Opinion ID: 2184580
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Time-Barred Limitation

Text: Having determined that a cause of action exists, we must next determine whether it is time-barred. In the trial court, defendant claimed that section 13-214 of the Code of Civil Procedure barred plaintiff from recovery because more than 10 years had elapsed from the time the addition was constructed. See 735 ILCS 5/13-214(b) (West 1994). In its brief before this court, however, defendant adopts the language of Redarowicz and asserts that plaintiff cannot recover because the action has not been brought within a reasonable time. Redarowicz, 92 Ill.2d at 185, 65 Ill.Dec. 411, 441 N.E.2d 324. Because neither court addressed the issue in dismissing plaintiff's original or amended complaints, plaintiff contends the lower courts accepted the 11-year gap as reasonable for bringing suit. Plaintiff further asserts that the time within which an action may be brought should start on the date the subsequent purchaser takes ownership of the premises, not from the date of completion of construction. Because the parties have neither briefed nor argued in this court whether it is the repose provision of section 13-214 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the reasonable time standard of Redarowicz that controls the time limitation here, we do not decide that question today. We believe, however, that under either of defendant's theoriesthe repose period of section 13-214 or the reasonable time standard of Redarowicz the 11-year gap between the time of the construction and the claim for damages resulting from a latent defect bars plaintiff from recovery in this case. Under section 13-214 of the Code of Civil Procedure, plaintiff's action is barred because it has been longer than 10 years since the date of construction of the addition. Further, under the reasonable time standard of Redarowicz, we find the 11-year period between the date of the act or omission causing the defect and the time the action was brought to be an unreasonable time to hold a builder liable. A builder cannot be a lifetime guarantor of construction, susceptible to a claim for damages under the implied warranty of habitability beyond the foreseeable future. We therefore hold that the reasonable time for bringing a cause of action under the reasonable time standard of Redarowicz begins with the act or omission causing the defect rather than the date on which the subsequent purchaser takes title to the property. Because plaintiff would not prevail whether the claim must be brought within 10 years under the statute of repose or within a reasonable time under Redarowicz, we find that the claim is time-barred.