Opinion ID: 666003
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of Preemption Doctrine: Federal Savings

Text: Associations 68
69 We first inquire whether the materials cited by the banks demonstrate the clear and manifest purpose of the FHLBB/OTS to preempt Texas homestead law with respect to the operations of federal savings associations. Because the current regulations governing federal savings associations are unfortunately vague on the topic of preemption, we find it useful to consider the chronological development of the regulations at issue, those concerning RAMs and line of credit conversion mortgages. 70 We think it clear that, had this action been brought under the regulatory scheme in place in 1982, Texas' homestead laws would be preempted by the clear intent of the FHLBB in promulgating its regulations regarding RAMs. Texas' homestead laws prohibit private lenders from taking enforceable security interests in real estate coming within the legal definition of homestead with two exceptions (for purchase money or home improvements). These restrictions therefore constitute limits on federal savings associations' ability or right to make, purchase, or participate in RAMs, which involve security interests taken in simple accumulated equity. See 12 C.F.R. Sec. 545.6-4(c)(1) (1982) (describing RAMs as providing periodic payments to homeowners based on accumulated equity). A December 1988 report prepared by the House Research Organization to the Texas legislature estimated that Texas' homestead exemption removed from $150 to $260 million in home equity from the lending market, illustrating the substantial limitation on the ability of federal savings associations to make RAMs in Texas. See TEXAS HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, No. 147, SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT: SECOND MORTGAGES AND THE TEXAS HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION 30 (Dec. 21, 1988). 71 Under de la Cuesta, we focus our preemption inquiry on the manifestation vel non of agency intent to preempt state laws that might limit the ability of federal savings associations to make or participate in, for instance, the reverse annuity mortgages described in 12 C.F.R. Sec. 545.6-4(c) (1982). Any ambiguity regarding agency intent arising from the text of the regulations themselves may be dispelled by reasonable agency constructions of the regulations. See de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 158 & n. 13, 102 S.Ct. at 3025 & n. 13. The regulations existing prior to 1983 clearly meet this test. State laws that directly or indirectly restricted the ability of federal savings associations to engage in graduated payment or reverse annuity mortgages were explicitly preempted by 12 C.F.R. Sec. 545.6-4(a)(2) (1982). Texas' homestead laws indirectly prohibit RAM lending on property classified as homestead property because RAM lending depends entirely on the enforceability of liens taken in the owner's equity. Such laws were therefore in conflict with the FHLBB regulations existing in 1982. They also directly conflicted with the earlier expressed agency purpose in promulgating its regulations authorizing AMT lending--to meet the needs of homeowners during different phases of their financial life cycles. 43 Fed.Reg. 59,336, 59,336 (1978) 72 Having reviewed the state of the law prior to 1983, we must now answer the question of whether the current OTS regulations, which have gone unchanged in many respects since the 1983 revision of the real estate lending regulations, manifest a contrary, non-preemptive intent. 73 We conclude that the FHLBB did not manifest an intent to end its preemption of inconsistent state laws, such as Texas' homestead laws, in its 1983 revision of its real estate lending regulations. In particular, we note that the commentary preceding the publication of the final rules explicitly stated that the revision d[id] not mean that any authority c[ould] no longer be exercised. 48 Fed.Reg. 23,032, 23,032 (1983). We further note that the preamble to the final regulations also explicitly states that loan contract[s] may provide for negative amortization of a portion of the interest, or of all interest on a loan such as a reverse annuity mortgage. The substance of these provisions is unchanged from the Board's prior regulations. Id. at 23,037-38 (emphasis added). Thus, the ability of federal savings associations to engage in RAM lending, previously granted by 12 C.F.R. Sec. 545.6-4 (1982), seems not to have been diminished by the elimination of that section in 1983. 