Opinion ID: 1745096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Official and Qualified Official Immunity

Text: In its opinion below, the Court of Appeals found KRS 75.070 unconstitutional insofar as it attempted to confer immunity to Fire Chief Clark in his personal capacity. However, the Court of Appeals determined that Chief Clark and similarly situated firefighters were entitled to qualified official immunity to the extent that they were engaged in discretionary rather than ministerial duties. Cf. Ashby v. City of Louisville, 841 S.W.2d 184, 189 (Ky.App. 1992) (holding that municipal policemen were entitled to qualified official immunity as set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D(3)). Believing that the record, however, was insufficient to determine whether the negligent action of which Chief Clark was accused was premised upon discretionary or ministerial functions, the Court of Appeals remanded the matter back to the circuit court for further proceedings. We agree with the Court of Appeals' logic to the extent that KRS 75.070 should not be construed to issue a blanket grant of immunity upon firefighters in their personal capacity. In Kentucky, personal liability for a public officer's or employee's negligent performance of duties depends in part on whether the powers or duties in question were ministerial or discretionary in nature. Ashby, 841 S.W.2d at 188 ( citing Thompson v. Huecker, 559 S.W.2d 488 (Ky.App.1977)). We simply do not believe that the language of KRS 75.070(1) attempts to confer personal immunity as it expressly references acting solely and alone in a governmental capacity. (emphasis added). Thus, the immediately following reference to such municipality ... district or area is a clear reference and limitation to its acting in a governmental] capacity. Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, this is an entirely reasonable reading of the language contained therein. See id. ([Firefighters and fire departments shall be considered agents of the Commonwealth] acting solely and alone in a governmental capacity, and such municipality, fire protection district, or area normally served by a volunteer fire department, shall not be liable in damages for any omission or act of commission or negligence while answering an alarm, performing fire prevention services, or other duly authorized emergency services. ) (emphasis added); see also 57 Am.Jur.2d Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 454 (2008) (recognizing that in jurisdictions which predicate tort liability on distinguishing between discretionary and ministerial functions, a fire department's decision on how to fight a fire does not give rise to liability.). Moreover, if there are two ways to reasonably construe a statute, one upholding the validity and the other rendering it unconstitutional, we `must adopt the construction which sustains the constitutionality of the statute.' Flynt v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 415, 423 (Ky.2003) ( quoting Halsell, 934 S.W.2d at 555). Thus, we are bound to construe KRS 75.070 as acknowledging the governmental immunity of fire departments and the official and qualified official immunity of firefighters. Autry, 219 S.W.3d at 717, succinctly and accurately sets forth the current status of Kentucky law in regards to official and qualified official immunity: The immunity that an agency enjoys is extended to the official acts of its officers and employees. However, when such officers or employees are sued for negligent acts in their individual capacities, they have qualified official immunity. Qualified official immunity applies to public officers or employees if their actions are discretionary (i.e., involving personal deliberation, decisions and judgment) and are made in good faith and within the scope of their authority or employment. This is intended to protect governmental officers or employees from liability for good faith judgment calls in a legally uncertain environment. An act is not discretionary merely because some judgment is used in deciding on the means or method used. However, even if an act is discretionary, there is no immunity if it violates constitutional, statutory, or other clearly established rights, or if it is done willfully or maliciously with intent to harm, or if it is committed with a corrupt motive or in bad faith. The burden is on the plaintiff to show that the public official or employee was not acting in good faith. If the negligent acts of public officers or employees are ministerial, there is no immunity. An act is ministerial if the duty is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving mere execution of a specific act based on fixed and designated facts. If ministerial acts are proper, then the public officer or employee has official immunity without qualification. Any act done by a public officer or employee who knows or should have known that his actions, even though official in nature, would violate constitutional rights or who maliciously intends to cause injury, has no immunity. (internal citations omitted). Therefore, as Autry portends, KRS 75.070 recognizes the official immunity enjoyed by firefighters engaged in their official acts; it should not, however, be construed to confer immunity upon firefighters sued in their personal capacity, as such liability turns on a subsidiary qualified official immunity analysis. [9] See Autry, 219 S.W.3d at 717. Here, the CVFD was an agent of the state both by virtue of its engaging in a function essential to government, Berns, 801 S.W.2d at 332, (which was inherently governmental as opposed to proprietary in nature, Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 519) and by virtue of the General Assembly's recognition of its historical authority as such. See KRS 75.070 ([a] volunteer fire department and the personnel of each ... shall be considered an agent of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and acting solely and alone in a governmental capacity.). Therefore, its immunity extends to its officers and employees who are sued in their official capacity. Autry, 219 S.W.3d at 717; see also Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 521-522. Thus, in the present instance, to the extent that Chief Clark was sued in his official capacity he enjoys official immunity. Here, the Court of Appeals correctly noted that Chief Clark was named to the suit in both his official and individual capacities. In his official capacity he is immune. However, the Court of Appeals also believed that the record below was insufficient insofar as it failed to articulate precisely how and for what actions/omissions Clark was allegedly personally negligent. Thus, as previously noted, the court remanded the matter to the trial court for such further determinations. In their pleadings and brief, Appellees allege and argue that Chief Clark was negligent because CVFD lacked sufficient equipment and personnel to combat the fire and Clark did not seek assistance from neighboring fire departments until it was too late. However, it should be noted that a judgment call by a fire chief as to how, with what assistance, and in what manner to extinguish a fire is the very definition of a discretionary act. Moreover, a decision as to how to fight a fire does not necessarily render subsequent determinations ministerial. See 57 Am. Jur.2d Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 454; see also City of Hammond v. Cataldi, 449 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (Ind.Ct.App.1983). Kentucky has recognized that part and parcel to the scheme of qualified official immunity is the notion that public officials will not be held liable for `bad guesses in gray areas.' Rowan County v. Sloas, 201 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Ky.2006) ( quoting Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir.1992)). Accordingly, in order to charge liability, a complainant may not merely allege injury, but must point to a causally related Violation of a constitutional, statutory, or other clearly established right,' Sloas, 201 S.W.3d at 475 ( quoting Yanero , 65 S.W.3d at 523), or produce some proof that the action was not in good faith, Autry, 219 S.W.3d at 717. There is often a clear distinction between proof of a negligent act and proof of any bad faith which prompted it. Thus, Chief Clark was not engaged in a ministerial function and Appellants have not brought forth any allegations of bad faith. As such, the trial court was proper in its ruling on Appellees CR 12.02 motion to dismiss this negligence action. Judicious and timely resolution of immunity claims bears a twofold purpose of particular social importance in ensuring that government agents and officials are not needlessly ensnared in protracted litigation and in preventing the incurrence of excessive trial expense by both parties. These social costs include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office. Finally, there is the danger that fear of being sued will dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 591 n. 12, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, recognizing that Chief Clark's acts were discretionary and that there is no allegation, or suggestion, that his decision was in bad faith, Clark was entitled to qualified official immunity in his individual capacity.