Opinion ID: 1805723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: cruel or unusual

Text: An obvious failing of the majority opinion is its apparent unwillingness to directly confront and explain the Florida Constitution's prohibition of cruel or unusual punishments and the ban of cruel and unusual punishments in the U.S. Constitution. [54] If the majority did so it would surely have to conclude that at the very least punishing someone by the direct application of lethal doses of electricity to various parts of the body is a highly unusual method of punishment, whether considered years ago when our constitutions were approved, or considered today. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has quoted with approval an opinion of the New York Court of Appeals characterizing electrocution as certainly unusual. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 443-44, 10 S.Ct. 930, 34 L.Ed. 519 (1890). Electrocution is simply not a usual form of punishment, and it cannot somehow be made usual by its continued use. If we were to allow an unusual punishment to become usual simply by its repeated usage then we simply would be editing out the ban on unusual punishments in the Florida Constitution. Determining whether electrocution is a cruel punishment requires more analysis. Arguably, for example, electrocution may not have been considered cruel when it was first introduced in the nineteenth century, because it was then compared to death by hanging and considered more humane than hanging. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly relied upon findings that electrocution would be more humane than hanging in refusing to interfere with New York's decision to abandon hanging (as a barbaric practice from the dark ages) in favor of the more humane electrocution. In re Kemmler. Based on the prevailing culture and knowledge at the time, and the urgency to do away with hanging, it is easy to understand why electrocution may not have been considered constitutionally cruel. However, just as electrocution may have been originally evaluated in comparison with hanging, we know today that the overwhelming majority of death penalty jurisdictions have long since rejected use of the electric chair and have turned to lethal injection as a more humane punishment. As noted above, In re Kemmler was decided in the context of a state's attempt to find a more humane means of death than hanging. However, it is also important to note that the case was decided before electrocution had actually been used. Because we know that lethal injection provides a more humane alternative, and, because we now know from actual experience that electrocution always involves mutilation (within and without the body) and a substantial risk of malfunction (including external burning, bleeding, asphyxiation, etc.), as well as a culture of cruelty (burn `em, fry `em), it is apparent that electrocution has become a cruel and senseless punishment, especially when evaluated in light of our evolving standards of decency. Hopefully, just as those who reflected back on the history of hanging at the close of the nineteenth century and concluded it was inhumane, we now, at the close of the twentieth century, have an even more informed and enlightened view of acceptable punishments upon which to evaluate death by electrocution. In Justice Shaw's opinion he again notes that for humane reasons we as a society have rejected the use of electrocution even for the killing of animals. That simple but eloquent observation perhaps speaks more directly to the heart of the issue before us than any other argument. In effect, we have found the killing of animals by electrocution to be inhumane and uncivilized. We know, as the State has candidly conceded, that the entire process of death by electrocution is at least somewhat ghastly. We also know, as aptly explained by Chief Justice Harding, that a more humane means of taking life is readily available to the State. Under those circumstances, our continuing embrace of a savage and inhumane means of taking life does a disservice to our justice system and our society. [55] SHAW, J., concurs. PARIENTE, J., dissenting. I write to explain the reasons I am compelled to dissent in this case. The subject of the debate presented by this case is not whether the death penalty is a constitutionally permissible punishment for those in this State who commit the most aggravated and least mitigated crimes, such as Allen Lee Davis and Thomas Provenzano. Thus, this case does not have to do with the legislative prerogative to specify the punishment for the crimewhether it be death, life in prison, or a sentence of a definite number of years in prison. Rather, the subject of the legal debate before this Court solely concerns the scope of the legislative prerogative to select one method of execution over another. Thus, the issue in this case is not whether Provenzano should be executed; only how he should be executed. [56] It is without question that the legislative prerogative to choose a given method of execution must be judged by the prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment found in the Florida and federal constitutions. See U.S. Const., amend. VIII; art. I, § 17, Fla. Const. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 130, 133, 25 L.Ed. 345 (1878), although the legislative branch may define crimes and prescribe the punishment of the offenders, this power is subject to the prohibition of the Constitution that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. (Emphasis supplied.) Almost one hundred years later, this principle was reiterated: It seems conceded by all that the Amendment imposes some obligations on the judiciary to judge the constitutionality of punishment and that there are punishments that the Amendment would bar whether legislatively approved or not. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313-14, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (White, J., concurring)). [57] [T]he Constitution contemplates that in the end [a court's] own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of a challenged punishment, guided by objective factors to the maximum possible extent. