Opinion ID: 844224
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Background, procedure,

Text: and summary of conclusions Article XXI of the California Constitution, as amended by ballot measures approved by the electorate in November 2008 (Prop. 11, the Voters First Act) and November 2010 (Prop. 20), removes the task of redistricting from the Legislature and gives it to the newly created Citizens Redistricting Commission. (Cal. Const., art. XXI, §§ 1 & 2.) The Commission is required to adjust the boundary lines of California’s state Senate, state Assembly, congressional, and State Board of Equalization voting districts “[i]n the year following the year in which the national census is taken under the direction of Congress at the beginning of each decade . . . .” (Id., art. XXI, § 1.) The membership of the Commission selected to create new districts in light of the 2010 census was finalized in late 2010, and in the first eight months of 2011 the Commission held more than 70 business meetings and 34 public hearings in 32 cities throughout the state. The Commission produced draft statewide maps on which it sought and responded to public comment, and finally, in mid-August 2011, it approved and certified all four required maps. (We describe the Commission’s structure and process and the requirements of article XXI in greater detail post, part II.) Two challenges to the Commission’s certifications were initiated shortly thereafter. First, and roughly contemporaneously with certification by the Commission, an organization designated Fairness and Accountability in Redistricting (FAIR), a Republican-funded entity,5 was established. Under FAIR’s sponsorship, Julie 5 See (as of Jan. 27, 2012). FAIR is not mentioned in the petition itself, but the petition states: “Republicans have sponsored and funded the referendum against the Commission’s Senate plan.” 6 Vandermost, a registered California voter and the petitioner in this proceeding, initiated the process of attempting to qualify a referendum measure, challenging the state Senate map, for placement on the November 2012 general election ballot.6 After the Attorney General prepared a title and summary of the proposed referendum for inclusion on the referendum petitions, FAIR commenced soliciting referendum petition signatures, which were due for submission by November 13, 2011. (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 2, subd. (i).) Second, in September 2011, while the proposed referendum petition was circulating for signatures, two petitions for writ of mandate were filed in this court challenging the Commission’s state Senate and congressional district maps on numerous constitutional and statutory grounds, and seeking to bar the Secretary of State from implementing either map. (See Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 3, subd. (b)(2) (hereafter article XXI, § 3(b)(2)) [authorizing such suits].) The petition in Vandermost v. Bowen (Sept. 16, 2011, S196493), challenged the Commission’s certified state Senate map; the petition in Radanovich et al. v. Bowen (Sept. 29, 2011, S196852), challenged the Commission’s certified congressional map. After preliminary briefing (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.487) and thorough consideration of all the issues raised by petitioners, we determined that the petitions lacked merit and denied the requested writs on October 26, 2011.7 6 The constitutional provision permits earlier ballot submission of a referendum to the voters if a special election is called by the Governor. (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 2, subd. (i), referring to art. II, § 9, subd. (c); see also Elec. Code, § 9016, as amended by Stats. 2011, ch. 558, § 1, approved by the Gov. on Oct. 7, 2011 [providing that all initiatives and referendum measures that are certified for the ballot on or after July 1, 2011, will be placed on the ballot only at a Nov. statewide general election or at a statewide special election].) 7 The 126-page petition in Vandermost v. Bowen (Sept. 16, 2011, S196493) sought issuance of a writ directed to the Secretary of State, as the chief elections officer, commanding her to refrain from implementing the Commission’s certified maps for the Senate districts, and to refrain from taking any other action to hold, or to order county (Footnote continued on following page) 7 Thereafter FAIR completed the signature-gathering process and timely submitted referendum petition signatures to county election officials immediately prior to the November 13, 2011 filing deadline. On November 23, 2011, the Secretary of State confirmed that at least 504,760 “raw” (unverified) referendum petition signatures had been submitted by FAIR, and ordered county election officials to determine, by random sampling, the number of qualified signers and to certify that result to the Secretary.8 On December 2, 2011, Vandermost filed the present petition,9 asserting that approximately 710,000 referendum signatures have been collected, and that in view of (Footnote continued from previous page) officials to hold, any election using the Commission’s certified Senate maps. Petitioner asserted that the maps violate state constitutional criteria for voting districts, set out in article XXI, section 2, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution, concerning contiguity, geographic integrity, and compactness, and that they failed to afford Latino/Hispanic voters an opportunity to elect candidates of choice under sections 2 and 5 of the federal Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq.). Petitioner also requested the immediate appointment of special masters to “advise the Court on the instant petition,” and if the court found the Senate maps to be unconstitutional, she requested that this court direct the special masters to draw new district boundaries for the Senate. Although the cover page of the petition requested an emergency stay, the petition did not set forth a separate plea for emergency relief. In acting on the petition, we assumed that petitioner sought to stay any action on the part of the Secretary of State to implement the Commission’s certified state Senate map. Our order denying the petition read: “The requests of petitioner and real party in interest for judicial notice are granted. [¶] The motion of real party in interest to strike the declarations of Dr. T. Anthony Quinn is denied. [¶] The petition for a writ of mandate is denied. [¶] The request for an emergency stay is denied.” 8 Statutory schedules concerning the timing for such events, and related statutory procedures, are described post, part III. 9 Petitioner is represented in this matter, as she was in the petition filed in this court in September, by Charles H. Bell, Jr., of the Sacramento law firm Bell, McAndrews & Hiltachk, LLP. The firm’s Web site identifies Mr. Bell as general counsel to the California Republican Party. (See [as of Jan. 27, 2012].) 8 the circumstance that 504,760 valid signatures are required to qualify the proposed referendum for the November 2012 ballot,10 the referendum is “likely to qualify and stay timely implementation of the [state Senate] map” and hence she is entitled to seek “relief” under article XXI, section 3(b)(2).11 The petition seeks immediate relief,12 as well as future contingent relief that would be triggered in the event the proposed referendum actually qualifies for placement on the ballot. The contingent relief sought by the petition would take effect only after county 10 See California Constitution, article II, section 9, subdivision (b) (requiring a petition “certified to have been signed by electors equal in number to 5 percent of the votes for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial election”). 11 Article XXI, section 3(b)(2) reads in relevant part: “Any registered voter in this state may . . . file a petition for a writ of mandate or writ of prohibition to seek relief where a certified final map is subject to a referendum measure that is likely to qualify and stay the timely implementation of the map.” 12 With respect to immediate relief, the petition seeks an order granting (1) suspension of statutory filing fees (Elec. Code, §§ 8103-8105) and related “in lieufiling-fee petition” procedures for candidates who wish to submit signatures in lieu of paying filing fees (Elec. Code, § 8106, subd. (a)(7)), which procedures would otherwise have commenced on December 30, 2011; and (2) appointing an expert or special master or masters to serve in effect in a “standby/advisory” role by advising the court on “the process of determining interim Senate Districts for 2012.” The petition also seeks a third form of immediate relief, amounting to a request for an immediate preliminary stay of the Commission’s Senate map. The petition asserts that “[t]he [submitted referendum] petitions contain sufficient ‘raw’ signatures to suspend temporarily the implementation of” the Commission’s state Senate map and it seeks as immediate relief an order “prohibiting the Secretary of State and county election officials acting at her direction from implementing” that map “for the June 5, 2012 primary election, until [a] new interim Senate map [has] been implemented by this Court.” Elsewhere the petition asserts that the Secretary of State’s November 23, 2011, order finding an adequate number of raw signatures and directing county election officials to commence random sampling “immediately suspends the operation of the Commissioncertified Senate maps until such time as the signature verification process is complete.” Such a preliminary stay of the Commission’s certified state Senate map would force county election officials to immediately halt preelection planning that they have undertaken and continue to undertake in preparation for the June 2012 primary election. 9 election officials and the Secretary of State finish the time-consuming, statutorily governed process needed to determine whether the proposed referendum actually is supported by the requisite number of valid signatures and hence qualifies for the ballot — a process that may take approximately nine to 17 weeks following submission of petition signatures.13 If the referendum qualifies, the Commission’s certified Senate map would automatically be stayed by operation of law.14 Petitioner asks that, in the event the proposed referendum qualifies for the ballot, this court should establish new interim state Senate district maps for the June and November 2012 state Senate elections by either (1) using the old state Senate map created by the Legislature in 2001; or (2) creating a new state Senate map by “nesting” two adjacent Commission-certified Assembly districts within one Senate district; or (3) establishing a different new state Senate map based on a proposal by petitioner’s redistricting consultant, addressing alleged “deficiencies . . . in the Commission’s Senate map.” On December 9, 2011, we denied the request for all immediate relief pending this court’s eventual decision in this matter, issued an order to show cause concerning the prayer for future contingent relief, and granted a motion by the Commission to intervene. We established an extremely expedited briefing schedule, designed to permit this court to conduct oral argument by early January 2012, and file an opinion by the end of that month. We also specified additional issues for briefing, expressly reserving resolution of the threshold question of jurisdiction for our eventual written decision.15 13 Statutory schedules concerning the timing for such events, and related statutory procedures, are described post, part III. 14 See post, part III. 15 Our December 9, 2011, order stated: (Footnote continued on following page) 10 (Footnote continued from previous page) “In light of the short time frame imposed by the impending 2012 electoral cycle, and the need to clarify the districts that are to be used in conducting the primary and general elections for the California Senate in 2012 should the referendum petitions that have been filed with the