Opinion ID: 2823851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rental Car Context

Text: Â¶23Â Â Â Â Â Â We now apply these governing principles to the search and seizure of packages in a rental car with an unauthorized driver. We are mindful not to conflate standing to contest the search of the rental car itself with standing to contest the search and seizure of packages within the rental car. See generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure:Â A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, Â§ 11.3(e), at 257â59 & n.325 (5th ed. 2013); Forty-Third Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 43 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 119â20 & nn.274â75 (2014). They are two different inquiries. Â¶24Â Â Â Â Â Â This case requires us to address only whether an unauthorized driver of a rental car may have standing to challenge a search of packages within the rental car, regardless of whether the driver has standing to challenge the search of the rental car itself. 4 Â¶25Â Â Â Â Â Â We begin our analysis with Rakas. There, the defendants were passengers in a getaway car used to escape a robbery. 439 U.S. at 130. Although they did not own or lease the car, the defendants challenged the legality of a search and seizure of both the car and its contents. Id. at 148â49. They did not, however, assert a possessory or proprietary interest in the car or the property seized. Id. at 148. Consequently, the Court concluded that they did not have âa legitimate expectation of privacyâ and were not entitled to challenge the search of either the car or the property within the car (namely, a sawed-off rifle and rifle shells). Id. at 148â50. The Court also rejected the defendantsâ assertion that they had standing because they were legitimately present in the car, driven by the owner: [T]he phrase âlegitimately on premisesâ has not been shown to be an easily applicable measure of Fourth Amendment rights so much as it has proved to be simply a label placed by the courts on results which have not been subjected to careful analysis. We would not wish to be understoodÂ as saying that legitimate presence on the premises [here, the car] isÂ irrelevant to oneâs expectation of privacy, but it cannot be deemedÂ controlling. Id. at 147â48 (emphasis added). Â¶26Â Â Â Â Â Â This court swiftly followed suit and implemented the legitimate-expectation-of-privacy standard enunciated in Rakas. See People v. Suttles, 685 P.2d 183, 190 (Colo. 1984). In Suttles, we held that, for standing purposes, âthe focus is now on whether the proponent of a motion to suppress had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or in the items seized.â Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 190â91 (separately examining whether the defendant had a possessory interest in a car, or a gun or earring seized within the car). Our use of the disjunctive âorâ is consistent with our conclusion here that a defendant need not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a vehicle in order to have one in the property within it. Â¶27Â Â Â Â Â Â So how do we evaluate the legitimacy of a privacy interest when the focus is on personal effects, and not a place? Rakas instructs that a defendant may show a legitimate expectation of privacy âeither by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.â 439 U.S. at 143 n.12. Â¶28Â Â Â Â Â Â The Tenth Circuit addressed what this means in United States v. Edwards, 632 F.3d 633 (10th Cir. 2001). The defendant in Edwards was arrested in connection with a bank robbery. When the police contacted him, the defendant stood near a car rented in his companionâs name; he was not listed on the rental agreement as an authorized driver. Id. at 636â37. The police searched the car and found a clothing bag in the trunkÂ that contained plastic bags full of stolen currency covered in dye, as well as another bag that contained a mask. Id. at 637. The police also found a sweatshirt and shoes belonging to Edwards. Id. The district court denied Edwardsâs motion to suppress this evidence. Id. at 641. Â¶29Â Â Â Â Â Â On appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered whether Edwards had standing to challenge both the search of the rental car and the search of his bags. Id. at 641â42. The court found that Edwards did not have standing to challenge the search of the rental car because he was an unauthorized driver. Id. at 641 (citing United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1499â1500 (10th Cir. 1996), and United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1374â75 (10th Cir. 1984)). It reached a contrary conclusion with respect to the bags within the rental car. Id. at 642. Â¶30Â Â Â Â Â Â To explain why it found standing with respect to the bags themselves, the court referenced two cases that found a person can have a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to the content of luggage within another personâs car. In Arkansas v.