Opinion ID: 2637056
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Asserted inadequacy of admonitions regarding risks of self-representation

Text: In order to make a valid waiver of the right to counsel, a defendant should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that `he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' [Citation.] ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525.) No particular form of words is required in admonishing a defendant who seeks to waive counsel and elect self-representation; the test is whether the record as a whole demonstrates that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case. ( People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1048, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 174, 846 P.2d 756, revd. on another point in Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293.) In People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal. App.3d 568, 138 Cal.Rptr. 36 (Lopez ), the court enumerated a set of suggested advisements and inquiries designed to ensure a clear record of a defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. First, the court recommended the defendant be cautioned (a) that self-representation is almost always unwise, and the defendant may conduct a defense `ultimately to his own detriment' (id. at p. 572, 138 Cal.Rptr. 36); (b) that the defendant will receive no special indulgence by the court and is required to follow all the technical rules of substantive law, criminal procedure and evidence in making motions and objections, presenting evidence and argument, and conducting voir dire; (c) that the prosecution will be represented by a trained professional who will give the defendant no quarter on account of his lack of skill and experience; and (d) that the defendant will receive no more library privileges than those available to any other self-represented defendant, or any additional time to prepare. Second, the Lopez court recommended that trial judges inquire into the defendant's education and familiarity with legal procedures, suggesting a psychiatric examination in questionable cases. The Lopez court further suggested probing the defendant's understanding of the alternative to self-representation, i.e., the right to counsel, including court-appointed counsel at no cost to the defendant, and exploring the nature of the proceedings, potential defenses and potential punishments. The Lopez court advised warning the defendant that, in the event of misbehavior or disruption, his or her self-representation may be terminated. Finally, the court noted, the defendant should be made aware that in spite of his or her best (or worst) efforts, the defendant cannot afterwards claim inadequacy of representation. (Id. at pp. 572-574, 138 Cal.Rptr. 36.) As indicated above, the purpose of the suggested Lopez admonitions is to ensure a clear record of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, not to create a threshold of competency to waive counsel. (See People v. Stansbury, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1048, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 174, 846 P.2d 756; Godinez v. Moran, supra, 509 U.S. at pp. 399-400, 113 S.Ct. 2680.) In the present case, defendant asserted his right of self-representation at the conclusion of the preliminary examination. The trial court then warned defendant in the following terms: If the jury believes what [McLean Currie] just testified toโif there was ever a just case for imposing the death penalty, this is the case. And I would be very careful, sir, because you are dealing in a highly technical area, and you need all the help you can get. [ถ] Now, I don't know whether you are guilty or not. I haven't heard all the case. But I'm telling you, you are in serious trouble, serious trouble. The trial court went on to advise defendant: First, you have the right to be represented by a lawyer at all stages of this case. In any case which you are a defendant in, if you cannot afford your own lawyer I'll appoint one to represent you. That's already been done. [ถ] Second, it is generally not a wise choice to represent yourself in a criminal matter. I think I just said that as strongly as I could say it. [ถ] The penalty for the offense of violating [section] 187 of the Penal Code, that is, murder, in this case of Mr. Martinez, is [the] death penalty.... [T]he district attorney is telling you right now, that if the jury finds you guilty of murdering Mr. Martinez, that he will ask that jury to impose a death penalty. [H] And, fourth, I cannot help you present your case. No judge can help you present your case or grant you any special treatment because you are representing yourself. You must know that, [ถ] ... [Y]ou will be opposed by a trained prosecutor. There is no question about that. Mr. Maguire has already, I'm sure, convinced you of that. [ถ] You must comply with all the rules of criminal procedure and evidence just as an attorney must. And I will tell you that very few judges and attorneys know all of those. And, I mean, unless you have been practicing law for some time, you wouldn't know many of them. [ถ] ... [F]urther, if you are convicted, you cannot appeal based on the claim that you were not competent to represent yourself. You must know that I have serious questions about that. The court also warned defendant that if he was disruptive, he would be removed from the courtroom and an attorney would be appointed to finish the case. Defendant explained he had assisted a number of inmates in preparing pro se motions while at Folsom Prison, and that he was literate and able to write legibly. When the court inquired whether he knew what the charges were, defendant initially stated a self-defense case and [t]he charges are irrelevant, but, on being pressed, correctly responded: Murder in the first degree. Murder, robbery, kidnapping. Defendant indicated his defense would be that the homicide was justifiable because the victim had attacked him with a knife. Defendant complains the warnings he received fell short of the Lopez recommendations in various respects. (See Lopez, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at pp. 572-574, 138 Cal.Rptr. 36.) Defendant notes that, although the court cautioned that self-representation is generally not a wise choice, it did not warn him that he might conduct a defense ultimately to his own detriment. The latter warning, however, clearly was implicit in the former. Defendant acknowledges that the court cautioned he would have to comply with all the rules of criminal procedure and evidence, but he complains that the court said nothing about having to follow substantive rules of law and did not specify that this requirement applied to motions and objections, the presentation of evidence, voir dire and argument. We conclude, however, that the warning given sufficed to put defendant on notice of what would be expected of him. Defendant acknowledges that the court mentioned he would be opposed by a trained prosecutor, but complains the court did not sufficiently elaborate on the unfairness of such a mismatch. Again, however, we find the admonition sufficient and the failure to comment further on the prosecutor's superior training and experience to be inconsequential. Next, defendant observes the court gave no warning at all that he would be entitled to no more library privileges than any other self-represented defendant and that he would not have a staff of investigators, in the words of the Lopez court, at his beck and call. (Id. at p. 573, 138 Cal.Rptr. 36.) Of course, defendant did have a staff of investigators and repeatedly expressed satisfaction with the two investigators under appointment at the time of trial. Moreover, while defendant complained to the trial court on a number of occasions that he was not getting sufficient time in the law library to prepare his case, the court did attempt to address his dissatisfaction, and defendant cites nothing in the record suggesting either that his decision to waive counsel was predicated on a misunderstanding about the extent of his in propria persona library privileges or that he was somehow prejudiced by lack of access to the law library. Defendant's central argument with respect to the asserted inadequacy of the admonitions seems to be that his asserted mental illness rendered him unfit to comprehend the risks of self-representation. He points to the court's statement that it had serious questions about [defendant's] mental capacity and that defendant appear[ed] to [have] a pretty severe mental problem because he's certainly unable to function socially, evidently referring to defendant's lengthy criminal history. Alluding to various occasions during the trial when he gave disorganized speeches in open court, defendant contends he was not in fact literate, contrary to his own representation to the court. Defendant further asserts that he made delusional claims, such as an assertion that he possessed an Associate of Arts degree and had attended the University of California at Davis, that the trial courtโ aware that defendant had spent most of his adult life in prisonโshould have realized indicated he was mentally unfit to stand trial. But a proclivity to boast or exaggerate, a tendency to digress in argument, a shaky grasp of the legal concept of relevancy, even a certain tangentiality in speech patterns does not necessarily mean that a defendant lacks a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings, the basic criterion for competency. (See Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824.) Finally, defendant notes that, at one point, he asserted self-representation had been forced upon [him]. The assertion, however, flies in the face of the trial court's careful admonitions, as quoted above, and seems to have been born of midtrial disappointment at the course the proceedings had taken. Defendant fails to show that mental illness rendered him unable to validly elect self-representation.