Opinion ID: 2803228
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment

Text: We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary judgment. See Cont’l Terminals, Inc. v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 782 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1 Robinson does not challenge on appeal the district court’s dismissal on summary judgment of her claims against defendants Rick Dibble and Cliff Hilton for tortious interference with contractual relations and prima facie tort. 2 2015). Robinson’s ADA and Title VII disparate treatment claims are premised on her gender and on the fact that she suffers from anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Claims of discrimination under Title VII and the ADA are analyzed pursuant to the burden-shifting framework established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying McDonnell Douglas to ADA claim). Under that framework, after a plaintiff presents evidence establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant in response may articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the defendant successfully articulates such a reason, the plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that the reason proffered by defendant is pretextual, and that the employer’s action was discriminatory. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-08 (1993); McBride, 583 F.3d at 96. Aside from her termination, none of the conduct of which Robinson complains rises to the level of an “adverse employment action” sufficient to make out a prima facie case of discriminatory disparate treatment under Title VII or the ADA. “To be ‘materially adverse’ a change in working conditions must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Galabya v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). As to Robinson’s termination, assuming arguendo that Robinson had successfully made out a 3 prima facie case of discrimination, she failed to adduce evidence upon which a reasonable juror could conclude that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason proffered by Purcell for her termination – that the project at the Fort Drum military base on which Robinson was working was reaching completion, and the company was therefore carrying out layoffs due to reduced staffing needs – was pretextual. Robinson proffered no evidence that Dibble and Hilton, the individuals whose conduct allegedly displayed a discriminatory animus towards her, played any part in her termination, nor did she offer any evidence of discriminatory animus on the part of those who were responsible for her termination. Robinson’s Title VII and ADA hostile work environment claims were also properly dismissed on summary judgment.2 A plaintiff alleging a hostile work environment must prove either that the conduct complained of was “sufficiently continuous and concerted to be considered pervasive, or that a single episode [wa]s severe enough to establish a hostile working environment.” Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass’n, 192 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Robinson did not argue that a single episode of harassment in this case was sufficiently severe to create a hostile work environment, to survive summary judgment, she was required to offer evidence “that the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult[] that was sufficiently . . . pervasive to 2 We have not yet decided whether a hostile work environment claim is cognizable under the ADA. See, e.g., Giambattista v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 584 F. App’x 23, 25 n.1 (2d Cir. 2014). For purposes of this discussion, we assume, without deciding, that it is. 4 alter the conditions of [her] employment.” Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 227 (2d Cir. 2004) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Robinson has not done so here, offering evidence of crude and offensive comments directed at her gender or mental health issues that were delivered sporadically by coworkers which, while condemnable, did not rise to the level of creating an abusive and hostile workplace environment. The district court therefore did not err in granting Purcell’s motion for summary judgment as to Robinson’s Title VII and ADA discrimination and hostile work environment claims.