Opinion ID: 2635034
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of K.S.A. 60-1507 Motion Counsel

Text: The extent of a movant's statutory right to effective assistance of counsel during a K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding is a question of law over which this court has previously exercised unlimited review. See Brown v. State, 278 Kan. 481, 483, 101 P.3d 1201 (2004); Campbell v. State, 34 Kan.App.2d 8, 114 P.3d 162 (2005). As a preliminary matter, we note that Robertson raises this issue for the first time on appeal. This court has held that a constitutional challenge to an attorney's performance must first be raised in the district court, either via a collateral attack or on remand during direct appeal, for determination of the issue. See State v. Mann, 274 Kan. 670, 691, 56 P.3d 212 (2002). This is not necessarily true, however, when the challenge addresses a statutory right to counsel or when it deals with an attorney's performance on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. See Brown, 278 Kan. at 483, 101 P.3d 1201 (no suggestion that argument must have been raised below). Several Court of Appeals cases addressing this threshold issue have reasoned that, as long as the record is sufficient or the claim clearly without merit, an appellate court may consider the quality of the assistance provided by K.S.A. 60-1507 counsel for the first time on appeal. See State v. Paredes, 34 Kan.App.2d 346, 348-49, 118 P.3d 708, rev. denied 280 Kan. 989 (2005) (record sufficient); Rice v. State, No. 95,659, 2007 WL 3341738, unpublished Court of Appeals opinion filed November 9, 2007 (record sufficient); Corwin v. State, No. 95,554, 2007 WL 1413090, unpublished Court of Appeals opinion filed May 11, 2007, rev. denied 285 Kan. ___ (record sufficient); Stephens v. State, No. 93,834, 2006 WL 903156, unpublished Court of Appeals opinion filed April 7, 2006 (claim without merit). Because the quality of the assistance provided to Robertson by his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion counsel is determinable on the transcript of the nonevidentiary hearing included in the record on appeal in this case, we are able to address this issue without remand to the district court. There is no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in an action pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507. Brown, 278 Kan. at 483, 101 P.3d 1201 (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 [1987]). However, there is a conditional right to counsel protected by statute. State v. Andrews, 228 Kan. 368, 375, 614 P.2d 447 (1980); see K.S.A. 22-4506(b) (If the court finds that the petition or motion presents substantial questions of law or triable issues of fact and if the petitioner or movant has been or is thereafter determined to be an indigent person..., the court shall appoint counsel ... to assist such person....). Once this statutory right to counsel attaches, a movant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel. Appointment of counsel in a K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding should not be a useless formality. Brown, 278 Kan. at 484-85, 101 P.3d 1201 (overruling, e.g., McCarty v. State, 32 Kan. App.2d 402, 83 P.3d 249 [2004]; Robinson v. State, 13 Kan.App.2d 244, 248-50, 767 P.2d 851, rev. denied 244 Kan. 738 [1989]; see also Holt v. Saiya, 28 Kan.App.2d 356, 362, 17 P.3d 368 [2000]; Foy v. State, 17 Kan.App.2d 775, 844 P.2d 744, rev. denied 252 Kan. 1091 [1993]). In Brown, the district court appointed counsel to represent Charles D. Brown at a hearing on his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Counsel failed to advise Brown of the appointment or the hearing, did not notify Brown of the district court's subsequent denial of the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, and did not advise Brown of his right to appeal. Two years later, when Brown learned the fate of his motion, he attempted to appeal the dismissal. On appeal from the denial of Brown's motion to appeal out-of-time, this court held that, by failing to notify Brown of the outcome of the K.S.A. 60-1507 hearing, Brown's counsel had failed to meet the most minimal of standards of effectiveness. Brown, 278 Kan. at 484, 101 P.3d 1201. The court declined to conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the district court had properly denied the motion on its merits. Noting that Brown had no remedy whatsoever other than an out-of-time appeal, the court reversed and remanded to the district court with instructions to allow the appeal to be filed and promptly forwarded the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the denial of Brown's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion on its merits. Brown, 278 Kan. at 485-86, 101 P.3d 1201. In this case, Robertson's motion counsel's performance was comparable to the performance of counsel in Brown. We acknowledge that the district judge may have contributed to some confusion regarding counsel's role, appearing to suggest that counsel needed to act and could act as a reserve arbiter of the motion, files, and records for the court as much as an advocate for the indigent client. Any such suggestion was not correct. Once appointed, counsel for a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion must, within the stricture of required candor to the court and other ethical rules, pursue relief for the client. If this requires counsel to stand silent or merely to submit the case on the written arguments of that client, so be it. Counsel is simply not free to act merely as an objective assistant to the court or to argue against his or her client's position. That is, unfortunately, what counsel for Robertson did here and what we specifically prohibited in Brown. This brings us to the question of prejudice. Nowhere in the Brown opinion did this court discuss a prejudice requirement when a K.S.A. 60-1507 movant has demonstrated ineffective assistance of motion counsel. But, in Brown, the existence of legal prejudice was obvious because counsel's poor performance led to a complete forfeiture of Brown's right to a timely appeal. See State v. Patton, 287 Kan. 200, 223-25, 195 P.3d 753 (2008) (discussing prejudice arising out of loss of timely direct appeal, standard to be applied when counsel responsible); Kargus v. State, 284 Kan. 908, 926, 169 P.3d 307 (2007) (discussing loss of timely petition for review, standard to be applied when counsel responsible). Shortly after Brown, our Court of Appeals mentioned prejudice in extending our holding. In Campbell, 34 Kan.App.2d 8, 114 P.3d 162, Campbell filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and was appointed counsel. The district judge held a nonevidentiary hearing without Campbell being present. Motion counsel presented a detailed, forceful, and effective argument against her client's position. 