Opinion ID: 1192598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Extinguishment of the First Easement through Merger.

Text: Breliant contends that the district court's finding that the two properties were never held in common ownership is not supported by substantial evidence because the district court misapplied community property presumptions to the facts of this case. We agree. Properties acquired during marriage are presumed to be community property, and the presumption can only be overcome by clear and certain proof. Burdick v. Pope, 90 Nev. 28, 29, 518 P.2d 146, 146-47 (1974); see also Forrest v. Forrest, 99 Nev. 602, 668 P.2d 275 (1983). In the present case, the Breliant Property was conveyed to Laird and Fisher, each married men as their sole and separate property, while the PEC Property was conveyed simply to Laird and Fisher. We conclude that the district court properly found that the conveyance of the PEC Property to Laird and Fisher created a vested community interest in the property in their wives. However, we also conclude that, regardless of the separate property language in the Breliant Property deed, there was insufficient proof to rebut the general presumption in favor of community property in regard to the Breliant property. The only evidence in the record to support PEC's contention that the Breliant Property was Laird and Fisher's separate property is the recitation in the deed that it was conveyed to them as their sole and separate property. As Breliant points out, however, this court has specifically held that the phrase sole and separate property in a deed, standing alone, without supporting evidence, is not the clear and certain proof required to overcome the presumption. Burdick, 90 Nev. at 30, 518 P.2d at 146-47. Because PEC was apparently unable to trace the source of the funds Laird and Fisher used to purchase the Breliant Property to a separate property source, we conclude that the district court's conclusion that the Breliant property was Laird and Fisher's separate property is not supported by substantial evidence. We hold, accordingly, that the district court erred in concluding that there did not exist a unity of interest sufficient to extinguish the First Easement.