Â Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 n.8 (1979), abrogated on other grounds by California v.Â Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991), the Supreme Court held that the defendant unquestionably had standing to challenge a search where there was no dispute that he owned the luggage in question. Likewise, in United States v. Buchner, 7 F.3d 1149, 1154 (5th Cir. 1993), the Fifth Circuit held that â[t]he owner of a suitcase located in anotherâs car may have a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to the contents of his suitcase.â Testimony by the defendant asserting an ownership interest in a shoulder bag sufficed to confer standing. Id.Â Â¶31Â Â Â Â Â Â Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court found that Edwards did have a subjective expectation of privacy in the bags and that society would recognize this expectation as reasonable. The bags were closed and stored in the trunk. Also, they contained clothing and toiletries in addition to contraband. Edwards, 632 F.3d at 642. Therefore, the court held that the evidence seized from the rental car should have been suppressed. Id. at 641. 5 Â¶32Â Â Â Â Â Â We agree with the Tenth Circuitâs approach in Edwards. If, considering the totality of the circumstances, an unauthorized driver of a rental car is able to satisfy theÂ subjective and objective prongs of the reasonableness test, the driver has standing to challenge a search of his or her possessions within the rental car. Â¶33Â Â Â Â Â Â This approach tracks our precedent. Only âa person with a possessory or proprietary interest in the property or premises searchedâ can assert the right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures. 6 Perez, 231 P.3d at 960 (emphasis added). Thus, â[t]his court has consistently âheld that the owner or possessor of a sealed container possesses a legitimate expectation of privacy in its contents.ââ Hillman, 834 P.2d at 1275 n.12 (quoting Oates, 698 P.2d at 816). We have also found that travelers generally have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal luggage or bags. People v. Ortega, 34 P.3d 986, 990 (Colo. 2001) (citing Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336â37 (2000) (holding that a bus passenger who places his luggage in an overhead bin retains an expectation of privacy)). Â¶34Â Â Â Â Â Â In addition, this conclusion comports with well-reasoned case law from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Buchner, 7 F.3d at 1154 (holding that a defendant in his girlfriendâs rental car had a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to the contents of a shoulder bag that he owned, which was within the car, and therefore had standing to contest a search of the bag); People v. Young, 843 N.E.2d 489, 490â92 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (holding that a defendant, who was a passenger in a vehicle that was subjected to an inventory search, did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle because he had no ownership interest, but did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his closed suitcase in the trunk, which had a tightly wrapped and taped package containing marijuana inside it). Â¶35Â Â Â Â Â Â We acknowledge that the Fourth Circuit has been unwilling to recognize an expectation of privacy in a bag within a car when the driver cannot assert a legitimate claim to the car itself. In United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 412 (4th Cir. 1981), that court stated, with respect to the driver of a stolen car, that â[a] person who cannot assert a legitimate claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is a private repository for his personal effects, whether or not they are enclosed in some sort of a container, such as a paper bag.â It summarily extended that rule to an unauthorized driver of a rental car in United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119â20 (4th Cir. 1994). But Hargrove involved a stolen car (a fact that the court in Wellons did not even try to reconcile). While Sotelo was not an authorized driver, there is no claim that the car was stolen. Â¶36Â Â Â Â Â Â Like other courts that have rejected Wellons, we conclude that an inflexible, bright-line rule denying standing to contest the search and seizure of packages within a rental car is inappropriate. See, e.g., State v. Bruski, 727 N.W.2d 503, 510â11 (Wis. 2007) (refusing to adopt a bright-line rule that a defendant who does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle cannot have an expectation of privacy relative to his travel case within the vehicle as a matter of law, even if he owns the case). Â¶37Â Â Â Â Â Â In summary, binding precedent of both the United States Supreme Court and this court makes clear that a defendant who has a possessory interest in a seized item may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that property. Reasonableness is assessed based on the totality of the circumstancesânot on any single factor. Other courts throughout the country have expounded the same principle.