Opinion ID: 430531
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conspiracy to Murder May Be a Predicate Act for a RICO Conviction

Text: 14 The District Court instructed the jury that there were three possible acts which the jury could find to serve as predicate acts of racketeering for the RICO charge. These were: 1) conspiracy to murder Danny Greene; 2) the murder of Danny Greene; and 3) bribery. The court instructed that the bribery act applied only to defendants Liberatore and Ciarcia. The jury therefore had to find that the other four defendants both conspired to murder, and murdered Danny Greene in order to convict them of the RICO violation. These four defendants (Licavoli, Calandra, Carabbia, Cisternino) now argue that conspiracy to commit murder cannot serve as a predicate act for a RICO conviction, and that their RICO convictions therefore cannot stand. 15 Under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(1)(A) racketeering activity includes any act or threat involving murder.... Conspiracy to murder on its face fits within this definition of racketeering activity. Conspiracy is an act ... involving murder. However the original versions of the bill that ultimately became RICO specifically included conspiracy as a predicate act under section 1961, while the final bill did not. Defendants argue that Congress' failure specifically to enumerate conspiracy in the final version of the bill demonstrates a legislative intent not to allow conspiracy as a predicate act. 16 The Second Circuit rejected this argument with respect to conspiracies to commit acts listed in the definition of racketeering activity under section 1961(1)(D) in United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871, 101 S.Ct. 209, 66 L.Ed.2d 91 (1980). See also United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1216 (9th Cir.1982) (conspiracy to extort may be a predicate act), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1194, 75 L.Ed.2d 439 (1983); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1015 (5th Cir.1981) (conspiracy to import marijuana may be a predicate act), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S.Ct. 2965, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354 (1982). 17 Under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(1)(D), racketeering activity includes: 18 [A]ny offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States. 19 The Second Circuit in Weisman based its holding on the expansive language in (D), any offense involving the enumerated substantive crimes, punishable under any law of the United States. 5 The court noted: 20 This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that subsections (B) and (C) [of Sec. 1961(1) ], which list most of the other predicate acts chargeable under RICO, conspicuously lack the broad any offense involving language of subsection (D) and, in fact, require that the act be indictable under specifically enumerated sections of the criminal code. 6 21 624 F.2d at 1124. 22 Subsection (A) of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(1) contains language similarly expansive to that in subsection (D). Under (A), racketeering activity includes any act or threat involving the substantive crime, chargeable under state law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. The provisions of ... [RICO] should be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. 7 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-452, Sec. 904(a), 84 Stat. 947. We see no indication that Congress intended conspiracy to commit murder not to be a predicate act under section 1961(1)(A) along with conspiracy to extort, to commit securities fraud or to import drugs under section 1961(1)(D). The Fifth Circuit took the position that conspiracy to commit murder may be a predicate act in United States v. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039, 1063 n. 32 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915, 102 S.Ct. 1768, 72 L.Ed.2d 173 (1982), saying, 23 There is merit to the argument that subsection A [of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(1) ] is as broad and inclusive as the language of subsection D. If conspiracy to commit a section D offense can serve as a predicate act for a RICO charge, then conspiracy to commit a subsection A offense should also be able to serve as a predicate act. The language of subsection A itself--which includes any act or threat involving murder--appears to contemplate a conspiracy to commit murder. A conspiracy to commit murder is an act involving murder. (emphasis in original) 24 We adopt the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Welch and hold that conspiracy to commit murder may be a predicate act under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(1)(A) for a RICO charge. 25 III. Murder and Conspiracy to Murder Are Separate Offenses under Ohio Law and May Both Be Predicate Acts under RICO 26 For a defendant to be convicted under RICO he must have committed more than one act of racketeering activity. In order for a state crime, such as murder or conspiracy to murder to serve as a predicate act, it must be chargeable under state law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(1)(A). Federal law holds that conspiracy to commit a substantive offense and the substantive offense itself are two separate crimes. See, e.g., Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1289, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975). Under Ohio law, conspiracy to murder and murder are also two separate crimes. However, a person convicted of the substantive crime shall not be convicted of conspiracy involving the same offense. Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2923.01(G). Thus under Ohio law a person cannot be convicted of or sentenced for both conspiracy to commit murder and the murder crime itself. Defendants argue that the two acts consequently are not both chargeable under state law and punishable for more than one year. 27 We disagree, for two reasons. First Ohio law, in both the Ohio Revised Code and the earlier case law, provides that conspiracy to commit a substantive act and the substantive act are separate offenses, both separately chargeable under state law. In State v. Lucas, 85 N.E.2d 154, 156 (Ohio Ct.C.P.1949), the court stated: 28 The conspiracy to commit a crime is an entirely different offense from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy. It is not a substantive offense, but essentially a crime of intent. It does not merge in the completed offense. The unlawful combination and confederacy constitute the essential element of criminal conspiracy rather than the overt acts done in pursuance thereof, and neither the success nor failure of criminal conspiracies is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the conspirators. 29 Lucas predates the current Ohio statutory provision, Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2923.01. 8 The statute in Lucas made it a crime to conspire to defraud. Under this statute, unlike the current one, a defendant could be convicted and sentenced separately for the substantive crime and conspiracy to commit the substantive crime. Lucas is significant here, however, for its articulation of the common law of Ohio that the conspiracy and the substantive crime are entirely different. 30 The Ohio Revised Code has not modified this common law precept. Murder is a crime, chargeable under Ohio law, Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2903.02, and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, Sec. 2929.02. Conspiracy is also a crime in Ohio, Ohio Rev.Code Sec. 2923.01(A), and is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, Sec. 2929.11. RICO nowhere indicates that two criminal acts otherwise qualifying as predicate acts may not both constitute predicate acts because under state law a defendant could not be convicted of or sentenced for both crimes. 31 Secondly, contrary to defendants' contention, it is irrelevant whether these particular defendants could have been charged under Ohio law and imprisoned for more than one year for both conspiracy to murder and murder. This argument has been raised and rejected several times in the context of state statutes of limitations, when the state statute has run on a state crime which is offered as a predicate act for a RICO violation. Courts have held that regardless of the running of the state statute the defendant is still chargeable with the state offense within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(1)(A). United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748, 758 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962, 99 S.Ct. 1508, 59 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979); United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1066-67 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836, 99 S.Ct. 119, 58 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978); United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1134 (3d Cir.1977). The reference to state law in the statute is simply to define the wrongful conduct, and is not meant to incorporate state procedural law. United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 418 n. 22 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 1448, 55 L.Ed.2d 494 (1978). The Third Circuit noted in United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1087 n. 8A (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072, 98 S.Ct. 1256, 55 L.Ed.2d 775 (1978): 32 Section 1961 requires, in our view, only that the conduct on which the federal charge is based be typical of the serious crime dealt with by the state statute, not that the particular defendant be chargeable under State law at the time of the federal indictment. (emphasis in original) 33 We agree and hold that conspiracy to murder and murder may both constitute predicate acts in this case, regardless of the fact that a defendant cannot under Ohio law be separately punished for having committed both crimes. Ohio law does define the two acts as separate crimes, each punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, and this is all that is required under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(1)(A). 34 IV. Acquittal in State Court of Criminal Acts Does Not Bar Their Use as Predicate Acts for a RICO Conviction 35 Defendants Licavoli and Calandra were acquitted in state court proceedings of murdering Greene and conspiring to murder Greene. Consequently, they argue, they were not chargeable with the murder or conspiracy to commit murder, as required under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(1)(A), and murder and conspiracy to commit murder could not therefore serve as predicate acts for their RICO convictions. 36 We disagree. Frumento is directly on point. Defendants in that case were acquitted in state court on charges of bribery, extortion and conspiracy to accept bribes. They were then convicted in federal court of violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(c) and (d), with the above crimes as predicate acts. On appeal defendants argued that the conviction was barred by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. The Third Circuit disagreed. The court said, 37 [RICO] forbids racketeering, not state offenses per se. The state offenses referred to in the federal act are definitional only; racketeering, the federal crime, is defined as a matter of legislative draftsmanship by a reference to state law crimes. This is not to say ... that the federal statute punishes the same conduct as that reached by state law. The gravamen of section 1962 is a violation of federal law and reference to state law is necessary only to identify the type of unlawful activity in which the defendant intended to engage. United States v. Cerone, 452 F.2d 274, 286 (7th Cir.1971). (Footnote omitted.) 38 563 F.2d at 1087. See also United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1015 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 912 (1982); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1367 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 1351, 67 L.Ed.2d 336 (1981). 39