Opinion ID: 1109157
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court erred in overruling the farris motion to dismiss based upon immunity.

Text: ¶ 46. Farris further argues that unless the Forrest County District Attorney petitioned the Pearl River County Chancery Court and attacked the orders signed and approved by that court, he is immune from prosecution as a properly appointed guardian ad litem since Chancellor Taylor's orders are presumed valid on their face. As authority for this proposition, he cites Article 6, Section 159 of the Mississippi Constitution, which we have already addressed, and Bryan v. Holzer, 589 So.2d 648 (Miss.1991), where we noted: It has long been settled that Chancery Courts in Mississippi which exercise jurisdiction over guardianships of minors and incompetents and their business have general and constitutional jurisdiction, and all facts necessary to sustain the jurisdictional decrees of such Courts are presumed to exist until the contrary appears in the record. (quoting Majors v. Purnell's Pride, Inc., 360 F.Supp. 328, 329 (N.D.Miss.1973)). ¶ 47. Farris further cites Herring v. Herring, 571 So.2d 239 (Miss.1990), for the proposition that since his fees were approved by court order, and no attempt has been made to invalidate Chancellor Taylor's orders, then evidence which would render Chancellor Taylor's orders invalid is non-existent on appeal. He points to Hinds County Bd. of Supervisors v. Common Cause, 551 So.2d 107 (Miss.1989), and M.R.C.P. 60(b), which outline the proper procedure for attacking the validity of a chancery court judgment. Farris's reliance on these authorities is misplaced. ¶ 48. Common Cause and Rule 60(b) both address the proper avenue for attacking chancery court judgments in civil matters. Today we are faced not with a civil matter, but with a criminal conspiracy case which was perpetrated through the veil of chancery court authority. A guardian ad litem does not enjoy immunity from our criminal law just because a chancellor has made the appointment and subsequently orders attorney fees. Any actor, regardless of official authority, who commits a crime against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi, and who is subject to the jurisdiction of this sovereign State, shall be held responsible for his actions according to the law of this State and the supreme law of the United States. Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 156. ¶ 49. Herring involved the recusal of three sitting Chancellors from a child custody case where a Special Chancellor was appointed by a recusal order to hear the case. 571 So.2d at 239. Subsequent to the recusal order, one of the previously recused Chancellors stepped back into the fray and entered an order overruling a motion for his recusal. Id. at 241-42. We reversed and remanded, holding that, In the absence of some valid order setting aside ... [the original recusal order], the only person authorized to hear this case was [the Special Chancellor]. Id. at 243. We also held that the orders of the Special Chancellor were not subject to collateral attack. Id. ¶ 50. Herring is distinguishable from the case sub judice. While Chancellor Taylor's orders pertaining to Ike Farris and the other indicted co-conspirators may have held a presumption of civil validity on their face, the indictment charged, and the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, that the orders were a central part of the criminal conspiracy. We decline Farris's invitation to extend Herring and hold that fraudulent orders of a chancellor may not be reviewed in a circuit court criminal trial because of collateral estoppel, immunity of the guardian ad litem, or because a chancery court may have jurisdiction over a civil matter. ¶ 51. We fully accept the chancery court's subject matter jurisdiction over conservatorships under Article 6, § 159. But we can not ignore the circuit court's original jurisdiction over criminal matters under Article 6, § 156. The Mississippi Constitution also grants concurrent jurisdiction to the circuit court in matters of accounting for the money or property placed in the hands of a fiduciary. [1] ¶ 52. Although Farris correctly cites the procedure for civilly attacking a judgment of the chancery court, the prosecution did not attack an order of the chancery court on civil grounds. The focal point of the indictment charged a conspiracy to defraud the Diamond estate and to hinder the administration of justice. The judgments and orders of the chancery court relating to the accounting of Farris as the guardian ad litem did not cloak Farris with immunity from criminal prosecution. Farris's problem, in arguing that his actions were approved by the chancery court, is that Chancellor Taylor's involvement as an unindicted co-conspirator hung a dark shadow upon the chancery court orders and greatly diminished the credibility of Ike Farris in front of the jury. This argument is without merit.