Opinion ID: 3049934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: quid pro quo issues

Text: All defendant-appellants argue that their bribery convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 66633 must be vacated because the Indictment failed to allege, and the government failed to prove, the contractor-defendants gave specific benefits to County employees in exchange for, and with the intent that, the employees perform 32 Defendant Roland Pugh called Barber to testify that he (Barber) never met Roland Pugh until after the relevant time period and that Barber did not have an intent to be influenced by the trips that PUGH bought for him. 33 The defendant-appellants’ § 666 convictions are: (1) McNair, Counts 1-3, 5-12, 32; (2) Swann, Counts 51-54, 57, 58, 60; (3) PUGH, Counts 1, 15, 51, 61-63, 71, 75, 78, 83-86; (4) Roland Pugh, Count 1; (5) RAST, Counts 1, 19-24, 51, 66, 67, 72, 87; (6) Bobby Rast, Counts 1, 19-22, 51, 66, 67, 72, 87; (7) Danny Rast, Counts 1, 19, 20, 22; (8) FWDE, Counts 1, 28, 51, 69; and (9) Dougherty, Counts 1, 28, 51, 69. 49 a specific official act, termed a quid pro quo.34 The defendant-appellants also argue the district court erred, at a minimum, by refusing to charge the jury that the government must prove a specific quid pro quo. We begin by reviewing the relevant parts of § 666.35
Section 666 proscribes theft and bribery in connection with programs of local governments receiving federal funds.36 Section 666(a)(1)(B) criminalizes a local government employee’s “corruptly” soliciting or accepting a bribe: (a) Whoever . . . 34 Black’s Law Dictionary defines quid pro quo as follows: “An action or thing that is exchanged for another action or thing of more or less equal value; a substitute.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1367 (9th ed. 2009). Defendants argue the government must prove a specific or identifiable thing of value was exchanged for a specific or identifiable official act. 35 The interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. United States v. Searcy, 418 F.3d 1193, 1195 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mazarky, 499 F.3d 1246, 1248 (11th Cir. 2007). Whether an indictment is sufficient is also a question of law reviewed de novo. United States v. Steele, 178 F.3d 1230, 1233 (11th Cir. 1999). “An indictment is sufficient if it: (1) presents the essential elements of the charged offense, (2) notifies the accused of the charges to be defended against, and (3) enables the accused to rely upon a judgment under the indictment as a bar against double jeopardy for any subsequent prosecution for the same offense.” Id. at 1233-34 (quotation marks omitted). 36 A predicate to a § 666 offense is that the defendant must be an agent of an “organization, government, or agency [that] receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(b). It is undisputed that Jefferson County received the requisite amount of federal funds and that McNair, Swann, Wilson, Barber, Chandler, Ellis, and Creel were employees and thus agents of Jefferson County. 50 (1) being an agent[37 ] of [a] local . . . government, or any agency thereof-- .... (B) corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such . . . government, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or more; or shall be fined . . . , imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B). Defendants McNair, Swann, Wilson, and Barber, as Jefferson County employees, violated § 666(a)(1)(B) if: (1) they solicited or accepted anything of value; (2) with the corrupt intent to be influenced or rewarded; (3) in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of Jefferson County involving anything of value of $5,000 or more.38 Id. The 37 As to “agent,” the district court in the McNair trial charged the jury: “The term ‘agent’ means a person authorized to act on behalf of a local government and includes an employee, officer, manager or representative of a local government. Jefferson County, Alabama is a local government of Alabama.” In the Swann, Barber, and Wilson trials, the district court charged the jury: “The term ‘agent’ as relevant to this case means any employee, officer, director, manager or representative of a local government. Jefferson County, Alabama, is a local government of Alabama.” 