Opinion ID: 74903
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Scope of the Required Evidentiary Hearing

Text: If a party has properly moved for termination of prospective relief under either § 3626(b)(1)(A) or § 3626(b)(2), the court must determine whether such relief should be continued under § 3626(b)(3). That subsection provides that prospective relief shall not terminate if the court makes written findings on the record that: (1) the prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of a federal right, (2) the relief extends no further than necessary to correct the violation, (3) the relief is narrowly drawn, and (4) the relief is the least intrusive means to correct the violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3).
The plaintiffs contend that a “current and ongoing” violation of federal rights, as that term is used in § 3626(b)(3), includes more than just a currently existing violation. They ask us to adopt a standard of “current and ongoing” that is broad enough to include the persistence of practices that have led to violations of federal law in the past, even though no such violations currently exist. They say that if the institutional policies that led to violations in the past are still in existence and pose a danger that future violations will occur, then the court should find that the “current and ongoing” violation standard is met. 14 We discussed the scope of the “current and ongoing” standard in Parrish v. Alabama Dept. of Corrections, 156 F.3d 1128 (11th Cir. 1998). There we took note of the issue about whether “current and ongoing” means that a violation must exist “right now” or instead means a “substantial and very real danger that a violation of rights will follow the termination of the injunction.” Id. at 1129. However, it was not necessary for us to decide the issue in Parrish because, under either standard, the plaintiff could not show a “current and ongoing” violation in that case. Id. That is not the case here where we are remanding for an evidentiary hearing in order to give the plaintiffs an opportunity to show a “current and ongoing” violation, so we will now resolve the issue of what that entails. As we observed in Parrish, the phrase “current and ongoing” was originally enacted as “current or ongoing.” Id. at n.3. In 1997 Congress amended the phrase to substitute “and” for “or.” See Department of Justice Appropriations Act, Pub.L. No. 105-119, § 123(a)(2), 111 Stat. 2440, 2470 (1997). The legislative history of the enactment, which we did not have occasion to discuss in Parrish, clearly shows that Congress intended “current and ongoing” to mean a presently existing violation, not a potential, or even likely, future violation. The conference report explaining the amendment makes this clear, stating that the change to “current and ongoing” (emphasis added): 15 corrects the confusing use of the word “or” to describe the limited circumstances when a court may continue prospective relief in prison conditions litigation to make clear that a constitutional violation must be “current and ongoing”. These dual requirements are necessary to ensure that court orders do not remain in place on the basis of a claim that a current condition that does not violate a prisoners’ Federal rights nevertheless requires a court decree to address it, because the condition is somehow traceable to a prior policy that did violate Federal rights, or that government officials are “poised” to resume a prior violation of federal rights. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-405, at 133 (1997). Accordingly, we hold that a “current and ongoing” violation is a violation that exists at the time the district court conducts the § 3626(b)(3) inquiry, and not a potential future violation. On remand, the district court should hold an evidentiary hearing to allow both parties to present evidence on whether there are any currently existing violations of class members’ federal rights within the meaning of § 3626(b)(3). In accordance with that provision, if the district court concludes that a “current and ongoing” violation does exist, it must make written findings on the record about whether the prospective relief aimed at that violation remains necessary to correct it. The court will also need to address the other components of § 3626(b)(3).7 7 Of course, if the court finds no current and ongoing violation, the prospective relief must be terminated. 16 b. The Required Need-Narrowness-Intrusiveness Findings If the district court determines that there are current and ongoing violations sufficient to support the continuation of the prospective relief, the court must then determine whether the scope of the existing relief comports with the other findings required by § 3626(b)(3). Even where there is a current and ongoing violation, prospective relief must be terminated unless the district court makes written findings on the record that the relief extends no further than necessary to correct the violation, that the relief is narrowly drawn, and that the relief is the least intrusive means to correct the violation (hereinafter, the “need-narrownessintrusiveness” findings). See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3). As to those factors, in this case the district court stated only that the “the court specifically finds, based on the content of the orders and upon the philosophy of the undersigned which existed prior to the enactment of the PLRA, that the relief set forth [in the consent decrees] extends no further than necessary to correct the . . . violations dealt with by the parties . . . at the time the orders were consented to and/or entered.” (emphasis in original). This statement indicates that the district court misunderstood both the nature and extent of the analysis required by § 3626(b)(3). 17 With regards to the nature of the § 3626(b)(3) inquiry, the district court’s statement indicates that it thought the question was whether the relief contained in the orders extended no further then necessary “to correct the [alleged] violations dealt with by the parties and the court at the time the orders were consented to and/or entered.” (emphasis added). That is not the (b)(3) question. Instead, if there is a “current and ongoing” violation, the question becomes whether the prospective relief meets the need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirements at the time of the court’s inquiry in response to the motion to terminate. The court must make new findings about whether the relief currently complies with the neednarrowness-intrusiveness requirements, given the nature of the current violations. It is not enough under § 3626(b)(3) that the orders, when entered, were sufficiently narrow considering the violations that existed at that time. Regarding the extent of the analysis, the district court’s summary conclusion that the consent decrees “extend[ed] no further then necessary to correct the . . . violations” was seriously deficient. We read § 3626(b)(3) as requiring particularized findings, on a provision-by-provision basis, that each requirement imposed by the consent decrees satisfies the need-narrowness-intrusiveness criteria, given the nature of the current and ongoing violation. It is not enough to simply state in conclusory fashion that the requirements of the consent decrees 18 satisfy those criteria. Particularized findings, analysis, and explanations should be made as to the application of each criteria to each requirement imposed by the consent decrees. On remand, rather then summarily concluding that all of the consent decrees satisfy all of the requirements of § 3626(b)(3), the district court should engage in a specific, provision-by-provision examination of the consent decrees, measuring each requirement against the statutory criteria. The court must determine, and enter findings about, whether each requirement extends no further than necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of a federal right, is narrowly drawn, and is the least intrusive means of correcting that violation. Only if the court makes written findings on the record that the relief satisfies the above need-narrownessintrusive standards can the prospective relief be continued.8 B. THE DISTRICT COURT’S PURPORTED “TERMINATION” OF THE CONSENT DECREES In its order, the district court stated that it was terminating the lawsuit, but leaving the substantive provisions of the consent decrees intact. With respect to the termination of the lawsuit, the court stated that it “contemplates and directs that 8 Of course, we do not mean to suggest that the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing about or enter particularized findings concerning any facts or factors about which there is not dispute. The parties are free to make any concessions or enter into any stipulations they deem appropriate. 