Opinion ID: 867478
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Opinion Testimony on Motive

Text: ¶ 103 Moody first alleges error in Dr. Morenz's testimony about Moody's possible motive for the murders. At trial, Dr. Morenz testified that, in his opinion, it was very likely that the motivation [for the murders] was money and cocaine. Moody alleges that this was inappropriate opinion testimony permitted by neither the Arizona Rules of Evidence nor our case law on expert testimony. ¶ 104 Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 provides that an expert witness may testify on any subject if the witness's specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. This court has interpreted Rule 702 to preclude expert testimony, however, if the subject of inquiry is one of such common knowledge that people of ordinary education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness. State v. Poland, 144 Ariz. 388, 398, 698 P.2d 183, 193 (1985) (quoting State v. Owens, 112 Ariz. 223, 227, 540 P.2d 695, 699 (1975)). ¶ 105 Moody alleges that Dr. Morenz exceeded the permissible scope of Rule 702 by testifying that Moody's cocaine use was a motive for the murders. Moody contends that although Dr. Morenz could express an opinion on whether Moody was suffering from mental illness, he was not permitted to offer an opinion that Robert killed Michelle Malone and Patricia Magda because of his cocaine use. Moody argues that because there was no evidence that he had used cocaine at the time of the murders, and therefore no foundation for the opinion, Arizona case law renders Dr. Morenz's testimony improper. See State v. Miles, 186 Ariz. 10, 18, 918 P.2d 1028, 1036 (1996) (upholding trial court's decision to preclude defense expert's testimony on cocaine intoxication where the expert had no basis upon which to render an opinion about the effects of crack cocaine use at the time of the murder); State v. Gretzler, 126 Ariz. 60, 85, 612 P.2d 1023, 1048 (1980) (stating that [t]estimony concerning intoxication should be limited to the time of the crime for which the defendant is being tried), modified on other grounds by State v. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, 194, 665 P.2d 70, 76 (1983). ¶ 106 A review of the context of that testimony, however, undermines Moody's claim. Dr. Morenz was called on rebuttal, shortly after the jury heard evidence from the defense experts that Moody was in a psychotic, dissociated state when he committed the killings. Dr. Morenz testified that he had eleven reasons for concluding that Moody was not insane, but rather was malingering. One of these reasons was that the murders did not fit the profile of psychotic killings. Dr. Morenz testified that psychotic killings rarely have any rational motive. He then told the jury that one indication that Moody was malingering was that, unlike psychotic killers, Moody actually did have a likely motive  namely, that his substantial cocaine addiction had rendered him broke and desperate. ¶ 107 What evidence is permissible on rebuttal is left to the trial court's discretion. See State v. Young, 116 Ariz. 385, 387, 569 P.2d 815, 817 (1977). The rebuttal evidence provided by Dr. Morenz in this case responded to the issues covered by the defense and is of the type on which expert testimony is generally allowed: the mental health and thought processes of a defendant who alleges insanity or mental illness or defect. Dr. Morenz testified to motive in support of his opinion that Moody's actions contradicted a diagnosis of psychosis. We find no abuse of the court's discretion in permitting this testimony, and certainly no fundamental error.