Opinion ID: 2623595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony of Katherine Davis and Marlene Boggs

Text: Marlow complains that the testimony by his former wife, Katherine Davis, and her mother, Marlene Boggs, presented during Coffman's case in mitigation (discussed in detail, post ) constituted, in essence, nonnoticed evidence in aggravation and improper evidence of his propensity for violence. He further asserts that Coffman's counsel actively concealed from his defense team their intention to call Davis and Boggs. The admission of their testimony, he contends, thus violated Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) and deprived him of his rights to due process and a reliable penalty determination as guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Marlow did not object to the evidence on the ground that it had not been included in the notice of aggravating evidence, but rather questioned its relevance to Coffman's case in mitigation and asserted it constituted nonstatutory aggravating evidence. He therefore has forfeited this contention for appellate purposes. ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 453, fn. 15, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) In any event, we disagree with the substance of the contention. As pertinent to the introduction of aggravating evidence, section 190.3 provides: Except for the evidence in proof of the offense or special circumstances which subject a defendant to the death penalty, no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to the trial. The statute thus contemplates that the prosecution will give notice of the aggravating evidence it will present, but omits any mention of a codefendant's obligation to provide notice of penalty phase evidence. Moreover, the testimony of Davis and Boggs was not introduced by the prosecution in aggravation of Marlow's penalty, but by Coffman in mitigation of her own, and the trial court specifically admonished the jury not to consider the evidence as aggravation against Marlow. We presume the jury followed the admonition. ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 435, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) Defendant Marlow thus was not forced to defend against aggravating evidence without proper notice. Marlow's assertion that Coffman's counsel actively concealed their intention to call the witnesses, unsupported by any evidence in the record apart from counsel's failure to mention them in his opening statement, adds nothing to his argument. Marlow further contends the testimony of Davis and Boggs should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 1101 as improper evidence of a propensity for violence. Again, we observe he failed to object on this specific ground at trial and thus has forfeited the contention for purposes of this appeal. (See People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 453, fn. 15, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) In any event, the contention lacks merit. Marlow relies on People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 921, 254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940, overruled on another ground in People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at page 724, footnote 6, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46, where we rejected a claim of error in the exclusion of evidence of violent criminal activity on the part of a third person, offered to show that person was more likely the killer than was the defendant. Farmer, however, is distinguishable, in that here the trial court admitted the testimony of Davis and Boggs to rebut Marlow's insistence that Coffman was the instigator of Novis's murder. In overruling Marlow's objection to the evidence as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, the trial court stated: I think this is legitimate evidence to impeach the position which he has taken in opposition to her defense. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling. Moreover, before the jury retired to deliberate on penalty, the trial court specifically instructed it regarding the criminal acts it could consider as aggravating circumstances in the case and cautioned that it could not consider any evidence other than those enumerated aggravating circumstances. We again presume the jury followed these instructions. ( Boyette, supra, at p. 436, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.)
