Opinion ID: 1512200
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion to Suppress the Statements at the Callaway County Jail

Text: The State's point on appeal is that the trial court did not err in overruling Fuente's motion to suppress the statements at the Callaway County Jail. The court of appeals found that the state troopers failed to scrupulously honor the defendant's right to cut off questioning as required by Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 326. The Western District, therefore, reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. It is not necessary for this Court to reach the issue of whether Officer Tinnin scrupulously honored Fuente's right to silence because we conclude that the court's refusal to exclude the statements would at most constitute harmless error within the meaning of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-11, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1265-6, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), the Supreme Court held that the Chapman harmless error rule can be applied to the admission of an involuntary confession. In situations where the harmless error rule is applicable, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). To rely on this principle, the State must demonstrate that the challenged evidence did not contribute to the defendant's conviction. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 289, 111 S.Ct. at 1253, citing Chapman, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824. The primary purpose of the troopers' questioning of defendants Fuente and Kerrigan at the jail was to determine the original source of the marijuana. During the course of the questioning, the troopers learned the essential element of a possession charge: that both of the defendants were aware of the presence of the marijuana in the Blazer. Essentially, this same information was obtained through the testimony of Defendant Kerrigan at the suppression hearing. As we previously determined, Kerrigan's testimony is admissible against Fuente because Fuente stipulated that the court could take that transcript of the motion to suppress hearing and all the evidence presented there as evidence in this matter (the trial). Because Kerrigan's testimony and Fuente's statements at the Callaway County Jail were cumulative, we conclude that Fuente's statements at the jail did not contribute to his conviction. Moreover, the 45 pounds of marijuana that was discovered as the result of a lawful search of the vehicle Fuente was driving, the interior of which was permeated with the inescapable odor of raw marijuana, was more than sufficient to prove that Fuente knowingly possessed in excess of 35 grams of marijuana. Based on the whole record, we can confidently say that any error the trial court may have committed in refusing to exclude Fuente's statements at the jail would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681, 106 S.Ct. at 1436. The State also argues in the alternative, and for the first time in its brief to this Court, that any error in admitting Fuente's statements at the Callaway County Jail was not prejudicial because this was a judge-tried case. We have already concluded, however, that any error committed by the court in admitting Fuente's statements at the jail was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the holding of Chapman, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824. Therefore, we need not rely on the fact that the court was the trier of fact in determining whether the admission of Fuente's statements at the jail was prejudicial error.