Opinion ID: 2313322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Claim for Damages

Text: The Tuccis alleged in their complaint that the condition of the Grant Road right-of-way constitutes a substantial and unreasonable interference with the ... use and enjoyment of their property and therefore is a public nuisance. On appeal, however, they concede that the label public nuisance was imprecise and argue that their claim was, in reality, a claim of private nuisance; indeed, they assert that they actually ple[ ]d the elements of a private nuisance. Thus, we concentrate our analysis on the nature of a private nuisance. [10] [A] `private nuisance' is a substantial and unreasonable interference with private use and enjoyment of one's land ... for example, by interfering with the physical condition of the land, disturbing the comfort of its occupants, or threatening future injury or disturbance. B & W Management, Inc. v. Tasea Investment Co., 451 A.2d 879, 882 (D.C.1982) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979) (other internal citations omitted)). [T]he tort was developed, as needed, to protect use and enjoyment of land against nontrespassory interference. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT, § 821D cmt. a). [11] Nuisance law is a `a field of tort liability, rather than a type of tortious conduct.... Nuisance, in short, is not a separate tort in itself, subject to rules of its own. District of Columbia v. Fowler, 497 A.2d 456, 461 (D.C.1985) (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 87, at 573-74, 577 (4th ed.1971)). Liability must be based on some underlying tortious conduct, such as negligence. Fowler, 497 A.2d at 462; see also District of Columbia v. Beretta, 872 A.2d 633, 646 (D.C.2005) (en banc) (pointing out that, [a]s an independent tort, claims of nuisance have ... not been viewed favorably by this court[,] and citing the RESTATEMENT'S conclusion that nuisance entails `conduct ... tortious only if it falls into the usual categories of tort liability. ' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A cmt. c (1979) (emphasis added).). [12] We therefore must look past the label nuisance to determine whether the neglect which the Tuccis allege provides a basis for finding the District liable for tortious conduct. As with their claim for injunctive relief, the Tuccis complain that the District failed to discharge its duty to enforce the LCA and the implementing regulations. [13] They also assert that the District has not properly maintained the roadway. As the trial court recognized, however, the District is protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Our cases describing the scope of sovereign immunity distinguish between discretionary acts and ministerial acts: It is now settled that a District officer, and the District when sued for the acts of an officer under the theory of respondeat superior, are protected by sovereign immunity if the officer's acts are discretionary, but subject to liability if the acts were ministerial in character. Powell v. District of Columbia, 602 A.2d 1123, 1126 (D.C.1992) (other citations and quotation marks omitted); see also District of Columbia v. Pace, 498 A.2d 226, 228-29 (D.C. 1985). As we have discussed above, the District exercises discretion when making law enforcement decisions. [A]bsent a special relationship creating a municipal duty to exercise care for the benefit of a particular class of individuals, no liability may be imposed upon a municipality for failure to enforce a statute or regulation. Platt v. District of Columbia, 467 A.2d 149, 152 (D.C.1983) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Roberson v. District of Columbia, 86 A.2d 536 (D.C.1952) (the District is not liable for negligence or nuisance when it fails to enforce anti-loitering regulations). No special relationship exists here. See generally Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 4 (D.C. 1981) (en banc) (no special relationship created when emergency dispatcher twice assures crime victims that help is on the way). In addition to faulting the District for failure to enforce the litter regulations, the Tuccis complain about the condition of the roadway. They would like the city to install curbs and gutters and pave the road consistent with the requirements that it enforces [upon] their contractors on other adjacent city streets. They concede, however, that the roadbed has been repaved since they moved into their home. Whether to install curbs and gutters is a discretionary decision for which the District is entitled to immunity. Pace, 498 A.2d at 229 (Street design falls squarely within the ambit of this definition [of discretionary acts].) In Pace, we agreed that freeway improvements are discretionary in nature.... To hold otherwise would be effectively to impose a legal duty on the District