Opinion ID: 482542
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: burden of proof of response costs

Text: 96 The district court found appellants had the burden of proving the government's response costs were inconsistent with the NCP, 579 F.Supp. at 850, and that response costs that are not inconsistent with the NCP are conclusively presumed to be reasonable and therefore recoverable, id. at 851. Appellants argue the district court erred in requiring them to prove the response costs were inconsistent with the NCP, not cost-effective or unnecessary. Appellants further argue the district court erred in assuming all costs that are consistent with the NCP are conclusively presumed to be reasonable. Appellants note that the information and facts necessary to establish consistency with the NCP are matters within the possession of the government. 97 We believe the district court's analysis is correct. CERCLA Sec. 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9607(a)(4)(A), states that the government may recover from responsible parties all costs of removal or remedial action ... not inconsistent with the [NCP]. The statutory language itself establishes an exception for costs that are inconsistent with the NCP, but appellants, as the parties claiming the benefit of the exception, have the burden of proving that certain costs are inconsistent with the NCP and, therefore, not recoverable. See United States v. First City National Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 366, 87 S.Ct. 1088, 1092, 18 L.Ed.2d 151 (1967). Contrary to appellants' argument, not inconsistent is not, at least for purposes of statutory construction and not syntax, the same as consistent. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 618 F.Supp. at 899; United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F.Supp. at 186; Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 600 F.Supp. 1487, 1499 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 777 F.2d 882 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1970, 90 L.Ed.2d 654 (1986); New York v. General Electric Co., 592 F.Supp. at 303-04 (state action for recovery of response costs); J.V. Peters & Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 584 F.Supp. 1005, 1010 (N.D.Ohio 1984), aff'd, 767 F.2d 263 (6th Cir.1985). 98 The statutory scheme also supports allocation of the burden of proof of inconsistency with the NCP upon the defendants when the government seeks recovery of its response costs. As noted above, CERCLA Sec. 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9607(a)(4)(A), provides that the federal government or a state can recover all costs of removal or remedial action ... not inconsistent with the [NCP]. In comparison, CERCLA Sec. 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9607(a)(4)(B), provides that any other person, referring to any person other than the federal government or a state, can recover any other necessary costs of response ... consistent with the [NCP]. That statutory language indicates that non governmental entities must prove that their response costs are consistent with the NCP in order to recover them. The statutory scheme thus differentiates between governmental and nongovernmental entities in allocating the burden of proof of whether response costs are consistent with the NCP. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 618 F.Supp. at 899; New York v. General Electric Co., 592 F.Supp. at 303-04 (state action for recovery of response costs). 99 The statutory language also supports the district court's reasoning that under CERCLA Sec. 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9607(a)(4)(A), all costs incurred by the government that are not inconsistent with the NCP are conclusively presumed to be reasonable. CERCLA does not refer to all reasonable costs but simply to all costs. Cf. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Sec. 311(f) (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1321(f) (responsible parties are liable for actual costs incurred by the government for cleanup); see, e.g., Union Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 228 Ct.Cl. 54, 651 F.2d 734, 744 (1981) (construing actual costs incurred in 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1321(f) to apply conclusive presumption of reasonableness). Case law interpreting the FWPCA is relevant because CERCLA defines the NCP by referring to the NCP mandated by the FWPCA. CERCLA Secs. 101(31), 105, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 9601(31), 9605; see United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F.Supp. at 204 (noting cross-references in CERCLA to FWPCA); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F.Supp. at 1073-74 & n. 4 (the NCP as revised to incorporate CERCLA was issued in 1982). 7 100 Appellants also argue the district court erred in requiring them to establish that the government's cleanup actions were not cost-effective and necessary. This argument challenges the government's choice of a particular cleanup method. We note, however, that CERCLA Sec. 105(3), (7), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9605(3), (7), requires the EPA, as the agency designated by the President, to revise the NCP required by Sec. 311 of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1321, to include the national hazardous substance response plan, which is specifically required by CERCLA to include methods and criteria for determining the appropriate extent of removal, remedy, and other measures, and means of assuring that remedial action measures are cost-effective. Consideration of whether particular action is necessary is thus factored into the cost-effective equation. The term cost-effective is defined by regulation as the lowest cost alternative that is technologically feasible and reliable and which effectively mitigates and minimizes damage to and provides adequate protection of public health, welfare, or the environment. 40 C.F.R. Sec. 300.68(j) (1986). 101 Because determining the appropriate removal and remedial action involves specialized knowledge and expertise, the choice of a particular cleanup method is a matter within the discretion of the EPA. The applicable standard of review is whether the agency's choice is arbitrary and capricious. As explained in United States v. Ward, 102 [i]f [appellants] wish the court to review the consistency of [the government's] actions with the NCP, then they are essentially alleging that the EPA did not carry out its statutory duties. The statute provides liability except for costs not inconsistent with the NCP. This language requires deference by this court to the judgment of agency professionals. [Appellants], therefore, may not seek to have the court substitute its own judgment for that of the EPA. [Appellants] may only show that the EPA's decision about the method of cleanup was inconsistent with the NCP in that the EPA was arbitrary and capricious in the discharge of their duties under the NCP. 103 618 F.Supp. at 900. 104 Here, appellants failed to show that the government's response costs were inconsistent with the NCP. Appellants also failed to show that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in choosing the particular method it used to clean up the Denney farm site. 105