Opinion ID: 72743
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The role of couriers

Text: The district court stated that even if it had believed De Varon’s proposed testimony it would deny a minimal or minor role reduction because couriers are an “integral and essential part in the scheme to import. . . . [B]ut for individuals willing to perform the role that this defendant played, we would not have the importation” of drugs. The court’s statement comes very close to propounding that couriers are ineligible for role adjustments as a matter of law. This circuit has firmly rejected that contention. 11 In U.S. v. Veloza, we stated that “the fact that a courier plays an essential role in an importation scheme does not alone necessarily preclude him from receiving a reduction for a minor role.” Veloza, 83 F.3d at 382. We relied on the language of the guidelines in making this statement noting that “[i]f the guidelines foresee granting a four-level reduction to a courier as a less-culpable minimal participant, they certainly do not foreclose granting a two-level reduction to a courier as a minor participant.” Id. Veloza’s guidance comports with the general rule that “Congress did not grant federal courts authority to decide what sorts of sentencing considerations are inappropriate in every circumstance.” Koon v. U.S., 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2050 (1996). Indeed the guidelines specify that the decision to grant a role adjustment is “heavily dependant on the facts of each case.” USSG § 3B1.2, comment.(backg’d.). The government has suggested that the district court’s ruling can be affirmed because it makes no sense for De Varon to claim that she was a minor participant in her own conduct. In support of this proposition the government cites two Seventh Circuit cases, U.S. v. Lampkins, 47 F.3d 175, 181 (7th Cir. 1995) and U.S. v. Burnett, 66 F.3d 137, 140 (7th Cir. 1995).5 These 5 The government also cites the Eleventh Circuit case of U.S. v. Costales, 5 F.3d 480, 484 (11th Cir. 1993), for this proposition. The holding of Costales does not support the government’s position in this case. Costales denied a role reduction to a defendant convicted of buying child pornography 12 cases hold that where a defendant is sentenced only for the amount of drugs actually handled by that defendant, a minor role adjustment is unwarranted because one is not a minor participant in one’s own conduct. Lampkins, 47 F.3d at 181. We reject this rationale. In 1990 the Sentencing Commission amended the commentary to Chapter 3, Part B of the guidelines, which concerns level adjustments based on role. This amendment announced that, “[t]he determination of a defendant's role in the offense is to be made on the basis of all conduct within the scope of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct), i.e., all conduct included under § 1B1.3(a)(1)-(4),6 from undercover government agents. Id. Because the guidelines do not recognize government agents as participants, See USSG § 3B1.1, comment. n.1, Costales was the only imaginable participant in the crime. This holding is different from the Seventh Circuit’s position that a defendant cannot be a minor participants in his own conduct even where other participant in the crime exist. 6 Section 1B1.3(a) defines relevant conduct as: (1) (A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and (B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense; (2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for which §3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple counts, all acts and omissions described in subdivisions (1)(A) and (1)(B) above that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan 13 and not solely on the basis of elements and acts cited in the count of conviction.” USSG Ch.3, Pt.B, intro. comment. This amendment suggests that courts must look to the entire criminal scheme that produced the crime in question and weigh the relative culpability of all participants in that scheme. The guidelines define participant as “a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted.” USSG § 3B1.1, comment. n.1. The government’s stance ignores the plain directives of the guidelines. Declaring that De Varon cannot be a minor participant in her own conduct overlooks the fact that the “relevant conduct” a court must consider in an importation scheme includes much more than the lone acts of the actual courier. Under the definition provided in the guidelines, participants in the crime might include those who provided the heroin for importation, those who solicited De Varon as a courier, those who were to receive the heroin in Miami, and those who procured buyers or distributors for the heroin in the United States. All of this conduct is relevant. A court must examine the defendant’s role in the scope and as the offense of conviction; (3) all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions specified in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, and all harm that was the object of such acts and omissions; and (4) any other information specified in the applicable guideline. 14 structure of the scheme, including whether this was the defendant’s single contact with the criminal enterprise and whether the defendant had any connection to the source or destination of the drugs. At the least a court must make some factual inquiry which measures that particular individual’s conduct against that of the other participants in a criminal scheme. See U.S. v. Webster, 996 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 1993)(“the evidence available to the court at sentencing must, at a minimum, show (i) that the ‘relevant conduct’ . . . involved more than one participant . . . [and](ii) that the defendant's culpability . . . was relatively minor compared to that of the other participant(s).”); U.S. v. Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1991)(“[S]ection 3B1 allows the sentencing judge to look to the contours of the underlying scheme itself rather than the mere elements of the offense charged.)(internal quotations and citations omitted). The fact-specific nature of this inquiry makes the district court’s comments in this case improper. It did not examine De Varon’s role in comparison to the conduct of other participants in the criminal scheme to import heroin. After the necessary inquiry is made, the district court may determine De Varon’s role according to what the facts of this case warrant.7 7 We note that the role of a courier can vary widely in an importation scheme. Some couriers may be the most culpable or even sole participant in the crime of importation, while others 15 Because the district court in this case based its second reason for denial solely on De Varon’s status as a courier, rather than on the distinct factual ingredients of her case, we cannot credit that reason to deny her request for a minor role reduction.