Opinion ID: 2515059
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Retaliatory Discharge/Title VII

Text: [¶ 20] Sheaffer next argues that UW committed a retaliatory termination against her because she participated in protected activity in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964i.e., reporting complaints against the TAC and then providing recorded evidence of the hostile behavior, language, and conduct of the TAC members. UW responds that there is no direct evidence, nor any inference, that it retaliated against Sheaffer because she engaged in any protected activity. [¶ 21] Section 704 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits an employer from discriminating against any of his employees... because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Section 703(a) of the Act defines an unlawful employment practice as follows: It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.] 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). [¶ 22] Where a plaintiff cannot produce direct evidence of an employer's discriminatory intent, the plaintiff may prove his case with circumstantial evidence under the burden-shifting scheme of proof established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). In the instant case, Sheaffer has presented no direct evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of UW. Therefore, she must rely on the McDonnell Douglas framework to establish her cause of action for retaliatory discharge and to survive summary judgment. See Kruzich v. Martin-Harris Gallery, LLC, 2006 WY 7, ¶ 14, 126 P.3d 867, 872-873 (Wyo.2006) (the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme applies in analyzing retaliation claims under Title VII). [¶ 23] Under McDonnell Douglas, the initial burden falls on Sheaffer to demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. Id., ¶ 13, 126 P.3d at 872. If Sheaffer satisfies this initial burden, then a presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. Id. If the employer proffers a legitimate reason, the employee then must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer's explanation is merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination. At this point, the McDonnell Douglas framework, with its presumptions and burden shifting, drops out and the sole issue is whether unlawful discrimination occurred. Id., ¶ 14, 126 P.3d at 873 (internal citations omitted). [¶ 24] To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he engaged in protected opposition to discrimination, (2) that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, and (3) that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1202 (10th Cir. 2006). If a plaintiff is unable to make out a prima facie case, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate. See Aquilino v. Univ. of Kan., 268 F.3d 930, 936 (10th Cir.2001) (reversing district court's denial of a post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law where court held plaintiff did not suffer from an adverse employment action). To establish the first of these elementsparticipation in a protected activitySheaffer need not prove that the conditions against which she protested actually amounted to a violation of Title VII. See id. Rather, she must demonstrate only that she had a good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying challenged actions of the employer violated the law. Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 385 (10th Cir.1984). [¶ 25] Protected activities fall into two distinct categories under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision: (1) opposition to an employer's discriminatory employment practices; or (2) participation in an ongoing investigation or proceeding conducted pursuant to Title VII. Under the opposition clause, an employer is prohibited from discriminating against an employee because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII]. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To qualify for protection under the opposition clause, an employee's behavior need not rise to the level of formal charges of discrimination against his employer. Armstrong v. Index Journal Co., 647 F.2d 441, 448 (4th Cir.1981). Protected activity under the opposition clause includes utilizing informal grievance procedures as well as staging informal protests and voicing one's opinions in order to bring attention to an employer's discriminatory activities. Laughlin v. Metro. Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir.1998) (citing Armstrong, 647 F.2d at 448). To determine whether or not an employee has engaged in legitimate opposition activity, courts traditionally `balance the purpose of [Title VII] to protect persons engaging reasonably in activities opposing ... discrimination, against Congress' equally manifest desire not to tie the hands of employers in the objective selection and control of personnel.' Armstrong, 647 F.2d at 448 (quoting Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 231 (1st Cir.1976)). [¶ 26] Although the district court found that Sheaffer met the first requirement to establish that a prima facie case of retaliation had been met, UW maintains its argument on appeal that Sheaffer failed to meet the first requirement in establishing her prima facie case. We agree with UW. [¶ 27] Sheaffer argues on appeal that she participated in a protected activitythat is, reporting complaints and providing recorded evidence of the hostile, vulgar, unprofessional, abusive, discriminatory and offensive behavior, language and conduct of the TAC membersspecifically, that her workplace could be defined as a hostile work environment. In her complaints, Sheaffer repeatedly criticized the TAC members' conduct, saying that they were partial to UW employees, faculty, and student athletes, and that decisions of the TAC generally lacked consistency. Her final act of protected activity, in her estimation, was presenting the recorded meeting of the TAC to Johnson in an effort to show the hostile work environment. [¶ 28] In order for a hostile work environment claim to survive a summary judgment motion, a plaintiff must show that a rational jury could find that the workplace [was] permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment. Penry v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 155 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir.1998) (citation omitted). To evaluate whether a working environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive, we examine all the circumstances, including: (1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee's work performance. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). In addition, the environment must be both subjectively and objectively hostile or abusive. Id.; see also Davis v. United States Postal Serv., 142 F.3d 1334, 1341 (10th Cir.1998). [¶ 29] The Supreme Court has instructed that courts judging hostility should filter out complaints attacking the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (sex discrimination). This screening is in place to ensure that Congressional enactments do not become trivialized as a civility code. Id. In particular, courts should filter out offhand comments and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious). [¶ 30] Applying these principles, we find that Sheaffer's allegations regarding the behaviors of the TAC fall short of demonstrating a pervasive or severely hostile work environment. The evidence proffered by Sheaffer includes hostile, vulgar, unprofessional, abusive, discriminatory and offensive behavior and gender-based appellate decision-making. Specifically, when considering the TAC's conduct, we cannot conclude that the committee's sometimes off-the-record joking, gossip, and swearing could be considered hostileperhaps unprofessional, but not hostile. There is no evidence, in our estimation, that a hostile work environment, as is defined by civil rights laws, existed in the instant case. Furthermore, we note that Sheaffer never complained of being personally victimized by the allegedly offensive behavior of TAC members, or even present during their allegedly vulgar behavior. [¶ 31] Even if Sheaffer had met her burden of establishing a prima facie case, UW, under its burden, produced legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing Sheaffer. In fact, UW provided three specific, non-discriminatory reasons for her termination: (1) significant misconduct and carelessness by engaging in activities (secret audio taping of the [TAC]) which are detrimental to the operations of UW and which impair UW missions, purposes, and objectives as an institution of higher education and which caused an irreversible erosion of trust; (2) asking a subordinate employee (Paul Kunkel) to implement detrimental activities; and (3) deception and dishonesty in the investigation of the misconduct. UW also explains in the same document listing the reasons for termination that any one of the three reasons given, standing alone, was sufficient cause for termination. [¶ 33] In view of our discussion above, without a prima facie showing of retaliation, Sheaffer's claim fails on appeal.