Opinion ID: 1903987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the county's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Text: ¶ 14. The second issue before this Court is whether the circuit court erred in finding that the County stated in Count I of its complaint a claim upon which relief may be granted. We stress that the sole question before us is whether the County can prove no set of facts which would entitle it to the relief requested. Our analysis of this issue requires no conclusion as to the constitutional validity of the funding scheme enacted by the Legislature. Though members of this Court have heretofore expressed dissatisfaction with that scheme and even gone so far as to question its constitutional validity, that question is not presently before us, and this opinion should not be construed as stating a position on that issue. ¶ 15. Again, the County alleged in its complaint that by requiring counties to fund the representation of indigent defendants, the State has violated its duty under Art. 3, § 26 of the Mississippi Constitution to provide effective assistance of counsel to indigent criminal defendants. The County claims that Miss.Code Ann. § 25-32-7 and § 99-15-17 are unconstitutional because they impose fiscal obligations to provide defense counsel on the counties in violation of the State's duty under Art. 3, § 26. In its opinion, the circuit court repeatedly refers to the State's compliance with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as Art. 3, § 26 of the Mississippi Constitution. The County's complaint, however, brings this action only under Art. 3, § 26 of the Mississippi Constitution. ¶ 16. A motion to dismiss under M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) raises an issue of law, which is reviewed de novo. Lowe v. Lowndes County Bldg. Inspection Dep't, 760 So.2d 711, 712 (Miss.2000); Tucker v. Hinds County, 558 So.2d 869, 872 (Miss. 1990). Taking the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true, the motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond any reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle it to relief. Moore ex rel. City of Aberdeen v. Byars, 757 So.2d 243, 246 (Miss.2000). ¶ 17. Essentially, the State makes two arguments regarding the County's alleged failure to state a claim. First, the State argues that the County's allegations, even if taken as true, are insufficient to overcome the applicable presumption of constitutionality afforded the statutes at issue. Second, the State argues that the financing of public defenders is a legislative matter for which the courts can provide no remedy. We will address these arguments in turn. It is well settled that a court may strike down an act of the legislature only where it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute violates the clear language of the constitution. James v. State, 731 So.2d 1135, 1136 (Miss. 1999). A party challenging the statute must be able to overcome the strong presumption that the act is constitutional. Cities of Oxford, Carthage, Starkville, & Tupelo v. Northeast Elec. Power Ass'n, 704 So.2d 59, 65 (Miss.1997). ¶ 18. Art. 3, § 26 of the Mississippi Constitution states, in pertinent part: In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself or counsel, or both, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and, in all prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the county where the offense was committed.... This provision has been interpreted to create a duty on the part of the State to provide effective assistance of counsel to indigent defendants. Mease v. State, 583 So.2d 1283 (Miss.1991); Wilson v. State, 574 So.2d 1338 (Miss.1990); Conn v. State, 251 Miss. 488, 170 So.2d 20 (1964) (relying on Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963)). ¶ 19. The State legislatively requires counties to fund the representation of indigent criminal defendants. Section 25-32-7 provides: The public defender shall be provided with office space, secretarial assistance, and all reasonable expenses of operating the office, at least equal to or more than the county prosecuting attorney, or the district attorney if the public defender represents the entire circuit court district. The compensation and expenses of the public defender's office shall be paid by the county or counties if two (2) or more counties are acting jointly. The funds shall be paid upon allowance by the board of supervisors by order spread upon the minutes of the board. ¶ 20. Also, § 99-15-17 provides, in pertinent part, The fees and expenses [of counsel for indigents] as allowed by the appropriate judge shall be paid by the county treasurer out of the general fund of the county in which the prosecution was commenced. ¶ 21. The cases brought before this Court to date involved the issue of the State's compliance with its duty to provide representation for indigent criminal defendants in the context of the limits placed on attorney's fees in individual cases by § 99-15-17. In each of those cases, the Court upheld the constitutional validity of § 99-15-17, deferring to the Legislature's right to expend public funds. See Mease v. State, 583 So.2d 1283 (Miss.1991); Wilson v. State, 574 So.2d 1338 (Miss.1990); Pruett v. State, 574 So.2d 1342 (Miss.1990). The case at hand is different in that it involves the issue of the State's compliance with its duty to provide representation for indigent