Opinion ID: 2634399
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Properly Admitted the Preliminary Hearing Testimony of Kenny Dustin

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in determining that prosecution witness Kenny Dustin was entitled to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, ง 15), thereby rendering Dustin unavailable as a witness at the trial and leading to the introduction of Dustin's preliminary hearing testimony into evidence. Defendant contends the alleged error constituted a violation of his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to a fair trial, and also undermined the reliability of the jury's penalty determination. He claims violations of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and parallel provisions of the California Constitution. Two statutory provisions are particularly significant to defendant's claim, Evidence Code sections 1291 and 240. Pursuant to Evidence Code section 1291, under various circumstances prior testimony by an unavailable witness is admissible despite the general rule excluding hearsay evidence. [13] Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a) defines the circumstances under which a witness may be considered unavailable for the purpose of admitting the witness's prior testimony in evidence. [14] One such circumstance occurs when the witness properly invokes the privilege against self-incrimination at trial. (Evid. Code, ง 240, subd. (a)(1).) Defendant claims first that Dustin's preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible pursuant to Evidence Code sections 240 and 1291, because Dustin was not entitled to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination. Specifically, defendant claims, Dustin waived the privilege against self-incrimination as to all the circumstances surrounding the charged crimes. Defendant rests this claim upon the circumstance that during the in limine hearing on the admissibility of Dustin's preliminary hearing testimony and the propriety of his invocation of the privilege, Dustin, without asserting the privilege, answered questions inquiring whether his preliminary hearing testimony was true. Second, defendant contends that the prosecution should have afforded Dustin immunity from prosecution at trial, thereby permitting Dustin to testify and forcing him to submit to defendant's cross-examination in the presence of the jury. Defendant argues that the prosecution procured Dustin's unavailability at trial by withholding immunity, and that for this reason, Dustin was not unavailable within the terms of Evidence Code sections 240, subdivision (a), and 1291. [15] Defendant also contends the trial court on its own motion should have afforded Dustin immunity from prosecution.
Dustin testified for the prosecution at the preliminary hearing without consulting an attorney concerning potential self-incrimination. The People were represented by Fresno County Deputy District Attorney Steven Polacek. At trial, represented by another deputy district attorney, the prosecution intended to call Dustin to testify during its case-in-chief. The trial court, however, appointed counsel to advise Dustin, because in its view Dustin could be viewed as a potential suspect in the murder of Miguel Gonzalez and in other crimes committed on February 17-18, 1991. After conferring with counsel, Dustin decided to assert his privilege against self-incrimination and to refuse to answer any questions relating to the crimes. The prosecution then announced its intention to offer into evidence the testimony given by Dustin at the preliminary hearing, under the former-testimony exception to the hearsay rule. (See Evid. Code, งง 1200, 1291.) The court conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury in order to determine whether Dustin properly could invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, rendering him unavailable as a witness under the pertinent Evidence Code provisions. After Dustin was sworn, the prosecutor asked him several questions, including whether Dustin recalled the events of February 17-18, 1991, whether Dustin recalled seeing defendant at the Drakes' residence during that period, whether Dustin recalled seeing the white Chevrolet Monte Carlo parked near the residence, whether Dustin recalled defendant beating Miguel Gonzalez with a tire jack, and whether Dustin recalled traveling to the area where the victim's body was dumped. Dustin refused to answer each question, expressly grounding his refusal on the privilege against self-incrimination. In response to the prosecutor's inquiry whether he had testified truthfully at the preliminary hearing, Dustin responded affirmatively. On cross-examination, when defense counsel inquired of Dustin whether he intended to respond to any questions regarding the period February 17-18, 1991, Dustin replied, No. I plead the Fifth. Defense counsel asked Dustin whether he intended to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to any questions that are asked of you about ... those dates. Dustin responded, Yes. In response to additional questions posed by defense counsel to Dustin regarding specific crimes committed against Miguel Gonzalez, Dustin repeatedly invoked the privilege. In response to defense counsel's question, Dustin again asserted that the testimony he gave at the preliminary hearing had been complete and truthful. The defense objected to the admission of Dustin's preliminary hearing testimony, claiming that defendant's right to representation by counsel free of conflict of interest had been violated at the preliminary hearing. Specifically, defendant alleged that his own