Opinion ID: 1133622
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dr. Coleman's Testimony Regarding Forensic Psychiatry

Text: Defendant contends that Dr. Coleman's rebuttal testimony was inadmissible, and that its admission deprived him of his constitutional right to psychiatric assistance in preparing his defense, denied him the right to have the jury consider his defense, and usurped the court's role in determining the qualifications of expert witnesses and the reliability of scientific methods. Defendant further contends that his trial attorney's failure to object on these grounds constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the prosecutor's presentation of this testimony constituted misconduct. Dr. Coleman's testimony may be summarized as follows. Psychiatrists and other mental health professionals are no more qualified than a layperson to determine a defendant's mental state at the time he or she committed a crime, or to decide whether a defendant is psychotic. Such professionals have no special skills for doing so, and the tools they use are far inferior to those that a layperson would use. The opinions of the defense experts were based upon tests that are unreliable, unscientific, and irrelevant, because, among other things, the examiner cannot ascertain whether someone performs poorly on a test simply because he or she is distracted, not interested, not trying, or malingering, and the results must be interpreted subjectively. The tests were not designed to be used in a forensic setting to ascertain a defendant's mental state at the time of a crime; moreover, they are not reliable even for what they were intended to accomplish. In determining whether defendant was psychotic when he killed Cheryl, the jurors first should realize that psychotic simply means crazy, irrational, or out of touch with reality. [E]ither a person shows that they're acting and thinking crazy or they don't. There's nothing we [psychiatrists] can see below the face that lay persons couldn't see. The jurors should not listen to any psychiatric labels or psychiatric reconstruction, but simply... look at the evidence, whatever evidence you get. The best way for the jurors to make sense of all the psychiatric testimony would be to decide whether or not they think the methods are reliable, having heard the testimony of the other doctors, my testimony.... And then, based on that decision, give the testimony the weight they think it deserves. [¶] If the methods are not considered reliable, then obviously no doctor ... can make ... a silk purse out of a sow's ear, ... and therefore it would deserve no weight if it was based on unreliable methods. And if they conclude otherwise, then again they have to give it the weight they think it deserves. On cross-examination, Dr. Coleman acknowledged that he believes using a psychiatrist to determine mental state in a forensic setting is so flawed in its concept that it's completely worthless. Defendant concedes that, although his trial counsel objected to certain portions of Dr. Coleman's testimony, counsel did not assert the grounds he presently raises or argue that Dr. Coleman's generic attack on psychiatry should have been excluded. Thus, defendant has waived the issue on appeal. ( People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 729, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729.) Because, however, defendant claims that such failure to object amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, we consider his claim that this evidence was inadmissible in order to enable us to assess whether any alleged deficiency in counsel's performance prejudiced defendant. ( People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 366, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169 [If a defendant has failed to show that the challenged actions of counsel were prejudicial, a reviewing court may reject the claim on that ground without determining whether counsel's performance was deficient.].) On several occasions we have considered testimony of Dr. Coleman that was virtually identical to that offered in this case, and in each instance we rejected defense claims based upon such testimony. ( People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1019, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099; People v. Danielson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 728-731, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729; People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 698-700, 248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253 [claim of prosecutorial misconduct arising from reliance upon Dr. Coleman's testimony]; see also People v. Prince (1988) 203 Cal. App.3d 848, 856-859, 250 Cal.Rptr. 154 [cited with approval in Danielson]. ) Although a defendant has the right to present a psychiatric defense through experts, and, as we have observed, the courtroom is not the proper forum to challenge the propriety of this process ( People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 700, 248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253), testimony such as Dr. Coleman's does not violate that right. As we determined in People v. Danielson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 691, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729, Dr. Coleman's testimony regarding the unreliability of psychiatric testimony was neither improper nor prejudicial, because he did not suggest that courts should bar psychiatrists from the courtroom. Thus, his criticism of forensic psychiatry and of the opinions of the defense experts went to the weight of those opinions rather than their admissibility. ( Id. at p. 730, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729.) Moreover, because