Opinion ID: 901461
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Budget Host Manager as a Citizen Informant

Text: [¶ 76.] [I]f an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activity  which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability  we have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233-34, 103 S.Ct. at 2330, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (citing Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-147, 92 S.Ct. at 1923-24, 32 L.Ed.2d 612). That is because tips from citizen informants are more likely to be reliable than information from informants; `the ordinary citizen who has never before reported a crime to the police may, in fact, be more reliable than one who supplies information on [a] regular basis.' State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896, 899 (S.D.1993) (quoting United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971)) (citing State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700, 703-04 (Minn.1990); Marben v. State, Dept. of Public Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn.1980)). A tip based on an explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles [the informant's] tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case. Gates, 462 U.S. at 234, 103 S.Ct. at 2330, 76 L.Ed.2d 527. [¶ 77.] The Court appears to categorize the Budget Host manager as an anonymous informant, and evaluates his reliability, veracity, and basis of knowledge using cases involving anonymous tipsters. See supra ¶¶ 19-21. The Budget Host manager is more properly classified as a citizen informant as he gave his title and place of work, which was then relayed to Hamann by dispatch. See Lammers, 676 N.W.2d at 725 (noting that identification of the informant's occupation alone is sufficient to negate a claim that the informant was anonymous.) (citing United States v. Pasquarille, 20 F.3d 682 (6th Cir.1994); City of Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 720 N.E.2d 507, 514 (Ohio 1999)). Therefore, the Budget Host manager more properly qualifies as a voluntary and identified citizen informant rather than an anonymous informant. As a citizen informant, it is not necessary to rigorously examine the basis of his knowledge. [¶ 78.] It is true that the Budget Host manager detected the presence of marijuana via his olfactory sense rather than through visual observation. However, some courts have long recognized that marijuana has a distinct smell and that the odor of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement to search a vehicle or baggage. United States v. Morin, 949 F.2d 297, 300 (10th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Merryman, 630 F.2d 780, 785 (10th Cir.1980); United States v. Sperow, 551 F.2d 808, 811 (10th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930, 97 S.Ct. 2634, 53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977); United States v. Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229, 1231 (10th Cir.1973)). These cases have typically pertained to law enforcement officers detecting the odor of marijuana. However, not all jurisdictions require that an officer provide the basis of his knowledge of the odor of marijuana in order to establish probable cause. See United States v. Turner, 431 F.3d 332, 337 (8th Cir.2005) (upholding district court's finding of probable cause based on law enforcement officers' statements that defendant smelled strongly of marijuana when they encountered him in a public bar); United States v. Carr, 92 F.Supp.2d 1137, 1141-42 (D.Kan.2000) (upholding law enforcement officer's affidavit asserting he smelled marijuana despite the failure to provide a basis for his ability to recognize the odor of marijuana) (citing United States v. Ludwig, 508 F.2d 140, 141 (10th Cir.1974)) (holding inherent in officer's statement that he smelled marijuana is the claim that he is familiar with substance's odor). [¶ 79.] The facts of this case meet the threshold requirement of reasonably trustworthy information. The hotel manager called Lawrence County dispatch and identified himself by title. He gave a detailed account of what he had perceived via his sense of smell: The hallway smells of marijuana, as well as the two rooms that they were staying in. (Room 23 and Room 24). He then provided information that four male guests had just left the Budget Host Hotel, provided a description of the vehicle, its license plate number and state of issue, and the general direction of the vehicle's travel. Hamann corroborated the physical description of the vehicle, the license plate number and the direction of travel, and occupancy by four males when he spotted Sweedland's car; he then initiated the stop. [¶ 80.] What is at issue then, is whether the citizen informant tip plus the corroboration of the non-criminal conduct and appearance of Sweedland and his passengers rose to the level of probable cause, sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that these were the individuals who had been smoking marijuana at the hotel in violation of SDCL 22-42-15. [17] If yes, then Hamann had probable cause to stop the vehicle and conduct the search from the very beginning of the encounter. If the facts rose only to the level of reasonable suspicion for a Terry investigative stop, the question then becomes did anything occur during the stop that provided the additional facts necessary for reasonable suspicion to ripen into probable cause.