Opinion ID: 1196421
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 35

Heading: Alleged Misconduct in Cross-examination of Defense Witnesses

Text: (46) Defendant next argues the prosecutor committed misconduct when questioning Dr. Hamilton about possible stressors which could lead to defendant acting out in a violent manner. The prosecutor twice asked the witness whether being raped at knife point (as Jane B. had been) was a stressor. Both times the defense counsel objected and both times the trial court sustained the objection. Thus, even assuming the prosecutor committed misconduct, there was no prejudice. When cross-examining Lucy Bross, the custodian of records for the Department of Corrections, the prosecutor elicited the information that defendant served only six years for the 1975 rape and murder convictions although he was sentenced to consecutive life terms. Defendant claims this was prejudicial error because it suggested the jury should impose the death penalty because defendant's punishment for past wrongs had not been severe enough. In addition, Bross revealed that defendant had several in-prison disciplinary infractions. Defendant claims this evidence was inadmissible because none of the incidents involved violence. (See § 190.3, factor (b).) Finally, the prosecutor elicited from Bross that defendant had violated his parole by living with a woman in Lompoc instead of with his sister in Santa Barbara. Defendant claims this constituted prosecutorial misconduct because defendant's conduct did not involve violence. Because defendant failed to object to the questions he now condemns, he waived the issues for appeal. To the extent the challenged questions elicited otherwise inadmissible, nonstatutory aggravating evidence ( Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 775), there was manifestly no prejudice in light of the other, properly admitted aggravating evidence. (See People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 427-429 [276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221].) Defendant also complains that the prosecutor asked Dr. Patterson on cross-examination whether defendant's prior murder of Pierce and rape of Jane B. fell within the ambit of section 190.3, factor (b), i.e., the presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence. Defense counsel objected but his objection was overruled and Dr. Patterson was permitted to answer. We agree this question was beyond the scope of both the direct testimony and the witness's expertise. The error, however, was harmless. Defendant admitted his guilt of those prior crimes and they indisputably come within the scope of section 190.3, factor (b). Moreover, Dr. Patterson's answers were quite evasive and thus not particularly damaging. The jury's reception of Dr. Patterson's opinion on that subject was thus harmless. When questioning Dr. Patterson, the prosecutor also asked him whether rape and robbery often occur together in the same criminal episode. Defendant correctly contends this was beyond the scope of Dr. Patterson's expertise. There was, however, no objection, and in any case, Patterson replied that he did not know. Defendant finally complains the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking about (i) the robbery of Jane B. (because the robbery count had been dismissed), (ii) a change in state law regarding the admissibility of psychiatric testimony about premeditation and deliberation, and (iii) the reasons for the change. In addition, defendant challenges the prosecutor's comments that it is just ... a matter of self-defense for the district attorney to get a psychiatrist down to the police station to examine [a recently arrested] person. As to these matters, the failure to object waived any error and any prejudice flowing from such questions and comments on such tangential matters was negligible.