Opinion ID: 1296921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: charge on lesser included offenses

Text: White next asserts the trial court erred in refusing to charge on the lesser-included offenses of second- and third-degree burglary. Essentially, he claims that since the hotel was a building the jury could have found he committed second or third-degree, rather than first-degree burglary. We disagree. Pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 16-11-312(B)(Supp.2001), a person is guilty of second-degree burglary if he enters a building without consent and with intent to commit a crime therein, and ... [t]he entering or remaining occurs in the nighttime. [5] White asserts that since a dwelling is also a building, he was entitled to a second-degree burglary charge. We disagree. We specifically rejected this contention in State v. Goldenbaum, 294 S.C. 455, 365 S.E.2d 731 (1988)(where victim's apartment was a dwelling, there was no evidence from which the jury could have inferred defendant was guilty of second- or third-degree burglary). See also State v. Berntsen, 295 S.C. 52, 367 S.E.2d 152 (1988)(lesser degrees of burglary need not be submitted to the jury when there is uncontroverted evidence that the structure entered was a dwelling). Finally, we find the trial court properly held the motel room in question was being used as a dwelling under S.C.Code Ann. §§ 16-11-10 and 16-11-310 (dwelling is defined to include any building in which there sleeps a tenant or person who lodges there with a view to the protection of property; for purposes of burglary statute, dwelling also means living quarters of a building used or normally used for sleeping, living, or lodging by a person). Accord State v. Hobgood, 112 N.C.App. 262, 434 S.E.2d 881 (1993)(motel room regularly and usually occupied by travelers for the purpose of sleeping is considered a sleeping apartment). See also State v. Hussain, 189 Ariz. 336, 942 P.2d 1168 (App.1997)(motel room qualifies as a residential structure within burglary statute); People v. Fleetwood, 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 217 Cal.Rptr. 612 (1985)(historically and traditionally, hotel rooms have been included within the definition of dwelling house); Commonwealth v. Correia, 17 Mass.App. Ct. 233, 457 N.E.2d 648 (Mass.1983)(motel constituted a dwelling house within purview of statute prohibiting breaking and entering a dwelling house in the nighttime). See also 3 Wharton's Criminal Law § 335, at 208 (1980) (rooms of an inn, hotel, or lodging house regarded as dwelling house). Further, as noted above, the fact that the dwelling was temporarily unoccupied is irrelevant in light of the fact that the occupant intended to return. State v. Ferebee, supra . See also State v. Steadman, 257 S.C. 528, 186 S.E.2d 712 (1972)(upholding jury charge to the effect that it is not necessary entire building be devoted to dwelling purposes, nor that the dwelling area entered be constantly inhabited). Here, given that the motel room was a dwelling as a matter of law, the trial court did not err in refusing the request to charge second-degree burglary. State v. Goldenbaum, supra ; State v. Berntsen, supra . AFFIRMED. MOORE, A.C.J., BURNETT, PLEICONES, JJ., and Acting Justice GEORGE T. GREGORY, JR., concur.