Opinion ID: 51486
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Allow or Advise Bower to Testify

Text: Bower asserts that his counsel prevented him from testifying at trial. The right to testify is a fundamental right, Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 50, 52, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1997), that is personal to the defendant; therefore, only the defendant can waive that right, voluntarily and knowingly. Emery v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 191, 198 (5th Cir.1997). A defendant who argues that his attorney prevented him from testifying must still satisfy the two prongs of Strickland.  United States v. Harris, 408 F.3d 186, 192 (5th Cir.2005). This court has repeatedly held there is a strong presumption that counsel's decision not to place [a defendant] on the stand was sound trial strategy. Sayre v. Anderson, 238 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir.2001). Nonetheless, counsel cannot override the ultimate decision of a defendant who wishes to testify contrary to counsel's advice. United States v. Mullins, 315 F.3d 449, 453 (5th Cir.2002). Bower argues that he never waived his right to testify on or off the record. In fact, Bower and his wife, who sat with her husband at the counsel table throughout the trial, testified that Buckner rested his defense without ever asking Bower if he wished to testify. Bower states that because of the weight of the evidence, he felt during trial that he had to testify; therefore, he was shocked that Buckner rested after only two hours without consulting Bower about his right to testify. Buckner testified that during a pre-trial visit with his client, he spoke to Bower about the evidence and about viable trial strategy, and that during this conversation, Bower himself made the decision not to testify. Buckner stated, in response to questioning by the court, that he did not confirm this decision with Bower during the trial but assumed that Bower's original decision not to testify was still valid. Buckner also testified that he was positive Bower knew he had a right to testify and it was his decision as to whether to testify. . . . Having heard from Bower and his wife, Shari, and Buckner, the district court found Buckner's testimony credible. The district court, in its memorandum opinion, focused on the fact that Buckner did not force Bower not to testify. As Bower states, this is not the proper inquiry. Instead, the district court should have focused on whether or not Bower made a knowing waiver of his right to testify. Emery, 139 F.3d at 198. After reviewing the record and recognizing that the district court found Buckner's testimony credible, we find that Bower knowingly waived his right to testify and did not communicate any change of heart during trial to his counsel. Thus, we find no violation. Bower also contends, that even if he did waive his right to testify, it was ineffective for Bower to encourage him not to testify. Generally, Bower asserts that the time/proximity defense was unreasonable and that a more reasonable defense would have been to allow Bower to testify and acknowledge that he visited the ultralight hangar before the murders to purchase the ultralight. Specifically, Bower argues that during the initial investigation of the crime scene a business card was found on one of the victims. He also alleges that one of the victims' wives asked police investigators whether $3000 was found on her husband's body. Bower claims that the business card was his, given to the victim when he bought the plane, and the $3000 was a down payment that he made on the plane. While the business card is mentioned in the state's investigative reports, it was lost at some point during the investigation and has never been found. According to Bower, the lost business card and the possible presence of $3000 are strong evidence of his preferred theory. We do not agree that Buckner's strategy, including his advice that Bower not testify, was unreasonable. If Bower had testified, he would have been subject to cross-examination concerning, inter alia, his numerous inconsistent and untrue statements to the FBI; where he got the money to buy the ultralight; why he told other people that he was assembling his own ultralight from parts in his garage; and why he had disassembled the ultralight and hidden pieces of it in his garage and in a field. Neither the business card nor the $3000 would be sufficient to explain these many inconsistencies and gaps in Bower's story. Moreover, as Buckner noted, by testifying that he was at the ranch on the day of the murders and had met with the victims, Bower would have established the time/proximity element of the state's case without gaining any benefit for his alternate theory that someone else committed the murders. Buckner's advice on testifying and his time/proximity strategy were not unreasonable, and we decline to find deficiency.