Opinion ID: 1184396
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the search question

Text: Our holding that AS 47.37 impliedly repealed 13 AAC 02.175(c) eliminates the argument that the items taken from Peter were the result of a search incident to a valid arrest. [29] But we still are confronted with the question of whether officer Sage improperly obtained knowledge that Peter was in possession of goods stolen from the Kaleaks. The limited record before us does not disclose a list of the items reported to Sage as being stolen. It does indicate that Nimrod Bodfish turned over to the officer a camera case and some .22 caliber ammunition he had seen Peter drop. Also, when Sage confronted Peter, he dropped a box of.22 caliber shells. Thus the shells and camera case did not come to his attention as the result of a search. Sage also discovered camera film and some bottles of shaving lotion while making a routine search before placing Peter in the vehicle. Although under our holding, Sage had no right to arrest Peter for being drunk on the highway, he may have had a duty to take him into protective custody and to bring him to an approved public treatment facility in the event that Peter was incapacitated. [30] We take judicial notice that Barrow had no such approved facility at the time of Peter's arrest. In that event, the statute provides that the incapacitated person be taken to an emergency medical service customarily used for incapacitated persons. We also take judicial notice that Barrow has a hospital to which incapacitated persons are customarily taken. [31] Under AS 47.37.170, a peace officer in detaining the person and in taking him to an approved public treatment facility, is taking him into custody and may take reasonable steps to protect himself. While a statute countenancing an unreasonable search would be in violation of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and the similar article I, section 14 of the Alaska Constitution, [32] the provisions of AS 47.37.170 constitute no such violation. An officer transporting a person incapacitated by drink has a valid reason to make a limited search for possible weapons which might be used to injure him. Accordingly, any items discovered by Sage as a result of such a search made prior to transporting Peter to jail were not the product of an illegal search. [33] There is difficulty, however, with any additional items obtained at the time of the more detailed search performed when Peter was placed in jail. Under the Uniform Act, he should have been taken to a treatment facility or an emergency medical service. At that point the police would normally release him from custody, and thus would have direct access to items in the possession of the intoxicated person. Accordingly, any items that were revealed or came into the possession of officer Sage solely as a result of this latter search were the subject of an illegal search and seizure and should be suppressed. We are left with a number of unresolved factual questions. 1. Did officer Sage have probable cause to believe that Peter was incapacitated by alcohol? Only if this were the case was Sage authorized to take Peter into protective custody. 2. What were the items reported to Sage as being stolen from the Kaleaks? 3. Assuming that there was probable cause to believe that Peter was incapacitated, would the officer have questioned Peter about the burglary based solely on the items which Sage had properly discovered on taking Peter into protective custody and prior thereto, without in any manner considering any additional items discovered as a result of the illegal search at the jail? 4. Assuming that there was not probable cause to believe that Peter was incapacitated, would the officer have questioned Peter about the burglary based solely on the items revealed to Sage from sources other than the searches? In Wong Sun v. United States, [34] it was held that evidence obtained as the fruit of an officer's unlawful action was inadmissible in evidence. Thus, if Peter's confession was the fruit of an illegal search or searches, it is inadmissible in evidence. But if it was obtained as a result of lawfully acquired information, and not in any manner in reliance on illegally acquired information, it is admissible. Prior to Wong Sun, Justice Holmes succinctly stated the underlying principle in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States [35] as follows: The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed. We therefore remand the case for resolution of the factual issues discussed in this opinion and such further proceedings as may be necessary. Remanded.