Opinion ID: 156059
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Acting in Contravention of the Law

Text: In their Complaint, Plaintiffs generally assert they have been injured because Defendants are acting without authority and otherwise in contravention of 14 Plaintiffs cite no authority for this statement. -23- established procedures. 15 On appeal, Plaintiffs appear to abandon these arguments altogether in the standing context 16 and for good reason: the mere allegation that Defendants are acting without authority or in violation of the law is insufficient to establish standing. The Supreme Court “has repeatedly held that an asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with [the] law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 754 (holding plaintiffs lacked constitutional standing to challenge government action that allegedly violated the law); cf. Diamond, 476 U.S. at 62 (“The presence of a disagreement, however sharp and acrimonious it may be, is insufficient by itself to meet Art. III’s requirements.”). To prevail on the merits, Plaintiffs must prove that Defendants have acted in contravention of the law. To reach the merits, however, Plaintiffs must first identify a concrete injury flowing from Defendants’ allegedly unlawful actions. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485 (“Although respondents claim that the Constitution has been violated, they claim nothing else. They fail 15 In particular, Plaintiffs claim they are injured because (1) Defendants lack authority to include state trust lands in the 1996 inventory; (2) Defendants have improperly singled out the State of Utah for “unique and special study”; (3) Defendants lack authority to conduct the 1996 inventory; and (4) Defendants arbitrarily changed their interpretation of FLPMA and the WIH. 16 In arguing they are likely to prevail on the merits, which is a requirement for obtaining a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs do maintain their contention that Defendants lack authority to conduct the 1996 inventory and to include state trust lands in the inventory. -24- to identify any personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under Art. III ....”). We therefore consider Plaintiffs’ additional claims of injury to determine whether Plaintiffs have shown a concrete injury flowing from Defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct. 17 17 On appeal, Defendants primarily rely on FLPMA § 201 as providing the necessary authority to conduct the 1996 inventory, but also assert they have authority under FLPMA § 603. Just prior to this litigation, however, Defendants explicitly rejected § 603 as providing the necessary authority to conduct the inventory. See, e.g., Letter from Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, to James V. Hansen, Chairman, Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands 2 (July 24, 1996) (“I also agree with you that FLPMA’s section 603 no longer provides authority to inventory BLM land in Utah for wilderness values.”); BLM, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Utah Wilderness Review Procedures (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Procedures] (stating “wilderness review mandate” of § 603 “has been completed” and identifying, inter alia, § 201 as authority for conducting the 1996 inventory). Similarly, in other wilderness inventory contexts, such as inventories of newly acquired public lands, BLM has consistently relied on FLPMA §§ 201 and 202, not § 603, as providing the necessary authority to conduct the inventories. See, e.g., Wilderness Society, 119 I.B.L.A. 168, 170-72 (1991) (noting “second inventory” of lands previously inventoried under § 603 and inventory of adjacent newly acquired parcels was completed under § 201, not § 603); Amendment of Notice of Intent, 56 Fed. Reg. 40,341 (1991) (announcing intent to prepare land use plan and to inventory newly acquired public lands for wilderness values, and citing § 202 as authority). In proceedings before the district court, Defendants relied solely on § 201 as providing authority to conduct the inventory. In their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Defendants noted that “[w]hile letters from the Secretary and the State Director have cited various provisions of FLPMA for the authority to undertake the re-inventory, section 201(a) provides the authority necessary.” During the hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court -25-