Opinion ID: 59098
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing Appeal Waiver

Text: In this direct appeal, Pliego-Duarte raises several sentencing issues, 1 Because Pliego-Duarte did not object to the plea proceedings in the district court, our review is limited to plain error in order to avoid manifest injustice. See United States v. Quinones, 97 F.3d 473, 475 (11th Cir. 1996). The factual statement of Pliego-Duarte’s appeal brief mentions briefly that his counsel was ineffective in negotiating his plea, but Pliego-Duarte fails to develop this argument. In any event, to the extent Pliego-Duarte attempts to raise an ineffective assistance claim, we decline to address it on direct appeal. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-05, 123 S. Ct. 1690, 1694 (2003). 5 including the district court’s refusal to award Pliego-Duarte an additional acceptance-of-responsibility point under the guidelines and failure to resentence him in accordance with Booker. However, if enforceable, Pliego-Duarte’s sentence appeal waiver precludes review of these claims.2 Pliego-Duarte argues that his appeal waiver is invalid because the district court failed to adequately explain his appeal rights or the appeal waiver during his plea colloquy.3 A sentence appeal waiver must be knowing and voluntary and will be enforced if the government shows either that: (1) the district court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver; or (2) the record makes clear that the defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver. United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d, 1343, 1350-51 (11th Cir. 1993). A waiver of the right to appeal can cover “difficult or debatable legal issues or even blatant error,” including Booker issues. United States v. Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005). Pliego-Duarte claims that his counsel during the plea negotiations did not explain the appeal waiver to him before he signed the plea agreement. Pliego- 2 Pliego-Duarte’s sentence appeal waiver permits him to appeal only if there is an upward departure under the guidelines or if the government appeals the sentence. Pliego-Duarte’s appellate claims do not fall under either of these exceptions to the sentence appeal waiver. 3 We review the voluntariness of an appeal waiver de novo. United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1352 (11th Cir. 1993). 6 Duarte also points out that his sentencing counsel testified during the § 2255 hearing that, at the sentencing hearing, Pliego-Duarte appeared not to understand that he had waived his right to appeal his sentence. However, the district court specifically questioned Pliego-Duarte about the sentence appeal waiver during the plea colloquy, and Pliego-Duarte stated that he understood the appeal waiver. We apply a strong presumption that Pliego-Duarte’s statement under oath that he understood the sentence appeal waiver in his plea agreement was true, and PliegoDuarte has failed to meet the heavy burden to show otherwise. See United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Rogers, 848 F.2d 166, 168 (11th Cir. 1988). Moreover, Pliego-Duarte’s claim that he did not question the district court regarding the appeal waiver out of fear of a life sentence or due to advice of counsel is belied by the fact that Pliego-Duarte did not hesitate to object to the government’s factual proffer during the plea. Because Pliego-Duarte knowingly and voluntarily entered into his sentence appeal waiver, the sentence appeal waiver is enforceable.4 Thus, we do not address the sentencing issues raised by Pliego-Duarte. AFFIRMED. 4 Pliego-Duarte’s argument that his sentence appeal waiver is unenforceable because it is not supported by adequate consideration is also without merit. In exchange for Pliego-Duarte’s guilty plea, the government agreed to dismiss the thirteen remaining counts in the indictment and to recommend that Pliego-Duarte’s offense level be reduced for acceptance of responsibility. 7