Opinion ID: 4562699
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Abuse-of-Discretion Claim

Text: Next, Ralston argues that the out-of-court statements made by the Indian housekeeper and her daughter were inadmissible as hearsay. M.W. testified as to these out-of-court statements. Ralston points out that his trial counsel objected to the testimony as unreliable and that “[t]he court ruled that the government could elicit testimony about admissions allegedly made by . . . [Ralston] to his wife, but that the evidence could not be used to establish the truth of the allegations.” Appellant’s Br. at 39. Ralston asserts that the government ignored this ruling and, thus, violated his right of confrontation. M.W.’s testimony, according to the government, was not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. The government avers that M.W.’s testimony about the out-of-court statements simply provided context for other admissible statements, such as Ralston’s admissions to sexually violating the Indian women—which were admissible as party-opponent admissions. The government further asserts that the district court provided an adequate limiting instruction and that Ralston’s trial counsel did not seek a further limiting instruction. “We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion,” United States v. Coutentos, 651 F.3d 809, 819 (8th Cir. 2011), but to the extent that Ralston failed to raise his confrontation clause argument in the district court, our review is for plain error. Ralston’s argument fails under either standard. Ralston concedes that the district court provided the jury with a limiting instruction as to M.W.’s testimony about her conversations with the Indian housekeeper and her daughter, accusing Ralston of raping and sexually assaulting them. Specifically, that instruction provided: The statements that the ladies and the daughter from India made to the witness would be hearsay but they’re not admitted for the truth of what -24- they said but to explain why she then in turn would have had a conversation with her husband. That’s the reason you’re told that. Now, if her husband made an admission, you can consider that as any other piece of evidence, just so you understand. People sit over there sometimes and they think, why isn’t that hearsay? And to explain, that wasn’t offered for the truth to prove what occurred but only to explain to you why it was that this witness would approach her husband and have that conversation. Trial Tr., Vol. 2, at 466. Ralston’s contention that the government ignored the district court’s instruction is meritless. “Statements providing context for other admissible statements are not hearsay because they are not offered for their truth. As a result, the admission of such context evidence does not offend the Confrontation Clause because the declarant is not a witness against the accused.” United States v. Spencer, 592 F.3d 866, 879 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). In regards to Ralston’s confession to M.W., i.e., party-opponent admission, Ralston was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine M.W. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) (providing that a statement “is not hearsay” if it “is offered against an opposing party and . . . was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity”). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion, much less plainly err, in allowing M.W. to testify as to the out-of-court statements made by the Indian women.