Opinion ID: 37901
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Extrinsic Evidence of Bad Acts

Text: 42 See Lavergne, 805 F.2d at 521 (holding that defendants had not been surprised or prejudiced by facts used to support the government’s case because the government had made the evidence used at trial available for inspection and copying by the defendants’ attorneys or investigators). 43 United States v. Vasquez, 867 F.2d 872, 874 (5th Cir. 1989). 44 See United States v. Montemayor, 703 F.2d 109, 117 (5th Cir. 1983). 45 United States v. Stouffer, 986 F.2d 916, 924 (5th Cir. 1993)(citing United States v. Liu, 960 F.2d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 1992). Defendants made a 404(b) challenge only to the admission of the testimony of Lydia Roberts, a patient/client of the clinic; the trial court also admitted testimony of other patients and patient files not listed in the indictment, to which the defendants did not object. Although review of this other evidence should rightfully be for plain error, as we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion with respect to admission of any of the evidence at issue here, it obviously did not commit plain error either. 22 Defendants challenge the trial court’s admission of evidence of fraudulent transactions that were not specified in the indictment. They contend that these transactions constitute evidence of extrinsic bad acts, requiring the trial court to weigh the probative value of the evidence against unfair prejudice to the defendants as a result of its admission.46 Defendants argue further that, as the government did not disclose its intention to introduce this evidence at trial pursuant to defendants’ 404(b) motion to disclose, they did not receive fair notice that such evidence would be introduced against them at trial. If the existence of a scheme to defraud is an element of the offense, then acts and transactions constituting a part of that continuing offense are admissible as proof of the criminal enterprise.47 Evidence of an uncharged offense arising out of a scheme or artifice to defraud is not “extrinsic” within the meaning of 404(b) and thus not excludable on this ground.48 The prosecution 46 See United States v. Dula, 989 F.2d 772, 777 (5th Cir. 1993). 47 See id. at 777-78. 48 Id. See also Stouffer, 986 F.2d at 926 (“[E]vidence relevant to establish the existence of a criminal enterprise is not extrinsic to the crime charged.”); United States v. Lokey, 945 F.2d 825, 834 (5th Cir. 1991)(holding evidence of similar crimes committed outside the temporal scope and substantive counts of the indictment admissible “because it was relevant to establish how the conspiracy came about, how it was structured, and how each appellant became a member”); United States v. Nichols, 750 F.2d 1260, 1264-64 (5th Cir. 1985)(holding evidence of defendant’s involvement in uncharged crimes admissible as it was intrinsic to the government’s case in proving the existence 23 may offer evidence of any surrounding circumstances that are relevant to prove intent or motive with respect to the fraudulent scheme.49 All the evidence challenged by Murphy and Kirkham concerned other transactions that tended to show the existence of the continuing scheme to defraud insurers. The evidence introduced by the government was undeniably relevant to proving defendants’ intent or motive with respect to the fraudulent scheme. Most telling is the fact that defendants did receive fair notice of this evidence, as the government either produced or allowed defendants access to all of it well in advance of trial. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.