Opinion ID: 789389
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Sentencing Errors

Text: 43 Finally, Jones claims that the district court erred in calculating his sentence or applying the Sentencing Guidelines. Since Booker requires a district court to consult the Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing, id. at 767, 125 S.Ct. 738 (Breyer. J, for the Court), we comment briefly on Jones's claims as a matter of Guideline interpretation. United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 379-382 (6th Cir.2005). 44 Acting through counsel, Jones argues that the district court erred by failing to depart downward outside of the Sentencing Guidelines given the outrageous conduct of the Murfreesboro Police Department, including the alleged race-based selective prosecution. Jones notes that this Court previously concluded that the officers' conduct was outrageous, Jones, 159 F.3d at 977, and that the district court failed to consider this properly on a motion for downward departure. 45 Prior to Booker, we could not disturb a district court's denial of a downward departure for exceptional circumstances unless the district court was unaware it had discretion to make such a departure. United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295, 329 (6th Cir.2002). Here, the district court clearly noted that it had such discretion, but refused to depart downward. 46 Booker however, makes clear that the Sentencing Guidelines are now advisory, giving the sentencing judge substantially more discretion to sentence above and below the Guideline range. Booker, ___ U.S. at ___, 125 S.Ct. at 767 (Breyer, J., for the Court). Furthermore, the district court's sentence, and its exercise of discretion (if any), must be reviewed by an appellate court for reasonableness. Id. at 766. (Breyer, J., for the Court). Accordingly, on remand, we encourage the sentencing judge to explicitly state his reasons for applying particular Guidelines, and sentencing within the recommended Guidelines range, or in the alternative, for choosing to sentence outside that range. Such a statement will facilitate appellate review as to whether the sentence was reasonable. However, we take no position as to the content or extent of such a statement. 47 Acting pro se, Jones also filed briefs making numerous additional sentencing arguments. Many, but not all of these arguments were previously raised and disposed of by the district court. As these arguments have already been analyzed or are without merit, we will only summarily address them here. 48 Jones first argues that evidence of his prior felony conviction should have been presented to the jury. However, the Supreme Court has previously noted that the fact of a prior felony conviction need not be subject to a determination by the jury. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. 49 Jones next argues that the district court incorrectly calculated the adjusted offense level by adding certain enhancements to the base offense level for cocaine base. However, a review of the Pre-Sentencing Investigation Report indicates that this argument is without merit. 50 Jones additionally argues that the district court failed to afford an opportunity for allocution pursuant to the former FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(C), and now as amended, found at FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). However, during his second sentencing, Jones was afforded the opportunity for allocution. Indeed, Jones expressed his deep remorse for the crimes he committed, his successful effort to remain drug free, and his request to be sentenced at the low end of the range. Accordingly, this claim is without merit. 51 Finally, Jones argues that the inclusion of a simple assault charge in his Pre-Sentencing Investigation Report investigation report was error since certain information regarding the crime was inaccurate. However, Jones himself notes that he pleaded guilty to this crime at trial.