Opinion ID: 4538312
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: request for a stay

Text: We have authority over Snyder’s and Dillon’s request for a stay of the district court’s discovery ruling because they have shown that filing an initial motion for a stay in the district court would be futile. See FED. R. APP. P. 8(a). We balance four interrelated factors when considering whether to grant a stay: “(1) the likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the merits of the appeal; (2) the likelihood that the moving party will be irreparably harmed absent a stay; (3) the prospect that others will be harmed if the court grants the stay; and (4) the public interest in granting the stay.” Michigan State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson, No. 20-1352 Waid, et al. v. Earley, et al. Page 6 833 F.3d 656, 661 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mich. Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991)). First, Snyder and Dillon are not likely to succeed on appeal from the district court’s order denying their request for a protective order. They claim that they cannot be deposed on any matter pending resolution of their qualified-immunity appeal. That is incorrect. Snyder and Dillon stress that qualified immunity protects them from discovery until their claim of entitlement to immunity has been conclusively denied on their motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court requires that civil-rights actions brought under § 1983 play out in stages to shield government officials from the “burdens of litigation.” Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297, 299–300 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985)). If the defendant files a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, the court must “stay discovery until that issue is decided.” Id. at 299. If the defendant is denied qualified immunity on the motion to dismiss, then “the plaintiff ordinarily will be entitled to some discovery.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998). Yet, qualified immunity protects government officials from “unnecessary and burdensome discovery or trial proceedings” only. Id. at 597–98; see also Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (explaining that qualified immunity relieves defendants of “the burdens of broad-reaching discovery” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982)) (emphasis added))). The “right to immunity is a right to immunity from certain claims, not from litigation in general . . . .” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312 (1996) (emphasis added). “Granting qualified immunity on only one of the claims may reduce discovery but it does not eliminate it.” McLaurin v. Morton, 48 F.3d 944, 949 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Alice L. v. Dusek, 492 F.3d 563, 565 (5th Cir. 2007) (“To the extent that [the defendant] is subject to discovery requests on claims for which she does not or cannot assert qualified immunity, such discovery requests do not implicate her right to qualified immunity.”). Here, the district court granted the state defendants effective immunity pending the final resolution of their motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity. In other words, the district court recognized that no discovery may be sought from the state defendants on the claims against No. 20-1352 Waid, et al. v. Earley, et al. Page 7 them unless and until they are conclusively denied qualified immunity on their motions to dismiss. The district court carefully sculpted a discovery plan that afforded the state defendants their full entitlement to immunity, while permitting other parties to seek discovery from them as fact witnesses on wholly separate claims. The discovery plan would permit state defendants to be deposed as non-party fact witnesses to events regarding separate claims brought against different defendants to prevent the litigation from stalling out for all defendants during the pendency of these state defendants’ appeals of the denial of their motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity. See R. 827 (Case Management Order 4/30/19 at 1) (Page ID #22804); R. 861 (Discovery Order 5/20/19 at 5, 8–10) (Page ID #23411, 23414–16). The state defendants obtained a broad stay from discovery that treats them as though they had already proven their immunity and were dismissed from the case. The district court’s exception to that stay was limited, and it was necessary for discovery to proceed for other parties in the sprawling litigation. Doing so was well within the district court’s discretion. Discovery rulings, no doubt, are high stakes, but we usually leave decisions on how best to manage discovery to the district court’s discretion. See Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 261 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[I]t is well established that the scope of discovery is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” (quotation omitted)). It is up to the district court to take qualified immunity into account when developing its discovery plan. See Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 597– 98 (“[T]he trial court must exercise its discretion in a way that protects the substance of the qualified immunity defense. It must exercise its discretion so that officials are not subjected to unnecessary and burdensome discovery or trial proceedings.”). And, in fact, the district court did so here. The district court refrained from issuing its discovery plan until after it resolved defendants’ motions to dismiss asserting qualified immunity. See R. 827 (Case Management Order 4/30/19) (Page ID #22804); R. 861 (Discovery Order 5/20/19 at 5) (Page ID #23411). Then, recognizing that its ruling on qualified immunity was subject to appeal, the district court ordered a stay of discovery regarding the sole remaining claim against the state defendants— plaintiffs’ bodily integrity claim. R. 861 (Discovery Order 5/20/19 at 6–7) (Page ID #23412– 13). “[T]he state and MDEQ defendants,” the district court ruled, “will not be subjected to No. 20-1352 Waid, et al. v. Earley, et al. Page 8 discovery with respect to the sole allegation against them, which is that they violated plaintiffs’ right to bodily integrity, until they have exhausted their opportunities to pursue their qualified immunity claim on appeal.” Id. In the same order, the district court made a limited exception to the stay to permit discovery from state defendants as non-party fact witnesses to events relevant to entirely separate claims brought against different defendants. Id. at 7–8 (Page ID #23413–14). The district court explained