Opinion ID: 200608
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instructions and Statements to the Jury

Text: 12 Appellant challenges both the District Court's instructions as to the government's burden of proof for willful blindness, and its instructions as to what was required to convict Keene of aiding and abetting. 13 The standard of review for a challenge of this type to jury instructions as erroneous is de novo. United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 28 (1st Cir.2002). A willful-blindness instruction is proper if a defendant claims a lack of knowledge, the facts suggest a conscious course of deliberate ignorance, and the instruction, taken as a whole, cannot be misunderstood as mandating an inference of knowledge. United States v. Masse, 816 F.2d 805, 812 (1st Cir.1987). As this Court recently pointed out in another drug distribution case, whether there was knowledge of drug dealing, or so much awareness that ignorance was willful blindness, may turn exclusively on circumstantial evidence. United States v. Corchado-Peralta, 318 F.3d 255, 258 (1st Cir.2003). The District Court instructed members of the jury that they may infer knowledge from conscious ignorance, not that they were required to do so. See United States v. Bilis, 170 F.3d 88, 92 (1st Cir.1999). The instructions contained a clear explanation of what the jury was required to find in order to determine whether Mr. Keene had been willfully blind to the presence of large quantities of drugs on his property. In particular, the lower court explained that it was important to bear in mind that mere negligence or mistake in failing to learn the facts is not sufficient. There must be a deliberate effort to remain ignorant of the fact. Jury Instructions at 10(# 32). The instructions gave an accurate statement of the pertinent law. 14 Appellant also argues that, because the crime of aiding and abetting was not charged in the indictment, the jury should not have been instructed about it. A defendant may be convicted as an aider and abettor if the evidence shows: (1) that the underlying offense was committed by a principal; (2) that the defendant consciously shared the principal's knowledge; and (3) that he willfully associated himself in some way with the crime and willfully participated in it as he would in something he wished to bring about. United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92, 109-10 (1st Cir.2003). When asked about the fifty-two pounds of marijuana in his garage, Keene observed, It's been there for a while. When told he faced serious drug charges, he asked that his girlfriend not be charged, stating it's my house, it's my garage.... I guess it's my responsibility. He later speculated that whoever put the marijuana there must have put the coke there as well. 15 An instruction on aiding and abetting may be given although there is no reference to the crime in the indictment. United States v. Footman, 215 F.3d 145, 154 (1st Cir.2000). Indeed, a charge of aiding and abetting is implicit in indictments for substantive offenses. Ibid. The revisor's note to 18 U.S.C. § 2 states that one who puts in motion or assists in the illegal enterprise ... is guilty as a principal even though he intentionally refrained from the direct act constituting the completed offense. The instruction was proper, and since it had been given in Keene's first trial, which ended in a mistrial, he cannot claim that the charge came as a surprise to him in the second trial. The instructions on aiding and abetting and willful blindness were proper.