Opinion ID: 1119568
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: AS 25.27.120(a) and AS 47.25.345

Text: CSED enjoys both independent and derivative rights to seek reimbursement for public assistance. CSED's independent right to recover public assistance reimbursement from child support obligors is derived from Alaska case law and Alaska statutes. In Matthews v. Matthews, [7] we noted that [a] parent's duty of support encompasses a duty to reimburse other persons who provide the support the parent owes. [8] In State, CSED v. Gammons, [9] we noted that the state is entitled to reimbursement for public assistance just as any other third party would be entitled to reimbursement. [10] An independent right of recovery is created by AS 25.27.120(a). An obligor parent who owes a duty of support is liable to the state for public assistance paid to the child. [11] Green owed Becky a duty of support. [12] That duty existed whether or not Green had paid all support then owing. The duty of support does not end until the parental relationship is terminated. Alaska Statute 25.27.120(a) looks not to whether the obligor owes support, but to whether the obligor owes a duty of support. The statute imposes a duty that runs directly from the obligor to the state; it is not derivative of any rights the custodian or even the child might have to collect support. The statutory liability is for the amount of public assistance paid, or for the amount of child support ordered, whichever is less. The obligor's prepayment of court-ordered support without court approval does not reduce either measure of liability under subsection .120(a). Because CSED's right to recoupment under AS 25.27.120(a) is an independent right, Green could not defeat or diminish his direct liability to CSED by paying Burton directly. By contrast, AS 47.25.345 gives CSED a derivative right to recoup public assistance payments by assigning to the state the public assistance recipient's support rights. [13] Under that statute, an AFDC applicant is considered to have assigned [to CSED] all rights to accrued and continuing support that the applicant and other persons for whom assistance is sought may have from all sources. [14] This statutory assignment terminates when the applicant ceases to receive assistance. [15] Section .345 had the effect of assigning to CSED Burton's and Becky's rights against Green. Courts elsewhere have held that agreements between parents do not defeat the state's right to reimbursement and that the state's assigned rights are not limited by the acts of the AFDC recipient. [16] But we do not need to consider that issue here. Even assuming that Green's direct payments impaired CSED's derivative rights (those derived through Burton under AS 47.25.345) to enforce the 1990 child support order against Green, and ignoring the question whether Burton's acts could impair rights derived through the child, CSED's independent right continues. Because CSED's independent right to recover AFDC payments under AS 25.27.120(a) is separate from CSED's derivative right to recover under AS 47.25.345, Burton's receipt of the lump sum payment did not defeat or diminish CSED's recoupment claim. Green's duty to reimburse the state under AS 25.27.120(a) was not affected by the prepayment. Rather, Green's direct liability simply depended on the existence of the duty to support his child. We need not consider whether circumstances could both defeat CSED's derivative section .345 right and also make it inequitable for CSED to rely on its independent subsection .120(a) right. (Consider, for example, an obligor who makes payments directly to the obligee with CSED's permission, in extremis, or under an arrangement adequately protecting the child's interests.) There was no judicial determination that Green's arrangement was in Becky's best interests. [17] Other courts have reached similar conclusions. In State ex rel. Phipps v. Phipps, [18] the Iowa Supreme Court held that a dissolution decree releasing a father from future support payments did not prevent the state from seeking reimbursement for AFDC payments made by the state to his child. [19] Like Green, the father in Phipps argued against reimbursing the state based on an agreement purporting to relieve him of child support. [20] The court held that the Iowa statute authorizing the state to seek public assistance reimbursement established an independent remedy, and that the state was therefore entitled to recover in its own right without regard to the terms of support orders affecting the parents' rights and obligations. [21] In In re Marriage of Walje, [22] the court required an obligor to reimburse the state for public assistance paid on behalf of his children when the obligor paid support directly to the custodial parent and children, and not through the court trustee as the decree required. [23] The court recognized that this result required the obligor to pay twice. In State ex rel. D.H.S. v. Hartless, [24] the court held that an obligor's payments to the custodial parent did not discharge the obligor's debt to the state for public assistance paid for his children. [25]