Opinion ID: 1969629
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Motion to Dismiss Because of Undue Delay

Text: The Court has held that because the primary purpose of the disciplinary system is protection of the public, undue delay in prosecuting a disciplinary case is not in itself a proper ground for dismissal of charges of attorney misconduct. In re Williams, 513 A.2d 793, 796 (D.C.1986). Rather, the proper approach is to treat the lapse of time as a possible mitigating factor. Id. at 798. [8] The Court has limited such mitigation to unique and compelling circumstances. In re Fowler, 642 A.2d 1327, 1331 (D.C.1994). This case was reported to Bar Counsel in October 1993 and a petition was filed on June 15, 1994. Respondent's answer was filed on July 22, 1994, and the first day of hearings was October 6, 1994. Because Bar Counsel discovered files that Respondent and his attorney had not reviewed, the hearing was temporarily adjourned and concluded two months later on December 12, 1994. Respondent says that the Hearing Committee report was due two months after that, by February 12, 1995 (Board Rule 12.2); however, Respondent's own post-hearing brief was not filed until February 17, 1995. The time it took the Hearing Committee to produce its report after receiving post-hearing briefs six monthsis not unusual in this volunteer disciplinary system. Respondent was not under interim suspension and was free to practice law throughout the proceedings. Because current disclosure rules were not yet in effect, the case was confidential until issuance of the Hearing Committee's report. [9] Respondent argues prejudice on the grounds that witnesses' memories were diminished because of delays, causing factual disputes that were decided against him. Reply Brief of Respondent, December 13, 1995, at 7. Respondent refers specifically to the dispute between him and Mr. Clower as to when Mr. Clower learned about the altered records. It is not clear that the delay caused this factual dispute but, in any event, we do not believe this to be material to the issue before us. The one-year lapse between the time the case was reported to Bar Counsel and the first day of the hearing is not egregious. A seven-month investigation time is not unique or even unusual for most types of disciplinary cases. Bar Counsel verified his petition on May 9, 1994 and filed it with the Board on June 15, 1994, after approval by a contact member. Respondent filed his answer on July 22, 1994, and the hearing was scheduled for October 6, 1994, which is not out of line considering the fact that schedulers were dealing with summer vacations. Even at the best of times, it is difficult to find a hearing date agreeable to all parties. We do not find that delays harmed Respondent or were so unique or compelling that they should be considered in mitigation. The Board denies the motion to dismiss.