Opinion ID: 2456428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Implied Reciprocal Negative Easement Doctrine

Text: Because it sets the legal context for the factual disputes, we first briefly discuss the legal theory of this controversy. The doctrine of implied reciprocal negative easements applies when an owner of real property subdivides it into lots and sells a substantial number of those lots with restrictive covenants designed to further the owner's general plan or scheme of development. The central issue is usually the existence of a general plan of development. The lots retained by the owner, or lots sold by the owner from the development without express restrictions to a grantee with notice of the restrictions in the other deeds, are burdened with what is variously called an implied reciprocal negative easement, or an implied equitable servitude, or negative implied restrictive covenant, that they may not be used in violation of the restrictive covenants burdening the lots sold with the express restrictions. A reasonably accurate general statement of the doctrine has been given as follows: [W]here a common grantor develops a tract of land for sale in lots and pursues a course of conduct which indicates that he intends to inaugurate a general scheme or plan of development for the benefit of himself and the purchasers of the various lots, and by numerous conveyances inserts in the deeds substantially uniform restrictions, conditions and covenants against the use of the property, the grantees acquire by implication an equitable right, variously referred to as an implied reciprocal negative easement or an equitable servitude, to enforce similar restrictions against that part of the tract retained by the grantor or subsequently sold without the restrictions to a purchaser with actual or constructive notice of the restrictions and covenants. [Citations omitted.] Minner v. City of Lynchburg, 204 Va. 180, 188, 129 S.E.2d 673, 679 (1963). The implied reciprocal negative easement doctrine has long been recognized in many jurisdictions. Annot., 60 A.L.R. 1216 (1929); Annot., 144 A.L.R. 916 (1943). This court expressly approved the doctrine in Curlee v. Walker, 112 Tex. 40, 43-44, 244 S.W. 497, 498 (1922). Curlee was a standing case in which we expressly addressed whether the owner of a lot subject to a restrictive covenant had standing to assert the restrictive covenant in another landowner's deed; the case did not involve an implied reciprocal negative easement. Because the concept of a general plan of development is so frequently connected to the doctrine and standing questions, however, we wrote extensively on the implied reciprocal negative easement doctrine. The leading Texas case on implied reciprocal negative easements is Hooper v. Lottman, 171 S.W. 270 (Tex.Civ.App.El Paso 1914, no writ), from which we quoted at length with approval in Curlee. We implicitly recognized the doctrine in MacDonald v. Painter, 441 S.W.2d 179 (Tex.1969). Numerous intermediate appellate decisions have applied it, as we will examine below.