Opinion ID: 256955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 18 We have noted already that we are dealing with a case in which a labor union, in its capacity as an employer, is charged with unfair labor practices. In this connection, the Supreme Court has made it clear that 'when a labor union takes on the role of employer the Act applies to its operations just as it would to any other employer.' Office Employees International Union, Local No. 11 AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 353 U.S. 313, 316, 77 S.Ct. 799, 1 L.Ed.2d 846 (1957). In the instant case the Board, following its own precedent, Oregon Teamsters' Security Plan Office, 119 N.L.R.B. 207, 208 (1957), asserted jurisdiction over Local 11 because it was an integral part of a multi-state and non-retail enterprise (the International) which had an annual direct inflow or outflow exceeding $50,000. Siemons Mailing Service, 122 N.L.R.B. 81, 85 (1958); cf. Office Employees International Union, Local No. 11 AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., supra, at p. 315, 77 S.Ct. 799, 1 L.Ed.2d 846; see also The T. H. Rogers Lumber Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1732, 1735 (1957). 19 Local 11 argues that the Board erred in categorizing it as part of a nonretail enterprise since its members work almost entirely in retail establishments. But, the short answer to this is that the union, to which the inflow-outflow tests are applied, is not itself in the retail 'business' although it may be servicing enterprises that are. Concededly unions are not, strictly speaking, either 'retail' or 'non-retail' as those terms are ordinarily used, and it might be wise to give uniions a separate classification. Meanwhile the Board's application of nonretail discretionary standards to this union is not unreasonable, and we perceive no considerations which compel this Court to resist it. 20 Local 11 makes the interesting point, that if the Board relies upon the fact of affiliation with an International to justify its assertion of jurisdiction over locals it will place a premium on non-affiliation. This question involving the wisdom of the Board's policy is more appropriately addressed to the Board than to a reviewing court. The issue before this Court is whether the Board has statutory jurisdiction in this particular case, and in the light of the Board's determination of this issue and the reasons assigned by it for its exercise of jurisdiction we cannot say that it violated any statutory mandate. Its assertion of jurisdiction in this instance resulted from its 'experience, appreciation of the complexities of the problem (and) realization of the statutory policy   ' Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1583, 1760, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947). We should not set ourselves against reasonable standards set up by the Board. See Friendly, the Federal Administrative Agencies; The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 H.L.Rev. 863, 891-903 (1962). In this instance we conclude that the Board correctly found that Local 11's affairs were subject to the active control of the International in several respects; and that he International's intervention in the Local 11-Local 153 dispute helped to provoke the unfair labor practices in issue. In these circumstances we have no difficulty in concluding that Local 11 was an integral part of a multistate enterprise which was within the Board's statutory jurisdiction. 7 21 Since the Fund is not formally a part of the Local 11 organizational structure, the Board does not attempt to assert jurisdiction over it on the same principle applied to Local 11. 8 Instead, the Board refers to a stipulation entered into by the parties 9 which states that: 22 (a) during the calendar year 1958 the employers contributing to the Fund and 'serviced' by it included nine firms 'engaged in commerce' and clearly within the jurisdiction of the Board; 23 (b) during this period the Fund 'serviced' a total of 5,030 employees under the terms of its trust indenture, of which 2,708 were employed by the firms described in (a) above; and 24 (c) the nine employers engaged in commerce paid $165,547.37 to the Fund for its services. 25 On the basis of these facts the Board concluded that the Fund furnished services valued in excess of $50,000. to employers engaged in commerce and therefore it too was within the Board's jurisdiction under the indirect outflow standards set forth in Siemons Mailing Service, supra. 26 The Fund attempts to bring itself within a discretionary rule formulated by the Board whereby it declines to assert jurisdiction over certain non-profit organizations engaged in activities of a charitable nature. 10 We do not understand this respondent to argue that the the rule is based on a statutory prohibition, and that such organizations cannot fall within the miniumum jurisdictional standards; but even is inapplicable to is clear that the rule is inapplicable to the Fund. Union welfare trust funds are different from non-profit organizations such as hospitals and universities. The Fund may be 'non-profit' but it exists solely to service the employees of a particular industry as an integral part of the industry's system of labor relations. It is a mechanism whereby certain ends of a thoroughly commercial activity are achieved. It is, as the Board effectively points out, 'the means through which the employers provide the health and accident insurance and medical care for their employees for which the union has bargained and which constitute benefits for the employees flowing from the employment relationship.' 11 We agree with the Board that there is nothing in the inherent nature of a wflfare fund that places it behond the jurisdiction afforded by the Act. 27 Nor do the principles stated in N.L.R.B. v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 297 F.2d 94 (2nd Cir. 1962) preclude the exercise of jurisdiction over the Fund in this case. In Reliance the Board was instructed to make further findings on the manner in which a labor dispute would tend to affect commerce. 12 In the present case the operation of the Fund has a direct impact on the employment benefits received by more than 2,700 employees of interstate employers in a single industry operating in a limited geographic area. In addition, disruption of its operations would have a direct impact on several thousand other employees in the same industry and location. 28 Although it would appear that the individual trustees of the Fund were named as respondents solely in their official capacity, we believe that in the absence of any evidence indicating that they were actually involved in the commission of unfair labor practices, the order should be phrased in a manner which does not suggest personal responsibility for the violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. 29 The orders will be enforced as modified in accordance with this opinion.