Opinion ID: 167730
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The offense must be a felony;

Text: (ii) the offense must involve a risk that physical force may be used against the person or property of another; (iii) that risk must result from the nature of the offense; (iv) the risk must be that the use of physical force would occur in the course of the offense; and 2 The definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4) includes two other types of offenses: an “offense that has as an element . . . the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” see § 3156(a)(4)(A ); and a sexual exploitation offense falling within three specified chapters of Title 18, United States Code, § 3156(a)(4)(C). Because an unlawful possession of a firearm does not fit within these definitions, see § 3156(a)(4)(B), there is no need to discuss them. See Rogers, 371 F.3d at 1228. -6- (v) the risk must be substantial. Id. at n.4 (quotation omitted). The existence of three of elements is incontestible. Unquestionably, the offense is a felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(3) (defining “felony” as an offense punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of more than one year); id. § 924(a)(2) (providing for imprisonment of up to ten years for a violation of § 922(g)). Also, a felon in possession of a gun presents some risk of physical force being used against another. See Rogers, 371 F.3d at 1229; see also United States v. Lane, 252 F.3d 905, 906 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A person who has been convicted of committing a felony . . . is no doubt more likely to make an illegal use of a firearm than a nonfelon, and the illegal use is likely to involve violence. Otherwise it would be a little difficult to see why being a felon in possession of a firearm is a crime.”); United States v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2000) (possession of a gun greatly increases one’s ability to inflict harm on others and therefore involves some risk of violence). M oreover, we have previously recognized that “[if] one uses a gun in an act of violence, that violence necessarily occurs during the possession of the gun.” Rogers, 371 F.3d at 1230 (quotation omitted). Thus, a “risk of physical force created by the [illegal] possession of a firearm . . . occurs in ‘the course of committing’ the weapon-offense.” Id. Accordingly, we need to consider only two elements: whether the risk results from the categorical nature of the offense and whether the risk is substantial. This court has not reached these two questions in the context of a -7- § 922(g)(1) offense. In Rogers, we decided that possession of a firearm while subject to a protection order and possession of a firearm following misdemeanor conviction of domestic violence are “crimes of violence” for purposes of the Bail Reform Act. Id. at 1230. But we explicitly limited our discussion to the offenses before us in that case and declined to resolve the issues in relation to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Id. “This differing context is key.” Id. at 1229. Nevertheless, we have ample guidance on the issues. M any other circuit courts have provided thoughtful discussions on the nature of the felon-in-possession offense and the substantiality of the risk. The majority of these courts have determined that a § 922(g)(1) offense does not satisfy these elements. See United States v. Bowers, 432 F.3d 518, 524 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 399 F.3d 1297, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); United States v. Twine, 344 F.3d 987, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Lane, 252 F.3d at 906-08; United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7, 16 (D .C. Cir. 1999). See also United States v. Hardon, No. 98-1625, 1998 W L 320945, at  (6th Cir. June 4, 1998) (unpublished). The Second Circuit has held to the contrary. See Dillard, 214 F.3d at 104. W e are persuaded by the rationale of the majority position. Concerning the categorical nature of the crime, it is apparent that § 922(g)(1) offenses present “numerous factual scenarios.” Johnson, 399 F.3d at 1301. The offense applies to persons with greatly diverse propensities and previously convicted of a wide range of conduct. “[N]ot all felons are potentially -8- more violent than non-felons. Numerous felonies involve economic crimes or regulatory offenses which, while serious, do not entail a substantial risk of physical force.” Singleton, 182 F.3d at 15. “[A]nd ex-felons have the same motives as lawful possessors of firearms to possess a firearm–self-defense, hunting, gun collecting, and target practice.” Lane, 252 F.3d at 906. Accordingly, we conclude that a felon-in-possession offense under § 922(g)(1) is not inherently a crime of violence. For coinciding reasons, we also decide that the mere possession of a firearm by a convicted felon does not create a substantial risk that physical force will be used against the property or person of another. . . . [L]arge numbers of felonies involve economic, regulatory, or other crimes that do not entail physical violence at all. Thus . . . although there might be some increased chance of violence flowing from the possession of a weapon by a felon, that risk could simply not be classified as substantial. Rogers, 371 F.3d at 1229 (citations omitted) (explaining the reasoning of the Singleton and Lane decisions). W e acknowledge the frustration of the district court in its comment that “[t]he broad coverage of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)–including both violent and non-violent felons–probably makes the most correct answer to the question of whether commission of the offense constitutes a crime of violence not ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ but ‘sometimes.’” United States v. Green, 414 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (referenced in the court’s ruling in the instant case). Yet under the structure of the Bail Reform Act and established case law, “either -9- felon-in-possession is a crime of violence or it is not.” Nicole J. Bredefeld, Note, The Bail Reform Act of 1984 and Felons who Possess Weapons: Discrepancy Among the Federal Courts, 26 Seton Hall Legis. J. 215, 233 (2001) (quotation omitted). W e hold that a § 922(g)(1) offense is not a crime of violence for purposes of the Act because the nature of the offense does not involve a substantial risk of physical force used against the person or property of another. As applied to M r. Ingle, this means that he is eligible for bail pending sentencing if a judicial officer concludes there is clear and convincing evidence that he “is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1).