Opinion ID: 1998751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion for Separate Trials at the Sentencing Phase

Text: Rouster argues that, even if his counsel's failure to file a motion for separate trials in regard to the guilt phase of his trial was within the bounds of effective representation, his failure to file a motion for separate trials before the sentencing phase was deficient, prejudicial conduct. Whether a defendant may claim separately that his counsel was deficient for failing to file a motion for separate trials in regard to the guilt and penalty phases of his trial is a novel question in our jurisprudence. [7] Indiana Code § 35-34-1-11 enumerates the grounds upon which a motion to separate may or should be granted. The portion of the statute relevant to Rouster's case reads: [U]pon motion of the defendant or the prosecutor, the court shall order a separate trial of defendants whenever the court determines that a separate trial is necessary to protect a defendant's right to a speedy trial or is appropriate to promote a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-34-1-11(b) (West 1986). The rules describing when a motion for separate trials may be made read: (a) A defendant's motion for severance of crimes or motion for a separate trial must be made before commencement of trial, except that the motion may be made before or at the close of all the evidence during trial if based upon a ground not previously known. The right to severance of offenses or separate trial is waived by failure to make the motion at the appropriate time. (b) If a defendant's pretrial motion for severance of offenses or motion for separate trial is overruled, the motion may be renewed on the same grounds before or at the close of all the evidence during trial. The right to severance of offenses or separate trial is waived by failure to renew the motion. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-34-1-12 (West 1986). The key to whether the trial court should consider a motion to separate trials filed at the close of evidence is thus whether a previously unknown ground, or a known but newly relevant ground, causes a separate trial to become necessary for a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence. Here, no evidence different from that which we have already considered in our previous section on whether trial counsel should have filed a motion to separate could have been offered by Rouster. See discussion supra Part I.A.1. Accordingly, our conclusions regarding Rouster's arguments are the same and counsel was not deficient, nor was Rouster prejudiced, by counsel's omission in failing to file a motion to separate trials before sentencing. C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel/Fundamental Error in Penalty Phase Instructions. Rouster argues counsel was ineffective for failing to raise penalty phase instruction issues. He alternatively argues each alleged instruction error was fundamental. [8] The four errors alleged by Rouster are: (a) the instructions did not inform the jury they were to weigh each co-defendant's mitigating and aggravating circumstances separately, (b) the instructions failed to inform the jury that if they found Rouster was sufficiently intoxicated, this finding would negate the intentionality requirements inherent in two of the aggravating factors urged by the State, (c) that the jury should have been instructed on what sentencing alternatives were available to the judge if they did not recommend the death penalty, and (d) the instructions might have led jurors to believe they were required to find mitigating circumstances unanimously.