Opinion ID: 1859635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we address the issue prior to all others. Byrd v. State, 337 Ark. 413, 992 S.W.2d 759 (1999). A directed-verdict motion is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. McDole v. State, 339 Ark. 391, 6 S.W.3d 74 (1999); Ayers v. State, 334 Ark. 258, 975 S.W.2d 88 (1998). The test for determining sufficiency of the evidence is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. On appeal, when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence convicting him, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Windsor v. State, 338 Ark. 649, 1 S.W.3d 20 (1999); Dixon v. State, 310 Ark. 460, 839 S.W.2d 173 (1992). Evidence is substantial if it is of sufficient force and character to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. Ladwig v. State, 328 Ark. 241, 943 S.W.2d 571 (1997). Only evidence supporting the verdict will be considered. Hendrickson v. State, 316 Ark. 182, 871 S.W.2d 362 (1994). This court makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence when reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence. However, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient, it must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. Whether the evidence excludes every hypothesis is left to the jury to determine. Williams v. State, 338 Ark. 97, 991 S.W.2d 565 (1999). Guilt may be proved in the absence of eyewitness testimony, and evidence of guilt is not less because it is circumstantial. Trimble v. State, 316 Ark. 161, 871 S.W.2d 562 (1994). A criminal defendant's intent or state of mind is rarely capable of proof by direct evidence and must usually be inferred from the circumstances of the crime. Byrd, supra ; Green v. State, 330 Ark. 458, 956 S.W.2d 849 (1997). In his directed-verdict motion, Steggall argued that this case is based on circumstantial evidence alone; therefore, if any other conclusions can be drawn from that evidence, besides that of knowingly causing injuries as defined by the statute, then the capital-murder sentence is not warranted. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a)(9) (Repl.1997), the capital-murder statute, states: (a) A person commits capital murder if: (9) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, he knowingly causes the death of a person fourteen (14) years of age or younger at the time the murder was committed, provided that the defendant was eighteen (18) years of age or older at the time the murder was committed. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-2-202 on culpable mental states defines knowingly as follows: (2) KNOWINGLY. A person acts knowingly with respect to his conduct or the attendant circumstances when he is aware that his conduct is of the nature or that such circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. According to Ark.Code Ann. § 5-2-202 (Repl.1993): A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. A jury need not lay aside its common sense in evaluating the ordinary affairs of life, and it may infer a defendant's guilt from improbable explanations of incriminating conduct. See e.g., Goff v. State, 329 Ark. 513, 953 S.W.2d 38 (1997); Davis v. State, 325 Ark. 96, 925 S.W.2d 768 (1996). In Byrd , we dealt with shaken baby syndrome in a case in which a seven-month-old boy died after suffering a blunt-force trauma causing a skull fracture and brain swelling. The child in Byrd had suffered repeated episodes of abuse as evidenced by his medical history, including evidence of multiple healing rib fractures and a leg fracture. In that case, the defendant argued, as Steggall does now, that only circumstantial evidence existed and, as such, a finding of knowingly could not be established to support a capital-murder conviction. We especially noted that the medical evidence indicated that the injuries occurred during the time that the defendant was caring for the child, and that the injuries presented uncontroverted evidence of child maltreatment. The court in Ladwig also came to the same conclusion in that shaken baby syndrome case, finding that the defendant struck and shook the child, knowing that the result would be serious injury or death. Here, the evidence before the jury certainly provided them with ample evidence, circumstantial and direct, to find Steggall acted knowingly in causing the child's death. At trial, both Dr. Schexnayder and Dr. James testified about their opinions regarding the source of Haylee's injuries. Dr. James stated that the type of rib injuries Haylee sustained are not generally seen in accidental trauma. He stated: This site of bone injury is felt to be highly, highly specific for child abuse because we don't see this fracture in this location hardly ever in other forms of trauma, bad car wreck, bad fall, resuscitation. This site of bone injury is felt to be highly, highly specific that there was intentional trauma to the infant, which is what we term child abuse or non-accidental trauma. He further stated: We know from the images now that we have severe force has ( sic ) been applied, traumatic force has been applied to the infant. We know from being able to age both on the head scan the hemorrhage, the blood, and the healing changes of bone, we have severe traumatic force applied to this child over different time periods, over different organ systems, the brain, the bones scattered throughout the body. Dr. Schexnayder testified that given the whole picture of some of the findings I've yet to get to, this is consistent with multiple repetitive injuries that were not accidentally inflicted. In other words, this child was abused. In response to a question regarding whether these findings are consistent with shaken baby syndrome, Dr. Schexnayder responded that the skull fracture was actually part of a related syndrome called shake and slam syndrome. Dr. Schexnayder stated: To get this skull fracture, the child had to have a high force impact with some solid object, be