Opinion ID: 2625
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: First Amendment Right of Access to the Courts

Text: The First Amendment provides, in relevant part, that Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. U.S. Const. amend. I. The right to petition, which has been recognized as one of `the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights,' BE & K Const. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S.Ct. 2390, 153 L.Ed.2d 499 (2002) (quoting Mine Workers v. Ill. Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222, 88 S.Ct. 353, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967)), extends to all departments of the Government, including the courts, Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972) (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969)); see also Gagliardi v. Village of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188, 194 (2d Cir.1994) (The rights to complain to public officials and to seek administrative and judicial relief are protected by the First Amendment.). By its terms, the Act bars plaintiffs from courts for the adjudication of qualified civil liability actions, allowing access for only those actions that fall within the Act's exceptions. We conclude that these restrictions do not violate plaintiffs' right of access to the courts. The constitutional right of access [to the courts] is violated where government officials obstruct legitimate efforts to seek judicial redress. Whalen v. County of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 406-07 (2d Cir.1997); cf. Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 575 (2d Cir.1986) (Unconstitutional deprivation of a cause of action occurs when government officials thwart vindication of a claim by violating basic principles that enable civil claimants to assert their rights effectively.). The right to petition exists in the presence of an underlying cause of action and is not violated by a statute that provides a complete defense to a cause of action or curtails a category of causes of action. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002) ([O]ur cases rest on the recognition that the right [of access to the courts] is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court.); accord Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Lab., 385 F.3d 961, 968 (6th Cir.2004) (A cognizable claim can be made out only by showing that the defendants' actions foreclosed [a potential litigant] from filing suit in state court or rendered ineffective any state court remedy [the litigant] previously may have had. (internal quotation marks omitted)). The PLCAA immunizes a specific type of defendant from a specific type of suit. It does not impede, let alone entirely foreclose, general use of the courts by would-be plaintiffs such as the City. Cf. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 527, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (upholding a statutory provision that sought to provide relief to individuals who were being excluded from courthouses and court proceedings by reason of their disabilities); Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (noting that right-of-access concerns are triggered when official action . . . den[ies] an opportunity to litigate [to] a class of potential plaintiffs and citing illustrative cases); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963) (striking down a state statute that had the effect of preventing Negro litigants from obtaining counsel); Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 13 (1st Cir.1986) (noting that Congressional alter[ation] . . . [of] prior rights and remedies does not provoke right-of-access concerns because [t]here is no fundamental right to particular state-law tort claims). For these reasons, the PLCAA cannot be said to deprive the City of its First Amendment right of access to the courts.