Opinion ID: 1172635
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony of Arthur Cox

Text: (12a) Defendant contends admission of Cox's testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as Cox was a government agent and deliberately elicited incriminating statements from defendant when his counsel was not present. ( Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, 207 [84 S.Ct. 1199, 1203-1204, 12 L.Ed.2d 246].) Accordingly, defendant argues, the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of defendant's statements to Cox. Defendant also argues Cox's testimony was erroneously admitted as tending to prove defendant's consciousness of guilt, because the statements Cox reported were cast only in terms of an intention to suppress evidence, not in terms of an admission of having done so. Finally, defendant argues admission of Cox's testimony violated Evidence Code section 352. Defendant asserts Arthur Cox was not acting on his own initiative when he reported defendant's jailhouse statements about shooting Lewis's house. According to defendant, Cox was in effect directed to elicit incriminating information. Defendant argues government agents induced Cox to act on their behalf in exchange for leniency on a robbery charge that was pending against him. Defendant does not claim that police or prosecutors made any explicit request of Cox for information, nor that they expressly promised him any benefit for eliciting statements. Instead, defendant claims Cox was given the impression that a deal was possible, and was led by indirect comments to expect leniency if he were to elicit incriminating information from defendant. The record, however, reveals no Massiah violation. Defendant was arrested on these charges in April 1982. In early July 1982, Officer Mejia testified, after defendant's preliminary hearing on these charges had concluded, he received a call from Arthur Cox, who, like defendant, was being held in Los Angeles County jail. Cox was charged with burglary and personal use of a gun. Mejia went down to the jail and met with Cox. Cox told Mejia he wished to cut a deal for information. Mejia told Cox he could not promise anything and that he would have to see the district attorney. Before departing, Mejia testified, he made clear to Cox that Cox was not his agent and that there was no deal. About a week later, Deputy District Attorney Jacobs accompanied Mejia to the county jail and met with Cox. Jacobs's primary interest in talking with Cox was in connection with Cox's status as a victim and witness on an unrelated murder case. At the meeting, Jacobs testified, Cox related certain statements defendant allegedly had made regarding a series of incidents between the 89th Street Family Bloods and the Avalon Gardens Crips. Among other things, Cox related defendant's statements about a killing at Green Meadow Park, in connection with which defendant had been indicted. Jacobs was at that time assigned to prosecute the Green Meadow Park incident. Cox also related some statements defendant allegedly had made about the shooting of Jerome Dunn. Cox told Jacobs that defendant had said Curtis Thomas was in the van with him at the time Dunn was shot and that defendant had told Thomas to shoot. Jacobs testified he did not recall Cox speaking that day about Patricia Lewis. Jacobs testified he told Cox, I'll get back to you, and that he further indicated if anything could be worked out it was not up to Jacobs, but to his supervisors. Jacobs told Cox it would take considerable amount of persuasion on my part to get anything done. Jacobs acknowledged indicating to Cox he was interested to know what his [i.e., defendant's] reaction is now. Later in the interview, Mejia apparently said to Cox: If you talk to him now, he would have a different thing to say about beating it. But, Jacobs testified, he did not promise Cox leniency, intercede to affect the handling of Cox in jail or ask Cox to obtain any additional information. Similarly, Mejia testified that neither he nor anyone else present at the interview exchanged anything with Cox or promised him anything in exchange for information. On September 2, 1982, Mejia testified, Cox called him from jail with information about the shooting of Lewis's house. Cox told Mejia that defendant, in a conversation with Cox, had indicated he was going to use one of his friends, or home boys, named Curtis Thomas, to get rid of witness Patricia Lewis by killing her. In that conversation, Mejia testified, he neither requested of Cox additional information nor promised Cox any reward. Subsequently, the police provided 24-hour protection to Lewis. Jacobs testified that, in September 1982, he wrote a letter to counsel for the Youthful Offenders Parole Board, California Youth Authority, requesting that a certain parole hold on Cox be lifted so Cox could be released from jail. Jacobs desired Cox's release because he wanted to call Cox to