Opinion ID: 6323823
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: We first consider whether this appeal is moot.

Text: On appeal, the Commission argues neither the Third Renewal Order nor the Nunc Pro Tunc Renewal Order render this appeal moot. We agree. “ ‘An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded’ by judicial relief.” State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (quoting Koch v. Canyon Cnty., 145 Idaho 158, 163, 177 P.3d 372, 377 (2008)). An issue does not present a real and substantial controversy if “any judicial relief from this Court would simply create precedent for future cases and would have no effect on either party.” Id. However, [e]ven where a question is moot, there are three exceptions to the mootness doctrine: “(1) when there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on the person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial review and thus is capable of repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of substantial public interest.” Id. (quoting Koch, 145 Idaho at 163, 177 P.3d at 377). Here, the prosecutor’s first involvement in the case was at the hearing on July 20, 2020, more than five years after the Second Renewal Order was issued on July 14, 2015. The prosecutor did not file a motion to renew the restitution order until eight months later on March 23, 2021. We do not condone the magistrate court’s decision to allow a party it deemed to have standing (but who did not file a motion to renew a judgment within the time allowed) to somehow benefit from another party’s filing when the magistrate court concluded the party who made a timely filing did not have standing. We question whether the procedure followed in this case effectively tolled the timeline to seek a renewal order. In addition, the Industrial Commission argued that the prosecutor’s motion was untimely. We have no reason to disagree with the Industrial 5 Commission’s argument. Therefore, we conclude a real and substantial controversy exists in the case at bar. Accordingly, because the appeal is not moot, we will address its merits. B. The Industrial Commission does not have standing to bring a motion to renew an order of restitution. The district court concluded that victims do not have standing to renew restitution orders because the “Industrial Commission has no standing to intervene in a criminal case.” While “[t]he victim is the beneficiary of [a restitution] order,” the district court reasoned, “the order itself is entered as part of the criminal sentencing process[:]” If the order is to be amended, or process under the order is to be altered, the change, in effect, would be a change to the sentence as pronounced by the trial judge. Only the court has the jurisdiction to alter or amend the terms of a criminal sentence, which would include modifying or renewing an order of restitution. This means that even when recorded as a judgment, the parties to the order remain the state, as the entity prosecuting the crime, and the defendant. The victim is not a party, and clearly, the victim has no jurisdiction to seek to alter or amend the criminal sentence pronounced by the court. The district court further explained that, in Johnson, 167 Idaho 454, 470 P.3d 1263, the Idaho Court of Appeals “held that restitution in a criminal case sought by a non-party is not a process provided by law.” On appeal, the Industrial Commission asserts it is not attempting “to intervene in a criminal case,” it is only attempting to renew the restitution order originally obtained by the Owyhee County Prosecuting Attorney. The Commission argues that Johnson is inapplicable because it dealt with the entry of an order of restitution rather than a renewal of such an order. The Commission points to Article I, section 22(7) of the Idaho constitution and notes that “[a] crime victim in Idaho has a constitutional right ‘[t]o restitution, as provided by law, from the person committing the offense that caused the victim’s loss.’ ” Additionally, the Commission asserts, when the Legislature amended Idaho Code section 10-1110 in 2015 to provide more time for crime victims to collect restitution, the Legislature did so with an understanding that victims would be able to renew judgments for orders of restitution. We conclude that victims do not have standing in a criminal case to independently seek renewal of a judgment for an order of restitution. “Although the Idaho Constitution enumerates a series of rights for crime victims, including the right “to restitution, as provided by law, from the person committing the offense that caused the victim’s loss,” nowhere does it confer upon a crime victim the status of a party in a criminal proceeding.” Johnson, 167 Idaho at 458, 470 P.3d at 1267 6 (quoting IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22(7)). We recognize that Johnson focused on whether a victim has standing to seek restitution but said nothing about who may renew judgments of orders of restitution. However, we nonetheless find the Court of Appeals’ decision in Johnson well-reasoned and instructive here. In Johnson, the district court granted a victim’s motion for restitution. 167 Idaho at 457, 470 P.3d at 1266. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that, “[b]ecause the State was not seeking restitution on behalf of the crime victim and the victim did not have standing to file a restitution motion, the district court lacked authority to consider the motion.” Id. at 455, 470 P.3d at 1264. The court explained: Under Idaho’s current statutory scheme, crime victims are not parties to a criminal case even for the limited purpose of seeking restitution and therefore lack standing to pursue a motion independently of a party. The Idaho Constitution provides “every action prosecuted by the people of the state as a party, against a person charged with a public offense, for the punishment of the same, shall be termed a criminal action.” IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 1. This principle is echoed statutorily by I.C. § 19-104, which defines the State and the person charged as the only parties to criminal actions. At the core of these provisions is the belief that criminal prosecutions are public matters, sought by the State on behalf of its citizen, not contests between a defendant and a crime victim. See State v. Gault, 304 Conn. 330, 39 A.3d 1105, 1113 (2012). Although the Idaho Constitution enumerates a series of rights for crime victims, including the right “to restitution, as provided by law, from the person committing the offense that caused the victim’s loss,” it does not confer upon a crime victim the status of a party in a criminal proceeding. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22. This is true, even when the proceeding involves a restitution order. Although restitution statutes vary from state to state, it is generally understood while crime victims are sometimes present and often represented by counsel, the government is still the only party to the case, other than the defense, and procedurally, the prosecutor requests restitution. Cortney E. Lollar, What Is Criminal Restitution?, 100 IOWA L. REV. 93, 110 (2014). Id. at 458, 470 P.3d at 1267 (footnote omitted). We agree with the Court of Appeals. The only parties to a criminal action are the State and the defendant. I.C. § 19-104 (“A criminal action is prosecuted in the name of the state of Idaho, as a party, against the person charged with the offense.”). “As a crime victim is not a party to a criminal case, the victim cannot intervene in a defendant’s criminal proceeding because, unlike Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 24, the Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide a process for intervention.” Johnson, 167 Idaho at 458, 470 P.3d at 1267. “The inability of non-parties to 7 intervene in a criminal case recognizes that the considerations underlying intervention in a civil case are not applicable to a criminal proceeding.” Id. “No other rule, statute, or constitutional provision allows a crime victim to independently intervene within a defendant’s criminal case.” Id. at 459, 470 P.3d at 1268. Idaho Code section 101111(1), relevant here, provides: Unless the judgment has been satisfied, at any time prior to the expiration of the lien created by section 10-1110, Idaho Code, or any renewal thereof, the court that entered the judgment, other than a judgment for child support, may, upon motion, renew such judgment by entry of an order renewing judgment. I.C. § 10-1111(1). Assuming without deciding that an order of restitution for a crime victim may be renewed pursuant to Idaho Code section 10-1111 as the Industrial Commission contends, nothing in the plain language of the statute confers the right to intervene in a criminal case upon a victim. The statute simply states that the criminal court, as “the court that entered the judgment,” “may, upon motion, renew such judgment[.]” We decline to read meaning into the statute that is not present in its plain language, particularly where doing so would give a victim “the authority to usurp the prosecutor’s distinct position in a criminal case.” See Johnson, 167 Idaho at 458, 470 P.3d at 1268. Finally, we address the Commission’s argument that, “[i]f a prosecutor is allowed to choose to not renew a civil [sic] judgment stemming from the recording of a validly entered restitution order but is free to instead let the victim’s judgment lien expire, that would deny victims their constitutional right to restitution.” The Commission’s argument conflates “civil” and “criminal” judgments. Idaho Code section 19-5305(1) provides that “an order of restitution may be recorded as a judgment and the victim may execute as provided by law for civil judgments.” I.C. § 195305(1) (italics added). That we have concluded victims do not have standing to intervene in a criminal case has no bearing on their ability to recover the restitution due on a civil judgment. Title 11 of the Idaho Code governs “Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Actions.” I.C. §§ 11-101–731. Idaho Code section 11-101 explicitly contemplates the enforcement of a restitution order: “The party in whose favor a judgment for restitution to a victim of crime has been entered pursuant to section 19-5305, Idaho Code, may . . . have a writ of execution issued for its enforcement[.]” I.C. § 11-101. Furthermore, even if the victim in the underlying criminal case decides not to bring a civil suit, the Industrial Commission is authorized by statute to bring a civil action against a criminal defendant to recover compensation awarded to victims through the Crime Victims 8 Compensation Program. I.C. § 72-1023. Additionally, we note that, before the order of restitution expires, victims may record the restitution order and obtain “a lien upon all real property of the judgment debtor” pursuant to Idaho Code section 10-1110. I.C. § 10-1110. We recognize that crime victims are constitutionally entitled to restitution; however, our decision today simply “preserves the nature of criminal proceedings as a process between the State and the defendant[.]” See Johnson, 167 Idaho at 459, 470 P.3d at 1268. It does not foreclose victims from pursuing their right to restitution through the correct procedural path. In sum, we hold that the district court did not err when it concluded the Industrial Commission did not have standing to pursue a renewal of an order of restitution. Because we conclude the Industrial Commission has no standing, we need not reach the other issues presented by this appeal.