Opinion ID: 3031548
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural Due Process Violation

Text: Espinosa also claims the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the County and its co-defendants on his procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, he argues his rights were violated when the County made a variety of procedural missteps and stopped his pay without first holding a hearing. The County claims Espinosa received adequate due process and suffered no damages as a result of any mistakes. We find Espinosa’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were not violated, as the August 2000 notice and January 2001 hearing satisfied the requirements of due process. When a plaintiff challenges the actions of a state on due process grounds, we are 15 obligated to make two determinations: “whether the State has deprived the claimant of a protected property interest,” and “whether the State’s procedures comport with due process.” Marshall v. Lauriault, 372 F.3d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 195, 121 S.Ct. 1446, 149 L.Ed.2d 391 (2001)). A property interest in a public sector job arises when the employee has “a legitimate entitlement to . . . continued employment” as determined by the laws of the state in which he works. Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)). In determining whether a State’s procedures comported with the requirements of the Constitution, we balance (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action,” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and (3) “the Government’s interest.” Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 931-32, 117 S.Ct. 1807, 138 L.Ed.2d 120 (1997) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)). New Jersey law defines the procedural due process required before disciplinary action is taken against an employee protected by the state’s Civil Service Act: “the employee shall be notified in writing and shall have the opportunity for a hearing before the appointing authority or its designated representative.” N.J.S.A. § 11A:2-13. “The hearing shall be held within 30 days of the notice of disciplinary action unless waived by the employee.” Id. New Jersey’s Administrative Code further requires that, “[w]ithin 20 16 days of the hearing…the appointing authority shall make a decision on the charges and furnish the employee either by personal service or certified mail with a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action.” N.J.A.C. § 4A:2-2.6(d).6 It is undisputed that Espinosa was a civil service employee who had a property interest in his job. Accordingly, we must determine whether the procedures ultimately afforded Espinosa were constitutionally adequate. Espinosa first argues due process principles required the County to provide him with a hearing before placing him on leave and terminating his pay on August 14, 2000. As the Supreme Court made clear in Gilbert, however, a temporary suspension without pay generally does not require a predeprivation hearing. Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 932. This is because “lost income is relatively insubstantial” as compared to the “severity of depriving someone of the means of his livelihood.” Id. Accordingly, we do not find that the County’s removal of Espinosa from its payroll without a hearing violated due process. Even if a predeprivation hearing was not required, Espinosa argues he should have at least had a hearing promptly after the County stopped his pay on August 14, 2000. Instead, the County waited five months to hold a hearing (until January 2001) because it claimed it wanted to give Espinosa a chance to resign without the prejudice of disciplinary action. When an employee has property interest in his job, a suspension without pay is 6 Although Espinosa was entitled to the procedures outlined in the Civil Service Act, his due process claim in this appeal is rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment. 17 acceptable only if “the suspended employee receives a sufficiently prompt postsuspension hearing.” Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 932. In this case, however, we find the delay was acceptable because Espinosa’s interest in his paycheck was weak. In making this determination, we consider the following: (1) Espinosa had not performed any services for the County in over two years; (2) he agreed that he would stop receiving a paycheck and seek other work; and (3) he received over $100,000 from the County while working at another job on a full-time basis. Weighing Espinosa’s weak interest against the County’s interest in removing a non-working employee from its payroll, we find Espinosa had no basis on which he could claim he was entitled to additional payments from the County. As a result, we do not find the five month delay violated Espinosa’s procedural due process rights. Espinosa also claims the delay between his disciplinary hearing and the issuance of a decision in his case, which exceeded the time allowed by N.J.A.C. § 4A:2-2.6(d), violated his rights. We disagree. Because he had not worked for the County for over two years and had agreed to find another job, Espinosa’s interest in his continued status as a County employee was weak. For this reason, the procedural protections afforded Espinosa by the County, which for the most part were consistent with the Civil Service Act, were more than sufficient. Finally, Espinosa claims that the inclusion for 16 months of erroneous information on his Final Notice of Disciplinary Action constituted a procedural due process violation. Espinosa, however, fails to elaborate on this claim or explain how this error deprived him 18 of a protected property interest. Accordingly, we find this claim has no merit.7 C. Breach of Contract and the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing As a County employee covered by the Civil Service Act and an agreement between the County and the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, Union County Corrections Officers Local No. 199, Inc. (“Union Agreement”), Espinosa could only be terminated for “just cause.” See N.J.A.C. § 4A:2-2.3; Union Agreement, App. at 1662 (“No employee shall be disciplined except for just cause.”). He claims, however, the County breached the Union Agreement and the Civil Service Act when it terminated him for refusing to return to work in an environment the County knew was unsafe.8 He further claims the County’s ordering him back to an unsafe environment constituted a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The District Court mistakenly interpreted Espinosa’s contract claim as identical to his CEPA claim, and, as a result, granted summary judgment in favor of the County with respect to this claim. We find, however, that Espinosa’s CEPA and contract claims are not identical. His CEPA claim is based on his being fired in retaliation for his protected 7 It appears that Espinosa originally brought this as a substantive due process claim. Had we analyzed the claim as such, we would have reached the same conclusion because he presents no evidence that his reputation was damaged by the inclusion of the erroneous information in his personnel file. 8 Because we review a motion for summary judgment decided against Espinosa, we take as true his assertion that it