Opinion ID: 2828539
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: e., the conduct may be intentional, it may

Text: be unintentional but caused by negligent or reckless conduct, or it may result from an abnormally dangerous activity for which there is strict liability. [90 N.J. at 591-92 (footnote omitted) (adopting Restatement section 822 analysis).]8 Section 824 of the Restatement, on which plaintiffs rely, does not expand private nuisance claims into settings in which there is no showing of fault and no abnormally dangerous activity being conducted. Rather, it confirms that two categories of conduct, an affirmative act and a failure to act in circumstances in which the defendant has a duty, can give rise to a claim for private nuisance: 8 Smith, supra, 421 N.J. Super. at 379, 389-90, does not support the proposition that a nuisance claim can be maintained in the absence of evidence of fault. There, although the jury declined to find that the plaintiffs’ damage -- stray voltage passing through the ground on their residential property -- resulted from the defendant utility’s negligence, it suggested that a utility’s continued conduct in causing the stray voltage to be present on the plaintiffs’ property constituted an intentional act. Id. at 379, 389. This case does not raise the issue addressed by the Appellate Division in Smith, and we do not consider that issue. 17 The conduct necessary to make the actor liable for either a public or private nuisance may consist of

in which the actor is under a duty to take positive action to prevent or abate the interference with the public interest or the invasion of the private interest. [Restatement § 824.] This Court has adopted this section of the Restatement. See Birchwood Lakes, supra, 90 N.J. at 592 (adopting Restatement section 824 analysis); accord S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 254 F. Supp. 2d 486, 504 (D.N.J. 2003) (applying New Jersey law). As its commentary explains, section 824 of the Restatement authorizes the imposition of liability for a failure to satisfy a duty, as well as the commission of an affirmative act: One is ordinarily subject to no liability to another merely because he has failed to take positive action to prevent another from being harmed. There are, however, certain circumstances under which the law imposes a duty on a person to take positive action for the protection of another and subjects him to liability if he fails to meet the standard of action required in the particular case. [Restatement § 824 comment e (citations omitted).] Thus, while Restatement section 824 confirms that a breach of an affirmative duty may give rise to liability in appropriate 18 settings, it does not give rise to a strict liability claim outside of the abnormally dangerous activity setting recognized by section 822 of the Restatement. The principle that limits private nuisance claims under section 822 of the Restatement to cases involving the defendant’s fault or abnormally dangerous activity also limits the reach of section 839 of the Restatement, the provision at the core of our dissenting colleagues’ analysis. Plaintiffs did not invoke section 839 before the trial court or on appeal. More importantly, that provision does not revive plaintiffs’ nuisance claims in the setting of this case. Section 839 of the Restatement governs a claim that a defendant is liable for a private nuisance because he or she failed to abate an artificial condition: A possessor of land is subject to liability for a nuisance caused while he is in possession by an abatable artificial condition on the land, if the nuisance is otherwise actionable, and (a) the possessor knows or should know of the condition and the nuisance or unreasonable risk of nuisance involved, and (b) he knows or should know that it exists without the consent of those affected by it, and
opportunity to take reasonable steps to abate the condition or to protect the affected persons against it. 19 [Restatement § 839 (emphasis added).] Significantly, section 839 of the Restatement imposes liability for failure to abate a nuisance only “if the nuisance is otherwise actionable.” The commentary to Restatement section 839 defines this language to “mean[] that all other elements necessary to liability under the rule stated in § 822 . . . must be present in addition to the breach of duty specified in this Section.” Restatement § 839 comment g. Thus, in the absence of a showing of fault or the conduct of an abnormally dangerous activity that would support a private nuisance claim under section 822 of the Restatement, plaintiffs have no claim under section 839 of the Restatement. Our dissenting colleagues contend that there is ambiguity in Restatement section 839 by virtue of an illustration provided in its commentary that postulates two alternative scenarios involving contamination by a leaking underground storage tank. Post at __ (slip op. at 11-13) (citing Restatement § 839 comment f, illustration 1-2). Our colleagues acknowledge that this case more closely resembles the first scenario presented in comment f, in which no liability is imposed where the underground storage tank leaked “[w]ithout [the tank owner’s] knowledge or negligence,” “because it would not be practicable” for the owner to remove the oil from his or her neighbor’s land. Post at __ (slip op. at 12). They argue, however, that the illustration in 20 the Restatement is outdated because with modern technology, migrating home heating oil can be remediated. Post at __ (slip op. at 13). Whether or not the Restatement’s drafters should update the illustration, the principle of Restatement section 839 remains the same: there is no liability under that provision unless the defendant’s conduct was “actionable” within the meaning of section 822 of the Restatement. Our courts also apply the Restatement’s standard of liability where a plaintiff pursues a trespass claim. See Siddons v. Cook, 382 N.J. Super. 