Opinion ID: 1991894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Application of Second Injury Fund to Body-as-a-Whole Injury.

Text: The district court reversed the industrial commissioner's conclusion that the Second Injury Fund was liable for any industrial disability attributable to Nelson's 1963 knee injury. The court held that Fund liability is not triggered when the second injury is unscheduled, as it was here. We agree. Iowa Code section 85.64 apportions liability for an industrial disability caused by two successive injuries between the employer and the Second Injury Fund in certain situations: If an employee who has previously lost, or lost the use of, one hand, one arm, one foot, one leg, or one eye, becomes permanently disabled by a compensable injury which has resulted in the loss of or loss of use of another such member or organ, the employer shall be liable only for the degree of disability which would have resulted from the latter injury if there had been no pre-existing disability. In addition to such compensation, and after the expiration of the full period provided by law for the payments thereof by the employer, the employee shall be paid out of the Second Injury Fund created by this division the remainder of such compensation as would be payable for the degree of permanent disability involved after first deducting from such remainder the compensable value of the previously lost member or organ. Under the circumstances specified in the statute, the Fund is responsible only for the difference between the compensation for which the current employer is liable and the total amount of industrial disability from which the employee suffers, reduced by the compensable value of the first injury. Shank, 516 N.W.2d at 812; Braden, 459 N.W.2d at 470. We held in Shank that the statute applies when (1) the employee has either lost, or lost the use of a hand, arm, foot, leg, or eye; (2) the employee sustained the loss, or loss of use of another such member or organ through a work relatedthat is, compensableinjury; and (3) there must be some permanent disability from the injuries. Shank, 516 N.W.2d at 812. The disagreement here centers on the second requirement: Is Nelson's shoulder injury the loss, or loss of use of another such memberthe arm? Before we directly address that question, however, we review the distinction between a scheduled and unscheduled loss. The workers' compensation statute provides a schedule of benefits for injuries to specific members of the body. See Iowa Code § 85.34(2) (1995). The members listed in section 85.34(2) include the fingers, toes, hands, feet, arms, legs, and eyes. Id. Loss of hearing and disfigurement of the face or head are also scheduled injuries under section 85.34(2). Id. Disabilities resulting from injuries other than those listed in section 85.34(2) are considered unscheduled injuries; benefits for unscheduled injuries are based on injury to the body as a whole. Shank, 516 N.W.2d at 813. We have previously held that an injury to a joint such as a hip or shoulder should be treated as an injury to the body as a whole, not as a scheduled injury. Lauhoff Grain Co. v. McIntosh, 395 N.W.2d 834, 837-39 (Iowa 1986); Alm v. Morris Barick Cattle Co., 240 Iowa 1174, 1177, 38 N.W.2d 161, 163 (1949). The ultimate question here is whether an unscheduled injury can trigger Second Injury Fund liability. The commissioner interpreted section 85.64 to require an injury that merely affects a scheduled member; thus, he held that Nelson's unscheduled shoulder injury that affects his arm, a scheduled member, is sufficient to make the Fund liable. This conclusion is inconsistent with the clear language of section 85.64 as well as with our prior cases interpreting the workers' compensation statute. Section 85.64 lists specific members, the injury of which triggers Fund liability. All of the injuries listed are scheduled injuries. We have consistently interpreted the workers' compensation statute as making a clear distinction between scheduled and unscheduled injuries. E.g., Second Injury Fund v. Bergeson, 526 N.W.2d 543, 547 (Iowa 1995); Lauhoff Grain, 395 N.W.2d at 839, 840; Alm, 240 Iowa at 1177, 38 N.W.2d at 163. We find nothing in section 85.64 that would cause us to blur that distinction here. See Lauhoff Grain, 395 N.W.2d at 840 (refusing to apply benefits schedule for injury to the leg merely because the hip impairment affects the leg); see also Taylor v. Pfeiffer Plumbing & Heating Co., 8 Ark.App. 144, 648 S.W.2d 526, 527 (1983) (Even if the effects of the shoulder injury extended into his arm ..., this fact would not make the injury a scheduled one.). As we observed in Lauhoff Grain, the word leg as used in section 85.34 simply does not include a hip. Lauhoff Grain, 395 N.W.2d at 839. Likewise, the word arm as used in section 85.64 simply does not include the shoulder. We conclude that section 85.64 requires two scheduled injuries to invoke Fund liability. See Bergeson, 526 N.W.2d at 548 (Under the statute, a second scheduled injury to a hand, arm, foot, leg or eye, invokes the Fund's liability.) (emphasis added) (dicta); Braden, 459 N.W.2d at 470 (Section 85.64 provides that where an employee suffers two `scheduled' losses, the employer is only liable for ...) (emphasis added) (dicta); Harry W. Dahl, The Iowa Second Injury FundTime For Change, 39 Drake L.Rev. 101, 105, 108, 119 (1989-90) (observing that Iowa's second injury fund law provides narrow coverage because it does not cover all types of preexisting impairments, that Iowa's law limit[s] coverage to specific `schedule' losses and that both the first and second injuries must be to a scheduled part named in the Iowa Act). We disavow any contrary implication in Second Injury Fund v. Mich Coal Co., 274 N.W.2d 300, 304 (Iowa 1979). See Second Injury Fund v. Neelans, 436 N.W.2d 355, 357 (Iowa 1989) (noting that it was unclear whether the second injury in the Mich Coal case was a scheduled or unscheduled injury). Because Nelson's shoulder injury is not a scheduled injury and therefore, does not fall within section 85.64, the Second Injury Fund has no liability. The district court correctly ruled that the commissioner erred in holding otherwise.