Opinion ID: 440538
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issues Relating to Matters Arising at Trial

Text: 82 The appellants challenge the italicized portions of the following excerpt from the government's closing argument, as improperly calculated to incite the passions of the jury and prejudicial to the defendants' right to a fair trial: 83 By your verdict today, by your verdict today or tomorrow, whenever you render that verdict, you will be serving the cause of justice. I am going to tell you, too, whatever the outcome is in this case, justice will have been served. I want to see justice done. I don't want to see convictions for the sake of convictions. I want to see that justice is done. 84 You go in there, follow the instructions of the law, apply it to the evidence in the case. Then justice will have been done. Justice will have been served. 85 But you serve by your verdict, you serve as a conscience of this community. If you find that the government, by its evidence, has proved these defendants guilty beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, then it's your duty to find these defendants guilty as charged. By that verdict, you will send out a very loud and clear message to other people of a similar persuasion that will traffic -- 86 MR. HARTMAN: Judge, I object. 87 THE COURT: Overruled. 88 MR. GEEKER: --That would traffic in marijuana of these quantities, that would engage in this kind of illegal activities. You have heard and you're familiar by virtue of your own common sense and experience with everyday affairs, the term, the war on drugs. 89 Isn't this case really one about a war? Haven't they invaded our shores? 90 MR. HARTMAN: Objection. 91 MR. KRIEGER: Objection. 92 THE COURT: Well, the argument of counsel is in response to the defense lawyers' argument. The jury knows that the argument of counsel is not evidence. To that extent, they will disregard it. 93 MR. GEEKER: In any event, there are tons and tons of marijuana brought into our communities here and dumped on our community. This arena of justice, this court of law, is the place to decide whether or not this kind of activity is going to continue. Consider the evidence. 94 MR. DIAMOND: Continuing objection-- 95 THE COURT: Overruled. 96 MR. DIAMOND: Continuing objection to that line of questioning. 97 THE COURT: Overruled. 98 MR. GEEKER: Consider your verdict based on the evidence, not what I argue. My argument is not evidence. But consider the evidence. If you consider the evidence and weigh it properly, then I am confident you will return a just verdict. Thank you. 99 (v. 43 at 293-95). 100 In order for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument to warrant reversal, the challenged remarks must be 1) improper; and 2) prejudicial to a substantial right of the defendant. United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1341 (11th Cir.1982). Upon evaluating the prosecutor's closing argument in light of the foregoing criteria, we hold that the challenged statements do not constitute reversible misconduct. 101 The statements of the United States Attorney that are complained of in this appeal, were made in rebuttal, following the closing arguments of the defendants. Among the closing arguments, and occupying thirty pages of transcript, was a self-described drama performed by counsel for James and beginning as follows: 102 This is a criminal trial. This is a big case for the government. That's what it was, folks. I didn't lie. It was a circus right from the beginning to the bitter end. 103 So allow me to indulge a bit in a little drama and tell you about Operation Sunburn. 104 Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the Big Top, the Greatest Show on Earth, also known as Operation Sunburn. Accompany me. The drama is in three sections. Starring Mr. Nickolas Geeker, United States Attorney, as Mr. Nick the Ringmaster. Mike Moore as Mr. Mike, the Animal Trainer, and Assistant Ringmaster, Mr. Ken Sukhia, as the Young Circus Boy in Training. The Friendly Mr. Ferdinand Bockelman, the Paper Man Putting Posters Out to Welcome People to the Circus. And Scott Daniels, Assistant Animal Trainer and Keeper of the Zoo. 105 Act One. The circus comes to town. Well, Mr. Nick, we certainly have a good circus coming here. We've got a good show, got a lots of animals lined up for Mr. Mike. I got some great people some--rather, we've got them lined up. We are going to get that man on the high wire. 106 Who is that, says the Young Circus Boy. Who is that man walking on the high wire up there? 107 Well, this is Manny James. 108 Defense counsel's extended analogy of the government's conduct to a three-ring circus was clearly an invitation to the prosecutor to protest to the contrary. United States v. Eley, 723 F.2d 1522, 1526 (11th Cir.1984). When the prosecutor goes no further than to take defense counsel up on his invitation, his conduct will not be regarded as impermissibly calculated to incite the passions of the jury. Id.; see also United States v. Cotton, 631 F.2d 63, 63-66 (5th Cir.1980). The United States Attorney's likening the drug problem to a war or enemy invasion, coupled with his statement that he was interested in justice and not convictions for their own sake, could fairly be described as little more than a response to defense counsel's suggestion that the defendants' prosecution was a show put on by government counsel for their own amusement. 109 Turning to the specific remarks complained of, prosecutorial appeals for the jury to act as the conscience of the community are not impermissible, unless calculated to inflame. United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1292-93; United States v. Lewis, 547 F.2d 1030, 1036 (8th Cir.1976); United States v. Alloway, 397 F.2d 105, 113 (6th Cir.1968). Nor is it impermissible to simply compare the duties of citizens serving on juries with those of citizens serving in the armed forces. Brooks v. Francis, 716 F.2d 780, 789 (11th Cir.1983) (en banc pending). Finally, the prosecutor's reference to tons and tons of marijuana being dumped on the community was nothing more than a permissibly colorful way to describe a fact amply borne out in the record. 