it, you know, a table, a fist, a wall, but the child not only had to be shaken but the child had to have some severe impact to the point that it caused a very large skull fracture. The doctor summarized, stating: The bleeding in the eyes, the bleeding over the top of the brain, the rib fractures at the back, at the back part of the ribs that were fresh, those are consistent all with shaking. The old rib fractures are consistent with this child being shaken but at a different time, as is that healing rib fracture on the right, but to get that fresh skull fracture on the right, the child had to have a severe impact with something. The State also offered the testimony of Dr. Charles Paul Kokes, who performed an autopsy on Haylee's body on May 4, 1998. Dr. Kokes, a specialist in the fields of anatomic and forensic pathology, testified regarding his findings from the autopsy, noting that Haylee suffered an eleven centimeter long healing skull fracture which extended from the right front part of the skull back over the right side of the skull. Dr. Kokes also noted the subdural hematoma that Haylee's treating physicians saw on the CT scan. Dr. Kokes testified that he saw evidence of healing rib fractures on both sides of the chest wall and on four ribs. While Dr. Kokes did not see evidence of the arm or leg fractures, he attributed this to the time that had elapsed, over one month, from the time the injuries occurred to the time he performed the autopsy. Dr. Kokes testified that the injuries Haylee sustained were a result of a blunt force trauma, which could consist of the child either being struck very forcibly or compressed in some manner. In Dr. Kokes's medical opinion, the cause of Haylee's death was the head injuries with complications, and the manner of death was due to homicide. Dr. Kokes stated: [I]f you consider in the context of a child with that sort of head trauma, older injuries sufficiently severe enough in different anatomic locations in that same individual at a different time, that simply means that this child was the victim of repetitive physical abuse, had been abused before the time she sustained the head injuries. In that context that makes the likelihood that the injuries were not accidental in nature very strong, and it's not ( sic ) likely even under those circumstances without consideration of other factors, that this death is in all likelihood a homicide. Dr. Kokes further noted in his autopsy report, which was admitted into evidence at trial, the following: Healing fractures of the ribs and left radius are important in this case, not because they had adversely affected the infant, but because of what they say about the circumstances surrounding the traumatic incident. The initial story regarding what happened to this infant on April 2, 1998 is totally inconsistent with the clinical and pathologic findings. Subsequent statements given by the father, which admit some relatively mild head injuries took place, are also inconsistent with the findings. Mechanisms described by the father could not have caused the degree of head damage that was present. Nor does it explain the presence of healing rib fractures and a left wrist fracture at the time of the presentation to the hospital on April 2, 1998. The presence of healing fractures at that time indicates that this child was a victim of repetitive abuse. The head injuries which occurred on April 2, 1998 were the final injuries in a series of incidents which were sustained in this infant's short life. In addition to Steggall's statements to the police, he also made a fourth statement to Dr. John R. Anderson, Ph.D., a staff psychologist at the Arkansas State Hospital, during a mental examination to determine whether Steggall was competent to stand trial and whether he was competent at the time of the April 2, 1998, incident to understand and conform his actions. Before the examination, Dr. Anderson advised Steggall that the statements he made during the interview would not be privileged. During the examination, when asked about the events of April 2, Stegall first denied he did anything to Haylee, but then recanted and said that she had been injured while he was feeding her. Dr. Anderson quoted Steggall as saying, I dropped my daughter, I got frustrated and I shook my daughter. He further stated, I tried to keep her from hitting the floor, and she hit the couch. When I realized what happened, I got mad at myself. He also stated, I realized what I had done and I laid her down in her crib. As the State notes, the appellant's attorney conceded on closing arguments that Steggall had shaken Haylee to death. Steggall's attorney argued, however, that he did not knowingly shake her to death. However, Steggall's own conduct in giving different versions of the incidents of April 2, 1998, defy this assertion. A criminal defendant's intent or state of mind is seldom capable of proof by direct evidence and must usually be inferred from the circumstances of the crime. Thompson v. State, 338 Ark. 564, 999 S.W.2d 192 (1999); Mulkey v. State, 330 Ark. 113, 952 S.W.2d 149 (1997); Williams v. State, 325 Ark. 432, 930 S.W.2d 297 (1996). In Thompson , the verdict was based on circumstantial evidence, but the evidence excluded any other hypothesis consistent with innocence. Thompson's attempts to cover up his connection to the crime were before the jury, and the jury could have properly considered evidence of cover-up as proof of a purposeful mental state. See also, Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d 1 (1993); Mulkey, supra . Circumstantial evidence of a culpable mental state may constitute substantial evidence to sustain a guilty verdict. Williams, supra; Crawford v. State, 309 Ark. 54, 827 S.W.2d 134 (1992). Here, there was ample evidence for the jury to find that Steggall knowingly caused the death of the infant. Therefore, denial of the directed-verdict motion was proper, and the court was correct in allowing the jury to consider the evidence.