Opinion ID: 2005169
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: the trial court properly admitted rodriguez' statement

Text: On September 27, 2002, after police arrested Rodriguez, he requested to speak with an officer; Det. Donnie Thorson was assigned to interview him. Rodriguez immediately made several statements to Thorson, without having his Miranda rights entirely read, and then requested that Thorson leave. A partial and incomplete transcript of the interview reveals the following exchange occurred before Rodriguez' request: [Thorson (T):] Since sitting in hand cuffs, have to read you rights. [Rodriguez (R):] I only turned myself in because I don't need that shit right now. I saw my girl on television. Fucked up. You put her on television. T: Just found that out[.] R: Came down because . . . T: Don't think you did it[.] R: Have a baby girl. Trying to get information . . . T: . . . if you never did anything wrong . . . R: Why did you put me on television? T: I didn't know. I didn't agree with [the] thing that took place . . . R: [Crying] I didn't know my little brother was capable of doing that shit man. I went in because my girl and shit she'd say the same thing. Asking for a fucking savings account because she owned [sic] money; 100 or something. If I switched it to my name, she wouldn't have to pay for the savings account so she wouldn't have to pay the money. Before trial, Rodriguez moved to suppress the interview. The district court sustained the motion regarding everything that Rodriguez said after he told Thorson to leave. But the court found that before Rodriguez told Thorson to leave, his statements were voluntary. At trial, the court allowed Thorson to testify regarding the conversation that took place before Rodriguez' request. Rodriguez' girl friend's testimony contradicted the statement he made regarding why he was at the bank on the morning of the murders. Rodriguez argues that this statement should have been suppressed because Thorson engaged him in a conversation meant to solicit information without reading him Miranda warnings. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), prohibits the use of statements derived during custodial interrogation unless the prosecution demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards that are effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. See, State v. Ball, 271 Neb. 140, 710 N.W.2d 592 (2006); State v. Mata, 266 Neb. 668, 668 N.W.2d 448 (2003). Under the Miranda rule, a custodial interrogation takes place when questioning is initiated by law enforcement officers after one has been taken into custody or is otherwise deprived of one's freedom of action in any significant way. Ball, supra . This court has determined that interrogation occurs when a person is placed under a compulsion to speak. State v. Lamb, 213 Neb. 498, 330 N.W.2d 462 (1983). `[T]he term interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.' State v. Buckman, 259 Neb. 924, 935, 613 N.W.2d 463, 474 (2000), quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Statements made in a conversation initiated by the accused or spontaneously volunteered by the accused are not the result of interrogation and are admissible. Further, we have excluded from the definition of interrogation a course of inquiry related and responsive to a volunteered remark. Buckman, supra . See, also, Lamb, supra . In determining whether the State has shown the admissibility of custodial statements by the requisite degree of proof, we will accept the factual determination and credibility choices made by the trial judge unless they are clearly erroneous and, in so doing, will look to the totality of the circumstances. Ball, supra . In State v. Red Feather, 205 Neb. 734, 289 N.W.2d 768 (1980), we addressed whether a conversation between an officer and the defendant constituted interrogation. There, an officer placed the defendant under arrest, and the following exchange occurred, according to the officer's testimony: `I said [to the defendant], you're under arrest. . . . And [the defendant] says, What for? And I says, You're under arrest for raping [the victim]. And he says, How do you know I did that? And I says: I got your evidenceI've got evidence. I've got your fingerprints in blood. And he says, You got me. . . . ' Id. at 738, 289 N.W.2d at 771. Although the defendant did not receive Miranda warnings, we determined that he spontaneously volunteered the statement. Here, Rodriguez was clearly in custody during his interview with Thorson. Police arrested him and placed him in handcuffs, and he was not free to leave the police station. Despite this, the videotape and transcript of the interview do not show that Rodriguez was compelled to speak because of interrogation. Instead, his statements were like the spontaneous comments made by the defendant in Red Feather, supra . Rodriguez' remarks were made in an abrupt, rambling manner and not in response to any questioning by Thorson. When Thorson attempted to read the Miranda warnings, Rodriguez interrupted him by complaining about Rodriguez' and his girl friend's appearances on television. A review of the videotape reveals that Thorson then made several remarks that seemed focused toward calming Rodriguez rather than eliciting information. See United States v. Voice, 627 F.2d 138 (8th Cir.1980). These remarks included telling Rodriguez that he believed him and acknowledging that Rodriguez had to take care of his children. Further, Rodriguez voluntarily asked, Why did you put me on television? Thorson's reply that he didn't know and didn't agree with [the] thing that took place was merely responsive to Rodriguez' question. But it was then that Rodriguez attempted to explain why he had been in the bank the morning of the murders. Thorson could not have expected that Rodriguez would respond to his remarks by making a potentially incriminating statement. Nothing that Thorson said coerced or compelled Rodriguez to speak. Rodriguez' statements were spontaneous, excited remarks that were not the result of any compulsion by the police. The trial court did not err in determining that the statements were voluntary and admitting them in evidence.