Opinion ID: 2610902
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Reinstatement of Withdrawn Insanity Plea

Text: Defendant originally entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. After the competency and guilt phases, defendant successfully moved to withdraw the insanity plea. Two days later, however, defense counsel announced that defendant personally wished to reinstate his insanity plea. Counsel stated his own opinion that his client's decision was tactically unsound, because none of the psychiatrists had testified defendant was legally insane, and a sanity hearing would require him to expose his remaining psychiatric evidence, leaving nothing in reserve for the penalty phase. The court agreed with counsel's assessment but evidently believed it had no option to deny the motion on purely tactical grounds in view of defendant's personal request. The court thereupon examined defendant, confirmed that reinstatement of the plea was defendant's free and voluntary choice, and ultimately accepted the change of plea. (Defendant explained that he had been taking medication and had been confused at the time he withdrew his insanity plea.) (15) Defendant now asserts the trial court erred in failing to exercise discretion in deciding whether to accept the withdrawn plea. As defendant observes, although the original choice of plea is left to the accused (งง 1016, 1018), once a plea has been entered the court has discretion to refuse to allow him to withdraw that plea or enter a new plea. (ง 1016; see People v. Cartwright (1979) 98 Cal. App.3d 369, 386 [159 Cal. Rptr. 543].) But we think defendant is in no position to complain on appeal of the trial court's order granting his request to reinstate his withdrawn plea. Initially, we observe that prior cases generally have stressed that the decision to plead, or to change or withdraw a plea, is a matter lying within the defendant's, rather than his counsel's, ultimate control, regardless of tactical considerations. (See People v. Gauze (1975) 15 Cal.3d 709, 717 [125 Cal. Rptr. 773, 542 P.2d 1365] [defendant's personal right to refuse to enter insanity plea]; People v. Rogers (1961) 56 Cal.2d 301, 305 [14 Cal. Rptr. 660, 363 P.2d 892] [counsel's improper withdrawal of not guilty plea and entry of guilty plea to lesser offense]; People v. Redmond (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 931, 938 [94 Cal. Rptr. 543] [defendant's qualified right to withdraw insanity plea].) As we noted in Gauze, supra, 15 Cal.3d 709, under the rule in Redmond, supra, a presently sane defendant may withdraw an insanity plea, provided the court is satisfied that the defendant is making a free and voluntary choice with adequate comprehension of the consequences. [Citations.] If a defendant may withdraw an insanity plea, certainly he cannot be compelled to present such a plea.... [ถ] [He] made a free and voluntary choice with knowledge of its consequences. Neither counsel nor the court had the power to contravene that choice. (15 Cal.3d at pp. 717-718; cf. People v. Frierson (1985) 39 Cal.3d 803, 813-818 [218 Cal. Rptr. 73, 705 P.2d 396] [defendant's fundamental right to present diminished capacity defense].) By analogy to Gauze, if a defendant cannot be compelled by counsel to present an insanity defense, he cannot be compelled by counsel to abandon one merely because counsel disagrees with the tactics of that decision. Thus, contrary to defendant's present premise, the trial court had no discretion to deny defendant's motion to reinstate his insanity plea solely because his counsel opposed that choice on tactical grounds. We conclude the court did not err in granting defendant's free and voluntary decision to reinstate his previously withdrawn insanity plea.