Opinion ID: 4528310
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Dismissal of Counts 27-29

Text: [¶38] Paquin finally contends that the court erred in allowing the State to dismiss Counts 27-29 during the trial rather than entering a judgment of acquittal on those counts. Those counts concerned the second alleged victim; the jury returned verdicts of not guilty on all counts concerning the second alleged victim that were submitted to it (Counts 14-26). [¶39] After the second alleged victim testified, the State advised the court in chambers that it would be dismissing Counts 27-29 “with regard to [the second alleged victim] based on his testimony of not recalling.” The court replied, “All right. Then Counts 27, 28 and 29 are dismissed.” When Paquin’s counsel raised the question of whether Paquin’s consent to the dismissal was required, the court advised: “[T]he State anticipated my thinking on this because I would be disposed, unless they present a witness . . . to fill in the blanks on Counts 27, 28 and 29, I would be dismissing those counts on a 21 judgment in response to [a motion for a judgment of acquittal] anyway, so it’s sort of moot.” The court deferred ruling pending Paquin’s response to the proposed dismissal, but said, “I’ve already indicated I’m likely to grant the motion for judgment of acquittal on those three counts anyway. Whether [Paquin] agrees or not, the evidence is not in the record at this point.” [¶40] After the State rested its case-in-chief on the third day of the trial, Paquin moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts. In ruling on the motion, the court again stated that “with respect to Counts 27, 28 and 29 . . . I would be inclined to grant the motion for acquittal.” This exchange followed: [STATE]: Judge, would have [sic] the Court consider it moot, then I think we were waiting in chambers to determine if there would be an objection to those dismissals, and I just want to make sure the record’s clear that’s mooted then. COURT: I haven’t heard an objection, so either way, 27 either— either dismissal without objection or on the basis of [M.R.U. Crim. P. 29]. Counts 27, 28 and 29 are dismissed. [STATE]: Judge, the State would move orally to dismiss those without objection. COURT: 27, 28 and 29 are dismissed without objection. The court later summarized its ruling, saying in part that the motion for judgment of acquittal “is moot with respect to [Counts] 27, 28 and 29 and those counts have been dismissed by agreement.” 22 [¶41] The State later filed a written dismissal for the stated reason: “Probable cause established but insufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on those Counts.” The written dismissal inaccurately stated that “[c]ounsel for the Defendant indicated on the record that the Defendant does not object to the dismissal of these Counts.” [¶42] Contrary to the written dismissal and the State’s expressed wish “to make sure the record’s clear,” neither of Paquin’s attorneys ever expressly said whether Paquin did or did not consent to the dismissals, although the State is correct in arguing that they had multiple opportunities to do either. Pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 48(a), “a dismissal may not be filed during the trial without the consent of the defendant.” The reason for the rule is that “dismissal of charges after jeopardy has attached without the consent of the defendant raises a serious double jeopardy problem.” 2 Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine Criminal Practice § 48.2 at IX-102 (Gardner ed. 1995). [¶43] Beyond the potential violation of Rule 48(a), we conclude that Paquin was in fact acquitted on Counts 27-29. “[A] defendant once acquitted may not be again subjected to trial without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.” United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96 (1978). The Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated “when it is plain that the [trial court] evaluated the 23 [prosecution’s] evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Id. at 97 (quotation marks omitted). [¶44] The Supreme Court said in Scott that “the trial judge’s characterization of his own action cannot control the classification of the action,” and explained that “a defendant is acquitted . . . when the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution in the defendant’s favor, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” Id. at 96-97 (alteration and quotation marks omitted). Applying Scott, the trial court’s characterization of its action on Counts 27-29 as a dismissal does not control our analysis, see id. at 96; rather, we consider that after the State proposed a dismissal due to insufficient evidence, the court repeatedly said that absent a dismissal it would grant Paquin’s motion for acquittal on those counts. The State then filed a written dismissal for the explicit reason that there was insufficient evidence to support them. [¶45] Because “the ruling of the judge . . . actually represent[ed] a resolution in the defendant’s favor . . . of some or all of the factual elements of the offense[s] charged” in Counts 27-29, the court’s action—although termed a dismissal—acquitted Paquin on those counts. Id. at 97 (alteration and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal of 24 Counts 27-29 and remand with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal on those counts.