Opinion ID: 4242298
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Enumerated Crimes of Violence

Text: Under the Guidelines Having concluded that Arizona armed robbery is not a crime of violence under Section 4B1.2’s force clause, we now turn to whether it qualifies as a crime of violence under a different clause. At the time Molinar was sentenced, robbery was enumerated in the commentary to Section 4B1.2. We have held that robbery is an enumerated crime of violence. See United States v. Barragan, 871 F.3d 689, 713–14 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing the commentary to Section 4B1.2). We must now determine whether a conviction for robbery under Arizona law is equivalent to generic robbery, such that Arizona Robbery is a crime of violence under the enumerated felonies clause. We conclude that Arizona Robbery (and thus armed robbery) is a categorical match to generic robbery, and that Arizona attempt is equivalent to generic attempt, so Molinar’s conviction does constitute a crime of violence for purposes of Section 4B1.2. Under the categorical approach, when an offense is enumerated, we “compare the elements of the statute forming the basis of the defendant’s conviction with the elements of the ‘generic’ crime—i.e., the offense as commonly understood.” Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013). The state crime is a match only if its “elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense.” Id. We have defined generic robbery as “aggravated larceny, containing at least the elements of misappropriation of property under circumstances involving immediate danger to the person.” United States v. Becerril-Lopez, 541 F.3d 881, 891 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Santiesteban-Hernandez, 469 F.3d 376, 380 (5th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Rodriguez, 14 UNITED STATES V. MOLINAR 711 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc)); see also United States v. House, 825 F.3d 381, 387 (8th Cir. 2016) (adopting same generic definition). We have not previously examined the meaning of “immediate danger to the person” in depth, so we must do so now. Our precedent dictates that in interpreting generic definitions of common-law crimes such as robbery, we adopt the “contemporary meaning employed by most states, guided by scholarly commentary.” See United States v. Esparza-Herrera, 557 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d 777, 790 (9th Cir. 2008)). The majority of states implement the notion of immediate danger to the person by “requir[ing] property to be taken from a person or a person’s presence by means of force or putting in fear.” 5 See Santiesteban-Hernandez, 469 F.3d at 380 (collecting state statutes and citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 20.3 (2d ed. 2003)). Thus, we hold that for a state crime to be equivalent to generic robbery, it must require property to be taken from a person or a person’s presence by means of force or putting in fear. 6 5 The minority approach, also reflected in the Model Penal Code, requires bodily injury or the threat of or putting in fear of bodily injury. Santiesteban-Hernandez, 469 F.3d at 380; see MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1. 6 The dissent contends that we are abandoning Becerril-Lopez. We are not. Becerril-Lopez did not define “immediate danger” but used that phrase in describing the elements of generic robbery. Indeed, beyond stating that threats to a person’s property do not suffice to constitute an immediate danger to the person, Becerril-Lopez said nothing else about how much danger to the person is required. See 541 F.3d at 891. We accordingly endeavor here to determine how much immediate danger generic robbery requires. As explained, the majority of states, and accordingly the scholarly commentary, treat the level of danger involved UNITED STATES V. MOLINAR 15 As to how much force is needed to comport with this definition, we have held that force sufficient “to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the property” satisfies the generic definition of robbery, regardless of what degree of force that is in a particular instance. United States v. Harris, 572 F.3d 1065, 1066 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.380) (holding that a statute stating “[t]he degree of force used is immaterial if it is used to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the property” in jostling a victim as sufficient to satisfy the requirements of robbery. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 20.3 (2d ed. 2003); see also CHARLES E. TORCIA, 4 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 464 (15th ed.). The dissent thinks that our recognition of this fact means we are contradicting Becerril-Lopez by defying the plain meaning of the phrase “immediate danger.” But our task here, as it was in Becerril-Lopez, is to understand the requirements for generic robbery, not to define in the abstract words that have been used to describe the elements of generic robbery. Authoritative sources surveying state definitions of generic robbery indicate that it requires very little danger. The dissent also cites United States v. Tellez-Martinez, 517 F.3d 813 (5th Cir. 2008), to argue that we have required a stronger showing of immediate danger than the Fifth Circuit has. In Tellez-Martinez, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the California robbery statute at issue in Becerril-Lopez and concluded that California robbery is a categorical match to generic robbery. Id. at 815. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the California robbery statute required an immediate danger to the person because “danger is inherent in the criminal act. . . . even when the statue is violated by placing the victim in fear of injury to property.” Id. In Becerril-Lopez, we disagreed with this interpretation of California robbery, noting that the statute “does not imply any force or threat of force against the person” and therefore does not require an immediate danger to the person. 541 F.3d at 891 n.8. That we and the Fifth Circuit disagree on what is outlawed by the California robbery statute in no way suggests a disagreement on the definition of generic robbery, or how much immediate danger to the person it requires. 16 UNITED STATES V. MOLINAR satisfied the generic definition of robbery). 7 This accords with the definition of robbery in a majority of states, which require no more force than the jostling of the victim. 8 See LAFAVE, supra, at § 20.3(d)(1) (explaining that pickpocketing or sudden snatching of a purse where the victim does not have the chance to resist is not robbery, but if the victim struggles for control of the purse or if the robber “jostles” or renders the victim “helpless by more subtle means,” then the force is sufficient for robbery); CHARLES E. TORCIA, 4 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 464 (15th ed.) (“It is likewise robbery to pick a person’s pocket while scuffling with him, or while jostling, pushing, or crowding him.” (footnotes omitted)). There is no indication that the Supreme Court’s definition of “violent force” in Johnson— a product of specific statutory interpretation—should apply 7 The dissent points out that Harris is a two-paragraph per curiam opinion, but our published opinions are precedential regardless of length or authorship. See Miller, 335 F.3d at 899. The dissent also argues Harris did not contain “a holding with respect to the degree of force required for generic robbery.” But as the dissent notes, Harris stated that the Nevada robbery statute at issue was not distinguishable from the California robbery statute analyzed in Becerril Lopez on the grounds that the Nevada statute stated that “[t]he degree of force used is immaterial if it is used to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the property.” Harris, 572 F.3d at 1066. And Harris held that, even with this phrase, the Nevada statute was a crime of violence because it was a match for either generic robbery or generic extortion. Id. This was as much a holding as any other because it was necessary to the disposition of the case. 8 See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 737 A.2d 622, 639 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (affirming conviction for attempted robbery where officer “felt a tugging on his holster” and “was required to use force to prevent appellant from taking the gun.”); People v. Davis, 935 P.2d 79, 84-85 (Colo. App. 1996) (“[R]obbery includes the snatching of an object attached to the person of another if force is used to tear or break the attachment”). UNITED STATES V. MOLINAR 17 to the understanding of “force” in the definition of generic robbery. See United States v. Mendoza-Padilla, 833 F.3d 1156, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 2016) (analyzing elements of an enumerated offense without discussing Johnson). Indeed, enumerated offenses are crimes of violence even when their elements do not include the threat or use of violent force; this must be so, or the enumerated felonies clause would be surplusage. See United States v. Pereira-Salmeron, 337 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003). As to the meaning of “fear” within the generic definition, a leading treatise teaches: [T]he word ‘fear’ in connection with robbery does not so much mean ‘fright’ as it means ‘apprehension’; one too brave to be frightened may yet be apprehensive of bodily harm. The victim who is not apprehensive of harm from the robber so long as he does what the robber tells him to do, though he does expect harm if he refuses, is nevertheless ‘put in fear’ for purposes of robbery. LAFAVE, supra, at § 20.3(d)(2) (footnotes omitted); accord TORCIA, supra, at § 462. Thus, “actual fright by the victim, without regard to the defendant’s behavior calculated to produce such a reaction, is [not] alone determinative.” LAFAVE, supra, at § 20.3(d)(2) (internal quotation marks omitted). And the defendant need not verbally threaten the victim with harm to put the victim in fear. Intimidation for purposes of a robbery statute may occur where a defendant approaches a victim and, using a threatening tone or threatening body language, makes demands of the victim. That is, the putting in fear may 18 UNITED STATES V. MOLINAR be sustained by evidence of acts, words, or circumstances reasonably calculated to effect that result. JILL GUSTAFSON & JEFFREY J. SHAMPO, 67 AM. JUR. 2D ROBBERY § 31 (2d ed. 2017) (footnotes omitted). Applying those generic definitions of force and fear here, we conclude that Arizona robbery is coextensive with generic robbery. Again, the generic definition of robbery encompasses not only de minimis force sufficient to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with property, 9 but also the implied threat of force. Although we think it is a close question, we do not understand Arizona’s application of its robbery statute to sweep more broadly than that. To explain why, we turn again to Moore, as well as to two other cases, State v. Yarbrough, 638 P.2d 737 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981), and State v. Stevens, 909 P.2d 478 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). These cases appear to represent the outer bounds of what conduct is considered robbery, whether accomplished by force or putting in fear, in Arizona. In Moore, the defendant used enough force to wrest the officer’s wallet away from him despite his resistance. See Moore, 2014 WL 4103951, at –2. Force sufficient to overcome resistance is enough to satisfy the generic definition of robbery. See LAFAVE, supra, at § 20.3(d)(1). We are therefore satisfied that the defendant’s actions in Moore fell within that definition. 