Opinion ID: 1196295
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lack of Remorse as Aggravating Circumstance

Text: (48) Defendant also complains of the prosecutor's references to his failure to express contrition as a factor in aggravation. [T]he propriety of commenting on lack of remorse depends to a degree on the inference one is asking the jury to draw from it. [Citation.] ( People v. Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 124.) In People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 771, we observed that `[t]he concept of remorse for past offense as a mitigating factor sometimes warranting less severe punishment or condemnation is universal. The prosecutor's argument here merely demonstrated the absence of that particular mitigating factor. [Citation.]' [¶] Although Ghent arose under the 1977 death penalty law, we think its reasoning applies with equal force to the present case, tried under the 1978 law. Both laws require the jury to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors in deciding the penalty issue. Under both sentencing procedures, the prosecutor should be entitled to observe that a particular mitigating circumstance, such as the defendant's remorse for his victims, is lacking from the case. [Citation.] Of course, the prosecutor is not permitted to argue that the absence of such mitigating factors is itself an aggravating factor justifying the death penalty [citation]. ( People v. Dyer, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 82.) After reviewing the record, we find no impropriety. Moore and Brown testified that defendant remarked, I just blew the bitch's head off, when he reentered the van after the shooting, suggesting a callous indifference to the consequences of his lethal acts. At the penalty phase, the defense essentially conceded defendant's presence during the killings but sought to minimize his actual participation. Under such circumstances, it is not unfair to expect defendant to show some remorse.... ( People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 112; see People v. Gallego, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 197; People v. Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 966-967.) However, according to his great-grandmother, he consistently assured her he had never hurt nobody in [his] life. Under these circumstances, the prosecutor's two passing comments were not untoward. In one, he suggested defendant's lack of remorse undermined any sympathy that might have been engendered by his family's pleas to spare his life. Since the import of this argument challenged defendant's offer of mitigation, it was acceptable. [24] (See People v. Walker, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 650; People v. Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 124.) While the other reference tended to cast lack of remorse as an aggravating factor, the prosecutor was simply emphasizing the callous execution style nature of the killings, i.e., a relevant circumstance of the offense. The context of the argument thus negated the possibility of an impermissible inference that lack of remorse, in and of itself, made defendant's crimes more reprehensible. Accordingly, we find that such remarks could not have affected the penalty verdict. [Citation.] ( People v. Walker, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 650; see also People v. Carrera, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 339.)