Opinion ID: 2581903
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hironaka's fleeting possession instruction partially misconstrues the applicable law and is otherwise redundant.

Text: Citing State v. Hogue, 52 Haw. 660, 664, 486 P.2d 403, 405 (1971), Hironaka argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that `possession' means conscious and substantial possession, not a mere involuntary or superficial possession and much more than a passing control, fleeting and shadowy in nature. Hironaka misreads both the holding of Hogue and its continuing vitality following the enactment of HRS § 702-202. In Hogue, this court approved the Florida Supreme Court's definition of possession conscious and substantial possession ... as distinguished from a mere involuntary or superficial possessionexplicated in State v. Eckroth, 238 So.2d 75, 76 (Fla.1970), and held that taking one or two puffs of marijuana from a pipe demonstrated the requisite conscious and substantial possession, not a mere involuntary or superficial possession, and much more than a passing control, fleeting and shadowy in nature. 52 Haw. at 664-65, 486 P.2d at 406. But neither this court in Hogue nor the Florida Supreme Court in Eckroth expressly held that control, for the purposes of possession, turned on whether the prosecution had proved more than a passing control, fleeting and shadowy in nature. In fact, the Florida Supreme Court specifically disavowed this language in Eckroth, overruling the lower appellate court that had used it, and clearly held that [p]ossession and control ... need not be ... of great duration. [6] 238 So.2d at 77-78. Following this court's decision in Hogue, the Hawai`i Penal Code was recodified with significant substantive revisions and additions, including a definition of possession as a voluntary act: Possession is a voluntary act if the defendant knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or if the defendant was aware of the defendant's control of it for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate the defendant's possession. HRS § 702-202 (1993). This statutory definition supersedes this court's definition of possession found in Hogue. It both codifies the conscious element of Hogue (knowingly procured or received or aware of the defendant's control) and clarifies that substantial possession, not a mere involuntary or superficial possession means for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate possession. HRS § 702-202 does not, however, incorporate the fleeting element urged by Hironaka. The temporal element that the legislature did adopt is qualitative rather than quantitative; possession of an object is substantial and neither involuntary nor superficial if a defendant had time to terminate his or her control over the object but did not, either by choice or by failure to act. This is based on the idea that [a]n actor who is aware of his [or her] control of the thing possessed for a period that would enable him [or her] to terminate control has failed to act in the face of a legal duty imposed by the law that makes his [or her] possession criminal. State v. Moniz, 92 Hawai`i 472, 481, 992 P.2d 741, 750 (App.2000) (Acoba, J., concurring) (citing Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 2.01 cmt. 4 at 224 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985)). There is no reason why a defendant cannot possess an illegal substance for a brief period of time, so long as it was enough time to have permitted him or her to have terminated the possession. Therefore, Hironaka was not entitled to a jury instruction that defined possession as much more than a passing control, fleeting and shadowy in nature, because such an instruction has no basis in Hawai`i law. The rest of Hironaka's proposed jury instruction, in light of Hogue, would have been redundant and confusing, considering the instruction that the circuit court did give based on HRS § 702-202. This instruction was all that Hironaka was entitled to and required for his defense. Hironaka admitted that he twice picked up the glass pipe and placed it on the front passenger seat of the van, after which he ate and slept alone in the van. Hironaka's defense (aside from the brevity of his possession and lack of ownership/control) was that he did not know that the pipe contained methamphetamine. The circuit court's instruction on possession clearly explained that the prosecution had to prove that Hironaka knowingly possessed the methamphetamine for a sufficient period of time to have terminated possession. Thus, the circuit court's instruction on possession was not prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in refusing to give Hironaka's Proposed Jury Instruction No. 7.