Opinion ID: 1111130
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Residents of Group Home Meet Single Family Requirement

Text: 12. The Neighbors also argue on appeal that the four, unrelated residents of the group home do not constitute a single family as required by the restrictive covenant. The Neighbors contend that the restrictive covenant should be interpreted such that the term family encompasses only individuals related by blood or by law. We disagree. 13. The word family is not defined in the restrictive covenant and nothing in the covenant suggests that it was the intent of the framers to limit the term to a discrete family unit comprised only of individuals related by blood or by law. Accordingly, the use of the term family in the covenant is ambiguous. As we noted above, we must resolve any ambiguity in the restrictive covenant in favor of the free enjoyment of the property. Cain, 100 N.M. at 186, 668 P.2d at 302. This rule of construction therefore militates in favor of a conclusion that the term family encompasses a broader group than just related individuals and against restricting the use of the property solely to a traditional nuclear family. 14. In addition, there are several other factors that lead us to define the term family as including unrelated individuals. First, the Albuquerque municipal zoning ordinance provides a definition of family that is at odds with the restrictive definition suggested by the Neighbors. The Albuquerque zoning ordinance includes within the definition of the term family, [a]ny group of not more than five [unrelated] persons living together in a dwelling. Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinances, art. XIV, § 7-14-5(B)(41) (1974 & Supp.1991). 15. The Neighbors argue that the zoning code definition is irrelevant to the scope of the covenant. They point to Singleterry v. City of Albuquerque, 96 N.M. 468, 470, 632 P.2d 345, 347 (1981), in which this Court stated, It is well established that zoning ordinances cannot relieve private property from valid restrictive covenants if the ordinances are less restrictive. However, we agree with the Colorado Court of Appeals which noted, While [the zoning] statute has no direct applicability to private covenants, it is some indication of the type of groups that might logically, as a matter of public policy, be included within the concept of a single family. Turner v. United Cerebral Palsy Ass'n, 772 P.2d 628, 630 (Colo.Ct. App.1988) (construing term family in covenant to include unrelated group home residents), cert. denied, (Apr. 24, 1989); see also Gregory, 495 A.2d at 1002 n. 3 (referring to zoning ordinances when construing the term family, as used in covenant). In the present case, we are not using the zoning ordinances to relieve the Community of its obligations under the restrictive covenant. We are instead looking to the definition of family within the zoning ordinance as persuasive evidence for a proper interpretation of the ambiguous term in the covenant. The Albuquerque zoning ordinance would include the residents of the group home within its definition of family. 16. Second, there is a strong public policy in favor of including small group homes within the definition of the term family. The federal government has expressed a clear policy in favor of removing barriers preventing individuals with physical and mental disabilities from living in group homes in residential settings and against restrictive definitions of families that serve to exclude congregate living arrangements for the disabled. The FHA squarely sets out this important public policy. As the court in United States v. Scott, 788 F.Supp. 1555, 1561 n. 5 (D.Kan.1992), stated, The legislative history of the amended Fair Housing Act reflects the national policy of deinstitutionalizing disabled individuals and integrating them into the mainstream of society. The Scott court further noted that the Act is intended to prohibit special restrictive covenants or other terms or conditions, or denials of service because of an individual's handicap and which ... exclud[e], for example, congregate living arrangements for persons with handicaps. Id. at 1561 (alterations in original) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2184-85). It protects against efforts to `restrict the ability of individuals with handicaps to live in communities.' Id. This policy is applicable to the present case because the FHA's protections for handicapped people extend to individuals with AIDS. See Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 808 F.Supp. 120, 129 (N.D.N.Y.1992) (The legislative history of the 1988 amendments to the FHA reveals that Congress intended to include among `handicapped' persons those who are HIV-positive....). The Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6000 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), also identify a national policy favoring persons with disabilities living independently in normal communities and opposing barriers to this goal. See Scott, 788 F.Supp. at 1561 n. 5. 