38 The $5,000 in § 666(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2) refers to the value of the “business, transaction, or series of transactions,” not the value of the bribe. See United States v. Zimmermann, 509 F.3d 920, 927 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding a benefit of more than $5,000 received for less than $5,000 in bribes was sufficient for a § 666(a)(1)(B) conviction); see also Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57, 118 S. Ct. 469, 473 (1997) (“Subject to the $5,000 threshold for the business or transaction in question, the statute forbids acceptance of a bribe by a covered official . . . .”); United States v. Castro, 89 F.3d 1443, 1454 (11th Cir. 1996) (describing in dicta the $5,000 element in § 666(a)(2) as “in connection with any business transaction [sic] or series of transactions”); but see United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 521 (6th Cir.) (stating in dicta that “§ 666 contains . . . a requirement that the illegal gift or bribe be worth over $5,000”), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 739 (2009). Where the bribe-giver receives an intangible benefit, some courts 51 counts in the Indictment as to McNair and Swann track the language of the statute. Section 666(a)(2) also criminalizes “corruptly” offering or giving a bribe to a local government employee: (a) Whoever . . . .... (2) corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give anything of value to any person, with intent to influence or reward an agent of [a] . . . local . . . government, or any agency thereof, in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or more; shall be fined . . . , imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. Id. § 666(a)(2). The contractor-defendants — PUGH, Roland Pugh, RAST, Bobby Rast, Danny Rast, FWDE, and Dougherty — violated § 666(a)(2) if: (1) they gave to a County employee anything of value; (2) with the corrupt intent to influence or reward them; (3) in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of Jefferson County involving anything of value of $5,000 or more. Id. The counts in the Indictment as to these contractor-defendants also track the language of § 666(a)(2). have used the bribe amount as a proxy to stand for the value of the business or transaction. See United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1194 (5th Cir. 1996) (using, under § 666(a)(1)(B), the more than $5,000 paid to sheriff to determine the value of conjugal visits received by prisoner); United States v. Fernandes, 272 F.3d 938, 944 (7th Cir. 2001) (using the value of bribes to prosecutor, under § 666(a)(1)(B), where prosecutor received bribes in exchange for his expunging the bribe-givers’ DUI convictions). Here, the parties do not dispute that the $5,000 level was met. 52 It is well established in this Circuit that an indictment is sufficient if it tracks the language of the statute and provides a statement of facts that gives notice of the offense to the accused. See United States v. Jordan, 582 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Walker, 490 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Sharpe, 438 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1299 (11th Cir. 2006). By listing the items of value received or given by the defendants, each count of the Indictment provides sufficient facts and circumstances to give adequate notice of the charges to be defended against. Thus, we readily determine the Indictment itself was not defective for failure to allege a specific quid pro quo.
Nonetheless, this does not resolve whether the language in § 666(a)(1)(B) or (a)(2) effectively requires the government to prove a specific quid pro quo to obtain a § 666 conviction. This question has been before this Court twice before but only under plain error review, and even then, we did not squarely answer it. See United States v. US Infrastructure, 576 F.3d at 1212-14; United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266, 1289 (11th Cir. 1996). In Paradies, the defendant claimed that the district court erred in failing to charge the jury that a quid pro quo was an element required to convict under § 666 53 Id. at 1289. This Court did not decide if quid pro quo was an element but concluded there was no reversible jury charge error because the jury charge tracked the statutory language of § 666 and the defendant did not object to the charge. Id. The Paradies Court also rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. The Paradies Court stated: “the evidence at trial was sufficient for a jury to find that Jackson [the official] accepted payments for his votes and his influence upon the City Council and the administration,” and “[s]uch a finding would satisfy any quid pro quo requirement under the statute.” Id. In other words, Paradies concluded that even if § 666 requires a quid pro quo, that requirement is satisfied by showing a series of payments intended generally to influence the official’s decisions. Subsequently, our United States v. US Infrastructure decision involved an appeal from the fifth trial (the USI trial, 05-543) that arose out of the Indictment here. US Infrastructure, 576 F.3d at 1202-03. The defendants in US Infrastructure argued the jury charges on the § 666 counts were erroneous because they did not include their proposed instruction that the jury must find a specific quid pro quo to convict under § 666. Id. at 1213. This Court concluded that the district court “did not commit plain error by refusing [defendants’] quid pro quo [jury] instruction.” Id. at 1214. As its sole basis for this conclusion, US Infrastructure stated this 54 Court had