Opinion ID: 393273
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prejudicial Effect of the Variance in this Case

Text: 52 We turn next to a consideration of prejudicial effect of the variance involved in this case. As we note above, a variance is fatal only if it affects the substantial rights of the defendants. 9 53 Any analysis of the prejudicial effect of a variance between the government's indictment on a single conspiracy count and its proof of multiple conspiracies must begin with the Supreme Court's two seminal cases on this question Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935), and Kotteakos v. United States, supra. Berger announced the rule that such a variance is fatal only if it has affected the substantial rights of the accused, 295 U.S. at 81-82, 55 S.Ct. at 630-631, and went on to find no such effect on the facts of that case. The conspiracy charged by the government in Berger consisted of four persons who were alleged to have agreed together to utter counterfeit federal reserve notes; what the government proved at trial was the existence of two separate conspiracies, one consisting of two of the defendants and the other consisting of three of the defendants, with one defendant common to both agreements. The Court rested its analysis in Berger on the reasons that underlie the prohibition of material variances: 54 The general rule that allegations and proof must correspond is based upon the obvious requirements (1) that the accused shall be definitely informed as to the charges against him, so that he may be enabled to present his defense and not be taken by surprise by the evidence offered at the trial; and (2) that he may be protected against another prosecution for the same offense. 55 295 U.S. at 82, 55 S.Ct. at 631. Because nothing in the record suggested that the defendants had been prejudiced in either respect by their joinder, the Court concluded that their substantial rights had not been affected. 295 U.S. at 83, 55 S.Ct. at 631. 56 In Kotteakos, by contrast, the Court did find that the defendants had been sufficiently prejudiced to justify reversal. In reaching this decision, the Court emphasized the size and complexity of the Kotteakos conspiracies: 57 On the face of things it is one thing to hold harmless the admission of evidence which took place in the Berger case, where only two conspiracies involving four persons all told were proved, and an entirely different thing to apply the same rule where, as here, only one conspiracy was charged, but eight separate ones were proved, involving at the outset thirty-two defendants. 58 328 U.S. at 766, 66 S.Ct. at 1248-49. It was this fact that made the joint trial in Kotteakos so serious an error and distinguished it from Berger: The sheer difference in numbers, both of defendants and of conspiracies proven, distinguishes the situation. Id. This does not mean, however, that the proper analysis should hinge on numbers above. A more fundamental distinction between Kotteakos and Berger can be found in the Court's treatment in Kotteakos of the reasons for the prohibition of material variances. When the government tries multiple conspiracies under a single count, an important right is at stake in addition to those cited in Berger: the right not to be tried en masse for the conglomeration of distinct and separate offenses committed by others. 328 U.S. at 775, 66 S.Ct. at 1252-53. Prejudice inhered in the Kotteakos trial not because of the number of defendants or conspiracies per se, but because of (t)he dangers of transference of guilt from one to another across the line separating conspiracies, subconsciously or otherwise .... 328 U.S. at 774, 66 S.Ct. at 1252. 10 59 The crucial question before us, therefore, is whether the defendants were substantially prejudiced by the inherent transference of guilt that was the focus of Kotteakos. 11 Our review of the record convinces us that for several reasons the defendants were not so prejudiced. We need not decide whether any one of these reasons would be sufficient to compel such a result; but taken together, the following facts lead us to the conclusion that the defendants' substantial rights were not affected. 60 First, the number of conspiracies (two) and defendants (three) is small even more so than in Berger. This is not to say that such cases may always be tried together without substantial prejudice to the defendants, but we do think that the danger implicit in the jury's confusion of different defendants and offenses and of the evidence related to each is diminished by the simpler pattern of events involved in a smaller trial. 61 Second, the evidence as to each conspiracy was clearly distinct. Kalastro's testimony involved only the Walker-Sutherland conspiracy, and the Maynard conversations involved only the Maynard-Sutherland conspiracy. In neither case did the evidence directly implicate the other conspiracy or specifically contradict any portion of the defense as to the other conspiracy. Moreover, the government conceded at trial the independence of these conspiracies, and did not seek to link the evidence on each one to the other. This does not mean that the defendants' joinder in a single trial with evidence of each conspiracy was harmless, for proof at trial of a similar conspiracy to bribe the same judge obviously makes any hypothesis of innocence more difficult to accept. Still we must conclude that prejudice is more difficult to establish where, as here, the evidence as to each conspiracy is so distinct as to render confusion between the different defendants and conspiracies unlikely. 62 Third, and most importantly, the government introduced overwhelming evidence of guilt as to all three defendants, and this evidence would have been admissible in two separate trials on individual conspiracy counts. With respect to the Walker-Sutherland conspiracy, the government had Kalastro's testimony as to Walker's meetings with Sutherland, her handing to Sutherland of tickets and cash, and her confession of the bribery scheme. With respect to the Maynard-Sutherland conspiracy, the government had the Maynard conversations in which Maynard agreed to take care of or fix a number of tickets for persons cooperating with the investigation, and in which Maynard appeared to contact Sutherland for his help. We recognize that this evidence, taken alone, allows for plausible hypotheses of innocence: (1) Walker and Sutherland could argue that Kalastro had lied, and these defendants did in fact introduce substantial impeachment evidence; and (2) Maynard and Sutherland could argue that despite the content of the Maynard conversations, Maynard had actually given his collected traffic tickets to an attorney or otherwise legally disposed of them. However, these hypotheses are rendered implausible indeed, wholly incredible by the government's additional evidence. As explained in Part II of this opinion, the government's evidence shows that a number of individual tickets that were collected by Walker and Maynard and favorably disposed of by Sutherland were handled through extraordinarily irregular procedures. By and large, these tickets found their way into Sutherland's court without the help of the Traffic Violations Bureau and without the usual formal complaints; Sutherland asked his clerks not to discuss these irregular procedures in public, paid them out of his own pocket for their extra work, and halted such procedures when he learned he was under investigation. This evidence which would have been admissible in each of two separate trials on the multiple conspiracies involved in this case most certainly obscured the importance of any potential transference of guilt between the two conspiracies. This fact, when considered along with the additional factors discussed above, convinces us that the defendants' substantial rights were not affected by their joinder under a single conspiracy count and that, accordingly, their convictions need not be reversed for variance.