Opinion ID: 377037
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Douthit's Other Allegations of Error

Text: 44 On this appeal Douthit also contends that the judgment rendered below must be reversed on the grounds that the jury was impaneled so as to exclude poor persons, blacks, and Mexicans; that the trial judge exhibited bias against him; that his appointed trial counsel were ineffective; that the defendants committed perjury and withheld material evidence; and that the trial judge improperly allowed the defendants to introduce into evidence his past and present criminal record. Upon an examination of the record we conclude that with the exception of the introduction of Douthit's criminal record, these allegations are without merit. 45 Douthit did not challenge the makeup of the jury at trial, and nothing in the record supports his allegation that certain groups were excluded from the jury. He has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that the process by which the jury was selected systematically and arbitrarily excluded a recognizable, distinct class, since he did not present any evidence showing that any group was underrepresented on jury panels over a significant period of time or that the process by which the jurors were selected was not racially neutral or was susceptible to being used as a tool of discrimination. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1280, 51 L.Ed.2d 498, 510 (1977); United States v. Lopez, 588 F.2d 450 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947, 99 S.Ct. 2895, 61 L.Ed.2d 319 (1979). The only specific allegation of improprieties occurring in the jury selection that Douthit makes is that the trial judge did not rule on his motion to exclude a potential juror who admitted to a bias in favor of the defendants. The record shows conclusively, however, that the suspect individual was not a member of the jury impaneled by the court. 46 Douthit's assertion of bias on the part of the trial judge does not constitute reversible error on two grounds. First, he neglected to file a timely and sufficient affidavit with the district court stating the basis of his belief that bias existed, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 144. Second, the actions of the district judge that Douthit alleges reflect his bias consist solely of judicial actions and do not indicate any personal bias on his part against Douthit. See United States v. Archbold-Newball, 554 F.2d 665, 681-82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1000, 98 S.Ct. 644, 54 L.Ed.2d 496 (1977). 47 The record before us on this appeal belies Douthit's contention that he received ineffective assistance from his court-appointed trial counsel. While he asserts that his counsel failed to subpoena several witnesses or to obtain copies of certain documents, he does not indicate what information could have been obtained from such sources that was not available from the court records introduced by the parties at trial. When questioned before the district court at the end of the trial proceedings but prior to a verdict being rendered, Douthit stated that he knew of nothing that his counsel had failed to do which he wanted done, and that he was satisfied with their representation of him. The record reflects that Douthit received more than adequate representation from his counsel, who were well prepared, vigorously presented his claims, thoroughly questioned the witnesses, and made the necessary legal arguments. 48 Douthit's arguments that the defendant sheriff and deputy sheriff committed perjury and deliberately suppressed material evidence are equally without merit. Even if Deputy McCallum's testimony that the sheriff's office must have had a valid commitment order on November 1, 1973, might be characterized as implausible in light of the evidence presented, Douthit has not presented any evidence showing it to be perjurious. The failure of the defendants to produce two documents requested by Douthit during discovery might have justified a motion on his part seeking the court either to compel discovery or to impose sanctions upon the defendants under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37, but it does not constitute deliberate suppression of evidence and does not warrant reversal. 49 Finally, Douthit contends that the trial judge erred in failing to rule on his motion in limine seeking the exclusion of any reference to his past and present incarceration for crimes unrelated to his false imprisonment action. The defendants' attorney questioned Douthit about other unrelated convictions and periods of imprisonment and referred to him as a criminal and a habitual criminal in his closing argument. Although Douthit moved for a mistrial on the basis of the defendants' reference to his current imprisonment on a life sentence, he did not object to the questions and statements concerning his other convictions and his pretrial motion in limine did not serve as a standing objection to any evidence of his convictions unrelated to this action. Had Douthit objected to this evidence, it would not have been admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 609(a), since the potential prejudicial impact of the other crimes proof clearly outweighs its minimal probative value. However, the trial court's failure to exclude this evidence on his own motion did not constitute plain error. 50 The judgment appealed from is vacated and the cause is remanded for a new trial of all issues. 51 VACATED AND REMANDED.