Opinion ID: 1775339
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: did the trial court err in allowing melissa carver to testify?

Text: Defense counsel asserts, The first time that counsel for the appellant was aware that Melissa Carver would testify that she was an eyewitness to the alleged event was when the State stated same in its opening argument... . Around the time of the January discovery order, Melissa Carver apparently gave a taped statement to the sheriff's department, which statement was later reduced to writing and supplied to the defense. Counsel argues that the statement negated Melissa Carver's testimony as an eyewitness to the incident. Additionally, counsel stresses that the discovery order stated that The State possesses no exculpatory or incriminating evidence regarding the defendant. Counsel believes that the State should have been required to provide supplemental statements of Melissa Carver's proposed testimony showing her to be such an eye witness. Mississippi Uniform Criminal Rules of the Circuit Court, Rule 4.06 reads: If, subsequent to compliance with these rules or orders pursuant thereto a party discovers additional material or information which is subject to disclosure, he shall promptly notify the other party or his counsel of the existence of such additional material, and if the additional material or information is discovered during the trial, the court shall also be notified. Taking Rule 4.06 into consideration, counsel cites Acevedo v. State, 467 So.2d 220 (Miss. 1985). In Acevedo, this Court discusses the purpose of discovery. This Court writes: The purpose of the Uniform Criminal Rule 4.06 is to avoid unfair surprise to either the State or the defendant at trial. Harris v. State, 446 So.2d 585, 589 (Miss. 1984); Ford v. State, 444 So.2d 841, 843 (Miss. 1984). In Box v. State, 437 So.2d 19, 21 (Miss. 1983), we said with regard to discovery under rule 4.06: The question presented here brings into direct conflict two important interests. First there is prosecution's interest in presenting the jury all relevant, probative evidence. On the other hand, there is the accused's interest in knowing reasonably well in advance of trial what the prosecution will try to prove and how it will attempt to make its proof which of course, includes the names of persons the State expects to call as witnesses. This State is committed to the proposition that these conflicting interests are best accommodated and that justice is more nearly achieved when, well in advance of trial, each side has reasonable access to the evidence of the other. See Rule 4.06, supra; Rules 26-37, Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. This issue is answered by the record. Upon the defense motion for a mistrial, the trial judge read the written statement of the witness that was furnished defendant and found: [I]t's the Court's position that the objection will be overruled. That availability to Melissa is still present, present on yesterday and today. And I do believe there is sufficient indication in that last paragraph as to what Alisa [sic] would say. that Melissa was in the bathroom, that I think could have been discovered or at least a motion to ask the Court to have an interview with Melissa, would have been sustained. The content of the witness's statement is not in the record for review by this Court. But the content of the trial judge's finding evidences that the statement was sufficient to put the defense counsel on notice that Melissa was an eye witness. In the absence of the questioned statement in the record, this Court cannot say that the trial court's ruling was in error. Lambert v. State, 524 So.2d 576 (1988). It therefore follows that the authority of Acevedo, supra, is not applicable. Acevedo represented a factual situation where the furnished statement required updating and supplementation. The instant case is factually distinguishable in that the trial court's assessment of the statement was that it contained sufficient information to notice defense counsel of the fact that the witness was in fact an eye witness. The defense counsel was put on notice of its contents. Interview prior to trial was not sought by him; however, interview during trial was afforded. Box v. State, 437 So.2d 19 (Miss. 1983). There was no further motion for continuance or mistrial by the defendant. This Court concludes therefore that this factual situation does not contain an updating or supplemental requirement or a Rule 4.06 violation, and therefore, finds no reversible error on this point.