Opinion ID: 1245833
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Heading: Whether Chapter 403 constitutes special and local legislation.

Text: Appellant argues that Chapter 403 is special and local legislation violative of the Nevada Constitution. We disagree. State of Nevada ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111, 121 (1869), defined local legislation as operating over a particular locality instead of over the whole territory of the state and defined special legislation as pertaining to a part of a class as opposed to all of a class. It has long been the law of this state that all presumptions by the judiciary are in favor of legislative enactments. City of Las Vegas v. Ackerman, 85 Nev. 493, 457 P.2d 525 (1969); Ormsby County v. Kearney, 37 Nev. 314, 142 P. 803 (1914). Additionally, every act passed by the legislature is presumed to be constitutional. T. & G.R.R. Co. v. Nev. Cal. T. Co., 58 Nev. 234, 75 P.2d 727 (1938). Appellant, in order to successfully assail this legislation, must make a clear showing of its invalidity. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Turner v. Fogg, 39 Nev. 406, 159 P. 56 (1916). Our Constitution forbids the passage of a local or special law regulating county or township business. Nev.Const. Art. IV, Sec. 20. Such a law must be general and of uniform operation throughout the state. Nev.Const. Art. IV, Sec. 21. Further, county and township government shall be uniform throughout the State. Nev.Const. Art. IV, Sec. 25. Appellant interprets the foregoing constitutional provisions as requiring uniformity in bond issuance on behalf of county hospitals. Indeed, he argues, subsection 1 of NRS 450.290 is general and uniform legislation, as it requires approval of the bond issuance by electoral authorization pursuant to NRS 350.070. The only difference between subsections 1 and 2 of NRS 450.290, as amended, is that in subsection 2 any county with a population over 200,000 may issue without voter approval not only special obligation bonds but also general obligation bonds payable from taxes and secured by hospital operating and other revenues. Appellant contends that because only Clark County currently has the requisite population, this is patent local and special legislation. He argues that the population requirement is a mere subterfuge to avoid outright identification of Clark County as the sole beneficiary of the legislation. It is arguable that respondents have provided substance to appellant's argument by eliciting testimony below that, in Nevada, only in Clark County does the county hospital have to compete with private, profit-making facilities. Respondents claim that the benefit of the subject legislation is needed so that the county hospital can successfully compete for quality staff and service personnel and accommodate the large population with more facilities and sophisticated equipment. These facts are just as consistent with respondents' position. We have long upheld, as constitutional, statutes authorizing bond issues for specific counties for purposes particular and peculiar to those counties, reasoning that such statutes were not laws regulating county business and thus not violative of Article 4, Section 20. Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, 177 P.2d 677 (1947); Conservation District v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, 45 P.2d 779 (1935). That is precisely the case before us. In the Conservation District case, this Court held that: It is a general rule, under such provisions as those of sections 20 and 21 of article 4 of the State Constitution, that if a statute be either a special or local law, or both, and comes within any one or more of the cases enumerated in section 20, such statute is unconstitutional; if the statute be special or local, or both, but does not come within any of the cases enumerated in section 20, then its constitutionality depends upon whether a general law can be made applicable. (Court's emphasis.) Id. at 116, 45 P.2d at 782. Moreover, the use of population as a qualifying criterion is permissible. Fairbanks v. Pavlikowski, 83 Nev. 80, 423 P.2d 401 (1967); Viale v. Foley, 76 Nev. 149, 350 P.2d 721 (1960); compare State v. Donovan, 20 Nev. 75, 15 P. 783 (1887); cf. State v. Boyd, 19 Nev. 43, 5 P. 735 (1885). In the instant case, the classification scheme remains open and any other county reaching the minimum qualifying figure will be entitled to exercise the authority granted by the statute. Respondents state that the latest reliable population estimate for Washoe County is approximately 171,000. It appears possible, or even probable, that Washoe County may qualify under the new law's classification at the time of publication of the 1980 census. In Fairbanks, supra , this Court relied on the classification of townships according to U.S. Census figures rather than the more recent, actual statistics. We acknowledge that population classifications are more easily justified when, for example, the number of elected public officials, as opposed to the situation presently before us, is to be determined relative to population minimums and/or maximums ( see NRS 4.020 and NRS 244.010, et seq., concerning justices of the peace and county commissioners, respectively), nevertheless an act should not be declared void because there may be a difference of opinion as to its wisdom. These are questions for the legislature, not the courts. Turner v. Fogg, supra ; Fairbanks, supra. The fact the law might apply only to Clark County is of no consequence, for if there were others, the statute would then also apply. It therefore conforms to the constitutional mandates that there shall be no local or special laws, and that general laws shall have uniform operation. Nev. Const. Art. 4, Sec. 20 and 21; Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, 177 P.2d 677 (1947). Fairbanks, supra. 83 Nev. at 83, 423 P.2d at 403. Here, the basis for the legislation to permit populous counties more flexibility in acquiring bond approval is rational and will be upheld.