Opinion ID: 348709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: permit & registration inspection

Text: 16 We turn to the government's contention that the stop was legally justified as a routine permit inspection. The government argues that police officers have unqualified 2 authority to stop motor vehicles for the purpose of inspecting the drivers' permit and registration cards which operators of vehicles are required to carry. 3 Reliance upon the administrative nature of the stop does not supply the requisite justification. The fact that the purpose of (traffic stop) laws is said to be administrative is of limited relevance in weighing their intrusiveness on one's right to travel . . . . United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 n. 14, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3084, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). 17 A broad discretion to make the kind of temporary seizure involved in stops for permit inspection includes a significant intrusion on personal mobility and privacy. That kind of inspection stop involves not only a seizure of the car, but often, perhaps typically, a visual inspection of the interior of the car. 4 The stop is not momentary, but leads to delay several minutes to complete a radio check for outstanding traffic warrants. A stop for this purpose will typically be inconvenient and, depending on the personalities and circumstances, may well be embarrassing, perplexing or even fraught with anxiety. A permit-inspection stop is less of an interference then a full search, but it has qualities of intrusiveness that cannot be gainsaid. 18 On the other side is the public interest in enforcing the vehicle control laws, and the permit and registration requirements. This interest is substantial, and must be given respectful consideration. Still, it would not seem to be any more weighty then our interest in stemming the flow of illegal immigrants into this country, see United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 900, 95 S.Ct. 2585, 45 L.Ed.2d 623 (1975) (Appendix to Opinion of Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the judgment). In addition, the need for individual traffic stops as a means of enforcing the traffic laws is less pressing if there are other less intrusive techniques which may be used to achieve the same goals. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). 19 We approach the problem before us with an awareness that the practice of stopping automobiles briefly for questioning has a long history evidencing its utility and is accepted by motorists as incident to highway use. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 n. 14, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3084, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). But this history does not answer the question before us: assuming that police do have the power to conduct stops for permit inspection, under what circumstances may it be exercised? 20 In Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883 n. 8, 95 S.Ct. at 2581, the Court observed, Our decision thus does not imply that state and local enforcement agencies are without power to conduct such limited stops as are necessary to enforce laws regarding drivers' licenses, vehicle registration, truck weights, and similar matters. The Court did not discuss what kinds of limited stops it would view as necessary for the enforcement of these laws. Other Supreme Court decisions similarly reserve this question. 5 21 The underlying reasoning of the border search cases, however, does provide a meaningful framework for analysis of the vehicle stop problem. First, in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973), the Court held unconstitutional the Border Patrol's practice of searching automobiles without probable cause and without consent, simply because they could be found within 100 miles of a U.S. border. The Government attempted to justify this practice by relying heavily on cases dealing with administrative inspections. E. g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct. 774, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972). In rejecting this line of argument, the Court emphasized that the search at issue was conducted in the unfettered discretion of the members of the Border Patrol . . . precisely the evil the Court saw in Camara when it insisted that the 'discretion of the official in the field' be circumscribed by obtaining a warrant. 413 U.S. at 270, 93 S.Ct. at 2538. The Court rejected the other administrative inspection cases partly on the grounds that the private motorist did not, like a businessman in an intensely regulated industry, 6 subject himself to the full rigors of administrative inspection simply by using the public highways. See 413 U.S. at 271, 93 S.Ct. 2535. 22 In the next of this series of cases, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975), the Court was concerned with stops rather than searches. It held that members of a roving border patrol team could not stop and question passing motorists unless the officers had reasonable basis for suspecting that the private vehicles contained illegal aliens. The primary reason given for imposing this restriction on the operations of the Border Patrol was the Court's appreciation that an unlimited discretion to stop vehicles was a threat to individual freedom to use the highways. 23 To approve roving-patrol stops of all vehicles in the border area, without any suspicion that a particular vehicle is carrying illegal immigrants, would subject residents of these and other areas to potentially unlimited interference with their use of the highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers. The only formal limitation on that discretion appears to be the administrative regulation defining the term reasonable distance in § 287(a)(3) to mean within 100 miles from the border. . . . Thus, if we approved the Government's position in this case, Border Patrol officers could stop motorists at random for questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles of the 2,000 mile border, on a city street, a busy highway, or a desert road, without any reason to suspect that they have violated any law. 24 422 U.S. at 882-83, 95 S.Ct. at 2581. 