Opinion ID: 2507985
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Abuse of discretion in allowing group voir dire

Text: Defendant next contends the trial court abused its discretion because it conducted group voir dire under Code of Civil Procedure former section 223, and did not use its discretion to engage in sequestered and individual voir dire as also allowed under the statute. [6] Section 223 requires that voir dire of any prospective jurors must, where practicable, occur in the presence of other jurors, and applies in all criminal cases, including death penalty cases. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 223, sequestration is left to the trial court's discretion, based on the court's determination that it is practicable to conduct voir dire in the presence of other prospective jurors. ( Covarrubias, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1172, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 91.) In support of his claim, defendant includes two affidavits, one from retired Superior Court Judge Norman Spellberg, and one from jury consultant Therese Waller, a psychologist and staff member of the National Jury Project. In the affidavits, the jury selection experts give their opinions on the potentially unfair effect of the statutory voir dire procedures, including the apprehension prospective jurors may feel when voir dire is conducted in the presence of other prospective jurors. Although the court did indicate that group voir dire would save time and was convenient, given the courtroom size (and its inability to accommodate all prospective jurors at once), it did not, defendant contends, appropriately weigh the fact that the prospective jurors had been exposed to substantial pretrial publicity and another venire person's experience with an unsolved murder, both of which could desensitize the panel to its task of determining the appropriate penalty. In review of potential error under Code of Civil Procedure section 223, we apply the abuse of discretion review standard to the trial court's denial of defendant's request to conduct individual voir dire of prospective jurors. ( Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 713-714, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) In considering defense counsel's claim that every question of every juror should be outside the presence of the other jurors, the trial court expressly stated that it had discretion to order individual and sequestered voir dire if group voir dire was impracticable. The court specifically permitted the parties to prepare a jury questionnaire designed to streamline the voir dire process and to ensure that the pretrial publicity did not taint or bias the jurors' view of the case. The court admonished the jurors not to read any newspaper articles about the case and, even though some jurors did later read accounts of the trial, nothing suggests that the voir dire process was responsible for their actions. The court also offered to permit defense counsel to conduct private questioning of particular jurors when necessary and, in order to ensure the panel was impartial, conduct in-depth questioning of jurors who indicated they strongly believed in capital punishment. Nor do the declarations discussed above assist defendant's argument. The declarations are general in character and do not point to problems in this case. In addition, the declarations do not undermine the constitutionality of Code of Civil Procedure section 223. The trial court's approach to group voir dire, and its thoughtful questioning on specific points, were reasonable, and we find no abuse of discretion in the court's conduct. (See People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1180-1181, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130 [trial court's reasonable approach to group voir dire upheld].)