criminal defendants in the context of a system of providing indigent defense. Nevertheless, in two of those cases, members of the Court expressed reservations regarding the constitutional validity of the county-based system of indigent representation. In Wilson this Court stated: Nothing in this opinion is meant to interfere with the right of the Legislature to order the expenditure of public funds but in light of this opinion, the Legislature may wish to reconsider the funding of attorney representation of indigents. In fact, we would encourage the Legislature to review the system and provide funds for the representation of indigent defendants in capital cases from State funds rather than county funds. Since the State funds the prosecution in these cases, why not the defense? Wilson, 574 So.2d at 1341. Also, in Mease, Justice Prather, specially concurring, stated, As in Wilson, I suggest the Legislature address the problem of indigent representation on a statewide basis, rather than thrust the burden on financially-strapped counties. Mease, 583 So.2d at 1285. ¶ 22. The County alleges that § 99-15-17 and § 25-32-7 unconstitutionally remove the burden of the State to provide representation for indigent defendants and place it on the County. The County does not argue that it is per se unconstitutional for the Legislature to require the County to fund the representation of indigent defendants. In fact, the County conceded during oral argument that the Legislature has the authority to place the burden of such funding on the County. The County's argument lies in the allegation that these statutes do not meet the requirements of Art. 3, § 26 because they result, in Quitman County, in widespread ineffective assistance of counsel due to the fact that the County cannot afford to discharge its burden of providing funding for indigent defendants in a constitutional manner. The State argues that because the Legislature has the authority to direct counties, as subdivisions and agencies of the State, to assist in providing representation for indigent defendants, the County's complaint fails to allege a palpable conflict between the actions of the Legislature and the Constitution and, as such, must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. ¶ 23. The State relies on Art. 14, § 261, which provides that [t]he expenses of criminal prosecutions shall be borne by the county in which such prosecution shall be begun.... The State's reliance on Art. 14, § 261 is misplaced. Again, the County's allegations do not rest on the assertion that the State is constitutionally prohibited from requiring the County to provide funding for indigent defense. Rather, the County's allegations rest on the assertion that the State's requiring the County to provide funding has resulted in chronic underfunding and systemic ineffective assistance of counsel in Quitman County. It is not the funding which the County argues the State has unconstitutionally shifted to the counties, but the ultimate obligation of indigent defense. The breach of duty, alleges the County, occurred not when the State required the counties to fund indigent criminal defenses, but when that requirement resulted in systemic ineffective assistance of counsel that has gone unchecked and unremedied by the State. It is the State's failure to remedy the alleged systemic ineffective assistance of counsel that is the crux of the County's complaint. ¶ 24. The County states that at trial it is prepared to show the cost of an effective system of indigent criminal defense, the County's inability to fund such a system, and the failure of the existing system to provide indigent defendants in Quitman County with the tools of an adequate defense. The County's complaint includes the following well-pled facts:  The State's refusal to provide funds and its imposition of the financial burden on resource-starved counties has had dire consequences for the provision of indigent defense services in Mississippi. Studies prepared for a committee of the Mississippi Bar Association in the 1990s found: Funding for indigent defense is totally inadequate (amounting to $3.24 per capita, far less than any other state); The lack of adequate resources for indigent defense services results in poor quality services and representation that falls beneath the minimum standards of representation required by the Mississippi Constitution; and There is not statewide oversight of indigent defense, which leads to a hodgepodge, county-by-county approach to defense services.  The State's lack of involvement in the provision of indigent defense and inadequate resources available to such indigent defense means that constitutional requirements for the effective assistance of counsel are not met. Studies conducted for the Mississippi Bar Associate found: Resources are not sufficient to provide adequate representation even in felony cases, particularly in those counties using the contract public defender system. Every aspect of defense representation is compromised. Specifically, there is very little: early representation provided, investigation conducted, attorney/client contact, or use of experts. There is a low trial rate in felony and misdemeanor cases. The requirement for contract defenders and assigned counsel to handle their own appeals, often with no additional compensation, creates a disincentive for taking cases to trial. Case preparation is often late, and frequently preliminary hearings are waived and defendants are held in jail three to six months without counsel until arraignment in circuit court. The overall situation has led to an insufficient number of qualified attorneys willing to take court appointments in indigent cases or to seek contract public defender positions.  