Opinion ID: 3000714
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Harm

Text: This Court reviews the denial of the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. Erickson v. Wis. Dep’t of Corrs., 469 F.3d 600, 601 (7th Cir. 2006). We consider whether the evidence presented, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant, was sufficient to support the verdict. Davis v. Wis. Dep’t of Corrs., 445 F.3d 971, 975 (7th Cir. 2006). The Court will disregard any evidence that was favorable to the defendants that the jury was not required to believe, but it must give credence to evidence that was uncontradicted and comes from disinterested witnesses. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). The verdict should be overturned only if no reasonable jury could have found in Williams’ favor. Erickson, 469 F.3d at 601. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, as 6 No. 06-3493 imposing a duty on states to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). Prison officials violate the Constitution if they are deliberately indifferent to prisoners’ serious medical needs. Id. at 104. A claim based on deficient medical care must demonstrate two elements: 1) an objectively serious medical condition, and 2) an official’s deliberate indifference to that condition. See Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 584 (7th Cir. 2006). An objectively serious medical need includes both diagnosed conditions requiring treatment and conditions “so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” See Zentmyer v. Kendall County, Ill., 220 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation and citation omitted). In cases where prison officials delayed rather than denied medical assistance to an inmate, courts have required the plaintiff to offer “verifying medical evidence” that the delay (rather than the inmate’s underlying condition) caused some degree of harm. See, e.g., Petty v. County of Franklin, Ohio, 478 F.3d 341, 344 (6th Cir. 2007); Laughlin v. Schriro, 430 F.3d 927, 929 (8th Cir. 2005); Surber v. Dixie County Jail, 206 Fed. App’x 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006). That is, a plaintiff must offer medical evidence that tends to confirm or corroborate a claim that the delay was detrimental. This Court adopted the verifying medical evidence requirement in Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Beyerbach v. Sears, 49 F.3d 1324, 1326 (8th Cir. 1995). In Langston, the plaintiff claimed that a one-hour delay in medical treatment after he was raped by another inmate violated the Constitution. 100 F.3d at 1240. We affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants because the plaintiff did not produce any evidence that the one-hour delay had a detrimental No. 06-3493 7 effect; the rape had already occurred, and there was no evidence that it had caused any serious physical injury. Id. at 1241. We did not, however, articulate what qualified as verifying medical evidence. The parties dispute whether Williams offered sufficient verifying medical evidence in this case, and they disagree about what constitutes verifying medical evidence. While the defendants claim that expert testimony is the only acceptable form of verifying medical evidence, Williams claims that his testimony, his medical records, and his treatment are sufficient to show the delay’s detrimental effect. Clearly, expert testimony that the plaintiff suffered because of a delay in treatment would satisfy the requirement. See, e.g., Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 785 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding that expert testimony satisfied the verifying medical evidence requirement). On the other hand, evidence of a plaintiff ’s diagnosis and treatment, standing alone, is insufficient if it does not assist the jury in determining whether a delay exacerbated the plaintiff ’s condition or otherwise harmed him. See Laughlin, 430 F.3d at 929. The evidence in this case falls somewhere in between a bare recitation of treatment received and expert testimony about the delay’s effect. Williams’ medical records and Doughty’s testimony showed that when Williams arrived at the hospital, he had elevated blood pressure, had an abnormal EKG, was sweating, and complained of severe pain. The medical records also showed that with treatment, Williams’ symptoms, including his pain and high blood pressure, quickly subsided. The only testimony from a medical expert, Dr. Doughty, was that the delay did not appear to have adversely affected Williams’ condition.2 2 The defendants contend that this Court must credit Doughty’s testimony because it was uncontradicted testimony from a (continued...) 8 No. 06-3493 Although no jury could determine, based on this record, whether it was the delay in care or the underlying condition that necessitated Williams’ treatment or affected his ability to work, a reasonable jury could have concluded from the medical records that the delay unnecessarily prolonged and exacerbated Williams’ pain and unnecessarily prolonged his high blood pressure. See Gil v. Reed, 381 F.3d 649, 662 (7th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that “hours of needless suffering” can constitute harm). The medical records indicate that the nitroglycerin almost immediately relieved his pain and lowered his blood pressure, so a jury could find that the defendants’ delay caused Williams six extra hours of pain and dangerously elevated blood pressure for no good reason. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law.3 2 (...continued) disinterested witness. See Reeves, 520 U.S. at 150. They argue that although a prison employee generally is not a disinterested witness, see Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1999), Doughty was not a typical employee because 1) he was employed by an independent medical vendor contracting with the Department rather than the Department itself, 2) he no longer worked at the prison when he testified, and 3) the Department did not control his diagnoses and medical opinions. We need not decide whether Doughty was a disinterested witness, however, because the testimony he offered was not uncontradicted. Indeed, as discussed in the text of this opinion, Williams offered medical evidence suggesting, contrary to Doughty’s testimony, that the defendants’ delay caused harm. 3 Although our sister circuits have come to different conclusions about the need for verifying medical evidence in some contexts, compare Laughlin, 430 F.3d at 929 (requiring verifying medical evidence in all delayed treatment cases), with Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 898 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that verifying medical evidence is required only in cases (continued...) No. 06-3493 9