Opinion ID: 901470
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: It was unnecessary to instruct the jury on Hy-Vee's affirmative defense and the burden shifting analysis.

Text: [¶ 17.] Hy-Vee's requested Jury Instruction No. 23 attempted to incorporate the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green burden shifting analysis. 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). At the outset, however, it must be noted that this instruction is an incorrect statement of the law. Therefore, it did not preserve the burden shifting issue for appeal. [¶ 18.] Comparing requested Jury Instruction No. 23 to the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis reveals that the trial court properly rejected the instruction as an incorrect statement of law. Under the correct McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by the preponderance of the evidence. [5] Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff must prove (1) he engaged in Title VII protected activity (reported sexual harassment); (2) he subsequently suffered adverse employment action; and (3) [there was] a causal link between engaging in protected activity and the adverse employment action. Leslie v. Hy-Vee Foods, Inc., 2004 SD 59, ¶ 11, 679 N.W.2d 785, 789. [¶ 19.] If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. The defendant's burden at this stage, however, is only a burden of production, not persuasion. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259-60, 101 S.Ct. 1089. If the defendant produces a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the stated reason is merely a pretext for retaliation. Id. at 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089; see also Leslie, 2004 SD 59, ¶ 11, 679 N.W.2d at 789; Johnson v. Kreiser's, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225, 227-28 (S.D.1988) (utilizing the burden shifting analysis). [¶ 20.] Here, requested Jury Instruction No. 23 required Lord to establish a prima facie case that his termination was solely caused by retaliation for filing the sexual harassment complaint. This is an incorrect statement of the law. As we noted in Leslie, a plaintiff need only establish a causal link between engaging in protected activity and the adverse employment action. 2004 SD 59, ¶ 11, 679 N.W.2d at 789. In defining that causal link courts have not required a claimant to prove that the protected activity was the sole cause of the adverse employment action. Instead, they require a plaintiff to show that the sexual harassment complaint was merely a contributing factor in the decision to terminate his employment. Wiehoff v. GTE Directories Corp., 61 F.3d 588, 598 (8th Cir.1995) (specifically stating that the plaintiff is not required to show that the retaliatory motive was the sole reason for the employment action, but `merely a contributing factor'). Thus, there can be no preserved error because Hy-Vee's requested Instruction No. 23 was an incorrect statement of law. [¶ 21.] More fundamentally, however, Jury Instruction No. 23 should not have been given because most jurisdictions have concluded, for a variety of reasons, that a jury instruction setting forth the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis is unnecessary. [6] Those courts reason that the terminology associated with the McDonnell Douglas analysis, including prima facie case, preponderance of the evidence, burden of production, and pretext, create a distinct risk of confusing the jury. Dudley, 166 F.3d at 1322; see also Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 434 Mass. 493, 508, 751 N.E.2d 360, 373 (2001). [T]he distinction between burden of persuasion and burden of production is not familiar to jurors, and they may easily be misled by hearing the word `burden' (though referring to a burden of production) used with reference to a defendant in an explanation of that part of the charge that concerns a plaintiff's burden of persuasion. Dudley, 166 F.3d at 1322. We conclude that there is a significant risk that the jury may be confused and misled by the use of these legal concepts in a McDonnell Douglas burden shifting instruction. [7] [¶ 22.] Instead of instructing the jury regarding the burden shifting analysis, the United States Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals have indicated that the McDonnell Douglas analysis is merely an analytical tool that `serves to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly' to the ultimate question, which in any retaliation case is whether the employer's adverse action against the employee was motivated by retaliatory intent. Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1119 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089). The McDonnell Douglas `analytical framework' was established in the context of summary judgment `to give judges a method of organizing evidence and assigning the burdens of production and persuasion in [a] discrimination case.' Lipchitz, 434 Mass. at 508, 751 N.E.2d at 372-73 (quoting Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1016). Thus, the analysis would only be applicable in a summary judgment or directed verdict situation for the trial court to utilize to determine if the issue should be given to the jury. Kanida v. Gulf Coast Medical Personnel LP, 363 F.3d 568, 575 (5th Cir. 2004) (The McDonnell Douglas formula... is applicable only in a directed verdict or summary judgment situation.)(quoting Powell v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 788 F.2d 279, 285 (5th Cir.1986)). But, the analysis is not the proper vehicle for evaluating a case that has been fully tried on the merits. Id. In other words, the analysis `was not written as a prospective jury charge,' and is ill-suited to the task. Lipchitz, 434 Mass. at 508, 751 N.E.2d at 372-73; see also Grebin v. Sioux Falls Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 49-5, 779 F.2d 18, 20 (8th Cir. 1985); abrogated on other grounds by Foster v. Univ. of Arkansas, 938 F.2d 111 (8th Cir.1991) ( McDonnell-Douglas was not a jury case and its ritual is not well suited as a detailed instruction to the jury). [¶ 23.] The United States Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also explained that the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis and presumption disappears when the case is submitted to the jury: at [the] final stage of the burden shifting analysis, the plaintiff's burden `merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the jury that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional [retaliation].' Wallace, 442 F.3d at 1120 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089). This merging burden analysis appears to have been the basis for the trial court's decision in this case. The merging burden theory is also required under state law. See SDCL 19-11-1 (Rule 301). That rule of evidence provides that when a presumption (the presumption of retaliation established by Lord's prima facie case) requires the opposing party to produce evidence to rebut, and the rebutting party produces substantial, credible evidence making the presumption disappear, the jury shall not be instructed on the presumptions. [8] Thus, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the presumption of retaliation that arises once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case disappears when the defendant satisfies its burden of articulating a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the employment action. At this point, the McDonnell Douglas framework  with its presumptions and burdens  is no longer relevant. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). The only question that the jury needs to be instructed on is the ultimate question of whether the plaintiff was terminated in retaliation for filing a complaint. See Walther, 952 F.2d at 127. [¶ 24.] For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court was correct in instructing the jury (Jury Instruction No. 30) that Lord had the burden of proving that Hy-Vee terminated his employment because he complained about sexual harassment. The presumption of retaliation had disappeared following the submission of conflicting evidence on this point, and therefore, this instruction correctly required Lord to prove a retaliatory motive for the termination. The trial court correctly rejected requested Jury Instruction No. 23 because it was an incorrect statement of the law and because a jury should not be instructed to conduct a burden shifting analysis in reaching its verdict.