Opinion ID: 2638434
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issues Involving Defendant's Confession

Text: Police spoke to defendant on June 17 and 21, 1988. The first interview was partially tape-recorded, the second fully recorded. Only evidence from the first interview was admitted at trial. In that interview, defendant admitted critical facts about his participation in the crimes of which he now stands convicted. He claims on appeal that admission at trial of his statements to police on June 17, 1988, violated his rights under various provisions of the federal Constitution. His primary claim is that police violated his rights as set forth in Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. As we explain, he is mistaken.
Prior to trial, defendant moved to exclude the statements he had given to police on June 17, 1988. He claimed: (i) critical portions of the interview intentionally were not recorded by the investigating officers, thereby compromising his ability to litigate the question of the voluntariness of his confession in violation of his right to due process; (ii) his Miranda waiver was invalid because the officers deceived him by misrepresenting that they were investigating a robbery instead of a capital murder; and (iii) the confession was involuntary. The following information was ascertained at the hearing on defendant's motions. Investigating the information obtained from Garrison, Sergeant Quinn concluded that the man known as Apache was defendant. Quinn located defendant in Folsom State Prison, where he was serving a term for an unrelated second degree murder. Quinn and Detective McCarthy traveled to Folsom on June 17, 1988, to interview defendant. Quinn had a tape recorder in a briefcase; before defendant arrived in the interview room, he recorded the time and date on the tape. The recorder was otherwise hidden from view. Defendant arrived, and the officers engaged him in some small talk to put him at ease. Sergeant Quinn then read defendant his Miranda rights from a card supplied by the City of Daly City. Defendant said he understood his rights, read the card himself, and signed it in the officers' presence. [9] He exhibited no reservations or hesitancy. This part of the interrogation was not recorded, but after defendant waived his rights Quinn surreptitiously turned on the recorder. Quinn explained the secrecy, testifying that some people do not speak as freely when they know they are being recorded. When the tape ran out, Quinn did not replace it for fear of distracting defendant, who was showing signs of nervousness. Detective McCarthy, however, took notes of the entire interrogation. Quinn began the interrogation by informing defendant he was interested in discussing a robbery that had occurred some years before. Only after they began discussing the case did Quinn reveal there also had been a homicide. McCarthy informed defendant the case carried the potential for the death penalty, and defendant indicated he understood. The officers informed defendant that they had enough evidence to charge him with the crime and the interview would be the only time he could tell his side of the story because, once he was arraigned, we would not be able to talk to him again because he would have to have a lawyer around. McCarthy explicitly denied promising defendant he would be arraigned on lesser charges or receive less time in prison if he told his side of the story, although he advised defendant that Garrison's attorney was attempting to obtain a plea bargain for his client. The officers said that if defendant wanted to tell his side of the story, they would bring it to the attention of the prosecuting attorney. During the interview, defendant initially denied knowing Garrison, then admitted knowing him only vaguely. As the interview progressed, defendant admitted to a stronger acquaintance with Garrison and to participation in the robbery, but denied the murder. This change may have been prompted by the officers' telling defendant that Garrison was placing primary blame for the robbery and murder on defendant, and that witnesses had placed defendant in the vicinity of the crime shortly before the murder. Both Sergeant Quinn and Detective McCarthy expressly denied threatening defendant in any way. Both officers also expressly denied promising defendant leniency, immunity or a reward should he confess. The interrogation began around 10:00 in the morning and ended around 1:00 in the afternoon. The interrogation was continuous, but breaks were taken. The officers returned on June 21, 1988, with a representative from the prosecutor's office, and defendant reiterated his statement. This interview was recorded in its entirety. The parties stipulated the trial court could listen to and consider the recording of the June 17th interview, the transcript of the recording, the Miranda warning card, Detective McCarthy's notes, and the transcript of the preliminary examination. Following the hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motions. The court indicated its ruling would be the same whether the People's burden was beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence.
