Opinion ID: 619866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A Free and Appropriate Public Education

Text: Next, we consider whether the district court erred in concluding that the 2007 and 2008 IEPs were offers of a FAPE, and offered K.D. an actual placement. We conclude that K.D.'s tuition reimbursement claim for the 2007-08 school year is time-barred and that the district court did not err in finding that the 2007 and 2008 IEPs comply with IDEA requirements.
K.D. challenges the district court's finding that his request for tuition reimbursement for the 2007-08 school year was time-barred. The IDEA provides an opportunity for any party to seek an impartial hearing, and permits a state to set the timeline for when such a request must be filed. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B). Hawaii has set a timeline for the filing of a request seeking a due process hearing, in Hawaii Revised Statutes Section 302A-443. The statute, in relevant part, read as follows during the 2007-08 school year: (a) An impartial hearing may be requested by any parent or guardian of a child with a disability, or by the department, on any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, program, or placement of a child with a disability; provided that the hearing is requested: (1) Within two years of the date the parent, guardian, or department knew or should have known about the alleged action that formed the basis of the request for a hearing; and (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), within ninety days of a unilateral special education placement, where the request is for reimbursement of the costs of the placement. Haw.Rev.Stat. § 302A-443. [3] Thus, whether the two-year or 90-day statute of limitations applies depends on whether a placement is a unilateral special education placement. Id. § 302A-443(2).
K.D. contends that a unilateral placement occurs only when a parent physically removes the child from public school and enrolls him or her in a private school, without DOE agreement. K.D. also asserts that his placement at Loveland was bilateral because it was agreed upon in the 2007 settlement agreement with the DOE, and that settlement agreement was not time-limited. The term unilateral placement is not defined by statute, and at least two Hawaii-based courts have concluded that the legislative history of Section 302A-443 is silent on the meaning of unilateral and placement. See D.C. v. Dep't of Educ., 550 F.Supp.2d 1238, 1248 (D.Haw.2008); Makiko D. v. Hawaii, No. 06-CV-00189, 2007 WL 1153811, at  (D.Haw. April 17, 2007). Nevertheless, the Makiko D. court defined the term as follows, based on its plain meaning: a unilateral special education placement occurs when one party unilaterally (i.e., without consent or agreement of the other party) enrolls the student in a special education program. Id. at . For purposes of this opinion, and given the plain meaning of the statute, we adopt the definition of unilateral special education placement used in Makiko D. As so defined, the term unilateral special education placement does not support K.D.'s contention that placement only occurs upon the physical removal of a student from one school to another. Here, the agreement between the DOE and K.D. ended after the 2006-07 school year, and the DOE proposed a new IEP placing K.D. at a different school. However, C.L. unilaterally decided to enroll K.D. at Loveland for the 2007-08 school year. This enrollment thus occurred without consent or agreement of the other party. Id. K.D.'s contention that the settlement agreement is not time-limited is likewise without merit, as discussed supra at section I.B, in our stay put provision analysis. K.D. also argues that the settlement agreement somehow modifies K.D.'s enrollment at Loveland to be bilateral from that point forward. K.D. claims that the effect of the agreement is analogous to situations in which a hearing officer's decision in favor of the parent changes a unilateral placement to a bilateral placement. To support this argument, K.D. cites D.C. v. Department of Education, which held that a favorable administrative ruling constituted the State's agreement to the private placement and changed an otherwise unilateral placement to a bilateral placement. 550 F.Supp.2d at 1249. However, in so holding, the D.C. court relied on the reasoning that we have applied to the stay put provision of the IDEA. Id. (citing Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372, 105 S.Ct. 1996 (holding same in the context of the stay put provision of the IDEA) and Clovis, 903 F.2d at 641 (holding same also in the stay put context)). Thus, just as we found that Loveland was not K.D.'s stay put placement based on the settlement agreement, we also conclude that the settlement agreement did not operate to change the placement from unilateral to bilateral.
Because K.D.'s enrollment at Loveland for the 2007-08 school year is a unilateral placement, the 90-day statute of limitation applies. K.D. filed his request for an impartial due process hearing challenging the 2007 IEP on August 29, 2008. This was over a year after his enrollment at Loveland for the 2007-08 school year. Thus, K.D.'s claim requesting tuition reimbursement for the 2007-08 school year is barred by the statute of limitations in Section 302A-443(2).
