Opinion ID: 657191
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Least Restrictive Environment Requirement

Text: 28 Title 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(5)(B) requires states to ensure that handicapped children are educated to the maximum extent appropriate with children who are not handicapped. The Tennessee statute provides that [t]o the maximum extent practicable, handicapped children shall be educated along with children who do not have handicaps and shall attend regular classes. Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 49-1-103 (1990). 29 The district court held that the IEP developed for appellant by the M-Team represented a less restrictive alternative for him than the Brehm School. Appellant contends that the district court misapplied the mainstreaming requirement by assuming that it is absolute. 30 In Roncker on Behalf of Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir.1983), this Circuit set out its interpretation of the mainstreaming requirement of the federal Act: 31 The Act does not require mainstreaming in every case but its requirement that mainstreaming be provided to the maximum extent appropriate indicates a very strong congressional preference. The proper inquiry is whether a proposed placement is appropriate under the Act. 32 However, this Court recognizes that even though the preference for mainstreaming is very strong there are still situations in which, 33 some handicapped children simply must be educated in segregated facilities either because the handicapped child would not benefit from mainstreaming, because any marginal benefits received from mainstreaming are far outweighed by the benefits gained from services which could not feasibly be provided in the non-segregated setting, or because the handicapped child is a disruptive force in the non-segregated setting. 34 Id., at 1063. 35 Appellant does not fall within any of these categories. The record does not support a finding that the benefits to appellant from mainstreaming would have been marginal or that the specific services which he needed could not feasibly be provided in the non-segregated setting, much less that the benefits to appellant from such services provided in a segregated setting would far outweigh the benefits from mainstreaming. Indeed, the feasibility of providing those services in the non-segregated setting is demonstrated by the specialized and detailed IEP created by the M-Team. Finally, there is no mention in the record of appellant's being a disruptive child. Under these circumstances, the Act mandates that among appropriate placements the least restrictive alternative must be chosen. 36 While the Brehm school is certainly an appropriate, and in some respects even a superior, placement, it is clearly far more restrictive than the IEP proposed by the Board. All students at the Brehm School are learning disabled, handicapped children; that school therefore provides a child no opportunity for educational interaction with non-handicapped students. 37 The school system's proposed placement, on the other hand, offers the child an appropriate placement in a setting that is essentially a modified mainstream educational setting, allowing maximum contact with non-handicapped children. The district court did not err in holding that the IEP proposed by the Board was the least-restrictive, appropriate placement for appellant.