Opinion ID: 703886
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Permissibility of the Departure

Text: 16 In assessing the district court's authority under the statutory scheme of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. Secs. 3551 et seq. & 28 U.S.C. Secs. 991-98) (SRA), which established the framework for the Sentencing Guidelines, we start with the recognition that [t]he keystone section in the creation of the new sentencing system is 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553. United States v. Merritt, 988 F.2d 1298, 1306 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2933, 124 L.Ed.2d 683 (1994). In particular, [s]ubparagraph (a) instructs the sentencing court as to the '[f]actors to be considered in imposing sentence.'  Id. Congress directs a sentencing court to consider, among other factors, the need for the sentence imposed-- 17 (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; 18 (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 19 (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 20 (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. 21 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(a)(2). 22 In United States v. Maier, 975 F.2d 944, 947 (2d Cir.1992), we concluded that Sec. 3553(a)(2)(D) indicated that Congress did not abandon rehabilitation as a permissible goal of sentencing when it passed the SRA. We pointed out that Congress's concern in enacting the SRA was not with the rehabilitative goal per se, but with the vices of the indeterminate sentence regime of prior law, under which the effective time of incarceration was determined, not by the sentencing judge, but by the Parole Commission endeavoring to decide when the prisoner had been 'rehabilitated.'  Id. at 947 n. 1. Because Congress continued to endorse rehabilitation as a goal of a sentencing in Sec. 3553(a)(2)(D), and because there was no evidence that the Sentencing Commission had given adequate consideration to a defendant's efforts at drug rehabilitation in formulating the Guidelines, id. at 948; cf. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(b), we concluded that such endeavors could serve as a basis for a downward departure. Maier, 975 F.2d at 948. Indeed, in light of Sec. 3553(a)(2)(D), we questioned whether the Commission even had the authority to bar sentencing judges from considering a defendant's efforts at drug rehabilitation. Id. 23 However, [a]lthough the Guidelines afford the district court flexibility in sentencing, the power to depart is to be used sparingly and is reserved for unusual cases. Williams I, 37 F.3d at 85. A tentative step towards rehabilitation is not usually enough to warrant a downward departure. In Maier, and again in Williams I, we emphasized that a drug rehabilitation program, which is  'easily entered but difficult to sustain, cannot be permitted to become an automatic ground for obtaining a downward departure.'  Id. at 86 (quoting Maier, 975 F.2d at 948). Accordingly, if departure is to be based on the defendant's rehabilitative efforts, those efforts must be extraordinary. Id. 24 In the government's view, our holding in Williams I settles the matter. It argues that the only change in circumstances between the first and the second sentencing is that Williams was granted admission to the Butner program, which Williams I and Maier indicate is not enough to warrant a departure. 25 To say that admission to a drug treatment program is not an automatic ground for obtaining a downward departure, however, is not to say that it can never be the basis for such a departure, provided that there exist other compelling circumstances not adequately considered by the Commission. Indeed, the Commission itself has disavowed the idea that sentencing can be reduced to simple rules mechanically applied without careful attention to the circumstances of a case. The Commission has stresse[d] the difficulty of prescribing 'a single set of guidelines that encompass[es] the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision.'  Merritt, 988 F.2d at 1309 (quoting U.S.S.C. Guidelines Manual [hereinafter Manual], Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro. cmt. 4(b) and altered to match original). Accordingly, 26 in the discussion of Departures in Part 4(b) of the Introduction [to the Manual], the Commission asserts that courts should treat each guideline as carving out a 'heartland,' a set of typical cases and that, [w]hen a court finds an atypical case, that significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure is warranted. This discussion goes on to assert that (apart from a few enumerated factors that may not serve as a ground for departure), the Commission does not intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the Guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case. ... [T]he overall treatment makes clear that departure in the appropriate case is essential to the satisfactory functioning of the sentencing system. 27 Id. ((quoting Manual, Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro. cmt. 4(b)) (citations omitted). 28 On remand, the district court did not depart from the guidelines sentencing range of 130 to 162 months simply because Williams had entered a drug treatment program. It departed because, on the facts of this case, there was effectively no other sentence that would accord with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(a)(2)(D). The district court determined that Williams was an excellent candidate for rehabilitation given his prior history, demeanor, post-arrest resolve, and acceptance into a special and selective treatment program based on criteria devised by experts in the field. However, the only program available to Williams would not take him unless he were within 18 to 36 months of release. To sentence him to even the minimum term of 130 months, the district court reasoned, would require Williams to wait some six or seven years to begin treatment. If in the interim the Butner program were terminated for budgetary or other reasons or if Williams's resolve weakened under the pressures of prison life, the chance of curing him of his addiction and perhaps his criminal ways would vanish. 