Opinion ID: 1288237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: observations of affiant

Text: That on November 9, 1992, your affiant received the following information from DETECTIVE STEVEN GUILLERMO of the Criminal Investigation Section of the Hawaii County Police Department. That on November 7, 1992, GUILLERMO investigated a robbery reported at a residence located at 15-2802 Kala Street, in Hawaiian Shores Subdivision, Puna, Hawai[`]i. That the robbery had occurred at the residence whereupon three (3) unidentified males entered the victims' residence and held the victims at gun point and demanded money. After obtaining approximately $1,000.00 in U.S. Currency, the suspects fled the scene utilizing the victims' vehicle. Said vehicle was subsequently located at the bottom of Kahakai Boulevard. That the victims/occupants of the residence are identified as DANIEL and KELLY HAUNIO [sic]. That on November 7, 1992, at about 0927 Hours, with the permission of KELLY HAUNIO's [sic] mother, PATRICIA COOPER, GUILLERMO made a check of the residence for evidence connected to the robbery investigation. During this time, he had located a cellophane package containing what appeared to be rock-like substance or crack cocaine. That the rock-like substance was located upon the floor of the master bedroom laying next to the bed. That the aggregate weight of the rock-like substance had been 3.5 grams. According to GUILLERMO, at the time of the recovery of the rock-like substance, Cooper was present in the bedroom. Further that the victims had checked into a Hilo hotel since the robbery incident. The affidavit also discussed, inter alia, the laboratory test results of the rock-like substance, which was found to be cocaine, as well as a detailed description of the Hauanios' home. Additionally, it discussed Officer Diego's experience as a police officer and what he had learned about the benefits of searching a premises after cocaine and cocaine paraphernalia have been found. However, it did not allege any other information, independent of Detective Guillermo's illegal search, to support the warrant. Thus, the independent source exception does not apply.
While this court has utilized the independent source exception in determining whether to validate otherwise unconstitutional searches, we have not yet decided whether to adopt the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. The inevitable discovery exception is, in a sense, a variation of the independent source exception, see Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 9.3(e) (2d ed. 1992), and was first adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). In Williams, a ten-year-old girl disappeared from a YMCA building in Des Moines, Iowa, where she had been accompanied by her parents. Id. at 434, 104 S.Ct. at 2504. Shortly thereafter, a witness saw respondent Williams leaving the YMCA carrying a large bundle wrapped in an army blanket. Id. The next day, Williams' car was found in Davenport, Iowa. Id. Several items of clothing belonging to the missing child along with some of Williams' clothing and an army blanket were also found at a rest stop somewhere between Des Moines and Davenport. Id. Subsequently, a warrant was issued for the arrest of Williams. Id. at 435, 104 S.Ct. at 2504-05. Because the Iowa police suspected the missing girl's body to be located somewhere between Des Moines and the rest stop where the clothing and blanket were found, they initiated a large-scale search with over two hundred volunteers for the body. Id. Meanwhile, Williams surrendered to the local police in Davenport. Id. Des Moines police informed Williams' attorney that they would go to Davenport and return him to Des Moines without questioning him. Id. Two Des Moines detectives then went to Davenport, took Williams into custody, and proceeded to drive him back to Des Moines. Id. During the drive, one of the detectives began a conversation with Williams by saying: `I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the road.... They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is ... and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And since we will be going right past the area [where the body is] on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered.... [A]fter a snow storm [we may not be] able to find it at all.' Id. at 435-36, 104 S.Ct. at 2505 (brackets in original). The detective told Williams not to answer and to just think about it[.] Id. at 436, 104 S.Ct. at 2505. Sometime thereafter, Williams asked the detective whether the police had found the young girl's shoes. Id. After the detective replied that he was not sure, Williams directed the police to a point near a service station where he said he had left them; the shoes were not found. Id. Williams then directed the police to the child's body and the search was called off. Id. At the time, one of the search teams was only two and one-half miles from the area where the body was located  a location within the area to be searched. Id.
