Opinion ID: 2516667
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Multi-County Signature Requirement under Moore v. Ogilvie

Text: ¶ 70 For decades the United States Supreme Court has held unconstitutional state election laws when there is a disparity in the political and voting power of the voters similarly situated within a state. In 1962, the Court reversed a federal district court that had determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remanded, ordering that the district court conduct a trial regarding the asserted constitutional claim that the state apportionment act was offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment in that it effected a gross disproportion of representation to voting population because the act's classification disfavors the voters in counties in which [the appellants] reside, placing them in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable inequality vis-a-vis voters in irrationally favored counties. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-08, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). ¶ 71 Then in 1963, the United States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional Georgia's county-unit system under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-81, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963). In Gray, Georgia's county-unit system gave every qualified voter one vote in a statewide election; but in counting those votes [Georgia] employ[ed] the county unit system which in end result weight[ed] the rural vote more heavily than the urban vote and weight[ed] some small rural counties heavier than other larger rural counties. Id. at 379, 83 S.Ct. 801. Declaring this county-unit system unconstitutional, the Court, adopting the one person, one vote principle, explained: The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing one person, one vote. Id. at 381, 83 S.Ct. 801 (emphasis added). Striking down the Georgia county-unit system, the Court reasoned: How then can one person be given twice or ten times the voting power of another person in a statewide election merely because he lives in a rural area or because he lives in the smallest rural county? Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal votewhatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their home may be in that geographical unit. This is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 379, 83 S.Ct. 801 (emphasis added). ¶ 72 The next year, the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional Alabama's legislative apportionment system, stating: Since the achieving of fair and effective representation for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment, we conclude that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators. Diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as invidious discriminations based upon factors such as race or economic status. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963)). In Reynolds, the Court reasoned, Weighting the votes of citizens differently, by any method or means, merely because of where they happen to reside, hardly seems justifiable. 377 U.S. at 563, 84 S.Ct. 1362. ¶ 73 While the foregoing cases address votes rather than a voter's right to petition to place a candidate or direct legislation on the ballot, in 1969 the Court applied the one person, one vote principle to the petition context in Moore v. Ogilvie. 394 U.S. at 818-19, 89 S.Ct. 1493. At issue in Moore was [t]he use of nominating petitions by independents to obtain a place on the Illinois ballot. 394 U.S. at 818, 89 S.Ct. 1493. The Court explained that the one person, one vote principle applied to nomination petitions because the use of such petitions is an integral part of [Illinois's] election system. All procedures used by a State as an integral part of the election process must pass muster against the charges of discrimination or of abridgement of the right to vote. Id. (citation omitted). ¶ 74 In Moore, the Court held that an Illinois statute requiring 200 signatures from qualified voters in at least 50 of the state's 102 counties was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause according to the one person, one vote principle. Id. at 818-19, 89 S.Ct. 1493. The statute at issue in Moore required at least 25,000 voters statewide to sign a nomination petition and 200 qualified voters to sign nomination petitions in each of at least 50 of the state's 102 counties before a candidate could be placed on the ballot. Id. at 815, 89 S.Ct. 1493. At the time the case was pending before the Court, 93.4 percent of the state's total population was concentrated in the 49 most populous counties and only 6.6 percent of the population resided in the remaining 53 counties. Id. at 816, 89 S.Ct. 1493. The Court held the Illinois requirement of obtaining 200 signatures in 50 counties unconstitutional, stating: The law . . . discriminates against the residents of the populous counties of the State in favor of rural sections. It, therefore, lacks the equality to which the exercise of political rights is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 819, 89 S.Ct. 1493. The Court explained: Under this Illinois law the electorate in 49 of the counties which contain 93.4% of the registered voters may not form a new political party and place its candidates on the ballot. Yet 25,000 of the remaining 6.6% of registered voters properly distributed among the 53 remaining counties may form a new party to elect candidates to office. Id. [12] ¶ 75 Several courts have applied Moore to invalidate election laws that discriminate between voters of populous and sparsely settled counties. See, e.g., Blomquist v. Thomson, 739 F.2d 525, 528 (10th Cir.1984) (holding Wyoming two-county rule unconstitutional under Moore ); Communist Party v. State Bd. of Elections, 518 F.2d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding Illinois two-county rule unconstitutional under Moore ); Baird v. Davoren, 346 F.Supp. 515, 522 (D.Mass.1972) (holding election law violates equal protection because it has the effect of discriminating between voters in populous and sparsely-settled counties); Socialist Workers Party v. Rockefeller, 314 F.Supp. 984, 990 (S.D.N.Y.1970) (invalidating law that granted voters in rural, less populous counties an absolute equal veto power over the nomination of any candidate); Socialist Workers Party v. Hare, 304 F.Supp. 534, 536 (E.D.Mich.1969) (holding that election law that is discriminatory against voters in populous counties violates equal protection). ¶ 76 Then, in 2001, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho held unconstitutional an Idaho requirement that initiative sponsors obtain signatures [from] at least 6 percent of qualified electors from each of 22 of Idaho's 44 counties before an initiative qualifies to be placed on the Idaho general election ballot. Idaho Coalition United for Bears v. Cenarrusa, Civ. No. 00-0668-S-BLW, slip op. at 9-10 (D.Idaho Nov. 30, 2001). The Idaho District Court concluded that Moore governed that case and stated, Idaho's law suffers from the same flaw as the Illinois law struck down in Moore.  