Opinion ID: 186717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of Juror During Deliberations

Text: 47 First, each of the five appellants challenges his conviction on the grounds that the district court erred in dismissing Juror No. 3 during deliberations and in permitting the remaining eleven jurors to deliberate to verdict pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b). At the time of the trial, Rule 23(b) (since amended 12 ) provided in relevant part: 48 (b) Jury of Less than Twelve. Juries shall be of 12 but at any time before verdict the parties may stipulate in writing with the approval of the court that the jury shall consist of any number less than 12 or that a valid verdict may be returned by a jury of less than 12 should the court find it necessary to excuse one or more jurors for any just cause after trial commences. Even absent such stipulation, if the court finds it necessary to excuse a juror for just cause after the jury has retired to consider its verdict, in the discretion of the court a valid verdict may be returned by the remaining 11 jurors. 49 The district court's decision under this rule to dismiss a juror or to continue with an eleven-member jury is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Ginyard, 444 F.3d 648, 651 (D.C.Cir.2006) (dismissal of juror); United States v. Harrington, 108 F.3d 1460, 1472 (D.C.Cir. 1997) (eleven-juror verdict). We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Juror No. 3 and permitting the remaining eleven jurors to continue deliberating to verdict. 50 The jury began deliberations on July 9, 2001 and the district court dismissed the alternate jurors at that time. On Thursday July 19, 2001 the judge informed counsel he had learned from U.S. Deputy Marshall Terry Adams that Juror No. 3 had transported himself to the Veterans Administration Hospital with symptoms of chest pains and a tingling sensation in one arm, which were to him sufficiently suggestive that he was having coronary problems. 7/19/01am Tr. 3. The court also told counsel that Deputy Adams was going to the hospital to try to ascertain more information about the situation and then excused the jury until the following Monday, July 23, when hopefully they w[ould] be able to resume their deliberations . . . with Juror Number 3 present. Id. at 4. He stated that, if Juror No. 3 was not present when the jury returned on July 23, he would ask the parties to stipulate to proceeding with an eleven-person jury but, failing such a stipulation, he would exercise [his] prerogative under Rule 23(b) to have the jury of 11 continue to deliberate and take their verdict. Id. He then explained the situation to the other jurors and excused them until Monday morning. On Monday morning, Juror No. 3 was present and deliberations continued. 51 On Tuesday July 24, 2001 the judge assembled counsel and placed Deputy Adams on the witness stand to describe difficulties . . . with respect to Juror No. 3. 7/24/01pm Tr. 4. Adams testified that, after Juror No. 3 left for the hospital the previous Thursday, Juror No. 17 informed Adams that in the last couple of weeks Juror No. 3 told her he had experienced some mental health issues in the past and had been treated for them and that he was experiencing difficulty with his supervisor about not reporting to work on days the jurors were not in court. Id. at 4-5. Juror No. 3 had also informed Juror No. 17, Adams recounted, that he bought a `thing' and planned to do `her' — an unidentified `her' — and himself. Id. at 5. She explained to Adams that she took the word `thing' to mean `gun.' Id. In response to Adams's questioning of her, Juror No. 17 further explained she had not reported the conversation earlier because she was scared. Id. at 6. Later the same day (the previous Thursday), Adams testified, Juror No. 3 called Adams from his cell phone and reported he had seen a doctor and had a secondary appointment for that afternoon in the same hospital in the mental hygiene unit. Id. at 6. At the judge's request, Adams then drove to the hospital and brought Juror No. 3 back to the courthouse for questioning. At this point the judge interrupted Adams's testimony to state on the record that upon his return to the courthouse on Thursday, Juror No. 3 admitted he had not experienced chest pains and arm tingling, as he had informed Adams, but had personal problems, which were, to a certain extent, being exacerbated by pressure from his supervisor to work when he was not on jury service. Id. at 7. Juror No. 3 assured the court, however, he was prepared to return to deliberate on Monday. 