Opinion ID: 588805
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the mistake-of-law thesis

Text: 16 In an effort to put some flesh on the bare bones of its mistake-of-law thesis, appellant develops two criticisms of the judgment below. One criticism is relatively general; the other is relatively specific. The gist of the broader criticism is that the district court erroneously factored a subjective component into the calculus of decision by considering what Dedham actually knew (or believed) about a threat of potential harm and when Dedham actually acquired such knowledge. The more particularized criticism suggests that, regardless of whether a subjective component could properly be considered, the trial court's conception of the legal standard was faulty because it slavishly embraced a temporal standard, requiring that appellant prove it had identified Cumberland as the source of threatened releases before it incurred the costs for which recovery was sought. 17 We examine these contentions seriatim. In concluding this section of our opinion, we also discuss a fallback position that appellant visualizes as an anchor to windward. 18  We begin with appellant's insistence that any inquiry into its institutional state of mind was erroneous because the only legitimate question before the district court was whether, objectively viewed, Cumberland posed a threat that warranted responsive action. There is a gaping hole in the fabric of this construct. 19 Appellant's theory at the second trial, as expressed in its pleadings, evidence, and trial memoranda, hinged upon precisely the mixed subjective/objective approach it now reviles. Nothing could make this point clearer than a reading of the closing argument given by Dedham's counsel in the district court--a summation that focused squarely on what did they know and when did they know it? Indeed, appellant conceded in closing argument that [t]o the extent there was no idea of the activities on Cumberland Farms up to April of 1979 ... costs [incurred prior thereto] could be fairly excluded as having been incurred in response to a contamination. 20 If the district court's view of the law was in error--and we do not suggest that it was--Dedham must bear its fair share of responsibility for leading the court down a garden path. A litigant who attempts to sell a particular view of the law to the trial court cannot later appeal on the ground that the court bought the litigant's wares. See Austin v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 705 F.2d 1, 15 (1st Cir.) (in general, a party may not appeal from an error to which he contributed, either by failing to object or by affirmatively presenting to the court the wrong law), cert. dismissed, 463 U.S. 1247, 104 S.Ct. 34, 77 L.Ed.2d 1454 (1983); McPhail v. Municipality of Culebra, 598 F.2d 603, 607 (1st Cir.1979) (A party may not 'sandbag' his case by presenting one theory to the trial court and then arguing for another on appeal.). 21 Moreover, we think that appellant's failure to articulate the subjective/objective dichotomy in the district court was particularly egregious under the circumstances of this case. Our opinion in the earlier merits appeal strongly suggested that Dedham's institutional state of mind was relevant to the issue of whether the costs it incurred were threat-related and/or recoverable against Cumberland on that basis. 2 See, e.g., EMA, 889 F.2d at 1157 (observing that [a] plaintiff ... under certain circumstances might reasonably think that a particular release would prove likely to contaminate his wells); id. at 1158 (implying that if, objectively, a defendant's releases pose a threat, a subjective fear of contamination, reasonably held, can then establish a defendant's liability for response costs incurred by the plaintiff). 22 To be sure, these statements are obiter dictum, that is, observations relevant, but not essential, to the determination of the legal questions then before the court. Dictum constitutes neither the law of the case nor the stuff of binding precedent. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Tanker Robert Watt Miller, 957 F.2d 1575, 1578 (11th Cir.1992); Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp., 902 F.2d 703, 715-16 (9th Cir.1990). In short, dictum contained in an appellate court's opinion has no preclusive effect in subsequent proceedings in the same, or any other, case. 23 Be that as it may, courts often, quite properly, give considerable weight to dictum--particularly to dictum that seems considered as opposed to casual. See, e.g., McCoy v. Massachusetts Inst. of Technology, 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir.1991) (court of appeals should ordinarily respect considered Supreme Court dicta) (citing authorities), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1939, 118 L.Ed.2d 545 (1992); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs., Inc. v. Asociacion de Empleados, Etc., 873 F.2d 479, 482 (1st Cir.1989) (court of appeals should ordinarily respect considered dictum of state's highest court on points of state law). When, as here, the district court, on remand, proposed to act upon dicta contained in the appeals court's earlier opinion in the same case, and no one demurred, it is especially important that we toe the mark and hold the parties to the usual consequence of invited error. To do otherwise would place a premium on agreeable acquiescence to perceivable error as a weapon of appellate advocacy. Merchant v. Ruhle, 740 F.2d 86, 92 (1st Cir.1984). 