Opinion ID: 1059146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: suppression of defendant's statement

Text: Jackson filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the statement that he made to the police investigators. After hearing evidence and argument of counsel, the circuit court denied the motion, finding that Jackson's statement was voluntary and not the product of any psychological or physical coercion. The defendant assigns error to the court's decision and argues that, [b]ased on the totality of the circumstances, [his] will was overcome, his capacity for self-determination was critically impaired and his confession was not the product of a free and unconstrained choice. Jackson claims that the investigators who questioned him engaged in trickery and deceit because of statements such as, I will work with you . . . I will be with you, thick and thin, boy . . . I will be in your corner and I'm here for you. As further evidence that his will was overborne, Jackson points to his repeated denials of culpability during the first part of the interrogation, his initial confession to a different crime, and his lack of knowledge that the crime for which he was being interrogated carried a possible sentence of death. In accordance with his testimony at the suppression hearing, Jackson claims that he simply told the investigator what the investigator wanted to hear so that he, the defendant, would be free to go. We find no merit in Jackson's arguments. The circuit court found, and we agree, that there was no evidence of any promises of leniency, any force, any threats, any intimidation, any coercion, or any deprivation of the defendant's physical or mental needs. Such subsidiary factual determinations are entitled to a presumption of correctness. Swann v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 231, 441 S.E.2d 195, 202 (1994). The court also noted that the defendant had a reported IQ score of 100 and an educational level sufficient to read and write. Furthermore, Jackson signed a waiver of his Miranda rights at the beginning of the interview. And, he obviously understood the implications of making statements to the police because he had been charged with crimes on two previous occasions after confessing to those crimes. A defendant's waiver of Miranda rights is valid if made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Id.; Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 453, 423 S.E.2d 360, 366 (1992). The test for voluntariness is whether the statement is the `product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,' or whether the maker's will `has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.' Id. at 453-54, 423 S.E.2d at 366 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961)). When determining whether a defendant's statement was voluntarily given, we examine the totality of the circumstances, which include the defendant's background and experience as well as the conduct of the police in obtaining the waiver of Miranda rights and confession. Swann, 247 Va. at 231, 441 S.E.2d at 202; Correll v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 454, 464, 352 S.E.2d 352, 357 (1987). Using these principles, we conclude that the defendant's statement was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Thus, the circuit court did not err in admitting Jackson's incriminating statement.