29 We believe that the district court had the authority to depart downward in order to facilitate Williams's rehabilitation given the atypical facts of this case, which place it outside the heartland of usual cases involving defendants who may benefit from drug treatment. As we stated in Maier, awareness of one's [drug dependency] and the demonstrated willingness to act to achieve rehabilitation, thereby benefiting the individual and society, may justify a downward departure. 975 F.2d at 948. We clarified in Williams I that demonstrated willingness to rehabilitate one's self must be manifested by objective indicia of extraordinary efforts to that end. 37 F.3d at 86. But when a defendant who has been in federal custody since his arrest has had no opportunity to pursue any rehabilitation, when he has been admitted to a selective and intensive inmate drug treatment program, and when a sentence within the guideline range would effectively deprive him of his only opportunity to rehabilitate himself while incarcerated, we think a departure is within the district court's discretion. If the Sentencing Commission did not give adequate consideration to the mitigating circumstance of drug rehabilitation generally, Maier, 975 F.2d at 948, it certainly did not consider the unique constellation of mitigating circumstances in this case. 30 The government's position, in essence, would limit the authority to depart on the basis of drug rehabilitation to the extraordinary facts of Maier. In that case, the defendant, while on bail, was admitted to a residential drug treatment program before sentencing. At the defendant's request, the district court postponed sentencing for three months to allow her to attend that program, and then for another year to pursue additional rehabilitation programs. 975 F.2d at 945. Since 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(a)(2)(D) requires the district court to consider the need for future medical or correctional treatment in devising a sentence, we see no reason to limit the power to grant departures for rehabilitative purposes to defendants who, by grace of a district court's delay in sentencing, have had an opportunity to develop a record of extraordinary past progress. 31 Moreover, if the district court had no power to adjust the term of incarceration to facilitate rehabilitation, it is difficult to see how the defendant's need for medical or correctional treatment could otherwise be taken into account in sentencing. A sentencing court has no authority to order that a convicted defendant be confined in a particular facility, much less placed in a particular treatment program; those decisions are within the sole discretion of the Bureau of Prisons. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3621(b); United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 644-45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 405, 126 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993); United States v. Voda, 994 F.2d 149, 151-52 (5th Cir.1993). 32 In upholding the district court's authority, we by no means imply that district courts should automatically grant downward departures to defendants in circumstances similar to that of Williams. We intend only to acknowledge that the district court has the discretion that remains a vital component of individualized sentencing under the Guidelines regime. As we said when commenting on the Guidelines generally: 33 The legislative history reflects that it was not Congress' aim to straitjacket a sentencing court, compelling it to impose sentences like a robot inside a Guidelines' glass bubble, and preventing it from exercising discretion, flexibility or independent judgment. [As the sponsoring committee wrote,] 34 The Committee does not intend that the guidelines be imposed in a mechanistic fashion. It believes that the sentencing judge has an obligation to consider all the relevant factors in a case and to impose a sentence outside the guidelines in an appropriate case. The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to provide a structure for evaluating the fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for an individual offender, not to eliminate the thoughtful imposition of individualized sentences. 35 United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 604 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235). Here, the district court was impressed by Williams's demeanor and resolve to change his ways, cf. id. at 603 (deferring to district court as being in the best position to observe the defendant's demeanor and characteristics), convinced that Williams's criminality was largely a product of his addiction and his brother's malignant influence, and persuaded that there was only a limited window of opportunity for rehabilitation. Consequently, while the district court was not required to grant a downward departure, it acted within its power in doing so. 36 Because we find that the district court had authority to depart from the guideline range, and because we find none of its factual findings clearly erroneous, we turn now to the reasonableness of the sentence imposed. Williams I, 37 F.3d at 85; Maier, 975 F.2d at 949.