Opinion ID: 2994089
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Test Validity

Text: Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that Dr. Barrett’s testimony, if properly admitted, was insufficient to support a finding that the examination was job related. They contend that the 1994 test was not job related because it did not approximate the work situation. Plaintiffs cite Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), in which the Court held that, under Title VII, employment tests are forbidden which produce a disparate impact unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance. Id. at 436. Additionally, plaintiffs note that, in 1972, Congress realized that equal employment had been thwarted when employment was based on criteria unrelated to job performance and on discriminatory supervisory ratings, citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 449 n.10 (1982). From these two cases it can be seen that, if a facially neutral employment practice has a significant discriminatory impact, the employer bears the burden of demonstrating that any requirement of employment imposed has a manifest relationship to the particular employment. Griggs makes clear, however, that even employment tests with a disparate impact are acceptable if they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. It would be unrealistic to require more than a reasonable measure of job performance. It therefore is a matter of reasonableness, except in cases in which the plaintiff can show that the employer was using the practice as a mere pretext for discrimination. There is no claim, however, of employer pretext in the present case. As previously noted, an evaluation method may be shown to be job related under any one of three tests: criterion related, content validity, or construct validity. Gillespie v. State of Wisconsin, 771 F.2d 1035, 1040 (7th Cir. 1985). In the present case, the district court found that the test was content valid. In evaluating content validity, a court must consider (1) the degree to which the nature of the examination procedure approximates the job conditions; (2) whether the test measures abstract or concrete qualitites; and (3) the combination of these factors, i.e. [sic] whether the test attempts to measure an abstract trait with a test that fails to closely approximate the working situation. Id. at 1043. In the present case, the district court recognized the correct standard for determining content validity. After considering all of the evidence, the court determined that the 1994 examination measured a significant portion of the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary for a police lieutenant and, therefore, was content valid. Because this is a factual finding, we will affirm the decision of the district court unless it is clearly erroneous. Gillespie, 771 F.2d at 1042. The factual details we have already related about the development of the lieutenant test are enough to refute plaintiffs’ arguments. The record shows not only the knowledge, expertise, and experience of those involved in the test development, but also the preliminary use of peer review and pilot testing of each of its three parts. Officers of various police ranks and experience, including minorities, were consulted during the development of the process. It would be totally unjustified to fail to take note of those preliminary efforts and, considering our standard of review, to reverse the trial judge who had carefully considered and weighed all the evidence before coming to the conclusion of test validity. The standard to be applied is not simply whether minorities do well or not on a test. That is only the beginning. It is obviously not impossible to develop a useful and nondiscriminatory test.