Opinion ID: 1786952
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: is a fundamental right of the acker's being affected, properly placing this issue before the court even without a transcript of the hearing on the motion for resentencing?

Text: ¶ 21. Acker claims that because her fundamental rights are at stake this Court should look past the fact that there is no hearing transcript in the record and review the issue of Acker's physical and mental health as set forth in her brief. She identifies no specific fundamental right which was lost, and she concedes that her appeal would have been more efficient if there was a record of the arguments and evidence from the motion hearing. She urges in her brief that the absence of any record of the hearing is excused since her former attorney agreed with the State that no court reporter would be required, speculating that counsel for both sides thought that the motion would be granted. No evidence of either an agreement nor the reason for it is offered. ¶ 22. This Court has consistently held that it will not address issues based on assertions in the briefs and that it will not consider matters which do not appear in the record and must confine itself to what actually does appear in the record. Medina v. State, 688 So.2d 727, 732 (Miss.1996) (citing Robinson v. State, 662 So.2d 1100, 1104 (Miss.1995), and Ross v. State, 603 So.2d 857, 861 (Miss.1992)). Acker feels that this procedural bar should not apply in the present case because a fundamental right is at stake. This Court has stated, it has been established that where fundamental rights are violated, procedural rules give way to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Gray v. State, 549 So.2d 1316, 1321 (Miss.1989) (citing House v. State, 445 So.2d 815, 820 (Miss.1984)). ¶ 23. Acker maintains that her fundamental rights outweigh the requirement to procedurally bar her from presenting mitigating circumstances and evidence not part of the record. She asserts that she is not at fault for there not being a transcript of the hearing, that the evidence of her physical and mental problems were not made known to the trial court at the time of sentencing because of her mental deficiencies, and that she was not able to mention these physical and mental problems at the motion hearing because she was not present. ¶ 24. She relies on Gallion v. State, 469 So.2d 1247, 1249 (Miss.1985), where this Court held that an exception to the rule that questions not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal exists where errors at trial affect fundamental rights. (citing Brooks v. Wynn, 209 Miss. 156, 46 So.2d 97 (1950)). Acker also points to Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 666 (Miss.1991) where this Court applied the exception where an appellant did not raise an argument in his motion to suppress at the pretrial hearing or at trial. ¶ 25. Acker is asking this Court to ignore well-established rules governing matters which are properly before an appellate court without even identifying the fundamental supposedly being violated. She was sentenced within statutory limits, was represented by counsel when the plea was entered and at the hearing on her motion, and nothing in the record indicates that she was in any way prevented from presenting evidence. The thoroughness with which the trial judge interrogated Acker at the time of her plea also serves as significant evidence of her competence and the voluntary and intelligent nature of her plea and goes against Acker's assertion that she was less than mentally sound. It should be noted once again that Acker has not challenged the voluntariness of her guilty plea nor made a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. ¶ 26. This issue is also, without merit.