Opinion ID: 610843
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reputation Testimony

Text: 77 Defendants next contend that the district court erred in permitting Morgan to put on witnesses who testified as to his reputation. We disagree. We review a district court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion and will not reverse those decisions absent some prejudice to the appealing party. Roberts v. College of the Desert, 870 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir.1988). 78 The defendants objected in the district court to the admission of evidence as to Morgan's character and reputation on the ground that it was impermissible under Fed.R.Evid. Rule 403 as evidence of prior conduct indicating habit or custom. Defendants argued further that evidence would lead the jury to believe that Morgan would not have acted aggressively against Searle that day. 18 Morgan's counsel requested the introduction of this evidence for the purposes of establishing that because Morgan's reputation was so important to him, he suffered a great deal of emotional distress as a result of the unlawful arrest. The district court permitted the testimony, preceding it with the following cautionary instruction: 79 The testimony which you are going to hear is not offered to show that Mr. Morgan did or did not act in any particular way on the date and at the time of the incident in question here. It is offered on the issue of damages, the damages that he has been claiming--that he does claim, so let me say it again to you. 80 It is not offered to show or to convince you that Mr. Morgan did or did not do certain kinds of things on the date and at the time alleged herein but offered instead on the issue of the damages that Mr. Morgan is claiming. 81 We consider the question whether such evidence should have been admitted to be a fairly close one. The jury may well have been more inclined to believe Morgan rather than Searle once they heard from others about Morgan's integrity and good reputation. However, in civil cases, even the improper admission of evidence is not grounds for granting a new trial unless it constitutes prejudicial error. As discussed above, the jury had plenty of evidence from which to conclude that Searle rather than Morgan was the aggressor. Most important, however, is the probable effect of the district court's cautionary jury instruction and its statement expressly forbidding plaintiff's counsel from implying that such evidence went to habit or custom. We believe that those precautionary steps blunted significantly the impact of this testimony. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. 82