already rejected this argument in two prior cases: “This Court has rejected the argument that the government must ‘show a direct quid pro quo relationship between [the defendants] and an agent of the agency receiving federal funds.’” US Infrastructure, 576 F.3d at 1214 (quoting United States v. Castro, 89 F.3d 1443, 1454 (11th Cir. 1996), and citing Paradies, 98 F.3d at 1289). However, as shown above, Paradies did not actually make a holding to that effect. Neither did United States v. Castro.39 Nonetheless, US Infrastructure itself holds a specific quid pro quo is not required for a § 666 conviction. Because US Infrastructure was only plain error review, we now make the same holding but under de novo review. We begin with the statutory language itself.40 Importantly, § 666(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2) do not contain the Latin phrase quid pro quo. Nor do those sections 39 In Castro, the issue was whether § 666(a)(2) required that the bribe-givers intended to enter into a direct exchange with an agent of an entity receiving the federal funds, or if it was sufficient that they offered the bribe to a third-person middleman with the intent to influence that agent by having that middleman authorize that agent to issue payments to the defendants. Castro, 89 F.3d at 1453-54. The Castro Court concluded that “influence” under § 666 could be exercised indirectly and that it was sufficient that the defendants intended to influence the agent by causing a middleman to authorize the agent to issue payments. Id. Although in reaching this conclusion the Castro Court stated, “[w]e reject appellants’ suggestion that the government had to show a direct quid pro quo relationship between [the defendants] and an agent of the agency receiving federal funds,” id., Castro was addressing whether there was a “directness” requirement between the bribe-giver and the agent and did not answer the question before us here. 40 “When construing a criminal statute, [this Court] begin[s] with the plain language; where ‘the language Congress chose to express its intent is clear and unambiguous, that is as far as we go to ascertain its intent because we must presume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said.’” United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1250 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc)). 55 contain language such as “in exchange for an official act” or “in return for an official act.” In short, nothing in the plain language of § 666(a)(1)(B) nor § 666(a)(2) requires that a specific payment be solicited, received, or given in exchange for a specific official act. To accept the defendants’ argument would permit a person to pay a significant sum to a County employee intending the payment to produce a future, as yet unidentified favor without violating § 666. The requirement of a “corrupt” intent in § 666 does narrow the conduct that violates § 666 but does not impose a specific quid pro quo requirement. In all the trials consolidated in this appeal, the district court’s jury charge, with slight variations, defined “corruptly” as follows: “An act is done ‘corruptly’ if it is performed voluntarily, deliberately and dishonestly for the purpose of either accomplishing an unlawful end or result or of accomplishing some otherwise lawful end or lawful result by an[y] unlawful method or means.” It is acting “corruptly” — dishonestly seeking an illegal goal or a legal goal illegally — that separates permissible from criminal. The addition of a corrupt mens rea avoids prosecution for acceptable business practices.41 41 We do not read the definitional language of “corrupt” to impose a quid pro quo requirement. In any event, the district court charged that definition. It also has been suggested that § 666’s language — a thing of value given with corrupt intent to influence — effectively constitutes a quid pro quo in that the payment is made for influence. This at best would be “quid pro quo light.” Even if one views § 666 this way, the district court charged the language of the § 666 statute. 56 For all of these reasons, we now expressly hold there is no requirement in § 666(a)(1)(B) or (a)(2) that the government allege or prove an intent that a specific payment was solicited, received, or given in exchange for a specific official act, termed a quid pro quo. As to the defendant County employees, the government must show only what § 666(a)(1)(B) says: that a County employee “corruptly” accepted “anything of value” with the intent “to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions” of the County. And as to the contractor-defendants, the government must show only what § 666(a)(2) says: that the defendant “corruptly” gave “anything of value” to a County employee with the intent “to influence or reward” that person “in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions” of the County. To be sure, many § 666 bribery cases will involve an identifiable and particularized official act, but that is not required to convict. Simply put, the government is not required to tie or directly link a benefit or payment to a specific official act by that County employee. The intent that must be proven is an intent to corruptly influence or to be influenced “in connection with any business” or “transaction,” not an intent to engage in any specific quid pro quo.42 42 The defendant-appellants rely on United States v. Siegelman, 561 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3083 (U.S. Aug. 10, 2009) (No. 09-167), 78 57
