Opinion ID: 1661990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying emmett barnes' request for attorney's fees and expenses and granting c.c.'s request for attorney's fees and expenses.

Text: Emmett argues that the trial court, in addition to erroneously denying his Motion to Compel, imposed sanctions on him and his attorney under M.R.C.P. 37 for bringing the motion. (The sanctions consisted of attorneys' fees in the amount of $4,279.00, and costs in the amount of $215.39). Emmett argues that the Motion to Compel was brought in good faith, pursuant to the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, and that these sanctions should be reversed. He also contends that sanctions should be imposed against C.C. and his attorneys for their willful failure to comply with discovery ... and their flagrant disregard for discovery rules. C.C. argues that the attorneys' fees and costs were correctly assessed against Emmett because under M.R.C.P. 37(a)(4), such awards are mandatory against the losing party in a Motion to Compel. Rule 37(a)(4) reads in part: Award of Expenses of Motion. If the motion (to compel) is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the moving party of the attorney advising the motion or both of them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expense unjust. Emmett acknowledges that this Rule allows the court to require the losing party on a Motion to Compel to pay the opponent's attorney's fees. However, he submits that the purpose of Rule 37 is not to impose monetary penalties every time a party loses a Motion to Compel. Yet that is precisely what the plain language of the Rule requires  provided, of course, that the court finds that the motion was not substantially justified, and that no other circumstances render such an award unjust. This Court has not yet addressed an award of expenses under Rule 37(a)(4). However, the Fifth Circuit has addressed the award of attorneys' fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4), identical to our Rule. In Merritt v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 649 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir.1981), the court held that an award of attorney's fees under F.R.C.P. 37(a)(4) need not be premised on bad faith. Rather, it reached the inescapable conclusion that an award of expenses is mandatory against a party whose conduct necessitated a motion to compel discovery ... 649 F.2d 1013 at 1018. The trial court's original Order Granting Deponent Motion For Protective Order, To Place Documents Under Seal, And Request For Attorneys' Fees and Expenses stated in part that Emmett's Motion to Compel was not substantially justified, and that there were no circumstances which would make an award of expenses to the prevailing party unjust. This Order was apparently rendered without the opportunity for a hearing as required by Rule 37. However, this omission was cured by the hearing held on Emmett's Motion for Reconsideration. [8] The Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration also states that Emmett's Motion to Compel was not substantially justified and that an award of expenses to C.C. was just. Since Emmett's Motion to Compel was correctly denied, the plain language of Rule 37(a)(4) seems to require that C.C.'s attorneys' fees and costs be assessed against Emmett. We are bound to uphold the judge's order, absent a showing that the judge abused his discretion, either in his finding that the Motion to Compel was not substantially justified, or that no circumstances rendered the award unjust. While this Court has not articulated a standard of review for decisions under Rule 37(a)(4), our standard of review of sanctions for discovery violations generally was stated in Cooper v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 568 So.2d 687, 693 (Miss. 1990): Our standard for review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in its decision. This Court must decide whether the ... court could have entered the order which it did. Under this standard, this Court will affirm unless there is a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon weighing of relevant factors. Cooper v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 568 So.2d at 693 (cites omitted). See also Kilpatrick v. Mississippi Baptist Medical, 461 So.2d 765, 767 (Miss. 1984); Clark v. Mississippi Power Co., 372 So.2d 1077 (Miss. 1979). Because the award of attorney's fees against the losing party is mandatory under 37(a)(4), the only decision subject to this Court's review is the trial judge's finding that the Motion to Compel was not substantially justified, and that circumstances did not make the award unjust. We find no abuse of discretion in the judge's findings. The judge was aware that the Georgia court had denied Emmett's Motion to Compel Leslie to testify about her relationship with C.C. He was aware that the Georgia court could draw the most negative inference from Leslie's and C.C.'s refusals to testify. The judge could therefore conclude that C.C.'s testimony was unnecessary, and that Emmett's tenacious pursuit served only to annoy, embarrass, oppress and burden C.C. with expense. Considering these factors, the judge had sufficient grounds to find that the Motion to Compel was not substantially justified, and that circumstances did not make the award unjust. Moreover, the judge could also conclude that because C.C. was entitled to assert the privilege under O.C.G.A. § 24-9-27, a motion to compel could not possibly be granted. Therefore, the award of attorney's fees under M.R.C.P. 37(a)(4) would be mandatory. Under either theory, the judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering Emmett, the losing party in a Motion to Compel, to pay C.C.'s attorney's fees and costs. The judge's award is affirmed.