Opinion ID: 223533
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Guzman’s Relative Role in the Conspiracy

Text: Fourteen of the indicted defendants pled not guilty and went to trial. Interests of judicial economy and efficiency weighed against conducting fourteen individual trials, but fairness and practicality weighed against conducting one joint trial. Judge Castillo divided the defendants into two groups: roughly, into the “alleged leaders of the conspiracy” and the “less major players.” Based on the indictment and the government’s characterization of the evidence in its pretrial briefs, the judge found that it appeared that Guzman, a Shorty, played a larger role in the alleged conspiracy than the defendants grouped in the second trial as “less major players,” and would be tried with the leaders of the conspiracy. Guzman moved to sever his trial, arguing in part that he would be unfairly prejudiced if he were tried with the gang leadership. (“Guzman showed up at a murder trial and a RICO conspiracy broke out.” Guzman Br. at 18). His motion was denied. After hearing the evidence, the jury found Guzman guilty of one murder and of RICO conspiracy. He argues that he was found guilty on these charges only because he was prejudiced by being tried alongside the major players of the Aurora Insane Deuces. We review a district court’s denial of a motion to sever under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Rice, 520 F.3d 811, 817 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Coleman, 22 F.3d 126, 134 (7th Cir. 1994). Nos. 09-1190, 09-1224, 09-1225, 09-1226, 09-1227, 09-1251 Page 6 “When many defendants are tried together in a complex case and they have markedly different degrees of culpability, [the] risk of prejudice is heightened.” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993); see also United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 765 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Denial of a motion for severance may be an abuse of discretion if there is a great disparity of evidence between the moving defendant and his co-defendants.”). But a “simple disparity in the evidence will not suffice to support a motion for severance.” United States v. Caliendo, 910 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation omitted). There will inevitably be some differences among defendants tried together. Someone will be first and someone will be last. Half will be below the median. We do not see a prejudicial disparity of evidence against Guzman as compared to his co-defendants. He was charged with participating in the RICO conspiracy through murdering Lazcano and attempting to murder another victim, and he was charged with additional counts of murder and assault with a dangerous weapon. Most of the evidence presented at trial against his co-defendants would have been admissible in a trial on these charges against him alone. The district court properly instructed the jury to consider the evidence against each defendant individually, and we presume that the jury was capable of following such a limiting instruction. See United States v. Zahursky, 580 F.3d 515, 525-26 (7th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Vargas, 552 F.3d 550, 557 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e assume that limiting instructions are effective in reducing or eliminating unfair prejudice.”). The jury’s verdicts show that its members were indeed able to consider the evidence against each defendant individually. For example, Guzman was acquitted of Count 5 (assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering activity), while Delatorre was convicted of that count. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Guzman’s motion to sever on the basis of his relative role in the conspiracy.