Opinion ID: 472184
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: inadmissibility claim based upon illegal arrest

Text: 18 Cherry urges two theories as to why the introduction of the murder weapon at his trial was barred under the exclusionary rule because it was obtained by a search and seizure which violated the Fourth Amendment. First, he contends that his consent to the second search of his cubicle that resulted in the discovery of the murder weapon grew out of his illegal arrest as the fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation. Second, Cherry argues that the second warrantless search of his cubicle was without probable cause and therefore unconstitutionally infringed upon his expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. The district court rejected both theories in ruling that the murder weapon was admissible. We turn now to the first argument. 19 As one means of discouraging police from improperly exercising their power to arrest individuals, the Supreme Court holds that there is an exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment with regard to evidence derived from an illegal arrest. Ordinarily, such evidence will be excluded as the fruit of unconstitutional conduct. Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 2667, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Nevertheless, there are situations in which evidence obtained after an illegal arrest may become so attenuated from the illegal arrest that the taint becomes dissipated. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487, 83 S.Ct. at 417. The fundamental issue, therefore, is whether the effect of the illegal arrest had so dissipated that Cherry's consent to the search of his cubicle was  'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.'  Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486, 83 S.Ct. at 416. 20 The central inquiry regarding the dissipation of the taint of the illegal arrest is the voluntariness of the consent to search obtained from Cherry. Taylor, 457 U.S. at 690, 120 S.Ct. at 2668; Brown, 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. at 2262. Voluntariness is determined by the totality of all the circumstances. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1879, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Voluntariness is a question of fact to be decided by the trial court and upheld on appeal unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Davis, 749 F.2d 292, 294 (5th Cir.1985); United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1218 (5th Cir.1980). 21 The district court found that Cherry, a high school graduate, was mentally capable of understanding his rights and of giving a voluntary waiver of those rights. Cherry's right to refuse consent and to remain silent had been thoroughly explained to him. See United States v. Troutman, 590 F.2d 604, 606 (5th Cir.1979). In addition, Cherry's consent was not coerced by physical or mental abuse, or intimidation. Cf. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 828, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). Cherry was also twice given full Miranda warnings. Although his Miranda rights were infringed when he was not provided with an attorney following his equivocal request for one, the knowledge required of the Miranda warnings had been imparted to him thoroughly. This knowledge and understanding is critical to the issue of voluntariness of the consent to search. A Miranda violation is not in all instances a dispositive indication of involuntariness. 4 See Elstad, 105 S.Ct. at 1292. 22 Other factors must also be considered in order to evaluate the admissibility of evidence derived from the exploitation of an illegal arrest. These are: (1) the temporal proximity between the arrest and Cherry's consent to search; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of official misconduct. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct. at 2261. There is no particular way to rank the importance of each factor. The totality of their effect must be evaluated in relation to the particular facts of each case. Cherry II, 759 F.2d at 1211. Considered together, we find that these factors show that Cherry's consent to search his cubicle was sufficiently free of any taint arising from his illegal arrest to permit the evidence discovered to be admitted at trial. 23 First, Cherry's second consent to search was separated from the illegal arrest by the substantial time period of approximately twenty-four hours. 5 This varies significantly from the situations presented in cases such as Brown (2 hours) and Taylor (6 hours). Cf. United States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908, 912 (9th Cir.1983) (delay of 18 hours between illegal arrest and confession was sufficient to show attenuation of taint). 24 Second, important intervening circumstances between the arrest and the consent developed. For example, during the time that Cherry was in custody, investigating agents independently acquired additional inculpatory evidence that the taxi had last been dispatched to Cherry's barracks and that Cherry had been seen with a pistol of the same caliber as the murder weapon. This additional evidence would have been enough to establish probable cause for Cherry's continued detention. Cherry II, 759 F.2d at 1212. The development of independently procured probable cause following an illegal arrest is a critical factor attenuating the taint of the initial illegal arrest. See United States v. Nooks, 446 F.2d 1283, 1287 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hughes v. United States, 404 U.S. 945, 92 S.Ct. 299, 30 L.Ed.2d 261 (1971). It is also apparent from the record that Cherry realized that the authorities were developing a strong case against him and thus that it might be in his interest to cooperate with them. 25 Finally, we cannot find that there was any flagrant official misconduct. Cherry was not subjected to continuous questioning during his detention. He was allowed to sleep and to consider his predicament. There was no physical nor mental coercion or intimidation. Although the agents did not properly deal with Cherry's equivocal request for counsel, their error was neither purposeful nor flagrant. They asked Cherry whether he wanted some time alone before making any additional statements. At this point, Cherry changed his mind and asked to see a sergeant known to him. The investigating agents then suspended questioning until the additional evidence was presented to him that he had been seen with a gun in his possession. The agents could have in good faith, although erroneously, believed Cherry had retracted his request for counsel. 26 We hold that Cherry's consent to the second search was not tainted by his illegal arrest and thus we uphold the district court's judgment. Consequently, the murder weapon was properly admissible in evidence as against that claim. It, therefore, is unnecessary for us to decide the question of whether Cherry possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the space in the ceiling above his cubicle since that claim is predicated upon a finding of an invalid consent to search growing out of the illegal arrest. 27