Opinion ID: 1436568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. McFarland's Claims of Racial Discrimination and Gender Discrimination

Text: This court reviews the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo.  Joyner v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, 826 A.2d 362, 368 (D.C.2003). [T]o be entitled to summary judgment, [GW] must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that [it is] entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Colbert v. Georgetown University, 641 A.2d 469, 472 (D.C.1994) (en banc) (citing Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c)). Although we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, [c]onclusory allegations by the nonmoving party are insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact or to defeat the entry of summary judgment. Hollins v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 760 A.2d 563, 570 (D.C.2000) (citation omitted). The DCHRA prohibits an employer from discharging or failing to promote an employee based on race, sex, or other prohibited reasons. D.C.Code § 2-1402.11(a)(1) (2001). In considering claims of discrimination under the DCHRA, we employ the same three-part, burden-shifting test articulated by the Supreme Court for Title VII cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Hollins, 760 A.2d at 571; Atlantic Richfield Co. v. District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights, 515 A.2d 1095, 1099 (D.C.1986). In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, [the employee must] establish a prima facie case that [the employer discriminated against him]. If such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate basis for [its action]. If the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for the [action], the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the employer's action was pretextual. Blackman v. Visiting Nurses Association, 694 A.2d 865, 868 (D.C.1997). It is the burden of production that shifts in this process. Id. `[T]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.' Hollins, 760 A.2d at 571 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)) (additional internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Appellant McFarland claims that GW discriminated against him when it promoted Mattie Hunter to the position of CEEP Director in November 1998. We hold that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case that he was denied the promotion because of his race or his gender. Because he did not surmount the first step in the McDonnell Douglas procedure, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to GW. To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote, the complainant must prove four elements: (1) that [he] was a member of a protected class; (2) that [he] applied for a job for which [he] was qualified; (3) that [he] was rejected in favor of another applicant; and (4) that a substantial factor in the employment decision was [his] membership in the protected class. United Planning Organization v. District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights, 530 A.2d 674, 677 n. 3 (D.C. 1987); accord, Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 & n. 6, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 361 (D.C.1993). The prima facie showing requires circumstantial evidence raising an inference of purposeful discrimination. [W]e infer discriminatory animus because experience has proved that in the absence of any other explanation it is more likely than not that th[e] actions [of the employer] were bottomed on impermissible considerations. Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978). We have recognized that [c]ourts are justifiably hesitant to throw out employment discrimination claims on summary judgment, since they almost always involve issues concerning the employer's (or supervisor's) motive or intent. Hollins, 760 A.2d at 570-71. Nevertheless, if the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case, the inquiry stops and a grant of summary judgment is appropriate. See, e.g., Chang v. Institute for Public-Private Partnerships, Inc., 846 A.2d 318, 324 (D.C.2004) (affirming grant of summary judgment because plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination); Blackman, 694 A.2d at 872 (same).
Mr. McFarland did not establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Most notably, he failed to establish the fourth prong of the prima facie test, that a substantial factor in the employment decision was his membership in the protected class. He offered no direct proof of racial animus, nor did his evidence raise an inference of discriminatory intent. Mattie Hunter, who received the promotion, is a member of the same protected class as Mr. McFarland. Because they are both African-American, Mr. McFarland has not shown that GW denied him the promotion because of his race. See McManus v. MCI Communications Corp., 748 A.2d 949, 955 (D.C.2000) (Because appellant . . . did not show that [the employer] replaced her with someone outside her protected class, she failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.); cf. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (black plaintiff made out a prima facie case by showing, among other things, that after his demotion and discharge, the position was filled by a white person); Klein v. Derwinski, 869 F.Supp. 4, 7-8 (D.D.C.1994) (explaining that in order to make out a prima facie case of discriminatory termination, a plaintiff must ordinarily show the position ultimately was filled by someone not a member of the protected class). In addition, as we discuss below, Mr. McFarland did not demonstrate that he was so well-qualified for the position that the failure to select him raises an inference of discrimination.
