Opinion ID: 737402
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fragmented Bargaining Unit

Text: 15 First, HeartShare argues that the NLRB improperly certified the Union because the Aiello Center constitutes an inappropriate bargaining unit. We disagree. 16 The NLRB has substantial discretion when it selects an appropriate bargaining unit. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 610, 111 S.Ct. 1539, 1542, 113 L.Ed.2d 675 (1991); Staten Island Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 450, 455 (2d Cir.1994). Its mandate is to select only an appropriate unit, not the most appropriate unit (citation omitted), and the NLRB's decision will stand unless arbitrary and unreasonable. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 24 F.3d at 455 (citing Continental Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 727, 728 (2d Cir.1969)). 17 When selecting an appropriate bargaining unit, the NLRB employs the so-called single-facility presumption, that employees in a separate facility of a multi-facility operation should be presumptively treated as a separate bargaining unit. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 24 F.3d at 456; see also NLRB v. Catherine McAuley Health Ctr., 885 F.2d 341, 345 (6th Cir.1989). Although we once had held that the single-facility presumption [was] inapplicable in the health care context, Long Island Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 685 F.2d 29, 34 (2d Cir.1982), we have since abandoned that view. Our current position is that the NLRB has good reasons to use the single-facility presumption [in the health care field]. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 24 F.3d at 457. 18 The party challenging the composition of a single-facility bargaining unit can rebut the presumption by showing that the single-facility unit is inappropriate. This is demonstrated by employing the traditional test used to determine whether a group of employees has a sufficient community of interests to justify defining it as a bargaining unit. 19 The degree of shared interest is measured by eight factors: geographic proximity, similarity of skills and functions, similarity of employment conditions, centralization of administration, managerial and supervisory control, employee interchange, functional integration of the employer, and bargaining history. 20 Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 24 F.3d at 454; see also Catherine McAuley Health Ctr., 885 F.2d at 345; NLRB v. Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d 468, 473 (2d Cir.1985). 21 HeartShare has failed to rebut the single-facility presumption. In HeartShare's case, the geographic proximity factor neither compels nor precludes the NLRB's decision because HeartShare's three sites are separate, but only by five to ten miles. See Staten Island Univ. Hospital, 24 F.3d at 455. 22 The skills and functions factor likewise offers little guidance. See id. The NLRB acknowledges that all three sites offer the same services to developmentally disabled adults, and therefore, employees at the three centers use the same skills and serve the same function. 23 The similarities in employment conditions and administrative centralization factors present conflicting considerations. Id. All three sites have identical policies on fringe benefits, initial wage rates, and personnel practices. Additionally, there is some administrative centralization of the three HeartShare day treatment centers. HeartShare employs a Director of Programs, who operates out of the central office and oversees the entire Day Treatment Program. 24 Despite a degree of centralized administration, the three sites remain independently supervised. The Director of Programs employs three coordinators who are responsible for the day to day operations of each site. Under the coordinator, each facility employs other managers including an assistant coordinator, an administrative assistant and various unit coordinators, all of whom have authority to hire, fire, discipline, and evaluate employees at their particular location. 25 The employee interchange factor supports the NLRB's decision. Each facility has its own staff and there is no routine interchange of employees among the three sites. Not surprisingly, if one facility becomes particularly busy, an employee from another center may lend a hand, but usually only for a day or two. This is the exception not the rule. Additionally, if there is a job opening at one facility, employees from another site may apply; however, they are required to follow the same procedures as non-HeartShare applicants. Selections are based on merit, and employees from related facilities are given no preference, unless all else is equal. 26 The functional integration of the employer factor also supports the NLRB's decision. The three facilities operate independently, and do not depend on each other for any services. Additionally, there is almost no patient transfer among the facilities, which supports a finding that the sites function independently. See Staten Island Univ. Hospital, 24 F.3d at 456. 27 Lastly, the bargaining history factor is irrelevant because prior to the current election there is no bargaining history to consider. 28 Additionally, not all eight factors need always be explicitly assessed, and a strong showing on just a few of the factors may suffice to sustain the Board's decision, which is entitled to considerable deference on such matters. In HeartShare's case, in light of the relevant factors, the NLRB's decision that HeartShare failed to rebut the presumption that the Aiello Center constituted a single bargaining unit was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. 29 HeartShare also maintains that the bargaining unit was inappropriate because certain employees who voted were ineligible under NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, 511 U.S. 571, 114 S.Ct. 1778, 128 L.Ed.2d 586 (1994). We decline HeartShare's invitation to reach this issue because the Board's prohibition against post-election challenges to voter eligibility is well established and nothing in the Supreme Court's decision in Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America requires otherwise. See NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 67 S.Ct. 324, 91 L.Ed. 322 (1946).