Opinion ID: 787628
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did WisDNR timely commence and diligently prosecute a civil or administrative action?

Text: 15 In determining whether the plaintiffs' suit was barred under § 1365(b)(1)(B), the district court discussed three of the State's judicial actions: the 1977 Stipulation (which arose out of the 1976 litigation and addressed earlier violations); the 2001 Stipulation (which was filed as an attempted continuation of the 1976 litigation to address the violations alleged by the plaintiffs but was not accepted by the Dane County court and was later rescinded by the 2002 Stipulation); and the 2002 Stipulation (which ended litigation that had been filed in Milwaukee County court later on the same day that the plaintiffs filed suit in district court). The district court also examined whether administrative actions undertaken by the State barred the plaintiffs' suit for civil penalties under § 1319(g). We will consider in turn each of these four hurdles facing the plaintiffs.
16 No one disputes (or could dispute) that the 1976 litigation in Dane County and the resulting 1977 Stipulation occurred or were commenced before the plaintiffs' suit was filed nearly 25 years later. However, whether these actions also qualify as a diligent prosecution of violations that occurred after all work contemplated under the 1977 Stipulation had been completed is another matter. The plaintiffs argue that the 1977 Stipulation was over and done with by 1996 at the latest. But even if we assume that the 1976 action were still open to receive the filing of the 2001 Stipulation, the 1977 Stipulation could not qualify as a diligent prosecution of the violations alleged by the plaintiffs since the projects mandated by the 1977 Stipulation obviously did not prevent those violations from occurring. 17 Whether the 1976 litigation and 1977 Stipulation constituted a diligent prosecution of the historical violations that had occurred prior to the 1976 litigation and the contemplated violations that were going to continue to occur until work was completed under the 1977 Stipulation is not at issue here. Logically, however, the 1976 litigation and 1977 Stipulation cannot constitute diligent prosecution of violations that have occurred (or continued to occur) after all work under the 1977 Stipulation had been completed. If the violations alleged by the plaintiffs occurred because of lingering problems that the 1977 Stipulation failed to resolve, the 1977 Stipulation cannot have been a diligent prosecution of the circumstances causing those violations. If, on the other hand, the violations alleged by the plaintiffs occurred because of circumstances unrelated to those that the 1977 Stipulation was intended to comprehensively address, then the 1976 action cannot possibly have been a diligent prosecution of violations due to circumstances unknown and unlitigated at that time. Either way, the 1976 litigation and 1977 Stipulation do not amount to diligent prosecution of the violations alleged by the plaintiffs.
18 The 2001 Stipulation was filed as part of the 1976 litigation in Dane County Circuit Court before the 60-day notice period had expired and before the plaintiffs filed their suit. But the Dane County judge refused to enter the 2001 Stipulation, and the parties later rescinded it by the 2002 Stipulation, which was entered as part of a separate action instituted in Milwaukee County Circuit Court. The district court concluded that the Dane County court had retained jurisdiction over the 1977 Stipulation and that the 2001 Stipulation was a diligently prosecuted continuation of the same action. The plaintiffs argue that the Dane County court lacked continuing jurisdiction because all work contemplated under the 1977 Stipulation was long completed and that the flaws in the 2001 Stipulation render it non-diligent. 19 With respect to the timeliness of the action, if the State had chosen to file a brand new lawsuit rather than a new consent order in a very old lawsuit, that lawsuit would have been timely commenced. And if the Dane County judge had approved the 2001 Stipulation after it was filed, the 2001 Stipulation would also have been a timely commenced judicial enforcement action. The fact that the 2001 Stipulation was never approved by the court and was later rescinded does not affect its timeliness, which is determined by the date of filing. 5 Connecticut Fund for the Environment, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 660 F.Supp. 1397, 1404 (D.Conn.1987) ([T]he court must apply an inflexible rule which determines jurisdiction from the time of filing the complaint.). But the court's non-approval does render the 2001 action a non-diligent prosecution. 6 Even though the 2001 Stipulation may have been intended to address dry and wet weather overflows, and mandate[ ] three extensions to the Deep Tunnel (PSA at 19), the fact that the Dane County judge refused to enter the 2001 Stipulation (whether on a jurisdictional basis or otherwise) robbed that Stipulation of any legally binding effect. Even if the 2001 Stipulation had bound the parties, it was rescinded a few months later by the 2002 Stipulation, which resolved a separate judicial action filed in a different court. The fact that the 2002 Stipulation was very similar to the 2001 Stipulation does not equip the 2001 Stipulation with the teeth required to qualify on its own as a diligent prosecution. A judicial action that never resulted in any legally binding agreement to resolve the violations alleged by the plaintiffs (and was rescinded before MMSD took any actions toward complying with it) is not a diligent prosecution.
