Opinion ID: 3012210
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: New Trial Remand

Text: Raglin’s new evidence does not entitle her to a remand to the Commissioner for a new trial. Most of it does not refer to the relevant time period covered by the ALJ’s 1998 decision, and the evidence that does refer to that time period does not add any substantially new information. The new evidence consists of the following seven items: 1. The July 5, 2000 notice of award from the Social Security Administration on Raglin’s March 15, 2000, application. That notice stated, You were disabled on March 2000. 2. A Residual Functional Capacity Assessment, dated May 25, 2000, from Sanford Golin, Ph. D. That assessment is marked as a Current Evaluation. It concludes that Raglin has limited abilities to maintain concentration and keep a schedule, but can sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision and can work in coordination with others and make simple work-related decisions. 3. A Psychological Consultive Examination Report, dated May 19, 2000, from Charles M. Cohen, Ph.D. That report concluded that this woman has been depressed for the past nine years. Dr. Cohen also found that Raglin would be incapable of coming to work on time, of dealing effectively with authority figures or peers or concentrating well enough to perform even simple repetitive tasks. 4. Mercy Hospital of Pittsburgh medical records from 12/24/01 to 1/16/92 diagnosing major recurrent depression. 5. Records from Northern/Southwest Community, St. John’s Health & Hospital Ctr., dated March 11, 1991. This exhibit also contains psychiatric treatment progress notes starting in 1997, which apparently describe a history of major depression. 6. Documents, dated May 31, 2000, from Joseph P. Decker, Esquire (Raglin’s attorney), containing a daily activities report, work history report, and April 12, 2000, medical statement by Dr. Victor Adebimpe. 7. Evaluation Letter Report of Barbara R. Monroe, the Adult Program Director of the Association for Children and Adults with Learning Disabilities, Inc., dated May 31, 2000. It confirms that she has languagebased learning disabilities. The standard for a remand for new trial derives from 42 U.S.C. 405(g), which states in relevant part: The court may . . . at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding[.] 42 U.S.C. 405(g). In Szubak v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 745 F. 2d 831 (3d Cir. 1984), we elaborated on this standard. We stated that the evidence must first be ’new’ and not merely cumulative of what is already in the record. 745 F.2d at 833. It must also be material, meaning that it is relevant and probative and there is a reasonable possibility that the new evidence would have changed the outcome of the Secretary’s determination. Id. An implicit materiality requirement is that the new evidence relate to the time period for which benefits were denied, and that it not concern evidence of a later-acquired disability or of the subsequent deterioration of the previously non-disabling condition. Id. The new evidence in the Szubak case consisted of five new medical reports that cast considerable doubt on the accuracy of the earlier medical reports relied upon to deny benefits. The ALJ in that case had placed considerable weight upon the conclusion of a single doctor that the claimant’s medical condition was not disabling. In this case, by contrast, the new evidence is largely repetitive of the evidence in the record. Although it confirms that Raglin has suffered from recurrent depression and learning disabilities, the ALJ did not deny the existence of those conditions. She simply concluded that they did not prevent Raglin from obtaining substantial gainful employment. The new reports do not effectively refute this. Even Dr. Cohen’s report states only that Raglin would be incapable of working in the future, but does not evaluate her ability to work in the past. Her condition may have been less severe in the past, considering that psychological reports from that time did not indicate an inability to work and suggested that she had basic social skills and decision-making abilities. Moreover, most of the new evidence Raglin seeks to present does not even relate to the time period considered by the ALJ in reaching his September 1998 decision. The new evidence Raglin presents is therefore not material. Moreover, the fact that the SSA eventually awarded Raglin benefits on her March 15, 2000 application does not affect our conclusion. That an agency reaches different decisions at different times under different circumstances does not mean that the first decision was not supported by substantial evidence or that the agency’s refusal to remand for a new trial amounts to an abuse of discretion.