Opinion ID: 2462598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: five year statute of limitations

Text: The principal basis for the Wilsons' contention that the judgments of the courts below should be affirmed is the holding announced in Rosborough v. Cook, 108 Tex. 364, 194 S.W. 131 (1917), which is to the effect that in order to support a limitation title under the Five Year Statute of Limitations, it is not necessary that the deed, under which the claim is made, convey any title. The contention is that the grantor may be wholly barren of any vestige of title, and, therefore, the deed pass no semblance of title; yet, if it describes and purports to convey the land and is on its face a good deed, it meets the requirements of the statute, and the claimant under the deed would prevail, provided, of course, that all other requirements of the statute have been met. The Wilsons also cite in support of their contention the case of Benskin v. Barksdale, Tex.Com.App., 246 S.W. 360 (1923), wherein it was held, in part: The deed is sufficient to support adverse possession and to set in motion the five-year statute of limitation. Parker v. Newberry, 83 Tex. 428, 18 S. W. 815   . The statute, in so far as a deed is concerned, demands only that the person having peaceable and adverse possession of real estate be `claiming under a deed or deeds duly registered.' Rev.St. Art. 5674. Of course such deed must describe the land. We think the instrument   falls within the class designated as deeds. We cannot agree that the judgments reached in these cases are controlling. The deed, [3] under which the Wilsons seek to perfect title under the Five Year Statute of Limitations, was executed by J. H. Bright and wife on May 28, 1956. This deed recites that the Brights bargain, sell, release and forever quit claim unto the said Frank P. Wilson, Sr., and wife, Iris Kirk Wilson, their heirs and assigns, all our right, title and interest in and to that certain tract or parcel of land.    The habendum clause reads as follows: TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, together with all and singular the rights, privileges and appurtenances thereto in any manner belonging unto the said Frank P. Wilson and wife, Iris Kirk Wilson, their heirs and assigns forever, so that neither we, the said grantors, nor our heirs, nor any person or persons claiming under us shall, at any time hereafter, have, claim, or demand any right or title to the aforesaid premises or appurtenances, or any part thereof. The controlling question in this case is whether the instrument here involved is sufficient to give notice of the nature and extent of the claim asserted thereunder so as to qualify under the five-year statute. This question does not depend upon whether the grantors actually owned an interest in the property described in the instrument or not, but we must ascertain from an examination of the instrument whether it purports to convey the land itself or merely some wholly undefined and uncertain interest therein and in effect is a mere release of an invalid or doubtful claim. It seems well settled that a deed purporting to convey an undivided interest in land will not support a claim to the entire tract under the five-year statute but will only operate as a claim to the interest which the instrument on its face purports to convey. Martinez v. Bruni, Tex.Com. App. (1921), 235 S.W. 549, holdings approved by the Supreme Court, 2 Tex.Jur.2d 244, Adverse Possession, § 128. An instrument which purports to convey such right, title and interest as a grantor may have and no more will not qualify as a deed under the statute as it does not purport to convey the land itself nor does it specify any particular interest which is purportedly conveyed. Here the limitation claimants contend that the instrument under which they hold affords a basis for a limitation claim to all of Lots 21 and 24 under the five-year statute. The circumstance that the instrument employs the words, all our right, title and interest or the word quitclaim is not fatal to their contention as it must be determined from the instrument as a whole whether it purports to convey the land itself or merely such interest as the grantor may have therein. For example, in Jackson v. Heath, Tex. Civ.App. (1959), 325 S.W.2d 453, no wr. hist., it was held that an instrument which quitclaimed all the right, title and interest of the grantor did not qualify under the five-year statute. The habendum clause contained in such instrument was as follows: to have and to hold the above released rights, titles, interests, claims and demands, to the said [grantors] their assigns, forever. This decision is correct. From the face of the instrument it cannot be said that the grantors purported to convey the land or a specified interest therein. Instruments purporting to convey or release one's right, title or interest are commonly used to convey undivided interests of an unknown extent or claims having a dubious basis. It would be anomalous to say that a deed to an undivided one-third interest would support a claim to no more than an undivided one-third interest while a release or quitclaim of an unspecified right, title or interest would give notice and hence support a claim to the entire tract of land. In cases wherein the courts have construed an instrument employing the words, all my right, title and interest as one purporting to convey the land itself, they have found some wording in the instrument which evidenced an intention to convey the land itself rather than the right, title and interest of the grantor. In Cook v. Smith, 107 Tex. 119, 174 S.W. 1094, 3 A.L.R. 940 (1915), this Court construed an instrument which contained the following clauses: Granting Clause: `   have bargained, sold, released and forever quitclaimed, and by these presents do hereby bargain, sell, release and forever quitclaim,    all my right, title and interest in and to that certain tracts or parcels of land   .' Habendum Clause: `To have and to hold the said premises, together with all and singular the rights, privileges and appurtenances thereto in any manner belonging to the said A. A. Neff and his heirs and assigns forever, so that neither I, the said R. Potts, nor my heirs nor any person or persons claiming under me, shall at any time hereafter have, claim or demand any right or title to the aforesaid premises or appurtenances or any part thereof.' Intention Clause: This