Opinion ID: 1847714
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: grappin and watts [4]

Text: We find that this conflict may be resolved in accordance with our decisions in Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480 (Fla.1984), and Watts. In Grappin the defendant was convicted of five separate acts of larceny for stealing five firearms during the commission of a burglary. Focusing on the language of the statute at issue, particularly the word a in prefacing the word firearm, we held that use of the term `a firearm' ... clearly shows that the legislature intended to make each firearm a separate unit of prosecution. 450 So.2d at 482. In so holding, we recognized that federal courts have held that use of the word any, on the other hand, renders the meaning of the statute ambiguous, and in that instance, several firearms taken at the same time must be treated as a single offense. Id. (citing United States v. Rosenbarger, 536 F.2d 715 (6th Cir.1976), and United States v. Kinsley, 518 F.2d 665 (8th Cir.1975)). Thus, we acknowledged a critical difference between the use of the words a and any in construing the legislative intent of a statute. In Watts we followed the reasoning and analysis in Grappin. In Watts, the defendant was charged with two counts of possessing two prison-made knives at the same time. The statute made it unlawful for any person to introduce or possess while upon the grounds of any state correctional institution any firearm or weapon of any kind. Watts, 462 So.2d at 814 (quoting § 944.47, Fla. Stat. (1981)). In interpreting the language of the statute, we recognized the ambiguity in the legislature's use of the language any firearm or weapon. Id. In accordance with our decision in Grappin, we concluded that such ambiguity required construction of the statute most favorably for the accused and that such a favorable construction prohibited Watts from being convicted of multiple offenses for the possession of two prison-made knives. [5] Id. The meaning of Watts is clear; although Watts possessed two knives, he was subject to only one conviction under an ambiguous statute, absent a clearer statement of legislative intent to the contrary.