Opinion ID: 210673
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timeliness of Filing of Appeal

Text: The requirements for filing a timely appeal to the Board in a mixed case are specified by 5 C.F.R. § 1201.154(b), which states: (1) An appeal must be filed within 30 days after the [employee] receives the agency resolution or final decision on the discrimination issue; or (2) If the agency has not resolved the matter or issued a final decision on the formal complaint within 120 days, the [employee] may appeal the matter directly to the Board at any time after the expiration of 120 calendar days. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.154(b). This requirement may only be excused if “a good reason for the delay is shown.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.22(c). Mr. White argues that under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.154(b)(2), because the agency issued its final decision 543 days after his complaint was submitted as a mixed case, the thirty day time limit of § 1201.154(b)(1) did not apply and he could therefore file his appeal at any time. The government disagrees with Mr. White’s interpretation, arguing that § 1201.154(b)(2) “does not create an open-ended right to appeal, but rather ensures the complainant the right to come to the [Board] should his or her employing agency not promptly process a discrimination complaint.” According to the government, 2007-3007 3 in all cases in which the agency has issued a final decision the employee must file his appeal within thirty days of receipt. When construing a regulation, we look first to the underlying statute to determine whether or not the regulation is in compliance with the statute. See Garcia v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 437 F.3d 1322, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc). We then examine the language of the regulation to determine its plain meaning. Roberto v. Dep’t of the Navy, 440 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In doing so, we examine the entire regulation in question rather than just the sentences at issue in isolation. Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). Moreover, we give broad deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, “even when that interpretation is offered in the very litigation in which the argument in favor of deference is made.” Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The agency's construction of its own regulation[] is ‘of controlling weight unless it is T plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” Id. (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). Here, the agency’s construction is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation as a whole. Congress has granted the Board “the authority to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary for the performance of its functions.” 5 U.S.C. § 1204(h). Acting under this authority, the Board issued 5 C.F.R. § 1201.154, which prescribes the time for the filing of appeals. The language of § 1201.154(b)(1) imposes an absolute requirement that appeals be filed within thirty days of the employee’s receipt of the agency’s decision. Section 1201.154(b)(2) only applies in the alternate circumstance in which no final decision has been issued. This understanding of 2007-3007 4 § 1201.154(b) is further supported by the purpose of the regulation. By preventing an agency from avoiding an appeal by simply never issuing a final decision, § 1201.154(b)(2) ensures that employees have a right to appeal in all cases. Where that final decision has been issued, even after a delay of more than 120 days, it is not inconsistent with the regulation to require that the employee file his appeal within thirty days. If the thirty day time limit were not to apply, an employee could potentially file an appeal months, years, or even decades after a final decision had been issued. This would be inconsistent with the purpose of a regulation that acts to bring cases to a timely close. We therefore find that the Board did not abuse its discretion by finding that Mr. White was required by § 1201.154(b) to file his appeal within thirty days of receiving the final decision from the agency. Mr. White alternatively argues that his appeal was timely filed within thirty days of his receipt of the final decision, as required by § 1201.154(b)(1), because he did not receive the decision until August 13, 2005 when he returned from a trip to Arizona. However, this court has long held that constructive receipt will begin the period for filing an appeal. Anderson v. Dep’t of Transp., 735 F.2d 537, 541 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that a notice sent to employee’s address and signed for by employee’s mother was sufficient to begin the time period). Here, the agency sent the decision letter by certified mail to Mr. White’s home address where it was signed for by his mother-in-law. The Board did not abuse its discretion by finding that Mr. White had thereby constructively received the letter. Because Mr. White was required to file his appeal within thirty days of that receipt, the Board properly found that Mr. White’s appeal was not timely.