Opinion ID: 1434906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Allegedly Prejudicial Remarks Made by the Prosecution

Text: The remarks complained of [3] indicate that the prosecutor expressed his personal beliefs to the jury with respect to the guilt of the appellants-defendants. Appellants maintain that such intimation by the prosecutor was prejudicial error especially since the evidence was conflicting. [4] While this Court does not deem these remarks made by the prosecutor inherently prejudicial, nonetheless when they are considered in conjunction with the many other prejudicial comments made by the prosecutor and the numerous errors occurring throughout the course of trial, they are factors which have been considered in arriving at the Court's determination to reverse and grant the appellants a new trial. See State v. Rodriguez, 93 Idaho 286, 460 P.2d 711 (1969). Appellants maintain that the purity of the jury's verdict was affected by statements and testimony elicited by the prosecuting attorney while examining Brant and Walker. Specifically objected to are some 44 references to the fact that the two were former prostitutes. It is the appellants' position that this information was completely irrelevant to the issue presented for the jury's consideration and thus served only to prejudice it and unfairly and unlawfully influence it. Where defendants are on trial for the felony of robbery, undue emphasis placed on the past occupations of two of the defendants may have adversely influenced the jury. Representative of the remarks which the Court deems objectionable are the following which have been excerpted from the cross examination of the defendant Brant. Q. Okay, Now here's an ex-prostitute with a man who's sick and drunk, and if she knows he carries lots of money  just what did you do, Miss Ashpole? A. Mr. French, I'm a prostitute, but I'm not a thief. Q. Now in your professional opinion as a former prostitute would you consider this man an easy mark or not? A. No, I wouldn't. Q. Do you know that Mr. Martin's on the School Board of District Ninety-one? A. I don't know Mr. Martin. I don't know him. I met him last night. Q. Would he have any reason to put his hands on a common prostitute? A. He didn't know me. MR. BENJAMIN: Objection. A. He didn't know me. He didn't know me from Adam, because I didn't know him either. Q. (By Mr. French) What I'm asking  the question I asked you is, would Mr. Martin, a member of the School Board, have occasion or ever want to put his hands on a common  MR. BENJAMIN: Your Honor, I'll have to object to this . The Court does not think that this alone nor any one of the other numerous points standing alone raised by the appellants in this case is sufficient to require reversal. However the cumulative effect of all of these errors requires the granting of a new trial. State v. Rodriguez, supra . This is especially so where the prosecution's case is based principally on circumstantial evidence. The only direct evidence in the case was the testimony of the complaining witness Mason. A reading of the record in the instant case does not indicate isolated prejudicial comments made unwittingly by the prosecution but rather repeated conduct which, in this Court's opinion, requires not only rebuke, but reversal.