Opinion ID: 6324275
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The “Previously Unavailable” Requirement

Text: Neither we nor the Supreme Court has interpreted § 2255(h)(2)’s “previously unavailable” requirement, nor did Congress define this term. However, the Supreme Court has interpreted what “available” means in the context of the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) requirement that prisoners exhaust the “administrative remedies as are available” before filing a lawsuit to challenge a prison condition. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 635 (2016). In that context, the Supreme Court explained that “the ordinary meaning of the word ‘available’ is ‘capable of use for the MUÑOZ GONZALEZ V. UNITED STATES 7 accomplishment of a purpose,’ and that which ‘is accessible or may be obtained.’” Id. at 642 (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 737–38 (2001)). The Court further explained that this is a pragmatic analysis: “courts in this and other cases must apply [the availability standard] to the real-world workings of prison grievance systems.” Id. at 643. For example, when a prison’s administrative grievance system is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use” because “no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it,” administrative remedies are not “available.” Id. at 643–44. Likewise, the Court instructed that administrative remedies are not available when a prisoner is “thwart[ed] . . . from taking advantage of a grievance process through machinations, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 644. Although Ross addressed a different statute, the Supreme Court’s analysis is persuasive here. If the PLRA’s availability-of-administrative-remedies standard is measured against “the real-world” practicalities that prisoners face, id. at 643, we see no reason why the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s (AEDPA) previously-unavailable-claim standard, which uses similar language, should not be interpreted to account for whether a prisoner seeking to raise a claim based on a new constitutional rule in a second or successive habeas proceeding could have, as a practical matter, raised that claim at an earlier time. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Several of our sister circuits have adopted a pragmatic approach when interpreting AEDPA’s “previously unavailable” requirement. 3 For example, in In re Cathey, the 3 This same “previously unavailable” requirement also applies to second or successive habeas petitions filed under § 2254. 28 U.S.C. 8 MUÑOZ GONZALEZ V. UNITED STATES Fifth Circuit refused to adopt a “strict rule” that a claim based on a new constitutional rule is available anytime the Supreme Court announces the rule before the inmate’s initial habeas proceeding is concluded. 857 F.3d 221, 229–30 (5th Cir. 2017). Rather, that court recognized that there is “a gray area of previous unavailability [of a new constitutional rule] despite technical availability,” and it adopted a “rebuttable presumption that a new rule of constitutional law was previously available if published by the time a district court ruled on a petitioner’s initial habeas petition,” which can be overcome by presenting “cogent arguments that [the claim] was previously unavailable” during the initial habeas proceedings. Id. at 229–30 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Applying this pragmatic standard, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Cathey sufficiently established that his proposed claim was “previously unavailable” even though it was based on a constitutional rule that was announced well before his initial habeas proceedings were concluded—in fact, before he even filed his initial habeas petition. Cathey sought to bring a claim under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held that imposing capital sentences against intellectually disabled prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment. In re Cathey, 857 F.3d at 223. Even though Atkins had already been decided, throughout his initial habeas proceedings, Cathey, who was represented by counsel, believed that his IQ was “outside of the range that § 2244(b)(2)(A). Requests for habeas relief brought under § 2255 are motions. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Requests for habeas relief brought under U.S.C. § 2254 are referred to as petitions or applications. But regardless of whether the underlying collateral attack arises under § 2254 or § 2255, a request for permission to file a second or successive habeas filing is referred to as an application. We follow this nomenclature. MUÑOZ GONZALEZ V. UNITED STATES 9 was then understood to satisfy the subaverage intellectual functioning prong of an Atkins claim.” Id. at 230. Only after the state disclosed evidence that his IQ was lower than he had understood and that new science showed prior IQ tests could be inflated did he realize that he had a valid Atkins claim. Id. at 230–33. And those disclosures were both made after Cathey’s first habeas petition was decided. Id. Under these circumstances, the Fifth Circuit found that Cathey made a sufficient showing that his Atkins claim was “previously unavailable” to warrant allowing him to present his second or successive petition to the district court. Id. at 233. Similarly, in In re Hill, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a “mechanistic test” for assessing whether a claim based on a new rule of constitutional law was previously available. 113 F.3d 181, 183 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). As an initial matter, the Eleventh Circuit assessed the previously unavailable requirement “with reference to the availability of the claim at the time the first federal habeas application was filed.” Id. at 182. But it also required an inmate to “demonstrate the infeasibility of amending” his request for habeas relief if it is still pending when a new rule that applies retroactively is announced. Id. at 183. The court explained that its “pragmatic approach . . . properly recognizes that the liberal amendment policy applicable to habeas petitions may make claims based upon new rules of constitutional law ‘available’ to the petitioner during a prior habeas action, even when the claim would not have been available at the inception of that prior action.” Id. In that case, Hill sought to bring a claim under Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), and challenge his conviction based on an improper jury instruction. In re Hill, 113 F.3d at 182. Cage was issued while Hill’s initial petition was still 10 MUÑOZ GONZALEZ V. UNITED STATES pending. Id. at 183. After Hill filed his initial petition, the district court permitted him to present additional filings, and a year after Cage was decided Hill filed a supplemental brief that addressed other issues. Id. Hill’s petition remained pending for an additional two and a half years, and yet he never asserted a claim based on Cage. Id. These facts were central to the Eleventh Circuit’s denial of his request for leave to file a second or successive habeas petition, and it concluded “that the circumstances . . . conclusively refute Hill’s contention that his Cage claim was ‘previously unavailable’ within the meaning [of AEDPA].” Id. at 184. The Eighth Circuit also applies a pragmatic approach to determining unavailability. Davis v. Norris, 423 F.3d 868, 879 (8th Cir. 2005). In Davis, the prisoner sought to bring an Atkins claim in a second or successive petition. Id. at 878. Represented by counsel, the prisoner filed his first habeas petition after Atkins was argued in the Supreme Court but before a decision was issued. Id. at 879; see also, Davis v. Norris, No. CV 01-05188-SOH, Dkt. No. 17 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 1, 2002). The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the habeas petition three months after Atkins was issued and did not deny the petition until well over a year after that. Id. The evidence that the prisoner relied on in making his later-presented Atkins claims was also available to him during the pendency of his initial habeas proceeding. See id. Under these circumstances, the Eighth Circuit held that “the Atkins rule was not previously unavailable” because the prisoner “could have raised [it] in the district court.” Id. Based on the weight of authority, including the Supreme Court’s interpretation of similar language in the PLRA, we likewise adopt a pragmatic approach to determining whether a claim based on a new constitutional rule was “previously unavailable,” as required by AEDPA when a prisoner seeks MUÑOZ GONZALEZ V. UNITED STATES 11 to file a second or successive request for habeas relief based on a new constitutional rule. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Under this approach, the prisoner seeking to file a second or successive request for habeas relief must show that the realworld circumstances that he faced prevented him, as a practical matter, from asserting his claim based on a new rule of law in his initial habeas proceeding. If he makes this showing, leave to file a second or successive request for habeas relief must be granted.