Opinion ID: 603814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Current FELA Jurisprudence

Text: 11 Congress enacted the FELA in 1908 to provide compensation for railway employees suffering job-related injuries caused by the negligence of their employer. The FELA, as codified, provides that every railroad shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier ... resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of [the railroad]. 45 U.S.C. § 51. As stated by the Supreme Court: We have recognized generally that the FELA is a broad remedial statute, and have adopted a 'standard of liberal construction in order to accomplish [Congress'] objectives.'  Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562, 107 S.Ct. 1410, 1414, 94 L.Ed.2d 563 (1987) (citation omitted). Thus, an employee can recover under the FELA as long as the employer's negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 448, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957); Pehowic v. Erie Lackawanna R.R. Co., 430 F.2d 697, 699 (3d Cir.1970) (quoting Rogers ). The FELA imposes on railroads a clear duty to provide their employees with a safe workplace. Sano v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 282 F.2d 936, 937 (3d Cir.1960). 12 In deciding which injuries are compensable under the statute, FELA jurisprudence gleans guidance from common-law developments. Buell, 480 U.S. at 568, 107 S.Ct. at 1417. However, determining the scope of FELA liability is distinctly a federal question, not varying in accordance with the differing conceptions of negligence applicable under state and local laws.... Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 1027, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949). While the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress was unknown in 1908, mental distress law has evolved to the point where all states have recognized the tort, but with a wide array of threshold tests and limitations. An American Law Reports annotation noted many years ago that [t]he case law in the field [of emotional distress] is in an almost unparalleled state of confusion and any attempt at a consistent exegesis of the authorities is likely to break down in embarrassed complexity. 4 This wide divergence among states in their doctrinal approach to recovery for emotional injury continues to this day. 5 13 In Buell, the Supreme Court declined to decide whether wholly emotional injuries arising from work conditions were compensable under the FELA, partly because of the inadequacy of the record in that case, but also because of the broad divergence among the states in their standards for recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Buell Court noted the striking doctrinal divergences between states in the area and concluded: 14 [T]he question whether one can recover for emotional injury may not be susceptible to an all-inclusive yes or no answer. As in other areas of the law, broad pronouncements in this area may have to bow to the precise application of developing legal principles to the particular facts at hand. 15 Id. 480 U.S. at 570, 107 S.Ct. at 1418. Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Buell, the federal courts of appeals have engaged in case-by-case determinations of the proper standards for recovery under the FELA in cases involving claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 16 Four basic common law standards have been adopted by the states for testing the genuineness of claims arising from negligently inflicted emotional injuries: the physical impact test (recovery only where plaintiff's emotional injury is incidental to physical contact); the zone of danger test (recovery absent contact allowed when emotional injury arises from plaintiff being threatened with physical harm); the physical manifestation test (plaintiff's emotional injury must cause some physical injury); and the relative bystander test (plaintiff must witness injury to a close relative). 6 17 These doctrines have been adopted due to the courts' suspicion that emotional distress claims are often subject to fraud and exaggeration. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A cmt. b (1965) (detailing concerns that emotional injury claims are often trivial, falsified and unforeseeable). The central purpose of the four standards is to screen possibly fraudulent claims for emotional injury by requiring some external indicia of the genuineness of the harm suffered. This Court has repeatedly noted its concerns about the potential for a flood of litigation, unlimited damages and fraud arising from unrestrained emotional distress claims. See, e.g., Outten v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 928 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir.1991); Holliday v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 914 F.2d 421, 424 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1090, 111 S.Ct. 970, 112 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1991). 18 However, an important tension exists between courts' concerns about excessive, frivolous litigation, the common law standards employed by the courts to curb such claims, and the broad remedial purposes of the FELA. As noted by the Buell Court, [a] primary purpose of the Act was to eliminate a number of traditional defenses to tort liability and to facilitate recovery in meritorious cases. 480 U.S. at 561, 107 S.Ct. at 1413. The Supreme Court has also held that Congress did not intend to create a static remedy, but one which would be developed and enlarged to meet the changing conditions and changing concepts of industry's duty towards its workers. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432, 78 S.Ct. 394, 398, 2 L.Ed.2d 382 (1958). Thus, Congress' express intent in creating the FELA and the Supreme Court's consistent interpretation of the statute require us to reconcile the FELA's mandate to expand recovery standards with the courts' reasonable concerns about the potential for a flood of baseless litigation. 19 In our recent opinion in Gottshall, we reviewed closely the recent decisions of the other circuits since Buell. 988 F.2d at 362-65. Rather than repeating that effort here, we will note that only the Seventh Circuit has firmly decided this issue since Buell, reaffirming its earlier holding that purely emotional injuries are not compensable under the FELA, while the Ninth Circuit continues to operate under a pre-Buell holding allowing full recovery under the FELA for emotional injuries. See Ray v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 938 F.2d 704 (7th Cir.1991) cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 914, 116 L.Ed.2d 813 (1992); Taylor v. Burlington N.R.R ., 787 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir.1986); Pierce v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 823 F.2d 1366, 1372 n. 2 (9th Cir.1987). The First, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth circuits have declined to decide whether emotional injuries without a precipitating injury or accident are compensable under the FELA, ruling in each case that the plaintiff failed to make a requisite threshold showing. See Moody v. Maine Cent. R.R., 823 F.2d 693 (1st Cir.1987); Elliott v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 910 F.2d 1224 (4th Cir.1990); Plaisance v. Texaco, 966 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.1992) (en banc) 7 ; Adams v. CSX Transp., Inc., 899 F.2d 536 (6th Cir.1990). Thus, as we concluded in Gottshall, a review of the decisions in other circuits in the wake of Buell indicates that there is no common discernable principle, test, view or attitude. 988 F.2d at 365.