Opinion ID: 672915
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deference to the EPA's Construction of the CAA

Text: 34 Even were our decision not controlled by Kamp, we would reach the same result in deference to the EPA's interpretation of the statute. The EPA interprets the pre-1990 CAA to allow it to approve conditionally portions of plans submitted by states, such that the approved portions become part of a state's SIP. 35 The CAA provided prior to 1990 that the EPA may approve any submitted plan or any portion thereof. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7410(a)(2) (1988); cf. id. Sec. 7410(k)(3), (4) (1994). According to the EPA, approval of a portion of a submitted plan would be meaningless if the approved portion did not become part of a SIP at the time of the approval. Because the EPA could approve a portion of a plan submitted by a state, the EPA could, it claims, by implication, approve revisions to the plan applicable to a nonattainment area without approving the attainment demonstrations that would render the plan complete. 36 Moreover, under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7410(c)(1) (1988), the EPA was not required to promulgate a FIP if, after the state's original submitted plan or a portion thereof had been rejected, the state timely submitted a revision of the plan that the EPA determined it could approve. Cf. id. Sec. 7410(k) (1994). The EPA and Appellants assert that section 7410(c)(1) (1988), in conjunction with the EPA's authority to approve portions of submitted plans, impliedly gave the EPA authority to approve incomplete plans and require revisions as a condition precedent to final and complete approval of a SIP. City of Seabrook v. EPA, 659 F.2d 1349, 1356 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied sub nom., Vavra v. EPA, 459 U.S. 822, 103 S.Ct. 51, 74 L.Ed.2d 57 (1982). Accordingly, the EPA considers SIP revisions to be additions to, rather than in lieu of, the existing SIP, unless specifically stated otherwise and accepted by [the] EPA. EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Guidance Document for Correction of Part D SIP's for Nonattainment Areas 32 (1984) (emphasis added). The EPA used its authority under these statutes to approve conditionally plans that are substantially complete (and only such plans, as noted supra ). 37 This reading of the CAA is reasonable. City of Seabrook, 659 F.2d at 1356 (also noting that other reasonable readings may be possible). This incremental approach fostered attainment of NAAQS as expeditiously as practicable, as required by the CAA, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7502(a) (1988). 38 The EPA's actions in the instant case conform to this interpretation of the statute. The EPA considered the Mass Transit Provisions, approved by the 1982 Conditional Approvals, to be part of Arizona's SIP when published in the Federal Register. See 47 Fed.Reg. at 19328 (This action may not be challenged later [than 60 days from May 5, 1982] in proceedings to enforce its requirements.); 47 Fed.Reg. at 29534 (same (but not later than 60 days from July 7, 1982)). The EPA accordingly denoted each of the 1982 Conditional Approvals a final rulemaking. Moreover, the EPA has allowed the Mass Transit Provisions to remain in the C.F.R. since they were approved in 1982. It is doubtful that the EPA would allow the Mass Transit Provisions to remain in the C.F.R. version of the Arizona SIP if it considered them unenforceable. 2 The EPA clearly considers approved portions of conditionally approved plans to be part of a SIP. The EPA's reasonable interpretation of the CAA is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). 3 We therefore adhere to that interpretation. 4 39 The district court's interpretation of the statute, unlike that of the EPA, is unreasonable. The district court's reasoning leaves intact only the most recently approved revisions to a SIP or, alternatively, requires the EPA to re-approve all previously approved provisions each time it approves another portion of a SIP. If the EPA does not include such a re-approval every time it issues a ruling, and particularly when approving attainment provisions, all of the other provisions previously approved and present in the SIP as printed in the C.F.R. would be excluded. The district court's ruling has a potentially counterproductive result in the instant case. As the EPA notes, the 1991 Documents bring the Arizona SIP into compliance with the CAA only when combined with the submissions approved in the 1988 approval and all of the measures existing in the SIP as set forth in the C.F.R. and approved previous to 1988. Thus, according to the EPA, the SIP presently held enforceable by the district court--which includes only the specific provisions mentioned in the 1988 approval and the 1991 Documents--is insufficient under the CAA. 5