Opinion ID: 2625741
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Medellin

Text: The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Medellin's habeas corpus petitionhis secondbecause in its view neither the Avena decision nor the Presidential Memorandum constituted binding federal law that could displace a state procedural limitation on successive petitions. ( Ex parte Medellin (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) 223 S.W.3d 315, 352.) The Supreme Court again granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment of the Texas court. ( Medellin v. Texas, supra, 552 U.S. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1353].) The Supreme Court specifically rejected Medellin's argument that the Avena decision and/or the Presidential Memorandum is a binding federal rule of decision that pre-empts contrary state limitations on successive habeas petitions. ( Id. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1356], italics added.) (6) With respect to Medellin's claim that Avena itself constituted binding federal law, the court examined the treaties through which the United States had submitted to the jurisdiction of the ICJ and concluded that none of these treaty sourcesthe Optional Protocol, the United Nations Charter, and the ICJ statutewere self-executing, and, therefore did not create binding federal law in the absence of implementing legislation, and because it is uncontested that no such legislation exists, we conclude that the Avena judgment is not automatically binding domestic law. ( Medellin v. Texas, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1357].) [8] (7) Nor was the court persuaded that the President, acting unilaterally through the Presidential Memorandum, could create such binding domestic law. The court cited Justice Jackson's familiar tripartite scheme for evaluating executive action in the area of foreign policy decisions. First, `[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.' [Citation.] Second, `[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.' [Citation.] ... Finally, `[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,' and the Court can sustain his actions `only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.' [Citation.] ( Medellin v. Texas, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1368].) Here, the non-self-executing nature of the treaty sources of ICJ jurisdiction not only refutes the notion that the ratifying parties vested the President with the authority to unilaterally make treaty obligations binding on domestic courts, but also implicitly prohibits him from doing so. When the President asserts the power to `enforce' a non-self-executing treaty by unilaterally creating domestic law, he acts in conflict with the implicit understanding of the ratifying Senate. His assertion of authority, insofar as it is based on the pertinent non-self-executing treaties, is therefore within Justice Jackson's third category, not the first or even the second. ( Id. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1369].) Finally, the court rejected the alternative argument advanced by the President that the memorandum was a valid exercise of his authority to resolve claims disputes with other nations. The court found inapposite the cases cited by the government that involved the making of executive agreements to settle civil claims between American citizens and foreign governments or nations. The court noted, the Government has not identified a single instance in which the President has attempted (or Congress has acquiesced in) a Presidential directive issued to state courts, much less one that reaches deep into the heart of the State's police powers and compels state courts to reopen final criminal judgments and set aside neutrally applicable state laws. [Citation.] The Executive's narrow and strictly limited authority to settle international claims disputes pursuant to an executive agreement cannot stretch so far as to support the current Presidential Memorandum. ( Medellin v. Texas, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1372].)