counsel at the preliminary hearing had a conflict of interest, because she was a member of the public defender's office and another deputy from the same office had represented Dustin on a prior occasion when Dustin had been charged with a battery in violation of section 242. Initially, defendant contended that because of the conflict, he did not have an appropriate opportunity to cross-examine Dustin at the preliminary hearing. The defense also contended that, when Dustin testified at the in limine hearing at trial that he had testified truthfully at the preliminary hearing, he thereby waived his privilege against self-incrimination, and that as a consequence he was available as a witness and his prior testimony was inadmissible. At a hearing held in response to the claim of conflict, the deputy public defender who had represented defendant at the preliminary hearing testified that she had been unaware at the time of the hearing that her office ever had represented Dustin and that her representation of defendant had been as vigorous as it would have been had her office never represented Dustin. Defendant's trial counsel conceded that any conflict of interest on the part of defendant's preliminary hearing counsel had not caused defendant prejudice. [16] Trial counsel acknowledged that prior counsel's cross-examination of Dustin at the preliminary hearing had been excellent, robust and uninhibited, and that there was the same motive and incentive to cross-examine [Dustin] at [the] preliminary hearing as there is at ... trial. The trial court found that Dustin was unavailable as a witness within the meaning of Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(1), and, pursuant to the formertestimony exception to the hearsay rule codified in Evidence Code section 1291, permitted the prosecution to introduce the testimony given by Dustin at the preliminary hearing. The trial court concluded that the conflict of interest claimed by defendant did not adversely affect the cross-examination of Dustin at the preliminary hearing. The transcript of Dustin's preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury. In his testimony, Dustin recounted his observation of the events of February 17-18, 1991. Dustin's testimony implicated defendant in the robbery, kidnapping, and fatal beating of Miguel Gonzalez.
Defendant claims the prosecution failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that Dustin was unavailable within the meaning of Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(1). But if the trial court properly determined Dustin was entitled to assert his privilege against self-incrimination, the prosecution necessarily carried its burden, because a witness is unavailable if he or she is entitled to invoke the privilege. (Evid.Code, งง 240, subd. (a)(1), 1291.) In substance, defendant's claim is that the trial court erred in concluding Dustin properly asserted rather than waived his privilege. It is a fundamental principle of our law that witnesses may not be compelled to incriminate themselves, and the scope of a witness's privilege is liberally construed. ( Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118; People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742; see Evid.Code, ง 940.) To invoke the privilege, a witness need not be guilty of any offense; rather, the privilege is properly invoked whenever the witness's answers `would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute' the witness for a criminal offense. ( People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 617, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635, quoting Hoffman v. United States, supra, 341 U.S. at p. 486, 71 S.Ct. 814; see also People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 304, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742.) A witness may assert the privilege who has `reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.' ( People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 304, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742.) Moreover, `[t]o sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.' [Citation.] To deny an assertion of privilege, `the judge must be ` perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency' to incriminate.' ( Id. at pp. 304-305, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742; see Evid.Code, ง 404 [such evidence is inadmissible unless it clearly appears to the court that the proffered evidence cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate the person claiming the privilege].) Given the broad protective scope of the privilege, waiver of a nonparty witness's privilege is not to be lightly inferred. ( Klein v. Harris (2d Cir. 1981) 667 F.2d 274, 287; see also U.S. v. Seifert (9th Cir.1980) 648 F.2d 557, 561.) Under the circumstances of the present case, we independently review the question whether the court properly permitted Dustin to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. ( People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 304, 30 Cal. Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742.) Defendant does not dispute that Dustin had reasonable cause to apprehend danger from answering questions concerning his activities and observations on the night of the murder, or that he properly invoked his privilege as to the bulk of the questions posed to him at the in limine hearing. Indeed, defendant claims the police and the prosecution should have treated Dustin as a suspect from the outset of their investigation and prosecution. Defendant claims, nonetheless, that, for the purpose of the trial, Dustin waived his privilege against self-incrimination as to the entire subject matter of his activities and observations during the period related to the murder. According to defendant, the waiver occurred during the in limine hearing when Dustin, after repeatedly invoking the privilege, failed to invoke it when he testified that his testimony at the preliminary hearing was truthful. Defendant reasons that Dustin's claim that he testified truthfully at the earlier hearing constituted a ratification of his preliminary hearing testimony, and that it essentially repeated his testimony at that hearing concerning his activities during the period surrounding the crimes. Defendant claims Dustin waived or failed to assert the privilege as to the entire subject matter of his preliminary hearing testimony and that as a consequence, he was not unavailable within the meaning of Evidence Code sections 240, subdivision (a)(1) and 1291. A nonparty witness may elect to waive his or her privilege against self-incrimination. In addition, in some instances a waiver may be implied when a witness has made a partial disclosure of incriminating facts. It is well established that a witness, in a single proceeding, may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about the details. [Citation.] The privilege is waived for the matters to which the witness testifies, and the scope of the `waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination.' [Citation.] ( Mitchell v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 314, 321, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 ( Mitchell) ; see Rogers v. United States (1951) 340 U.S. 367, 374, 71 S.Ct. 438, 95 L.Ed. 344 ( Rogers ) [a witness may not invoke the privilege as to details after voluntarily disclosing incriminating facts].) On the other hand, a witness's failure to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination during one hearing within a proceeding does not necessarily constitute a waiver for the purpose of subsequent hearings. Thus the failure of a witness to claim the privilege at a preliminary hearing does not prevent the witness from refusing to testify regarding the same incriminating material at the trial. ( People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 303, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742; People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 23, 252 Cal. Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249, citing Overend v. Superior Court (1900) 131 Cal. 280, 284, 63 P. 372; People v. Maxwell (1979) 94 Cal. App.3d 562, 570-571, 156 Cal.Rptr. 630.) Similarly, a witness's incriminating admission at an in limine hearing concerning the admissibility of evidence ordinarily does not prevent the witness from invoking the privilege against being compelled to give testimony regarding the matter at the trial. ( People v. Lawrence (1959) 168 Cal. App.2d 510, 517, 336 P.2d 189; see also 2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Witnesses, ง 500, p. 808; 31A Cal.Jur.3d (2002 ed.) Evidence ง 574, p. 122.) Applying these principles, we observe that any waiver of the privilege that occurred by virtue of Dustin's statement that he had told the truth at the preliminary hearing ordinarily would be binding upon Dustin only within the context of the in limine hearing. Even if we assume without deciding that Dustin essentially ratified his preliminary hearing testimony when he asserted he had been truthful at that hearing, he did so only after he clearly and justifiably had asserted his privilege as to his conduct and observations during the period related to the crimes. And even if his asserted ratification could have opened him to further questioning during the in limine hearing despite his assertion of the privilege, it does not follow that the asserted ratification constituted a waiver of his privilege for the purpose of trial. Dustin's statement did not occur at trial, nor did it occur when the trial court was acting in a factfinding capacity. As noted, waiver of the privilege is not lightly inferred ( Klein v. Harris, supra, 667 F.2d at p. 287), and there can be little justification for compelling a witness to incriminate himself concerning a whole series of events as to which he has invoked the privilege, when there is no need to do so to ensure the integrity of the factfinding process. Significantly, application of the waiver doctrine depends upon the purpose of the hearing at which the statements are made and the impact upon the integrity of the factfinding process if assertion of the privilege is permitted. The justifications for the rule of waiver in the testimonial context are evident: A witness may not pick and choose what aspects of a particular subject to discuss without casting doubt on the trustworthiness of the statements and diminishing the integrity of the factual inquiry. As noted in Rogers, [supra, 340 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 438] a contrary rule 'would open the way to distortion of facts by permitting a witness to select any stopping place in the testimony,' [citation] ... [and] `make of the Fifth Amendment not only a humane safeguard against judicially coerced self-disclosure but a positive invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to tell' [Citation.] ( Mitchell, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 322, 119 S.Ct. 1307; see also 1 McCormick on Evidence (6th ed.2006) ง 133, p. 562 [the waiver rule rests primarily ... on the need to avoid leaving triers of fact with the limited version of relevant information that would be before them if a witness was permitted to at will pick a point at which to invoke the privilege].) In the