Opinion ID: 1175624
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Multiple Convictions for Necessarily Included Offenses

Text: (2) For two alternative reasons, defendant maintains that multiple conviction is improper in this case. The first is in two steps: he contends (1) that a defendant may not be convicted of both a greater and lesser included offense, and (2) that statutory sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)) necessarily includes the lesser offense of lewd conduct (§ 288, subd. (a)). Thus defendant claims his convictions of lewd conduct must be reversed. The first step in defendant's argument is apparently correct. Although the reason for the rule is unclear, this court has long held that multiple convictions may not be based on necessarily included offenses. (See, e.g., People v. Moran (1970) 1 Cal.3d 755, 763 [83 Cal. Rptr. 411, 463 P.2d 763] [If the evidence supports the verdict as to a greater offense, the conviction of that offense is controlling, and the conviction of the lesser offense must be reversed]; People v. Bauer (1969) 1 Cal.3d 368, 375 [82 Cal. Rptr. 357, 461 P.2d 637] [double conviction is prohibited where one offense is necessarily included in another]; People v. Smith (1950) 36 Cal.2d 444, 448 [224 P.2d 719]; People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589, 604 [184 P.2d 512].) We recently affirmed this policy in People v. Cole (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568 [183 Cal. Rptr. 350, 645 P.2d 1182], in which the defendant was convicted of robbery and grand theft for the same act. We held the grand theft conviction must be reversed because it is a lesser necessarily included offense of the crime of robbery. ( Id. at p. 582.) Assuming arguendo that defendant correctly states the rule prohibiting multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses, his contention must still fail because its second step is unsupported. The test in this state of a necessarily included offense is simply that where an offense cannot be committed without necessarily committing another offense, the latter is a necessarily included offense. ( People v. Greer, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 596; In re Hess (1955) 45 Cal.2d 171, 174 [288 P.2d 5]; People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 612 [91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409]; In re Robert G. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 437, 441 [91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409].) Although the issue is not free of doubt, we believe that under this test the offense of lewd conduct is not a lesser included offense of statutory sodomy. The lewd conduct statute (§ 288, subd. (a)) provides in relevant part: Any person who shall willfully and lewdly commit any lewd or lascivious act ... upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person or of such child, shall be guilty of a felony.... (Italics added.) This provision can be violated only when a lewd act is committed with the required specific intent. In contrast, statutory sodomy is a general intent crime: the sodomy provision (§ 286, subd. (c)) makes punishable [a]ny person who participates in an act of sodomy with another person who is under 14 years of age and more than 10 years younger than he or she, and section 286, subdivision (a), defines sodomy as sexual conduct consisting of contact between the penis of one person and the anus of another person. Defendant argues that it is inconceivable that a person can engage in sodomy on a child without at the same time committing a lewd and lascivious act on that child. Although this may be accurate in a moral sense, it is not true that every such act is committed with the specific intent required in section 288. For example, an act of sodomy can be committed for wholly sadistic purposes, or by an individual who lacks the capacity to form the required specific intent. Defendant relies on People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658 [214 Cal. Rptr. 832, 700 P.2d 446], in which we observed that: It is true that appellant confessed to committing an act of sodomy on Carl Jr.'s body  an act which constitutes a violation of section 286 [sodomy] as well as section 288 [lewd conduct]. ( Id. at p. 697, fn. 47.) In Memro, however, the defendant admitted that the offenses he planned to inflict on his victim were to be done to achieve sexual satisfaction. ( Id. at p. 697.) Thus, we knew on the facts of the case that the defendant had the intent required under section 288, and our comment cannot be interpreted to hold that all acts of sodomy necessarily constitute lewd conduct. Other cases cited by defendant also fail to consider the precise question before us  whether sodomy must in all cases be committed with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of the perpetrator or his victim. [2]