Opinion ID: 1811748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over dr. wright and semmes-murphy.

Text: ¶ 9. This Court conducts a de novo review of jurisdictional matters. McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So.2d 303, 308 (Miss.1989) ( citing MISS CAL 204, Ltd. v. Upchurch, 465 So.2d 326, 330 (Miss.1985); S & A Realty Co. v. Hilburn, 249 So.2d 379, 382 (Miss.1971)). Jurisdiction is determined as of the time the suit is filed. Euclid-Mississippi v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 249 Miss. 547, 554, 163 So.2d 676, 679 (1964); Compton v. Compton, 188 Miss. 670, 673, 196 So. 635, 637 (1940). The proper order when analyzing personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants is to first consider whether the long-arm statute subjects a nonresident defendant to personal jurisdiction and then to consider whether the statute's application to that defendant offends the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Sorrells v. R & R Custom Coach Works, Inc., 636 So.2d 668, 671 (Miss.1994). See also Horne v. Mobile Area Water & Sewer Sys., 897 So.2d 972, 976 (Miss.2004). ¶ 10. Dr. Wright and Semmes-Murphy filed a motion to dismiss based upon the circuit court's lack of jurisdiction over their person after the Phillipses filed their Third Amended Complaint. They were deposed concerning their jurisdictional contacts. The Phillipses also propounded requests for admission upon the doctor and clinic. After further briefing and a hearing, the circuit court denied the motions to dismiss. Dr. Wright and Semmes-Murphy again raised the matter of jurisdiction in post-trial motions. The circuit court denied those motions as well.
¶ 11. On appeal, Dr. Wright and the clinic first argue Mississippi's long-arm statute does not reach to subject them to suit in Mississippi courts. The Phillipses respond that either or both of the tort or doing business components of the long-arm statute enabled the circuit court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Dr. Wright and the clinic. Section 13-3-57 of the Mississippi Code, commonly called the long-arm statute, provides, in relevant part: Any nonresident person ... or any foreign or other corporation not qualified under the Constitution and laws of this state as to doing business herein, who shall ... commit a tort in whole or in part in this state against a resident or nonresident of this state, or who shall do any business or perform any character of work or service in this state, shall by such act or acts be deemed to be doing business in Mississippi and shall thereby be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state. Miss.Code Ann. § 13-3-57 (Rev.2002) ( emphasis added. ) The threshold condition for application of the long-arm statute is the requirement that the nonresident corporation, over which personal jurisdiction is sought, is not a corporation qualified to do business in this state. Sorrells, 636 So.2d at 671. ¶ 12. Assuming, for argument's sake, that Semmes-Murphy was a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in Mississippi [4] , the clinic and Dr. Wright still subjected themselves to the personal jurisdiction of Mississippi courts under the doing-business component of Mississippi's long-arm statute, as discussed below.
¶ 13. The clinic and Dr. Wright argue the clinic's contacts with this state cannot be imputed to Dr. Wright for long-arm statute analysis purposes because the clinic's liability was derivative of Dr. Wright's conduct. They also argue the character of work Dr. Wright performed in this state was not related to any act or transaction from which this action arose. The Phillipses argue there is nothing within the long-arm statute which restricts its application to the cause of action. ¶ 14. The long-arm statute could not be more clear: Any corporation or person who shall do any business or perform any character of work or service in this state is subject to the personal jurisdiction of Mississippi courts. Miss.Code Ann. § 13-3-57 (Rev.2002). At one point, the long-arm statute required the cause of action to be connected with the business or work or service in this state. [5] See Mladinich v. Kohn, 250 Miss. 138, 147, 164 So.2d 785, 790 (1964). The Legislature removed this nexus requirement in 1991. Gross v. Chevrolet Country, Inc., 655 So.2d 873, 878 (Miss.1995). As it stands now, the long-arm statute, by its plain terms, applies to any person or corporation performing any character of work in this state. ¶ 15. It is uncontested that Dr. Wright was licensed to practice medicine in Mississippi in 2001 and did so occasionally (or hardly ever), visiting the patients of another Semmes-Murphy physician who were being treated at Baptist Hospital-DeSoto in Southaven, Mississippi. [6] The clinic had an office in Southaven and rented timeshare office space in Grenada and Corinth, Mississippi. [7] It staffed these offices with physicians who treated patients who resided in Mississippi. The evidence indicates both Dr. Wright and the clinic did business or performed work in this state. We find that Dr. Wright and the Semmes-Murphy Clinic did business in this state and, therefore, are subject to the jurisdiction of Mississippi courts under the clear terms of the long-arm statute. ¶ 16. Since both Dr. Wright and the Semmes-Murphy Clinic subjected themselves to suit under the doing-business component of the long-arm statute, considering whether the tort component of the long-arm statute also subjects both to the jurisdiction of Mississippi courts is unnecessary. ¶ 17. The next issue is whether the circuit court's assertion of jurisdiction over Dr. Wright and the Semmes-Murphy Clinic under the long-arm statute offends the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
¶ 18. [D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) ( quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940).) The requirements of International Shoe ... must be met as to each defendant over whom a state court exercises jurisdiction. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332, 100 S.Ct. 571, 62 L.Ed.2d 516 (1980). Cf. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984) (an employee's contacts with the forum state are not to be judged according to the employer's activities there). Since the opinion in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987), courts have divided the question whether due process has been afforded a nonresident defendant into two considerations: (1) the extent and quality of the contacts of the defendant with the forum state and, assuming sufficient minimum contacts exist, (2) whether the maintenance of the suit in the forum state offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See Id., 480 U.S. at 113-15, 107 S.Ct. 1026; Amer. Cable Corp. v. Trilogy Communications, Inc., 754 So.2d 545, 550-552 (Miss.Ct.App.2000); Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 285 (5th Cir.1997). In keeping with this practice, we will similarly divide the issue.
