Opinion ID: 1611671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: whether cumulative errors in this case denied jones his right to a fair trial.

Text: ¶ 74. In his final assignment of error, Jones alleges the trial court committed numerous other errors, the cumulative effect of which deprived him of a fair trial. In this assignment of error, Jones offers little or no authority or record support for his arguments. As stated, this Court is under no obligation to review assignments of error unsupported by argument or citation to authority. Pate v. State, 419 So.2d 1324,1325-26 (Miss.1982). However, due to the seriousness of the crime Jones was convicted of committing and the fact that he will be incarcerated for the remainder of his life, each of his arguments have been considered and will be addressed. (1) Fruits of the Poisonous Tree. ¶ 75. First, Jones reiterates his allegation that his confessions and all evidence gained because of them and subsequently used against him should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree flowing from his illegal arrest, the violation of his right to counsel, and the intervention of the District Attorney. Each of these allegations has already been discussed and dismissed as lacking merit. Therefore, no further discussion is warranted here. (2) Disqualification of District Attorney. ¶ 76. Next, Jones argues that the trial court erred by refusing to disqualify District Attorney Frank Carlton as he was a potential witness in the case and by allowing him to participate in the case and remain in the courtroom, though other witnesses were sequestered. Jones cites numerous cases for the proposition that courts and prosecutors should strive to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. However, no such appearance was created in this case. Carlton was not a fact witness. He was a witness to a preliminary matter and testified at the suppression hearing outside the presence of the jury. Once the decision was made by Judge Hines to deny the motion to suppress Jones's statements, there could not have been any further purpose or use in having Carlton as a potential witness. [8] This assignment is without merit. (3) Disqualification of Jurors. ¶ 77. Jones further asserts error in the trial court's overruling his motion to disqualify a panel of jurors because, during voir dire as to juror's opinion of the death penalty, one among them made the comment if you commit a crime and you kill someone, then you should give your own life. The defense moved to disqualify the panel. The court did not grant the motion but rather examined the other members as to whether the comment changed their positions. At the conclusion of the case, Jones was sentenced to life imprisonment. As he did not receive the death penalty, this issue is moot. (4) Injury to Jones's hand. ¶ 78. Jones claims the trial court erred in allowing any evidence regarding his cut hand, arguing it was fruit of an illegal arrest and was a warrantless search of the Defendant's person in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article 3, Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution. This contention was analyzed and dismissed as having no merit in Section II supra. (5) Evidentiary Rulings. ¶ 79. Jones asserts various evidentiary rulings made during the trial as error. These include: allowing the jury to have copies of statements during the trial and thereby putting added emphasis on that evidence; allowing redirect examination over defense objection concerning the lineup; overruling an objection concerning garbage bags; overruling an objection to the cumulative testimony of Peggy Kuntz; overruling an objection to the testimony of Dr. Steven Hayne as being cumulative to that of the coroner; and allowing Pam Miller to testify despite defense objections that her testimony was cumulative of crime lab testimony. ¶ 80. Questions of relevancy and admissibility are left to the discretion of the trial court. Century 21 Deep South Properties, Ltd. v. Corson, 612 So.2d 359, 369 (Miss.1992). Admission of testimony is subject only to an abuse of discretion review. Tatum v. Barrentine, 797 So.2d 223, 230 (Miss.2001) (citing Thompson Mach. Commerce Corp. v. Wallace, 687 So.2d 149, 152 (Miss.1997)). Evidentiary rulings are within the broad discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 784 (Miss.1997). In this Court's opinion, the trial court did not abuse his discretion in admitting this evidence. (6) Denial of Defendant's Motion to Exclude the State's Evidence. ¶ 81. Jones next argues Judge Hines erred in denying his motion to exclude the State's evidence and direct a verdict for the defense. This issue is without merit. The evidence presented by the State was sufficient for the jury to convict Jones of the crime charged. It cannot be said that it was against the great overwhelming weight of the evidence or manifestly wrong. The State presented evidence that Jones lived with and worked for Wilkerson, that he left town on the day of the murder, that he confessed to committing the murder and that he was hired and paid for the murder by Shamoun. They told the jury how Jones led them to the murder weapon, and how he led them