19 all complaints regarding issues dealt with herein shall henceforth be considered in new lawsuits if such become necessary . . . . To that end, all provisions in the various orders/injunctions entered herein dealing with enforcement by way of contempt or otherwise, or requiring or permitting enforcement action by class counsel within the framework of this case are VACATED and TERMINATED.” (emphasis in original). With respect to preserving the substantive provisions of the consent decrees, the court stated, “[i]f orders or injunctions entered in [this case] have not been complied with, it will be up to this court or any other court having jurisdiction over the issue at hand to determine whether new operating procedures, etc. pass constitutional muster. Orders/injunctions herein previously entered may be taken into consideration, if applicable, as may the fact that this court does not wish to destroy what it considers to be positive steps taken by the [Defendants] . . . .” Thus, while the court intended to terminate the enforcement provisions of the consent decrees, it also intended that the decrees would continue to have some effect although it is unclear exactly what effect. We have considerable doubt that the district court’s partial termination of the prospective relief went far enough to comply with the PLRA.9 It appears as 9 At oral argument counsel for plaintiffs conceded that the district court’s approach was not proper. When that counsel was asked how he would have drafted a termination order in this case, he directed us to four orders that had been entered by another district court in other prison litigation reform cases, and told us that they were good examples of how it should be done. 20 though the court was interpreting § 3626(b) as operating to limit the jurisdictional authority of a court to enforce the decrees instead of requiring the actual termination of the decrees. If so, we have previously rejected that very interpretation of the PLRA. See Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d 1424, 1426 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997). However, we need not address that issue any further now because we are remanding this case for an evidentiary hearing and findings on the issue of whether there are any “current and ongoing” violations and, if so, on the need-narrowness-intrusiveness factors. Only after the district court holds the evidentiary hearing and enters findings will we know whether any of the decrees are due to be “terminated,” and only then will any issues about what termination entails be presented. Also it may be that any issues involving the scope of termination are shaped and clarified by the district court’s findings. For these reasons, we leave any such issues for another day. C. DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO AMEND The plaintiffs cross-appeal the denial of their motion to amend the complaint to include certain ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims and to certify a sub-class of Three of those four orders said that the prior orders were “hereby vacated, dissolved, and terminated,” while the fourth one said that the prior orders were “hereby vacated and terminated and the action is dismissed.” 21 individuals defined as disabled under the ADA and handicapped under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that the addition of a new sub-class more than ten years after the case was initially filed would needlessly prolong the already protracted litigation. The court also noted that the plaintiffs could present any such claims in a new lawsuit if they wished to pursue them. The plaintiffs argue that the district court abused its discretion in denying their motion to amend. The plaintiffs stress that, although some fifteen years have elapsed since this lawsuit was initiated, they originally sought leave to amend the complaint in 1995, more than four-and-one-half years ago. The district court delayed ruling on the motion to amend until after the Supreme Court decided whether the ADA was applicable to state prison systems.10 The plaintiffs argue that the district court’s delay in ruling on the motion was not their fault, and should not prejudice their efforts to bring the additional claims. They argue further that the parties and the court have acted since 1992 as though the substantive issues that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act raise were already part of the case, particularly 10 The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the ADA did apply to state prisons in Pennsylvania Dep’t. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 524 U.S. 206 (1998). 22 with respect to mental health care and conditions at geriatric and disabled inmate facilities. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides, in pertinent part, that “a party may amend the party’s pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). While the plaintiffs stress that leave to amend “shall be freely given,” we stress that our review of the district court’s denial of leave to amend is limited to deciding whether there has been an abuse of discretion, which means we give that court considerably more leeway than if we were reviewing its decision de novo. See In re Rasbury, 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994). The question before this Court is not whether we would have granted leave to amend under the “freely given” standard of Rule 15, but whether the district court abused its discretion by not granting it under that standard and in the circumstances of this case. As we have observed before, when we review only for abuse of discretion the district court has “a range of choice ...so long as that choice does not constitute a clear error of judgment.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted). Even if we focus, as the plaintiffs argue that we should, on the date on which plaintiffs initially filed their motion to amend rather then on the date when the district court ultimately ruled on it, we cannot say that it the district court’s denial 23 of the motion constituted a clear error of judgment. The plaintiffs sought to amend the complaint nearly eleven-and-one-half years after it was filed. Despite their protestations that the ADA did not exist when they filed the suit, it had existed for nearly five years before they filed leave to amend, and the Rehabilitation Act had been in existence since before they filed the lawsuit. Finally, as the district court noted, if plaintiffs wish to pursue any claims they might have under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, they will not be unduly burdened by having to file a new lawsuit to do so.