Opinion ID: 2489402
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erroneously restricted cross-examination in violation of hickman's confrontation rights.

Text: ¶ 11. Hickman was tried twice. In Hickman's first trial, Walls had testified on redirect examination that she had spoken with Hickman while she was sitting on her porch waiting on some marijuana. The trial resulted in a hung jury, and the court declared a mistrial. Before the second trial, the State entered a motion in limine to exclude the testimony. Specifically, the State requested that the defense be prohibited from asking any questions or making any statements in the presence of the jury regarding who state witness, Alexis Walls, was waiting on when she had her conversation with the defendant regarding Mr. Jesse Reed. ¶ 12. The trial court heard arguments on the motion. The State argued that the reason Walls had been sitting on her porch was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative, because there had been no testimony that, at the time Walls spoke with Hickman, she had been using marijuana or had been under its influence. Hickman argued that the testimony was admissible, because it tended to show she was a credible witness as she was able to recall what she had been doing when she had spoken to Hickman. Hickman also argued it was relevant because it showed how she was able to remember what she had been doing. The State responded that, because Walls had not mentioned the planned marijuana delivery until redirect examination, Walls obviously had not relied on her memory of the planned marijuana delivery to refresh her memory. The trial court granted the motion upon a finding that the testimony was irrelevant and inadmissible under Mississippi Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 608(b). ¶ 13. Hickman argues that the ruling was incorrect under the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, and it erroneously restricted his right his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI (emphasis added). See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1364, 158 L.Ed.2d 177, 192 (2004) (the Confrontation Clause applies to witnesses against the accused, in other words, those who bear testimony.) (citations omitted). ¶ 14. As long as the trial court remains within the boundaries of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, its decision to admit or exclude evidence will be accorded a high degree of deference. Johnston v. State, 567 So.2d 237, 238 (Miss.1990). But error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of a party is affected. M.R.E. 103(a). The trial court has the inherent power to limit cross-examination to relevant matters. Foley v. State, 914 So.2d 677, 691 (Miss.2005). ¶ 15. The trial court held that Walls's testimony that she was waiting on marijuana was irrelevant under Rule 401 and inadmissible under Rule 402. Under Rule 401, relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. M.R.E. 401. Under Rule 402, irrelevant evidence is not admissible. The trial court also held that the testimony was inadmissible under Rule 403, which states that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. M.R.E. 403. The trial court further held that the testimony was inadmissible under Rule 608(b) because it was not probative of Walls's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Rule 608(b) states: Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness's character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on crossexamination of the witness (1) concerning the witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being crossexamined has testified. ¶ 16. Hickman argues that Walls's testimony that she was waiting on marijuana was relevant to show her character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. This Court has held that, under Rule 608(b), a specific instance of conduct not resulting in a conviction may be inquired into on crossexamination if it reflects on the witness's character for truthfulness. Brent v. State, 632 So.2d 936, 943 (Miss.1994). But [i]f the past conduct did not involve lying, deceit, or dishonesty in some manner, it cannot be inquired into on cross-examination. Id. ¶ 17. In Johnston v. State, 618 So.2d 90, 94 (Miss.1993), this Court held that a witness's prior marijuana use had no bearing on her character for truthfulness under Rule 608(b) and was irrelevant. But in Havard v. State, 800 So.2d 1193, 1199 (Miss.Ct.App. 2001), the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had properly permitted cross-examination of a witness about his marijuana use on the day of the crime because it was relevant to his memory and powers of observation. And in Smith v. State, 733 So.2d 793, 801 (Miss. 1999), cited by Hickman, this Court held that cross-examination concerning the witness's drug problems was probative of a witness's credibility, because the witness had been a mental patient, abused alcohol, drugs, sniffs gas and freon, that he was suicidal, that he was afraid of being in jail, has an explosive, violent temper, and had attempted to kill members of his immediate family. Smith, 733 So.2d at 801. ¶ 18. We hold that the trial court was within its discretion in finding that Walls's testimony that she was waiting on some marijuana when she spoke with Hickman had no bearing on her truthfulness. The fact that Walls expected to receive a delivery of marijuana does not involve lying, deceit, or dishonesty. Unlike in Smith, there was no evidence that Walls had a significant past history of mental problems and drug use that could have impacted her credibility. Unlike in Havard, there was no evidence that Walls had been under the influence of marijuana at the time she spoke with Hickman such that her memory or powers of observation were impaired. We find that the exclusion of the testimony was within the trial court's discretion, and Hickman's right to confrontation was not violated.