Opinion ID: 2006639
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Command or Actual Killer Instruction

Text: Defendant claims that it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could convict defendant of first degree murder either as a commander or shooter. Penal Law § 125.27 (1) (a) (vii), the felony murder provision of the first degree murder statute ( see People v Harris, 98 NY2d 452, 475-477 [2002]), states that a person is guilty of first degree murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of that person or a third person, and: the victim was killed while the defendant was in the course of committing or attempting to commit and in furtherance of . . . kidnapping in the first degree . . .; provided however, the victim is not a participant . . . and, provided further that, unless the defendant's criminal liability under this subparagraph is based upon the defendant having commanded another person to cause the death of the victim or intended victim pursuant to section 20.00 of this chapter, this subparagraph shall not apply where the defendant's criminal liability is based upon the conduct of another pursuant to section 20.00 of this chapter. [8] In turn, Penal Law § 20.00, the accessorial liability provision, provides that [w]hen one person engages in conduct which constitutes an offense, another person is criminally liable for such conduct when, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids such person to engage in such conduct. Based upon the plain language, it is clear that the Legislature has set forth a single circumstance by which to impose accessorial liability for first degree felony murder. An actor may be found guilty as an accessory under Penal Law § 125.27 (1) (a) (vii) only when the theory proved by the prosecution is that the defendant commanded the killing ( see People v Couser, 94 NY2d 631, 635 [2000] [(a) defendant's criminal responsibility for murder in the first degree can be based upon the conduct of another when that defendant ` commanded another person to cause the death of the victim or intended victim' (emphasis in original)]). By comparison, the Legislature chose not to limit accessorial liability for the other 12 subparagraphs of the first degree murder statute ( see generally People v. Cahill, 2 NY3d 14 [2003] for a discussion of 13 aggravating factors of first degree murder statute). It is only the felony murder aggravator that is so limited. Indeed, the Assembly Codes Committee memorandum explains that the felony murder provision excludes defendants whose criminal liability under this subparagraph is based upon the conduct of another person, unless the defendant commanded another person to cause the death of the victim or intended victim (Mem of Assembly Codes Comm, Bill Jacket, L 1995, ch 1, at 22 [emphasis added]). [9] The legislative history supports the conclusion that, while the Legislature limited accessorial liability for first degree felony murder to command[ing], it did nothing to upset the settled principle that [t]here is no distinction between liability as a principal and criminal culpability as an accessory ( People v Duncan, 46 NY2d 74, 79-80 [1978]). When it enacted the statute, the Legislature was surely aware of our decisions interpreting the accessorial liability statute ( see generally People v. Robinson, 95 NY2d 179, 183-184 [2000]). If the Legislature had wanted to set forth command as a separate element of the first degree felony murder offense, moreover, it would have done so. [10] The question here is whether due process requires that the command theory be considered by the jury apart from the actual killer theory, and that the jury be unanimous on one theory or the other, even though the Legislature expressly intended that the two coexist in the same subparagraph of the statute. [11] We conclude it does not. The trial court's instructions comported with due process. In Schad v. Arizona (501 US 624 [1991]), the United States Supreme Court analyzed an Arizona statute that defined first degree murder as, among other things, premeditated murder or murder committed during a felony. Justice Souter, writing for a plurality, observed that there is a point at which differences between means become so important that they may not reasonably be viewed as alternatives to a common end, but must be treated as differentiating what the Constitution requires to be treated as separate offenses (501 US at 633). The Schad plurality adopted a case-by-case approach of analyzing the problem, while deferring to the states: [i]f a State's courts have determined that certain statutory alternatives are mere means of committing a single offense, rather than independent elements of the crime, we simply are not at liberty to ignore that determination and conclude that the alternatives are, in fact, independent elements under state law ( id. at 636). The plurality observed that [w]here a State's particular way of defining a crime has a long history, or is in widespread use, it is unlikely that a defendant will be able to demonstrate that the State has . . . defined as a single crime multiple offenses that are inherently separate ( id. at 640). Although New York's current first degree murder statute is recently enacted, the term command, under our law, has its roots in the 1907 Penal Code, which defined a principal as [a] person concerned in the commission of a crime whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense or aids and abets in its commission, and whether present or absent, and a person who directly or indirectly counsels, commands, induces or procures another to commit a crime ( People v Farmer, 196 NY 65, 76 [1909] [Bartlett, J., dissenting, quoting Penal Code of 1907 § 29] [emphasis added]; see also Couser, 94 NY2d at 637). [12] Almost 100 years ago, then, a commander was not only just as culpable as a person who directly committed an offense, but also was indeed a principal. In a related vein, Schad is instructive in its observation that if two possibilities for proving an element exist, an appropriate inquiry is whether a moral equivalence between the two could reasonably be found (501 US at 644). If so, it is enough to rule out the argument that any hypothetical moral disparity bars treating them as alternative means to satisfy the element of a single offense ( id. ). We have a long history of treating actual killers and commanders as moral equivalents ( see Farmer, 196 NY at 70-71). [13] Defendant nevertheless contends that he could have been guilty of only one of the two theoriesshooting or commandingand therefore a different result should obtain. Indeed, he argues that the prosecutor must prove to the jury's satisfaction precisely what occurred as a matter of historical fact. This is so, he claims, for any issue that is critical to the main dispute in the case. As we sift carefully through the evidence, it becomes apparent that defendant makes much of what is essentially a preliminary fact. Plainly there is no general requirement that the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict ( Schad, 501 US at 632, quoting McKoy v North Carolina, 494 US 433, 449 [1990] [Blackmun, J., concurring]). Defendant certainly kidnapped the victimthat is undisputed. He took on the mental state required: it was his decision to execute Matos. Thus, whether he personally pointed the gun at the victim's head and pulled the trigger, or whether, handing the gun to Monica, he gave her an order and stood near as she carried it out, the two choices for the jury were not so different that they amounted to any more than alternatives to a common end. Indeed, Justice Souter wrote that in analogous circumstances, [w]e have never suggested that in returning general verdicts . . . the jurors should be required to agree upon a single means of commission, any more than the indictments were required to specify one alone (501 US at 631). We have, more recently, had occasion to employ this principle in similar circumstances. For example, in People v Rivera (84 NY2d 766 [1995]), the defendant was indicted for second degree murder as a principal. Concluding there was no bar to the People's assertion at trial that defendant acted as an accomplice, we held that the elements of the crime were the same, whether the defendant acted in either role ( id. at 771). The facts showed that the victim was shot once and died from the wound. Witnesses saw defendant and two cohorts, all of whom had guns drawn, near the victim. The victim looked at defendant and said, [y]ou shot me before falling down ( id. at 768). Thus, the People were entitled to prove that defendant intended the victim's death, and caused the death either by shooting his gun or by aiding the shooter. To convict, the People had to prove each element of the crime, and defendant's liability was the same whether he acted as either a principal or an accessory ( id. at 770-771). Similarly, in People v Russell (91 NY2d 280, 288-290 [1998]), we concluded that the prosecution was not required to prove which of the defendants fired the lone bullet that killed the victim, when the evidence established that each defendant, embroiled in a gun battle with the others, intentionally aided one another in a mutual combat that caused the death of an innocent bystander. Here, too, the prosecution need not have shown which of the two perpetrators actually fired the fatal shot. [14]