Opinion ID: 796659
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Determination of BTA

Text: 45 Perhaps the most significant challenge to the Phase II Rule is the petitioners' contention that the EPA exceeded its authority in rejecting closed-cycle cooling, and selecting instead the suite of technologies, as the best technology available as required by section 316(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b), in large part because the Agency engaged in improper cost considerations. 46 This challenge requires us at the outset to determine to what extent, if any, the EPA can consider cost when selecting the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact under the statute. 47
48 Section 316(b) does not itself set forth or cross-reference another statutory provision enumerating the specific factors that the EPA must consider in determining BTA. The statute, however, does make specific reference to CWA sections 301 and 306, which we have taken previously as an invitation to look to those sections for guidance in discerning what factors Congress intended the EPA to consider in determining BTA. Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 186. We look to each of these statutes in turn. 49 Section 301(b)(1)(A) established the BPT standard that governed the effluent limitations applicable to existing sources through 1989. Congress provided that, in determining BPT, the Agency could consider the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such application. CWA § 304(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B). As noted above, however, the CWA created standards that were to become increasingly stringent over time, and in 1989, the more lenient BPT standard for existing sources was replaced by the BAT standard of section 301(b)(2)(A), in which Congress provided that the EPA could consider only the cost of achieving such effluent reduction. CWA § 304(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B). Notably omitted from the list of permissible factors to which the EPA could look in determining BAT was the cost of technology in relation to the benefits that technology could achieve. 50 This shift from BPT to BAT fundamentally altered the way in which the EPA could factor cost into its CWA determinations. Indeed, in analyzing BPT and BAT, the Supreme Court stated that in assessing BAT[,] total cost is no longer to be considered in comparison to effluent reduction benefits, as it had been in assessing BPT. EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 71, 101 S.Ct. 295, 66 L.Ed.2d 268 (1980). The Court indicated that the less stringent BPT standard had allowed for a limited cost-benefit analysis intended to `limit the application of technology only where the additional degree of effluent reduction is wholly out of proportion to the costs of achieving such marginal level of reduction.' Id. at 71 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 295 (quoting Remarks of Senator Muskie reprinted in Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress) Ser. No. 93-1, p. 170 (1973)). In determining BAT, by contrast, the EPA may consider cost as a factor to a limited degree, see id., but only as to whether the cost of a given technology could be reasonably borne by the industry and not the relation between that technology's cost and the benefits it achieves, Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 195. 51 Section 306, which governs the effluent limitations that apply to new sources, provides that a standard of performance established by the EPA must reflect the best available demonstrated control technology. CWA § 306(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1). In language identical to the text of § 304(b)(2)(B) governing BAT, Congress provided that in establishing standards of performance, the EPA shall take into consideration the cost of achieving such effluent reduction, CWA § 306(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B), but did not require the EPA to conduct cost-benefit analysis. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 570 (D.C.Cir.2002) ([S]ection 306 requires that, when setting the [new source performance standards], the Administrator must take costs into consideration, but does not require that she conduct a cost-benefit analysis.). Sections 301 and 306 of the CWA thus demonstrate that, after 1989, cost is a lesser, more ancillary consideration in determining what technology the EPA should require for compliance under those sections. 52 The shift from the BPT standard to the more stringent BAT one clearly signaled Congress's intent to move cost considerations under the CWA from a cost-benefit analysis to a cost-effectiveness one. We understand the difference between these two analyses to turn on the difference between means and ends. Cost-benefit analysis, like BPT, compares the costs and benefits of various ends, and chooses the end with the best net benefits. By contrast, cost-effectiveness considerations, like BAT, determine which means will be used to reach a specified level of benefit that has already been established. 10 Given the above and considering the parallel language of sections 304(b)(2)(B) and 306(b)(1)(B), the reasoning of National Crushed Stone strongly suggests that cost-benefit analysis is no longer permitted under those sections of the CWA.
