Opinion ID: 2606396
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr. Buchanan's testimony

Text: First, Dr. Buchanan expressed the opinion although work-related stress was a major factor contributing to her condition, a major factor was not a substantial factor. His testimony establishes, however, that he did in fact consider work-related stress to be a substantial factor  as that term is properly used in workers' compensation cases  in the aggravation of Williams's physical ailments. He misconstrued the legal meaning of the term substantial factor, and imported an exclusivity requirement into the term where none exists in workers' compensation law. [10] He testified: The problem is in the definition of the word substantial. And I think that's the whole case, to my way of thinking. Clearly [work-related stress] was a factor. I've already said that in print. .... Whether that was a substantial one, by the definition that you said, I  I don't know. Because it implies exclusively  I mean, the implication is exclusively this job did it and not other jobs. .... I think the job that she was in was a factor, an important factor. But the real problem for the board is to decide if any job was a factor and therefore would that reduce the importance of the job she was in or was it  did it meet the criteria for substantial, which would be exclusive of other jobs. He also stated: [T]here seemed to be a relationship between the job stresses  a fairly clear consistent temporal relationship between job stresses and symptoms. And when the job stresses went away, the symptoms improved but were still present. Absent the semantical confusion, Dr. Buchanan's testimony unequivocally supports Williams's claim. [11] It cannot be interpreted as substantial evidence rebutting the presumption of compensability. That Dr. Buchanan also testified that he believed that Williams's chronic irritable bowel syndrome was not predominantly caused by her work is of little significance given the fact that we understand his testimony to convey the opinion that her CSED job was a substantial factor in bringing about her condition. Although Dr. Buchanan presented an alternative explanation  that genetics and emotional factors played a significant role in her illness  he did not eliminate all possibilities that the injury was work-connected. Veco, Inc. v. Wolfer, 693 P.2d 865, 872 (Alaska 1985). This court has held that medical testimony cannot constitute substantial evidence if it simply points to other possible causes of an employee's injury or disability, without ruling out work-related causes. Childs, 860 P.2d at 1189. Taken as a whole, Dr. Buchanan's testimony can only be understood as positing that, although Williams's job at CSED was not a predominant cause of her disability and non-work-related factors contributed to her disability, her CSED job was a substantial factor in bringing about her condition. Dr. Buchanan's testimony thus fails to satisfy either method of rebutting the presumption of compensability under Childs.