Opinion ID: 4576942
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Twenty-Sixth Amendment Analysis

Text: “The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.” U.S. Const. amend. XXVI, § 1. Though few courts have interpreted the meaning of “denied or abridged” in the context of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, the phrase has been interpreted in the context of the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. In the absence of an unambiguous definition, much effort has been devoted to unearthing the legislative history of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. In my view, neither precedent nor legislative history compels a narrow definition of “abridged.” Neither party argues that Section 82.003 denies individuals the right to vote by permitting some individuals to vote via mail-in ballot. Plaintiffs argue that the statute abridges voting rights through a facial classification that permits individuals 65 years and older to vote via mail-in ballot. Defendants argue on appeal that the statute does not abridge the right to vote by giving the benefit of mail-in ballots to certain members of the electorate. The definition of abridge is central to this appeal. As the panel majority notes, Black’s Law Dictionary defines abridge as “[t]o reduce or diminish.” Abridge, Black’s Law Dictionary 7 (10th ed. 40 Case: 20-50407 Document: 00515602091 Page: 41 Date Filed: 10/14/2020 No. 20-50407 2014). The panel majority concludes that because no voter is made worse off by Texas’s mail-in ballot provisions, the State of Texas has not abridged voting rights. The panel majority holds that “an election law abridges a person’s right to vote for the purpose of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment only if it makes voting more difficult for that person than it was before the law was enacted or enforced.” Precedent supports a different outcome. The panel majority cites Reno v. Bossier Parish School for the proposition that “abridge” requires a comparison to a baseline. See 528 U.S. 320, 334 (2000) (discussing the use of baseline comparisons in preclearance proceedings under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act); see Maj. Op. at 27. They further explain that plaintiffs cannot prevail under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment without proof that their voting rights were reduced by the addition of a privilege for older voters. See Maj. Op. at 33 (emphasis added). What the panel majority refers to as a privilege here has been recognized as a right in other contexts. See Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 764, 796 (1974) (holding that a state’s decision to only offer absentee ballots to major party primary voters violated the Equal Protection Clause). Furthermore, the panel majority misreads Reno. While Reno holds that the appropriate comparison in preclearance proceedings is between the status quo and the proposed changes, Reno expressly identifies a broader definition of abridge within § 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment. Reno, 528 U.S. at 334. In the context of the Fifteenth Amendment, Reno indicates that the proper comparison is a hypothetical one—one between the status quo and what the hypothetical right to vote “ought to be”. Id. “If the status quo ‘results in [an] abridgement of the right to vote’ or ‘abridge[s] [the right to vote]’ relative to what the right to vote ought to be, the status quo itself must be changed.” Id. Luft v. Evers considered Reno and persuasively offered what the baseline should be in cases 41 Case: 20-50407 Document: 00515602091 Page: 42 Date Filed: 10/14/2020 No. 20-50407 challenging voter qualification and election mechanisms—an equal opportunity to participate. 963 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Reno, 528 U.S. at 334). Section 82.003 fails to treat members of the electorate equally with regard to mail-in voting. This unequal treatment is discriminatory in normal times and dangerous in the time of a global pandemic. Though all individuals can seemingly vote in person, those without the opportunity to vote by mail have less opportunity to participate than others. Though Luft interpreted § 2 of the Voting Rights Act in respect to protected classes, there is little reason to think the term “abridge” should carry a distinct meaning within the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 1 the Supreme Court held that Congress has broad authority to enforce § 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment (“the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”). 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966). The Court stated that § 1 “has always been treated as self-executing and has repeatedly been construed, without further legislative specification, to invalidate state voting qualifications or procedures which are discriminatory on their face or in practice.” Id. at 305 (emphasis added). Though Katzenbach predates the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, § 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment and § 1 of the 1 South Carolina v. Katzenbach refused to invalidate § 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which required that for certain jurisdictions to make changes to a “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting,” they must seek a declaratory judgment that those policy changes do not have the purpose or effect of abridging or denying the right to vote on the basis of race. 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a)). The Supreme Court has since held that the formula of the Voting Rights Act which determines if a state is covered is unconstitutional but declined to issue a holding on § 5 itself. Shelby Cty. Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556 (2013). 42 Case: 20-50407 Document: 00515602091 Page: 43 Date Filed: 10/14/2020 No. 20-50407 Twenty-Sixth Amendment both include language prohibiting states from denying or abridging the right to vote. Katzenbach interprets “deny or abridge” as invalidating procedures that are facially discriminatory or applied in a discriminatory manner with regard to race. Katzenbach does not cabin its language to the word “deny” but rather interprets the phrase in total to prevent an array of discriminatory practices including facial classifications. Katzenbach supports a broad understanding of “deny or abridge” that is inconsistent with the panel majority’s holding. The Seventh Circuit also construed “denial or abridgment” in the context of § 2(a) of the Voting Rights Act. Luft v. Evers, 963 F.3d at 672. The court states that § 2 was violated when the voting system was “not equally open to participation by members of a protected class so that groups members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate.” Id. The court recognized an equality requirement in § 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act that requires states to treat voters equally with regard to their opportunity to participate in the electoral process. Id. Reno, Katzenbach, and Luft persuade me to read “denial or abridge” in the Twenty-Sixth Amendment as generally prohibiting states from depriving individuals of the equal opportunity to vote based on a protected status. The panel majority does not cite any case that compels an understanding of “abridge” in the context of a voting rights amendment that requires a plaintiff’s position to be worsened. Though the panel majority relies on Lane v. Wilson and an “onerous procedural requirement” as violative of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court does not state that such an onerous procedural requirement is necessary to find abridgment. 