74 Turning to the language of the current regulations, we find that those regulations, in keeping with the general philosophy of the FHLBB/OTS, contain only a general grant of authority to federal savings associations to originate, invest in, sell, purchase, service, participate, or otherwise deal in ... loans made on the security of residential or nonresidential real estate, ... subject to the limitations of this part. 12 C.F.R. Sec. 545.32 (1993). The regulations contain few direct references to RAMs or line of credit conversion mortgages. However, 12 C.F.R. Sec. 545.32(b)(4) (1993) provides that, with certain limitations, a real estate loan may be fully amortized, partially amortized, non-amortized, or a line-of-credit loan, and the loan contract may provide for the deferral and capitalization of a portion of the interest (emphasis added). The regulation governing home loans authorizes federal associations to use loan contracts that provide for the deferral and capitalization of all interest on loans to natural persons secured by borrower-occupied property and on which periodic advances are being made. 12 C.F.R. Sec. 545.33(a) (1993) (emphasis added). The regulation implementing the Parity Act authorizes housing creditors that are not commercial banks, credit unions, or federal savings associations to make alternative mortgage transactions (as defined by [12 U.S.C. Sec. 3802] and as further defined and described by applicable regulations identified herein) notwithstanding any state constitution, law or regulation, 12 C.F.R. Sec. 545.33(f) (1993) (emphasis added), thus suggesting broad authority to make such transactions on the part of federal associations as well. All these references support the inference that the OTS has continued the FHLBB's policy of permitting federal savings associations to engage in RAM lending (including line of credit conversion mortgage lending) without interference from state laws such as Texas homestead law. 75 The fly in the ointment is 12 C.F.R. Sec. 545.32(c) (1993), which provides a definition for use in determining whether a loan is made on the security of real estate. One element of the definition of such a loan is that the security interest ... may be enforced as a real estate mortgage or its equivalent pursuant to the law of the state in which the property is located. 12 C.F.R. Sec. 545.32(c)(2) (1993). The district court relied exclusively on this provision in determining that the OTS regulations do not preempt Texas homestead law, and in fact incorporate that law as federal law. First Gibraltar Bank, 815 F.Supp. at 1014. 76 The history of this definitional section, however, indicates an agency purpose contrary to the district court's conclusion. The preamble to the 1983 revision of the regulations reveals that Sec. 545.32(c) was adopted to deal with the problem of classifying property interests in time share units. Before the 1983 revision, loans on time share units were authorized only as consumer loans. 46 Fed.Reg. 23,032, 23,036 (1983). The FHLBB promulgated Sec. 545.32(c) in order to make clear what is required for a loan to be secured by real estate. Id. Under this revised regulation, then, an association may make a real estate loan on the security of a time-share unit if the security property is real estate under state law. Id. Thus, the purpose of this section seems to have been to broaden rather than to constrict the range of transactions that federal associations could engage in under the real estate lending regulations. The state of Texas has not referred us to any authority beyond the words of Sec. 545.32(c)(2) themselves for the proposition that that section was intended to cut back on federal associations' ability to engage in RAM or line of credit conversion mortgage lending, and we find none. 77 Additionally, we take note of the de la Cuesta Court's statement that 78 the incorporation of state law does not signify the inapplicability of federal law, for a fundamental principle in our system of complex national polity mandates that the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States are as much a part of the law of every State as its own local laws and Constitution. 79 de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 157, 102 S.Ct. at 3024 (citations omitted). The Court was considering language in the FHLBB's regulations to the effect that rights and duties created by a due-on-sale clause in a mortgage contract used by a federal savings association shall be fixed and governed by that contract. Id. The appellees in de la Cuesta argued that this regulation demonstrated intent to incorporate state contract law rather than preempt it. The Court rejected this argument, explaining that incorporation of state contract law for the purpose of contract interpretation did not foreclose preemption of state law for other purposes, e.g., the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses. Id. Likewise, in our case, we may recognize that 12 C.F.R. Sec. 545.32(c)(2) incorporates state law generally concerning the creation of an enforceable security interest in real property, and, at the same time, conclude that other provisions of the OTS's regulations have preempted one aspect of state law affecting the enforceability of a security interest in real property--the homestead law--in part. 80 Although specific references to these particular AMTs in the pertinent regulations are few, they lend support to the argument that Sec. 545.32(c)(2) was not adopted with the intent of limiting the lending authority possessed by federal savings associations. In particular, we refer to Sec. 545.32(b)(4), which authorizes federal savings associations to deal in line of credit loans, subject to the limitations of Secs. 545.33 and 545.35. Had the OTS intended Sec. 545.32(c)(2) to act as an incorporation of state law restricting the ability of federal savings associations to engage in line of credit conversion mortgage lending, presumably that section would also have been mentioned as a limiting section in Sec. 545.32(b)(4). 