Opinion ID: 379476
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: DeCoster I

Text: 113 DeCoster I stated that under the Sixth Amendment an attorney has a duty to his client to be a diligent and conscientious advocate and to provide reasonably competent assistance. This standard of conduct is almost self evident. The court gave this general duty more specific content by listing some of counsel's responsibilities toward his client. 11 114 No itemization of general duties, however, can serve as a check-off list of absolute, hard and fast rules such that the slightest deviation will constitute a constitutional error. 12 It would be wrong to construe DeCoster I as establishing such rigid guidelines. The duties listed in DeCoster I were phrased generally, 13 and most of them require the exercise of considerable judgment, discretion and adjustment to the widely varying facts of criminal cases. The borderline between the adequate assistance (required by the Constitution) and inadequate assistance may vary greatly with the factual circumstances of each case. 14 In recognition of this, the American Bar Association Standards for the Defense Function, which the DeCoster I guidelines incorporate by reference, explicitly provide that they are not intended as criteria for judicial evaluation of the effectiveness of counsel to determine the validity of a conviction. 15 Thus, while counsel has certain general duties to his client, the exact nature of these duties varies with the case, and counsel's competent judgment exercised in the best interests of his client should be afforded great weight, as should that of the trial judge with his first hand knowledge of the proceedings. In short, whether counsel has breached his duty depends upon the facts in each case. 115 Once a defendant establishes a breach of duty by his counsel, DeCoster I, supra, still requires that the defendant demonstrate that this breach constitutes a substantial violation. 116 If a defendant shows a substantial violation of any of these requirements he has been denied effective representation unless the government, on which is cast the burden of proof once a violation of these precepts is shown, can establish lack of prejudice thereby. Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968). 117 159 U.S.App.D.C. at 333, 487 F.2d at 1204 (emphasis added). The deficiencies in this formulation are set out in the plurality opinion. In addition, what was meant by substantial violation is not clearly articulated in DeCoster I. United States v. Pinkney, 177 U.S.App.D.C. 423, 543 F.2d 908 (1976), decided subsequently, indicates that substantial violation contemplates a showing that counsel's duty to the defendant was breached substantially and that this prejudiced the defendant. 118 In Pinkney, appellant alleged inadequate assistance of counsel. The court rejected Pinkney's claim, holding that a DeCoster I motion is one for a new trial in which the defendant bears the same obligation to show prejudice to his cause as in any other new trial motion: 119 The vehicle (for raising an inadequate assistance of counsel claim), we said (in DeCoster I ), was a motion for a new trial, obviously one presenting new evidence in the sense of evidence outside the record in other words, a new-trial motion based on newly discovered evidence. An essential characteristic of such a motion is a disclosure of evidence portraying the movant's claim materially and resolutely, and evincing a capability of mounting a serious challenge. By the same token, a motion charging ineffective assistance of counsel must set forth evidence upon which the elements of a constitutionally deficient performance might properly be found. 120 177 U.S.App.D.C. at 431, 543 F.2d at 916 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The court then cited several cases, each of which unambiguously states that a defendant must show prejudice to sustain his new trial motion. 16 According to Pinkney, therefore, prejudice to the accused is a necessary element of a claim of a constitutionally deficient performance by counsel. 17 121 In summary, under DeCoster I and our prior decisions, the defendant lacks a substantial claim unless he makes out a prima facie case showing (1) that counsel's constitutional duty toward him was breached and (2) that he suffered unfair prejudice as a result of that breach. The burden of proof to make this showing falls squarely on the defendant. 18