Opinion ID: 3033437
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 2002 Quota Is Based on an Impermissible

Text: Construction of the Act Under Chevron, we must determine whether “the agency’s [quota] is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. Chevron review is also described as determining whether the quota reflects “a reasonable interpretation” of the statute. Id. at 844. The interpretation of § 1854(e)(4) stated in the 1998 NSG, as applied in the 2002 quota, is not a permissible (or reasonable) construction of the statute; it is directly at odds with the text and purpose of the Act.6 Section 1801 of the Act contains its “Findings, purposes and policy.” The “Findings” section states that the nation’s fishery resources “constitute valuable and renewable natural resources,” that many of these species’ “survival is threatened” and that others’ survival will soon be threatened by “increased fishing pressure, . . . the inadequacy of fishery resource conservation and management practices and controls.” §§ 1801(a)(1), (2). The next subsection recognizes “commercial and recreational fishing” as a “major source of employment” that “contributes significantly to the economy of the Nation.” § 1801(a)(3). But even here, the Act urges that the economies of many coastal areas “have been badly damaged by the overfishing of fishery resources at an ever-increasing rate over the past decade.” Id. The Act goes on to explain that “[i]f placed under sound management before overfishing has caused irreversible effects, the fisheries can be conserved and maintained so as to provide optimum yields on a continuing basis.” § 1801(a)(5). These observations lead to the conclusion that “[a] national program for the 6 NRDC counsel confirmed at oral argument that its appeal is as applied; it challenges only this particular application of the Act. We also note that because the Act explicitly states that NSGs do not have the force of law, there would be no way for us to review the 1998 NSG facially; as discussed above, it gains the force of law (and hence becomes reviewable) only through specific applications, such as the 2002 darkblotched rockfish quota. 11422 NATURAL RESOURCES v. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES conservation and management of the fishery resources of the United States is necessary to prevent overfishing, to rebuild overfished stocks, to insure conservation, to facilitate longterm protection of essential fish habitats, and to realize the full potential of the Nation’s fishery resources.” § 1801(a)(6). The “purposes” section adds that “[i]t is therefore declared to be the purposes of the Congress in this chapter . . . to take immediate action to conserve and manage the fishery resources . . . .” § 1801(b)(1). [1] The purpose of the Act is clearly to give conservation of fisheries priority over short-term economic interests. See Daley, 209 F.3d at 753 (“[U]nder the [Act], the [Agency] must give priority to conservation measures.”). The Act sets this priority in part because the longer-term economic interests of fishing communities are aligned with the conservation goals set forth in the Act. Without immediate efforts at rebuilding depleted fisheries, the very long-term survival of those fishing communities is in doubt. See id. This background provides helpful context for interpreting § 1854. However, even if we turn to the plain language of § 1854(e)(4) and, without such context, ask how its two subsections interact, we still must reject the interpretation of the Act contained in the 1998 NSG as it was applied to this species. [2] Section 1854 contains two significant mandates that constrain the Agency’s options in adopting a rebuilding plan for an overfished species. First, the time period must be “as short as possible,” although the Agency may take into account the status and biology of the overfished species and the needs of fishing communities. See § 1854(e)(4)(i). Subsection (i)’s commands apply to all rebuilding periods, whatever their length. Second, Congress specified a presumptive cap of 10 years on any rebuilding period, subject to exceptional circumstances beyond the Agency’s control — such as an international treaty or, relevant here, “the biology of the stock of fish.” See § 1854(e)(4)(ii). NATURAL RESOURCES v. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES 11423 [3] We have noted some ambiguity in subsection (i)’s mandate to rebuild a species in “as short [a time period] as possible” while giving consideration to “the needs of fishing communities.” The natural reading of this language, however, is that Congress intended to ensure that overfished species were rebuilt as quickly as possible, but wanted to leave some leeway to avoid disastrous short-term consequences for fishing communities. To use an example relevant here, even if a fishing community is actively seeking not to fish for a certain species, it will inevitably catch some of the overfished species in the process of fishing for other, more plentiful fish — what is known as “bycatch.” Because almost no groundfish that are caught as bycatch survive even if they are thrown back into the ocean, an absolute ban on catching any of a species of groundfish could mean a total moratorium on all fishing in the parts of the fishery containing groundfish, with