Opinion ID: 2974967
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: brooks’ motion to dismiss

Text: The district court granted Defendant-Appellee Melinda Brooks’ (“Brooks”) motion to dismiss after determining she was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Loggins appeals this dismissal.3 We review de novo the district court’s grant of Brooks’ motion to dismiss under FED . R. CIV . P. 12(b)(6). G.M. Eng’rs and Assocs. v. W. Bloomfield Twp., 922 F.2d 328, 330 (6th Cir. 1990). The crux of the analysis is whether Brooks was entitled to immunity. If so, the district court was correct in dismissing Brooks from this action. Loggins argues Brooks falsely advised Judge Froehlich that an arrest warrant for Loggins arising from the University incident had been issued when it was actually forthcoming. In the district court and in his briefs to this Court, Loggins 3 The district court dismissed Loggins’ claims against Brooks in both her individual and official capacities. On appeal, Loggins argues only that Brooks was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Accordingly, we do not address any other issues related to Brooks’ potential liability in her individual or official capacity. -15- No. 05-4135 James Loggins v. Franklin County Ohio, et al apparently fails to understand that where immunity applies, his claim is completely barred. Therefore, the preliminary question is whether the district court’s immunity determination was appropriate. The question of whether immunity will attach in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is a question of federal law. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1990). A panel of the Sixth Circuit previously decided the issue with respect to probation officers. Balas v. Leishman-Donaldson, No. 91-4073, 1992 WL 217735 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 1992). The panel found a probation officer performing duties to ensure a probationer was complying with the terms of probation was entitled to quasijudicial immunity. Id. at . See also Timson v. Wright, 532 F.2d 552 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding quasi-judicial immunity shields chief probation officer from liability). The panel explained: Federal officers, other than judges to whom a form of judicial immunity has been found to attach (quasi-judicial immunity), include hearing officers and administrative law judges. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978). The Court has also extended the defense to state prosecutors and state parole officers, but taken pains to point out that immunity will only cloak functions performed by such officers which are judicial in nature. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) . . . . .... . . . [W]hen a judge seeks to determine whether a defendant is complying with the terms of probation, the judge is performing a judicial function. To the extent court personnel were investigating whether [a defendant] was complying with the terms of his probation, they were performing a quasi-judicial function. To the extent [probation officers] were performing that function at the direction of the judge, they are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. All of the same considerations that would apply to the judge apply to the probation officer. “The prospect of damage liability under section 1983 would seriously erode the officer's ability to carry out his independent fact-finding function and thereby impair the sentencing judge's ability to carry out his judicial duties.” Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 157 (9th Cir.1986) (finding absolute immunity for probation officers). -16- No. 05-4135 James Loggins v. Franklin County Ohio, et al Balas, 1992 WL 217735 at . The Court agrees with the reasoning of the Balas opinion. Accepting all of Loggins’ allegations against Brooks as true, he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Brooks is entitled to immunity. All of Brooks’ actions were related to ensuring Loggins was complying with the terms of his probation. At all relevant times Brooks was working for Judge Froehlich in the context of a judicial proceeding, unlike, for example, an independent complaining witness or investigating officer. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 126-28 (1997). All statements made by Brooks were during the judicial decision making process considering whether to revoke Loggins’ probation. All adverse actions Loggins complains of were done by Judge Froehlich aided by the recommendation of Brooks. As all of Brooks’ actions were intimately associated with judicial proceedings, the district court did not err in granting Brooks’ motion to dismiss.