Opinion ID: 1352210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Additional Evidence on the Issue of Fact Before the Referee.

Text: The trial court, with the assent of both parties, appointed a referee pursuant to sec. 270.34 (1) (a), Stats. [1] The referee's function was to hear and decide one of the main issues of fact in this case, namely, the value of the Kleinsticks' inventory at cost, as of August 1, 1969. The Kleinsticks provided the referee with all the business and financial data he desired, including their inventory sheets and tax records. Daleiden asserted that he had evidence which would show that the Kleinsticks had overstated the value of the inventory. However, he never produced any of that evidence for the referee, although he had ample opportunity to do so, and was requested to do so on several occasions. In fact, the referee specifically noted at the end of his carefully prepared report as follows: I have requested several times that Mr. Daleiden submit to me any evidence that the costing was incorrect on any of the merchandise that he purchased. As of the date of this report, I have not received one document from Mr. Daleiden. Nevertheless, at trial, counsel for Daleiden, during his cross-examination of Ray Kleinstick, attempted to introduce into evidence a 1968 price list which had been in Daleiden's possession since the sale. The apparent aim in introducing this evidence was to show that the price of the artificial flowers on the list was less than the cost assigned to the same flowers in the Kleinsticks' inventory. The trial court sustained an objection to the introduction of this evidence on the ground that it related to the issue of inventory value, and should have been presented to the referee at the time he was deciding that issue. In the offer of proof which followed, Ray Kleinstick stated that he himself had not used price lists in valuing the inventory, and counsel for Daleiden never specifically showed any disparity between this price list and the inventory cost. On another occasion, during the cross-examintion of Lauretta Kleinstick, counsel for Daleiden requested that she produce the individual sales slips for the store, so that it could be determined how much of the business was attributable to floor-covering sales. The Kleinsticks had not sold their floor-covering merchandise, so that Ray Kleinstick could continue in the floor-covering business. The aim in introducing this particular evidence was to gain a figure which might be helpful in arriving at the value of the nonfloor-covering inventory sold to Daleiden. The trial court sustained an objection to the introduction of this evidence on the ground that, if the figure was in fact useful in determining the inventory value, the referee should have been asked to determine it. In the offer of proof which followed, Roger Kleinstick, the plaintiffs' son and the bookkeeper for the business, testified that he had kept only one sales account, and that his monthly ledger sheets only broke down sales into taxable and nontaxable categories (not into floor-covering sales versus sales of other merchandise). The trial court correctly ruled in both instances that the evidence was inadmissible. Both the price lists and the sales slips bore upon the issue of inventory value, and this was the precise issue which the referee was to resolve. The purpose of appointing a referee in such matters is twofold: to save court time and to insure that a competent, trained accountant reports upon a matter peculiarly within his expertise. Both of these purposes would be ill-served by a de novo reconsideration of the same issue at trial. Sec. 270.35, Stats., [2] envisions a review by the trial court of the referee's report, and a decision whether to accept, reject, or modify this report; it does not provide for the reception of additional evidence on the very point which the referee was appointed to decide. The findings by the referee have the effect of findings of fact by a trial court, and are to be upheld unless they are contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. [3] From the earliest date this court has held that, in reviewing the report of a referee, the trial court is to decide upon the return, [4] which includes the referee's report, all of the evidence he has considered, and any exceptions taken to that report. Of course, a party may move that the trial court vacate the entire report, and then, if his motion is granted, have a new determination of the issue, with the opportunity to introduce evidence. [5] Also, when there is excusable delay in discovering and producing evidence on the issue, a party may move that the trial court recommit the matter to the referee for additional consideration. [6] Neither of these situations is presented by the instant case. Accordingly, the trial court committed no error in ruling as it did on these attempts to offer different evidence on the very issue the referee was supposed to decide.