Opinion ID: 2048997
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Single Work or Purpose Requirement

Text: We first consider the threshold issue of standing to challenge the Bond Act as violative of the single work or purpose requirement set forth in article VII, § 11 of the State Constitution. [2] As a general principle, citizen-taxpayer status does not confer standing to challenge the issuance of State bond acts. That principle is grounded on a recognition that such lawsuits increase the cost of raising the revenue by creating uncertainty in the minds of potential investors ( see , Wein v Comptroller of State of N. Y. , 46 N.Y.2d 394, 400; State Finance Law § 123-b [1]). As we held in Matter of Schulz v State of New York (81 N.Y.2d 336, 344-347), however, there are limited instances when a voter may challenge a bond issue on the basis that it infringes upon explicit voter protections provided by article VII, § 11 of the State Constitution. Such an instance is presented by petitioners' first challenge. Article VII, § 11, which sets forth the prerequisite of a public referendum for all proposed long-term public debt, also mandates that proposed public financing schemes must be for some single work or purpose, to be distinctly specified therein. That requirement prevents the Executive and Legislative branches of our State government from embracing in one bond act several distinct and unrelated purposes, none or some of which could singly obtain referendum approval ( see , Problems Relating to Taxation and Finance, 1938 Report of NY Constitutional Convention Comm, vol 10, at 87 [the Poletti Report]). By restricting each bond act to a single work or purpose, referendum approval cannot be procured by combining the votes of several different groups, each with an interest in one of the bond act's multiple purposes, and thereby creating a majority that will approve them all ( see , New York Pub. Interest Research Group v Carey , 59 AD2d 172, 176, revd on other grounds 42 N.Y.2d 527). The requirement also assures that several different purposes  some of which are not independently worthy of referendum approval  will not be combined in a single bond act in the hopes that the voters will not separately evaluate the relative merit and strength of each purpose. If voters could not bring a claim for violation of that clause, the Executive and Legislative branches could safely ignore it altogether, and referendum approval  garnered from voters unable to cast an intelligent ballot  would be reduced to a meaningless charade (233 AD2d 43, 48). While petitioners may have standing to assert this particular claim, their argument nonetheless fails on the merits. Petitioners argue that the Bond Act, when read in conjunction with its implementing legislation, impermissibly authorizes the use of bond proceeds for a multitude of unrelated projects, rendering voters at the November 1996 referendum unable to intelligently evaluate and appraise the single purpose of the proposed public debt. Petitioners' primary support for this argument is People ex rel. Hopkins v Board of Supervisors (52 N.Y. 556, 561), an 1873 case in which this Court concluded that a bond act was unconstitutional, and therefore invalid, because its appropriations [were] in fact many, and their objects many and diverse. When Hopkins was decided, article VII, § 12 of the State Constitution restricted the acquisition of public debt in a number of ways: requiring voter approval of bond issuances, directing that only one bond act at a time could be submitted for such approval and limiting the subject matter of each bond act to a single work or object . Originally adopted in 1846, these constitutional mandates were intended to stem the extensive, unwise government borrowing practices that had caused serious financial problems in the 1840s. By the early 1900s, however, it was apparent that the single work or object clause was too restrictive and unwieldy. Interpreted as only permitting bond issuances for a single physical structure, the requirement severely hampered the State's ability to build roads, develop parks and supply other desperately needed public works ( see , 1915 Revised Record of NY Constitutional Convention, vol 2, at 1295-1299 [remarks of Delegate Alfred E. Smith, et al. ]; Poletti Report, op. cit. , vol 10, at 90-96). Accordingly, at the Constitutional Convention of 1938, the single work or object  language was replaced with the current single work or purpose . That revision was intended to create a more flexible standard and remove any doubt that may exist as to the power of the State to contract a debt for some single objective that may relate to more than one physical structure or, indeed, as in the case of relief bonds, may not include a physical structure ( see , Journal of 1938 NY Constitutional Convention, Doc No. 3, at 6-7). While broader than its predecessor, the clause still precludes the Legislative and Executive branches from proposing bond issues aimed at purposes that are so imprecise as to be essentially generic, thereby allowing funding of a host of projects having no discernible common theme ( see, e.g. , New York Pub. Interest Research Group v Carey , 59 AD2d at 173-174, 176-177, supra [bond issue for comprehensive economic development where the funding was earmarked for four different areas of development  including industrial development, environmental projects, tourism and transportation  was struck down because the areas were not so naturally and necessarily related to each other as to constitute a single purpose within the meaning of the Constitution]). Indeed, application of the more flexible single work or purpose standard of article VII, § 11 has produced results that are profoundly different from those ensuing from the more rigid requirement in effect when Hopkins was decided. It is now possible, for example, to fund a number of different projects through a single issue, so long as those projects have a common goal ( New York Pub. Interest Research Group v Carey , 59 AD2d at 175-176, supra ). Petitioners' reliance on Hopkins , applying article VII, § 12's outdated single work or object requirement, is plainly misplaced. [3] The Bond Act at issue in this dispute satisfies the modern constitutional standard. The act authorizes the creation of State indebtedness for projects in a number of subcategories, all of which are directly related to the single categorical purpose of improving the State's environment. Each of the subcategories  safe drinking water, improvement of solid waste facilities, remediation of contaminated properties, enhancement of air and water quality, and preservation of open spaces, parks and historic sites  is naturally and logically related to the stated unitary goal of preserving, enhancing, restoring and improving the environment (L 1996, ch 412, § 2). Thus, the single work or purpose requirement is satisfied. We note that, contrary to petitioners' argument, the preservation and restoration of parks, open spaces and sites connected with our historical and cultural heritage have long been considered part and parcel of the State's over-all environmental management plan. The State Environmental Quality Review Act mandates consideration of objects of historic or aesthetic significance that may be affected by a proposed project (ECL 8-0105 [6]; see also , 6 NYCRR 617.4 [a] [9] [projects having an impact on historic sites are Type I actions]), and the Legislature has specifically linked the State's invaluable natural and historic resources as key components of the environmental and social policy of the state (Environmental Protection Act of 1993, L 1993, ch 610, § 2, codified at ECL art 54 [emphasis supplied]). Furthermore, section 14.01 of the Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation Law recognizes that historical, archaeological, architectural and cultural heritage sites are among the most important environmental assets the State has. Thus, there is nothing dissonant about including projects related to the preservation of such sites in a Bond Act aimed at conserving and improving the environment. Inasmuch as the Clean Water/Clean Air Bond Act of 1996 is aimed at a single purpose  preserving, enhancing, restoring, and improving the quality of the state's environment  and that purpose is clearly set forth in the Bond Act itself, there is no merit to petitioners' additional contention that that provision fails to satisfy the constitutional requirement that the purpose of the debt be distinctly specified in the act (NY Const, art VII, § 11). That the particular projects for which the proceeds were to be appropriated are listed in a separate legislative enactment is of no legal consequence in this context because the Constitution requires only that the bond act distinctly specif[y] the single work or purpose of the bond issue; it does not require a listing of the myriad activities to be undertaken in the service of that work or purpose. Indeed, a rule that would require a detailed enumeration of each and every funded project in the bond act itself would lead to clotted verbiage and unwieldy ballot submissions, thereby defeating the primary purpose of article VII, § 11. Thus, we conclude that the Bond Act does not violate the single work or purpose clause of article VII, § 11 of the State Constitution.