Opinion ID: 1175474
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: delay in filing charges

Text: Appellant contends that the delay in charging the nine separate crimes of sexual assault was so excessive as to be violative of his due process rights under Art. 1, § 6 of the constitution of the state of Wyoming which provides: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, and violative of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the constitution of the United States. It is undisputed that the investigation of these charges began in June of 1984 and that the criminal complaint was filed on October 31, 1984. The information in the district court was filed November 19, 1984, charging appellant with ten counts of sexual assault in the second degree and seven counts of rape. The April 8, 1985 amended information, upon which appellant was tried, reduced the charges to six counts of rape in violation of § 6-63, W.S. 1957, supra, and three counts of second degree sexual assault in violation of § 6-4-303(a)(vii), W.S. 1977, supra. The incidents which were the bases of the nine charges occurred over a period of approximately seventeen years from July 24, 1967 to 1983. The period of time between the occurrence of the incidents and the charges against appellant ranged from 20 months to 17 years. It is this delay in charging that appellant claims denied him a fair trial and should result in dismissal of this case. At common law there was no limitation period for the prosecution of any criminal offense. Where no statute of limitations pertaining to criminal offenses has been adopted, prosecution for such an offense may be commenced at any time during the life of the offender. Vasquez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 557 S.W.2d 779 (1977); State v. Brown, 21 Md. App. 91, 318 A.2d 257 (1974). When statutes of limitations governing the commencement of prosecution for specific crimes are adopted, they are said to be acts of grace under which the sovereign surrenders its right to prosecute. Being acts of grace, statutes of limitations may be changed or repealed without violating ex post facto prohibitions, People v. Isaacs, 37 Ill.2d 205, 226 N.E.2d 38, 52 (1967); but in the final analysis, whether statutes of limitations governing prosecution of criminal offenses should be adopted at all is a matter solely for the legislature. Bennett v. District Court of Tulsa County, 81 Okl.Cr. 351, 162 P.2d 561, 573 (1945). Forty-eight of the 50 states have adopted statutes of limitations with respect to certain crimes. Generally, these limitation periods have been adopted for less serious crimes. None of these 48 states have limitation periods for murder or capital offenses. Many have no limitation period for the prosecution of some or all of the serious crimes. Of the states that have adopted statutes of limitations for criminal prosecutions, ten have no limitation period for the crime of rape. Comment, Criminal Law: Limitation of Prosecution  Time, 5 Land & Water L.Rev. 179 (1970). Wyoming is one of the two states which has no statute of limitations for any criminal case. The nine charges of rape filed against Dr. Story in this case were timely and properly brought by the State. See, 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 223. Although the prosecution of Dr. Story upon the nine sexual assault charges was not barred by any period of limitation, we must still determine whether his constitutional right to due process and a fair trial was denied by the delay in charging him. The cases dealing with this subject generally involve prosecutorial delay in charging. They are cases in which the prosecution had possession of facts and evidence of crimes but delayed commencing prosecution for periods of from a few months to as long as 19 years. Stoner v. Graddick, 751 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Comosona, 614 F.2d 695 (10th Cir.1980). In United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), there was a delay of three years, two months between the commission of the crime and the return of an indictment. There was a five-year limitation period for commencing the prosecution. Thus, the prosecution had been timely commenced as far as the statute of limitations was concerned. The Court noted, however, that the statute of limitations does not fully define the appellees' rights with respect to the events occurring prior to indictment, and that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment would require dismissal of the indictment if it were shown at trial that the pre-indictment delay in this case caused substantial prejudice to appellees' rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused.  (Emphasis added.) 92 S.Ct. at 465. The Court also noted that a criminal prosecution, commenced within the limitation period provided, would not be dismissed for preaccusation delay where there was reliance only upon potential prejudice and the passage of time as being violative of due process. Where timely commenced, the defendant must establish that the precharging delay caused substantial prejudice to rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused. United States v. Marion, supra. The Court in Marion, supra, reversed the order dismissing the charges stating: No actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged or proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them. Appellees rely solely on the real possibility of prejudice inherent in any extended delay: that memories will dim, witnesses become inaccessible, and evidence be lost. In light of the applicable statute of limitations, however, these possibilities are not in themselves enough to demonstrate that appellees cannot receive a fair trial and to therefore justify the dismissal of the indictment. 92 S.Ct. at 466. In United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), the United States Supreme Court, commenting upon the Marion case, stated that proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim, and that the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused. (Emphasis added.) 