Opinion ID: 1787959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Effect of Trial Court's Reliance on Court of Appeals' Herrera Decision

Text: The trial court, when it decided this case, did not have the benefit of our decision overruling the Court of Appeals' Herrera decision. As a result, it did not use the specialized standard of care for cases involving an injury caused by a condition on an owner or occupier's premises. We need to determine how this error affected the court's comparison of negligence. Comparative negligence abrogates the common-law concept of contributory negligence, thus relieving both parties of an all-or-nothing situation, and substitutes apportionment of the damages by fault. Baldwin v. City of Omaha, 259 Neb. 1, 607 N.W.2d 841 (2000). To compare fault, it is critical that the fact finder knows the correct standard of care for each party. For example, in some situations, like the one here, the law imposes a specialized standard of care on one party (e.g., the City), while imposing only the ordinary standard of reasonable care on the other (e.g., Aguallo). That the one party fell short of the specialized standard of care, while the other party failed to meet only the ordinary standard of reasonable care is a legitimate factor to be considered in apportioning fault. Further, another important factor to be considered in apportioning fault is the extent to which [each person's risk-creating] conduct failed to meet the applicable legal standard. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 8, comment c. at 87 (2000). That party X deviated substantially from its standard of care while party Y's deviation was only slight suggests that X should shoulder a higher burden for the damage done. But it would be impossible for a fact finder to accurately gauge how far a party has deviated from its standard of care if the fact finder does not have the correct understanding of the party's standard of care. Given the importance of a correct understanding of each party's standard of care, we conclude that a fact finder cannot properly compare a plaintiff's negligence to a defendant's negligence when it uses the incorrect standard of care for either party. Cf. Dever v. Goranflo, 473 S.W.2d 131 (Ky.1971). Thus, when a fact finder has used an incorrect standard of care in apportioning fault between a plaintiff and a defendant, the appropriate appellate remedy generally will be to remand for a new trial so that the fact finder can employ the correct standard in its apportionment analysis.