In granting summary judgment on Mr. McFarland's claim of gender discrimination, Judge Zeldon applied a heightened standard articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit  though never adopted by this court  for cases alleging reverse discrimination. Under that standard, in order to establish a prima facie case, plaintiffs must show additional background circumstances that support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority. Mastro v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 371 U.S.App. D.C. 68, 76, 447 F.3d 843, 851 (2006) (quoting Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 153 (D.C.Cir.1993), and Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 209 U.S.App. D.C. 215, 220, 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (1981)). Appellant McFarland argues that we should not adopt this standard, and that even if we do it should not apply to him, because he is an African-American man and therefore not a member of the majority. According to Mr. McFarland, imposing additional burdens of proof on an African-American male overlooks hundreds of years of American history and presumes that [he] occupies a privileged spot at GW because he is male. Because Mr. McFarland has failed to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination even under the less-demanding traditional standard, see supra pages 346-47; Arthur Young, 631 A.2d at 361, we leave to another day the decision whether to adopt the D.C. Circuit's heightened standard for cases of reverse discrimination. [4] Under the second prong of the prima facie test, Mr. McFarland must show that he applied for and was qualified for the promotion he did not receive. [5] See Arthur Young, 631 A.2d at 361; United Planning Organization, 530 A.2d at 677 n. 3. Appellant's application is not in the record, but his resume and testimony are, and they do not demonstrate that he was qualified for the position. McFarland's conclusory statements about his own qualifications are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Hollins, 760 A.2d at 570; Hastie v. Henderson, 121 F.Supp.2d 72, 81 (D.D.C.2000) (plaintiff's own self-serving and conclusory statement that she was more qualified not sufficient; summary judgment granted), aff'd, 2001 WL 793715 (D.C.Cir.2001). Appellant argued that the fact that he received a Master of Business Administration degree from GW and had been working within GW for more than ten years qualified him for the Director position. The MBA degree and his familiarity with GW certainly are relevant, but they are far from sufficient. Mr. McFarland acknowledged that he had no supervisory experience before applying for the position, but the job announcement explained that the director will supervise approximately 15 managerial and clerical employees and that four years of relevant experience including supervisory responsibilities [were] required. Mr. McFarland also admitted that he had never managed a budget; the job description included oversight and expansion of approximately $4 million budget as one of the Director's responsibilities and stated that [p]revious budget/fiscal management experience [was] highly desirable. Because Mr. McFarland did not establish prong two of a prima facie case, it was appropriate to grant summary judgment against him. See Dunning v. Quander, 468 F.Supp.2d 23, 30 (D.D.C.2006) (no prima facie case of age discrimination; plaintiff failed to show that he was qualified for the position for which he applied); Lutes v. Goldin, 62 F.Supp.2d 118, 127 (D.D.C. 1999) (plaintiff failed to establish that he was qualified for a job upgrade, so summary judgment was appropriate). Even if we assume that Mr. McFarland was minimally qualified, his qualifications do not obviously exceed those of Ms. Hunter, and the evidence thus failed to raise the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. See page 8, supra. The fourth prong of our prima facie test requires the plaintiff to show that a substantial factor in the employment decision was [his] membership in the protected class. United Planning Organization, 530 A.2d at 677 n. 3; cf. Brown v. National Academy of Sciences, 844 A.2d at 1123 (that the decision not to hire her was based on the characteristic that placed her in the protected class). One way of meeting this requirement would be to show that Mr. McFarland was much better qualified than Ms. Hunter. If a factfinder can conclude that a reasonable employer would have found the plaintiff to be significantly better qualified for the job, but this employer did not, the factfinder can legitimately infer that the employer consciously selected a less-qualified candidate  something that employers do not usually do, unless some other strong consideration, such as discrimination, enters into the picture. Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 332 U.S.App. D.C. 256, 266, 156 F.3d 1284, 1294 (1998) (en banc). In order to justify an inference of discrimination, the qualifications gap must be great enough to be inherently indicative of discrimination. Holcomb v. Powell, 369 U.S.App. D.C. 122, 130, 433 F.3d 889, 897 (2006) (affirming entry of summary judgment for employer on discrimination claim). Mattie Hunter began working for GW in October 1997 in a part-time capacity, handling distance learning. She became a full-time employee on July 1, 1998, and served as the Director for CEEP's Records and Information Management Programs. Before joining GW, she had been self-employed as a consultant and trainer in the telecommunications industry. She previously had spent more than ten years working for MCI, becoming Senior Manager of Corporate Training and Education. In that position she supervised a staff of eight and managed and maintained oversight of departmental expense budgets. She had also worked for Avon Products for several years, becoming a Division Sales manager. She led a staff of twenty district sales managers and developed and implemented strategic and tactical