Opinion ID: 2100511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: willful violation.

Text: On September 23, 2004, the Fayette Circuit Court concluded that the LFUCG did not violate the Open Records Act. The Act provides, in pertinent part: Any person who prevails against any agency in any action in the courts regarding a violation of KRS 61.870 to 61.884 may, upon a finding that the records were willfully withheld in violation of KRS 61.870 to 61.884, be awarded costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred in connection with the legal action.... In addition, it shall be within the discretion of the court to award the person an amount not to exceed twenty-five dollars ($25) for each day that he was denied the right to inspect or copy said public record. KRS 61.882(5). A public agency's mere refusal to furnish records based on a good faith claim of a statutory exemption, which is later determined to be incorrect, is insufficient to establish a willful violation of the Act. See Blair v. Hendricks, 30 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Ky.App.2000), overruled on other grounds by Lang v. Sapp, 71 S.W.3d 133, 135-36 (Ky.App.2002). In other words, a technical violation of the Act is not enough; the existence of bad faith is required. The trial court's decision on the issue of willfulness is a finding of fact and, as such, will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. CR 52.01; Weiand v. Bd. of Tr. of Ky. Ret. Sys., 25 S.W.3d 88, 92 (Ky.2000); Lawson v. Loid, 896 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Ky.1995). Appellant's claim of willful violation is based on the LFUCG's denials of his requests for records related to Donald Adams before the trial court ordered the disclosure of such records. On November 3, 1999, the LFUCG agreed to release Donald Adams's records to Appellant, but withheld records generated after April 9, 1990, claiming that such records were part of an ongoing investigation. Appellant continued to make requests for records pertaining to Adams, and his action in the Fayette Circuit Court followed when the LFUCG continued to claim the ongoing-investigation exemption. On May 11, 2001, the Fayette Circuit Court ordered the LFUCG to provide Appellant with all LPD records pertaining to Donald Adams generated between April 10, 1991, and April 10, 1996, and to provide the court with all records generated after April 10, 1996, for in camera inspection. After the entry of this order, the LFUCG discontinued its claim to the ongoing-investigation exemption for the records generated after April 10, 1996, and provided Appellant with all records in its possession relating to Adams, with the exception of eight files, which it provided to the court for in camera review of its claim of exemption. Appellant argues that the LFUCG's abandonment of its claim to the ongoing-investigation exemption after the trial court ordered it to produce for in camera inspection all records generated after April 10, 1996, reveals that the LFUCG's reliance on this exemption was a sham. We disagree. The following public records are excluded from the application of KRS 61.870 to KRS 61.884 and shall be subject to inspection only upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction . . . ... (h) Records of law enforcement agencies... that were compiled in the process of detecting and investigating statutory or regulatory violations if the disclosure of the information would harm the agency... by premature release of information to be used in a prospective law enforcement action .... Unless exempted by other provisions of KRS 61.870 to KRS 61.884, public records exempted under this provision shall be open after enforcement action is completed or a decision is made to take no action .... KRS 61.878(1). We also note that the Open Records Act contemplates exemptions otherwise provided by law, KRS 61.878, including the following: Intelligence and investigative reports maintained by criminal justice agencies are subject to public inspection if prosecution is completed or a determination not to prosecute has been made. However, portions of the records may be withheld from inspection if the inspection would disclose: ... (d) Information contained in the records to be used in a prospective law enforcement action. KRS 17.150(2). The LFUCG's initial denials of Appellant's request were based on a memorandum issued by the LPD, which concluded after a review of the LPD's intelligence files that release of the requested information would impair an ongoing investigation. The LFUCG relied on this memorandum to claim the exemption provided in KRS 17.150(2)(d) and 61.878(1)(h). The LFUCG abandoned its claim to the exemption only after receiving a second memorandum, over a year and a half after the first, which stated that after engaging in a preliminary investigation of Adams, the LPD had decided not to commence a formal investigation due to a lack of credible information. Given the passage of time between the two memoranda, this statement is plausible. Thus, even if the trial court concluded that the LFUCG's claim to the ongoing investigation was incorrect, there was no evidence whatsoever to indicate that the claim was in bad faith. We hold that the trial court's finding that the LFUCG did not willfully violate the Open Records Act was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the decision of the Fayette Circuit Court is AFFIRMED. LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES, JOHNSTONE, SCOTT, and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., sitting. All concur.