Opinion ID: 1249253
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ASUC Support of Political and Ideological Groups.

Text: (2a) Plaintiffs contend that the ASUC uses income from the mandatory fee in several ways that violate their rights to freedom of speech and association. We consider first the use of such fees to subsidize student groups devoted to political and ideological causes. This case involves two important principles. (3) The first is that the government may not compel a person to contribute money to support political or ideological causes. (See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of California, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 9-10 [110 L.Ed.2d at pp. 11-12] ( Keller ); Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977) 431 U.S. 209, 234-235 [52 L.Ed.2d 261, 283-285, 97 S.Ct. 1782] ( Abood ).) Such contributions are a form of speech, and compelled speech offends the First Amendment, [7] just as do restrictions on speech. (E.g., Keller, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 9-10 [110 L.Ed.2d at pp. 11-12]; Abood, supra, 431 U.S. at pp. 234-235, & 235 fn. 31 [52 L.Ed.2d at pp. 283-285]; Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo (1974) 418 U.S. 241, 247-258 [41 L.Ed.2d 730, 735-741, 94 S.Ct. 2831] [state may not compel a newspaper to print a political candidate's reply to an editorial]; Torcaso v. Watkins (1961) 367 U.S. 488, 489-496 [6 L.Ed.2d 982, 983-988, 81 S.Ct. 1680] [state may not compel civil servants to affirm a belief in God]; Board of Education v. Barnette (1943) 319 U.S. 624, 630-642 [87 L.Ed. 1628, 1633-1640, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 147 A.L.R. 674] [state may not compel students to salute the flag].) Courts have often stressed this principle by repeating Thomas Jefferson's view that `to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.' (Brant, James Madison: The Nationalist (1948) p. 354, as quoted in Abood, supra, 431 U.S. at p. 235, fn. 31 [52 L.Ed.2d at p. 284]; see also Keller, supra , 431 U.S. at p. 10 [110 L.Ed.2d at pp. 11-12], and Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson (1986) 475 U.S. 292, 305, fn. 15 [89 L.Ed.2d 232, 246, 106 S.Ct. 1066] ( Hudson ).) (4) The second principle is that the Regents, to be effective, must have considerable discretion to determine how best to carry out the University's educational mission. Indeed, we have said that the power of the Regents to operate, control, and administer the University is virtually exclusive. ( Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 529, 540 [91 Cal. Rptr. 57, 476 P.2d 457], internal quotation marks omitted; see also San Francisco Labor Council v. Regents of University of California (1980) 26 Cal.3d 785, 788 [163 Cal. Rptr. 460, 608 P.2d 277].) (2b) These principles conflict in the case before us. Plaintiffs, invoking their constitutional right not to be compelled to speak, argue that the use of mandatory fees to subsidize student political groups impermissibly burdens that right. The Regents, relying on their authority to define the University's educational mission, acknowledge the burden on plaintiffs' rights but argue that student political activity offers educational benefits that justify the burden. Our analysis begins with a line of high court decisions that arose in the context of agency-shop agreements. Under these decisions, a state may compel employees who obtain the benefits of a union's collective bargaining efforts to pay service fees to the union, even though such employees may choose not to join. ( Abood, supra, 431 U.S. at pp. 217-223 [52 L.Ed.2d at pp. 272-277]; see also Hudson, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 301 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 243-244].) The court has explained this result as justified by the state's interest in facilitating collective bargaining and preventing free riders. ( Abood, supra, 431 U.S. p. 222 [52 L.Ed.2d at pp. 275-276]; see also id., at pp. 220-221 [52 L.Ed.2d at pp. 274-275].) However, the constitutional prohibition against compelled speech limits the uses to which a mandatory fee may be put: When the state does compel nonmembers to support a union financially, the nonmembers may prevent the union from using their contributions to fund the expression of political and ideological views unrelated to collective bargaining. ( Id., at p. 234 [52 L.Ed.2d at pp. 283-284]; see also Hudson, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 301-302 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 243-244].) (5) Because the use of a mandatory fee implicates freedom of association, strict scrutiny applies. As the high court reiterated in Hudson, supra, [i]nfringements on freedom of association `may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.' (475 U.S. at p. 303, fn. 11 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 245], quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S. 609, 623 [82 L.Ed.2d 462, 104 S.Ct. 3244].) Thus, even when the government has a sufficiently compelling interest to require a person to subsidize an organization against his or her will, the resulting burden on freedom of association requires that the procedure be carefully tailored to minimize the infringement. ( Hudson, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 303 