Opinion ID: 179414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Heli-Expo Incident

Text: Following a bench trial, we review the district court's conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. Johnson v. West, 218 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir.2000). Rain contends that the district court erred in reading the contract term disparage not to include the sort of personal embarrassment he suffered as a result of being escorted out of the Heli-Expo event. Under Indiana state law, the court's goal in interpreting a contract is to give effect to the parties' intent as reasonably manifested by the language of the agreement. Reuille v. E.E. Brandenberger Constr., Inc., 888 N.E.2d 770, 771 (Ind.2008). Unless the terms of a contract are ambiguous, they will be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. In order to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the term disparage, the district court looked to Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.1999), which defines disparage as [t]o dishonor (something or someone) by comparison or [t]o unjustly discredit or detract from the reputation of (another's property, product or business). Other courts applying Indiana law similarly have looked to dictionary definitions in order to discern the meaning of the contract term disparage. For example, in Indiana Ins. Co. v. North Vermillion Community School Corp., 665 N.E.2d 630, 635 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), the court relied on Webster's New World Dictionary to determine the meaning of disparaging material in the context of an insurance policy, concluding that to disparage means to lower in esteem; discredit. Similarly, in Heritage Mut. Ins. Co. v. Advanced Polymer Technology, Inc., 97 F.Supp.2d 913, 932 (S.D.Ind.2000), which also involved the interpretation of an insurance policy, the court considered three different dictionary definitions before concluding that material that . . . disparages a person's or organization's goods, products or services refers to material that denigrate[s], discredit[s] or belittle[s] [another's] products. Finally, in Westfield Ins. Co. v. Gil Behling & Son, Inc., 2010 WL 989933, at  (N.D.Ind. March 15, 2010), the court relied on Black's Law Dictionary to conclude, in the context of yet another insurance policy, that disparagement of goods, products, or services involves the denigration, discrediting, or belittling of a person's or organization's goods, products, or services. We conclude that the Indiana Supreme Court would rely on dictionary definitions to find that the term disparage, as it is used in the settlement agreement, means to dishonor by comparison; to unjustly discredit or detract from the reputation of; to lower in esteem; to denigrate; to belittle. The real dispute, however, is whether the term disparage applies in the context of injuries to an individual's reputation (in a manner akin to the tort of defamation), or whether it refers more narrowly to assaults on one's reputation in the business or commercial context. The district court took the later approach, concluding that the act of escorting Rain out of the event was not designed to, and in fact did not, detract from Rain's reputation as a businessman or carry with it any inherent message regarding his character, his products or his business dealings, and thus did not constitute disparagement. By contrast, Rain contends that his personal embarrassment can constitute disparagement. We find that the meaning of the word disparage in the settlement agreement properly is limited to actions dishonoring, discrediting, denigrating or belittling the parties' economic, business or professional interests. As the case law discussed above indicates, the term disparage generally arises in the context of commercial or professional interests. For example, in both Heritage and Westfield, the insurance policies at issue specifically referred to disparagement of a person's or organization's goods, products or services.  See 97 F.Supp.2d at 932; 2010 WL 989933, at  (emphasis added). [1] Furthermore, the other area of law in which the term disparage arises is in connection with the tort of product disparagement, which indicates that the word relates primarily to attacks on business interests as opposed to individuals. In Sanderson v. Indiana Soft Water Services, Inc., 2004 WL 1784755 (S.D.Ind. July 23, 2004), then-district court Judge Hamilton considered a product disparagement claim asserted under Indiana law. Judge Hamilton noted that the tort, which has also been described by commentators as `disparagement of property,' `slander of goods,' `commercial disparagement,' `trade libel,' and `injurious falsehood[,]' . . . differs from defamation in that it seeks to protect economic interests rather than reputational interests. Id. at  (citing Prosser and Keaton on the Law of Torts § 128, at 963 (5th ed.1984); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 623A, 624 (1977); American Academic Suppliers, Inc. v. Beckley-Cardy, Inc., 922 F.2d 1317, 1323 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying Illinois and Ohio law)). Courts in other jurisdictions similarly have recognized that the tort of disparagement relates to business interests, not reputational ones. See Thompson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 84 P.3d 496, 506 (Colo.2004) (the tort of disparagement differs from defamation in that it focuses on the economic consequences of an injurious statement rather than on damage to reputation); Zerpol Corp. v. DMP Corp., 561 F.Supp. 404, 408 (E.D.Penn.1983) ([t]he cause of action for disparagement . . . protects economic interests by providing a remedy to one who suffers pecuniary loss from slurs affecting the marketability of his goods); Hurlbut v. Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 766 (Tex.1987) (the tort of business disparagement is part of the body of law concerned with the subject of interference with commercial or economic relations); Bankwest v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 63 F.3d 974, 980 (10th Cir.1995) (applying Kansas law and noting that the tort variously know as `disparagement of property,' `slander of goods,' `commercial disparagement,' . . . `trade libel'. . . [and] `injurious falsehood' . . . has been broadly interpreted to include the publication of `other falsehoods harmful to any legal interest of another that has pecuniary value') (citations omitted). [2] Likewise, the Restatement, which refers to the tort as injurious falsehood, contrasts actions for defamation, which protect the personal reputation of the injured party, with actions for injurious falsehood, which protect economic interests of the injured party against pecuniary loss. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 623A cmt. g. In determining the intention of the parties to a contract, Indiana courts in addition to ascertaining the plain meaning of the contract termshave a duty to consider . . . the surrounding circumstances which existed at the time the contract was made, including the nature of the agreement, together with all the facts and circumstances leading up to the execution of the contract, the relation of the parties, the nature and situation of the subject matter, and the apparent purpose of making the contract. Ruff v. Charter Behavioral Health System of Northwest Indiana, Inc., 699 N.E.2d 1171, 1176 (Ind. Ct.App.1998) (citation omitted). Here, the circumstances surrounding the execution of the settlement agreement confirm our conclusion that the parties intended the non-disparagement clause to protect their business interests. In particular, the partiesdirect business competitorsexecuted the non-disparagement clause as part of an agreement to settle a commercial dispute concerning Rolls-Royce's intellectual property. [3] For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Heli-Expo incident did not constitute disparagement in violation of the settlement agreement because there is no indication that Rain's business or his reputation as a businessman was adversely impacted. To the contrary, the record evidence indicates that appellants' business associates, the AMCs, thought that Rolls-Royce was in the wrong for forcing Rain to leave the event. Again, Rain asks this Court to certify a question to the Indiana Supreme Courtnamely, what the proper definition of disparagement is under these circumstances. We decline that request. [F]act specific, particularized decisions that lack broad, general significance are not suitable for certification to a state's highest court. Woodbridge Place Apartments v. Washington Square Capital, Inc., 965 F.2d 1429, 1434 (7th Cir.1992) (citing Diginet, Inc. v. Western Union ATS, Inc., 958 F.2d 1388, 1395 (7th Cir.1992)). Appellants' claim involves the interpretation of a contract, and the term disparage as it is used in that contract. Cases involving the interpretation of contractual documents . . . by nature [involve] particularized inquiries, that turn on the specific contract language, and the circumstances surrounding the contract's execution. Woodbridge Place Apartments, 965 F.2d at 1434. Moreover, our interpretation of the term disparage lacks significance beyond this case, as it is limited to the term's use in the particular agreement at issue. Therefore, certification is not appropriate.