Opinion ID: 170091
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Voluntariness of the Plea

Text: Mr. Hamilton argues that he should be permitted to withdraw his plea because he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to inform him of the effect the career-offender guideline could have on his sentence. He also argues that his plea was not voluntary because he received ineffective assistance. Our review of both questionswhether Mr. Hamilton received ineffective assistance of counsel and whether his plea was voluntaryis de novo. See United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 796 (10th Cir.2006) (A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of fact and law, which we review de novo.); Black, 201 F.3d at 1300 (noting we review de novo the question of whether a plea was knowing and voluntary). When a defendant's challenge to a guilty plea is based on ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). To prevail under this test, Mr. Hamilton must show both (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that this deficiency prejudiced [his] defense. Carr, 80 F.3d at 417 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). In order to establish that his attorney's performance was constitutionally deficient, he must show that the attorney's performance fell outside the wide range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Id. To demonstrate he suffered prejudice as a result of the alleged deficiency, Mr. Hamilton `must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.' Id. at 418 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366). In this case, we need not decide whether the attorney's performance was deficient because Mr. Hamilton has failed to show that he suffered prejudice as a result of his attorney's representations regarding his potential sentence. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ([A] court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.). Mr. Hamilton repeatedly affirmed his understanding of how his sentence would be determinednamely, that the court would determine the sentence and could impose a much greater sentence than Mr. Hamilton expected. For example, by signing the plea agreement, Mr. Hamilton acknowledged that any estimate of the likely sentence received from any source is a prediction, not a promise, and that the Court has the final discretion to impose any sentence up to the statutory maximum. He also acknowledged that the sentence to be imposed upon [him] will be determined solely by the sentencing judge. In signing the plea petition, he further acknowledged that sentencing is a matter left exclusively in the province of the Court and that his sentence is solely a matter within the control of the Judge. The petition also contains a statement indicating that Mr. Hamilton knew his attorney had no authority to make promises regarding his sentence. Moreover, at his change-of-plea hearing, Mr. Hamilton responded affirmatively when the court asked whether he had read and initialed each page of the plea agreement and whether he had read and understood every part of the petition. The court then explained to him that it could impose a maximum sentence of life. When asked whether he understood these potential penalties, Mr. Hamilton said yes. Finally, after he signed the plea agreement and the court informed him of the consequences of his plea, Mr. Hamilton pleaded guilty to both counts. In light of the court's careful explanation of the plea's consequences and Mr. Hamilton's testimony that he understood those consequences, Mr. Hamilton's allegation that he would have gone to trial but for his attorney's failure to advise him of the career-offender provision is insufficient to establish prejudice. [3] See Gordon, 4 F.3d at 1571 (holding that the mere allegation that defendant would have gone to trial but for counsel's failure to warn him about the use of relevant conduct at sentencing was insufficient to establish prejudice); see also Bethel v. United States, 458 F.3d 711, 718-19 (7th Cir.2006) (holding that an attorney's failure to inform a defendant of the possible application of the career-offender guideline did not result in prejudice when the defendant repeatedly acknowledged under oath that he understood his sentence could be greater than expected). That is, Mr. Hamilton has failed to show that, but for counsel's conduct, he would have insisted on going to trial. Moreover, because Mr. Hamilton's argument regarding the voluntariness of his plea is based on his allegation of ineffective assistance, he has also failed to show that his plea was involuntary.