testify without endangering Cox's life, and, in Jacobs's opinion, Cox's life would have been endangered if Cox testified while remaining in jail. Cox pled guilty to the robbery charge with use of a firearm under section 12022.5. In exchange for the plea, Jacobs struck the allegation under section 1203.06 (which, if true, would have barred Cox's probation, thus ensuring his being sent to state prison or the Youth Authority). At trial, defendant, pursuant to Massiah v. United States, supra, 377 U.S. 201, moved to suppress evidence of his statements to Cox. Defendant suggests Cox was induced by Jacobs's and Mejia's comments at the July 1982 jail meeting to seek additional incriminating information from defendant. Defendant further suggests the sentence Cox received on his robbery charge, favorable dispositions on a probation violation and a parole violation, and certain small monetary payments together constituted quid pro quo for the information Cox had provided. Accordingly, defendant argues, Cox was a government agent when defendant made incriminating statements to him, and the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion. We disagree. (13a) As we have recognized, [i]n order to prevail on a Massiah claim involving use of a government informant, the defendant must demonstrate that ... the informant (1) was acting as a government agent, i.e., under the direction of the government pursuant to a preexisting arrangement, with the expectation of some resulting benefit or advantage, and (2) deliberately elicited incriminating statements. ( In re Neely (1993) 6 Cal.4th 901, 915 [26 Cal. Rptr.2d 203, 864 P.2d 474].) (12b) The trial court properly denied defendant's Massiah motion because defendant failed to meet either prong of the foregoing test. Defendant established neither that Cox was acting under the direction of the government pursuant to a preexisting arrangement, with the expectation of some resulting benefit or advantage nor that he deliberately elicited incriminating statements from defendant. (13b) Where [ as here ] the informant is a jailhouse inmate, the first prong of the foregoing test is not met where law enforcement officials merely accept information elicited by the informant-inmate on his or her own initiative, with no official promises, encouragement, or guidance. ( In re Neely, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 915.) (12c) As the trial court observed, Cox's telephone contact with the police regarding defendant's case was initiated by Cox himself. All of the prosecution witnesses who testified on the suppression motion stated they in no way asked or even suggested that Cox should be their agent. No evidence contradicted that testimony. The trial court also found that Cox had neither been promised nor led to expect any benefit in return for his statements. Jacobs's remark that he would be interested to know what [defendant's] reaction is now plainly does not constitute an express request or direction that Cox act as a government agent. Moreover, we agree with the trial court that the remark must be considered in its context. Just before making the remark, Jacobs told Cox he had an absolutely airtight case against defendant and did not need Cox's statement. The trial court correctly concluded Jacobs's statement did not, under the circumstances, imply that Cox should act for the prosecution or the police. Defendant points out that Cox spoke with prosecutors more than once, that he informed on defendant and that he subsequently received what appears to have been favorable treatment as to various penalties. We have not found such circumstances sufficient to support a conclusion that an informant was motivated to inform by prosecutorial promises of leniency. (See People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1249-1250 [278 Cal. Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899].) In Pensinger, we observed: [The inmate-informant]'s housing arrangement had nothing to do with any hope of eliciting information from defendant.... [N]o officer ever promised [the inmate-informant] any benefit. No one asked him to perform any service. The police simply made use of [the inmate-informant]'s own motivation to inform on defendant, a technique we found not to be a knowing subversion of the defendant's right to counsel.... ( People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1250, citing People v. Whitt (1984) 36 Cal.3d 724, 742-743 [205 Cal. Rptr. 810, 685 P.2d 1161].) Similarly here. There was no evidence prosecutors or police deliberately placed Cox in proximity to defendant in jail. (13c) Absent evidence of direct motivation by police in this case, or of a prior `working relationship' between [the informant] and the authorities from which such encouragement might be inferred, there is no basis to hold the police accountable for [the informant]'s decision to question defendant. ( People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1241 [275 Cal. Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159], citing People v. Whitt, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 744.) Defendant also failed to establish that Cox deliberately elicited defendant's statements. As defendant acknowledges, in order to establish a Sixth Amendment violation, the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks. ( Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986) 477 U.S. 436, 459 [106 S.Ct. 2616, 2630, 91 L.Ed.2d 364].) (12d) Although Cox testified that he and defendant talked about their cases together, nothing in the record suggests that Cox actively questioned defendant about defendant's case. As discussed, there was no evidence prosecutors or police directed that Cox be jailed in proximity to defendant. If it were necessary to reach the question (which it is not, inasmuch as the trial court, as discussed above, properly found the government did not have a preexisting arrangement with Cox), we would conclude Cox acted as a mere governmental `listening post,' which, according to Kuhlmann, raises no Sixth Amendment concern. ( People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1127, 1141 [245 Cal. Rptr. 635, 751 P.2d 901].) Thus, the trial court properly denied defendant's suppression motion. As the People acknowledge, defendant at trial also objected on relevance grounds to the admission of Cox's testimony. [ People v.] Weiss [, supra, 50 Cal.2d 535] holds that the admission of evidence purporting to show the suppression or attempted suppression of evidence is erroneous absent the prerequisite of proof that the defendant was present at such an incident or proof of authorization of such illegal conduct. ( People v. Hannon, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 600.) Invoking Weiss, supra, 50 Cal.2d 535, defendant correctly notes that Cox's testimony about defendant's statements suggested defendant phrased them in terms of an intention to arrange for suppression of Mrs. Lewis's evidence, rather than in terms of an admission that he had already done so. Even so, Weiss would not for that reason bar admission of the statements. From the declared intent to a do a particular thing an inference that the thing was done may fairly be drawn. ( People v. Alcalde (1944) 24 Cal.2d 177, 185 [148 P.2d 627], citing Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon (1892) 145 U.S. 285, 295-296 [12 S.Ct. 909, 912-913, 36 L.Ed. 706].) Thus, defendant's declarations of... intent are admissible ... as evidence of the probable doing of the act.... ( People v. Weatherford (1945) 27 Cal.2d 401, 422 [164 P.2d 753].) Specifically, the statement by defendant indicating he was going to have witnesses or a witness shot, would constitute evidence from which the trier of fact could infer that he authorized the shooting that actually occurred. Such evidence is admissible to prove consciousness of guilt. ( People v. Weiss, supra, 50 Cal.2d at p. 554.) Therefore, Cox's testimony about defendant's statements was not inadmissible on the ground the statements expressed intention only. (14a) Finally, defendant complains that, in admitting Cox's testimony, the trial court failed to weigh its prejudicial effect against its probative value. (Evid. Code, § 352.) As he concedes, however, defendant failed at trial to object to admission of Cox's testimony on section 352 grounds. Indeed, the record reveals he objected only on relevancy grounds. Consequently, any objection based on the prejudicial effect of Cox's testimony was waived. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 179 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664].) Defendant's relevancy objection to witness intimidation evidence has been discussed. In a single sentence, defendant asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for not specifically objecting on Evidence Code section 352 grounds to admission of Cox's testimony. (15) Points perfunctorily asserted without argument in support are not properly raised. ( People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 985, fn. 15 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214].) To the extent defendant means impliedly to adopt his argument on the merits of the trial court's failure to conduct section 352 weighing as also showing why counsel was ineffective, we reject the conclusion. As discussed, Cox's testimony was relevant to prove defendant's consciousness of guilt. It is not reasonably probable that an objection on section 352 grounds would have succeeded. In sum, defendant fails to demonstrate the trial court erred in admitting testimony from Patricia Lewis, Kenneth Simmons, Mark Williams and Arthur Cox that defendant authorized or directed the shooting of Patricia Lewis's house. As that evidence was admissible, the court did not err in instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.06, regarding consciousness of guilt.