Opinion ID: 1481920
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is this name inherently false or misleading?

Text: Leather is the tanned skin of an animal, and the petitioners' product concededly contains no leather. It has a cotton cloth base on which is spread a coating composed of nitrocellulose solution, castor oil, and various pigments for coloring, and by painting and embossing is made to resemble real leather on the only side thereof that is exposed to view when made up into goods or used in upholstering, paneling, or trimming. Duraleather is a coined word. Dura admittedly is an abbreviation of the word durable, and the word thus composed can be given no other meaning than Durable leather. So read and considered, it is an assertion that the product marked, advertised, and sold as Duraleather consists of leather. By putting this imitation product bearing a false name into the channels of trade, whatever may have been the petitioners' motive in so doing, they furnished their customers and those dealing with them the means to misrepresent that the goods made from that product were made of leather, and when such a false trade-name is subsequently associated with the sale of goods made from such product, the petitioners cannot escape legal responsibility by disclaiming any intention to deceive or by showing that those with whom they dealt directly  first purchasers of the product  well knew that it was but an imitation or substitute for the genuine article. While this imitation leather, as it passed from the petitioners in the first instance, was to its customers a finished product, it was to their knowledge and purpose to be used ultimately in upholstering and in the manufacture of suitcases and other goods and to come into the hands of those usually called the consuming public. The knowledge which these original and intermediate buyers had as to the character of the petitioners' product cannot be imputed to the ultimate buyer. There is nothing on the face of the upholstered goods and those made up in whole or in part from this imitation leather that would convey such knowledge to the buyers thereof. So far as appearances were concerned, the contrary would be the intimation. These purchasers of the goods thus made could and would see only one side of this product  that side which had been purposely made to resemble or imitate genuine leather. Masland Company concedes that many of these would have difficulty to distinguish its product thus made up from genuine leather. When these goods are unaccompanied with the name Duraleather, as is the case in most instances, the likelihood that the purchaser thereof would be deceived into buying them, believing that they were made of genuine leather, was ever present. But when the goods so made are advertised as made of Duraleather, as was done by the Virginia Trunk & Bag Company in its catalogues and circulars issued for 1924 use by its customers and prospective customers located throughout several of the states, and who mostly were retailers of leather and imitation leather goods, in which advertisements appeared cuts or prints of suitcases under some of which was printed the legend Made of `Duraleather,' or Made of Black Cobra Grain Duraleather, the likeness of such goods and the trade-name associated therewith in which the word leather was prominent, would co-operate and tend to deceive the ordinary ultimate buyer of such bags into the belief that their purchases were made of genuine leather. The price thereof, assuming that to their knowledge it was less than that of ordinary leather goods, would in many instances, probably, mean no more  if that much  than that they were made of an inferior grade of leather. A false trade-name or one that has both the capacity and tendency to deceive the ordinary purchaser will be enjoined. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C. C. A. 7), 258 F. 307; Federal Trade Commission v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U. S. 483, 42 S. Ct. 384, 66 L. Ed. 729, supra; Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C. C. A. 2), 281 F. 744; Guarantee Veterinary Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C. C. A. 2), 285 F. 853; Fox Film Corporation v. Federal Trade Commission (C. C. A. 2), 296 F. 353; Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C. C. A. 6), 11 F.(2d) 47; Federal Trade Commission v. Balme (C. C. A. 2), 23 F.(2d) 615; Indiana Quartered Oak Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C. C. A. 2), 26 F.(2d) 340. The potential deceptive character of this trade-name is also shown by its similarity with Duro, the registered trade-name of A. C. Lawrence Leather Company, used in connection with its advertisements and sales of calfskin and veals  genuine leathers  manufactured by it for use in upholstering and in making traveling bags and other leather goods, and in which branch of trade petitioners and Lawrence Company compete. While Duro is not combined with the word leather in a compound word, as is petitioners' Dura, its use is associated with leather. If Duraleather was the name given to a genuine leather, there would be no question but that it would be in conflict with the registered name Duro used as aforesaid whenever and wherever the two competed. True, the manufacturers of goods made from either of these products, and the jobbers who sell them to such manufacturers, are not deceived as to the character of the Duraleather. To them the product thus named is but a substitute for the genuine article, some of which is called Duro, but not so to the ordinary ultimate buyers of the goods made from this imitation product, who know of goods being made of leather called Duro. To them, not having the knowledge of the original or intermediary buyers, goods advertised as made from Duraleather would be likely to mean that they were made from the Duro product  genuine leather. Goods bought under such conditions would tend to injure and victimize both purchasers and Lawrence Company. That the record does not show any instances of the latter kind of purchasers does not militate against the Commission's finding that the petitioners' trade-name has the capacity and tendency to deceive the ultimate buyer. For under the cited cases, actual deception is not necessary to be shown ere such unfair trade practices can be enjoined. For the foregoing reasons we are of the opinion that petitioners' trade-name is Duraleather; that it is inherently false; and that it has the capacity and tendency to deceive the ultimate purchasers of the goods made from the imitation leather marked, advertised, and marketed under such trade-name into the belief that such goods are made of genuine leather. The remaining question is: