Opinion ID: 1650180
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Should Sec. 903.01, Stats. 1977, Be Applied When Presumptions Arise in Worker's Compensation Hearings Before the Department?

Text: [10] It has been the consistent position of this court that the presumption in favor of travelling employees under sec. 102.03(1) (f), Stats., is rebuttable and drops out of consideration when evidence to the contrary is presented. Tyrrell v. Industrial Comm., 27 Wis.2d 219, 224, 133 N.W.2d 810 (1965); Armstrong v. Industrial Comm., 254 Wis. 174, 35 N.W.2d 212 (1948); Dibble v. ILHR Dept., 40 Wis.2d 341, 347, 161 N.W.2d 913 (1968). Conceding this point, the applicant urges this Court to adopt a twofold change in existing law. The first change would be to adopt the presumption set forth in sec. 903.01, Stats. 1977, which provides: 903.01. Presumptions in general. Except as provided by statute, a presumption recognized at common law or created by statute, including statutory provisions that certain basic facts are prima facie evidence of other facts, imposes on the party relying on the presumption the burden of proving the basic facts, but once the basic facts are found to exist the presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence. The applicant contends that under this section, when the basic facts are shown, the burden is on the person attacking the presumed fact to prove the contrary by a preponderance of the evidence. [11] There is no requirement that sec. 903.01, Stats., be adopted in hearings before the Department. The rules of evidence govern proceedings in the courts of the State of Wisconsin. Sec. 901.01, Stats. 1975; [4] See also, sec. 911.01, Stats. 1975. The Department is not a court. Employers Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 230 Wis. 374, 376, 284 N.W. 40 (1939). Proceedings before the Department in worker's compensation cases do not require strict adherence to the statutory rules of evidence. See, Lager v. ILHR Dept., 50 Wis.2d 651, 660-661, 185 N.W.2d 300 (1971); and sec. 227.08, Stats. 1975. Also, by adopting sec. 903.01, Stats., once the basic facts are shown, the Department would be required to determine whether a party has proved that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence. This type of balancing of the evidence has not been required in the past, because of the need perceived by this Court to allow the Department the widest possible latitude in making its decisions. The second departure from existing law which would necessarily be required if sec. 903.01, Stats., is applied to Department hearings, would be a change in the scope of judicial review of the findings of the Department. The applicant argues that the any credible evidence test for judicial review of the Department's findings should be abandoned when the travelling employee presumption is called into play. Thus, in this special class of cases, a more exacting judicial review would apply. The arguments presented here are not unique and this court has considered similar arguments in past decisions. In Phillips v. ILHR Dept., 56 Wis.2d 569, 577, 202 N.W. 2d 249 (1972), it was argued that the travelling employment special presumption was a weak one and that it could be refuted by intoxication evidence. This court concluded that the effect to be given the presumption was primarily for the Department to determine and that this court would review the Department's determination under the limited circumstances provided in the any credible evidence test. The court said: It is unnecessary to determine whether the traveling employment special presumption is strong or weak and is or is not rebutted by a given quantum of evidence to the contrary. As has been noted, the department's finding of fact may be reviewed in very limited situations. 56 Wis.2d at 577 (footnote omitted). Accord, Tyrrell v. Industrial Comm., 27 Wis.2d at 219; Armstrong v. Industrial Comm., 254 Wis. at 178. This court, in addition, has repeatedly rejected attempts to modify the standard of review applied in worker's compensation cases. In a recent case, Consolidated Papers, Inc. v. ILHR Dept., 76 Wis.2d 210, 214-216, 251 N.W.2d 69 (1977), the employer urged this court to adopt a standard of review whereby the Department's findings would be reversed if found to be against the great weight of the evidence. This court examined earlier cases, and the purposes behind limiting review, concluding ultimately that there were sound policy and practical reasons for retaining the any credible evidence standard of review. The legislative purpose in restricting judicial review in worker's compensation cases is to limit appeals and protracted litigation in the interest of attaining speedy justice for the employee. Consolidated Papers, Inc. v. ILHR Dept., 76 Wis.2d at 216; R. T. Madden, Inc. v. ILHR Dept., 43 Wis.2d 528, 536, 169 N.W.2d 73 (1969).