53 As already noted, section 316(b) does not itself set forth the factors that the Agency can consider in determining the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact. The BTA standard of section 316(b), however, is linguistically similar to the BAT standard of section 301 and the standard that applies to new sources under section 306, and to the extent that cost-benefit analysis is precluded under those statutes, one might reasonably conclude that it is similarly not permitted under section 316(b). We conclude in any event that the language of section 316(b) itself plainly indicates that facilities must adopt the best technology available and that cost-benefit analysis cannot be justified in light of Congress's directive. 54 We stated in Riverkeeper I that the EPA can consider cost in establishing BTA, but only in a limited fashion and not as a primary consideration. Indeed, [w]ith respect to costs, `the Administrator must inquire into the initial and annual costs of applying the technology and make an affirmative determination that those costs can be reasonably borne by the industry.' Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 195 (quoting Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 262 (5th Cir.1989)) (emphasis added). While the statutory language suggests that the EPA may consider costs in determining BTA, in that a technology that cannot be reasonably borne by the industry is not available in any meaningful sense, cost-benefit analysis is not similarly supported by the language or purpose of the statute. Section 316(b) expressly requires a technology-driven result, cf. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 123 (D.C.Cir.1987) ([T]he most salient characteristic of [the CWA's] statutory scheme, articulated time and again by its architects and embedded in the statutory language, is that it is technology-forcing.), not one driven by cost considerations or an assessment of the desirability of reducing adverse environmental impacts in light of the cost of doing so. A selection of BTA based on cost-benefit considerations is thus impermissibly cost-driven, but a selection based in part on cost-effectiveness considerations, while taking cost into account, remains technology-driven. The statute therefore precludes cost-benefit analysis because Congress itself defined the basic relationship between costs and benefits. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509, 101 S.Ct. 2478, 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (1981). Moreover, this conclusion is further supported by the fact that Congress in establishing BTA did not expressly permit the Agency to consider the relationship of a technology's cost to the level of reduction of adverse environmental impact it produces. 11 When Congress has intended that an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on the face of the statute. Id. at 510, 101 S.Ct. 2478. 55 Given the above, the EPA may permissibly consider cost in two ways: (1) to determine what technology can be reasonably borne by the industry and (2) to engage in cost-effectiveness analysis in determining BTA. Thus, the EPA must first determine what is the most effective technology that may reasonably be borne by the industry. In making this initial determination, the most effective technology must be based not on the average Phase II facility but on the optimally best performing Phase II facilities, see, e.g., Kennecott v. United States EPA, 780 F.2d 445, 448 (4th Cir.1985) (In setting BAT, EPA uses not the average plant, but the optimally operating plant, the pilot plant which acts as a beacon to show what is possible.), although, of course, the EPA must still ascertain whether the industry as a whole can reasonably bear the cost of the adoption of the technology, bearing in mind the aspirational and technology-forcing character of the CWA. This technology constitutes the benchmark for performance. Once this determination has been made, the EPA may then consider other factors, including cost-effectiveness, to choose a less expensive technology that achieves essentially the same results as the benchmark. 12 For example, assuming the EPA has determined that power plants governed by the Phase II Rule can reasonably bear the price of technology that saves between 100-105 fish, the EPA, given a choice between a technology that costs $100 to save 99-101 fish and one that costs $150 to save 100-103 fish (with all other considerations, like energy production or efficiency, being equal), could appropriately choose the cheaper technology on cost-effectiveness grounds. Cost-benefit analysis, however, is not permitted under the statute because, as noted, Congress has already specified the relationship between cost and benefits in requiring that the technology designated by the EPA be the best available. 13 Cf. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., 452 U.S. at 509-10, 101 S.Ct. 2478. The Agency accordingly could not make the policy decision, in the face of Congress's determination that facilities use the best technology available, that an economically feasible level of reduction of impingement mortality and entrainment is not desirable in light of its cost. Indeed, in the example above, the EPA could not choose the cheaper technology on cost considerations under section 316(b) if the EPA had first determined that the power plants could reasonably bear the cost of technology that could save at least 102 fish. 56 We nevertheless acknowledge that the comparable technologies considered by the Agency need not be identically effective for the Agency to engage in cost-effectiveness analysis. Were that the case, all that would be required would be the simple determination of which among competing technologies that achieved the same degree of reduction of adverse environmental impacts is the cheapest. Instead, the specified level of benefit is more properly understood as a narrowly bounded range, within which the EPA may permissibly choose between two (or more) technologies that produce essentially the same benefits but have markedly different costs. With these considerations in mind, we turn to the Rule as promulgated. 57
