Opinion ID: 853837
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Precluding Direct Questions by the Grand Jury

Text: Indiana statutes provide that a “grand jury shall hear and examine evidence concerning crimes and shall take action with respect to this evidence as provided by law.” Ind. Code § 35-34-2-2(a) (1998). No statutory provision specifically addresses the ability of grand jurors personally to question witnesses called before them. (footnote: 5) However, the oath administered to grand jurors provides that they “diligently inquire . . . of all offenses committed or triable within this county, of which you have or can obtain legal evidence . . . .” See id. § 35-34-2-3(e). (footnote: 6) The statute also provides that “[t]he grand jury shall be the exclusive judge of the facts with respect to any matter before it.” Id. § 35-34-2-4(j). Although the statute is ambiguous on the point of whether grand jurors must be permitted to ask questions directly of witnesses, our decisional law has recognized the importance of allowing questioning for at least a century. See State v. Turley , 153 Ind. 345, 347, 55 N.E. 30, 30 (1899) (“The duty of the grand jury is to ‘diligently inquire,’ to obtain ‘legal evidence’, to discover and detect crime, and for that purpose they have the right to interrogate witnesses concerning all matters which may tend to accomplish that result.”). In the face of this longstanding understanding of the role of grand jurors, the statutory oath relied upon in Turley has remained essentially unchanged for a century. See 1 Revised Statutes § 1652 (1881). And the usual practice in Indiana, as we understand it, is to allow grand jurors to pose questions directly to witnesses that appear before them. We believe this to be the better practice, and also, in light of this history, required by the statute. The State argues that, even if direct questioning is required, no prejudice has been shown by the procedure adopted here. We agree that immaterial irregularities are not a basis for dismissal of an indictment. On this record, the effect, if any, of this failure to follow conventional procedure is impossible to evaluate, and we cannot conclude that it constituted any significant interference with the grand jury’s role. It is speculative what the record, if there were one, would reveal of the exchanges between the prosecutor and the grand jurors, and even more speculative how prejudice might be shown. In any event, in the absence of any such showing, this alleged statutory violation does not present a basis for dismissal of the indictment. Cf. State v. Bitz , 487 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (“irregular appointment of a grand jury foreperson and clerk does not warrant application of a per se rule of dismissal”).