Opinion ID: 168603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Title V II Claim

Text: W e review the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law de novo, using the same standard employed by the district court. M ason v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 115 F.3d 1442, 1450 (10th Cir. 1997). W e construe the facts of the case in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. In doing so we bear in mind that “[u]nless the proof is all one way or so overwhelmingly preponderant in favor of the movant as to permit no other rational conclusion, judgment as a matter of law is improper.” Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 -5- F.3d 554, 557 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted).
Title VII outlines four classes of persons w ho are exempt from its protection: (1) elected officials; (2) persons chosen by an elected official to be on such official’s personal staff; (3) “appointee[s] on the policy making level”; and (4) persons serving as an immediate adviser to the elected official with respect to the constitutional exercise of the powers of the official’s office. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). 1 Crumpacker was not an elected official, nor was her position at KDHR on the personal staff of the Governor. KDHR does not allege that Crumpacker was an immediate adviser to the Governor or any other elected official with respect to the exercise of their powers of office. Thus, we are concerned exclusively with 1 The full text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) provides: The term “employee” means an individual employed by an employer, except that the term “employee” shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision. W ith respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States. Id. (emphasis added). -6- the third exemption: for an “appointee on the policy making level.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(f).
This is not the first time w e have addressed the requirements for Title VII’s policy maker exemption. In Anderson v. Albuquerque, 690 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1982), we held that a Title VII plaintiff falls within this exemption only if “appointed by an elected official to a policy making position.” Id. at 800 (emphasis added). In that case w e concluded, moreover, that an elected official’s participation in the selection process alone would not demonstrate compliance with the appointment requirement, especially where the employee did not work with the elected official in the “intimate and sensitive association contemplated by [Congress].” Id. In reaching this result, we pointed to Congress’s explanation of the scope of the exemption: it is the intention of the conferees to exempt elected officials . . . and persons appointed by such elected officials as advisors or to policym aking positions at the highest levels of the departments or agencies of State or local governments, such as cabinet officers, and persons with comparable responsibilities at the local level. Joint Explanatory Statement, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2179–80. 2 2 Other courts which have considered this exception agree that the appointment must be made by an elected official. See, e.g., Tranello v. Frey, 962 F.2d 244, 248–51 (2d Cir. 1992); Rutland v. M oore, 54 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 1995); Butler v. N.Y. State Dept. of Law, 211 F.3d 739, 747–48 (2d Cir. 2000); E.E.O.C. v. M assachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 55–56 (1st Cir. 1988). In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the late Justice White also specifically endorsed this view in a (continued...) -7- Accordingly, to be exempt from Title VII’s protections, Crumpacker must (1) have been appointed by an elected official, and (2) acted as a policy maker. In light of this precedent, KDHR has not argued that an appointment implicating Title VII’s policy maker exception could be made by someone other than an elected official.
