Opinion ID: 487749
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State's Claim For Damages

Text: 11 The only question remaining is whether the Attorney General, suing as parens patriae, may obtain under RICO an order directing payment of treble damages to its citizen-consumers injured by defendants' alleged illegalities. 12 At the outset, we emphasize that this question differs from that which would be presented if the Attorney General had sought treble-damage recovery for an injury to a quasi-sovereign interest of the state itself--for example, an injury to the general economy of the state. In that case, common law parens patriae standing would undoubtedly exist. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 3268, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982). We would then be called on to decide whether the RICO statute authorized recovery for that harm. See Life of Mid-America Insurance Company, 805 F.2d at 763; Hawaii v. Standard Oil Company of California, 405 U.S. 251, 264, 92 S.Ct. 885, 892, 31 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972) (concerning identical issue in context of Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act). 13 Here, in contrast, a monetary award is sought solely for injury to the business and property of the state's citizens. The issue before us, therefore, is whether the state has standing to sue in a representative capacity to recover those damages. We hold that it does not. 14 A state that sues as parens patriae must seek to redress an injury to an interest that is separate from the interests of particular individuals. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607, 102 S.Ct. at 3268; See also People of the State of New York by Abrams v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir.1982). The state cannot merely litigate as a volunteer the personal claims of its competent citizens. Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665, 96 S.Ct. 2333, 2335, 49 L.Ed.2d 124 (1976). Where the complaint only seeks to recover money damages for injuries suffered by individuals, the award of money damages will not compensate the state for any harm done to its quasi-sovereign interests. Thus, the state as parens patriae lacks standing to prosecute such a suit. See State of California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774, 776-777 (9th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908, 93 S.Ct. 2291, 36 L.Ed.2d 974 (1973); Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corporation, 309 F.Supp. 1057, 1061 (E.D.Pa.1969); and In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 52 F.R.D. 398, 401 (C.D.Cal.1970). 15 To be sure, in this case the Attorney General alleges that the defendants' conduct has caused substantial injury to the integrity of the state's marketplace and the economic well-being of all its citizens. Since, however, the monetary relief sought by the complaint is not designed to compensate the state for those damages, the asserted presence of such damages cannot serve as the foundation for the state's authority to act here as the representative of its citizens. 16 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint is affirmed.