Opinion ID: 2174874
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appeal of Anne Battista, Alfred Battista and Frances R. Fitch

Text: As heretofore related, these plaintiffs made no allegation that the car being operated by Muscatelli was registered to Fiore. Rather, it is their position that, although not registered to Fiore, the motor vehicle in question is conceded to have been owned by the latter whose liability is established by the provisions of § 31-33-6, assuming that Muscatelli was, in fact, operating the vehicle as Fiore's agent or servant at the time of the accident. This question of agency, plaintiffs argue, constitutes a genuine issue for trial. In advancing this contention, plaintiffs stress that the Superior Court justice, in reaching his decision, relied on paragraph 4 of Fiore's supporting affidavit. They acknowledge that they filed no counter-affidavit, but argue, in effect, that Rule 56(e) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure do not require the filing of a counter-affidavit where the moving party's supporting affidavit is legally deficient in that it does not set forth probative facts which, uncontradicted by a counter-affidavit, would entitle the moving party to summary judgment as a matter of law. We are in full accord with plaintiffs' understanding of Rule 56(e), (see Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 22 F.R.D.5) but our acceptance thereof is unavailing to them. Paragraph 4 of Fiore's supporting affidavit affirmatively asserts that Rivelli took possession and control of said motor vehicle pursuant to an agreement between Fiore Pontiac, Inc. and Peter Rivelli d/b/a Auto-Brite Company whereby Peter Rivelli d/b/a Auto-Brite Company would perform certain work upon said motor vehicle for an agreed charge and return said motor vehicle. (emphasis supplied) Taking cognizance of this factual assertion of an existing contract between Fiore and Rivelli, and noting that it stood uncontradicted, the Superior Court justice then referred to § 31-1-17(f). It provides: (f) Bailee. A bailee is one to whom possession of personal property has been entrusted by the bailor for a specific purpose resulting from either an express or implied contract, with the understanding that such personal property shall be returned to the bailor or any other person designated by the bailor when the terms and purposes of the contract have been accomplished. Applying the uncontradicted assertion of facts set forth in paragraph 4 of Fiore's supporting affidavit to the afore-stated legislative declaration, the Superior Court justice found that on the question of Fiore's consent in fact there was no genuine issue for trial. We agree. The plaintiffs argue, however, that paragraph 4, even if construed as a statement of fact admissible in evidence, is equivocal and open to the equally reasonable inference that, by its very terms, Fiore's assertion is that the contract of bailment terminated with the completion of the services to be performed on Fiore's car and that a jury would be warranted in finding that the return of the car was a favor to Fiore. We cannot agree that the assertion in question is equivocal. The plaintiffs' contention in this regard, in our opinion, is an exercise in semantics. That the return of the car to Fiore was not impliedly agreed to by Rivelli in consideration of the charge made for services rendered by the latter, is an inference that strains the reasoning processes. Hence, the rule stated in Marandola v. Hillcrest Builders, Inc., 102 R.I. 46, 227 A.2d 785, that, in determining whether there is a genuine issue of a material fact, the trial justice should consider affidavits and pleadings in the light most favorable to the party opposing a motion for summary judgment is, in the view we take of defendant's uncontradicted assertion of fact, of no assistance to plaintiffs. The posture of the instant appeals is readily distinguishable from that in Gallo v. American Egg Co., 76 R.I. 450, 72 A.2d 166. There, defendant's trucks were regularly serviced by another in the latter's garage during the night, and, the following morning, returned by the garage operator's servant to defendant's place of business. The plaintiff in Gallo had been injured by one of defendant's trucks when it was being returned to the latter by the garage man's servant. At the close of plaintiff's case, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that the facts established that, at the time of the accident, defendant's truck was the subject of a commercial bailment. The trial justice in Gallo denied the motion and this court sustained. However, in Gallo, there was some evidence that the return of the truck by the garage man's servant was in the nature of a favor to defendant, and not part of the bailment. This court held that in accordance with the well settled rule on motions for a directed verdict, there being some evidence on the issue of bailment at the time of the accident, the trial justice properly submitted that issue to the jury. Similarly distinguishable is Goulet v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of R.I., 83 R.I. 310. 