Opinion ID: 699248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: 17 We review the district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo. NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2249, 132 L.Ed.2d 257 (1995). Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). When determining if a genuine issue of material fact exists, all facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and the court must draw all inferences in favor of that party. NLFC, Inc., 45 F.3d at 234; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). 18 B. The Policymaking Authority of Detectives McQuinley and Sherck as Co-Directors of the RUFF Drug Task Force 19 In Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the Supreme Court ruled that local governmental bodies could not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 simply because they employed the tortfeasor acting within the scope of his or her employment. Cornfield v. Consolidated High School Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1324 (7th Cir.1993) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037-38); McNabola v. Chicago Transit Authority, 10 F.3d 501, 509 (7th Cir.1993) (well-established caselaw prohibits the imposition of Sec. 1983 liability against a local governmental entity under a theory of respondeat superior ). Rather, [m]unicipalities are answerable only for their own decisions and policies; they are not vicariously liable for the constitutional torts of their agents. Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397, 399 (7th Cir.1992). 20 Monell and its progeny stand for the proposition that a local governmental entity will be responsible for the unconstitutional actions of its employees only if those actions were taken pursuant to official policy or custom. See Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735-36, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2722-23, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) (to prevail on a Sec. 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that the state actor's constitutional tort was caused by a custom or policy); St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 122, 108 S.Ct. 915, 923-24, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) ([local] governments should be held responsible when, and only when, their official policies cause their employees to violate another person's constitutional rights); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478-80, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (recovery from a municipality is limited to acts that are, properly speaking, acts 'of the municipality'--that is, acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered); see also James v. Milwaukee County, 956 F.2d 696, 700 n. 4 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 63, 121 L.Ed.2d 31 (1992) (a 'pattern' of activity by state actors must be shown to infer that a policy existed). The Supreme Court has held that municipal liability [under Sec. 1983] may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480, 106 S.Ct. at 1299 (emphasis added). 4 However, not every action taken by employees with decisionmaking authority gives rise to the potential for liability: 21 Municipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered. The fact that a particular official--even a policymaking official--has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion.... The official must also be responsible for establishing final government policy respecting such activity before the municipality can be held liable. 22 Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-83, 106 S.Ct. at 1299-1300 (citations and footnotes omitted). 23 We are called upon to decide whether Detectives McQuinley and Sherck, while acting in their official capacities as members of the RUFF Drug Task Force and as law enforcement officers within their own respective jurisdictions, possessed final policymaking authority with respect to the investigation and subsequent arrest of Eversole. 5 Policymaking authority may be granted directly by a legislative enactment or may be delegated by an official who possesses such authority. Id. at 483, 106 S.Ct. at 1300. [W]hether a particular official has 'final policymaking authority' is a question of state law. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123, 108 S.Ct. at 924. State or local law will always direct a court to some official or body that has the responsibility for making law or setting policy in any given area of a local government's business. Id. at 125, 108 S.Ct. at 925; see also Auriemma, 957 F.2d at 400. 24 The law enforcement officers involved in the RUFF Drug Task Force, including Detectives McQuinley and Sherck, were acting pursuant to the rules and regulations of their respective law enforcement agencies, in this instance the Fayette County Sheriff's Department and the Connersville Police Department but were not acting pursuant to any policies established by the RUFF Drug Task Force. The RUFF Drug Task Force was simply a multi-jurisdictional effort of law enforcement agencies joined together in a coordinated effort to stop or at least control drug activity in the four-county area. Each participant in the Task Force remained obliged to follow the rules and regulations of his or her respective law enforcement agency. 6 Thus, Jett directs our inquiry: based on applicable state and local law, we must identify those officials ... who speak with final policymaking authority for Detectives McQuinley and Sherck concerning their RUFF Drug Task Force activities. Jett, 491 U.S. at 737, 109 S.Ct. at 2723-24. 25 We recognize that identifying those vested with the authority to make policy is no mean feat. Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1325. Nonetheless, our review of Indiana law reveals that the county sheriff is the final policymaker for law enforcement in his or her particular jurisdiction. See Delk v. Board of Commissioners, 503 N.E.2d 436, 440 (Ind.App.1987); see also Ind.Code Secs. 36-2-13-1 to 36-2-13-14 (Burns 1994). Similarly, a police chief in Indiana is the final policymaker for his municipal police department. See Ind.Code Sec. 36-8-3-3(g) (Burns 1994) ([t]he police chief has exclusive control of the police department); id. at Sec. 36-8-3.5-11. 7 Although, as Eversole notes, McQuinley and Sherck held positions of authority within their respective law enforcement departments and as co-directors of the RUFF Drug Task Force, nothing in the record suggests that either was vested with policymaking authority. The discretion to make final decisions to carry out the policies of a local law enforcement entity does not equate to policymaking authority. 26 Monell's effort to limit municipal liability under Sec. 1983 to acts that carry out local policy entails distinguishing legislative from executive functions--a distinction always present in principle even though blurry in practice. [R]esponsibility for making law or setting policy--the objective under Praprotnik of our search through local law--is authority to adopt rules for the conduct of government. Authority to make a final decision need not imply authority to establish rules. 