In concluding § 666 does not require a specific quid pro quo, we align ourselves with the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. See United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 520 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 739 (2009) (stating “the text says nothing of a quid pro quo requirement to sustain a conviction” and “while a quid pro quo of money for a specific legislative act is sufficient to violate [§ 666(a)(1)(B) or (a)(2)], it is not necessary”) (quotation marks omitted); United States v. Gee, 432 F.3d 713, 714-15 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that “[a] quid pro quo of money for a specific legislative act” is not necessary under § 666(a)(1)(B) and that an exchange of money for the official’s “influence” was enough); United States v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 1183, 1190 (7th Cir. 1997) (“We decline to import an U.S.L.W. 3090 (U.S. Aug. 10, 2009) (No. 09-182), and United States v. Massey, 89 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1996), but neither case answers the question here. In Siegelman, the district court gave a quid pro quo instruction in response to the defendant’s request. The district court instructed the jury that they could not convict unless “the defendant and official agree that the official will take specific action in exchange for the thing of value.” Siegelman, 56 F.3d at 1225. This Court stated “[s]o, whether or not a quid pro quo instruction was legally required, such an instruction was given,” and “[t]herefore assuming a quid pro quo instruction was required in this case, we find no reversible error.” Id. at 1225, 1227. In Massey, “[t]he jury convicted [attorney] Massey of one count of bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) finding that Massey purchased [Judge] Sepe’s lunches at Buccione in exchange for court appointments.” Massey, 89 F.3d at 1439. This Court rejected Massey’s claim that the government was required to produce direct evidence of a verbal or written agreement to this effect and stated “inferences drawn from relevant and competent circumstantial evidence” were sufficient. Id. (quotation marks omitted). The quid pro quo issue here was not raised or discussed in Massey. The fact that the evidence of a specific exchange was sufficient to sustain the § 666(a)(2) bribery conviction in Massey does not mean one is required to obtain a § 666(a)(2) conviction here. 58 additional, specific quid pro quo requirement into the elements of § 666(a)(2).”); but see United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1014 (4th Cir. 1998) (concluding the “corrupt intent” element in § 666 requires the government to prove a quid pro quo, but stating the “quid pro quo requirement is satisfied so long as the evidence shows a ‘course of conduct of favors and gifts flowing to a public official in exchange for a pattern of official actions favorable to the donor’” and “the intended exchange in bribery can be ‘this for these’ or ‘these for these,’ not just ‘this for that’” (citations omitted)). The Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2007), also supports our analysis to some extent.43 The defendant “Ganim’s challenges to the jury charge primarily relate[d] to a single issue: namely, whether proof of a government official’s promise to perform a future, but unspecified, official act is sufficient to demonstrate the requisite quid pro quo for a conviction” under § 666(a)(1)(B). Id. at 141-42. Although accepting a quid pro quo requirement for a bribery conviction, the Second Circuit rejected Ganim’s claim 43 The defendant in Ganim was convicted of these “bribery-related crimes”: “(1) extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951; (2) ‘honest services mail fraud’ in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 & 1346; (3) federal programs bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(b) [sic]; and (4) bribe receiving in violation of Connecticut General Statutes section 53a-148 (collectively, the ‘bribery-related crimes’).” Ganim, 510 F.3d at 141. The Ganim opinion first analyzed the quid pro quo issue collectively as to the bribery-related crimes. Id. at 141-42. It later discussed the jury charges under an “Extortion” subheading, but much of that discussion related to all bribery-related crimes in the case. Id. at 142-47. Because Ganim discussed the bribery-related crimes collectively, it did not focus on the language of § 666(a)(1)(B). 