Opinion ID: 3010606
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Forfeiture of the Right to Counsel

Text: Finally, we turn to Leggett's claim that the district court improperly determined that he forfeited his right to counsel at sentencing by physically attacking his lawyer. We exercise plenary review over claims alleging denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995). This case raises the issue of forfeiture of the right to counsel. Forfeiture, however, is often confused with the closely related -- but distinct -- concept of waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248, 258 (5th Cir. 1985) (concluding that defendant waive[d] right to counsel while resting decision on notion of forfeiture); Yale Kamisar et al., Modern Criminal Procedure, 1598 n.b (8th ed. 1994) (noting that some courts refer to waiver as forfeiture). In the interest of clarity, we shall initially note the distinction between the two concepts. A waiver is an intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a known right. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1099 (citing, inter alia, Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, S 11.3(c), at 546 n.4 (2d ed. 1992)); United States v. McCleod, 53 F.3d 322, 325 n.6 (11th Cir. 1995) (We discuss `forfeiture' rather than `waiver' because waiver implies `an intentional relinquishment of a known right.' ) (citation omitted). Most commonly, one waives a constitutional right by an affirmative, verbal request (e.g., requests to proceed pro se or to plead guilty). Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1099. It is well established that any waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent. United States v. Salemo, 61 F.3d 214, 218 21 (3d Cir. 1995); Government of the Virgin Islands v. James, 934 F.2d 468, 470 (3d Cir. 1991); McMahon v. Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934, 944 (3d Cir. 1987). With regard to ensuring that a waiver is valid, the trial court's responsibility varies -- depending on the right being waived. As we discussed in depth earlier, a trial court has no duty to ascertain that a waiver of the right to testify is valid. By contrast, if a defendant elects to waive the right to counsel, a trial court must make sure that the defendant has an awareness of the dangers and disadvantages inherent in defending oneself. United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (trial record must show that defendant who waives right to counsel  `knows what he is doing and [that] his choice is made with eyes open' ) (citation omitted). Forfeiture, on the other hand, does not require the knowing and intentional relinquishment of a known right. Rather, forfeiture results in the loss of a right regardless of the defendant's knowledge thereof and irrespective of whether the defendant intended to relinquish the right. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1100. To forfeit the right to legal representation, a defendant must engage in extremely serious misconduct. Id. at 1102. For example, in McCleod, a defendant's attorney testified that the defendant was verbally abusive; had threatened to harm[the attorney]; had threatened to sue the attorney; and had tried to persuade the attorney to engage in unethical conduct. 53 F.3d at 325. The district court concluded that the defendant's behavior was so egregious as to constitute a forfeiture of the right to counsel -- and the court of appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed by affirming that decision. Id. at 326. Leggett's conduct was even more extreme than that of the defendant in McCleod. Whereas the McCleod defendant's abuse of his attorney was verbal in nature, Leggett's abuse was an unprovoked physical battery. We do not hesitate to conclude that such an attack qualifies as the sort of extremely serious misconduct that amounts to the forfeiture of the right to counsel. Goldberg, 67 F.2d at 1102. Leggett argues that the requirements of Goldberg were not satisfied by the district court when it concluded that 22 Leggett forfeited his right to a lawyer. We disagree. In Goldberg, a defendant's attorney alleged that the defendant had threatened his life. 67 F.3d at 1095. The district court concluded that the defendant forfeited his right to counsel by threatening the life of his attorney. Id. at 1096-97 (noting that district court used term waiver even though it was actually applying forfeiture principle). We reversed the district court's ruling but did not base our decision on the severity of the defendant's misconduct. (Certainly, it would be difficult to quantify a death threat as any more or less offensive to the sensibilities of civilized society than, say, an actual physical assault. Both acts are reprehensible.) Instead, we reversed the district court's ruling because its factual findings concerning the death threat were made at a hearing to which the defendant was not a party. Id. at 1102. We concluded that a forfeiture ruling could not be based entirely on evidence presented at an ex parte hearing. Id. No such evidentiary problem exists in this case. An evidentiary hearing was not necessary because Leggett assaulted Gardner in full view of the district court. Furthermore, at the subsequent competency hearing (at which Leggett was represented by counsel), the district court did consider the possibility that Leggett was not in control of his faculties when he assailed Gardner-- though it did ultimately conclude that he was responsible for his actions.13 Thus, Leggett benefited from two elements which were not present in Goldberg: (1) a direct presentation of evidence before the district court (i.e., the occurrence of the attack itself) and (2) participation in an adversarial proceeding to contest the forfeiture. Since we based our decision in Goldberg on the absence of these factors and since those factors are present in this case, we reject Leggett's argument that the requirements of Goldberg were not satisfied by the district court. _________________________________________________________________ 13. In denying Leggett's motion for the appointment of counsel after the attack and at the conclusion of the competency hearing, the district court remarked, [N]o evidence presented at th[e competency] hearing supports Leggett's assertion that after engaging in an argument with his counsel, allowing 20 seconds to pass, and then assaulting his counsel, such actions were not voluntary. 23 In sum, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that, by physically attacking his attorney, Leggett forfeited his right to counsel at the sentencing hearing.14