Williams was indicted for first-degree murder. At trial his attorney moved to suppress the evidence of the girl's body and all related evidence. Id. The trial court denied the motion, and a jury found him guilty as charged. Id. at 437, 104 S.Ct. at 2505-06. Williams then sought habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. Id. The district court concluded that the evidence relating to the body had been wrongly admitted at trial and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed, holding that the detective had obtained the incriminating statement from Williams by violating his right to counsel. Id. (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977)). However, the Court noted that evidence of the body's location and condition `might well be admissible on the theory that the body would have been discovered in any event, even had incriminating statements not been elicited from Williams.' Id. (citing 430 U.S. at 407, n. 12, 97 S.Ct. at 1243, n. 12).
At Williams' second trial, the court concluded that the State had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that, if the search had not been suspended and Williams had not led the police to the victim, her body would have been discovered `within a short time' in essentially the same condition as it was actually found. Id. at 437-38, 104 S.Ct. at 2506 (emphasis in original). The trial court also ruled that if the police had not located the body, `the search would clearly have been taken up again where it left off, given the extreme circumstances of this case and the body would [have] been found in short order. ' Id. at 438, 104 S.Ct. at 2506 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the challenged evidence was again admitted. The jury found Williams guilty of first-degree murder and he was sentenced to life in prison. Id. The Iowa Supreme court affirmed. In 1980, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa again reviewed the case on a writ of habeas corpus. The court affirmed, finding that the body would have inevitably been found by the searchers. Id. at 439, 104 S.Ct. at 2506-07. However, the Eighth Circuit reversed. While the Eighth Circuit agreed that there is an inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, the court held that the exception requires proof that the police did not act in bad faith. Once again, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 440, 104 S.Ct. at 2507.
Justice Burger, writing for the majority, [26] began the opinion by acknowledging the Court's past adherence to the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 441-42, 104 S.Ct. at 2507-08 (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920) and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)). [27] The Williams majority justified its adherence to the independent source doctrine by stating, inter alia, that [w]hen challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent any error or violation. Id. at 443, 104 S.Ct. at 2509. (emphasis added). The majority then explained that the exclusion of evidence that would inevitably have been discovered would also put the government in a worse position, because the police would have found the evidence if no misconduct had taken place. Id. at 444, 104 S.Ct. at 2509 (emphasis added). Thus, the majority ruled that while the independent source exception did not apply in the case before it, its rationale is wholly consistent with and justifies our adoption of the ultimate or inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. Consequently, the Williams majority announced the following rule: If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means  here the volunteers' search  then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received. Anything less would reject logic, experience, and common sense. Id. (footnote omitted). The majority proceeded to stress the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule on the federal level, i.e., deterrence. [28] Finally, after reviewing the evidence, the majority held that the young girl's body would inevitably have been discovered. Id. at 450, 104 S.Ct. at 2512.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from the majority. In his dissent, Justice Brennan began by agreeing that the `inevitable discovery' exception to the exclusionary rule is consistent with the requirements of the Constitution. Id. at 459, 104 S.Ct. at 2517. However, Justice Brennan opined that the majority overlooked the crucial distinction between the inevitable discovery exception and the independent source exception. Id. When properly applied, the `independent source' exception allows the prosecution to use evidence only if it was, in fact, obtained by fully lawful means. It therefore does no violence to the constitutional protections that the exclusionary rule is meant to enforce. The `inevitable discovery' exception is likewise compatible with the Constitution, though it differs in one key respect from its next of kin: specifically, the evidence sought to be introduced at trial has not actually been obtained from an independent source, but rather would have been discovered as a matter of course if independent investigations were allowed to proceed. Id. Thus, Justice Brennan pointed out that [t]he inevitable discovery exception necessarily implicates a hypothetical finding that differs in kind from the factual finding that precedes application of the independent source rule. Id. Because of this distinction, Justice Brennan would have required the prosecution to satisfy a heightened burden of proof before allowing evidence to be admitted under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. He explained: To ensure that this hypothetical finding is narrowly confined to circumstances that are functionally equivalent to an independent source, and to protect fully the fundamental rights served by the exclusionary rule, I would require clear and convincing evidence before concluding that the government had met its burden of proof on this issue. Increasing the burden of proof serves to impress the factfinder with the importance of the decision and thereby reduces the risk that illegally obtained evidence will be admitted. Id. at 459-60, 104 S.Ct. at 2517 (emphasis added and internal citations omitted).
