Opinion ID: 2974510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: standard of review

Text: This Court reviews a district court’s decision on the issue of equitable tolling de novo where the facts are undisputed. Allen v. Yukins, 366 F.3d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 2004). Equitable Tolling We apply the following factors to determine whether equitable tolling is appropriate: (1) the petitioner’s lack of notice of the filing requirement; (2) the petitioner’s lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement; (3) diligence in pursuing one’s rights; (4) absence of prejudice to the respondent; and (5) the petitioner’s reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the legal requirement for filing his claim. Dunlap, 250 F.3d at 1008 (adopting factors set forth in Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1988)). These five factors are not comprehensive, nor is each factor relevant in all cases. Cook v. Stegall, 295 F.3d 517, 521 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1091, 123 S. Ct. 699 (2002). “The propriety of equitable tolling must necessarily be determined on a case-bycase basis.” Truitt v. County of Wayne, 148 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1998). This Court has cautioned, however, that equitable tolling should be granted sparingly. Dunlap, 250 F.3d at 100809. Petitioner concedes that he was aware of the AEDPA’s one-year grace period “at the turn of 1997.” Additionally, the government does not claim (and the district court did not find) any prejudice as a result of Petitioner’s delay in filing his petition. We therefore must focus our inquiry on the third and fifth factors in the five-prong test set forth above. See Vroman v. Brigano, 346 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2003). Again, those factors are petitioner’s diligence in pursuing his rights and his reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the legal requirement for filing his claim. We will first consider Petitioner’s reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the AEDPA’s limitations period. As Petitioner informs us, he was ignorant of Congress’ adoption of a one-year limitations period for habeas petitions from April 1996, when the statute was enacted, until “the turn of 1997.” This delay does not appear unreasonable in light of Petitioner’s explanation that “[d]ue to the circumstances that exist at Marion, there is poor circulation of information on changing laws available to inmates.” With respect to Petitioner’s diligence in pursuing his rights, Petitioner provides the following description of his activities after learning of the AEDPA’s limitations period. At the time, he was incarcerated in Marion, Illinois, where inmates gained access to the law library on a rotational basis.6 Petitioner explains that during the first few months of 1997, “there was great 6 In his objections to the magistrate judge’s R&R, Petitioner described the process by which Marion inmates obtain legal materials: Access to the Law Library is non-existence [sic]. Every unit has a cell-like room No. 04-3650 Solomon v. United States Page 6 competitiveness amongst the inmates jocking [sic] for time in the small unit library at Marion because of the AEDPA time limitation.” Petitioner provides that he “diligently worked day and night studying and preparing his 2255 . . . until his unsuspected departure to Memphis on March 19, 1997.” It was during this time period, specifically on January 27, 1997, that Petitioner filed a motion in the district court requesting transcripts he indicated he “needs . . . in order to file” his Section 2255 motion. On March 19, 1997, Petitioner was transferred without his legal materials to a facility in Oklahoma, where he was placed in administrative detention pending his transfer to Memphis, Tennessee. Upon learning that he was being transferred to Memphis to secure his presence as a witness in an upcoming trial, Petitioner immediately asked staff members at the Oklahoma facility to provide him with the address or phone number of the Clerk of the District Court in Cincinnati. According to Petitioner, he wanted to inform the court of his situation. When he arrived at the Memphis facility– a low security prison– Petitioner was housed in segregated housing due to his maximum security classification. While he attempted to use the law library, he claims access was even more restricted than in Marion. Petitioner continued to seek the address or phone number of the Clerk of the District Court in Cincinnati, and eventually a staff member arranged for Petitioner to call the court. According to Petitioner, he explained his predicament to one of the court clerks and was advised by the clerk to file a “Notification of Intent” to file his 2255 motion. Petitioner claims that he called the court a second time to learn how to caption the motion and what he should state in the body of the motion. Heeding that advice, on April 3, 1997, Petitioner signed and forwarded to the district court his “Motion of Notification of Intent to File 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Habeas Corpus to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence.” On May 29, 1997, Petitioner was returned to Marion and within a month completed his Section 2255 motion. These facts demonstrate that Petitioner diligently pursued his rights once he became aware of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Relying on this Court’s decision in Cook, 295 F.3d at 521-22, the government argues that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling because he has no excuse for “sitting on his claims” from the time his conviction and sentence became final sometime in 1993 until he began preparing his Section 2255 motion in January 1997. There are at least two reasons why Cook is distinguishable from Petitioner’s case. First, the petitioner in Cook filed his habeas petition almost twelve years after his conviction became final. 