Opinion ID: 4519669
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial court’s refusal to sever trials

Text: Housman next contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to properly raise and litigate a claim that Housman’s right to due process and a fair trial were violated when the trial court refused to sever the guilt phase of his trial from that of his codefendant Markman, thereby allowing highly prejudicial evidence, including prior bad acts, bad character, and hearsay, to be introduced into evidence. Housman acknowledges that trial counsel raised and preserved this issue as a claim under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, and, further, that his appellate counsel raised the issue on direct appeal. He maintains, however, that appellate counsel was ineffective “for failing to raise it as a federal due process claim and failing to raise specific factual and legal grounds supporting this claim.” Housman’s Brief at 125. 11We recognize that, in its brief, the Commonwealth addresses several alleged hearsay statements beyond the one specifically identified by Housman in his brief. This, however, does not alter this Court’s prohibition against incorporation by reference. [J-58AB-2019] - 18 In response, the Commonwealth contends that Housman fails to demonstrate arguable merit or prejudice with respect to this claim. It first observes that, notwithstanding the fact that appellate counsel did not specifically cite federal due process principles on direct appeal, the foundation of Housman’s federal due process claim was substantively rejected by this Court on direct appeal, wherein this Court, in rejecting his state claim, relied extensively on Commonwealth v. Chester, 587 A.2d 1367 (Pa. 1991), which, in turn, relied on federal precedent. Noting that “the test for prejudice in the ineffectiveness context is more exacting than the test for harmless error,” the Commonwealth further argues that, in light of this Court’s determination that any error by the trial court in failing to sever Housman’s case from Markman’s was harmless, Housman failed to meet his burden that he was prejudiced by appellate counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. Commonwealth’s Reply Brief at 36-37 (citing Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 315 (Pa. 2014) (observing that, in order for an error to be deemed harmless, the Commonwealth must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute the verdict, whereas, in order to establish actual prejudice in connection with an ineffectiveness claim, the defendant must demonstrate that the ineffectiveness had an actual adverse effect on the outcome of the proceedings)). The PCRA court rejected Housman’s claim, noting that, while now couched as an ineffectiveness claim, it rests on the same facts upon which this Court denied the claim on direct appeal. PCRA Court Opinion, 2/2/18, at 15. The court further reasoned that, even if appellate counsel was unreasonable in failing to present the additional arguments offered by Housman, Housman failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that the additional arguments would have resulted in a different outcome. Id. at 16. [J-58AB-2019] - 19 We agree with the PCRA court that Housman’s refashioned severance claim does not afford him relief. This Court addressed a similar claim by the defendant in Commonwealth v. Elliott, 80 A.3d 415 (Pa. 2013). In that case, the defendant argued that, although appellate counsel unsuccessfully challenged the admissibility of bad acts evidence on direct appeal, counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the distinct contention that the admission of bad acts evidence violated his federal constitutional right to due process. The PCRA court in Elliott determined that the issue had been previously litigated on direct appeal and, therefore, was not cognizable under the PCRA. This Court concluded that the PCRA’s court’s finding that the issue had been previously litigated was erroneous, as a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffectiveness raises a distinct legal ground for purposes of state PCRA review from the underlying claim of trial court error. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 999 A.2d 564, 573 (Pa. 2005). Nevertheless, we concluded that Elliott’s ineffectiveness claim lacked arguable merit, as the foundation of the underlying federal due process claim was that the evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, an argument this Court had rejected on direct appeal. See Elliott, 80 A.3d at 442. Housman’s underlying federal due process claim is based on the argument that the trial court’s refusal to sever his trial from Markman’s unduly prejudiced him by permitting evidence of his prior bad acts and bad character to be used against him. However, this Court previously rejected this identical argument on direct appeal, concluding that any prejudice that resulted from the admission of such evidence was de minimis, and was eclipsed by his own admissions. See Housman, 986 A.2d at 835. Thus, consistent with Elliott, Housman has failed to demonstrate the arguable merit prong of his current ineffectiveness claim, and he is not entitled to relief. [J-58AB-2019] - 20 4. Jury charge on accomplice liability and conspiracy Housman next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s charge on accomplice liability and conspiracy because the charge did not advise the jury that it had to make a finding that Housman had a specific intent to kill in order to convict him as an accomplice to first-degree murder. Housman contends that the jury charge, as given, eliminated the Commonwealth’s burden of proof as to a crucial element of the offense, violating his due process rights. In support of his argument, Housman quotes the following portion of the jury charge on accomplice liability given by the trial court: I say, as a general rule, you may find a defendant guilty of a crime without finding that he or she personally engaged in the conduct required for the commission of the crime. A defendant is guilty of a crime if he or she is an accomplice of another person who commits that crime. A defendant does not become an accomplice merely by being present at the scene or knowing about the crime. He or she is an accomplice if, with the intent of promoting or facilitating commission of the crime, he or she solicits, commands, requests, encourages or agrees with the other person in planning or committing it. You may find a defendant guilty of a crime on the theory that the defendant was an accomplice so long as you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that the defendant was an accomplice of the person who committed it. N.T. Trial, 11/1/01, at 1209-10. Housman suggests that the above charge was substantially similar to the charge deemed to violate due process by the Third Circuit in Laird v. Horn, 414 F.3d 419, 425 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Under Pennsylvania law, first-degree murder requires the specific intent to kill, and that mens rea is also required of accomplices and co-conspirators.”). Housman further notes that this Court already determined, in his co-defendant’s appeal, that the [J-58AB-2019] - 21 accomplice liability charge given by the trial court was erroneous. See Markman, 916 A.2d at 597 n.8 (“Here, the trial judge gave the jury a general accomplice liability instruction, but did not explain that the defendant must personally have had a specific intent to kill to be convicted of first degree murder as an accomplice. While this omission constituted error under the Bachert/Huffman[12] rule . . . the error is irrelevant for purposes of a sufficiency analysis and, moreover, the parties have not raised the issue.”). Housman additionally challenges the trial court’s conspiracy charge to the jury, which provided: For purposes of this case, the defendants are charged with conspiracy on homicide, kidnapping, theft, unlawful restraint and abuse of corpse. I just gave you the elements of those charges. In order to find the defendants guilty of conspiracy to commit these charges, you must be satisfied initially that the following two elements of a conspiracy have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: One, that the defendants agreed with one another that they or one or more of them would engage in conduct which constitutes a crime of homicide as I have described it or kidnapping or theft or unlawful restraint or abuse of [a] corpse, or agreed to aid another person or persons in the planning and/or commission of the crimes as I have outlined them to you. And, second, that the defendant or defendants did so with the intent of promoting or facilitating commission of these other crimes. In other words, the defendants shared the intention to bring about the crime or to make it easier to commit all these crimes. 12 In Commonwealth v. Huffman, 638 A.2d 961 (Pa. 1994), this Court found reversible error where the trial court’s instruction suggested that the jury could find that the defendant possessed the specific intent to kill required for a first-degree murder conviction based solely on an act of his accomplice. We clarified that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant independently possessed the requisite specific intent to kill, and that the same could not be proven by evidence of the intent to kill possessed by the defendant's accomplice or co-conspirator. [J-58AB-2019] - 22 No person may be convicted of conspiracy unless an overt act is done in pursuance of the conspiracy -- unless an overt act is alleged and proven to have been done by the defendant or the co-defendant, co-conspirator. In this case, it is alleged that the following were overt acts: Luring Leslie White to 112 Big Spring Terrace in Newville, blindfolding, gagging, tying the hands and feet of Leslie White, strangling Leslie White, stealing White’s vehicle and camera and using this property as their own, transporting White’s body to Floyd County, Virginia, in the rear of her Jeep and placing White’s body in the trunk of an abandoned car on the abandoned property that you heard, such as her whereabouts were unknown. Thus, you cannot find the