Defendant first contends the prosecution failed to make even a threshold showing [of voluntariness] because they failed to demonstrate that appellant was informed of his Miranda rights. We recently explained the applicable law: When reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion that a statement was collected in violation of the defendant's rights under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694], we defer to the trial court's resolution of disputed facts, including the credibility of witnesses, if that resolution is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] Considering those facts, as found, together with the undisputed facts, we independently determine whether the challenged statement was obtained in violation of Miranda's rules [citation], that is, whether (assuming the defendant was in custody) the statement was preceded by the now-famous admonition of Miranda rights: the defendant has the right to remain silent, any statement he might make can be used against him, he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and an attorney will be provided at state expense if he cannot afford one. ( Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 435 [120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405]....) [¶] If a custodial defendant requests counsel, all questioning must cease. ( Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 482 [101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378]....) Statements made by a custodial defendant in the absence of Miranda warnings are inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief. ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 918, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.) Neither side disputes that Quinn and McCarthy were interrogating defendant or that defendant was in custody. The only issues, then, are whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that defendant was given Miranda warnings before giving his June 17th statement, whether he invoked his right to counsel, and whether he was tricked into waiving his rights by improper police deception. Both officers testified that Quinn informed defendant of his rights, and their testimony was supported by the actual card defendant had signed. The trial court specifically accepted the officers' testimony as truthful; consequently, substantial evidence supports the court's resolution of the issue. Normally this would suffice to conclude no violation of the familiar Miranda rules occurred. Defendant contends, however, that Quinn's failure to record the Miranda admonition and defendant's waiver is suspicious. Indeed, defendant argues Quinn took quite a bit of trouble not to record the Miranda admonition and waiver. As indicated, however, Quinn explained the circumstances that led to the partial recording: he secretly turned on his hidden tape recorder after defendant had waived his rights and, when the tape ran out, decided against putting in a new tape for fear of distracting defendant. We assume the trial court considered the plausibility of this explanation together with Sergeant Quinn's credibility before it ruled in the People's favor. We also assume the court considered the fact that the officers had engaged in small talk before interrogating defendant. Unlike defendant, we cannot assume such pre-interview banter necessarily suggests the Miranda warning was jokingly delivered or was otherwise conveyed in a manner lacking the solemnity defendant argues such warnings require. The officers explained they wished to place defendant at ease before starting the interrogation. The trial court observed the officers testify, and we assume it evaluated their credibility on this issue. To the extent defendant suggests that by engaging in small talk Quinn and McCarthy improperly soften[ed] him up before extracting a Miranda waiver, we disagree. First, we find defendant did not raise this objection in his moving papers below. As a result, the parties had no incentive to fully litigate this theory below, and the trial court had no opportunity to resolve material factual disputes and make necessary factual findings ( People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 339, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846), such as the nature and effect of the type of small talk in which the officers engaged. We conclude the objection was not preserved for appeal. ( Ibid. ) Second, even assuming for argument the issue was preserved, we find it lacks merit. We have explained that [w]hen the waiver results from a clever softening-up of a defendant through disparagement of the victim and ingratiating conversation, the subsequent decision to waive without a Miranda warning must be deemed to be involuntary for the same reason that an incriminating statement made under police interrogation without a Miranda warning is deemed to be involuntary. ( People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 160-161, 141 Cal.Rptr. 698, 570 P.2d 1050.) But unlike in Honeycutt, neither Quinn nor McCarthy discussed the victim. Nor is there any other evidence suggesting that the manner in which Quinn and McCarthy engaged in small talk overbore defendant's free will. Honeycutt is thus distinguishable. Defendant argues due process requires application of a blanket rule requiring that all interrogations, including the Miranda warnings and waivers, be tape-recorded to facilitate later determinations of voluntariness. He cites Stephan v. State (Alaska 1985) 711 P.2d 1156 in support. While we have no wish to