Opinion ID: 3134054
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exception to Hearsay

Text: For his final point on appeal, Edison argues that the circuit court erred in overruling his hearsay exception on the grounds that the testimony was admissible under the dyingdeclarations exception. He contends that because Thomas’s testimony did not demonstrate her belief that she was dying or was going to die following the robbery and shooting, any statement she made to Little Rock Police Officer James Anderson when he asked her who had shot her was inadmissible hearsay. For this reason, he asserts, the circuit court’s admission of the testimony was prejudicial and requires that this court reverse his convictions and sentences and remand to the circuit court. The State responds that, although it mistakenly relied on the dying-declaration exception before the circuit court, the challenged testimony was admissible under other exceptions to the hearsay rule. Edison urges that the circuit court committed reversible error when it allowed Officer Anderson’s testimony under the dying-declaration exception to the hearsay rule in Arkansas Rule of Evidence 804 (2015). We need not address the merits of Edison’s argument relating to Officer Anderson’s testimony, however, “because we have said on numerous occasions that when hearsay is erroneously admitted, we will not reverse if it is cumulative of other evidence admitted without objection.” Dougan v. State, 330 Ark. 827, 832, 957 S.W.2d 182, 185 (1997); see also Weber v. State, 326 Ark. 564, 933 S.W.2d 370 (1996). 8 Cite as 2015 Ark. 376 Here, Officer Anderson, on direct examination by the State and over Edison’s objection, did testify that after arriving at Sbarro, he asked Thomas if she knew who had shot her. He stated that Thomas had responded that she did know the person, that he worked at Sbarro, and that his name was Deonte. But, Thomas herself also testified to the same without any objection by Edison. During her testimony, she stated that she knew Edison when she saw him, there was no mistake about that, and she was 100 percent sure of that fact. She testified that Edison worked at Sbarro with her, and that she was able to tell the police officer who had come to Sbarro that Edison had shot her. She was further able to identify Edison in court for the record. Evidence that is merely cumulative or repetitious of other evidence admitted without objection cannot be prejudicial. See Wedgeworth v. State, 2012 Ark. 63. This court will not reverse an evidentiary decision by the circuit court in the absence of prejudice. See id. Even if the circuit court erred in admitting the testimony of Officer Anderson, that testimony was cumulative and any error would have been harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s ruling. Pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(i) (2015), the record has been reviewed for all objections, motions, and requests that were decided adversely to Edison, and no prejudicial error has been found. Affirmed. Montgomery, Adams & Wyatt, PLC, by: Dale E. Adams, for appellant. Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Kristen C. Green, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee. 9