Secretary of State prove sufficient to qualify the referendum for placement on the November 2012 ballot and to stay the Senate redistricting map drawn and certified by the Citizens Redistricting Commission, the court has determined that it is appropriate to issue an order to show cause in this matter at this juncture, while reserving the question of this court’s jurisdiction for resolution in our eventual decision in this proceeding. “In addition to addressing issues relating to what relief, if any, this court should order in the event the referendum regarding the Senate redistricting map qualifies for the November 2012 ballot, the parties are directed to address the following jurisdictional issues: (1) What standard or test should this court apply in determining whether a referendum is ‘likely to qualify’ within the meaning of article XXI, section 3, subdivision (b)(2) of the California Constitution, for purposes of deciding when a petition for writ of mandate may be filed in this court under that constitutional provision? (2) Is this court’s authority to entertain a petition for writ of mandate prior to the formal qualification of a referendum petition limited to the circumstances set forth in article XXI, section 3, subdivision (b)(2), or does this court have other authority (including inherent authority) to entertain such a petition even if it cannot yet be determined whether such a referendum is ‘likely to qualify’ for placement on the ballot? “The motion of the Citizens Redistricting Commission to intervene in this proceeding and for leave to file preliminary opposition is granted. “To the extent the petition filed in this matter seeks any interim relief pending this court’s eventual decision in this matter, the request for any such interim relief is denied. “Petitioner’s request for judicial notice filed on December 2, 2011, is granted. “To facilitate this court’s conducting of oral argument in this matter as early as the first two weeks in January 2012, and the filing of an opinion in this matter as early as the end of January 2012, the court orders an extremely expedited briefing schedule, as follows: “Respondent and intervener Citizens Redistricting Commission are each directed to serve and file a return or opposition to the order to show cause on or before Wednesday, December 14, 2011. “Petitioner may serve and file a reply to the return or opposition on or before Monday, December 19, 2011. “Any application to file an amicus curiae brief and any amicus curiae brief may be served and filed on or before Wednesday, December 21, 2011. (Footnote continued on following page) 11 Having considered the subsequent briefing and oral argument, we conclude as follows: (1) This court has jurisdiction to entertain this writ proceeding and it is sufficiently ripe for our review. (2) In the event the referendum eventually qualifies for presentation to the voters on the November 2012 ballot, triggering a stay of the Commission’s certified state Senate map by operation of law, election officials are nonetheless directed to use the boundaries set out in the Commission-certified state Senate map on an interim basis for the June 2012 primary election and November 2012 general election, pending a vote by the people on the proposed referendum at the November 2012 election. II. California Constitution, amended article XXI and the Citizens Redistricting Commission We first briefly describe the structure and workings of the Citizens Redistricting Commission. Prior to 2008, redistricting in California was performed by the Legislature subject to the veto power of the Governor — or by the courts, when the Legislature and Governor could not agree. (See, e.g., Legislature v. Reinecke (1973) 10 Cal.3d 396; Wilson v. Eu (1992) 1 Cal.4th 707.) The electorate, however, dramatically changed the process by ballot measures in 2008 and 2010. Those measures amended California Constitution, article XXI, transferring the redistricting task to a newly created Citizens Redistricting Commission. (Prop. 11, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 2008) (Footnote continued from previous page) “Any reply or consolidated reply to any amicus curiae brief or briefs may be served and filed on or before Thursday, December 22, 2011. “All service and filings may be made by facsimile with the original and hard copies to follow by mail. The court’s fax number is (415) 865-7183. “No extension of time will be granted.” 12 (Proposition 11); Prop. 20, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2010) (Proposition 20).)
California Constitution, article XXI, section 2 establishes the Commission and defines how it is to be constituted. The constitutional provision creates a body that excludes career politicians, reflects citizen participation at every level, and is expected to rise above partisanship. Accordingly, subdivision (b) of section 2 charges the Commission with “conduct[ing] an open and transparent process enabling full public consideration of and comment on the drawing of district lines; . . . draw[ing] district lines according to the redistricting criteria specified in this article; and . . . conduct[ing] themselves with integrity and fairness.” Section 2, subdivision (c)(1) of article XXI further provides that “[t]he selection process is designed to produce a commission that is independent from legislative influence and reasonably representative of this State’s diversity.” The Commission has 14 members. Five must be registered with the largest political party in California (based on voter registration), five must be registered with the second largest political party in California, and four must be individuals who are not registered with either of the two largest political parties. (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 2, subd. (c)(2).) Commission members are ineligible to hold elective public office at the federal, state, county or city level for a period of 10 years, beginning from the date of their appointment to the Commission (id., art. XXI, § 2, subd. (c)(6)), and, for a five-year period beginning from their appointment, are ineligible to hold appointive federal, state, or local public office, or to serve as paid staff for, or as a paid consultant to, the State Board of Equalization, Congress, the Legislature, or any individual legislator, or to register as a federal, state or local lobbyist in California. (Ibid.) Government Code section 8250 et seq., enacted by the voters in 2008 as part of Proposition 11, governs the process for selecting commissioners. Government Code 13 section 825216 sets forth how the commissioners are to be selected. The State Auditor, an office that is independent of the legislative and executive branches (§ 8546), initiates an application process, open to all registered voters, that is designed to “promote[] a diverse and qualified applicant pool.” (§ 8252, subd. (a)(1).) According to the Commission’s Final Report on Redistricting, August 15, 2011 (Final Report), the State Auditor “undertook a significant outreach process throughout the state utilizing a wide variety of communications media, including mainstream and ethnic media, social media, a website, and staff assigned to respond to all telephone calls and e-mails.” (Final Rep., at p. 2, available on the Commission’s Web site, [as of Jan. 27, 2012].) Section 8252, subdivision (a)(2) authorizes the State Auditor to remove from the pool those applicants with a conflict of interest. Subdivisions (a)(2)(A) and (a)(2) (B) of section 8252 identify the relationships that can create a conflict of interest. Section 8252 also authorizes the State Auditor to establish an “Applicant Review Panel” to screen the applicants. (§ 8252, subd. (b).) The panel consists of three independent auditors randomly drawn from a pool comprised of “all auditors employed by the state and licensed by the California Board of Accountancy at the time of the drawing” (ibid.); one of the three must be registered with the largest political party in California, one must be registered with the second largest political party in California, and the third must not be not registered with either of those two parties. (Ibid.) Prospective panel members are to be screened for conflicts of interest under the same set of standards that are applied to applicants. (§ 8252, subd. (a)(2).) Once the panel is constituted, the State Auditor provides it with the applications of prospective commission members. (§ 8252, subd. (c).) 16 Subsequent unlabeled statutory references in this part (pt. II) and in part III are to the Government Code. 14 The panel then selects “60 of the most qualified applicants,” 20 of whom must be registered with the largest political party; 20 must be registered with the second largest political party; and the final 20 must not be registered with either of those two parties. (§ 8252, subd. (d).) Selection is to be made on the basis of “relevant analytical skills, ability to be impartial, and appreciation for California’s diverse demographics and geography.” (Ibid.) The panel presents its pool of recommended applicants to the Secretary of the Senate and to the Chief Clerk of the Assembly, and those officers, in turn, permit the President pro Tempore of the Senate, the Minority Floor Leader of the Senate, the Speaker of the Assembly, and the Minority Floor Leader of the Assembly each to strike up to two applicants from each subpool of 20, for a total of eight strikes per subpool. (§ 8252, subd. (e).) The State Auditor then randomly draws eight names from the remaining pool of applicants: three from the subpool of applicants registered with the largest political party, three from the subpool registered with the second largest political party, and two from the remaining subpool. These eight individuals serve on the Commission. (§ 8252, subd. (f).) They, in turn, review the remaining pool of applicants and appoint a final six to complete the Commission: two are to be drawn from the subpool of those registered with the largest political party, two are to be drawn from the subpool of those registered with the second largest political party, and two are to be drawn from the remaining subpool. The six appointees must be approved by at least five affirmative votes of the original eight commissioners; those five votes must include the votes of two Commissioners registered with the largest political party, two Commissioners registered with the second largest political party, and one from a Commissioner not registered with either party. (§ 8252, subd. (g).) The six appointees are to be “chosen to ensure the commission reflects this state’s diversity, including, but not limited to, racial, ethnic, geographic, and gender diversity.” (Ibid.) The Commission, however, need not comply with any specific ratio or formula. (Ibid.) 15