20 The plaintiffs argue that a timely commenced action must be filed prior to a citizens' suit in order for it to have potentially preclusive effect under the Act. Since the plaintiffs filed their suit several hours before the state's suit was filed, they argue that the State's 2002 litigation was not timely commenced. MMSD counters that the State agreed to postpone filing its complaint until March 15, 2002 at the plaintiffs' request, in order to give the parties a chance to negotiate a satisfactory resolution. The parties did not incorporate into their agreement to postpone filing their lawsuits any provision governing which party would be considered to have filed first. The district court did not weigh in on this issue, finding that the State's 2002 suit was filed several hours after the plaintiffs' suit, and apparently concluding that it could not qualify as a timely commenced judicial action. (PSA at 21.) 21 We are relieved to note that races to the courthouse to file Clean Water Act complaints, such as the one which took place here, are rare, though the caselaw relating to such situations is correspondingly sparse. When there has been an agreement between the parties that the citizens would file first, the citizens' suit has been held not to be barred by a suit filed by the state agency later the same day. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Am. Recovery Co., 769 F.2d 207, 207-08 (4th Cir.1985). Similarly, where the state agency had asked the citizens to postpone filing their suit, the earlier-filed citizens' suit was not barred. Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. New York City Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 27 F.Supp.2d 380, 382-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). MMSD argues that these cases are inapposite here because the State postponed filing its suit at the plaintiffs' request and not the other way around. However, these decisions (and others) arrived at their holdings by employing a literal, inflexible interpretation compelled by the clear and unambiguous language of the Act. See Chesapeake Bay Found., 769 F.2d at 208 (This latter statutory bar is an exception to the jurisdiction granted in subsection (a) of § 1365 and jurisdiction is normally determined as of the time of the filing of a complaint. Moreover, the verb tenses used in subsection (b)(1)(B) and the scheme of the statute demonstrate that the bar was not intended to apply unless the government files suit first (and is diligently prosecuting such suit).); Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, 27 F.Supp.2d at 383 (The language of this statute `clearly contemplates action prior to the filing of a citizen suit.') (internal citation omitted); Connecticut Fund for the Env't, 660 F.Supp. at 1404 ([T]he court must apply an inflexible rule which determines jurisdiction from the time of filing the complaint.). We are not inclined to add our encouragement to a race to the courthouse. Nor do we wish to discourage state agencies from attempting to resolve disputes through negotiation with citizens' groups. But the clear and unambiguous language of § 1365(b)(1)(B) and its uniform interpretation by the courts on a jurisdictional point dictate a conclusion that the State's 2002 litigation (and resulting 2002 Stipulation) cannot qualify as a timely commenced action barring the plaintiffs' suit. 7 22 Any similarity of the 2002 Stipulation to an ineffective stipulation that was timely filed in a different suit in a different court (i.e., the 2001 Stipulation) does not alter the outcome. Thus, we find that the State's judicial action resulting in the 2002 Stipulation was commenced when the Milwaukee County suit was filed after the plaintiffs' suit was filed on March 15, 2002, not when the 2001 Stipulation was filed (or earlier). Any other conclusion would allow state agencies to file placeholder lawsuits or consent decrees to ensure timely commencement and then to grapple with the problem at their (relative) leisure, subject only to the diligent prosecution requirement (which, as the district court noted, is a deferential standard). Since the Milwaukee County action does not meet the timely commencement requirement, it cannot bar the plaintiffs' citizens' suit under § 1365(b)(1)(B), whether it is diligent or not. We will address the question whether the 2002 Stipulation represents a diligent prosecution of the violations alleged by the plaintiffs later, in our discussion of res judicata.
