Opinion ID: 6350182
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Beyond AMFM

Text: Petitioners argue that AMFM does not control this case because their theories as to how the Estate’s claims are subject to arbitration do not depend on Administratrix Hoover’s authority to enter the Arbitration Agreement on her mother’s behalf.33 Instead, 31 Syl. Pt. 8, id. 32 See Syl. Pt. 3, in part, Dan Ryan Builders, 230 W. Va. at 281, 737 S.E.2d at 550. 33 Petitioners also contend that the circuit court erred when it denied their motion to compel arbitration for reasons Administratrix Hoover did not advance. Petitioners acknowledge that their “[e]xhaustive research [has] fail[ed] to reveal a case in which this Court has directly addressed the propriety of a circuit court denying a non-dispositive motion on grounds not presented by the non-moving party.” Lacking such authority, they direct us to two cases arising in distinguishable circumstances. See State ex rel. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Hummel, 243 W. Va. 681, 684−85, 850 S.E.2d 680, 684 (2020) (granting writ to prohibit execution of order sua sponte dismissing claim); W. Va. Reg’l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. A.B., 234 W. Va. 492, 516, 766 S.E.2d 751, 775 (2014) (court would not “concoct or resurrect arguments neither made nor advanced by the parties,” so plaintiff’s failure to identify a specific law, statute, or regulation allegedly violated by jail and correctional authority was fatal to her negligence claim against the 13 they present four theories of contract formation that they contend do not run afoul of AMFM: ratification, estoppel, unilateral contract, and assent.34 We have recognized that a signatory to an arbitration agreement may invoke traditional theories of contract and agency law to bind a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement. 35 But we do not find that the circuit court erred in rejecting Petitioners’ attempts to do so on the facts of this case. Ratification. Petitioners argue that Administratrix Hoover ratified the Arbitration Agreement because she did not object to that agreement or repudiate it after she obtained Ms. Faw’s power of attorney.36 This argument is unavailing because the durable power of attorney executed by Ms. Faw explicitly withheld from Administratrix Hoover the authority to enter agreements to arbitrate future disputes on Ms. Faw’s behalf. The document states that, [t]he acts of any Agent acting under this instrument are binding upon me, my estate, my heirs, beneficiaries . . . ; provided, authority) (internal quotation omitted). Petitioners in those cases appealed from dispositive orders, which is not the case, here. In essence, Petitioners attempt to bind Ms. Faw’s estate to the Arbitration 34 Agreement, even though neither Ms. Faw nor her authorized agent signed it. 35 See Syl. Pt. 4., Bayles v. Evans, 243 W. Va. 31, 842 S.E.2d 235 (2020) (“‘A signatory to an arbitration agreement cannot require a nonsignatory to arbitrate unless the non-signatory is bound under some traditional theory of contract and agency law. The five traditional theories under which a signatory to an arbitration agreement may bind a nonsignatory are: (1) incorporation by reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency; (4) veilpiercing/alter ego; and (5) estoppel.’ Syllabus Point 10, Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Hickman, 236 W. Va. 421, 781 S.E.2d 198 (2015).”). 36 As detailed above, the Arbitration Agreement could be rescinded within thirty days of its execution. 14 however, my Agent shall not enter into any pre-injury arbitration agreements and/or releases on my behalf which limit, in any way, the right to a trial by jury in a court of competent jurisdiction or an action for damages for any personal physical or emotional injuries sustained by me or any action for wrongful death which may be brought by my estate. If my Agent enters into any such agreements, such agreement shall not be binding upon me or my heirs, administrators, agents and assigns. Plainly, Ms. Faw did not imbue her attorney-in-fact with the authority to enter an agreement to arbitrate future disputes on her behalf. So, we fail to see how Administratrix Hoover could ratify such an agreement on her mother’s behalf after obtaining her power of attorney. For that plain reason, we reject Petitioners’ ratification argument. 