Opinion ID: 1236383
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Denial of Motion to Sever Counts.

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the Belvedere Park murders from the Wells murders. He argued for severance on the basis that the incidents were unrelated, not cross-admissible, and that the evidence in the Wells charges was far weaker than that in the Belvedere Park charges. The court denied severance based on the prosecutor's representation that Benjamin Verduzco would testify at trial and provide evidence of defendant's motive and premeditation concerning the Wells murders that linked them with the Belvedere Park murders. Defendant renewed his motion to sever shortly before trial was scheduled to begin. The trial court denied the motion, again in reliance on the prosecutor's representation about Verduzco's anticipated testimony. Section 954 provides in pertinent part: An accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses ... of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts, ... provided, that the court in which a case is triable, in the interests of justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the different offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately or divided into two or more groups and each of said groups tried separately.... The statutory requirements for joinder were met here because both incidents involved the same class of crimes  murder. (1) Since the requirements for joinder were satisfied, defendant can predicate error only on a clear showing of potential prejudice. ( People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576, 587 [253 Cal. Rptr. 710, 764 P.2d 1087].) The burden is on the party seeking severance to clearly establish that there is a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be separately tried. ( People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 938 [251 Cal. Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996].) The determination of prejudice is necessarily dependent on the particular circumstances of each individual case, but certain criteria have emerged to provide guidance in ruling upon and reviewing a motion to sever trial. ( Frank v. Superior Court (1989) 48 Cal.3d 632, 639 [257 Cal. Rptr. 550, 770 P.2d 1119].) Refusal to sever may be an abuse of discretion where: (1) evidence on the crimes to be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) a weak case has been joined with a strong case, or with another weak case, so that the spillover effect of aggregate evidence on several charges might well alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) any one of the charges carries the death penalty or joinder of them turns the matter into a capital case. ( Ibid. ; see also Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 453 [204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699].) (2) Defendant bases his argument for prejudice primarily on the absence of cross-admissibility of the two sets of offenses. He argues that the trial court's reasoning did not establish that the evidence of the two separate incidents would have been admissible in its entirety had there been separate trials. According to defendant, all it established was that there would have been some minor evidentiary crossover as to the two incidents. However, even if defendant is correct on this point, it is now clear that cross-admissibility is not the sine qua non of joint trials. ( People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 934 [277 Cal. Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950]; Frank v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 641; People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 321 [246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082].) While we have held that cross-admissibility ordinarily dispels any inference of prejudice, we have never held that the absence of cross-admissibility, by itself, sufficed to demonstrate prejudice. ( People v. Mason, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 934.) That the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible may be considered as a factor suggesting possible prejudice, but countervailing considerations that are not present when evidence of uncharged offenses is offered must be weighed in ruling on a severance motion. The burden is on the defendant therefore to persuade the court that these countervailing considerations are outweighed by a substantial danger of undue prejudice. ( People v. Bean, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 939.) Defendant did not carry that burden. The potential prejudice he asserted did not rise to the level of demonstrating that the court's denial of severance was an abuse of discretion. The court recognized that the anticipated testimony by Verduzco added significantly to the strength of the Wells case, thereby obviating the danger of a spillover effect from the Belvedere Park evidence. Indeed, the court suggested that it would reconsider the severance motion if the prosecution were not able to secure Verduzco's testimony. The inflammatory effect of defendant's gang membership as to the Belvedere Park case was neutralized by the fact that the victims were also gang members. Moreover, this was not a case in which capital charges resulted solely from the joinder of the two incidents. (Cf. Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 454.) Defendant also made passing reference to the fact that he had separate defenses that would be prejudiced because he desired to testify as to one incident but not the other. Although we have not addressed this theory of prejudice, it has been considered by federal courts. The federal courts have ruled that severance is not mandatory every time a defendant wishes to testify to one charge but not to another. `If that were the law, a court would be divested of all control over the matter of severance and the choice would be entrusted to the defendant.' ( U.S. v. Archer (7th Cir.1988) 843 F.2d 1019, 1022.) The need for severance does not arise in federal courts `until the defendant makes a convincing showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other.' ( Ibid. ; quoting Baker v. United States (D.C. Cir. (1968) 401 F.2d 958, 977 [131 App.D.C. 7]; see also United States v. Valentine (10th Cir.1983) 706 F.2d 282, 291.) Federal courts have required the defendant to present enough information to satisfy the court that the claim of prejudice is genuine and to enable it to weigh the considerations of economy and expedient judicial administration against the defendant's interest in having a free choice with respect to testifying. ( United States v. Valentine, supra, 706 F.2d at p. 291.) Defendant's showing fell far short of anything that would have satisfied the federal standards or any standard this court might adopt. Defendant neither explained the nature of the testimony he wished to give in the Belvedere Park case nor his reasons for not wanting to testify in the Wells case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance. (3) Because the issue is raised on appeal following trial, we must also consider whether, despite the correctness of the trial court's ruling, a gross unfairness has occurred from the joinder such as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial or due process of law. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 590.) Defendant claims gross unfairness occurred as a result of the destruction of his ability to testify as to one incident but not as to the other. He has done no more, however, than make a bald assertion to that effect. One asserting prejudice has the burden of proving it; a bald assertion of prejudice is not sufficient. ( Id. at p. 591.) We conclude, therefore, that defendant has failed to show that denial of severance deprived him of a fair trial.