to Wilkerson's car, which was in the bottom of a lake. The jury was justified in returning a verdict of guilty on the evidence. This issue is without merit. (7) Denial of motions for mistrial. ¶ 82. Jones alleges the trial court erred in denying two motions for mistrial due to alleged prosecutorial misconduct during his closing argument in the sentencing phase. During his closing argument, the district attorney told the jury, [y]ou might also say a prayer for the Wilkerson family. The defense objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. Later in the same argument, the district attorney stated, The Bible tells you that you reap what you sow. The defense objected, and the judge overruled the objection, finding that the district attorney was using the Bible for a literary reference rather than to interject religion. ¶ 83. A party has broad latitude in closing argument. Wells v. State, 698 So.2d 497, 506 (Miss.1997). In determining whether a prosecutor's remarks necessitate reversal, the test is whether the natural and probable effect of the prosecuting attorney's improper argument created unjust prejudice against the accused resulting in a decision influenced by prejudice. Davis v. State, 530 So.2d 694, 701 (Miss.1988). The trial judge is in the best position to determine the prejudicial effect of the objectionable comment; thus the trial court is entrusted with the discretion to determine whether an improper statement made during a closing argument warrants a mistrial. Alexander v. State, 602 So.2d 1180, 1182 (Miss.1992). In light of the overwhelming evidence against Jones, the jury's verdict likely was not influenced by any prejudice that might have resulted from the district attorney's isolated comments. As the trial judge was in the best position to determine the level of prejudice, if any, that resulted from this comment, this Court will defer to his finding. Therefore, this issue is without merit. ¶ 84. Jones also argues that the court erred in denying a motion for mistrial following a disruption of the trial by the victim's family. Apparently, some of them left the courtroom crying loudly during Dr. Steven Hayne's testimony. The judge sent the jury out of the courtroom and admonished the spectators to remain quiet. The defense did not request and the trial judge did not give a curative instruction to the effect that the jury should disregard the outburst. However, the trial judge did ban all the persons who disrupted the proceeding from attending the remainder of the trial. ¶ 85. In Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 848-49 (Miss.1994), during the guilt phase of the trial, the victim's widow took the stand and began crying as she described her husband's murder. This prompted other family members in the audience to begin crying as well. Defense counsel made an objection for mistrial which the trial court overruled. This Court stated that, the trial judge is in a better position to assess the effect of such an incident than is this Court on appeal, and this Court will not reverse on the failure to grant a mistrial unless a trial judge abused his discretion in overruling the motion for a mistrial. Id. at 848 (quoting Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743, 753 (Miss.1991)). See also Davis v. State, 530 So.2d 694, 697 (Miss.1988). In Floyd v. State, 166 Miss. 15, 148 So. 226, 232 (1933), this Court held, as long as an audience does not disturb or prevent a fair trial, we cannot control the lower court in its discretion, and tell it when to exercise authority and when not. It is only when it is evident that such authority should be exercised, and is not, that this Court will interfere. ¶ 86. In the case at bar, the trial court immediately restored order to the courtroom and admonished the spectators of the impropriety of their actions and that any further outbursts would result the declaration of a mistrial. He banned the spectators that caused the disruption from attending the remainder of the trial. The trial court immediately admonished the spectators, and no other outburst occurred. This issue is without merit. (8) Failure to Grant Continuances. ¶ 87. Jones argues that he was denied a fair trial by the refusal of a continuance for the purpose of securing an investigator in West Virginia and a mental health professional to evaluate the defendant and to prepare to testify at the sentencing phase. This issue was addressed in Section V(2), supra, in regard to Jones's claim of judicial bias. Here, as there, this Court holds that this issue is moot because Jones did not receive the death penalty. ¶ 88. Jones reiterates his argument that it was error to deny a continuance for the purpose of allowing the defense to review the DNA evidence and discuss this with the defense experts prior to the commencement of trial. Jones also argues that it was error to force the defense to trial before they had adequate time to prepare to meet the State's DNA evidence which was provided to them one week before trial. This issue has also been raised and dismissed earlier. See Section V(3), supra. It is also moot because the DNA evidence was ruled inadmissible by the trial court. ¶ 89. This issue is without merit.