Opinion ID: 2791341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dellosantos's Additional Arguments

Text: Recognizing that we may affirm the district court on any basis made apparent by the record, McCloskey v. Mueller, 446 F.3d 262, 266 (1st Cir. 2006), Dellosantos raises two additional arguments to support the dismissal of the Current Indictment. We address each issue briefly, finding neither to have merit.
Dellosantos first contends that the government is judicially estopped from arguing that there are two distinct conspiracies because this position is inconsistent with its initial position that there existed one overarching conspiracy. See InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 144 (1st Cir. 2003) (As a general matter, the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a litigant from pressing a claim that is inconsistent with a position taken by that litigant either in a prior legal proceeding or in an earlier phase of the same legal proceeding.). Though the contours of judicial estoppel are hazy, and there is no mechanical test for determining its applicability, Alt. Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 33 (1st Cir. 2004), three factors have guided us in the past: Dellosantos's entire variance analysis. -20- First, a party's later position must be clearly inconsistent with its earlier position. Second, courts regularly inquire whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party's earlier position . . . . A third consideration is whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped. United States v. Pakala, 568 F.3d 47, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 504 (2006)). Dellosantos is certainly correct that the government has taken mutually exclusive positions in these successive prosecutions, thus satisfying the first factor. The other factors, however, are not met. Contrary to Dellosantos's claim, the government was not successful in the initial prosecution. Its initial position of one overarching conspiracy -- which did admittedly succeed at trial -- was ultimately rejected on appeal in Dellosantos. Once the jury's verdict was vacated, any success the government may have had with its one-overarching-conspiracy position disappeared. We also reject the contention that the government is deriving an unfair advantage from this change in position. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Burks, when a conviction is reversed following a finding of procedural error, not only does the accused [have] a strong interest in obtaining a fair readjudication of his guilt free from error, but society also maintains a valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished. 437 U.S. at 15. Both -21- the jury and our prior decision found sufficient evidence to convict Appellees. There is nothing unfair about allowing the government to retry them following a reversal for a material variance, which is nothing more than a procedural error. Because two of the three considerations for a finding of judicial estoppel are lacking, Dellosantos's argument fails.9
Dellosantos next argues that because he did not have a relationship with any of the Maine co-conspirators, never lived or worked in Maine, is accused of buying and selling cocaine only in Massachusetts, and entered Maine only for court-related matters, venue in Maine is improper and thus his constitutional rights are being violated. See United States v. Lanou, 137 F.3d 656, 661 (1st Cir. 1998) (A defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to be tried in a proper venue.); see also U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed 9 We also note that Dellosantos's argument cuts both ways. Like the government, Dellosantos is taking an opposite position here. In the prior prosecution and before us in Dellosantos, Dellosantos argued that the evidence was insufficient because there were multiple conspiracies; now he argues that the two conspiracies were really just part of one overarching conspiracy. If anything, the case for judicial estoppel would be stronger against Dellosantos because his initial position of two distinct conspiracies did succeed in the earlier proceedings and because he is now attempting to escape punishment for his crime despite a jury finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and this court finding sufficient evidence in the record to support that verdict. -22- . . . .); id. amend. VI (In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .). Venue in Maine, however, is appropriate. In the context of a conspiracy, venue is proper in any district in which an act in furtherance of the charged conspiracy has taken place. United States v. Santiago, 83 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 1996). This is true even if a particular coconspirator was not himself physically present in that district. Id. While Dellosantos may not have had any ties to Maine, his co-conspirator Szpyt did have such ties. As we explained in Dellosantos, the evidence showed that Szpyt owned the Iron Horsemen clubhouse in Maine and sold cocaine to numerous Iron Horsemen members there, one of those customers being Sanborn. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 111-12. Given these facts, the government has met its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that venue in Maine is proper. See Lanou, 137 F.3d at 661.