81 Even assuming for the sake of argument that 12 C.F.R. Sec. 545.32(c)(2) creates some ambiguity as to the authority of federal savings associations to engage in RAMs and line of credit conversion mortgages, we must give substantial deference to agency interpretations of these regulations that resolve the ambiguity. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 158 & n. 13, 102 S.Ct. at 3025 & n. 13. The general rule is that agency interpretations of their own regulations are entitled to special deference if they are not plainly erroneous. Udall, 380 U.S. at 16-17, 85 S.Ct. at 801; Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945). We have held that a published advisory letter from the general counsel of the FHLBB is entitled to deference as the interpretation of the agency. See Gavey Properties/762 v. First Fin. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 845 F.2d 519, 521 (5th Cir.1988) (To the extent that Sec. 1730g(a) is ambiguous, this FHLBB interpretation is entitled to deference provided it is reasonable.); see also Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94, 94 S.Ct. 334, 339, 38 L.Ed.2d 287 (1973) (referring to a letter from general counsel for the EEOC as the interpretation of the commission). In the context of statutory interpretation by an agency, however, the Supreme Court has indicated that numerous factors can influence the general principle, such as (1) whether the agency has maintained its position consistently, even if infrequently, (2) whether the agency interpretation is of long standing, (3) whether the public has relied upon the interpretation, (4) whether the interpretation involves a matter of public controversy, (5) whether the interpretation is based upon agency expertise in a complex area, (6) whether the agency itself has rulemaking authority, (7) whether Congress has known of and failed to repudiate the agency interpretation, (8) whether the agency has expressly addressed the application of the statute to the proposed issue, (9) whether the agency interpretation was rendered contemporaneously with the passage of the statute, and (10) the thoroughness, validity, and consistency of the agency's reasoning. See Weber v. Heaney, 793 F.Supp. 1438, 1455 (D.Minn.1992) (collecting cases), aff'd, 995 F.2d 872 (8th Cir.1993); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U.PA.L.REV. 549, 562 n. 95 (1985) (same). 82 Continuing to assume arguendo that the relevant regulations are ambiguous, we agree with the banks that the FHLBB Letter is entitled to deference as the interpretation of the agency under Gavey Properties if it is reasonable. See Gavey Properties, 845 F.2d at 521. But see Colorado Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Harmon, 951 F.2d 1571, 1579 (10th Cir.1991) (holding that no deference is due an agency when it interprets statutes or regulations to preempt state law because preemption involves matters of law--an area more within the expertise of the courts than within the expertise of [an administrative agency]). The construction of these regulations expressed in the FHLBB Letter is, in our opinion, reasonable. Several factors support this conclusion, first among them being the consistency of this interpretation with the history of the regulation of RAMs and the absence of any conflicting agency interpretations during the lifetime of these regulations. We also recognize the expressed opinion of the FHLBB in its preamble to the 1983 amendments to the regulations that no diminution of the lending authority of federal savings associations was intended by the amendments. The FHLBB Letter is supported by several portions of the OTS regulations that appear to assume that federal associations will be able to enter into and enforce RAMs and line of credit conversion mortgages. Section 545.32(b)(4) adverts to the power of savings associations to make real estate loans that are line-of-credit loans, subject to the limitations contained in Secs. 545.33 (governing home loans) and 545.35 (governing other real estate loans). Notably absent is any reference to state law or Sec. 545.32(c)(2). The regulation implementing the Parity Act, Sec. 545.33(f), authorizes state lending institutions to use AMTs as defined and described by Secs. 545.32(b)(3) and (b)(4), Secs. 545.33(a) and (c), and Sec. 563.99 notwithstanding any state constitution, law or regulation. Section 545.32(c) is not referred to in this section as a limiting provision. 