Opinion ID: 2815883
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The shooting of Eric Dawson

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the shooting of Eric Dawson as aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b) without specifying which particular crime defendant was alleged to have committed in that incident. He claims the error violated his rights to due process and a reliable penalty verdict. There was no error. As described, ante, at page 11, in January 1992, defendant and his associate, Reginald Robinson, were involved in an incident in a motel room involving Anita Smith, 50 her husband, and Eric Dawson. At that time, Dawson suffered a shotgun wound to his arm, but Anita Smith did not see who shot him. Later, Robinson pointed a shotgun at Anita Smith, but defendant intervened and told Robinson not to shoot her. Defendant then slapped Smith in her face and left with Robinson. Defendant claims the trial court failed to instruct on the specific crime defendant committed in connection with the shooting of Dawson. Because the evidence did not establish who shot Dawson, he contends, the jury could only speculate whether he was the shooter, an aider or abettor to the shooting, or an accessory to the shooting. We have held that “absent a request, the trial court has no duty to specify the names or elements of the unadjudicated crimes when instructing the jury on factor (b) evidence” because, for tactical reasons, “most defendants prefer not to risk having the jury place undue emphasis on the prior violent crimes.” (People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 656.) In the present case, defendant did not ask the court to enumerate the specific crimes relevant to the shooting of Dawson, and he provides no persuasive reason for us to reconsider our prior precedent on this subject. D. Admission of defendant’s statement concerning gangs Defendant contends it was error for the trial court to admit his 1989 statement to a police officer that he had personally expelled members of the Gardena Payback Crips from his Casa Blanca neighborhood. He argues that his statement was not relevant to prove his involvement in the 1989 driveby shooting of a Gardena Payback Crips gang member, and that the admission of his statement violated Evidence Code section 352 and his constitutional rights to due process and a reliable penalty verdict. The statement was properly admitted. As explained, ante, at page 10, the trial court admitted as prior violent crimes evidence the 1989 driveby shooting of Nigel Hider, a member of the Gardena Payback Crips. After being shot, Hider identified defendant as the shooter but told a detective he 51 would not testify in court. A witness to the shooting, Angela McCurdy, described the shooter‟s appearance as consistent with defendant‟s appearance but could not definitively identify defendant as the shooter. At the penalty phase retrial, Hider claimed the person who shot him was a Caucasian male, and denied previously having identified defendant as the shooter. Similarly, McCurdy testified that she had not witnessed the shooting and denied ever stating to the contrary. After the witnesses‟ testimony, the prosecutor sought to introduce evidence of defendant‟s prior 1989 statement to a police officer, made approximately one month before the Hider shooting, in which he bragged that “he single-handedly ran the Gardena Payback Crips out of the Casa Blanca area.” The prosecutor argued the evidence would prove identity and motive in the Hider shooting. The trial court permitted the admission of this statement over defendant‟s objection under Evidence Code section 352. The trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that the probative value of defendant‟s statement was not substantially outweighed by any undue prejudice. Defendant made the statement approximately one month before Hider was shot and it explained his motive in shooting Hider. Because Hider and McCurdy at trial both denied their previous identifications of the shooter, the issue of identity also became relevant and defendant‟s statement gave credence to Hider‟s prior identification of defendant as his attacker. Defendant‟s statement, therefore, supported the prosecution‟s theory that defendant intentionally shot Hider in an effort to expel gang members from his neighborhood. (See People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 533 [statements relevant to motive were properly admitted to support the theory that the victim was the intended target].) E. Claims of instructional error Defendant raises several unmeritorious claims of instructional error at the penalty phase. 52
Defendant contends that CALJIC No. 8.87, the standard instruction concerning evidence of other aggravating criminal activity admissible under section 190.3, factor (b), improperly created a mandatory presumption that the activity was criminal in nature instead of having the jury decide whether the conduct constituted a crime. We have previously rejected similar challenges to CALJIC No. 8.87, reasoning that the instruction properly compels the jury to decide the factual question of whether the evidence proved that defendant committed the acts, whereas whether the activity constituted an actual crime or a crime of violence is a legal matter decided by the trial court. (People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 235; People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 720.)
