Opinion ID: 52506
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of drug dealing evidence

Text: The district court properly permitted receipt of evidence of certain drug interdictions since the obstruction count identified that drug smuggling operation as the particular investigation which Raymond’s conduct sought to impede, and also because it provided the motive for Raymond’s falsification of certain loan files. C. Propriety of the use of certain deposition testimony The district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering and admitting into evidence the deposition testimony of Edwin Jack since Jack possessed material 2 information which would not have been available at trial unless preserved by deposition. D. Propriety of district court’s refusal to extend immunity to a potential witness The district court properly declined to confer judicial immunity on Donna Galloway, for among other reasons, Raymond’s failure to establish the requisite evidentiary predicate for even the court’s consideration of such an extraordinary step. E. Failure of the district court to grant a mistrial The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Raymond a mistrial based upon the prosecution’s failure to provide at pretrial Marie Lisa Frederique’s grand jury transcript since her testimony therein was not exculpatory, its substance known to Raymond and no prejudice was experienced as a result of its later disclosure. Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial based upon Jack Adderley’s pretrial perusal of Edwin Jack’s deposition testimony since it did not violate Fed.R.Evid. 615, did not result in prejudice and was properly addressed by the district court’s permission to permit Adderley to be cross-examined on the matter. F. Failure to sentence Raymond according to the law and record 3 The district court properly determined Raymond’s base offense level and her specific offense characteristic level, which was calculated according to the intended loss of the nine loans which formed the basis of the offenses of conviction as well as twenty other relevant fraudulent loan transactions. Moreover, Raymond waived the issue of whether the court erred in enhancing her base offense level for more than minimal planning, abuse of trust, and obstruction of justice, by improperly incorporating by reference arguments made before the district court. In addition, the district court’s consideration of uncharged or acquitted conduct did not violate United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 378 (2005), or Raymond’s constitutional rights. Finally, because the district court considered all of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), Raymond’s sentence was reasonable. Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 4