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 245].) The principle that underlies the agency-shop decisions took sharper focus in Keller, supra, 496 U.S. 1, which concerned the mandatory payment of dues by lawyers to a bar association. The plaintiff lawyers objected to the bar's use of dues to fund lobbying on issues of general social concern that had little, if anything, to do with the practice of law, such as gun control, abortion, and prayer in public schools. The bar defended its lobbying as a permissible exercise of its statutory authority to aid in all matters pertaining to the advancement of the science of jurisprudence or to the improvement of the administration of justice. ( Id., at p. 15 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 15], internal quotation marks omitted.) The high court rejected the bar's argument. In so doing, the court made clear that the use of mandatory contributions must be germane, not simply to any purpose the organization chooses to declare for itself, but to the purpose for which compelled association was justified as a matter of constitutional law. ( Keller, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 13 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 14], citing Abood, supra, 431 U.S. 209; see Abood, supra, at pp. 219, 235 [52 L.Ed.2d at pp. 273-274, 284-285].) In other words, the existence of a compelling interest sometimes permits the state to require a person to associate with an organization, or to support it financially, despite the general constitutional prohibition against laws with that effect. However, that one's support may be compelled for some purposes does not mean that one must also subsidize every activity the organization in question chooses to undertake. To illustrate, the state interests that justified compulsory bar membership in Keller were the specific goals of regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services. (496 U.S. at p. 13 [110 L.Ed.2d at pp. 13-14].) As the high court explained, [t]he State Bar may therefore constitutionally fund activities germane to those goals out of the mandatory dues of all members. It may not, however, in such manner fund activities of an ideological nature which fall outside of those areas of activity. ( Id., at p. 14 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 14].) Thus, the high court rejected the State Bar's argument that its lobbying on matters of general social interest, for example, to advance a gun control or a nuclear weapons freeze initiative, could be justified as germane to the Bar's broader goal of improving the administration of justice. ( Id., at pp. 14-16 [110 L.Ed.2d at pp. 14-16].) To summarize, Keller and Abood teach that the state may compel a person to support an organization if there is a sufficiently compelling reason to do so, and that the organization's use of mandatory contributions must be germane to the purposes that justified the requirement of support. ( Keller, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 13-14 [110 L.Ed.2d at pp. 13-14]; Abood, supra, 431 U.S. at pp. 217-223, 232-237 [52 L.Ed.2d at pp. 272-277, 282-286].) (2c) The Regents argue that their use of mandatory fees to support student political groups satisfies these principles. They reason that the University's purpose is to educate, and that the funding of such groups by the ASUC provides educational opportunities. Participation in such groups, according to the Regents, gives students a chance to express their views on campus, to participate in campus administrative positions, to provide self-education in government processes, to develop social skills, to inform the student body about a variety of issues, and to ensure freedom of expression and association. While Keller and Abood hold that activities supported by mandatory contributions must be germane to the constitutionally relevant function, it does not follow, as the Regents argue, that everything germane is automatically permissible without the need for further inquiry. Keller and Abood involved much lighter burdens on speech and associational rights than those at issue here. A state bar's regulatory function, as in Keller, and a labor union's collective bargaining function, as in Abood, can be narrowly defined. Thus, to be compelled to pay for activities germane to those functions does not substantially burden an unwilling supporter's speech and associational rights. While the unwilling supporter may receive unwanted professional or economic assistance, he or she remains free not to speak or to support others' speech on political and ideological issues. In contrast, the University's educational function is extremely broad; it potentially encompasses all of life. By recognizing that student political activity can be germane to education we run the risk of sanctioning a much greater burden on speech and associational rights than the high court necessarily contemplated when it used that term. ( Keller, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 13-14 [110 L.Ed.2d at pp. 14-16], citing Abood, supra, 431 U.S. 209; see also Abood, supra, at pp. 219, 235 [52 L.Ed.2d at pp. 273-274, 284-285].) The solution to this problem is to set a rational limit on the use of mandatory fees. We can do this by recognizing what is obviously true, namely, that a group's dedication to achieving its political or