Opinion ID: 202030
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Breaking and Entering in the Daytime (Paragraph 34)

Text: 13 Mastera next raises a challenge to the validity of Paragraph 34 as an ACCA predicate conviction. He admits that he was convicted and sentenced in 1998 on one count of breaking and entering in the daytime with intent to commit a misdemeanor. He argues, however, that under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), there was insufficient evidence to allow the district court to conclude that this breaking and entering qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA. 6 14
15 The ACCA includes burglary in its enumeration of qualifying violent felonies. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). However, the crime of burglary does not have the same elements in every jurisdiction. To clear up potential confusion and ensure consistent application of the ACCA across state lines, the Supreme Court has read the ACCA's definition of burglary to refer to what we called `generic burglary,' an `unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.' Shepard, 125 S.Ct. at 1257 (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990)). This generic definition, which is limited to burglary of a building, is narrower than the crime as defined by some states, which define burglary more broadly, as by extending it to entries into boats and cars. Shepard, 125 S.Ct. at 1257. Massachusetts is one of the handful of states with a broader definition of burglary. 7 16 Because of this inconsistency, in non-generic states like Massachusetts, a sentencing judge cannot necessarily tell, simply from the fact that a defendant has been convicted of burglary, whether that conviction was for breaking and entering into a building (in which case it would qualify as an ACCA predicate) or whether the conviction was for breaking and entering into a ship or motor vehicle (in which case it would not qualify as an ACCA predicate). Thus, before counting a Massachusetts burglary conviction as an ACCA predicate, a sentencing court must somehow determine that the burglary did, in fact, involve a building. This is because any sentence under the ACCA [must] rest on a showing that a prior conviction `necessarily' involved (and a prior plea necessarily admitted) facts equating to generic burglary. Id. at 1262 (plurality opinion) (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601, 110 S.Ct. 2143). 17 Moreover, in Taylor and then in Shepard, the Supreme Court restricted the types of evidence a sentencing court may consider when deciding whether a state burglary conviction was for an act of generic burglary. In the context of a burglary conviction resulting from a guilty plea, a later court determining the character of an admitted burglary is generally limited to examining the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented. Shepard, 125 S.Ct. at 1257. A comparable judicial record is also acceptable. Id. at 1263. Documents such as complaint applications or police reports, in contrast, may not be considered by the sentencing court. Id. at 1257. 18
19 On appeal, Mastera argues that the district court lacked sufficient evidence of the type permitted by Shepard to allow the conclusion that the Paragraph 34 conviction was for a generic burglary. He acknowledges, however, that he forfeited this objection by failing to raise it before the sentencing court. Thus, we review only for plain error. See United States v. Eirby, 262 F.3d 31, 36 (1st Cir.2001). To prevail under this standard, Mastera must make a four-part showing: (1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected [his] substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Luciano, 414 F.3d 174, 177 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir.2001)). 20 Mastera's argument fails on plain error review, at least under the second prong of the test, which requires that the error be clear or obvious at the time of appellate consideration. United States v. Bradstreet, 135 F.3d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467-68, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)). Mastera's counsel, in a sentencing memorandum to the district court, more or less conceded that the conviction in Paragraph 34 was for breaking into a home (not a boat or a vehicle), stating that the breaking and entering that occurred September 7, 1997 [the Paragraph 34 offense] appears to be a breaking and entering into his own home. It may be debatable whether the defendant's admission, which was not made during the plea colloquy for the original conviction, falls within the evidence permitted by Taylor and Shepard. But it was not a clear or obvious transgression of the Shepard rule for the sentencing court to consider the admission (which was sufficient to justify a conclusion by the court that the conviction was for generic burglary). Given this uncertainty, we cannot say that the district court's finding of an ACCA predicate in the Paragraph 34 conviction was plainly erroneous. Cf. United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 32 (1st Cir.2002) (unsettled state of the law precludes finding of plain error). 21 Because Mastera has not shown that any clear or obvious error occurred, we need not address the third and fourth prongs of the plain error test. The convictions in Paragraphs 34 and 35, together with the assault conviction that Mastera has conceded is a valid ACCA predicate, create the three convictions necessary to sustain adjudication as an Armed Career Criminal. 22