Opinion ID: 2739473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The majority’s finding of a contract

Text: 22 ¶54. The majority completely disregards the chancellor’s findings of fact and makes its own findings, which this Court does not have the authority to do, in order to reach a its chosen conclusion that the parties had a contract. The parties have not once asserted that a contract existed. In a glaring twist of legal irony, had the Nelsons argued in the instant appeal that a contract had been formed, the Court quite possibly would have declined to consider the argument, as, on appeal, parties waive matters not presented to the trial court. Fowler v. White, 85 So. 3d 287, 293 (¶ 21) (Miss. 2012) (quoting Triplett v. Mayor and Bd. of Aldermen of Vicksburg, 758 So. 2d 399, 401 (Miss. 2000) (“This Court has long held that it will not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal.”). Not only does the majority disregard the chancellor’s findings of fact, it fails even to mention the standard of review for a chancellor’s findings. This Court has been abundantly clear that findings of fact are left to the trial court; this Court does not have the authority to disturb those findings absent manifest error or unless the findings are against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Richardson, 355 So. 2d at 668. The principle of law with which we are concerned has been repeated by this Court many times. It is that where the chancellor was the trier of facts, his findings of fact on conflicting evidence cannot be disturbed by this Court on appeal unless we can say with reasonable certainty that these findings were manifestly wrong and against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Even if this Court disagreed with the lower court on the finding of fact and might have arrived at a different conclusion, we are still bound by the chancellor’s findings unless manifestly wrong, as stated above. Id. (emphasis added). It cannot be said that the chancellor’s findings are against the overwhelming weight of the evidence or manifestly erroneous. The majority fails even to 23 mention the standard, which is perhaps why it was able to disregard the chancellor’s findings so easily. ¶55. The chancellor found that the Barriffes had given Lawson $165,000, which had not been repaid. Therefore, the Nelsons had been unjustly enriched, and the chancellor imposed a constructive trust. The majority dismisses the chancellor’s finding and concludes that “the Barriffes’ agreement to provide the $165,000 in exchange for Nelson’s promise was nothing more than a contract.” (Maj. Op. ¶ 29.) However, the existence of a contract is a question of fact, which is to be made by the finder of fact. 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 791 (1991). See also Mauldin Co. v. Lee Tractor Co. of Miss., Inc., 920 So. 2d 513, 515 (¶ 8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Hunt v. Coker, 741 So. 2d 1011, 1014 (¶ 6) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (“The existence of a contract is a question of fact that is to be determined by a jury, or a trial judge when a trial is conducted without a jury.”)). We have held: “Whether a contract exists involves both questions of fact and questions of law.” Ham Marine, Inc. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 454, 458 (5th Cir. 1995). However, where the existence of a contract turns on consideration of conflicting evidence, that presents a “question of fact properly presented to, and determined by, the jury.” Id. at 461. “Consequently, unless there was no credible evidence presented which might authorize the verdict, the jury’s findings must stand.” Id. Jackson HMA, LLC v. Morales, 130 So. 3d 493, 497 (¶ 14) (Miss. 2013). Here, the chancellor was the finder of fact, rather than a jury. To say that the instant case presents “conflicting evidence” is a gross understatement. Therefore, whether a contract existed is a question for the chancellor, not the Supreme Court. 24 ¶56. For a valid contract to exist, the following elements must be present: “(1) two or more contracting parties, (2) consideration, (3) an agreement that is sufficiently definite, (4) parties with legal capacity to make a contract, (5) mutual assent, and (6) no legal prohibition precluding contract formation.” Rotenberry v. Hooker, 864 So. 2d 266, 270 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2003) (emphasis added) (quoting Lanier v. State, 635 So. 2d 813, 826 (Miss. 1994)). Based on the chancellor’s findings, there is no evidence of consideration, a sufficiently definite agreement, or mutual assent. The majority fails to identify terms of the contract or make findings regarding consideration, a sufficiently definite agreement, or mutual assent. The majority does not identify the terms of the agreement, e.g., the time period by which the money was to be paid back and an interest rate. Thus, the majority not only usurped the chancellor’s duty to make factual findings, it has done an insufficient job of inserting its own factual findings. Without all of the elements of a contract, which are not present in the record or supported by the chancellor’s findings, there can be no contract. Perhaps the lack of such evidence is the reason the parties never argued the existence of a contract. ¶57. The majority relies on the chancellor’s findings after the second trial, where the chancellor seemed to recognize that the Barriffes’ investment was in exchange for a twothirds interest in the landfill business. Relying on those facts, the majority may be correct that the agreement between the Barriffes and Lawson was a contract. However, none of the parties ever argued that they had a contract, and the chancellor did not make any findings about a contract. In the only pronouncement following either trial regarding the credibility of the evidence that the money was given in exchange for a two-thirds interest (in either the 25 business or the profits of the business), the chancellor following the first trial expressly found the evidence that the Barriffes gained an interest in the business not to be credible. Lowery v. Lowery, 25 So. 3d 274, 297 (¶ 59) (Miss. 2009) (“A chancellor sits as a fact-finder in resolving factual disputes, and is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses.”). The chancellor found the existence of a constructive trust, and the existence of a contract is a question of fact wholly unaddressed by the court below. Rather than usurping the chancellor’s duty and imposing a contract, the majority should remand the case for the chancellor to determine whether a contract existed.