Opinion ID: 1158522
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: T.I.E.'s Duty to Defend

Text: (6) The T.I.E. CGL policy insuring language was standard. The company agreed to pay all damages which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of ... bodily injury to any person, and ... damage to property ... to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence. Bodily injury was defined as sickness or disease and property damage meant physical injury or destruction of tangible property. The T.I.E. policy also contained the standard exclusions for bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured, and for the liability of any insured for bodily injury to ... the named insured. The policy defined occurrence to mean an event, or series of events, including injurious exposure to conditions, proximately caused by an act or omission of the insured regardless of the number of persons, vehicles or objects affected by the act or omission which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage, neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. Thus, to demonstrate a potential for coverage under T.I.E.'s policy, an insured must show the claim he must defend is an alleged act or omission that caused bodily injury or tangible property damage (as defined by the policy) to the third party, and that the alleged injury was neither expected nor intended by the insured. The first issue we address is whether, under the insuring language and definitions of the liability policy, T.I.E. owed a duty to defend plaintiffs against Amey's lawsuit based on the fact that T.I.E.'s CGL policy provided coverage for property damage and bodily injury caused by an occurrence. In reversing the trial court judgment, the Court of Appeal focused on the fact that Amey's complaint alleged emotional and physical distress flowing from an uncovered economic loss. The appellate court found no duty to defend the underlying lawsuit because the gravamen of the complaint was economic loss. It found the damages for emotional and physical distress were derivative of and inseparable from Amey's allegations of intentional and business torts, allegations that could not, by themselves, give rise to coverage under a CGL policy. [1] The Court of Appeal relied principally on three cases (including two cases decided after the trial in the present matter) to conclude that T.I.E. had no duty to defend the Amey action because plaintiffs' alleged misconduct (as asserted in the Amey complaint) was not potentially covered by the T.I.E. policy. ( Keating, supra, 995 F.2d at pp. 156-157; McLaughlin, supra, 23 Cal. App.4th at pp. 1150-1151; Chatton, supra, 10 Cal. App.4th 846.) In Keating, supra, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue whether, under California law, an insurer had a duty to defend its insureds against an investor action alleging that the insureds' conduct in committing securities fraud and other related claims had caused the plaintiff investors to suffer economic damages that, in turn, resulted in their suffering from `emotional and physical distress, and impairment of health.' (995 F.2d at p. 156.) The court held the insurer owed no duty to defend the underlying investor lawsuits because the alleged emotional and physical distress flowed from economic losses, which were not covered by the CGL policy and therefore did not give rise to a duty to defend. ( Ibid. ) The Keating court relied on Allstate Ins. Co. v. Interbank Financial Services (1989) 215 Cal. App.3d 825 [264 Cal. Rptr. 25] (hereafter Allstate ), which denied coverage under a CGL policy for bodily injury in a lawsuit alleging that an investment firm had conspired to convince third party plaintiffs to make unsound investments. In reaching its conclusion, the Allstate court held that [t]he [liability] policy covers losses resulting from accidental events which cause bodily injury or property damage, not the giving of professional or investment advice.... Here, although the insureds attempt to characterize the claims differently, the clear bases of the complaints are that the insureds gave poor professional advice and the plaintiffs lost money in a tax shelter investment. [¶] Had these insureds desired to obtain a professional liability policy to protect them from charges resulting from the performance of professional services, such insurance could have been obtained [at a higher premium].... [J]ust as an insurer would not reasonably expect that a [CGL] policy would cover claims for securities fraud, these insureds could not reasonably expect that such claims would be covered under this policy. ( Id. at pp. 830-831.) As in Allstate, supra, 215 Cal. App.3d at pages 830-831, the Keating court recognized that economic or business loss of the sort alleged by the investors is not a covered loss within the meaning of a standard CGL policy. Nor, in the Keating court's view, is emotional and physical distress induced by (or derivative of) the economic loss a covered event. As the court observed, It would expand coverage of these policies far beyond any reasonable expectation of the