Opinion ID: 1718181
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Refusal to Give Res Ipsa Loquitur Instruction.

Text: Weyerhaeuser last contends that the district court erred in refusing to give the jury an instruction on res ipsa loquitur. Thermogas responds that Weyerhaeuser was not entitled to such an instruction because it did not plead a claim of general negligence, but rather pleaded specific acts of negligence. Additionally, Thermogas asserts Weyerhaeuser failed to establish that the LP tank (1) was under Thermogas' exclusive control and (2) would have exploded even if ordinary care had been exercised. Finally, to establish a basis for a res ipsa loquitur instruction, Thermogas contends Weyerhaeuser had to eliminate its own negligence as a cause of injury, something Weyerhaeuser failed to do. A. General principles regarding res ipsa loquitur. Res ipsa loquitur (Latin for the thing speaks for itself) is only a rule of evidence. It is not a rule of substantive law. Palleson v. Jewell Co-op. Elevator, 219 N.W.2d 8, 13 (Iowa 1974). Res ipsa loquitur applies when `(1) the injury is caused by an instrumentality under the exclusive control of the defendant, and (2) the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.' Brewster v. United States, 542 N.W.2d 524, 529 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Mastland, Inc. v. Evans Furniture, Inc., 498 N.W.2d 682, 686 (Iowa 1993)). Provided there is substantial evidence to support both elements, the happening of the injury permitsbut does not compelthe jury to draw an inference that the defendant was negligent. Mastland, 498 N.W.2d at 686. In this sense, res ipsa loquitur is a type of circumstantial evidence. Brewster, 542 N.W.2d at 528. B. Pleadings. The plaintiff may plead, and the district court may submit to the jury, both specific negligence and general negligence under res ipsa loquitur. Id. at 530. The court submits the theories alternatively. Id. If the jury finds for the plaintiff on specific acts of negligence, it should not consider liability under res ipsa loquitur. Id. Iowa is a notice-pleading state. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 69; Adam v. Mt. Pleasant Bank & Trust Co., 355 N.W.2d 868, 870 (Iowa 1984). A petition need not plead ultimate facts to raise or preserve a claim. Id. The petition is sufficient if it apprises the opposing party of the incident from which the claim arose and the general nature of the action. Id. Several reasons lead us to believe Thermogas had sufficient notice that Weyerhaeuser was relying on res ipsa loquitur in addition to specific acts of negligence. One of the specifications of negligence was that Thermogas was negligent in supplying a propane tank to Weyerhaeuser that was defective and unreasonably dangerous without specifying how the tank was defective and unreasonably dangerous. We think this was a general allegation of negligence, notwithstanding the district court's motion-for-new-trial ruling that Thermogas had not pled res ipsa loquitur. Additionally, prior to trial, Thermogas asked the district court in a motion in limine (which was not granted) to preclude Weyerhaeuser from presenting solely circumstantial evidence that the tank would not have exploded in the absence of a defect. This is precisely the type of evidence that res ipsa loquitur permits. Additionally, at the hearing on pretrial motions, when Thermogas was trying to exclude the testimony of Weyerhaeuser's expert, Thermogas' counsel argued: [Weyerhaeuser's expert] said in this [supplemental rule 125] disclosure the tank exploded more quickly than a tank of proper integrity. He didn't say why or how the tank lacked proper integrity, and he did not identify a defect. Based on all his examination, [Weyerhaeuser's expert] is simply speculating that there must have been a defect. There is no physical evidence of a defect. In reply, Weyerhaeuser's counsel stated: [Weyerhaeuser's expert] testified at his deposition, and his opinion disclosure in this case clearly indicates, that based on his review of the physical evidence he couldn't find a defect. The reason is because the tank blew up. His opinion is based on the circumstantial evidence in this case; namely the testimony of the relevant eyewitnesses. (Emphasis added.) Thermogas' motion in limine and counsel's arguments convince us Thermogas had notice that Weyerhaeuser was relying on res ipsa loquitur in addition to its specific allegations of negligence. C. Instrumentality under the exclusive control of the defendant. As mentioned, one of the elements of res ipsa loquitur is that the injury is caused by an instrumentality under the exclusive control of the defendant. The district court refused to give a res ipsa loquitur instruction because it believed there was insufficient evidence on this element. Notwithstanding the exclusive control language, a plaintiff relying on res ipsa loquitur need not prove that the defendant had control of the instrumentality when the injury occurred. Palleson, 219 N.W.2d at 13. The plaintiff need only show that the defendant controlled the instrumentality at the time of the alleged negligent act. Id. Additionally, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not) that (1) there was no change in the condition of the instrumentality, and (2) no intervening act that could have caused the event resulting in the injury. Id. The exclusive control requirement is simply another way of saying that the injury must be traced to a specific