Opinion ID: 1723461
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: exemptions under the foia

Text: The appellants contend that their personnel records are exempt from the mandatory disclosure requirements of the FOIA because their records fall within two exemptions___subsections 13(1)(a) and (n). Additionally, appellants LASA submit that subsection 13(1)(m) exempts their records. Because this issue raises a question of law, we review the Court of Appeals ruling de novo. [17]
The FOIA's privacy exemption, subsection 13(1)(a), provides: A public body may exempt from disclosure as a public record under this act: (a) Information of a personal nature where the public disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual's privacy. [M.C.L. § 15.243, subd. 13(1)(a); M.S.A. § 4.1801(13)(1)(a).] The privacy exemption consists of two elements, both of which must be present for the exemption to apply. First, the information must be of a personal nature. Second, the disclosure of such information must be a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. [18] In the past, we have used two slightly different formulations to describe personal nature. The first defines personal as [o]f or pertaining to a particular person; private; one's own.... Concerning a particular individual and his intimate affairs, interests, or activities; intimate.... [19] We have also defined this threshold inquiry in terms of whether the requested information was personal, intimate, or embarrassing. [20] Combining the salient elements of each description into a more succinct test, we conclude that information is of a personal nature if it reveals intimate or embarrassing details of an individual's private life. We evaluate this standard in terms of the `customs, mores, or ordinary views of the community'.... [21] In these cases, the requested records were provided, under seal, to this Court for our evaluation. With regard to Ms. Bradley, her file contained documents pertaining to corrective or disciplinary actions, complaints filed, and performance evaluations. As for the administrators, their requested records contained administrative performance reviews. Significantly, none of the documents contain information of an embarrassing, intimate, private, or confidential nature, such as medical records or information relating to the plaintiffs' private lives. Moreover, the appellants have not alleged specific private matters that would be revealed by the disclosure of their personnel records. Instead, the requested information consists solely of performance appraisals, disciplinary actions, and complaints relating to the plaintiffs' accomplishments in their public jobs. Because the requested information does not disclose intimate or embarrassing details of the plaintiffs' private lives, we hold that the requested records do not satisfy the personal-nature element of the privacy exemption. Because we conclude that the records are not of a personal nature, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether disclosure of the personnel files is a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. [22] We hold that the FOIA's privacy exemption does not apply under these facts.
The plaintiffs also contend that the requested information is exempt from disclosure under the FOIA because of subsection 13(1)(n), which exempts [c]ommunications and notes within a public body or between public bodies of an advisory nature to the extent that they cover other than purely factual materials and are preliminary to a final agency determination of policy or action. This exemption does not apply unless the public body shows that in the particular instance the public interest in encouraging frank communications between officials and employees of public bodies clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure. This exemption does not apply to the plaintiff's personnel records for at least two reasons. First, the complaints from parents are not communications and notes within a public body or between public bodies [23] because the documents were created by parents, not by the school district. Second, the appellants lack standing to assert this exemption. Subsection 13(1)(n) requires the public body that possesses the records to show that the public interest in disclosure is outweighed by the public interest in encouraging frank communications between officials and the employees of public bodies. Consequently, the proper party to raise this exemption is the school district, not the appellants. This conclusion is consistent with our Court of Appeals interpretation of this exemption. [24] For the reasons stated above, we hold that the plaintiffs' personnel records are not exempt from the FOIA under subsection 13(1)(n).
LASA argues that subsection 13(1)(m) exempts their personnel records. The following information is exempt under subsection 13(1)(m): Medical, counseling, or psychological facts or evaluations concerning an individual if the individual's identity would be revealed by a disclosure of those facts or evaluation.[ [25] ] The plaintiffs assert that their performance evaluations are counseling evaluations for purposes of this exemption. Neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals has addressed whether employment-related personnel evaluations are counseling evaluations. However, the Attorney General has addressed this issue, concluding that the context within which the word counseling appears indicates the Legislature's intent that this apply only where there is a professional relationship between counselor and counselee, not where there is an employment relationship.[ [26] ] We agree with the Attorney General's analysis that the Legislature's use of the term counseling does not appear to include an employment relationship. Further, we acknowledge that the apparent purpose of this exemption is to prevent the disclosure of a person's identity through the release of medical, counseling, or psychological records. The exemption's concern is not with the release of the underlying information, only with the release of the patient's identity. In particular, we note that the exemption prevents the disclosure of certain records only if disclosure would reveal the patient's identity. If the patient's identity were already public information, the exemption would appear inapplicable. In the present case, the parties seeking the plaintiffs' records requested them by name, and not by job title. Thus, this exemption would not apply even if the plaintiffs' records were counseling evaluations because the plaintiffs' identities were already known. We conclude that subsection 13(1)(m) does not exempt the plaintiffs' employment records.
Our conclusion that the plaintiffs' personnel records are not exempt under the FOIA is bolstered by the absence of any indications that the Legislature intended a different result. As the Court of Appeals noted below, the Legislature specifically exempted the personnel records of law enforcement agencies from disclosure. [27] This Court recognizes the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius; that the express mention in a statute of one thing implies the exclusion of other similar things. [28] Because the Legislature realized that the FOIA could require the disclosure of the personnel records of law enforcement personnel, the conclusion that the Legislature rejected the opportunity to extend this exemption to other public employees is inescapable. Additionally, accepting the appellants' interpretation of the FOIA would render the law enforcement exemption redundant, thus violating another rule of statutory construction: namely, that no part of a statute should be treated as mere surplusage or rendered nugatory. [29] This Court has recognized that the Michigan FOIA is patterned after the federal FOIA. [30] Unlike the Michigan FOIA, the federal FOIA has a specific exemption for personnel records. [31] Because the Legislature modeled its FOIA on the federal version, we must conclude that by not adopting the specific language of the federal privacy exemption the Legislature intended that the personnel records of non-law enforcement public employees be available to the public. The plaintiffs assert that the integrity of the evaluation process will be compromised by the disclosure of their personnel records. They suggest that the evaluators will be less inclined to candidly evaluate their employees if the evaluations are to be made public. We draw the opposite conclusion. Making such documents publicly available seems more likely to foster candid, accurate, and conscientious evaluations than suppressing them because the person performing the evaluations will be aware that the documents being prepared may be disclosed to the public, thus subjecting the evaluator, as well as the employee being evaluated, to public scrutiny. The knowledge that their efforts may be brought before the public at some distant date may encourage those who evaluate their peers to accurately reflect the achievements, or lack thereof, of those being evaluated. An argument similar to the plaintiffs' argument was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Univ of Pennsylvania v. EEOC . [32] In that case, the Court concluded that the release of written evaluations of college professors, which had been prepared to assist in tenure decisions, would not create a chilling effect on candid evaluations. Although it is possible that some evaluators may become less candid as the possibility of disclosure increases, others may simply ground their evaluations in specific examples and illustrations in order to deflect potential claims of bias or unfairness. Not all academics will hesitate to stand up and be counted when they evaluate their peers.[ [33] ] Like the United States Supreme Court, we are not ready to assume the worst about those in the public schools who are in a position to evaluate others. [34] We conclude that the requested information does not fit within any of the exemptions of § 13 of the FOIA. Because none of the exemptions apply, the requested information must be disclosed. [35]