Opinion ID: 2335853
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: arguments and discussion

Text: ¶ 11 Lumber 2 claims that COCA ignored common sense definitions of consumer, including buyer and purchaser, which plainly would be applicable to it. As noted in the language used in the title of the OCPA above, [3] we acknowledge the Legislature has indicated an intent to protect buyers. However, the protection in the OCPA does not extend to buyers in every capacity. It protects buyers who are also consumers. ¶ 12 Lumber 2 also argues that it is the unique language of the OCPA that distinguishes it from the language of other acts showing that Lumber 2 should be included. It refers to the term consumer transaction. When the Act was enacted in 1972, consumer transaction related entirely to personal, household and family purposes. [4] In 1980, business oriented purpose was added to the definition of consumer transaction, and family purpose was deleted. [5] We assume the Legislature intended to provide the same level of protection to corporations and other legal entities purchasing goods for business use which was already enjoyed by individuals purchasing goods for personal or household use. Nevertheless, the Legislature did not choose to define consumer in 1980, nor since then. We further recognize that neither resale nor resell is found in the OCPA's definition of consumer transaction. ¶ 13 Lumber 2 also contends it is a person involved in a consumer transaction for the business oriented purpose of stocking its retail store. [6] Lumber 2 thus appears to argue that because businesses are persons and consumer transactions include purposes which are business oriented under the OCPA, it qualifies as a consumer. However, Lumber 2's interpretation overlooks important considerations, i.e., the Legislature chose not to define consumer or business oriented purposes. Moreover, the definition of person has included corporations and other legal entities since its enactment in 1972, despite the fact that consumer transaction was limited to purposes that were primarily personal, family or household. In our review of the OCPA, we have discovered the Legislature has used the term person in multiple sections of the OCPA in a variety of capacities relating to consumer transactions. These capacities include a person who is the victim of a deceptive trade practice, [7] retailers violating the OCPA in good faith, [8] and a person who engages in practices declared to be unlawful under the OCPA. [9] When the OCPA first became law in 1972, the term person [10] was used to indicate a natural person and specific categories of legal entities applicable to the OCPA, as follows: A. Person means a natural person, corporation, trust, partnership, incorporated or unincorporated association, and any other legal entity. ¶ 14 The current statute, 15 O.S. Supp.2003 § 752(1), is identical except for the 1983 amendment changing and to or followed by any other legal entity;. ¶ 15 COCA correctly considered the plain and ordinary meaning of the term consumer which we are required to do with an undefined statutory term. See Naylor v. Petuskey, supra. In considering the plain and ordinary meaning of consume or consumer, [11] we also note the following which focus on using the goods which are purchased: Consumer. One who uses economic goods and so diminishes or destroys their utilities; opposed to producer. Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition (1968). consumer. A person who buys goods or services for personal, family, or household use, with no intention of resale; a natural person who uses products for personal rather than business purposes. Black's Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition (2009). consumer1. One that consumes. 2. Economics. One who acquires goods or services; a buyer. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, New College Edition (1980). consume1. To eat or drink up; ingest. 2. To expend (fuel, for example); use up. 3. To waste; squander. 4. To destroy, to level. 5. To absorb, engross. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, New College Edition (1980). ¶ 16 Lumber 2 also contends the OCPA does not exempt businesses from recovering under the Act and that COCA improperly created an exception to recovery which does not exist. It contends that COCA violated the rule of statutory construction requiring courts to consider only the statutory language used and not read into it exceptions not made, citing Ledbetter v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Comm'n, 1988 OK 117, 764 P.2d 172, 179. However, COCA did not hold that Lumber 2 could not recover under the OCPA because it was a business. Its holding was based entirely on the fact Lumber 2 did not purchase the product to use in its