Opinion ID: 3154978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Classification of the Water

Text: Â¶22Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Meridian next contends that the district court erred when it ultimately found that the water at issue was designated ground water. We are not persuaded. Â¶23Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The Management Act defines âdesignated ground waterâ as $$that ground water which in its natural course would not be available to and required for the fulfillment of decreed surface rights, or ground water in areas not adjacent to a continuously flowing natural stream wherein ground water withdrawals have constituted the principal water usage for at least fifteen years preceding the date of the first hearing on the proposed designation of the basin, and which in both cases is within the geographic boundaries of a designated ground water basin. Â§ 37-90-103(6)(a), C.R.S. (2015) (emphasis added). Â¶24Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â âGround water,â in turn, is defined as âany water not visible on the surface of the ground under natural conditions.â Â§ 37-90-103(19) (emphasis added). Â¶25Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Accordingly, the determination of whether the water at issue was designated ground water turned on whether, âunder natural conditions,â the water would be visible on the surface, Â§ 37-90-103(19), and whether, in its ânatural course,â it would be available for the fulfillment of decreed surface rights, Â§ 37-90-103(6)(a). Â¶26Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Here, the district court found: The precipitation that falls in the Basin would sink into the ground and be part of the ground water supply under natural or pre-development conditions and is water that would normally not be visible on the surface under natural pre-development conditions in the Basin, except during heavy rain events. The court further found that the water that Meridian sought to divert was merely runoff that had been increased by Meridianâs construction of impermeable surfaces. Thus, the court concluded that the water at issue was âneither a ânatural streamâ nor water that is âtributary to a natural streamâ under natural conditions.â Â¶27Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Because each of these findings was amply supported by the record, we conclude that the district court correctly found that a portion of the water claimed by Meridian as a result of its development was designated ground water over which the Commission had jurisdiction. Â¶28Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â We are not persuaded otherwise by Meridianâs assertion that the district court incorrectly relied on what Meridian deems the âtruncatedâ definition of âdesignated ground waterâ set forth in Vickroy. In Vickroy, 627 P.2d at 756, this court stated that the statutory definition of âdesignated ground waterâ âincludes water not tributary to any stream, and other water not available for the fulfillment of decreed surface rights.â Although it is true that this statement twice omitted the word âgroundâ from the definition, it appears that these omissions were the result of a paraphrase and that no substantive change to the statutory definition was intended. More important, for theÂ reasons set forth above, the district courtâs analysis in this case correctly applied the pertinent statutory definition. Â¶29Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â We likewise are unpersuaded by Meridianâs assertion that the district court erred in replacing this courtâs broad 1913 definition of ânatural streamâ with a purportedly narrow dictionary definition. In support of this argument, Meridian relies on our decision in In re German Ditch & Reservoir Co., 139 P. 2 (Colo. 1913). We, however, see no inconsistency between the use of the term ânaturalâ in German Ditch and the ordinary meaning of that term as used by the district court here. Â¶30Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In German Ditch, which preceded both the Management Act and the 1969 Act, we considered whether Dry Creek was a ânatural streamâ within the meaning of the Colorado Constitution. Id. at 6; see also Colo. Const. Art. XVI, Â§Â§ 5â6 (providing, respectively, that the water of every natural stream not previously appropriated is public property and that the right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial use shall not be denied). If Dry Creek was a natural stream, then it would have been tributary to the South Platte River and thus subject to the prior appropriation system established by the constitution. See German Ditch, 139 P. at 6. Â¶31Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In considering this question, we explained that the legislature did not use the phrase âtributary to a natural streamâ in a ârestricted sense,â such that âthe tributaries themselves should be natural, continuous running streams.â Id. at 9. Rather, âthe word âtributariesâ [was] used to include all sources of supply which go to make up the natural stream, and which properly belong thereto.â Id. Because the evidence established that for over twenty-five years, a âconsiderable body of waterâ had flowed and continued toÂ flow down the channel of Dry Creek until it emptied into the Platte River, we concluded that Dry Creek was tributary to the South Platte River and therefore was a ânatural stream.â See id. at 8â9. Â¶32Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Unlike the water at issue in German Ditch, the water that Meridian sought to appropriate here was not tributary to a natural stream. Indeed, the evidence established that the water would not reach a tributary system. Thus, the water at issue did not constitute a ânatural streamâ under the definition that we applied in German Ditch. Â¶33Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in finding that ânatural,â as that word is used in the Management Actâs definition of designated ground water, retains its common meaning. See Univex Intâl, Inc. v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 914 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Colo. 1996) (stating that in construing statutory provisions, a court âmust look first to the statutory language itself, giving words and phrases their commonly accepted meaningâ). Â¶34Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In light of our determination that a portion of the water that Meridian sought to appropriate was designated ground water and not unappropriated water of a natural stream, we need not address Meridianâs contention that because the Management Act interferes with its right to divert the unappropriated waters of natural streams, that act is unconstitutional. See Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Goss, 993 P.2d 1177, 1182 (Colo. 2000) (noting that the General Assembly has âplenary authorityâ over the allocation and administration of, among other things, designatedÂ ground water, which is not part of the natural stream waters subject to the prior appropriation provisions of the Colorado Constitution).