instrumentality or cause for which the defendant was responsible. Prosser § 39, at 248. On this point, the treatise writer points out what showing the plaintiff must make: [Where causes for the injury other than a defendant's negligence are equally probable], there must be evidence which will permit the jury to eliminate them. This means, for example, that a plaintiff injured by the explosion of a beer bottle purchased from a retailer will be required to make some sufficient showing that the bottle was not cracked by mishandling after it left the defendant's plant. Again, however, the evidence need not be conclusive, and only enough is required to permit a finding as to the greater probability. The plaintiff is not required to do the impossible by accounting for every moment of the bottle's existence since it left the defendant's plant; and it is enough if the plaintiff produces sufficient evidence of careful handling in general, and of the absence of unusual incidents, to permit reasonable persons to conclude that, more likely than not, the event was due to the defendant's negligence. Id. at 249. Here, the instrumentality was the tank and liquid propane that produced the explosion. The jury could find from the evidence that Thermogas provided the tank to Weyerhaeuser probably the day before the accident. Henriksen testified he found the tank in its regular location in the storage room and carried it to the clamp truck. He further testified that he inspected the tank for dents, cracks, anything that was busted on it, and that he checked the nozzle that is used to open the valve to make sure it was not busted or cracked. Henriksen further testified that he opened the valve on the tank one-half turn to allow sufficient propane to flow through the line so the truck could run. He then checked for leaks and found none. We think from this evidence the jury could reasonably infer there was no change in the tank and liquid propane from the time it left Thermogas' possession until the explosion. The evidence was sufficient to generate a jury question on the control element of res ipsa loquitur. We have already concluded that the cause of the fireWeyerhaeuser's negligencewas a foreseeable intervening cause and for that reason the cause of the fire was irrelevant. We think the same reasoning applies with respect to the application of res ipsa loquitur. D. Injury-causing accident would not ordinarily occur in the absence of some negligence. This element is another way of stating an obvious principle of circumstantial evidence: that the event must be such that in the light of ordinary experience it gives rise to an inference that someone must have been negligent. Id. at 244. Usually, the basis of past experience, from which the conclusion may be drawn that such events usually do not occur without negligence, is one common to the whole community, upon which the jury are simply permitted to rely. Id. at 247. Even where such a basis of common knowledge is lacking, however, expert testimony may provide a sufficient foundation. Id. Res ipsa loquitur applies if there is no direct evidence to show cause of injury, and the circumstantial evidence indicates that the negligence of the defendant is the most plausible explanation for the injury. Prosser § 46, at 257. And, [i]n many cases, the inference to be drawn is a double one, that the accident was caused in a particular manner, and that the defendant's conduct with reference to that cause was negligent. The inference of negligence may arise either where a definite cause is known, or where the accident is more or less a mystery, with no particular cause indicated. Id. § 39, at 247-48. Here, there was no direct evidence of any defect in the tank. However, Weyerhaeuser's expert testified the premature explosion was the result of a defect in the tank. He based his opinion on the following. First, the expert examined the remnants of the tank. Second, both Henriksen and Chorny testified that, when they last saw the clamp truck, the flames were not impinging on the tank. Forty-five seconds later the tank exploded. Third, the expert conducted two testsone on a normal, properly functioning LP tank to determine how quickly the tank would explode and another when the relief valve did not function. In the first test, after twenty-eight minutes of direct flame on the bottom of the tank, where the flame would travel as much as it could along the liquid space in the tank, the tank did not explode. The flame had scorched the bottom of the tank. In the second test, the expert plugged the relief valve so it could not prevent an explosion. He then fired flames directly at the side of the tank at a ninety-degree angle, making contact with the space the liquid and the vapor occupied. After thirteen minutes the tank exploded. Additionally, Fire Marshal Thomas Joseph Lanigan, who investigated the fire's origin, testified that in his opinion, the tank exploded prematurely. He also testified that he called the National Fire Protection Association, which authors the code regulations fire marshals follow, and gave them the scenario of what had happened. The association responded that it had no reports of an LP tank explosion happening as quickly as this one had happened. We must view all of this evidence in the light most favorable to Weyerhaeuser. In doing so, we think the evidence was sufficient to generate a jury question on the second prong of res ipsa loquitur. The district court erred in not instructing on res ipsa loquitur.