Opinion ID: 852648
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Examining the Taxpayers' Arguments Supporting a Special Law

Text: Although Section 44 is a special law, this does not make it per se unconstitutional. Rather, the conclusion that a law is special is only a threshold determination in analyzing a law's constitutionality. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d at 692. As we have stated the drafters [of the 1851 Constitution] expressed a preference for general laws, but they also recognized that special laws were sometimes necessary. Moseley, 643 N.E.2d at 300. Thus, even if a law is special, it may still be constitutionally permissible. Article IV, Section 23 declares that [i]n all cases enumerated in the preceding section, and in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general, and of uniform operation throughout the State. Thus, to be unconstitutional under Section 23, a law must not only be special but subject to a law of general applicability. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d at 689-90. When examining special legislation to determine if a general law can be made applicable, we ask whether there are inherent characteristics of the affected [class] that justify [special] legislation. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d at 692. See also State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Lake Superior Court, 820 N.E.2d 1240, 1249 (Ind.2005). This inquiry leads us to consider 1) whether in fact [the statute] is meaningful in a variety of places or whether relevant traits of the affected area are distinctive such that the law's application elsewhere has no effect, Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d at 692, and 2) if those unique circumstances . . . rationally justify the legislation. Lake Superior Court, 820 N.E.2d at 1249. Succinctly then, we look at whether there is something about the class that makes it unique and whether that uniqueness justifies the differential treatment. In our more recent cases, we have typically looked first to whether some uniqueness exists in the class specified in the special law. In Moseley, for example, we considered whether the statute authorizing riverboat gambling in select Indiana counties could have been made generally applicable. 643 N.E.2d at 300-01. In concluding that it was not, we noted that unlike other areas in the state, the counties specified in the statute were home to a suitable body of water. Id. at 301. This uniqueness made it permissible for the special law to apply to only those specified counties. Id. Similarly, in State v. Hoovler , we held that a statute that by its terms applied only to Tippecanoe County did not violate Article IV, Section 23. 668 N.E.2d at 1235. This decision was based in part on the fact that Tippecanoe County was the only county in Indiana in which the county itself was subject to possible Superfund liability under federal environmental laws. Id. Again, in Lake Superior Court, we found that the long and tortured history of property taxation in Lake County, 820 N.E.2d at 1249, which included a one-of-a-kind situation in which only a few industrial sites were responsible for a large percentage of property tax revenue, constituted unique circumstances that warranted local legislation to deal with a reassessment problem of a scale and complexity not found elsewhere in the state. Id. at 1250. By contrast with the cases above, there is nothing unique about the class specified in Section 44. The taxpayers provide no meaningful explanation as to why the problems they face are any different than those faced by landowning fraternities and sororities throughout the state. Certainly, as the Monroe County Auditor notes, there is nothing supporting the contention that education cost[s are] a problem unique to Indiana University students living in Monroe County. [Nor is there] evidence to suggest that tax years 2000. . . and 2001 . . . were unique tax years. (Appellees' Br. at 8.) In attempting to establish some basis for uniqueness, appellants argue that by enacting Section 44 of Public Law 25602003[sic], the General Assembly has determined that nonprofit entities that own property used for fraternities for students attending Indiana University are in greater need of fiscal relief that other nonprofit entities . . ., because it is the state's goal to make higher education affordable. (Appellants' Br. at 10-11.) This rationale might identify unique characteristics of fraternities and sororities as a whole that could justify the special treatment of the entire class. It does not, however, identify anything unique about the three fraternities here that differentiate them from any other fraternity or sorority, at any other time, at any other college, in any other county. Indeed, the problems college students and their parents face in financing higher education are well known and apply across the entire country and across all economic strata. As the fraternities themselves point out, the problem is so ubiquitous that Governor Kernan created a special taskforce to address the problem in the waning days of his administration. (Appellants' Br. at 10.) Ultimately, the taxpayers' argument boils down to a claim that they are unique because they, and they alone, require relief from the consequences of their own oversight. This is hardly a fact that justifies some form of special treatment. In fact, it is little different than the case of Mr. John Carter and Mr. Joel Dixon who, in 1827, received from the legislature by act the deeds to land purchased by them from Mr. and Mrs. Moses Alderson. See 1827 Ind. Acts 50-51. The passage of the act was necessary because the warranty deeds that the Aldersons provided to Carter and Dixon were not properly sealed before the death of Mr. Alderson. Id. In other words, the act allowed the named purchasers, whose own inattentiveness to the contract put them into a difficult set of circumstances, to circumvent the ordinary rules of property transfers.