59 that “a direct link must exist between a benefit received and a specifically identified official act.” Id. at 142. The Second Circuit held “that the requisite quid pro quo for the crimes at issue [which included § 666(a)(1)(B)] may be satisfied upon a showing that a government official received a benefit in exchange for his promise to perform official acts or to perform such acts as the opportunities arise.” Id. (emphasis added). The Second Circuit added that “so long as the jury finds that an official accepted gifts in exchange for a promise to perform official acts for the giver, it need not find that the specific act to be performed was identified at the time of the promise, nor need it link each specific benefit to a single official act.” Id. at 147. The Second Circuit also explained that “requiring a jury to find a quid pro quo . . . ensures that a particular payment is made in exchange for a commitment to perform official acts to benefit the payor in the future,” and “[o]nce the quid pro quo has been established, however, the specific transactions comprising the illegal scheme need not match up this for that.” Id. at 147. The Second Circuit’s analysis lies somewhere beyond a no-quid pro quo requirement, as adopted by the Sixth, Seventh, and now the Eleventh Circuits, and the Fourth Circuit’s requirement. While the Second Circuit requires a quid pro quo, that requirement is satisfied by a quid (thing of value) in exchange for a promise to perform an unidentified, official 60 act at some point in the future. Id. at 142-47. In other words, in the Second Circuit the quo need not be specific or even identifiable at the time of the quid, and to that extent the Second Circuit arguably supports our conclusion. And to some extent, confusion reigns in this area because courts often use the term quid pro quo to describe an exchange other than a particular item of value for a particular action.
Because there is no support for the defendant-appellants’ quid pro quo argument in the text of § 666, they rely on how the Supreme Court interpreted a different criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 119 S. Ct. 1402 (1999). However, SunDiamond does not address § 666, and there are significant differences in the text of the two statutes (§§ 201 and 666). The defendant Sun-Diamond was a trade association convicted of providing “illegal gratuities” under 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) for having given tickets, meals, and other items to the federal Secretary of Agriculture. Id. at 401, 119 S. Ct. at 1404-05. Section 201(c)’s illegal gratuity provision prohibited Sun-Diamond from: “giv[ing] . . . anything of value to any public official . . . for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official . . . .” 18 61 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).44 In Sun-Diamond, the district court charged the jury it could convict if it found “Sun-Diamond provided [the Secretary] with unauthorized compensation simply because he held public office,” and that “[t]he government need not prove that the alleged gratuity was linked to a specific or identifiable act or any act at all.” Id. at 403, 119 S. Ct. at 1405 (emphasis added). The “point in controversy” was that the jury instructions suggested that an illegal gratuity “did not require any connection between [defendant’s] intent and a specific official act.” Id. at 405, 119 S. Ct. at 1406. The Supreme Court in Sun-Diamond concluded that § 201(c) did require a link between the gratuity and a specific “official act” because the statutory text prohibited gratuities given or received “for or because of any official act performed or to be performed” and then defined “official act” as “any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy . . . .” Id. at 406, 119 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting § 201(c)(1)(A) and (a)(3)). And it was specifically this text of the illegal gratuity statute — “for or because of any official act” — that the Supreme Court in Sun-Diamond found to be “pregnant with the requirement that some particular official act be identified and proved.” Id. at 406, 119 S. Ct. at 1407 (emphasis added). In stark contrast, none of these phrases are used in 44 There is no threshold monetary requirement in §§ 201(b) or 201(c)(1)(A). 