24 Then, too, because appellant's neoteric thesis was not asserted below, it is procedurally defaulted. It is hornbook law that theories not raised squarely in the district court cannot be surfaced for the first time on appeal. McCoy, 950 F.2d at 22; accord, e.g., Boston Celtics Ltd. Partnership v. Shaw, 908 F.2d 1041, 1045 (1st Cir.1990); Sanchez-Arroyo v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 835 F.2d 407, 408 (1st Cir.1987); Clauson v. Smith, 823 F.2d 660, 666 (1st Cir.1987). There is no basis in the present record to relax the rule. After all, [l]itigants cannot try their case under one theory and then urge a remand on appeal so it can be tried again under a different theory. Johnson v. Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 731 F.2d 64, 73 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018, 105 S.Ct. 433, 83 L.Ed.2d 359 (1984). 25 For these reasons, appellant's newly conceived subjective/objective dichotomy does not assist its cause. B 26 We turn now to appellant's more specific asseveration: its claim that the district court erroneously required proof that it identified Cumberland as the source of the threat prior to incurring any response costs. This asseveration is belied by the record. 27 The short of it is that the district court simply did not embosom, or operate on, the premise that, in order to prevail, Dedham must have identified Cumberland as the source of threatened contamination before incurring response costs. Rather, the district court found, wholly apart from the question of identification, that the actions which appellant took were not in response to approaching or threatened releases of any description. See Second Trial Op., 770 F.Supp. at 42-43. Thus, the court did not decide the point mechanically, based strictly on whether identification preceded expenditure, but decided it on a much different basis: that appellant was not responding to a perceived threat, wheresoever originating, when it set its course, but was responding instead to the need to rid its wells of existing contamination. In other words, appellant's construction of the treatment plant, its search for the sources of the contamination, and its other response costs were undertaken to define the magnitude of a known problem (actual contamination), to rectify that problem and, relatedly, to fix responsibility for it with an eye toward litigation--not as an environmental rejoinder to threatened releases of any kind. 3 28 On this aspect of the case, appellant is tilting at windmills. Its claim of legal error dissolves upon analysis of the decision below and the record upon which that decision was based. The district court did not require appellant, as a condition precedent to recovery, to have identified the party responsible for the threat before beginning to incur response costs. Instead, the court's focus was exactly where it belonged--not on whether the chicken preceded the egg, or vice versa, but on whether Cumberland somehow, or in some way, caused Dedham to incur response costs. 4 This was precisely the task we set in remanding the case. See EMA, 889 F.2d at 1151-54, 1157-58. C 29 Dedham's fallback position is that the district court committed legal error by failing to appreciate that, in this case, the mere presence of actual contamination itself constituted a threat causing Dedham to incur response costs for which Cumberland was liable. This argument is entirely specious. Appellant does not elucidate any plausible theorem as to how or why Cumberland should be liable for response costs expended to deal with threats signalled by actual contamination when Cumberland, during the first trial, was fully exonerated from legal responsibility for that contamination. See EMA, 889 F.2d at 1149; First Trial Op., 689 F.Supp. at 1235. 30 At any rate, appellant's plaint boils down to little more than thinly veiled dissatisfaction with the district court's factual findings. It neither demonstrates an error of law (as opposed to a disagreement over the facts) nor raises a question of jurisprudence sufficient to call the legal underpinnings of the court's factbound findings into legitimate question. That ends the matter. The 'clearly erroneous' rule cannot be evaded by the simple expedient of creative relabelling. Reliance Steel, 880 F.2d at 577. Hence, we decline appellant's invitation that we play what amounts to a game of charades.