Opinion ID: 1878549
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the failure of the warrant to designate a nighttime search invalidates the search.

Text: Tyson argues that the warrant to search his apartment contained a box that the judge should have checked in order to authorize a nighttime search. That box was not checked, yet the search was made at night. Rule 3.10, Ala.R.Crim.P., provides, in pertinent part: In cases in which the property to be seized does not include a controlled substance, a search warrant must be executed in the daytime unless the affidavits state positively that the property is on the person or in the place to be searched, in which case the search warrant may be executed at any time of the day or night. Except in cases in which the property to be seized includes a controlled substance, the issuing judge or magistrate must state in the warrant, according to the character of the affidavits, whether it is to be executed by day or at any time of the day or night. In cases in which the property to be seized includes a controlled substance, a warrant may be executed at any time of the day or night and the warrant need not state whether it is to be executed by day or at any time of the day or night. Similarly, § 15-5-8, Ala.Code 1975, provides: In cases in which the property to be seized does not include a controlled substance, a search warrant must be executed in the daytime unless the affidavits state positively that the property is on the person or in the place to be searched, in which case it may be executed at any time of the day or night. Except in cases in which the property to be seized includes a controlled substance, the issuing judge or magistrate must state in the warrant, according to the character of the affidavits, whether it is to be executed by day or at any time of the day or night. In cases in which the property to be seized includes a controlled substance, a warrant may be executed at any time of the day or night. Tyson argues that because the warrant did not authorize a nighttime search, any evidence found at his residence is the fruit of an illegal search. Quoting Ex parte Turner, [Ms. 1971735, April 7, 2000] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.2000), Tyson argues: `There is no common law authorizing search warrants. Statutes authorizing searches are strictly construed against the prosecution [and] in favor of the liberty of the citizen.' ___ So.2d at ___ (quoting Kelley v. State, 55 Ala.App. 402, 403, 316 So.2d 233, 234 (Ala.Crim.App.1975)). Turner dealt with a search predicated on an anticipatory search warrant issued in September 1995. This Court held that the search was unconstitutional because at that time there was no Alabama statute authorizing anticipatory search warrants. [3] Turner, ___ So.2d at ___. This case is distinguishable from Turner because § 15-5-8 specifically authorizes the execution of nighttime warrants. In rejecting Tyson's argument as to this issue, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied on Gamble v. State, 473 So.2d 1188 (Ala. Crim.App.1985). In Gamble, the court stated: The question, as the trial court framed it in its order denying the motion to suppress, is `whether or not, under the circumstances of this case, the failure of the issuing judge to use the words at anytime of day or night or words of similar import in the warrant invalidates the warrant and renders inadmissible the evidence discovered during the search.' We answer that question in the negative. In Dean v. State, 54 Ala.App. 270, 307 So.2d 77 (Ala.Cr.App.1975), this court upheld a nighttime search for which the warrant lacked a directive that it be served `at any time of the day or night.' We found that because the warrant was in fact issued at night under authorization for an `immediate' search, the statutory requirement of § 15-5-8 was satisfied. See also United States v. Sturgeon, 501 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1071, 95 S.Ct. 659, 42 L.Ed.2d 667 (1974). The same situation is present here. As the trial judge found, `The issuing judge was requested and did issue the warrant in the middle of the night knowing that it would be immediately executed.' . . . . Although there is a split of authority on the admissibility of evidence obtained in a nighttime search when the warrant does not contain language authorizing nighttime execution, see generally Annot. 58 A.L.R. Fed. 757 (1982); compare State v. Dudgeon, [13 Ariz.App. 464, 477 P.2d 750 (1970)] (allowing evidence), with State v. Dalrymple, 80 N.M. 492, 458 P.2d 96 (1969) (disallowing evidence on the ground that a warrant must conform to statutory requirements in every material detail), of those courts finding the warrant technically invalid many have, nevertheless, refused to order suppression of the evidence on one or more of the following grounds, namely: (1) a statutoryas opposed to a constitutionalviolation does not automatically warrant exclusion, see, e.g., United States v. Searp, [586 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 921, 99 S.Ct. 1247, 59 L.Ed.2d 474 (1979)]; State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833 (Minn. 1978); (2) the statutory violation was not a result of bad faith conduct on the part of law enforcement authorities, see e.g., United States v. Searp, supra; and (3) the violation did not affect the defendant's substantial rights, see e.g., United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834, 91 S.Ct. 69, 27 L.Ed.2d 66 (1970). 473 So.2d at 1194-95. It is clear in this case, as it was in Gamble, that the police officers were acting in good faith. Agent Smith had every intention of obtaining a search warrant authorizing a nighttime search and submitted an affidavit clearly establishing grounds for a nighttime search. Furthermore, he requested the warrant at 7:45 p.m., after dark, and executed the warrant at 8:00 p.m. Agent Smith also informed the magistrate issuing the warrant that other officers at Tyson's residence were waiting for the warrant. Had the warrant been issued in the daytime, the necessity for checking the box authorizing a nighttime search would be readily understandable. However, where, as here, the warrant was issued after dark and the magistrate knew of its imminent execution, for us to require that the box be checked would be to exalt form over substance. The magistrate issued the warrant knowing that Agent Smith planned to execute it immediately. [4] Therefore, applying the exclusionary rule in this case would serve no purpose. Discussing the exclusionary rule, the United States Supreme Court has stated: The [exclusionary rule] operates as `a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.' United States v. Calandra, [414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)]. . . . . ... `Our cases have consistently recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury.' United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980) Indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule, therefore, may well `generat[e] disrespect for the law and administration of justice.' [ Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976)]. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-08, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). In Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984), a case in which police officers, acting in good faith, secured a search warrant that later was held invalid because of a clerical error committed by the magistrate who issued the warrant, the United States Supreme Court held: In sum, the police conduct in this case clearly was objectively reasonable and largely error-free. An error of constitutional dimensions may have been committed with respect to the issuance of the warrant, but it was the judge, not the police officers, who made the critical mistake. `[T]he exclusionary rule was adopted to deter unlawful searches by police, not to punish the errors of magistrates and judges.' Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 263, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (White, J., concurring in judgment). Suppressing evidence because the judge failed to make all the necessary clerical corrections despite his assurances that such changes would be made will not serve the deterrent function that the exclusionary rule was designed to achieve. Accordingly, federal law does not require the exclusion of the disputed evidence in this case. 468 U.S. at 990-91, 104 S.Ct. 3424 (footnote omitted). The same rationale applies in the case before us. As noted previously, when the warrant was issued, the issuing judge was fully aware that Agent Smith intended to conduct a nighttime search. The officers were acting in good faith and with reasonable reliance on a belief that the search warrant was valid. Therefore, suppressing the evidence gained from the search would not serve as a deterrent. We decline to exclude the evidence recovered from Tyson's apartment because of a clerical error made by the issuing judgefailing to check the box authorizing a nighttime search. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard .