Opinion ID: 463220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tribal Rescission Prior to the Secretary's Decision.

Text: 11 IMDA requires the Secretary to approve or disapprove all submitted mineral agreements. 25 U.S.C. Sec. 2103(a). No agreement stands submitted to the Secretary awaiting his review if the Tribe has effectively rescinded the agreement in question. 12 It is Quantum's position that a valid agreement remains before the Secretary abiding its fate. Quantum argues that an effective, binding agreement was formed between itself and the Tribe on March 8, 1984. According to Quantum, the Tribe's August 8, 1984, rescission of the agreement violates the terms of IMDA and existing case law and contravenes general principles of contract law. 4 Contrary to Quantum's assertions, IMDA's provisions and legislative history reveal a congressional intent to accord tribes the right to disentangle themselves from the negotiations and agreements entered into prior to the Secretary's final decision. 13 The enforceability of IMDA agreements between tribes and mineral developers is entirely dependent on the approval of the Secretary. IMDA states that [a]ny Indian tribe, subject to the approval of the Secretary ... may enter into any joint venture for the development of mineral resources in which the tribe owns a beneifical or restricted interest. 25 U.S.C. Sec. 2102(a) (emphasis added). Typically, language requiring governmental approval of Indian agreements under other statutes has been interpreted to mean that the agreements simply are invalid absent the requisite approval. See County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 1250, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985) (Court found Indians possessed common-law right to sue on land sale agreement which was invalid for lack of proper governmental approval) and Wisconsin Winnebago Business Committee v. Koberstein, 762 F.2d 613, 615, 619 (7th Cir.1985) (contract with tribe void for failure to obtain the approval of the Department of the Interior). 14 That secretarial approval is similarly prerequisite under Sec. 2102(a) is evidenced by the statute's legislative history. Perhaps the clearest expression of congressional intent appears in the legislative history analyzing Sec. 2103(c). Under that section, the Secretary must prepare written findings forming the basis of his intent to approve or disapprove a minerals agreement and provide them to the tribe at least thirty days prior to formal approval or disapproval. In its report on the then-pending version of IMDA, the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs noted that the purpose for having the Secretary report to the tribe was to ensure that tribes are fully apprised of the potential risks, as well as potential benefits. Having the opportunity to review the Secretary's findings in advance of a decision, tribes will have time to reassess and perhaps reconsider before final approval or disapproval. S.Rep. No. 97-472, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982) (hereinafter Senate Report) (emphasis added). See also id. at 12. Quantum argues that the legislative history merely recognizes a right for the Indians to consult with the Secretary with no possibility to withdraw from the agreement. The plain language of the report, however, shows the converse to be true. The right to reconsider clearly indicates that the tribe has the right to rescind the agreement. 15 This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that congressional reports preceding the enactment of IMDA often classified tribal arrangements with developers merely as proposed agreements prior to secretarial approval. See H.R.Rep. No. 97-746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3465, 3467 (hereinafter House Report); and Senate Report at 10. See also Senate Report, at 9 (IMDA allows any Indian tribe to enter any joint venture agreement ... approved by the Secretary). 16 Quantum argues that the Tribe is unable to rescind without the Secretary's approval. Quantum relies heavily on our decision in Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Watt, 707 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017, 104 S.Ct. 548, 78 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983). The holding of Yavapai-Prescott is inapposite. The tribe as lessor in Yavapai-Prescott sought unilaterally to terminate a lease alleging that the agreement had been breached. Unlike the instant case, the original lease agreement had received the formal approval of the Secretary and was thus binding. 17 Of importance to this court in Yavapai-Prescott was the consideration that, were the tribe allowed to rescind approved leases without secretarial involvement, lessees would have no available remedy; the tribe is immune from suit and the Secretary's inability to prohibit the termination deprives the lessee of any administrative remedy. 707 F.2d at 1075. Quantum claims it is in the same position as the lessee referred to in Yavapai-Prescott because it would have no remedy if the Tribe is allowed to rescind prior to secretarial approval. As noted above, Congress intended to make tribal agreements with developers binding only after official secretarial approval. This being so, until the Secretary approves the agreement Quantum has no remediable claims. 18