Because we believe that the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule is a sound principle, which prevents the setting aside of convictions that would have been obtained in the absence of police misconduct, we now adopt the federal concept of inevitable discovery on the state level. However, we also view the logic of Justice Brennan's dissent as compelling. We agree that application of the inevitable discovery exception necessarily requires speculation as to the outcome of hypothetical circumstances. And because the privacy rights of the citizens of the State of Hawai`i may turn upon the outcome of the hypothetical, it is incumbent upon us to assure that our speculation is as close to correct as possible. The added protection against governmental invasions of privacy in our constitution demands no less. [29] Thus, because we discern wisdom in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, and because we want to ensure that the added protection in the Hawai`i Constitution is not vitiated by a bad guess, we require the prosecution to present clear and convincing evidence that any evidence obtained in violation of article I, section 7, would inevitably have been discovered by lawful means before such evidence may be admitted under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. [30] See State v. Worthy, 273 N.J.Super. 147, 156, 641 A.2d 282, 286-87 (1994) (requiring a showing of clear and convincing evidence as a precondition to admission of evidence under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule). In the present case, the trial court has not specifically ruled on whether the evidence in question would have been inevitably discovered. Nevertheless, the prosecution urges us to review the entire record and make an independent determination that the evidence recovered from the illegal search of the Hauanios' home would have been inevitably discovered lawfully pursuant to Sergeant Magnani's investigation. According to the prosecution, the record demonstrates that it was only a matter of time before Magnani would have obtained a search warrant to search the Hauanios' home. [31] The prosecution therefore contends that we should reverse the portion of the circuit court's order that set aside the warrant to search the Hauanios' home, as well as the evidence recovered from the search. We disagree. The record is simply devoid of evidence that would produce `in the mind of a reasonable person a firm belief as to the facts [the prosecution is seeking to establish.]' [32] It is fundamental that no warrant may be issued absent a showing of probable cause. Monick v. State, 64 Haw. 399, 400, 641 P.2d 1341, 1342 (1982) (citing State v. Kalai, 56 Haw. 366, 537 P.2d 8 (1975)). A mere suspicion is not enough to demonstrate the existence of probable cause. Indeed, [p]robable cause is said to exist when facts and circumstances within one's knowledge and of which one has reasonable trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed. Id. (citing State v. Decano, 60 Haw. 205, 588 P.2d 909 (1978)). According to the record, before Detective Guillermo informed Sergeant Magnani that he had recovered cocaine from the Hauanios' house on Kala Street, Sergeant Magnani had no information regarding any involvement of the Hauanios in drug activity. And, although he was suspicious that cocaine had been delivered to one of the four houses on Kala Street, he had taken no action to determine who occupied or owned any of the houses in question. Thus, on the record before us, there is no evidence to support an inference that Sergeant Magnani ever independently possessed the level of suspicion necessary to obtain a warrant to search the Hauanios' home. Even if he might have eventually acquired enough information to obtain a search warrant, however, the record lacks the clear and convincing evidence necessary to show that the evidence recovered from the Hauanios' home as a result of Detective Guillermo's illegal search, would have still been there. Accordingly, we hold that, based on the record before us, the prosecution has failed to meet its burden of proof that the evidence recovered from the Hauanios' home would have been inevitably discovered lawfully pursuant to Sergeant Magnani's investigation.