110 Because the remarks of government counsel are better understood as a response to the defendant's closing argument than as an attempt to inflame the jury, and because those remarks were not improper in and of themselves, reversal is unwarranted. 111 B. Ex Parte Communications Between the Judge and Jury During Deliberations 112 The jury commenced its deliberations at 9:50 a.m. on March 25. In the course of the day, the judge and jury exchanged several notes: (1) the jury requested an index of tapes played at trial, to which the court responded that no acceptable index existed; (2) the jury inquired as to a number of pages missing from the indictment, to which the court responded that the missing pages involved matters not relevant for the jury's consideration; (3) the jury requested transcripts of telephone conversations introduced into evidence by the prosecution and defense, to which the court responded that the jury already had transcripts of all telephone conversations introduced by the government, that some but not all of the telephone conversations introduced by the defense had been transcribed, and that to the extent the jury could not recall what it heard in the tapes that were not transcribed, it could request that any particular tape be replayed in open court; (4) the jury indicated that the tape transcripts were not in the jury room, to which the court did not respond. (v. 15 at 3455-62). The court went back on the record at 6:00 p.m., and in the presence of counsel stated: 113 I think we'll start tomorrow morning afresh, assuming they're not finished. I am confident they're not. But what I thought I would do is just send a note to them and ask them if they have arrived at any complete verdicts as to any defendants. Then find out yes or no. And then tell the marshal to bring them into the courtroom and bring with them only those verdicts, if any that they have arrived at as to any of the defendants. Is that fair enough? 114 (v. 44 at 68). Notwithstanding the concern of a number of defendants that such a note might be interpreted as coercive, the court sent the following message to the jury room: Have you arrived at a unanimous verdict as to any defendant which you wish to report to me? Yes or no, to which the jury responded, No, sir. The record reflects that the jury was returned to the courtroom at 6:11 p.m., at which time the court stated: 115 Members of the jury, I passed the note to you asking you whether you had reached a unanimous verdict as to any defendant, for the sole purpose of trying to give me some idea of how you were coming in your deliberations. I don't suggest that you should have reached a unanimous verdict as to any defendant. It occurs to me you have been here now over ten hours and you have had to digest a lot of things. And it further occurs to me that you probably won't be able to reach a verdict tonight as to any or all of the defendants. And consequently, I am going to discharge you to the custody of the marshals for the remainder of the evening. 116 (v. 44 at 71-72). 117 After the jury had been excused, the court stated as follows: 118 While we are on the record and the jury is gone, have all counsel seen the notes that the jury has, the questions they have asked and the answers given? ... I didn't see any need in calling counsel on the questions that were asked. The main problem was, they couldn't find a piece--or some evidence. And the transcripts of the tapes. 119 (v. 44 at 72-73). Counsel for appellant James indicated affirmatively on the record that he had read the notes, and it can be assumed by the silence of the remaining counsel, who were present, that they had likewise read the notes. No objections were made at that time. 120 On March 26, two notes were sent from the jury to the court: one indicating that a verdict had been reached as to four of the six defendants, and the second stating that the jury was hung with respect to one defendant. At 4:45 that afternoon, the court went on the record to say that it had received the note indicating that the jury was hung, and proposed that an Allen charge, the so-called dynamite charge, be given. Over objection, the jury was returned to the courtroom at 4:51, and the Allen charge was read. The verdict was returned approximately an hour after the jury had been returned to the jury room and recommenced deliberations. 121 With respect to the court's inquiry into whether the jury had reached a partial verdict as of the evening of the 25th, we find that no error was committed. The record clearly indicates that the communication was not undertaken until after counsel had been notified and had been given the opportunity to object. United States v. McDuffie, 542 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir.1976). Moreover, any coercive or otherwise improper impact the note might conceivably have had, was neutralized by the court's later remarks when the jury was returned to the courtroom. 122 The other communications undertaken on the 25th are somewhat more troubling. It is certainly true that preferable procedure would have been for the court to have informed counsel of communications from the jury and to afford them an opportunity to be heard before written responses were returned. United States v. McDuffie, 542 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir.1976). Nevertheless, counsel's failure to object to the ex parte communications at the time they were revealed may have operated as a waiver. Moreover, courts have universally held that where wholly innocuous inquiries of the sort at issue here are responded to by the court without first consulting counsel, any error thereby committed is nonprejudicial. United States v. Reynolds, 489 F.2d 4, 7-8 (6th Cir.1973); United States v. Stone, 452 F.2d 42, 48-49 (8th Cir.1971); United States v. Goodman, 457 F.2d 68, 72-73 (9th Cir.1972); United States v. Freed, 460 F.2d 75, 78-79 (10th Cir.1972). As the Fifth Circuit noted in United States v. Breedlove, 576 F.2d 57, 60 (5th Cir.1978), when the judge's answer to the jury's inquiry was distinctly responsive to the question, it clearly stated the law, and no prejudice is shown, the error is harmless. See also United States v. McDuffie, 542 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir.1976). In this case, the court's answers were distinctly responsive to the jury's questions, and as such were at most harmless error. 13 Separate Issues