Opinion ID: 484640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The First Trial and Wakefield I

Text: 8 A jury trial was held on Wakefield's breach of contract claim. The court instructed the jury, inter alia, that it could find in Wakefield's favor if it found either that Wakefield had substantially performed all of his contractual obligations or that NTI did not act in good faith toward Wakefield. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Wakefield in the amount of $111,079.87. NTI's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.) or a new trial were denied, and NTI appealed. 9 On appeal, we noted that Wakefield advanced two theories in support of his contract claim: (1) that NTI's 1979 communications concerning modification of the sales incentive plan wholly superseded the Danray Plan and, containing no provision similar to Paragraph J, eliminated any requirement that Wakefield be an NTI employee when the commissions became payable, so long as he had procured the sale; and (2) that NTI had fired him precisely in order to avoid paying him commissions on sales that were complete but for formalities, thereby violating an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. We found the district court's instructions to the jury flawed because (1) Paragraph J, if not superseded, was an express contractual requirement and hence strict compliance, rather than substantial compliance, would be required in order to entitle Wakefield to commissions on sales consummated after his termination; and (2) the court's instructions on good faith dealing had been too broad and the jury should have been told that it could not find in favor of Wakefield unless it found that his termination had been substantially motivated by NTI's desire to deny him commissions and was not part of a legitimate reduction in work force or the result of dissatisfaction with him. 10 Noting that the dispute as to the continued viability of Paragraph J had not been submitted to the jury, and concluding that a properly instructed jury could have awarded damages to Wakefield upon either of [his] theories described above, Wakefield I, 769 F.2d at 113, we remanded for a new trial. We stated that 11 Wakefield may prevail in one of two ways. First, he may attempt to prove that Paragraph J of the 1978 Danray Sales Incentive Plan did not apply to some or all of the sales for which he seeks commissions, and that he substantially fulfilled the requirements of any applicable contracts to earn commissions for those sales. Second, he may attempt to prove that NTI's desire to avoid paying him commissions that were virtually certain to become vested was a substantial motivating factor in the decision to discharge him. If the discharge was otherwise motivated, he may not recover on the good faith theory. 12 Id. at 114.