Opinion ID: 1944931
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Single Aggravator

Text: In numerous cases, this Court has found the sentence of death disproportionate in cases involving only one aggravator. While there will always be room for exceptions, we have followed a general rule that death is not proportionate in single aggravator cases absent unusual circumstances. See Jones v. State, 705 So.2d 1364, 1366 (Fla.1998); see also Almeida, 748 So.2d at 933-34 (holding that death sentence was disproportionate where, after striking aggravator, defendant was left with a single aggravator and substantial mitigation including a brutal childhood and vast mental health mitigation); Jorgenson v. State, 714 So.2d 423, 425, 428 (Fla.1998) (finding death disproportionate where the sole aggravator consisted of a prior conviction for second-degree murder many years before, and where the mitigation consisted of two statutory and three nonstatutory circumstances); Besaraba v. State, 656 So.2d 441, 446-47 (Fla.1995) (finding the death sentence disproportionate where defendant's sole aggravator was a prior violent felony and defendant had vast mitigation including two statutory and several nonstatutory factors); Nibert v. State, 574 So.2d 1059, 1061-63 (Fla.1990) (vacating death sentence as disproportionate where there was one aggravator and a large quantum of uncontroverted mitigation). Comparing these cases with the instant one reveals clearly that this case is not the most aggravated or least mitigated of crimes, for which the death penalty is reserved. This Court should vacate the death sentence in light of the single aggravating circumstance, mitigated in weight, as in Jorgenson, due to the circumstances of that prior crime, the passage of over twenty years since the prior crime, and the substantial mitigating circumstances that surround this crime and affect the defendant.