Opinion ID: 3038167
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: attorneys’ fees award to the state

Text: DEFENDANTS While not raised by the parties, we must sua sponte consider whether the district court lacked jurisdiction to award attorneys’ fees to the state defendants. Branson v. Nott, 62 ELWOOD v. DRESCHER 8477 F.3d 287, 293 n.9 (9th Cir. 1995). Where a claim is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the defendant is not a prevailing party within the meaning of § 1988, and the district court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to award attorneys’ fees. Id. at 292-93; see also Miles v. California, 320 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 2003) (extending Branson to deny Rule 54(d) costs when dismissal is based on lack of jurisdiction). [7] The claims against the state defendants were dismissed on various grounds.5 The claim against Judge Kehiayan was dismissed under Rooker-Feldman, which is a jurisdictional ground for dismissal and precludes the awarding of attorneys’ fees. Branson, 62 F.3d at 292-93. This Court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against Judge MacLaughlin on the ground of judicial immunity and in the alternative on the basis of Rooker-Feldman. Because Rooker-Feldman provides a jurisdictional ground for dismissal, and federal courts must generally address jurisdictional issues first, we treat this dismissal as one under Rooker-Feldman, and Judge Mac- Laughlin is therefore not entitled to fees. [8] The dismissal of claims against Commissioner Zakon and Judge Farrell was affirmed on the ground of Younger abstention. This Court has explained that “in cases in which Younger applies, the federal courts have jurisdiction over the parties’ claims; Younger abstention concerns whether they should exercise that jurisdiction.” Meredith v. Oregon, 321 F.3d 807, 816 (9th Cir. 2003). A dismissal based on Younger abstention signifies that the court declined to exercise jurisdiction; it makes no comment on the merits of the case, and does not “materially alter[ ] the legal relationship between the parties.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992). Therefore, neither Commissioner Zakon nor Judge Farrell prevailed within the meaning of § 1988, and they are not entitled to attorneys’ fees. 5 We look to our own decision affirming dismissal of these claims to determine the relevant basis for dismissal here. 8478 ELWOOD v. DRESCHER In affirming the dismissal of Elwood’s claim against Juvenile Court Referee Skeba, we noted that “it is not entirely clear whether the matter handled by the referee is ongoing or concluded,” but that the claim was barred by either Younger or Rooker-Feldman. As discussed above, attorneys’ fees cannot be awarded based on a dismissal on either of those grounds. [9] Finally, the claim against the California DOJ was dismissed based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. While the Eleventh Amendment prevents federal courts from hearing cases against states, we have stated that “dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,” but instead rests on an affirmative defense. Miles, 320 F.3d at 988-89. We previously upheld an award of attorneys’ fees under § 1988 to a defendant who successfully raised an Eleventh Amendment immunity defense. Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the California DOJ is not barred from recovery of fees by reason of having been dismissed on the basis of the Eleventh Amendment. We reject Elwood’s other arguments in support of her contention that the award to the California DOJ was an abuse of discretion. The district court’s finding of frivolousness was not an abuse of discretion, given that Elwood continued to press her claim against the California DOJ even after the court warned her that it appeared to be frivolous, and failed to amend her complaint or provide any basis for overcoming the Eleventh Amendment defense. The fee request submitted by the attorney for the state defendants (including the California DOJ) for 152.5 hours was not excessive. The attorney represented six parties, and spent time reviewing the complaint, defending against two motions for declaratory judgment, preparing and bringing two motions to dismiss, and making several court appearances. The district court did not err when it allowed the state defendants to refile their motion for attorneys’ fees after the ELWOOD v. DRESCHER 8479 initial motion was stricken for failure to comply with Local Rule 7-3 requiring parties to meet and confer before filing a motion. Rule 54(d)(2)(B) allows a district court to extend the time for filing a motion for attorneys’ fees, and the striking of the initial motion had no preclusive effect on the second motion. Finally, Elwood offered no evidence in the district court showing inability to pay the fee awards; her tax returns, of which she asks this Court to take judicial notice, would show only her income and not whether she has assets with which to satisfy the fee awards. [10] We affirm the award of attorneys’ fees to the California DOJ. However, because the same attorney represented all of the state defendants, the award must be recalculated to include only those hours spent on the claim against the California DOJ.