Opinion ID: 2569893
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Do the Facts of this Case Substantiate a Bar to Retrial Under the Double Jeopardy Principles of Breit?

Text: {25} As we said in Breit, [r]aising the bar of double jeopardy should be an exceedingly uncommon remedy. 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 35, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792. This remedy applies only in cases of the most severe prosecutorial transgressions. State v. Gonzales, 2002-NMCA-071, ¶ 14, 132 N.M. 420, 49 P.3d 681. In Breit, we diverged from the federal precedent articulated in Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 674-75, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982), to hold that Article II, Section 15 of the New Mexico Constitution permits a bar to retrial under double jeopardy principles when (1) improper official conduct is so unfairly prejudicial to the defendant that it cannot be cured by means short of a mistrial or a motion for a new trial; (2) if the official knows that the conduct is improper and prejudicial; and (3) if the official either intends to provoke a mistrial or acts in willful disregard of the resulting mistrial, retrial, or reversal. Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 32, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792. Instituting our narrow expansion of the Kennedy rule, we held: It makes little difference, when the constitutional rights of the defendant are at stake, whether the prosecutor deliberately pursues an improper course of conduct because he means to goad a defendant into demanding a mistrial or because he is willing to accept a mistrial and start over. From the standpoint of a defendant forced to choose between accepting prejudicial errors or undergoing a second trial, the precise degree of the official's mens rea is a matter of indifference. Id. ¶ 35 (quoted authority omitted). {26} Breit focuses on the effect of the prosecutorial misconduct on the defendant, regardless of the prosecutor's intent, because [t]he object of constitutional double-jeopardy provisions is not to punish disreputable prosecutors. The purpose, rather, is to protect the defendant's interest in having the prosecution completed by the original tribunal before whom the trial was commenced. Defendants should be protected from reprosecution once a prosecutor's actions, regardless of motive or intent, rise to such an extreme that a new trial is the only recourse. Id. ¶ 22 (emphasis added)(quoted authority omitted). {27} In Breit, we rejected the subjectivity allowed under Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 674-75, 102 S.Ct. 2083 and instituted this objective standard. Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶¶ 23, 32, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792. Therefore, the Breit objective standard is based on the prosecutor's conduct as it manifests at the trial, not the motivation for that conduct. We cannot overemphasize or overstate that this is an objective standard, not a subjective one: the belief of the prosecutor regarding his or her own conduct is irrelevant in this analysis. {28} We begin by outlining the facts developed after our remand, and then evaluate Montoya's trial misconduct using the Breit three-prong test for determining whether a double jeopardy bar to retrial is the proper remedy in this case. Id. ¶ 32. The district court's findings that concern us most are (1) Montoya did not know or can be presumed not to have known that [his] conduct was improper and prejudicial and (2) Montoya had an honest belief that his questions [to Defendant on cross-examination] were proper.
{29} As we discussed above, the State filed motions in the district court for voluntary dismissal of the appeal and to reopen the proceedings, and both were granted. Once the hearing was reopened, the State called Montoya to testify. Montoya testified that when he cross-examined Defendant at trial about what Tucker and Goen had said in their statements to police, he had actually based the cross-examination questions about Defendant shooting and bragging about it on all the statements together as one whole statement, relying on a stack of statements from all the witnesses who [had] given statements, and [a]ll the evidence in the case. Montoya clarified that, during his cross-examination of Defendant about the Sarah Tucker statement, which he referred to as a statement to the police 6/19/99, he actually relied on other material. Montoya testified that the bases for those questions included not only the June 19th statement but also an undocumented and unrecorded statement that Montoya claimed Ms. Goen made to him personally. Montoya stated, Your Honor, Ms. Goen actually came to the office and that [is] not a statement you have. Montoya elaborated saying that, Sherri Goen came in, broke down very quick, started crying, saying `I'm very afraid, got to let you know what happened. He came up, he was bragging that he shot him.' He said, `we did it.' {30} Describing this alleged second statement from Goen, Montoya testified that it was given to him by Goen with her former lawyer present as well as a female whom he later said was a police officer, a detective, or a victim impact person. He said that Defendant's former lawyer stopped the interview and agreed to a plea right then because Ms. Goen was so definite in front of us there in person that [Defendant] came up and bragged. Through Montoya, the State introduced a pretrial interview notice to Goen for Thursday, February 24, 2000, the date Goen allegedly gave the second statement. Montoya couldn't set the precise time, but remembered that the interview did not take place in his office but in a conference room. The content of the interview that he remembered was that Goen claimed that Defendant bragged to her that he had shot and killed the victim. {31} Montoya