Opinion ID: 4525521
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Enforceability of the Subpoena

Text: As a provider of electronic communication services, Facebook must comply with the provisions of the SCA governing its disclosure of customer communications and records. The provision of the SCA applicable to this case, 18 U.S.C. § 2702, contains a prohibition on disclosure and exceptions to that prohibition. Subsection (a) states that “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) or (c),” service providers “shall to defy a criminal defendant’s Rule 17 subpoena for evidence material to the defense. See D.C. App. R. 44(a). In view of our disposition of the appeal on statutory grounds, we do not reach Mr. Pepe’s constitutional claim. 8 Our vacatur of the nondisclosure order was effective immediately, ahead of the new date we set for Facebook to comply with the subpoena or begin suffering the sanctions imposed for its contempt. 7 not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents” of electronically stored communications or “to any governmental entity” “record[s] or other information pertaining to a subscriber [] or customer” (i.e., records that are not communications). If one of the exceptions listed in subsections (b) and (c) applies, the provider “may divulge” the communication, record, or information at issue. 9 In Facebook v. Wint 10 we held that where no statutory exception applies, § 2702(a) prohibits a service provider from complying with a criminal defendant’s subpoena for covered communications and records. In other words, the SCA renders that subpoena unenforceable against the provider. Our opinion left unanswered the question whether the SCA similarly precludes a criminal defendant from subpoenaing material that falls within one of § 2702’s exceptions. That is the question posed in the present case. Mr. Pepe contends the SCA is no obstacle to the enforcement of his subpoena, because exceptions in subsections (b) and (c) of § 2702 specifically allow a provider like Facebook to divulge (1) the contents of a covered communication to, or with the consent of, “an addressee or intended recipient of 9 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(b), (c). 10 199 A.3d 625 (D.C. 2019). 8 such communication,” 11 and (2) customer records and information other than a covered communication “to any person other than a governmental entity.” 12 In opposing Mr. Pepe’s invocation of these exceptions, Facebook makes two principal arguments. First, it argues that Mr. Pepe is not “an addressee or intended recipient” of an Instagram communication that has, by design, automatically expired and disappeared from his account. Second, Facebook argues that even if subsections (b)(1), (b)(3), and (c)(6) permit it to divulge the requested communications and records to Mr. Pepe, it cannot be compelled to do so by his subpoena because the SCA preempts such compulsory discovery and commits the disclosure decision in cases like this to the service provider’s unfettered discretion. Each of these arguments presents a question of statutory interpretation as to which our review is de novo. 13 As we stated in construing the SCA in Wint, We first look to see whether the statutory language at issue is “plain and admits of no more than one meaning.” Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C. 1983) (en banc) (internal quotation 11 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(b)(1), (b)(3). 12 Id. § 2702(c)(6). Governmental access to customer communications or records by warrant, subpoena, or court order is addressed separately in § 2703 of the SCA. 13 Wint, 199 A.3d at 628. 9 marks omitted). We will give effect to the plain meaning of a statute “when the language is unambiguous and does not produce an absurd result.” McNeely v. United States, 874 A.2d 371, 387 (D.C. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e may also look to the legislative history to ensure that our interpretation is consistent with legislative intent.” Thomas v. Buckley, 176 A.3d 1277, 1281 (D.C. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).[14] For the following reasons, we reject both arguments and conclude that the SCA does not render Mr. Pepe’s subpoena unenforceable. 15 14 Id. 15 Facebook also makes a non-statutory argument. It contends the subsection (b) exceptions are inapplicable because Mr. Pepe has provided no evidence that he is the holder of the Instagram account that allegedly received messages from Mr. Brown’s account, or that he ever received communications from Brown. On the record before us, however, Mr. Pepe’s status as an account holder and recipient is not in reasonable dispute. The trial court found him to be the account holder based on the sworn evidence presented by the government to obtain the warrant for his Instagram records, and the warrant yielded numerous communications between Pepe and Brown. Service providers often “rely on law enforcement certification under oath” that factual assertions underlying government requests for covered records or communications are “true and accurate,” and their good faith reliance on those assertions relieves them of liability under the SCA. United States v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341, 349 (D. Vt. 2013), aff’d, 831 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Alexander v. Verizon Wireless Servs., LLC, 875 F.3d 243, 254 (5th Cir. 2017). We see no reason why providers would cease to rely on the same law enforcement certification when a criminal defendant uses it to seek similar information. 