Opinion ID: 553904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Weaver's Title VII Termination Claims

Text: 33 Weaver alleged that his termination was the result of racial discrimination and in retaliation for the filing of his initial charge with the EEOC in October, 1983. The district court, although recognizing the retaliation claim, did not specifically advert to it in its liability order, and mentioned only in conclusion the claim that the termination resulted from racial discrimination. Because the two claims are closely interrelated, we will discuss them together. 34 To establish a prima facie case of discharge in retaliation for filing charges with the EEOC, a plaintiff must show (1) statutorily protected expression, (2) adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between the protected expression and the adverse action. 43 Weaver unquestionably satisfies the first two elements through his filing of the charge and his ultimate termination. 35 Although the district court did not address itself to the issue, we believe that Weaver satisfied the third element as well. First, Weaver met with Casa Gallardo President Wayne Jones, Director of Operations Jim Bunting, and his supervisor, Operations Manager Ted Geiger, on July 18, 1983. Jones told Weaver that he was not going to be promoted to the new Operations-Manager position that eventually went to Matseas. It was at this same meeting that Jones made his remark about having to be wary around articulate black men. Weaver protested the decision denying him the promotion, claiming that it was racially motivated--a protest that may be considered statutorily protected expression. 44 Shortly afterward, on September 4, 1983, Geiger gave Weaver a negative performance and development review, with a total rating of needs improvement, which Weaver refused to sign. 36 More important, however, was management's behavior after Weaver's filing of the charge with the EEOC, which was communicated to Gallardo sometime after October 12, 1983. Although a meeting had already been held on October 11, before the company received notice of the charge, two participants in the meeting thereafter wrote memos to Weaver's personnel file regarding the content of the meeting. These primarily concerned Weaver's poor relations with Matseas (by then his supervisor) and his poor compliance with company reporting, paperwork, and inventory protocols. The meeting apparently ended with Weaver asking, Why don't you just terminate me?, and Bunting informing Weaver that he had 30 days to improve in the discussed areas or he would be terminated. A follow-up meeting for October 28 was scheduled at that time, but Bunting met with Weaver on October 21 and 25 instead. At about this time, Casa Gallardo began a program of intensive monitoring of Weaver's performance, in which at least one management employee was assigned to keep track of Weaver's work schedule and expense reports and regularly write memos to his personnel file. Bunting testified that Weaver was the only Area Supervisor so tracked. Bunting, Matseas, and other members of management wrote negative memos to Weaver's personnel file, Matseas writing at one point that if Weaver failed once more to show up for a regularly scheduled shift, barring extraordinary circumstances, he should consider himself to be on notice of termination. 37 The pronounced increase in negative reviews and the careful scrutiny of Weaver's performance, coupled with testimony suggesting that management personnel were acutely aware of Weaver's EEOC charge, is sufficient to establish a causal link for Weaver's prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. As this court observed in Simmons v. Camden County Board of Education, 45 38 [T]he causal link in the [retaliatory discharge] formula [is not] the sort of logical connection that would justify a prescription that the protected participation in fact prompted the adverse action. Such a connection would rise to the level of direct evidence of discrimination, shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant. Rather, we construe the 'causal link' element to require merely that the plaintiff establish that the protected activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated. 46 39 A prima facie case of racially discriminatory discharge is generally established by a plaintiff proving (1) that he is a member of a protected minority, (2) that he was qualified for the job from which he was discharged, (3) that he was discharged, and (4) that his former position was filled by a non-minority. 47 The fourth element may also be satisfied by demonstrating that the plaintiff was terminated while others not in the plaintiff's protected class, 'having comparable or lesser qualifications,' were retained, 48 or that the plaintiff suffered from differential application of work or disciplinary rules. 49 There is serious question as to whether Weaver fulfilled any of these requirements: he does not allege that his position was filled by a person not in his protected class, or that others committed nearly identical misconduct but were retained. 50 At best, Weaver's general allegations of unfair treatment may be read to raise the inference that others not in his protected class and of comparable or lesser qualifications were retained, despite the fact that he identified no particular individuals or qualifications. The record discloses that Matseas, for example, had been terminated for unspecified reasons approximately two months before Weaver was terminated. Because the prima-facie-case method was never intended to be rigid, mechanistic, or ritualistic, 51 because we review only for clear error, and because Weaver in any event retains the burden of establishing intentional racial discrimination, we need not focus unduly on Weaver's failings in this regard, 52 and turn our attention to Casa Gallardo's rebuttal and Weaver's attempt to show pretext. 40 The plaintiff's prima facie case of both retaliatory 53 and discriminatory 54 discharge may be rebutted by the defendant's proffer of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge. If fully credited, the evidence Casa Gallardo adduced supporting its decision to terminate Weaver is impressive, particularly for the period subsequent to the Matseas promotion. The district court, therefore, might well have concluded that Casa Gallardo had rebutted any presumption of retaliation or discrimination raised by Weaver's prima facie cases. But it did not. The issue, therefore, is whether the record is so lacking in support for the district court's judgment that we must reverse it. 41 Weaver introduced exhibits praising certain aspects of his management of restaurants under his supervision. He also introduced evidence that he was at least minimally competent. 42 The actual decision to terminate Weaver was made by David Lane, Casa Gallardo's Vice President of Operations. While Weaver does not suggest that Lane, to whom he attributed sole responsibility for the termination decision, had made any racist comments, had been involved in any social exclusion of Weaver, or was himself racially insensitive, the district court might well have concluded that he was influenced by Jones, Bunting, and Geiger in making his decision to terminate Weaver, and may in particular have been influenced by their racism or desire to retaliate against Weaver for filing the EEOC charge. Lane admitted discussing the charge with all three men and with others in the Casa Gallardo organization, although he denied any negative influence on his decision. Given the lengthy record and the credibility choices necessary to properly evaluate the testimony, we conclude that the district court had sufficient evidence to support its finding of pretext.