Opinion ID: 1989792
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claims of Abuse by the State

Text: Defendant makes further claims of being subjected to double jeopardy and vindictive prosecution. The language of rule 27(1) itself belies the double jeopardy argument by stating that a dismissal in the furtherance of justice is not a bar to prosecution of an offense charged as a felony or aggravated misdemeanor. See State v. Sefcheck, 261 Iowa 1159, 1167, 157 N.W.2d 128, 133 (1968) (prosecution of previously dismissed felony offense does not constitute double jeopardy). In State v. Henderson, 537 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Iowa 1995), we approved of the application of a good faith standard to these questions. In Henderson we found: [T]he trial court's standard was effective in protecting the defendant from abusive tactics by the State. The district court reviewed the evidence submitted by the parties and found that the State had filed the ... charge in good faith. This procedure will protect a defendant when the state files inflated charges merely to avoid the potential bar resulting from a prior dismissal. Henderson, 537 N.W.2d at 767. We look to whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's factual finding that the charge was filed in good faith. Id. Good faith exists when the county attorney has made a reasonable inquiry into both the facts and the law before filing the trial information. Id. In the instant case, the county attorney stated that in reviewing the facts and circumstances of the case, the charge of kidnaping rather than false imprisonment was the appropriate charge. Our review shows that there is no evidence casting doubt that this is a good faith assessment of the case against the defendant. An argument similar to the defendant's claim of vindictive prosecution was made in Sefcheck. There we held the county attorney should not use the considerable powers of a prosecutor to punish a defendant for asserting any procedural right, nor should the county attorney use those powers for vindictive purposes. Sefcheck, 261 Iowa at 1167, 157 N.W.2d at 133. In the absence of a showing to the contrary, we assume the regularity of official acts. Id. There is nothing in this record which indicates the State was motivated by any improper purpose. We also reject the defendant's claim that the original plea agreement should be considered invalid on the ground the State entered into the agreement in bad faith, knowing the terms of the agreement were impossible to fulfill. The record indicates that the defendant and the State entered into this plea agreement in good faith, believing that it would be carried out. There is no evidence even remotely suggesting that the State bargained a condition into the plea agreement knowing that it was impossible to fulfill.