Opinion ID: 1830839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Whether the Circuit Court erred in overruling the Appellant's motion for a mistrial based upon a violation of URCCC 9.04 and his motion to suppress the identification of a photograph of a pickup by Cindy Dunn.

Text: ¶ 85. Hughes contends that the trial court erred when it failed to grant a mistrial after the State introduced a photograph of a pickup truck to witness Cindy Dunn which was not disclosed to Hughes. Furthermore, Hughes contends that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress the identification of the pickup truck as unduly suggestive. ¶ 86. The photo in question was presented to Cindy Dunn for an in-court identification during her testimony. She stated that it was extremely close to the truck she saw. Hughes objected and moved for a mistrial and made an impromptu ore tenus motion to suppress. ¶ 87. Certainly a photo which the State intends to use to obtain an in-court i.d. of the defendant's truck is relevant, and should have been given to the defense prior to the day it was used in court. U.R.C.C.P. 9.04. The question remains, however, whether Hughes had adequate time to prepare for the use of the photo. In Inman v. State, this Court noted that there is no hard and fast rule determining how much time is a reasonable time for the defense to assimilate unexpected and previously undisclosed evidence offered by the State, Where the state is tardy in furnishing discovery which it was obligated to disclose, the defendant is entitled upon request to a continuance postponement of the proceedings reasonable under the circumstances.... There will no doubt be cases where postponement of a day or two, or in some cases even an hour or two, will suffice. Inman v. State, 515 So.2d 1150, 1153 (Miss.1987)( quoting Foster v. State, 484 So.2d 1009 (Miss.1986)) (citations omitted). Similarly, while this Court has eschewed any notion that a defendant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice to show reversible discovery violations, [5] this Court has always maintained that an adequate time to assimilate the unexpected information cures the error: We have recognized that non-discovered evidence may be admitted at trial if the party against whom that evidence is offered is given a reasonable opportunity to make adequate accommodation. Robinson v. State, 508 So.2d 1067, 1071 (Miss.1987)( quoting Henry v. State, 484 So.2d 1012, 1014 (Miss.1986)). ¶ 88. However, the truck in question was known to be an important issue from the day Hughes was taken into custody. No question was raised by Hughes as to whether the picture accurately portrayed the truck owned by Mrs. Hughes Sanders and used by Hughes. Further, Hughes had access to the photograph prior to Mrs. Dunn's taking the stand, and used it in questioning her. ¶ 89. Hughes, however, argues that the photo was on its face unduly suggestive, and the identification was improper, not being tested by the presence of other similar vehicles, or a vehicle line-up. Although this Court has not directly addressed this issue, an examination of relevant authorities from federal and state law demonstrates that a line-up to identify inanimate objects is not subject to the same constitutional restrictions which burden eyewitness identifications of criminal defendants. See Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 931-32 (9th Cir.1995)(Johnson contends that the victim's in-court identification of the automobile which Johnson used to carry Jones out to the desert was tainted by unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedures and therefore should have been excluded. While this argument deserves credit for creativity, Stovall and its progeny do not require car line-ups. There is no authority holding that a defendant's due process right to reliable identification procedures extends beyond normal authenticity and identification procedures for physical evidence offered by the prosecution.); Inge v. Procunier, 758 F.2d 1010, 1015 (4th Cir.1985)(We agree with the district court and the Virginia court that the identification of a truck is not governed by the constitutional limitations that control the identification of a defendant. Objections in the nature of those made here rather go to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence than as a constitutional limitation on its admissibility.) People v. Miller, 211 Mich.App. 30, 535 N.W.2d 518, 523 (1995)(We add Michigan to the growing list of states that hold that any suggestiveness in the identification of inanimate objects is relevant to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence.); Brooks v. State, 560 N.E.2d 49, 58 (Ind. 1990). See also State v. Roscoe, 145 Ariz. 212, 700 P.2d 1312, 1324 (1985); People v. Coston, 40 Colo.App. 205, 576 P.2d 182, 185 (1977), aff'd. 633 P.2d 470 (Colo.1981); Klase v. State, 346 A.2d 160, 162 (Del. 1975). State v. Bruns, 304 N.W.2d 217, 219 (Iowa 1981); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 383 Mass. 46, 417 N.E.2d 1193, 1195 (1981); State v. Cyr, 122 N.H. 1155, 453 A.2d 1315, 1317 (1982); State v. King, 31 Wash.App. 56, 639 P.2d 809, 811 (1982). ¶ 90. In this case, Hughes' ore tenus motion to suppress the identification of the vehicle by Mrs. Dunn was properly denied without comment by the trial court judge. Furthermore, the use of the black Ranger pickup was an issue known to Hughes from the beginning and no surprise can be attached to the use by the State of a picture identified by a witness whose identity and whose testimony was also well known by all. It is apparent that Hughes had more than enough time to adequately prepare for the use of the photograph. For these reasons, Issue V is without merit.