Opinion ID: 3158047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act

Text: Before addressing Tiedemann’s appeal, we consider whether he has accumulated three strikes and must first prepay the appellate-filing fee. We conclude that Tiedemann need not prepay, because before his present appeal he had accumulated only two strikes. Congress passed the PLRA to address the “sharp rise in prisoner litigation in the federal courts.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Under the PLRA, prisoners obtain a “strike” against them for purposes of future IFP eligibility when their “action or appeal in a court of the United States . . . was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon 2 which relief may be granted . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Childs v. Miller, 713 F.3d 1262, 1265 (10th Cir. 2013). Once a prisoner accumulates three strikes, he must prepay the entire filing fee before federal courts may consider his civil actions and appeals. Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 635 F.3d 1172, 1176 (10th Cir. 2011). The district court denied Tiedemann leave to proceed IFP on appeal. It cited three cases where it believed that Tiedemann had accumulated separate strikes under the PLRA. First, the district court cited Tiedemann’s 2012 case that it had dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) after concluding that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Tiedemann v. Corum, No. 2:11-CV-668, Doc. No. 10, at 5 (D. Utah May 5, 2012). We agree that the dismissal of this case counts as a strike. See Hafed, 635 F.3d at 1176 (noting that a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) counts as a strike for PLRA purposes). Second, the district court concluded that a strike was warranted for a case that Tiedemann had filed against law enforcement officers for violating his constitutional rights during his arrest. There, the district court dismissed Tiedemann’s complaint for failure to state a claim, but it appointed counsel to determine whether that case (and others) alleged any viable claims to include in an amended complaint. Tiedemann v. Stinson, No. 2:07-CV-00907-TC, Doc. No. 36, at 6–8 (D. Utah Jan. 27, 2009). Appointed counsel later consulted with Tiedemann and told the district court that Tiedemann wished to voluntarily dismiss the case. Tiedemann v. Stinson, No. 2:07CV-00907-TC, Doc. No. 46, at 2 (D. Utah Feb. 25, 2010). The district court then dismissed the case and directed the clerk to close the matter. Id. 3 We disagree with the district court that this dismissal counts as a strike against Tiedemann. The district court did not dismiss the case because of one of the statutory factors in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Phillips v. Humble, 587 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir. 2009); Moya v. Schollenbarger, 465 F.3d 444, 449 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Rather, we ‘endeavor to scrutinize [complaint dismissals] . . . closely in order to pinpoint those situations wherein, in a practical sense, the district court by its order has dismissed a plaintiff’s action as well.’” (quoting Petty v. Manpower, Inc., 591 F.2d 615, 617 (10th Cir. 1979) (alterations in original))). Instead, the district court appointed counsel to determine whether Tiedemann had any claims that would merit an amended complaint. Counsel concluded that Tiedemann did not and asked for a voluntary dismissal of the case, which the district court granted. A voluntary dismissal does not count as a PLRA strike. See Hafed, 635 F.3d at 1176 (stating that, under the PLRA, a dismissal counts as a strike when an action or appeal “is dismissed as frivolous, as malicious, or for failure to state a claim”). But we agree that the district court’s third case—its dismissal in this very case—counts as a strike. The district court dismissed Tiedemann’s case for failure to state a claim and cited 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This dismissal counts as a strike for PLRA purposes. See Childs, 713 F.3d at 1266 (assessing a strike for a district-court dismissal under § 1915A). See also Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763 (2015) (holding that a prior dismissal on a ground listed in § 1915 counts as a strike even if the dismissal is the subject of an appeal). 4 We have reviewed Tiedemann’s remaining cases and all but one were voluntary dismissals that do not count as strikes under the PLRA.1 Thus, Tiedemann has only two strikes. He can proceed on appeal without prepaying the filing fee. But we now assess a strike—Tiedemann’s third—in dismissing this appeal as frivolous. See Jennings v. Natrona Cty. Det. Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999) (imposing a strike for dismissal of frivolous appeal).