Opinion ID: 1934995
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 38

Heading: Actual Voting Power Exceeds 25%

Text: The first objective premise relied upon by the Court of Chancery, unsupported by the record, is that the shareholder directors needed to implement the Repurchase Program to attain voting power in a proxy contest equal to 25%. The Court of Chancery properly calculated that if the Repurchase Program was completed, Unitrin's shareholder directors would increase their absolute voting power to 25%. It then calculated the odds of American General marshalling enough votes to defeat the Board and its supporters. [27] The Court of Chancery and all parties agree that proxy contests do not generate 100% shareholder participation. The shareholder plaintiffs argue that 80-85% may be a usual turnout. Therefore, without the Repurchase Program, the director shareholders' absolute voting power of 23% would already constitute actual voting power greater than 25% in a proxy contest with normal shareholder participation below 100%. See Berlin v. Emerald Partners, Del.Supr., 552 A.2d 482 (1989). [28]