Opinion ID: 2779368
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Life Sentence in Excess of Statutory Maximum on

Text: Count VI In his opening brief, Vázquez mentions in passing that his life sentence for the firearm offense (Count VI) exceeded the maximum penalty.16 He did not develop this point in any of his briefs or at oral argument. Usually, we deem such a perfunctory challenge to waive a challenge to many types of claimed error. Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17 ([I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.). Here, though, where the error that comes to our attention on direct review is a plainly unlawful and excessive sentence (albeit on one count only), we may set aside the error to prevent a miscarriage of justice. See United States v. García-Ortiz, 528 F.3d 74, 85 (1st Cir. 2008) (deciding to address otherwise waived argument that life sentence on one count exceeded statutory maximum to prevent a miscarriage of justice, even though defendant was still subject to life sentence on another count). 16 This passing reference reads in full, [h]ere, where the defendant was issued a life sentence on counts one through six of the indictment, exceeding the maximum penalty for counts three, five, and six of the indictment, the failure to perform the required analysis of drug amount affected the defendant's substantive rights and the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. His suggestion that the life sentences on the crack cocaine and marijuana possession charges (Counts III and V) exceeded the statutory maximum is without merit. Vázquez faced a statutory maximum of life imprisonment on those two counts based on a prior felony drug conviction and the quantities of crack cocaine and marijuana (fifty grams and one hundred kilograms, respectively) that the jury found Vázquez possessed with intent to distribute. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), (vii). -32- The error here is Vázquez's life sentence for the firearm offense, Count VI, which exceeds the applicable statutory maximum. 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) (a defendant convicted of conspiracy to possess a firearm in furtherance of a drug offense shall be imprisoned for not more than 20 years); see United States v. Almonte-Nuñez, 771 F.3d 84, 92 (1st Cir. 2014) (Guideline calculations simply cannot usurp a maximum level of imprisonment established by Congress.). Section 924(o) does provide for a maximum life sentence if the firearm is a machinegun or destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or muffler, but there was no such finding by the jury here. As a practical matter, Vázquez's overall sentence of life in prison will not change even if we vacate his above-the-maximum sentence for the firearm possession offense, because the life sentences on his other five counts (Counts I-V) will remain. We recently observed that [w]e have not adopted a uniform rule about whether, without a preserved claim of error, a defendant who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of a statutory maximum is entitled to relief even though his overall period of immurement will not be affected. Almonte-Nuñez, 771 F.3d at 92. Despite the lack of a uniform rule, we further noted that [a]lthough particular cases may differ, flexibility exists and, under normal circumstances, our discretion should be exercised in favor of trimming back an excessive sentence. Id. In -33- Almonte-Nuñez, we decided to exercise this discretion in favor of modifying a 150-month sentence on one count that was in excess of the 120-month statutory maximum, even though the defendant still faced a concurrent 150-month sentence on another count. Id. Two factors influenced our decision. First, leaving intact a sentence that exceeds a congressionally mandated limit may sully the public's perception of the fairness of the proceeding. Id. Second, we found it unwise and unfair to ask a defendant to bear the risk of difficult to predict collateral consequences [that] may arise as a result of an above-the-maximum sentence imposed on a particular count. Id. Here, Vázquez faces a smaller risk of harm from collateral consequences than the defendant in Almonte-Nuñez because, regardless of our decision, he must serve five concurrent life sentences on five other counts. But leaving in place the plainly unlawful sentence for Count VI could sully public perception of the proceeding. And, at least in theory, collateral review or other unpredictable events might alter someday the impact of the conviction on the other counts. We therefore remand to the district court with instructions to enter a modified sentence of twenty years in prison for the firearm offense (Count VI). See id. at 92-93. -34-