Opinion ID: 1920315
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Precedents

Text: We first opened the door to extra-statutory compensation in Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla.1986). There, an attorney who represented an indigent criminal defendant in a first-degree murder trial sought compensation above the applicable statutory caps. See § 925.036, Fla. Stat. (1981). We held that the caps, while not facially unconstitutional, could be unconstitutional when applied to cases involving extraordinary circumstances and unusual representation. Makemson, 491 So.2d at 1110. In such cases, we said, the caps threaten to interfere with the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and with the judiciary's inherent power to ensure the adequate representation of the criminally accused. Id. at 1112. Thus, we concluded that a trial court may depart from the caps when necessary to prevent an attorney from being compensated in an amount which is confiscatory of his or her time, energy and talents. Id. at 1115. Three years later, we announced that virtually every capital case fits within [ Makemson's ] standard and justifies the court's exercise of its inherent power to award attorney's fees in excess of the current statutory fee cap. See White v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 537 So.2d 1376, 1380 (Fla.1989). As we explained, the statutory fees for capital cases were at that time unrealistic, amounting to little more than token compensation. Id. at 1379-80. To protect the Sixth Amendment rights of capital defendants, we authorized additional fees in most capital cases. Both Makemson and White involved the representation of criminal defendants at trial and on direct appeal, where they have a constitutional right to counsel. In Remeta v. State, 559 So.2d 1132 (Fla.1990), however, we extended this reasoning to executive clemency proceedings, without reach[ing] the question of whether an indigent, death-sentenced prisoner has a state or federal constitutional right to counsel in that setting. Id. at 1135 n. 4. We explained that, regardless of whether counsel is constitutionally required, this state has established a right to counsel in clemency proceedings for death penalty cases, and this statutory right necessarily carries with it the right to have effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 1135. Because the statutory fee cap threatened to undermine that right, see § 925.035(4), Fla. Stat. (1987), we held that courts could award extra compensation when necessary to ensure effective representation and to prevent confiscatory compensation of counsel. Remeta, 559 So.2d at 1135. Then, in Olive v. Maas, 811 So.2d at 644, we went even further. The issue there was whether trial courts may award more than the statutory fee caps to attorneys representing defendants in the postconviction context. Of course, we have held many timesand have reiterated only just recentlythat prisoners enjoy no constitutional right to such counsel. See, e.g., Zack v. State, 911 So.2d 1190, 1203 (Fla. 2005) (Under Florida and federal law, a defendant has no constitutional right to effective collateral counsel.). That right is purely statutory. Nevertheless, by a vote of four to three, this Court held that even in such cases attorneys may be awarded fees above the caps where unusual or extraordinary circumstances exist. Olive, 811 So.2d at 654. The majority in Olive did not base its decision on any constitutional right to postconviction counsel. Instead, it interpreted the statuteor rather, the legislative history of the statuteas allowing for fees exceeding the caps. The statute provided that [t]he fee and payment schedule in this section is the exclusive means of compensating a court-appointed attorney who represents a capital defendant in collateral proceedings. § 27.711(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). Yet the majority determined from the legislative history and staff analysis that the Legislature intended to accommodate an implied exception. Olive, 811 So.2d at 654. Thus, it held that registry counsel is not forever foreclosed from seeking [extra] compensation should he or she establish that ... compensation within the statutory cap would be confiscatory of his or her time, energy and talent. Id. I question this Court's interpretation of the statute in Olive. It appears to elevate the staff analysis over the statute's plain text. As I have previously explained, [W]here the language is clear, courts need no other aids for determining legislative intent. Even if the language were not clear, legislative staff analyses add nothing to an investigation of legislative intent. Staff analyses are not written by legislators but, as the name implies, by staff that is unelected employees.... Another problem with relying on a staff analysis is that no evidence exists that any of the legislators who voted for the proposed bill even read the analysis, much less agreed with it.... The fact is that even if all the legislators read the staff analysis of a bill, they could disagree with it and still vote in favor of the bill itself. The only text with which a legislator must agree is the text of the bill itself. Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So.2d 360, 376 (Fla.2005) (Cantero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). Thus, I am not convinced that Olive was correct. However, because the parties in this case have not asked us to overrule or recede from it, I do not address that issue. Nevertheless, given that Olive represents an extra-statutory remedy, and given that the statutory caps should mean something, the award of fees exceeding the cap should be determined with the caps in mind. They should be the benchmark. The exception should be narrow, applied rarely, and exceed the caps only to the extent necessary to prevent confiscat[ing] the attorney's time, energy and talent. Olive, 811 So.2d at 654.