Opinion ID: 2551730
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: DDA's Denial of Services to A.T. Was Proper

Text: A.T. argues that DDS had no procedures in place to review and resolve her application, and that the absence of a procedure is procedural error. We disagree that there was an absence of procedure at DDS. A.T. received three Notices of Determination, all of which advised her to send a written request for review to the Intake Chief, and provided the name and telephone number of a staff member should A.T. have questions. The third Notice, dated January 15, 2009, explained the agency's reason for denying services to A.T., which was that she did not meet the diagnostic criteria ... for mental retardation. The Notice summarized the scores from Dr. Lockwood's examination. Finally, A.T. and her lawyers were given the opportunity to meet with Deputy Director Nuss to discuss [DDS's] determination that A.T. was ineligible for DDA services. Nuss then provided A.T. with a final administrative decision regarding A.T.'s ineligibility, in the form of a letter that summarized their meeting and the agency's reasons for denying her services. The letter listed the criteria for mental retardation, and stated that [b]ased on the documentation presented, most notably the results of psychological evaluations performed from December 2004 through April 2008, I have determined that you are not eligible for DDA services. The letter also advised A.T. that she had the right to bring a civil action to review this final administrative decision in the Superior Court.... Because hers was a non-contested case, A.T. was not entitled to a formal, trial-type, contested-case hearing before DDS. See Rones, 500 A.2d at 1001. Procedurally, [a]ll that is required is the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Our function in reviewing administrative action is to assure that the agency has given full and reasoned consideration to all material facts and issues. The court can only perform this function when the agency discloses the basis of its order by an articulation with reasonable clarity of its reasons for the decision. Felicity's, Inc. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Appeals & Review, 851 A.2d 497, 502 (D.C.2004) (quotation marks omitted). In this case, we are satisfied that A.T. was given the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner, Rones, 500 A.2d at 1001, and that the January 15, 2009 Notice and Nuss's September 4, 2009 letter clearly articulated DDS's reasons for denying services to A.T. See Felicity's, Inc., 851 A.2d at 502. Finally, we note that although A.T. complains about the alleged lack of procedures at DDS, she failed to avail herself of the procedures the agency laid out for her, the first step of which was to contact the Intake Chief upon receipt of the Notices of Determination. Despite her failure to follow DDS's procedures, it appears that A.T. was able to submit any and all documentation that she wanted DDS to consider throughout her application process. She does not claim that her efforts were rebuffed in any way, or that DDS failed to consider everything she put before it in support of her application. Although DDS's procedures likely could have been more transparent throughout the review process, we hold that there was no procedural error.
There was substantial evidence in the record to support DDS's decision. Substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. We will affirm the agency's findings of fact as long as they are supported by substantial evidence notwithstanding that there may be contrary evidence in the record (as there usually is). Washington Hosp. Ctr. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs., 859 A.2d 1058, 1061 (D.C.2004) (quotation marks omitted); see also Felicity's, Inc., 851 A.2d at 503. In considering A.T.'s application for services, DDS reviewed her intake application, her psychological evaluations from Drs. Missar, Gilliard, and Lockwood, and letters from her doctors. None of the materials submitted with A.T.'s application indicated that she was mentally retarded, or otherwise had significantly subaverage intellectual functioning. D.C.Code § 7-1301.03(19). A.T. did not check the box labeled mentally retarded on her intake application. Drs. Lockwood and Missar specifically disclaimed a diagnosis of mental retardation in their evaluations. Finally, the January 2009 letter from A.T.'s own doctors actually stated that A.T. had normal intellectual functioning. Given the lack of evidence in the administrative record to show that A.T. met all of the Act's requirements for a finding of mental retardation, DDS's decision that she was ineligible for services was supported by substantial evidence, and was not otherwise arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.