Opinion ID: 612134
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Information in the PSI

Text: 18 Ratliff also complains that the sentencing court erred in failing to permit him to review his Presentence Investigation Report prior to imposing sentence. Ratliff now contends that false information regarding his net worth was included in the PSI. 19 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3), applicable to offenses committed prior to November 1, 1987, provides: 20 (A) At a reasonable time before imposing sentence the court shall permit the defendant and the defendant's counsel to read the report of the presentence investigation exclusive of any recommendation as to sentence.... 21 (emphasis added). The record indicates that defense counsel reviewed the original PSI and requested changes, but had an opportunity to review the amended PSI only at the sentencing hearing. Following his review of the amended PSI at the hearing, defense counsel voiced minor objections to that report, but did not contest any information regarding Ratliff's net worth. Ratliff asserts that he personally did not have the opportunity to review the PSI at all. 22 Although the district court specifically found that Ratliff had an adequate opportunity to bring to the court's attention any inaccuracies in the PSI, that finding is clearly erroneous. A review of the record reveals no evidence that Ratliff was given any opportunity to personally review the PSI, or that he and his attorney discussed the report. 23 In United States v. Stevens, 851 F.2d 140 (6th Cir.1988), this court held it error for a sentencing court to fail to determine that both the defendant and his counsel had the opportunity to read and discuss the presentence investigation report prior to sentencing, where that report contained false information. The sentence in Stevens was upheld in part because, unlike this case, it was clear from the record that the defendant had personally reviewed his PSI. In addition, the error in Stevens did not rise to the level of a due process violation because the record indicated that the sentencing court did not rely on the false information contained within the report in passing sentence. Id. at 143-44. 24 Unlike Stevens, the error here arguably rises to the level of a due process violation because a court is required to consider a defendant's ability to pay prior to awarding restitution under the VWPA, and there is no information in the record, other than the statement in the PSI as to Ratliff's net worth, on which the sentencing court might have based the additional $50,000 in restitution. However, our analysis is complicated by the fact that it is not entirely clear that the information relied upon was false. 25 The allegedly false statement on which the court relied represented Ratliff's net worth as $413,682.00. Without submission of specific evidence, Ratliff now contends that his net worth was substantially less than that amount. For a claim regarding the sentencing court's reliance on inaccurate information within a PSI to amount to a constitutional due process violation, the defendant must raise grave doubt as to the veracity of the information and show that the court relied on that false information in determining the sentence. United States v. Fry, 831 F.2d 664, 667 (6th Cir.1987). Although the sentencing court clearly relied on the information, Ratliff has not met his burden of raising grave doubt as to the veracity of the information. 26 Because Ratliff has failed to show that the sentencing court relied on false information in a presentence report which he was not afforded the opportunity to review, he raises neither a Rule 32 violation which would require resentencing nor a due process claim which can be addressed in this § 2255 proceeding. See United States v. Mandell, 905 F.2d 970, 973-974 (6th Cir.1990). In addition, because any claim ultimately undermines only the validity of the additional $50,000 restitution award which has been reversed on other grounds, any error committed by the sentencing court was harmless.