Opinion ID: 4514949
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scope of Reply Testimony

Text: The admission of reply testimony is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. Stewart, 283 S.C. 104, 106, 320 S.E.2d 447, 449 (1984). The admission of testimony which is arguably contradictory of and in reply to earlier testimony does not constitute an abuse of discretion. Id. Rather, [a]n abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support. State v. Jones, 416 S.C. 283, 290, 786 S.E.2d 132, 136 (2016). Reply testimony should be limited to rebuttal of matters raised by the defense. State v. Huckabee, 388 S.C. 232, 242, 694 S.E.2d 781, 786 (Ct. App. 2010). Any arguably contradictory testimony is proper on reply. State v. South, 285 S.C. 529, 535, 331 S.E.2d 775, 779 (1985). In State v. McDowell, we held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the examining pathologist to testify on reply that the murder victim's head was resting against a hard, flat object at the time the third shot was fired. 272 S.C. 203, 206-07, 249 S.E.2d 916, 917 (1978). The defendant argued the State was required to introduce the pathologist's testimony during its case-in-chief, and therefore, the testimony was improper. We held the pathologist's testimony was proper reply testimony to the defendant's testimony that the victim was standing when he fired the third shot, which was in direct opposition to his earlier statements. Id. We reasoned the pathologist's testimony was unnecessary until the defendant contradicted his statement to law enforcement that the victim was lying on the floor when he (the defendant) fired the last shot. Id. Here, the court of appeals' majority distinguished this case from McDowell and other cases, stating [u]nlike [those] cases, LaRosa's testimony was not proper reply testimony because the rebuttal should have been limited to refuting Prather's testimony, rather than to complete the State's case-in-chief. Prather, 422 S.C. at 106, 810 S.E.2d at 424. The majority cited Prather's testimony that he waited in his vehicle for Phillips for about ten minutes and that he denied carving anything into Victim's back or covering him with a blanket. The majority noted Prather did not testify to the number of perpetrators or as to anyone's motive for the carving, the placement of the dildo, or the covering of Victim. Id. at 107, 810 S.E.2d at 424. The majority also concluded LaRosa's broad expert testimony explain[ing] the crime scene could not reasonably be anticipated by Prather. Id. at 107, 810 S.E.2d at 424. We disagree. Prather testified that when he and Phillips left Victim's residence, Victim was alive, walking around, not mutilated, not covered, and not face-down in the couch. Prather further testified that Phillips went back inside the residence to find his shoes, leaving Prather in the car. The inferences arising from Prather's testimony are obvious—when Phillips went back inside the dwelling, he was alone with Victim, thus placing blame for the crimes solely upon Phillips. LaRosa's testimony provided another explanation for the number of people present immediately after Victim was murdered. Consequently, until Prather testified that Victim was alive, was not mutilated, and was not covered just before Phillips went back inside, LaRosa's testimony was unnecessary, much like the pathologist's testimony in McDowell. At the least, LaRosa's testimony was arguably contradictory to Prather's testimony. See South, 285 S.C. at 535, 331 S.E.2d at 779 (Any arguably contradictory testimony is proper on reply.). Although Prather did not testify about the motivation for someone to carve rapist into Victim's back or to cover Victim's body, LaRosa's testimony of the motives for staging and undoing was necessary to his conclusion that the two separate behaviors evidenced two conflicting personalities. This provided the foundation for LaRosa's testimony that two people were present after the crime and countered Prather's testimony that only one person was present at that time. See State v. Durden, 264 S.C. 86, 90, 212 S.E.2d 587, 589 (1975) (The reply testimony was made necessary by the evidence which the appellant had submitted. The reply testimony did not go beyond a refutation of that which the appellant's witness had asserted. It can hardly be argued that the appellant's counsel was taken by surprise.).