9 The dissent contends that we treat all de minimis force as necessarily satisfying the definition of immediate danger to the person. We do not. Rather, we consider only de minimis force that is sufficient to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with property. UNITED STATES V. MOLINAR 19 In Yarbrough, the defendant entered a convenience store at night with a stocking over his head, ran behind the counter, and demanded money from the clerk with his left hand out of view. 638 P.2d at 738, 740. Even though no physical force was used or expressly threatened, taken together, the defendant’s actions were reasonably calculated to, and in fact did, put the victim in fear. The conduct was therefore consistent with generic robbery. See GUSTAFSON & SHAMPO, supra, at § 31. In Stevens, the defendant approached a stopped car, opened its door, and accused the driver of nearly hitting him. The driver did not recall any near accidents. The defendant’s movements and words made the driver afraid that he might hurt her. He then bent down over the back of her seat, grabbed her purse from the rear seat, and fled. 909 P.2d at 479–80. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that “the jury could and did reasonably conclude [the defendant] intended to cause her to be so fearful and threatened that she would not, at the very least, resist his efforts to take her purse.” Id. at 480. It is a close question whether the conduct in Stevens satisfies the generic definition of robbery because the defendant never verbally threatened the victim and there was no struggle over the purse. But the defendant’s conduct, including entering the confined space of the car, created the sort of face-to-face confrontation that inherently presents a risk of violence. 10 See United States v. Prince, 772 F.3d 10 We note that the court in Stevens also stated that the victim believed the defendant “looked like an abusive person” and that this was part of what made her fearful. 909 P.2d at 479-80. To whatever extent the court treated as relevant a purely subjective reaction to the defendant’s appearance, we do not rely on that reaction in our assessment 20 UNITED STATES V. MOLINAR 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Lewis, 405 F.3d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hawkins, 69 F.3d 11, 12–13 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. McVicar, 907 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Castro-Vasquez, 802 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2015). That leads us to conclude that the defendant’s conduct was reasonably calculated to put the victim in fear and thus satisfies the generic definition of robbery. See GUSTAFSON & SHAMPO, supra, at § 31. Having considered these boundary cases, we conclude that Arizona robbery is coextensive with generic robbery and is thus a crime of violence under Section 4B1.2’s enumerated felonies clause. And, of course, armed robbery includes all the elements of robbery plus the additional element of being armed. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1904. Thus, anyone who has been convicted of armed robbery in Arizona will have been convicted of all of the elements of generic robbery. As a result, we hold that Arizona armed robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under Section 4B1.2’s enumerated felonies clause. The only question that remains is whether Arizona attempted armed robbery also constitutes a crime of violence. “An attempt to commit a crime of violence is itself a crime of violence.” United States v. Wenner, 351 F.3d 969, 971–72 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing USSG § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1). And we have already held in Taylor that Arizona attempt is coextensive with generic attempt. See Taylor, 529 F.3d at 1238. We are not persuaded that the state court cases Molinar cites regarding Arizona’s definition of attempt of whether the conduct amounted to generic robbery. The defendant’s actions were sufficient to create an objectively reasonable fear of harm, making it a match to generic robbery. UNITED STATES V. MOLINAR 21 compel a different result. We thus remain bound by Taylor’s holding that Arizona attempt is a categorical match to generic attempt. See Gomez-Hernandez, 680 F.3d at 1175 (“[W]e are not aware of any subsequent Arizona decision deviating from the generic definition of attempt.”); see also United States v. Quintero-Junco, 754 F.3d 746, 750 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (adhering to Taylor’s holding on attempt); United States v. Gomez, 757 F.3d 885, 899 n.10 (9th Cir. 2014) (same). We therefore hold that Arizona attempted armed robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under Section 4B1.2’s enumerated felonies clause.