Opinion ID: 1201106
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the standards of preemption analysis

Text: Prior to any discussion of the merits of appellants' contention that the State has neither preempted the field of hazardous waste disposal, nor the field of PCB disposal, a discussion of the salient standards governing such an analysis is appropriate. The Idaho Constitution, art. 12, § 2, provides that county ordinances may not conflict with state statutes: § 2. Local police regulations authorized.  Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws. See also, In re Ridenbaugh, 5 Idaho 371, 49 P. 12 (1897). This grant of police power to local governments has been recognized and accorded respect by this Court: [A] municipality, under the constitutional provision in question, [art 12, § 2] has authority to make police regulations not in conflict with general laws, co-equal with the authority of the legislature to pass general police laws. Clyde Hess Distributing Co. v. Bonneville County, 69 Idaho 505, 512, 210 P.2d 798, 801 (1949). The concept of conflict broadens when put in the context of a determination of state preemption over a field of regulation. Of course, direct conflict (expressly allowing what the state disallows, and vice versa) is conflict in any sense. State v. Musser, 67 Idaho 214, 176 P.2d 199 (1946). Additionally, a conflict between state and local regulation may be implied. This state firmly adopted the doctrine of implied preemption in Caesar v. State, 101 Idaho 158, 610 P.2d 517 (1980). Where it can be inferred from a state statute that the state has intended to fully occupy or preempt a particular area, to the exclusion of [local governmental entities], a [local] ordinance in that area will be held to be in conflict with the state law, even if the state law does not so specifically state. Caesar, supra, 101 Idaho at 161, 610 P.2d at 520. ( See also, United Tavern Owners of Philadelphia v. School District of Philadelphia, [441 Pa. 274] 272 A.2d 868 (Pa. 1971); Boyle v. Campbell, 450 S.W.2d 265 (Ky. 1970); In re Hubbard, [62 Cal.2d 119, 396 P.2d 809] (Cal. 1964). The doctrine of implied preemption typically applies in instances where, despite the lack of specific language preempting regulation by local governmental entities, the state has acted in the area in such a pervasive manner that it must be assumed that it intended to occupy the entire field of regulation. The [local governmental entity] cannot act in an area which is so completely covered by general law as to indicate that it is a matter of state concern. Caesar, 101 Idaho at 161, 610 P.2d at 520. Other jurisdictions have commonly found that the doctrine of implied preemption will also apply where uniform statewide regulation is called for due to the particular nature of the subject matter to be regulated. [I]f the court finds that the nature of the subject matter regulated calls for a uniform state regulatory scheme, supplemental local ordinances are preempted. Township of Cascade v. Cascade, Resource Recovery Inc., 118 Mich. App. 580, 325 N.W.2d 500, 502 (Mich. App. 1982). (See also, People v. Llewellyn, 401 Mich. 314, 257 N.W.2d 902 (1977), cert. den., 435 U.S. 1008, 98 S.Ct. 1879, 56 L.Ed.2d 390 (1978). Owyhee County argues that Caesar, supra, is an anomalous case which has been abrogated by more recent case law. Specifically, Owyhee County cites Benewah County Cattlemen's Association, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Benewah County, 105 Idaho 209, 668 P.2d 85 (1983), as the more orthodox precedent. Any reliance by Owyhee County on Benewah County, supra, is misplaced. In that case, the doctrine of implied preemption was in no way abrogated. Rather, this Court simply could not find any intent to preempt by the legislature, since it had not occupied the field at issue (livestock control): We hold that the herd district statutes were not intended to preempt, and do not preempt, the field of livestock regulations so as to preclude local regulation. Herd district statutes which by their own terms are inapplicable to open range areas do not preempt the field of livestock control in such areas. Benewah County, 105 Idaho at 214, 668 P.2d at 90. Moreover, the underpinnings for the doctrine of implied preemption are principles of long-standing in this state. In Clyde Hess Distributing Co. v. Bonneville County, 69 Idaho 505, 210 P.2d 798 (1949), this Court acknowledged the ability of the legislature to implicitly preempt local regulation by occupying the field of regulation. In that case, we found that the legislature did not intend to occupy the whole field of hours of sale of beer, thereby making any regulation by the county necessarily inconsistent with the general law. Clyde Hess, 69 Idaho at 510, 210 P.2d at 800. Our failure to find the field preempted in Clyde Hess was due to the fact that express intent not to preempt was found in the same statute which had been alleged to preempt the field. (I.C. §§ 23-1014-15). (See also, State v. Poynter, 70 Idaho 438, 220 P.2d 386 (1950). With these standards in mind, we turn now to the case at hand.