Opinion ID: 2513957
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Historical Development of Dram-Shop Liability

Text: [ถ 70] A historical review of the development of dram-shop liability [1] is relevant to a complete understanding of the current state of the law in Wyoming. Prior to 1983, a Wyoming alcohol vendor who negligently furnished alcohol to a customer was not liable for resulting injury. In Parsons v. Jow, 480 P.2d 396, 397 (Wyo.1971), overruled by McClellan, 666 P.2d 408, this Court stated: We think it cannot be denied there was no cause of action at common law against a vendor of liquor in favor of one injured by a vendee who becomes intoxicated this for the reason that the proximate cause of injury was deemed to be the patron's consumption of liquor and not its sale. While this was the position adopted historically in most states, various courts began to question its propriety. Until recently, dram shop law in America remained virtually unchanged from the English common law. Traditionally, dram shops were not held liable for damages sustained by third parties as a result of the conduct of an intoxicated patron to whom the alcohol was served. Although the traditional common law approach is still referred to and has often been followed by courts, an emerging trend ... has emerged, straying from common law principles by finding dram shops liable for damages to third parties caused by intoxicated patrons. Brett T. Votava, Comment, Missouri Dram Shop Liability: Last Call for Third Party Liability?, 69 UMKC L.Rev. 587, 592 (2001). [ถ 71] Consistent with this trend, this Court in 1983 rejected the common-law principles espoused in Parsons and recognized a cause of action against alcohol vendors based on common-law negligence principles. McClellan, 666 P.2d at 410-12. We challenged the use of stare decisis `as a justification for the continuance of an unfair and improper rule which operates to the detriment of those who may suffer tortious injury.' Id. at 411 (quoting Collins v. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County, 521 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Wyo.1974)). We do not choose to stand by and wring our hands at the unfairness which we ourselves have created. Id. at 415. In support of our departure from the common law, we cited the existence of a possible causal connection between a vendor's conduct and a plaintiff's injuries: When alcoholic beverages are sold by a tavern keeper to a minor or to an intoxicated person, the unreasonable risk of harm not only to the minor or the intoxicated person but also to members of the traveling public may readily be recognized and foreseen; this is particularly evident in current times when traveling by car to and from the tavern is so common-place and accidents resulting from drinking are so frequent. [Citations.] ... Rappaport v. Nichols, ..., [31 N.J. 188] 156 A.2d [1,] 8 [(N.J. 1959)]. The fact that the risk to the traveling public may readily be recognized and foreseen is supported by disturbing statistics. In 1977, the year when the statute forbidding sale of alcohol to minors and the statute forbidding sale of alcohol at a drive-in to minors or to intoxicated persons were recodified, there were 212 fatal vehicular accidents in Wyoming; 119, or over fifty percent, involved alcohol as a contributing circumstance. Id. at 414-15. [ถ 72] As further support for our departure from Parsons, we noted the following policy considerations: Refusing to acknowledge a claim for relief against a liquor vendor harms society in two ways. First, it is an unjust doctrine which often limits recovery when an intoxicated minor driver injures someone. Businesses which sell liquor are usually in a more solid financial position than a minor. Second, it is reasonable to assume that the current state of the law places us all at more peril, because there is no effective deterrent to keep liquor vendors from selling liquor to minors or to intoxicated persons. Liquor licenses are seldom revoked. Perhaps the threat of civil liability or increased insurance premiums will serve to make liquor vendors more careful. Id. at 415. We cited cases from other courts finding a cause of action against a liquor vendor based upon common-law negligence principles and concluding a liquor vendor owes the same duty to the whole world as does any other person. Id. at 411. We said: Once the general duty to use reasonable care is acknowledged, then courts focus their attention on the foreseeability of the resulting harm to establish proximate cause. We think this is a sensible and just approach. Henceforth, cases involving vendors of liquor and injured third parties will be approached in the same manner as other negligence cases. Id. (emphasis added). We recognized a duty [on the part of liquor vendors] based both upon the common law and upon statutes. Id. at 414. [ถ 73] We defined the common-law duty on the basis of ordinary negligence principles a liquor vendor owes a duty to exercise the degree of care required of a reasonable person in light of all the circumstances. Id. at 411. We defined the statutory duty on the basis of ง 12-5-301(a)(v), prohibiting the sale of alcohol in the drive-in area to minors or intoxicated persons, and ง 12-6-101(a), making it a misdemeanor for anyone to furnish alcohol to a minor (except a legal ward, medical patient, or immediate family member). We held that the violation of either statute was evidence of negligence to be considered by the trier of fact together with other circumstances in determining liquor vendor negligence. Id. at 413. [ถ 74] Addressing the issue of proximate cause, we held the ultimate test concerning proximate cause will be whether the vendor could foresee injury to a third person. This question will be one of fact based on the circumstances of each particular case. It is, however, not necessary that a specific injury be foreseen. Id. at 414. Nowhere in the entirety