Opinion ID: 2298935
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: R.C. Section 6231(a)(6).

Text: The Service sends notice of the computational adjustment to the taxpayer-partner in a Form 4549 or Form 4549A, titled Income Tax Examination Changes. [5] IRS Chief Counsel Notice CC-2009-027 (Aug. 21, 2009). If the taxpayer disputes the calculations reported on Form 4549 or Form 4549A, the partner may file a claim, but only with respect to the arithmetic computations, pursuant to two sections of the Internal Revenue Code: Sections 6228(b) [6] and 6230(c). I.R.C. Section 7422(h). [7] Section 6230(c) of the Internal Revenue Code makes clear that a taxpayer can only challenge computational errors made by the Service, not the determinations upon which those computations were made: (4) No review of substantive issues. For purposes of any claim or suit under this subsection, the treatment of partnership items on the partnership return, under the settlement, under the final partnership administrative adjustment, or under the decision of the court (whichever is appropriate) shall be conclusive. In addition, the determination under the final partnership administrative adjustment or under the decision of the court (whichever is appropriate) concerning the applicability of any penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount which relates to an adjustment to a partnership item shall also be conclusive. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, the partner shall be allowed to assert any partner level defenses that may apply or to challenge the amount of the computational adjustment. I.R.C. Section 6230(c)(4). The taxpayer-partner has six months from the date that the Service issues the Form 4549A to file a challenge to the computational adjustment, I.R.C. Section 6230(c)(2), but if the taxpayer does not challenge the calculations reported on Form 4549A, the matter is concluded. The Act also provided specific procedures for filing refund claims. [8] A taxpayer-partner who files a refund claim alleging erroneous computations must do so within six months of the Service issuing the notice of computational adjustment, in this case Form 4549A. I.R.C. Section 6230(c)(2)(A). A taxpayer-partner who files a refund claim for overpayment attributable to a settlement agreement (Form 870-PT) has two years from the settlement date to file his or her refund claim. I.R.C. Section 6230(c)(2)(B)(i). A taxpayer-partner who did not settle with the Service, receiving a final partnership administrative adjustment following the audit rather than a settlement agreement (Form 870-PT), has two years from either the expiration of the period during which he or she could have appealed the final partnership administrative adjustment or the date the decision of the court becomes final if an appeal was filed. I.R.C. Section 6230(c)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii). Turning to the case at hand, in 2005, the Service concluded its audit, pursuant to the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, of the Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership's tax returns for years 1993-1999 and adjusted various partnership items as a result of its disallowance of certain claimed deductions on the partnership returns for 1999 and 2000. Once the partnership audit was concluded, the Service sent Ms. King, one of the limited partners, two Forms 870-PT, one for year 1999 and one for year 2000 that identified the partnership items being adjusted and the amounts of the adjustments. [9] Each was accompanied by a Form 886-A that explained the results of the partnership audit. The Form 886-A regarding the partnership return for 1999 stated: The partnership agreement precludes BOLP [Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership] from allocating losses pursuant to the General Sharing Percentages to the extent the losses would cause a limited partner to have an Adjusted Capital Account Deficit (defined as the deficit balance . . . in such Partner's Capital Account . . . after giving effect to certain adjustments). In determining whether a partner's Adjusted Capital Account has a deficit balance, the Capital Account balance is increased to the extent that the partner is obligated (or deemed obligated) to restore that Capital Account balance to zero. Under the partnership agreement, any loss that cannot be allocated pursuant to the General Sharing Percentage is allocable to Mr. Angelos. On BOLP's 1999 return, losses allocated to Tom Clancy and Wanda King, as limited partners, were limited by the terms of the partnership agreement. As a result, a portion of the losses that would have otherwise been allocated to Tom Clancy and Wanda King were allocated to Peter Angelos. But as a result of the resolution of the IRS examination for years 1993 through 1999, a substantial amount of tax deductions on the originally filed income tax returns for those years was disallowed. As a result of the disallowed deductions, Mr. Clancy's and Ms. King's Capital Account balances were increased. And as a result of the increased Capital Account balances, BOLP