parties to sweep within their potential coverage any alleged emotional or physical distress that might result from economic loss that is itself clearly outside the scope of the policy. ( Keating, supra, 995 F.2d at p. 156.) For this latter statement, the Keating court relied on Chatton, supra, 10 Cal. App.4th 846, a coverage case that is nonetheless applicable to our duty to defend discussion because the court concluded that a CGL policy does not provide a potential for coverage for allegations based on economic losses and emotional distress flowing from those losses. ( Id. at p. 857.) In Chatton, several investors sued the directors and officers of Technical Equities, an investment services company, for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence. The investors prevailed on their negligence and fraud causes of action and were awarded damages for both their economic losses and resulting emotional distress, as well as punitive damages. Following their success at trial, the investors filed a declaratory relief action against the company's liability insurer to adjudicate coverage. The trial court held, among other things, that there was coverage under the bodily injury clause because the investors' emotional distress constituted bodily injury under the CGL policy, and that the wrongful activities of Technical Equities (i.e., security manipulations, note fraud, etc.) were occurrences within the meaning of the same policy. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that any emotional distress suffered by the investors due to their economic losses was not covered by the liability policy even though those losses were caused by the negligent misrepresentations of Technical Equities officers and directors. (See Warner v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1991) 230 Cal. App.3d 1029 [281 Cal. Rptr. 635]; Allstate, supra, 215 Cal. App.3d 825; Giddings, supra, 112 Cal. App.3d 213; Fresno Economy Import Used Cars, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. (1977) 76 Cal. App.3d 272, 279 [142 Cal. Rptr. 681].) This is so, the court held, because the bodily injury clause under a CGL policy provides coverage for bodily injury to the person and for physical injury to, or destruction or loss of use of, tangible property.  ( Chatton, supra, 10 Cal. App.4th at p. 857, some italics omitted.) Recognizing that the investors' emotional distress claims were predicated upon the `bodily injury' clause of the CGL policy, the court concluded that the emotional trauma suffered by the investors was caused by investment or intangible economic losses which, in turn, were caused by the negligent misrepresentations of the Technical Equities officers. ( Id. at p. 860.) The emotional trauma, the court concluded, fell outside the coverage clauses of the CGL policy. ( Id. at p. 858.) The present Court of Appeal also relied on McLaughlin, supra, 23 Cal. App.4th 1132, 1150, another case involving Technical Equities officers and directors, decided after the Keating and Chatton cases. One issue in McLaughlin was whether the insurer had a duty to defend against an action alleging that the insureds' conduct had caused the investor plaintiffs to suffer economic damages and resultant mental, physical and emotional distress. ( Ibid. ) The McLaughlin court followed the reasoning of Keating, supra, 995 F.2d 154, and Chatton, supra, 10 Cal. App.4th 846, to reverse a multimillion-dollar, bad faith judgment against Technical Equities's insurer, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa., and to conclude the insurer owed no duty to defend under the bodily injury and property damage clauses because none of the damages sought was allowed under the CGL policy. The McLaughlin court observed, [p]laintiffs' physical and emotional distress derived from their investment loss which in turn was negligently inflicted upon them by the insureds. First, the property damage coverage under the CGL extends only to physical injury to, or destruction or loss of use of, `tangible property.' Damage for lost profits, loss of investment or other harm to one's economic interest constitute injuries to intangible property which by definition fall outside the scope of the [CGL] policy. ( Chatton, supra, 10 Cal. App.4th at pp. 857-858.) [¶] Second, since [p]laintiffs' physical distress was induced by an uncovered economic loss it defies reason that bodily injury coverage would nevertheless independently obtain. ( McLaughlin, supra, 23 Cal. App.4th at p. 1150, italics in original.) We agree with the Court of Appeal below that Keating, Chatton, and McLaughlin properly determined that CGL policies do not provide coverage for economic losses that cause emotional distress. As we have observed, the CGL policy provides coverage for occurrences that cause bodily injury or tangible property losses. ( Giddings, supra, 112 Cal. App.3d at p. 217.) These policies were never intended to cover emotional distress damages that flow from an uncovered occurrence, and the parties could not reasonably have expected that coverage would be expanded merely because a claim of emotional or