Opinion ID: 1918224
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Seizure of the Gun

Text: In his appeal, Gomes also contends that Officer Deschamps lacked reasonable suspicion to approach and detain him while he simply was using the telephone outside Sam's store in Olneyville. He additionally asserts that the officer had no legal right to conduct a pat-down search of him before his arrest and had no probable cause later to arrest him. In his appellate brief, Gomes contends that the trial justice erred in permitting Officer Deschamps to testify to the seizure of the gun. He bases that contention on his assertion that Deschamps's testimony establishes that he searched Marc Gomes simply because he was in the neighborhood where the shooting occurred. That assumption by Gomes simply is erroneous. It assumes the nonexistence of the articulable and undisputed facts upon which the officer relied and acted upon in detaining and later arresting Gomes. The record discloses that when Officer Deschamps unexpectedly came upon Gomes in00485B Olneyville Square, where Gomes was purporting to be using the public telephone on the outside wall of Sam's store, the officer had just minutes before left the murder scene at 8 Whelan Rd., where he had observed the murder victim's body. He was aware that the victim had been lured out of the Whelan Road apartment and shot to death. He also was aware that a person who was visiting at the apartment had twice talked with and seen the young black man who had lured the victim out of the apartment and had given a detailed description of him to the police. Having been given the suspect's description and information that the suspected murderer had fled from the murder scene and might still be armed, the officer also was aware that Sam's store in Olneyville Square was but a short run down Hartford Avenue from the murder scene. That was the nature of the information possessed by Officer Deschamps when he came upon Gomes in Olneyville Square and observed that Gomes matched perfectly the broadcast description of the suspected murderer that had been given to Officer Francis Calabro at the murder scene. [2] [A] police officer may conduct an investigatory stop, provided [the officer] has a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that the person detained is engaged in criminal activity. State v. Abdullah, 730 A.2d 1074, 1076 (R.I.1999) (per curiam) (quoting State v. Halstead, 414 A.2d 1138, 1147 (R.I.1980)). An investigatory stop differs from a full arrest and search both in the duration of the detention and in the quantum of suspicion necessary to conduct it. In re John N., 463 A.2d 174, 176 (R.I.1983). An investigatory stop is defined as `[a] brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his [or her] identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, [such a stop] may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.' Abdullah, 730 A.2d at 1076 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, 617 (1972)). In Abdullah, we stated that: Numerous factors exist which may contribute to a finding of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.    Some of the factors that may contribute to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity include the location in which the conduct occurred, the time at which the incident occurred, the suspicious conduct or unusual appearance of the suspect, and the personal knowledge and experience of the police officer. 730 A.2d at 1077. During an investigatory stop of an individual whom a police officer reasonably suspects (1) has engaged in wrongdoing, and (2) may be armed and thus dangerous to the officer or others, Terry allows the officer to negate the presence of an obvious weapon on the suspect  such as a gun, knife, or club  by conducting a limited and self-protective patdown search of the suspect's outer clothing. [3] State v. Black, 721 A.2d 826, 829-30 (R.I.1998). In United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985), the Court expanded Terry to permit a policeman who has reasonable suspicion grounded in specific and articulable facts to conduct a Terry stop to investigate that suspicion in connection with a completed felony. The Court in Hensley, reversed a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals holding that had determined that Terry manifested a clear intention to restrict investigative stops to situations involving only the investigation of ongoing crimes. The Court noted: We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that our prior opinions contemplate an inflexible rule that precludes police from stopping persons they suspect of past criminal activity unless they have probable cause for arrest. To the extent previous opinions have addressed the issue at all, they have suggested that some investigative stops based on a reasonable suspicion of past criminal activity could withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Thus United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, n. 2 [101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 110] (1981), indicates in a footnote that `[o]f course, an officer may stop and question a person if there are reasonable grounds to believe that person is wanted for past criminal conduct.' And in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 [103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110] (1983), decided barely a month before the Sixth Circuit's opinion, this Court stated that its prior opinions acknowledged police authority to stop a person `when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.' Id., at 702 [103 S.Ct. 2637] (emphasis added). See also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699, and n. 7 [101 S.Ct 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340] (1981). Indeed, Florida v. Royer [460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)] itself suggests that certain seizures are justifiable under the Fourth Amendment even in the absence of probable cause `if there is articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.' Hensley, 469 U.S. at 227, 105 S.Ct. at 679-80, 83 L.Ed.2d at 611. In this case, when Officer Deschamps determined that Gomes fit the description of the suspected murderer, he approached Gomes to inquire of his identity and presence. He noticed that Gomes grew very nervous and began to stutter and mumble in response to his questions. When the officer came close to Gomes and reached out in an attempt to pat him down for possible weapons, Gomes suddenly jerked back away from the officer. As he did, the officer's hand accidentally brushed along Gomes's side, and the officer then felt a bulk that he immediately believed to be a gun. Officer Deschamps quickly lifted Gomes's shirt and observed a 9-millimeter pistol tucked under his waistband. The officer seized the gun and observed that it was cocked and ready to fire. He put the pistol on the ground, placed his foot on it to secure the pistol and radioed for police assistance to assist in arresting Gomes and transporting him to police headquarters. We are convinced from the record of events in this case that when Officer Deschamps approached Gomes he had more than probable cause not only to detain but also to arrest Gomes and, incidental to that arrest, to search Gomes to determine whether he was armed. [4] The trial justice did not err in permitting the testimony of Officer Deschamps about his seizure of the gun from inside Gomes's waistband. Indeed we need only cite to our recent holding in State v. Guzman, 752 A.2d 1, 4 (R.I. 2000), for authority to reject Gomes's contention of error regarding Officer Deschamp's testimony concerning his arrest of Gomes and seizure of the pistol that was later determined to be the actual murder weapon. In Guzman, we stated that: a police officer may arrest a suspect without a warrant if, before the arrest, the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime.    The existence of probable cause to arrest without a warrant depends on whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the arresting officer possesses sufficient trustworthy facts and information to warrant a prudent officer in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense. Id. Our de novo review of the trial evidence convinces us that Officers Deschamps and Matracia had probable cause to arrest and search Gomes when they came upon him a short distance from the scene of the murder.