Opinion ID: 217569
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Motion for Contempt and the PLRA

Text: Unlike criminal contempt, which has a punitive function, civil contempt is imposed either to coerce compliance with a court order or to compensate a party harmed by non-compliance. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191, 69 S.Ct. 497, 93 L.Ed. 599 (1949); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947); United States v. Saccoccia, 433 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir.2005). The United States did not seek compensatory relief. Thus we focus solely on the contempt sanction's purpose to induce the purging of contemptuous conduct, In re Kave, 760 F.2d 343, 351 (1st Cir.1985) (emphasis omitted). [7] A finding of civil contempt ordinarily involves proof that the alleged contemnor had notice that he was subject to a clear and unambiguous order, that compliance is possible, [8] and that the order was in fact violated. Saccoccia, 433 F.3d at 27 (quotation marks and internal citation omitted). There can be no dispute here that the Commonwealth was aware of the January 2009 Order and failed to comply with it. The parties' debate concerns the Commonwealth's ability to comply and, relatedly, whether the terms of the Order continue to be an appropriate response to the conditions in the juvenile facilities. As we have explained, however, the January 2009 Order has been stayed. Hence, there presently is no justification for a coercive sanction to induce the Commonwealth's compliance with that Order. The United States insisted at oral argument that we nonetheless may review the district court's denial of such a sanction because the Order has only been suspended, not abrogated, and the issue of contempt is consequently not moot yet. That argument, however, collapses of its own weight. If the Order were certain to reactivate at some future time, we would agree that we could perform our review now in anticipation of its future resumption. Where reactivation is neither automatic nor inevitable, however, any decision we reach may be without purpose or effect. See Miller, 530 U.S. at 354, 120 S.Ct. 2246 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that, once an injunction governing prison conditions is automatically stayed, it would regain[] life only if, when, and to the extent that the judge eventually decided to deny the PLRA motion). Such a contingent ruling would transgress the prudential considerations underlying the ripeness doctrine, including the policy of judicial restraint from unnecessary decisions, McInnis-Misenor v. Me. Med. Ctr., 319 F.3d 63, 70 (1st Cir.2003), and, given the contingency, may turn out to be an impermissible advisory opinion. See City of Fall River, Mass. v. F.E.R.C., 507 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2007) ([A] `claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.' (quoting Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)) [9] ; see also Steir v. Girl Scouts of the USA, 383 F.3d 7, 16 (1st Cir.2004)(A court cannot hear an action that loses `its character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law.' (quoting Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48, 90 S.Ct. 200, 24 L.Ed.2d 214 (1969) (per curiam))). Indeed, as the United States acknowledges, the Commonwealth's defense to the United States' request for a contempt sanction overlaps with its argument that the requirements of the January 2009 Order are no longer appropriate under the PLRA. The defendants cite their limited financial resources both to explain their inability to meet the staffing requirements of the January 2009 Order and to substantiate their contention that fifty-hires-per-month is neither narrowly drawn relief nor the least intrusive means to correct the violation of federal rights. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3). The Commonwealth argues that the defendants should be allowed to work toward the staffing goals by alternative means, and it invokes the creative efforts it already has made  for example, consolidating facilities and obtaining outside funding  to demonstrate its good faith in complying with the spirit of the January 2009 Order. We offer no view as to whether the Commonwealth's arguments have force either in defending against the contempt motion or showing a need for partial or full release from the January 2009 Order. The relevant considerations for our purposes are that those two issues are intertwined, and the one that is before us  the contempt ruling  may disappear with the district court's decision on the other. Moreover, even if the appeal were technically neither moot nor unripe, it would make no sense for us to review the district court's brief contempt ruling at this juncture. The court's yet-to-come ruling on the motion to modify or terminate the January 2009 Order will necessarily clarify and elaborate on the reasons it denied contempt sanctions. We urge the district court to make that ruling in short order. See Miller, 530 U.S. at 333, 120 S.Ct. 2246 (noting that the PLRA requires courts to rule `promptly' on motions to terminate prospective relief); 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(1). Accordingly, the United States' appeal must be dismissed. So ordered.