Opinion ID: 779373
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: sentencing after downward departure

Text: 84 The sole issue presented in Timothy Lanxter's appeal concerns the proper method of sentencing defendants who are granted downward departures from statutory minimum sentences. Although Lanxter's sentencing range under the guidelines was from fifty-one to seventy-one months, the district court's drug quantity calculation and Lanxter's previous felony drug conviction triggered a statutory minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). 20 However, the district court departed below that statutory minimum upon a motion by the government pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) based upon the substantial assistance Lanxter provided to the government in the investigation of other suspects. 21 The district court reduced Lanxter's sentence, but the resulting sentence of ninety-two months imprisonment fell between the statutory minimum (120 months) and the upper end of the guideline range (seventy-one months). Lanxter now appeals that decision.
85 The government contends that Lanxter is challenging the extent of the court's downward departure, which would mean that we lack jurisdiction over his appeal. See United States v. Gregory, 932 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that this Court should not accept jurisdiction over appeals based on factors which the appellant argues should have influenced the degree of a downward departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)). However, in the case at bar, Lanxter does not argue that certain factors should have led to a greater downward departure; rather, he challenges the method used to calculate the downward departure for substantial assistance. Section 3553(e) provides that, after the government files a downward departure motion authorizing the district court to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence... [,such] sentence shall be imposed in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.... 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). Lanxter's appeal asks us to determine whether, by using his 120 month mandatory minimum sentence as the starting point for its downward departure calculation, the district court ignored the language in § 3553(e) directing the court to rely upon the guidelines in calculating reduced sentences. This is an issue of law regarding the interpretation of a statute and the sentencing guidelines; thus, we apply the de novo standard of review. United States v. Rutana, 18 F.3d 363, 365 (6th Cir.1994).
86 Lanxter contends that once the district court grants a § 3553(e) motion to depart from a statutory minimum sentence, the resulting sentence may be no higher than the upper end of the otherwise applicable guideline range. He therefore claims that after the downward departure, his resulting sentence should have been somewhere within the guideline range of fifty-one to seventy-one months. This is an issue of first impression in this Circuit. However, the other appellate courts that have considered this issue have rejected similar arguments. 87 In United States v. Hayes, 5 F.3d 292, 293 (7th Cir.1993), the Seventh Circuit considered a case on all fours with the instant case. In that case, a defendant who faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 60 months under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) obtained a downward departure motion from the government under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). The defendant claimed that § 3553(e) required that his resulting sentence fall within his sentencing guideline range of twenty-one to twenty-seven months. The court rejected this argument, finding instead that the defendant's resulting sentence of forty-seven months was imposed in accordance with the guidelines. In drawing this conclusion, the court pointed to language in USSG § 5G1.1(b) providing that [w]here a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.  Hayes, 5 F.3d at 294-95. Based upon its interpretation of this language, the court held that the statutory mandatory minimum sentence ... became [the defendant's] guidelines range, albeit a narrow one. Id. at 295. The court therefore determined that the appropriate starting point for the defendant's downward departure was his mandatory minimum sentence. Other circuits have followed the same logic used in Hayes. See, e.g., United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 78, 89 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that the proper starting point from which a departure is to be subtracted or to which it must be added is the greater of the guideline range or the mandatory minimum); United States v. Head, 178 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir.1999). 88 We find this logic persuasive as well. To hold otherwise would afford defendants a double benefit by first permitting them to avoid a higher mandatory minimum sentence and then granting a departure from an even lower sentencing guidelines range. We do not believe that Congress intended such a result. For these reasons, we now join our sister circuits and hold that the appropriate starting point for calculating a downward departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) is the mandatory minimum sentence itself.