Opinion ID: 2630573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The People Have Legitimate Interests in Responding to Defense Attempts to Obtain Privileged PITCHESS Information

Text: The lead opinion insists the People have no direct stake in the proceeding, and that any opposition to defense Pitchess discovery would merely advance the interests of the third party custodian and police officer. (Maj. opn., ante, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 680, 63 P.3d at p. 235.) This argument is used to reject the People's claim that their due process rights encompass both notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The lead opinion also implies the Legislature could not possibly have contemplated prosecutorial involvement in defense Pitchess hearings any more extensive than what the lead opinion allows. Preliminarily, I agree that the chief guardians of a peace officer's right to privacy are the officer himself, and the government agency holding the personnel file and charged with asserting any attendant privilege. Under the special notice provisions of Evidence Code section 1043(a), both the officer and custodian can resist unwarranted attempts by criminal defendants to penetrate the private file. However, the People have independent adversarial concerns that the lead opinion unfairly discounts. In general, the Pitchess scheme carefully balances the moving party's interest in relevant information against the privacy interests identified above. ( Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d 74, 84, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222.) Barriers to discovery include failure to show good cause for in-chambers review (Evid.Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3)), a finding that the material is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation ( id., § 1045, subd. (a)), and the application of certain exclusions] from disclosure ( id., § 1045, subd. (b)). By creating such finely tuned procedures and standards, and by requiring the balancing of such important competing concerns, the Legislature obviously intended a full and meaningful debate. To the extent it limits or bars the People's participation in the Pitchess process, the lead opinion risks depriving trial courts of information `essential' to a fair and proper decision. ( Ayala, supra, 24 Cal.4th 243, 262, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193.) District attorneys have long joined record custodians, peace officers, and criminal defendants in litigating defense access to police personnel files. Much like the facts of this case, Pitchess disputes typically involve officers who played a significant role in investigating the charged crime. Their character, training, and experience could affect the weight and admissibility of incriminating evidence. (E.g., Brandon, supra, 29 Cal.4th 1, 5-6, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 202, 52 P.3d 129 [officers arrested defendant and interviewed child molestation victim]; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 329-330, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432 [officers questioned defendant at murder scene and then interviewed and arrested him at police station]; Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1221-1222, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 482, 36 P.3d 21 [officer was the victim of an alleged jailhouse battery by defendant]; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1219-1220, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254 [officers arrested and questioned defendant and seized evidence of murder]; Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 658, 674, 214 Cal.Rptr. 832, 700 P.2d 446; see id. at pp. 669-672, 214 Cal.Rptr. 832, 700 P.2d 446 [officers elicited defendant's confession to multiple murder].) The People have an interest in ensuring that an erroneous Pitchess determination does not unfairly jeopardize their ability to obtain a valid conviction at trial, and to prevent reversal on appeal. The lead opinion conflicts with both settled law and practice insofar as it denies the People a meaningful opportunity to protect genuine interests in the underlying case.