Opinion ID: 1058157
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Second Statement

Text: In his closing argument, defense counsel stated that after Taylor's funeral, Donna returned to the house she and Taylor had lived in but she was arrested within seven days and did not receive the house nor did she get one penny as a result of Taylor's death. In rebuttal, the prosecutor made this statement: She was in jail ten days after [Taylor's death] happened. That's why she didn't get one penny. That's why she didn't get the house. Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's reference to Donna's presence in jail and moved for a mistrial or a curative instruction. Defense counsel likened the comment about Donna being in jail to allowing an accused to appear before a jury while in shackles or prison garb and, hence, was overly prejudicial. The trial judge remarked that defense counsel had sort of opened that door by his statement that Donna had been arrested seven days after Taylor's murder. The prosecutor stated that he had not said that Donna had been in jail continuously since that time, only that she was in jail ten days after the murder. The prosecutor also said he may have misstated the number of days as ten rather than seven between the murder and the arrest. The circuit court denied the defense motion for a mistrial. However, the trial judge reminded the jurors that he had previously instructed them that what the attorneys say is not evidence, that it is only their recollection of the evidence, that [y]ou are the triers of fact, and [y]ou heard the evidence based upon your collective memories as to what, in fact, is the evidence. Resuming his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor stated to the jury: Let me correct myself. Of course, she didn't get the house. Of course, she didn't get any money. She was arrested for the murder of Taylor Blanton seven days after he was murdered. We hold that the circuit court did not err in denying defense counsel's motion for a mistrial. The denial is supported by established principles of law, as follows: The decision whether to grant a motion for mistrial lies within a trial court's exercise of discretion. When a motion for mistrial is made, based upon an allegedly prejudicial event, the trial court must make an initial factual determination, in the light of all the circumstances of the case, whether the defendant's rights are so indelibly prejudiced as to necessitate a new trial. Unless we can say that the trial court's determination was wrong as a matter of law, we will not disturb its judgment on appeal. Green v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 81, 102, 580 S.E.2d 834, 846 (2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We cannot say that the circuit court's determination was wrong as a matter of law. Considering the innocuous nature of the prosecutor's comment under all the circumstances of the case, the circuit court's cautionary instruction to the jury, and the prosecutor's corrective statement, Donna's rights were clearly not so indelibly prejudiced as to necessitate a new trial. Accordingly, we will not disturb the circuit court's judgment.