Opinion ID: 495278
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Caspersen and Kragness

Text: 57 Caspersen and Kragness, who were convicted on both the RICO-conspiracy count (Count I) and the substantive RICO count (Count II), each claim the government failed to demonstrate an adequate nexus between them and any enterprise or pattern of racketeering activity. RICO, they stress, makes it unlawful for any person ... to conduct or participate ... in the conduct of [an] enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(c) (emphasis added). They contend that to meet this standard, it must be shown that the individual defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by personally and directly taking part in two different schemes. 58 We doubt that it is necessary for each defendant to be personally and directly engaged in two different schemes (though the enterprise must be), given that the statute requires only that one participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [the] enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. See infra pp. 859-860. Even were we to accept this proposition, it would be of no avail to Kragness and Caspersen, for they each participated directly in two different schemes conducted by the enterprise. 59 Kragness asserts that there is no evidence that he had any truck with the cocaine-and-quaalude project. 13 This, even if true, makes no difference, since Kragness participated in both of the marijuana schemes we have identified, supra pp. 6-9 and 14-16. As for Caspersen, there is evidence that he participated in the La Junta marijuana scheme and in the cocaine-and-quaalude scheme. Caspersen objects that evidence of his participation in the cocaine-and-quaalude project may not be considered in assessing the validity of his RICO convictions because to do so would be inconsistent with his acquittal on Count VI, which charged him with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and quaaludes. 14 However, inconsistency between verdicts on separate counts of an indictment does not entitle a defendant to reversal of a conviction on insufficient-evidence grounds. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 68-69, 105 S.Ct. 471, 478-79, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932); United States v. Bryant, 766 F.2d 370, 376 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054, 106 S.Ct. 790, 88 L.Ed.2d 768 (1986). 15 Evidence of Caspersen's cocaine activities, together with evidence of his role in the La Junta scheme, is sufficient to support his RICO conviction.