Opinion ID: 2548578
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court is Proceeding Within its Jurisdiction.

Text: In the first type of writ case referred to above, the jurisdiction at issue is the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., its authority to address the matter or the question before it. Goldstein v. Feeley, 299 S.W.3d 549 (Ky.2009). The Cabinet and Frasure Creek contend that the federal courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over citizen suits under the Clean Water Act and thus by allowing the Citizen Plaintiffs to intervene in this state  court proceeding, the trial court is purporting to exercise a subject matter jurisdiction that federal law preempts. As the parties note, the federal Circuit Courts of Appeal which have addressed the question of federal preemption  usually in the context of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the citizen suit provisions of which are similar to those of the Clean Water Act  have split, the First, Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits having held or indicated that federal jurisdiction over citizen suits is exclusive, the Sixth Circuit having held that it is not. Baykeeper v. NL Industries, Inc., 660 F.3d 686 (3rd Cir.2011); Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc., 644 F.3d 483 (7th Cir.2011); Chico Service Station, Inc. v. Sol Puerto Rico Limited, 633 F.3d 20 (1st Cir.2011); Davis v. Sun Oil Company, 148 F.3d 606 (6th Cir.1998); Blue Legs v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989). At this point, however, we need not weigh in on this question, for as noted the trial court's order limited the Citizen Plaintiffs' intervention, initially at least, to commenting upon and raising objections to the proposed consent judgment. The trial court has held in abeyance the Citizen Plaintiffs' own claims under the Clean Water Act. Even if the state court's jurisdiction to hear and decide those independent claims has been preempted by federal law, we are persuaded that the limited intervention the trial court has thus far allowed for purposes of citizen comment and objection is not so preempted. As we noted above, 33 U.S.C. 1365(b)(1)(B) bars a citizen suit if within the sixty-day notice period the affected State commences a compliance action, in a court of the United States, or a State, and diligently prosecutes it. The statute continues by providing that in any such action in a court of the United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of right. Id. Congress thus clearly distinguished between a citizen's suit on his or her own behalf, a suit that is barred by a diligently prosecuted governmental enforcement action, and the same citizen's intervention in the federal court enforcement action, where he or she is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If the enforcement action is in state court, the EPA's regulations similarly require that [a]ny State administering a program shall provide for public participation in the State enforcement process by providing either: (1) Authority which allows intervention as of right in any civil or administrative action to obtain [specified remedies] by any citizen having an interest which is or may be adversely affected; or (2) Assurance that the State agency or enforcement authority will: (i) Investigate and provide written responses to all citizen complaints submitted pursuant to [specified] procedures; (ii) Not oppose intervention by any citizen when permissive intervention may be authorized by statute, rule, or regulation; and (iii) Publish notice of and provide at least 30 days for public comment on any proposed settlement of a State enforcement action. 40 C.F.R. 123.27(d). Clearly the regulations contemplate citizen intervention in an agency's state-court enforcement action, such as this one, and to that extent these regulations would be meaningless if such intervention were preempted. It is conceivable, of course, that the EPA has misconstrued Congress's jurisdictional intent, but considerable weight is to be accorded the EPA's construction, Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), and nothing the Cabinet and Frasure Creek have argued suggests an EPA misreading of the Act. This is particularly so in light of Congress's express declaration that public participation in efforts to control water pollution is a priority of the Clean Water Act: Public participation in the development, revision, and enforcement of any regulation, standard, effluent limitation, plan, or program established by the Administrator or any State under this chapter shall be provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the Administrator and the States. The Administrator, in cooperation with the States, shall develop and publish regulations specifying minimum guidelines for public participation in such processes. 33 U.S.C. 1251(e). Federal courts, too, far from deeming citizen intervention in state-court enforcement proceedings a trespass upon an exclusively federal jurisdiction, have indicated instead that an interested citizen's not being permitted to so intervene can be a factor casting doubt upon the diligence of the state's enforcement efforts. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 859 F.2d 156 (D.C.Cir. 1988); Frilling v. Village of Anna, 924 F.Supp. 821 (S.D.Ohio 1996); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 890 F.Supp. 470 (D.S.C.1995). The named individual plaintiffs in the underlying case are Kentucky residents who allege they regularly use and enjoy the Kentucky River and its tributaries. Members of Appalachian Voices, Inc., a non-profit environmental organization, allegedly include individuals who reside near or use water downstream from Frasure Creek's discharge into the Kentucky and Big Sandy Rivers and their tributaries in Pike, Perry, Floyd and Knott Counties. Waterkeeper Alliance Inc. claims members who reside near or use waters directly downstream from the discharges into the Kentucky, Big Sandy and Licking Rivers. The other non-profit organizations, Kentucky Riverkeeper, Inc., and Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, also claim as members numerous Eastern Kentucky residents who reside near and use the waters at issue. Judge Shepherd found that the Citizen Plaintiffs not only had an interest in the subject matter of the enforcement action but that they had brought the violations to the Cabinet's attention through their own efforts. [1] We conclude, therefore, that to the extent the Franklin Circuit Court has permitted the Citizen Plaintiffs to intervene in the Cabinet's enforcement action so as to give them an opportunity to comment upon and to criticize the proposed consent judgment, it is not acting outside its jurisdiction. Because the trial court has thus far held the Citizen Plaintiffs' own claims in abeyance, we need not at this time address whether it likewise has jurisdiction to entertain those claims under the Clean Water Act. For the same reason, we decline to address at this point the Cabinet's contention that allowing the Citizen Plaintiffs' own claims would contravene the General Assembly's purported intent to disallow them.