Opinion ID: 1119201
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: state jurisdiction

Text: Identification of the individual trust allotments involved in these appeals as Indian Country only resolves the threshold issue of territorial jurisdiction. The question of subject matter jurisdiction remains. Although making generalizations about the allocation of subject matter jurisdiction between federal, state and tribal governments is treacherous, certain general principles are clear. Congress has plenary power over Indians and Indian activities by virtue of the Indian commerce clause [16] and supremacy clause [17] of the United States Constitution. Federal power over Indian activities has always been exercised broadly, subject to few limitations. [18] Tribal authority over tribal members and their property is derived either through the doctrine of inherent sovereignty (Indian nations) or, as more recently articulated, from the protection afforded to tribal self-government by Congress. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143, 100 S.Ct. 2578, 2583, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980). As a general principle, states have full authority over Indians and Indian activity outside Indian Country. Within Indian Country, state jurisdiction may be exercised only if the field has not been preempted by federal statutes, regulations and policy, and tribal authority has not been determined. [19] In areas traditionally within the federal ambit, states may exercise authority over Indians or Indian Country only with the explicit consent of Congress. [20] Public Law 280 [21] embodies express Congressional consent to state assumption of civil and/or criminal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian activities within Indian Country, provided that certain conditions are met. Public Law 280 has appeared in two forms. As originally enacted, states were divided into two groups: mandatory states (those required to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction) [22] and optional states (which could voluntarily assume jurisdiction by affirmative legislative action). [23] The optional states were further divided into two groups: those whose constitutions and enabling acts disclaimed all title to and interest in Indian lands within state borders and those states having no such disclaimer. Congress perceived that disclaimer clauses presented a barrier to the assumption of jurisdiction. The barrier presented by the enabling acts was removed by Congress, [24] but disclaimer states were required to amend their constitutions where necessary as well as to take affirmative legislative action to assume jurisdiction. [25] Oklahoma is among the disclaimer states. [26] Public Law 280 was amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1968 [27] in two significant ways: first, the affirmative legislative action requirement was removed; second, consent by tribal referendum was required before state jurisdiction could be assumed. The Kiowa Tribe has not assented to the assumption of jurisdiction by the State of Oklahoma. Therefore Oklahoma to assume jurisdiction under Public Law 280 must have done so under the original 280 Act before the amendment by the Civil Rights Act of 1968. [28] With this background in mind, we turn now to the issue of whether the State of Oklahoma has assumed jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer actions seeking possession of leased trust allotments.
Allottees first argue that the disclaimer clause of the Oklahoma Constitution presents a barrier to the assumption of jurisdiction which can only be removed by Constitutional amendment. The Supreme Court has determined that the extent to which a state constitution provides a barrier to the assumption of jurisdiction is a question for the particular state. Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 493, 99 S.Ct. 740, 757, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979). This Court recently considered the matter in Currey v. Corporation Commission, 617 P.2d 177 (Okl. 1980). Currey presented the question of whether the disclaimer clause of the Oklahoma Constitution prevented the Corporation Commission from ordering the replugging of an abandoned well on Choctaw property. The federal government had explicitly made the Five Civilized Tribes (which include the Choctaws) subject to Oklahoma oil and gas conservation law. [29] We interpreted the disclaimer clause as a disclaimer of proprietary rather than governmental interests. Currey, 617 P.2d 180. Thus, the State of Oklahoma retains full authority over persons and property within its territorial boundaries. This authority, however, may not be exercised where preempted by federal law. Clearly, the disclaimer clause in the Oklahoma Constitution presents no barrier to the adjudication of forcible entry and detainer actions involving Indians and Indian property in and of itself, for such act is governmental.
To determine if the other conditions imposed by the original enactment of Public Law 280, have been met, we must examine the pertinent federal and state enactments. Section 4 of Public Law 280, which described the jurisdiction which could be assumed, provided in part: (a) ... jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in Indian country ... to the same extent that the state has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action and those civil laws ... that are of general application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the state. (b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property ... belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band or community that is held in trust by the United States ... or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the state to adjudicate, in probate or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest therein. Section 7, which applied to option states, including Oklahoma, provided: The consent of the United States is hereby given to any other state not having jurisdiction with respect to ... civil causes of action ... to assume jurisdiction at such time and in such manner as the people of the State shall, by affirmative legislative action, obligate and bind the State to assumption thereof. The Housing Authority argues that 63 O.S. 1981, § 1057 meets the requirements imposed by original Public Law 280 because: (1) it is affirmative legislative action within the meaning of § 7, supra; (2) it is a civil law of general application to private persons or private property within the meaning of § 4(a), supra; and (3) it is not within the exceptions provided by § 4(b), supra. The Supreme Court has provided some guidance in interpreting the terms of original Public Law 280. A primary canon of construction of Indian law is that ambiguous provisions are to be construed for the benefit of Indians. [30] Consequently, Congressional intent to diminish or delegate its trust responsibility to Indians is not to be lightly inferred. [31] In light of this canon, the Supreme Court has taken a very narrow and strict view of Public Law 280. First, the Court has required strict compliance with the procedural provisions of Public Law 280 both before