Opinion ID: 1808742
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the evidence demonstrated the landowners' intent to relinquish and the public's acceptance of the property for use as a public road.

Text: Findings of fact should not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard should be given to the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. SDCL 15-6-52(a); Brusseau v. McBride, 245 N.W.2d 488, 491 (S.D.1976). In applying this standard, this court will not overturn the trial court's decision unless, after reviewing all the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Wiggins v. Shewmake, 374 N.W.2d 111, 114 (S.D.1985). Smith does not claim an express dedication of the subject roadway. In respect to an implied dedication of streets, this court has said: `One of the methods of acquiring the right to the use of land for a street is that of the implied dedication of the same by the owner of the fee. In an implied common-law dedication, the use of such land by the public as a street, with the knowledge of, and without objection by, the owner of the fee for a number of years, is evidence of such dedication, and from such use by the public, without objection by the owner of the fee, a jury may presume an actual dedication of such street to the public use.' Roche Realty & Investment Co. v. Highlands Co., 29 S.D. 169, 176-177, 135 N.W. 684, 685 (1912) citing Mason v. City of Sioux Falls, 2 S.D. 640, 648, 51 N.W. 770, 772-773 (1892). Generally, no particular formality is essential to an implied dedication or acceptance of land for a public use. Roche Realty, supra . An actual intent to dedicate the land to public use must exist, but proof of use for a period much shorter than that required to show title by prescription may be sufficient to prove such intent and dedication. The extent and character of the use furnishes evidence of the intention to dedicate. Edmunds v. Plianos, 74 S.D. 260, 263, 51 N.W.2d 701, 702 (1952); Mason, supra . The intention to dedicate must clearly appear and may be shown by deed, words, or acts. If by acts, such as the trial court found in this case, they must be such acts as are inconsistent with any construction except the assent to dedication. First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Revell, 68 S.D. 377, 385, 2 N.W.2d 674, 678 (1942). A long line of South Dakota cases on the doctrine of implied dedication of private property to public use have established that: Conduct on the part of the owner that is clearly expressive of an intention to dedicate usually amounts to a dedication, if acted upon by the public in a manner which clearly justifies the inference of an acceptance. Mason, supra ; Larson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 19 S.D. 284, 103 N.W. 35 (1905); Roche Realty, supra ; First Church, 68 S.D. at 383, 2 N.W.2d at 677; Stannus v. Heiserman, 72 S.D. 567, 569, 38 N.W.2d 130 (1949); Edmunds, supra ; Brusseau, 245 N.W.2d at 489. To prevent the establishment of highways on public and private lands by a user, the legislature enacted Chapter 100, Laws of 1893. [1] This statute has been reenacted in successive revisions and presently appears as SDCL 31-3-2 which provides: Notwithstanding § 31-3-1, the mere use by the public of any route of travel along or across public or private land, or the right-of-way of any railroad company for any period, shall not operate to establish a public highway and no right shall inure to the public or any person by such use thereof. This court has held that mere use will not support an inference of implied dedication. Roche Realty and First Church, supra ; Lacey v. Judge, 68 S.D. 394, 3 N.W.2d 115 (1942); Stannus, Edmunds, and Brusseau, supra . [W]hat amounts to a dedication by implication depends upon the facts of the particular case, and no hard and fast rule can be laid down as a guide for the courts. Evans v. City of Brookings, 41 S.D. 225, 229, 170 N.W. 133, 134 (1918); Stannus; Brusseau; Miller v. Scholten, 273 N.W.2d 757, 762 (S.D.1979). The trial court's Findings of Fact included the following:  Since 1940, the road has been used by residents of the area and their guests which include all parties to this action and their predecessors in title.  The road has also been used by: hunters, woodcutters, U.S. Forest Service employees, S.D. Department of Game, Fish & Park employees, as well as business people who have provided service to the residents living on the road and west of the road, and other members of the general public.  Smith's husband performed frequent maintenance work on the road from 1951 until approximately 1977.  In 1957, Meade County caused work to be performed by the county maintenance and road crews on a portion of the subject road which crosses property now owned by appellants Sponheim, Kistler, Atkinson, and Gapp.  In 1957, the county widened the road, constructed a roadway ditch, and installed culverts. The county crews performed surface grading and gravel work on the road.  In 1957, the predecessors in title to appellants Gapp, Atkinson, Sponheim, and Kistler, moved their respective roadside fences to allow Meade County to have their land to use in widening and improving the road and installing a roadway ditch on the south side of the road.  In 1972, Meade County's highway maintenance crews performed work on the road to repair damage caused by flooding.  From approximately January 1975, until about June 1978, the Meade County Highway Department maintained the road annually. Such maintenance included road grading and graveling work, snow removal, and maintenance of the roadway ditch by county work crews.  In 1977, the Meade County Commission approved and accepted a plat for a new subdivision which was located west of the disputed road.  When Meade County accepted the plat, the only public access to the subdivision was via the road.  A Meade County Commissioner testified that the road is public and that Meade County is responsible for its maintenance and upkeep. These findings are sufficient to support the judgment of an implied dedication if substantiated by the evidence. Thus, the issue before this court is whether there is evidence to support the findings of the trial court under the clearly erroneous rule. Brusseau, 245 N.W.2d at 492 (Dunn, C.J., dissenting). For the reasons stated below, we hold that the trial court's findings are amply supported by the evidence. In Evans, we found that the defendants had dedicated a private road to public use and the City of Brookings had accepted the dedication by expending public funds for grading, graveling, and maintaining the road. 41 S.D. at 229-231, 170 N.W. at 134. Similarly in Edmunds, the payment by the city for the cost of paving an intersection of a street and alley supported the finding that there had been an implied dedication of the property in question as a public alley. 74 S.D. at 269-270, 51 N.W.2d at 706. In Haley v. City of Rapid City, 269 N.W.2d 398 (S.D.1978), we reiterated our adoption of the rule that acceptance of a dedication may be shown through use. Id. at 400. In Haley, we followed the ruling in Evans, supra, and held: Notwithstanding the fact that the public has not used the disputed portion of the alley for vehicular traffic in recent years, we conclude that the utilization of the alley by utilities under a franchise from the city, the graveling of the entire alley by the city, the provision in the curb for ingress and egress, and the refusal of the city to vacate the alley constitute sufficient evidence of the acceptance of the dedication. 269 N.W.2d at 400. Likewise, in Miller, we held that payment by the township for road grading, graveling, and maintenance supported the conclusion that the defendants had dedicated the roadway to the public, that there had been acceptance by the public, and that the roadway constituted a public road. 273 N.W.2d at 762. SDCL 31-3-1 provides in full: Whenever any road shall have been used, worked, and kept in repair as a public highway continuously for twenty years, the same shall be deemed to have been legally located or dedicated to the public, and shall be and remain a public highway until changed or vacated in some manner provided by law. Here, the evidence shows that the disputed roadway has been used for a period of at least twenty years. The record demonstrates that all parties to this lawsuit as well as their predecessors in interest; hunters; woodcutters; forest service personnel; state game, fish, and parks employees; and the general public have used the road openly, continuously, and without the appellants' or their predecessors' permission since 1940.