Opinion ID: 1262449
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: 2 The 1997 Washington State Conviction Requires the Sentencing Enhancement

Text: Rosales was convicted on Count 1 of conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), the mandatory minimum sentence increases from five years to ten years for defendants with a prior conviction for a felony drug offense. A felony drug offense is defined as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of . . . a State . . . that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs . . . 21 U.S.C. § 802(44). To determine whether a state felony drug offense is punishable by more than one year, we look to the state's statutory maximum sentence and not the maximum sentence available under the state sentencing guidelines. United States v. Murillo, 422 F.3d 1152, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2005) (in determining whether a state conviction is punishable for more than one year's imprisonment for purposes of a federal criminal statute predicated on a prior felony conviction or for federal sentencing purposes, we look to the maximum penalty allowed by statute.). The maximum penalty for the crime to which Rosales pled guilty is five years of imprisonment. Wash. Rev.Code § 69.50.401(d). Because this maximum is greater than one year, the conviction is a felony drug offense under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) and the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed. Rosales cites legislative history and policy to argue that his 1997 state conviction could not qualify as a felony drug offense because the state conviction was only for simple possession. But [s]tatutory interpretation begins with the plain language of the statute. United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir.1999). If the language of the statute is clear, we need look no further than that language in determining the statute's meaning, Id. With a straightforward statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history. United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997). Here, section 802(44) defines felony drug offense as an offense . . . that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs. Possessing drugs is conduct relating to them. The statutory command here is straightforward, and Rosales's arguments about simple possession must fail. Our case law follows the clear language of the statute. In United States v. Meza-Corrales, 183 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir.1999), we held that when determining whether a prior conviction supported an enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841, the law at issue itself need not relate to (i.e., make mention of) narcotic drugs but only need mention (for purposes of prohibition and restriction) some conduct that itself relates to (i.e., involves the use, possession, or sale of) narcotic drugs. Id. at 1127 (emphasis added). Other circuits addressing this issue have reached the same conclusion. See United. States v. Curry, 404 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir.2005) (concluding that the district court need only verify that the previous convictions were (1) felonies and (2) drug offenses); United States v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 913, 932 (6th Cir.1998) (concluding that the statute encompasses drug offenses that involve the simple possession of drugs); United States v. Hansley, 54 F.3d 709, 718 (11th Cir.1995) (concluding that 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) applies to convictions for simple possession). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in failing to impose the sentencing enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841(3)(1)(B).