Opinion ID: 1192807
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cross Examination of Clarke

Text: Clarke next asserts the district court erred when the district court allowed the government to cross examine Clarke regarding her pseudoephedrine purchases and positive drug tests. Clarke maintains the evidence was improper under Fed. R.Evid. 404(b) because (1) the government failed to give notice of its intent to rely on this evidence; (2) the evidence only showed Clarke's propensity to use and manufacture methamphetamine; (3) the evidence lacked reliability; and (4) the district court gave no limiting instruction. We review a district court's evidentiary rulings under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hawkins, 548 F.3d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 2008). We construe Rule 404(b) broadly as a rule of inclusion, `and we will reverse only when such evidence clearly had no bearing on the case and was introduced solely to prove the defendant's propensity to commit criminal acts.' Id. (quoting United States v. Anthony, 537 F.3d 863, 865 (8th Cir.2008)). Clarke did not argue to the district court that evidence of Clarke's pseudoephedrine purchases was improper under Rule 404(b), and although Clarke objected to a question by the government on her prior methamphetamine use, Clarke did not object to the government's questions regarding Clarke's positive drug tests. Thus, we review these rulings for plain error, which requires Clarke to prove that there was (1) error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected substantial rights. United States v. Eagle, 515 F.3d 794, 801 (8th Cir.2008) (citations omitted). Reversal under plain error review is only warranted if `the error has prejudiced the substantial rights of a party and would result in a miscarriage of justice if left uncorrected.' United States v. Porchay, 533 F.3d 704, 708 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 481 F.3d 619, 627 (8th Cir. 2007)). Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) excludes evidence of crimes, wrongs, or acts which are offered to show a defendant's propensity, or character, to commit a crime, but does not exclude the evidence for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In criminal cases, Rule 404(b) requires the prosecution to give pretrial notice, unless the district court excuses the notice at trial, regarding the general nature of any Rule 404(b) evidence the government intends to introduce at trial. The district court found the government's questioning on Clarke's pseudoephedrine purchases was admissible as both impeachment evidence and proof of the charged conspiracy in count one of the indictment. This was not error. We have consistently held `crimes or acts which are inextricably intertwined with the charged crime are not extrinsic and Rule 404(b) does not apply.' United States v. Aldridge, 561 F.3d 759, 766 (8th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Adams, 401 F.3d 886, 899 (8th Cir.2005)). Count one of the indictment charged Clarke with conspiracy to possess pseudoephedrine between August 23, 2005, and October 3, 2007, knowing the pseudoephedrine would be used to manufacture methamphetamine. The government questioned Clarke about her pseudoephedrine purchases from September 12, 2006, through March 18, 2007. The government's questioning provided direct evidence of Clarke's possession of pseudoephedrine during the alleged conspiracy of count one, and was clearly relevant to establishing Clarke's participation in the conspiracy. Thus, the evidence was outside the province of Rule 404(b), because it was inextricably intertwined with the charged conspiracy, and the district court did not commit any error, much less plain error, in allowing the government to inquire about these purchases during Clarke's cross examination. See United States v. O'Dell, 204 F.3d 829, 833-34 (8th Cir.2000) (holding testimony about a defendant's possession of methamphetamine was inextricably intertwined with the charged conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine). The district court also did not commit error under Rule 404(b) by allowing the government to cross examine Clarke regarding her positive methamphetamine tests because the questions were not subject to Rule 404(b), but rather, were offered to impeach, under Fed. R.Evid. 608(b), Clarke's testimony denying methamphetamine manufacturing, possession, and use. Under Fed.R.Evid. 608(b), a witness may be cross examined regarding specific incidents and actions which attack or support the witness's character for truthfulness, but these acts cannot be proved by extrinsic evidence. During direct examination, Clarke testified she did not recognize some of the items seized at her house which had been identified by the government as commonly used for methamphetamine manufacturing. Clarke also testified, during 2005 and 2006, she did not engage in methamphetamine manufacturing, breaking down of pills, mixing combustible substances, or possessing diet pills and cold pills to manufacture methamphetamine. On cross examination, Clarke testified she previously had used methamphetamine, but did not use methamphetamine in 2005 and 2006. Clarke also testified she inadvertently took diet pills, after she was indicted, which had been laced with methamphetamine. Because Clarke denied any connection to methamphetamine manufacturing, possession, or use, the government could attempt to impeach Clarke with questions regarding Clarke's positive methamphetamine tests. The positive tests contradicted Clarke's denials about methamphetamine possession and use and attacked Clarke's truthfulness, and the government did not offer extrinsic evidence of the positive tests. Thus, the evidence was proper under Rule 608(b), and the district court did not commit any error. Lastly, because Rule 404(b) evidence was not involved, a limiting instruction was not necessary.