Opinion ID: 748759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing Credit

Text: 18 Delgado also argues, relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (1994) and Guidelines § 5G1.3(b), that he should have been given a sentence credit for the 14 months he spent in state custody following his return to the United States. His arguments are meritless. 19 Under § 3585(b), a defendant is to be given credit toward his sentence for 20 any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences-- 21 (1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or 22 (2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; 23 that has not been credited against another sentence. 24 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). Delgado's reliance on this section is misplaced for two reasons. First, the credit envisioned by this section is granted by the Attorney General through the Bureau of Prisons after a defendant is sentenced, not by a district court at the time of sentencing. United States v. Keller, 58 F.3d 884, 894 (2d Cir.1995); see generally United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 1354, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992) (s 3585(b) does not authorize a district court to compute the credit at sentencing). 25 Second, even if this were an attempt to obtain review of a denial of such credit by the Bureau of Prisons, see, e.g., United States v. Keller, 58 F.3d at 894 (To obtain sentencing credit under § 3585 a federal prisoner must first exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.), it would properly be rejected. Section 3585(b) is inapplicable to Delgado because the time he spent in state custody after violating his parole was part of his sentence for the 1991 attempted robbery conviction; that robbery was not the offense for which sentence was imposed here, which was his 1993 unlawful reentry into the United States. 26 Nor is there merit in Delgado's argument that the time he spent in state custody from July 1995 to September 1996 for his parole violation warranted a sentence credit under Guidelines § 5G1.3(b). That section provides that in certain circumstances, the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to [an] undischarged term of imprisonment. Guidelines § 5G1.3(b). Assuming arguendo that this provision on its face applied to Delgado, it would afford him no basis for relief, for he would fall within the exception spelled out in the commentary that the sentence for the instant offense should be imposed to run consecutively to [a] term imposed for [a] violation of ... parole ... in order to provide an incremental penalty for the parole violation. Guidelines § 5G1.3 Application Note 6.