Opinion ID: 2481410
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutor's Remarks in Closing Argument Regarding Mitigation Evidence

Text: During the sentencing phase of defendant's trial, defendant sought to demonstrate that he would positively adapt to the structured environment of incarceration and would not be a threat to others. Defendant relied primarily on the testimony of psychologist Mark Cunningham. Dr. Cunningham concluded, after reviewing defendant's records and interviewing several corrections officers, that there is a very low likelihood that Dan Ramsey would commit an act of serious violence or seriously injure someone while confined for life. In closing, the State responded to defendant's mitigation argument with the following: But the instructions say that you must also consider the evidence in mitigation, and we ask that you do that, that you do your duty and consider the evidence in mitigation. And I want to talk to you about the evidence that you've heard in mitigation in this case. What evidence has the defendant presented? Well, you heard from Dr. Cunningham. Recall that Dr. Cunningham testified that in his opinion, the defendant would not likely commit any acts of violence in prison. And I ask you: Is that relevant to doing justice in this case? How is that relevant to what the appropriate sentence of the defendant should be or to his actions in this case or to any issue that you have to decide in this case? And isn't that the purpose of prison, to prevent violence. Anyway, we know that the defendant is not the type of out-of-control, impulse-driven killer who is likely to act out in those types of settings. No, he's cold, calculating, cold-blooded, manipulative, kills to meet his needs. We suggest that Dr. Cunningham's evidence is not entitled to much weight here. The prosecutor also suggested that the testimony of defendant's jail guard and community service supervisor were also not entitled to much weight here. Defendant argues that these comments were misstatements of the law and prevented jurors from considering Dr. Cunningham's testimony as evidence in mitigation. Defendant acknowledges that he failed to preserve this issue for review, as he did not object to the prosecutor's argument at trial. However, defendant asks this court to review the issue for plain error. A reviewing court may consider unpreserved error when a clear or obvious error occurs and (1) the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. Piatkowski, 225 Ill.2d at 565, 312 Ill.Dec. 338, 870 N.E.2d 403. In this case, defendant argues a clear and obvious error occurred and both that the evidence was closely balanced and that the error was of such magnitude as to deny defendant a fair sentencing hearing. Our first step is to assess whether a clear or obvious error occurred. When determining the propriety of a prosecutor's closing argument, a reviewing court must evaluate the comments in the context in which they were made. People v. Burgess, 176 Ill.2d 289, 319, 223 Ill.Dec. 624, 680 N.E.2d 357 (1997). Defendant's argument focuses on the prosecutor's comments as a misstatement of the law. Defendant contends that because a defendant's ability to adjust to life in prison is widely accepted evidence in mitigation, the State improperly suggested that this evidence was not relevant and should not be considered. It is well settled that an attorney may not misstate the law in closing argument. People v. Woolley, 178 Ill.2d 175, 209-10, 227 Ill.Dec. 497, 687 N.E.2d 979 (1997). However, taken in context, the prosecutor's comments in this case do not constitute a misstatement of the law. The prosecutor did ask whether defendant's ability to adapt to prison life was relevant to whether defendant should receive the death penalty. In referring to relevance, however, it is clear the prosecutor was not suggesting Dr. Cunningham's testimony was legally irrelevant or inadmissible, or that it should not be considered as evidence in mitigation. Rather, the prosecutor was suggesting that given the nature of the crime and the fact that there were multiple victims, defendant's evidence in mitigation was not substantial and was insufficient to overcome the much stronger evidence in aggravation. In fact, the prosecutor prefaced his remarks regarding Dr. Cunningham's testimony by saying the instructions say that you must also consider the evidence in mitigation, and we ask that you do that, that you do your duty and consider the evidence in mitigation. The prosecutor later suggested that Dr. Cunningham's testimony was not entitled to much weight. He also suggested that evidence from defendant's jail guard and community service supervisor were entitled to little weight. Throughout his closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized the weight that should be given to defendant's evidence in mitigation. Although the State, as would be expected, asked the jury to give little weight to this evidence, it nonetheless acknowledged that the evidence must be considered. Contrary to defendant's assertion that the State removed defendant's mitigation evidence from the sentencing equation, the prosecutor in this case asked only that the jury put a smaller value on defendant's evidence in that equation. Moreover, the jury was instructed that it was to weigh all the evidence received in both parts of the death penalty hearing. The court instructed the jury that in considering the evidence it must weigh any aggravating and mitigating factors. The jury heard Dr. Cunningham's testimony and the rest of defendant's evidence. Counsel for defendant suggested this evidence should carry great weight with the jury, while the prosecutor suggested the jury should give this evidence little weight. Had the jury been instructed not to consider evidence of his ability to adapt to prison life as mitigating evidence, it would constitute error. However, in this case, the comments, taken in context, did not undermine the court's instruction to weigh all of the evidence in aggravation and mitigation. It was not error for the court to allow the prosecutor's comment. Because we find there was no error, we need not address the remaining parts of plain error review.