Opinion ID: 75827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Adequate Explanation Prong

Text: 53 An independently adequate alternative reason for affirming the district court's dismissal of the petition is that Scher also failed to satisfy the first Whitmore prong, which requires an adequate explanation — such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability — why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163, 110 S.Ct. at 1727. The usual explanation proffered is mental incompetency, and that is the theory on which Scher staked his claim to third-party standing. After appointing an expert to examine Sanchez-Velasco and holding an evidentiary hearing on the issue, the district court correctly concluded that Scher had failed to establish that Sanchez-Velasco is mentally incompetent, but it could and should have reached that conclusion without having an expert examine Sanchez-Velasco and holding an evidentiary hearing. 54 The district court failed to give the state courts' determination that Sanchez-Velasco was mentally competent to decide for himself whether to pursue further challenges to his conviction and death sentence the presumption of correctness it was entitled to under Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 735, 110 S.Ct. 2223, 2225, 109 L.Ed.2d 762 (1990). The Demosthenes decision requires a federal court to presume that a state court finding of competency is correct. Id.; see also Hauser, 223 F.3d at 1323 (These subsidiary findings, and the ultimate decision [of the state court] that Hauser is competent, are factual in nature and are entitled to a presumption of correctness.); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The presumed correctness of the state court finding can be overcome only if the party challenging the inmate's mental competency comes forward with evidence that clearly and convincingly establishes incompetency. Hauser, 223 F.3d at 1323 (In order to rebut these findings, CCRC ... must present clear and convincing evidence that Hauser is incompetent.). In this case, a state trial court adjudged Sanchez-Velasco competent to waive further legal proceedings. That finding was made in October 1996, and it was affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court in December 1997. 55 The filing of the federal habeas petition in this case came two years and two months after the state trial court had found Sanchez-Velasco mentally competent, and one year after the Florida Supreme Court had affirmed that finding. That is substantially more time than had elapsed between the state court findings and the filing of the federal habeas proceeding in Demosthenes and Hauser, but it is not so much time as to remove the presumption of correctness, at least where no evidence is offered that the inmate's mental condition has changed in the interval. Cf. Mata v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 324, 332 (5th Cir.2000) (holding the district court erred in basing a competency determination on a twelve-year-old finding from state trial proceedings when there was extensive new evidence of incompetency). 56 In the face of a state court determination that the real party in interest inmate is mentally competent, in order to be entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing on the issue a would-be next-friend must proffer evidence that does one of two things. The proffered evidence either must clearly and convincingly establish that the state court finding was erroneous when made, or it must show that even though the state court finding was correct when made the mental condition of the inmate has deteriorated to the point that he is no longer mentally competent. Scher did proffer some evidence in the two-and-a-half pounds of documents appended to the habeas petition, but none of that evidence clearly and convincingly established that the state court's finding about mental competency was erroneous. Nor did any of it show a change in Sanchez-Velasco's condition since the state court findings were made. In fact, the vast majority of the evidence in those documents was before the state trial court when it found that Sanchez-Velasco was mentally competent. 9 57 In these circumstances, the district court should not have appointed another expert to examine Sanchez-Velasco yet again, it should not have conducted an evidentiary hearing into the issue, and it should not have made its own independent finding regarding the mental competence issue. Instead, the district court should have accepted as correct the state court finding that Sanchez-Velasco is mentally competent to decide his legal fate. 58 Alternatively, even if Scher had been entitled to have the district court make its own determination of Sanchez-Velasco's mental condition after appointing another expert to examine him and conducting an evidentiary hearing on the issue, that is what the court did. Scher says the district court made a number of errors tainting its own finding that Sanchez-Velasco was mentally competent, but we are not convinced by his arguments. 59 First, Scher argues that the district court abused its discretion in choosing the expert it did to examine Sanchez-Velasco and in failing to appoint an additional expert picked by Scher. The court had asked Scher and the State to agree on an expert to do the examination, or failing that, to submit names from which the court could choose one. They could not agree, so Scher and the State each submitted two names. The court chose Dr. Richard Greer, one of the experts whose name the State had submitted. His qualifications were beyond question. Dr. Greer was Chief of the Forensic Psychology Division of the University of Florida Medical School, where he was professor of neurology and psychiatry, and he had extensive experience in making competency evaluations. He was also familiar with the specific subject matter — Sanchez-Velasco's mind — having conducted an examination as a court-appointed expert in November of 1995 to determine if Sanchez-Velasco was mentally competent to stand trial for the murder of two inmates. (He had found that Sanchez-Velasco was competent at that time to stand trial or plead guilty.) 