62 §§ 666(a)(1)(B) or 666(a)(2). We recognize that the Supreme Court in Sun-Diamond also distinguished between a § 201(b) bribery crime and a § 201(c) illegal gratuity crime. Id. at 40405, 119 S. Ct. at 1406. The Supreme Court pointed out that bribery in § 201(b) “requires a showing that something of value was corruptly given, offered, or promised to a public official (as to the giver) or corruptly demanded, sought, received, accepted, or agreed to be received or accepted by a public official (as to the recipient) with intent, inter alia, ‘to influence any official act’ (giver) or in return for ‘being influenced in the performance of any official act’ (recipient).” Id. at 404, 119 S. Ct. at 1406 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)). The Supreme Court explained that “[t]he distinguishing feature of each crime is its intent element.” Id. at 404, 119 S. Ct. at 1406. The Supreme Court explained further that in § 201: Bribery requires intent “to influence” an official act or “to be influenced” in an official act, while illegal gratuity requires only that the gratuity be given or accepted “for or because of” an official act. In other words, for bribery there must be a quid pro quo – a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act. An illegal gratuity, on the other hand, may constitute merely a reward for some future act that the public official will take (and may already have determined to take), or for a past act that he has already taken. Id. at 404-05, 119 S. Ct. at 1406 (emphasis added).45 The Supreme Court also 45 A bribe under § 201(b) is punishable by up to 15 years’ imprisonment, while the lesser crime of illegal gratuity under § 201(c) is punishable by up to 2 years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), (c). 63 stated: “The District Court’s instructions in this case, in differentiating between a bribe and an illegal gratuity, correctly noted that only a bribe requires proof of a quid pro quo.” Id. at 405, 119 S. Ct. at 1406. Although § 201(b) requires that a bribe be given or received to influence an “official act” or “in return for” an “official act,” § 666 sweeps more broadly than either § 201(b) or (c). Section 666 requires only that money be given with intent to influence or reward a government agent “in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) & (a)(2). Section 666 does not say “official act” but says “any business, transaction, or series of transactions.” Id. Section 666 does not say “in return for” or “because of” but says “in connection with.” Id. More importantly, the Supreme Court in Sun-Diamond was concerned with accidentally criminalizing legal gratuities under § 201(c), such as giving a ball cap, a sports jersey, or token gift to the Secretary of Agriculture “based on his official position and not linked to an identifiable act.” Id. at 406-07, 119 S. Ct. at 1407; see Ganim, 510 F.3d at 146 (“Undergirding the [Supreme] Court’s decision in SunDiamond was a need to distinguish legal gratuities (given to curry favor of an official’s position) from illegal gratuities (given because of a specific act).”). That concern is diminished here because § 666 contains a corrupt intent requirement. In 64 any event, as reasoned by the Second Circuit, “there is good reason to limit Sun-Diamond’s holding to the statute at issue in that case, as it was the very text of the illegal gratuity statute — ‘for or because of any official act’ — that led the Court to its conclusion that a direct nexus was required to sustain a conviction under § 201(c)(1)(A).” Ganim, 510 F.3d at 146. “Nor is there any principled reason to extend Sun-Diamond’s holding beyond the illegal gratuity context.” Id.
We also reject defendant-appellants’ argument that the rule of lenity requires us to read a specific quid pro quo requirement into § 666. The rule of lenity may apply in a number of different circumstances. For example, “[t]he rule of lenity is applied when a broad construction of a criminal statute would ‘criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct.’” United States v. Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, 1169 (11th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426, 105 S. Ct. 2084, 2088 (1985)), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 78 U.S.L.W. 3546 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2010) (No. 09-7576). However, “[t]he simple existence of some statutory ambiguity . . . is not sufficient to warrant application of that rule, for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree.” Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1919 (1998). The mere possibility of a narrower statutory construction by itself does not make the rule of lenity applicable. Svete, 65 556 F.3d at 1169. Application of the rule requires a “grievous ambiguity.” Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138-39, 118 S. Ct. at 1919 (“The rule of lenity applies only if, ‘after seizing everything from which aid can be derived,’ . . . we can make ‘no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.’”) (citation omitted). The rule of lenity does not apply here because defendant-appellants fail to identify a “grievous ambiguity” in § 666(a)(1)(B) or (a)(2), or to show that the statutory language criminalizes innocent behavior. Section 666(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2) criminalize only those acts done “corruptly,” and, indeed, § 666 provides a defense for “bona fide salary, wages, fees, or other compensation paid, or expenses paid or reimbursed, in the usual course of business.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(c).
