Opinion ID: 1650509
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was petitioner denied a speedy trial?

Text: Petitioner contends he was not afforded the speedy trial guaranteed him by § 795.2, The Code; article I, section 10, Iowa Constitution; and Amendment 6, United States Constitution. This right was recently considered by this court in State v. Jennings, 195 N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 1972). The last trial date scheduled was March 23, 1970, three days later than petitioner's guilty plea. During all pertinent times he was represented by counsel. We assume, although there is some question in the record, petitioner made oral request for prompt trial. Crucial, however, was his failure to move for dismissal. We hold the rationale enunciated in State v. Allnutt, 261 Iowa 897 at 901, 905, 156 N.W.2d 266 at 268, 270 (1968), is decisive here: It has long been held, both in this state and elsewhere, that a defendant, unless he is neither admitted to bail nor represented by counsel, may waive the constitutional and statutory provisions assuring him a speedy trial. (citing authority)       We hold defendant waived his right to a speedy trial under section 795.2 by failing to move for a dismissal until after trial had been completed and a jury verdict returned. There is no rule, constitutional or statutory, which permits a defendant to use this cherished right simply to challenge an adverse verdict. In Allnutt, supra, defendant, represented by counsel, made demand for speedy trial at time of arraignment. Our ruling that defendant waived his right to speedy trial by failing to move to dismiss until after trial surely applies to this petitioner, who never made such motion. The rule of the first Allnutt case, supra, was followed in the second Allnutt case, State v. Allnutt, 261 Iowa 910, 156 N.W.2d 274 (1968) and reconsidered and again invoked in State v. Peterson, 189 N.W.2d 891 (Iowa 1971). In both cases defendant delayed filing motion to dismiss until just before trial commenced. Such delay was held to waive the right to speedy trial. See also State v. Lindloff, 161 N.W.2d 741 (Iowa 1968). In view of this holding it is unnecessary for us to consider whether the State had good grounds for the delay in failing to try this case within 60 days from the filing of county attorney's information. It is also unnecessary for us to decide whether petitioner's plea of guilty was a waiver of his right to speedy trial, although this issue has been decided against defendants in several jurisdictions. Duncan v. State, 42 Ala.App. 509, 169 So.2d 439 (1964); People v. Hocking, 140 Cal.App.2d 778, 296 P. 2d 59 (1956); Cooper v. State, 196 Kan. 421, 411 P.2d 652 (1966). We hold petitioner waived his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial. Affirmed. All Justices concur, except McCORMICK, J., who takes no part.