Opinion ID: 584586
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Atkinson's Proposed Instructions

Text: 26 Atkinson proposed two additional jury instructions. First, he asked for an instruction clarifying the meaning of taking game under Montana law. Second, he sought an instruction on the requirements for tagging deer in Montana. He contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give either of these proposed instructions. 27 A defendant is entitled to an instruction concerning his theory of the case if it is supported by law and has some foundation in the evidence. United States v. Echeverry, 759 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir.1985). Here, neither instruction was relevant to the issues presented at trial. Consequently, the trial court did not err in rejecting them. 5 SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 28 Atkinson argues that the evidence presented was insufficient to support his convictions for conspiring to violate the Lacey Act. He also contends that the evidence failed to show he sold or transported wildlife in interstate commerce as required under the Act. 29 In deciding whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the government to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). A. Conspiracy 30 The elements of [a] conspiracy are (1) an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective, (2) coupled with one or more acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose, and (3) the requisite intent to commit the underlying substantive offense. United States v. Pemberton, 853 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.1988). The agreement giving rise to a conspiracy need not be explicit. United States v. Thomas, 887 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir.1989). 31 There was ample evidence of a conspiracy among Atkinson, Bacon and Nelson. Bacon and Nelson expressly agreed with Atkinson to provide guide services for unlicensed hunters. Further, they agreed to sell their own deer tags to these hunters in violation of Montana law. 32 Atkinson also conspired with the hunters who accompanied him to Montana. Atkinson agreed to guide these hunters knowing they were not legally authorized to hunt game. On the few occasions he was questioned about the need for hunting licenses, he either arranged to provide the hunters with fake licenses or encouraged them to hunt without licenses. He also agreed to conduct illegal nighttime hunts. Finally, he plotted with at least three hunters to unlawfully mistag their kills. 33 Given this evidence, a reasonable jury could have found that Atkinson conspired to violate the Lacey Act. B. Interstate Transport 34 Atkinson also argues the evidence failed to show he either sold or transported wildlife in interstate commerce as required under the Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A). We disagree. 35 At the end of each hunt, Atkinson either arranged to ship the deer carcasses to hunters' homes outside the State of Montana, or assisted the hunters in these shipments. This satisfies the Act's interstate commerce requirement. See United States v. Gay-Lord, 799 F.2d 124, 126 (4th Cir.1986) (Lacey Act satisfied when defendant knew that [wildlife] would be transported in interstate commerce and took the steps that began their travel to interstate markets). 6 SENTENCING GUIDELINES 36 Atkinson argues that the district court improperly increased his base offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines for: (1) committing an offense under the Lacey Act involving wildlife with a market value in excess of $20,000 (section 2Q2.1); (2) acting as the organizer of a criminal activity involving five or more participants (section 3B1.1); and (3) obstructing justice (section 3C1.1). A. Sentencing Guideline § 2Q2.1 37 Sentencing Guideline § 2Q2.1(b)(3)(A) provides for an increase in a defendant's base offense level for smuggling or unlawfully dealing in wildlife with a market value greater than $2,000. The amount of this increase is determined by reference to the table at section 2F1.1. When the market value of game exceeds $20,000, the table requires an increase of four levels. The district court found that the aggregate market value of the deer in this case was $21,000. 38 Atkinson argues that section 2Q2.1 is inapplicable because deer are not specially protected wildlife. He also contends that even if deer are specially protected, the market value of the deer taken did not justify the four-level increase imposed by the trial court. 39 Atkinson's argument that section 2Q2.1 does not apply to ordinary wildlife taken in violation of the Lacey Act is contrary to the history of the section. Prior to November 1, 1989, the Guidelines contained two separate provisions dealing with the unlawful sale of wildlife. Section 2Q2.1 expressly applied only to specially protected animals, while section 2Q2.2 applied to all violations of the Lacey Act. On November 1, 1989, section 2Q2.2 was deleted and consolidated with section 2Q2.1. See U.S.S.G., app. C, amend. 209 (1990). Although the consolidated version of section 2Q2.1 initially retained the reference to specially protected wildlife, see U.S.S.G. § 2Q2.1 (1989), this language was deleted two years later, see U.S.S.G. § 2Q2.1 (1991). Atkinson contends that because he was sentenced before the reference to specially protected wildlife was deleted in 1991, 7 section 2Q2.1 cannot be used to enhance his sentence. We disagree. 40 We give substantial deference to a subsequent Guideline amendment when it plainly serves to clarify rather than change the existing law. United States v. Martinez, 946 F.2d 100, 102 (9th Cir.1991). It is clear from the commentary to the 1991 amendment that the deletion of the words specially protected clarified, rather than changed, section 2Q2.1(b)(3)(A). U.S.S.G., app. C, amend. 407 (1991) (this amendment removes language inadvertently retained when this guideline was consolidated with the former § 2Q2.2). This view is also supported by the 1990 commentary to section 2Q2.1(b)(3)(A). As this commentary shows, section 2Q2.1(b)(3)(A) was never intended to apply solely to specially protected wildlife after its consolidation. Rather, it was intended to apply to violations of several different animal protection statutes, including the Lacey Act. See U.S.S.G. § 2Q2.1 commentary (1990) ([t]his section applies to violations of the ... Lacey Act). We therefore conclude there is no distinction between specially protected wildlife and wildlife taken in violation of the Lacey Act under the consolidated version of section 2Q2.1. 41 Atkinson argues that even if this section applies, the market value of the deer in this case did not warrant a four-level increase in his sentence. The district court calculated the market value of the deer by multiplying Atkinson's standard outfitting fee ($1,500) by the number of deer killed (14). The result was a total market value of $21,000. As the district court correctly concluded, this corresponds to a four-level increase under section 2F1.1. B. Sentencing Guideline § 3B1.1(a) 42 Atkinson's sentence was enhanced four levels because the trial court found he organize[d] ... a criminal activity that involved five or more participants.... U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) (1990). Atkinson argues that his sentence was improperly increased under this section because none of the hunters qualified as a participant. 43 For purposes of section 3B1.1, [a] 'participant' is a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 Application Note 1 (1990); see also United States v. Anderson, 942 F.2d 606, 615 (9th Cir.1991) (participant under section 3B1.1 means criminally responsible person). 44 Each of the hunters was criminally responsible for illegally buying game in violation of the Lacey Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 3372(c)(2)(A) (buying guiding, outfitting or other services is a purchase of wildlife under the Act). Thus, even though none of the hunters was prosecuted, all twelve of them qualified as participants under Guideline section 3B1.1(a). 45 Finally, each of the four hunts involved Atkinson, 8 Wayne Bacon and Brian Nelson (the two guides/ranch owners), as well as at least two hunters. Thus, even if the four hunts are viewed as separate criminal activities, each involved five or more participants. C. Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.1 46 The district court also increased Atkinson's sentence because it found he obstructed justice by instructing Campbell and Brown to lie to federal agents during the investigation. Under section 3C1.1, a two-level increase is warranted where a defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation.... 47 Campbell testified that Atkinson contacted him several weeks after the hunt and told him not to speak with the police about his trip to Montana. Atkinson also helped Campbell concoct a story to tell the authorities if he was forced to discuss the hunt. He instructed Brown in the same manner. 48 The district court did not err in determining that Atkinson obstructed justice under section 3C1.1.