Opinion ID: 758098
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Effect of an Unlawful Secondary Purpose

Text: 34 This Court held that an unlawful secondary purpose invalidates an otherwise permissible administrative search scheme in $124,570. See $124,570, 873 F.2d at 1247. $124,570 addressed the validity of administrative searches for weapons in the carry-on bags of airline passengers. See id. at 1240. The $124,570 court acknowledged that an administrative search for weapons and explosives is valid. See id. at 1246. The court, however, found that where the scope of the search was no longer for purely administrative purposes, but included criminal investigatory purposes, it could no longer be justified as an administrative search. See id. at 1246 n. 5. 35 In $124,570, the Flight Terminal Security officers (FTS officers) executing the searches had a dual purpose when conducting the search. In $124,570, the United States Customs Service and Port Police had a policy of giving FTS officers a $250 reward for reporting a passenger carrying over $10,000 in currency. See id. at 1241. 36 With this policy in place, a dark mass was revealed when the defendant's briefcase passed through an airline's x-ray scanner. See id. The FTS officer asked the defendant to open the briefcase, revealing a large sum of money. See id. The FTS officer returned the briefcase to the defendant and allowed him to proceed on his scheduled flight from Seattle to Los Angeles. See id. The FTS officer notified the appropriate authorities and the defendant was subsequently arrested in conjunction with this currency. See id. at 1241-42. 37 Holding that this search was invalid, the $124,570 court noted that the FTS officers had very broad latitude in determining whether or not to search a package. See id. at 1245. The court reasoned that if the sole purpose of the search was to find weapons or explosives, the court could defer to the guard's judgment regarding when to search a bag. See id. The addition of the dual motive created a different set of facts because the decision to open a particular briefcase may be motivated by the desire to comply with the FTS's cooperation policy. See id. Therefore, the FTS officers might choose to search bags more often or to do more extensive searches because of the dual motive. See id. at 1246. Because the dual motive extended the scope of the administrative search beyond the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment, the court held that the search was invalid. See id. at 1247. 38 The Government argues that $124,570 stands for the proposition that a search conducted with both a proper and an improper motive is invalid if the improper motive expands the scope of an administrative search. Therefore, the Government argues, $124,570 does not apply here, because Schaller was properly searching for weapons as well as drugs and did not search in any compartments that could not have contained explosives. Further, the Government distinguishes $124,570 on the ground that the $250 reward provided an almost irresistible incentive for the FTS officers to improperly expand the scope of their searches. 39 We find that the concerns expressed by the $124,570 court are equally applicable to the administrative search at issue here. As in $124,570, the scope of a search for weapons and explosives could be co-extensive with a search for drugs. In both situations, however, the officers carrying out the search have broad discretion in deciding what items to search for and how carefully to search for those items. In $124,570, the court noted that: 40 [i]f the officers have only one objective--detecting firearms and explosives--we can safely defer to their judgment, as they would have no reason to open packages unless they contained something potentially dangerous. It is much different where the agents have a dual objective; the decision to open a particular briefcase may be motivated by the desire to comply with the FTS's cooperation policy. 41 Id. at 1245. Therefore, where officers have broad discretion as to the parameters of the search, the addition of an impermissible motive extends the scope of the search, regardless of whether the items searched could have been subject to a valid administrative search. 42 Here, the testimony shows that the officers had broad discretion in deciding which bags to search and which containers to open. Further, it is undisputed that the officers conducting the search were instructed to search not only for weapons and explosives, but also for narcotics. The lack of a monetary reward does not eliminate the concerns expressed in $124,570. Therefore, just as in $124,570, the scope of the search is extended because the Security Officers had an impermissible motive and broad discretion regarding the extent of the search. 43 The Government argues that, under the district court's interpretation, $124,570 is incompatible with Ninth Circuit cases that hold that an improper secondary purpose does not invalidate an otherwise proper administrative search. 2 In support of this argument, the Government relies primarily on three cases in which dual purpose administrative searches were upheld by the Ninth Circuit: United States v. Soto-Camacho, 58 F.3d 408 (9th Cir.1995); Bowhay, 992 F.2d at 229; and United States v. Watson, 678 F.2d 765 (9th Cir.1982). 44 Bowhay involved an inventory search that comported with the constitutional limitations on inventory searches established by the Supreme Court in Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). The limitations that the Constitution imposes on inventory searches distinguish the search conducted in Bowhay from the search conducted here. The Supreme Court has approved warrantless inventory searches in part because no significant discretion is placed in the hands of the individual officer: he usually has no choice as to the subject of the search or its scope. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 384, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). In Wells, the Supreme Court clarified that an officer may have some discretion when conducting an inventory search so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity. Wells, 495 U.S. at 3-4, 110 S.Ct. 1632 (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987)). The Wells Court outlined the limits of the discretion that may be allowed, stating: 45 A police officer may be allowed sufficient latitude to determine whether a particular container should or should not be opened in light of the nature of the search and characteristics of the container itself. Thus, while policies of opening all containers or of opening no containers are unquestionably permissible, it would be equally permissible, for example, to allow the opening of closed containers whose contents officers determine they are unable to ascertain from examining the containers' exteriors.... 46 Id. at 4, 110 S.Ct. 1632. 47 Applying this standard, the Wells Court struck down the inventory search at issue because there was no policy whatever with respect to the opening of closed containers encountered during an inventory search. Id. at 4-5, 110 S.Ct. 1632. The Court held that absent such a policy, the search did not satisfy the Fourth Amendment and evidence obtained in the search should be suppressed. See id. 48 In Bowhay, the court considered whether a search that met the Wells standards was invalidated because the officer conducting the search had a dual motive. The Bowhay court first noted that the discretion given the officer was similar to that approved by the Wells Court because the police department had a general policy of searching all items for inventory purposes. See Bowhay, 992 F.2d at 231. Because the department policy required the officer to search all of the items in question, the incriminating items would have been found regardless of the officer's dual motive. The Bowhay court therefore held 49 In this case, the department's policy was to search everything; the officer had no discretion. Because of this, the presence of an investigative motive does not invalidate the inventory search. Since we uphold this search as a valid inventory search, we do not consider the other proffered justifications for the search. 50 Id. 51 In contrast, in the administrative search of Bulacan's pack, the Security Officers were given no objective criteria upon which they were to base their decisions regarding whether to search a container. Instead, the determination as to whether to search a particular container was entirely within a Security Officer's judgment. Therefore, the underlying search gave the Security Officers a degree of discretion that was prohibited by the Wells Court. Had the officer in Bowhay had this degree of discretion, it appears that, under Wells, the entire search would have been invalid. Further, in contrast to Bowhay, because the Security Officers had complete discretion regarding which container to search, their conduct could vary depending upon their subjective motivation. Therefore, the dual motive of the Security Officers could alter the scope of the search. Finally, in Bowhay, the court was considering the significance of the subjective motive of an officer who had no discretion and who was conducting an inventory search under a constitutional search scheme. Here, the issue is whether the search scheme set forth in the regulations at issue is constitutional even when it directs an officer to have both a permissible and an impermissible motive and gives that officer such discretion in conducting the search. 52 Unlike Bowhay, which involved the subjective motivation of an officer who was conducting a search under a constitutional search scheme, Watson and Soto-Camacho address the validity of dual purpose administrative search schemes. In Watson, marijuana was discovered when the Coast Guard was conducting an administrative search of the Globe Trotter, a 40-foot sailboat, on the high seas, approximately 100 miles west of the mouth of the Gulf of California. See Watson, 678 F.2d at 765-66. The search was made in accordance with an administrative plan. See id. at 766. The sole purpose of the search was to inspect for compliance with document and safety regulations. See id. The boarding party was not instructed to search for narcotics, nor did it have any reason to suspect that narcotics would be found on the boat. See id. Nonetheless, the Government conceded that one of the purposes of the administrative scheme under which the search was conducted  'was to attempt to interdict the flow of marijuana....'  Id. at 769. 53 In holding that the administrative scheme underlying the search was valid, the Watson court rejected the dual motive argument, noting that for the purpose of the appeal, 54 [w]e assume that the administrative plan which led to the stop of the GLOBE TROTTER was motivated partly by suspicion of drug smuggling. However, the stop and search had an independent administrative justification, and did not exceed in scope what was permissible under that administrative justification. 55 Id. at 771. 56 In Soto-Camacho, the defendant challenged the admissibility of drugs seized pursuant to an administrative search conducted at a border checkpoint. See Soto-Camacho, 58 F.3d at 408. At the time Soto-Camacho was decided, it was established that clearly visible border checkpoints to inspect for illegal immigrants were constitutional. See United States v. Hernandez, 739 F.2d 484 (9th Cir.1984); cf. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 543. The checkpoint in Soto-Camacho, however, had a dual purpose. While the checkpoint was a valid temporary immigration checkpoint, the border patrol timed its decision to activate the checkpoint based in part on intelligence regarding the movement of drugs. See Soto-Camacho, 58 F.3d at 412. The Soto-Camacho court nonetheless held that the checkpoint was valid, reasoning that, as in Watson, the search had an independent justification, and the scope of the search  'did not exceed in scope what was permissible under that administrative justification.'  Id. (quoting Watson, 678 F.2d at 771). 57 In Watson and Soto-Camacho, the Ninth Circuit approved administrative searches that, as designed, had a secondary purpose of searching for drugs. Nonetheless, while the Watson and Soto-Camacho courts do not address this issue, the border context of these searches appears to have been the underlying factor in the courts' decisions that the dual motive administrative searches were reasonable. Soto-Camacho dealt with an administrative search conducted at a border checkpoint; this search was clearly related to the proximity of the border. Watson involved a search of a boat on the open sea. 58 The Supreme Court has indicated that the Fourth Amendment is weakened in the context of border searches. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985) (holding that a 16-hour detention based on reasonable suspicion is not unreasonable because it occurred at the international border where the Fourth Amendment balance of interests leans heavily to the Government). Searches conducted at border checkpoints and searches of vessels in waters providing the open sea are analyzed in light of the proximity of the border. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that searches at border checkpoints are incidental to the protection of the border); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 592, 103 S.Ct. 2573, 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983) (holding that officials may search vessels located in waters providing access to the open sea without probable cause or reasonable suspicion). 59 The Almeida-Sanchez Court discussed the factors weakening the Fourth Amendment's protection in the context of searches at border checkpoints. See Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 266, 93 S.Ct. 2535. In his concurrence, Justice Powell indicated that, while border checkpoints are not border searches in the conventional sense, they are incidental to the protection of the border and draw a large measure of justification from the Government's extraordinary responsibilities and powers with respect to the border. See id. at 279, 93 S.Ct. 2535. Justice Powell further noted that the Fourth Amendment influence at these checkpoints is further weakened because the searches are of automobiles. The search of an automobile is far less intrusive on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than the search of one's person or of a building. Id.; see also Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074. 60 Further, Congress has granted to the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine border searches to prevent the introduction of contraband into the country. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537, 105 S.Ct. 3304. The Court has noted that, under this power: 61 [r]outine searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant.... Automotive travelers may be stopped at fixed checkpoints near the border without individualized suspicion even if the stop is based largely on ethnicity, and boats on inland waters with ready access to the sea may be hailed and boarded with no suspicion whatever. 62 Id. at 538, 105 S.Ct. 3304 (footnote and citations omitted). 63 These cases demonstrate that the Government has extraordinary powers to search for drugs in the border contexts at issue in Watson and Soto-Camacho. The Government's interests in preventing the entry of contraband at the border is substantial, and the protections of the Fourth Amendment are weakened. In Soto-Camacho, the privacy interest was further weakened because Soto-Camacho involved an automobile search, which is less intrusive than the search of a person or building. See Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 278, 93 S.Ct. 2535. 64 In contrast, in the administrative searches conducted in $124,570 and in the case at bar, the Government's interest in the search is not heightened by its need to protect the border. Nor has the Government's interest been weakened by Bulacan's proximity to the border. Therefore, in this case, the effect of the dual motive behind the search should be judged under the standard set forth in $124,570. 65 In sum, we find that when an administrative search scheme encompasses both a permissible and an impermissible purpose, and when the officer conducting the search has broad discretion in carrying out the search, that search does not meet the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirements. Here, as in $124,570, given the breadth of the Security Officer's discretion in conducting the search, the dual motive extends the scope of the administrative search beyond a mere search for weapons and explosives. This change in the scope of the search compels a reexamination of the constitutionality of the administrative search scheme. Therefore, the Court must assess the constitutionality of the regulations authorizing the search. 66