Defendant claims the trial court had a duty on its own motion to provide the jury with an instruction regarding the appropriate use of victim impact evidence. Although he did not ask for such instructions below, on appeal he proposes that the trial court had a duty to inform jurors that victim impact evidence is “simply another method of informing you about the nature and circumstances of the crime in question,” that “the law does not deem the life of one victim more valuable than another; rather, victim impact evidence shows that the victim, like the defendant, is a unique individual,” and that the jury is “limited to a rational inquiry into the culpability of the defendant, not an emotional response to the evidence.” The proposed instruction would have also stated that “a victim impact witness is precluded from expressing an opinion on capital punishment and, therefore, jurors must draw no inference whatsoever by a witness‟s silence in that regard.” We have previously rejected the same argument concerning the same proposed instructional language because the standard instructions provide essentially similar advisements; moreover, some of the proposed instructional language erroneously would 53 preclude a jury from having an emotional response, or is simply unnecessary to the jury‟s understanding of the case. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 369-370.) F. Alleged prosecutorial misconduct Defendant contends the prosecutor committed three instances of misconduct during the penalty phase retrial closing arguments. He argues that the asserted misconduct violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty verdict. We disagree. “As at the guilt phase of the trial, at the penalty phase a prosecutor commits misconduct under the federal standard by engaging in conduct that renders the trial so unfair as to constitute a denial of due process. [Citations.] State law characterizes the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods as misconduct.” (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 786.) First, defendant argues it was improper for the prosecutor to make the following statement in closing argument: “The people who know the defendant know enough about him to fear him, and so should you.” Defendant objected but the trial court overruled the objection.15 To the extent that the prosecutor‟s comments stressed defendant‟s dangerousness, there was no improper argument. In People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, we found no misconduct concerning a similar closing argument emphasizing the defendant‟s dangerousness. In that case, the 15 The Attorney General argues that defendant forfeited this claim because he did not also ask for a curative admonition. But, logically, the requirement that a defendant also seek a curative instruction to alleviate the effect of improper argument applies only if the court sustains the defense objection as to its impropriety. (People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1205 [“Defendant‟s objection having been sustained, defendant bore the burden of seeking a curative admonition from the court”].) Defendant did not forfeit this claim. 54 defendant had robbed and murdered a young woman after her car broke down on the road. At the penalty phase closing argument, the prosecutor stated: “ „It‟s really scary what happens out there on our highways. And it‟s even more scary because we know we got a predator sitting right here in the courtroom with us. It is time that we take control of the situation and do what is right.‟ ” (Id. at p. 323.) We concluded that this argument was “not unduly inflammatory.” (Ibid.) Similarly, in People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th 225, we found no misconduct created by the prosecutor‟s emphasis that witnesses were afraid of the defendant. As in the present case, the prosecutor argued that various witnesses feared the defendant and that their fears affected their testimony. The prosecutor claimed that these witnesses, by testifying, took “ „a substantial risk‟ ” and came forward “ „at great peril to themselves.‟ ” (Id. at pp. 286-287.) Again, we concluded that the remarks “were proper argument.” (Id. at p. 287.) Defendant relies on Tucker v. Zant (11th Cir. 1984) 724 F.2d 882, but it is neither on point nor binding authority. In that case, the prosecutor argued that his office rarely sought the death penalty, based on his personal experience, but that the defendant was “ „not the type of man you‟re going to want to take a chance on living‟ ” and if executed the prosecutor would “ „sleep just as good, or [he‟ll] sleep better knowing that one of them won‟t be on the street.‟ ” (Id. at p. 889.) The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that this argument was improper because the prosecutor had assured the jurors that someone with greater experience had made the decision that defendant deserved death, rather than the jury. (Ibid.) Furthermore, whether the prosecutor would sleep better was not relevant and served “only to arouse the generalized fears of the jurors and divert the focus of their attention from the character of this crime and this criminal.” (Ibid.) The prosecutor here did not personalize his fear or experience, and, in any event, we are not bound by the decisions of the lower federal courts. (People v. Avena, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 431.) 