Opinion ID: 1303713
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: Admission of Defendant's Other Crimes

Text: a. Necessity of Empaneling Two Juries. At the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecutor introduced evidence of certain prior offenses by defendant, including a prior rape, kidnap-assault and sexual assault. Defendant claims that he was denied his due process rights when the trial court allowed the same jury that convicted him on the murder charge to determine his guilt of these prior offenses for purposes of deciding the penalty issue. (See State v. McCormick (Ind. 1979) 397 N.E.2d 276.) Of course, technically speaking, the jury hearing such evidence did not determine his guilt of murder, but was limited to the special circumstance and penalty issues. In any event, the point is without merit. (See People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 204-206 [rejecting similar contention under 1978 death penalty law].) b. Instructions on Elements of Other Crimes. (27) Defendant further contends that the trial court, sua sponte, should have instructed the penalty phase jury regarding the essential elements of defendant's uncharged criminal activity. Defendant acknowledges that the trial court properly instructed the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that an uncharged offense occurred before such offense may be considered in determining penalty. ( People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53-55 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279].) But defendant suggests that the jury could not rationally determine whether the offenses were committed without first knowing their essential elements. (See, e.g., Burger v. State (1980) 245 Ga. 458 [265 S.E.2d 796]; State v. Moore (Tenn. 1981) 614 S.W.2d 348, 351.) In the absence of a prior request for such instructions, the contention is without merit. (See People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 281-282; People v. Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d 29, 72, fn. 25.) c. Instructions on Unanimity. (28) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that its finding of uncharged criminal activity must be unanimous. The jury was instructed that in order to make a determination as to the penalty, all twelve jurors must agree. That instruction is sufficient under existing law, and defendant cites no authorities which suggest that such unanimity must extend to each incident of uncharged criminal activity disclosed during the penalty phase. Any such requirement would immerse the jurors in lengthy and complicated discussions of matters wholly collateral to the penalty determination which confronts them. Moreover, we see nothing improper in permitting each juror individually to decide whether uncharged criminal activity has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and, if so, what weight that activity should be given in deciding the penalty. d. Dismissed Assault Charge. Although the information charging such misconduct was dismissed, the People were permitted to introduce during the penalty phase evidence of a forcible sexual assault on witness Tyson. Defendant now contends that the trial court was bound by the dismissal and should have ruled the evidence inadmissible. (29) Former section 190.3 permitted the presentation of penalty phase evidence of other criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence. Although proof of a conviction of the offense was unnecessary, no evidence could be admitted of a prior offense for which the defendant was prosecuted and acquitted.  (Former § 190.3, italics added.) Defendant cites no controlling authorities favoring his position, and we conclude that his argument is without merit. A dismissal (§ 995) is not an acquittal after prosecution. Following such a dismissal, the People may refile the same charges (§ 1238), thus confirming that a dismissal is not a final determination of the matter. Moreover, permitting the People to rely upon evidence of a dismissed charge during the penalty phase is not unduly unfair to the defendant, for he is entitled to an instruction which requires that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was committed. ( People v. Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d 21, 53-55.) Such an instruction was given here.