Opinion ID: 1109932
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the proximate effect of above conditions on leslie.

Text: Eswin Dean testified that the Plymouth made a sudden dip to the left and went around the pump. Mrs. Mary Lucy Fowler testified that Leslie, just as he came to the pump, jerked the car to the left, which pulled it into their lane; that he did not get back on his side, that he did not have time to do so; and that this was what caused the collision. K.B. Fowler, Jr., testified that Leslie just before he got to the pump, which was sitting on the highway, jerked the car to the left in their lane of traffic. Mrs. Lillie D. Kerr testified that she saw the lights of the car coming and Leslie, all of a sudden, swerved his car to avoid hitting a large mound of dirt and a pump in the road. Of course Leslie is dead, and no direct proof can be given as to why he cut to the left and continued almost in the middle of the road until the collision occurred; but the proof showed that most of the eastbound motorists before and after the collision did the same thing; and  that because of the optical illusion, a motorist would reasonably think that he was in his proper lane when actually he was not, but was partly in the other lane. (Hn 4) If the negligence of the defendants in creating and maintaining this situation proximately caused or contributed to Leslie's act in colliding with the Chevrolet automobile, with the consequent tragic results, then the defendants were liable; and direct evidence is not absolutely essential to prove such negligence. It may be shown by circumstantial evidence when sufficient to place it within the field of legitimate inference. 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, Sec. 333, page 1032; Palmer v. Clarksdale Hospital, 206 Miss. 680, 40 So.2d 582; Johnston v. Canton Flying Services, Inc., 209 Miss. 226, 46 So.2d 533; Southern Pine Elec. Power Assn. v. Denson, 214 Miss. 397, 57 So.2d 859, 59 So.2d 75; Brown-Miller Co. v. Howell, (Miss.) 79 So.2d 818. Tied together in the solution of this lawsuit are the questions of proximate, contributing, and intervening cause. The question here is the same as it was in Miss. City Lines, Inc. v. Bullock, 194 Miss. 630, 13 So.2d 34, where it was asked, Did the facts constitute a succession of events so linked together as to make a natural whole, or was there some new and independent cause intervening between the alleged wrong and the injury? (Hn 5) There may be more than one proximate cause of an injury, 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, Section 63 ... Moreover, when reasonable minds might differ on the matter, the question of what is the proximate cause of an injury is usually a question for the jury, 65 C.J.S., Negligence, Sec. 264. American Creosote Works v. Harp, 215 Miss. 5, 60 So.2d 514. See also Magers v. Railroad Co., 174 Miss. 860, 165 So. 416, as follows: If the defendant's negligence is a substantial factor in causing harm to another, then that action is negligent on the part of the actor. If reasonable men have a difference of opinion  as to whether or not the negligence of the actor continued as a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, then the question is for the jury. Restatement, Law of Torts, Sec. 434. (Hn 6) `If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable.' Section 435, Restatement, Law of Torts. One of the landmarks in the jurisprudence of this state on the question of proximate cause is the case of Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Woodham, 99 Miss. 318, 54 So. 890, where it is said:    the negligent act of a person, resulting in injury, is the proximate cause thereof, and creates liability therefor, when the act is of such character that, by the usual course of events, some injury, not necessarily the particular injury, or injury received in the particular manner complained of, would result therefrom, provided the attendant circumstances are such that an ordinarily prudent man ought reasonably to have anticipated that some injury would probably result from the act done. In order that a person may be liable for damages resulting from his negligence, it is not necessary that his negligence should have been the sole cause of the injury. His negligence may be the proximate cause, where it concurs with one or more causes in producing an injury, and, although the author or authors of such cause or causes may also be liable therefor. 29 Cyc. 492-496, inclusive, and authorities there cited. `If a defendant is negligent, and this negligence combines with that of another or with any other independent intervening cause, he is liable, although his negligence was not the sole negligence, or the sole proximate cause, and although his negligence, without such other independent intervening cause, would not have produced the injury.' Susie B. Harrison v. Kansas City Elec. Light Co., 195 Mo. 606,  93 S.W. 951, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 293.    but where the negligence of a defendant results in a condition dangerous in itself, such as an ordinarily prudent person ought to have anticiapted might occur, he is liable for any damage resulting therefrom, even though the particular injury complained of would not have resulted, had not the negligence of a third person combined with his. In Public Service Corp., et al v. Watts, 168 Miss. 235, 150 So. 192, where the corporation had not kept filled an excavation which it had dug in the street, this omission was held to be a contributing proximate cause of the injury to Watts, on a motorcycle traveling south, when he was struck by the automobile of Smith, going north, as he cut to the left to dodge the excavation, lost control of his machine, and collided with the motorcycle. In rejecting the contention that Smith's action in continuing to the left, after he had fallen in the ditch, until he struck the motorcycle, was an intervening, independent and efficient cause, the Court said: If the force which causes the injury is put in operation or motion by what is the negligence of the defendant, and that force or motion is still in progress or operation and has not lost its identity and continuity, as such, when the injury occurs, then the negligence which puts the injurious force in operation is the proximate cause.    