17. In New Mexico, the Developmental Disabilities Act, NMSA 1978, § 28-16A-2 (Cum.Supp.1995), expresses a clear state policy in favor of integrating disabled individuals into communities. The Act provides in relevant part: It is the purpose of the legislature in enacting the Developmental Disabilities Act... to promote opportunities for all persons with developmental disabilities to live, work and participate with their peers in New Mexico communities. Priority shall be given to the development and implementation of support and services for persons with developmental disabilities that will enable and encourage them to ... achieve their greatest potential for independent and productive living by participating in inclusive community activities; and ... live in their own homes and apartments or in facilities located within their own communities and in contact with other persons living in their communities. Section 28-16A-2(A). Although this act is directed at assisting individuals with developmental disabilities, such as autism or mental retardation, we find that this important state policy applies with equal force to individuals with any form of disability or handicap. 18. Furthermore, the state grant of zoning authority to municipalities, NMSA 1978, § 3-21-1(C) (Repl.Pamp.1995), expressly provides: All state-licensed or state-operated community residences for the mentally ill or developmentally disabled serving ten or fewer persons may be considered a residential use of property for purposes of zoning and may be permitted use in all districts in which residential uses are permitted generally, including particularly residential zones for single-family dwellings. Although this section may not necessarily require that municipalities include community residences within single-family residential zones, it clearly indicates a preference for municipalities adopting this inclusionary approach. 19. Both the federal and state governments have expressed a strong policy encouraging locating group homes in single-family residential areas and treating them as if they constituted traditional families. This overwhelming public policy is extremely persuasive in directing us toward an expansive interpretation of the term family. See Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 1339 (refusing to enforce restrictive covenant that contravened long-standing public policy favoring the establishment of group homes for the mentally disabled), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 804, 105 S.Ct. 60, 83 L.Ed.2d 11 (1984); Craig v. Bossenbery, 134 Mich.App. 543, 351 N.W.2d 596, 599 (1984) (noting that strong public policy favoring group homes overrides enforcement even of unambiguous restrictive covenant), appeal denied, (Jan. 28, 1986); cf. Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 757 F.Supp. 1243, 1312-13 (D.N.M. 1990) (noting importance of community placement for the mentally impaired and identifying shortages of adequate community-based group housing in New Mexico), rev'd in part on other grounds, 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992). 20. Third, other jurisdictions have consistently held that restrictive covenants mandating single-family residences do not bar group homes in which the occupants live as a family unit. For example the Williams court noted, When ... the restrictive covenant under consideration prohibits occupancy of more than one family unit but does not address itself to the composition of the family, a court is loathe to restrict a family unit to that composed of persons who are related, one to another, by consanguinity or affinity. Williams, 714 P.2d at 1023; see also Welsch v. Goswick, 130 Cal.App.3d 398, 181 Cal.Rptr. 703, 709-10 (1982) (noting that policy considerations mandate that covenant be interpreted to allow residential care facilities of six or fewer people); Maull v. Community Living for the Handicapped, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Mo.Ct.App.1991) ([G]roup homes where the residents function in a family setting, interdependent on one another in carrying out the daily operation and routine of the residence meet the single family requirement of the covenant.), transfer denied, (Aug. 8, 1991); Montana ex rel. Region II Child & Family Servs., Inc. v. District Court, 187 Mont. 126, 609 P.2d 245, 248 (1980) (holding group home constituted family as required by covenant). But see Adult Group Properties, Ltd. v. Imler, 505 N.E.2d 459, 465-67 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (questionable conclusion that the undefined term family in the covenant included only father, mother and children, immediate blood relatives), transfer denied, (Oct. 15, 1987). 21. Accordingly, we reject the Neighbors' claim that the term family in the restrictive covenants should be read to include only individuals related by blood or by law. We agree with the court in Open Door Alcoholism Program, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 200 N.J.Super. 191, 491 A.2d 17, 21 (App.Div.1985), which noted, The controlling factor in considering whether a group of unrelated individuals living together as a single housekeeping unit constitutes a family... is whether the residents bear the generic character of a relatively permanent functioning family unit. As we already discussed above, the individuals living in the Community's group home do operate as a family unit. Much of the activities of the residents are communal in nature. More importantly, the residents provide moral support and guidance for each other and together create an environment that assists them in living with the disease that has afflicted them. We find that the Community's group home exhibit[s] [the] kind of stability, permanency and functional lifestyle which is equivalent to that of the traditional family unit. Id., 491 A.2d at 22. We therefore conclude that the Community's use of the property as a group home does not violate the Four Hills restrictive covenant.