55 As to the prosecutor‟s suggestion that the jury should fear defendant, this brief comment, even if we assume it was improper, was harmless, as it was not so egregious, deceptive, or reprehensible so as to render his trial unfair. Second, defendant challenges the method by which the prosecutor discussed defendant‟s remorse. Prior to closing argument, defense counsel preemptively objected to the prosecutor arguing lack of remorse. The prosecutor acknowledged he could not argue that defendant‟s lack of remorse was an aggravating factor but observed that the law did permit him to argue that defendant‟s lack of remorse is nonexistent as a mitigating factor. The trial court agreed and cautioned the prosecutor to exercise care in this regard. During closing argument, the prosecutor explained that the presence of remorse can be a mitigating factor and that its absence cannot be an aggravating factor. He then continued: “But as I said, if he has remorse, it can be considered as mitigating. Is there any sign of remorse here? I‟d submit there‟s none, that there is no mitigation in remorse to be placed on this side of the scale.” Defendant acknowledges that our case law establishes that the prosecutor‟s argument was proper. But he insists, however, that the argument was improper under the facts of this case because the prosecutor seized upon a matter for which defendant put forth no evidence, thereby violating fundamental fairness and due process. We construe defendant‟s argument to mean that the prosecutor, in this context, improperly commented on his silence, in violation of Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, which holds that a prosecutor‟s comment on a defendant‟s failure to testify violates the Fifth Amendment. But we have previously rejected this kind of claim, explaining that the prosecutor simply “noted the lack of evidence and did not refer to defendant‟s silence” and that “a prosecutor is entitled during closing argument to highlight a defendant‟s lack of remorse, and doing so does not necessarily violate Griffin.” (People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 585.) 56 Third, defendant contends the prosecutor improperly argued that the defense had tried to denigrate the victims by suggesting that “these victims, Martin and Candy, aren‟t worthy enough.” Defendant objected, but the trial court overruled the challenge.16 The prosecutor then continued, questioning why the defense spent so much time asking questions about Martin Campos‟s prior drug deals and gun purchases, about the presence of amphetamines in Camerina Lopez‟s body at the time of her death, and about how Norberto Estrada was drunk and in possession of marijuana when defendant shot him. The prosecutor further argued: “You don‟t measure the gravity of the defendant‟s crimes by who he killed. In our society everyone‟s life has equal value. You don‟t have to pass a test or reach some kind of threshold of worthiness in order for your special circumstance murder to warrant the most severe sentence.” Contrary to defendant‟s suggestions on appeal, these comments did not improperly disparage or demean defense counsel. In People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th 514, 559, the prosecutor during closing argument commented that it was “ „outrageous‟ ” for the defense to attempt to demean the victim. We rejected the claim of misconduct, noting that the comment did “not involve such forbidden prosecutorial tactics as falsely accusing counsel of fabricating a defense or otherwise deceiving the jury.” (Id. at p. 560.) Instead, the prosecutor had simply criticized “counsel‟s tactical approach.” (Ibid.) The same is true here because the prosecutor made a fair inference that the defense had engaged in tactics designed to make the victims appear less sympathetic. 16 The Attorney General again faults defendant for not seeking a curative admonition, but for the same reason we described, ante, footnote 15, we conclude defendant did not forfeit this claim. 57 G. Erroneous verdict form on death eligibility for Lopez’s second degree murder The parties agree that the verdict form erroneously listed both murders in setting the penalty at death and that the trial court in this case read this erroneous verdict form to the jury before deliberations. Defendant correctly asserts that he cannot be sentenced to death for the second degree murder of Lopez. He further contends, however, that the entire death judgment should be reversed because the error made it likely that the jury returned a verdict of death based only on the relatively tragic nature of Lopez‟s death. We reject the argument. The record shows that, at the start of the penalty phase, the trial court told the jury that the defendant had been convicted of first degree murder with one or more special circumstances and that he also had been found guilty of second degree murder “with the further special circumstance of multiple murder.” Then, the court stated, “[t]he law of this state is that the penalty for a defendant found guilty of these crimes that I have just outlined shall be death or confinement in state prison for life without the possibility of parole.” Before the penalty phase deliberations, the court instructed the jury: “The defendant in this case has been found guilty of one count of murder in the first degree and one count of murder in the second degree” and that “one of the murders was committed under special circumstances and the special circumstances of robbery, kidnapping, and multiple murder have specifically been found to be true” The court then specifically stated: “It is the law of this state that the penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole in any case in which the special circumstances alleged in this case have been found to be true. Under the law of this state, you must now determine which of these two penalties shall be imposed upon the defendant.” The jury was given identical written instructions that it could consult during deliberations. 58 Subsequently, however, the trial court read the erroneous verdict form to the jury. The verdict form returning a sentence of death read: “We, the jury in the above-entitled action, as to the defendant, Lumord Johnson, fix the penalty for the murder of Martin Campos and Candy Camerina Lopez as death.” The jury returned this form as its verdict, and the court subsequently imposed a sentence of death for both murders. At no point did defendant object to the verdict form, nor did he seek specific clarification when the court polled the jury concerning its verdict. We agree that the sentence of death as to Lopez must be reversed because such a sentence is not authorized for second degree murder. (People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1174.) But this error does not require the reversal of the entire penalty phase judgment. First, defendant has forfeited the issue of whether the technical error in the