testified that he did not contemporaneously tape record or take notes of this brief, two-minute interview with Goen; he never provided this statement to the defense; he never had any intention to call Goen to testify at trial; and he did not mention this statement to his trial co-counsel until just before the hearing on the motion to reopen. However, Montoya said that his confidence to form his good faith questions to Defendant came from him adding that all up together after this interview with Goen: both her police statement and [her] statements in my office to me personally. He testified Defendant's attorney was smart enough to stop the interview when Goen stated that Defendant told her not merely that he had shot a gun, but that he had killed the victim. Montoya claimed he and Defendant's attorney walked out of the interview right then, talked about a plea for Defendant, and came to an agreement. Montoya told the district court that, based on his own review of all the statements and evidence, I'm sure, as sure as somebody could be that wasn't there, that Mr. McClaugherty came up and bragged about it. Shooting an innocent victim and killing an innocent victim. Montoya additionally claimed that the evidence in the case was overwhelming, one of those cases [where] we didn't have to [go] back on [it] being a first-degree [murder]. {32} The district court continued the matter to allow defense counsel to interview the potential witnesses Montoya had identified from the interview with Goen: Defendant's former counsel and Goen's counsel. The hearing recommenced, primarily on the topic of Goen's alleged statement to Montoya. {33} Defendant's former defense attorney testified he did not remember being present at the Goen statement described by Montoya. He did, however, say that he would never stop an interview statement where a witness made damaging statements about his client because he found it helpful to know damaging facts as well as helpful facts. He also said that he did not reach a plea agreement with Montoya after any witness interview because [t]he plea negotiations were ongoing before interviews, after interviews, so no. Later, with no objection from the State, defense counsel offered into evidence a copy of a plea offer sent from Montoya to this defense attorney. The plea offer, dated April 27, 2000, was made about two months after the date of Goen's alleged second, personal statement to Montoya wherein she said that he shot and killed the victim and bragged about it. The offer was to dismiss the open count of murder and the first-degree felony murder charges in exchange for a plea to conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, aggravated battery and shooting at or from a motor vehicle. {34} The State elicited from Goen's attorney that she received a subpoena for Goen's pretrial interview scheduled for August 29, 2000. She remembered being present at that interview with Montoya and Goen, it took place in Montoya's individual room lasting not more than an hour, and no one else was in Montoya's office during the interview. {35} At the close of evidence from these hearings, the State argued that the trial objection to Montoya's cross-examination of Defendant had been improper impeachment, not an objection that Montoya had asked the question in bad faith, and that Montoya's good faith basis for the questions he asked came from all the evidence against Defendant of which Montoya was aware of at the time he posed the questions. {36} Defense counsel responded that Montoya's misrepresentation during his cross-examination was when he asked Defendant, Sir, would it surprise you to hear that your sister, Sarah Tucker, gave a statement to the police, 6-19-99, that day or that morning that said that you admitted to her that you shot? Defense counsel quoted from the earlier hearing where the district court had dismissed the State's case with prejudice, saying, `It is clear through those witness's statements that the statement to the police was that the Defendant did not shoot and was not the shooter.' Defense counsel reiterated that the Goen statement to the police does not contain a single reference to Defendant bragging that he had shot the victim. However, after his question about the Tucker statement, Montoya peppered Defendant with questions about Goen, including, How about your roommate, Sherri Goen? Does it surprise you that she also made the same statement? ... That you admitted shooting?... Bragged about it? Defense asked the district court to adhere to its earlier dismissal of the case.
{37} At the conclusion of the hearings on the motion to reopen, the district court found inter alia that (1) Montoya did not know or can be presumed not to have known that [his] conduct was improper and prejudicial; (2) Montoya had an honest belief that his questions were proper; (3) Montoya did not act in willful disregard; (4) Montoya's misconduct does not appear to be the result of a plan or scheme to inject unfair prejudice into the trial; and (5) Montoya did not seek a tactical advantage through his conduct [n]or would the State have gained a tactical advantage because of a mistrial. The district court then concluded that Montoya's conduct did not evince the extraordinary circumstances that would require barring a retrial ruling that the Order of Dismissal filed on May 8, 2003 be vacated and Defendant's Motion to Bar further Prosecution be Denied. {38} The district court concluded that the only prong of the Breit test that was met was that if the court had known about Montoya's misconduct at the time he was introducing the inadmissible hearsay, it would have granted a mistrial. The district court did not construe the facts to meet the other two prongs of Breit. Defendant appealed these conclusions to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court. McClaugherty II, 2007-NMCA-041, ¶ 2, 141 N.M. 468, 157 P.3d 33.