Opinion ID: 345553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: fountain's appeal.

Text: 9
10 The description of appellant's complaint by the Union's counsel as a bad case was accurate, although perhaps generous. It is clear that regulations promulgated by employers which require male employees to conform to different grooming and dress standards than female employees is not sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII. Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046, 95 S.Ct. 2664, 45 L.Ed.2d 699 (1975). Other circuits that have addressed this question share our view. Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977); Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1976); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976); Knott v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975); Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 160 U.S.App.D.C. 9, 488 F.2d 1333 (1973). 11 Faced with these precedents, appellant tries a different approach. He argues that even if separate dress and grooming regulations do not offend Title VII, unequal enforcement of these regulations does violate the statute. He cites Safeway's conciliatory treatment of the female employees' resistance to the skirt requirement and contends that his termination for his protest of the tie requirement constitutes unequal treatment of the sexes with regard to protests involving personal appearance regulations. 12 We disagree. Appellant's own experience with the dress and grooming regulations indicates that Safeway did not handle male protests in a discriminatory manner. When he complained about the hair length requirement, Safeway consented to his demands. Furthermore, given that Safeway may promulgate different personal appearance regulations for males and females, it follows that it should be able to amend its regulations when they no longer reflect management's judgment regarding desirable dress and grooming standards. Likewise, an employer may enforce those regulations that it believes its particular business requires. Safeway's reactions to the different protests do not constitute uneven treatment of the sexes; they merely indicate an effort to maintain dress and grooming regulations that are not overly burdensome to its employees yet still serve to extend an image to its customers which Safeway believes is beneficial to its business. This business judgment may or may not change through the years, nor will it necessarily change at an even pace with respect to the sexes. Thus, the regulations for one sex may be relaxed without necessitating a corresponding relaxation of the regulations for the other sex. This power to amend regulations for one sex independent of any action with respect to the regulations for the other sex flows directly from the employer's power to promulgate separate regulations in the first place. Any claim that this process, standing alone, constitutes unequal treatment of the sexes is without merit. 13
14 Appellant also contends that Safeway's conduct violated two separate sections of the collective bargaining agreement, viz. Sections II(d)(2) and V(e). The Union's failure to process his grievance based on these claims, he insists, was arbitrary and unreasonable and as a result was violative of the Union's duty of fair representation. 2 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). He argues that the question of arbitrariness was a triable issue of material fact and as such should not have been disposed of with a summary judgment in favor of the Union. 15 Under the circumstances of this case, the question of arbitrariness is tied inextricably to the merits of appellant's claims against Safeway. Looking to appellant's complaint, 3 it is clear that no question of bad faith or discriminatory conduct on the part of the Union is involved. Appellant's sole contention is that the Union's categorization of his grievance as a bad case and its failure to process the grievance for that reason was arbitrary. To refuse to process a bad case is in itself not arbitrary. Such a refusal is most reasonable and in fact essential to the grievance and arbitration system. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191, 87 S.Ct. at 917. The contrary is true, however, if the categorization of the case as a bad case was arbitrary. As already indicated by our discussion of appellant's Title VII claims against Safeway, the Union's categorization of the claim was accurate and not arbitrary. 16 Section II(d)(2) of the collective bargaining agreement prohibits, inter alia, termination on the basis of sex. Safeway's termination of appellant's employment did not violate this section. Nor was Section V(e), which deals with the wearing of uniforms and who shall bear the cost of special wear required by the job, violated. Appellant did not seek to pursue a grievance with respect to whom should bear the cost of the uniforms or special wear; he only complained of the fact that he had to wear a tie. Moreover, wherever for these purposes the line between a dress code and required uniforms may be, Safeway's tie requirement is well within the dress code portion of the spectrum. 17 Appellant, therefore, did not present a valid grievance to the Union. The Union's refusal to process such a complaint was not a breach of its duty of fair representation. The judgment in favor of the appellees Safeway and Union is affirmed. 18