10 A. Mr. Pepe’s Status as an “Addressee or Intended Recipient” Facebook argues that Mr. Pepe cannot be considered an “addressee or intended recipient” of Instagram messages that have expired and disappeared from view on his Instagram platform after twenty-four hours. According to Facebook, a sender’s use of such an ephemeral format implies the sender meant to limit the receiver’s continued access to the message and makes the receiver only a former addressee or intended recipient of the message once it has disappeared. Taken to its logical conclusion, Facebook’s position is that a receiver must have current access to a communication when seeking its disclosure in order to be deemed an “addressee or intended recipient” of it within the meaning of §§ 2702(b)(1) and (b)(3). Mr. Pepe disagrees, arguing that the plain meaning of “addressee or intended recipient” does not turn on how long the sender wanted the communication to remain available for viewing or whether it in fact remains accessible to the receiver. We agree with Mr. Pepe. The SCA does not define or qualify the meaning of an “addressee or intended recipient” of an electronic communication. “When the terms of a statute are undefined and not recognized terms of art, we presumptively accord them their 11 ordinary meaning in common usage, taking into account the context in which they are employed[.]” 16 Facebook has not rebutted that presumption in this case. In the ordinary sense of the term, being an “addressee or intended recipient” of a communication is not linked in any way to how long the receiver continues or is intended to possess it. In general, an “addressee” is simply “one to whom something is addressed,” and to “address” is simply “to direct to go to” or “to direct by way of communication.” 17 The status of addressee arises at the time of sending an addressed item, and this status is not altered by what happens to the item thereafter, or by what the sender wanted or expected to happen thereafter. We would not say, for example, that someone ceased to be the addressee of a letter that was deposited in the mail if the letter was lost in transit or thrown away after receipt. Similarly, an “intended recipient” is simply “one that receives,” that is, “take[s] possession or delivery of,” as the sender had “in mind” or in accordance with the sender’s plans or “designs.” 18 The status of intended recipient does not depend on whether the recipient keeps the communication or whether the sender intended that 16 Hood v. United States, 28 A.3d 553, 559 (D.C. 2011). 17 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED 24, 25 (1993). 18 Id. 1175, 1894, 1895 (defining “intended” and “recipient”). 12 it be preserved. For example, a person need not record a phone call in order to be deemed its intended recipient. Absent any indication to the contrary, the plain and most natural reading of the term “addressee or intended recipient” in § 2702 is that it includes people who receive electronic messages that expire at some point after receipt. Indeed, the (b)(1) and (b)(3) exceptions would serve little purpose and be virtually superfluous if they permitted Facebook to disclose electronic communications only to, or with the consent of, people who still have the communications. Facebook’s disclosure is unnecessary for those individuals to obtain or consent to share communications they already control. The (b)(1) and (b)(3) exceptions are useful when a receiver did not retain possession of, or access to, a desired electronic communication. That the sender may have intended a communication to disappear by sending it in an ephemeral format thus has no bearing on whether the receiver is, in plain language and with regard to the purposes of the exception, an “addressee or intended recipient” of that communication. This conclusion does not undermine senders’ reasonable privacy expectations created by the SCA. The SCA itself limits such expectations by allowing service providers to divulge electronic communications to 13 addressees or intended recipients, or to anyone else with their consent, without sender authorization. And of course the SCA contains no special provision for communications that are designed to self-delete; as Facebook acknowledges, the development of such evanescent messages was not envisioned when Congress enacted the SCA in 1986. 19 In point of fact, the automatic expiration of an Instagram Story merely removes it from the recipient’s and the sender’s Instagram platform; it does not prevent a receiver from preserving it before its deletion by downloading or other means. 20 The sender of a Story cannot prevent its preservation. Thus, if anything, the sender’s consent to the receiver’s continued access to the message is implied by the sender’s decision to send it. 21 Mr. Brown had no reasonable assurance that a Story he sent to Mr. Pepe would disappear for good. 19 We have found nothing in the legislative history of the SCA indicating that “addressee or intended recipient” should be understood to exclude persons who receive disappearing electronic messages or messages that the sender intended to be destroyed or not disclosed. 20 Instagram’s Data Policy, available to its users, specifically states that “when you share a post or send a message to specific friends or accounts, they can download, screenshot, or reshare that content to others across or off our Products, in person or in virtual reality[.]” Instagram Help Center, “Data Policy: Content others share or reshare about you,” available at https://help.instagram.com/155833707900388 https://perma.cc/D554-J6EL (last accessed Mar. 24, 2020). 