Opinion ID: 187525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Claims under the ADEA and the DCHRA

Text: We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment on Schuler's 2001 and on Murphy's 2000, 2001, and 2004 claims under the ADEA and DCHRA. See Venetian Casino Resort, LLC v. EEOC, 530 F.3d 925, 929 (2008). In order to prevail at summary judgment, the plaintiff in an ADEA case must show that a reasonable jury could find his age was the but-for cause of the employment action he challenges. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2352, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009); see also Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1198 (D.C.Cir.2008) (plaintiff must produce[] evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find nondiscriminatory reason offered by employer was not the actual reason for challenged action and employer intentionally discriminated against [plaintiff] based on his . . . age (internal quotation marks omitted)) (citing Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 495 (D.C.Cir.2008)). The courts of the District of Columbia look[] to federal court decisions interpreting the [ADEA] when evaluating age discrimination claims under the DCHRA. Washington Convention Ctr. Auth. v. Johnson, 953 A.2d 1064, 1073 n. 7 (D.C.2008). Under current D.C. precedent, which predates the Supreme Court's recent decision in Gross, a claimant under the DCHRA, if he is to survive summary judgment, must show a reasonable jury could find his age had a determinative influence on the challenged employment action. Id. at 1073 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 141, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hamilton v. Howard Univ., 960 A.2d 308, 314 (D.C.2008) (stating issue as whether age actually motivated the employer's decision). We need not determine whether D.C. case law prescribes a meaningfully different standard from the one in Gross because, based upon the evidence in this case, no reasonable jury could believe either appellant's age had a determinative influence upon PwC's failure to promote him or was the but-for cause of that decision. As for Schuler, PwC maintains it did not make him a partner in 2001 because there was no business case for doing so. The record shows business conditions had deteriorated: In 2000 and in 2001 the RAS nominated no one for partner, and Schuler himself acknowledged there was slow economic activity and not a lot . . . of regulatory action in 2000-2001. Schuler presents no evidence rebutting that explanation. He points to a statement made by the head of the RAS in September 1999 when proposing him for partnership the RAS is booming and I need full time partnersbut it is anachronistic and therefore unavailing. Murphy likewise fails to provide any basis upon which a reasonable jury could disbelieve PwC's primary explanation for not making him a partner, viz., that employees were rated on a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 being the highest; the RAS proposed for partnership only employees with performance ratings of 1 in each of the three prior years; and Murphy was not promoted because he did not meet that requirement. The record documents the existence and exercise of such a policy: Every candidate the RAS proposed for partner in the years for which there are data in the record (1999 through 2004) had a performance rating of 1 in each of the three years before he was proposed, see Murphy v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 580 F.Supp.2d 4, 13 n. 15 (D.D.C.2008) (noting this fact), and Murphy did not have three years of 1s immediately before any year in which he claims he should have been made a partner2000, 2001, or 2004. Murphy does not contest these facts. Murphy does, however, maintain a reasonable jury could find he received relatively low performance ratings only because those rating him believed that, in view of his age, PwC would never make him a partner. As evidence of a general policy not to make older employees partners, Murphy points to the provision for mandatory retirement in the partnership agreement, to the modest number of employees who were made partner after turning 50 (between 1998 and 2005 only 61 (3.6%) of new partners were 50 or older; six (0.4%) were aged 55-59), and to comments three PwC executives made about the value of bringing in younger partners. No reasonable jury, however, could conclude from this general evidence that Murphy's ratings in particular were the result of his age and not of his performance; the record shows in the RAS alone at least two other employees over the age of 50 each received ratings of 1 in multiple years. Indeed, his co-plaintiff Schuler had received ratings of 1 for each of the three years prior to his 1998 nomination for partner, when he was 54. [] Finally Murphy asks us to provide guidance as to whether the provision in the partnership agreement making retirement mandatory at age 60 or 62 violates the ADEA because, he says, the issue is likely to rise [sic] again in this litigation. He contends most partners at PwC are more like employees than owners of the firm and are therefore entitled to the protection of the statute, which prohibits any mandatory retirement age for employees over 40. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (unlawful to limit an employee in any way which would deprive [him] of employment opportunities or adversely affect his status as an employee because of [his] age); see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., PC v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 445-46, 123 S.Ct. 1673, 155 L.Ed.2d 615 (2003) (employees, but not owners, of firm protected by antidiscrimination laws). Be that as it may, the district court correctly observed, in declining to pass upon the issue, that nothing in the present case turns upon it. See Murphy, 580 F.Supp.2d at 16 n. 22. Murphy seems to suggest the legality of the retirement provision affects whether he should prevail here, but it does not: Even if the partnership agreement violated the ADEA, that violation would have no bearing upon whether a reasonable jury could disbelieve PwC's explanation for not making Murphy a partner. Because a federal court does not have jurisdiction to issue an advisory opinion, see, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968) (no justiciable controversy is presented. . . when the parties are asking for an advisory opinion), we must decline Murphy's request to consider the issue.