plans designed to maximize sales growth. She had earned a Master's degree in Human Resources and Organization Development and had served as interim director of CEEP for approximately two months. [6] Appellant McFarland has not established that he is on the favorable side of any qualifications gap. Claiming the benefit of hindsight, appellant McFarland asserts that once she became director, Ms. Hunter proved incompetent and CEEP lost vast sums of money under her leadership. However, neither a court nor a jury sits as a super-personnel department that re-examines an entity's business decisions. Holcomb, 369 U.S.App. D.C. at 130, 433 F.3d at 897 (citations omitted). Even if we assume his allegations are true, demonstrating discriminatory intent and pretext requires more than merely showing that the employer was mistaken. United Planning Organization, 530 A.2d at 679. [I]f the employer made an error too obvious to be unintentional, perhaps it had an unlawful motive for doing so, Fischbach v. District of Columbia Dep't of Corrections, 318 U.S.App. D.C. 186, 189, 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (1996), but Mr. McFarland has made no such showing here. Some courts would wait until step three of the McDonnell Douglas protocol to compare qualifications of the candidates. See, e.g., Lathram v. Snow, 357 U.S.App. D.C. 413, 419-20, 336 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (2003) (reasonable jury could conclude that there was a wide and inexplicable gulf between the qualifications of the candidates, that plaintiff was substantially more qualified than person selected, and that employer's assertions to the contrary were pretextual); McIntyre v. Peters, 460 F.Supp.2d 125, 136 (D.D.C.2006); see also Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 458, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006) (This is not the occasion to define more precisely what standard should govern pretext claims based on superior qualifications.). But see District of Columbia Housing Authority v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 881 A.2d 600, 615-16 (D.C.2005) (comparing qualifications of applicants in context of discussing whether plaintiff was qualified, an element of his prima facie case). We do not pursue that debate here. Mr. McFarland was required to present evidence raising an inference of purposeful discrimination. He did not do so, and summary judgment was appropriate.
In his reply brief, Mr. McFarland complains that [i]f the Office of Human Rights had conducted a thorough investigation, the agency would have realized that McFarland was the victim of discrimination as an African-American man, not just gender discrimination. At other points in the reply brief, and at oral argument, he emphasized that he is not just a man and not just an African-American, but an African-American man. He thus appears to suggest that he is a member of a distinct protected subgroup. See Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1034 (5th Cir. 1980) (using the language distinct protected subgroup to describe a similar claim by an African-American woman). This is too little, too late. [7] A few courts have accepted this type of intersectional or combination claim in Title VII litigation. In Jefferies the Fifth Circuit held that black women are a distinct protected subgroup for purposes of the McDonnell Douglas test. 615 F.2d at 1034. Since then, courts in other jurisdictions have applied this holding to other Title VII cases. See, e.g., Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir.1994) (Asian women); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987) (black woman); Jeffers v. Thompson, 264 F.Supp.2d 314, 327 (D.Md.2003) (black female plaintiff established a prima facie case of composite, race-and-gender discrimination); Judge v. Marsh, 649 F.Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C.1986) (cautioning that the Jefferies analysis is appropriately limited to employment decisions based on one protected, immutable trait or fundamental right, which are directed against individuals sharing a second protected, immutable characteristic). We have not found a federal case where the court has squarely held that black men are a distinct subgroup for purposes of applying the anti-discrimination principles of Title VII. See generally Sixth Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality Law, 6 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 615, 662-64 (2005). Appellant McFarland has not cited any of these cases, however, and he has made no attempt to brief this complex question. Issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. Wagner v. Georgetown University Medical Center, 768 A.2d 546, 554 n. 9 (D.C.2001) (citation omitted). Accord, Bardoff v. United States, 628 A.2d 86, 90 n. 8 (D.C.1993) (questions raised but not argued in briefing are treated as abandoned); Carducci v. Regan, 230 U.S.App. D.C. 80, 86, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (1983) (declin[ing] to entertain appellant's asserted but unanalyzed constitutional claim). To the extent Mr. McFarland is attempting to argue that this court for the first time should recognize African-American men as a distinct protected subgroup for purposes of establishing a prima facie case under the DCHRA, the argument is most definitely undeveloped and perfunctory, and we deem it to have been waived. [8]
Appellant McFarland claims that GW engaged in unlawful discrimination when it terminated him on April 19, 1999. He did not produce any direct evidence of discriminatory animus, so this claim must also proceed through the three steps of the McDonnell Douglas protocol. See supra page 346; Hollins, 760 A.2d at 571. We conclude that Mr. McFarland failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory termination based on race or gender. Alternatively, he has provided no evidence to show that GW's proffered reason for terminating him was a pretext for impermissible discrimination.