California Constitution, article XXI, section 2, subdivision (b) and related statutes establish a public redistricting process. The constitutional provision requires the Commission to “conduct an open and transparent process enabling full public consideration of and comment on the drawing of district lines.” Section 8253 implements that charge, and requires the Commission to “establish and implement an open hearing process for public input and deliberation that shall be subject to public notice and promoted through a thorough outreach program to solicit broad public participation in the redistricting public review process. The hearing process shall include hearings to receive public input before the commission draws any maps, and hearings following the drawing and display of any commission maps. In addition, hearings shall be supplemented with other activities as appropriate to further increase opportunities for the public to observe and participate in the review process. The commission shall display the maps for public comment in a manner designed to achieve the widest public access reasonably possible. Public comment shall be taken for at least 14 days from the date of public display of any map.” (§ 8253, subd. (a)(7).) The Commission was sworn in during the month of January 2011, and conducted an open bidding process to hire independent counsel and experts to advise it on matters related to the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq.) (Voting Rights Act) and technical issues. It thereafter held more than 70 business meetings and 34 public hearings in 32 cities throughout the state. (Final Rep., at p. 4.) Generally, the Commission’s hearings were scheduled in the early evening hours at school or government locations in the center of a community, making it convenient for “average citizens” to participate. (Ibid.) It regularly allowed public input and comment at its business meetings as well. (Ibid.) Its educational materials were broadly distributed in English and six other languages (Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Tagalog, and Vietnamese), and it ultimately received, in addition to oral testimony, more than 2,000 16 written submissions, including maps reflecting statewide, regional, or other districts. (Ibid.; see also Final Rep., at pp. 3-5 [listing representative groups providing submissions and other testimony].) The Commission’s staff received “written comments, input and suggestions from more than 20,000 individuals and groups.” (Id., at p. 5.) The Commission held 23 public input hearings before issuing a set of its draft maps in June of 2011. After a five-day public review period, it held 11 more public input hearings around the state to collect reactions to and comments concerning those draft maps. (Ibid.) It held 22 business meetings in Sacramento to discuss the draft maps, at which more than 276 people appeared and commented. All of the Commission’s public meetings were “livestreamed,” captured on video, and placed on the Commission’s Web site for public viewing. All of the Commission’s completed documents, and those of its staff, were posted on the Commission’s Web site for public viewing as well. (Ibid.) All such materials remain archived on the Commission’s Web site, (as of Jan. 27, 2012). Pursuant to California Constitution, article XXI, section 2, subdivision (c)(5), the structure of the Commission’s vote on each map mirrored the balanced process described above, under which the Commission’s members were selected. An affirmative vote on each map was required to be supported by a supermajority of at least nine Commission members, including three from each subpool of members: those registered with the largest political party in California (that is, three Democrats), those registered with the second largest political party (that is, three Republicans), and three who are not registered with either major party. With regard to the state Senate map — the subject of the proposed referendum — the Commission’s vote was 13 to 1 in favor.
California Constitution, article XXI, section 2, subdivision (d) requires the Commission to “establish single-member districts for the Senate, Assembly, Congress, and State Board of Equalization pursuant to a mapping process” that complies with 17 criteria expressly set forth in article XXI itself. It is of considerable consequence to our analysis that the constitutional provision ranks the applicable criteria by order of priority. First, “[d]istricts shall comply with the United States Constitution. Congressional districts shall achieve population equality as nearly as is practicable, and Senatorial, Assembly, and State Board of Equalization districts shall have reasonably equal population with other districts for the same office, except where deviation is required to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act or allowable by law.” (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 2, subd. (d)(1).) Second, “[d]istricts shall comply with the federal Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1971 and following).” (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 2, subd. (d)(2).) Third, “[d]istricts shall be geographically contiguous.” (Cal. Const., art XXI, § 2, subd. (d)(3).) Fourth, the Commission’s maps must respect “[t]he geographic integrity of any city, county, city and county, local neighborhood, or local community of interest . . . in a manner that minimizes their division to the extent possible without violating the requirements of any of the preceding subdivisions.” (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 2, subd. (d)(4).) The Constitution defines a “community of interest” as “a contiguous population which shares common social and economic interests that should be included within a single district for purposes of its effective and fair representation.” (Ibid.) “Examples of such shared interests are those common to an urban area, a rural area, an industrial area, or an agricultural area, and those common to areas in which the people share similar living standards, use the same transportation facilities, have similar work opportunities, or have access to the same media of communication relevant to the election process.” (Ibid.) The term “communities of interest” expressly excludes “relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.” (Ibid.) Fifth, “[t]o the extent practicable, and where this does not conflict with the criteria above, districts shall be drawn to encourage geographical compactness such that nearby 18 areas of population are not bypassed for more distant population.” (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 2, subd. (d)(5).) Sixth, and finally, “[t]o the extent practicable, and where this does not conflict with the criteria above, each Senate district shall be comprised of two whole, complete, and adjacent Assembly districts, and each Board of Equalization district shall be comprised of 10 whole, complete, and adjacent Senate districts.” (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 2, subd. (d)(6) [commonly referred to as the “nesting” goal].) Subdivision (e) of article XXI, section 2, provides that “[t]he place of residence of any incumbent or political candidate shall not be considered in the creation of a map. Districts shall not be drawn for the purpose of favoring or discriminating against an incumbent, political candidate, or political party.” Subdivision (f) of article XXI, section 2, provides that “[d]istricts for the Congress, Senate, Assembly, and State Board of Equalization shall be numbered consecutively commencing at the northern boundary of the State and ending at the southern boundary.” These criteria are derived, for the most part, from the standards developed by the special masters appointed by this court in 1973 after the Legislature failed to pass legislative and congressional redistricting bills that were acceptable to the Governor. (Legislature v. Reinecke, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 400-402.) This court approved the use of these criteria in Legislature v. Reinecke, and they subsequently were added to the Constitution as article XXI when the voters approved Proposition 6 in 1980. The current version of article XXI, as amended by the voters in 2008 (Prop. 11) and again in 2010 (Prop. 20), expands upon the original criteria articulated by the special masters in 1973, based, in large part, on decisions of this court applying the criteria developed by the special masters. (See, e.g., Wilson v. Eu, supra, 1 Cal.4th 707.) Unlike former article XXI, section 2, or the judicial decisions on which that provision was based, however, the current version of article XXI, in section 2, subdivision (d), expressly ranks the criteria in 19 order of priority, stating explicitly that a lower-ranked criterion is to be followed only when doing so does not conflict with a higher-ranked criterion or criteria. III. Did this court have authority to issue an order to show cause in this original writ proceeding in the absence of a showing that the proposed referendum was “likely to qualify” for the ballot? And does this court at this juncture have authority to determine which state Senate district map should be used in the event the referendum qualifies for the ballot and stays the operative effect of the Commission-certified state Senate map? In considering petitioner’s request for relief, we must first address the threshold question whether this court had authority to issue an order to show cause in this original writ proceeding in the absence of a showing by petitioner that the proposed referendum was “likely to qualify” for the ballot. In her preliminary opposition to the petition, filed prior to this court’s consideration of the petition, the Secretary of State maintained that the petition in this proceeding was not properly filed and should be summarily denied because petitioner had not demonstrated that the underlying proposed referendum was “likely to qualify” for the ballot within the meaning of article XXI, section 3(b)(2) of the California Constitution. We will analyze this threshold question in light of the circumstances that were before this court on December 9, 2011, when we issued the order to show cause, both to explain why this court’s December 9 action was authorized and appropriate, and, as importantly, to provide guidance on this procedural point for the future in the event similar circumstances arise in the course of subsequent redistricting efforts. As we will explain, we conclude the petition’s allegations adequately invoked our traditional extraordinary writ authority under article VI, section 10 of the state Constitution over a question that was, and is, ripe for our decision. For this reason, it is not necessary for this court to apply the language in article XXI, section (3)(b)(2) 20 providing that a “registered voter . . . may file . . . a petition for a writ of mandate . . . to seek relief where a certified final map is subject to a referendum measure that is likely to qualify and stay the timely implementation of the map.” (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 3(b)(2).) As noted above, the petition filed in this case on December 2, 2011, stated that the proponents of the referendum had submitted a total of approximately 710,000 raw (unverified) signatures in support of the referendum to local election officials throughout the state. The petition asserted that because only approximately 504,000 valid signatures were required to qualify the referendum for the ballot, the number of signatures that had been submitted established that the proposed referendum was “likely to qualify” for placement on the November 2012 ballot and thus that the petition was properly filed under the provisions of article XXI, section 3(b)(2) of the California Constitution and should be entertained and acted on by this court. Article XXI, section 3(b)(2) provides in this regard that “[a]ny registered voter . . . may file . . . a petition for a writ of mandate . . . to seek relief where a certified final map is subject to a referendum measure that is likely to qualify and stay the timely implementation of the map.” (Italics added.) As also noted above, the preliminary opposition filed by the Secretary of State took issue with the petition’s contention that the number of raw signatures that had been submitted to election officials established that the proposed referendum was likely to qualify for the ballot. The preliminary opposition pointed out that in the prior separate mandate proceeding filed in this court (see ante, fn. 7 and related text), petitioner had asserted that she anticipated obtaining more than 780,000 raw signatures on the referendum petition but that petitioner instead submitted only approximately 710,000 raw signatures. The preliminary opposition, noting that a 2008 study of initiative petitions reported that initiative proponents “lose up to 40 [percent] of gross signatures in the verification check” (citing Center for Governmental Studies, Democracy by Initiative: Shaping California’s Fourth Branch of Government (2d ed. 2008) p. 149), asserted that 21 given the relatively low number of raw signatures that had been submitted, it was too soon to tell whether the proposed referendum was likely to qualify for placement on the November 2012 ballot. For this reason, the Secretary of State took the position that the petition was not properly filed and should be summarily denied. As we have pointed out (ante, at p. 10), our order to show cause in this matter specifically reserved resolution of this threshold issue for our eventual opinion and directed the parties to brief two questions related to this issue, regarding (1) the test or standard this court should apply in determining whether a proposed referendum is “likely to qualify” within the meaning of article XXI, section 3(b)(2), and (2) whether this court’s authority to entertain a petition for a writ of mandate prior to the formal qualification of a referendum petition is limited to the circumstances set forth in article XXI, section 3.17 The briefs responding to the order to show cause filed by the Secretary of State and the Commission argued that in order to comply with the “likely to qualify” provision of article XXI, section 3(b)(2), a petitioner must demonstrate by “a preponderance of the evidence” that it is “more probable than not” that the referendum petition will qualify for placement on the ballot. Both briefs further contended that because the relatively low number of raw signatures submitted in support of the proposed referendum left it unclear whether there was a sufficient number of valid signatures to qualify the referendum for the ballot, petitioner failed to meet the “likely to qualify” standard. In addition, both asserted that if the petition failed to satisfy the “likely to qualify” standard set forth in article XXI, section 3(b)(2), this court lacked authority to entertain the mandate proceeding. Accordingly, both maintained that the petition should be dismissed on this basis. 