Opinion ID: 409069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Individual Liability of Middlebrooks and Phelps

Text: 10 At the outset, we must recognize that the present case is distinguishable from Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not necessarily bar a claim that named as defendants the Governor of Ohio, the Adjutant General of the Ohio National Guard, various other Guard officers and enlisted members, and the President of Kent State University. The Scheuer Court stated that damages against individual defendants are a permissible remedy in some circumstances notwithstanding the fact that they hold public office. Id. at 238, 94 S.Ct. at 1687 (citations omitted). The critical distinction between Scheuer and the case before this court is that Scheuer involved allegations of unconstitutional activity whereas the present case does not. As the Scheuer Court noted, the Supreme Court established in 1908 that:(W)hen a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States. 11 416 U.S. at 237, 94 S.Ct. at 1686 (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 453-54, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908)) (emphasis supplied by Scheuer Court). Because there are no claims of unconstitutional conduct on the part of the named defendants, they are not necessarily  'stripped of (their) official or representative character,'  416 U.S. at 237, 94 S.Ct. at 1686 (quoting 209 U.S. at 159-60, 28 S.Ct. at 453-54). 12 Two cases on which Adden relies, Geiger v. State, 242 So.2d 606 (La.App.1970), and Webb v. State, 91 So.2d 156 (La.App.1956), do not address, let alone resolve, the legal question before this court. In both Webb and Geiger, the plaintiffs sued the State of Louisiana through (the) Department of Institutions claiming damages for injuries sustained at the hand of escaped convicts. No prison officer was individually named as a defendant in either suit. These two cases support only the proposition that Adden might have brought his suit in a state court in Louisiana, naming the state as defendant. 13 Similarly, Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475 (Former 5th Cir. July 1, 1982) (en banc), is inapposite. Although that suit involved allegations of negligence by the United States Board of Parole and the United States Board of Prisons, the United States was the named defendant. The principal issue in the case was whether the challenged conduct was within the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, 2680(a) (1982). 14 Frank v. Pitre, 353 So.2d 1293 (La.1977), is also not dispositive. In that case, a policeman sought damages from a parish sheriff for injuries sustained at the hand of a prisoner who had been permitted to leave prison on a pass. The majority held that the appellate court order awarding damages must be reversed because the plaintiff had failed to establish that the prisoner's release was the proximate cause of the injury. Id. at 1295-96. The Frank court did not discuss directly whether it viewed the action as one against the defendant sheriff individually. The court did cite, however, Cappel v. Pierson, 15 La.App. 524, 132 So. 391 (1931), in which the Louisiana appellate court had affirmed a judgment in favor of the defendant in part on the ground that his good faith execution of his quasi-judicial discretionary authority could not be questioned in a civil damage suit. 353 So.2d at 1295. Because Cappel involved the superintendent of a state insane asylum rather than a prison official, it is not directly analogous to the case at bar. Although we do not think that Frank-or Cappel-resolves the issue before this court, we do find that Frank is entirely consistent with the result we reach. 15 Adden also relies on Semler v. Psychiatric Institute, 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827, 97 S.Ct. 83, 50 L.Ed.2d 90. Semler was an action to recover damages from the Psychiatric Institute of Washington, D.C. and a physician who practiced there for negligently releasing from day-care status a probationer named Gilreath. While an outpatient at the Institute, Gilreath killed Semler's daughter. The named defendants filed a third-party complaint against Paul Folliard, Gilreath's probation officer. 16 The state court had suspended Gilreath's twenty-year prison sentence on an abduction charge, conditioned on his confinement and treatment at the Institute, which was located in Virginia. In the course of the next year, the trial judge approved various passes for Gilreath, as well as a request that he be transferred to day-care status. Gilreath decided that he wanted to work in Ohio. Folliard granted him passes, without the approval of the state judge, so that he might seek employment there. Thinkingerroneously-that Ohio probation authorities would accept Gilreath's transfer application, the Institute physician treating Gilreath discharged the probationer and so informed Folliard. 17 When Folliard found that Ohio would not accept the transfer application, he ordered Gilreath to return to Virginia. Gilreath did so. He visited his physician who accorded him outpatient status. Folliard was advised of these events but the state judge was never consulted. Gilreath killed the plaintiff's daughter approximately a month after his return to Virginia. 