Opinion ID: 1058633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The VCPA claim

Text: Manassas seeks reversal of the trial court's ruling that the regulation was inconsistent with Code § 46.2-1581(12)(a), and that Manassas therefore could not introduce the regulation or argue that compliance with the regulation was a defense to the Couches' claim of deceptive advertising. Manassas also complains that the trial court erred in allowing the Couches to maintain an action under the VCPA based on a violation of Code § 46.2-1581(12)(a). As a preliminary matter, we agree with Manassas' statements that regulations of state agencies such as the Motor Vehicle Board have the force of law, Sargent Electric Co. v. Woodall, 228 Va. 419, 424, 323 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1984), and that an agency's interpretation of its governing statutes, as reflected in its regulations, is entitled to great weight. Commonwealth v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary, 202 Va. 13, 19, 116 S.E.2d 44, 48 (1960). Regulations, however, may not conflict with the authorizing statute. Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n v. Elliott, 272 Va. 97, 115, 630 S.E.2d 485, 494 (2006). Whether a regulation is inconsistent with its enabling legislation is properly a subject of judicial review. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Dep't of Taxation, 268 Va. 289, 292-95, 602 S.E.2d 123, 125-26 (2004) (holding regulation promulgated by Department of Taxation was inconsistent with statute); Virginia Department of Taxation v. Blanks Oil Co., 255 Va. 242, 246-47, 498 S.E.2d 914, 916 (1998) (holding regulation promulgated by Department of Taxation was not inconsistent with statute); WTAR Radio-TV Corp. v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 877, 879-80, 234 S.E.2d 245, 246-47 (1977) (holding regulation promulgated by the Commissioner of the Revenue was not unwarranted extension of statute). Code § 46.2-1581(12)(a) prohibits a motor vehicle dealer from advertising for sale a vehicle which the dealer has no intention to sell at the price or terms advertised. That section states: If a specific vehicle is advertised, the seller shall be in possession of a reasonable supply of said vehicles, and they shall be available at the advertised price. If the advertised vehicle is available only in limited numbers or only by order, that shall be stated in the advertisement. For purposes of this subdivision, the listing of a vehicle by stock number or vehicle identification number in the advertisement for a used vehicle is one means of satisfactorily disclosing a limitation of availability. Stock numbers or vehicle identification numbers shall not be used in advertising a new vehicle unless the advertisement clearly and conspicuously discloses that it relates to only one vehicle. Code § 46.2-1581(12)(a). The regulation promulgated by the Motor Vehicle Board pursuant to this statute states in relevant part: If the advertised vehicle is available only in limited numbers or only by order, that shall be stated in the advertisement. The listing of vehicles by stock numbers or vehicle identification numbers is permissible and is one means of satisfactorily disclosing a limitation of availability, provided a separate number is used for each vehicle. 24 VAC § 22-30-30(L). Manassas argues that Code § 46.2-1581(12)(a) specifically allows the use of stock numbers in advertising new vehicles as long as the advertisement clearly and conspicuously discloses that the stock number used in the ad relates to only one vehicle. The regulation, according to Manassas, is consistent with the statute because the regulation states that, if a separate stock number is used for each car in the advertisement, the stock number satisfactorily discloses limitation of availability. Manassas' interpretation ignores the prohibition in Code § 46.2-1581(12)(a) against using a stock number in the advertisement of new cars to indicate limited availability unless the advertisement clearly and conspicuously discloses that it relates to only one vehicle. The plain meaning of this section is that, for new car advertisements, the stock number alone is insufficient to show limited availability and that something in the advertisement, in addition to the stock number, must clearly and conspicuously indicate that only one vehicle is available. The regulation, however, specifically allows the use of the stock number alone in an advertisement for a new car to serve as an indication of limited availability. Therefore, the regulation and the statute are in conflict and the trial court correctly concluded that the statute prevailed. See General Motors, 268 Va. at 293, 602 S.E.2d at 125 (It is equally well established, however, that if the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a regulatory interpretation . . . that is in conflict with the plain language of the statute cannot be sustained.). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to allow Manassas to introduce the regulation or argue as a defense that the advertisement at issue complied with the regulation. [3] Manassas also asserts the trial court erred in allowing the Couches to maintain a VCPA claim based on their allegations that a violation of Code § 46.2-1581(12)(a) was a fraudulent act or practice under the VCPA. While this assignment of error appears straightforward, Manassas' arguments at trial, and on brief and in oral argument in this Court encompass different legal issues. At oral argument Manassas addressed this assignment of error by arguing that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider a violation of Code § 46.2-1581 under the VCPA. Manassas based this position on the fact that Code § 46.2-1581 is not included among the sections of Title 46.2 which are set forth in Code § 59.1-200 as possible violations of the VCPA. In other words, according to Manassas, the failure to include Code § 46.2-1581 in Code § 59.1-200 vested enforcement of that section solely in the Motor Vehicle Board. Manassas did not make this argument in the trial court, however, and we therefore do not consider it. Rule 5:25. Manassas did argue on brief and at the trial court, however, that the Couches had no claim under the VCPA because of the provision in Code § 59.1-199(A) that the VCPA does not apply to [a]ny aspect of a consumer transaction which aspect is authorized under laws or regulations of this Commonwealth. . . . Manassas construes this language to mean that any aspect of a consumer transaction that is regulated by Title 46.2, or by regulations adopted pursuant to that Title, becomes an authorized aspect of the transaction and is therefore exempt from the VCPA. Applying this logic to the case before us, Manassas argues that the advertisement at issue was exempt from a claim under the VCPA because it was an aspect of the consumer transaction between Manassas and the Couches, and dealer advertising is regulated and therefore authorized by Code § 46.2-1581 and the regulation. Manassas' construction of Code § 59.1-199(A) equates the word authorized with regulated. This interpretation, if correct, would provide an exemption from the VCPA to all motor vehicle dealer advertising regardless of content, since such advertising is regulated pursuant to Title 46.2. Section 59.1-199(A), however, exempts only those aspects of a consumer transaction that are authorized. Authorized actions are those sanctioned by statute or regulation. Manassas was not entitled to exemption from a VCPA claim on the sole ground that motor vehicle dealer advertising is regulated by other statutory provisions and regulations. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's ruling that the Couches could pursue a claim under the VCPA in this case.