Opinion ID: 1476426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Inferences from Strangulation

Text: During the charge to the jury, the trial court informed the members that they could draw certain inferences from the manner in which defendant allegedly killed Rosenthal: A homicide or a killing by suffocation in itself would permit you to draw an inference that the defendant's purpose was to take life or cause serious bodily injury resulting in death. Suffocation is commonly understood as a form of violence designed and likely to kill a victim and hence would ordinarily not be used by one whose purpose was not to take a life or to cause serious bodily injury resulting in death. In your deliberations, you may consider the manner and circumstances of the killing and if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant suffocated and killed [Rosenthal] with his hands, you may draw an inference from the manner and circumstances of the killing as to the defendant's purpose or knowledge. Defendant argues that this instruction violated his State and federal due process rights by relieving the State of the burden of proving all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant failed to object to the instruction at trial, and we thus review his claims under the plain error standard. Josephs, supra, 174 N.J. at 98, 803 A. 2d 1074. As noted, we have recognized the critical need for accuracy in jury instructions, particularly in capital cases, and have presumed erroneous instructions on material points to be reversible error. Nelson II, supra, 173 N.J. at 446-47, 803 A. 2d 1; State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 15, 573 A. 2d 1359 (1990). As we observed in State v. Martini, [i]nferences are constitutionally sound so long as the jury is not compelled to accept them and the trier of fact can rationally make the connection between the facts and the inference. 131 N.J. 176, 271-72, 619 A. 2d 1208 (1993) ( Martini I ) (citing County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157-63, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224-27, 60 L.Ed. 2d 777, 792-95 (1979)), overruled in part by, State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 843 A. 2d 974 (2004) ( Fortin II ); see also Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314-15, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1971, 85 L.Ed. 2d 344, 353-54 (1985) (noting that [a] permissive inference violates the Due Process Clause only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury). In Martini I, supra, defendant claimed error in the following instruction: A homicide or a killing with a deadly weapon such as a .32 caliber handgun in itself would permit you to draw an inference that the defendant's purpose was to take life or to cause serious bodily injury resulting in death. A deadly weapon is defined as any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance which, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. In your deliberations you may consider the weapons used, the manner and circumstances of the killing. And if you were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant shot and killed the decedent with a handgun, you may draw an inference from the weapon used and from the manner and circumstances of the killing as to the defendant's purpose or knowledge. [131 N.J. at 270, 619 A. 2d 1208.] We found no error in the instruction, concluding the charge clearly communicated to the jury that the inference was permissive and not mandatory. Id. at 272, 619 A. 2d 1208. In reviewing the instruction as a whole, we noted that the trial court instructed the jury on the State's burden of proof as to every element of the offense, the reasonable doubt standard, and the presumption of innocence. Id. at 269-70, 619 A. 2d 1208. In an analogous context, we have held that the manner of the murder, in conjunction with the defendant's statements or actions, can permit inferences regarding defendant's intent. State v. Bey, 129 N.J. 557, 578, 610 A. 2d 814 (1992) ( Bey III ), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164, 115 S.Ct. 1131, 130 L.Ed. 2d 1093 (1995). In Bey III, after taking into account the horrific assault upon the victim, we concluded that defendant's actions, taken as a whole, were so wantonly brutal that he could have intended only to cause death, or knew that death was practically certain to occur. Id. at 580, 610 A. 2d 814. Here, as in Martini I, supra, the trial court instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence, the non-shifting burden of proof on the State, the reasonable doubt standard, the elements of murder, including culpability, and inferences in general. The charge adequately informed the jury that the inference was permissive. Furthermore, the manner of the murder as described by defendant, in conjunction with defendant's other statements and actions, provided more than a sufficient basis for the jury to infer that defendant purposely or knowingly killed Rosenthal by suffocating her. No error occurred.