Opinion ID: 4035366
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Train by Police Chief Williams

Text: Zimmerman also argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on his claim that Howard Williams, in his capacity as Chief of Police of the City of San Marcos Police Department (the (alteration omitted) (quoting Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc))). 13 “Department”), is liable for failing to train his officers not to shoot a Taser at a fleeing misdemeanor suspect and not to arrest persons suspected of committing a Class C misdemeanor. Zimmerman makes clear on appeal that his claim against Chief Williams is a claim against the municipality and is governed by Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 4 To succeed on his Monell claim, Zimmerman would have to show that the Department’s training practices caused a violation of his constitutional rights. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 200 (5th Cir. 1996). Specifically, he would need to demonstrate that (1) the training conducted by the municipality’s policymaker was inadequate, (2) the municipality’s policymaker was deliberately indifferent in adopting the training policy, and (3) the inadequate training policy directly caused a violation of Zimmerman’s constitutional rights. See id. Zimmerman argues that summary judgment was erroneously granted because the chief of the Department endorsed Harris’s conduct in an affidavit. However, it is Zimmerman’s burden to produce evidence concerning the inadequacy of officer training that could support a jury verdict in his favor. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Zimmerman has failed to adduce any evidence of Department training procedures—inadequate or otherwise—and thus fails to carry this burden. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391. Further, because Zimmerman has not offered sufficient evidence of a constitutional violation by Harris, he also cannot satisfy the causation requirement of a failure-to-train claim as it pertains to his allegedly unlawful arrest. See Hill v. Carroll Cty., 587 F.3d 230, 238 (5th Cir. 2009) (declining to give Monell claim further consideration where plaintiff had 4 Zimmerman has thus abandoned any claim against Chief Williams in his individual capacity. 14 not created a genuine issue of material fact on the existence of a constitutional violation). Thus, summary judgment was properly granted. V. Deliberate Indifference by Hays County Deputies Finally, Zimmerman contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the individual defendant deputies of the Hays County jail on his claim that these defendants were deliberately indifferent to his arm injury. To survive summary judgment on these deliberate indifference claims, Zimmerman must demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether each deputy was actually aware of a risk of serious harm and consciously disregarded it. Lawson, 286 F.3d at 262. As Zimmerman has presented no evidence of any of the individual deputies’ knowledge, actions, or omissions, a reasonable factfinder would have no basis to conclude that any of the individual Hays County defendants were aware that Zimmerman could suffer serious harm. Zimmerman thus cannot show that the Hays County defendants exhibited deliberate indifference, and the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of these defendants. See id. (“The deliberate indifference standard is a subjective inquiry; the plaintiff must establish that the jail officials were actually aware of the risk, yet consciously disregarded it.” (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 839)).