17 The two questions are reproduced in full ante, footnote 15. 22 In her reply, petitioner disagreed with the proposed interpretation of the “likely to qualify” language, arguing that in light of the provision’s purpose, the phrase “likely to qualify” should not be interpreted to mean that a petition for writ of mandate may be filed only when it can be shown that it is “more probable than not” that a proposed referendum will qualify for placement on the ballot, but instead that such a petition may be filed on a lesser showing. (The reply did not specify or quantify the lesser showing that petitioner believes is contemplated by the “likely to qualify” language.) In addition, the reply maintained that, in any event, the number of raw signatures that had been submitted in support of the proposed referendum was sufficient to establish that it was more probable than not that the referendum would qualify. Finally, the reply asserted that, apart from article XXI, section 3(b)(2), this court possesses authority under article VI, section 10 of the Constitution — establishing this court’s original jurisdiction “in proceedings for extraordinary relief” — to entertain the petition for a writ of mandate in this case because the petition presented a matter of great public importance that had to be resolved promptly in light of the impending 2012 electoral cycle. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that there is no need for this court to decide the meaning of the term “likely to qualify” as used in article XXI, section 3(b)(2) or to determine whether the “likely to qualify” standard of section 3(b)(2) was satisfied at the time the petition in this case was filed or is satisfied at the present time. As we explain, in light of the statewide importance of the issue presented by the petition and the need for an expeditious judicial resolution of this matter, this court had authority, under article VI, section 10 of the California Constitution, to issue an order to show cause in this original writ proceeding at the time the petition was filed and also possesses the authority at the present time to determine, through the exercise of its original writ jurisdiction, what state Senate district map should be used as an interim measure if the 23 proposed referendum qualifies.18 The sentence of article XXI, section 3(b)(2) in question — containing the “likely to qualify” language — was not intended, and cannot reasonably be interpreted, to limit or restrict this court’s authority under article VI, section 10 to determine that such an original writ proceeding is appropriately ripe for adjudication and resolution at an earlier point in time. As the facts of this case illustrate, in light of the great public interest and exigencies of the electoral process, this court may need to assume jurisdiction and act expeditiously when such a petition is filed if the court is to retain the ability to render a meaningful decision that can be realistically implemented. This is so even under circumstances in which it cannot reasonably be predicted whether the proposed referendum is likely to qualify for the ballot. Nothing in the background or purpose of article XXI, section 3(b)(2) suggests that the provision was intended to deprive this court of its fundamental and long-standing constitutional authority to accept such a filing and to act in such a setting when the court determines that it is appropriate and prudent to do so. In analyzing this issue, it is important to recognize at the outset that it is firmly established that this court possesses “jurisdiction,” in the fundamental sense, to entertain a petition for an original writ of mandate that is directed to the Secretary of State and concerns her official duties related to the electoral process, and to grant appropriate relief in such a proceeding. Article VI, section 10 of the California Constitution explicitly provides in this regard that this court possesses “original jurisdiction in proceedings for 18 Although the petition in this case asserted that it was filed under the authority granted by article XXI, section 3(b)(2), the representations disclosed by the petition demonstrated that petitioner, as a registered voter and the official proponent of the proposed referendum in question, unquestionably had standing to file a petition for an original writ of mandate seeking the relief in question under the so-called “public-interest exception” applicable to mandate proceedings. (See, e.g., Hollman v. Warren (1948) 32 Cal.2d 351, 356-357; see generally 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Extraordinary Writs, § 84, pp. 970-973, and cases cited.) 24 extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition,” and this court has long exercised such original extraordinary writ jurisdiction with respect to public officials’ exercise of their official conduct. (See, e.g., Hollman v. Warren, supra, 32 Cal.2d at pp. 354-357; see generally People ex rel. S.F. Bay etc. Com. v. Town of Emeryville (1968) 69 Cal.2d 533, 537-538 [discussing 1966 state constitutional amendment that “deliberately broadened the constitutional language relating to jurisdiction in extraordinary writ proceedings”].) In past cases, this court has repeatedly exercised authority to entertain and decide petitions for original writs of mandate related to the referendum, initiative, and redistricting process in circumstances in which an expeditious ruling was necessary to the orderly functioning of the electoral system. (See, e.g., Senate v. Jones (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1142; Wilson v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 546; Wilson v. Eu, supra, 1 Cal.4th 707; Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638; Legislature v. Reinecke, supra, 10 Cal.3d 396; Silver v. Brown (1965) 63 Cal.2d 270.) Accordingly, we disagree with the Secretary of State’s and the Commission’s argument and analysis regarding this court’s alleged lack of authority to issue an order to show cause in this writ proceeding in light of the petition’s asserted failure to establish that the proposed referendum was likely to qualify for the ballot. Properly analyzed, the issue does not implicate this court’s fundamental jurisdiction over petitioner’s mandate action. Rather, the issue presents a question of the “justiciability” of petitioner’s claim, and, more specifically, whether the action is “ripe” for adjudication under the “ripeness” doctrine that constitutes one aspect of justiciability. As this court explained in Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170: “The ripeness requirement, a branch of the doctrine of justiciability, prevents courts from issuing purely advisory opinions. [Citation.] It is rooted in the fundamental concept that the proper role of the judiciary does not extend to the resolution of abstract differences of legal opinion. It is in part designed to regulate the workload of courts by preventing judicial consideration of lawsuits that seek only to obtain general guidance, rather than to resolve 25 specific legal disputes. However, the ripeness doctrine is primarily bottomed on the recognition that judicial decisionmaking is best conducted in the context of an actual set of facts so that the issues will be framed with sufficient definiteness to enable the court to make a decree finally disposing of the controversy. On the other hand, the requirement should not prevent courts from resolving concrete disputes if the consequence of a deferred decision will be lingering uncertainty in the law, especially when there is widespread public interest in the answer to a particular legal question. [Citations.]” (Italics added.) As the Court of Appeal observed in California Water & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 16, 22, “[a] controversy is ‘ripe’ when it has reached . . . the point that the facts have sufficiently congealed to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made.” In past cases this court has repeatedly held that this court may appropriately exercise its jurisdiction over a petition for an original writ of mandate when “the issues presented are of great public importance and must be resolved promptly.” (County of Sacramento v. Hickman (1967) 66 Cal.2d 841, 845; see, e.g., Clean Air Constituency v. California State Air Resources Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 801, 808; see generally 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Extraordinary Writs, § 146, pp. 1043-1046.) We have frequently found challenges ripe for the invocation and exercise of our original writ jurisdiction under this standard in cases involving significant legal issues affecting the electoral process, when a speedy resolution of the underlying controversy is necessary to avoid a disruption of an upcoming election. (See, e.g., Wilson v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 472473; Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 646; Thompson v. Mellon (1973) 9 Cal.3d 96, 98; Legislature v. Reinecke (1972) 6 Cal.3d 595, 598; Jolicoeur v. Mihaly (1971) 5 Cal.3d 565, 570, fn. 1; Silver v. Brown, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 277-278; Perry v. Jordan (1949) 34 Cal.2d 87, 90-91.) In this case, the legal issue posed by the petition plainly presented a question of significant statewide public importance. The petition noted that a referendum petition, 26 challenging the state Senate redistricting map that had been certified by the Commission and that was currently being implemented by election officials throughout the state, had been circulated for signatures and had been timely filed with election officials with a number of raw signatures that was greater than the number of verified signatures required for qualification. The petition also pointed out that if the proposed referendum proves to have a sufficient number of verified signatures to qualify for placement on the November 2012 ballot, the existing Commission-certified state Senate map would, as a matter of law, automatically be stayed pending the electorate’s November 2012 vote on the referendum measure. (See Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a); Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 654-657, and cases cited [construing the cited constitutional provision to mean that a “duly qualified referendum” stays implementation of the challenged electoral maps].) And the petition further explained that if the existing state Senate map is stayed by qualification of the proposed referendum, this court would bear the direct responsibility of deciding which state Senate districts are to be used by election officials for the interim June 2012 primary election and November 2012 general election. (Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 657-658.) Thus, there is no question that the legal issue presented by the petition — what state Senate districts should be used for those elections in the event the proposed referendum qualifies for the ballot — is clearly an issue of sufficient statewide public importance to warrant this court’s exercise of its original writ jurisdiction. At the time the petition was filed, however, the proposed referendum had not yet qualified for the ballot (indeed, at the time of filing this opinion, it still has not qualified), and the question raised by the informal opposition to the petition was whether the matter was sufficiently ripe to render it appropriate for this court to issue an order to show cause, establish a briefing schedule, and proceed to adjudicate the matter, or whether the petition was premature. 