Opinion ID: 39678
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education

Text: Finally, LADOE argues that it did not “knowingly” waive Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court under § 504 in accordance with § 2000d-7 by accepting federal funds. As LADOE acknowledges, this argument was considered and rejected by our en banc majority in Pace II.27 LADOE nevertheless argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education,28 requires us to re-examine the issue, repudiate the reasoning of Pace II, and adopt the analysis of Pace I. In Pace I, the panel held that the state defendant did not “knowingly” waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by accepting federal funds because, at the time it received those funds, the prevailing legal authorities suggested that it had no Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits under § 504.29 In rejecting the Pace I panel’s syllogism, the en banc court in Pace II held that, in accordance with Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,30 “the only ‘knowledge’ that the Court is concerned about is a state’s knowledge that a Spending Clause condition requires waiver of immunity, not a state’s knowledge that 27 403 F.3d at 282–85. 28 ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005). 29 325 F.3d at 617. 30 451 U.S. 1 (1981). 13 it has immunity that it could assert.”31 We also stated in Pace II that, “[a]t bottom...if Congress satisfies the clear statement rule, the knowledge prong of the Spending Clause waiver analysis is fulfilled.”32 Finding that § 504 and § 2000d-7 clearly and unambiguously conditioned the receipt of § 504 funds on waiver of a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits grounded in § 504, we held that the State had “knowingly waived” immunity from suits under § 504.33 LADOE does not argue that § 504 and § 2000d-7 fail the “clear statement rule” of Pace II; rather LADOE contends that in Jackson (decided after Pace II), the Supreme Court repudiated this “clear statement rule” and replaced it with a “notice” rule. In Jackson, the male coach of a high school’s girls basketball team asserted a retaliation claim against the local school board, grounding his claim in Title IX. The school board argued that, because retaliation claims are not expressly authorized by the language of Title IX, it was not put on notice of the potential for retaliation claims under the statute.34 The Supreme Court agreed that, because Title IX was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause, “private damage actions are 31 403 F.3d at 279 (emphasis in original); see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst). 32 403 F.3d at 279. 33 Id. at 282–85. 34 125 S. Ct. at 1508–09. 14 available only where recipients of federal funding had adequate notice that they could be liable for the conduct at issue.”35 Consonant with its holding in Pennhurst, the Court reiterated its position that a State must be aware of the conditions imposed on receipt of federal funds for there to be “knowing acceptance” of those conditions.36 Acknowledging that Title IX is silent on the question of the fund recipient’s amenability to retaliation suits, the Court looked to its prior decisions dealing with the scope of remedies available under Title IX and concluded (in the absence of a “clear statement”) that the school board nevertheless had sufficient “notice” because: [T]he Board should have been put on notice by the fact that our cases since Cannon [v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)], such as Gebser [v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998)] and Davis [v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629 (1999)], have consistently interpreted Title IX’s private cause of action broadly to encompass diverse forms of intentional sex discrimination.37 LADOE would have us read Jackson as the Court’s abandoning of College Savings Bank’s “clear statement rule” that we applied in Pace II, and replacing it with a “notice” test of what the recipients of the funds should have known at the time the funds were accepted. We cannot read such a sweeping change into the court’s opinion in Jackson. Title IX, the statute at issue in 35 Id. (internal citation omitted). 36 Id. at 1509 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17). 37 Id. 15 Jackson, is silent (or at least ambiguous) regarding retaliation; in contrast, the Spending Clause statutes we addressed in Pace II were clear and unambiguous regarding waiver: Section 2000d-7 expressly and unambiguously states that parties waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity to actions under § 504 by accepting federal funds. Moreover, there is no language in Jackson that can be pointed to in support of a conclusion that the Court desired to modify, much less repudiate, the well-established rule with such a long and distinguished history laid out in Pennhurst, Dole, and College Savings Bank that “if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously,” and “speak with a clear voice.”38 Stated differently, nothing in Jackson undermines Pace II’s holding that a clear statement like the one found in § 2000d-7 is sufficient to satisfy the “knowing” requirement for a waiver to be valid.” Even if Jackson can be interpreted as standing for the proposition that a clear and unambiguous statement from Congress is not the exclusive road to a “knowing waiver,” it cannot be read to call into question the holding in Pace II that the presence of a clear statement is sufficient to satisfy the need for a waiver to be “knowing.” Accordingly, LADOE’s Jackson argument in this regard fails.