Opinion ID: 4253284
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Text of the CWA

Text: “It is well settled that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself.” Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 56 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When interpreting a statute, we first use the “traditional tools of statutory construction,” to determine whether Congress directly addressed the “precise question at issue.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. If the precise question at issue is addressed, then the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress” controls. Id. at 843. A “clear and unambiguous” statutory provision is one in which the meaning is not 8 OLYMPIC FOREST COALITION V. COAST SEAFOODS contradicted by other language in the same act. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 460–62 (2002); United States v. Rosenthal, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 454 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2006). The CWA defines “point source” as follows: The term “point source” means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (emphases added). It is undisputed that discharges from point sources must obtain NPDES permits. It is also undisputed that under § 1362(14) “pipe[s], ditch[es], [and] channel[s]” are point sources, and that a CAAPF, a kind of “concentrated animal feeding operation,” is also a point source. The disputed question is whether pipes, ditches, and channels that discharge pollutants from a non-concentrated aquatic animal production facility are point sources. The key to interpreting § 1362(14) is the word “any.” The CWA requires an NPDES permit for the “discharge of any pollutant.” 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (emphasis added). The Act defines “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other than a vessel or other floating OLYMPIC FOREST COALITION V. COAST SEAFOODS 9 craft.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (emphasis added). And, as quoted above, the Act provides that “any . . . conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, . . . concentrated animal feeding operation,” is a “point source.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). The Supreme Court has interpreted the term “any” as being broad and all-encompassing. See United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531–32 (1995) (broadly construing the word “any” in tax refund statute) (emphasis added). We have similarly interpreted “any.” See Lockett v. Ericson, 656 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that an “any issue determined therein” clause is all-inclusive); Barker v. Riverside Cty. Office of Educ., 584 F.3d 821, 825–26 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that “any person aggrieved” and “any individual” are all-inclusive phrases); Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362, 1373 (9th Cir. 1978) (interpreting the term “any” broadly under forfeiture law). The meaning of a statutory provision is also determined by placing the language in context — both the specific context in which it is used and the broader context of the overall statute. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 477 (1992); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991). Where exceptions or exemptions are meant in the CWA, they are expressly provided. For example, the Act carves out exemptions for what constitutes a “pollutant,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6), what constitute “coastal recreation waters,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(21), what constitute “recreational vessels,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(25), and what constitutes a “point source,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). Further, the “point source” definition expressly exempts “agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.” 10 OLYMPIC FOREST COALITION V. COAST SEAFOODS 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). The Act does not exempt point source conveyances, such as pipes, ditches, and channels, that discharge pollutants from aquatic animal production facilities that are not CAAPFs. We therefore conclude, as a matter of the plain meaning of the text of the CWA, that “pipes, ditches, channels,” and “concentrated animal feeding operations” that discharge pollutants into navigable waters are all “point sources” subject to the NPDES permit requirement. See Brown, 640 F.3d at 1071 (relying on the “clarity of the text” of the CWA to hold that a “system of ditches, culverts, and channels” collecting storm water runoff was a point source); Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1185–86 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on the “clear and unambiguous” text of CWA to hold that an aircraft spraying insecticide was point source). We further conclude, as a necessary corollary, that pipes, ditches, and channels that discharge pollutants from an aquatic animal production facility that is not a CAAPF are point sources for which an NPDES permit is required.