Opinion ID: 1907013
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial based on the testimony of Patrick Ervin.

Text: ¶ 14. Yarbrough also alleges that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion for a mistrial which he made following a statement of narcotics agent Patrick Ervin. The prosecution was questioning Ervin regarding a meeting he had with another narcotics officer and a confidential informant when the following exchange took place: Q: And what was the purpose of this meeting between the three of you? A: We had talked to Mr. Bozeman about possibly who he could buy illegal drugs from. He mentioned the name of Robert Yarbrough, which he called him by Peanut, which we knew of him through all our activity that we did here in the city. By Mr. Weir: Now, I object to that, Judge, and move the Court to grant a mistrial. By the Court: I am going to sustain the objection. The last statement of the witness, can all thirteen of you disregard that statement and not allow it to enter into your consideration at all? Will you do that? let the record show that all thirteen jurors state they will follow the Court's instructions. ¶ 15. Yarbrough argues that this testimony is improper evidence of other crimes or bad acts which violates Mississippi Rules of Evidence (M.R.E.) 403 [5] and 404(b). [6] He acknowledges that the taint of an improper question or comment can normally be cured with the court's admonition to the jury yet argues that his situation is an example of where the comment is so blatantly and clearly prejudicial, and where the instruction of the court would not ordinarily remove it from the minds of the jury that reversal is required. Criddle v. State, 633 So.2d 1047, 1048 (Miss.1994). Yarbrough additionally notes that this Court has held, under M.R.E. 404(b), that admission of evidence of unrelated crimes or acts for the purpose of showing the accused acted in conformity therewith to be reversible error. Smith v. State, 724 So.2d 280, 313-14 (Miss.1998) (citations omitted). ¶ 16. Yarbrough likens his situation to that in Burrell v. State, 727 So.2d 761 (Miss.Ct.App.1998), where the Mississippi Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting a confidential informant's testimony that he knew the defendant because he had previously purchased drugs from him. In Burrell, the trial court actually held a hearing on the admissibility of this evidence and admitted it over defense counsel's objections. Id. at 768. The Court of Appeals found that this testimony was not necessary to prove identity of the defendant, the reason the trial court gave for admitting the evidence. Id. The Burrell Court also noted the trial court's failure to give a limiting instruction as to the purpose for which the prior bad acts testimony could be considered and reiterated the trial court's responsibility to issue a limiting instruction sua sponte if one is not requested. Id. at 768-69. ¶ 17. Yarbrough's situation is factually distinguishable from that in Burrell. Here, the prosecutor did not specifically elicit the improper testimony; rather, the witness gave an answer that was more expansive than the question asked of him, whereas the judge in Burrell held a hearing on the proposed testimony before admitting it. In Burrell, the informant explicitly stated that he had previously bought drugs from the defendant. In the instant case, one must infer that Yarbrough committed other crimes based on the narcotics officer's statement that he knew Yarbrough through all our activity that we did here in the city. There is also a difference between the corrective measures taken in Burrell and this case. The trial judge in Burrell did not give a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the prior crimes testimony which would have helped to limit any prejudicial effects of the testimony. In Yarbrough's case, the trial court quickly sustained defense counsel's objection to the improper testimony and admonished the jury to disregard Ervin's statement. ¶ 18. The State contends that a mistrial is not warranted because the trial court's actions, in sustaining Yarbrough's objection and admonishing the jury, were sufficient to cure any taint on Ervin's improper testimony. The State points out that the granting of a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Horne v. State, 487 So.2d 213, 214-15 (Miss.1986). In Wright v. State, 540 So.2d 1, 4 (Miss.1989), we stated that a judge's admonition to the jury to disregard improper testimony or comments after sustaining an objection to such testimony would not be held in error, absent unusual circumstances. The State also advocates that this Court adhere to our rule that jurors are presumed to follow a judge's instructions because without this presumption, our jury system would be rendered inoperable. Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136, 1142 (Miss.1985). ¶ 19. The parties' argument on this issue boils down to the State's contention that the trial court took sufficient action to correct the admission of Ervin's unsolicited improper testimony and Yarbrough's contention that the nature of Ervin's testimony is so prejudicial to him that nothing short of a mistrial can cure the admission of this prior crimes testimony. We find that the trial judge did everything he could, short of granting a mistrial, to keep the jury from considering the improper testimony of Patrick Ervin. He sustained defense counsel's objection and told the jury to disregard Ervin's previous statement, which the jury agreed to do. These actions were sufficient to cure any potential prejudice in Ervin's testimony. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial.