Opinion ID: 888888
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the District Court err in concluding a prescriptive easement existed to Lots 15 and 16 for year-round residential and recreational use?

Text: ¶ 17 The Schmids also argue the record does not support the District Court's conclusion that Lots 15 and 16 were historically used for residential purposes. Rather, they assert the record demonstrates that these lots were used only seasonally for recreational purposes, and then only as an extension of the use of Lot 14. The Schmids contend that seasonal recreational use alone cannot establish prescription because such occasional use is insufficient to notify the servient owner of an adverse claim and, thus, a prescriptive easement cannot be established for merely recreational purposes on Lots 15 and 16, let alone for residential purposes. The Schmids argue that, even if all three lots were viewed as a single unit, the historical use would be limited to one family for all three lots. In response, PTH argues that [t]he rationale relied on by the Schmids to limit the scope of the prescriptive easement for Lots 14, 15 and 16 to seasonal use for recreation purposes is precisely the argument rejected by the Court in Clark.  ¶ 18 In Clark, we affirmed the declaration of a prescriptive road easement for residential access to three subdivided tracts and a separate parcel, although only one of the properties previously contained a residence. Clark, ¶ 30. The dispute in Clark arose over Section 33 in Missoula County. In 1971, the Dwyers purchased land in the eastern part of Section 33. Three tracts of land to the north of Dwyers' property had been subdivided in the 1960's. Between 1979 and 1986, the Clarks purchased land adjacent to the Dwyers in Section 33, including all three of the subdivided tracts and a Parcel A, a parcel divided from a farm property located in Section 33. Clarks resided in the original farmhouse next to Parcel A and used the disputed road to access that residence from 1979 to 1986. The Clarks built a home on one of their three northern tracts and moved there in 1991, continuing to use the disputed road. In 1986, the Clarks sold Parcel A to the Shrivers, who subsequently sold Parcel A to the Byrums. The disputed roadway, Byrum Lane, ran through Section 33 across the Dwyers' property, along a border of the Clarks' property, and continued onto the Byrums' property. Historically, Byrum Lane was used by the Clarks and their predecessors to access Parcel A, the three northern tracts and other nearby properties for residential and farming purposes. There was also evidence that Byrum Lane was used by the public and occasionally maintained by local government. In 1998, the Dwyers executed a sixty foot road and utility easement on Byrum Lane for the benefit of the Byrums. Later, the Dwyers and Byrums sought to prevent use of Byrum Lane for access to the Clarks' northern tracts, leading to litigation. Clark, ¶¶ 6-13. ¶ 19 We observed that all owners had been put on notice that the road was intended to service residences, noting the many years of service provided by the road for residential purposes to multiple properties and multiple owners, as enhanced by the recording of the three tract subdivision. We noted the evidence that Clarks had no intention of further subdividing the properties. We therefore concluded that a prescriptive easement had been established for residential use and that such use did not expand the scope of the easement beyond what was contemplated at the time of its creation. Clark, ¶ 30. ¶ 20 Here, the evidence is significantly different than in Clark, and the intended use of the Road to serve residences on Lots 15 and 16 exceeds historical use. The subject parcels were originally subdivided into separate lots in 1938, although a road was not then constructed to access the lots. Streets owned all of the subject lots and built the Road in the 1940s to access their cabin on Lot 14 and to recreate on Lots 15 and 16. [1] The Road is a single lane which is very narrow in places and difficult to pass because of snow in winter, as compared to the road lying upon 30 and 60-foot recorded easements in Clark. There is no evidence here that the Road served public access purposes or that it was maintained by local government, as in Clark. The history of this Road does not include multiple owners and multiple residential uses, as in Clark. Brittles Point property owners could not have reasonably expected from the historical use that the Road would be used to access Lots 15 and 16 for more than recreational purposes. ¶ 21 By granting PTH a prescriptive easement over the Road for residential use of Lots 15 and 16, the District Court erred by exceeding the scope of the Road's use for those lots as established by the Streets during the prescriptive period. Leichtfuss, ¶ 30. Historical use of the Road does not support access to Lots 15 and 16 for residential purposes. However, we reject Schmids' argument that the recreational use here is insufficient to give notice to the servient owner of an adverse claim and cannot, as a matter of law, create a prescriptive easement of any kind. While that may be the result in a different case, here the recreational use of Lots 15 and 16 occurred in conjunction with the residential use of co-owned Lot 14, providing a heightened notice of the use of Lots 15 and 16. Yet, this recreational use occurred on separately divided parcels, creating a clearly discrete historical use of those particular lots apart from the use of Lot 14 and establishing a separate, and narrower, prescriptive easement. These uses will not increase the burden upon the servient tenement. Leichtfuss, ¶ 30. ¶ 22 We affirm the District Court's judgment regarding the scope of the prescriptive easement over the Road for Lot 14. We reverse the District Court's judgment granting prescriptive use of the Road to access Lots 15 and 16 for residential purposes. We remand for the entry of an amended judgment and for any additional proceedings consistent with this opinion which may be necessary. ¶ 23 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. We concur: MIKE McGRATH, C.J., JAMES C. NELSON, PATRICIA O. COTTER, BRIAN MORRIS, W. WILLIAM LEAPHART and JOHN WARNER, JJ.