Opinion ID: 771073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Imposition of the Fine

Text: 27 Torres-Otero's direct criminal appeal, to which we now turn, challenges the procedure by which the district court levied a $ 25,000 fine at sentencing. We review the imposition of fines under the Sentencing Guidelines for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 620 (1st Cir. 1993). 28 Torres-Otero claims that the district court failed to fulfill its duty under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(D) 7 to settle disputes surrounding all facts relevant to his ability to pay the fine. In his sentencing memorandum, Torres-Otero had challenged the finding in the presentence report (PSR) that, despite extensive seizures already visited upon him by the government, he had the ability to pay a fine from either remaining assets or possible hidden drug proceeds. He contends that, based on the bare facts regarding his financial condition contained in the PSR, he has done all that is necessary to establish his inability to pay, notwithstanding the contrary factual conclusion reached by the probation officer. Torres-Otero also contends that the obligation to resolve factual sentencing disputes was essentially ignored [by the district court] in this case. 29 We find these arguments to be without merit. Torres-Otero does not dispute the basic proposition that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that his . . . case warrants an exception to the rule that a fine be imposed. United States v. Cunan, 152 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Peppe, 80 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1996)); see also U.S.S.G. 5E1.2(a) (The court shall impose a fine in all cases, except where the defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any fine.). And by his own admission he offered no affirmative evidence to prove that he could not pay. Instead, he merely takes umbrage with the probation officer's factual conclusion that he could pay the fine - a conclusion he considers unsupportable in light of the numerous seizures documented in the PSR. We have noted before, however, that evidence in the record that a defendant has a zero or even negative net worth does not, by itself, preclude the imposition of a fine. See Peppe, 80 F.3d at 23. 8 And in cases where a defendant fails to rebut factual assertions in a PSR, the district court is justified in relying on those assertions. See United States v. Grant, 114 F.3d 323, 328 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Mir, 919 F.2d 940, 943 (5th Cir. 1990)); United States v. Garcia, 954 F.2d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding reliance on facts in PSR lawful when defendant challenges interpretation of facts but not the facts themselves). 9 30 Torres-Otero's contention that the district court neglected to resolve adequately these factual disputes also fails. The record indicates that the district court referred to the PSR's findings regarding Torres-Otero's financial condition at the sentencing hearing, and expressly adopted those findings in issuing the judgment. As we have recently observed, under these facts the only logically inferable conclusion is that the court rejected . . . appellant's fact-based challenge[] to the PSI Report. United States v. Saxena, 229 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Savoie, 985 F.2d at 621). 10 On this record, the district court's conclusion was well within its discretion. 31 Affirmed.