Opinion ID: 844211
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Heading: The 2002 Amendment to Section 340.1 Created a Subcategory of Third Party Defendants Against Whom Actions Could Be Brought Within Eight Years of Majority or Three Years of Discovery of the Injury

Text: We come finally to the 2002 amendment of section 340.1, which, as noted, identified a new subcategory of third party defendant who henceforth would not receive the protection of the absolute cutoff of age 26. (Stats. 2002, ch. 149, § 1, pp. 752-753.) It is into this category that plaintiffs claim defendant falls. Under the 2002 amended statute, a category of third-party defendants would be exposed to liability in any action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse for the same extended period as direct perpetrators. The 2002 amendments did not alter section 340.1, subdivision (a), with its limitation period of eight years from majority (i.e., age 26) or three years from the time the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered that adult psychological injury was caused by childhood abusewhichever period is longer. The category of third party defendants to whom the subdivision (a) limitations period applied was not amended (see § 340.1, subd. (a)(2) & (3)), but a new subcategory of such defendants was defined. Significantly, the existing outer limitthat is, the age 26 cutoff on third party claimsremained, and the statute still provides that [n]o action described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) may be commenced on or after the plaintiff's 26th birthday. (§ 340.1, subd. (b)(1).) However, under the 2002 amendment, for the first time a special exception to the age 26 cutoff appeared and provided a longer limitations period for childhood sexual abuse claims, subject to the statutory delayed discovery rule already defined by subdivision (a) of section 340.1. (Stats. 2002, ch. 149, § 1, pp. 752-753.) This exception was adopted to apply to claims against a subcategory of the third party defendants that already had been defined in section 340.1, subdivision (a)(2) and (3). Thus, in 2002 the Legislature added subdivision (b)(2) to section 340.1, and as relevant, the new subdivision provides: This subdivision [(referencing subd. (b)(1), declaring third party claims to be timely solely if they are brought prior to the plaintiff's 26th birthday)] does not apply if the person or entity knew or had reason to know, or was otherwise on notice, of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee, volunteer, representative, or agent, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by that person, including, but not limited to, preventing or avoiding placement of that person in a function or environment in which contact with children is an inherent part of that function or environment. (§ 340.1, subd. (b)(2).) Instead of the general rule restricting a plaintiff's claim against third parties to a plaintiff who had not reached the age of 26, claims against such subcategory of third party defendants are governed by subdivision (a), described above, establishing, as noted, the limitations period of eight years from majority or three years from discovery, as defined. (13) To sum up, in its 2002 amendments to section 340.1, the Legislature enlarged the limitations period applicable to childhood sexual abuse claims against a certain subcategory of third parties by extending subdivision (a)'s existing expansive limitations periodincluding its recognition of delayed discoveryto claims against these third parties, but without the age 26 cutoff. For claims against defendants falling within that subcategory of third party defendants, actions for damages suffered as the result of childhood sexual abuse would be timely even if brought beyond eight years after obtaining majority, so long as they were brought within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later .... (§ 340.1, subd. (a).) In substance, potential plaintiffs with claims against the subcategory of third party defendants were in the position of plaintiffs with claims against perpetrators after the 1990 amendmentsthey could claim the benefit of the extended period established by section 340.1, subdivision (a). We recall that the 1990 amendments, which created subdivision (a)'s extended discovery period, did not revive lapsed claims. ( David A., supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 286; see also Lent v. Doe, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1183.) In 2002, however, the Legislature followed the requirement discussed previously that revival of lapsed claims must be accomplished expressly, but it also limited the period of revival. Thus, section 340.1, subdivision (c) now provides that [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, any claim for damages described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) that is permitted to be filed pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2003, solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired, is revived, and, in that case, a cause of action may be commenced within one year of January 1, 2003. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to alter the applicable statute of limitations period of an action that is not time barred as of January 1, 2003. (Italics added.) [9] This language revived any lapsed claims, giving them the benefit of the new enactment, but the claims were revived for only one year. (14) The first sentence of section 340.1, subdivision (c) refers to any claim that is barred. The phrase any claim is inclusive language that by its terms refers to any lapsed claim, whether previously discovered or not. The first sentence of the subdivision revives a claim that has lapsed by virtue of the passing of the limitations period, and in that casei.e., in any case that was barred but is revivedrequires the action to be brought within the one-year window period. There is no language in either sentence of subdivision (c) that permits a longer period for hitherto undiscovered claims. The subdivision quite plainly supplies an exception to the general rule against retroactive enlargement of limitations periods once claims have lapsed. We recall that lapsed claims are revived only by express language of revival. And from subdivision (c)'s expressly limited exception, we infer that other exceptions to the general rule were not intended. (15) It is a settled rule of statutory construction that where exceptions to a general rule are specified by statute, other exceptions are not to be implied or presumed. ( Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190, 195 [132 Cal.Rptr. 377, 553 P.2d 537].) In Moore, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th 371, for example, the court applied this rule of construction in the context of an enlarged limitations period for claims against a crime victim's restitution fund, concluding that claims not noted in the statute's new language were not affected. ( Id. at p. 382; see also Krupnick, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1029-1030 [interpreting an expansion of the limitations period for personal injury claims, the court inferred from the statute's express language of revival for victims of terrorist acts that the Legislature excluded retroactive enlargement of the statute of limitations as to other lapsed claims].) (16) We observe, too, that the Legislature has experience with phrasing revival clauses in connection with its various amendments to section 340.1, and as discussed above, has used separate revival clauses even as it created or made changes to delayed discovery provisions in the statute (see former § 340.1, subd. (e), added by Stats. 1986, ch. 914, § 1, pp. 3165, 3166; former § 340.1, subds. (o) & (p), added by Stats. 1994, ch. 288, § 1, pp. 1928, 1930-1931; former § 340.1, subd. (s), added by Stats. 1999, ch. 120, § 1, pp. 1735, 1738-1739). We may infer from the absence of broad language of revival with respect to the 2002 enlargement of the limitations period, that the Legislature did not intend, merely because it extended a discovery provision to a new class of defendants, to authorize revival of lapsed claims except as specified in section 340.1, subdivision (c). We have pointed out that express statutory language is required to revive lapsed claims. In the absence of any attempt by the Legislature in 2002 to add express language of revival to subdivision (a) of section 340.1, and in the absence of any language of revival in the newly added text of subdivision (b)(2), and in the presence of express but limited language of revival in subdivision (c) that purports to govern any claim (italics added) against the new subcategory of third party defendants that previously had lapsed, it seems evident that any claim against a defendant alleged to fall within the third party subcategory that had lapsed prior to January 1, 2003, was revived, but only for the period referred to in the amended statutethat is, only for one year following January 1, 2003. Here, plaintiffs' claims had lapsed prior to the 2002 enactment (because they were over 26 years of age), but they failed to bring their action during the revival period, so the trial court correctly concluded that their action is barred. Our conclusion is consistent with the reviewing court's decision in Hightower, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th 759. There the court determined that the plaintiff's third party claims had lapsed in 1977, one year after he reached majority, and that his claims clearly were time-barred under the 1998 amendments to section 340.1 because he had then attained the age of 26. The plaintiff countered that he had not discovered the injury until 2003, and he claimed that therefore the 2002 amendments extending the statutory delayed discovery rule to certain third party defendants applied to his claims. The Court of Appeal disagreed, explaining that the circumstance that the plaintiff would have been able to assert delayed discovery under the 2002 amendmentsif his claims had not previously lapseddid not alter the result. The court observed that the Legislature revived for only one year all such claims that were already time-barred. The Legislature therefore drew a clear distinction between claims that were time-barred and those that were not. Hightower's interpretation would obliterate that distinction by allowing his time-barred claim to take advantage of the new limitations period. Therefore, the new delayed discovery rule does not revive Hightower's previously lapsed claims. ( Hightower, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at pp. 767-768.) (17) We have established that the revival of any lapsed claims against the subcategory of defendants identified in the 2002 amendments is governed by subdivision (c). We have also established that as of 1998 plaintiffs' claims necessarily had lapsed. Plaintiffs' claims were not revived by the 1999 amendments. Thereafter, plaintiffs' lapsed claims were revived by the 2002 amendments, but for one year only. Because they did not file their claims within that year, their claims are barred under the applicable statute of limitations.