Opinion ID: 1478545
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sexual Harassment and The Law Against Discrimination

Text: The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination was first enacted in 1945. Its purpose is nothing less than the eradication `of the cancer of discrimination.' Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 334, 537 A. 2d 652 (quoting Jackson v. Concord Co., 54 N.J. 113, 124, 253 A. 2d 793 (1969), cert. denied sub nom. University of Medicine & Dentistry of N.J. v. Fuchilla, 488 U.S. 826, 109 S.Ct. 75, 102 L.Ed. 2d 51 (1988). The opportunity to obtain employment is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. N.J.S.A. 10:5-4. The LAD was enacted to protect not only the civil rights of individual aggrieved employees but also to protect the public's strong interest in a discrimination-free workplace. Fuchilla, supra, 109 N.J. at 335, 537 A. 2d 652. Freedom from discrimination is one of the fundamental principles of our society. Discrimination based on gender is peculiarly repugnant in a society which prides itself on judging each individual by his or her merits. Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 118 N.J. 89, 96, 570 A. 2d 903 (1990) (citation omitted). The LAD specifically prohibits employment discrimination based on sex. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12 provides: It shall be unlawful employment practice, or, as the case may be, an unlawful discrimination: a. For an employer, because of the race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, sex    of any individual,    to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge    from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment   . The legislative history of the LAD is silent on the subject of sexual harassment. In construing the terms of the LAD, this Court has frequently looked to federal precedent governing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e to § 2000e-17 (Title VII), as a key source of interpretive authority. Grigoletti, supra, 118 N.J. at 97, 570 A. 2d 903. Although the substantive and procedural standards that we have developed under the State's LAD have been markedly influenced by the federal experience, ibid., we have applied the Title VII standards with flexibility and have not hesitated to depart from federal precedent if a rigid application of its standards is inappropriate under the circumstances. Id. at 107, 570 A. 2d 903. Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that violates both Title VII and the LAD. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed. 2d 49 (1986) (holding that when supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of subordinate's sex, that supervisor discriminates on basis of sex in violation of Title VII); Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 555-56, 569 A. 2d 793 (1990) (suggesting that sexual harassment that creates hostile environment is prohibited under LAD). Sexual harassment jurisprudence generally divides sexual harassment cases into two categories. Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when an employer attempts to make an employee's submission to sexual demands a condition of his or her employment. It involves an implicit or explicit threat that if the employee does not accede to the sexual demands, he or she will lose his or her job, receive unfavorable performance reviews, be passed over for promotions, or suffer other adverse employment consequences. Hostile work environment sexual harassment, by contrast, occurs when an employer or fellow employees harass an employee because of his or her sex to the point at which the working environment becomes hostile. Plaintiff Lehmann does not charge that defendant Baylous engaged in quid pro quo sexual harassment. Rather, she alleges that his sexually-charged offensive conduct towards her and other women in the workplace created a hostile work environment. Quid pro quo sexual harassment is more easily recognized and more clearly defined and well-established as a cause of action. Hostile work environment sexual harassment, on the other hand, has only recently been recognized as actionable sexual harassment. Because of the relatively recent recognition of the harm, some confusion remains in the minds of employers and employees concerning what sorts of conduct constitute hostile work environment sexual harassment. In the majority of hostile work environment cases, the harassing conduct takes the form of unwelcome sexual touchings and comments. However, the harassing conduct need not be sexual in nature; rather, its defining characteristic is that the harassment occurs because of the victim's sex. See Muench v. Township of Haddon, 255 N.J. Super. 288, 605 A. 2d 242 (App.Div. 1992) (holding defendant employer liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment where employees harassed dispatcher because she was female although harassment was not sexual in nature). Although we recognized in Erickson, supra, 117 N.J. at 155-57, 569 A. 2d 793, that allegations of a sexually hostile work environment state a claim under the LAD, we have not yet been called on to define the elements of a hostile work environment sexual harassment cause of action. In fashioning a standard we acknowledge that the hostile work environment claim is still evolving. Conduct considered normal and non-discriminatory twenty years ago may well be considered discriminatory today. Like all courts, we are reluctant to penalize behavior that was not previously understood or intended to be wrongful. However, we cannot deny legal redress to the victims of discrimination and harassment merely because the perpetrators may be unaware of the illegality of their conduct. In order to ensure fairness for all, both employees and employers must be able to understand what constitutes a claim for gender-hostile work environment. A clear and intelligible legal standard will protect employees from the damage wrought by a hostile working environment and will enable employers to conform their conduct to the law. We therefore agree with the majority below that a structured definition of the cause of action is preferable at this early stage in the development of the law concerning hostile work environment sexual harassment. However, we are sensitive to the concern expressed by Judge Skillman in his dissent below that the standard must be sufficiently flexible to recognize the wide variety of forms which hostile work environment sexual discrimination may take and to allow for the evolution of this new area of law. 255 N.J. Super. at 648, 605 A. 2d 1125. We find that the standards expressed in the EEOC Guidelines, while helpful, are insufficiently structured to define the cause of action at this stage in the development of the law. However, we agree with the dissent below that the Third Circuit's Andrews test employed by the majority below contains too many analytical difficulties and deficiencies to be usefully employed here. Rather than risking confusion by engrafting major revisions to the Andrews test, we announce a new test in the hope of creating a standard that both employees and employers will be able to understand and one that employers can realistically enforce. We cannot overstate the importance we place on a test that allows employees to know their rights in a given set of circumstances and that allows employers to set policies and procedures that comply with that test. To state a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment, a female plaintiff must allege conduct that occurred because of her sex and that a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. For the purposes of establishing and examining a cause of action, the test can be broken down into four prongs: the complained-of conduct (1) would not have occurred but for the employee's gender; and it was (2) severe or pervasive enough to make a (3) reasonable woman believe that (4) the conditions of employment are altered and the working environment is hostile or abusive. However, the second, third, and fourth prongs, while separable to some extent, are interdependent. One cannot inquire whether the alleged conduct was severe or pervasive without knowing how severe or pervasive it must be. The answer to that question lies in the other prongs: the conduct must be severe or pervasive enough to make a reasonable woman believe that the conditions of employment are altered and her working environment is hostile. In this case, we discuss the standard assuming a female plaintiff, because in both the present case and the majority of cases, the plaintiff is a woman. However, the standard we announce today applies to sexual harassment of women by men, men by women, men by men, and women by women. The LAD protects both men and women and bars both heterosexual and homosexual harassment. The only difference in the standard would be that a male plaintiff would have to allege conduct that a reasonable man would believe altered the conditions of his employment and created a working environment that was hostile to men.