ideological goals, at some point, begins to outweigh any legitimate claim it may have to be educating students on the University's behalf. To fund such a group through mandatory fees will usually constitute more of a burden on dissenting students' speech and associational rights than is necessary to achieve any significant educational goal. The University can teach civics in other ways that involve a lesser burden on those rights, or no burden at all. Indeed, this is the approach that courts have followed in the two cases that are fairly closely on point. ( Carroll v. Blinken (2d Cir.1992) 957 F.2d 991, cert. den. (1992) ___ U.S. ___ [121 L.Ed.2d 224, 113 S.Ct. 300]; Galda v. Rutgers (3d Cir.1985) 772 F.2d 1060, cert. den. (1986) 475 U.S. 1065 [89 L.Ed.2d 602, 106 S.Ct. 1375].) [8] In Carroll v. Blinken, supra, 957 F.2d 991 ( Carroll ), students at the State University of New York (SUNY) at Albany challenged the use of a portion of their mandatory student activity fee to fund the New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. (NYPIRG). NYPIRG, a statewide organization with chapters on 19 SUNY campuses, described itself as a `nonpartisan research and advocacy organization directed by New York State college and university students.' ( Id., at pp. 993-994.) NYPIRG spent money both on and off campus. On campus, NYPIRG financed research projects by students and sponsored debates, symposiums, and professors' fora on issues of public interest. Off campus, NYPIRG employed 60 full-time professional staff members to lobby the state government on issues of `consumer protection, government and corporate accountability and economic and social justice.' ( Id., at p. 994.) The court in Carroll identified the limits of mandatory funding by balancing the educational benefits that NYPIRG offered to students against the infringement of the dissenting students' right not to be compelled to subsidize NYPIRG's political activities. The court frankly recognized the infringement. To quote the opinion, the dissenting students' right to be free from compelled speech suffers when NYPIRG uses student funds to raise issues on campus, organize the community and lobby the legislature in pursuit of `economic and social justice.' (957 F.2d at p. 999.) The court also recognized that these intrusions must be `narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary intrusion on freedom of expression' and justified by the state. ( Ibid., quoting Schad v. Mount Ephraim (1981) 452 U.S. 61, 69 fn. 7 [68 L.Ed.2d 671, 681, 101 S.Ct. 2176].) However, the court found that NYPIRG offered benefits on campus that were substantial enough to justify the infringement.... ( Carroll, supra, 957 F.2d at p. 1001.) These benefits consisted of promoting extracurricular life, transmitting skills and civic duty, and stimulating energetic campus debate. ( Ibid. ) The Carroll court reached a different conclusion regarding NYPIRG's off-campus activities. Reasoning, as before, that even incidental burdens on speech [must] be `narrowly drawn' (957 F.2d at p. 1002, quoting Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 69, fn. 7 [68 L.Ed.2d at p. 681]; cf. Carroll, supra, at p. 999), the court concluded that the purported educational benefits vanish when NYPIRG money is spent in the halls of the state legislature.... ( Id., at p. 1002.) The university's interests, the court reasoned, are still, after all, those of the university and its community, not that of an independent statewide organization. ( Ibid. ) There is language in Carroll that the Regents interpret as suggesting that the standard of review in cases such as this is more relaxed than the strict scrutiny standard that courts typically apply in cases involving burdens on speech and associational rights. However, we do not read the Second Circuit's opinion that way. The court wrote, citing United States v. Albertini (1985) 472 U.S. 675 [86 L.Ed.2d 536, 105 S.Ct. 2897] ( Albertini ), that it would look to see whether the [challenged] regulation `promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.' ( Carroll, supra, 957 F.2d at p. 999, quoting Albertini, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 689 [86 L.Ed.2d at p. 548].) In context, however, it is clear that the high court in Albertini did not use this language to announce a relaxed standard of review. In that case the Court upheld, as applied to a person protesting nuclear weapons, a law making it a criminal offense to reenter a military base after having been ordered not to do so by the commander. The high court did use the language quoted in Carroll, but the Court also emphasized that even an incidental burden on speech [must be] no greater than is essential.... ( Albertini, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 689 [86 L.Ed.2d at p. 548].) Reading the quoted language in context, it is evident that the high court merely applied a version of the strict scrutiny test that courts traditionally apply in symbolic conduct cases. [9] Whatever the import of the Carroll court's reference to Albertini may be, what matters for our purposes is this: The Second Circuit expressly and repeatedly recognized that the defendants had to show that SUNY's mandatory funding rule was `narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary intrusion' on constitutional rights. ( Carroll, supra, 957 F.2d