Opinion ID: 1990113
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Heading: Mendon Road's Motion to Vacate

Text: We first address Mendon Road's appeal from the denial of its motion to vacate the judgment by default. Rule 60(a) [4] provides for relief from judgment for clerical mistakes and Rule 60(b) allows for relief from judgment for reason of mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, a void judgment, or for any other reason justifying relief. In this case, Mendon Road asserts the Superior Court should have vacated the judgment of possession on the following grounds: (1) clerical error resulted in its answer being misfiled; (2) both service of process and notice were insufficient; (3) defendant's failure to attend the hearing date was due to excusable neglect; (4) plaintiff asserted fraudulent statements and misrepresentations at the hearing; (5) the judgment is void because defendant received no notice under either Rule 55 or Rule 77 of the District Court Civil Rules; (6) and the judgment is inequitable based on the small amount allegedly owed to plaintiff and the potential financial harm to defendant. We begin our discussion with the issue of notice under Rule 55, which we consider to be dispositive. A motion to vacate under Rule 60(b) is addressed to the trial justice's sound judicial discretion and `will not be disturbed on appeal, absent a showing of abuse of discretion.' Keystone Elevator Co. v. Johnson & Wales University, 850 A.2d 912, 916 (R.I.2004) (quoting Crystal Restaurant Management Corp. v. Calcagni, 732 A.2d 706, 710 (R.I.1999)). Mendon Road argued in the Superior Court, as it does before us, that it was entitled to receive notice under Rule 77(d) [5] of the District Court Civil Rules that a judgment had been entered, or, alternatively, it was entitled to notice under Rule 55 of the District Court Civil Rules that plaintiff was applying for a judgment by default. Rule 55(b) of the District Court Civil Rules sets forth the procedure for entering a judgment by default in the District Court and provides in pertinent part: (b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: (1)    (2) By the Court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor; but no judgment by default shall be entered against an infant or incompetent person unless represented in the action by a guardian, guardian ad litem, or such other representative who has appeared therein. If the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action, the party (or, if appearing by representative, the party's representative) shall be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least three (3) days prior to the hearing on such application. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper. In rejecting Mendon Road's arguments, the Superior Court hearing justice held that Rule 77(d) did not apply because default judgment was entered against defendant specifically for its failure to appear at the hearing, rather than for its apparent failure to file an answer. Because Rule 77(d) of the District Court Civil Rules excepts from its notice provision parties who are in default for failure to appear, she concluded Mendon Road was not entitled to Rule 77 notice. She also held that the three-day notice requirement of Rule 55 did not apply because it was trumped by the specific statute pertaining to commercial evictions for delinquency of rent-G.L. 1956 § 34-18.1-9. [6] We deem such conclusions to be error. It is uncontroverted that Mendon Road timely filed an answer to Tonetti's complaint on January 3, 2006. In accordance with the applicable statute concerning actions for repossession of leased commercial properties, a hearing was scheduled for January 4, 2006. The date of the hearing was stated on the summons, along with a notation that a judgment by default would be entered if defendant failed to appear. It is true that the summons was served on the wrong individual; nevertheless, we give great deference to the Superior Court hearing justice's finding that Mendon Road did receive actual notice of the hearing date, albeit in an indirect manner. It is clear from the record, however, that on that hearing date Mendon Road's answer was not in the court file, nor had Tonetti received a copy of same. Unaware that defendant had, in fact, filed a responsive pleading, the District Court trial judge proceeded with the hearing, after which she entered judgment in Tonetti's favor. On appeal, the Superior Court hearing justice concluded that judgment was entered properly by default because of Mendon Road's failure to appear at the January 4, 2006 hearing. The entry of judgment by default in this case is governed by Rule 55(b) of the District Court Civil Rules, which requires three days notice of the hearing on an application for default. The hearing