Opinion ID: 744166
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasonably Anticipated Use

Text: 11 The district court concluded that Mr. Kampen's use of the jack was not reasonably anticipated. The LPLA defines reasonably anticipated use as a use or handling of a product that the product's manufacturer should reasonably expect of an ordinary person in the same or similar circumstances. LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53(7). Whether a particular use of a product is reasonably anticipated is an objective inquiry, undertaken from the manufacturer's point of view at the time of manufacture. See Lockart v. Kobe Steel Ltd. Constr. Mach. Div., 989 F.2d 864, 867 (5th Cir.1993). The factfinder must determine how the manufacturer should have reasonably expected ordinary people would use its product. See LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 2800.53(7); see also John Kennedy, A Primer on the Louisiana Products Liability Act, LA. L. REV. 565, 586 (1986), quoted in Myers v. American Seating Co., 637 So.2d 771, 774 (La.App.1994). 12 Before the LPLA became effective in September 1988, a products liability claimant had to show that his damage resulted from a condition of the product that made it unreasonably dangerous to normal use.  Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So.2d 839, 843 (La.1987) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Normal use included all intended uses, as well as all foreseeable uses and misuses of the product. Id. (citations omitted). The Louisiana legislature replaced the normal use test with the LPLA's reasonably anticipated use requirement. The legislature apparently intended the new reasonably anticipated use standard to be narrower in scope than the normal use standard it replaced. See Dunne v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 679 So.2d 1034, 1037 (La.App.1996); Myers, 637 So.2d at 775 (citations omitted); Daigle v. Audi, 598 So.2d 1304, 1307 (La.App.1992); Walker v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 582 So.2d 258, 259 (La.App.1991). The parameters of the reasonably anticipated use test nevertheless remain imprecise. 13 The Louisiana courts have frequently defined reasonably anticipated use in terms of what it is not, contrasting a reasonably anticipated use with one that is merely conceivable. See Myers, 637 So.2d at 779 (Although this use may be a conceivable use, it is not a reasonably anticipated use.); Delphen v. Department of Transp. & Dev., 657 So.2d 328, 333 (La.App.1995) (The more restrictive scope of liability [under the reasonably anticipated use standard] was meant to avoid prior confusion because virtually any conceivable use is foreseeable.) (citation omitted). As one of the LPLA's drafters explained:  'Reasonably anticipated use' ... convey[s] the important message that the manufacturer is not responsible for accounting for every conceivable foreseeable use. Kennedy, supra at 586. The following are examples of uses that are conceivably foreseeable, but not reasonably anticipated: ... a consumer might use a soft drink bottle for a hammer, might attempt to drive his automobile across water or might pour perfume on a candle to scent it. Id.
14 Both the language of the LPLA and the cases that have interpreted reasonably anticipated use suggest that the statute is aimed principally at the manner in or method by which the claimant operated or handled the product. The statute defines reasonably anticipated use in terms of the use or handling  of a product. LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53(7)(emphasis added); see also Lockart, 989 F.2d at 868 (the use of the excavator was hanging a pontoon from the bucket of an excavator with a chain); Myers, 637 So.2d at 779 (the use of the folding chair was standing on the back instead of the front portion of the seat); Delphen (the use was riding the tire with the front end loose). 1 Yet in some cases use may also encompass the purpose for which the product is used. 2 For example, if a consumer uses a soda bottle as a hammer, both the manner of use (hitting the bottle against a surface) and the purpose of use (to flatten or nail something) are not reasonably anticipated. 15 Viewing the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to Kampen, the manner in which he used the jack was one that Isuzu should have reasonably expected. He properly placed the jack, there was nothing unusual about how he operated the jack, and he even blocked the opposite wheel as suggested in the owner's manual. 3 Isuzu should also have reasonably anticipated the purpose for which Kampen used the jack: to jack up the car with which it was provided. Kampen did not use the jack for a conceivably foreseeable, yet bizarre purpose, such as elevating a house's foundation or jacking up a semi-truck. Hunter v. Knoll Rig & Equipment Manufacturing Co., 70 F.3d 803, 812 (5th Cir.1995) (Benavides, J., dissenting), reh'g denied with per curiam opinion, 80 F.3d 136 (5th Cir.1996). 16 Isuzu contends, however, that getting under the car was part of the use of the jack. We disagree. In our view, Kampen's use of the jack was complete when he jacked up the car. Not every action taken in connection with the product is a use of the product. Placing oneself in the zone of danger created by a product is different from using the product. For example, in Lockart, the use that the court found was not reasonably anticipated was hanging a steel pontoon by the teeth of an excavator bucket, not getting under the suspended pontoon. Lockart, 989 F.2d at 868. Here, getting under the car while it was elevated by the jack was not a use of the jack within the meaning the statute any more than a hat that is blown under the car uses the jack or a child uses the jack by wandering underneath the car. 17 Use includes both the manner in which a product is handled and the purpose for which the product is used to the extent