The circuit court concluded that the inculpatory statements, including the consents to search the hotel room, made by the Hauanios were fruits of Detective Guillermo's illegal search. See COL 5(b). Aside from (1) making a general claim that the court erred in issuing COL 5(b) and (2) contending that the statements would have been inevitably discovered, see discussion infra, the prosecution does not present a single argument to support the contention that the circuit court's conclusion was erroneous. [33] Because of this, it is our prerogative to disregard the prosecution's claim without addressing it. See Loui v. Board of Medical Examiners, 78 Hawai`i 21, 29 n. 19, 889 P.2d 705, 713 n. 19 (1995) (citing State v. Reed, 77 Hawai`i 72, 86, 881 P.2d 1218, 1232 (1994)). Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, we address the prosecution's claim herein. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the circuit court's COL 5(b) was not wrong. As discussed supra, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution protect the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Pau`u, 72 Haw. at 509, 824 P.2d at 835. In addition, the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Hawai`i Constitution provide in relevant part that [n]o person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against [oneself][.] Id. When a confession or other evidence is obtained in violation of either of these rights, the prosecution will not be permitted to use it to secure a defendant's criminal conviction. Id. (citing State v. Russo, 67 Haw. 126, 681 P.2d 553 (1984)). Thus, a waiver of one's constitutional rights or a confession, even if uncoerced and intelligently given, will be inadmissible if induced by a prior illegality. See Pau`u, 72 Haw. at 509, 824 P.2d at 835-36 (citing State v. Knight, 63 Haw. 90, 94, 621 P.2d 370, 374 (1980)). Indeed, when the defendant makes a showing that [the] waiver [or confession] was predicated upon an illegal search, the government's burden in rebutting the invalidity of the waiver [or confession] is to show that the waiver `[is not the result of an exploitation] of that illegality but instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' Id. at 510, 824 P.2d at 836 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (internal brackets added) (quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)). In Pau`u, supra, we addressed the issue whether a defendant's confession and consent to search were admissible when made after the police conducted an illegal search and seizure of the defendant's belongings, and proceeded to show him the evidence recovered against him. The relevant facts of Pau`u, see 72 Haw. at 507-08, 824 P.2d at 834-35, are as follows: Several officers pulled the defendant, Folototo Pau`u, over by surrounding his car. Pau`u had been suspected of theft. In addition, the vehicle tax and safety check on his car had expired. The officers ordered Pau`u out of his car and arrested him. Because Pau`u's car was stopped in the middle of a busy street, one of the officers entered the car to move it. While in the car, the officer found a black bag with stolen credit cards inside. Shortly thereafter, at the arrest scene, one of the officers approached Pau`u with the credit cards and stated: You've been a busy boy, haven't you. Later at the police station, after being informed of his Miranda rights, Pau`u consented to a search of his car, and confessed to the crimes. At trial, Pau`u moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his black bag and car, as well as evidence of his confession. The circuit court held that the police officer, who entered Pau`u's car to move it, had conducted an illegal search of the black bag. The prosecution did not challenge this holding. Accordingly, the circuit court suppressed the evidence of the credit cards found inside. The circuit court, however, concluded that Pau`u's consent to search and confession were (1) voluntarily given, and (2) free of any taint of the illegal warrantless search of the bag. Pau`u's statements and the evidence subsequently recovered were therefore admitted at trial. Pau`u was ultimately convicted. On appeal, Pau`u conceded that his consent to search his car and his confession were voluntary to the extent that he understood his rights and was not coerced; however, he contended that the only reason he consented and confessed was that he felt he had no choice because the police already had the evidence to convict him when the credit cards were found in his bag. Pau`u, 72 Haw. at 510, 824 P.2d at 836. Because the search of the bag was illegal, and because Pau`u made a showing that his confession and waiver were predicated upon an illegal search, [t]he [prosecution], therefore, had to demonstrate that the taint of the illegal search of the bag had been dissipated