83 The FHLBB Letter, of course, is not without flaws. It admittedly fails to mention or incorporate 12 C.F.R. Sec. 545.32(c) into its analysis. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37, 102 S.Ct. 38, 44, 70 L.Ed.2d 23 (1981) ([T]he thoroughness, validity, and consistency of an agency's reasoning are factors that bear upon the amount of deference to be given an agency's ruling.). Whether we would have reached the same conclusion as the FHLBB, however, is not the question. To uphold its determination, we need not find that its interpretation is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result we would have reached had we interpreted the regulations in the first instance. We need conclude only that it is a reasonable interpretation of the relevant provisions. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 389, 104 S.Ct. 2472, 2479, 81 L.Ed.2d 301 (1984). That conclusion is warranted on this record. 84 We therefore defer to the opinion expressed in the FHLBB Letter. Federal associations are authorized to offer, and if the need arises, to foreclose upon line of credit conversion mortgages which are secured by Texas homesteads, despite contrary state law. FHLBB Letter, supra, at 61,708. Likewise, the authority of Federal associations to make reverse mortgages is governed solely by the HOLA and 12 C.F.R. Sec. 545.1, and ... 12 C.F.R. Sec. 545.2 establishes that the [OTS] did not cede its authority over such transactions by Federal associations to the states. Id. at 61,707 n. 9. 85 We reject the argument by the state of Texas that our holding condones preemption by stealth. As we have seen, the FHLBB made its preemptive intent clear in promulgating the first AMT (including RAM) regulations in 1978; any slight ambiguity was resolved by the adoption of the express preemption provision in 12 C.F.R. Sec. 545.6-4(a)(2) (1982). Any objection to the agency's decision could and should have been made during the notice-and-comment periods preceding the adoption of these sets of regulations. Additionally, the regulations have been amended several times since 1982, and parties opposed to the preemption of Texas homestead law could have made their voices heard at each stage of the regulations' evolution. The agencies responsible for regulating federal savings associations, however, have never manifested an intent to retreat from the clear preemption of Texas homestead law accomplished in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 86 The state argues that we may not find agency preemption in this case because Congress has expressly recognized the continued viability of Texas' homestead laws in recent legislation. For instance, 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1428 directs the Federal Housing Finance Board to examine the laws of the various states from time to time relating to the operation of federal home loan banks, including homestead and other rights. Additionally, some relatively recent amendments to the Internal Revenue Code now provide that 87 [i]ndebtedness shall not fail to be treated as secured by any property solely because, under any applicable State or local homestead or other debtor protection law in effect on August 16, 1986, the security interest is ineffective or the enforceability of the security interest is restricted. 88 I.R.C. Sec. 163(h)(4)(C). This provision's legislative history reveals that its purpose is to protect the deductibility of interest payments made 89 on a loan secured by a recorded deed of trust, mortgage, or other security interest in a taxpayer's principal or second residence, in a State such as Texas where such security instrument will be rendered ineffective or the enforceability of such instrument will be otherwise restricted by State and local homestead or other debtor protection law such as the Texas homestead law[.] 90 S.REP.NO. 100-445, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4515, 4561 (emphases added). 91 Congress has assumed the continued vitality of Texas homestead law for the purposes of certain recent legislation--and with good reason. As we stated at the outset, the preemption sought in this case involves the applicability of Texas homestead law to only two specific types of mortgage transactions; its applicability in other contexts, such as standard fixed-term, fixed-rate mortgages not for purchase money or property improvements, remains unquestioned. We do not believe that Congress has acted in any of the legislation cited by the state of Texas with the purpose of revising or repudiating the limited preemption undertaken by the FHLBB and the OTS. The fact that Congress has incorporated into legislation special provisions to take the peculiarities of Texas homestead law into account does not necessarily demonstrate that the FHLBB/OTS's decision to preempt that law is not one that Congress would have sanctioned. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 154, 102 S.Ct. at 3023 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383, 81 S.Ct. 1554, 1560, 6 L.Ed.2d 908 (1961)). It is hardly surprising that Congress was unaware of the limited preemption undertaken by the FHLBB and the OTS in the absence of any judicial pronouncements to that effect; we note that the clarifying interpretation rendered by the deputy general counsel for the FHLBB was not rendered until 1989, after Congress passed the section of the Internal Revenue Code cited above. 92 Congress, it may also be noted, has apparently not acted to repudiate the interpretation espoused in the FHLBB Letter since its publication. Cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 1278, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965) (Under some circumstances, Congress' failure to repeal or revise [an] administrative interpretation [of a statute] has been held to constitute persuasive evidence that that interpretation is the one intended by Congress.). Not only has Congress declined to expressly repudiate the OTS's preemption of Texas homestead law, but Congress also expressly recognized in the Parity Act that the FHLBB had adopted regulations authorizing federally chartered depository institutions to engage in alternative mortgage financing. 12 U.S.C. Sec. 3801(a)(3). As we have noted, at the time the Parity Act was passed FHLBB regulations included express authorization for federal associations to engage in RAM lending. 93 Although the persuasive force of the FHLBB Letter is not enhanced by the agency's failure to consider these acts of Congress suggesting the continued vitality of Texas homestead law in its interpretive analysis, we do not agree with the state's argument that Congress' actions cited above forbid the agency's interpretation in favor of preemption. Assuming that the pertinent regulations are in fact ambiguous on the subject of preemption of Texas homestead law, we conclude that the interpretation of the agency as expressed in the FHLBB Letter is a reasonable one. The OTS has preempted Texas homestead law insofar as Texas law prohibits federal savings associations from taking enforceable security interests in homestead property through RAMs and line of credit conversion mortgages. 94
95 The second prong of our analysis under de la Cuesta requires us to ask whether the OTS's attempted preemption of Texas homestead law is within the scope of the [agency's] delegated authority. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 154, 102 S.Ct. at 3023. Express congressional authorization to displace state law is not required. City of New York, 486 U.S. at 64, 108 S.Ct. at 1642; de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 154, 102 S.Ct. at 3023. [T]he best way of determining whether Congress intended the regulations of an administrative agency to displace state law is to examine the nature and scope of the authority granted by Congress to the agency. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 374, 106 S.Ct. at 1901. The Supreme Court has already told us that, in enacting the HOLA, Congress delegated to the [FHLBB] ample authority to regulate the lending practices of federal savings and loans so as to further the Act's purposes. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 159, 102 S.Ct. at 3025. Congress intended for the FHLBB to create and regulate federal savings and loans so as to ensure that they would remain financially sound institutions able to supply financing for home construction and purchase. Id. at 168, 102 S.Ct. at 3030. 96 The de la Cuesta Court rejected several arguments that Congress had not delegated to the FHLBB the power to preempt state law with a uniform federal law governing the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses. The appellees argued that certain parts of the HOLA explicitly preempted various aspects of state law and that the FHLBB's authority to preempt was limited to those enumerated areas; the Court refused to read Congress' broad delegation of power to the FHLBB in 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1464(a) as confined to areas of state law specifically described by the Act's other provisions. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 162, 102 S.Ct. at 3027. The Court also relied on the HOLA's legislative history as supporting a broad delegation of plenary power to the FHLBB to regulate the operations of federal savings and loans. Id. at 163-64, 102 S.Ct. at 3027. Finally, the Court noted that the mortgage lending practices of a savings association are a critical aspect of its operation, over which the FHLBB unquestionably had jurisdiction. Id. at 167, 102 S.Ct. at 3029. The FHLBB's due-on-sale regulation was promulgated with the purpose of protecting the financial soundness of federal savings associations and thus enhancing the availability of credit for home construction and purchase. Id. at 168, 102 S.Ct. at 3030. The Court refused to pass on the advisability of the regulation allowing enforcement of due-on-sale clauses as a matter of economic policy except to hold that the regulation was not arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 169-70, 102 S.Ct. at 3030-31. The Court explicitly rejected the appellees' contention that the FHLBB's power to regulate federal savings associations extends only to the associations' internal management and not to any external matters, such as their relationship with borrowers. Id. at 170 n. 23, 102 S.Ct. at 3031 n. 23. 