Opinion ID: 754226
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiffs' Establishment of the Village's Liability

Text: 4 The present action was brought by plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and the FHA against the Village and others, alleging principally that the Village had been incorporated for the purpose of excluding Orthodox Jews from Airmont, in violation of the FHA and the First Amendment. The complaint requested, inter alia, a declaratory judgment nullifying the incorporation of the Village; a permanent injunction restraining the Defendants ... from continuing their unlawful acts and conspiracy, including acts with respect to ... zoning (Second Amended Complaint at 32, p 1.b.); and compensatory damages from the Village in an amount to be determined at trial (id. p 1.c.). Thereafter, the United States brought a parallel action (the government action) against the Village and others, also alleging that the Village had been incorporated for the purpose of enacting zoning regulations that would have the effect of excluding Orthodox Jews. The government sought principally a declaratory judgment that the Village had violated the FHA and an injunction against future housing discrimination. The two actions were consolidated for trial, with the government's claims and plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief to be decided by the court, and plaintiffs' claims for damages to be decided by the jury. The evidence at the eight-week trial included the following. 5 Until 1991, Airmont was an unincorporated area within the Town of Ramapo, New York (Ramapo or the Town), and was thus subject to the Town's zoning code. During the 1980s, after substantial numbers of Orthodox and Hasidic Jews moved to Ramapo, the Town made several zoning decisions to accommodate them, including, within certain limitations, allowing rabbis to use their own homes as congregational places of worship (home synagogues) in order to permit these new residents to adhere to requirements of their religion. Some residents of Airmont objected and formed defendant Airmont Civic Association, Inc. (ACA), which pushed for Airmont's incorporation as a Village in order to exempt Airmont from the Town's zoning power and permit it to implement a local zoning code designed to exclude Orthodox and Hasidic Jews. See, e.g., LeBlanc-Sternberg I, 67 F.3d at 418 ( 'everybody knows ... why [ACA] was formed. What does [ACA] and the proposed village plan to do to keep these Hasid[i]m out?'  (quoting trial testimony describing a 1986 meeting of ACA)); see also id. at 418-19, 430-31. After Airmont residents had voted in 1989 to incorporate the Village, defendant Robert Fletcher stated at an ACA meeting that  'the only reason we formed this village is to keep those Jews ... out of here.'  LeBlanc-Sternberg I, 67 F.3d at 419. Thereafter, candidates backed by ACA were elected Airmont's mayor and trustees; Fletcher, who was then ACA's president, was one of those trustees. 6 The zoning code eventually enacted by the Village contained language designed to curb the establishment and operation of home synagogues. The Village created a planning board to interpret and apply that code. Among the persons appointed to that board was ACA member James Montone, an active opponent of home synagogues and other accommodations for the observance of Orthodox tenets. Montone had stated at an ACA meeting his view that 'most people were against houses of worship in residential areas,'  LeBlanc-Sternberg I, 67 F.3d at 421, and had sued to prevent a slight variance from the Town's 2-acre lot requirement that would have permitted construction of a synagogue on 1.926 acres, id. at 420. In addition, after an ACA board member, who was also a Village trustee, suggested that ACA not finance additional litigation against Orthodox and Hasidic Jews because  'there are other ways we can harass them,'  id., Montone had conducted surveillances of Orthodox Jewish homes at prayer times, id. at 421. 7 The jury, although finding that plaintiffs had not proven their claims against the individual defendants and had proven no damages, found that the Village had violated plaintiffs' rights under the FHA and had conspired to violate their rights under the First Amendment. In contrast, the district judge, in deciding the government action and the claims by plaintiffs for equitable relief, made findings in favor of the Village. The district judge found that although the Village's newly adopted zoning code could be interpreted to restrict home synagogues, the Village had not yet taken any action to apply it discriminatorily against Orthodox Jews; that there was insufficient evidence on which to conclude that the Village would discriminate against Orthodox Jews in the future; and that there was no basis or need for the equitable relief requested by the government and plaintiffs. See United States v. Village of Airmont, 839 F.Supp. 1054, 1064 (1993), rev'd, LeBlanc-Sternberg I, 67 F.3d at 435. In addition, on the basis of [t]he facts recited in [his] opinion [in the government action], LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 846 F.Supp. 294, 295 (1994), rev'd, LeBlanc-Sternberg I, 67 F.3d at 435, and on the basis of his view that the jury's verdict against the Village was inconsistent with its verdicts in favor of the individual defendants, the district judge concluded that there was no possible basis for the jury's verdict against the Village, id. at 296. The judge thus granted the Village judgment as a matter of law, dismissing the claims on which it had been found liable by the jury. 8 All of these rulings by the district judge were reversed on appeal. In LeBlanc-Sternberg I, we noted that the district judge had an obligation to attempt to harmonize the findings implicit in the jury's verdict, and we concluded that a reasonable and logically consistent interpretation of those findings was 9 that Airmont's zoning code would be interpreted to restrict the use of home synagogues, that the motivation behind the enactment was discriminatory animus toward Orthodox and Hasidic Jews, and that Airmont pursued this goal jointly with ACA. 10 67 F.3d at 431. We also reviewed the trial evidence and concluded that it amply supported the jury's verdict. That evidence included instances in which defendants took positions favoring other religions and nonreligious activities while opposing parallel activities by Orthodox and Hasidic Jews, see, e.g., id. at 430-31, as well as numerous explicit statements of anti-Orthodox-and-Hasidic animus, including those quoted above, see, e.g., id. at 418-19. 11 Further, given the Seventh Amendment provision for a jury trial, we noted that principles of collateral estoppel precluded the judge--both in the plaintiffs' action and in the government action--from making findings of fact that were contrary to the findings of the jury. See id. at 432 (When two claims asserted by the same plaintiff are tried together and one is to be decided by the jury and the other by the judge, principles of collateral estoppel prevent the judge from making findings of fact contrary to those of the jury.); id. at 434 (same principles of collateral estoppel precluded court from making contrary findings in government action because [t]he findings of the jury with respect to the private plaintiffs' FHA claims against the Village necessarily determined all of the liability issues in the government's FHA claim against the Village). Since the jury's findings that the Village violated plaintiffs' rights under the FHA and conspired to violate their First Amendment rights were binding on the court, it was impermissible for the district judge to impose his own views of the facts and find that the Village had not so acted. 12 Because the district judge failed to apply this principle both in ruling in favor of the Village in the government action and in denying plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief, and because he erred in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Village on plaintiffs' claims for damages, we set aside the judgments in both actions. In plaintiffs' action, we reversed so much of the judgment as dismissed the claims against the Village, and we remanded for entry of a judgment that, inter alia, awarded plaintiffs nominal damages, and for consideration of what equitable relief, if any, was appropriate in light of the findings of the jury. In the government action, we reversed the judgment entered in favor of the Village and remanded for entry of a judgment in favor of the government declaring that the Village had violated the FHA and awarding appropriate injunctive relief. 13