Opinion ID: 3050228
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Coercing Guilty Plea

Text: Plaintiffs also claim that the Defendants coerced their guilty pleas. “To prove that his plea was not a knowing and voluntary plea, [a criminal defendant] must show that he did not make ‘a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action.’” Weisberg v. Minnesota, 29 F.3d 1271, 1278 (8th Cir. 1994). We agree with the district court that the evidence does not support Plaintiffs’ coerced guilty plea claims. As our Court recently recognized in Hayden v. Nevada County, 664 F.3d 770, 772 (8th Cir. 2012), we are unaware of any case in which section 1983 liability has been imposed for “coercing or inducing a guilty plea.” A guilty plea is not rendered involuntary merely because an officer informs a defendant of the possible alternatives to pleading guilty, including facing the death penalty. See id. at 773 (holding guilty plea not rendered involuntary when sheriff told defendant “that pleading guilty ‘would result in only two years of probation, with no fines or further holding’”); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (stating that presenting a defendant with “the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges in which [the defendant] was plainly subject to prosecution” does not violate due process). We note that the Supreme Court has also left open the possibility that there may be a circumstance where a coerced confession or reckless investigation unconstitutionally taints a guilty plea. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) -30- (reversing murder convictions of four defendants, three of whom pled guilty, when evidence showed their confessions were coerced). Commenting on Chambers, the Supreme Court has stated that there may be a circumstance where a coerced confession has an “abiding impact” that “also taint[s] the plea.” See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 767 (1970). In Chambers, guilty pleas were taken from two petitioners only two days after their confessions were secured. While Chambers was tried a month later, he and his fellow petitioners were “purportedly informed . . . they would be killed if they did not stick to their prior confessions.” Cochran v. Norvell, 446 F.2d 61, 65 (6th Cir. 1971). “[F]rom arrest until sentenced to death, petitioners were never—either in jail or in court—wholly removed from the constant observation, influence, custody and control of those whose persistent pressure brought about the sunrise confessions.” Chambers, 309 U.S. at 235. This is not such a case. Here, each Plaintiff had at least a month from the time that he or she was arrested to the time that he or she eventually pled guilty.7 There is no evidence they were denied provisions or that they were subjected to harsh living conditions. Furthermore, Plaintiffs were each represented by counsel during the bulk of the time that passed between their arrest and eventual guilty plea. See United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 459 F.2d 663, 665 (8th Cir. 1972) (finding any taint was sufficiently dissipated where defendant was afforded advice of counsel for four-month period between incriminating statements and change of plea). Thus, while Plaintiffs opted to enter guilty pleas based on the false evidence that had been assembled against them, there is no evidence that they “did not understand the nature of the plea proceeding or that [they] entered [their] pleas involuntarily.” See United States v. Vest, 125 F.3d 676, 679 (8th Cir. 1997). We agree with the district court 7 Taylor was booked on March 17, 1989, but did not enter a guilty plea until September 1. Winslow was booked on March 17, but did not enter his no contest plea until December 8. Gonzalez was booked on May 26, but she did not enter her plea of nolo contendere until October 5. Dean’s case is the closest, as he was arrested on April 15 and entered his guilty plea on May 17. -31- that the evidence is inadequate to show that their guilty pleas were not voluntary or knowing. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision to grant immunity to Defendants against Plaintiffs’ coerced guilty plea claims.