Opinion ID: 853122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Jurors' After-Hours Activities

Text: To warrant a new trial based on juror misconduct, the defendant must show the misconduct was gross and probably harmed him. Griffin v. State, 754 N.E.2d at 901 (citing Lopez v. State, 527 N.E.2d 1119 (Ind.1988)). This determination lies within the trial court's discretion. Id. Only when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances will this Court find an abuse of discretion. [2] Hall v. State, 760 N.E.2d 688, 689-90 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). A. The Two Beers. Majors requests a new trial because one juror ordered and drank two beers that a bailiff delivered to the juror's hotel room on the evening after the third day of deliberations. (R. at 2848.) This juror saw bailiffs running up and down the hall filling orders at other jurors' doors and assumed that other jurors drank alcohol also. [3] (R. at 2849.) Majors cites Schultz v. Valle, 464 N.E.2d 354 (Ind.Ct.App.1984), where the Indiana Court of Appeals held a verdict per se invalid because jurors drank alcohol during deliberations. Schultz, however, presented quite a different scene. There, some jurors consumed as many as three beers each during an hour-and-a-half dinner break, then resumed deliberations. Id. at 355. Here, the jury had adjourned for the day and did not resume deliberations until 8:00 the next morning. (R. at 3237.) While allowing jurors to consume alcohol during deliberations would certainly be ill-advised, the question is not whether alcohol touched any juror's lips during the entire time between the judge's charge to the jury and the jury's rendering of verdicts. Rather, the focus is whether the jury was free from the influence during actual deliberations. A full night passed after this juror drank her two beers, and Majors does not claim that she or any other juror showed any effects related to alcohol consumption when deliberations resumed the next morning. He has therefore not shown either gross misconduct or probable harm. B. The Fishing Expeditions. Majors next claims that jurors were subtly influenced to favor the State due to their fraternization with law enforcement officers at two picnics hosted by the Clay County sheriff. When the trial began and the jury was sequestered for what looked to be a rather long haul, Judge Yelton told the jurors that they could request recreational activities. (R. at 3203, 3207.) During the second week of trial, they asked if they could go fishing some evening. (R. at 3209.) A local podiatrist agreed to allow the use of his property, which was adjacent to that of Clay County's sheriff. (R. at 2856, 2859, 3209.) The sheriff was a veteran officer who was well versed on appropriate juror exposure and had no involvement in the Majors investigation or prosecution. (R. at 3210.) All the jurors along with the doctor, the sheriff and his wife and young son, several Indiana State Police officers, and two bailiffs participated in the outing, which was held the third week of trial. (R. at 2844, 2858, 2971.) The officers and bailiffs transported the jurors to the picnic, provided security, and performed duties such as grilling food. (R. at 3211-12.) None of the officers at the cookout were involved with the investigation of Majors in any capacity. (R. at 3204, 3210, 3212.) The event was so well received that a similar picnic was held two weeks later. One juror had disclosed during voir dire that her sixty-fifth birthday was approaching. Her birthday fell on the day of the first outing, and the judge arranged for delivery of a cake to honor the occasion. At the end of the evening, the sheriff's wife gave this juror a bottle or two of white zinfandel wine that may have been left over from the party supplies. Majors offers no support for his speculation that the jurors would favor testifying police officers because they were friendly with their security detail. Moreover, sequestered jurors whose activities are confined in the interests of a fair trial are necessarily placed under the care and custody of a court's bailiff and, where the length of a trial or other logistics necessitate, additional personnel such as law enforcement officers. If we were to view any small kindnesses as currying favor on behalf of the State, jurors' freedom would be even more restricted, which could easily produce a resentment that would benefit neither party. Although friendships may have developed between the security officers and the jurors here, nothing in the record indicates that Majors suffered prejudice as a result of the two outings or the modest birthday gift. [4] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the jury's verdict was not influenced by these events. C. Comments About the Attorneys. Majors next claims the jury improperly discussed aspects of the trial prior to deliberations. He offers a juror affidavit indicating that jurors made a few isolated comments during trial about physical characteristics of both State and defense attorneys, and about the way a defense attorney questioned witnesses. (R. at 2852.) He does not claim that the trial judge was aware of these alleged comments. ( See Appellant's Br. at 58-62.) This constitutes an attempt to impeach the verdict, impermissible under Ind. Evidence Rule 606(b). [5] Conclusion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Majors' claims of juror misconduct.