58 As noted previously, unlike the Phase I Rule, the Phase II Rule does not require facilities to reduce intake flow to a level commensurate with the intake of closed-cycle systems. Instead, the Rule requires facilities to meet the national performance standards associated with the suite of technologies the EPA identified as BTA. Petitioners' challenge here has two components. First, the state petitioners contend that closed-cycle cooling is the best technology available and that the EPA has exceeded its authority by promulgating a rule that does not require closed-cycle cooling, or the use of technologies producing a commensurate reduction of water usage for existing facilities in the same manner as the Phase I Rule required for new facilities. 14 Second, the environmental petitioners argue that the EPA improperly rejected closed-cycle cooling as BTA for the largest facilities on the most sensitive waterbodies at the direction of OMB because it sought to maximize net economic benefits rather than to minimize adverse environmental impact. They further argue that the BTA standard of section 316(b) requires a commitment of the maximum resources economically feasible to the goal of eliminating adverse environmental impacts and that the statute does not permit the EPA to select BTA on the basis of cost-benefit analysis. 59 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the statute's best technology available standard permits cost-effectiveness considerations to influence the choice among technologies whose performance does not essentially differ from the performance of the best-performing technology whose cost the industry reasonably can bear, but that the statute does not permit the EPA to choose BTA on the basis of cost-benefit analysis. As we explain below, however, the record is unclear as to the basis for the EPA's selection of the suite of technologies as BTA, and we therefore remand for clarification of the basis for the Agency's decision and potentially for a reassessment of BTA. 60 The EPA stated in the Rule's preamble that the BTA standard should be interpreted as best technology available commercially at an economically practicable cost, and explained that an important component of economic practicability is the relationship of costs to environmental benefits. 69 Fed.Reg. at 41,604. The EPA further explained that this inquiry required that there should be some reasonable relationship between the cost of cooling water intake structure control technology and the environmental benefits associated with its use. Id. (emphasis added). 61 The EPA took this economically practicable concept directly from the text of a floor speech of a single representative — the only specific reference to section 316(b) in the congressional debates. See Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 186 n. 12. We noted in Riverkeeper I that the paucity of legislative history counsels against imputing much specific intent to Congress beyond the section's words themselves. Id. Moreover, we find the EPA's interpretation of section 316(b) problematic because its construction significantly resembles the less stringent, and now obsolete, BPT standard of section 301(b)(1)(A). As noted earlier, in setting forth the factors for the EPA to consider in establishing BPT under section 301(b)(1)(A) and the more stringent BAT under section 301(b)(2)(A), Congress made only one distinction: while the Agency could consider the relationship between cost and benefits in establishing BPT, CWA § 304(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B), it could consider cost insofar as it can be reasonably borne by the industry, but not the relationship between cost and benefits, in establishing BAT, CWA § 304(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B). Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 195. 62 This difference in how the EPA can consider cost under section 304(b) in establishing BPT and BAT is directly mirrored by the most significant textual distinction between sections 301(b)(1)(A) and 301(b)(2)(A) — the requirement that a technology be practicable under only the less stringent BPT standard. Compare CWA § 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (BPT is the best practicable control technology) with CWA § 301(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. 1311(b)(2)(A) (BAT is the best available technology). The use of the word practicable, therefore, when coupled with the permissible cost considerations under section 304, signals that Congress intended the EPA to strike a balance between cost and benefits in determining BPT. But the word practicable is missing from the more stringent BAT standard, under which Congress prohibited the EPA from considering the relation of cost to benefits. This omission is thus significant. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) ([W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original)). Because Congress also omitted practicable from section 316(b), we are troubled by the Agency's interpretation of the statute to require practicability analysis here and its implicit corollary that the Agency can undertake a cost-benefit analysis in establishing BTA under section 316(b). 63 Our concern with the EPA's determination with respect to section 316(b) is further deepened by the Agency's rejection of closed-cycle cooling and selection of a suite of technologies as the basis for BTA for existing facilities because the suite of technologies were the most cost effective option. 69 Fed.Reg. at 41,667. The EPA explained this decision on several grounds. It first noted that it was rejecting closed-cycle cooling as BTA because of (1) its generally high costs (due to conversions), (2) the fact that other technologies approach the performance of this option, and (3) concerns for energy impacts due to retrofitting existing facilities, and other considerations. Id. at 41,605. The EPA emphasized that it selected BTA based on its determination that a national requirement to retrofit existing systems is not the most cost-effective approach and at many existing facilities, retrofits may be impossible or not economically practicable. Id. It further explained that its rejection of closed-cycle cooling as BTA was based on total social costs and lack of cost-effectiveness, as well as concerns regarding potential energy impacts. Id. at 41,606. 64 Given the EPA's discussion, noted above, of economically practicability, it is unclear whether the Agency improperly weighed the benefits and the costs of requiring closed-cycle cooling. Indeed, a comparison between the cost of closed-cycle cooling and the monetized benefits of this technology appears to have played some role in the EPA's rejection of this option as BTA. In the preamble to the proposed Rule, for instance, the EPA examined whether to require closed-cycle cooling on specific large bodies of waters and stated that the incremental costs of [this closed-cycle cooling] option relative to the proposed option ($413 million) significantly outweigh the incremental benefits ($146 million). 67 Fed.Reg. at 17,158. Other record evidence on the EPA's rejection of closed-cycle cooling as BTA is a terse EPA memorandum indicating that a requirement commensurate with closed-cycle cooling for facilities on sensitive water-bodies would cost three times as much as the option ultimately adopted by the EPA and reduce entrainment, at most, by 1.33 times that option. 65 Given the above indications that the EPA engaged in cost-benefit analysis, we remand for the EPA to explain its conclusions. At the outset, it is difficult to discern from the record how the EPA determined that the cost of closed-cycle cooling could not be reasonably borne by the industry. 15 Additionally, the EPA did not explain its statement that the suite of technologies approach[es] the performance of closed-cycle cooling. We see no adequate comparison in the Rule's proposal, the final Rule or its preamble, or the EPA's submissions to this Court of the effectiveness of closed-cycle cooling and the group of technologies whose effectiveness provided the basis for the Phase II Rule's performance standards. 16 In a technical area of this sort, it is difficult for judges or interested parties to determine the propriety of the Agency's action without a justification for the action supported by clearly identified substantial evidence whose import is explained. The record evidence alone here, which consists in large part of a voluminous database compilation of studies that assess the efficacy of various technologies at different locations, is oblique, complicated, and insufficient to permit us to determine what the EPA relied upon in reaching its conclusion. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, [o]ur recognition of Congress' need to vest administrative agencies with ample power to assist in the difficult task of governing a vast and complex industrial Nation carries with it the correlative responsibility of the agency to explain the rationale and factual basis for its decision, even though we show respect for the agency's judgment in both. Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627, 106 S.Ct. 2101, 90 L.Ed.2d 584 (1986) (plurality opinion). 66 The EPA was required to explain its judgment and the basis for it. Because the EPA purported to base its decision in large part on cost-effectiveness considerations, it was required to identify and explain any evidence indicating a minimal performance difference between comparable technologies, but it did not do so here. It stated only that the performance of the technologies it identified as BTA approach the performance of closed-cycle cooling. 17 67 We therefore find it impossible to judge whether the performance of these technologies is essentially the same as the performance of closed-cycle cooling, or whether they simply are cheaper per percentage point of reduction in entrainment and impingement mortality. That is, on the record before us, it is impossible to tell whether the EPA based its decision on permissible cost-effectiveness analysis or exceeded its authority by relying impermissibly upon a cost-benefit analysis. To the extent that the record does not indicate the EPA's basis, however, its statement that the relationship of costs to environmental benefits is an important component of economic practicability, 69 Fed.Reg. at 41,604, indicates that cost-benefit analysis, under the cover of considerations of practicability, was central to the Agency's decisionmaking. 