discourage law enforcement officials from recording such interrogations, we have already found that such a blanket rule is not required to protect the due process rights of those being interrogated ( People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 663-665, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213), and defendant fails to raise any argument convincing us that Holt was incorrectly decided. Defendant next contends his Miranda waiver was vitiated by Quinn and McCarthy's promise that anything defendant told them, we're going to keep between us. He claims such a promise was diametrically opposed to the statement that whatever [defendant] told the police officers could and would be used against him in a court of law. If the police had actually promised defendant his statements would not be used against him, contrary to the earlier Miranda warning, an error of constitutional dimension would have occurred. (See, e.g., People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 66 Cal. Rptr.2d 609, 941 P.2d 788.) As with the previous claim that the officers softened him up, defendant did not raise in his moving papers below the claim that he spoke in reliance on the officers' promise not to divulge his statements to anyone. Accordingly, the officers were not asked to explain the meaning of their assertion that they would keep between us defendant's revelations. [10] Consequently, the objection was not preserved for appeal. ( People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 339, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846.) Even were we to assume the issue is properly before us, we find defendant's claim cannot be sustained, for the record does not support a conclusion that the officers made a promise to hold defendant's statements in confidence, or that defendant understood their comments as constituting such a promise. To begin with, the record is somewhat ambiguous and should be placed in context. In the course of the long interrogation, Detective McCarthy explained to defendant that Garrison had placed the blame for the crime primarily on defendant. McCarthy explained that [w]e're interested in this guy, Mark [Garrison]. OK, obviously we can't tell you everything. But he knows certain things about this case ... too. McCarthy told defendant the district attorney had not yet charged Garrison because of Garrison's allegations suggesting defendant was the actual killer. When defendant retorted, That ain't true, McCarthy responded: Well, we know [it] isn't. Only because of, No. 1, what he said, and No. 2 what some other people have told us. OK, again, I can't go into what the other people have told us because, what you tell us we're going to keep between us. Just like if somebody else tells us something, you know, that's why like I told you, we're going to know. (Italics added.) Despite this fleeting comment, defendant continued to deny his involvement. Placed in context, McCarthy's statement that what you tell us we're going to keep between us is but a fleeting comment during a long interrogation that was meant to communicate to defendant why the officers could not reveal everything Garrison had told them. Reading the whole transcript, we conclude McCarthy did not promise defendant that his statements would remain confidential, nor did defendant understand McCarthy's comment to mean that all that was said would remain confidential. Finally, defendant makes no showing he understood McCarthy's brief comment to vitiate the Miranda warning given just minutes earlier. We conclude that, assuming the issue was preserved for appeal, the officers did not promise defendant his comments would remain confidential. Accordingly, we find no Miranda violation. To the extent defendant separately contends his statements were involuntary due to the officers' promises, we also find the trial court's rejection of this claim was proper.
As noted, the June 17, 1988, interview was only partially tape-recorded. The prosecution offered the entire tape recording as evidence, but an issue arose as to the admissibility of extraneous statements contained in the recording: the prosecutor was concerned about defendant's self-serving statements, and defense counsel was concerned about the officers' hearsay and accusatory insinuations. It was agreed the parties would edit out offending statements. In addition, defendant argued the recording of the second police interview with him, conducted a few days after the June 17th interview, should (with the exception of the discussion of defendant's prior murder) be admitted without any redactions because the entire interview had been recorded. The prosecution disagreed, arguing the intervening days between the first and second police interrogations allowed defendant to think about how to slant his story to portray his involvement in the crime in the best light. The prosecution ultimately did not introduce the second recording into evidence. Defendant argues that the trial court committed a number of errors by admitting the redacted recording of the June 17th interview. He first claims the redacted recording was so distorted and misleading that it should certainly have been excluded as more prejudicial than probative. We assume defendant is referring to Evidence Code section 352, but he nowhere asserts he made such an objection at trial. Moreover, even if such a claim was preserved, the gist of defendant's argument is that the full recording included much information favorable to him that had been redacted. For example, in the interview