Opinion ID: 741157
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: strict scrutiny review of the ordinance

Text: 40 In order to survive strict scrutiny, the classification created by the juvenile curfew ordinance must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217, 102 S.Ct. at 2395. To be narrowly tailored, there must be a sufficient nexus between the stated government interest and the classification created by the ordinance. Id. at 216-17, 102 S.Ct. at 2394-95. 41 (1) Compelling Governmental Interest 42 The ostensible purposes of the ordinance identified by the City in its brief are to protect children from nighttime dangers, to reduce juvenile crime, and to involve parents in control of their children. At oral argument, the City admitted that its compelling interest is, quite frankly, to reduce gang activity. As the City also admits, however, the ordinance is not limited to gang activities. 43 The City has a compelling interest in protecting the entire community from crime, Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2409-10, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984), including juvenile crime. The City's interest in protecting the safety and welfare of its minors is also a compelling interest. See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492; Hutchins, 942 F.Supp. at 674; Waters, 711 F.Supp. at 1139. The fact that much of the perceived danger stems from gang activity does not lessen the nature of the City's interest in protecting the safety and welfare of minors, although it may affect the analysis of whether the ordinance is narrowly tailored, as discussed below in Part II.B(2). 44 Furthermore, the government may have a compelling interest in protecting minors from certain things that it does not for adults. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 2836-37, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989) (holding that a ban on dial-a-porn is not appropriate for adults, although it might be for minors). The City claims its interest in protecting minors from the dangers of public places at night is particularly compelling, for all the reasons set forth in Bellotti regarding differential treatment of minors. 45 As other courts have recognized, Bellotti does not set forth reasons that always justify greater restrictions on minors than adults; rather, Bellotti sets forth factors for determining whether the government has a greater justification for restricting minors than adults in the manner at issue. E.g. Waters, 711 F.Supp. at 1136-37. Our consideration of the Bellotti factors leads to the conclusion that greater restrictions of minors may be justified because they have a greater vulnerability at night than do adults and because minors are not equally able as adults to make mature decisions regarding the safety of themselves and others. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 168, 64 S.Ct. at 443 (concluding that the diverse influences of the street pose greater danger to children than adults). Some courts have reached the opposite conclusion. Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1073; Hutchins, 942 F.Supp. at 673-74; Waters, 711 F.Supp. at 1137; McCollester, 586 F.Supp. at 1385. We agree with those courts that all citizens are vulnerable to crime at night and that minors' participation in many legitimate activities does not involve the kind of profound decisions of concern in Bellotti. Nonetheless, we find it unexceptional for the City to conclude that minors are more susceptible to the dangers of the night and are generally less equipped to deal with danger that does arise. Thus, the City may have a compelling interest in placing greater restrictions on minors than adults to insure the minors' own safety. 46 In sum, we find that the City has a compelling interest in reducing juvenile crime and juvenile victimization. We analyze below whether the particular restrictions of the ordinance are narrowly tailored to meet that interest. 47 (2) Is the Ordinance Narrowly Tailored? 48 Plaintiffs offer two reasons why the ordinance is not narrowly tailored: (1) the record reflects little statistical support for the efficacy of the curfew; and (2) the exceptions are too narrow to protect minors' fundamental rights. 49 (a) Statistical Support for Curfew 50 Plaintiffs attack the City's reliance on national and local statistics to support a juvenile curfew as a narrowly tailored means to reduce juvenile crime and victimization. Although the Constitution does not require the government to produce scientifically certain criteria of legislation, Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642-43, 88 S.Ct. at 1282, the City must demonstrate that its classification is precisely tailored. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217, 102 S.Ct. at 2395; see also Hutchins, 942 F.Supp. at 678 (concluding that the District of Columbia could not adopt the curfew ordinance upheld in Qutb without its own evidence showing the particular effectiveness of a nocturnal juvenile curfew in meeting its compelling interests). The City offered several statistical reports to demonstrate that the juvenile curfew is a solution to rising juvenile crime and victimization. 51 The first piece of evidence is a Justice Department report on juvenile offenders and victims. It shows a rising juvenile crime rate in the nation as a whole but does not provide information specific to San Diego. It also shows that juvenile crime peaks at 3 p.m. and again around 6 p.m. We accept the relevancy of the national crime statistics regarding the general increase of dangers to minors and others, but the national statistics do not conclusively show that the nocturnal juvenile curfew is a narrowly tailored solution. 52 Second, the City provided the local statistics regarding juvenile crime and victimization; our review of this evidence yields mixed results. The City's October 3, 1994, resolution to continue the aggressive enforcement policy stated that the violent crimes and juvenile activity had decreased during curfew hours from the previous year. In contrast, a San Diego Police Department report dated August 16, 1995, stated that violent crimes had decreased for the third year in a row and that total crime decreased for the sixth consecutive year, thus weakening any link to the increased enforcement of the curfew that began in June 1994. The 1995 report also reveals that the percentage of juvenile victimization that occurred during curfew hours slightly increased in the year following the curfew initiative, that the decrease in overall victimization for adults was larger than for minors, and that only 15% of arrests for violent juvenile crimes occurred during curfew hours. The 1996 version of the Police Department's report better supports the City, revealing that from the first quarter of 1995 to 1996 the percentage of victimization that occurred during curfew hours dropped and showing a greater increase in arrests for violent crimes during curfew hours than during other hours. 