Opinion ID: 2320924
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: riley's contentions

Text: Riley asserts that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had already attached when he was arrested during the early morning hours of September 9 because the government had filed a criminal complaint charging him with first-degree murder in order to obtain an arrest warrant on September 7. Relying on this assertion, Riley maintains that he should have been informed by the police that a lawyer had telephoned the police station on his behalf before the police made any further attempts to question him. These arguments fail because, under controlling Supreme Court precedent, Riley's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached when he was arrested on September 9. It has been settled law for thirty-five years that a person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against that person by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972); accord, e.g., United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984); United States v. Moore, 122 F.3d 1154, 1156 (8th Cir.1997); see United States v. Duvall, 537 F.2d 15, 18-19 (2d Cir.1976). Riley contends nevertheless, relying on D.C.Code § 23-113(c)(3) (2001), that as soon as an Assistant United States Attorney filed a complaint charging him with murder to obtain an arrest warrant on September 7, the government had committed itself to prosecuting him, and he was faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877. There is no denying that D.C.Code § 23-113(c)(3) does state that the prosecution of an individual commences with the filing of a complaint to obtain an arrest warrant. [11] However, obtaining an arrest warrant has never been deemed to be the point at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877; see Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 190, 104 S.Ct. 2292 (stating that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has never been held to attach at the time of arrest); Beck v. Bowersox, 362 F.3d 1095, 1102 (8th Cir.2004) (this court and other circuits have repeatedly held that the [Sixth Amendment right to counsel] does not attach with an arrest, [or] even an arrest preceded by the filing of a complaint); State v. Beck, 687 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Mo.1985) (stating that an arrest warrant is not a formal charge as that term is used in Kirby ); see also Martinez v. United States, 566 A.2d 1049, 1051-1052 (D.C.1989) (grand jury indictment of the defendant was the first formal charge against him even though arrest warrants had previously been issued). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against [the defendant]. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877 (citations omitted). Though filing a complaint to obtain an arrest warrant involves criminal charges, these are not the same formal charges of which Kirby speaks. The phrase charged by the United States attorney has different meanings in different contexts. See Marrow v. United States, 592 A.2d 1042, 1046 n. 9 (D.C.1991). If this court were to hold that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches when the government files a complaint to obtain an arrest warrant, we would be granting greater protection to persons arrested with warrants than without, thus discouraging the use of warrants in making arrests. Moore, 122 F.3d at 1156; see Duvall, 537 F.2d at 18-19. Moreover, holding that . . . the issuance of an arrest warrant is akin to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings would result in swinging the pendulum of criminal justice far too distant from society's interest in effective and meaningful criminal investigations. State v. Beck, 687 S.W.2d at 160. Thus we conclude that the filing of a complaint containing a criminal charge in order to obtain an arrest warrant does not give rise to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. What matters is the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings  whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877 (emphasis added); accord, e.g., United States v. Rorie, 518 A.2d 409, 412-413 (D.C.1986) (citing Kirby ). Because no adversary judicial criminal proceedings were initiated against Riley until after September 9, no Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached on September 9, the date on which he was arrested. The police therefore had no obligation to inform Riley that they had received a telephone call on September 9 from someone claiming to be his attorney or to terminate their interrogation. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422-423, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (police are not required under the Sixth Amendment to inform a suspect of his attorney's efforts to reach him (citing, inter alia, Kirby and Gouveia )). The trial court was correct when it ruled that the police were not constitutionally required to suspend their interrogation of Riley when they received the call from Mr. O'Brien, or even to advise him of Mr. O'Brien's call. [12]

