Opinion ID: 2558572
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Same Matter

Text: Whether a second matter is the same or substantially related to an earlier matter is determined by a practical [inquiry] asking whether the two matters substantially overlap. Sofaer, 728 A.2d at 628. The same matter test involves examining the extent to which the matters involve the same basic facts, related issues, the same or related parties, time elapsed, the same confidential information, and the continuing existence of an important [government] interest. 5 C.F.R. § 2637.201(c)(4) (discussing same particular matter under 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)). Two representations involve the same matter if they relate to the same discrete, identifiable transactions or conduct involving a particular situation and specific parties. See Sofaer, 728 A.2d at 627; see also id. at 643 (The same issue of fact involving the same parties and the same situation or conduct is the same matter) (Board report adopted by and appended to opinion of D.C. Court of Appeals). Matters are substantially related if it is reasonable to infer that confidential information gained in the course of the first matter would be relevant to the second. Brown, 486 A.2d at 49-50 (determining whether counsel for a private real estate developer should be disqualified in zoning proceeding where counsel previously represented the District government in prior transactions relating to the same property); Sofaer, 728 at 643-45. The lawyer may rebut this presumption only by showing that the two matters did not overlap. Brown, 486 A.2d at 49-50; Sofaer, 728 A.2d at 643-45. [7] The Board concludes that the overlap here was substantial and that the evidence supports the conclusion that the matters were substantially related. An investigation and ensuing litigation centering on the same historical event involving specific parties are the same matter. Sofaer, 728 A.2d at 646 (rejecting an argument by the former Legal Advisor to the State Department that the investigation and the criminal litigation regarding the Lockerbie airline bombing were separate matters). The matter before OHR and the lawsuit centered on the termination of Ms. Thomas' employment, a single historical event involving specific parties. Id. at 627. G. Thomas' federal court action was based on the same claim of age discrimination that the OHR had investigated. G. Thomas' exhaustion of her administrative remedies within OHR was a precondition to that lawsuit. At the time that Respondent began working on the G. Thomas lawsuit in late 2003, G. Thomas was seeking to amend her age discrimination complaint to add a claim of sex discrimination. The immediate critical question in late 2003 was whether she had exhausted her administrative remedies at OHR on that claim. Respondent was therefore providing legal assistance to G. Thomas on the issue of how Respondent's former employer, OHR, had handled the G. Thomas matter at the time that Respondent had responsibility for the G. Thomas file. As the Board stated in the report adopted by the Court in Sofaer, [i]t would be strange indeed if Rule 1.11(a) permitted a government lawyer to know the confidential course of an investigation into an act, take some responsibility for legal reaction to those events, but then turn around in private practice and represent an alleged perpetrator of those same acts. Id. at 647. Further, Respondent's counsel conceded at the outset of the hearing that it would be an untenable position to assert that the two matters were not substantially related within the meaning of Rule 1.11(a). Tr. 12/13/05 at 25-26. In her post-hearing submission to the Hearing Committee, Respondent conceded that the Gladys Graye Thomas age discrimination complaint under the D.C. Human Rights Act, which was investigated by the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights (OHR) bear (sic) strong resemblance to the complaint filed by Gladys Graye Thomas in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under ADEA (Age Discrimination Employment Discrimination Act). Respondent's Opposition to Bar Counsel's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation as to Sanctions, at 33. The Hearing Committee correctly concluded that the second factor of the Rule 1.11(a) inquiry was satisfied by clear and convincing evidence.