Opinion ID: 795721
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court's Refusal to Consider Portions of Briggs's Affidavit

Text: 8 As a preliminary matter, we review the district court's refusal to consider a portion of Briggs's affidavit, which Briggs submitted as an appendix to his motion in opposition to the Postal Service's motion for summary judgment, when the district court was considering the summary-judgment motion. As this decision was an evidentiary ruling, we review the district court's refusal to consider a portion of Briggs's affidavit for an abuse of discretion. Aerel, S.R.L., v. PCC Airfoils, L.L.C., 448 F.3d 899, 906 (6th Cir.2006). A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on erroneous findings of fact, applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard when reaching a conclusion, or makes a clear error of judgment. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 9 Briggs argues that Pickard's statements to him over the telephone in June 2001 made before applications for the ECS positions were even being accepted constitute direct evidence that unlawful age and sex discrimination motivated the ECS promotion decision. At oral argument, Briggs argued that Pickard's statements indicate that Pickard had preselected the ultimately successful candidates before the formal ECS selection process began, and that this constitutes direct evidence of age and sex discrimination, or in the alternative, evidence of pretext under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Briggs first recounted Pickard's alleged June 2001 statements in his deposition, and then later in greater detail in his affidavit. In his deposition, Briggs stated that, during the June 2001 conversation with Pickard, Briggs expressed his unhappiness to Pickard that Briggs was the only DECC who would have to move in order to take one of the new ECS positions. In response, Briggs stated that Pickard said, Well, based on your background and experience... [y]ou're very well qualified; you won't have a problem finding a job someplace else. J.A. at 111 (Briggs Dep. at 44). Briggs then testified that he asked Pickard what he meant by that response, to which Briggs testified that Pickard said, Well, there are other DECCs who have much less time than you do in the postal service and would have a lot harder time finding a residual position if they weren't one of the successful bidders [for an ECS position]. Id. In his subsequent affidavit, Briggs stated that during his June 2001 phone conversation with Pickard: 10 ¶ 19 Mr Pickard told affiant that affiant would not have a problem finding another job [within the Postal Service], whereas the less-qualified and less-experienced selected candidates, including Jennifer Jendras, would have a more difficult time finding alternative positions within the Postal Service due to their limited knowledge and experience in Postal operations. 11 ¶ 20 In other words, Mr. Pickard all but advised that despite his superior qualifications, affiant was not going to be promoted. 12 J.A. at 314 (Briggs Aff. at ¶¶ 19-20) (alterations in original). 13 The district court refused to consider both the statement in the affidavit about Jendras and the other subsequently selected candidates as being less qualified than Briggs and the sentence in ¶ 20 of the affidavit because it concluded that these statements are lawyer argument rather than statements of fact to be considered in determining whether this case should go forward. J.A. at 520 (Dist. Ct. Op. at 6). The district court properly relied upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), which states that supporting affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, and shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. We firmly agree with the district court's decision to strike ¶ 20 of the affidavit, because this portion was on its face explicitly not a reflection of fact but rather an argumentative interpretation of statements of fact from the June 2001 telephone conversation, as evidenced by the terms [i]n other words, and all but advised. Striking ¶ 20 of Briggs's affidavit was proper under Rule 56(e) and therefore was not an abuse of discretion. 14 Whether the district court's decision to strike the description of Jendras as less qualified than Briggs and other more senior, non-selected ECS candidates was an abuse of discretion is a closer question. The district court concluded that this statement was inconsistent with the earlier deposition and therefore inappropriate for consideration at the summary-judgment stage under Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 460 (6th Cir.1986) (stating that [a] party may not create a factual issue by filing an affidavit, after a motion for summary judgment has been made, which contradicts her earlier deposition testimony). J.A. at 520-51 (Dist. Ct. Op. at 6-7). The district court therefore relied upon the principle that Briggs's failure to mention such a material piece of evidence when asked about the June 2001 telephone conversation during the deposition was akin to admitting at the deposition that such evidence did not exist. The district court reasoned that Briggs's subsequent statement that the material piece of evidence did exist was therefore contradictory. The district court also stated, It is inconceivable to this court that, if Pickard had actually said that Jendras was less qualified than Briggs, Briggs would not have mentioned this fact during his deposition. Id. 15 In these circumstances, we conclude that the district court's refusal to consider the affidavit's description of Jendras and the other subsequently selected ECS candidates as less qualified was an abuse of discretion for two reasons. First, the district court essentially stated that it did not believe that Pickard had actually called Jendras less qualified, and it appears that this disbelief factored into the district court's admissibility determination. This adverse determination against Briggs as the nonmoving party is inconsistent with the district court's obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Briggs. The Supreme Court explains: 16 Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether [the judge] is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [the nonmovant's] favor. 17 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). See also Pack v. Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813-14 (6th Cir.2006) (In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.). 18 Second, our most recent precedent on whether or not a subsequent affidavit is contradictory to a previous deposition for the purposes of admissibility at the summary-judgment stage clarifies a relatively narrow definition of a contradiction. In Aerel, we declined to extend the Reid rule barring the admission of contradictory affidavits to bar a party who was not directly questioned about an issue [at deposition] from supplementing incomplete deposition testimony with a sworn affidavit. 448 F.3d at 907. We reasoned: 19 Such an affidavit fills a gap left open by the moving party and thus provides the district court with more information, rather than less, at the crucial summary judgment stage. Because the deponent is under no obligation to volunteer information not fairly sought by the questioner, we see no reason to apply Reid and its progeny to such a situation. 20 Id. While Briggs was questioned generally about that June 2001 conversation, he was not expressly asked what Pickard had said to him during that conversation. As Briggs was not under any obligation to volunteer everything Pickard said during that conversation, he should not be prevented from providing greater detail in a later affidavit. With the benefit of our reasoning Aerel, 1 we conclude that the district court did abuse its discretion excluding the reference in Briggs's affidavit to the ECS candidates who were eventually selected as being less qualified than Briggs. Nevertheless, for the reasons explained below, even when considering this additional phrase of Briggs's affidavit, we conclude that Briggs has been unable to show the existence of any genuine issue of material fact on either his age- or sex-discrimination claims.