Opinion ID: 786677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Attenuation of the Fourth Amendment Violation

Text: 243 Under established law, evidence obtained through the exploitation of illegal behavior by the police cannot be admitted into evidence. Brown, 422 U.S. at 599, 95 S.Ct. 2254. The question under Brown was whether there had been sufficient attenuation of the illegality that the evidence obtained could be admitted. The Supreme Court stated that once an illegality has been shown, we must decide whether the evidence has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Id. (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407). [T]he purpose of this attenuated connection test is to mark the point of diminishing returns of the deterrence principle inherent in the exclusionary rule. United States v. Ienco, 182 F.3d 517, 526 (7th Cir.1999). 244 When the evidence at issue is a confession, the attenuation analysis determines whether the confession is the result of an exploitation of the illegality, or whether it is the result of the defendant's free will. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 226, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). As we explained in United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1289 (9th Cir.1979): 245 The free will of an inculpating defendant is to be considered in light of the twin policies — deterrence and judicial integrity — of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. It is not enough for Fourth Amendment attenuation that the statement be uncoerced; the defendant's free will must also be sufficient to render inapplicable the deterrence and judicial integrity purposes that justify excluding his statement. 246 A determination that a confession was a product of a defendant's free will under an attenuation analysis is different from a determination that a confession was voluntary under the Fifth Amendment. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216-17, 99 S.Ct. 2248. A confession can be voluntary under the Fifth Amendment and yet, at the same time, inadmissible into evidence because it is the result of an exploitation of an illegality under a Brown attenuation analysis. Id. 247 The Supreme Court has instructed us to look to three factors in performing an attenuation analysis: (1)the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, (2)the presence of intervening circumstances, and, (3) particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254; see also Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982) (quoting Brown factors); Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 218, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (same). 248 An analysis of the attenuation factors in this case leads to the conclusion that Crawford's confession should not have been admitted into evidence. The district court found that the first factor, temporal proximity, favored Crawford. I agree. The temporal proximity between the search and Crawford's detention at the residence, on the one hand, and Crawford's confession, on the other, was close. The drive to the FBI office took about 20 minutes, and Crawford confessed after about an hour and a half at the office. 249 The second factor, intervening circumstances, also favors Crawford. Intervening circumstances, in the case law, means intervening events. We look at intervening events of significance that render inapplicable the deterrence and judicial integrity purposes that justify excluding [a tainted] statement. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d at 1289 & n. 3; see also United States v. Ricardo D., 912 F.2d 337, 343(9th Cir.1990). Examples of such events include release from custody, an appearance before a magistrate, or consultation with an attorney. See, e.g., United States v. Wellins, 654 F.2d 550, 555 (9th Cir.1981) (The crucial factor in this case is that Wellins was permitted to consult with his attorney.). In this case, there were no intervening events. In a continuous, uninterrupted sequence, Agent Bowdich and the other officers conducted the illegal search; detained Crawford during the search; took Crawford to the FBI office; and talked to him in a closed room in the office until he confessed. Nothing else happened. This factor thus clearly cuts in favor of Crawford. 250 Finally, the third factor, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct also favors Crawford. Agent Bowdich candidly admitted that the purpose of his suspicionless search and detention was to get Crawford to confess to the pre-parole bank robbery. Agent Bowdich testified that he conducted the unconstitutional suspicionless search as a tool to obtain that confession. As we explained in Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d at 1289, [w]hen police purposely effect an illegal arrest or detention in the hope that custodial interrogation will yield incriminating statements, the deterrence rationale for application of the exclusionary rule is especially compelling. See also Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. 2254(finding taint of illegal arrest not attenuated when [t]he arrest, both in design and in execution, was investigatory. The detectives embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that something might turn up.). Because the search was conducted with the purpose of pressuring Crawford to confess, this factor weighs heavily in favor of excluding the confession. 251 Further, the official misconduct was flagrant. At the time of the search, the case law in this circuit required probable cause to justify investigatory searches, whether the crimes being investigated were current or past. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.a. California Supreme Court case law did not (and still does not) authorize suspicionless parole searches to investigate past crimes. Anyone charged with a knowledge of this case law — as Agent Bowdich, an FBI agent, must be — should have known at the time that a suspicionless search to investigate a pre-parole crime was not authorized under either our case law or that of the California Supreme Court. Anyone with a knowledge of the case law also should have known that the Fourth Waiver form signed by Crawford did not authorize a suspicionless search to investigate a pre-parole crime. 252 All three attenuation factors clearly favor Crawford. I therefore conclude that his confession, obtained as a result of the illegal suspicionless search of his residence and his accompanying illegal detention, could not properly have been admitted into evidence.