Opinion ID: 624771
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Garcia’s Appeal

Text: 14 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 15 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 Garcia’s convictions for violating RICO’s conspiracy provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and VICAR, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1), extend from his involvement in the murder of Crisantos Moran. Garcia challenges his convictions on sufficiency-ofthe-evidence and confrontation grounds, and also challenges the jury instructions the district court delivered.
On March 20, 2003, Crisantos Moran, a Texas Syndicate member, was murdered. Garcia had pled guilty to this murder in Texas state court, and was later tried on the federal offenses enumerated above. At Garcia’s federal trial, the Government called codefendant Noel De Los Santos (“De Los Santos”) to testify as to the circumstances of Moran’s death. De Los Santos testified that at a March 2003 Texas Syndicate meeting, the gang’s leadership discussed the murder of Carlos Salinas, a member of a rival gang. The task of killing Salinas was assigned to Moran at this meeting. Garcia and De Los Santos were to accompany Moran and ensure that he killed Salinas. On March 20, 2003, Garcia, De Los Santos, and Moran drove to Salinas’s house, whereupon Moran exited the vehicle and approached the house. Moran, however, returned to the car and reported that nobody was at the house. De Los Santos testified that he interpreted this to mean that Moran did not want to carry out the killing. He explained that under Texas Syndicate rules, if someone “doesn’t do his job, he gets killed,” so De Los Santos decided to kill Moran. Garcia drove the car to a secluded field where De Los Santos shot Moran in the head. Moran fell to the ground, where he lay motionless, and De Los Santos shot him again while he was on the ground. When asked, “[W]hat did . . . Garcia do?” De Los Santos replied, “He came around and shot him too. . . . Like six times.” The Government also called Mario Garcia, Garcia’s brother, to testify as well. He testified that Garcia told him that “Boy [i.e., De Los Santos] had shot and killed him—Moran,” and that Garcia “shot [Moran] afterwards when [Moran] 15 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 16 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 was laying down [sic].” The Government also introduced Garcia’s guilty plea in Texas court to the murder of Moran. The final major piece of evidence in the Government’s case came from the testimony of the medical examiner, Dr. Fulgencio Salinas. Dr. Salinas opined that Moran “died of multiple gunshot wounds to different parts of the body.” Dr. Salinas explained that Moran’s corpse had eight gunshot wounds, one of which was to the head. Based on the head wound’s characteristics, Dr. Salinas opined that the shooter would have been between six inches and two or three feet away to cause this kind of wound. Dr. Salinas testified that a gunshot wound to head of that type might have caused instantaneous death, but that “sometimes they do and sometimes they don’t.” Dr. Salinas, however, also observed that there was evidence of a “vital reaction” in the blood vessels surrounding the other gunshot wounds in Moran’s body indicating that Moran’s heart may have still been pumping after the gunshot to his head when the other wounds were inflicted.
Garcia challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his Count 1 conviction under RICO’s conspiracy provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Sufficiency of the evidence challenges are reviewed de novo and in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, focusing on whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Diaz, 637 F.3d at 602. Garcia argues the Government was required to prove that Mr. Garcia specifically agreed that two of the predicate acts of murder alleged in the indictment would be committed and that the Government failed to carry this burden because there was no evidence that Mr. Garcia knew of or agreed to the murders other than that of Moran. The RICO conspiracy provision makes it “unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the [other] provisions of [this] subsection . . . .” 18 16 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 17 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 U.S.C. § 1962(d).4 In this circuit, the Government is not required to prove that the defendant agreed to the commission of two predicate acts. See Delgado, 401 F.3d at 296 (“The conspirator need not have committed or agreed to commit the two predicate acts. . . . [The conspirator] need only have known of and agreed to the overall objective of the RICO offense.” (citing Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 61–66 (1997)). Garcia bases his argument on case law from other circuits which varies from this position, without an argument as to why the Fifth Circuit’s position should be changed.5 Compare United States v. Driver, 535 F.3d 424, 432 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining that under Sixth Circuit precedent, “[a defendant]’s RICO conspiracy conviction can be sustained [only] if there is evidence sufficient to prove that [defendant] agreed that someone would commit two predicate acts”) (emphasis in original) with Chaney v. Dreyfus Serv. Corp., 595 F.3d 219, 239 n.17 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A defendant need not know exactly what predicate acts the conspiracy intends to perpetrate so long as the defendant knows and agrees to facilitate the ‘overall objective’ of the conspiracy.”). Thus, Garcia’s argument incorrectly elevates the burden of proof on the Government, which was only required to show that Garcia knew of and agreed to the Texas Syndicate’s overall objectives. It is clear that the Government met this burden at trial. 4 In this case, the conspiracy was to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), which provides: It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 5 Moreover, “whatever persuasiveness [the cases Garcia cites] may have, [the] rule of orderliness directs that one panel of this court cannot overrule the decision of another panel.” United States v. Dial, 542 F.3d 1059, 1060 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 17 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 18 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 In assessing the evidence presented at trial, Garcia contends that the Government was only able to show that he was merely “associated” with the Texas Syndicate, and argues this was insufficient to convict him of RICO conspiracy. To support his argument, Garcia relies on United States v. Driver, 535 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 2008), and United States v. Posada–Rios, 158 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 1998). Neither case supports his position. As discussed above, the Sixth Circuit’s test for proving a RICO conspiracy is different from that of this jurisdiction, so Garcia’s reliance on Driver is misplaced. Moreover, while it is true that the Posada–Rios court did conclude that a defendant’s “longstanding association” with the drug trade and members of a RICO enterprise