27 Auriemma, 957 F.2d at 401; see also Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1325 ([t]he exercise of discretion by a particular official, standing alone, does not give rise to municipal liability). Detectives McQuinley and Sherck followed and implemented the policies of their respective law enforcement agencies through the cooperative mechanism of the RUFF Drug Task Force. The scope of their authority was limited to executing their responsibilities as law enforcement officers in accordance with federal, state, and local laws within their respective jurisdictions. Neither McQuinley nor Sherck had policymaking authority within the meaning of Monell and its progeny. 28 That the RUFF Drug Task Force had no formal rules or regulations of its own is of no concern. See Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1325 (the absence of a written policy is not enough to support an inference that final policymaking authority has been delegated to a subordinate). We recognize that in situations that call for procedures, rules, or regulations, the failure to make a policy itself may be actionable. Id. at 1326. However, this situation, i.e., the operation of the RUFF Drug Task Force, was not one calling for its own procedures, rules, or regulations. Because the Task Force was nothing more than a joint effort of four counties in the State of Indiana to implement existing law enforcement policies, no new or unique policies were needed. C. Qualified Immunity 29 Eversole also argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants McQuinley and Sherck based on qualified immunity. A government official who, while acting under color of state law, deprives an individual of constitutionally protected rights may be subject to personal liability for civil damages. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. However, [t]he defense of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'  Marshall v. Allen, 984 F.2d 787, 791 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Qualified immunity is a powerful shield that insulates [government] officials from suit. Gregorich v. Lund, 54 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir.1995); see also Maltby v. Winston, 36 F.3d 548, 554 n. 6 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2576, 132 L.Ed.2d 827 (1995) (qualified immunity is not merely a defense to liability but an immunity from suit). When a defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity, this court engages in a two-part, objective inquiry: the court must determine (1) whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a federal constitutional right, and (2) whether the constitutional standards implicated were clearly established at the time in question. Kernats v. O'Sullivan, 35 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir.1994). 8 The first part of this two-part test 'is a threshold issue that can defeat entirely a claim of qualified immunity. If a plaintiff's allegations, even when accepted as true, do not state a cognizable violation of constitutional rights, then the plaintiff's claim fails.'  Zorzi v. Putnam, 30 F.3d 885, 892 (7th Cir.1994) (quoting Marshall, 984 F.2d at 793). Although qualified immunity is often raised as a defense to a Sec. 1983 action, it is the plaintiff who bears the burden of proof on the above two-part test. Rakovich, 850 F.2d at 1209. 30 Eversole asserts that Detectives McQuinley and Sherck violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest without probable cause because their misinterpretation of the date of her purchase of cough syrup from Thielking Drug Store was the result of plain incompetence. We disagree. The qualified immunity standard 'gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by protecting 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'  Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534, 537, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)). Qualified immunity will shield a police officer from Sec. 1983 liability if  'a reasonable officer could have believed [the plaintiff's arrest] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers possessed.'  Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227, 112 S.Ct. at 536 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)).  'If a case involves a question of whether probable cause existed to support an officer's actions, the case should not be permitted to go to trial if there is any reasonable basis to conclude that probable cause existed.'  McDonnell v. Cournia, 990 F.2d 963, 968 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting Cross v. Des Moines, 965 F.2d 629, 632 (8th Cir.1992)). 31 Detective McQuinley, in the performance of his lawful duties as a member of the RUFF Drug Task Force, mistakenly determined that Eversole had made two purchases of codeine-containing cough syrup on April 8, 1988. His error stemmed from the marginally legible handwritten log maintained at Thielking Drug Store. In preparing and executing an Affidavit of Probable Cause, Detective Sherck relied on McQuinley's reading and interpretation of the entries made on the pharmacy records pursuant to Indiana law. See 856 Ind.Admin.Code Sec. 2-6-18(a)(5). We agree with the district court that the less than perfect pharmacy record itself provided a reasonable basis for the officers to believe that probable cause existed. As explained by Judge Dillin: 32 The handwriting in which the date was entered reasonably could be construed as April 8. In fact, the number more nearly resembles an 8 than a 5. Although construing the April 5 date as April 8 upsets the otherwise sequential entry of dates in the pharmacy record, we do not believe this destroys the officers' reasonable basis for believing probable cause existed. The record of sales maintained by Thielking is by no means an example of clarity. 33 McQuinley's mistake was unfortunate, but not unreasonable. 9 As such, it cannot be the basis for a Sec. 1983 claim. See Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227, 112 S.Ct. at 536 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. at 3039-40) ([e]ven law enforcement officials who 'reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present' are entitled to immunity). 34 Eversole argues that McQuinley's mistake was not reasonable because a simple inquiry to the Thielking pharmacist would have confirmed the actual date of her cough medicine purchase. The fact that McQuinley might have discovered his mistake had he questioned the pharmacist about the dates recorded in the log is of no consequence. We have consistently held that  'once police officers have discovered sufficient facts to establish probable cause, they have no constitutional obligation to conduct any further investigation in the hopes of uncovering potentially exculpatory evidence.'  Garcia v. Chicago, 24 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1313, 131 L.Ed.2d 194 (1995) (quoting Schertz v. Waupaca County, 875 F.2d 578, 583 (7th Cir.1989)); see also Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228-29, 112 S.Ct. at 537 (the court should ask whether the agents acted reasonably under settled law in the circumstances, not whether another reasonable, or more reasonable, interpretation of the events can be constructed ...). If McQuinley had been in doubt about the dates recorded in the pharmacy logs, he certainly should have questioned store employees, but since there is no evidence in the record to lead us to believe or even conjecture that he was in doubt and believed the date on the pharmacy record to be anything other than April 8, 1988, there was no need for him to conduct any further investigation, i.e., asking any more questions.