defendants guilty unless, in addition to the elements of conspiracy, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the defendants did at least one of the alleged overt acts in pursuance of the conspiracy. N.T. Trial, 11/1/01, at 1221-22 (emphasis added). Housman maintains that the inclusion of the above-italicized phrase “or to make it easier to commit all these crimes” in the trial court’s conspiracy charge relieved the Commonwealth of its burden of proving that he had the specific intent to kill. The PCRA court rejected Housman’s claims of ineffectiveness based on the trial court’s jury instructions on accomplice liability and conspiracy, noting that Laird, the case on which Housman relies, was decided years after the jury instruction was given in the instant case, and holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to predict a change in the law. PCRA Court Opinion, 2/2/18, at 17. The Commonwealth asserts that Housman ignores the more recent controlling case law of this Court, including Commonwealth v. Daniels, 963 A.2d 409 (Pa. 2009), wherein we held that the PCRA petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to challenge the trial court's jury instructions regarding the specific intent to kill required for a conspiracy conviction, even though an isolated portion of the charge appeared to have [J-58AB-2019] - 23 violated the rule of Huffman. Indeed, the Commonwealth suggests that the instruction on accomplice liability given by the trial court in the instant case was nearly identical to the one at issue in Daniels, as well as the instruction at issue in Commonwealth v. Bennett, 57 A.3d 1185 (Pa. 2012), and that, consequently, trial counsel was not ineffective for not challenging the instruction. Commonwealth’s Brief at 46. The Commonwealth further points out that, in Bennett, this Court stated that it is not bound by decisions of the Third Circuit construing Pennsylvania law. See Bennett, 57 A.3d at 1203. We need not engage in a protracted examination of the trial court’s instructions on accomplice liability and conspiracy in this case to determine whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the charge. As noted above, under the Strickland test, a petitioner must establish that his underlying claim has arguable merit; that no reasonable basis existed for counsel's action or failure to act; and that petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's error, with prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Pierce, 786 A.2d at 213. A claim may be dismissed if it fails any one of these three prongs. Ali, 10 A.3d at 291. In the instant case, we find that Housman’s ineffectiveness claim fails because he cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object to the jury instructions. Housman confessed that he lured the victim to his trailer by lying to her, strangled her with speaker wire, and discarded her body in an abandoned car. Based on this evidence, it is inconceivable that the jury would have convicted Housman merely as an accomplice to Markman, rather than as a principal in the crime.13 For this reason, his ineffectiveness claim fails. 13Indeed, while not dispositive, we note that the jury – the same jury that heard the guilt and penalty phase presentations against both Housman and Markman – found as a penalty phase mitigating factor for Markman that her participation in the killing was [J-58AB-2019] - 24 5. Evidence as to specific cause of death Housman next contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence to establish that Markman’s act of placing a gag in the victim’s mouth, rather than Housman’s act of wrapping speaker wire around the victim’s neck, was the actual cause of the victim’s death, and for failing to object to the trial court’s related instruction. He further argues that the prosecution elicited and failed to correct misleading testimony regarding the specific cause of death. Preliminarily, at trial, the medical examiner, Dr. Susan Venuti, testified that, during the autopsy of the victim, she removed, inter alia, the speaker wire that was tied around the victim’s wrists and ankles, the cloth gag that was tied around the victim’s face, and the folded piece of cloth that had been stuffed into the victim’s mouth. N.T. Trial, 10/29/01, at 533-36. Dr. Venuti also noted that she had observed “a small area of pink discoloration on the decedent’s neck,” which “could be due either to some pressure on the neck, it could be a pressure mark, or it could simply be some discoloration due to the decompositional changes.” Id. at 538. Dr. Venuti testified that it was her belief “that Leslie White died from deprivation of oxygen due to airway obstruction. And the term we use is asphyxia due to suffocation by smothering.” Id. at 545. When asked what effect “getting the hands under the ligature or wire that may have been placed around her neck” would have had on the process of asphyxiating the victim, Dr. Venuti further stated: Okay, you also have to remember that the decedent had a large gag cloth within her mouth and also another gag securely tied around her mouth and her