Opinion ID: 1058853
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Piecemeal Downzoning

Text: Greengael assigns cross-error to the trial court's finding that the Board's rezoning of its Property was reasonable and not piecemeal downzoning. When a court reviews the legitimacy of a zoning amendment, it presumes the action is valid so long as it is not unreasonable and arbitrary. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Snell Construction Corp., 214 Va. 655, 658, 202 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1974) (quoting Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 660, 107 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1959)). The opponent of the action bears the burden of proving that the action is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that it bears no reasonable or substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Id., 214 Va. at 658, 202 S.E.2d at 892-93. The court will uphold the ordinance if its reasonableness is fairly debatable. Id., 214 Va. at 658, 202 S.E.2d at 893. A court conducts a more expansive review, however, when a rezoning is a piecemeal downzoning, which is defined as a rezoning (1) that the local governing body initiates on its own motion, (2) that selectively addresses the landowner's single parcel, and (3) that reduces the permissible residential density below that recommended by a duly-adopted master plan. Id. at 658, 202 S.E.2d at 893. An aggrieved landowner can make a prima facie case that the rezoning is piecemeal downzoning upon a showing that since the enactment of the prior ordinance there has been no change in circumstances substantially affecting the public health, safety, or welfare. Id. at 659, 202 S.E.2d at 893. At that point, the burden shifts to the governing body to offer evidence of mistake, fraud, or changed circumstances sufficient to make reasonableness fairly debatable. Id. We must first examine whether Greengael established a prima facie case for a piecemeal downzoning. Greengael sufficiently pleads two of the elements of a piecemeal downzoning discussed in Snell: the Board initiated the zoning amendment on its own motion, and it selectively directed that amendment to Greengael's Property. However, the trial court held, and we agree, that Greengael has not established that the rezoning reduced the density of development below that recommended by the Comprehensive Plan. Id. Greengael argues that the rezoning was a piecemeal downzoning because it was against [Greengael's] will and violative of what Snell referred to as a landowner's `legitimate profit prospects.' Id. According to Greengael, its profit prospects are especially important because this rezoning makes a drastic shift from residential to industrial, rather than simply a change in intensity of land use within the same zoning classification, such as the higher intensity to lower intensity residential change featured in Snell. Greengael claims that the Property was far more valuable when zoned R-4 and discusses the glut[ ] of vacant industrial land [in Culpeper County] with no foreseeable prospects for users. Greengael's arguments are not availing. We agree with the trial court that the use of the land, rather than the profit expectation, is determinative of whether a rezoning is a downzoning. See, e.g., Turner v. Board of County Supervisors, 263 Va. 283, 289, 559 S.E.2d 683, 686 (2002) (finding a piecemeal downzoning partly based on reduction of residential density below that recommended by County's master plan); Code § 15.2-2286(A)(11) (defining downzoning in context of agreements between localities and landowners to mean a zoning action resulting in a reduction in a formerly permitted land use intensity or density). Further, we agree with the Board's argument that adopting Greengael's definition of downzoning would require governing bodies desiring to enact zoning amendments to undertake speculative and costly analyses of the future profit potential of the affected properties under multiple development scenarios. Applying the intensity of use analysis, we find the rezoning was not a downzoning because the LI designation allows more intense coverage of land than the R-4 designation, 50% versus 35% respectively, and more expansive uses than R-4, including manufacturing, dry cleaning, fabricating metal products, printing and publishing, broadcasting, and disposing of waste. We also conclude that in rezoning the Property, the Board acted reasonably. As the trial court ruled, the amendment brought the property into conformance with the comprehensive plan, which first designated the property as future industrial in 2000, and the Board followed proper procedure by first passing a resolution, then considering the Planning Commission's recommendation, and finally holding a public meeting after providing proper notice. Thus, we reject Greengael's assignment of cross-error.