25 The Court further articulated its objections to discretionary stops in the companion case, United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 95 S.Ct. 2585, 45 L.Ed.2d 623 (1975), in which it struck down discretionary searches at fixed Border Patrol checkpoints. The Court recognized two grounds for distinguishing between police action taken at a fixed checkpoint and that taken by roving patrols: 26 First, a checkpoint officer's discretion in deciding which cars to search is limited by the location of the checkpoint. That location is determined by high-level Border Patrol officials, using criteria that include the degree of inconvenience to the public and the potential for safe operation, as well as the potential for detecting and deterring the illegal movement of aliens. 27 Second, the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving patrol stop. Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion. 28 Although the Court found that these differences were not sufficient to justify discretionary searches at the checkpoints, it noted that the differences between a roving patrol and checkpoint would be significant in determining the propriety of the stop, which is considerably less intrusive than a search. 422 U.S. at 894, 95 S.Ct. at 2587. 29 Finally, in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976), the Court relied on these differences to uphold routine stops without suspicion at Border Patrol checkpoints. Checkpoint stops were seen to be less than roving stops because: 30 the subjective intrusion the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop. 31 Id. at 558, 96 S.Ct. at 3083. The fixed location was seen to be an important limitation on the discretion of the individual officials: 32 The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class. And since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of the individuals than there was in the case of roving patrol stops. Id. at 559, 96 S.Ct. at 3083. 7 33 From these Supreme Court decisions we draw several conclusions. First, the intrusiveness of a police stop of a private motorist is to be measured not only by objective criteria, such as the period of time for which the vehicle is detained, but also in terms of the stop's subjective impact. A roving police stop is a more serious intrusion than a predicted checkpoint inspection, because the unexpected stop is pregnant with greater annoyance and inconvenience, and more likely to frighten or embarrass. 8 34 Second, the possibilities for stops that are harassing or more intrusive are heightened by a rule that vests the field officer with absolute discretion to stop and question passing motorists. Under that formulation there can be no effective control over arbitrary or harassing police action. The discretion of the field officer can be controlled, however, by a program staked out in advance by superior officials, which includes as safeguards specific instructions to be followed by field officers. 35 These principles, evolved for governance of the vexing problem of police checks for illegal aliens, can be given appropriate application so as to control police activities in enforcing the motor vehicle laws. An unexpected police stop for a driver's license inspection may cause the same subjective reactions as a stop for any other law enforcement purpose. 9 The same possibilities for police abuse are present in the unchecked power to make stops for asserted traffic purposes. However, the conduct of vehicle stops in accordance with instructions issued by the superior officials as part of a publicly understood program for enforcement of the motor vehicle laws may reduce both police abuse and citizen apprehension to a level consistent with the Fourth Amendment's objectives. 10 36 Martinez-Fuerte indicates one permissible format would use predetermined checkpoints, at which vehicles could be stopped for permit inspection. These could be changed to different locations, with frequent rotation. Public response to such a systematic program would insure that it does not become too burdensome to individual citizens. It would not be necessary to stop every vehicle passing each checkpoint, as long as a regular procedure was followed. 11 37 Roving patrol cars might also be permitted to make vehicle stops assuming appropriate instructions. Random stops would be permissible, provided they are truly random. The important point is that the stops be made in some systematic fashion, prescribed in advance by superiors. 38 Stops are not random simply because they are left to the officer's discretion. In that formulation there lurks the possibility that assertedly  random stops will be used to harass where reasonable grounds for suspicion do not exist. The courts have had experience with stops represented as a random traffic stop but found to be a pretext for investigation of other matters. 12 39 Our views on the problem of traffic stops are generally congruent with the decisions of other courts. The courts have approved the use of roadblocks and other systematic procedures for stopping automobiles for permit inspections. 13 Yet several courts have disapproved of police techniques which permit field officers to single out individual motorists for questioning, 14 and other courts have specifically reserved judgment as to the constitutionality of such discretionary stops. 15 Of our sister circuits, only one, the Fourth, 16 has announced that a roving police patrol has complete discretion in stopping individual motorists. With all deference, that opinion relied on precedents subsequently limited and questioned (see note 16), and chose to speak broadly on facts (the stop of a truck tipped on a warehouse theft) which came within the ambit of the Terry standard of articulable suspicion. 40 We have examined with particular care the decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573 (1972), aff'd on jurisdictional grounds only, 411 U.S. 389, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972). In that decision the court upheld permit inspection stops as necessary to enforce the motor vehicle laws. 290 A.2d at 582. It then confined its holding in the following way: 41 We hasten to add that the courts, including ours, have warned law enforcement officers, specifically and emphatically, that a so-called spot check is not to be used as a substitute for a search for evidence of some possible crime unrelated to possession of a driver's permit. Mincy v. District of Columbia, 218 A.2d 507, 508 (D.C.App.1966), (and the cases cited at 508 n. 3). 42 Id. While the language of this opinion is somewhat more permissive than our own, we note that it was decided before the Supreme Court's decisions in Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte, and their guidance on the intrusiveness of discretionary stops. 