Opinion ID: 769386
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alford pleas and U.S.S.G. S 4A1.1

Text: 11 The most interesting issue on appeal, and one as to which there is a dearth of caselaw in this or any other court, is Mackins's contention that the District Court erred in calculating his criminal history category because it counted the sentence on his Alford plea. 2 As noted earlier, pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 4A1.1(b), two criminal history points are assessed for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days, but not exceeding one year. Section 4A1.2(a)(1) defines a prior sentence asany sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for conduct not part of the instant offense. Id. No other terms are defined in the guideline or in the commentary which follows. 12 Mackins argues that, by definition, only if the defendant has acknowledged factual guilt by entry of a guilty plea, been found to be factually guilty as a result of a trial, or acknowledges the government has sufficient evidence, which if found credible, would support a finding of guilty is there an `adjudication of guilt' usable i[n] calculating criminal history. He contends that an Alford plea lacks the factual basis from which to conclude that the defendant is factually guilty of the offense. Instead, he submits, in an Alford plea the defendant asserts factual innocence or denies guilt, but accepts the disposition in order to obtain a favorable sentence. 13 The origin of what has become known as an Alford plea -- North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) -- must, of course, inform our decision. Alford was a defendant who had been indicted for first-degree murder, a capital offense in North Carolina. Given the strength of the state's evidence against him, Alford's attorney recommended that he plead guilty to a charge of second-degree murder, thereby avoiding the possibility of a death sentence. Prior to accepting his plea, the trial court heard a summary presentation of the state's case, including the sworn testimony of several witnesses who testified, inter alia, that Alford had stated his intention to kill the victim shortly before the murder and returned home with the declaration that he had carried out the killing. Id. at 28. Alford insisted that he was innocent, but nonetheless confirmed his desire to plead guilty because he faced the threat of the death penalty if he did not do so. Id. The trial court accepted his plea. 14 In subsequent federal habeas corpus proceedings, Alford challenged the voluntariness of his guilty plea, arguing it was the product of fear and coercion. Id. at 29. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed and held that Alford's plea of guilty should... have been rejected because [it was] impermissibly induced by his desire to eliminate the possibility of a death sentence. Id. at 30. 15 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, and made clear that a defendant's desire to avoid a potential death sentence does not necessarily demonstrate that the plea of guilty was not the product of a free and rational choice. Id. at 31. The Court then discussed the impact, if any, of Alford's insistence at the time of pleading guilty that he did not commit the murder. See id. at 32 (recognizing that [i]f Alford's statements were to be credited as sincere assertions of innocence,.... it might be argued that the conviction... was invalid, since his assertion of innocence negatived any admission of guilt). The Court pointed out its prior approval of nolo contendere pleas, and explained that [i]mplicit in the nolo contendere cases is a recognition that the Constitution does not bar imposition of a prison sentence upon an accused who is unwilling expressly to admit his guilt but who, faced with grim alternatives, is willing to waive his trial and accept the sentence. Id. at 36. The Court could not perceive any material difference between a plea that refuses to admit commission of the criminal act and a plea containing a protestation of innocence when, as in the instant case, a defendant intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt. Id. at 37. Indeed, the Court acknowledged that its earlier cases dealing with pleas of nolo contendere would be directly in point if Alford had simply insisted on his plea but refused to admit the crime. Id. Although Alford's case presented a different factual scenario from that found in a plea of nolo contendere, i.e., Alford expressly insisted on his innocence, the Court rejected the argument that it was constitutional error for the trial court to accept the plea given the strong factual basis for the plea demonstrated by the State and Alford's clearly expressed desire to enter it. Id. at 38. 16 The Court was clearly concerned with the apparent conflict in accepting Alford's plea of guilty coupled with his assertion of innocence. Nonetheless, relying his interest in pleading guilty, i.e., avoiding a harsher sentence, and the evidence on the record of his actual guilt, the Court was persuaded that he could, under such circumstances, plead guilty. Simply put, the Court was persuaded that once a factual basis for guilt is established, the fact that the defendant may continue to proclaim his innocence does not negate the legal conclusion that he is guilty. See, e.g., White Hawk v. Solem, 693 F.2d 825, 829 (8th Cir. 1982) (As long as there is in fact a strong factual basis supporting a guilty plea, it is valid even if the defendant protests his innocence.); Government of Virgin Islands v. Berry, 631 F.2d 214, 220 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980) (recognizing that, pursuant to Alford, a guilty plea may be accepted notwithstanding the defendant's protestation of innocence). 