business. ¶ 17 ITW argues that the issue is not whether Lumber 2 is a person or whether a corporation could sometimes be a consumer. ITW agrees with COCA that the ordinary and plain meaning of consumer is one who consumes. Therefore, it contends Lumber 2, a retailer buying welder/generators for resale to its customers, is a supplier, not a consumer, under the OCPA because it did not consume or use the product. Thus, it argues Lumber 2 is unable to bring a private action against it under the OCPA. ¶ 18 In its petition for certiorari, Lumber 2 cited cases from other jurisdictions which held that businesses were consumers. However, we find the reasoning in those cases, Big H Auto Auction, Inc. v. Saenz Motors, 665 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.1984), (reh. denied) (retailers who purchased goods for resale were consumers under the Texas Act); and Dreier Co., Inc. v. Unitronix Corp., 527 A.2d 875, 882, 218 N.J.Super. 260, 273 (1986) (a merchant who bought a computer for its business use was a consumer under the New Jersey Act) give more support to ITW's arguments and to COCA's holding in this case than to Lumber 2's position. [12] ¶ 19 COCA relied on Guyana Telephone & Telegraph Co., Ltd. v. Melbourne International Communications, Ltd., 329 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir.2003), in deciding Lumber 2 is not a consumer for purposes of the OCPA. The Eleventh Circuit court construed the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (Florida Act). Consumer was defined in the Florida Act which included corporations. The Act had been amended to include an intent to protect the consuming public at large and legitimate business enterprises from unfair practices. The plaintiff argued it was a corporation and that the Act was intended to protect legitimate business enterprises and should protect it, despite the fact it was a supplier. The appellate court noted that the Act at that time still required actions to be brought by consumers [13] and cited cases from Florida state courts which considered the capacity of the buyer involved in the purchase to determine whether a plaintiff was a consumer. Because the plaintiff was a supplier, rather than a consumer, it could not pursue a claim under the Florida act. Accord, Warren Technology, Inc., supra, note 6; and N.G.L. Travel Associates v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 764 So.2d 672 (Fla.3d Dist.Ct.App.2000). ¶ 20 In Oklahoma, as well, aggrieved consumers have claims against violators of the OCPA for monetary damages. See 15 O.S. Supp.1999 § 761.1(A). Similar to the Florida Act, the OCPA gives a consumer the right to bring a claim for violation of its rights under the Act. Thus, under the plain and ordinary meaning of consumer, i.e., one who consumes or uses economic goods, Lumber 2 has no claim under the OCPA. The fact Lumber 2, a person, purchased the welders for a business oriented purpose does not make the transaction a consumer transaction for purposes of the OCPA. In this case, Lumber 2 purchased the welder/generators for the business oriented purpose of selling them to their retail customers. Lumber 2 is not a consumer in this case. ¶ 21 Our holding does not mean that Lumber 2, as a corporate entity, could never be a consumer under different facts. However, the purchase would have to involve goods which Lumber 2 bought to use in its own business, not to resell to its customers. In describing the importance to Lumber 2's business of obtaining the recons, J.P. Fox testified: That isthat's what makes this thing a niche item for us, is that it is reconditioned, you know, it has all these features that I've just explained. But what makes it so awesome for me was that it was reconditioned. It gave us something that our competitors didn't have, gave us something to go out there and present to our customers that would have given us a good promotion. [14] [emphasis added]. ¶ 22 Lumber 2's intent under the current facts was to buy the new and reconditioned Champ 10,000's to sell to their farm and ranch customers, despite its contention on certiorari that it purchased the product to stock or supply their retail store. Lumber 2 clearly described its intent not only to stock their stores, but also to resell the product to its customers, the intended ultimate consumers. Just as we would not imply legislative intent to provide a private right of action for OCPA violations before 15 O.S. § 761.1 was amended to allow for such action, see Holdbert v. Echeveria, 1987 OK 99, 744 P.2d 960, Walls v. American Tobacco Company, 2000 OK 66, 11 P.3d 626, we will not imply legislative intent to allow a plaintiff who purchases goods for resale to its customers to seek relief as a consumer under the OCPA. Such direction must come from the Legislature.