27 As we will explain (see, post, at pp. 29-32), both on December 2, 2011 (when the petition for writ of mandate was filed in this court), and on December 9, 2011 (when this court considered whether to issue an order of show cause), it was apparent (1) that it was a close question whether a sufficient number of valid signatures had been filed to qualify the proposed referendum for placement on the November 2012 ballot, and (2) that the ultimate resolution of that question might not be determined until early March 2012. As we also will explain, however, under the circumstances shown by the petition, our timely intervention was critical because of practical impediments faced by election officials preparing for the 2012 election cycle. Under the applicable California statutes (Elec. Code, § 9030 et seq.), when, as in this case, the proponents of a referendum filed with election officials petitions containing a number of raw signatures greater than the number of valid signatures required for qualification, local election officials were required to conduct a random sampling of the raw signatures to make an initial determination of the percentage of raw signatures that would be found to be valid signatures.19 Here, the last day for counties to complete random sampling was January 10, 2012. (Elec. Code, § 9030, subds. (d), (e).) Thereafter, based on the county certificates, the Secretary of State was required to determine the statewide result of the random sampling by January 18, 2012. Under the governing statutory provisions, if the random sampling projected a number of total valid signatures that was less than 95 percent of the required number of valid signatures, the petition would fail without any further count. If the projection of valid signatures was 110 percent or more of the required number, the petition would qualify without any 19 Random sampling is conducted in each county with regard to 3 percent of the signatures presented, or 500 signatures, whichever number is greater. If fewer than 500 signatures are submitted in a county, the county election officials must check each signature. (Elec. Code, § 9030, subd. (d).) 28 further count. If the projection of valid signatures was between 95 and 110 percent, the Secretary of State would notify counties that a full count of all submitted signatures would be required to verify the number of valid signatures that had been submitted. (Elec. Code, §§ 9030, subds. (f) & (g), 9031, subd. (a).) If a full count was required, the last day for counties to determine the number of qualified signatures would be March 6, 2012. (Id., § 9031, subds. (b) & (c).) Thereafter, by March 12, 2012, the Secretary of State would determine whether the referendum petition qualifies for placement on the November 2012 ballot. (Id., §§ 9031, subd. (d), 9033.) At the time the petition in the present case was filed, all parties in this proceeding agreed that the available data indicated that the random sampling of the petition signatures was very likely to result in a projection falling between 95 and 110 percent of the required number of valid signatures. Thus, although the parties disagreed whether the available data demonstrated that it was more probable than not that the proposed referendum would qualify, the parties agreed that the data established that there was at least a substantial possibility that the referendum would ultimately qualify for the ballot. And because the parties also agreed that it was quite likely that the final result of the random sampling process would mean that the verification process would have to go to a full count of all signatures, at that time it appeared very probable that it would not be definitively known whether the proposed referendum qualified for the ballot until early March 2012. However, the Secretary of State informed the court that a number of actions for the 2012 electoral cycle were required to begin well before that date. Thus, at the time the petition was filed and this court had to decide whether to issue an order to show cause, we faced a serious problem of timing and coordination. As noted in Wilson v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d at page 548, “preparing for elections is a complex and ‘sequential’ process, requiring various tasks be performed before others may begin, including identifying the various district boundaries, developing county election precincts, assigning such districts to all registered voters, designing ballot styles, printing 29 ballots, providing polling places, and training precinct workers. Early delays in one function can impact all other functions. As the Secretary [of State] points out, the need to know precise district boundaries ‘is at the front end of the process.’ ” According to the Secretary of State here, “[t]hese words are particularly applicable to the 2012 election cycle, where elections officials will implement not only new redistricting plans, but also the new ‘top two’ or ‘voter-nominated’ election scheme adopted by Proposition 14 (June 2010).” At the time the petition was filed, all four maps certified in mid-August by the Commission — including the state Senate map — were then the legally applicable maps, and county election officials and the Secretary of State and others were using and relying upon them for purposes of state election planning and “preclearance” under section 5 of the federal Voting Rights Act,20 and would continue to do so unless and until the state Senate map is automatically stayed by qualification of the proposed referendum or this court orders otherwise. The Secretary of State, citing a declaration by the chief of the elections division, explained that up to six weeks would be required “for state and local elections officials to implement [any] changes [that might be ordered] to the new maps.” This court was also informed that the Secretary of State and county election officials needed to know by the end of January 2012 whether they would be required to implement any changes in the state Senate districts in the event the proposed referendum qualifies and automatically stays the Commission-certified state Senate redistricting map. As the circumstances of the present case demonstrate, even when the available data may be insufficient to show just how likely or probable it is that a proposed referendum will qualify for placement on the ballot, detrimental consequences to the orderly process of an election may result if the court fails to exercise jurisdiction 20 See post, footnote 44. 30 expeditiously and the referendum does ultimately qualify for the ballot. The potential detrimental consequences resulting from this court’s deferring action until later in the signature verification process may reasonably support a judicial determination that the proposed mandate action is sufficiently “ripe” to permit this court to exercise jurisdiction over the mandate action at that earlier juncture. The combination of the redistricting process embodied in California Constitution, article XXI and the electoral schedule often leaves very little time between the deadline for filing referendum petition signatures and the beginning of the numerous tasks that must be undertaken by candidates and election officials during the upcoming primary and general election electoral cycle. Thus, it may be necessary for this court to issue an order to show cause, elicit briefing, and hold oral argument before it can be determined with any substantial degree of accuracy or confidence how likely or probable it is that the proposed referendum will qualify for the ballot. Such immediate action by this court may be essential in order for this court to retain the ability to render a decision (regarding what districts should be used in the event the referendum qualifies) at a time when the court’s decision can actually be implemented. If issuance of an order to show cause is deferred until later in the signature-verification process, then by the time a judicial decision ultimately is rendered it may, as a practical matter, be impossible for election officials to use any districts other than the districts that the officials have been utilizing up until the date on which the Commission-certified maps are stayed by the official qualification of the proposed referendum. In other words, if this court were to conclude that other districts should be used in the event the referendum qualifies, it may be too late at that time to apply the court’s decision to implement those other districts. Accordingly, we conclude that, in order to preserve this court’s ability to render a meaningful and realistically enforceable decision regarding which districts should be used in the event a proposed referendum qualifies, this court properly may determine that a proposed mandate proceeding is “ripe” for adjudication and may issue an order to show 31 cause in such a proceeding in the absence of a showing that the referendum is “likely to qualify” for placement on the ballot. Given the realities of the timing of redistricting and the statutory electoral process, we hold that this court has authority to find that a mandate action satisfies the ripeness doctrine when we conclude that, in light of the relative probability that the proposed referendum will qualify for the ballot and the time limitations and potential detrimental consequences of refusing to consider a mandate petition at that point in time, it is prudent to issue an order to show cause and decide which districts should be used in the upcoming elections in the event the proposed referendum does qualify for placement on the ballot. (Accord, People ex rel. S.F. Bay etc. Com. v. Town of Emeryville, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 537-539 [an appellate court has inherent power to order interim relief in aid of its own jurisdiction and to preserve the effectiveness of its ultimate decision].) Furthermore, not only may this court issue an order to show cause in the absence of a showing that the proposed referendum is “likely to qualify” for the ballot, but this court’s authority to decide what districts should be used in the event the referendum does qualify and to grant relief based upon that decision also is not contingent upon a showing that the proposed referendum is “likely to qualify” for the ballot. Even when it cannot be determined from the available data how likely it is that a referendum will qualify for the ballot — or when there is a substantial possibility that the proposed referendum will qualify but it is not “more probable than not” that it will qualify — a court may conclude that it is prudent to determine, at that time, which districts should be used in the event the referendum does qualify so that election officials are not left