Opinion ID: 2103784
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard of Constitutional Review

Text: The initial issue which this Court must decide is whether the right of privacy implicated in this case as guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution is broader than the right as guaranteed by the federal constitution and as construed by the United States Supreme Court. Implicit in this determination is whether the statutes at issue are to be judged under the less demanding undue burden standard, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 878, 112 S.Ct. at 2821, or the more stringent strict scrutiny standard. See Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tenn.1993). Planned Parenthood argues that the state right to procreational autonomy is broader than the federal right and that the appropriate standard to apply is strict scrutiny. The State, on the other hand, asserts that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the appropriate standard to apply under the Tennessee Constitution is the undue burden standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Casey . See 505 U.S. at 874, 112 S.Ct. at 2819 (Only where the state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this decision [the decision of whether to undergo an abortion] does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause).
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court first recognized a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153, 93 S.Ct. at 727. Roe involved a challenge to a Texas criminal abortion statute that criminalized all abortions except those necessary to preserve the life of the mother. In a plurality opinion, the Court concluded that the constitutional right of privacy encompassed a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. Id. The Court also recognized that the State has important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life and that [a]t some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation.... Id. at 154, 93 S.Ct. at 727. Accordingly, the Court concluded that a woman's right to choose abortion is not absolute and must be considered against important state interests in regulation. Id. Reasoning that the State's interests become compelling at certain stages of pregnancy, the Court established a trimester framework by which to review states' abortion regulations in light of the competing interests. Id. at 163-64, 93 S.Ct. at 731-32. According to the Court, medical evidence indicates that before the end of the first trimester, childbirth presents greater risks to a woman's health than does abortion. Id. at 163, 93 S.Ct. at 732. Thus, the Court reasoned that the State's interest in maternal health becomes compelling after the first trimester, when the State may regulate abortion practice in ways reasonably related to protecting maternal health. Id. The Court reasoned further that at viability, the fetus is capable of sustaining life independent of the mother. Id. Accordingly, the Court held that the State's interest in potential life becomes compelling at viability. Id. The Court held that the State may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. Id. at 163-64, 93 S.Ct. at 732. In Roe , a trimester framework was established pursuant to which the State's interest in maternal health becomes compelling at the end of the first trimester, and the State's interest in potential life becomes compelling at the point of viability. Id. at 163-64, 93 S.Ct. at 731-32. After Roe , many states, including Tennessee, revised their criminal abortion statutes to account for Roe's trimester framework and a woman's constitutionally protected right to choose abortion. The United States Supreme Court decided several federal constitutional challenges to these newly enacted criminal abortion statutes. Ten years after Roe , in Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983), overruled by Casey , the Court reaffirmed Roe and struck down a second-trimester hospitalization requirement, physician-only informed consent requirements, a twenty-four hour waiting period requirement, a parental consent requirement, and an ordinance dealing with fetal remains. Id. at 452, 103 S.Ct. at 2504. Three members of the Court dissented, urging that the trimester framework of Roe be discarded and that the Court adopt the less restrictive unduly burdensome standard. See id. at 461, 103 S.Ct. at 2509 (O'Connor, J. joined by White and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). In Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 106 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989), the Court considered the constitutionality of the challenged portions of Missouri's abortion statutes, which provided: 1) that, as a preamble, each human's life begins at conception and that the state's laws should be interpreted to afford unborn children all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents; 2) that public facilities and employees cannot be used for abortion services; and 3) that physicians conduct viability tests prior to performing abortions. [5] A majority of the Court refused to pass on the constitutionality of the preamble but observed that a State has the authority to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and that the preamble can be read simply to express that sort of value judgment. Id. at 506, 109 S.Ct. at 3050. The majority also upheld the restrictions on the use of public facilities and employees. Id. at 511, 109 S.Ct. at 3053. The constitutionality of viability testing was sustained in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 520, 109 S.Ct. at 3058. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented from the views of the majority. Id. at 539, 109 S.Ct. at 3067 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens dissented in a separate opinion. Id. at 560, 109 S.Ct. at 3079 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissenting justices, however, concurred in the Court's conclusion that the a provision regarding public funding was moot. Id. at 540, 109 S.Ct. at 3068, n. 1 and id. at 560, 109 S.Ct. at 3079. Nineteen years after deciding Roe , the Court modified Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey . A majority of the Court reaffirmed Roe's holding that the Constitution protects a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability without undue interference from the State. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846, 112 S.Ct. at 2804. After viability, the state has the power to restrict abortions if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman's life or health. Id. Three justices concluded that the undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the State's interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty. Id. at 876, 112 S.Ct. at 2820 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, JJ.). According to the opinion, [a] finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. Id. at 877, 112 S.Ct. at 2820. The Court upheld informed consent requirements, a twenty-four hour waiting period requirement, a parental consent requirement, a medical emergency exception to protect the mother's life and health, and most record keeping and reporting requirements. Id. at 880, 886-87, 899-901, 112 S.Ct. at 2822, 2825, 2826, 2832-33. It struck down a spousal notification requirement and related record keeping requirements. Id. at 898, 901, 112 S.Ct. at 2831, 2833. Four justices, concurring in part and dissenting in part, criticized the undue burden test. The justices noted that the undue burden approach has no recognized basis in constitutional law. Id. at 964, 112 S.Ct. at 2866 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). They also observed that the approach is not built to last. Id. at 965, 112 S.Ct. at 2866. The test is based on a judge's subjective determinations and will allow judges to make decisions guided only by their personal views. Id. They criticized the approach as being no more workable than the trimester framework it discards. Id. at 966, 112 S.Ct. at 2866. Most recently, in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 120 S.Ct. 2597, 2617, 147 L.Ed.2d 743 (2000), a majority of the Court reaffirmed the undue burden standard. The Court struck down a statute banning partial birth abortions because it had no exception for the health of the mother and applied to dilation and evacuation abortions as well as to dilation and extraction abortions, thereby constituting an undue burden on the woman's ability to choose an abortion. Although the United States Supreme Court has now replaced the strict scrutiny standard in the abortion context with the less exacting undue burden standard, this action does not determine the standard which this Court must apply under the Tennessee Constitution. We now turn to the issue of the appropriate standard to apply under our state constitution.
Though we have never before had the abortion issue squarely before us, we have considered the related issue of procreational autonomy. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600. In Davis, we first recognized a right to privacy under the Tennessee Constitution. Id.; see also Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 577. Davis involved a divorce dispute over the disposition of seven frozen preembryos the parties had created during their marriage. The husband did not want to become a father outside of the marital relationship and therefore wanted the preembryos destroyed. The wife wanted to donate the preembryos to a childless couple. Our analysis of whether the parties would become parents turned on the exercise of the parties' constitutional right to privacy. After observing that the right to privacy is not specifically mentioned in either the federal or the Tennessee constitutions, we initially reviewed the development of the federal right to privacy for guidance in interpreting our state constitution. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598-99. We noted that the United States Supreme Court has recognized a federal constitutional right of privacy despite the absence of specific language mentioning such a right in the United States Constitution. We reasoned that, likewise, the right to privacy, or personal autonomy ..., while not mentioned explicitly in our state constitution, is nevertheless reflected in several sections of the Tennessee Declaration of Rights.... Id. at 600. We further reasoned that the drafters of the Tennessee Constitution surely foresaw the need to protect individuals from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters ... involving intimate questions of personal and family concern. Id. We thus concluded that the Tennessee Constitution protects the individual's right to privacy and explained that: the specific individual freedom in dispute is the right to procreate. In terms of the Tennessee state constitution, we hold that the right of procreation is a vital part of an individual's right to privacy. Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, we explicitly relied on the Tennessee Constitution in Davis to extend protection to the husband's right to procreational autonomy. Since the Davis decision, we have identified privacy rights in other contexts. We have held that a parent's right to the custody of his or her child implicates a fundamental right of privacy and may not be abridged absent a compelling state interest. See Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 577; Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tenn.1994); Bond v. McKenzie (In re Adoption of Female Child), 896 S.W.2d 546, 547-48 (Tenn.1995); Petrosky v. Keene, 898 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn.1995); Tennessee Baptist Children's Homes, Inc. v. Swanson (In re Brittany Swanson), 2 S.W.3d 180, 187 (Tenn.1999). The Court of Appeals has relied upon Davis to find a privacy interest in consensual adult homosexuality. See Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 266 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996). There is no exhaustive list of activities that fall under the protection of the right to privacy, at either the federal or the state level. [6] However, it is clear that such activities must be of the utmost personal and intimate concern. We observe that expressly limiting the substantive scope of the interests comprising the right to privacy serves no helpful purpose, is indeed impossible, and is best left to constitutional amendment or interpretation of individual cases. Our task here is to determine whether the interest asserted in this case constitutes a cognizable privacy interest. We hold that a woman's right to obtain a legal termination of her pregnancy is sufficiently similar in character to those personal and private decisions and activities identified in state and federal precedent to implicate a cognizable privacy interest.
