Opinion ID: 783527
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dallio Concludes the Hearing Pro Se

Text: 12 On April 19, 1995, before Copeland resumed the witness stand, O'Grady advised the court that Dallio had advised him, after an in-depth conversation, that he wished to go pro se on this hearing. Apr. 19, 1995 Hearing Trans. at 63. O'Grady explained that Dallio felt very familiar with the manner in which to proceed on this hearing, and how he want[ed] to handle Detective Copeland. Id. Acknowledging that Dallio might not have the competence of an attorney in conducting the hearing, counsel nevertheless voiced his opinion that Dallio was competent to make [the] decision to proceed pro se. Id. Dallio also addressed the court, reiterating his concern about the adequacy of prior counsel's cross-examination of Copeland and questioning present counsel's familiarity with certain materials and some of his strategic decisions. Id. at 65-67. The prosecution accused Dallio of seeking to delay the case, whereupon the court inquired, Are you ready to proceed now? Id. at 68. When Dallio replied that he was, the court, without further discussion, permitted Dallio to proceed pro se with O'Grady serving as stand-by counsel. 13 Immediately, Dallio submitted a supplemental suppression motion to the court, explaining that he wished to ensure that all grounds for suppression with particular specificity [were] raised and reserved on the record. Id. at 68. O'Grady noted that Dallio was acting against his advice, which petitioner confirmed. Dallio then proceeded to cross-examine Copeland, consulting with O'Grady from time to time, but nevertheless drawing frequent objections for interspersing his questions about the witness's prior statements with arguments about their inconsistency. Although the prosecution occasionally displayed exasperation, see id. at 76-77 (Again, your Honor, this is not a proper line of questioning. The prior transcript is part of the record. And I think the questions that the defendant is asking illustrates his inability to go pro se in this matter.), the court did not, patiently listening as Dallio explained his theory of cross-examination, and even telling him to [t]ake your time, id. at 88, until Dallio reported that he had no further questions for the witness. 14 Through O'Grady, Dallio requested and obtained court permission to take the stand and testify in a narrative form, id. at 92, to the circumstances under which he had made incriminating statements to police authorities, an account that covers fifty pages of transcript. At the conclusion of Dallio's direct testimony, as well as at the conclusion of his cross-examination, the court asked O'Grady if he wished to pose any questions. Although counsel replied that he did not, O'Grady did ensure that Dallio had nothing more to say to the court before leaving the witness stand. Counsel also noted (and the trial court acknowledged) that during the course of the proceeding that my client went pro se, I was available to him[. W]hen he questioned Detective Copeland I assisted and although he testified on direct in narrative form[,] I was here and available for consultation. Id. at 176. 15 On the last hearing date, May 18, 1995, Dallio called two corrections employees, Donna Hunt and Scott Willis, to testify briefly to entries in prison records about petitioner's movements on October 15, 1991, which evidence Dallio believed was at odds with the accounts of Copeland and Pierce about the time of their interview. When the prosecution attempted to rebut this evidence with the testimony of Edward Carroll, the corrections officer who had actually escorted Dallio to the challenged interview, Dallio conducted the witness's cross-examination. 16 With the hearing thus concluded, Dallio addressed the court for over an hour in support of his suppression motion. Thereafter, the court inquired of O'Grady whether he wished to add anything. Counsel demurred, explaining, I couldn't say it better. May 18, 1995 Hearing Trans. at 120. A few weeks later, on June 3, 1995, Dallio submitted a fifteen-page memorandum of law in support of his suppression motion, outlining six points with citations to legal authority. 17 On August 3, 1995, the trial court denied the suppression motion, ruling that Dallio's inculpatory prison statements were knowingly and voluntarily made after waiver of the right to counsel and that his subsequent inculpatory statements were spontaneous and not the product of police interrogation. See People v. Dallio, No. 1368-92 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Aug. 3,1995). 18