Opinion ID: 454262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Evidence of Drinking

Text: 13 The plaintiff alleges that the trial court committed prejudicial error in permitting the defendants to introduce evidence that the plaintiff had consumed alcoholic beverages on the day of the accident. On January 20, 1984, one month before the trial began, the plaintiff filed a motion in limine to bar the defendants from introducing such evidence. In support of its motion, the plaintiff invoked the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in Handy v. Geary, 105 R.I. 419, 252 A.2d 435 (2969), which held that it is prejudicial error for a trial court to admit evidence of drinking to prove negligence in the absence of evidence of actual intoxication. Id., 252 A.2d at 441. Handy prescribed a procedure whereby the judge would be required to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of intoxication in the absence of the jury before he could admit evidence of mere consumption of alcohol. Id. at 442. 14 At the time plaintiff filed its motion in limine, the defendants offered no evidence of either drinking or intoxication. Accordingly, the trial court granted the motion. Trial Transcript, p. 23. During their cross examination of Patricia McInnis at trial, however, defense counsel attempted to question her as to whether she had consumed three beers prior to the motorcycle crash. The line of inquiry was based on Massachusetts General Hospital's records of plaintiff's admission on the day of the accident. According to the records, the plaintiff had reported drinking three beers that day, and that she had eaten nothing since the previous evening. The plaintiff's attorney objected to the question on the basis of the court's prior ruling on the motion in limine. 15 The trial judge reversed his previous ruling and allowed the defendants' line of questioning. He found that the medical reports, standing alone, furnished sufficient evidence to permit reasonable jurors to find the plaintiff was intoxicated as defined in Handy v. Geary. 4 In the alternative, the Court noted that if the federal rather than the state rule were controlling, the evidence would still be admissible under Fed.Rule of Evid. 403, since its probative value was not outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect. Trial Transcript, p. 292-93. 16 The plaintiff appeals this ruling on two grounds. First, she argues that the trial judge was obligated to follow both the substantive and procedural standards set forth in Handy v. Geary. She claims that the judge's failure to hold a full evidentiary hearing on the issue of intoxication was therefore error. In addition, the plaintiff indicates that Handy requires independent evidence of intoxication, beyond the fact of drinking, before the trial judge may submit the issue to the jury. She claims that because there was no such evidence in this case, admission of the evidence of drinking was improper as a matter of law. Second, the plaintiff's attorneys assert that the trial court prejudiced McInnis by reversing its original ruling on the motion in limine after they had concluded their direct examination of her. They assert that they had deliberately refrained from raising the issue of alcohol in reliance on the ruling. By allowing defense counsel to bring out those facts for the first time on cross-examination, they argue, the trial judge committed prejudicial error since the testimony heard in that context would inevitably convey an impression to the jury that McInnis had been dishonest or furtive about drinking when she was examined by her own attorneys. 17 As to the plaintiff's first argument, we hold that the trial judge was bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence rather than the state evidentiary rule judicially fashioned in Handy v. Geary. Accordingly, we need not decide whether the judge substantially complied with the procedures prescribed in that case or correctly interpreted its mandate. 18 The Federal Rules of Evidence are properly characterized as housekeeping rules for federal courts. Congress' authority to prescribe such rules, even though they may differ from comparable state rules, has long been recognized. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471, 473, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 1144, 1145, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965). Of course, federal courts and Congress are constitutionally precluded from displacing state substantive law with federal substantive rules in diversity actions. See generally, Erie R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). But federal rules purporting to govern procedural matters, which are duly passed by Congress, shall be presumed constitutionally valid unless they cannot rationally be characterized as rules of procedure. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471, 85 S.Ct. at 1144. 