Opinion ID: 1044002
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Victim's Statements to Deputy Benton

Text: Deputy Benton arrived at Mr. Trentham's apartment in response to Mr. Trentham's 911 call. Answering the deputy's questions about what had occurred, Ms. Lackey told him about how her assailant had attacked her and described him, according to Deputy Benton, as a white male, approximately five foot nine, long black hair with a goatee, wearing camouflaged pants, . . . [with] a tear in the right leg and . . . a white Dale Earnhardt shirt. Ms. Lackey also told Deputy Benton that she had recognized her assailant because he had been on the can crew with her son. When Deputy Benton accompanied Ms. Lackey to her apartment, she identified to him the hat on her bed as belonging to her assailant. Ms. Lackey's statements to Deputy Benton were testimonial, and the State concedes this point in its brief to this Court. By the time Ms. Lackey was speaking with Deputy Benton, there was no longer an ongoing emergency. Ms. Lackey was describing past events to a law enforcement officer and she was answering questions designed to help apprehend her attacker. As recognized by the intermediate appellate court, this aspect of this case is very similar to the Crawford issue presented in Lewis. In Lewis, an assailant shot the owner of an antiques store during a robbery attempt. Hearing a disturbance in the store, some employees of the business next door came to investigate. They found the owner lying on the floor, shot. Responding to the 911 call, Detective Chastain arrived at the store while the owner was still lying on the floor, bleeding. By this time, the shooter had fled in a car driven by the female defendant. Detective Chastain asked the owner a series of questions about what had happened, and the owner described his assailant as a young black man. After medical assistance arrived and treatment had begun, the owner called to Detective Chastain and pointed, saying the lady's information is on the desk. On further questioning, the owner claimed that the lady was connected with the robbery and shooting. On the owner's desk was a piece of paper with the defendant's name on it. The owner later died of his gunshot wounds. See Lewis, 235 S.W.3d at 139-40. This Court determined that the victim's statements to Detective Chastain implicating the defendant were testimonial: The assailant had left the store. The victim had talked to [the next door employees] who were first to arrive at the scene. The 911 call had already been made. In Davis, the Court pointed out that the fact that [statements were] given at an alleged crime scene and were `initial inquiries' is immaterial. [547 U.S. at 832, 126 S.Ct. 2266]. While the victim's statements here took place at the crime scene, they were responses to inquiries by the investigating officers. Even though the victim was in a state of distress from his wounds, his comments did not describe an ongoing emergency, as defined in Crawford, and were instead descriptions of recent, but past, criminal activity as in Hammon [the companion case to Davis ]. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d at 147 (footnote omitted). Similarly, Ms. Lackey's statements to Deputy Benton were made after the 911 call had been made; after Ms. Lackey had already spoken with Mr. Trentham; after her assailant had left the premises; and they were made in response to questions by Deputy Benton aimed at discovering who the assailant was for apprehension purposes. Ms. Lackey's statements to Deputy Benton were descriptive of past criminal activity and were not addressed to responding to an ongoing emergency. Where the statements at issue are testimonial hearsay, the confrontation clause prohibits their admission unless (1) the declarant is unavailable, and (2) the defendant has been provided a previous opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354; Lewis, 235 S.W.3d at 146. Here, Ms. Lackey became unavailable upon her death the day after she was attacked. Defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine her prior to her death. The trial court erred in allowing Deputy Benton to testify about the statements that Ms. Lackey made to him. The trial court's error violated Defendant's constitutional rights under the federal and state confrontation clauses. However, [t]he erroneous admission of testimony in violation of an accused's right of confrontation is not structural error mandating reversal. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d at 306. Rather, we review for constitutional harmless error, and reversal is not required if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict at trial. Id. at 306-07. An assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of whether the witness' testimony would have been unchanged, or the jury's assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation; such an inquiry would obviously involve pure speculation, and harmlessness must therefore be determined on the basis of the remaining evidence. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021-22, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988). We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the State has carried its burden of demonstrating harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt in this case. Deputy Benton testified that, when he accompanied the victim back to her apartment, he found her bedroom in disarray. He collected as evidence a hat found on the victim's bed. Subsequent DNA analysis indicated that Defendant had been in contact with this hat at some point. Mr. Pruitt testified that he took Defendant to Ms. Lackey's residence and that Defendant entered her residence, ostensibly to borrow money. Defendant remained inside for fifteen to twenty minutes. Mr. Trentham testified that Ms. Lackey told him that her attacker was someone her son knew. Ms. Lackey's son testified that he knew Defendant. Ms. Lackey told medical personnel that her attacker had tried to rape her with his hand, had choked her, and had put her to the ground and then bent her legs up over her head. Medical proof established that Ms. Lackey died from a subdural hematoma suffered on the night she was attacked, caused by a sudden deceleration of her head. Had the jury heard only this proof, without Deputy Benton's testimony about Ms. Lackey's statements describing her attacker and telling him that the hat on her bed belonged to her attacker, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it would have convicted Defendant as it did. Defendant is therefore entitled to no relief on this issue.