Opinion ID: 2443531
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Warrantless Search and Seizure of Nadeau's Flash Drive Were Lawful Due to Nadeau's Consent

Text: [¶ 16] Nadeau argues for the suppression of the flash drive and the data stored on the flash drive because he never consented to its seizure by the police. He contends that neither his words nor his gestures constituted an objective manifestation of consent and that he turned the flash drive over to the police only in response to their persistent demands.
[¶ 17] A search conducted pursuant to consent is one of the well-settled and established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Consent must be given freely and voluntarily. State v. Seamen's Club, 1997 ME 70, ¶ 7, 691 A.2d 1248, 1251. The State has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that an objective manifestation of consent was given by word or gesture. Id. [¶ 18] A court's factual findings addressing the existence of consent are reviewed for clear error. See, e.g., Bailey, 2010 ME 15, ¶ 19, 989 A.2d at 722. The ultimate question of whether the facts, as found, establish that an individual consented to the ensuing search and seizure is a distinctly legal question that we will review de novo. This approach is consistent with the bifurcated standard of review that the United States Supreme Court and this Court apply to a variety of analogous issues with constitutional import. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112, 115-17, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985) (applying clear error standard of review to factual findings and de novo review for conclusions of law to determine voluntariness); see also State v. Dion, 2007 ME 87, ¶ 22, 928 A.2d 746, 750 (We [re]view a decision on whether a person was in custody as a mixed question of fact and law.). [3] We treat consent as a mixed question of law and fact because the ultimate issue of whether consent was given and, if given, the scope of that consent, [4] has a uniquely legal dimension arising from core constitutional values. See State v. Tuplin, 2006 ME 83, ¶ 13, 901 A.2d 792, 796 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 19] The recorded interview between the University Police and Nadeau indicates that he verbally consented to the seizure of the flash drive. After Officer Hart stated, Ah, we, we need to have that, Officer Irving stated, Absolutely Yeah. Officer Hart then asked, Alright? to which Nadeau responded, Yup. Moreover, the officers testified that Nadeau, upon being confronted about possessing child pornography, voluntarily moved towards his desk to retrieve the flash drive before he gave it to the police. Thus, Nadeau's verbal consent was consistent with his physical actions. These findings are sufficient to support the ultimate conclusion that Nadeau consented to the seizure of the flash drive by the police. The court did not commit clear error in its factual findings, and we discern no error in the court's ultimate conclusion that Nadeau consented to the search and seizure of the flash drive.
[¶ 20] Nadeau asserts that even if he is found to have consented to the seizure of the flash drive, his consent cannot be construed as having extended beyond the initial impoundment of the flash drive by the police. Thus, he argues that even if we conclude that the seizure of the flash drive was lawful, the ensuing warrantless search of the digital information contained in the flash drive was unlawful because the search was conducted without a warrant and in the absence of any exception to the warrant requirement. Nadeau also relies on our recent decision in Bailey, 2010 ME 15, 989 A.2d 716, for the proposition that the court erred in this case because it relied on subjective factors to determine the scope of his consent. [¶ 21] In Bailey, a police officer was investigating a lead regarding the dissemination of child pornography through a network program connected to the Internet. 2010 ME 15, ¶ 4, 989 A.2d at 718-19. The officer appeared at the defendant's home and asked the defendant for permission to examine the defendant's computer. Id. ¶ 7, 989 A.2d at 719. The reason given by the officer for the search was to determine whether others had improperly accessed the computer over the Internet. Id. Having been provided access to the computer, the officer ran a general search for all of the video files on [the defendant's] computer. Id. ¶ 28, 989 A.2d at 725. We concluded that the court erred in considering subjective factors when determining the scope of the defendant's consent because such factors are inconsistent with the standard of objective reasonableness by which a person's manifestation of consent is measured. Id. Applying the objective reasonableness standard, we determined that the officer's search exceeded the scope of the defendant's consent because the search was not consistent with [its] stated purpose. [5] Id. [¶ 22] Here, the court's conclusion that Nadeau consented to the search of the flash drive was based in part on subjective factors. Specifically, the court cited both Nadeau's intelligence and his prior dealings with law enforcement in reaching its conclusion that his consent extended to the search of the flash drive. Nevertheless, the court's other factual findings, independent of these subjective considerations, provide ample support for its conclusion that the scope of Nadeau's consent included consent to access the digital information stored on the flash drive. At the outset of the interview with Nadeau, the officers explicitly informed Nadeau that they were investigating a complaint that he possessed child pornography. In response, Nadeau acknowledged that he was in possession of child pornography stored on his flash drive. The police then explained that they would need to take the flash drive, and Nadeau handed it to them. [¶ 23] Within the context of the specific encounter between the officers and Nadeau, Nadeau's words and gestures communicated his implicit consent to the search of the digital information stored on the flash drive that he handed to the officers. See United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1113, 1120 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that the defendant gave implied consent to a search of his person by placing his hands on his head in response to the officer's request to search him). [6] The police were abundantly clear that the reason for and object of their investigation was child pornography. The object of their search was not limited to the flash drive itself, but plainly extended to any child pornography stored in the drive's digital memory. Moreover, when Nadeau handed the flash drive to the officers, he expressed no limitations on what they might do with it. Viewed objectively, a person in Nadeau's situation would have reasonably understood that the act of voluntarily handing the flash drive to the police was tantamount to handing over the child pornography itself. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (determining that under the circumstances presented, it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondents' car included consent to search containers within that car).
[¶ 24] Having concluded that Nadeau consented to the seizure and search of the flash drive, we next consider Nadeau's assertion that he subsequently withdrew his consent. Nadeau contends that his mother's testimony that she requested the return of the device contradicts the court's finding that there was no evidence that he withdrew his consent to the seizure of the flash drive. He also contends that the court erred in concluding that a parent cannot assert constitutional rights for his or her adult children. [¶ 25] Nadeau's argument that he withdrew his consent to the seizure and search of the flash drive is unpersuasive. [T]he law generally requires that the withdrawal of consent amount to an unequivocal act or statement of withdrawal. ( United States v. Cadieux, 324 F.Supp.2d 168, 170 (D.Me.2004) (quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir.2005) (Withdrawal of consent need not be effectuated through particular magic words, but an intent to withdraw consent must be made [known] by unequivocal act or statement. (quotation marks omitted)). [¶ 26] There was no evidence that Nadeau personally expressed, directly or otherwise, a desire to withdraw his consent to the search and seizure of the flash drive. In addition, the court was not compelled to accept the mother's testimony that she was acting as her son's authorized agent when she requested the return of the computer and the flash drive from Chief Blais. Although a college student, Nadeau was an adult at the time of these events. There is no presumption at law that the parent of an adult child is acting as the child's authorized agent in matters affecting the child, nor was the court required to find the same as a matter of fact based solely on the mother's claim. Based on the evidence before it, the court was not required to conclude that there was an unequivocal withdrawal of consent.