KDHR makes two arguments based on K ansas law that Crumpacker is a political appointee of the Governor. First it argues that Crumpacker was an unclassified employee, not subject to traditional civil service protections under state law and should therefore be considered to be exempt from Title VII’s protections. Second, it argues that the G overnor’s consent to her appointment by the Secretary satisfies the policy maker exception. Crumpacker’s status as an unclassified employee under state law is a necessary predicate, but not determinative of her exemption from Title VII protection under federal law. Title VII explicitly provides that persons subject to a state’s civil service laws may not be excluded from Title VII protections, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (“The exemption . . . shall not include employees subject to the civil 2 (...continued) concurrence joined by Justice Stevens. 501 U .S. 452, 481–82 (1991) (W hite, J. concurring). -8- service laws. . . .”). 3 But the converse is not also true— every unclassified employee is not necessarily exempt from the Act. KDHR’s second argument— the Governor’s consent required by Kansas statute constitutes an appointment— is also ultimately unpersuasive. Section 755702 of the Kansas code requires that a division director be appointed by the Secretary of KDHR “with the consent of the governor.” 4 Kansas argues the statutory requirement that the Governor “consent” to Crumpacker’s appointment means functionally that every employee subject to the provision is appointed by the 3 It is also the case that an individual’s exemption from state civil service laws is cited by the EEOC as an indication that the individual is not protected by Title VII. See EEOC Compliance M anual § 2-III A-5. 4 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-5702 provides: The secretary of labor may appoint, with the consent of the governor, one public information officer, one or m ore division directors, one personal secretary and one special assistant, all of whom shall serve at the pleasure of the secretary of labor, shall be in the unclassified service under the Kansas civil service act and shall receive an annual salary fixed by the secretary of labor with the approval of the governor. The secretary of labor also may appoint such other officers and employees as are necessary to enable the secretary to carry out the duties of the office of the secretary and the department of labor. Except as otherwise specifically provided by law , such officers and employees shall be within the classified service under the Kansas civil service act. All personnel of the department of labor shall perform the duties and functions assigned to them by the secretary or prescribed for them by law and shall act for and exercise the powers of the secretary of labor to the extent authority to do so is delegated by the secretary. Id. (emphasis added). -9- Governor. 5 W e agree that this statutory language is relevant to our inquiry. W e conclude, however, that an analysis of the statute does not yield the conclusion that Crumpacker w as appointed by the Governor. To determine whether a person is appointed by an elected official under Title VII is a two-step process. The first step is to decide the meaning of applicable Kansas law. If the state law is clear, our analysis ends. If the law is indeterminate, we must look to the underlying facts surrounding the appointment to help answer the question. W hen attempting to answer a question of state substantive law, we look to the statutory text or interpretations of the text by the state’s highest court. Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1104 n.7 (10th Cir. 2005). Here, we are presented with a statute on which no Kansas court has spoken. Therefore, we are left to interpret § 75-5702 as a matter of first impression. The Department asks us to read § 75-5702 as vesting ultimate appointment power in the Governor for purposes of Title VII, interpreting the statute’s “consent” requirement as the sine qua non of the appointment power. W e disagree. The plain 5 It bears mentioning that the K ansas C onstitution provides for a unitary executive. Kansas Const. Article I, Clause 3. This makes the Kansas system analogous to the federal system. In the context of the federal government, it is w ell established that A rticle II vests appointment authority in the President. No circuit court has had occasion to consider an argument that where a state constitution mandates a unitary executive, all state appointment authority not constitutionally assigned to another elected constitutional officer must be presumed to lie w ith that executive. KDHR has not made such an argument in this case, and we therefore do not consider it. -10- language of the statute vests the appointment power with the Secretary of KDH R, who is not an elected official. Simply put, even if we agree the “consent” provision requires some level of participation by the Governor in Crumpacker’s appointment, it does not subsume the Secretary’s ultimate appointment responsibility in the hiring process. 6 W hile it is clear the Governor’s office has some role in personnel selection at the sub-cabinet level, § 75-5702 nonetheless assigns to the Secretary, not the G overnor, the responsibility to “appoint” division directors. 