Opinion ID: 359861
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Probability of Prejudice in This Case

Text: 110 Appellant's right to counsel of his choice was violated when he was denied the opportunity to secure new counsel to replace Ms. Roundtree. Since, however, Mr. Hutter represented him throughout the trial, obviously the violation did not negate all of the Sixth Amendment protection to which he was entitled. Nonetheless, I have reasonable indeed, substantial doubts that it did not materially affect the evidence and argument presented on his behalf to the jury. Mr. Hutter performed competently, but the right to effective assistance of counsel is not the concern here. Appellant's Sixth Amendment right was to retain not merely adequate counsel but one or more exceptional counsel if he could. 106 Mr. Hutter is experienced, but appellant wanted counsel who, like Ms. Roundtree, was more experienced and additionally was black in a word, counsel in whom appellant could repose complete confidence. 107 To say that Mr. Hutter did well is not to say that had appellant gotten his full constitutional due the defense might not have been markedly better. 111 Many of the raw facts of the case were not in serious dispute, but the interpretation of the facts definitely was. Appellant's office admittedly was a madhouse at times; the Government's evidence certainly indicated that appellant had many more patients than any one physician should attempt to handle, and that many of them received what charitably can be called less than thorough care. 108 The crucial question was whether this sad state of affairs was attributable to a well-intentioned endeavor to provide medical service to a needy community, 109 to malpractice remediable only in a civil suit or by the medical society or instead to a criminal scheme to peddle prescriptions for controlled drugs. Who can say with real assurance that another lawyer 110 more experienced in the courtroom and more familiar with life in the ghetto would not have been able to impeach prosecution witnesses' interpretations of what they saw, to elicit a more favorable gloss on the facts from appellant's own witnesses, or to convince the jury in final argument that the Government's conclusion on the facts was not the only reasonable explanation? 111 112 On this we are not permitted nor am I willing to speculate, particularly in the context of a criminal appeal where the Government's burden is to establish harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. 112 The decision in this regard, rather, must be guided by Glasser v. United States, 113 in which the trial court, over objection, had assigned one of Glasser's two counsel 114 to simultaneously represent a codefendant after one of the codefendant's counsel had become unable to participate and the codefendant had become dissatisfied with his other counsel. 115 Finding that this was error, the Supreme Court noted that a possible conflict of interest and the burden of representing two clients might have impaired the assigned counsel's effectiveness in defending Glasser. 116 But critically for present purposes, the Court did not search for specific instances of prejudice before reversing the conviction: 113 To determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained by Glasser as a result of the court's (action) is at once difficult and unnecessary. The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial. 117 114 Because I believe that the right to a reasonable opportunity to replace one counsel on a two-attorney defense team is as fundamental as the right to have both members of such a team devote their full energies to their client, I too would decline to indulge in nice calculations of prejudice. 115 I am supported in this course by the very nature of the constitutional deprivation confronting us here. To treat the error as harmless on the ground that one cannot perceive grave fault in Mr. Hutter's performance 118 would be to undermine the right to retain counsel of choice. 119 It would make no sense to hold that a trial court may not say that because attorney X is competent the accused has no right to retain attorney Y, and then to turn right around and say that such an error is harmless because attorney X really was competent. Surely trial judges are not likely to force unqualified counsel upon an accused, and if proficiency were the lone predicate of harmlessness the constitutional guarantee of freedom to select one's paid counsel would be an empty exhortation. 120 Implicit in the right is that neither trial nor appellate courts may dishonor it simply because the accused already has a lawyer who is capable. In short, the right should not be gutted simply because violations of it seem generically harmless. 121 116 The logic of this conclusion is exemplified by a Fourth Circuit decision in which the statutory right to have two appointed counsel in federal capital cases 122 had been denied. The court recognized the almost insuperable difficulty which would be placed on any defendant, if the burden is placed on him, to show Post hoc that he was prejudiced by denial of his right to two attorneys. 123 Because the court believed that the statute would be eviscerated by application of the harmless error doctrine, it perceive(d) no alternative but to enforce the statute, even though the evidence was substantial, if not overwhelming and on the whole the accused was fairly tried. 124 I believe a similar outcome is even more strongly indicated where the right to two counsel derives from the Constitution rather than just a statute. 117 A refusal to demand precise quantification of prejudice in these limited circumstances is further necessitated by the character of the interests shielded by the constitutional protection denied in this case. Lest we forget, the right to counsel of choice is one that safeguards the dignity of the accused and of the court. The right to choose to defend oneself Pro se, the Supreme Court has recently proclaimed, is also such a right, 125 and we have recognized that the interest in preserving that dignity demands that a refusal of the right not be deemed harmless. 126 By the same token, one charged with crime must have a fair opportunity to retain counsel of his choice even if the court's choice of counsel would make for a better defense. 127 It is our heritage that each person is ultimately responsible for choosing his own fate, including his position before the law, 128 and I share the Ninth Circuit's view that reversal of an erroneous denial of the right to pick one's own retained counsel may be necessary even absent an obvious example of prejudicial impact. 129 118 Indeed, this court adopted that very proposition many years ago. In Smith v. United States, 130 we examined a situation in which counsel was appointed to represent Smith after his retained counsel failed to appear for trial because he was kept in another court longer than he had anticipated. 131 Assuming that error had occurred, 132 we held that reversal would be warranted not only if the accused had been actually prejudiced but also if the attorney assigned to represent the defendant was unsatisfactory to him . . . . 133 In that case the accused had made no objections to the appointment; in this case appellant did protest his dissatisfaction, and Smith thus directs us to reverse. 119 If I believed it possible on careful scrutiny to determine the presence or absence of prejudice as a demonstrable fact, I would support a remand to the District Court for a hearing. But such an investigation would be both futile and dangerous: futile because outcroppings of prejudice instances in which Mr. Hutter performed adequately but another counsel might have done better would be next to impossible to discern; dangerous because in the absence of affirmative proof of prejudice one might tend to think that no harm had occurred. Even if it could be shown conclusively that appellant suffered no prejudice, I would have grave reservations about a ruling that the wrong done appellant is legally inconsequential. The right to counsel of choice seeks not only to assure an accurate assessment of guilt or innocence but also to protect the accused's dignity. If only violations of the former interests were remediable, breaches of the latter would have no effective protection. Courts will not allow constitutional rights so easily to come to naught. 134