Opinion ID: 1671366
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Text: However, having so concluded, it is now necessary to determine whether the doctrine of primary agency jurisdiction counsels in favor of submitting Respondents' grievances through the appropriate administrative processes. [4] The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that when a party seeks to invoke the original jurisdiction of a trial court by asserting an issue which is beyond the ordinary experience of judges and juries, but within an administrative agency's special competence, the court should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction over that issue until such time as the issue has been ruled upon by the agency. [5] See State ex rel. Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Willis, 344 So.2d 580, 589 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); see also Hill Top Developers v. Holiday Pines Serv. Corp., 478 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); South Lake Worth Inlet Dist. v. Town of Ocean Ridge, 633 So.2d 79, 87-88 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). The doctrine of primary jurisdiction enables a court to have the benefit of an agency's experience and expertise in matters with which the court is not as familiar, protects the integrity of the regulatory scheme administered by the agency, and promotes consistency and uniformity in areas of public policy. See Key Haven Associated Enters. v. Bd. of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 427 So.2d 153, 157 (Fla.1982); Hill Top Developers, 478 So.2d at 370. Pursuant to the doctrine, [j]udicial intervention in the decision-making function of the executive branch must be restrained in order to support the integrity of the administrative process and to allow the executive branch to carry out its responsibilities as a coequal branch of government. Key Haven Associated Enters., 427 So.2d at 157; see also Gulf Pines Mem'l Park, Inc. v. Oaklawn Mem'l Park, Inc., 361 So.2d 695, 698-99 (Fla.1978) ([I]f administrative agencies are to function and endure as viable institutions, courts must refrain from `promiscuous intervention' in agency affairs `except for most urgent reasons.'); Bal Harbour Village v. City of North Miami, 678 So.2d 356, 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Willis, 344 So.2d at 589. It is also important to note that the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a matter of deference, policy and comity, not subject matter jurisdiction. See Gulf Pines Mem'l Park, 361 So.2d at 699; St. Joe Paper Co. v. Florida Dep't of Natural Resources, 536 So.2d 1119, 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Town of Ocean Ridge, 633 So.2d at 87. Respondents' arguments with regard to primary jurisdiction are two-fold. First, they assert that the doctrine does not apply because past agency errors have been so egregious and devastating that resort to administrative remedies would be, essentially, futile. Alternatively, Respondents contend that even if the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable, the trial court erred in dismissing the action with prejudice because the proper outcome would have been to suspend the court's jurisdiction until the appropriate administrative agency addressed the issues. As to Respondents' first position, Florida courts have consistently held that parties need not resort to administrative remedies where agency errors are so egregious or devastating that the promised administrative remedy is too little or too late. Communities Fin. Corp. v. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 416 So.2d 813, 816 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); see also Willis, 344 So.2d at 590. [6] Specifically, courts have set forth the following criteria which, if satisfied, would invoke the jurisdiction of trial courts in such cases: (1) the complaint must demonstrate some compelling reason why the APA (Chapter 120, Florida Statutes) does not avail the complainants in their grievance against the agency; or (2) the complaint must allege a lack of general authority in the agency and, if it is shown, that the APA has no remedy for it; or (3) illegal conduct by the agency must be shown and, if that is the case, that the APA cannot remedy that illegality; or (4) agency ignorance of the law, the facts, or public good must be shown and, if any of that is the case, that the Act provides no remedy; or (5) a claim must be made that the agency ignores or refuses to recognize related or substantial interests and refuses to afford a hearing or otherwise refuses to recognize that the complainants' grievance is cognizable administratively. Communities Fin. Corp., 416 So.2d at 816; see also Willis, 344 So.2d at 591. As noted earlier, Respondents in this case have relied on the egregious or devastating agency errors exception to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In support, they alleged in their Amended Complaint: [Former Governor Kirk] is compelled to bring this action to continue his efforts as a private citizen acting in the name of the State as a consequence of the government's complicity in the offensive conduct of the [Petitioners]. Government from the local municipal level to the Federal level has aided and abetted in the creation and maintenance of the nuisance complained of by failing to