Opinion ID: 1476448
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: The Demerit of Pan American's Exclusive Jurisdiction Arguments

Text: Pan American first argues that Article 117 of the Argentine Constitution confers ab initio jurisdiction to hear and decide all disputes involving the Argentine national government or a Province thereof. Even if correct, that proposition has no relevance to this Delaware action, because no claims are being asserted in Delaware against the Argentine national government or the Province of Salta. Nor does Pan American claim that those Argentine governmental entities are indispensable to a just adjudication of Candlewood's claims, within the meaning of Court of Chancery Rule 19. [49] Similarly irrelevant is Pan American's second argument, which is that Argentine law vests exclusive jurisdiction in its courts over disputes concerning real property and disputes involving issues of environmental protection. That argument is not analytically helpful, because this dispute is about compensation for harm to privately-owned land, not about ownership rights to real property or issues involving protection of the environment. As set forth in Section 87 of the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws (1971), [a] state may entertain an action that seeks to recover compensation for a trespass upon or harm done to land in another state. Comment a to that Section explains that [s]uch an action does not seek to affect title to foreign land, as would a bill to quiet title[.] [50] Finally, Pan American relies upon a theory of its foreign law expert, Dr. Horacio A. Grigera Naón, that there are issues of public policy implicated in this dispute that require exclusive jurisdiction in Argentina. Dr. Naón's opinion, however, is disputed by an equally plausible opinion articulating the contrary view. According to Professor Litvinoff, there are no principles of public policy that affect the parties' legal rights, but even in cases that do involve the Argentine public interest, this does not mean that the jurisdiction of Argentine courts is exclusive; thus, the fact that rules of public policy must be applied in the resolution of a particular case does not negate the existence of concurrent jurisdiction in other courts[.] [51] Given these disputed expert opinions and Pan American's inability to cite any Argentine legal authority supportive of its positionincluding any statute that purports to localize the claims being asserted here in the Argentine courtswe conclude that Pan American has not met its burden of establishing that jurisdiction over this dispute has been vested exclusively in the Argentine courts.