[A] state must comply both procedurally and substantively with the IDEA. M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir.2005). The court must determine (1) whether the state complied with procedures set forth in the IDEA and (2) whether the state developed an IEP that is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07, 102 S.Ct. 3034. Procedural violations may be harmless if they do not result[ ] in a loss of educational opportunity or significantly restrict parental participation. L.M., 556 F.3d at 910. K.D. challenges the 2007 and 2008 IEPs on several procedural and substantive grounds.

K.D.'s first procedural contention is that placement was determined prior to the 2007 IEP meeting, in violation of the IDEA. K.D. asserts that the DOE settled on Pearl Harbor Kai as a placement for K.D. about three weeks after the settlement agreement was signed in March 2007, and that the IEP team did not consider any other placement options for K.D. A school district violates the IDEA if it predetermines placement for a student before the IEP is developed or steers the IEP to the predetermined placement. W.G. v. Bd. of Tr. of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir.1992), superseded by statute on other grounds, as recognized in R.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932 (9th Cir.2007); see also Spielberg v. Henrico Cnty. Pub. Schs., 853 F.2d 256, 258-59 (4th Cir.1988). Predetermination violates the IDEA because the Act requires that the placement be based on the IEP, and not vice versa. Spielberg, 853 F.2d at 259. Here, the fact that the DOE scouted out Pearl Harbor Kai in March of 2007 as a place of potential placement for the 2007 IEP is not conclusive evidence that the DOE had decided to place K.D. there. See, e.g., Doyle v. Arlington Cnty. Sch. Bd., 806 F.Supp. 1253, 1262 (E.D.Va. 1992) (noting that school officials must come to an IEP meeting with an open mind but may have given thought to placement). The first 2007 IEP meeting was held on April 5, 2007, shortly after the DOE's visit to Pearl Harbor Kai. However, a review of the prior written notices of placement from the 2007 and 2008 IEPs indicates that other options were considered, including placement at Loveland, at another private school setting at Hauoli Na Kekei, and in a full inclusion class setting with same age peers without resource special education services. The DOE rejected the full inclusion class setting because K.D. required a more distraction free environment with more specialized activities to target his learning style and rate of learning. The DOE rejected Hauoli Na Kekei because it only enrolls children with severe communication and behavioral needs, and it feared that K.D. might not develop his potential communication skills in that setting. Finally, the DOE rejected Loveland because Pearl Harbor Kai was a less restrictive environment where K.D. could receive similar services to those he was receiving at Loveland and, in addition, have immediate access to non-disabled peers in that community. Thus, the record reveals that the DOE considered other options besides Pearl Harbor Kai, reasonably rejected them, and therefore did not predetermine K.D.'s placement.
K.D. also argues that his parent, C.L., was deprived of an opportunity to participate in the IEP process, and that the district court erred in blaming C.L. for not cooperating with the IEP team, and missing both the July 2007 and July 2008 IEP meetings. Parental participation in the IEP process is an integral part of the IDEA. See Amanda J., 267 F.3d at 890-91. The regulations require the DOE to take steps to ensure that the parents of a disabled student is present at the IEP meeting, or at least afforded the opportunity to participate. 34 C.F.R. § 300.322(a). However, an IEP meeting may take place without a parent in attendance if the agency is unable to convince the parent that they should attend. Id. § 300.322(d). In such a situation, the agency must keep a record of its attempts to arrange a mutually agreed on time and place. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.322(d)(1)-(3); see also Shapiro ex rel. Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 317 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) ([T]he school district must document phone calls, correspondence, and visits to the parents demonstrating attempts to reach a mutually agreed upon place and time for the meeting.). We conclude that the record clearly reveals that the DOE attempted to have C.L. participate in both the 2007 and 2008 IEP meetings. C.L. and the Loveland director were in attendance at the first IEP meeting held on April 5, 2007, which was continued to July due to time constraints. C.L. and the DOE continued to correspond from May 2007 through July 2007 regarding the scheduling of tests for K.D., in preparation for his IEP. On June 28, 2007, the DOE wrote C.L. a letter reminding her that the parties had agreed to continue the April IEP meeting to