Opinion ID: 561200
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Merritt's appeal

Text: 22 The district court awarded Merritt damages for emotional suffering, but did not award him lost wages or punitive damages. Merritt cross-appeals, arguing that the district court erroneously identified the due process violation which he suffered. 23 The district court confined its finding of a due process violation to KADA's failure to provide Merritt with a pretermination hearing. That finding was based on this court's holding in Merritt I that Merritt was deprived of his property interest in continued employment when the state and federal agents intentionally coerced KADA to fire him. Merritt I, 827 F.2d at 1372. Merritt contends that such a holding requires that his compensable injury includes, not only the deprivation of his right to a pretermination hearing, but also the deprivation of his property interest in continuing employment itself. 24 The district court found, however, that Merritt would have been fired regardless of Mackey's involvement. Unless that finding is clearly erroneous, it limits Merritt's damages to those arising from the denial of procedural due process only, and precludes an award of damages for deprivation of the employment itself, a loss not caused by Mackey. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 260-66, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1050-54, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1977); See Alexander v. City of Menlo Park, 787 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032, 107 S.Ct. 879, 93 L.Ed.2d 833 (1987). 25 We cannot say that the district court's finding that Merritt would have been fired anyway was clearly erroneous. Although the evidence conflicted, there was ample support for the district court's finding. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to award Merritt damages for his loss of employment. 7