Opinion ID: 785761
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The New Jersey Pierce Claim

Text: 53 In Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J.1980), the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that an at-will employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy. An employee can prove such a wrongful discharge claim by show[ing] that the retaliation is based on the employee's exercise of certain established rights, violating a clear mandate of public policy. MacDougall v. Weichert, 144 N.J. 380, 677 A.2d 162, 168 (1996). The sources of public policy include legislation; administrative rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions. Pierce, 417 A.2d at 512. Furthermore, the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that federal law and policy can constitute New Jersey's clear mandate of public policy. D'Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 133 N.J. 516, 628 A.2d 305, 312 (1993). Whether a plaintiff has established the existence of such a public policy is an issue of law. Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163, 707 A.2d 1000, 1012 (1998). A salutary limiting principle is that the offensive activity must pose a threat of public harm, not merely private harm or harm only to the aggrieved employee. Id. at 1013. The public policy must also be clearly identified and firmly grounded.... A vague, controversial, unsettled, and otherwise problematic public policy does not constitute a clear mandate. MacDougall, 677 A.2d at 167. [U]nless an employee at will identifies a specific expression of public policy, he may be discharged with or without cause. Pierce, 417 A.2d at 512. 54 Conoshenti contends that he is entitled to recover under Pierce because he was discharged in violation of a clear public policy established by the FMLA, 13 i.e., a policy of ensuring the job security of employees who have serious health conditions that require temporary leave. If the record would support a finding that Conoshenti was discharged because he took FMLA leave, this might be a viable theory, although it is not clear to us that a Pierce claim in that event would be of any additional benefit to him. As we have held, however, the record will not support a finding that Conoshenti was discharged in retaliation for taking his FMLA leave. 55 We also conclude that Conoshenti would not have a meritorious Pierce claim based on the FMLA even if he were able to show that the failure to advise him of his FMLA rights caused him prejudice. The Pierce doctrine is about wrongful discharges, and it has only been applied where the discharge itself offended a clear public policy. Thus, all cases in which it has been successfully advanced have involved situations in which the discharge was in retaliation for conduct supported by the policy or for the employee's exercise of some established right. As the Supreme Court of New Jersey explained in MacDougall v. Weichert, 144 N.J. 380, 677 A.2d 162, 168 (1996) (citations omitted): 56 In most cases of wrongful discharge, the employee must show retaliation that directly relates to an employee's resistance to or disclosure of an employer's illicit conduct. In some cases, however, the employee may show that the retaliation is based on the employee's exercise of certain established rights, violating a clear mandate of public policy. 57 Conoshenti was discharged for violating the LCA and the conduct constituting that violation, and that discharge, accordingly, was unrelated to his having taken FMLA leave. As a result, we predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold that Conoshenti's discharge did not give rise to a Pierce claim even if it was preceded by a failure to provide advice required by the FMLA. The District Court's summary judgment on Conoshenti's Pierce claim will, accordingly, stand.