Opinion ID: 1981608
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Nature of Defendant's Claim

Text: We believe it appropriate, at the outset, to identify the exact nature of defendant's claim. When seeking relief from a guilty plea, either directly or collaterally, there are two separate, though closely related, constitutional challenges that may be made: (1) that the plea of guilty was not made voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences, and (2) that defendant did not receive the benefit of the bargain he made with the State when he pled guilty. In the case at bar, the State argues that defendant's appeal is an improper amalgamation of these two constitutional claims and that this court should clarify that a claim that a petitioner did not get the benefit of the People's bargain is fundamentally different from a claim that he did not understand the People's offer and that, as a result, his plea was not knowing and voluntary. Defendant, on the other hand, agrees that the two types of constitutional claims are analytically different, but denies that he has confused them in his petition. Defendant contends that he is raising a benefit of the bargain claim, i.e., that his constitutional right to due process and fundamental fairness was violated because the State breached the plea agreement which induced his plea. In his reply brief, defendant disavows and waives any challenge to the voluntariness of his plea. In light of the arguments raised, we examine the two types of constitutional claims. The first constitutional claim derives from Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). In Boykin, the defendant entered pleas of guilty to five counts of robbery and was subsequently sentenced to death. The record of defendant's plea hearing, however, showed that the trial court asked defendant no questions concerning his plea and that defendant did not address the court. On review, the Supreme Court held that, for a guilty plea to be valid under the due process clause, the record must affirmatively show that the plea was entered intelligently and with full knowledge of its consequences. Because, in that case, it could not be determined from the record of defendant's plea hearing that his plea had been entered voluntarily or that he was aware of the consequences of his plea, the Court reversed defendant's convictions and sentence. The benefit of the bargain claim finds its roots in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 433 (1971). In Santobello, the defendant agreed to plead guilty in exchange for various concessions by the government, including a promise by the prosecutor that no sentencing recommendation would be made by the government. Defendant pled guilty and, after a lengthy hiatus, was sentenced by the court. At defendant's sentencing hearing, the government, represented by a different prosecutor, recommended a sentence to the court over defendant's objection. The court adopted the recommended sentence. On appeal, the government conceded that the promise to refrain from making a sentencing recommendation had been made during plea negotiations. Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding: This phase of the process of criminal justice, and the adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances. Those circumstances will vary, but a constant factor is that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. (Emphasis added.) 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499, 30 L.Ed.2d at 433. The cause was remanded to state court to determine whether specific enforcement of the plea agreement was the appropriate remedy or whether fundamental fairness required that defendant be given the opportunity to withdraw his plea. Boykin and Santobello deal with two different aspects of a pleaits acceptance and its implementation. As these decisions make clear, principles of due process apply to both aspectsto the procedure of accepting the plea, as well as to the process of implementing the bargain itself. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2547, 81 L.Ed.2d 437, 443-44 (1984) (both the validity of a plea and its enforcement are governed by due process); see also People v. Walker, 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1024, 819 P.2d 861, 867, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 902, 908-09 (1991). There are instances, however, when these two aspects of a plea will be interconnected. As noted by Justice Douglas in his specially concurring opinion, a prosecutor's promise may deprive a guilty plea of the `character of a voluntary act.' Santobello, 404 U.S. at 266, 92 S.Ct. at 501, 30 L.Ed.2d at 435 (Douglas, J., concurring), quoting Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S.Ct. 510, 513, 7 L.Ed.2d 473, 478 (1962). Thus, when a benefit of the bargain claim is made, a court may need to consider the extent to which the plea was validly entered in order to decide whether due process requires (a) that there be specific performance of the plea bargain or (b) that the defendant be given the option to go to trial on the original charges. One alternative may do justice in one case, and the other in a different case. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 267, 92 S.Ct. at 501, 30 L.Ed.2d at 436 (Douglas, J., concurring). In the case at bar, defendant raises a benefit of the bargain claim. We note that he does not assert that the prosecutor or the court affirmatively promised him that he would not have to serve a period of MSR. Instead, defendant's premise is that principles of due process, embodied in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402, made it incumbent upon the circuit court to admonish him, on the record, regarding the statutorily required MSR. Further, because no admonishment was given, his plea agreement, as evinced by the record, was that he would receive a maximum sentence of 25 years' imprisonment. Based on this premise, defendant then argues that the State, by adding the MSR term, has breached the plea agreement, in violation of due process, and that he is prejudiced because he received a more onerous sentence25 years plus 3 years MSR. Defendant does not challenge the validity of the plea and, accordingly, does not seek the withdrawal of his plea of guilty. Instead, defendant contends that his plea of guilty, given in exchange for the promise of a 25-year sentence, was voluntarily and knowingly made. He requests specific enforcement of the negotiated plea agreement as he understood it. He now concedes, however, that a term of supervised release is statutorily mandated and, therefore, cannot be legally struck from his sentence. For this reason, he asks that his sentence be modified to 22 years' imprisonment plus 3 years of mandatory supervised release to approximate the bargain that was struck between the parties.