Opinion ID: 1658135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the statutory official proceedings privilege

Text: Because, if it is applicable, it would determine the outcome of this case, we first discuss the official proceedings privilege statute, MCL 600.2911(3); MSA 27A.2911(3). The relevant provisions of that statute read: No damages shall be awarded in any libel action brought against a reporter, editor, publisher, or proprietor of a newspaper for the publication in it of a fair and true report of any public and official proceeding.... Although the statute was enacted in 1931, its origins may be traced to much earlier Michigan common law. In 1882, this Court summarized the various common-law privileges available at the time. We described what may be termed a privilege to report judicial proceedings: [1] [T]he publication of judicial proceedings taken before magistrates is privileged to the same extent as the proceedings of the trial court.... [ Miner v Detroit Post & Tribune Co, 49 Mich 358, 359; 13 NW 773 (1882).] The privilege was invoked in Jastrzembski v Marxhausen, 120 Mich 677; 79 NW 935 (1899), which involved an article concerning the plaintiff's alleged elopement with a woman other than his wife. The newspaper claimed the privilege because the story was based on a verbal complaint made by the plaintiff's wife to a police officer. We noted that [t]he only document filed in the justice's court was a complaint made for nonsupport, and this was not known to the reporters or to defendant. Id., p 680. Thus, we held that the privilege did not apply in that [t]he statements published were not gathered from any proceedings in court, but the information was obtained from parties entirely outside of any court. Id., p 682. The common-law privilege to report judicial proceedings was again claimed in Sherwood v Evening News Ass'n, 256 Mich 318; 239 NW 305 (1931), but was held not to cover the facts of that case. In Sherwood, we noted, It is well settled that a faithful and fair report of the proceedings in courts of justice [is] privileged, even though the reputation of individuals incidentally suffer[s] from [its] publication.... [ Id., p 320.] In Sherwood, defendant's article had alleged that the plaintiff had participated in a gun fight with the police, had been wounded, had stolen a car to escape, and had been caught and put in jail. In the words of the Court, Plaintiff was not the bandit, did not participate in the gun battle, was not shot, did not steal a car, was not arrested, or sent to jail. [ Id., p 319.] The issue was whether the defendant, absent malice, was privileged in publishing a true, a fair, and accurate statement of information received from the sheriff and his deputies concerning the official acts of such public officers? Id. Relying on applications of similar qualified privileges from other states, and on Davis v Marxhausen, 86 Mich 281; 49 NW 50 (1891), after remand 103 Mich 315; 61 NW 504 (1894), Clair v Battle Creek Journal Co, 168 Mich 467; 134 NW 443 (1912), and Jastrzembski, supra, we held that the jury instructions were more favorable than defendant was entitled to. Sherwood, p 325. The instructions had stated: When a newspaper fairly and without malice or intent to harm, publishes the progress being made in a criminal matter upon the information received from peace officers in charge of the examination involving crime, the articles so published are qualifiedly privileged, and the newspaper would not be liable in damages. [ Id. ] The statute, of course, is not limited to judicial proceedings, but refers to any public and official proceeding. Only one Michigan case has actually construed this language. In McCracken v Evening News Ass'n, 3 Mich App 32; 141 NW2d 694 (1966), the Court of Appeals applied the statutory privilege in a case that is factually similar to the case at bar. It referred to the statutory privilege as a qualified one. In McCracken, the plaintiff was a subcontractor on a building addition to a VA hospital. An employee of the general contractor on the project had signed a complaint against the plaintiff, alleging felonious execution and delivery of an allegedly false certificate that certain materials were in plaintiff's possession. A warrant was issued and the defendant published an article about the affair, quoting the warrant and comments made by the assistant prosecutor. The Court found the privilege applicable. It held that the slight inaccuracy in the article did not amount to an abuse of the statutory privilege and ruled in favor of the defendant. However, the Court made the following observations: The statute protects newspaper publishers if the article is a fair and true report of the public and official proceeding. The fact that the reporter herein relied on the word of another as to the nature of the complaint and warrant is immaterial. The statute does not command the reporter to obtain his information from the official court records. At his risk, and at the risk of his publisher, he may rely upon the word of another as to the contents of the complaint and warrant, and that it will be so issued if it has not already been. If the information thus obtained and published does not substantially represent the matter contained in the court records, then the question arises as to whether or not the publisher has abused his privilege. The abuse of the privilege is a question of fact for the trier of fact to determine. Obviously, if a warrant is never issued, there are no official proceedings that can be reported and this statute is not applicable. [ Id., pp 38-39. Emphasis added.] The Court of Appeals in Rouch found the arrest privileged under the statute, but the supporting information from the police officers outside the privilege. We agree that the statute does not apply, but under a different analysis. It has not been made known to us whether, in adopting this statute in 1931, the Legislature wished to codify the common-law privilege to report judicial proceedings, [2] and intended that the word proceedings refer only to judicial proceedings, or whether a broader scope was