Opinion ID: 2428633
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: judgment of disability pursuant to krs 387.500 et seq. and testamentary capacity.

Text: On July 9, 1990, pursuant to KRS 387.500 et seq., William McQuady was adjudged partially disabled in the Breckinridge District Court. Appellants urge this Court to rule that the effect of such judgment was to remove McQuady's capacity to draft a will or in the alternative that a presumption against testamentary capacity was created by the judgment. We decline to make either such ruling. In Kentucky there is a strong presumption in favor of a testator possessing adequate testamentary capacity. This presumption can only be rebutted by the strongest showing of incapacity. Williams v. Vollman, Ky.App., 738 S.W.2d 849 (1987); Taylor v. Kennedy, Ky.App., 700 S.W.2d 415, 416 (1985). Testamentary capacity is only relevant at the time of execution of a will. New v. Creamer, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 918 (1955). Thus any order purporting to render a person per se unable to dispose of property by will is void ab initio, as such a ruling on testamentary capacity would be premature. This is not to say that such an order is irrelevant, but rather it is not dispositive of the issue of testamentary capacity. Kentucky is committed to the doctrine of testatorial absolutism. J. Merritt, 1 Ky.Prac.Probate Practice & Procedure, § 367 (Merritt 2d ed.). See New v. Creamer, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 918 (1955); Jackson's Ex'r v. Semones, 266 Ky. 352, 98 S.W.2d 505 (1937). The practical effect of this doctrine is that the privilege of the citizens of the Commonwealth to draft wills to dispose of their property is zealously guarded by the courts and will not be disturbed based on remote or speculative evidence. American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Penner, Ky., 444 S.W.2d 751 (1969). The degree of mental capacity required to make a will is minimal. Nance v. Veazey, Ky., 312 S.W.2d 350, 354 (1958). The minimum level of mental capacity required to make a will is less than that necessary to make a deed, Creason v. Creason, Ky., 392 S.W.2d 69 (1965), or a contract. Warnick v. Childers, Ky., 282 S.W.2d 608 (1955). To validly execute a will, a testator must: (1) know the natural objects of her bounty; (2) know her obligations to them; (3) know the character and value of her estate; and (4) dispose of her estate according to her own fixed purpose. Adams v. Calia, Ky., 433 S.W.2d 661 (1968); Waggener v. General Ass'n of Baptists, Ky., 306 S.W.2d 271 (1957); Burke v. Burke, Ky.App., 801 S.W.2d 691 (1990); Fischer v. Heckerman, Ky.App., 772 S.W.2d 642 (1989). Merely being an older person, possessing a failing memory, momentary forgetfulness, weakness of mental powers or lack of strict coherence in conversation does not render one incapable of validly executing a will. Ward v. Norton, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 193 (1964). Every man possessing the requisite mental powers may dispose of his property by will in any way he may desire, and a jury will not be permitted to overthrow it, and to make a will for him to accord with their ideas of justice and propriety. Burke v. Burke, Ky.App., 801 S.W.2d 691, 693 (1991) ( citing Cecil's Ex'rs. v. Anhier, 176 Ky. 198, 195 S.W. 837, 846 (1917)). In the instant case Mr. McQuady executed wills in 1988, 1989 and 1991. Appellant seeks to have the 1991 will declared invalid as it was executed following the 1990 adjudgment of partial incapacity. While a ruling of total or partial disability certainly is evidence of a lack of testamentary capacity, it is certainly not dispositive of the issue. This Court has upheld the rights of those afflicted with a variety of illnesses to execute valid wills. Tate v. Tate's Ex'r, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 597 (1955) (testator suffered deafness and retarded speech); Bush v. Lisle, 89 Ky. 393, 12 S.W. 762 (1889) (testator was blind); In re: McDaniel's Will, 25 Ky. 331 (1829) (testator was paralyzed); Bodine v. Bodine, 241 Ky. 706, 44 S.W.2d 840 (1932)(testator was an epileptic). We have not disturbed the testatorial privileges of those who believed in witchcraft [1] , spiritualism [2] or atheism. [3] While none of these cases absolutely parallels the instant case, we recite them here to demonstrate how this Court has always taken the broadest possible view of who may execute a will no matter what their infirmity. When a testator is suffering from a mental illness which ebbs and flows in terms of its effect on the testator's mental competence, it is presumed that the testator was mentally fit when the will was executed. This is commonly referred to as the lucid interval doctrine. Warnick v. Childers, Ky., 282 S.W.2d 608, 609 (1955); Pfuelb v. Pfuelb, 275 Ky. 588, 122 S.W.2d 128 (1938). See In re Weir's Will, 39 Ky. 434 (1840); Watts v. Bullock, 11 Ky. 252 (1822). Alzheimer's is a disease that is variable in its effect on a person over time. It is precisely this type of illness with which the lucid interval doctrine was designed to deal. By employing this doctrine, citizens of the Commonwealth who suffer from a debilitating mental condition are still able to dispose of their property. The lucid interval doctrine is only implicated when there is evidence that a testator is suffering from a mental illness; otherwise the normal presumption in favor of testamentary capacity is operating. The burden is placed upon those who seek to overturn the will to demonstrate the lack of capacity. Warnick, 282 S.W.2d at 609; Pfuelb, 275 Ky. at 588, 122 S.W.2d at 128. The presumption created is a rebuttable one, so that evidence which demonstrates conclusively that the testator lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will results in nullifying that will. In the present case there is no question that Mr. McQuady suffered from Alzheimers disease. However, under the doctrine he is presumed to have been experiencing a lucid interval during the execution of the will. The wisdom of this doctrine is demonstrated by Mr. McQuady's testimony during the hearing on the petition for marriage in Breckinridge District court. During that hearing Mr. McQuady was very lucid and demonstrated a complete grasp of the circumstances in which he found himself. Appellant has failed to offer this Court evidence which demonstrates that the testator did not have a lucid interval during which he executed the 1991 will. In sum, let it suffice to say that in the instant case a presumption of a lucid interval of testamentary capacity was appropriate. Given this Court's consistent attitude toward the virtually absolute right of the citizens of the Commonwealth to make wills, it would be incongruous for us now to announce a new rule of law which restricted these rights which we have held in such high regard for so long. While the clear policy of the Commonwealth is that our citizens who are no longer able to fully care for themselves must be protected from the various societal predators, we will restrict their testamentary rights only when it is absolutely necessary and even then only to the degree required to defend their interests.