neck. This action about her neck and her upper body may force this gag further relatively minor, Markman, 916 A.2d at 597 n.7 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(7)), thereby highlighting Housman’s predominate role. [J-58AB-2019] - 25 back in her throat, push her tongue further backwards, and it will obstruct her airway. Id. at 540. She further explained: The term asphyxiate means lack of oxygen. A person can be asphyxiated by having their external airways obstructed, for instance, their nose or their mouth. Another mechanism can be obstructing the decedent’s airway around the neck. The trachea can be obstructed, or the blood vessels supplying the blood to and from the brain can be obstructed, physically lying on both sides of the front of the neck. Id. at 543. Commonwealth witness Agent Stephen Lester, who was present at the autopsy of the victim, also testified at trial, where the following exchange occurred during crossexamination: Markman’s counsel: And do you recall Doctor Venuti telling you that she did not find any bruising in the neck area, but if there were, if they were there, they could have been destroyed by decomposition? Agent Lester: That is correct. N.T. Trial, 10/26/01, at 414. On redirect, the following exchange took place: District Attorney: There was a mark on the neck, was there not? Let me show you Commonwealth Exhibit Number 88. We haven’t had an opportunity to view Dr. Venuti’s testimony yet. Agent Lester: Yes. There was a mark on the neck, but -- District Attorney: I think Mr. Braught [Markman’s counsel] was trying to talk about ligature marks. You didn’t find any of those, and she said it could have not been there because of decomposition? Agent Lester: That is correct. [J-58AB-2019] - 26 District Attorney: But there was this pink spot on the neck that still remained? Agent Lester: Right. Id. at 414-15. Housman contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to rebut the Commonwealth’s theory that Housman intended to and/or caused the victim’s death by strangling her with speaker wire with two pieces of evidence. First, he notes that Dr. Venuti’s autopsy report listed the cause of death as “asphyxia due to suffocation by smothering.” Report of Autopsy, 1/18/01 (PCRA Hearing Exhibit 19). He further refers to a memorandum by Virginia State Police Agent S.T. Oliver, in which the agent recounts that Dr. Venuti told him, during a November 3, 2000 interview in her office, that she saw no evidence of ligature strangulation on the victim’s body, and that she did not believe decomposition would have obscured ligature injuries.14 That memorandum provided: Dr. Venuti advised that during the autopsy of LESLIE WHITE, she saw no petechial hemorrhages and no evidence of any ligature strangulation. This is why she ruled that WHITE died from suffocation. Dr. Venuti did not rule out that something may have blocked the carotid artery but it would have been done with something that was soft that did not leave any marks. She advised that there was a lot of decomposition on the body and this may have obscured minor injuries but does not believe that it would have obscured any ligature injuries. Dr. Venuti offer [sic] the opinion that if the victim was gagged in Pennsylvania, she probably died before getting to Virginia. She advised that she had no way of knowing for sure when or where the victim died. Memorandum of S.T. Oliver, 11/3/00 (PCRA Hearing Exhibit 20). 14 On at least one occasion, Housman refers to this memorandum as “Dr. Venuti’s report to Agent Oliver.” Housman’s Brief at 149. The memorandum, however, was not authored by Dr. Venuti; rather, the memorandum merely set forth Agent Oliver’s recollection of his interview with Dr. Venuti. [J-58AB-2019] - 27 According to Housman, his counsel should have used the autopsy report and Agent Oliver’s memorandum to cross-examine Dr. Venuti regarding the absence of ligature marks, and to rebut Agent Lester’s testimony. Housman further suggests that the prosecutor’s failure to correct Agent Lester’s statement that Dr. Venuti opined that the absence of ligature marks on the victim could have been due to decomposition of the body, when the police memorandum of Agent Oliver contradicted the statement, amounts to prosecutorial misconduct. Housman’s Brief at 152. Housman argues that, where there is “any reasonable likelihood” that “false testimony” offered by the prosecutor could have “affected the judgment of the jury,” a new trial is required. Id. The PCRA court rejected Housman’s claim, concluding, inter alia, that trial counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that he did not cross-examine Dr. Venuti regarding her report that noted a lack of ligature marks because, “[s]trategically, I thought there was more than enough evidence based on my client’s own admissions and all of the evidence he strangling [sic] the young girl and the woman puts a sock down her throat. They are both in the process of causing her death, and I didn’t see the strategic advantage of getting involved in that particular issue.” N.T. PCRA Hearing, 5/22/17, at 89-90. The PCRA