Opinion ID: 1184134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: forty-five to ninety days time period

Text: Appellant's primary contention is that under Land Use Commission's State Land Use District Regulation 2.35 [1] and HRS § 205-4, prior to 1972 amendment, [2] the appellee was required as a matter of law to render a decision on the Yagi petition within the prescribed time period. Appellant contends that the sentence stating: Within a period of not more than ninety days and not less than forty-five days after the hearing, the commission shall act upon the petition for change (emphasis added), is a mandatory provision of the statute rather than directory and should the appellee fail to act within the prescribed period, any decision rendered thereafter is null and void. In Hawaii Corporation v. Kim, 53 Haw. 659, 500 P.2d 1165 (1972), a case involving the failure of the appellant to give notice of its intention to bid on a state contract by the specified statutory deadline which was not to be later than six days prior to the opening of bids, we held: We are of the opinion that the time specified in HRS § 103-25, as implemented, is mandatory and not subject to waiver by the appellee. HRS § 103-25 clearly provides ... he shall, not less than six calender days prior to the day designated for opening bids, give written notice... . (Emphasis added.) The language of the statute is plain and unambiguous that the prospective bidder must meet the time specified in the statute in giving his written notice of his intention to bid to have his bid considered by the officer charged with letting the contract for the construction... . [53 Haw. at 666, 500 P.2d at 1169] In Territory v. Fasi, 40 Haw. 478 (1954), this court stated at 484: The language is clear and explicit. The language Within twenty days following any election, each candidate    shall file    an itemized statement of his    expenses    showing each amount expended, the purpose or object for which each expenditure was made, and the person or persons to whom made. Such statement shall be sworn to by each person making the expenditures and shall be open to public inspection is as mandatory as The Ten Commandments. (Emphasis added.) See also, Maui County v. do Rego, 24 Haw. 608 (1919). The language of appellee's Regulation 2.35 and HRS § 205-4 with regard to the time provision is plain and unambiguous with no implication of a contradiction in its intent. As stated in Territory v. Fasi, supra, at 483-484, citing Nichols, Ltd. v. Vannatta, 33 Haw. 602, 606 (1935), with approval:    neither official construction nor usage, no matter how long indulged in, can be successfully invoked to defeat the purpose and effect of a statute which is free from ambiguity, nor will the courts be influenced by the construction placed upon a statute by the officials whose duty it is to execute it where such construction is manifestly incorrect. We are of the opinion that the time period requiring a decision to be rendered after 45 days and before 90 days has elapsed following the public hearing clearly is a mandatory requirement and not merely directory, subject to the waiver by the applicant. [3] We are of the further opinion that the argument by counsel for appellee during oral argument contending that since appellant's only interest in the case was in preserving the status quo and that any delay on the decision by the commission was to his advantage and, therefore, the time limitation may be waived solely by the applicant, is without merit. An interested party to a proceeding for a change in boundary, especially where he is an adjoining property owner, has an inherent interest in the decision no matter what that decision may be and he is entitled to have that decision within the specified period of time. The impact that the change in boundary will have, if approved, to the use and value of adjoining property are factors that must be considered. The interested party should not be placed in a state of limbo at the discretion of the applicant or the appellee, and the time limitations prescribed by HRS § 205-4 and LUC Regulation 2.35 insures the protection of both the applicant and the adjoining landowners at both extremes. Furthermore, HRS § 205-4, prior to 1972 amendment, provides, inter alia : ... a public hearing to be held on the appropriate island in accordance with the requirements of section 205-3, and the appropriate island in the instant case is the island of Maui. Neither § 205-3 nor § 205-4 provides for any ex parte appearances by the applicant before the appellee after the initial public hearing. The facts of the instant case give a clear indication of the consequences which will result should the argument of counsel for the appellee prevail. The first meeting for rendering a final decision on the Yagi petition was scheduled on Molokai on October 8, 1971, 84 days after the public hearing and within the 45-90 days time prescribed by statute and appellee's own rules. After the appellant, in good faith and at his own expense, made an appearance at the Molokai hearing, the decision on the Yagi petition was postponed at the written request of petitioner Yagi. The next meeting date was scheduled for November 11, 1971, 118 days after the public hearing and beyond the 45-90 days time limit. Upon being notified that a final decision would be rendered on the Yagi petition at the meeting in Honolulu, appellant again made a good faith effort to protect his interest by informing appellee by letter that he objected to the taking of any further testimony by the commission without an opportunity to be heard. Again, at the request of the petitioner, the decision was postponed. The meeting at which the actual decision was made fell on January 7, 1972, in Hilo, island of Hawaii, 175 days after the public hearing and well beyond the 45-90 days time period. Appellant again wrote the appellee, reiterating his request that further testimony not be taken without his being present. The appellant was placed in an impossible position, which worked only to the advantage of the petitioner. Petitioner was allowed to pick and choose the meeting at which he felt his petition would receive the most favorable treatment, or wait until such time as the other interested parties, either for financial reasons or for sheer lack of time, had given up on making an appearance at a meeting at which there was no guarantee that a decision would be reached. The approval of the Yagi petition was rendered in violation of HRS §§ 205-3 and 205-4 as well as Land Use Regulation 2.35 and is therefore null and void.