Opinion ID: 1779363
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional malice

Text: This species of malice arises under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, not under the common law, and is, therefore, properly called constitutional malice. The threshold inquiry is whether the plaintiff in the defamation action is a public official or public or private figure. Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. Faulkner, 372 So.2d 1282, 1284 (Ala.1979). This is so, because Sullivan and its progeny mandate that no public [official or] figure may recover compensatory or punitive damages for libel unless actual malice as defined in Sullivan is proved: a publication made with actual knowledge of its falsity or made with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.  372 So.2d at 1284 (emphasis added). As defined ... in Sullivan, [`actual malice'] connotes neither the common meaning of `malice' nor the meaning attached to it in other areas of the law. 372 So.2d at 1284 n. 5. Common-law malice and constitutional malice constitute two distinct species of malice, Duffy v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir.1995), and proof of constitutional malice is not made merely by proof of common-law malice. Elder v. Gaffney Ledger, 341 S.C. 108, 114, 533 S.E.2d 899, 902 (2000). Constitutional malice must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. Smith v. Huntsville Times Co., 888 So.2d 492, 499 (Ala.2004). While constitutional malice focuses on the defendant's attitude toward the truth or falsity of his published material,  common-law malice focuses generally on the defendant's attitude toward the plaintiff. Gomes v. Fried, 136 Cal.App.3d 924, 934, 186 Cal.Rptr. 605, 611 (1982) (emphasis added). The similarity in terminology is deceptively superficial. For these reasons, the two definitions have caused a considerable amount of confusion and ambiguity in interpretation and application of the two different standards of malice. Fulton v. Advertiser Co., 388 So.2d 533, 538 (Ala. 1980). Unfortunately, our cases have not always explained the means of proving common-law malice as methodically or as fully as they could have. At times, the Court has stated that proof could consist, not only of evidence of previous ill will, hostility, threats, other actions, former libels or slanders, or by the violence of the defendant's language, the mode and extent of publication, and the likethe APJI formulationbut also of knowledge that [the statements were] false or made with reckless disregard of whether they [were] falsethe Barnett formulation. See Johnson Publ'g Co. v. Davis, 271 Ala. at 487, 124 So.2d at 450; Kenney v. Gurley, 208 Ala. 623, 626, 95 So. 34, 37 (1923). At other times it has cited only the APJI formulation. See, e.g., Delta Health Group, Inc. v. Stafford, 887 So.2d 887 (Ala. 2004); Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So.2d 1085, 1095 (Ala.1988); Webster v. Byrd, 494 So.2d 31, 36 (Ala.1986); Fulton, 388 So.2d at 538. Curiously, these latter cases rely on Kenney, which, in fact, recognized both formulations. We tacitly acknowledged the Barnett formulation in a recent defamation action by Karen Brackin, a former employee of Family Security Credit Union (FSCU), against, among others, Jo Lynn Rutledge, a certified public accountant employed [by] the Alabama Credit Union League. Brackin v. Trimmier Law Firm, 897 So.2d 207, 209 (Ala.2004). The dispute in Brackin began when an audit of FSCU identified potential lending violations and other improprieties connected with Mitchell Smith, a former employee of FSCU. Id. Rutledge was employed to investigate the possible violations. 897 So.2d at 209. During her investigation, Rutledge discovered that the due dates on several loans originated by Smith had been `advanced.' 897 So.2d at 210. In connection with that discovery, she interviewed a number of Brackin's co-employees. 897 So.2d at 210. Her investigation and interviews culminated in a written report to her employer, in which she criticized Brackin and implicated her in the improprieties. 897 So.2d at 210-11. Matters addressed in the report were also discussed at a meeting before the Alabama Credit Union Administration (the ACUA). 897 So.2d at 215. In Brackin's defamation action, the trial court entered a judgment as a matter of law for Rutledge. 897 So.2d at 217. On the appeal of that judgment, Brackin relied on the knowledge factor as set forth in Barnett. 897 So.2d at 225. More specifically, she argued that Rutledge failed to investigate the accuracy of [Brackin's co-employees'] statements to Rutledge, which, she argued, was evidence that Rutledge's statements before the ACUA were `made with reckless disregard of whether they [were] false.' 897 So.2d at 225 (quoting Barnett, quoting in turn Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 451 So.2d at 313). This Court affirmed the judgment. In our analysis, we first concluded that Brackin did not present substantial evidence showing that Rutledge acted with actual malice under the APJI formulation. 897 So.2d at 224. We went further, however, and also found no evidence to indicate that Rutledge knew that any of the statements made in her report were false or that she acted with reckless disregard of their falsity. 