Opinion ID: 182845
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Law on Removal from a Volunteer Position

Text: Retaliation, though it is not expressly referred to in the Constitution, is nonetheless actionable because retaliatory actions may tend to chill individuals' exercise of constitutional rights. Powell v. Alexander, 391 F.3d 1, 16-17 (1st Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a general matter, the government may not deprive an individual of a valuable government benefit[] in retaliation for his or her exercise of First Amendment rights. [10] Lynch, 180 F.3d at 13-14. In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), the Supreme Court explained: For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a person has no `right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interestsespecially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. Clancy does not dispute this general principle, but instead contends that a volunteer position, such as that of Parks Commissioner, is not a valuable governmental benefit, the deprivation of which would trigger First Amendment scrutiny. Clancy relies heavily on Lynch, in which we held that, as of August 1994, it was not clearly established that it was unlawful for a government official to remove an individual from a volunteer position in retaliation for protected speech. 180 F.3d at 13. The plaintiff claimed that she was terminated from service as a volunteer on the mayor's Hunger Commission in retaliation for her exercise of First Amendment rights. Id. at 6, 13. We first assume[d], without deciding, that the opportunity to serve as a volunteer could constitute the type of valuable governmental benefit or privilege the deprivation of which can trigger First Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 13 (citing Perry, 408 U.S. at 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694). We then reasoned that even if removal from a volunteer position in retaliation for protected activity violated the First Amendment, it was not a violation of clearly established law: It was not clearly established as of August, 1994, when [the supervisor] removed [the plaintiff] from the Hunger Commission, that a government official could not take such action in retaliation for protected speech. We recognize that the Supreme Court has held that a variety of public benefits, in addition to public employment, cannot be denied solely because of the recipient's exercise of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990) (promotion or transfer in government job); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (welfare benefits). [The plaintiff] argues that loss of a volunteer position with a government agency falls into this category. However, neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ever held that the rule forbidding denial of valuable governmental benefits in reprisal for protected speech announced in Perry v. Sindermann and its progeny extends to the denial of non-compensated positions on voluntary boards. Scant authority in support of such an extension of the doctrine currently exists. Id. at 13-14. We acknowledged that in Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir.1992) ( Hyland I ), the Ninth Circuit held that volunteer status is a valuable governmental privilege that cannot be denied on the basis of protected speech. Lynch, 180 F.3d at 14. However, we concluded that a single decision from another circuit applying its own precedents was insufficient to make it apparent to a reasonable public official that a particular act was unlawful. Id. Between August 1994, when the alleged retaliatory action occurred in Lynch, and April 2006, when the alleged retaliatory action occurred in this case, neither the First Circuit nor the Supreme Court addressed whether removal from a volunteer position in retaliation for protected speech can violate the First Amendment. [11] Relying on decisions from other jurisdictions, Barton argues that the legal landscape has changed since Lynch and that the right he asserts was clearly established at the time of his non-reappointment. We review the relevant out-of-circuit decisions, beginning with the earliest. Prior to Lynch, a Second Circuit decision, Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department, 607 F.2d 17, 25-26 (2d Cir.1979), found that the dismissal of a volunteer firefighter for certain work-related complaints could violate the First Amendment. [12] In that case, however, it was unnecessary for the court to engage in an analysis of the plaintiff's status because Connecticut law specifically provided that volunteer firemen `shall be construed to be employees of the municipality' for purposes of workmen's compensation. Id. at 21 ( quoting Conn. Gen.Stat. § 7-314a). Therefore, after concluding that the termination of the firefighter was state action for purposes of a § 1983 claim, the court simply treated the firefighter as a public employee for purposes of the First Amendment claim. Id. at 25. [13] More than a decade later in Hyland I, the Ninth Circuit held that the loss of a high-level volunteer position with the city Juvenile Probation Department could trigger First Amendment scrutiny. 972 F.2d at 1136. As noted, we concluded in Lynch that Hyland I, a single circuit decision applying its own precedents, did not suffice to clearly establish the right at issue. In addition, both that case and its sequel, Hyland v. Wonder, 117 F.3d 405 (9th Cir. 1997) ( Hyland II ), [14] relied in part on Janusaitis. Neither Hyland decision considered the fact that in Janusaitis, unlike in Hyland, state law required that the volunteer position at issue be treated as equivalent to public employment for certain purposes. Between the two Hyland decisions, in Versarge v. Township of Clinton, 984 F.2d 1359 (3d Cir.1993), the Third Circuit assume[d], without deciding, that `the opportunity to serve as a volunteer [firefighter] constitutes the type of governmental benefit or privilege the deprivation of which can trigger First Amendment scrutiny.' Id. at 1364 (quoting Hyland, 972 F.2d at 1135). Several years later, in Andersen v. McCotter, 100 F.3d 723, 727 (10th Cir. 1996), the Tenth Circuit held that an intern terminated from her position at a community corrections facility was entitled to First Amendment protection. While the court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff was an employee, it also stated that her claim would not be defeated even if she were considered to be a volunteer. Id. Because it found the plaintiff to be an employee, the court declined to decide whether it was clearly established, as of March 1994, that volunteers were entitled to First Amendment protection. Id. at 729. [15] Instead, the court relied on the unremarkable proposition that it had been clearly established since 1968 that public employees were entitled to such protection. Id. Most recently, in Mosely v. Board of Education of Chicago, 434 F.3d 527 (7th Cir.2006), the Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiff stated a First Amendment claim when she alleged that she had been denied the opportunity to meaningfully participate in her role as a school committee volunteer in retaliation for her protected activity. That case, however, relied in part on another Seventh Circuit case which, like Janusaitis, concluded that a volunteer firefighter could be protected by the First Amendment based in part on a state statute that treated volunteer firefighters as employees under the law. Mosely, 434 F.3d at 535 ( citing Brown v. Disciplinary Comm. of Edgerton Volunteer Fire Dep't, 97 F.3d 969, 973-74 (7th Cir.1996)). [16] In sum, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have found that volunteer positions are entitled to constitutional protection; however, these cases have relied in part, either directly or indirectly, on state statutes which mandate that such volunteers be treated as employees. The Tenth Circuit, albeit in dicta, has concluded that volunteers enjoy First Amendment protection without reliance on any such state statute. The Third Circuit, like this circuit, has assumed without deciding that a public volunteer position is a valuable government benefit, the deprivation of which can trigger First Amendment scrutiny. At the same time, no court has held that volunteers are not protected by the First Amendment.