Opinion ID: 2449444
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: trooper williams's traffic stop and further detention of mr. morris was a reasonable seizure under the fourth amendment of the united states constitution

Text: ¶ 15 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects our citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. [5] Motor vehicle stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment and thus must be reasonable in scope to be upheld. [6] To be reasonable, a traffic stop must be justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. [7] During a lawful traffic stop, `[t]he temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop.' [8] [W]ithout additional reasonable suspicion, the officer must allow the seized person to depart once the purpose of the stop has concluded. [9] But if during the scope of the traffic stop, the officer forms new reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may also expediently investigate his new suspicion. [10] We conclude that Trooper Williams's traffic stop was both justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place.
¶ 16 Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may stop a vehicle only if the officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the driver or a passenger is engaged in criminal activity. [11] Although to be lawful, reasonable suspicion must be based on `specific and articulable facts and rational inferences,' [12] [a] police officer need not actually observe a violation to make a stop. [13] Instead, `as long as an officer suspects that the driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic... regulations, the police officer may legally stop the vehicle.' [14] The fact that an officer mistakenly relies on objective facts that upon closer review suggest that the stop would not be justified will not automatically render the subsequent search unconstitutional. Indeed, [a] factual belief that is mistaken, but held reasonably and in good faith, can provide reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. [15] In our examination of each individual stop, the touchstone of our analysis is not whether the officer was correct, but whether his actions were reasonable. [16] ¶ 17 We conclude that Trooper Williams's initial traffic stop was reasonable. As part of our review on appeal, we closely examined a recording of the traffic stop submitted by the parties. The recording shows a car with dark windows traveling at night. It is difficult to see much detail on the car and nothing is visible in the rear window. No license plate is visible on the vehicle. As the car comes to a stop, the video shows the Trooper shining his spotlight on the car, and a temporary registration tag in the corner of the rear window comes into clear view. The State concedes that at this point, Trooper Williams's reasonable suspicion for the stop dissipated. Although we agree that the Trooper lost reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Morris when he saw the temporary registration tag, we conclude that this fact does not make his initial decision to stop Mr. Morris unreasonable. At the time of the stop, Trooper Williams had an objectively reasonable basis to believe the vehicle did not have a current license plate and that this traffic violation justified a stop. Thus, the traffic stop was justified at its inception, and we must now examine the officer's actions from this point forward to determine whether Mr. Morris's subsequent detention was reasonable.
¶ 18 Having concluded that the traffic stop was justified at its inception, we now examine the scope of the remainder of the detention. We have previously stated that [o]nce a traffic stop is made, the detention `must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.' [17] Both the length and [the] scope of the detention must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. [18] If during the encounter, new reasonable suspicion of criminal activity arises, an officer may temporarily detain the driver. However, the scope of the stop is still limited, and officers must diligently [pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly. [19] ¶ 19 The court of appeals concluded that Trooper Williams's detention of Mr. Morris exceeded a lawful scope. The court of appeals held that a police detention is no longer justified as soon as the exception initially justifying the intrusion is absent. [20] Trooper Williams's original reasonable suspicion was related to the validity of the car's registration and this concern disappeared when the Trooper spotted Mr. Morris's temporary registration tag. The court of appeals reasoned that once reasonable suspicion was lost, any contact with the driver was unreasonable. Thus, the Trooper's approach, acceptance of Mr. Morris's identification, registration, and proof of insurance, along with his decision to question Mr. Morris `exceeded the limits of a lawful investigative detention and violated the Fourth Amendment.' [21] ¶ 20 Under the court of appeals' holding, if a police officer is objectively mistaken as to the facts forming the basis for reasonable articulable suspicion, the officer may not come into contact with the driver to explain his mistake. Instead, he must wave the car on or simply drive away without any further communication. Although the court of appeals recognized its holding could lead to momentary motorist confusion and individual bewilderment, it reasoned that promotion of police politeness was not a significant enough concern to outweigh the countervailing interest that all individuals share in having their constitutional rights fully protected. [22] ¶ 21 While we agree that an individual's constitutional rights must be fully protected, we disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that Mr. Morris's constitutional rights were violated during the traffic stop. Although we have examined the constitutional parameters of many traffic stops in the past, we have never squarely addressed the question of what an officer may lawfully do after discovering that the reason for his traffic stop was erroneous. For analytical clarity, we approach this issue by examining the Trooper's conduct in two stages. We first discuss the Trooper's decision to approach the driver to explain the mistaken grounds for his reasonable suspicion. We then consider the Trooper's actions after the explanation is offered. For the reasons explained below, we ultimately conclude that in both instances, the Trooper's conduct was constitutionally reasonable.