Opinion ID: 209426
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tradeshow Device

Text: We next turn to Invacare’s cross-appeal of the jury’s finding that the Tradeshow Device infringed claims 29, 30, and 32 of the ’517 patent.
Invacare challenges the district court’s construction of the “controlling” step in claim 29 of the ’517 patent, which the district court declined to interpret as a step-plusfunction limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Claim Construction Order at 34-35. The “controlling” step reads: controlling a pressure of the flow of breathing gas delivered to a patient based on a product of the expiratory gain and the fluid characteristic during at least a portion of an expiratory phase of such a patient’s breathing cycle, so that a pressure of the flow of breathing gas delivered to the patient during at least a portion of the expiratory phase varies with fluctuations of the fluid characteristic. Without pointing to anything in the claim language itself that would dictate construction under § 112 ¶ 6, Invacare relies entirely on the prosecution history. Specifically, Invacare asserts that Respironics urged the examiner to interpret the “controlling” step as a step-plus-function limitation and that the examiner adopted this interpretation. Neither assertion is persuasive. First, Respironics never urged the examiner to apply § 112 ¶ 6 to method claim 29 (then-claim 73). When that claim was added during prosecution, together with 2008-1164, -1193 16 apparatus claim 24 (then-claim 68), the pending application already included apparatus claim 1 (then-claim 45) and method claim 9 (then-claim 53). J.A. 3790-801. Both apparatus claims recite a “processing means . . . for producing a command signal,” and both method claims recite “controlling a pressure of the flow of breathing gas delivered to a patient.” Notably, the apparatus limitations are written in “means for” format; by contrast, the method steps lack the words “step for,” thus triggering a presumption that § 112 ¶ 6 does not apply to the method steps. See Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. Med. Tech. Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that “there is a presumption that . . . limitations are not subject to section 112, paragraph 6” when they do not use the words “means for” or “step for”). When Respironics added new claims 68 and 73 (now 24 and 29, respectively), Respironics told the examiner that “[n]ew independent claims 68 and 73 are similar to existing independent claims 45 and 53” (now 1 and 9, respectively). J.A. 3788. Although Invacare now seizes upon Respironics’s “similar to” language in this statement, it is clear, based on the above comparison of common terms, that Respironics was referring to the common language used respectively in the two apparatus claims (“processing means . . . for producing a command signal”) and in the two method claims (“controlling a pressure of the flow of breathing gas delivered to a patient”), not to any alleged similarity between apparatus and method claims. Thus, contrary to Invacare’s assertion, Respironics did not urge the examiner to import a meaning under § 112 ¶ 6 from the apparatus claims into the method claims. Second, the examiner never adopted any step-plus-function interpretation. In the reasons for allowance, the examiner set forth the various limitations of the apparatus claims, referring to the “processing means” limitation in the apparatus claims, but not 2008-1164, -1193 17 the “controlling” step in the method claims. J.A. 3806. After setting forth the apparatus limitations, the examiner referred to the “abovementioned” (apparatus) limitations only as “means plus function” limitations. Id. (emphasis added). Nowhere in the reasons for allowance does the examiner mention the patent’s “controlling” steps, or refer to them as step-plus-function limitations. Accordingly, we reject Invacare’s argument that the prosecution history compels a different construction.