53 Overall, the statistical evidence provides some, but not overwhelming, support for the proposition that a curfew will help reduce crime. The City makes little showing, however, that the nocturnal, juvenile curfew is a particularly effective means of achieving that reduction. Compare Waters, 711 F.Supp. at 1139-40 (finding no statistical support of necessary nexus) with Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493 (discussing specific statistical evidence that Dallas offered to support its curfew). 54 On the other hand, we reject the City's further justification that the ordinance has the additional beneficial deterrent effect of permitting police officers to get juveniles off the streets before crimes are committed. The Supreme Court has sharply critiqued this type of rationale as overinclusive, at least with respect to adults. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 171, 92 S.Ct. at 848 (The implicit presumption of these generalized vagrancy standards-that crime is being nipped in the bud-is too extravagant to deserve extended treatment.). Furthermore, the relatively light penalties imposed by the curfew are a small deterrent to crime when compared to the penalties for the actual crimes that the curfew ostensibly seeks to thwart. See Waters, 711 F.Supp. at 1139. 55 Notwithstanding our expressed concerns, we reject a challenge to the ordinance that is based on the argument that a curfew is not particularly effective at meeting the City's interest. The City has established some nexus between the curfew and its compelling interest of reducing juvenile crime and victimization. This is particularly true because of our conclusion that minors have a special vulnerability to the dangers of the streets at night. We will not dismiss the City's legislative conclusion that the curfew will have a salutary effect on juvenile crime and victimization. 56 (b) The Scope of the Exceptions 57 In order to be narrowly tailored, the ordinance must ensure that the broad curfew minimizes any burden on minors' fundamental rights, such as the right to free movement. Thus, we examine the ordinance's exceptions to determine whether they sufficiently exempt legitimate activities from the curfew. See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493-94 (stating that the curfew's exceptions were the most important consideration in its constitutional analysis of whether the curfew ordinance was narrowly tailored); Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1071 (noting lack of meaningful exceptions to justify curfew); Hutchins, 942 F.Supp. at 679 (finding that exceptions broader than those in the San Diego ordinance were still insufficient because they were too ill-defined); Waters, 711 F.Supp. at 1134 (characterizing a juvenile curfew with few exceptions as a bull in a china shop of constitutional values); McCollester, 586 F.Supp. at 1385. 58 The City contends that the ordinance has necessary exceptions for legitimate activity. Specifically, it contends, California law establishes the ordinance has an exception for the right to travel because the phrase loiter, wander, idle, stroll or play does not include driving at night under Teresinski, 180 Cal.Rptr. at 621, 640 P.2d at 757. The California Supreme Court was clear on this point; we accept its controlling interpretation that the ordinance does not prohibit nocturnal driving. That conclusion does not carry the day for the City, however. We have previously explained the vagueness of the ordinance's general prohibition language. Similarly, it is not clear whether a reasonable reading of Teresinski would extend this exclusion to cover all travelling, such as riding on public transportation or walking. In any event, Teresinski does little to ameliorate the ordinance's restrictions of minors' freedom of movement. 59 Clearly, San Diego could have enacted a narrower curfew ordinance that would pass constitutional muster. Its present ordinance is problematic because it does not provide exceptions for many legitimate activities, with or without parental permission. This is true even though minors may be uniquely vulnerable at night; the curfew's blanket coverage restricts participation in, and travel to or from, many legitimate recreational activities even those that may not expose their special vulnerability. See Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1073. In this regard, it is significant that San Diego rejected a proposal to tailor the ordinance more narrowly by adopting the broader exceptions used in the ordinance upheld in Qutb. The City's failure to provide adequate exceptions not only excessively burdens minors' right to free movement, but it also excessively burdens their right to free speech, as explained in our separate discussion of the First Amendment in Part III, below. 60 We therefore conclude that the City has not shown that the curfew is a close fit to the problem of juvenile crime and victimization because the curfew sweeps broadly, with few exceptions for otherwise legitimate activity. The broad sweep of the ordinance is particularly marked for an ordinance aimed, as the City admitted, at illegal gang activity. The district court in Waters eloquently explained the constitutional difficulty with a juvenile curfew lacking adequate exceptions: 61 The Court recognizes that, in the eyes of many, the crippling effects of crime demand stern responses. With the Act, however, the District has chosen to address the problem through means that are stern to the point of unconstitutionality. Rather than a narrowly drawn, constitutionally sensitive response, the District has effectively chosen to deal with the problem by making thousands of this city's innocent juveniles prisoners at night in their homes. 62 Waters, 711 F.Supp. at 1135. We conclude that the ordinance is not narrowly tailored to meet the City's compelling interests, as required by strict scrutiny. Thus, we hold that the ordinance is unconstitutional even if given a broad construction to avoid vagueness problems. 63