Opinion ID: 200709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Demand for New Trial on Post-1969 Claims

Text: 24 Appellants also appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Reynolds on post-1969 failure-to-warn claims, which the district court found preempted by the terms of the Labeling Act. Cruz Vargas, 218 F.Supp.2d at 117. As with judgment as a matter of law, we review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Sparks v. Fidelity Nat'l. Title Ins. Co., 294 F.3d 259, 265 (1st Cir.2002). Furthermore, we may affirm the district court on any ground revealed by the record. Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 339 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003). 25 Appellants offer the intriguing suggestion that our preemption analysis consider the linguistic particularity of Puerto Rico in giving effect to the clearly expressed Congressional intent that warnings required by the Labeling Act be deemed adequate to inform the public of cigarettes' hazards. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331(1) (1998). Reynolds, on the other hand, points to case law analyzing the preemptive scope of the Labeling Act and argues that any state law tort action based on inadequate package warnings falls under the rubric of these decisions. See Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 488 n. 9, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (text of the Labeling Act specified the precise warning to smokers that Congress deemed both necessary and sufficient); Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (failure-to-warn claims preempted to the extent such claims require a showing that advertisement or promotion of cigarettes required additional, or more clearly stated, warnings); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 629 (1st Cir.1987) (describing state tort liability as seriously disruptive to the congressionally calibrated balance of national interests). We need not decide, however, if appellants' argument defeats preemption because we have already determined that the jury was required to believe Reynolds' uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony on the existence of common knowledge in Puerto Rico prior to July 1, 1969. It is thus axiomatic that proof of such common knowledge also stymies all subsequent failure-to-warn claims. 11 26 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law in favor of Reynolds. 27 Affirmed.