Opinion ID: 821509
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Asserted jury instruction error

Text: a. Asserted error in failing to instruct on theft as a lesser included offense of robbery The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of robbery (CALJIC No. 9.40), first degree murder under a robbery-felony-murder theory (CALJIC Nos. 8.10, 8.21), first degree premeditated murder (CALJIC No. 8.20), and the robbery-murder special circumstance. (CALJLIC No. 8.80.) The court further instructed on the crime of receiving stolen property as a lesser offense of robbery. (CALJIC No. 14.65.) Defendant did not request, and the trial court did not give, instructions regarding theft. Defendant now contends the trial court had a duty to instruct on its own motion regarding theft as a lesser included offense of robbery. He contends the error violated state law and deprived him of his rights to a fair jury trial, to due process of law, and to reliable guilt and penalty determinations under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and parallel provisions of the California Constitution, requiring that we vacate the guilt, special circumstances and penalty determinations. 84 ― ‗The trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on all general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence, whether or not the defendant makes a formal request.‘ [Citations.] ‗That obligation encompasses instructions on lesser included offenses if there is evidence that, if accepted by the trier of fact, would absolve the defendant of guilt of the greater offense but not of the lesser.‘ [Citations.]‖ (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 866; see People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154 [sua sponte duty]; People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684 [duty upon request].) ―Nevertheless, ‗the existence of ―any evidence, no matter how weak‖ will not justify instructions on a lesser included offense . . . .‘ [Citation.] Such instructions are required only where there is ‗substantial evidence‘ from which a rational jury could conclude that the defendant committed the lesser offense, and that he is not guilty of the greater offense. [Citations.]‖ (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 50.) Robbery is ―the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.‖ (§ 211.) In general, theft is the felonious taking, carrying, stealing, leading, or driving away of the personal property of another, or the appropriation of property, labor or money by fraudulent means. (§ 484.) ―The greater offense of robbery includes all of the elements of theft, with the additional element of a taking by force or fear. [Citation.] If the defendant does not harbor the intent to take property from the possessor at the time he applies force or fear, the taking is only a theft, not a robbery. [Citations.]‖ (People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 562.) Defendant argues he was entitled to a theft instruction because there was substantial evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the guns — the main proceeds of the crimes and the only proceeds to be taken by defendant personally and exchanged for drugs — were removed from the house after the 85 victim was shot. Defendant argues the jury could have concluded that he decided to steal the guns only as an afterthought, after killing the victim. Defendant further contends the jury reasonably could have ascribed the taking of other items to Joe and Fader alone; accordingly, there was evidence from which the jury could have absolved him of robbery, but convicted him of theft. We disagree. We acknowledge that there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded defendant formed the intent to steal the guns after killing the victim, and therefore, as to the guns, he was guilty only of theft. (See People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 562 [if defendant formed the intent to steal after killing the victim, the offense is theft, not robbery].) Joe and Fader both testified that after they had removed property from the house and were waiting in or near the car, they heard a shot. Defendant emerged from the house carrying a shotgun. After placing that gun in the car, defendant returned to the house and retrieved a second gun. Nonetheless, there was no evidence from which the jury could have concluded that only Joe and Fader, but not defendant, were liable for the taking of the other property from the house. As defendant concedes, Joe and Fader testified that defendant, while pointing a gun at the still-living victim, demanded to know the location of his wallet, ordered Fader to tie him up, and directed the women to take property from the house to the car. Joe and Fader further testified that they carried various items of property — including a microwave oven, a typewriter, a jar of pennies, and a ―stereo‖ or ―radio‖ or ―boom box‖ — to the car while the victim was still alive. Thus, if the jury believed Joe and Fader at all, there was no substantial evidence from which the jury reasonably could have concluded that the taking of the microwave oven, typewriter, jar of pennies, and boom box was anything less than a robbery. Similarly, there was no substantial evidence from which the jury could have ascribed responsibility for the robbery solely to Joe and 86 Fader. To the contrary, all of the available evidence suggested defendant was a major participant in the robbery and that he personally both engaged in conduct intended to evoke fear (pointing the gun at the victim) and directed the application of force (directing Fader to tie the victim‘s hands) with the intent to facilitate the taking of property from the house. For similar reasons, even were we to conclude the court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding the lesser included offense of theft, we would find the error harmless under any standard. The evidence that defendant robbed the victim by applying force and fear while Joe and Fader removed various items of property from the house was extremely strong, and defendant points to no evidence to the contrary. The prosecutor argued the robbery occurred when property was ―loaded into the car while the gun [was] being held on Sherman Robbins‖; defendant did not seriously contest that theory. Under these circumstances, it is not reasonably probable (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837) that the jury would have concluded defendant was guilty of theft but not also guilty of robbery, and indeed, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24). b. Instructions assertedly undermining the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt Defendant contends that 10 standard jury instructions given in his case — CALJIC Nos. 1.00, 2.01, 2.21.1, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27, 2.51, 2.90, 8.83 and 8.83.1 — individually and collectively allowed the jury to convict him based upon proof insufficient to satisfy the constitutionally required ―beyond a reasonable doubt‖ standard. (In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364.) He argues that the error violated his right to due process of law under the federal Constitution and requires reversal without an inquiry into prejudice. (See Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 278.) As defendant concedes, we have rejected this precise argument on 87 occasions too numerous to recite. (E.g., People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 697-698; People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 792.) As we have explained, each of these instructions ―is unobjectionable when, as here, it is accompanied by the usual instructions on reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence, and the People‘s burden of proof.‖ (People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 715.) Defendant invites us to revisit the issue, but provides no persuasive reason to do so. c. Motive instruction The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to former CALJIC No. 2.51, as follows: ―Motive is not an element of the crime charged and need not be shown. However, you may consider motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in this case. Presence of motive may tend to establish guilt. Absence of motive may tend to establish innocence. You will therefore give its presence or absence, as the case may be, the weight to which you find it to be entitled.‖ Defendant contends this instruction: (1) permitted the jury to determine guilt based on motive alone; (2) shifted the burden of proof to him to show an absence of motive to establish his innocence; and (3) lessened the prosecution‘s burden of proof in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights to a fair jury trial, due process of law, and reliable guilt and penalty verdicts. He contends the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and requires reversal of the guilt and penalty verdicts. The first of these subclaims goes to the clarity of the instruction. Because defendant did not request clarification at trial, his subclaim is forfeited. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1134; People v. Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 750.) Substantively, we have held in prior cases that all of the same subclaims lack merit. (E.g., People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 792; People v. Guerra, supra, at pp. 1134-1135; People v. Cleveland, supra, at p. 750; People v. Cash 88 (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 738-739; People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 503504.) Again, we decline to revisit these conclusions.