Determining whether an asserted interest is fundamental is essential because fundamental rights receive special protection under both federal and state constitutions. Federal case law uniformly holds the government regulation of the exercise of fundamental rights is unconstitutional unless the regulations both serve a compelling governmental interest and are narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1294, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). Tennessee courts have adopted this strict scrutiny approach in regard to fundamental rights without exception. See State v. Smoky Mountain Secrets, Inc., 937 S.W.2d 905, 911 (Tenn.1996). Under federal law, privacy interests involving matters of marriage, procreation, and child rearing have been held to be fundamental in nature. Fundamental rights have been described as those liberties that are `deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 2844, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986) (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 503, 97 S.Ct. at 1938)). They have also been described as those rights that are `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that `neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed.' Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92, 106 S.Ct. at 2844 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969); accord Roe, 410 U.S. at 152, 93 S.Ct. at 726. Additionally, fundamental rights have been found to be those rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-34, 93 S.Ct. at 1297 (context of equal protection challenge). Nevertheless, in Davis, we found the right to procreational autonomy to be inherent in our most basic concepts of liberty. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601. That test was essentially a restatement of the fundamental rights approach of Roe . Because a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy and an individual's right to procreational autonomy are similar in nature, we find the Davis test to be most appropriate here. [7] Thus, a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy is fundamental if it can be said to be inherent in the concept of ordered liberty embodied in the Tennessee Constitution. The dissent contends that the right to terminate a pregnancy as guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution is co-extensive with the similar right as guaranteed by the United States Constitution, and this Court should follow the pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court as to the appropriate standard on which to judge abortion regulations. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876, 112 S.Ct. at 2820. The dissent's primary contention in this regard is that the historical backgrounds of the federal due process clauses and the Law of the Land clause in the Tennessee Constitution (Tenn. Const. art. I, § 8) are similar and that the textual differences of the clauses should be accorded little weight. The dissent also contends that historically the courts of this State have consistently viewed the Law of the Land clause as providing co-extensive protection to personal liberty as that provided by the federal due process clauses. Without question, the protections afforded Tennessee citizens by the Tennessee Constitution's Declaration of Rights share the contours of the protections afforded by the United States Constitution's Bill of Rights. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600. This is due, in large part, to affinity of purpose. Both documents were written with the intent to reserve to the people various liberties and to protect the free exercise of those liberties from governmental intrusion. It is also due in part to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that the federal constitution is the ultimate Law of the Land. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. It essentially mandates that no Tennessee law, whether statute, rule, or constitution, may operate to deprive a Tennessean any right afforded by the federal constitution. See Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758, 760 (Tenn.1979). Therefore, Tennessee courts are rightfully reluctant to find greater protection from the text of the state constitution where the protections of the federal constitution suffice. As a result, more interpretive case law is generated in regard to the federal constitution. See Richard S. Wirtz, Foreward: Interpreting the Tennessee Constitution, 61 Tenn.L.Rev. 405, 406 (1994). Therefore, analysis of case law interpreting the federal constitution is often a first step in interpreting provisions of our own constitution that are similar in wording, intent, or purpose. It is equally without question, however, that the provisions of our Tennessee Declaration of Rights from which the right to privacy emanates differ from the federal Bill of Rights in marked respects. In Davis, we found that the right to privacy guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution sprang from the express grants of rights in Article I, sections 3, 7, 19, and 27, and also from the grants of liberty in Article I, sections 1, 2, and 8. