Opinion ID: 1120097
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: commencement of 180 day period

Text: OSP contends, in support of the demurrer, that the 180 day period commenced either on May 5, 1975, the date of towing, or on May 6, 1975, the date OSP denied responsibility for the towing. In either event January 23, 1976, the date plaintiff discovered OSP's part in the matter, was more than 180 days after the event; consequently, the sustaining of the demurrer has the effect of foreclosing plaintiff's claim under the Tort Claims Act before he knew he had a claim under that Act. The Court of Appeals reached that result by holding: (a) that the loss or injury occurred the date of towing or the day after; (b) that the 180 day period from loss or injury in ORS 30.275(1) should commence at the same date as the two year period of limitations in ORS 30.275(3); (c) that under the Court of Appeals' decision in Dowers Farms, Inc. v. Lake County, 39 Or. App. 685, 593 P.2d 1207, 40 Or. App. 647, 595 P.2d 1385 (1979) the two year period was not tolled to allow discovery, but commenced upon the accident or occurrence; and (d) that the 180 day period is not delayed to give a plaintiff a reasonable period for discovery. Subsequent to the Court of Appeals' decision in the case at bar we allowed review of Dowers Farms, Inc. v. Lake County, supra , and held that the two year statute of limitations in ORS 30.275(3) does not begin to run until there is a reasonable opportunity for plaintiff to discover his injury resulting from defendant's negligence. Dowers Farms v. Lake County, 288 Or. 669, 607 P.2d 1361 (1980). We found no reason to construe the Tort Claims Act narrowly and therefore applied the body of law previously developed by this court in US Nat'l Bank v. Davies, 274 Or. 663, 548 P.2d 966 (1976) and Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 421 P.2d 996 (1966). In Berry we stated: To say that a cause of action accrues to a person when she may maintain an action thereon and, at the same time, that it accrues before she has or can reasonably be expected to have knowledge of any wrong inflicted upon her is patently inconsistent and unrealistic. She cannot maintain an action before she knows she has one. To say to one who has been wronged, `You had a remedy, but before the wrong was ascertainable to you, the law stripped you of your remedy,' makes a mockery of the law. 245 Or. at 312, 421 P.2d at 998. In US Nat'l Bank v. Davies, supra , we extended the period in which the statute of limitations is tolled to such time as it appeared probable that plaintiff's damage actually suffered was caused by defendant. See, also, Niedermeyer v. Dusenberry, 275 Or. 83, 549 P.2d 1111 (1976). In Schiele v. Hobart Corporation, 284 Or. 483, 587 P.2d 1010 (1978), we held that the statute of limitations begins to run when a reasonably prudent person perceives the role which the defendant has played in the plaintiff's injury. The notice of claim provision preserves for public bodies a special protection from action and, as such, is a vestige of the former doctrine of governmental immunity. In Dowers Farms v. Lake County, supra , we noted that the legislature largely abolished governmental tort immunity when it passed the Tort Claims Act and that a narrow construction of that legislation would be contrary to its remedial purposes. The logic of allowing a reasonable discovery period in the statute of limitations in ORS 30.275(3) is equally applicable to the 180 day notice period in ORS 30.275(1). OSP has candidly urged in the brief on appeal that the 180 day notice period and the two year statute of limitations should commence to run from the same date. The Court of Appeals was of like disposition in Hall v. City of Hillsboro, 29 Or. App. 161, 562 P.2d 597 (1977). We agree and hold that the 180 day period and the period of limitations does not commence to run until plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to discover his injury and the identity of the party responsible for that injury. Upon the facts presented by this record, therefore, the 180 day period began to run on January 23, 1976, the date when plaintiff discovered that OSP was in fact the party responsible for his injury.