Opinion ID: 2258708
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Integrity of Pending Investigations

Text: The State also asserts that confidentiality helps guarantee the integrity of pending investigations by encouraging the cooperation of witnesses, enabling a full and thorough review of the matter, and promoting the filing of grievances. To accomplish those objectives, the State insists that a grievant cannot be permitted to disclose that he or she filed a grievance. We disagree. Although undoubtedly legitimate interests, they are not sufficiently compelling to justify restricting grievants' speech. Further, even if those interests could be considered compelling, Rule 1:20-9 is not narrowly tailored to achieve them. We first consider the claim that maintaining confidentiality encourages witnesses to fully cooperate with ongoing investigations. The State argues that secrecy in ethics proceedings is a compelling interest because, like grand jury secrecy, it promotes free and untrammeled disclosures by witnesses. United States v. Rose, 215 F. 2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir.1954). However, the justifications for grand jury secrecy are simply not present in a disciplinary investigation. Grand jury proceedings are kept secret from a suspect in order to prevent him or her from fleeing and to protect witnesses from intimidation or bribes. Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops NW, 441 U.S. 211, 219, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 1673, 60 L.Ed. 2d 156, 165 (1979). In an ethics proceeding the respondent attorney is notified that allegations of unethical conduct have been reported, R. 1:20-3(g)(2), is informed of the substance of that grievance, ibid., and is generally entitled to the identity and contact information of the grievant and potential witnesses, R. 1:20-5(a)(2)(D). The attorney also may obtain copies of any witness statements and summaries thereof. R. 1:20-5(a)(2)(B). Thus, from the outset, the respondent attorney knows what the charges are, who made them, and who can corroborate them. Furthermore, the scope of grand jury secrecy is narrower than the confidentiality provision in Rule 1:20-9. In the grand jury context, the obligation to keep an investigation secret extends only to the prosecutor, the grand jurors, and court staff. R. 3:6-7. A crime victim who makes a report to the police is not required to keep that fact confidential, and witnesses who appear before the grand jury are not prohibited from discussing the content of their own testimony. Ibid.; see also United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 425, 103 S.Ct. 3133, 3139, 77 L.Ed. 2d 743, 753 (1983) (explaining that under analogous federal rule, witnesses are generally not prohibited from disclosing their own testimony). In contrast, under Rule 1:20-9(a) and (h), all participants, including grievants, are barred from divulging that a grievance has been filed and that an investigation is underway. Such a prohibition not only exceeds the extent of secrecy traditionally afforded grand jury hearings, but is uniquely broad among the State's other systems of professional discipline. In New Jersey, over seventy professions are subject to regulation, but, as the State acknowledges, only persons who file ethics charges against attorneys are prohibited from discussing their grievances. Compare R. 1:20-9, with N.J.S.A. 45:1-1 to -27. Even assuming that encouraging witnesses to cooperate with disciplinary authorities is a compelling interest, Rule 1:20-9 is not narrowly tailored to achieve that end. As the Supreme Court recognized in Landmark, supra, the risks associated with premature disclosure of an investigation can be largely eliminated through careful internal procedures that protect confidentiality. 435 U.S. at 845, 98 S.Ct. at 1545, 56 L.Ed. 2d at 14 (emphasis added). At a minimum, we can and do require disciplinary authorities themselves to keep the existence and substance of an investigation secret, see R. 1:20-9(h), and nothing in the First Amendment prevents us from imposing this obligation, see Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734, 20 L.Ed. 2d 811, 817 (1968) ([T]he State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.). And, although we recognize that voluntary cooperation by witnesses is desirable, their testimony can be secured by means that are less restrictive of a grievant's speech. For example, as with grand jury investigations, a subpoena can be issued to compel the appearance of a reluctant witness. R. 1:20-3(g)(6); see also Butterworth, supra, 494 U.S. at 634, 110 S.Ct. at 1382, 108 L.Ed. 2d at 582 ([S]ubpoena and contempt powers [are] available to bring recalcitrant witnesses to the stand.); Doe v. Doe, supra, 127 S.W. 3d at 736 (concluding that because subpoenas are available, guarantee of confidentiality has little additional effect). Further, all witnesses appearing at disciplinary hearings are duly sworn, R. 1:20-6(c)(2)(A), providing reasonable assurance that they will testify fully and frankly, Douglas Oil, supra, 441 U.S. at 219, 99 S.Ct. at 1673, 60 L.Ed. 2d at 165. See also Butterworth, supra, 494 U.S. at 633, 110 S.Ct. at 1382, 108 L.Ed. 2d at 582 (stating that perjury laws eliminate need for speech-restrictive rules intended to promote truthful testimony). The State further argues that confidentiality protects the ability of disciplinary authorities to make a full and fair investigation  an objective that overlaps substantially with the interest in promoting witness cooperation. Certainly, disclosure that an investigation is ongoing has the potential to invite the exertion of outside influence. However, that possibility is speculative. In any event, the risk of coercion can be minimized by the same procedures that ensure witness cooperation: the use of subpoenas and the imposition of criminal sanctions for witness tampering, destruction of evidence, and attempts to unduly pressure officials. See ibid. Finally, the State asserts that encouraging persons to file grievances is a compelling interest that is furthered by investigative confidentiality. To