Opinion ID: 853258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The High Hurdle for Ineffective Assistance Claims

Text: A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy two components. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); accord Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390-91, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). First, the defendant must show deficient performance: representation that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the defendant did not have the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Second, the defendant must show prejudice: a reasonable probability (i.e. a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Few points of law are as clearly established as the principle that [t]actical or strategic decisions will not support a claim of ineffective assistance. Sparks v. State, 499 N.E.2d 738, 739 (Ind.1986). We afford great deference to counsel's discretion to choose strategy and tactics, and strongly presume that counsel provided adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment in all significant decisions. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Even the best and brightest criminal defense attorneys may disagree on ideal strategy or the most effective approach in any given case. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Furthermore, [i]solated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective. Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind.2001) (citing Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 199 (Ind.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1021, 119 S.Ct. 550, 142 L.Ed.2d 457 (1998)).
McCary argued on direct appeal that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. McCary, memo. op. at 6, 657 N.E.2d 204. His argument failed. Id. at 11, 657 N.E.2d 204. He raises this same issue again in his petition for post-conviction relief. (Appellant's Br. at 1.) It has long been the rule that a defendant who raises a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal is foreclosed from subsequently relitigating that claim. Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1220 (Ind.1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 861, 120 S.Ct. 150, 145 L.Ed.2d 128 (1999). See also Sawyer v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1328, 1329 (Ind.1997)([The defendant], having once litigated his Sixth Amendment claim concerning ineffective assistance of counsel, is not entitled to litigate it again, by alleging different grounds.); Morris v. State, 466 N.E.2d 13, 14 (Ind.1984)(Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner gave several additional examples of his counsel's alleged ineffectiveness during the post-conviction hearing, a consideration of the ineffectiveness issue would constitute review of an issue already decided on direct appeal.). McCary's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is res judicata.
McCary next asserts that his appellate counsel was ineffective for raising the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. McCary's trial counsel did not call Officer Tracey Murphy as a witness. (T.R. at iii-vii.) McCary asserts that his appellate counsel's failure to develop[ ] a record to show what the officer would have testified to ... doom[ed] the claim to failure and depriv[ed] McCary of an effective appeal. (Appellant's Br. at 11-12.) This argument stems from the probable cause affidavit, which was available to both trial and appellate counsel. It stated that Officer Murphy, who was at home and off duty, heard shots and chased but then lost the suspect. (T.R. at 21.) McCary's defense was that he did indeed flee the police, but did not shoot. (P-C.R. at 255-64.) McCary's appellate lawyer suggested that the man Officer Murphy saw was most likely Aaron Blanche, whom the defense had portrayed at trial as the probable shooter. (P-C.R. at 208-09, 259, 261.) The Court of Appeals rejected this argument as speculative, though it turned out to be correct. [4] In Timberlake, 753 N.E.2d at 604, we described the burden a party must establish for a claim of this type: When the claim of ineffective assistance is directed at appellate counsel for failing fully and properly to raise and support a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant faces a compound burden on postconviction. The postconviction court must conclude that appellate counsel's performance was deficient and that, but for the deficiency of appellate counsel, trial counsel's performance would have been found deficient and prejudicial. Thus, Timberlake's burden before the postconviction court was to establish the two elements of ineffective assistance of counsel separately as to both trial and appellate counsel. Id. (citing Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 261-62 (Ind.2000)). Of course, we review appellate counsel's effort in its totality when considering whether a defendant received constitutionally adequate assistance. Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at 194. The forty-three-page brief filed for McCary's appeal raised three major issues: sufficiency of the evidence, improper communication between the court and jury in McCary's absence, and ineffective assistance of counsel. (P-C.R. at 172-214.) Under the heading of ineffective assistance, appellate counsel argued that trial counsel was deficient in three respects: by (1) failing to conduct an adequate investigation, (2) failing to interview and call certain witnesses, and (3) failing to respond properly to the communications between the court and jury during jury deliberations. (P-C.R. at 286.) Appellate counsel also argued that another attorney specially appointed to represent McCary during a hearing on a pro se motion to correct error was ineffective. [5] (P-C.R. at 205, 289.) The heart of McCary's claim about his appellate lawyer is that counsel should not have raised the issue of trial counsel's ineffective assistance during the direct appeal because insufficient facts were available about Officer Murphy to make the claim. The brief from that appeal, however, contradicts this argument: Consideration of the affidavit for probable cause yields further concern with regard to witnesses who were not summoned. The affidavit states that an Officer Murphy who lives in the area heard the shots, came out of his home, and gave chase to the suspect, losing him in the area of 2800 North Gale. We know from McCary, Castle and Tamara Johnson that her address was 3053 North Olneynorth of 30th Street. We also know that McCary's flight began in the alley east of Sherman and just a few doors south of 30th Street, technically in the 2900 block. We also know that Aaron Blanche had been in the area, had a gun and turned up; shortly after the shooting, at LaToya Harrison's house at 2835 North Gale near the middle of the block where Officer Murphy was said to have lost the suspect he was chasing the area of 2800 Gale near 28th and Gale. The result of this analysis is the question Why didn't Murphy testify? His testimony, it would seem, would have made clear, when taken with other evidence that was heard by the jury, that it was improbable that the person Murphy saw was McCary and, at the same time, more probable than not that the person was Aaron Blanche, a man we know had a gun. On the record available here, we cannot know why Murphy did not testify nor why the matter was not raised on cross of the police witnesses with knowledge of this case. (Appellant's Br. at 6-7) (internal citations omitted). McCary's appellate lawyer thus had a fair amount of evidence available on Murphy's encounter. The record also demonstrated to McCary's appellate lawyer the considerable effort trial counsel made in pointing to Blanche as the perpetrator. For instance, the defense called Latoya Harrison, who lived near the site of the attempted murder. (T.R. at 424.) She testified that Blanche arrived on her doorstep that night, scared and covered with burrs as if he had just run through bushes or a field. (T.R. at 425-26.) Blanche used Harrison's telephone twice, and Blanche gave Harrison's friend a handgun to keep for him until he picked it up early the following morning. (T.R. at 426-29.) Thus, the only fact about Officer Murphy that was not available when the appellate lawyer chose to argue trial counsel's ineffective assistance was Officer Murphy's confirmation during the post-conviction proceedings that it was Blanche whom he had seen. This was, of course, a concrete piece of additional information. But even McCary's trial counsel, testifying with the benefit of hindsight during the post-conviction proceeding, thought it had so little probative value that he might not have called Officer Murphy even if he had known it was Blanche Officer Murphy had seen. [6] The post-conviction court found that appellate counsel's performance did not deprive McCary of effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. The facts in this record do not point unerringly to the opposite conclusion, the standard required for relief.