Opinion ID: 1322365
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenges to the 2001 and 2002 Biological Opinions are Moot

Text: The appellants challenge the district court's determination that the FWS's issuance of the 2003 B.O. did not moot the Environmental Groups' claims. [10] To determine whether any claim remains for review, we must ascertain what type of relief the Environmental Groups seek, and whether we can, at this juncture, afford them meaningful relief. [11] See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Smith, 110 F.3d 724, 727 (10th Cir.1997). The Environmental Groups essentially contend that, since the Minnow's listing as endangered, and continuing to the date of the filing of the third amended complaint, Reclamation has failed to fully consult. They prayed for a declaration [12] that the federal agencies are violating § 7(a)(2) by failing to consult on all discretionary aspects of the federal action, and for an injunction ordering full consultation. Because only the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O. had been issued when the Environmental Groups filed their third amended complaint, we must therefore interpret their pleadings as directed at the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O. The Environmental Groups' allegations of legal wrongdoing must be grounded in a concrete and particularized factual context; they are not subject to review as free-floating, ethereal grievances. See Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 251 F.3d 1007, 1010 (D.C.Cir.2001) (To determine whether anything remains of NMA's case, we need to identify which regulations NMA challenged and whether the new rules altered those regulations.). And only the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O. were extant targets for their allegations. The problem for the Environmental Groups, however, is that neither the 2001 B.O. nor 2002 B.O. still exists. After the Environmental Groups filed their third amended complaint, the FWS issued the 2003 B.O., which superseded both of them. The 2003 B.O. establishes a new regulatory framework under which the propriety of Reclamation's actions must be judged. The Environmental Groups have not argued that the 2003 B.O. is a mirror image of the two biological opinions that it supplanted, nor could they. Nor have they asserted that the changes are only superficial[]. Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 360 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir.2004). We must conclude that the FWS's issuance of the 2003 B.O. mooted the Environmental Groups' prayer for both injunctive and declaratory relief. If we issued an injunction directing Reclamation to consult concerning the biological opinions at issue in this litigation, it would have no effect in the real world because those biological opinions have been superseded. Indeed, even as to the 2003 B.O., a consultation injunction would be meaningless because the federal agencies already have consulted. An injunction ordering consultation [using an expanded scope] is no longer warranted. There is no point in ordering an action that has already taken place. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 728. Furthermore, any declaration that the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O. were insufficient due to Reclamation's failure to fully consult would be wholly without effect in the real world. The Environmental Groups insist that we are situated to provide some relief, especially declaratory relief regarding the scope of Reclamation's discretion in consultation. However, the Environmental Groups have not been able to point to some concrete ongoing injury. See Cox, 43 F.3d at 1348 ([T]his court has explained that a plaintiff cannot maintain a declaratory or injunctive action unless he or she can demonstrate a good chance of being likewise injured [by the defendant] in the future. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). As the regulations governing formal consultation, 50 C.F.R. § 402.14, and reinitiation of formal consultation, 50 C.F.R. § 402.16, [13] demonstrate, the duty to consult is not itself an ongoing agency action subject to challenge. See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 439-40 (5th Cir.1991) (Once an agency submits a plan that has been agreed to through the section 7 consultation process, the court then, applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, must approve or disapprove it.). In other words, the Environmental Groups cannot challenge the scope of consultation untethered from the federal agencies' efforts to develop a biological opinion. The consultation process culminates in the issuance of a biological opinion. [14] Water Keeper Alliance, 271 F.3d at 26. And, in this case, that biological opinion has now been issued (i.e., the 2003 B.O.). The Environmental Groups' concerns about whether Reclamation will appropriately consult with the FWS in response to changing water-demand conditions are far too speculative to support a claim for declaratory relief. Any such relief would amount to an advisory opinion regarding the scope of Reclamation's discretion and such an opinion would clearly be improper. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 730 (SUWA has not shown that the defendants are likely to violate section 7(a)(2) in the near future.); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lohn, 511 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.2007) (concluding that a claim for declaratory relief regarding allegedly improper regulatory policy was mooted by governmental agency's listing of killer whale species as endangered, which was ultimate objective of environmental advocacy appellants; the fact that agency employed the allegedly improper policy in effecting the listing did not alter the mootness calculus because it was too speculative that this policy in the future  might adversely affect listed species or affect  other  killer whale species); Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 04-3096-PA, 2007 WL 1072112, at  (D.Or. Apr.3, 2007) (Plaintiffs also argue that declaratory relief would be helpful to `ensure that the [new] BiOp complies with the law and does so in a timely manner' and that declaratory relief would `clarify and settle' defendants' legal obligations. I agree with defendants, however, such justifications are so vague as to make Article III's `case or controversy' requirement meaningless. Courts should not micromanage an agency's procedures under the guise of judicial review.). We addressed an analogous situation in Wyoming. There the State of Wyoming successfully brought a NEPA challenge before the district court against a rule of the U.S. Forest Service, commonly known as the `Roadless Rule,' that generally prohibited road construction in inventoried roadless areas on National Forest System lands. 414 F.3d at 1210. During the pendency of the appeal by certain environmental group defendant-intervenors, the Forest Service issued a final rule that replaced the Roadless Rule, and we concluded that the new rule has mooted the issues in th[e] case and dismissed the appeal. Id. In particular, we noted that [t]he portions of the Roadless Rule that were substantively challenged by Wyoming no longer exist. Id. at 1212. Furthermore, we reasoned that the alleged procedural deficiencies of the Roadless Rule are now irrelevant because the replacement rule was promulgated in a new and separate rulemaking process. Id. As in Wyoming, to the extent that the Environmental Groups seek a declaration that the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O. are legally infirm due to Reclamation's failure to consult using the full scope of its discretion, we are not situated to issue a present determination with real-world effect because those regulations no longer are operationalfor all material purposes, they no longer exist. And, because of that fact, we likewise are not situated to cure any purported procedural irregularities in Reclamation's consultation behavior concerning those opinions. Thus, the Environmental Groups' claims are moot. See also Colo. Off-Highway Vehicle Coal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 357 F.3d 1130, 1135 (10th Cir.2004) (Plaintiff's challenge to the 1997 Decision Notice and its request for declaratory and injunctive relief is moot. The 1998 Routt Forest Plan and its accompanying [off-road vehicle] use policy now governs the Routt National Forest making Plaintiff's attack on the 1997 Decision Notice futile. (emphasis added)); cf. Camfield v. City of Okla. City, 248 F.3d 1214, 1223 (10th Cir. 2001) (Because parties have no legally cognizable interest in the constitutional validity of an obsolete statute, a statutory amendment moots a case to the extent that it removes challenged features of the prior law[.] (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). On these facts, cases of our sister circuits also are instructive. For example, in American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Service, the Ninth Circuit summarized plaintiffs' challenge as follows: The plaintiffs alleged that the 1994-1998 Biological Opinion [issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service] violated § 7(a)(2) of the ESA. Specifically, American Rivers contended that the federal defendants violated the ESA by relying on the transportation of Snake River smolts to conclude that the 1994-1998 operations of the River Power System are unlikely to jeopardize the continued existence of the listed salmon. 126 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir.1997) (footnote omitted). However, during the course of the litigation, the National Marine Fisheries Service issued a new biological opinion (1995 Biological Opinion) which superseded the [challenged] 1994-1998 Biological Opinion. Id. at 1123. With little difficulty, the Ninth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' action was moot. Id. at 1124 ([T]he biological opinion in the present case has been superseded by the 1995 Biological Opinion. Therefore, any challenge to the 1994-1998 Biological Opinion is moot.). The D.C. Circuit reached a similar conclusion in National Mining Ass'n. At issue there was the validity of several federal regulatory requirements imposed on permit applicants, and the procedures for contesting the accuracy of information used to determine permit eligibility. 