Opinion ID: 6499668
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rescission is Forfeited

Text: The Defendants first argue that they rescinded 2 the Settlement after Rivera’s November 2009 first material breach or after Rivera’s March 2010 second material breach. Neither argument was made to the District Court. Recall that both breaches occurred when Rivera filed public motions to enforce the Settlement, motions that revealed the deal and its material terms. Each seemed to entitle the Defendants to cancel the contract. See, e.g., Pappan Enters. v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 806 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Under basic contract principles, when one party to a contract feels that the other contracting party has breached its agreement, the non-breaching party may . . . stop performance and assume the contract is avoided.” (quoting S & R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 968 F.2d 371, 376 (3d Cir. 1992))). 1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the District Court’s rulings on the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and Rivera’s motion to enforce, upholding them if there are no genuine issues of material fact. See Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1031–32 (3d Cir. 1991). 2 “Rescind” means “[t]o abrogate or cancel (a contract) unilaterally or by agreement.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 4 They did not, instead responding to Rivera’s motions by arguing that the Settlement remained enforceable, while asking the District Court to excuse their performance. Only now do they argue rescission, but we “generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal, and will not do so in this case.” Orie v. Dist. Att’y Allegheny Cnty., 946 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Gardner v. Grandolsky, 585 F.3d 786, 793 (3d