Opinion ID: 1258573
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State's Witness Bennie Cameron

Text: Defendant first contends that the prosecution allowed State's witness Bennie Cameron to perjure himself concerning his prior convictions, current charges, and discussions with the Durham County District Attorney's office. Defendant also alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the impeachment of Cameron on cross-examination, that defendant's right to effective assistance of conflict-free counsel was violated, and that defendant was sentenced to death upon materially false and unreliable information in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights. Defendant's arguments are without merit. [I]t is established that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment. The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. Further, with regard to the knowing use of perjured testimony, the Supreme Court has established a standard of materiality under which the knowing use of perjured testimony requires a conviction to be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Thus, [w]hen a defendant shows that testimony was in fact false, material, and knowingly and intentionally used by the State to obtain his conviction, he is entitled to a new trial. State v. Williams, 341 N.C. 1, 16, 459 S.E.2d 208, 217 (1995) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1128, 116 S.Ct. 945, 133 L.Ed.2d 870 (1996). Defendant asserts that Bennie Cameron testified falsely concerning pending charges in Durham. At trial, defense counsel questioned Cameron concerning charges filed against Kevin Jermaine McAdoo, which defendant contends has been identified by fingerprint comparison as an alias of Cameron. Defense counsel asked Cameron if he had any pending charges in Durham. He responded that he did not. This statement was in fact true, even assuming that Cameron and McAdoo are the same person, since the supporting documentation provided by defendant and the testimony at trial show that the charges against McAdoo were dismissed with leave for failure to appear. Although the charges were subject to reinstatement, they were not pending at the time of the challenged testimony. Even assuming, arguendo, that this testimony was false, defendant has presented no supporting evidence for his assertion that the prosecution knowingly and intentionally allowed Cameron to testify falsely concerning these matters. Moreover, even had sufficient evidence been provided by affidavit or other supporting documentation to demonstrate such knowledge by the prosecutors, Cameron's testimony on this peripheral issue concerning charges dismissed in another district attorney's jurisdiction was simply not material. See State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 353, 451 S.E.2d 131, 151 (1994) (holding that counsel is not allowed to cross-examine witnesses on pending charges). Unlike State v. Prevatte, 346 N.C. 162, 163-64, 484 S.E.2d 377, 378 (1997), in which the State's witness faced pending charges within the same jurisdiction in which he testified, any charges pending against Cameron were being handled in a different jurisdiction, and defendant provides no supporting documentation of any discussion between the two district attorneys' offices to demonstrate that Cameron's testimony was biased in this respect. Moreover, this case is unlike Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), in which the trial court had refused to allow defense counsel to question a witness as to his probationary status when the witness was afraid he might be charged with the crime for which the defendant was on trial. Id. at 312-14, 94 S.Ct. 1105. In the instant case, there is no indication that Cameron feared being charged with the victim's murder. Thus, Cameron's allegedly false testimony was clearly not material to defendant's trial. Defendant also argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel during the cross-examination of Cameron. We disagree. Defense counsel's performance at trial was far from deficient. Counsel not only confronted Cameron about his numerous prior convictions, but also questioned him concerning the charges under his alleged alias and any conversations with the district attorney regarding the disposition of the alleged charges against him. Defense counsel's cross-examination of Cameron spanned twenty-nine pages of transcript and we cannot say that her performance in impeaching Cameron was deficient. Thus, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Defendant argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because it was revealed during defense counsel Lisa Costner's cross-examination of Cameron that she had represented him on a previous charge that resulted in a conviction. However, the transcript also reveals that Costner did not recall Cameron or her representation of him, nor did she discuss defendant's case with Cameron. Defendant did not object at trial to this potential conflict of interest and has failed to show that this asserted conflict of interest `adversely affected his lawyer's performance.' State v. Walls, 342 N.C. 1, 39-40, 463 S.E.2d 738, 757 (1995) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1197, 116 S.Ct. 1694, 134 L.Ed.2d 794 (1996). As noted above, Costner sufficiently cross-examined Cameron and adequately raised issues concerning his credibility. Thus, defendant's arguments relating to Cameron's testimony lack merit, and his related assignments of error are overruled.