Opinion ID: 783682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: 1984 sexual abuse conviction

Text: 21 Finally, we review Melton's conviction for sexual abuse under Alaska Statute § 11.41.436(a), which provides in relevant part: 22 (a) An offender commits the crime of sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree if ... 23 (3) being 18 years of age or older, the offender engages in sexual contact with a person who is under 18 years of age, and the offender is the victim's natural parent, stepparent, adopted parent, or legal guardian. 24 Sexual contact is defined as: 25 (i) knowingly touching, directly or through clothing, the victim's genitals, anus, or female breast; or (ii) knowingly causing the victim to touch, directly or through clothing, the defendant's or victim's genitals, anus, or female breast. 26 Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900(a)(57)(A). 27 The district court concluded that Melton's conviction under § 11.41.436(a), which was supported in the record by a valid judgment, qualified under the ACCA as a crime that is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another .... 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). We agree. 28 Although we have not previously construed the otherwise clause of the ACCA in the context of sexual abuse convictions, our analyses in the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) context provide guidance. In United States v. Wood, 52 F.3d 272 (9th Cir.1995), we reviewed whether a person convicted under a Washington indecent liberties law qualified as a conviction for a crime of violence as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, a career offender enhancement provision that uses language identical to that of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Looking to the charging documents, which specified that the victim was only four years old, we concluded that anytime an adult engages in sexual contact with a four year old child, there is always a serious potential risk of physical injury and there is always a substantial risk that physical force will be used to ensure the child's compliance. Wood, 52 F.3d at 275 (internal quotation marks omitted). 29 More recently, in United States v. Pereira-Salmeron, 337 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2003), we considered the question of whether a prior felony conviction under Va.Code § 18.2-63, for carnal knowledge of a child between 13 and 15 years old, constitutes a conviction for a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. Although § 2L1.2 defines crime of violence differently than § 4B1.2, 2 we held that there is no indication that the term is intended to mean something different for this provision than it does elsewhere, and resolved, consistent with Wood, that sexual contact with a minor inherently presents a risk of force sufficient to characterize the misconduct as a crime of violence. See Pereira-Salmeron, 337 F.3d at 1153. 30 Other circuits have similarly found the otherwise clauses of the ACCA and U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 applicable where the conviction at issue involved sexual offenses against minors. See, e.g., United States v. Meader, 118 F.3d 876, 881, 884 (1st Cir. 1997) (statutory rape and unlawful sexual contact with a child under the age of fourteen); United States v. Shannon, 110 F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir.1997) (en banc) (sexual intercourse with thirteen year old); United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 138, 140 (8th Cir.1992) (lascivious acts with a ten year old); United States v. Coronado-Cervantes, 154 F.3d 1242, 1243-45 (10th Cir. 1998) (sexual contact with twelve year old); see also United States v. Champion, 248 F.3d 502, 506 (6th Cir.2001) (inducement of minor to engage in sexual conduct to produce sexually explicit materials would cross the threshold for serious potential risk of physical injury). 31 We recognize that the statute before us encompasses all victims under the age of 18, and that some courts have hesitated in categorically equating the physical risks of sexual acts to minors of different age groups. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 159 F.3d 296, 298-300 (7th Cir.1998) (noting that the risk of sex to 13 year old girls is much greater than the risk to 16 year olds); United States v. Kirk, 111 F.3d 390, 395 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1997) (observing that the question whether sexual indecency with a child is always a crime of violence is difficult because a nineteen year-old's consensual contact with a sixteen year old may not carry a risk of physical injury). We also acknowledge that not all types of sexual conduct necessarily present the same risk of physical injury. See Shannon, 110 F.3d at 387 (noting sexual contact under state statute did not carry the same risk of physical injury as sexual intercourse). 32 But we need not draw any bright lines here with regard to age or range of conduct because the Alaska sexual abuse statute contains an additional element that bears upon our analysis. The statute requires that the offender is the victim's natural parent, stepparent, adopted parent, or legal guardian. Alaska Stat. § 11.41.436(a). This clause explicitly and implicitly excludes perpetrators that are close in age to the victim and narrows the class of offenders to those who bear parental authority over the victim. 3 Our precedents recognize that such factors as age and the authority position of the offender contribute to the risks inherent in the sexual abuse of a minor. See Wood, 52 F.3d at 275 (acknowledging that the risk of violence is implicit in the size, age and authority position of the adult in dealing with a child); Pereira-Salmeron, 337 F.3d at 1154 (noting as significant that sexual crimes against minors typically occur in close quarters, and are generally perpetrated by an adult upon a victim who is not only smaller, weaker, and less experienced, but is also generally susceptible to acceding to the coercive power of adult authority figures) (quoting United States v. Velazquez-Overa, 100 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 1996)). 33 Other courts also have acknowledged the unique nature of laws that involve, or may involve, parent-child offenses. See United States v. Vigil, 334 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir.2003) (holding that aggravated incest constituted a crime of violence because incest is an aggravating factor that carries unique physical risks); United States v. Pierce, 278 F.3d 282, 290 (4th Cir.2002) (concluding crime of indecent liberties with a child was crime of violence because [t]he youth and vulnerability of children, coupled with the power inherent in a parent's position of authority, creates a unique situation of dominance and control.... (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Martinez-Carillo, 250 F.3d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir.2001) (finding incest to be an aggravating factor in determining physical risk because of the nature of the parent-child relationship). 34 Acknowledging the special and unique dynamic of a parent-child relationship and in view of these authorities, we have no trouble concluding that Melton's crime of sexual abuse involve[d] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The sexual contact, by definition, was committed against a minor. The power disparity inherent in that act, coupled with the fact that Melton was in a position of parental control over the victim, created a situation of dominance and control that brought with it an inherent risk of physical injury. Melton's sexual abuse conviction constituted a conviction for a crime of violence within the meaning of § 924(e). 4