68 In short, the EPA's failure to explain its decision frustrates effective judicial review. If the EPA construed the statute to permit cost-benefit analysis, its action was not based on a permissible construction of the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. It may also be that the EPA misunderstood or misapplied cost-effectiveness analysis. If so, its decision was arbitrary and capricious because the Agency relied on factors Congress has not intended it to consider. See Waterkeeper Alliance, 399 F.3d at 498. Finally, the EPA may have simply failed either to perform the required analysis or to explain adequately a decision that was within its authority to make. We cannot opine on this subject, because we must consider only those justifications that the EPA offered at the time of the rulemaking. See SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 87-88, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943). Moreover, while the EPA could rely on factors other than impingement and entrainment in establishing BTA, such as negative environmental impacts or concerns about energy production and efficiency, see Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 195-96, we are unable to determine, on the record before us, whether the EPA gave paramount consideration to an improper factor in determining BTA. We therefore remand for clarification of the basis for the Agency's action and possibly for a new determination of BTA. 18 69
70 The Phase II Rule establishes performance standards expressed as an 80 to 95 percent reduction in impingement mortality and a 60 to 90 percent reduction in entrainment, which existing power plants must achieve, subject to certain exceptions, in order to be considered in compliance with the Rule. 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(b)(1), (2). The environmental petitioners challenge the Rule's wide and indeterminate ranges as failing to constitute precise single-level limitations based on the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact and argue that these ranges are inconsistent with Congress's intent that there be a national standard under section 316(b). We agree in part and, because the EPA in reconsidering its selection of BTA on remand may alter the suite of technologies it originally selected, thereby causing a coordinate alteration in the performance ranges, we provide some guidance to the EPA insofar as the petitioners' challenge touches on the limits of the Agency's authority. Although the EPA may, in the circumstances to be discussed, set performance standards as ranges, it must require facilities to minimize the adverse environmental impacts attributable to their cooling water intake structures to the best degree they can. 71 The petitioners note that the EPA has found that certain screens and filter systems can reduce impingement mortality by up to 99 percent and that similar technologies can produce 80 to 90 percent reduction in entrainment. 69 Fed.Reg. at 41,599. They contend that the CWA therefore requires the EPA to set BTA standards reflecting these best performers, see Texas Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 161 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1998) (Congress intended these [BAT] limitations to be based on the performance of the single best-performing plant in an industrial field. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), particularly given the EPA's acknowledgment that [t]he higher end of the range is a percent reduction that available data show many facilities can and have achieved with the available technologies upon which the performance standards are based. 69 Fed.Reg. at 41,600. The petitioners emphasize that the Rule's ranges impermissibly fail to require facilities even to attempt to achieve performance equal to the upper bound of the prescribed ranges. 72 According to the EPA, section 316(b) does not require a single-numeric standard applicable to all Phase II existing facilities, and expressing the performance standards as ranges is necessary to account for the variables involved in reducing impingement mortality and entrainment under local conditions at particular facilities. The EPA contends that [b]ecause the Phase II requirements are applied in a variety of settings and to existing facilities of different types and sizes, no single technology is most effective for all facilities subject to the Rule. The Agency argues that the technologies do not provide a fixed level of performance at all facilities and that their performance is affected by the nature of the waterbody, facility intake requirements, climatic conditions, and the waterbody's biology. The EPA argues also that the permit process requires facilities to reduce impingement mortality and entrainment commensurate with the efficacy of the installed technologies, which it claims ensures that the installed technologies will be maintained to ensure their utmost efficacy. 19 The difficulty with the EPA's arguments is that the Rule does not require facilities to choose technologies that produce the greatest reduction possible. 