Opinion ID: 2586281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Asserted Errors Arising From Prosecutor's Late Disclosure of Report on Informant Jimenez

Text: The jury returned its verdicts in the guilt phase on March 7, 1994. The next day, the prosecutor sent defense counsel a copy of a one-page report dated March 7, 1994 prepared by the prosecutor's investigator, David Weil, which described statements Jimenez had made to Weil on September 22, 1993, when Weil served a subpoena on Jimenez. Weil's report appeared to undermine the credibility of Jimenez as a potential witness because it noted that Jimenez said his statements to the police about Alvarado's admissions in jail could have been untrue because of drugs Jimenez was taking at the time. [25] As discussed above in part LLC, the trial court had excluded Jimenez's statements from the prosecution's case-in-chief on Aranda and Bruton grounds, but Jimenez's statements were held admissible for impeachment if Alvarado testified. Neither Alvarado nor Jimenez testified at trial. Both defendant and Alvarado filed written motions seeking a new trial and other relief. They complained that the prosecutor's failure to disclose information affecting Jimenez's credibility violated Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. at page 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Defendant's motion included the declaration of his cocounsel, Arturo Herrera, stating that defendant had consistently expressed a desire to testify in his own defense, and that Attorney Herrera had advised defendant against testifying because Alvarado was not going to testify. The trial court granted Alvarado's motion for a new trial, reasoning that Jimenez's statements to Weil constituted Brady material that the prosecution was obligated to disclose to Alvarado, and that the prosecutor's failure to provide this information at a critical stage in the proceedings prevented Alvarado's counsel from providing effective representation on the question of whether to testify. [26] ( Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194.) The trial court denied defendant's motion in all respects. Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the late disclosure of the Weil report violated his right to due process under Brady and his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant claims these constitutional violations rendered his trial fundamentally unfair and require the court to set aside his verdicts. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude defendant's constitutional rights were not violated, and the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a new trial. [27]

In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. ( Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194.) The high court has extended the prosecutor's duty to encompass the disclosure of material evidence, even if the defense made no request concerning the evidence. ( United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 107, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342.) The duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence. ( United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481.) Such evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ( Id. at p. 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375.) `[T]he reviewing court may consider directly any adverse effect that the prosecutor's failure to respond may have had on the preparation or presentation of the defendant's case.' ( In re Brown (1998) 17 Cal.4th 873, 887, 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 698, 952 P.2d 715, quoting Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at 683, 105 S.Ct. 3375.) Defendant has the burden of showing materiality. ( In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 545, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527.)
Defendant essentially asserts the Brady violation that led the court to grant Alvarado's new trial motion had a spillover effect as to him because he and Alvarado had a strategic understanding that if one defendant testified, the other defendant would also have to testify. Defendant contends the timely disclosure of the Weil report would have led him to testify due to a change in this joint defense strategy. As the trial court acknowledged during the hearing on the new trial motions, Brady claims typically require showing the different result of the proceeding in terms of the verdict, rather than in terms of an intermediate event such as a defendant's testifying. Defendant essentially ignores the issue of how his testimony would have changed the verdict. If, however, defendant cannot establish the materiality of the Weil report even as to the intermediate event of his decision whether to testify, then he has failed to establish the verdict would have been different. As discussed below, we conclude defendant has failed to establish materiality even as to his decision whether to testify.
Assuming defendant's claim is cognizable under Brady, the People pose a further threshold issue in observing that evidence inadmissible at trial is immaterial under Brady and, therefore, the failure to disclose such inadmissible evidence is not a Brady violation. Defendant concedes that, at the joint trial, Alvarado's purported admissions would have been admissible against Alvarado but inadmissible as hearsay against defendant, and that if defendant's motion for severance had been granted, the Jimenez testimony could not have been admitted at his single trial for any purpose. Defendant claims, however, that even though the Jimenez testimony was not admissible against defendant individually, his due process claim must survive. The United States Supreme Court has never announced a bright line rule that only admissible evidence is material for purposes of a Brady violation. [28] Some federal and state courts, however, have held that unless the undisclosed evidence would have been admissible at trial, it need not have been disclosed under Brady. [29] Other courts have rejected admissibility as a prerequisite for determining Brady's applicability, as long as the information would have led to admissible evidence or been useful to the defense in structuring its case. [30] This court has not directly addressed the issue, although we have implied in dicta that admissibility might be a prerequisite to materiality. [31] In addition, this case presents the additional question of what aspect of admissibility is a prerequisite to Brady materiality in a joint trial: admissibility at trial generally, or admissibility as to the individual defendant making the Brady claim? Because the evidence on which defendant bases his Brady claim was admissible at the joint trial, for the reasons that follow, we conclude defendant may assert a Brady claim, even though the evidence was not admissible against him. [32] The Brady standard for materiality states the undisclosed evidence is to be evaluated in terms of how the result of the proceeding would have been different. ( United States v. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375.) In addition, the evidence's materiality `must be evaluated in the context of the entire record.' ( In re Brown, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 887, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, 952 P.2d 715, quoting United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392.) In deciding whether asserted Brady evidence is material to defendant's case, it is therefore appropriate to examine the effect of the evidence on the actual joint proceeding in which defendant was tried.
