Opinion ID: 206338
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Batson Merits

Text: The PCRA court denied Williams' Batson claim on the merits: it held that there was insufficient evidence from which to infer that the Commonwealth exercised its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. As noted above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not address this substantive determination, but instead resolved Williams' Batson claim on procedural grounds. The Supreme Court's procedural resolution is the only decision entitled to preclusive effect. See Thomas, 570 F.3d at 115. Thus, for purposes of AEDPA, the Pennsylvania state courts have not adjudicated the Batson claim on the merits. See id. at 114-15; see also Lewis, 581 F.3d at 100 (explaining that when a state court's final resolution of a claim is based on procedural grounds, that claim has not been adjudicated on the merits for purposes of § 2254(d)). No AEDPA deference is due by this Court. [16] Lewis, 581 F.3d at 100. A Batson challenge presents a mixed question of law and fact on federal habeas review. Hardcastle, 368 F.3d at 254; Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 719 (3d Cir. 2004). When AEDPA deference does not apply, we review a mixed question of law and fact de novo. Lewis, 581 F.3d at 100. However, any of the state courts' pure factual determinations, whether explicit or implicit, retain the presumption of correctness mandated by AEDPA. See id.; see also § 2254(e)(1); Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 231 (3d Cir.2009). Batson announced a three-step burden-shifting framework for judges to employ in order to determine whether racial discrimination is at work in jury selection. That procedure, which we have set forth above, requires a defendant to make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination before the prosecutor must articulate raceneutral justifications for her strikes. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 328, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712). After the parties have satisfied their respective burdens of production in these first two steps, the defendant must prove purposeful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 328-29, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712). Establishment of a prima facie case requires the defendant to show that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94, 106 S.Ct. 1712). This step is not intended to be particularly onerous, and the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact ... that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. Abu-Jamal v. Horn, 520 F.3d 272, 288 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712). That said, we have emphasized that peremptory strikes are presumptively valid and need not be supported by any reason so long as they are not exercised on an unconstitutional basis, such as race or gender. United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir.2003). The Supreme Court has identified at least two examples of circumstances relevant to step one's totality inquiry. First, the defendant may proffer evidence that the government exercised a `pattern' of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire, [which] might [then] give rise to an inference of discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Second, the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose. [17] Id. In the instant matter, the venire was 39% African American. The Commonwealth exercised a total of sixteen peremptory challenges; fourteen of those were used to remove African American members of the venire. Thus, the prosecutor struck African Americans at a rate of 87.5%, but struck white venirepersons at a rate of 12.5%. The District Court called this pattern stark and held that these statistics alone were sufficient to make out a prima facie case. That ruling is consistent with our precedents. Statistical evidence may be sufficient by itself to make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination. See, e.g., Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960, 971 (3d Cir. 1993); Overton v. Newton, 295 F.3d 270, 278 & n. 9 (2d Cir.2002) (citing cases and stating statistics, alone and without more, can, in appropriate circumstances, be sufficient to establish the requisite prima facie showing under Batson ). In Holloway v. Horn , we had little difficulty finding a prima facie case when the prosecutor used eleven of twelve strikes to remove African American venirepersons. 355 F.3d at 722. Similarly, we found a prima facie showing in Brinson v. Vaughn , where the Commonwealth used thirteen of its fourteen strikes to remove African Americans. 398 F.3d 225, 234-35 (3d Cir.2005). Additionally, our decision in Hardcastle v. Horn strongly implies that a prosecutor who removes twelve of fourteen African American venire members exhibits a pattern of strikes sufficient to raise an improper inference. See 368 F.3d at 256. In each of these decisions, however, we were unable to fully reconstruct the racial composition of the venire. Reconstruction of the venire often provides crucial context to a prosecutor's strike rate. See Abu-Jamal, 520 F.3d at 291-92. For example, a strike rate of 90% looks less stark when the venire is 90% African American. When the record does not illuminate the composition of the venire, there may be insufficient evidence with which to mount a successful collateral attack. Indeed, we rejected the petitioner's challenge in Abu-Jamal when he established that ten of the prosecutor's fifteen peremptory strikes were used to remove African Americans, but was unable to reconstruct the composition of the venire. See id. at 291-92. What is telling about Holloway, Brinson, and