Opinion ID: 885743
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Retroactive application of the judicial interpretation of a statute

Text: ¶ 18 Both Goebel and Giddings differ from Waters and the majority of the cases mentioned above because Goebel and Giddings do not involve a new judicial rule of criminal procedure, but rather, the judicial interpretation of a statute. It is helpful, however, to keep the former in mind while examining the latter. ¶ 19 Regarding the retroactive application of the judicial interpretation of a statute, the Supreme Court has held that the ex post facto clause does not apply because that clause is a limitation upon the powers of the Legislature and does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of government. Marks v. United States (1977), 430 U.S. 188, 191, 97 S.Ct. 990, 992, 51 L.Ed.2d 260. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has stated that an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law and is thus forbidden. Bouie v. Columbia (1964), 378 U.S. 347, 353, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 1702, 12 L.Ed.2d 894. ¶ 20 As explained by the Supreme Court in Bouie, if a state legislature is barred from passing an ex post facto law, then a state supreme court must be barred by the due process clause from achieving the same result by judicial construction. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 353-54, 84 S.Ct. at 1702. Accordingly, under Bouie, if a judicial construction of a criminal statute is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue, it must not be applied retroactively. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354, 84 S.Ct. at 1703. ¶ 21 In a decision handed down only a short time ago, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the limitation expressed in Bouie and held that it would serve in the common law context as well. In Rogers v. Tennessee (2001), 532 U.S. 451, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 149 L.Ed.2d 697, the Supreme Court had to determine the constitutionality of the retroactive application of a judicial decision abolishing the common law year and a day rule under which no defendant could be convicted of murder unless the victim died by the defendant's act within a year and a day of the act. The Rogers Court concluded that a judicial alteration of a common law doctrine of criminal law violates the principle of fair warning, and hence must not be given retroactive effect, only where it is `unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue.' Rogers, 532 U.S. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 1700 (quoting Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354, 84 S.Ct. at 1703). ¶ 22 Following the rule expressed in both Bouie and Rogers, the two cases before this Court, Giddings and Goebel, did not represent a construction of § 46-23-1012, MCA (1999), that was unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct at issue, because our decisions in those cases interpreted a statute that had not previously been interpreted by this Court. ¶ 23 Furthermore, in Rivers v. Roadway Express (1994), 511 U.S. 298, 312-13, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 1519, 128 L.Ed.2d 274, the Supreme Court determined that [a] judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction. Accord Haugen v. Blaine Bank (1996), 279 Mont. 1, 8, 926 P.2d 1364, 1368. Thus, a court's interpretation of a statute is never new law because the decision declares what the statute meant from the day of its enactment, not from the date of the decision.