Opinion ID: 4229402
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Original Meaning of Due Process

Text: ¶ 66 Our commitment to stare decisis and resolving disputes according to the adversarial process thus counsels against discarding Labrum and reaching for the original meaning of the due process provision. And, ironically, the dissent’s own originalist analysis underscores the wisdom of our historiographical restraint. Without the benefit of adversarial briefing, the dissent makes two historical claims: (1) that, on its original understanding, the due process provision likely 26 Cite as: 2017 UT 89 Opinion of the Court wouldn’t have been understood to apply to sentencing or parole proceedings, infra ¶¶ 165–66; and (2) that, even if it did, Mr. Neese received all the process he was entitled to under the original understanding of the due process provision, infra ¶¶ 170–73. ¶ 67 We agree with the dissent that this court should look to the original meaning of the Utah Constitution when properly confronted with constitutional issues. But we don’t think we should revisit our precedent without prompting from the parties and based exclusively on our own review of ratification-era common law and other historical sources. “The lack of adversarial briefing on the issues explored . . . is troubling.” Meza v. State, 2015 UT 70, ¶ 40, 359 P.3d 592 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). To show the problem with exploring these issues without the benefit of adversarial briefing, we take this opportunity to illustrate how the dissent’s historiography may be incomplete. 7 1. The Original Scope of Due Process: Sentencing and Parole ¶ 68 The dissent begins by questioning whether, on the original understanding of the due process provision, due process protections would have been understood to apply to post-trial proceedings, such as sentencing proceedings and parole hearings. ¶ 69 The heart of the dissent’s historical case is the supposed absence of Reconstruction and Gilded Age case law applying due process protections to discretionary sentencing proceedings. The dissent sees in this absence “an important ‘dog that didn’t bark’”—“[i]f the generation of the framing of the Utah Constitution viewed the constitutional guarantee of due process of law to attach to sentencing proceedings, surely,” the dissent suggests, “someone would have raised the argument.” Infra ¶ 163. And the dissent thinks it knows why due process didn’t apply to these proceedings (or, later, to early parole proceedings). Any sentence less than the statutory maximum—and any decision by a parole board to release an inmate early—was “an act of 7 In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, the Chief