18 The Semler case is relevant to Adden's claim insofar as Folliard was required to contribute personally one-half of the twenty-five thousand dollar judgment awarded the plaintiff. The Fourth Circuit upheld the district judge's finding that the appellants had breached the duty imposed on them by Gilreath's probation order. The court also held that Folliard had been performing a ministerial, rather than a discretionary, act when he failed to obtain the state court's approval for the various changes in Gilreath's status, stating: The district court properly ruled that this act was ministerial. It simply involved the officer's obedience to the mandate of the court order. 538 F.2d at 127. Because Folliard was performing a ministerial act, he was not entitled to immunity. 19 The distinction recognized by the Semler court between ministerial and discretionary acts has long been deemed relevant to whether a public officer is subject to liability as an individual. See, e.g., Lawhorne v. Harlan, 214 Va. 405, 200 S.E.2d 569 (1973); Huckabay v. Netterville, 263 So.2d 113 (La.App.1972); DiVincenti Brothers v. Livingston Parish School Board, 355 So.2d 1 (La.App.1977), cert. denied, 357 So.2d 558 (1978); 43 Am.Jur. Public Officers §§ 278, 279, at 90-93 (1942). The well settled rule is that a public officer is not individually liable for performance of a discretionary act but may be liable for non-feasance of a ministerial act. Id. §§ 278, 279, at 90-95. A ministerial act has been defined as one in which a person performs in a given statement of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to, or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety of acts being done. Frame v. Yenni, 347 So.2d 309, 311 (La.App.1977) (quoting Lemoine v. Ducote, 45 La.Ann. 857, 12 So. 939 (1893)). 20 The Semler court's conclusion that Folliard's failure to obtain court approval of changes in Gilreath's status was non-feasance of a ministerial duty is entirely consistent with the above-quoted definition. The action required of Folliard by the court's order demanded no exercise of judgment or discretion. 21 Although the analysis in Semler is relevant to the case at bar, we do not think that Semler supports the result urged by Adden. Louisiana statutory law makes the Department of Corrections through its officers and offices, La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 36:151(B), responsible for the custody of criminal offenders. Although imposition of the duty is clear, the manner in which the Department of Corrections-through its officers-is to meet the statutory obligation is not defined in such a way that it can be met without the exercise of judgment by the Department and its employees. We do not think that those officials charged with maintaining the confinement of convicted criminals are engaged in ministerial acts; therefore, the defendants are not subject to individual liability in the instant case. 1 B. Department of Corrections as Alter-Ego of the State 22 There remains the question whether LCIS and the Department are alter-egos of the State of Louisiana. If they are, the State is the real party in interest and subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. State Highway Commission v. Utah Construction Co., 278 U.S. 194, 200, 49 S.Ct. 104, 106, 73 L.Ed. 262 (1929). It is appropriate for a federal court to consider state law as a factor in determining whether the State is the real party in interest, see Johnson v. Texas Department of Corrections, 373 F.Supp. 1108, 1109-10 (S.D.Tex.1974). In the instant case, however, research has disclosed no case in which the courts of Louisiana have discussed whether an action against the Louisiana Department of Corrections is in reality an action against the State. 23 The district court stated that two tests have traditionally been used to determine whether an agency is the alter-ego of the State. The first turns on whether the agency is performing a normal governmental function. Johnson, 373 F.Supp. at 1109. Although we think the maintenance of custody over inmates is a normal governmental function, we recognize that the Johnson court relied almost exclusively on decisions of the Texas courts as to the status of the Texas Department of Corrections. See id. We therefore cannot rest our conclusion solely on the Johnson rule. 24 The second test relied upon by the district court is whether any judgment against the agency would have to be paid out of the State treasury. Miller-Davis Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 567 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1977). In Miller-Davis, the state's financial liability was certain because of a statutory provision. Id. (citing Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 121, § 100-24 (1975)). In the instant case, no similar statutory provision appears to exist and the record below is not clear as to whether the State of Louisiana would be required to meet any