Opinion ID: 1974381
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Text: The defendants argue that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter because Wright's complaint raises a nonjusticiable military question. The defendants fail, however, to recognize that jurisdiction and justiciability are two separate and distinct concepts. Jurisdiction of the subject matter involves the [p]ower of a particular court to hear the type of case that is then before it. Black's Law Dictionary 767 (5th ed.1979). Justiciability, however, as it relates to the present case in the form of the political question doctrine, concerns [q]uestions of which courts will refuse to take cognizance, or to decide, on account of their purely political character, or because their determination would involve an encroachment upon the executive or legislative powers. Black's Law Dictionary 1043 (5th ed.1979). The New York Court of Appeals, in Jones v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 380 N.E.2d 277, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978), shed some light on this important distinction by discussing the underlying theme of justiciability: the court as a policy matter, even apart from principles of subject matter jurisdiction, will abstain from venturing into areas if it is ill-equipped to undertake the responsibility and other branches of government are far more suited to the task. As put by the then Chief Judge Wyzanski, speaking with respect to a political question, abstention was a recognition that the tools with which a court can work, the data which it can fairly appraise, [and] the conclusions which it can reach as a basis for entering judgments, have limits. ( United States v. Sisson, D.C., 294 F.Supp. 511, 515). Jones, 380 N.E.2d at 280, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 452 (emphasis added). A court can have jurisdiction over the subject matter but, nevertheless, have a nonjusticiable issue before it and refuse to hear the case. Because we conclude that the Freedom of Access Act, on its face, does not apply to discharge proceedings before an Air National Guard administrative separation board, we need not reach the question whether application of the Act to these types of proceedings raises a nonjusticiable military or political question. We do conclude, however, that the Superior Court's determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction was erroneous. The jurisdiction of the Superior Court is set forth in Section 105 of Title 4 of the Maine Revised Statutes Annotated. Suffice it here to state that ... the Superior Court exercises the full powers of a court of general jurisdiction, both at law and in equity. 1 Field, McKusick, & Wroth, Maine Civil Practice § 0.1 at 3 (2d ed.1970). Wright's complaint in the present case presents the question whether the Maine Freedom of Access Act applies to an administrative separation board of the Air National Guard. Determining whether a state statute applies to a given set of facts is not only within the Superior Court's powers, but is one of the most important functions of the judiciary in general. In short, Wright's complaint simply presents a question of legislative intent, which has always been for resolution by the courts. Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 388 F.Supp. 649, 664 (D.Me.), aff'd, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir.1975). See Thornburgh v. Lewis, 504 Pa. 206, 470 A.2d 952, 955 (1983) (determining the meaning of constitutional and statutory provisions is precisely the role of the Judiciary in our tri-partite system of government); O'Neill v. Thomson, 114 N.H. 155, 316 A.2d 168, 170 (1974) (interpretation of state constitution and statutes relative to executive and legislative branches is traditional function conferred on judiciary). We conclude, therefore, that the Superior Court erred in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and its subsequent dismissal pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) was improper.