Opinion ID: 1367567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Burden of Self-Defense

Text: We now analyze the effect of Roberts on the validity of petitioner's conviction for manslaughter. [4] In Roberts, the petitioner was convicted of and sentenced for second degree murder. He excepted to instructions on permissible presumptions of intent and the burden of proving self-defense. This court reversed the trial court and held that the burden of proving the absence of self-defense remains upon the prosecution and not upon the party asserting it. This court in Roberts stated that: Inasmuch as this case must be remanded for a new trial, appellant's argument challenging the constitutionality of the trial court's instruction on self-defense must be considered.... In view of the decisions in Mullaney and [ State v. ] Kroll, [ [64] ] it is now only permissible to place upon the defendant the obligation to produce evidence, from whatever source, tending to establish self-defense. The obligation to prove the absence of self-defense must remain at all times with the prosecution.... This decision should not prove unduly burdensome to the prosecution.... The jury should be instructed as to the pertinent aspects of the law of justification in homicide cases and then simply informed that the State has the burden to prove absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.[ [65] ] State v. McCullum, supra , in 1983 decided the issue whether in a first degree murder case the State must disprove self-defense when the issue is properly raised. This court stated that it found nothing in the new statutory scheme to indicate the Legislature reallocated the burden of proof with respect to self-defense. [66] The court reasoned that: In construing legislation, we presume the Legislature is familiar with past judicial interpretations of its enactments. In the absence of an indication from the Legislature that it intended to overrule the common law, new legislation will be presumed to be in line with prior judicial decisions in a field of law.... By choosing not to employ similar language setting out the burden of proof as to self-defense, the Legislature indicated the continuing validity of the existing law on self-defense burdens of proof. Under the rule of State v. Roberts , the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of self-defense. This construction of the new code is entirely consistent with the surrounding statutory scheme.[ [67] ] Offering some guidance on self-defense instructions, this court in McCullum observed: As stated previously, there need only be some evidence, admitted in the case from whatever source to raise the issue of self-defense. Once the issue is properly raised, the jury should be instructed as to the definition and elements of self-defense. The jury then should be instructed that the State bears the burden of proving the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.... Finally, the jury should be informed that the State sustains its burden of proof as to the absence of self-defense if it proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, each of the elements of the crime as defined by the applicable statute.[ [68] ] In State v. Acosta, [69] reversing a conviction for second degree assault, this court further discussed the burden of proof in self-defense jury instructions. The court observed that: The jury should be informed in some unambiguous way that the State must prove absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant is entitled to a correct statement of the law, and should not be forced  to argue to the jury that the State [bears] the burden of proving absence of self-defense. Rather, the defense attorney is only required to argue to the jury that the facts fit the law; the attorney should not have to convince the jury what the law is....[ [70] ] [5] The court in Acosta noted that failure to provide [a specific instruction] is not reversible per se so long as the instructions, taken as a whole, make it clear that the State has the burden. [71] That was not the case in Petitioner Summers' 1976 trial. At petitioner's 1976 trial, the Honorable Frank J. Eberharter instructed the jury that in order to convict the defendant of first degree manslaughter, it must find (1) that the defendant stabbed the victim, (2) that the defendant's conduct was reckless, (3) that the victim died as a result of the defendant's acts, and (4) that the acts occurred in King County. [72] The court also instructed the jury on self-defense, [73] but the instructions did not indicate whether the State or the defendant bore the burden of proof for self-defense. The court's principal instruction on self-defense read in its entirety: An assault may be justified if used in defense of the person of the perpetrator when there is imminent danger that his adversary may injure him unless prevented. When attacked, one has the right to defend himself, to resist force with force, to the extent of what then appears to be the apparent danger to the one attacked. The right of self-defense is given only in emergencies to enable persons who are attacked, and to whom it may reasonably appear that their lives are endangered or their bodies are in danger of physical injury, to defend themselves. The right is limited to the emergency, and ends when the emergency ceases. This right is based upon what a reasonable man, having due regard for human life and safety, would do under similar circumstances. An assault is not justified when made for the purpose of avenging insults, abuse or a previous assault which has ended, or for the purpose of settling an argument not involving physical safety. No one is justified in using a dangerous weapon in self-defense against a simple assault with hands or fists, unless the one assaulted has reasonable cause to believe that he is at that moment in danger of losing his life or of suffering great bodily injury at the hands of his adversary.[ [74] ] Additionally, the court instructed the jury that: It is for you to determine whether or not the defendant had reasonable ground to apprehend imminent death or grievous bodily harm, and in deciding that question you should judge from the defendant's standpoint at the time of the occurrence; that is to say, you should take into consideration all the facts and circumstances bearing on the question and surrounding defendant and existing at or prior to the time of the occurrence, as said facts and circumstances are disclosed by the evidence.[ [75] ] In closing argument petitioner's attorney made the following comments on self-defense: The burden is not on Mr. Summers to prove that he acted in self defense. Mr. Summers has no burden at all, no obligation to do anything in a criminal case and in this case specifically. He doesn't have to prove anything to you. The prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Summers did not act in self defense. ... [Y]ou can come to no other conclusion than that Mr. Summers acted in self defense in this barroom brawl. Bear in mind, however, it is not his burden. There is no obligation on him to prove that to you. The prosecutor must prove to you that he did not act in self defense. If you're not satisfied that he's proved that to you, then you must find Mr. Summers not guilty.[ [76] ] In contrast, the prosecuting attorney made the following statement about self-defense in rebuttal argument to the jury: I think Mr. Olson, both in his voir dire and opening remarks and also in his closing remarks here, has said that on several occasions the burden is on the State to prove that Mr. Summers did not act in self defense. When you take the instructions that Judge Eberharter has instructed you as the law for this case, read the to convict instruction and look and see if at any place in the to convict there is a statement or element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Summers did not act in self defense. It is not there. What the State must prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt and which must be proved before Mr. Summers is guilty, is the elements that are contained in those to convict instructions.[ [77] ] The jury in the 1976 case convicted Petitioner Summers of the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter and acquitted him of the assault charge. In the case now before us, we conclude that only a constitutionally valid conviction of Petitioner Summers could serve as the predicate conviction for the charge of violation of the Uniform Firearms Act because a proper self-defense instruction might have made a difference in the jury's verdict in the 1976 case. The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there existed a constitutionally valid conviction for a crime of violence as an element of RCW 9.41.040. [78] This the State has not done.