Opinion ID: 600266
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Combination of Lesser-Included and Greater Offenses.

Text: 12 At sentencing, the district court imposed concurrent sentences for the convictions on count 1 (CCE) and count 2 (conspiracy to distribute cocaine). Lindsay points out, and the government agrees, that this was error. 13 Since Lindsay's narcotics conspiracy conviction is a lesser-included offense of the CCE violation, see United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 60, 73 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043, 108 S.Ct. 2035, 100 L.Ed.2d 620 (1988), it cannot be treated as a separate conviction for sentencing purposes. In the past, when the sentencing court has imposed a separate sentence on a lesser-included charge, we have vacated that sentence, but we generally have declined to vacate the lesser-included conviction. Instead, we have remanded the matter to the district court so that the lesser-included conviction may be  'combined' with the conviction on the greater offense, although it is not 'merged out of existence.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Osorio Estrada, 751 F.2d 128, 135 (2d Cir.1984), modified on reh'g on other grounds, 757 F.2d 27, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830, 106 S.Ct. 97, 88 L.Ed.2d 79 (1985)). 14 We have previously acknowledged that our practice of combining convictions for lesser-included offenses with convictions for greater offenses is somewhat inconsistent with the Supreme Court's practice as described in Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985), where the Court held that a convicted felon who handled a firearm on one occasion could not be punished for both receiving, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(h), and possessing, see 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a)(1), a firearm. 15 The district court in Ball had imposed concurrent sentences for the two violations, but the Supreme Court held that having the sentences run concurrently still did not cure the double-punishment problem, citing to the potential adverse collateral consequences that stem from a separate conviction. See id., 470 U.S. at 865, 105 S.Ct. at 1673 (collateral consequences might include delayed parole eligibility, increased sentence under recidivist statute for future offense, and impeachment of defendant's credibility). Instead, the Court remanded to the district court to exercise its discretion by vacating one of the two convictions. 16 In United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621 (2d Cir.1985), decided after Ball, we noted that Ball did not address the possibility that the greater offense on which the district court imposed judgment on remand might subsequently be reversed, and thereby permit the defendant to completely escape punishment for his crime. Id. at 634. Thus, we continued our pre-Ball practice of combining a lesser-included conviction into a greater conviction, see, e.g., Osorio Estrada, 751 F.2d at 135, concluding that 17 there is no practical difference between the Supreme Court's prescription to vacate a conviction and our practice of 'combining' a lesser conviction into a conviction on a greater offense, except that if the conviction on the greater offense were eventually to be overturned, our practice would, by design, resuscitate the lesser conviction and thereby ensure that the defendant would not avoid punishment for the lesser crime. We do not believe that the potential to reactivate a conviction in this way creates impermissible cumulative punishments. 18 Aiello, 771 F.2d at 634 n. 6 (emphasis in original). 19 We generally have followed this procedure. See, e.g., United States v. Avelino, 967 F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir.1992) (vacating and remanding to the district court to combine two counts where defendant was convicted under separate statutory provisions for the same conduct); Benevento, 836 F.2d at 73 (vacating lesser-included narcotics-conspiracy sentence and remanding to district court to combine conviction on lesser offense with CCE conviction); Aiello, 771 F.2d at 634 (vacating sentences for two narcotics-conspiracy counts and one CCE count and remanding to district court to combine lesser-included conspiracy counts with CCE count). In United States v. Coiro, 922 F.2d 1008, 1015 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2826, 115 L.Ed.2d 996 (1991), however, we cited Ball and remanded to the district court to vacate one of two convictions. Coiro involved a defendant convicted of two violations of the same statutory provision, and we determined that the statute did not authorize multiple prosecutions of the defendant's conduct. In that case, vacation of one of the convictions--rather than merging the convictions--was appropriate, because the statute only permitted a single conviction for the conduct at issue. With greater and lesser-included offenses, however, the government is authorized to prosecute the defendant for both crimes, so the merging of the convictions is allowable in the event that the greater conviction is subsequently reversed. 20 Thus, with the government's consent, we vacate Lindsay's sentence on count 2 and remand to the district court for resentencing on counts 1 and 2 after combining the conviction on the lesser count, count 2, with the greater conviction, count 1. See, e.g., Benevento, 836 F.2d at 73; Aiello, 771 F.2d at 634. Thus, Lindsay's conviction on the cocaine conspiracy would have future effect only in the event his conviction on count 1, CCE, should be later overturned. See Benevento, 836 F.2d at 73. 21