21 In enacting the SCA, Congress envisioned that “[i]f conditions governing disclosure or use are spelled out in the rules of an electronic communication service, and those rules are available to users . . . it would be appropriate to imply consent 14 We hold that under §§ 2702(b)(1) and (b)(3), Mr. Pepe is an “addressee or intended recipient” of any communications sent to his account, and those exceptions therefore permit Facebook to disclose all such communications to Pepe, including any Instagram Stories, that are responsive to his subpoena. B. The Enforceability of a Subpoena for Information the SCA Permits Facebook to Divulge Facebook contends that even if §§ 2702(b)(1), (b)(3), and (c)(6) permit it to divulge the communications and records sought by Mr. Pepe, the SCA preempts his ability to obtain that information from it by subpoena. The SCA does not do so expressly, but Facebook asserts that it does so implicitly because allowing such use of compulsory process would create “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of and objectives of Congress” 22 in enacting the SCA. According to Facebook, the permissive exceptions in the SCA leave disclosure entirely to the service provider’s unfettered discretion in order to channel discovery to other entities, such as users who can assert their own privacy interests in the communications and records at issue. In effect, Facebook argues that Congress on the part of a user to disclosures or uses consistent with those rules.” H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 66 (1986) (hereinafter “House Report”). 22 Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764, 771 (D.C. 2009) (quotation and alteration omitted). 15 intended the SCA to create an absolute service provider discovery privilege whenever the SCA does not specifically require a service provider to permit discovery. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “preemption cannot be based on a freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state [rule] is in tension with federal objectives.” 23 For Facebook’s implicit preemption argument to succeed, it “must be grounded ‘in the text and structure of the statute at issue.’” 24 We conclude that the necessary grounding is lacking. There is, to begin with, a weighty and well-settled presumption against inferring that Congress silently intended to foreclose or restrict the availability of a core component of the judicial process such as the subpoena power. As we reiterated in Wint, [I]t is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense[.] . . . [E]xceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are 23 Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 801 (2020) (internal punctuation omitted, quoting Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 607 (2011)). 24 Id. at 804 (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)). 16 not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.[25] Thus, a “clear and strong indication” of Congressional intent “is required before it may be implied that the policy of prohibition is of such force as to dominate the broad objective of doing justice” by preempting the ordinary rules of discovery in the judicial process. 26 Such clear intent exists for us to conclude that when § 2702(a)’s general prohibition on disclosure is applicable, it precludes a provider from complying with a criminal defendant’s subpoena; we so held in Wint, as have other courts. 27 But when the (b)(1), (b)(3), and (c)(6) exceptions to the prohibition apply and expressly 25 Wint, 199 A.3d at 632 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 70910 (1974)). 26 Id. (quoting Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see also Facebook v. Superior Court (Hunter), 417 P.3d 725, 751 (Cal. 2018) (“[T]here should be a clear expression of congressional intent before relevant information essential to the fair resolution of a lawsuit will be deemed absolutely and categorically exempt from discovery and not subject to the powers of the court[.]”); cf. Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 84 N.E.3d 766, 774-78 (Mass. 2017) (holding that absent “clear congressional intent” to preempt an “‘area[] of traditional State regulation,’” § 2702(a) of the SCA did not preempt state probate law allowing personal representatives to consent to release of information on behalf of decedent) (citing Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001)). 27 See Wint, 199 A.3d at 628-29. 17 permit disclosure, they remove that barrier to subpoena compliance and enable service providers to comply with compulsory process. The subsections do not purport to authorize providers to refuse to do so at their own option, let alone to vest them with a novel privilege to withhold evidence from discovery for any or no reason. Facebook argues that subsections (b) and (c) state that providers “may divulge” information under certain conditions, and that “the permissive ‘may’ rather than the imperative ‘shall’” 28 indicates that the decision to divulge is discretionary. This assertion is too sweeping. As the California Supreme Court has explained the subdivision[s] [in § 2702] where ‘may’ appears [are] framed not as a grant of discretionary power . . . but as a special exception to a general prohibition. In such a context all ‘may’ means is that the actor is excused from a duty, liability, or disability otherwise imposed by the prohibition.[29] 28 Cruz v. United States, 165 A.3d 290, 293 (D.C. 2017). 29 Hunter, 417 P.3d at 751 (emphasis in the original; internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that § 2702 does not give electronic service providers discretion to defy otherwise lawful subpoenas from criminal defendants where an exception in § 2702 permits the disclosure of the subpoenaed materials). 18 Indeed, underscoring that point, some of the excepted circumstances in which subsections (b) and (c) say a provider “may divulge” information are, in fact, circumstances in which the provider must divulge it. 30 And “while ‘may’ suggests discretion, it does not necessarily suggest unlimited discretion.” 