Id. at 10. The court explained: Because over 60% of Idaho's population resides in just 9 of the State's 44 counties, it is easy to envision a situation where 3/4 of Idaho's voters sign a petition but fail to get it on the ballot because they could not collect 6% of the vote in the rural counties. Id. ¶ 77 Intervenors argue that Moore is distinguishable from this case because Moore involved requirements for placing third-party candidates on the ballot, while this case involves rules regarding direct legislation. However, intervenors have not provided us a cogent reason why a different rule should apply to candidates on the one hand and to initiatives on the other. The only difference between the case of a petition to place a candidate on the ballot and the case of a petition to place an initiative on the ballot is that the first involves a person and the second involves an idea that possibly could become law. The voters' suffrage right is fundamental and not to be infringed, regardless of whether the voters are voting for candidates or initiatives. Additionally, in either case, a multi-county requirement like the requirement at issue in this case would mitigate or eliminate the voters' right to vote because neither the candidate nor the initiative would ever be placed on the ballot. Accordingly, in the context of whether there is an equal protection violation regarding ballot access, the distinction between whether ballot access is denied to a candidate rather than to an initiative is a distinction without a relevant difference, and therefore a different rule is not required in this case. See Idaho Coalition United for Bears, Civ. No. 00-0668-S-BLW, slip op. at 10. Therefore, we apply Moore. ¶ 78 The multi-county signature requirement in this case unconstitutionally suffers from the same infirmities as the Illinois law in Moore and the less severe [13] multi-county signature requirement of the Idaho statute struck down in Idaho Coalition United for Bears. As in both Moore and Idaho Coalition United for Bears, the multi-county signature requirement in this case invidiously discriminates against voters in urban areas. The multi-county signature requirement requires sponsors to obtain from each of at least 20 counties, legal signatures equal to 10% of the total of all votes cast in that county for all candidates for governor at the last regular general election at which a governor was elected. Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2001). Requiring signatures from at least 20 counties is intrinsically discriminatory against voters in urban counties because it impermissibly exalts the power of voters in rural, sparsely populated counties: The multi-county signature requirement effectively increases the relative weight of the signatures of voters in the rural counties and diminishes the relative weight of signatures of urban voters, permitting rural voters to foreclose the placement of an initiative on the ballot, even if the majority of the voters in the state desire the initiative to be on the ballot. In Utah, three-fourths of the state's population resides in only 4 Wasatch Front counties: Weber, Davis, Salt Lake, and Utah. Further, 87.14 percent of the state's overall population is concentrated in the 14 counties in which the sponsors satisfied the individual county signature requirement of the multi-county signature requirement. Comparatively, the aggregate population of the remaining 15 counties is less than 13 percent of the state's total population. To place a proposed initiative on the ballot, sponsors would be required to meet the signature requirement in at least 6 of the 15 counties in which less than 13 percent of the statewide population resides and in 16 of the 24 counties in which only a quarter of the state's population resides. Such a requirement concentrates an inordinate and disproportionate amount of control over qualifying initiatives for placement on the ballot to voters in those less populous counties, effectively affording a few voters a preemptive veto over placement of a proposed initiative on the ballot based solely upon the county in which those voters reside. ¶ 79 This problem is exacerbated by the removal provision of Utah Code section 20A-7-205(3)(a), which allows voters to remove their signatures from initiative petitions after the petitions have been submitted to the county clerks for certification and after the sponsors can no longer solicit additional signatures to replace removed signatures. The removal provision effectively allows an initiative petition to be defeated by the removal of a very small number of voters' signatures from initiative petitions in specifically targeted rural counties. Indeed, in this case opponents of the initiative conducted a concerted campaign in rural counties to encourage voters in those counties to remove their signatures from initiative petitions after the petitions had been delivered to the county clerks, and around 3,000 voters in rural counties removed their signatures, effectively preventing the initiative from qualifying for placement on the ballot. ¶ 80 As in Moore and Idaho Coalition United for Bears, the disparity in power between the registered voters in rural counties and the registered voters in urban counties under the multi-county signature requirement is constitutionally impermissible, and such invidious discrimination will not be constitutionally tolerated. Thus, the multicounty signature requirement is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.