Opinion ID: 1604196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: the evidence of culpability was skewed in favor of the state by prosecutorial misconduct and trial court error.

Text: Under this first assignment of error in the sentencing phase, Chase includes several alleged errors. Chase questions the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding that Chase killed Elmer Hart. Chase argues that the State resorted to a varied array of underhanded tactics to bolster its case due to scant evidence to support their case. Chase alleges prosecutorial misconduct (misstatement of the law, inflammatory argument, failure to preserve evidence, expression of personal opinion, and bolstering of witnesses) and trial court error in excluding mitigation evidence. As has been the case previously, the majority of the alleged errors were not objected to in the lower court and are now procedurally barred.
The jury found that Ricky Chase actually killed Elmer Hart. Chase challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding necessary for a sentence of death as required under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7) and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). In reviewing the evidence to support the finding, Chase fails to include the testimony of Robert Washington among the evidence supporting the finding. Chase also does not mention the clothing that Chase was wearing which was splattered with blood. The question of fingerprints and who was or was not wearing gloves is a small part of the evidence before the jury. While there was conflicting testimony, there was more than scant evidence supporting the finding.
In appropriate circumstances, prosecutorial misconduct has been the basis for reversal of a defendant's conviction and sentence. See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 557 So.2d 542, 552-553 (Miss. 1990) (death sentence reversed because of prosecutorial misconduct in commenting on defendant's failure to testify). The prosecutor, indeed any attorney, is required to act in a fit, dignified, and courteous manner which will not degrade or interfere with the administration of justice. Rule 5.01, Unif.Crim.R.Cir.Ct. Chase's first complaint is that the prosecutor misstated the law during voir dire. The prosecutor stated that if the jury found the mitigating factors did not outweigh the aggravating factors ... then you on your oath would be required to return the death penalty. Defense counsel and the court responded as follows: BY MR. VARAS: Excuse me, Your Honor. I don't think that the law states that they have to do that, even if the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. They can return life no matter what. BY THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you will be instructed as to the law at the proper time and just wait and when you receive the law, that will be the law that you are to apply, the law that you receive from the instructions of the Court. Although no specific relief was requested, the court immediately took steps to correct the situation. No further relief was requested by the defense. The instruction of the trial judge was adequate to correct any error in the misstatement of the law. It is presumed that jurors follow the instructions of the court. To presume otherwise would be to render the jury system inoperable. Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136, 1142 (Miss. 1985). Chase next argues that the prosecutor improperly questioned witnesses concerning Mrs. Hart's condition after the murder and introduced pictures of Mrs. Hart which allegedly lacked relevance. This is characterized by Chase as an attempt to elicit sympathy for the victim and his family. Edwin Dodds, the mail carrier who discovered Mrs. Hart tied up and blindfolded in her front yard, was asked to describe her physical condition at that time. Sheriff Tommy Jackson was asked about Mrs. Hart's condition when he arrived at the crime scene. The other two references in the record noted by Chase are to Mrs. Hart's testimony and are not concerning her condition. Clearly, there was no error in allowing witnesses to testify as to what they observed when arriving at the murder site. Chase does not support his argument with any authority. Chase further fails to note that Mrs. Hart was a material witness to the events of August 14 and also a victim of physical abuse by Chase and Washington. There was no objection raised to the testimony or to the photographs of Doris Hart. In fact, defense counsel was asked if there was any objection to admission of the photographs and responded, No, sir, not to this particular photograph. and No, sir. Argument on this comes too late and is totally without merit. Chase next complains about points raised by the prosecutor during closing argument which Chase says are inflammatory. The prosecutor argued to the jury: You have to go inside you, you can get past the objective because we have met the burden, but I think that when you search your souls you will see that Mr. Hart, his