Opinion ID: 741074
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Georgia Prison Identification Card

Text: 53 Johnson also contends that the district court erred in admitting his Georgia prison identification card because the probative value of the prison card was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial value. The court reviews the district court's decision to admit the card for abuse of discretion. United States v. Chin, 83 F.3d 83, 87 (4th Cir.1996). 54 In the instant case, Campbell during his testimony referred to the second robber as having once been incarcerated in the Georgia Department of Corrections. Immediately following his testimony, the district court issued the following instruction: 55 All right, members of the jury. That testimony is admitted not--it is not evidence of any substantive elements of the offense, but, if connected later, is admitted solely on the issue of the identification of the [Johnson]. 56 Subsequently, the government presented the testimony of Special Agent Womble of the FBI, who testified about the arrest of Johnson at an area hotel, and items recovered from the hotel room after the officers searched the room. During his testimony, Agent Womble mentioned that Johnson's Georgia prison identification card was recovered from the room. Once again, the district court instructed the jury: 57 Members of the jury, you will recall that testimony regarding Georgia and the Department of Corrections has been admitted solely on the issue of identification of[Johnson]. This is in connection with that and may not be considered by you as probative of any of the substantive issues which the [g]overnment's required to prove, but is admissible and may be considered by you only on the question of whether [Johnson] has been identified. 58 Johnson concedes that the Georgia prison identification card was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show the identity of the [Johnson], but nevertheless, bases his argument on Rule 403 arguing that the prejudicial effect of the card outweighs its probative value. 59 Here, the district court gave two limiting instructions immediately following both Campbell's and Womble's testimony about Johnson's prior incarceration in Georgia and his prison identification card. As this court recognized in United States v. Jones, 907 F.2d 456 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1029, 111 S.Ct. 683, 112 L.Ed.2d 675 (1991), [t]he jury is generally presumed to be able to follow an instruction to disregard evidence, absent some strong indication that the evidence is so powerful that a jury could not ignore it and that the defendant would be harmed as a result. Id. at 460 (citing Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987)). The testimony surrounding Johnson's prison identification card does not rise to that level. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the identification card under Rule 403. Therefore, the district court's admission of the identification card is affirmed.