Opinion ID: 768198
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Partial Judgment of the District Court

Text: 22 In 1997, plaintiffs commenced the present 1983 action against the County and against Sheriff Barnes, Undersheriff Buffardi, and Major Elwell in their individual and official capacities, alleging that defendants had violated the First Amendment by retaliating against plaintiffs for speaking out against the inmate beatings and for cooperating with the federal government in its investigation. In seeking to impose liability on the County, plaintiffs contended that, as a matter of law, Barnes as County sheriff had final policymaking authority for the County with regard to Jail personnel and conditions, and that his instigation and command of the ongoing course of retaliation against plaintiffs was attributable to the County. They also argued that the retaliation against them was the result of Sheriff Barnes's deliberate indifference to their First Amendment rights, as reflected in, inter alia, his failure to supervise or train officers at the Jail in order to protect plaintiffs from an obvious threat of retaliation. 23 Following discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. With respect to the claims asserted against them in their individual capacities, the individual defendants argued principally that there was no evidence that any of the named defendants was personally involved in the alleged harassment and intimidation. With respect to the claims asserted against the County and the individual defendants in their official capacities (collectively the claims against the County), defendants contended that plaintiffs could not establish a First Amendment violation and that, in any event, under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), the County could not be held liable because plaintiffs had not shown that any such violation was caused by a County policy or custom. Defendants argued that plaintiffs had not identified any formal policy that caused the alleged violations, that there was no evidence that Sheriff Barnes acted within his policy making authority in directing subordinates to retaliate against plaintiffs, and that there was no evidence of a widespread or permanent custom of retaliation against correction officers who reported inmate abuse. The County further argued that the evidence did not show that the retaliation against plaintiffs was a result of the County's failure to train or supervise its correction officers. 24 In an opinion reported at 20 F. Supp.2d 404 (1998), the district court denied the individual defendants' motion to dismiss the claims asserted against them in their individual capacities, but granted the motion to dismiss the claims against the County, including those asserted against the individual defendants in their official capacities. With regard to individual liability, the court denied the motion to dismiss because the evidence showed sufficient personal involvement given the 25 affirmative acts taken by Barnes to identify and disclose Jeffes as the disguised informer to his co-workers, and his failure to act after learning about the host of alleged retaliation and harassment that Jeffes, Keenan, and Carlos experienced after publicly reporting officer misconduct and cooperating in the federal investigation and subsequent prosecution. 26 20 F. Supp.2d at 416. The court went on to note that 27 [a]lthough the record is less clear as to the nature, if any, of any investigation undertaken by Barnes, a reasonable fact-finder could infer that there was little chance that Barnes would act in light of the allegations that he initiated much of the acts of retaliation and harassment complained of by the plaintiffs. 28 Id. at 417. The court thus concluded that there was 29 a triable issue of fact regarding Barnes' supervisory liability based on his direct participation in the alleged constitutional violations, a deliberate indifference or tacit authorization to such acts, and a failure to remedy the acts of retaliation and harassment of which he became aware. 30 Id. 31 As to the claims against the County, however, the district court concluded that plaintiffs had not presented evidence that the alleged harassment should be attributable to the County. The court reasoned that the retaliatory actions taken against plaintiffs occurred in the workplace and adversely affected the manner in which they carried out their assigned duties and therefore fit squarely within the context of employment or personnel matters, and it found that although Sheriff Barnes possessed some discretion in running the Jail, he did not speak[] with final policymaking authority for Schenectady County in th[e] area of municipal employment policy. Id. at 420, 421 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court stated that the fact that the Sheriff was effectively put on notice that such [retaliatory] events could occur at the jail .... fails to establish any awareness on the part of Schenectady County. Id. at 421-22. 32 The court found that there was not sufficient evidence to establish 33 any widespread practice, express or otherwise, authorizing acts of retaliation and harassment in cases where employees exercise their First Amendment rights, that would establish a permanent or well settled custom or usage with equal force of law. 34 Id. at 419. The court also rejected plaintiffs' contention that the harassment was the result of the County's failure adequately to train or supervise other correction officers, given the lack of any evidence that [the] County was aware that the alleged retaliatory conduct had occurred or that employees had historically mishandled similar situations. Id. at 421. 35 The court eventually entered a Rule 54(b) certification with respect to the claims against the County, and a partial final judgment dismissing those claims was entered. This appeal challenges that dismissal.