Opinion ID: 2977121
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Review of District Court’s Decision

Text: DeLeon claims that he became a “prevailing party” upon entry of the March 10, 2006 settlement order and because of the subsequent arbitration proceeding.5 The district court held that the settlement order did not grant any substantive relief to DeLeon, but “merely submitted Plaintiff’s claims to arbitration,” and therefore was unconvinced that this materially altered the parties’ legal relationship. DeLeon, 2007 WL 2259331, at . As for the arbitration, the district court acknowledged that DeLeon “succeed[ed] in proving that his due process rights were violated” and therefore “achieve[d] some degree of success”: “[t]he fact that Defendants were required to pay all of the arbitration costs as a result of the due process denial, a portion of which costs was originally Plaintiff’s obligation, modified Defendants’ behavior in a way that directly benefits Plaintiff.” Id. at . The court ruled that DeLeon may be considered a prevailing party “[t]o the extent that” the 5 A litigant must be a “prevailing party” to qualify for attorney’s fees under § 1988. “[A] plaintiff ‘prevails’ when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992). “[T]he Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ when he receives ‘at least some relief on the merits of his claim,’ even nominal damages.” Andretti v. Borla Performance Indus., Inc., 426 F.3d 824, 835 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001)). 8 arbitrator’s decision materially altered the parties’ legal relationship, but noted that “[t]o the extent that the arbitrator’s award is insufficient to bestow prevailing party status upon Plaintiff, Plaintiff fails to establish his eligibility for an award of attorneys’ fees.” Id. at  & n.5. We need not decide whether DeLeon was made a “prevailing party” either by the settlement order or the arbitration. Assuming arguendo that DeLeon was a “prevailing party,” we nevertheless conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award attorney’s fees to DeLeon. Section 1988 provides in pertinent part that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Supreme Court has made clear that [o]nce civil rights litigation materially alters the legal relationship between the parties, “the degree of the plaintiff’s overall success goes to the reasonableness” of a fee award under Hensley v. Eckerhart[.] Indeed, “the most critical factor” in determining the reasonableness of a fee award “is the degree of success obtained.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114 (citations omitted). The “technical” nature of an award does not affect whether a plaintiff prevailed, but “it does bear on the propriety of fees awarded under § 1988.” Id. The district court found DeLeon’s procedural victory regarding the hearing to which he was entitled under the MVPA to be insufficient to support an award for fees in this case. The court observed that “[DeLeon]’s success was only in the context of establishing procedural rights”—and that “[t]he procedural issue, though not insignificant, was not the substance of his case.” DeLeon, 2007 WL 2259331, at . According to the court, “it was the CBA-based property interest in employment that was the meat of Plaintiff’s claims, not the rather ethereal MVPA violation upon which he now bases his claim for attorneys’ fees.” Id. at . The district court acknowledged that DeLeon achieved “some degree of success,” but observed that “the relief Plaintiff obtained, in light 9 of the relief he sought, [was] not substantial.” Id. The court found that the arbitration award was akin to a mere technical victory, as the award to DeLeon of his arbitration costs “in essence left Plaintiff in only a marginally more favorable position after arbitration,” and concluded that “the award in this case reinforces the technical nature of Plaintiff’s success.” Id. at . The district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that any success by DeLeon in this litigation was “technical” and insubstantial. Although the arbitrator awarded DeLeon what turned out to be $9,008, DeLeon acknowledges that this award “compensated DeLeon for arbitration costs.” Appellant’s Br. 50. Thus, the award of $9,008 was more than nominal, but it was clearly technical or de minimis when considered in context. As this court recently observed, “[t]he trial court’s exercise of discretion is entitled to substantial deference because the rationale for the award is predominately fact-driven.” Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 551 (6th Cir. 2008). “This deference ‘is appropriate in view of the district court’s superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters.’” Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)). We see no reason in this case not to defer to the district court’s understanding of the litigation and, thus, the “degree of success obtained” by DeLeon. Accordingly, and in light of the fact that “the most critical factor” in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is a party’s success, see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award DeLeon his attorney’s fees.6 6 The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by not awarding DeLeon any fees for his fee-related litigation efforts or his costs under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 10