Opinion ID: 2266381
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Williams Conviction

Text: Mr. Williams argues that his First and Fifth Amendment rights have been violated. We review this matter de novo since it involves a legal issue. See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1220-21, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991). The record before us contains legal conclusions but no findings of fact made by the commissioner who conducted Mr. Williams' hearing pursuant to Super. Ct.Crim. R. 117(c). [5] However, the trial judge who reviewed the commissioner's judgment did make factual findings. Under Super. Ct. Crim.R. 117(g) a motion for review of the commissioner's order or judgment must include a written summary of the evidence presented before the hearing commissioner relating to the grounds for objection. An opposing party must describe any proceedings before the commissioner which conflict with or expand upon the summary filed by the moving party. In his motion for review, Mr. Williams summarized his version of the testimony of Officers Godinez and Holman, and stated that there was no interference with the travel of pedestrians. The District's opposition to Mr. Williams' motion asserted that officers [Darryl] Godinez and Donald Holman of the Metro Transit Police observed the defendant standing at the top of the escalator at Metro Center.... At no time did [Officer Godinez] see the defendant acting in an aggressive manner. Notwithstanding the characterization of the hearing testimony by Mr. Williams and the District, the trial judge had the authority to conduct [his] review either upon the written summary of the evidence presented by the parties or after listening to the tape or reading the transcript of the proceedings before the commissioner. Speight v. United States, 558 A.2d 357, 359-60 (D.C.1989). The trial judge appears to have listened to the tape or reviewed the transcript of the hearing. In his August 25, 1994, order, the trial judge found that Mr. Williams was on Metro subway station property at the time of the solicitation and that he placed the styrofoam cup in the face of the passengers, blocking their direct egress from the escalator. [6] The trial judge also determined that Mr. Williams was at the top of the Metro escalator. In ruling on Mr. Williams' motion for reconsideration, in an order filed on October 11, 1994, the trial judge concluded that the defendant was on Metro property and panhandling at the very top of the escalator on which people were exiting from the subway, and the statute denying the defendant the right to panhandle in this area was a valid time, place and manner restriction. Section 3 (b) of the Act provides that, No person may ask, beg, or solicit alms in any public transportation vehicle; or at any bus, train, or subway station or stop. Mr. Williams contends that this statute runs afoul of the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution because it impermissibly burdens speech and it fails to describe with sufficient specificity the location at which panhandling is prohibited. We disagree. In International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 112 S.Ct. 2701, 120 L.Ed.2d 541 (1992), a case involving a non-profit religious corporation, the Supreme Court of the United States said: It is uncontested that the solicitation at issue in this case [contributions at airport terminals] is a form of protected speech under the First Amendment. 505 U.S. at 677, 112 S.Ct. at 2704 (referencing Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981) and United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 110 S.Ct. 3115, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990)). It has also been held, and we assume here without deciding, that begging implicates expressive conduct or communicative activity and is regarded as `a form of speech.' Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir.1993). [7] However, neither the Act in its entirety nor § 3(b) prohibits all begging in open or public places in the District of Columbia. [8] In moving the panhandling bill for first reading at the Council's June 1, 1993, legislative session, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Nathanson, stated: The bill repeals that portion of the District['s] 1941 vagrancy law that prohibits begging in any form ..., therefore making non-aggressive panhandling a legitimate activity in the District of Columbia. Council of the District of Columbia, Council Period X, Tenth Legislative Meeting, Transcript, June 1, 1993, at 27. Hence, the Council in approving the bill did not intend to preclude all begging or solicitation in the District. Nonetheless, the Council sought to regulate begging and solicitation. This is permissible under our Constitution. As the Supreme Court has said: [I]t is also well settled that the government need not permit all forms of speech on property that it owns and controls. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678, 112 S.Ct. at 2705. Here the government has chosen not to permit begging or solicitation at a subway station or stop. The legislative history suggests that the Council intended to prevent begging or solicitation in any part of a subway station or stop which would create a public safety problem. As Councilmember Ray, a member of the Judiciary Committee, said during the Council's June 1, 1993, legislative session: [The] bill does not outlaw panhandling. It only outlaws aggressive panhandling. It permits panhandling.... [It] ... has also outlawed a second kind of conduct, ... which creates a public safety problem.... Consistent with Mr. Ray's statement, it appears that the Council was primarily concerned about public safety in enacting the non-aggressive panhandling sections of the Act, including § 3(b). It sought to prohibit panhandling in certain places where public safety could be compromised by disrupting the smooth flow of pedestrian or vehicular traffic. The subway station or stop was one of those places. [9] Through its fifteen foot rule and for public safety reasons, WMATA has also sought to prohibit free speech activities in certain areas of its property. Specifically, it has prohibited such activities within fifteen feet of the top of a subway escalator. [10] Section 3 (b) of the Act, as relevant here, provides that soliciting may not take place at any . . . subway station or stop. As the Act does not define subway station or stop, this court should construe that phrase in a manner that avoids possible constitutional difficulties. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 1169, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988); see also In re E.D.P., 573 A.2d 1307, 1309 (D.C.1990). The Council of the District of Columbia reasonably could assume that § 3(b) of the Act would be interpreted in light of WMATA's particular needs and concerns. WMATA's regulation provides a reasonable gloss on the meaning of at any ... subway station or stop, and we therefore construe § 3(b), insofar as relevant here, as prohibiting all panhandling (whether aggressive or nonaggressive) within fifteen feet of the escalator entrance. So interpreted, the statute does not necessitate the heightened First Amendment scrutiny applicable to public fora. [A] traditional public forum is property that has as `a principal purpose ... the free exchange of ideas.' International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, supra, 505 U.S. at 679, 112 S.Ct. at 2705 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3447-48, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985)). No one can fairly argue that the entranceway to (or point of egress from) a subway escalatordefined as the area within fifteen feet of the entranceis a place whose principal purpose is the free exchange of ideas. Its primary purpose, indeed its only practical purpose, is as an area within which pedestrian traffic is funnelled onto the escalator. Moreover, it is not a designated public forum, id. at 678, 112 S.Ct. at 2705; WMATA has explicitly prohibited expressive activity within that limited area. Since we are faced with a non-public forum area, our review of § 3(b) of the Act is restricted. We need only determine whether § 3(b) is reasonable and whether it is an effort to suppress the speaker's activity due to disagreement with the speaker's view. Id. at 679, 112 S.Ct. at 2705. The District has not attempted to suppress the speech of beggars who wish to communicate regarding their plight by asking for money. Beggars may engage in soliciting in many different parts of the District where open or public space is located. Indeed, had Mr. Williams moved several feet into space away from the top of the escalator and engaged in peaceful begging by asking whether someone could spare some change, his activity would have been lawful. However, he solicited at the top of the escalator, a foot or less away from where passengers were trying to step off the escalator from the interior of the subway station. We conclude that § 3(b), as we have construed it, is a reasonable regulation of begging. It is designed to ensure public safety by prohibiting conduct that may be reasonably expected to disrupt or impede the smooth flow of pedestrian subway traffic within fifteen feet of a subway escalator. In O'Brien v. United States, 444 A.2d 946, 949 (D.C.1982), [11] we concluded that the fifteen foot WMATA regulation serves a significant governmental interest by ensuring an orderly flow of pedestrian traffic on and off the escalator and, in turn, avoiding congestion at the escalator's entrance or exit which could cause injury. We also determined that the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted and is reasonably narrow, given the necessity of restricting this activity where congestion of pedestrian traffic poses the greatest danger. Id. Section 3(b) of the Act similarly advances the District's significant interest in promoting public safety and convenience at a subway station or stop, while leaving those engaged in expressive activity readily available alternative means of communicating their message. There is nothing in the legislative history to even remotely suggest that the Council sought to prohibit beggars from engaging in expressive conduct because of any disagreement with their message or intent to suppress it. The Council's public safety purpose clearly was unrelated to the suppression of ideas. [12] In fact, § 4 of the Act, D.C.Code § 22-3313 specifies that [a]cts authorized as an exercise of a person's constitutional right to ... protest, or speak ... shall not constitute unlawful activity under this act. Furthermore, § 3(b), as we have construed it, is narrow in scope and does not cut off all right to solicit or beg in a non-aggressive manner. Nor does it focus only on beggars; it covers all those who seek to obtain an immediate donation of money or thing of value. Mr. Williams also argues that § 3(b) violates his Fifth Amendment rights and is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to describe with sufficient specificity the location at which panhandling is prohibited. We disagree. We have previously ruled that: The specific terms of the statute need not be defined with mathematical precision. As long as a person of ordinary intelligence exercising common sense, can understand and comply with the dictates of a statute, due process is not offended. In re L.E.J., 465 A.2d 374, 378 (D.C.1983) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607-08, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2913-14, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (other citations omitted)). To withstand a vagueness challenge, a statute `must state its standard with adequate clarity and mark sufficiently distinct boundaries for the law to be fairly administered.' Id. (citing and quoting In re J.S.R., 374 A.2d 860, 862-63 (D.C.1977)). Section 3(b) of the Act meets this standard. The term at a subway station or stop, as construed in light of the WMATA regulation, is not unconstitutionally vague. A complete ban on soliciting within fifteen feet of the escalator provides unmistakable notice to those of ordinary intelligence and conveys sufficiently definite warnings as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. Ricks v. District of Columbia, 134 U.S.App. D.C. 201, 206, 414 F.2d 1097, 1102 (1968). [13] And Mr. Williams' conduct clearly fell within that proscription. The trial judge found that he was on Metro property and panhandling at the very top of the escalator on which people were exiting from the subway. Officer Holman testified that Mr. Williams was less than a foot or about a foot from the subway escalator. Mr. Williams himself estimated that he was six feet away from the escalator. Indeed, whatever the breadth of strictures of § 3(b)'s interpretation, Mr. Williams can hardly assert surprise that his particular activities, carried on here and as they were at that subway escalator would be held to violate that subsection. In short, § 3(b) does not impermissibly burden free speech; nor is it unconstitutionally vague either under the First or Fifth Amendments. Hence, we affirm Mr. Williams' conviction.