Opinion ID: 1621769
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assistance of CounselGuilty Pleas

Text: Roll claims that the motion court erred in denying post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was not that of a reasonably competent attorney, and that the defendant was thereby prejudiced. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). In order to show prejudice in a guilty plea case, a defendant must prove that, but for the errors of counsel, he would not have pled guilty and would have demanded trial. Id. If conviction results from a guilty plea, any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is immaterial except to the extent that it impinges the voluntariness and knowledge with which the plea was made. Hagan v. State, 836 S.W.2d 459, 463 (Mo. banc 1992). The motion court found that counsel was not ineffective, so review is limited to whether that court clearly erred. Rule 24.035(k); State v. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d 911, 922 (Mo. banc 1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 772, 136 L.Ed.2d 717 (1997). Findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous if, after a review of the entire record, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. Id.
Roll contends that his guilty plea was involuntary due to pressure and promises of his counsel, which deprived him of due process and effective assistance of counsel, and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. A guilty plea not only admits guilt but also consents to judgment of conviction without a jury trial. Hunter, 840 S.W.2d at 861. Accordingly, a guilty plea must be a voluntary expression of the defendant's choice, and a knowing and intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Id., citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). On the morning of the first day of trial, Roll attempted to plead guilty. Because he could not recall many aspects of the crimes, the judge refused to accept the pleas. Later that evening after trial had adjourned for the day, Roll again requested to plead guilty. After further inquiry, the court accepted the pleas. Roll contends that his counsel pressured him by promising him that if he pled guilty, he would not get the death penalty. Moreover, Roll asserts that before his second attempt to plead guilty, counsel coached him on acceptable answers to the judge's questions. The record at the second guilty plea hearing indicates otherwise: THE COURT: And finally in connection with this matter, do you understand that the ranges of punishment of the three offenses of murder in the first degree are that punishment is either life without probation or parole or the death penalty on each one of those three charges ...? ROLL: Yes, your honor.       THE COURT: Now I need to be absolutely sure of this fact. Have you in any way been led to believe that this Court would be more lenient on you if you entered a plea of guilty? ROLL: No, I have not. THE COURT: Have you in any way been promised any particular result in this case? ROLL: No, I have not. THE COURT: You understand that the full range of punishments is available to the Court and that the Court on the basis of the pre-sentence investigation, the sentencing hearing and what other factor, whatever other factors that the Court might consider would have to reach a decision in this case if I elected to accept your plea of guilty? ROLL: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Do you understand that? ROLL: Yes, I do. THE COURT: Do you in any way hold or harbor any kind of feeling that you're entering a plea of guilty will in some way ensure you that possibly the ultimate punishment would not be imposed? Do you in any way believe that? ROLL: No, your honor.       THE COURT: Is that a fair statement of what he's also told you? Now, I don't want a defendant to leave this courtroom and then later come back into the courtroom and say, The only reason I pled guilty was because my attorney threatened me, pressured me or coerced me into this plea. Has Mr. McManaman or his assistant over there in any way pressured you into making, entering these pleas of guilty? ROLL: No, your honor. THE COURT: Have they in any way threatened you or coerced you into entering these pleas of guilty? ROLL: No, your honor. The trial court found that the pleas are freely and voluntarily entered with understanding of nature of charges, ranges of punishment and consequences thereof. Court further finds that factual basis exists for said pleas and that same are not the product of fear, threats, or coercion. In addition, Roll later stated that he had no complaints about the way counsel had represented him. See Rule 29.07(b)(4). At the evidentiary hearing, Roll's trial counsel testified that after Roll expressed his desire to plead guilty, they discussed its pros and cons. After this discussion, Roll decided to plead guilty. Critically, Roll did not testify at the evidentiary hearing that he was pressured or coerced in any way. Roll did maintain that counsel promised him he would not receive the death penalty; counsel denied making such a promise. While an individual may proclaim he had a certain belief and may subjectively believe it, if it was unreasonable for him to entertain such a belief at the time of the plea proceeding, relief should not be granted. McMahon v. State, 569 S.W.2d 753, 758 (Mo. banc 1978). Because the guilty plea record is clear and because the motion court found trial counsel believable and Roll unbelievable, the motion court's determination was not clearly erroneous. In the alternative, Roll asserts that his guilty pleas were not knowing, voluntary and intelligent because counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him one way or the other whether he should plead guilty. Roll did not raise this claim in his pro se or amended motions for post-conviction relief. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on appeal following a post-conviction relief hearing are procedurally barred. State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 386 (Mo. banc 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1414, 131 L.Ed.2d 299 (1995).
