Opinion ID: 2058245
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Count II. Negligence

Text: Though the plaintiff apparently conceded that exculpatory contracts generally insulate defendants from liability on common law negligence claims (152 Ill. App.3d at 387), we reaffirm that under certain circumstances exculpatory contracts may act as a total bar to a plaintiff's negligence claim. We start from our often-repeated axiom that [p]ublic policy strongly favors freedom to contract [citation], as is manifest in both the United States Constitution and our constitution. ( McClure Engineering Associates, Inc. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. (1983), 95 Ill.2d 68, 72.) Regarding contracts that shift the risks of one's own negligence to another contracting party, the general rule is to enforce exculpatory contracts unless (1) it would be against a settled public policy of the State to do so, or (2) there is something in the social relationship of the parties militating against upholding the agreement. ( Jackson v. First National Bank (1953), 415 Ill. 453, 460; see also O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co. (1958), 15 Ill.2d 436, 437; Schlessman v. Henson (1980), 83 Ill.2d 82, 87.) More recently, we observed that exculpatory clauses are not favored and must be strictly construed against the benefitting party, particularly one who drafted the release. Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (1986), 112 Ill.2d 378, 395. In this case, defendant's sign-in sheet contained the following release agreement: Your signature below indicates that you have read the posted rules and will abide by them. Also, your signature shall release Ky-Wa Acres and employees of any liabilities you may incur while on the premises or for any injury which may result from horseback riding. If your signature is not reliable please do not sign or ride. In addition, the prominently posted rules stated that riders rode at their own risk. Plaintiff stated in his deposition that he was an experienced rider and that he understood the release he signed. Just as this court has noted that the racing of automobiles entails certain risks of injury that are obvious to experienced drivers ( Schlessman v. Henson (1980), 83 Ill.2d 82, 86), so too horseback riding involves various risks of injury that are plain to experienced riders. As the court stated, [t]he parties may not have contemplated the precise occurrence which resulted in plaintiff's accident, but this does not render the exculpatory clause inoperable. ( Schlessman v. Henson, 83 Ill.2d 82, 86.) The court also concluded that when the parties adopt broad language in a release, it is reasonable to interpret the intended coverage to be as broad as the risks that are obvious to experienced participants. Even if the release in this case is strictly construed against the defendant, its terms are broad enough to cover the situation at issue here. We believe that only the most inexperienced of horseback riders would not understand that under certain circumstances a horse may become spooked or side-shocked and cause a rider to fall from the horse. Yet plaintiff was an experienced rider who claimed to understand the release he signed. Our review of the record and search for public policies that might be violated by the enforcement of this release have failed to uncover any policy reasons not to hold this release effective. In fact, we note that the legislature has dealt with liability for injuries caused by animals in the Animal Control Act, and they did not choose to preclude the use of exculpatory contracts. In sum, we do not find any public policy in conflict with upholding the defendant's contractual release from negligence liability. In addition to finding no public policy that is offended by enforcing the exculpatory contract here, we see nothing in the relationship between the contracting parties that suggests that the exculpatory agreement should not be enforced. This is not a case where the plaintiff is in an unequal bargaining position. Again, Schlessman is instructive, for in that case it was stated, [w]hile it is obvious that plaintiff would not have been allowed to use the racetrack had he not signed the release, plaintiff was under no economic or other compulsion to sign the release in order to engage in amateur auto racing. ( Schlessman v. Henson, 83 Ill.2d at 87.) Similarly, this plaintiff voluntarily chose to enter into a relationship with the defendant whereby plaintiff agreed to accept the risks associated with horseback riding. Therefore, the plaintiff `will not be heard to complain of a risk which he has encountered voluntarily, or brought upon himself with full knowledge and appreciation of the danger.' Vanderlei v. Heideman (1980), 83 Ill. App.3d 158, 162-63, quoting Prosser, Torts 523 (4th ed. 1971). Clarification is also required with regard to one of the appellate court judges' suggestion that plaintiff's amended complaint alleged fraud sufficient to vitiate what would otherwise be a valid release. (152 Ill. App.3d at 387 (Heiple, J., specially concurring).) In order to state a cause of action for fraud, we require plaintiffs to allege that defendant made a false representation of a material fact knowing or believing it to be false and thereby intending to induce plaintiff to act. ( Glazewski v. Coronet Insurance Co. (1985), 108 Ill.2d 243, 249.) Count II of the amended complaint alleges only negligence, that defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known [that the horse] had a propensity to become `side-shocked,' creating an unreasonable dangerous condition to the person riding said horse. We do not consider this to be an allegation that defendant knowingly misrepresented to the plaintiff the dangers inherent in horseback riding or peculiar to the horse he rented in an effort to induce plaintiff to sign the release. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court, and affirm the decision of the circuit court. Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.