Opinion ID: 1878297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedures To Be Followed By Trial Court

Text: But merely concluding that the plea colloquy in this case was inadequate does not define the procedures which a trial court judge must follow in accepting a plea of guilty or no contest. Nor does it necessarily indicate that the defendant lacked the requisite understanding and knowledge to make his plea constitutionally valid. Although the court must [a]ddress the defendant personally and determine that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge, sec. 971.08(1)(a), Stats., the statute does not explain how that determination should be made. This court cannot overemphasize the importance of the trial court's taking great care in ascertaining the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge. The prospect of imprisonment for a defendant demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused. . . . Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44. We have previously discussed the trial court's duty to ascertain a defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge. We merely reformulate the source of the duty from a constitutional requirement to a statutory imperative. In McAllister, 54 Wis. 2d at 230, this court held that the ascertainment of understanding must be made on the record. In Martinkoski, 51 Wis. 2d at 245, we stated that while there is a burden on the trial court to establish a record showing the defendant's understanding of the charge, the form of the inquiry need not be inflexible. An understanding of the nature of the charge must include an awareness of the essential elements of the crime. Cecchini, 124 Wis. 2d at 212. While we have not established inflexible guidelines which a trial court must follow in ascertaining a defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge, this court is of the opinion that the time has arrived to require a trial court to do more than merely record the defendant's affirmation of understanding pursuant to sec. 971.08(1)(a). As a function of our superintending and administrative authority over the circuit courts, [4] we now make it mandatory upon the trial judge to determine a defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge at the plea hearing by following any one or a combination of the following methods. We characterize this obligation as a duty to first inform a defendant of the nature of the charge or, alternatively, to first ascertain that the defendant possesses accurate information about the nature of the charge. The court must then ascertain the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge as expressly required by sec. 971.08(1)(a). Which of the following methods is selected depends on the circumstances of the particular case, including the level of education of the defendant and the complexity of the charge. First, the trial court may summarize the elements of the crime charged by reading from the appropriate jury instructions, see, Wis. J I Criminal SM-32, Part IV (1985), or from the applicable statute. See, e.g., Cecchini, 124 Wis. 2d at 213. Second, the trial judge may ask defendant's counsel whether he explained the nature of the charge to the defendant and request him to summarize the extent of the explanation, including a reiteration of the elements, at the plea hearing. Third, the trial judge may expressly refer to the record or other evidence of defendant's knowledge of the nature of the charge established prior to the plea hearing. For example, when a criminal complaint has been read to the defendant at a preliminary hearing, the trial judge may inquire whether the defendant understands the nature of the charge based on that reading. A trial judge may also specifically refer to and summarize any signed statement of the defendant which might demonstrate that the defendant has notice of the nature of the charge. We first note that this list is not necessarily exhaustive of the methods which a trial judge may exercise in satisfying the antecedent step to its statutory obligation to personally determine the defendant's understanding. But it is no longer sufficient for a trial judge merely to perfunctorily question the defendant about his understanding of the charge. Likewise, a perfunctory affirmative response by the defendant that he understands the nature of the offense, without an affirmative showing that the nature of the crime has been communicated to him or that the defendant has at some point expressed his knowledge of the nature of the charge, will not satisfy the requirement of sec. 971.08, Stats. Whether the trial court communicates the elements of the crime at the plea hearing or whether the court refers to a document or portion of the record predating the plea hearing, the operative time period for determining the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge remains the plea hearing itself. The defendant must understand the nature of the crime at the time of the taking of the plea. Cecchini, 124 Wis. 2d at 201. In essence, we are reiterating the statutory duty placed on the trial courts to ascertain a defendant's understanding of the nature of a charge, sec. 971.08(1)(a), Stats. But we go beyond that duty to establish a mandatory obligation on the trial court to first inform the defendant of the charge's nature or, instead, to ascertain that the defendant in fact possesses such information. A defendant's mere affirmative response that he understands the nature of the charge, without establishing his knowledge of the nature of the charge, submits more to a, perfunctory procedure rather than to the constitutional standard that a plea be affirmatively shown to be voluntarily and intelligently made. Form would be elevated over substance. Understanding must have knowledge as its antecedent; knowledge, like understanding, cannot be inferred or assumed on a silent record. CI, Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242, 243. Conversely, it is not enough merely to inform the defendant or point to a portion of the transcript or other evidence which indicates that the defendant possesses knowledge of the nature of the charge; that court must also ascertain the defendant's understanding of that information, sec. 971.08(1)(a), Stats. The duty to inform, although not expressly required by sec. 971.08, is a logical outgrowth of the constitutional standard that a defendant's plea be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. The duty is complementary to the obligation of the trial court to ascertain a defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge. Like the other Ernst requirements, it is made mandatory on the trial courts. The trial court also failed to ascertain on the record Bangert's understanding of his constitutional rights which he was necessarily waiving by entering a plea of no contest. A person must know and understand that constitutional rights are waived by the plea in order for the plea to be voluntarily and intelligently made. Edwards, 51 Wis. 2d at 234. The defendant need not specifically waive each right, but the record or other evidence must show that he entered his plea voluntarily and knowingly, see, id. at 235-36, with understanding of the rights he was waiving. The trial judge in this case did not ascertain that the defendant knew and understood which constitutional rights he was waiving. The plea hearing record indicates only that Bangert's counsel believed that Bangert knew and understood which constitutional rights Bangert was waiving. Defense counsel may not speak for the defendant; the defendant must affirmatively state his own knowledge and understanding when he is capable of doing so. Henceforth, we will also require as a function of our supervisory powers that state courts at the plea hearing follow the provisions set forth in Wis. J I Criminal SM-32 (1985), Part V, Waiver of Constitutional Rights, [5] or specifically refer to some portion of the record or communication between defense counsel and defendant which affirmatively exhibits defendant's knowledge of the constitutional rights he will be waiving. The court must then, as before, ascertain whether the defendant understands he will be waiving certain constitutional rights by virtue of his guilty or on contest plea. Cf., Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243. The express duty to inform the defendant of the constitutional rights which he will be waiving, or to ascertain that the defendant possesses such knowledge, may be considered a seventh duty to be followed by the trial courts. See, Ernst, 43 Wis. 2d at 674. Whether the plea is voluntary will in part depend on whether the defendant understands the nature of the constitutional protections he is waiving. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 645, n. 13. It is incumbent upon the trial court to inform the defendant of his rights and ascertain that he understands they are being waived. Although Bangert questions only the adequacy of the nature of the charge and constitutional waiver colloquy of the plea hearing, we urge trial courts to closely follow all of the procedures for the taking of a guilty or no contest plea as set forth at Wis. J ICriminal SM-32 (1985). We have previously expressed this recommendation, Bartelt, 112 Wis. 2d at 483-84, n. 3, Minniecheske, 127 Wis. 2d at 245, and believe that careful adherence to SM-32 will satisfy the constitutional standard of a voluntary and knowing plea, as well as the Ernst requirements, the procedure of sec. 971.08, Stats., and the other mandatory procedures described herein.