Opinion ID: 1120058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preclusion of Equitable Defenses.

Text: In Peot v. Peot, 92 Nev. 388, 551 P.2d 242 (1976), this court held that a URESA order would not supersede any previous order of support. Id. at 390, 551 P.2d at 243-44, citing 1955 Nev.Stats. ch. 44, § 28, at 65. In 1969, the legislature provided that such an order, entered by a Nevada court, could permit a modification if there was a specific provision for such modification in the order. 1969 Nev.Stats. ch. 346, § 23, at 607 (codified in NRS 130.280). Appellant asserts that respondent, by stipulating to the URESA judgment through the district attorney and by acting in accordance with it by accepting subsequent payments, waived her right to accrued support, is estopped from asserting the 1963 California order and is guilty of laches in prosecuting this enforcement action. Appellant argues that Nevada law and Peot should not be applied and, even if it is, that Peot should be limited in application. We cannot agree. According to NRS 130.090, the duties of support under URESA are those imposed under the laws of any state where the obligor was present during the period for which support is sought. This statute, combined with the fact that both parties were before the district court, makes Nevada law applicable. See Elkind v. Byck, 68 Cal.2d 453, 67 Cal. Rptr. 404, 439 P.2d 316 (1968). In any event, under the law of either state, the lower court did not err. The laws of California and Nevada under URESA provide that the remedies in the Act are in addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies and support orders under the Act do not supersede or nullify support orders of any other state. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code §§ 1654, 1689 (West 1972); Nev.Rev.Stat. §§ 130.050, 130.280 (1975). Thus, the Nevada order in 1967 under URESA did not modify the obligation under the previous California order. Appellant contends that according to California case law dehors URESA, respondent's actions here amounted to a waiver or modification. Appellant's reliance is misplaced. In California, under authority cited by appellant, the courts have distinguished between their ability to modify support payments retroactively and their ability to deny enforcement of accrued support under a writ of execution on equitable grounds. In one case, a spouse acquiesced to a child living with the other spouse. Jackson v. Jackson, 51 Cal. App.3d 363, 124 Cal. Rptr. 101, 104 (1975). In another case, the wife left the state with the child and hid. In re Marriage of Szamocki, 47 Cal. App.3d 812, 121 Cal. Rptr. 231, 235-36 (1975). And, in Graham v. Graham, 174 Cal. App.2d 678, 345 P.2d 316, 318-19 (1959), a spouse agreed to a certain amount of payments. These acts constituted a waiver of the enforcement of accrued support by way of a writ of execution or on an order to show cause. None of the waivers stemmed from an order under URESA which was involved in this case. Additionally, enforcement by way of a writ of execution in California is not subject to laches if it is within ten years of the installments due. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 681 (West Supp. 1980). The stipulated order and subsequent obedience by appellant, along with respondent's acceptance of payments, does not amount to a waiver or modification by respondent. As recognized in Peot, the spouse seeking enforcement under URESA relies upon the prosecutor in the foreign state and is usually not present. The fact that the complaint requested more support is also not controlling.