Opinion ID: 1714041
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: WHETHER THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED IN AWARDING POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON $50,000 OF JUDY FRANCIS DRAPER'S AWARD OF DAMAGES UNDER M.R.C.P. 59(e).

Text: ¶ 36. USF & G argues as its final assignment of error that the trial court erred by granting Francis/Draper prejudgment and post-judgment interest. This Court has commented on the award of prejudgment interest, saying: Mississippi recognizes judicial authority to award prejudgment interest to a prevailing party in a breach of contract suit. Prejudgment interest may be allowed in cases where the amount due is liquidated when the claim is originally made or when the denial of a claim is frivolous or in bad faith. No award of prejudgment interest is allowed where the principal amount has not been fixed prior to judgment. Prejudgment interest is not imposed as a penalty for wrong doing; it is allowed as compensation for the detention of money overdue. For prejudgment interest to be awarded, the party must make a proper demand for the interest in the pleadings, including the date that it was allegedly due. [T]o be entitled to prejudgment interest, they must meet several requirements. First, the claim for damages must be liquidated or the denial of the claim ... must have been frivolous or in bad faith. Second, the pleadings must reflect ... a request for prejudgment interest. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 730 So.2d 574, 577 (Miss.1998) (citations omitted). USF & G argues that Francis/Draper failed to meet the necessary requirements listed above to qualify for prejudgment interest. We agree with USF & G. ¶ 37. The damages suffered by Francis/Draper were in dispute and unliquidated. Had they been liquidated, there would have been no need for a finding from the trial court on that matter. Bad faith on USF & G's part was never alleged nor proven. It was error for the trial court to award prejudgment interest. Because we reverse the award of prejudgment interest based upon Francis/Draper's failure to meet the required standard of proof outlined in Johnson, we need not address USF & G's M.R.C.P. 59 argument. ¶ 38. We also hold the chancellor was within the bounds of his discretionary authority in awarding post-judgment interest. Because the right to post-judgment interest is a statutory right according to Miss.Code Ann. § 75-17-7 (1991), this Court does not conclude that the motion for interest was a motion to amend or alter the judgment. Therefore, we need not address the timeliness of filing the motion in accordance with M.R.C.P. 59. Miss. Code Ann. § 75-17-7 (1991) has been amended to allow interest at a per annum rate set by the judge. We hold that the chancellor's awarding of interest at the rate of one percent above the prime rate of eight percent was within his discretion under the revised statute.