Opinion ID: 1155462
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of Dismissal of Johnson's Action

Text: Judge Shortell's order granted Johnson a grace period to prepare her case for trial. That was the Civil Rule 41(e) adjudication. Judge Shortell thus asserted control over the litigation and a subsequent dismissal for failure to prosecute could be made only if the requirements of that order were not met. Siegfried does not contest the validity of that order. Although the order provided potentially for a dismissal pursuant to Civil Rule 41(e), we look only to the requirements of Judge Shortell's order and not to the arguably different requirements of Rule 41(e) in determining whether Judge Michalski's dismissal was proper. We believe that Johnson's actions during the 180 day period sufficiently complied with Judge Shortell's order. Johnson's initial delay was excused by Judge Shortell. Her use of the full 180 day period was authorized. The order was granted so that Johnson would have more time to prepare her case for trial. Steps taken on and off the record were preparatory for trial. [2] Johnson pursued her claim in one manner or another for most of the 180 day period. She engaged both Washington and local counsel and requested her medical records from Siegfried. Pleadings were prepared in anticipation of a favorable review of the medical records. There was significant activity on the record after the complaint was filed and served on Siegfried before the motion to dismiss was filed. The order conditioned dismissal on a lack of proceedings. Although, as noted above, we are not analyzing the Rule 41(e) requirements, our previous interpretations of the similar language of that rule are helpful. We do not believe that the proceedings required by this order were intended to be any more demanding than proceedings required by Rule 41(e). [3] This court has defined proceeding as a step, act or measure of record, by either party, which reflects that the suit is not stagnant. Shiffman, 657 P.2d at 403. A suit is considered stagnant when to the court it appears that for lack of activity of record neither party has taken the steps, acts or measures to be reasonably expected in the pursuit or defense of the particular cause of action. Id. In this case Johnson's actions on the record during the 180 day period included the filing of the amended complaint and the Application of Non-Resident Attorney for Permission to Appear and Participate in the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, both filed on December 28, 1990. The summons was filed on December 28 and issued on January 2. [4] We conclude that Johnson's actions were sufficient to demonstrate that the case was not stagnant. The amended complaint and the request for appearance both demonstrate that Johnson had a serious determination to pursue her cause of action. These proceedings are comparable to those which we have held terminate the period of lapse in a Rule 41(e) dismissal. Shiffman, 657 P.2d at 403 (filing of defendant's answer); Zeller, 577 P.2d at 697 (letter requesting a trial date). Cf. Cleary Diving Serv. v. Thomas, Head & Greisen, 688 P.2d 940, 943 (Alaska 1984) (holding that a note asking the court not to dismiss the action was not a sufficient proceeding). Siegfried argues that there was no effective action during the 180 day period. He notes that the summons was not issued until January 2 and was not served until January 10. He notes further that the amended complaint served on January 10 was defective. [5] However, we do not believe that the proceedings requirement, or any other language in the July 3 order, requires specifically that a sufficient complaint be filed or served, but only that measures be taken which are reasonably expected in the pursuit of the cause of action. [6] See Shiffman, 657 P.2d at 403. Johnson's actions were sufficient to show that she was moving the case forward and preparing for trial. That is all Judge Shortell's order required. Siegfried argues that the policy underlying the statute of limitations would be contravened by allowing Johnson to proceed. He notes that she did not file her original complaint until two days before the expiration of the limitations period and that she did not serve him with the complaint until 20 months later. He argues that since the object of the statute of limitations is to protect against the difficulties caused by lost evidence, faded memories and disappearing witnesses, Byrne v. Ogle, 488 P.2d 716, 718 (Alaska 1971), Johnson's delay of over three and one-half years from the surgery until service of the complaint should not be condoned. See Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522, 525 (9th Cir.1976) (holding that permitting a delay in service of process when the plaintiff filed immediately prior to the running of the limitations period undercuts the purposes served by the statute). However, these concerns are not determinative in this case. Resolution of this case will depend largely on a review of medical records and expert testimony. There is not a significant threat of lost evidence or disappearing witnesses. See Lee Houston & Assoc. v. Racine, 806 P.2d 848, 855 (Alaska 1991) (reasoning that a longer limitations period was appropriate for cases based largely on available documentary evidence). There is no evidence that Siegfried was prejudiced by the delay. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing Johnson's case. She pursued her case continuously, although perhaps not urgently, throughout the 180 day period. The case was obviously moving toward resolution. The dismissal served no purpose, once the case was progressing, except to sanction Johnson for the slow pace at which she initiated the action. See First Nat'l Bank of Fairbanks v. Taylor, 488 P.2d 1026, 1032 (Alaska 1971) (holding that it was neither necessary or (sic) justifiable to allow dismissal where the case had seen progress despite an earlier lapse in excess of a year).