37 37 Even if Administratrix Hoover’s authority to bind Ms. Faw to arbitrate future disputes had not been so limited, AMFM cuts strongly against this argument. There we refused to determine the extent of authority granted to Ms. Belcher as Ms. Wyatt’s power of attorney after the admissions process because Ms. Belcher was not appointed as her mother’s power of attorney until nearly three months after Ms. Wyatt’s nursing home admission and the completion of the attendant paperwork. It is the authority that Ms. Belcher possessed at the time the Arbitration Agreement was signed on September 10, 2009, and not the authority with which she was imbued some three months later, that is determinative of her authority to bind Ms. Wyatt to the Arbitration Agreement. AMFM, 230 W. Va. at 481 n.9, 740 S.E.2d at 76 n.9 (emphasis in original). Similarly, Petitioners question Ms. Faw’s capacity to execute the durable power of attorney in favor of Administratrix Hoover shortly after Ms. Faw’s admission to Greystone. We do not consider that question. As stated above, “it is the authority that [Administratrix Hoover] possessed at the time the Arbitration Agreement was signed” and not the authority Administratrix Hoover gained later that controls the question of whether she could bind 15 Assent. Petitioners state that Administratrix Hoover is a party to this case and that her signature appears on the Arbitration Agreement. They then conclude that those circumstances establish that Administratrix Hoover assented to arbitrate future disputes arising from the Residency Agreement. We disagree. Petitioners’ argument fundamentally misconstrues the capacity in which Administratrix Hoover brings this suit and the real party in interest to the Estate’s claims. Administratrix Hoover has not brought these claims in a personal capacity. She has brought them in a fiduciary capacity. Administratrix Hoover clearly filed the complaint pursuant to her authority under Ms. Faw’s durable power of attorney and now pursues the action in her capacity as administratrix of Ms. Faw’s estate.38 And contrary to Petitioners’ intimations, the claims at issue are not Administratrix Hoover’s. Rather, the claims belong to Ms. Faw’s estate.39 For those reasons, we reject Petitioners’ argument that the appearance of Administratrix Hoover’s name on the Estate’s her mother to the Arbitration Agreement. Plus, the power of attorney executed by Ms. Faw withheld authority to bind her to agreements to arbitrate future disputes, so her capacity to grant that authority to Administratrix Hoover shortly after Ms. Faw’s admission to Greystone is a moot point. 38 See Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Latimer v. Mechling, 171 W. Va. 729, 301 S.E.2d 819 (1983) (“The personal representative of the estate of a deceased acts in a fiduciary capacity. His duty is to manage the estate under his control to the advantage of those interested in it and to act on their behalf.”). 39 See Syl. Pt. 6, Est. of Gomez by & Through Gomez v. Smith, 243 W. Va. 491, 845 S.E.2d 266 (2020) (“In litigation filed for the purpose of recovering assets for inclusion in a decedent’s estate, the only substantive claim belongs to the estate. Such litigation is brought by the executor solely in his or her fiduciary capacity, and therefore the executor is not a real party in interest under West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a).”). 16 complaint and the Arbitration Agreement establishes that the Estate’s claims are now subject to arbitration. 40 Estoppel and Unilateral Contract. Petitioners’ next two arguments rest on their contention that the circuit court erroneously construed the Residency and Arbitration Agreements as separate contracts, rather than parts of an integrated contract comprised of the documents Administratrix Hoover executed during the admissions process. From there, Petitioners make two, parallel leaps. First, they argue that Administratrix Hoover is now estopped from resisting the parts of the integrated contract she dislikes—namely, the Arbitration Agreement—because Ms. Faw directly benefitted 41 from the Residency Agreement. 42 Similarly, Petitioners argue that they made a promissory offer of services to 40 Petitioners argue that the “practical reality” is that Administratrix Hoover is a beneficiary of Ms. Faw’s estate, meaning that she pursues the lawsuit in her own interest and any niceties about her role as fiduciary should not get in the way of enforcing the Arbitration Agreement bearing her signature. As Petitioners put it, “[a]s a beneficiary of the Estate of Elveria Faw, [Administratrix] Hoover is a real party in interest and is clearly pursuing the action on her own behalf, as [Administratrix] Hoover has a financial interest in any recovery by the estate.” (Emphasis in original.). We summarily reject this contention in view of the authority cited in notes 38 and 39, supra. 