Opinion ID: 200205
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grace Period

Text: 36 The Commonwealth asserts that the district court erred when it ruled that Lattimore's petition for habeas corpus, deposited in the prison mail system on April 25, 1997, and docketed on April 28, 1997, was timely. We agree. The effective date of AEDPA, providing prisoners a one-year statute of limitations for habeas petitions, was April 24, 1996. It is established in this circuit, as elsewhere, that the grace period for prisoners whose state convictions became final prior to AEDPA to file a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is one year. Gaskins, 183 F.3d at 9. The one-year grace period runs from the date of AEDPA's enactment and ends on April 24, 1997. Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 349, 354 (1st Cir.1999); see also Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 183, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the courts of appeals have uniformly created a 1-year grace period, running from the date of AEDPA's enactment). 37 Lattimore's § 2254 petition was docketed on April 28, 1997, four days after the one-year grace period expired. If Lattimore is given the benefit of the prisoner mailbox rule, see Morales-Rivera v. United States, 184 F.3d 109, 110 (1st Cir.1999) (holding the prisoner mailbox rule is applicable to petitions filed pursuant to § 2254), and his petition were deemed to be filed on April 25, 1997, the date it was allegedly deposited in the prison mail system, his petition was still one day late and hence barred. 5 38 While Lattimore concedes that, pursuant to the current case law, his petition was untimely, he argues that at the time he filed his petition in 1997 the proper measurement of the year in this circuit had yet to be established and was insufficiently clear to exclude a petition that was filed on April 25, 1997. He says he lacked adequate notice that the grace period would end on April 24 and not April 25, 1997. To support his argument, Lattimore cites to two district courts within this circuit that opted for the April 25, 1997 date in decisions rendered after he filed his petition. 39 Considered as a legal argument, Lattimore's contention is without merit. Wrong guesses, even reasonable ones, as to precisely how a new statute of limitations will be authoritatively applied do not entitle a disappointed petitioner to relaxation of rules once adopted. See United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 878, 121 S.Ct. 188, 148 L.Ed.2d 130 (2000) (denying a § 2255 motion filed one day late because of confusion over the applicable deadline). The language in AEDPA put would-be petitioners, including those with preexisting causes of action, on notice of Congress's new one-year limitations. In instances where Congress has altered an established statute of limitations, courts have commonly construed the grace period for preexisting claims to be the shorter of: (1) the original limitation period, or (2) the new, shortened limitation period, commencing from the date the statute became effective. See Rogers, 180 F.3d at 354; Brown v. Angelone, 150 F.3d 370, 375 (4th Cir.1998); United States v. Flores, 135 F.3d 1000, 1005 (5th Cir.1998). Under existing case law, it could be expected that someone in Lattimore's position would be allowed one year to file, measured from the effective date of the AEDPA, April 24, 1996. When a limitations period is measured in years, the last day for instituting the action is traditionally the anniversary date of the start of the limitations period. Rogers, 180 F.3d at 354 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)). One in Lattimore's shoes had no reason to be surprised that his petition was out of time. 40 We note that before Lattimore had filed his petition, two circuit courts and the Department of Justice (DOJ) had spoken regarding the applicable grace period. Peterson v. Demskie, 107 F.3d 92, 93 (2d Cir.1997) (no need to accord full year); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 866 (7th Cir.1996) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997) (implied period ended on April 23, 1997). The DOJ's official position, announced in a memo dated June 28, 1996, was that it would not seek to enforce the limitations period against prisoners convicted prior to AEDPA until one year after the Act took effect — i.e. April 24, 1997. Mickens v. United States, 148 F.3d 145, 148 (2d Cir.1998). 41 As a legal proposition, therefore, Lattimore's petition was too late. We turn next to whether it could or should be tolled equitably.