Opinion ID: 1855326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: timeliness of appellee's motion

Text: Following the trial, the district court made a docket entry setting forth its decision in detail on October 6, 1995. Seven days later, on October 13, appellee filed a motion for new trial and an order nunc pro tunc. The actual divorce decree, however, was not filed in the district court until October 27, some 14 days after appellee's motion was filed. Thus, our first inquiry is whether appellee's motion was effective. A motion for new trial in a dissolution action must be filed within 10 days after the decree or judgment is rendered. Neb. Rev.Stat. § 25-1143 (Reissue 1995); Smith v. Smith, 225 Neb. 93, 402 N.W.2d 688 (1987). A rendition of judgment occurs when the court makes an oral pronouncement in open court and accompanies that pronouncement with a notation on the trial docket or, in the alternative, when some written notation of the judgment is filed in the records of the court. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1301 (Reissue 1995); Tri-County Landfill v. Board of Cty. Comrs., 247 Neb. 350, 526 N.W.2d 668 (1995); In re Interest of J.A., 244 Neb. 919, 510 N.W.2d 68 (1994). An examination of the bill of exceptions reveals that there was no oral pronouncement of a judgment at the August 10, 1995, trial. That being the case, we conclude that the judgment was rendered on the date the divorce decree was filed, October 27, thereby making appellee's motion for new trial premature. However, a premature filing of a motion for new trial is not necessarily fatal. A similar situation was addressed in Pfeiffer v. Pfeiffer, 203 Neb. 137, 277 N.W.2d 575 (1979). There, the district court announced its decision on November 28, 1977, but the actual divorce decree was not signed and filed until December 6. A motion for new trial was filed by the wife on December 5. This court rejected the husband's argument that the motion was a nullity because it was filed prematurely, stating: We now hold that a motion for new trial filed after the trial court has announced its decision, but before a judgment has been rendered or entered, is effective and does not constitute a nullity if the record shows that the motion for new trial relates to the decision which has been announced by the trial court and the record shows that a judgment was subsequently rendered or entered in accordance with the decision which was announced and to which the motion for new trial relates. Id. at 141-42, 277 N.W.2d at 578. The record in the instant case reflects that a docket entry detailing the trial court's determination was entered on October 6, 1995, with directions that a copy be sent to each party. Appellee's motion for new trial and order nun pro tunc relates specifically to orders entered by the court in its Decree dated October 6, 1995. As noted above, the decree was subsequently filed on October 27. This decree mirrors the October 6 docket entry in all respects. We conclude that appellee's motion for new trial was effective within the dictates of Pfeiffer.