by itself could not support a RICO conspiracy conviction, the defendant in that case had merely engaged in failed negotiations to sell drugs to the enterprise. Posada–Rios, 158 F.3d at 858. The court concluded that “[a]lthough . . . a conspirator need not know each of his co-conspirators, or the details of the conspiracy, the government’s theory in this case stretche[d] too far the outer bounds of RICO conspiracy law.” Id. In contrast, Garcia’s connection to the Texas Syndicate and his knowledge of its objectives were substantial. Garcia was identified at the trial as having been a Texas Syndicate member for several years. He attended meetings of the gang. The Government introduced testimony from Garcia’s own brother that Garcia’s victim, Crisantos Moran, had received instructions at a Texas Syndicate meeting to kill a rival gang member and that Garcia’s job was to make sure Moran carried out this task. De Los Santos confirmed that both he and Garcia had been ordered to make sure that Moran carried out the murder. Following these orders, Garcia and De Los Santos killed Moran for failing to follow the Texas Syndicate’s “rules.” This connection goes beyond mere association with the organization. 18 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 19 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 Consequently, under the proper Fifth Circuit case law, a rational trier of fact could conclude that Garcia “knew of and agreed to the overall objective of the RICO offense” sought to be perpetrated by the Texas Syndicate. Delgado, 401 F.3d at 296. We therefore hold that the evidence was sufficient to support Garcia’s RICO conspiracy conviction.
Garcia also argues that the district court violated his confrontation right by restricting his cross-examination of a Government witness. As noted above, we review Confrontation Clause objections de novo, but subject to harmless error analysis. United States v. McCormick, 54 F.3d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 1995). “If there is no constitutional violation, then we review a district court’s limitations on cross-examination for an abuse of discretion, which requires a showing that the limitations were clearly prejudicial.” Skelton, 514 F.3d at 438. The Government called a former Texas state prosecutor, Kimberly Leo (“Leo”), to testify that Garcia pled guilty to Moran’s murder in state court. As part of Leo’s direct examination, the Government introduced copies of Garcia’s indictment and the judgment of conviction against him as evidence, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(22), that Garcia had pled guilty to the murder of Moran in state court. Leo then identified Garcia in court. On cross-examination, Garcia’s counsel brought up the fact that Garcia’s plea was the result of a plea bargain and that the sentence for Moran’s murder was to run concurrently with other sentences, with the intention of showing that Garcia pled guilty to the murder for a reason other than that he had an intent to kill Moran: Q: There is a concurrent agreement to run other cases together; is that right? A: That is correct. 19 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 20 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 Q: Would you agree with me that there’s also a consideration that other cases be taken into account; is that right? A: Yes. Q: Would you agree with me that those are very important factors in resolving criminal cases that lawyers consider? The Government objected and the district court upheld the objection on grounds that the line of questioning was not relevant. The district court, however, allowed Garcia to rephrase his question: Q: Ms. Leo, is it a common practice amongst lawyers—Defense lawyers and prosecutors in State Court—in order to resolve cases, to bring a closure to cases, to enter into agreements where there is [sic] concurrent sentences and cases to be considered as part of an overall package to just bring the case to an end? A: Yes. Garcia now appeals the district court’s restriction on his cross-examination of Leo. He argues that his motive for entering into the guilty plea was relevant for showing the jury that he may not have intended to kill Moran, even in spite of his guilty plea to the murder.6 Here, the constitutional standard is met. The district court allowed Garcia to rephrase his question to make his point that defendants enter into plea agreements including concurrent sentences for reasons other than guilt, like bringing the “case to an end.” Garcia’s counsel reiterated this exact point in his closing argument: But I want you to look at that judgment where it says “concurrent sentences.” And Ms. Leo testified under cross examination that the reason for concurrent sentences was so those sentences could run 6 Garcia asserts in this regard that the Government was required to prove that he intended to kill Moran, but that testimony at trial indicated that he only shot Moran after his accomplice had already shot him in the head and Moran had fallen motionless to the ground. Accordingly, he argues that he did not intend to kill Moran, but only to shoot Moran’s already dead body and avoid punishment at the hands of the Texas Syndicate for failing to carry out orders. 20 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 21 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 together with the underlying charge. Basically, this conviction was going to wash itself out because he was going to be eaten up by the other cases that Mr. Garcia was doing time for. That’s the reason he pled guilty, because he actually wasn’t going to do any time at all in state court for that murder. While Leo was on the stand, defense counsel asked no further questions regarding Garcia’s guilty plea or why he may have agreed to a plea agreement. The record shows that Garcia was permitted to expose the jury to the relevant facts from which they could draw his desired inference, namely, that he may have had an incentive to plead guilty to the murder despite not having intended to kill Moran. We also find that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Because Garcia was allowed to make his argument, though perhaps not in his preferred way, he cannot claim that the district court’s restriction on his line of questioning was clearly prejudicial. Garcia’s argument that the Government needed the jury to rely on his guilty plea to establish the element of an intent to kill Moran to obtain a conviction on both counts fails to comport with the record. While it is true that the Government referred to Garcia’s guilty plea in its closing statement, as we explained above, the Government also made reference to a range of other evidence supporting its theory. While a jury could have drawn Garcia’s preferred inference that he shot Moran’s already-dead body only to avoid punishment at the hand of the Texas Syndicate, there was more than enough evidence for a rational jury to conclude that Garcia shot Moran while he was still alive in order to ensure Moran’s death. Our review of the record reveals that there is no evidence that the district court’s decision to disallow Garcia to further pursue his cross-examination of Leo was clearly prejudicial. We therefore reject Garcia’s confrontation argument.
