Opinion ID: 612350
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Counsel Elicited “Unfavorable” Testimony

Text: Here, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of the decision to call his mother, Kathryn Carr, and to question Officer Janczarek about whether “dopesters” wear fancy clothes and shoes. Petitioner now argues that the strategic decisions were not reasonable because they were based on inadequate investigation. No. 09-1294 25 Strickland explained that “strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. First, it is true that Carr’s concession on cross-examination that petitioner “dated,” “socialized,” and sometimes spent the night with Broome was consistent with the prosecution’s theory that petitioner had sufficient connection to the Karen Court residence to establish constructive possession of the cocaine and firearm found there. However, it is hard to imagine that counsel had failed to determine the relationship between petitioner and Broome before deciding to call petitioner’s mother. Nor can we conclude that it was unreasonable to call Carr to testify that petitioner lived with her. Carr provided the only evidence that petitioner lived with her, that her home was the address where he received mail, and that parole officers had even verified that petitioner was living with her while on parole. Although she conceded that petitioner had been released from parole before the search, her testimony presented the jury with evidence which, if believed, showed that he did not reside at the Karen Court residence. Second, petitioner complains that in cross-examining Officer Janczarek, defense counsel elicited testimony that caused petitioner’s shoes to become evidence against him. Defense counsel asked Officer Janczarek about the “Kmart” jacket that petitioner was wearing when he was detained and whether “dopesters” dress nicely or wear alligator shoes. No. 09-1294 26 When the witness answered that “[t]hey may dress nice, they may not,” counsel asked if he had “ever seen a dopester from the beginning of the world up until now that would have in his closet anything but Armani or some very expensive suit?” The following exchange ensued: Q: Ever seen any of them didn’t have alligator shoes? A: Yes. Q: Yeah. But what about some of the Italian shoes? . . . they could wear shoes from Kmart? A: They could. Q: They could, but do they? . . . I’m asking you as an expert. A: Have I ever seen a drug dealer wear shoes that I would consider poor, like not nice shoes? Yes, I have. Q: What about Nike . . . sports shoes that — A: Yes. Q: — Nike makes. A: Yes. Quite often, in fact — Q: Sell for 175 — I beg your pardon? A: Yes. Quite often, in fact, the people that are out selling drugs on the street are wearing tennis shoes so when they see me they are able to run from me. Petitioner’s complaint is not that the witness said drug dealers wear all kinds of clothes and shoes, but that this line of questioning opened the door for the prosecutor to point out that petitioner was wearing what appeared to be snake or alligator skin shoes. Petitioner argues that this was not “reasonable trial strategy” because it could not have been based on a reasonable investigation of petitioner’s footwear on the day of trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded this questioning did not result in prejudice because the officer testified as an expert that drug dealers wear all types of clothing and shoes, both expensive and inexpensive. It was not objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude that there was no reasonable probability that but for the misguided No. 09-1294 27 questioning that invited attention to petitioner’s shoes, the result would have been different.