Opinion ID: 2611853
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of Collateral Estoppel to Retrial of Charges of Which the Defendant Had Been Convicted

Text: Ashe, supra, 397 U.S. 436, involved successive prosecutions. Defendant was charged only with the first robbery. When that prosecution failed, the second was charged. The Ashe court stated that the collateral estoppel doctrine prevented relitigation of an ultimate fact between the same parties in any future lawsuit.  ( Id. at p. 443 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 475], italics added.) Here, of course, we do not confront a future lawsuit, but retrial in the same one. (5) The high court has never suggested the doctrine applies to the same proceeding. Indeed, it has consistently stated it applies to successive prosecutions. ( Brown v. Ohio, supra, 432 U.S. at p. 167, fn. 6 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 195].) In Ohio v. Johnson (1984) 467 U.S. 493, 500, footnote 9 [81 L.Ed.2d 425, 434, 104 S.Ct. 2536], the court specifically stated, Moreover, in a case such as this, where the State has made no effort to prosecute the charges seriatim, the considerations of double jeopardy protection implicit in the application of collateral estoppel are inapplicable. In United States v. Dixon (1993) 509 U.S. ___ [125 L.Ed.2d 556, 113 S.Ct. 2849], a case involving successive prosecutions, the high court, although expressly not deciding the collateral estoppel question in that case because the lower courts had not ruled on it ( id. at p. ___, fn. 17 [125 L.Ed.2d at p. 578, 113 S.Ct. at p. 2864]), noted at page ___ [125 L.Ed.2d at pp. 572-573, 113 S.Ct. at p. 2860] that [t]he collateral-estoppel effect attributed to the Double Jeopardy Clause, see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 [25 L.Ed.2d 469, 90 S.Ct. 1189] (1970), may bar a later prosecution for a separate offense where the Government has lost an earlier prosecution involving the same facts. (First italics in original, second italics added.) Most recently, the court has stated, Where ... there is `no threat of either multiple punishment or successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended.' [Citation.] Thus, our cases establish that the primary evil to be guarded against is successive prosecutions: `[T]he prohibition against multiple trials is the controlling constitutional principle.' [Citation.] ( Schiro v. Farley, supra, 510 U.S. at p. ___ [127 L.Ed.2d at pp. 56-57, 114 S.Ct. at p. 789].) (3b) In the face of this, we question whether collateral estoppel applies to the same proceeding where the government won by securing a conviction of the substantive count. The policies behind the doctrine do not clearly support its application to a retrial of that count. In Ashe, supra, 397 U.S. at page 446 [25 L.Ed.2d at pages 476-479], the court attached the doctrine to the double jeopardy clause because that clause surely protects a man who has been acquitted from having to `run the gantlet' a second time. [Citation.] Here, defendant was convicted, not acquitted, of the murder charge. Retrial after reversal is not the sort of governmental oppression protected by the double jeopardy clause. ( United States v. Scott, supra, 437 U.S. at p. 91 [57 L.Ed.2d at p. 74].) (6) In People v. Taylor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 686, 695 [117 Cal. Rptr. 70, 527 P.2d 622], we stated the purposes of an application of the doctrine to be: (1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system; and (3) to provide repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation. (Accord, People v. Howard, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 412.) (3c) None of these purposes apply here. This is the same action, not repetitive litigation; a murder conviction by the second jury would be consistent, not inconsistent, with the original verdict; and retrial following reversal is not vexatious litigation. Defendant relies on Bullington v. Missouri (1981) 451 U.S. 430 [68 L.Ed.2d 270, 101 S.Ct. 1852] and Arizona v. Rumsey (1984) 467 U.S. 203 [81 L.Ed.2d 164, 104 S.Ct. 2305], where the United States Supreme Court held that double jeopardy barred imposition of the death penalty at retrial after the state had failed to obtain the death penalty at