Opinion ID: 1147593
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Writ of Habeas Corpus and Jurisdictional Considerations

Text: This Court has repeatedly held that the county court has subject-matter jurisdiction over habeas corpus proceedings. See, Talley v. Womack, 249 Miss. 773, 163 So.2d 742, 744 (1964) (citing cases). The judge may not by special order prolong its powers and jurisdiction. Id. A habeas corpus proceeding may be convened by a judge of the chancery, circuit, or Supreme Court. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-43-7 (1972). When an application in habeas corpus has been made to a county judge, or has been made returnable before him, he acts not as a county court [judge], but with all the power and authority of a circuit judge or chancellor; wherefore, an appeal [must] be taken direct to this Court under [statutory law]. Cole v. Cole, 194 Miss. 292, 295, 12 So.2d 425, 426 (1943); see also Wade v. Lee, 471 So.2d 1213, 1215 (Miss. 1985) (citing cases and Miss. Code Ann. § 9-9-23 (1972)); Nance v. Vick, 318 So.2d 889, 890 (Miss. 1975); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-43-53 & -55 (1972). Finally, venue of the habeas corpus proceeding is in the county where the children allegedly are being wrongfully detained. Logan v. Rankin, 230 Miss. 749, 759, 94 So.2d 330, 335 (1957).
The common-law writ of habeas corpus  also known as the Great Writ  extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto, except in cases expressly excepted. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-43-1 (1972). [3] The writ is a civil, as distinguished from a criminal, remedy or proceeding. 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 3, at 461 (1976). With regard to proceedings instituted to resolve the issue of alleged wrongful detention of children, as distinguished from detention of individuals under criminal process, Mississippi jurisprudence has followed what seems at first impression to be two schools of thought. The first school of thought  reflected in this Court's opinions issued primarily in the former half of this century  held that a judge is narrowly empowered to either set the child at liberty or award its custody to the [entitled] party. See, e.g., Gray v. Gray, 121 Miss. 541, 545, 83 So. 726, 726 (1920). The judge is not empowered to direct the manner in which [the custodial] party shall exercise his lawful authority over such child, or to direct that he shall surrender ... the custody ... to another person, for example, due to a material change in circumstances. Id., quoted in Yarbrough v. Dunnam, 130 Miss. 669, 94 So. 892, 892 (Miss. 1923). In the latter half of this century, this Court continued to recognize the writ of habeas corpus as a legal remedy in custody disputes. However, the remedial nature of the writ took on another dimension  an equitable dimension  to which this Court referred in Neal v. Neal as the majority rule: If, [upon issuance of] the decree granting a divorce and awarding the custody of a child, the circumstances have changed, a habeas corpus court may award the custody to the other parent or to a stranger, if the welfare of the child demands it; and in the exercise of such discretion, the court may look to the circumstances relating to the child's ordinary comfort, contentment, and intellectual and moral development. 238 Miss. 572, 119 So.2d 273, 275 (Miss. 1960). [4] The Court noted the public policy considerations which led to promulgation of this rule: (1) a material change in circumstances, (2) the welfare of the child, (3) the position and responsibility of the state as parens patriae,  and (4) the fact that the parties to [ habeas corpus ] proceedings [may not be] the same as in the divorce action. Id. (citing 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 46, at 586 n. 57 ([1976])). In short, the best interest and welfare of the child is the prime consideration. Id. The Neal Court confined the scope of its opinion to a situation where a parent has invoked the aid of a court other than that which made the initial custodial decree awarding [the parent's] custody, and the defendants were not parties to that decree. Id.; see also Mixon v. Bullard, 217 So.2d 28, 30 (Miss. 1968); Hinman v. Craft, 204 Miss. 568, 575, 37 So.2d 770, 770-71 (1948). If the parties in the habeas corpus proceeding and original custody proceeding are identical, the chancery court in which the original custody decree was issued has continuing and exclusive jurisdiction to modify the decree upon a show of proof of changed circumstances. [A]ny other court is without jurisdiction to modify the original court's decree. Reynolds v. Riddell, 253 So.2d 834, 836-37 (Miss. 1971); Ladner v. Ladner, 206 So.2d 620, 624 (Miss. 1968). More recently, this Court relaxed the jurisdictional restriction placed upon the judge presiding over a habeas corpus proceeding which involves the same parties involved in the original custody proceeding: Generally, when prior proceedings conducted by another court determined the custody of an infant, the prior judgment must be regarded as final, and it is not subject to attack by subsequent habeas corpus proceedings. However, the habeas corpus court can disregard the prior decree where circumstances and conditions arising since the decree show that the party awarded custody is unfit to exercise or has abandoned custody of the child. Smith v. Watson, 425 So.2d 1030, 1032 (Miss. 1983); see Pearson v. Pearson, 458 So.2d 711, 713 (Miss. 1984) (judge may modify custody decree issued through another court when urgent circumstances warrant such action). The burden of proof which must be met before the custody decree may be modified is higher than that which must be met in the ordinary modification proceeding held in the chancery court with original jurisdiction. In the ordinary modification proceeding, the non-custodial party must prove: (1) that a substantial change in circumstances has transpired since issuance of the custody decree; (2) that this change adversely affects the child welfare; and (3) that the child's best interests mandate a change of custody. See Smith v. Todd, 464 So.2d 1155, 1157 (Miss. 1985); Tucker v. Tucker, 453 So.2d 1294, 1297 (Miss. 1984); Cheek v. Ricker, 431 So.2d 1139, 1143 (Miss. 1983). In the habeas corpus proceeding, the non-custodial party must go further and affirmatively prove that, since issuance of the custody decree, the custodial parent has abandoned the child or has otherwise become altogether unfit to continue to exercise custody over the child. Wade v. Lee, 471 So.2d 1213, 1216 (Miss. 1985); [5] see also Mixon v. Bullard, 217 So.2d 28, 30 (Miss. 1968). The foregoing may not be construed to mean that the habeas corpus court acquires continuing jurisdiction over the child or his or her custody. Wade, 471 So.2d at 1217 (citing Watson, 425 So.2d at 1035). Jurisdiction is only temporary ; that is, modification by the judge in a habeas corpus proceeding remains in effect only until a modification proceeding is held in the chancery or other court with original jurisdiction. [6] Id.