Opinion ID: 4528737
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conduct Establishing Sexual Motivation

Text: According to W. Va. Code § 15-12-2(c), a defendant’s obligation to register as a sex offender turns, first, on whether he “has been convicted of a criminal offense” and, second, on whether “the sentencing judge made a written finding that the offense was 15 sexually motivated[.]” 17 An offense is sexually motivated when “one of the purposes for which a person committed the crime was for any person’s sexual gratification.” W. Va. Code § 15-12-2(j). In this case, the circuit court determined that Petitioner committed battery when he carried A.M. to the back room. However, the State’s witnesses actually described several instances where Petitioner’s conduct could be described as “unlawfully and intentionally mak[ing] physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature to the person of another[.]” W. Va. Code § 61-2-9(c). 18 For example, Petitioner allegedly touched the victim’s breasts and buttocks when she was on the couch. By his own admission, he also threw her on the couch when she “attacked” him. Petitioner contends that the circuit court was wrong to single out one alleged instance of battery as the basis for its sexual motivation finding. Petitioner’s argument ignores two facts. First, the jurors did not tell the circuit court the nature of the battery that led to Petitioner’s conviction. Therefore, it was necessarily up to the circuit court to identify the conduct that was sexually motivated under W. Va. Code § 15-12-2(c). Accordingly, we hold that when a sentencing court makes a written finding of sexual motivation under W. Va. Code § 15-12-2(c), the sentencing court 17 The standard set forth in W. Va. Code § 15-12-2(c) only applies when the defendant’s criminal offense is not listed among the offenses—like sexual assault—that lead to automatic registration. See W. Va. Code § 15-12-2(b). Battery is not a listed offense that results in automatic registration. 18 See supra note 11. 16 has the discretion to determine that the particular misconduct that led to the defendant’s conviction exhibited sexual motivation, and we will not disturb this determination on appeal unless the sentencing court abuses its discretion. This brings us to the second relevant fact, which is that, in this instance, Petitioner was convicted of battery as a lesser included offense of sexual assault in the second degree. This is appropriate when “the primary offense . . . [is] fully and plainly charged in the indictment, such that a defendant . . . [is] on notice to mount a defense to both the primary offenses and any lesser-included offense.” State v. Corra, 223 W. Va. 573, 583, 678 S.E.2d 306, 316 (2009), holding modified by Lewis v. Ames, ___ W. Va. ___, 836 S.E.2d 56 (2019). When we review a circuit court’s decision to instruct a jury on a lesser included offense, we typically focus on two things. “The first inquiry is a legal one having to do with whether the lesser offense is by virtue of its legal elements or definition included in the greater offense.” State v. Neider, 170 W. Va. 662, 664, 295 S.E.2d 902, 904 (1982). “The second inquiry is a factual one which involves a determination by the trial court if there is evidence which would tend to prove such lesser included offense.” Id. at 665, 295 S.E.2d at 905. There was testimony that Petitioner had sexual intercourse with A.M. in the back room, and “sexual intercourse with A.M.” was the conduct charged in the indictment. The circuit court apparently determined that Petitioner committed battery when he carried 17 A.M. to the back room, and we find no abuse of discretion in such finding. As the circuit court found, 1) The [Petitioner]’s own audio statement to the police proves sexual motivation beyond a reasonable doubt. The [Petitioner] admitted to the police that he gave [J.M.] (a minor) the encouragement to have sex with the victim as long as she was awake. . . . 2) The Defendant also made admissions to the police that he told [J.M.] that “if she was awake you can go for it”; . . . and that “she wants anybody right now.” 3) The . . . testimony of three different witnesses, [B.S.], [A.G.], and [Z.P.], proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the [Petitioner]’s action were sexually motivated. All three witnesses testified at trial that the [Petitioner] helped carry the victim’s limp body into a back bedroom where she was sexually assaulted. 4) In addition, . . . the victim was highly intoxicated and obviously impaired at the time that the [Petitioner] helped carry her to the bedroom and encouraged [J.M.] to have sex with her. . . . 5) The evidence at trial also proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the [Petitioner], who was over the age of 21, purchased the alcohol consumed by the victim and others prior to the sexual assault. The victim was 16 years old, the perpetrators and other teenage witnesses were 18 or under the age of 18 at the time of the events. The conduct that the circuit court identified directly contributed to the crime alleged in the indictment and may be properly described as part of the same alleged criminal transaction. Accordingly, we find that the circuit court was within its discretion to determine that this misconduct was the relevant misconduct for purposes of its finding of sexual motivation. 18