Opinion ID: 2632228
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: testimony of keith d. burks

Text: (2) Whether, under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution, the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Keith D. Burks; and whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecuting attorneys to ask Mr. Burks on redirect examination, With the people that you hang out with, is it a good thing or a bad thing to be labeled a snitch? In this case, Appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Keith D. Burks concerning the events on the morning of January 25, 1997 as told to him by Co-defendant Wilson. He claims the hearsay statement made by Mr. Wilson to Mr. Burks, determined by the trial court to fall within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, [235] was not trustworthy and reliable. [236] In addition, Appellant argues Co-defendant Wilson's hearsay statement to Mr. Burks implicated him in violation of his right to confront the witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Washington Constitution article I, section 22. [237] A defendant may prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct upon showing the conduct of the prosecuting attorney was improper and had a prejudicial effect on the jury's verdict provided an objection is made and a curative instruction is requested unless such an instruction would not cure it. [238] Appellant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct for questioning Mr. Burks is without merit. A criminal defendant's rights under the confrontation clause are not violated when the relator of a hearsay statement admitted under the excited utterance exception is available for cross-examination as a witness under oath and whose demeanor, observations, and perceptions of the events that existed at the time the declarant's statement was made can be assessed by the trier of fact. [239] Contrary to Appellant's claims, the State argues the trial court properly admitted Mr. Burks' testimony in accord with its determination that the testimony constituted an excited utterance under ER 803(a)(2). [240] The State also asserts Mr. Burks' testimony did not offend Appellant's rights under the confrontation clause because the testimony fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule and was imbued with particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. [241] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... be confronted with the witnesses against him[.] Similarly, article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution provides: In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to ... meet the witnesses against him face to face[.] The federal confrontation clause under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is applicable to the states under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [242] A determination by the trial court that a hearsay statement falls within the excited utterance exception under ER 803(a)(2) will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. [243] Appellant relies upon State v. Brown [244] for the proposition that Co-defendant Wilson's statement to Mr. Burks was not trustworthy or reliable, and was improperly construed by the trial court as an excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. The State correctly argues this case is factually distinguishable from Brown. In Brown, the alleged rape victim reported to police authorities that she was abducted and raped. At a pretrial hearing, the trial court ruled the 911 tape of her telephone call was admissible as an excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. At trial, the victim testified she had lied to the police about being abducted because she thought they would not take the case seriously, knowing she was a prostitute and had agreed to meet with the defendant to commit fellatio for money. This Court reversed the defendant's conviction, concluding the trial court had abused its discretion in ruling the alleged victim's 911 telephone call was an excited utterance, holding that her testimony evidenced not only the opportunity to fabricate, but represented an actual fabrication of part of her story prior to making the 911 call. [245] In this case, there was no evidence that Co-defendant Wilson fabricated his statements to Mr. Burks. [246] In addition, Mr. Wilson's statement to Mr. Hubley does not impeach the credibility of his statement to Mr. Burks. Mr. Burks testified that Mr. Wilson told him he was on the porch when Appellant kicked in the front door to the Couch residence and began assaulting Ms. Couch. However, Mr. Wilson did not tell Mr. Burks he did not enter the home. He told him he was on the porch when Appellant kicked in the door. Mr. Burks testified at trial that he did not know whether Mr. Wilson went into the home. [247] Mr. Wilson later told Mr. Hubley on one occasion that he was inside the Couch residence. [248] Mr. Hubley's testimony does not contradict Mr. Wilson's statement to Mr. Burks because he did not deny to Mr. Burks that he went inside the home. The facts in this case are distinguishable from the facts in Brown. The hearsay rule precludes admission of out-of-court statements to prove the truth of the fact asserted, except as provided by the Rules of Evidence, court rules, or statute. [249] By definition, some out-of-court statements are not hearsay. [250] Even though hearsay, certain out-of-court statements are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. [251] Under ER 803(a) (2), the excited utterance exception provides: (a) Specific Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: .... (2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.[ [252] ] The excited utterance exception is based upon the theory that a statement made as a spontaneous reaction to the stress of a startling event offers little to no opportunity for misrepresentation or conscious fabrication. [253] A hearsay statement qualifies as an excited utterance under ER 803(a)(2) if (1) a startling event or condition occurred, (2) the statement was made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition, and (3) the statement relates to the event or condition. [254] Under these principles, the statements of Co-defendant Wilson to Mr. Burks qualify as an excited utterance. Appellant's brutal attack upon Ms. Couch was a startling event witnessed by Co-defendant Wilson. In his statement to Mr. Burks, he disclosed his own intention to rip the lady off, but was surprised as Appellant began to beat her and rub her all over. [255] Co-defendant Wilson's reaction to this unexpected turn of events was to leave the Couch residence within minutes of his arrival without taking any property. Appellant's attack upon Ms. Couch was a startling event creating stress for Co-defendant Wilson. The key to the second element is spontaneity. [256] Ideally, the statements should be made contemporaneously with or immediately after the startling event, because the opportunity for reflective thought and the danger of fabrication are minimized. [257] The longer the time period between the event and the statement, the greater the need for proof the declarant did not engage in reflective thought prior to making the statement. [258] In addition, other factors surrounding the startling event and the statement may be considered in determining whether the declarant was still under the effect of the excitement caused by the event. [259] In this case, the time interval between the startling event and the statement was brief. Only five to six minutes passed before Co-defendant Wilson appeared at the sliding glass