Opinion ID: 1281092
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kelley's Liability under Dealers Act

Text: Kelley claims the trial judge erred in including him as a defendant to the Dealers Act cause of action on the jury verdict form because he was not subject to liability under the Dealers Act. Specifically, Kelley contends Mr. and Mrs. Jackson did not allege in their complaint or prove at trial he was a dealer or a person in control under the Dealers Act. We disagree. When interpreting a statute, words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation. Rowe v. Hyatt, 321 S.C. 366, 468 S.E.2d 649 (1996). Under the Dealers Act, any person who sells or attempts to effect the sale of any motor vehicle is a dealer. S.C.Code Ann. § 56-15-10(h) (1991) (emphasis added). Person is defined as: [A] natural person, corporation, partnership, trust or other entity, and, in case of an entity, it shall include any other entity in which it has a majority interest or effectively controls as well as the individual officers, directors and other persons in active control of the activities of each such entity. S.C.Code Ann. § 56-15-10(n) (1991). To be liable, the dealer must participate in the wrongdoing. Rowe v. Hyatt, supra (dealer must personally commit, direct, or authorize the inappropriate acts); S.C.Code Ann. § 56-15-40 (1991) (unlawful for a motor vehicle dealer to engage in any action which is arbitrary, in bad faith, or unconscionable ...). An agent for an entity who makes misrepresentations while attempting to sell a motor vehicle qualifies as a dealer who may be held liable under this act. By using the word any in § 56-15-10(h), this definition contemplates including all persons who were involved in the transaction. Further, the controlling person language in § 56-15-10(n) allows an injured party to disregard the entity when the controlling person of the entity actively participates in the unlawful act. However, this language does not eliminate an agent's liability to a third party for his own actions. See Gilbert v. Mid-South Machinery Co., 267 S.C. 211, 227 S.E.2d 189 (1976); 3 Am.Jur.2d, Agency § 309 (1986) (under common law, agents of an entity who deal directly with a third party owe that party a duty not to injure the party with his actions and may be held liable for violating that duty). If the Legislature intended agents to escape liability under this act, it could have done so. Thus, under the Dealers Act, an agent for an entity who sells or attempts to sell a motor vehicle, along with the entity, may be held liable for any misrepresentations made during the transaction. To hold otherwise would allow the person most responsible for the unlawful conduct to escape liability. Although Mr. and Mrs. Jackson did not allege Kelley was a dealer in their complaint, there was evidence presented at trial to prove Kelley was a dealer. Evidence at trial demonstrated that Kelley assisted Speed in showing the vehicle to them. Mr. and Mrs. Jackson and Kelley made several representations about the vehicle during the Jacksons' inspection, including the vehicle had not been wrecked, the mileage was actually 87,000, the engine still met factory specifications, and after restoration, the vehicle would be in excellent condition. Further, during the delivery of the Jaguar to the Jacksons, Kelley assured Mrs. Jackson the vehicle was in good shape and dismissed her concerns over the appearance of certain problems during their drive to and from the gas station. Based on this evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude Kelley was a person, as contemplated by the Dealers Act. He was attempting to effect the sale of the Jaguar, and therefore, was a dealer who could be held liable for his misrepresentations under this act. Kelley further contends he did not receive notice of this cause of action; therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction over him on this cause of action and the judgment is void under Rule 60(b), SCRCP. We disagree. Under Rule 60(b), SCRCP, a judgment is void if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction over the parties. See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, 11 Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 (2d ed.1995). However, a defendant may waive objections to insufficiency of service and voluntarily subject himself to personal jurisdiction. Hospital Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Parque Insdus. Rio Canas, Inc., 653 F.2d 54 (1st Cir.1981). Further, the Due Process Clause only demands notice reasonably calculated under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865, 873 (1950). Under the facts of this case, Kelley received adequate notice and had an opportunity to defend under this cause of action. Kelley was properly served with a summons and complaint setting out the three causes of action. While the complaint does not specifically allege Kelley is a dealer under the Dealers Act, the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to put Kelley on notice that he could be found to be a dealer under the Dealers Act. In the prayer for relief, Mr. and Mrs. Jackson ask for relief against all defendants. Under the Dealers Act claim, the Jacksons incorporate the allegations of the other causes of action. Under the first cause of action, Mr. and Mrs. Jackson allege Kelley is an employee of CSCG, and they allege certain representations about the condition of the vehicle were made. These same representations were used to show liability under the Dealers Act. Further, the defense of this lawsuit was the same for all defendants on all the claimsdeny any wrongdoing and deny making any representations. Kelley fails to show how his defense of the lawsuit would have been altered had the third cause of action specifically alleged Kelley was a dealer. Thus, Kelley suffered no prejudice. Further, Kelley failed to object to having his name included on the verdict form, therefore, waiving any objections to the adequacy of notice.