clause follows a description by block and number of a large number of lots including the lot in controversy and also several small tracts by metes and bounds. The clause reads as follows: `   and all other real estate that I now own and am possessed of in the town of Paducah, in Cottle county, Texas. All of the above town property is situated in the town of Paducah, in Cottle county, Texas, as shown by the original recorded plat of said town, of record in vol. 5, page 81, in the deed records of Cottle county, Texas; and it is my intention here now to convey to the said A. A. Neff all the real estate that I own in said town of Paducah in Cottle county, Texas, whether it is set out above or not.' The Court then said: The character of an instrument, as constituting a deed to land or merely a quitclaim deed, is to be determined according to whether it assumes to convey the property described and upon its face has that effect, or merely professes to convey the grantor's title to the property. If, according to the face of the instrument, its operation is to convey the property itself, it is a deed. If, on the other hand, it purports to convey no more than the title of the grantor, it is only a quitclaim deed. Richardson v. Levi, 67 Tex. [359], 364, 3 S.W. 444; Threadgill v. Bickerstaff, 87 Tex. 520, 29 S.W. 757. The Court then made special reference to the granting clause and the habendum clause of the conveyance involved, which clauses have been heretofore set out and said: If the character of the instrument were dependent, alone, upon the construction of [the granting and habendum clauses]    there could be no doubt    of its being simply a quitclaim deed,   . It should be noted that the granting clause contained the words, all my right, title and interest, and that the words of the habendumto have and to hold the said premises, were not construed to make the instrument operate to convey the property described, but the instrument remained one merely professing to convey the grantor's interest to the property. In other words, the word premises was construed as applying to the right, title and interest of the grantor rather than to the tracts of land described in the deed. It was held, however, that when the instrument was construed as a whole and the Intention Clause given due weight and consideration, the instrument was properly construed as one purporting to convey the land rather than such interest the grantor might have therein. It was held that one holding under the instrument in question would be protected as an innocent purchaser for value. While the five-year statute of limitations was not involved in Cook v. Smith, supra, the proper construction of the instrument of conveyance was at issue, i. e., did the deed purport to convey the land itself or merely the grantor's interest therein, if any? It should be pointed out that the Court used the word quitclaim deed to describe an instrument which does no more than purport to convey the right, title and interest of a grantor. The Court held that the instrument involved in Cook v. Smith purported to convey the land and was not a quitclaim, despite the use of the words, `release and forever quitclaim    all my right, title and interest in and to' the land involved. It was similarly held in Parker v. Newberry, 83 Tex. 428, 18 S.W. 815 (1892), that an instrument which used the word quitclaim in a clause releasing a 320-acre tract from the warranty clause did not render the instrument of conveyance ineligible under the five-year statute. The words right, title and interest did not appear in the deed involved in Parker v. Newberry. Perhaps the case which lends most support to respondent's position is Benskin v. Barksdale, Tex.Com.App. (1923), 246 S.W. 360, heretofore mentioned. Benskin recognizes as does Rosborough v. Cook, supra, that for an instrument to qualify under the five-year statute it must purport to convey the land and not merely the grantor's interest in the land. The granting clause in Benskin v. Barksdale used the words bargain, sell, release and forever quitclaim    all of my right, title and interest in and to [the described property]. The habendum clause read as follows: `To have and to hold the said premises together with all and singular the rights, privileges and appurtenances thereto in any manner belonging, unto the said J. M. Benskin, his heirs and assigns, forever, so that neither I, the said J. J. Ellis nor my heirs, nor any person or persons claiming under me, shall, at any time hereafter, have, claim or demand any right or title to the aforesaid premises or appurtenances, or any part thereof. But it is expressly agreed, understood and stipulated that a vendor's lien is retained on the aforesaid described premises until the aforementioned and described note and all interest thereon has been fully paid when this deed shall become absolute as a quitclaim deed.' The Commission held that the wording of the habendum clause converted the instrument into one which purported to convey the land itself and not merely the interest which the grantor actually had therein. It was said that: The granting clause in the above deed [which employs the words `all my right, title and interest'] is indefinite and uncertain as to the extent of the estate granted in the lands described.    The habendum of the above deed is not so flexible, pliant, and adaptable in its revelation of the extent of estate, in the land, intended by the parties to be passed. By its terms Benskin, his heirs and assigns, are to have and to hold the premises, together with all and singular the rights, privileges, and appurtenances thereto in any manner belonging, forever. We do not think the language of the instrument shows an intent merely to quitclaim the leasehold interest of Ellis. We have heretofore set out the clauses under consideration in Cook v. Smith, supra, wherein it was said that the habendum clause would not convert a right, title and interest instrument into one purporting to convey the land itself, although it was held that the Intention Clause would have that effect. In our opinion Cook v. Smith sets forth the better rule insofar as the construction and effect of the habendum clause is concerned. It seems that a grantor who deliberately chooses the words, right, title and interest would not intend to destroy the effect of such words by using an habendum clause using the common phrase, To have and to hold the above described premises.