Opinion ID: 2611058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 34

Heading: Eighth Amendment vagueness

Text: In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), a majority of the Court held that Georgia's capital punishment statute violated the Eighth Amendment. The justices explained that the statute operated randomly, with no rational way to distinguish those persons who were subject to the death penalty from those who were not. See 408 U.S. at 240, 92 S.Ct. at 2727 (Douglas, J., concurring); 408 U.S. at 306, 92 S.Ct. at 2760 (Stewart, J., concurring); 408 U.S. at 310, 92 S.Ct. at 2763 (White, J., concurring). Four years later, the Court upheld three death penalty statutes because each statute reduced the randomness the Court had found unconstitutional in Furman. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). These statutes satisfied the Eighth Amendment by narrowing the class of persons on whom the death penalty could be imposed. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). They did so either by identifying discrete categories of aggravated murder for which the death penalty may be imposed, see Jurek v. Texas, supra , or by requiring the jury to find at least one aggravating circumstance before deciding whether to impose the death penalty, see Zant v. Stephens, supra . An aggravating factor or a category of aggravated murder is vague in violation of the Eighth Amendment if it does not genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (plurality). Godfrey v. Georgia illustrates the Eighth Amendment concern. In that case, the jury had found, as an aggravating factor, that the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman. The plurality in Godfrey reasoned, however, that because almost all murders could be characterized in this way, this aggravating factor did not provide any principled way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not. Id., 446 U.S. at 433, 100 S.Ct. at 1767. Accordingly, it held that the factor was vague in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Neither ORS 163.095(2)(d) nor (2)(e) suffers from a defect like that identified in Godfrey. Both describe separate, discrete classes of conduct. Subsection (2)(d) applies to murders that a defendant personally and intentionally commits during the course of or in furtherance of certain felonies. Subsection (2)(e) focuses on why the murder is committed and enhances the penalty on all murders committed for the purpose of concealing a separate crime. In State v. Reynolds, 289 Or. 533, 539, 614 P.2d 1158 (1980), this court recognized that ORS 163.095(2)(d) does not eliminate the felony-murder elements and thereby make every murder that is committed personally and intentionally an aggravated murder. Rather, ORS 163.095(2)(d) requires proof of the elements of felony murder and proof that the defendant personally and intentionally committed the murder. With respect to ORS 163.095(2)(e), defendant contends that this section is unconstitutionally broader than the aggravated felony murder section in that it appears to punish for killings involving any crime, including misdemeanors. The fact, however, that one class of aggravated murder is broader than another does not mean that the broader class is unconstitutional. The question is not the comparative size of the two classes. Rather, it is whether the category at issue impermissibly could be applied to almost all murders. ORS 163.095(2)(e) applies only if a separate crime is committed to conceal the commission of that crime or the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Unlike the aggravating circumstances at issue in Godfrey v. Georgia, supra , ORS 163.095(2)(e) could not be applied to all or almost all murders. Rather, by describing a discrete class of criminal conduct, it genuinely narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. See Zant v. Stephens, supra, 462 U.S. at 878, 103 S.Ct. at 2743. Defendant's claim of federal constitutional violation fails.