97 The state of Texas focuses on part of the de la Cuesta Court's rationale for finding congressional delegation of the power claimed by the FHLBB to distinguish that case from the one at bar. The Court noted that the FHLBB's due-on-sale policy is based on the view that due-on-sale clauses are essential to the financial soundness of federal savings and loans; preservation of the associations' very existence is obviously related to their internal management and is one of the functions delegated to the Board by Congress. Id. The state of Texas argues that the ability to make loans secured by equity in homestead property is not integral to the management of a federal savings association, nor is it essential to preserve the very existence of such associations. Plainly such associations have existed in Texas for many years despite the rigors imposed on them by Texas homestead law. 98 The state also relies on our opinion in Gulf Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121, 102 S.Ct. 3509, 73 L.Ed.2d 1383 (1982), for the proposition that the FHLBB/OTS lacks the power to preempt state law except with respect to the internal management of federal savings associations. Gulf Federal, a federal savings and loan, used from its inception a method of calculating interest due on its loans known as the 365/360 method. Id. at 261. Four years after Gulf Federal was chartered, however, its board of directors adopted a motion to change the savings and loan's interest calculation policy to the 365/365 method, which is slightly more favorable to borrowers. Id. Although the 365/365 method was incorporated into Gulf Federal loan agreement forms, the agreements also stated the precise amounts of interest to be paid calculated under the 365/360 method, and the savings and loan in fact continued to charge interest based on the 365/360 method. Id. at 261-62. Despite the fact that no borrowers complained of the discrepancy, the FHLBB investigated the situation and issued a cease-and-desist order against Gulf Federal ordering it to calculate interest under the 365/365 method described in its loan agreements and to reimburse borrowers for any overpayments that resulted from application of the 365/360 method. Id. at 262. Gulf Federal appealed from the cease-and-desist order. Id. 99 We first reversed the FHLBB's finding that Gulf Federal's practice of charging interest according to the 365/360 method regardless of contrary terms in the loan agreements constituted an unsafe or unsound practice within the meaning of the statute granting the FHLBB cease and desist authority. Id. at 263; see also id. at 264 (The breadth of the 'unsafe or unsound practice' formula is restricted by its limitation to practices with a reasonably direct effect on an association's financial soundness.). We also rejected the FHLBB's contention that it was entitled to issue the cease-and-desist order because Gulf Federal was violating a law, holding that Gulf Federal had not breached the loan agreements under either federal common law or Louisiana law. Id. at 266-67. The state of Texas now relies on our discussion of the federal common law argument, in which the FHLBB contended that Congress had preempted state law generally in matters relating to federal savings associations. Id. at 266. We rejected this argument, concluding that the cases relied upon by the FHLBB stood only for the proposition that federal law governs the internal management of federal savings and loan institutions. Id. We observed that Gulf Federal's conduct vis-a-vis its borrowers had nothing to do with the internal management of the association and that its loan contracts did not implicate the sound management of the association or the insurance liability of the government, nor did those contracts require a uniform federal rule to assure the sound management of such associations. Id. 100 The banks respond that our Gulf Federal decision was criticized by the Supreme Court in de la Cuesta: 101 We therefore reject appellees' contention that the Board's power to regulate federal savings and loans extends only to the associations' internal management and not to any external matters, such as their relationship with borrowers. Although one federal ... court[ ] ha[s] drawn this distinction, [citing Gulf Federal ], we find no support in the language of the HOLA or its legislative history for such restriction on the Board's authority. 102 de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 170 n. 23, 102 S.Ct. at 3031 n. 23. It seems plain, then, that the de la Cuesta Court recognized that the FHLBB possessed the power to preempt state laws affecting the relationship between federal associations and their borrowers; indeed, the Court held that the FHLBB could adopt a uniform federal rule to regulate the effect of due-on-sale clauses agreed to by the parties. Gulf Federal is thus not good authority for the proposition that the power delegated by Congress to the FHLBB was limited solely to the internal management of federal savings associations in light of de la Cuesta. 