Opinion ID: 695522
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: More than minimal planning enhancement

Text: 26 Stanley's presentence report recommended a two-level increase in his offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 2F1.1(b)(2) because the offense involved more than minimal planning and more than one victim. Stanley contested that recommendation, but the district court imposed the enhancement. Although Stanley did not pursue the issue on his first appeal to this Court, he attempts to do so now. The government argues that Stanley is barred under the mandate rule from challenging the enhancement on this second appeal. We agree. 27 The mandate rule is a specific application of the law of the case doctrine. The rule bars the district court from  'reconsidering or modifying any of its prior decisions that have been ruled on by the court of appeals.'  United States v. Minicone, 994 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Uccio, 940 F.2d 753, 757 (2d Cir.1991)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 344, 130 L.Ed.2d 300 (1994). The district court, however, retains discretion under the mandate rule to reconsider, on remand, issues that were not expressly or implicitly decided by this Court. United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26, 33 (2d Cir.1977) (citation omitted). The rule serves a number of purposes, including finality of judgment and deference to the decisions of appellate courts. 28 Two of our recent cases are illustrative. In Minicone, the defendant at his initial sentencing sought to reduce his offense level because he played only a minor role in the offense. The district court rejected the defendant's argument, and the defendant appealed. A panel of this Court agreed with the district court that the defendant was not a minor participant, but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing on a different issue. At resentencing, the district court had a change of heart and this time granted the minor role reduction. On appeal by the government, we held that the district court had violated the mandate rule. See 994 F.2d at 88-89. 29 Uccio involved the same point in the context of an upward departure. At initial sentencing, the district court agreed with the defendant that an upward departure under Sec. 5K2.4 (abduction or unlawful restraint in furtherance of the underlying offense) was unwarranted, but departed upwardly on other grounds. The defendant appealed, challenging the upward departure. We left open whether a departure under Sec. 5K2.4 was appropriate. On remand, the district court decided that a departure based on Sec. 5K2.4 was warranted. See 940 F.2d at 754-56. On the defendant's second appeal, we found no violation of the mandate rule because the issue had remained open after the defendant's first appeal. See id. at 757-59. 30 Here, unlike the defendants in Minicone and Uccio, Stanley on his first appeal failed even to raise the issue he now seeks to litigate. Because he decided on his first appeal to forego any argument concerning the Sec. 2F1.1(b)(2) enhancement, the mandate rule prohibited the district court from reopening the issue, unless our initial opinion called for de novo resentencing. See United States v. Bell, 988 F.2d 247, 250 (1st Cir.1993) (where appellate court vacates a sentence and remands for consideration of a specific issue, mandate rule prevents district court from hearing an issue not raised on the initial appeal); United States v. Pimentel, 34 F.3d 799, 800 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (same), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 777, 130 L.Ed.2d 671 (1995); United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir.1993) (the [mandate] rule forecloses litigation of issues decided by the district court but foregone on appeal or otherwise waived); cf. Day v. Moscow, 955 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir.) (where this Court vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's arrest/search claims so that plaintiff could  'file an amended complaint amplifying those claims,'  this Court implicitly, if not explicitly, ruled that any amended complaint was to be limited to those claims) (citation omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 71, 121 L.Ed.2d 37 (1992). But see United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419, 1421-23 (6th Cir.1994) (no violation of mandate rule where, on remand, district court reversed an earlier ruling that neither party had initially appealed). 31 Our decision in Stanley I did not call for de novo resentencing. Instead, we identified a narrow issue for remand: whether the district court's loss calculation was based on the actual or intended loss to Merchants Trust and its customers. See Stanley I, 12 F.3d at 21 ([B]ecause the district court failed to indicate whether its loss calculation was based on actual or intended loss, and failed to make sufficient factual findings supporting either calculation, we remand for resentencing.... We have examined Stanley's remaining contentions regarding his sentence and find them to be without merit.). Thus, even if the district court reconsidered the Sec. 2F1.1(b)(2) enhancement--a matter by no means clear from the record--it did so improperly. (Stanley insists that the district court did reconsider the enhancement. At resentencing, however, there was no argument concerning the enhancement, although it appears that the parties did brief the issue. In addition, the court stated several times that the sole issue was the loss calculation.) 32 We recognize that the law of the case doctrine is not inflexible and that this Court retains discretion to hear Stanley's eleventh-hour argument under compelling circumstances. See, e.g., Uccio, 940 F.2d at 758 ([T]his Court will adhere to its own prior rulings in a given case absent cogent or compelling reasons to deviate, such as an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.) (internal quotations omitted). Stanley can point to no compelling circumstances, and we decline to reopen an issue resolved by Stanley I.