Opinion ID: 2584655
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: Kansas Federal Court Decisions

Text: Our colleagues reference three unpublished federal district court decisions they find reinforcing to their viewpoint. Wildermuth v. Staton, 2002 WL 922137 (D.Kan. 2002) (unpublished opinion); Davis v. Management & Training Corp. Centers, 2001 WL 709380 (D.Kan.2001) (unpublished opinion); and Strahley v. Mercy Health Center of Manhattan, 2000 WL 1745291 (D.Kan.2000) (unpublished opinion). We find these decisions unpersuasive for two reasons. First, all three decisions use the majority opinion in Bates v. Hogg, 22 Kan.App.2d 702, 921 P.2d 249 (1996) as their center of gravity. They do this because Kansas state law governs evidentiary questions in federal diversity cases when those questions are closely intertwined with a state's substantive policy. Wildermuth, 2002 WL 922137, at  (agreeing that the collateral source doctrine is governed by Kansas law); Davis, 2001 WL 709380, at  (quoting Strahley and concurring that the collateral source doctrine is governed by Kansas law); and Strahley, 2000 WL 1745291, at  (stating: Application of the collateral source doctrine, while an evidentiary rule, is closely tied to state substantive policy, and thus is governed by Kansas law.). As noted above, given the lack of controlling authority from this court, Bates was seen by these federal courts as the next best case, even though our decision in Rose I expressly limited that two-judge majority opinion. Second, and as our colleagues noted, those federal decisions inaccurately predicted how this court would analyze the collateral source rule questions presented because this court has now rejected the federal result. As to Wildermuth specifically, we also note this court expressly rejects its conclusion that the cash amount paid to satisfy the medical bills should be deemed the reasonable value of those services. But in addition, we find Wildermuth 's reference to the Kansas collateral source rule as being limited to amounts actually paid on plaintiff's behalf ignores case law from this court dating back to 1906 applying the rule to gratuitous services benefiting plaintiff. See Lewark, 73 Kan. at 555-56, 85 P. 601. Accordingly, we find little in the federal case law referenced by our colleagues that informs our decision any better than a review of our court's own case law as previously discussed.