Opinion ID: 6328135
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cellphone Claim

Text: Next, we consider Karr’s claim that Taylor provided ineﬀective assistance because he did not present the jury with evidence relating to McGovern’s forensic audit of Karr’s cellphone. According to Karr, this amounted to ineﬀective assistance because the audit did not reveal that Karr accessed a pornographic video or made a video recording during the second assault. The Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that Karr suﬀered no prejudice under Strickland from Taylor’s decision in this respect. The state appeals court reasoned that even if this evidence had been presented, it would not necessarily have undermined A.P.’s account of the assaults. That court also concluded there was suﬃcient evidence adduced at trial for the jury to draw credibility determinations about A.P.’s testimony. We agree with the district court that the Indiana Court of Appeals reasonably applied Strickland in reaching a noprejudice determination on this issue as well. Even if the forensic analysis of Karr’s cellphone had been presented to the jury, it is extremely unlikely that evidence would have changed the trial’s outcome. Recall that McGovern could not exclude the possibility that one or more videos had been 14 No. 21-2463 deleted from Karr’s cellphone and did not appear on the oﬃcer’s forensic-analysis report. Had Taylor introduced the cellphone evidence at trial, then on cross-examination the State could have elicited the limits of that evidence. Karr has therefore not shown it is likely that the introduction of the cellphone evidence would have impeached A.P.’s testimony about Karr’s cellphone use. Further, as the district court noted, presumably the State would have also argued that A.P. was, at most, mistaken to assume Karr was viewing pornography or taking a video during the second assault. At no point has Karr explained why the jury would not have accepted such an explanation. Considering the cellphone evidence in the context of the entire trial, Thompson v. Vanihel, 998 F.3d 762, 767–68 (7th Cir. 2021), there is no reasonable probability that, but for Taylor’s alleged unprofessional errors, the result of the trial would have been diﬀerent. Karr’s arguments about the impact of the forensic audit of his cellphone on A.P.’s credibility are likewise unconvincing. The jury heard from several witnesses, including A.P., oﬃcers Denison and Boudreau, and nurse Bowens. The jury “had ample evidence on which to base a determination of [A.P.’s] credibility.” Hodkiewicz v. Buesgen, 998 F.3d 321, 328 (7th Cir. 2021). It was therefore “reasonable for the court of appeals to conclude … there is not a reasonable likelihood” that this one piece of evidence “would have so changed the jury’s credibility determination that they would have acquitted [Karr.]” Id. (citations omitted). Essentially, Karr contends “in a credibility contest, counsel must employ scorched-earth tactics in attacking the credibility of the primary witness.” Gilbreath v. Winkleski, 21 No. 21-2463 15 F.4th 965, 991 (7th Cir. 2021). But Karr ignores that there are “signiﬁcant downsides” to attacking a sympathetic accuser or “even being perceived as attacking her.” Id. The Indiana Court of Appeals recognized those downsides when, in making its no-prejudice determination, it noted that the forensic analysis of Karr’s cellphone “would not necessarily undermine [A.P.’s] account of the incidents.” In fact, an attempt to impeach A.P. with the forensic analysis of Karr’s cellphone could have hurt rather than helped Karr’s defense. See id. at 990–91. The jury might have perceived a potential attempt to cast A.P. as unreliable—by focusing on an extraneous part of her account—as reinforcing the strength of the State’s case on the core details of the assaults. Thus, the Indiana Court of Appeals reasonably applied Strickland in ruling that Karr was not prejudiced by Taylor’s failure to present evidence from the forensic analysis of the cellphone.