Opinion ID: 4551814
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ambiguity in the Autodialer Definition

Text: “In determining the meaning of a statutory provision, we look first to its language, giving the words used their ordinary meaning.” In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, 939 F.3d 710, 717 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594, 603 (2018)). To do so, we “look[] at the language and design of the statute as a whole.” Id. at 718. The TCPA defines ATDS as “equipment which has the capacity— (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). Courts have tried to fashion a plain text reading from these words, but each reading has its problems, as every circuit to consider this question admits. First, the phrase “using a random or sequential number generator” could apply both to “store” and “produce,” like so: An ATDS is “equipment which has the capacity— (A) to store [telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator]; or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” § 227(a)(1). Under this definition, the Avaya system would not qualify as an ATDS because it does not store numbers by using a random or sequential number generator. The Avaya system instead stores numbers using some other type of device. The advantage of this reading is that it follows proper grammar—here, the last antecedent rule. When a clause is set off by a comma at the end of a sentence, it should modify all that precedes it. See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 468 (“[A] qualifying phrase separated from antecedents by a comma is evidence that the qualifier is supposed to apply to all the antecedents instead of No. 19-2043 Allan v. Penn. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency Page 7 only to the immediately preceding one.” (quoting WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 67–68 (2016))). The problem with this reading is that it requires a strained reading of “store.” “[I]t is hard to see how a number generator could be used to ‘store’ telephone numbers,” even if it can “as a technical matter.” Id. at 464 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Because a number generator produces numbers, the more natural reading is that “using a random or sequential number generator” solely modifies “produce.” “As a matter of ordinary usage it’s hard to say that the random number generator is ‘storing’ in any notable way.” Id. at 464–65 (quotation omitted). We will not apply the last antecedent rule “in a mechanical way where it would require accepting ‘unlikely premises.’” Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2014) (quotation omitted). The last antecedent rule “is ‘not an absolute and can assuredly be overcome by other indicia of meaning.’” Id. (quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003)). There are other indicia of meaning in § 227(b), as will be explained below. See infra at 10–12. This reading also renders “store” superfluous. “Common sense suggests that any number that is stored using a number-generator is also produced by the same number-generator; otherwise, it is not clear what ‘storing’ using a number-generator could mean.” See Duran, 955 F.3d 279. Even if a random or sequential number generator can store numbers, its storage function, if any, is incidental to its production function. “It is our duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute . . . . We are thus ‘reluctan[t] to treat statutory terms as surplusage’ in any setting.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (quotations omitted). True, Congress sometimes will use the “belt-and-suspenders” approach to avoid loopholes. But here, we risk creating a loophole if we were to follow the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits’ narrow interpretation of “store.” If stored-number systems are not covered, companies could avoid the autodialer ban altogether by transferring numbers from the number generator to a separate storage device and then dialing from that separate storage device. The autodialer ban would not apply to them because, technically, they are not using the random or sequential number generator to store and dial the numbers. We conclude that this plain text reading of the autodialer definition is too labored and problematic to carry the day. No. 19-2043 Allan v. Penn. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency Page 8 The second option is that the phrase “using a random or sequential number generator” could apply to “produce” only, like so: An ATDS is “equipment which has the capacity— (A) to store [telephone numbers to be called]; or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” § 227(a)(1). Under this reading, the Avaya system that PHEAA uses would qualify as an ATDS because it stores numbers and dials those numbers. The advantage to this reading is that it avoids the awkwardness and surplusage of the first reading. But there is a new problem. “To store,” a transitive verb, lacks a direct object. Thus, this reading requires adding the phrase “telephone numbers to be called” after “store” for it to make grammatical sense. This is a significant modification. And as stated above, this reading violates the last antecedent rule. We conclude that the second plain text reading of the autodialer definition is, by itself, unworkable, too.4 The dissent offers a third reading in which “using a random or sequential number generator” modifies the phrase “telephone numbers to be called.” We agree that the dissent’s reading, like the first reading, follows proper grammar. However, like the first reading, the dissent’s reading still requires a strained reading of “store.” Even if “using a random or sequential number generator” modifies a truncated version of the phrase that precedes it, it still makes little sense why the statute would require stored numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator. Moreover, it is the dissent’s reading that introduces superfluity into the statute. If the goal of the statute is to regulate devices that randomly or sequentially generate numbers, then the autodialer definition simply could include devices that produce those numbers, without mentioning devices that store those numbers. On the flipside, modifying “produce” with “using a random or sequential number generator” meaningfully differentiates “produce” from “store.” Whereas it would be strange to store numbers using a number 4 There are other proposed interpretations that are substantively the same as those discussed here or are inferior options. See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 463–68. No. 19-2043 Allan v. Penn. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency Page 9 generator, “produce,” on its own, easily could mean numbers produced from a stored list. At day’s end, the dissent’s proposed reading is not so different from the first reading and does not open up a new interpretive avenue not previously analyzed by this court or other circuits. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits decided that the first reading, though “imperfect,” was the better option from a textual perspective. Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 468; Glasser, 948 F.3d at 1306. “Clarity,” the Eleventh Circuit “lament[ed], does not leap off this page of the U.S. Code. Each interpretation runs into hurdles.” Glasser, 948 F.3d at 1306. The Seventh Circuit conceded that “the comma seems to be ungrammatical under any interpretation” and that “a purported plain-meaning analysis based only on punctuation is necessarily incomplete and runs the risk of distorting a statute’s true meaning.” Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 468 (quotation omitted). Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit concluded, the first reading “lacks the more significant problems of the other three interpretations and is thus our best reading of a thorny statutory provision.” Id. In addition to the text, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits considered the administrative and legislative history of the TCPA and the practical effects of a more expansive interpretation of ATDS. See Glasser, 948 F.3d at 1308–11; Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 467. The Second and Ninth Circuits rejected the interpretation of ATDS adopted by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. “After struggling with the statutory language,” the Ninth Circuit concluded that the autodialer definition, viewed in isolation, was “ambiguous on its face” and went on to examine the structure and context of the autodialer ban as a whole. Marks, 904 F.3d at 1051. We agree with the Ninth Circuit’s assessment and approach. In doing so, we note, as the Ninth Circuit did, that the D.C. Circuit already decided that the definition of ATDS is open to more than one reasonable interpretation. See id; ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 703 (holding that it was permissible for the FCC to interpret the autodialer ban as applying (1) to devices that use a random or sequential number generator or (2) devices that do not—just not both). Because the definition of ATDS itself is ambiguous, we look to other provisions of the autodialer ban to guide us in our interpretation. No. 19-2043 Allan v. Penn. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency Page 10