In the McNair, Swann, Barber, and Wilson trials, all defendant-appellants requested jury charges that included a quid pro quo requirement.46 46 For example, in the McNair trial, PUGH requested this instruction: In order for you to find defendant [PUGH] guilty, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that [PUGH] gave something of value to Defendant McNair with the specific intent of obtaining a quid pro quo, that is, that [PUGH] gave the item of value with the specific intent to improperly cause Defendant McNair to commit a specific act in favor of [PUGH], or with the specific intent of illegally rewarding Defendant McNair for having previously committed such an act. In other words, the United States must show that [PUGH] provided the item of value either (1) with the expectation that Defendant McNair would improperly provide something specific in return or (2) for the purpose of rewarding McNair for something improper that Defendant McNair had previously done. In the Swann trial, Bobby Rast, for example, requested this instruction: [Y]ou must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Bobby Rast gave something of value to Defendant Swann with the specific corrupt intent of obtaining a quid pro quo, that 66 In the McNair trial, the district court rejected the proposed quid pro quo instructions, gave the Eleventh Circuit’s pattern jury instructions for § 666 as to corruptly giving bribes, telling the jury: As I’ve said, the defendants, other than Jewell C. “Chris” McNair, are charged in various counts of violating a portion of Title 18, Section 666, which makes it a federal crime or offense for anyone to corruptly give, offer or agree to give anything of value to anyone who is an agent of a local government receiving significant benefits under a federal assistance program intending to reward or influence that agent in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such local government involving anything of value of $5,000 or more. .... Fifth: And this is another thing that the government would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. That each such gift, offer or agreement to give, that by each of those gifts, offer or agreement to give, the Defendant [] corruptly intended to reward or influence Jewell C. “Chris” McNair in connection with a transaction, or series of transactions, with Jefferson County, Alabama, which transaction or series of transactions involved something of value of $5,000 or more. Sixth: That in doing so, the Defendant [] acted corruptly. An act is done “corruptly” if it is performed voluntarily, deliberately, and dishonestly, for the purpose of either accomplishing an unlawful end or result or of accomplishing some otherwise lawful end or lawful result by is, that Bobby Rast gave the item of value with the specific corrupt intent to improperly influence Defendant Swann to commit a specific official act in favor of Bobby Rast, or with the specific corrupt intent of illegally rewarding Defendant Swann for having previously committed such an act. In other words, the United States must show that Bobby Rast corruptly provided the item of value either (1) with the expectation that Defendant Swann would improperly provide some official specific act or acts in return or (2) for the purpose of rewarding Jack W. Swann for some specific improper official act or acts that Defendant Swann had previously done. 67 an unlawful method or means.47 The district court also gave the pattern § 666 jury charge, with slight variations, as to corruptly receiving bribes. The judges in the subsequent trials (Swann,48 Barber,49 and Wilson50 ) agreed with the district 47 See Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) at 180-81 (Offense Instruction 24) (2003). The district court instructed the jury the government must prove all elements of a § 666 crime, such as that McNair had to be an agent and the County had to receive over $10,000 in federal funds. We quote in the text only the part of the pattern charge about the corrupt intent element. 48 In the Swann trial, the district court instructed the jury as to corruptly accepting bribes: As to [the § 666 substantive bribery] counts the defendant Jack W. Swann can be found guilty of [§ 666 bribery] only if all the following facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. .... The fifth element which is common to all of those counts as the first four were, that . . . by such acceptance or agreements, the defendant Jack W. Swann intended as to the count under consideration to be influenced or rewarded in connection with a transaction or series of transactions of Jefferson County, Alabama which transactions or series of transactions involve something of value of $5,000 or more. And six, that in so doing the defendant Jack W. Swann acted corruptly. An act is done corruptly if it is performed voluntarily and deliberately and dishonestly for the purpose of either accomplishing an unlawful end or result or of accomplishing some otherwise lawful end or lawful result by any unlawful method or means. The court gave a similar pattern § 666 jury charge as to corruptly giving bribes. 