Opinion ID: 1385434
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: voir dire examination of prospective jurors

Text: Joseph contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the Commonwealth could ask prospective jurors whether there were any circumstances that exist that would cause you not to consider the death penalty as punishment if you found the defendant guilty of capital murder? We will not consider this contention because no objection was made to the seating of any juror to whom this question, or one similar thereto, was propounded. Rule 5:25; Mu'Min v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 433, 445 n. 6, 389 S.E.2d 886, 894 n. 6 (1990), aff'd, 500 U.S. 415, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991). Next, Joseph argues that the court erred in refusing to permit him to ask prospective jurors if they were aware that if the defendant is sentenced to life for capital murder, then the defendant will not be eligible for parole for at least twenty-five years? Joseph recognizes that we have consistently rejected efforts to permit jurors to consider a defendant's parole eligibility or ineligibility in fixing an appropriate sentence. King v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353, 367-68, 416 S.E.2d 669, 677, cert. denied, 506 U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 417, 121 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992); Yeatts, 242 Va. at 127, 410 S.E.2d at 258. However, Joseph contends that the prohibition must now fall, in light of the recent holding in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. ___, [114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133] (1994). Joseph states that  Simmons requires that where a defendant's future dangerousness is at issue and he is parole- ineligible under state law, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the sentencing jury be informed as to parole ineligibility.  (Emphasis added.) According to Joseph, the underlying rationale of Simmons and its predecessors mandates reversal in this case. We disagree because Joseph is parole eligible. Justice Blackmun, author of the four-justice plurality opinion in Simmons, pointed out that [t]he logic and effectiveness of petitioner's argument naturally depended on the fact that he was legally ineligible for parole and thus would remain in prison if afforded a life sentence. 512 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2194-95. In a concurrence, Justice O'Connor, with whom two other justices joined, noted that [i]n a State in which parole is available, the Constitution does not require (or preclude) jury consideration of that fact. 512 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2200. Hence, Simmons is inapplicable if, as here, a defendant is eligible for parole. Wright v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 485, 487, 450 S.E.2d 361, 362-63 (1994); Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 518, 520, 450 S.E.2d 360, 360-61 (1994). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to permit a voir dire question which would have told prospective jurors that Joseph would not be eligible for parole for 25 years if given a life sentence. For the same reasons, we also hold that the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury on the issue of parole during the sentencing phase or to answer the jury's question posed during its sentencing deliberations as to the meaning of two life sentences.