Opinion ID: 715844
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence on Credit Union Robbery

Text: 34 Mr. Spring was charged in count three of the indictment with robbing the University of Utah Credit Union. The facts relating to this robbery are as follows: On March 1, 1993, a man approached teller Tristin Christensen's window, asked if the window was open, and handed her a note which said, this is a robbery, no dye packs. R. Vol. XV at 48-51. As she was gathering up money, the robber said that's it, that's it to Ms. Christensen. Id. at 52. Ms. Christensen gave him $1144, and the robber left. Ms. Christensen worked with a police sketch artist to create a drawing of the robber. She testified at trial that the hair in the drawing was redder than the actual robber's hair. Id. at 55. The record on appeal contains both the sketch artist's drawing and a photograph of Mr. Spring, R. Supp. Vols. V, VI, and they are similar. The jury was permitted to see both items. 35 Ms. Christensen also participated in two line-ups, one occurring one month after the robbery and one occurring six months after the robbery. At the first line-up, she was unable to make a positive identification, although she was able to identify a person in the line-up who looked similar to that man that robbed us. R. Vol. XV at 56. Mr. Spring was not in that line-up. At the second line-up, in which Mr. Spring did participate, the participants were asked to say are you open and that's it. Ms. Christensen again was not able to make a positive identification, but she did identify a person in the line-up as having a similar appearance and also similar sounding voice as the person who robbed us. Id. at 58. That person was not Mr. Spring. At trial, Ms. Christensen identified Mr. Spring as looking similar to the two individuals she had identified in the line-ups. 36 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms agent Duane Jackson participated in the second line-up. He testified that during the line-up, the participants were asked to file in and out of the line-up room several times, and, during one of the line-ups, to say three times are you open and that's it. Id. at 71. He further testified that, when the participants returned to the waiting room following that particular line-up sequence, several of them directed questions at Mr. Spring asking why are they making us say this stuff. Id. at 72. Agent Jackson stated that he observed Mr. Spring to respond to that question, we didn't say anything like that, I don't know what they are talking about. Id. When Mr. Spring testified at his trial, he was asked whether he had made those statements, to which he responded That, or something to that effect. R. Vol. XIX at 925. The government attorney then asked, When you used the word we, you were referring to yourself and Mr. Monitz; is that right? Id. Mr. Spring responded, [r]eferring to the felony complaint, yes, sir. Id. 37 The government presented testimony from a Salt Lake County Sheriff crime technician, who testified that a latent fingerprint from the demand note matched Mr. Spring's fingerprint. R. Vol. XVI at 230-35. The technician testified that there were other latent fingerprints on the note, but that they matched neither Mr. Spring nor any other known individual. The government also presented testimony from an FBI fingerprint specialist, who testified that he found three latent fingerprints on the demand note which matched Mr. Spring's fingerprints. R. Vol. XV at 151-52. The defense presented testimony from a handwriting expert, who expressed the opinion that Mr. Spring did not write the demand note. R. Vol. XVIII at 707, 724-25. 38 Mr. Spring argues there was insufficient evidence supporting his conviction for the Credit Union robbery. We review the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the government to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 864 (10th Cir.1995). We have stated that the jury may draw reasonable inferences from direct or circumstantial evidence, but the inferences must be more than speculation and conjecture to be reasonable. Id. at 865. Defendants challenging a conviction on sufficiency of the evidence grounds face a difficult standard of review, United States v. Hoenscheidt, 7 F.3d 1528, 1530 (10th Cir.1993), as we reverse only if no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1462-63 (10th Cir.1995). 39 Mr. Spring argues that, except for the fingerprint evidence, there is no other evidence proving he committed the Credit Union robbery. We have stated, as have some other courts, that standing by itself, [fingerprint evidence] would be insufficient to support a conviction. United States v. Milano, 443 F.2d 1022, 1025 (10th Cir.) (fingerprints found on brown paper bag), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943, 92 S.Ct. 294, 30 L.Ed.2d 258 (1971); see also Mikes v. Borg, 947 F.2d 353, 356-57 (9th Cir.1991) ([I]n fingerprint-only cases in which the prosecution's theory is based on the premise that the defendant handled certain objects while committing the crime in question, the record must contain sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably infer that the fingerprints were in fact impressed at that time and not at some earlier date.