judgment awarded. Although we think that the Miller-Davis test is an excellent basis for determining the identity of the real party in interest, it is not dispositive in the instant case. 25 Our inquiry must be guided, therefore, by a number of factors considered by other courts to be relevant in determining whether the State itself is the real party in interest. These include whether the agency may sue and be sued in its own name, whether any legislative provision stating that the agency performs an essential governmental function exists, whether the agency has power to buy and/or sell property in its own name, and whether the agency is accorded independent status under state law. See generally DeLong Corp. v. Oregon State Highway Commission, 233 F.Supp. 7 (D.Or.1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877, 86 S.Ct. 161, 15 L.Ed.2d 119; 6 A.L.R. Fed. 655 (1971 and Cum.Supp.1981). 26 Section 15:821 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes provides, in pertinent part: The functions of the department shall comprise administrative functions of the state now or hereafter authorized by law to be exercised in relation to the administration, management and operation of all State institutions for the care, custody and correction of persons sentenced for felonies or misdemeanors. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 15:821 (West) (emphasis added). We read this provision as stating the legislators' view that the Department performs an essential governmental function. Cf. Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Van Kirk, 146 F.Supp. 364 (S.D.Fla.1956) (holding analogous statement to be indication Turnpike Authority was alter-ego of the State). 27 Section 834 of Title 15 of the Louisiana statutes governs land under the control of the Department. That section provides: 28 The director of corrections shall have power and authority, with the approval of the Board of Corrections, to lease (but not for oil, gas or other minerals) any of the lands owned by the state and under the control of the department which is not being used .... The director shall have the right to grant rights of way across state owned lands under its jurisdiction for the purpose of laying pipe lines, gas lines, water lines and transmission of electricity .... The director shall also have the authority, with the approval of the Board of Corrections and the governor, to buy lands needed for the proper use of any institution under the jurisdiction of the department; and also to sell and transfer to any other state agency real property belonging to the state and under the jurisdiction of the department. 29 La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 15:834 (West) (emphasis added). This section indicates that the Department's control over land under its jurisdiction can be exercised only with the approval of the Board of Corrections and, if land is to be bought or sold, of the Governor. Further, it clarifies that the land under the jurisdiction of the Department is owned by the State. 30 On the whole, we believe that sections 15:821 and 15:834 support the appellees' contention that the Department of Corrections performs a normal governmental function and, therefore, the State of Louisiana is the real defendant in this suit. 2 31 The appellant has relied almost exclusively on a line of cases holding that the Louisiana Highway Commission is not the alter-ego of the State. See, e.g., Farnsworth v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 8 F.Supp. 11 (D.La.1934), aff'd, 74 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 729, 55 S.Ct. 638, 79 L.Ed. 1259. We note that in a recent case, Dagnall v. Gegenheimer, 645 F.2d 2, 3 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit stated that the plaintiff does not dispute the Department (of Highways)'s claim that it is a state agency entitled to invoke eleventh amendment limitation on the judicial power of the United States. Whatever the status of the Department of Highways, we do not find it relevant to whether the Department of Corrections is the alter-ego of the State of Louisiana. To conclude otherwise would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's prescription in Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500, 41 S.Ct. 588, 590, 65 L.Ed. 1057 (1921), that the determination as to who is the real party in interest must turn on the essential nature of the particular proceeding in which the issue arises. 32 Finally, Adden has cited no federal case involving a tort suit against officials of a state Department of Corrections that was found permissible under the Eleventh Amendment. This reinforces our conclusion that the function of such a department is to perform what is essentially a governmental function. We conclude, therefore, that the Department of Corrections is the alter-ego of the State of Louisiana. 33 Because we believe the State of Louisiana is the real defendant in the instant suit, we find that the district court could not exercise diversity jurisdiction over the action; further, the suit was barred from federal court by the Eleventh Amendment.