Opinion ID: 3038508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: guideline at the time of sentencing

Text: The relevant provision of the version of the Guidelines in effect at the time of Wood’s sentencing states: Prior sentences imposed in unrelated cases are to be counted separately. Prior sentences in related cases are to be treated as one sentence for purposes of § 4A1.1(a), (b), and (c). U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2). Application Note 3 defines “related” cases: Related Cases. Prior sentences are not considered related if they were for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest . . . . Otherwise, prior sentences are considered related if they resulted from offenses that (A) occurred on the 7 same occasion, (B) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (C) were consolidated for trial or sentencing. The court should be aware that there may be instances in which this definition is overly broad and will result in a criminal history score that underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history and the danger he presents to the public. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. n.3. Based on the record before the Court, it is undisputed that Wood’s commission of the prior offenses at issue was not separated by intervening arrests, nor did they occur on the same occasion or as part of the same scheme or plan. Therefore, the only issue we have to consider is whether the District Court properly applied § 4A1.2(a)(2) in finding that Wood’s prior convictions were not “consolidated” despite the fact that he was sentenced for these offenses on the same day before a single judge. Other courts that have addressed this issue have concluded that, absent a formal consolidation order, factually and temporally distinct offenses are not considered related, notwithstanding the fact that a defendant may have been sentenced for the offenses at the same time. See United States v. Correa, 114 F.3d 314, 317 (1st Cir. 1997) (requiring “actual order of consolidation or . . . some other persuasive indicium of formal consolidation apparent on the face of the record which is sufficient to indicate that the offenses have some relationship to one another beyond the sheer fortuity that sentence was imposed 8 by the same judge at the same time.”); United States v. Allen, 50 F.3d 294, 297 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that Application Note 3 required either formal consolidation order or factual relationship among prior offenses); United States v. McAdams, 25 F.3d 370, 375-76 (6th Cir. 1994) (affirming district court’s finding that factually distinct offenses, prosecuted under different docket numbers, were not consolidated despite simultaneous imposition of sentences); United States v. Lopez, 961 F.2d 384, 386-87 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that two prior convictions were not related notwithstanding the fact that same judge sentenced defendant concurrently on the same date). To consider only whether sentences for multiple convictions were handed down the same day by the same judge, as Wood urges us to do, would place those defendants whose offenses were sentenced together in a far better position with respect to calculation of their criminal history scores under the Guidelines than those who did not enjoy similar fortuity. Such a disparity between otherwise similarly situated, repeat offenders, would appear to be without any rational justification. Thus, we adopt the approach utilized by other circuits and by the District Court in this case, and hold that, the imposition of sentences for multiple offenses at the same time by the same judge does not render the cases “consolidated for sentencing,” and, therefore, related within the meaning of § 4A1.2(a)(2), in the absence of either a formal consolidation order or a close factual relationship between the offenses. Here, the District Court found that the three prior convictions at issue were factually distinct. They were different crimes involving separate victims, different types of goods 9 stolen, and occurred on separate dates. The offenses were charged under distinct instruments, bearing different docket numbers. No formal consolidation order was ever issued. Further, the Erie County judge imposed consecutive sentences. We do not find the District Court’s findings of fact with respect to Wood’s prior convictions to be in error.