Opinion ID: 2782883
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constructive Amendment/Variance

Text: Investigator Thomas Garrison testified for the United States at Defendant’s trial. On direct examination, the United States inquired whether the Red Roof Inn was in close proximity to the Johnson City Motel 6. Defense counsel objected, arguing that the superseding indictment charged a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine beginning on or about June 24. Any allegation that drugs were dealt out of the Red Roof Inn on another date would therefore be outside the scope of the indictment. The district court overruled the objection, concluding that the evidence was “relatively close in time and appears to be evidence related to acts that were part and parcel of and in furtherance of the conspiracy charged in the indictment.” On appeal, Defendant contends that the United States constructively amended the superseding indictment by introducing Marquesha Jones’s testimony concerning drug distribution at the Johnson City Red Roof Inn on June 23, 2011. Defendant emphasizes that the date specified in the indictment was June 24, 2011, which encompassed only activities at the Johnson City Motel 6. Def.’s Br. 26. As an initial matter, we clarify that Defendant’s argument implicates a variance, not a constructive amendment. “[A] defendant can prove a constructive amendment only by pointing to a combination of evidence and jury instructions that effectively alters the terms of the indictment . . . .” United States v. Hynes, 467 F.3d 951, 962 (6th Cir. 2006). Because Defendant -4- No. 14-5430, United States v. Roberts points only to “[e]vidence . . . presented at trial concerning controlled substances activities at a different Johnson City motel a day earlier,” Def.’s Br. 25, he does not allege a constructive amendment, but rather a variance. See Hynes, 467 F.3d at 962 (“[D]efendants can establish a variance by referring exclusively to the evidence presented at trial.”). A variance “occurs when the charging terms [of the indictment] are unchanged, but the evidence at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment.” United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 683 (6th Cir. 2008). Unlike a constructive amendment, a variance is not per se prejudicial. Id. “To obtain reversal of a conviction because of a variance between the indictment and the evidence produced at trial, a defendant must satisfy a two-prong test: (1) the variance must be demonstrated and (2) the variance must affect some substantial right of the defendant.” United States v. Budd, 496 F.3d 517, 521-22 (6th Cir. 2007). We evaluate variances from an indictment de novo. Id. Evidence of drug activity at the Red Roof Inn did not prove facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment. The superseding indictment alleged that Defendant and his compatriots conspired to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine “on or about June 24, 2011.” “When ‘on or about’ language is used in an indictment, proof of the exact date of an offense is not required as long as a date reasonably near that named in the indictment is established.” United States v. Ford, 872 F.2d 1231, 1236 (6th Cir. 1989). In the instant case, Jones’s trial testimony described one continuously flowing enterprise that occurred over the course of two nights. Jones recounted how Defendant and his coconspirators transported crack cocaine from Knoxville to Johnson City, arriving at the local Red Roof Inn early on June 23. On that date, Jones observed Defendant package and distribute drugs at that motel. She explained that once the group sold out of crack cocaine, Defendant and three -5- No. 14-5430, United States v. Roberts co-conspirators returned to Knoxville in order to resupply, and then drove back to Johnson City. Jones described how the co-conspirators feared increased attention at the Red Roof Inn, so they shifted their operations over to a neighboring Motel 6 on the morning of June 24. Here, the only “fact” purportedly creating a separate conspiracy was the use of a different motel, but the reason that the conspirators changed motels in the first place was to keep the original conspiracy operating. Because the events of June 23 were part of the same conspiracy as those of June 24, Jones’s testimony concerning drug activity at the Red Roof Inn did not create a fatal variance. See United States v. Manning, 142 F.3d 336, 338-40 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that evidence of an August 4, 1995 meeting between the defendant and two other individuals to discuss a cocaine deal did not create a fatal variance, even though the indictment alleged that the defendant participated in a drug conspiracy “on or about” September 6 to 12, 1995, because the August 1995 meeting “related to” the drug negotiations and sales that occurred in September 1995).