97 S.Ct. at 2048-2049. The Court further stated, in commenting upon the duty of the prosecutor and the court with respect to the filing of criminal charges: Judges are not free, in defining `due process,' to impose on law enforcement officials our `personal and private notions' of fairness and to `disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function.' Our task is more circumscribed. We are to determine only whether the action complained of  here, compelling respondent to stand trial after the Government delayed indictment to investigate further  violates those `fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions'   . (Citations omitted.) 97 S.Ct. at 2049. In Stoner v. Graddick, 751 F.2d 1535, supra, the prosecution knew of the bombing of a church in 1958. There was a 19-year delay between the 1958 crime and the bringing of prosecution. The court, referring both to the Marion and Lovasco cases, applied the test stated therein requiring a showing of actual prejudice and deliberate prosecutorial delay to gain tactical advantage and stated that the Court's reference to `the community's sense of fair play and decency,'    strongly hinted that bad faith was a necessary component of a successful due process challenge. 751 F.2d at 1542. The court held that the criminal charge for the bombing should not be dismissed for due process reasons. In State v. Haga, 8 Wash. App. 481, 507 P.2d 159 (1973), there was no statute of limitations governing the time for bringing a charge of murder. There was a five-year delay in filing this murder charge. All of the facts were available, but the first prosecutor did not feel they were sufficient to make a case. A subsequent prosecutor viewed the case otherwise and commenced the prosecution. The court found there was no showing of actual prejudice sufficient to overcome the absence of any statute of limitations concerning the crime of murder in the first degree. We hold that the showing of actual prejudice must be sufficient to overcome the legislative intent expressed by the absence of a limitation on prosecution for such crime, before the prosecution should be forbidden. Id. 507 P.2d at 165. We note here that the cases cited generally deal with cases in which the State, having knowledge of the commission of a crime, delays the commencement of the prosecution of that crime. The State, of course, is a party to the action. It is charged with the duty of affording the defendant due process, a fair trial, and with otherwise satisfying the requirements of the constitution and laws relating to that prosecution. The legal authorities cited provide for dismissal where the person charged is denied due process because the prosecutor delays filing charges to gain a tactical advantage, perhaps where the prosecutor acts in bad faith in delaying the filing of charges, and where substantial prejudice results from the delay. In this case there is not a claim that the State delayed the filing of charges. It is conceded that once the State became aware of the potential crimes with which appellant was charged, it proceeded diligently to investigate and file the charges. The preaccusation delay here resulted because the victims did not report the crimes for the periods of time stated. Victims, of course, are not parties to the action. We are not prepared to say that they have the same duty as the State in prosecuting the defendant. The legislature has not seen fit to limit the period within which an action for sexual assault may be commenced. Rape is a crime that goes largely unreported. The reasons are obvious: the embarrassment, the humiliation, the public notoriety, the difficulty of proof, (there usually being only two persons with knowledge of the crime), and the social stigma that attaches to the crime. In this case, Dr. Story was an authority figure, a prominent member of the community. The victims said they did not report the crime because they were scared, afraid, did not want to hurt a loved one, thought they would not be believed, or because it was their word against the word of a doctor. Those reasons are easily understandable. There is no indication that the failure to report was for the purpose of gaining a tactical advantage or that it was done in bad faith. Nor is there any showing of substantial specific prejudice as opposed to general prejudice resulting from the passage of time and loss of memory. Specific prejudice is the showing of the loss of a witness, exhibit or other evidence, the presence of which would probably bring about a different result. In a case very close to the instant case, Cooper v. State, Okl.Cr., 671 P.2d 1168 (1983), there was a 14-year delay in commencing a homicide prosecution. The crime was alleged to have occurred on or about November 28, 1966, and the appellant was charged with the crime on January 16, 1980. The court noted: [C]rucial evidence  the incriminating statements of the appellant  did not come to the attention of the authorities until 1979 and 1980. It thus appears that the long delay in filing charges against the appellant was based on the need for proof of his guilt. To prosecute a defendant following an investigative delay does not deprive him of due process, even if his defense might have been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time. Id. at 1175. In this case the incriminating evidence did not come to the attention of the authorities until June 1984. After investigation, appellant was charged on October 31, 1984 with the crimes indicated. The delay was not attributable to the state of Wyoming. There is no indication of bad faith by anyone, nor is there evidence of specific prejudice. As a matter of law, there was no denial of due process nor of a fair trial in the prosecution of these charges and, therefore, no error in proceeding with the prosecution.