Opinion ID: 2718298
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merits of the Retaliation Claims

Text: Where, as here, a plaintiff offers only circumstantial evidence of retaliation, her claim is governed by the burdenshifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–808 (1973). See Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Under that framework, Solomon must “first establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing” that (i) “[s]he engaged in statutorily protected activity”; (ii) “[s]he suffered a materially adverse action by h[er] employer”; and (iii) “a causal link connects the two.” Id. Once a prima facie case is established, the burden of production shifts to the employer to produce a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its action. Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2007). If the employer does so, the plaintiff must respond with sufficient evidence to “create[] a genuine dispute on the ultimate issue of retaliation either directly by [showing] that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Pardo-Kronemann, 601 F.3d at 604 (internal quotation marks omitted; second alteration in original). The district court’s entry of summary judgment rested principally on the erroneous premise that Solomon, “as a matter of law,” “could not have been reasonably accommodated” and, therefore, the denials of her requested accommodations “cannot be ‘adverse[.]’” Solomon, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 75. Because that ruling was based on the flawed predicate holding that Solomon’s request for a maxiflex schedule was legally foreclosed, that rationale fails here as well. In the alternative, the district court held that Solomon failed to establish a prima facie causal connection between 22 her December 2003 meeting with an EEO counselor and the denials in the Spring and Summer of 2004 of her various accommodation requests. However, we need not decide whether Solomon established a prima facie case of retaliation because the Secretary came forward with a legitimate, nonretaliatory justification for the Department’s actions. Once the Secretary did that, the burden-shifting framework fell away, and now the “only question is the ‘ultimate factual issue in the case’”—retaliation “‘vel non.’” Jones, 557 F.3d at 678 (quoting United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714–715 (1983)); see also Taylor v. Solis, 571 F.3d 1313, 1320 n. (D.C. Cir. 2009) (once the employer asserts a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, “the court need not—and should not—decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). With respect to that ultimate factual issue, Solomon contends that a reasonable jury could infer retaliation from: (i) the withdrawal on April 23rd of her permission to work late, (ii) the withdrawal on April 6th of permission to use a privacy curtain, and (iii) the denials of her requests for accommodation. Solomon is correct with respect to her first argument, but not the other two.
Solomon contends that her supervisors withdrew her de facto flexible schedule, forbidding her to work late, in retaliation either for her filing of a formal EEO complaint eleven days earlier or for the accommodation requests she made. The Secretary responds by stating that the decision not to let her work late on April 23rd was made by temporary supervisors who were unaware of any informal arrangements Solomon might have had with her regular supervisors, did not 23 know about the formal complaint, and were advised by human resources to have her follow standard policy and work normal duty hours. While it would not be unreasonable for the trier of fact to accept that explanation, the question at this juncture is whether the record forecloses any other plausible conclusion. It does not. First, Solomon came forward with “evidence discrediting” the Department’s proffered explanation for the refusal to let her work late. See Jones, 557 F.3d at 680. While the Secretary relied on the temporary status of the April 23rd decisionmakers and their alleged ignorance of Solomon’s circumstances, Solomon showed—through French’s deposition and emails among management officials—that her permanent supervisor (French) ratified and formalized the revocation of her permission to work late after consulting with Human Resources Chief Arleen Christian. Christian was a permanent employee long familiar with Solomon’s situation, and French received an email from Solomon discussing her prior arrangement several days before he ratified the decision to revoke it. Thus, Solomon casts doubt on the Secretary’s proffered justification, and “we do not routinely require plaintiffs ‘to submit evidence over and above rebutting the employer’s stated explanation in order to avoid summary judgment.’” Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)). Second, Solomon’s evidence that another budget analyst had been allowed to work hours outside of her normal duty schedule and similar to those Solomon had been working would allow a jury to find that the Secretary’s they-were-justfollowing-policy justification was pretextual. Even the district court thought it “odd that Solomon’s supervisors 24 voiced their objection not to her absence but to her presence, especially if other employees were permitted to work late.” Solomon, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 73. Such pretext evidence “‘usually’ is itself sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to infer retaliation.” Jones, 557 F.3d at 681 (quoting George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). Indeed, “a plaintiff’s discrediting of an employer’s stated reason for its employment decision is entitled to considerable weight.” Aka, 156 F.3d at 1290; see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (“In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose.”). Accordingly, we hold that Solomon came forward with sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment on her claim that the revocation of her permission to work late was retaliatory. In so doing, we join our sister circuits in holding that the act of requesting in good faith a reasonable accommodation is a protected activity under 42 U.S.C. § 12203, which is incorporated into the Rehabilitation Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 791(g). 