Opinion ID: 489887
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Supervisory and Training Liability

Text: 35 It is well established that a governmental officer may be held liable in damages for constitutional wrongs engendered by his failure to supervise or train subordinates adequately. 110 This responsibility is not premised on the notion of vicarious liability; rather, it is bottomed on the principle that in some contexts failure of an official to safeguard against constitutional transgressions by those under his control constitutes an actionable wrong under Bivens and Section 1983. The party seeking to impose liability must demonstrate that the official had an obligation to supervise or train the wrongdoer in the manner alleged, that the duty was breached, and that this breach was a proximate cause of the injury. 111 But while there is consensus on the existence of an actionable duty in this regard, the contours of that duty are unclear. 112 36 This court held in Carter v. Carlson 113 that a police chief would be liable for negligent failure to prevent constitutional impingements by his subordinates, thereby implying that such officials have a duty to supervise and train to foreclose all reasonably foreseeable constitutional harms. 114 While this decision arguably carries weight, 115 we have reason to question its continuing vitality in light of subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court 116 and other circuits 117 suggesting that the standard of culpability is higher. 118 Accordingly, we consider the question anew. 37 In Rizzo v. Goode, 119 the Supreme Court vacated an order providing equitable relief against city officials for failure to supervise municipal police officers. The Court noted that supervisory liability under Section 1983 had important limitations: it required an affirmative link between the occurrence of the various incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy by petitioners--express or otherwise--showing their authorization or approval of such misconduct. 120 Rejecting the amorphous proposition[ ] that the officials implicated shared a constitutional 'duty' ... to 'eliminate' future police misconduct, 121 the Court saw no foundation for the asserted liability absent a showing of direct responsibility by the supervising official for the infringement. 122 38 Applying the tenets of Rizzo, numerous courts have concluded that something more than mere negligence on the part of the supervisor is necessary to state a claim under Bivens or Section 1983. 123 These courts have asserted that, in order to construct a basis for liability, the injured party must establish that the supervising official was either grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent in failing to take precautions against the constitutional violation that did in fact occur. 124 This standard of culpability for supervisory officials has been justified by a recognition that imposition of a duty of care to prevent all foreseeable misconduct by subordinates would thrust an excessive burden on supervisors and hamper performance of official duties. 125 Despite differences in articulations of the applicable standard 126 and the underlying rationale, 127 the overwhelming majority of courts faced with claims of supervisory liability after Rizzo have determined that, where responsibility is predicated on inattentiveness rather than affirmative misconduct, the plaintiff must establish a high degree of fault in order to implicate the supervisor in the constitutional infractions of his subordinates. 39 We agree that Rizzo mandates a retreat from the standard proclaimed in Carter v. Carlson, and join the majority of courts calling for something more than mere negligence to forge the affirmative link between the constitutional infringement and the supervisor's conduct. Consideration of the exigencies of criminal law enforcement also suggests that a higher standard is appropriate, given the wide range of constitutional breaches arguably foreseeable in the daily operations of a law enforcement agency, and the difficulty of providing meaningful guidance to ward off all possible wrongs. 128 The duty to supervise is triggered by proof that, absent effective supervision, harm was not merely foreseeable, but was highly likely, given the circumstances of the case. When inaction in the face of a substantial threat of harm is shown, it can be said that the supervisor acquiesced in the resulting constitutional violation, thereby linking the non-feasance with the injury in the manner required by Rizzo. 40 It remains to delineate those situations that trigger the duty to supervise under Bivens and Section 1983. Courts requiring gross negligence or deliberate indifference have held that standard satisfied where a supervisor remains passive in the face of past constitutional violations about which he knew or should have known. 129 Some of these courts have also concluded that a duty to supervise may arise, even absent a pattern of past transgressions, where training has been so clearly deficient that some deprivation of rights will inevitably result absent additional instruction. 130 In general, the existence of a duty to supervise to prevent a particular harm is a question of fact rather than law, and depends on the particulars of each dispute. 131 41 We hold today that the close analogy to Rizzo requires us to constrict the ambit of supervisory liability for constitutional wrongs. Our decision does not shift the level of culpability required to establish the underlying violation; that must turn on the nature of the constitutional provision allegedly infringed. 132 Nor does it affect the showing essential to municipal liability for inadequate supervision, since the problem of determining whether a governmental entity should be charged with responsibility for the acts of its employees is conceptually distinct from the question whether the wrongs of one municipal worker should be imputed to another. 133 Our holding is that, in order to find a supervisory official personally liable in damages for the unconstitutional acts of his subordinate, it must be shown that he was responsible for supervising the wrongdoer; that a duty to instruct the subordinate to prevent constitutional harm arose from the surrounding circumstances; and that, as a result of the official's failure to instruct, the plaintiff was harmed in the manner threatened. We turn now to Haynesworth's complaint against Cullinane to ascertain whether it states a colorable claim for relief under this standard. 42