at pp. 999, 1002, quoting Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 69, fn. 7 [68 L.Ed.2d at p. 681].) This, in essence, is strict scrutiny, the same standard that the high court invoked in Hudson ( supra, 475 U.S. at p. 303, fn. 11 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 245]). In Galda v. Rutgers, supra, 772 F.2d 1060 ( Galda ), the court applied the same test to a similar organization but reached a different conclusion. The student plaintiffs at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, objected to the use of a mandatory fee to support the New Jersey Public Interest Research Group (New Jersey PIRG). New Jersey PIRG, like the organization involved in Carroll, supra, 957 F.2d 991, was a statewide organization with student members on many campuses. New Jersey PIRG lobbied the federal and state governments on various matters of social interest, including the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, nuclear weapons, and the environment. New Jersey PIRG also provided internships for students, who received academic credit on campus for the work they performed. (772 F.2d at p. 1061.) The court in Galda considered it important that New Jersey PIRG was a statewide organization rather than one consisting solely of Rutgers students. The court also attributed significance to the particular funding mechanism employed: Students voted periodically to support New Jersey PIRG through a separate, mandatory fee rather than through the general student activities fund. For these reasons, the court felt that it was unnecessary to address the problem presented by a state university's allocation of a mandatory nonrefundable student activity fee or the question whether an organization with PIRG's philosophic outlook may be funded though the general activities fund as are other campus organizations representing diverse views. (772 F.2d at p. 1064.) The particular facts of the Galda case undoubtedly determined its outcome, but there is nothing in the Third Circuit's approach that prevents its application to on-campus student groups. In essence, the court inquired whether mandatory funding of New Jersey PIRG was necessary to achieve the university's educational goals and weighed the purported educational benefits against the burden on constitutional rights to determine whether the burden was justified. ( Galda, supra, 772 F.2d at pp. 1065-1068.) This, of course, is the same approach that the Second Circuit took in Carroll ( supra, 957 F.2d at pp. 1001-1002). Following this approach, the Galda court accepted the university's argument that participation in New Jersey PIRG offered educational benefits to students. However, the court determined that the educational benefits offered by New Jersey PIRG were not sufficient to justify the infringement of dissenting students' speech and associational rights. The court reasoned as follows: Although the training PIRG members may receive is considerable, there can be no doubt that it is secondary to PIRG's stated objectives of a frankly ideological bent. To that extent the educational benefits are only `incidental'  arising from or accompanying the principal objectives  and subordinate to the group's function of promoting its political and ideological aims. (772 F.2d at p. 1065.) While there is language in Galda suggesting that the mandatory funding of political groups might be acceptable if accomplished through a content-neutral process in which all groups on campus were free to compete (772 F.2d at p. 1067), the opinion did not purport to announce such a holding. Moreover, other language in the opinion cogently demonstrates why a content-neutral funding process, standing alone, cannot sufficiently protect the rights of students who do not wish to subsidize other students' political activity. [10] To quote the Galda opinion, even if the opponents succeed in achieving mandatory contributions for their own organization, they are not relieved from the obligation to pay a fee to a group with which they disagree. For example, if the university compelled a student to make separate contributions to both the Democratic and Republican National Committees, the evil is not undone; it is compounded. Adherents to each party would be forced to pay a fee to the other political group, a clearly unconstitutional exaction. ( Ibid. ) The Second Circuit made the same point in Carroll, supra : The fact that appellants' student activity fee will also compel them to speak through a number of other campus groups in addition to NYPIRG in no way heals the constitutional infirmity; it simply means that students must fund more than one unwanted view. (957 F.2d at p. 998, citing Galda, supra, 772 F.2d at p. 1067.) The principles that we derive from Carroll and Galda, as well as Keller and Abood, are these: A university may, in general, support student groups through mandatory contributions because that use of funds can be germane to the university's educational mission. ( Carroll, supra, 957 F.2d at pp. 1001-1002; cf. Keller, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 13-14 [110 L.Ed.2d at pp. 13-14], and Abood, supra, 431 U.S. at pp. 232-237 [52 L.Ed.2d at pp. 282-286].) At some point, however, the educational benefits that a group offers become incidental to the group's primary function of advancing its own political and ideological