Opinion ID: 1302133
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: barnette's appeal

Text: Defendant Barnette first contends that the State did not produce sufficient evidence of the crime of first degree rape to warrant submission of that charge to the jury and that his motion to dismiss the charge should have been allowed. In reviewing the denial of the motion to dismiss, this Court must examine the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the State to determine if there is substantial evidence of every essential element of the crime of first degree rape. See State v. Wright, 302 N.C. 122, 126, 273 S.E.2d 699, 703 (1981). Evidence is substantial if a reasonable person would consider it sufficient to support the conclusion that the essential element in question exists. State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 265 S.E.2d 164 (1980); State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 261 S.E.2d 114 (1980). Put another way, we must examine the evidence to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jones, 303 N.C. 500, 279 S.E.2d 835 (1981); see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). First degree rape is defined as vaginal intercourse by force and against the will of the victim when the perpetrator employs or displays a deadly weapon or an article which the victim reasonably believes is a deadly weapon, inflicts serious bodily injury, or is aided or abetted in the commission of the offense by one or more other persons. G.S. § 14-27.2(a) (1981). An aider or abettor is a person who is actually or constructively present at the scene of the crime and who aids, advises, counsels, instigates or encourages another to commit the offense. State v. Bell, 270 N.C. 25, 153 S.E.2d 741 (1967); State v. Hargett, 255 N.C. 412, 121 S.E.2d 589 (1961); 4 Strong's North Carolina Index 3d, Criminal Law § 9, 9.1 (1976). Even though not actually present during the commission of the crime, a person may be an aider or abettor if he shares the criminal intent of the perpetrator and if, during the commission of the crime, he is in a position to render any necessary aid to the perpetrator. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 63 (1972); R. Perkins, Criminal Law 660-61 (2d ed. 1969); 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 169 (1981); see State v. Jarrell, 141 N.C. 722, 53 S.E. 127 (1906). The trial court submitted the first degree rape charge to the jury against Barnette on two alternative theories allowed by the bill of indictment: that Barnette, acting by himself or together with any other defendant employed or displayed a deadly weapon or that defendant Hughes aided and abetted Barnette by threatening the victim with the shotgun. Barnette contends that there is insubstantial evidence under either theory and of the use of force to take the case to the jury. We disagree. When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that on one occasion while Barnette was in the bedroom with the victim, Hughes entered and forced her to place the gun in her mouth. Jackson was lying on the bed, naked, covered only by a blanket. After Hughes forced Jackson to put the gun in her mouth, he laughed and left the room. Barnette then forced Jackson to engage in sexual intercourse even though she asked him to leave her alone. These circumstances give rise to a reasonable inference that Hughes helped prepare for the commission of the crime by displaying or employing a deadly weapon in order to overcome the victim's resistance and to enable Barnette to commit the crime. Thus, there is sufficient evidence that Barnette acting either by himself or acting together with one or more of the other defendants, employed or displayed a shotgun and that Barnette was aided and abetted by Hughes. The evidence supports a reasonable inference that Barnette shared with Hughes the community of unlawful purpose necessary for aiding and abetting, see State v. Westbrook, 279 N.C. 18, 181 S.E.2d 572 (1971), death sentence vacated, 408 U.S. 939, 92 S.Ct. 2873, 33 L.Ed.2d 761 (1972). The trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss. Defendant Barnette also contends that the evidence was deficient on the essential element of force. He argues that there is no evidence that Jackson was forced to submit to rape. He points out that while there is evidence that Hughes arrayed such physical force as to engender fear of great bodily harm, there is no evidence that the force, the display of a shotgun, was directed against the will of the victim to resist sexual activity. Barnette is correct in stating that the evidence shows that Hughes never told Jackson that she must submit to intercourse. The absence of an explicit threat, however, is not determinative. It is enough if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the actions of Hughes gives rise to a reasonable inference that the unspoken purpose of the threat was to force the victim to submit to unwanted sexual contact. The evidence here shows that Hughes entered the bedroom while Jackson was lying on the bed naked. Barnette was also in the bedroom. Jackson had previously been told by Hughes, while holding the gun, that they had decided on