Opinion ID: 2617558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: lease interpretation

Text: IMC argues that the district court erred when it found the lease agreement ambiguous. An ambiguous contract contains language that conveys a double meaning. McNeiley v. Ayres Jewelry Co., 855 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Wyo.1993). Disagreement between parties regarding the meaning of a contract does not establish an ambiguity. Moncrief v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., 861 P.2d 516, 524 (Wyo.1993). Whether a contract contains an ambiguity is a question of law for the reviewing court. Prudential Preferred Properties, 859 P.2d at 1271. Contract interpretation is the process of ascertaining the meaning of the words used by the parties to express their intent. Doctors' Co. v. Insurance Corp. of America, 864 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Wyo.1993). We generally look to the four corners of an instrument to determine the intent of the parties. Id. at 1024. However, this rule is only applicable where the language clearly and unambiguously expresses the intent of the parties. Rouse v. Munroe, 658 P.2d 74, 77 (Wyo. 1983). If the meaning of a provision in a contract is not readily apparent, the court may resort to competent evidence of extraneous circumstances to explain the ambiguity. Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 216 (Wyo.1994) ( quoting Alexander v. Phillips Oil Co., 707 P.2d 1385, 1387 (Wyo.1985)). The dispute between IMC and the Warilas involves the TERM provision in the lease agreement: 2. TERM: The term of this lease shall be for sixty (60) months commencing on [the] 10th day of June, 1991, and termination on June 9, 1996. However, should Lessee's Migrant Head Start Center funding for this site or desired use cease, Lessee may terminate his lease without penalty by giving thirty (30) days written notice to Landlord in accordance with paragraph 12 below. (Emphasis added.) The provision conveys a double meaning and is, therefore, ambiguous. McNeiley, 855 P.2d at 1244; Busch Development, Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, 645 P.2d 65, 68 (Wyo. 1982). IMC argues that the disputed language created a lease term of five years terminable at the option of the lessee if IMC no longer desired use of the property or if funding for the Migrant Head Start program ceased. The Warilas argue that the lease is terminated only if funding ceases, and that funding can cease for the site or for its desired use, either of which would allow IMC to terminate. The district court found the term, desired use, ambiguous. The provision readily lends itself to more than one interpretation. The district court did not, therefore, err in concluding that the term desired use was ambiguous. Nor did the district court err in construing the ambiguity against IMC. We have repeatedly held that a contract will be construed most strongly against the party who drafted the contract. McNeiley, 855 P.2d at 1244; Brazelton v. Jackson Drug Co., Inc., 796 P.2d 808, 810 (Wyo.1990); Kelliher v. Herman, 701 P.2d 1157, 1159 n. 1 (Wyo. 1985). James Warila testified regarding the drafting of the lease agreement. IMC originally drafted the lease agreement with a ten year term. The Warilas rejected that lease agreement and suggested a five year term. The Warilas made no changes to the desired use language at issue today. The district court's finding that IMC drafted the operative language of the contested clause is not clearly erroneous. Bowles, 847 P.2d at 1004. The district court construed the language of the lease agreement against IMC and determined that IMC could not terminate the lease at their option. We agree with that determination and hold that the ambiguity in the contract was properly construed against IMC and that the lease could not be terminated at IMC's option.