that the purpose affects the manner in which the product is handled. Limiting the scope of use in this way is consistent with the apparent purpose of the reasonably anticipated use requirement: to express the types of product uses and misuses by a consumer that a manufacturer must take into account when he designs a product, drafts instructions for its use and provides warnings about the product's dangers in order that the product not be unreasonably dangerous. Kennedy, supra at 584. In every case in which the courts have found that a use was not reasonably anticipated, the manufacturer would have had to do something to make the product safe (or, more precisely, not unreasonably dangerous) for the unanticipated use that would have been unnecessary to make the product safe for a reasonably anticipated use. 4 In other words, the way in which the claimant used the product caused the product to exhibit a weakness or defect that would not have manifested itself had the product been used in the manner or for the purpose the manufacturer could reasonably expect. In this case, the use to which Kampen put the jack did not create a defect that would not have otherwise existed. That is, the fact that he was under the car did not make the failure any more or less likely to occur. The risk that Isuzu was required to take into account in designing, manufacturing, and warning about the jack was that the jack would collapse under the weight of a vehicle it was designed to lift. 18 Moreover, even if getting under the car was a use of the jack, we are unwilling to hold that, as a matter of law, the manufacturer should not have reasonably expected a user to place part of his or her body beneath a jacked up car. 19 The district court viewed the sole issue ... [to be] whether, viewed in the light of ... [Isuzu's adequate] cautions, placing one's body beneath a car supported only by the jack is reasonable behavior. 923 F.Supp. at 111. This is incorrect. The reasonable in the phrase reasonably anticipated use does not refer to the plaintiff's behavior, but rather to the manufacturer's anticipation. That the plaintiff's behavior is unreasonable does not necessarily mean that the manufacturer should not have reasonably anticipated it. No doubt there may be overlap between unreasonable uses of a product and uses of a product that the manufacturer should not reasonably anticipate. And, a use may be so unreasonable or the danger from such a use so obvious that, as a matter of law, no manufacturer would reasonably anticipate the use. See, e.g., Hunter, 80 F.3d at 137 (per curiam denial of rehearing); Lockart, 989 F.2d at 868. But unreasonable use and use that is not reasonably anticipated are not coterminous. Reasonably anticipated use is use that a manufacturer should reasonably expect of an ordinary person in the same or similar circumstances. LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53(7) (emphasis added). 20 Under Louisiana law, the unreasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct is taken into account by a system of comparative fault. See Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, Div. of Ervin Indus., 462 So.2d 166 (La.1985); Thomas C. Galligan, The Louisiana Products Liability Act: Making Sense of It All, 49 LA. L. REV . 629, 685 (1989) (stating the obvious: that the [LPLA] makes no change in Louisiana's comparative fault law). The claimant's comparative fault provides the manufacturer with an affirmative defense that may well reduce the claimant's recovery. But if a product is unreasonably dangerous in a use that the manufacturer could reasonably anticipate, the fact that the claimant has put himself or herself in the zone of danger created by that defective product should not bar the claimant's recovery. Cf. Terrebonne v. Goodman Mfg. Corp., 687 So.2d 124 (La.App.1996). Applying the reasonably anticipated use element to preclude recovery by a negligent plaintiff would inject a contributory negligence bar through the back door. See Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So.2d 1123, 1136 (La.1988) (quoting Murray v. Ramada Inn, Inc., 821 F.2d 272 (5th Cir.1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 21 If the Louisiana legislature had intended the reasonably anticipated use requirement to function as a contributory negligence bar, it could have said so. The LPLA's definition of adequate warning suggests that the Louisiana legislature did not consider ordinary to be synonymous with reasonable: unlike the definition of reasonably anticipated use, which refers to an ordinary person, see LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53(7), the definition of adequate warning speaks of an ordinary reasonable user. See id. § 9:2800.53(9) (emphasis added). 22 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Louisiana has recognized that it can be reasonably expected that ordinary people will sometimes act without reasonable care. See Levi v. Southwest La. Elec. Membership Co-op., 542 So.2d 1081, 1086 (La.1989) (explaining that a power company's placement of electrical lines may demand precautions against 'that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life and therefore to be anticipated' )(citing Murphy v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 2 Ir. Rep. 301 (1897); other citations omitted). The issue under the LPLA is not whether the claimant engaged in a reasonable use of the product, but rather whether the manufacturer should have reasonably anticipated that an ordinary person would use the product in a particular manner. Even if Kampen acted negligently in getting under the car, his use of the jack to lift the car was still a reasonably anticipated use. 23 In support of its conclusion that Kampen's use was not reasonably anticipated, the district court relied on two warnings given by Isuzu, one in the owner's manual and the other on the vehicle's spare-tire compartment, which cautioned jack users not to get beneath the vehicle. 