Opinion ID: 1235129
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: White's downgraded-performance-evaluation claim and the proper summary-judgment framework for mixed-motive claims

Text: Although I agree with the majority's persuasive and well-reasoned discussion of the appropriate framework for evaluating mixed-motive claims at the summary-judgment stage and concur in the result reached in that portion of the majority opinion, I write separately to comment on the likely effect of the new framework and its application to the specific circumstances of the case before us. In particular, I am wary of the majority's statement that the standard we announce today will typically require sending the case to the jury. Maj. Op. at 402. In my view, the standard laid out in the majority opinion must be applied with a view towards the more general principle that summary judgment serves an important screening function in our judicial system. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) ([S]ummary judgment serves as the ultimate screen to weed out truly insubstantial lawsuits prior to trial.). District courts reviewing motions for summary judgment on a mixed-motive claim, therefore, must always undertake that analysis with Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in mind, which directs courts to grant such a motion where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Contrary to the majority's suggestion, I believe that the articulated standard leaves ample room for courts to determine that no reasonable jury could conclude that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision. I also believe that the evidence favoring White in this case is quite weak and just barely passes muster under the new standard that we have articulated. Indeed, the key evidence in the record that supports White's performance-review claim is the collection of remarks allegedly made by Phillips, whichas the district court properly foundseem to evince a racially discriminatory animus. Those alleged remarks, combined with the factual dispute over which criteria should have governed the evaluation of White's performance (the Gold email or the 2004 PMO grid), could lead a jury to infer that race was at least a motivating factor when Phillips chose to partially follow the more stringent requirements of the Gold email. That inference is not dispelled by any showing in the record that Phillips applied the Gold email to any nonprotected employees, which would render unreasonable the conclusion that Phillips was motivated by race in determining how to properly evaluate White's performance. See Maj. Op. at 401 (noting that the court should also consider evidence presented by the employer that the protected characteristic was not a motivating factor for its employment decision) (quoting Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 720 (6th Cir.2006) (Moore, J., concurring)). Nevertheless, in the absence of Phillips's alleged racist remarks, I would have concluded that there was no basis for a jury to find that race was a motivating factor in the downgraded performance review received by White. White's claim would certainly fail under the more stringent McDonnell Douglas framework used to evaluate claims brought under Title VII's general antidiscrimination provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), if for no other reason than that he has failed to show that any similarly situated employee was treated more favorably than he was with respect to performance evaluations. So although I concur in the majority's explanation of why this type of evidence should not be required to survive summary judgment on a mixed-motive claim, there is no question that White would have a much stronger case to present to a jury if there was such evidence in the record. I therefore find myself barely persuaded that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether race was a motivating factor in White's performance review, but I would not be at all surprised if a jury ultimately finds to the contrary. Finally, I would note that the remedy-limitation provision contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) may prove to be particularly important in the instant case. That provision provides an employer with a limited affirmative defense that does not absolve it of liability, but restricts the remedies available to a plaintiff. The available remedies include only declaratory relief, certain types of injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). In the present case, Baxter may well be able to show that White would have received a downgraded performance review even in the absence of the impermissible consideration of race, in which case it could successfully assert the § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) affirmative defense. See § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (explaining that the limitation-of-remedies provision applies where an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor). The evidence in the record relating to the Gold email and White's failure to meet his Suprane sales goals will be highly relevant to this showing. Moreover, the jury could easily conclude that Phillips split the difference between the criteria contained in the 2004 PMO Grid and the Gold email, giving White a more favorable review than he would have received upon a straightforward application of the criteria set forth in the Gold email. If Baxter chooses to proceed in this way and the jury finds that the company would have downgraded White's performance review even in the absence of any impermissible consideration of White's race, then the remedies available to White will be considerably limited. He would under such circumstances be entitled to declaratory and perhaps limited injunctive relief, and to attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of the mixed-motive claim. See § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i). If this is indeed the ultimate outcome, then the district court would be unable to award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment. § 2000e5(g)(2)(B)(ii). Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) thus provides an important counterbalance to the relatively lenient summary-judgment standard that we announce today, and may be particularly applicable in the present case.