Opinion ID: 2615512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Part Two: Mandamus and State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson

Text: {10} Plaintiffs argue that this case is controlled not by Rule 1-019(B) or the public policy articulated in Srader regarding tribal sovereign immunity, but by State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 562, 904 P.2d 11 (1995). In Johnson, this Court issued a writ of mandamus that declared the original, pre-HB 399 compacts between the Governor and certain tribes and pueblos to be without legal effect. 120 N.M. at 578, 904 P.2d at 27. We did so in spite of the writ's obvious effect on then-incipient Indian gaming because the Governor's unilateral act of binding the state to the terms of the compacts, without legislative authorization or ratification, was both patently beyond his authority and a clear violation of state constitutional separation of powers principles, see id. at 576-78, 904 P.2d at 25-27, thereby posing a serious threat to this State's definition of itself as sovereign, id. at 569, 904 P.2d at 18. We were careful to point out in Johnson that In a mandamus case, a party is indispensable if the performance of an act [to be compelled by the writ of mandamus is] dependent on the will of a third party, not before the court. Chavez v. Baca, 47 N.M. 471, 482, 144 P.2d 175, 182 (1943). That is not the case here. Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus against the Governor of New Mexico, not against any of the tribal officials. Resolution of this case requires only that we evaluate the Governor's authority under New Mexico law to enter into the compacts and agreements absent legislative authorization or ratification. Id. at 570, 904 P.2d at 19. As this Court stated in Srader, Johnson articulates an indispensability rule based on the special character of mandamus. 1998-NMSC-025, ¶ 37, 125 N.M. 521, 964 P.2d 82. {11} Here, citing Johnson, Plaintiffs have styled their amended complaint a petition for writ of mandamus and they advance several arguments regarding the grave threats HB 399 allegedly poses to this state's definition of itself as sovereign. Upon close examination, however, none of Plaintiffs' arguments provide a proper basis for this Court to order mandamus. Johnson is therefore inapposite. {12} Mandamus is a drastic remedy to be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances. Brantley Farms v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 1998-NMCA-023, ¶ 12, 124 N.M. 698, 954 P.2d 763. The writ shall not issue in any case where there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It shall issue on the information of the party beneficially interested. NMSA 1978, § 44-2-5 (1884). [A] writ of mandamus is available only to one who has a clear legal right to the performance sought; it is available only in limited circumstances to achieve limited purposes. State ex rel. Stratton v. Alto Land & Cattle Co., 113 N.M. 276, 282, 824 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Ct.App.1991); see generally 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 57 (1998). {13} We conclude that Plaintiffs fail to show a clear legal right to the performance they seek in their petition for a writ of mandamus. In contrast to the facts in Johnson, 120 N.M. at 562, 904 P.2d at 11, the Legislature has now passed legislation authorizing gaming compacts with the Tribes and Pueblos. See §§ 11-13-1, 11-13-2; cf. Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65, 961 P.2d 1013, 1020 (1998) (en banc) (distinguishing Johnson on the grounds that Arizona had expressly authorized its governor to enter into gaming compacts). Thus, instead of ascertaining the Governor's authority to enter into compacts and agreements absent legislative authorization or ratification as we did in Johnson, 120 N.M. at 570, 904 P.2d at 19, we are asked today by Plaintiffs to evaluate a much broader and more loosely defined set of issues involving standing generally and whether Plaintiffs are beneficially interested parties under the mandamus statute.