intended. In support of its finding that the arrest was privileged, but that the supporting information was not, the Court of Appeals quoted three sources. See Rouch, supra, pp 48-49. The Restatement of Torts states: The publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action or proceedings or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported. [3 Restatement Torts, 2d, ง 611. Emphasis added.] The Court quoted comment h to that section: An arrest by an officer is an official action, and a report of the fact of the arrest or of the charge of crime made by the officer in making or returning the arrest is therefore within the conditional privilege covered by this Section. On the other hand statements made by the police or by the complainant or other witnesses or by the prosecuting attorney as to the facts of the case or the evidence expected to be given are not yet part of the judicial proceeding or of the arrest itself and are not privileged under this Section. [Emphasis added.] It also cited Prosser, Torts (4th ed), ง 118, pp 831-832: Thus it is the prevailing view, with some few courts to the contrary, that a pleading or a deposition filed in a case but not yet acted upon may not be reported under the claim of privilege.... The same is of course true of the preliminary statements of police, or any other evidence not yet given. The Court also relied upon 1 Harper & James, Torts, ง 5.24, p 433: [T]he publication of a petition, an answer, a deposition or an affidavit before a hearing has been held, does not receive the protection of privilege. The same is true, as a general rule, of investigations and other activities of the police before a warrant is issued or any other official action taken. [ Id., p 49, n 8.] We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals use of these authorities. [3] The Restatement deals with a privilege (official action ) broader than either our common-law privilege to report judicial proceedings or the statutory public and official proceedings privilege. Accordingly, it is not helpful in our effort to interpret the statute. [4] The quotations from Prosser and Harper & James do relate to judicial-proceedings privileges, but do not support the inclusion of either the arrest or the supporting charge under such a privilege. Although we have not spoken on the question whether an arrest is a judicial proceeding, others have, and generally, they have not found it to be the case. See, e.g., Lancour v Herald & Globe Ass'n, 111 Vt 371, 384-386; 17 A2d 253 (1941); Turnbull v Herald Co, 459 SW2d 516, 520 (Mo App, 1970). A few cases have construed the meaning of official, as opposed to judicial, proceeding as it relates to a privilege governing the reporting of the same. The rationale for a public proceedings privilege is basically the same as that offered in favor of the judicial-proceedings privilege. The privilege rests upon the idea that any member of the public, if he were present, might see and hear for himself, so that the reporter is merely a substitute for the public eye โ this, together with the obvious public interest in having public affairs made known to all. [Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), ง 115, p 836.] In Phillips v Evening Star Newspaper Co, 424 A2d 78 (DC App, 1980), cert den 451 US 989 (1981), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, applying the privilege to report official actions or proceedings as enunciated in ง 611 of the Restatement, held that it did not apply to information obtained from a police hot line. The court noted that [t]his log representing the oral police communication from which the [newspaper] composed its article does not carry the dignity and authoritative weight as a record for which the common law sought to provide the reporting privilege. [ Id., p 89.] Broader privileges have included arrests and information given to a law enforcement official. See Lotrich v Life Printing & Publishing Co, 117 Ill App 2d 89; 253 NE2d 899 (1969) (an official government proceedings and records privilege applies to police files). See also Lulay v Peoria Journal-Star, Inc, 34 Ill 2d 112; 214 NE2d 746 (1966) (governmental-affairs privilege applicable to a report of a health department inspection); Gawel v Chicago American Publishing Co, 1 Ill App 3d 481; 274 NE2d 628 (1971) (governmental-affairs privilege covered misidentification of arrestee based on information from police and jail officials). We think a fair reading of the public and official proceedings language of the instant legislation would dictate that it is intended to cover at least the more limited common-law privilege to report judicial proceedings, but is not by its very language intended to be a government action, arrest record, or public records privilege. [5] If such a broader scope had been intended, the necessary words could easily have been employed. Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed), defines proceeding in part as follows: In a general sense, the form and manner of conducting juridical business before a court or judicial officer. Regular and orderly progress in form of law, including all possible steps in an action from its commencement to the execution of judgment.... An act which is done by the authority or direction of the court, agency, or tribunal, express or implied; an act necessary to be done in order to obtain a given end; a prescribed mode of action for carrying into effect a legal right.... The proceedings of a suit embrace all matters that occur in its progress judicially. [Emphasis added.] The words official proceeding evoke notions of adjudicatory action, rather than of government action generally. The term official proceeding may be broader than judicial proceeding, [6] but does not in our view encompass all actions of all government officials. [7] We conclude that an arrest that amounts to no more than an apprehension is not a proceeding under the statute. Accordingly, the information orally furnished to the defendant in support of it does not, as such, enjoy the privilege afforded by the public and official proceedings statute. [8]