Opinion ID: 1367800
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Kaapu's Standing to Challenge the ATDC's Selection of ATA as Developer of the Complex

Text: Kaapu asserts that the ATDC illegally selected ATA as the entity with which it would negotiate the terms of a long-term development of the complex because: (1) the selection mechanism utilized by the ATDC ( i.e., the RFP), in accordance with ATDC Rule 15-26-42, violated the draw or bid for the lease requirement of HRS § 206J-11 in its pre-amended form; [17] and (2) any effort to invoke retroactively the apply for such lease provision of HRS § 206J-11, as amended, would constitute an illegal divesting of Kaapu's property rights. Inasmuch as we agree with the circuit court that Kaapu lacks standing as a matter of law to challenge the ATDC's selection of ATA as the developer of the complex, we need not reach either of these issues. HRS chapter 206J is devoid of the kind of private attorney general provision that is contained in HRS § 92-12. Accordingly, the standard rules governing standing to sue apply to Kaapu's HRS ch. 206J claim. In this regard, the crucial inquiry... is `whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of... [the court's] jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf.' Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 592, 837 P.2d 1247, 1257, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1277, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, 61 U.S.L.W. 3500 (1992) (quoting Hawaii's Thousand Friends, 70 Haw. at 281, 768 P.2d at 1298 (citations omitted)). Kaapu claims that he has standing to sue because he has suffered a financial and cultural loss as a result of the ATDC's allegedly illegal action. Kaapu's opening brief at 9. Insofar as his claim of standing is based on an alleged cultural loss, Kaapu is purporting, at least to that extent, to be suing as a member of the public. See id. at 593, 837 P.2d at 1257. Yet, as we have noted, Kaapu has from the inception asserted his claims in his individual capacity only; neither his original nor his second amended complaint alleged that he represented any class, group, entity, or individual. Assuming arguendo, however, that Kaapu is suing in part in the public interest, we have held that `a member of the public has standing to sue to enforce the rights of the public generally, if he can show that he has suffered an injury in fact, and that the concerns of a multiplicity of suits are satisfied by any means, including a class action.' Id. at 593, 837 P.2d at 1257-58 (quoting Akau v. Olohana Corp., 65 Haw. 383, 388-89, 652 P.2d 1130, 1134 (1982)). A plaintiff has suffered injury in fact when (1) he or she has suffered an actual or threatened injury as a result of the defendant's wrongful conduct, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's actions, and (3) a favorable decision would likely provide relief for the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 593, 837 P.2d at 1258; see also Hawaii's Thousand Friends, 70 Haw. at 283, 768 P.2d at 1299; Akau, 65 Haw. at 389, 652 P.2d at 1134-35. The Kaapu affidavit alleges that, for historical and genealogical reasons, the geographic area encompassing the complex is of cultural significance to Kaapu. The Kaapu affidavit also alleges that the ATDC's nondisclosure of the rival development proposals impaired his economic interests as an affiliate of one of the competing developers, The Hawaiian Waterfront Connection Consortium (the Consortium). Assuming that these allegations create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Kaapu has suffered an actual or threatened injury, the record before us is devoid of both a causal connection between the alleged injury and the ATDC's use of the RFP procedure and any showing that the alleged injury is likely to be remedied by a favorable judicial decision. See Hawaii's Thousand Friends, 70 Haw. at 283, 768 P.2d at 1299. Whether or not the ATDC utilized an RFP or competitive bidding system, Kaapu was accorded a full and fair opportunity to promote the merits of the Consortium's development proposal at the public meeting, an opportunity of which Kaapu declined to take advantage. Moreover, there has been no showing that a draw or bid procedure would have protected Kaapu's interests at the public meeting to a greater extent than the RFP system actually utilized. Kaapu claims that the failure to release the development proposals denied him the right to give informed testimony at the public meeting. Yet a draw or bid system would have had no more utility to Kaapu than the RFP procedure inasmuch as the consummation of a long-term lease was not the subject of the public meeting, the only business before the ATDC at that time being the selection of a developer with which to enter into a development agreement based on the merits of the various development proposals. In this connection, Kaapu does not dispute that he had full knowledge of the Consortium's proposal. Finally, even if the lease application terms of HRS § 206J-11, as amended, cannot govern the ultimate negotiation of a long-term lease of the complex  an issue we need not reach in this appeal  the fact remains that no long-term lease has been executed, and there is no certainty that ATA will ever become the developer of the complex; thus, any purported challenge of a consummated long-term lease would not be ripe for adjudication at this time. For the reasons set forth above, we hold as a matter of law that Kaapu has suffered no injury in fact and that he therefore lacks standing to challenge the ATDC's selection of a developer as a result of the public meeting.