is able to allocate its 1999 loss pursuant to the General Sharing Percentages. . . . The Form 886-A accompanying the Form 870-PT regarding the year 2000 issued to Ms. King contained nearly identical language. Ms. King consented to the partnership item adjustments when she signed both Forms 870-PT on April 7, 2005; the Service accepted the 1999 Form on June 23, 2005 and the 2000 Form on July 29, 2005, thereby closing the partnership audit. On January 3, 2006, the Service sent Ms. King a letter indicating the computational adjustments resulting from the partnership item adjustments for years 1999 and 2000. Accompanying this letter were two Forms 4549A, one for each of the years 1999 and 2000; two unlabeled spreadsheets, one for each year, that explained the details of the calculations on the Forms 4549A; and two Forms 886-A, titled Explanation of Items, one for each year, that explained that the adjustments to Ms. King's individual tax liability were made pursuant to the Forms 870-PT she had signed. Ms. King did not challenge the computations reported on the Forms 4549A that she received. The practical effect of the adjustments to the partnership items was that Ms. King's personal income tax liability was lessened, because partnership deductions were disallowed, permitting a pass through of partnership losses to her individual return; as a result, she became eligible for a Maryland tax refund totaling $173,364 for both years. Ms. King filed a claim for refund on February 2, 2007, but the Comptroller of the Treasury denied it, stating that the refund claim was not timely filed under Section 13-1104(c)(2)(i) of the Tax-General Article, because the Service's final report regarding adjustments to her personal tax liability had been issued on January 3, 2006, more than a year before Ms. King filed for her refund on February 2, 2007. After the Comptroller denied her refund claim, Ms. King requested and received from the Service a report indicating that the computational adjustments reported on Forms 4549A were applied to her federal account on February 6, 2006. Ms. King filed an informal appeal with the Hearings and Appeals Section of the Comptroller's Office, pursuant to Section 13-904(a)(2) of the Tax-General Article, [10] arguing that the one year statute of limitations for filing a refund claim in Maryland did not begin to run until after the expiration of the appeal period regarding errors in the calculations reported in Form 4549A, or, in the alternative, after the computational adjustment was applied to her account on February 6, 2006. The hearing officer affirmed the Comptroller's denial of Ms. King's refund claims as untimely, reasoning that because the Forms 4549A that Ms. King received were unquestionably reports and Ms. King did not challenge the calculations reported on the Forms, the adjustments detailed on Form 4549 A-CG constitute a final adjustment report. [11] The hearing officer, thus, determined that Ms. King's claims for refund needed to have been submitted within one year of the date the Service issued Form 4549A. The hearing officer concluded that [t]he date the changes were implemented to the account is not the date of a final adjustment report; the Form 4549 A-CG and enclosed correspondence is the final adjustment report. Ms. King then appealed to the Maryland Tax Court, which also ruled in favor of the Comptroller. [12] The Tax Court relied on the fact that no evidence was presented that there would have been a report generated were Ms. King to have appealed the calculations on the Forms 4549A. The court also considered significant the longstanding practice of the Comptroller's Office regarding treatment of Form 4549A under Section 13-1104(c)(2) noting, [the Manager of the Amended Income Tax Return Unit] went on to testify that it had been the consistent long-standing administrative procedure to treat the 4549A Forms as a final adjustment report of the Internal Revenue Service. [13] The Tax Court determined that the date the Forms 4549A were issued to Ms. King was the date upon which the one year statute of limitations began to run. Ms. King then filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit Court for Calvert County, pursuant to Section 13-532 of the Tax-General Article of the Maryland Code. [14] The Circuit Court reversed the Tax Court determination and opined with respect to its interpretation of Section 13-1104(c)(2)(i): I'm persuaded in this case that the words of the statute mean the final date is the date that the appeal period on the Federal Form 4549A expires, and when you read all of those words tegether that that's what the Legislature, the plain meaning, that's what the Legislature intendedthat appeal period ending, making the federal determination final. The Comptroller appealed the Circuit Court's decision to the Court of Special Appeals, which, in an unreported opinion, reversed the Circuit Court, reasoning that the Circuit Court judge's determination would run contrary to the statute's plain meaning by using an entirely different datethe date a claimant's right to an administrative appeal expiresthan the date emphasized in the statute: the date of the report. The intermediate appellate court concluded that Ms. King's interpretation of the statute would insert an unnecessary element of uncertainty into the statutes of limitations and, [h]ad the legislature intended to allow for varied limitations periods, it would have done so explicitly. The statutory section under which Ms. King's claim for refund was denied, Section 13-1104(c) of the Tax-General Article, states: (c) Financial institution franchise tax and income tax. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a claim for refund or credit of overpayment of financial institution franchise tax or income tax may not be filed after the periods of limitations for filing claims for refund or credit of overpayment set forth in § 6511 of the Internal Revenue Code. (2) A claim for refund or credit of overpayment may not be filed later than 1 year from the date of: (i) a final adjustment report of the Internal Revenue Service; or (ii) a final decision of the highest court of the United States to which an appeal of a final decision of the Internal Revenue Service is taken. It is not contested that the Form 4549A Ms. King received represents an adjustment report of the Internal Revenue Service. The parties also agree that Ms. King did not receive any further reports from the Service before she filed her Maryland refund claim. The point upon which they differ is what represents a final adjustment report in subsection (2)(i). The Tax-General Article of the Maryland Code is silent on the definition of final. Ms. King argues, however, that the Tax Court determination was erroneous, because, she asserts, Form 4549A does not become final until six months from the date on which it was issued as a result of the six-month period during which a taxpayer-partner could challenge the computations reported on the Form referred to in subsection (2)(i); she concludes that her refund claim, therefore, was due no later than one year and six months from the date Form 4549A was issued (January 3, 2006), so the Tax Court improperly ruled in favor of the Comptroller. The Comptroller asserts that the Tax Court was correct in determining that Form 4549A is a final report and that the fact that a taxpayer could appeal the Service's calculations is not relevant. He posits that the bifurcated statute of limitations in Section 13-1104(c)(2) contemplates two scenarios: one in which the taxpayer does not appeal the Service's report, (2)(i), and one in which the taxpayer does appeal, (2)(ii). In the first scenario, the Comptroller argues, the one year limitation on filing a refund claim begins on the date the Form 4549A is issued. In the second, the one year limitation period would only begin once the final decision of the court to which an appeal was taken was rendered. Ms. King's proffered interpretation of the statute at issuethat the term final adjustment report refers to the time at which an adjustment report can no longer be challenged rather than the date it is issuedcannot stand when one looks at the entire Section. The Legislature constructed 13-1104(c)(2) with three distinct parts. The first clause, [a] claim for refund or credit of overpayment may not be filed later than 1 year from the date of, provides the framework and duration on which the subsequent subsections rely. Each subsection, then, provides the starting point to begin calculating the one year period. The statute of limitations applicable to Ms. King, thus, reads [a] claim for refund or credit of overpayment may not be filed later than 1 year from the date of a final adjustment report of the Internal Revenue Service. The natural, plain meaning of this sentence is that the date of the report itself is the date of the event that begins the one year limitation period. Ms. King's interpretation would require us to ignore the written language and instead read the statute as though it said a claim for refund or credit of overpayment may not be filed later than 1 year from the date an adjustment report of the Internal Revenue Service becomes final.  Ms. King's interpretation would require us to add language to the Section and would introduce an element of uncertainty into the statute of limitations. [15] The Section very clearly links the terms date and report, and the date of issuance is the only date on Form 4549A. Under the Maryland statute, therefore, a taxpayer-partner, such as Ms. King, who does not challenge the Service's calculations, is bound by the statute of limitations that begins to run on the date the final adjustment report is issued, without regard to the unused appeals process that was triggered. The structure of Section 13-1104(c)(2), when viewed in conjunction with its federal analogue, also supports our interpretation. Section 13-1104(c)(2) was promulgated in response to the enactment of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act heretofore discussed. See Letter from Assistant Attorney General Gerald Langbaum to George H. Spriggs, Jr., Director of the Income Tax Division of the Comptroller's Office (Jan. 27, 1989). Section 