Opinion ID: 1892409
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: manslaughter in nebraska

Text: There are no common-law crimes in Nebraska. State v. Douglas, 222 Neb. 833, 388 N.W.2d 801 (1986); Kinnan v. State, 86 Neb. 234, 125 N.W. 594 (1910). Within constitutional boundaries, the Legislature is empowered to define a crime and punish a person's conduct expressly declared to be criminal. See, State v. Douglas, supra ; State v. Ewert, 194 Neb. 203, 230 N.W.2d 609 (1975); State v. Tucker, 183 Neb. 577, 162 N.W.2d 774 (1968). However, the meaning of words or phrases used in reference to common-law crimes may be helpful in determining the meaning, intent, or effect of a statute which does not contain an express definition of terms in the statute. State v. Mattan, 207 Neb. 679, 300 N.W.2d 810 (1981); State v. Eynon, 197 Neb. 734, 250 N.W.2d 658 (1977); State v. De Wolfe, 67 Neb. 321, 93 N.W. 746 (1903). For Nebraska statutes, the Legislature has drawn from the common law to define the crime of manslaughter. Nebraska's initial statute on manslaughter, Rev. Stat. Part III §§ 21 to 24 (1866), provided: Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice, express or implied, and without any deliberation whatever. It must be voluntary, upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a provocation apparently sufficient to make the passion irresistible or involuntary, in the commission of an unlawful act, or a lawful act without due caution or circumspection. § 21. In cases of voluntary manslaughter, there must be a serious and highly provoking injury inflicted upon the person killing, sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person, or an attempt by the person killed to commit a serious personal injury on the person killing. § 22. The killing must be the result of that sudden, violent impulse of passion, supposed to be irresistible; for if there should appear to have been an interval between the assault or provocation given and the killing, sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard, the killing shall be attributed to deliberate revenge, and punished as a murder. § 23. Involuntary manslaughter shall consist in the killing of a human being without any intent so to do, in the commission of an unlawful act, or a lawful act, which probably might produce such a consequence, in an unlawful manner: Provided, always, That where such involuntary killing shall happen in the commission of an unlawful act, which, in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being, or is committed in the prosecution of a felonious intent, the offense shall be deemed and adjudged to be murder. (Emphasis in original.) § 24. In 1873, however, by Gen.Stat. ch. 58 § 5 (1873), the Legislature amended the manslaughter statute and defined the crime as follows: If any person shall unlawfully kill another without malice, either upon a sudden quarrel, or unintentionally, while the slayer is in the commission of some unlawful act, every such person shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter.... Noteworthy is the fact that in enacting the 1873 manslaughter statute, the Nebraska Legislature drew extensively from the criminal code of Ohio. See Morgan v. State, 51 Neb. 672, 71 N.W. 788 (1897). Construing the Ohio statutory progenitor of the 1873 Nebraska manslaughter statute, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated in John Sutcliffe v. The State, 18 Ohio 469, 476 (1849): [T]he entire description of the offense is embraced in these words, to wit: that if any person shall unlawfully kill another without malice, either upon a sudden quarrel or unintentionally, while the slayer is in the commission of some unlawful act; every such person shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter; Swan's Stat. 229. It is evident that the Legislature had in their view, while framing the enactment above quoted, the crime of manslaughter, as well understood at the common law. They have adopted it in substance, and almost in form. The statutory definition of manslaughter, contained in the General Statutes of 1873, was substantially carried into Comp. Stat. § 28-403 (1929): Whoever shall unlawfully kill another without malice, either upon a sudden quarrel, or unintentionally, while the slayer is in the commission of some unlawful act, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter.... As a part of the Nebraska Criminal Code, enacted in 1977, § 28-305(1) contained the current definition of manslaughter: A person commits manslaughter if he kills another without malice, either upon a sudden quarrel, or causes the death of another unintentionally while in the commission of an unlawful act. As noted in State v. Hutter, 145 Neb. 798, 802-03, 18 N.W.2d 203, 207 (1945): The different degrees of homicide as defined by our statute are all carved out of murder and manslaughter as known to the common law. No new offense has been created, and no homicide which was not criminal at common law is made so by statute, but it is divided into degrees and the punishment graded to meet the circumstances of the particular case. The decisions of this court clearly hold to this view. In light of the foregoing, § 28-305(1) establishes and distinguishes the two categories of manslaughter: an unlawful killing, without malice upon a sudden quarrel, which may be characterized as voluntary manslaughter, and an unlawful but unintentional killing, without malice, as the result of the defendant's commission of an unlawful act, which may be characterized as involuntary manslaughter. As used in § 28-305(1), the phrase sudden quarrel does not necessarily mean an exchange of angry words or an altercation contemporaneous with the unlawful killing and does not