Opinion ID: 1752752
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the shooting of john coleman arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of sanford's vehicle?

Text: Both Sanford's liability policy and Coleman's uninsured motorist policy provided coverage only for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the described vehicle. Thus, neither coverage would apply unless the shooting arose out of Sanford's ownership, maintenance or use of his vehicle. The undisputed facts are that, after the minor collision, the police allowed Coleman to leave but told Sanford to move his truck off the road so they could administer an intoxication test. Although Coleman and Sanford had not argued about the accident, Sanford took off after Coleman instead of pulling off the road as instructed. Sanford's vehicle approached Coleman's from behind and passed him on the right shoulder; then, with both cars still moving, Sanford shot through Coleman's windshield with a handgun, injuring Coleman. Sanford stated in deposition that he had been very intoxicated at the time of the shooting, and that he did not remember the actual shooting. According to Coleman's argument, this evidence presents a fact issue as to whether the shooting arose from use of the vehicle. It appears that Roberts v. Grisham, 487 So.2d 836 (Miss. 1986), controls. There, Grisham and Roberts had an argument, after which they met on the highway, each in his own vehicle. Grisham followed Roberts. When Roberts stopped, Grisham walked to the driver's side of Robert's truck and, after a few minutes, fatally shot Roberts. The lower court entered a directed verdict for Robert's uninsured motorist carrier, holding as a matter of law that the shooting did not arise from the ownership, maintenance or use of the vehicle. This Court affirmed, holding that [s]uch voluntary, deliberate acts are independent acts which render a vehicle's use incidental, viz, argument followed by assault or shooting, which result in injury did not arise out of the use of the insured vehicle. Id. at 839. Coleman claims that his case is distinguishable from Roberts, in that 1) Kado was actually driving the vehicle when he shot Coleman, and 2) Kado used the vehicle to catch up with Coleman. In spite of those facts, the shooting was still, in the language of Roberts, a voluntary, deliberate act which rendered use of the vehicle incidental. Although Sanford cites cases from other jurisdictions to the contrary, Sciascia v. American Ins. Co., 183 N.J. Super. 352, 443 A.2d 1118 (1983); Novak v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 424 So.2d 178 (Fla.App. Div. 4, 1983), in Mississippi Roberts controls.