court additionally reasoned that, even if there was no reasonable basis for trial counsel’s actions, Housman failed to demonstrate prejudice. We find no error in the PCRA court’s rejection of Housman’s claim. Initially, although Housman suggests that Dr. Venuti testified that it was the gag which impaired or obstructed the victim’s airway, and that Dr. Venuti “repeatedly refused to conclude that the evidence showed that strangulation caused [the victim’s] death,” Housman’s Brief at 147, Dr. Venuti nonetheless stated, as evidenced by the trial testimony quoted above, that a ligature or wire around the victim’s neck could have forced the gag further back into the victim’s mouth, obstructing her airway. N.T. Trial, 10/29/01, at 540. [J-58AB-2019] - 28 Moreover, there was sufficient evidence that Housman’s unchallenged acts constituted first-degree murder. A person is guilty of first-degree murder where the Commonwealth proves that a human being was unlawfully killed; the person accused is responsible for the killing; and the accused acted with specific intent to kill. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(d); Commonwealth v. May, 887 A.2d 750, 753 (Pa. 2005). An intentional killing is a killing by means of poison, or by laying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premediated killing. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a). The Commonwealth may establish that a defendant intentionally killed another “solely by circumstantial evidence, and the fact finder may infer that the defendant intended to kill a victim based on the defendant’s use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body.” May, 887 A.2d at 753. The evidence presented at trial, including Housman’s own admission that he strangled the victim with speaker wire, was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that he intentionally, deliberately, and with premeditation participated in the murder of Leslie White. His active participation in this regard was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that he harbored a specific intent to kill. Accordingly, even if the actual cause of the victim’s death was asphyxia due to the cloth in her mouth and the gag around her face, and not the speaker wire around her neck, the evidence clearly was sufficient to convict Housman of first-degree murder. See May, 887 A.3d at 757 (appellant’s active participation in the killing of two victims, including cutting the throat of and shooting one of the victims, was sufficient to prove that he harbored a specific intent to kill, such that, even if he did not inflict the specific injuries that caused each of the victim’s deaths, he properly was convicted of first-degree murder because the evidence proved he clearly shared that intent with his accomplice); Daniels, 963 A.2d at 428 (rejecting claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to secure testimony of a pathologist as to specific cause of death, and emphasizing that “PCRA defense experts’ opinions on the specific cause [J-58AB-2019] - 29 of death say little about appellees’ intention−which was a very different question. . . . [A]ppellees controlled the circumstances surrounding [the victim’s] death every step of the way and . . . those circumstances fully supported a finding of an intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Accordingly, Housman fails to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to present evidence establishing that it was Markman’s specific acts of placing a gag in and around the victim’s mouth, rather than Housman’s act of wrapping speaker wire around the victim’s neck, that caused the victim’s death. 6. Cumulative effect of errors Finally, Housman argues that, in the event this Court determines he is not entitled to relief from his “conviction and sentence” based on any of the individual claims discussed above, he nonetheless is entitled to relief due to the cumulative effect of the errors at trial. Housman’s Brief at 160. Housman suggests that, while this Court has “been averse to broadly-stated claims of cumulative error,” we have acknowledged that multiple instances of deficient performance may warrant a prejudice assessment premised on cumulation. Id. Housman’s discussion, however, appears to be limited to the errors he alleges occurred during the penalty phase of his trial. At any rate, in addressing Housman’s guilt-phase claims above, we rejected three − that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of evidence of Housman’s prior bad acts and bad character; that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s charge on accomplice liability and conspiracy; and that counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine Dr. Venuti regarding the absence of ligature marks and rebut Agent Lester’s testimony − on the basis that he failed to demonstrate prejudice. Upon review, we find that these three errors are insufficient to establish collective prejudice that would [J-58AB-2019] - 30 entitle Housman to relief. Accordingly, for all of the reasons set forth above, we affirm the PCRA court’s denial of a new trial.