Opinion ID: 199280
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does this violate the petitioner's right to equal protection?

Text: 26 The petitioner next argues that failure to apply the FJDA violates his right to equal protection. He claims that similarly situated persons--persons of the same age, who commit the same offense--will be treated differently depending on where they commit the offense. This is quite a stretch for the equal protection doctrine. 27 There can be no doubt that aliens are entitled to equal protection of the law. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641 (1973); Herrera-Inirio, 208 F.3d at 306; Almon v. Reno, 192 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 83 (2000). We apply a rational-basis review to this equal protection analysis. See Hellerv. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993); Almon, 192 F.3d at 31. This is a minimal standard of review, and the distinction must be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Almon, 192 F.3d at 31. We also note that the government need not actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification. Id. 28 Under this minimal standard of review, we hold that there is no violation of equal protection and it is entirely rational for the BIA to rely on the law of the convicting state to determine whether a juvenile has been convicted as an adult. We have held that the definition of a conviction as defined in § 101(a)(48) applies even if both the predicate offense and the penalty therefor are creatures of state law. Herrera-Inirio, 208 F.3d at 306. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, it is beyond our jurisdiction to determine whether a state court adjudicates its criminal defendants as adults or juveniles. Once the determination is made, we are thereby bound. 29 The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution provides: 30 Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. 31 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. Congress passed a statute implementing the Full Faith and Credit Clause, see 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which states, inter alia, that 32 [s]uch Acts, records and judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken. 33 Id. 34 The petitioner argues that the BIA must apply the FJDA rather than the laws of the convicting state to avoid disparate treatment of juveniles based on where they are prosecuted. We disagree. Under our dual system of criminal justice, there are innumerable instances where the sentence of a convicted defendant will be lesser or greater depending on where the defendant is tried, in one state or another or, as here, in a federal court or a state court. The most drastic penalty of all--the death penalty--depends on where the crime has been committed. Disparate treatment of those accused of a crime is an inevitable concomitant of separate federal and state jurisdictions. 35 We have given greater weight to the laws of the convicting state than to a comparable federal law. United Statesv. Restrepo-Aguilar, 74 F.3d 361, 365 (1st Cir. 1996) (hold[ing] that a state drug offense is properly deemed a 'felony' . . . if the offense is classified as a felony under the law of the relevant state, even if the same offense would be punishable only as a misdemeanor under federal law). 36 There is no merit in the petitioner's equal protection claim. It was entirely rational for the BIA to rely on the law of the convicting state to determine whether a juvenile has been convicted as an adult.