Opinion ID: 776960
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kevin Jones' Testimony

Text: 40 Karis argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to admission of his half-brother Kevin Jones' preliminary hearing testimony, for failing to move for exclusion of testimony regarding Kevin's statements to the police, and for consenting to the introduction of these statements. Kevin testified at the preliminary hearing, but suffered a stroke before trial and this testimony was read into the record. Parts of Kevin's testimony contradicted Karis' testimony and Kevin's preliminary hearing testimony was easily impeached by the prosecution because he had given a number of conflicting prior statements. 41 To establish a claim for constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, Karis must show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 673 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether Karis received the reasonably effective assistance to which he was entitled, we must determine whether counsel's representation `fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.' Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). In so doing, we will neither second-guess counsel's decisions, nor apply the fabled twenty-twenty vision of hindsight, id., but will defer to counsel's sound trial strategy. See id. 42 Karis must also show that the deficient performance prejudiced him. In doing so, he must present a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. 43 The district court found counsel's conduct reasonable in regard to the admission of Kevin's testimony. Karis' lead trial counsel stated that he was aware that Kevin's inconsistent statements could have been kept from the jury. He declared that his purpose was to put those statements before the jury in hope that he could persuade the jury to believe at least one part of Kevin's testimony — that Karis had arrived home from Placerville on July 8, 1981, by 10 a.m. — in order to corroborate Karis' alibi. In closing argument, defense counsel attempted to support Karis' alibi by pointing out that Kevin's first statement to the police corroborated Karis' story. Defense counsel testified in his deposition that Kevin's first statement to the police was the only available corroboration of Karis' alibi. 44 Furthermore, we agree with the district court that Karis was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to object to the evidence. There is not a reasonable probability that exclusion of this testimony would have changed the result of the proceeding.