Opinion ID: 1855550
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the court erred in allowing the state to ask the defendant about a prior felony conviction without giving a limiting instruction.

Text: ¶ 21. Jasper next argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed the State to ask Jasper if he had ever been convicted of a felony. Jasper claims that this was highly prejudicial. Jasper further contends that the trial court should have given a limiting instruction sua sponte to the jury. The State responds that this general question was asked to demonstrate knowledge and motive and that the trial judge's failure to give an instruction was harmless error. ¶ 22. M.R.E. 404(b) governs the admissibility of previous acts at trial and states: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. ¶ 23. This rule exists to prevent the State from suggesting that, since a defendant has committed other crimes previously, the probability is greater that he is also guilty of the offense for which he is presently charged. See Lancaster v. State, 472 So.2d 363, 367-368 (Miss.1985). ¶ 24. In Smith v. State, 656 So.2d 95, 99 (Miss.1995) (citing Jenkins v. State, 507 So.2d 89, 93 (Miss.1987)), we held that, [e]ven when other-crimes evidence is admissible under M.R.E. 404(b), it must pass through the `ultimate filter' of M.R.E. 403. We went on to find in Smith that when other-crimes evidence is admitted under M.R.E. 404(b) a limiting instruction is required: [T]he jury must be informed as to the limited purpose for which they are allowed to consider the other-crimes evidence. This cannot be accomplished if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.... Smith, 656 So.2d at 99. We further stated that: ... wherever 404(b) evidence is offered and there was an objection which is overruled, the objection shall be deemed an invocation of the right to M.R.E. 403 balancing analysis and a limiting instruction. The court shall conduct an M.R.E. analysis and, if the evidence passes that hurdle, give a limiting instruction unless the party objecting to the evidence objects to giving the limiting instruction. Smith at 100. ¶ 25. Jasper was briefly examined, out of the presence of the jury, before he began his testimony on direct examination. At the end of the brief examination, still outside the presence of the jury, the State announced that it would ask Jasper if he had ever been convicted of a felony. The discourse was as follows: ASS'T. DA: Your Honor, wethe State intends to ask him if he's ever been convicted of a crime before. DEFENSE ATT'Y: Your Honor, to which I object because they cannot justI understand they're asking basically for a hearing on this. But they cannot just as that question unless they have a purpose to it.... That specifically cannot be done, and think it would be error for them to ask him that, Your Honor. ASS'T. DA: Not specific questions. Just ask him if he's ever been THE COURT: Why are you going to ask him? ASS'T. DA: Sir? THE COURT: Why would you ask him? ASS'T. DA: Knowledge and motive    (BRIEF PAUSE) THE COURT: What's your specific question you intend to ask him? ASS'T. DA: Mr. Jasper, have you ever been convicted of a felony? THE COURT: All right DEFENSE ATT'Y: Could I just note my objection to that based on my previous assertion, Your Honor? THE COURT: All right. Bring the jury out. ¶ 26. The defense then called Steve Jasper to the stand and questioned him on direct examination. No mention was made of any prior conviction. On cross examination, the State's final question to Jasper was whether Jasper had ever been convicted of a felony. Jasper responded, Yes. The defense announced he would have no redirect, the witness was excused, and the defense rested. At that point, the jury was given a break, and the defense renewed its motion for a directed verdict and its objection to the State being allowed to inquire about Jasper's prior conviction with a single question which could not possibly show motive or knowledge. [1] ¶ 27. The State asserts that the general nature of the question lessens its potential for prejudice. We disagree. By avoiding the specifics of Jasper's prior indiscretion, the State created an opportunity for the jurors' minds to run rampant pondering what other crimes Jasper might have committed. Further, the ambiguous posture of the State's questioning undermines its M.R.E. 404(b) argument that it was trying to show knowledge or intent. The State simply wanted to leave the question of the previous felony in the minds of the jurors by strategically asking that question last. ¶ 28. Also, after this question was asked and answered, no M.R.E. 403 balancing analysis was done, and no limiting instruction was given by the judge as required by this Court in Smith. ¶ 29. Therefore, we hold that the admission of Jasper's prior felony conviction and the trial court's failure to instruct the jury sua sponte were reversible error in violation of this Court's holding in Smith and require reversal and remand for a new trial.