Opinion ID: 4398284
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petitioner’s Fourth Child

Text: As noted above, the petitioner gave birth to another child during the pendency of this case. However, that child was not included in the proceeding below. 14 While no party assigned any error in that regard, we cannot ignore the fact that this child is now living in the same household from which N.H., C.H., and B.H. were removed. This Court has made clear that [w]here there has been a prior involuntary termination of parental rights to a sibling, the issue of whether the parent has remedied the problems which led to the prior involuntary termination sufficient to parent a subsequently-born child must, at minimum, be reviewed by a court, and such review should be initiated on a petition pursuant to the provisions governing the procedure in cases of child neglect or abuse set forth in West Virginia Code §§ 49–6–1 to –12 (1998) [now West Virginia Code § 49-4-601 to -610]. Although the requirement that such a petition be filed does not mandate termination in all circumstances, the legislature has reduced the minimum threshold of evidence necessary for termination where one of the factors outlined in West Virginia Code § 49– 6–5b(a) (1998) [now West Virginia Code § 49-4-605(a) (2015)] is present. Syl. Pt. 2, In the Matter of George Glen B., Jr., 205 W.Va. 435, 518 S.E.2d 863 (1999); see also W.Va. Code § 49-4-605(a)(3) (2015) (requiring DHHR to file abuse and neglect petition when “the parental rights of the parent to another child have been terminated involuntarily”). Given the record in this case, we find it extremely troubling that no action was taken after the fourth child was born to amend the abuse and neglect petition to include that child in the proceeding below, nor was any petition filed with regard to that child after the disposition order was entered by the circuit court. During oral argument in this case, the DHHR indicated that although it requested that the petition be amended, the county prosecutor declined to do so. This Court has made it abundantly clear that prosecuting 15 attorneys must fully and promptly cooperate with the DHHR as mandated by West Virginia Code § 49-4-502 (2015). That statute provides: It is the duty of every prosecuting attorney to cooperate fully and promptly with persons seeking to apply for relief, including copetitioners with the department, under this article in all cases of suspected child abuse and neglect; to promptly prepare applications and petitions for relief requested by those persons, to investigate reported cases of suspected child abuse and neglect for possible criminal activity; and to report at least annually to the grand jury regarding the discharge of his or her duties with respect thereto. Id. Accordingly, this Court has held: [i]n civil abuse and neglect cases, the legislature has made DHHR the State’s representative. In litigations that are conducted under State civil abuse and neglect statutes, DHHR is the client of county prosecutors. The legislature has specifically indicated through W.Va. Code § 49-6-10 (1996) [now W.Va. Code § 49-4-502 (2015)] that prosecutors must cooperate with DHHR’s efforts to pursue civil abuse and neglect actions. The relationship between DHHR and county prosecutors under the statute is a pure attorney-client relationship. The legislature has not given authority to county prosecutors to litigate civil abuse and neglect actions independent of DHHR. Such authority is granted to prosecutors only under State criminal abuse and neglect statutes. Therefore, all of the legal and ethical principles that govern the attorney-client relationship in general, are applicable to the relationship that exists between DHHR and county prosecutors in civil abuse and neglect proceedings. Syl. Pt. 4, State ex rel. Diva P. v. Kaufman, 200 W.Va. 555, 490 S.E.2d 642 (1997). In other words, “prosecutors [are not] statutorily entrusted with independent enforcement of civil abuse and neglect proceedings. To the contrary . . . the State ha[s] reposed that responsibility upon the DHHR.” Id. at 565, 490 S.E.2d at 652. See also In re Ashton M., 228 W.Va. 584, 589, 723 S.E.2d 409, 414 (2012) (observing that prosecuting attorney had 16 duty to convey DHHR’s recommendation in abuse and neglect proceeding to the court because of attorney-client relationship). Thus, in this case, the prosecutor should have complied with the DHHR’s request and amended the abuse and neglect petition to include the petitioner’s fourth child in the proceeding below. Because an abuse and neglect petition has not been filed with respect to the petitioner’s fourth child despite the statutory and case law requirements, we are remanding this case to the circuit court for further proceedings in that regard. As we have held, [i]n cases involving the abuse and neglect of children, when it appears from this Court’s review of the record on appeal that the health and welfare of a child may be at risk as a result of the child’s custodial placement, regardless of whether that placement is an issue raised in the appeal, this Court will take such action as it deems appropriate and necessary to protect that child. Syl. Pt. 6, In re Timber M., 231 W.Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 353 (2013); see also In re A.N., 241 W.Va. 275, 823 S.E.2d 713 (2019) (remanding for re-evaluation of appropriateness of allowing father to retain custody of his son where father’s parental rights to his daughter were terminated). Upon remand, the circuit court shall order the State to immediately file an abuse and neglect petition with respect to the petitioner’s fourth child in accordance with West Virginia Code § 49-4-605(a)(3). In remanding this case, we take no position with regard to the ultimate resolution as to petitioner’s fourth child. Syllabus point four of In re George B. holds: 17 When an abuse and neglect petition is brought based solely upon a previous involuntary termination of parental rights to a sibling pursuant to West Virginia Code § [49-4- 605(a)(3) (2015)], prior to the lower court’s making any disposition regarding the petition, it must allow the development of evidence surrounding the prior involuntary termination(s) and what actions, if any, the parent(s) have taken to remedy the circumstances which led to the prior termination(s). Id. at 437, 518 S.E.2d at 865, syl. pt. 4. However, the circuit court should be mindful that “[p]rior acts of violence, physical abuse, or emotional abuse toward other children are relevant in a termination of parental rights proceeding, are not violative of W.Va. R. Evid. 404(b), and a decision regarding the admissibility thereof shall be within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Syl. Pt. 8, In re Carlita B., 185 W.Va. 613, 408 S.E.2d 365 (1991). In re George B., 205 W.Va. at 437, 518 S.E.2d at 865, syl. pt. 3.