Opinion ID: 1450094
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: single larceny doctrine

Text: At trial, Grissom objected to the four separate instructions on robbery, claiming there was but one robbery because the four transactions were one continuous act. In rejecting Grissom's claim, the trial court reasoned that the robberies occurred at different times and locations, necessitating travel between each occurrence. On appeal, Grissom claims the trial court erred in not applying the single larceny doctrine to the four counts of robbery. He contends the single larceny doctrine applies to robbery because this court has cited with approval a C.J.S. discussion stating that `robbery is merely an aggravated form of larceny or theft.' State v. Long, 234 Kan. 580, 591, 675 P.2d 832 (1984). The context of the C.J.S. discussion was whether theft is a lesser included crime of robbery. Grissom relies upon the discussion of the single larceny doctrine found in State v. Roberts, 210 Kan. 786, 504 P.2d 242 (1972), cert. denied 414 U.S. 832 (1973). The Roberts court stated: When property is stolen by a succession of takings from the same owner and from the same place, each taking is a separate crime if it results from a separate impulse or intent. However, if it appears that a single incriminating impulse or intent is involved in the successive [takings], they constitute a single larceny. 210 Kan. at 791. See State v. McClanahan, 251 Kan. 533, 836 P.2d 1164 (1992). In support of his claim that the four robberies were the result of a single criminal impulse, he directs this court's attention to the fact that, based upon the time between the cashing of each check and the distance between the various branches of the bank, Rusch apparently drove directly from branch to branch. He points out the similarities among the four transactions. Grissom, however, overlooks the very language he quotes: When property is stolen by a succession of takings from the same owner and from the same place, each taking is a separate crime if it results from a separate impulse or intent. (Emphasis added.) Here, the robberies did not occur in the same place. Roberts is not controlling on the instant facts. The defendant also maintains the trial court's reliance upon the time and location variances is misplaced because robbery is a crime against persons, not property. He argues what is important is that Rusch was the victim in each count and not that the takings occurred at different branches of the same bank. The defendant cites no authority to support this argument, and none has been found. The single impulse theory is generally associated with theft cases. Whether it should be limited to theft cases need not be decided here. The defendant's claim that the four robbery convictions are multiplicities because they resulted from one criminal impulse also fails. A test for determining whether a continuous transaction results in the commission of but a single offense is whether separate and distinct prohibited acts, made punishable by law, have been committed. A single motive for a series of acts does not necessarily result in a single crime. State v. Scott, 250 Kan. 350, Syl. ¶ 2, 827 P.2d 733 (1992). Thus, even if the robberies resulted from a single motive or a single criminal impulse, the jury was not required to find a single crime. Whether or not the separate acts were the result of one larcenous impulse or plan is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. State v. Fox, 242 Kan. 457, 463, 749 P.2d 16 (1988); see State v. McClanahan, 251 Kan. 533, Syl. ¶ 2. Here, the jury found the evidence supported four robberies  four separate and distinct prohibited acts. Grissom's arguments do not provide a legal basis for this court to disturb the jury's findings.