Opinion ID: 6111649
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Chain of Distribution

Text: Even if “Polo” drugs were the but-for cause of the victims’ overdoses, Defendants argue that the jury was also required to find that they were personally linked to these drug sales in order to impose an enhanced sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). The death-or-injuryresults enhancement applies only if the defendant violated a substantive provision of § 841—that is, there must be an underlying crime. See § 841(b)(1)(C). When a defendant’s underlying crime relies on a conspiracy theory of liability, then the district court cannot impose the enhanced sentence unless the jury finds that the defendant was part of the distribution chain that led to the victim’s overdose. Hamm, 952 F.3d at 745. This rule emerged through two cases: United States v. Swiney, 203 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2000) and United States v. Hamm, 952 F.3d 728 (6th Cir. 2020). In Swiney, nine co-defendants were convicted of conspiring to distribute heroin under § 846. 203 F.3d at 400. One unindicted co-conspirator sold heroin to a man who later overdosed on that heroin. Id. at 400–01. The district court refused to apply the death-or-injury-results enhancement to the conspiracy defendants because there was “no proof linking the heroin which caused” the overdose to other co-conspirators, and we affirmed. Id. at 401. We concluded that “before any of the [d]efendants can be subject to the sentence enhancement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)” the jury must find that the defendants were “part of the distribution chain.” Id. at 406. We vacated the defendants’ sentences and remanded the case for the district court to make this factual determination. See id. In Hamm, we reiterated that “to apply the § 841(b)(1)(C) sentencing enhancement” to any underlying conspiracy crime, “the jury need[s] to find beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] w[as] part of the distribution chain.” 952 F.3d at 747. But Hamm also extended Swiney, applying the chain-of-distribution requirement when the underlying crime is a Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 49 substantive offense under § 841 that is based solely on a conspiracy theory, even if the underlying crime is not conspiracy under § 846. 952 F.3d at 746–47. Specifically, Hamm held that a defendant who did not personally commit the underlying crime, but who is nevertheless liable as a co-conspirator, cannot be sentenced under the death-or-injury-results enhancement unless he was part of the chain of distribution. Id. Such co-conspirator liability, known as “Pinkerton liability,” “is a way of holding members of a conspiracy liable ‘for acts committed by other members.’” Id. at 744 (quoting Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 Yale L.J. 1307, 1336 (2003)). In Hamm, the defendants were convicted of distribution charges under § 841. Hamm, 952 F.3d at 746–47. The two defendants worked together with another woman, Tracey Myers, to buy carfentanil in Cincinnati and bring it back to Kentucky. See id. at 748. But, once in Kentucky, Myers and the two defendants each used or sold their carfentanil on their own terms. See id. At some point, Myers gave carfentanil to her cellmates while in jail, and her cellmates overdosed on the drugs. Id. The defendants were convicted of distributing carfentanil, and each received a 20-year sentence because the carfentanil caused Myers’ cellmates’ overdoses. See id. at 746–47. We concluded that, without the Pinkerton doctrine imposing liability onto coconspirators, the defendants could not have been convicted under § 841(a). See id. at 747 (“No one is alleging that [the defendants] actually sold carfentanil to [the overdose victims]; they are only liable for the distribution to [the overdose victims] as . . . Myers’ co-conspirators.”). Because the defendants were only liable as co-conspirators, “it ma[de] little sense to say that Swiney [wa]s a conspiracy case but this one [wa]s not.” Id. at 747. We thus held that the district court could not have imposed the sentence enhancement unless the jury found that the defendants were in the chain of distribution. Id. at 747; see also Williams, 998 F.3d at 734 (“To prove that [the defendant] was liable for the death of others, moreover, the government cannot rely on Pinkerton liability, and must show that [the defendant] was in the chain of distribution that caused the victim’s death or injury.”). But the jury was not instructed on this element. See Hamm, 952 F.3d at 747. By failing to give a chain-of-distribution instruction, the district court “misstated the law.” Id.; see also United States v. Nelson, 27 F.3d 199, 200, 202 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding plain error when district court failed to instruct the jury on a critical element under a similar sentencing enhancement provision—18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)). The district court here Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 50 did not give a chain-of-distribution instruction for either Tempo or Sadler. Because their underlying crimes were different, and the effects of any error differ, they require separate discussions. a) Kenneth Sadler: § 846 Conspiracy The district court plainly erred by omitting a chain-of-distribution instruction as part of the jury instructions for Sadler’s § 846 conspiracy count. The district court instructed the jury that: If you find that the defendant is guilty of the conspiracy charged in Count One, and that the distribution of Heroin or Fentanyl causing the serious bodily injury or death was in furtherance of the conspiracy and was committed by or reasonably foreseeable to him, you may find that the Heroin or Fentanyl so distributed caused a serious bodily injury or death if he or she would not have suffered a serious bodily injury or died had he or she not used that substance. (Jury Instrs., R. 662, Page ID ##3574 (emphasis added)). Sadler did not object to this instruction or request a chain-of-distribution instruction before the district court. We therefore review this instruction for plain error. See Castano, 543 F.3d at 833. The jury found that Sadler conspired to distribute controlled