Opinion ID: 1867862
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was There Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause to Justify the Seizure?

Text: ¶ 53 Our analysis cannot end here because this case is unlike Hodari D. in one significant respect: Young did not abandon the contraband before he was seized. Thus, we cannot rely on abandonment as the basis for admitting the incriminating evidence. Instead, we must inquire whether Alfredson's search of Young's coat was justified. ¶ 54 We begin with the rule that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Williams, 255 Wis.2d 1, ¶ 18, 646 N.W.2d 834. There are, however, `specifically established and well-delineated' exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357, 88 S.Ct. 507). One of these exceptions is for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 753, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); see also Wis. Stat. §§ 968.10 (authorizing a search incident to arrest) and 968.11 (authorizing a search incident to arrest for the purpose of, inter alia, [d]iscovering and seizing the fruits of the crime). ¶ 55 There is a similar, albeit more limited, exception for searches incident to an investigatory stop. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868; State v. Guy, 172 Wis.2d 86, 93-94, 492 N.W.2d 311 (1992). If a police officer reasonably suspects a person of committing a crime, he may frisk the person if he reasonably believes the person is armed and if a reasonable officer would have believed the person posed a safety risk to the officer or others. Id. at 93-94, 492 N.W.2d 311; see also Wis. Stat. § 968.25. ¶ 56 We need not resolve whether Alfredson's search of Young's coat was a frisk or a search, because we conclude that Alfredson had probable cause to believe Young had violated Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1)obstructing an officerby the time he arrested Young on the porch, thereby justifying a full-blown search. ¶ 57 To prove Young guilty of obstruction, the State was required to show: (1) Young obstructed an officer, meaning his conduct prevented or made more difficult Alfredson's performance of his duties; (2) Alfredson was acting in an official capacity; (3) Alfredson was acting with lawful authority; and (4) Young knew Alfredson was acting in his official capacity and with lawful authority and that his conduct would obstruct the officer. See Wis JI  Criminal 1766. Young contests the sufficiency of the evidence as to the third element, whether Alfredson had reasonable suspicion when he ordered Young to return to the car. Without reasonable suspicion at the time he ordered Young to return to the car, Alfredson would have lacked lawful authority. See id. ¶ 58 To determine whether Officer Alfredson had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop, we examine the facts leading up to the stop to determine whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003). ¶ 59 An officer need not dispel all innocent inferences before conducting an investigatory stop. Anderson, 155 Wis.2d at 84, 454 N.W.2d 763. Indeed, the suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). As a leading commentator notes in regard to reasonable suspicion: Such generalities as he didn't look right will not suffice; like Officer McFadden in Terry, the officer must relate what he has observed, and, when appropriate, indicate why his knowledge of the crime problem and the habits of the residents on his beat or of the practices of those planning or engaging in certain forms of criminal conduct gives special significance to what he observed. 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.5(a), at 476 (4th ed. 2004). ¶ 60 Alfredson testified at a preliminary examination, at a suppression hearing, and at the jury trial. His testimony was consistent. ¶ 61 First, Alfredson testified to his knowledge of the neighborhood. It was a problem area with several nearby bars. It was known for fights, drinking in cars, littering, and drug use. The police had made the area a priority for patrol, especially after 10:00 p.m., because of these problems. Many cars were in the area on Saturday, October 26, 2002. ¶ 62 Second, Alfredson testified that he was an experienced officer who had patrolled this area for seven years. He was familiar with local automobiles and local practices. Alfredson understood there was a correlation between people remaining in their cars for an extended time and the use of alcohol and narcotics in those cars. Based on his nightly patrols, Alfredson knew this type of activity was common in the neighborhood. ¶ 63 Third, Alfredson testified to the facts that aroused his suspicion. Specifically, five people had lingered in an unfamiliar car with Illinois license plates for five to ten minutes. It was nearly midnight. Alfredson did not see these people get out to go to a bar or a local party, or come back from one. He did not see them drop off one of their number. If any of the occupants were going to spend the night at a dwelling on 21st Avenue, they could have left the car and gone inside. Alternatively, the whole group might be driving back to Illinois after an evening of drinking. Perhaps they were still drinking in the car. Five people sitting in a car for about ten minutes, around the corner from a major bar, shortly before midnight: The facts were not necessarily unusual, but they were not usual, either. ¶ 64 Although there are innocent explanations for why five people would be sitting in a car for five to 10 minutes, Alfredson was not required to rule out all these potential explanations before initiating his investigation. The officer described the particular facts that made him suspicious and linked those facts to his seven years of experience patrolling the neighborhood. At the time Alfredson stopped his squad car, turned on his flashers, and illuminated Young's car, we think there were sufficient facts for Alfredson to initiate an investigatory stop. [17] ¶ 65 Determining that Officer Alfredson had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop is different from determining that he seized the vehicle and its occupants. That is a close question with respect to the persons in the car other than Young. When a marked squad car pulls up behind a car, activates emergency flashers, and points a spotlight at the car, it certainly presents indicia of police authority. [18] Yet, not every display of police authority rises to a show of authority that constitutes a seizure. As both Mendenhall and Hodari D. teach, not every police action, initiative, display of authority, or interaction with a citizen would cause a reasonable person to believe that he was not