Opinion ID: 76434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Carruthers's Motion for Leave to Amend

Text: 16 Citing no authority, Carruthers summarily argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion for leave to amend her first amended complaint to add a claim for retaliatory discharge. She asserts that the amendment would not have delayed the proceedings or prejudiced BSA because no additional discovery would have been required and because the essential witnesses for the retaliation claim were already available. 17 We review the denial of leave to amend for clear abuse of discretion. Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Universities of Fla. Dept. of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1286-87 (11th Cir.2003); Lowe's Home Centers, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 313 F.3d 1307, 1314-15 (11th Cir.2002). Rule 15(a) instructs that leave of the court to amend pleadings shall be freely given when justice so requires. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Nevertheless, a motion to amend may be denied on numerous grounds, such as undue delay, undue prejudice to the defendants, and futility of the amendment. Maynard, 342 F.3d at 1287 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, [i]t is not an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a motion for leave to amend following the close of discovery, past the deadline for amendments, and past the deadline for filing dispositive motions. Lowe's, 313 F.3d at 1315. 18 We conclude that the district court properly exercised its discretion in denying Carruthers's motion. Carruthers filed her motion on 17 January 2003, six months after the court's 25 July 2002 deadline for amendments to the pleadings and two months after its 25 November 2002 deadline for completion of discovery. Carruthers offers no explanation as to why the interests of justice required leave to amend. Nor does she offer any explanation as to why she could not have discovered and pled retaliation in her original complaint or in her first amended complaint. We find that such unexplained tardiness constitutes undue delay. Moreover, granting the motion likely would have further delayed proceedings and prejudiced BSA, which had completed discovery and would have had to conduct additional discovery on the issue of whether Carruthers's filing of her workers' compensation claim was causally related to BSA's termination of her employment. The district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying Carruthers's motion to amend.