Opinion ID: 1039050
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: 1 Hearsay Statements During the trial, the trial justice allowed both Ryan and Mainor to testify about hearsay statements made to them by the children. The respondent argues that both the passage of time and the fact that the children had been questioned by and made statements to multiple individuals about their sexual abuse should have precluded the admission of the challenged testimony, because there was ample time for the children to reflect and deliberate, and, as a result, the children’s statements were not spontaneous. Conversely, DCYF maintains that the statements made by the children to their therapists were properly admitted under the child hearsay exception set forth in § 14-1-69, because of the indicia of reliability of the statements. These indicia, argues the state, include the level of trauma endured by the children, their young ages, and the corroborating medical evidence. In a similar vein, the guardian ad litem for the children contends that the length of time before the children disclosed the sexual abuse was not unreasonable because, given the “months of being subjected to a bizarre atmosphere of abuse and concealment” created by Morales, the disclosures to Ryan were the first opportunity for the children to feel safe. 10 10 The department argues that we should look to the law of other jurisdictions that list various factors to consider in determining whether a child’s delay in disclosure of sexual abuse was - 11 - Section 14-1-69 provides, in pertinent part: “Hearsay. — In any custody and/or termination trial    where a petition has been filed by the department of children, youth, and families in accordance with §§ 14-1-11, 40-11-7 and/or 15-7-7 in the family court, the court may, in its discretion, permit as evidence any statement by a child under the age of thirteen (13) years old about a prescribed act of abuse, neglect, or misconduct by a parent or guardian, if that statement was made spontaneously within a reasonable time after the act is alleged to have occurred, and if the statement was made to someone the child would normally turn to for sympathy, protection, or advice.” Indeed, we have interpreted § 14-1-69 as “liberaliz[ing] the common law test for admission of children’s out-of-court statements concerning their physical abuse” by eliminating “the requirement that the declarant must have been ‘laboring under the stress of nervous excitement’ when the statement was made.” In re Deborah M., 544 A.2d 572, 574 (R.I. 1988) (quoting State v. Creighton, 462 A.2d 980, 982 (R.I. 1983)). Despite the relaxed standards of timeliness and spontaneity under § 14-1-69, there are, nevertheless, limits to the admissibility of hearsay statements made by children in custody and termination proceedings. We have held that the passing of a few days or weeks between either a child’s disclosure of abuse and the date that the alleged abuse occurred or the date when the child was removed from the scene of the abuse constitutes a reasonable time lapse for purposes of § 14-1-69. However, it is significant that the passing of several months between the acts of alleged abuse and a child’s disclosure consistently has been held to be unreasonable. Compare In re Veronica T., 700 A.2d 1366, 1367 (R.I. 1997) reasonable in the particular circumstances. Similarly, the guardian ad litem argues that we should adopt the reasoning and rationale used in the “fresh complaint” doctrine, as applied in other jurisdictions. See 75 C.J.S. Rape § 72 at 366-67 (2002) (“The fresh complaint doctrine permits an out-of-court complaint seasonably made by the complainant in a sexual assault case to be admitted as part of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, for the purposes of corroborating the complainant’s testimony and not for substantive purposes.”). However, we see no need to refer to the law of other jurisdictions for guidance in deciding the issues in this case; our own jurisprudence furnishes ample assistance. - 12 - (statements made after two weeks admissible), and In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200, 205 (R.I. 1989) (statements made to a social worker during the first few weeks after the child victim had been placed in foster care were admissible under § 14-1-69), with In re Rocco W., 706 A.2d 1302, 1304 (R.I. 1998) (hearsay statements made approximately six months after the child was removed from the abuse were not within a reasonable time after the alleged abuse occurred), and In re Jessica C., 690 A.2d 1357, 1360, 1361 (R.I. 1997) (statements made “almost three months after” children removed from scene of alleged abuse not admissible under § 14-1-69). It is further noteworthy that we have rejected “any approach to this issue that calls for blind obedience to the clock and an hour-by-hour count of the time that has passed between the event and the declaration”; rather, “the test to be applied is whether from the facts of a particular case the statements were spontaneous or impulsive or whether they were the product of reflection and deliberation.” In re Deborah M., 544 A.2d at 574-75, 575. In determining whether a statement was made with spontaneity or at the child’s first safe opportunity to disclose the alleged abuse, we have considered factors such as whether there were “significant lapses of time, ample opportunity for reflection and deliberation, and numerous previous disclosures of abuse   .” In re Jessica C., 690 A.2d at 1361. In this case, the children disclosed the sexual abuse approximately ten months after the alleged abuse had ceased and approximately three months after they had been removed from the scene of the abuse. Although we have declined to delineate any precise time limits for such statements to be admissible, we have never extended the hearsay exception under § 14-1-69 to more than “a few weeks.” In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d at 201, 205. However, our review of the record in this case makes it clear, without question, that the children’s hearsay statements were not necessary for the trial justice to determine that abuse had occurred or that a termination of - 13 - parental rights was appropriate. Thus, even if the admission of the children’s statements was erroneous, it does not demand reversal of the trial justice’s finding that respondent knew the children were being sexually abused by Morales. 