Opinion ID: 766509
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Public versus private concern

Text: 16 In order for a public employee to maintain a First Amendment claim against his employer, the employee must allege that he or she was seeking to exercise First Amendment rights with respect to a matter of public concern. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. A matter of public concern generally involves a matter of political, social, or other concern to the community. See Jackson v. Leighton, 168 F.3d 903, 909 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that a physician-employee's comments relating to a proposed merger between his employer-medical college and a hospital addressed a matter of public concern, but that his interest in speaking on this issue was outweighed by the interest of the college and its administrators). Federal courts normally do not review personnel decisions reacting to an employee's behavior 'when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest.' Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147). 17 Determining whether speech involves a matter of public or private concern must be based on the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. The fact that an employee alleges discrimination on the part of a public employer is not itself sufficient to transform the dispute into a matter of public concern. See Rice v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., 887 F.2d 716, 721 (6th Cir. 1989) ([T]he First Amendment does not convert every public employee grievance into a matter of public concern . . . .), rev'd on other grounds, 497 U.S. 1001 (1990). If in fact Jackson's restricted speech was solely a matter of private concern, we would thus not engage in an evaluation of the reasons for the City's restriction. See Jackson, 168 F.3d at 910. 18 Whether Jackson's restricted speech in this case involves a matter of private or public concern is a close question. We need not decide this issue, however, because the question before us is simply whether Jackson has sufficiently allegedthat he was restricted from speaking about matters of public concern. If he has, then we must assume such to be true for the purpose of evaluating the City's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). 19 We hold that, in considering the complaint as a whole, Jackson has sufficiently alleged that his restricted speech was a matter of public concern. Jackson is not an ordinary employee, but rather is a high-profile member of the Columbus community. Because the investigation involved allegations of corruption and abuse of power within the Division of Police, as well as the City's allegedly racial motivations, the gag order could be construed as covering more than a private employment dispute. Such social and political issues are generally matters of public concern. See Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (A statement concerning racial discrimination on the part of a public agency is a matter of public concern because it involves information that enables members of society to make informed decisions about the operation of their government.) (internal quotation marks omitted); Solomon v. Royal Oak Township, 842 F.2d 862, 865 (6th Cir. 1988) ([S]peech disclosing public corruption is a matter of public interest and therefore deserves constitutional protection.). 20 Furthermore, the fact that the gag order was only temporary does not bar Jackson's claim. The Supreme Court has stated that the burden on the [party seeking the restraint] is not reduced by the temporary nature of a restraint. Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.). 21