Opinion ID: 1091907
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: United's Fault

Text: The jury found United negligent, but plaintiffs were denied recovery because of contributory negligence. The court of appeal in its first opinion agreed that Buckbee was contributorily negligent, thereby pretermitting the issue of United's fault. In its second opinion the court addressed both issues and decided against plaintiffs on both. In reviewing United's fault, we utilize the duty-risk analysis under Fowler v. Roberts, 556 So.2d 1 (La.1989). We inquire first whether United's conduct was a cause-in-fact of the accident. [7] Clearly United's failure to remove the oil from the heater was a cause-in-fact of the accident, because if United had removed the oil, the accident would never had occurred as it did. The more critical inquiries in this case involve the questions whether United had a duty to conform its conduct to a specific standard (the duty issue) and, if so, whether the risk of injury created by United's breach of duty was within the scope of protection of the rule of law which gave rise to the duty (the scope of duty issue). [8] The court of appeal relied on the fact that United was no longer the owner of the heater at the time of the explosion. That fact, while perhaps pertinent to a strict liability determination under La.Civ.Code art. 2317, has little significance in the determination of United's duty, as a user and seller of a heater previously used by United to process dangerous materials, to future owners of the heater and to persons who might later come into contact with the heater. At the time of the sale United knew that the heater had been used in its plant operations to process highly volatile hydrocarbons. United also knew that residual oil in the heater could present dangers to others who might subsequently use or otherwise encounter the heater. In selling the heater to a used equipment broker, United knew that the heater would be resold and might be reused. United further knew that heating torches would probably be used to dismantle and to reassemble the huge heater, and perhaps to make it operational for future use. By selling the heater as is, where is, United arguably limited its warranty obligation under the sales contract as to the performance of the heater for its intended use by the buyer and the buyer's successors. But that limitation on contractual warranty is not determinative of United's obligations in tort for hazardous conditions created by United and known to exist at the time of the sale. United's knowledge that residual oil in its heater could present dangers of explosion to future users gave rise to a duty to make sure that the oil from its operations was removed from the heater. United apparently recognized this duty to eliminate the hazard when it required in the contract of sale that the buyer clean the vessels which had been used to process highly volatile hydrocarbons and natural gas, obligating itself to provide an inspector to assist in monitoring the cleaning. The buyer did not use the proper method for cleaning hydrocarbons from the heater, and United either did not monitor the cleaning or performed the monitoring in a substandard manner. In either event neither United nor its vendee removed the oil from the heater, and the presence of the residual oil led in logical sequence to the foreseeable result. As to the scope of duty inquiry, United's breach of duty to clean the heater properly gave rise to the very risk that the duty was imposed to protect againstthat a subsequent user may believe the heater to be free of volatile materials and apply heat while dismantling, transporting, reassembling or preparing the heater to be used again. We conclude that United, who introduced the hydrocarbons into the heater, had the duty to remove the residual oil which constituted a significant hazard before transferring the heater to a broker who intended to resell it to a future user. We further conclude that the scope of protection of this duty extended to persons who came in contact with the heater as it was being placed back into use, inasmuch as there was an ease of association between the duty that was breached and the injury that occurred. The jury was not manifestly erroneous or legally incorrect in finding that United's negligence was a legal cause of this accident. Accordingly, United is liable for the damages sustained by Buckbee and his survivors unless contributory negligence bars their recovery.