Opinion ID: 1515484
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Propriety of Remedial Racial Quotas

Text: Though the majority apparently acknowledges the breadth of the remedial provisions of the Law Against Discrimination, ante at 16-18, it nonetheless rules out administratively or judicially imposed racial quotas as a permissible means of granting relief for past discrimination. The Court's criticisms of employment quotas are neither novel nor unusual. Indeed, its adamant opposition to this remedy is echoed by some critics who are disillusioned with current efforts by courts and administrative agencies to enforce the civil rights laws. See, e.g., N. Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination (1975). The majority begins from the premise that race can never be a criterion for preferential treatment because it is an irrelevant factor which bears no relation to merit or qualifications. It argues that racial guidelines exalt group, rather than individual interests, and divide society on the basis of race and ethnic background, thereby undoing the beneficial effects of the anti-discrimination laws. More importantly, the majority interprets the State Constitution to bar all such preferential plans, whether or not aimed at instances of past injustice. This Court is virtually alone in holding that an employment quota is never permissible as a remedial device aimed at wiping out the effects of discrimination. I believe that the majority has underestimated the necessity for such measures in many cases, and exaggerated their negative effects.
First, the majority's characterization of remedial quotas creates the spectre of a remedial bludgeon. Thus, the majority envisions that the remedial obligations imposed in this case will continue in perpetuity and will invite subsequent imposition of quotas to assist other groups. Indeed, the majority seriously suggests that a caste system will be the ultimate result of the remedial quotas which we consider today, see ante at 24. This characterization not only miscontrues the underlying purpose of preferential quotas, but overlooks their flexibility as a remedial device. Quotas which are limited in scope and duration and which are properly designed to a particular area and a limited end will not encroach upon principles of fairness and reasonableness. One commentator has used the term tailored decree to characterize the need for quotas which are limited to eradicating the effects of past discrimination: The tailored decree avoids a conflict with the stricture against preferential treatment based on race if it observes two limitations. The first is that, even though the class of beneficiaries may be predominantly, if not exclusively, blacks, the benefits are not being conferred because of their race but because they are victims of discrimination. Race is used to identify beneficiaries. but it is being used symptomatically, along with some other criteria, to identify the victims.... The second limitation is that the benefit conferred is limited. It will result only in the applicant being treated equally. So long as the credit does no more than neutralize the discriminatory effect of the criterion, the claim can be made that, notwithstanding the outward appearance of unequal treatment (the additional credit), the beneficiaries are merely treated equally and thus the remedy is consistent with the theory of a fair employment law. [Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 235, 307-308 (1971); emphasis supplied.] Accordingly, the federal courts have consistently approved quotas which were designed to remedy specific instances of past discrimination. Nine of the ten federal circuits have endorsed preferential hiring or promotion plans based upon decrees which were carefully molded to fit the exigencies of each situation. See Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F. 2d 257, 273-274 (4 Cir.1976) and cases cited. [7] For example, in N.A.A.C.P. v. Allen, 493 F. 2d 614 (5 Cir.1974), the Fifth Circuit imposed a quota on future hiring by the Alabama State Police, stressing both the limited purpose served by the quota and its limited duration: In conclusion we would note that this extraordinary remedy is not without its limitations. The use of quota relief in employment discrimination cases is bottomed on the chancellor's duty to eradicate the continuing effects of past unlawful practices. By mandating the hiring of those who have been the object of discrimination, quota relief promptly operates to change the outward and visible signs of yesterday's racial distinctions and thus, to provide an impetus to the process of dismantling the barriers, psychological or otherwise, erected by past practices. It is a temporary remedy that seeks to spend itself as promptly as it can by creating a climate in which objective, neutral employment criteria can successfully operate to select public employees solely on the basis of job-related merit. [493 F. 2d at 621; emphasis supplied.] On the other hand, courts have been reluctant to sustain quotas where they have been used for purposes other than to overcome the effects of past discrimination. See, e.g., Smith v. East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio E.D. 1973), where the court declined to impose a quota on the grounds that there had been positive efforts to erase the effects of past discrimination. 363 F. Supp. at 1152. [8] Because remedial quotas are primarily intended to mollify the vestiges of specific instances of past discrimination, they will vary in content depending on the circumstances of each case. Among the remedial plans which have received judicial approval are orders which require an employer to hire a fixed number of minority employees, Carter v. Gallagher, supra (municipal fire department ordered to hire minority persons pursuant to a set ratio until 20 qualified minority persons had been employed), United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 478 (W.D.N.C. 1970) (preliminary injunction granted to require the employment of six blacks as over-the-road drivers). Alternatively, courts have ordered employers to hire minority employees until they comprise a fixed percentage of the relevant work force, United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F. 2d 634 (6 Cir.1973) (labor union ordered to acquire an 11% black membership), N.A.A.C.P. v. Allen, supra (Alabama State Police ordered to hire blacks on a one-to-one basis until 25% of the supporting personnel were black), Buckner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 339 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ala. M.D. 1972) (set percentages established for admission of minority persons to pre-apprentice and apprentice training programs). Finally, courts have utilized orders which have required