Opinion ID: 4534203
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Language Regarding the Jury’s Recommendation

Text: Bush’s first challenge involves language contained in interim instruction 7.11, Preliminary Instructions in Penalty Proceedings—Capital Cases. In two places during the initial penalty phase instructions, the language contained a reference to a jury recommendation: (1) “An aggravating factor is a standard to guide the jury in making the choice between recommending life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or death.”; (2) “Should you find sufficient aggravating factors do exist to justify recommending the imposition of the death penalty, it will then be your duty to determine whether the aggravating factors that you unanimously find to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt outweigh the mitigating circumstances that you find to have been established.” Additionally, the prosecutor said the following during closing arguments: “So let’s talk about aggravating factors. An aggravating factor is a standard to guide the jury in making the choice between recommending life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or death.” Bush argues that this language did not adequately - 61 - inform the jury of its responsibility in deciding Bush’s sentence. This argument has no merit. Bush’s argument is consistent with similar challenges based on Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985) (“[I]t is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests elsewhere.”). This Court has repeatedly held that claims challenging the constitutionality of Florida’s standard jury instructions given in capital cases that refer to the jury’s advisory role and to their sentencing verdict as a recommendation under Caldwell are meritless: “Hurst-induced Caldwell claims against the standard jury instruction do not provide an avenue for Hurst relief.” Reynolds v. State, 251 So. 3d 811, 828 (Fla. 2018) (concluding “beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury was properly instructed under the existing law in a manner that underscored ‘their power to determine the appropriateness of death as an “awesome responsibility.” ’ ” (quoting Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 330)). The limited references to a jury recommendation were insufficient to diminish the jury’s understanding of its role in the sentencing process. The jury was instructed: “It’s now your duty to make a decision as to the appropriate sentence that should be imposed upon the defendant for the crime of first-degree murder. There are two possible punishments: life imprisonment without the - 62 - possibility of parole or death.” There is no merit in Bush’s argument that the jury was misled as to its role in his sentencing. What is more, unlike Reynolds, where the pre-Hurst jury instructions stated that the sentence was advisory, the interim instructions used during Bush’s postHurst penalty phase did not refer to an advisory sentence. Thus, Bush’s argument is even weaker than that which we have consistently rejected under the old jury instructions. As a result, Bush is not entitled to relief.