Opinion ID: 3064121
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pre-trial Discussions and Opening Statements

Text: Before voir dire, Swaine’s counsel stated, in regard to Anderson, “there may be a problem with some of the anticipated defense that may cause a spillover and possible prejudice to my client on that count.” Swaine’s counsel referenced potential problems with the introduction of Anderson’s plea agreement and stipulation of facts if Anderson was not available for cross-examination and with 3 jury confusion in hearing evidence that the drugs charged in Count VI were found at Anderson’s home when Count VI had been dismissed as to Anderson. Anderson’s counsel agreed not to reference Anderson’s plea agreement or stipulation of facts until his defense case began. Swaine’s counsel concluded by saying, “If at some point I feel that my client is going to be overly prejudiced, I may move for a mistrial and move for a severance if that count and that issue comes up . . . .” The district court responded, “We’ll take it a step at a time and see how this plays out. Nobody wants to do this twice.” Notably, Anderson’s counsel did not move for a severance at that time. During voir dire, the parties and the court discussed how to question the prospective jurors as to whether Anderson’s guilty plea on Count I would bias them as to Count VII against Anderson or as to any of pending charges against Swaine. In drafting a question for the potential jurors, the district court wondered aloud “whether any of them can figure out what the hell I’m talking about and whether they can give a meaningful response.” The district court asked the potential jurors if any of them believed that they could not fairly judge Anderson or Swaine in light of Anderson’s guilty plea on Count I, and none of the potential jurors responded. Before counsel gave their opening statements, the district court instructed 4 the jury that counsel’s opening and closing statements were intended only to help the jury understand the evidence and should not be considered as evidence in the case or instructions on the law. During its opening statement, the government noted that Anderson pled guilty to a drug conspiracy charge, but this did not mean that he was guilty of anything else. The government further stated that Anderson’s guilty plea “certainly doesn’t mean Mr. Swaine is guilty. That’s what you will determine from the evidence.” During Anderson’s opening statement, his counsel conceded that Anderson pled guilty to a drug conspiracy charge (Count I) and noted that the only issue for the jury to decide as to Anderson was whether the firearms seized from his residence were possessed in furtherance of that drug offense (Count VII). Anderson’s counsel continued by saying, “In our society most people don’t accept responsibility for what they do these days. They’ve got an excuse for why it shouldn’t have happened, why it wasn’t their fault. I know that, and I dare say you know that. But Mr. Anderson has accepted his responsibility for what he did wrong.” Anderson’s counsel summarized Anderson’s story of being a law-abiding citizen until he participated in the drug activity to which he pled guilty. He stated 5 that Anderson legally purchased the two firearms seized from his vehicles four years before the drug activity began. Anderson’s counsel told the jury, “It started, by the evidence in this case, the middle of March of 2007, in which he agreed to store marijuana in his house for someone else.” Anderson’s counsel said he was paid half the rent in return for storing the marijuana. But Anderson’s counsel insisted that the firearms were not in any way used in connection with the criminal activity. After opening statements concluded, Swaine’s counsel asked to approach for a sidebar conference. Swaine’s counsel stated to the court: As we talked in the previous pretrial, Mr. Anderson’s lawyer made a comment that he only stored the drugs in his house for someone else and that he was getting half the rent paid. I don’t believe – unless there’s a witness the government plans to call to that, I can’t cross-examine Mr. Anderson, and I can’t cross-examine Mr. Anderson’s lawyer. That is thrown out there to the prejudicial effect of my client, and I have no way to confront that. And it’s a concern that I had that has no bearing on the gun charge, but now there’s evidence or the suggestion to the jury that he was holding those drugs for somebody else. That’s a charge that he pled to, and that he was getting half of his rent paid. I don’t know if the government has a witness who can verify that, other than they’re going to use a proffer by Mr. Anderson, and that’s improper. And I can’t confront that or cross-examine that unless he testifies. Anderson’s counsel stated that no one had been identified by name, and the government commented that Anderson’s counsel was “very careful to not speak to 6 any defendants’ names.” The government stated that it intended to present evidence that people would call Swaine to order marijuana and Anderson would deliver it. The district court stated, “I think we’re going to have to take it a step at a time and see who is going to testify on these points.” Anderson’s counsel again noted that he was careful not to reference Swaine, and the government commented, “I thought it was a nice tapdance.” Swaine’s counsel responded, “I understand he didn’t mention him by name, but the implication is clear.” The district court resolved, “I don’t see where we can do anything with it now. Let’s just see how we go.”