free to leave. A police officer's actions must be assessed in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident. ¶ 66 Not every contact between the police and a citizen constitutes a seizure. In this case, the officer did not stop a moving vehicle or a vehicle about to move. Compare State v. Harris, 206 Wis.2d 243, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996). Young's car was already stopped and had been parked for some time. When Alfredson's squad approached Young's car, he was not able to pull in behind it, out of the lane of traffic. This presented him with two choices. He could park his car at some distance and proceed on foot, or he could stop in the lane of traffic and turn on some warning lights. ¶ 67 Young concedes that Alfredson had authority to approach the suspect car on foot to check it out and make inquiry. We think, however, that it would be unreasonable to expect an officer, traveling alone near midnight, in a problem area, to leave his squad car and approach a suspicious car full of people, without being able to see clearly the situation into which he was walking. We think this would ask too much and would discourage effective law enforcement. [19] Cf. Terry, 392 U.S. at 23, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (noting it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties). ¶ 68 Instead, Alfredson turned on his emergency flashers and a spotlight, two actions consistent with a concern for the safety of passing motorists and the safety of the officer. We believe the flashing lights are the same lighting the officer would have used if he had stopped to aid a motorist. The officer never turned on his red-and-blue rolling lights. ¶ 69 On these facts, we are reluctant to conclude that the positioning of the officer's car, together with the lighting he employed, necessarily involved such a show of authority that a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870. We are not required to make that determination in this case. ¶ 70 Even if we were to determine that the officer's show of authority constituted a seizure and that he did not have reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop, it would not help Young. Young's situation is governed by a different rule because of Hodari D. ¶ 71 At the very moment Alfredson illuminated the spotlight, Young got out of his car. This might have been a coincidence, but a reasonable officer could suspect that it was not. In response, the officer called out to Young. This call was either not heard or it was ignored. If there were any doubt that Alfredson had reasonable suspicion before he illuminated the car, there can be no doubt that Alfredson had reasonable suspicion after Young got out of the car and disregarded Alfredson's first order. ¶ 72 One might argue that at the moment Young exited the car, a reasonable officer in Alfredson's position would have had no way of knowing what the person intended. Alfredson's first order for Young to return to the car may be viewed as a reasonable attempt to clarify the ambiguity in Young's conduct. It is also a standard tactic for police officer safety. Once Young disregarded the command and began to flee, Alfredson had reasonable suspicion to stop Young. ¶ 73 Officer Alfredson testified that after he ordered Young to return to the car the first time, Young turned and started walking away. We acknowledge that people may have the right to disregard the police and walk away without giving rise to reasonable suspicion. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). Where a police officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business.  Id. (emphasis added). Under these circumstances, any `refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a [stop] or [arrest].' Id. ¶ 74 Plainly, however, a person who disregards a police officer's order assumes the risk that the officer cannot establish that he had reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. The person who believes he is exercising his Fourth Amendment rights by disregarding the officer may be subjecting himself to criminal prosecution if the officer has reasonable suspicion to make a stop. [20] ¶ 75 Young's actions were not consistent with disregarding the police presence and going about his business. Young had remained in the car for at least five to 10 minutes. The instant Alfredson illuminated Young's car with the spotlight, Young altered his course of conduct and got out of the car. It is improbable that the timing of Alfredson's appearance and Young's abrupt departure, with no word to the officer, were mere coincidence. Young's action smacked of evasion and flight, which can properly give rise to reasonable suspicion when viewed in the totality of the circumstances. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125, 120 S.Ct. 673. Thus, we conclude that Young's evasive action, set against the above-described facts, reinforced reasonable suspicion. ¶ 76 Because Alfredson had reasonable suspicion before he issued his second command for Young to return to the car, we conclude Alfredson was acting with lawful authority when he issued this second order. Thus, there is sufficient evidence in the record for a jury to have convicted Young of obstruction. ¶ 77 As a result of this conclusion, it also follows that when Young disregarded Alfredson's second command to return to the car, Alfredson had probable cause to arrest Young for obstruction. Because a search incident to arrest is one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, Alfredson lawfully searched Young's jacket, in which he found the vial of marijuana. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034. Thus, the circuit court properly denied Young's motion to suppress evidence of the marijuana. ¶ 78 Lastly, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to convict Young of resisting an officer, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1). For Young to be guilty of resisting, the State had to prove: (1) Young resisted an officer, meaning he used force to oppose Alfredson; (2) Alfredson was acting in an official capacity; (3) Alfredson was acting with lawful authority; and (4) Young knew Alfredson was acting in his official capacity and with lawful authority and that his conduct would resist the officer. See Wis JI  Criminal 1765. As with his conviction for obstructing, Young only contests the third element; that is, whether Alfredson was acting with lawful authority. Because we have concluded that Alfredson had probable cause to arrest Young for obstruction before he physically apprehended Young, there is sufficient evidence in the record for a jury to have convicted Young of resisting.