the trial court instructed the jury that an expert was entitled to state an opinion on a matter at issue in the trial, and that the jury was entitled to disregard an expert opinion if it was unreasonable, we have found such testimony by Dr. Coleman to be `clearly nonprejudicial.' ( Id. at p. 731, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729, quoting People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 700, 248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253.) Defendant attempts to distinguish the foregoing decisions on the ground that in the present case Dr. Coleman characterized psychiatric testimony in a forensic setting as completely worthless, and exhorted the jurors not to listen to any psychiatric labels or psychiatric reconstruction  essentially telling them to disregard the defense experts' psychiatric testimony altogether. Defendant contends that Dr. Coleman's testimony thus deprived him of his right to have psychiatric experts assist the jury in making the necessary mental state determinations. As in People v. Danielson , however, Dr. Coleman did not ask the jury completely to disregard psychiatric opinion. Although he expressed his own view that psychiatric methods are unreliable and offer no assistance in determining the mental state issues presented in the case, Dr. Coleman also stated that if the jury determined that those methods are reliable in light of all the psychiatric testimony, the jury must give the opinions of the defense experts whatever weight they deserve. This testimony, together with the court's instructions permitting the jurors to consider expert opinions with the reasons given for them, to give them the weight to which they are entitled, to disregard opinions they find to be unreasonable, and to resolve any conflict in the expert testimony by weighing the opinion of one expert against another, clearly indicated that it was the province of the jury to consider and weigh all the expert testimony. The admission of Dr. Coleman's testimony thus was not improper or prejudicial. Therefore, defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails, as does his claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct in eliciting the testimony. Defendant further contends that Dr. Coleman's testimony circumvented the trial court's exclusive authority to determine the qualifications of experts and the admissibility of expert opinion based upon scientific methods. Defendant asserts that any challenge to the psychiatric testimony or to the reliability of the psychological tests used by his experts should have been raised in a Kelly hearing outside the presence of the jury. ( People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 30, 130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240 [admissibility of evidence produced by a new scientific technique requires a preliminary showing that it is reliable and generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, that the witness testifying regarding such reliability is properly qualified as an expert on the subject, and that correct scientific procedures complying with that technique were used in the particular case]; see People v. Venegas (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 76-81, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 262, 954 P.2d 525.) Neither the prosecutor nor Dr. Coleman, however, disputed the admissibility of the defense experts' opinions based upon the results of psychological testing. Rather, Dr. Coleman stated his opinion that psychological evaluations and testing are unreliable because the results must be interpreted subjectively and the expert has no means to determine whether extraneous causes, such as malingering, affect the results. This rebuttal testimony was not subject to Kelly 's requirements. As defendant acknowledges, California courts have accepted a qualified expert's decision to base his or her opinion regarding mental state upon standardized psychological tests such as those used by the defense experts in this case, and have not suggested that Kelly applies to expert opinions based upon such tests. ( People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1154, 1157-1158, 265 Cal.Rptr. 111, 783 P.2d 698.) Instead, issues of test reliability and validity may be thoroughly explored on cross-examination at trial. (See [Evid. Code,] § 721, subd. (a).) The prosecution also may call, in rebuttal, another expert of comparable background to challenge defense expert methods. [Citation.] ( People v. Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1159, 265 Cal.Rptr. 111, 783 P.2d 698, italics added.) As an example of this procedure, our decision in Stoll cites People v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 79-80, 211 Cal.Rptr. 102, 695 P.2d 189, which describes rebuttal testimony by Dr. Coleman similar to that presented in this case. If expert opinion based upon psychological tests is admissible without first determining the reliability of those tests in a Kelly hearing, rebuttal expert opinion regarding reliability also must be admissible. ( People v. Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 1157-1159, 265 Cal. Rptr. 111, 783 P.2d 698; see People v. Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1019, 22 Cal. Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099 [Dr. Coleman was qualified to give expert testimony regarding the unreliability of psychiatric testimony, which is a proper subject for expert opinion]; People v. Prince, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 858, 250 Cal.Rptr. 154 [Dr. Coleman's testimony was relevant to the issues of weight and credibility of the expert opinions presented to the jury].) [6]