Opinion ID: 1750963
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Pamela's Counterclaims Against Protective Life

Text: Pamela argues that, by disbursing the proceeds of the Protective Life policy to Metro Bank, Protective Life breached the insurance contract, of which, Pamela argues, Stephen was a third-party beneficiary. It is undisputed that the terms of the policy allowed the policy to be assigned and that the rights and interest of the beneficiary would be subject to an assignment, so long as that beneficiary was not an irrevocable beneficiary. It is also undisputed that Stephen was never named an irrevocable beneficiary of the policy. Nevertheless, because we hold that a jury question is presented regarding the extent to which Protective Life had knowledge of Stephen's interest in the policy before Bret assigned the policy to Metro Bank or before Protective Life paid the proceeds of the policy to Metro Bank, whether Protective Life breached the contract is also a jury question. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred when it entered the summary judgment in favor of Protective Life on Pamela's breach-of-contract claim. Pamela also contends that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Protective Life on Pamela's bad-faith claim. On appeal, Pamela cites State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Slade, 747 So.2d 293 (Ala.1999), which recognized the abnormal case of bad-faith failure to pay an insurance claim. At this point in the proceedings, we cannot determine whether the alleged bad faith in this case is of the normal or abnormal variety. The result of further proceedings before a fact-finder regarding Protective Life's knowledge of Stephen's interest in the policy is critical to a determination of whether Protective Life breached the contract; if it did, whether that breach was in bad faith; and if it did not, whether one or more of its actions constituted an abnormal case of bad faith. A summary judgment on Pamela's bad-faith claim at this stage of the proceedings is premature. At one point in her brief to this Court, Pamela states that she presented substantial evidence in support of her conversion and negligence claims against Protective Life. However, she fails to cite any authority or otherwise to present arguments in support of those claims. Accordingly, the trial court's summary judgment against Pamela on those claims is due to be affirmed. See City of Birmingham v. Business Realty Inv. Co., 722 So.2d 747, 752 (Ala.1998) (When an appellant fails to cite any authority for an argument on a particular issue, this Court may affirm the judgment as to that issue, for it is neither this Court's duty nor its function to perform an appellant's legal research.); Ex parte Riley, 464 So.2d 92, 94 (Ala.1985) ([I]t has long been the law in Alabama that failure to argue an issue in brief to an appellate court is tantamount to the waiver of that issue on appeal. An appellate court will consider only those issues properly delineated as such and will not search out errors which have not been properly preserved or assigned. . . . This standard has been specifically applied to briefs containing general propositions devoid of delineation and support from authority or argument.). III. Conclusion We affirm the summary judgment for Protective Life as to Pamela's conversion and negligence claims against it. With respect to Pamela's bad-faith claim against Protective Life, we reverse the summary judgment in favor of Protective Life as premature and make no determination as to the existence of any genuine issue as to material fact. Because genuine issues as to material facts exist precluding a summary judgment in favor of Metro Bank and Protective Life as to Protective Life's complaint for a declaratory judgment and as to all of Pamela's claims against them other than her conversion, negligence, and bad-faith claims against Protective Life, we reverse the summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. Finally, we affirm the trial court's order denying Pamela's motion for a summary judgment because genuine issues as to material facts exist, precluding a summary judgment in her favor. [4] AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. HARWOOD, WOODALL, BOLIN, and PARKER, JJ., concur. NABERS, C.J., recuses himself.