Opinion ID: 1776520
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: law i. was the tribunal permitted to consider haimes' prior suspension as an aggravating circumstance?

Text: On October 25, 1988, Haimes was suspended from the practice of law for six months on grounds that he had commingled a client's funds with his own without advising the client. Purportedly, Haimes appropriated the funds in payment of a fee which the client owned him. In July of 1989, Haimes filed a petition seeking reinstatement on two grounds: First, he alleged that the six months had expired and that he had complied with all conditions incident to the suspension; secondly, he sought reconsideration of the original suspension order on grounds that, subsequent to the suspension, an arbitrator had settled in Haimes favor the dispute between Haimes and his client regarding the appropriated funds. This Court reinstated Haimes on grounds that the suspension period had expired. The Court declined to reconsider the original suspension order, however, stating: We note particularly that, following the judgment of suspension of October 25, 1988, Haimes took no appeal to this Court. Moreover, the arbitration award, accepting arguendo Haimes' interpretation of it, hardly eviscerates the Tribunal's finding that Haimes failed to preserve the identity of client funds by placing them in an identifiable trust account. Haimes v. Mississippi State Bar, 551 So.2d 910, 913 (Miss. 1989). It is well settled that a complaint tribunal may consider prior disciplinary offenses of the attorney as an aggravating factor when deciding what type and degree of discipline to impose. See Culpepper v. Mississippi State Bar, 588 So.2d 413, 421 (Miss. 1991); see also Mississippi State Bar v. Smith, 577 So.2d 1249, 1251 (Miss. 1991); Foote v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 517 So.2d 561, 565 (Miss. 1987); ABA, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Std. 9.22(a) (1986). There is no reason to depart from the established rule in the present case, particularly since the latest offense is of the same character as the earlier one. Haimes has now twice committed the cardinal sin  mishandling a client's money. He apparently learned nothing from the six-month suspension imposed in 1988. A more severe penalty is definitely in order for this second offense. Haimes fervently contends that the guardianship money he transferred to the racing association by way of his personal bank account was merely a loan. In so arguing, Haimes demonstrates his utter insensibility to our rules of professional conduct. An attorney must not comingle a client's funds with his own, regardless of motive. When a lawyer mixes a client's money with his own, an appearance of gross impropriety arises even if the transaction is otherwise benign. The primary purpose of disciplinary action is to vindicate the reputation of the bar in the eyes of the public, not to punish an attorney's misdeeds. See Smith, 577 So.2d at 1252; Mississippi State Bar v. A Mississippi Attorney, 489 So.2d 1081, 1084 (Miss. 1986); see also Phillips v. Mississippi State Bar, 427 So.2d 1380, 1382 (Miss. 1983). Haimes' misconduct has besmirched the reputation of the legal profession. His disbarment may help to cleanse that stain.