Opinion ID: 2543856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: exclusion of juror for cause

Text: Defendant contends that by excusing Prospective Juror S.M. for cause, based on her opposition to the death penalty, the trial court violated defendant's federal and state constitutional rights to an impartial jury, a fair capital sentencing hearing, and due process of law. [3] In her responses to the jury questionnaire, S.M. indicated that she held moral or philosophical beliefs preventing her from imposing the death penalty. She also wrote that she could not personally participate in a decision that would result in the execution of defendant. These answers prompted the trial court to question S.M. further during voir dire. At that time, S.M. said she could impose the death penalty only in a case of multiple murder. The trial court then asked her if she would be able to impose the death penalty if a defendant was convicted of first degree murder with a robbery or a burglary special circumstance; S.M. responded, I still don't believe in [the] death penalty, sir. Defense counsel then questioned her: Defense counsel: Now, let me ask you this, ma'am: If you heard evidence ... that the person charged with the murder in this case, or any case, would have previously been convicted of killing someone, do you think that's a situation in which you might be able to give the death penalty? S.M.: Yes, sir. Defense counsel: You could give the death penalty in that situation? S.M.: Yes, sir. Because it has been done before. And, you know, I still don't want the convicted person to commit another murder, you know. Defense counsel: So are you saying then that maybeeven though you think a person, in the situation I've outlined, perhaps should get the death penalty, that you couldn'tif you were a juror in this case, you couldn't vote for the death penalty, even under that situation? S.M.: I don't understand, sir. Defense counsel: Well, Iagain, going to the situation where a person who is charged in the case was convicted by the jury of murder, and you subsequently learned that that person had previously killed someone, is that a person that you could personally vote to give the death penalty, or is your feeling still, no matter what the facts were, that you could never vote for the death penalty? S.M.: Well, it really depends on a situation. If, before hejust like I said before, if it was multiple murders, you know. Not unless it's multiple murders, I could probably vote for death penalty. In an attempt to clarify that response by S.M., the trial court asked her whether she could impose the death penalty if she were convinced that the evidence established [defendant's] guilt [of murder] beyond a reasonable doubt and that the special circumstance, the robbery or the burglary, was true, ... without knowing any more. S.M. replied that she was confused by the questioning. The trial court made another attempt at clarification. The court: ... You've told us that if this were a case where Mr. Carey was charged with multiple murders S.M.: Yes. The court: and he were to have been found to have committed those murders, and they were murders in the first degree, that you might be able to impose the death penalty or vote for the death penalty. Right? S.M.: Yes, sir. The court: Okay. Well, how about a case where he's not charged with multiple murders, but he is convicted of the murder, and it's a first degree, and you're convinced it was during a robbery or a burglary, and you find that to be true. Now you get in the penalty phase, and you find that some time in the past, not in this same case, that he was convicted of another killing of some kind. Not in this case. S.M.: Um-hmm. The court: Could you vote for a death penalty in that situation? S.M.: No, sir. The trial court then excused Prospective Juror S.M. for cause. A trial court may excuse for cause a prospective juror who on voir dire expresses views about capital punishment, either for or against, that would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of the juror's duties as defined by the court's instructions and the juror's oath. ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 121, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887, quoting Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424, 105 S.Ct. 844; see also People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 536-537, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.) A challenge for cause may be based on the juror's response when informed of facts or circumstances likely to be present in the case being tried. ( People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 720, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332, citing People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1005, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248.) The determinative question is whether the juror's views on the death penalty ``would prevent or impair the juror's ability to return a verdict of death in the case before the juror. (Ibid., quoting People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 431, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.) A reviewing court will uphold a trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause by either party `if it is fairly supported by the record, accepting as binding the trial court's determination as to the prospective juror's true state of mind when the prospective juror has made statements that are conflicting or ambiguous.' ( People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 743, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145, quoting People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 987, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) Having observed the juror during voir dire, the trial court is in the best position to assess the juror's state of mind. (See People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 14, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591.) Here, Prospective Juror S.M., both in her questionnaire and during voir dire, expressed her opposition to the death penalty, except in a case of multiple murders. In her answer to the trial court's final question, S.M. said, in no uncertain terms, that she would not vote for death in a case such as this, which involved a single murder. ( People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 720, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332.) Thus, the trial court properly excused her for cause. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 121, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) To the extent her earlier answer to defense counsel indicated her ability to impose the death penalty on the facts of this case, it conflicts with her final response, made to the question posed by the trial court. Under such circumstances, we accept the trial court's implied determination that Prospective Juror S.M.'s views on the death penalty would have prevented or substantially impaired her performance of the duties required of a juror in a capital case. ( People v. Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 537, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.)