Opinion ID: 2087875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: larry dancy

Text: Dancy argues on appeal that (1) the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his motion for severance; (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him for a total of two counts of premeditated murder, four counts of felony murder while armed, as well as the underlying felonies of armed robbery and burglary while armed; and (3) the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. [10] Dancy first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance. An order denying severance may be reversed only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. See Winestock v. United States, 429 A.2d 519, 526 (D.C. 1981). In order to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a severance, a defendant must show not merely prejudice, but manifest prejudice. Elliott v. United States, 633 A.2d 27, 34 (D.C.1993) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Dancy specifically contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant severance under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 14 because his defenses were irreconcilable with that of Anderson, and Anderson's counsel had assumed the posture of a second prosecutor by pointing a finger at Dancy as the second gunman during his closing argument. [11] There exists a strong presumption that two defendants charged with jointly committing a criminal offense will be tried together. See Ingram v. United States, 592 A.2d 992, 996 (D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1017, 112 S.Ct. 667, 116 L.Ed.2d 757 (1991). In order for a defendant to be granted severance on the basis of conflicting defenses, he must demonstrate `a clear and substantial contradiction between the respective defenses,' causing inherent irreconcilability between them. ( Ronald) Garris v. United States, 559 A.2d 323, 329 (D.C. 1989) (quoting Tillman v. United States, 519 A.2d 166, 169 (D.C.1986)). According to Dancy, his defenses were irreconcilable with that of Anderson because each attorney argued that his client did not participate in the crimes. The trial court, however, in denying Dancy's motion for severance, rejected the assertion that the defenses were irreconcilable. The trial court noted that Anderson's defense was merely that the government had not proven its case with respect to himself. Furthermore, neither Dancy nor Anderson called any witnesses on his own behalf. Any theory of the case with respect to Dancy or Anderson was only provided through closing arguments. Closing arguments by counsel are not evidence for severance purposes because the level of the antagonism in defenses is measured by the evidence actually introduced at trial. United States v. Rose, 104 F.3d 1408, 1417 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1258, 117 S.Ct. 2424, 138 L.Ed.2d 187 (1997). The trial court further found that, even if Dancy's and Anderson's defenses were conflicting, Dancy was not prejudiced by the conflict. Unfair prejudice does not arise merely because defendants are mutually hostile and attempt to blame each other. Ingram, 592 A.2d at 996. In order to show prejudice, Dancy must demonstrate that there is a danger or risk that the jury will draw an improper conclusion from the existence of the conflicting defenses alone that both defendants are guilty. Garris, 559 A.2d at 329. The trial court specifically noted that there was enough independent evidence of Dancy's guilt so that it could reasonably find with substantial certainty that the conflict in defenses alone would not sway the jury to find Dancy guilty. The government's evidence against Dancy included that he willingly drove to and from the scene, returned grinning to the car with Anderson, attempted to pry open the safe, and received a split of the proceeds. Because there were no irreconcilable defenses and no prejudice to Dancy, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for severance. Dancy also argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him for a total of two counts of premeditated murder, four counts of felony murder while armed, as well as the underlying felonies of armed robbery and burglary while armed. Dancy specifically argues that the case should be remanded for resentencing so that the trial court can elect which counts to merge. This court has held that a defendant cannot remain convicted of premeditated murder and felony murder of the same decedent, nor of both felony murder and the underlying felony. Green v. United States, 718 A.2d 1042, 1062 (D.C.1998) (citing Parker v. United States, 692 A.2d 913, 918 n. 9 (D.C.1997)). Therefore, we must remand the case to permit the trial court to determine which counts should merge and to resentence accordingly in order to allow[ ] the trial court to effectuate its original sentencing plan without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. ( David) Garris v. United States, 491 A.2d 511, 514 (D.C.1985). [12] Dancy finally contends that the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to prove that he aided and abetted in the shooting and the burglary. In reviewing a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, giving deference to the fact finder's right to weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses, and draw inferences from the evidence presented. We can only reverse a conviction on this ground if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable mind could infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Patton v. United States, 633 A.2d 800, 820 (D.C.1993). Dancy's claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal has no merit. There was ample evidence of Dancy's participation in the crimes. According to Williams, the driver of the car, Dancy struggled to open the stolen safe in the car following the murders and stated, Man, there ain't nothing in here, sounds like papers; we did all that for nothing. Furthermore, witnesses testified that Dancy ran to the car from the victims' house with Anderson, smiling as he arrived, continued trying to open the safe throughout the car ride, looked for tools to open the safe, helped count out the money, drugs, and other items in the safe, and ultimately took his own share, including a diamond ring which he was seen wearing shortly after the murders. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the trial court did not err in denying Dancy's motion for judgment of acquittal.