Opinion ID: 456186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Project Modification Claim

Text: 19 The district court found first that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims that the Chief of Engineers had acted arbitrarily and capriciously and in excess of his authority in permitting the substitution of the Route 104 bridge for a replacement bridge over the new channel as originally contemplated by H.R.Doc. 332. This holding was based on an unduly narrow interpretation of the discretion accorded the Chief of Engineers to make modifications in Congressionally approved harbor projects and cannot be sustained. 20 The Irondequoit Bay project was one of a series of projects approved by Congress in the River and Harbor Act of 1958. As with each of the other projects authorized in that Act, this project was authorized to be prosecuted under the direction of the Secretary of the Army and the supervision of the Chief of Engineers, in accordance with the plans and subject to the conditions recommended by the Chief of Engineers in the respective reports hereinafter designated. Pub.L. No. 85-500, Sec. 101, 72 Stat. 297. H.R.Doc. 332, the report designated for the Bay project, id. at 299, was entitled a Preliminary Examination and Survey and stated that its recommendations were all generally in accordance with the plans of the district engineer and with such modifications thereof as in the discretion of the Chief of Engineers may be advisable. H.R.Doc. 332, at 3, 4 (emphasis added). Thus, in authorizing implementation of the Bay project in accordance with H.R.Doc. 332, Congress gave the Chief of Engineers considerable discretion to approve modifications of the project. The granting of such discretion was in accordance with Congress's usual practice, and should be honored by the courts. 21 It has long been the custom of Congress to approve projects of this nature on the basis of such preliminary plans and to authorize the Chief of Engineers to make such modifications as later studies indicate are necessary. United States v. 2,606.84 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d 1286, 1292 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 916, 91 S.Ct. 1368, 28 L.Ed.2d 658 (1971); see United States v. 255.25 Acres of Land, 712 F.2d 1263, 1266 (8th Cir.1983); Creppel v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 670 F.2d 564, 572 (5th Cir.1982). The reports with reference to which such projects are adopted are never intended to be the final plans for the ... project, United States v. 2,606.84 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d at 1292, but are merely planning document[s] that explore[ ] in general rather than detailed terms the feasibility of the engineering and economic aspects of the Project, United States v. 255.25 Acres of Land, 712 F.2d at 1266. As the Fifth Circuit has noted, [i]t imparts both stupidity and impracticality to Congress to conclude that the [authorizing] statute impliedly forbids any change in a project once approved, and thus prevents the agency official from providing for the unforeseen or the unforeseeable.... Creppel v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 670 F.2d at 572. Accordingly, that court has concluded that [e]ven when [the] project's purpose is authorized by Congress, the executive officer charged with responsibility for the project may modify it[ ] ... unless this action is so foreign to the original purpose as to be arbitrary or capricious. Id. (footnote omitted; emphasis added); see United States v. 2,606.84 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d at 1293; United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 191 F.2d 796, 807 (4th Cir.1951), aff'd, 345 U.S. 153, 73 S.Ct. 609, 97 L.Ed. 918 (1953); Ryan v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 59 F.2d 137, 142 (7th Cir.1932). 22 We find the reasoning of these cases eminently sound. Particularly in a situation such as is presented here, where more than twenty-five years have elapsed between the Congressional authorization and the actual implementation of the project, it would be unreasonable to impute to Congress the intent to preclude the Chief of Engineers from making reasonable modifications in the project to accommodate intervening developments in the economic, social, ecological, or political climate. Accordingly, we conclude that modifications by the Chief of Engineers in a project such as this are within the scope of his authority unless they are so foreign to the original purpose of the project as to be arbitrary and capricious. 23 In the present case, we conclude that plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing either likelihood of success on the merits or a sufficiently serious ground for litigation of their claim that the Chief of Engineers's approval of the Route 104 bridge was foreign to the original purpose of the project. The Corps contends that the sole purposes of the local assurance requirement were to ensure that any replacement for the Bridge would not hamper use of the new channel and that the expense of a replacement would not be borne by the federal government. Plaintiffs, while acknowledging these to be among the purposes of the requirement, contend that a further purpose was to preserve through-traffic on Route 18. In light of the preliminary nature of the plans outlined in H.R.Doc. 332, we think it unlikely that Congress had that specific purpose. Route 18 is not mentioned in H.R.Doc. 332, and if Congress's intent in adopting the Bay project included consideration of the effects on automobile traffic across the Bay, it is likely that that intention was no more specific than that such traffic not be unduly disrupted. Assuming such an intent, plaintiffs are highly unlikely, for several reasons, to be able to show that the substitution of the Route 104 bridge was foreign to that intent. 24 First, we note that H.R.Doc. 332 recommended that assurances be obtained that local interests would [r]eplace and relocate the Bridge. H.R.Doc. 332, at 30 (emphasis added). Thus, H.R.Doc. 332 itself appears to contemplate that the replacement for the Bridge might be located at a different site than that occupied by the Bridge, and the district court's view that the approval of the Route 104 bridge, 1 1/2 miles south of the Bridge, was a complete[ ] depart[ure] from the original Congressional intent seems unwarranted. Further, although automobile traffic between some points is less convenient over the Route 104 bridge than over the Bridge, any placement of a bridge will be more convenient to some than to others. The greatest additional distance that use of the Route 104 bridge will require is 10 miles. For most travelers, the increase in distance will be less; and, of course, the Route 104 bridge has shortened the travel distance for many. Thus, the substitution of the Route 104 bridge for the Bridge appears generally to serve the purpose of facilitating automobile traffic across the northern end of the Bay, and its substitution for a new bridge on the precise site of the existing Bridge does not appear to be foreign to the original purpose of the project. Finally, given the broad discretion expressly granted to the Chief of Engineers to adopt modifications to the project, his approval of the substitution hardly appears to have been arbitrary or capricious. 25 In sum, plaintiffs' claim that the approval of the Route 104 bridge as a substitute violated the Administrative Procedure Act is too insubstantial to support the granting of a preliminary injunction.