Opinion ID: 1905655
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Grant of a Summary Judgment

Text: [¶ 22] We review the court's grant of a summary judgment in favor of the Trust and State de novo, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Owners, to decide whether the parties' statements of material fact and referenced record evidence reveal a genuine issue of material fact. Welch v. State, 2006 ME 121, ¶ 11, 908 A.2d 1207, 1210 (quotation marks omitted); Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000 ME 84, ¶ 6, 750 A.2d 573, 575.
[¶ 23] The Owners argue that the commercial activities they now propose to offer to the paying public are within the scope of allowable uses under the Conservation Easement, will cause no harm to the Protected Parcel, and that, even if their proposed use for the Protected Parcel would constitute a commercial use, the Conservation Easement does not prohibit commercial uses and the grantors of the easement intended such uses. [¶ 24] The construction of a deed is a question of law that we review de novo. N. Sebago Shores, LLC v. Mazzaglia, 2007 ME 81, ¶ 13, 926 A.2d 728, 733. A court construing the language of a deed ... must first attempt to construe the language ... by looking only within the four corners of the instrument. In evaluating the language of a deed, courts should give effect to the common or everyday meanings of the words in the instrument. If the deed is unambiguous, the court must construe the deed without considering extrinsic evidence; if the deed is ambiguous, however, the court may admit extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. Id. (quotation marks and internal citations omitted) (alterations in original). In determining the intent of the parties to the deed, we look at the instrument as a whole. Kinney v. Cent. Me. Power Co., 403 A.2d 346, 349 (Me.1979). [¶ 25] The deed states that the Conservation Easement's dominant purpose is: [T]o preserve and protect in perpetuity the natural, open space, scenic, aesthetic and ecological features and values of the Property while not limiting the Grantor's power to utilize the property for residential recreational purposes. In so doing, it is the purpose of this Easement to foster responsible conservation practices while permitting Grantor to engage in certain recreational uses on the Property. The deed also states that [t]he Property shall be used by the [Owners] only for residential recreational purposes, and maintenance or access related to such purposes, together with conservation purposes and for the proper management of its forest resources. Further, the deed states that the Conservation Easement is intended to prevent any non-residential use, non-recreational use or development which would conflict with [the land's] natural, scenic condition, except as provided in the deed and that the Protected Parcel is intended to provide a place of recreation and of natural solitude. The key issue for analysis is to determine whether the term residential recreational purposes encompasses the uses proposed by the Owners. [¶ 26] We note at the outset that, despite the parties' attempts to define residential by contrasting it to commercial, the word commercial does not appear in the Conservation Easement. We do not, therefore, attempt to define commercial for purposes of interpreting residential recreational purposes. [¶ 27] The terms residential recreational purposes and non-residential use are not defined in the deed. The Owners urge us to apply a meaning of residential as that word is, they argue, typically used in land use law. We decline to do so. In evaluating the language of a deed, courts should give effect to the common or everyday meanings of the words in the instrument. N. Sebago Shores, 2007 ME 81, ¶ 13, 926 A.2d at 733. We apply the common, everyday understanding of the word residential, which is of or relating to residence or residences. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 977 (1979). The definition of residence is understood to include: 1a: the act or fact of dwelling in a place for some time; b: the act or fact of living or regularly staying at or in some place for the discharge of a duty or the enjoyment of a benefit; 2a(1): the place where one actually lives as distinguished from his domicile or a place of temporary sojourn. Id. [¶ 28] The meaning of residential recreational purposes, therefore, refers, unambiguously, to recreational activities associated with those who are regularly living at that locale. Thus, the deed's several references to residential recreational purposes indicate the parties' intent to restrict the use of the Protected Parcel to the residents of the front fifteen acres for their recreational purposes, and to preclude the income-producing or -generating uses proposed by the Owners. See generally Green v. Lawrence, 2005 ME 90, ¶ 8, 877 A.2d 1079, 1082 (holding that the term wood lot in a restrictive covenant is a common term and not ambiguous, requiring no extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent). [¶ 29] The Owners' several arguments in favor of a contrary conclusion are not persuasive. First, the deed occasionally refers to recreational use (without the residential modifier) and to the Owners' right of general enjoyment on the Protected Parcel. However, when those terms are read in the context of the deed as a whole, it is evident that the parties intended the more specific term, residential recreational purposes to trump any more general terms. See Kinney, 403 A.2d at 349. [¶ 30] Second, the Owners argue that the deed's reference to the legal duties of the Owner and the Trust with respect to members of the general public who may enter the Protected Parcel for recreational purposes can only refer to an intent to allow the Owners to open the Protected [Parcel] to the general public for a fee. We disagree. This provision merely reiterates our statutory law limiting landowner liability for recreational uses, see 14 M.R.S. § 159-A(2) (2008), and acknowledges Maine's open lands tradition, allowing public access to wilderness lands for recreational use, see Weeks v. Krysa, 2008 ME 120, ¶ 15, 955 A.2d 234, 238 (Maine has a tradition of acquiescence in access to nonposted fields and woodlands by abutters and by the public. Pursuant to our open lands tradition, recreational use of unposted open fields or woodlands and any ways through them are presumed permissive and do not diminish the rights of the owner in the land.) (internal citation omitted). This section of the deed does not undermine a conclusion that, as a matter of law, the deed prohibits the Owners from engaging in the types of activities they propose. [¶ 31] Finally, the Owners assert that language