Opinion ID: 2334182
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the defendant's written statement rendered involuntary by actions of the investigating officers?

Text: The defendant argues that certain actions of the investigating officers were coercive and rendered his written statement involuntary, thus requiring suppression of that statement. Specifically, the defendant argues that the officers prevented him from making a phone call, required him to make his written statement when he wished to postpone it until later, and promised him that cooperating could not hurt him. The United States Supreme Court has held that in order for a confession to be involuntary, it must be the product of coercive state action. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-64, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). The test of voluntariness for confessions under article I, § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution is broader and more protective of individual rights than the test of voluntariness under the Fifth Amendment. State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn.1996) (citing State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 544 (Tenn.1994)). In Tennessee, for a confession to be considered voluntary, it must not be the product of `any sort of threats or violence, . . . any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.' State v. Smith, 42 S.W.3d 101, 109 (Tenn. Crim.App.2000) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897)). The essential question therefore is whether the behavior of the State's law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the defendant's] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined. State v. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn.1980) (quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961)). A valid waiver of Miranda rights remains valid unless the circumstances change so seriously that the suspect's answers to interrogation are no longer voluntary or unless the suspect is no longer making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. Courts must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether renewed warnings are required. Factors to be considered when assessing the totality of the circumstances include: 1) the amount of time that has passed since the waiver; 2) any change in the identity of the interrogator, the location of the interview, or the subject matter of the questioning; 3) any official reminder of the prior advisement; 4) the suspect's sophistication or past experience with law enforcement; and 5) any indicia that the suspect subjectively understands and waives his rights. Because of the infinite variety of circumstances a case may present, the list of factors is by no means exhaustive. The weight to be accorded different factors will vary depending on the particular facts of the case. State v. Rogers, 188 S.W.3d 593, 606 (Tenn. 2006) (citations omitted).
The defendant argues that he was denied the opportunity to make a phone call prior to writing his statement, thus making his statement involuntary. The defendant asked the investigators: Is there any way I'll be able to make a phone call tonight? Investigator Hodge replied: Yeah, soon as we get you downstairs we'll get you on the phone and try to post bond, okay? The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that this exchange was in no way coercive. Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-7-106(b) (2006) provides: No person under arrest by any officer. . . shall be named in any book, ledger or any other record until after the person has successfully completed a telephone call to an attorney, relative, minister or any other person that the person shall choose, without undue delay. One (1) hour shall constitute a reasonable time without undue delay. However, if the arrested person does not choose to make a telephone call, then the person shall be booked or docketed immediately. With respect to this provision, we have held that The failure to afford to a defendant the phone call required by this statute is but one factor to be considered in determining the voluntariness of the defendant's statement and whether the conduct of the officers has overcome the will of the accused. Automatic suppression of the statement is not called for. State v. Claybrook, 736 S.W.2d 95, 103 (Tenn.1987). While the investigating officers did not comply with the requirements of section 40-7-106(b), we are not persuaded that the statutory violation warrants suppression of the statement. The defendant's request to make a phone call came after he had already made his verbal confession to the investigating officers. Their denial of his request until after he provided a statement in writing, given the totality of the circumstances, did not render that written statement the product of police coercion. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the finding by the trial court that the written statement was voluntary, this issue is without merit.
The defendant argues that the written statement was involuntary because his request to write the statement at a later time clearly shows that the defendant wished to remain silent at that point. The videotape of the police interview shows that after the defendant made his oral statement to the police, he was given a pen and paper to reduce his statement to writing. The police left the room. The tape shows the defendant sitting at the table with the paper, then knocking on the door to speak with an investigator. The defendant asked if he could write his statement later, and the investigator responded No, we need to go ahead and get that done now. The defendant then took about twenty minutes to write out his statement. Once a person has been informed of his Miranda rights, if the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). To fully honor an accused's self-incrimination rights, the court stated that [o]nce warnings have been given, . . . [i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At that point, he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege. State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 265, 268-69 (Tenn.1992) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602). For example, in State v. Cauthern, after the defendant said that he was not guilty, the officer asked the defendant to tell them just exactly what happened. 778 S.W.2d 39, 46 (Tenn. 1989). The defendant refused, and attempted to turn off the tape recorder. Id. The Court concluded that the officers should have concluded the interview at that time. Id. Unlike the defendant in Cauthern, the defendant in this case never refused to give a statement. He had already given a verbal account of the events, which was videotaped. When asked to write out his statement, he simply asked if he could do that later. He never told the officers that he no longer wished to cooperate or that he no longer wished to make a statement. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the defendant's request to give his statement later was not a clear and unequivocal expression that he wished to remain silent. We agree that the officers' request was not coercive and did not render his statement involuntary.
The defendant argues that his statement was not voluntary because it was induced by the improper statements of law enforcement  the officer telling him the amount of prison time that he was facing, that his co-defendants were giving their side of the story, and assuring him that writing the statement could not hurt him. Following the defendant's arrest, he orally waived his right to counsel, then signed a written waiver. The officers informed him that the two co-defendants had already made statements to the police, and they encouraged the defendant to tell his side of the story and to assist them in recovering the stolen television. After the defendant gave an oral statement to police, the investigators requested that he provide a written statement as well. The defendant asked, How's this gonna help me? The investigator responded, Because you've been truthful, you've told your part, your involvement, you basically told it the way it happened and that way when the district attorney's office asks us, you know, `Hey, was he cooperative?' we can say `yeah.' The officers continued to encourage the defendant by telling him that his statement can't hurt you at all and certainly can help you. In Tennessee, [p]romises of leniency by state officers do not render subsequent confessions involuntary per se: `The Fifth Amendment does not condemn all promise-induced admissions and confessions; it condemns only those which are compelled by promises of leniency.' State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d at 455 (quoting Kelly, 603 S.W.2d at 729). In determining whether or not a promise of leniency has compelled a statement, the court must examine whether the behavior of the State's law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the accused's] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d at 728 (quoting Rogers, 365 U.S. at 544, 81 S.Ct. 735). Additionally, [a] defendant's subjective perception alone is not sufficient to justify a conclusion of involuntariness in the constitutional sense. Smith, 933 S.W.2d at 455 (quoting State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 79 (Tenn.1994)). Rather, coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not voluntary. Id. In this case, the record fails to establish that the police exercised any compelling influence over the defendant or that his statements were induced by promises of leniency. The defendant had already confessed to the crimes, and it was only before the written statement that this discussion of cooperation and leniency took place.