that “[p]laintiffs have counts pending against other defendants that have filed answers and are ready to defend their positions.” Id. “It follows that the Court can order discovery to proceed with respect to these other defendants.” Id. at 8 (Page ID #23414). The key Supreme Court cases that Snyder and Dillon cite for us—Mitchell, Crawford-El, and Harlow—feature prominently in the district court’s order delineating the state officials’ discovery obligations. The district court recognized that Mitchell “established that qualified immunity grants ‘immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.’” Id. at 6 (Page ID #23412) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526). “[C]ourts must take care,” the district court wrote, “to ensure that government officials are not subjected to unnecessary and burdensome discovery until issues of immunity have been resolved at the earliest opportunity.” Id. (citing Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 597). Accordingly, the district court struck a balance between the discovery needs of other defendants and the state defendants’ immunity interest: “If the state and MDEQ defendants are eventually dismissed as a result of their pending appeals, they will still be required to respond to discovery as a non-party. So in the interim, this litigation will go forward and the state and MDEQ defendants are required to respond to discovery requests as if they were already dismissed from the case.” Id. at 8 (Page ID #23414).2 2 The district court’s decision to permit discovery from government officials as non-party fact witnesses to events related to claims against other defendants is not out of the ordinary. See, e.g., Mendia v. Garcia, No. 10-cv03910-MEJ, 2016 WL 3249485, at  (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2016) (“While discovery directed to Defendants as to the Bivens claims against them is inappropriate given their pending qualified immunity appeal, . . . limited discovery as to these Defendants is appropriate because regardless of whether they are entitled to qualified immunity, they will still need [to] participate in discovery as percipient witnesses related to the FTCA claims against the United States.”); Harris v. City of Balch Springs, 33 F. Supp. 3d 730, 733 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (“The court can think of no legal reason why discovery and pretrial matters may not proceed with respect to [the counts not being appealed on qualified-immunity grounds]. . . . [E]ven if the Fifth Circuit were to grant [him] qualified immunity . . . he would necessarily be required to testify on behalf of the City regarding [those counts]. . . . Whether [he] is subjected to discovery on these counts now or after the resolution of qualified immunity is quite beside the point.”). No. 20-1352 Waid, et al. v. Earley, et al. Page 9 We disagree with Snyder and Dillon that the district court’s “non-party” versus “party” distinction is meaningless, or that it permits an end-run around their entitlement to immunity. The district court was clear that no party may seek discovery from the state defendants on the particular claim that they continue to litigate with respect to immunity. See id. at 2 (Page ID #23408) (“The state and MDEQ defendants are entitled to a stay of discovery on claims for which they continue to litigate the issue of immunity.”). If these non-party depositions turn out to be a ruse—as Snyder and Dillon assert that they are—Snyder and Dillon are free to object and move for a protective order at the district court level as issues arise. It is inappropriate for us, however, to issue a prophylactic order to stop these depositions from going forward based on hypothetical horrors before a single problematic question has been asked. For all these reasons, we conclude that Snyder and Dillon are not likely to succeed on their appeal from the district court’s order denying them a protective order. Second, and for the same reason, Snyder and Dillon will not suffer irreparable harm absent a stay. The district court forbade the noticing parties from using depositions to probe Snyder and Dillon regarding the sole surviving claim against them, which is that they violated plaintiffs’ right to bodily integrity. See id. at 5, 8–10 (Page ID #23411, 23414–16). Snyder and Dillon will not be effectively denied their “entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation” if we deny their request for a stay of the district court’s denial of their protective order pending their appeal from that denial. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. Even if Snyder and Dillon ultimately should be granted qualified immunity, the noticing parties would still request these depositions because, in their view, Snyder and Dillon are key factual witnesses regarding other claims. The discovery at issue is not only suitably tailored to the situation, but also inevitable. We further emphasize that our decision does not leave Snyder and Dillon without a remedy. They may file for a protective order in the district court if they object to the noticing parties’ line of questioning. What they cannot do is ask us to resolve a run-of-the-mill discovery dispute on an interlocutory appeal. No. 20-1352 Waid, et al. v. Earley, et al. Page 10 For each of these reasons, Snyder and Dillon will not suffer any irreparable harm absent a stay of the district court’s discovery order. Third, the noticing parties will be harmed if we grant a stay. The plaintiffs have alleged ongoing serious health injuries that continue to worsen over time. See In re Flint Water Cases (Waid v. Snyder), – F.3d –, 2020 WL 2611546, at  (6th Cir. 2020). Thus, the progress of the litigation has a real effect on plaintiffs’ ability to secure a meaningful remedy. A delay also could interfere with the scheduled start of the bellwether trials, presently set to begin in January 2021. R. 1150 (Order 5/21/20 at 3) (Page ID #28167). A delay similarly would prejudice the Veolia defendants, who are also invested in the efficient resolution of this case. Finally, the public interest favors the development of the facts and the expeditious resolution of this case. And as described above, Snyder’s and Dillon’s immunity interest—and the public’s accompanying interest in their immunity—is not at stake in this limited non-party fact witness discovery. We conclude that all four factors weigh against granting a stay of the district court’s order allowing the non-party depositions to proceed. We accordingly DENY Snyder’s and Dillon’s motion for a stay of non-party depositions pending resolution of their appeal from the district court’s order denying their motion for a protective order.