the first trial. Both Bullington and Rumsey were capital cases, and our reasoning in those cases was based largely on the unique circumstances of a capital sentencing proceeding. ( Caspari v. Bohlen (1994) 510 U.S. ___, ___ [127 L.Ed.2d 236, 247, 114 S.Ct. 948, 954.) Assuming the rationale of these cases applies to other sentencing decisions such as the enhancement finding here (an issue the high court expressly did not decide in Caspari v. Bohlen, supra, 510 U.S. at p. ___ [127 L.Ed.2d at pp. 250-251, 114 S.Ct. at p. 957]), at most that would preclude retrial of the enhancement allegation, which, as noted, the parties agree cannot occur here. [4] Nothing in those decisions suggests that sentencing decisions affect retrial of a substantive offense of which the jury had found the defendant guilty. Defendant seems to agree that if the original split verdict had been inherently inconsistent, that is, if it were factually impossible for the jury to convict on one count and yet acquit on another or find an enhancement allegation not true, then collateral estoppel would not apply. This necessarily flows from the acceptance in United States v. Powell, supra, 469 U.S. 57 of inconsistent verdicts. As the court in Powell noted, The problem is that the same jury reached inconsistent results; once that is established principles of collateral estoppel  which are predicated on the assumption that the jury acted rationally and found certain facts in reaching its verdict  are no longer useful. ( Id. at p. 68 [83 L.Ed.2d at p. 471]; see also Pettaway v. Plummer, supra, 943 F.2d at pp. 1045-1046.) Defendant argues, however, that what applies to an inconsistent verdict does not apply to a verdict that might have a rational basis. This may be correct, but it would be odd if a conviction that is clearly inconsistent with an acquittal or not true finding may be retried without constraint after an appellate reversal, but a conviction that may, in theory at least, be reconciled with another verdict would, as here, be significantly affected by that verdict following a similar reversal. The not true finding may be explained by mistake, compromise, or lenity ( United States v. Powell, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 65 [83 L.Ed.2d at p. 468]) or confusion or ennui. ( People v. Pettaway, supra, 206 Cal. App.3d at p. 1325.) Moreover, in the first appeal, the Court of Appeal found an 11-day continuance during jury deliberations undoubtedly had some significant effect on jurors' ability to remember complicated facts, as well as on their recall and understanding of instructions. ( People v. Santamaria, supra, 229 Cal. App.3d at p. 282.) The continuance might have adversely affected the enhancement verdict as well as the murder conviction. For these reasons, the high court might well not apply Ashe, supra, 397 U.S. 436, to a retrial of a count the jury had convicted the defendant of in the same action. But that court has not decided the issue in a case like this. In Schiro v. Farley, supra, 510 U.S. at page ___ [127 L.Ed.2d at p. 58, 114 S.Ct. at p. 790], the court did not address whether collateral estoppel could bar use of the `intentional' murder aggravating circumstance, because Schiro has not met his burden of establishing the factual predicate for the application of the doctrine, if it were applicable, namely that an `issue of ultimate fact has once been determined' in his favor. (Italics added.) Some federal courts have found that Ashe does apply to a retrial. (E.g., U.S. v. Bailin (7th Cir.1992) 977 F.2d 270, 275-280; Pettaway v. Plummer, supra, 943 F.2d 1041.) [5] Under these circumstances, and because, as explained in the next part, defendant's collateral estoppel claim can be rejected on the merits, we do not reach the issue of whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel is limited, like its parent doctrine of double jeopardy, only to successive prosecutions. ( U.S. v. Farmer (11th Cir.1991) 923 F.2d 1557, 1563, fn. 12.) Instead, we will follow the lead of the high court in Schiro v. Farley, supra, 510 U.S. ___ [127 L.Ed.2d 47, 114 S.Ct. 783], and proceed to examine whether, assuming the doctrine of collateral estoppel can apply to a retrial such as this, the necessary elements of the doctrine have been satisfied.