Opinion ID: 537255
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Error in Bifurcating Trial

Text: 28 Goland contends, however, that the prosecutorial overreaching in urging bifurcation is relevant in another way: it prevented him from presenting his entire defense, an error so egregious that the double jeopardy clause bars retrial. Goland argues that the bifurcation illegally infringed upon his constitutional right to present his entire defense by preventing the jury from hearing evidence presented by his codefendants. 29 Other circuits have upheld bifurcation in some instances and found it error in others, although they have in general disapproved it. The courts reversed convictions after bifurcated trials in United States v. McIver, 688 F.2d 726 (11th Cir.1982), and United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir.1981). 15 In both cases, the appellants' trials had been held after their codefendants' and the jury had convicted at least some of the first-tried codefendants. The courts reasoned that the previous guilty verdicts as to codefendants prejudiced the appellants because the verdicts prevented the jury from being impartial. McIver, 688 F.2d at 728-29; Stratton, 649 F.2d at 1081-83. In addition, in Stratton, the court had permitted the jury to consider when deliberating in the codefendants' trial the appellant's participation in the crimes charged, only instructing the jury not to consider the appellant's ultimate guilt or innocence, though the appellant had not been present and was unrepresented. Id. at 1080-81. The reviewing court believed that this permission to consider the appellant's participation also harmed the codefendants because a conspiracy was at issue, and the appellant was a major figure in it. Id. at 1083. 30 The eleventh circuit stated specifically in McIver that it was not deciding whether a jury that acquits the first defendant could later be impartial. 688 F.2d at 729. The sixth circuit refused to reverse in United States v. Crane, 499 F.2d 1385 (6th Cir.1974), finding that the bifurcation did not prejudice the appellant because the jury found the first-tried codefendant not guilty. The jury would not have drawn an adverse inference from the codefendant's association with the later-tried appellant. 16 Id. at 1388. 31 Although we express no opinion on bifurcation in general, Goland's trial does not implicate the concerns other circuits have expressed in respect to bifurcation. He was tried first, so he was not prejudiced by his association with prior-tried codefendants. Additionally, the jury later found his codefendants either not guilty or could not agree on a verdict on the charges against them. Goland contends that the prosecutor was overreaching or improper in stating before the trial judge that case authority did not prohibit bifurcation of Goland's case. We disagree, especially since there is no ninth circuit case law on the issue. Finally, if bifurcation did result in prejudice to Goland, as he contends, retrial will afford him a proceeding free of that prejudice. 32
33 Goland contends that the court's bifurcation decision prejudiced him by preventing him from presenting his full defense. His attorneys assert that they and their codefendants' counterparts cooperated fully in preparing their defenses. Weisman's and Habalow's attorneys filed affidavits supporting this claim. The attorneys discussed which lawyer would call which witnesses. One of Goland's attorneys states that he did not call two witnesses, who he believed could provide testimony helpful to Mr. Goland, in reliance on the assurance of one codefendant's attorney that he would call them. Additionally, Weisman and his attorney assured Goland that Weisman would testify favorably for Goland if questioned by Goland's counsel at trial. Goland claims that he has a right to this joint defense, to have the jury hear evidence presented by his codefendants that favors Goland, and that the bifurcation infringed this right. 34 In support of his assertion of such a right, Goland cites cases confirming that codefendants have an attorney-client privilege for materials and information shared in their joint defense. See, e.g., Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir.1965); Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir.1964). These cases simply cannot be stretched to support the right to a joint defense that Goland claims. A defendant must be prepared to present all evidence in his defense in his own case in chief and cannot count on codefendants. Several events beyond a defendant's control can take codefendants out of a trial. They may change their plea to guilty, they may be acquitted before presenting their case, or their trials may be severed. Goland was on notice that his codefendants' acquittal or severance could occur before he had rested his case because their motions for acquittal were pending at the time the prosecution rested and their motions for severance were pending from the beginning of the trial. 35 Goland also argues that this claimed right to present a codefendant's evidence is constitutional in nature. Goland draws our attention to those cases confirming a defendant's right to present a defense generally. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (a defendant can impeach his own witness to prove his innocence); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) (under the sixth amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, Texas could not prevent a defendant from calling his coparticipants in the charged crime to testify on his behalf); Clark v. Blackburn, 632 F.2d 531 (5th Cir.1980) (the government violated the due process clause by sending informants out of state whom it knew the defendant had subpoenaed, thereby preventing them from testifying); United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez, 450 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.1971) (the government violated the due process rights of a defendant charged with smuggling and transporting aliens when it returned some of the aliens to Mexico before the defendant had the opportunity to question them). These precedents, however, do not relieve counsel of the responsibility to present any evidence crucial to the defense during the defense case in chief. 36 Goland claims that he valued highly Weisman's and the other witnesses' testimony. He asserts that if his codefendants should have their trials later to permit them to call him, he should be allowed that also. As the court noted, however, Goland had never moved to sever, which would have protected his right to have his codefendants testify in his behalf without infringing their right against self-incrimination in their own trial. After the bifurcation, although he had the opportunity, Goland did not ask the court to reopen his case so he could call other witnesses. 37 No right to a joint defense exists that permits Goland to rely on his codefendants to present evidence on his behalf during their cases in chief instead of his own. Goland was responsible for presenting his own case in full. He was not prevented from doing so at his first trial. On retrial, Goland can remedy any error caused by bifurcation by calling his former codefendants and their witnesses to testify in his defense.