Opinion ID: 1782236
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Crane's Motion to Dismiss Based on Improper Venue

Text: We have held that a petition for the writ of mandamus is the proper method for obtaining review of an order denying a motion to dismiss seeking the enforcement of an outbound forum-selection clause. Ex parte CTB, Inc., 782 So.2d 188, 190 (Ala. 2000). However, instead of petitioning for the writ of mandamus, Crane appealed. In its brief, Malouf argues that we should refrain from reviewing the trial court's order because it was presented to us as an appeal and not as a petition for a writ of mandamus. Crane urges us to treat its appeal from the order denying its motion to dismiss as a petition for the writ of mandamus. Crane cites two cases in support. In one, this Court treated a notice of appeal as a petition for the writ of mandamus. Morrison Rests. Inc. v. Homestead Village of Fairhope, Ltd., 710 So.2d 905 (Ala.1998) (stating that [t]his Court has previously held that a petition for a writ of mandamus is the appropriate method of challenging an order referring a case to arbitration, and treating Morrison's appeal as a petition for the writ of mandamus). In the other, this Court treated a petition for a writ of mandamus as a notice of appeal. Ex parte Burch, 730 So.2d 143 (Ala.1999). Crane also argues that Rules 1 and 2 of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure likewise compel us to treat its appeal from the denial of its motion to dismiss as a petition for the writ of mandamus. Rule 1, Ala. R.App. P., provides: [These rules] shall be construed so as to assure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every appellate proceeding on its merits. Rule 2, Ala. R.App. P., allows for the suspension of the requirements or provisions of any of the appellate rules [i]n the interest of expediting decision. In Ex parte Burch, we treated a petition for the writ of mandamus addressed to a trial court's denial of a motion in limine as a notice of appeal. We stated in Burch that there is no bright-line test for determining when this Court will treat a particular filing as a mandamus petition and when it will treat it as a notice of appeal. 730 So.2d at 146. Instead, we consider the facts of the particular case in deciding whether to treat the filing as a petition or as an appeal: The question we come to, then is this: Do the circumstances of this case make it such that the policies set forth in Rule 1[, Ala. R.App. P.,] will be served by resolving the matter presented to us? Or, will those policies be better served by requiring, as we do in the normal case, strict compliance with our appellate rules and thus not reviewing the trial court's interlocutory ruling? 730 So.2d at 147. In Burch, we treated the petition as a petition for a permissive appeal under Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P., because the hearing transcript revealed the trial court's belief that this Court's resolution of the motion in limine was important to materially advancing th[e] litigation. 730 So.2d at 147-48. Similarly, we believe that deciding the issue of the enforceability of this forum-selection clause on its merits will further the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination . . . on [the] merits of the case favored by Rule 1, Ala. R.App. P. It is well-settled that mandamus is an extraordinary writ, requiring a showing that there is (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court. Morrison Restaurants, 710 So.2d at 907 (quoting Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So.2d 889, 891 (Ala.1991)). Crane has not demonstrated a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to dismiss Malouf's claims against it based on the outbound forum-selection clause in the subcontract. This Court has recognized that outbound forum-selection clauses actually `implicate the venue of a court. . . .' Ex parte CTB, Inc., 782 So.2d at 190 (quoting and approving language from dissent in O'Brien Eng'g Co. v. Continental Machs., Inc., 738 So.2d 844, 849 (Ala.1999) (See, J., dissenting)). Therefore, an outbound forum-selection clause raises procedural issues and is governed by the law of the forum jurisdictionin this case, the law of Alabama. See, e.g., Ex parte Procom Servs., Inc., 884 So.2d 827 (Ala.2003) (deciding the validity of an outbound forum-selection clause under Alabama law despite a choice-of-law clause in the contract stating that Texas law governed disputes between the parties). In Alabama, we review the trial court's decision on the enforcement of such a clause to determine whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in deciding not to enforce the outbound forum-selection clause. See Ex parte Procom Servs., 884 So.2d at 830. Forum-selection clauses are enforceable under Alabama law. Ex parte Rymer, 860 So.2d 339, 341 (Ala. 2003). However, this Court has held that a forum-selection clause should not be enforced if the chosen forum would be `seriously inconvenient for the trial of the action.' Ex parte Leasecomm Corp., 886 So.2d 58, 62 (Ala.2003) (quoting Ex parte CTB, Inc., 782 So.2d at 191). Such a serious inconvenience arises if enforcement of the forum-selection clause `would result in two lawsuits involving similar claims or issues being tried in separate courts.' 886 So.2d at 63 (quoting Alpha Sys. Integration, Inc. v. Silicon Graphics, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 904, 909 (Minn.Ct.App.2002)) (emphasis omitted). Malouf argues that just such a serious inconvenience would exist in this case if we ordered the trial court to enforce the outbound forum-selection clause. In the underlying action, the Association has asserted claims against Malouf arising from Malouf's general construction of the Palm Beach Condominiums; Malouf has, in turn, brought third-party claims against Crane and several other subcontractors. Malouf argues that enforcement of the outbound forum-selection clause in this case would move the litigation of the claims between Malouf and Crane to Mississippi, where, Malouf argues, they would be litigating claims and issues identical to those being tried in Alabama between Malouf and the Association and between Malouf and the other subcontractors, all of which arose out of the same construction job as did Malouf's claims against Crane. If its claims against Crane are transferred, Malouf argues, it would be subject to duplicative discovery and litigation. Crane asks us to transfer the claims involving Malouf and Crane to Mississippi, while all the other related claims remain in Alabama. Crane argues that the action brought in Alabama by the Association involves claims and parties wholly unrelated to anything Crane did in the construction of Palm Beach Condominiums, and that the action in Mississippi would involve the sole issue whether Crane properly completed its work during the construction. Crane is correct that the action brought by the Association involves other parties unrelated to Malouf's third-party action against Crane and therefore involves issues that may not be present in the third-party action, but the opposite is not necessarily true. Malouf's claims against Crane involve issues that will be litigated in the Association's action. Both cases will likely involve interpretation of the same contract terms, and Malouf's testimony as to its activities during construction will be necessary in both actions. Litigation of the same issues, arising out of the same construction project, could therefore cause Malouf serious inconvenience. Based on these facts, we cannot conclude that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it refused to enforce the outbound forum-selection clause and denied the motion to dismiss the action based on improper venue. Therefore, Crane has no clear legal right to the writ of mandamus.