Opinion ID: 2034804
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: In his next contention, Parr argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for separate trial made one week before trial. Parr asserts that it prejudiced him by forcing him to stand trial with a co-defendant who had a previous criminal record. He also argues that severance was necessary to give him adequate time to retain private counsel. Parr's motion was based upon Ind. Code 35-34-1-11(b) which provides in part: In all other cases, upon motion of the defendant or the prosecutor, the court shall order a separate trial of defendants whenever the court determines that a separate trial is necessary to protect a defendant's right to a speedy trial or is appropriate to promote a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of a defendant. A trial court has discretion to determine whether severance was necessary to insure a fair trial. We will only review its decision for an abuse of discretion. We consider events that actually occurred at trial to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion and not allegations in the motion for severance. Hodge v. State (1982), Ind., 442 N.E.2d 1006. Gourley did not testify at trial and his prior criminal record was not raised at trial. However, Parr argues on appeal that his alibi defense was undetermined because Gourley did not testify and therefore, he did not corroborate Parr's alibi defense. Parr's argument is speculative at best. Parr testified that he was watching television with Gourley in their motel room when the robbery was committed (approximately 9:30 p.m.). The two women who accompanied Parr and Gourley that evening testified that they left the motel shortly after 9:00 p.m. and returned about 9:45 p.m. after driving around town in the van and stopping to get cigarettes. They also stated that Parr and Gourley were watching television when they left and when they returned. While the time period involved and the surrounding circumstances tend to support Parr's alibi, the jury chose to disbelieve these witnesses. In view of the victim's very positive identification testimony and the slight impact Gourley's self-serving testimony would have had in supporting Parr's alibi, we do not find a showing of the prejudice required to prove an abuse of trial court discretion, and therefore hold that the trial court did not err by refusing to grant Parr's motion for separate trial. Compare, Weans v. State (1985), Ind., 483 N.E.2d 1388 (a co-defendant's allegedly exculpatory testimony was unavailable because of joinder.)