Opinion ID: 2614079
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Drug and Alcohol Abuse

Text: Defendant relies heavily on Malanga's alleged drug and alcohol abuse during trial to establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. But this fact, standing alone, does not establish a per se violation of a criminal defendant's right to receive effective assistance of counsel. State v. D'Ambrosio, 156 Ariz. 71, 73, 750 P.2d 14, 16 (1988). Generally, there must be some additional showing of a causal connection between counsel's drug and/or alcohol use and the alleged errors at trial. D'Ambrosio, 156 Ariz. at 73-74, 750 P.2d at 16-17. We agree that defendant presented ample evidence to indicate that Malanga likely was using drugs and/or alcohol during court proceedings. Although expert witnesses could not state with any degree of certainty that Malanga's actions at trial were affected by alcohol and/or drug use, in this case we need not determine whether such a causal connection exists. Notwithstanding the allegations of substance abuse, we find that Malanga's errors at trial provide independent support for defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We therefore turn to specific acts and omissions advanced by defendant in support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. B. Decision to Advance a Conspiracy Defense and to Allow Kenneth Spillman to Testify During the State's Case-in-Chief Defendant argues that Malanga's decision to advance a conspiracy defense and his decision to allow Kenneth Spillman to testify during the state's case-in-chief constituted errors so egregious that they alone support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In response, the state maintains that Malanga's decision to allow Spillman to testify was a tactical one consistent with his decision to advance a conspiracy defense, and therefore, these decisions cannot support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Ordinarily, we would agree with the state's position. We realize that our scrutiny of [defense] counsel's performance must be highly deferential. Nash, 143 Ariz. at 398, 694 P.2d at 228, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. As such, we have repeatedly acknowledged that disagreements in trial strategy will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, provided the challenged conduct had some reasoned basis. State v. Nirschel, 155 Ariz. 206, 208, 745 P.2d 953, 955 (1987); see also State v. Smith, 158 Ariz. 222, 231, 762 P.2d 509, 518 (1988); State v. Sammons, 156 Ariz. 51, 56, 749 P.2d 1372, 1377 (1988). Our review of the record in this case, however, leads us to the inescapable conclusion that neither the decision to advance a conspiracy defense nor the decision to allow Spillman to testify had a reasoned basis. As Gray testified during the rule 32 proceedings, Malanga admitted to him that there was absolutely no evidence to support a conspiracy defense. Moreover, as we determined in Vickers I, defendant's statements to Spillman were inadmissible during the state's case-in-chief. 129 Ariz. at 511, 633 P.2d at 320. The statements were properly admitted during defendant's first trial only because Spillman was called by the state as a rebuttal witness after defendant took the stand and denied making any statements to Spillman. Vickers I, 129 Ariz. at 511, 633 P.2d at 320. At his retrial, however, defendant did not testify on his own behalf; therefore, the state could not have called Spillman as a witness had Malanga not withdrawn the motion to suppress. As such, we are unable to conceive of any logical basis for allowing Spillman to testify. The testimony itself, which was nearly identical to that given at defendant's first trial, best illustrates this point: Q: At any time did you ask [defendant] directly if he killed his cellmate? A: I said did you kill him. And then he said you mean premeditated? And I said yes. He smiled and said yes. He then described in detail how he killed Ponciano. Q: Who supplied the word premeditated? A: He did. Q: Had you mentioned the word premeditated at any time in the conversation up until then? A: No. No. .... A: Then [defendant] had mentioned that when he let Ponciano go, he made some rasping noises and he thought he might not be dead. He reported jumping on Ponciano's back and stabbing him in the neck. He said it didn't bleed much and explained once the heart stops and you cut someone, they don't bleed much. He described stabbing him in the back and how difficult it was and the crunching noise it made. He said he thought about jumping on the knife. Then he stabbed him again and this time the knife went in easily and there was noise like escaping air and he thought he must have punctured the lung. I asked if he remembered writing his nickname Bonzai on Ponciano's back and he said no but later he said I did not have time to put on a swastika. Standing alone, Malanga's decisions to advance a conspiracy defense and to allow Spillman to testify during the state's case-in-chief probably would have provided a sufficient basis for concluding that defendant was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel. We need not rest our decision on these errors alone, however, because here we have more. Malanga's preparation for trial was haphazard at best. For example, his general inattention to defendant's case is demonstrated by his failure to have some of the defense exhibits admitted into evidence before closing arguments  despite the trial court's reminder to do so. And his lack of preparation for trial is evidenced not only by his failure to interview witnesses but also by his seemingly endless requests for continuances. Yet, one of the most important indicators of Malanga's inadequate trial preparation is the motion to determine counsel filed by the state before trial. The motion outlined several ways in which Malanga's trial preparation was inadequate and concluded that [d]ue to defense counsel's complete lack of preparation, it is likely that a conviction would be reversed. In using the state's motion as evidence of Malanga's inadequate trial preparation, we do not wish to suggest that the state made an unwise tactical decision in filing it. To the contrary, we think that submitting the motion was precisely the correct action by the state under the circumstances. Considering Malanga's failures as a whole, we have no trouble concluding that his performance fell outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). We have long recognized, however, that reversal is required only if there is a reasonable probability that, but for [defense] counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210, 214, 689 P.2d 153, 157 (1984), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; see also State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 592, 769 P.2d 1017, 1038 (1989), aff'd, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990). Reasonable probability is defined as less than more likely than not, but more than a mere possibility. Lee, 142 Ariz. at 214, 689 P.2d at 157. We find that there is more than a mere possibility that the outcome of defendant's trial would have been different but for Malanga's errors. Although we recognize that defendant's case would present a challenge to even the most competent defense attorney, Malanga's errors cannot be characterized as mere tactical blunders. This is especially true in light of the Ninth Circuit's determination that there was enough evidence in this case of a sudden and impulsive act that the trial court's failure to give a second-degree murder instruction warranted reversal of defendant's conviction. Vickers v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d at 372-73. Malanga's decision to allow Spillman to testify, which resulted in Spillman's detailed account of defendant's statements just after the murder, essentially foreclosed any possibility of the jury finding defendant guilty of second-degree rather than first-degree murder. Considering this error along with those discussed above, we can only conclude that Malanga's deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defense. [1] In short, both prongs of the Strickland test have been satisfied in this case. Defendant is therefore entitled to a new trial in which he is represented by competent counsel. [2]