Opinion ID: 2614001
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The trial court's denial of defendant's Wheeler motion

Text: (1a) Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion, pursuant to People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748], for mistrial, to quash the jury venire, and to commence jury selection anew, on the ground the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse the sole African-American juror in the venire, Mrs. Casey. (2) A presumption exists that a prosecutor has exercised his or her peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner. ( People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 652 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705]; People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 278.) Nonetheless, it is well established that the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors solely on the basis of a presumed group bias, based upon membership in a cognizable group, violates both the federal and state Constitutions. ( Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 S.Ct. 1712]; People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258.) `Group bias is a presumption that jurors are biased merely because they are members of an identifiable group,' distinguished on grounds such as race, religion, ethnicity, or gender. ( People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 170 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664]; People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 713 [286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75]; see J.E.B. v. Alabama (1994) 511 U.S. ___, ___ [128 L.Ed.2d 89, 101-104, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1425-1427]; Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400, 407-410 [113 L.Ed.2d 411, 422-425, 111 S.Ct. 1364].) (3) `If a party believes an opponent is improperly using peremptory challenges for a discriminatory purpose, that party must make a timely objection and a prima facie showing that the jurors are being excluded on the basis of group bias. [Citation.] To establish a prima facie case, the moving party should first make as complete a record as possible; second, the moving party must establish that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group; and third, the moving party must show a strong likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of group association.' ( People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 171; People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 164-165 [32 Cal. Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521]; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1153-1154 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315]; People v. Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d 707, 714; People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1216 [255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047]; see Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 87-89].) A party may make a showing of a strong likelihood by, inter alia, pointing out that his opponent has struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire, or has used a disproportionate number of his peremptories against the group. He may also demonstrate that the jurors in question share only this one characteristic  their membership in the group  and that in all other respects they are as heterogeneous as the community as a whole. Next, the showing may be supplemented when appropriate by such circumstances as the failure of his opponent to engage these same jurors in more than desultory voir dire, or indeed to ask them any questions at all. Lastly, ... if [defendant is a member of the excluded group], and especially if, in addition, his alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the court's attention. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 280-281, fn. omitted.) (1b) In support of his motion, defendant emphasized that the prosecutor had excused the only African-American juror in the venire. It is clear, however, that defendant did not rely solely upon the circumstance that the prosecutor's peremptory challenge was directed toward the only African-American juror; defendant made an effort to set forth other relevant circumstances. (Cf. People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 171; People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1154.) He presented evidence, compiled from the biographical information of 50 prospective jurors, that Mrs. Casey was typical in terms of her age (58 years), employment status (housewife with prior employment outside the home), length of residence in the community (17 years), and marital status and children (1 marriage, 2 adult children), and in that her husband had served in the armed forces. Defendant also compiled a list showing that, like Mrs. Casey, 24 other prospective jurors had expressed views suggesting opposition to, or concerns with, the death penalty. Defendant presented evidence indicating that, in an earlier trial in Butte County involving an African-American defendant, the same prosecutor had employed a peremptory challenge against the one African-American prospective juror remaining in the venire after for-cause challenges had been exercised. Defendant also emphasized that Mrs. Casey and defendant both were African-American, whereas the victims were Caucasian. The court denied the motion on the ground that defendant had not established a prima facie case, the court determining that during voir dire Mrs. Casey had shown indecisiveness and could not decide whether she would be able to follow the law. [2] (4) `[W]hen a trial court denies a Wheeler motion without finding a prima facie case of group bias the reviewing court considers the entire record of voir dire. [Citations.] As with other findings of fact, we examine the record for evidence to support the trial court's ruling. Because Wheeler motions call upon trial judges' personal observations, we view their rulings with considerable deference on appeal. [Citations.] If the record suggests grounds upon which the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged the jurors in question, we affirm. [Citation.]' ( People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 171-172; People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1155; People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 498, 501 [273 Cal. Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561]; see Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 88, 98, fn. 21 [90 L.Ed.2d at pp. 81, 89].) (1c) When Mrs. Casey was asked by the court how she felt about serving on a jury for the first time, she responded, Not good, and that it was scary to do something she never had done before. When asked whether she would decline to find first degree murder even if the prosecutor had established that crime, out of fear of having to decide whether to apply the death penalty, she initially stated she was against persons being put to death, as well as against people killing people. [] That is hard to answer, then responded in the negative, also responding in the negative to the question whether she would refuse to vote on the issue of special circumstances if these were shown. When asked whether she could conceive of situations in which she might vote for the death penalty if first degree murder and special circumstances were established, she answered in the affirmative. Upon questioning by defense counsel, Mrs. Casey reiterated she did not believe in the death penalty, and also did not believe in nobody killing anybody either, so that she was in-between or whatever. She also stated she could conceive of a case in which the death penalty would be appropriate, if the circumstances of the case were awful bad and if she believed it. Upon questioning