Opinion ID: 196355
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Interception and Disclosure of Extortion-Related Conversations

Text: 30 With certain exceptions, Title III prohibits the interception and disclosure of conversations other than those relating to the offenses specified in the district court's interception order. See generally 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2511, 2517, and 2518(4)(c). As noted, London argues that the government wrongfully intercepted and disclosed certain extortion-related conversations (i.e., conversations concerning the paying of rent to Ferrara) despite the fact that the district court's initial interception orders did not specify extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951 as a target offense. London's claim of governmental overreaching in this context is without merit. 31 Unlike London's first two arguments, the instant one is not built upon a faulty factual basis; extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951 was not a target offense listed in the government's interception applications or the district court's interception orders. This fact alone, though, does not make the interception of the rent conversations unlawful. Title III clearly contemplates that law enforcement officials will, in the course of intercepting conversations related to specified target offenses, intercept conversations relating to offenses other than those specified in the order of authorization or approval. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2517(5). For example, an intercepted conversation can relate to both a specified offense and to an unspecified offense. In such a situation, the interception is unlawful only when it is motivated by an illicit purpose--e.g., subterfuge interceptions where the government applies to intercept conversations relating to offenses specified in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2516(1)(a)-(o) while intending to intercept conversations relating to offenses for which interceptions are unauthorized or for which it has no probable cause to obtain an interception order. See United States v. Angiulo, 847 F.2d 956, 980 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852, 109 S.Ct. 138, 102 L.Ed.2d 110 (1988). 32 Here, the intercepted rent conversations clearly related to at least one offense--operating a gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955--specified in the initial authorization orders. The victims of the rent/extortion scheme were bookmakers involved in illegal gambling, and the intercepted conversations provided a means of identifying them. Moreover, the district court supportably found that there was no subterfuge involved in the initial interception applications. See Angiulo, 847 F.2d at 980 (clear-error reviewing standard applicable to finding that government's wiretap application was not subterfuge). Extortion, after all, is an enumerated offense under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2516, and there would have been no need for the government to engage in subterfuge unless it suspected that extortion was taking place but lacked the probable cause necessary to intercept conversations pertaining to extortion. London makes no argument along these lines, and the record does not suggest this sort of governmental deception. The government's interception of the rent conversations was therefore not unlawful. 33 We still must consider whether the government acted unlawfully in disclosing the rent conversations during the proceedings below. The government argues that the disclosure of such other offense evidence is permissible so long as the information is related to an offense listed in the initial authorization orders. Cf. United States v. Shields, 999 F.2d 1090, 1097 (7th Cir.1993) (Since the government was free to release this information to a grand jury anyway under the [authorization for the offenses listed in the Title III order], it is difficult to see how the defendants were harmed when the same facts were presented in the context of different offenses.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 515, 130 L.Ed.2d 421 (1994). We need not reach the merits of this argument, however, because we conclude that the district judge who issued the initial interception orders impliedly and permissibly authorized the disclosure of the conversations at issue. 34 Under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2517(5), the government may secure a court's blessing to disclose the contents of an other offense interception in connection with a federal prosecution. The relevant statutory provision permits disclosure when the interception has been authorized or approved by a judge of competent jurisdiction where such judge finds on subsequent application that the contents were otherwise intercepted in accordance with the provisions of [Title III]. Such application shall be made as soon as practicable. Id. It is settled that disclosure authorization can be implicitly obtained when a judge grants a renewal of a wiretap after being advised of the essential facts of the unspecified violation. United States v. McKinnon, 721 F.2d 19, 23-24 (1st Cir.1983). In other words, the disclosure in subsequent affidavits to the issuing judge of material facts constituting or clearly relating to other offenses satisfies the Government's obligation to seek judicial authorization for the disclosure and use of evidence inadvertently intercepted. Id. at 24 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 35 As the district court found in denying London's suppression motion, there was implicit authorization in this case. When the government applied for extensions of the initial interception orders, its attached affidavit advised the court of interceptions containing the essential facts of the extortion violations: 36 London acts as a bank and account keeper for other bookmaking and loansharking operations.... [Also] London's illegal businesses, and the illegal businesses for which London keeps the accounts, only operate with the consent and protection of certain other persons, to whom London and others pay a percentage of their income.... Further electronic surveillance is necessary, however, to identify the balance of the members of each organization and the relationship between London, these organizations, and the persons to whom 'rent' is paid, as discussed below. 37 The attached affidavit then detailed London's relationship with Ferrara. Thus, the court's approval of the extension application constituted both an implicit finding that the extortion-related conversations were intercepted in accordance with the provisions of Title III and permission for the subsequent disclosure of the conversations. See McKinnon, 721 F.2d at 23-24. 38 London complains that the affidavit not only failed to seek approval for subsequent interceptions of extortion-related conversations, but it also failed to alert the court that some of the intercepted conversations related to other offense evidence. While we certainly think it advisable that the government provide issuing courts with this type of notice, we note that it is not a sine qua non of implicit authorization. We presume that the court read the supporting affidavit with care, and took seriously its obligation to police the interceptions that were taking place. We require no more to infer implicit authorization. Cf. id. at 23 (supporting affidavits describing communications related to other offenses sufficient to ground reasonable ... conclu[sion] that issuing judge approved of their interception); see also United States v. Masciarelli, 558 F.2d 1064, 1068 (2d Cir.1977) ([W]e presume ... that in renewing ... the tap the judge carefully scrutinized th[e] supporting papers and determined that the statute's requirements had been satisfied.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 39 We therefore reject London's argument that the interception and disclosure of the extortion-related conversations violated Title III. 40