Opinion ID: 4678698
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Multiplicity of Counts One and Two

Text: Naidoo argues that Counts One and Two of the superseding indictment are multiplicitous as they charge possession of child pornography on overlapping dates.7 The Government responds by pointing out that, notwithstanding the overlap, Count One charged Naidoo with possession across a range of dates and argues that the evidence at trial showed that the pornography had been placed on the relevant devices at different dates. The 6 Naidoo attempts to raise this issue both as a standalone argument and as a separate challenge to his sentence. However, because the issue of multiplicity was only raised at sentencing and not in a pre-trial motion, Naidoo has only preserved a complaint about the multiplicity of his sentences rather than the multiplicity of the indictment. See United States v. Galvan, 949 F.2d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 1991). 7 In response to Naidoo’s multiplicity-based objection at sentencing, the district court stated that it did not see the issue as relevant to its Guidelines calculations and thus overruled the objection. 14 Case: 20-60730 Document: 00515827551 Page: 15 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 No. 20-60730 Government further contends that the relevant actus reus was Naidoo’s possession of two distinct SD cards charged in each count. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects individuals against multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V. An indictment is “multiplicitous,” and in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, “if it charges a single offense in separate counts.” United States v. Woerner, 709 F.3d 527, 538 (5th Cir. 2013). As relevant here, one type of multiplicity challenge may arise “when charges for multiple violations of the same statute are predicated on arguably the same criminal conduct.” Id. at 539. In such a case, we inquire “whether separate and distinct prohibited acts, made punishable by law, have been committed.” Id. (quoting United States v. Planck, 493 F.3d 501, 503 (5th Cir. 2007)). The relevant test has two steps: “[f]irst, we look to the statute charged to ascertain the ‘allowable unit of prosecution,’ or the actus reus of the crime.” Id. (quoting United States v. Reedy, 304 F.3d 358, 365 (5th Cir. 2002)). “Congress’s intent is paramount on this point: the legislature may castigate a particular act by exposing the actor to several prosecutions and punishments, or it may specify that the act should only be subject to a single unit of prosecution.” Id. at 539–40 (quoting United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 272 (1st Cir. 2012)). Second, we review “the evidence to see how many distinct criminal acts the defendant committed.” Id. at 540. We review a trial court’s rulings on multiplicity challenges de novo. Id. at 538. Turning to the allowable unit of prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), it must first be noted that the Government’s argument relies on caselaw analyzing an entirely distinct provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). We have indeed held that under § 2252A(a)(5)(B), which prohibits possession of “any” material containing images of child pornography, the allowable unit of prosecution is “each ‘material,’ or medium, containing an image of child pornography.” Id. at 540 (citing 15 Case: 20-60730 Document: 00515827551 Page: 16 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 No. 20-60730 Planck, 493 F.3d at 504). However, that is not the provision under which Naidoo was charged. Rather, he was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), which prohibits the possession of “1 or more” matters containing child pornography. This and other circuits have consistently held that § 2252(a)(4)(B)’s use of the phrase “1 or more” dictates that the simultaneous possession of multiple images of or matters containing child pornography constitutes a single violation of the statute.8 Put simply, each separate SD card containing offending images is not a distinct allowable unit of prosecution under § 2252(a)(4)(B). See Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 274–75 (“[T]he defendant may have possessed two ‘matters’ (i.e., two computers) that collectively contained thousands of images, but his simultaneous possession of ‘one or more’ matters transgressed the statute only once.”). The Government’s attempts to distinguish this clear precedent are unavailing. First, notwithstanding the range of dates included in Count One, both counts plainly alleged simultaneous possession of child pornography on or about July 10, 2017. Next, the separate acts of transferring images onto the 8 See United States v. Chilaca, 909 F.3d 289, 295 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We, like all other circuits that have considered the issue, interpret § 2252(a)(4)(B)’s use of the phrase ‘1 or more’ to mean that the simultaneous possession of different matters containing offending images at a single time and place constitutes a single violation of the statute.”); United States v. Emly, 747 F.3d 974, 979–80 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding three possession counts to be multiplicitous where defendant simultaneously possessed images on three separate devices); Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 276 (holding that “the defendant’s unlawful possession of a multitude of files on two interlinked computers located in separate rooms within the same dwelling gave rise to only a single count of unlawful possession under section 2252(a)(4)(B)”); United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 155 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that “Congress intended to subject a person who simultaneously possesses multiple . . . matter[s] containing a visual depiction of child pornography to only one conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)”); United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 730 (5th Cir. 1995) (analyzing predecessor statute and finding that similar language “indicate[d] that the legislature did not intend for this statute to be used to charge multiple offenses” where the defendant was alleged to have possessed multiple images on or about the same date). 16 Case: 20-60730 Document: 00515827551 Page: 17 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 No. 20-60730 SD cards do not constitute separate violations of the statute. We have held that multiplicitous convictions for possessing a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause “[i]f the record establishes that the defendant obtained the firearm and ammunition on different occasions.” United States v. Sanchez, 675 F. App’x 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2017). However, even assuming that the same rationale may apply in the § 2252(a)(4)(B) context, the Government cites no evidence that the pornography on the relevant devices was obtained at different times. And, as the Eighth Circuit has persuasively explained, the mere “act of copying or transferring files onto different devices in itself does not constitute an independent violation of the statute.” Emly, 747 F.3d at 979; see also Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 275 (“If a defendant had multiple photo albums of images in his bedroom and living room and periodically swapped images between them, two convictions—one for each album—would not stand.”). Indeed, in this case, the Government’s evidence revealed not only that both devices contained images that were also found on Naidoo’s HP laptop, but also that child pornography was accessed on both devices years before the November 2016 date relied on by the Government. Having concluded that Counts One and Two of the superseding indictment are multiplicitous, we turn to the appropriate remedy. As Naidoo’s terms of imprisonment and periods of supervised release for each count were ordered to run concurrently, our focus is on the monetary assessments Naidoo was ordered to pay per count. “Where it is clear that the dual convictions did not lead the district court to impose a harsher sentence,” we may simply modify the judgment to limit the monetary assessments paid rather than remanding for resentencing. See United States v. Boston, 186 F. App’x 504, 506–07 (5th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Thomas, 690 F.3d 358, 372 (5th Cir. 2012). In this case, the district court made clear that, regardless of any potential error in its rulings at sentencing—including its 17 Case: 20-60730 Document: 00515827551 Page: 18 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 No. 20-60730 rejection of Naidoo’s multiplicity-based challenge—it “would have imposed the identical sentence.” Accordingly, rather than remand for resentencing, we vacate Naidoo’s Count Two conviction and sentence and modify the district court’s judgment to impose only a $200 special assessment and a $10,000 assessment under the JVTA.