physical distress is alleged as a result of the economic loss. ( Keating, supra, 995 F.2d at p. 157, fn.1.) Accordingly, when we apply this rule to the present case and look to the allegations of the Amey complaint compared with the terms of T.I.E.'s CGL policy, we conclude that T.I.E. owed no duty to defend the Amey lawsuit. ( Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 276.) All allegations in the Amey complaint were related to Amey's asserted economic loss as a Marmac shareholder, and, as T.I.E. noted in its denial letter, shareholder disputes are not covered by its policy. In sum, the allegations of the Amey complaint, liberally construed, did not assert a risk potentially covered under T.I.E.'s CGL policy. Nonetheless, plaintiffs make several procedural arguments urging this court to recognize a duty to defend based on the allegations of the complaint. (7) First, plaintiffs contend that T.I.E. and Farmers should not be allowed to rely on either Keating or McLaughlin, or their theory of no coverage for economic losses, because those cases were not decided until after the trial in the present matter was complete. Moreover, plaintiffs contend the economic loss issue cannot be considered because it was not raised in the trial court or in the regular briefing in the Court of Appeal. Both arguments fail. As T.I.E. and Farmers observe, Courts of Appeal routinely consider newly published case law that was not available until after entry of judgment in the trial court. (See, e.g., Hattersley v. American Nucleonics Corp. (1992) 3 Cal. App.4th 397, 402 [4 Cal. Rptr.2d 331] [rejecting claim that appellant should be foreclosed from relying on theory of law espoused in newly decided Court of Appeal opinion]; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29.3(a) [When a party desires to present new authorities ... not available in time to have been included in the party's brief on the merits, the party may serve and file a supplemental brief....].) Moreover, after the Keating and McLaughlin cases were decided, T.I.E. (and Farmers) sought, and obtained permission, to file supplemental briefs. As the Court of Appeal observed, supplemental briefing is proper when a court wishes to consider a point of law following the regular briefing of a case on appeal. (See Meier v. Ross General Hospital (1968) 69 Cal.2d 420, 423-424, fn. 1 [71 Cal. Rptr. 903, 445 P.2d 519]; Kievlan v. Dahlberg Electronics, Inc. (1978) 78 Cal. App.3d 951, 957, fn. 5 [144 Cal. Rptr. 585].) Second, as T.I.E., Farmers, and the Court of Appeal observe, the duty to defend issue involves a question of law based on undisputed facts. Under settled law, the Court of Appeal had discretion to address the issue even though it had not been raised in the trial court. ( Canaan v. Abelnour (1985) 40 Cal.3d 703, 733, fn. 17 [221 Cal. Rptr. 468, 710 P.2d 268, 69 A.L.R.4th 915]; see Ward v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal.2d 736, 742 [336 P.2d 534] [new theory pertaining to question of law on facts appearing in the record may be raised for the first time on appeal].) In a related context, plaintiffs assert the Court of Appeal should not have applied Keating or McLaughlin retroactively because both cases represent new law that should not be used to justify T.I.E.'s denial of a defense to the Amey action. Plaintiffs also claim that any uncertainty on legal questions of policy interpretation compels a defense of a third party lawsuit until the issue is resolved by controlling authority. These claims ignore the general rule that judicial decisions are to be applied retroactively. ( Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 973, 978-982 [258 Cal. Rptr. 592, 772 P.2d 1059] [general rule that judicial decisions are given retroactive effect is basic to our legal tradition]; Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1207 [246 Cal. Rptr. 629, 753 P.2d 585] [relying on general rule of retroactive application of judicial decisions]; see also Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation (1993) 509 U.S. 86, 96 [125 L.Ed.2d 74, 86, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 2517] (hereafter Harper ) [stating that in general, civil decisions must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule].) Notwithstanding the general rule on retroactive application of case law, plaintiffs assert that neither Keating nor McLaughlin should apply to their bad faith action because they relied on pre- Keating law in deciding what facts needed to be explored in the Amey suit. Plaintiffs also assert that Keating was an unforseeable decision, and retroactive application of its holding would be contrary to the public policy behind the duty to defend. Similar arguments were rejected by the high court in Harper, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 96 [125 L.Ed.2d at p. 86, 113 S.Ct. at p. 2517]. The Harper court found unmeritorious the argument that a court should consider the equities of each individual case in deciding the question of retroactivity. (Cf. Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 986-987.) Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Keating was not new law; rather it was a clarification of the law as it existed when plaintiffs tendered their defense to T.I.E. Thus, T.I.E. may rely on Keating to defend the position it took at the time of tender, and its position here, that there was no possibility of coverage under the facts alleged or otherwise known to T.I.E. Indeed, the Keating decision was but a logical extension of the principle, well established at the time T.I.E. denied a defense in the Amey action (see e.g., Lassen Canyon Nursery, supra, 720 F.2d 1016, 1018; Giddings, supra, 112 Cal. App.3d 213, 219; Fresno Economy Import Used Cars, Inc., supra, 76 Cal. App.3d 272, 279), that a CGL policy does not cover intangible economic loss. ( Keating, supra, 995 F.2d at p. 156.) (8) Plaintiffs' related claim, that the lack of authority on the duty to defend issue required a defense by T.I.E. of the Amey lawsuit because uncertainty of policy interpretation compels a duty to defend in this case, is equally unmeritorious. Plaintiffs misinterpret CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal. App.3d 598, 605 [222 Cal. Rptr. 276] (hereafter CNA Casualty ) (criticized on other grounds in Montrose v. Superior Court, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 297, 298). CNA Casualty held that: An insurer's duty to defend must be analyzed and determined on the basis of any potential liability arising from facts available to the insurer from the complaint or other sources available to it at the time of the tender of defense. (176 Cal. App.3d at p. 605, italics in original.) As the Court of Appeal below observed, CNA Casualty simply recites the settled rule that the insurer must look to the facts of the complaint and extrinsic evidence, if available, to determine whether there is a potential for coverage under the policy and a corresponding duty to defend. CNA Casualty does not hold, as plaintiffs suggest, that the insurer must always defend a third party lawsuit absent a published judicial opinion definitively construing the specific policy provision on which the insurer relies, or, as plaintiffs assert, until the extent of `the policy coverage' is legally certain, to deny the defense. This has never been the law. (See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra, 23 Cal. App.4th at p. 1152 [duty to defend depends on facts in complaint; where only potential for liability turns on resolution of legal question, there is no duty to defend]; citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Longden (1987) 197 Cal. App.3d 226, 233 [242 Cal. Rptr. 726].) As plaintiffs themselves observe, the determination whether the insurer owes a duty to defend usually is made in the first instance by comparing the allegations of the complaint with the terms of the policy. ( Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 276.) If the terms of the policy provide no potential for coverage, as in this case, the insurer acts properly in denying a defense even if that duty is later evaluated under case law that did not exist at the time of the defense tender. ( Ibid.; see Giddings, supra, 112 Cal. App.3d 213; see also Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co. (1993) 14 Cal. App.4th 1595, 1608-1609 [18 Cal. Rptr.2d 692] [affirming summary judgment for insurer based on numerous cases decided after insurer refused to defend]; Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Peoples Church of Fresno (9th Cir.1993) 985 F.2d 446, 448-451 [applying Bank of the West, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1254, to relieve insurers of obligation to defend action pending when Bank of the West was decided].) Here, the terms of the policy provided coverage for an occurrence, meaning an event proximately caused by the insured's act or omission that causes either bodily injury or tangible property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. The event in this case that led to Amey's complaint was the purposeful conduct of Waller and Marmac in allegedly mismanaging Marmac property, manipulating the value of Marmac stock, disregarding Amey's rights as a minority shareholder, violating the corporate bylaws, interfering with Amey's prospective economic advantage and inducing Waller to breach his stock-sale contract with Amey. This conduct, according to plaintiffs eventually resulted in financial detriment to Amey and was the reason he suffered humiliation, mental anguish, and emotional and physical distress. Thus, the alleged policy occurrence under which T.I.E. evaluated coverage was based entirely on economic acts or events that resulted in economic injury and mental and physical damages to Amey. At no point did Amey allege an occurrence that could have triggered liability and thus a duty to defend, i.e., an event based on a noneconomic act causing either emotional distress or bodily injury. Plaintiffs claim that the plain meaning of the words [in the insuring clause] would lead the insured to reasonably expect the insurer to defend him against suits seeking damages for bodily injuries caused by an occurrence as