52 Adams resumed his testimony and stated that earlier that Tuesday afternoon he received a phone call from a member of his staff advising that Juror No. 3 wished to see the courthouse nurse. The nurse checked the juror's vital signs and reported they were normal. Later that afternoon, Adams was again approached by Juror No. 17, accompanied this time by Juror No. 1, the foreman. The two jurors relayed some concern about Juror No. 3's health and overall well-being and informed Adams that everyone on the jury had the same concern. Id. at 9. When they asked Adams to relay their concerns to the judge, he told them they should write a note and he would deliver it to the judge. They expressed reluctance because they were receiving pressure from Juror Number 3 not to do so, explaining that he was making comments referencing homicide, and suicide and certain violent tendencies. Id. Adams repeated that they should communicate to the judge through a written note, which they did shortly before the judge summoned counsel. The judge informed counsel that the note stated in essence: We wish to speak to you directly on a matter of considerable importance, and we wish to do so right away. Id. at 10. It was signed by Juror No. 1 and Juror No. 17. After informing counsel of the note, the judge brought Juror No. 1 and Juror No. 17 into the courtroom. 53 The judge asked Juror No. 1 to act as spokesperson. 7/24/02pm Tr. 10. Juror No. 1 expressed concern that because of external factors, his job and other concerns that are mounting on him to the point that he is visibly despondent and is concerned for his safety, Juror No. 3 was just not contributing to the deliberations and was not fully there as far as being involved with the deliberations. Id. at 11-12. Juror No. 17 stated in turn that Juror No. 3 admitted he was having problems staying focused because of problems with his job. Id. at 12. Both jurors responded affirmatively when the judge asked: If [Juror No. 3] were to be excused from further deliberations, do you think that you would be able to progress more rapidly with respect to reaching a verdict? Id. at 12. 54 The following morning, Wednesday July 25, 2001, defense counsel requested that the court bring Juror Number 3 out individually and have the court conduct somewhat of an open-ended voir dire of the juror to determine whether the testimony regarding his conduct was accurate. 7/25/01am Tr. 4-5. They also informed the court that on the state of this record they were opposing the striking of this juror. Id. at 5. The government suggested recalling Adams to put on the record various disclosures Juror No. 3 had made to him (as recounted by Adams in a conversation with government counsel the preceding evening)—specifically that Juror No. 3 had had a drinking problem, had taken trazodone hydrochloride, a medication administered for depression, had recently been in possession of a gun and lived in a neighborhood with a crime problem—which admissions, the government argued, were directly at odds with what he revealed in his jury questionnaire. Id. at 6. 55 Adams returned to the witness stand and confirmed that Juror No. 3 had made the disclosures the government identified. He also expanded on his conversation the day before with Juror No. 1 and Juror No. 17, testifying they told him Juror No. 3 had warned them they had better not write a note to the judge and had better not turn him in. Id. at 10. Juror No. 17, who was animated and agitated, told Adams she took the warning as a threat and was scared to write a note. Id. at 11. Adams further testified that, during his conversation with the two jurors, Juror No. 3 kept running back and forth between the jury room and where Adams was speaking with the other two jurors, urging them to continue deliberating. Id. One of the other two jurors—Adams was not sure which—told Juror No. 3 he need[ed] to take care of this matter and Juror No. 3 started talking about his supervisor at work, repeating she is just messing, she is just messing with me. Id. at 11-12. Then, getting real agitated, he said I just want to hit something and made a motion in the air with his arm as if to do just that. Id. at 12. 56 After questioning Adams, defense counsel sought to question Juror No. 1 and Juror No. 17 to determine whether the latter had expressed fear of Juror No. 3, whether Juror No. 3 was in fact having difficulty participating in deliberations and, if so, whether the difficulty was the result of a personality conflict or of differing views of the case. When the judge declined, defense counsel asked that the judge question Juror No. 3 on whether he felt he could meaningfully participate in the deliberations. The judge denied this request as well, explaining that he had already asked that of him in chambers when he was brought . . . from the hospital and notwithstanding his own belief to the effect that he can participate, that, in fact, he cannot. Id. at 41. 