Opinion ID: 505490
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: too soon

Text: 12 The Commission treated Public Citizen's April 15, 1986 letter as a petition for a rulemaking, published it in the Federal Register, solicited and received public comments, and denied it on January 14, 1987. The denial was presumably reviewable. See American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir.1987). In the course of review of that denial this court might well entertain challenges to the legality of the Policy Statement. See National Labor Relations Board Union v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 834 F.2d 191 (D.C.Cir.1987) (discussing extent to which a party may secure review of an agency decision, well after expiration of time limits on appeals, by petitioning for review and challenging the denial of the petition); but see Eagle-Picher Industries v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 911 (D.C.Cir.1985) (stressing extraordinary importance of enforcing congressional time limits on challenges to agency action; [w]e have entertained untimely claims only in a limited number of exceptional circumstances). 13 Regardless of the extent to which petitioners might through this device secure the substantive review they seek, we are persuaded by NRC's argument that we are without jurisdiction to review petitioners' claim. Their suit was filed on November 24, 1986, 51 days before NRC's denial of the request for a rulemaking. 14 Petitioners say we should not be troubled by their gun-jumping, as the final decision was issued after the filing of the suit and is presently ripe for review. As then-Judge Scalia framed the issue in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. FCC, 773 F.2d 375, 377 (D.C.Cir.1985), this essentially requires us to determine whether the statutory time limits of the two statutes potentially supporting jurisdiction create mere deadlines, allowing suit anytime before close of the stated period, or windows, requiring that suit be filed no sooner than the trigger date and no later than the closing date. Actually, as Western Union itself held that the Hobbs Act created a window, id., the question is open only as to the Waste Act. See also Selco Supply Co. v. EPA, 632 F.2d 863, 865 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030, 101 S.Ct. 1740, 68 L.Ed.2d 225 (1981) (holding that statutory language similar to that of the Hobbs Act created a window). 15 Petitioners note that while the Hobbs Act allows suits within 60 days after ... entry of the challenged order, the Waste Act says that suits are to be brought not later than the 180th day after the date of the [challenged] decision. They point out that a suit filed before the order is literally not later than a period ending after the order. But in ordinary parlance, the same is true for the Hobbs Act's within: a suit filed before an order is literally filed within 60 days after the order. Note that the Hobbs Act does not say within the period framed by the order and 60 days thereafter, or any other language explicitly creating a window. Thus petitioners' argument requires us to attach controlling significance to what seems a minor linguistic variation. 16 It is true, and petitioners naturally stress the point, that in dictum Judge Scalia distinguished between the two phrases. He noted that if the Hobbs Act's within language were intended to create only a deadline, it was inapt for such a purpose. If the intent were to establish a filing deadline rather than a filing window, it would more naturally have been phrased 'no later than 60 days after ... entry.'  Western Union, 773 F.2d at 377. This offhand remark hardly offers much support for petitioners' position that the Waste Act permits premature claims. 17 Moreover, the only provision of the Waste Act allowing a suit such as one challenging the Commission's January 14, 1987 decision clearly points against allowance of suits before the decision challenged. It allows actions for review of any final decision of the Commission, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 10139(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added), not of a suspected or future decision or action. 18 It may seem odd to dismiss a suit because the claimant anticipated a statutory trigger date, where time has seemingly cured the defect. In Western Union Judge Scalia noted the point, but observed that dismissal in these circumstances was 19 no more anomalous than the situation which arises when petitions that are premature for other reasons are dismissed despite the fact that the prematurity of the court's reaching the issue (but not the prematurity of the filing ) has been eliminated. For example, a challenge to now-final agency action that was filed before it became final must be dismissed. See, e.g., Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965, 968-69 (D.C.Cir.1977) (per curiam); Selco Supply Co. [v. EPA ], 632 F.2d at 865 [ (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030, 101 S.Ct. 1740, 68 L.Ed.2d 225 (1981) ]. 20 773 F.2d at 378 (emphasis in original). 21 Many dismissals for prematurity have occurred in the context of the race to the courthouse created by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2112(a) (1982), amended by Act of Jan. 8, 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-236, 101 Stat. 1,732. This statute provides for consolidation of suits challenging the same agency order in the court where a proceeding with respect to such order was first instituted. Courts judging the winners of such races have dismissed challenges to final agency orders that were filed before the orders became final. See, e.g., Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 738 F.2d 1388 (D.C.Cir.1984); Public Service Co. v. FERC, 716 F.2d 778 (10th Cir.1983), City of Gallup v. FERC, 716 F.2d 1116 (D.C.Cir.1983), modified on other grounds, 726 F.2d 772 (D.C.Cir.1984); Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. EPA, 610 F.2d 187 (4th Cir.1979). 22 This case is in fact a much stronger one for dismissal on prematurity grounds than Western Union. There the FCC had actually released an order to the public before the petition was filed; the filing was premature only because the Commission had not yet entered the order within the meaning of the applicable statute and regulations (i.e., by publishing it in the Federal Register). Here the petition clearly was filed before the action was final and ripe for review. Moreover, petitioners filed a full 51 days before the NRC's action was taken, whereas petitioners in Western Union filed only seven days too early. In fact, it is plain that the suit filed November 24, 1986 was not a challenge to denial of the rulemaking petition. Whatever injustice rigorous application of the rule may cause in the case of an ambiguous trigger date provision (such as Western Union 's), it causes none where the suit did not attack the action complained of, and the petitioners' characterization of it as such is just an ex post facto salvage job. If [petitioners'] notice of appeal was not premature, no notice of appeal is premature. United States v. Hansen, 795 F.2d 35, 38 (7th Cir.1986) (Posner, J.). This is not a case where the early bird deserves the worm. 23