Opinion ID: 1464517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Prior Testimony

Text: Appellant's argument on appeal centers around the testimony of former codefendant Leroy Farley. At the time of appellant's trial, Farley was serving a prison sentence of twenty years to life for a different murder conviction. Farley was an eyewitness to Reed's murder and was originally charged in the offense along with Myrick, Hawthorne, and appellant. In exchange for not being prosecuted for his role in the events leading up to this case, Farley entered into an agreement with the government to testify against the remaining codefendants involved in Reed's murder, and to plead guilty to an unrelated felony murder case. Pursuant to this agreement, he testified in the earlier trial of codefendants Myrick and Hawthorne. See Hawthorne v. United States, 504 A.2d 580 (D.C.1986). As soon as Farley was brought into the courtroom during appellant's trial, however, his behavior, as observed by counsel for appellant and the government, as well as the court, was described as peculiar. In response to a few simple preliminary questions by the trial court outside the jury's presence, Farley denied that he remembered anything about the murder of Reed. Defense counsel requested a forensic screening of Farley to determine whether he was competent to testify. A psychiatrist examined Farley and found him not competent to testify, but recommended further examination. The prosecutor, however, contacted the federal prison authorities in Springfield, Missouri, where Farley was incarcerated, and represented to the court that Farley was alert and coherent in speech and thought and displayed no evidence of significant mental illness. Based on the prison medical report, as well as its observation of Farley's behavior, the trial court concluded that Farley was deliberately feigning lack of memory or mental illness in order to deceive the court about his competency, and thus to avoid testifying in appellant's case. The court found Farley to be a competent witness, and he was called as a government witness before the jury. After extensive questioning by the prosecutor, however, it became apparent that Farley would not admit to having any memory or knowledge of Reed's shooting. He denied knowing anything about the crime or any of the participants, whom he had previously identified at the trial of Myrick and Hawthorne. He even stated that he could not remember the earlier trial. To almost every question the prosecutor asked, even simple questions about why he was currently in prison, Farley either denied that he knew or claimed that he did not remember. When it became clear that he would not cooperate as a witness and that further questioning was futile, the prosecutor requested the court's permission to treat Farley as a hostile witness in order to impeach him with his prior recorded testimony, and that in the event Farley persisted in denying any recollection of the past events, that the trial court make a determination that Farley was unavailable as a witness and allow the transcript of Farley's prior testimony at the trial of Myrick and Hawthorne to be read to the jury. Defense counsel objected to the latter request on the ground that appellant did not have the opportunity to cross-examine Farley at the earlier trial. Before determining that Farley was unavailable as a witness, the trial court once again directed him to take the stand to be questioned by the prosecutor. Again Farley denied recollection either of the events and circumstances surrounding Reed's murder or of his prior testimony. Consequently, the trial court ruled that because Farley either had no recollection of the facts and circumstances relating to the case or was feigning lack of memory, he was unavailable as a witness. The trial court then ruled, over defense counsel's further objections, that the government would be permitted to introduce portions of Farley's prior recorded testimony, on both direct and cross-examination, given at the trial of Myrick and Hawthorne. The court also ruled that the government could not introduce those portions of Farley's prior recorded testimony that made any reference whatever to appellant. Farley's prior testimony, as introduced in evidence and read to the jury, revealed that on November 5, 1981, the day Reed was shot, Farley was in the area of 11th and O Streets, Northwest. In the early afternoon, he met with Myrick and Hawthorne, at which time Myrick told them that he was going to pull a stunt on Big Mike, meaning that he was going to rob William Reed. Hawthorne agreed to go along with Myrick, and the pair walked over to Reed. Out of curiosity, Farley followed Myrick and Hawthorne as they, along with Reed, entered an alley that opened out onto O Street. Farley was in the alley when he saw Myrick pull out what he believed to be a .38 caliber pistol and Hawthorne pulled out a .357 caliber handgun. Myrick ordered Reed not to move and began searching through his pockets. Farley saw Myrick take money and a brown bag from Reed. As Myrick ordered Reed to lay face down on the pavement, Reed pleaded with them not to kill him. Farley observed Myrick place his pistol against the back of Reed's head and fire a shot. Farley immediately ran out of the alley, but heard two more shots as he did so. In his haste to get out of the alley, he saw nothing more. Portions of Farley's prior testimony that referred to appellant were supposed to be excluded from the reading of the transcript; however, two questions during cross-examination, in which Farley stated that Melvin did not walk with the victim into the alley when Reed was shot, were in fact read to the jury. In his direct testimony, Farley stated that he had entered into an agreement with the government whereby he agreed to plead guilty to felony murder in an unrelated case in exchange for his testimony in the case involving Reed's murder and for not being prosecuted in that case. The entire cross-examination of Farley by attorneys for Myrick and Hawthorne was also read to the jury. He was extensively cross-examined by both attorneys: he was questioned on his use of PCP and heroin, and his selling of drugs; his credibility was attacked by means of his prior criminal record, including two prior felony murder convictions; and, through leading questions, counsel for Myrick implied that Farley and Hawthorne were the persons who had conceived the idea to rob Reed, while counsel for Hawthorne implied that Farley had actually shot Reed. Counsel also explored in detail Farley's ability to observe the shooting and to recall the events correctly. Through cross-examination, defense counsel had extracted from Farley the admission that he was testifying because of the deal he had struck with the government. He was questioned pointedly about his failure to say anything about the shooting before that deal was arranged, and every detail of the bargain was explored, including the charges he had pending against him at the time, his maximum exposure to time in prison as a result of the charges, the strength of the government's case against him, and the extent to which his prison exposure was reduced in exchange for his testimony. Appellant argues that the trial court's allowance in evidence of Farley's prior recorded testimony violated the rule against hearsay and abridged his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. He bases his arguments on the fact that appellant was not a party to the prior proceeding against defendants Myrick and Hawthorne, and he was therefore deprived of any opportunity to cross-examine the witness whose testimony was used against him.