or that the waivers were induced by a source independent of the illegal search. Id. The prosecution attempted to meet this burden by arguing that, under the circumstances of Pau`u's arrest, namely that he was stopped by being surrounded by several police officers' cars, ordered to place his hands on the dashboard, then ordered out of the car, all of which occurred prior to the search of the black bag, Pau`u must have known or believed that the police already had the evidence to convict him, and at this point Pau`u must have felt the futility of withholding any consent or confession. Id. at 511, 824 P.2d at 836 (emphasis added). This court disagreed with the prosecution's argument, finding that the [prosecution's] argument ... [was] not based on any evidence but was merely surmise and speculative inference. Id. at 512, 824 P.2d at 837 (emphasis added). We therefore held that the [prosecution] ... failed to meet its burden of showing that the taint of the prior illegal search had been dissipated or that there was an independent source which induced Pau`u to waive his constitutional rights. Id. As such, we vacated Pau`u's convictions and remanded for a new trial. The instant case is analogous to the Pau`u decision. In this case, as in Pau`u, an illegal search was conducted by the police. Also in this case, as in Pau`u, the evidence recovered as a result of that illegal search provided the basis for the defendants' arrest. See discussion of Pau`u facts supra, and unchallenged FOF 23 (Guillermo ... arrested both the Hauanios at approximately 4:00 p.m. for the `crack' cocaine that he recovered from their house. ) (emphasis added). Finally, in both cases, at some point before making the statements, the defendants were questioned about the evidence recovered as a result of the illegal search. See discussion of Pau`u facts supra, and unchallenged FOF 21 (When Guillermo inquired about the drugs, Daniel replied that he wanted to think about it before responding[.]). Accordingly, as we did in Pau`u, we hold that the Hauanios were induced to make inculpatory statements and to consent to a search of their hotel room in violation of article I, sections 7 and 9 of the Hawai`i Constitution. [34]
The prosecution next contends that the Hauanios were already the primary suspects in Sergeant Magnani's drug conspiracy investigation; thus, even if their statements and consents were tainted, it was inevitable that Magnani would contact the Hauanios at his earliest possible opportunity, advise them of their rights, obtain voluntary statements from them, and request consent to search places they occupied or obtain search warrants for those premises. At this point, we fail to see how the prosecution could possibly present the clear and convincing evidence that would be necessary to support its contention. Indeed, absent some sort of supernatural ability, there is simply no way to predict that a particular individual would have inevitably legally made the same statements that he or she made as a result of an illegal interrogation. Thus, because we believe that applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to oral statements, including confessions and consents to search, would amount to surmise and speculative inference see Pau`u, 72 Haw. at 512, 824 P.2d at 837, beyond that in which we are willing to engage at the expense of our constitution, we hold that it only applies to the admissibility of tangible physical evidence. [35] Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in suppressing the inculpatory statements of the Hauanios and the waivers of their rights to refuse consent to a search of the hotel room in which they were staying. We reach this holding on adequate and independent state grounds. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 182, 110 S.Ct. at 2798; supra note 25.
The circuit court suppressed the evidence recovered from the Hauanios' hotel room as fruits of prior constitutional violations. See COL 5(b). Because we held that the inculpatory statements and the consent were induced as a result of a prior illegal search, and because the search of the hotel room was a direct result of the statements and consent to search, we hold that the evidence recovered amounts to fruits of the prior illegality. The prosecution nonetheless contends that the evidence obtained from the hotel room as a result of the waivers would have inevitably been discovered in the course of Sergeant Magnani's investigation. Upon reviewing the record before us, we are unable to find any evidence to support the prosecution's contention. Accordingly, we disagree and hold that the prosecution has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating, through clear and convincing evidence, that the evidence recovered from the Hauanios' hotel room would have been inevitably discovered by Sergeant Magnani.