Opinion ID: 1708859
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: was the introduction of copies of the plea bargaining agreements with the coindictees and the state's closing argument vouching for their credibility violative of the appellant's right to confront witnesses against him, and did it deny him due process and fundamental fairness?

Text: After Rhonda Brock testified as to her version of the events which occurred on June 21, 1982, she was extensively cross-examined. The cross-examination covered her relationship with Parker and Medders, her prior employment with an escort service in New Orleans, the inconsistencies between the first and second statements which she made, her prior testimony in the case, and whether she had been arrested and indicted since the crime. During redirect, when counsel for the state began to question Brock about the agreement she had with the state, counsel for the defendant objected. With the exception of deleting a reference in the agreement to a polygraph test, the court overruled the objection, and allowed admission of the agreement. Mike Medders' statement was admitted into evidence during his direct examination. During closing argument, Mr. Davis, counsel for the state, stated that Medders and Brock had testified truthfully. The objection to that statement was overruled, on the basis that Medders and Brock had testified that their statements were true. Mr. Davis went on to point out to the jury that the court reporter was taking down everything that Medders and Brock said. Later, during Mr. Peters' closing argument, he made the following statement: If you had the entire Jackson police department to determine whether or not you were lying, if you had the entire district attorney's office to determine whether you were lying, and the best you can do is  as one of them says, they were going to use the bandana to wipe off the finger prints and the other one doesn't, and the best you can do is they were five feet into the house instead of a foot inside the door, then would you believe that person? When legal minds, when courts, when police, when investigators had not been able to find you in a lie, then would you believe that person? The appellant argues that this was improper vouching, making the prosecutor a witness against him. The state argues that counsel for the appellant failed to object at trial; however, the record shows that the attorney made an objection to the reference in closing argument that Medders and Brock were testifying truthfully, and later interposed a continuing objection on that ground. Thus, the assigned error was preserved for appeal. In Cabello v. State, 471 So.2d 332 (Miss. 1985), this Court allowed admission of the agreement to remand the defendant's son's case to the youth court. One of the factors allowing disclosure was that Defense counsel used the agreement to attack Rico's credibility on cross-examination. Thus the offer by the state and its acceptance by Rico, with its potential for truthfulness or falsehood in his testimony, was placed before the jury for their resolution. Id. at 341. In Cabello, the prosecutor informed the jury of the agreement before the direct testimony of the witness. During cross-examination, defense counsel used the agreement to attempt to impeach the witness's testimony. In this case, the jury was not informed of the agreement between Brock and the state until after her cross-examination. It was not brought out in cross-examination, thus, defense counsel could not have used it to impeach her testimony. At the end of Brock's cross-examination, defense counsel asked her You have not been indicted, have you? A. No sir. Q., I guess you know who prosecutes, don't you, Miss Brock? A. Yes, sir. During redirect, counsel for the state noted that question and answer, and then asked Miss Brock about the agreement between her and the state. This case does not fall squarely under Cabello, because defense counsel did not use the plea bargain agreement in his cross-examination. However, the agreement, as admitted into evidence, does not contain any improper vouching for the witness. It is merely evidence of an agreement between the witness and the state that she will testify truthfully, and, in the event that the state ascertains that she did not testify truthfully, she will be subject to prosecution for perjury. Given the fact that Miss Brock's credibility was attacked during cross-examination, introduction of the agreement showing that she had an incentive to testify truthfully was not improper. The introduction of Medder's statement may be viewed under the same rationale, since it was inevitable that his credibility would also be tested during cross-examination, as indeed it was. The closing argument of the prosecutors comes much closer to improper vouching. In United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530 (9th Cir.1980), the Court reversed a conviction where, during closing argument, the prosecutor said that a police officer was monitoring a government witness' testimony for truthfulness. The court held that The suggestion is that the prosecutor is forcing the truth from his witness and the unspoken message is that the prosecutor knows what the truth is and is assuring its revelation. Conveying this message explicitly is improper vouching. Id. at 536. In this case, the prosecutors noted that the court reporter was taking down everything that was testified. They also noted that the entire police department and the district attorney's office was available to determine whether the witness was lying. However, the unspoken message in these arguments was not so much that the prosecutor knew what the truth was, but that, if the witnesses were caught in an inconsistency, the district attorney's office would investigate to see if they were lying. Thus, there was no improper vouching in this case.