Opinion ID: 1462208
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The appellant does indeed argue that since no proceeding was pending before the trial court, the court lacked jurisdiction to compel her testimony. Essentially, she contends that the criminal action against her client, Aquino, on the charge of raping a nine-year old child, was not a proceeding because trial had not commenced. She further contends that the failure of the district attorney to bring charges against Aquino for default in required appearance precludes that charge from serving as a basis for jurisdiction. In support of her position she cites Commonwealth v. Polak, 438 Pa. 67, 263 A.2d 354 (1970), and Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d 1283 (1979). Both cases stand for the proposition that a subpoena duces tecum issued prior to the institution of criminal proceedings (the filing of a complaint) is invalid. The lower court found that both cases were inapposite, and held that its jurisdiction to compel appellant's testimony was proper based on the provisions of the Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947, as applied to the rape charge pending against Aquino. I agree and would hold that the trial court properly exercised its jurisdiction. Both Commonwealth v. Polak, supra , and Commonwealth v. DeJohn, supra , address the situation in which investigatory or prosecutorial officers subpoena information or documents prior to the commencement of a criminal action. Such action was clearly violative of the statutory grant of authority. 17 P.S. § 251. [1] The present case is readily distinguishable on several grounds. Here, a criminal complaint charging Aquino with the rape of a nine-year old child had been filed. Bail was set, and upon payment, Aquino was released. In posting bail, Aquino subjected himself to the conditions of bail, which included the requirement that he notify the court of any change of address. Pa.R.Crim.P. 4013(c). Aquino also signed a subpoena agreeing to appear in court at the designated place and on the designated date. He failed to appear and he failed to notify the court of his change in address, putting himself in violation of the court's lawful process and the conditions of bail prescribed by the criminal rules. However, his attorney showed up; as did the district attorney, the nine-year old prosecutrix, her five-year old brother (a witness), and the trial judge. Each, for his own part, ready to proceed with trial. The jurisdiction of the court had been invoked, and no one disputes the validity of that jurisdiction. Yet, without the defendant, the matter could not proceed  Justice was stymied. Obviously, the court had the responsibility to attempt to ascertain the whereabouts of Aquino in order that the prosecution could proceed. Common sense dictates that defense counsel is the logical target of the court's inquiry. It is in this context that we must determine the question of jurisdiction. The legislature has provided the judiciary with the means to compel testimony from witnesses who raise their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination [2] by statutorily authorizing the grant of immunity from prosecution based on any information given by the witness. In 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947, it states: (a) General Rule.  Immunity orders shall be available under this section in all proceedings before: (1) Courts. (2) Grand Juries. (3) Investigating grand juries. (4) The minor judiciary and coroners.       (c) Order to Testify.  Whenever a witness refuses on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding specified in subsection (a), and the person presiding at such proceeding communicates to the witness an immunity order, that witness may not refuse to testify based upon his privilege against self-incrimination. A refusal to testify after the grant of immunity may be punished by either civil contempt, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947(e), or criminal contempt, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947(f). It must be determined whether the trial court could properly compel the testimony of the appellant under the Immunity Act. There are two aspects to this determination: (1) was the pending rape charge against Aquino a proceeding as contemplated by § 5947(a) and (2) can information not strictly relating to the guilt or innocence of the defendant be compelled? As I construe the Immunity Act, the answer to both questions is yes. In construing a statute, we must attempt to ascertain the legislative intent. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). However, When the words of a statute are clear and free from doubt, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). In construing proceeding, this court once said in Commonwealth v. Dean, 172 Pa.Super. 415, 417, 94 A.2d 59, 60 (1953): Without question, the word `proceeding', standing alone, is broad enough to cover each step or all steps in a criminal action from commencement to final determination. The court found that legislative intent was paramount in deciding the meaning of the word in context. In ascertaining the legislative intent, I am also mindful of the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Brady, 470 Pa. 420, 368 A.2d 699 (1977), wherein the court construed 19 P.S. § 640.1 et seq., the predecessor to the present Immunity Act. The court said: [T]he delicate balance created by the privilege requires that the Act be construed according to its express terms, and that its applicability be limited to only those proceedings clearly within the purview of the language employed by the legislature. Id. 470 Pa. at 426, 368 A.2d at 702. In Brady, the court construed the act as being inapplicable to indicting, as opposed to investigating, grand juries. The legislature subsequently vitiated this construction by specifically including both in the present act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947(a)(2). Even if a strict construction is applied, the Immunity Act is applicable to criminal prosecutions before a trial court, whether trial has commenced or not. The clear, express and unambiguous language of the Act states that, [i]mmunity orders shall be available in all proceedings before: (1) Courts. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947(a) (emphasis added). This language was meant to encompass every aspect of the case subsequent to the filing of the criminal complaint and prior to the verdict. If the legislature had meant to limit the Act's applicability to the trial only, it could have easily done so by stating just that. The second determination  whether the Act can be used to compel information not strictly related to the guilt or innocence of the accused  is addressed in the majority opinion: It seems clear that if the claim were that appellant had information relevant to whether Aquino had committed the rape, the trial court would have had jurisdiction to grant her immunity so that the Commonwealth might call her as a witness against Aquino. But is not so clear that the Immunity Act was intended to extend to a situation where the information sought is irrelevant to whether the rape was committed. Opinion of Spaeth, J. at 326. I construe the Immunity Act to provide for the availability of immunity orders to compel information beyond that relevant to the guilt or innocence of the criminal defendant. The legislature has specifically provided that an immunity order may be issued, [W]henever a witness . . . refuses to testify or provide other information.  42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947(c) (emphasis added). I believe this language shows the intent of the legislature to extend the scope of the Act to information necessary to a just and expeditious resolution of the proceedings. [3] In Commonwealth v. Polak, supra 438 Pa. at 69, 263 A.2d at 355, the Supreme Court said, [t]he essence of a subpoena's function is to aid the court in the resolution of litigation. The court's power to compel testimony through the grant of immunity has an almost identical function. I would therefore hold that the court below had jurisdiction to compel the appellant, despite her claim of Fifth Amendment privilege, to divulge the whereabouts of her client. Finally, I wish to make clear that the trial court's power to compel such information is not limited to situations where a Fifth Amendment privilege is interposed and the provisions of the Immunity Act become applicable. I would hold that in the absence of a Fifth Amendment claim of privilege  i.e., relying solely on a claim of attorney-client privilege  the court's inherent authority to enforce its orders and decrees enables it to inquire into the whereabouts of the appellant's client. A further explanation of this position is set forth, infra. In sum, I would hold that the trial court has proper jurisdiction and authority to compel an attorney to reveal the whereabouts of his or her client under the Immunity Act or its contempt powers.