Opinion ID: 1889683
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Criticism by lawyers

Text: With respect to lawyers, however, it is not nearly as clear what protection the First Amendment provides. The United States Supreme Court held that states may use a lesser standard than that applied to non-lawyers to decide if a lawyer should be disciplined for his or her speech. Gentile, 501 U.S. 1030, 111 S.Ct. 2720. Gentile, a Nevada attorney, held a news conference upon the indictment of one of his clients and allegedly violated a Nevada Supreme Court rule prohibiting attorneys from making extrajudicial statements that had a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Id. at 1033, 111 S.Ct. 2720. Although the Supreme Court struck down the Nevada rule on other grounds, the Court endorsed Nevada's substantial likelihood standard as sufficient under the First Amendment for the discipline of attorneys who had made extrajudicial statements concerning pending cases. Id. at 1048-49, 1072, 111 S.Ct. 2720. Since Gentile , numerous state courts have considered the regulation of lawyer speech. Almost all of these cases, however, have involved situations in which a lawyer is disciplined under his or her state's ethics rules. See, e.g., In re Comfort, 284 Kan. 183, 159 P.3d 1011 (2007) (citing cases). In In re Westfall, decided shortly before Gentile , this Court held that a lawyer who made a derogatory statement about a judge could be disciplined if he made the statement with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard for the truth. 808 S.W.2d 829, 837 (Mo. banc 1991). The Court reasoned that lawyers who were subjected to discipline for their speech could be held to a higher standard than those who were subject to civil or criminal sanctions because lawyers were admitted to the bar to protect the public and the administration of justice. Id. This Court distinguished Garrison v. Louisiana, which held that a district attorney who had been charged with defamation for disparaging the judicial conduct of eight judges could be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions only if the statements were made with [a] high degree of awareness of their probable falsity. 379 U.S. 64, 74, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). The scrutiny of a state's interest in regulating lawyer speech may be significantly higher today than when this Court decided Westfall. [15] See, e.g., Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (2002). In any event, cases involving lawyers' statements require some knowledge of falsity or, at the very least, a reckless disregard for whether the false statement was true or false. The disciplinary process may be a more suitable forum than a contempt proceeding for ascertaining a lawyer's knowledge as to the truth or falsity of the lawyer's statements. [16] Monetary sanctions pursuant to Rule 55.03(c) rather than incarceration also may be more suitable. [17]