Opinion ID: 837889
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: intent of the original grantors

Text: I concur with the lead opinion's conclusion that the original grantors intended plaintiffs' property to have access to utilities through the central drive easement, and I would grant plaintiffs' request for relief. [1] I also concur with the lead opinion's conclusion that the restrictive covenant does not bar plaintiffs from building on their property. As the lead opinion noted, the cardinal rule of interpreting deeds and plats is to effectuate the intent of the parties. Ante at 183. To effectuate this rule, in light of the principle of freedom of contract, this Court has generally observed that [i]f the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, it is to be construed according to its plain sense and meaning.... City of Grosse Pointe Park v. Michigan Municipal Liability & Prop. Pool, 473 Mich. 188, 197-198, 702 N.W.2d 106 (2005) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Where a contract is ambiguous, however, this Court may use extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties. Id. at 198, 702 N.W.2d 106. Extrinsic evidence may sometimes also be used to detect an ambiguity in a contract, depending on whether the ambiguity is latent or patent. Id. A patent ambiguity `clearly appears on the face of a document, arising from the language itself.' Id., quoting Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed). Extrinsic evidence is generally not necessary to detect a patent ambiguity. In contrast, a latent ambiguity `does not readily appear in the language of a document, but instead arises from a collateral matter when the document's terms are applied or executed.' Id. Where there is a latent ambiguity, extrinsic evidence may be used not only to resolve the ambiguity, but also to prove the existence of the latent ambiguity. Grosse Pointe Park, 473 Mich. at 198, 702 N.W.2d 106. See also McCarty v. Mercury Metalcraft Co., 372 Mich. 567, 575, 127 N.W.2d 340 (1964); Ives v. Kimball, 1 Mich. 308, 313 (1849). In Ives, after explaining that a latent ambiguity may be shown by parol evidence, this Court highlighted the importance of this doctrine by stating that [t]here is no more useful, just and practical rule of law, than that which admits evidence of surrounding circumstances and collateral facts, within certain well defined limits, for the purpose of enabling courts to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of contracting parties. The cases in which this rule has been applied are almost innumerable. [ Ives, 1 Mich. at 313.] This Court has applied the latent ambiguity doctrine to give easement language a meaning that becomes apparent only in light of the surrounding circumstances. See Keller v. Paulos Land Co., 381 Mich. 355, 161 N.W.2d 569 (1968); McConnell v. Rathbun, 46 Mich. 303, 9 N.W. 426 (1881). Keller is particularly instructive in this case. In Keller, the parties disagreed over the purpose of a nonexclusive easement of ingress and egress, where the easement was landlocked within the defendant's property. Keller, 381 Mich. at 360, 161 N.W.2d 569. The defendant argued that, in context, it was clear that the easement was only intended to be used for parking. Id. at 360-361, 161 N.W.2d 569. This Court concluded that the language was ambiguous because a landlocked easement is not a use of ingress and egress within the common legal meaning, and accordingly it was appropriate for the Court to use oral testimony to determine the true intent of the parties. Id. at 362, 161 N.W.2d 569. Similarly, in this case, the surrounding circumstances show that there was a latent ambiguity; therefore, extrinsic evidence should be used to determine and effectuate the intent of the parties. The central and south drive easements were described in the deeds as a non-exclusive right of way for driveway purposes. Driveway purposes is not so unclear as to create a patent ambiguity. But the parties' use of the south drive easement for utilities at the time the easements were created suggests that, as in Keller, the parties' understanding of driveway purposes was not limited to its common legal meaning. Keller, 381 Mich. at 362, 161 N.W.2d 569. Because there is a latent ambiguity, the court may look to extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties. As explained in the lead opinion, extrinsic evidence shows that the grantors intended that the central easement could be used for utilities access for plaintiffs' property. Therefore, I concur that plaintiffs should be granted relief.