Opinion ID: 889185
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: factor three: rose's responses to the delay [4]

Text: ¶ 166 At the outset, I note the Court's assertion that [t]he State's response to the motions for delay indicates its desire to proceed to trial. Opinion, ¶ 62. As explained in Ariegwe, however, the critical question under Factor Three is whether the accused actually wanted to be brought to trial promptly. Ariegwe, ¶ 76 (emphasis added). The State's desire to proceed to trial has little, if any, relevance to this question. Rather, we must evaluate Rose's responses to the pretrial delays. See Ariegwe, ¶¶ 79-81. Conduct evidencing a desire to be brought to trial promptly weighs in Rose's favor, whereas conduct demonstrating a desire to avoid trial weighs against Rose in the overall balancing. See Ariegwe, ¶ 85. ¶ 167 Some of Rose's pretrial letters suggest ongoing frustration about the pace at which defense counsel was investigating and preparing the defense. Yet, many of Rose's actions (such as the repeated about-faces concerning Mansch's representation and the request for a psychological examination in spite of the fact that it would require a trial postponement) suggest that Rose was not overly concerned about the pretrial delays. Likewise, although Rose asserted his right to a speedy trial in a number of court filings beginning in late-February 2003, the sincerity of these assertions is questionable. See Opinion, ¶ 61 (referring to Rose's assertions as half-hearted). Considering the totality of Rose's conduct, I agree with the Court that Factor Three weighs in favor of the State.