Opinion ID: 583599
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Acts of Evasion: Count 6

Text: 35 For Count 6, the alleged act of evasion is McGill's use of certain bank accounts beginning on April 15, 1986. After the IRS issued levies on both of McGill's personal bank accounts in 1985, he ceased using those accounts and instead deposited funds into and drew checks on the Lillie account and the McGill & Seay account. 36 IRS Special Agent Isabella performed a detailed analysis of the Lillie and the McGill & Seay accounts. Transactions attributable to McGill and general cash transactions (unattributable to a specific individual) for these two accounts are briefly summarized below. 37 Lillie AccountActivity Attributable to McGill 38 Deposits by McGill Cash In/Outby All Users 39 1985 $26,487 $8,400/$5,890 (45%)  1986 12,341 6,815/4,360 (23%) 1987 19,733 4,560/4,870 (32%) 1988 1,346 3,245/4,130 (3%) 40 See Joint App. at A-1592-1601, A-1607-08 (Isabella testimony); Supp. App. at 135-78. 41 McGill & Seay AccountActivity Attributable to McGill 42 Deposits by McGill Cash In/Outby All Users 43 1985 $ 6,840 $ 700/N/A (45%) 1986 21,638 4,150/N/A (47%) 1987 15,437 3,615/N/A (39%) 1988 2,935 1,140/N/A (Jan.Mar.) (42%) 44 See Joint App. at A-1609-15 (Isabella testimony); Supp. App. at 179-90. 45 McGill's use of the Lillie account decreased between 1985 and 1988, in both absolute dollars and as a percentage of total deposits. His use of the McGill & Seay account is more sporadic. Agent Isabella testified that McGill used the accounts as you and I would use our own personal checking accounts. Joint App. at A-1616. 46 McGill testified that he knew once the levies took effect that any money he put into an account in his own name would be taken. He put funds into the McGill & Seay account thinking that the IRS wouldn't bother the money. Govt.App. at A-501; Joint App. at A-2102. He admitted that he saw income taxes as another bill that I didn't have the money to pay. Joint App. at A-1998. 47 On the other hand, he also testified that he thought his two personal bank accounts had been closed by the banks after the levies were imposed: 48 Thinking that [one of the personal accounts] was closed and that the Provident Bank account 21 was closed, I still had bills to pay. I had office expenses, as well as expenses at home that had to be paid and so I began using the McGill [ & Seay] account to pay business expenses and the account--my wife's account to pay bills at home. 49 Joint App. at A-464. Agent Isabella admitted that there were no luxury items on the list of expenses paid from the Lillie account on behalf of McGill. Joint App. at A-1626. McGill himself commented that he did not lead a luxurious lifestyle, Joint App. at A-1933-34, and that he wasn't trying to escape anything. Joint App. at A-2029. 50 The Government alleges that McGill's shift in bank accounts constituted an affirmative act of evasion of payment. McGill did not tell the IRS of the existence of the Lillie and the McGill & Seay accounts. 22 2] The Government argues that it could not have discovered the accounts because his wife's name was different from his, and that the McGill & Seay account bore McGill's surname made it no more identifiable as his than would be the case for any other account bearing that not-uncommon name. 51 McGill counters that the use of these accounts cannot be an affirmative act because he did not act with evasive intent. He argues that it is unlikely one could conceal assets in an account partially in one's own name (McGill & Seay) or in an account bearing the name of one's spouse, especially when these accounts were fully reachable by the IRS. At trial, IRS Special Agent Kroll, who reviewed McGill's OIC, testified that he did not believe that McGill was concealing any information about the money he was receiving. Govt.App. at A-166. Further, Kroll admitted that he did not ask McGill where he banked, instead assuming that McGill was using his attorney's account. Joint App. at A-162, A-164. 52 We are not presented here with evasion of the magnitude of Spies, Voorhies, or Conley, supra. However, in Spies, the Supreme Court specifically included as an affirmative act of evasion deposits into an account registered to a family member. Spies, 317 U.S. at 499, 63 S.Ct. at 368. The Conley court found similar conduct objectionable. Conley, 826 F.2d at 557 (defendant used his son's name on a bank account he opened for personal use). Banking under the name of one's spouse satisfies the affirmative act requirement under § 7201. By analogy, banking through a business account containing the names of others also suffices as an affirmative act. 53 Thus, based on the rationale of Spies and Conley, the evidence is sufficient for the jury to find an act of evasion for, at minimum, Count 6. Any evasive behavior after April 15, 1986, satisfies the affirmative act requirement for this charge. McGill's substitute use of the Lillie and the McGill & Seay accounts began in mid-1985 and continued through to early 1988. While McGill's argument concerning a lack of evasive intent is perhaps plausible, a jury could have found evasive intent from his testimony ('I thought the IRS wouldn't bother the money') and his failure simply to set up another account in his own name. McGill's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of an act of evasion for Count 6 will be denied.