¶ 19. Dr. Wright argues he did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Mississippi to reasonably anticipate being haled into court here. He and Semmes-Murphy again argue that the clinic's contacts with this state cannot be imputed to him because the clinic's liability was derivative of his own. [8] The Phillipses respond by arguing both the clinic and Dr. Wright have minimum contacts generally with Mississippi; the clinic's contacts can be imputed to Dr. Wright; and Dr. Wright's specific contacts with the sate as part of his treatment of Mr. Phillips all subjected them to the jurisdiction of the circuit court below. [9] We agree that the clinic's contacts with this state cannot be imputed to Dr. Wright for purposes of determining whether Dr. Wright has minimum contacts with Mississippi. See Rush, 444 U.S. at 332, 100 S.Ct. 571; Calder, 465 U.S. at 790, 104 S.Ct. 1482. However, Dr. Wright's own contacts with this state subjected him to the jurisdiction of our state courts so that the Due Process Clause was not offended. ¶ 20. Historically, minimum contacts have been split into two types: those which invoke specific jurisdiction over a defendant and those that lead to general jurisdiction over a defendant. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-415, nn. 8, 9, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473, n. 15, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). See also Am. Cable Corp., 754 So.2d at 550; Allred, 117 F.3d at 286. The U.S. Supreme Court explained the requirements for specific jurisdiction as follows: Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has not consented to suit there, this fair warning [that a particular activity may subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign] requirement is satisfied if the defendant has purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984), and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174. We may exercise general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the defendant's activities in the forum state as long as the defendant's contacts with the forum are systematic and continuous. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-418, 104 S.Ct. 1868. This lawsuit is related to Dr. Wright's contacts with Mississippi so that the circuit court properly exercised specific jurisdiction over him.
¶ 21. The record reflects that Dr. Wright was first licensed to practice medicine in this state in 1993 and practiced here until early 2001. The nature of his practice within this state was covering the patients of another physician associated with Semmes-Murphy at Baptist Hospital-Southaven, Mississippi. When he moved to Memphis in 1993 to practice with Semmes-Murphy, Dr. Wright knew this coverage was expected of him, so he maintained a medical license from Mississippi. [10] He described the frequency of his coverage of that doctor's patients as occasionally or hardly ever. He also made telephone calls to this state to Mary Phillips and Dr. Cooper for the purpose of having Mr. Phillips travel to Memphis for immediate medical treatment. Ordinarily, this phone call would be an incidental contact with this state caused by the necessity to have Mr. Phillips obtain further medical treatment immediately. However, Dr. Wright specifically instructed Mr. Phillips to come to the Baptist Hospital in Memphis (where Dr. Wright apparently had admitting privileges) rather than generally instructing Mr. Phillips to go to a hospital (such as Northwest Regional in Clarksdale) and seeking to have him admitted there. This distinction illustrates how this contact was directed toward a resident of Mississippi and drawing that resident to another forum rather than the resident independently choosing to exit the state. ¶ 22. Dr. Wright's activities were directed purposefully at residents of this state, and from these activities the present litigation arose. Dr. Wright reasonably could have anticipated being sued for negligent treatment in Mississippi courts. Therefore, Dr. Wright had minimum contacts with this state such that the circuit court's exercise of specific jurisdiction over him was not constitutionally deficient.