context of a claim that a statement made by a defendant at a proceeding in which a guilty plea was entered constituted a waiver of the privilege at the ensuing sentencing hearing, the United States Supreme Court in Mitchell, supra, 526 U.S. 314, 119 S.Ct. 1307, examined the nature of the two proceedings and determined that the defendant's guilty plea and concession that she did some of it, during discussion of the factual basis for her plea, did not constitute a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination for the purpose of the sentencing hearing. The high court in Mitchell explained that had the petitioner testified at a trial that she did some of it, she would have subjected herself to cross-examination at sentencing on related subject matter. ( Mitchell, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 322, 119 S.Ct. 1307.) On the other hand, [t]he concerns which justify the cross-examination when the defendant testifies are absent at a plea colloquyโa hearing the high court characterized as one protecting the defendant from an involuntary or unintelligent plea. ( Ibid. ) There is no convincing reason why the narrow inquiry at the plea colloquy should entail such an extensive waiver of the privilege. Unlike the defendant taking the stand, who `cannot reasonably claim that the Fifth Amendment gives him ... an immunity from cross-examination on the matters he has himself put in dispute,' [citation] the defendant who pleads guilty puts nothing in dispute regarding the essentials of the offense. Rather, the defendant takes those matters out of dispute, often by making a joint statement with the prosecution or confirming the prosecution's version of the facts. Under these circumstances, there is little danger that the court will be misled by selective disclosure. In this respect a guilty plea is more like an offer to stipulate than a decision to take the stand. Here, petitioner's statement that she had done `some of the proffered conduct did not pose a threat to the integrity of fact-finding proceedings, for the purpose of the District Court's inquiry was simply to ensure that petitioner understood the charges and that there was a factual basis for the Government's case. ( Id. at pp. 322-323,119 S.Ct. 1307.) As the high court suggested in the Mitchell decision, we consider the purpose of the hearing at which it is claimed Dustin waived his privilege against self-incrimination. The purpose of the in limine hearing in the present case was to permit the trial court to determine whether the witness was entitled to invoke the privilege during testimony at the trial, thereby rendering him unavailable as a witness for the purpose of Evidence Code sections 240 and 1291. Dustin's testimony, at the conclusion of his direct and cross-examination at the in limine hearing, that he told the truth at the preliminary hearing did not cast doubt on the trustworthiness of his other statements at the in limine hearing. The concerns that would justify application of the waiver doctrine to permit cross-examination at a trial were absent at the in limine hearing, at which Dustin consistently invoked his privilege as to specific questions and merely concluded with a general assertion that he had told the truth at the prior hearing. In view of the broad protection afforded to potential witnesses by the privilege against self-incrimination, we cannot conclude that Dustin's general ratification caused this nonparty witness to lose the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege he just had invoked repeatedly. Moreover, as in the Mitchell case, in which the defendant had made incriminating statements at a plea colloquy rather than at trial in the presence of the jury, when Dustin assertedly ratified his prior testimony at the in limine hearing, the trier of fact was not present and the testimony had no impact upon the factfinding process at trial. Accordingly, even if Dustin had made an incriminating admission at the in limine hearing, his asserted waiver of the privilege would be effective solely for the purpose of that hearing. Contrary to defendant's assertion, neither U.S. v. Rosario Fuentez (10th Cir. 2000) 231 F.3d 700, 707, nor U.S. v. Seifert, supra, 648 F.2d 557, 561, assists him. Both cases are distinguishable, because they concern a witness's partial disclosure of incriminating matter during testimony at trial โa forum in which a party cannot be permitted to distort the factfinding process by allowing witnesses to give some testimony on a topic but to assert the privilege against self-incrimination to bar related questioning. We are not presented with a case in which a witness testifies to the jury that his prior testimony was truthful, and then invokes the privilege concerning the subject matter of the former testimony, which is then read to the jury. Such testimony would implicate confrontation rights that simply are not at stake when a witness testifies before the court at an in limine hearing. We conclude that the trial court properly determined it was not perfectly clear that Dustin's answers could not possibly have a tendency to incriminate him ( People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 304, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742), and that the witness's asserted ratification of his preliminary hearing testimony at the in limine hearing did not constitute a waiver of his right to invoke the privilege for the purpose of testifying at trial. The trial court did not err in finding Dustin was entitled to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination, and as a consequence the court correctly determined that Dustin was