by the prosecutor, Mrs. Casey reiterated that she truly did not believe in the death penalty, and stated: But if it is bad, it [is] really bad and I felt that, you know  I hate death. I don't know how to express myself, really. But I really hate to see anybody be put to death. And I hate to see someone take a life. I don't care who it is. So  it is  it is hard for me to express it. [¶] But I could, if proven to me, to, no doubt, that it was a crime, then I don't think I would hesitate. She indicated she did not know whether the prosecutor was at a disadvantage because of her views; she couldn't say fully, but would attempt to be completely open and objective about the issue. When the prosecutor asked whether she honestly believed she could vote for a verdict that would cause defendant to be sent to the gas chamber, she replied: I can't sit here and really say for sure if I could. But, if it is proven to me, truly proven to me, and I feel deep down inside that he did it, I could. I think I could. When the prosecutor asked, You think you could? Mrs. Casey said, Yes, I have to say I think I could. This is all new to me. So I am very upset with it. She further stated that her feelings concerning the death penalty (that she did not believe in it) would make it difficult for her to make a decision on that issue. She could not say yes or no to whether her feelings about the death penalty might substantially impair her ability to evaluate fairly all the evidence pertaining to the death penalty. She indicated that, despite her not believing in the death penalty, she believed she could vote in favor of it if she heard facts and circumstances that warranted it, but then stated: I can't say  I can't come out and say fully, yes, I could or, no, I couldn't, because I don't know the circumstances. Following these statements, Mrs. Casey informed the court that her family possessed only one automobile, which her husband used when not carpooling, and that she could not depend upon automobile transportation. The trial court denied the prosecutor's for-cause challenge to Mrs. Casey, premised upon her statement that she did not believe in the death penalty, and the prosecutor later employed a peremptory challenge to excuse this prospective juror. Because the trial judge had presided over all of the voir dire, he was in a good position to determine from all relevant circumstances whether a strong likelihood existed that the prosecutor had challenged Mrs. Casey solely by reason of her group association. ( People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1156.) He properly could consider the nature of the prosecutor's voir dire, which was not desultory but rather reflected a thorough investigation of her views, especially as to her feelings concerning the death penalty. ( People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1156.) Mrs. Casey's apparent opposition to, uncertainty about, and repeatedly contradictory responses pertaining to the death penalty, her indication she might be unable to apply the law in that regard, her apparent general apprehension at serving on a jury for the first time, as well as her concern over her transportation to the court for trial, indicate there were legitimate, race-neutral grounds upon which the prosecutor reasonably might have challenged her. ( People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 172-173; People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1156; People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1092 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659].) As indicated above, defendant presented other matters to the court in an attempt to make a prima facie showing. His demonstration that Mrs. Casey generally appeared to be an otherwise typical member of the community, although a circumstance properly the subject of consideration, did not obviate the concerns evoked by her responses. Defendant's showing that 24 other prospective jurors had expressed views suggesting opposition to, or evidencing concern over applying, the death penalty, does not establish a prima facie case, because all except one of these prospective jurors were excused (almost all by the prosecutor), and the prosecutor's failure to excuse the remaining juror must be viewed in light of the circumstance that the juror was called later in the proceedings, when the prosecutor's remaining peremptory challenges were few. (See People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1220-1221 [comparison of prospective jurors did not take into account such factors as the prosecutor's remaining peremptory challenges and the number of prospective jurors with a particular point of view].) Moreover, that juror indicated her understanding of and willingness to uphold the law, despite her reservations. Assuming defendant's showing that the prosecutor had, in an unrelated case involving an African-American defendant, exercised a peremptory challenge in order to excuse an African-American prospective juror is relevant under Wheeler (22 Cal.3d 258, 285-287 [a defendant need not show that the same prosecutor has excluded all members of a cognizable group over a long period of time]; Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 88, 92-96 [90 L.Ed.2d at pp. 81-82, 84-88]; see also People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1156, fn. 4) this showing is not very probative, in light of the isolated nature of the prior conduct (cf. People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th 137, 162, 168) and the record introduced in the trial court of the circumstances surrounding that excusal, indicating the prosecutor validly excused the prospective juror on the basis of the juror's legal training. (5) Although the prosecutor's excusal of all members of a particular group may give rise to an inference of impropriety, especially if the defendant belongs to the same group, that inference, as we have observed, is not dispositive ( People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1156; People v. Sanders, supra, 51 Cal.3d 471, 500.) (1d) Moreover, in the present case the inference is of less weight, because the prosecutor excused only a single member of that group. In light of all the relevant circumstances, the trial court properly could find that defendant had not made a prima facie showing, and, accordingly, the burden did not shift to the prosecution to establish a neutral explanation, related to the particular case, for the peremptory challenge. ( People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th 137, 164-165; People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 281.) (6) We also reject defendant's claim that his right under the Sixth Amendment to an impartial jury was violated. Although a defendant has a right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community as a means of ensuring his or her right to an impartial jury, he or she has no right to a jury that reflects the racial composition of the community. ( Holland v. Illinois (1990) 493 U.S. 474, 480, 482-483 [107 L.Ed.2d 905, 916, 918, 110 S.Ct. 803]; People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 173; see also Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522, 538 [42 L.Ed.2d 690, 702-703, 95 S.Ct. 692].) (1e) Defendant's claim of a violation of his right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment lacks merit because, as explained above, the record supports the trial court's finding that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that this prospective juror was excluded on the basis of group bias. ( Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 363-367 [114 L.Ed.2d 395, 408-411, 111 S.Ct. 1859]; see Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 88, 96-97 [90 L.Ed.2d at pp. 81-82, 87-88]; cf. Johnson v. Vasquez (9th Cir.1993) 3 F.3d 1327.) [3]