Opinion ID: 1384716
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Conspiracy Instruction Was Adequate

Text: Matthews also assigns several errors to the conspiracy instruction. First, he contends that the instruction did not identify the crime that Matthews was charged with conspiring to commit; second, that the instruction failed to require unanimity as to the overt act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy; and third, that the jury was permitted to identify as an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, acts committed before the conspiracy's objective formed. As Matthews did not object to the conspiracy instructions in the district court, we review these arguments for plain error. Allen, 390 F.3d at 952; Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b). Tracking verbatim the Seventh Circuit's pattern jury instruction for conspiracy, the district court told the jury that to convict Matthews of conspiracy to obstruct justice, the government had to prove: First, that the conspiracy as charged in Count 1 existed; and Second, that Ronald Matthews knowingly became a member of the conspiracy with an intention to further the conspiracy; and Third, that an overt act was committed by at least one conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find Ronald Matthews guilty on Count 1. See Seventh Circuit Pattern Criminal Federal Jury Instructions 5.08.
Matthews argues that the jury might have convicted him of conspiracy to obstruct justice without agreeing as to which overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. The indictment charged eighteen overt acts. The court gave a general unanimity instruction, but it did not specify that the jurors had to be unanimous as to which overt acts were performed. These facts, Matthews says, imperiled his right to a unanimous jury verdict. See United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 470 (7th Cir.1998) (discussing federal criminal defendant's right to a unanimous verdict). On the facts of this case, however, we find no such risk. We can be sure that the jury was unanimous as to at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and no more is required. See United States v. Soy, 454 F.3d 766, 768 (7th Cir.2006). Specifically, the jury unanimously found Matthews guilty of the perjury count, and Matthews does not challenge that conviction. As discussed below, the facts underlying the perjury conviction are the same as those alleged in Overt Act Q. With respect to the perjury count, the indictment alleged that, on November 16, 2004, Matthews testified that the East St. Louis Police Department had seized a firearm from Qattoum on August 7, 2004, but that the Department could no longer locate the weapon. Further, the indictment charged that Matthews falsely testified before the grand jury that he had not spoken with Qattoum about the case since August 7, and had never spoken with Qattoum about the grand jury subpoena. He was also alleged to have told the grand jury that he last saw the weapon sometime around or about October 19, 2004, the day he received the subpoena. However, the indictment notes that, as of October 19, Matthews knew that the firearm had been removed from the Department. Overt Act Q of the conspiracy recites the exact same allegations of perjury before the grand jury: On or about November 16, 2004, RONALD MATTHEWS appeared before the Federal grand jury in East St. Louis, Illinois and testified that the East St. Louis Police Department had, in fact, seized a firearm from AYOUB S. QATTOUM on August 7, 2004, but that the Department could not locate the actual physical weapon seized from AYOUB S. QATTOUM. MATTHEWS falsely testified that he had not discussed the case or the Federal grand jury subpoena with QATTOUM. Further, MATTHEWS falsely testified that he last saw the firearm on or about October 19, 2004, when he was served with the Federal grand jury subpoena by the ICE Special Agent. Given the complete overlap between Overt Act Q and the facts underlying Matthews's perjury conviction, we find that the jury did agree unanimously on at least one overt act. Matthews attempted to argue against this conclusion at oral argument, contending that his perjury could not have furthered the conspiracy to conceal the gun, because the government was in possession of the gun at that time. This argument is legally flawed. A conspiracy does not automatically terminate simply because the Government, unbeknownst to some of the conspirators, has `defeated' the conspiracy's `object.' United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270, 274, 123 S.Ct. 819, 154 L.Ed.2d 744 (2003). When Matthews testified, he was unaware that McIntosh had already given the gun to the FBI. Even though his lies had no hope of advancing the conspirators' goals, they were nonetheless acts legally in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. La Budda, 882 F.2d 244, 248 (7th Cir.1989) ([D]efendants can be found guilty of criminal conspiracy even though the object of their conspiracy is unattainable from the very beginning. (citations omitted)). The omission of a specific unanimity instruction on the overt acts was not plain error and did not affect Matthews's substantial rights. We should note however that if either party had requested a unanimity instruction or a special verdict form on the overt acts, unanimity would not have been an issue in this case. Counsel should seriously consider making such requests in the future.
Matthews asserts that it was legal error to allow the jury to consider overt acts occurring before the initiation of grand jury proceedings. He maintains that acts occurring before he became aware of the grand jury proceedings could not have furthered a conspiracy whose charged object was to impair the firearm's availability for use in an official proceeding. We review this forfeited argument for plain error. Allen, 390 F.3d at 952; Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). In making this argument, Matthews all but ignores § 1512(f)(1), which provides that an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense. This plainly means that a defendant may obstruct justice in violation of § 1512(c)(1) even before a judicial proceeding is ongoing. As we stated above, a defendant may obstruct justice under § 1512(c)(1) if he believes that his acts will be likely to affect a foreseeable proceeding. See Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 707, 125 S.Ct. 2129; Kaplan, 490 F.3d at 125. Since the government supplied ample evidenceincluding Matthews's own recorded statementsto support its claim that Matthews thought judicial proceedings likely if he did not dispose of the firearm, it was not plain error to submit the challenged overt acts to the jury for consideration. Matthews also argues that the conspiracy instruction was flawed because it did not specify the crime he conspired to commit or identify the object of the conspiracy. Rather than simply excerpting the language of the indictment, the instruction incorporates the counts of the indictment by reference. As the jury had access to the indictment, that was entirely proper. [4]