Opinion ID: 1374687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mary Carter Agreements Defined.

Text: The term Mary Carter Agreement was coined by the Florida Court of Appeals in Maule Industries, Inc. v. Rountree, 264 So.2d 445, 446 N. 1 (Fla.App.1972), reversed on other grounds, 284 So.2d 389 (Fla.1973). It arose from an agreement popularized in Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So.2d 8 (Fla.App.1967). Today the term Mary Carter agreement generally has come to be understood as constituting three parts: First, the agreeing defendant promises to remain a party to the plaintiff's action until a verdict has been reached or it has been released by the trial court or plaintiff. Second, the agreeing parties promise to keep the whole agreement secret. Third, and most important, the agreeing defendant guarantees a certain recovery for the plaintiff. In return, the agreeing defendant's liability is decreased in direct proportion to the increase in the nonagreeing defendant's liability. Vermont Union School Dist. No. 21 v. H.P. Cummings Construction Co., 143 Vt. 416, 469 A.2d 742, 748-49 (1983); Cox v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 594 P.2d 354, 357 (Okl. 1979); Comment, Mary Carter Agreements: Unfair and Unnecessary, 32 Sw. L.J. 779, 782-83 (1978); Comment, The Mary Carter AgreementSolving the Problems of Collusive Settlements in Joint Tort Actions, 47 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1393, 1396-97 (1974). [4] The importance in determining whether or not an agreement is a Mary Carter agreement is that the weight of case law does require such agreements to be disclosed to the jury. See, e.g., Mustang Equipment, Inc. v. Welch, 115 Ariz. 206, 564 P.2d 895, 899 (1977); Rountree, supra, 284 So.2d at 390; Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So.2d 385, 387 (Fla.1973). [5] The reason for requiring disclosure of such agreements is manifest: the normal adversarial relationship between the plaintiff and defendants is distorted, if not destroyed, in instances where a purported defendant has an incentive to increase plaintiff's damages. [6] Such distortion and incentive have the distinct potential for misleading jurors in reviewing evidence and judging witness credibility. Cox, supra, 594 P.2d at 357-58. We need not decide, however, whether Mary Carter agreements are valid in Idaho, or, if they are, what requirements attach to them with respect to disclosure, because we are convinced that the agreement here is not a Mary Carter agreement.