Roll claims that his counsel did not adequately investigate and thus failed to: (i) raise a defense of diminished capacity based on mental disease or defect; (ii) present expert testimony during the penalty phase regarding Roll's twenty-year treatment for chronic pain and the effects of LSD; and (iii) apply for funds for expert witnesses. Roll asserts prejudice because if counsel had properly investigated and advised him, he would not have pled guilty. The terms `mental disease or defect' do not include alcoholism without psychosis or drug abuse without psychosis.... § 552.010. For counsel to be ineffective in failing to investigate a mental disease or defect defense, Roll must show facts indicating a questionable mental condition. State v. Richardson, 923 S.W.2d 301, 328 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 403, 136 L.Ed.2d 317 (1996). Absent some suggestion of mental instability, counsel has no duty to initiate an investigation of the accused's mental condition. Id. The need for an investigation is not indicated where a defendant has the present ability to consult rationally with counsel and to understand the proceedings. Id. A neuropharmacologist testified at the evidentiary hearing that Roll was psychotic on the night of the murders based upon the ingestion of LSD (though he first examined Roll nearly two years after the murders). A neuropsycologist also testified that Roll was not then in control of himself or able to make any kind of decision in a normal fashion (though he, too, first examined Roll nearly two years after the murders). Roll's counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did consider a mental disease or defect defense, but rejected it for several reasons. First, during initial interviews, Roll said he knew nothing about the murders. After counsel confronted him with police reports of his involvement, Roll indicated that he had only waited outside while Rhodes and Browne committed the murders. Since Roll denied committing the murders, counsel had no reason to pursue a mental disease or defect defense, because it was inconsistent with the theory that the other defendants not Rollcommitted the murders. Second, counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he spoke with Dr. Agnew, a psychologist whofor three years before the murderstreated Roll for chronic pain and depression. Dr. Agnew testified at the evidentiary hearing that every time he saw Rollincluding five days before the murdershe was sane and never revealed any signs of psychosis from drugs or mental disease. Dr. Agnew further testified that he told Roll's counsel that we had no history of Gary Roll ever experiencing any psychotic symptoms, and that Roll was competent every time I saw him. Third, counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that on the eve of trial, Roll told him that he had committed the murders and wanted to plead guilty. Based on these conversations, counsel believed that Roll understood the events on the night of the crimes, the charges against him, and the penalty he faced. These facts do not suggest mental instability that requires further investigation or a mental evaluation. The motion court did not clearly err in finding that Roll failed to show that counsel did not adequately investigate mental disease or defect issues.
Roll alleges that his attorney had a conflict of interest that violated his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights (and the companion clauses of the Missouri constitution). Specifically, Roll claims that counsel used Roll's assets to pay counsel's fee, instead of securing a mental health expert. To prevail, a defendant must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected counsel's performance. Wise, 879 S.W.2d at 515, citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). Conflict of interest normally arises where one attorney represents multiple defendants with divergent interests. Parker, 886 S.W.2d at 929. Here, counsel represented only Roll. Even assuming that the doctrine applies to individual representation, Roll has not shown clear error. As discussed above, there is substantial evidence that counsel investigated a mental disease or defect defense but rejected it for legitimate reasons. Roll interprets a letter he received from counsel (before his withdrawal) as attempting to conceal a conflict of interest, by these words: The Public Defender hired and paid by the State of Missouri (the same entity that prosecuted you) seems awfully anxious to get involved in your case, which doesn't make a lot of sense to me. I cannot understand what their true motivation is here, Gary; there may be nothing to it, Gary, but I am suspicious of it. Gary, I hope you know what you are doing but I have my doubts about it all, especially the way the P.D. wants to get their hands on you. (emphasis in original). This language infersinaccuratelythat the Public Defender and the Prosecutor have similar interests against Roll. It also inappropriately questions the motives of the Public Defender. Roll, however, fails to show an adverse effect because the Public Defender timely represented him post-conviction. The motion court did not clearly err; counsel decided not to hire a mental health expert for reasons other than a lack of funds.