21 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 22 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 Garcia’s final point on appeal is that the district court reversibly erred in the jury instructions it delivered. Specifically, Garcia points to instructions that Hinojosa proposed, that he joined in requesting, stating “Your verdict must be unanimous as to which specific racketeering acts you find that the Defendant committed, caused or aided and abetted.” Instead, the district court instructed the jury that participation in RICO conspiracy focuses on: the Defendant’s agreement to participate in the objective of the enterprise, to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity and not on the Defendants agreement to commit the individual criminal acts. The Government must prove that the Defendant participated in some manner in the overall objectives of the conspiracy and that the conspiracy involved or would have involved the commission of two racketeering acts. The Government is not required to prove either that the Defendant agreed to commit two racketeering acts or that he actually committed two such acts, although you may conclude that he agreed to participate in the conduct of the enterprise from proof that he agreed to commit or actually committed such acts. Thus, Garcia argues on appeal that district court reversibly erred by omitting the requirement that the jury unanimously agree on which two of the various predicate acts alleged by Government Garcia agreed would be committed.7 “Because ‘[d]istrict courts enjoy substantial latitude in formulating a jury charge,’ we review ‘all challenges to, and refusals to give, jury instructions for abuse of discretion.’” United States v. Davis, 609 F.3d 663, 689 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 321–22 (5th Cir. 1998)). Accordingly, “we review a defendant’s objection to the jury instruction by assessing whether the district court’s charge, as a whole, was a correct statement of the law and whether it clearly instructed the jurors as to the 7 This is, in fact, a more charitable reading of Garcia’s requested jury instruction. The requested jury instruction focused on acts that “the Defendant committed, caused or aided and abetted.” The commission of predicate acts is a requirement for proving a substantive RICO violation, and unnecessary in showing a RICO conspiracy violation. The formulation we give Garcia’s instructions is closer to the proper standard, but still an incorrect statement of law, as we discuss below. 22 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 23 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 principles of the law applicable to the factual issues confronting them.” United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 486 (5th Cir. 2008). RICO provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of [its other] provisions.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). As noted above, in order to demonstrate a RICO conspiracy under § 1962(d), the Government must demonstrate “(1) that two or more people agreed to commit a substantive RICO offense and (2) that defendant knew of and agreed to the overall objective of the RICO offense.” United States v. Sharpe, 193 F.3d 852, 869 (5th Cir. 1999). The use of the term “‘overall objective’ [in defining RICO conspiracy liability] . . . was designed to expand, not restrict, the class of persons subject to conspiracy liability.” Chaney, 595 F.3d at 239 n.17 (emphasis in original). Consequently, “[a RICO] conspiracy may exist even if a conspirator does not agree to commit or facilitate each and every part of the substantive offense. . . . The partners in the criminal plan must agree to pursue the same criminal objective and may divide up the work, yet each is responsible for the acts of each other.” Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63–64 (1997). In the Fifth Circuit, Salinas has been read to “hold[] that [an] individual co-conspirator does not need to personally commit predicate acts to be convicted of a RICO conspiracy.” United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 640 (5th Cir. 2002). Moreover, “[a] defendant need not know exactly what predicate acts the conspiracy intends to perpetrate so long as the defendant knows and agrees to facilitate the ‘overall objective’ of the conspiracy.” Chaney, 595 F.3d at 239 n.17. Garcia’s requested instructions at trial—that the jury must unanimously find agreement on his part to commit two specific predicate acts—were not legally correct, while the district court’s instructions were a proper summation of our caselaw. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to reject Garcia’s instructions proffered at trial.
23 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 24 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 As Garcia has raised no compelling arguments as to why his convictions should be overturned, we affirm his convictions.