The defendants have imposed enormous and unpredictable indigent defense costs on Quitman County and its taxpayers. As a result, financial resources available to fund schools, hospitals, local law enforcement and the traditional health, safety and welfare obligations of county government have been substantially reduced. Defendants' imposition of indigent defense costs on counties has disproportionately increased tax burdens on counties with small populations but significant crime problemsoften from non-residentssuch as Quitman County, and has led to unequal tax burdens. Chronic underfunding of indigent defense has resulted in constitutional requirements for effective assistance of counsel often not being met and has adversely affected the administration of justice in Mississippi. ¶ 25. We conclude that the County has pleaded facts which, when taken as true as they must be on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, are sufficient to demonstrate that by requiring Quitman County to fund indigent criminal defense in that County, the State has breached its constitutional duty to provide indigent defendants with effective assistance of counsel. ¶ 26. Additionally, the State argues that the financing of public defenders is a legislative matter for which the courts can provide no remedy. The State asserts that because there exists no constitutional restriction on the ability of the State to allocate the costs of indigent defense between the State and counties, the system of indigent defense is a public policy decision solely within the purview of the Legislature. ¶ 27. This Court has recognized that in most instances the authority to control the expenditure of funds for the purpose of indigent defense is a legislative rather than a judicial matter. See Wilson v. State, 574 So.2d 1338, 1340 (Miss.1990); Bd. of Supervisors v. Bailey, 236 So.2d 420, 423 (Miss.1970). Though questions of this nature are traditionally legislative affairs, this Court has recognized that where the Legislature fails to act, the courts have the authority and the duty to intervene. This Court addressed the Legislature's failure to allocate sufficient funds for the courts to operate in Hosford v. State, 525 So.2d 789 (Miss.1988). In Hosford, poor courtroom conditions including loud noises and poor temperature control led the circuit court to petition this Court for assistance so that the county courthouse would have adequate operating facilities. We noted that while the three branches of government should remain separate and co-equal, where the Legislature, in its allocation of funds to the judicial branch, fails to fulfill a constitutional obligation to enable the judicial branch to operate independently and effectively, then it has violated its Constitutional mandate, and the Judicial branch has the authority to see that courts do not atrophy. Id. at 798. The Court recognized that while the Legislature has the authority to furnish what funds and facilities it deems proper, the courts may act in cases of necessity where the Legislature fails to furnish the essentials required for the operation of an independent and effective court. Id. Certainly, if adequate facilities are essential to the administration of justice, so is effective representation. ¶ 28. In Jackson v. State, 732 So.2d 187, 190 (Miss.1999), this Court recognized its authority to act in cases of necessity. In Jackson, this Court held that the indigent petitioner was entitled to appointed and compensated counsel to represent him in his post-conviction efforts. We stated, with regard to expenses in post-conviction proceedings, The Legislature has been aware of this acute problem.... It is strongly urged that the Legislature proceed toward a solution to this serious problem by enacting the program utilized in Virginia or some other system. We can no longer sit idly by. Id. at 191. ¶ 29. In Wilson v. State, 574 So.2d 1338, 1340 (Miss.1990), the Court addressed the issue of indigent defense attorney compensation under § 99-15-17 and stated, [w]hile we do have the authority to override the Legislature in cases of absolute necessity, we have previously held that the issue of compensation for an attorney appointed to defend an accused in a criminal case is a legislative matter rather than a judicial matter. See also Bd. of Supervisors v. Bailey, 236 So.2d 420 (Miss. 1970) (where the Court first indicated that the question of compensation was a legislative matter as opposed to a judicial matter). ¶ 30. The question raised by the County's allegations is whether, assuming the State has failed in its duty to provide effective indigent defense, the county-based system has resulted in the inability of the judiciary to operate in an independent and effective manner to the extent that this Court must, of necessity, interfere in this traditionally legislative function and order the Legislature to establish a statewide, state-funded system of indigent criminal defense. Again, taking as true the well-pled allegations of the County's complaint, such systemic constitutional deficiencies would entitle the County to relief.