Opinion ID: 74940
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Specialty Doctrine

Text: The specialty doctrine stands for the proposition that the requesting state, which secures the 13 Counsel cannot be adjudged incompetent for performing in a particular way in a case, as long as the approach taken might be considered sound trial strategy. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). 14 See Resolution Number 235. 15 United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567 (11th Cir.1995). 16 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946); see also Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 69 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949). surrender of a person, can prosecute that person only for the offense for which he or she was surrendered by the requested state or else must allow that person an opportunity to leave the prosecuting state to which he or she had been surrendered.17 As noted by various courts of appeals, specialty is a doctrine based on international comity. Because the surrender of the defendant requires the cooperation of the surrendering state, preservation of the institution of extradition requires that the petitioning state live up to whatever promises it made in order to obtain extradition.18 Gallo asserts that the Pinkerton instruction violated the doctrine of specialty because the Colombian government failed to authorize a Pinkerton charge in Resolution 235. Gallo also points to Diplomatic Note E-1518, expressly stating that Colombian courts do not recognize Pinkerton because it is vicarious in nature. Our ruling in Gallo's direct appeal is controlling herein. Gallo was prosecuted only for the crimes for which Colombia granted extradition; there was no specialty violation.19 Rather than mandating exact uniformity between the charges set forth in the extradition request and the actual indictment, [w]hat the doctrine of specialty requires is that the prosecution be 'based on the same facts as those set forth in the request for extradition.' 20 The district court tried Gallo on the facts included in the request for extradition,21 17 United States v. Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463, 1465 (11th Cir.1988) (quoting 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 359-60 (2d ed.1987)); see also United States v. Gallo-Chamorro, 48 F.3d 502, 504 (11th Cir.1995). 18 United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.1986); see also United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 7 S.Ct. 234, 30 L.Ed. 425 (1886) (recognizing specialty doctrine for the first time). 19 Gallo-Chamorro, 48 F.3d at 506-07. 20 United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 895-96 (D.C.Cir.1989) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 477, cmt. a (1987)). We are mindful that some courts and other authorities state the test as whether the requested state has objected or would object to prosecution. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 477 cmt. b (1987). See also United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir.1994) (stating that the test for this case is 'whether the extraditing country would consider the acts for which the defendant was prosecuted as independent from those for which he was extradited.' ) (citing United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 1428 (9th Cir.1988) (internal citations omitted)). While this language seems to lend importance to the view of the rendering country, the main focus remains on the prosecution and the conduct of the defendant. In this case Colombia authorized the prosecution, based on Gallo's conduct, with respect to the charges upon which the district court convicted Gallo. We find no case law reversing a conviction because a rendering country objected after trial to a jury instruction or evidentiary issue. As we stated on direct appeal, the specialty and dual criminality doctrines cannot be construed to permit foreign intrusion into the evidentiary or procedural rules of the requisitioning state. Gallo-Chamorro, 48 F.3d at 508 (citing United States v. Archbold- and gave jury instructions in accordance therewith. Gallo changes his position in this petition, now asserting that the instruction violated the specialty doctrine not because of its similarity to 18 U.S.C. § 2, but because Colombia specifically prohibited prosecution for conspiracy to import. This brings his contention squarely under the reasoning in United States v. Thirion,22 wherein our colleagues in the Eighth Circuit held that even though the asylum country had specifically denied extradition on a conspiracy charge, no specialty doctrine violation occurred when the district court instructed the jury on co-conspirator liability under Pinkerton. The court reasoned that a Pinkerton instruction merely permitted the government to establish the defendant's membership in a conspiracy as an evidentiary fact to prove guilt in the related substantive offenses.23 We view such reasoning as persuasive, as we did on direct appeal, and conclude that the Pinkerton instruction did not violate the specialty doctrine.