substances, that the substances distributed as part of that conspiracy resulted in death and serious bodily harm, and that those distributions were in furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable to Sadler. But the jury did not receive a chain-of-distribution instruction and, thus, did not decide whether Sadler was “part of the distribution chain” as required under Hamm and Swiney. Hamm, 952 F.3d at 745 (quoting Swiney, 203 F.3d at 406). Because the district court sentenced Sadler under the death-or-injury-results provision without the necessary factual findings by the jury, the district court plainly erred. See Nelson, 27 F.3d at 200, 202. This error substantially affected Sadler’s rights because, “taken as a whole, the jury instructions were so clearly erroneous as to likely produce a grave miscarriage of justice.” Castano, 543 F.3d at 833. An erroneous jury instruction affects a defendant’s substantial rights when it “could have led the jury to convict the defendant under a lower standard.” Id. at 836. Here, the jury found that Sadler was part of the “Polo” conspiracy, but the jury did not consider Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 51 whether Sadler was “part of the chain of distribution” of the drugs that killed or injured the victims. Therefore, the district court improperly imposed the 20-year minimum sentence under § 841(b)(1)(C). See Hamm, 952 F.3d at 745; see also United States v. Donovan, 539 F. App’x 648, 653 (6th Cir. 2013) (vacating defendant’s sentence because “[a] defendant may not be sentenced under the statutory penalties for a cocaine conspiracy following a general jury verdict on a conspiracy to distribute both cocaine and marijuana as the jury may have found only a marijuana conspiracy”). The chain-of-distribution instruction could have monumental effects for Sadler. Without the 20-year enhancement, Sadler’s sentence would have been five years shorter. He is entitled to have a jury decide whether he was in the chain of distribution. Therefore, we vacate his sentence and remand on this question. b) Demarco Tempo: Pinkerton Liability Tempo similarly argues that the district court improperly omitted a chain-of-distribution instruction. However, he believes that this instruction was necessary because the jury convicted him of substantive offenses under § 841 solely under a Pinkerton conspiracy theory. In its jury instructions, the district court explained that: There are multiple ways that the government can prove a defendant guilty [distribution under § 841]. The first is by convincing [the jury] that the defendant personally committed or participated in this crime. The second is by showing that the defendant aided and abetted the commission of the charged offense. The third is based on the legal rule that all members of a conspiracy are responsible for acts committed by the other members, as long as those acts are committed to help advance the conspiracy, and are within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the agreement. This is often called “Pinkerton Liability.” (Jury Instrs., R. 662, Page ID #3580). As to the death-or-injury-results enhancement on the substantive distribution counts, the court instructed that: [T]he government need not prove that the serious bodily injury or death was foreseeable to the defendant or defendants. Rather, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (A) The defendant is guilty of the charged Distribution of a Controlled Substance under at least one of the theories of liability described above; (B) That the victim . . . used the Heroin of Fentanyl so distributed . . .; Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 52 (C) That he or she suffered a serious bodily injury or died; and (D) That he or she would not have suffered a serious bodily injury or died but for the use of the Heroin or Fentanyl. (Id. at Page ID ##3588–89 (emphasis added)). At trial, Tempo objected to the Pinkerton instruction, but he did not ask for a chain-ofdistribution instruction. Rather, he argued that the Pinkerton instruction was erroneous because “no conspiracy ha[d] been established” that involved Tempo. (Trial Tr., R. 727, Page ID #6626). The district court overruled that objection. Because Tempo lodged his objection to Pinkerton on different grounds than he now presents, we review the district court’s omission of a chain-ofdistribution instruction for plain error. See Castano, 543 F.3d at 833. As Hamm made clear, the death-or-injury-results enhancement cannot apply if the defendant is convicted on a Pinkerton theory unless the jury also finds that the defendant was in the chain of distribution. Hamm, 952 F.3d at 745. Here, the district court gave a Pinkerton instruction but not a chain-of-distribution instruction on Tempo’s substantive charges. Because the district court failed to instruct the jury that, if it found Tempo liable under a Pinkerton theory, it must also determine whether he was in the chain of distribution, the district court plainly erred. Although Tempo argues that this error alone necessitates vacation and remand, such a remedy is warranted only if the error “affect[ed] substantial rights,” meaning it “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Castano, 543 F.3d at 833 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734). Unlike Sadler’s conspiracy conviction—and unlike the defendants in Hamm who could be found liable only on a Pinkerton theory—a rational jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Tempo was a principal in the crime and/or an aider and abettor. See supra Part II.A.1.a. In this context, omitting a chain-of-distribution instruction did not substantially affect Tempo’s rights because he “is not being held responsible for someone else’s actions based on his status as a co-conspirator, but is being punished for his own actions.” Davis, 970 F.3d at 657 (quoting United States v. Atkins, 289 F. App’x 872, 877 (6th Cir. 2008) (refusing to require a Swiney/Hamm instruction because the defendant was liable as a principal)). Thus, even though the district court plainly erred by omitting a chain-of-distribution instruction with the Pinkerton instruction, that error does not warrant remand. See Castano, 543 F.3d at 833. Nos. 19-2217/2221/20-1177 United States v. Sadler, et al. Page 53