23 As the Eleventh Circuit has recently noted, 24 [c]ourts that have addressed § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii)—the diligent-prosecution bar—have interpreted the statute to bar citizen suits when three requirements are satisfied. First, the state must have commenced an enforcement procedure against the polluter. Second, the state must be diligently prosecuting the enforcement proceedings. Finally, the state's statutory enforcement scheme must be comparable to the federal scheme promulgated in 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g). 25 McAbee v. City of Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248, 1251 (11th Cir.2003). In finding that the State's administrative enforcement actions barred the plaintiffs' suit under § 1319(g), the district court here referred to such actions as meetings between the EPA and WisDNR, between WisDNR and MMSD and between all three entities (PSA at 5, 6); information requests by WisDNR that MMSD had to comply with (PSA at 6); projects outlined by WisDNR for MMSD to focus on initially (PSA at 7); investigation of overflow events between February and July 2001 ( id. ); the issuance of an informal notice of non-compliance to MMSD shortly after the plaintiffs' notice of intent to sue was received ( id.; see also Plaintiffs' Br. at 33-34 (noting that until the State filed its suit on March 15, 2002, it had never escalated its stepped enforcement policy beyond the first level, which is the issuance of an informal notice of non-compliance)); meetings between MMSD and WisDNR in August 2001 to negotiate a corrective action plan (PSA at 8); and the formal referral of the matter to WisDOJ, which subsequently filed the 2001 Stipulation in Dane County court (PSA at 8-9). Although these actions undeniably resulted in the eventual filing of the Milwaukee County action and the 2002 Stipulation, they do not themselves qualify as the commencement of an administrative enforcement action that would serve to bar the plaintiffs' suit. 26 Commencement with respect to an administrative action is not defined by the Act, and we have not previously had the opportunity to weigh in on this issue. Other courts have found that the filing of an administrative consent order prior to the filing of a citizens' suit would in most cases qualify as the sort of administrative action that would bar a citizens' suit for civil penalties. 8 But if the consent order comes after the citizens' suit is filed, the citizens' suit may proceed. See Altamaha Riverkeepers v. City of Cochran 162 F.Supp.2d 1368, 1373 (M.D.Ga.2001) (finding that proposed consent order and fines that came after citizens' suit was filed did not bar suit). The Eighth Circuit has implied that issuance of a formal Notice of Violation could also qualify as the commencement of an administrative enforcement action if it triggers notice and hearing procedures designed to protect and give access to the public and interested parties. Cf. Arkansas Wildlife Fed'n, 29 F.3d at 379-80. Letters and conferences where no public notice was given and that did not result in hearings have been found not to bar a citizens' suit. See Tobyhanna Conservation Ass'n v. Country Place Waste Treatment Co., 734 F.Supp. 667, 669-70 (M.D.Pa.1989) (finding state environmental department's unsigned letter to alleged water discharge permit violator setting administrative conference for which no public notice was provided and at which no hearing was held did not bar citizens' suit); cf. PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 618-19 (7th Cir.1998) (noting in context of the bar Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) places on citizens' suits when judicial action has been commenced, that [w]riting a letter would hardly be described as `commencing' or `prosecuting' an `action'. . ., especially when we consider the interminable character of much administrative process and the difficulty of deciding on a threshold below which the process is too tentative to justify barring a citizen's suit) (citations omitted). 27 Discerning from these various decisions the contours of the law, we conclude that with respect to administrative enforcement actions, the commencement of the action is tied in with the comparability of the state statute to the federal provisions. Specifically, we hold that for the purposes of § 1319(g), an administrative action commences at the point when notice and public participation protections become available to the public and interested parties. Because Wisconsin law does not authorize administrative penalty proceedings or fines, there are no administrative enforcement provisions comparable to those of the Clean Water Act. Rather, when WisDNR decides that a violation requires enforcement, Wisconsin law provides that WisDNR shall refer the matter to [WisDOJ] for enforcement, and WisDOJ shall initiate the legal action requested by WisDNR. Wis. Stat. § 283.89(1)-(2). MMSD admits that Wisconsin's permissive intervention statute is triggered only when the administrative enforcement advances to the stage at which a legal action is filed. (MMSD's Br. at 39.) Thus, in Wisconsin, the formal moment at which an action is commenced is when WisDOJ files a complaint with state or federal court because [f]rom this formal moment enforcement becomes public. Wisconsin Envtl. Law Advocates v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 03-C-0739-S, at 17 (W.D.Wis. May 3, 2004). 28 We conclude that the non-judicial actions taken by the State did not commence an administrative action barring the plaintiffs' suit under § 1319(g), because at no point prior to the filing of the Milwaukee County suit did the state's administrative enforcement procedures contemplate public notice and participation. Although the filing of the 2001 Stipulation was a judicial action, there was no opportunity provided for public notice or participation. Moreover, as we noted earlier, the 2001 Stipulation was not a diligently prosecuted action because it was not legally binding and was withdrawn by the 2002 Stipulation. And the Milwaukee County action was filed too late. Because the State did not timely commence and diligently prosecute an administrative enforcement action, the plaintiffs' suit for civil penalties is not barred by § 1319(g). And, as we have already concluded, the plaintiffs' suit is not barred under § 1365(b)(1)(B) by any of the State's judicial enforcement actions.