Opinion ID: 2086340
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Constitutional Background of 1969 PA 312, as Amended

Text: Constitution 1963, art 4, § 48 replaced the former provision of Const 1908, art 16, § 7 for courts of conciliation. The contemporary provision reads as follows: The legislature may enact laws providing for the resolution of disputes concerning public employees, except those in the state classified civil service. The convention's committee comment to art 4, § 48 stated the article's purpose in the following terms: The purpose of this section is to make it clear that the legislature has power to establish procedures for settling disputes in public employment. This section does not say what the procedure should be, but leaves that decision up to future legislatures. 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 2337. [16] Unlike the 1908 Constitution, therefore, art 4, § 48 did not specify the type of legislation which it authorized but posited wide discretion in the Legislature to establish those means and methods most effective for the accomplishment of the article's objective. A legislative response to the 1908 organic grant of authority was the 1947 enactment of the public employment relations act (PERA), MCL 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.455(1) et seq. Twenty-two years later, the Legislature enacted 1969 PA 312, a statutory scheme to provide for the compulsory interest arbitration of labor disputes in municipal police and fire departments, MCL 423.231 et seq.; MSA 17.455(31) et seq. The Legislature stated the act's purpose as follows: It is the public policy of this state that in public police and fire departments, where the right of employees to strike is by law prohibited, it is requisite to the high morale of such employees and the efficient operation of such departments to afford an alternate, expeditious, effective and binding procedure for the resolution of disputes   . MCL 423.231; MSA 17.455(31). In considering the constitutional propriety of Act 312 prior to its critical amendments in 1972 [17] and 1976, [18] then-Justice, now-Chief Justice COLEMAN summarized the raison d'etre of the scheme: PERA procedurally requires the parties to meet at the bargaining table and confer in good faith with an open mind and a sincere desire to reach an agreement. It does not mandate agreement. If the parties fail to agree on one or more mandatory subjects, an `impasse' situation is reached and the employer may take unilateral action on an issue consistent with its final offer to the employees' representative. The duty to bargain is then suspended until there is a change in the surrounding conditions or circumstances. In the private sector `impasse' often results in a strike. The employees refuse to accept the unilateral conditions imposed by the employer and withhold their services as a bargaining weapon. In the public sector strikes are prohibited but nevertheless occur. If the public employees do strike, the public employer may resort to the courts in order to return the labor situation to the status quo. By the time that court relief is obtained, however, the public may well have been left for a long period without the services and protection of the striking employees. When policemen engage in a strike, the community becomes immediately endangered by the withdrawal of their services. Likewise, our case law has often focused on the fact that fire fighters have a distinct and crucial employment relationship with a public employer. The Legislature, with knowledge of the vital character of police and fire services and with reference to the specific recommendations of the Governor's Advisory Committee on Public Employee Relations (February, 1967) moved to foreclose strikes to police officers and fire fighters by enacting 1969 PA 312. Dearborn, supra, 278-279 (opinion of COLEMAN, J.) (footnotes omitted). There is and has been no question that pursuant to the broad discretionary grant of authority embodied in art 4, § 48, the Legislature may enact such supplementary labor schemes subject to other constitutional constraints. Indeed, this was made clear by each of the four Justices participating in Dearborn [19] and is supported by a series of earlier decisions. [20] However, it is on the topic of the application of such constitutional constraints to Act 312 that the parties differ. Before responding to these differences, a brief sketch of the act as amended will be of assistance in analyzing the scheme's constitutional viability.