Opinion ID: 852929
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proof of Insanity

Text: Because Thompson admits to committing the alleged offense, the only issue before us is whether the record supported the trial court's finding that Thompson was guilty but mentally ill rather than not guilty by reason of insanity. Pursuant to Indiana Code Annotated § 35-41-3-6 (West 1998), A person is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the offense. The section defines mental disease or defect as a severely abnormal mental condition that grossly and demonstrably impairs a person's perception, but the term does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated unlawful or antisocial conduct. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-41-3-6(b). The insanity defense is an affirmative defense for which the burden of proof is on the defendant. The State must prove the offense, including mens rea, beyond a reasonable doubt but need not disprove insanity. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-41-4-1 (West 1998). This Court has held that although the State is required to prove the defendant committed the act `knowingly' this is not tantamount to requiring the State to prove that the defendant was `sane.' Lyon v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1368, 1370 (Ind. 1993). As we said more recently: [A]lthough [the defendant] offered evidence of mental illness, the State has no obligation to offer evidence which disproves mental illness in order to meet its burden of proving [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. To require the State to disprove mental illness would shift the burden of proof of insanity, controverting the General Assembly's placement of that burden on the defendant. Garner v. State, 704 N.E.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Ind.1998) (citations omitted). To avoid responsibility for the crime proven by the State, the defendant must establish the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-41-4-1(b). Whether or not a defendant can appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct is a question for the trier of fact. A convicted defendant who claims his insanity defense should have prevailed at trial is in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment, and we will reverse only when the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed. Robinette v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1162 (Ind.2001); Rogers v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1259 (Ind.1987). We will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses but will consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable and logical inferences to be drawn therefrom. Metzler v. State, 540 N.E.2d 606 (Ind.1989). Although expert opinions provide a strong justification for raising the insanity defense, we have never held expert testimony to be conclusive. Cate v. State, 644 N.E.2d 546, 547 (Ind.1994). Cases like Thompson's have often turned on the proposition that the trier of fact is free to disregard the testimony of experts and rely upon the testimony of lay witnesses. Garner, 704 N.E.2d at 1014; Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60, 63-64 (Ind.1995); Rogers, 514 N.E.2d at 1261. Indeed, we have noted that testimony regarding behavior before, during, and after a crime may be more indicative of actual mental health at time of the crime than mental exams conducted weeks or months later. Barany, 658 N.E.2d at 64. Conflicting lay testimony is not required, however, for the trier of fact to reject expert testimony. As a general rule, factfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted. If judges and juries can disbelieve uncontradicted testimony about facts, they are surely entitled to decide whether to accept or reject testimony that represents a witness's opinion. The psychiatrists' reports in this case merely offer their opinions about Thompson's state of mind two days after she committed the crime at issue. As it happens, the trial judge to whom these opinions and the remainder of the evidence were submitted is among the most knowledgeable of Indiana's judicial officers on mental health matters. He was not persuaded, and we can think of little reason to second-guess that judgment. The State contends that non-medical evidence of [Thompson's] sanity could be gleaned from the affidavit. (Appellee's Br. 5.) Specifically, it cites Thompson's removal of only her own possessions from Beeler's home as indicating her awareness of the propriety of taking only what belonged to her and hence her awareness of right and wrong. Id. It further argues that because the officers who stopped Thompson when she was leaving the scene felt comfortable releasing her, they must have felt she was sufficiently lucid to be allowed to go about her business. Id. The Court of Appeals rejected the State's argument, correctly stating that in reviewing the judgment, we review only the `reasonable inferences' to be drawn from the facts and finding that there were other more reasonable inferences that could be drawn from those facts. Thompson, 782 N.E.2d at 454 (citation omitted). The question, however, is whether the inferences supporting the judgment were reasonable, not whether there were other more reasonable inferences that could have been made. Reaching alternative inferences such as this is a function of the trier of fact, not this Court. We cannot reverse the conviction merely because this inference is a plausible one that might have been drawn from the evidence. Askew v. State, 439 N.E.2d 1350, 1352 (Ind. 1982). As we said in Metzler v. State : Triers of fact determine not only the facts presented to them and their credibility, but any reasonable inferences from facts established either by direct or circumstantial evidence. It is not necessary that the court find the circumstantial evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. It need only be demonstrated that inferences may reasonably be drawn which support the finding of guilt. 540 N.E.2d at 610 (citations omitted). In Cate, we upheld the jury's determination that the defendant was not legally insane despite unanimous expert testimony to the contrary, saying that the evidence was not uncontroverted because the defendant's lucidity after his arrest, conflicting claims about his motivation, and an incentive to lie provided at least the minimal evidentiary justification [necessary] for the jury to find him sane enough to be held legally accountable for his actions. 644 N.E.2d at 548. Similarly, in this case two experts submitted reports indicating that they believed that, due to her mental illness, Thompson could not appreciate the wrongfulness of her actions when she kicked in Beeler's window and entered the house. The trial judge was not persuaded by these opinions, however, in light of the rest of the record. When Thompson was released from the hospital on February 9, only days before the incident, she had no active psychotic symptoms, no homicidal or suicidal ideations, and was calm and pleasant without agitation. (Tr. at 12). The trier of fact was entitled to prefer this evidence to psychiatric examinations conducted weeks or months later. In the course of the sentencing hearing, the judge provided some insight into why he did so. He cited Thompson's history of avoiding criminal responsibility through her illness, her conflicting stories about what happened to her medication, her decision to use illegal drugs and drink alcohol while on her medication, and lies she told one of the examining psychiatrists regarding that use of drugs and alcohol. The judge had concluded that she knew her actions were wrong but was using her illness to manipulate the system. (Tr. at 39-44). The evidence on the issue of insanity clearly was in conflict and did not lead inexorably to a single conclusion. Rogers, 514 N.E.2d at 1261. We find that based on the evidence presented, the trier of fact could have found that Thompson was mentally ill but able to distinguish right from wrong.