Opinion ID: 1947969
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Tolling of the Statute of Limitations

Text: Because section 752-C does not apply to McAfee's claims, they were barred by the previous statute of limitations, unless a statutory tolling provision applies. McAfee argues on appeal that factual issues surrounding the applicability of two tolling provisions, 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 853 (mental illness) and 859 (fraudulent concealment), precluded the dismissal of his complaint. McAfee further argues that he should have been granted leave to amend his complaint to include allegations of mental illness and fraud. The defendants argue that McAfee did not raise these issues before the Superior Court and therefore waived them on appeal. We agree with the defendants that McAfee did not preserve the issue of mental illness. In his complaint, McAfee alleges that he denied and repressed all memories of the sexual acts until he watched a television report concerning criminal charges against Cole, and claims to have experienced trauma and severe stress. McAfee's complaint is insufficient to alert the court and opposing parties that mental illness might be an issue. Chasse v. Mazerolle, 580 A.2d 155, 156 (Me. 1990). Mental illness under the tolling statute refers to an overall inability to function in society that prevents plaintiffs from protecting their legal rights. See Smith v. Smith, 830 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir.1987); Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 736 F.Supp. 1512, 1514 (S.D.Ind.1990); Hickey v. Askren, 198 Ga. App. 718, 403 S.E.2d 225, 229 (1991); Yannon v. RCA Corp., 131 A.D.2d 843, 517 N.Y.S.2d 205, 206 (1987). McAfee does not allege such an overall incapacity. With respect to the tolling provisions of 14 M.R.S.A. § 859 (Supp.1993), the record is devoid of any mention of fraudulent concealment. Although McAfee asserts that he would have raised this issue had he been granted leave to amend his complaint, he did not seek leave from the Superior Court to do so, even after the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. Instead, McAfee opted to appeal the order of dismissal and now takes the position that the court abused its discretion by denying him such an opportunity. McAfee's position is without merit. He correctly points out that, pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 15(a), leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires. See Barkley v. Good Will Home Ass'n, 495 A.2d 1238, 1240 (Me.1985) (absent evidence of bad faith or dilatory motives on the part of the plaintiff or undue prejudice to the defendant, the trial court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint after it was dismissed pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)). In the instant case, however, McAfee did not file a motion requesting this relief, nor did he inform the court of his basis for desiring to amend the complaint. We have repeatedly held that [n]o principle is better settled than that a party who raises an issue for the first time on appeal will be deemed to have waived the issue, even if the issue is one of constitutional law. Cyr v. Cyr, 432 A.2d 793, 797 (Me.1981). [T]he primary reason for that rule is to ensure that the trial court has an opportunity to determine the propriety of the relief requested. Id. at 797-98. Another reason for the rule is to ensure that the trial court has full opportunity to dispose finally of the action. Laurel Bank and Trust Co. v. Burns, 398 A.2d 41, 44 (Me.1979). If McAfee wanted to amend his complaint, it was incumbent on him to file a motion with the Superior Court. By failing to take such action, he has not preserved this issue on appeal. See Johnson v. Bollinger, 86 N.C.App. 1, 356 S.E.2d 378, 382 (1987) (when plaintiff failed to take any action to amend his complaint either before or after its dismissal, he cannot complain on appeal that he lacked adequate opportunity to amend his complaint). The entry is Judgment affirmed. WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD and COLLINS, JJ., concurring.