Opinion ID: 2747273
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Actual Physical Control

Text: Our past decisions involving operation of a vehicle under the influence have focused on whether the defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle. See, e.g., Enriquez, 283 Va. at 511, 722 S.E.2d at 252; Nelson, 281 Va. at 214, 219, 707 S.E.2d at 815, 818; Nicolls v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 257, 258, 259, 184 S.E.2d 9, 10, 11 (1971); Gallagher v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 666, 667, 670, 139 S.E.2d 37, 38, 40 (1964). In Nelson, we addressed a factual scenario remarkably similar to this case. Nelson was asleep inside his vehicle which was parked in the cul-de-sac of a residential neighborhood. 281 Va. at 214, 707 S.E.2d at 816. The ignition was in the auxiliary position, and the radio was playing. Id. Nelson argued that, based on these facts, he was not operating his motor vehicle. Id. at 215, 707 S.E.2d at 816. We disagreed, holding that: Operating means engaging the machinery of the vehicle which alone, or in sequence, will activate the motive power of the vehicle. Manipulating the electrical equipment was one step between the off position and the point at which the motive power would be activated. While Nelson's action in turning the key to the on or accessory position of the 7 ignition did not alone activate the motive power, it was an action taken in sequence up to the point of activation, making him the operator of the vehicle within the meaning of Code § 18.2-266. Nelson, 281 Va. at 219, 707 S.E.2d at 818 (internal citation omitted). Just a year after deciding Nelson, we again addressed the meaning of operate in Enriquez. We stated that any individual who is in actual physical control of a vehicle is an operator. Enriquez, 283 Va. at 516, 722 S.E.2d at 255 (internal quotation marks omitted). In defining actual physical control, we embraced the dissenting opinion in Stevenson v. City of Falls Church, 243 Va. 434, 439-40, 416 S.E.2d 435, 438-39 (1992)(Compton, J., dissenting), which stated: Ordinary experience tells us that one in a drunken stupor in the driver's seat of a vehicle is likely to arouse abruptly, engage the motive power of the vehicle, and roar away imperiling the lives of innocent citizens. This sequence of events easily can occur where, as here, a drunk is sitting behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle alone, with the key already in the ignition. From a mechanical standpoint, the vehicle is capable of being immediately placed in motion to become a menace to the public, and to its drunken operator. Based on this reasoning, we held in Enriquez that: [I]n discerning whether an intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of 8 a motor vehicle . . . with the key inserted into the ignition switch of the vehicle is in actual physical control of the vehicle, the position of the key in the ignition switch is not determinative. [W]hen an intoxicated person is seated behind the steering wheel . . . and the key is in the ignition switch, he is in actual physical control of the vehicle and, therefore, is guilty of operating the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol within the meaning of Code § 18.2- 266. 283 Va. at 516-17, 722 S.E.2d at 255. In this case, Sarafin was in actual physical control of his vehicle. He was seated behind the steering wheel, and the key was in the ignition switch. Accordingly, under our prior case law, the evidence was sufficient to conclude that he was an operator of the vehicle.