Opinion ID: 2632907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court's Failure to Conduct New Competency Hearing During Penalty Phase

Text: Defendant argues that the testimony presented by the defense at the penalty phase of trial pertaining to the damage to his brain gave rise to new doubts as to defendant's competence to stand trial, and that after hearing this evidence the trial court should have suspended proceedings to hold a second competency trial. Once a defendant has been found competent to stand trial, a second competency hearing is required only if the evidence discloses a substantial change of circumstances or new evidence is presented casting serious doubt on the validity of the prior finding of the defendant's competence. ( People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 734, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2; see also People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 954, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1153-1154, 282 Cal.Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757.) Defendant does not claim that the penalty phase evidence demonstrated a `substantial change of circumstances' ( People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 954, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103); he argues, however, that it cast `serious doubt on the validity of  ( ibid. ) the prior competency finding. He points to testimony by Dr. Bruce Reed, a neuropsychologist, who concluded that a PET scan of defendant's brain showed severe damage to defendant's temporal lobes, hippocampi, and amygdalae, and he notes corroborating testimony by Dr. Timmen Cermak, an expert in psychology and neurology. According to defendant, this testimony showed that the traditional psychological approach used by the doctors at the competency hearing resulted in an incomplete understanding of [defendant's] condition because it failed to consider the brain damage underlying [defendant's] epilepsy as the central and defining feature of his personality, and thus the trial court should have ordered a new competency hearing. Although Drs. Reed and Cermak testified at the penalty phase that defendant's seizure disorder had caused significant damage to his brain, persons with significant brain damage may nonetheless be competent to stand trial. Neither doctor testified that defendant did not satisfy the statutory test for competence to stand trial, that is, that he lacked the ability to understand the nature of the proceedings or to cooperate with his counsel. The doctors who testified at defendant's competency hearing had not seen the results of the PET scan of his brain that defendant's penalty phase witnesses cited as evidence of his brain damage, but they were well aware of defendant's seizure disorder as well as the likelihood of brain damage when they evaluated his competence to stand trial. For instance, Dr. Charles Schaffer's report, introduced as an exhibit at the competency hearing, mentioned that defendant had a seizure during his interview with Dr. Schaffer, and it made reference to electroencephalograph studies showing that defendant had temporal lobe damage, and to Dr. William Lynch's finding that defendant had an organic brain disorder with mild to moderate neuropsychologic impairment. Dr. Schaffer nevertheless concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial, an assessment that persuaded the trial court. Thus, the penalty phase testimony of Drs. Reed and Cermak did not cast `serious doubt on the validity of  the previous competency determination ( People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 954, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103), and that testimony did not necessitate a suspension of the criminal proceedings and a second competency hearing. Defendant relies on Odle v. Woodford (9th Cir.2001) 238 F.3d 1084. There, a federal appellate court held that the trial court in a capital case erred by failing to hold a competency hearing when the defendant presented evidence that he had a partial lobectomy after an automobile accident, after which he exhibited bizarre behavior that led several times to admissions to psychiatric wards. Decisions of the federal circuit courts are not binding on us, and in any event Odle is distinguishable. There, the trial court held no competency hearing, and the issue was whether it should have done so. By contrast, here the trial court held a hearing at which it found defendant competent to stand trial. The question is whether the court should have held a second hearing. The answer is no. We find nothing in Odle's reasoning that would undermine that conclusion.