Opinion ID: 1310349
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Error Was Prejudicial

Text: A trial court has the discretion to determine the relevancy and admissibility of evidence, and such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal unless they constitute an abuse of that discretion. See Brown v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 855, 468 N.W.2d 105 (1991). If a trial court erroneously admits evidence that unfairly prejudices a substantial right of the complaining litigant, such admission is an abuse of discretion and constitutes reversible error. See, Radecki v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 255 Neb. 224, 583 N.W.2d 320 (1998); Westgate Rec. Assn. v. Papio-Missouri River NRD, 250 Neb. 10, 547 N.W.2d 484 (1996). Our first step is to determine whether it was error to admit the waiver clause; if so, our next step is to decide if the error was prejudicial and reversible. In Nebraska, all relevant evidence is admissible unless there is some specific constitutional or statutory reason to exclude such evidence. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-402 (Reissue 1995). Relevant evidence is that which tends to make the existence of any fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-401 (Reissue 1995). The facts of consequence in this case were (1) whether an enforceable written or oral contract existed between the parties, (2) whether the enforceable provisions of such a contract were breached and by whom, (3) whether NFO's corn was damaged while in BVC's custody and to what extent, and (4) whether negligence on the part of BVC was the proximate cause of such damage. Had the waiver clause been enforceable under § 7-204, then the waiver clause might have been admissible under §§ 27-401 and 27-402. Indeed, such a clause would tend to prove the existence of an enforceable contractual provision. However, because we have determined that the waiver clause was unenforceable, it had no tendency to make any of the above facts of consequence more or less likely and was irrelevant. Just as § 27-402 makes all relevant evidence admissible, so too does it render all irrelevant evidence inadmissible. Hence, the clause was irrelevant under § 27-401 and inadmissable under § 27-402. The trial court abused its discretion in admitting the waiver clause into evidence. Of course, the question at the crux of this matter is whether the error was prejudicial and reversible. In arguing that it was not prejudicial, BVC points out that NFO neither objected nor offered an alternative to jury instruction No. 10which allowed the jury to find against BVC on NFO's negligence cause of action. In other words, BVC asserts that (1) instruction No. 10 allowed the jury to find against BVC on a negligence theory, thereby curing or undoing any prejudicial harm caused by the erroneous admission of the waiver clause, or (2) NFO's failure to object to instruction No. 10 or offer another instruction waived the error objected to at the evidentiary stage of trial. In support of its argument, BVC cites Keller v. Noble, 229 Neb. 542, 428 N.W.2d 170 (1988). However, the Keller case does not stand for the proposition that a proper jury instruction will cure an otherwise reversible error committed during the evidentiary phase of a trial. On the contrary, Keller concerns waiver of an erroneous jury instruction by failing to object to it. NFO counters that it had no duty to object to instruction No. 10 because the instruction was favorable to NFO. Moreover, NFO urges that it did not waive the error complained of at the evidentiary stage by failing to offer a jury instruction on the unenforceable nature of the waiver clause. NFO claims that offering such an instruction would have been fruitless, given the trial court's prior rulings on the admissibility of the waiver clause. In the instant cause, the jury was not specifically instructed that the waiver clause was unenforceable or that they should disregard the clause. As such, the jury could easily have been confused or misled as to whether BVC could be held liableeven if BVC was negligent and such negligence caused the harm to NFO's corn. In the final analysis, the record does not disclose (and it is impossible to say) what effect, if any, the waiver clause had on the jury's verdicteven in light of instruction No. 10. Where it cannot be gleaned from the record that evidence wrongfully admitted did not affect the result of the trial unfavorably to the party against whom such evidence was admitted, reception of that evidence must be considered prejudicial error. Westgate Rec. Assn. v. Papio-Missouri River NRD, 250 Neb. 10, 547 N.W.2d 484 (1996). We so conclude. In holding that it was prejudicial and reversible error to admit the waiver clause, we do not, however, undo the jury's entire verdict. The jury's verdict in favor of BVC on the breach of the written contract action is unaffected. Partial retrials are permissible if it clearly appears that the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable from the others that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice. Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500, 51 S.Ct. 513, 75 L.Ed. 1188 (1931). If the issues are so interwoven... that the former cannot be submitted to the jury independently of the latter without confusion and uncertainty, then a retrial on all interwoven issues is required. 283 U.S. at 500, 51 S.Ct. 513. See, also, e.g., Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497 (8th Cir.1993); England v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co., 728 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir.1984); Hallberg v. Brasher, 679 F.2d 751 (8th Cir.1982); Slater v. KFC Corp., 621 F.2d 932 (8th Cir.1980). We note that NFO did not appeal the jury's finding that NFO was liable for the contractual demurrage charges; instead, NFO assigned as error the jury's finding that BVC was not liable for negligently damaging NFO's corn. Retrial is not necessary on the contract claim because the issue of BVC's alleged negligence is so distinct and separable from the contract claim that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice. See Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Co., supra . NFO's liability on the demurrage charge is governed by the written contract, whereas BVC's alleged negligence in storing the corn is a completely separate issue based upon a separate set of facts. The inadmissibility of the waiver clause regarding liability has no bearing on the contract claim for demurrage charges. Therefore, we reverse only that portion of the judgment that found BVC not liable for negligently damaging NFO's corn and remand for a new trial on that cause of action consistent with this opinion.