Opinion ID: 180412
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Size of the variance

Text: Finally, Stewart objects to the size of the district court's upward variance, which yielded a sentence approximately twice as high as that called for under the Guidelines. A district court need not give a mechanical recitation of the § 3553(a) factors, but rather must provide an explanation of why, based on the totality of the circumstances, it chose the sentence that it did. And we have declared that the district court is entitled to deference in its sentencing decisions because of its ringside perspective on the sentencing hearing and its experience over time in sentencing other individuals. Vowell, 516 F.3d at 510 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (sentencing a sex offender to 65 years in prison, which amounted to a 242 percent upward variance over the Guidelines range). In applying the § 3553(a) factors to Stewart's case, the district court noted that it must look at just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, reflect the seriousness of the offense, and improve offender conduct and condition. The court's determinations that Stewart's actions were tantamount to attempted first-degree murder, that Stewart felt no immediate remorse for his conduct, and that what he did had such a severe impact on Washington and the other victims, properly influenced its sentencing decision. It also conducted a detailed examination of Stewart's personal history and characteristics before deciding what sentence to impose. In sum, the court considered the various § 3553(a) factors and made its final sentencing decision based on the totality of the circumstances. The size of the district court's variance from the Guidelines also satisfies the principle that a major departure should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586. As the court noted, if Stewart had been successful in his intent, Ms. Washington would have been dead.... This is a serious offense, and anything more serious would be if Ms. Washington had died. The court also emphasized that Stewart did not feel any immediate remorse or regret about shooting Washington. Finally, Stewart's sentence satisfies the principle that high sentences should preserve reasoned distinctions among offenders by leaving room for more severe offenders to receive harsher punishments. United States v. Poynter, 495 F.3d 349, 355 (6th Cir.2007) (vacating a statutory maximum sentence imposed on a sex offender because the extreme deviation from the Guidelines did not leave room to distinguish between the defendant and worse sex offenders). The district court went to great lengths to explain that short of Washington having died, the court could not think of a more serious situation than what was presented in this case. Under these circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Stewart to 25 years in prison on the armed-robbery count and to 35 years on one of the firearm counts.