Opinion ID: 2788754
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “an alien described in paragraph (1).”

Text: The government states that the first phrase (“when the alien is released”) is an adverbial phrase, which must modify a verb rather than a noun. Thus, according to the government, a grammarian could reasonably conclude that the noun phrase (“an alien described in paragraph (1)”) could not be modified by an adverbial clause (“when the alien is released”). But, this argument begs the question: The phrase “when the alien is released” can be adjectival or adverbial, depending on its function in the sentence. As a result, the grammar does not remove the inherent ambiguity in § 1226(c)(1). This section contains three parts: 1. the opening phrase (“The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who–”) 2. the middle part (“A” through “D,” referring to the reasons that a given alien might be considered “inadmissible” or “deportable”) 3. the end phrase (“when the alien is released” without regard to the form of release or potential reincarceration for the same offense). 9 The end phrase can modify (1) the opening phrase (by describing the aliens who are to be taken into custody), or (2) the middle part (by describing the aliens considered inadmissible or deportable). If the end phrase simply modifies the opening phrase, the government’s interpretation would be correct. But, this is not the only possible reading: The end phrase can also be read as modifying the middle part (by clarifying the aliens who are identified in Paragraphs “A” through “D”). Under this interpretation, Mr. Olmos would prevail because aliens would be described in Paragraph “1” only if they were immediately taken into custody upon release in their criminal cases. Because either interpretation is plausible from the text alone, the government’s grammatical characterization does not remove the ambiguity. b. Legislative History The government relies not only on the grammar, but also on the legislative history. In adopting § 1226(c), Congress sought to reduce the risk of nonappearance for aliens who had committed crimes. See S. Rep. No. 104-48, at 23 (1995) (“Many criminal aliens who are released pending their deportation never appear for their deportation proceedings.”). Thus, the government argues that Congress would have preferred reincarceration to ensure appearance at the removal hearing — regardless of whether there had been a gap in custody. 10 But, again, the government’s reliance on congressional intent does not remove the ambiguity. Congress did not impose mandatory detention for all aliens guilty of crimes. Instead, Congress drew lines, imposing mandatory detention for some aliens and not for others. Congress could conceivably have been less concerned about the appearance of aliens who had been released and had not taken the opportunity to flee. Thus, the government’s reliance on congressional intent does not remove the inherent ambiguity: Congress might or might not have wanted bond hearings for aliens like Mr. Olmos who had not fled after obtaining release. c. Generality in the Statutory Cross-Reference to “Paragraph (1)” Mr. Olmos points to other statutory clues. For example, he emphasizes that Congress referred to aliens “described in paragraph (1)” and that this paragraph went beyond identifying aliens considered “inadmissible” or “deportable.” The paragraph also directed the Attorney General to take custody of these aliens (the opening phrase) and told him when to do that (“when the alien is released”). Mr. Olmos argues that when Congress referred to aliens “described in paragraph (1),” Congress had to be referring to the entirety of Paragraph “1.” And, the entirety of Paragraph “1” contemplated continuous confinement of aliens identified in “A” through “D.” 11 To Mr. Olmos, the meaning is clear: If Congress wanted to focus exclusively on aliens identified in Paragraphs “A” through “D,” the statute would have referred to aliens “described in paragraph (1)(A)-(D)” instead of aliens “described in paragraph (1).” In fact, Congress elsewhere used this kind of specific citation form when it intended to refer to a specific subsection. For example, in § 1226(d)(2), Congress referred to “[t]he record under paragraph (1)(C).” Mr. Olmos points out that Congress could easily have used the same specific form of citation (referring to aliens “described in paragraph (1)(A)-(D)”) if the intent was to focus on “A” through “D” regardless of when the aliens had been released. But, the government points out that Congress has not always been consistent in how it refers to other subsections in the same statute. For example, in 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(B)(i), Congress referred broadly to “subparagraph (A)” even though the context showed that Congress was referring to only two subparts of “subparagraph (A)”: (i) and (ii). Thus, Congress’s reference to “paragraph (1)”—rather than “paragraph (1)(A)-(D)”—might not have reflected an intent to incorporate the end phrase (“when the alien is released”). d. The Interpretation of “Flush Language” Mr. Olmos also points to case law on how to interpret “flush language.” As noted above, § 1226(c)(1) consists of three parts: an opening phrase (directing the 12 Attorney General to take custody of aliens), the middle part (identifying the aliens who are to be taken into custody), and the end phrase (“when the alien is released”). The first and third parts of § 1226(c)(1) are considered “flush,” meaning they begin at the left margin on the page. The middle part (Paragraphs “A” through “D”) consists of “inset clauses,” meaning they are indented. As Mr. Olmos points out, some courts state that “flush” language is intended to refer to the entire section. See Snowa v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 123 F.3d 190, 196 n.10 (4th Cir. 1997); Reser v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 112 F.3d 1258, 1262 n.10 (5th Cir. 1997); Sherwin-Williams Co. Emp. Health Plan Trust v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 330 F.3d 449, 454 n.4 (6th Cir. 2003). But, these cases do not remove the ambiguity in whether the flush language (“when the alien is released”) was intended to qualify the list of aliens identified in “A” through “D.” As noted above, there are two flush clauses in § 1226(c)(1). Mr. Olmos has focused on the second flush clause (“when the alien is released”). But, there is also another “flush clause”: “The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who–.” No one suggests that this clause could be used to describe the aliens listed in “A” through “D.” The two “flush” clauses might simply be read as two parts of a cohesive sentence. The sentence would read: “The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who–[is identified in ‘A’ through ‘D’] when the alien is released . . . .” 13 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2012). Thus, case law on the use of “flush language” does not remove the inherent ambiguity in the reference to aliens “described in paragraph (1).” e. Canon of Constitutional Avoidance Mr. Olmos argues that § 1226(c) is unambiguous because the Board’s interpretation would create serious constitutional questions. This argument does not advance the inquiry at step one of Chevron. The problem with the argument is that it reflects a misapplication of the canon of constitutional avoidance. This canon provides that when a particular construction would raise serious constitutional problems, the court will avoid that construction unless doing so would plainly conflict with Congress’s intent. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). As Mr. Olmos states, this canon provides “‘a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text.’” Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005), quoted in Appellee’s Resp. Br. at 34. But, at the first step of Chevron, we examine solely “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). Thus, the canon of constitutional avoidance does not bear on our inquiry at step one. See Warger v. 14 Shauers, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 (2014) (stating that the canon of constitutional avoidance applies only if the statute is ambiguous). f. Rule of Lenity According to Mr. Olmos, the rule of lenity suggests that the statute is unambiguous. We disagree. Mr. Olmos invokes lenity at step one, where we are determining only whether Congress has directly spoken. See Appellee’s Resp. Br. at 33-37. But, the rule of lenity applies only if the statute is grievously ambiguous. Robers v. United States, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1854, 1859 (2014). Section 1226(c) can be grievously ambiguous only if Congress failed to directly speak on the issue. Thus, Mr. Olmos’s invocation of lenity at step one is self-defeating: Lenity can apply only if the government has satisfied Chevron’s first step by showing ambiguity in the statute. g. Interplay Between Paragraphs “1” & “2” Mr. Olmos also points to the structure of Paragraphs “1” and “2” in § 1226(c). Paragraph “1” is entitled “Custody”; Paragraph “2” is entitled “Release.” Based on these titles, Mr. Olmos argues that it would be odd if the rules of custody were to be found in Paragraph “2,” where one would expect to find the rules governing release. Mr. Olmos adds that this oddity is heightened by the language in Paragraph “2,” which addresses limitations on the Attorney 15 General’s power to “release an alien described in paragraph (1).” