Opinion ID: 2632377
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Concealed Gesture Is a Representation Under Utah Code Section 76-1-601(5)

Text: ¶ 10 Under section 76-1-601(5), a dangerous weapon can be any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury or a facsimile or representation of the item used in a manner specified by subsections (i) and (ii). [12] The State contends that Ireland's concealed gesture constitutes a representation of a weapon. We agree. ¶ 11 The plain meaning of the term representation, as used by section 76-1-601(5), encompasses a gesture. Unlike a facsimile, which is `an exact and detailed copy,' [13] a wide array of items, conduct, and statements can be considered representations. [14] Black's Law Dictionary defines a representation as [a] presentation of facteither by words or by conductmade to induce someone to act. [15] A representation has also been defined as [a]n image or likeness of something or an account . . . of facts. [16] In context, the use of the term representation refers to verbal or nonverbal statements or conduct conveying an impression for the purpose of influencing action. [17] Because a concealed gun-like gesture is intended to influence a victim to act out of fear for his life or safety, it falls within the definition of representation. ¶ 12 The plain meaning of the word representation as used in the statute is buttressed by the available legislative history. The term representation was added to the statute in response to this court's decision in State v. Suniville. [18] In that case, the defendant pointed his concealed hand at a bank teller and demanded that she give him all her money to prevent the robbery from turning into a homicide. [19] Under the prior version of the statute, which did not include the term representation, this court ruled that a [d]efendant's menacing gesture accompanied by verbal threats is not sufficient evidence alone to establish the use of a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm. [20] The legislature responded to our ruling by adding the term representation to the statute, evincing its intent that gestures, at least those accompanied by verbal threats, should be covered by the aggravated robbery statute. ¶ 13 Utah precedent also supports our conclusion that the term representation includes concealed gestures and verbal statements. For example, in State v. Candelario , the court of appeals affirmed a firearm enhancement, reasoning that even though the defendant did not use an actual firearm, [t]he plain meaning of the phrase `the representation of a dangerous weapon' requires that courts apply the firearm enhancement if a defendant makes a verbal or a nonverbal statement that he possesses a firearm. [21] Similarly, in State v. Reyos, [22] the court of appeals upheld an aggravated robbery charge, reasoning that a representation of a dangerous weapon may include a statement conveying an impression for the purpose of influencing action. [23] And in State v. Hartmann, [24] we indicated that a charge can be aggravated when a defendant verbally represents that he has a dangerous weapon, reasoning that [u]se or display of a weapon is not required; threat of such use is sufficient. [25] ¶ 14 The majority of courts from other jurisdictions have similarly held that statutes containing terms such as representation are broad enough to encompass verbal threats, menacing gestures, and the use of everyday objects in a threatening manner. For example, in Faulkner v. State, [26] a defendant threatened a victim by placing a sock-covered chisel to her back. The Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the defendant's conviction for armed robbery, reasoning that he used an article that had the appearance of a gun to persuade [the victim] to comply with his demand and that his acts created a reasonable apprehension on her part that he was threatening her with a gun. [27] Similarly, in State v. Arena, [28] the Connecticut Supreme Court indicated that [t]he state only had to prove that the defendant represented by his conduct that he had a firearm and that he need not actually possess a real firearm. [29] And in People v. Lopez, [30] the New York Supreme Court held that [w]hile the display of what appears to be a firearm test requires a display of something that could reasonably be perceived as a firearm, there is no requirement that the object need be anything other than the defendant's hand. [31] ¶ 15 In this case, Ireland clearly gestured in a menacing manner. Although Ireland did not have a real firearm or even a facsimile of one, he gestured with his concealed hand in order to influence Reinkoester to turn over the money. We accordingly conclude that Ireland's concealed gesture constitutes a representation within the meaning of the statute.