July, and suggesting three possible dates for the meeting. The letter also indicated that if C.L. did not respond by July 13, 2007, the meeting would be held on July 25, 2007. C.L. signed for receipt of this letter on June 30, 2007. The DOE did not receive a response to its June 28 letter, and sent C.L. another letter on July 13, 2007 stating that because it had not heard from C.L., the meeting was scheduled for July 25, 2007. C.L. signed for receipt of this letter on July 14, 2007. This pre-IEP meeting correspondence shows that the DOE presented C.L. with several opportunities to raise any concerns with the proposed meeting date. The hearing officer and district court both found that, after the fact, C.L. gave conflicting stories about why she was not present at the meeting. C.L. originally testified that she was escorting her son to the mainland for the entire month of July 2007, as required by a divorce decree, but later changed her testimony, and admitted that she was in Hawaii, but contended that she could not attend the meeting because she had started a new job and needed money. The record is devoid of any evidence showing that C.L. attempted to contact the DOE to reschedule the meeting. See Shapiro, 317 F.3d at 1078 (finding that because the parents asked to reschedule the meeting, the school district violated the IDEA by prioritizing the schedule of its representatives over the parents). Indeed, even after the IEP meeting occurred, C.L. still failed to respond to several letters from the DOEsent in July, August, October, December, and February, respectivelyasking whether she accepted the 2007 IEP offered to K.D., and encouraging her to contact the DOE to discuss any concerns, changes, or issues regarding the IEP. We conclude that this record clearly shows that the DOE satisfied its duty to involve C.L. in the 2007 IEP process, as required under the IDEA. Similarly, the record shows that the DOE also attempted to find a mutually acceptable time and place for the July 2008 IEP meeting. The DOE began corresponding with C.L. in preparation for the 2008 IEP meeting in May 2008, by requesting written consent to conduct observations of K.D., and requesting his performance reports. The DOE repeated its requests on June 19 and July 10, 2008. In a letter dated July 10, 2008, the DOE suggested three dates for the IEP meeting, and indicated that if no response was received before July 16, 2008, the meeting would be set for July 25, 2008. C.L. failed to respond to any of the referenced correspondence, and did not attend the July 25, 2008 meeting. Later, C.L. cited a work conflict as her reason for missing the meeting. As was the case with the previous year's IEP meeting, despite receiving the DOE's letters, C.L. never attempted to contact the DOE to reschedule the meeting. We conclude that the DOE satisfied its duty to involve C.L. in the 2008 IEP process, as required under the IDEA.
We next consider whether K.D.'s 2007 and 2008 IEPs were substantively appropriate for K.D., and we conclude that they were.
K.D. argues that the 2007 and 2008 IEPs did not offer adequate goals and objectives, and failed to address K.D.'s educational needs. Moreover, K.D. contends that the goals set forth in the IEPs were poorly written, not measurable, and vague. In preparing K.D.'s 2007 IEP, the DOE conducted several tests that were documented in the IEP. These included (1) occupational therapy testing, which assessed K.D.'s motor skills, (2) academic diagnostic testing, which tested K.D.'s knowledge of body parts, colors and shapes, (3) cognitive development assessment, (4) communication testing, and (5) speech-language assessment. Based on these assessments, the IEP provided K.D. with occupational therapy services, speech/language therapy, special education, individualized instructional support, behavior intensive support services, parent training, and 1:1 after-school support. Furthermore, the IEP stated that K.D. should receive verbal/physical prompts and auditory/visual cues as needed, constant supervision and redirection to ensure that objects are not put in his mouth, and constant supervision to ensure that he remains with the class. The hearing officer concluded that the goals and treatment plan set forth in the 2007 IEP were substantially similar to the plan that was in place for K.D. at Loveland. K.D.'s only specific, substantive complaint about the 2007 IEP is that the DOE never offered a 1:1 skills trainer. However, both the hearing officer and the district court concluded that the prescribed individualized instructional support and 1:1 after-school support met the requirement for a 1:1 skills trainer. K.D.'s argument to the contrary is insufficient to disturb this finding in the absence of evidence that these services would not be on a 1:1 basis. K.D. also claims that the goals and assessment the DOE proffered are generally insufficient. We disagree. The IEP showed a focus on evaluating K.D.'s speech and communication progressareas