death demands the ultimate punishment, and that is death. The prosecutor also argued that if you cannot be safe [in your own home], then you can't be safe anywhere. Mrs. Hart will never, ever return to that home. Again, no objection was raised to any of this argument. In Johnson v. State, 477 So.2d 196, 209-210 (Miss. 1985) this Court addressed the need for objection to closing argument: We next observe it is the duty of a trial counsel, if he deems opposing counsel overstepping the wide range of authorized argument, to promptly make objections and insist upon a ruling by the trial court. The trial judge first determines if the objection should be sustained or overruled. If the argument is improper, and the objection is sustained, it is the further duty of the trial counsel to move for a mistrial. The circuit judge is in the best position to weigh the consequences of the objectionable argument, and unless serious and irreparable damage has been done, admonish the jury then and there to disregard the improper comment... . (citations omitted). The legal authority cited by Chase does nothing to support his argument. This was not a case where the prosecution introduced evidence of the character or reputation of the deceased or other evidence outside the aggravating circumstances. See, e.g., Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660 (Miss. 1991), Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928 (Miss. 1986), Wiley v. State 484 So.2d 339 (Miss. 1986), Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d 640 (Miss. 1979). In Williams v. State, 522 So.2d 201, 209 (Miss. 1988), the Court, despite cautioning prosecutors against making such arguments, declined to reverse based on arguments of the prosecution in summation. At issue in Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45, 53 (Miss. 1985), also cited as support by Chase, was the presence of the victim's daughter within the rail throughout the trial, which affords no basis for comparison. Next, Chase argues that the State failed to preserve physical evidence. Specifically, Chase argues that the State failed to test the gloves purportedly worn by Robert Washington for evidence that he fired the fatal shot. Chase also claims that the State did not adequately examine Elmer Hart's clothing. Defense counsel asked that the gloves be tested to determine whether they had been worn by the triggerman and was told that this test could not be done due to a previously conducted serological test. There is no mention in the record of testing being requested on Mr. Hart's clothing. In deciding whether destruction of evidence is a denial of due process, the Court looks to whether the government agents acted in good faith and in accord with their normal practice or had made a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence. Tolbert v. State, 511 So.2d 1368, 1372 (Miss. 1987), citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 (1984). The testimony was that the testing done on Mr. Hart's clothing was standard and the clothes were returned to the family. In the letter to defense counsel advising him that the specific test he wanted on the gloves was no longer possible, the prosecutor offered full cooperation to have any additional tests performed on other exhibits. There was no evidence of bad faith destruction or suppression of any evidence that might be exculpatory. Chase also argues that the prosecutor improperly expressed his personal opinion as to the his guilt in voir dire and during closing arguments. Once again, there was no objection raised to any of these statements and any argument is now procedurally barred. On voir dire, the prosecutor stated: Two people were involved in this murder, in the death of Mr. Hart. I believe that Ricky Chase was one of them. In guilt phase closing argument, the prosecutor said: We know that all of the clothes and shoes that were found that everything, in my mind, proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the clothes belonged to the defendant. In the sentencing phase closing argument, the prosecutor was recorded as saying: My whole decision, my whole point in being here is because I believe that I have proved to you beyond a reasonable doubt and beyond any doubt, that that man right there, a man that shows absolutely no remorse, is the one that pulled the trigger at a time when an elderly man was on his knees with a pocket knife in his hand trying to cut the bonds that held his wife imprisoned. The comments by the prosecutor were based on matters in evidence. During closing argument, the prosecutor, as well as defense counsel, may comment on facts in evidence and may draw proper deductions from those facts. Johnson v. State, 416 So.2d 383, 391 (Miss. 1982). In Nixon v. State, 533 So.2d 1078, 1100 (Miss. 1987) this Court warned prosecutors to refrain from interjecting personal beliefs into presentation of their cases. Hard blows are permissible; foul blows are not. Id. As was the case in Nixon, the comments by the prosecutor in this current case are neither hard