Opinion ID: 166617
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The larger factual context of the case

Text: 41 In determining whether to apply the presumption that deliberate adoption of a similar mark leads to an inference of an intent to pass off goods as those of another, mere knowledge [of a similar mark] should not foreclose further inquiry. GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10th Cir.1990). Rather, we must look to the larger factual context of the case. Universal Money Ctrs., 22 F.3d at 1532. Having done so, we remain unconvinced that Western has failed to raise a genuine factual issue as to intent. 42 In Universal Money Centers, even though we acknowledged that the defendant's in-house counsel knew of the trademarked term, we did not find a factual dispute over the intent to benefit from the goodwill of another in part because the defendant had spent nearly $60 million in promoting its own product. Id. at 1532. In the instant case, while the record establishes that Hyundai spent nearly $25 million promoting its manufacturer's warranty, there is nothing to indicate that it spent any significant resources in promoting its extended warranty program. 43 We are also persuaded by the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in WSM, Inc. v. Tenn. Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir.1983), in which the court stated: 44 [the defendant] was aware of [the plaintiff's] mark, yet with an infinite variety of non-similar designs available, it chose a virtually identical design, knowing that it intended to sell that design on identical goods in the same channels of trade as that in which [the plaintiff's] mark moved. It is reasonable to infer therefrom that [the defendant] intended to deceive the public concerning the origin of the goods. The district court thus properly awarded profits to [the plaintiff.] Id. at 1087. 2 45 Here, the evidence indicates that Hyundai appropriated not one, but two of Western's marks, THE ADVANTAGE and THE ADVANTAGE PLUS. Furthermore, Hyundai's marks were not only similar to Western's, they were identical and referred to substantially similar products aimed at the same group of consumers, i.e. automobile purchasers. 46 Considering the larger factual context of the case in conjunction with the factual dispute over Hyundai's knowledge, we are compelled to presume that Hyundai's deliberate adoption of two similar marks could lead to an inference that it intended to benefit from Western's goodwill. 47 But we do not hold as a matter of law that Hyundai actually possessed such an intent. Like almost every presumption in the law, the one we apply today may be rebutted by competent evidence in front of a jury. Hyundai argues that its initial selection of the Bumper-to-Bumper name for its extended warranty and the prominence of its corporate logo on the warranty brochures shows that it did not have the requisite intent for willful infringement. These arguments are not without merit, and it may well be that they will win the day when considered by the jury. But at this point in the proceedings, all that can be said is that the parties have established a genuine factual dispute over the intent required for willful infringement. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, nothing else need be shown for the plaintiff to avoid summary judgment.