Opinion ID: 413199
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Keel

Text: 9 The robbery occurred September 24. The government established that previously Keel had told Wehby he was going to Texas after the robbery, and that he had discussed with the manager of his apartment, approximately a month before the robbery, that he was leaving in about a month. Later, but still before the robbery, the manager told Keel that unless he paid his rent she would turn the matter over to an attorney. Keel told her that he was expecting a check at the end of the week and would pay his September rent from this. The day after the robbery Keel paid his September rent in cash. 10 On cross-examination the apartment manager was permitted to testify that Keel told her he was going to Texas because he was ill. The court refused to permit additional testimony by the manager that Keel said he was going to Texas because he was dying of cancer and wanted to spend his last days there. If this was error, it was error without injury. 11 The government offered the testimony of a department store salesman concerning substantial purchases of clothing by Keel a few days after the robbery. Keel objected on the ground that the salesman had been located through a sales slip found in Keel's apartment, which had been suppressed as evidence because it was beyond the scope of a search warrant that permitted search of the apartment. Government counsel represented to the court that the salesman had not been located through the sales slip but through the name of the store appearing on a label in a blue blazer that belonged to Keel. The testimony concerning the clothing purchases was permitted. Then, during a recess, the government put on testimony to establish that the testimony of the salesman was not tainted by the suppressed sales slip. A government agent was examined. He testified that the sales slip was returned to the defendant soon after it was ordered suppressed and before the agent went to the store. He stated that he saw the blazer with the department store label in it, that he was instructed by government counsel to go to the named store, and that he should not use the sales slip to determine whether Keel had spent large sums of money at the store. He said that he followed those instructions and that, in any event, under routine procedure he would have checked with the store without having seen the sales slip. However, on cross-examination, the agent acknowledged that he recalled that the receipt showed large purchases (over $600), and when he called the store he inquired about the identity of the salesman who had made substantial sales to a person on the day in question, and this inquiry produced the correct person. Finally, in answer to a single question by the court the agent finally said that the receipt itself caused him to go to the store and investigate. 12 Under these circumstances the testimony of the salesman was inadmissible. The effect of the suppressed sales slip was not attenuated. However, we cannot find the government guilty of either intentional misconduct or gross negligence requiring reversal. As we have pointed out, the agent's testimony concerning what he relied on was conflicting. He was instructed not to use the slip. To the extent that it can fairly be concluded that he did use the slip, the use was not invidious, rather the agent used information he had learned from reading the slip and had not erased from his mind. The issue--substantial purchases of clothing as tending to show recently acquired funds--was peripheral. Wehby's testimony placed Keel as the principal actor in the robbery, and several witnesses positively identified him as such. Moreover, when Keel moved for a mistrial, after the agent's testimony, the court offered to strike all of the testimony of the clothing salesman, but Keel refused this and stood on his claim of right to a mistrial. In closing argument to the jury the government argued that the clothing purchases tended to show Keel's guilt on the theory of recently acquired funds. In his oral argument Keel sought to obtain affirmative advantage from the testimony of the clothing salesman. There had been some testimony that the chief actor in the robbery was wearing a blue blazer. Keel argued that the robber could not have been he because his blue blazer had been among the items bought at the clothing store after the robbery. Under all of these circumstances, we hold that admitting the evidence of the clothing salesman was error without injury beyond reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 13 There was no error in refusing to permit cross examination about allegedly conflicting statements Wehby had made to defense counsel and the prosecutor concerning an alleged suicide attempt by Wehby several years before the robbery. 14 AFFIRMED.