19 Congress clearly intended that the Federal Rules of Evidence would apply to diversity actions. See Fed.R.Evid. 1101(b) (rules apply generally to civil and criminal proceedings). This conclusion is underscored by the fact that where Congress deemed it desirable for state rules to be applied in diversity actions, it created a special proviso to that effect in the federal rule. Rule 501, for example, provides that in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with state law. Fed.R.Evid. 501. The only question remaining, therefore, is whether Rule 403 may rationally be characterized as a procedural provision. We think it too obvious to warrant discussion that the rule survives the application of this deferential standard. 5 20 Our conclusion is supported by the weight of authority from other federal courts addressing similar issues. Federal Rule of Evidence 407, another relevancy provision, has been held applicable to diversity cases by several circuits. See, e.g., Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir.1984); Grenada Steel Industries v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 885 (5th Cir.1983); Gibbs v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 544 F.2d 423, 428 n. 2 (9th Cir.1976). See also, In Re Air Crash Disaster, 701 F.2d 1189, 1193 (7th Cir.1983) (holding generally that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in diversity cases); Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d 1147, 1153 (5th Cir.1981). In addition, in Levitt v. Jefferies, Inc., 517 F.2d 523 (7th Cir.1975) (rehearing en banc), the Seventh Circuit concluded that Federal Rule of Evidence 403 should govern the admissibility of evidence of drinking notwithstanding a state rule, very similar to the one formulated in Handy v. Geary, which would have excluded it. See id. at 527. 6 21 In spite of the general applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence to diversity actions, it is well recognized that Congress did not intend the rules to preempt so-called substantive state rules of evidence such as the parole evidence rule, the collateral source rule, or the Statute of Frauds. Although the application of these rules will affect the admissibility of certain evidence, they in reality serve substantive state policies regulating private transactions. 19 Wright, Miller and Cooper Sec. 4512. See Mohr v. Metro East Manufacturing Co., 711 F.2d 69, 72 (7th Cir.1983) (Although the parole evidence rule has a procedural name, it is in fact a rule of contract formation....). The plaintiff argues that the Handy v. Geary rule is in the nature of such a substantive rule, and as such, must be applied in diversity cases. We find it simply cannot be so characterized. First, a comparison of the state rule with Federal Rule of Evidence 403 reveals that they are both rules of evidentiary relevance. They endeavor to reach almost identical results--to provide for the exclusion of relevant evidence where its prejudicial impact potentially outweighs its probative value. Handy, 252 A.2d at 441. 7 The Handy v. Geary rule is merely a more focused relevancy rule, similar in nature to Federal Rules of Evidence 406 through 412, which represent presumptions that undue prejudice shall occur in certain situations. Second, the Rhode Island rule cannot reasonably be considered substantive in light of the policies reflected in Erie. It is strictly a rule of admissibility--one which could not rationally affect private ordering or encourage forum shopping. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 64, 58 S.Ct. at 817. 8 22 The question remaining before us, then, is whether the evidence that Patricia McInnis had consumed three beers prior to the motorcycle accident was properly admitted under Fed.R. of Evid. 403. That rule provides that, [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. We are bound by the trial judge's ruling of admissibility unless the defendants can demonstrate that he exercised his discretion arbitrarily or irrationally. Cf. Berrios Rivera v. British Ropes, Ltd., 575 F.2d 966, 969 (1st Cir.1978) (findings and orders of a district court will not be upset unless clearly erroneous). See also Rovegno v. Geppert Brothers, Inc., 677 F.2d 327 (3d Cir.1982). We do not believe that the trial judge abused his discretion when he admitted the evidence of drinking as relevant to the issue of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. Accordingly, we uphold that ruling. 23 Finally, we reject the plaintiff's argument that in reversing his original ruling on the plaintiff's motion in limine the trial judge greatly prejudiced Patricia McInnis. First, the plaintiff's attorney was aware that the defendants intended to bring up the reference to drinking in the hospital records prior to the conclusion of the direct examination of McInnis. He had ample opportunity to elicit that information from her himself. In addition, notwithstanding this opportunity, we are not convinced that the plaintiff was in fact prejudiced by the mere timing of the introduction of the evidence of drinking.