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 599-600. These protections contained in our Declaration of Rights are more particularly stated than those stated in the federal Bill of Rights. For example, the explicit guarantee of freedom of worship found under the United States Constitution occupies but sixteen words in an amendment generally guaranteeing freedom of worship, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right to assemble, and the right to petition the government for redress of grievances. See U.S. Const. amend. I. In contrast, the guarantee of worship under the Tennessee Constitution exists in its own paragraph constituting eighty-one words. It characterizes mankind's right to worship as a natural and indefeasible right and declares that no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience. Tenn. Const. art I, § 3. This Court has said that the language of this section, when compared to the guarantee of religious freedom contained in the federal constitution, is a stronger guarantee of religious freedom. See Carden v. Bland, 199 Tenn. 665, 288 S.W.2d 718, 721 (1956). Tennessee's guarantees of free speech and free press are similarly more descriptive than the federal grant. The verbal expression of these basic freedoms in our constitution is infused with a strong sense of individuality and personal liberty: The free communication of thoughts and opinions, is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. Tenn. Const. art. I, § 19. While these differences in language and expression have yet to give rise to recognition of a substantial difference in protection of speech, this Court has not foreclosed the possibility that our constitution might offer greater protection to speech in certain contexts. See, e.g., Davis-Kidd Booksellers, 866 S.W.2d at 525 (noting finding coextensive protection in obscenity context does not mean provisions are identical for all purposes); Leech v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 582 S.W.2d 738, 745 (Tenn.1979) (holding Art. I, § 19 should be construed to have a scope at least as broad as that afforded those freedoms by the first amendment of the United States Constitution (emphasis added)). That this Court has seen fit to leave this door open speaks of our recognition of a potentially greater state protection. Some of our constitutional protections have been found to be identical to provisions of the United States Constitution in some respects. For example, this Court held in Sneed v. State, 221 Tenn. 6, 423 S.W.2d 857 (1968) that the Tennessee constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is identical in intent and purpose to the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution. Id. at 860. Identity in intent and purpose, however, does not necessarily correlate to coextensive degrees of protection. In fact, this Court's decisions applying the state constitution have been somewhat more restrictive than comparable federal cases in some search and seizure contexts. State v. Lakin, 588 S.W.2d 544, 548 (Tenn.1979) (finding Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7 offered greater protection than U.S. Const. amend. IV in context of open fields doctrine); see also State v. Doelman, 620 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tenn.Crim.App.1981) (noting the Tennessee Constitution is somewhat more protective of private property rights). This difference in degree of protection afforded by the state and federal constitutions was due primarily to an explicit difference in wording between the two constitutional provisions. Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution protects possessions, a term not mentioned in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Lakin, 588 S.W.2d at 549 (construing protection of possessions to include occupied, fenced areas); see also Welch v. State, 154 Tenn. 60, 64, 289 S.W. 510, 511 (1926). We do not mean to suggest a qualitative difference in constitutional provisions simply because of a mere quantitative difference in words. Nor do we suggest that different expressions of intent preclude that intent being identical. Cf. Delk v. State, 590 S.W.2d 435, 440 (Tenn.1979) (stating, We do not agree that the Tennessee prohibition against self-incrimination is broader or different in any application thereof because of the use of the word `evidence' instead of the word `witness'). Still, this Court is not free to discount the fact that the framers of our state constitution used language different from that used by the framers of the United States Constitution. No words in our constitution can properly be said to be surplusage, see Welch, 154 Tenn. at 62, 289 S.W. at 510 ([T]he word `possessions' was added [to our Constitution] for a purpose.), and differences in expressions of right are particularly relevant to determining the concept of liberty embodied in our constitution. Our constitution also contains specific provisions not found in the federal constitution, the most pertinent being Article 1, section 2, condemning the doctrine of nonresistence. This provision exemplifies the strong and unique concept of liberty embodied in our constitution in that it clearly assert[s] the right of revolution. Otis H. Stephens, Jr., The Tennessee Constitution and the Dynamics of American Federalism, 61 Tenn.L.Rev. 707, 710 (1994). It provides: That government being instituted for the common benefit, the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind. Tenn. Const. art. I, § 2. In essence, this section recognizes that our government serves at the will of the people of Tennessee, and expressly advocates active resistence against the government when government no longer functions to serve the people's needs. There is no better statement of our constitution's concept of liberty than this audacious empowerment of Tennesseans to forcibly dissolve the very government established but one Article later in our constitution. That the protections afforded by some of these express provisions, including the Law of the Land clause, have been found to be practically synonymous with their federal counterparts is not dispositive of the issue of whether the collective concept of liberty embodied in our constitution is greater than the concept envisioned by the federal constitution. Indeed, this Court has recognized that practical synonymity does not necessarily correspond to coextensive expressions of liberty, even as to individual express guarantees under the constitution. For example, in Carden v. Bland, 199 Tenn. at 672, 288 S.W.2d at 721, we held that the freedom of worship clauses in the Tennessee and federal Constitutions are practically synonymous. Still, in that same breath, the Court noted, If anything, our own organic law is broader and more comprehensive in its guarantee of freedom of worship and freedom of conscience.... Id. Today, we remain opposed to any assertion that previous decisions suggesting that synonymity or identity of portions of our constitution and the federal constitution requires this Court to interpret our constitution as coextensive to the United States Constitution. [8] Tennessee constitutional standards are not destined to walk in lock step with the uncertain and fluctuating federal standards and do not relegate Tennessee citizens to the lowest levels of constitutional protection, those guaranteed by the national constitution. State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 193 (Tenn.1991) (Reid, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We have said time and again that: [A]s to Tennessee's Constitution, we sit as a court of last resort, subject solely to the qualification that we may not impinge upon the minimum level of protection established by Supreme Court interpretations of the federal constitutional guarantees. But state supreme courts, interpreting state constitutional provisions, may impose higher standards and stronger protections than those set by the federal constitution. It is settled law that the Supreme Court of a state has full and final power to determine the constitutionality of a state statute, procedure, or course of conduct with regard to the state constitution, and this is true even where the state and federal constitutions contain similar or identical provisions. Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d at 760 (emphasis added). We do not intend to divert from this principle. The concept of ordered liberty embodied in our constitution requires our finding that a woman's right to legally terminate her pregnancy is fundamental. The provisions of the Tennessee Constitution imply protection of an individual's right to make inherently personal decisions, and to act on those decisions, without government interference. A woman's termination of her pregnancy is just such an inherently intimate and personal enterprise. This privacy interest is closely aligned with matters of marriage, child rearing, and other procreational interests that have previously been held to be fundamental. To distinguish it as somehow non-fundamental would require this Court to ignore the obvious corollary.
It is well settled that where a fundamental right is at issue, in order for a state regulation which interferes with that right to be upheld, the regulation must withstand strict scrutiny. The State's interest must be sufficiently compelling in order to overcome the fundamental nature of the right. See State v. Smoky Mountain Secrets, 937 S.W.2d at 910-11; Hawk 855 S.W.2d at 579 n. 9 (citing Davis for the proposition that the state's interest must be sufficiently compelling to overcome a fundamental right, Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602.). See also Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 969 (Alaska 1997); American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 66 Cal. Rptr.2d 210, 231, 16 Cal.4th 307, 340-41, 940 P.2d 797, 819 (1997) (plurality opinion); Women of the State of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 31 (Minn.1995); Florida v. Presidential Women's Ctr., 707 So.2d 1145, 1149 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1998). Other jurisdictions have applied heightened scrutiny of governmental regulation of abortion since Casey was decided. Our rejection of the Casey standard is similar to the action taken by those state courts. In Women of the State of Minn. v. Gomez , the Minnesota Supreme Court considered a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of statutes restricting the use of public medical assistance and general assistance funds for abortions. The Court determined that the Minnesota Constitution guaranteed a right of privacy rooted in several provisions of the constitution, including a due process provision, a law of the land provision, and a provision protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 27 n. 10. The Court held that the right of privacy includes a woman's right to choose to have an abortion. Id. at 27. Stating that it could think of few decisions more intimate, personal, and profound than a woman's decision between childbirth and abortion, it held that the case was one of those limited circumstances in which it would interpret the Minnesota Constitution to provide more protection than that afforded under the federal constitution. Id. at 27, 30. It subjected the regulations to strict scrutiny because the right of privacy is fundamental. Id. at 31. See also Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Attorney General, 424 Mass. 586, 590, 677 N.E.2d 101, 104 (1997) (holding that the state constitution Declaration of Rights afforded greater degree of protection to the right asserted than did the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court). The application of the strict scrutiny approach is entirely consistent with our jurisprudence considering laws which impose upon or restrict fundamental rights. While the joint opinion in Casey adopted the undue burden approach, Justice Scalia in a separate dissent and concurrence criticized the so-called standard as being ultimately standardless. 