Opinion ID: 2510535
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Richardson Interview

Text: [¶ 23] The appellant next claims that the summary of Richardson's January 7, 2003 interview, quoted above, was suppressed in violation of Brady. Specifically, the appellant claims the information could have been used substantively to show his innocence, to impeach CS by contradiction, and would have carried great weight at trial because it was a statement given to DCI and, as a result, the jury would not have viewed it as self-serving. Therefore, we must determine whether the Richardson interview was suppressed, favorable, and material. Davis, 2002 WY 88, ¶ 16, 47 P.3d at 985. [¶ 24] Although the State appears to concede that the Richardson interview was suppressed for purposes of our analysis, it actually presents us with a suppression argument couched in materiality terms. The State argues, as it did in the district court, that Richardson's testimony in Doherty's trial contained the same information as the Richardson interview and that the State had no duty to disclose the interview because the appellant had access to the record in Doherty's trial. Further, the State claims that the appellant was in a solid position without the DCI report to have evaluated Richardson's availability and usefulness as a defense witness because of his personal relationship with her. The appellant equivocally responds that his trial counsel was unsure whether he had ever seen Richardson's testimony in the Doherty trial and suggests in his reply brief that it is the State's burden to prove that he reviewed Richardson's previous testimony. [¶ 25] The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has said that [e]vidence is not `suppressed' if the defendant either knew or should have known of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence. United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 618 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174, 103 S.Ct. 823, 74 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983) (internal citations omitted); see also Relish, 860 P.2d at 459 (citing with approval the LeRoy court's reasoning). The fact that the appellant's trial attorney used CS's testimony from Doherty's case as an impeachment tool satisfies us that he had access to and reviewed the record in that case. If he failed completely and diligently to review that record and, as a consequence, overlooked Richardson's testimony, that evidence was not suppressed by the State and no Brady violation occurred. [¶ 26] However, the State admits that the content of Richardson's testimony in Doherty's case does not exactly address the information contained in Richardson's January 7, 2003 interview. Richardson testified at Doherty's trial that she had spoken to CS on the night of October 27, 2002, and believed she had given CS the methamphetamine she possessed when she was arrested on October 28. However, according to Richardson, she was in Wes Chauncey's bedroom all night and did not know CS was in the trailer until she came to the bedroom door. Therefore, she did not testify about who, if anyone, had let CS into the trailer or who CS had encountered inside the trailer before coming to Richardson's bedroom. In contrast, during Richardson's January 7, 2003 interview, she simply stated that she never saw Doherty or the appellant sell any drugs and made no reference to the events of October 27 and 28. Richardson's interview and her testimony in Doherty's trial, while similar, are not identical and the question remains whether the specific content of the interview was suppressed, favorable, and material. [¶ 27] The State argues that, due to the personal relationship between the appellant and Richardson, the appellant was in a better position than the prosecution to determine how useful Richardson would be as a defense witness. While this may be true, this argument ignores the edict of Brady and its progeny that information in the possession of the State may not be suppressed if it is favorable and material. The State has presented us with no authority to suggest that the content of a witness' interview with law enforcement officers is equally available to a defendant when the defendant is acquainted with that witness. Absent such an argument, this interview appears to be suppressed under Brady. [¶ 28] The State has also failed to convince us that the content of the January 7 interview was not favorable to the appellant. The State concedes that, because she lived in the trailer and babysat the appellant's child, Richardson had a close personal relationship with the appellant. It seems clear that, by virtue of this relationship, Richardson's statement that she had never seen the appellant sell drugs would meet our evidentiary requirement of relevance ( see W.R.E. 402) and, therefore, be at least marginally favorable to the appellant. [¶ 29] While the Richardson interview was suppressed and favorable to the appellant, the State is correct that, in this case, the information was not material. The State aptly notes that the appellant's argument regarding the Richardson interview is inconsistent with his trial strategy. Doherty testified for the appellant at trial and she claimed full responsibility for selling methamphetamine to CS. Doherty also testified during cross-examination that Richardson had lied when she testified at Doherty's trial that she had given CS methamphetamine on October 27, 2002, and had spoken to her later that night at the appellant's home. Richardson's interview, however, tended to show that neither the appellant nor Doherty were involved in the sale of narcotics and in the Doherty case, Richardson testified that she had provided CS with the methamphetamine she possessed on October 28. The appellant, therefore, faces the initial materiality challenge of showing that a statement which contradicts his main witness creates a reasonable probability of a different result. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. at 1566. [¶ 30] In his reply brief, the appellant claims that, had the Richardson interview been disclosed, he might have presented his defense differently. Conspicuously absent from the appellant's argument, however, is any claim that, with this information, the appellant actually would have changed his trial strategy and how that change would have made a different result reasonably probable. [¶ 31] For clarity, we reiterate that the only piece of evidence being reviewed under the Bagley materiality test is Richardson's January 7, 2003 interview. Because Richardson's testimony during Doherty's trial was not suppressed, the question before us is whether it is reasonably probable that the result in the appellant's trial would have been different had the State disclosed the summary of the Richardson interview. [¶ 32] If we assume that the appellant would have changed his trial strategy based on the Richardson interview, this information was still not material under Brady. [5] Even if we were to go one step further and assume that one statement in a DCI interview would have inspired the appellant comprehensively to examine Richardson as a potential witness such that he would uncover all of the information to which she testified in Doherty's trial, we still do not find such testimony to be material. The practical effect would be to adopt the same trial strategy that resulted in Doherty's conviction. As in Doherty's trial, the jury would be faced with a credibility determination between Richardson and CS. It is clear from the record and the transcript of Richardson's testimony in Doherty's trial that Richardson, like Doherty and CS, was deeply involved in using and selling narcotics and she also played a role in manufacturing methamphetamine. Richardson's efficacy as a witness would also be marred, as it was in Doherty's trial, by the fact that she had no firsthand knowledge of any contact between CS and the appellant that night and, during cross-examination at the Doherty trial, she admitted to lying and not telling [DCI] everything during her interviews with them. Under these circumstances, switching one witness who claimed to be at fault for another neither makes a different result reasonably probable, nor does it undermine our confidence in the outcome of the trial. Richardson's interview was, therefore, not material and its nondisclosure was not a violation of Brady. [¶ 33] We affirm.