Opinion ID: 2737209
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: schaffer’s challenges

Text: Schaffer argues that the district court erred at trial by declining to instruct the jury on his proposed entrapment defense; by admitting evidence of the March 14 arrest as intrinsic evidence; and by admitting testimony that he was “uncooperative” following his arrest. Schaffer further argues that the government committed prosecutorial misconduct during his trial; that he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors at trial entitles him to a new trial. We address these claims in order.
“We review the district court’s decision not to grant an entrapment instruction de novo, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.” United States v. Nelson, 732 F.3d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 2013). Although entrapment is a question for the jury and not the court, in order “for 7 Case: 13-40322 Document: 00512782290 Page: 8 Date Filed: 09/25/2014 No. 13-40322 an entrapment instruction to be put to the jury, a defendant must make a prima facie showing of two elements: (1) lack of predisposition to commit the offense and (2) some governmental involvement and inducement more substantial than simply providing an opportunity or facilities to commit the offense.” Id. at 514 (internal quotation marks omitted). Both elements assist the court in making the “critical determination” of “whether criminal intent originated with the defendant or with the government agents.” United States v. Bradfield, 113 F.3d 515, 521 (5th Cir. 1997). In order to determine “whether the defendant lacked predisposition, we consider whether he ‘intended, was predisposed, or was willing to commit the offense before first being approached by government agents.’” Nelson, 732 F.3d at 514 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Theagene, 565 F.3d 911, 919 (5th Cir. 2009)). “[A] defendant’s eager willingness to participate in government-solicited criminal activity is sufficient to prove predisposition.” United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 722, 741 (5th Cir. 2001). We have found that “[a] defendant lacks predisposition where he had no prior interest or experience related to the crime, displayed ‘significant hesitation or unwillingness, or attempt[ed] to return discussion to lawful conduct.’” Nelson, 732 F.3d at 514 (quoting Theagene, 565 F.3d at 920). It may be taken as evidence of predisposition that the defendant was an “active, enthusiastic participa[nt] or demonstrated expertise in the criminal endeavor.” Id. at 515 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Government inducement consists of the creative activity of law enforcement officials in spurring an individual to crime.” Theagene, 565 F.3d at 922 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Evidence that government agents merely afforded the defendant an opportunity . . . for the commission of the crime is insufficient to warrant the entrapment instruction.” United States v. Bradfield, 113 F.3d 515, 522 (5th Cir. 1997). 8 Case: 13-40322 Document: 00512782290 Page: 9 Date Filed: 09/25/2014 No. 13-40322 Schaffer argues that the drug transaction with Frosch was at a standstill and that it was the Government’s prodding that made it come to fruition. He further argues that he was a reluctant participant in the drug conspiracy and that, but for the Government’s efforts, the conspiracy would not have begun. In support of these arguments, Schaffer highlights the testimony of his father who stated that the charges against Schaffer were not “in keeping with the child that [I] raised.” Although Schaffer acknowledges that the jury could have concluded that he was a willing participant, he argues that they jury should have been instructed on entrapment to allow it to evaluate the merits of the defense. After a review of the record, with the evidence viewed in Schaffer’s favor, he does not show that his entrapment defense was “plausible enough that the jury deserved a chance to evaluate it.” Theagene, 565 F.3d at 922. As to Schaffer’s predisposition, he “demonstrated expertise in the criminal endeavor,” Nelson, 732 F.3d at 514, when he described to Frosch, in depth, how he usually conducted drug transactions, when he indicated that “there’s a lot of money to be made for everybody” from such drug transactions, and when he described how the drugs would be packaged to deter detection. Schaffer did not express “significant hesitation or unwillingness” when presented with the opportunity to make a second attempt to transact with the undercover officer. Theagene, 565 F.3d at 920. In fact, he was an eager participant, which he demonstrated by encouraging the hesitant officer to make a second attempt at the drug transaction. Mr. Schaeffer’s vague testimony concerning his impression of Schaffer’s character cannot rebut the evidence that Schaffer was an “active, enthusiastic participant in the crime.” Nelson, 732 F.3d at 515 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). As to inducement, Schaffer fails to assert how the June 10 transaction amounted to anything more “than simply providing an opportunity or facilities to commit the offense.” Theagene, 9 Case: 13-40322 Document: 00512782290 Page: 10 Date Filed: 09/25/2014 No. 13-40322 565 F.3d at 922. In short, the district court did not err when it declined to provide the jury with an entrapment defense instruction.
