Opinion ID: 472576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: I.Code Ann. tit. 24, Sec. 374(h).

Text: 10 The second provision involved in this dispute, Sec. 376, details the impasse procedure. 3 In general, the section provides for the appointment of a mediator by the Public Employee Relations Board at the request of a party when negotiations break down. If the mediator is unsuccessful in facilitating a voluntary resolution, the dispute then must be submitted to final and binding arbitration. The parties may also agree to submit the dispute directly to arbitration without first resorting to mediation, as in the instant case. See V.I.Code Ann. tit. 24, Sec. 376(a)(4). After the arbitration panel renders its award, the section requires the parties to take whatever action is necessary to carry out and effectuate the decisions. Id., Sec. 376(a)(5). 11 District 2A argues that the two sections must be read separately, such that the Virgin Islands Legislature's power to approve public employee labor contracts extends only to those contracts that are the product of direct negotiations. We decline this invitation. We have previously construed the Public Employee Labor Relations Act in light of case law interpreting national labor law and policy. See Virgin Islands Nursing Association v. Schneider, 668 F.2d 221 (3d Cir.1981). A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation, applicable to labor statutes, is that courts should endeavor to interpret the statute as a whole where possible. Thus, [i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy. Mastro Plastics Corporation v. Labor Board, 350 U.S. 270, 285, 76 S.Ct. 349, 359, 100 L.Ed. 309 (1956) (construing the National Labor Relations Act). 12 We hold that Sec. 374 and Sec. 376 should be read in conjunction. The Act structures the employer-employee relationship by permitting parties who have exhausted negotiations to submit to arbitration. 4 Although the arbitration award is final and binding on the parties, the award does not bind the Legislature. Two provisions compel this conclusion. The Act defines employer as the executive branch of the Government of the Virgin Islands and any agency or instrumentality thereof. V.I.Code Ann. tit. 24, Sec. 362(i). Thus, while the executive branch must honor the award, as a party to the arbitration award, the same cannot be said of the Legislature. Second, the Legislature explicitly reserved its power of approval over all instruments of agreement in Sec. 374(h), notwithstanding any other provision in the Act. Clearly, an arbitrator's award must be subject to legislative approval to the extent it requires the appropriation of funds. 13 Moreover, we find a legislative veto over certain labor agreements consonant with the Act's policy. Section 361 describes the purposes behind the Act as follows: 14 It is the purpose of this chapter to provide for the orderly and constructive relationships between public employers and their employees. The Legislature finds and declares that the Government of the Virgin Islands shall fully accept the principle and procedure of collective bargaining and shall bargain in good faith with valid public employee organizations, subject, however, to the paramount right of the citizens of this Territory to keep inviolate the guarantees for their health, safety and welfare. 15 (emphasis added). The Legislature's reservation of a right of final approval over arbitration awards that require the expenditure of public funds is consistent with the Act's concern that the public welfare prevail over the public employees' collective bargaining rights when the two conflict. 16 District 2A and the UIW raise three challenges to this interpretation. Both contend that Sec. 374(h) cannot apply to an arbitration award because the award is not a contract or other instrument of agreement. The unions also suggest that the term binding arbitration in Sec. 376 necessarily requires the Legislature to appropriate funds to honor arbitration awards. Finally, District 2A alleges that an arbitration award is not subject to Sec. 374(h) because such awards do not mandate the appropriation of funds. We shall address these arguments in turn. 17 Appellant argues forcefully that an arbitral award cannot be characterized as a contract or instrument of agreement because the parties do not agree to the award's terms in the conventional sense. Instead, District 2A maintains that the award is imposed on the employees and employer by a third party. According to this view of the arbitration process, the Union suggests that the Legislature intended that Sec. 374(h) apply only to agreements that result from face-to-face collective bargaining negotiations. Amicus's brief echoes this theory, asserting that the mutual consent necessary for a contract or instrument of agreement is lacking when the parties engage in final and binding arbitration. 18 We disagree with this view of the arbitration procedure. Federal labor law views arbitration as an extension of the collective bargaining process rather than an alternative to bargaining. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corporation, 363 U.S. 593, 596, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1360, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). Although fashioned by a third party, the award is nonetheless a product of collective bargaining and, as such, a contract or instrument of agreement within the meaning of Sec. 374(h). 5 19 The UIW and District 2A suggest that the legislative power over appropriations necessary to facilitate an arbitration award is inconsistent with the Act's impasse arbitration procedure. We disagree. It is axiomatic that an arbitration award can bind only the parties to the arbitration. The Act's definition of employer leads us to conclude that the award is final and binding only on the executive branch. Thus Sec. 376's arbitration procedure award by itself cannot require the Legislature to authorize the necessary expenditures. The Legislature's reservation of the power to approve certain awards through Sec. 374(h) merely makes explicit that which is implicit in Sec. 376. 20 Finally, District 2A contends that an arbitration award pursuant to Sec. 376 does not require the Legislature to appropriate funds because the Legislature has delegated its authority to prescribe salary rates for government employees and to appropriate the necessary funds to the arbitration panel. In support, the Union notes that courts have defined interest arbitration between local governments and public employees as a means of delegating the legislative authority to prescribe salaries. See, e.g., Carofano v. City of Bridgeport, 196 Conn. 623, 495 A.2d 1011 (1985); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 37 N.Y.2d 19, 371 N.Y.S.2d 404, 332 N.E.2d 290 (1975); City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Association, 304 A.2d 387 (Me.1973); Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969). These cases discuss the issue of the power of state legislatures to bind city and municipal authorities to arbitration awards, however, and do not address the question in the instant case. In any event, [t]o establish salaries is not to appropriate funds for them. Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation & Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769, 776, 352 N.E.2d 914, 920 (1976). Our construction of the statute convinces us that the Act does not delegate the power to appropriate funds to pay government employees to the arbitration panel. The Act simply directs the government, in its capacity as an employer, to pay a salary set by the arbitration panel subject to the Legislature's final approval.