Hardcastle in contrast to Abu-Jamal is that the pattern of strikes in these cases was sufficient to satisfy the prima facie threshold even without evidence of the venire's racial makeup. In each case, the strike rate exceeded 85%, whereas the rate in Abu-Jamal was 66.7%. Here, the strike rate also exceeded 85%; consistent with Holloway, Brinson, and Hardcastle, we find that evidence of the strike rate alone satisfies Williams' prima facie showing. After all, the Commonwealth exercised fourteen of its sixteen peremptory challenges on African Americans. In a venire that was less than 40% black, it is hardly a leap to conclude that a strike rate of 87.5% raises an inference of discrimination. Although the strike rate data is sufficient by itself to make a prima facie showing in this case, we need not rely exclusively on the Commonwealth's strike rate. Evidence contrasting the rate at which the prosecution accepts black and white jurors may also raise an inference of discrimination. In Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256 (3d Cir.2008), the prosecutor accepted between 41% and 47% of the black venirepersons that he had the opportunity to strike; his acceptance rate for white members of the venire was 83%. We held that the disparity between these acceptance rates was sufficient to make out a prima facie case at step one of the Batson analysis. Bond, 539 F.3d at 270. In this case, Foulkes accepted five of the nineteen African Americans she had the opportunity to strike. Her acceptance rate was thus 26.3%. By contrast, she accepted nineteen of the twenty-one white venirepersons she had the opportunity to strike. Her acceptance rate for white venire members was therefore 90%. Under Bond, this disparity raises an inference of discrimination. In sum, Williams has proffered statistical evidence sufficient to suggest that the Commonwealth's peremptory challenges were based upon an improper motive. We must therefore proceed to step two and three of the Batson inquiry. The government's burden of production at step two is relatively low, Hardcastle, 368 F.3d at 257; [u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral, Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)). At the PCRA hearing, Foulkes provided an explanation for each of her strikes. Williams does not contend that any of Foulkes' reasons were facially illegitimate. Nonetheless, we have reviewed the record and conclude that the proffered reasons, some of which are discussed in more detail below, are facially race-neutral. The burden therefore rests upon Williams to prove that the explanations offered by Foulkes are not persuasive and are instead pretextual. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338-39, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (stating that step three of the Batson framework centers upon the persuasiveness of the prosecutor's justification). At step three of the Batson analysis, the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that the prosecutor struck at least one juror because of race. Bond, 539 F.3d at 264. To determine whether the petitioner has carried his or her burden, the court must evaluate all evidence introduced by each side (including all evidence introduced in the first and second steps) that tends to show that race was or was not the real reason for each strike. Hardcastle, 368 F.3d at 259 (quoting Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 286 (3d Cir.2001) (en banc)); see also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008) (explaining that all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted). Step three ultimately focuses upon the prosecutor's subjective motivation, which ideally includes an assessment of the demeanor and credibility of the various voir dire participants. See Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203 (Step three of the Batson inquiry involves an evaluation of the prosecutor's credibility, and the best evidence [of discriminatory intent] often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenges. (alteration in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). To the extent that such assessments factor into the court's final ruling, they must be accorded significant deference on appeal. See id. at 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203; DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 507. As we have stated, the PCRA court made no step-three findings. The parties nonetheless developed a significant record at the PCRA hearing and, while this is a very imperfect substitute for a trial judge's findings of fact, it permits sufficient though hardly idealcollateral review. In the District Court, Williams proceeded by method of comparing stricken members of the venire to individuals the Commonwealth deemed acceptable. We have previously authorized such an evaluative procedure, explaining, A comparison between a stricken black juror and a sitting white juror is relevant to determining whether the prosecution's asserted justification for striking the black juror is pretextual. Riley, 277 F.3d at 282; Holloway, 355 F.3d at 724; see also Snyder, 552 U.S. at 479-86, 128 S.Ct. 1203 (performing comparative analysis); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241-52, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (finding Batson violation based in part on juror comparison). An explanation that appears race neutral at step two may betray an improper motive if it is invoked to strike African Americans but not other non-black venirepersons exhibiting the same characteristic. Williams focuses upon five stricken members of the venire, all of whom were African American. We will confine our comparative inquiry accordingly. Lucille Dozier. Ms. Dozier