Opinion ID: 177263
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prayer Option

Text: In response, Sherman argues that Bown is distinguishable because, unlike Section 1, the Georgia legislature in Bown had removed the word prayer from the state's moment of silence law and the Eleventh Circuit noted that this deletion provides some support for the idea that the Act's purpose is secular. Id. at 1470 n. 3. She further claims that Brown and Croft were wrongly decided because the moment of silence statutes in those cases mentioned prayer; in her view, a moment of silence law will only pass constitutional muster if it does not mention prayer. It is true that when the Georgia legislature amended the statute at issue to make the moment of silence mandatory, it simultaneously removed the word prayer from the statute. [6] But the Eleventh Circuit in Bown merely found that deletion supported the government's secular purpose it did not hold that a moment of silence law would fail the Lemon test if the law included prayer as a permissible activity. And we find nothing wrong with Illinois's (or Virginia's or Texas's) legislature informing teachers and students alike that students may pray during the period of silence, given that the statutory language does not indicate any preference for prayer over silent reflection. In fact, listing prayer as a permissible option makes eminent sense in this case, given that Section 1 expressly states that the period of silence shall not be used as a religious exercise. 105 ILCS 20/1. As Koch explained, it was important to note that prayer is a permissible option to negate any impression that teachers or students may have that students were not allowed to pray (silently) during the period of silence. [7] And deleting prayer from Section 1after it had been part of that statute for nearly forty yearscould actually evidence a hostility to religion which is itself unconstitutional. Brown, 258 F.3d at 281-82 (finding that striking down a moment of silence statute solely because pray was used would manifest a hostility to religion that is plainly inconsistent with the religious liberties secured by the Constitution). Therefore, contrary to Sherman's argument, we conclude that a moment of silence law can constitutionally include a prayer option in accord with the holdings in Brown and Croft. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 73, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Even if a statute specifies that a student may choose to pray silently during a quiet moment, the State has not thereby encouraged prayer over other specified alternatives.).