Opinion ID: 182572
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discretionary Function Exception Applies

Text: Hart advances several reasons why the discretionary function exception does not apply here. Hart criticizes the district court for overly emphasizing the Handbook's granting of discretion to BIA officers in deciding when and how to restrain a suspect. Hart explains her complaint grounds the government's liability not only on S/A Robertson's failure to restrain Block, but also S/A Robertson's overall failure to supervise and control Block. Hart argues other arrest procedures in the Handbook are mandatory and criticizes S/A Robertson's decision to allow Block to leave S/A Robertson's presence. Hart relies upon her expert witness's testimony that allowing Block freely to enter the house was unreasonable, negligent, and patently inconsistent with nationally recognized protocols for making arrests. Hart characterizes these national standards as mandatory. The district court did not err. The discretionary function exception clearly applies, and the district court lacked jurisdiction over Hart's complaint. Turning to the familiar two-part test: First, S/A Robertson's actions were the product of the wide discretion afforded to him as a BIA officer in effectuating Block's arrest. By its terms, the Handbook merely establishes guidelines for contact with. . . arrestees and explicitly permits some discretion in the use of handcuffs and restraining devices. The Handbook repeatedly limits its own recommendations to, for example, the majority of arrests and most prisoners. While some provisions of the Handbook are phrased in imperative language, in context, all of the decisions S/A Robertson made regarding Block's arrest remained discretionary, involving `an element of judgment or choice.' Riley, 486 F.3d at 1032; cf. Four v. United States ex rel. BIA, 431 F.Supp.2d 985, 991 (D.N.D.2006) (holding other provisions of the Handbook, relating to a dispatcher determination of whether immediate assistance is needed, are discretionary). The Handbook's granting of discretion is consistent with our prior recognition that [l]aw enforcement decisions of the kind involved in making or terminating an arrest must be within the discretion and judgment of enforcing officers. Deuser v. Vecera, 139 F.3d 1190, 1195 (8th Cir.1998). Hart's characterization of nationally recognized protocols for making arrests as mandatory does not make them so. Second, because the Handbook granted S/A Robertson discretion to afford Block some freedom of movement before transporting him to jail, we presume S/A Robertson's actions were grounded in the sort of policy choice that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield from liability in tort. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991) (When established governmental policy, as expressed or implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a Government agent to exercise discretion, it must be presumed that the agent's acts are grounded in policy when exercising that discretion.). Hart does not cite, and we cannot find, any law or facts rebutting this presumption. We readily conclude a federal law enforcement officer's on-the-spot decisions concerning how to effectuate an arrestincluding how best to restrain, supervise, control or trust an arresteefall within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA absent a specific mandatory directive to the contrary. See, e.g., Dykstra, 140 F.3d at 796 (We have no difficulty in concluding that the discretionary function exception applies to the correctional officer's decision not to place Dykstra in protective custody or to take other protective action.); Deuser, 139 F.3d at 1195-96 (holding a park ranger's decision to terminate an arrest falls within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, because such decision was the classic example of conduct grounded in policy); Mesa v. United States, 123 F.3d 1435, 1438 (11th Cir.1997) (holding the manner in which federal law enforcement agents investigated a suspect and executed an arrest warrant fell within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA). Such decisions are quintessential examples of the permissible exercise of policy judgment. In an analogous case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently observed: In general, because it is the mandatory duty of law enforcement agents to enforce the law, decisions as to how to best fulfill that duty are protected by the discretionary function exception. . . . [The agent is] required to consider his training, the need to restrain [the arrestee], the concern for [the arrestee's] safety, the public's safety, his available resources, and the information at hand in determining the proper course of action. All of these factors indicate that the decision regarding how to best effectuate an arrest warrant is fundamentally rooted in policy considerations, and that judicial second-guessing of this decision thus is not appropriate.