Opinion ID: 484641
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Supervening Cause Arguments of Garrett and Phoenix

Text: 56 The principal contentions of Garrett and Phoenix on their appeals are that they were entitled to judgment n.o.v. because their negligence, conceded for purposes of these arguments, was not the proximate cause of the crash of the Jetstar because of the supervening conduct of TGA. We reject these contentions. 57 Preliminarily, we note our rejection of Woodling's contention that these arguments were not properly preserved for appeal. Phoenix's written motion for a directed verdict specifically referred to lack of proximate cause as a ground. The oral motions of both Phoenix and Garrett for a directed verdict were made on all possible grounds, and the district court stated this was sufficient to preserve the record. Woodling neither objected to the lack of specificity in the directed verdict motions nor opposed the judgment n.o.v. motions on this ground. On this record, the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence concerning proximate cause was preserved for appeal. See, e.g., Mosley v. Cia. Mar. Adra, S.A., 362 F.2d 118, 121-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 933, 87 S.Ct. 292, 17 L.Ed.2d 213 (1966). 58 The evidence at the liability trial painted the following picture as to the cause of the crash. At 6:40 p.m. on February 11, 1981, in darkness, with visibility limited by weather, the Jetstar was attempting an instrument landing approach. The jet's electrical equipment, including the cockpit navigation instruments, was powered by four engine generators, each regulated by its own generator control unit (GCU). As the plane descended, the GCUs tripped the four generators, i.e., disconnected them from the electrical equipment. At first, backup batteries provided power for resetting the generators and essential equipment; but the GCUs continued to disconnect intermittently, depleting and finally exhausting the batteries. The final tripping occurred when the plane was about 500 feet above the ground. The plane crashed some 20 seconds later, a mile short of the runway and 2,300 feet to the right of course. 59 The generators had been installed in the Jetstar by Garrett in late January 1981. On January 31, Garrett's electrician was present during TGA's ensuing test flights. On the first of those flights a single generator tripped, was reset, tripped again, and was reset again; then all four generators tripped. On a second test flight, one generator again tripped twice and had to be reset. On a third flight, there was no tripping. Garrett employees testified that they never discovered the cause of the problem, but they told TGA that the tripping problem had been solved. 60 There was testimony that TGA reported further tripping problems to Garrett on two other occasions prior to the date of the crash. Garrett's electrical shop supervisor testified that from these reports he knew the condition still existed. Garrett personnel admitted that they knew Garrett did, at its own facility, all major maintenance for TGA aircraft and that TGA relied on Garrett's expertise, including that concerning electrical problems. Garrett never advised TGA to ground the Jetstar because of the tripping. 61 The generators had been designed by Phoenix. In the ten days prior to the crash, Phoenix was informed once of a double tripping of the generators and once that three generators had tripped. On the day of the crash, a TGA official informed Phoenix that multiple tripping had occurred that morning. Phoenix admitted that it knew TGA was relying on its knowledge and advice with respect to the proper functioning and safety of the generators. It never advised TGA to ground the plane. 62 Woodling's expert witnesses testified that the multiple tripping should have indicated that a systemic problem remained, that both Phoenix and Garrett had greater expertise than TGA with respect to such problems, that Garrett should have asked TGA to ground the Jetstar until Garrett could repair it, and that Garrett should have known that TGA would be unable on its own to know whether the problem was solved. 63 In support of their arguments that TGA's conduct was the supervening cause of the crash and hence relieves them of liability as a matter of law, Garrett and Phoenix point principally to evidence that TGA's pilots and maintenance director were aware of all of the incidents of tripping; that they were aware that at least three of the four generators had tripped out during a flight on the morning of the crash and had been off-line for several minutes; and that TGA pilots were aware of the weather forecast for the Westchester area on the evening of the crash, which predicted an overcast sky, fog, occasionally heavy rain, light thunder showers, winds at 15 knots, and obscured visibility. TGA's chief pilot testified that in order to fly in such conditions, a plane is required to have flight instruments that are working and that the loss of all four generators would be unacceptable at night or in bad weather conditions because that loss would soon exhaust the backup battery power and leave the pilot without means to navigate the plane. 