57 When Juror No. 3 was brought to the courtroom, the judge questioned him briefly about the subjects earlier noted by the government. Juror No. 3 acknowledged that (1) as of last Thursday he was a patient at the mental hygiene unit at the V.A. Hospital and that he was taking trazodone prescribed for him there; (2) in years past he had had a drinking problem, (3) he had recently kept a firearm for his brother, who was homeless, and (4) he lived in a generally bad neighborhood. Id. at 47-49. Juror No. 3 then left the courtroom. After brief argument by defense counsel opposing dismissal, the judge announced: I am going to exercise discretion under Rule 23(b), and I'm going to excuse Juror Number 3 from further participation. Id. at 50. The judge then brought Juror No. 3 into the courtroom and informed him he was dismissed. The remaining jurors were summoned and told that Juror No. 3 had been excused for primarily concerns . . . with respect to his health. Id. at 54. The judge then expressed the hope that the remaining 11 jurors would, with a fair degree of alacrity, be able to reach a verdict. Id. at 54. The eleven remaining jurors resumed deliberating and returned verdicts against all of the defendants (but not on all of the counts) over a ten-day period from July 26 to August 15, 2001. 58 Each defendant filed a motion for mistrial based on the dismissal of Juror No. 3. The court denied the motions in an order filed August 16, 2001. The order states in part: 59 Notwithstanding his expressed willingness to continue his service as juror, in light of his deceptive answers to voir dire questions the Court was unwilling to credit Juror No. 3's assurances that he was able to do so, and in conjunction with the testimony of the jury foreman and the female juror in whom Juror No. 3 had confided, the Court concluded that just cause existed to dismiss Juror No. 3. 60 United States v. Hill, Crim. Action No. 98-329, at 4 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 16, 2001) (8/16/01 Mem. & Order). In the order the court specifically found that Juror No. 3 had given incorrect answers on his voir dire questionnaire when he answered in the negative questions about personal or familial alcohol abuse, mental health medications, firearm possession and neighborhood crime problems because the juror had in the past, abused alcohol, had recently been in possession of a firearm, lived in a crime-ridden neighborhood and was currently taking the anti-depressant medication for a mental condition that he shares with his brothers. Id. at 4, 3 & n. 4; see also Joint Appendix 967-71 (Juror No. 3 questionnaire responses). The appellants offer six grounds for reversing the district court's decisions to dismiss Juror No. 3 and proceed with an 11-member jury under Rule 23. We address and reject each ground seriatim. 61 First, the appellants argue that the court failed to make an adequate inquiry into Juror No. 3's fitness to continue deliberating, noting specifically that, because the judge questioned Juror No. 3 in camera, there is no record evidence to support a finding of just cause to dismiss him. In pressing this challenge, the appellants rely on two decisions which we find distinguishable. 62 In United States v. Patterson, 26 F.3d 1127 (D.C.Cir.1994), this court held that the district judge erred in dismissing a 68-year-old juror who had gone to the doctor after complaining of chest pains and had been absent for 2½ hours. There we concluded that the record revealed no just cause for the dismissal because the district judge made no attempt to learn the precise circumstances or likely duration of the twelfth juror's absence. Patterson, 26 F.3d at 1129. In United States v. Ginyard, 444 F.3d 648 (D.C.Cir.2006), 13 we found a similar lapse in the district court's juror investigation. The judge there dismissed the juror on the ground that his continued service the following week might jeopardize an employment opportunity available to him through a rehabilitation program. We concluded that the district court's reasons for dismissing [the juror] rested on unexamined uncertainties about the extent of the juror's continuing availability because it was unclear whether [the juror] could be available the following week at all, for only a couple of days, or for a longer period of time. Ginyard, 444 F.3d at 654. Under the circumstances the district court was obliged to make some further effort to resolve the uncertainty about the risk of loss of the holdout juror's job in order to find `good cause' necessitated the juror's dismissal. Id. at 655. In contrast to these two cases, the district court here conducted an extensive examination of Juror No. 3's fitness. He questioned Deputy Marshal Adams, Juror No. 1, Juror No. 17 and Juror No. 3. Although Juror No. 3's initial examination occurred off the record, the judge recited its content on the record at the hearing the following Tuesday. In the end, there were simply no factual uncertainties requiring additional inquiry. 