Opinion ID: 3017068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Title III Recordings

Text: Following the decision in Crawford, the courts of appeals have struggled with the definition of “testimonial hearsay.” See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) (“We conclude that Llaurador’s signed confession, presented under oath to the prosecutor in Puerto Rico, is testimonial hearsay within the meaning given by the Supreme Court [in Crawford].”); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 674 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that “[a] statement made knowingly to the authorities that describes criminal activity is almost always testimonial” and thus concluding that CI’s statement to police wherein CI implicated defendant in criminal activity constituted testimonial hearsay); Parle v. Runnels, 387 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 2004) (suggesting, in dictum, that statements contained in diary constituted nontestimonial hearsay); United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 78 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that plea allocution transcript and grand jury testimony of unavailable witnesses constituted testimonial hearsay); see generally Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging & Securing 12 the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 511, 533615 (2005). Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq., a duly authorized law enforcement officer must obtain approval from the United States Attorney General or a designated Assistant Attorney General in order to apply to a federal judge for approval to intercept and record wire communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1); see also United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1974). Once such approval is obtained, the officer must present to a judge a written application for a wiretap, 18 U.S.C. § 2518, which must contain an adequate and particularized showing of probable cause. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(b). It must also contain a showing of necessity, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c), and explain why “normal investigative techniques would be of no avail.” United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1114 (3d Cir. 1985). The Government must further take steps to minimize the monitoring of nonpertinent conversations and otherwise to limit invasions of privacy. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5); see generally United States v. Sorapuru, 902 F. Supp. 1322 (D. Colo. 1995). In the instant case, the District Court determined that the wiretaps at issue were “legally sufficient in terms of authority, probable cause, necessity, and minimization.” J.A. at 39. Those findings are not before this court. As recounted in Section I, the District Court ruled that multiple conversations between the various Defendants and other third parties surreptitiously intercepted by law enforcement through Title III wiretaps were testimonial statements and thus inadmissible unless the particular speakers in any given conversation were to testify at trial. The District Court’s decision to exclude the Title III recordings on the basis of Crawford--under any conceivable definition of “testimonial”-- was error. Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for the defense was unable to argue to the contrary. First and foremost, the recorded conversations here at issue neither fall within nor are analogous to any of the specific examples of testimonial statements mentioned by the Court. 13 Crawford, 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1374 (listing “prior testimony [given] at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial[,] and . . . police interrogations” as examples of obviously testimonial statements). Second, the recorded conversations do not qualify as “testimonial” under any of the three definitions mentioned by the Court. They are not “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent,” nor are they “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized . . . materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.” 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1364 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Each of the examples referred to by the Court or the definitions it considered entails a formality to the statement absent from the recorded statements at issue here. Even considered in perspective of the broad definition offered by the NACDL, the Title III recordings cannot be deemed “testimonial” as the speakers certainly did not make the statements thinking that they “‘would be available for use at a later trial.’” Crawford, 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. 1364 (quoting Brief of NACDL). Rather, the very purpose of Title III intercepts is to capture conversations that the participants believe are not being heard by the authorities and will not be available for use in a prosecution. A witness “who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. The Title III recordings here at issue are much more similar to the latter than the former. Therefore, as recognized by other courts that have addressed similar issues, we find that the surreptitiously monitored conversations and statements contained in the Title III recordings are not “testimonial” for purposes of Crawford. See Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 84 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding “statements . . . made during a private conversation” nontestimonial); State v. Rivera, 844 A.2d 191, 202 (Conn. 2004) (“Glanville made the statement in confidence and on his own initiative to a close family member . . . . [It] clearly does not fall within the core category of ex parte testimonial statements that the court was concerned with in Crawford.”). Cf. United States v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278, 292 n.20 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he statement challenged as hearsay was 14 made during the course of the conspiracy and is non-testimonial in nature.”); United States v. Reyes, 362 F.3d 536, 541 n.4 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[C]o-conspirator statements are nontestimonial.”); People v. Cook, 815 N.E.2d 879, 893 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“[I]f the statements in question qualify as co-conspirator statements, the rule announced in Crawford does not apply to bar their admission.”). Inasmuch as the District Court erroneously interpreted the Crawford ruling as requiring the rejection of the Title III recordings, we will reverse its order denying the United States’ motion in limine. As we concluded above, the Title III recordings are not testimonial. Because of the District Court’s reliance on Crawford, it never considered whether the Title III conversations were admissible under the proper standards set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence and, to the extent it is applicable, the reliability standard under Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. But see Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1987) (“[W]e hold that the Confrontation Clause does not require a court to embark on an independent inquiry into the reliability of statements that satisfy the requirements of [Fed. R. Evid.] 801(d)(2)(E).”). Cf. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 399400 (1986) (holding that Confrontation Clause does not require the prosecution to show that 801(d)(2)(E) declarant is unavailable). Therefore, on remand the District Court is directed to determine on an individualized basis whether each of the Title III recordings is admissible (and, if admissible, against whom and for what purpose). 8