and at the same time the inquiry involved is typical of those things which should be submitted to the jury. The Woodham case, supra, was cited. In Magers v. Railroad Co., supra, where Magers, at night, drove his automobile into a gondola car that obstructed 4 1/2 feet of the traveled portion of the street, it was held that, even though he was guilty of gross negligence, concurrent with that of the railroad company, this would not defeat a recovery from the negligent actor whose negligence proximately caused or proximately contributed to the injury, and that the cause should have been submitted to the jury.  In Keith v. Y. & M.V.R. Co., 168 Miss. 519, 151 So. 916, as Keith was driving south on a highway, paralleling the railroad right of way, a dense smoke, coming from a fire put out on the right of way by railroad employees, kept him from seeing ahead. He turned to the right and stopped. Thereafter he was struck suddenly by a truck, being driven north through the smoke. The opinion, in reversing the action of the trial court in granting a peremptory instruction for the railroad company, held that the negligence of the truck driver was not the sole proximate cause, but the negligence of the railroad company in creating the smoke on the highway and that of the northbound motorist cooperated to bring about the injury, and that the dense smoke continued to be actively operative. See also Continental Southern Lines v. Klaas, 217 Miss. 795, 65 So.2d 575. The case of McKenna v. Scott, 202 Fed.2d 23, an Oklahoma case, held that the negligent parking by Tree Surgeon Company of its truck about 2 feet on the blacktop surface of the highway set in motion an unbroken chain of circumstances leading to the collision, which was occasioned by a loaded gravel truck veering to the left to pass the parked truck, and the driver's losing control and running into an approaching automobile 40 to 150 feet beyond the obstruction. See also DeBardelaben v. Stallings, 226 Fed.2d 951, a North Carolina case. (Hn 7) Appellants contend however that even if they were negligent by reason of the pump and flares being on the side of the pavement, and that the optical illusion resulted from the circumstances, which they deny, yet the last flare on the south side was 201 feet from the point of impact; and that the continued operation by Leslie of the automobile approximately in the middle of the road was an independent intervening cause. Of course if this collision had occurred a substantial distance east of the setting for the optical illusion obviously  the condition on the highway could not be blamed, but it must be remembered that Patrolman Harris testified positively that there was a flare on the south side at a point 72 feet east of the point of impact, and that several other flares were burning in or near Peachtree Street, 186 feet east of the point of impact. Consequently it would be difficult to say that the alleged illusion had ceased to exist. At least reasonable minds might differ theron. Besides, the same witness testified that the position of the Plymouth's impact on the left side could indicate that Leslie was trying to get back to his lane of the road. In addition, at a speed of 45 miles an hour, Leslie would have covered the 201 feet in about 3 seconds. Thus it cannot be said that the chancellor was in error, or manifestly wrong, in rejecting this contention of independent, efficient, intervening cause. An intervening force, to be efficient, must be a superseding force. Billups Petroleum Co. v. Entrekin, 209 Miss. 302, 46 So.2d 781. The opinion cited Public Service Corp. v. Watts, supra. It also cited Russell v. Williams, 168 Miss. 181, 150 So. 528, 151 So. 372, which held that, if the occurrence of the intervening cause might reasonably have been anticipated, such intervening cause will not interrupt the connection between the original cause and the injury. In Evans Motor Freight Lines, et al v. Fleming, 184 Miss. 808, 185 So. 821, an Evans truck was traveling north on the west side of the road. Miles, in a car, traveling south, was blinded by the lights of the truck. Yet he proceeded for 450 to 1,000 feet in a blinded condition at a speed of 40 miles an hour, until in order to avoid a collision, he swerved his automobile to the right, placing the right wheels on the shoulder and striking and killing Mrs. Fleming, who was walking on the shoulder, and then continued over 100 feet forward before he brought his automobile to a stop. Liability against the motor lines  was affirmed for the reason that the negligence of the driver of the truck was the proximate cause of the swerving of the car to the right to avoid a collision; and against Miles for the reason that he did not slow down and stop when the lights blinded him, and in proceeding in that condition, and in not seeing the deceased on the side of the highway. Moreover, the opinion stated that it cannot be said that the negligence of the appellants was insulated by the negligence of Miles; nor can it be