Opinion ID: 704047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discrimination Claims Against H & R Block

Text: 14 Turning to the sex and age discrimination claims against H & R Block, Meinecke contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on these claims because she presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the reasons for her forced retirement. Specifically, Meinecke argues that this evidence established a prima facie case of sex and age discrimination and demonstrated that H & R Block's proffered reasons for her retirement were pretextual. H & R Block responds that Meinecke could not meet her burden of proving discrimination because she was legitimately terminated as part of H & R Block's plan to close its Houston headquarters office. 15 Title VII provides that [i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1). The ADEA proscribes similar treatment on the basis of age. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 623(a)(1). The same evidentiary procedure for allocating burdens of proof applies to discrimination claims under both statutes. Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 n. 4 (5th Cir.1993); Fields v. J.C. Penney Co., 968 F.2d 533, 536 n. 2 (5th Cir.1992). Initially, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 957. The prima facie case, if established, raises a presumption of discrimination, which the defendant must rebut by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094-95, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 957. If the defendant satisfies this burden, the presumption disappears, and the plaintiff must prove that the proffered reasons are a pretext for discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 957. The plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion throughout the case. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095. 16 To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position that she held; (3) she was discharged; and (4) after being discharged, her employer replaced her with a person who is not a member of the protected class. See Vaughn v. Edel, 918 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir.1990). In cases where the employer discharges the plaintiff and does not plan to replace her, we have held that the fourth element is, more appropriately, that after [the] discharge others who were not members of the protected class remained in similar positions. Id. The first three elements of a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA are identical to the first three elements of a Title VII prima facie case. Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 957. The fourth element is similar, although we have worded it somewhat differently: The plaintiff must show that [s]he was either i) replaced by someone outside the protected class, ii) replaced by someone younger, or iii) otherwise discharged because of [her] age. Id. The third alternative of this last element applies in circumstances where the plaintiff is not replaced. See Armendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co., 58 F.3d 144, 150 (5th Cir.1995). Because the requirements under both statutes are essentially the same, we will analyze them together. 17 The parties agree that Meinecke has established the first three elements of her prima facie case. They dispute, however, which version of the fourth element of the prima facie case is applicable and, in either case, whether Meinecke has made the requisite showing. Meinecke contends that this is a replacement case rather than a reduction in force case. Specifically, she points out that Ken Treat of HRB/STI assumed her duties after she left H & R Block, that Ilah Merriman did not announce Meinecke's retirement as part of a reduction in force, and that the Houston offices which she oversaw as part of her duties have continued to function. H & R Block counters that this is a reduction in force case because it closed the entire Houston headquarters office where Meinecke was employed and because no one replaced Meinecke at her position. Rather, her duties were incorporated into the job responsibilities of other employees. 18 We agree with H & R Block that this is a reduction in force case. The evidence clearly establishes that H & R Block closed the Houston headquarters office where Meinecke worked and abolished her position as part of the reorganization plan that accompanied Michael Merriman's purchase of the business. Other entities assumed the functions of the headquarters office, and Meinecke's managerial role in particular was obviated by the contract between H & R Block and HRB/STI, whereby the latter agreed to assist Michael Merriman in managing H & R Block. However the Merrimans characterized Meinecke's departure from H & R Block, it cannot be said that she was replaced in her position. The evidence presented by Meinecke does not raise a fact question on this point. 19 Because this is a reduction in force case, Meinecke must prove as the fourth elements of her prima facie cases of sex and age discrimination that males remained in similar positions and that she was otherwise discharged because of her age. Armendariz, 58 F.3d at 150; Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 957; Vaughn, 918 F.2d at 521. With respect to her Title VII claim, Meinecke argues that she has shown that Ken Treat remained in a position similar to hers when she was discharged. While Treat may have assumed many of the duties that Meinecke had performed before she left H & R Block, he did so as an employee of another company, HRB/STI, which had agreed to provide managerial consulting services pursuant to a management agreement. 5 Further, H & R Block eliminated Meinecke's position and closed the headquarters office where she worked. Under these facts, Meinecke cannot show that males remained in similar positions after she was discharged. 20 With respect to her ADEA claim, Meinecke contends that Ilah Merriman's alleged statement about Michael wanting a younger person with whom to work and the fact that her departure was characterized as a retirement create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was otherwise discharged because of her age. We disagree. Meinecke was not the only H & R Block employee affected by the reorganization of the business. When H & R Block closed the Houston headquarters office, it laid off seven other employees, including six under the age of forty. Accordingly, we concur with the district court's conclusion that, [w]hile Ms. Merriman's alleged statement may reveal Michael Merriman's true feelings, it does not, in light of the reduction of force, show that age was a factor in his decision not to continue Meinecke's employment. In sum, we hold that H & R Block was entitled to summary judgment on both the sex and age discrimination claims.