to have `state-of-the-art' streets. Id. The Tuccis also complain about the District's failure to maintain Grant Road, the rat and other vermin infestation, [14] and the overgrowth of vegetation [15] along the road. [T]he District does have a ministerial duty to maintain its streets and highways. Pace, 498 A.2d at 230. However, it cannot be held strictly liable for its failure to maintain the alley properly. Fowler, 497 A.2d at 462 n. 11. The District is not an insurer of the safety of travelers upon its streets and is only required to maintain ... roadways in a reasonably safe condition. Pace, 498 A.2d at 230 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Before the District may be liable for failure to maintain a roadway, it must have notice (actual or constructive) of an unsafe or dangerous condition. Rajabi v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 650 A.2d 1319, 1322 (D.C. 1994). The existence of prior notice, is not enough, however; a plaintiff must demonstrate that the street is in fact unreasonably dangerous. District of Columbia v. Freeman, 477 A.2d 713, 718-19 (D.C.1984). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing that a violation of the reasonable standard of care is the proximate cause of the injury sustained. District of Columbia v. Cooper, 445 A.2d 652, 655 (D.C.1982) (en banc); see Fowler, 497 A.2d 456 (city was liable for failure to maintain an alley properly after being put on notice of its defective condition, when the vibration of a loose slab of concrete in the alley caused structural damage to abutting garage and house, and all the elements of negligence were established). The Tuccis aver that the abhorrent condition of the road has caused damage to their personal property. They complain that they have had at least ten flat tires since they moved to Grant Road, and have replaced hundreds ... if not thousands of dollars worth of tires, and have had their cars aligned much more often than you would expect based on normal wear and tear. Damages of this type are not enough, by themselves, to show an unreasonably dangerous condition or negligence on the part of the District. Cf. Williams v. District of Columbia, 646 A.2d 962, 963 (D.C. 1992) ([A]s a matter of law appellant could not recover because any defect was de minimis.); Proctor v. District of Columbia, 273 A.2d 656, 659 (D.C.1971) ([F]rom the minor nature of that protrusion [in the sidewalk], the evidence is not sufficient to support a finding of negligence on the part of the District of Columbia.). What is an actionable defect in the driveway, or what depressions and minor defects are sufficient to establish municipal negligence, depends upon all the circumstances of the particular case, taking into consideration the physical structure and nature of the area, its climate, the character of the street, and the kind and amount of travel at the location concerned. MCQUILLIN, § 54:84; see also Husovsky v. United States, 191 U.S.App. D.C. 242, 248, 590 F.2d 944, 950 (1978) ([T]he appropriate level of inspection and maintenance of a particular roadway depends not only on the expense and burden of various maintenance programs, but also on the characteristics of the surrounding land and the roadway itself, including the type and extent of dangers posed thereto.... For instance, a seldom travelled roadway in a national forest in a rural area would require fewer inspections and a different type of maintenance than would a heavily travelled thoroughfare in an urban area. (internal citations omitted)). [16] Given the relatively minor nature of the damage, and the complexity of the inquiry, this is the type of case where [t]he standard of care must be established through expert testimony.... Rajabi, 650 A.2d at 1322; see Katkish v. District of Columbia, 763 A.2d 703, 706 (D.C.2000) ([T]he standard of reasonable care and maintenance of a dead and leaning tree by a municipality, at least in the non-emergency situation presented here, are beyond the ken of the average person); Freeman, 477 A.2d at 719 (expert testimony required to show whether a painted crosswalk is sufficient to render a particular intersection reasonably safe [because that] is a determination essentially technical in nature, based upon an expert evaluation of vehicular and pedestrian traffic patterns, design feasibility, cost effectiveness, and related variables). Thus, although a minor portion of their claim for damages is not precluded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the grant of summary judgment was proper because the Tuccis failed to proffer evidence to establish the applicable standard of care. See Brown v. George Washington University, 802 A.2d 382, 385 (D.C.2002) ([T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). For these reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is hereby Affirmed.