Opinion ID: 2696094
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 316 (2001).

Text: - 36 - Indeed, it is a necessary part of the majority’s analysis that supervision under section 5-615 is available following the acceptance of a guilty plea; if it were not, there would be no need for the majority to reach the constitutionality of the State’s Attorney consent provision. If, however, section 5-615 permits the circuit court to enter an order of supervision when the court accepts a minor’s guilty plea and thereby finds the minor guilty, then the State’s Attorney consent provision is unconstitutional. ¶ 125 As the majority acknowledges, a circuit court’s finding of guilt marks “a traditional procedural boundary” (supra ¶ 84), beyond which the State’s Attorney’s constitutionally permissible role comes to an end. Once the circuit court in this case accepted the respondent’s plea of guilty, that fact established the respondent’s guilt and the State’s Attorney was constitutionally prohibited from vetoing the circuit court’s subsequent decision to order supervision for the respondent. Accordingly, when applied to the facts of this case, the State’s Attorney consent provision under section 5-615(1)(b) violates the separation of powers provision of the Illinois Constitution. Because the judgment of the circuit court should be affirmed on this ground, there is no need to reach the remaining constitutional issues and I express no opinion on them. ¶ 126 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.