251 F.3d at 1009. The permits were issued under the Surface Mining Reclamation and Control Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., and its implementing regulations; no one could engage in surface coal mining without such a permit. Id. After oral argument, the Interior Department revised the regulations that governed some of the challenged regulatory requirements and procedures and, consequently, the D.C. Circuit was faced with additional questions concerning the extent to which the case is now moot. Id. After identifying the regulations that were the subject of appellant's challenge, the D.C. Circuit determined that the Interior Department's revisions to those regulations rendered appellant's attack upon them moot. Id. at 1010-11. In particular, the D.C. Circuit stressed that the revisions effected substantial changes to the previously existing regulatory regime, thus altering the real-world conditions and eliminating the possibility of meaningful relief. Id. at 1011. The court noted: The old set of rules, which are the subject of this lawsuit, cannot be evaluated as if nothing has changed. A new system is now in place. Id. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit determined that the revisions mooted appellant's challenge. See also Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 329 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir.2003) (holding ESA § 7 and § 9 claims moot when challenged permits were issued pursuant to superseded biological opinion); Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434, 446 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that the same rule of mootness applies where an agency would no longer be relying on the particular biological opinion that was being challenged, but rather upon a new opinion, and where an agency will be basing its ruling on different criteria or factors in the future). The relevant case law thus strongly counsels in favor of a conclusion of mootness here. Due to the FWS's issuance of the 2003 B.O., we can provide no effective relief. The Environmental Groups did not challenge the 2003 B.O., and it currently governs Reclamation's disposition of the water at issue. That B.O. has altered the real-world parameters within which Reclamation operates, creating a new regulatory context for assessing its compliance with its ESA obligations. The Environmental Groups' reliance on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Forest Guardians v. Johanns is unavailing. In that case, the Forest Service and the FWS engaged in comprehensive management and monitoring of lands used for grazing that ultimately allowed the Forest Service to presume that the FWS concurred each year in a no-jeopardy finding for parcels of land covered by its plan. Johanns, 450 F.3d at 458-59. When the Forest Service did not comply with the management and monitoring requirements, the plaintiff brought suit claiming that consultation should be reinitiated. See id. at 459-60. The Forest Service then reinitiated consultation and subsequently received the FWS's concurrence in its no-jeopardy finding. Id. at 461. In holding that the Forest Service's subsequent reinitiation of consultation did not moot the plaintiff's claims, the court distinguished our decision in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance. The court observed that the monitoring requirements were on-going action that would extend through the lease term. Id. at 462. Additionally, the court determined that the Forest Service was likely to continue its practice of not complying with the monitoring requirements, especially because it argued that compliance was not required. Id. The court, therefore, determined that a [d]eclaratory judgment in favor of Forest Guardians would thus ensure that the Forest Service does not continue to fail to meet its monitoring responsibilities in the future and that it fulfills its duty under the ESA to consult with FWS when necessary. Id. Consequently, the court concluded that, although the plaintiff's request for an injunction was mooted by reinitiation of consultation, a declaratory judgment would, nevertheless, provide relief. Id. at 462-63. The absence of an on-going ESA violation makes this case distinguishable from Johanns and more akin to Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 728-30 (finding plaintiff's claim, seeking declaratory judgment for the Bureau of Land Management's alleged failure to consult with the FWS as required by § 7(a)(2), moot when agencies subsequently completed informal consultation). Unlike the Forest Service in Johanns, Reclamation is not currently engaged in the same behavior that was the subject of the Environmental Groups' objections. Instead, the FWS issued a superseding B.O. with which Reclamation is complying. Thus, we are constrained to conclude that the issuance of the 2003 B.O. mooted the Environmental Groups' scope-of-consultation claim under the ESA.