Opinion ID: 790692
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Rejection of the Motion on the Merits

Text: 62 Even if Canova's Rule 33 motion had been timely filed, that would not entitle him to relief on appeal because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying him a new trial. As Canova acknowledges, a trial court exercises broad discretion in ruling on a new trial motion, and we review its decision deferentially, reversing only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir.2001). In considering whether to grant a new trial, a district court may itself weigh the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, but in doing so, it must be careful not to usurp the role of the jury. See United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 120 (2d Cir.2000); accord United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d at 133. The ultimate test is whether letting a guilty verdict stand would be a manifest injustice.... There must be a real concern that an innocent person may have been convicted. United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d at 133 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Aponte-Vega, 230 F.3d 522, 525 (2d Cir.2000) ( per curiam ). 63 In concluding that this case does not present such a concern, the district court pointed to a number of prosecution witnesses who had offered direct evidence of Canova's guilty knowledge of the Raytel testing fraud and of his active role in deceiving Medicare auditors about this fraud. Canova argues that these witnesses were not credible because their accounts were riddled with inconsistencies, and they had motives to testify falsely. These arguments, however, were forcefully presented to the jury through the vigorous cross-examinations and arguments of Canova's able trial counsel. Nevertheless, the jury, which had the opportunity to see the witnesses testify, to weigh their testimony against the other evidence in the case, and to hear the arguments of the prosecution, found Canova guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on four of the five charges tried. Only exceptional circumstances warrant a district court's intruding upon the jury function of credibility assessment, United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1414 (2d Cir.1992); accord United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d at 133; United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d at 120, and the experienced trial judge found none in this case. To the contrary, he explicitly found that the jury could reasonably have concluded from the totality of the evidence that Canova had importuned Raytel employees not to comply with Medicare testing requirements and had then made false statements to conceal this conduct. Under these circumstances, the district court's decision not to grant Canova a new trial fell well within its broad discretion. 64 The fact that Canova proffered some new evidence in support of his Rule 33 motion warrants no different conclusion. When a defendant proffers new evidence to support a Rule 33 motion, a court may appropriately consider whether (1) counsel could have discovered the evidence with due diligence before or during trial; (2) the evidence demonstrates that a witness in fact committed perjury; (3) the new evidence is material; and (4) the new evidence is not cumulative. United States v. Middlemiss, 217 F.3d 112, 122 (2d Cir. 2000). As the district court observed, Canova's new evidence, which essentially derived from Raytel employees and records, was certainly available to him at the time of trial. Canova's assertion that he had no reason to procure this evidence for trial because he had not anticipated certain government tactics and arguments is unconvincing. The evidence in question all pertained to matters that Canova knew would be in issue at trial, even if he did not know the government's exact position on these matters. In any event, the evidence, even when viewed most favorably to Canova, did not demonstrate any witness's actual perjury. At best, it would have afforded defense counsel additional grounds on which to impeach prosecution witnesses whose credibility had already been vigorously challenged or to bolster Canova's own suspect credibility. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that such evidence was insufficient to raise a real concern that an innocent person may have been convicted. United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d at 133 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see generally United States v. Monteleone, 257 F.3d 210, 219 (2d Cir.2001) (noting that inconsistencies in testimony do not, by themselves, demonstrate that the witness actually committed perjury for purposes of reviewing a new trial motion); United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 366 (2d Cir.1995) (Nondisclosure of cumulative evidence tending only to further impeach a witness' general credibility is not grounds for granting a Rule 33 motion.). 65 In sum, assuming jurisdiction to hear Canova's new trial motion, we conclude that the denial of that motion on its merits was not an abuse of the district court's discretion. Accordingly, we reject defendant's cross-appeal and affirm so much of the judgment of conviction as establishes his guilt on the four specified crimes.