41 See Bayles, 243 W. Va. at 41, 842 S.E.2d at 245 (stating that “‘[d]irect-benefit estoppel involve[s] non-signatories who, during the life of the contract, have embraced the contract despite their non-signatory status but then, during litigation, attempt to repudiate the arbitration clause in the contract.’” (quoting Hellenic Inv. Fund, Inc. v. Det Norske Veritas, 464 F.3d 514, 517−18 (5th Cir. 2006)). 42 Petitioners repeatedly assert that Administratrix Hoover directly benefitted from the services furnished by Greystone. But Ms. Faw was admitted to Greystone and received the services offered, there—not Administratrix Hoover. Petitioners also appear to assert that Administratrix Hoover benefitted from services furnished by Greystone indirectly, by virtue of her status as Ms. Faw’s power of attorney, and so is now estopped from refusing 17 Ms. Faw. They contend that she accepted that offer by her actions and a valid, unilateral contract comprised of the Residency and Arbitration Agreements was formed. 43 We reject these arguments. The Arbitration Agreement plainly states that: The Resident understands that . . . (2) the execution of this Arbitration Agreement is not a precondition to the furnishing of services to the Resident by the Community, and (3) this Arbitration Agreement may be rescinded by written notice to the Community from the Resident within 30 days of signature.[44] The language emphasized above establishes that a resident such as Ms. Faw or her authorized agent may accept the benefit of services offered under the Residency Agreement even if the resident or her authorized agent does not accept the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. That remains so even if the Residency and Arbitration Agreements are a single, integrated contract. The terms of the Arbitration Agreement do not change simply because it is integrated into the Residency Agreement. Petitioners invoke estoppel to take the Estate’s claims to arbitration. Regardless of the merits of that assertion, it does not overcome the plain terms of the Arbitration Agreement in this case, as discussed in the body of the opinion. 43 See Citizens Telecomm. Co. of W. Va. v. Sheridan, 239 W. Va. 67, 73, 799 S.E.2d 144, 150 (2017) (quoting Cook v. Heck’s Inc., 176 W. Va. 368, 373, 342 S.E.2d 453, 458 (1986)) (“A unilateral contract is established ‘where one party makes a promissory offer and the other accepts by performing an act rather than by making a return promise.’”). 44 Emphasis added. 18 and unilateral contract theories to maneuver around the plain terms of the Arbitration Agreement, but we do not see how either theory takes them where they want to go. Petitioners drafted a contract that does not condition the furnishing of services upon acceptance of arbitration. Considering that clear proviso, we cannot say that it is inequitable for Ms. Faw to have benefitted from the Residency Agreement while permitting Administratrix Hoover to pursue the Estate’s claims in court, rather than before an arbitrator. 45 Nor can we say that Ms. Faw’s acceptance of the benefits of the Residency Agreement equates to acceptance of the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. Again, that is because acceptance of the terms of the Arbitration Agreement was not a precondition to receipt of services under the Residency Agreement. For those reasons, we reject Petitioners’ estoppel and unilateral contract theories, in addition to their theories of ratification and assent for the reasons already stated. 46 45 See Bayles, 243 W. Va. at 41, 842 S.E.2d at 245 (“‘The doctrine of equitable estoppel is applied only in very compelling circumstances, where the interests of justice, morality and common fairness clearly dictate that course.’”) (quoting IBS Fin. Corp. v. Seidman & Assocs., L.L.C., 136 F.3d 940, 948 (3d Cir. 1998) (cleaned up)); see also Syl. Pt. 3, Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Lane, 152 W. Va. 578, 165 S.E.2d 379 (1969) (“The doctrine of estoppel should be applied cautiously and only when equity clearly requires it to be done.”). 46 Petitioners argue that AMFM, LLC v. Shanklin, 241 W. Va. 56, 818 S.E.2d 882 (2018), “should compel this Court to find that the arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable . . . .” We disagree. In Shanklin, we considered whether a “durable power of attorney . . . provided an adult daughter with the authority to enter into an arbitration agreement with a nursing home on her mother’s behalf.” Id. at 58, 818 S.E.2d at 884. Our analysis in that case turned on pertinent provisions of the Uniform Power of Attorney Act, 19