Opinion ID: 203446
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence as to RICO and VICAR

Text: Convictions Brandao disputes the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial to support each charge of conviction. We review the record de novo and affirm the jury's conclusions if we conclude, after looking at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and taking all reasonable inferences in its favor, that a rational fact finder could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecution successfully proved the essential elements of the crime. United States v. Connolly, 341 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Boulerice, 325 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 2003). Our inquiry pays considerable deference to a jury's assessment of the evidence, and we will reverse only if the verdict is irrational. Connolly, 341 F.3d at 22.
For a defendant to be convicted of a substantive RICO violation, the government must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the existence of an enterprise (2) that affected interstate commerce; and (3) that the defendant was associated with the enterprise; (4) and conducted or participated in the conduct of the enterprise; (5) through a pattern of -12- racketeering activity. Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 31; United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 33 (1st Cir. 2002). The first two elements are not contested. Indeed, in an earlier appeal, this court affirmed jury verdicts that Stonehurst constituted an enterprise and was one that affected interstate commerce. See Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 45; see also United States v. Patrick, 248 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) (youth street gang in Boston was RICO enterprise). Brandao's appeal from RICO convictions focuses on the details of his involvement with Stonehurst in three respects. First, he argues that the government presented insufficient evidence that he was associated with Stonehurst at any time before the Dinho Fernandes murder. Specifically, there was insufficient evidence Brandao had sufficient knowledge there was a Stonehurst gang or that his cousin, Monteiro, was a member of the gang, in order for him to have been associated with Stonehurst at the time of Fernandes's murder. He concedes the evidence supports an inference that Brandao knew his cousin had a propensity to commit violent crimes, but not that Monteiro's criminality was part of his gang affiliation with Stonehurst. Second, he argues the evidence did not support the jury's finding that the Fernandes murder was a purpose or affair of the Stonehurst gang, as opposed to a purely personal dispute. -13- Third, Brandao argues that the evidence does not support the conclusion that the Dinho Fernandes and Alcides Depina shootings constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. a. Association2 -- In order to establish a substantive RICO violation, the prosecution had to prove that Brandao was associated with Stonehurst at the time that he committed the predicate racketeering acts. The murder of Fernandes is the predicate act which concerns us. The government does not contend that Brandao was associated with Stonehurst before March 17, 1999, but that he became associated with it by his actions that day. The evidence of defendant's association with Stonehurst after Fernandes was killed for the remaining shootings which are predicate acts cannot be seriously questioned. Some knowledge of the enterprise is necessary as part of the requirement of showing association with the enterprise. The RICO net is woven tightly to trap even the smallest fish, those peripherally involved with the enterprise. Marino, 277 F.3d at 33 2 There is no claim the jury was not properly instructed. The jury instruction here was: A person is associated with an enterprise if he knowingly participates, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise. One need not have an official position in the enterprise to be associated with it. One need not formally align himself with an enterprise to associate with it. Association may be by means of an informal or a loose relationship. Mere presence, however, is not enough. The requirement of association with the enterprise is not strict. -14- (quoting United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir. 1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The RICO statute seeks to encompass those people who are 'merely associated with' the enterprise. Id. (quoting Elliott, 571 F.2d at 903). As we held in Marino, [t]he defendant need only be 'aware of at least the general existence of the enterprise named in the indictment,' id. (quoting United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 1993)), and know about its related activities, id. (quoting United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 394 (5th Cir. 1981). As the Fifth Circuit noted some time ago, the point of making the government show that the defendants have some knowledge of the nature of the enterprises is to avoid an unjust association of the defendant with the crimes of others. United States v. Manzella, 782 F.2d 533, 538 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Elliott, 571 F.2d at 903. In essence, Brandao's claim is that the prosecution failed to introduce any direct evidence that Brandao knew his cousin Monteiro was a member of Stonehurst or even what Stonehurst was. Absent such direct evidence, Brandao argues, the inferences of knowledge from the other evidence are equally balanced and cannot constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Morillo, 158 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1998) ([W]here an equal or nearly equal theory of guilt and a theory of innocence is supported by the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the -15- prosecution, 'a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt.' (quoting United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 323 (1st Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). We conclude a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Brandao had the requisite knowledge, and that the inferences were far from equally balanced. Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 47. Brandao makes much of the fact that no direct testimony at trial explicitly named Brandao as the party who paged Monteiro at the gas station on the afternoon of the Fernandes murder. The argument is not a strong one. Even if some individual other than Brandao actually spoke with Monteiro on the phone, it is uncontested that as a result of that conversation, Monteiro went to Brockton to help a cousin of his, and that they went to the home of Brandao, a cousin of Monteiro's. They did not go to the home of Barros, whom defendant argues paged Monteiro. Brandao and Monteiro acted together. Brandao joined his cousin Monteiro at Brandao's home in a Honda, and then led Monteiro's car to the intended victims, where Brandao pointed out the victims. The two cars returned to Brandao's home, then back toward where the victims were. Before reaching the victims, the two cars stopped, and Brandao got out and handed the murder weapon to his cousin Monteiro. Brandao returned to his home. After the shooting, Monteiro returned to Brandao's home and left the home unarmed. This is very strong evidence that Brandao instigated -16- Monteiro's trip, and the purpose of the trip was to murder Fernandes. As Brandao concedes, the jury had ample cause to find that Brandao knew that Monteiro was prone to commit violent crimes. Brandao did not object or pose any questions when Monteiro brought two other men along to assist in the shooting. The very lack of a need for communication between Brandao and his three fellow gang members is strong evidence of familiarity and common purposes. That evidence alone, however, might not be sufficient itself to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Brandao knew that his cousin was a member of Stonehurst, and that by enlisting Monteiro, Brandao was enlisting Stonehurst, the RICO enterprise. On all of the evidence, a jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Brandao knew that Monteiro, Lopes, and Rodrigues belonged to the Stonehurst group, and that their group regularly engaged in shootings of rival gang members. Monteiro and Lopes were gang leaders; leaders are frequently known by name. The murder of Bobby Mendes and the ensuing conflict between Stonehurst and Wendover affected many members of Boston's Cape Verdean community. Further, Brandao was a cousin to the DeSoto brothers, who were embroiled in a separate dispute with a prominent member of Wendover. Ironically, another of Brandao's cousins, Gelson Brandao, was known to associate with Wendover and was targeted by Stonehurst members, further supporting the inference of Brandao's -17- knowledge of the two gangs and who was a member of which. The victim was a member of the Cape Verdean community, as was Brandao. That makes it unlikely Brandao did not know of Stonehurst or Monteiro's association with it. Brandao argues he lived in Brockton and not in the geographic center of the Stonehurst and Wendover groups, which was in the Dorchester and Roxbury neighborhoods of Boston. But the jury heard evidence that Gus Lopes and other Stonehurst members repeatedly traveled to Brockton on missions in search of rivals to shoot. The evidence of knowledge goes well beyond the fact that Brandao may have known of Monteiro's relationship with Stonehurst merely because they were cousins. It is unlikely that when commissioning a shooting by his cousin, Brandao was unaware Monteiro's expertise in shooting people came from his being a Stonehurst member. The jury could also reach its conclusion based on the fact that the gun used to kill Fernandes was a gun which had been used in earlier Stonehurst shootings, and that Brandao had the gun. At trial, Gus Lopes testified that he recognized the gun when Brandao handed it to Monteiro. In fact, Lopes knew the gun to be one that had been used in at least two previous Stonehurst shootings. Police later found the same gun during a search incident to the arrest of Stonehurst member Jackson Nascimento. -18- The jury could reasonably infer that this network of personal and family ties and the possession of a gang gun would put Brandao on notice of Stonehurst's general existence and related activities. b. Relationship of Fernandes Shooting to Stonehurst -- Brandao argues that the prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence of relatedness between the Fernandes murder and Stonehurst's purposes or affairs to be through a pattern of racketeering activities. The prosecution must prove Brandao participated in Stonehurst's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The statute's use of the word through implies a nexus between these racketeering acts and the enterprise. Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 45. A sufficient nexus or relationship exists between the racketeering acts and the enterprise if the defendant was able to commit the predicate acts by means of, by consequence of, by reason of, by the agency of, or by the instrumentality of his association with the enterprise. Marino, 277 F.3d at 27. The jury could reasonably find that the evidence in this case fulfills the test. Brandao did not himself fire the shots which killed Fernandes. Instead, he sought the assistance of three members of Stonehurst who were well-rehearsed in the techniques of drive-by shootings. Brandao quite literally conspired to kill -19- Fernandes by the agency of and by the instrumentality of his association with three members of Stonehurst. If that were not enough, the nexus or relationship test may be met by proof that the resources, property, or facilities of the enterprise are used by the defendant to commit the predicate acts. Id. at 28. The gun used to kill Fernandes was such a resource. The gun that killed Fernandes passed from the ownership and control of Stonehurst members to Brandao and back again. Evidence that a gun shared amongst Stonehurst members killed Fernandes could permit a rational jury to find a relationship between the shooting and Stonehurst itself. Brandao mounts a similar attack based on the third element of RICO culpability requiring that a defendant participate in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs. Brandao cites Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993), for the proposition that liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) depends on showing that the defendants conducted or participated in the conduct of the 'enterprise's affairs,' not just their own affairs. Id. at 185. Brandao interprets this language as foreclosing RICO liability for predicate acts undertaken for personal motivations. The argument takes Reves out of context. At issue in Reves was the liability of an outside accounting firm with a mere contractual relationship with the corrupt enterprise. See id. at 186. Cases involving outsiders to the enterprise as defendants -20- are different from those involving insiders as defendants. United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1298-99 (1st Cir. 1996). Insiders -- those who are integral to carrying out the enterprise's racketeering activities -- by definition participate in the conduct of the enterprise. Id. at 1299. The jury in this case heard evidence that the Fernandes shooting was related to Stonehurst's affairs. The criminal enterprise here had particularly malleable purposes. The indictment defined that purpose in part as being to shoot and kill other people with whom members and associates of [Stonehurst] were engaged in violent or drug-related disputes. The jury rationally could have concluded that the purpose of the murder of Fernandes was to kill someone with whom an associate of Stonehurst had a violent dispute. When asked why he participated in the Fernandes shooting, Gus Lopes testified, Because Manny was my boy, and that's his cousin, and I'm going to help Manny with whatever problem he's got. The jury could have interpreted this statement as a simple expression of personal loyalty, but also could have concluded otherwise. The other evidence supported an inference that Lopes was motivated by a desire for a quid pro quo that would benefit Stonehurst's interests and further the campaign against Wendover. Marcelino Rodrigues, a Stonehurst member who was incarcerated in mid-1999, testified that Gus Lopes visited him in prison and told -21- him about his new acquaintance, Angelo Brandao. Lopes told Rodrigues that they both did favors for each other, with Lopes operating in Boston and Brandao reciprocating in Brockton. That testimony was consistent with Lopes's assertion that Brandao became part of Stonehurst on the occasion of the Fernandes shooting. c. Pattern of Racketeering Activity -- Brandao next argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence of a pattern of racketeering activity on his part. A RICO conviction requires proof of at least two acts of racketeering activity over a period of ten years.3 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). More than numbers are required to establish a pattern of racketeering acts. It is not the number of predicates but the relationship that they bear to each other or to some external organizing principle that renders them a pattern. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238 (1989). Thus, two or more racketeering predicates constitute a pattern if they are (1) related and (2) amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. Id. at 239. The relatedness prong may be satisfied by proof that the predicate acts have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are 3 There must have been at least two predicate acts in order to make out a pattern under RICO. See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237 (1989); United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 88 (1st Cir. 2004). -22- interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. Id. at 240 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (repealed 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The standard is intentionally flexible, id. at 238, and will take into account the nature of the enterprise. [A] criminal enterprise is more, not less, dangerous if it is versatile, flexible, diverse in its objectives and capabilities. Versatility, flexibility, and diversity are not inconsistent with