Opinion ID: 2600307
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Constitutionality of Instructions Defining Scope of Jury's Sentencing Discretion and the Nature of its Deliberative Process

Text: Defendant contends the standard jury instruction (based on CALJIC No. 8.88) defining the scope of the jury's sentencing discretion and the nature of its deliberative' process is unconstitutional for various reasons. We adhere to the decisions that have rejected similar claims, and decline to reconsider such authorities, as follows: 1. Reference to substantial aggravating circumstances Defendant claims that the instruction (CALJIC No. 8.88) impermissibly asked the jury to decide whether the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with mitigating circumstance as to justify the death penalty. Defendant argues the phrase so substantial is too vague to give adequate guidance to the jurors, but our case law disagrees. (E.g., People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 124, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 315-316, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585.) 2. Failure to instruct the jury to return a verdict of life imprisonment if aggravating factors do not outweigh mitigating ones Defendant contends the instruction based on CALJIC No. 8.88 failed to tell the jurors that they were required to impose a verdict of life imprisonment without parole if aggravating factors do not outweigh mitigating ones. We have rejected this argument and see no reasons to reconsider it here. (E.g., People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 124, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30; People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 381, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) 3. Failure to instruct jury that it could impose life even if factors in aggravation outweighed those in mitigation Defendant contends the court's sentencing instruction based on CALJIC No. 8.88 failed to tell the jurors that they could return a life sentence even if they found that the factors in aggravation outweighed those in mitigation. Defendant's jury was instructed that [a]ny of the mitigating factors, standing alone, may support a decision that death is not the appropriate punishment in this case, if you find that the weight of such a single mitigating factor outweigh[s] all aggravating factors. Defendant was not entitled to a specific instruction that the jury may choose life without possibility of parole even if it finds the aggravating circumstances outweigh those in mitigation. ( People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 381, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169; People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 781-782, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) 4. Failure to inform jury that defendant had no burden to persuade the jurors that death was not an appropriate penalty Defendant contends the instruction based on CALJIC No. 8.88 was constitutionally inadequate because it failed to instruct the jury that he had no burden to persuade them that the death penalty was inappropriate in this case. Again, we have rejected the contention and continue to do so here. (E.g., People v. Coffman and Marlow. supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 124, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) Implicit in the sentencing instructions is that the determination of penalty is essentially moral and normative [citation], and therefore ... there is no burden of proof or burden of persuasion. [Citation.] ( People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 643, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.)