Opinion ID: 2972499
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis: loss for purposes of restitution

Text: The district court’s $4,868 restitution order consisted of three components: -9- Charges made by Tate’s wife on stolen credit card $2,968 Amounts not contested by Tate $1,800 Check that the Tates were trying to cash when they were arrested $ 100 The government states, “We must ... concede that the defendant was ordered, in error, to make restitution in the amount of $100.00 to American Eagle. [T]he transaction was terminated before either the defendant or his co-defendant could defraud yet another victim.” Government’s Brief at 17. Thus the only dispute is whether the district court erred in counting the charges that Tate’s wife made on the stolen credit card as a loss for purposes of his restitution order. U.S.S.G. § 5E1.1 provides, in pertinent part, (a) In the case of an identifiable victim, the court shall – (1) enter a restitution order for the full amount of the victim’s loss, if such order is authorized under 18 U.S.C. ... § 3663, or § 3663A .... See also 18 U.S.C. § 3556 (“The court, in imposing a sentence on a defendant who has been found guilty of an offense shall order restitution in accordance with section 3663A, and may order restitution in accordance with section 3663.    ”); 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (“The court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense under this title, ... may order ... that the defendant make restitution to any victim of such offense....”). The question is whether the issuer of the stolen credit card is Tate’s “victim” for purposes of restitution. We answer that question in the affirmative. In Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990), the Supreme Court interpreted the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (“VWPA”) and reversed an order that required the defendant to pay restitution for counts other than the counts of conviction. The Court held that “the language and structure of the Act make plain Congress’[s] intent to authorize an award of restitution only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction.” Id. at 420. -10- Shortly after Hughey, however, Congress amended the VWPA to broaden the definition of victim. The VWPA now provides that for purposes of restitution, an offender’s victims include: a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered including, in the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, any person directly harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) (emphasis added). For defendants sentenced after the effective date of the amendment, we inquire whether any offense of conviction had as an element “a scheme, conspiracy or pattern of criminal conduct.” If so, we uphold restitution orders that go beyond the conduct directly underlying the offenses of conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, Nos. 97-5977 and 97-6014, 149 F.3d 1185, 1998 WL 344041 (6th Cir. May 28, 1998) (pled guilty to conspiracy). In United States v. Clark, 957 F.2d 248 (6th Cir. 1992), the defendant was convicted of theft of one vehicle and conversion with the intent to steal another. The defendant stole two other vehicles so that he would not have to use his own car to get to the scene of the thefts for which he was convicted. See id. at 249-50. The district court ordered restitution not only for the two vehicles underlying the conviction, but also for the third and fourth vehicles. See id. at 252-53. On appeal, the government emphasized that the defendant stole the third and fourth vehicles in the course of his theft and conversion of the first two. The government argued that “the evidence, taken in its entirety, indicated that [the defendant] was involved in a scheme, conspiracy or pattern of stealing vehicles and, therefore, that the ‘victims’ entitled to restitution include all those whose vehicles were stolen during the course of [his] activities.” Id. at 253. We rejected the government’s argument and held, Section 3663(a)(2) by its terms extends only to those crimes where a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity is an element of the offense [of conviction].