Opinion ID: 1861743
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction of the State Courts

Text: The Housing Authority suggests that, aside from its sovereign immunity, the state courts have no jurisdiction over this dispute because it involves a matter which is appropriate for resolution only by a Chippewa tribunal. Under the facts of this case, we hold that the Minnesota state courts do have jurisdiction. The question of state jurisdiction over matters involving Indians is complex and not susceptible to easy resolution. Court decisions are not always consistent, and the maze of judicial considerations has been the discussion of numerous commentaries. See, Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L.Rev. 535; Note, 25 Hastings L.J. 1451; Comment, 4 Wm.Mitchell L.Rev. 454. Much of the problem in assessing the appropriate limits of jurisdiction stems from the vacillating views of Congress and the Federal Government concerning Indian reservations. Prior to 1953, state courts had little authority to adjudicate disputes concerning Indian matters. In 1953, Congress enacted Public Law 280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360), which granted jurisdiction to many states over certain civil and criminal matters. As one commentator observes:    Public Law 280 [granted] to Minnesota, among other states, jurisdiction over many civil and criminal actions on most reservations within the state. Jurisdiction over certain items on all Minnesota reservations, however, was reserved by the federal government to the tribal groups. The items which were reserved from the jurisdiction granted to Minnesota are items that generally were the subject of treaties and that are tied to the particular location in which they occur, such as hunting, fishing, trapping, taxation, and other civil regulatory functions. Administration of tribal rights relating to such matters is accomplished through statutes and ordinances passed by the tribal government of each reservation. 4 Wm.Mitchell L.Rev. 456. (Footnotes omitted.) [1] See, also, Washington v. Confederated Bans and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979) (discussing Public Law 280). The purpose of the statute was to curtail the problem of lawlessness on many reservations which had developed due to inadequate Indian institutions for law enforcement. Public Law 280 was enacted at a time when Congress favored assimilation of the Indian culture with American culture, and would seem to give state jurisdiction over all matters that are not expressly reserved to the Indians. In recent years, however, it is clear that Federal courts have recognized a Federal policy of Indian self-government rather than assimilation, and therefore judicially-created restrictions on state jurisdiction have been imposed. Defining the precise nature of these restrictions is the task which confronts this court. Several United States Supreme Court decisions are instructive on the limitations of state jurisdiction over Indian matters. One of these decisions is Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota, 426 U.S. 373, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976), reversing 303 Minn. 395, 228 N.W.2d 249 (1975). In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that the state does not have authority to impose a personal property tax on a mobile home located on the Leech Lake Indian Reservation in Minnesota. In discussing the meaning of Public Law 280, § 4, the court said (426 U.S. 383, 96 S.Ct. 2108, 48 L.Ed.2d 718): Piecing together as best we can the sparse legislative history of § 4, subsection (a) seems to have been primarily intended to redress the lack of adequate Indian forums for resolving private legal disputes between reservation Indians, and between Indians and other private citizens, by permitting the courts of the States to decide such disputes   . Thus, state courts generally have full jurisdiction over common-law disputes such as torts or contracts involving Indians. However, additional language in the court's opinion indicates that even this jurisdiction may be limited in certain situations (426 U.S. 387, 96 S.Ct. 2110, 48 L.Ed.2d 720):    Today's congressional policy toward reservation Indians may less clearly than in 1953 favor their assimilation, but Pub.L. 280 was plainly not meant to effect total assimilation.    And nothing in its legislative history remotely suggests that Congress meant the Act's extension of civil jurisdiction to the States should result in the undermining or destruction of such tribal governments as did exist and a conversion of the affected tribes into little more than `private, voluntary organizations'   . Therein lies an ever-present, overriding principle: State jurisdiction must not interfere with Indian self-government, absent some compelling state interest. [2] A subsequent Supreme Court decision has underscored this principle limiting state jurisdiction. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978), the court held that only tribal institutions have jurisdiction under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 to settle an intratribal dispute. In resolving the question of jurisdiction, the court said (436 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 1677, 56 L.Ed.2d 116):    Even in matters involving commercial and domestic relations, we have recognized that `subject[ing] a dispute arising on the reservation among reservation Indians to a forum other than the one they have established for themselves,'    may `undermine the authority of the tribal cour[t]    and hence    infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.'   A fortiori, resolution in a foreign forum of intratribal disputes of a more `public' character, such as the one in this case, cannot help but unsettle a tribal government's ability to maintain authority. Although Congress clearly has power to authorize civil actions    a proper respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent. See, also, McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973). [3] The question in the present case, therefore, is whether the state court would adversely affect the Chippewa Tribe's self-government by assuming jurisdiction over a civil dispute involving monies disbursed by the Housing Authority. Generally, state courts may assume jurisdiction over disputes arising from commercial transactions between Indians and non-Indians if the transaction is not confined to the Indian Reservation. Crawford v. Roy, Mont., 577 P.2d 392 (1978); Indian Oasis School Dist. No. 40 v. Zambrano, 22 Ariz. App. 201, 526 P.2d 408 (1974). In Little Horn State Bank v. Stops, 170 Mont. 510, 555 P.2d 211 (1976), certiorari denied, 431 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 2198, 53 L.Ed.2d 238 (1977), a bank sought to levy upon certain property owned by private Indians, who had borrowed money from the bank. The bank was located and the transaction occurred outside of the reservation. The Montana Supreme Court held that the state court had jurisdiction. In so holding, the court said (170 Mont. 515-516, 555 P.2d 214): The crucial fact of this appeal is that the subject matter jurisdiction lies with the state court, not the tribal court. In this case the tribal members elected to leave the reservation and conduct their affairs within the jurisdiction of the state courts. When they do so they are submitting themselves to the laws of this state. They cannot violate those laws and then retreat to the sanctuary of the reservation for protection. Cases which indicate that a state has no jurisdiction over commercial disputes involving Indians and non-Indians can be distinguished. In Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959), the Supreme Court held that a non-Indian owner of a store on a Navajo Indian reservation could not invoke state court jurisdiction to collect a debt owed by a Navajo Indian, but instead must seek relief through tribal institutions. This case can be distinguished because the transaction occurred entirely on the reservation and the state had not acquired jurisdiction under Public Law 280. Other cases involving torts or transactions entirely on the reservation can be distinguished on the same basis. See Sigana v. Bailey, 282 Minn. 367, 164 N.W.2d 886 (1969) (tribe excepted from Public Law 280); Security State Bank v. Pierre, 161 Mont. 350, 511 P.2d 325 (1973) (business transaction entirely reservation). In conclusion, state jurisdiction in this case does not interfere with the right of the Indians on the Fond du Lac Reservation to make their own laws and be ruled by them. By entering into an agreement with the United States and Delta, a private developer, the Housing Authority is deemed to have submitted itself to the jurisdiction of non-Indian institutions for the purpose of construing and enforcing the agreement. Construction and application of the agreement are at stake, not the governmental functions, laws, or customs of the tribe. Hence, state jurisdiction is proper.