Opinion ID: 161014
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Coupon as a Contract Between Ms. Cooper and Dillard's

Text: 138 We agree with the district court that Ms. Cooper's receipt of the coupon did not establish a contractual relationship between Ms. Cooper and Dillard's. In this regard, we refrain from adopting Amicus Curiae's (Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law) expansive interpretation that § 1981 broadens the scope of relevant civil rights and protects customers from harassment upon entering a retail establishment. Although Amicus Curiae proposes an arguable application, § 1981 is limited to remedy any act of discrimination committed in the making or the performance of a contract. 137 Cong. Rec. S15483 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth). We note that the statute's formulations are not exhaustive, H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(II), at 37 (1991), and a broader interpretation might discourage intolerable harassment in the retail setting based on unfounded racial biases. But we cannot extend § 1981 beyond the contours of a contract. We are aligned with all the courts that have addressed the issue that there must have been interference with a contract beyond the mere expectation of being treated without discrimination while shopping. See Morris, 89 F.3d at 415 (noting that, where claim was interference with prospective contractual relations, [w]hile the incident... was unfortunate and undoubtedly disconcerting and humiliating, it does not constitute a violation of the statutes); Wesley, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 (granting summary judgment where there was no evidence that plaintiff would have attempted to purchase a car from the dealership if the agents had not chased her away); Sterling v. Kazmierczak, 983 F. Supp. 1186, 1192 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss where plaintiff failed to allege that he was prepared to purchase air rifle cartridges or that he had them in hand when confronted by police officer); Lewis, 948 F. Supp. at 371 (granting summary judgment to defendants and rejecting theory that an unwritten contract between commercial establishments and the public guarantees that whenever a member of the latter enter premises of the former [she] will be treated equally regardless of race); Robertson, 848 F. Supp. at 81 (dismissing claim where plaintiff was not denied admittance or service); cf. Bobbitt, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 519 (denying defendant-restaurant's motion to dismiss where plaintiffs alleged that restaurant required plaintiffs to prepay, thereby changing an essential term of the customer/restauranteur contract because of race). 139 Because there is no dispute as to a material fact regarding Ms. Cooper's failure to make or attempt to make a purchase at Dillard's, we hold that the district court correctly dismissed Ms. Cooper's claims as a matter of law.