Opinion ID: 814753
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Group’s remaining Section 7433 claims

Text: concerning Johnson’s behavior Next, the Group argues that Johnson violated various provisions of the Code and a regulation, permitting recovery under section 7433. Again, the Group offers no economic damages, so it has no standing to sue. Regardless, the claims lack merit.
Section 6304(b) states an officer may not “harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of any unpaid tax” including “the use of obscene or profane language.” I.R.C. § 6304(b), (b)(2). The Group cites a number of minor incidents which it argues violate the statute. For example, it argues that Johnson did not explain to Jonynas what a levy was, that she “threatened to take action” when Jonynas tried to interfere with IRS’s levy against the Pfizer funds, and became upset when Jonynas discovered he could designate pay- ments. Most of the allegations take the form of the Group labeling Johnson’s behavior as “abrupt,” “threatening,” “erratic,” and “aggressive.” These conclusory allegations devoid of factual support do not preclude summary judgment. See Ozlowski v. Henderson, 237 F.3d 837, 840 (7th Cir. 2001). Indeed, in light of the Group’s refusal to pay over $1 million it owed the government, including over $300,000 it withheld from its employees but did not turn over to the government, it is unremarkable that Johnson persistently tried to assess a trust fund recovery penalty against Jonynas for his role in the No. 09-3380 13 debacle. Further, to the extent that Johnson was wrong in doing so, the IRS Appeals Office ultimately removed the penalty against Jonynas. Thus, Jonynas’s rights were vindicated. Finally, the Group argues Johnson “repeatedly” called DePuy about the levied funds. However, its record citations cite just a handful of unremarkable calls to both Pfizer and DePuy inquiring about the levies. Indeed, the testimony of DePuy and Pfizer employees directly conflicted with these allegations, describing Johnson as professional. This claim does not justify reversal.
Next, the Group argues Johnson violated section 7206(4), which makes it a felony for any individual that “[r]emoves, deposits, or conceals . . . with intent to evade or defeat the assessment or collection of any tax.” This provision is directed at taxpayers that try to defeat tax claims. See, e.g., United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 824 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hook, 781 F.2d 1166, 1170 (6th Cir. 1986). It is not a rule governing the conduct of IRS employees and therefore cannot form the basis of recovery under section 7433. Moreover, any remedy for damages (e.g., the $1,500 fee assessed for insufficient funds) was barred by the statute of limitations.
Section 7214 penalizes officers or employees that are “guilty of extortion or willful oppression” or “knowingly 14 No. 09-3380 demand[] . . . greater sums than are authorized by law.” I.R.C. § 7214(a)(1)-(2). The Group principally argues that Johnson tried to “strong arm” a sum greater than what she could legally levy from DePuy. In support, the Group cites Depuy employee Monte Moore’s testimony that “after [Johnson] received the $121,000 check [for the levy], she called [Moore], acknowledged having received the check, and then asked about something along the lines of, ‘Now, when will I get the rest of the money.’ ” The Group had a $300,000 contract with DePuy of which approximately $121,000 was due. As noted above, the IRS can only levy money due. Moore testified that when Johnson called after receiving the first $121,000, he “told her that [he] wasn’t sure exactly what she was referring to” and explained that the “$200,000 wasn’t due and payable” under the terms of the levy. The Group does not assert that Johnson pursued this $200,000 after learning it was not due. Thus, this conduct does not meet section 7214’s requirement that the revenue officer “knowingly” demand or extort the property. The Group makes a few more accusations. It argues Johnson violated the section by threatening to seize Gessert’s house. However, Gessert owes the IRS over $400,000 that he refuses to pay. The Code permits Johnson to seize the house. I.R.C. §§ 6331, 7403. The Group next asserts Johnson “threatened” Jonynas when he faxed a Pfizer employee during the levy process. However, Jonynas does not explain how Johnson threatened him, what was said, or whether Johnson could legally take the threatened action. These accusations do not merit reversal. No. 09-3380 15
Finally, the Group asserts that Johnson violated Treasury Regulation § 801.3 entitled “[M]easuring employee performance.” Section 801.3(b) instructs evaluators to consider “whether they provided fair and equitable treatment to taxpayers.” The district court properly concluded that Johnson could not violate this regulation because it only provided a method for evaluating her performance. Accordingly, we affirm the entry of summary judgment for the Group’s remaining section 7433 claims.