Opinion ID: 1247035
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: We will first dispose of Iowa Electric's third and fourth assignments of error.

Text: By motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict defendant Iowa Electric urged that decedent was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The trial court instructed the jury on contributory negligence. There were no exceptions to the instruction. Appellant admits in argument that it had the burden to plead and prove contributory negligence of decedent as a defense. This accident happened prior to but was tried subsequent to the enactment of section 619.17, Code of 1966 changing the rules on contributory negligence. In Schultz v. Gosselink, 260 Iowa 115, 121, 148 N.W.2d 434, 437, we said: We hold the new statute, now section 619.17, Code 1966, affects both remedial or procedural and substantive rights. As to burden of proof the statute is retroactive and, of course, prospective. As to the quantum of proof it is prospective only. Stated otherwise, as to actions brought involving an accident which occurred prior to July 4, 1965, but trial commenced thereafter the burden is on defendant to plead and prove plaintiff's negligence contributed in any way or any degree directly to the injury or damage.    Defendant extensively argues by deductions that might well have convinced the jury that decedent was contributorily negligent. The jury, however, was not convinced. Defendant's argument is persuasive, but we may not substitute our view of the evidence for that of the jury. We cannot say as a matter of law that decedent's negligence contributed to his death. As actions involving accidents occurring on or subsequent to July 4, 1965, involve proximate cause the issue now before us will rarely appear. Further discussion would serve no useful purpose. IV. Iowa Electric's fourth assignment of error is based on the argument that Cipco was not entitled to claim the benefits of the general rule of non-liability for the acts of an independent contractor. Except for the presumption under section 489.16 of the Code the record before us would not support plaintiff's verdict. As we agree with the trial court that the presumption does not apply against Cipco we need not discuss this assignment of error. V. After consideration of defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict the trial court filed an exhaustive and analytical review of the evidence and the authorities. As we are in accord therewith we quote extensively therefrom. A review of the entire record has convinced the court that no jury question was presented as to any negligence on the part of the defendant cooperative [Cipco]. There is no hint that the design of the original facility, nor the design for the improvement, was in any way defective. There was not a scintilla of evidence of any failure on the part of the defendant owner with respect to the National Electrical Safety Code, of any statute or indeed of any suggested or reasonable standard. The separate motion of the defendant cooperative [Cipco] will have to be sustained. The questions presented by the motion of the defendant company [Iowa Electric] are much more difficult, complex and close. A close review of the record for direct evidence of negligence amounts to quite a search.    [The trial court indicated disagreement with the conclusion of the jury but then discussed 9 evidentiary matters that the jury might have accepted.] But the court is not the finder of the facts and of course the evidence has to be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. We are faced with a consideration of the effect of section 489.16 of the Code. That section provides: [quoting the statute] A determination must be made as to whether the statutory presumption of negligence, if applicable here, will assist whatever matters presented in the evidence toward the making of a jury question. The defendant company takes the position that the statute is not applicable here, that no `electric transmission line', within the meaning of the statute, was involved. It is argued that this question is a matter of law and should have been determined by the court. The case was tried on the theory that this was a fact question with the jury determining whether or not it was in fact an `electric transmission line' within the meaning of the statute. Of course the defendant cannot complain of any error, if it be error, in submitting this question to the jury on this motion unless it appears that the court had to determine that it was not an electric transmission line. Otherwise any error in the submission of that question was in favor of the defendant company. And it does not appear that the court had to determine that the wire at the place in question was not an electric transmission line.    And the section has been held to apply to lines on private property. Litchford v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Company, 247 Iowa 947, 75 N.W.2d 346. It has been held to apply to workmen in the area as well as to the passing public. Cronk v. Iowa Power & Light, 258 Iowa 603, 138 N.W.2d 843. It is not felt that the court was bound to hold as a matter of law that the section did not apply to this case. As explained, it follows that on this motion it must be considered that it did. Our court has taken the position that a rebuttable presumption of law is itself evidence. Re Givins Estate, 254 Iowa 1016, 119 N.W.2d 191. Thus the presumption applies unless the jury finds from the evidence that the presumption has been rebutted. Re Estate of Wood, 374 Mich. 278, 132 N.W.2d 35, 5 A.L.R.3d 1.