hiring of minority employees according to a fixed ratio, Vogler v. McCarty, 451 F. 2d 1236 (5 Cir.1971) (labor union ordered to make referrals to whites and blacks on a one-to-one ratio), or decrees which require employers to hire minority employees on some other limited basis, Castro v. Beecher, 459 F. 2d 725 (1 Cir.1972) (Boston police department ordered to make subsequent appointments to department from a priority pool of eligible minority applicants until priority pool had been exhausted), Western Addition Community Org. v. Alioto, 369 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd 514 F. 2d 542 (9 Cir.1975) (San Francisco fire department required to appoint whites and blacks according to a one-to-one ratio until a designated list of qualified minority applicants had been exhausted). The majority's emphasis on instances in which the federal courts have either limited or rejected quotas ignores the realization by those courts that this remedy is often necessary and proper in other cases. In fact, it relies on decisions which are wholly at odds with its blanket rejection of quotas. For instance, in Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Service Commission, 482 F. 2d 1333 (2 Cir.1973), cert. den. 421 U.S. 991, 95 S.Ct. 1997, 44 L.Ed. 2d 481 (1975), the Second Circuit expressly approved hiring quotas favoring applicants on the basis of race even though there was no showing of intentional discrimination. The opinion criticized the use of an archaic test which was not job validated or job related, and the absence of any significant recruiting efforts aimed at minority persons. Id. at 1340. Although the court did strike down a promotion quota, it noted the lower court's failure to make a finding that the promotion examination was not job related. Id. at 1341. [9] Likewise, in Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., supra , the Fourth Circuit noted the unanimity of opinion among other circuits, authorizing preferential relief as a remedy for unlawful discrimination, and itself upheld the propriety of such relief when there is a compelling need for it. Id. at 274. It approved, in principle, the use of a promotion quota for supervisors, although it found that the employer's rate of appointments to supervisory positions was high enough to remove any compelling need for the quota in that particular case. Id. at 274-275. [10] The quotas adopted by the Division on Civil Rights  as modified below  are well within the standards articulated by the federal courts. First, the Division imposed numerical goals only where gross under-representation of minorities on the work force would have ensured that the effects of past hiring practices would have continued indefinitely without drastic action. Thus, it refused to require hiring goals for the police department, even though black representation in the force (14.7%) is substantially less than the proportion of blacks in the community (27.2%). Similarly, it only revised the testing and selection procedures for hiring in the fire department, because one of the three black employees was in a promotional position. Second, the Division limited the quota relief to a stated period of time, and set reasonably attainable numerical goals which can be met by Montclair without excessive disruption. Both features are consistent with the model of a tailored decree. In one respect, however, the Director's order is unsatisfactory and should be revised. Paragraph 6 orders the Montclair Fire Department to hire at least 15 qualified minority applicants on a one-to-one basis with white applicants. They are to be taken initially from the pool of applicants who took the 1971 examination and are deemed qualified under the newly adopted nondiscriminatory procedures. After the pool is exhausted, hiring is to continue at the prescribed rate until the requisite number of applicants is appointed. For reasons I discuss below, see Part III, I would limit the quota relief to the class of persons who were directly subjected to the discriminatory hiring procedures, and release Montclair from the one-to-one requirement after all members of the pool have been hired or have declined appointments. Finally, contrary to the majority's suggestion, the imposition of such relief will not entail imposition of similar quotas to protect the interests of other racial or ethnic groups. Judicial validation of quotas in certain cases does not mean that all racial or ethnic groups are entitled to a fixed percentage or established representation on each governmental agency or with each private concern subject to the Law Against Discrimination. Such relief can only be imposed if there has been an adjudication of past discrimination whose effects continue to be felt. Even though there may have been minority applicants in the past, these complainants must also prove that the employment practices discriminated against them in purpose or effect. Minority groups which may have just moved into the area will be unable to prove that proportional under-representation is related to past discrimination. Accordingly, I would find the quotas imposed by the Division on Civil Rights, being limited in scope and operation, to be valid exercises of the Division's remedial powers.
Next, the majority argues that remedial quotas will promote and even require the hiring of unqualified municipal employees. This argument appears to be based on the conclusion that failure to pass an examination  regardless of which examination is administered, what skills it tests, and whether it is professionally validated  indicates a lack of education which in turn shows that one is unsuited for the job. As the majority states: The Director's orders granted priorities to black applicants and employees vis-a-vis others (assuming the minimum standard is met) without regard to the particular training, experience, and education of each applicant.... Equality of opportunity in employment will become more realistic when co-equality of opportunity in education exists. Lowering the standards for the Montclair Police and Fire Departments is not the solution. [ Ante at 21] Although this argument may appear plausible at first, careful examination rebuts any notion that these guidelines require a harmful lowering of standards by Montclair. The order issued by the Division on Civil Rights fully recognizes the critical need for qualified applicants and therefore limits the pool of eligibles to minority candidates who have demonstrated that they were so qualified: 6. Future appointments to the Montclair Fire Department shall be conducted on the following basis: One (1) qualified minority applicant shall be selected for every one (1) qualified white applicant until the total number of minority officers on the Fire Department equals at least fifteen (15) persons....