Although Davis described in detail the course of her relationship with Marlow and his behavior toward her, Coffman challenges several rulings by the trial court that restricted certain aspects of the examination, claiming they violated her federal constitutional rights, under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, to present mitigating evidence ( Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604-605, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973; Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 113-114, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1) and to due process of law ( Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 65 L.Ed.2d 175). In order to assess the propriety and effect of the challenged rulings, we find it necessary to set forth Davis's testimony in some detail. Davis testified she met Marlow in 1977, when she was 18 or 19 years old and he was two years older. At their first meeting, they were somewhat hostile toward each other, but a few weeks later she and several of her friends took Marlow to her parents' house, where Davis and Marlow partied and had sex together for the first time. Later, when they were among a group of other teenagers and she was not immediately friendly to him, Marlow made a comment that greatly embarrassed her [41] and caused her to be very angry toward him. Not long after that incident, Marlow appeared at the door of her apartment and demanded admission, beating on the door and threatening to destroy her car. The next time she saw Marlow, he behaved like a gentleman and was attentive, romantic and considerate; on that occasion, she took him to a party she was attending. On the way, Marlow asked her to keep a handgun in her purse. Later that evening, Marlow pointed the gun at a man who was demanding drugs from him and who had broken the driver's window of the car Davis was driving, and gave him a whipping. Still later that night as Davis and Marlow were visiting at the trailer of some friends, that man, one Jeff Tailor, and another man, both carrying shotguns, forced their way in. Tailor pointed his shotgun at Marlow. Davis, interposing herself between Marlow and Tailor, created a sufficient diversion to enable Marlow to grab both shotguns. After a scuffle, Marlow ran the two intruders off the property. The following morning, police arrested Marlow. Davis eventually bailed him out of custody and married him the same day. Their marriage was initially happy, but their drug use and other behavior soon displeased Davis's parents, with whom they were living, and resulted in Davis and Marlow's moving to Indianapolis to live with friends there. After the move, Marlow began accusing Davis of flirting with other men. He started manifesting fits of rage and would slap or hit her with his fist for no reason; on one occasion, he cut her on the shoulder and forearm with his pocketknife as she sat in the bathroom. Because of the tension and violence between Davis and Marlow, they soon were no longer welcome in their friends' house. At that point, they returned to Kentucky and stayed with her paternal grandparents. There, Marlow kept Davis isolated in their bedroom or elsewhere in the house most of the time, preventing her from talking with her relatives. After two weeks, they moved into a vacant house owned by Davis's maternal grandparents. There, on one occasion, Marlow became enraged and choked Davis into unconsciousness. When Davis became pregnant, Marlow was happy; they decided to name their child Joshua Luke. Marlow then wanted the couple to move back to McCreary County, Kentucky, where Davis had previously lived and where she had many relatives and friends. Davis feared such a move because of Marlow's intense jealousy. She was so distraught over the prospect of the move that she stabbed herself in the leg with a pair of scissors. Immediately after that incident, Marlow left the house, whereupon Davis's father chased him with a pistol and shot at him. Over the course of her relationship with Marlow, Davis testified, she wasn't a person any more; she didn't have any spirit, didn't talk to other people, and hardly even [made] eye contact with other people. She lost 73 pounds during their marriage, and her hair fell out by the wads. Davis had tried to encourage Marlow to join her in attending church services, but on one occasion he responded by throwing her on the bed, getting on top of her and saying, in a menacing voice, I am the devil and I own you. Despite the extensive scope of the foregoing testimony, Coffman contends the trial court committed error of constitutional magnitude in precluding her from examining Davis concerning (1) her subjective reaction to Marlow's sexual performance; (2) the precise nature of Marlow's embarrassing remark; (3) the specific grounds for Marlow's arrest following the altercation in the trailer with two men armed with shotguns; (4) the identity of a person with respect to whom Marlow was particularly jealous in his relationship with Davis; (5) the size of the links on a chain Marlow often carried; (6) the reasons why Davis often cried and whether she lay awake at night during their stay in Indianapolis; and (7) whether Davis feared she would be killed if she returned with Marlow to McCreary County. The excluded evidence, Coffman contends, would have corroborated Dr. Walker's guilt phase testimony concerning battered woman syndrome and supported a lingering doubt of Coffman's guilt of the Novis and Murray homicides; thus, she urges, it constituted potentially mitigating evidence she was constitutionally entitled to have the jury consider. (See Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954; Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869; Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393, 395-399, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347.) As Coffman correctly observes, the cited authorities hold that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution require that the sentencer not be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence. Nevertheless, the trial court determines relevancy in the first instance and retains discretion to exclude evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will create substantial danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury. ( People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 64, 40 Cal. Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224.) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence described above. Davis's testimony presented to the jury a picture of a woman who endured abuse from Marlow similar to that described by Coffman, and thus tended to support Coffman's claim that she had acted under duress in committing the offenses. The additional details of Davis's abuse were either irrelevant to Coffman's circumstances, or their probative value was so slight as to be substantially outweighed by the danger of misleading the jury. The trial court properly excluded them.