43 Upon application of these legal standards to the facts of this case, it is clear that the police officers' stop of defendant's car cannot be justified as a spot check. The police officers admitted that defendant's car had not been randomly selected, but chosen because it aroused their suspicion. Although the trial judge originally thought that the stop was justified as a  routine traffic stop, at the rehearing of the motion to suppress after the trial he concluded: 44 The evidence in this case was that the officer saw this defendant cruising repeatedly through a particular neighborhood, looking around in a suspicious manner. And from that a reasonably prudent officer could conclude that he might well have been trying to case some place in the neighborhood, or what not, . . . . (Tr. 11). 45 In short, this was a stop to discover evidence where no adequate grounds for suspicion existed. This inspecting of defendant's driver's license was not conducted for the purpose of enforcing the vehicle control laws, but was a maneuver for investigating defendant's suspicious conduct. 46 The considerations underlying our conclusion concerning the invalidity of the discretionary permit-stop are confirmed by the record evidence indicating how the so-called vehicle spot check program in force in the District of Columbia is being used. A departmental order states that officers are authorized to stop motor vehicles at random to determine whether an operator has in his possession a valid operator's permit and recites that the justification for such spot checks is limited to assuring that only properly qualified persons operate motor vehicles. 17 The reality, however, as it emerges in the testimony, is that the individual police officer is free to use the vehicle spot check authority as a basis to stop and question any vehicle driver he pleases, on bare suspicion of other possible crimes past or potential. 47 Officer Exum's testimony confirms the foregoing. On cross-examination the following colloquy occurred: 48 Q. . . . Officer, let me ask you this. What criteria, or what situations, under what situation or what criteria do you personally use in making what we call a routine traffic check, or spot check if someone has an operator's permit, or a registration with him? (Pausing) In other words, in what situations do you make this traffic stop? 49 A. Well, there are several. If he commits a violation, you know, if he is acting in a suspicious manner and you observe him several times in any area, you know, that you may think he's he may be thinking about he's about to, or have committed a crime. 50 Additionally corroborative of the purpose for which spot checks are being used are the elaborate records which the police department requires the field officers to keep. 18 After each stop, the officer is directed to fill out a card on which there are blanks for the citizen's race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, color of eyes and hair, complexion, scars, tattoos, clothing, facial hair and nickname. 19 Why would the police need this information, in addition to the name and address of the driver and the place, time and purpose of the stop, if the purpose is that of enforcing the motor vehicle code? Officer Exum's testimony continues: 51 The main purpose of the spot check is to obtain the identity of the subject, a description of the subject. We have a 3 X 5 card that we put this information on and it is sent to the precinct of that area in case of . . . a subject fitting a description, you know, later of crime committed in that area and the subject, if we get a lookout, we have a we may have the description of that subject on a 3 X 5 card. (Tr. 68). 52 Thus, in Officer Exum's understanding, the spot-check program was to gather information about the whereabouts and activities of various suspicious citizens, in case a criminal act was later reported in the vicinity. Government counsel do not contend on appeal that the Exum testimony gives a misleading impression of prevalent police practice, but instead defend the result as permitted by the plenary discretion of police officers to make stops. 53 The exercise of the police power to stop motorists for such surveillance purposes is clearly contrary to the spirit of the Fourth Amendment. This is not to say that patrolmen may not observe and take notes of unusual, or even usual, occurrences on their beat; such vigilance is the hallmark of good police work. A policeman may address questions to anyone on the street. But the person may not be detained merely because he refuses to cooperate and goes on his way. White, J., concurring in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 34, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Here we have an assertion of a police right to engage in greater intrusions a right to stop a moving vehicle, and to compel responses (documents). The use of the state's coercive power to detain citizens, without reasonable suspicion, and interrogate them to create a record of their activities, involves an interference with individual autonomy which cannot be reconciled with American notions of personal privacy and mobility. 54 We find in the District's vehicle spot check procedures the same features that led, in Gomez v. Wilson, 20 to judicial condemnation of the District's program for surveillance of pedestrians. Under that program, the police could, regardless of whether grounds for a Terry stop existed, detain and question any suspicious person on the city streets about his or her activities. The information obtained from the interrogation was recorded on a form similar to the 3 X 5 card involved here, and then indexed and cross-indexed in police files. 21 This practice was held unconstitutional in a direct challenge in civil litigation, 22 and the District did not appeal. 23 That aspect of police power with which Gomez was concerned discretionary authority to stop and question citizens lies at the heart of the District's traffic check program. Because it carries with it the same potential for abuse that was demonstrated in Gomez, that power must be subjected to clear programmatic instructions designed to reduce the intrusiveness of the stops and limit the possibilities for harassment. Indeed, we note that the practices declared unconstitutional in Gomez actually began as an extension to pedestrians of the spot check program involved in this case. See 323 F.Supp. at 90. This growth of one unconstitutional program from another evidences the potentially cancerous nature of excessive police power.