Opinion ID: 2074839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Hearsay Testimony from the Victim's Wife

Text: Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion also by admitting into evidence the following hearsay statement from the victim's wife, Joyce Pellegrino: Jimmy had told me the last time I saw him that if he turns up dead, that I should go to the FBI a [ sic ] Agent Pecoraro and tell him Steve Manning killed him. Prior to trial, the court ruled that the State could elicit from Joyce Pellegrino only that the victim told her that he was going to meet defendant. However, the State could not elicit from her the victim's out-of-court statement that if he were killed she should tell the FBI that defendant killed him. At trial, Pellegrino testified on direct examination only that the victim told her that he was going to meet defendant. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked her what she told Agent Pecoraro about her conversation with the victim. Throughout her cross-examination, she did not mention the victim's out-of-court statement. At a sidebar prior to its redirect examination, the State argued that since defense counsel questioned her regarding what she told the FBI, then the State could ask her exactly what the victim said. The trial court ruled that since the defense brought up the FBI agent, then the State could elicit the testimony. On appeal, the State concedes that the victim's out-of-court statement was barred as prejudicial inadmissible hearsay. However, the State argues that defense counsel's cross-examination of the victim's wife opened the door to the previously barred evidence. The State invokes the doctrine of curative admissibility. If A opens up an issue and B will be prejudiced unless B can introduce contradictory or explanatory evidence, then B will be permitted to introduce such evidence, even though it might otherwise be improper. People v. Lewis, 52 Ill. App.3d 477, 485, 10 Ill.Dec. 257, 367 N.E.2d 710 (1977); People v. Wilbert, 15 Ill.App.3d 974, 984-87, 305 N.E.2d 173 (1973); accord 1 R. Steigmann, Illinois Evidence Manual § 4:04 (3d ed.1995). Specifically, in a criminal case, where the door to a particular subject is opened by defense counsel on cross-examination, the State may, on redirect, question the witness to clarify or explain the matters brought out during, or to remove or correct unfavorable inferences left by, the previous cross-examination. People v. Thompkins, 121 Ill.2d 401, 444, 117 Ill.Dec. 927, 521 N.E.2d 38 (1988); Lewis, 52 Ill. App.3d at 485-86, 10 Ill.Dec. 257, 367 N.E.2d 710. However, the doctrine of curative admissibility is not a panacea; it does not permit a party to introduce inadmissible evidence merely because the opponent brought out some evidence on the same subject. People v. Higgins, 71 Ill.App.3d 912, 931, 28 Ill.Dec. 173, 390 N.E.2d 340 (1979). The rule is merely protective and goes only as far as is necessary to shield a party from adverse inferences. Saputo v. Fatla, 25 Ill.App.3d 775, 783, 324 N.E.2d 34 (1975). Further: `[T]he doctrine of curative admissibility    is limited in scope and design to those situations where its invocation is deemed necessary to eradicate undue prejudicial inferences which might otherwise ensue from the introduction of the original evidence. The decision of whether to admit curative evidence lies within the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge.' (Emphasis in original.) People v. Chambers, 179 Ill.App.3d 565, 581, 128 Ill.Dec. 372, 534 N.E.2d 554 (1989), quoting Higgins, 71 Ill.App.3d at 931, 28 Ill.Dec. 173, 390 N.E.2d 340. The record shows that, at trial, neither the prosecution nor the trial court indicated how defense counsel's cross-examination of the victim's wife prejudiced the State. On appeal, the State now argues that defense counsel's cross-examination of the victim's wife left the jury with the misleading impression that she never told the FBI anything about defendant. Referring to defense counsel's opening statement, the State now argues that this cross-examination fits with the defense theory of the case: that defendant had nothing to do with the victim's murder; but rather it was committed by another; and, as proof, even the victim's wife does not implicate defendant. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the State was not unduly prejudiced by defense counsel's cross-examination of Joyce Pellegrino. Defense counsel's cross-examination of the victim's wife actually brought out much information about defendant and the victim-with the exception that the victim had named defendant as his murderer. Defense counsel's cross-examination did not mislead the jury any more than the trial judge's in limine order barring the hearsay statement. Thus, the State was not thereby unduly prejudiced. Therefore, defense counsel did not open the door to the victim's out-of-court statement and, accordingly, it remained inadmissible. See Chambers, 179 Ill.App.3d at 580-82, 128 Ill.Dec. 372, 534 N.E.2d 554. We note, sua sponte, that under the completeness doctrine, which provides that where a witness relates a conversation the opponent may bring out all of the conversation on cross-examination ( People v. Weaver, 92 Ill.2d 545, 556, 65 Ill.Dec. 944, 442 N.E.2d 255 (1982)), prejudice is nonetheless required. People v. Olinger, 112 Ill.2d 324, 337, 97 Ill.Dec. 772, 493 N.E.2d 579 (1986). We hold that the trial court erred in admitting this prejudicial evidence. Further, as with the evidence of other crimes, we cannot deem the erroneous admission of this evidence to have been harmless. Based on the erroneous admission of other-crimes evidence and the hearsay testimony of the victim's wife, defendant's conviction must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. We note our previous finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We adhere to that finding even with the above-mentioned evidence excluded. This finding removes the risk of subjecting defendant to double jeopardy. See People v. Taylor, 76 Ill.2d 289, 309-10, 29 Ill.Dec. 103, 391 N.E.2d 366 (1979). Due to our disposition of this cause, we need not address defendant's remaining contentions.