Opinion ID: 2814719
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Omitted Information Was Immaterial

Text: McLellan argues that Agent Locke intentionally and recklessly omitted material information regarding the FBI's investigation into a35scott prior to the December 1 Download from his affidavit, and had this information been included in the affidavit, probable cause would have been lacking. Specifically, McLellan points to: (1) the February 2008 Canadian tip into babylick; (2) the March 2009 report detailing a35scott's involvement in the YOUCANTSEEMETOO e-group on Multiply.com, which was registered with a California zip code; and (3) the links between these child pornographic activities and IP addresses traced to Dennis Truso, Greg Little, and others, but not to Darryl J. St. Yves (collectively, the Omitted Information). This information, according to McLellan, revealed that whoever a35scott was, he or she was nomadic and never remained at the same place for very long, and thus when the FBI applied for the warrant two months after Agent Patel's single December 1 Download, there was no longer probable cause to believe that a35scott would still be at 180 High -14- Street. In other words, the information contained in the affidavit was stale.5 The parties do not dispute that this information was omitted from the affidavit,6 though they do disagree over whether 5 It is important to take a moment to emphasize what McLellan is not arguing. He is not suggesting that the affidavit in support of the warrant was stale because it was unlikely he would have kept his illicit child pornography for more than two months. This argument would readily fail, as courts have held time and time again that child pornography traders and collectors maintain their collections for long periods of time, and often store it in safe, close, and easily accessible locations. See United States v. Morales-Aldahondo, 524 F.3d 115, 119 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that a warrant application was not stale where more than three years had passed since law enforcement acquired the information contained in the affidavit because customers of child pornography sites do not quickly dispose of their cache); United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 12 n.4 (1st Cir. 1993) ([H]istory teaches that collectors [of child pornography] prefer not to dispose of their dross, typically retaining obscene materials for years.); see also United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 528 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding that a four-month gap between warrant application and attempt to access child pornography did not render information stale because it was not unreasonable for officers to infer that the person responsible for those attempts already possessed some quantity of child pornography); United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (finding that a four-month delay did not render information stale because [t]hanks to the long memory of computers, any evidence of a crime was almost certainly still on his computer, even if he had tried to delete the images). Rather, McLellan is arguing that by February 2010, a35scott would have already relocated from 180 High Street, and brought his or her child pornography along. 6 Indeed, the affidavit itself states that it does not contain every fact known to [Agent Locke] with respect to this investigation but rather contains those facts that [he] believe[d] to be necessary to establish probable cause. Though we have upheld warrants based on affidavits with similar language in the past -- and do so again today -- we once again caution law enforcement officers about this practice. [T]he best way to ensure that the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement is complied with is to meticulously comply with it. Khounsavanh, 113 -15- or not the omission was intentional and/or reckless. We need not decide this, however, because the inclusion of the Omitted Information would have been immaterial to the probable cause determination. See Rigaud, 684 F.3d at 173 (In this case, we need not address the first Franks requirement, because [the defendant] has plainly failed to meet the second (establishing the effect of the omission on the probable cause showing).). Information contained in an affidavit is stale if it established probable cause at some point in the past but does not support probable cause at the time of the warrant's issuance. Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932) ([I]t is manifest that the proof must be of facts so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time.). When evaluating a claim of staleness, we do not measure the timeliness of information simply by counting the number F.3d at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted). And [m]eticulous compliance involves more than an agent's own judgment as to the ultimate importance of a piece of information to a judgment of probable cause. The agent also should, in the interest of both judicial economy and fairness, ask the further question, Is this information so trivial, remote or irrelevant that no reasonable official could assign it weight in coming to a decision to issue the warrant? Unless an affirmative answer can be given, the information should be included -- even if, in context, its weight seems too slight to tip the balance away from a finding of probable cause. United States v. Stewart, 337 F.3d 103, 107 (1st Cir.), as amended (Oct. 14, 2003) (footnote omitted). -16- of days that have elapsed. Instead, we must assess the nature of the information, the nature and characteristics of the suspected criminal activity, and the likely endurance of the information. Morales-Aldahondo, 524 F.3d at 119. Here, the Omitted Information would not have led the magistrate to