Opinion ID: 2631723
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Willful Failure to Pay Child Support

Text: [¶13] District courts have the power and discretion to grant adoptions without parental consent provided all the statutory elements are satisfied. See In re Adoption of CF, ¶ 10, 120 P.3d at 998. We review adoption decrees under the abuse of discretion standard: The power to grant or deny a petition for adoption is within the discretion of the trial court. Matter of Adoption of BGH, 930 P.2d 371, 377 (Wyo.1996); Matter of Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 988 (Wyo.1986). Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria. Mintle v. Mintle, 764 P.2d 255, 257 (Wyo.1988) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo.1986)). In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably have concluded as it did. Matter of Adoption of BGH, 930 P.2d at 377-78 (quoting Matter of Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d 73, 76 (Wyo.1982)). Id., ¶ 10, 120 P.3d at 998-999. Furthermore, because the right to associate with one's child is a fundamental right protected by the Wyoming and United States Constitutions, adoption statutes are strictly construed when the proceeding is against a nonconsenting parent, and every reasonable intendment is made in favor of that parent's claims. Id., ¶ 11, 120 P.3d at 999. [T]he party requesting adoption bears the burden of proving the existence of at least one of the statutory factors by clear and convincing evidence. Id. We have defined clear and convincing evidence as that kind of proof which would persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the contention is highly probable. Id. [¶14] The district court determined that Appellant's consent to the adoption was not required pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110 (LexisNexis 2003) which states: (a) In addition to the exceptions contained in W.S. 1-22-108, the adoption of a child may be ordered without the written consent of a parent or the putative father if the court finds that the nonconsenting parent or putative father is unknown and that the putative father has not registered under W.S. 1-22-117 and the affidavit required by W.S. 1-22-109(a)(iv) has been filed with the petition to adopt or if the court finds that the putative father or the nonconsenting parent or parents have: . . . (ix) Willfully failed to pay a total dollar amount of at least seventy percent (70%) of the court ordered support for a period of two (2) years or more and has failed to bring the support obligation one hundred percent (100%) current within sixty (60) days after service of the petition to adopt. [¶15] Appellant concedes that he failed to pay at least seventy percent of the court ordered child support for two years or more. He also does not dispute that he failed to bring the support obligation current within sixty days of the filing of the adoption petition. He does not contest the district court's finding that he failed to make any payments on his arrearage after the petition was filed. Appellant's challenge is limited to the district court's finding that his failure to pay was willful. He contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's determination. He states that the evidence supports his position that his failure to pay the required child support was due solely to his incarceration and that he did the best he could. He relies on In re Adoption of TLC, 2002 WY 76, 46 P.3d 863 (Wyo. 2002), as support for his position. His reliance is misplaced. [¶16] In TLC, we reversed a district court's consent determination because it improperly found a willful failure to pay support because the father was incarcerated. Id., 46 P.3d 863. In TLC, the district court found that the willfulness element was met because the conduct giving rise to the father's incarceration was willful. Id., ¶ 33, 46 P.3d at 874. Specifically, the district court stated that the [Father's] failure to pay child support from October 8, 1998, through October 8, 1999, is a consequence of incarceration which was his own making and which was willful. Id. We found this approach to be clearly erroneous. We explained [t]he act that must be willful is the failure to pay support. Incarceration, standing alone, does not provide the direct intent necessary to constitute willful failure to pay under the pertinent statute. Id., ¶ 34, 46 P.3d at 874. We reasoned that to hold otherwise would allow the granting of an adoption without parental consent to be based upon a mere desire to compound the sentence for a parent's past crime. Id., ¶ 34, 46 P.3d at 874-875. [¶17] However, and significantly for purposes of this case, we also noted in TLC that incarceration does not provide total justification for nonpayment of child support. Id., ¶ 36, 46 P.3d at 875. We reiterated that [a] parent must always pay child support according to his or her financial ability. Id. We instructed that the courts should look at whether the parent has demonstrated, through whatever financial means available to him, that the parent has not forgotten his statutory obligation to his child. Id. [¶18] In this case, the district court did not make a specific finding that Father's willful failure to pay was due to incarceration. Rather, the finding related to willfulness simply stated: 21. Pursuant to W.S. §1-22-110(a)(ix) Father has willfully failed to pay at least 70% of court-ordered support for periods exceeding two years. Also, Father did not make any payments toward arrearages after being served with the petition to adopt herein. The underlying basis for this finding was not set forth by the district court. [¶19] Appellant bears the burden of providing this court with a sufficient record to allow proper evaluation of the district court's decision. Beeman v. Beeman, 2005 WY 45, ¶ 10, 109 P.3d 548, 551 (Wyo. 2005). Appellant failed to do so in this case. The consent determination hearing was unreported and a statement of the evidence was not filed pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03. As a result, our review is limited to the district court's findings of fact. In re Adoption of TLC, ¶ 14, 46 P.3d at 869. The district court found that Appellant's failure to pay the requisite child support was willful and concluded that his consent was not required for the adoption. Although Appellant argues that clear and convincing evidence does not support that finding, without a sufficient record to review, we must assume that the district court's findings are adequately supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. Id. Based upon the record before us, we find no error in the district court's determination that Appellant's consent to the adoption was not required. [¶20] Affirmed.