Opinion ID: 52897
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Nullification Instruction

Text: To correct the special issues’ inadequacies identified by the Supreme Court in Penry I, Texas courts temporarily adopted a “nullification instruction,” like the one presented to the jurors in the instant case. Such an instruction permits the jurors to answer “no” to one of the special issues, even though the proper answer is “yes,” if they nonetheless believe that the death penalty is not warranted. In Penry II, the Supreme Court found this innovation insufficient. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 798-804 (2001). The Court identified two flaws in the special issues nullification instruction in Penry II. First, it reasoned that the instruction could be read as a gloss on the special issues, rather than as a vehicle to override them. See id. at 798. Thus, the jury might have believed that it was still required to give “truthful answers to each special issue,” even in light of other mitigating factors. Id.3 Second, even if the jury did properly understand the nullification 3 The instruction Justice O’Connor complained of as ambiguous in Penry II read, in part, “If you determine, when giving effect to the mitigating evidence, if any, that a life sentence, as reflected by a negative finding to the issue under consideration, rather than a death sentence, 8 No. 03-11097 instruction as allowing it to override the special issues, it was in a position where “it would have been both logically and ethically impossible for a juror to follow both sets of instructions.” Id. at 799. The instruction in the instant case was different from the instruction the Court held unconstitutional in Penry II. For instance, the instruction to Garcia’s jury did not contain the language that Justice O’Connor worried could “be understood as telling the jurors to take Penry’s mitigating evidence into account in determining their truthful answers to each special issue.” Id. at 798. Rather, the jury instructions here state clearly that, even “[i]f you believe . . . that the answers to the Special Issues are ‘Yes,’” you “shall answer one or both of the Special Issues ‘No’ in order to give effect to your belief that the death penalty should not be imposed in this case” (emphasis added). However, the nullification instruction here still has the second flaw identified in Penry II – it requires jurors to answer a special issue untruthfully in order to give effect to the mitigating evidence. See id. at 802. Although “[a] clearly drafted catchall instruction on mitigating evidence . . . might have complied with Penry I,” in this case, “jurors . . . [still] had to answer the special is an appropriate response to the personal culpability of the defendant, a negative finding should be given to one of the special issues.” 532 U.S. at 798-99 (emphasis in original; quotations omitted). 9 No. 03-11097 issues dishonestly in order to give effect to . . . mitigating evidence.” Id. at 802-03. Thus, the trial court’s additional “‘clarification’ provided no real help.” Id. at 802.4 Furthermore, the trial court’s clarification of the word “deliberately” did not permit the jurors to give effect to any additional mitigating evidence. Indeed, the court’s definition of “deliberately,” provided above, is less than artful. And, in any event, the instruction simply did not “defin[e] the term . . . ‘in a way that would clearly direct the jury to consider fully [petitioner’s] mitigating evidence as it bears on his personal culpability.’” Id. at 803 (quoting Penry I, 492 U.S. at 323). Thus, in order for us to find that the jury had the opportunity to give meaningful effect to Garcia’s mitigating evidence, we must determine that the two special issues, standing alone, are constitutionally sufficient. 4 Both the Supreme Court and this Circuit have indicated in recent opinions that requiring jurors to return false answers in order to give effect to mitigating evidence violates the defendant’s constitutional rights. See Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 48 (2004); Bigby v. Dretke, 402 F.3d 551, 572 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that “even if the jur[ors] understood the instruction as directing them to ‘nullify’ their answers to the special issues, they still would have faced the ethical dilemma of violating their oath to render a ‘true verdict’ by providing false answers to the special issues in order to give effect to Bigby’s mitigating evidence and comply with the supplemental instruction”). 10 No. 03-11097