To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory termination, a plaintiff generally must demonstrate (1) that he was a member of a protected class, (2) that he was qualified for the job from which he was terminated, (3) that his termination occurred despite his employment qualifications, and (4) that a substantial factor in his termination was his membership in the protected class. Hollins, 760 A.2d at 572; accord, McManus, 748 A.2d at 954; Blackman, 694 A.2d at 868-69. In a situation like Mr. McFarland's, when an employee is not replaced because his job is eliminated, the fourth (substantial factor) prong of the prima facie showing is tailored to the circumstances. In making a prima facie case of employment discrimination in the absence of an allegation that someone had replaced [him] in the same job, appellant would be required to show that the jobs of one or more persons who were not members of the protected class, and who had jobs similar to [ his ], had not been terminated. McManus, 748 A.2d at 954 n. 5 (emphasis added); see Boulton, 808 A.2d at 503 (quoting McManus ); O'Donnell v. Associated General Contractors of America, Inc., 645 A.2d 1084, 1088 (D.C.1994) (plaintiff who was not replaced must show that persons who were not members of the protected class and were similarly situated to appellant, were not terminated); see also Gragg v. Somerset Technical College, 373 F.3d 763, 767-68 (6th Cir.2004) (in a reduction in force case, plaintiff must produce direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence tending to indicate that the employer singled out the plaintiff for discharge for impermissible reasons (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir.1995) (in reduction in force cases, fourth prong is met by showing that the employer either did not treat members of the protected class neutrally or retained persons not within the protected class in the same position  (emphasis added)). Mr. McFarland cannot establish that GW treated other employees who had jobs similar to his (or who were similarly situated) more favorably than himself. To show that employees are similarly situated, the plaintiff must demonstrate that all of the relevant aspects of [their] employment situation[s][are] nearly identical. Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 310 U.S.App. D.C. 82, 89, 43 F.3d 1507, 1514 (1995); accord, McDonald v. Village of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1002-03 (7th Cir.2004); McGuinness v. Lincoln Hall, 263 F.3d 49, 53-54 (2d Cir.2001); Conward v. Cambridge School Committee, 171 F.3d 12, 20-22 (1st Cir. 1999). Differences in job title, responsibilities, education, experience, and work record can be used to determine whether two employees are similarly situated. Leadbetter v. Gilley, 385 F.3d 683, 691 (6th Cir.2004); Zaccagnini v. Chas. Levy Circulating Co., 338 F.3d 672, 675-76 (7th Cir.2003); see O'Donnell, 645 A.2d at 1089 (holding that a female employee failed to establish she was similarly situated to male employees where there was disparity between them in years of service and employment disciplinary record). Because CEEP was losing money, its management recommended a two-phase departmental reorganization that would improve efficiency and redeploy resources from administrative functions to revenue generating activities, and it chose to eliminate McFarland's Marketing Manager position in the first phase. His was the only such position in CEEP, so he cannot demonstrate that GW retained in the same position persons who were outside his protected class. Mr. McFarland's position was selected for elimination because most of the marketing responsibilities for CEEP had been outsourced before the total absorption of CEEP's activities that took place in November 1999. GW explained that it eliminated Mr. McFarland's position earlier than November 1999 to aid in [the] effort to reach revenue and profit goals for the 1999 fiscal year without completely disrupting departmental operations. At her deposition, Ms. Hunter explained, CEEP was hemorrhaging money every day and we needed to make some changes in order to try and curb that as much as possible. No inference of discrimination arises from the decision to eliminate that particular position or to do so in April rather than in November. Nevertheless, appellant McFarland seems to complain that the manner of his termination demonstrates discrimination. The two other employees whose positions were slated for elimination in April were white women, and he alleges that they were given preferential treatment. One woman resigned shortly before (and apparently without knowing that) she was to be terminated. In her resignation letter, dated April 13, she stated that her last day of work would be April 29th or 30th. Knowing of her imminent departure, Ms. Hunter did not eliminate her position until after she left. By contrast, Mr. McFarland's termination on April 19 was effective immediately. The