Opinion ID: 172719
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nature of the Underlying Felony

Text: Medina-Rodriguez claims the court erred in denying his motion for a downward departure based on the minor nature of his arson conviction and its remoteness. The court departed downward after finding the guidelines substantially over-represented Medina-Rodriguez’s criminal history. To the extent Medina-Rodriguez is challenging the court’s refusal to depart even further, we lack jurisdiction. See United States v. Chavez-Diaz, 444 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2006). “This court may review a denial of a downward departure only if the denial is based on the sentencing court’s interpretation of the Guidelines as depriving it of the legal authority to grant the departure.” United States v. Fonseca, 473 F.3d 1109, 1112 (10th Cir. 2007). There is nothing in the record to suggest the court thought it lacked authority to grant a further departure. We nonetheless have jurisdiction to review the sentence imposed for reasonableness. See Chavez-Diaz, 444 F.3d at 1228 (reviewing a sentence for reasonableness after concluding it lacked jurisdiction to review the court’s discretionary decision to deny a downward departure). “Our appellate review for reasonableness includes both a procedural component, 4 encompassing the method by which a sentence was calculated, as well as a substantive component, which relates to the length of the resulting sentence.” United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 803 (10th Cir. 2008). “A sentence is procedurally reasonable when the district court computes the applicable Guidelines range, properly considers the § 3553(a) factors, and affords the defendant his rights under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. A sentence is substantively reasonable when the length of the sentence reflects the gravity of the crime and the § 3553(a) factors as applied to the case.” United States v. Martinez-Barragan, 545 F.3d 894, 898 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations and citation omitted). Medina-Rodriguez objected to the procedural reasonableness of the sentence before the district court, arguing “the court’s sentence does not address the factors in 18 U.S.C. [§] 3553 . . . .” (R. Vol. III at 14.) In considering whether the court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors, we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 2006). In arriving at a sentence, the court must consider “the history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). And, “at the time of sentencing,” the court must “state in open court the reason for its imposition of the particular sentence.” Id., § 553(c). We have held that in a run-of-the-mill case involving a sentence within the advisory guideline range, the district court need not specifically address a request for a sentence outside the guideline range. See United States v. Cereceres-Zavala, 499 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 2007). Instead, it is sufficient for the court to state how it arrived at 5 the guideline range and generally note it considered in gross the factors set forth in § (a). See id. Here, the court determined Medina-Rodriguez’s criminal history, including his arson conviction, warranted a departure from Criminal History Category V to IV. The court then imposed a sentence at the bottom end of the guideline range after “review[ing] the presentence report factual findings, and [ ] consider[ing] the Sentencing Guideline applications and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. [§] 3553(a)(1) through (7).” (R. Vol. III at 11.) Medina-Rodriguez’s sentence is procedurally reasonable. Medina-Rodriguez’s sentence is also substantively reasonable. “When reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness, this court employs the abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Sells, 541 F.3d 1227, 1237 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1391 (2009). “A district court abuses its discretion when it renders a judgment that is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” Id. (quotations omitted). On appeal, a sentence within a properly calculated guideline range is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. See id. A defendant “may rebut [that presumption] by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when viewed against the other factors delineated in § (a).” Id. (quotations omitted). Medina-Rodriguez makes no effort to rebut the presumption of reasonableness but argues United States v. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 2005), supports his position. It does not. In Trujillo-Terrazas, the defendant received a 16-level enhancement pursuant to USSG §2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) because he had a prior felony conviction for a crime of violence. Id. at 817. At sentencing, the district court judge “expressed reservations about imposing the sentence” based on the “comparatively 6 innocuous nature of [the defendant’s] prior [felony] conviction.” Id. However, at the time the defendant was sentenced, the sentencing guidelines were mandatory and the court imposed a sentence at the low-end of the guideline range, explaining “he was bound by the Guidelines.” Id. We vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing in accordance with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), because the court treated the guidelines as mandatory. See id. Here, the court did not treat the guidelines as mandatory and expressed no reservation about applying the 16-level enhancement based on Medina-Rodriguez’s arson conviction. The sentence imposed was, in no way, “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” Sells, 541 F.3d at 1237 (quotations omitted).