Opinion ID: 2575864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Batson/Wheeler Claim

Text: During jury selection, after the prosecution used its ninth peremptory challenge to excuse B.J., a Black woman, the defense made an objection under People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748. The trial court stated that it would hear argument on the objection at the next recess. The prosecution then used its eleventh peremptory challenge against N.M., another Black woman. After the prosecutor had exercised 12 peremptory challenges and the defense had exercised 13 peremptory challenges, both sides expressed satisfaction with the jury as constituted, and the jurors were sworn to try the case. Alternate jurors were then selected and sworn. During the next recess, the defense presented argument on the Wheeler objection. Defense counsel stated that the objection was under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ( Batson ) as well as Wheeler and that [t]he racial group we are talking about in this instance is African American, specifically African American women. The court asked whether the challenge was based on the race of the two jurors who were excused. Defense counsel replied that it was based on race and gender, that the prosecutor had excused two of the three African-American women who were on the jury panel, and that defense counsel believed this was sufficient to raise an inference of impermissible discrimination. In response, the prosecutor argued that the defense was improperly interrelating classes and that the presence of seven women on the jury showed there had been no discrimination against women. The prosecutor also noted that of the four African-Americans on the initial panel, he had challenged two, the defense had challenged one, and one was seated on the jury. Defense counsel responded that, as to gender, the prosecution had used eight of 12 peremptory challenges against women. The trial court stated that out of an abundance of caution it was giving the prosecution the opportunity to offer whatever nongender-based or nonracially based rationale you care to offer for the challenges. The prosecutor said he challenged N.M. because she indicated that she thought there was some problems with the district attorney's office handling high-profile cases and because she indicated that she had a brother that had been arrested and prosecuted for drugs. The prosecutor said he challenged B.J. because her son was prosecuted by our office, and she was an alibi witness in that case and because she's probably one of the most hostile jurors that I've ever questioned. The prosecutor added: I think that she feels very, very upset with the prosecution of her son. Defense counsel declined the trial court's invitation to comment on these reasons, stating: We would submit for the court's ruling on it. The trial court then ruled on this aspect of the challenge, stating: I think the Peopletheir explanation I think convinces me that the challenges to [B.J.] and [N.M.] were not racially motivated or based upon their race. The trial court then out of an abundance of caution asked the prosecutor to provide reasons for its peremptory challenges against the other six women. The prosecutor asked for time to review his notes and papers, and the court agreed to take up the matter later. The prosecutor noted that the defense had used most of its peremptory challenges against men, possibly as many as 11 out of 13 challenges. The court replied, in substance, that it did not think that was relevant in ruling on the defense challenge: I'm not sure two wrongs make a right.... The next day, the prosecutor provided reasons for the remaining six peremptory challenges to women. The prosecutor said he challenged L.J. because she indicated on five different places on the questionnaire that she was against the death penalty. He challenged J.O. because she indicated on her questionnaire that she felt she was a wishy-washy person, that she had difficult[y] making up her mind, that pressure from other jurors might start her to doubt herself, and that she thinks she is a bad judge of character. He challenged N.J. because she stated on her questionnaire that the burden of deciding a person's life was really just too great a decision for her to make. He challenged F.C. because she stated on her questionnaire that she would find it difficult to vote for death and the prosecutor thought she had a clear leaning against the death penalty. He challenged L.H. because a fair reading of her questionnaire is that she hasn't made up her mind about the death penalty, and because a fair reading of her statements in court was that she really is much opposed to the death penalty. He challenged B.B. because she wrote on her questionnaire that she had religious and philosophical views so that she would always vote against the death penalty and because he thought she might have difficulty understanding spoken English. Finally, he challenged M.B. because she was 73 years old and appeared to be basically overwhelmed and because she had apologized for believing in the death penalty. After hearing defense counsel's argument in response, the trial court overruled the defense objection, stating: I'm satisfied that the district attorney has made an explanation for each of these challenges which persuades me that they were not solely or sufficiently based on gender that they should be held to have violated [defendant's] constitutional rights. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in overruling the Batson/Wheeler objection because the prosecutor's reasons for the peremptory challenges found little or no support in the record and because the trial court failed in its duty to seriously evaluate the credibility of the prosecutor's excuses and make a reasoned determination of whether purposeful discrimination existed. Defendant contends that this error violated his rights under the federal Constitution to a fair trial, to due process of law, and to equal protection of the law, and his rights under the state Constitution to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. The use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors because of their race or gender violates both the federal and the California Constitutions. ( J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994) 511 U.S. 127, 129, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89; Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400, 409, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411; Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712; People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 969, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874.) The United States Supreme Court has set out a three-step process to be followed when a party claims that an opponent has improperly discriminated in the exercise of peremptory challenges. First, the complaining party must make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination. Second, the party exercising the challenge must state nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenge. Third, the trial court must decide whether the complaining party has proved purposeful discrimination. ( Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 2416, 162 L.Ed.2d 129; Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834; People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 384, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769.) By asking the prosecutor to explain the peremptory challenges, the trial court here implicitly found that defendant had made a prima facie showing of impermissible discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. ( People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 723, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332.) Once the trial court ruled on the credibility of the prosecutor's stated reasons, the issue of whether the defense had made a prima showing became moot. ( Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 135, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) When a trial court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror, we accord great deference to its ruling, reviewing it under the substantial evidence standard. ( People v. McDermott, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 971, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874; People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 725, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332.) We consider each of the eight challenged jurors, taking them in the order in which the prosecutor provided reasons for the peremptory challenges. The prosecutor's stated reasons for challenging N.M. were that she indicated that she thought there was some problems with the district attorney's office handling high-profile cases and because she indicated that she had a brother that had been arrested and prosecuted for drugs. These reasons are neutral as to race and gender, they are not inherently implausible, and substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding on the credibility of this explanation. In response to a question on the juror questionnaire asking whether she had any specific feeling for or against ... prosecutors (district attorneys), she marked yes and explained: There seems to be many problems with high-profile cases. In response to another question, she indicated that a close relative or friend had been arrested, charged, and tried for a crime, and she explained: Brother arrested for possession of drugs. Defendant argues that the prosecutor's reasons for challenging N.M. are not credible because other jurors whom the prosecutor did not challenge, and who were ultimately seated on the jury, also had relatives who had been arrested for drug-related offenses. Even if we assume we must conduct a comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal (see Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. ___, fn. 2, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2326, fn. 2, 162 L.Ed.2d 196; People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 270, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 118 P.3d 451; People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 188-189, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496), defendant does not identify any seated juror who gave responses similar to N.M.'s on both of the topics mentioned by the prosecutor. Although some of the seated jurors had relatives who had been arrested for drug-related offenses, none of these jurors also expressed any feelings against prosecutors. The prosecutor said he challenged B.J. because her son was prosecuted by our office, and she was an alibi witness in that case and because she's probably one of the most hostile jurors that I've ever questioned. The prosecutor added: I think that she feels very, very upset with the prosecution of her son. These reasons are neutral as to race and gender, they are not inherently implausible, and substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding on the credibility of this explanation. On voir dire, B.J. said that she had been an alibi witness in her son's trial in San Diego County, that the case was dismissed after two trials resulted in hung juries, and that her experiences with the police in that case were not very favorable, although she denied having negative feelings toward the prosecutor or the criminal justice system. When the prosecutor stated that B.J. was probably one of the most hostile jurors he had ever questioned, the trial court said, I recall having that same impression when we were talking to her. Defense counsel did not dispute this characterization of B.J.'s demeanor on voir dire, instead merely submitting the matter. The prosecutor's stated reason for challenging L.J. was that she indicated on five different places on the questionnaire that she was against the death penalty. The record supports this statement, which provides a credible and gender-neutral ground for challenge. Skepticism about the death penalty is a permissible basis for a prosecutor's exercise of a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 441, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790; People v. McDermott, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 970-971, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874.) The prosecutor's stated reasons for challenging J.O. were that she indicated on her questionnaire that she felt she was a wishy-washy person, that she had difficult[y] making up her mind, that pressure from other jurors might start her to doubt herself, and that she thinks she is a bad judge of character. The record supports these reasons, which provide credible and gender-neutral grounds for challenge. A prosecutor could reasonably be concerned about a juror who said she was a bad judge of character because she would believe any hard luck story. The prosecutor's stated reason for challenging N.J. was her questionnaire response that the burden of deciding a person's life was really just too great a decision for her to make. This is an accurate description of one of N.J.'s questionnaire responses, in which she marked the no response to a question asking whether she would like to serve as a juror on this case, adding this explanation: The burden of decision for a person's lifeeither the death sentence or life imprisonment. This response provides a legitimate and credible reason for the challenge. The prosecutor said he challenged F.C. because she stated on her questionnaire that she would find it difficult to vote for death and the prosecutor thought she had a clear leaning against the death penalty. In response to a question asking for her feelings about the death penalty, F.C. wrote on her questionnaire, In a few cases it may be necessary, but in general I would find it difficult to give this recommendation. These reservations about the death penalty provided a permissible basis for a prosecutor's exercise of a peremptory challenge. ( People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 441, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790; People v. McDermott, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 970-971, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874.) The prosecutor said he challenged L.H. because a fair reading of her questionnaire is that she hasn't made up her mind about the death penalty, and because a fair reading of her statements in court was that she really is much opposed to the death penalty. In response to the question asking for her feelings about the death penalty, L.H. wrote this response: Well, it seems that killing a person by the death penalty for killing someone else is confusing. What will sentencing someone to die do for our society? I'm not sure of this `eye for an eye' sentence. In response to a question asking what purpose or purposes the death penalty serves, she wrote: I'm not sure it does serve a valid purpose. Unfortunately, it seems to be disproportionately given to non-whites. Also, there's no going back once it's donewhat if new evidence comes to light? Her responses on voir dire also revealed skepticism about the death penalty. These reservations about the death penalty provided a legitimate, credible, gender-neutral basis for a prosecutor's exercise of a peremptory challenge. He challenged B.B. because she wrote on her questionnaire that she had religious and philosophical views so that she would always vote against the death penalty and because he thought she might have difficulty understanding spoken English. The record supports these reasons. The questionnaire asked the prospective jurors whether they had any moral, religious, or philosophical opposition to the death penalty so strong that [they] would be unable to impose the death penalty regardless of the facts. In response to this question, B.B. put a check mark next to yes, with this explanation: Thou shalt not kill, one of the 10 commandments of God. She also indicated that she had been born in the Philippines, thereby suggesting that English might not be her first language. These are permissible, neutral, and credible reasons for the peremptory challenge of B.B. Finally, the prosecutor said he challenged M.B. because she was 73 years old and appeared to be basically overwhelmed and because she had apologized for believing in the death penalty. The record supports these reasons, which are credible and gender neutral. The questionnaire asked the prospective jurors to state their feeling about the death penalty. M.B. wrote in response: I am sorry to say but I am for the death penalty. She also indicated on the questionnaire that she would not like to serve as a juror on this case. On voir dire, when the prosecutor asked her about this response, she said: I have served on juries before and I also been on election boards, I think somebody else should do it. You know, my years living. We are unpersuaded by defendant's argument that the trial court erred in deferring argument on defendant's Batson/Wheeler motion until the next recess, which occurred after the jury selection process had been completed and a jury had been sworn to try the case. Defense counsel did not object to this procedure at the time, and in fact indicated that the defense was satisfied with the jury that was sworn to try the case. Moreover, the swearing of the jury would not have made it impossible for the trial court to grant effective relief in the event the court granted the Batson/Wheeler motion. Although jeopardy attached with the swearing of the jury, a Batson/Wheeler motion may be deemed a motion for mistrial and thus a waiver of any double jeopardy defense. (See People v. Batts (2003) 30 Cal.4th 660, 679, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67, 68 P.3d 357 [a defendant's request for a mistrial waives any double jeopardy claim]; see also People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 115, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166 [ Wheeler motions often termed motions for mistrial].) We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court's rulings rejecting defendant's Batson/Wheeler challenges on the basis of race and gender.