Opinion ID: 159763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Johnny Glover

Text: Next, we turn to Johnny Glover’s § 2255 motion, which this court remanded for reasons not related to any of the above discussed motions. In 1991, Johnny Glover pled guilty to a methamphetamine crime and conspiracy to launder money and was sentenced to 150 and 60 months’ imprisonment, respectively, the sentences to run concurrently. He did not appeal his conviction. Instead, he waited until May 29, 1997–approximately one month after AEDPA’s one-year grace period had expired–to file his § 2255 motion. See United States v. Simmonds , 111 F.3d 737, 746 (10th Cir. 1997) (according one-year grace period to “prisoners whose convictions became final on or before April 24, 1996”). The district court found his motion time barred and dismissed it. Johnny Glover appealed that determination, arguing that the government created an impediment that caused him to file his motion late. On his appeal of that decision, this court remanded his § 2255 motion with instructions to the district court “for findings regarding whether there was an impediment created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and if it prevented [Johnny Glover] from filing his motion on time.” United States v. Johnny Glover , No. 97-5158, 1998 WL -16- 453674, at  (10th Cir. Aug. 5, 1998). We also left the district court free to consider equitable tolling arguments, granted Johnny Glover’s certificate of appealability, vacated the district court’s order denying the motion as time barred under the AEDPA, and remanded the case. See id. at  & n.2. The main issue before the district court on remand was whether Johnny Glover’s § 2255 motion was late because the government impeded its filing by not responding to his requests for information made under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Although Johnny Glover’s first request was in 1994, he did not receive the FOIA materials until approximately August 1997, after he had already filed his § 2255 motion. The district court held a hearing on December 17, 1998. The only witness who testified at the hearing was Johnny Glover, who was called by the government only in response to the district court’s prodding. The evidentiary hearing did not reveal any new pertinent evidence on Johnny Glover’s impediment claim. The district court found that, because Johnny Glover was able to file his § 2255 motion before his receipt of the documents, there was no AEDPA impediment. See R., Vol. II, Doc. 398 at 3. The district court was not persuaded by Johnny Glover’s argument that he could have filed a better § 2255 motion with the FOIA materials, and noted that the comprehensiveness of the motion filed by Johnny Glover belied his assertion. See id. at 3-4. Last, the district court found -17- no grounds for equitable tolling. See id. at 5-6. On appeal, Johnny Glover contends that: (1) the government impeded or prevented his ability to file his § 2255 motion; (2) he diligently pursued the steps he thought necessary for filing his motion; and (3) equitable tolling applies. We agree that there was no impediment and that the doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply. AEDPA provides, in relevant part, that the one-year limitation period “ shall run from . . . the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by the governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Here, there was no government action in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States, nor an impediment that prevented the filing of the motion. Moreover, Johnny Glover is not eligible for equitable tolling; he waited an extended period of time before filing his initial motion, and waited three years after his conviction to make his FOIA request. See Miller v. Marr , 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that only petitioners who diligently pursue their habeas remedies can benefit under the equitable tolling doctrine) . Because Johnny Glover’s motion is time barred under AEDPA, we deny his request for COA.