Opinion ID: 172511
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Leon Good Faith

Text: Even if the warrant was not sufficiently particularized to comply with the Fourth Amendment, the evidence need not be excluded if the search qualified under the good faith doctrine of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). Whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should be applied is a question of law, subject to de novo review by this Court. [22] Leary, 846 F.2d at 606. In Leon, the Supreme Court held the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct and suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further that purpose. 468 U.S. at 918, 104 S.Ct. 3405. Where an officer acting with objective good faith obtains a search warrant from a detached and neutral magistrate and the executing officers act within its scope, there is nothing to deter. United States v. Nolan, 199 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir.1999). Burgess argues the Leon exception does not apply here because the warrant was so facially deficient ... the executing officers [could] not [have] reasonably presume[d] it to be valid. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405. It is the government's burden to prove its agents' reliance upon the warrant was objectively reasonable. United States v. Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d 927, 932 (10th Cir.1990) (quotations omitted). Just as reviewing courts give `great deference' to the decisions of judicial officers who make probable-cause determinations, police officers should be entitled to rely upon the probable-cause determination of a neutral magistrate when defending an attack on their good faith for either seeking or executing a warrant. Id. at 939. It is the magistrate's responsibility to determine whether the officer's allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. Leon, 468 U.S. at 921, 104 S.Ct. 3405. Burgess cites to two district court cases from other circuits to demonstrate these officers could not reasonably believe the warrant was valid. In United States v. Clough, the warrant authorized a search of computers for a. text documents of any variety, including e-mail, websites, records of chat sessions, correspondence or shipping records; and b. digital images of any variety, including still images and videos. 246 F.Supp.2d 84, 87 (D.Me.2003). As the court found, the warrant contained no restrictions on the search, no references to statutes, and no references to crimes or illegality. Id. Again, in United States v. Fleet Mgm't Ltd., the warrant authorized a computer search for any and all data from the three seized computers, including, but not limited to certain types of data relating to the Ship's operation, engineering, maintenance, pollution control equipment, navigational charts, and crew. 521 F.Supp.2d 436 (E.D.Pa.2007) (quotations omitted). In neither case was the search restricted in any way by the warrant. These cases only underscore the officers' reasonable reliance on the language of the warrant in this case limiting the search to evidence of drug trafficking. Contrary to Burgess' assertions, Agent Hughes did not contact the agency attorney because he was confused about the scope of his search, he emphatically stated his concern was the delay. Hughes knew he was looking for evidence of drug possession and distribution and that such evidence would very likely be contained in the digital images on the hard drive. At each step of the investigation, the officers made every effort to comply with the law. Therefore, even if the warrant was deficient, exclusion of the evidence would not be necessary.