14 63 Second, the appellants claim that there is no basis for the court's finding that Juror No. 3 was, in effect, mentally incapable of continuing to participate in the deliberative process, contending that such a finding requires more detailed evidence of a juror's mental condition than exists in this record. Br. of Appellants 35. The district court, however, did not dismiss Juror No. 3 based on mental incapacity. The court relied on a combination of factors—including that Juror No. 3 had lied about his symptoms before visiting the hospital, provided inaccurate voir dire responses about mental health treatment and was, according to Juror No. 1 and Juror No. 17, distracted and unfocused (and even threatening) during deliberations. These findings are amply supported by the evidence. See 8/16/01 Mem. & Order. 64 Third, the appellants claim that the trial judge improperly dismissed Juror No. 3 because he was impeding conviction. We reject this contention as well. It is true that the trial court may not dismiss a juror during deliberations if the request for discharge stems from doubts the juror harbors about the sufficiency of the government's evidence. United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591, 596 (D.C.Cir.1987). As a consequence, if the record evidence discloses any possibility that the request to discharge stems from the juror's view of the sufficiency of the government's evidence, the court must deny the request. Id. (citing United States v. Essex, 734 F.2d 832, 843 (D.C.Cir.1984); United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 832 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1162, 106 S.Ct. 2285, 90 L.Ed.2d 726 (1986)). The evidence in this case supports no such inference notwithstanding the appellants' contention that there is a probability—a reasonable likelihood—that Juror 3's dismissal for allegedly deceptive answers on his jury questionnaire was a pretext to obtain a quicker verdict. Br. of Appellants 44. The judge plainly stated his reasons for the dismissal and they had nothing to do with the juror's view of the case. The judge did not believe Juror No. 3 could continue his service as juror in light of his deceptive answers to voir dire questions and the testimony, described above, of Adams and the two jurors who were empaneled with him. 8/16/01 Mem. & Order at 4. There is no evidence the judge was motivated by Juror No. 3's view of the sufficiency of the government's evidence. Brown, 823 F.2d at 596. The judge was scrupulous to counsel Jurors No. 1 and 17 not to reveal how [they] may be split any way on the verdict or anything about [their] deliberations on the merits of the case or who may have voted what way, 7/24/01pm Tr. 10-11, and they did not. Nor is there any suggestion in the record that the judge had the least inkling of Juror No. 3's views regarding innocence or guilt. What the record shows is that Juror No. 3 was viewed by his fellow jurors as an obstacle to deliberations because he was having problems staying focused. Id. at 12. In Brown, by contrast, we found that the record indicate[d] a substantial possibility that [the dismissed juror] requested to be discharged because he believed that the evidence offered at trial was inadequate to support a conviction, based on his statements that his difficulty was with `the way [the law is] written and the way the evidence has been presented' and that `[i]f the evidence was presented in a fashion in which the law is written, then, maybe, [he] would be able to discharge [his] duties.' 823 F.2d at 596-97 (emphasis by Brown court; alterations to last clause added). 65 Fourth, the appellants object to the court's finding that Juror No. 3's voir dire responses on the questionnaire were deceptive. 8/16/01 Mem. & Order at 4. They argue first that the United States Supreme Court's decision in McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984), requires that there be a showing that the juror failed to answer honestly a material question arising during voir dire and that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. Br. of Appellants 46. The appellants' reliance on McDonough Power Equipment is misplaced. In that case the Supreme Court reversed a Tenth Circuit decision that ordered a new trial in a personal injury case because a juror gave a mistaken, though honest response to a question regarding injuries suffered by family members. 15 464 U.S. at 555, 104 S.Ct. 845. The Court concluded that to obtain a new trial based on a juror's voir dire misstatement, a party must show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. Id. at 556, 104 S.Ct. 845. Here the judge did not rely on the voir dire misstatements as a basis for dismissal but only to explain, in part, why he did not credit Juror No. 3's assurance that he could continue to deliberate notwithstanding evidence to the contrary. 