31 That the SCA grants providers certain exemptions from its general prohibition on disclosure does not imply that it grants providers exemptions from mandatory disclosure requirements imposed by other law. Although the SCA preempts other disclosure laws to the extent they would require providers to violate the SCA, that is no reason to think the SCA also preempts laws that require disclosures the SCA expressly permits. 32 When the SCA lifts the bar on disclosure of electronic communications in § 2702(a) and explicitly permits providers to disclose information, the requisite indication of congressional intent to preclude 30 E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(b)(2) and (c)(1) (referencing mandatory disclosures to governmental entities pursuant to warrants or other means specified in § 2703); §§ 2702(b)(6) and (c)(5) (referencing mandatory reporting to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children). 31 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001). 32 See Hunter, 417 P.3d at 751. 19 compulsory process is absent. It does not appear in the statutory text, and we have not found it in the legislative history of the SCA. 33 Accordingly, we hold that the SCA did not authorize Facebook’s refusal to comply with Mr. Pepe’s subpoena for information that SCA §§ 2702(b)(1), (b)(3), and (c)(6) allowed Facebook to divulge to him. Our conclusion accords with the substantial weight of authority from other jurisdictions. 34 While a few courts have 33 House Report, at 64-67; S. Rep. No. 99-451, at 36-38 (1986). 34 See, e.g., Hunter, 417 P.3d at 751; Negro v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215, 230-34 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 88 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (in holding that civil subpoena for contents of communications violated the SCA, noting “[c]opies may still be sought from the [service provider] if the discovery can be brought within one of the statutory exceptions—most obviously, a disclosure with the consent of a party to the communication”); Mafille v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Co., No. 18-CV-586-TCK-FHM, 2019 WL 1933747, at  (N.D. Okla. May 1, 2019) (civil subpoena to Google did not violate the SCA where the plaintiff could consent to disclosure under § 2702(b)(3)); Super Vitaminas, S.A., No. 17-mc-80125-SVK, 2017 WL 5571037, at -4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2017) (civil subpoena to provider for email contents between litigant and third party did not violate the SCA where litigants were recipients of the emails and consented to the disclosure of the contents thereof because “the exception provided [under § 2702(b)(3)] for disclosure applies”); Lee v. Glob. TelLink Corp., No. CV15-2495-ODW(PLAx), 2017 WL 10575166, at  (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2017) (in holding that provider could disclose customer information to litigant under § 2702(c)(6), stating, “the Court is not aware of[] any case holding that a federally-recognized privilege exists that prohibits a telephone company from disclosing customer information”); Al Noaimi v. Zaid, No. 11–1156– EFM, 2012 WL 4758048, at  (D. Kan. Oct. 5, 2012) (denying motion to quash subpoena to service provider where plaintiff could consent to disclosure of his own requested email communications under § 2702(b)(3)); Two Rivers Fin. Grp., Inc. v. 20 held or, in dicta, suggested otherwise, 35 their opinions do not rebut our reasoning and we do not find them persuasive. Ralston, No. 3:11-cv-00152-CRW-CFB, 2012 WL 13018842, at  (S.D. Iowa July 9, 2012) (ordering provider to comply with defendant’s subpoena for her own email communications, as “18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1) . . . does allow the disclosure of the . . . communication to ‘the addressee or intended recipient of such communication . . . ’”); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578 SVW(JCx), 2007 WL 9627899, at  (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2007) (“[A]s the court has ordered the production of essentially only those private forum messages to which defendants or their agents are privy because they are a party or participant thereto, and as defendants have the ability to consent to the disclosure thereof, the Stored Communications Act does not provide a basis to withhold such data which is clearly within defendants' possession, custody and control.”). Courts are particularly uniform in demanding that service providers comply with subpoenas for information that falls within the § 2702(c)(6) exception for noncontent information. See, e.g., CineTel Films, Inc. v. Does 1-1,052, 853 F. Supp. 2d 545, 555 n.5 (D. Md. 2012); First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1-500, 276 F.R.D. 241, 247 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Sines v. Kessler, No. 18-mc-80080-JCS, 2018 WL 3730434, at -11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2018); Haw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. Yoshimura, No. 16-00198 ACK-KSC, 2017 WL 738554, at -4 (D. Haw. Feb. 17, 2017); Site B, LLC v. Does 1-51, No. 13 C 5295, 2014 WL 902688, at  (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2014); TCYK, LLC v. Does 1-87, No. 13 C 3845, 2013 WL 5567772, at  (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2013). 35 See United States v. Wenk, 319 F. Supp. 3d 828, 829 (E.D. Va. 2017); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Jiangsu Tie Mao Glass Co., 273 F. Supp. 3d 558, 561 (W.D. Pa. 2017); State v. Johnson, 538 S.W.3d 32, 69-70 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017); In re Facebook, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1206 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Schweickert v. Hunts Point Ventures, Inc., No. 13-CV-675RSM, 2014 WL 6886630, at  (W.D. Wash. Dec. 4, 2014). 21