Opinion ID: 2354947
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony About Nguyen's Statements

Text: On appeal, Chanthaseng argues that the trial court erred by excluding his and Martin's testimony about Nguyen's statements. He argues that he did not offer the statements for the truth of the matters asserted and they were thus admissible nonhearsay. He also asserts that the statements were admissible under K.S.A. 60-460(j) as statements against Nguyen's interest. Neither of these arguments was advanced in the district court. Indeed, Chanthaseng passed up several opportunities at conferences with the judge out of the hearing of the jury. The party arguing for admission of evidence should provide a district judge with a specific objection or argument on an issue so that he or she has a chance to consider, as fully as possible, whether the evidence should come in and to avoid any potential reversible error. State v. Brown, 291 Kan. 646, 652, 244 P.3d 267 (2011) (quoting State v. Richmond, 289 Kan. 419, 429, 212 P.3d 165 [2009]). Chanthaseng contends that we should nevertheless consider his claim, arguing that appellate courts may address the merits of constitutional issues raised for the first time on appeal if the issue falls within one of three recognized exceptions: (1) The newly asserted claim involves only a question of law arising on provided or admitted facts and is determinative of the case; (2) consideration of the claim is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent the denial of fundamental rights; or (3) the district court is right for the wrong reason. State v. Dukes, 290 Kan. 485, 488, 231 P.3d 558 (2010) (citing State v. Spotts, 288 Kan. 650, 652, 206 P.3d 510 [2009]). Recently, however, we have refused to review an evidentiary issue not preserved for appeal, even when the issue involved a fundamental right. Dukes, 290 Kan. at 488, 231 P.3d 558. We hold that none of the exceptions is applicable to save Chanthaseng's claim here. On the first exception, although there is a purely legal question on hearsay, its resolution will not be determinative of the case. See State v. Richmond, 289 Kan. at 429, 212 P.3d 165, (admissibility of testimony not determinative; case still subject to review of all other evidence under state standard, federal standard, both). On the second exception, exclusion of the evidence in question did not implicate Chanthaseng's fundamental rights; the substance of his conversation with Nguyen still got before the jury. See State v. Baker, 281 Kan. 997, 1009, 135 P.3d 1098 (2006) (defendant's right to jury trial not violated when other evidence to support defense theory presented); State v. Carr, 265 Kan. 608, 621-22, 963 P.2d 421 (1998) (same), abrogated on other grounds State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 145 P.3d 1 (2006). The third exception applies when a party seeks to uphold a district judge's decision, not when the party attacks it. For all of the reasons above, we do not reach the merits of Chanthaseng's first issue on this appeal. See State v. Haislip, 237 Kan. 461, Syl. ¶ 5, 701 P.2d 909 (1985).