Opinion ID: 160828
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conviction under 42 U.S.C. 3631(a)

Text: 25 To establish a violation of 42 U.S.C. 3631(a), the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the specific intent to injure, intimidate or interfere with the victim[s] because of [their] race and because of the victim[s'] occupation of [their] home. Whitney, 229 F.3d at 1303 (internal quotation marks omitted). 3 Mr. Magleby argues that the district court improperly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal because the government presented insufficient evidence to prove either that he targeted the Henrys because of their race or that he acted because the Henrys occupied their home. 26 In making its determination regarding a defendant's intent, a jury is permitted to draw inferences of subjective intent from a defendant's objective acts. Wingfield, 122 F.3d at 1333. The government may also prove intent through circumstantial evidence and surrounding circumstances. E.g., United States v. Prows, 118 F.3d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1997) ('[B]ecause intent involves the defendant's state of mind, and is difficult to prove directly, it is usually proven by circumstantial evidence.' (quoting Kathleen Flavin & Kathleen Corrigan, Eleventh Survey of White Collar Crime: Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud, 33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 861, 869 (1996))); United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 566 (10th Cir. 1992) (Direct evidence of a defendant's intent is seldom available. Intent can be proven, however, from surrounding circumstances.); United States v. Dysart, 705 F.2d 1247, 1257 & n.15 (10th Cir. 1983) (upholding jury instruction permitting jury to infer intent from circumstantial evidence). Thus, even when a defendant, as here, denies having the requisite intent, a jury may disbelieve the defendant if [his] words and acts in the light of all the circumstances make [his] explanation seem improbable. Wingfield, 122 F.3d at 1333 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). 27 Viewing the record in its entirety together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the government, as we must, we find that the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Magleby targeted the Henrys because of their race. The jury heard evidence that Mr. Magleby knew that burning crosses were symbols of racial hatred. Mr. Magleby admitted during cross-examination that he understood the racial hatred nature of a burning cross when used by the Ku Klux Klan. He also admitted that he understood that a burning cross, like a swastika, was a universal symbol of racial hatred. He admitted that he knew that the general public saw a burning cross as a symbol of racial hatred. Mr. Magleby's friends and associates testified that, prior to the cross-burning, Mr. Magleby had watched the movie Mississippi Burning a movie that includes scenes of crosses being burned as symbols of hatred toward African-Americans. 28 Although Mr. Magleby testified that he could not remember whether L.M. had told him that the Henrys are an interracial family, claiming that he could remember being told only that the home was occupied by a crackhead, he also testified that he first learned that Mr. Henry is African-American after returning to his house following the cross-burning. Likewise, L.M. testified that he first learned that Mr. Henry is African-American subsequent to the cross-burning. Evidence was presented at trial, however, that L.M. had signed a statement in which he told police that he had told Mr. Magleby that Mr. Henry is black prior to the cross-burning. 4 Furthermore, Andy Whitlock testified that, after the cross-burning, both Mr. Magleby and L.M. appeared to know that Mr. Henry is African-American. Liz Cannon testified that, after Mr. Magleby and L.M. returned from burning the cross in the Henrys' yard, she clearly recall[ed] them indicating the family was black and that they discussed with their friends at the party that Mr. Henry is African-American. Tr. at 474-75. Moreover, contrary to Mr. Magleby's assertion that he felt remorse after learning that Mr. Henry is African-American, Ms. Cannon testified that Mr. Magleby appeared excited by what he had done and bragged about it. We do not question the jury's conclusions regarding the credibility of Mr. Magleby and L.M. and must presume that the jury resolved these conflicts in favor of the prosecution. See Springfield, 196 F.3d at 1184; Wingfield, 122 F.3d at 1333. 29 The jury also heard Mr. Henry's unrebutted testimony that he is the only African-American on his block. This evidence, combined with Mr. Magleby's and L.M.'s testimony that they targeted a specific residence, was sufficient to permit the jury to reasonably infer that it was highly unlikely that Mr. Magleby burned a cross at a home occupied by an African-American merely by coincidence. 30 Viewing this evidence combined with the background of racial slurs, racist jokes, racist music, and racist internet sites in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Magleby targeted the Henrys because of their race. 31 Mr. Magleby also argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he targeted the Henrys because they occupied their home. We disagree. Mr. Magleby's own testimony regarding his understanding of the meaning of a burning cross, combined with his testimony that he intentionally burned the cross in the Henrys' yard, provides sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Magleby also targeted the Henrys because they occupied their home. We therefore find that the district court properly denied Mr. Magleby's motion for judgment of acquittal on this count. 32