Opinion ID: 1976705
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Divorce Issue.

Text: On this issue, the chancellor, because he believed that he was required to give full faith and credit to the Florida decree, denied the husband a divorce. It is unnecessary, however, to pass upon the correctness of that ruling for, as we see it, the decree of the lower court should be affirmed for a different reason. Since the husband failed to corroborate his claim for relief, the chancellor was without authority to grant a divorce in any event. This is so because the separation agreement merely recited that the parties were about to separate and had mutually agreed to settle their property rights. There was no recital nor an agreement that the separation was voluntary. The separation could have been caused by misconduct either on the part of the husband or the wife or both. Actually, the wife, besides denying the voluntary nature of the agreement, claimed that the husband intended to leave her in any event and so announced, and that she executed the agreement merely to protect her financial and property rights since she was faced with a situation she could not control. This denotes acquiescence, not agreement. The situation here was not the same as it was in Hahn v. Hahn, 192 Md. 561, 64 A.2d 739 (1949), on which the husband relied to support his claim for a divorce. There, the husband admitted that the separation was voluntary. Moreover, there was substantial corroboration of the wife's testimony by a person who was not a party. Here, the agreement, insofar as the separation of the parties was concerned, proved nothing. Even if we assume, without deciding, that the execution of a separation agreement may in some instances corroborate a separation by mutual consent, it certainly did not do so in this case. While only slight corroboration is required, it cannot be dispensed with. Zulauf v. Zulauf, 218 Md. 99, 145 A.2d 414 (1958). Cf. Rule 1190 f.