Opinion ID: 170647
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Obtaining Money or Property

Text: Mr. Vigil contends that Mr. Everage did not have any money to be obtained and that the government's intangible property theory varies from the indictment. According to Mr. Vigil, Mr. Everage did not have any money or property to obtain because no enforceable contract existed. Mr. Vigil contends that Mr. Everage's business plan was nothing more than speculative potential. Property under the Hobbs Act may be tangible or intangible property, see Gotti, 459 F.3d at 320-21, and we have no difficulty concluding that Mr. Vigil attempted to obtain both tangible and intangible property from Mr. Everage. First, Mr. Vigil attempted to obtain money from Mr. Everage and direct that money to Ms. Sais. See United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 420, 76 S.Ct. 522, 100 L.Ed. 494 (1956) (extortion may be proven where payments are made to a third party). We reject the argument that the income was too speculative because abundant evidence supports the view that all parties involved treated the right to income under the contract as a valuable interest. There was extensive testimony concerning the negotiations between Mr. Vigil, Mr. Everage, and Mr. Sais to quantify the amount of Ms. Sais's take against a backdrop of the gross proceeds from the contract under Mr. Everage's business plan. Second, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that Hobbs Act cases relying on an intangible rights theory such as United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1076 (2d Cir.1969) (holding that the intangible right to solicit refuse collection accounts is property under the Hobbs Act), are still good law. See Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. of Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 402 n. 6, 123 S.Ct. 1057, 154 L.Ed.2d 991 (2003). The Second Circuit recently held that a number of intangible property rights were cognizable under the Hobbs Act, including inter alia, the right to contract with a party of one's choosing, the right to make various business decisions free from outside pressure, and the right to decide with whom to work. See Gotti, 459 F.3d at 326-27. The government presented evidence that Mr. Vigil attempted to force Mr. Everage to hire Ms. Sais as a condition for receiving the SLOM contract. A reasonable jury could conclude that this evidence demonstrates that Mr. Vigil attempted to obtain Mr. Everage's intangible right to make business decisions free from outside pressure and to decide with whom to work. Second, Mr. Vigil argues that the government's intangible rights theory varied from the indictment and constitutes a constructive amendment to the indictment. After reviewing Mr. Vigil's post-trial pleadings before the district court, it does not appear that Mr. Vigil raised a constructive amendment argument below. Therefore, our review is for plain error. See United States v. Gonzalez Edeza, 359 F.3d 1246, 1250 (10th Cir.2004). We reverse for plain error only when there is (1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3) which affects substantial rights, and (4) which seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Chavez-Calderon, 494 F.3d 1266, 1268 (10th Cir.2007). However, even if Mr. Vigil had raised the issue before the district court, we conclude that there was no error, plain or otherwise, constituting a constructive amendment or variance from the indictment. We recognize two types of variances: [a] constructive amendment, which is reversible per se, occurs when the district court's instructions and the proof offered at trial broaden the indictment, and [a] simple variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts different from those alleged in the indictment, and triggers harmless error analysis. United States v. Sells, 477 F.3d 1226, 1237 (10th Cir.2007). The indictment alleges that part of the attempted extortion was that Mr. Vigil both required George Everage to hire [Ms. Sais] as a subcontractor . . . as a condition of Everage doing business with the [STO] and required George Everage to pay a substantial portion of the value of the [SLOM] contract to [Ms. Sais], all as a condition of Everage's employment. Aplt.App. at 26. The allegation in the indictment that Mr. Vigil attempted to force Mr. Everage to hire Ms. Sais is sufficiently broad to support an intangible rights theory.