Opinion ID: 2165009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Characterization and Valuation of Property

Text: A. The Wilson Lake Residence David purchased a house on Wilson Lake in Wilton in 1971. Mary moved into the house in 1983 and the couple remained there until they separated in 1990. Title to the property remained solely in David's name until 1989 when he conveyed it to himself and Mary as joint tenants. Both parties testified that David made the conveyance to enable Mary to finance a new real estate business. The court found that this real estate was mixed marital and nonmarital and awarded it to David along with the assumption of all mortgages and obligations. In Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018 (Me.1980), we held that a transfer of property during marriage from one spouse to both spouses jointly is presumed to be a transfer to the marital estate in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Id. at 1022. In Lalime v. Lalime, 629 A.2d 59 (Me.1993), we held that the transfer of property from a husband to himself and his wife as joint tenants for the purpose of securing a loan did not constitute clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of a gift to the marital estate. Id. at 61. Motivation for the transfer is irrelevant to whether a transferor has intended to make a gift to the marital estate. Id. We stated that the donor spouse's explanation of why title was placed in joint tenancy is not a denial of title transfer, but rather a statement of the reason for the gift. Id. We further noted: We do not mean to suggest that the presumption of a gift to the marital estate is an irrebuttable one. The presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the transferring spouse did not intend to transfer the property to joint ownership or was induced to do so by fraud, coercion, duress, or deception. Id. at 61 n. 1 (citation omitted). David's reason for transferring the property to joint tenancy is indistinguishable from that in Lalime and is insufficient therefore to overcome the presumption that it was a gift to the marital estate. We conclude that the court erred by finding to the contrary. As we stated in part I, the court adopted verbatim David's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. As a result, the court cited authority for its conclusions but failed to address the effect of Lalime on the present case, despite Mary's argument that Lalime was controlling. This omission creates doubt whether the court in fact performed its judicial function. B. The Teamster's Union Pension In 1979 David began earning credits with the Teamster's Union pension fund and continued earning credits after the couple married. The pension plan permitted four benefit choices that included a single life annuity option and three different survivor options. At the trial both parties offered expert testimony on the values of the marital and nonmarital portions of the pension. David's expert testified that the total present value of the pension was $29,000 and that the value of the marital portion was $9,200. Mary's expert testified that because she was substantially younger than David, the values of the survivor options would be greater than the single annuity option. He testified that depending on the option chosen, the present total value would range from $36,000 to $52,000, with the corresponding values for the marital portions ranging from $13,000 to $19,000. In its findings as proposed by David, the court explicitly stated that it accepted the valuation of Mary's expert and found the total present value to be $52,000 and the marital portion to be $13,000. A court's determination of what property is marital or nonmarital is reviewed for clear error and will not be disturbed if there is competent evidence in the record to support it. Williams v. Williams, 645 A.2d 1118, 1119-20 (Me.1994). Although there is competent evidence in this record to support a finding that the marital portion of the pension was $13,000, there is not competent evidence to support a finding both that the total present value was $52,000 and that the value of the marital portion was only $13,000. By finding that the total present value was $52,000, the court necessarily adopted the most valuable survivor option. The only evidence of the value of the marital portion of this option was offered by Mary's expert, who valued the marital portion at $19,000. The court's finding that the value of this marital portion was only $13,000 is inconsistent with its finding that the total value was $52,000 and is, therefore, clearly erroneous. C. The 401(k) Plan After David and Mary were married, David started a 401(k) retirement plan. He later borrowed $2,800 against the plan. At the time of the trial the gross value of the plan was approximately $10,000. A few weeks before trial, David borrowed an additional $4,100 against the plan. The loan check, however, was inadvertently delivered to Mary and she was still in possession of the uncashed check at the time of the trial. The court found that, after deducting the loans, the 401(k) plan had a net value of $4,000. The court awarded the 401(k) plan to David and required him to repay the loans. It did not account for the $4,100 loan check, but stated only that the proceeds from the loans were properly used for marital purposes. The court could not have had a basis on which to make this latter finding at the time of the trial. Not only had David not yet received the proceeds from the second loan, those proceeds were actually in Mary's possession. Although David testified that the purpose of the loans was for payment of marital expenses, there is no evidence that the proceeds were used for that purpose. The court's finding is, therefore, clearly erroneous. The result of this erroneous finding is that the value of the $4,100 check is not properly accounted for in the divorce judgment. From the judgment it appears that David receives only the 401(k) plan which the court valued at $4,000.