Opinion ID: 1472584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claimed Privilege for Statements Made in Judicial Proceedings

Text: This jurisdiction, like the majority of other jurisdictions, has long recognized an absolute privilege for statements made preliminary to, or in the course of, a judicial proceeding, so long as the statements bear some relationship to the proceeding. Finkelstein, Thompson & Loughran v. Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc., 774 A.2d 332, 338 (D.C.2001). Under this jurisdiction's rule, an attorney has an absolute privilege to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he [or she] participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1977)). The judicial proceedings privilege is `based upon a public policy of securing to attorneys as officers of the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients.' Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 cmt. a). There are some limitations on the application of the privilege relevant to appellees' claim of privilege. Treatises addressing this issue have indicated that the so-called judicial privilege applies to judges, court officers, attorneys, parties, grand and petit jurors performing those functions, witnesses and participants in judicial proceedings. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS at 816-17 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that there is absolute immunity in judicial proceedings for judicial officers acting in an official capacity, grand and petit jurors performing their functions, witnesses even if testifying by affidavit, counsel in the conduct of the case, parties and instigators of prosecution in criminal cases) (citations omitted); and Robert Sack, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 8.2.1 (3d. ed. 2005) (noting that the privilege extends to parties, witnesses, counsel, jurors, and judges). Appellees cite no cases in support of the extension of this absolute privilege to a person who was not involved in, or connected with the judicial proceedings in one of the type of capacities indicated. Therefore, appellees failed to show at the pre-answer stage of the proceedings that Mrs. Oparaugo's statements are protected by the judicial proceedings privilege. [11] Ms. Watts is alleged to be an attorney, and therefore she comes within the category of individuals qualifying for the protection of the privilege. With respect to the absolute privilege for attorneys for statements made in judicial proceedings, this court has stated: An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he [or she] participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding. Finkelstein, supra, 774 A.2d at 338 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586) (other citations omitted). There is no contention that the Nigerian Court proceedings were not judicial proceedings. Rather, appellant argues that Ms. Watts was not participating as an attorney in those proceedings as she was not the lawyer for anyone involved in the proceeding or even licensed to practice law in Nigeria. Appellant argues that the mere showing that the participants in the Nigerian criminal investigation and subsequent civil rights suit are the brother and the estranged husband of appellee, Mrs. Oparaugo, and that Ms. Watts represents Mrs. Oparaugo in other matters, are insufficient interests to trigger this privilege. Further, he contends that the publication of the defamatory material had no connection to the proceeding in the District in which Ms. Watts represented his wife. Appellees seem to argue that Mrs. Oparaugo had an interest in the proceeding in Nigeria and that she engaged Ms. Watts to help her advance that interest; therefore, she is entitled to an absolute privilege. For at least two reasons, appellees' argument is not persuasive on this point. First, there has been no showing that the alleged defamatory documents were published in connection with the court proceeding or even in contemplation of a court proceeding in Nigeria in which Ms. Watts represented Mrs. Oparaugo's interest. Appellant alleges that the defamatory statements were published in a proceeding where Mrs. Oparaugo's brother, whom appellant accused of shooting him, alleged that appellant had violated his civil rights by filing a criminal complaint against him. Second, appellees have cited no cases that stand for the proposition that an attorney for a client who is not a party to a proceeding, a potential party or witness or otherwise connected with the proceeding is entitled to an absolute privilege of counsel. To the contrary, the language from Finkelstein makes it clear that the attorney claiming absolute privilege must be involved in the proceeding, not merely an attorney advocating the interest of a non-party. The language states that an attorney is protected for statements made as a part of a judicial proceeding in which he [ or she ] participates as counsel.  Finkelstein, supra, 774 A.2d at 338 (emphasis added). Thus, merely acting as an attorney is insufficient; the attorney must participate as counsel in the relevant proceeding. Since appellees failed to show that Ms. Watts was participating as counsel in the Nigerian proceeding, it cannot be determined on this record that she is entitled to claim absolute privilege. [12]