Opinion ID: 2585321
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Suspicion necessary for detention

Text: A police officer may stop and detain a suspect for questioning regarding possible criminal behavior. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). However, detention must be made only when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is engaged or is about to engage in criminal activity. Id. at 27. There must be some objective information to support a reasonable suspicion connecting the person to criminal activity. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). In United States v. Rembert, 838 F.Supp. 1336, 1338 (D.Minn.1993), a search was conducted in an apartment pursuant to a search warrant, when the defendant knocked on the door. A police officer answered the door and grabbed the defendant when he asked for Black, the name of the person selling crack cocaine out of the apartment. See id. The officer performed a pat down search and recovered a loaded gun and drugs. See id. The defendant subsequently moved to suppress the evidence, and the court held that the gun and drugs were fruits of an illegal search because the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to justify a detention of the defendant. See id. at 1341; see also United States v. Clay, 640 F.2d 157, 162 (8th Cir.1981) (holding that where the defendant walked up to a house where a search warrant was being executed, knocked on the door and was detained and frisked by the police that [t]he initial frisk of appellant was simply not supported by a reasonable belief that he was armed and presently dangerous, a belief which the Supreme Court has invariably held must form the predicate to a pat down search of a person for weapons). The practice and procedure of seizing and searching anyone who knocks on a door during the execution of a search warrant on a residence violates the Fourth Amendment. Any evidence recovered must be suppressed unless the police officers have a reasonable suspicion based on objective information that the person knocking on the door has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime. NRS 171.123(1). Here, the officers had nothing more than a hunch that appellant was engaged in any criminal activity or was armed and dangerous. Before appellant knocked on the door of the residence and refused to step in, there was no evidence linking him to any criminal act, let alone the reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity required by Terry. The State contends it is common knowledge that the controlled substance industry relies heavily upon firearms. Police officers who fight this menace should not have to second guess themselves regarding their own safety. See United States v. McMurray, 34 F.3d 1405, 1410 (8th Cir.1994). In McMurray, the appellate court held the police officers had a reasonable suspicion that McMurray was dealing drugs and was armed and dangerous prior to the detention and seizure. See id. The police were informed by a hotel employee of the actions of the occupants in a room whose behavior matched that of drug dealers. See id. at 1409. After a period of surveillance, the officers knocked on the door. See id. McMurray was captured, and a pat down search revealed drugs on his person. See id. at 1409-10. The court ruled the search was justified because the officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion that he was involved in criminal activity based on the hotel employee's tip and the surveillance. See id. at 1410. Unlike McMurray, the officers in this case did not have an informer's tip as to Proferes' behavior and performed no surveillance before detaining him. Instead, the officers testified that the procedure in such cases was to routinely ask anyone who came to the door to enter the house, handcuff them and conduct a pat down search. If they refused to enter voluntarily, reasonable force was applied to force entry. Under this policy, anyone, however innocent, who happened to knock on a door during the execution of a search warrant, would be subjected to seizure and search. The seizure of Proferes was based solely on his mere presence at a location where police were conducting a search warrant and as such, violated his right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-63, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968)).