Opinion ID: 1842526
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Statements made during investigatory proceedings.

Text: As to statements made to a grand jury or to a district attorney in his official capacity, in relation to matters pending for investigation by the grand jury or the district attorney, the Wisconsin rule is that such statements are absolutely privileged. The rule was established in a case in which a plaintiff sued, alleging that his indictment for extortion and bribery resulted from false and defamatory statements made by the defendant to the grand jury and . . . also to Francis E. McGovern in his official capacity, then the district attorney of Milwaukee county, and that the information sought had relation to matters then pending for investigation by the grand jury and the district attorney.... [17] This court held that the ... plaintiff has no cause of action arising out of the transaction participated in by the defendant before the grand jury; nor has he a cause of action against defendant by reason of any statements defendant made to the district attorney or his assistants in their official capacities.... [18] In this early, but not overruled case, this court found absolute privilege was to be ... accorded to statements made by witnesses and counsel in the course of judicial proceedings for bringing offenders to justice, and the furnishing of preliminary information to officers charged with the duty of enforcing the law against offenders . . . . [19] In an earlier case, where a communication had been sent to the governor seeking removal of a county sheriff, this court held that, because of such power of removal, . . . the action contemplated or requested by the communication, namely, the removal of the plaintiff sheriff by the governor, so partakes of the nature of judicial proceedings that it should come within the same rule of absolute protection as governs all testimony, statements, or communications in or with reference to strictly judicial proceedings. . . . [20] This rationale was followed by this court as to a complaint to the state attorney general concerning a claimed violation of excise laws in their home town, with this court stating, . . . That the absolute privilege extends to statements both malicious as well as false is indicated in such cases as Schultz v. Strauss, 127 Wis. 325, 106 N. W. 1066; Kelley v. G.N.R. Co., 156 Wis. 181, 145 N. W. 664 [and other cases cited]. [21] The Schultz Case is wine of early vintage, but the passing years have not altered the soundness of its reasoning, and the correctness of its result. The wine may have mellowed, but it has not soured. As to statements made to a grand jury, in a John Doe investigation, or to a district attorney or his assistant in seeking issuance of a criminal complaint, we deal with the initial proceedings that are an integral part of the regular course of justice. [22] As to such proceedings, including in the case before us, the statements made by defendant about the plaintiff to the assistant district attorney in seeking issuance of a criminal complaint, we find an absolute privilege, agreeing with the court holding in Schultz that: . . . `the policy of the law here steps in and controls the individual rights of redress. The freedom of inquiry, the right of exposing malversation in public men and public institutions to the proper authority, the importance of punishing offenses, and the danger of silencing inquiry and of affording impunity to guilt, have all combined to shut the door against prosecutions for libels in cases of that or of analogous nature.' [23] By the Court. Order reversed, demurrer sustained, and cause remanded for purpose of dismissing the complaint.