defined. This argument is misleading, for it ignores the fact that the occurrence or act leading to coverage must be an injury to tangible property, not to one's economic interest. It is well established that CGL policies do not provide coverage for intangible property losses, including economic losses. ( Chatton, supra, 10 Cal. App.4th 846, 850; Giddings, supra, 112 Cal. App.3d 213.) Both Keating and McLaughlin apply the Chatton and Giddings rule, notwithstanding the fact that the insureds in those cases alleged both mental and physical distress caused by the economic occurrence. Because the alleged occurrence here was the creation of economic loss to Amey, harmful enough to result in his removal from the company, there is no potential for coverage and no corresponding duty to defend under the policy, regardless of the damages allegedly suffered by Amey as a result of that loss. Plaintiffs next criticize Chatton (and, indirectly, Keating and McLaughlin ) for creating an economic loss exclusion by allegedly confusing the definitions of bodily injury and property damage as they appeared in the CGL policy. This economic loss exclusion, plaintiffs claim, is an unwarranted expansion and attenuation of the holding in Giddings v. Industrial Indemnity Co., supra, 112 Cal. App.3d 213, which simply held that purely economic losses do not constitute tangible property losses under a CGL policy. ( Giddings, supra, 112 Cal. App.3d at pp. 218-219.) Plaintiffs claim that Chatton created an economic loss exclusion by erroneously eliminating the separate and independent nature of bodily injury coverage and property damage coverage in a CGL policy. They argue that Chatton would require covered property damage as a prerequisite to bodily injury and thereby eviscerate the separate and independent coverage for bodily injury resulting from an occurrence, and criticize Chatton's reliance on cases defining tangible property loss. (See, e.g., Allstate, supra, 215 Cal. App.3d 825, 830 [economic or contractual losses not tangible property losses in CGL policy]; Kruse v. Bank of America (1988) 202 Cal. App.3d 38, 67 [248 Cal. Rptr. 217] [emotional distress damages not recoverable as element of fraud].) We agree with the Court of Appeal that plaintiffs' criticism of the Chatton analysis is unwarranted. As the Court of Appeal observed, when the third party complaint alleges emotional and/or physical distress flowing from economic losses  as was the case in Chatton, Keating, and McLaughlin as well as in the present lawsuit  the occurrence or event that causes damages is an economic loss. There is no separate bodily injury occurrence within the terms of the policy. Thus, the injured party's claim that he suffered incidental emotional distress flows directly from the economic occurrence and, hence, is not covered by the CGL policy. As the Court of Appeal also noted, the result reached by the courts in Chatton, Keating, and McLaughlin is consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties when they enter into an insurance contract for CGL coverage. It is simply not within the intent of parties to a CGL contract that the bodily injury provision would require the insurer to defend a third party lawsuit in which uncovered economic loss is the gravamen of the complaint. (9) Plaintiffs also attempt to distinguish this case from Chatton, Keating, and McLaughlin on the ground that the definition of occurrence in the T.I.E. policy is different from the standard definition found in the policies governing the above cases. In the T.I.E. policy, the word accident is absent from the definition of occurrence, and there is no modifying language for event or series of events in the occurrence clause. Plaintiffs claim this indicates that the volitional nature of the occurrence or event leading to coverage is irrelevant, and the T.I.E. policy therefore potentially covers intentional or purposeful acts. Plaintiffs rely on United Pacific Ins. Co. v. McGuire Co. (1991) 229 Cal. App.3d 1560, 1564 [281 Cal. Rptr. 375] (hereafter United Pacific ) to support their contention. The issue in United Pacific, supra, 229 Cal. App.3d at page 1563, was whether a plaintiff's claim of wrongful termination that allegedly resulted in mental distress was an event within the meaning of a policy endorsement that defined occurrence to mean `an accident, an event or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended by the insured.' (Italics omitted.) The United Pacific court held that the expanded policy definition of occurrence provides coverage for intentional actions (subject to the statutory limitations of Ins. Code, § 533) that result in bodily injury but excludes coverage for those elements of damages that were expected or intended by the insured. ( United Pacific, supra, 229 Cal. App.3d at p. 1566, italics added.) Thus, the defendants were covered for the intentional act of terminating the plaintiff, as long as the result of the termination  i.e., emotional distress  was not intended by the defendants. ( Ibid. ) Plaintiffs assert that United Pacific supports their argument for a duty to defend