Opinion ID: 730824
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Gore Factors

Text: 18 In this context, reprehensibility is not a question of whether the conduct is acceptable or unacceptable; the jury's finding of liability has already settled that question. That conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to give rise to tort liability, and even a modest award of exemplary damages, does not establish the high degree of culpability that warrants a substantial punitive damages award. Gore, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1601. Rather, punitive damages should reflect the enormity of [a defendant's] offense. Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1599 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 19 The Supreme Court in Gore noted that reprehensibility is perhaps the most important factor in assessing a punitive damage award. Id. The Court then identified certain types of aggravating factors that are associated with particularly reprehensible conduct and contribute to the sense that some wrongs are more blameworthy than others. --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1599. Aggravating factors include (1) whether a defendant's conduct was violent or presented a threat of violence, (2) whether a defendant acted with deceit or malice as opposed to acting with mere negligence, and (3) whether a defendant has engaged in repeated instances of misconduct. Id. at ---- - ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1599-1600. 20 1. Violence. Although the jury found Edwards liable for punitive damages on the assault and battery, Lee elected to waive that claim, with good reason. 3 So the punitive damages at issue on this appeal were awarded solely on account of malicious prosecution. 21 The malicious prosecution entailed little overt violence. Lee's troubles with the law lasted all of two hours: he was handcuffed by Edwards, placed into the police cruiser, taken to the hospital, and then taken to the police station, where he was charged with assault on a police officer and resisting arrest. These charges were later nolled. In any event, the jury (which merely awarded nominal compensatory damages) was obviously unimpressed by Lee's claim to have suffered harm by reason of being prosecuted maliciously. 22 There is, however, an element of real and threatened force that could have aroused the jury. As a police officer, Edwards exercised an authority backed by the weight and force of state power. His decision to charge Lee falsely was implemented merely by an entry on a form, but that act nevertheless had the power to set into motion the coercive apparatus of the state, which is ultimately rooted in a willingness to use force. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392, 394, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2002, 2003-04, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (Agent using official authority possesses a far greater capacity for harm than a private individual; mere invocation of federal power by a federal law enforcement official normally renders attempts to resist futile). In Lee's case, this threat of force was attenuated and short-lived, but a jury could properly recognize it, and conclude that malicious prosecution by a police officer is egregious and reprehensible. It may be that the offenses falsely charged are minor when compared with drunk driving, and that the false charges therefore entailed no great incremental threat of state power. But the jury had no occasion to consider that: there is no record evidence that Lee was charged with the drunk driving offense that he uncontestedly committed, and the district court sustained an objection to a question put to Lee concerning alcohol counseling. (No appeal is taken as to the admissibility of the drunk driving charges or proceedings.) 23 2. Deceit or malice. Edwards' conduct was marked by malice. In order to find Edwards liable for malicious prosecution under § 1983, the jury had to find, inter alia, that the defendant acted with malice, primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice. McHale v. W.B.S. Corp., 187 Conn. 444, 447, 446 A.2d 815, 817 (1982) (defining malicious prosecution under Connecticut law). 4 Edwards moved post-verdict for judgment as a matter of law, on the ground that there was no evidence presented that [Edwards] acted with malice, but the district court denied the motion, and Edwards is not contesting that ruling on appeal. 24 3. Repeated misconduct. A finding of repeated misconduct is supportable by testimony in the trial transcript as to other complaints against Edwards charging excessive force. Although there is no evidence concerning any formal investigation of these complaints, the jury did hear testimony from Edwards about them. 25 After considering these three aggravating factors, we believe that the reprehensibility of Edwards' conduct can support a substantial punitive damage award in this case. 26
27 In considering the ratio between a punitive damage award and the actual harm inflicted, the second Gore factor, the proper inquiry is whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually occurred. Gore, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1602 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). It therefore seems to be a great problem for the plaintiff that the punitive damage award is 200,000 times greater than the nominal compensatory award. Still, the Supreme Court has stressed that the reasonableness of such a relationship is no simple mathematical formula: 28 Indeed, low awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages. A higher ratio may also be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine. 29 Id. 30 In Gore, the Court found the 500 to 1 ratio in that contract dispute to be breathtaking. --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1602. But that observation does not necessarily control the fair ratios in a § 1983 case. We have said that punitive damages may be awarded in a § 1983 case, even if the compensatory damages are only nominal. See King v. Macri, 993 F.2d 294, 297-98 (2d Cir.1993) (citing cases). The Supreme Court's observations in Gore reinforce that view: violations of civil rights may very well be particularly egregious acts that result in only a small amount of economic damages or injuries whose monetary value is difficult to determine. Gore, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1602. Because the compensatory award here was nominal, any appreciable exemplary award would produce a ratio that would appear excessive by this measure. 31 In Gore, a 500 to 1 ratio was breathtaking. However, in a § 1983 case in which the compensatory damages are nominal, a much higher ratio can be contemplated while maintaining normal respiration. Since the use of a multiplier to assess punitive damages is not the best tool here, we must look to the punitive damage awards in other civil rights cases to find limits and proportions. We do that in Section II, in which we determine the proper amount of the remittitur. 32
33 When penalties for comparable misconduct are much slighter than a punitive damages award, it may be said that the tortfeasor lacked fair notice that the wrongful conduct could entail a substantial punitive award. See Gore, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1603; Patton v. TIC United Corp., 77 F.3d 1235, 1244 (10th Cir.1996). 34 According to Lee, Edwards' conduct could have exposed him to a charge of making a false statement, a class A misdemeanor. See Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 53a-157 (West Supp.1996). If Edwards were convicted of that offense, he would have faced imprisonment of up to one year, and/or a fine of up to $2,000. Id. §§ 53a-36, 53a-42 (West 1994). A year's imprisonment is certainly a serious sanction, although the maximum fine of $2,000 gives little warning that the offense could entail a $200,000 civil award. 35 If anything, we believe that the civil and criminal penalties understate the notice, because the misconduct at issue here was committed by a police officer. We will assume that Edwards' training as a police officer gave him notice as to the gravity of misconduct under color of his official authority, as well as notice that such misconduct could hinder his career. At the same time, although Edwards did have some notice as to the gravity of his conduct, nothing could conceivably have prepared him for a punitive damage award amounting to the sacrifice of the better part of a policeman's after-tax pay for a decade. 36 Examining the three Gore factors together, we see circumstances that might support a substantial punitive damage award. First, Edwards brought to bear against Lee the weight of Edwards' official position, acted maliciously, and had previously engaged in analogous misconduct--enough to indicate a degree of reprehensibility. Second, the nominal compensatory damage award renders the use of a ratio to limit punitive damages ineffective. Third, although the criminal and civil penalties for comparable conduct are middling, Edwards' training as a police officer provided him with some notice of the gravity of his conduct. 37 In short, we believe that the reprehensibility of Edwards' conduct and the extent to which he had notice of potential penalties support the award of a substantial multiple, but we conclude that the district court exceeded its discretion in thinking that these factors support the magnitude of the award on the malicious prosecution claim in this case. We now turn to other police misconduct cases for assistance in determining the proper remittitur.