door at the back of Appellant's residence and told Mr. Burks he left the Couch residence as soon as he realized what Appellant was doing to Ms. Couch. [260] It took Mr. Wilson only about two minutes to cross the street and knock on the back door. The opportunity for him to reflect on the statement was minimal and the evidence supports a conclusion he was under stress when he spoke to Mr. Burks. His appearance and demeanor support a conclusion he was still reacting to a startling event. [261] His statement explained the facts leading up to the event; Ms. Couch came down the stairs and Appellant beat her and rubbed her breasts; and he reacted to the event by leaving the Couch residence when he realized what Appellant was doing to Ms. Couch. The requirements for admissibility of an excited utterance as an exception to the hearsay rule under ER 803(a)(2) are satisfied under the evidence in this case since there was a startling event to which the statement related; and the spontaneity of the statement was preserved because the time between the event and the statement was sufficiently slight to ensure that when he made the statement to Mr. Burks, Mr. Wilson was still under the stress of witnessing Appellant's attack upon Ms. Couch. Appellant's emphasis upon the United States Supreme Court decision in Lilly v. Virginia , [262] in support of his argument that his rights under the confrontation clause were violated, is misplaced. [263] The State correctly asserts Co-defendant Wilson's statement to Mr. Burks did not violate Appellant's rights under the confrontation clause because the statement fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the excited utterance exception under ER 803(a)(2), and contained particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact. [264] When the State seeks to offer a declarant's hearsay statements against the accused, and the declarant is unavailable, courts must decide whether the Clause permits the [State] to deny the accused his usual right to force the declarant `to submit to cross examination[.]' [265] The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the Clause does not necessarily prohibit the admission of hearsay statements against a criminal defendant, even though the admission of such statements might be thought to violate the literal terms of the Clause. [266] The Supreme Court has indicated `a preference for face-to-face confrontation [with witnesses] at trial,' acknowledging that such confrontation is [not] an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to confront one's accusers. [267] The Supreme Court adheres to the general rule it articulated in Ohio v. Roberts [268] that admissibility of a hearsay statement does not offend the confrontation clause if [the statement] bears adequate `indicia of reliability.' Reliability can be inferred... where [the hearsay statement (1)] falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception [or (2) contains] particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. [269] A hearsay statement that qualifies for admission under a `firmly rooted' hearsay exception is so trustworthy that adversarial testing can be expected to add little to its reliability. [270] The Supreme Court has stated that the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule is a firmly rooted hearsay exception that carries sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the reliability requirements of the confrontation clause. [271] In this case, Co-defendant Wilson's statement to Mr. Burks is reliable because it falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the excited utterance exception under ER 803(a)(2), and does not offend Appellant's rights under the confrontation clause. While the Supreme Court has held the indicia of reliability of a co-defendant's confession, which implicated the nontestifying defendant, was sufficiently reliable under the Roberts test, [272] Appellant is correct in his assertion that the Court in Lilly v. Virginia concluded the admission of a nontestifying accomplice's confession in a trial against the defendant violated the defendant's rights under the confrontation clause. However, Lilly is distinguishable from the facts of this case. In Lilly v. Virginia [273] the confession of a nontestifying accomplice, which implicated the defendant, was admitted against the defendant in a separate trial on the grounds that it satisfied Virginia's statement against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule. [274] A plurality of four Justices relied upon the decisive fact, ... that accomplices' confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. [275] The Court in Lilly found unreliable an accomplice's confession obtained in police custody because of the accomplice's natural motive to attempt to exculpate himself. In a footnote, the Court referred to Dutton v. Evans [276] as the only exception to its unbroken line of cases holding that the admission of an accomplice's spontaneous comment that indirectly inculpated the defendant did not violate the Confrontation Clause. [277] The Court clarified its holding in Dutton by stating [w]hile Justice Stewart's plurality opinion observed that the declarant's statement was `against his penal interest,' the Court's judgment did not rest on that point, ... [r]ather, the five Justices in the majority emphasized the unique aspects of the case and emphasized that the co-conspirator spontaneously made the statement and `had no apparent reason to lie.' [278] The Supreme Court in Lilly specifically mentioned spontaneous declarations as an example of a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. [279] Similarly, this Court has determined that admission of a co-defendant's hearsay statement does not offend the confrontation clause if it falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. [280] The Roberts test requires that the hearsay exception be firmly rooted or contain particularized guaranties of trustworthiness. Because the excited utterance exception under ER 803(a)(2) is a firmly rooted hearsay exception, Co-defendant Wilson's statement to Mr. Burks satisfies the requirements of Roberts. Inquiry into whether the hearsay statement is trustworthy is not necessary. [281] In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the testimony of Keith D. Burks admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Admission of Mr. Burks' testimony at trial did not offend confrontation clause principles because the statement fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. Appellant's right to confront witnesses was not violated in this case. In addition, Appellant contends the trial court erred in allowing the prosecuting attorneys to ask Keith D. Burks on redirect examination, With the people that you hang out with, is it a good thing or a bad thing to be labeled a snitch? [282] Appellant argues [t]he defense objected to this question, but the trial court overruled the objection and allowed the State to ask it. [283] The State argues, to the contrary, that Appellant Davis did not object to the prosecuting attorney's question, nor to Mr. Burks' response, and only Co-defendant Wilson's counsel made an objection to the question at trial. [284] The State's version of the trial proceedings concerning this issue is correct. Appellant's counsel made no objection to the question it now argues was erroneously allowed. Without an objection, an evidentiary error is not preserved for appeal. [285] Appellant cannot rely upon the objection of a co-defendant's counsel to preserve an evidentiary error on appeal. [286] This issue is not properly raised before this Court. [287]