Opinion ID: 524689
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Civil Contempt Issue

Text: 13 As noted, the district courts held Mosher and Trinity in civil contempt for failing to honor the OSHA inspection warrants. On appeal, Mosher and Trinity challenge the orders as improper, asserting that the warrants, since not based on probable cause, should have been quashed. More specifically, they contend that the warrant applications in question did not contain sufficient information from which the magistrates could make a probable cause determination. In contrast, the Secretary contends that sufficient information was contained in the applications from which the magistrates could make a probable cause determination, that there was probable cause to support issuance of the warrants, and that Mosher and Trinity properly were held in contempt for their contumacious refusal to honor the warrants. We must review the district courts' civil contempt determinations for an abuse of discretion. Afro-American Patrolmen's League v. City of Atlanta, 817 F.2d 719, 723 (11th Cir.1987) (citing In re Newton, 718 F.2d 1015 (11th Cir.1983)). 14 To determine whether the district courts abused their discretion in holding Mosher and Trinity in civil contempt, we initially must consider whether the federal magistrates acted on probable cause in issuing the warrants authorizing the inspections. See Donovan v. Hackney, Inc., 769 F.2d 650, 652 (10th Cir.1985). If the magistrates did not so act, then the district courts should have quashed the warrants and dismissed the contempt petitions. See Hackney, 769 F.2d at 652; Marshall v. Horn Seed Co., Inc., 647 F.2d 96 (10th Cir.1981). 15 The starting point for any analysis of probable cause for OSHA administrative search warrants is Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978), 1 wherein the Supreme Court stated: 16 For purposes of an administrative search such as this, probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an ... inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].    A warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for an OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the Act derived from neutral sources such as, for example, dispersion of employees in various types of industries across a given area, and the desired frequency of searches in any of the lesser divisions of the area, would protect an employer's Fourth Amendment rights. 17 Id. at 320-21, 98 S.Ct. at 1824-25 (citations and footnotes omitted). To determine whether a warrant application meets the Barlow's administrative plan criterion (as contrasted with the specific evidence of a violation criterion), the magistrate must apply a two-part test: First, the magistrate must determine that the plan pursuant to which the warrant is to be issued is based on specific, neutral criteria and, second, the magistrate must determine that the warrant application clearly and adequately establishes that the particular company was selected for inspection pursuant to an application of the plan's neutral criteria. See Donovan v. Trinity Industries, Inc., 824 F.2d 634, 635 (8th Cir.1987) (citing Brock v. Gretna Machine & Ironworks, Inc., 769 F.2d 1110, 1112 (5th Cir.1985)). In reviewing a magistrate's probable cause determination, this Court generally may consider only that evidence which was presented to the magistrates, 2 which, in the case before this Court, consists of the warrant applications and supporting materials. Therefore, with the Barlow's test in mind, we must examine the applications in question.
18 The warrant applications involved here were virtually identical. Each contained a copy of the Secretary's administrative plan for programmed health and safety inspections (CPL 2.25C) and a sworn affidavit by an OSHA supervisor declaring that Mosher and Trinity were selected for safety and health inspections, respectively, pursuant to that plan. Additionally, the Trinity application was accompanied by a copy of CPL 2.25B (another administrative plan for programmed health and safety inspections), and a sworn affidavit by an OSHA supervisor declaring that Trinity had been selected for a safety inspection pursuant to that plan. 19 To enable a magistrate to determine whether the first prong of the Barlow's test has been met, the warrant application must contain adequate information from which the magistrate properly may assess the inspection plan's neutrality. Donovan v. Mosher Steel Co., 791 F.2d 1535, 1538 (11th Cir.1986). The adequacy determination is to be made by examining the inspection plan itself to ascertain that it contains the requisite neutral criteria, Brock v. Gretna Machine & Ironworks, Inc., 769 F.2d 1110, 1113 (5th Cir.1985), and as a whole is susceptible of neutral nonarbitrary application. Industrial Steel Products Co., Inc. v. OSHA, 845 F.2d 1330, 1333 (5th Cir.1988). The court is not authorized to inquire into the facts which presaged formulation of the plan. Gretna, 769 F.2d at 1113. 20 CPL 2.25B and CPL 2.25C, which are virtually identical, have received widespread acceptance by the courts. 3 Each establishes a three-step, worst-first ranking system for inspecting companies in high-hazard industries for health and/or safety violations. Under the plans, the national OSHA office initially provides the area OSHA office with a statewide Industry Ranking Report, which ranks companies according to lost workday injury (LWDI) rates (for safety inspections) or potential exposure to hazardous substances (PEHS) (for health inspections) using a four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code. The industry with the highest LWDI or PEHS rate is ranked first. The national office also provides the area office with a list of companies for each SIC Code on the statewide Industry Ranking Report that are located within the area office's jurisdiction. Companies with ten or fewer employees are not shown on the list, and companies having a better LWDI rate than the national average for all private sector industries are not included on the list for safety inspections. The companies are listed by SIC Code, county, and size. Within each SIC Code, counties are listed alphabetically, and within each county, companies are listed according to size, with the largest company being listed first. 