Opinion ID: 724022
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sablan's sentence

Text: 27 Sablan asserts that the district court erred in three ways in sentencing her: (1) incorrectly applying the Sentencing Guidelines in calculating the amount of loss sustained by the victim, (2) failing to depart downward at sentencing, and (3) ordering restitution. We review the district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Felix, 87 F.3d 1057, 1058-59 (9th Cir.1996); United States v. Ginn, 87 F.3d 367, 370-71 (9th Cir.1996). The district court's factual determinations supporting a sentence are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Mainard, 5 F.3d 404, 405 (9th Cir.1993).
28 At sentencing, the principal issue in dispute was the amount of loss sustained by the Bank of Hawaii as a result of Sablan's conduct. Sentencing Guideline § 2F1.1(a), which applies to fraud and related activities in connection with computers, provides for a base offense level of 6. The base offense level is subject to enhancement depending upon the extent of the loss incurred. U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b). In calculating the loss, the district court included the cost of repairs and other activities necessary to restore the bank's files to their original condition. These costs included $13,377.38 in programming and $14,875 in associated expenses, for a total of $28,282.38. 29 The court applied U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1), which provides that when the loss exceeds $20,000 the offense level is to be increased by four levels. Application Note 8 states that for this purpose, the loss need not be determined with precision. The court need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available information. Application Note 7, dealing with the valuation of the loss, refers to the Commentary for U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 dealing with valuation of loss in theft cases. Application Note 2 to that section is pertinent with respect to the damage loss in this case. It states in part, [w]hen property is damaged, the loss is the cost of repairs, not to exceed the loss had the property been destroyed. 30 The district court calculated the cost of repairs based upon the bank's standard hourly rate for its employees' time, computer time, and administrative overhead-the same rate that the bank uses in charging paying customers. Sablan complains that this was improper because of the profit margin and administrative overhead that is built into these charges. However, had the bank hired an outside contractor to make the repairs these factors would have been built into the charges. Similarly, had it not been necessary for the bank to devote its employees' time and computer time to making these repairs, the administrative overhead and profit would have been paid to the bank by its normal customers. The utilization of the normal bank charges in valuation of the loss was a reasonable approach by the district court. 31 Sablan also objects to the inclusion in the calculation of $4,000, which reflect the value of a meeting of bank managers with the FBI, $1,000 for a staff meeting to discuss the incident, and $350 for the handling of crank calls during the repair time. These expenses, while probably foreseeable, were not required to repair the damage. Thus, they were consequential losses. There is some uncertainty in the case law as to whether and under what circumstances consequential damages may be considered in valuing loss under the Sentencing Guidelines. Compare United States v. King, 915 F.2d 269, 272 (6th Cir.1990) (holding that foreseeable consequential damages are to be considered in valuing loss) with United States v. Wilson, 993 F.2d 214, 217 (11th Cir.1993) (holding that consequential damages are not to be considered). However, we need not consider this matter in this case because even deducting the $5,350 in consequential damages from the $28,252.38 calculated by the district court, the remaining balance exceeds the $20,000 specified for the four-level enhancement.
32 Sablan asserts that the district court should have departed downward in her sentence because (1) the damage figure overstates the seriousness of the offense and (2) this was a single incident. We affirm the district court's refusal to depart downwards on jurisdictional grounds. A district court's refusal to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines is not reviewable on appeal. United States v. Eaton, 31 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Morales, 972 F.2d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1012, 113 S.Ct. 1665, 123 L.Ed.2d 283 (1993). In the present case, the district court recognized that it could depart downwards and chose not to. That decision is not reviewable by this court.
33 Sablan challenges the amount of restitution ordered by the district court. Restitution in criminal cases is authorized by the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664. The amount of restitution ordered is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Catherine, 55 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir.1995). However, restitution can only include losses directly resulting from a defendant's offense. United States v. Koenig, 952 F.2d 267, 275 (9th Cir.1991). Sablan challenges the restitution order because it includes consequential damages and because it does not consider her ability to pay. 34 As discussed above, the $28,252.38 loss valuation contains consequential damages of $5,350. We have held that a restitution order must be based on losses directly resulting from the defendant's criminal conduct. United States v. Barany, 884 F.2d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1034, 110 S.Ct. 755, 107 L.Ed.2d 771 (1990). The consequential expenses incurred due to the meetings with the FBI, the staff meeting, and the handling of the crank calls were not expenses necessary to repair the files damaged by Sablan's criminal conduct. These expenses were thus not properly included in the restitution order. On remand, the sum of $5,350 should be excluded from the restitution order, resulting in a restitution order of $22,902.38. 35 We reject Sablan's contention that no order of restitution is proper because she is unable to pay. In issuing an order of restitution, a district court must consider (1) the amount of loss sustained by the victim, (2) the financial resources of the defendant, and (3) the financial needs and earnings of the defendant and the defendant's dependents. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a). Although the district court is not required to make findings of fact regarding the defendant's financial condition, United States v. Cannizzaro, 871 F.2d 809, 810-11 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 895, 110 S.Ct. 245, 107 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989), the record must reflect that the district court had at its disposal information relating to the defendant's financial position. Id. at 811. In the present case, the presentencing report contains information relating to Sablan's financial condition. The report concludes that Sablan has a negative net worth of $8,587.83 and a negative monthly cash flow of $187.28. Nonetheless, the court ordered Sablan to pay restitution to the bank. 36 Although Sablan is indigent at the present time, we hold that an order of restitution was proper. A defendant's present indigence is not sufficient to preclude a restitution order. United States v. Smith, 944 F.2d 618, 623 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 951, 112 S.Ct. 1515, 117 L.Ed.2d 651 (1992). Imposing restitution on indigent persons is deemed appropriate in the Ninth Circuit because the defendant's future financial status is indeterminable and could change. United States v. Jackson, 982 F.2d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir.1992). The district court found that Sablan had the capability of providing restitution. The court noted that she is a trained person, she has an education, and she has, therefore, skills that can still be used on the job market. Because Sablan has a computer science degree, the court determined that she would have the ability to pay a restitution order. That finding is not an abuse of discretion. 37 We therefore AFFIRM Sablan's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) and her sentence. We REVERSE AND REMAND the restitution order for recalculation consistent with this opinion. 38 AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.