Opinion ID: 1134674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Public Employee Strikes are Unlawful

Text: The majority opinion itself cites five Court of Appeal cases which, without equivocation, hold that public employees have no right to strike in California. ( Ante, pp. 5-6.) Indeed, we ourselves have fully acknowledged the rule that In the absence of legislative authorization public employees in general do not have the right to strike.... ( Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (1960) 54 Cal.2d 684, 687 [8 Cal. Rptr. 1, 355 P.2d 905].) Yet despite past unanimity of judicial opinion on the subject, the majority finds it unnecessary here to resolve the question of the legality of public employee strikes.... ( Ante, p. 7, italics added].) Contrary to the majority's suggestion, however, there remains no such question to decide, for prior cases which have carefully and thoughtfully analyzed and resolved the issue have ruled that public employee strikes are unlawful in the absence of legislation to the contrary. I quote at some length from Justice Coughlin's opinion in City of San Diego v. American Federation of State etc. Employees (1970) 8 Cal. App.3d 308 [87 Cal. Rptr. 258], wherein he painstakingly reviewed the prior authorities in California and in other states, concluding that in the absence of some statutory authorization, public employees have no right to strike against the public. He observed that This California common law rule is the generally accepted common law rule in many jurisdictions. [Citations, including cases from 24 states.] The common law rule has been adopted or confirmed statutorily by 20 states and the federal government. [Citations.] The reasons for the rule are many; apply public policy; relate generally to the fundamental differences between private and public employment as regards the processing and settlement of labor demands and disputes; take into account the authority of the public employer respecting both the method for fixing and the substance of the terms and conditions of public employment is limited to that prescribed by law; include a consideration of the overriding duty of the public employer to perform prescribed governmental functions; and furnish a constitutionally approved basis for classification in the premises. [Citations.] Of particular significance is the fact the employer-employee relationship in public employment is the product of law  constitutional, legislative and decisional  rather than the product of a contract as in private employment. [Citations.] The terms and conditions of public employment are fixed by the public through the process of law, and acceptance of such employment requires acceptance of the processes by which the terms and conditions of employment are fixed, i.e., by law rather than by contract [citation]; confers benefits not available to the private employee which are the product of the processes of law, such as civil service tenure status and a vested right to retirement benefits [citations]; but also imposes a distinct responsibility attendant upon public service [citations]; and results in the relinquishment of certain rights enjoyed by private employees. [Citations.] ... The common law rule public employees do not have the right to bargain collectively or to strike is predicated expressly on the necessity for and lack of statutory authority conferring such right. Where a statute authorizes collective bargaining and strikes it includes them within the methods authorized by law for fixing the terms and conditions of employment. Those who advocate the right of public employees to strike should present their case to the Legislature. [Italics added.] .... .... .... .... ... Wherever the issue has been raised, it has been held laws governing the rights of public employees to engage in union activities, collective bargaining, strikes and other coercive practices, not equally applicable to private employees, and vice versa, are premised on a constitutionally approved classification; and, for this reason, are not violative of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law. [Citations.] [¶] The reasons for the law denying public employees the right to strike while affording such right to private employees are not premised on differences in types of jobs held by these two classes of employees but upon differences in the employment relationship to which they are parties. The legitimate and compelling state interest accomplished and promoted by the law denying public employees the right to strike is not solely the need for a particular governmental service but the preservation of a system of government in the ambit of public employment and the proscription of practices not compatible with the public employer-employee relationship. [Citation.] (8 Cal. App.3d at pp. 311-315.) In the context of teachers' strikes, one commentator has cogently observed that a sound public policy underlies the foregoing established rule. The use of the strike against the school boards, as against private employers, amounts to an exercise of economic pressure  the stoppage of services to force concessions. But to the extent teachers can wield the strike against the school boards, they wield it also against the public. Should the public be subjected to economic pressure? From a political view, the answer would seem to be an unequivocal no. The public should be and is subject to political pressure that is exercised in open channels in the legislative and executive branches of the government. This pressure is tolerable, indeed desirable, because all interested organized groups have access to the same channels of communication and are able to use the same methods of pressure, subject to limitations in relative strength and interest. The people, through the political organs of government, remain the ultimate decisionmakers. Utilization of economic pressure via the strike leaves no room for the free interchange of groups with differing views. The impact on the public can be severe, dramatic, and immediate. The school board, having an obligation to the public to provide a continuing service, has little discretion in its adjustment to the strike. To halt the stoppage, some concession will usually have to be made; and, when such steps are taken, the teachers and not the board decide the issues. At that point, public sovereignty is at its lowest ebb. Though the board is still accountable to the electorate, the power of the strike enables the teachers to compel decisions possibly inconsistent with the wishes of the public's representatives. Since the teacher's expertise is a justification for his power to bargain collectively, one may argue that the same rationale should be applied to his use of the strike, particularly since this power is used to make collective bargaining effective. Except for the fact that the powers of bilateral control and the strike are exercised in much different situations, the argument might carry considerable weight. In the case of bilateral control, the board has the power to make concessions and to determine the shape of its counterproposals. This freedom of action is greatly constricted when the board must make decisions under the pressure of a strike. Against the expertise of the teacher must be balanced the interest of the public in retaining control over educational decisionmaking in the hands of its representatives. Although teacher expertise might justify a role for teachers in the decisionmaking process, it cannot justify the use of an economic weapon that places the balance of power in the hands of the teachers. This is particularly true when the strike is used to compel higher wages, a matter only peripherally related to teacher expertise. (Note, Collective Bargaining and the California Public Teacher (1969) 21 Stan.L.Rev. 340, 375-376, italics in original, fn. omitted.) It is well and widely accepted that education ranks among the highest and most important of public purposes. We ourselves have said that public education is a fundamental interest ( Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728, 766 [135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929]) which is essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people.... (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 1.) It follows, accordingly, that a strike which might be tolerated in the private sector as a legitimate economic weapon, must necessarily be held unlawful when it becomes a strike against the sovereign public itself as applied to educational employment, for it is pointed and directed against a function essential to the rights and liberties of the people. ( Ibid. ) Since the majority elects not to pursue the point, I will forego further discussion beyond noting, however, that as recently as 1977, in a case declaring unlawful a strike by public school employees, the appellate court reiterated the views of a 1972 case that `no benefit ... would result from our reanalyses of the same issues which the ... (omission in original) cited opinions have exhaustively treated, with extensive citation of authority.' ( Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist. v. Pasadena Federation of Teachers (1977) 72 Cal. App.3d 100, 107 [140 Cal. Rptr. 41].) We unanimously denied a hearing in the Pasadena case. If there are lurking majority reservations regarding an important principle of law which has been treated as settled for so long, surely there is an obligation to set forth those views openly and candidly. In reexpressing the reasons for the long established conclusion that public employee strikes are illegal, we could repeat with Justice Coughlin the words of the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt, long recognized as an historic friend of labor: `Particularly, I want to emphasize my conviction that militant tactics have no place in the functions of any organization of Government employees.... [A] strike of public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part to prevent or obstruct the operations of Government until their demands are satisfied. Such action, looking toward the paralysis of Government by those who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable and intolerable.' [Citations.] (8 Cal. App.3d at p. 316.)