something for her to do. Hughes forced Jackson to put the gun in her mouth. Barnette made no attempt to stop him. When she had done so, Hughes laughed and left the room. Barnette then proceeded to have intercourse with Jackson although she asked him not to do so. These facts, which also show community of unlawful purpose, give rise to a reasonable inference that the force displayed by Hughes, acquiesced in by Barnette, was intended to make Jackson submit to intercourse. Thus, the evidence of force was sufficient to be submitted to the jury, and the motion to dismiss on this ground was properly denied. Defendant next argues that the trial court's instructions on lack of consent to the intercourse were inadequate. The trial court instructed the jury that consent induced by fear is not consent at law. He contends that the instruction failed to require that the fear be reasonable, that the fear be of violence, that the individual defendant either induce the fear or know of its inducement by another, and that the individual defendant know of the lack of consent. We discuss Barnette's first two contentions together, as it appears to us that they are inextricably related. Barnette concedes that the trial court's instruction on consent is a correct statement of the law, State v. Henderson, 285 N.C. 1, 203 S.E.2d 10 (1974), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 902, 96 S.Ct. 3202, 49 L.Ed.2d 1205 (1976), but contends that it is incomplete. In support of this contention, he cites us to statements contained in prior cases. Indeed, in State v. Burns, 287 N.C. 102, 116, 214 S.E.2d 56, 65, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 288, 46 L.Ed.2d 264 (1975), we stated that [a] threat of serious bodily harm which reasonably induces fear thereof constitutes the requisite force and negates consent. Accord, State v. Hall, 293 N.C. 559, 238 S.E.2d 473 (1977); State v. Primes, 275 N.C. 61, 165 S.E.2d 225 (1969); State v. Carter, 265 N.C. 626, 144 S.E.2d 826 (1965). In none of these cases, however, was the jury instructed that in order to be void the consent must have been induced by a reasonable fear of serious bodily harm, and we do not interpret these cases as establishing an objective standard of reasonableness by which the jury must judge consent. Additionally, even if the reasonableness standard were the rule, further elaboration on the issue of consent would have been unnecessary under the facts of this case. First, the record discloses that the fear which induced Jackson's submission to intercourse was the threatened use of a sawed-off shotgun. Hughes on one occasion pointed it at her and on another forced her to put it in her mouth. A shotgun is per se a deadly weapon. When a per se deadly weapon is the force used to overcome the victim's resistance, we think that the issues of whether the fear engendered by the deadly weapon is reasonable and whether the fear is of violence are not in issue. If the jury believed that Jackson was threatened with a shotgun, then it follows that the fear engendered was both reasonable and of violence. Thus, the only issue raised by the evidence here was whether Jackson was threatened with a shotgun; instructions that the victim's fear must be reasonable and of violence were unnecessary. Secondly, the victim testified that she never consented to the intercourse, that she resisted, and that resistance was overcome by physical force. Barnette also contends that the Court erred in failing to instruct that, in order to be convicted, he must be found to have known of Hughes's threats which induced the void consent. We cannot agree. For Barnette to be convicted of first degree rape based in part on the actions of Hughes, it is necessary to show only that the two share a common unlawful purpose, i. e., that the two aid and abet one another in the commission of the crime. It is not necessary for each to have full knowledge of all acts committed by the other. An aider or abettor is fully responsible for the acts of the other done in perpetration of the crime. State v. Overman, 269 N.C. 453, 153 S.E.2d 44 (1967). The trial court fully and adequately instructed on the elements of aiding and abetting; nothing more is necessary. We also reject Barnette's argument that the perpetrator of the actual rape must have knowledge of the lack of consent. Jackson testified that she never consented, that she resisted his advances and that he overpowered her. Barnette testified that she enticed him into bed. Thus, the testimony presents two possible versions of the facts: that the victim physically resisted the assault and that the victim encouraged Barnette's sexual advances. No version of the evidence supports the view that Jackson had been induced by force to consent to Barnette's advances without his knowledge. Moreover, we think this assignment also relates more to the element of aiding and abetting and not to the issue of consent. Since Hughes and Barnette were aiding or abetting one another, Jackson's forced consent, if any, induced by Hughes's threats need not be known by Barnette. We conclude that as to defendant Barnette the instructions were adequate and that the case was properly submitted to the jury.