Opinion ID: 4025929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Speech as Citizen

Text: Although the termination letter Holbrook received cites three speech-based grounds for the decision—i.e., the July 26 e-mail, the Facebook post, and Holbrook’s conversation with the assistant chief of a neighboring fire department—the district court’s ruling and the parties’ briefing below and on appeal have focused primarily on Holbrook’s July 26 e-mail to fire department employees. It was this correspondence that evidently triggered Dumas’s ire—written in “all caps” with multiple exclamation points, informing employees that “we could potentially be out of a job” because closure of the fire department could be imminent, urging employees to attend the next Village Council meeting, and accompanied by the notice of insurance cancellation . . . even before Village leaders discussed the significance of the notice at the July 28 Village Council meeting. Of the three speech-based grounds included in the termination letter, Dumas ostensibly knew only about the July 26 e-mail correspondence when, on August 5, Dumas told Holbrook she would be asking for his resignation after he admitted communicating the potential loss of jobs to employees. R. 22-8, Holbrook Aff. at ¶ 7, Page ID 236. It was this correspondence that Dumas has characterized in her briefing as sensationalized and alarmist, inciting panic among employees, hurting morale, and inducing some to leave the department. It was this correspondence, more than the others, that fits the termination letter description of Holbrook’s “violation” as “disruptive activity in the workplace,” and “insubordination and other disrespectful conduct,” and “unauthorized disclosure of confidential information” and “unsatisfactory performance or conduct.” R. 19-1 Ex. F, Termination Letter, Page ID 152. In his appellate briefing, however, Holbrook has taken a somewhat different tack. He has attempted to blur the focus by relying more heavily on the later communications as speech-based -8- Case No. 15-4334, Holbrook v. Dumas grounds for his termination. He argues that Dumas’s reference to these communications in the termination letter—i.e., communications directed to non-employees—indicates he was disciplined in part due to speech that was not strictly intra-departmental, speech that was not pursuant to his official duties, speech that was “as a citizen.” The district court did not address this argument—and for good reason. Review of the briefing on both motions for summary judgment reveals that the argument was not addressed to the district court. That is, the summary judgment briefing reflects the parties’ mutual understanding that the principal speech-based reason for termination was the July 26 e-mail. Holbrook’s attempt to now attack the district court ruling based on arguments not presented below is improper and entitled to no consideration on appeal. See Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, 759 F.3d 601, 614–15 (6th Cir. 2014) (argument not raised below deemed waived unless plain miscarriage of justice would result). Moreover, as detailed below, careful review of the totality of the circumstances reveals why the July 26 e-mail was the focus below and why we need not address the newly asserted role of the later communications to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Yes, the termination letter mentions the Facebook message—addressed to current and past employees and those who support the fire department—and Holbrook’s assistant chief conversation. By the time Holbrook had disclosed the Facebook post and the assistant chief conversation in his August 8 answers to Dumas, however, the notice of insurance cancellation had already been made public, by Dumas herself, at the July 28 Village Council meeting. 4 The subsequent communications can hardly have provoked Dumas, as they disclosed nothing more than she had already disclosed herself. The impact of Holbrook’s later communications thus 4 In fact, according to Holbrook’s Facebook posting, the Village made a video recording of the Village Council meeting available on-line. -9- Case No. 15-4334, Holbrook v. Dumas appears to have been redundant of the impact of the July 26 e-mail, which is clearly what provoked Dumas. And apart from their nominal inclusion in the termination letter, the record is devoid of evidence—from either side—supporting the notion that either of these communications played a motivating role in the termination decision. Instead, the record evidence is decidedly to the contrary. As indicated above, Holbrook’s affidavit avers that Dumas said she would ask for his resignation on August 5, immediately after he admitted sending the July 26 e-mail to employees, ostensibly before she knew anything about the later communications. Within days, Holbrook sent a letter of formal complaint to Village Mayor LaVerne Mitchell, objecting to the unfairness of Dumas’s anticipated request for his resignation. R. 19-1 Ex. C, Letter to Mayor, Page ID 139. In his protestations to the Mayor, Holbrook complained that he was being punished for telling the employees about the insurance letter and the consequent threat to their employment, information he thought they had a right to know about, and information he thought he, as “Chief,” had a duty to communicate to his employees. Further, Holbrook’s deposition testimony, given eight months later, demonstrates that he continued to believe, unequivocally, that this was the reason for his termination. That is, he believed, “absolutely,” that he was retaliated against because he told employees about the insurance problem. R.19-1, Holbrook Dep. at 63, 66, Page ID 129–30. This “violation” was accomplished by the July 26 e-mail. Given the extant record, the conclusion is practically inescapable that Dumas included the later two communications in the termination letter, communications addressed to nonemployees, simply to buttress the real reason for her decision, her disapproval of the July 26 e- mail. It was clearly the alarmist July 26 e-mail to the firefighters personally that could be reasonably perceived by Dumas as an “unauthorized disclosure,” as “insubordinate and - 10 - Case No. 15-4334, Holbrook v. Dumas disrespectful,” and as “disruptive in the work place.” This was almost certainly the predominant trigger of Dumas’s strong reaction. Indeed, Holbrook readily admitted in deposition that employees’ knowledge of the insurance problem and the threat to their jobs affected morale and contributed to attrition in the fire department. R. 19-1, Holbrook Dep. at 40, Page ID 123. Thus, even if Holbrook’s new reliance on the Facebook post and assistant chief conversation were considered, the conclusion that Holbrook was fired for sending the July 26 e-mail, as Fire Chief, to his employees, enjoys far more support in the record than any other conclusion. The inclusion of the later communications in the termination letter amounts to no more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the newly asserted notion that Holbrook’s communications with nonemployees actually precipitated his firing. Any mischief perceived to have been done by the later communications would appear to have been redundant of, and wholly incidental to, the actual moving cause of Dumas’s decision.5 Hence, the threshold question whether Holbrook engaged in speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern is rightly focused on the July 26 e-mail communication.