7 Nevertheless, the nature of an appointment for purposes of Title VII is a question of federal law, and we cannot deny that § 75-5702 allows for some degree of involvement by an elected official in the appointment process. This uncertainty requires w e turn to an analysis of how the statute w as actually implemented in this case. W e do so noting that where a state statute unambiguously and unqualifiedly 6 KDHR also argues that the term “consent” denotes a degree of action inconsistent with passive approval. Even so, as we discuss below, the appointment here was ultimately made by the Secretary, and the record does not suggest active involvement by the Governor in Crumpacker’s selection. 7 KDHR further contends that the “consent” required from the Governor is equivalent to the advice and consent of the Senate to Presidential appointments. This analogy is unhelpful to KDHR: it is indisputable that federal appointment power is vested in the President. The Senate’s advice and consent power, exercised in the confirmation process, does not turn Presidential appointees into Senatorial appointees. -11- vests the appointment power in a specific elected or non-elected official, we will not construe the statute to say otherwise. 8 Despite the noted ambiguity, the statute itself weighs in favor of a conclusion that Crumpacker was not appointed by the Governor. The record also breaks in Crumpacker’s favor. It shows that Secretary Franklin, not the G overnor, interview ed and appointed Crumpacker for the director’s position. Secretary Franklin was, by all accounts at trial, the person who took note of Crumpacker’s perform ance in the G overnor’s office and who asked her to apply for the KDHR position. Franklin made the decision to hire Crumpacker, and in the end, made the decision to fire her. Nothing suggests the G overnor compelled Franklin to hire Crumpacker, or otherwise actively orchestrated her interview and appointment to the position. Nor did the Governor control her day-to-day job responsibilities, monitor her performance, or insist on her eventual firing. KDHR, however, maintains that the evidence presented at trial compels a different conclusion, citing four pieces of evidence: (1) Secretary Franklin’s letter to the G overnor requesting permission to appoint Crumpacker; (2) the G overnor’s approval of the pool of candidates for Crumpacker’s position; (3) the G overnor’s later appointment of C rumpacker to the KW IP task force as a result of her KDH R 8 Nothing prevents K ansas from expressly exempting sub-cabinet officials like Crumpacker from Title VII under state law. It would be a simple m atter to modify the scheme to require a direct gubernatorial appointment of such officials, and, so long as the Governor follows the statute and these employees are engaged in a policy making role, the Title VII exemption will apply. -12- directorship; and (4) Franklin’s request that the G overnor agree to Crumpacker’s firing. W e disagree that these facts mandate the conclusion that Crumpacker was a gubernatorial appointee. To the contrary, the record is clear that Franklin asked Crumpacker to apply for the position, personally selected Crumpacker from the pool of candidates, interview ed her for the position, and sought the Governor’s “consent” as required under § 75-5702. Franklin then appointed her, as was his statutory prerogative. Crumpacker’s KW IP duties, while certainly pursuant to a gubernatorial appointment, were nonetheless derivative of her responsibilities at KDHR. Crumpacker served on KW IP because of her KDHR job, not vice-versa. 9 M oreover, though Franklin testified he asked the Governor’s advice regarding his dissatisfaction with Crumpacker, the G overnor took no part in Crumpacker’s termination. Finally, § 75-5702 plainly states that Crumpacker served “at the pleasure of the secretary,” and it is the Secretary who made the decision to fire her. Based on this evidence, we cannot find that the district court erred in concluding that Franklin, not the Governor, appointed Crumpacker. W hile we can imagine a case where the noted statutory ambiguity would allow a record of active 9 KDHR maintians it is undisputed that the Governor appointed Crumpacker to the KW IP task force. Assuming that this is a qualifying appointment by an elected official under Title VII, we nonetheless note that Crumpacker’s hybrid duties arising from KW IP and KDHR do not preclude a Title VII lawsuit arising out of Crumpacker’s duties exclusively attributable to KDHR. It is clear from this record that Crumpacker’s KDHR position was her primary position and her KW IP responsibilities were an ancillary to her K DHR work. -13- involvement by the Governor to render an appointment gubernatorial, this is not that case. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that neither Kansas law nor the facts presented at trial compel a finding that Crumpacker was appointed by an elected official as required under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). Crumpacker is, therefore, not subject to the policy maker exemption to Title VII, and her discrimination claims were properly considered by the jury. As a result of this conclusion, we need not address the second requirement of the exemption— whether her duties w ere actually those of a policy maker.
KDHR’s subsidiary argument is that the jury verdict intrudes on core state governmental functions and is, therefore, inconsistent with the Eleventh Amendment, citing to Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991) (holding that federal law does not preempt M issouri’s mandatory judicial retirement age). W e rejected this argument in Crumpacker I and reject it here for the same reasons. See 338 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2003).