in cases involving intentional economic torts that lead to emotional distress. The argument is misplaced. First, in contrast to the present case, the United Pacific court did not question whether coverage for bodily injury includes incidental emotional distress damages that may flow from a noncovered loss. In addition, as the Court of Appeal below observed, the issue we address does not focus on whether plaintiffs' actions toward Amey were intentional; thus, this difference in the policy language is irrelevant. Finally, plaintiffs assert that the Court of Appeal disregarded the rule set forth by this court in Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076 [17 Cal. Rptr.2d 210, 846 P.2d 792] (hereafter Horace Mann ). There, a student sued her teacher primarily for sexual misconduct, but included allegations of negligence in her complaint. The defendant's general liability policy provided for coverage `as a result of any claim arising out of an occurrence in the course of the insured's educational employment activities, and caused by any acts or omissions of the insured....' ( Id. at pp. 1079-1080.) A majority of this court held that the insurer must provide a defense under the complaint of any claim potentially covered, even though the noncovered claims predominated the action: Horace Mann contends that [defendant's] alleged misconduct apart from the molestation could not possibly give rise to liability because the admitted molestation is the `dominant factor' in this case. The argument misconceives the role of the court in determining the duty to defend. We look not to whether noncovered acts predominate in the third party's action, but rather to whether there is any potential for liability under the policy. [Citation.] Since an insurer has a duty to defend the entire third party action if any claim encompassed within it potentially may be covered ... the mere fact that Horace Mann could not indemnify [defendant] for the molestation did not eliminate its duty to defend other, possibly covered claims. ( Id. at p. 1084, italics in original.) Plaintiffs are correct that the complaint for sexual misconduct in Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pages 1079-1080, alleged potentially covered negligent acts. By contrast, the Amey complaint alleged no potentially covered acts because all allegations were based on the occurrence of business torts, corporate mismanagement and other equally noncovered acts. Moreover, rather than predominate, the noncovered acts in this case comprised the entire complaint. Thus, the facts on which Amey based his theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress were identical business and contract transgressions on which he based the remainder of his complaint. Unlike the complaint in Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1076, therefore, the Amey complaint gave rise to no potential for coverage under T.I.E.'s CGL policy, and hence no duty to defend. ( Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 276.) Plaintiffs also argue that in addition to the alleged emotional and physical distress, the Amey complaint asserted loss in reputation and humiliation that did not arise from the occurrence of economic loss and should give rise to a duty to defend under Horace Mann, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1076. This claim is equally unavailing. Plaintiffs assert that Amey's complaint arguably alleged conduct resulting in uncovered bodily injury as well as potentially covered conduct. For example, plaintiffs claim that although Amey's allegations of physical distress were generally alleged to have been caused by all of the acts set forth in the complaint, his bodily injury allegations were not specific as to root causes. Plaintiffs note that Amey's allegations were broad and varied and alleged that plaintiffs' conduct in changing Amey's job description humiliated him in front of others. In addition, Amey alleged he was upset and distressed by being excluded from the board and shareholder meetings and the decisionmaking process. Amey was also upset that despite his implicit trust in Waller for over 16 years, Marmac's officers entered into a secret stock transaction causing Amey fear, anger, and a sense of betrayal. Indeed, plaintiffs observe, Amey was distressed because he felt he was being forced out of Marmac, a company he felt he owned and which he helped build. Plaintiffs contend that for T.I.E., Farmers, and the Court of Appeal to claim that, as a matter of law on undisputed facts, all such allegations necessarily or entirely flowed from economic loss, is, respectfully, incomprehensible. As T.I.E., Farmers, and the Court of Appeal observe, however, any lost reputation and humiliation Amey may have suffered was, like the emotional and physical distress alleged in the Amey complaint, directly related to the uncovered business torts and economic loss. That plaintiffs' alleged business torts may have caused Amey to feel betrayed, angry or distressed, does not transform those feelings into a separate occurrence under the bodily injury clause of the CGL policy.