Dumas argues, and the district court concluded, that the July 26 e-mail was sent by Holbrook not as a private citizen, but as an employee pursuant to his official duties. In support, the district court cited several circumstances. R. 29, Order at 10, Page ID 317. First, Holbrook used his official Village e-mail account, sent the e-mail to firefighters he supervised, and signed it “Fire Chief.” Second, the e-mail warned the employees that they “could potentially be out of a 5 Unfortunately, there is little evidence directly from Dumas explaining her motivations. She did not file an affidavit and was not deposed. When the extant record materials are viewed as a whole, however, they clearly indicate that the July 26 e-mail was the trigger. This understanding is corroborated by the fact that the parties’ briefing below focused almost exclusively on it. And our review of the district court’s ruling is properly confined to the record made below. - 11 - Case No. 15-4334, Holbrook v. Dumas job.” Third, in his letter to Mayor Mitchell, Holbrook explained that his job required him to “play both Fireman and Chief to my employees” and that he sent the e-mail to employees because he felt it was their right to know about the potential for losing their jobs, recognizing that they had families to support and it could be difficult to find another job quickly. Additionally, Holbrook expressly conceded in his deposition that he sent the information to employees in his “role as fire chief.” R. 19-1, Holbrook Dep. at 44–45, Page ID 124. In concluding that Holbrook communicated pursuant to his official duties, not as a citizen, the district court distinguished Lane v. Franks. In Lane, an employee testified pursuant to subpoena in a criminal prosecution about matters he learned of in the course of his employment. The Court concluded his testimony was speech “as a citizen” even though it concerned his duties as an employee because the speech was not ordinarily within the scope of his duties. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379. The district court explained its reasoning as follows: The critical question “. . . is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties.” Lane, 134 S.Ct. at 2379. Here there is no dispute that Holbrook learned about the insurance situation as a result of his position as Fire Chief. But the determinative question is not how he learned the information, but what he said, where and how he said it, and when he spoke about that information. His own words in the email demonstrate that he communicated the information to his firemen because he was their chief, and he felt he had an obligation to inform them of the situation and that they could be without a job in the near future. R. 29, Order at 14, Page ID 321 (emphasis in original). The district court also distinguished Westmoreland v. Sutherland, 662 F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 2011), where an employee who was off duty and not in uniform spoke during a public comment period at a city council meeting. Finding nothing in the record supporting the claim that he spoke pursuant to his official duties, the court held that he spoke as a citizen. Id., 662 F.3d at 719. Here, in contrast, as the district court noted, the factual record is quite different. The - 12 - Case No. 15-4334, Holbrook v. Dumas instant record is replete with evidence that Holbrook sent the July 26 e-mail in his role as Fire Chief, not simply as a concerned citizen. If, instead of sending the e-mail to his employees from his official e-mail account because he felt duty-bound to do so as Fire Chief, “Holbrook had appeared at the [Village] Council meeting, off duty and not in uniform, and publicly commented about ramifications on his department of a potential loss of insurance coverage,” the district court noted, the question would have been closer. R. 29, Order at 11–12, Page ID 318–19. Holbrook insists the district court’s conclusion is in error. He attacks it on several fronts, all unsuccessfully. First, he contends the e-mail message informed employees about the impending cancellation of the Village’s liability insurance, a subject not ordinarily within the scope of the Fire Chief’s duties. He concedes that the potential loss of the employees’ jobs was a concern, but argues this was a by-product of the loss of insurance. Inasmuch as the cancellation of insurance was precipitated, he contends, by Dumas’s style of management—because it “spawned a large number of actions” against the Village—the e-mail is said not to be addressed only to intra-departmental personnel issues. The district court addressed this argument and, considering the “content, form and context” of the e-mail, concluded Holbrook was speaking as Fire Chief to his employees on a personnel issue. R. 29, Order at 14–15, Page ID 321–22. Citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423–24, the court held such communication was not protected and that Dumas therefore had the right to take corrective action if she