enforce existing laws prohibiting and regulating [Petitioners'] offensive conduct and by providing direct and indirect economic subsidies to support the [Petitioners'] offensive conduct without which subsidies and price supports the [Petitioners'] agricultural and processing activities would cease as economically productive. With the assistance and encouragement of the legislature and executive branches of government, the [Petitioners'] offensive conduct has generated huge profits for the [Petitioners] which they have used in part to preserve their special interests at the expense of the public good through the making of enormous political contributions. The judicial branch alone has the will, the authority, the power, and the independence to abate this ongoing nuisance. Respondents' Amended Complaint at 5-6. The decision below emphasized that due to the procedural posture of the casea review of an order entered on a motion to dismissRespondents' allegations must be accepted as true; and as such, it was improper for the circuit court to dismiss based on primary jurisdiction because Respondents' had seemingly alleged that agency errors were egregious and devastating. See Kirk, 726 So.2d at 825. While the district court was certainly correct that in reviewing an order entered on a motion to dismiss the allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, see Londono v. Turkey Creek, Inc., 609 So.2d 14, 19 n. 4 (Fla.1992), the allegations in the complaint, even if true, do not satisfy the requirements which would trigger the application of the exception. Noticeably, the criteria outlined as a condition precedent to the application of the egregious or devastating agency errors exception to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires some allegation that the APA provides no remedy. No such allegation was made by Respondents. In fact, Respondents' allegations may be appropriately characterized as little more than general and vague allusions relating to a governmental conspiracy propelled by campaign contributions. In short, the allegations in the amended complaint do not sufficiently set forth ultimate facts that agency errors are egregious or devastating and that the APA provides no recourse. Incidentally, allegations that political contributions equate to political corruption are insufficient. See Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990) ([T]he use of funds to support a political candidate is `speech'; independent campaign expenditures constitute `political expression at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.'); State v. Dodd, 561 So.2d 263 (Fla.1990) (noting that political contribution is a constitutional right and an entirely legal activity). Moreover, Respondents' allegations of widespread corruption are conclusory and lacking in the precision necessary for even notice pleading. Accepting these generalized allegations facially as sufficient would require an extension of logic to the extreme that, not only are the administrative agencies and independent administrative law judges corrupt, but also that district court judgeswho are in the position to review the decisions of the agencies and administrative judgesare also somehow part of this conspiracy. In addition, while states do have primary responsibilities for environmental regulations, state action is subject to oversight by the Federal Environmental Protection Agency. Again, if accepted as facially sufficient, the allegation of a covert conspiracy would require application of logic that the Federal Government is also aiding and abetting the alleged nuisance. Again addressing primary jurisdiction, the simple fact that the doctrine of primary agency jurisdiction may apply does not necessarily mean that it must be applied. As noted earlier, this is a doctrine grounded on the notion of judicial deference and restraint. See, e.g., Hill Top Developers, 478 So.2d at 370 (In the circumstance where the primary jurisdiction doctrine is applicable, the judiciary, although possessing subject matter jurisdiction to pass upon the asserted claim, stays its hand and defers to the administrative agency in order to maintain uniformity at that level or to bring specialized expertise to bear upon the disputed issues.). In this case it is abundantly apparent that the comprehensive legislative scheme established to deal with environmental concerns is aptly suited to address the complex technical issues which may arise in this case. Specifically, the scheme now in force extensively controls pollutant discharge, requires comprehensive permitting, establishes air and water quality standards, and sets forth a detailed plan for the restoration of the Everglades through the Everglades Forever Act and the Everglades Construction Project. This legislative scheme is implemented by numerous volumes of regulations containing extensively detailed, scientific criteria and is enforced by agencies having the required experience and expertise, such as the DEP. These are not simple, routine matters which may be easily understood by trial judges and juries. It is necessary to note that the district court did not hold that primary jurisdiction was not applicable. Rather, the Fourth District noted that [i]f [Petitioners'] can later disprove [Respondents'] allegations through record evidence, then the doctrine of primary jurisdiction might serve