Opinion ID: 1660303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Statements of Intent.

Text: During the trial Crawford testified that his stepfather Paulson had stated to him in a conversation that he did not like the idea of being apart from his wife and also had asked Crawford if mother was willing to let him come back home. Attorney Engle testified that Paulson had told him that he was commencing the action to shake her up so she would fly right.... He further testified that Paulson had told him that he didn't really want a divorce, and that he would dismiss the action after he had accomplished the purpose of shaking up his wife. (Paulson waived the attorney-client privilege.) Appellant contends that this testimony by Crawford and Engle constituted inadmissible hearsay, and the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to sustain appellant's objections thereto. As pointed out in the above-quoted excerpt from our opinion on the first appeal [t]here is a close analogy between the concepts of household and domicile because intent of the person involved plays such a significant part. [5] In Will of Heymann [6] this court stated: ... The declarations of the party before, at, and after the time of change of domicile are admissible, as well as all the facts and circumstances gained with such change of domicile.... [7] Wigmore has stated: That declarations of intent as to residence are in general admissible is nowhere questioned .... [8] In Bridges v. State [9] this court quoted with approval from American Jurisprudence as follows: `... There is no question that where a particular state of mind of a person is a relevant fact, declarations which indicate its existence are admissible as primary evidence, notwithstanding the declarant is available as a witness.' [10] `Assuming that the state of mind of a person at a particular time is relevant, his declarations made at that time are admissible as proof on that issue, notwithstanding they were not made in the presence of the adverse party. It is clear that when evidence of the declarations of a person is introduced solely for the purpose of showing what the state of mind or intention of that person was at the time the declarations were made, the declarations are regarded as acts from which the state of mind or intention may be inferred in the same manner as from the appearance of the person, or his behavior, or his actions generally.' ... [11] In view of these authorities the trial court properly overruled appellant's objections to the testimony of Crawford and Engle.