believed the communication was inflammatory or misguided. Id. In this we find no error. Holbrook’s attempt to recast the purpose of the e-mail is understandable, but is simply not supported by the record. Yes, the notice of insurance cancellation was attached and was referred to in the body of the message, but the purpose of the e-mail is evident in the text of the message. Holbrook, as Fire Chief, wanted to alert his - 13 - Case No. 15-4334, Holbrook v. Dumas employees as soon as possible to a development he just learned about that potentially jeopardized their employment. He urged them to attend the upcoming Village Council meeting—ostensibly to show their concern about their jobs and to witness how the Council responded to the challenge posed by the notice of insurance cancellation. That this evident purpose was the actual purpose of the communication finds manifold confirmation in the record, from Holbrook himself. From the outset—in his written answers to Dumas, in his letter to Mayor Mitchell, in his deposition testimony, and in his affidavit—Holbrook consistently explained and defended his actions by emphasizing employees’ right to know about this threat to their continued employment, for their benefit. See R. 19-1 Ex. B, Holbrook’s Answers No. 5, Page ID 137; R. 19-1 Ex. C, Letter to Mayor, Page ID 139; R. 19-1, Holbrook Dep. at 37–38, Page ID 121–22; R. 22-8, Holbrook Aff. at ¶ 5, Page ID 235–36. Neither the text of the e-mail message nor the factual record as a whole supports Holbrook’s present characterization of the e-mail’s purpose as reflecting a citizen’s concern about mismanagement in Village government. Among the factors we consider in determining whether an employee’s speech was made pursuant to his official duties rather than as a citizen are the ordinary scope of the employee’s duties, the impetus for the speech, the setting, the audience, and the subject matter of the speech. Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 695 F.3d 531, 540 (6th Cir. 2012); Weisbarth, 499 F.3d at 546. All of these factors support the district court’s conclusion. Holbrook sent the e-mail as Fire Chief, from his official e-mail account, to fire department employees, informing them of a development potentially affecting their employment, out of a sense of duty to them and concern for their well-being. In all these respects, the factual record is undisputed. Holbrook contends that his having sent the e-mail from his official account does not necessarily disqualify the communication from First Amendment protection. Indeed, not “all - 14 - Case No. 15-4334, Holbrook v. Dumas speech within the office is exposed to restriction” by the employer. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. That Holbrook used the Village e-mail account to communicate is not dispositive. What is important is that he communicated, as he conceded, with fire department employees in furtherance of his responsibilities as Fire Chief. “Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.” Id. at 421–22. But Holbrook maintains he did not share the information because he was Fire Chief, but because the employees had the right to know. This after-the-fact “clarification” is hardly persuasive. To the extent Holbrook means to suggest he communicated merely as a concerned friend or citizen, not as Fire Chief, the clarification is directly contradicted by the fact that he signed the e-mail as “Fire Chief,” and by Holbrook’s explicit admissions in his letter to Mayor Mitchell, R.19-1 Ex. C, Page ID 139, and in his deposition testimony, R. 19, Holbrook Dep. at 37–38, 44–45, Page ID 124. Holbrook cannot now substantiate his claim of error simply by contradicting, in legal argument, his previous statements in the factual record that formed the basis for the district court’s ruling. See Aerel, S.R.L. v. PCC Airfoils, L.L.C., 448 F.3d 899, 908– 09 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that a party cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply by contradicting his previous sworn statement). Moreover, Holbrook expressly recognized in his deposition testimony that the employees’ “right to know,” from him in particular, was a function of his obligation to tell them as their Chief. R. 19, Holbrook Dep. at 38, Page ID 123. Even if Holbrook was not specifically required by his job duties to send the July 26 e-mail, it is clear that the communication “owed it existence” to his responsibilities as Fire Chief. This is enough to render it speech “pursuant to his duties” as a public employee and not speech “as a citizen.” See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22; - 15 - Case No. 15-4334, Holbrook v. Dumas Alomari v. Ohio Dep’t of Public Safety, 626 F.App’x 558, 567–68 (6th Cir. 2015); Keeling v. Coffee Cty, Tenn., 541 F.App’x 522, 528 (6th Cir. 2013); Weisbarth, 499 F.3d at 544. Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s holding that Holbrook communicated pursuant to his official duties and that his speech was therefore not protected.