Opinion ID: 2349793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The $14,500.00 principal

Text: Mr. Arthur maintains that even if Ms. Arthur's claim is before the court, the entire principal sum of $14,500.00 paid into the court registry should be distributed solely to him. Consequently, once the trial court resolves the default issue on remand, the question as to the distribution of the $14,500.00 also should be addressed on remand. The trial court ruled that because the note and deed on the property were void as a matter of law, Mr. and Ms. Arthur are entitled to the entire $14,500.00 as tenants by the entirety, and ordered the D.C. Treasurer to forthwith issue a check to them. [16] However, prior to any distribution of this sum, the trial court must determine whether Mr. and Ms. Arthur have consented to a partition of the property which they acquired as tenants by the entireties. In the event Mr. and Ms. Arthur have consented to a partition, then the court must determine the relative equities of each in the marital property. We turn first to the factual underpinning of our discussion of these issues. Counsel for Mr. Arthur and Mr. Kamins executed and filed a stipulation on February 9, 1981, paragraph 4 of which provided: Upon entry of final judgment in this case, and disposition of any appeal therefrom, the Court shall disburse to Washington Title and Abstract Corporation any portion of the $14,500.00 that is not ordered paid over to defendants in satisfaction of the note. Washington Title and Abstract Corp. shall then disburse such amount to [Mr.] Arthur and [Ms.] Arthur in accordance with their equities in said property [that is, the marital home]. At the July 2000 trial, Ms. Arthur's mother, Nellie Gibson, testified that she and her husband gave Ms. Arthur $1,500.00 in the 1970s as a gift to assist with the purchase of a home. Subsequently, at Ms. Arthur's request, Ms. Gibson and her husband let Ms. Arthur have an additional sum of $1,300.00. During her testimony, Ms. Arthur stated that at the time of purchase, she was working and was the only one that ever paid the house note, and [her] parents had given [her] money and [she] had borrowed money occasionally [to] keep[ ] the notes going.... Ms. Arthur was employed at a fish market owned by her brothers-in-law. Mr. Arthur made improvements to the marital property: added on a sun deck; extended the carport; and made a subbasement. Ms. Arthur paid for the materials. Mr. Arthur used his veteran's benefits to obtain a loan to purchase the marital home, but other than a period of three months during which he worked and gave Ms. Arthur $50 per week, he did not assist with family expenses. Ms. Arthur voiced her belief that she was entitled to the money in the court registry, even though counsel for Mr. Arthur told [her] that the money was not [hers], that it was [her] husband's money, and that he was going to win the money for my husband. [17] Mr. Arthur did not testify, but Judge Mize summarized the respective efforts of both Mr. and Ms. Arthur as follows: I think it's very reasonable to infer from [Ms.] Arthur's testimony that the property was acquired during their marital years, and she put up money, and he put up his energy and attention and helped close the deal. And then [he] put sweat labor into improving the property thereafter. It is undisputed that Mr. and Ms. Arthur held their home as tenants by the entireties. We have said previously that: A tenancy by the entirety is a form of concurrent ownership which resembles a joint tenancy, but exists only between a husband and wife. This form of concurrent ownership is a product of the common-law doctrine that a husband and wife are one person and are each seized of the entire estate. The most significant incidents of this concurrent estate are the unilaterally indestructible right of survivorship; the inability of either spouse, acting alone, to alienate his [or her] interest in the property; and the broad immunity from the claims of separate creditors.... As long as the parties are united in marriage, neither spouse can effectively convey an interest in the estate nor compel a partition of the property without the other's consent. Travis v. Benson, 360 A.2d 506, 509 (D.C.1976) (citations omitted); see also Finley v. Thomas, 691 A.2d 1163, 1165 & n. 1 (D.C.1997); Ridgely v. Ridgely, 188 A.2d 296, 297 (D.C.1963) (citation omitted). But this jurisdiction permits a judicially ordered partition [18] of lands under D.C.Code § 16-2901 (2001). And, a cotenant enjoys a unilateral right of partition. See Carter v. Carter, 516 A.2d 917, 919 (D.C.1986). This unilateral right of partition makes it possible for any dissatisfied cotenant to, in effect, withdraw from and dissolve the quasi-partnership that cotenancy entails. Id. Nevertheless, as we said in Carter, the right to partition, while normally an integral part of the cotenancy form of ownership, is like most property rights subject to possible limitation by voluntary act of the parties or in its initial creation. Id. at 921. In addition, [a]s long as the parties are united in marriage [as apparently are Mr. and Ms. Arthur], neither spouse can effectively convey an interest in the estate nor compel a partition of the property without the other's consent. Travis, supra, 360 A.2d at 509 (citing Ridgely, supra, 188 A.2d at 297) (other citations omitted); see also Roberts & Lloyd, Inc. v. Zyblut, 691 A.2d 635, 638 (D.C.1997) ([I]n the absence of an agreement to the contrary, each spouse retains a tenancy by the entireties in the proceeds from the sale of property held as a tenancy by the entireties.) (citation omitted); Verges v. Verges, 193 A.2d 208, 209 (D.C.1963) ([W]here there is no consent, and no divorce, the court is powerless to partition or award to one party property held by the entireties) (citing Hogan v. Hogan, 102 U.S.App. D.C. 87, 250 F.2d 412 (1957)). Here, to support his argument that he is entitled to the entire $14,500.00 sum, Mr. Arthur maintains that [he] consented to the partition of the funds held in the court registry when he filed his ... [a]mended [c]ross-[c]laim against [Ms.] Arthur. And, in her November 1997 letter, [Ms.] Arthur consented to the partition by stating she withdrew `any claim or rights to refund or monies in question.' But, the District argues that Ms. Arthur is entitled to all of the proceeds pursuant to the 1981 Stipulation signed by Mr. Arthur's counsel in his behalf where he expressly agreed that if the original defendants were not entitled to all of the $14,500 in satisfaction of the note in that amount, the remaining portion should be disbursed ... to [Mr.] Arthur and [Ms.] Arthur in accordance with their equities in said property,  (emphasis in original); and furthermore, as to the respective equities in the marital property, the uncontradicted evidence is that Ms. Arthur, by working, through her family, and by her desperate loans, furnished the down payment and made all of the mortgage payments on the house from 1976 to 1980 (to the extent that payments were made). [19] Relying on Roberts & Lloyd and Finley, supra, the trial court correctly applied some of the fundamental principles relating to property held by a husband and wife. The trial court ruled, however, that: There has been no unequivocal effort by Mr. and M[s]. Arthur to have the property conveyed in a form other than as tenants by the entiret[ies], and therefore, [s]uch property remains a tenancy by the entireties even if it moves from realty to chattle or cash, which is what happened here. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court did not specifically consider evidence regarding the respective equities of Mr. and Ms. Arthur; nor did it consider specifically, evidence (such as Ms. Arthur's written communication of November 1997, and her subsequent July 2000 testimony or Mr. Arthur's amended cross-claim against Ms. Arthur) relating to whether either Ms. Arthur or Mr. Arthur actually sought and consented to a partition; or whether they jointly agreed to a partition of property held as tenants by the entireties. In the absence of such findings, we are constrained to direct that on remand the trial court make findings as to whether Mr. and Ms. Arthur have consented to a partition and, if they have consented, as to their relative equities.