conclude that the connection between a35scott and 180 High Street was stale. The Omitted Information shows that from February 2008 until March 2009, a35scott was using IP addresses assigned to Dennis Truso in Boston, Greg Little in East Boston, and two other accounts in Boston and Cambridge -- with the majority of those uses occurring between January and May 2008. This information can be taken in multiple ways. It could mean, as McLellan argues, that a35scott was nomadic and moving around, using whatever internet he or she could find.7 However, it could also indicate locations where a35scott lived, worked, and/or spent his or her free time during that time span.8 7 McLellan also implies that the Omitted Information could suggest that a35scott was merely using whatever nearby internet he or she could connect to. Putting aside the fact that McLellan provides absolutely no evidence to support this allegation, we have previously rejected the argument that the possibility of a third party stealing a subscriber's internet access defeats probable cause to search the subscriber's residence. See Grant, 218 F.3d at 75 ([E]ven discounting for the possibility that an individual other than [defendant] may have been using his account, there was a fair probability that [defendant] was the user and that evidence of the user's illegal activities would be found in [his] home.); see also United States v. Pérez, 484 F.3d 735, 740 (5th Cir. 2007). 8 In fact, given that there were multiple links to Dennis Truso and Greg Little over a multi-month span, this latter scenario is -17- Either way, this ambiguous information as to a35scott's travels between January 2008 and March 2009 has very little relevance to a35scott's location in February 2010. To the contrary, even taking into account this Omitted Information, the best information the FBI had in February 2010 as to a35scott's current location was still the trace of the December 1 Download to St. Yves's account at 180 High Street. Nothing in the Omitted Information suggests, for example, that a35scott had used an IP address linked to a different location between December 1, 2009, and the filing of the affidavit on February 11, 2010; nor does it suggest that a35scott had used IP addresses linked to multiple or different locations around the time of the December 1 Download. And without any evidence that a35scott had relocated, we do not believe this two-plus-month delay in applying for the warrant rendered the information in the affidavit stale. This is especially true considering those two months were used by the FBI to corroborate (through checks with the RMV and USPS and with a drive-by site visit to 180 High Street) that St. Yves -- the account holder for the targeted IP address -- had not moved. Cf. United States v. Tiem Trinh, 665 F.3d 1, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that information contained in an affidavit was not stale where one month had elapsed between the warrant's issuance and the last observed narcotics-related activity); United States v. actually more likely. -18- Bucuvalas, 970 F.2d 937, 940-41 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding information in an affidavit not to be stale where events related to the conspiracy charge took place four years prior to the search warrant application because a co-conspirator was seen bribing a police officer one month before the warrant and the affiant had verified that a person related to the conspiracy was still designated as a record owner for the premises), abrogated on other grounds by Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000). But cf. United States v. Charest, 602 F.2d 1015, 1018 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding sixteen days between date of murder and date of affidavit rendered information stale because it was contrary to common sense and logic to expect a murderer to keep the murder weapon in his own premises for almost three weeks). The Omitted Information, therefore, does not render a35scott's link to 180 High Street in February 2010 stale, and as such does not negate the probable cause finding.9 See Rigaud, 684 9 With good reason, McLellan does not challenge that without the Omitted Information, probable cause to search 180 High Street for a35scott and child pornography existed following the December 1 Download. See, e.g., Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 279 (finding probable cause where affidavit spelled out how [the investigation] led to the defendant's IP address and, in turn, his abode); United States v. Gillman, 432 F. App'x 513, 515 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding sufficient nexus between illegality and defendant's residence where (1) child pornography was transferred to police from a specific IP address; (2) that IP address was registered to the defendant's residential address; and (3) the defendant actually lived at that address); United States v. Renigar, 613 F.3d 990, 991 (10th Cir. 2010) (same); Vosburgh, 602 F.3d at 526-27 (same); Pérez, 484 F.3d at 740 (same); United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 635-36 (9th Cir. 2000) (same). -19- F.3d at 173 n.5 (With an omission, the inquiry is whether its inclusion in an affidavit would have led to a negative finding by the magistrate on probable cause.); Woodbury, 511 F.3d at 98 (explaining that a reviewing court examines an affidavit in a practical, commonsense fashion to determine whether it would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that evidence of a crime will be found (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Because McLellan failed to make this preliminary showing, he cannot satisfy the prerequisites for a Franks hearing. Accordingly, there was no error -- let alone a clear error -- in the district court's decision to deny McLellan's request.