Opinion ID: 795898
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Chief Flynn

Text: 43 As we have noted, there is no question that plaintiffs have alleged a legally sufficient case as to the animus element. As we discussed above, on the plaintiffs' view, Chief Flynn disciplined the plaintiffs and brought them before the Board because they exercised their First Amendment rights. The district court's decision that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that other officers had in fact engaged in other misconduct and were disciplined differently than plaintiffs is not before us. See Salim, 93 F.3d at 90. We cannot review the district court's determination that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether other officers committed other misconduct and were disciplined differently than plaintiffs. We can review only the purely legal question of whether, on plaintiffs' version of the facts of what these other officers did and how they were disciplined, a jury could conclude as a matter of law that the other officers were similarly situated to plaintiffs. Id. Because Chief Flynn does not argue that the other officers were not similarly situated to the plaintiffs as a matter of law, we do not reach this issue here. We note, however, that the district court did not articulate what standard it used in evaluating whether the plaintiffs were similarly situated to other officers. On remand, the district court should consider our discussion here and our decisions in Harlen Associates and Neilson in deciding whether sufficient evidence of similarity exists to make out a jury question. 44 In any event, we agree with the district court that no reasonable state employee could think that he was allowed to discipline an employee more severely because of the employee's expression of his First Amendment rights. We decided Harlen Associates in 2001. Moreover, we have articulated specifically the elements of a selective treatment claim in the context of police investigations in a case decided in 2000. See Diesel v. Town of Lewisboro, 232 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir.2000). In sum, if Chief Flynn brought the plaintiffs before the Board because the plaintiffs exercised their First Amendment rights and did not charge or discipline other similarly-situated officers, Chief Flynn violated plaintiffs' Equal Protection rights and is not entitled to qualified immunity. 45 We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court on this count but with the caution that, in order to prevail, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that they were similarly situated with comparable officers within the meaning of our caselaw.