Opinion ID: 741827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Probative Value and Prejudicial Effect

Text: 13 If specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a qualified expert witness may provide opinion testimony on the issue in question. Fed.R.Evid. 702. The expert testimony that people conceal firearms in the engine compartment of their cars to avoid arrest and prosecution was relevant to and probative of Webb's knowledge of the gun's presence. Moreover, the testimony explained evidence about the gun's whereabouts that easily could have been beyond the knowledge of an average juror. The question therefore becomes whether the testimony's possible prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value. Fed.R.Evid. 403. 14 In analogous cases, we have held that drug-enforcement experts may testify that a defendant's activities were consistent with a common criminal modus operandi. See United States v. Johnson, 735 F.2d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir.1984) ([G]overnment agents or similar persons may testify as to the general practices of criminals to establish the defendants' modus operandi.). This testimony helps the jury to understand complex criminal activities, and alerts it to the possibility that combinations of seemingly innocuous events may indicate criminal behavior. Id. Further, we even allow modus operandi expert testimony in cases that are not complex. United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1422 (9th Cir.) (rejecting defendants' contentions that the modus operandi testimony was more prejudicial than probative because the activities described are not complex ones requiring expert explanation), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 430, 133 L.Ed.2d 345 (1995). 15 In Gil, the district court permitted the Government to offer expert testimony that drug traffickers often employ counter-surveillance driving techniques, register cars in others' names, deliver narcotics and cash in public parking lots, and frequently use pagers and public telephones. Id. at 1421-22. Noting a long line of cases allowing modus operandi testimony, we held that the admission of this testimony was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1422; see also United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604, 611-12 (9th Cir.1987) (allowing expert testimony regarding the use of apartments as stash pads for drugs and money); United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (allowing expert testimony on how criminal narcotics conspiracies operate); United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir.1981) (per curiam) (permitting expert testimony that defendant's actions were consistent with the modus operandi of persons transporting drugs and engaging in counter-surveillance); cf. United States v. Boykin, 986 F.2d 270, 275 (8th Cir.1993) (allowing testimony that the type of firearms found in [the defendant's] home, their location, and the fact that they were loaded was significant to their usefulness and availability for use in connection with a drug business). 16 The above cases are analogous to the instant case. In the drug cases, the testimony was necessary to inform the jury of the techniques employed by drug dealers in their illegal trade. Here, the expert testimony similarly was necessary to inform the jury that concealment of weapons in the engine compartment of a car: 1) indicates an intention on the part of the person who put them there to avoid detection; and 2) does not necessarily indicate that the occupant of the car did not know of the weapon's presence. 17 The expert's testimony in the instant case is also similar to the expert testimony consistently admitted in drug trials to rebut lack of knowledge claims. For example, in United States v. Castro, 972 F.2d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir.1992), an expert testified that millions of dollars worth of cocaine would have never been entrusted to an unknowing dupe. Here, as in Castro, the expert's testimony rebutted the defendant's lack of knowledge claim. 18 The necessity of this expert testimony was apparent from the very beginning of Webb's trial. Webb's attorney stated in her opening statement: 19 So what is the focus of this case, and what are we asking you to pay close attention to? Whether or not the government will be able to prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that Marty Webb knew that the gun that was hidden in this shirt, hidden under the hood of the car, was there, that he knew it was there, and that it was his gun, that he possessed that gun. That's the key question in this case.... 20 [The Government] will not be able to prove to you, ladies and gentlemen, that he knew that that gun was hidden in that car and that he intentionally and knowingly possessed that gun. 21 The Government therefore properly used the expert's testimony to rebut Webb's lack of knowledge claim. 22 Significantly, the expert was particularly qualified to give such an opinion. He testified that, in his nineteen years as a police officer, he had training and experience in the way that guns are concealed in cars. While working in the county jail for a period of one year, the officer talked to 50 to 60 inmates per day about how and why criminals conceal weapons. Thus, the officer's experience qualified him to render an opinion regarding one of the most important concerns faced by police officers-where, how, and why criminals conceal their weapons. 23 In addition, the trial court and the Government took steps to mitigate the testimony's potential prejudicial effect. The Government focused its questions on the practices of persons rather than criminals or gang members. Moreover, even if the jury drew the adverse inference that Webb was a criminal, that inference would not prejudice him because the jury already knew that Webb was a criminal: Webb had stipulated that he had been convicted of three prior felonies. 24 In light of the above, the district court properly determined that the testimony's prejudicial effect did not substantially outweigh its probative value.