Opinion ID: 1541806
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Courtroom Closure

Text: Before Jane testified at trial, the state moved for a partial closure of the courtroom, purportedly under G.L.1956 § 12-28-8 and G.L. 1956 § 11-37-13.2, arguing that closing the courtroom was necessary, given Jane's age, the nature of the allegations, and the subject of the expected testimony. In a ruling devoid of appropriate findings, the trial justice indicated that he was prepared to allow the motion. The trial justice declared that he would close the courtroom to unnecessary personnel, but that court staff, defense counsel, a member of the victim's family, and the media would not be excluded. Notably, it was only upon prompting by the trial justice that defendant proffered a bare objection, stating, I would object to it, Your Honor. The trial justice then stated: I've reviewed various materials presented. It appears as though we not only have a young, traumatized alleged victim, but she has some, what I consider to be, learning disabilities or slow maturation, and so it appears to me that her psychological or mental age may be substantially less than her actual age, and so I think that is even more reason that she deserves some additional consideration. [14] On appeal, defendant argues that this ruling violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The state argues that the trial justice's decision was not erroneous in light of Jane's age, the nature of the allegation, and her expected testimony. According to the state, the trial justice's decision ordering a partial closure of the courtroom was appropriate because § 11-37-13.2(a) provides that there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the child is unable to testify before the court without suffering unreasonable and unnecessary mental or emotional harm. [15] This argument is without merit. We are of the opinion that the state had no basis whatsoever to point to § 11-37-13.2(a), in seeking an order to close the courtroom. This statute sets forth alternate means for relieving child rape victims from the trauma associated with facing their alleged abusers in a courtroom; however, closing the courtroom is not among them. The statute wholly does not apply to this case because Jane testified at trial  not outside the courtroom, as provided for by § 11-37-13.2(a). Although this statute reflects the Legislature's effort to establish procedures for the protection of child victims, it does not anticipate that a trial justice summarily will exclude the public from attending the trial. After all, it is the defendant who is accused and whose right to a public trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court has recognized the wisdom of protecting children who are witnesses under difficult circumstances. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 607, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982) ([S]afeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor    is a compelling [interest].). Additionally, the General Assembly has enacted legislation that provides for statutory protections for children  both victims and those who allegedly are delinquent. See, e.g., Providence Journal Co. v. Rodgers, 711 A.2d 1131 (R.I.1998) (court records that concern the identity of victims of child molestation sexual assault shall be confidential in accordance with § 11-37-8.5); see also Matter of Falstaff Brewing Corp. Re: Narragansett Brewery Fire, 637 A.2d 1047, 1051-52 (R.I.1994) (the Legislature has endeavored to afford juveniles the opportunity to enter adulthood free of the stigmatization that follows criminal offenders) and G.L.1956 § 14-1-30 (mandating that in the Family Court, [a]ll cases involving children shall be heard separately and apart from the trial of cases against adults). After careful review of the record in this case, we are of the opinion that the trial justice did not deprive defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. It is significant that defendant, upon prompting by the trial justice, mouthed a barebones objection to the closure of the courtroom (whereby unnecessary personnel were to be excluded), but failed to articulate a legal basis for his objection. Furthermore, and fatal to defendant's Sixth Amendment challenge, there has been no showing that anyone, whether court personnel or the citizenry, was, in fact, excluded from this portion of the trial. This Court reviews de novo a party's allegation that a constitutional right has been infringed. State v. Keohane, 814 A.2d 327, 329 (R.I.2003). When undertaking such a review, the court  should take care    to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts   . Powers v. State, 734 A.2d 508, 514 (R.I.1999) (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657). After reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that defendant was not denied a public trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, despite the trial justice's failure to articulate appropriate findings to support his ruling. This Court has declined to hold a trial justice's closure to constitute reversible error when the record does not establish that anyone actually was excluded from the courtroom. See State v. Fayerweather, 540 A.2d 353, 354 (R.I.1988) (holding that the trial justice's courtroom closure, even if inappropriate, did not prejudice defendant because the closure did not totally exclude the public and there was nothing in the record to suggest that a significant number of individuals attended the trial or wished to attend or were unable to gain admittance to the courtroom when the six-year-old was about to testify); see also State v. Lerner, 112 R.I. 62, 91, 308 A.2d 324, 342 (1973) (dismissing defendant's contention that he was denied his right to a public trial because [w]hile it [was] suggested that the public would be excluded from the trial, nothing in the record establishe[d] that the public actually was excluded). The trial justice's limited ruling to close the courtroom to unnecessary personnel, standing alone, does not establish that the public was excluded. Absent a showing that a member of the public was prevented from attending the trial, we are unable to conclude that defendant's Sixth Amendment right was violated. However, the record before us is woefully inadequate and does not support the ruling that the trial justice made. He should have conducted a hearing and made specific findings to justify his decision  merely referring to materials that he reviewed in camera and that are not part of the record is insufficient as a matter of law. The Supreme Court has held that, in seeking to exclude the public from a trial, the moving party must articulate an overriding interest and then a trial court must make findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 464 U.S. 501, 510, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984). It is clear that such specific findings were not made in this instance. Further, defense counsel did little to avoid this error when he failed to offer a specific objection to the state's motion and did not suggest any options. After a trial justice proposes to close the courtroom, it is the opposing party's obligation to offer a specific, not perfunctory, objection to the closure. See Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 169 (4th Cir.2000); Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 71 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Brown v. Kuhlmann, 142 F.3d 529, 541-42 & n. 6 (2d Cir.1998) (partially attributing the trial justice's mistake in closing the courtroom to the opposing party's lack of effective advocacy). In State v. Torres, 844 A.2d 155, 159 (R.I. 2004), defense counsel made a record showing that members of the public and defendant's family were excluded by the trial justice during jury selection. We deemed this showing specific and granted a new trial. Id. at 162. In the case before us, there is no evidence that anyone was barred from the courtroom. The trial justice's order to exclude unnecessary personnel, without more, does not establish that defendant was denied a public trial. Notwithstanding our holding in this case, however, we pause to note that the state's reliance on § 11-37-13.2, as support for its motion for the closure of the courtroom, was misplaced. Before this Court, the state suggests, inter alia, that the trial justice's decision to close the courtroom was appropriate because § 11-37-13.2(a) provides that there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the child is unable to testify before the court without suffering unreasonable and unnecessary mental or emotional harm. Additionally, the state points to § 12-28-8(c) as support for excluding the public from our courtrooms. Section 12-28-8(c) provides in pertinent part: Child victims of felony offenses, or offenses which would be considered felony offenses if committed by adults, shall have the following rights in addition to those set forth elsewhere in this chapter:    (4) To be permitted to testify at all judicial proceedings in the manner which will be least traumatic to the child, consistent with the rights of the defendant[.] We do not read these enactments as allowing trial justices to bar the public from attending a criminal trial. In an appropriate case, with an established record, we will not hesitate to order a new trial. See Torres, 844 A.2d at 162 (The exclusion of the defendant's family during jury empanelment deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The conviction was vacated and a new trial ordered.). Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we reject defendant's argument that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated.