling, 435 F.3d at 462 (“[W]here the laws of the two jurisdictions would produce the same result on the particular issue presented, there is a ‘false conflict,’ and the Court should avoid the choice-of-law question.”); Williams v. Stone, 109 F.3d 890, 893 (3d Cir. 1997) (same); Lucker Mfg. v. Home Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 808, 813 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); Coons v. Lawlor, 804 F.2d 28, 30 (3d Cir. 1986) (“If the various laws that might be applied to the case do not differ on the relevant issue, there is a false conflict.”); Complaint of Bankers Trust Co., 752 F.2d 874, 882 (3d Cir. 1984) (“If the foreign law to which the forum’s choice-of-law rule refers does not differ from that of the forum on the issue, the issue presents a ‘false conflict.’”). 15 determine which state has the “greater interest in the application of its law.” Ratti v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 758 A.2d 695, 702 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).7 A different line of cases holds that a “false conflict” exists “if only one jurisdiction’s governmental interests would be impaired by the application of the other jurisdiction’s laws.” Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 F.2d 170, 187 (3d Cir. 1991).8 7 See also Budtel Assoc., LP v. Continental Cas. Co., No. 728 MDA 2005, 2006 WL 3718238, at  (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2006) (“[T]he first step in a choice of law analysis under Pennsylvania law is to determine whether a conflict exists between the laws of the competing states. If no conflict exists, further analysis is unnecessary. If a conflict is found, it must be determined which state has the greater interest in the application of its law.”) (internal citations omitted); Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp., 2006 WL 3457582, at  (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 2006) (same); Wilson v. Transp. Ins. Co., 889 A.2d 563, 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (same); Keystone Aerial Surveys, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Assoc., 777 A.2d 84, 94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (same). 8 See also Garcia v. Plaza Oldsmobile Ltd., 421 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2005) (“A true conflict exists ‘when the governmental interests of [multiple] jurisdictions would be impaired if their law were not applied.’”) (quoting Lacey, 932 F.2d at 187 n.15); Budget Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc. v. Chappell, 407 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2005) (same); LeJeune v. Bliss-Salem, Inc., 85 F.3d 1069, 1071 (3d Cir. 1996) (same); Shuder v. McDonald’s Corp., 859 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding the existence of a “true 16 In that case, the court should “apply the law of the state whose interests would be harmed if its laws were not applied.” Id. On the other hand, if the “governmental interests of both jurisdictions would be impaired if their law were not applied,” there is a true conflict. Id. at 187 n.15 (emphasis in original). The court must then proceed with the choice-of-law analysis and apply the law of the state with the “most significant contacts or relationships with the particular issue.” Budget Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc. v. Chappell, 407 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting In re Estate of Agostini, 457 A.2d 861, 871 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)). We think it is incorrect to use the term “false conflict” to describe the situation where the laws of two states do not differ. If two jurisdictions’ laws are the same, then there is no conflict at all, and a choice of law analysis is unnecessary. Thus, the first part of the choice of law inquiry is best understood as determining if there is an actual or real conflict between the potentially applicable laws. See, e.g., Air Prod. & Chem., 272 F.Supp.2d at 490 n.9 (“Before we even reach the ‘false conflict’ question, we must determine whether, for lack of better terminology, a ‘real conflict’ as opposed to ‘no conflict’ exists; that is, we must determine whether these states would actually treat this issue any differently.”). conflict” because the application of “the law of either Virginia or Pennsylvania [would] further the policies of that state”); Rosen v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 582 A.2d 27, 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (“[T]his is not a case of ‘false conflict,’ because either state’s interests would be disserved by the application of the other state’s law....”). 17 If there are relevant differences between the laws, then the court should examine the governmental policies underlying each law, and classify the conflict as a “true,” “false,” or an “unprovided-for” situation.9 A “deeper [choice of law] analysis” is necessary only if both jurisdictions’ interests would be impaired by the application of the other’s laws (i.e., there is a true conflict). See Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854, 856 (Pa. 1970) (deciding to “undertake a deeper analysis” because the plaintiff “is a resident of Pennsylvania which has adopted a plaintiff-protecting rule” and the defendant “is a resident of Delaware which has adopted a defendant-protecting rule”); Rosen v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 582 A.2d 27, 30-31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (finding a “true conflict” between the malicious prosecution laws of Texas and Pennsylvania, where the underlying suit was brought in Texas against Pennsylvania residents, and the Texas law intended to provide litigants with “open access to the judicial system,” while Pennsylvania’s law intended to give greater protection to individuals “who may be forced to defend a baseless suit”).10 9 An “unprovided-for” case is one in which neither state’s interests would be impaired if its laws were not applied. Garcia, 421 F.3d at 220. In that situation, courts should apply the traditional, lex locus contractus rule. Id. 10 The Court notes that in Lebegern v. Forman, 471 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 2006), we reached a different conclusion in analyzing New Jersey’s choice-of-law principles. In Lebegern, we held that a true conflict exists if the laws of the jurisdictions differ. Id. at 431. If there is a true conflict, then the court should conduct a choice-of-law analysis, and consider the interests of 18