Opinion ID: 2241728
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: appellee's instructions

Text: There was no error in giving any of appellee's requested instructions. Instruction No. 3 told the jury that contributory negligence on the part of appellant's truck driver would bar recovery by it. It is apparent the terms careless and carelessness were used as synonymous with negligence. 45 C.J. 633; 65 C.J.S. 315. Number 4 told the jury that the truck driver was required to use ordinary care under the circumstances. Appellant's objection was that it was not limited to the negligent acts as alleged in the counterclaim. But the instruction was correct under the issues made on the complaint, for the answer thereto denied the allegations of the complaint, and specifically pleaded general contributory negligence of the truck driver. Contributory negligence is provable under a specific denial or answer of no information. Rule 1-3. Holt v. Basore (1948), 118 Ind. App. 146, 77 N.E.2d 903. It was not necessary for this instruction to embody the element of proximate cause, which was covered by other instructions. Number 5 instructed the jury that it was the duty of the operator of a motor vehicle to exercise ordinary  care to avoid a collision which duty included the duty of keeping and maintaining a lookout for other traffic on the highway, and that a failure to exercise such ordinary care or keep a lookout constituted negligence, which if proximately caused injury, constituted actionable negligence provided the injured person was free of contributory negligence. Appellant's objection was to the effect that the instruction did not inform the jury that the operator was only required to keep and maintain a reasonable lookout. But there is no fact in this record, or reasonable inference from any fact that would excuse either driver from keeping a lookout before the collision; so under the facts the instruction was proper. Instruction No. 7 in substance set forth the statutory duty to yield one-half of the main traveled portion of the roadway (§ 47-2011, Burns' 1940 Replacement), and that a violation thereof constituted negligence. The objection was that a violation of this statute was only prima facie negligence. In Gamble v. Lewis (1949), 227 Ind. 455, 85 N.E.2d 629, we held that a violation of § 47-2010, Burns' 1940 Replacement, was prima facie evidence of negligence, but that if there was no evidence in the record, or any reasonable inference from any evidence which would excuse such conduct, such driving was negligence as a matter of law. In Northern Indiana Transit v. Burk (1950), 228 Ind. 162, 89 N.E.2d 905, we held that if there was no evidence showing an excuse for the violation of a statute which constituted prima facie evidence of negligence, it was not error to instruct that a violation of the statutory duty was negligence. The record here does not disclose any excuse for either party to drive to the left of the center of the highway when meeting the other vehicle, and therefore there was no prejudicial error in giving such instruction, even  though it was inaccurate as an abstract proposition of law.