Even though defendant's Brady claim is not per se precluded because the undisclosed evidence was inadmissible against him individually, its inadmissibility highlights the weaknesses in his Brady contention. As defendant concedes, Jimenez's statements were admissible only as impeachment evidence against Alvarado, if Alvarado testified. For defendant, unlike Alvarado, there was no direct causal connection between Jimenez's statements and the decision whether or not to testify. If Alvarado testified, Jimenez's statements could have impeached him. But the prosecution could not have impeached defendant with Jimenez's statements, even if Jimenez testified. Defendant contends Jimenez's statements did affect his decision whether to testify because the potential prejudicial impact of the statements on the jury caused him to adopt a joint defense strategy with Alvarado, to the effect that either both or neither of them would testify. During the hearings on the motions for a new trial, defense counsel extensively discussed the reasoning behind this joint defense strategy, which defendant summarizes and adopts on appeal. If the jury heard Jimenez's statements, their impact would be prejudicial not merely on Alvarado but on defendant as well. Defendant was free to testify without causing Jimenez's statements to be admitted, but if he testified, he presumably would say something exculpatory about his participation in the crime. Then more blame might be placed on Alvarado, so Alvarado would feel compelled to testify. Defendant's and Alvarado's defense counsel believed there was no fair way to have only one story presented. Thus, the codefendants had agreed on a both-or-neither approach to testifying.
Defendant alternatively refers to his understanding with Alvarado on testifying at trial as an agreement and as a trial strategy. To the extent that the defendant implies the existence of a binding agreement, the argument fails. He fails to establish that he formed a binding agreement with Alvarado either by contract or detrimental reliance. [33] The trial court made no findings establishing the existence of a joint defense agreement. To the extent defendant's argument for materiality depends on the existence of a binding agreement, defendant has therefore failed to establish one. In the alternative, defendant describes his agreement with Alvarado as a trial strategy that each codefendant adopted, based on their shared interest in keeping Jimenez's statements away from the jury. [34] Defendant claims that if the prosecution had timely disclosed the Weil report, it would have changed the joint defense strategy because the information revealed in the report would have undercut Jimenez's credibility. He reasons, therefore, that neither he nor Alvarado would have been deterred from testifying because they feared the effect of Jimenez's statements on the jury. Defendant implies the above trial considerations necessitated his adoption of the agreement with Alvarado and corresponding trial strategy. But this strategy was not compelled by necessity, legal or otherwise. Even assuming both codefendants wished to keep Jimenez's statements from the jury, defendant's testifying would not necessarily have caused Alvarado to testify. Alvarado's testifying in response to Jimenez's statements would have been contingent on the nature of defendant's testimony. If defendant's testimony painted Alvarado in a particularly bad light, Alvarado might have testified, in order to shift the blame to defendant. It was also possible, however, that Alvarado would not have testified. Before testifying, Alvarado would have considered the consequences of his testimony: leaving defendant's testimony unrebutted, or taking the stand and risk having the jury hear Jimenez's statements. Alvarado could not make that calculation prior to hearing defendant's actual testimony. Neither could defendant know with any certainty in advance what Alvarado would do. There was no necessary connection between defendant's testifying and Alvarado's testifying. In observing that defendant has not shown the legal necessity of the purported joint defense strategy, we do not hold defendant is required to show legal necessity in order to establish his Brady claim. [35] Nor do we deny defendant presents reasonable strategic considerations that may possibly have been factors in his decision whether or not to testify. But codefendants in many joint trials face difficult tactical choices in deciding how to proceed where multiple considerations are involved. Defendant has shown only the possibility that his decision not to testify was a result of strategic considerations made in connection with Jimenez's statements. In other words, defendant has shown only the possibility that he would have testified had the Weil report been timely produced. To establish materiality under Brady, defendant must do more than establish a possible relationship between the Weil report and a different result; he must establish a reasonable probability of a different result. The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish `materiality' in the constitutional sense. ( United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at pp. 109-110, 96 S.Ct. 2392.) Ultimately, defendant's contention that the timely disclosure of the Weil report would have resulted in his testifying is based on speculation and fails to establish materiality under Brady. (Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194; Wood v. Bartholomew, supra, 516 U.S. at p. 6, 116 S.Ct. 7.) The People raise the related point that considerations entirely independent of Jimenez's statements caused defendant not to testify, regardless of whether the prosecution had disclosed the Weil report. The People point out that if defendant testified, he could have been subject to impeachment by his own prior statements to the police, and his admissions to jailhouse informant Jorge Flores. In response, defendant attempts to discredit the possible influence of these other impeachment sources. Defendant claims his statements to the police were not preceded by any Miranda warning, were far from a confession, and might have been excluded in any case as being involuntary. It is true that the People have not shown conclusively that these other impeachment factors independently determined defendant's decision not to testify. But neither has defendant conclusively shown these factors could not have done so. The highly speculative nature of any analysis here further supports our conclusion that defendant has failed to establish materiality under Brady.
