Opinion ID: 495278
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Enterprise Instructions

Text: 35 The District Court's instructions to the jury contained the following statements concerning the enterprise requirement: 36 You must find the existence of an enterprise, that is, as it applies to this case, a group of persons associated for the common purpose of dealing in narcotics or other dangerous drugs[.] 37 Tr. 3745. 38 You must find that the defendant's participation in the affairs of the enterprise was through a pattern of racketeering activity which was separate from the acts that constitute the enterprise. 39 Tr. 3745-46. 40 The term enterprise includes any group of individuals associated in fact, although not a legal entity. 41 Tr. 3747. 42 The defendants did not object to these instructions at trial; accordingly, as the defendants acknowledge, Brief of Appellant Kragness at 30, any deficiency in the instructions merits reversal only if it constitutes plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 30; United States v. Gantos, 817 F.2d 41, 43 (8th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 87-5101 (U.S. July 13, 1987). The defendants maintain that there is plain error here because the instructions permitted the jury to find an enterprise upon mere proof of a conspiracy. They also contend that the instructions allowed the jury to find an enterprise from the proof of predicate acts without more, rather than requiring them to find an entity separate from the pattern of racketeering activity. 43 We disagree. First, we think it clear that the instructions required more than proof of a conspiracy, of an agreement among a group of individuals to do illegal acts. Instead, the instructions adequately address, at least for the purposes of plain-error review, the three characteristics of an enterprise listed by this Court in Bledsoe. The requirements of a common purpose and of a structure distinct from that inherent in the pattern of racketeering are expressly mentioned in the instructions. The instructions do not expressly mention the requirement of continuity of structure and personnel, but we think that use of the term enterprise itself implies that such continuity is contemplated. Although it might have been preferable to refer specifically to this factor in the instructions, omitting such a reference was not plain error. 44 The defendants argue that the instruction concerning the requirement of a structure distinct from the pattern of racketeering is deficient because it contains the words acts that constitute the enterprise; this, they assert, permitted an enterprise to be found from proof of predicate acts simpliciter. This is a misconstruction of the instruction, which, as it should, states precisely the opposite of what the defendants contend, requiring that an enterprise be established separately. The phrase acts that constitute the enterprise refers not to predicate acts, but to any acts that demonstrate the characteristics of an enterprise, e.g., acts demonstrating that individuals associated with a putative enterprise occupy positions of command and subordination. 11 Accordingly, we conclude that there was no plain error in the District Court's enterprise instructions.