Opinion ID: 1233878
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: Deitz's sentence is substantively reasonable

Text: A sentence must also be substantively reasonable, which means it must be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances of the offense and offender, and sufficient but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of § 3553(a). Vowell, 516 F.3d at 512. We afford sentences within a properly calculated Guidelines range a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir.2006). Deitz's sentence falls within the advisory Guidelines range of 120 months' to 150 months' imprisonment, so it is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. Deitz does not expressly challenge the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, but his claim that his 144-month sentence was more than double the worst case scenario discussed with the Government during plea negotiations could be construed as a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We find this argument unavailing. The district court considered Deitz's objections to the PSR and his lengthy sentencing memorandum as well as the parties' arguments during the sentencing hearing. The district court also considered the fact that Deitz had long-time participation in criminal activities, stating: In amplifying my reasons for sentence further, I have considered the guidelines to be advisory and the statute, of course, to be mandatory. However, within those advisory guidelines of an additional zero to 30 months over the mandatory minimum of ten years or 120 months, I've considered the background of this defendant, and I believe that the guidelines are extremely reasonable in light of the facts which were adduced at trial, and the criminal history, and the reasons for the compilation of those criminal history points. I believe that without regard to the guidelines that Section 3553(a) is satisfied by my sentencing to 144 months. I believe it to be reasonable in light of the conviction, the history of this defendant, the criminal history of this defendant, the findings of the jury, the need for incarceration for purposes of both rehabilitation and deterrence. (JA 1182.) Section 3553(a) requires district courts to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense...., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), and demands that the sentence imposed... reflect[s] the seriousness of the offense, [] promote[s] respect for the law, and [ ] provide[s] just punishment for the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Under Booker and its progeny, the sentencing choices available to the district courts in meeting the requirements of § 3553(a)(2) have `significantly broadened.' Moon, 513 F.3d at 544 (citing Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 602). Thus, the district court's ability to weigh the factual circumstances surrounding the offense to determine the appropriate sentence is paramount. Id. In general, we must give `due deference' to the district court's conclusion that the sentence imposed is warranted by the § 3553(a) factors. The fact that [we] might have reasonably concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court. United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 581 (6th Cir.2007). The district court's explanation adequately establishes that the court properly considered Deitz's significant criminal history and past violence and his association with a known criminal group in evaluating the seriousness of his offense, as well as the need to provide just punishment for the crime. See, e.g., Moon, 513 F.3d at 544 (finding that court properly considered the impact of defendant's health care fraud on her patients in conducting the inquiry required by § 3553(a)). Therefore, Deitz has failed to rebut the presumption that his within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Deitz's conviction and sentence.