Opinion ID: 2634857
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary of the prosecution's argument

Text: In response, the prosecution argues that there is no violation of the plain language of the manslaughter statute. First, the prosecution contends that although Aiwohi engaged in the proscribed conduct when Treyson was prenatal, there is no doubt that Treyson was born alive and was therefore indisputably a person at the time of his death. The prosecution thus argues that Treyson was a person within the definition supplied by the manslaughter statute and that the only remaining issue was Aiwohi's state of mind  an issue for the trier of fact at trial. Second, the prosecution contends that Aiwohi is wrong in her assertion that she cannot be held criminally liable for Treyson's death merely because her alleged culpable conduct occurred prior to Treyson's birth. For support, the prosecution cites to another decision of the Texas Court of Appeals, Cuellar v. State, 957 S.W.2d 134 (Tex.Ct.App.1997). The Cuellar court assessed a third party's liability for manslaughter when the defendant's car collided with another car driven by a mother who was seven and one-half months pregnant. Cuellar, 957 S.W.2d at 137. The fetus was born alive, but subsequently died due to injuries caused by the car accident. Id. The Cuellar court stated that [i]t is axiomatic that a homicide conviction, requiring the death of the victim as an element of the offense, may stand even though the victim's death is not instantaneous with the defendant's conduct but results from that conduct at a later time. Id. at 139. Thus, the prosecution urges us to affirm the circuit court's decision and order denying Aiwohi's respective motions to dismiss the indictment.