Opinion ID: 3159389
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Summary Judgment in Favor of Dr. Troutt

Text: Mr. Lemmons argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Troutt. We disagree. We review de novo a grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 749 (10th Cir. 2005). We construe a pro se party’s pleadings liberally. Hammons v. Saffle, 348 F.3d 1250, 1254 (10th Cir. 2003). 6 “When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established.” Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009). The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from acting with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “The test for deliberate indifference is both objective and subjective.” Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1088. The objective component requires that the harm be sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth Amendment, and for the purpose of resolving this appeal, we assume that the harm alleged by Mr. Lemmons rises to that level. “The subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test requires the plaintiff to present evidence of the prison official’s culpable state of mind.” Mata, 427 F.3d at 751. A plaintiff may prevail on this component by showing that the defendant knew he faced a substantial risk and disregarded that risk by failing to take measures to abate it. Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1089. However, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care—even if it rises to the level of medical malpractice—does not necessarily amount to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06; Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 2006). Thus, Mr. Lemmons was required to provide evidence supporting an inference that Dr. Troutt knew about and disregarded a substantial risk of harm to his health and safety. See Mata, 427 F.3d at 752. 7 Mr. Lemmons has adduced no evidence Dr. Troutt disregarded the risk posed by his seizure disorders. The record shows Dr. Troutt saw Mr. Lemmons multiple times and twice referred him to neurologists. Cf. id. at 758-59 (concluding that evidence of a nurse’s complete refusal to assess or diagnose inmate’s medical condition could amount to deliberate indifference so as to defeat summary judgment in her favor). The first neurologist, Dr. Karunapuzha, recommended Mr. Lemmons be referred to psychiatric services and psychological counseling to better manage his pseudoseizures. Those referrals were made. Dr. Karunapuzha did not make a recommendation one way or the other with respect to keeping Mr. Lemmons on gabapentin, so there is no evidence to support the inference that Dr. Troutt subjectively believed weaning Mr. Lemmons off gabapentin would be contrary to Dr. Karunapuzha’s recommendations. Rather, Dr. Troutt’s notes indicate that he made a good faith effort to devise a treatment plan based upon and consistent with the neurologist’s recommendations. See id. at 760-61 (concluding that another nurse was entitled to qualified immunity in part because her statements and notes demonstrated she subjectively believed the inmate was not suffering from a serious medical condition). Further, regardless of Mr. Lemmons’s repeated requests to be put back on gabapentin, the Eighth Amendment does not give him a right to a particular course of treatment. See Callahan, 471 F.3d at 1160. Eight months after Mr. Lemmons saw Dr. Karunapuzha, Dr. Troutt referred him to a second neurologist, who recommended restarting gabapentin. Soon afterward, Dr. Troutt again prescribed gabapentin. Though the record also supports 8 the conclusion that Dr. Troutt may have misread Dr. Karunapuzha’s diagnosis and misdiagnosed generalized tonic clonic seizures as pseudoseizures, Mr. Lemmons adduces no evidence that Dr. Troutt was aware of these alleged mistakes. “A negligent failure to provide adequate medical care, even one constituting medical malpractice, does not give rise to a constitutional violation.” Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corrs., 165 F.3d 803, 811 (10th Cir. 1999). Because the record does not demonstrate Dr. Troutt acted with deliberate indifference toward Mr. Lemmons’s medical needs, the district court properly concluded he was entitled to qualified immunity.