Opinion ID: 6978959
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Broad Conception

Text: The current broad conception of the Eleventh Amendment as the constitutional guarantor of state sovereign immunity is usually traced to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. at 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114; Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779, 111 S.Ct. 2578, 115 L.Ed.2d 686 (1991); see also Richard H. Fallon et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1051 (4th ed.1996) (“[T]here is no doubt that the decision marked a critical turning point, and that ever since, the Court has not adhered to a ‘literal’ reading of the Amendment in determining its effect on federal jurisdiction.”). In Hans a Louisiana citizen and bondholder sued the State of Louisiana claiming that the state’s adoption of a constitutional amendment prohibiting the payment of interest on its bonds violated the Contracts Clause of the Constitution. Acknowledging that the literal terms of the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to suits by in-state plaintiffs, Hans, 134 U.S. at 10, 10 S.Ct. 504, the Court nonetheless refused to limit the reach of the Amendment to its “letter.” Id. at 15, 10 S.Ct. 504. In extending the states’ immunity from suit beyond the text of the Amendment, the Court relied on the already quoted views of Madison, Hamilton and Marshall. See Part III.A.I.a., supra. It recalled the “shock of surprise,” Hans, 134 U.S. at 11, 10 S.Ct. 504, arising from the Supreme Court’s decision in Chilsolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793): The letter is appealed to now, as it was then, as a ground for sustaining a suit brought by an individual against a state. The reason against it is as strong in this case as it was in that. It is an attempt to strain the constitution and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of.... Suppose that congress, when proposing the eleventh amendment, had appended to it a proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a state from being sued by its own citizens in cases arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, can we imagine that it would have been adopted by the states? The supposition that it would is almost an absurdity on its face. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15, 10 S.Ct. 504. Criticism of the Hans Court’s approach and its conception of a broad principle of sovereign immunity implicit in the constitutional design have been at the heart of much of the debate over the meaning and scope of the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 84-93, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 116-85, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (Souter, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 259-302, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As the Supreme Court noted recently, “[t]hese criticisms and proposed doctrinal revisions ... have not found acceptance with a majority of the Court.” Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, -, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 2033, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997). On the contrary, a consistent course of Supreme Court decisions has reaffirmed the principle that the Eleventh Amendment functions as a constitutional limit on the jurisdictional grant contained in Article III. See, e .g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, at -, 117 S.Ct. at 2034 (“[Eleventh Amendment immunity represents a real limitation on a federal court’s federal-question jurisdiction.”); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 63, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment st[ands] for the constitutional principle that state sovereign immunity limit[s] the federal courts’ jurisdiction under Article III.”); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 238, 105 S.Ct. 3142 (“[T]he significance of this Amendment ‘lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. Ill of the Constitution.’” (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (Pennhurst II))).