Opinion ID: 532808
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dairy Farm's Conversion and Procurement of Breach Claims.

Text: 36 After denying that Dairy Farm's evidence supported a claim of conversion, the court wrote: 37 Even if plaintiff were liable for conversion, defendant would be entitled to no more than what it is to receive under the terms of this order: the fair market value of the four cows that it owned, plus interest from the date on which plaintiff took possession of the cows. 38 Mem. op. at 20 (citing 18 Am.Jur.2d Conversion Sec. 105 (1967)). With regard to Dairy Farm's allegation that the Bank procured the Brocks' breach of contract, the court reasoned that Dairy Farm had failed to pursue the claim so the court would not consider that argument. Id. at 20-21. Dairy Farm claims that the trial court erred by denying its counterclaim for conversion and by finding that Dairy Farm had failed to pursue its claim of procurement of breach of contract. 39 However, Dairy Farm is entitled, under both its conversion and procurement of breach claims, to no more than the value of its lost cattle plus interest. Therefore, we will not consider these alleged errors. For a procurement of breach claim, a party has a right to the actual damages it suffered due to the contract breach. Segall v. Hurwitz, 114 Wis.2d 471, 339 N.W.2d 333, 341 (Ct.App.1983). Here, those damages are the value of Dairy Farm's cattle. In a conversion action, the injured party may recover the value of the property at the time of the conversion plus interest to the date of the trial. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Zuelke's, Inc., 46 Wis.2d 568, 175 N.W.2d 634, 639 (1970) (quoting Traeger v. Sperberg, 256 Wis. 330, 41 N.W.2d 214, 216 (1950)). Dairy Farm may have pursued these claims in hopes of obtaining punitive damages. We turn, therefore, to that issue. 40 The trial court found that Dairy Farm had adduced no evidence that would support an award of punitive damages. Such an award requires a showing of fraud, ill will, recklessness, willful disregard of another's rights or other circumstances tending to aggravate the injury. Mem. op. at 20 (citing 18 Am.Jur.2d Conversion Sec. 114 (1967)). [A]n award of punitive damages is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Wood v. Worachek, 618 F.2d 1225, 1233 (7th Cir.1980). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has written that a claim for punitive damages may be supported by proof of aggravating circumstances beyond those supporting compensatory damages. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis.2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437, 442 (1980). The Wangen court continued: 41 [I]n order that punitory damages may be assessed, something must be shown over and above the mere breach of duty for which compensatory damages can be given; that is, a showing of a bad intent deserving punishment, or something in the nature of special ill will towards the person injured, or a wanton, deliberate disregard of the particular duty then being breached.... 42 Id. 294 N.W.2d at 443 (quoting Meshane v. Second Street Co., 197 Wis. 382, 222 N.W. 320, 322 (1928)). The Wangen court also quoted from Anderson v. Continental Insurance Company, 85 Wis.2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368, 379 (1978) as follows: For punitive damages to be awarded, a defendant must not only intentionally have breached his duty of good faith, but in addition must have been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.... Id. 43 Dairy Farm contends that it has a right to punitive damages because the Bank intentionally removed all the dairy cattle from the Kenneth Brock farm, did not give Dairy Farm written notice of the sale of the cattle, and converted the cattle, which is by definition a willful and deliberate act. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 29. The quoted discussion from the Wangen decision shows that a party claiming punitive damages must show something more than a simple legal violation. This principle was essential to the Wangen court's affirmance of exemplary damages in that case. 294 N.W.2d at 462. Therefore, the Bank's intentional removal of the cows from the Brock farm is an insufficient basis for punitive damages. 44 In the present case, the trial court's denial of exemplary damages is also justified by the evidence that Mr. Brock refused to take care of the cattle any longer, forcing the parties to take quick action. Although our discussion of the facts shows that there is some question whether the court was correct to conclude that Dairy Farm refused to take its cattle when it came to the farm on the morning of October 20, this possibly erroneous finding does not affect our review of the punitive damages issue. Even if Dairy Farm had been thwarted by Brock in its attempt to take its cattle, this fact does not make the Bank's conduct willful or wanton. 45 Dairy Farm comes closest to showing willful conduct on the part of the Bank with its argument that the Bank gave it no notice of an intention to sell the cows before they were slaughtered. That act made it substantially more difficult for the parties to sort out ownership. However, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to deny punitive damages based on Dairy Farm's allegation that it was not given notice. 46 Dairy Farm never disputes that it had notice that the Bank had the cows. It contends only that it did not have written notice and that there was no evidence in the record that Dairy Farm personnel knew of the Bank's intention to sell the cows. However, the Bank submits that the record included Mr. Henseler's notes of phone calls made by the Bank's attorney, Mr. Tuchscherer, to Dairy Farm. Henseler wrote, Tuchscherer in contact with Dairy Farm Leasing counsel. Invited Dairy Farm to meet at site of herd to settle matter on 10-22-87 because the cows would have to be disposed of on 10-23-87. Plf. Ex. 9. Those notes of phone calls are not in a particularly reliable form. Not only are they self-serving, but they are also hearsay (notes by Henseler about what Tuchscherer said to Dairy Farm personnel). 47 Nevertheless, even though the trial court should not have relied on the Henseler notes as proof of Dairy Farm's knowledge, the court was not forced to conclude that the Bank was maliciously destroying evidence. Dairy Farm knew that the Bank had the cows and was not likely to pay to keep them for very long. In addition, much of the evidence showed that the cows were in poor condition, so that the Bank's decision to slaughter them is easily explained as a reasonable economic choice rather than an attempt to destroy evidence of ownership. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Dairy Farm's claim for punitive damages. 48