would not have been safe for him to return to work. 19 expression. In contrast, his contract claim is based on his being fired without “just cause,” which does not require that he show retaliatory conduct on the part of the County. Although the District Court did not appropriately analyze Espinosa’s contract claim, we ultimately uphold its ruling. The County ultimately terminated Espinosa for abandoning his job. New Jersey’s Administrative Code describes job abandonment as follows: “Any employee who is absent from duty for five or more consecutive business days without the approval of his or her superior shall be considered to have abandoned his or her position and shall be recorded as a resignation not in good standing.” N.J.A.C. § 4A:2-6.2. The County agreed to continue to pay Espinosa his salary, even though he was absent from work, from the time he began assisting prosecutors in October 1995 until the conclusion of the officers’ trials in May 1998. Accordingly, his absence from work during this period could not have constituted job abandonment. After May 1998, however, Espinosa did not have permission to be absent and he failed to perform any services for the County justifying compensation under his Union Agreement or the Civil Service Act. This was clearly job abandonment. In this appeal, Espinosa essentially argues there should be an exception to the plain language of N.J.A.C. § 4A:2-6.2 permitting employees who are authorized to remain absent from work for a finite period to remain absent and on the County’s payroll indefinitely. Were such an exception to exist, it would only be possible through the approval of an employee’s superiors. Since neither the County nor Espinosa’s superiors 20 authorized an indefinite period of absence from work with pay and Espinosa never found another County job that would justify his being on the County’s payroll, we find the County’s termination of Espinosa was based on just cause and, as a result, Espinosa’s contract claim must fail. D. Fraud Espinosa next contends the Prosecutor’s Office committed common law fraud by promising him another position in the County in an effort to induce Espinosa to testify against those involved in the INS detainee abuses. We find Espinosa did not offer sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that such a promise existed. “A misrepresentation amounting to actual legal fraud consists of a material representation of a presently existing or past fact, made with knowledge of its falsity and with the intention that the other party rely thereon, resulting in reliance by that party to his detriment.” Jewish Center of Sussex County v. Whale, 432 A.2d 521, 524 (N.J. 1981) (citations omitted). Fraud claims succeed only when they are established by clear and convincing evidence. New Jersey Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Pavonia Rest., Inc., 725 A.2d 1133, 1139 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). To establish fraud on the part of the Prosecutor’s Office, Espinosa must first show prosecutors promised him a job. By Espinosa’s own admission in January 1998, however, no such promise was made: Q. Were you ever promised a job by anybody? A. I have not been promised a job to this day. Q. Did the Prosecutor’s Office ever promise you a job? A. No, they have not. Excerpt of Trial Transcript in New Jersey v. James Rice, et 21 al., App. at A1505. In addition, the “Neafsey letter” sent to Espinosa after striking a bargain with prosecutors is explicit about a lack of a firm job offer: “we are obviously unable to guarantee [Espinosa] a position . . ..” App. at 1542. Given Espinosa cannot establish the existence of any promise on the part of the Prosecutor’s Office, his fraud claim must fail. E. Tortious Interference with a Prospective Economic Advantage Espinosa also claims that the Prosecutor’s Office tortuously interfered with his prospective economic advantage when it suggested to County officials a way by which to terminate him. We find Espinosa did not offer sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude he had any prospective economic advantage with which the Prosecutor’s Office could interfere. To establish a claim for tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff must show the following: (1) the existence of a reasonable expectation of economic advantage; (2) an intentional and malicious interference with that expectation by the defendant; (3) a causal connection between the interference and the loss of the prospective gain; and (4) damage. Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 563 A.2d 31, 37 (N.J. 1989). Espinosa claims he had a reasonable expectation of continued payment by the County with which the Prosecutor’s Office interfered. We disagree. Espinosa knew he would not be kept on the County’s payroll in perpetuity: Q. After your conversation with Mr. Lapolla [in 1999,] did you understand that there was a certain timeframe to the next 22 step in your obtaining a position within Union County? A. Well, I understood . . . I wasn’t going to be home getting paid forever. I understood that. I mean, there’s a timeframe to everything. App. at A1329 (emphasis added). In addition, he had not performed any services for which he could expect to be paid for over two years. Given these facts, we find Espinosa did not present sufficient evidence showing a reasonable expectation of continued payment by the County. F. Rule 56(f) Motion Espinosa finally claims the District Court abused its discretion by denying his Motion to Stay the Parties’ Pending Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)), thereby prohibiting him from deposing two Union County corrections officers. These officers would have testified to the following: (1) a culture of retaliation existed inside the Jail; (2) the President of the corrections officers’ union had lied under oath about the conditions Espinosa would face inside the Jail should he return; and (3) the County used payroll deductions from corrections officers’ pay to support the families of corrections officers convicted of abusing the INS detainees. We find the District Court did not abuse its discretion. Rule 56(f) permits the court to order a continuance of a motion for summary judgment “should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). To succeed, a Rule 56(f) motion “must identify with specificity what particular information is sought; how, if uncovered, it would preclude 23 summary judgment; and why it has not previously been obtained.” Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 71 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Espinosa fails to identify with specificity how the testimony of the two Union County corrections officers would have precluded summary judgment. The officers would have provided evidence of the union’s indifference to Espinosa’s plight and the dangerous prospects facing those who testify against fellow officers and return to work. Espinosa, however, had already introduced ample evidence of the union’s animus towards him and the retaliation he would likely face if he returned to the Jail. Such evidence is cumulative. In addition, we have taken as true his assertion that he could not return to work. Accordingly, we find the District Court acted well within its discretion when it denied Espinosa’s Rule 56(f) motion.