Opinion ID: 2571543
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Womac's Convictions for Counts II and III Should be Vacated

Text: ¶ 29 The Court of Appeals' conditional dismissal of Womac's lesser charges and verdicts, allowing for reinstatement if the greater verdict and sentence are later set aside, is entirely without support. Womac, 130 Wash.App. at 458-59, 123 P.3d 528. The State may bring (and a jury may consider) multiple charges arising from the same criminal conduct in a single proceeding. State v. Freeman, 153 Wash.2d 765, 770, 108 P.3d 753 (2005) (citing State v. Michielli, 132 Wash.2d 229, 238-39, 937 P.2d 587 (1997)). Courts may not, however, enter multiple convictions for the same offense without offending double jeopardy. Freeman, 153 Wash.2d at 771, 108 P.3d 753. ¶ 30 The State declares the Court of Appeals' approach is consistent with the trial court's ruling in [Womac's] case, which was to let the jury verdict stand but not enter judgment and sentence on the conviction. Supplemental Br. of Resp't at 3. The State continues, [i]t is only when the court enters a judgment and sentence that double jeopardy issues arise and vacation is required. Id. at 3-4. But here, the trial court did enter judgment on Counts II and III declaring both convictions valid while clarifying that imposing separate punishments would violate double jeopardy provisions. See CP at 28 (J. & Sent.), 37-38 (App. A to J. & Sent.). ¶ 31 In State v. Ward, 125 Wash.App. 138, 104 P.3d 61 (2005) the jury found the defendant guilty of second degree felony murder and alternatively first degree manslaughter (a lesser included offense of second degree intentional murder). The trial court entered a judgment and sentence solely on the second degree felony murder conviction; the court denied the defendant's motion to vacate the first degree manslaughter conviction and did not mention the jury's finding of guilt on the manslaughter conviction in the judgment and sentence. The judgment and sentence for Ward's second degree felony murder was vacated. Ward argued he could not be charged, tried, or sentenced for first degree manslaughter because the manslaughter verdict should have been vacated, or was vacated by operation of law, and that once vacated, the verdict is no longer available for the court to revive. Id. at 144, 104 P.3d 61. The Court of Appeals determined convicting and sentencing a defendant for both second degree felony murder and first degree manslaughter would violate double jeopardy and found where there is a violation of double jeopardy the remedy is to vacate one of the convictions and sentences. Id. But the court found no double jeopardy violation in Ward's case as the judge entered judgment and sentenced Ward only on the second degree felony murder charge. Id. And because there was no violation of double jeopardy, reasoned the court, the trial court was not required to vacate Ward's manslaughter charge. Id. ¶ 32 Ward is distinguishable from the present case. Here, there was a double jeopardy violation because Womac's judgment included all three convictions; therefore, vacation of the convictions for Counts II and III is required. Also, Womac was never charged in the alternative; instead, he was charged with three separate offenses in a single proceeding. Womac correctly argues, a court has no authority to take a verdict on another charge . . ., find that it violates double jeopardy . . ., not sentence the defendant . . . on it[,] and just . . . hold it in abeyance for a later time. 7 VRP at 1074. ¶ 33 In Trujillo, 112 Wash.App. 390, 49 P.3d 935, a jury convicted four defendants of first degree assault, and in the alternative, first degree attempted murder. [9] The Court of Appeals stated, where the jury returns a verdict of guilty on each alternative charge, the court should enter a judgment on the greater offense only and sentence the defendant on that charge without reference to the verdict on the lesser offense. Id. at 411, 49 P.3d 935. The Court of Appeals reasoned since the verdict for first degree assault was not reduced to judgment, it does not subject the appellants to any future jeopardy. Id. The court also mentioned that if the jury's verdict on assault was in fact reduced to judgment, the trial court should enter an order vacating the assault judgment. Id. at 412 n. 15, 49 P.3d 935. ¶ 34 Again, Womac was not charged in the alternative. He was charged with homicide by abuse, murder in the second degree, and assault in the second degree, all separate counts as separate charges. And Womac's convictions were in fact reduced to judgment. Accordingly, we direct the trial court to vacate counts II and III. See Ball, 470 U.S. at 864-65, 105 S.Ct. 1668; State v. Weber, 159 Wash.2d 252, 265-66, 149 P.3d 646 (2006); Schwab, 98 Wash.App. at 180, 988 P.2d 1045 (remedy for double jeopardy violation is to vacate one of the underlying convictions).