unavailable as a witness within the terms of Evidence Code sections 240, subdivision (a)(1) and 1291. [17] Defendant nonetheless complains that his constitutionally guaranteed right to confront the witnesses against him was violated because Dustin was permitted to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination, thereby avoiding cross-examination at trial. (See U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.; Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400, 403-405, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923.) Although defendants `have the general right to confront the witnesses against them, this right is not absolute and properly gives way when a witness is entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the defendant had an appropriate prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. ( People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 303, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742, citing Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177.) The defendant `must not only have had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the previous hearing, he must also have had an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the [subsequent] hearing.' [Citation.] ... The recent [Crawford] decision ... although changing the law of confrontation in some respects, left these principles intact. ( People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 303, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742, italics omitted.) Significantly, [a] witness who successfully asserts the privilege against self-incrimination is unavailable to testify for these purposes. ( Ibid. ) Within the context of the in limine hearing, defendant was permitted to cross-examine Dustin, and defense counsel elicited the same ratification that Dustin provided on direct examination. Defendant cannot establish a violation of his confrontation rights at trial simply because a witness at an in limine hearing, after repeatedly invoking his privilege as to incriminating questions that clearly called for incriminating answers, answered a general question calling for his ratification of his preliminary hearing testimony. This answer had no impact on defendant's countervailing constitutional right to confront witnesses. Defendant claims a confrontationclause violation on the ground that he did not have an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Dustin at the preliminary hearing. But defendant's trial counsel conceded the opportunity for cross-examination had been exploited fully at the preliminary hearing, and that defense counsel's examination at that hearing had been excellent. Defendant counters that he lacked an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Dustin at the preliminary hearing, because the prosecutor failed to disclose to the defense, prior to the preliminary hearing, contacts the prosecution had had with the witness, particularly the prosecution's agreement to pay approximately $200 toward Dustin's living expenses and the prosecution's asserted secret or implicit promise to Dustin that he would not be prosecuted. [18] In defendant's view, defendant consequently did not have an interest and motive for cross-examination at the preliminary hearing similar to his interest and motive for cross-examination at trial. At trial, the defense did not object to the admission of Dustin's preliminary hearing testimony on this ground and did not bring to the court's, attention the circumstance that the prosecution had paid Dustin's living expenses while assertedly failing to disclose this or other information to the defense prior to the preliminary hearing. Rather, although by this time the defense had been made aware of the payments, defense counsel ultimately conceded that the cross-examination had been thorough and vigorous. Nor did the defense argue that Dustin's testimony should be excluded because there had been a secret or implied immunity agreement prior to the preliminary hearing. Under the circumstances, defendant failed to preserve the claim that Dustin's testimony should have been excluded at trial because the prosecution's asserted withholding of evidence prior to the preliminary hearing substantially impaired his ability to cross-examine Dustin at that hearing. We reach this conclusion because `questions relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeal. [Citation.]' ( People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 301, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742; see People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434-435, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765.) In light of defendant's failure to object on this ground at trial, the trial court did not hold a hearing on defendant's factual assertion that the People improperly delayed discovery or failed to disclose potentially inculpatory evidence prior to the preliminary hearing, nor did the court consider any argument concerning the specific impact any omission may have had on the prior hearing. The objection requirement is necessary in criminal cases because a `contrary rule would deprive the People of the opportunity to cure the defect at trial and would permit the defendant to gamble on an acquittal at his trial secure in the knowledge that a conviction would be reversed on appeal.' [Citation.] ( People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 434, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765; see also id. at p. 435, 35 Cal. Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765 [recognizing a narrow exception inapplicable to the present case].)