was asked whether she had any beliefs which would prevent her from being able to impose the death penalty in an appropriate case. She answered, I would have to be absolutely certain, sure that this person really deserves that. After the prosecutor rephrased the question, Dozier stated that she could impose the death penalty if appropriate. At the PCRA hearing, Foulkes testified that she struck Dozier on the basis of her initial hesitancy. Foulkes explained, [I]t appeared to me from her answers [that it would be] very difficult for her to apply the law in this case. Williams names two comparators, both of whom were white: Debra Pagano, seated as juror number seven, and Virginia Feo, who was accepted by the Commonwealth but stricken by the defense. When Foulkes asked Pagano whether she would have any difficulty imposing the death penalty in an appropriate case, Pagano answered, No. Feo was posed the same question and stated that although it would not be easy, she did not think she would have any difficulty imposing a penalty of death. Neither of these comparators expressed a sentiment close to that exhibited by Dozier; specifically, neither Pagano nor Feo required absolute certainty in order to recommend the death penalty. The comparative evidence thus fails to suggest that Foulkes' reason for striking Ms. Dozier was pretext. Shawn Kimble. Mr. Kimble was employed as a purchasing agent, graduated from Central High School in west Philadelphia, and studied business at Drexel University. Foulkes observed that he was approximately the same age as Williams and, in her opinion, he exhibited a hostile affect. Foulkes testified that she struck Kimble due to concerns about his attitude, his age, and because Williams asked Kimble no questions during voir dire. Furthermore, Foulkes explained that none of these factors alone moved her to exercise a challenge; rather, it was the combination of concerns that together led to the strike. Because the PCRA court resolved the Batson claim at step one, it did not assess Foulkes' reasons for striking Kimble and, consequently, made no finding with respect to Kimble's alleged hostility. We cannot presume that the PCRA court credited Foulkes' assertion that Kimble displayed a hostile affect. See Snyder, 552 U.S. at 479, 128 S.Ct. 1203 (declining to credit prosecutor's justification that stricken venireperson was excessively nervous when the state court did not make an on-the-record determination regarding venireperson's demeanor). As a result, we will not consider the prosecutor's demeanor-based reason for striking Kimble and will instead focus upon Foulkes' remaining justifications: age and the defendant's decision not to question Kimble on voir dire. Williams attacks these rationales by proffering two comparators to whom Williams posed no questions during voir dire, and who were nonetheless accepted by the Commonwealth. These two individualsIsabelle Edmonson and Robert Eberledo not constitute true comparators for purposes of our inquiry. Although Williams did not ask any questions of either Edmonson or Eberle, both were significantly older than the defendant. Therefore, neither can be said to exhibit the same characteristics as Kimble (age and lack of questioning). In a comparison analysis, it is insufficient to proffer venire members who lack one or more of the characteristics upon which the prosecutor exercised a strike. This is not to erect an unreasonable roadblock; rather, it ensures accuracy in an area often guided by guesswork and hunches. See DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 505 (explaining that a peremptory challenge is usually based on educated guesses about probabilities based on the limited information available to an attorney about prospective jurors). Because the focus in step three is to uncover a prosecutor's subjective motivation, it is imperative to account for the complete combination of factors that caused the prosecutor to exercise a strike. Here, it was Kimble's proximity to the defendant's age and the fact that defense counsel asked him no questions. Williams identifies no comparators that meet these criteria; therefore, his comparative evidence is unpersuasive. Geraldine Hill. Ms. Hill was a married mother of five living in southwest Philadelphia. During voir dire, Foulkes asked Hill, would you surrender your belief merely because of the fact that other members of the jury, even a majority of the jury, would believe contrary to what you believe? Hill replied, Either way I believe, no one, and I mean no one[,] would change my mind. At the PCRA hearing, Foulkes explained her dismissal of Hill as follows: I have to say I can almost remember her saying this, I know that's rather remarkable, but she said that no one would change her mind if she came to a certain conclusion in the jury. Again, the way she put it, the language that she used, was such that it was not sufficient to challenge her for cause, but the emphasis that she gave that response indicated to me that if she came to a conclusion, that she was not someone who was responsive to deliberating further with her fellow jurors. And again, this is something that is a matter of affect and emphasis in the tone of how she delivered her answers. Williams contends that Hill subsequently clarified her response, and that Foulkes' concerns were thus unreasonable. In particular, Foulkes later asked Hill, So when you say that you make up your mind and that's it, that doesn't mean that you wouldn't be able to deliberate with your fellow jurors? Hill answered, No. You will have to show me where I am wrong, either way. As long as I can be shown. There is no question that as a result of Hill's clarification, she could not be stricken for cause. However, Foulkes' lingering