defendant claimed he had at first been less than forthcoming with police because he had gotten married while in prison, vowed to change his life, and just wanted to serve his present term and join his wife; he had discouraged Garrison from harming Dolinka; he was not personally responsible for the stabbing; and that when he saw Dolinka emerge from the service station, he did not appear to be badly hurt. Even had defendant moved to exclude the redacted June 17th recording pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, the trial court should properly have denied the motion. The fuller picture defendant argues should have been presented to the jury consisted of self-serving hearsay not otherwise admissible at trial. (See Evid. Code, § 1220 [to qualify as a party admission, a hearsay statement must be introduced against the declarant].) Defendant was free to present this information by taking the stand himself. To allow him to present this evidence through admission of the unredacted recording would have allowed him to present favorable evidence without subjecting himself to cross-examination. `A defendant in a criminal case may not introduce hearsay evidence for the purpose of testifying while avoiding cross-examination.' ( People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 820, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436, quoting People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36, 69, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433 (plur. opn. of Broussard, J.).) Defendant further argues that [providing the jury with this type of truncated, distorted, and misleading `confession' deprived [him] of state and federal due process, and of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. It again appears that defendant did not preserve this issue for appeal by raising the constitutional claim below. Assuming, however, for argument the issue is properly before us, we find it lacks merit: defendant's trial was not rendered fundamentally unfair nor was he deprived of his Sixth Amendment rights merely because the trial court did not allow him to spread before the jury his own hearsay statements insulated from cross-examination. Defendant also contends that, by playing for the jury the edited version of the recording of his June 17th statements, and also ruling the prosecution was not obligated to introduce the recording of his June 21st interview with police, the trial court subjected him to unfair pressure to testify, thereby burdening his constitutional right to refrain from testifying. ( Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106.) Defendant exaggerates his dilemma. First, defense counsel willingly participated in the redaction of the June 17th recording because the recording contained information damaging to his client, such as the fact defendant was already in prison when the interview occurred. Second, the trial court was correct in ruling that it could not force the People to introduce the second recording into evidence. Finally, even assuming undue pressure was placed on defendant to testify, he apparently was able to withstand the pressure, for he did not take the stand. Accordingly, there was no violation of defendant's Fifth Amendment rights.
Defendant had previously been convicted of rape in 1978, attempted grand theft from the person in 1982, grand theft from the person in 1984, and murder in 1986. Anticipating that the prosecution would introduce such evidence as impeachment should he testify, defendant moved to exclude evidence of these convictions pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. [11] His motion addressed the law both pre-Proposition 8 ( People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1 ( Beagle )) and post-Proposition 8 ( People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111 ( Castro )). [12] The trial court discussed the motion as a Castro motion and ruled all four convictions were admissible for impeachment purposes. [13] Defendant later sought reconsideration of the ruling, arguing that the case was governed not by Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 301, 211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111, but by pre-Proposition 8 law. The court agreed and, this time applying Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d 441, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1, again ruled defendant's prior felony convictions would be available for impeachment. The court explained that it still believed witnesses should not be allowed to testify under a false aura of credibility, and, [w]ith that thinking, and on rebalancing in light of Beagle, the Court does reconsider its ruling, and nevertheless, rules similarly. Namely, that I feel the nature of the offenses, the time frame within which the prior convictions have occurred, does fairly and accurately give the jurors some guidance at least in terms of the issue of credibility of a person who has suffered such convictions. Defendant now argues the trial court erred, and the error, coupled with the court's earlier ruling permitting admission into evidence of a redacted recording of his June 17th interview with police, placed him in the dilemma of staying silent and allowing the People to present this truncated version of his statements, or testifying to clarify his statement and suffering impeachment with his prior felony convictions. He contends his prior convictions had little bearing on his truthfulness, were highly prejudicial due to their similarity to the crimes against Dolinka, and