Opinion ID: 1814962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Right to a Speedy Trial

Text: The bill of information charging defendant with theft alleges that the offense was committed between January 29-July 30, 1971. The theft of an amount exceeding $500 is a felony that is not necessarily punishable by imprisonment at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:67. Hence, under article 572 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, [4] the state had four years from the date of the commission of the offense to institute prosecution. The instant criminal prosecution was instituted by the filing of a bill of information on January 7, 1975. La.Code Crim.Pa. arts. 382, 934(7). Since less than four years elapsed between commission of the offense and institution of prosecution, institution of the prosecution is not barred by prescription. Nor is trial on the charge barred by the limitations of article 578(2), which requires that the trial herein be commenced within two years from institution of prosecution (January 7, 1975). Notwithstanding the fact that prosecution and trial are not barred by the applicable prescriptive periods, defendant contends in his motion to quash that his right to a speedy trial under the federal and state constitutions was violated by the roughly thirty-four month delay between his arrest on March 16, 1972 and the institution of prosecution on January 7, 1975. U.S. amend. 6; La.Const. art. 1, § 16 (1974). The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions. We have recognized that this right attaches when a defendant becomes an accused, which, in this case, occurred on the date of his arrest. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); State v. Stetson, 317 So.2d 172 (La.1975). In determining whether this constitutional right has been violated, no fixed time period governs; rather, the conduct of both the prosecution and the defense are weighed in light of several factors: the length of the delay; the reason for the delay; the defendant's assertions of his rights; and the actual prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.3d 101 (1972); State v. Bullock, 311 So.2d 242 (La.1975). Although the delay in prosecuting this case was considerable, the state asserts that it was caused by several resignations and reassignments within the attorney general's office. Defendant does not show that the delay was due to any bad faith effort on the part of the state to hamper his defense. Additionally, there is no evidence that defendant, during the period between his arrest and his filing of the information asserted a demand for prompt disposition of the allegations of theft that occasioned his arrest. [5] Finally, we find any claim of prejudice to be minimal. While Neyrey was prejudiced to some extent by living for over thirty-five months under a cloud of suspicion and anxiety, he spent only one night in jail, as he was released on bail the day after his arrest. Moreover, defendant does not demonstrate any prejudice to his case resulting from the delay, making no showing, or even alleging, that any of his witnesses are now unavailable or that his defense has been otherwise impaired. After a consideration of these factors, we do not find that defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial judge properly denied the motion to quash the information.