Opinion ID: 7089211
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Other-Acts-Evidence Instruction

Text: {¶ 249} In his 13th proposition of law, Tench contends that the trial court committed plain error by giving the following penalty-phase instruction, to which the defense did not object, dealing with other-acts evidence: Evidence was previously received about the commission of crimes, wrongs, or acts other than the offenses with which the Defendant is charged in this trial. That evidence was received only for a limited purpose. It was not received and you may not consider it to prove the character of the Defendant in order to show that he acted in conformity with that character. You may consider that evidence only for the purpose of deciding whether it proves the Defendant's motive, opportunity, intent or purpose, preparation or plan to commit the offense charged in this case . This evidence cannot be considered by you for any other purpose. You will consider all of the evidence admitted during the sentencing phase together with the Defendant's own statement. (Emphasis added.) {¶ 250} Tench argues that this instruction was erroneous for two reasons. First, the instruction to consider all of the evidence admitted during the sentencing phase included the guilt-phase evidence readmitted at sentencing. Thus the prejudicial carryover effect of the improperly admitted other-acts evidence was compounded, he argues. {¶ 251} Second, Tench argues, the limited purpose for which the court told the jury it could consider the other-acts evidence-deciding whether it proves the Defendant's motive, opportunity, intent or purpose, preparation or plan to commit the offense charged in this case-had no relevance at the penalty phase. We agree: the defendant's guilt had been determined in the guilt phase and did not need to be relitigated in the penalty phase. See generally  State v. McGuire , 80 Ohio St.3d 390 , 686 N.E.2d 1112 (1997), syllabus (residual doubt of guilt is not a mitigating factor). Thus, the other-acts limiting instruction given here, while proper in the guilt phase, was out of place in the penalty phase. {¶ 252} On the other hand, the jury was specifically told that it could consider the other-acts evidence for no purpose except deciding whether it proved the defendant's motive, opportunity, intent, purpose, preparation, or plan to commit the offense charged in this case. Thus, it is questionable whether the jury considered the evidence in the penalty phase at all. Accordingly,  Tench cannot show a reasonable probability that the alleged error resulted in prejudice, and hence cannot show plain error. Rogers , 143 Ohio St.3d 385 , 2015-Ohio-2459 , 38 N.E.3d 860 , at ¶ 22. And even if the jury did consider it, our independent review will eliminate any prejudice, as we noted above in discussing Tench's 5th proposition of law. We overrule his 13th proposition of law.