Opinion ID: 3065386
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motions to Strike and Ex Parte Application

Text: [6] Narouz appeals not only the order denying approval of the settlement and certification of a class for settlement purposes, but also two separate motions to strike and a denial of an ex parte application seeking extension of a date in a Rule 16 scheduling order. These issues are not ripe for review because the parties have agreed to settle this case. On remand, if the class is certified and the settlement is approved, the disputes over these interlocutory orders will be rendered moot and will never need to be reached. See Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Ripeness doctrine is based on the ‘central perception . . . that courts should not render decisions absent a genuine need to resolve a real dispute.’ . . . [and] is grounded in both Article III and prudential con1178 NAROUZ v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS cerns.”) (internal citation omitted); Western Oil and Gas Ass’n v. Sonoma County, 905 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The ripeness inquiry asks ‘whether there is yet any need for the court to act,’ while the mootness inquiry asks ‘whether there is anything left for the court to do.’ ” (quoting Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3532.1 (2d ed. 1984))). Consequently, we do not have jurisdiction to consider Narouz’s interlocutory appeal of the district court’s decisions concerning the motions to strike and its denial of the ex parte application seeking extension. III. Denial of Motion for Certification of Settlement Class and For Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement
Normally, class certification decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2007). This is not the case, however, where the district court fails to make sufficient findings to support its application of the Rule 23 criteria. In such circumstances, the class certification decision “is not entitled to the traditional deference given to such a determination.” Local Joint Exec. Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the district court refused to certify the settlement class, offering almost no analysis to support its decision. At the hearing held to preliminarily certify the class, the district court stated “I don’t see how I can certify this matter for class action as a class action for settlement purposes. I just don’t think I could probably certify it for a class action at all. There is some question in my mind. So the motion is denied.” The court’s written order states, “The motion is denied since the court is unable to ascertain a class which can be certified.” This statement contains virtually no analysis. Thus, the disNAROUZ v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS 1179 trict court’s decision is not entitled to the traditional deference given to class certification determinations.
[7] The parties agree that the district court erred by refusing to certify a class for settlement purposes only. In reviewing the district court’s determination, however, this court must still review the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b), which are “designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class definitions” and “demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997). To obtain class certification, a class plaintiff has the burden of showing that the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met and that the class is maintainable pursuant to Rule 23(b). Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613-14. [8] It is clear here that the district court erred in denying class certification without providing any findings or providing any analysis of the Rule 23 factors. Meaningful appellate review is impossible. On this basis alone, we are compelled to vacate and remand for a reasoned determination of class action status. See Las Vegas Sands, 244 F.3d at 1161. While both parties make a strong case in their briefs for why class certification for settlement purposes is appropriate, and although we tentatively see no reason why preliminary approval should not be granted, we prefer to remand the issue to the district court for its determination. Further, before any settlement can receive final approval, a fairness hearing must be held where members of the class may be heard concerning their support for, or objection to, the settlement. We vacate the district court’s denial of the Motion for Certification of Settlement Class and For Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, and remand for reconsideration of the motion.1 1 A final judgment was not entered in this case. Where an order appealed from clearly represents a final decision and the appellees do not object to 1180 NAROUZ v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS [9] Under the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate that the case be reassigned to a different district judge on remand. See Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2007). VACATED and REMANDED to a DIFFERENT DIS-