Opinion ID: 598512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Kenneth Kelly Harris

Text: 18 Regarding Count One (conspiracy), Kenneth concedes that evidence showed him to have used cocaine and also to have distributed drugs from his personal supply to others. However, he theorizes that such activity does not show agreement, as required for a conspiracy conviction. 19 Though the evidence Kenneth summarizes may not necessarily support the existence of an agreement, the testimony of two coconspirators does. Deborah Young testified that Kenneth had helped her and other conspirators package drugs at one of the sites raided by police. She also told of Kenneth's distributing drugs from the same address. Freda Wise and Gregory Davis, other coconspirators, described instances where Kenneth accompanied Defendant-Appellant Harris on deliveries of narcotics to drug houses. A disinterested witness told of Kenneth's frequent presence at one of Harris's rented apartments, another drug distribution locale. Finally, during one of the many raids, police arrested Harris, in the midst of drugs, weapons, and drug paraphernalia. The circumstantial strength of this evidence, when taken as a whole, clearly would allow a reasonable jury to convict Kenneth of having conspired under Count One. 20 Kenneth's Count Two theory, given only a paragraph in his brief, similarly fails. Though admitting possession of a single rock of cocaine and a handgun when arrested on April 29, 1988, Kenneth asserts that the Government did not show that he possessed the drug with intent to distribute. However, as noted previously, police arrested Kenneth during the raid of a house with drugs, weapons, and drug paraphernalia in open view. When considering this quality along with the other evidence indicating Kenneth's drug distribution activities, justification for the jury's decision is plain.
21 Kenneth also claims that the physical evidence seized from him during the April 29, 1988, arrest should have been suppressed. Police arrested Kenneth as they executed a search warrant at 4702 Glenn Street in Flint. First, Kenneth asserts that police failed to knock and announce pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3109 prior to entering the residence, tainting any evidence seized from him. Alternatively, Kenneth claims that the pat-down search yielding evidence was improper. Finally, even if the pat-down search was proper, Kenneth denies the existence of adequate grounds for a plenary search of his person. 22 As the Government correctly notes, Kenneth did not raise his statutory knock and announce theory at trial, thus limiting the development of the record regarding the issue. However, it is clear, from testimony of the arresting officers, that the police announced their presence, waited some fifteen seconds, and forcibly entered the residence only after scurrying sounds emanated from within. As such, the knock-and-announce requirements were satisfied. 23 Also, authorities legitimately chose to pat Kenneth down, an action that yielded the weapon addressed in Count Three. The police were raiding a suspected site of drug activity reported to contain at least one weapon. Further, sounds of commotion prompted entry by the police. When taken together, these facts provide the requisite articulable, reasonable basis for frisking Kenneth. See also United States v. Lane, 909 F.2d 895, 900 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 977 (1991). 24 Once inside the house, and after frisking Kenneth, authorities discovered indicia of drug activity. This environment provided probable cause for Kenneth's arrest, apparently on the charge of frequenting a drug house. As such, the plenary search of Kenneth that yielded cocaine was a valid search incident to arrest. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
25 Finally, Kenneth argues that the district court erred in failing to strike certain enumerated weapons from Count Three, which charged the use of a firearm in connection with a felony drug offense. As discussed, authorities arrested Kenneth on April 29, 1988, and found on his person cocaine and a handgun. Count Three focuses not only on the weapon found in Kenneth's rear pocket, a .357 magnum, but also on other weapons seized from the site of the arrest. Kenneth asserts that nothing connected him to the other weapons, so they should have been stricken from the charge as surplusage, under Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(d). 26 Significant circumstantial evidence exists to support the notion that Kenneth constructively possessed all of the guns found at the site of his arrest. Witness testimony portrayed him not only as a frequenter of the house, but possibly as a resident thereof. Physical evidence found at the scene, e.g., identification cards and traffic citations, further linked Kenneth to the arrest site. Such evidence, taken as a whole, lends itself to a determination of constructive possession. 27 Even if Kenneth did not possess any of the other listed weapons, his conceded possession of the .357 handgun provides an adequate basis for conviction under Count Three. Possession vel non of other guns would have had no effect on the efficacy of the conviction or on ultimate sentencing. Thus, assuming the other guns listed were surplusage, no prejudice arose from their inclusion in Count Three. 28