identified by C.L. as the areas most crucial to K.D.'s developmentand offered him services like speech/language therapy and behavior intensive support to address concerns in those areas. Furthermore, with respect to goals, the IEP provided for specific goals and areas where K.D. needed to improve. For example, under fine motor skills, the IEP indicated that K.D. could not screw or unscrew a cap, turn pages one at a time, or cut with scissors, and needed assistance dressing, using the toilet, and with grooming and hygiene. Likewise, the IEP stated that K.D. needed to improve with other goals, such as to increase eye contact and to respond to social greetings and verbal cues. K.D. has not shown that the IEP the DOE provided is not reasonably calculated to enable [him] to receive educational benefits. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07, 102 S.Ct. 3034. The DOE prepared the 2008 IEP for K.D. based on many of the same tests considered in the 2007 IEP. K.D. faults the DOE for not conducting updated tests. However, the record shows that the DOE requested information regarding K.D.'s performance at Loveland in 2008 in order to update its test results and information about K.D.'s performance. The DOE sent C.L. letters on four separate occasions between March 14, 2008 and July 10, 2008 requesting written consent to observe K.D. at Loveland, and requesting access to his performance reports. Not having received written consent or any records from Loveland due to C.L.'s lack of cooperation, the DOE could only prepare a 2008 IEP that was substantially similar to the 2007 IEP. K.D. argues that the district court erred in blaming C.L. for the DOE's inability to perform further testing in preparation for the 2008 IEP. While it is the DOE's responsibility to develop the IEP, the record shows that the DOE took reasonable steps to prepare the 2008 IEP. While C.L. testified to the hearing officer that she gave verbal consent to the DOE to observe K.D., she did not provide details on when this communication allegedly took place. In light of the letters produced by the DOE requesting consent from C.L., it appears that both the hearing officer and the district court gave C.L.'s claim little weight in reaching the decision that it was reasonable for the DOE to base the 2008 IEP largely on the 2007 tests. We find that the district court did not err, particularly in light of the documented issues between the DOE and Loveland regarding C.L.'s history of withholding and revoking consent. The 2008 IEPlike the 2007 IEPwas a FAPE.
K.D. also contends that he was never offered actual placement in either the 2007 or 2008 IEP offers, and alternatively, that any placement he may have been offered was inappropriate. Under the IDEA's regulations, a placement must be made in compliance with the following: (a) The placement decision (1) Is made by a group of persons, including the parents, and other persons knowledgeable about the child, the meaning of the evaluation data, and the placement options; and (2) Is made in conformity with the LRE provisions of this subpart, including §§ 300.114 through 300.118; (b) The child's placement (1) Is determined at least annually; (2) Is based on the child's IEP; and (3) Is as close as possible to the child's home; 34 C.F.R. § 300.116. The least restrictive environment provision (LRE) requires that the state have in effect policies and procedures to ensure that public agencies in the state meet the LRE requirements of this section and §§ 300.115 through 300.120. Id. § 300.114. Hawaii Administrative Rules defines the LRE requirement as to the maximum extent appropriate, educating students with disabilities ... with students who are non-disabled and removing students with disabilities from the regular educational environment only if the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. Haw. Admin. R. § 8-60-2; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2). The 2007 IEP offered to K.D. specified a free and appropriate public education at Pearl Harbor Kai elementary to be supported by an after-school program (2hrs/daily) ... in a smaller student to teacher ratio [setting] within a fully self contained environment designed ... especially for the students. The 2007 IEP further stated that K.D. would participate with general education peers for the following activities, when deemed appropriate: lunch in the cafeteria, recess and school wide assemblies. The 2008 IEP offered to K.D. specified a placement in a special education setting at Pearl Harbor Kai in a small group setting with not more than ten (10) students of varying levels of competencies, but with language abilities that will assist in facilitating [K.D.]'s communication and social skill development. The IEP also indicated that K.D. may participate with non-disabled peers in after-school group activities and outings if deemed appropriate. We conclude that both the 2007 and 2008 IEPs offered K.D. actual placement. Both identified the specific