Opinion ID: 2135631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Kunkel Lawsuit

Text: Kunnanzes assert that the trial court erred in refusing to allow them to introduce evidence of similar medical care by Dr. Edge to another patient. According to Kunnanzes, one week before Ernest's operation, Dr. Edge performed an ureteroscopy on Cathy Kunkel and perforated her ureter, leading to a kidney loss. Kunkel sued Dr. Edge, and her case was settled prior to the trial of this action. Kunnanzes argue that Kunkel's testimony showed Dr. Edge's ureteroscopy complication rate and was highly probative of his skill and competence. Dr. Edge answers that he did not perforate Kunkel's ureter and that his treatment of her was not probative of the degree of his care in this case. He argues that, under N.D.R.Ev. 403, the trial court properly excluded Kunkel's testimony. N.D.R.Ev. 403 grants a trial court discretion to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Ebach v. Ralston, 510 N.W.2d 604 (N.D. 1994); Williston Farm Equipment, Inc. v. Steiger Tractor, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 545 (N.D. 1993). We review a trial court's balancing of the probative value of proffered evidence against the dangers enumerated in N.D.R.Ev. 403 under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Ebach; Williston Farm Equipment. As we explained in Wall v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co., 274 N.W.2d 208 (N.D. 1979), a trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably. Negligence generally cannot be proved by showing the commission of similar prior acts by the same person. N.D.R.Ev. 404(b); Lange v. Cusey, 379 N.W.2d 775 (N.D.1985). See 1 McCormick, Evidence ¶ 189 (4th ed. 1992); 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 315. The purpose of Kunnanzes' proffered evidence was to show that Dr. Edge was negligent in treating Kunkel. However, that evidence was not admissible to show that Dr. Edge was negligent in treating Ernest, and its introduction would have injected a collateral matter into this trial and confused the jury. The trial court's exclusion of that evidence was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Kunnanzes argue that the trial court erred in refusing to allow them to use Dr. Edge's deposition in the Kunkel action to impeach his testimony in this action. Kunnanzes offered to prove: Plaintiffs would offer the following evidence of Dr. Edge's skill at ureteroscopy. One week prior to the procedure performed on Mr. Kunnanz, Dr. Edge did a ureteroscopy on another patient. He perforated that other patient's upper ureter, but recognized the perforation and stented the ureter for one week. The ureter did not heal, and the patient lost her kidney because of the ureteral injury. Dr. Edge has presented evidence of his experience and has testified that he is an expert at ureteroscopy. Evidence of the number of ureters he had injured prior to Mr. Kunnanz's procedure is highly probative of Dr. Edge's skill at ureteroscopy. Its probative value outweighs its prejudice. Dr. Edge testified on direct that it was his usual practice to leave a stent in place for two weeks after ureteroscopy. On cross, he testified that he did not recall having left a stent in for one week after having perforated a ureter during ureteroscopy. Plaintiffs seek to use Dr. Edge's deposition in Kunkel v. Edge to impeach that evidence. Without introducing evidence of the other lawsuit, Plaintiffs seek to ask Dr. Edge the number of ureters he has perforated during ureteroscopy, and the number of those patients who have lost their kidneys following ureteroscopy. Kunnanzes argue that the court's refusal to allow use of Dr. Edge's deposition from the Kunkel lawsuit denied them an adequate opportunity to cross-examine and impeach Dr. Edge about his complication rate and about the differences and similarities in his treatments of Ernest and Kunkel. They assert that, in addition to being substantially prejudiced by the limitation on impeachment of Dr. Edge, the court's ruling prevented the jury from hearing how Dr. Edge treated a known perforation, his knowledge of ESWL, and his procedure for obtaining informed consent. N.D.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(1) regulates the use of depositions at trial: At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and testifying, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions: (1) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness, or for any other purpose permitted by the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. Under that rule any deposition may be used to impeach the testimony of the deponent as a witness. See Beck v. Lind, 235 N.W.2d 239 (N.D.1975); Klein v. Harper, 186 N.W.2d 426 (N.D.1971). See also N.D.R.Ev. 801(d)(2) (admission by party-opponent). To the extent relevant, Dr. Edge's deposition from the Kunkel lawsuit would ordinarily be admissible to impeach his trial testimony in this case. The trial court followed its earlier ruling about Kunkel's testimony under N.D.R.Ev. 403 and excluded the use of Dr. Edge's deposition testimony. Although Kunnanzes claim that Dr. Edge's deposition was clearly offered for impeachment purposes, the gist of their offer of proof was to show Dr. Edge's skill at ureteroscopy, a purpose that essentially sought to prove Dr. Edge was negligent in his prior treatment of Kunkel. That evidence was not admissible for that purpose, and would have injected a collateral claim into this case. We cannot say the trial court acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably in refusing to allow Kunnanzes to use Dr. Edge's deposition testimony from the Kunkel case for the purpose stated.