Riley argues that he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel at 9:00 a.m. on September 9, during the initial interrogation by Detectives Sauls and Garvey, when he checked no in the box next to the question Do you want to make a statement at this time without a lawyer? on the Prince George's County rights waiver form. The trial court found, however, that he did not invoke his Fifth Amendment rights at that time, and there is evidentiary support for its finding. Under case law interpreting the Fifth Amendment, custodial interrogation must cease if, at any time during the questioning, the suspect clearly and explicitly requests an attorney. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). If the suspect clearly requests an attorney, interrogation may lawfully resume only if the suspect initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880. However, the Supreme Court has stated that if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). [13] Police officers have no duty to clarify ambiguous statements that might arguably contain a request for an attorney. Id. at 461-462, 114 S.Ct. 2350; see United States v. Cooper, 85 F.Supp.2d 1, 20 (D.D.C.2000). A court, moreover, must consider the totality of the circumstances to ascertain whether the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). The trial court found, as a fact, that Riley did not explicitly invoke this right when he answered no to the question Are you willing to make a statement at this time without a lawyer? The court interpreted this no answer as clearly invoking his right to remain silent, but not his right to an attorney under the Fifth Amendment. In explaining its finding, the court said that when a person answers no to the [question of whether he is willing to make a statement without a lawyer], it is impossible to know whether the person . . . is not willing to make a statement without a lawyer but is willing to make a statement with a lawyer or whether the person is not willing to make a statement. The Prince George's County waiver form, the court said, was inherently ambiguous. [14] The court noted that Riley did not explicitly ask for a lawyer at any time on September 9, and when he was specifically asked late in the day on September 9 whether he had ever requested a lawyer that day, he responded no. Riley further demonstrated that he did not ask for a lawyer when, at 1:43 p.m. on September 9, he again answered no upon being asked whether he was willing to make a statement without a lawyer, but clarified that statement by saying to Detective DeLoatch, I don't want to make a written statement, but I'm willing to talk to you. Taking all of these facts into consideration, we hold that Riley failed to invoke his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment. See Gresham v. United States, 654 A.2d 871 (D.C.1995) (holding that defendant's confession to the police need not be suppressed because defendant did not clearly assert his right to counsel during interrogation when he asked his girl friend, in the presence of the police, to call his mother and tell her to get him a lawyer). [15]
There is no doubt that Riley invoked his right to remain silent at 9:00 a.m. on September 9. The issue before us here, however, is whether he waived that right a few hours later, at 1:43 p.m. on September 9. The admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). In Stewart v. United States, 668 A.2d 857 (D.C. 1995), this court listed four factors, originally set forth in Mosley, that must be considered in determining whether a suspect's rights have been scrupulously honored: (1) was the suspect orally advised of his rights and did he orally acknowledge them; (2) did the police immediately cease questioning and make no attempts to resume or ask him to reconsider; (3) was there a sufficient break (in Mosley, two hours) between the first and second interrogations and was the second performed at a different location by a different officer about a different crime and (4) were Miranda warnings given before the second questioning session. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. 321; see Stewart, 668 A.2d at 863. The Mosley Court envisioned a case-by-case approach involving an inquiry into all of the relevant facts to determine whether the suspect's rights have been respected. United States v. Dell'Aria, 811 F.Supp. 837, 842 (E.D.N.Y.1993) (cited in Stewart, 668 A.2d at 863). In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this court may not disturb the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. E.g., Stewart, 668 A.2d at 863; see D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (2001). However, we review de novo whether the defendant's rights were scrupulously honored and whether the police conduct constituted interrogation because these are questions of law. Jones v. United States, 779 A.2d 277, 281 (D.C. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 906, 122 S.Ct. 1207, 152 L.Ed.2d 145 (2002); Stewart, 668 A.2d at 863. The trial court ruled that with one failing, which I find to be inadvertent, the police did scrupulously honor [Riley's] right to remain silent . . . having invoked his right to remain silent at 9:00 a.m. that morning and having decided to waive his rights at 1:30 or 1:43 that same afternoon. In coming to this decision, the court reviewed the events of September 9 following Riley's arrest. The court first noted that the police properly terminated their questioning when Riley invoked his right to remain silent at 9:00 a.m. However, Detective DeLoatch then improperly entered Riley's interview room at 10:45 a.m. with the express purpose of eliciting a statement from Riley and interrogating him. Though this was not a proper reinitiation of questioning under Michigan v. Mosley , the trial court concluded, and we agree, that under the totality of the circumstances this isolated act did not invalidate Riley's subsequent waiver of rights or make his confession inadmissible. In Peoples v. United States, 395 A.2d 41 (D.C.1978), the defendant was arrested in Maryland at 9:00 a.m. and thereafter invoked his rights. Despite this invocation, improper questioning ensued, and the defendant admitted to past criminal involvement in the District of Columbia and gave a written confession. Six hours after making this confession, the defendant was again informed of his rights by a magistrate, and he indicated that he understood them. He was then taken back to the police station, where he asked to speak to a District of Columbia police officer. This officer again read the defendant his rights, and the defendant waived them, giving a four-page written statement on the crimes he had committed, signing each page, and initialing a further waiver of his Miranda rights. Though the defendant's initial confessions early in the day were inadmissible, this court held that the trial court did not err in finding appellant's subsequent confession to be voluntary and untainted. 395 A.2d at 44. Although the defendant in Peoples was interviewed about the same crime after invoking his right to remain silent, we held that under the totality of the circumstances the Mosley requirements were satisfied, and thus the statements were admissible. In the case at bar, we are satisfied that, under the totality of the circumstances, the Mosley requirements, as applied in Peoples, were met. [16] Riley invoked his right to remain silent at 9:00 a.m., and the questioning was immediately terminated. Riley was then left alone for a substantial period of time, more than four hours, except for the brief improper remarks that Detective DeLoatch directed at Riley at 10:45 a.m. Later, while Riley was being escorted to the bathroom at around 1:30 p.m., he initiated a conversation on the subject of the murders by making statements to Detective DeLoatch about his innocence which the detective described as unsolicited outbursts. [17] After returning from the bathroom with Riley and hearing his outbursts continue, DeLoatch correctly understood that Riley wished to speak further on the subject. Detective DeLoatch then read Riley his Miranda rights and gave him a waiver form listing these rights, asking if he waived them. After checking the no box next to the question, Are you willing to make a statement at this time without a lawyer?, Riley, without prompting, orally clarified that he was willing to talk but did not want to make a written statement. [18] After Detective DeLoatch explained to Riley that answering yes would not result in a written statement but would simply allow him to talk about the murders, Riley changed his answer from no to yes and waived his rights. [19] During the ensuing conversation Riley told Detective DeLoatch that he had nothing to do with the murders for which he had been arrested. After leaving Riley alone for another long stretch, Detective DeLoatch returned to complete the processing of Riley's arrest. While this was going on, Riley initiated a conversation with Detective DeLoatch by asking if he could speak with Muhammad. Detective DeLoatch arranged a meeting between the two of them at about 7:30 p.m., and during that meeting Riley learned from Muhammad that he had confessed. Riley then decided that he too wanted to confess, and told Detective DeLoatch that he wanted to tell his side of the story. Riley then gave a written statement, in the course of which he admitted his involvement in the murders. Although he was not read his Miranda rights again before writing that statement, which was completed at around 9:40 p.m., the evidence established that he had already heard his rights read several times that day. In addition, he testified at the suppression hearing that he understood his rights because of his prior arrest on August 22, only two and a half weeks earlier. Finally, Riley signed an addendum at the end of his written statement, indicating that he waived his rights and that at no time that day had he requested the aid of counsel. The timing of Riley's confession persuades us that the key factor in prompting him to confess was his 7:30 p.m. meeting with Muhammad, which was arranged at Riley's behest. We hold that Riley's waiver of his Miranda rights shortly after 1:30 p.m. was not tainted by Detective DeLoatch's serious, but ultimately inconsequential, misstep at 10:45 a.m., and that his written confession several hours later  which he gave after his meeting with Muhammad  was not subject to exclusion under Mosley and its progeny.
At this court's request, all of the parties filed supplemental memoranda after oral argument discussing the effect on this case of the recent Supreme Court decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). In his memorandum, Riley asserts that Crawford represents a course correction and that, taken together with Bruton, [20] Gray, [21] and Cruz, [22] the Crawford opinion demonstrates a significant shift in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning the admissibility in joint trials of police obtained confessions. Although we agree that the Crawford case dramatically transformed Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 5 (D.C.2006), we think Riley reads the Crawford opinion too broadly. Initially, Riley relies on Cruz to argue that all three appellants' confessions in this case were not properly sanitized under Gray (and Bruton ). He asserts that [the] jurors only needed to insert the word `we' for `I' to conclude that Mr. Muhammad and Mr. Marks implicated Mr. Riley in their statements, and the interlocking nature of the statements was an open invitation to do so. Cruz does not support this argument. In Cruz a co-defendant's confession was held to be inadmissible, even though the defendant against whom it was admitted had confessed as well, because it was unredacted. Cruz, 481 U.S. at 193, 107 S.Ct. 1714. In the present case, by contrast, the confessions of Muhammad and Marks were redacted to eliminate any mention of Riley. Furthermore, in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987), decided on the same day as Cruz, the Supreme Court clarified that if the prosecution in Cruz had redacted the confession to remove any mention of the co-defendant, there would have been no Confrontation Clause problem. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702. Because the co-defendants' confessions in this case were redacted to omit any mention of Riley, Cruz does not apply. Riley also contends that the inferences that could be drawn from the interlocking nature of Marks' and Muhammad's statements violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. This contention fails under established Supreme Court precedent. In Richardson the Court instructed that, when determining whether a confession expressly implicates a co-defendant, courts should restrict their examination to determining whether the confession is incriminating on its face and should not consider whether it is incriminating when linked with evidence introduced later at trial. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702; see Plater v. United States, 745 A.2d 953, 960-962 nn. 11 & 12 (D.C.2000) (noting that the Supreme Court in Gray ruled out the consideration of other evidence when determining whether a statement inferentially incriminates a defendant). Inferences that are considered offensive to Bruton's principles are those that allow the jury to infer from the redactions themselves that the co-defendant was a part of the criminal enterprise, even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial  such as using the word deleted instead of a specific individual's name, which obviously refer[s] directly to someone. Plater, 745 A.2d at 961 n. 11. Nothing like that happened in this case. An examination of Muhammad's and Marks' statements, as admitted into evidence, reveals that they were properly redacted and did not implicate Riley, standing alone; thus the statements, as admitted, did not violate the teachings of Bruton and its progeny. Riley also relies on Crawford to argue that the introduction of his co-defendants' confessions violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. In Crawford the Supreme Court held that the admission of an out-of-court testimonial statement by the defendant's wife which incriminated her husband infringed his Sixth Amendment rights because he did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine her. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. [23] The wife's statement was both facially incriminating and introduced against the defendant challenging the statement. United States v. Cuong Gia Le, 316 F.Supp.2d 330, 338 (E.D.Va.2004). Here, by contrast, the confessions of Riley's co-defendants were redacted to eliminate all references to the other defendants' participation in the murders; thus they could not facially incriminate Riley. Furthermore, those statements were not admitted as evidence against Riley. Crawford, therefore, is not pertinent to Riley's appeal, because Marks' and Muhammad's confessions were properly redacted in accordance with Bruton, Richardson, Gray, and Plater. In addition, the court gave a proper limiting instruction to resolve any questions that the jurors might have had about how the statements could be used. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702. Thus Riley had no right based on the Bruton line of cases, or on Crawford, to confront his co-defendants through cross-examination because their statements did not implicate Riley's Confrontation Clause rights.