Opinion ID: 2746598
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonable Suspicion to Investigate Further

Text: Under well-settled law, police can permissibly detain an automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009) (referencing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Accordingly, Defendant admits police lawfully stopped his Malibu for speeding. He also concedes police properly arrested Johnson. He only argues police did not have sufficient reasons after Johnson's arrest to justify detaining him any further. The only lawful option available to police after Johnson's arrest, he asserts, was to let him go; as such, the subsequent investigation was an illegal fishing expedition. The law and the facts belie this contention. To begin, the Supreme Court has made it perfectly clear that during a lawful traffic stop an officer may order a passenger out of the car as a precautionary measure, without reasonable suspicion that the passenger poses a safety risk. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258 (2007) (emphasis added) (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414–15 (1997)). Here, we have an undisputedly lawful traffic stop, and we have police ordering Defendant, a passenger, out of the car. Thus, reasonable suspicion was almost certainly not needed in this situation. reveals the reasonable suspicion theory detailed below. Whether Defendant raised this additional theory at trial is unclear; out of an abundance of caution we analyze and dismiss it here. -13- That said, Defendant contends the initial stop was complete once Johnson was arrested, and reasonable suspicion was therefore essential to continue investigating him. See United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008) ([R]easonable suspicion of a crime is necessary to extend a traffic stop for investigatory purposes. (emphasis added)); cf. United States v. Sowers, 136 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1998) (Courts must determine whether the actions undertaken by the officer following the stop were reasonably responsive to the circumstances justifying the stop in the first place, as augmented by information gleaned by the officer during the stop. (emphasis added)). The record does not support this claim. Only three or so minutes passed--at most-- between the Malibu pulling over and Defendant's being ordered out of the car. This strongly suggests, to put it mildly, that the initial stop was ongoing. Moreover, the officers noticed Defendant moving around while they were securing Johnson, not after. Finally, although the record indicates an officer asked Defendant for his driver's license, nothing shows Defendant was able to produce a license.5 Thus, the initial stop could not have been over, as the officers still had to figure out what to do with the Malibu when they had no licensed or authorized driver on hand. 5 To the contrary, one officer testified if Defendant had produced the license he would have noted this in his report. The officer made no such note, suggesting no license was produced. -14- Regardless, the officers' telling Defendant to exit the vehicle was reasonable. At least six facts, taken together, point to possible criminal activity on the part of Defendant: (1) the initial violation (traveling well over the speed limit); (2) the subsequent violation (ignoring the order to pull over); (3) Defendant's apparent control of the Malibu (as evidenced by his talking over Johnson and the rental agreement); (4) Defendant's movements while officers were away (suspicious); (5) Defendant's visage when officers returned (heavy breathing and sweating); and (6) the time of day (just past midnight). These facts are sufficient. See, e.g., United States v. Chaney, 584 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (Here, the officer's initial inquiries into Chaney's identity took at most a minute or two and did not measurably extend the duration of the stop. Any additional delay, including that attributable to the records check, was independently warranted by the officer's reasonable suspicion, based on Chaney's implausible answers and nervous demeanor, that Chaney was giving a false name and might be involved in other criminal activity. (emphasis added)). Moreover, these facts distinguish United States v. McKoy, 428 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2005), which is the primary case Defendant relies upon. In McKoy, we held a person's nervousness and movement in a car parked in a high-crime area were not enough to justify a Terry frisk. See id. at 41. Although the present situation bears some resemblance to McKoy, unlike McKoy the -15- officers here were faced with more than just nervousness and furtive movements in questionable surroundings. Chiefly, they were dealing with a car that had attempted to evade police after being caught speeding, and with a man who appeared to control that car. That pushes this case beyond McKoy. Defendant attacks these facts on an array of grounds. For starters, he attempts to pawn off the half-mile police evasion on Johnson: she was the driver and he was merely a passenger, he claims, who had no control over when the vehicle stopped. Thus, according to Defendant, it was clear error for the district court to take police evasion into account when analyzing the decision to investigate him. If true, though, then why did Defendant attempt to monopolize the conversation with the initial officer? And was it not his rental car (as he otherwise steadfastly maintains)? Could not an officer reasonably surmise that if Defendant was doing the talking and in possession of the car then it was quite possible he was also in control of Johnson's driving? We think so. Defendant also cites the district court's vocal skepticism about the officers' testimony. Even if the court was skeptical at hearings--for example, about Defendant's profuse sweating--it resolved these doubts in its written fact findings in favor of the officers. See, e.g., Awer, 2007 WL 172258, at  nn.1–2 (finding the officers' testimony credible). Our job is to -16- determine whether the court's fact findings and credibility determinations are clearly wrong, not to decide such questions de novo or divine the court's inner thoughts from transcripts of the hearings. Next, Defendant assails in a mishmash of ways the officers' reliance on his suspicious movements. Defendant first protests because the initial officer failed to see any furtive movements from Defendant when he was following the vehicle. This is trivial, however, as a lack of suspicious activity at one instant hardly alters the existence of suspicious behavior at a later instant. What officers did see and rely upon is the crux of the matter.6 Defendant next contends his movements were not suspicious because he was searching for his license. This is sheer speculation, with no basis in the record. Third, Defendant attempts to distinguish cases allowing police to rely on furtive movements, see, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 (1968) (a suspect's deliberately furtive movements when approached by police officers are strong indicia of mens rea), by contending furtiveness requires more than merely moving a shoulder or bending and turning. As detailed above, however, the officers testified Defendant moved his shoulders, moved about the vehicle, kept 6 This same principle squelches a number of other absence of evidence objections raised by Defendant (e.g., Defendant argues it matters that officers didn't see him breathing heavily or sweating when they first approached the vehicle). -17- looking around, turned left and right, and bent over forward as if he was trying to conceal or retrieve something. See supra note 1. Thus, even assuming Defendant is correct about the law on this point, his own actions still doom him. In the end, the district court found these various movements were suspicious, Awer, 2007 WL 172258 at , , and we see no basis for clear error. To recap, even if reasonable suspicion was required-- which it likely was not--the facts here gave officers at least 'a minimal level of objective justification' for the belief that criminal activity [was] afoot. Branch, 537 F.3d at 337 (citation omitted).