Opinion ID: 2137860
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Heading: We will summarize the provisions of Code chapter 496A, I.C.A., so far as material to the appeal.

Text: Section 496A.74 provides that a foreign corporation and a domestic one may merge if permitted by laws of the state where the former is organized and 1. Each domestic corporation shall comply with the provisions of this chapter with respect to the merger    of domestic corporations   . Section 496A.68 states that two or more domestic corporations may merge pursuant to a plan approved in the manner provided in this chapter. The board of each corporation shall approve a plan setting forth: (1) the names of the merging corporations and the survivor; (2) terms of the merger; (3) manner of converting shares of each merging corporation into shares of the survivor; (4) any changes in the articles of incorporation of the survivor; (5) other provisions of the merger deemed necessary or desirable. Section 496A.70 provides for approval of the plan of merger by the shareholders of each merging corporation and [a]t each such meeting, a vote of the shareholders shall be taken on the proposed plan   .    The plan    shall be approved upon receiving the affirmative vote of the holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding shares of each such corporation,   . Section 496A.71 states that upon such shareholder approval articles of merger shall be executed by each corporation setting forth: (1) the plan of merger; (2) the number of shares of each corporation outstanding; (3) as to each corporation, the number of shares voted for and against the plan. The articles shall be filed with the secretary of state and county recorder and a certificate of merger shall be issued by the former. Section 496A.73 provides that upon issuance of the certificate the merger shall be effected and (1) the merging corporations shall be a single corporationthe one designated in the plan as the survivor; (2) the separate existence of the merging corporations, except the survivor, shall cease; (3) the survivor shall have all the powers and be subject to the same duties as a corporation organized under chapter 496A; (4) the survivor shall have all the rights, franchises and properties of the merging corporations; (5) the survivor shall be liable for all obligations of the merging corporations; (6) the articles of incorporation of the survivor shall be deemed amended to the extent that changes therein are stated in the plan of merger. Section 496A.77 states that any shareholder shall have the right to dissent from any merger to which the corporation is a party. Section 496A.78 gives a dissenting shareholder, by following the procedure there outlined, the right to be paid the fair value of his shares as of the day prior to that on which the corporate action was approved. The above sections are those on which plaintiffs rely. They contend these statutes specifically provide for effecting a merger and the same result cannot legally be attained at least without approval of the holders of two thirds of the shares and according to dissenters appraisal rightsi. e., the right to receive the fair value of their stock by compliance with the specified procedure. Defendants contend and the trial court held compliance with the above sections was not required and defendants could legally proceed under other sections of chapter 496A which merely authorize amendments to articles of incorporation and issuance of stock. The sections just referred to provide (section 496A.55) that a corporation may amend its articles in any respects desired and in particular: change its name, change the number of shares of any class, change shares having a par value to those without par and create new classes of shares with preferences over shares then authorized. Section 496A.56 states articles may be amended by giving shareholders notice of a meeting at which the amendments are to be considered, with a summary of the proposed changes, and upon receiving the affirmative vote of holders of a majority of the stock entitled to vote. The articles of amendment shall be filed with the secretary of state and county recorder (496A.59) and be effective upon issuance by the former of the certificate of amendment (496A.60). Section 496A.17 provides that shares, with or without par, may be issued for such consideration as the board fixes. Section 496A.18 states that shares may be paid for in money or property, tangible or intangible, and in the absence of fraud the judgment of the board as to value of the consideration received shall be conclusive. II. The principal point of law defendants asked to have adjudicated under rule 105, R.C.P., is that the provisions of chapter 496A last referred to are legally independent of, and of equal dignity with, those relating to mergers and the validity of the action taken by defendants is not dependent upon compliance with the merger sections under which the same result might be attained. The trial court accepted this view. It is clear the view just expressed emanates from the opinion in Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., Del., 188 A.2d 123, the only precedent called to our attention which sustains the decision appealed from. Virtually the only basis for the conclusion Hariton reaches is the statement of the law point these defendants raised. The opinion contains little discussion and cites no authority that supports the decision. We can agree all provisions of our chapter 496A are of equal dignity. But we cannot agree any provisions of the act are legally independent of others if this means that in arriving at the correct interpretation thereof and the legislative intent expressed therein we are not to consider the entire act and, so far as possible, construe its various provisions in the light of their relation to the whole act. See Ahrweiler v. Board of Supervisors, 226 Iowa 229, 231, 283 N.W. 889, 890; Everding v. Board of Education, 247 Iowa 743, 747, 76 N.W.2d 205, 208, and citations; Manilla Community School District, etc. v. Halverson, 251 Iowa 496, 501-502, 101 N.W.2d 705, 708, and citations. Nor should other fundamental rules of statutory construction be ignored in determining the scope and effect of any provision of chapter 496A. We may also observe that the trial court concluded the `safeguards' written into the codes of most states, including Iowa and Delaware, with respect to rights of dissenting shareholders in connection with mergers are based on outmoded concepts of economic realities, particularly in the case of an enterprise such as Rath which is regularly traded on the American Exchange and has a diversified stock ownership with over 4000 shareholders. The court cites especially in this regard articles of Professor Manning, 72 Yale Law Journal 223, and Professor Folk, 49 Virginia Law Review 1261. If the soundness of this view were admitted, the statutory safeguards should of course be removed by legislative, not judicial action. Our 1959 legislature evidently had a purpose in enacting what we may call the merger sections of chapter 496A as well as those relating to amending articles and issuing stock. We have frequently pointed out it is not the province of courts to pass upon the policy, wisdom or advisability of a statute. Dickinson v. Porter, 240 Iowa 393, 399, 35 N.W.2d 66, 71, and citations; Steinberg-Baum & Co. v. Countryman, 247 Iowa 923, 929, 77 N.W.2d 15, 18; Town of Mechanicsville v. State Appeal Board, 253 Iowa 517, 529-530, 111 N.W.2d 317, 325.