Opinion ID: 6317069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sentencing as a Habitual Offender

Text: Sentencing in Arkansas is entirely a matter of statute. Halfacre v. State, 2015 Ark. 105, at 3, 460 S.W.3d 282, 284. “[S]entencing shall not be other than in accordance with the statute in effect at the time of the commission of the crime.” Hale v. Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 3 405, at 4, 443 S.W.3d 533, 535. A sentence is legal if it is within the limits set by the statute. Proctor v. Payne, 2020 Ark. 142, at 8, 598 S.W.3d 17, 23. Our analysis focuses on the statute that was in effect on February 27, 2019, which was when Mason committed the crime for which he was sentenced.1 That statute requires that a defendant who is convicted of a felony such as the one at issue in the instant case, and who has previously been convicted or found guilty of more than one felony but fewer than four felonies “may be sentenced to pay any fine authorized by law for the felony conviction and to an extended term of imprisonment as set forth in subdivision (a)(2) of this section.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (Supp. 2017) (emphasis added). The word “may” implies permissive or discretionary action or conduct and is construed in a permissive sense unless necessary to give effect to an intent to which it is used. Hobbs v. Jones, 2012 Ark. 293, at 13–14, 412 S.W.3d 844, 853–54 (citing Chrisco v. Sun Indus., Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 229, 800 S.W.2d 717, 718 (1990)). This is different than the word “shall,” which is frequently used in statutes as a synonym of the word “must.” Kitchens v. Ark. Appraisal Serv., 233 Ark. 384, 385–86, 344 S.W.2d 853, 853–54 (1961) (citing Fort Smith Gas Co. v. Kincannon, 202 Ark. 216, 150 S.W.2d 968 (1941)). The version of the statute in effect when Mason committed his crime did not contain the word “shall.” Instead, it only contained the word “may.” 1 The habitual offender statute was amended in July 2019 and then again in July 2021. 4 A plain reading of the statute in effect at the time Mason committed the crime permits the circuit court to impose a fine, imprisonment, or both. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in imposing a fine-only sentence. Affirmed. Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellant. William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: Clint Miller, Deputy Public Defender, for appellee. 5