Opinion ID: 1982910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: exception for injuries intentionally inflicted by a third party

Text: While we find that appellant's cause of action against appellee for appellee's own intentional tort is barred, appellant argues that his allegations state a cause of action against appellee under the third party attack exception to the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Act specifically excepts from the definition of compensable injury an injury caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employee because of reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employee or because of his employment. Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 77, § 411(1) (Purdon Supp. 1986). In such a case, the employee is permitted to maintain a common-law action against his employer, typically on the theory that the employer was negligent in failing to take precautions necessary to prevent a foreseeable attack by the third party. McBride v. Hershey Choc. Corp., 200 Pa.Super. 347, 188 A.2d 775 (1963); Mike v. Borough of Aliquippa, 279 Pa.Super. 382, 421 A.2d 251 (1980). Appellant contends that his complaint sets forth allegations sufficient to establish a cause of action against appellee under this exception and that the lower court erred in dismissing his complaint. We agree. This exception to the coverage of the Act applies to situations in which the third party's acts were motivated by a feeling of animus against the particular person injured. If the third party would have attacked a different person in the same position as the injured employee, that attack falls outside the exception and is covered exclusively by the Act. See Injury Inflicted by Third Person for Personal Reasons, 99 C.J.S. § 159, p. 540; Mike v. Borough of Aliquippa, supra . In his complaint, appellant avers that: 5. On or about February 4, 1984, Terri L. Brooks, while at the Restaurant, was severely beaten and stabbed to death by an unknown person or persons following the conclusion of a robbery of the Restaurant. 6. The acts of the unknown person or persons who beat and stabbed Terri Brooks to death were intended to kill Terri L. Brooks because of reasons which were personal to such unknown person or persons, and were not directed against Terri L. Brooks as an employee of the Defendant or because of this employment. 7. The Defendant knew or should have known that the personal safety of persons occupying the Restaurant was at risk on or about February 4, 1984. 8. The Defendant knew or should have known that the Restaurant was located in an area which was subject to frequent violent crimes against similar restaurants. R.R. at 52a. (emphasis added) Viewing these allegations and all inferences fairly deducible therefrom as true, we conclude that appellant has sufficiently set forth a cause of action within the third party exception of Section 411(1). Appellant may find it difficult to prove at trial that Terri Brooks was killed after the accomplishment of the robbery, for reasons not connected with her status as an employee. Appellant would have to prove that the killer had personal animus against the victim and the personal animus was the motivation for the stabbing. However, his allegations are sufficient to withstand preliminary objections. In conclusion, the trial court properly sustained the preliminary objections as to appellant's allegation of an intentional tort inflicted by appellee, but erred in dismissing appellant's claim as it relates to the intentional tort of a third party. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.