Opinion ID: 3000513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Agent Miller’s Testimony

Text: Before turning to the substance of Shelia’s claim, we must first determine the appropriate standard of review. In order to preserve a ruling on the admission of evidence for appeal, a party must make “a timely objection or motion to strike [which] appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context.” Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1); see also United States v. Wynn, 845 F.2d 1439, 1442 (7th Cir. 1988). We review the district court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion if the party contesting its admissibility objected to it at trial. United States v. Sanders, 979 F.2d 87, 92 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Medina, 755 F.2d 1269, 1274 (7th Cir. 1985). If no objection was made, the standard of review is plain error. United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir. 2005); Wynn, 845 F.2d at 1443. The defendant argues that we should review the district court’s decision to admit the evidence for abuse of discretion. The government counters that plain error should be the standard of review because the defendant’s counsel failed to object to the government’s question. In order to determine the appropriate standard of review, we must examine the relevant testimony. Q. [Ms. Noller, Prosecutor] Who is Tom Marszewski?
Montgomery group representing A-1. Q. So, Mr. Marszewski was also an attorney representing A-1; is that correct? No. 06-1417 7 A. Correct. Q. Was he also representing [Seutter] Tyrone Swan and Sheila Swan, as far as you know? A. To the best of my knowledge, yes. Q. What did he say to you? MR. SHEPHERD [attorney for Shelia Swan]: Objection. Hearsay. MS. NOLLER: It’s an admission of a party oppo- nent. THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer. BY MS. NOLLER: Q. What did Mr. Marszewski tell you in response to the subpoena? A. He informed me that there were no documents as described in the subpoena, and that he was aware of where my description came from and that these documents didn’t exist. Q. Did he also tell you why A-1 sent that—or the defendants sent that—description to Medicare? A. Yes. MR. BOURGEOIS [attorney for Seutter Swan]: Objection. Hearsay. MS. NOLLER: Admission by a party opponent. THE COURT: Overruled. BY THE WITNESS: A. Mr. Marszewski informed me that they used the description submitted to Medicare so that they could be reimbursed at a higher rate per that job description. 8 No. 06-1417 MR. BOURGEOIS: Objection. I ask that it be stricken. THE COURT: On what basis? MR. BOURGEOIS: Clearly, we have no evidence that either one of these parties said that. THE COURT: It is an admission through a party opponent through an agent. Overruled. (R. 75-3 at 352-53.) The defendant’s objection at the time of Agent Miller’s testimony was based solely on hearsay grounds. On appeal, the defendant’s issue with Agent Miller’s testimony concerns whether Attorney Marszewski was an agent of the defendant and the scope of his authority. The hearsay objection offered by Shelia’s attorney, Attorney Shepherd, and her husband’s attorney, Attorney Bourgeois, does not constitute the “specific ground” on which the defendant now objects. The simple hearsay objection by the defendant failed to put the district court on notice of the precise nature of the defendant’s concern. See Wynn, 845 F.2d at 1442; United States v. Laughlin, 772 F.2d 1382, 1392 (7th Cir. 1985). The district court even acknowledged the difference between the objection made during Agent Miller’s testimony and the issue raised in the motion for mistrial and the subsequent motion for new trial or for judgment of acquittal, stating: “That is a different issue than the one you raised and you objected to the testimony on, though. You objected to its admission based on hearsay.” (R. 75-4 at 542.) The defendant argues that the “specific ground” was raised in the motion for mistrial and the motion for a new trial, but any “objection” at that time was not timely. In order to preserve an objection for appeal under Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1), “[t]he specific ground for reversal of an evidentiary ruling on appeal must also be the same as that raised at trial.” Wynn, 845 No. 06-1417 9 F.2d at 1442 (citing United States v. Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012, 1017 (10th Cir. 1986)). We conclude that the defendant’s hearsay objection to Agent Miller’s testimony does not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1). Accordingly, we review the district court’s decision to admit the testimony of Agent Miller concerning Attorney Marszewski’s statement for plain error. Under plain error review, an error must be “clear or obvious” and “affect substantial rights” in order for this court to reverse the district court’s decision to admit the evidence. United States v. Sumner, 265 F.3d 532, 539 (7th Cir. 2001). Moreover, we should not exercise our discretion to correct the error unless it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Kibler, 279 F.3d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)) (quotation marked omitted). Now turning to the substance of the defendant’s argument, Federal Rule of Evidence 801 provides certain exceptions to the rule against hearsay testimony. “A statement is not hearsay if . . . [t]he statement is offered against a party and is . . . a statement by the party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d). We have previously held that “[a]n attorney may be the agent of his client for purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)(D).” United States v. Harris, 914 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. McClellan, 868 F.2d 210, 215 n.9 (7th Cir. 1989)); see also United States v. Brandon, 50 F.3d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 1995). Shelia asserts that Attorney Marszewski was not an agent of the Swans and that he was not acting within the scope of his authority. In questioning Agent Miller, the 10 No. 06-1417 government sufficiently established the agency relationship and the scope of that agency in questioning Agent Miller. Agent Miller testified that Attorney Marszewski called him in response to the subpoena; Marszewski identified himself as an associate of the law firm representing A-1 in this investigation; and, to the “best of [Agent Miller’s] knowledge,” he was representing the defendants. (R. 75-3 at 352.) Relying on this testimony, the district court did not commit plain error in admitting Agent Miller’s testimony as an admission of a party by an agent. Shelia also argues that attorney-client privilege should have been considered in admitting Agent Miller’s testimony as to Attorney Marszewski’s statement.3 The defendant contends that there is no evidence that she waived this privilege. But, as the government points out, there is also no evidence that she asserted this privilege at trial. Importantly, the privilege is forfeited if the party fails to make a timely objection at trial. See United States v. Sanders, 979 F.2d 87, 92 (7th Cir. 1992). We have noted that “[t]he unique nature of the attorneyclient relationship, however, demands that a trial court exercise caution in admitting statements that are the product of this relationship.” Harris, 914 F.2d at 931 (citing United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 30-33 (2d Cir. 1984)). In Harris, we followed the Second Circuit in considering certain policy concerns in admitting an attorney’s statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D). Namely, we noted that “the routine use of attorney statements against a criminal defendant risks 3 Incidentally, the defendant’s attorney-client privilege argument has merit only if Attorney Marszewski was in fact the defendant’s agent. Therefore, the privilege argument and the lack of agency argument are mutually exclusive. No. 06-1417 11 impairment of the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel of one’s choice and the right to effective assistance of counsel.” Harris, 914 F.2d at 931 (quoting United States v. Valencia, 826 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1987)) (quotation marks omitted). Although these policy considerations are important, none was implicated in the present case. The defendant was not forced to take the stand because of the admission of the evidence. Attorney Marszewski could have been called as a witness to rebut Agent Miller’s testimony. Attorney Marszewski’s work on this case was limited to pre-indictment activities; neither he nor any member of his firm represented the defendant at trial, nor is there any allegation made by Shelia that she wanted Attorney Marszewski to represent her at trial. Even if the district court failed to adequately consider attorney-client privilege, this error does not implicate plain error review since the defendant has failed to show any violation of the privilege, and therefore, any effect on her substantial rights.