of the opinion did we limit our holding to only those situations where a vendor sells intoxicating liquor to underage or intoxicated persons in the drive-in area. Contrary to the majority's conclusion that one can confidently and reasonably conclude that the McClellan holding was narrow, Maj. op. at ถ 13, it is clear this Court intended the holding to apply broadly. That is, we intended a complete abrogation of the common-law rule of nonliability in favor of the application of general negligence principles in cases alleging vendor liability. [ถ 75] With an emerging trend of state court decisions attaching liability to dram shops, state legislatures responded by enacting statutes either authorizing or denying causes of action against dram shops. Votava, supra, 69 UMKC L.Rev. at 595-96. In 1985, just two years after our decision in McClellan, Wyoming followed suit and enacted ง 12-8-301 which abrogated this Court's decision in McClellan. 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 205, ง 1. With the enactment of ง 12-8-301, liquor vendor liability became strictly a creature of statute. The 1985 version of ง 12-8-301 provided: 12-8-301. Limitation of liability. (a) No licensee is liable for damages caused by an intoxicated person to whom the licensee legally sold or furnished alcoholic liquor or malt beverages unless the licensee sold or provided alcoholic liquor or malt beverages to a person who was intoxicated, and: (i) It was reasonably apparent to the licensee that the person buying or receiving the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage was intoxicated; or (ii) The licensee knew or reasonably should have known from the circumstances that the person buying or receiving the alcoholic liquor or malt beverages was intoxicated. (b) No person who is not a licensee who has gratuitously and legally provided alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to any other person is liable for damages caused by the intoxication of the other person. (c) This section does not affect the liability of the intoxicated person for damages. (d) This section does not affect the liability of the licensee or person if the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage was sold or provided in violation of title 12 of the Wyoming statutes. (e) For purposes of this section licensee is as defined in W.S. 12-1-101(a)(viii) and includes the licensee's employee or employees. Id. In what appears to be an attempt to codify and clarify the common-law duties established in McClellan, the legislature limited liquor vendor liability to two situations. First, a liquor vendor could be liable if he furnished alcohol to an intoxicated person and either it was reasonably apparent to him the person was intoxicated or he knew or should have known the person was intoxicated. Second, a liquor vendor could be liable if he furnished alcohol in violation of Title 12 of the Wyoming Statutes. Title 12 set hours of operation for liquor vendors, prohibited the sale of alcohol in the drive-in area to minors or intoxicated persons, prohibited the sale of alcohol generally to minors, and contained various other restrictions and rules relating to the sale of alcohol. Like McClellan, ง 12-8-301 as originally written broadly imposed liability on liquor vendors for sales occurring not only in the drive-in areas but whenever they knew or should have known the purchaser was intoxicated. Like McClellan, therefore, the original version of ง 12-8-301 allowed for liquor vendor liability arising out of sales occurring inside a drinking establishment. [ถ 76] One year later, in 1986, ง 12-8-301 was amended to provide (changes are indicated throughout): 12-8-301. Limitation of liability. (a) No licensee is liable for damages caused by an intoxicated person to whom the licensee legally sold or furnished alcoholic liquor or malt beverages unless the licensee sold or provided alcoholic liquor or malt beverages to a person who was intoxicated, and: (i) It was reasonably apparent to the licensee that the person buying or receiving the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage was intoxicated; or (ii) The licensee knew or reasonably should have known from the circumstances that the person buying or receiving the alcoholic liquor or malt beverages was intoxicated, (b) (a) No person who is not a licensee who has gratuitously and legally provided alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to any other person is liable for damages caused by the intoxication of the other person. (c) (b) This section does not affect the liability of the intoxicated person for damages. (d) (c) This section does not affect the liability of the licensee or person if the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage was sold or provided in violation of title 12 of the Wyoming statutes. (e) (d) For purposes of this section licensee is as defined in W.S. 12-1-101(a)(viii) and includes the licensee's employee or employees. 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 6, ง 1. Under this version of the law, which remains in effect today, liquor vendors have complete immunity from civil liability unless they furnish alcohol in violation of Title 12. That is, liquor vendors are immune unless they furnish alcohol in a drive-in area to minors or intoxicated persons, otherwise furnish liquor to a minor, or violate some other provision of Title 12. Under the law as it currently reads, therefore, and in contrast to the law as it existed under McClellan and the original statute, liquor vendors who furnish alcohol to intoxicated persons inside a liquor establishment are immune from liability for injuries occurring after the intoxicated person leaves the establishmentโno matter what the circumstances. Clearly, ง 12-8-301 as it currently reads does not broaden liquor vendor liability as the majority opinion concludes. Rather, the statute as amended severely limits liquor vendor liability. [2]