897 So.2d at 225. We employed a comparable analysis in Delta Health Group, Inc. v. Stafford, supra, which involved a qualified privilege asserted by Delta Health Group, Inc. (Delta), in a defamation action against it commenced by Tim Stafford and Lana Stafford. 887 So.2d at 895. The Staffords alleged that Delta had filed an insurance claim that falsely accused Tim Stafford of pilfering building materials for use on the Staffords' personal residence from a nursing home owned and operated by Delta. 887 So.2d at 890-91. In holding that Delta's qualified privilege did not entitle it to a judgment as a matter of law on the Staffords' claims, we quoted the APJI formulation. However, we cited no evidence of previous ill will, hostility, threats, rivalry, other actions, former libels or slanders and the like. Instead, we focused on the extent of the investigation conducted by Delta and the basis for its assumptions that Tim Stafford was responsible for the missing materials, and held that there was substantial evidence of common-law malice. 887 So.2d at 897. In reality, evidence needed to establish constitutional malice and common-law malice overlap[s] significantly. Paul v. Hearst Corp., 261 F.Supp.2d 303, 306 (M.D.Pa.2002). It overlaps insofar as the same evidence bears both on the defendant's motive, for purposes of common-law malice, and on the defendant's attitude toward the truth or falsity of his published material,  Gomes v. Fried, 136 Cal.App.3d at 934, 186 Cal.Rptr. at 611, for purposes of constitutional malice. Indeed, evidence that the defendant failed to determine whether or not his or her statements were grounded in fact is probative of whether common-law malice motivated the statements, since disregard of the truth may suggest that ill will and hostility were actually at work. Marshall v. Planz, 13 F.Supp.2d 1246, 1253 n. 16 (M.D.Ala.1998). The failure of our cases to cite consistently the Barnett formulation does not deprive that formulation of its value as proof of common-law malice. In this case, we are not asked to hold, and we do not hold, in accord with the dicta in Phillips v. Bradshaw, supra, that the making of a statement with knowledge of its falsity is  conclusive evidence of malice. (Emphasis added.) Neither are we asked to decide whether a qualified privilege may be dissolved by proof of constitutional malice as an alternative to proof of common-law malice. [3] We do hold, however, consistent with statements in our cases, in dicta and otherwise, that a private-party-defamation plaintiff may overcome a qualified-immunity defense with testimony indicating that the defendant intentionally lied about the plaintiff. Thus, common-law malice may be shown, not only by evidence of hostility, rivalry, the violence of the language, the mode and extent of publication, but, also, by proof of the recklessness of the publication and prior information regarding its falsity. Davis, 271 Ala. at 487, 124 So.2d at 450. Both Chief Mallard and Wallace were acquainted with Raymond Wiggins at the time the article was published in the Standard, [4] and neither defendant testified that he identified a Raymond Wiggins by mistake. In that connection, Wallace testified as follows: Q. [By Wigginses' counsel:] So is it your testimony, as I understand it, that Chief Mallard gave you Raymond Wiggins's name as having been arrested? A. [By Wallace:] Yes. Q. And then you asked him whether this was the Raymond Wiggins that ran for county commissioner and he said, `I don't know'? A. I askedI said: `Is thisor is he related to the man that just ran for office?' And he said: `I don't know.' Q. Okay. And then you asked for his address? A. Correct. Q. And he gave you A. Appears to be 2474, or two-something, 74 Bradley Road. (Emphasis added.) Chief Mallard, on the other hand, testified as follows: Q. [By Wigginses' Counsel:] Well, can you tell me what information you read to [Wallace] from [the police report of the arrests]?. . . . A. [By Chief Mallard:] I told him that we had a drug bust over the weekendwhich was, you know, Friday prior to me talking to himand that we arrested three subjects for possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of marijuana. And in turn I told him thatwho it was and gave him an address on each one. Q. So the addresses came from you, is that correct? A. The addresses that I gave him, yes, they did. Q. Well, can you just tell me the name[] that you gave to him? A. I gave him Clinton Keith Wiggins . . . Brewton, Alabama. . . . Q. Do you recall any questions that Mr. Wallace asked you about this story or this arrest or any of this information? A. I don't recall any. . . . . Q. Do you recall Mr. Wallace asking you if one of the people named was named Raymond Wiggins? A. No. No way. . . . . Q. Do you recall Mr. Wallace asking you if the Raymond Wiggins that was arrested was the Raymond Wiggins who ran for office? A. If you notice what I said, I didn't say Raymond Wiggins was arrested. Q. So it's your testimony that you did not say Raymond Wiggins A. No. I did not. (Emphasis added.) Both testimonies cannot be true. The unequivocal testimony of each defendant is substantial evidence of the untruthfulness of the other's testimony. It is within the exclusive province of the jury to determine which version is true. The APJI formulation is incomplete in a case such as this one, which involves substantial evidence of a deliberate falsehood on the part of one or the other of two defendants.