116 A.2d 178, also relied on by plaintiffs. Neither is there merit to plaintiffs further contention that paragraph 4 of Fiore's supporting affidavit is fatally deficient in that it merely refers to a contract between Fiore and the bailee Rivelli and fails to spell out the contract on which Fiore relies. Rule 56 (e) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure does not require that an affidavit assert in detail all the facts on which the affidavit is predicated. It is sufficient if the assertion substantially states a fact or facts which, if believed, would entitle the affiant to judgment, such facts not being contradicted. Slefkin v. Tarkomian, supra, and see also Cottrell Employees Credit Union v. Pavelski, supra, where the rule as thus stated was made applicable to a counter-affidavit, but, whether an affidavit in question is made in support of or in opposition to a summary judgment motion, the rule as to sufficiency is the same. As to all plaintiffs in both civil actions, therefore, we find no merit in their contentions that they were prejudicially denied the right to litigate the question of whether Muscatelli, at the time of the accident, was operating Fiore's motor vehicle with the latter's consent in fact as contemplated by § 31-33-6. Finally, common to all plaintiffs in both civil actions is the contention that the granting of Fiore's motions for summary judgment constituted an abuse of the Superior Court justice's discretion in that, when the motions were heard on September 20, 1968, defendants Rivelli and/or Muscatelli had not filed their respective answers to the complaints filed in the civil actions brought against Rivelli and Muscatelli by Lisa and Paul Fitch, and by Anne Battista et al. against Muscatelli. On this state of the record, plaintiffs argue the Superior Court justice's granting of Fiore's motions for summary judgment was prejudicially premature in that plaintiffs were foreclosed from resorting to discovery procedures in the unanswered cases, which procedures were essential, they insist, to their eliciting factual data on which counter-affidavits could be based. We find no merit in such contention as to any of the plaintiffs. Rules 26 and 33 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to depositions and interrogations respectively, authorize a plaintiff to institute discovery proceedings after the passing of twenty days from the time service is made on a defendant without regard to whether the latter has answered. Here, in the case of Lisa and Paul Fitch versus Rivelli and Muscatelli, service was made on June 6, 1968, and in the case of Anne Battista et al. versus Muscatelli service was obtained on June 11, 1968. For almost three months then, there was no impediment in both civil actions against Fiore to plaintiffs' initiating discovery proceedings against Rivelli and Muscatelli within whose control plaintiffs argue, was information essential to plaintiffs' filing probative affidavits in opposition to Fiore's supporting affidavits. Indeed, as heretofore noted, plaintiffs Lisa and Paul Fitch, in paragraph 9 of their complaint allege, and Rivelli and Muscatelli, in their answer admit, that, at the time and place of the accident, Muscatelli was returning the motor vehicle to Fiore on behalf of Rivelli. In light of this, one wonders how discovery procedures would have been helpful to these plaintiffs. In the case of Anne Battista et al. against Fiore and Muscatelli, the latter admits plaintiffs' allegation that, at the time and place of the accident, the motor vehicle was owned by Fiore and being operated by Muscatelli, but neither admits nor denies that at said time he was Fiore's agent and servant. Since Muscatelli was admittedly an employee of Rivelli, it is difficult to see how Muscatelli could shed much light on the contract existing between his employer and Fiore. Be that as it may, all plaintiffs fail to take recourse to Rule 56(f), made and provided for parties confronted with the circumstances of which plaintiffs complain. It provides: (f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. Here, counsel for Lisa and Paul Fitch filed an affidavit of sorts, but in so doing did not invoke the discretion of the court as provided for in Rule 56(f), and plaintiffs Anne Battista et al. filed no affidavit whatsoever. See Mill Factors Corp. v. L.S. Building Supplies, Inc., 103 R.I. 675, 240 A.2d 720. In these circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the Superior Court justice cannot be faulted on the ground that the motions for summary judgment were prematurely granted. The plaintiffs' appeal in each case is denied and dismissed, and the judgments appealed from are affirmed. ROBERTS, C.J., did not participate.