Opinion ID: 2082776
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Determination of incapacity

Text: [¶ 19] PNG next challenges the Hearing Officer's award of total incapacity benefits. [8] An employee can prove entitlement to total incapacity benefits by showing: (1) the unavailability of work within the employee's local labor market; and (2) the physical inability to perform full-time work in the statewide labor market, regardless of availability. See Lamphier v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 2000 ME 121, ¶ 1, 755 A.2d 489, 490; Adams v. Mt. Blue Health Ctr., 1999 ME 105, ¶ 18, 735 A.2d 478, 483-84. [¶ 20] The Hearing Officer stated: Even assuming that Mr. Alexander could find work in a competitive labor market within his limitations for ten dollars an hour for forty hours a week, he would continue to be entitled to total compensation. We agree with PNG that this statement is erroneous on its face. The physical ability to perform full-time work in the competitive labor market precludes an award of total compensation pursuant to the total incapacity statute. Lamphier, 2000 ME 121, at ¶ 1, 755 A.2d at 490; Adams, 1999 ME 105, at ¶ 18, 735 A.2d at 483-84. [¶ 21] Alexander contends that the Hearing Officer's use of the phrase total compensation was not intended to refer to total incapacity benefits pursuant to section 212, but to the maximum level of partial benefits permissible under the Act. See 39-A M.R.S.A. §§ 211, 213 (2001). Workers' compensation benefits are capped at a maximum dollar amount as provided in 39-A M.R.S.A. § 211 (2001). Alexander contends that, because his average weekly wage was calculated at over $2,000 a week, he would be limited to the maximum level of benefits even if he returned to work earning $10 an hour for a forty-hour work week. See 39-A M.R.S.A. § 213(1) (2001) (Partial benefits are calculated as 80% the difference between the employee's after-tax average weekly wage and post-injury wages). [¶ 22] Nevertheless, because partial incapacity benefits are potentially subject to a maximum week-limitation, see 39-A M.R.S.A. § 213, and total incapacity benefits have no such limitation, see 39-A M.R.S.A. § 212, the applicable statute can have important long-term consequences to the employer and employee. PNG is, therefore, entitled to a determination as to whether Alexander is physically able to perform full-time work in the statewide labor market in order to determine whether Alexander is entitled to benefits pursuant to section 212 or section 213. Moreover, because the Hearing Officer's determination of incapacity was based on the employee's average weekly wage, and because the Hearing Officer may have erred in its determination of that wage, we must remand to the Board for a new calculation of Alexander's entitlement to incapacity benefits. [¶ 23] Finally, PNG contends that the Hearing Officer erred, as a matter of law, in suggesting that accommodations made by the Delta Gulf, during Alexander's post-injury employment, automatically prevents the employment from being regarded as reflecting his post-injury earning capacity. We disagree with PNG's contentions that the Hearing Officer's findings reflect an automatic assumption that, just because the employer accommodated the injury, the employment must be discounted out of hand. As we have stated, the fact that the employee is earning the same or more after the injury than before does not preclude a finding of an earning incapacity. Severy v. S.D. Warren Co., 402 A.2d 53, 55 (Me.1979). In light of the substantial job-modifications made by the employer to accommodate Alexander's work-injuries, the Hearing Officer's finding that Alexander's short-term employment with Delta Gulf did not reflect the employee's post-injury earning capacity was not clearly erroneous.