Opinion ID: 2086392
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The inapplicability of any rebuttable presumption.

Text: Section 23-1325(a) creates a rebuttable presumption of dangerousness under certain limited circumstances: In any pretrial detention hearing under the provisions of this section, if the judicial officer finds that there is a substantial probability that the person has committed murder in the first degree while armed with or having readily available a pistol, firearm, or imitation firearm, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that no condition or combination of conditions of release will reasonably assure the safety of any other person or the community. The foregoing language makes it plain that a presumption of dangerousness arises only if a judicial officer finds 1. by a substantial probability, that 2. the defendant has committed first degree murder while armed. No such presumption arises under § 23-1325(a) where the defendant is found by a substantial probability to have committed AWIKWA. [16] The statute likewise makes no provision for a rebuttable presumption of dangerousness based on a finding of probable cause, either as to FDMWA or AWIKWA. In 1992, the Council amended the preventive detention statute to render it more accountable to community safety concerns. See COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON BILL 9-360, THE BAIL REFORM AMENDMENT ACT OF 1991, at 4 (Jan. 23, 1992) (hereinafter REPORT). Bill 9-360, as originally proposed, would have lowered the threshold showing required to trigger a rebuttable presumption from substantial probability to probable cause. The Committee on the Judiciary rejected this proposal, however, because it would be too great an erosion of constitutional safeguards. The `probable cause' standard is too low and would lead to detention in many cases where there is no threat to the safety of the community. REPORT, at 6. We believe that the thrust of the rebuttable presumption provision of § 23-1325(a) is reasonably clear. If the judge finds by a substantial probability that a defendant has committed first degree murder while armed, then that defendant is presumed to be dangerous (and subject to preventive detention) even if his prior record is clean and if no other showing of dangerousness is made. Under the statute, however, the defendant can never be presumed to be dangerous solely on the basis of a finding of probable cause that he has committed an offense covered by this section (either AWIKWA or FDMWA). All first-degree murders and armed assaults with intent to kill while armed are dangerous, and the facts and circumstances will necessarily be unfavorable to the defense whenever an individual is being prosecuted for either of these grave crimes. Nevertheless, the legislature has not authorized the court to presume that a defendant is dangerous and detainable on the basis of a probable cause finding even of AWIKWA or first-degree murder while armed. To presume dangerousness on the basis of such a finding, looking only at evidence relating to the specific incident underlying the charged offense, without more, would effectively create, by judicial fiat, a presumption broader than the statutory one. This court may not create a non-statutory presumption which would permit detention under circumstances in which the legislature has refused to permit it. In the absence of a statutory presumption based on a finding of substantial probability the government's burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is properly subject to preventive detention therefore cannot be satisfied simply by reference to the known facts regarding the crime of which the defendant has been accused. [17] The court's calculus must include not only the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, but also, inter alia, the weight of the evidence against the defendant; the defendant's history and criminal record, if any; his community ties and resources; whether the defendant was on parole, probation, or release pending trial at the time of the charged offense; and the danger that the defendant's release would pose to any person in the community. Cf. D.C.Code § 23-1322(e). [A] defendant's past conduct is important evidenceperhaps the most important in predicting his probable future conduct. Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 930 (D.C.1991). Substantial weight must therefore be accorded to the presence in (or absence from) the defendant's record of convictions of dangerous crimes or a history of violent conduct. [18]
We summarize. Having considered the language of the statute, the footnote in Lynch, the Council's refusal to lower the threshold for a presumption of dangerousness from substantial probability to probable cause, and the principles of statutory construction discussed above, we are unable to agree with the government's position as to the proper interpretation of § 23-1325(a). In most, if not all, cases, proof of (1) probable cause that a defendant committed AWIKWA and (2) the facts and circumstances of the charged offense, will be insufficient, without more, to establish by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant is dangerous and preventively detainable. [19]
The government apparently argues that this is an unusually strong case of probable cause and that the circumstances, taken as a whole, warrant detention. We do not agree. It is true that the trial judge found the attempt to kill Keith Jones to be an especially vicious offense. She commented that this is like shooting into a fishbowl. I mean, the man was under a car. No reasonable person could disagree with the judge's characterization. Without doubt, this record, as developed so far, reflects a merciless, chilling attempted assassination. But there are few, if any, merciful or non-chilling first degree murders or AWIKWA's. The facts and circumstances of this case present no dramatic departure from the norm of these intrinsically dangerous crimes. As the Public Defender Service (PDS) points out in its brief as amicus curiae, [t]he question before the court in a detention hearing is whether the defendant would be a danger to the community if released pending trial. [20] This predictive judgment depends, as this [c]ourt explained in Tyler, on an individualized assessment of information concerning specified items that pertain to the crime charged, the history and characteristics of the person, and the danger that may be posed to others if the person is released. 705 A.2d at 277 (emphasis added).. . . [T]he inference that a defendant would be a danger if released ( i.e., that he would do it again) cannot be stronger than the factual premise ( i.e., that he did it before). (Emphasis in original.) This reasoning quite properly focuses on the dangerousness of the defendant as well as on the nature of the crime, and reinforces our view that a detention order could seldom, if ever, be sustained on the basis of a finding of probable cause plus the facts and circumstances of the charged offense, standing alone. To assess the record as a whole, we consider, in turn, the criteria for dangerousness set forth in D.C.Code § 23-1322(e): 1. The circumstances of the offense charged, see D.C.Code § 23-1322(e)(1), reflect extremely violent and dangerous conduct. We recognize, at the same time, that few, if any, assaults with the specific intent to kill while armed can be substantially less reprehensible; AWIKWA is intrinsically an extremely serious crime. 2. The weight of the evidence against Pope, see D.C.Code § 23-1322(e)(2), is marginal; indeed, the judge found the identifications sufficient only because she viewed the requirement of probable cause as having a very low evidentiary threshold. [21] 3. With the exception of a single expunged conviction, Pope has no criminal record. There is no evidence of recent drug or alcohol involvement, and Pope apparently has unusually strong community support and ties. See D.C.Code § 23-1322(e)(3)(A). 4. Pope was not on probation, parole, or other supervised release at the time of the charged offense. See D.C.Code § 23-1322(e)(3)(B). The nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by [Pope's] release, see D.C.Code § 23-1322(e)(4), therefore turns largely on the strength of the evidence against him. In any event, the enumeration of the foregoing factors demonstrates that although the nature of the crime tends in some measure to support the government's position, the available individualized information about Pope does not demonstrate that he personally is dangerous.