Opinion ID: 4503539
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bodily Integrity and Right to Be Free From

Text: Punishment “Where guards themselves are responsible for the rape and sexual abuse of inmates, qualified immunity offers no shield.” Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original). “In the simplest and most absolute of terms the . . . right of prisoners to be free from sexual abuse [is] unquestionably clearly established [in the Ninth Circuit] . . . and no reasonable prison guard could possibly [believe] otherwise.” Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000). Anderson argues that his alleged conduct—including sexual comments and contact—is not equivalent to the sexual abuse that we have found unconstitutional. Yet, in Fontana, we noted that the alleged similar conduct, was “malum in se” and that “[n]o reasonable officer could believe that this conduct did not violate [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights.” Fontana, 262 F.3d at 882 n.8. Moreover, the Kern County Juvenile Hall policy prohibiting staff members from being alone in a room with minors absent an emergency as well as Anderson’s likely PREA training provided him with notice that his alleged conduct VAZQUEZ V. COUNTY OF KERN 21 was unreasonable. 10 And, beyond the clearly established case law, training, and juvenile hall policies, it is “obvious” that a juvenile corrections officer should not sexually harass or abuse a juvenile ward as it is always wrong for a juvenile corrections officer to engage in such conduct. See Sharp, 871 F.3d at 912 (9th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, we conclude that Anderson is not entitled to qualified immunity for Vazquez’s bodily integrity or punishment claims.