11. The black applicants who are deemed qualified by this re-evaluation shall be so notified in writing. Future promotions in the Montclair Police Department shall be made on the following basis. One qualified black applicant shall be promoted for every one qualified white applicant until 50% of those minority applicants deemed qualified by the re-evaluation have been promoted. [Emphasis supplied] Thus, to the extent that the majority is concerned with a lowering of standards in the fire and police departments of Montclair to accommodate less-than-qualified or incompetent candidates, it should be satisfied by the requirement that the eligible applicants pass the revised examination adopted by the Montclair Department of Public Safety. More troubling is the balance that the majority strikes between the concept of merit, as measured by standardized, written tests, and the goal of fair employment for minority group members. As illustrated by the case at bar, the real question to be considered is not whether public agencies should insist upon obtaining qualified employees. The necessity for this is obvious. Rather, the important questions which must be addressed are (1) what are the relevant job qualifications and how should they be measured and (2) can a supposedly more qualified applicant be by-passed to hire an applicant for purposes of redressing the effects of past discrimination. As to the first inquiry, the majority fails to address the question squarely, but it apparently is willing to accept criteria which place a premium on educational background. The record contains no evidence concerning relevant job qualifications because the respondents chose not to rebut the appellants' prima facie case; moreover, the question has now become moot with the development of new employment procedures which have won the approval of the Division on Civil Rights. Nonetheless, the same issue will surely arise in subsequent cases, and I must differ with the majority's position that coequality of education is the only solution to the problem at hand. Indeed, the presumption that certain written tests serve a discriminatory function by acting as built-in headwinds for minority candidates is based on the likelihood that these applicants have been denied the schooling and cultural opportunities available to whites. See, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, 401 U.S. at 431, 91 S.Ct. at 853, 28 L.Ed. 2d at 164. To sanction overdemanding requirements which are not proven indicators of job performance is tantamount to permanently foreclosing employment prospects for a generation of minority workers. [11] Moreover, such a decision is fundamentally unfair. As Justice Powell remarked in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green : Griggs was rightly concerned that childhood deficiencies in the education and background of minority citizens, resulting from forces beyond their control, not be allowed to work a cumulative and invidious burden on such citizens for the remainder of their lives. [411 U.S. at 806, 93 S.Ct. at 1826 36 L.Ed. 2d at 680] See generally, Cooper and Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1598, 1640 (1969). The majority also fails to recognize the problem inherent in the concept of merit, as it is used in this context. Hiring and promotion procedures are designed to identify candidates who are most likely to perform well in a given position. These procedures should focus on achievements or innate talents only to the extent that those characteristics correspond to the demands of the employer. Though the merit system has served a salutary purpose in public employment by providing an objective measure for choice, it may have the undesirable effect of weeding out members of a particular racial or minority group on the basis of factors which are unrelated to job performance. [12] We should admit that these measurements of merit serve an allocative, rather than an evaluative, function, and recognize the value judgment implicit in preferring educational background. See Karst and Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 Va. L. Rev. 950 (1974). Moreover, merit is necessarily defined by reference to community needs. I see nothing objectionable in a public employer making a concerted effort to recruit minority candidates in order to improve the efficiency of an agency's work in specific areas. [13] See Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Service Commission, supra, 482 F. 2d at 1340-1341 (2 Cir.1973). In addition, other screening devices unrelated to educational background may be more valuable than written tests in assessing qualifications. For instance, in view of the strenuous, and often dangerous, nature of the work, a competitive physical examination may provide a better method for eliminating applicants for a fire department. Vulcan Society of N.Y.C. Fire Department, Inc. v. Civil Service Commission, 360 F. Supp. 1265, 1276-1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd and remanded on other grounds, 490 F. 2d 387 (2 Cir.1973). Therefore, I would adhere to the standard adopted by the Hearing Examiner in this case and require that, when written tests or job criteria are shown to have a statistically disproportionate impact on a given racial or minority group, the employer demonstrate that the criteria measure skills which are necessary for satisfactory job performance. Ante at 28 n. 1 (Pashman, J., dissenting). See Erie Human Relations Commission v. Tullio, supra, 493 F. 2d at 373 (3d Cir.1974); Educational Equality League v. Tate, 472 F. 2d 612, 618 (3d Cir.1973); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel., 433 F. 2d 421 (8th Cir.1970). To this extent, I would qualify the suggestion in Jackson v. Concord Co., supra, 54 N.J. at 119, that the complainant be given the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence. Where the employer's procedures include unvalidated testing devices and subjective evaluations, without adequate standards or safeguards against discrimination, it is enough that the complainant show discriminatory consequences. The employer is better equipped to identify the core of relevant considerations which add up to business necessity. Moreover, in contrast to the individual complainant, the employer can draw upon a readily accessible fund of information and array of resources to establish the nondiscriminatory character of his procedures.