Opinion ID: 2621477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Probable Cause To Arrest Exception

Text: I agree with the majority that objectively Sergeant West had probable cause to believe O'Neill had committed the crime of driving with a revoked license. [5] Majority at 498-99. Probable cause existed because O'Neill informed the officer that he had driven to the spot where his car broke down and that his driver's license had been revoked. RCW 10.31.100 authorizes an arrest for misdemeanors not committed in the officer's presence. [6] However, Sergeant West did not elect to arrest O'Neill for driving with a suspended license. Sergeant West's election not to arrest properly ends any further inquiry into the probable cause to arrest exception. See Barker, 143 Wash.2d at 921, 25 P.3d 423; cf. Johnson, 71 Wash.2d at 243, 427 P.2d 705. As a result, the existence of probable cause to suspect O'Neill of driving with a revoked license does not provide the necessary authority of law to justify the warrantless seizure of O'Neill once the officer decided not to exercise his authority to make that arrest. 3. Investigatory Stop Exception First, we must determine whether, at the time of the seizure, Sergeant West's suspicion of burglary at the minimart was objectively reasonable. At the time of seizure, it was objectively unreasonable to suspect O'Neill of burglary. O'Neill had explained that he had called a friend and was waiting for help because his car would not start. He was parked near a pay phone, and Sergeant West had witnessed the car's inability to start. Moreover, Sergeant West testified that, at the time of seizure, [t]here was nothing to indicate that a crime was going on. Report of Proceedings at 24. Although he testified otherwise, Sergeant West did have reasonable suspicion to believe that O'Neill was involved in criminal activity: driving with a revoked license. In fact, as pointed out by the majority, Sergeant West actually had probable cause to arrest O'Neill for driving with a revoked license had the offense occurred within his presence. As noted by the majority, the existence of probable cause to arrest exceeds the articulable facts and reasonable suspicion standard in the first prong of an investigatory stop analysis. Majority at 499. However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the existence of reasonable suspicion ends our investigatory stop analysis. See majority at 499. The majority completely ignores the second prong of our investigatory stop analysis, which requires the seizure to be reasonably related in scope to the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justifies the seizure in the first place. Having determined that the existence of reasonable suspicion for driving with a revoked license existed, our analysis continues to determine whether the seizure of O'Neill was reasonably related in scope to the actual circumstances triggering this common law exception to the warrant requirement. Sergeant West testified that he ordered O'Neill out of the vehicle to verify O'Neill's credibility. The specific and articulable facts which gave rise to Sergeant West's suspicion of criminal activity had nothing to do with driving with a revoked license. It was unnecessary to order O'Neill out of the car to further the investigation for the crime of driving with a revoked license. The seizure of O'Neill to verify his credibility is not reasonably related in scope to driving with a revoked license. As a result, the seizure of O'Neill was not a valid investigatory seizure, and the common law exception does not apply to provide the authority of law necessary to justify the seizure. I stress that the majority opinion does not hold there is no expectation of privacy in a vehicle, and I join it on that point of law. Although it is less than the expectation of privacy in a home, our prior opinions clearly recognize that individuals have a protected privacy interest in their vehicles. E.g., State v. Parker, 139 Wash.2d 486, 496, 987 P.2d 73 (1999) (acknowledging our continued recognition of a constitutionally protected privacy interest the citizens of this state have held, and should continue to hold, in their automobiles and the contents therein.).
I concur with much of the majority opinion. An officer may approach a vehicle and engage in consensual conversation with its occupants, just as an officer may approach a person on the street and engage in consensual conversation. Not every encounter with a law enforcement officer is a seizure. I also concur with the majority's conclusion that the cocaine and the pipe must be suppressed. Our state constitution requires an actual and valid arrest before the search incident to arrest exception applies. Majority at 502. Sergeant West's attentive police work and sharp instincts are commendable. But our constitution does not allow an officer to search and seize without a warrant unless the officer is authorized by one of our common law exceptions to the warrant requirement. If we are to adhere to our precedents, we must suppress evidence seized under no valid exception. I would affirm the trial court's decision. ALEXANDER, C.J., and OWENS, and SANDERS, JJ., concur.