Opinion ID: 2796395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “transmit”

Text: The district court construed the term “transmit” to mean “initiate a contact with and send an electronic signal to another device.” Claim Construction Order at . It based the construction on its understanding that the patent exclusively disclosed the sending of control signals from the server to the remote playback devices, and that the remote playback devices were only configured to receive transmissions. Info-Hold argues that the district court erred by limiting the claims to features disclosed in the preferred embodiment. It notes that we have rejected the contention that it is proper to limit the claims to the single disclosed embodiment absent a clear expression of intent to limit the claims’ scope. E.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 3020 (2011). InfoHold also contends that it is improper to import limitations from the specification absent an express statement limiting the claims. Since there is no language in the claims limiting the term “transmit” to the initiation of communication to either device prior to transmission of data, initiation by either the server or the message playback device would be covered by the claims. AMTC contends that if the preferred embodiment is synonymous with the invention itself, our precedent INFO-HOLD, INC. v. APPLIED MEDIA TECH. CORP. 9 restricts the scope of the claims to the features disclosed in that embodiment. See Wang Labs. v. Am. Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (limiting claims to one of two alternatives because only one was described and enabled). According to AMTC, in the single embodiment disclosed in the ’374 patent, the message playback device only receives control signals after another device initiates contact. Further, the message playback device disclosed in the invention is incapable of initiating contact with another device, meaning that transmission can only be initiated by the server. We find that the claim term “transmit” and the specification support a construction that is neutral as to whether the message playback device or the server initiates the transmission. Nothing in the word “transmit” suggests a limitation on initiation: there is no linguistic ambiguity to resolve. And the specification confirms the term’s neutrality as to initiation. For instance, the patent discloses that the “message playback device is preferably operational in a receive-only manner . . . .” ’374 patent, col. 18 ll. 5-6. The mention of a preferred “receive-only” manner implies the invention’s ability to operate in a manner in which the message playback device may transmit. Operating in such a manner would allow for communications which are initiated by the message playback device. The claims themselves are indeterminate as to which communication endpoint initiates the transmission. Also, even if the embodiment in the specification only disclosed server-initiated communication, we have “expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations and quotations omitted). The ’374 patent’s written description does not invoke the exception to the rule that we will not read limitations 10 INFO-HOLD, INC. v. APPLIED MEDIA TECH. CORP. from the preferred embodiment into the claims. Under that exception, the scope of the invention is properly limited to the preferred embodiment if the patentee uses words that manifest a clear intention to restrict the scope of the claims to that embodiment. Id. We find nothing in the ’374 patent’s preferred embodiments or the remainder of the specification that evinces a clear intention to restrict the invention’s communications to those initiated by the server. Absent an intentional statement of restriction, we refuse to restrict the patent’s claims to cover only server-initiated transmissions. We also find a lack of a clear, intentional disavowal of claim scope that would require the incorporation of a step of initiating contact in the construction of “transmit.” We find no basis to depart from the ordinary and customary meaning of the term. See, e.g., Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining the presumption favoring ordinary meaning will be overcome by the inventor’s use of words that represent “a clear disavowal of claim scope”), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1058 (2003). Moreover, the patentee has not defined the term “transmit” by implication. We have found that a patentee defined a term “by implication” where the patentee used the term throughout the specification in a way that was consistent with only one meaning. Bell Atl. Network Servs. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). This principle does not apply in this case because the ’374 patent does not consistently use the term “transmit” in a way that necessarily restricts the term to server-initiated communications. As explained above, the patent’s “preferably operational in a receive-only manner” language illustrates that transmission can occur in either direction. Other statements in the specification also use the term “transmit” in a way that is consistent either with serverINFO-HOLD, INC. v. APPLIED MEDIA TECH. CORP. 11 initiated or message-playback-device-initiated communications. For instance, the specification discloses that “the invention relates to a system for generating and transmitting message playlists to remotely located optical disc players” that are part of MOH systems. Claim Construction Order, at  (citing ’374 patent, col. 1 ll. 9-11) (emphases omitted). While this statement illustrates the direction of transmission of the playlists, it says nothing about whether the remote playback device could first send a signal requesting that the server transmit the playlist. This shows that the term “transmit” does not require all communications to be server-initiated. Accordingly, the patentee has not implicitly defined the term “transmit” by its usage in the ’374 patent. Finally, we decline to accept AMTC’s invitation to analyze this case under Wang. This court explained in Liebel-Flarsheim that we have never read Wang to stand for the proposition that a patent’s claims are limited to the subject matter discussed in the sole embodiment of a patent. 358 F.3d at 907. In Wang, the disputed term could only be understood to have one possible meaning when read in the light of the specification. Wang, 197 F.3d at 1382. Furthermore, during prosecution, the inventors disclaimed a construction that would have encompassed the second possible meaning. Id. at 138384. As discussed above, the ’374 patent does not support a reading that restricts the term “transmit” to one meaning. Nor does AMTC point to any disclaimer in the intrinsic evidence that would restrict the term to serverinitiated communications. Therefore, Wang does not control this case. In sum, the ’374 patent’s discussion of preferred embodiments discloses the possibility of transmission that may be initiated by the message playback device, while there is no requirement in the remainder of the patent’s disclosure that the server initiate all communications. As such, the claims should not be limited to server-initiated 12 INFO-HOLD, INC. v. APPLIED MEDIA TECH. CORP. transmissions. For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s construction of the term “transmit.”