nor foul. Even if there had been an objection raised, the comments were within permissible bounds. Chase's next argument is that the prosecution bolstered the testimony of witnesses and elicited the evidence concerning the polygraph taken by Robert Washington. There was no objection to any of this alleged bolstering and the argument is procedurally barred. The testimony complained of in the redirect examination of Robert Washington is as follows: Q He asked you about being in a a lineup. What did you say you did after you had been in a lineup? A Ricky was telling the Sheriff that I was involved in a killing at the roadside park and I didn't know nothing about it, and so I told him I didn't know nothing about it, you know, and he took me to Jackson to take a polygraph test, and so I went and took it, and the man said I passed the test just like that. Q Where did you take the test? A In Jackson at the Highway Patrol Office. Washington's testimony that he had taken a polygraph came during questioning by the prosecution, but his testimony and apparently the polygraph are concerning an unrelated killing of which Washington was accused. This questioning was a follow up on questioning by defense counsel. Asking the additional question of where the testing occurred does not particularly bolster Washington's testimony. During closing argument the prosecutor stated the following: I don't believe anyone could question the fact that Mrs. Hart was trying to tell the truth as she remembers it. She is amazingly accurate. When she tells you something, when she tell you she says something, when she tells you she knows something, it is proven without question. She described the man that assaulted her, light skinned, large man. Ricky Chase is a small man, Robert Washington is about 5' 11, 180. He is a large man... . Mr. Varas made a point that Terry Washington was telling the truth when she contradicted something that Robert said, and I think that Terry Washington told you the truth about everything she knew. I don't think she tried to hold anything back. As previously discussed, the prosecutor is allowed some leeway in discussion of the evidence in closing argument. Looking at Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 935-936 (Miss. 1986), this does not amount to improper vouching in this case.
On several occasions Chase's counsel attempted to introduce evidence of the bad character and background of Robert Washington. Objection was raised by the prosecution based on relevancy and sustained by the trial court. Shirley Norrells, Robert Washington's cousin, testified that Washington used drugs and on the Saturday before the murder he appeared spaced out and did not respond when she spoke to him twice. When defense counsel sought to continue this line of questioning, the prosecutor objected as to its relevancy, and the court sustained the objection. During the sentencing phase, Norrells was asked if she thought Chase was capable of pulling a trigger on somebody. The question was objected to and the objection sustained by the court. During the testimony of Henry Puckett, a cellmate of Washington at the Copiah County Detention Center, defense counsel asked, And how does Robert appear, what is your impression of him? The objection by the prosecutor was sustained. Defense counsel next asked, Well, let me ask you this. Is there any other specific act you can refer to about Robert? Objection by the prosecutor was again sustained. The court told defense counsel that unless the questions went to character or truthfulness the court would sustain the objection. During the sentencing phase, defense counsel asked Henry Dorsey, a former teacher and coach of Chase and Washington, about any incidents involving Washington that stood out in his mind. When Dorsey started to testify to an altercation between him and Washington, the prosecution objected and the court sustained the objection. Dorsey was also asked if he thought Chase was a murderer. The objection to this question as being improper was sustained. Lynn Beall, the principal of Hazlehurst Elementary School, was asked if he thought Ricky Chase was capable of shooting somebody. In sustaining the objection, the court told defense counsel that [w]e are now in a phase where if you wish to offer any evidence of mitigating circumstances, then I will let you offer any evidence as to that. Defendants should be given broad latitude in introducing mitigating circumstance evidence restricted only by the requirement that the evidence must be relevant. Davis v. State, 512 So.2d 1291, 1293 (Miss. 1987). Apparently, Chase is confused as to the nature of mitigating evidence. The character of Robert Washington and personal opinion as to Chase's capacity for murder are not the same as evidence of mitigating circumstances. The jury had already determined that Chase had committed murder. There was no relevant evidence excluded. There is no merit to this assigned error. The arguments under this assignment of error are either procedurally barred, without merit or both.