Opinion ID: 3064792
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Express Consent

Text: [11] Finally, the district court erred in granting summary judgment based upon Satterfield expressly consenting to receiving the message. While the TCPA exempts those calls “made with the prior express consent of the called party,” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), no express consent was given in this case. Express consent is “[c]onsent that is clearly and unmistakably stated.” Black’s Law Dictionary 323 (8th ed. 2004). Satterfield solely consented to receiving promotional material from Nextones or their affiliates and brands. The term “affiliate” carries its own, independent legal significance. “Affiliate refers to a ‘corporation that is related to another corporation by shareholdings or other means of control . . . .’ ” Delaware Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Christiana Care Health Servs., Inc., 892 A.2d 1073, 1077 (Del. 2006) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 59 (7th ed. 1999)). The plain and ordinary meaning of “affiliate”4 supports this definition as “a company effectively controlled by another or associated with others under common ownership or control.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 35 (2002). The record confirms that Nextones neither owns nor controls Simon & Schuster, nor can Nextones 4 See, e.g., McHugh v. United Service Auto. Ass’n, 164 F.3d 451, 455 (9th Cir. 1999) (unless contract terms are specifically different than common usage of the terms, comman usage will be adopted.) SATTERFIELD v. SIMON & SCHUSTER, INC. 7345 be considered a Simon & Schuster subisidiary. In fact, the record shows no direct contractual relationship between Nextones and Simon & Schuster.5 The district court also erred in granting summary judgment based on Satterfield’s consent to receive promotional materials by Nextones’ brands. The district court found there was “no dispute of fact that the promotional text message at issue was identified with a Nextones brand.” The district court’s conclusion is based solely on the fact that the message contained the phrase “PwdbyNexton.”6 We do not agree. Under this logic, any company sending a text message could simply include “PwdbyNexton” and it would be considered a “brand” of Nextones. Brand is not defined in the contract, therefore we look to its plain and ordinary meaning. Brand is commonly defined as “a class of goods identified as being the product of a single firm or manufacturer.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 268 (2002). The message was a product of Simon & Schuster, not Nextones. Nextones’s only role in this case was simply supplying the numbers to MIA, who in turn supplied the numbers to ipsh!. The record also shows no agreement between Nextones and Simon & Schuster. Therefore, Simon & Schuster is not a Nextones Brand. [12] Thus, Satterfield’s consent to receive promotional material by Nextones and its affilliates and brands cannot be read as consenting to the receipt of Simon & Schuster’s promotional material. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting summary judgment. 5 Nextones’ own website explains that its affiliates include other companies who “sell mobile content such as ringtones and graphics.” Simon & Schuster does not fall within Nextones’ own definition. 6 The district court assumes that, without any explanation, “PwdbyNexton” means “Powered by Nextones.” 7346 SATTERFIELD v. SIMON & SCHUSTER, INC.