Opinion ID: 3010443
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: a substantial and recurring question of

Text: LAW We now turn to the issue in this case -- whether this appeal to the district court was permissible pursuant to § 39. The section reads: § 39. Appeals by the United States and the Government of the Virgin Islands (a)(1) The United States or the Government of the Virgin Islands may appeal an order, entered before the trial of a person charged with a criminal offense under the laws of the Virgin Islands, which directs the return of seized property, suppresses evidence, or otherwise denies the prosecutor the use of evidence at trial, if the United States Attorney or the Attorney General conducting the prosecution for such violation certifies to the Judge who granted such motion that the appeal _________________________________________________________________ 1. Under such a reading of § 39, appeals would be permitted in cases that were tried in the district court, but appeals would not be permitted to the district court from trials in the territorial court. See, Government of the Virgin Islands v. Testamark, 570 F.2d 482, 483 n.2 (3d Cir. 1978) (permitting an appeal from a trial in the district court under 4 V.I.C. § 39(c)), but see Government of the Virgin Islands v. David, 741 F.2d 653, 654 n.2 (3d Cir. 1984) (expressing doubt as to whether this provision of the Virgin Islands Code applies to appeals from trials in the district court). If the dicta in David is correct,§ 39 would have no force whatsoever if it did not apply to trials in the territorial court. 7 is not taken for the purpose of delay and the evidence is a substantial proof of the charge pending against the defendant. (2) A motion for the return of seized property or to suppress evidence shall be made before trial unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion. (b) The United States or the Government of the Vir gin Islands may appeal a ruling made during the trial of a person charged with a criminal offense under the laws of the Virgin Islands which suppresses or otherwise denies the prosecutor the use of evidence on the ground that it was invalidly obtained, if the United States Attorney or the Attorney General conducting the prosecution for such violation certifies to the Judge who made the ruling that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of the charge being tried against the defendant. The trial court shall adjourn the trial until the appeal shall be resolved. (c) The United States or the Government of the Vir gin Islands may appeal an order dismissing an information or otherwise terminating a prosecution in favor of a defendant or defendants as to one or more counts thereof, except where there is an acquittal on the merits. (d) The United States or the Government of the Virgin Islands may appeal any other ruling made during the trial of a person charged with an offense under the laws of the Virgin Islands which the United States Attorney or the Attorney General certifies as involving a substantial and recurring question of law which requires appellate resolution. Such an appeal may be taken only during trial and only with the leave of the court. The trial court shall adjourn the trial until the appeal shall be resolved. (e) Any appeal taken pursuant to this section eith er before or during trial shall be expedited. If an appeal is taken pursuant to subsections (b) or (d) during the 8 trial, the appellate court shall, to the extent practicable, give the appeal priority over all other pending appeals. (f) Pending the prosecution and determination of a n appeal taken pursuant to this section, the defendant shall be detained or released in accordance with applicable law. 4 V.I.C. § 39 (emphasis added). The territorial court gave the government leave to appeal under subsection (d), without considering on the record whether an appeal of its rulings would involve a substantial and recurring question of law which requires appellate resolution. The Virgin Islands Attorney General certified that the evidentiary rulings did involve such a question. The district court disagreed and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. We exercise plenary review over whether the territorial court's evidentiary rulings presented a substantial and recurring question of law because this is an issue of statutory interpretation, Christian v. Joseph, 15 F.3d 296, 297 (3d Cir. 1994), and because it involves the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Warner, 48 F.3d 688, 691 (3d Cir. 1995).2 In interpreting § 39(d), familiar canons of statutory interpretation direct that we begin with the text of the statute. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Sharp, 87 F.3d 89, 92 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). We are mindful that in considering subsection (d), we must look to the entirety of § 39 because the text of the statute is to be read as a whole. . . .since the meaning of statutory language, plain, or _________________________________________________________________ 2. Although the statute is not clear, we believe that § 39(d) requires that the court review the certification that there exists a substantial and recurring question of law requiring appellate resolution. If the issue did present a substantial and recurring question of law requiring appellate resolution, the territorial court's decision to grant leave to appeal would be reviewed by us only for an abuse of discretion. We would apply this standard of review because the statute vests the trial court with the discretion to grant or deny leave to appeal, presumably based on its familiarity with the course of the litigation. See United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817-818 (3d Cir. 1981) (where trial court has a superior vantage point from which to resolve the question, its decision merits a high degree of insulation for appellate revision). 9 not, depends on context. Hudson United Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Conn., 43 F.3d 843, 848 n.11 (3d Cir. 1994 ) (quoting King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (further citation omitted)). This is consistent with Virgin Islands law which provides that in interpreting its statutes words and phrases must be read with their context and construed according to the common and approved usage of the English language. 4 V.I.C. § 42 (1921). Terms that are technical or that have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, are to be construed and understood according to their peculiar and appropriate meaning. Id. None of the terms in the phrase substantial and recurring question of law which requires appellate resolution are defined by the statute. The term question of law does, however, at least in one sense, have a particular meaning in the law, where questions of law are distinguished from questions of fact. We thus understand a question of law as something other than a question of fact. Virgin Islands statutes on the books before the enactment of § 39 confirm this reading. Title 30, section 35, of the Virgin Islands Code, governing public utilities, for example, distinguishes between questions of law and findings of fact in appeals from the findings of the Commission. 30 V.I.C. § 35. Although this helps frame our inquiry, it by no means ends it. As many courts have remarked, distinguishing questions of fact from those of law is often no simple task. Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S.Ct. 457, 464 n.10 (1995) (collecting cases). The rulings at issue in this case were made under Fed. R. Evid. 403 and Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 16. There is no question that these rules applied to this case, that the court used the correct standard in applying the rules,3 and that the district court ordered relief specifically contemplated by both rules -- exclusion of the evidence. Under these circumstances, trial court orders made pursuant to these _________________________________________________________________ 3. The government has suggested that the territorial court acted with an improper motive when it excluded the evidence. For the reasons set forth infra note 5, we reject this characterization of the issues presented by this appeal. 10 two rules lie entirely within the court's discretion and are only reviewed for an abuse of that discretion. Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1111 (3d Cir. 1985); see also, 25 Moore's Federal Practice, § 616.02[4][e] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 1997). Indeed, if judicial restraint is ever desirable it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal. United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 442 (3d Cir.) (quoting United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir. 1988)), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 517 (1996). This is so in large part because the trial court sits in a unique position to evaluate the evidentiary and discovery questions, including the selection of sanctions, which suggests that the application of these rules in a particular case is unlikely to involve substantial or recurring questions of law. The issues presented here confirms this conclusion. Application of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 involved determining what discovery the district court had ordered; whether, when, and to what extent the government had complied with such orders; the importance of compliance to the case; and the appropriateness of various sanctions. Similarly, the orders made under Fed. R. Civ. P. 403 required the court to determine the purpose of the evidence, its value to the government, and its potential prejudice to the defendant in the context of the other evidence that the parties would introduce. Because these inquiries hinged almost entirely on the facts of this particular case, we conclude that the trial court's rulings presented no substantial question of law. For the same reason, any questions of law that the rulings raise are not recurring-- this case has unfolded in a unique way, and the evidentiary and discovery rulings from which appeal is sought present questions that are specific to this case. In its post-argument brief, the government characterizes the question for review as where the defendant has not been prejudiced, does a trial court have the power under Rule 16(d)(2)4 to, in effect, dismiss a serious criminal _________________________________________________________________ 4. It is unclear whether the government, by asserting that this is the question on appeal, was abandoning its argument that the Rule 403 rulings were appealable under the statute. Because the government made no explicit concession and because their earlier briefs argue that the Rule 403 rulings were appealable, we nonetheless considered this question. 11 charge as a sanction for discovery violations?5 But defendants have not conceded, and the trial court did not find, that the defendants have not been prejudiced and that excluding the evidence in this case was in effect, dismiss[ing] the charges against the defendants. Indeed, the trial court was clearly concerned with prejudice when it stated, with reference to the physical evidence that what if after seeing this billy club he wanted to hire an expert witness? He wouldn't be able to because at the last minute you are springing on him at least six items. As to the assertion that the exclusion of the evidence was equivalent to dismissing the case, both the victim and his niece identified the defendants, who were known to them previously. Indeed, Blake's attorney stated at trial that this is what he thought the whole case was about -- the testimony of the government's witnesses versus that of the defendants. Because the victim, who witnessed the crime, and his niece, who saw the scene immediately after shots were fired, were both prepared to identify the defendants as _________________________________________________________________ 5. The government formulated the question differently in its first brief to this court: to what extent may a trial court penalize the Government for the carelessness or confusion of an individual prosecutor? At oral argument two other versions of the this question were offered by the government: the propriety of the sanction in this case, and whether or not, simply because the trial court is annoyed with counsel, whether she can effectively gut the government's entire case? These questions incorrectly characterize the issue presented by this appeal. The trial court excluded evidence under Rule 403 because it was not sufficiently probative in light of the unfair prejudice it could cause. Evidence was excluded under Rule 16 because the government failed to comply with the court's discovery orders. Although the discovery sanctions may penalize the government for the carelessness and confusion of one prosecutor who failed to follow discovery rules, this is entirely appropriate under Rule 16. Moreover, we do not read the transcript to suggest that the judge ruled as she did because she was annoyed, instead the record shows that she ruled after considering the appropriate factors under the rules in question. Finally, the government never stated to the trial court that this was the issue for which it sought review; we thus have no reason to think that this was the issue which the trial court gave the government leave to appeal. Appeals under § 39(d) require leave from the trial court. 12 the perpetrators, the characterization of the exclusion of the evidence as a dismissal is entirely without merit.6 The balance of the statute also supports our conclusion that the Virgin Islands legislature did not intend to permit this appeal when it enacted the statute. Subsections (b) and (d) of § 39 provide the circumstances under which the government may appeal a ruling made during trial. Under (b) the government may appeal rulings made during trial that exclude government evidence on the ground that it was invalidly obtained. 4 V.I.C. § 39(b). The government must certify, however, that the evidence is a substantial proof of the charge being tried against the defendant. Id. Subsection (d) works the same way. It begins, however, with a broader set of rulings. Under it the government may appeal any other ruling made during trial. This is limited, however, by the language that requires government certification that the ruling involve a substantial and recurring question of law that requires appellate resolution. 4 V.I.C. § 39(d). Thus while subsection (b) is concerned with the importance of the evidence to the trial at hand, different concerns animate subsection (d). It is focused not on the role that the evidence plays in the specific trial but instead with the importance of the legal question that the trial court's ruling presents. This intent is made clear with the terms substantial and recurring which modify the phrase question of law. Thus it is not enough, under subsection (d) that the ruling excluded evidence that was important to the government's case-- the ruling must also present a question of law that has import in other cases as well. There is no issue on appeal which meets this standard.