The court reviews a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, subject to harmless-error analysis. See United States v. Girod, 646 F.3d 304, 318 (5th Cir. 2011). “For any of the evidentiary rulings to be reversible error, the admission of the evidence in question must have substantially prejudiced the defendant’s rights.” Id. at 318 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The district court referred to the evidence relating to the March 14 arrest as both “404(b) evidence” and “intrinsic” evidence. Although the court performed a Beechum analysis, its ruling on admissibility rested on its conclusion that the evidence was intrinsic. We need not decide whether the district court was correct when it held the March 14 arrest evidence to be intrinsic, because that evidence was properly admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” However, “[t]his evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Id. This court held in United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), that Rule 404(b) requires a two-step analysis: “[f]irst, it must be determined that the extrinsic offense evidence is relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character,” and “[s]econd, the evidence must possess probative value that is not substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice and must meet the other requirements of rule 403.” Id. at 911. 10 Case: 13-40322 Document: 00512782290 Page: 11 Date Filed: 09/25/2014 No. 13-40322 “We have previously held that in a conspiracy case, the defendant puts his intent into issue when he pleads not guilty.” United States v. Heard, 709 F.3d 413, 430 (5th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, Schaffer’s possession of a “distributable amount” of cocaine and other drugs on March 14 and the fact that he admitted that he was taking it “to a business partner” are clearly relevant to establishing Schaffer’s intent to participate in the conspiracy at issue here. As for the second prong of the Beechum analysis, “we must take care not to infringe upon the broad discretion of the trial court regarding the relevance, probative value, and prejudicial effect of evidence.” United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1562 (5th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Given that the evidence regarding the March 14 arrest was within the time frame alleged by the indictment and involved possession by Schaffer of a “distributable amount” of cocaine, we conclude that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by any undue prejudice. Therefore, the evidence was properly admitted.
The Supreme Court has established that “use of [a] defendant’s postarrest silence” to impeach a defendant is a violation of due process. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611 (1976). “Ordinarily, we review a constitutional question de novo.” United States v. Potts, 644 F.3d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 2011). However, where, as is the case here, an appellant “did not properly preserve his claim of error regarding the prosecutor’s comments on his post-arrest silence in the district court, we review this claim only for plain error.” United States v. Salinas, 480 F.3d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 2007). In order to establish plain error, “the defendant must show that (1) there is an error, (2) the error is clear or obvious, and (3) the error affects his substantial rights.” Id. at 756 (internal quotation marks omitted). For the error to be considered plain, it must have been clear under existing law. See id. “If those three conditions are satisfied, 11 Case: 13-40322 Document: 00512782290 Page: 12 Date Filed: 09/25/2014 No. 13-40322 this court may grant relief if ‘the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Ibarra-Zelaya, 465 F.3d 596, 606 (5th Cir. 2006)). Schaffer argues that it was a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when DEA Agent Gray testified that the “Plano Police Department Detective advised that they had spoken to Mr. Schaffer and he wasn’t being cooperative.” However, Gray’s statement that Schaffer was not “being cooperative” was likely not a comment on Schaffer’s supposed postarrest silence, 2 but a spontaneous comment suggesting that Schaffer’s explanation for where he was going when the police pulled him over—he stated he was en route to McDonald’s—rang hollow under the circumstances. As such, it is likely that Gray’s statement was not a comment on Schaffer’s silence and did not implicate Schaffer’s Fifth Amendment rights. See Salinas, 480 F.3d at 756 (“[T]he Supreme Court has established that due process prevents the prosecution from commenting at trial on a criminal defendant’s silence. . . .”). Given that the test for a Doyle violation is “whether the manifest intent of the remarks was to comment on the defendant’s silence, or (stated another way) whether the character of the remark was such that the jury would naturally and necessarily construe it as a comment on the defendant’s silence,” United States v. Pennington, 20 F.3d 593, 599 (5th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted), it is difficult to see how the jury could consider the vague remark, “wasn’t being cooperative,” as a comment on Schaffer’s silence. Moreover, the remark was “a spontaneous comment by the witness,” not “a comment prompted by the prosecutor.” United States v. Andaverde-Tiñoco, 741 2The record does not establish whether Schaffer’s discussion with the police officers occurred before or after he received a Miranda warning. 12 Case: 13-40322 Document: 00512782290 Page: 13 Date Filed: 09/25/2014 No. 13-40322 F.3d 509, 521 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Moreno, 185 F.3d 465, 472 (5th Cir. 1999)). This analysis leads us to reject Schaffer’s argument, regardless of whether he received a Miranda warning before his short discussion with the police officers. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619 (addressing postarrest, post-Miranda silence); Salinas, 480 F.3d at 758 (addressing post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence).
