Opinion ID: 185067
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Auction

Text: 22 In reviewing the interpretation and application of the FCC auction rules challenged here, we afford the deference due the FCC's interpretation of its own rules and policies, and will uphold the FCC's interpretation unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. E.g., Freeman Eng'g, 103 F.3d at 178 (citations and quotations omitted).Considering the ambiguity surrounding the interaction between the § 309(l) auction and settlement provisions as described by the Commission in the Auction Order, we conclude that the Commission adequately explained why it did not regard paragraph 89 of the Auction Order as requiring that Damsky be allowed to participate in an auction for the construction permit. 23 In addition to giving the Commission the ability to resolve transitional competing comparative permit applications though a competitive auction mechanism, Congress required the Commission to waive any provisions of its regulations necessary to permit such persons to enter an agreement to procure the removal of a conflict between their applications during a 180-day window. 47 U.S.C. § 309(l). Here, two applicants, not including Damsky, filed a settlement agreement within the 180-day period. The agreement was contingent upon the Commission's affirming the ALJ's finding that Damsky was disqualified on financial qualification grounds. Since the auction issue involves, in part, the Commission's interpretation of a statute committed to its administration, we employ the Chevron analysis in reviewing the agency's interpretation. Pursuant to Chevron, we will give effect to any unambiguously expressed intent of Congress as contained in the statutory provision under review. See Nuclear Info. Resource Serv. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 969 F.2d 1169, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc). However, if the statutory provision is silent or ambiguous, we will defer to the agency's interpretation assuming its interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the statute's purpose. See id. Given the statutory language in issue, we hold that the Commission reasonably interpreted § 309(l) as affording applicants falling in the window period, upon the resolution of any basic qualification disputes, the opportunity to settle instead of participating in an auction. See Further Petition for Reconsideration, 14 F.C.C.R. 370 pp 11-12; In re Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act, 14 F.C.C.R. 8724 p 18. The Commission's use of Damsky's financial qualification as a condition to approving the settlement agreement is consistent with the statute. See also 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(6)(E) (1994) (indicating that the grant of auction authority not be construed to relieve the Commission of the obligation in the public interest to continue to use ... threshold qualifications ... in order to avoid mutual exclusivity in application and licensing proceedings). 24 In reaching our decision, we reject Damsky's contention that § 309(l)(3) only governs global settlements. The Commission reasonably interpreted the statute when it determined that partial settlements could be approved under § 309(l)(3). See Auction Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 15920 pp 73, 93; In re Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act, 14 F.C.C.R. 8724 p 18. Nothing in the statute dictates that § 309(l)(3) only permits universal settlement. Since settlements are private contractual arrangements, an applicant such as Damsky has no general legal right to be included in a settlement. See In re Anax Broad. Inc., 88 F.C.C.2d 607 p 10 (1981). Thus, nothing in the statute or other law appears to preclude the Commission from approving a settlement that includes only qualified parties. The Commission has acted consistent with this interpretation. See In re Global Information Tech., Inc., 12 F.C.C.R. 11808 pp 1, 3, 6 (1997), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Frontier Broad., Inc. v. FCC, No. 97-1530, 1998 WL 704510 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 1998); In re Gonzales Broad., Inc., 12 F.C.C.R. 12253 pp 4, 19 (1997), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Jelks v. FCC, 146 F.3d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 199 S. Ct. 1045 (1999); In re Pensacola Radio Partners, 13 F.C.C.R. 11681 p 1 (1998), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Floyd v. FCC, No. 98-1269, 1999 WL 236879 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 1999). 25 The Commission's interpretation of paragraph 89 of the Auction Order comports with its interpretation of the statute and its prior practice. The Commission reasonably interprets paragraph 89 as only applying to cases where an auction would otherwise be held because no settlements were reached. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 370 p 12. As the Commission points out, the Auction Order and supporting notices separate out § 309(l)(3) settlement from auction rules and guidelines. See id. p 13. Moreover, the Commission adequately established on the record that a proper § 309(l)(3) settlement would obviate the need for an auction. See id.; In re Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act, 14 F.C.C.R. 8724 p 18. The Commission's reading of paragraph 89 makes sense when the provision is analyzed in context. Thus, paragraph 89 does not undo the Commission's approval of the settlement agreement in this case since the Commission reasonably interpreted paragraph 89 as not pertaining to permissible settlement agreements reached pursuant to § 309(l)(3). 26 To recap, we hold that Damsky provided sufficient notice to entitle her to review of her claims stemming from the Memorandum Opinion and Order in addition to review of the auction issue. However, we uphold the Commission's determination that Damsky was financially disqualified from receiving the Homewood FM station construction permit. We also hold that the Commission reasonably interpreted § 309(l) and its Auction Order as not providing Damsky with the opportunity to participate in an auction.