505 U.S. at 987, 112 S.Ct. at 2878 (Scalia, J. dissenting and concurring). He noted that the undue burden standard was created largely out of whole cloth and essentially had no recognized basis in constitutional law. Id. (referring to Rehnquist, C.J. concurring and dissenting, Id. at 964, 112 S.Ct. at 2866.) We agree that the undue burden approach is essentially no standard at all, and, in effect, allows judges to impose their own subjective views of the propriety of the legislation in question. The dissent has criticized the majority for convert[ing] itself into a roving constitutional convention which is free to strike down the duly enacted laws of the legislature for no other reason than the Court feels they are burdensome and unwise. In fact, that is exactly what the undue burden approach allows. Under that test, the Court is free to determine, under the justices' own subjective opinions as to the wisdom of the legislation, whether the legislation creates an undue burden upon a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. Application of strict scrutiny, a recognized principle of constitutional law, on the other hand, requires the Court to apply a standard that has been applied repeatedly over the years, and the Court may draw upon that precedent in determining whether the legislation passes muster. The subjective nature of the undue burden analysis is aptly illustrated by the fact that the majority and the dissent reach diametrically opposed results when applying the analysis. The majority would find each of the challenged abortion statutes to be unconstitutional under Casey , while the dissent, applying exactly the same analysis, would reach the opposite result as to each statute, save one. [9] The undue burden test requires a judge to consider only the effect of the governmental regulation. It fails, however, to offer an objective standard by which the effect should be judged. Accordingly, a regulation held to be an undue burden by one judge could just as easily be found to be reasonable by another judge because the gauge for what is an undue burden necessarily varies from person to person. Thus, the Casey test offers our judges no real guidance and engenders no expectation among the citizenry that governmental regulation of abortion will be objective, evenhanded, or well-reasoned. This Court finds no justification for exchanging the long established constitutional doctrine of strict scrutiny for a test, not yet ten years old and applicable to a single, narrow area of the law, that would relegate a fundamental right of the citizens of Tennessee to the personal caprice of an individual judge. It may be appropriate in some areas of our law to provide judges individual, and necessarily subjective, discretion. Subjective judicial opinion has no place, however, in determining the constitutionality of the exercise of fundamental rights. Accordingly, we conclude that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard to apply in this case.
The next critical inquiry in our review is the nature of the State's interests and when each of the respective interests becomes compelling. In our view, the State has an interest in promoting the health and safety of all its citizens, and the State clearly has a compelling interest in maternal health from the beginning of pregnancy. Tenn. Const. art. I, § 1 (stating that the government is instituted for [the] peace, safety and happiness of its citizens); but see Roe, 410 U.S. at 163, 93 S.Ct. at 731 (With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the `compelling' point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester.). In Davis, we discussed the State's interest in potential life. There, we were concerned with the State's interest in the potential life of the four- to eight-cell preembryos, and we ultimately concluded that the State's interest in potential life was insufficient to permit an infringement on the parties' procreational autonomy. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602. We reviewed our state statutes which deal with potential human life and noted that Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-5-106(b) (1980) allowed a civil action for wrongful death of a viable fetus. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602 n. 26 (emphasis added). We further noted that pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 39-13-107 and -214 (1991), a person cannot commit a criminal offense against a fetus unless the fetus is viable. Id. Finally, we reviewed the trimester framework of our criminal abortion statutes. We reasoned that: Taken collectively, our statutes reflect the policy decision that, at least in some circumstances, the interest of living individuals in avoiding procreation is sufficient to justify taking steps to terminate the procreational process, despite the state's interest in potential life. Id. We thus concluded that the State's interest in the four- to eight-cell preembryos was at best slight and indicated that viability marks a critical developmental point in a woman's pregnancy. Id. at 602, 602 n. 26. We further noted in Davis that the abortion statute reveals that the increase in the state's interest is marked by each successive developmental stage.... Id. at 602. It follows that as the pregnancy progresses, the State's interest in potential life gradually increases and gradually comes into conflict with the woman's interest in procreational autonomy. In our view, therefore, it is clear that at some developmental point in the woman's pregnancy, the State's interest in potential life becomes compelling, and the woman's interest in procreational autonomy must yield to the State's interest. See id. at 602 n. 26; Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-5-106(c) (Supp.1999); Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 39-13-107 and -214 (1997). Accordingly, we hold that the State's interest in potential life becomes compelling at viability. Bearing these constitutional standards in mind, we now consider the challenged provisions.