Opinion ID: 513179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: standard of review for agency findings

Text: 58 The Final Test Rule was promulgated under section 4 of TSCA, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2603(a). Judicial review of the rule must proceed according to 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2618(c)(1)(B)(i), which specifically states that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) standard customarily applied in agency cases, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706, is inapposite: 59 [I]n the case of review of a rule under section 2603(a) ... of this title, the standard for review prescribed by paragraph (2)(E) of such section 706 [of title 5] shall not apply and the court shall hold unlawful and set aside such rule if the court finds that the rule is not supported by substantial evidence in the rulemaking record ... taken as a whole.... 60 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2618(c)(1)(B)(i). 61 This case, therefore, does not turn on an interpretation of the term substantial evidence as it appears in the APA, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(2)(E), but on an interpretation of the term substantial evidence in the rulemaking record ... taken as a whole as it appears in TSCA, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2618(c)(1)(B)(i). Despite the similarity in wording, Congress apparently contemplated that the TSCA standard should be viewed as a distinct standard; otherwise there would have been no need to specifically rule out the APA review standard. 62 The legislative history of TSCA further indicates that Congress perceived some difference between the standard it chose for TSCA and the APA's arbitrary-and-capricious standard. 17 The House Report explained: 63 [I]t is the intent that the traditional presumption of validity of an agency rule would remain in effect, [but] ... [t]he Committee has chosen to adopt the substantial evidence test, for the Committee intends that the reviewing court engage in a searching review of the Administrator's reasons and explanations for the Administrator's conclusions. 64 H.R.Rep. No. 1341, supra, at 55-56 (emphasis added). 18 65 The Conference Committee Report further illuminated its rejection of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard:[T]he conferees have adopted the substantial evidence test because they intend that the reviewing court focus on the rulemaking record to see if the Administrator's action is supported by that record. Of course, the conferees do not intend that the court substitute its judgment for that of the Administrator. 66 H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1679, supra, at 96, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, p. 4581. Both the House and the Conference Report thus indicate that it was Congress' intent that review of test rules under section 4 of TSCA be more searching than the judicial review undertaken in most agency cases. Interpreting courts have similarly concluded that the standard of review for test rules under TSCA is a particularly demanding one. Ausimont U.S.A., Inc. v. EPA, 838 F.2d 93, 96 (3d Cir.1988); Shell Chemical Co. v. EPA, 826 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir.1987); accord Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267, 1277 (D.C.Cir.1980). 67 This fairly rigorous standard of record review should not, however, be confused with the substantive statutory standard previously discussed at length. EPA's permissible interpretation of may present an unreasonable risk works in tandem with the substantial evidence standard of record review to effectuate a statutory scheme that empowers the Agency to require testing where the existence of an unreasonable risk of injury to health is not yet more-probable-than-not, but at the same time the Agency is required to identify the facts that underlie its determination that there is a more-than-theoretical basis to suspect the presence of such a risk. See Ausimont, 838 F.2d at 96 ([H]ere we look to see if the Administrator produced substantial evidence to demonstrate not fact, but doubt and uncertainty.).