Opinion ID: 1303713
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Severance or Exclusion of Evidence Regarding Preskitt Offense

Text: (11) Prior to trial, defendant moved to sever the Preskitt assault count from the Bert murder and attempted rape counts. The trial court denied the motion, and defendant sought pretrial writ review. The Court of Appeal, in Ghent v. Superior Court (1979) 90 Cal. App.3d 944, 958 [153 Cal. Rptr. 720] ( Ghent I ), concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance, and we denied a petition for hearing. Defendant purports to renew his contention here. The Court of Appeal in Ghent I observed that the Preskitt and Bert offenses were connected together in their commission (§ 954), sharing common elements of substantial importance (see People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 39 [117 Cal. Rptr. 664, 528 P.2d 752]), namely, sexual motivation and contemporaneous commission. As the Court of Appeal noted, The time element is important because the frustration of the sexual attack at 5 a.m. inferably provided a motive for the rape committed shortly thereafter. [¶] These factors ... override the prospect of prejudice, which respondent court can effectively control at the single trial. No abuse of discretion appears.... (90 Cal. App.3d at p. 958.) The People urge us to hold that Ghent I has become law of the case and cannot be attacked on appeal. The People's contention would be valid if no contrary controlling decisions have intervened, and if application of the law of the case doctrine would not lead to an unjust decision. (See People v. Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835, 845-846 [120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 533 P.2d 211].) As we made clear in Shuey, the unjust decision exception applies only where a manifest misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial injustice has occurred. (P. 846.) Although several severance decisions have intervened since Ghent I was decided (see People v. Smallwood (1986) 42 Cal.3d 415, 422-434 [228 Cal. Rptr. 913, 722 P.2d 197]; People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 170-177 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480]; Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 447-454 [204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699]), the principles announced in those cases were neither contrary to, nor manifestly misapplied in, Ghent I. Accordingly, no reason appears for permitting defendant to attack Ghent I 's holding. Without unnecessarily prolonging this opinion, all three cases stress the importance of cross-admissibility. As stated in Smallwood, If the two offenses are cross-admissible, there will probably be little or no prejudice from joinder. (42 Cal.3d at p. 425.) As noted above, Ghent I concluded that the common elements of sexual motivation and contemporaneous commission overrode any possible prejudice to defendant; indeed, evidence of the Preskitt sexual assault was cross-admissible to show defendant's motive for attacking Mrs. Bert. No manifest misapplication of correct legal principles occurred here; accordingly, the law of the case doctrine applies to bar defendant from renewing his challenge to the severance ruling. Defendant disputes Ghent I 's premise that the Preskitt incident was admissible to show defendant's motive regarding Mrs. Bert. He argues that evidence that appellant committed an act of sexual assault upon Ms. Preskitt would have no tendency to show a motive for the murder or rape of Ms. Bert. The argument is frivolous, given the contemporaneity of the two events and the evidence indicating that defendant's sexual advances were frustrated during his earlier encounter. (12) We must likewise reject defendant's argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion, prior to the second special circumstances trial, to exclude the Preskitt evidence as unduly prejudicial when compared with its probative value. (Evid. Code, § 352.) The special circumstance charge rested on allegations of a murder committed during the course of a rape or attempted rape. The Preskitt evidence obviously was highly probative of defendant's motive or intent to commit the underlying felony. We observe that the trial court properly gave a cautionary instruction which explained that the Preskitt evidence was admitted for the limited purpose of proving motive or intent, and not to prove that defendant was a person of bad character with a disposition to commit such crimes.