Opinion ID: 1722496
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fjelland's first basis raises two problems.

Text: (a) Did Wemhoff and Holm enter into a contract for the sale of the farm at the time they made their oral agreement or at the later time when they signed a writing? The American Law Institute states the rule on this subject thus, in Restatement, Contracts 2d § 26: Manifestations of assent that are in themselves sufficient to conclude a contract will not be prevented from so operating by the fact that the parties also manifest an intention to prepare and adopt a written memorial thereof; but the circumstances may show that the agreements are preliminary negotiation. The determinative factor is the parties' intent. We stated in Elkader Co-op Co. v. Matt, 204 N.W.2d 873, 875 (Iowa): The intention of the parties is decisive on this issuedid they intend the oral agreement to be binding or not? The testimony in the present case leaves no doubt as to what the parties intended at the time they made the oral agreement. The agreement had only two partiesWemhoff the seller and Holm the buyer. When counsel asked Wemhoff on the stand, Did you consider it sold at that time? he answered, Yes. When counsel asked Holm whether as far as you were concerned you had bought it? he responded, Yes. We hold that the Wemhoff-Holm oral agreement was a contract for the sale and purchase of the farm. (b) As regards Fjelland, was the Wemhoff-Holm oral agreement a contract notwithstanding the statute of frauds, § 622.32(3), Code 1975? That statute constitutes a rule of evidence, but both Wemhoff and Holm admit the oral agreement. Huston v. Gelane Co., 254 Iowa 752, 119 N.W.2d 188. Fjelland cannot question the Wemhoff-Holm agreement on the ground of the statute of frauds. Sherwood v. Greater Mammoth Vein Coal Co., 193 Iowa 365, 185 N.W. 279; Restatement, Contracts 2d § 218; 73 Am.Jur.2d Statute of Frauds § 578 at 217; 37 C.J.S. Frauds Statute of § 220 at 715. As to Fjelland the Wemhoff-Holm agreement was a contract although it was oral. The effect of these legal determinations is to defeat Fjelland's first basis of recovery. Wemhoff sold the farm before Fjelland's prospect was able to buy it. On Fjelland's first basis of recovery, his listing thus terminated before he produced an able buyer. White & Hoskins v. Benton, 121 Iowa 354, 96 N.W. 876. See also Espy v. Eells, 349 Mass. 314, 207 N.E.2d 918; Wallace v. Figone, 107 Mo.App. 362, 81 S.W. 492; McFadden v. Crisler, 141 Tenn. 531, 213 S.W. 912; Dindo v. Cappelletti, 116 Vt. 403, 77 A.2d 840. The record discloses no substantial evidence of bad faith on Wemhoff's part in accepting Holm's offer to buy the farm. Nor does the record disclose expenditure of time or effort by Fjelland after Wemhoff sold to Holm and before Fjelland learned that Wemhoff had sold the farm. Cf. Staats v. Mangelsen, 105 Neb. 282, 180 N.W. 78. The trial court erred in allowing recovery on the first basis. II. Fjelland did not ask the trial court to enlarge its findings and rule upon his second basis for recovery. See rule 179(b), Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore Fjelland presents nothing for review. Fjelland's petition must be dismissed. REVERSED.