This court applies a “two-step analysis to claims of prosecutorial misconduct.” United States v. Davis, 609 F.3d 663, 677 (5th Cir. 2010). “First, we assess whether ‘the prosecutor made an improper remark.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 358 (5th Cir. 2007)). If so, we then ask if the defendant was prejudiced because of the prosecutor’s remark. Id. “The determinative question is whether the prosecutor’s remarks cast serious doubt on the correctness of the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 358 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). We determine whether the prosecutor’s remark cast serious doubt on the correctness of the jury’s verdict by considering three factors: “(1) the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s remarks, (2) the efficacy of any cautionary instruction by the judge, and (3) the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction.” Davis, 609 F.3d at 677 (internal quotation marks omitted). While we review “the propriety of the prosecution’s arguments de novo, we review the question of whether or not the defendant’s substantial rights were affected under the abuse of discretion standard.” United States v. McCann, 613 F.3d 486, 494 (5th Cir. 2010). Schaffer argues that his substantial rights were affected when the prosecutor, on cross-examination of Schaffer’s father, asked, “Mr. Schaeffer, were you aware that your son was trying to have another inmate contact you to pay [the Assistant United States Attorney] 30 to 50 thousand dollars to 13 Case: 13-40322 Document: 00512782290 Page: 14 Date Filed: 09/25/2014 No. 13-40322 make this case go away?” We disagree because we find that this question was proper. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 405(a), [w]hen evidence of a person’s character or character trait is admissible, it may be proved by testimony about the person’s reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On crossexamination of the character witness, the court may allow an inquiry into relevant specific instances of the person’s conduct. We have “explained that ‘[o]nce a witness has testified concerning a defendant’s good character, it is permissible during cross-examination to attempt to undermine his credibility by asking him whether he has heard of prior misconduct of the defendant which is inconsistent with the witness’ direct testimony.’” United States v. Skelton, 514 F.3d 433, 444 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Wells, 525 F.2d 974, 976 (5th Cir. 1976)). Schaffer’s father had testified on direct examination to Schaffer’s good character. He was asked whether there was anything in Schaffer’s background to prepare him for the news of the drug conspiracy charge, whether Schaffer was employed since graduating from college, and whether he had a “normal lifestyle.” These questions were clearly asked by the defense as a means to establish Schaffer’s good character and to attempt to show that he was not predisposed, for entrapment purposes, to commit the offense. As such, the prosecution’s question on cross-examination about Schaffer’s attempted bribery was proper under the Federal Rules of Evidence, given that the record shows that the prosecutor had a good faith basis to ask the question. Accordingly, the prosecutor did not make an improper remark and there was no prosecutorial misconduct. Davis, 609 F.3d at 677 (prosecutorial misconduct is assessed by asking whether prosecutor made improper remark).
Schaffer argues that we should, on direct appeal, consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. He highlights a number of points in the trial where 14 Case: 13-40322 Document: 00512782290 Page: 15 Date Filed: 09/25/2014 No. 13-40322 he believes his lawyer made errors sufficient to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. However, we decline to reach this claim “because it is premature.” United States v. Montes, 602 F.3d 381, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). In this circuit, the “general rule . . . is that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be resolved on direct appeal when the claim has not been raised before the district court since no opportunity existed to develop the record on the merits of the allegations.” Id. (quoting United States v. Gulley, 526 F.3d 809, 821 (5th Cir. 2008)). We will only consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal “in those rare occasions where the record is sufficiently developed.” Gulley, 526 F.3d at 821. If the record does not allow us to “fairly evaluate the claim . . . we must decline to consider the issue without prejudice to a defendant’s right to raise it in a subsequent proceeding.” Id. Schaffer’s ineffective assistance claim was not raised before the district court. As a result, the record is not sufficiently developed for the court to fairly evaluate the claim that Schaffer’s attorney was ineffective. As in Montes, this case “falls within th[e] general rule because the record reveals neither the reasons for [Schaffer’s] attorney’s decisions nor the availability of alternative strategies.” 602 F.3d at 387. Schaffer makes no persuasive argument for why this is one of the “rare occasions” in which the court should evaluate his claim on direct appeal. Accordingly, we decline to reach his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Schaffer next argues that the “cumulative effect” of the errors he has identified was to deprive him of a fair trial. The cumulative error doctrine “provides that an aggregation of non-reversible errors (i.e., plain errors failing to necessitate reversal and harmless errors) can yield a denial of the constitutional right to a fair trial, which calls for reversal.” United States v. 15 Case: 13-40322 Document: 00512782290 Page: 16 Date Filed: 09/25/2014 No. 13-40322 Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 343–44 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). There being no error, the cumulative error doctrine has no application.