Opinion ID: 151874
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre-SRA

Text: Understanding the sentencing model I apply today requires understanding the deeply rooted purposes of sentencing and their evolution in American criminal law. Prior to the American Revolution, colonial courts fashioned sentences with three basic purposes in mind: to punish the offender for his crime, thereby satisfying society's desire for retribution (punishment); to deter others from committing the same crime by demonstrating its disadvantageous consequences (general deterrence); and to incapacitate the wrongdoer, so as to protect society from further criminal activity (specific deterrence or incapacitation). United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1206 (11th Cir.1989). In the 1800s, penological experts became dissatisfied with the failure of prisons to rehabilitate inmates, and rehabilitation became a fourth basic purpose of sentencing. See Arthur W. Campbell, The Law of Sentencing § 1:2 (2009). The American tradition thus embraced four purposes of sentencingpunishment, general deterrence, specific deterrence, and rehabilitation; [2] this tradition has continued to the present day. An early model of sentencing that combined these four purposes was the medical model, so named because penological experts believed that proper measures taken during imprisonment could cure offenders, allowing them to reenter society as productive members. Accordingly, rehabilitation received more weight than the other three purposes of sentencing under the medical model. Under the medical model, sentencing responsibilities were divided between the district court and the Parole Board. [3] District courts imposed indeterminate sentences that were monitored by a Parole Board, meaning that a judge would impose a sentence that had a minimum term of confinement and a maximum term of confinement, but allow[ed for] the possibility of release sometime between the expiration of those terms[, with] the date and conditions of release before the maximum term determined by the Parole Board. [4] Campbell, supra, § 4:2. District courts fashioned the minimum and maximum bounds of the sentence in accordance with the four traditional purposes of sentencing. They could consider all facts they thought were relevant to these purposes, conduct[ing] an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information ... or the source from which it [could] come. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972). [5] Because they could consider a broad array of facts, they enjoyed wide discretion in determining what sentence to impose. Id. [6] Although the district court set the bounds of the sentence, the Parole Board was given discretion to determine when a prisoner ha[d] reached that point in his rehabilitation process at which he should be released under supervision to begin his readjustment to life in the community. By [the district court's] keeping the minimum low, the prisoner [was] encouraged to earn favorable consideration for parole in accord with the public policy embodied in the parole statutes. [7] Garafola v. Benson, 505 F.2d 1212, 1217 (7th Cir.1974) (internal citations omitted). The Parole Board therefore determined how much of the sentence would be served beyond the minimum term. Thus, although the Parole Board could not review the parameters the district court set on the offender's sentence, it could re-sentence the offender within the parameters. Because the parameters were often widethe district court could not accurately predict how long the offender would need for rehabilitation, the model's driving factorthe Parole Board was a powerful actor in the medical model. The courts of appeals, on the other hand, had virtually no role under the medical model. So long as the sentence was within statutory limits, it was, for all practical purposes, not reviewable on appeal. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 2045, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). [8] Because sentences were not subject to appellate review, judges rarely explained the reasoning behind the sentences imposed, and there is little direct evidence from the pre-SRA era of how judges made sentencing decisions. Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. Cal. L.Rev. 413, 451-52 (1992). So while a judge sentencing an offender to prison implied that imprisonment was needed for punishment, general and specific deterrence, and rehabilitation, there was little evidence of the relative weights the judge assigned to those purposes. Therefore, prior to the SRA, district judges had wide discretion in imposing sentences, but the Parole Board ultimately had control over how much of the sentence would be served. The courts of appeals played a very limited role.