Opinion ID: 1704302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rights Under Lease.

Text: Roberts' initial lease of the riverbed adjacent to Leach Park was subject to a number of provisions and conditions. The lease was designated commercial and approved use of the described area for excursion boats, a gift shop, and a ticket office. The lease incorporated the language of the statute relating to the public trust doctrine. The DNR reserved the right to terminate the lease upon any of the grounds specified in Section 648.1 of the Code of Iowa or for violation of any terms of this lease. The renewed lease was identical. Roberts argues that the lease granted it a superior right to possession over all other commercial ventures for that portion of the riverbed, during the entire lease term. Roberts further argues that the State had no basis to terminate the lease. We believe this issue can be resolved by determining whether the DNR lease is a true lease or whether it is in effect a license. See generally Lee v. North Dakota Park Serv., 262 N.W.2d 467 (N.D.1977). It is often difficult to distinguish between a lease, an easement, and a license. See 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant § 5, at 45-47 (1970); 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 2, at 417-19, § 3, at 419, § 123, at 525-26 (1966). The title of an instrument is not controlling; the intent of the parties is the determining factor. Paul v. Blakely, 243 Iowa 355, 358, 51 N.W.2d 405, 407 (1952). A lease on the one hand conveys a present interest in real property for the period specified. W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 13, at 67 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser & Keeton ]. Black's Law Dictionary defines a lease as [a] contract for exclusive possession of lands... for terms of years ..., usually for a specified rent or compensation. Black's Law Dictionary 889 (6th ed. 1990); see, e.g., State v. Mann, 463 N.W.2d 883, 884 (Iowa 1990). [T]he criterion seems to be the right to the possession of the land, and if such right is not conferred, the transaction is to be deemed a license, profit, or easement. 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant § 5, at 46. On the other hand, a license in real property is an authority or permission to do a particular act or series of acts upon the land of another. Resnick v. City of Ft. Madison, 259 Iowa 578, 583, 145 N.W.2d 11, 14 (1966); see also Black's Law Dictionary 920. A license also involves the exclusive occupation of the property, but only so far as is necessary to do the act, and no further, whereas a lease gives the right of possession of the land, and the exclusive occupation of it for all purposes not prohibited by its terms. 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant § 5, at 46; see also 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 123, at 525-26, § 125, at 528; Lee, 262 N.W.2d at 470-73. Thus, a license is merely a privilege to use land in the possession of another. Resnick, 259 Iowa at 583, 145 N.W.2d at 14. It is generally personal, revocable, and unassignable. Paul, 243 Iowa at 358, 51 N.W.2d at 407. Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instrument executed by the DNR and Roberts, we conclude the lease is in fact a license, and not a true lease. In accordance with Iowa Code sections 111.4 and 111.25 and the public trust doctrine the State has the authority to permit the use of the bed of a river for certain specified purposes, subject to the paramount right of navigation vested in the federal government for the benefit of all the public. Roberts' lease permitted occupation of the riverbed to accommodate excursion boat operations from the City-owned park. We believe the agreement in this context must be construed so as to limit Roberts' commercial operations to those activities consistent with and for the specified purpose for which consent was given. To hold otherwise would yield a result which is contrary to the limitations imposed by the public trust doctrine and inconsistent with the purposes of the State lease program. Moreover, the State may not interfere with riparian rights unless the purpose has a reasonable and substantial relationship to... navigational or other public purpose to which the riparian owner's right of access is made subservient by law. Lakeside Boating & Bathing, 344 N.W.2d at 221. Accordingly, we conclude that Roberts' right to use the riverbed was conditioned upon access to the City's frontage property. The record does not bear out Roberts' contentions of alternate uses for the riverbed area which would reasonably fall within these bounds. Further, we find that Roberts voluntarily relinquished its right of use when it vacated the premises. We therefore hold that Roberts did not acquire a property interest in the riverbed area under the lease agreement. For all practical purposes Roberts' license to use the area terminated when the lease with the City expired. Having determined that Roberts acquired only the rights of a licensee we turn now to the trespass claim.