As noted, defendant contends Dustin was not unavailable within the terms of Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a). His theory, in essence, is that, instead of employing reasonable diligence to secure the witness's presence at trial as assertedly required by Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(5) and due process principles, the prosecution actually procured the witness's absence by failing to offer him formal immunity or to extend the de facto immunity assertedly received by Dustin at the preliminary hearing. Defendant raises a number of interrelated claims, but they can be reduced to the claim that when Dustin asserted his privilege against self-incrimination at trial, the prosecutor or the court should have offered him immunity from prosecution in order to afford defendant the opportunity to cross-examine him fully in the presence of the jury. Defendant's claim is based upon various inferences he draws from the record that suggest to him that at the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor had either a secret arrangement or an implicit understanding with Dustin that Dustin would not be prosecuted in connection with the crimes for which defendant stood trial. [19] Defendant claims that the prosecutor secured Dustin's preliminary hearing testimony with the intent of later withdrawing his secret or implicit promise of immunity, forcing Dustin to assert the privilege against self-incrimination at trial, and thereby avoiding cross-examination in the presence of the jury. Accusing the prosecutor of willfully procuring the unavailability of Dustin for trial, or at the least of failing to make reasonable efforts to secure his availability by offering immunity, defendant contends the prosecutor distorted the factfinding process in a manner that violated defendant's right to a fair trial. [20] The grant of immunity is an executive function, and prosecutors are not under a general obligation to provide immunity to witnesses in order to assist a defendant. ( People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 127, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 105, 113 P.3d 1125; People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 468, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271; In re Williams (1994) 7 Cal.4th 572, 609, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 64, 870 P.2d 1072; People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 619, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635; In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 720, 114 Cal.Rptr. 429, 523 P.2d 229.) Similarly, we have expressed reservations concerning claims that trial courts possess inherent authority to grant immunity (see People v. Samuels, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 127, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 105, 113 P.3d 1125), and even assuming the court possesses such authority, it has been recognized only when the defense has made a showing that a defense witness should be afforded immunity in order to provide clearly exculpatory testimony. (See People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 469-470, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271.) [21] Contrary to defendant's contention, neither Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 74, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, disapproved in part by Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. 36, 62-63, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177, nor Barber v. Page (1968) 390 U.S. 719, 724-725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255, assists his claim that the prosecution was under an obligation to make reasonable efforts to persuade Dustin to testify at trial. He cites Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, for the following proposition: The basic litmus of Sixth Amendment unavailability is established: '[A] witness is not unavailable for purposes of ... the exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.' ( Id. at p. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2531; see also Barber v. Page, supra, 390 U.S. at pp. 724-725, 88 S.Ct. 1318.) This language does not imply, however, that a witness who appropriately invokes the privilege against self-incrimination is not unavailable without a showing that the prosecution made a goodfaith effort to persuade him or her to testify, either through discussion or through the offer of a grant of immunity. Nor is defendant's claim assisted by his reliance upon very general pronouncements that the constitution ... strongly favor[s] live testimony ( U.S. v. Kehm (7th Cir.1986) 799 F.2d 354, 360-361), or upon cases discussing the prosecution's failure to employ reasonable diligence to secure a witness's attendance at the trial. (See, e.g., People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 904-905, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243; Whelchel v. Washington (9th Cir. 2000) 232 F.3d 1197, 1209.) [22] As noted, it is settled that the preference for live testimony gives way when the witness properly invokes the privilege against self-incrimination and a prior appropriate opportunity for cross-examination existed. Defendant also refers to federal authority that characterizes as a due process violation a prosecutor's refusal to grant immunity to a defense witness when the refusal was undertaken with the deliberate intention of distorting the fact-finding process. ( Williams v. Woodford (9th Cir.2004) 384 F.3d 567, 600; see also In re Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 