Opinion ID: 1771411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: appellant william harrison was denied counsel of his choice guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions and deprived of due process of law by the refusal of the trial court to allow privately-retained counsel to appear for him.

Text: Appellant contends he was denied counsel of choice. On May 20, 1985, J. Ronald Parrish was appointed by the court to defend the appellants after an indigency hearing. The appellant appeared pleased with the appointment. However, on September 19, 1985, the day of trial, Attorney Sebastian Moore appeared in court as retained counsel for appellant, unknown to Attorney Parrish or the court, and stated that appellant had given him a check for compensation, although he had not presented it to the bank. The lower court told Attorney Moore that he could not be substituted as counsel until appellant first paid to the county the sum of five hundred dollars ($500.00) already expended in preparation for appellant's defense. Appellant replied that he could not pay $500.00 at that moment, but could, perhaps, have the money by the following week. With reference to repayment of the $500.00 expended by the county for an appointed attorney, Attorney Moore said: ... But I think that is inherently fair, and it is something that should be done. At the time of making his appearance on September 19, 1985, the date the case had been set for trial, Attorney Moore filed an affidavit for continuance. During the proceedings with reference to discussion of obtaining different counsel, the judge ruled upon the affidavit for continuance with the following language: I will also tell you before you get started talking with him [Harrison] about repaying the county that this case will not be continued. It has been dragging along here now long enough and he has known when this case was set for trial. Appellant argues that he has the absolute right to discharge his attorney and represent himself and, therefore, he has the right to discharge his appointed counsel and retain another at his own expense. In Collins v. State, 369 So.2d 500 (Miss. 1979), the defendant's attorney was retained by his family. On the day of trial, one month following arraignment, the defendant sought to discharge his counsel and substitute another. The trial court refused to allow withdrawal, and this Court affirmed, stating: Under the circumstances detailed, it is our view that, if [defendant] wanted other counsel, he had abundant time and should have arranged therefor in advance of the day the trial was begun. The request was untimely. Following the same reasoning, [defendant's] motion for a continuance, if motion it was, was not worthy of favorable consideration. There was no compliance with Mississippi Code Annotated, section 99-15-29 (1972), which contains requisites of such a motion. If all these steps had been met, however, the motion was untimely made and action on it lay in the sound discretion of the court, which ruled wisely. 369 So.2d at 501 (Citations omitted). In Burnett v. State, 285 So.2d 783 (Miss. 1973), this Court said that [t]he motion of an indigent prisoner requesting the court to dismiss his court-appointed attorney is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and that defendant was not entitled to a continuance so that he could work and earn money with which to hire an attorney. 285 So.2d at 783-84. The lower court observed that the case had dragged on for a long period of time; that it had been set for the day certain on September 19, 1985; and that the trial would not be delayed by the appearance of other counsel on that date, who opted for a continuance. The assigned error is rejected.