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939). In fact, Lane states that “[t]he Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination.” Id. In this case, we have straightforward facial discrimination, while Lane dealt with a 43 Case: 20-50407 Document: 00515602091 Page: 44 Date Filed: 10/14/2020 No. 20-50407 complicated scheme with severely discriminatory impacts without a facial classification. The panel majority also cites Harman v. Forssenius, which similarly outlines an unconstitutional method of burdening voters. 380 U.S. 528 (1965). Harman also cites Lane for the proposition that the Twenty-Fourth Amendment “nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of impairing the right guaranteed.” Id. at 540–41 (internal quotations omitted). Harman concludes that the Twenty-Fourth Amendment does not require an outright poll tax, but that a violation can be found if it is shown that the statute “imposes a material requirement solely upon those who refuse to surrender their constitutional right to vote in federal elections without paying a poll tax.” Id. at 541. In this case, I see both a facial classification and a material requirement to vote in person imposed on younger voters. Harman seems to stand for the proposition that this material requirement suffices when the statute itself does not plainly violate the Amendment but does not suggest that it is necessary. Suffice it to say, I respectfully differ with my panel colleagues about how these Supreme Court cases should be read and construed in the context of this case. Though the legislative history here is unclear, there are more legislative arguments in favor of construing “abridge” broadly than there are in favor of construing the term narrowly. On balance, I conclude that the legislative history does not favor the panel majority’s holding. In 1970, Congress attempted to lower the voting age from 21 to 18, which was invalidated in Oregon v. Mitchell. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 302, 84 Stat. 314, 318, invalidated in part by Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). The Twenty-Sixth Amendment was ratified the following year. Eric S. Fish, Note, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment 44 Case: 20-50407 Document: 00515602091 Page: 45 Date Filed: 10/14/2020 No. 20-50407 Enforcement Power, 121 Yale L.J. 1168, 1194–95 (2012). The Twenty-Sixth Amendment did more than merely raise the voting age in a constitutionally permissible manner. Congress’s 1970 effort to lower the voting age stated: Except as required by the Constitution, no citizen of the United States who is otherwise qualified to vote in any State or political subdivision in any primary or in any election shall be denied the right to vote in any such primary or election on account of age if such citizen is eighteen years of age or older. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 302, 84 Stat. 314, 318, invalidated in part by Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). Several legislators expressed the intent to have the Twenty-Sixth Amendment create protections against discrimination akin to those in the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. See, e.g., 117 Cong. Rec. H7534 (daily ed. March 23, 1971) (statement of Rep. Richard Poff) (“What does the proposed constitutional amendment accomplish? It does not grant the right to vote to all citizens 18 years of age or older. Rather, it guarantees that citizens who are 18 years of age or older shall not be discriminated against on account of age. Just as the 15th amendment prohibits racial discrimination in voting and just as the 19th amendment prohibits sex discrimination in voting, the proposed amendment would prohibit age discrimination in voting . . . In this regard, the proposed amendment would protect not only an 18-year-old, but also the 88-year-old . . . ”) (emphasis added); 117 Cong. Rec. H7539 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1971) (statement of Rep. Claude Pepper) (“What we propose to do . . . is exactly what we did in . . . the 15th amendment and . . . the 19th amendment . . .”; see also id. at H7533 (Rep. Emanuel Celler noting that the Twenty-Sixth Amendment is “modeled after similar provisions in the 15th amendment . . . and the 19th amendment . . .”). The content and naming of the 1970 Voting Rights Amendment also indicates that Congress considered regularized access to absentee ballots a 45 Case: 20-50407 Document: 00515602091 Page: 46 Date Filed: 10/14/2020 No. 20-50407 significant part of “voting rights.” § 5 of the Voting Rights Act concerned evaluating practices and procedures for potential abridgement, and most likely the method by which a person is permitted to vote would constitute such a practice or procedure. This persuades me that the right to vote should be construed more broadly than the mere right to cast a ballot in person. The panel majority relies on various aspects of statutory and legislative history as support for its holding. The panel majority also cites McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners of Chicago for the proposition that the framers understood the right to vote as the right to cast a ballot. 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969). I am unpersuaded that McDonald controls the outcome of this case. McDonald affirmed a summary judgment grant in favor of Illinois on inmates’ Equal Protection Claims. Id. at 809, 810. The inmates argued that their rights were violated by the state’s refusal to provide them with mail-in ballots, and the court granted the motion noting that there was “nothing in the record to indicate that the Illinois statutory scheme has an impact on appellants’ ability to exercise the fundamental right to vote.” Id. at 807. McDonald is a limited holding on its own terms because it is based on a lack of evidence in the record. To be sure, McDonald has not been overruled by the Supreme Court. However, that truism is unremarkable; the Court does not routinely overrule its cases. The point is that McDonald has limited vitality for the purposes of this appeal. Beyond McDonald’s limited scope, the Supreme Court has limited McDonald at least three times. See Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 521–22 (1973) (discussion of McDonald’s inapplicability in a situation where there was greater evidence); see O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 529 (1974) (same); see Am. Party 415 U.S. at 794-95. American Party held that Texas violated the Fourteenth Amendment by allowing some party primary voters to cast absentee ballots while requiring other party primary voters to vote in person. Id. at 794. 46 Case: 20-50407 Document: 00515602091 Page: 47 Date Filed: 10/14/2020 No. 20-50407 I conclude that the options granted to voters to cast their vote are part of “the right to vote” under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. By giving younger voters fewer options, especially in the context of a dangerous pandemic where in-person voting is risky to public health and safety, their voting rights are abridged in relation to older voters who do not face this burden. 2 This implicates the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.