Opinion ID: 1830951
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the transfer of venue to wayne county from hinds county was improper.

Text: ¶ 71. Donald originally filed his Complaint and later his Amended Complaint in the Circuit Court of Hinds County. The Defendants moved for transfer of venue to the county where the property is located based primarily on the local action doctrine and secondarily on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Circuit Court of Hinds County agreed and issued an order transferring venue to Wayne County. Donald's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Circuit Court of Wayne County. Donald now contends that the transfer of venue was in error because neither the local action doctrine nor forum non conveniens supports the transfer. ¶ 72. The standard of review for a transfer of venue is, as follows: An application for a change of venue is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling thereon will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of discretion or that the discretion has not been justly and properly exercised under the circumstances of the case. Estate of Jones v. Quinn, 716 So.2d 624, 626 (Miss.1998)( quoting Beech v. Leaf River Prods., Inc., 691 So.2d 446 (Miss.1997)( quoting Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Rogers, 240 Miss. 529, 128 So.2d 353, 358 (1961))).
¶ 73. In Mississippi, the local action doctrine is codified in Section 11-11-3 which states: Civil actions of which the circuit court has original jurisdiction shall be commenced in the county in which the defendant or any of them may be found or in the county where the cause of action may occur or accrue and, if the defendant is a domestic corporation, in the county in which said corporation is domiciled or in the county where the cause of action may occur or accrue, except where otherwise provided, and except actions of trespass on land, ejectment and actions for the statutory penalty for cutting and boxing trees and firing woods and actions for the actual value of trees cut which shall be brought in the county where the land or some part thereof is situated. If a civil action is brought in an improper county, such action may be transferred to the proper county pursuant to section 11-11-17. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-3 (Supp.1998) (emphasis added). ¶ 74. In explaining the local action doctrine under the old venue statute, this Court said that [t]hey must be brought in the county in which the land lies. All other actions must be brought with reference to the person of the defendant. City of Jackson v. Wallace, 189 Miss. 252, 196 So. 223 (1940)(McGowen, J. dissenting)( quoting Oliver v. Loye, 59 Miss. 320 (1881)). Furthermore, The statute alone governs. The only local actions with us are ejectment and trespass on land. They must be commenced in the county in which the land lies. Id. The effect of the local action doctrine on venue is jurisdictional, i.e. subject matter jurisdiction lies only where the property is located and objections to venue cannot be waived. Belk v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 473 So.2d 447, 449 (Miss.1985); Leake County Coop. v. Dependents of Barrett, 226 So.2d 608, 615 (Miss.1969). ¶ 75. Obviously, under the local action doctrine, Donald's original Complaint as filed would have been required to be brought in Wayne County, because it contained a claim for trespass to land. However, Donald amended his Complaint and dropped the cause of action for trespass to land. Despite dropping the trespass to land claim, the Hinds County Circuit Court transferred the case to Wayne County after oral arguments at a hearing on the Defendants' motion. ¶ 76. The Defendants argue here, as they did at the hearing, that Donald's allegations are primarily those of trespass to land whether he titles it trespass or nuisance. The Defendants rely upon Filtrol, in which the Fifth Circuit said, Our examination of Mississippi law indicates that on the facts of this case nuisance, trespass, and strict liability are not separate theories of liability. Mississippi allows a plaintiff damaged by a physical invasion to its land to recover upon a simple showing that the defendant was responsible for the physical invasion. 624 F.2d 1384, 1389 (5th Cir.1980). Furthermore, [t]he label that a court attaches to the theory under which it holds a defendant liable does not appear to be of critical importance. Id. at 1390. Similarly, the Defendants contend that Donald's claims all revolve around an alleged physical invasion to land, and are thus in the nature of trespass whether labeled as such or not. ¶ 77. On the other hand, Donald seeks to distinguish Filtrol on grounds that the Fifth Circuit was not faced with the legal issue of venue, and never considered or interpreted Mississippi's statutes and rules governing venue. Moreover, in contrast to the Fifth Circuit's above-quoted determination of Mississippi law, the theory under which the plaintiff seeks to hold the defendant liable is of critical importance for purposes of venue and the local action doctrine. ¶ 78. In regards to the distinction between trespass and nuisance, this Court has said: There is a distinction between a nuisance and a trespass, although many things are sometimes called nuisances which are mere trespasses, and it has been said that an action for a nuisance which violates a property right incident to the ownership of land is in the nature of one for trespass to realty. The difference is that a nuisance consists of use of one's own property in such a manner as to cause injury to the property or other right or interest of another and generally results from the commission of an act beyond the limits of the property affected, while a trespass is a direct infringement of another's right of property. Thus, where there is no actual physicial [sic] invasion of the plaintiff's property, the cause of action is for nuisance rather than trespass. Blue v. Charles F. Hayes & Assocs., Inc., 215 So.2d 426, 429 (Miss.1968)( quoting 39 Am.Jur. Nuisances § 3 (1942)). Here, Donald alleges an actual physical invasion of the subject property, although he labels it a nuisance cause of action. Therefore, this action is in the nature of one for trespass to realty and is thus subject to the local action doctrine of Section 11-11-3. Hence, the Hinds County Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in transferring the venue of this case to Wayne County where the property is located. Likewise, the Wayne County Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration of the venue transfer issue.
¶ 79. Because we hold that venue was properly transferred pursuant to the local action doctrine, we need not discuss forum non conveniens except to note that we recently held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is inapplicable when the trial court is faced with a choice of venue between two Mississippi counties. Clark v. Luvel Dairy Prods., Inc., 731 So.2d 1098 1129 (Miss. 1998).