11 Contrary to respondent’s argument that the only evidence of her knowledge of the abuse was the statements by the children to Ryan and Mainor, it is our opinion that there is a plethora of independent, competent evidence in the record to support the trial justice’s decision. First, when respondent had these children in her care, she permitted them to live with an individual who she knew had been charged with first-degree child molestation of a child within the same age range as her own children. It is beyond question that sexual abuse is conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being. Further, parental knowledge that an actual offense has occurred is not necessary; it is sufficient that the parent was aware of the potential for danger and disregarded the risk. See In re Chester J., 754 A.2d 772, 778 (R.I. 2000) (a parent who ignores or stands by while child abuse or neglect occurs is tantamount to the parent inflicting the abuse himself or herself for purposes of a termination proceeding); In re Nicole B., 703 A.2d 612, 618 (R.I. 1997) (holding that parents are held to a greater level of responsibility and awareness concerning the well-being of their children than other adults, and parents who ignore abuse are as culpable as the actors in the context of termination of parental rights); see, e.g., In re Jennifer R., 667 A.2d 535, 536 (R.I. 1995) (affirming a termination of parental rights when the trial justice found that the mother “[wa]s totally aligned with her husband [the abuser] 11 The department also argues that the statements are admissible under the hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, Rule 803(4) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. However, because we conclude that there was clear and convincing legally competent evidence in the record to support the termination of parental rights without the children’s statements, we decline to comment on this issue. - 14 -    [and] therefore, [was] unable to be supportive to her daughters [and]    unable to protect them”). The undisputed evidence in this record supports a determination that, despite numerous reminders and warnings from DCYF that Morales had been accused of sexually molesting his niece and that respondent needed to remove him from her home, respondent did not end the relationship. Instead, she bailed him out of jail when he was incarcerated after being accused of molesting his niece—claiming that she believed that he was falsely accused—and she moved him into her home, despite the continued warnings from DCYF and in clear violation of a court order that the children were to have no contact with him. Not only did she disregard DCYF’s warnings and defy a court order, she also provided mendacious statements to DCYF about her contact with Morales: Silva and D’Abrosca testified that they had instructed her on multiple occasions that Morales was not to be in contact with the children, and each time, respondent falsely responded that he was not. Also, when asked about the surveillance camera and blankets over the windows, she responded untruthfully, telling the social worker that she had obtained a restraining order against her sister, although it was later revealed that it was Morales who had shrouded the windows with blankets and installed the security camera to avoid detection by DCYF. Indeed, the testimony by Silva and D’Abrosca support the unavoidable conclusion that respondent failed to provide proper care or protection for her children when she allowed Morales, an accused sex offender, to move into her home and when she refused to end the relationship with him, thereby subjecting her children to an unreasonable risk of physical and emotional harm. See § 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii), (v). - 15 - In addition, the graphic medical evidence presented by Dr. Goldberg reveals that Rita suffered from obvious and serious injuries that could not have escaped the watchful eye of a loving parent. Indeed, we have held that when a child suffers obvious injuries, “[i]t [is] reasonable for [a] trial justice to conclude on the basis of the evidence before him that a loving, caring parent would have known the source of the injuries and would have reported this information to physicians or to the police if she had not caused them herself or permitted them to happen.” In re Frances, 505