as a basis for disposing of this case. Kirk, 726 So.2d at 825. This determination, however, is contrary to the general rule that the burden is on the party seeking to bypass usual administrative channels [to] demonstrate that no adequate remedy remains available under chapter 120. Gulf Pines Mem'l Park, 361 So.2d at 699; see also Communities Fin. Corp., 416 So.2d at 816 (noting that complainant must demonstrate some compelling reason why the APA does not avail them in their grievance); Willis, 344 So.2d at 591(same). We note that in reaching our conclusion today that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction counsels in favor of having an administrative agency address the allegations presented by Respondents in this case, we have given thorough consideration to the reasoning presented in State ex rel. Shevin v. Tampa Electric Co., 291 So.2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). In that case, the attorney general filed a public nuisance action seeking to enjoin the electric company from allegedly discharging noxious and deleterious chemicals into the air. The circuit court granted a motion to dismiss on the basis of primary jurisdiction. On appeal, the Second District held that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was not applicable since the resolution of a public nuisance action was a judicial matter, reasoning that public nuisance actions do not necessarily turn on technical questions. See Shevin, 291 So.2d at 47. It is critical to mention, however, that Shevin was decided prior to the enactment of the modern APA which: [S]ubjects every agency action to immediate or potential scrutiny; which assures notice and opportunity to be heard on virtually every important question before an agency; which provides independent hearing officers as fact finders in the formulation of particularly sensitive administrative decisions; which requires written findings and conclusions on impact issues; which assures prompt administrative action; and which provides judicial review of final, even of interlocutory, orders affecting a party's interest. Willis, 344 So.2d at 590. Indeed, [t]he Act's impressive arsenal of varied and abundant remedies for administrative error requires judicial freshening of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of remedies, and greater judicial deference to the legislative scheme. Id. Moreover, while the APA indicates that nothing in it shall be construed to repeal any provision of the Florida Statutes which grants the right to a proceeding in the circuit court in lieu of an administrative hearing, see section 120.73, Florida Statutes (1995), Florida courts have noted that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is one of self-limitation which has evolved in marking out the boundary lines between areas of administrative and judicial action. Florida Soc'y of Newspaper Editors v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 543 So.2d 1262, 1266 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (quoting Willis, 344 So.2d at 589). That is, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not serve to divest the circuit court of jurisdiction; it merely counsels that when issues arise which have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, the court should practice judicial restraint. Finally, Respondents also argue that, even assuming the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to be applicable, the trial court erred in dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice. Respondents are correct in this assertion. The doctrine of primary agency jurisdiction operates to postpone judicial consideration of a case to administrative determination of important questions involved by an agency with special competence in the area. It does not defeat the court's jurisdiction over the case, but coordinates the work of the court and the agency by permitting the agency to rule first and giving the court the benefit of the agency's views.... Hill Top Developers v. Holiday Pines Serv. Corp., 478 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (quoting Mercury Motor Express, Inc. v. Brinke, 475 F.2d 1086, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).) Thus, where the doctrine is applicable, the court is to suspend consideration of the issues until these have been presented to the appropriate administrative agency. See, e.g., Hill Top Developers, 478 So.2d at 370 (finding that application of primary jurisdiction simply would have required the trial court to abate the proceeding until such time as an order was issued by the [Public Service Commission], pursuant to its powers.). Similarly, in Bal Harbour Village, the Third District has agreed with Respondents' contention on this issue. After finding that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was applicable, the district court in Bal Harbour Village noted that [t]he dismissal is, of course, without prejudice to Bal Harbour to pursue its environmental objections with the [DEP]. 678 So.2d at 364. In this case, however, the trial court dismissed Respondents' complaint with prejudice. This determination is contrary to the general rule cited above that primary jurisdiction simply requires that the court postpone or suspend judicial determination of the issues. It certainly does not support, nor does it mandate, dismissal with prejudice.