Opinion ID: 2593661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: testimonial opinion as to mead's guilt

Text: ¶ 49 Mead contends the trial court erred by allowing his neighbor, Marsh, to testify as to his opinion of Mead's guilt. Specifically, the witness testified at trial that he initially believed the drowning was accidental, but now I have reconsideredI was going to say I have changed my mind insofar as I no longer have a certainty of his innocence and I'm more than willing to wait out the process to see things. The trial court struck the testimony and specifically instructed the jury to disregard it. Additionally, the trial court gave a blanket preliminary instruction to the jury not to consider evidence stricken from the record. ¶ 50 To demonstrate reversible error stemming from the presentation of evidence ruled inadmissible, but cured by either a curative or preliminary instruction, Mead must demonstrate that there [was] an `overwhelming probability' that the jury [was] unable to follow the court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence [was] `devastating' to [him]. State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 273 (Utah 1998) (quoting Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 767 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987)). Mead has failed even to allege that Marsh's testimony meets this standard. [9] We believe the trial court's instructions were sufficient to dispel any prejudice occasioned by the improper statement. The testimony, while certainly not beneficial to [Mead], was not so prejudicial as to impair a substantial right. Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 70. Accordingly, Mead has failed to demonstrate error on this issue.