Opinion ID: 2611807
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Charter counties and cities under the state Constitution

Text: Article XI of our Constitution concerns local government. Section 1, subdivision (a), of that article divides the state into counties, which are legal subdivisions of the State. Subdivision (b) of that section (hereafter section 1 (b)) states: The Legislature shall provide for county powers ... and an elected governing body in each county. A parallel provision  article XI, section 2  grants the Legislature authority to provide for formation of cities, and to provide for city powers. Under the authority of these sections, the Legislature has enacted hundreds of statutes that regulate the powers and governmental structure of both counties and cities. (See Gov. Code, tit. 3 [Government of Counties], § 23000 et seq.; id., tit. 4 [Government of Cities], § 34000 et seq.; & id., tit. 5, [Local Agencies], § 50001 et seq.) Article XI, section 3, allows for an alternative governmental structure  independent from the legislative schemes enacted pursuant to sections 1 (b) and 2 of article XI  for both counties and cities that adopt a charter for their own governance. Subdivision (a) of section 3 (hereafter section 3(a)) states: For its own government, a county or city may adopt a charter by majority vote of its electors voting on the question.... County charters adopted pursuant to this section shall supersede any existing charter and all laws inconsistent therewith. The provisions of a charter are the law of the state and have the force and effect of legislative enactments. (Italics added.) Article XI, sections 4 and 5, concern county and city charters, respectively, and grant to both entities varying degrees of home rule, i.e., the authority of the people to create and operate their own local government and define the powers of that government, within the limits set out by the Constitution. (See Younger v. Board of Supervisors (1979) 93 Cal. App.3d 864, 869 [155 Cal. Rptr. 921] (hereafter Younger ).) Article XI, section 4  the provision at issue in this case  addresses the structure and operation of county government. In so doing it both specifies and confines the authority of county charters. It states: County charters shall provide for: [¶] (a) A governing body of 5 or more members.... [¶] (b) The compensation, terms, and removal of members of the governing body.... [¶] (c) An elected sheriff, an elected district attorney, an elected assessor, other officers, their election or appointment, compensation, terms and removal. [¶] (d) The performance of functions required by statute. [¶] (e) The powers and duties of governing bodies and all other county officers, and for consolidation and segregation of county officers, and for the manner of filling all vacancies occurring therein. (Italics added.) Section 4 further provides that general laws enacted by the Legislature pursuant to article XI, section 1 (b), shall be  superseded by said charter as to matters for which, under this section it is competent to make provision in such charter, and for which provision is made therein, except as herein otherwise expressly provided.  (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 4, subd. (g), italics added.) Finally, subdivision (h) specifies that charter counties have at minimum those powers provided by the Legislature, pursuant to section 1 (b), to noncharter (i.e., general law) counties. [3] Whereas charter county home rule authority is limited to matters concerning the structure and operation of local government, the version of home rule afforded to a charter city is substantially more expansive. First, in comparison with charter counties, article XI, section 5, subdivision (b), gives charter cities even broader authority to structure and organize their government; for example, it grants plenary authority over the election, removal, and compensation of municipal officers and employees. ( Ibid. ) In addition, and unlike charter counties, charter cities are also given broad authority to make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs. ... City charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede any existing charter, and with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent therewith. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5, subd. (a).) There is no corresponding grant of authority and autonomy over the county affairs of charter counties. ( Johnson v. Bradley (1992) 4 Cal.4th 389, 406 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 470, 841 P.2d 990]; see also Sato, Municipal Affairs in California (1972) 60 Cal.L.Rev. 1055, 1115.) Indeed, as noted above, the Constitution requires charter counties to provide for [t]he performance of functions required by statute. (Art. XI, § 4, subd. (d).)) As Professor Van Alstyne noted in his authoritative review of the predecessors to present article XI, sections 3, 4 and 5: The principal difference between `city home rule' and `county home rule' lay in the fact that since 1896, cities, by express provision in their charters could acquire control of `municipal affairs' independent of general laws pertaining thereto. [Citations.] The scope of home rule available to cities thus was coextensive with the purview of the broad and general expression, `municipal affairs'. No such general grant of authority to incorporate provisions relating to `county affairs' was included in [the prior version of present section 4] with respect to county charters. Surely, if the proponents of county home rule sincerely wished to authorize a fully parallel system of county autonomy matching that enjoyed by charter cities, this omission was a strange way to accomplish their object. (Background Study Relating to Article XI, Local Government (1966) Cal. Const. Revision Com., Proposed Revision, at pp. 140-141.) These observations remain a valid description of present sections 3(a), 4, and 5, all of which, pursuant to article XI, section 13, must be construed as a restatement of all related provisions of the Constitution in effect immediately prior to [June 2, 1970, the effective date of the current version of article XI], and as making no substantive change. Plaintiff makes much of the above described distinction between the grant of autonomy over municipal affairs to charter cities and the corresponding absence of any such grant of autonomy over county affairs of charter counties. As we shall explain, however, the distinction is irrelevant in this case, because the constitutional authority for defendants' enactment and implementation of the CLERB rests, not on any purported county affairs power of charter counties, but instead on the long-standing grant of structural and operational home rule powers found in article XI, section 4, subdivision (e) (hereafter section 4(e)).