Opinion ID: 164600
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Erroneous Sentence Enhancement

Text: Mr. Ives next argues his appellate counsel was ineffective for not appealing the court’s use of his prior federal conviction for possessing an unregistered firearm under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) to enhance the requisite minimum for his sentence. Mr. Ives does not dispute the fact he pled guilty to, and was convicted of, “possessing firearms with no serial number and not registered to him, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).” Instead, Mr. Ives contends the firearms conviction should not lead to enhancement because the “offense – based solely on 9 (...continued) the finding in the first proceeding conclusively established the issue in the second proceeding). -37- powers reserved to the federal government – has no analogue in the Oklahoma criminal statutes.” Consequently, Mr. Ives believes the court should have sentenced him based on a minimum term of ten years incarceration rather than a minimum term of twenty years incarceration. At the time the state trial court sentenced Mr. Ives, Oklahoma law required “every person who, having been twice convicted of felony offenses, commits a third, or thereafter, felony offense within ten (10) years of the date following the completion of the execution of the sentence, shall be punished by imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for a term of not less than twenty (20) years.” Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 51(B) (1983 & Supp. 1990) (current version available at Okla Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 51.1(B) (2002)). In contrast, a person convicted of only one previous “offense punishable by imprisonment in the State Penitentiary” was subject to a ten-year minimum sentence if the subsequent offense would normally qualify for a sentence exceeding five years. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 51(A) (1983 & Supp. 1990) (current version at Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 51.1 (2002)). Oklahoma law further explains what convictions its courts may use for enhancement purposes. Every person who has been convicted in any other state, government or country of an offense which, if committed within this state, would -38- be punishable by the laws of this state by imprisonment in the penitentiary, is punishable for any subsequent crime committed within this state ... to the same extent as if such first conviction had taken place in a court of this state. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 54 (2002). When analyzing whether a foreign conviction can be used to enhance a defendant’s minimum sentence, Oklahoma courts ask “whether the allegation in the [foreign] indictment ..., and the admitted guilt thereof, constitute a felony, punishable by a term in the penitentiary, under the statutes of Oklahoma.” Tice v. State, 283 P.2d 872, 876 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955). Because the emphasis is on the specific charges to which the defendant pled guilty, Oklahoma need not have an offense identical to the foreign statute; it is sufficient if the defendant pled guilty to an indictment describing conduct constituting a felony under Oklahoma law. See id. at 876-77. With this understanding, we now return to Mr. Ives contention that his federal firearm conviction should not have been used to enhance his sentence. Mr. Ives insists that “since 26 U.S.C. section 5861(d) is based solely on powers reserved to the federal government, there is no analogous Oklahoma crime.” Mr. Ives’ argument fails because, as noted above, Oklahoma requires a court look at the conduct to which Mr. Ives pled guilty in determining whether the conduct was a crime under Oklahoma law rather than spend time comparing the federal statute to various Oklahoma laws. See Tice, 283 P.2d at 876-77. Under this rubric, -39- Oklahoma courts have held federal convictions may enhance the punishment for subsequent crimes even when the prior federal conviction was under a statute based on powers reserved to the federal government. See, e.g., Webb v. State, 732 P.2d 478, 480 (1987) (holding federal conviction for making a false statement to obtain a weapon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), could be used to enhance sentence for subsequent conviction); Lee v. State, 576 P.2d 770, 771-72 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978) (holding federal conviction for interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle, 18 U.S.C. § 2312, could be used to enhance sentence for subsequent conviction). Thus, our examination must involve the indictment rather than simply the federal statute itself. Our examination of the federal indictment, however, is impossible because the indictment is not included in the record. Without the indictment, we cannot tell which, if any, of the numerous Oklahoma laws involving firearms in effect at the time of Mr. Ives’ federal conviction 10 may have applied to the conduct to which Mr. Ives pled guilty. We must therefore conclude Mr. Ives has not met his 10 See, e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1283 (1983) (felon in possession of a firearm) (current version available at Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1283 (2002)); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1289.18 (1983 & Supp. 2000) (possession of a sawedoff shotgun or rifle) (current version available at Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1289.18 (2002)). -40- burden of showing his appellate counsel was ineffective. Likewise, Mr. Ives has not shown a miscarriage of justice will occur unless we review his claim.