Opinion ID: 1608288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Common-law Rights Approach

Text: In Reed v. Brunson, 527 So.2d 102, 115 (Ala.1988), the Court reasoned: `Legislation which abolishes or alters a common-law cause of action, then, or its enforcement through legal process, is automatically suspect under § 13. It is not, however, automatically invalid. Grantham [v. Denke, 359 So.2d 785 (Ala.1978),] itself restates the established rule that such legislation will survive constitutional scrutiny if one of two conditions is satisfied: `1. The right is voluntarily relinquished by its possessor in exchange for equivalent benefits or protection, or `2. The legislation eradicates or ameliorates a perceived social evil and is thus a valid exercise of the police power.' (Quoting Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 394 So.2d 334, 352-54 (Ala. 1981).) (Emphasis added and emphasis omitted.) See also Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So.2d 996, 1000 (Ala. 1982). The construction statute of repose found in § 6-5-220 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, does operate to abrogate certain common-law rights after the expiration of the 13-year period. This Court has previously identified common-law rights of action against architects, engineers, and builders. See, e.g., Watson, Watson, Rutland/Architects, Inc. v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 559 So.2d 168, 174 (Ala.1990) (holding that an architect could be held liable for failing to inspect reasonably); McFadden v. Ten-T Corp., 529 So.2d 192, 201 (Ala.1988) (holding that a contractor, a builder, could be held liable for negligently widening and resurfacing a highway and that the contractor was not insulated from liability by the owner's acceptance of the contractor's work); Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So.2d 725 (Ala.1983) (allowing the plaintiff to pursue his claims, grounded in both negligence and the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine, against the engineers responsible for the installation of an electric arc furnace); Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So.2d 313 (1971) (holding that caveat emptor does not apply to a builder-vendor's sale of a newly constructed house). While the legislation in question does operate to abolish certain common-law causes of action, nonetheless the legislation passes constitutional muster even judged by the common-law rights approach because the legislation eradicates or ameliorates a perceived social evil and is thus a valid exercise of the police power. Reed, supra . Reed explains:  Fireman's Fund [] poses the pertinent question: `Who is to determine if society at large receives a benefit by the deprivation of the common law remedy, the legislature or the courts?' See 394 So.2d at 352-53. All questions of `propriety, wisdom, necessity, utility, and expediency are held exclusively for the legislative bodies, and are matters with which the courts have no concern. This principle is embraced within the simple statement that the only question for the court to decide is one of power, not of expediency or wisdom.' Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, supra, 246 Ala. at 9-10, 18 So.2d at 815 [(1944)]. 527 So.2d at 116. However, [i]n this regard, it is not enough for the legislature to merely characterize the problem as a `social evil' and then recite in the enacting clause that the legislation is directed to that evil. There must be a substantial relationship between the act and the eradication of the evil. Lankford, 416 So.2d at 1001. In § 6-5-225, Ala.Code 1975, the Alabama Legislature expressed its findings and intent in enacting the statute: It is the purpose and intent of the Legislature in connection with all actions against architects and engineers, who perform or furnish the design, planning, specifications, testing, supervision, administration, or observation of the construction of an improvement on or to real property, and builders who construct, perform, or manage the construction of an improvement on or to real property designed by and constructed under the supervision, administration or observation of, or in accordance with the plans and specifications prepared by, an architect or engineer, to limit the time for commencement of an action to a period of two years from the date a cause of action accrues and to bar all causes of action and rights of action which accrue more than thirteen years after substantial completion of such improvement. The Legislature finds that this classification distinguishing architects, engineers, and builders is rationally and reasonably related to the legislative regulatory scheme and is valid.... This article bears a reasonable relationship to the proposed legislative objective of limiting the period of liability for architects and engineers and builders whose professional services or work on improvements to real property generally ends at the time of substantial completion of the improvement. While protecting architects and engineers from exposure to liabilities for injuries and damages occurring long after the completion of their professional architectural and engineering services and builders as defined from exposure to liabilities for injuries and damages occurring long after the completion of their work, this article imposes no unfair burden on the injured party for he or she is still afforded an avenue of legal action to seek redress from those who are more likely to have been responsible for or could have prevented such injury. . . . . It is the further legislative objective to provide for the abolishing of rights of action against architects and engineers and builders which would have accrued after the passage of thirteen years from the substantial completion of the construction of an improvement on or to real property, except rights of action for breach of express warranties, contracts, or indemnities which extend beyond thirteen years. Where causes of action accrue during the thirteen years from completion, an action may be brought within two years of accrual even though this extends beyond the thirteen-year period. This permits all injured parties a period of two years to file suit unless already barred because the cause of action accrues after the passage of thirteen years, which would in certain circumstances permit the filing of an action up to fifteen years after the completion of the improvement (or up to two years after the expiration of written express warranties, contracts, or indemnities). The legislative objective of abolishing potential liabilities of architects and engineers and builders after the passage of a sufficient period of time from the completion of their work is rationally and reasonably related to the permissible state objective of removing responsibility from, and preventing suit against these regulated professions and builders which are least likely to be responsible or at fault for defects and deficiencies which cause injury long after their services or work is completed. The Legislature has deemed that, after a lapse of time of more than thirteen years without incident, the burden on the courts to adjudicate, the complexities of proof with the obstacle of faded memories, unavailable witnesses and lost evidence, and even where evidence is available, the opportunity for intervening factors such as acts or omissions of others in inadequate maintenance, improper use, intervening alterations, improvements and services, and other negligence, and such as changes in standards for design and construction and changes in building codes, and the burden on architects and engineers and builders, who have no control over the improvements after their services are completed, to disprove responsibility after acceptance and years of possession by other parties, all weigh more heavily in favor of repose or the abolishing of rights of action against architects and engineers and builders than allowing adjudication of the few, if any, meritorious claims which might have accrued thereafter. The Legislature finds that the burden of tenuous claims upon both the courts and architects and engineers and builders sufficiently vindicates the denial of a right of action after the passage of a period of thirteen years from the substantial completion of the construction of the improvement. (Acts 1994, No. 94-138, p. 183, § 6.) (Emphasis added.) Buildings are unique in that typically they are intended to endure indefinitely if not permanently. Without this statute, architects, builders, and engineers would remain subject to liability until they die or, indeed, for some months after they have died. See 43-2-350(b), Ala.Code 1975. The construction statute of repose bears a substantial relationship to the eradication or amelioration of this potentially perpetual liability as well as the evils specifically found by the Legislature. Therefore, as a valid exercise of police power, as judged by the common-law rights approach, the statute comports with Article I, Section 13 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. Furthermore, in the present statute, the Legislature has remedied the defect that caused its precursor to be declared unconstitutional. See Jackson, 435 So.2d at 729. In Jackson, the Court found that the statute did not provide for those plaintiffs whose causes of action accrued close to the expiration of the limitations period. In the present statute, the Legislature has added a savings clause to provide parties who are injured near the expiration of the thirteen-year period sufficient time to file their actions.