Opinion ID: 2677087
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claims Against Washoe County and the City of

Text: Reno Rosales-Martinez concedes that his complaint, as written, does not plead sufficient facts to state claims for municipal liability. Accordingly, his claims against Washoe County and the City of Reno are dismissed without prejudice. On remand, Rosales-Martinez should be given an opportunity to file an amended complaint against these defendants. See A.E. ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637–38 (9th Cir. 2012); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 7 Even though the district court did not address this argument, we consider it in the first instance because Palmer raised the argument before the district court and “we may sustain the dismissal for reasons not addressed by the court below.” Perugini v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 935 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1991). ROSALES-MARTINEZ V. PALMER 17 V. Considering the Judicially Noted Facts of Record on Remand The court records relating to the invalidation of RosalesMartinez’s conviction and his release from custody present a more complicated picture of the events than the simple allegation of his complaint, that “[u]pon review of the petition for habeas corpus,” the state court ordered his release. When reading a complaint that incorporates or summarizes documents, we may also consider the documents thus incorporated or summarized. See Cooper, 137 F.3d at 622–23. On December 2, 2008, Rosales-Martinez agreed to plead guilty on the understanding that the prosecutor would recommend a sentence of “time served,” which could be “all the time I have served,” but accepted that the court “could impose a different sentence.” The sentencing judge gave Rosales-Martinez credit for 501 days “time served,” nunc pro tunc to September 28, 2004, the date of Rosales-Martinez’s original twenty year sentence. Immediately after this agreement, plea, and sentence, Rosales-Martinez was freed. The fact that Rosales-Martinez was reconvicted following the vacation of his initial convictions, means that he still has an outstanding conviction. This outstanding conviction raises the question whether Rosales-Martinez’s § 1983 action is barred by Heck’s holding that “[a] claim for damages [based] on a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable.” See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. We held recently that a successive conviction of guilt following a re-trial did not bar a § 1983 claim. Jackson, 2014 WL 1424448, at . In that case, the prosecutor had offered 18 ROSALES-MARTINEZ V. PALMER Jackson’s admission as proof of guilt. However, the admission was obtained unconstitutionally, without advising Jackson of his right to remain silent, in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The conviction was held invalid. Jackson, who remained in prison having been convicted of other crimes, was re-tried, convicted, and sentenced to twenty-six years in prison. Meanwhile, Jackson filed a § 1983 lawsuit, seeking damages for his initial conviction. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that under Heck v. Humphrey, his claim for damages was inconsistent with the judgment of conviction following his re-trial. The panel reversed, holding that since the conviction initially obtained was invalidated, a § 1983 lawsuit would not be inconsistent, even though the later trial produced a like judgment of conviction. See Jackson, 2014 WL 1424448 at  (noting that the § 1983 action did “not have any bearing on” the second conviction). The panel ruled that while Jackson could state a claim, he was not entitled to any compensatory damages for his time in prison, since Jackson “was not imprisoned for any additional time as a result of his first, illegal conviction.” Id. at . However, Jackson could seek punitive and nominal damages. Id. The panel remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the panel’s ruling. Jackson cited with approval a recent en banc decision of the Second Circuit, Poventud v. City of New York, — F.3d —, No. 12-1011, 2014 WL 182313 (2d Cir. Jan. 16, 2014) (en banc). There, the defendant had been convicted in the New York state courts of attempted murder, robbery and assault of a driver of a taxicab, and sentenced to a term of custody of 10 to 20 years. After serving six years, the state court ROSALES-MARTINEZ V. PALMER 19 invalidated the conviction because of the prosecutor’s failure to disclose material evidence relevant to the credibility of the main witness against defendant, in violation of his constitutional right to a fair trial under Brady, 373 U.S. 83, and Giglio, 405 U.S. 150. Defendant then entered into a plea agreement with the prosecutor pursuant to which defendant pleaded guilty of attempted robbery, agreed to a sentence of one year of the time he served, and immediately was released. He then filed a § 1983 lawsuit. The district court dismissed his claim as inconsistent with Heck v. Humphrey. The Second Circuit, en banc, reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The en banc court wrote six opinions. Ten of the judges favored a remand to sort out the scope of consistency and inconsistency with Heck; six seemed to favor dismissal of the case. In Poventud, the defendant had contested his guilt by