Opinion ID: 75961
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Circuits' Approaches to this Issue

Text: 49 Having set out the Supreme Court authority relevant to the issue of whether AEDPA applies to Isaacs' petition, we will now discuss the competing approaches taken by our sister circuits in this regard. 50 As mentioned above, five circuits have considered this exact issue, and all but one have found AEDPA to be applicable under these circumstances. The only circuit so far to have accepted Isaacs' position on when a habeas case is instituted is the Ninth. In Calderon, the en banc Ninth Circuit overruled the position announced in previous decisions and held that, for purposes of determining whether a case was pending when AEDPA took effect in April 1996, courts should look to the date on which the defendant filed a motion for appointment of counsel. 163 F.3d at 539-40. Its previous cases had interpreted the Supreme Court's McFarland decision as applying only to the two statutory provisions presented in that case (the provisions allowing for appointment of habeas counsel and providing district courts with authority to stay state court proceedings), but not to the question of whether a case was pending for AEDPA purposes. Id. at 539 (discussing cases). The Calderon court found, however, that the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Hohn required it to revisit and reverse its position. 51 In Calderon, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Hohn as indicating that a habeas case may be initiated by the filing of an application for a COA. Id. The court focused on the Supreme Court's rejection of the notion that a COA is a threshold matter separate from the merits of a habeas case. Id. The court then reasoned that: 52 In the wake of Hohn, we must overrule [the Ninth Circuit precedent] holding that a habeas corpus case is not pending until the habeas petition itself has been filed. Hohn 's holding, as well as its reliance on Ex Parte Quirin that a threshold request for leave to file a petition for habeas corpus commences the habeas case, is simply irreconcilable with [those cases]. Like a request for leave to file a habeas petition, a petition for the appointment of counsel to prepare and file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, accompanied by a motion for a stay of execution under McFarland, is a threshold action that presents a case to the district court. By analogy to Hohn, it follows that a petition for appointment of counsel under McFarland creates a pending habeas case. Accordingly, we overrule those [cases] that held that a habeas corpus case is pending only when the habeas petition itself has been filed. A petition for the appointment of counsel to prepare and file a habeas petition, coupled with a motion for a stay of execution, also suffices. 53 Id. at 540. See also Garceau v. Woodford, 275 F.3d 769, 772 n. 1 (9th Cir.2001) (following Calderon ); Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 771 (9th Cir.2001). 54 Contrary to the Ninth Circuit, four courts of appeals have held that AEDPA applies to § 2254 petitions filed after the Act became effective, even if the defendant had filed a motion for appointment of counsel or for a stay prior to the effective date. The courts which have taken this position have found the Supreme Court cases discussed above distinguishable for several reasons. 55 The Sixth Circuit's decision in Williams v. Coyle, 167 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir.1999), is a good example that contains most of the reasons cited by the other circuits for the conclusion that a habeas case is only pending from the time that an actual petition is filed. The Williams court began by noting that [i]n ordinary usage a case is pending when a complaint or petition is filed. Id. at 1038. Also, the Sixth Circuit noted that habeas cases are generally subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Rule 11 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, and Rule 3 of those rules states that [a] civil action is commenced by the filing of a complaint with the court. Id. After stating that no habeas rules address the specific issue, the court conclude[d] that Fed.R.Civ.P. 3 yields a presumption that a federal habeas corpus case is filed with the filing of an application for the writ. Id. The court found that [t]his presumption is reinforced by the language of the habeas corpus provisions, because, for example, Section 2254(e) refers to a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. 56 After discussing these reasons to believe that a habeas case is only pending after a petition is filed, the Williams court turned to the Supreme Court cases discussed above. The court noted that McFarland held that a motion for the appointment of counsel constitutes a post conviction proceeding for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B), and that a motion for appointment of counsel was sufficient to enable a district court to stay an execution pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2251, which literally grants this power to a judge `before whom a habeas corpus proceeding is pending.' Id. The Sixth Circuit concluded that McFarland did not indicate that a habeas case was pending, for purposes of AEDPA's applicability, simply because a motion for appointment of counsel had been filed, stating: 57 [B]oth holdings of McFarland appear to rest on the necessity of expanding the ordinary meaning of a pending case in order to give effect to clear congressional intent. By contrast, we perceive no compelling reason to depart from plain meaning in the present case. The problem the Court addressed in McFarland was of an ongoing nature and had nothing to do with the effective date of any statutory provision. In the present case, on the other hand, the defendant faces additional procedural hurdles post-AEDPA, but there is no ongoing rationale for stretching the pending period to reach prior to the actual filing of the application as there was in McFarland. Once all cases in which a petitioner initiated some habeas corpus-related legal action prior to the effective date of the AEDPA have been resolved, the point at which a § 2254 case is filed will become irrelevant. 