Opinion ID: 1223875
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: application of general principles to present case

Text: In the present case, the plaintiffs allege that the Series 510 straddle carrier was defective with respect to the configuration of its cab and engine housing, which created a blind zone vis-a-vis adjacent areas. The resulting visual impairment did not arise under particular circumstances only, but was constant and discernible to anyone seated in the driver's position. Thus, the straddle carrier's potential, during operation, for striking an object or person located in the blind zone would be obvious and manifestly within the common knowledge of any ordinary person who had driven any large vehicle. But we are not dealing here with ordinary members of the driving public. It is uncontroverted that the only operators of the enormous straddle carriers utilized at the loading dock of Pier 52 were trained drivers who navigated within specially designated areas that were circumscribed precisely because of the dangers, including limited visibility, posed by those very straddle carriers. That the dangers presented were obvious, apparent, and discernible by casual inspection is underscored by the fact that all witnesses, including Tabieros, who had ever occupied the straddle carrier's cab, testified that they were aware of the blind zone and its attendant risk of harm to anyone in the vicinity. Indeed, the photographic exhibits introduced into evidence  both by Clark and the plaintiffs  make plain and palpable the visual restrictions to which anyone atop the straddle carrier would be subject, as well as the dangerousness of piloting such a vehicle through an occupied or minimally congested area. [19] Given the occupations of the ordinary consumers of the Series 510 straddle carrier and the bystanders foreseeably in its vicinity  trained straddle carrier operators and dock workers , the self-evident characteristics of the vehicle, and the patent nature of the danger posed by the blind zone, we hold, as a matter of law: (1) that the danger involved in using [the straddle carrier was] obvious and apparent, discernible by casual inspection, Plante, 771 F.2d at 620, and generally known and recognized, Maneely, 108 F.3d at 1179; and, therefore, (2) that Clark was not negligent in failing to warn of that danger, Plante, 771 F.2d at 620. We emphasize, however, that although our holding impacts a manufacturer's strict product liability, see infra at section III.C.2.a, and duty to warn, see infra at section III.C.2.b, it neither completely shields a manufacturer under Hawai`i law from strict product liability, see Wagatsuma, 10 Haw.App. at 566, 879 P.2d at 583-84, nor from negligence liability, see id. at 565, 879 P.2d at 583. With respect to the former, the following [risk-utility] factors [are] relevant to determine whether a product is defective: (1) The usefulness and desirability of the product  its utility to the user and to the public as a whole[;] (2) The safety aspects of the product  the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury[;] (3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe[;] (4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility[;] (5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product[;] (6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the exercise of suitable warnings or instructions[; and] (7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance. Larsen v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc., 74 Haw. 1, 23-24 n. 6, 837 P.2d 1273, 1285 n. 6 (citing J. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973)), reconsideration granted in part and denied in part, 74 Haw. 650, 843 P.2d 144 (1992). And with respect to the latter, we reaffirm the proposition that [t]he creation of any unreasonable danger is enough to establish negligence, even though the danger is obvious. Brown, 62 Haw. at 539, 618 P.2d at 273 (citation omitted). Accordingly, liability may be established by way of a theory of negligent design. See generally Ontai, Brown, and Wagatsuma, supra . We therefore analyze the circuit court's jury instructions regarding a manufacturer's duty to warn with these principles in mind.