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (2012). An alien can be released only if he is already in custody. Thus, Mr. Olmos argues that Paragraph “2” cannot serve as the sole provision authorizing the Attorney General to take an alien into custody. But, it isn’t. That authority also arises in Paragraph “1.” There the statute requires the Attorney General to take aliens into custody if they are covered by categories “A” through “D.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2012). As Mr. Olmos points out, the Attorney General must exercise this responsibility “when the alien is released.” Id. But, what happens when the Attorney General fails to take aliens into custody when they are released? The government argues that apart from § 1226(c)(2), the Attorney General had an ongoing duty to take custody. That interpretation is plausible, 1 making Mr. Olmos’s argument irrelevant because the authority for mandatory detention would arise under § 1226(c)(1), not § 1226(c)(2). With the alien in the Attorney General’s custody under his delayed enforcement of § 1226(c)(1), there would be nothing odd about § 1226(c)(2)’s restrictions on when the alien can be released. Thus, Mr. Olmos’s reliance on the structure and titles in § 1226(c) does not remove the ambiguity on whether the reference to Paragraph “1” incorporates the phrase “when the alien is released.” 1 E.g., Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 158-59 (2003); Brock v. Pierce Cnty. 476 U.S. 253, 260 (1986). 16 h. Summary The text, the statutory clues, and canons of interpretation do not definitively clarify the meaning of § 1226(c). Even with the statutory text, clues, and canons, a reader cannot tell from the text alone whether aliens remain subject to mandatory detention after a gap in custody. C. The Second Step of Chevron: Whether the Board’s Statutory Interpretation Was Permissible Because Congress has not directly spoken on the issue, we consider how the Board of Immigration Appeals interpreted the statute and decide whether this interpretation was permissible. See p. 5, above. The Board’s interpretation is permissible unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to” § 1226(c). Berneike v. Citimortgage, Inc., 708 F.3d 1141, 1148 (10th Cir. 2013). As noted above, the Board held in In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117, 125 (B.I.A. 2001) that § 1226(c) required mandatory detention of aliens listed in “A” through “D” regardless of gaps in confinement. This interpretation is permissible. 1. The Alleged Irrationality of Rojas Mr. Olmos and amici curiae contend that Rojas leads to unjust, irrational results, uprooting aliens from the community when they are the family’s sole source of income, eligible for relief from removal, and tied to family in the United States. This contention overlooks Congress’s policy determination that aliens in certain categories (Paragraphs “A” through “D”) must be detained 17 without a bond hearing even when they are the family’s sole source of income, are eligible for relief from removal, and have family ties in the United States. The Board of Immigration Appeals is not free to second-guess Congress’s policy judgment; the Board’s sole task was to determine whether Congress had intended to exempt aliens from mandatory detention when the Attorney General was slow to act. The alleged hardships flow from Congress’s policy judgment, not from the Board’s interpretation of the statute in Rojas. 2. The Rule of Lenity and Canon of Constitutional Avoidance As discussed above, Mr. Olmos argued at step one of Chevron that § 1226 is unambiguous based on the rule of lenity and the canon of constitutional avoidance. These arguments are misguided because lenity and constitutional avoidance come into play only if the statute is ambiguous. Though Mr. Olmos does not address lenity or constitutional avoidance at step two of Chevron, we do so to ensure the Board’s interpretation would not run afoul of well accepted principles of statutory interpretation. They wouldn’t.
