Opinion ID: 2613184
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Depravity of Mind Instruction

Text: NRS 200.033(8) allows for the finding of an aggravating circumstance in cases where the murder involves torture, depravity of mind, or mutilation of the victim. Since Libby's trial, this court has reconsidered the constitutionality of NRS 200.033(8). In Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1764, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), the Supreme Court held that states imposing the death penalty must limit the jury's discretion with clear and objective standards that provide specific and detailed guidance and make the process of imposing death rationally reviewable. The aggravating circumstance instruction at issue in Godfrey applied if [t]he offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim. The definition used in Libby's case was substantially similar to the definition that the Godfrey court found unconstitutional. In Robins v. State, 106 Nev. 611, 628, 798 P.2d 558, 569 (1990), however, we noted that the Georgia statute at issue in Godfrey was not unconstitutionally vague on its face but that the statute had been applied unconstitutionally. We thus held that if an aggravating circumstance is based upon depravity of mind, it must include torture, mutilation or some other serious and depraved physical abuse beyond the act of killing itself. See also Jiminez v. State, 106 Nev. 769, 774, 801 P.2d 1366, 1369 (1990). In Libby's case, the jury received no such limiting instruction. Therefore, we conclude that the depravity of mind instruction was applied unconstitutionally. In Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), the Supreme Court held that the federal constitution does not prevent a state appellate court from upholding a death sentence which is based in part on an invalid or improperly defined aggravating circumstance. According to Clemons, this court may reweigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence, or we may conclude that there was harmless error. See also Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 111 S.Ct. 731, 112 L.Ed.2d 812 (1991) (confirming holding in Clemons ). In the case at bar, there remains one valid aggravating circumstancethat the murders were committed during the commission of a robbery (NRS 200.033(4)) to be weighed against the one mitigating factor of Libby's family background. NRS 200.035(7). When faced with one remaining valid aggravating circumstance and one mitigating circumstance, each of which have approximately equal factual support, we may decline to affirm the imposition of the death penalty and resubmit the penalty determination to a new jury. This process is unnecessary in Libby's case, however, because the factual basis supporting the aggravating circumstance far outweighs that supporting the mitigating circumstance. The facts supporting the aggravating circumstance are that these murders were committed in an execution-like manner and were for monetary gain. The jury found that Libby's family background was a mitigating circumstance. This finding could not have been based on a finding that Libby had been neglected or abused as a child, because no such evidence was presented. Rather, this circumstance could only be based on the support family members provided Libby at trial and the obvious concern they showed for him when testifying. The facts supporting the finding of a mitigating circumstance have unequal persuasive impact when compared to those supporting the aggravating circumstance. We therefore conclude, as required by Stringer v. Black, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1136, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992), that the invalid aggravating circumstance was not a significant factor in sentencing Libby to death.