Opinion ID: 6043870
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Hague Convention

Text: The Hague Convention, to which the United States and Turkey are parties, see Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 358 (2d Cir. 2013), “was adopted in 1980 ‘to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access.’” Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Hague Convention, Preamble, supra, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98, reprinted in Fed. Reg. at 10,498). The United States ratified the Hague Convention in 1988, and Congress implemented the Convention that same year through the ICARA. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 6 (2014). The ICARA allows a parent to petition a federal or a state court to return an abducted or wrongfully retained child to the child’s country of residence. See 22 U.S.C. § 9003(b). “The Hague Convention applies only to determine whether a child should be returned, and does not empower the court to make any determinations regarding child custody.” Avendano v. Balza, 985 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2021) 3 (citation omitted). “The court simply asks whether a custody decision should be made in the United States or in the country of the child’s habitual residence.” Id. “The Convention states two primary objectives: ‘to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State,’ and ‘to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.’” Lozano, 572 U.S. at 4-5 (quoting the Hague Convention, art. 1). “To those ends, the Convention’s central operating feature is the return of the child.” Id. at 5 (quotation omitted). There is, thus, a “strong presumption of return of the child to his or her country of habitual residence.” Avendano, 985 F.3d at 11. However, “[t]he Convention’s return requirement is a provisional remedy” that merely “fixes the forum for custody proceedings.” Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 723 (2020) (quotation omitted). “Upon the child’s return, the custody adjudication will proceed in that forum.” Id. “The Convention is based on the principle that the best interests of the child are well served when decisions regarding custody rights are made in the country of habitual residence.” Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 20 (2010). The Convention “stresses the importance of deciding matters expeditiously,” Ermini v. Vittori, 758 F.3d 153, 167 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted), and the need to establish “swiftly a degree of certainty and finality for children,” id. at 168. “To avoid delaying the custody proceeding, the Convention instructs contracting states to use the most expeditious procedures available to return the child to her habitual residence.” Monasky, 140 S. Ct. at 724 (quotation omitted). A parent, like Mother in this case, alleging wrongful retention has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of wrongful retention by a preponderance of the evidence. See 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(1). A retention is wrongful when: “(1) the child was habitually resident in one State and has been . . . retained in a different State; (2) the . . . retention was in breach of the petitioner’s custody rights under the law of the State of habitual residence; and (3) the petitioner was exercising those rights at the time of the . . . retention.” Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2005). Here, Father does not argue that Mother failed to establish her prima facie case. Once the petitioning parent establishes her prima facie case, the child must be “promptly returned unless one of the narrow exceptions set forth in the Convention applies.” Lozano, 572 U.S. at 6 (quotation omitted); see 22 U.S.C. § 9001(a)(4). Father invokes the exception contained in Article 12 of the Convention. Under that article, when, as in this case, more than one year has elapsed between the date that the child was wrongfully retained and the date on which the proceedings commenced, the court must order the child to be returned “unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in [her] new 4 environment.” Hague Convention art. 12, supra, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 100, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,499. Father argues that the trial court erred by declining to consider whether the child was now settled in New Hampshire. We do not share his interpretation of the trial court’s decision as reflected in its narrative order and order from the bench. In the Matter of Sheys & Blackburn, 168 N.H. 35, 39 (2015) (“The interpretation of a court order is a question of law, which we review de novo.”). Rather, we interpret the trial court’s narrative and bench orders as the trial court assuming that the child was now settled in New Hampshire, and deciding that, nonetheless, return was still proper. As Father acknowledges, the trial court “accepted [his] argument that the child was ‘now settled’ in the community, but it was unwilling to allow this fact to change its analysis.” Even when a narrow exception under the Hague Convention applies, the court retains the discretion to return the child. Article 18 states that “[t]he provisions of this Chapter [Chapter III, which includes Article 12] do not limit the power of a judicial or administrative authority to order the return of the child at any time.” Hague Convention art. 18, supra, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,500. Those federal circuit courts of appeal, “which have addressed the issue[,] have all held that this language, either standing alone or when read in conjunction with another provision (Article 12, for instance), grants courts the discretion to order the return of a child despite the existence of an exception to return.” Fernandez v. Bailey, 909 F.3d 353, 362 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing cases). Thus, under Article 18 of the Hague Convention, the court may exercise its discretion and order the child’s return, despite the existence of an exception, if doing so is in keeping with the Convention’s goals. Id. at 362-63; see Lozano, 572 U.S. at 18-19 (Alito, J., concurring). “[I]f more than one year has passed, a demonstration that the child is now settled in its new environment may be a sufficient ground for refusing to order repatriation,” but it does not compel that result. Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (quotation and brackets omitted).