require a physical struggle or other combative corporal contact between the defendant and the victim. See State v. Vosler, 216 Neb. 461, 345 N.W.2d 806 (1984). Rather, in relation to manslaughter, a sudden quarrel is a legally recognized and sufficient provocation which causes a reasonable person to lose normal self-control, or, as expressed in Savary v. State, 62 Neb. 166, 175, 87 N.W. 34, 37-38 (1901), whether the defendant acted under the impulse of passion suddenly aroused which clouded the reason and prevented rational action ... whether there existed reasonable and adequate provocation to excite the passion of the defendant and obscure and disturb his power of reasoning to the extent that he acted rashly and from passion, without due deliberation and reflection, rather than from judgment.... See, also, State v. Rincker, 228 Neb. 522, 423 N.W.2d 434 (1988), wherein Rincker, carrying a hunting knife, entered a house, discovered his wife on a bed between two naked men, and stabbed to death the victim, one of the men who was on the bed with Rincker's wife. The State charged Rincker with first degree murder on account of the victim's death, that is, premeditated criminal homicide in violation of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-303(1) (Reissue 1985). Notwithstanding that Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2027 (Reissue 1985) provides in part, In all trials for murder the jury before whom such trial is had, if they find the prisoner guilty thereof, shall ascertain in their verdict whether it be murder in the first or second degree, or manslaughter, Rincker contended that the trial court, without request, should not have instructed on manslaughter. This court responded to Rincker's contention: The jury could well have concluded from the evidence that Rincker's wife was lying on the bed between the victim and Siegrist and that Rincker reacted to that scene without any prior intention to kill the victim. That alone required the trial court to instruct the jury concerning manslaughter. (Emphasis supplied.) 228 Neb. at 534, 423 N.W.2d at 442. In view of the first degree murder charge in Rincker, this court's expression without any prior intention to kill the victim, when placed in proper context, clearly refers to Rincker's reaction without premeditation in slaying the victim. In reference to manslaughter, defined by the General Statutes of 1873 of the State of Nebraska, this court stated in Boche v. State, 84 Neb. 845, 854, 122 N.W. 72, 75 (1909): [T]o convict a defendant of manslaughter, it must be proved either that the killing was done in a sudden quarrel, or while the slayer was in the commission of some unlawful act.... In the first class of cases referred to in the statute the homicide must have been intentional, but in sudden passion or heat of blood caused by a reasonable provocation, and without malice; in the latter clause the killing must have been unintentional, but caused while the slayer was committing some act prohibited by law.... (Emphasis omitted.) In Egbert v. State, 113 Neb. 790, 799, 205 N.W. 252, 256 (1925), this court approved an instruction which informed the jury in a manslaughter case that to warrant a verdict of guilty [for the crime of manslaughter] the state must satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt that the revolver at the time and place in question was not accidentally discharged, or, if accidentally discharged, that the defendant was then in the commission of an unlawful act directly connected therewith.... The instruction approved in Egbert must be read in relation to our decisions in which we have considered a criminal assault with a weapon, that is, a defendant's commission of an unlawful act, in reference to an unlawful killing characterized as involuntary manslaughter; for example, see, State v. Bachkora, 229 Neb. 421, 427 N.W.2d 71 (1988): defendant claimed that the gun he was holding discharged accidentally, killing the victim; held, an instruction on accidental killing was not required because the defendant admitted pointing the gun at the victim, an act which was a criminal assault and, therefore, an unlawful act which resulted in the homicide; State v. Drew, 216 Neb. 685, 687-88, 344 N.W.2d 923, 925 (1984): [T]he focus of the inquiry is not whether the gun discharged accidentally but, rather, whether the defendant was acting lawfully at the time the gun discharged. The defendant must establish that the use of the gun was privileged at the time it discharged. The threatening use of a firearm is an unlawful assault sufficient to convict one of manslaughter, when defined as causing the death of another unintentionally while in the commission of an unlawful act. § 28-305(1). Similarly, the accidental discharge of a gun, the use of which was not justified under the circumstances, is not a defense to manslaughter when the killing occurred upon a sudden quarrel. (Emphasis in original); Ford v. State, 71 Neb. 246, 98 N.W. 807 (1904): although the defendant believed that the gun was unloaded, the defendant's pointing the gun at the victim constituted a criminal assault as the basis for a manslaughter conviction. State v. Worley, 178 Neb. 232, 132 N.W.2d 764 (1965), illustrates that in an appropriate factual setting, a jury must decide whether a homicide constitutes murder in the second degree, that is, a person causes another's death intentionally without premeditation (Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-304 (Reissue 1985)), or whether the homicide is voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. In Worley, the defendant, alone in his girlfriend's house, where he awaited her return, fired a pistol at some figurines in the bedroom. As Worley