verdict form improperly biased the penalty verdict “by failing to object to the form of the verdict when the court proposed to submit it or when the jury returned its finding.” (People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1259, citing People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 330.) When the trial court polled the jury, defendant had the opportunity to clarify any misunderstanding that may have motivated the jury‟s verdict, but he failed to do so. (See Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247, 270 [without a timely objection, “a court cannot avoid or cure the defect: after the jury‟s discharge, the court can neither complete the polling nor return the jury to its deliberations”].) If we were to allow the issue to be raised for the first time on appeal, a party would have an incentive not to complain about the verdict form in the trial court in order to secure the advantage of seeking a complete reversal on appeal. (See People v. Kennedy, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 612 [“the forfeiture rule ensures that the opposing party is given an opportunity to address the objection, and it prevents a party from engaging in gamesmanship by choosing not to object, awaiting the outcome, and then claiming error”].) In any event, the claim fails on its merits. 59 Although the verdict form was technically inaccurate, the error was harmless. Because one of the two special circumstances that the jury found true was multiple murder, the verdict form was not entirely incorrect to state that defendant was eligible to receive the death penalty considering that he committed both murders. “ „Technical defects in a verdict may be disregarded if the jury‟s intent to convict of a specified offense within the charges is unmistakably clear, and the accused‟s substantial rights suffered no prejudice.‟ ” (People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 331.) Here, the jury‟s intent was unmistakably clear given the applicable law and penalties concerning first degree murder. Accordingly, we also reject defendant‟s contention that the inaccurate verdict form amounted to structural error requiring automatic reversal. This is not a situation in which it cannot be fairly determined whether the error affected the jury‟s verdict. (See People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545, 554 [“A structural error requires per se reversal because it cannot be fairly determined how a trial would have been resolved if the grave error had not occurred”].) In this particular case, the gap between the correct reading of the verdict form (that the jury was sentencing Johnson for the murder of Campos given the special circumstance that he also murdered Lopez) and the incorrect reading (that the jury was sentencing Johnson for having committed both murders) is so narrow that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. H. Constitutionality of California’s death penalty law Defendant raises a number of constitutional challenges to California‟s death penalty law, all of which we have repeatedly rejected; defendant offers no persuasive reason to reexamine these prior decisions. Thus, we again hold: California‟s death penalty statute adequately narrows the class of death-eligible offenders. (People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 703.) 60 Section 190.3, factor (a), which allows the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime, does not result in arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty. (People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 960.) The death penalty law does not require that the jury achieve unanimity regarding aggravating circumstances or that it be instructed on a burden of proof or standard of proof for finding the existence of aggravating factors, finding that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, or finding that death is the appropriate penalty. (People v. Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 960.) The United States Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220, Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466, and their progeny, have not altered these conclusions. (People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 858.) The CALJIC No. 8.88 instruction was not erroneous for describing the jury‟s task as determining whether the death penalty was warranted, or using the phrase “ „so substantial‟ ” in explaining the process of weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors. (People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 371.) The death penalty statute is not deficient by failing to require that the jury be instructed on the presumption of life, nor was there any error because the jury was not so instructed. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1233.) There is no requirement for a jury in a capital case to make written findings. (People v. Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 960.) There is no constitutional obligation to instruct the jury to identify which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating, or to instruct the jury to restrict its consideration of evidence in this regard. (People v. Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 961.) The failure to require intercase proportionality review does not render the death penalty law unconstitutional. (People v. Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 960; People v. Watson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 704.) 61 Because we have concluded that capital defendants and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated, the death penalty law does not violate equal protection by denying capital defendants various procedural rights given to noncapital defendants. (People v. Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 330.) Last, we reject the claim that the death penalty itself violates international law or international norms or that these norms require the application of the penalty to only the most extraordinary crimes. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 834; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 500-501.)