Opinion ID: 405364
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: order approving settlement

Text: 19 Appellant contends at the outset that the ALJ's order approving settlement is analogous to a consent decree and that the Director, therefore, cannot appeal to the Benefits Review Board in the absence of proof that would nullify the parties' consent. Appellant cites no law to justify this conclusion, and we find it both unpersuasive and erroneous. 20 Though there is no authority specifically addressing the reviewability of an order approving settlement of a LHWCA claim, there is instructive precedent on the reviewability of consent decrees in other contexts. See United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 nn. 10-13 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), where the court discusses the responsibilities of district and appellate courts in assessing settlements of class actions, stockholders' derivative suits, and compromises of claims in bankruptcy. It is clear that when the district judge is required by law to ascertain specific facts before approving a settlement, the appellate court will examine that determination to ensure that it is fair, adequate and reasonable. Contrary to appellant's assertions, review is not limited to ascertaining whether consent is valid or whether the district judge abused his discretion: (T)he degree of appellate scrutiny must depend on a variety of factors, such as the familiarity of the trial court with the lawsuit, the stage of the proceeding at which the settlement is approved, and the type of issues involved. United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1361 (5th Cir. 1980). 21 Thus, even if we accept Ingalls' contention that an order approving settlement is like a consent decree, we find that an ALJ, in approving the settlement of a LHWCA claim, is limited in the same manner as a district judge approving a compromise in a class action or stockholders' derivative suit. Though the criteria for approval are different, the purpose of approval is the same-to protect the interests of the parties within constitutional and statutory strictures and to ensure that the decree is consistent with the public policy objectives sought to be attained by Congress in enacting the statutory right of action. City of Miami, supra, 664 F.2d at 441. The ALJ in examining a proposed settlement of longshoreman's claim is required to consider specific facts that help determine the size of award that the claimant deserves. Clefstad, supra, 9 BRBS at 222. The Benefits Review Board, like any appellate court, plays an indispensable role in overseeing settlement approval just as it did in this case: if review was precluded, there would be no check on ALJ approval, a result that could frustrate Congress' intent in passing the LHWCA. The likelihood of frustrating legislative intent appears even greater in a case such as this one, where the power of the ALJ to approve agreed settlements in the first instance is at issue. Thus, even if we treat the ALJ's order approving settlement like a consent decree, as appellant bids us, we find ample support in law and logic for holding that it is reviewable.