Opinion ID: 1952246
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: RSI As Defendant

Text: As the trial court noted in its decision, [i]t is an elementary proposition of law that a plaintiff must sue the proper party or parties as defendant. Council of Sch. Officers v. Vaughn, 553 A.2d 1222, 1225 (D.C. 1989). In ascertaining the proper defendant here, we note that, as a general rule, an administrative agency itself must carry the burden of defending its action in any challenge to it. See, e.g., District of Columbia Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. International Bhd. of Police Officers, Local 445, 680 A.2d 434, 437 (D.C.1996) (Even if the rule and proposed form did not make it clear that [plaintiff] should have named as respondent the agency that issued the order, rather than the party that prevailed before the agency, our decision in [ Vaughn ] should have settled the matter.); Vaughn, 553 A.2d at 1226 (noting that agency would be proper defendant but for operation of statute that makes D.C. Council proper defendant); Dankman v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 443 A.2d 507, 516-17 (D.C.1981) (en banc) (opinion of Harris, J.) (By procedural design, the agency carries the burden of supporting its decision and occupies a defensive role.); 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 18.1 (3d ed. 1994). Unless the legislature alters this approach by statute, therefore, the agency is the proper defendant. Francis offers several inventive reasons why she elected to sue RSI instead of the CAB. First, she contends that, because the CAB is a noncorporate department or other body within a municipal corporation, the CAB is not suable as a separate entity (i.e., is not sui juris). Braxton v. National Capital Hous. Auth., 396 A.2d 215, 216 (D.C. 1978). [8] We cannot credit this argument. We regularly have sustained suits against the CAB, see, e.g., Fry & Welch Assoc., P.C. v. District of Columbia Contract Appeals Bd., 664 A.2d 1230 (D.C.1995); Abia-Okon v. District of Columbia Appeals Bd., 647 A.2d 79 (D.C.1994); Jones & Artis, supra, as well as against other adjudicative agencies, see, e.g., Spielman v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters' Retirement & Relief Bd., 624 A.2d 932 (D.C.1993); Doe v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human Rights, 624 A.2d 440 (D.C.1993);  N St. Follies Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 622 A.2d 61 (D.C.1993). As a further example that agency adjudicators routinely are considered to be proper respondents, this court's own rule governing review of agency decisions requires the petitioner to name the respondent agency when seeking direct review here; we clearly have rejected the idea that an adjudicating agency is not sui juris for purposes of defending its own decisions. See D.C.App.R. 15(c). It is therefore clear that the CAB is a proper defendant in this action. It is equally clear that RSI is not. If a defendant cannot provide the requested relief, the defendant should be dismissed. See Vaughn, 553 A.2d at 1226. Like the trial court, we question how Francis can expect RSI to vacate the CAB's order, as the complaint seeks. Without the CAB in the case, the best Francis could hope for was an order enjoining RSI from taking advantage of the CAB decision. Francis, however, did not ask for such relief or make any argument as to why RSI should not seek to enforce the CAB order in its favor. Francis, moreover, has not explained what wrong RSI has committed to bring it under judicial scrutiny. Instead, Francis has argued in her complaint only that the CAB was at fault by issuing an arbitrary and capricious order that exceeded its authority. Such charges, directed only against the CAB, not RSI, self-evidently indicate that only the CAB, not RSI, was in a position to address them. Finally, we reject Francis's argument that RSI was the real party in interest. As discussed above, the matters raised in the complaint go directly to the CAB's authority and to the validity of its decision, which the CAB has a substantial interest in defending. We cannot agree with Francis's unsupported assertion that the CAB has no more interest in an appeal of its decision than the Superior Court has in an appeal of a judgment. That statement confuses the role of adjudicative agencies with that of the courts and conflicts with the well established proposition discussed above: that an agency defends its own decisions. See Dankman, 443 A.2d at 516-17 (opinion of Harris, J.); id. at 524-25 (Ferren, J., concurring). In sum, we agree with the trial court that Francis improperly named RSI as the defendant in this action. Under a well established rule of administrative law, Francis should have named the CAB as the respondent agency in seeking review of the CAB decision. Francis's reasons for bringing the suit against RSI  that the CAB was not a suable entity and that RSI was the real party in interest  are not persuasive. And, of fundamental importance, RSI cannot provide the relief that Francis has requested. Accordingly, we sustain the trial court's ruling that Francis improperly named RSI as defendant in this case.