Opinion ID: 374663
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Necessity of FOP's Consent

Text: 13 The FOP argues that the trial court should not have approved the consent decree without the approval of the FOP. This argument involves two separate contentions. First, the FOP asserts that it has been deprived of its day in Court by the waiver of findings of fact by the signatories to the consent decree. 11 Second, it argues that its exclusion from the consent decree violates Fed.R.Civ.P. 19. 14 Both of these arguments are meritless. The FOP misses the crucial point here, to wit, that the consent decree orders no relief against the FOP. Unless the FOP can demonstrate that it has been ordered to take some action by the decree, or ordered not to take some action, 12 or that its rights or legitimate interests have otherwise been affected, it has no right to prevent the other parties and the Court from signing the decree. 13 The FOP has made no such showing. In fact, the district court specifically found that the consent decree does not violate the contractual relationship between the City and the FOP, and this finding is not challenged on appeal. 15 The FOP's Fed.R.Civ.P. 19 argument fails for the same essential reason: no rights of the FOP are affected by the decree. Even if the FOP was at the outset a necessary party under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19, 14 once it was determined that the consent decree would not affect the FOP's rights, it was not a necessary party to the judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 20 explicitly provides that (j)udgment may be given . . . against one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities, making it clear that a judgment, consensual or otherwise, need not necessarily include all defendants in the lawsuit.