Invacare asks us to vacate the jury’s verdict regarding the Tradeshow Device because the district court ruled that Invacare could not introduce into evidence a prior opinion by Respironics’s sole testifying witness, who had opined that the Commercial Device does not infringe the ’517 patent. The district court sustained Respironics’s objection that this evidence was “[i]rrelevant,” J.A. 220, which we interpret as an exclusion under Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”). “We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings under the law of the regional circuit.” Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Third Circuit reviews the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Williams, 458 F.3d 312, 315 (3d Cir. 2006). Because the sole issue at trial was infringement by the Tradeshow Device, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to exclude the noninfringement opinion regarding the Commercial Device. Other available evidence shows that these two devices operate quite differently. For example, Invacare’s own product manager, Ms. Hanley, testified that she had detected deep exhalation unloading when she used 2008-1164, -1193 18 the Tradeshow Device, but detected virtually none with the Commercial Device. J.A. 2323. Because independent claim 29 requires that the accused device provide breathing gas whose pressure “varies with fluctuations of the fluid characteristic,” the Commercial Device’s lack of appreciable variations in unloading (in contrast to that of the Tradeshow Device) would have been a critical difference for purposes of infringement. Given this key difference, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that noninfringement by the Commercial Device was not probative of whether the Tradeshow Device infringed. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 (defining “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence”). Invacare’s reliance on Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 887 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1989), is misplaced. Evidence in that case was relevant under Rule 402 but was excluded by the district court under Rule 403. 1 Petree, 887 F.2d at 37-38. The appeal there focused solely on admissibility under Rule 403. Id. at 40-41 (holding that the evidence was admissible for impeachment purposes). Here, by contrast, the district court sustained Respironics’s objection that the noninfringement opinion was “[i]rrelevant.” J.A. 220. Because we affirm this ruling under Rule 402, the parties’ arguments regarding unfair prejudice and jury confusion are, themselves, irrelevant. 1 Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides, with emphasis added, “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” 2008-1164, -1193 19
Invacare appeals the denial of its JMOL motion, asserting that the jury’s verdict regarding the Vscale variable used in the Tradeshow Device did not amount to a finding of infringement of the ’517 patent. We review the denial of a JMOL motion under the law of the regional circuit. 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd., 539 F.3d 1354, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In this regard, the Third Circuit asks “whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving [the nonmovant] the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could reach the conclusions that it did.” Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 383 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that Invacare’s JMOL motion was properly denied. In that motion, Invacare argued that the question sent to the jury was not dispositive of infringement because it pertained only to a single claim element, and that there was no finding as to all other claim elements. 2 The district court held that Invacare had waived this argument because it had not been raised (and no missing claim elements had been identified) in opposition to Respironics’s motion for summary judgment of infringement. JMOL Opinion at 10-11. Moreover, the district court held that Invacare had a duty of candor to come forward and help the court identify any remaining factual issues, rather than permit the court to conduct the entire proceeding on an issue the court thought was the sole issue in dispute. Id. at 11-12. 2 The question on the verdict form asked, “Has Respironics proven by the preponderance of the evidence that the Vscale variable in the Unloading Equation converts valve position information into flow rate units, that is, the volume of breathing gas moving per unit of time?” The jury checked “YES,” above “Respironics wins.” J.A. 2183. 2008-1164, -1193 20 We agree: “Counsel must remember that they are not only advocates for their clients; they are also officers of the court and are expected to assist the court in the administration of justice, particularly in difficult cases involving complex issues of law and technology.” Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In this case, the district court went to great lengths to understand a complex algorithm and to distill the myriad issues down to those issues in material dispute. The district court identified a single factual issue—unit conversion by the Vscale variable— which precluded entry of summary judgment and which would be resolved by a jury. Respironics, 511 F. Supp. 2d. at 598 (“If it does [convert valve position information into flow rate units], then defendant’s trade show device infringed this patent. If it does not, then defendant’s trade show device did not infringe this patent.”). In response, Invacare filed a motion for reconsideration that was focused solely on the Vscale variable, nowhere addressing any other claim elements. When the district court denied this motion, it again stated that the Vscale variable was the sole issue for trial. Later, at an August 2007 status conference, both parties agreed that the only way to bring the infringement case to a close was for a jury to answer the question regarding the Vscale variable. See JMOL Opinion at 7-8 (recounting history of case). Invacare never filed any motion in limine indicating that there were additional issues for trial. Nor did it so indicate in either its proposed jury instruction or its proposed verdict form. Six weeks after the August 2007 status conference, and a mere three weeks before trial was scheduled to begin, Invacare stated that it wanted to present its new noninfringement defense, but again failed to identify any particular claim element that was missing from the Tradeshow Device. Id. at 9. Under these circumstances, we agree with the district court that 2008-1164, -1193 21 Invacare should not be permitted to overturn a judgment of infringement based on claim limitations that Invacare itself apparently conceded were met.