interests. ( Galda, supra, 772 F.2d at pp. 1065, 1068; cf. Carroll, supra, 957 F.2d at p. 1002.) To fund such a group may still provide some educational benefits, but the incidental benefit to education will not usually justify the burden on the dissenting students' constitutional rights. Phrased in terms of the tests that courts have applied, a regulation that permits the mandatory funding of such groups is not `narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary intrusion on freedom of expression' ( Carroll, supra, 957 F.2d at p. 999, quoting Schad v. Mount Ephraim, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 69, fn. 7 [68 L.Ed.2d at p. 681]; see also Carroll, supra, 957 F.2d at p. 1002), and it unnecessarily restrict[s] constitutionally protected liberty, [when] there is open a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interest ( Galda v. Rutgers, supra, 772 F.2d at p. 1066). One can reach the same result by applying the Carroll court's alternative formulation of the test. When mandatory funding is being used to create an incidental benefit to education at the cost of a significant burden on constitutional rights, it cannot usually be said that the state is `promot[ing] a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.' ( Carroll, supra, 957 F.2d at p. 999, quoting Albertini, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 689 [86 L.Ed.2d at p. 548].) We find no reason to doubt that the burden on dissenting students' speech and associational rights in this case is real and substantial. Students are, in fact, forced to support causes they strongly oppose. For example, students who favor abortion rights must pay to support the political activities of Berkeley Right to Life, a group opposed to abortion, and students opposed to abortion must subsidize groups such as Campus N.O.W. and Campus Abortion Rights Action League, which favor abortion rights. Another possible consequence of the current funding system was suggested at oral argument. Counsel for the ASUC acknowledged that a group which espoused the supremacy of a particular race would be eligible to receive mandatory fees so long as it permitted all students to join without discrimination. A sufficient remedy for the incidental infringement of the rights of a student of a different race, counsel suggested, would be to join that group and engage in vigorous debate within that group as to whether their ideas are acceptable or not. One might ask, rhetorically, whether being compelled to subsidize an organization whose goals one abhors is less of a burden than being compelled to display the state motto on a license plate ( Wooley v. Maynard (1977) 430 U.S. 705, 714-717 [51 L.Ed.2d 752, 762-764, 97 S.Ct. 1428] [Live Free or Die]), a burden that the high court has found to be impermissible. (6) The ASUC does purport to have a standard for identifying those groups whose political activities are of such a nature as to disqualify them from receiving support from mandatory fees. Specifically, an ASUC rule requires that funds not be used for partisan political activities or any ballot measure.... (ASUC, Policy & Procedure Manual, Guidelines for Funding Student Organizations, pp. 9-10.) However, the rule does not satisfy constitutional requirements, either on its face or as applied. While the rule on its face bars funding only for partisan political activities, much broader concerns are at stake. The court's opinion in Abood, supra, 431 U.S. 209, makes this clear: It is no doubt true that a central purpose of the First Amendment `was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.' [Citations.] But our cases have never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters  to take a nonexhaustive list of labels  is not entitled to full First Amendment protection. Union members in both the public and private sectors may find that a variety of union activities conflict with their beliefs. [Citations.] Nothing in the First Amendment or our cases discussing its meaning makes the question whether the adjective `political' can properly be attached to those beliefs the critical constitutional inquiry. ( Id., at pp. 231-232 [52 L.Ed.2d at pp. 281-282], fn. omitted.) Moreover, as applied by the ASUC, the partisan political rule actually permits the use of mandatory fees to fund a great deal of activity that is indisputably political and even partisan by any reasonable definition. [11] Indeed, the ASUC's executive vice-president testified at trial that the rule has been interpreted to bar funding only for the campus Young Republicans and Young Democrats. In contrast, the rule has been interpreted not to bar funding for a group that supports the nuclear freeze initiative, organizations that support the [proposed Equal Rights Amendment], organizations that hold demonstrations against the policies of the Reagan administration, organizations that oppose U.S. aid to the government of El Salvador, [o]rganizations that oppose construction of the peripheral canal, [o]rganizations that support gay rights legislation, a group that advocates replacement of our current form of government with a revolutionary socialist regime, and a group that supports abolition of the death penalty. Confronted with these funding decisions on cross-examination, the ASUC witness conceded that she could not articulate the criteria by which the