In this case, Dr. Goldberg testified that Rita’s injuries would have resulted in a copious amount of blood and significant pain. She explained that Rita had incurred “some of the deepest scarring that [she had] seen,” and that this trauma would have resulted in “a significant amount of blood.” In fact, Dr. Goldberg explained that Rita’s injuries would have resulted in so much bleeding that they would have required pressure and the holding of gauze in the “injured area” to stanch the flow of blood. Further, even though Dr. Goldberg did not testify about her examination of Theresa or Michael, DCYF’s petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights as to Theresa and Michael was amply supported by clear and convincing evidence because they were also exposed to the risk of cruel and abusive conduct and the aggravated circumstance of sexual abuse. See In re Frances, 505 A.2d at 1385 (terminating parental rights with respect to all children based on cruel and abusive conduct to only one child, reasoning that “[t]he state    need not wait until a child’s life has been permanently or irretrievably impaired before acting” quoting In re Lester, 417 A.2d 877, 881 (R.I. 1980)). Further, during the trial on termination of parental rights, respondent invoked her privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. We specifically have stated that in the trial of a petition seeking the termination of parental rights, the invocation of the protection afforded under the Fifth Amendment in order to avoid testifying does not forbid the drawing of - 16 - adverse inferences against a party who refuses to testify. In re Rosalie H., 899 A.2d 199, 206 (R.I. 2006). Here, respondent invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege after every question, including whether she knew Morales was facing criminal charges for first-degree child molestation, whether she had bailed Morales out of jail, whether she allowed Morales to be around the children after being told by DCYF that he could not be near them, whether she faced criminal charges, whether she visited Morales at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI) and told him that she wanted him to come back and live with the children, and whether her children told her that Morales was sexually assaulting them. In light of all the other evidence adduced at trial, it was proper for the trial justice to draw an adverse inference when respondent refused to answer any questions whatsoever. Moreover, the finding of cruel or abusive conduct and aggravated circumstances on the part of respondent shifted the burden of producing evidence of parental fitness to respondent to “present evidence demonstrating ‘that his or her past abusive conduct no longer endangers the safety of a child.’” In re Victoria L., 950 A.2d at 1175 (quoting In re Corryn B., 914 A.2d 978, 983 n.3 (R.I. 2007)). There was no such evidence presented here. Accordingly, after reviewing the record, we are of the opinion that, even without the children’s hearsay statements, clear and convincing evidence exists to support the trial justice’s findings that respondent was unfit by reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to her children, in that she allowed conduct to be committed towards her children of a cruel and abusive nature, and she subjected her children to aggravated circumstances of sexual abuse. See § 15-7- 7(a)(2)(ii), (v). 12 12 In view of our holding that the trial justice articulated a proper basis for termination of respondent’s parental rights in accordance with § 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii) and (v), we need not and - 17 - 2 Reunification Efforts Because we agree with the trial justice that respondent’s rights were properly terminated pursuant to § 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii) and (v), DCYF was under no obligation to attempt reunification of the family. Pursuant to the explicit language of § 15-7-7(b)(1), “[i]n the event that a petition is filed pursuant to subdivision[] (a)(2)(ii) [or] (a)(2)(v)    of this section, the department has no obligation to engage in reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify a family.” The instant case falls squarely within that statutory directive. See In re Natalya C., 946 A.2d 198, 203 n.10 (R.I. 2008) (“It should be noted that [the statutory requirement that reasonable efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship be made prior to filing a termination of parental rights petition] does not apply to abuse petitions filed under § 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii).”). 3 Best Interests of the Children Once a Family Court justice establishes that the state has proven a statutory justification for terminating the relationship between a biological parent and child, here § 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii) and (v), he still must establish that “the best interests of the child outweigh all other considerations.” In re Dayvon G., 10 A.3d 448, 454 (R.I. 2010) (quoting In re Brook Ann R., 994 A.2d 1241, 1244 (R.I. 2010)). We are “ever cognizant of the significance of severing the bond between parent and child,” but also resolutely appreciate that “it is in the best interests of children to have a safe and nurturing environment in which to live, learn and grow.” In re Daniel D., 9 A.3d 651, 657 (R.I. 2010) (quoting In re Alexis L., 972 A.2d 159, 170 (R.I. 2009)). In this case, the trial justice found that it was in the best interests of the three children to terminate the respondent’s parental rights because all three children were living together with a therefore shall not address respondent’s other claim of error under § 15-7-7(a)(3). See In re Gabrielle D., 39 A.3d 655, 668 (R.I. 2012). - 18 - preadoptive family with which they have bonded. After carefully reviewing the record in this case, we perceive no error in the trial justice’s “best interests” determination. Indeed, the fact that the respondent was willing to jeopardize the children’s safety and welfare for the sake of maintaining a relationship with Morales is evidence that she is unlikely to be able to provide the proper care and custody for her children.