34 Kan.App.2d at 13, 114 P.3d 162. The panel's review of the record revealed certain legal issues appearing to warrant an evidentiary hearing, but it was not upon this basis that the panel remanded Campbell's motion for appointment of new counsel and an evidentiary hearing. Rather, the lynchpin and sole concern of the panel was that counsel's performance did not meet the most minimal of standards required of counsel appointed pursuant to K.S.A. 22-4506(b) to assist an indigent client. 34 Kan.App.2d at 13, 114 P.3d 162. The panel wrote: [W]e understand the Supreme Court's enunciation of a statutory right to effective counsel in K.S.A. 60-1507 proceedings in Brown was extended to an egregious instance of ineffectiveness of counsel that resulted in a highly prejudicial outcome. We view the ineffectiveness in Brown as highly prejudicial as it is extraordinary because, unless remedied, it foreclosed a right to appeal. Similarly, in the case before us, court-appointed counsel's advocacy against her client's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion seriously prejudiced Campbell's legal position and, in essence, compelled the district court's adverse judgment. As a result, we believe the Supreme Court's precedent enunciated in Brown is applicable to Campbell's unique factual situation. 34 Kan.App.2d at 13-14, 114 P.3d 162. Thus, the Campbell panel applied Brown to a situation in which appointed counsel's performance did not lead to a complete forfeiture of a proceeding but in which counsel advocated against an indigent K.S.A. 60-1507 movant's position. This was enough to make counsel's conduct egregiously ineffective and highly prejudicial. 34 Kan.App.2d at 14, 114 P.3d 162. Since Campbell, other decisions of the Court of Appeals, including the one by the panel in this case, have seized on its reference to prejudice to apply a two-prong test familiar from constitutional claims regarding ineffective assistance of trial and direct appeal counsel to challenges based on the performance of K.S.A. 60-1507 counsel. In fact, the analytical effect of these decisions on the difference between evaluation of counsel that is constitutionally required versus evaluation of counsel that is only statutorily provided for has appeared to be an inflation of the degree of prejudice required for relief in the case of 60-1507 counsel. For example, in Corwin v. State, No. 95,554, 2007 WL 1413090, the Court of Appeals referred to the two-prong constitutional test for ineffective assistance of counsel, citing State v. Mathis, 281 Kan. 99, 109-10, 130 P.3d 14 (2006); it required a showing that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance resulted in legal prejudice. It then stated that, when a movant asserts that his or her K.S.A. 60-1507 counsel was ineffective, the movant must meet a higher standard, and must show: (1) an egregious act that results in (2) a highly prejudicial outcome. Corwin, slip op. at 3 (citing Campbell ); see also Rice v. State, No. 95,659, slip op. at 4 (tepid representation of K.S.A. 60-1507 counsel might constitute ineffective assistance; movant failed to show prejudice; motion successive, untimely; on appeal, no credible argument to support a finding of manifest injustice ... or exceptional circumstances); Garnes v. State, No. 94,064, 2006 WL 1071614, unpublished Court of Appeals opinion filed April 21, 2006, rev. denied 282 Kan. 789, slip op. at 10 (on independent review after dismissal of K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, arguments presented in motion lacked merit; even with active advocate, claims would not have prevailed; petitioner failed to show prejudice from counsel's conduct at K.S.A. 60-1507 hearing); Stephens, No. 93,834, slip op. at 6-7, 2006 WL 903156 (noting claim of ineffective assistance of 60-1507 counsel not properly raised for first time on appeal; nevertheless, no remand necessary when independent review of record reveals no issues warranting evidentiary hearing). In this case, the Court of Appeals focused on Robertson's failure to establish prejudice as a result of his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion counsel's performance to uphold the district judge's decision. We agree that a showing of legal prejudice is required when the performance of statutorily provided counsel on a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is questioned. This is the sensible holding from both theoretical and practical perspectivestheoretical because we should not require a lesser showing from a litigant attempting to vindicate a statutory right than the showing demanded of a litigant attempting to vindicate a constitutional right, practical because reversal and/or remand when there has been no legal prejudice can usually be characterized as a profligate expenditure of scarce judicial resources. But we disagree with those Court of Appeals panels that have appeared to impose a more rigorous standard of prejudice than that imposed in constitutional cases. The required showing of prejudice is the same. In this case, no such prejudice can be demonstrated. As the above discussion of his original arguments and of those few that remain alive at this procedural juncture illustrates, there existed no substantial legal issues or triable issues of fact when motion counsel was appointed for Robertson. Indeed, had the district judge elected to refuse to appoint counsel, refuse any hearing, and summarily deny the motion, those decisions could easily have been affirmed on appeal. The motion, files, and records in this case demonstrated as a matter of law that Robertson was not entitled to K.S.A. 60-1507 relief. It is ironic that the district judge's abundance of caution resulted in a performance by unnecessary appointed counsel at an unnecessary nonevidentiary hearing that could not go unaddressed, at some length, by this court.