was reloading the weapon, the doorbell rang. On answering the door, Worley found his girlfriend, Lucy, in the company of Ralph Gomez. Worley expressed his concern about what he believed to be the couple's inordinately long absence from the house. After seating himself on a divan, Worley began manipulating the pistol, which appeared to be jammed, when he was approached by Gomez with raised hands. As Worley was handling the apparently jammed pistol, the weapon discharged. When Worley started to get up from the divan, the pistol fired again. Gomez fell to the floor and died of multiple gunshot wounds in his chest. Although Worley was charged with second degree murder, the jury found him guilty of manslaughter, that is, killing of another without malice, either upon a sudden quarrel or unintentionally while the slayer is in the commission of some unlawful act. 178 Neb. at 235, 132 N.W.2d at 767. In reviewing the factual background for the discharge of the pistol in Worley's hand, the court stated: We believe this evidence alone was sufficient for the jury to reach a conclusion that the killing occurred upon a sudden quarrel and in the heat of passion. The lack of intent, as well as intent itself, is a matter peculiarly within the jury's province. 178 Neb. at 236, 132 N.W.2d at 767. After examining the evidence of intent in relation to the charge of manslaughter upon a sudden quarrel, the Worley court then directed its attention to manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act and expressed the following: The court also instructed the jury that the defendant could be found guilty of manslaughter if he shot and killed Gomez while in the commission of an unlawful act of assault and battery. From the same circumstances set out above, the jury possibly could have found that the defendant assaulted Gomez with the weapon in his hand without necessarily rendering the commission of the homicide intentional. Malice, intent, or purpose may be inferred from the shooting of another person with a deadly weapon. But not every assault with a deadly weapon in hand is necessarily conclusive proof of intent or a design to effect death. To come within the provisions of the manslaughter statute, the killing must not have been intentional or with a design to effect death. [Citation omitted.]... The question of whether he [Worley] was engaged in an assault on the deceased, and whether it was done with the intent to kill, is peculiarly within the province of the jury. Id. However, because the State, over Worley's valid objection, introduced prejudicial hearsay regarding Worley's firing the fatal shots into Gomez, the court set aside Worley's conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial. Courts of other jurisdictions have considered manslaughter statutes which contain language quite similar to the sudden quarrel provision in § 28-305(1). In People v. Brubaker, 53 Cal.2d 37, 346 P.2d 8 (1959), the Supreme Court of California examined Cal.Penal Code § 192 (West 1970), which provided: Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice. It is of three kinds: 1. Voluntaryupon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. 2. Involuntaryin the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony.... 3. In the driving of a vehicle (a) In the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, with gross negligence.... (b) In the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, without gross negligence.... The California court concluded: Voluntary manslaughter is a willful act, characterized by the presence of an intent to kill, engendered by sufficient provocation and by the absence of premeditation, deliberation and ... malice aforethought. Section 192, subdivision 1, of the Penal Code defines voluntary manslaughter as the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice, upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. To be sufficient to reduce a homicide to manslaughter, the heat of passion must be such as would naturally be aroused in the mind of an ordinary, reasonable person under the given facts and circumstances, or in the mind of a person of ordinary self-control. [Citation omitted.] (Emphasis in original.) 53 Cal.2d at 44, 346 P.2d at 12. Under New Mexico's statute, N.M.Stat.Ann. § 30-2-3 (Supp.1984), manslaughter was defined: Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. A. Voluntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. In State v. Lopez, 79 N.M. 282, 442 P.2d 594 (1968), Lopez and one of his longtime acquaintances had an argument. Shortly after the argument Lopez was seated behind the driver's wheel of his automobile when the decedent opened the driver's door, and, almost instantaneously, a gunshot from within the vehicle felled the victim. Lopez testified that he did not intend to shoot the victim and did not know how or why the gun he was holding discharged. Lopez contended that the victim had grabbed hold of Lopez's jacket and right arm in a manner that such contact might have caused the gun to discharge. On appeal, Lopez argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his manslaughter conviction. However, the court, noting the dispute in testimony concerning the fatal occurrence, held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for voluntary manslaughter and stated: We have not overlooked appellant's argument that the killing was accidental, based upon his testimony that he did not intend to pull the trigger, and didn't intend to shoot. That an accidental killing will not support a conviction of voluntary manslaughter goes without saying. However, just because the appellant testified to this effect does not make it so. The evidence is not undisputed, as contended by appellant. Id. at 285, 442 P.2d at 597. The Supreme Court of Wyoming, in Searles v. State, 589 P.2d 386 (1979), construed Wyo.Stat. § 6-58 (1957), which contained: Whoever unlawfully kills any human being without malice, expressed or implied, either voluntarily, upon a sudden heat of passion, or involuntarily.... The court in Searles stated: In order to sustain a conviction for voluntary manslaughter, the wrongful act of killing must have been intentional. [Citation omitted.] An accidental killing is not voluntary manslaughter. [Citation omitted.] 