Opinion ID: 854102
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Haak's statements to a government informant

Text: Northwest Indiana drug dealer Alvin McCarver was charged in 1992 with a number of federal drug-related offenses. Facing the possibility of a life sentence, he began cooperating with federal authorities in 1993. Although it does not appear that he was a party to the conspiracy, McCarver sold Haak the murder weapon the week before the killing. On May 20, 1994, Haak went to the Federal Building in Hammond to meet with McCarver (then in federal custody) at the latter's request. On July 8, 1994, the two met again as cellmates at the Federal Building after Haak had been arrested on a federal drug charge. At the behest of federal authorities who recorded both conversations, McCarver steered both exchanges to Haak's involvement in Pronger's murder. Haak was recorded stating that he shot Pronger and disposed of the gun and reporting the payment he had received for the killing. Haak moved unsuccessfully before trial to suppress audio and video recordings of these conversations as involuntarily given. He contends that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated when this evidence was admitted at trial over his objection. When a defendant challenges the voluntariness of a confession under the United States Constitution, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntarily given. Smith v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1238, 1246-47 n. 11 (Ind.1997). The finding of voluntariness will be upheld if the record discloses substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial court's decision. We do not reweigh the evidence and conflicting evidence is viewed most favorably to the trial court's ruling. See, e.g., Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921, 926 n. 2 (Ind.1998). Haak does not argue that his statements to McCarver were involuntary because of the circumstances of the interrogation or the questions McCarver asked to elicit the incriminating information. Rather, Haak maintains that his statements were coerced because of events that occurred before the challenged conversations. There was testimony that Haak's father was involved with McCarver's drug organization in the 1980s and had begun sharing information about McCarver with federal authorities in 1992. The father, who told Haak that he feared McCarver and possible reprisal due to his cooperation, sustained serious burn injuries in a fire at his apartment in 1994 that may have been set by McCarver's subordinates. Haak contends that when viewed against this backdrop of events, his will was overborne in such a way as to render [his] confessions to McCarver ... the product of coercion. Haak relies on Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) for the proposition that this states a Fifth Amendment claim. [2] In that case, Fulminante, while incarcerated in New York for illegal gun possession, was threatened by other inmates because of a rumor that he had murdered his stepdaughter in Arizona. Fulminante confessed the murder to another inmate after the inmate promised to protect Fulminante from assaults by other inmates if he told the truth about the Arizona killing. Accepting the lower court's finding that Fulminante faced a credible threat of physical violence unless he confessed, the Supreme Court held that Fulminante's will was overborne in such away as to render his confession the product of coercion. Id. at 288, 111 S.Ct. at 1253. It was irrelevant whether the threat came from a government agent or a third party; a credible threat of violence was sufficient to render the confession involuntary. Id. at 287-88, 111 S.Ct. at 1252-53. Fulminante is inapposite here because it involved a trade of benefitprotectionfor the suspect's discussing the crime. Haak does not point to any evidence showing that he was promised immunity from possible reprisals against himself or his family if he confessed. Haak testified that (1) he concluded from prior telephone conversations with McCarver that any of my family who cooperated with law enforcement authorities against McCarver would be got; and (2) he went to meet with McCarver on May 20 because I was afraid that if I didn't cooperate and help him, that he might go after my father or mother or brothers. Cooperate and help in this context, however, referred to possibly assisting McCarver in getting out on bond, not confessing to Pronger's murder. A confession may be excludable if obtained after a threat to a member of the defendant's family. However, there must be a showing that but for the threat or inducement, the confession might not have occurred. Hall v. State, 255 Ind. 606, 611, 266 N.E.2d 16, 19 (1971) ([W]hen the threat to so charge and attempt to convict [the family member] is made ... to `encourage' the appellant to make a full confession, we cannot say as a matter of law that that confession is given freely and voluntarily). See generally Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, Voluntariness of Confession as Affected by Police Statements That Suspect's Relatives Will Benefit by the Confession, 51 A.L.R. 4TH 495 (1987 & Supp. 1997). That causal link is lacking here. If we accept Haak's testimony at face value, McCarver said he would punish, even kill, anyone who cooperated in the investigation of his drug enterprise. Haak feared McCarver because of his ability to carry out those threats. Whatever concern Haak may have had for the consequences of cooperating with an investigation of McCarver, there is no basis to suggest that his confessions were in any way caused by that fear. In fact, when asked on both direct and cross-examination why he made the incriminating statements to McCarver, Haak testified that he was covering for Harth, whom Haak described as a close friend for many years. This was consistent with Haak's defense that Harth and Timothy Weaver (brother of Linda, discussed above) carried out the killing. In sum, Haak's own testimony contradicts his assertion in this appeal that he made the challenged statements in response to a threat or inducement from McCarver. To the extent he feared reprisals against members of his family, he has not shown any connection between those threats and his inculpatory statements. Accordingly, the decision that the confession was voluntary was not error. Although the argument is not well developed, Haak appears to suggest that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because McCarver deliberately elicited incriminating statements from him. [3] The State responds that although Haak had been charged with an unrelated offense at the time of the conversation as cellmates, his Sixth Amendment rights with respect to the offenses here could not have been violated because he was not charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder until six days later. The State is correct. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not proscribe the admission of evidence of uncharged crimes still under investigation. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175-76, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). The Sixth Amendment therefore did not bar the admission of any statements Haak made before he was charged in this case.