justice held, however, that the Rule 55 provisions did not apply in this case because they were trumped by the statutory provisions of § 34-18.1-9. We disagree. We are of the opinion that Mendon Road was entitled to receive written notice under Rule 55 three days before a hearing on an application for entry of judgment by default, notwithstanding the specific statutory provision of § 34-18.1-9. It is well established that in situations in which a statute and a rule approved by the Rhode Island Supreme Court are in conflict, the court rule prevails. Heal v. Heal, 762 A.2d 463, 467 (R.I.2000). See also G.L. 1956 § 8-6-2(a) (The rules of the superior, family, district court and the traffic tribunal shall be subject to the approval of the supreme court. Such rules, when effective, shall supersede any statutory regulation in conflict therewith.). Rule 55(b)(2) of the District Court Civil Rules provides that a party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor; and it further provides in pertinent part [i]f the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action, the party (or, if appearing by representative, the party's representative) shall be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least three (3) days prior to the hearing on such application. It was clear from the record before the Superior Court that Mendon Road had filed an answer, and thus had appeared for purposes of the rule. The appearance required by the rule has been broadly defined and not limited to a formal court appearance. Medeiros v. Hilton Homes, Inc., 122 R.I. 406, 410, 408 A.2d 598, 600 (1979); see also Muniz v. Vidal, 739 F.2d 699, 700 (1st Cir.1984) (The defaulting party `has appeared,' for purposes of this rule, if he has `indicated to the moving party a clear purpose to defend the suit.') (quoting H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C.Cir. 1970)); Pollins v. McGovern, 110 R.I. 186, 188-89, 291 A.2d 418, 420 (1972) ([I]t is clear from the record that defendant answered the case and that the case must be, therefore, considered as coming within the provision of Rule 55    and defendant was entitled to the written notice of the application for judgment by default at least three days prior to the hearing on the application.). Further, this Court has said that default judgments are void if the moving party does not comply with the requirements for providing notice of the pending entry of the default. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lombardi, 773 A.2d 864, 869 (R.I. 2001); see also Pollins, 110 R.I. at 189, 291 A.2d at 420 (plaintiff did not comply with that provision of Rule 55 which is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction by the District Court to enter the default judgment). In Valley Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Bernard/Pocasset Investment Group, L.L.C., 779 A.2d 647, 648 (R.I.2001) (mem.), the plaintiff asserted a claim for the balance of the agreed upon contract price and sought to enforce a mechanic's lien. The defendant in that case filed a timely objection, answer, and counterclaim, but failed to appear at the hearing. Id. The hearing justice defaulted the defendant for failure to appear and, thereafter, the defendant moved to vacate the default judgment under Rule 60(b). Id. The hearing justice denied the defendant's request. Id. On appeal, this Court reversed stating that [b]ecause the defendant in this case had appeared and answered the case, it was entitled to proper notice before the entry of default judgment. Id. Judgment by default is a drastic remedy which should only be employed in extreme situations, Medeiros, 122 R.I. at 410, 408 A.2d at 600; it runs counter to the salutary goal of disposing of cases on their merits rather than on procedural deficiencies. Gosset v. Reid, 764 A.2d 138, 140 (R.I.2001); Hyszko v. Barbour, 448 A.2d 723, 726 (R.I.1982). The requirement of three days notice under Rule 55(b)(2) seeks to insure fairness by affording notice to a party who has expressed an interest in defending the suit brought against him. Medeiros, 122 R.I. at 410, 408 A.2d at 600. In this case, Mendon Road filed a timely answer and asserted affirmative defenses, including a claim that the monies allegedly owed had, in fact, been paid. It is our opinion that Mendon Road was entitled to notice under Rule 55(b)(2) of the hearing for entry of judgment by default, and further that the hearing justice should have granted relief under Rule 60(b)(4) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure [7] for reason that the judgment so entered was void. Accordingly, we reverse the Superior Court judgment denying Mendon Road's motion to vacate the judgment of possession in favor of Tonetti. Having done so, we need not address Mendon Road's remaining arguments on appeal.