Opinion ID: 186020
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Revenue Enhancement

Text: 26 Finally, Ranger argues the Commission violated 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(7)(B), which provides that in prescribing regulations pursuant to Paragraph 4(A) of this subsection, the Commission may not base a finding of public interest, convenience and necessity solely or predominantly on the expectation of Federal revenues from the use of a system of competitive bidding under this subsection. Specifically, Ranger contends the Commission opened the bidding to newcomers solely or predominantly for the purpose of enhancing what the licenses would fetch. 27 The Commission argues first that § 309(j)(7)(B) applies only in specifically-enumerated circumstances, of which determining eligibility to participate in an auction does not appear to be one. The Commission maintains that, on the contrary, it is charged with assigning spectrum to the party that places the highest value on the use of the spectrum, because that party is presumed to be most likely to use the licenses efficiently. 28 The Commission clearly has the better of the argument here: Section 309(j)(7)(B) simply does not apply to this case. It applies only to regulations concerning alternative payment schedules and methods of calculation to be used in specifying the methodology of competitive bidding. So far as § 309(j)(7)(B) is concerned, therefore, the Commission is free to consider revenue enhancement when determining whether to expand the pool of eligible bidders. 29 Unfortunately, the Commission did not notice that § 309(j)(7)(B) was inapplicable to this proceeding until briefing the matter to this court. In the Order itself the Commission instead explained why it was in compliance with that provision. We do not ordinarily consider an argument made for the first time on review. District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1084 (D.C.Cir.1984) (It is well settled that issues and legal theories not asserted at the District Court level ordinarily will not be heard on appeal). In this case, however, we have no qualms about doing so: The statute is clearly inapplicable. Indeed, Ranger does not suggest otherwise, resting instead upon the Commission's tardiness in raising the point. 30 We would be tilting at a non-existent windmill were we to consider whether the Commission has complied with an inapplicable statute. Cf. United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 447, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 2178, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993) (a court may consider an issue antecedent to ... and ultimately dispositive of the dispute before it, even an issue the parties fail to identify and brief) (internal quotation marks omitted); Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557, 61 S.Ct. 719, 721, 85 L.Ed. 1037 (1941) (There may always be exceptional cases or particular circumstances which will prompt a reviewing or appellate court, where injustice might otherwise result, to consider questions of law which were neither pressed nor passed upon by the court or administrative agency below). Surely, even if it has not complied, we would not, knowing that the statute is inapplicable, require the Commission to close the auction to newcomers; to do so would thwart the clearly stated will of the Congress because of a temporary oversight by the Commission.