24 This court in Lockart extensively discussed an instruction in the operator's manual for an excavator, which warned not to use the teeth of the excavator's bucket to lift anything. In that case, two workers suspended a steel pontoon from the teeth of the excavator's bucket with chains and got underneath the pontoon to work on it. 989 F.2d at 865. The chains slipped, and the pontoon fell, killing one man and injuring the other. Id. The Lockart plaintiffs argued that the presence of the warning indicated that the manufacturer reasonably anticipated that people would use the teeth of the excavator's bucket as a suspension device. We rejected that argument, noting: 25 When a manufacturer expressly warns against using the product in a certain way in clear and direct language accompanied by an easy to understand pictogram, it is expected that an ordinary consumer would not use the product in contravention of the express warning. 26 Id. at 989. 27 Although this statement is strong medicine, it does not control the outcome of this case for several reasons. First, unlike the instruction in Lockart, the warning in this case did not warn against a manner of using the product or instruct how the product could be used safely, but rather warned how the damage that might result from the jack's failure could be minimized. Second, the Lockart court recognized that the warning would not establish that a use was not reasonably anticipated if ... despite the warnings, [the manufacturer] should have been aware that operators were using the excavator in contravention of certain warnings. Lockart, 989 F.2d at 868. In this case, Isuzu should have been aware that jack users would place parts of their bodies under the car notwithstanding a warning not to do so. Finally, the court in Hunter v. Knoll Rig, suggested that the presence of the warning was not necessary to the outcome in Lockart. 70 F.3d at 806. Instead, the court insisted that the Lockart decision turned on the obviousness of the danger to both ordinary and experienced users. Id. 28 Lockart established that instructions are relevant to whether the claimant was using the product in a reasonably anticipated manner. But to hold that warnings are always dispositive of the reasonably anticipated use issue would be nonsensical and fundamentally inconsistent with the LPLA. The process established for evaluating unreasonably dangerous design under the LPLA demonstrates that the Louisiana legislature did not intend the presence of warnings to be dispositive of the reasonably anticipated use inquiry. Under the LPLA balancing test for determining whether a product has an unreasonably dangerous design, the factfinder must consider [a]n adequate warning about a product ... in evaluating the likelihood of damage. LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 2800.56(2). If any warned-against use were per se not a reasonably anticipated one, then this portion of the unreasonably dangerous design provision would be superfluous. See Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1294 n. 9 (5th Cir.1987)(holding that a statutory provision should not be construed to render another provision superfluous). 29 Moreover, a per se rule that any warned-against use is not reasonably anticipated could produce harsh and unintended results. Such a rule would allow a manufacturer to insulate itself from liability for uses of a defective product that are unquestionably reasonably anticipated. Consider, for example, a manufacturer that refuses to place an inexpensive guard on a radial saw to prevent severe hand injuries. Instead, the manufacturer warns the user against placing his or her hands under the rotating blade of the saw. Is the use of the saw by a home improvement buff who slices off a finger any less reasonably anticipated because the manufacturer may have warned against placing one's hands under the saw? The manufacturer cannot so easily transform a reasonably anticipated use of a defective product into a use that is not reasonably anticipated. 5 We conclude that in this case, the presence of a warning not to get under the car could not transform Kampen's otherwise reasonably anticipated use into a use that could not have been reasonably anticipated. 30 Isuzu also attempts to rely on the fact that Kampen worked as a mechanic for several years. This court in Lockart noted the expertise or sophistication of the user in discussing whether the use of a pontoon as a suspension device was reasonably anticipated. See 989 F.2d at 868. In Lockart, however, the product was designed for use by experienced operators: the ordinary user of bulldozing equipment is familiar with heavy equipment. Not so with a tire jack: the ordinary user of a tire jack is anyone who drives a car. Isuzu could reasonably anticipate that an ordinary person using a tire jack might place some part of his or her body under the elevated vehicle. 6 Moreover, the Lockart court's reliance on the expertise of the users in that case was dictum. The Lockart court recognized that the Louisiana statute requires an examination of what the manufacturer should expect of an ordinary person in the same or similar circumstances. Lockart, 989 F.2d at 868. The court concluded that the dangers of using the bucket to suspend a heavy pontoon should have been obvious to the ordinary consumer and certainly to experienced workers. Id. Finally, even if the expertise of the individual plaintiff has some bearing on reasonably anticipated use, there is no reason to suspect that an experienced mechanic would not use a tire jack to investigate the underside of his personal automobile. 31 We conclude that the summary judgment evidence presents a question for the jury regarding whether Kampen's use of the jack was reasonably anticipated. Consequently, summary judgment on the basis of the reasonable anticipation element was improper.