were remote in time. The People essentially concede error as to the prior rape and murder convictions. Although they note the prior convictions were not remote in time because defendant essentially was in prison during the time between the convictions, and thus his convictions had not `been followed by a legally blameless life' ( Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 453, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1), the People admit the rape and murder convictions did not bear directly on defendant's veracity as required by Beagle and its progeny. (See, e.g., People v. Rist (1976) 16 Cal.3d 211, 221, 127 Cal.Rptr. 457, 545 P.2d 833.) They also concede the murder and grand theft convictions are somewhat similar to the Dolinka crimes, but argue that conviction for grand theft from the person, being a larcenous crime, bears heavily on credibility. Assuming there was Beagle error, the People argue strenuously it was harmless. Dolinka was killed in May 1982, just prior to the passage of Proposition 8 in June 1982. Accordingly, defendant's case is governed by Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d 441, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1, and not Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 301, 211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111. ( People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251, 262, 193 Cal. Rptr. 692, 667 P.2d 149; People v. Pickett (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1042, 1047, 210 Cal. Rptr. 85.) Although the law before Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 301, 211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111, gave trial courts discretion to admit or exclude prior felony convictions for purposes of impeachment, this court, in a long line of cases, had developed guidelines for courts to follow. Thus, for example, prior convictions for crimes whose elements were relevant to a person's veracity (such as fraud or deceit) were more likely admissible than mere acts of violence or other assaultive behavior. ( People v. Barrick (1982) 33 Cal.3d 115, 122, 187 Cal. Rptr. 716, 654 P.2d 1243.) The nearness or remoteness in time of the prior conviction was also a factor, as was whether the defendant had led a blameless life between the prior conviction and the present one. ( Ibid. ) Whether the defendant was charged with a crime substantially similar to that underlying a prior conviction, as well as the importance of hearing the defendant's version of events, were other relevant considerations. ( Id. at pp. 122-123, 187 Cal. Rptr. 716, 654 P.2d 1243.) As the People concede, the trial court abused its discretion under Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d 441, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1, by ruling defendant's prior murder and rape convictions could be admitted to impeach him should he choose to testify. Defendant's conviction for murder was similar to the crime against Dolinka ( People v. Spearman (1979) 25 Cal.3d 107, 116, 157 Cal.Rptr. 883, 599 P.2d 74), and his convictions for murder and rape do not strongly suggest he was prone to dishonesty ( People v. Holt (1984) 37 Cal.3d 436, 456-457, 208 Cal.Rptr. 547, 690 P.2d 1207 [murder conviction does not indicate witness was disposed to falsify]; see People v. Rist, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 221, 127 Cal.Rptr. 457, 545 P.2d 833 [rape not relevant to lack of honesty]). On the other hand, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling defendant's grand theft conviction could be admitted to impeach him, for theft crimes necessarily involve an element of deceit. The crime[ ] of grand larceny ... [is] recognized as reflective of a person's honesty and integrity, and [is] therefore probative for purposes of impeachment. ( People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189, 196, 160 Cal.Rptr. 669.) Having determined the trial court abused its discretion in ruling defendant's prior convictions for rape and murder could be admitted for impeachment purposes, we turn to the question whether the error requires reversal. We agree with respondent it does not. As noted, had defendant testified, he properly would have been impeached with his 1984 felony conviction for grand theft from the person. Moreover, the evidence against defendant was quite strong, for his coperpetrator, Mark Garrison, testified against him and numerous aspects of Garrison's story were consistent with evidence already known to the police. Finally, although defendant did not testify, the jury heard his side of the story from Sergeant Quinn and Detective McCarthy, who recounted defendant's statements in the June 17th interrogation admitting having planned and executed the robbery but placing the blame for killing Dolinka squarely and solely on Garrison's shoulders. Although it is true, as defendant argues, that police had an incentive to inculpate him, he does not explain how his story would have been any different had he testified himself. Considering together the availability of the prior felony conviction for impeachment, the strong evidence of defendant's guilt, and the fact his version of the crime reached the jury, we conclude the trial court's error was harmless under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243. (See People v. Barrick, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 130, 187 Cal.Rptr. 716, 654 P.2d 1243 [applying Watson ]; People v. Woodard (1979) 23 Cal.3d 329, 341, 152 Cal.Rptr. 536, 590 P.2d 391 [same].)