49 In the Barber trial, the district court instructed the jury as to only PUGH’s corruptly giving bribes because Barber, the acceptor, pled guilty: The defendant Roland Pugh Construction, Inc., can be found guilty of the offense charging a violation of [§ 666(a)(2)] only if all the following facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt: .... Fifth, that by giving, offering, or agreeing to give things of value to Clarence R. Barber, defendant Roland Pugh Construction, Inc., intended to influence or reward Clarence R. Barber in connection with any business transaction or series of transactions which involve something of $5,000 or more. And, sixth, that in doing so, the defendant Roland Pugh Construction, Inc., acted corruptly. 68 court’s ruling in the McNair trial and gave jury instructions that did not include defendant-appellants’ requested quid pro quo instructions.51 Given our conclusion that § 666(a)(1)(B) and (2) do not require proof of a specific quid pro quo, defendant-appellants’ proposed jury instructions containing that requirement were incorrect statements of law. Thus, the district courts did not .... An act is done corruptly if it is performed voluntarily, deliberately, and dishonestly for the purpose of either accomplishing an unlawful end or result, or of accomplishing some otherwise lawful end or result by any unlawful method or means. 50 Because in the Wilson case only PUGH appeals, we quote the “corruptly giving” part of the court’s jury charge: The purpose of the plan alleged by the government in the indictment was also for the defendant, Pugh Incorporated, through Grady R. Pugh, Jr., to corruptly give, offer, and agree to give things of value to defendant Ronald K. Wilson with the intent of influencing and rewarding him for supporting their interests in connection with the J.C.E.S.D. sewer rehabilitation construction program in violation of [18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)]. .... Title 18 of the United States Code section 666(a)(2) makes it a federal crime or offense for any person to corruptly give, offer, or agree to give anything of value to any person with the intent to influence or reward an agent of a local government or local governmental agency receiving significant benefits under a federal assistance program, in connection with any business, transaction or series of transactions of such local government or government agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or more. .... An act is done corruptly if it is performed voluntarily, deliberately, and dishonestly for the purpose of either accomplishing an unlawful end or result or of accomplishing some otherwise lawful result by any unlawful method or means. 51 “In considering the failure of a district court to give a requested instruction, the omission is error only if the requested instruction is correct, not adequately covered by the charge given, and involves a point so important that failure to give the instruction seriously impaired the party’s ability to present an effective case.” Svete, 556 F.3d at 1161 (quotation marks omitted). The district court’s refusal to give a requested instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. 69 abuse their discretion in refusing them. See US Infrastructure, 576 F.3d at 1213 (determining omission of a specific quid pro quo requirement in § 666 jury instruction was not plain error); Paradies, 98 F.3d at 1289 (same). In the McNair trial, all defendant-appellants also requested that the jury be instructed that if a thing of value was given out of friendship or merely to foster goodwill and not to corruptly influence or reward, then a not-guilty verdict is required. After that request, the district court in the McNair trial supplemented the pattern instructions with this: Section 666 . . . does not prohibit all gifts by or to a public official, does not prohibit all receipts -- does not prohibit receipt of all gifts by or to a public official, but only gifts received with the corrupt intent to be influenced or rewarded by that governmental official in connection with a business or transaction or series of transactions of that governmental entity involving $5,000 or more.[52] After the defendant-appellants insisted the district court specifically identify friendship and goodwill gifts as legal gratuities, the court responded “if it’s corrupt and dishonest, it’s not for good will, is it?” The district court explained that giving defendant-appellants’ instruction would “carr[y] with it some sort of suggestion 52 In the Swann, Barber, and Wilson trials, PUGH also requested the same jury charge. The Rast and Pugh defendants either requested this jury instruction or adopted PUGH’s request, in the Swann trial. And in the Swann, Barber, and Wilson trials, the district court gave similar supplemental jury charges expressly advising the jury that § 666 does not prohibit all gifts to a public official, but only those gifts with the corrupt intent to influence or reward specified government officials in connection with the business or transaction or series of transactions of that governmental entity. 70 that I’m adopting that idea that that’s what these payments were.” This exchange then took place: THE COURT: What if it’s good will and corrupt? [ROLAND PUGH’S COUNSEL]: It can’t be. THE COURT: Okay. That’s your answer. A finding that a gift was made or accepted with corrupt intent necessarily excludes friendship and goodwill gifts. There is no reversible error in the court’s charge in this regard.53