The canon of constitutional avoidance would not preclude the Board’s interpretation of § 1226. As noted above, this canon provides a method of choosing between otherwise plausible interpretations of a statute. See p. 14, above. At step two of Chevron, we are simply determining whether an agency’s 18 interpretation is permissible. See p. 5, above. An agency’s interpretation may be permissible even if it would create constitutional issues. See Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 493 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 2 “[W]e do not abandon Chevron deference at the mere mention of a possible constitutional problem,” 3 and the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of mandatory detention in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). Amici Asian Americans Groups argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in Demore does not apply because there the alien’s confinement was continuous. This argument is not correct. The Supreme Court did not state whether there had been a gap in custody. But, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did, noting that the Attorney General had taken the alien into custody one day after his release. Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523, 526 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The day after his release from state custody, the 2 There the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: When Congress has explicitly or implicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, and the agency has filled it, we have no authority to re-construe the statute, even to avoid potential constitutional problems; we can only decide whether the agency’s interpretation reflects a plausible reading of the statutory text . . . . [T]he constitutional avoidance doctrine . . . plays no role in the second Chevron inquiry. Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 493 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (internal citation omitted). 3 Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Kempthorne, 512 F.3d 702, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 19 Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . detained Kim pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) . . . .”), rev’d sub nom. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). Mr. Olmos had six days of freedom, rather than one, after being released on probation in his criminal case. 4 But, there is nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision that would cast doubt on the constitutionality of mandatory detention for someone who had enjoyed six days (rather than one day) of freedom. According to Mr. Olmos, Demore does not apply because it “involved a constitutional challenge brought by a noncitizen who conceded § 1226(c)’s applicability to him.” Appellee’s Resp. Br. at 32 n.13 (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003)). But, this fact does not distinguish Demore. There the alien did not deny that he was “deportable” under § 1226(c). Demore, 538 U.S. at 522 (“Nor did he argue that he himself was not ‘deportable’ within the meaning of 4 Mr. Olmos contends that the gap in custody was four months rather than six days. This contention is incorrect. The parties apparently agree that physical custody is required to trigger § 1226(c): Otherwise, how could the alien be “released”? Mr. Olmos argues that the physical custody must be ordered as part of the sentence; the government contends that the physical custody can take place when the alien is arrested. We need not decide this issue because it was forfeited in district court. See pp. 26-29, below. But, both parties acknowledge that the Attorney General could not have taken custody until Mr. Olmos was sentenced to probation in his state criminal cases. That sentence was imposed six days before the Attorney General took custody of Mr. Olmos. Thus, the Attorney General’s delay spanned six days—not four months. 20 § 1226(c).”). But, that is also true here, for Mr. Olmos has not denied that he is “deportable” for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Mr. Olmos also tries to narrow the scope of the holding in Demore based on Justice Kennedy’s separate concurrence. The Court split 5-4 on the constitutionality of mandatory detention. Justice Kennedy, who was among the five justices in the majority, noted that due process concerns could arise if deportation proceedings took too long or continued detention became “unreasonable or unjustified.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 532 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring). But, Justice Kennedy did not suggest that a short gap in custody could render detention unreasonable or unjustified. And, he ultimately joined the majority opinion, which upheld the constitutionality of mandatory detention even though the Ninth Circuit had acknowledged a one-day gap in custody. In light of Demore, the canon of constitutional avoidance would not suggest congressional intent to excuse mandatory detention for a six-day gap in custody. 5
Mr. Olmos has not suggested that we apply lenity at step two. But, if we were to do so, we would be applying lenity only to decide whether the Board engaged in a permissible interpretation of § 1226. See p. 5, above. For this 5 Constitutional considerations could become greater when the gap in custody is considerably longer than six days. 21 purpose, lenity would provide little help. See Oppedisano v. Holder, 769 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2014) (stating that the rule of lenity “does not trump Chevron’s requirement of deference to reasonable interpretations by administrative agencies of statutes for which they are responsible”); Yi v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 412 F.3d 526, 535 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Rather than apply a presumption of lenity to resolve the ambiguity, Chevron requires that we defer to the agency’s reasonable construction of the statute.”); Perez-Olivo v. Chavez, 394 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[T]he rule of lenity does not foreclose deference to an administrative agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute.”); see also Amador-Palomares v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 864, 868 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that the rule of lenity “does not supplant Chevron deference merely because a seemingly harsh outcome may result from the [Board of Immigration Appeals’] interpretation”).