Opinion ID: 1752541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues surrounding dexter davis

Text: Dexter Davis helped appellant pawn Mrs. McDonald's jewelry. After police arrested him, Davis gave a videotaped statement incriminating appellant. The tape was lost and not recovered until approximately twenty-two months after appellant's trial. Appellant asserts that the court erred in overruling his motion to compel disclosure of the videotape and to suppress Davis's in-court testimony because he did not have an opportunity to view the videotape and that it was essential to impeach Davis. On the state's motion while the case was pending on appeal, this Court remanded for the trial court's determination of whether nondisclosure of the videotape violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), which holds that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Upon the state's motion, the trial court also ruled on whether a crime-scene videotape that was also lost and recovered after trial violated Brady . The motion court found that the videotapes were not material to either appellant's guilt or punishment. Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1001, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The court found the videotapes immaterial based upon the fact that appellant was aware that Davis had made a videotaped statement to the police; that he possessed the police report relative to Davis's anticipated testimony; that he examined Davis in great detail in pretrial depositions; and that both videotapes were basically duplicative. The court found that there was no reasonable likelihood that the videotape's nondisclosure affected the jury's verdict. The motion court was correct in finding that nondisclosure of the videotapes did not violate Brady . In addition to the reasons given by the trial court to support its finding, the record shows that appellant elicited from Davis on cross-examination that he was angry with appellant because he felt appellant was responsible for his arrest and subsequent job loss. Appellant also inquired into deals that Davis may have made with the police for Davis's testimony. In sum, there is not a reasonable probability that appellant would have been acquitted had Davis's testimony been excluded. Without Davis's testimony, the jury had evidence that: (1) appellant confessed to the murder; (2) appellant was found in possession of Mrs. McDonald's car, jewelry, and credit cards; (3) appellant's fingerprints were found on Mrs. McDonald's jewelry cases and car; (4) the murder weapon was a wrench that appellant used in his job and the missing parts to the wrench were found locked in a tool shed to which he had the only key other than the condominium's manager's; and (5) a witness saw appellant outside Mrs. McDonald's condominium shortly before the murder and heard a treacherous scream shortly thereafter. The court on remand did not err in ruling that nondisclosure of the videotapes did not violate Brady . [7] Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in sustaining the state's objection to his inquiry regarding pending criminal charges against Davis that arose after Mrs. McDonald's murder. Appellant asserts that inquiry into the pending charges was necessary to demonstrate Davis's possible motivation for testifying favorably for the state. Appellant's assertions are unsupported. Generally, witness credibility may not be impeached by showing a mere arrest, investigation, or criminal charge which has not resulted in a conviction. State v. Sanders, 360 S.W.2d 722, 725 (Mo.1962). In State v. Lockhart , this Court stated three exceptions to the general rule: (1) where the inquiry demonstrates a specific interest of the witness; (2) where the inquiry demonstrates the witness' motivation to testify favorably for the state; or (3) where the inquiry demonstrates that the witness testified with an expectation of leniency. State v. Lockhart, 507 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Mo.1974); State v. Watts, 813 S.W.2d 940, 943 (Mo.App.1991). Here, appellant attempted to show that four wanteds [8] had been issued against Davis to show that Davis was biased towards the state. Appellant failed, however, to establish the required nexus between the wanteds and Davis's testimony so as to satisfy the Lockhart exceptions. See Watts, 813 S.W.2d at 943. A party need not establish that the state made a deal or a promise in exchange for a witness' testimony, but must demonstrate the witness' perception of expectancy of favorable treatment if he furthers the state's case, or his basis to fear harsh treatment if his testimony is unfriendly. State v. Joiner, 823 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Mo. App.1991). Appellant failed to show that Davis was even aware of the wanteds, nor is there evidence that Davis was ever arrested on the wanteds or that any arrest resulted in pending charges. In addition, the prosecutor denied any connection between the wanteds and Davis's testimony and stated that no deals or promises had been exchanged for Davis's testimony. The court correctly sustained the state's objection to appellant's attempt to show Davis's wanteds.