Opinion ID: 661715
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Further Obstruction of Justice

Text: Defendants Fredette and Ritchie first claim that the district court improperly assessed a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice. At Fredette's sentencing hearing the sole issue was whether under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1 the district court could apply a two-level enhancement to his base offense level to account for significant further obstruction. The court applied the enhancement, relying on the fact that Fredette had sworn under oath by affidavit and testimony to a false statement. At Ritchie's sentencing hearing the court again grappled with the obstruction of justice enhancement. At issue was whether Ritchie had asked Fredette to prepare the false affidavit and if so, whether Ritchie's actions triggered an obstruction of justice enhancement. After the government offered testimony establishing that Ritchie had solicited Fredette to provide the false affidavit, the court applied the Sec. 3C1.1 enhancement. While the facts pertaining to each defendant are distinct, the legal issue before the court is the same: When a defendant is convicted of an obstruction-related offense what do the sentencing guidelines require before a district court can apply a Sec. 3C1.1 enhancement for obstruction of justice? A two-level enhancement is warranted under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1 if the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense. (emphasis added). Application Note 6 provides that the enhancement does not apply to an obstruction-related offense except where a significant further obstruction occurred during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the obstruction offense itself. Defendants argue that this language requires a finding that before there can be an enhancement for obstruction of justice based on additional obstructive acts, the additional acts must actually have the intended effect of obstructing the investigative and prosecutorial process. 1 Case law addressing Application Note 6 of Sec. 3C1.1 is scant. However, it is clear that the Sentencing Commission designed this provision to eliminate the possibility that a defendant could be convicted and sentenced for an obstruction-related offense and then be subject to an enhancement for the same base offense, a situation referred to as double counting. United States v. Agoro, 996 F.2d 1288, 1293 (1st Cir.1993); United States v. Bell, 953 F.2d 6, 7 n. 1 (1st Cir.1992). 2 In the present case there is no danger of double counting. Although the offense of conviction at issue is undoubtedly obstruction-related, defendants acted in an effort to further obstruct the investigation and prosecution of their respective cases. After committing the obstruction-related offense of beating McCormick, defendants concocted a false affidavit stating that Fredette was solely responsible and had been provoked. Because the defendants acted to further obstruct justice, there is no risk of double counting under the circumstances. 3 The issue therefore evolves to whether a significant attempt to further obstruct justice constitutes a significant further obstruction under Application Note 6. Obstruction as used in Application Note 6 is captured by the language of the guideline itself, which speaks of willful attempts to obstruct. Agoro, 996 F.2d at 1293 (emphasis added); cf. United States v. Stevenson, 6 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir.1993) (involving obstructive conduct; holding, without mention of Application Note 6, that no finding of actual prejudice to the government is required.). This interpretation fosters the essential purpose of Application Note 6, namely the need to avoid double counting. It also squares the language of Application Note 6 with the express language of Sec. 3C1.1 which targets attempts at obstruction whether or not they are successful. 4 There is nothing in Application Note 6 that even hints of the need to differentiate between obstruction-related offenses and other offenses, unless there is a threat of double counting. In fact, Application Note 6 provides an example that clearly covers significant attempts to further obstruct justice. According to Application Note 6, an enhancement is appropriate where, for example, the defendant threatened a witness during the course of the prosecution for the obstruction offense. Under this scenario, it is conceivable that a witness would testify truthfully despite being threatened by the defendant. If the witness does testify truthfully, the defendant will have attempted to obstruct justice but failed to do so. The example in Application Note 6 buttresses our conclusion that, irrespective of whether the base offense is obstruction-related, Sec. 3C1.1 applies to significant attempts to further obstruct justice. 5 Defendants propose an analogy between Application Note 4 and Application Note 6. They argue that because the application notes are similar, interpretations of Application Note 4 are equally applicable to the instant case. For example, the defendants rely on United States v. Williams, 952 F.2d 1504, 1516 (6th Cir.1991), where the court held that under Application Note 4(b) a false statement not made under oath must have succeeded in significantly impeding the investigation. 6 The basic flaw in defendants' argument is that there are no pertinent similarities between Application Note 4 and Application Note 6. For that reason it makes little sense to impart interpretations of Note 4 to the present circumstances. Application Note 4 sets forth examples of less serious forms of conduct to which [an obstruction] enhancement is not intended to apply. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1, Application Note 2 (emphasis added). Because these forms of conduct are less serious it is understandable that courts have held that to warrant enhancement a defendant must have successfully obstructed justice. See, e.g., Williams, 952 F.2d at 1516. 7 In addition, the two provisions of Note 4 upon which defendants rely contain language expressly requiring that defendant's obstructive act actually hinder the government's investigation or prosecution. Subdivision (a) of Note 4 states that providing a false name or identification document upon arrest will not ordinarily warrant an obstruction of justice enhancement except where such conduct actually resulted in a significant hindrance to the investigation or prosecution of the instant offense. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1, Application Note 4(a). Subdivision (b) similarly provides that making false statements, not under oath, to law enforcement officers will not subject a defendant to an obstruction of justice enhancement unless the statement significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense. Id. Application Note 4(b). 8 Application Note 6 does not contain language requiring an actual successful effect. Its text simply refers to cases where a significant further obstruction occur[s]. The Note does not specify that the obstructive act must actually result[ ] in a significant hindrance or that the act must significantly obstruct[ ] or impede[ ] the official investigation or prosecution. Moreover, Note 6 does not address the type of less serious obstructive conduct addressed by Note 4. The purpose of Note 6 is to prohibit double counting when the base offense level at issue is obstruction related. However, Note 6 permits an obstruction enhancement where a more serious obstructive act, such as threatening a witness, occurs. Because of the difference in subject matter and language between Application Notes 4 and 6, defendants' reliance on cases interpreting Note 4 is misplaced. 9 We conclude that Application Note 6 applies to cases in which a defendant attempts to further obstruct justice, provided that the obstructive conduct is significant and there is no risk of double counting. Regardless of whether the defendants in this case were successful in their efforts to obstruct justice, the fact remains that they used a false affidavit in an effort to derail the investigation and prosecution of their respective cases. The mere fact that this case involves an obstruction-related offense should not shield the defendants from the clear language of Sec. 3C1.1, particularly since there is no threat of double counting.