Opinion ID: 2453427
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Phyllis's 60(b) motions to reconsider allocation of DeJeaux's military retirement were untimely.

Text: In a divorce proceeding where marital property has been divided, a divorce decree incorporating a property judgment constitutes a final judgment and may be modified to the same extent as any equitable decree of the court. [15] Under AS 25.24.160(a) a court has authority to divide property, but the statute does not authorize a court to distribute assets on a piecemeal basis when the parties' property rights have been incorporated into a final judgment. [16] Other than a Civil Rule 77(k) motion for reconsideration, which must be made within ten days of the court's order, an Alaska Civil Rule 60(b) motion provides the only available means for seeking relief from a final judgment of property division. [17] Rule 60(b) allows relief from a final judgment or order only for specified reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. It is not necessary that the ex-spouse specify which of these reasons the 60(b) motion falls under. [18] Though Phyllis raised several different grounds for relief in her April 3 and April 6 motions, her appeal is primarily concerned with only one of these grounds. She contends that the superior court misinterpreted the USFSPA when dividing DeJeaux's military retirement pay. If true, this would fall under Rule 60(b)(1), which applies when the trial court has made a mistake of law. [19] While Rule 60(b)(1) claims must normally be filed within one year, [20] claims that the trial court has made a mistake of law constitute a special exception, and become time-barred after 30 days. [21] Though it is unclear whether Phyllis is appealing the July 2001 amended divorce decree in which the calculation was formalized, or the June 2007 order in which numbers were assigned to the calculation, she filed her 2009 motions well over 30 days after the final judgment. Her motion was therefore untimely, and the superior court did not err by dismissing the motions on that basis.