295 F.3d at 518. Second, Cook’s only excuse for filing the petition almost a month after the grace period expired was that the prison copier was broken a few days before the petition was due. Id. at 519, 521-22. Here, Petitioner was impeded from completing his petition more than one month before it was due and one month thereafter because of his transfer to other facilities to secure his testimony in a trial. Additionally, prior to preparing his Section 2255 motion, Petitioner was not sleeping on his rights. Instead, Petitioner was taking steps he believed were necessary to craft his legal motion. As Petitioner explains, based on the procedure for filing motions for habeas relief prior to Congress’ adoption of a statute of limitations in the AEDPA, he believed “he had time to enhance his knowledge of the law, while raising his level of formal education.” We do not fault Petitioner for any delay in pursuing his rights based on his efforts– or lack thereof– before the one-year limitations period was enacted. As the magistrate judge noted in his with less than a hundred law book[s] pertaining to Federal statutes only. There is a typ[e]writer that is shared with a connecting unit, and is available upon prerequest and only if an inmate in the connecting unit has not requeste[d] it first. In order to receive books with case citing, an inmate has to sent [sic] a note to the school department the night in advance, and is only allow[ed] three books a day. An inmate must cite the case number in order to receive the book the following day. No. 04-3650 Solomon v. United States Page 7 R&R, prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, “a habeas petitioner could file at any time.” In fact, before the one-year statute of limitations was adopted, even a twenty-five year delay in filing a habeas petition did not bar its consideration, provided there was no prejudice to the government from the delay. See, e.g., Buchanon v. Mintzes, 734 F.2d 274, 281 (6th Cir. 1984)(concluding that delay of 25 years in mounting federal habeas corpus challenge to guilty pleas did not bar petitioner’s claim where state had not been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the claims); see also Strahan v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 438, 441-43 n.4 (5th Cir. 1985)(surveying all appellate level cases applying former Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases, which employ the doctrine of laches to determine whether a petition must be dismissed due to delay, and citing cases declining to dismiss petitions where delay was as lengthy as twenty years). Based on the above, we conclude that this is an appropriate case to equitably toll the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Petitioner’s Section 2255 motion therefore is not time-barred and should be reviewed on its merits. Accordingly, the case will be remanded to the district court. Petitioner argues that on remand this case should be reassigned to a different district court judge. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2106, we have the authority to order the reassignment of a case on remand. Reassignment, however, “is an ‘extraordinary power and should be rarely invoked . . . Reassignments should be made infrequently and with the greatest reluctance.’” Sagan v. United States, 342 F.3d 493, 501 (6th Cir. 2003)(quoting Armco, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFLCIO, Local 169, 280 F.3d 669, 683 (6th Cir. 2002)). To determine whether reassignment is necessary, we consider (1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously expressed views or findings; (2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice; and (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. Id. (citation omitted). We conclude that reassignment is not necessary in this case. There is a benefit to having the district court judge who presided over the defendant’s trial review the defendant’s subsequently filed Section 2255 motion. It may not be necessary to call the district judge as a witness, as Petitioner suggests, because a district judge simply may rely on his or her recollections of the criminal proceedings in deciding a Section 2255 motion without testifying. See Blanton v. United States, 94 F.3d 227, 235 (6th Cir. 1996)(citing Blackledge v. Allen, 431 U.S. 63, 74 n.4, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1629 n.4 (1977)). While the district court’s handling of Petitioner’s request for habeas relief was not correct, we do not find that it was based on any improper conceptions regarding the merits of Petitioner’s claims. Accordingly, this matter is REMANDED to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio for consideration of the merits of the petition for habeas corpus relief. No. 04-3650 Solomon v. United States Page 8 ________________ DISSENT ________________