Opinion ID: 2329283
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Statements to law enforcement authorities

Text: The fourth instance of defamatory publication alleged in respondent's civil suit was the letter sent by Mr. Grossman to the United States Attorney. This letter was sent on the same day, and included the same allegations that were made in, the letter to Bar Counsel. Unlike the three publications made to the court and Bar Counsel, only a qualified privilege attaches to reports made to law enforcement authorities for investigation. See Carter v. Hahn, 821 A.2d 890, 894 (D.C.2003) (`[A] qualified privilege exists when a statement about suspected wrongdoing is made in good faith to law enforcement authorities.') (quoting Columbia First Bank v. Ferguson, 665 A.2d 650, 655 (D.C.1995) (citations omitted)). Like any other qualified privilege, the speaker is afforded immunity unless it is shown that the defamatory statement was malicious. See id. at 656. The District Court's order dismissing respondent's complaint recognized that the letter to the U.S. Attorney was subject to a qualified privilege, and implicitly determined that malice had not been sufficiently alleged in respondent's defamation complaint. As noted, the District Court's dismissal was summarily affirmed on appeal. Respondent is therefore collaterally estopped from arguing in this proceeding that he could overcome the qualified privilege by showing malice. See Washington Medical Ctr. v. Holle, 573 A.2d 1269, 1283 (D.C. 1990). Even if he could have, however, Rule 3.1 by its terms prohibits not only the bring[ing] of frivolous proceedings but also prohibits the assertionwithin an otherwise valid lawsuitof an issue therein which is frivolous. Therefore, given that three of the four alleged defamatory publications were absolutely privileged, we are satisfied that clearly frivolous claims and issues predominated the federal defamation suit. We have not previously considered what constitutes a frivolous proceeding or issue that warrants sanction under Rule 3.1. We have, however, considered analogous provisions in other rules which we find instructive. In determining whether a pleading is frivolous and subject to sanction under Superior Court Civil Rule 11 we have said that consideration should be given to the clarity or ambiguity of the law. District of Columbia v. Fraternal Order of Police, 691 A.2d 115, 119 (D.C. 1997) (citing Kamen v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1014 (2d Cir. 1986)). In deciding whether a claim is warranted under existing law, among the factors for consideration are the plausibility of the position taken, and the complexity of the issue. Id. Within the context of our own Rules, which authorize the court to impose sanction when . . . an attorney practicing before the court takes an appeal or files a petition or motion that is frivolous, D.C.App. R. 38, we have stated that an appeal is frivolous when it is wholly lacking in substance and not based upon even a faint hope of success on the legal merits. Slater v. Biehl, 793 A.2d 1268, 1278 (D.C.2002) (quoting Pine View Gardens, Inc. v. Jay's Frosted Foods, Inc., 299 A.2d 536, 537 (D.C.1973)). Thus, we have imposed upon attorneys an obligation to undertake an objective appraisal of merit before filing an appeal in a civil matter. Tupling v. Britton, 411 A.2d 349, 352 (D.C.1980). An appeal is frivolous if, after undertaking such an appraisal, a reasonable attorney would have concluded that there was not even a faint hope of success on the legal merits of the action being considered. Slater, 793 A.2d at 1278. We adopt the same standard to the evaluation of attorney conduct for purposes of Rule 3.1. Given the consistent and unambiguous state of the law concerning the privileges which attached to the allegedly defamatory statements, had an objective appraisal of merit been undertaken here, a reasonable attorney would have easily concluded that the defamation lawsuit was meritless. We recognize that the law is not always clear and never is static, Rule 3.1, cmt. [1], and that in zealously arguing their clients' causes lawyers must be able to press for change and reform in the law. Rule 3.1 expressly provides that lawyers are not subject to sanction if there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. But that safe harbor requires a position that is reasoned and supported. Respondent maintains that he brought suit in a good-faith effort to vindicate his reputation as a practicing attorney, and as a challenge to the privilege afforded under D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 19(a) to complaints made to Bar Counsel. However, nothing in the record of the defamation suit indicates that this was the purpose of the case. It was a straightforward defamation action brought in spite of, and not in challenge to, the privileges afforded the statements at issue. [8] Respondent's argument, therefore, appears to be merely a post hoc justification as to why he should not be sanctioned for bringing the defamation action. See In re Alexander, 513 A.2d 781, 791-92 (D.C.1986) (imposing sanctions under DR 6-101(A)(2) for bringing an inadequately prepared action, and rejecting claim that suit was brought as a good-faith attempt to create new law, where the framing of the issue and legal memoranda lacked indicia that the suit was brought to propose a good-faith extension of existing law). We make special note of the fact that respondent's defamation complaint was centered on the letter sent to Bar Counsel by Mr. Grossman. As we said in In re Nace, this court has exercised its authority to declare immune from suits or action under the law of the District of Columbia, the conduct of those who provide information or make complaint to the Board. 490 A.2d at 1123. We have provided such immunity in Bar Rule XI, § 19(a) so as to encourage those who have ethical complaints against members of this bar to come forward and make those assertions without fear of reprisal. Respondent makes a policy argument that we should not immunize those who would use the disciplinary system to make baseless accusations to harm the professional reputations of attorneys. Respondent's argument overlooks that the D.C. Bar Rules also provide confidentiality for initial complaints to Bar Counsel, so that members of the bar will not be harmed by baseless complaints made out of spite or malice, or those which are determined, after investigation, to have little merit. See Bar Rule XI, § 17(a); In re Alexander, 513 A.2d at 782 (noting that the Bar's disciplinary process insulates members from unfounded complaints . . . it is Bar Counsel who decides whether to initiate an investigation). Thus, when a defamation action is brought based on such a complaint, it contravenes our system for the regulation of those who practice before us; a system that encourages the reporting of unethical behavior, while ensuring that only meritorious claims are prosecuted and made known to the public.