60 Scher does not quarrel with Dr. Greer's qualifications. Instead, he argues that, because Dr. Greer was one of the two experts Florida had suggested, the district court should have also appointed an expert of Scher's choosing to evaluate Sanchez-Velasco. Of course, while the State put Dr. Greer's name on the list, it did not select him, the district court did. Given Dr. Greer's sterling qualifications and prior related work involving Sanchez-Velasco, the court had every reason for doing so. Due process did not require the appointment of two experts in these circumstances. 10 61 In contesting the fairness of the examination and evidentiary hearing Scher also argues that Dr. Greer's subsequent arrest for possession of cocaine on September 17, 2001, eight months after the examination, seven months after the report, and three months after he had testified at the hearing, potentially tainted his expert opinion. Scher maintains the case should be remanded to the district court with instructions that it consider the information about Dr. Greer's arrest and reweigh his testimony in light of it. Of course, an arrest without a conviction, or the conduct leading to it, cannot be proven by extrinsic evidence. See F.R.E. 608(b). So far as we know and the parties can tell us, Dr. Greer has not been convicted of the crime for which he was arrested. Nor could Scher even cross-examine Dr. Greer about the conduct or arrest unless in the discretion of the court, [it is] probative of... [Dr. Greer's] untruthfulness. Id. Scher's main argument is that the subsequent arrest would show that Dr. Greer was untruthful when he testified at the evidentiary hearing because the arrest is probative of his bias at the time. The theory, as we understand it, is that the district court could infer from the fact of Dr. Greer's arrest that he had slanted his report seven months earlier and his testimony three months earlier in favor of the State position's in order to curry favor in anticipation of a possible future arrest. The theory depends upon each of the following conjectures: first, that Dr. Greer had begun using drugs before the time he issued his report and gave his testimony in this case; second, that at the time he wrote the report and gave the testimony he anticipated getting caught; and, third, he thought that there was a reasonable possibility that having written a report and given testimony consistent with the State's position in an unrelated proceeding in the past would lead to more lenient treatment for him after his anticipated arrest. That conjectural chain is sufficiently unlikely that any finding based upon it would be clearly erroneous. For that reason, no remand is necessary. 62 In a recent case we approved the Florida Supreme Court's conclusion that evidence of government witnesses' collateral criminal conduct occurring at the time of their testimony is inadmissible to show that the witnesses had slanted their testimony in order to curry favor with the state. Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.3d 952 (11th Cir.2002). The Florida Supreme Court had considered the bias argument, but rejected it [b]ecause the detectives' criminal conduct was completely unrelated to the charges against Breedlove and because the detectives had not been indicted or convicted of any crime at the time of Breedlove's trial ... Breedlove, 279 F.3d at 963 (quoting Breedlove v. State, 580 So.2d 605, 609 (Fla.1991)). Because inquiry into the witnesses' criminal conduct would have done nothing more than `raise the possibility that [the detectives] had engaged in bad acts,' it was not permitted. Id. (quoting Breedlove v. State, 580 So.2d at 609). Similarly, in this case, because Dr. Greer's arrest is unrelated to the issue of Sanchez-Velasco's competency, and for the additional reason that it had not occurred at the time of his report and testimony, evidence of it would be inadmissible. 63 There were no procedural flaws in the appointment of Dr. Greer, in his examination and report, or in his testimony at the hearing, and there is no reason to do any of it over. Nor are there any flaws in any other aspect of the proceeding that are adverse to Scher's side of the case. Scher had the opportunity to question Dr. Greer, and he also had the opportunity to present new evidence challenging Sanchez-Velasco's competency, but he failed to do so. 64 The district court conducted an extended colloquy with Sanchez-Velasco to determine whether he was mentally competent and truly wished to waive his rights to federal habeas review. During that colloquy, the court asked Sanchez-Velasco why he had moved to dismiss the petition, and whether he understood that doing so meant he likely would be executed. The court asked whether Sanchez-Velasco wanted to pursue habeas relief, but not with Scher and CCRC as his lawyers. It reminded him that in the state proceedings he had changed his mind about waiving his post-conviction rights, and asked whether he was confident that he would not change his mind about this waiver request. To all of these questions, Sanchez-Velasco answered in a way that indicated he knew what he was doing and truly wished to do it. 65 Finally, the district court's finding that Sanchez-Velasco was competent was not clearly erroneous. The court had before it an unbroken string of state court determinations that Sanchez-Velasco was competent: at the time of the crime, immediately before trial, during trial, and at the time he sought to waive his Rule 3.850 petition. It had before it an overwhelming majority of mental health professionals who had determined Sanchez-Velasco was competent at various times while his state court proceedings were pending. It had before it Dr. Greer's fresh report and expert testimony at the hearing to the same effect. The court had no evidence before it to indicate that Sanchez-Velasco was not competent, other than evidence that had already been presented to and considered by the state courts. Finally, the court had the evidence of Sanchez-Velasco's answers to the court's questions during the colloquy. In light of all of this evidence, the district court's finding that Sanchez-Velasco was mentally competent was not even close to erroneous, much less clearly erroneous.