73 Our decision in Riverkeeper I sheds some light on the parties' arguments. In that case, we discussed the differences between the two tracks in the Phase I Rule: Track I set forth precise velocity and capacity requirements while Track II permitted compliance via technologies that would achieve at least 90 percent of the reduction in impingement mortality and entrainment that compliance with Track I would yield. See 358 F.3d at 182-83. The petitioners in that case challenged the Track II provision on the ground that it deviated from the statutory requirement that the EPA establish a single level of performance applicable to all facilities. Id. at 187. The EPA argued that Tracks I and II reflected the same standard and that 10 percent is an acceptable margin of error given that measurements of reduction of impingement mortality and entrainment are necessarily inexact and depend upon natural fluctuations in animal populations and sampling errors. Id. at 188. In assessing the parties' arguments, we stated that the EPA, consistent with Congress's intention that there be a national standard governing the discharge of pollutants, must promulgate precise effluent limitations under sections 301 and 306.... Id. (emphasis added). We went on to note, however, that while pollutant concentration and the velocity and volume of water withdrawn can be measured accurately, impingement mortality and entrainment cannot always be measured directly and with mathematical precision. Id. at 189. We concluded that the EPA acted reasonably in specifying how much ambiguity it is willing to tolerate in measuring compliance and what it considers a reasonable margin of error in comparing the performance of different technologies. Id. In short, we acknowledged that the Track II performance requirements, unlike the Track I requirements, could not be measured precisely and that it was therefore reasonable to consider a margin of error in comparing performance under the two standards. 74 This case is not entirely similar to Riverkeeper I because of the rationales that animate the EPA's creation of the performance ranges in Phases I and II. The Phase II Rule generally require facilities to reduce impingement mortality and entrainment by the specified percent ranges from the calculation baseline. 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(b). These ranges, as explained by the EPA, are based on the reductions achievable by using various technologies. See 69 Fed.Reg. at 41,599. The EPA explained that it expressed the performance standards in the form of ranges rather than a single performance benchmark because of the uncertainty inherent in predicting the efficacy of any one of these technologies. Id. at 41,600. It stated further that the lower end of the range is the percent reduction it expects all facilities could eventually achieve if they were to implement and optimize available design and construction technologies and operational measures on which the performance standards are based and that the higher end of the range is a percent reduction that available data show many facilities can and have achieved with the available technologies upon which the performance standards are based. Id. Unlike Riverkeeper I, therefore, a margin of error from a relatively precise benchmark that is tolerable given measurement difficulties is not at issue here. Instead, the performance standards reflect the range of performance associated with various technologies identified as BTA. That performance, in turn, depends in part on local conditions and natural fluctuations. Id. 75 Record evidence supports the EPA's conclusion that the percent reduction of impingement mortality and entrainment is not completely within the control of a facility and therefore may not be precisely achieved by a facility. See TDD for the Final § 316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule 4-3. Reducing these adverse environmental impacts is not as easily measured and controlled as are the discharge of pollutants and the capacity and flow rate of water intake. 20 We therefore acknowledge that in many cases it may be difficult, as a practical matter, for the EPA or other permitting authority to predict which plants will be able to achieve the upper, as opposed to the lower, end of the ranges. This uncertainty, however, does not justify a rule that permits even those facilities that could achieve the upper end of a range to be deemed in compliance if they reach only the lower end, particularly when the EPA has acknowledged that many facilities can and have achieved reductions at the high end of the range. 69 Fed.Reg. at 41,600. Congress's use of the superlative best in the statute cannot be read to mean that a facility that achieves the lower end of the ranges, but could do better, has complied with the law. The statutory directive requiring facilities to adopt the best technology cannot be construed to permit a facility to take measures that produce second-best results, see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, especially given the technology-forcing imperative behind the Act, Natural Res. Def. Council, 822 F.2d at 123. Insofar as the EPA establishes performance standards instead of requiring facilities to adopt particular technologies, it must require facilities to choose the technology that permits them to achieve as much reduction of adverse environmental impacts as is technologically possible. 21 For this reason, the EPA on remand should address these concerns if in its BTA determination, it retains performance ranges.