said that the negligence of the appellant was not a contributing proximate cause of the death of Mrs. Fleming. In both the case just mentioned and Keith v. Y. & M.V.R. Co.., supra, the drivers were blinded by the lights, or unable to see on account of the smoke. In the present case, the direct evidence was sufficient to show that Leslie jerked his car to the left to avoid the pump, and the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show that, because of the optical illusion, he reasonably thought that he was in his proper lane of traffic, although he was in fact approximately in the center of the road. The victim of an illusion, or false appearance, falls in the same general category as one without appearance or ability to see at all. Of course it was negligence for Leslie to continue to drive as he did, if he did not know where he was in the road, but such negligence did not insulate the negligence of the appellants. See also the recent cases of Grice v. Central Elec. Power Assn., (Miss.) 92 So.2d 837; and Meridian Hatcheries v. Troutman, (Miss.) 93 So.2d 472. Appellants cite a number of cases including Graves v. Johnson, 179 Miss. 465, 176 So. 256; Central Paving & Construction Co. v. McCaskin, 183 Miss. 814, 184 So. 464; Myers v. Sanders, 189 Miss. 198, 194 So. 300; Dunn Construction Co. v. Nail, 192 Miss. 793, 7 So.2d 884; C.C. Moore Construction Co. v. Hayes, 119 Fed.2d 742, and McClendon v. Boyd Construction Co., (Miss.) 80 So.2d  32, which deal with the duty of contractors toward the traveling public, appellants contend that they gave the requisite notice of such hazards as existed. However, in that line of cases, the road was under construction, or was only partially open to traffic, or had not been accepted, or the contractor was guilty of no negligence, or the injured party was the author of his own misfortune. In the case here, the road was not under construction at all. Neither was it undergoing repairs. The appellants were working on the shoulder. They had no right to block the paved portion. Besides they had not even worked on the project since Thursday afternoon before; and if by chance they could be excused, under certain circumstances, in blocking a part of the paved portion, that excuse would not extenuate the situation which existed from Thursday afternoon until the Saturday night of the tragedy. (Hn 8) Highway No. 12, being a completed highway, the traveler was expected to use only ordinary care. In Graves v. Johnson, supra, it was held that, on such a highway, he has the right to assume that it is in a reasonably safe condition for travel, is free from obstructions, and he need not keep his eyes constantly fixed on the path of the highway, or look ahead for defects which should not exist. Besides, as a general rule, one who, without right or authority, creates or maintains in, upon, or near a highway a condition which endangers the safety of travelers does so at his own peril and is liable for injuries proximately resulting therefrom ... 25 Am. Jur., Highways, Sec. 361, page 654. The cases of Miss. Power Co. v. Sellers, 160 Miss. 512, 133 So. 594; Tombigbee Elec. Power Assn. v. Gandy, 216 Miss. 444, 62 So.2d 567; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Williams, 222 Miss. 538, 76 So.2d 365; N.O. & N.E.R. Co. v. Burge, 191 Miss. 303, 2 So.2d 825; Bufkin v. L. & N.R. Co., 161 Miss. 594, 137 So. 517; Mauney v. Gulf Refining Co., 193 Miss. 421,  8 So.2d 249, 9 So.2d 780; Sturdivant v. Crosby Lbr. Co., 218 Miss. 91, 65 So.2d 291; and Permenter v. Milner Chevrolet Co., (Miss.) 91 So.2d 243, as well as other authorities cited by appellants are not in conflict with the conclusion which has been reached in this case. Appellants further contend that, since the Plymouth left no skidmarks or evidence that it was wobbling on the pavement, the court was manifestly wrong in finding as a fact that Leslie lost control of his automobile. (Hn 9) This case, insofar as the appellees were concerned, was tried throughout on the theory that Leslie jerked or swerved his automobile to the left to avoid a collision with the pump, and, because of the optical illusion resulting from the conditions then obtaining, he was caused to continue approximately in the middle of the road until the collision. The law enjoins it upon the driver of an automobile to keep his machine constantly under control. Ulmer v. Pistole, 115 Miss. 485, 76 So. 522; Snyder v. Campbell, 145 Miss. 287, 110 So. 678. Control contemplates driving where and in the manner one reasonably should. (Hn 10) The center of the pavement had been marked; and except for obstructions Leslie normally would have driven in the south lane in this instance. But the pump suddenly loomed up before him. He jerked or swerved the car to the left, and did not return immediately to the south lane. Thus he was not driving where or in the manner that he should have. His car, for that reason, was actually out of control; and the court was justified in concluding that his failure of control, or loss of control, resulted from the hazardous situation which the appellants created and had thereafter maintained for several days. Consequently this contention is not well taken. The appellants further contend that the court at all events committed grievous error in refusing to grant them a jury trial especially since questions of negligence and contributory negligence were involved, and it is the  established policy of the jurisprudence of this state that such issues shall be resolved by a jury. Sections 1454-5, Code of 1942. In Talbot & Higgins Lbr. Co. v. McLeod Lbr. Co., 147 Miss. 186, 113 So. 433, by the bill in chancery, the appellee sought