Opinion ID: 789142
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hobbs's Facial Challenge to 2

Text: 153 Hobbs also contends that the Prohibition is facially unconstitutional because it is substantially overbroad in that it prevents an entire class of people from engaging in public speech under any and all circumstances and throughout all public areas in Westchester County. (Hobbs brief on appeal at 34-35.) He argues that the Prohibition is invalid because (a) it automatically disqualifies all persons convicted of a sexual offense against a minor without any individual assessment as to their risk of recidivism in general or specifically with respect to minors who would see and listen to their performances, demonstrations or similar activities ( id. at 35); (b) almost any performance or demonstration in a public area, regardless of its substance or whom it is directed at, would likely `entice a child to congregate around' ... the speaker ( id. at 40); and (c) ¶ 2 thus gives unbridled discretion to a County employee to discriminate against a permit applicant on the basis of viewpoint ( id. at 41). We disagree. 154 It is established that the courts may, as an exception to ordinary standing requirements, New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11, 108 S.Ct. 2225, 101 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988), entertain a claim that a law, even if constitutional as applied to the claimant, is so broad that it may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third parties, Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). However, that exception is narrow. Invalidating any rule on the basis of its hypothetical application to situations not before the Court is `strong medicine' to be applied `sparingly and only as a last resort.' FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 743, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978) (plurality opinion) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). Invalidation of Executive Order 3-2003 on the ground of overbreadth is not warranted here. 155 As discussed in Part II.A. above, the Prohibition in § VI, ¶ 2, is narrowly tailored to the County's compelling interest in protecting children from sexual predation. Contrary to Hobbs's assertion, the Prohibition does not prevent [] an entire class of people from engaging in public speech under any and all circumstances (Hobbs brief on appeal at 34-35). The circumstances encompassed by the Prohibition are, as discussed above, narrowly circumscribed. Hobbs's contention that a fully rehabilitated person who had been convicted 20 years ago of a misdemeanor sexual offense would not be permitted to give a public speech on the dangers of pedophilia ( id. at 38) simply ignores the scope of the Executive Order. We would agree that if Hobbs were to give such a speech in conjunction with his self-styled theater experience for 3 and 4 year olds (Defendants' Exhibit 3), accompanied by the balloon sculptures that his complaint alleges attract children to him, his presentation would be within the scope of ¶ 2. But if given without props and/or equipment, such a speech-or any speech on any topic from any viewpoint — is beyond the scope of the Executive Order, and no permit is required. 156 Nor does the Prohibition apply to an entire class of people (Hobbs brief on appeal at 34). Rather, it applies only to members of a group that generally has a high rate of recidivism and poses a threat to the safety and welfare of children, i.e., persons known to have been convicted of a sexual offense against a minor, and it does not apply to all such persons. Within the class of persons known to have been convicted of a sexual offense against a minor, the Executive Order itself does not apply if the person will not use props or other such equipment in his presentation; and the Prohibition in the Executive Order does not apply if the presentation is not likely to entice children to gather around him. 157 The framing of the Prohibition in terms of the category of persons whom the County has ascertained have been convicted of a sexual offense against a minor is not unreasonable. We reject Hobbs's suggestion that the County must instead undertake an individual assessment of the likelihood of recidivism by each such permit applicant ( id. at 35). The imposition of that additional requirement, thereby necessitating substantial expenditures of time and resources for, inter alia, face-to-face psychiatric evaluation sessions by professionals, would not be reasonable. Cf. United States v. American Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 208, 123 S.Ct. 2297, 156 L.Ed.2d 221 (2003) (plurality opinion) (libraries may permissibly employ internet filtering software to exclude certain categories of [potentially inappropriate] content, without making individualized judgments). 158 Finally, we are not persuaded that the Executive Order gives the County's licensing officials unbridled discretion to deny a permit application. First, the permit requirement does not apply unless props and/or equipment would be used. Second, if such aids would be used, the  Prohibition  section itself describes the factors that require denial of a permit. It does not authorize denial of the application unless the applicant is known to have been convicted of a sex offense against a minor. Thus, denial of a permit is not authorized on the basis of mere suspicions or unproven allegations of child molestation. Section VIII of the Executive Order requires County officials to coordinate with law enforcement agencies in order to learn whether an applicant has been so convicted. Further, the Prohibition requires the licensing official to determine whether the proposed presentation would entice a child to congregate around the applicant, a phrase that squarely focuses the official's attention on whether the proposed presentation is child-oriented. We reject Hobbs's contention that almost any presentation would likely `entice a child to congregate around' the presenter (Hobbs brief on appeal at 40), although we agree that whether children are so enticed may well be unrelated to the presentation's substance ( id. ). For example, the mere contents of the messages that Hobbs states he is conveying ( e.g., the plight of the homeless, government inefficiency) would hardly be likely to entice children to congregate. His presentation of those messages with props and/or equipment such as balloons, however, is plainly child-oriented; and, as his complaint asserts, children are attracted by the manner of his presentation. If an applicant sought to deliver a speech simply using, for example, placards of text, such a presentation would seem not to be one that would entice children to congregate. ( See, e.g., Defendants' Post-Hearing Memorandum of Law dated April 17, 2003, at 8 (hand billing and[/or] advocating verbally does not require a permit).) 159 We conclude that the Executive Order's statement in § II as to the scope of the County's permit policy, expressly limiting the policy's applicability to presentations using props and/or equipment, and the criteria set forth in § VI, ¶ 2, specifying that a permit is to be denied if (a) the applicant is a person known to have been convicted of a sexual offense against a minor and (b) the presentation would entice a child to congregate, provide sufficient guidance to County officials and do not allow them discretion to deny a permit on the basis of content or viewpoint. To the extent that a given applicant might in fact be denied a permit in connection with the planned use of props or equipment in a non-child-oriented type of presentation, that applicant would be free, as the district court concluded in Hobbs II, 2003 WL 21919882, at , to seek judicial review in an Article 78 proceeding, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801 et seq. (McKinney 1994), challenging ¶ 2 on the ground that it was unconstitutionally applied to him or her. 160 In sum, we conclude that Executive Order 3-2003 is not facially overbroad.