without meaningful guidance if the referendum ultimately qualifies.21 Thus, at the relief stage, just as at the 21 As explained earlier, current California statutes mandate a full count of all submitted signatures whenever the results of the random sampling process project a signature validity rate between 95 and 110 percent of the required number of valid (Footnote continued on following page) 32 order to show cause stage of an original writ proceeding, this court may properly grant relief before a proposed referendum actually qualifies for the ballot when the court is of the view that there is a sufficient chance that the proposed referendum will qualify to make it prudent for the court to advise election officials of the districts that should be used on an interim basis if the proposed referendum ultimately qualifies for the ballot. We also emphasize that it is perfectly appropriate for this court, after the issuance of an order to show cause and while such a proceeding is pending before the court, to continue to consider all relevant factors that may affect both the need for relief and the prudence and appropriate timing of affording the relief that the court determines may be warranted.22 (Footnote continued from previous page) signatures. (Ante, at pp. 28-29.) This statutory scheme indicates that even when the random sampling process projects that the number of valid signatures submitted will be only 95 percent of the required number of valid signatures, the Legislature is of the view that there is a sufficient chance that a full count of all signatures will show that the proposed referendum actually has obtained a sufficient number of valid signatures to qualify for the ballot to require that a time-consuming and expensive full count be conducted. Accordingly, the suggestion advanced in one of petitioner’s supplemental briefs — that this court should adopt a rule under which a proposed referendum that obtains a random sampling rate of less than 100 percent of the required number of valid signatures should be considered insufficient to permit this court to advise election officials of the districts that should be used in the event the proposed referendum does qualify (see post, fn. 22) — would appear to conflict with the underlying premise of the statutory scheme. 22 In the present case, for example, we asked the parties during the pendency of this proceeding to file supplemental briefs addressing what significance the signature validity rate from the completed random sampling process would have with regard to the issue of whether a proposed referendum is “likely to qualify” under article XXI, section 3(b)(2). In response, the parties informed the court of the then-current signature validity rate of the proposed referendum based on the incomplete random sampling process that had been conducted as of the date the supplemental briefing was filed. Although the parties reported the same data — obtained from the Secretary of State’s Web site — they disagreed whether the signature validity rate obtained from the random sampling process (Footnote continued on following page) 33 Thus, for example, if in this case, after we issued an order to show cause, the completed random sampling process had projected less than 95 percent of the required valid signatures, it would have been clear that the proposed referendum had failed to qualify for the ballot and that there was no longer any need for a decision by this court because there was no longer any chance that the Commission-certified state Senate map would be automatically stayed. Under such circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that this court had properly issued an order to show cause, this court would simply have dismissed this writ proceeding as moot. Furthermore, other relevant factors that develop while such an original writ proceeding is pending in this court also may affect the timing and nature of the relief that (Footnote continued from previous page) is a sufficiently reliable indicator concerning whether a referendum is “likely to qualify” for the ballot. Petitioner maintained in this regard that “a petition that attains less than a 100 [percent] signature validity rate from the completed random sampling cannot be said to be ‘likely’ to qualify,” whereas “[a] petition that attains more than 100 [percent] is likely to qualify.” The Secretary of State, by contrast, explained that although the random sampling process is adequate to do what that process is designed to do — namely to determine “whether the number of valid signatures on petitions is within a broad range, 95 [percent] to 110 [percent]” — “the sampling technique is not designed to give reliable results at a greater level of precision.” The Secretary of State advised the court that “to use the completed sampling process to determine at what point a petition becomes likely to qualify, or to determine whether a 101 [percent] random sample petition is more likely to qualify than a 100 [percent] random sample petition, is beyond the capacity of the process.” (Italics added.) On this point the Commission, in its own supplemental filing and at oral argument, deferred to and agreed with the Secretary of State. For the reasons discussed in the text, we conclude that there is no need to determine whether the current available data establishes that it is likely or more probable than not that the proposed referendum will qualify. There is a sufficient probability that the referendum will qualify to make it prudent to decide at this time which districts should be used in the event the proposed referendum does qualify. (See, post, at p. 42.) 34 this court will provide. For example, as the briefing and oral argument process progresses, and as this court, through its deliberations, arrives at a consensus concerning the substantive question of what districts should be used in the event the proposed referendum qualifies and stays the Commission-certified districts, the court will continue to assess the relative probability that the referendum will qualify for the ballot and the prudence of resolving the proceeding prior to the referendum’s actual qualification. If this court, after deliberation, concludes that even if the proposed referendum qualifies for the ballot and automatically stays the operative effect of the Commissioncertified map, election officials should be directed to use the Commission-certified map on an interim basis because the court has concluded that that map best complies with the constitutionally mandated criteria embodied in the federal and state Constitutions (a scenario, as we discuss later in this opinion, that reflects this court’s decisionmaking process in this case), this court could also reasonably conclude that it should issue its decision as early as possible so as to eliminate the uncertainty that inevitably arises from the ongoing signature verification process and the pendency of the writ proceeding in this court. In such a case, when this court has concluded that the Commission-certified map should be used, so long as there remains a substantial possibility that the referendum will qualify for the ballot it would not be necessary for the court to decide whether it is more probable than not that the proposed referendum will qualify. Even if, after the court issues its opinion, the referendum ultimately does not qualify for the ballot and the Commission-certified map is not stayed, issuance of the court’s decision — approving the Commission’s map — could have no adverse effect upon the Commission-certified map. By contrast, based on the Commission’s processes and the Secretary of State’s statutory responsibilities, different considerations may come into play when this court, after briefing, oral argument, and deliberation, concludes that a map other than the Commission-certified map should be used in the interim elections in the event the 35 proposed referendum qualifies for the ballot. Because of the possibility that the issuance of a court decision favoring an alternative map over the Commission-certified map might — in the event the referendum does not qualify — unnecessarily cast a cloud over the legitimacy of that Commission-certified map for the ensuing decade, this court may determine that it is prudent to consider just how likely it is that the proposed referendum will not qualify for the ballot. In determining whether it is prudent to issue its decision in advance of the proposed referendum’s qualification notwithstanding this potential adverse consequence (and if so, how far in advance), this court would undoubtedly take into account the particular reasons underlying its analysis and determination that an alternative map is more consistent with the constitutionally based criteria than the Commission-certified map, and then decide if and when to issue its opinion based in part on such considerations. As the foregoing examples illustrate, under this court’s traditional California Constitution, article VI, section 10 authority over original writ proceedings, this court properly retains broad discretion to take into account all such considerations as well as any other relevant factor in deciding what relief is appropriate in such a proceeding and when it should be ordered. Because of the variety of circumstances that may be presented in the future, and the impossibility of predicting the nature of the controversies that may arise in this context, we conclude that it would not be wise or appropriate to establish a fixed and inflexible rule or standard that would restrict this court’s discretion to take appropriate action in light of all the circumstances that may be presented in a particular case. Thus, we reject any suggestion that this court may determine which districts are to be used for interim elections in the event a proposed referendum ultimately qualifies for the ballot only if, at the time the court issues its decision, the available data demonstrates that the referendum is “likely to qualify” for the ballot. In their briefs, the Secretary of State and the Commission do not deny that under the general provisions of article VI, section 10 of the California Constitution regarding 36 original writs of mandate, and the discretion courts may generally exercise under the ripeness doctrine, this court ordinarily would have authority to issue an order to show cause in this setting and to provide appropriate relief in light of all of the circumstances of the case, even if petitioner fails to demonstrate that it is more probable than not that the proposed referendum measure will qualify for the ballot. The Secretary of State and the Commission maintain, however, that the specific provision of article XXI, section 3(b)(2) authorizing “[a]ny registered voter [. . . to] file a petition for a writ of mandate or writ of prohibition to seek relief where a certified final map is subject to a referendum measure that is likely to qualify and stay the timely implementation of the map” should be interpreted to limit this court’s authority to issue an order to show cause and grant relief in an original writ proceeding in this setting to instances in which a petitioner establishes that the proposed referendum measure is “likely to qualify” for the ballot. (As discussed above, both the Secretary of State and the Commission maintain that “likely to qualify,” as used in article XXI, section 3(b)(2), means “more probable than not.”) In advancing this argument, the briefs rely upon decisions of this court holding that when constitutional provisions conflict, “a recent, specific provision is deemed to carve out an exception to and thereby limit an older, general provision.” (Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 371; see Greene v. Marin County Flood & Water Conservation Dist. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 277, 290.) The fundamental flaw in this argument lies in its implicit assumption that the sentence within article XXI, section 3(b)(2) upon which the briefs rely was intended, and may reasonably be interpreted, to impose a limitation on the circumstances under which this court is authorized to issue an order to show cause or to provide relief in this setting. In our view, it is evident — both from the language of article XXI, section 3(b)(2) itself and from the judicial background against which the provision was drafted (see Assembly 37 v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638)23 — that this section was intended to expand, rather than to limit, the ability of referendum sponsors or supporters to institute an original writ proceeding in this court by explicitly providing that when a proposed referendum is “likely to qualify” for the ballot, any registered voter has the right to file such a petition in this court before the Secretary of State formally certifies that the referendum has qualified for placement on the ballot. The language of article XXI, section 3(b)(2) does not purport to limit this court’s jurisdiction or its ability to determine, at a time prior to when the referendum is “likely to qualify,” that a case falling within its jurisdiction is ripe for adjudication, and nothing in the ballot pamphlet related to this initiative measure indicates an intention to limit this court’s broad article VI, section 10 authority in such a fashion. Indeed, it would clearly defeat, rather than further, the purpose of article XXI, section 3(b)(2) to interpret the section as limiting this court’s authority to entertain a writ petition at an earlier time when an earlier commencement of the action may be necessary, as a practical matter, to enable the court to provide the relief sought in the petition should such relief be found appropriate. Accordingly, we reject the argument that article XXI, section 3(b)(2) should be interpreted to limit this court’s traditional authority under California Constitution, article VI, section 10 in the manner suggested by the Secretary of State and the Commission. 23 In Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638, the referendum proponents gathered an extraordinary large number of signatures (well over two times the number of required valid signatures — see id., at p. 682 (dis. opn. of Richardson, J.)) in an exceptionally short period of time (see post, fn. 29), and thus may have been able to demonstrate even before the petitions were filed with election officials that it was more probable than not that the referendum would qualify for the ballot. The drafters of the relevant sentence of article XXI, section 3(b)(2) apparently wanted to make it clear that in such circumstances any registered voter would have the right to file an action for writ relief in this court even though the proposed referendum may not yet have formally qualified for the ballot. 38 Our determination in this regard does not render the pertinent sentence of article XXI, section 3(b)(2) meaningless or “surplusage.” In the absence of article XXI, section 3(b)(2), the ripeness of any petition seeking an original writ of mandate that is filed prior to the qualification of a proposed referendum would be a question for this court’s discretionary authority over original writs of mandate under article VI, section 10. Under article XXI, section 3(b)(2), however, when a petitioner is able to show that a proposed referendum is likely to qualify for placement on the ballot, the petition is, as a matter of law, sufficiently ripe to permit the petition to be entertained.24 Thus, by virtue of article XXI, section 3(b)(2), when it is shown that a proposed referendum is likely to qualify, this court may not properly deny the petition for lack of ripeness. By contrast, a petition that is filed prior to the time that it can be determined that the proposed referendum is likely to qualify is unaffected by article XXI, section 3(b)(2) and continues to be evaluated by this court under all the considerations ordinarily taken into account under the ripeness doctrine. Accordingly, our conclusion does not render article XXI, section 3(b)(2) surplusage.25 24 When a petition is properly filed under article XXI, section 3(b)(2), this court is required to give priority to ruling on the petition. (See art. XXI, § 3(b)(3).) Of course, in any case in which this court issues an order to show cause in an original writ proceeding because of the importance of the issue presented and the need for a prompt decision, this court naturally gives priority to the proceeding in order to provide an expeditious ruling. The present proceeding is an apt example. 25 Relying upon the “likely to qualify” language in article XXI, section 3(b)(2), the concurring opinion proposes that the court adopt “as a general rule — indeed a presumption — that where a petitioner has not shown that a referendum is likely to qualify, the court should not decide the merits of the mandate petition.” (Conc. opn., post, at p. 9.) Because the concurring opinion also concludes that the “likely to qualify” language is properly interpreted to mean “more likely than not” (conc. opn., post, at p. 11), under the concurring opinion’s approach this court, as a general rule, would not decide which map should be used for interim elections if a proposed referendum qualifies for the ballot unless a petitioner has shown that it is more probable than not that the proposed referendum will qualify. Thus, in the absence of such a showing, this court (Footnote continued on following page) 39 (Footnote continued from previous page) would often be unable to provide timely guidance to election officials, leaving them without sufficient time to implement this court’s eventual ruling should the referendum ultimately qualify for the ballot. For a number of reasons, we believe that the concurring opinion’s approach is untenable. First, as we have explained above (ante, pp. 37-39), the “likely to qualify” language in article XXI, section 3(b)(2) was not intended, and may not reasonably be interpreted, to limit this court’s authority under article VI, section 10 of the California Constitution to issue an order to show cause or to decide the merits in an original mandate proceeding at a point in time earlier than when a referendum is likely to qualify for the ballot. The concurring opinion fails to identify anything in the language of the provision or in the ballot materials accompanying the initiative measure that added this language to the California Constitution indicating that the provision was intended to have this type of limiting effect on this court’s authority. Under these circumstances, article XXI, section 3(b)(2) provides no support for the concurring opinion’s conclusion that that provision’s “likely to qualify” language constitutes the appropriate standard against which this court’s discretion to grant relief under article VI, section 10 should be measured or limited. Second, although the concurring opinion maintains that the “likely to qualify” standard should be adopted as the general standard for determining when this court will “decide the merits” in such a mandate proceeding, the “likely to qualify” language of article XXI, section 3(b)(2), by its terms, is not directed to the time when the court may or should decide the merits of the mandate petition, but rather to the time when a registered voter may file such a petition in this court. (“Any registered voter . . . may . . . file a petition for writ of mandate . . . to seek relief where a certified final map is subject to a referendum that is likely to qualify and stay the timely implementation of the map.” (Italics added.)) Although the concurring opinion contests this point, and argues that “the ‘likely to qualify’ language in section 3(b)(2) is better read as specifying when relief is available and may be granted by this court” (conc. opn., post, at p. 9), in our view a plain reading of the constitutional language, as well as the purpose of the provision, belie the concurring opinion’s contrary interpretation. Third, because the concurring opinion ultimately concludes that “we need not apply the ‘likely to qualify’ standard in this case because of our ultimate disposition” (conc. opn., post, at p. 14) — that is, because of the court’s determination that the Commission-certified state Senate map should be used if the referendum qualifies for the ballot (see conc. opn., post, p. 3) — the opinion makes clear that its proposed likely-toqualify “general rule” is not intended to apply in all cases but only “in circumstances where [the court] finds or contemplates finding that an alternative to the Commission (Footnote continued on following page) 40 In sum, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that, under California Constitution, article VI, section 10, this court is authorized to issue an order to show cause and decide which districts should be used in the event a proposed referendum directed at a Commission-certified redistricting map qualifies for the ballot, even in the absence of a showing that the proposed referendum is likely to qualify for the ballot. Finally, applying the general considerations of the ripeness doctrine to the facts of this case, we conclude that petitioner’s claim was sufficiently ripe to support this court’s issuance of the order to show cause on December 9, 2011, and that it continues to be appropriate for this court to determine which state Senate districts should be used in the interim elections in the event the proposed referendum qualifies for the ballot. First, as discussed above, at the time the petition was filed on December 2, 2011, the undisputed facts established that there was a substantial possibility that the proposed referendum would ultimately qualify for the ballot, but that the determination whether or (Footnote continued from previous page) map should be the interim map.” (Conc. opn., post, p. 4.) In advocating the adoption of a likely-to-qualify rule that applies only in such limited circumstances, the concurring opinion again departs substantially from the language of article XXI, section 3(b)(2), which draws no such distinction. The concurrence’s apparent response to this point — namely, that this court is not granting “relief” when, as in this case, it issues a writ of mandate directing election officials, in the event the Commission-certified map is stayed by qualification of the referendum, to use a specified map other than a map sought by petitioner (see conc. opn., post, at p. 10, fn. 1) — is totally without merit; this court is clearly granting relief when it directs which map is to be used in the event of a stay, whether or not the particular outcome ordered by the court is the relief petitioner is seeking. In sum, we conclude that article XXI, section 3(b)(2) does not support the concurring opinion’s approach. For the reasons fully set forth in the text (ante, pp. 2339), this court’s authority either to issue an order to show cause or to decide what districts should be used in the event a proposed referendum qualifies for the ballot is not limited to circumstances in which the proposed referendum is “likely to qualify” for the ballot. 41 not the referendum would qualify might not be made until early March 2012, when it would, as a practical matter, be impossible to implement a decision of this court requiring the use of state Senate district maps other than those certified by the Commission. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the ripeness doctrine was satisfied and that this court had authority on December 9, 2011, to issue an order to show cause in this original writ proceeding. Second, the relevant factors that have developed while this matter was pending in this court do not alter our conclusion that it is appropriate to determine in this proceeding what state Senate districts should be used in the event the proposed referendum qualifies for the ballot and stays the operative effect of the Commission-certified state Senate map. During the pendency of this proceeding, the random sampling verification process was completed, resulting in a determination by the Secretary of State on January 10, 2012, that the referendum petition had a signature validity rate projecting a total number of valid signatures between 95 and 110 percent of the required number of valid signatures. As a consequence, the Secretary of State has directed local election officials to conduct a full count of all submitted signatures, a process that the Secretary of State indicates will be completed by those officials no later than February 24, 2012. According to the Secretary of State’s representations, however, if this court were to wait until it is finally determined whether the proposed referendum has actually qualified for the ballot, it would be too late to permit this court’s decision to be implemented if the court were to determine that a map other than the Commission-certified map should be used for the June and November 2012 elections. Given these circumstances, we conclude that, even though the proposed referendum has not yet qualified for the ballot, it is appropriate for this court to determine at this time which state Senate district map should be used for the 2012 state Senate primary and general elections in the event the referendum does qualify for the ballot and automatically stays the effect of the districts certified by the Commission. 42 Accordingly, we now turn to that question. IV. If the proposed referendum qualifies, triggering a stay of the Commission’s certified map, under which Senate district map should the 2012 elections proceed? A. Relevant case law Petitioner emphasizes the interest that referendum proponents and petition signers have in insisting on an “up or down” referendum vote by the statewide electorate before the subject of that measure becomes effective. She acknowledges that 30 years ago in Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638, this court held, by a four-to-three vote, that redistricting maps that had been enacted by the Legislature and approved by the Governor, but stayed by the qualification of a referendum challenging those maps, should be used as an interim measure pending the electorate’s vote on that referendum. Petitioner asserts we should not follow that course here, but should instead establish new interim state Senate district boundaries by either (1) ordering use of the expired state Senate map that the Legislature created in 2001 based on the 2000 census — a remedy similar to the one adopted 40 years ago in Legislature v. Reinecke, supra, 6 Cal.3d 595 — or (2) ordering use of one of two alternative state Senate redistricting maps (other than the Commission-certified map) that petitioner has proposed. Indeed, petitioner suggests that the amendments made by Propositions 11 and 20 to article XXI of the California Constitution “vitiate” the main holding of Assembly v. Deukmejian with respect to the permissibility of using a stayed map. In order to put petitioner’s argument into context, we more fully describe the relevant past decisions of this court to which petitioner refers. In Legislature v. Reinecke, supra, 6 Cal.3d 595, a Republican Governor vetoed new state Senate, state Assembly, and congressional districts that had been passed by the Democratic-controlled Legislature after the 1970 census, leaving in place only the old voting districts that had been based upon the 1960 census. When the petition in Reinecke was filed, this court did not have sufficient time to appoint special masters and establish 43 court-approved districts for use in the upcoming 1972 elections. Under those circumstances, this court unanimously concluded that the new Legislature-passed state Senate and Assembly districts that had been vetoed by the Governor should not be used on an interim basis for the 1972 elections, and held instead that the old legislative districts, which had been based on the prior census, should be used for the 1972 elections, even though, due to population shifts, the old districts did not comply with the “one person, one vote” principle embodied in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Legislature v. Reinecke, supra, at pp. 601-602.) The court in Reinecke expressed the view that under the circumstances presented, “it will be far less destructive of the integrity of the electoral process to allow the existing legislative districts, imperfect as they may be, to survive for an additional two years than for this court to accept, even temporarily, plans that are at best truncated products of the legislative process.” (Id., at p. 602.)26 With respect to congressional districts, however, the court held that the vetoed map should be used, on an interim basis, in the upcoming elections.27 26 Thereafter, following the failure of the Legislature and Governor to agree on new district lines in 1973, we appointed three special masters to recommend to the court new district lines for the succeeding elections in 1974 through 1980, and we eventually accepted and adopted those recommendations with minor adjustments. (Legislature v. Reinecke, supra, 10 Cal.3d 396.) 27 The court explained: “There are . . . compelling considerations that impel us to adopt as a temporary court plan, for the 1972 elections only, the bill passed by the Legislature to reapportion the congressional districts. (Assembly Bill No. 16, 1971 First Extraordinary Session.) Unlike the numbers of assemblymen and state senators, which remain unchanged, the number of representatives in the United States House of Representatives to which California is entitled increased following the 1970 census from 38 to 43. Accordingly, unless congressional districts are reapportioned, the offices of five representatives will either have to be left unfilled or filled by statewide elections. We cannot accept either alternative, for Congress has expressly provided that California shall elect 43 representatives from 43 single member districts. We need only add that we fully agree with the congressional mandate. It would be wholly unacceptable to avoid statewide congressional elections by depriving the state of the representation of five (Footnote continued on following page) 44 Ten years later, in Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638, the three redistricting statutes at issue in that case (again, covering the state’s Senate, Assembly, and congressional districts) had been passed by a Democratic-controlled Legislature and signed by a Democratic Governor in mid-September 1981. A referendum signature drive by the California Republican Party began the next day, challenging all three maps. Shortly thereafter, legislators who supported the legislative reapportionment statutes and who opposed the referendum filed a writ petition in this court, challenging the Republican-sponsored referendum on various procedural grounds.28 Although petition signatures were gathered and submitted to election officials very quickly and the Secretary of State was able to determine expeditiously that the referendum had sufficient valid signatures to qualify for placement on the statewide ballot,29 in light of the pending writ challenge to the referendum the Secretary of State (Footnote continued from previous page) congressmen to which it is entitled, but to conduct statewide elections to fill five congressional seats in a state of California’s geographical size and large population would not only tremendously increase the burdens and expenses of effective campaigning but, by increasing the choices confronting the electorate from the candidates for one to the candidates for six congressional seats, would seriously impede the casting of informed ballots.” (Legislature v. Reinecke, supra, 6 Cal.3d at pp. 602-603, fn. omitted.) 28 Three issues ripe for preelection review were directly presented: (1) Because the referendum petitions directed signers to use their “address as registered to vote,” rather than their “residence address,” as required by the then-existing Elections Code, were the petitions defective? (2) If defective, should the petitions be allowed to qualify for placement of the referendum before the voters? (3) May the referendum process be used to challenge reapportionment statutes? (See Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 643.) A fourth issue subsequently arose after the referendum qualified and approximately six weeks before the court filed its opinion: In light of the intervening qualification of the referendum and the consequent automatic stay of the challenged maps, under what maps should the upcoming election be conducted? (Id., at p. 644.) 29 Within only 60 days — 30 days fewer than the 90 days authorized for signature gathering — the referendum proponents submitted their completed signature lists to the (Footnote continued on following page) 45 announced that she had refrained from directing county clerks to place the referendum on the June primary ballot, pending this court’s resolution of the writ challenge to the referendum. The Secretary of State also directed that in the interim, county election officials should proceed on a dual track, preparing to use either the newly adopted maps or the old maps from 1973 (see ante, fn. 26) for the June 1982 election. This court in Assembly v. Deukmejian thus faced a timing problem: the June 1982 primary elections were only a few months away, and election officials needed lead time to prepare ballots. In order to do so, they needed to know the district boundaries. The prior boundaries had become outdated and unconstitutional — because of population shifts, they violated “one person, one vote” requirements. The new boundaries, however, had been stayed by operation of law by the “duly qualified” referendum. (Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 654-657.) As already noted, ultimately, in a four-to-three decision, this court decided that the new boundaries should be used as an interim measure for the June 1982 primary election and for the subsequent November 1982 general election. The majority concluded that use (Footnote continued from previous page) Secretary of State. Approximately 30 days later, after reviewing the signatures, the Secretary of State announced that the referendum was duly qualified for placement before the voters on the statewide ballot. (Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 645.) Prior statutes in place at the time of Assembly v. Deukmejian provided shorter time lines for the required signature verification at each stage of that process. (Compare current Elec. Code, §§ 9030 & 9031 [allowing county election officials eight business days for counting of raw signatures, 30 business days for random sampling of 3 percent of raw signatures, and 30 business days for verifying all signatures by a full count] with former Elec. Code, §§ 3520 & 3521 (as amended by Stats. 1980, ch. 1287, §§ 11.3 & 11.4, pp. 4358-4360) [allowing county election officials five business days for raw counting, 15 calendar days for random sampling of 5 percent of raw signatures, and 30 calendar days for verifying all signatures by a full count].) The longer timing schedules of the current statutes, combined with the mid-August deadline for certification by the Commission, exacerbate the time crunch we face now. 46 of the new, albeit challenged maps, which were based on then-current 1980 census data, “more nearly comports with the requirements of the federal and state equal protection clauses and is least disruptive of the electoral process” in view of the limited options and time constraints. (Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 665-666.) The court also reasoned that permitting the voice of 5 percent of the electorate who had signed the referendum petition “to delay implementation of a constitutionally required reapportionment plan for two to four years” would “perpetrate a potentially grave injustice on the majority of the people of this state” (id., at p. 670): “Although the Constitution of our state grants the power to initiate a referendum to 5 percent of the voters, it does not require that the effect of that referendum be articulated in a manner that does such serious injury to conflicting and equally compelling constitutional mandates.” (Ibid.)