other woman applied for and obtained a different position at CEEP. Thus, Mr. McFarland asserts that her job was not in fact eliminated. These two women were not similarly situated to Mr. McFarland. Their position titles were different, as were their duties, which included ordering office supplies, providing computer and system support, and providing implementation assistance to the Program Manager for Contracts. Moreover, Mr. McFarland asks us to infer too much from these circumstances, which do not satisfy prong four of a prima facie case  showing that a substantial factor in Mr. McFarland's termination was his membership in a protected class. Finally, because his remaining job duties were redistributed to Mattie Hunter, a black woman, and to Troy Teeboom, a white man, Mr. McFarland argues that he was effectively fired and replaced by two people who were not members of his protected class. Depending on the circumstances, an `inference of discrimination [may] arise[] from the fact that [the plaintiff was] constructively replaced by workers outside of the protected class.' Boulton, 808 A.2d at 503 n. 5 (quoting Bellaver v. Quanex Corp./Nichols-Homeshield, 200 F.3d 485, 495 (7th Cir.2000)). An inference of discrimination is most natural when the plaintiff's job has not really been eliminated, but instead filled by others outside his protected class. Here, however, Mr. McFarland's most important duties were eliminated as redundant-they were being performed by the outside marketing contractor. Although some remaining duties still had to be performed within CEEP, they were absorbed by current employees, allowing GW to save costs by eliminating his position. Without evidence that it had a discriminatory motive, GW's decision to out-source a function previously performed in-house is a legitimate goal of a reduction in force. Moreover, Ms. Hunter is a member of the same race, and Mr. Teeboom is of the same gender. Reassigning duties to them does not raise a legitimate inference of discrimination based on race or gender. (We have explained above why Mr. McFarland has not properly raised a claim of intersectional or combination discrimination.) In sum, the circumstantial evidence cited by Mr. McFarland does not raise an inference of purposeful discrimination in eliminating his job. See page 8, supra.
At step two of the McDonnell Douglas process, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. Hollins, 760 A.2d at 571 (internal citation and quotation omitted). The employer can `satisfy its burden by producing admissible evidence from which the trier of fact [can] rationally conclude that the employment action [was not] motivated by discriminatory animus.' Id. (quoting Atlantic Richfield, 515 A.2d at 1099-1100). GW has satisfied its burden under part two of the McDonnell Douglas test by providing copious documentation of the reorganization which eliminated Mr. McFarland's position. Because GW articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove, again by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer's stated justification for its action was not its true reason but was in fact merely a pretext to disguise discriminatory practice. Hollins, 760 A.2d at 571 (internal citation and quotation omitted). We have explained the burden on the employee at this third step: [O]nce the employer has met its burden of producing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination, the presumption drops from the case. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 & n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 1089. From that point onward, the employee must show  both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason. St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (emphasis in the original). Hollins, 760 A.2d at 571. Therefore, Mr. McFarland must present evidence showing not only that GW's stated reason for his termination was a pretext, but also that it was a pretext for terminating him because of his race  or his gender. Id. at 573 (emphasis in original). For the reasons already discussed, we conclude that Mr. McFarland has not shown that GW's reason was a pretext for discrimination. Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate on this alternative ground. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) ([A]n employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.); Hollins, 760 A.2d at 574 (even if the employee claiming race discrimination could show direct evidence of pretext because the employer based the termination on a flawed investigation, it would still not be sufficient to get [the employee] beyond summary judgment without some evidence from which one could justifiably infer that discrimination was the more likely reason for his termination.).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision to grant summary judgment to GW on Mr. McFarland's claims of discriminatory failure to promote and discriminatory termination.