school K.D. was to attendPearl Harbor Kai Elementaryalong with a description of the classroom environment. The cases that K.D. cites for the proposition that a placement is only valid if the exact room where K.D. would be placed is specified are inapposite. In A.K. ex rel. J.K. v. Alexandria City School Board, 484 F.3d 672, 681 (4th Cir.2007), the court held as a matter of law that because [the agency] failed to identify a particular school, the IEP was not reasonably calculated to enable [the child] to receive educational benefits. In that case, the IEP only recommended a private day school, but did not specify the specific private day schools being considered. Id. The court reasoned that without a specific school being named, the parents were left to fend for themselves to determine whether any private day school in their area ... would be a satisfactory fit. Id. In contrast, K.D.'s IEP specified Pearl Harbor Kai as the school where he would be placed and offered that he would be placed into one of the three fully self contained classrooms that were available at the school. There was no question that he would have had a place in a classroom had he accepted the FAPE offer. Furthermore, in Union School District v. Smith, we held that a school district must formally offer an appropriate educational placement. 15 F.3d at 1526. In that case, the school district claimed that it did not need to do so because the parents visited the school and rejected it before a formal placement offer was actually made. Id. We held that the offer of placement was a formal requirement [that] has an important purpose that is not merely technical and that it creates a clear record that will do much to eliminate troublesome factual disputes many years later about when placements were offered, what placements were offered, and what additional educational assistance was offered to supplement a placement, if any. Id. In contrast, placement was formally offered to K.D., and any dispute that C.L. may have had with the appropriateness of the placement is immaterial to whether the placement offer was formally made. K.D. also claims that the placement offered in Pearl Harbor Kai was not appropriate. C.L.'s advocate, who visited Pearl Harbor Kai with her in 2008, testified that she believed that the classrooms were not appropriate to meet K.D.'s needs, and were babysitting classes with no good role models. To the contrary, Pearl Harbor Kai's principal, Elynne Chung, testified that the school offered three fully self contained classrooms and two resource rooms. One of the classrooms had only autistic children, but autistic children were part of the other two classrooms as well. K.D. argues that the principal's testimony should be discounted because she had not reviewed K.D.'s IEP before she showed C.L. and her advocate the classrooms, and she was the only person who testified at the hearing qualified to discuss the programs offered at Pearl Harbor Kai. However, the record shows that the district resource teacher, Aletha Sutton, also testified that she was familiar with the programs and services available at Pearl Harbor Kai. In addition, the district resource teacher testified as an expert in special education and autism, and stated that she had reviewed K.D.'s records and assessments and had an understanding of his IEP. She testified that Pearl Harbor Kai works with students with similar and lower abilities than K.D., and that one of the classrooms would be an appropriate placement for K.D. K.D. contends that Sutton's testimony should be discounted because she never assessed K.D. or worked directly with him or performed an classroom assessment of K.D. herself. However, the record reveals that Sutton additionally testified that she reviewed K.D.'s records and had observed him before he left for Loveland. The district court could properly consider the testimony of Pearl Harbor Kai's principal and the district resource teacher, and conclude that the placement offered in one of Pearl Harbor Kai's classroom was an appropriate placement for K.D. Furthermore, the record shows that Pearl Harbor Kai was more appropriate than Loveland as the least restrictive environment for K.D. Both K.D.'s 2007 and 2008 IEPs placing him at Pearl Harbor Kai included provisions providing that he would have the opportunity to interact with non-disabled peers. In contrast, Loveland placed K.D. in a classroom with only students who had mental health or learning disabilities, and K.D. proffered no evidence indicating that he had any opportunity there to interact with his non-disabled peers. K.D.'s Loveland placement does not square with one of the main purposes behind the IDEAto combat the apparently widespread practice of relegating handicapped children to private institutions or warehousing them in special education classes. N.D., 600 F.3d 1104 at 1115. Thus, the record evidence supports the district court's decision that K.D.'s 2007 and 2008 IEPs offered appropriate placement.