Opinion ID: 1395220
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The validity of ORS 221.360.

Text: It is well established that there is no constitutional right to an appeal. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77, 92 S.Ct. 862, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972); State v. Endsley, 214 Or. 537, 539, 331 P.2d 338 (1958). As defendants contend, however, and as stated in Lindsey v. Normet, supra (at 77, 92 S.Ct. at 876): When an appeal is afforded, however, it cannot be granted to some litigants and capriciously or arbitrarily denied to others without violating the Equal Protection Clause. As previously stated, the Court of Appeals held that:    ORS 221.360, to the extent that it provides for a reduced scope of appellate court review for municipal offenders tried in cities where the initial trial is in the city's municipal court rather than a district court, violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 20 of the Oregon Constitution. 42 Or. App. at 228, 600 P.2d 478. The Court of Appeals reached that conclusion by applying a rational basis test for legislative classifications. Finding no rational basis for differentiating between similarly situated defendants' appeal rights, that court concluded that there had been a violation of equal protection of the laws. The city, in its petition for review, contends that equal protection does not require identity of treatment and that when the appellate rights in cases originating in municipal court are compared with the appellate rights in cases originating in district court, no equal protection violation exists. We are also reminded by the United States Supreme Court's opinion in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1292, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973), that    the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantage. To the same effect, see e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2445, 41 L.Ed.2d 600 (1974), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 367, 83 S.Ct. 814, 821, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963). [10] As previously stated, in those cities where persons charged with violating municipal ordinances are tried in municipal court, they may take an appeal to the circuit court and obtain de novo review in the form of a new trial. ORS 221.350 and 221.390. In cities where such persons are tried in district court, they may appeal to the Court of Appeals. ORS 46.047. To convicted defendants seeking appeal, there are advantages inherent in each of these systems. Persons convicted in municipal court have the advantage of a complete new trial, including the right to a new jury. Thus, they have the opportunity to seek review not only of legal questions, but they may also seek new factual determinations as well. They also have an advantage resulting from possible use of the trial in municipal court for the purpose of discovery and prior to trial de novo in the circuit court. Further appeal to the Court of Appeals, however, is limited to questions of the constitutionality of charter provisions or ordinances. Persons convicted in district court have the advantage of appellate review before a multi-judge court. [11] That review, however, is limited to errors of law appearing on the record (ORS 138.220), and such persons do not have the advantages resulting from a review by trial de novo in the circuit court. It would be difficult to state categorically which system offers greater advantages to defendants. Whether one or the other system is to the advantage of a particular defendant depends on whether his defense rests only on factual contentions or also on legal contentions. Thus, if we were to hold ORS 221.360 to be invalid upon the ground that a defendant convicted in municipal court and circuit court is denied equal protection because he does not have the same right to appeal to the Court of Appeals as granted to a defendant convicted in a district court, a person convicted in a district court could equally contend that he is denied equal protection in that he does not have the same right to review by a trial de novo in circuit court as granted to a defendant convicted in municipal court. Yet, both defendants whose cases originate in municipal court and defendants whose cases originate in district court enjoy advantages on appeal that are not available to the other. For these reasons, it may well be that the differences between the procedures available to a defendant convicted in a municipal court, as compared with those available to a defendant convicted in a district court, do not rise to such a level of inequality as to constitute unequal protection of the laws. In any event, however, we are of the opinion that ORS 221.360 does not deny equal protection of the laws for other good and sufficient reasons. The Court of Appeals, assuming that these differences were of such a nature and degree so as to constitute unequal protection, proceeded to test the validity of ORS 221.360 by the use of more traditional equal protection analysis. Defendants contended, and the Court of Appeals held, that these differences were the result of a legislative classification of appellate jurisdiction which must satisfy a rational basis test in order to pass equal protection scrutiny. The Court of Appeals held that no rational basis existed to justify the classification. As previously noted, there is no constitutional right to an appeal. See State v. Endsley, supra , and Lindsey v. Normet, supra . Therefore, we are not dealing in this case with a classification affecting fundamental rights. It is also clear that this case does not involve classifications that are inherently suspect (such as those based upon race, religion, national origin, etc.). In the absence of fundamental rights or a suspect class, statutory schemes are examined to determine whether they rationally further legitimate objectives of state law. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, at 17, 93 S.Ct. at 1288. Stated otherwise, a statutory scheme violates equal protection if it discriminates without any rational basis in terms of the purposes of the act, i.e., affords benefits to some while denying those benefits to others in a manner that is capricious or arbitrary. Renaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 1499, 16 L.Ed.2d 577 (1976); Bock v. Bend School Dist. No. 1, 252 Or. 53, 55, 448 P.2d 521 (1968). In our opinion the statutory scheme for appellate review as set forth in ORS 221.360 satisfies the rational basis test. By generally limiting review of municipal court convictions to local circuit courts, the legislature has reduced the burdens placed upon the cities and upon the Court of Appeals. Defendants contend that the only purpose served by this differential treatment is to save the state and cities the cost of this group of appeals, and further, that the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected costs as a distinguishing factor, citing Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 83 S.Ct. 768, 9 L.Ed.2d 892 (1963); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 79 S.Ct. 1164, 3 L.Ed.2d 1209 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), and cf. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 92 S.Ct. 862, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972). We note, however, that these cases dealt with statutes and rules that prevented indigents from obtaining appellate review in circumstances under which such review was available to persons with means, which is not true in this case. We further note that more recent opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court have recognized that costs and cost-related factors are legitimate distinguishing factors and can support the rationality of legislative classifications. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 93 S.Ct. 1172, 35 L.Ed. 572 (1973), and North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 96 S.Ct. 2709, 49 L.Ed.2d 534 (1976). We also find a rational basis for ORS 221.360 limiting the appeal rights of persons convicted of municipal violations in cities where such violations are initially triable in municipal courts, while persons charged with municipal violations in certain cities are tried initially in district courts and, pursuant to ORS 46.250, may appeal to the Court of Appeals. To allow those who are initially tried in municipal courts review by the Court of Appeals would be contrary to the previously noted purpose of balancing the costs and burdens of cities and the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, to allow those initially tried in district courts de novo appeals to circuit courts could well impose undue burdens upon counties in that it could well increase costs and add congestion to court dockets. Because those district court defendants should have some right to appeal, a rational solution is to allow review by the Court of Appeals. Thus, in our opinion, Oregon's statutory scheme for appeals is a rational attempt to evenly spread the costs and burdens of appeal throughout different levels of government. In addition, we note that other jurisdictions have considered similar problems and determined that no equal protection problems were presented. In Whittaker v. Superior Court of Shasta County, 68 Cal.2d 357, 66 Cal. Rptr. 710, 438 P.2d 358 (1968), the California Supreme Court examined the validity of a statutory scheme that established different appeal rights from the county courts of counties with relatively large populations as opposed to those with smaller populations. The fact that appeals in the larger counties were presented to a three-judge superior court panel while appeals in smaller counties were heard by a single superior court judge did not, in the opinion of the court, create an equal protection violation. Other cases holding that different appeal rights pass equal protection scrutiny include Appeal of O'Rourke, 220 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. 