Opinion ID: 1826076
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ManslaughterUnreasonable Use Of Force.

Text: [16] A majority of this court concludes the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the elements of manslaughter; causing death of another unnecessarily in the exercise of self-defense. There is ample evidence in the record from which a jury could find defendant guilty on two counts of first-degree murder. But it is also clear there was evidence in the record, which, if the jury chose to believe it, could lead to acquittal on those charges and guilty verdicts on manslaughter. The privilege of self-defense is provided in sec. 939.48(1), Stats: 939.48 Self-Defense And Defense Of Others. (1) A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what he reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with his person by such other person. The actor may intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as he reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. He may not intentionally use force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself. This section was summarized in Thomas v. State, 53 Wis.2d 483, 192 N.W.2d 864 (1972), as follows: Force may be used against another to prevent or to terminate what one reasonably believes to be an unlawful intereference with his person by such other person; but he may only use such force as he reasonably believes is necessary. Before force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm can be used, one must reasonably believe that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself. 53 Wis.2d at 487. [17] In assessing the reasonableness of the defendant's belief the jury must apply an objective standard of the ordinary intelligent and prudent person . . . `in the position of the defendant under the circumstances existing at the time of the alleged offense.' State v. Kanzelberger, 28 Wis.2d 652, 660, 137 N.W.2d 419 (1965), cert. den. 385 U.S. 867. Maichle v. Jonovic, 69 Wis.2d 622, 627, 230 N.W.2d 789 (1975). [18] The law specially provides for the situation where, under the objective prudent person standard, it is found that the deadly force used in the exercise of the self-defense privilege was unreasonable. This has been referred to as the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, Ross v. State, 61 Wis.2d 160, 166, 211 N.W.2d 827 (1973), and is set forth in sec. 940.05 (2), Stats. as a type of manslaughter. 940.05 Manslaughter. Whoever causes the death of another human being under any of the following circumstances may be imprisoned not more than 10 years: . . . (2) Unnecessarily, in the exercise of his privilege of self-defense or defense of others or the privilege to prevent or terminate the commission of a felony; or . . . [19] The standard for putting this imperfect self-defense doctrine before the jury was recently discussed in State v. Johnnies, 76 Wis.2d 578, 583, 251 N.W.2d 807 (1977): To justify the submission of a lesser degree of homicide to the jury there must be a reasonable ground in the evidence for acquittal on the greater charge and for conviction on the lesser charge. McAllister v. State, 74 Wis.2d 246, 253, 246 N.W.2d 511 (1976). Therefore, the submission of an instruction on manslaughter would have been proper only if under some reasonable view, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant shot the deceased believing her use of force was necessary in self-defense, but that her belief was unreasonable under the circumstances. Bedford v. State, 65 Wis.2d 357, 364, 222 N.W.2d 658 (1974). [13] The court has also discussed what is meant by a reasonable ground in the evidence. As the court stated in State v. Bergenthal, 47 Wis.2d 668, 675, 178 N.W.2d 16 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972. `The key word in the rule is reasonable. The rule does not suggest some near automatic inclusion of all lesser but included offenses as additional options to a jury. Only if under a different, but reasonable view, the evidence is sufficient to establish guilt of the lower degree and also leave a reasonable doubt as to some particular element included in the higher degree but not the lower, should the lesser crime also be submitted to the jury. . . . The purpose of multiple verdicts is to cover situations where under different, but reasonable views of the evidence there are grounds either for conviction of the greater or of the lesser offense. The lesser degree verdict is not to be submitted to the jury unless there exists reasonable grounds for conviction of the lesser offense and acquittal on the greater.' Briggs v. State, 76 Wis.2d 313, 333-334, 251 N.W.2d 12 (1977). The evidence in the record so viewed, must reveal the person exercising the privilege of self-defense intended to use force or to threaten to use force against another for the purpose of self-defense. State v. Johnnies, supra, 76 Wis.2d at 584. Thomas v. State, supra, 53 Wis.2d at 488. In support of the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the imperfect self-defense crime of manslaughter, the state argues that a reasonable view of the totality of the trial testimony demonstrates that defendant initially was the aggressor and continued in that role during the struggle, resisting lawful arrest and attempting to escape. [20] But neither the trial court nor this court may, under the law, look to the totality of the evidence, as the state invites us to do, in determining whether the instruction was warranted. To do so would require the court to weigh the evidenceaccepting one version of facts, rejecting anotherand thus invade the province of the jury. Cf. Flores v. State, 76 Wis.2d 50, 69, 250 N.W.2d 720 (1977). Our holding in Bergenthal, supra, that an instruction may be submitted only if supported by a different, but reasonable view of the evidence was attacked as violative of due process in Ross v. State, 61 Wis.2d 160, 211 N.W.2d 827 (1973). The alleged infirmity of the rule was that this reasonable view formulation