concern was not unreasonable. Hill's initial assertion that no one, and I mean no one[,] would change my mind is emphatic and suggests that she may have difficulty deliberating with other jurors. This is not to say that she would, in fact, have had difficulty participating in deliberations; but a peremptory strike is often no more than a guess about future behavior, see DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 505. A prosecutor indeed, any trial advocatehas every reason to hedge against empaneling an individual who might prove unduly obstinate. What is more, Williams proffers no comparators for Hill, rendering our post-hoc comparative evaluation of little use. Given the guesswork inherent in the jury selection process, Hill's removal does not suggest improper motives. Lillie Moore & Dwayne Kitchen. Ms. Moore was married, worked as a keypunch operator, and lived in the Logan section of Philadelphia. Mr. Kitchen was twenty-two, resided in north Philadelphia, and was employed as a construction worker. Foulkes asked both of these venire members whether they would require the Commonwealth to prove Williams' guilt beyond all doubt. Both answered Yes. [18] After the prosecutor posed the question to Kitchen, the court interjected: I don't think that's an appropriate question, and I think that you ought to not ask it anymore. It is undisputed that Foulkes posed a question to several African American and white jurors that used similar beyond all doubt phrasing. At the PCRA hearing, Foulkes testified that she struck Moore and Kitchen because it appeared to her that both individuals would require[] proof beyond all doubt in a serious matter like this. The court pressed Foulkes on her explanation, asking, [I]f a juror adhered to the fact that they couldn't follow the Court's instructions concerning reasonable doubt, then [wouldn't they] be available to be challenged for cause? Foulkes indicated that although Moore and Kitchen were rehabilitated to the court's satisfaction, she believed both were trying very hard to satisfy the Court in their answers, that in their heart [they] really simply couldn't hold the government to a different standard than [certainty beyond all doubt]. By way of comparison, Williams proffers juror number 176, Gloria Mastronardo. Foulkes did not ask Mastronardo a question using the beyond all doubt phrasing; however, Williams argues that Mastronardo's opinions regarding the death penalty are comparable to those Foulkes attributed to Moore and Kitchen. The record does not support such a contention. If anything, Mastronardo expressed views that were somewhat more receptive to imposition of the death penalty. When asked whether she had any beliefs that might prevent her from recommending death, she stated, I used to think I would never be against capital punishment but perhapsit would depend on the nature of the crime, to be honest (emphasis added). Foulkes later asked if Mastronardo was capable of impos[ing] the death penalty. She answered, I believe so. In short, Mastronardo articulated none of the reservations that Moore and Kitchen expressed. Furthermore, while Foulkes posed an improperly phrased question to both Moore and Kitchen, she posed similar questions to several other individuals of each race. Williams cannot point to any venireperson who answered the beyond all doubt question like Moore and Kitchen, yet who Foulkes failed to strike. We thus find no value in the comparative evidence. Although Williams' juror-by-juror comparison evidence falls short, we are mindful that we must consider the totality of the available evidence, including that which was proffered at steps one and two of the Batson inquiry. See Hardcastle, 368 F.3d at 259. Here, Williams presents fairly strong strike-rate evidence: the prosecutor exercised fourteen of sixteen strikes to remove African Americans from a venire that was 39% black. The rate at which she struck African Americans was 87.5%, compared to a strike rate of 12.5% for white venire members. There are also less revealing statistics. The Commonwealth accepted black venire members at a rate of 26.3%. In Bond v. Beard , we held that at step three, an acceptance rate of 41-47% (compared to 83% for whites) was reasonably high, and was evidence that the prosecutor was not racially motivated. 539 F.3d at 270. While the acceptance rate in Williams' case is not equivalent to Bond 's, it is much higher than the 9% rate criticized by the Supreme Court in Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. at 240-41, 125 S.Ct. 2317. We find the acceptance rate data inconclusive at best. The statistical data is but one portion of the totality that we must consider at step three. Williams was tried by a jury of five African Americans and seven white individuals. Both defendant and victim were African American and there was no racial component to the crime. See Lewis, 581 F.3d at 103 (explaining that the race of the defendant and victim, and the nature of the crime, may be relevant circumstances to consider); Abu-Jamal, 520 F.3d at 288 n. 16 (same). These facts cut in the Commonwealth's favor. Furthermore, Williams' comparative evidence was exceedingly weak. Foulkes provided plausible reasons for each of her strikes, and supported her reasons by recourse to the record. More importantly, she was consistent in the application of her reasons; she did not, for example, accept white venire members who articulated a refusal to deliberate or who would require proof beyond all doubt to return a verdict of guilt. On the totality of the record before us, the evidence offered by Williams is simply insufficient to overcome the evidence that favors the Commonwealth. [19] Accordingly, Williams' Batson challenge fails on its merits.