589 P.2d at 389. Idaho's manslaughter statute, Idaho Code § 18-4006 (1979) provided: Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice. It is of two kinds: 1. Voluntaryupon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. 2. Involuntary.... The Idaho court decided that [t]he elements of voluntary manslaughter are: (a) an unlawful killing, with (b) the intent to kill, but without malice. State v. Atwood, 105 Idaho 315, 318, 669 P.2d 204, 207 (1983). See, also, Commonwealth v. Pitts, 486 Pa. 212, 404 A.2d 1305 (1979) (voluntary manslaughter involves the defendant's intentional or voluntary act, that is, involves the specific intent to kill but, by reason of passion and provocation, contains no legal malice. 404 A.2d at 1308). Thus, other courts, construing manslaughter statutes which have language substantially similar, if not identical, to the language of § 28-305(1), have agreed with this court's expression in Boche v. State, 84 Neb. 845, 854, 122 N.W. 72, 75 (1909), regarding voluntary manslaughter, that is, killing another, without malice, upon a sudden quarrel, namely: the homicide must have been intentional, but in sudden passion or heat of blood caused by a reasonable provocation, and without malice.... We note that Boche has never been overruled. Consequently, we hold that, to sustain a conviction for voluntary manslaughter under § 28-305(1), that is, a conviction for killing another, without malice, upon a sudden quarrel, the State, by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, must prove that the defendant intended to kill, and did kill, another. Thus, intentional criminal homicide as the result of legally recognized provocation distinguishes voluntary manslaughter upon a sudden quarrel from another intentional criminal homicide, murder in the second degree, namely, A person commits murder in the second degree if he causes the death of a person intentionally, but without premeditation. § 28-304. This court, in Bohanan v. The State, 15 Neb. 209, 18 N.W. 129 (1883), set aside Bohanan's manslaughter conviction because the trial court erroneously denied a hearing on Bohanan's plea in abatement, wherein Bohanan asserted that the grand jury which returned the indictment against Bohanan was illegally constituted. As stated in Bohanan: For the error in denying the prisoner a trial on the issue taken on his plea in abatement, the judgment must be reversed, the verdict set aside, and the cause remanded to the court below for further proceedings conformable to this opinion. 15 Neb. at 215, 18 N.W. at 131. Notwithstanding its determination that reversible error existed as the result of the trial court's refusal to grant a hearing on Bohanan's plea in abatement, the court, in dicta pertaining to one of Bohanan's tendered instructions rejected by the trial court, found general suitability in an instruction: `Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another without malice, either express or implied, which may be either involuntary, upon a sudden heat of passion, or inadvertently, upon the commission of some unlawful act.' Id. As noted, however, the comment in Bohanan concerning the tendered instruction is dicta. Also, some 25 years after Bohanan, but construing the same manslaughter statute which existed when Bohanan was decided, this court unequivocally stated that, concerning a criminal homicide involved in manslaughter which occurred in a sudden quarrel, the homicide must have been intentional, but in a sudden passion or heat of blood caused by a reasonable provocation and without malice.... Boche v. State, supra at 854, 122 N.W. 72, 75 (1909). Thus, remarks about manslaughter in Bohanan are unquestionably dicta and, nevertheless, were superseded by the court's dispositive statement on manslaughter in Boche. In State v. Batiste, 231 Neb. 481, 437 N.W.2d 125 (1989), Batiste was convicted of first degree murder on account of the victim's strangulation death. Batiste contended that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her murder conviction and that the evidence showed only the basis for a manslaughter conviction for a killing [which] was a result of a sudden quarrel. 231 Neb. at 486, 437 N.W.2d at 129. In Batiste, we concluded: The facts developed by direct and circumstantial evidence concerning [the victim's] death clearly justified the jury in finding beyond a reasonable doubt a higher degree of homicide than manslaughter, 231 Neb. at 488, 437 N.W.2d at 130; but, having determined that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Batiste's murder conviction, we, nevertheless, expressed: Thus, to constitute manslaughter, the slayer must have no intention of doing the wrongful act of killing another without just cause or excuse. Id. As a result of today's decision, reaffirming Boche v. State, supra , we disapprove of the language in Batiste to the effect that an intentional killing is not an element of voluntary manslaughter described in § 28-305(1). Today's decision, however, does not alter our position that an unintentional killing while in the commission of an unlawful act is manslaughter proscribed by § 28-305(1). See State v. Bachkora, 229 Neb. 421, 427 N.W.2d 71 (1988).