required the court to invade the province of the jury. But this argument was found without merit because the judge will not weigh the evidence, but determine only whether evidence existed in the record, viewed favorably to the defendant, to warrant the instruction. Under these tests, the evidence is to be viewed in the most favorable light it will `reasonably admit of from the standpoint of the accused.' This test does not call for a weighing of the evidence by the trial judge. He is merely obliged to examine the evidence to determine whether the proposed instruction is based upon mere conjecture and whether, if a verdict were returned on the lesser included offense, he would be obliged to set it aside. To instruct on the lesser included offense, speaking only to the evidentiary factors revealed at trial and not to the question of included elements, the evidence of the lesser included offense must be relevant and appreciable; and as considered most favorably to the defendant, the inclusion of the instruction must not be unreasonable. The question basically is whether a jury giving the evidence full credence could reasonably return a verdict of guilt on the lesser included offense. 61 Wis.2d at 172-173. Accord, Garcia v. State, 73 Wis.2d 174, 186, 242 N.W.2d 919 (1976). [21] Thus the question before us, as it was by law before the trial court, is not what the totality of the evidence reveals but rather, whether a reasonable construction of the evidence will support the defendant's theory viewed in the most favorable light it will `reasonably admit of from the standpoint of the accused.' Ross v. State, supra . If this question is answered affirmatively, then it is for the jury, not for the trial court or this court, to determine whether to believe defendant's version of events. [22] Defendant testified that he was beaten continually by the two officers; that he had dropped his gun and repeatedly asked them to stop; that he had grabbed the gun which was being used in the beating and intentionally shot them to stop what he characterized as their assault. This testimony was corroborated in part by a state's witness who testified he thought the two officers were going to beat up the tall Mexican . . . two against one. This evidence could be construed by the jury as showing that defendant was the victim of an unlawful interference with his person by another. [23, 24] Defendant had no privilege to interfere with an arrest, which may itself require a lawful use of force. But there are circumstances where a police officer's use of force is unlawful. An officer may be guilty of assault and battery if he uses unnecessary and excessive force or acts wantonly and maliciously. 4 Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, sec. 1621, p. 292; see, McCluskey v. Steinhorst, 45 Wis.2d 350, 173 N.W.2d 148 (1970) (a civil battery); also, see, Clark v. Ziedonis, 368 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Wis. 1973), aff'd 513 F.2d 79 (1975). This is a jury question. Wirsing v. Krzeminski, 61 Wis. 2d 513, 524, 213 N.W.2d 37 (1973). [25] Even if it were assumed that the defendant initiated the aggression when he pointed his revolver at the officers, it was possible, if the jury so believed, that the defendant regained his privilege of self-defense down the street when he dropped his gun and repeatedly told the officers that they had him and that they should stop beating him indicating that he was thereby submitting to arrest. [14] In Banks v. State, 51 Wis.2d 145, 156, 186 N.W.2d 250 (1971) the court quoted Miller, Criminal Law (Hornbook Series) sec. 67 (g) to amplify this principle: As has been previously stated, self-defense is not available as a plea in excuse or justification, to one who was himself the aggressor in the difficulty which resulted in death, or other injury. If, however, after bringing on the difficulty, such a person withdraws, in good faith, and shows his adversary that he does not desire to continue the conflict, but his adversary thereupon pursues him and becomes the aggressor, he has the same right to defend himself as if he had not originally provoked the difficulty. . . . If he withdraws and gives his adversary reasonable ground for believing that he has withdrawn, it is sufficient. It is not required of him that he, at all hazards, make it actually known to his antagonist that he has withdrawn; if his acts are such as would notify a reasonable man under the circumstances of the withdrawal that is all that is required of him. If the passion or cowardice of the adversary blind him to the actions of the accused showing his intention to withdraw, this cannot be charged against the accused, so as to deprive him of the right secured by his withdrawal to defend his life. `If the party assailed has eyes to see he must see, and if he has ears to hear he must hear. He has no right to close his eyes or deaden his ears.' . . . While the state advances strong arguments that such withdrawal was inconsistent with defendant's prior conduct, this is an argument properly addressed to the jury. See, Ruiz v. State, 75 Wis.2d 230, 234, 249 N.W.2d 277 (1977). [26] As previously noted, an actor invoking the privilege of self-defense may use only such force as he reasonably believes is necessary to prevent the interference. Ross v. State, 61 Wis.2d at 166. [27] A majority of this court holds that there exists no evidence from which the jury could believe defendant's use of deadly force was reasonable, entitling him to an instruction on complete self-defense. However, a majority also holds that under one reasonable view of the evidence, the jury could conclude that defendant's belief that he could act in self-defense was reasonable. The defendant was thus entitled to have the jury consider his theory of imperfect self-defense, which is embodied in the crime of manslaughter. Failure to so instruct the jury was error for which prejudice to the defendant (was) undeniable. State v. Stortecky, 273 Wis. 362, 369, 77 N.W.2d 721 (1956).