Opinion ID: 1191526
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Public easement by necessity.

Text: The News also argue that the judgment is sustainable on the following theory. The implied easement which Teas retained when he conveyed part of his land to the Demoskis and the three others was an easement which was reasonably necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of the remaining property that he owned. The only easement fitting that description, according to the News, would be a public easement since the beneficial use of the remaining property required further subdivision. Such a subdivision could not occur under applicable Borough ordinances unless Tribulation Trail was public. [2] Therefore the implied easement was public. Even though this was not a theory relied on by the trial court, the News are procedurally correct that it may be raised. An appellee may seek to defend a judgment on any basis established by the record, whether or not it was relied on by the trial court or even raised before the trial court. Ransom v. Haner, 362 P.2d 282, 285 (Alaska 1961). However, we reject this theory on the merits for two reasons. First, the News did not establish that the beneficial enjoyment of the remaining property would entail subdividing it further. Teas told Demoski and Everhart that he did not anticipate further subdividing of his property. Second, assuming that subdivision was required for beneficial enjoyment, Borough officials testified that subdivisions were occasionally approved during 1971 and 1972 where there was legal access but no roadway was actually built. Here, there was legal access to the Teas' homestead along the section line which forms the east boundary of Teas' property, so the subdivision might well have been accomplished without declaring Tribulation Trail to be a public road. Therefore, we conclude that Tribulation Trail is an implied easement but not a public road. [3]