Opinion ID: 2974385
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Slap

Text: Chaudoin argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity in light of this Court’s decision in Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2005). In Lyons, an opinion reconsidered after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brosseau, this Court granted qualified immunity to a police officer for allegedly tackling a suspect who was engaged in a verbal argument with another officer. According to Chaudoin, “[i]f it was unclear whether a police officer violated an established constitutional right by tackling a person simply arguing with another police officer, there was no violation of a clearly established constitutional right if an officer simply slaps an angry, cursing, disorderly suspect who is apparently resisting arrest and trying to escape.” -5- Chaudoin’s argument fails for two reasons. First, it misconstrues the facts, at least as viewed in light most favorable to Pigram. Pigram admitted that prior to being put into the squad car, he was “angry” and “cursing.” However, he specifically refuted the contention that he was “resisting arrest” or “trying to escape.” Moreover, any violent behavior in which Pigram engaged inside the squad car, i.e., banging his head against the glass and attempting to kick out the rear windows, should not be imputed to his prior behavior outside the car, when the alleged slap occurred. Second, even though a “slap” would appear to involve less physical force than a “tackle,” under specific circumstances, a slap may constitute a sufficiently obvious constitutional violation under Brosseau and Lyons. See Lyons, 417 F.3d at 579. For example, a tackle might legitimately be used to subdue an unruly suspect, especially if that suspect had not yet been secured in handcuffs, as was the case in Lyons. Id. at 570. In contrast, a slap to the face of a handcuffed suspect – even a verbally unruly suspect – is not a reasonable means of achieving anything more than perhaps further antagonizing or humiliating the suspect. See also Carico v. Benton, Ireland & Stovall, 68 Fed. Appx. 632, 637 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that the plaintiff “can clearly claim excessive force against [the officer] for the slap to the face”). Under Graham, this Court is required to evaluate the reasonableness of Chaudoin’s use of force by performing a “careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the “right to make an arrest . . . necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it,” the officers’ interest justifies only the amount of force that a reasonable officer in the heat of the moment could have believed was needed to effectuate the arrest. -6- In the present case, the slap cannot reasonably be construed as a means of subduing Pigram, especially given that Chaudoin’s justification for the slap was not to protect himself, other officers, or the public, but rather was because Pigram had a “smart-ass mouth.” Moreover, when Pigram’s mother asked Chaudoin why he had slapped her son, Chaudoin allegedly replied that she was “lucky he didn’t do more than that,” which provides further evidence that the officer’s action served no reasonable law enforcement purpose. On the facts as we must take them, there was simply no governmental interest in slapping Pigram after he had been handcuffed, nor could a reasonable officer have thought there was. This Court’s case law supports Pigram’s right not to be slapped gratuitously. Specifically, cases in this circuit clearly establish the right of people who pose no safety risk to the police to be free from gratuitous violence during arrest. See Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 302 (6th Cir. 2002); Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 386 (6th Cir. 1994) (use of force after suspect incapacitated by mace would be excessive as a matter of law); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1307 (6th Cir. 1988) (blow with nightstick to handcuffed, unresisting suspect would be gratuitous and therefore unreasonable). Therefore, qualified immunity is not available for lack of a “clearly established” right. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200. In summary, genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether Chaudoin used excessive force in arresting Pigram, and whether that force was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. We simply cannot find that the facts are so one sided in favor of Chaudoin that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the issue of whether a constitutional violation occurred as a result of the alleged slap. Accordingly, the district court correctly rejected Chaudoin’s claim of qualified immunity.