Opinion ID: 2571537
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right to a Complete Defense

Text: Carter argues that the district judge's refusal to grant a continuance to locate Bledsoe was an abuse of discretion and violated his constitutional right to present a defense. K.S.A. 22-3401 provides a district court may grant a continuance for good cause shown, and its refusal to grant a continuance will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Moreover, Carter has the burden to prove that his rights were substantially prejudiced by the decision of the district court. State v. Lackey, 280 Kan. 190, 216, 120 P.3d 332 (2005), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1653, 164 L.Ed.2d 399 (2006), overruled on other grounds State v. Davis, 282 Kan. 666, 148 P.3d 510 (2007). When a criminal defendant claims that a district judge has interfered with his or her constitutional right to present a defense, we review the issue de novo. State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 921-22, 40 P.3d 139 (2001), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834, 123 S.Ct. 144, 154 L.Ed.2d 53 (2002). When a continuance is requested during trial, the district judge should weigh the possible prejudice to the parties, the diligence or lack thereof in attempting to secure a witness, the materiality and importance of the probable testimony, and the probability of the witness' appearance at a later date if a continuance is granted. Lackey, 280 Kan. at 218, 120 P.3d 332; State v. Howard, 221 Kan. 51, 55, 557 P.2d 1280 (1976). Carter suggests that the district court failed to weigh these three factors. We acknowledge that the record shows no explicit discussion of them at the time the district court denied the continuance. Nevertheless, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion and no constitutional error. Considering the first two factors, under the circumstances before us, we see no possibility of prejudice to Carter from the omission of Bledsoe's repetitive testimony. To the extent Bledsoe's evidence would have been helpful to the defense, other witnesses were present to testify that they were aware someone was planning to rob Carter, and they did so testify. In addition, Bledsoe's statement on this topic was admitted through the audiotape of the telephone conversation and the testimony of an officer who overheard it. We also must not forget that Carter had at least as much to lose as he had to gain from Bledsoe's appearance at trial; the State sought his testimony for a reason: Bledsoe would have been another in an already impressively long lineup of eyewitnesses willing to swear that Carter shot an unarmed Revels. As to the diligence with which Bledsoe's appearance was sought, both the State and the defense did their utmost to ensure Bledsoe would be in court. In addition to service of multiple subpoenas, a pick-up order was issued. Bledsoe was traced from Kansas to Colorado and then to Texas. There was no way at the time of the motion for continuance to estimate how much longer it would take to find Bledsoe or even if that could ever be accomplished. Bledsoe had told the State long in advance of trial that he had no intention of showing up to testify. He appeared quite capable of making good on that statement. Our conclusion that there was neither an abuse of discretion nor a constitutional violation is consistent with the precedent of this court. For example, in Lackey, 280 Kan. at 190, 120 P.3d 332, we agreed with the district court that an indefinite continuance the day of trial was not justified when the missing witness would have testified that the victim's boyfriend acted inappropriately at her funeral and that the witness had spoken with the victim 2 days after her supposed murder. The first proffered evidence was not relevant to establish that the boyfriend, rather than defendant, killed the victim, and the second, while material to contest time of death, was unreliable because the witness was not firm on the dates and phone records did not confirm the call. The witness did not want to be found, two of the State's witnesses had already died in this 20-year-old murder case, and the defendant's several-month search for the witness had been unsuccessful. See also Howard, 221 Kan. at 54-55, 557 P.2d 1280 (despite two subpoenas for defendant's alibi witness and message left with family, typographical error prevented sheriff from locating witness; district court granted half-day continuance but denied 2-week continuance; no proffer of what witness would testify to or demonstration that witness could reasonably be expected to appear if longer continuance granted; no abuse of discretion); compare State v. Jones, 226 Kan. 503, 509-10, 601 P.2d 1135 (1979) (identity of defendant principal issue; eyewitness with exculpatory evidence failed to appear at trial despite defendant's substantial efforts; denial of request for bench warrant, continuance until next morning abuse of discretion, prejudicial error); Winkelman v. Allen, 214 Kan. 22, 34, 519 P.2d 1377 (1974) (district court's refusal to grant a 1-day continuance when weather conditions prevented expert witness' presence; expert's testimony regarding standards of the real estate industry concerning a qualified buyer crucial; denial of continuance prejudicial, reversible).