66 The appellants also assert the trial court's deceptive finding is unsupported but the record belies this claim. Adams's testimony regarding his conversation with Juror No. 3 supports the judge's findings that, contrary to his voir dire responses, Juror No. 3 abused alcohol, handled a gun, lived in a dangerous neighborhood and had received mental health treatment. According to Adams, Juror No. 3 disclosed to Adams that he (1) used to drink real bad, really hit that bottle and had a problem before he quit drinking 13 years earlier, 7/25/01am Tr. 15; (2) was on trazodone, which is used to treat depression, id. at 19-20; (3) used to have a `thing,' meaning a .44 magnum revolver, id. at 16; and (4) had the revolver because he lived in a real bad neighborhood, and he had been robbed at gunpoint, id. Further, the testimony of Juror No. 3 himself confirmed each of these facts. See id. at 47-49. 16 67 Fifth, the appellants argue summarily that, even if there was good cause to dismiss Juror No. 3, the court should have declared a mistrial rather than proceed with jury deliberations. We find no error in the judge's decision to continue. As we stated in United States v. Harrington, 108 F.3d 1460 (D.C.Cir.1997): Rule 23(b) explicitly and without reservation assigns the stop/go decision to the discretion of the trial court. . . . 108 F.3d at 1472. Having already concluded the judge acted within his discretion in dismissing Juror No. 3 for cause, we perceive no abuse of discretion in his decision to continue with an 11-member jury, especially given the trial's length and complexity. See id. (noting Advisory Committee notes to Rule 23 suggest if trial is a relatively short and simple one . . . , a trial court `might well' decide that a mistrial is appropriate, while for longer and more complex trials courts would be `more likely' to decide against a mistrial (quoting Fed.R.Crim.P. 23 Advisory Comm. note to 1983 amendments)). 68 Finally, the appellants assert that the judge's and Adams's ex parte contacts with the jurors violated the appellants' rights under the United States Constitution's Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43. We reject this argument as well. We are inclined to agree with the government that these claims are governed by plain error review because, although defense counsel sought to examine the jurors further, they made no objection specifically based on the ex parte nature of the communications between the jurors and Adams and the judge. See United States v. Yarborough, 400 F.3d 17, 20 (D.C.Cir.2005) (because defense counsel did not object to judge's ex parte conversation with the deliberating jurors, [p]lain error is . . . the standard of review (citing United States v. Lancaster, 968 F.2d 1250, 1254 (D.C.Cir.1992))). Nonetheless, even if defense counsel can be said to have properly objected, we find no reversible error. `[T]he mere occurrence of an ex parte conversation between a trial judge and a juror does not constitute a deprivation of any constitutional right. The defense has no constitutional right to be present at every interaction between a judge and a juror, nor is there a constitutional right to have a court reporter transcribe every such communication.' United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (quoting Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 125-26, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)) (alteration in original). Counsel's presence is necessary only if required to ensure fundamental fairness or a `reasonably substantial . . . opportunity to defend against the charge.' Id. at 527, 105 S.Ct. 1482 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934)). Because the ex parte conversations were unrelated to the merits of the case and their substance was reported in open court in the presence of the defendants and their counsel, they did not constitute error. In addition, even if the ex parte conversations with the judge were error, they were harmless and do not warrant reversal. See United States v. Gordon, 829 F.2d 119, 127 & n. 9 (D.C.Cir. 1987) (violation of statutory and constitutional rights to be present during jury contact subject to the harmless error analysis. (citations omitted)); cf. United States v. McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1525 (D.C.Cir.1991) ( ex parte communication between judge and juror not plain error where defense counsel made no objection and hearing was held at which trial court made full disclosure). This is particularly so as to Juror No. 3's conversations as his subsequent dismissal from the jury ensures that his ex parte contacts with the court did not taint the verdicts. Cf. United States v. Doherty, 867 F.2d 47, 72 (1st Cir.1989) (judge's ex parte conversation with subsequently dismissed juror could not have influenced the excused juror's further deliberations, for there were none; nor could it have influenced the remaining eleven jurors, because the excused juror had no further contact with them); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 745-46 (9th Cir.1977) (finding no prejudice from judge's ex parte interview with juror subsequently dismissed and replaced by alternate).