Opinion ID: 195871
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Nature of the Charges

Text: 19 Defendants contend that the trial court failed to determine that they understood the nature of the charges against them, as required by Rule 11(c)(1). See United States v. Ruiz-Del Valle, 8 F.3d 98, 102 (1st Cir.1993). Defendants maintain that they believed that the eight kilograms of cocaine could be somehow split among the three for sentencing, and, therefore, assert that they were prejudiced by the trial court's failure to explain that each of them would be held responsible for the cocaine found in their collective possession, regardless of any stated intention to later split the drugs. 20 There are two central difficulties with this argument. First of all, the amount of drugs for which each defendant is held responsible is an issue relevant to sentencing, not to a particular defendant's guilt. See United States v. Musa, 946 F.2d 1297, 1305 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Young, 927 F.2d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 943, 112 S.Ct. 384, 116 L.Ed.2d 334 (1991). 2 Secondly, the trial court personally addressed each defendant and discussed with him the maximum and minimum penalties provided by law for his offense. After fully explaining the guideline ranges, the court informed each defendant that the minimum sentence on Count I is 120 months. When asked if they understood this, each defendant answered in the affirmative. In addition, the trial court personally addressed each defendant and asked him to tell his story with respect to the charges against him. In telling their respective stories, none of the defendants gave the slightest indication that they disputed the amount of drugs involved or their role in the transaction vis-a-vis the total amount of drugs. 21 Defendants also argue that they must be allowed to withdraw their guilty pleas because the trial court did not read or explain the charges to them. Our review of the plea hearing transcript reveals that the trial court did not read the charges nor did it explain the law of conspiracy. 22 It is not necessary that the explanation of the charges come directly from the court, however, if it can be discerned from a review of the proceeding that the defendant nevertheless understood the charges. See Allard, 926 F.2d at 1246 (citing Dayton, 604 F.2d at 943). See also United States v. Musa, 946 F.2d 1297, 1305 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Darling, 766 F.2d 1095, 1099 (7th Cir.) (citing cases), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1024, 106 S.Ct. 579, 88 L.Ed.2d 561 (1985); United States v. Cusenza, 749 F.2d 473, 476 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Gray, 611 F.2d 194, 200 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 911, 100 S.Ct. 1840, 64 L.Ed.2d 264 (1980); United States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d 166, 173 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870, 98 S.Ct. 214, 54 L.Ed.2d 149 (1977). Thus, where the prosecutor's statement or the defendant's description of the facts sets forth all elements of the offense and the conduct of the defendant that constitutes the offense, the defendant's admission that the allegations are true is sufficient evidence that he understands the charge. Darling, 766 F.2d at 1099. See Allard, 926 F.2d at 1246. 23 In this case, each defendant stated at the plea hearing that he went, together with the other two defendants, to buy the drugs. In addition, Cotal-Crespo admitted to making phone calls with respect to the drug transaction. Thus, each defendant's admission of the events underlying the transaction accurately described the elements of a violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846--an agreement to buy a large amount of drugs 3 --and Cotal-Crespo's admission described the elements of a violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 843(b). Moreover, each of the defendants agreed with the prosecutor's detailed summary of the facts the government would prove at trial, which also included a description of all the elements of both charges. 24 The manner in which the charge is explained and the method for determining the defendant's understanding of the charge will vary from case to case depending upon the complexity of the charges, the capacity of the defendant, and the attendant circumstances. Allard, 926 F.2d at 1245. See also Darling, 766 F.2d at 1098. [W]hile the subtleties of conspiracy law may be the bane of criminal law students, the basic principle is easily understood: a group of people agreeing to do something illegal. United States v. Carter, 815 F.2d 827, 829 (1st Cir.1987). We find nothing in the record to indicate that the defendants did not understand the drug conspiracy charge. 4 Rather, the plea hearing indicates that the defendants knew exactly what they were charged with and voluntarily made the decision to plead guilty.