Opinion ID: 2998267
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: New Trial Based on Inconsistent Jury Verdicts

Text: The City contends that there is no way to reconcile the jury’s verdicts in this case and, consequently, submits that the district court abused its discretion by denying the City’s motion for a new trial. The crux of the City’s claim is that, given the district court’s instructions to the jury, it was impossible for the jury to have acted rationally and to have found for Ms. Deloughery on the Title VII claim but against her on the First Amendment claim. “As a rule civil juries must return consistent verdicts.” Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 677 (7th Cir. 1985). If possible, this court must reconcile apparently inconsistent verdicts, rather than overturn them. See American Nat’l Bank, 125 F.3d at 431. A party claiming that inconsistent verdicts have been returned is not entitled to a new trial “unless no rational jury could have brought back” 3 the verdicts that were returned. Will, 776 F.2d at 678. A new 3 This court has found inconsistent verdicts, for instance, where a jury returned special verdicts finding that “the filing of age discrimination charges was a determining cause for [the plain- (continued...) Nos. 04-2657 & 04-2876 11 trial on all claims is the appropriate remedy (rather than judgment as a matter of law) in a case in which the jury has returned inconsistent verdicts. See Gordon, 29 F.3d at 298-99. In determining whether the jury’s verdicts could be reconciled, the district court looked closely at its own instructions. With respect to Ms. Deloughery’s Title VII claim, the district court instructed the jury that it should find for Ms. Deloughery if she proved that the City decided not to promote her “in retaliation for filing charges with the [EEOC] and the [IDHR] and/or for complaining about and opposing discrimination within the Chicago Police Department.” Tr.IV at 597. With respect to Ms. Deloughery’s First Amendment claim, the district court instructed the jury that it should find for Ms. Deloughery if she proved that “her exercise of her right of free speech was a substantial or motivating factor in Hillard’s decision not to promote the plaintiff to captain.” Id. The district court further instructed the jury “that activity in opposing discrimination . . . is protected by the constitutional right of free speech.” Id. at 598. We believe that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the jury’s verdicts in this case can be reconciled. As the district court pointed out, the jury could have found for Ms. Deloughery on the Title VII claim by accepting her contention that CPD had retaliated against her for filing charges with the EEOC and IDHR, while still 3 (...continued) tiff’s] discharge” but also finding that the defendant did not “’willfully’ violate[] the age discrimination law when it discharged plaintiff.” Rose v. Hearst Magazines Div., The Hearst Corp., 814 F.2d 491, 493 (7th Cir. 1987). It was inconsistent to find retaliation as well as nonwillfulness because a jury finding of retaliatory discharge necessarily also finds willfulness. Id. 12 Nos. 04-2657 & 04-2876 rejecting her allegation that she had not been promoted in retaliation for her “opposi[tion] to discrimination” within CPD. Having rejected the idea that CPD retaliated against Ms. Deloughery for her activity opposing discrimination, the jury also could have concluded—because “activity in opposing discrimination” was described as being “protected by the . . . right of free speech”—that Ms. Deloughery’s free speech activities were not a motivating factor in the decision not to promote her. To have found as we have just described, the jury would have had to understand the practice of “filing charges with the [EEOC] and the [IDHR]” as falling outside the class of “activit[ies] . . . opposing discrimination in public employment.” This understanding is entirely consistent with the district court’s instructions. Read in conjunction with its instruction “that activity in opposing discrimination . . . is protected by the constitutional right of free speech,” the district court’s instruction on the Title VII claim—which phrased “filing charges . . . and/or . . . opposing discrimination” in the disjunctive—could have appeared to the jury to recognize two kinds of activity against which CPD might have retaliated, one protected by the First Amendment and one protected only by Title VII. Anticipating our conclusion, the City has argued that it is contrary to the law of this circuit for the jury to have thought that “filing charges” was not protected by the constitutional right of free speech. However, the City’s argument on this point fails for two reasons. First, as Ms. Deloughery points out, the City cannot now challenge the jury instructions as a misstatement of the law of this circuit because it did not object to the instructions at trial. See, e.g., R.J. O’Brien & Assocs., Inc. v. Forman, 298 F.3d 653, 657 (7th Cir. 2002) (“We will not make an end run around the failure to object to the jury instructions . . . .”). Nos. 04-2657 & 04-2876 13 Furthermore, although the filing of an employment grievance is entitled to constitutional protection if it addresses a matter of public concern, it is not at all clear that Ms. Deloughery’s filing of charges was protected by the First Amendment. See Zorzi v. County of Putnam, 30 F.3d 885, 897 (7th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that, under certain circumstances, the filing of charges of discrimination or of a lawsuit claiming discrimination will not constitute a matter of public concern); see also Yatvin v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 840 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[N]ot every legal gesture . . . is protected by the First Amendment.”). As Ms. Deloughery points out, the jury was not asked to determine whether her filing of charges touched on a matter of public concern. And, as we have explained at length, the district court’s instructions certainly did not require the jury to treat “filing charges” as equivalent to constitutionally-protected “activity in opposing discrimination.” The City also argues that the fact that the jury returned verdicts against Johnston on both of her claims is proof that the jury’s verdicts on Ms. Deloughery’s claims were inconsistent, since the two women presented “identical” evidence. Appellant’s Br. at 29. Ms. Deloughery contends that the City has waived this argument by failing to present it to the district court on its motion for a new trial. Notwithstanding the City’s likely waiver of this argument, the verdicts returned on Johnston’s claims do not affect our view of the jury’s verdicts as to Ms. Deloughery. Even if the evidence about Johnston’s filing of charges was the same as Ms. Deloughery’s evidence, it was well within the jury’s role as factfinder to determine that Ms. Deloughery’s actions influenced Superintendent Hillard’s decision not to promote her, while also concluding that Johnston’s actions had no effect on him. The City makes one final argument with respect to the jury’s verdicts: It claims that the jury was sympathetic to 14 Nos. 04-2657 & 04-2876 Ms. Deloughery but skeptical of her allegations and so decided to split the difference by finding for her on one claim and against her on another. Cf. United States ex rel. Chandler v. Cook County, 277 F.3d 969, 977 (7th Cir. 2002) (“There is always the danger that the ‘deep pocket’ of the municipality’s tax base will tempt a jury to succumb to an unprincipled determination.”). Courts cannot indulge in such speculation; they are “required to reconcile” inconsistent jury verdicts “if possible.” American Nat’l Bank, 125 F.3d at 431 (internal quotation omitted). As we already have explained, the district court recognized that the jury’s verdicts on Ms. Deloughery’s claims can be reconciled. Accordingly, we shall affirm the district court’s denial of the City’s motion for a new trial as an appropriate exercise of its discretion.