Opinion ID: 202656
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prong Three: Whether a Reasonable Officer Would Have Believed a Violation Occurred

Text: 93 The final prong of the qualified immunity analysis is whether an objectively reasonable official would have believed that the action taken violated that clearly established constitutional right. Starlight, 253 F.3d at 141. As we have previously explained, [i]t is not always evident at the time an official takes an action that a clearly established right is involved. For example, the factual situation might be ambiguous or the application of the legal standard to the precise facts at issue might be difficult. Riverdale Mills, 392 F.3d at 61. Thus, even if an officer's conduct violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law, he may still be eligible for qualified immunity if he was reasonably mistaken as to the degree of force he should have used. 94 At first glance, this inquiry appears indistinguishable from that in the first prong. Both involve the reasonableness of the officer's conduct. However, the key distinction is that prong one deals with whether the officer's conduct was objectively unreasonable, whereas prong three deals with whether an objectively reasonable officer would have believed the conduct was unreasonable. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 204-05, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (explaining that claims of excessive force in the context of arrests ... should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's `objective reasonableness standard' but that [i]f the officer's mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable . . . the officer is entitled to the immunity defense (internal citation omitted)). 95 The third prong analysis seems nonsensical at first blush because, in effect, officers receive protection if they acted reasonably in exercising unreasonable force. In Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987), the Supreme Court acknowledged the argument made by the appellant in that case that [i]t is not possible . . . to say that one `reasonably' acted unreasonably. However, the Court excused this apparent contradiction as merely linguistic, explaining: We have frequently observed, and our many cases on the point amply demonstrate, the difficulty of determining whether particular searches or seizures comport with the Fourth Amendment. Law enforcement officers whose judgments in making these difficult determinations are objectively legally reasonable should no more be held personally liable in damages than should officials making analogous determinations in other areas of law. 96 Id. at 644, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (internal citation omitted). Thus, qualified immunity affords protection to officers who reasonably, yet mistakenly, employ excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 97 Again, we are sympathetic to the situation that Jones confronted. Jennings had to be subdued while he was resisting arrest, and the chaos caused by his struggle may have made it difficult for Jones to gauge the appropriate level of force. These circumstances would arguably allow a reasonable officer in Jones' circumstances to believe that it was lawful to maintain the level of force he used even after Jones ceased resisting. 98 However, we reiterate that we must take the facts in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See, e.g., Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir.1999). Thus, we accept that Jones increased, rather than merely maintained, the force he applied to Jennings' ankle, even after Jennings had ceased resisting and stated that Jones was hurting his previously injured ankle. 22 99 Under such circumstances, even the added measure of protection provided by the third prong of the qualified immunity analysis does not insulate Jones from damages. Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25 (1st Cir.2004). We find that an objectively reasonable officer in Jones' circumstances would not have believed that it was lawful to increase the amount of force that he used after Jennings ceased resisting and stated that Jones was hurting him. 23 100 Because the first and third prongs of the qualified immunity analysis are so closely related in these Fourth Amendment excessive force cases, the evidence that supports our conclusion on the first prong, that a reasonable jury could have found that the force Jones used was unreasonable, is likewise relevant here, on the third prong, to demonstrate that an objectively reasonable officer in Jones' position would have believed that the force used was unreasonable. More specifically, Officer Delaney's testimony about the training that officers receive and the Use of Force Continuum is relevant both to the prong one question of whether there was a violation at all and to the prong three question, which we address here, of whether a reasonable officer in Jones' circumstances would have believed that his conduct violated the Constitution. 101 Officer Delaney's testimony about the training that officers undergo and the Use of Force Continuum made clear that officers should adjust their force in a manner proportional to the resistance offered by the arrestee. Instead, Jones adjusted his force inversely, increasing the force he used after Jennings stopped resisting and stated that the restraint was causing him pain. Under such circumstances, a reasonable officer would have believed that increasing his use of force would violate Jennings' constitutional right to be free from excessive force. 24 102 The district court concluded that Jones was entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer in his position would not have believed that his conduct violated Jennings' constitutional rights. However, this conclusion again indicates that the court did not construe the facts in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. In discussing the third prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the court stated that the evidence clearly demonstrates that, even if he was mistaken, Jones reasonably could have believed that his utilization of the ankle turn control technique was lawful. (Emphasis added.) As we have repeatedly emphasized, the conduct at issue was not the mere utilization of the technique, but rather the increase of force after Jennings ceased resisting. It is this increased force that an objectively reasonable officer would not have believed was lawful. 103 The dissent once again avoids the central issue—Jones' use of increased force on a nonresisting arrestee—by describing Jones' conduct and Delaney's testimony in sanitized terms. It states that Jones testified that he tried to secure Jennings' ankle, emphasizes Delaney's testimony that it was appropriate for Jones to continue using the same compliance technique, and refers repeatedly to the use of the ankle turn control technique. (Emphases added.) These characterizations ignore the view of the facts we must take in light of the jury verdict and, consequently, result in a misapplication of the qualified immunity analysis. 104 In light of the circumstances, we hold that a reasonable officer in Jones' position would have believed that increasing the force with which he restrained Jennings was a violation of Jennings' constitutional right to be free from excessive force. Thus, Jones is not entitled to qualified immunity.