Opinion ID: 2554198
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Future Parenting Disagreements

Text: The mother argues that the parenting plan provision stating that the parents shall seek the help of a neutral third party before petitioning the court in the event of future disagreements about parenting issues violates her constitutional rights to due process and access to the courts. See N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 14; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. She contends that the compulsory word shall bars the parties from accessing the courts and restricts her rights to seek judicial relief for her grievances. She further argues that due process requires that she be provided with the opportunity of an initial hearing and access to the courts, before being sent to a `third party process.' We first address her claims under the State Constitution, and cite federal opinions for guidance only. State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33, 471 A.2d 347 (1983). Due process under Part I, Article 14 provides that all citizens have a right to the redress of their actionable injuries. Gould v. Concord Hospital, 126 N.H. 405, 409, 493 A.2d 1193 (1985). The article does not prohibit all impairments of the right of access to the courts. Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H. 661, 665, 406 A.2d 704 (1979), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct. 1304, 63 L.Ed.2d 754 (1980). Reasonable regulations regarding the commencement of suits do not automatically violate the constitutional guaranty that justice will be administered promptly. Opinion of the Justices (Limitation of Civil Actions), 137 N.H. 260, 269, 628 A.2d 1069 (1993). We cannot accept the mother's contention that the provision at issue bars judicial relief for future parenting disagreements. The provision at issue neither infringes upon nor denies that right. It imposes no specific requirement that the assistance of a neutral third party must be of any particular nature or duration or even that the third party must have actually provided assistance. It permits either party to seek judicial relief, as long as that party demonstrates that the parents first sought the assistance of a neutral third party. Thus, the mother's concern that one parent could use this provision to cause undue delay is not supported by its plain meaning. Cf. Opinion of the Justices, 137 N.H. at 269, 628 A.2d 1069 ([W]e do not rule out the possibility that the lapse of time inherent in extended litigation could rise to a constitutional violation in a given case.). Similarly, because we conclude that the provision has no deleterious effect upon the mother's access to judicial relief, we need not address her argument that it implicates her fundamental rights as a parent. The Federal Constitution offers the mother no greater protection than the State Constitution with regard to her claims of error. See id.; Woods v. Holy Cross Hospital, 591 F.2d 1164, 1174 n. 16 (5th Cir.1979) (noting that a Florida statute permitting access to courts only after mediation of a medical malpractice claim is not a denial of court access). Accordingly, we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution. Affirmed.