Opinion ID: 2630649
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the context of the statute: seeking to effect a lawful arrest

Text: ¶ 23 Utah Code section 76-8-305 provides the following: A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with the arrest or detention by: (1) use of force or any weapon; (2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful order: (a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and (b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or (3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (2001). The court of appeals held that the introductory language, seeking to effect a lawful arrest, does not require that the underlying arrest or detention be legally sound. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323, ¶¶ 16-17, 14 P.3d 698. It held that the term lawful in the introduction of the statute does not incorporate the constitutional standards that require detentions to be based upon reasonable suspicion and arrests upon probable cause. Id. at ¶ 11. Rather, the court of appeals held that [s]o long as a police officer is acting within the scope of his or her authority and the detention or arrest has the indicia of being lawful, a person can be guilty of interfering with a peace officer even when the arrest or detention is later determined to be unlawful. Id. ¶ 24 Defendant asserts that the court of appeals' interpretation of the statute renders it unconstitutional because, under that interpretation, the statute punishes a citizen for pointing out that police are effecting an unlawful detention ... [and] permits and authorizes the seizure of citizens without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and without lawful basis for the detention. He claims the statute violates the federal due process clause by allowing the arrest or detention of persons without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. He argues that the statute allows police to circumvent the requirements of due process; for example, a police officer who lacks probable cause to arrest a citizen for one crime might evoke an uncooperative response from the citizen and then arrest that person for interference, thereby effecting an arrest without probable cause for the first crime. ¶ 25 Defendant correctly notes that in order to detain a citizen an officer must have reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir.2000) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)). In order to arrest a person, the police officer must have probable cause to believe a crime has been committed. Id. (citing Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1476 (10th Cir.1995)). The court of appeals' and this court's interpretation of the statute, however, does not necessarily do away with these standards. If a police officer lacks probable cause to arrest a person for one crime, the officer may still arrest that person for a second crime if the officer has probable cause to believe the person committed the second crime. Thus, assuming the officer has probable cause to believe the citizen committed the second crime, the only way in which the arrest would violate the citizen's constitutional rights is if the second crime i.e., interference with a peace officerprohibits a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. [1] If, however, the statute is constitutionally sound, the police are free to base an arrest on probable cause that the statute has been violated, regardless of whether they have probable cause to believe the person committed another crime as well. See State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, ¶ 31, 57 P.3d 1052 (holding that search incident to arrest was lawful where police had probable cause to believe the interference statute was violated). ¶ 26 I believe, therefore, that we should look to the statute to determine whether it prohibits a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. Since it has not been claimed that defendant interfered by the use of force or a weapon, I focus my review upon sections two and three of the statute, which prohibit interference but make no reference to the use of force. I consider the interpretation of these two sections in light of the interpretations suggested by defendant and the State, determine whether each section is constitutionally sound, and, if the section is constitutional, determine whether defendant's actions could properly be determined to have violated that section of the statute.