Opinion ID: 2172370
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentence Enhancement Under Section 12-13(b)(4)

Text: At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel conceded that sentence enhancement applies to defendant, and the defense did not challenge the enhancement in its posttrial motion to reconsider the sentence. Sentencing issues must be raised in the trial court to preserve them for appellate review. People v. Reed, 177 Ill.2d 389, 393, 226 Ill.Dec. 801, 686 N.E.2d 584 (1997). The appellate court nonetheless addressed this issue under the plain error rule. 326 Ill.App.3d at 412-13, 260 Ill.Dec. 140, 760 N.E.2d 557. The plain error doctrine allows a reviewing court to address defects affecting substantial rights if the evidence is closely balanced or if fundamental fairness so requires rather than finding the claims waived. People v. Macri, 185 Ill.2d 1, 58, 235 Ill.Dec. 589, 705 N.E.2d 772 (1998); 134 Ill.2d R. 615(a). The appellate court is in apparent conflict over whether to evaluate the issue of sentence enhancement under section 12-13(b)(4) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/12-13(b)(4) (West 2000)) according to the elements of or the classification of the convictions. People v. Gapski, 283 Ill. App.3d 937, 945-46, 219 Ill.Dec. 228, 670 N.E.2d 1116 (1996); People v. Juris, 189 Ill.App.3d 934, 935, 137 Ill.Dec. 298, 545 N.E.2d 1059 (1989). The application of these two approaches leads to different results in this case. Therefore, we will address the merits of this issue. The State argues that the appellate court erred in finding that the trial court improperly enhanced defendant's criminal sexual assault conviction (720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(3) (West 1998)) from a Class 1 to a Class X felony pursuant to section 12-13(b)(4), which states: A second or subsequent conviction for a violation of paragraph (a)(3) or (a)(4) or under any similar statute of this State or any other state for any offense involving criminal sexual assault that is substantially equivalent to or more serious than the sexual assault prohibited under paragraph (a)(3) or (a)(4) is a Class X felony. (Emphases added.) 720 ILCS 5/12-13(b)(4) (West 1998). Indecent liberties with a child and criminal sexual assault were both Class 1 felonies at the times of defendant's convictions. However, the appellate court concluded that indecent liberties with a child under section 12-13(a)(3) was a lesser offense than criminal sexual assault because the element of penetration need only be proved for the latter offense. As a result, the 1983 conviction was not for a crime substantially equivalent to or more serious than than criminal sexual assault to warrant sentence enhancement. 326 Ill. App.3d at 413, 260 Ill.Dec. 140, 760 N.E.2d 557. Again, the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Paris, 179 Ill.2d at 177, 227 Ill.Dec. 800, 688 N.E.2d 137. A statute is ambiguous if it can be reasonably interpreted in two or more ways. Holloway, 177 Ill.2d at 8, 224 Ill.Dec. 498, 682 N.E.2d 59. We review de novo matters of statutory construction. Paris, 179 Ill.2d at 177-78, 227 Ill.Dec. 800, 688 N.E.2d 137. The sentence enhancement language requiring the prior crime to be substantially equivalent to or more serious than the present crime is found in the statutes describing the crimes of criminal sexual assault, at issue in this case, and of criminal sexual abuse. 720 ILCS 5/12-13(b)(4), 12-15(d) (West 2000). However, this language has only been interpreted and applied by two appellate cases, both in reference to section 12-13(b). In People v. Gapski , the defendant was charged with criminal sexual assault, and he had a prior conviction for second degree sexual assault from Wisconsin. Gapski, 283 Ill.App.3d at 945, 219 Ill.Dec. 228, 670 N.E.2d 1116. The court examined the facts of the Wisconsin crime and concluded it would constitute aggravated criminal sexual abuse in Illinois, a Class 2 felony. Gapski, 283 Ill.App.3d at 945-46, 219 Ill. Dec. 228, 670 N.E.2d 1116. Therefore, the prior crime was inferior to criminal sexual assault, a Class 1 felony, so that sentence enhancement was improper. Gapski, 283 Ill.App.3d at 946, 219 Ill.Dec. 228, 670 N.E.2d 1116. In People v. Juris , the defendant was charged with criminal sexual assault in 1988; he had been convicted in 1979 of attempted rape, also a Class 1 felony. Juris, 189 Ill.App.3d at 935, 137 Ill.Dec. 298, 545 N.E.2d 1059. Section 12-13(b) provides for enhancement for any offense involving criminal sexual assault. (Emphasis added.) Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 12-13(b). The court reasoned that section 12-13(b) required the court to compare the elements of rather than the classifications of the crimes. Juris, 189 Ill. App.3d at 935, 137 Ill.Dec. 298, 545 N.E.2d 1059. Because attempted rape did not require penetration, it was inferior to criminal sexual assault and enhancement was inappropriate. Juris, 189 Ill.App.3d at 935, 137 Ill.Dec. 298, 545 N.E.2d 1059. We acknowledge that comparing the classifications and the elements were both reasonable interpretations of section 12-13(b). Therefore, this provision is ambiguous, and we will consider other interpretive aids. Whitney, 188 Ill.2d at 97-98, 241 Ill.Dec. 770, 720 N.E.2d 225. The legislative history is very brief but instructive. Senator Degnan explained that this section provides that any person who has been previously convicted of a criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault or rape and is subsequently convicted of criminal sexual assault is guilty of a Class X felony. 85th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 25, 1987, at 267. This comment shows that the legislature had only these three crimes in mind for the sentence enhancement scheme of section 12-13(b). In 1983, the General Assembly reorganized sex offenses by passing the Criminal Sexual Assault Act, which created the offenses of criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault. In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d 300, 313-14, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218 (2002). At the same time, the General Assembly repealed several sex offenses, including rape, which were superceded by the crimes created by the Act. We concluded that one purpose of these legislative actions was to create gradations of what was formerly encompassed by the single crime of rape. Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d at 317, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218. We found that the crimes of criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault were intended to subsume the offense of rape. Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d at 313-14, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218. In other words, rape is the sole offense under the old configuration of sex crimes that is substantially equivalent to criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault. In reaching this conclusion, we compared their elements, specifically that all three share the element of penetration, rather than their classifications. Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d at 315-16, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218. In the present case, defendant was convicted of indecent liberties with a child, which was described as: Any lewd fondling or touching of either the child or the person done or submitted to with the intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person or both. Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 11-4(a)(3). This offense did not require proof of the element of penetration. Therefore, indecent liberties with a child is not substantially equivalent to or more serious than criminal sexual assault. In light of the legislative history for section 12-13(b)(4) and our analysis in Lieberman, we find that a criminal sexual assault conviction will be enhanced to a Class X felony for sentencing under section 12-13(b)(4) only if the defendant's prior conviction from an Illinois jurisdiction was for criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, or rape, given the similarity of their elements. Therefore, the appellate court properly found that the trial court erred in enhancing defendant's sentence based on his conviction for indecent liberties with a child.