Opinion ID: 166424
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion

Text: 28 When determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, we look to the totality of the circumstances to see whether the officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (further quotation omitted). It is important to note that many aspects of Ms. Bradford's behavior, standing alone, would be insufficient to establish reasonable, articulable suspicion. Some items motorists might possess must be outrightly dismissed as so innocent or susceptible to varying interpretations as to be innocuous, Wood, 106 F.3d at 946, including cellular telephones. Williams, 271 F.3d at 1269. Likewise, wrappers from fast food establishments strewn about a car may indicate slovenliness or the need to travel while eating, but do not by themselves indicate a driver smuggling contraband. See United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1138 (8th Cir.1998) (We also conclude that the mere presence of fast-food wrappers in the Buick is entirely consistent with innocent travel such that, in the absence of contradictory information, it cannot reasonably be said to give rise to suspicion of criminal activity.); Wood, 106 F.3d at 947 (holding suspicion associated with possession of fast-food trash is virtually nonexistent); Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 496 (3d Cir.1995) (noting fast food wrappers have become ubiquitous in modern interstate travel and do not serve to separate the suspicious from the innocent traveler). The mere fact that a rental car was procured in California does not make its driver a drug dealer. See Beck, 140 F.3d at 1132 (We do not think that the entire state of California, the most populous state in the union, can properly be deemed a source of illegal narcotics such that mere residency in that state constitutes a factor supporting reasonable suspicion.). Moreover, we have repeatedly emphasized that nervousness and its signs should not be overcounted in our analysis. Compare United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir.2000) (holding nervousness is of limited significance in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists) with United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir.2000) (noting extreme and continued nervousness is entitled to somewhat more weight) and Williams, 271 F.3d at 1269 (concluding that when nervousness exceeds that of the average citizen during a traffic stop, there is no reason . . . to ignore [a defendant's] nervousness in reviewing the totality of the circumstances.). 29 Nevertheless, even if each factor confronting Trooper Peech may have had an innocent explanation when standing alone, the totality of the circumstances compels the conclusion that Trooper Peech had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. As the district court noted, in addition to the cellular telephone, the luggage in the backseat, and the fast-food wrappers, Ms. Bradford exhibited numerous physical manifestations of fright, including perspiration, hard breathing, shaking, wringing of hands, splotchiness, nervous laughter, and a squeaky voice. Bradford, 290 F.Supp.2d at 1271. Her answers to basic questions were evasive and conflicting at best, and the story she told defied common sense, particularly the financial illogic of purchasing a series of one-way plane tickets and one-way car-rentals. She could not answer simple questions about where her grandmother lived in Cheyenne. She could not explain the timing discrepancies of her story, including her claim that she picked up the rental car at Los Angeles International Airport prior to a week-long family reunion even though the car's rental agreement reflected that it had been picked up only two days earlier. Finally, the passing vehicle displayed bold chase car behavior. We are confident in our conclusion that reasonable, articulable suspicion existed. 30