Opinion ID: 2583058
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Request to frisk

Text: ¶ 22 A nonconsensual protective frisk for weapons is warranted when a reasonable safety concern exists . . . when an officer can point to `specific and articulable facts' which create an objectively reasonable belief that a suspect is `armed and presently dangerous.' State v. Collins, 121 Wash.2d 168, 173, 847 P.2d 919 (1993) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-24, 88 S.Ct. 1868). The officer need not be absolutely certain the individual is armed, only that a reasonably prudent person in the same circumstances would be warranted that their safety, or that of others, was in danger. Id. In State v. Belieu, 112 Wash.2d 587, 773 P.2d 46 (1989), we articulated the principle differently: [C]ourts are reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of police officers in the field. `A founded suspicion is all that is necessary, some basis from which the court can determine that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing. ' Id. at 601-02, 773 P.2d 46, (first emphasis added) (quoting Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1966)). A nonconsensual investigative detention is a seizure, albeit a legal intrusion if proper safeguards are met. See Garvin, 166 Wash.2d at 250, 207 P.3d 1266. ¶ 23 The reasoning in State v. Soto-Garcia, 68 Wash.App. 20, 841 P.2d 1271 (1992), abrogated on other grounds by Thorn, 129 Wash.2d 347, 917 P.2d 108, persuades us that a series of police actions may meet constitutional muster when each action is viewed individually, but may nevertheless constitute an unlawful search or seizure when the actions are viewed cumulatively. In Soto-Garcia, Kelso Police Officer Kevin Tate performed a social contact with Marcelo Soto-Garcia as the latter walked out of an alley. Soto-Garcia approached Tate's patrol car when the officer pulled to the side of the road. Tate asked Soto-Garcia where he was coming from and where he was going. Tate asked for Soto-Garcia's name, in response to which Soto-Garcia produced identification. Tate ran identification and warrant checks in Soto-Garcia's presence. When the checks came back clean, Tate asked if Soto-Garcia had any cocaine on his person. Soto-Garcia denied having cocaine. Tate then asked if he could search Soto-Garcia, who replied, `Sure, go ahead.' Id. at 22, 841 P.2d 1271. Tate reached into Soto-Garcia's shirt pocket and discovered cocaine. ¶ 24 The Soto-Garcia court held Tate's combined acts aggregated to seize Soto-Garcia. The atmosphere created by Tate's progressive intrusion into Soto-Garcia's privacy was of such a nature that a reasonable person would not believe that he or she was free to end the encounter. Id. at 25, 841 P.2d 1271. The court then inquired whether Soto-Garcia's subsequent consent to search was valid in light of the prior illegal seizure, answering in the negative. Id. at 26-27, 841 P.2d 1271. Soto-Garcia's consent to the search was obtained through exploitation of his prior illegal seizure. Id. at 29, 841 P.2d 1271. Accordingly the court found suppression of the cocaine proper. ¶ 25 Similar to Soto-Garcia, Harrington endured a progressive intrusion at the hands of Reiber. Tate's progressive intrusion included an inquiry about Soto-Garcia's identification, warrant check, direct question about drug possession, and request to search  all of which, combined, formed a seizure. The independent elements of Harrington's seizure are different, but the effect is the same. Before Reiber's request to search, he did not ask for Harrington's name or address, did not conduct a warrant check, and did not ask if Harrington carried drugs. Instead Reiber initiated contact with Harrington on a dark street. He asked questions about Harrington's activities and travel that evening and found Harrington's answers suspicious. A second officer arrived at the scene and stood nearby. Reiber asked Harrington to remove his hands from his pockets to control Harrington's actions. Then Reiber asked to frisk, without any `specific and articulable facts' that would create an objectively reasonable belief that Harrington was `armed and presently dangerous.' [5] Collins, 121 Wash.2d at 173, 847 P.2d 919 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868). The facts in both Soto-Garcia and this case create an atmosphere of police intrusion, culminating in a request to frisk. ¶ 26 Requesting to frisk is inconsistent with a mere social contact. If Reiber felt jittery about the bulges in Harrington's pockets, he should have terminated the encounter  which Reiber initiated  and walked back to his patrol car. Instead Reiber requested a frisk. ¶ 27 When Reiber requested a frisk, the officers' series of actions matured into a progressive intrusion substantial enough to seize Harrington. A reasonable person would not have felt free to leave due to the officers' display of authority. ¶ 28 We note this progressive intrusion, culminating in seizure, runs afoul of the language, purpose, and protections of article I, section 7. Our constitution protects against disturbance of private affairs  a broad concept that encapsulates searches and seizures. Article I, section 7 demands a different approach than does the Fourth Amendment; we look for the forest amongst the trees. [6] As Judge Sweeney wrote, We do a disservice to the public and to police by moving the so-called `social contact' into just another form of seizure, albeit without any cause or suspicion of crime or danger to the public or the police. Harrington, 144 Wash.App. at 564, 183 P.3d 352 (Sweeney, J., dissenting). ¶ 29 Because Harrington's consent to the search was obtained through exploitation of a prior illegal seizure, suppression of the evidence is required. See Garvin, 166 Wash.2d at 254, 207 P.3d 1266.