Opinion ID: 4545108
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Removability: CIMT

Text: On review of the circumstances presented, we conclude that Moore is removable for having been convicted of a CIMT because the object crime of his conspiracy offense was second-degree murder. A CIMT is an offense that is “inherently base, vile, or depraved.” Gill, 420 F.3d at 89 (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether an offense is a CIMT, we generally employ a “categorical approach”, which focuses “on the intrinsic nature of the offense rather than on the factual circumstances surrounding any particular violation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the approach, the agency and this Court look to the elements of the statute of conviction to determine whether a given crime is a CIMT. See id. 2 “To involve moral turpitude, a crime requires two essential elements: reprehensible conduct and a culpable mental state.” Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826, 834 (B.I.A. 2016). Therefore, “[c]rimes committed knowingly or intentionally generally have been found, on the categorical approach, to be CIMTs.” Gill, 420 F.3d at 89; see also Mendez v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 345, 347 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Whether a crime is one involving moral turpitude depends on ‘the offender’s evil intent or corruption of the mind.’” (quoting Matter of Serna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 579, 581 (B.I.A. 1992))). “[T]he fact that a crime may be considered only a minor offense does not preclude a finding that it involves moral turpitude.” Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 265 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Matter of Serna, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 581–82). Moore’s statute of conviction provides: A person is guilty of conspiracy in the fifth degree when, with intent that conduct constituting: 1. a felony be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct; or 2. a crime be performed, he, being over eighteen years of age, agrees with one or more persons under sixteen years of age to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct. NYPL § 105.05. Although we generally apply the categorical approach, where, as here, “the ground of removal involves an inchoate crime like solicitation, attempt, or conspiracy, . . . we consider only whether the ‘object crime’ charged is [a removable offense]. This is because, absent proof of a specific intent to commit the object crime, an inchoate offense cannot lead to a conviction.” Santana-Felix v. Barr, 924 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 2019). “[W]here the judgment reflects only the statute for the inchoate offense, the agency may turn to the record of conviction to determine the object offense.” Id. at 55. “The record of conviction for immigration purposes includes ‘the charging document, a plea agreement, a verdict or judgment of conviction, a record of the sentence, or a plea colloquy transcript.’” Id. (quoting Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 2003)). Moore’s indictment and plea transcript support the conclusion that the object crime of Moore’s inchoate offense of conviction was second-degree murder. Under New York law, “[a] person is guilty of murder in the second degree when . . . [w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person.” NYPL § 125.25(1). There can be no question 3 that second-degree murder is a CIMT because it involves “reprehensible conduct and a culpable mental state.” Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 834. Accordingly, Moore is removable as charged. 1