pattern. United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1367 (7th Cir. 1991). Stonehurst was a criminal enterprise with purposes broad enough to include shooting antagonists of the Stonehurst members as a preferred method of resolving conflict. The jury could have reasonably concluded that Brandao and Manuel Lopes targeted Alcides Depina for his perceived loyalties, however attenuated, to members of Wendover. In addition, both the Fernandes and Depina shootings shared distinguishing characteristics common to Stonehurst. Three prominent members of the gang assisted Brandao in killing Fernandes, while another member accompanied Brandao on the attack against Depina. Each of those shootings involved guns shared by Stonehurst members and implicated in multiple gang-related shootings. Both incidents involved drive-by shootings characteristic of Stonehurst's missions to hunt and kill Wendover rivals. -23- Brandao argues, in essence, that the Fernandes and Depina shootings cannot form a pattern because they were not directly related to each other. This argument misses the mark. Whether Brandao's motivations for conspiring to kill Dinho Fernandes and assisting in the assault on Alcides Depina were the same, whether identical Stonehurst members accompanied Brandao on both outings, and whether the same gun or car were used in each attack are not dispositive. Rather, the attacks' relatedness to Stonehurst, its purposes, its members, and its methods provides the external organizing principle behind both acts. Likewise, there was sufficient evidence for a finding that Brandao's participation with Stonehurst posed a threat of continued criminal activity. [T]he threat of continuity may be established by showing that the predicate acts or offenses are part of an ongoing entity's regular way of doing business. Thus, the threat of continuity is sufficiently established where the predicates can be attributed to a defendant operating as part of a long-term association that exists for criminal purposes. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242-43. Here, Stonehurst engaged in a long-term campaign of violence aimed at killing members of Wendover and other enemies of Stonehurst members. Once Brandao joined the group, he met with Stonehurst members several times a week with the aim of helping [them] with shootings. The jury found that Brandao participated in the Depina shooting and heard evidence that he participated in -24- the Dias shooting, acts for which Brandao's only motivation was his relationship with Stonehurst. Once Brandao associated with the enterprise, his violent activity would continue as long as that association continued.
Brandao argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the RICO conspiracy conviction for all of the reasons given above that the substantive RICO conviction must be vacated. Those arguments fail, as does the argument that there was no agreement to join the RICO conspiracy, as we have just held.
Brandao alleges there was insufficient evidence to show, under the second VICAR count, that his shooting of Alcides Depina, on May 14, 1999, was motivated by a purpose of maintaining or increasing his position in Stonehurst. VICAR prohibits assault with a dangerous weapon for the purpose of . . . maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a). This circuit has defined the motive requirement in VICAR as a general one, satisfied by proof either that the crime was committed in furtherance of defendant's membership in the enterprise or because it was expected of him by reason of his membership. United States v. Tse, 135 F.3d 200, 206 (1st Cir. 1998); accord Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 47. In light of the congressional purpose -25- in VICAR of curtailing violent activity associated with racketeering enterprises, we rejected a reading that the government must prove this was the sole purpose. Tse, 135 F.3d at 206. The government argues there was a basis in the evidence for the jury to find either that the crime was committed in furtherance of Brandao's membership or that it was expected by him by reason of his membership. The defendant argues that his motive was personal, and not gang affiliated. He says Depina was not an enemy of Stonehurst, and Depina was shot as a result of Brandao's relationship with DeSoto, which led to Brandao's dispute with Gomes, which led to the shooting. Brandao cites to two cases holding there can be no VICAR liability for purely personal matters. United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 85 (2nd Cir. 2004); United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 818 (2nd Cir. 1994). But those cases are inapposite, involving vastly different facts. This question of motive under VICAR was for the jury to resolve. The jury had sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that a general motive was that Brandao did what he did, in large part or even solely, to improve his standing or because it was expected of him in Stonehurst or both. By the time of the Depina shooting in May of 1999, Brandao had, a jury could find, been a member of Stonehurst for just two months and, anxious to earn his spurs, he had been helping with shootings. Soon after Lopes, the gang leader, told Brandao about problems with Gomes and Dias, -26- Brandao was out with other gang members shooting at Depina, using a gun and a car previously used in gang shootings. A jury could easily conclude that Brandao did so to impress and further ingratiate himself with the gang leader.