Opinion ID: 1476684
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's request for post-verdict interviews

Text: Defendant's motion for post-verdict juror interrogation is governed by Rule 1:16-1, which states: Except by leave of court granted on good cause shown, no attorney or party shall directly, or through any investigator or other person acting for the attorney interview, examine, or question any grand or petit juror with respect to any matter relating to the case. [(Emphasis added).] It is a high bar that defendant must hurdle to show good cause: Calling back jurors for interrogation after they have been discharged is an extraordinary procedure which should be invoked only upon a strong showing that a litigant may have been harmed by jury misconduct. State v. Athorn, 46 N.J. 247, 250, 216 A. 2d 369 (1966). We have reaffirmed repeatedly our adherence to that high bar. See, e.g., DiFrisco III, supra, 174 N.J. at 241, 804 A. 2d 507; Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 154, 716 A. 2d 458; State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 289-90, 548 A. 2d 939 (1988) (citing Athorn, supra, 46 N.J. at 247, 216 A. 2d 369). By allowing post-verdict interviews for good cause, a remedy is provided for extraordinary circumstances to prevent an injustice. However, the Rule also balances defendant's interests against other crucial concerns. The requirement that a defendant make such a strong showing is intended to prevent juror harassment and avoid chilling jury deliberations. DiFrisco III, supra, 174 N.J. at 241, 804 A. 2d 507 (citing Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 154, 716 A. 2d 458). Privacy and secrecy must attach to the process, not only to promote the finality of jury verdicts but also to aid the deliberative process itself, allowing each juror the freedom to discuss his or her thoughts. Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 154, 716 A. 2d 458. See also State v. Loftin, 287 N.J.Super. 76, 109, 670 A. 2d 557 (App.Div.1996) (stating that Rule protects free debate in cases to come, and prevent[s] the unsettling of verdicts after they have been recorded) (citations omitted). Thus, good cause for post-verdict interviews would exist if a defendant makes a strong showing that a juror inform[ed] (or misinform[ed]) his colleagues in the jury room of facts about the case, based on his personal knowledge, which facts were not introduced into evidence. Athorn, supra, 46 N.J. at 251-52, 216 A. 2d 369. But defendant in this case has not uncovered any evidence that jurors considered inappropriate information or that he was harmed by juror misconduct in any way. Id. at 250, 216 A. 2d 369. Similarly, bald accusations in Koedatich were held insufficient to generate a basis for juror interviews post-trial. Supra, 112 N.J. at 289, 548 A. 2d 939. In Koedatich, supra, the defendant submitted a newspaper article that quoted two deliberating jurors and one alternate juror, who indicated that jurors knew that the defendant was linked to another murder, although that information was not in evidence. 112 N.J. at 286, 548 A. 2d 939. We nonetheless denied Koedatich's motion to conduct post-verdict interviews because contents of a single newspaper article, indisputably hearsay, cannot be the sole basis for the extraordinary procedure of a post-trial jury interrogation. Id. at 289, 548 A. 2d 939; see also State v. Freeman, 223 N.J.Super. 92, 120-21, 538 A. 2d 371 (App.Div.1988) (holding that hearsay would clearly not provide good cause for post-verdict interrogation of jurors). In finding no evidence that the defendant may have been harmed, we noted that Koedatich never asserted that any juror impermissibly considered [other crimes evidence] in reaching a decision. Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 290, 548 A. 2d 939. The Court added that no member of the jury ever came forward to the court or counsel for the State or the defense and informed anyone of possible taint. Ibid. See also DiFrisco III, supra, 174 N.J. at 241, 804 A. 2d 507 (denying a motion for post-verdict interviews and highlighting that affidavit submitted by alternate juror did not suggest that jurors actually considered inappropriate evidence during deliberations). In the present matter, there is evidence that a reporter contacted some of the jurors, as reported to the State and to defendant and his counsel in open court in the presence of the jury members. The trial court's in-court statement signaled his satisfaction that extraneous information had not been conveyed by the reporter to those jurors who had been called in a contact of inquiry for comment. Indeed, no juror came forward during or after trial to say that he or she, or any other member of the jury, considered extraneous information provided by the reporter, or by Audrey Bomse for that matter. As was lacking in Koedatich, there is no affidavit indicating that jurors considered improper information. There is not even hearsay evidence of improper jury deliberations. Nor do we draw any negative inference from the jurors' reaction to the court's comments. The tenor of the court's comments in open court effectively informed the jurors that the reporter erred in contacting them and that the proceeding would continue. Implicitly reflected in the trial court's address to the jury was that the court was not aware of anything that jeopardized the fairness of defendant's trial. We note the jurors' lack of any response or apparent reaction upon hearing the court's remarks about the reporter's contact. We have no reason to think that they were concerned after hearing the trial court's statement. The trial court apparently saw no reason to dwell further on the subject. Thus, in that context, as hearsay cannot provide the necessary good cause under Rule 1:16-1, Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 289, 548 A. 2d 939, then, certainly, neither can no evidence at all. Calling back jurors for interrogation is an extraordinary step and a compelling reason to do so is necessary. Defendant has not carried his burden.