ASUC determined whether a group was partisan or nonpartisan. If these examples left any doubt that the ASUC's partisan political rule lacked any meaningful content, to be convinced of the point one would only need to consider the ASUC's decision to fund the Young Spartacus League. This group, according to the record, supported the former Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, opposed the Solidarity movement in Poland, and, to quote its successful application for ASUC funding, seeks to build a revolutionary socialist movement which can intervene in all social struggles armed with a working class program based on the politics of Marx, Lenin and Trotsky, as part of a disciplined revolutionary movement. We do not in any way mean to suggest that this group, or any group, should not be permitted to register with the University and attempt by all legitimate means to persuade other students of the correctness of its views. However, to fund the Young Spartacus League as nonpartisan, while denying funding to the Young Republicans and Young Democrats as partisan, borders on the absurd. (2d) We need not determine in the first instance whether each of the groups that plaintiffs specifically challenged at trial do or do not offer educational benefits that justify the infringement of plaintiffs' speech and associational rights. However, if the Regents decide to implement educational programs that entail burdens on constitutional rights they must ensure that the burdens are justified, and it is clear that they have made no serious effort to do so. At oral argument, counsel for the Regents argued that such a determination is virtually impossible to make because the terms political and ideological are vague. However, the high court has required labor unions and a state bar association to identify political and ideological activities that cannot properly be charged to mandatory contributors. ( Keller, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 15 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 15]; Abood, supra, 431 U.S. at pp. 235-236 [52 L.Ed.2d at pp. 284-285].) As already discussed, the Regents have more discretion than the defendants in Keller and Abood in determining how to use mandatory fees because some student political activity is germane to the University's educational mission. However, when a group's educational function has become merely incidental to its political and ideological activities, then the infringement of dissenting students' constitutional rights can no longer be justified by the purported educational benefit. ( Galda, supra, 772 F.2d at pp. 1065, 1067-1068.) So long as the present system of funding student activity groups continues, the only practical way to protect the rights of dissenting students is to implement the procedures outlined in Hudson, supra, 475 U.S. 292, 301-310 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 243-249], and Keller, supra, 496 U.S. 1, 16-17 [110 L.Ed.2d at pp. 15-16]. These procedures will require the Regents to identify any groups that are ineligible for mandatory funding under the constitutional standards set out above and offer students the option of deducting a corresponding amount from the mandatory fee. The State Bar of California adopted a similar procedure to comply with the high court's decision in Keller, supra . Students who disagree with the Regents' calculation of the deduction will be entitled to the procedural safeguards articulated in Keller : an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decision-maker, and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending. (496 U.S. at p. 16 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 16], internal quotation marks omitted.) While these procedures will obviously entail some administrative burden, they will not necessarily require the Regents to review each of the University's 150 registered student groups. Of these groups, the vast majority appear to have no discernible political or ideological interests; plaintiffs have challenged only 14. Moreover, as the high court has observed, even if such a procedure did `result in some ... administrative burden ... and perhaps prove at times to be somewhat inconvenient, such additional burden or inconvenience is hardly sufficient to justify contravention of the constitutional mandate. It is noteworthy that unions representing government employees have developed, and have operated successfully within the parameters of Abood procedures for over a decade.' ( Keller, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 16-17 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 16], quoting Keller v. State Bar (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1152, 1192 [255 Cal. Rptr. 542, 767 P.2d 1020] (conc. and dis. opn. of Kaufman, J.).) Of course, the Regents must provide a refund only to those students who object to the use of their fees for political and ideological activities. There is no legal barrier to funding such activities with the fees of students who do not object. Moreover, the refund will be necessary only so long as the Regents continue to subsidize political and ideological activities through mandatory fees. The Regents are free to adopt another system of funding student activities, such as a voluntary system, that avoids the constitutional defects identified in this opinion.