Opinion ID: 2632648
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory presumptions

Text: {12} Under Section 7-36-20(A), as amended in 1997, if property has been classified as agricultural in one of the three previous years and the use of the land has not changed, there is a presumption that the property continues to be agricultural. On the other hand, under NMSA 1978, § 7-38-6 (1981), Petitioner enjoys a statutory presumption that his valuation and classification is correct. The Board tried to reconcile these two provisions by concluding that Petitioner had the initial burden to show that the classification had changed or the original classification was incorrect. If at the end of his case-in-chief he had met that burden by showing that the use had changed or that the original classification was in error, he then enjoyed the statutory presumption of correctness and the Lodge then had the burden to show his valuation to be incorrect. Cf. NMSA 1978, § 7-36-16(A) (2000) (requiring assessors to implement a program of updating property values so that current and correct values of property are maintained) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals rejected this approach, relying on Black v. Bernalillo County Valuation Protests Board, 95 N.M. 136, 619 P.2d 581 (Ct.App.1980). In that case, the Court of Appeals held that Section 7-38-6 did not apply to the initial question whether property was entitled to the special valuation method available to agricultural property. Black, 95 N.M. at 141, 619 P.2d at 586. {13} Subsequent to Black, however, the Legislature amended Section 7-38-6. Prior to the 1981 amendment, Section 7-38-6 read, in its entirety: Values of property for property taxation purposes determined by the department or the county assessor are presumed to be correct. Determinations of tax rates, allocations of net taxable values of property to governmental units and the computation and determination of property taxes made by the officer or agency responsible therefor under the Property Tax Code [Articles 35 to 38 of Chapter 7 NMSA 1978] are presumed to be correct. 1973 N.M. Laws ch. 258, § 46. Only the first sentence was quoted in Black. {14} Subsequently, the Legislature amended Section 7-38-6 to read: Values of property for property taxation purposes determined by the division or the county assessor are presumed to be correct. Determinations of tax rates, classification, allocations of net taxable values of property to governmental units and the computation and determination of property taxes made by the officer or agency responsible therefor under the Property Tax Code [Articles 35 to 38 of Chapter 7 NMSA 1978] are presumed to be correct. 1981 N.M. Laws ch. 37, § 67 (emphasis added). The only major substantive difference between these two sections is the addition of the word classification in the second sentence. The question whether property is entitled to the special valuation method in Section 7-36-20 is a question of classification: property that is classified as agricultural is entitled to the benefit of that section, whereas other property is not. For that reason, we hold that the Legislature statutorily overruled Black to the extent it held that the Assessor and Board are not entitled to the statutory presumption of correctness under Section 7-38-6. {15} Furthermore, we conclude that the Board properly reconciled the competing presumptions found in Sections 7-36-20 and 7-38-6. Although the Legislature amended Section 7-36-20 in 1997, subsequent to the 1981 amendment to Section 7-38-6, it chose not to modify the statutory presumption in that later Section. We presume that the Legislature acts with full knowledge of, and consistent with, existing legislation. State ex rel. Quintana v. Schnedar, 115 N.M. 573, 575-76, 855 P.2d 562, 564-65 (1993). Thus, two statutes covering the same subject matter should be harmonized and construed together when possible, ... in a way that facilitates their operation and the achievement of their goals. Id. We therefore try to read Section 7-36-20 and 7-38-6 harmoniously, in a way that can give effect to the presumptions established by each. The Board's burden-shifting approach is a reasonable attempt to reconcile these two provisions, and we uphold it. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals on this point and accept the Board's decision to afford Petitioner a presumption that his classification of the property in question as miscellaneous non-agricultural was correct, having met his initial burden of putting on a prima facie case that the original classification was incorrect.