Opinion ID: 853338
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellate Counsel's Handling of Trial Counsel's Failure to Present Any Mitigation Evidence at Penalty Phase

Text: Timberlake claims that appellate counsel ineffectively presented trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failure to present mitigation evidence at the penalty phase. Specifically, Timberlake claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena any witnesses for the penalty phase and for failing to present expert witnesses, and that this led to the presentation of no mitigation evidence. Menadue raised this issue in the direct appeal and this Court concluded that trial counsel may have reasonably concluded that to argue any mitigation evidence would be ineffective and would open the door to damaging rebuttal. Timberlake, 690 N.E.2d at 261. The postconviction court, in addressing this issue as one of trial counsel ineffectiveness, stated that [t]here can be no question that trial counsel also conducted a proper mitigation investigation[,] effectively investigated the strength of the State's request for the death penalty[,] and presented the most appropriate defense to that request, given the facts of the Petitioner's crime and his lengthy criminal history. Under the deferential standard of review of this claim, Timberlake has failed to establish his claim of appellate counsel ineffective assistance of counsel for two reasons. First, he has not established that Menadue's handling of the issue on direct appeal was deficient. From the information known to Menadue and available in the record, she cannot be deficient for failing to contend that the lack of subpoenas was the cause of the deficient performance. This information only became available in postconviction relief, and, thus, is not relevant to her performance. Furthermore, because the lack of mitigation evidence was ascertainable from the record, Menadue did not err in raising this issue on direct appeal. See Part III.A. Second, Timberlake has not established that there was prejudice from trial counsel's failure to present mitigation evidence and, therefore, any prejudice from appellate counsel's performance. The death penalty aggravator in this case is Indiana Code section 35-50-2-9(b)(6), the killing of a police officer in the course of duty. As we have previously noted, The killing of a police officer in the course of duty is a most serious crime. Police officers routinely risk their lives in the sometimes high stakes gamble of protecting society. They do a job that we all want and need done, though few of us possess the bravery and skill to do. They ask for little in return, but they do ask for some protection. The General Assembly recognized this in enacting the statutory aggravator of Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(6). The seriousness of this aggravator is magnified in the present case due to defendant's use of such deadly force to kill an unaware and unsuspecting police officer in an otherwise nonviolent and ordinary arrest. Lambert v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1060, 1066 (Ind.1996) (citations omitted). Although trial counsel could have presented evidence of Timberlake's difficult childhood and substance abuse problems, this evidence has previously been held to be not very weighty. See Coleman v. State, 741 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind.2000); Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 543 (Ind.1996). In this case, Timberlake shot a police officer for no apparent reason after the officer had allowed Timberlake to go free. This situation is, if anything, more egregious than Lambert, where the defendant had been arrested by the police officer he killed. Furthermore, Timberlake's mitigation evidence was that his family was poor, his parents were alcoholics, and Timberlake had a problem with alcohol. Although Timberlake's father was physically abusive, the evidence is not nearly as disturbing as that presented in Coleman. [8] As in this case, Coleman's counsel presented no mitigating evidence, but relied instead on a general religious and moral argument against the death penalty and a request for mercy. We concluded that: Taking into consideration all the evidence, both presented and omitted, and our previous holdings that a difficult childhood carries little mitigating weight, we conclude that it is extremely unlikely that the sentencing result would have been different had Coleman's trial counsel presented credible evidence of Coleman's childhood abuse and neglect. Because we find no reasonable probability that Coleman would have avoided a death sentence based on the omitted evidence, Coleman's claim of IAC at the penalty and sentencing phase of his trial fails under the second prong of Strickland. Coleman, 741 N.E.2d at 703. Given the minor weight of the mitigators and the aggravator present in this case, there is not a reasonable probability that the jury would have found the mitigators to outweigh the very weighty aggravator. Because appellate counsel was not deficient and there was no trial court prejudice, Timberlake fails on this claim.