Opinion ID: 2390579
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sequential Deliberation on Homicide Offenses

Text: Defendant objects for the first time on appeal to the trial court instructing the jury to consider the various charges in a sequential manner. The trial court, when it charged the jury on knowing murder, aggravated manslaughter, and reckless manslaughter, instructed it to begin by deliberating on the first charge, knowing murder, and to move on to subsequent charges only if the jury acquitted defendant of murder. We reject defendant's contention because there is nothing inherently wrong with a sequential charge. State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 223, 574 A. 2d 951 (1990); see also State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 405-06, 548 A. 2d 1022 (1988) (same). In Coyle, we rejected the use of a strictly sequential charge where passion/provocation manslaughter provided a viable alternative for the jury. In such a case, the sequential charge has the potential to foreclose whether passion/provocation should reduce an otherwise purposeful killing from murder to manslaughter. State v. Coyle, supra, 119 N.J. at 222, 574 A. 2d 951. However, here, where no evidence supporting passion/provocation exists, and where passion/provocation was not argued, the concerns present in Coyle disappear. We reaffirm the position that [a]bsent evidence of passion/provocation, sequential charges usually provide a framework for orderly deliberations. State v. Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 405, 548 A. 2d 1022. [ State v. Coyle, supra, 119 N.J. at 223, 574 A. 2d 951]. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not commit plain error by instructing the jury to consider the charges in a sequential order.