58 Id. at 1039. Williams acknowledged that McFarland contains language which could be interpreted as meaning that a § 2254 case in general begins with the filing of a motion for appointment of counsel, but rejected such a broad reading, concluding instead that this reading is warranted only to the extent necessary to give effect to § 848(q)(4)(B). Id. 59 The Sixth Circuit then turned to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Calderon, and rejected the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the effect of the Supreme Court's Hohn decision. Id. The court stated that: 60 In our opinion Hohn and Ex parte Quirin stand only for the proposition that the denial by the district court of a motion for the issuance of a COA, a motion for leave to file a petition for the writ, or, as in our case, a motion for the appointment of counsel pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) would constitute an appealable case. This does not imply, however, that the petitioner's habeas corpus case has been initiated by the filing of such a preliminary motion. Although the Court in Hohn rejected the contention that the filing of a preliminary motion should be regarded as a threshold inquiry separate from the merits, Hohn, 118 S.Ct. at 1974-75, the holding and logic of the case were limited to the determination that the rejection by the district court of the preliminary motion constitutes an appealable case. Thus, we do not believe that Hohn dictates the result sought by Williams. 61 Id. at 1040. 62 Having rejected an interpretation of Hohn that would have the motion for appointment of counsel mark the beginning of a habeas case, the Sixth Circuit then stated that it agreed with a pre- Hohn Seventh Circuit opinion that stated: 63 Although it is linguistically possible for this preapplication legal assistance to open a case having some affinity to a petition under § 2254 ... the motion for counsel is not itself a petition, because it does not call for (or even permit) a decision on the merits. And it is the merits that the amended § 2254(d)(1) is all about. 64 Id. (quoting Holman v. Gilmore, 126 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir.1997)). Therefore, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a federal habeas corpus case is filed or pending for purposes of Lindh and the AEDPA only when the petition for the writ is filed. Id. 65 More recently, the Seventh Circuit addressed the effect of Hohn and the Ninth Circuit's Calderon opinion, and Judge Easterbrook stood by the court's earlier approach, stating: 66 The question in Hohn was whether an application for a certificate of appealability is a case in the court of appeals, and therefore amenable to review on writ of certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 1254. The answer to that question does not bear on the issue in Holman and Calderon: whether an application for counsel under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4) is a case pending under Chapter 153 of the Judicial Code — the critical question for application of the AEDPA. We did not doubt in Holman that a request for counsel is a case in the sense that it is subject to appellate review (and, if need be, review by the Supreme Court). Indeed, Gosier's request for counsel was reviewed by this court on appeal, after the district judge dismissed his application. But a request for counsel under § 848(q)(4), part of Title 21, is not a case under Chapter 153 of Title 28 — that is, the request is not a collateral attack on a criminal judgment. This rationale of Holman was ignored by the ninth circuit, and we are not persuaded by a decision that avoided the fundamental issue. So we apply the AEDPA to Gosier's case. 67 Gosier v. Welborn, 175 F.3d 504, (7th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). 68 The opinions of the other circuits add little to the analysis performed by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. In two opinions, both of which pre-dated Hohn, the Fifth Circuit found that McFarland simply did not address the issue of when a case was pending for AEDPA purposes, but was instead intended to resolve practical procedural problems related to the two specific statutory provisions at issue in that case. Williams v. Cain, 125 F.3d 269 (5th Cir.1997); see also Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 414 (5th Cir.1997) (same). Similarly, in Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir.1999), the Tenth Circuit agreed that  McFarland focused on the need to expand the ordinary meaning of a pending case to give effect to Congressional intent, and did not address when a case is pending for AEDPA purposes. Id. at 1162.