602-609, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 64, 870 P.2d 1072.) We note that these authorities discuss prosecutorial interference with defense witnesses, whereas Dustin was a prosecution witness. We need not resolve defendant's claims on the merits, however, because he failed to raise any of them in the trial court when Dustin's preliminary hearing testimony was offered into evidence. Yet each of the permutations of defendant's argument depends upon factual assertions concerning the prosecutor's credibility and intent. These claims are forfeited on appeal. ( People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 459-460, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373; People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 619, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635; People v. Sutter (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 806, 813, 184 Cal.Rptr. 829.) This case constitutes a classic illustration of the basis for rules requiring that objections to the introduction of evidence and claims respecting the extension of prosecutorial or judicial immunity must be made in the first instance in the trial court. These objections and claims must be initiated in the trial court so that the court can take steps to prevent error from infecting the remainder of the trial, so that an adequate record may be developed, and so that the court, acting as a finder of fact that has observed the participants, may reach conclusions on matters such as credibility and intent. Equally important as a basis for forfeiture rules is the need to afford the prosecution the opportunity to rebut the defendant's claims of misconduct, provide additional foundation for the admission of evidence, or cure the error. As we explained in applying the forfeiture rule to a claim that a prosecution witness testified under a coercive grant of immunity: In requiring an objection at trial, the forfeiture rule ensures that the opposing party is given an opportunity to address the objection, and it prevents a party from engaging in gamesmanship by choosing not to object, awaiting the outcome, and then claiming error. ( People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 612, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 160,115 P.3d 472.) Defendant contends his claim should not be forfeited, because it represents a pure question of law based upon undisputed facts. He relies upon a doctrine discussed in civil cases (see, e.g., Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 394, 149 Cal.Rptr. 375, 584 P.2d 512 [We have held that a litigant may raise for the first time on appeal a pure question of law which is presented by undisputed facts]; Panopulos v. Maderis (1956) 47 Cal.2d 337, 341, 303 P.2d 738; see also Yeap v. Leake (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 591, 599, fn. 6, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 680) but, as noted, we have concluded specifically that a defendant forfeits a claim that the court or the prosecutor should have granted immunity to a witness when the defendant has failed to raise that claim in the trial court. ( People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 461-462, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373; People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 619, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635.) Furthermore, even assuming the general applicability of the doctrine cited by defendant, the predicate for his claim is absent. He does not ask us to resolve a pure question of law based upon undisputed facts. Instead he asks that we interpret and apply the law to the facts despite the circumstance that there is a critical factual dispute that the trial court never was asked to explore or resolve, namely whether the prosecution informally promised Dustin immunity from prosecution prior to the preliminary hearing and whether it withdrew that immunity at trial, intending to profit by eliminating defendant's live cross-examination of the witness. (See, e.g., Panopulos v. Maderis, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 341, 303 P.2d 738 [if the new theory contemplates a factual situation the consequences of which are open to controversy and were not put in issue or presented at the trial the opposing party should not be required to defend against it on appeal].) Defendant also claims that his failure to request immunity for Dustin at trial should not bar consideration of his claim because, apart from the immunity issue, the prosecution failed to establish that it had employed reasonable diligence to procure Dustin's presence at trial within the meaning of Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(5). This claim also was not raised in the trial court and is forfeited. (See People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 517, 54 Cal. Rptr.3d 245, 150 P.3d 1224 [A defendant may not challenge, for the first time on appeal, the procedure used by the trial court to find a witness unavailable].) In any event, Evidence Code section 1291 provides that former testimony is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness, subject to certain qualifications such as the party's right and opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the prior hearing. Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a) defines unavailable witnesses as any of five types of witnesses. A witness who is exempted from testifying on the ground of privilege is defined as one type. (Evid. Code, ง 240, subd. (a)(1).) This provision does not contain a reasonable diligence requirement, so defendant's claim must fail.