Opinion ID: 2507588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motions to Dismiss and for a Directed Verdict

Text: Prior to trial, Green moved to dismiss the charged offenses. In support of this motion and his directed verdict motion, Green claimed it was legally impossible to carry out the criminal sexual conduct because the alleged victim was not a minor but, rather, a fictitious person created by Investigator Platt. During trial, Green also established that the picture on Mandy's profile page was actually that of Lynda Williamson, a twenty-four-year-old former probation officer who provided the photograph to an investigator with the Aiken County Sheriff's Office. Because the woman in the picture was over the age of consent, Green claimed he could not be convicted of attempted CSC with minor in the second-degree. As an additional ground, Green asserted the State failed to prove his specific intent to commit CSC with a minor in the second-degree and an overt act in furtherance of the crime. During his argument, Green pointed to the text of the online chat where he stated that he would not pressure Mandy to do anything that she did not want to do and that she could change her mind about having sex. On appeal, Green reiterates these arguments in support of his contention that the trial judge erred in denying his motions to dismiss and for a directed verdict. In addition, Green elaborates on his claim of legal impossibility. Citing United States v. Frazier, 560 F.2d 884 (8th Cir.1977), Green explains that this defense applies where the impossibility of a defendant's successfully committing a crime eliminates the culpability of his having tried to do so. According to this statement, Green claims he should not have been convicted of the charged offenses as he could not commit criminal sexual conduct with a fictitious person.
[L]egal impossibility occurs when the actions that the defendant performs or sets in motion, even if fully carried out as he or she desires, would not constitute a crime, whereas factual impossibility occurs when the objective of the defendant is proscribed by the criminal law but a circumstance unknown to the actor prevents him or her from bringing about that objective. 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 156 (2008). According to some authorities, legal impossibility is a defense to a charge of attempt, but factual impossibility is not. Id. In view of this distinction and Green's arguments, we have confined our analysis of this issue to the defense of legal impossibility. As we interpret Green's trial and appellate arguments, his claim of legal impossibility encompasses both the solicitation charge and the CSC charge. Specifically, the intent element in the solicitation statute and the necessary intent for the attempted CSC charge warrant a similar analysis with respect to Green's challenge that no actual minor was involved. Accordingly, we address Green's claims as to both charges. Section 16-15-342(D) definitively discounts Green's arguments with respect to the solicitation charge as this provision states, It is not a defense to a prosecution pursuant to this section, on the basis of consent or otherwise, that the person reasonably believed to be under the age of eighteen is a law enforcement agent or officer acting in an official capacity. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-15-342(D) (Supp.2011). Thus, based on the plain language of the statute, the Legislature clearly intended to eliminate the defense of impossibility as to the charge of criminal solicitation of a minor if a law enforcement officer impersonated the minor. State v. Dingle, 376 S.C. 643, 659 S.E.2d 101 (2008) (recognizing that in interpreting statutes, appellate courts look to the plain meaning of the statute and the intent of the Legislature). Similarly, the fact that an actual minor was not the subject of Green's intent did not preclude his prosecution and conviction for attempted CSC with a minor in the second-degree. A person is guilty of CSC with a minor in the second-degree if the actor engages in sexual battery with a victim who is fourteen years of age or less but who is at least eleven years of age. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-655(B)(1) (Supp.2011). A person who commits the common law offense of attempt, upon conviction, must be punished as for the principal offense. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-1-80 (2003). Thus, the elements of attempted CSC with a minor in the second degree are: (1) an attempt; (2) to engage in a sexual battery; (3) with a victim; (4) who is fourteen years of age or less; (5) but who is at least eleven years of age. Reid, 383 S.C. at 292, 679 S.E.2d at 197. In discussing attempt crimes, this Court has stated, In the context of an `attempt' crime, specific intent means that the defendant consciously intended the completion of acts comprising the choate offense. State v. Sutton, 340 S.C. 393, 397, 532 S.E.2d 283, 285 (2000). Accordingly, [t]o prove attempt, the State must prove that the defendant had the specific intent to commit the underlying offense, along with some overt act, beyond mere preparation in furtherance of the intent. State v. Reid, 393 S.C. 325, 329, 713 S.E.2d 274, 276 (2011) (emphasis in the original). Based on the above-outlined definitions, we find Green's actions were sufficient to prove the offense of attempted CSC with a minor in the second-degree. As noted, an attempt crime does not require the completion of the object offense. Thus, Green was not required to complete the sexual battery in order to be prosecuted and convicted of the offense. Accordingly, the fact that the intended victim was not an actual minor was irrelevant as the State was only required to prove Green had the specific intent to commit a sexual battery on a victim between the ages of eleven and fourteen years old coupled with some overt act toward the commission of the offense. See State v. Curtiss, 138 Idaho 466, 65 P.3d 207 (Ct.App.2002) (holding that impossibility did not constitute a defense to charge of attempted lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen in a case where detective posed as a fourteen-year-old girl in online chat room); Hix v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 335, 619 S.E.2d 80 (2005) (holding that the fact defendant was communicating with an adult law enforcement officer posing as a child was not a defense to the charge of attempted indecent liberties with a minor). A decision to this effect is consistent with our state's limited jurisprudence regarding Internet sex crimes. See Reid, 383 S.C. at 300, 679 S.E.2d at 201-02 (recognizing the policy goal of stopping dangerous persons through earlier intervention by law enforcement by punishing the attempted conduct as a crime, especially in any cybermolester type cases where the conduct also clearly manifests or strongly corroborates the intent to commit such a dangerous object crime). Finally, other state jurisdictions have concluded that a defendant may be prosecuted for criminal solicitation of a minor, as well as attempted sexual offenses, where the online persona is an undercover officer and not an actual minor. See, e.g., Karwoski v. State, 867 So.2d 486 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004); People v. Thousand, 465 Mich. 149, 631 N.W.2d 694 (2001); State v. Coonrod, 652 N.W.2d 715 (Minn.Ct.App.2002); Shaffer v. State, 72 So.3d 1070 (Miss.2011); Johnson v. State, 123 Nev. 139, 159 P.3d 1096 (2007); State v. Robins, 253 Wis.2d 298, 646 N.W.2d 287 (2002). [7]