1974) (appeal with leave of court only); In re Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J-72804, 18 Ariz. App. 560, 504 P.2d 501 (1973) (different procedures provided in juvenile cases as opposed to appeals in adult cases); Saunders v. Reynolds, 214 Va. 697, 204 S.E.2d 421 (1974) (different appeal rights for misdemeanors tried in courts not of record and felonies tried in courts of record). For these reasons, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in its holding that ORS 221.360 is invalid as a denial of equal protection of the laws. Defendants contend not only that they were denied equal protection of the laws, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, but also that they were discriminated against in a manner contrary to Article I, Section 20 of the Constitution of Oregon, which provides: No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens. Thus, defendants contend that other defendants, whose cases are prosecuted in state district courts, are granted an unlimited privilege of appeal to the Court of Appeals, a privilege denied to them upon the same terms. We believe, however, that substantially the same analysis applies. It is true that the provisions of Article I, Section 20 of the Oregon Constitution are not identical with those of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Thus, as we said recently in State ex rel. Reed v. Schwab, 287 Or. 411, 417, 600 P.2d 387 (1979) quoting from an earlier opinion by this court: The provisions of the state Constitution are the antithesis of the fourteenth amendment in that they prevent the enlargement of the rights of some in discrimination against the rights of others, while the fourteenth amendment prevents the curtailment of rights   . For examples of cases in which the applicability of the two provisions might not be identical, see Linde, Without Due Process, 49 Or.L.Rev. 125, 142-43 (1970). See also Tharalson v. State Dept. of Rev., 281 Or. 9, 15, 573 P.2d 298 (1978). Nevertheless, in the usual case substantially the same analysis is applicable in determining whether there has been a denial of equal protection of the laws or a grant of a privilege or immunity on terms not equally applicable to all citizens. Thus, as held by this court in School Dist. No. 12 v. Wasco County, 270 Or. 622, 628, 529 P.2d 386 (1975):    this court has stated that such semantic and conceptual differences which may exist between the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 20, can be resolved in favor of common underlying principles. In Plummer v. Donald M. Drake Co., 212 Or. 430, 437, 320 P.2d 245 (1958), the court said: `The controlling principles which guide the courts in determining questions of alleged unconstitutional discrimination or class legislation are the same whether it is the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States which is invoked, or the privileges and immunities provision in Art. I, § 20 of the Oregon Constitution. Fundamentally, classification is a matter committed to the discretion of the legislature and the courts will not interfere with the legislative judgment unless it is palpably arbitrary   .' To the same effect, see, e.g., Phillips v. City, 192 Or. 143, 153, 234 P.2d 572 (1951); and Savage v. Martin, 161 Or. 660, 693, 91 P.2d 273 (1939). See also Jarvill v. City of Eugene, 289 Or. 157, 184, 613 P.2d 1 (1980). Indeed, in State v. Pirkey, 203 Or. 697, 281 P.2d 698 (1955), relied upon by defendants in challenging the constitutionality of the Klamath Falls ordinance in this case, this court, in considering the problem presented in that case, which has considerable similarity to the problem presented in this case, for reasons stated below, said (at 703, 281 P.2d 698) that: The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Article I, Section 20 of the Oregon Constitution are alike in that they constitute similar limitations upon legislative action for the protection of the individual from arbitrary or capricious legislation. Phillips v. City of Bend, 192 Or. 143, 153, 234 P.2d 572; Savage v. Martin, 161 Or. 660, 91 P.2d 273. Affirmatively stated, both provisions constitute a pledge of the protection of equal laws. Power Manufacturing Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, [47 S.Ct. 678], 71 L.Ed. 1165. The Constitution does not require that a law shall affect all persons exactly alike, but there is a guaranty of like treatment to all persons similarly situated. It is not the purpose of either constitutional provision to take from the states the right and power to classify the subjects of legislation. It is only when such attempted classification is arbitrary and unreasonable that the courts can declare it to be beyond the legislative authority. Upon application of such an analysis to the question whether ORS 221.360 grants the privilege of an unlimited appeal to the Court of Appeals to defendants prosecuted in district courts for violation of state laws which does not upon the same terms    belong to these defendants, we are unable to escape the conclusion that these defendants are not denied such a privilege as individual persons, but only because they are members of a class of persons who are prosecuted in municipal courts for violation of municipal ordinances, as distinct from persons prosecuted in state district courts for violation of state statutes. For reasons previously stated, we have held that such a classification is not unreasonable for purposes of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. For the same reasons, we hold that such a classification or discrimination is not palpably arbitrary for purposes of the privileges and immunities clause of Article I, Section 20 of the Constitution of Oregon. Again, see School Dist. No. 12 v. Wasco County, supra, at 628, 529 P.2d 386. As stated in Mallatt v. Luihn et al., 206 Or. 678, 702, 294 P.2d 871 (1956): It is well established that the courts will not undertake to disturb a legislative classification unless the legislature could not have had any reasonable grounds for believing that there were valid public considerations for the distinction made.