103 We believe that the argument put forward by the state of Texas--essentially that the authorization of the OTS to preempt state law is limited to measures directly related to maintaining the financial soundness of federal associations--is an overly narrow interpretation of Congress' intent in enacting the HOLA and creating the FHLBB. Clearly part of Congress' purpose was to protect the integrity of federal associations through agency supervision. This purpose, however, was only a means to an end. An overarching purpose of the HOLA, which was enacted during the Great Depression, was to provide the country with sources of housing financing at a time when more than half the counties in the country, containing almost one-fifth of the total population, were without home-financing institutions. Id. at 159-60, 102 S.Ct. at 3026. That purpose has been capsulized and expanded in 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1464(a), which authorizes the OTS to regulate the organization and operation of federal savings associations [i]n order to provide thrift institutions for the deposit of funds and for the extension of credit for homes and other goods and services  (emphasis added). The decision of the FHLBB/OTS to preempt Texas homestead law in the case of RAMs and line of credit conversion mortgages, thereby greatly expanding the pool of collateral available to Texans for borrowing purposes, is entirely consistent with the HOLA's purpose of ensuring the broadest availability of credit for general consumer purposes. 104 Broad authority to preempt Texas' homestead law is also consistent with one of Congress' express findings leading to the enactment of the Parity Act: The Congress hereby finds that ... alternative mortgage transactions are essential to the provision of an adequate supply of credit secured by residential property necessary to meet the demand expected during the 1980's[.] 12 U.S.C. Sec. 3801(a)(2). Although the Parity Act's definition of AMTs, found at 12 U.S.C. Sec. 3802(1), did not expressly describe mortgages secured by accumulated home equity, Congress later authorized HUD to insure a number of home equity conversion mortgages in a demonstration program for elderly homeowners and explicitly cited the Parity Act as a source of statutory authority for housing creditors to make such loans. 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1715z-20; see id. Sec. 1715z-20(b)(3) (The term 'home equity conversion mortgage' means a first mortgage which provides for future payments to the homeowner based on accumulated equity and which a housing creditor ... is authorized to make ... in accordance with section 3803 of this title, notwithstanding any State constitution, law, or regulation....). These statutes provide additional support for the position that Congress intended to empower the FHLBB/OTS to preempt state laws that interfere with the ability of federal savings associations to engage in RAM or line of credit conversion mortgage lending. 105 The banks also point out that this circuit has accorded deference to an agency's determination of its own statutory authority. See NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank v. Cowden, 895 F.2d 1488, 1494 (5th Cir.1990) (As the cases dealing with the pre-emptive effect of agency actions suggest, substantial deference to an agency's determination of its authority may be appropriate.); Western Coal Traffic League v. United States, 719 F.2d 772, 777 (5th Cir.1983) (We begin, as we must, with a recognition of the limited role this Court plays in reviewing an administrative agency's construction of its statutory authority....), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953, 104 S.Ct. 2160, 80 L.Ed.2d 545 (1984). By asserting the position that its regulations have preempted Texas homestead law, both in the FHLBB Letter and in the OTS amicus brief filed in the instant cause, the agency has implicitly interpreted its governing statutes to authorize such preemption. This interpretation is not unreasonable in light of the broad mandate given the OTS by Congress in its governing statutes. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1464(a) (authorizing the Director of the OTS to issue regulations providing for the organization and operation of federal savings associations giving primary consideration of the best practices of thrift institutions in the United States). 106 We therefore conclude that the OTS did not exceed its authority in preempting Texas homestead law insofar as that law prohibits federal savings associations from engaging in RAMs and line of credit conversion mortgages and thereby taking enforceable security interests in real estate that qualifies as homestead property under Texas law. 107