Opinion ID: 2226490
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Likelihood of Harmful Sexual Conduct

Text: The SDP Act requires a finding that the proposed patient is likely to engage in harmful sexual conduct in the future. Id. ง 253B.02, subd. 18b(a)(3). The evidence must be clear and convincing. Id. งง 253B.18, subd. 1, 253B.185, subd. 1; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-33, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1809-13, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (holding that due process requires clear and convincing evidence for civil commitment of the mentally ill and dangerous). The state believes that the ordinary meaning of likely is more likely than not. Even if the petitioner must satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard, the state contends that the underlying fact to be determined (a probability) is not necessarily related to the burden of proof (the degree of certainty). We agree with the lower courts' conclusions for two reasons. First, the best reading of the statute and its concern for accurate factual findings precludes the state's construction. The SDP Act's demand for likely harm implies that committing courts cannot combine a factual element that requires only 50.1% probability with an evidentiary standard of less-than-certainty. See Minn.Stat. ง 253B.02, subd. 18b(a)(3). We do not believe that the legislature intended to weaken the standard of likelihood in the SDP Act by combination with a relatively high burden of persuasion โ the clear and convincing evidence standard. The district court applied this heightened burden of persuasion to each element of proof necessary under the Act, but by demanding highly likely future harm, the lower courts established a degree of overall certainty consistent with the statute. Second, and in the alternative, due process concerns under the state and federal constitutions constrain legislative discretion to set standards of likelihood when liberty is at stake. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, ง 7. The individual should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to the state. Addington, 441 U.S. at 427, 99 S.Ct. at 1810. No less is required by the guarantee of due process in our state constitution. See Minn. Const. art. I, ง 7; Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 313; State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726-27 (Minn.1985). Cf. Schulte v. Transportation Unlimited, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 830, 833-35 (Minn.1984) (applying notice standards under the due process clauses of the Minnesota and United States Constitutions as a procedural safeguard for unemployment compensation recipients). If the state were to require only a 10% probability of dangerousness (the fact to be demonstrated) and a clear and convincing evidence standard (say, a 75% degree of certainty), then the demand of due process that the citizen not share equally the risk of error would be undermined. Addington 's holding was partly motivated by substantive concerns about the preservation of individual liberty. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 427, 433, 99 S.Ct. at 1810, 1813. Hence, the error that due process seeks to avoid is a false prediction of future harmful conduct, and not only a prediction that is less accurate than the statutory standard prescribed by the legislature. The due process clauses of both the federal and state constitutions require that future harmful sexual conduct must be highly likely in order to commit a proposed patient under the SDP Act.