Opinion ID: 2517919
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Initial Jurisdiction over Public Employee Strikes

Text: (3) The City contends that because the right of public employees to strike is founded in the common law, the statute vesting initial jurisdiction in PERB for claims of unfair practices arising under the MMBA (Gov. Code, § 3509, subd. (b)) is inapplicable to public employee strikes. We disagree. As we will explain, to accept the City's argument would be at odds with the body of public employment labor law as it has developed in California. The language in Government Code section 3509, subdivision (b), which is part of the MMBA, is virtually identical to the language in Government Code section 3541.5, which is part of the EERA. [3] Both statutory provisions expressly vest in the administrative board exclusive initial jurisdiction over unfair labor practice charges. And with respect to the MMBA, in section 3541.5, this court in San Diego Teachers, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pages 12-14, held this provision vests in PERB exclusive initial jurisdiction to decide whether a strike is an unfair practice and, if so, to determine the appropriate remedy. (4) Because of the similar language in these two jurisdictional statutes, and because of the legal presumption that the Legislature is deemed to be aware of existing judicial decisions that have a direct bearing on the particular legislation enacted ( Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1155-1156 [278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873]; People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 897 [231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288]; Estate of McDill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 831, 837 [122 Cal.Rptr. 754, 537 P.2d 874]), we conclude that when in 2000 the Legislature transferred jurisdiction over the MMBA from the courts to PERB it did so in light of this court's existing case law. Those court decisions established: Public employees have a right to strike unless it is clearly shown that there is a substantial and imminent threat to public health and safety ( County Sanitation, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 586); PERB has exclusive initial jurisdiction over activities arguably protected or prohibited by public employment labor law ( El Rancho, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 953; see San Diego Teachers, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 12); and PERB's exclusive initial jurisdiction extends to remedies for strikes considered to be unfair labor practices ( San Diego Teachers, supra, at pp. 12, 14). The City insists, however, that this body of decisional law is inapplicable in this case, which arises under the MMBA, because no provision of the MMBA either arguably protect[s] or prohibit[s] ( El Rancho, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 953) threatened strikes by employees whose services are essential to public health and safety. The City's argument runs counter to this court's decisions in San Diego Teachers, supra, 24 Cal.3d 1, and in El Rancho, supra, 33 Cal.3d 946. Both were decided before the right of public employees to strike was established in this court's decision in County Sanitation, supra, 38 Cal.3d 564, and both involved the EERA, a statutory scheme that like the MMBA generally prohibits unfair labor practices but does not expressly either protect or prohibit public employee strikes. In San Diego Teachers, this court invalidated contempt orders arising out of an injunction against a strike by a teachers' association; we did so on the ground that PERB had exclusive initial jurisdiction over the matter. (24 Cal.3d at p. 14.) And in El Rancho, this court held that a complaint for damages arising out of a strike by a teachers' union was within PERB's exclusive initial jurisdiction over unfair labor practice charges. (33 Cal.3d at p. 960.) The holdings in those two cases would have been precluded if, as the City here contends, express statutory protection or prohibition of public employee strikes is a requirement of PERB's jurisdiction over those strikes. The City notes that under the arguably protected or prohibited principle ( El Rancho, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 953), all claims in which a strike is involved may hypothetically implicate some provision of the MMBA . . . enough to invoke PERB's jurisdiction. As the Court of Appeal observed, however, PERB's jurisdiction extends only to complaints about practices governed by the Government Code's MMBA. (Gov. Code, § 3509, subd. (b).) The City contends that regardless of whether a public employee strike falls within the arguably protected or prohibited principle ( El Rancho, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 953), an action that, as in this case, seeks injunctive relief against a public employee strike as to those public employees providing services essential to the public welfare is outside PERB's purview under the local concern doctrine. That doctrine was developed by the United States Supreme Court. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters (1978) 436 U.S. 180 [56 L.Ed.2d 209, 98 S.Ct. 1745], for example, the high court held that the National Labor Relations Board's authority did not preempt state court jurisdiction over an action by an employer for an injunction against a union picketing on the employer's property even though the picketing was arguably protected conduct under the federal labor law. This was so, said the court, because the conduct touched interests `deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility' ( id. at p. 195), and because the assertion of state jurisdiction did not create a significant risk of prohibiting protected conduct ( id. at p. 207). The doctrine has been applied in California in cases determining PERB's jurisdiction under the EERA. ( Pittsburg Unified School Dist. v. California School Employees Assn. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 875, 884-886 [213 Cal.Rptr. 34].) The City argues that because the subject of public health and safety has historically been a matter of local responsibility ( People v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1247 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 92]; see Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1149 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 136 P.3d 821]), the local concern doctrine should be applied in cases that, as here, involve strikes by public employees whose services are essential to public welfare, vesting in the courts exclusive jurisdiction over such cases. (5) The City's argument overstates the reach of the local concern doctrine. The doctrine applies primarily when the subject of the action is peripheral to the labor dispute ( Service by Medallion, Inc. v. Clorox Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1807, 1815 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 650]), or when a judicial decision does not present a substantial danger of interfering with labor decisions of an administrative agency ( Kaplan's Fruit & Produce Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 26 Cal.3d 60, 74-75 [160 Cal.Rptr. 745, 603 P.2d 1341]). The local concern doctrine has generally been applied in cases where it was necessary to maintain[] civil order by deterring and punishing violence and other intentional torts, including defamation, trespass, and infliction of emotional distress. (2 Higgins, The Developing Labor Law (5th ed. 2006) pp. 2334-2335.) Here, there was no evidence that a strike by the City's public employees posed an immediate threat to civil order. At issue here is the legality of a public employee strikean issue that goes to the essence of labor law. ( Fresno Unified School Dist. v. National Education Assn. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 259, 268 [177 Cal.Rptr. 888]; see County Sanitation, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 588.) Therefore, we reject the City's contention that the local concern doctrine should be applied to defeat PERB's jurisdiction in all public employee strike cases arising under the MMBA. (6) To summarize, a claim by a public entity that a proposed strike by public employees includes employees who perform services essential to the public welfare is generally subject to PERB's initial jurisdiction. We next discuss whether a public entity may nevertheless bypass that administrative forum by applying to a court for relief if it can establish a recognized exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.