Opinion ID: 1366794
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of Section 2-1(b) of the Kenai City Charter

Text: In his pro se complaint and ex parte request for a Writ of Mandate, Peloza challenges the three-year residency requirement imposed by Section 2-1(b) on the grounds that it denied him equal protection of law by impermissibly burdening his right to seek and hold public office, it unconstitutionally burdened his right of travel, [3] and it unconstitutionally limited the ability of voters to participate in the electoral process. Freas advanced two interests in support of the City of Kenai's three-year residency requirement: 1) to allow the candidate sufficient exposure to the constituents to allow them to judge the candidate's character, knowledge and reputation; and 2) to ensure that council members are sufficiently familiar with the community which they are to govern. Although Peloza's pleadings and briefs emphasize violations of the United States Constitution, [4] we believe it appropriate to analyze Section 2-1(b) of the Kenai City Charter under the more demanding state equal rights provision, Article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution. [5] The federal equal protection clause requires only rational-basis scrutiny of a law like this one. See MacDonald v. City of Henderson, 818 F. Supp. 303, 305-06 (D.Nev. 1993) (surveying federal cases). Alaska's equal rights clause, in contrast, requires much greater scrutiny. See Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984). Alaska law analyzes alleged violations of the equal rights clause using a sliding scale. When fundamental rights or constitutionally suspect classifications are involved, we employ heightened scrutiny. The rigor of the scrutiny determines what the government must show: As the level of scrutiny selected is higher on the [sliding] scale, we require that the asserted governmental interests be relatively more compelling and that the legislation's means-to-ends fit be correspondingly closer. On the other hand, if relaxed scrutiny is indicated, less important governmental objectives will suffice and a greater degree of over/or underinclusiveness in the means-to-ends fit will be tolerated. State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1193 (Alaska 1983). [6] Peloza's appeal raises a question of first impression: whether a three-year residency requirement for local office is constitutional under the equal protection clause of Alaska's Constitution. Neither Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131 (Alaska 1974), nor Castner v. City of Homer, 598 P.2d 953 (Alaska 1979), directly answers that question. In Gilbert, we addressed a challenge to the constitutionality of Article II, section 2 of the Alaska Constitution and AS 15.25.030, which together conditioned eligibility for candidacy to statewide legislative office upon three years of residency in the state and one year in the election district. After analysis of federal cases and our own authority, we concluded that the residency requirements of Article II, Section 2 of the Alaska Constitution should be viewed with strict judicial scrutiny. Gilbert, 526 P.2d at 1134. We further concluded that the state had shown two compelling interests: First, the requirements are necessary to permit exposure of the candidate to his prospective constituents so they may judge his character, knowledge and reputation. Second, they are needed to ensure that legislators are familiar with the diverse character of the state where they will participate in the lawmaking process. Id. at 1134 (emphasis added). Castner presented us with a challenge to the constitutionality of Homer City Code Section 3-200.2, which imposed a one-year durational residency requirement for candidacy for city office. We assumed, without deciding, that the right to seek elective public office should be treated as fundamental and subject to strict scrutiny. Castner, 598 P.2d at 955. In affirming the superior court's decision upholding the constitutionality of the one-year durational residency requirement for candidacy for city office in Homer, we said, There is sufficient authority from other jurisdictions either to uphold or to strike down the one year durational residency requirement in the case at bar. In general, the weight of authority is against longer durational residency requirements for local offices, but the authorities are fairly evenly divided on the constitutionality of a one year residency requirement. The courts validating a one year durational residency requirement have found compelling the interests of affording greater voter knowledge of candidates and greater candidate knowledge of the needs of the constituency, as we did in Gilbert v. State. Id. at 955-56 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). In the present case, given the importance of the right to seek elective public office, the right to both interstate and intrastate travel, and the right of qualified voters to cast their votes effectively, we conclude that the three-year durational residency requirement for candidacy for city office in Kenai should be subjected to rigorous scrutiny under the sliding scale we employ under the equal rights clause of the state constitution. [7] As noted above, when it is determined that a high level of scrutiny is considered appropriate we require that the asserted governmental interests be relatively more compelling and that the legislation's means-to-ends fit be correspondingly closer. State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1193 (Alaska 1983). Application of this test to the three-year durational residency requirement for candidacy for local office leads us to the conclusion that the Kenai Charter provision violates the equal rights clause of the Alaska Constitution. We are not persuaded that ensuring familiarity between the electorate and candidates in a local election is sufficiently compelling to outweigh the significant burden the charter provision places on the fundamental rights at stake. And the longer the candidate has been in the community, the weaker the means-ends fit becomes. Three years is an unacceptably long time to burden the right of local voters to make their own decisions. [8]