be sure, the reporting of attorney misconduct is of extreme importance for both the protection of the public and the success of the legal system. And, as a general rule, a grievant will be more likely to report unethical conduct by an attorney if disciplinary authorities are prohibited from revealing publicly the grievant's identity or the substance of the grievance. However, imposing on grievants the same obligation of nondisclosure provides little, if any, added benefit. The lawyer who may be the target of the complaint surely will learn about the grievance and the identity of the complainant, whether the procedures are deemed confidential or not. Doe v. Sup.Ct., supra, 734 F.Supp. at 985. Furthermore, as this matter demonstrates, not all grievants desire anonymity, and indeed, some grievants may be deterred from filing ethics complaints because they are forbidden from publicizing that fact. See ibid. (noting that perpetual bar from speaking out about [a] grievance may actually discourage filing of grievances). A more narrowly drawn rule would encourage, rather than require, grievants to preserve confidentiality. See ibid.; Brooks, supra, 678 A. 2d at 145. In that way, a grievant who wishes to avoid public attention can curtail his or her own speech, free from government encroachment. Cf. Butterworth, supra, 494 U.S. at 633, 110 S.Ct. at 1382, 108 L.Ed. 2d at 582 (holding that interest in protecting grand jury witnesses from retribution is not advanced by prohibition against witness discussion of own testimony; any witness is free not to divulge his own testimony).
We conclude that Rule 1:20-9, as written and as applied, violates the First Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling interest. Protecting the reputations of attorneys and the bar does not justify restricting a grievant's speech, and, in fact, such restrictions breed resentment rather than respect. Additionally, the confidentiality rule seeks to protect not only the reputation of the affected lawyer, but also the disciplinary process itself. Rule 1:20-9 imposes a period of enforced silence upon the filing of the grievance during which time the grievant cannot discuss the fact that he or she has filed a grievance or, more important, criticize the District Ethics Committees for unreasonably delaying the investigation of the allegedly errant lawyer. Restraining criticism of the District Ethics Committees cannot survive First Amendment scrutiny. Indeed, we delegate to the District Ethics Committees the responsibility to police members of the legal profession, and both this Court and those committees are part of the government that the public has a right to discuss and debate. The judiciary is no more immune from the reach of the First Amendment than the executive or legislative branches. Furthermore, although diversion is a valued component of the attorney ethics process, forbidding a grievant from discussing a grievance simply because the process resulted in diversion risks suppressing criticism of our disciplinary system. Fostering an environment where individuals are free to criticize government is precisely what the First Amendment is designed to do. Therefore, if the District Ethics Committee recommends that the matter be diverted, the fact that the respondent attorney admitted to minor misconduct and accepted diversion may be made public, but the contents of that agreement shall be kept confidential. This arrangement furthers the State's legitimate interest in encouraging diversion while accommodating grievants' First Amendment right to discuss their own grievances and the proceedings that follow. Protecting the integrity of pending investigations is a worthy goal, but, for the above reasons, it is not a compelling interest that justifies a prohibition on speech that would otherwise be free. Investigations can be adequately protected by less restrictive means than curtailing free expression. As the Conference of Chief Justices observed: `Gag rules' prohibiting complainants from publicly discussing the complaint have been found unconstitutional and should never be imposed. A National Action Plan on Lawyer Conduct and Professionalism: A Report of the Working Group on Lawyer Conduct and Professionalism 19, § II.D.1 (Jan. 21, 1999), available at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/natlplan/NatlActi onPlan.html. Accordingly, we hold that a grievant is not barred from divulging the fact that he or she filed a grievance, the content of that grievance, and the result of the process. Although our holding invalidates the confidentiality provisions of Rule 1:20-9, there are still means whereby the disciplinary system can further an attorney's interest in confidentiality without violating the First Amendment. First, the District Ethics Committee can recommend that the grievant maintain the confidentiality of the process during the investigatory stage and the grievant can agree to do so when it is in his or her interest. Further, there may be some disciplinary investigations in which the need for secrecy is paramount and the potential harm from premature disclosure is so great that the ethics investigator may have good cause to seek an order compelling the grievant to keep confidential the investigatory proceedings. Under such circumstances, the disciplinary authorities, if they can establish a compelling need for secrecy based on the specific and articulable facts of a case, can seek an appropriate order requiring confidentiality. Finally, we observe that although grievants are absolutely immune from suit for filing an ethics complaint or making statements within the context of subsequent disciplinary proceedings, they are not immune for statements made outside the context of a disciplinary matter, such as to the media or in another public forum. See In re Hearing on Immunity for Ethics Complainants, 96 N.J. 669, 674-75 & n. 3, 477 A. 2d 339 (1984) (explaining that grievant's public defamatory statements are actionable). Accordingly, grievants who falsely smear an attorney in public do so at their peril and may face defamation actions in appropriate cases. [3]