Opinion ID: 2575903
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Statute of Limitations on Discovery of Razor Blades

Text: The district attorney's office notified defendant that it planned to introduce aggravating evidence of certain unadjudicated violent criminal activity (ї 190.3, factor (b)); namely, evidence of the incident occurring on or about July 24, 1987, in which the defendant was [caught] in possession of a razor blade in the North County Jail in Oakland, California ..., a violation of section 4574, subdivision (a). The notice alleged that similar incidents occurred on or about February 5 and March 25, 1988. Defendant sought to exclude the evidence, contending that the alleged incidents had transpired so long ago that he was denied his due process rights because he could not properly defend against the charges Б─■ e.g., any razor blades that may have been confiscated were no longer available for examination regarding their potential for abuse. The court disagreed and ruled against him. Thereafter, as noted, sheriff's deputies testified about three occasions on which they found defendant possessed contraband razor blades, and defendant testified that he had innocent reasons for possessing them. Defendant argues that all three incidents were stale at the time of trial and the statute of limitations to prosecute him for them had expired. He contends that to introduce evidence of them violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution and to a reliable penalty determination under the Eighth Amendment thereto. He has failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment claim for review. (See ante, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 648, 131 P.3d at pp. 1041-1042, fn. 18.) In any event, both claims are without merit. In People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060[, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1], we concluded that the admission of violent criminal conduct occurring many years before the penalty trial is not necessarily inconsistent with a defendant's rights to due process, a speedy trial and a reliable penalty determination. We reasoned that `the state has a legitimate interest in allowing a jury to weigh and consider a defendant's prior criminal conduct in determining the appropriate penalty, so long as reasonable steps are taken to assure a fair and impartial penalty trial.' ( Id., at p. 1161[, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1].) We identified those `reasonable steps' as including notice of the evidence to be introduced, the opportunity to confront the available witnesses, and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. When these steps have been taken, we concluded, the remoteness of the offense affects its weight, not its admissibility. ( Ibid. ) ( People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 136-137, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166.) So it is here. Defendant acknowledges our precedents, but urges a different result in his case because the razor blades were not available for inspection. We disagree. The incident reports contained ample information about the incidents. Furthermore, the witnesses' testimony provided a full opportunity for cross-examination, and defendant availed himself of it. Finally, each juror was instructed not to consider any of the alleged incidents in the calculus of penalty unless he or she concluded individually that the prosecution had proved it beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th 536, 585, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344). We adhere to our prior conclusions. (See People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th 93, 136-137, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166.)