Opinion ID: 77695
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Obstructing a Police Officer

Text: 21 On the offense of obstructing a law enforcement officer, Georgia law provides that a person who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties is guilty of a misdemeanor. Ga.Code Ann. § 16-10-24(a). Under Skop's version of the arrest, we easily conclude that a reasonable officer could not conceivably have thought that he had probable cause or even arguable probable cause to arrest Skop — plainly she did not obstruct or hinder Brown in the lawful discharge of his official duties, and she certainly did not do so knowingly and willfully. See id. 22 Simply put, helping a stranded motorist like Skop was one of Brown's official duties, 1 and the argument that Brown was impeded in this duty because Skop asked Brown to pull his car one foot forward — a request politely made, without raised voice or threat, and in a situation where she was not distracting his attention from a threatening situation — is utterly devoid of merit. Indeed, the suggestion that a citizen asking an officer to assist her thereby provides him with probable cause or even arguable probable cause to arrest her is without foundation in our law. Skop's attempts to clarify her question to Brown were not actions that could even conceivably have provided Brown with any basis for an obstruction arrest. See Woodward v. Gray, 241 Ga.App. 847, 527 S.E.2d 595, 598 (2000) (To obstruct, resist, or oppose for purposes of obstructing an officer implies forcible resistance and does not mean the refusal to merely obey the police officer's command to move . . . so that the police could perform their duties unimpeded. For speech to rise to the level of obstruction, it must be reasonably interpreted to be a threat of violence to the officer, which would amount to obstruction or hindrance. (citations omitted)); Coley v. State, 178 Ga.App. 668, 344 S.E.2d 490, 491 (1986) (reversing an obstruction conviction because the defendant did nothing more than fail to respond immediately to [the officer's] orders); see also Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 767 (11th Cir. 2006) (Neither an owner's simple inquiry as to why officers are present on his property nor a person's attempt to bring a dangerous situation to the officer's attention can be construed as obstruction of justice or disorderly conduct. Nor can a citizen be precluded by the threat of arrest from asking to speak to an officer's superior or from asking for an officer's badge number. Those inquiries likewise do not constitute obstruction of justice or disorderly conduct.). 23 Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Skop, there is no indication that she in any way impeded or obstructed Officer Brown in the pursuit of his lawful duties, let alone that she forcibly resisted the police. Again, Skop did not threaten Brown in any way by asking him to move his patrol car. Nor did Skop in any way impede him from securing the safety of the street by barring passersby from approaching the downed tree and power line. Nor, finally, did she obstruct Brown by interrupting his paperwork. 24 Indeed, the idea that Skop's brief inquiry to the officer somehow provided a basis for arrest collides head-on with the First Amendment, which protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers. . . . The freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state. See Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461-63, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987). When, as under Skop's version of the facts, an individual does not even engage in speech that amounts to protected criticism and challenge, but simply reiterates or attempts to clarify a perfectly reasonable question directed to the officer, there is neither probable cause nor arguable probable cause to arrest for obstruction. 25 Had the circumstances been different — for example, had Brown been located at a busy intersection where Skop's inquiry impeded the officer's ability to direct other cars — this analysis might be different. See Houston, 482 U.S. at 463, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (providing, in dicta, possible examples of behavior which may be constitutionally prohibited as obstructive, including stand[ing] near a police officer and persistently attempt[ing] to engage the officer in conversation while the officer is directing traffic at a busy intersection). Here, however, Skop's car was the only vehicle to approach Brown's impromptu roadblock. As Officer Brown himself admitted in his deposition: 26 Q: She hindered you because she didn't do what you told her to do? 27 A: No. 28 Q: She hindered you because she interrupted your paperwork? 29 A: No. 30 Q: Well, she didn't stop you from telling anyone else not to approach the scene, right? 31 A: Not at that point. . . . 32 . . . 33 Q: And — And, under the objective circumstances confronting you right there, she didn't stop you from directing any other vehicles away from that scene? 34 A: No. 35 Brown Depo. 218-19. 36 The district court, nevertheless, viewed Skop's actions as amounting to obstructing an officer because it concluded that Brown did not know he was blocking Skop's driveway: 37 Thus, taking Skop's facts as true (i.e., that her car was angled to enter her driveway, her turn signal was on, and she had repeatedly gestured toward her driveway), given Officer Brown's plain purpose in being dispatched to Middlesex Avenue (i.e., to ensure residents' safety by closing and preventing access to the road due to the fallen tree and fallen power and/or utility lines), the court cannot say he was without arguable probable cause to arrest Skop for obstruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a) when, notwithstanding his reasons for refusing to do so, she repeatedly requested that Officer Brown move his car and Officer Brown did not realize his vehicle was blocking her driveway. 38 Dist. Ct. Order 16-17 (emphasis added). 39 We remain unpersuaded. First, we note that Brown's knowledge of his location is of little consequence in evaluating the legality of the arrest. Under Skop's version of the facts — which we are obliged to accept for our present purposes — she asked Brown to move his car. Brown did not give her the courtesy of providing any answer, let alone a clear one. Of course, Brown was not obliged to move his car at Skop's request — but neither was he permitted to arrest her just for asking, altogether reasonably, that he move his car a foot, a premise that holds true regardless of whether Brown knew that he was blocking Skop's driveway. 40 Second, and perhaps even more basic, to the extent the district court believed that Brown's knowledge of his location was somehow determinative, it misapplied the clear dictates of our summary judgment law by assuming hotly contested facts against the non-moving party. See Carlin Commc'n, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1986) ([T]he court may not weigh conflicting evidence to resolve disputed factual issues; if a genuine dispute is found, summary judgment must be denied.). Whether Brown knew that he was blocking Skop's driveway was an important, disputed fact, and one on which Skop clearly provided sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. Thus, for example, Skop testified that her car was turned towards her driveway with the turn signal on. She unambiguously told Brown, on at least three separate occasions, that she wanted to get into her driveway to get out of the storm. She gestured towards her driveway as she made her request, hoping to communicate to him that she was only trying to pull into her own driveway. After Brown exited his car, Skop said at least twice that this is my driveway, can you please move up a foot. Skop Depo. 75-76 (emphasis added). And, when he said that he could arrest her for obstruction, she responded, How can you arrest me for obstruction, this is my driveway? Id. at 76. 41 Skop also presented photographic evidence showing the position of her car, angled towards her driveway and with the turn signal apparently illuminated. 2 As Skop testified, my car was turned to enter my driveway, my blinker was on, I had repeatedly gestured toward my driveway, and I told him that I was trying to get into my driveway. I believe that Brown reasonably should have been able to ascertain my residence from all these circumstances. Skop Decl. ¶ 50; see also Civil Service Appeal, Testimony of Major Spillane 13 (Doc. 42, Ex. 55) (What I discovered on the scene was by talking to [Skop's neighbors] and looking at the scene and the position that they said the police car was in and the position that she said her car was in or what they told me her car was in, all their stories kind of corroborated each other[].). In entering final summary judgment for Brown, the district court failed to draw a critical inference in a light most favorable to Skop — that Brown well knew Skop was merely trying to get into her own driveway, and he went ahead and arrested her anyway. In short, we are constrained to conclude that Officer Brown did not possess probable cause or even arguable probable cause to arrest Skop for obstruction under the law of Georgia.