Opinion ID: 222427
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reconsideration of the Daubert Ruling

Text: Rimbert first challenges the grant of Eli Lilly's motion to reconsider the initial judge's Daubert ruling. Rimbert argues that the doctrine of law of the case should apply to constrain a successive district judge's ability to revisit discretionary, interlocutory decisions made by prior judges. The law of the case `doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.' United States v. Monsisvais, 946 F.2d 114, 115 (10th Cir.1991) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983)). This doctrine is designed to promote finality and prevent re-litigation of previously decided issues, but does not serve to limit a court's power. Wilson v. Meeks, 98 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir.1996). When law of the case doctrine applies, three circumstances generally warrant departure from the prior ruling: (1) new and different evidence; (2) intervening controlling authority; or (3) a clearly erroneous prior decision which would work a manifest injustice. Id. This court, however, has declined to apply these limitations to rulings revisited prior to entry of a final judgment, concluding that district courts generally remain free to reconsider their earlier interlocutory orders. Been v. O.K. Indus., 495 F.3d 1217, 1225 (10th Cir.2007); see Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 538 F.3d 1299, 1306 (10th Cir.2008) ([E]very order short of a final decree is subject to reopening at the discretion of the district judge. (quotation omitted)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) ([A]ny order..., however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties ... may be revised at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.). This principle remains true even when a case is reassigned from one judge to another in the same court: [T]he [law of the case] doctrine does not bind a judge to following rulings in the same case by another judge of coordinate jurisdiction as long as prejudice does not ensue to the party seeking the benefit of the doctrine. United States v. Johnson, 12 F.3d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir. 1993). The relevant prejudice is limited to lack of sufficient notice that one judge is revisiting the decision of a prior judge and the opportunity to be heard with respect to the new ruling. Id. Rimbert urges the adoption of a position suggested by the Seventh Circuit, under which law of the case principles would constrain a district judge's power to revisit a prior judge's interlocutory ruling when that ruling is discretionary. See Williams v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 1 F.3d 502, 503 (7th Cir.1993). Rimbert argues discretionary decisions should be treated differently because, while two judges may come to different conclusions, if the decision is reviewable only for abuse of discretion, neither may have committed reversible error. See id. Revisiting the initial decision in those circumstances, he contends, allows an unfair second bite of the apple with potentially no recourse on appeal. Rimbert's argument is foreclosed by this court's precedent. In Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., this court considered the ruling of a district judge in precisely these circumstances. 160 F.3d 625, 628 (10th Cir.1998). There, the initially assigned judge twice denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on an argument that the testimony of the plaintiff's expert was not admissible under Daubert. Id. at 627. When the case was reassigned, the second judge entertained a motion to reconsider the previous ruling and granted the summary judgment motion on the Daubert issue. Id. The plaintiff argued on appeal that law of the case doctrine should apply to constrain the second judge's reconsideration of the earlier Daubert ruling, but this court rejected that argument, instead reviewing that ruling for abuse of discretion. Id. at 628-29. Accordingly, Rimbert's argument that law of the case should apply in these circumstances has already been considered and rejected by this court. Rimbert argues Wilson is distinguishable because the second judge there granted reconsideration after being persuaded the prior decision was incorrect based on intervening authority. Under law of the case doctrine, a newly decided opinion is grounds for departure from a previous ruling only when that precedent is controlling. Wilson, 98 F.3d at 1250. In Wilson, as the newly decided opinion was out-of-circuit, it was merely persuasive. Wilson, 160 F.3d at 628. Thus, Rimbert is incorrect in his assertion that Wilson involved an exception to the law of the case doctrine. In any event, Wilson ruled law of the case doctrine was inapplicable to reconsideration of interlocutory orders in the district court without regard to the basis for reconsideration. Id. This court's decision in Been reaffirms that law of the case doctrine has no bearing on the revisiting of interlocutory orders, even when a case has been reassigned from one judge to another. 495 F.3d at 1225. Other cases cited by Rimbert are inapposite. In Johnson v. Champion, this court declined to decide whether law of the case applied because one of the exceptions to the doctrine was clearly applicable. 288 F.3d 1215, 1225-26 (10th Cir.2002). Moreover, at issue in Johnson was the application of the law of the case doctrine to bind the appeals court by a prior district court decision which could have been but was not appealed. Id.; see Martinez v. Roscoe, 100 F.3d 121, 123 (10th Cir.1996) (applying law of the case in those circumstances). Here, the district court's first order never became a final, appealable order which would invoke this type of law of the case doctrine. In Servants of Paraclete v. Does, this court merely announced the principles under which a motion for reconsideration after a final judgment should be granted, a wholly separate inquiry from the standard under which we review reconsideration of an interim order. See 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir.2000). Again, here, the initial judge's Daubert ruling was an interim order. Because the initial ruling was never made final, the second judge's reconsideration of that ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Wilson, 160 F.3d at 627. Notably, Rimbert makes no argument on appeal that the substance of the second judge's Daubert ruling, i.e., excluding the testimony of Rimbert's expert, constitutes an abuse of discretion. Rimbert also does not argue that he was denied notice or the opportunity to be heard such that the second judge's reconsideration of the prior ruling prejudiced his procedural rights. See Johnson, 12 F.3d at 1544. His arguments are limited to his contention that the second judge's ruling was an abuse of discretion because none of the three exceptions to law of the case doctrine apply, including his contention that there was no intervening authority, new facts, or manifest injustice resulting from the previous ruling. Because this court concludes that the doctrine has no applicability here, those arguments fail to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Moreover, it was not manifestly unreasonable for the district court to, upon being assigned a new case, independently assure itself of the expert's reliability and to fulfill its gatekeeper function. Wilson, 160 F.3d at 630.