Opinion ID: 1865871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the lower court err in refusing appellant's requested instruction for a directed verdict because of entrapment?

Text: At the trial, the State's case indicated facts substantially as those related above. Appellant testified that the informant and another individual by the name of Jimmie Dickens came to his house before the arrest. Appellant did not know the informant, and Dickens introduced them, referring to the informant as Don. Appellant said that the two men came to him because the informant Don wanted to borrow two hundred dollars ($200.00) and that he left with appellant a bag of legal pills that you could not be arrested for. According to Daniels, he gave them the $200.00, they left, and he took the bag of pills because they were to assure the return of his money. Appellant's mother corroborated the fact that Jimmie Dickens and another male visited her son around 5:00 p.m. the day before his arrest. Appellant testified that the next time he saw the informant was on the day he was arrested. Appellant said that the informant Don and the agent came to his house, Don came in, and said that he had the money for him, and also that he wanted to get some stuff out of the bag. The informant got some of the drugs, and then asked if Daniels wanted to go for a ride. Appellant agreed, and they took the bag and left with the agent. According to appellant, the informant never got out of the truck, but sitting between them, the informant gave the bag of pills to the agent, who then gave the informant the money, and the informant handed Daniels the money and said, Here's the $200.00 back I owe you. Afterwards, they drove back to appellant's home and in about five minutes, the police came and arrested him. On cross-examination, appellant admitted exchanging the pills for the money, but claimed that it was strictly repayment of the $200.00 loan. He said he has a friend, one Charles Hughes, who sells caffeine pills legally, and he believed the informant Don when he said the pills were legal. The State raises the question as to whether or not appellant raised the defense of entrapment, because one who denies the act which constitutes entrapment cannot afterwards claim entrapment as a defense. Pace v. State, 407 So.2d 530 (Miss. 1981); McCormick v. State, 279 So.2d 596 (Miss. 1973). Even though appellant testified that he believed the pills to be legal, in our opinion, he may still set up the defense of entrapment. The lower court held that such defense was properly raised. In Tribbett v. State, 394 So.2d 878, 882 (Miss. 1981), the Court said: The usual entrapment case which arises under Mississippi law involves a confidential informant or police officer who originates the sale of contraband by supplying it to the accused, who then, acting in complicity with the confidential informant or police officer, sells or disposes of it to another officer or person who initiates the prosecution. See also Epps v. State, 417 So.2d 543 (Miss. 1982) and Sylar v. State, 340 So.2d 10 (Miss. 1976). The appellant made out a prima facie case of entrapment by his testimony, which was partially corroborated by his mother. It then became the duty and responsibility of the prosecution to rebut and overcome that prima facie case by introducing the confidential informant and Agent Randy Johnson. The State is responsible for the undenied actions of its informant and officers when the defense of entrapment is raised. Torrence v. State, 380 So.2d 248 (Miss. 1980). The State failed to introduce the confidential informant, without making any explanation therefor. Although Agent Randy Johnson testified on the State's case in chief, the appellant implicated him in the entrapment process and testified that Agent Johnson gave the $200.00 to the confidential informant who then handed it to the appellant, with the statement, Here's the $200.00 back I owe you. The State failed to call Agent Johnson to the stand in rebuttal to refute that statement and other testimony involving Agent Johnson in the alleged entrapment. Since the testimony of the appellant is uncontradicted and the defense of entrapment was not rebutted or overcome, the appellant should have been granted a peremptory instruction for a directed verdict of not guilty and should have been discharged.