Opinion ID: 2545615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Strange

Text: The May 2004 complaint alleged that the defendants named in that complaint conspired to purchase the Shelton property at a higher price than that paid to Wheeler/Phillips and Southdale in order to avoid complying with the most-favorednation clause in the option agreements for the other parcels. Strange was not named as a defendant in that complaint. The complaint does name a fictitious defendant A, described as those individuals [whether singular or plural] who made misrepresentations or participated in making misrepresentations to the plaintiffs relating to the sale or purchase of the property at issue in this case. In the second amended complaint, Wheeler/Phillips and Southdale substituted Strange and others for fictitious defendant A. Strange argues that he was named as a defendant more than two years after the statute of limitations had expired in this case and that as to him the amendment does not relate back to the original date of the pleading. The trial court's summary judgment in favor of the project participants was grounded on the expiration of the statute of limitations. In their principal briefs, Wheeler/Phillips and Southdale argue that when the statute of limitations as to fraud began to run should be a question for the jury. We have so held. However, Wheeler/Phillips and Southdale did not address Strange's relation-back argument in their principal briefs. Instead, they argue for the first time in their reply briefs that their substitution of Strange as a defendant in February 2005 was proper. Unless we can conclude that the trial court's order entering a summary judgment on the basis of the expiration of the statute of limitations does not involve its rejection of the availability of the doctrine of relation back of the second amended complaint, we cannot reach an issue omitted from Wheeler/Phillips's and Southdale's principal briefs. This Court, in Lloyd Noland Foundation, Inc. v. HealthSouth Corp., 979 So.2d 784, 797 n. 3 (Ala. 2007), stated: The Foundation's original brief to this Court addresses only the issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel. HealthSouth's brief addresses those issues, as well as the four grounds asserted in its motion to dismiss. In its reply brief, the Foundation addresses the additional grounds argued by HealthSouth. This comports with this Court's interpretation of the rules of appellate review. See Pavilion Dev., LLC v. JBJ P'ship, 979 So.2d 24 (Ala.2007) (where the trial court specifies a basis for its ruling, the appellant does not waive additional arguments not addressed in its principal brief). (Emphasis added.) Because Wheeler/Phillips and Southdale did not address the doctrine of relation back in their principal briefs, and because we cannot conclude that the availability of relation back is an additional argument separate from the specified basis for the trial court's ruling, we must affirm the summary judgment as to Strange in his individual capacity on the basis that his substitution as a defendant in the second amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint, and, therefore, as to him, the statute of limitations had run. Because we affirm the summary judgment as to Strange on this basis, we need not address the remaining arguments as to him. As to the claims against Strange in his official capacity as the mayor of the City, the claims sounding in tort are moot for the reasons stated in Part V.A. The breach-of-contract claims are not moot, and they remain pending. To the extent Strange is a necessary party in his official capacity to effectuate any judgment in favor of Southdale and Wheeler/Phillips against the City, he remains involved.