to enjoin the appellant from prosecuting a pending action at law in the circuit court. The sole question was whether the subject matter of the litigation was one of equity or common law jurisdiction. In pointing out that under Section 147 of the Constitution this Court cannot reverse or annul either a judgment or decree in any chancery or circuit court rendered in a civil cause on the ground of want of jurisdiction to render the same from any error or mistake as to whether the cause in which it was rendered was of equity or common law jurisdiction, the opinion dealt with the conflict between that Section and Section 31 of the Constitution, assuring trial by jury, and reconciled them as follows: It is true that, where the chancery court assumes jurisdiction of a cause of action cognizable alone in the circuit court, in such a case the absolute right of trial by jury of the issues of fact given in the circuit court causes by Section 31 of the Constitution is taken away, for our court has held that it rests in the discretion of the chancery court whether a jury shall be granted to try issues of fact. But Section 147 is just as much a part of the Constitution and is just as binding on the courts as Section 31 of the Constitution. They are to be construed together. Construed together, they mean that the right of trial by jury of issues of fact in civil causes in the circuit courts shall remain inviolate, except in such cases of exclusively law cognizance as the chancery courts may erroneously assume jurisdiction of, where such error of jurisdiction is the only error in the decree. In such cases the absolute right of trial by jury of the issues of fact is denied; it being discretionary with the chancellor whether such issues of fact shall be tried by a jury.      The chancery court determined for itself the question of jurisdiction. It was given that right by Section 147 of the Constitution. This court, under the Constitution, is without power to correct the error, if there was error, in the chancery court so assuming jurisdiction. (Hn 11) The chancery court may direct the trial of a proper case by jury. Section 1275, Code of 1942. But such trial is within the discretion of the court. Bland v. Bland, 105 Miss. 478, 62 So. 641; Laub v. Reason, 217 Miss. 475, 64 So.2d 637. (Hn 12) The case of Boyd, et al v. Applewhite, 121 Miss. 879, 84 So. 16, was a suit by minority stockholders to establish the liability of directors and officers for their alleged negligence in the management of the bank. The trial court refused the request of the appellants for a jury trial, and this was assignd as error. In response thereto, the Court said: There is no merit in the assignment that appellants asked for and were refused a jury trial. Section 503, Hemingway's Code (Acts 1910, chapter 135), providing that, `all questions of negligence and contributory negligence shall be for the jury to determine,' has no controlling application in an equity case. Consequently the court did not err in refusing to grant a trial by jury in this instance. The appellants also contend that the scheme whereby the complainants sought to attach the small sum of $23, alleged to be owing to Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Company by Homer A. Moore in order to satisfy their large demands for damages, was a mere device to confer jurisdiction on the court; and that the court should not have assumed jurisdiction by reason of such a trivial amount. They rely strongly on Nicholson v. G.M. & N.R. Co., 177 Miss. 844, 172 So. 306. (Hn 13) The Court has found no reversible error in this record. Consequently, whether the court was in error in taking jurisdiction of these cases is wholly immaterial since Section 147 of the Constitution forbids  this Court to reverse or annul the decree on the ground of want of jurisdiction to render said judgment or decree, from any error or mistake as to whether the cause in which it was rendered was of equity or common-law jurisdiction. Talbot & Higgins Lbr. Co. v. McLeod Lbr. Co., supra, cited 16 early cases, beginning with Cazeneuve v. Curell, 70 Miss. 521, 13 So. 32, and ending with Engleburg v. Tonkel, 140 Miss. 513, 106 So. 447, to show this Court's interpretation of, and adherence to the plain language of Section 147, supra. Some of the later cases are Taylor v. Hines, 221 Miss. 759, 74 So.2d 834, and Myers v. Giroir, (Miss.) 84 So.2d 525. Conceding but not deciding that there is merit in this contention, the case could not be reversed on that ground. In passing, not by way of decision but as negativing the contention that the action of the learned chancellor, in taking jurisdiction of these cases, was arbitrary and capricious, these facts should be pointed out: Section 2729, Code of 1942, does not specify the minimum amount of the indebtedness necessary to be owing by the resident to the non-resident defendant. The collision, with its consequent injuries and deaths, occurred in Attala County. It is not contented that suits could not have been brought in the circuit court. The appellants were not deprived of their right to be sued in a fixed venue, as was the case of Nicholson v. G.M. & N.R. Co., supra. There was no collusion between the complainants and Homer A. Moore, the resident defendant, alleged to have been indebted to the insurance company. There was no fraud whatsoever. Thorough consideration and study have been given to all alleged errors which were assigned and argued. Since no reversible error appears in the record, it follows that the decrees of the lower court must be and they are, in each instance, affirmed. Affirmed. All Justices concur, except Kyle, J., who took no part.