21 After receiving the statewide Industry Ranking Report from the national office, the area office examines the list for errors and makes appropriate additions or deletions. For safety inspections, any company that was inspected within the previous fiscal year is deleted from the list; for health inspections, however, any company that underwent a substantially complete health inspection within the current year or previous three fiscal years and had no serious violations cited is removed from the list. After changes are made to the list, all remaining institutions are numbered consecutively. 22 Finally, the area OSHA office compiles the inspection register. In so doing, the office calculates the number of companies on the register by doubling the number of programmed inspections projected for the fiscal year. Then, the inspection register is divided into two cycles, with those companies listed on the first half of the list being grouped in one cycle, and those on the other half being grouped in the second cycle. Within an inspection cycle, companies are inspected in an order that makes most efficient use of OSHA's resources. With only limited exceptions, each inspection cycle must be completed before a new cycle is begun. 23 Mosher and Trinity strenuously assert that CPL 2.25B and CPL 2.25C are unfair and engender discriminatory and selective enforcement. In our opinion, however, CPL 2.25B and 2.25C are rational, neutral plans which satisfy the first prong of the Barlow's test. Clearly, each is calculated to result in an unbiased enforcement of the OSH Act and is intended and designed to protect the greatest number of employees who are exposed the greatest on-the-job health and safety risks. For safety inspections, for instance, only those companies having a safety record below the national average for all private sector industries are ever inspected. Furthermore, for both health and safety inspections, companies are ranked on a worst-first basis so that companies in the most hazardous industries are inspected first. Within the worst industries, companies are ranked alphabetically, according to county. Conceivably, a company which is included in the worst industry ranking could escape inspection during its designated cycle if it is located in a county the name of which begins with a letter near the end of the alphabet. That fact, however, hardly justifies characterizing the plans as discriminatory. 24 After the alphabetical ranking is made, companies are ranked in descending order based on the number of employees, a step which obviously furthers the objective of protecting the greatest number of employees. Moreover, the process of dividing the total number of companies to be inspected into two groups or cycles is patently indiscriminatory. Finally, inspecting firms within a cycle in an order which makes most efficient use of OSHA's resources does not alter the plans' neutrality. See, e.g., Industrial Steel Products Co., Inc. v. OSHA, 845 F.2d 1330, 1334 (5th Cir.1988). 25 Ultimately, the plans may result in relatively frequent inspections of a select portion of all industries (the high-hazard sector); however, it is entirely reasonable for OSHA to concentrate on the most dangerous workplaces having the most employees at risk. Industrial Steel Products Co. v. OSHA, 845 F.2d 1330, 1334 (5th Cir.1988); Donovan v. Trinity Industries, Inc., 824 F.2d 634, 636-37 (8th Cir.1987). In fact, that result is consistent with OSHA's objective of reducing safety and health risks in the workplace. 26
27 Having determined that the first prong of the Barlow's test was satisfied with respect to the OSHA plans in question, it is necessary to consider the second prong of the test: whether the warrant applications clearly and adequately establish that Mosher and Trinity were selected pursuant to the plans' specific, neutral criteria. Appellants contend that this prong of the Barlow's test was not satisfied because the applications in question did not contain adequate information from which the magistrates could determine how Mosher and Trinity were selected for inspection. More specifically, Mosher and Trinity contend that Barlow's requires the Secretary, in its warrant applications, to demonstrate affirmatively that the processes for selecting particular companies for inspection are reasonable, fair, and nondiscriminatory by appending encoded industry ranking reports and establishment lists to every warrant application. Without such documents, they maintain, the magistrate cannot determine how many businesses are subject to inspection, how frequently the selected businesses will be inspected, how many of Mosher and Trinity's direct competitors are exempted or excluded from OSHA review, and whether local additions to or deletions from the establishment lists were made arbitrarily. 28 Mosher and Trinity find support for their argument in a portion of Brock v. Gretna Machine & Ironworks, Inc., 769 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir.1985), which reads: 29 But the application contained neither the establishment list nor a description of the procedure followed in the selection of Gretna. 30