and after the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 424-425, 91 S.Ct. 480, 481, 27 L.Ed.2d 507 (1970). In Kennerly, the Court stated: Nor was the requirement of affirmative legislative action an idle choice of words; the legislative history of the 1953 statute shows that the requirement was intended to assure that state jurisdiction would not be extended until the jurisdictions to be responsible for the portion of Indian country concerned manifested by political action their willingness and ability to discharge their new responsibilities. [32] In Kennerly, the Court rejected the State of Montana's claim of jurisdiction over a debt action against a reservation Indian, even though the tribe, through legislative action, had consented to such an assumption of jurisdiction, because Montana had not taken specific steps to assume civil jurisdiction under the 1953 act. See 400 U.S. at 427, 91 S.Ct. at 482. This position was reaffirmed in Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 493, 99 S.Ct. 740, 757, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979). While the Court did not define the type of positive action required by § 7, its approval of the form of the Washington statute [33] as being in conformity with Congressional intent strongly suggests that a recital of a state's willingness and ability to assume responsibility for Indians will be an important, although perhaps not decisive, factor in determining whether a state has successfully assumed jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has also stated that while Public Law 280 is clearly an assimilationist measure, it is not intended to immediately terminate tribal government. Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. at 488-89 fn. 32, 99 S.Ct. 755-56 fn. 32. Section 4(b) of the act, setting forth the areas over which states may not assume jurisdiction, has been broadly interpreted as a reaffirmance of the existing reservation [34] Indian-Federal Government relationship in all respects save the conferral of state-court jurisdiction to adjudicate private civil causes of action involving Indians. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 391, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 2112, 48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1975). In Bryan, the State of Minnesota attempted to levy a tax against a reservation Indian for personal nontrust property located on trust land. In rejecting Minnesota's claim, the Court interpreted Congressional intent as requiring a narrow interpretation of § 4(a) [conferring jurisdiction] rather than as granting broad powers to the states except where limited by the literal language of § 4(b). See 426 U.S. 389-90, 96 S.Ct. at 2111. The Court found this interpretation consistent with the canon of construction applied to statutes affecting Indians as Indians. See 426 U.S. at 381, 96 S.Ct. at 2107. Section 1057 of 63 O.S. 1981 provides in part: There is hereby created, with respect to each Indian tribe, band, or nation in the state, a public body corporate and politic, to function in the operating area of such Indian tribe, band, or nation to be known as the `housing authority' of said Indian tribe, band, or nation, which shall be an agency of the State of Oklahoma, possessing all powers, rights, and functions herein specified for city and county authorities created pursuant to this act ... City and county authorities are granted all powers necessary or convenient to carry out and effectuate the purposes of the Oklahoma Housing Authorities Act, [35] which includes the power to sue and be sued. See 63 O.S. 1981, § 1061(a). We note that Congress has expressly authorized the creation of Indian housing authorities by state legislative act. See 25 C.F.R. § 261.6(b). Such housing authorities are endowed with all necessary legal powers to carry out low income housing projects for Indians. See 25 C.F.R. § 805.109. Nonetheless, we are unable to conclude that either the Oklahoma Legislature or the United States Congress intended that Indian trust lands be subject to forcible entry and detainer actions in state court. We are unable to find any evidence that the Oklahoma Legislature intended that the power of the Indian housing authorities to sue be extended to trust lands. The Legislature spoke in terms of conferring upon the Indian housing authorities all of the powers enjoyed by municipal and county authorities. Certainly, city and county authorities have never enjoyed the power to litigate issues of ownership and possession of federal lands. The Indian housing authority statute is barren of any specific expression of willingness and ability to assume responsibility over trust lands, a factor identified as important by the Supreme Court. Moreover, given the standards of interpretation of Public Law 280 §§ 4(a) and (b) discussed previously, we cannot believe that the United States intended to grant states authority over trust property. The specific prohibition of the assumption of jurisdiction to adjudicate, in probate or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of [trust] property [36] indicates the contrary. Legislative history somewhat supports the view that Public Law 280 did not oust federal and tribal control over allotments. [37] Certainly the Secretary of the Interior is convinced that this is the proper interpretation of Public Law 280. [38] We must also note that federal approval of state-created Indian housing authorities does not imply delegation of jurisdiction over trust allotments. State created housing authorities are granted only those powers necessary to implement low income housing projects for Indians. See 24 C.F.R. § 805.109. The power to sue Indian tenants for possession is not necessary to implement Indian housing projects for the power to terminate possession remains in the Secretary of Interior. [39] We are unaware of any state assumption of jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes involving trust property. The Alaska Supreme Court has expressly found that such an assumption of jurisdiction is improper. [40] It interpreted § 4(b) of Public Law 280 as reserving federal jurisdiction over any disputed interest in trust lands. Heffle v. State, 633 P.2d 264 (Alaska, 1981). Alaska has also found state courts do not have authority to adjudicate a dispute over personalty held in trust by the United States. Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53 (Alaska 1977). The proceeds from oil leases of trust land are a sufficient interest in the trust property to preclude the exercise of state court jurisdiction. Ollestead v. Native Village of Tyonek, 560 P.2d 31 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 938, 98 S.Ct. 426, 54 L.Ed.2d 297. We find particularly cogent the explanation of a federal district court: Indian trust lands are a federal instrumentality held to effect the federal policy of Indian advancement, and therefore may not be burdened or intervened with by the State ... Where a dispute involves trust or restricted property, the state may not adjudicate the dispute nor apply its laws. In re Humbolt Fir, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 292, 296 (N.D.Cal. 1977).