Opinion ID: 2086381
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: principles of statutory construction: the whole act

Text: From the litigant's viewpoint in statutory litigation of this type, the practical inquiry is usually framed in the basic determination of a particular provision's, clause's or word's meaning. Unremarkably, to satisfactorily fulfill that inquiry one must proceed in the same manner one would in considering any other composition ÔÇö construe the object of inquiry with reference to the leading idea or purpose of the whole instrument. Indeed, much like any other literary composition, a statute is enacted as a whole rather than in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section must be considered in connection with every other part or section and the meaning ascribed to any one section arrived at after due consideration of the act as a whole so as to produce, if possible, a harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole. Grand Rapids v Crocker, 219 Mich 178, 182-184; 189 NW 221 (1922). Sometimes, it is possible to construe an act by dividing it by a process of etymological dissection, apply to each word, clause or provision thus separated from its context some particular meaning given by lexicographers, and then rigidly reconstruct the instrument upon the basis of those intrinsic meanings. More often, however, an act must be construed as a whole, and the particular effect to be attached to any word, clause or provision determined from the context of the whole act, the nature of the treated subject matter, and the purpose or intention of the body which promulgated the act. While it is axiomatic that this Court must enforce clear and unambiguous statutory provisions as written, Nordman v Calhoun, 332 Mich 460, 465; 51 NW2d 906 (1952); Ypsilanti Police Officers Ass'n v Eastern Michigan University, 62 Mich App 87, 92; 233 NW2d 497 (1975), it is equally true that [w]hat is `plain and unambiguous' often depends on one's frame of reference. Shiffer v Board of Education of Gibraltar School Dist, 393 Mich 190, 194; 224 NW2d 255 (1974). The whole act provides this proper frame of reference in cases of statutory construction: A statutory provision that is in dispute must be read in light of the general purpose of the act and in conjunction with the pertinent provisions thereof. Romeo Homes, Inc v Comm'r of Revenue, 361 Mich 128, 135; 105 NW2d 186 (1960). It is equally axiomatic, therefore, that the intention of the Legislature, when discovered, must prevail, any existing rule of construction to the contrary. Michigan Central R Co v Michigan, 148 Mich 151, 156; 111 NW 735 (1907). Neither clinical construction nor the letter of the statute nor its rhetorical framework should be permitted to defeat the act's purpose and intent as gathered from consideration of the whole act. As eloquently stated by Justice GRANT in Common Council of Detroit v Rush, 82 Mich 532, 542; 46 NW 951 (1890): [A] thing which is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, although not within the letter; and a thing within the letter is not within the statute, unless within the intention. This principle was more recently stated in Aikens v Dep't of Conservation, 387 Mich 495, 499; 198 NW2d 304 (1972): It is well settled that the proper construction of any statute is for the court. The purpose of the court in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislative intent. If there is a conflict, the spirit and purpose of the statute should prevail over its strict letter. (Citations omitted.) In such instances of conflict, courts are authorized to collect the intention of the Legislature from the occasion and necessity of the law ÔÇö from the mischief felt, and the objects and remedy in view; and the intention is to be taken, or presumed, according to what is consonant to reason and good discretion. Sibley v Smith, 2 Mich 486, 492 (1853). `Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it' so that those unintended ends are avoided. Elba Twp v Gratiot County, 287 Mich 372, 394; 283 NW 615 (1939). This fundamental rule of statutory construction was recently reaffirmed in Salas v Clements, 399 Mich 103, 109; 247 NW2d 889 (1976), where it was remarked: [D]eparture from the literal construction of a statute is justified when such construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question.