17 As Alford and the cases which followed in its wake made clear, however, there must always exist some factual basis for a conclusion of guilt before a court can accept an Alford plea; indeed, a factual basis for such a conclusion is an essential part of an Alford plea. Willett v. Georgia, 608 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir. 1979) (In the face of a claim of innocence a judicial finding of some factual basis for defendant's guilt is an essential part of the constitutionally-required finding of a voluntary and intelligent decision to plead guilty.); United States v. Casscles, 494 F.2d 397, 399-400 (2d Cir. 1974) (explaining that the District Court took too narrow a view of Alford by simply focusing on the fact that the defendant made a voluntary and intelligent choice to plead guilty without making sure that there was a factual basis for the plea). Accordingly, we conclude that an Alford plea is, without doubt, an adjudication of guilt and is no different than any other guilty plea for purposes of S 4A1.1. 18 We, therefore, reject Mackins's contention that the drafters of the Sentencing Guidelines, by not including the Alford disposition in the definition of prior sentence in S 4A1.2(a)(1), intended that it not be counted under S 4A1.1. Its omission from S 4A1.2(a)(1) most likely reflects an understanding that it was unnecessary to list it as a separate disposition. As we have, hopefully, satisfactorily explained, an Alford plea is simply a guilty plea, with evidence in the record of guilt, typically accompanied by the defendant's protestation of innocence and his or her unequivocal desire to enter the plea. See 400 U.S. at 38. That the defendant asserts his or her innocence, however, does not change the fact that he or she ultimately enters a guilty plea. Thus, as the government succinctly states, [t]here is no such thing [as an Alford disposition], at least not separate and distinct from a plea of guilty. 3 19 Mackins, nonetheless, argues that his Alford plea should not be regarded as an adjudication of guilt because the underlying record at the time he pled guilty to attempted grand larceny lacked a factual basis from which it could be concluded that he was guilty of the charged offense. He claims that [t]here is not one iota of evidence that the government had a `strong case', an `overwhelming' case, or that the evidence against [him] `substantially negated his claim of innocence.'  20 Even assuming that Mackins made a claim of innocence at that time, and the record is far from clear on that point, his argument amounts to an attack on the underlying factual basis for his Alford plea. 4 In that regard, he is no different than a defendant who, having been convicted by a jury at some prior time, argues before a District Court at the time of sentencing on his new conviction that the prior conviction should not be included under S 4A1.1 because the verdict was based on legally insufficient evidence. It is a well-settled principle that, with very limited exceptions, a prior conviction cannot be collaterally attacked in the District Court at the time of sentencing on a new conviction. See Moore v. United States, 178 F.3d 994, 997 (8th Cir.) (Generally, defendants may not collaterally attack prior convictions used for sentencing enhancements.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 356 (1999); United States v. Arango-Montoya, 61 F.3d 1331, 1336 (7th Cir. 1995) ([A] prior conviction may be collaterally attacked at sentencing only where the defendant claims that he was deprived of counsel in violation of Gideon.) (citation omitted); United States v. Jones, 27 F.3d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1994) ([A] defendant may not collaterally attack prior state court felony convictions during a federal sentencing hearing unless the defendant was deprived of counsel in the state court proceedings.); see also United States v. Thomas, 42 F.3d 823, 824 (3d Cir. 1994) ([A] district court, when sentencing a defendant classified as a career offender under section 4B1.1, cannot entertain a constitutional challenge to the underlying convictions except in a case in which the defendant's right to counsel had been denied.); United States v. Garcia, 42 F.3d 573, 581 (10th Cir. 1994) ([W]ith the exception of a collateral attack based on the complete denial of counsel, a district court sentencing a defendant under the career offender provisions of the Guidelines cannot consider a collateral attack on a prior conviction.). Moreover, a Note to S 4A1.2 makes it clear that this guideline and commentary do not confer upon the defendant any right to attack collaterally a prior conviction or sentence beyond any such rights otherwise recognized in law. U.S.S.G. S 4A1.2, comment. (n.6). Accordingly, we accord Mackins's Alford plea the same finality we accord any other adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere. Id. 21 In sum, because an Alford plea is an adjudication of guilt under S 4A1.2(a)(1), any sentence imposed pursuant to an Alford plea is a prior sentence for purposes of S 4A1.1. The District Court, therefore, did not err by including the sentence on Mackins's Alford plea in the calculation of his criminal history category.