Opinion ID: 784093
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dictation of the Case and Evidence Allowed

Text: 16 Wheeler cites in a rambling brief, which is difficult to understand, a great number of instances in which he believes the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence and dictating the theory of his case. For purposes of our analysis, these alleged abuses may be divided into two categories: 1) those abuses relating to the discrimination phase of the case, and 2) those relating to the same decision verdict. 17
18 There is no reason to discuss Wheeler's numerous allegations of erroneously excluded evidence and unfair adverse rulings regarding discrimination for the simple reason that Wheeler prevailed on that issue. The jury, in fact, found discrimination. Therefore, even if meritorious, Wheeler's allegations of abuse of discretion would not warrant a new trial because the admission of additional evidence or other rulings in Wheeler's favor would not change the outcome on this issue. See Mems v. City of St. Paul, Dep't of Fire and Safety Servs., 327 F.3d 771, 779 (8th Cir.2003) (Ultimately, Appellants must show two things to gain relief from a faulty evidentiary ruling: (1) that the district court abused its discretion, and (2) that the evidentiary ruling was prejudicial to the point of producing a different verdict.). 19 We are not persuaded by Wheeler's argument that additional evidence regarding discrimination would have also influenced the jury's same decision finding. Additional evidence regarding discrimination could not have influenced the same decision verdict, because the relevant inquiry for the jury on that issue was whether, in the absence of discrimination, Wheeler would or would not have been hired. 2 20
21 MHTC can avoid liability, even where a jury finds that there was discrimination, by showing that it would have made the same decision without discrimination. See, e.g., Ross v. Douglas County, Nebraska, 234 F.3d 391, 397 (8th Cir.2000) ([O]nce plaintiff introduces direct evidence of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, `that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's [gender] into account.') (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989)). In the instant case, the jury found that even without discrimination, MHTC would not have hired Wheeler. Wheeler argues that this verdict was based substantially on two erroneous evidentiary rulings: 1) MHTC was unfairly allowed to bring up, and Wheeler was prevented from rebutting, ranking evidence of applicants other than Wheeler and Williams; and 2) the district court wrongfully excluded Wheeler's rebuttal testimony of MHTC's sole witness, Scott Stone, as hearsay. 22
23 The district court consistently instructed the parties to focus on Williams and Wheeler, and not the other applicants. The primary issue was to be whether Williams or Wheeler was more qualified. Consistent with this theory of the case, the district court granted MHTC's motion in limine prohibiting Wheeler from introducing any evidence concerning the qualifications of other applicants, thereby limiting the proof as to the other applicants in order to prevent the jury from hearing evidence that was not relevant. Wheeler argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting testimony in violation of its previous order without allowing Wheeler to address the issue on rebuttal or correct the matter in a jury instruction. 3 24 Wheeler argues that this testimony violated the district court's in limine ruling and created a pregnant negative that there was someone ranked above Wheeler. Wheeler contends that this testimony contributed substantially to the jury's same decision verdict, as evidenced by the jury's question on this issue to the court during its deliberations. 4 25 MHTC argues that there was no abuse of discretion for three reasons. First, Wheeler was the first to bring up evidence of ranking by asking whether Barton recommended Wheeler as better qualified than Williams. Second, the testimony did not violate the district court's in limine order because MHTC asked Barton only about Wheeler and Williams. Third, the ranking evidence did not play a significant part in the same decision determination by the jury, because the evidence of Wheeler's bad demeanor during the interview was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. 26 At the hearing on the post-trial motions, the district court went into great detail with counsel as to why he felt there was no prejudicial error in his rulings. The district court found that the jury's findings on the same decision instruction were consistent with the Defendant's theory of the case. 5 27 Based upon the district court's explanation and the fact that Wheeler's counsel was given an opportunity to go further and to offer rebuttal evidence to show that Wheeler was more qualified than Mr. Watson, who was ranked number one, we find the district court committed no error. 28
29 Wheeler also argues that he should be granted a new trial on the basis that the district court wrongfully excluded Wheeler's rebuttal of the testimony of Scott Stone, an interviewer. Stone testified that Wheeler raised his voice in the 1998 interview, and that this reminded him of a similar incident in a 1997 meeting where Wheeler, as a temporary employee, had also raised his voice. Wheeler wished to take the stand in rebuttal to testify that, in 1997, Mr. Stone had mistaken Wheeler for someone else and that there was another gentleman who made a sarcastic remark that Mr. Stone got mad about. However, during a sidebar conference before Wheeler took the stand, MHTC's attorney objected to this anticipated testimony on the grounds of hearsay. The district court agreed, allowing Wheeler to testify about the meeting, but not about the other gentleman's sarcastic remark. 30 Wheeler's proposed rebuttal testimony regarding the other gentleman's sarcastic remark was not hearsay. Out-of-court statements constitute hearsay only when offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974); Fed. R.Evid. 801(c). Evidence of the sarcastic remark, even if Wheeler could have remembered the content of the remark (which he could not), was not offered to prove the truth of that remark, but only to show that Stone was mistaken about who had raised his voice in the 1997 meeting. 31 As previously noted, however, [a] new trial is not warranted on the basis of an evidentiary ruling unless the evidence was so prejudicial that a new trial would likely produce a different result. Bevan, 118 F.3d at 612. Wheeler was not prohibited from testifying about the 1997 meeting or from denying Stone's assertion that Wheeler had appeared angry at this meeting. We believe that this afforded Wheeler a sufficient opportunity to rebut Stone's testimony and that being prevented from testifying about the substance of the sarcastic remark is not reversible error. 32