Opinion ID: 151405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Challenges to the Government's Rebuttal Summation

Text: In the government's rebuttal summation, the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) made statements about Kaplan's 1994 statement to Burstein, to which Caracappa takes exception on appeal. The AUSA stated, inter alia, I submit to you that based on the circumstances of the case and the circumstances of what Mr. Kaplan told him, you can completely trust everything [Burstein] said 100 percent, 100 percent (Tr. 3227), and Burstein told you the truth. He is an officer of the court ( id. at 3230). Caracappa contends that the government thereby improperly vouched for Burstein's veracity. In addition, the AUSA pointed out that all major religions such as Islam, Judaism, and Catholicism have rites of penitence; he analogized the attorney-client privilege to the priest-penitent privilege and argued that it would make no greater sense for Kaplan to have told Burstein, his attorney, falsely, that he had committed a crime than it would for persons practicing Catholicism, seeking forgiveness through the intermediary between themselves and their God, to admit[ ] something they didn't do. ( Id. ) Caracappa seeks a new trial on the ground that this constituted vouching for Burstein's credibility by using Burstein's testimony to bolster Kaplan's credibility through an appeal to religious faith. (Caracappa brief on appeal at 39 (emphasis omitted).) A defendant bears a substantial burden in arguing for reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct in the summation. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-12, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); United States v. Millar, 79 F.3d 338, 343 (2d Cir.1996). In determining whether an inappropriate remark amounts to prejudicial error, we look to the severity of the misconduct, the measures adopted to cure the misconduct, and the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct. United States v. Spinelli, 551 F.3d 159, 170 (2d Cir.2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 230, 175 L.Ed.2d 243 (2009). Flaws in the government's summation will require a new trial only in the rare case in which improper statements viewed against the entire argument to the jurycan be said to have deprived the defendant of a fair trial. See United States v. Forlorma, 94 F.3d 91, 93-94 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Millar, 79 F.3d at 343; United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 847, 113 S.Ct. 139, 121 L.Ed.2d 92 (1992). Further, in the absence of an objection at trial, a claim of improper vouching is reviewable only for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 587 F.3d 573, 583 (2d Cir.2009); Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). Under the standard set by United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), for applying Rule 52(b), before an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) `error,' (2) that is `plain,' and (3) that `affect[s] substantial rights.' Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770). If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error `seriously affect [s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (which was quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. at 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038 (other internal quotation marks omitted))). In the present case, although Caracappa's counsel and Eppolito's counsel, respectively, objected to other aspects of the government's rebuttal summation, neither of them objected to the statements described above or sought any cautionary instruction to the jury, and we cannot see that any of these statements warrants a new trial. The AUSA's statement that the jury could trust Burstein 100 percent based on the circumstances of the case and based on the circumstances of what Mr. Kaplan told him does not constitute vouching; it is merely an argument that the evidence indicates that Burstein's testimony was completely truthful and accurate. Nor can we agree with Caracappa's contention that the analogy drawn between the attorney-client privilege and the priest-penitent privilege was in any sense an appeal to religion; rather, it was plainly an argument that, in seeking aid from an advisor, it makes no sense to claim guilt falsely. The statement that Burstein should be believed because he is an officer of the court may have been improper either as a suggestion that Burstein should be viewed as something other than a witness for the prosecution or as a suggestion that attorneys always tell the truth; but that isolated statement, even if improper, clearly did not affect defendants' substantial rights. Accordingly, the plain-error test has not been met.