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1229, 112 S.Ct. 3055, 120 L.Ed.2d 921 (1992); United States v. Corso, 439 F.2d 956, 957 (4th Cir.1971) (The probative value of an accused's fingerprints upon a readily movable object is highly questionable, unless it can be shown that such prints could have been impressed only during the commission of the crime.); United States v. Collon, 426 F.2d 939, 942 (6th Cir.1970). The government does not seriously dispute that the fingerprint evidence, standing alone, would be insufficient to support Mr. Spring's conviction. Rather, it relies upon the fingerprint evidence, in conjunction with Agent Jackson's testimony about Mr. Spring's comment during the line-up, and the similarity between the photograph of Mr. Spring and the sketch artist's drawing of the suspect, along with Ms. Christensen's testimony that the hair in the drawing was redder than the suspect's hair, as additional evidence supporting the conviction. 40 We hold that there was sufficient evidence to support Mr. Spring's conviction for the Credit Union robbery. The standard is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones, 44 F.3d at 864. Here, while the teller, Ms. Christensen, was unable to positively identify Mr. Spring, soon after the robbery she helped prepare a sketch of the robber which bears a marked resemblance to Mr. Spring. Additionally, the jury could infer from Mr. Spring's comment at the line-up that he was acknowledging that he was present at the robbery, but disputes having said the words which he was asked to say during the line-up. This evidence, along with the fingerprint evidence, is sufficient to support the jury's verdict. We therefore hold that Mr. Spring has failed to meet the difficult burden of proving that the evidence was insufficient. 41 Mr. Spring also argues that the court erred in not allowing the defense to present statements made by Wayne Becker to an F.B.I. agent. Mr. Becker was told by F.B.I. agent Jeffrey Kearl that there was evidence connecting him to the Credit Union robbery. He was further told that the handwriting of the demand note used in the robbery matched the writing on a demand note that Becker used in a previous San Francisco bank robbery. Becker was also told that the prime suspect of the University of Utah Credit Union robbery was Bruce Derek Spring. R. Vol. XVIII at 629. 8 Mr. Becker then told Agent Kearl that he (Becker) was involved in the Credit Union robbery, but he would not say what his role was. He said that Mr. Spring did not commit the robbery, and that he (Becker) would take responsibility for the robbery if they needed a fall guy. Id. 9 42 Mr. Spring sought to have Mr. Becker's hearsay statements admitted under Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) as a statement against interest. The district court denied its admission, concluding that there is no evidence that would establish sufficient indicia of trustworthiness, reliability, that would indicate the statement being of sufficient value to be allowed. Id. at 633. Evidentiary rulings are committed to the sound discretion of the district court. We therefore review them only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Elkins, 70 F.3d 81, 82 (10th Cir.1995); United States v. Porter, 881 F.2d 878, 882 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944, 110 S.Ct. 348, 107 L.Ed.2d 336 (1989). 43 A defendant seeking to admit hearsay evidence under Rule 804(b)(3) to exculpate himself must show (1) an unavailable declarant; (2) a statement against penal interest; and (3) sufficient corroboration to indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Porter, 881 F.2d at 882. Rule 804(b)(3) itself states that corroborating circumstances [must] clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Fed.R.Evid. R. 804(b)(3) (emphasis added). The government concedes Mr. Becker's unavailability and that the statement would be against penal interest. It argues that the district court correctly held that there was insufficient corroboration of the trustworthiness of Mr. Becker's statement. The determination of the sufficiency of such corroborating evidence 'lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, which is aptly situated to weigh the reliability of the circumstances surrounding the declaration.'  Porter, 881 F.2d at 883 (quoting United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 754 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839, 98 S.Ct. 132, 54 L.Ed.2d 102 (1977)). Mr. Spring argues [f]our major corroborating circumstances support Becker's statements. Appellant's Br. at 33. They are: (1) the F.B.I. believed that the writing on the demand note used in the Credit Union robbery matched Mr. Becker's handwriting; (2) Agent Kearl informed Mr. Becker that there was evidence connecting him to that robbery; (3) Agent Kearl advised Mr. Becker of his Miranda rights prior to interviewing him; and (4) no witness could identify Mr. Spring as the Credit Union robber. 44 Against this allegedly corroborating evidence is the fact that Mr. Becker was very vague about his involvement in the robbery. Indeed, he provided no information one would expect from someone who was involved in the robbery. Similarly, his bald assertion that Mr. Spring did not commit the robbery is otherwise unsubstantiated. While, as Mr. Spring asserts, no eyewitness identified Mr. Spring as the robber, there was evidence connecting him to the crime, which we have held is sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict. Mr. Becker offered absolutely no specific information exculpating Mr. Spring and inculpating himself. 45 We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of Mr. Becker's statements.