Opinion ID: 155524
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timing of Grant of Summary Judgment

Text: 94 Finally, Pippinger claims that the district court abused its discretion by issuing a summary judgment order before Pippinger could complete his discovery process. He asserts two reasons why he should have been allowed more time to take discovery: (1) the magistrate judge had only recently ruled in Pippinger's favor on the IRS's governmental deliberative process privilege argument, leaving Pippinger with insufficient time to re-depose District Director Taylor and IRS labor relations specialist Probasco; and (2) the magistrate judge had only recently denied Pippinger's motion to compel with respect to the ex parte interviews, leaving Pippinger insufficient time formally to depose the friendly witnesses he had hoped to informally interview. 95 Pippinger originally filed his lawsuit on January 19, 1995. Some discovery began immediately. However, the IRS initially refused to comply with significant portions of Pippinger's discovery requests until after the magistrate judge ruled on its motion to dismiss Pippinger's constitutional claims. In particular, when Pippinger attempted to depose District Director Taylor and IRS labor relations specialist Probasco, these witnesses claimed a governmental deliberative process privilege and refused to answer many of Pippinger's questions. Partly for this reason, Pippinger filed his motion to compel on October 10, 1995. 96 On November 28, 1995, the magistrate judge ruled that Taylor and Probasco enjoyed no governmental deliberative process privilege, and that Pippinger was entitled to re-depose them. However, the magistrate judge stayed these re-depositions until January 15, 1996, or such time as the Honorable William F. Downes rules upon the pending dispositive motions, whichever first occurs. 97 In the same November 28, 1995 Order, the magistrate judge denied Pippinger's motion to compel with respect to the ex parte interviews. However, Pippinger had been free formally to depose his friendly witnesses since filing his complaint in January 1995, and remained free to do so after his motion was denied. 98 The district court granted the IRS's motion to dismiss and its motion for summary judgment on April 10, 1996. By that time, Pippinger had enjoyed fifteen months in which to depose his friendly witnesses, and three months in which to take partial re-depositions of two hostile witnesses. 99 Although Pippinger did not know when the district court was going to rule on the merits of the IRS's motion for summary judgment, the record contains no evidence suggesting that Pippinger ever asked the district court for more time. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f) (permitting the district court, at the request of a nonmovant for summary judgment, to order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had, and thereby delay action on the summary judgment motion). Further, Pippinger does not explain what type of evidence he hoped to develop through further discovery. 100 For these reasons, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling on the IRS's substantive motions on April 10, 1996.