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 597, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (plurality opinion). Thus, the Court must exercise its own judgment as to whether a method of execution is cruel and unusual in order to enforce the requirement of the Eighth Amendment that cruel and unusual punishment not be inflicted. To determine whether electrocution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, we must first consider what the United States Supreme Court has considered to be the purpose and scope of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. As explained in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958), the Eighth Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. Perhaps the most concise discussion of the scope of the Eighth Amendment is set forth in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976): It suffices to note that the primary concern of the drafters [of the Eighth Amendment] was to proscribe torture(s) and other barbar(ous) methods of punishment. Accordingly, this Court first applied the Eighth Amendment by comparing challenged methods of execution to concededly inhuman techniques of punishment.... Our more recent cases, however, have held that the Amendment proscribes more than physically barbarous punishments. The Amendment embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency ..., against which we must evaluate penal measures. Thus, we have held repugnant to the Eighth Amendment punishments which are incompatible with the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society or which involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Id. at 102, 97 S.Ct. 285 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). This clause has an expansive and vital character. Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1083, 105 S.Ct. 2159, 85 L.Ed.2d 514 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting Weems v. United States 217 U.S. 349, 377, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910)). [T]he Amendment has been interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171, 96 S.Ct. 2909. As concepts of civility and dignity evolve, so do the limits of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See Dulles, 356 U.S. at 100, 78 S.Ct. 590. Accordingly, Eighth Amendment issues must be evaluated in light of contemporary human knowledge, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962), rather than in reliance on century-old factual premises that may no longer be accurate. Glass, 471 U.S. at 1083, 105 S.Ct. 2159 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). These broad statements of constitutional principles apply with equal force to determine the legality of a method of execution. See Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119, 1121, 114 S.Ct. 2125, 128 L.Ed.2d 682 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (explaining that the United States Supreme Court has never distinguished between challenges to the proportionality and method of capital punishment). In holding that the absence of conscious pain after the electrical current is administered ends the judicial inquiry into whether electrocution is unconstitutional, the majority decision in this case relies on our opinion in Jones v. State, 701 So.2d 76, 79 (Fla.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1014, 118 S.Ct. 1297, 140 L.Ed.2d 335 (1998). Jones in turn cites to Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), Louisiana ex. rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 67 S.Ct. 374, 91 L.Ed. 422 (1947), and Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.1994). However, no such narrow and conclusive statement can be derived from those cases. The fact that the method of execution may result in instantaneous death, while an important factor to consider, does not end the judicial inquiry into whether the method of punishment is cruel and unusual. Analyzing the constitutionality of punishment under the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court in Gregg also stated that a penalty also must accord with `the dignity of man,' which is the `basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.' 428 U.S. at 173, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (quoting Dulles, 356 U.S. at 100, 78 S.Ct. 590). Further, the Campbell decision relied on the following statement in Glass: What are the objective factors by which courts should evaluate the constitutionality of a challenged method of punishment? First and foremost, the Eighth Amendment prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 173[, 96 S.Ct. 2909], (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). See also Coker v. Georgia, supra, at 592[, 97 S.Ct. 2861], (plurality opinion) (a punishment is excessive if it is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463[, 67 S.Ct. 374, 91 L.Ed. 422] (1947) (The traditional humanity of modern Anglo-American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of the death sentence). The Court has never accepted the proposition that notions of deterrence or retribution might legitimately be served through the infliction of pain beyond that which is minimally necessary to terminate an individual's life. Glass, 471 U.S. at 1084, 105 S.Ct. 2159 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (emphasis supplied), cited in Campbell, 18 F.3d at 682. However, Campbell failed to cite to the remainder of Justice Brennan's explanation in Glass that the contours of the Eighth Amendment extend beyond whether there is conscious pain inherent in the method of execution: The Eighth Amendment's protection of the dignity of man, Trop v. Dulles, supra, at 100[, 78 S.Ct. 590], (plurality opinion), extends beyond prohibiting the unnecessary infliction of pain when extinguishing life. Civilized standards, for example, require a minimization of physical violence during execution irrespective of the pain that such violence might inflict on the condemned. See, e.g., Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953 Report ¶ 732, p. 255 (1953) (hereinafter Royal Commission Report). Similarly, basic notions of human dignity command that the State minimize mutilation and distortion of the condemned prisoner's body. Ibid. These principles explain the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of such barbaric practices as drawing and quartering. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, supra, at 135. Glass, 471 U.S. at 1085, 105 S.Ct. 2159 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Thus, the Eighth Amendment also requires that the method of execution minimize physical violence as well as mutilation and distortion of the human body. Therefore, my conclusion differs from the majority because I fail to see how United States Supreme Court precedent allows us to limit our constitutional inquiry to the presence or absence of conscious pain. Even the concurring opinion of Justice Quince recognizes that the real question is whether electrocution violates the evolving standards of decency. Concurring opinion of Quince, J., at 420. In apparent recognition that the constitutional inquiry is not so limited, the State conceded in oral argument that the guillotine would not pass constitutional muster today, even though it most likely results in an instantaneous death without the defendant suffering conscious pain. No one seriously disagrees that as of the end of the twentieth century, lethal injection is a more humane method of execution and creates far less a spectacle than electrocution. It is less physically violent and minimizes mutilation of the body. No one seriously disagrees that electrocution was originally selected by the State of New York in 1885 in lieu of hanging because at that time the executive and legislative branches affirmatively determined that electrocution was the most humane and practical method known to modern science of carrying into effect the sentence of death in capital cases. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444, 10 S.Ct. 930, 34 L.Ed. 519 (1890). There is no indication that the legislative decision in 1999 to retain electrocution, contrary to the recommendations of the Florida Corrections Commission, was based on objective evidence that this method was more humane than lethal injection or other alternative methods. [58] The Legislature does not have the prerogative to select a method of execution that is inherently cruel, violent and mutilating when more humane methods exist. The State's only legitimate interest is in the extinguishment of life. Indeed, the State has not made the argument in this case that the Legislature has the right to make the execution more violent and more cruel than necessary to extinguish the lives of those sentenced to death. In determining whether electrocution comports with evolving standards of decency, we should consider the fact the Florida Corrections Commission recommended that the electric chair be phased out as a method of execution in favor of lethal injection because it believes that Florida has an obligation to ensure that modern technologies keep pace with the level of competence in this area, and, just as changes have occurred in Florida's past in carrying out the death penalty, changes should again occur. Jones, 701 So.2d at 82 (Kogan, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Florida Corrections Comm'n, Supplemental Report on Execution Methods Used by States (1997)). We cannot ignore the objective evidence that almost every state that authorizes the death penalty has either selected or changed its method to lethal injection some in response to the botched executions of Medina and Tafero. While the fact that only three other states (Georgia, Alabama, and Nebraska [59] ) retain electrocution as the sole method of execution is not determinative of the constitutional question, this fact bears on the exercise of the Court's judgment as to whether the method of punishment violates contemporary standards of decency. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 172-76, 96 S.Ct. 2909. In addition, we must look at the actual experience in recent years with the electric chair. Recent executions have revealed one problem after another. [60] Flames spewed from the heads of Medina and Tafero. See Jones, 701 So.2d at 85-86. The cause was found to be an improper sponge. See id. at 86. After two flaming executions, the sponges were replaced and the flames ceased. However, it is undisputed that despite all of the best efforts, electrocution will result in burning of parts of the body. In fact, all of the inmates in the last executions have sustained outward burns to their bodies. Thus, burning is inherent in the method of the execution. It is undisputed that, despite all best efforts, inmates have been observed breathing after the electric current has ceased. This indicates that brain stem activity has continued even after the application of electrical current. Now with the last execution, there is a serious question as to whether the mouth piece partially asphyxiated Davis, which resulted in bloody side showa spectacle more befitting of a B Hollywood horror movie than a state-sanctioned execution. Although a factual finding has been made by two different circuit court judges that Florida's electric chair causes no conscious pain, these factual findings need only be made by a preponderance of the evidence. Despite our deferential standard of review to trial court's factual findings, the expert testimony submitted by Provenzano and the witness accounts of survival after electrocution raise serious questions that judicial electrocution does in fact involve conscious pain and suffering. See generally Glass, 471 U.S. at 1086-87, 105 S.Ct. 2159 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (There is considerable empirical evidence and eyewitness testimony ... [that] suggests that death by electrical current is extremely violent and inflicts pain and indignities far beyond the `mere extinguishment of life.'). We cannot simply ignore this evidence. As Justice Brennan observed, [I]t is firmly within the `historic process of constitutional adjudication' for courts to consider, through a `discriminating evaluation' of all available evidence, whether a particular means of carrying out the death penalty is `barbaric' and unnecessary in light of currently available alternatives. Id. at 1084, 105 S.Ct. 2159 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 420, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (Powell, J., dissenting)) (emphasis supplied). [61] All of this leads to the conclusion that this method of execution does not comport with evolving standards of decency, Trop, 356 U.S. at 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, based on an evaluation of objective factors. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861. The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464, 67 S.Ct. 374 (emphasis supplied). Certainly, knowledge of death involves fear, which is inevitable with all impending executions. However, all of the other troubling aspects of recent electrocutionsthe flames, the blood, the screams, the burning, and the resulting spectacle of the actual execution indicate to me that there is cruelty, violence and mutilation inherent in this method of execution. In enacting the Eighth Amendment, the founders of this Nation determined that, as a civilized nation, we would not allow the State to become the instrument of cruelty and violence in the methods chosen to punish those who violated the law. This enduring constitutional principle applies no matter how great our desire as individuals for vengeance and no matter how cruel, how ghastly, or how violently the innocent victims died. We do not have to wait another fifty years to determine that in 1999, electrocution is not only unusual, since only three states including Florida currently execute its death-sentenced offenders solely by electrocution, but it is also inherently cruel as involving mutilation and violence. Electrocution, as a method of carrying out the State's legitimate interest in imposing the ultimate penalty of death, has become incompatible with the concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency that embody the essence of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102, 97 S.Ct. 285. History and this Court's recent experience with the electric chair all point to this inevitable conclusion. Just as the guillotine, public hanging and death by firing squad would be deemed barbaric relics of another era, so must electrocution be declared unconstitutional as violative of the Eighth Amendment's clear prohibition that cruel and unusual punishment not be inflicted. ANSTEAD, J., concurs.