Opinion ID: 1060172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Voluntariness of Roach's Confession

Text: Roach argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his confession as being involuntary for purposes of exposing him to the death penalty. Roach asserts that his waiver of Miranda rights was questionable, and that he made his statements based on the mistaken belief that he would receive the benefit of a lesser penalty in exchange for admitting that he had shot Hughes. He contends that the statements were induced by Sheriff Morris's allegedly misleading remarks such as the truth is so very, very important to you, to us and to yourself. In assessing the voluntariness of Roach's statement, we apply a well-established standard of review. In Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 356 S.E.2d 157, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873, 108 S.Ct. 207, 98 L.Ed.2d 158 (1987), we said: A defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights is valid only if the waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently, Miranda [ v. State of Arizona ], 384 U.S. [436] at 475 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)]. Whether a statement is voluntary is ultimately a legal rather than factual question. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110, 106 S.Ct. 445, 450 [88 L.Ed.2d 405] (1985). Subsidiary factual questions, however, are entitled to a presumption of correctness. Id. at 112, 106 S.Ct. at 451. The test to be applied in determining voluntariness is whether the statement is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker, or whether the maker's will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 [93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854] (1973). In determining whether a defendant's will has been overborne, courts look to the totality of all the surrounding circumstances, id. at 226, [93 S.Ct. at 2046-2047] including the defendant's background and experience and the conduct of the police, Correll v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 454, 464, 352 S.E.2d 352, 357 (1987); Stockton [ v. Commonwealth ], 227 Va. [124] at 140, 314 S.E.2d [371] at 381 [(1984)]. Id. at 324, 356 S.E.2d at 163. The record shows that Roach was of average intelligence, and that he telephoned Sheriff Morris to initiate the questioning. Prior to the interrogation, Morris advised Roach and Roach's father of Roach's Miranda rights. Although John Roach was not present during the interrogation, both he and Steve Roach indicated that they understood the Miranda rights and they signed the waiver forms. During the interrogation, there was no mention of the death penalty at any time. Roach stated to Morris that he was making the statements of his own free will, without pressure of threats or promises. We also consider the factual findings made by the trial court. The trial court found that Roach was not intoxicated [and] understood his surroundings and the questions asked of him. The court found that the interrogation atmosphere was not coercive and that Roach had not been threatened in any way. The court found that the entreaties to Roach to tell the truth did not overbear Roach's will. Because these factual findings are supported by the record, we accord them substantial weight in our determination whether Roach's statements were voluntary. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112, 106 S.Ct. 445, 450-451, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). Based on the above evidence and findings, we hold that Roach's statements were voluntary. No threats or promises were made to induce the confession and there is no evidence indicating that the confession was coerced. Instead, the evidence demonstrates that the statements were the product of Roach's free and unconstrained choice.