1, 11-12 (App. Div. 2005); Burke, supra, 239 N.J. Super. at 272-73. A defendant is liable in trespass for an “intentional[]” entry onto another’s land, regardless of harm. Restatement § 158. A defendant is also liable if he “recklessly or negligently, or as a result of an abnormally dangerous activity enters” onto another’s land, and the entry causes harm. Id. § 165. Liability for a “continuing trespass” arises with the “continued presence” on another’s “land of a structure, chattel, or other thing which the actor has tortiously placed there.” Id. § 161(1) & comment b. Importantly, the placement of the object on the plaintiff’s land must be a “tortious[]” act, in that the conduct “subject[s] the actor to liability under the principles of the law of Torts,” id. § 161 comment a, defined as conduct that is intentional, negligent, or abnormally dangerous, id. § 6 comment a. 21 Accordingly, a defendant is not liable in trespass for “an unintentional and non-negligent entry on land in the possession of another,” regardless of the harm done. Id. § 166. The commentary confirms that strict liability is eliminated except for abnormally dangerous activities. Id. § 166 & comment b.9 Like a private nuisance claim under section 822 of the Restatement, a cause of action for trespass requires a showing of intentional, reckless or negligent conduct, or the conduct of abnormally dangerous activity. Id. §§ 165-66. In short, “[strict] liability without fault should not be imposed, whether that activity be classified as a nuisance or a trespass, absent intentional or hazardous activity requiring a higher standard of care or, as a result of some compelling policy reason.” Burke, supra, 239 N.J. Super. at 273; see also Ruiz ex rel. Ruiz v. Kaprelian, 322 N.J. Super. 460, 472-73 (App. Div. 1999). Instead, “regardless of the analysis one might urge and the consequent label attached,” the outcome “should logically depend on whether the offending landowner somehow has made a negligent or unreasonable use of his land when compared with the rights of the party injured on the adjoining lands.” Burke, supra, 239 N.J. Super. at 274. Both 9 The Restatement (Third) of Torts did not alter this standard. See Restatement (Third) of Torts, supra, parallel table 2. 22 of the causes of action at issue -- a claim for private nuisance and a claim for trespass -- are governed by that limiting principle. Here, plaintiffs do not contend that their damages derive from negligent, reckless, or intentional and unreasonable conduct by Ellman or Lowitz. Moreover, there is nothing in the summary judgment record that would support such a claim. There is no suggestion that the underground oil storage tank leaked during the period in which Ellman owned the property at 72 Leighton Avenue. Lowitz arranged for the tank to be tested before she purchased the property in 1999, and no leak was detected at that time. When Lowitz contracted to sell the property four years later, she again arranged for a consultant to test the tank, and promptly notified her insurers when the consultant detected a leak in the underground storage tank. These homeowners’ actions do not support an allegation of an intentional tort, recklessness or negligence, and no such allegation is premised on their conduct. Relying exclusively on section 824 of the Restatement, plaintiffs argue that Ellman or Lowitz should be held liable on a theory of private nuisance or trespass because of delays in the defendant insurers’ remediation of the contamination on plaintiffs’ property, i.e. defendants’ “failure to act.” However, because plaintiffs cannot show fault or the conduct of 23 an abnormally dangerous activity on this record, as required by section 822 of the Restatement, they do not have a viable theory of liability under Restatement section 824. In the absence of an abnormally dangerous activity, the homeowner defendants cannot be held strictly liable for damages allegedly sustained by plaintiffs as a consequence of the delay before their property was excavated and remediated. The same limitations govern section 839 of the Restatement, which was not relied on by plaintiffs. Because the record is devoid of any allegation that Lowitz acted negligently, recklessly, or intentionally, section 839 does not provide a nuisance remedy in this case. Moreover, Lowitz took the “practicable” step available to her when she promptly contacted her insurers to advise them of the presence of the leaking oil tank on her property.10 Plaintiffs’ allegations present a sympathetic argument. But under well-settled law, they do not provide a basis for a claim for private nuisance under sections 822, 824, or 839 of the Restatement, or for trespass pursuant to sections 158, 161, or 165 of the Restatement, against the defendants. The trial 10Notwithstanding State Farms’ argument regarding the significance of the DEP’s “No Further Action Letter,” we do not rely on the determination of the DEP in our analysis of plaintiffs’ nuisance and trespass claims. 24 court correctly granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ private nuisance and trespass claims.