Opinion ID: 2075589
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the plea agreements

Text: The second error committed by the trial court concerns the plea agreements pursuant to which Charles Kellington and Charles Rossi testified in this case. The actual documents setting forth the terms and conditions of the deals reached between various Governmental authorities and Rossi and Kellington were improperly sent out with the jury during their deliberations. In the plea agreement entered into among Rossi, the United States of America and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Rossi agreed, inter alia, to provide complete and truthful information to . . . the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. . . and testify . . . as required. Rossi also agreed therein to provide complete and truthful information concerning any and all illegal activities in which [he] participated. Additionally, Rossi agreed to provide complete and truthful information about the deaths of Gary DeStefano and Thomas Sacco, among others. The agreement also stated that if at any time it is determined . . . that Rossi . . . has not provided complete and truthful information as called for in this agreement . . . or has at any time knowingly made a false statement under oath in connection with the terms of this agreement, [he] will be subjecting himself to a prosecution for perjury. . . . Kellington entered into a plea agreement of virtually identical language. The documents which formalized these two agreements were then signed by the United States Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania, the District Attorney of Allegheny County, the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Rossi and Kellington respectively, and the Attorneys who individually represented Rossi and Kellington at the time. The signatories to these agreements, by executing the documents, placed the imprimatur of their offices as support for the proposition that Rossi and Kellington were telling the truth. It is beyond question that permitting the prosecution to send these documents out with the jury during deliberations impermissibly bolstered the credibility of Charles Rossi and Charles Kellington. In so bolstering their credibility, the court violated the defendant's right to a fair trial. This Court had occasion to deal with a related issue in Commonwealth v. Tann, 500 Pa. 593, 459 A.2d 322 (1983). In Tann, the defendant was convicted of third degree murder for his part in the violent racial confrontation which ended with the death of James Fink. Two of the witnesses that testified against Tann did so pursuant to plea agreements that they entered into with the prosecution; obtaining leniency for their parts in the violence in exchange for their testimony against Tann. The attorneys representing each of those witnesses took the stand and testified that their clients had agreed to waive their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and to tell the truth in this case in exchange for their pleas. In reversing Tann's conviction, Mr. Justice Larsen, writing for the majority, held that the Commonwealth could not: call to the attention of the jury the fact that a witness, who is associated with the accused in the activity giving rise to the criminal charges, [footnote omitted] has waived his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and is taking the witness stand to tell the truth. This tactic has the effect of emphasizing to the jury that the defendant, who is associated with the witness, has the same opportunity to waive his constitutional rights and tell the truth. The defendant is unduly prejudiced by this blantant[sic] invitation for the jury to draw an inference from the fact that the witness is foregoing his constitutional right against self-incrimination. This tends to spotlight the accused if he fails to do the same thing and clearly invites an improper prejudicial inference from the jury. id. at 603, 459 A.2d at 328 (emphasis in original). In the case sub judice, the introduction of the plea agreements served as silent witnesses, causing the same prejudice to appellant as we held to be reversible error in the case of Paul Tann. With the agreements before them, the jurors could reasonably infer that appellant had the same opportunity as Rossi and Kellington to cooperate with the investigation of Thomas Sacco's death, and chose to remain silent. The fact that appellant did not take the stand in his own defense further bolsters his claim that there is a reasonable possibility that this error might have contributed to the verdict. Story, supra . The Commonwealth argues that the plea agreements had to be revealed to the jury; and had they not been revealed the Commonwealth would now be attacked for misconduct. This argument avoids the real issue. It would have been appropriate for the Commonwealth to reveal the existence of the agreements, and the parameters thereof, through the testimony of the witnesses. If they still felt it necessary to enter the documents into evidence they simply could have redacted portions of the agreements to delete the prejudicial aspects, as requested by defense counsel, prior to submission of them to the jury. To allow the jurors to read these unredacted documents at their leisure during deliberations runs afoul of the Tann case and the requirements of fundamental fairness. The prosecutor's closing argument in this case highlights the danger of permitting the jury to review these unredacted agreements. In his argument, the prosecutor stated that it would be difficult to find men of the cloth and real nice people to testify about the events in question. In fact, pursuant to the prosecutor's direct examination, Rossi and Kellington admitted to committing acts of extreme violence, extortion, theft, drug crimes on a grand scale, and murder. It is unquestionable that these two witnesses were members of the most vile and corrupt elements of our society. Yet by admitting into evidence these agreements that vouch for their credibility, the government was testifying sub silentio that just this once these lowlife witnesses should be believed; that during this trial they are crowned with the governmental halo of being on the right side and are therefore credible. The jury neither cautioned to look upon the testimony with disfavor nor to realize that the witnesses may falsely blame others because of some corrupt and wicked motive, were persuaded to believe that the witnesses were telling the truth because the government's own documents said so. This impermissible vouching for witnesses  especially witnesses of this caliber  offends our sense of decency and our notion of the fundamental fairness inherent in our judicial system. The Commonwealth correctly asserts that the decision to send these documents out with the jury was a question to be left to the discretion of the trial judge, and absent an abuse of discretion, that decision cannot be overturned. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1114. However, as succinctly stated by our Superior Court in the recent decision of Commonwealth v. Kubiac, 379 Pa.Super. 402, 550 A.2d 219 (1988), alloc. denied 522 Pa. 611, 563 A.2d 496 (1989); [a]n abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence or the record. Considering the clear prejudicial impact of these documents upon the appellant's right to a fair trial, we hold that the trial judge exercised his discretion in a manifestly unreasonable manner by allowing the documents to go out with the jury. Although the issue of harmless error was not raised in this context, our review of this matter leads to the inescapable conclusion that the substance of these agreements was such that it cannot be assumed they had no effect on the jury's verdict. The decision to admit these documents into evidence and permit them to go out with the jury, standing alone, would require reversal of this conviction. When this tactic was coupled with the failure of the trial court to provide the appropriate corrupt source charge, the prejudicial effect on the appellant's right to a fair trial was overwhelming. [12] For the reasons set forth above the judgment of sentence is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. FLAHERTY, J., files a dissenting opinion, in which NIX, C.J., and McDERMOTT, J., join.