Opinion ID: 357115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicable legal precedents law of freedom of association.

Text: 18 If the court does find that Mr. Payne did not renew Mrs. Hazlett's contract solely, or even partially, because she brought two unannounced representatives to his office and requested their presence at the meeting, the decisional law compels a conclusion that Mrs. Hazlett has been denied her First Amendment liberty to associate. 19 It is now well established that even if a teacher or other public employee does not have a contractual right to continued employment, he may not be dismissed nor denied renewal of his contract 20    on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests   . For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.    21 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) (emphasis added), and cases cited therein. Moreover in this circuit the rule is clear that even if Mr. Payne's reassessment of Mrs. Hazlett's employment status and his decision not to renew her contract was only partially in retaliation for her exercise of her freedom of association, he has violated her constitutional rights. Fluker v. Alabama State Board of Education, 441 F.2d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 1971). Another circuit has stated this rule succinctly: 22    a discharge motivated only in part by demonstrable retaliation for exercise of speech and associational rights is equally offensive to the Constitution.    23 Simard v. Board of Education, 473 F.2d 988, 995 (2d Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court has approved this standard by restating a lower court's ruling that a school board may not refuse to renew a teacher's contract when his constitutionally protected First Amendment conduct is a 'substantial factor' or, to put it in other words,    a 'motivating factor' in the Board's decision not to rehire him. Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). 2 24 With respect to the rather narrow question whether a superintendent's refusal to renew a contract because a teacher brings unannounced representatives to a meeting and requests their presence at that meeting constitutes a violation of the teacher's First Amendment freedom of association, we have found no case directly in point. The Supreme Court has held, however, in other disputes involving freedom of association that: 25 Among the rights protected by the First Amendment is the right of individuals to associate to further their personal beliefs. While the freedom of association is not explicitly set out in the Amendment, it has long been held to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition.    26 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181, 92 S.Ct. 2338, 2346, 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972). 27 In Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399, 405, 78 S.Ct. 1317, 1321, 2 L.Ed.2d 1414 (1958), the Supreme Court held: 28 By engaging in teaching in the public schools, petitioner did not give up his right to freedom of    association.    29 The right of free association may not be abridged merely because its exercise may be annoying to some people, Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971). 30 The above cited decisions of the Supreme Court seem to define freedom of association broadly enough that a superintendent's refusal to renew a contract for the reasons alleged by appellant Hazlett is precluded on constitutional grounds. 3 31 The one case cited by the district court to support its legal conclusion that there was no actionable impropriety in her (Mrs. Hazlett's) termination for insubordination is Whitsel v. Southeast Local School District, 484 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir. 1972). In Whitsel, the court held that a teacher who alleged he was fired for exercising his freedom of speech was in fact fired, because he was insubordinate in making remarks that encouraged a group of 400 demonstrating students to continue their unauthorized assembly in the school gymnasium. He spoke to the students after the superintendent had ordered them to return to their classes. He did not advise them to obey the superintendent's instructions; instead he said there might be political overtones in the dismissal of a student-teacher. Whitsel will not support a conclusion that there was no actionable impropriety in this case unless the district court on remand finds as a fact that Mr. Payne did not renew Mrs. Hazlett's contract, because she was insubordinate in refusing to obey his order to meet with him outside the presence of her companions. We cannot discover such an explicit finding in the district court's memorandum opinion. 32