Opinion ID: 2266285
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Goodrich's Contention Reliance Upon Boeing Rationale

Text: Federal common fund attorney's fee jurisprudence is not binding upon the Court of Chancery or this Court. Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d at 1165 n. 1. Sugarland Industries, Inc. v. Thomas, Del. Supr., 420 A.2d 142 (1980). Nevertheless, its history is didactic in the context of this case, for the purpose of evaluating the Court of Chancery's fee award and Goodrich's arguments. The Court of Chancery found that the amount of fees Goodrich's attorneys sought, computed as approximately 16% of the total settlement fund before the court, was perfectly appropriate and well within the guidelines that we typically use. According to Goodrich, using the lodestar/multiplier method, the fee request of $515,000 represented a minimal multiplier of the attorneys' basic lodestar of $449,687. Nevertheless, Goodrich does not contend that the Court of Chancery either should have awarded a larger percentage than 16% of the $3.3 million fund to his attorneys, or applied the lodestar method. Instead, Goodrich submits that the Court of Chancery applied erroneous legal precepts and abused its discretion by conditioning the fee award, i.e., limiting the fee to one-third of the amount actually claimed by class members from the settlement fund, subject to a maximum fee of $515,000. Goodrich argues that the Court of Chancery should have followed the ratio decidendi of Boeing in this case. In Boeing, the Supreme Court rejected the defendants' argument that the plaintiff's attorney's fee should be limited to the percentage of the fund actually claimed by class members. The Boeing opinion affirmed the trial court's conclusion that attorney's fees should be awarded as a percentage of the total common fund created for the benefit of the class, whether or not the class claimed the entire fund. Goodrich submits that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Boeing is logically correct and that it also leads to an equitable result from the perspective of both the class and plaintiff's counsel.