obvious adverse consequences for fishing communities. Section 1854(e)(4)(i), then, allows the Agency to set limited quotas that would account for the short-term needs of fishing communities (for example, to allow for some fishing of plentiful species despite the inevitability of bycatch), even though this would mean that the rebuilding period would take longer than it would under a total fishing ban.7 [4] Reading subsection (i) in this light, it is apparent that Congress intended subsection (ii) as a limit on the Agency’s discretion. The Agency may consider the short-term economic needs of fishing communities in establishing rebuilding periods, but may not use those needs to go beyond the 10-year cap set by subsection (ii). To breach this cap, the Agency may only consider circumstances that “dictate” doing so. One such circumstance, albeit not relevant here, would be an international agreement. Another that is relevant is “the biology of 7 This appears to explain the 2001 quota. The Agency determined that the darkblotched rockfish stock could be rebuilt within 10 years, but it still had the flexibility under the statute to set a fishing quota of 130 million tons for 2001 rather than ban fishing entirely. 11424 NATURAL RESOURCES v. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES the stock of fish” — that is, when the current number of fish in the fishery and the amount of time required for the species to regenerate make it impossible to rebuild the stock within 10 years, even with a total moratorium on fishing. In such cases, subsection (ii) recognizes that the presumptive 10-year cap cannot apply. That said, it is manifestly unreasonable to conclude, as the Agency apparently has, that Congress intended in such circumstances to relieve the Agency of its continuing obligation to rebuild the species in a time frame that is “as short as possible.” [5] The 2002 quota was not based on a permissible construction of the Act, because the Agency altered dramatically the balance between the needs of a species and of fishing communities with no statutorily grounded justification.8 NRDC argues that if the rebuilding period must exceed 10 years, the Act mandates a total moratorium on all fishing — the alternative interpretation of § 1854 that the Agency rejected when it adopted the 1998 NSG. Although NRDC’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable, it is not the only reasonable one. It is also reasonable to conclude that the needs of fishing communities may still be taken into account even when the biology of the fish dictates exceeding the 10year cap — so long as the weight given is proportionate to the weight the Agency might give to such needs in rebuilding periods under 10 years. This interpretation would allow the Agency’s rebuilding periods to account for short-term concerns such as bycatch in the same manner whether the rebuilding period exceeds 10 years or not. 8 In cases of species with much shorter mean generation times, the 1998 NSG might dictate a quota that limits the Agency’s discretion in a way that appropriately reflects congressional intent. It is no answer to the irrationality of the interpretation as applied to this species, however, that it may be rational as applied to some other species. As the Agency itself has noted, it is the 2002 darkblotched rockfish quota that is being challenged here. NATURAL RESOURCES v. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES 11425 [6] The 2002 darkblotched rockfish quota is patently unreasonable, however, and reflects no such measured proportionality. Freed from the 10-year cap because of the biology of the rockfish (its long regeneration time and its dire condition), the Agency simply applied the 1998 NSG’s formulaic approach and increased the annual take. In 2001, the Agency set a quota of 130 million tons of darkblotched rockfish because it believed the species had been reduced to only 22% of its unfished population. When its revised estimate revealed that the species was doing much worse, the Agency expanded the fishing of the species from 130 million tons to 168 million tons, a 29% increase. Whatever the outer limits of the range of permissible constructions of the Act, we are certain that what lies beyond them is an interpretation allowing the Agency, upon discovering that a species is in significantly worse shape than previously thought, to increase dramatically the fishing pressure on that species. Increasing the annual take in these circumstances is simply incompatible with making the rebuilding period as short as possible. We are not prepared to accept NRDC’s argument that once the 10-year cap is lifted because the biology of the fish dictates it, the Act in turn dictates that the Agency can no longer consider the short-term economic needs of fishing communities at all. Such an argument, although plausible, does not appear to give due consideration to the continuing operation of subsection (i)’s command to take the needs of fishing communities into account. But neither are we prepared to accept the Agency’s interpretation, which would ignore the primary mandate of subsection (i) — that the rebuilding period be “as short as possible.” At least as applied here, the Agency’s interpretation not only increased the fishing take by almost 30% but extended the maximum rebuilding period from less than 10 years to 47 years. Plainly, the Act does not contemplate that the Agency grant the least protection to the fish species in the worst shape. The arguments of the Agency and Intervenors regarding potentially dire consequences for fishing communities seem 11426 NATURAL RESOURCES v. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES persuasive at all only because they assume that the sole alternative is NRDC’s strict moratorium. The district court made this same flawed assumption: Faced with a choice between an interpretation of the [Act] that requires a moratorium on harvesting of fish species that take more than ten years to regenerate naturally, and an interpretation that permits limited harvesting over the course of a longer rebuilding period, [the Agency] selected . . . the latter interpretation. In light of [the Act’s] dual conservationist and commercial objectives, an interpretation that accommodates both objectives, rather than selecting one to the exclusion of the other, is permissible. 280 F.Supp. 2d at 1014. The Agency was “faced with [this] choice” only because it proposed these two extreme interpretations, and no others.9 [7] Our rejection of the Agency’s interpretation is compelled by the language of § 1854, which requires that rebuilding take place in “as short [a time] as possible” and, if biologically possible, in less than 10 years. § 1854(e)(4). That simple command cannot be reconciled with a rebuilding period that is from 20 to 33 years longer than the biologically shortest possible rebuilding period (and that increases the annual take in the meanwhile). We hold that even granting the Agency some leeway in extending rebuilding periods when the 10-year cap is not applicable, the 2002 darkblotched rockfish quota was based on an impermissible construction of the Act.10 9 The closest any party came to explaining the Agency’s justification for its decision to increase the quota was Intervenors’ counsel’s assertion that the Act was “not written by biologists,” apparently a criticism of the stringency of its rebuilding commands, and in particular of the presumptive 10year cap. 10 We therefore do not reach NRDC’s alternative arguments that the Agency violated the APA by failing to consider relevant biological factors and the NEPA by failing to do the required environmental analysis. NATURAL RESOURCES v. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES 11427 B. The 2002 Limits for Three Other Groundfish Species Do Not Violate the APA or the NEPA NRDC additionally argues that the 2002 levels for three other groundfish species violate the APA and the NEPA. The Administrative Procedure Act requires that courts determine if agency actions are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The National Environmental Policy Act requires agencies to consider the environmental consequences of an action before taking it. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989). A reviewing court’s ultimate NEPA inquiry is whether an agency has taken the required “hard look” at the environmental consequences of its action. See Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1332 (9th Cir. 1993). Bocaccio, cowcod and canary rockfish are three additional Pacific groundfish species that have been found to be overfished. When it set 2002 levels for these fish, the Agency simply carried over the levels from the previous year. The Agency concluded that there was no new information on these stocks to warrant changing the quotas. NRDC argues that because the Agency was aware that the actual amount of these fish that had been caught in previous years far exceeded the set quotas, the Agency should have reduced the 2002 quotas to compensate — and that its failure to do so was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA, and reflected a failure to take the NEPA’s “hard look.” The Agency argues that over- or under-harvests for a single year are accounted for through alternate mechanisms. Assessments are conducted only every three years because of budgetary constraints, so quota revisions likewise take place every three years. In the meantime, however, additional “management measures” are undertaken, such as restrictions on fishing in specific areas within the fishery, or on fishing during certain parts of the year when there is a greater chance of bycatch. 11428 NATURAL RESOURCES v. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES The district court concluded that: [The Agency’s] decision to maintain harvest limits at their 2001 levels was reasonably connected to — indeed, was dictated by — the agency’s policy of resetting harvest limits only after conducting a stock reassessment. In turn, that policy, which is a product of limited resources available to the agency to manage eighty-two different fish species, was neither an abuse of discretion nor contrary to law . . . . [T]he Court [also] finds that the EA’s analysis was ade- quate to permit informed decision-making under the circumstances. 280 F.Supp. 2d at 1017 & n.4. [8] We agree. Even if there are other reasonable approaches to dealing with the problem of exceeding quotas, we cannot say that the Agency’s actions were “arbitrary, capricious,” “contrary to law” or that they did not reflect a sufficiently “hard look.” We therefore affirm the district court on these claims.