Opinion ID: 1298515
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The sanctions available under section 4.

Text: In the 1988 general election, Arizona voters approved Proposition 102, which included amendments to the Arizona Constitution, art. 6.1, § 4. The relevant amendment expands this court's disciplinary authority by giving it the power to suspend, without pay, any judge for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. The governor proclaimed this amendment effective on December 5, 1988. Previously, the court's only alternatives in disciplining judicial misconduct under section 4 were censure or removal from office. [12] We must, therefore, determine whether the added power of suspension without pay is available as a sanction against this respondent, whose conduct and conviction as well as the institution of disciplinary proceedings occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment. We note, however, that the conviction became final only after the effective date of the amendment.
Judicial disciplinary proceedings, like attorney disciplinary proceedings, are neither criminal nor civil, but are sui generis. Haddad, 128 Ariz. at 492, 627 P.2d at 223; cf. Rule 54(a), Ariz.R.Sup.Ct., 17A A.R.S. (1988). Again, the goal of judicial discipline is not to punish the judge but to protect the public and the judiciary's integrity. Haddad, 128 Ariz. at 492, 627 P.2d at 223. Because judicial disciplinary proceedings are neither criminal in nature nor penal in objective, the ex post facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions do not prohibit application of judicial disciplinary rules to conduct predating the rules' effective date. See Gary v. State Bar of California, 44 Cal.3d 820, 827, 749 P.2d 1336, 1340, 244 Cal. Rptr. 482, 485 (1988) (use of disciplinary standards promulgated after attorney's conduct to enhance sanction is not prohibited by ex post facto principles). It seems settled, therefore, that new rules adopted for judicial or attorney disciplinary proceedings may be utilized in proceedings concerning misconduct occurring prior to the new rules' promulgation. See, e.g., McCoomb v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 19 Cal.3d (Spec.Trib.Supp.) 1, 7, 564 P.2d 1, 4, 138 Cal. Rptr. 459, 462 (1977) (new rule establishing tribunal of appellate court justices to review disciplinary commission's recommendations was procedural only, did not adversely affect respondent justice's rights, and thus was not an ex post facto law; retroactive application was proper); In re Barclay, 82 Utah 288, 292, 24 P.2d 302, 304 (1933) (state bar may investigate and charge attorney with misconduct even though misconduct occurred prior to state bar's organized existence). [13] In re Brown, 157 W. Va. 1, 197 S.E.2d 814 (1973), supports the view that a new rule relating to the availability of suspension may apply retroactively. Brown, an attorney, bribed a juror. The disciplinary rules in effect at the time of his conduct and resulting federal indictment did not allow for the interim suspension of an attorney's license pending an appeal of a conviction. Before Brown's actual conviction and the filing of a bar complaint, however, the rules were amended to allow for such interim suspension. The disciplinary agency sought to suspend Brown's license during his criminal appeal. Brown objected to the proposed suspension, claiming that because his crime and indictment occurred prior to the rule change, the interim suspension provision did not apply to his case. The state supreme court disagreed. It held the rules existing at the time of the disciplinary proceeding applied. Summarily dismissing any ex post facto concerns, it held that because attorney disciplinary cases are sui generis, the new suspension rule might be applied retroactively to offenses occurring prior to the rule changes. Id. at 7, 197 S.E.2d at 818. [14]
As stated, judicial and lawyer disciplinary proceedings are analogous. See Haddad, 128 Ariz. at 491, 627 P.2d at 222. In both proceedings, this court retains the ultimate authority to find facts, make conclusions of law, and impose discipline. See In re Pappas, 159 Ariz. 516, 526, 768 P.2d 1161, 1171 (1988); Haddad, 128 Ariz. at 491, 627 P.2d at 222. Also, the goals of both professional disciplinary systems are similar  protection of the public and policing special groups devoted to public service. See In re Hoover, 155 Ariz. 192, 197, 745 P.2d 939, 944 (1987) (goal of attorney discipline is to protect the public and police the profession); Haddad, 128 Ariz. at 492, 627 P.2d at 223 (public protection and policing judicial conduct). Neither disciplinary system seeks to punish the offender. Pappas, 159 Ariz. at 526, 768 P.2d at 1171; Haddad, 128 Ariz. at 492, 627 P.2d at 223. Because of these nonpenal, beneficent objectives, this court's state constitutional power to achieve the twin objectives of professional discipline should be construed flexibly. Hoover, 155 Ariz. at 197, 745 P.2d at 944 (upholding hearing committee's decision to combine attorney discipline and disability proceedings without benefit of express authorization by court rule). Thus, if the objectives of judicial discipline would best be served by suspending respondent without pay, rather than censuring or removing him, we believe the power to do so may be utilized if constitutionally available at the time discipline is imposed, even if that power first became available subsequent to the conduct giving rise to the discipline. Accordingly, the conviction having become final, we hold that the following sanctions are appropriate for consideration: censure, suspension without pay, or removal from office.