Opinion ID: 2369367
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lack of jury instruction on lesser included offense of manslaughter

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred by refusing his request to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter with respect to the deaths of Powalka and Amanda. [21] Defendant told the police that he accidentally nicked Corina, and Powalka responded by retrieving her handgun and threatening to shoot him. Defendant then claimed he struck Powalka and took the gun from her. Amanda, defendant told police, charged him, and during the ensuing melee he stabbed both victims and eventually shot Amanda. (18) As noted, a trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on all general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. (E.g., Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 953.) It is error for a trial court not to instruct on a lesser included offense when the evidence raises a question whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present, and the question is substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury. (E.g., Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 623-625.) When there is no evidence the offense committed was less than that charged, the trial court is not required to instruct on the lesser included offense. (E.g., People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 548 [98 Cal.Rptr.3d 113, 213 P.3d 652] ( Moye) . ) Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder. (E.g., id. at p. 549.) On appeal, we review independently whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct on a lesser included offense. (E.g., People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 705 [94 Cal.Rptr.3d 699, 208 P.3d 634].) (19) Defendant, relying on People v. Vasquez (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1176 [39 Cal.Rptr.3d 433], contends there was sufficient evidence that he committed voluntary manslaughter under a theory of imperfect self-defense, and thus the trial court should have instructed the jury on this lesser included offense. Imperfect self-defense is the killing of another human being under the actual but unreasonable belief that the killer was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury. (E.g., People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 664 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 126, 187 P.3d 970].) Such a killing is deemed to be without malice and thus cannot be murder. (E.g., ibid. ) The doctrine of imperfect self-defense cannot be invoked, however, by a defendant whose own wrongful conduct (for example, a physical assault or commission of a felony) created the circumstances in which the adversary's attack is legally justified. [22] (E.g., People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 288 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 605, 180 P.3d 351]; cf. People v. Randle (2005) 35 Cal.4th 987, 1001-1003 [28 Cal.Rptr.3d 725, 111 P.3d 987] [defendant's retreat, and the subsequent recovery of the decedent's stolen goods, extinguished the decedent's legal justification to attack], overruled on another ground in People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1201 [91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106, 203 P.3d 425]; Vasquez, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1178-1180 [although the defendant initiated the verbal quarrel, the decedent's physical response was unlawful].) Defendant contends he was entitled to an instruction on imperfect self-defense, as there was evidence that he (actually but unreasonably) believed he was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury at the hands of Powalka and Amanda. As defendant initiated the attack on Corina, however, and there was no evidence that Powalka's and Amanda's subsequent actions were not legally justified, he may not claim imperfect self-defense. Defendant nonetheless contends there was evidence that he was not the initial aggressor because he told the police that he accidentally inflicted Corina's injuries, and thus he claims his conduct was not wrongful. (See § 26, class Five.) Accordingly, defendant contends because there was evidence that he harbored no criminal intent when he first cut Corina, there was sufficient evidence to warrant the voluntary manslaughter instruction. Even were we to agree with defendant that an accidental stabbing is not wrongful, which according to him would allow him to claim imperfect self-defense, the evidence was not sufficiently substantial to warrant this jury instruction. (See, e.g., Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 623-625.) Defendant told the police, I already stabbed [Corina] once on accident[;] I just stabbed her again. (Italics added.) As such, any potential claim of imperfect self-defense evaporated when he intentionally stabbed Corina a second time. Although defendant on appeal prefers to highlight his statements to the police in which he omitted mentioning this second, intentional stabbing, the evidence introduced at trialconsisting of his contradictory accounts of how he stabbed Corinasimply was not substantial enough to merit the requested jury instruction. Finally, defendant contends he was entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction based on a theory of heat of passion, [23] claiming he was provoked into killing Powalka and Amanda by their aggressive actions towards him. Unsurprisingly, defendant fails to cite any case or statutory law supporting his proposition that Powalka's anger at him for cutting Corina, and Amanda's later anger for his attack on Powalka, somehow provoked him into killing them. Consequently, the trial court did not err in declining to instruct the jury on this theory.