Opinion ID: 3046749
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Additional Count Two Arguments

Text: Bornman makes a number of additional arguments relating to Count Two, which we find without merit. His argument that the government failed to introduce evidence of a quid pro quo is without merit, because the statute requires no such evidence. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 604 (2004) (§ 666(a)(2) requires no connection between the federal funds and the alleged bribe); United States v. Gee, 432 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir. 2005). He also contends that the District Court erred by denying his motion to sever Count Two from the other counts. A severance should be granted “‘only if there is a serious risk that 12 a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.’” United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 205 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 775 (3d Cir. 2005)). “Defendants seeking a severance bear a ‘heavy burden’ and must demonstrate not only that the court would abuse its discretion if it denied severance, ‘but also that the denial of severance would lead to clear and substantial prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair trial.’” Id. (quoting Urban, 404 F.3d at 775). Bornman’s argument that the evidence relating to Count Two was more damaging than the evidence relating to the other counts is not sufficient to meet his “heavy burden.” It is wellestablished that a defendant is not entitled to a severance solely on the basis that the evidence against his co-defendant is more damaging than the evidence presented against himself. Urban, 404 F.3d at 775. It follows from this that a defendant is not entitled to a severance solely on the basis that the evidence in regard to certain counts is more damaging than evidence in regard to other counts. Moreover, we note that the District Court expressly instructed the jury to compartmentalize the evidence presented and consider each count separately and independently. App. at 1631-1632. “We presume that the jury follows such instructions, and regard such instructions as persuasive evidence that refusals to sever did not prejudice the defendant.” Urban, 404 F.3d at 775 (internal citations omitted). Finally, Bornman also argues that his conviction violates Wharton’s Rule. Wharton’s Rule is “a doctrine of criminal law enunciating an exception to the general principle that a 13 conspiracy and the substantive offense that is its immediate end are discrete crimes for which separate sanctions may be imposed.” Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 771 (1975). In the classic Wharton’s Rule offenses – adultery, bigamy, incest, and duelling – the harms attendant upon the commission of the substantive offense are restricted to the parties in the agreement. Id. at 782-83. Hence, Wharton’s Rule has no applicability here.