Opinion ID: 622781
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Claim Concerning Depleted Uranium Bullets

Text: A court inquiring into whether an FTCA claim falls within the discretionary function exception must first identify the conduct that allegedly caused the harm. Muniz-Rivera v. United States, 326 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir.2003); see also Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154, 162 (1st Cir. 1998) (en banc). This inquiry is a factual one. When facts relevant to a jurisdictional question are dispositive of both that jurisdictional question and portions of the merits, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion should be granted only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Torres-Negrón v. J & N Records, LLC, 504 F.3d 151, 163 (1st Cir.2007) (quoting Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. Aircraft Indus., Inc., 813 F.2d 1553, 1558 (9th Cir.1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The parties largely agree on the facts concerning the firing of 263 uranium bullets described in the Navy's April 1999 letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its accompanying report. They diverge, however, on whether additional incidents involving the firing of uranium bullets occurred on Vieques, and on whether the firing of uranium bullets caused the injuries alleged by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs argue that their allegations are sufficient to raise disputed material facts. To do so, they must identify specific facts derived from pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits. Magee v. United States, 121 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1997). As we have held, [i]t is a long standing principle of this Circuit that bald assertions and unsupportable conclusions are not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact. Rojas-Ithier v. Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo y Beneficiencia de P.R., 394 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir.2005). The plaintiffs fall short of this standard for several reasons. They rely on one unnamed study for the proposition that depleted uranium bullets caused their injuries. In the portion of their complaint alleging the harm, they made no reference to uranium or radioactive materials. Instead, they referred to concentrations of certain heavy metals. The complaint did reference uranium in a brief description of the unexploded ordnance on the island and in a brief account of the alleged incident involving the 263 rounds, but these references have not been supported. These allegations are also not on par with the plaintiffs' other allegations concerning the breadth of the Navy's discretion. The complaint only cursorily mentioned the incident involving depleted uranium bullets as evidence of a larger pattern of pollution; it focused on allegations of causation concerning pollutants that the plaintiffs do not address on appeal. Even if the plaintiffs had raised a material fact that the Navy's firing of depleted uranium bullets caused the injuries they allege (as they have not), they have failed to adequately allege that the challenged conduct was non-discretionary, assuming Gaubert would apply here. Under Gaubert, conduct does not involve an element of judgment or choice if a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (emphasis added) (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954) (internal quotation marks omitted). Without this specificity requirement, we have held, the discretionary function exception would be a dead letter. Shansky, 164 F.3d at 691. This court has repeatedly rejected arguments that conduct was non-discretionary under Gaubert when FTCA plaintiffs have identified only vague, permissive, or unidentified requirements for government conduct. See, e.g., Muniz-Rivera, 326 F.3d at 16; Shansky, 164 F.3d at 691-92; Irving, 162 F.3d at 163-66. It is not sufficient for a plaintiff to identify a statute, regulation, or policy that contains mandatory directives; directives must be directly applicable to the challenged conduct. Muniz-Rivera, 326 F.3d at 16; see also Irving, 162 F.3d at 163 (holding that because regulations did not mandate a particular modus operandi  for government employees or otherwise materially restrict [their] flexibility, they did not render the government's conduct non-discretionary). Nor may a plaintiff rely on an unsubstantiated recollection of an unidentified policy statement; testimony that purports to describe written policies and regulations is no substitute for the original text. Shansky, 164 F.3d at 692. The plaintiffs here contend that they have identified policies that specifically eliminate the Navy's discretion with respect to the firing of depleted uranium bullets. They have not, however, introduced the language of these permits or situated them within a broader regulatory scheme. The Navy letter and accompanying report plaintiffs rely on is surely more than an unsubstantiated recollection of an unidentified policy statement, see id., but the content of these purported requirements remains unclear. The letter only states that there has been a violation of the permit requirements; it does not identify the content of those requirements. The only concrete requirements referenced in the report pertain to internal Navy procedure concerning ammunition classifications, which is not connected in any way to either of the permits. As we held in Irving, moreover, the Gaubert analysis requires attention to how a particular agency announces policy. Irving, 162 F.3d at 165. An agency may promulgate regulations on some topics but not others, it may rely on internal guidelines instead of published regulations, it may announce policy through rulemaking and adjudication, and so on. See id. These practices inform whether an agency statement constitutes a mandatory policy statement for purposes of the discretionary function exception; in Irving, for example, we could well imagine that resort to informal indicia may be justified either when an agency's legislative rules define the conduct of some employees, but not others . . . or when legislative rules create ambiguity. Id. Here, the plaintiffs have failed to show that the purported permits, even if they limit the firing of depleted uranium bullets, are mandatory in the relevant sense. Our Abreu decision gives a further, related reason to reject the argument that this FTCA claim should go forward on the ground that the Navy's conduct was non-discretionary. In Abreu, we recognized that congressional intent may foreclose a claim for damages against the United States premised on violations of federal law. Abreu, 468 F.3d at 29-32. Because the plaintiffs have neither introduced the text of the permits upon which they rely nor identified the statutory context governing the alleged permits, they have not come close to establishing that Congress intended that damages be available or unavailable for violations of the two alleged permits. In light of the many cases cautioning against interference with discretionary military authority, moreover, this is a particularly significant omission. See id. at 28. The plaintiffs contend that they cannot produce the text of the two permits because the district court erroneously denied their motion for jurisdictional discovery. Even were the claim not waived, [8] we would reject it. A district court has discretion to defer pre-trial discovery pending resolution of a jurisdictional question when the record indicates that discovery is unnecessary (or, at least, is unlikely to be useful) in regard to establishing the essential jurisdictional facts. Dynamic Image Techs., Inc. v. United States, 221 F.3d 34, 38 (1st Cir.2000). The plaintiffs' discovery request sought a broad range of documents, many of which had no apparent relationship to jurisdictional questions. The request did not mention the permits at issue, and only referenced depleted uranium in a pair of sweeping requests. The district court was well within its discretion in refusing to allow a fishing expedition by granting the plaintiffs' inherently speculative discovery request. Sanchez, 707 F.Supp.2d at 231.