6 Cf. Mayers v. Laborers’ Health & 6 See, e.g., A.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Shelby County Board of Educ., 711 F.3d 687, 698 (6th Cir. 2013); Cassimy v. Board of Educ., 461 F.3d 932, 938 (7th Cir. 2006); Coons v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 887 (9th Cir. 2004); Heisler v. Metropolitan Council, 339 F.3d 622, 632 (8th Cir. 2003); Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 191 (3d Cir. 2003); Wright v. CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472, 477 (1st Cir. 2003); Weixel v. Board of Educ., 287 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2002); Haulbrook v. Michelin N. America, 252 F.3d 696, 706 (4th Cir. 2001); Selenke v. Medical Imaging of Colorado, 248 F.3d 1249, 1265 (10th Cir. 2001); Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1328 (11th Cir. 1998); see also EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 620 n.9 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting 25 Safety Fund, 478 F.3d 364, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (assuming that accommodation requests are a protected activity under the Americans with Disabilities Act). Solomon also presses as an additional theory of retaliation the temporal proximity of her filing of a formal EEO complaint on April 12th to the revocation eleven days later of her ability to work late. But that complaint involved the absent-without-leave incident with Lawrence, who was out of the office on April 23rd and the ensuing weeks when French ratified the decision to prohibit Solomon from working late. Therefore, a reasonable jury could not find that the April 12th EEO filing motivated Christian’s and French’s decision to revoke Solomon’s permission to work late. For that reason, Solomon’s surviving retaliation claim is that her requests for accommodation motivated her supervisors to revoke her permission to work late.
Solomon’s claim that the April 6th order to remove her privacy curtain was retaliatory does not survive summary judgment. The Secretary came forward with a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for that action, pointing to Lawrence’s expressed concern with keeping the entrances to cubicle work spaces free from obstruction. Solomon has no answer to that justification other than the order’s temporal proximity to her informal attempt to resolve uniformity among the circuits that have decided the issue); 9 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 154.10, at p. 154105 & n.25 (2d ed. 2014) (“In addition to the activities specifically protected by the statute, courts have found that requesting reasonable accommodation is a protected activity.”). 26 her complaint with Lawrence’s superior. While Solomon points out that her then-supervisor, Booth, had allowed her to install the curtain, it was Lawrence, not Booth, who ordered the curtain’s removal. Solomon neither contends nor evidences that Lawrence knew Booth had authorized its installation. Nor does Solomon point to any evidence suggesting that Lawrence’s safety justification was pretextual, such as evidence that other employees had similar obstructions in the entrances to their cubicles. Because Solomon lacks “positive evidence beyond mere proximity,” she has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the motive for the ordered removal was safety or retaliation. Woodruff, 482 F.3d at 530.
Solomon’s remaining retaliation claims cannot survive summary judgment. For each allegedly retaliatory denial of an accommodation request, the Secretary came forward with evidence of a legitimate, non-retaliatory justification that Solomon has left unanswered. Specifically, with respect to Solomon’s request for advance sick leave, the Secretary explained that her request did not comply with agency policy because it failed to indicate when or whether she would be able to return to work. Plus Solomon was provided with unlimited leave without pay and participation in the leave donor program instead. Solomon also presses the requested relocation of her cubicle. The Department of Agriculture never had a chance to process that request, however, because Solomon made it six weeks before she left work on April 23rd and never returned. 27 Finally, Solomon points to her requests in late May to telecommute or to work part-time. But for that period of time, correspondence from Solomon herself and Dr. Cozzens led Solomon’s supervisors to believe that her condition had deteriorated to the point that she was medically unable to work in any capacity. Even if the supervisors incorrectly assessed Solomon’s condition, and the Department was thus obligated to provide reasonable accommodation, Solomon must still present evidence casting doubt on the sincerity of the Department’s proffered non-retaliatory justification for its action. “Once the employer has articulated a non- discriminatory explanation for its action   , the issue is not the correctness or desirability of the reasons offered but whether the employer honestly believes in the reasons it offers.” See Fischbach v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Corrections, 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citation and internal punctuation omitted). In response to those explanations, Solomon offers only conclusory statements, Solomon Reply Br. 32, devoid of citation to the record, and from which no reasonable jury could make the desired inference that the Secretary’s “justifications were mere pretext,” Smith v. District of Columbia, 430 F.3d 450, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2005), or that a retaliatory reason “more likely motivated” his actions, PardoKronemann, 601 F.3d at 604 (internal quotation marks omitted).