Opinion ID: 2524356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the allegations concerning district court judge

Text: ¶ 43 Two counts involve facts arising from an incident in the Dewey County Court Clerk's office. The facts here are taken from the record, including a video tape, and this Court's records. [30] On August 2, 2006, a district court judge (the Judge) in Dewey County was holding an in camera hearing on a search warrant in the court clerk's office. Respondent entered the office with his video camera in record mode and panned the room with the camera. The Judge approached Respondent, put his hand over the camera lens, and, using profanity in an abusive tone, told Respondent to turn off the camera and get out of the courtroom. Respondent replied that it was not a courtroom but was the clerk's office. The Judge responded that it was a courtroom because he was conducting a hearing. ¶ 44 Respondent then left the clerk's office and waited in the hall. When the hearing was completed, Respondent entered the clerk's office again with the camera in record mode. Several times, the Judge told Respondent to turn off the camera and quit recording. Each time, Respondent asked for a written order, and the Judge responded, I will get you a written order. During this time, Respondent asked for a court reporter for a hearing for the next week on an arraignment. Having apparently misunderstood, the Judge questioned Respondent on whether he wanted a reporter for a hearing on the order prohibiting his filming in the clerk's office. After only a few moments, Respondent stopped recording. ¶ 45 After Respondent filed a civil action against the Judge for assault, direct contempt charges were filed against Respondent. The trial court found Respondent in direct contempt and fined him $400.00. On November 13, 2006, Respondent filed an appeal with this Court. [31] Because Respondent failed to file a brief in chief, this Court dismissed the appeal on September 27, 2007, not November 28, 2007, as the OBA states.
¶ 46 The OBA alleged that this conduct violated Rule 3.5(d) of the ORPC. Rule 3.5(d) states that [a] lawyer shall not ... engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal. The comments to Rule 3.5 of the ORPC state: A lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge but should avoid reciprocation.... When Respondent entered the clerk's office, he could not have anticipated a judge would be holding a confidential in camera hearing in a public place. The Judge immediately began using profanity in ordering Respondent from the clerk's office. Respondent left immediately and did not re-enter the clerk's office until the in camera hearing was completed. The evidence shows that Respondent stood firm but did not reciprocate with profanity and did not use an abusive tone when replying to the Judge. We do not find that Respondent intended when he entered the clerk's office the first time to disrupt a tribunal nor did Respondent disrupt a tribunal when he reentered the clerk's office after the hearing's completion.
¶ 47 In the civil suit, Respondent alleged that the Judge grabbed the [Respondent] about his right arm and pushed the video camera ... away from plaintiff's face. The district court granted the Judge's motion to dismiss and awarded the Judge $600.00 in attorney fees pursuant to title 12, section 2011.1 of the 2001 Oklahoma Statutes. Respondent appealed and the case was assigned to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the district court's order, and Respondent petitioned for certiorari, which this Court denied. [32] ¶ 48 The OBA alleges that this conduct violates Rule 3.1 of the ORPC. In conducting an independent review, we turn to case law, particularly North Side State Bank v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 1994 OK 34, 894 P.2d 1046, and Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. Ct. Appeals 1974), to determine whether the civil suit filed by Respondent had a basis in law and fact, including a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. ¶ 49 North Side State Bank discussed the doctrine of judicial immunity in the context of a court clerk's actions. This Court recognized that a judicial officer is not liable for actions taken in an adjudicative capacity; stated that [a]n official's immunity depends largely upon the nature of the act; and defined a purely judicial act as one done by a member of the judicial department in construing the law or applying it to a particular state of facts. North Side State Bank, 1994 OK 34 at ¶ 12, n. 13, 894 P.2d at 1050-1051, n. 13. Under North Side State Bank, Respondent had a good faith argument that the Judge was not acting in his judicial capacity when he physically ejected Respondent from the court clerk's office, and, thus, that the doctrine of judicial immunity did not protect the Judge from liability. ¶ 50 Gregory discussed in detail whether the doctrine of judicial immunity was applicable when a judge physically ejected a person from a courtroom. In Gregory, a judge claimed absolute immunity from suit brought under title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code. Although Respondent did not allege a violation of section 1983 by the Judge, the Gregory court's reasoning on the issue of judicial immunity is germane to the OBA's allegations here. In Gregory, a judge had personally removed the plaintiff from the courtroom. The court acknowledged that it was a judge's obligation to protect the dignity of the courtroom and that the judge could exercise the court's criminal contempt power, which is judicial in nature, to maintain decorum in a courtroom. Gregory, 500 F.2d at 64. The court continued that there may be times when it is necessary for a judge to use physical force for such purpose, but the necessity does not mean that the judge is absolutely immune from suit. Id. ¶ 51 Looking at the nature of using physical force to remove someone from a courtroom, the Gregory court reasoned: The decision to personally evict someone from a courtroom by the use of physical force is simply not an act of a judicial nature. A judicial act within the meaning of the doctrine may normally be corrected on appeal. But when a judge exercises physical force in a courtroom, his decision is not amenable to appellate correction. More importantly, we cannot believe that the purpose of the judicial immunity doctrineto promote principled and fearless decision-making will suffer in the slightest if it is held that judges who physically assault persons in their courtrooms have no automatic immunity. Id. at 64 (citations omitted). ¶ 52 The Gregory court noted that the judge could have summoned a sheriff to remove the plaintiff from the courtroom, and if a sheriff had assaulted the plaintiff, the sheriff would not have been absolutely immune but could have asserted the defense that he was acting in good faith. Id. at 64-65. The judge's choice to perform an act similar to that normally performed by a sheriff or bailiff should not result in his receiving absolute immunity for this act simply because he was a judge at the time. Id. at 65. The Gregory court concluded that the judge was entitled only to a defense of qualified immunity and that the judge was required to show that he was acting in good faith. Id. ¶ 53 Certainly under North Side State Bank and Gregory, Respondent's suit against the Judge was based in law and fact . . . including a good faith argument that the Judge was not immune from suit but entitled only to qualified immunity for which the Judge would have been required to show that he was acting in good faith. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988). Thus, we do not find that Respondent's actions in filing suit against the Judge were frivolous for purposes of Rule 3.1 of the ORPC.