64 Given all the evidence, the proximate cause issues were properly submitted to the jury. Under New York law, which the parties agree governs the tort issues in this case, notwithstanding the intervention of an act of a third person between the original negligence and the ultimate injury, the original negligent actor can be found to have proximately caused the injury if the intervening act was normal or foreseeable. See Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 315-16, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 169-70, 414 N.E.2d 666, 670 (1980) (Derdiarian ); Bonsignore v. City of New York, 683 F.2d 635, 638 (2d Cir.1982); Vasina v. Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112, 114-15 (2d Cir.1981) (Vasina ). When, as is usually the case, circumstances permit varying inferences as to the foreseeability of the intervening act, the proximate cause issue is a question of fact for the jury. See Derdiarian, 51 N.Y.2d at 315, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 170, 414 N.E.2d at 670; Vasina, 644 F.2d at 114. If the intervening act was foreseeable, it does not excuse the original actor that the intervening act was reckless, Derdiarian, 51 N.Y.2d at 316, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 170, 414 N.E.2d at 671, or intentional, see Kush v. City of Buffalo, 59 N.Y.2d 26, 33, 462 N.Y.S.2d 831, 835, 449 N.E.2d 725, 729 (1983), or even intentional and criminal, see Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 507, 520-21, 429 N.Y.S.2d 606, 614, 407 N.E.2d 451, 459 (1980); Bonsignore v. City of New York, 683 F.2d at 638. A fortiori, the fact that the intervening actor, such as an employer who controls defective machinery, knows of the dangers and merely fails to warn or otherwise protect the plaintiff does not of itself relieve the original actor from liability. See Cohen v. St. Regis Paper Co., 65 N.Y.2d 752, 754, 492 N.Y.S.2d 22, 24, 481 N.E.2d 562, 564 (1985); accord Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639, 642-43 (1930). Nor should we strain to relieve a negligent party from responsibility because of an intervening act when the original negligence created a situation of extreme danger. Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts Sec. 44, at 319 (5th ed. 1984); cf. Gordon v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182, 1193-94 (5th Cir.1978) (high likelihood and grievous nature of potential harm are factors in finding that employer's failure to pass on warnings was not a supervening cause). 65 The trial evidence, taken in the light most favorable to Woodling, provided an ample basis for submitting the proximate cause issues to the jury. To Garrett's and Phoenix's knowledge, TGA had been flying the Jetstar despite ongoing tripping problems for more than a week. It was thus entirely reasonable for the jury to conclude that it was foreseeable to both Garrett and Phoenix that despite the systemic problems with the generators, TGA would not on its own know enough or be resolute enough either to solve the problem or to ground the plane. Especially given the potential for loss of life that was foreseeable to Garrett and Phoenix, there was sufficient evidence that the negligence of Garrett and that of Phoenix were proximate causes of the crash. 66 McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407, 181 N.E.2d 430 (1962), and Boltax v. Joy Day Camp, 67 N.Y.2d 617, 499 N.Y.S.2d 660, 490 N.E.2d 527 (1986), do not require a different result. Boltax is distinguishable because there was no pattern of constant consultation on the problem, the situation was not one of inherently extreme danger that required expertise to fathom, and the intervening actor was the plaintiff himself. While the discussion in McLaughlin might be read to suggest that an intervening actor's gross negligence is a superseding cause that relieves the original negligent actor from liability, see 11 N.Y.2d at 71, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 414, 181 N.E.2d at 435, the more recent New York cases discussed above, holding that reckless, intentional, and even criminal intervening acts are not superseding causes when they are foreseeable, indicate that such a reading would not accurately reflect current New York law. In any event, McLaughlin was a case in which the court found that the intervening act was entirely unforeseeable. There the product's container bore a warning as to the product's proper use; the intervening actor had been advised orally by the manufacturer's representative of the proper manner of use, and had received a formal demonstration of proper use. Yet the intervening actor removed the product from its carton before handing it to another person to use, thereby preventing the user from reading the manufacturer's warning, gave no oral warnings of his own to the user, and stood watching callously as the product was administered in precisely the manner proscribed by the manufacturer's warnings. Simply put, the court found this conduct so antithetical to the purpose of warnings as to be unforeseeable. In contrast, in the present case TGA in no way either refused to follow warnings or removed safety protections, for Garrett and Phoenix neither gave such warnings nor provided such protections. 67 Accordingly, the issue of proximate cause was properly submitted to the jury and no basis appears for setting aside the jury's findings. 68