13-1104(c)(2) is in parallel to Section 6230 of the Internal Revenue Code, which was enacted as part of the Act, involving the statutes of limitations for filing federal refund claims following a partnership audit. The statute of limitations applicable to a federal refund claim filed by a taxpayer-partner such as Ms. King, who enters into a settlement with the Service with respect to the treatment of partnership items, begins to run on the date the report, here Form 4549A, is issued or the date the settlement was agreed upon, depending on the basis for the claim. I.R.C. Sections 6230(c)(2)(A)-(B)(i). The statutory appeal period is to be taken into account only in identified circumstances when calculating the time frame for filing claims, and a claim filed by a taxpayer-partner situated similarly to Ms. King would not receive the benefit of the additional time during the appeal process provided by I.R.C. Sections 6230(c)(2)(B)(ii)-(i). The Maryland statute is similarly constructed. Section 13-1104(c)(2) is bifurcated, such that the subsection that references court challenges applies to those taxpayer-partners who file such challenges, while the other subsection applies to those taxpayer-partners, such as Ms. King, who do not file challenges. Subsection (ii) of (c)(2) of Section 13-1104 applies to those taxpayers who challenge the Service's determination of tax liability and states that a taxpayer has one year from a final decision of the highest court of the United States to which an appeal of a final decision of the Internal Revenue Service is taken to file a refund claim. Subsection (i) of (c)(2) applies to taxpayer-partners who do not challenge the determinations made by the Service, and provides that the taxpayer has one year from the date of a final adjustment report of the Internal Revenue Service to file a claim for a refund. Just as is the case under the federal statute, the applicable Maryland statute of limitations deals only with the date of a report and, although there is a different statute of limitations that does concern appeals, Ms. King does not benefit from it because she did not challenge the information on Forms 4549A. Ms. King previously asserted, however, that a fiscal note found in the bill file for 1989 House Bill 225 indicates that the intent of the bill was to require[] that refund claims stemming from federal audit related adjustments be filed within one year of the settlement date of the federal adjustment; she argues that the proper point at which to begin the one year statute of limitations period, then, is the settlement date. If we were to find this argument persuasive, the statute of limitations would have begun to run on July 29, 2005, when the Form 870-PT was signed as a settlement agreement; Form 4549A is an Income Tax Examination Changes form that does not require, or even provide for, a taxpayer's signature. Ms. King's underlying assumption that the term settlement date must refer to the date on which the Service applied the computational adjustment to her federal account (February 6, 2006) does not bear fruit. Her understanding is not supported by the language of the Section nor is there any mention of the date of such application in the legislative history to which Ms. King directs this Court's attention. Moreover, as the Tax Court noted, the Service does not customarily issue a report when a computational adjustment is applied to a taxpayer-partner's account, and Ms. King did not receive such a report until she requested it following the Comptroller's denial of her claim. Thus, the Comptroller was not aware of the date the adjustment was applied to Ms. King's federal account when he received her refund claim, nor was Ms. King aware of the application date when she filed her refund claim. Ms. King, finally, to bulwark her claim, refers us to statutes enacted in Texas and Kentucky relating to the statutes of limitations for filing state refund claims. The Texas statute states, in pertinent part, a revenue agent's report or other adjustment is final on the date on which all administrative appeals with the Internal Revenue Service or other competent authority have been exhausted or waived. Tex. Tax Code Ann. Section 171.212(b) (West 2007). [16] The Kentucky statute states, in pertinent part, `Final determination of the federal audit' means the revenue agent's report or other documents reflecting the final and unappealable adjustments made by the Internal Revenue Service. Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. Section 141.210(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2010). [17] These statutes, however, are explicit in their inclusion of appellate references, more in sync with Section 13-1104(c)(2)(ii), which does not apply to Ms. King. As a result, we hold that the statute of limitations applicable to Ms. King's refund claim began to run when the Service issued to her Forms 4549A on January 3, 2006. Accordingly, Ms. King's refund claim had to have been filed within one year of that date, so that her submission on February 2, 2007 was untimely. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.