Opinion ID: 844262
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Evidence of an Uncharged Offense

Text: Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that he committed an uncharged assault on Darrell Milton an hour before he beat Ricky McDonald to death. The claim fails because defendant fails to show prejudice.
In addition to the McDonald and Grote killings and the Ortiz attempted murder, the information charged defendant with robbing McDonald and alleged the robbery as a special circumstance of the murder. The alleged robbery consisted of stripping McDonald's lifeless body of its clothing and taking his shoes and bag of fast food. The court granted defendant's section 995 motion to set aside the robbery charge and special circumstance. It explained that the evidence indicated defendant formed the intent to rob only after McDonald was dead. After Nicole Halstead pled guilty, the prosecutor made a proffer that she would provide new evidence supporting a robbery-felony-murder theory. The new evidence involved the uncharged assault on Milton. Halstead was to testify that, when McDonald approached them, defendant and Cooksey were still hyped up from the Milton beating and were angry that they had failed to rob him. The prosecutor argued that the evidence would be relevant to an ongoing state of mind and evidence of [defendant's and Cooksey's] intent to rob McDonald. The court ruled evidence of the Milton assault admissible. It explained that there are sufficient similarities between this occurrence and the killing of Ricky McDonald so as to permit the admission of the evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101(b). [¶] As to the element of intent and/or mental state, the court is further and separately of the view that the evidence regarding the Milton incident is relevant and admissible as demonstrating a continuing course of conduct. . . . It does survive a 352 analysis and it is admissible. Later, the court reaffirmed its ruling that evidence of the Milton assault was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101(b) bearing upon the issues of intent and mental state. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court ruled that the prosecution had still failed to prove that defendant formed an intent to rob McDonald before killing him. Consequently, the court denied the prosecutor's request to instruct the jury on a felony-murder theory. [17] However, the court stressed [t]hat is not to suggest that counsel are precluded from arguing the evidence of taking as being probative of [defendant's] state of mind or intent. In charging the jury, the court gave this limiting instruction. Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant engaged in conduct, more particularly the liquor store incident, other than that for which he is on trial. This evidence, if believed, may not be considered by you to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit crimes. It may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show the intent and/or mental state which is a necessary element of the crime of murder of Ricky McDonald as charged in Count 1 of the information. For the limited purpose for which you may consider such evidence, you must weigh it in the same manner as you do all other evidence in the case. You are not permitted to consider this evidence for any other purpose.
(4) `Evidence that a defendant has committed crimes other than those currently charged is not admissible to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character or has a criminal disposition; but evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove, among other things, the identity of the perpetrator of the charged crimes, the existence of a common design or plan, or the intent with which the perpetrator acted in the commission of the charged crimes. (Evid. Code, § 1101.) Evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove identity, common design or plan, or intent only if the charged and uncharged crimes are sufficiently similar to support a rational inference of identity, common design or plan, or intent. [Citation.]' ( People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169].) ( People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1328 [117 Cal.Rptr.3d 658, 242 P.3d 105] ( Foster ).) [18] (5) As we stated in Kipp, `There is an additional requirement for the admissibility of evidence of uncharged crimes: The probative value of the uncharged offense evidence must be substantial and must not be largely outweighed by the probability that its admission would create a serious danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. ( People v. Ewoldt [(1994)] 7 Cal.4th 380, 404-405 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757].) On appeal, a trial court's resolution of these issues is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( Id. at p. 405.) A court abuses its discretion when its ruling falls outside the bounds of reason. ( People v. De Santis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1226 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210].)' ( People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th 349, 371.) ( People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1149 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 117 P.3d 476]; accord, Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 1328-1329; see Evid. Code, § 352. [19] ) (6) The least degree of similarity is required to prove intent or mental state. A higher degree is required to prove common plan, and the highest degree to prove identity. ( People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 736 [114 Cal.Rptr.3d 63, 237 P.3d 416]; Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 776; People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 402-403.) (7)`Evidence of intent is admissible to prove that, if the defendant committed the act alleged, he or she did so with the intent that comprises an element of the charged offense. In proving intent, the act is conceded or assumed; what is sought is the state of mind that accompanied it. [Citation.]' ( People v. Ewoldt, supra , ante, p. 394, fn. 2, italics in original.) ( People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 422 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 666, 867 P.2d 777].) In his jury argument, defense counsel conceded that defendant assaulted McDonald. He contested two points. First, he asserted that Cooksey, not defendant, inflicted the fatal blows. Second, he claimed that defendant did not possess the intent required for first or second degree murder. (8) Mental state and intent are rarely susceptible of direct proof and must therefore be proven circumstantially. ( People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741 [37 Cal.Rptr.3d 163, 124 P.3d 730]; People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 558-559 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].) Consequently, a defendant's actions leading up to the crime may be relevant to prove his or her mental state and intentions at the time of the crime. (See People v. Avila (2009) 46, Cal.4th 680, 701 [94 Cal.Rptr.3d 699, 208 P.3d 634]; Smith, at p. 741.) (9) `We have long recognized `that if a person acts similarly in similar situations, he probably harbors the same intent in each instance' [citations], and that such prior conduct may be relevant circumstantial evidence of the actor's most recent intent. The inference to be drawn is not that the actor is disposed to commit such acts; instead, the inference to be drawn is that, in light of the first event, the actor, at the time of the second event, must have had the intent attributed to him by the prosecution.' ( People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 171 [276 Cal.Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169].) ( People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 706 [27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289].) Defendant claims that his conduct in the Milton and McDonald incidents was not sufficiently similar to support an inference as to his intent. We need not resolve the question. Any error in allowing the jury to consider evidence of defendant's attack upon Milton was harmless. It is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached in the absence of the alleged error. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243] ( Watson ).) [20] Defendant's claim that the Milton evidence tipped the scales against [him] on the issue of whether the homicide was second degree murder or manslaughter is not compelling given the lack of strong provocation by McDonald and the viciousness of the attack upon him by defendant and Cooksey. Therefore, the asserted error, contrary to defendant's claims, was not of such gravity as to amount to a denial of his due process right to a fair trial, an impartial jury, and a reliable penalty determination guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and by Article One of the California Constitution.