Opinion ID: 202709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sentencing Error Claims

Text: 48 Pierre raises four claims of sentencing error. He argues that the district court improperly calculated his base offense level with respect to drug quantity and improperly applied a four-level enhancement for leadership of extensive criminal activity. He also argues that his sentence on the conspiracy count is unreasonable as a matter of law because of disparities with sentences imposed on other participants in the conspiracy. Finally, he argues that his sentence on the possession count is unreasonable because it exceeds the Guidelines range (although not the statutory maximum) for that count. 49 We review de novo sentencing issues involving questions of law. United States v. McCarthy, 77 F.3d 522, 535 (1st Cir.1996). We review the district court's determination of the reliability of sentencing information for abuse of discretion. United States v. Luciano, 414 F.3d 174, 180 (1st Cir.2005). Factual determinations are reviewed for clear error. Id.
50 At sentencing, the district court found that Pierre was responsible for 1.5 kilograms or more of cocaine base, and that the appropriate base offense level therefore was 38. Pierre argues that this finding was unsupported by either of the jury verdicts (one of which found that he did not, on a particular occasion, possess 500 or more grams of cocaine but rather possessed a lesser amount, and one of which found that he was responsible over the course of the conspiracy for 50 grams or more of crack and 500 grams or more of powder cocaine), and that it therefore infringed on his Fifth Amendment due process and Sixth Amendment jury trial rights. 51 Our prior caselaw forecloses any such argument. See United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1, 17-18 (1st Cir.2005) (Since Booker we have made it clear that the district courts may make drug quantity determinations for sentencing purposes . . . .); United States v. Pérez-Ruiz, 421 F.3d 11, 14-15 (1st Cir.2005) (rejecting the claim that the district judge violated the Sixth Amendment by himself making the determinations as to drug quantity and other enhancements). 52 To the extent Pierre argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's drug quantity finding, 5 the argument fails. At Pierre's first trial, in 2003, Fernandes testified that Pierre supplied the 504 Boyz with half a kilogram of crack every month for two years. At the sentencing hearing, the district court specifically commented on Fernandes's credibility and concluded that he was credible in [his] testimony about the drug quantity. This credibility determination was not an abuse of discretion, see Luciano, 414 F.3d at 180, and Fernandes's testimony amply supports the court's drug quantity finding. There was thus no clear error in the district court's drug quantity determination. See id.
53 Pierre makes similar objections to the district court's imposition of a four-level enhancement for leadership of extensive criminal activity. He argues first that no jury verdict established that he was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), and that imposition of the enhancement therefore was improper. He next argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was a leader of extensive criminal activity, even by a preponderance of the evidence. 54 There is no requirement that the jury find that the leadership enhancement applies. Under the advisory guidelines regime, the district court can use the preponderance of the evidence standard to determine whether an enhancement applies. United States v. Holliday, 457 F.3d 121, 130 (1st Cir.2006). 55 We review the district court's fact-bound determination that Pierre was a leader for clear error. United States v. Ventura, 353 F.3d 84, 89 (1st Cir.2003). The district court stated that it based its determination that Pierre was a leader of extensive criminal activity on the number of people involved, the number of places in which drugs were sold, . . . the fact that drugs were sold both at the wholesale level and at the retail level, . . . and at the center of all this is Mr. Pierre. The district court also mentioned the quantity of drugs involved and the period of time over which the drug business extended as factors contributing to its conclusion. The record bears out the district court's conclusion. There was testimony that a number of different people assisted Pierre with his drug operations; that Pierre made wholesale drug sales to groups like the 504 Boyz, as well as retail sales at bars in and around Fall River; that Pierre's business involved significant quantities of drugs; and that it extended over a period of at least three years. 56 The district court's application of the leadership enhancement thus was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Colón-Muñoz, 318 F.3d 348, 364 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that the extent of criminal activity within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 is assessed based on the totality of the circumstances, including not only the number of participants but also the width, breadth, scope, complexity, and duration of the scheme (quoting United States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
57 Pierre argues that his 432-month sentence on the conspiracy count is unreasonable as a matter of law. 6 See United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519 (1st Cir.2006) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 928, 166 L.Ed.2d 715 (2007); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He bases this argument on the fact that his sentence is over three times as long as that imposed on any other member of the conspiracy. He makes a related argument that the district court failed to explain adequately the reasons why his sentence is so much longer than his co-conspirators' sentences. 58 Pierre fails to present us with any evidence that he is similarly situated to other members of the conspiracy and so therefore arguably should have received a comparable sentence. Our review of the evidence indicates quite the contrary—that Pierre was not similarly situated to other members of the conspiracy. For example, Pierre is not similarly situated to Mickens, who reported to and took orders from Pierre. Mickens testified that Pierre beat her on a number of occasions, that he threatened to kill her, and that he forced her to have sex with other men while he watched. Likewise, Pierre's criminal history included incidents that distinguished him from his co-conspirators. Pierre's pre-sentence report, which included information from the grand jury investigation that had been excluded at trial, stated that Pierre previously had been convicted of threatening to kill a former girlfriend and cut up her face and dump her body. Moreover, both Mickens and Fernandes pled guilty and provided substantial assistance to the government. A defendant's sentence is not unreasonable simply because his co-defendants agreed to help the government in exchange for reduced sentences. United States v. Vázquez-Rivera, 470 F.3d 443, 449 (1st Cir.2006); see also United States v. Saez, 444 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 224, 166 L.Ed.2d 178 (2006). Finally, all of the participants in the conspiracy except for Mickens were sentenced by a different judge from the one who sentenced Pierre. 7 See Saez, 444 F.3d at 19. 59 The district court explained its reasons for imposing the sentence that it did. The court repeatedly expressed disappointment that Pierre, in his statement to the court, refused to take any responsibility for the situation in which he found himself and failed to express any remorse for his actions. In its Statement of Reasons, the court wrote that it viewed Pierre as an unrepentant and dangerous dealer in illicit drugs and firearms. It explained that it found a sentence of 432 months sufficient to punish [Pierre] and to deter him and others from similar conduct, while still preserving the possibility that Pierre would have some period of freedom in the sunset of his life. 60 Although the district court did not explicitly state why it imposed on Pierre a sentence much more substantial than those received by other members of the conspiracy, we can infer its reasoning by comparing what was argued by the parties . . . with what the [court] did. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 519. Pierre argued in his sentencing memorandum and at his sentencing hearing that he should receive a sentence no greater than that imposed on his co-conspirators. The district court rejected this argument and, having found that Pierre was a dangerous and unrepentant criminal, sentenced Pierre within the Guidelines range. 61 Pierre's sentence on the conspiracy count is reasonable and is adequately explained. See Saez, 444 F.3d at 17.
62 Because Pierre was sentenced to serve concurrent sentences, 8 he was not prejudiced by any error he alleges with respect to the possession count. See United States v. Ziskind, 471 F.3d 266, 271 (1st Cir.2006); see also United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81-82, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) ([R]elief for error is tied in some way to prejudicial effect . . . [and requires a] showing of `a reasonable probability that, but for [the error claimed], the result of the proceeding would have been different.' (third alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.))). His 240-month sentence on the possession count runs concurrently with his 432-month sentence on the conspiracy count. 63 Pierre's convictions, his combined sentence, and the forfeiture order entered against him are affirmed.