Opinion ID: 1254655
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review.

Text: (8a) The question, then, is whether the state need show only that its classification is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective  or whether it must comply with the mandate of the more stringent equal protection test by demonstrating that its classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. ( Plyler, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 217 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 799, 102 S.Ct. p. 2395].) (4b) As we have already noted, this court must employ the latter, active and critical analysis in cases involving suspect classifications or touching on fundamental interests. ( Serrano v. Priest, supra, 18 Cal.3d 728, 761 ( Serrano II ), quoting from Serrano I, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 597.) (8b) We find ourselves unable to agree with respondent's two principle contentions. Respondent first contends that because this case involves legislation and regulation in the economic and social welfare area, it must be governed by Dandridge v. Williams (1970) 397 U.S. 471 [25 L.Ed.2d 491, 90 S.Ct. 1153], and other cases employing the rational basis test. (See, e.g., Richardson v. Belcher (1971) 404 U.S. 78 [30 L.Ed.2d 231, 92 S.Ct. 254]; Lindsey v. Normet (1972) 405 U.S. 56 [31 L.Ed.2d 36, 92 S.Ct. 862]; Jefferson v. Hackney (1972) 406 U.S. 535 [32 L.Ed.2d 285, 92 S.Ct. 1724]; United States v. Kras (1973) 409 U.S. 434 [34 L.Ed.2d 626, 93 S.Ct. 631].) As will appear, respondent's reliance on Dandridge and its progeny is misplaced to the extent that none of the above-cited cases involved even a colorable claim of discrimination. Dandridge itself notes that a statutory classification does not violate equal protection if it is both rationally based and free from invidious discrimination.  (397 U.S. at p. 487 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 503]; italics added.) In Dandridge the high court sustained a state statute, which imposed a maximum grant available to welfare recipients regardless of family size, against a claim of violation of equal protection. Recipients with large families whose standard of need exceeded the maximum grant contended that their families were disadvantaged in relation to small needy families. In rejecting the claim, the court acknowledged the dramatically real difference between state regulation of business and welfare assistance, which involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings, but nonetheless applied the rational basis constitutional standard of review. (397 U.S. at p. 485 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 502].) The court concluded that [i]n the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some `reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification `is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.' [Citation.] (397 U.S. at p. 485 [25 L.Ed.2d at pp. 501-502].) Appellant in the instant case does not challenge the mathematical imperfections with which the state allocates welfare benefits. Of course, [t]here is no question that States have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources, since each State is free to set its own standard of need.... ( King v. Smith, supra, 392 U.S. 309, 318 [20 L.Ed.2d 1118, 1126].) Appellant complains, though, that once the state establishes standards of need it cannot create two classes of eligible children, one of which is singled out for unequal treatment on the basis of factors unrelated to the objectives of the statutory and regulatory scheme. Appellant contends that the state has drawn distinctions between otherwise eligible children and that the classification is presumptively invidious as it discriminates against a discrete and powerless minority  namely, eligible children who reside with undocumented siblings. [20] Respondent next contends that appellant's three younger children are not members of a suspect class because it is their siblings' trait  rather than their own  which is the basis of the differential treatment. He urges that it would be a novel approach to equal protection to hold that the traits of the undocumented children place their siblings in a suspect classification. In this regard, respondent argues that because the class affected by the challenged practice is comprised of citizens and documented aliens, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Plyler v. Doe, supra, 457 U.S. 202 [72 L.Ed.2d 786, 102 S.Ct. 2382], involving discrimination against un documented aliens, is inapposite. While we agree that the holding in Plyler is not squarely applicable here, we think that the high court's analysis and reasoning is especially pertinent. The Supreme Court in Plyler held that a Texas statute denying undocumented children free public school education violated equal protection. The threshold question before the court was whether undocumented aliens were persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a 1971 decision the high court had declared that [a]liens as a class are a prime example of a `discrete and insular' minority. ( Graham v. Richardson (1971) 403 U.S. 365, 372 [29 L.Ed.2d 534, 542, 91 S.Ct. 1848].) [21] Graham held discrimination against resident aliens inherently suspect and ... therefore subject to strict judicial scrutiny ( ibid. ) regardless of whether or not a fundamental right is impaired ( id., at p. 376 [29 L.Ed.2d at p. 544]). [22] In Plyler, the court held that undocumented aliens may claim the benefit of the Fourteenth Amendment (457 U.S. at p. 215 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 798, 102 S.Ct. at p. 2394]; cf. Cabral v. State Bd. of Control (1980) 112 Cal. App.3d 1012 [169 Cal. Rptr. 604]), but it perfunctorily dismissed in a footnote the contention that undocumented aliens are a suspect class (457 U.S. at p. 219, fn. 19 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 800, 102 S.Ct. at p. 2396] cf. id. at p. 235, fn. 3 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 811, 102 S.Ct. at p. 2404], conc. opn. by Blackmun, J.). Nor was strict scrutiny warranted because education was involved, the court held, since education is not a fundamental right. ( Id., at p. 223 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 803, 102 S.Ct. at p. 2398], citing San Antonio v. Rodriguez (1973) 411 U.S. 1, 28-39 [36 L.Ed.2d 16, 39-47, 93 S.Ct. 1278].) Nevertheless, the high court concluded in Plyler that heightened judicial scrutiny was required because more is involved in these cases than the abstract question whether [the statute] discriminates against a suspect class, or whether education is a fundamental right. [The statute] imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status.  (457 U.S. at p. 223 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 803, 102 S.Ct. at p. 2398]; italics added.) Accordingly, the court employed its now familiar intermediate standard of review requiring the state to show that the discrimination furthers a substantial state interest. (See, e.g., Craig v. Boren (1976) 429 U.S. 190 [50 L.Ed.2d 397, 97 S.Ct. 451]; Lalli v. Lalli (1978) 439 U.S. 259 [58 L.Ed.2d 503, 99 S.Ct. 518].) The primary underpinning of Plyler  that innocent children cannot be explicitly disadvantaged on the basis of their status of birth  unquestionably applies to the instant case. In both cases the classifying trait is one over which the children have no control: the undocumented status of a family member who in coming to this country, albeit illegally, placed the children in their disadvantaged position. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Plyler, reasoned that the Texas statute could not pass constitutional muster because it direct[ed] the onus of a parent's misconduct against his children who are present in this country through no fault of their own. (457 U.S. at pp. 220, 226 [72 L.Ed.2d at pp. 801, 805, 102 S.Ct. at pp. 2396, 2400].) Similarly, a recent federal district court decision held that the state cannot victimize the citizen child or a lawfully resident child and deprive it of [day care services] ... based solely on his mother's [undocumented] status.... ( Ruiz v. Blum, supra, 549 F. Supp. 871, 877.) As Justice Powell noted, concurring in Plyler, these holdings find support in decisions of this Court with respect to the status of illegitimates. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972), we said: `[V]isiting ... condemnation on the head of an infant' for the misdeeds of the parents is illogical, unjust, and `contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.' [¶] In these cases, the State of Texas effectively denies to the school-age children of illegal aliens the opportunity to attend the free public schools that the State makes available to all residents. They are excluded only because of a status resulting from the violation by parents or guardians of our immigration laws and the fact that they remain in our country unlawfully. The respondent children are innocent in this respect. They can `affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status.' Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977). (457 U.S. at p. 238 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 813, 102 S.Ct. at p. 2406], conc. opn. by Powell, J.) In the present case, appellant's citizen children are denied welfare benefits although, like the children in Plyler, they are innocent with respect to their parents' violation of the immigration laws. We cannot agree with respondent's position that Plyler is distinguishable because it involved education. We note that the court did not have to ground its holding upon a finding that education is a fundamental right. (Cf. Serrano II, supra, 18 Cal.3d 728.) Indeed, Justice Powell's concurring opinion suggests that the court's decision in Plyler is applicable in the welfare context: If the resident children of illegal aliens were denied welfare assistance, made available by government to all other children who qualify, this also  in my opinion  would be an impermissible penalizing of children because of their parents' status. (457 U.S. at p. 239, fn. 3 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 813, 102 S.Ct. at p. 2406] italics added.) We conclude that heightened judicial scrutiny is warranted in this case. What is the standard for such heightened judicial scrutiny? (9) Our state equal protection clause is possessed of an independent vitality from the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Serrano II, supra, 18 Cal.3d 728, 764.) [23] (8c) We hold that the challenged practice in this case should be reviewed under the strict scrutiny test. In holding that strict scrutiny is warranted  indeed compelled  in this case, we do so in recognition that constitutional safeguards can be preserved only by rejecting a rigid, categorical approach to equal protection. It would be truly incongruous to hold that appellant's alien children are entitled to heightened protection but not their brothers and sisters who live in the same home and suffer the same disadvantage. We have thus far emphasized the reason appellant's children constitute a discrete minority  their inability to control their parents' conduct. Equally crucial to our holding is the fact that appellant's citizen children are classified on the basis of an immutable trait  they cannot forsake their birth into an undocumented family. They are saddled with [the same] disabilities [and] subjected to [the same] history of purposeful unequal treatment as their brothers and mother. ( San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. 1, 28 [36 L.Ed.2d 16, 39].) Indeed, the challenged classification touches upon two traits that have been historically disfavored  national origin and ancestry. (See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas (1954) 347 U.S. 475 [98 L.Ed. 866, 74 S.Ct. 667] [national origin]; Takahashi v. Fish Game Comm. (1948) 334 U.S. 410 [92 L.Ed. 1478, 68 S.Ct. 1138] [origin and ancestry]; Oyama v. California (1948) 332 U.S. 633 [92 L.Ed. 249, 68 S.Ct. 269] [same]; Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) 118 U.S. 356 [30 L.Ed. 220, 6 S.Ct. 1064] [race, alienage, national origin].) As in these lineage cases, appellant's children are classified on the basis of an immutable trait and are relegated to an inferior status into which they are locked by accident of birth. For all of the foregoing reasons, the classification in the present case must be strictly scrutinized. [24]