Opinion ID: 223516
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dismissal of the Childhood Sexual Abuse Claim Against the School District and Hetherington

Text: Next, Walker argues that the district court erred in dismissing his childhood sexual abuse claim against the School District and Hetherington. He maintains that the court erroneously concluded that § 537.046 does not apply to nonperpetrator defendants. According to Walker, the plain language of the statute demonstrates that it applies to defendants other than the individual who performed the physical acts of abuse because § 537.046.1 only defines the types of acts that constitute childhood sexual abuse  not who commits them. He contends that § 537.046 incorporates accessory liability because, under Missouri law, anyone who aids or abets someone in the commission of an offense (including one of the crimes listed in § 537.046) can be guilty of the offense to the same extent as the principal offender. Moreover, according to Walker, § 537.046.2 permits any action that arises out of sexual abuse, and a claim for childhood sexual abuse based on an aiding and abetting or ratification theory would fall within the statute's broad language. Walker maintains that he sufficiently pleaded both an aiding and abetting and a ratification theory of liability against the School District and Hetherington, and, as such, the district court erred in dismissing his claim. Missouri appellate courts have not yet addressed whether a nonperpetrator can be held liable for childhood sexual abuse under § 537.046. Walker has cited no decisions from the Missouri Court of Appeals or the Missouri Supreme Court addressing the issue. Indeed, the only reported cases addressing this statute involve only perpetrator defendants. E.g., Straub, 128 S.W.3d at 158; cf. H.R.B. v. Rigali, 18 S.W.3d 440, 443 (Mo.Ct.App.2000) (noting only that [t]he parties are in agreement that the statute of limitations [under] section 537.046 ... does not apply to the facts of their case, which involved a suit against the perpetrator's employer). And based on the parties citations to various unpublished orders, it appears that Missouri trial courts have conflicting views on the issue. Compare Graham v. McGrath, No. 22032-02018, at 66 (Mo.Cir.Ct. Aug. 23, 2005) ([Section] 537.046 makes no distinction between one who is guilty as an accessory and one who directly commits the offense), with Dempsey v. Johnston, No. 22042-09280, at 3-7 (Mo.Cir.Ct. Mar. 10, 2008) (rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments that the perpetrator's employee could be held liable under § 537.046 under theories of aiding and abetting, respondeat superior, and ratification). We look first to the statute. The statutory language itself suggests that a nonperpetrator defendant cannot be liable under this statute. Section 537.046(2) defines the statute of limitations for [a]ny action to recover damages from injury or illness caused by childhood sexual abuse. It does not, as Walker contends, apply to all actions arising from childhood sexual abuse. Section 537.046.1(1) defines childhood sexual abuse as: any act committed by the defendant against the plaintiff which act occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of eighteen years and which act would have been a violation of section 566.030 [rape], 566.040 [sexual assault], ... 566.060 [forcible sodomy], 566.070 [deviate sexual assault], ... 566.090 [first degree sexual misconduct], 566.100 [sexual abuse], ... or section 568.020 [incest].... A nonperpetrator defendant could not cause injury or illness by childhood sexual abuse, as that term is defined, because such a defendant necessarily has not committed one of the enumerated acts. While Missouri law does hold an aider and abettor criminally liable to the same extent as the principal offender, State v. Kobel, 927 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Mo.Ct.App.1996), § 537.046 does not enumerate the statute criminalizing aiding and abetting, Missouri Revised Statutes § 562.041, as one of the acts that constitutes childhood sexual abuse. Accordingly, we conclude that the Missouri legislature did not intend to subject nonperpetrator defendants to liability under § 537.046. Accord Doe HL v. James, No. 4:05-CV-2032, 2006 WL 6677124, at  (E.D.Mo. Aug. 15, 2006) (concluding that [t]he statute defining childhood sexual abuse does not make an unincorporated association responsible for childhood sexual abuse and that plaintiff cannot assert a claim of childhood sexual abuse ... against the [unincorporated association] based on a theory of agency ratification). Even if Walker could sue the School District and Hetherington for childhood sexual abuse, under an aider/abettor or a ratification theory of liability, he has not pleaded any factual basis for such claims. Instead, he merely alleged that the School District and Hetherington aided and abetted Defendant Barrett's childhood sexual abuse and condoned and ratified the unlawful and abusive conduct... by failing to repudiate it. These legal conclusions, without any supporting factual allegations, are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (A pleading that offers `labels and conclusions' or `a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955)). Thus, the district court properly dismissed Walker's childhood sexual abuse claim against the School District and Hetherington.