Opinion ID: 4659173
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Godiksen challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction in two respects. First, Godiksen argues that the government failed to prove that he had the specific intent to murder his ex-wife when he used a facility of interstate commerce – his cell phone – as required under the statute. Second, Godiksen contends that there was insufficient evidence that, in exchange for his ex-wife’s murder, he gave or promised something of pecuniary value to the purported hitman, who was actually an undercover agent. Both arguments lack merit. This Court “review[s] de novo the sufficiency of evidence and the district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal.” United States v. Bramer, 956 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 2020). “A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence bears a heavy burden because a reviewing court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and uphold the conviction if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Godiksen intended 3 for his ex-wife to be murdered when he used his cell phone to speak with the undercover agent. The government’s theory at trial – that Godiksen ordered the hit on his wife because she wronged him, including financially, in their divorce – was not contrary to the evidence. While Godiksen could, and did, argue that he in fact retained certain assets, including title to his Corvette and his dog, there was ample evidence, including Godiksen’s own words, from which the jury could conclude that his actions were motivated by his perception that the divorce settlement was lopsided. Nor was the jury required to accept Godiksen’s assertion that he was intoxicated or suffering from alcohol-related deficits that prevented him from forming the requisite intent for the murder-for-hire. To the contrary, the jury heard testimony from government agents that Godiksen was not intoxicated during the investigation, and even Godiksen’s own expert, Dr. Madelon Baranoski, acknowledged that Godiksen’s alcohol-related deficits did not prevent him from being able to formulate a plan to commit a crime if desired. This testimony, coupled with the recordings of Godiksen arranging for the murder of his ex-wife, was more than sufficient to establish his intent to commit murder-forhire. 4 Godiksen fares no better with his contention that the evidence was insufficient to show pecuniary consideration. As relevant to § 1958, the promise of “an unspecified favor,” such as “[a]nything [the hired killer] need[s],” cannot support a finding of pecuniary value, unless the record contains some evidence that the parties understood the form the favor would actually take. United States v. Babilonia, 854 F.3d 163, 175 (2d Cir. 2017) (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the record need only be sufficient for the jury to reasonably find that the parties agreed “that the murder would be carried out in exchange for financial compensation” like “money.” Id. at 176 (explaining that the jury need not “divine the precise nature of th[e] consideration”). The evidence at trial included recordings of Godiksen agreeing to pay the undercover agent $5,000 in exchange for the murder. That figure may have first been suggested by the agent, but Godiksen expressly agreed to the $5,000 as “fine” and “fair,” Gov’t App’x at 221, and the agent repeatedly confirmed, without objection from Godiksen, that the murder would be committed in exchange for cash. As a result, there was ample evidence from which the jury could find that Godiksen “specifically intended that [the undercover agent] would be paid in exchange for committing the murder.” Babilonia, 854 F.3d at 177. That he had 5 not yet taken steps to withdraw the promised payment from his account is of no moment.