in the easement deed allows them to offer tractor-pulled hay rides to paying guests. The deed provides that the use of motorized vehicles, including, without limitation, motorcycles, snowmobiles, all terrain vehicles, and tractors, is prohibited on the Protected Parcel, except that the Owners shall be allowed the use of motorized vehicles by [the Owner] and [the Owner's] guests, up to but not exceeding five in number at any one time. This language is ambiguous in that it is unclear whether the Owner is limited to allowing up to five motorized vehicles or five guests at any one time on the Protected Parcel. Any ambiguity in this respect does not, however, alter our analysis that the deed, read as a whole, precludes the Owners from using the Protected Parcel for activities by the paying public. [¶ 32] We can, without resort to extrinsic evidence, derive from the deed's language the intent of the parties to limit use of the Protected Parcel to residential recreational purposes and to preclude the activities now proposed by the Owners. [5] The Conservation Easement may be an imperfectly drafted document. However, even if we were to conclude that the document was sufficiently ambiguous to require a court to look to extrinsic evidence to glean the parties' intent in drafting the deed, the Owners failed to demonstrate that such evidence exists. The only extrinsic evidence the Owners provided to the summary judgment court was an unauthenticated letter to the editor purportedly written by a Freeman family member. The Owners argue that this letter is evidence that the parties to the deed anticipated that the Protected Parcel would be used for horseback riding lessons by the paying public and, therefore, the deed does not prohibit use of the Protected Parcel for activities by the paying public. Contrary to the Owners' contentions, this letter fails to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for four reasons. [¶ 33] First, the letter was not put properly before the court. The Owners stated in their statement of additional facts that the letter, written by a family member in 2007, shows the intent of the Conservation Easement to allow the owners to use the protected property for horseback riding and horseback riding lessons. The Owners cite to Jeffords's affidavit as support for this factual statement. However, there is no indication that Jeffords had personal knowledge, as is required of an affiant, that the family member actually wrote such a letter or what the intent of the author was. See Bahre v. Liberty Group, Inc., 2000 ME 75, ¶ 12, 750 A.2d 558, 561 (holding that an affidavit submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must show affirmatively that it is based on the affiant's personal knowledge). [¶ 34] Second, [e]vidence set forth in an affidavit in opposition to a motion for a summary judgment must be admissible evidence. Searles v. Trs. of St. Joseph's Coll., 1997 ME 128, ¶ 9 n. 2, 695 A.2d 1206, 1210. The letter referred to in Jeffords's affidavit would not have been admissible evidence. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(e) (requiring all copies of papers referred to in an affidavit to be sworn or certified); M.R. Evid. 802 (hearsay rule), 901 (authentication). [¶ 35] Third, even if the letter were admissible, it provides no evidence that the parties to the deed actually agreed that the Protected Parcel could be used for income-generating horseback riding lessons, much less any other similar activities. The letter states that the couple who purchased the Freeman Farm from the Freeman family asked for language that would allow for horseback riding as well as possibly using the land for riding lessons. The letter states that, in response to that request, the Freeman family and the Trust agreed upon slight changes in the wording of the easement before the sale was complete. The letter does not state that the family and the Trust acquiesced to the then-buyer's request to allow the Protected Parcel to be used for horseback riding lessons by the paying public, and in fact, the plain language of the deed as finally drafted evidences no such thing. The deed provides only that the Protected Parcel may be used to dispose of horse manure or other animal waste generated from permitted activities on [the front fifteen-acre parcel] or [the Protected Parcel]. The plain language of the deed does not indicate that permitted activities relating to horses or other animals on the Protected Parcel would include fee-generating horseback riding lessons or any other fee-generating activity. [¶ 36] Accordingly, the language of the deed is sufficiently clear for us to conclude that the intent of the parties to that document was to prohibit use of the Protected Parcel for the income-generating purposes proposed by the Owners and that the Owners failed to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in this regard.
[¶ 37] The Owners argue that the court erred in granting the Trust's summary judgment motion because the competing statements of material fact demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and because an evidentiary hearing was required to determine whether the Trust should have been equitably estopped from pursuing its action. [¶ 38] As to their equitable estoppel argument, the Owners contend that the court's grant of a summary judgment improperly prevented them from establishing the key facts at trial to equitably estop the Trust from pursuing its action. However, the doctrine of equitable estoppel only applies when an individual makes misrepresentations, including misleading statements, conduct, or silence, that induce detrimental reliance. Town of Freeport v. Ring, 1999 ME 48, ¶ 14, 727 A.2d 901, 906 (quotation marks omitted). In this case, the Owners' additional material facts assert that the Trust's attorney told them more than a year after they purchased the Freeman Farm that he thought their proposed activities on the Protected Parcel would not violate the Conservation Easement and that the Owners relied on his statements in developing their 2007 financial plan. [6] Assuming for purposes of this discussion that this is true, the Owners have not shown any detrimental reliance given that they purchased the Freeman Farm long before the alleged conversation with the Trust's attorney; they purchased the land fully aware of the Conservation Easement; and they admit that, but for a few activities associated with charitable events held on the front fifteen-acre parcel, they have not gone forward with any of their proposed activities on the Protected Parcel. [¶ 39] Because there are no genuine disputes of material fact, the court did not err in granting a summary judgment in favor of the Trust and the State.