In the alternative, defendant asserts that regardless of whether the timely disclosure of the Weil report would have caused him to testify, its late disclosure was prejudicial because it violated his right to receive meaningful guidance from his counsel on whether or not to testify on his own behalf. Defendant relies on cases based on the deficient performance of counsel, such as Wiggins v. Smith (2003) 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471, which appear inapplicable to the facts of this case. Wiggins addressed whether counsel fulfilled his duty to `make reasonable investigations' into defendant's background so that counsel could make a reasonable decision as to what to offer in mitigation at the penalty phase. ( Id. at p. 522, 123 S.Ct. 2527.) Defendant does not argue that his trial counsel was deficient because he failed to uncover the Jimenez impeachment evidence. Thus, in contrast to Wiggins, there is no issue of trial counsel's not becoming aware of relevant evidence through counsel's failure to conduct a reasonable investigation. Defendant also contends he was in the same situation as Alvarado in regard to the untimely disclosure of the Weil report and consequently he suffered the same interference with his right to receive meaningful guidance from counsel on the issue of whether to testify. But defendant was not in the same situation as Alvarado in relation to the Weil report. As discussed above, Alvarado and defendant stood in different relationships to the Jimenez statements. If Alvarado testified, he faced impeachment with Jimenez's statements. Defendant, in contrast, could testify without being subject to impeachment. Defendant attempts to negate this fundamental difference by claiming that a joint defense strategy committed both codefendants to the same course of action in testifyingโthat is, either both would testify, or neither would. But, as discussed above, defendant has failed to establish a material connection between Jimenez's statements and defendant's decision to testify. Because there was no material connection, we find no interference with defendant's right to counsel based on the late disclosure of the Weil report.
Defendant contends his convictions and sentence should be set aside because the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he deliberately withheld Weil's report, which rendered the trial fundamentally unfair under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In addition, defendant contends the trial court erred in finding the prosecutor did not intentionally keep the Weil report secret until after the jury returned the guilty verdict. A prosecutor's conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process. Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the trial court or the jury. ( People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 18 P.3d 11.) As discussed above, because there was no material connection between the Weil report and defendant's decision whether or not to testify, we rejected his claims that the late disclosure of the Weil report violated his constitutional right to due process under Brady or his right to the effective assistance of counsel. This same lack of material connection likewise causes us to reject his claim that the late disclosure of the Weil report made his trial fundamental ly unfair. As to whether the prosecutor violated state law by using deceptive or reprehensible methods, we reject that claim based on the trial court's finding, not contradicted in the record, that the prosecutor's failure to disclose was unintentional. [36] In describing the circumstances surrounding the late disclosed Weil report, the prosecutor stated that, in September of 1993, after serving the subpoena on Jimenez, Weil told him the following: Jimenez did not want to be a witness; he was scared of what might happen to him or his family; and he might forget what he said or didn't really remember what was said. The prosecutor could not recall if he directed Weil to prepare a report in September of 1993, but he believed a report would be prepared. When the prosecutor was reviewing documents in preparation for the penalty phase, he became aware that no such report had been prepared. The prosecutor then directed Weil to prepare a report and had it delivered to defense counsel. The court made findings in connection with the codefendants' motions for a new trial. It concluded the prosecutor clearly had been negligent in failing to produce the information in the Weil report in a timely manner, but also found the prosecutor had not intentionally kept the Weil report secret until after the jury returned the verdicts. Defendant contends the court was unreasonable in concluding that the untimely disclosure was not intentional because there were several motions filed and hearings held regarding Jimenez's statements after the time in which the prosecutor became aware of the statements. Defendant claims the prosecutor could not have believed defense counsel was already aware of Jimenez's statements to Weil. Defendant contends it was inconceivable that defense counsel would not have mentioned a recantation by Jimenez because such a recantation would have rendered the Aranda/Bruton hearings on Jimenez's testimony unnecessary. [37] The record does not support defendant's claim. It appears the trial court's conclusion was consistent with the prosecutor's statement that when the prosecutor heard Weil's account of Weil's conversation with Jimenez in September of 1993, he understood Jimenez's comments to Weil to be an attempt to get out of testifying because he was unwilling or scared to testify. The prosecutor stated that it was not until after he read the version of the conversation in Weil's March 1994 report, that he was aware of Jimenez's comments that his prior statement to police might be misleading or contain falsehoods due to the drugs he was taking at that time. The prosecutor's understanding of Jimenez's comments to Weil as an attempt to get out of testifying, rather than as a recantation, is consistent with the prosecutor's apparent lack of surprise that Jimenez's comments to Weil were not mentioned during the Aranda/Bruton hearings addressing Jimenez's statements.