Opinion ID: 381246
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the amendments and effective desegregation enforcement

Text: 15 The amendments here at issue make no classification along impermissible lines, but that does not prevent an equal protection challenge. 50 Interference with the remedies necessary to implement the promise of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), could well rise to the level of impermissible discriminatory effect and purpose. 51 In essence, that is appellants' claim here. Appellants argue that, by restricting HEW's ability to require busing remedies, the amendments demonstrate discriminatory intent to interfere with desegregation. Presumably, this claim attaches to HEW's statutory obligation under Title VI to achieve equality in federally-funded schools and to the Executive's duty to take care that the Laws (are) faithfully executed. 52 16 Thus, appellants assert that the amendments, by their plain terms, effect and purpose, violate the fifth amendment by eliminating the single, proven, and most effective remedy for desegregating schools receiving federal aid. 53 There are actually two prongs to this claim: the amendments will effectively inhibit desegregation and thereby dilute the guarantees of the fifth amendment; and the amendments reflect an impermissible legislative motivation to inhibit desegregation. Because the amendments on their face leave open many apparently effective avenues for desegregation, we are not persuaded by either argument.
17 The traditional judicial practice of reaching statutory issues before constitutional ones, 54 combined with deference to Congress, supports application here of the general rule that legislation should be interpreted, if fairly possible, in such a way as to free it from not insubstantial constitutional doubts. 55 The amendments can be interpreted here to advance a permissible purpose, with no general inhibition of desegregation. 56 Although individual supporters broadly attacked busing as a desegregation remedy, 57 we do not find these statements expressive of the entire legislature's intent. Were they representative, we would be confronted with grave constitutional difficulties. Instead, we recognize the primary focus of the congressional debates on the role of HEW as an enforcement agency. An explicit, major purpose of the amendments was to take HEW out of the busing business. 58 In other words, Congress wanted to ensure that mandatory busing orders derive either from local school officials or federal courts. 59 18 Accordingly, the amendments only restrain HEW from using its fund-termination authority to induce school districts to require student transportation beyond schools closest to their homes. 60 They do not in any way restrict HEW's authority to threaten or actually terminate funds with respect to any other desegregation remedy which would suffice. 61 Thus, HEW can reject fund applications which fail to provide for magnet schools, 62 faculty desegregation, school construction or school closings that enhance desegregation, or other nontransportation remedies it deems necessary for compliance with Title VI and the Constitution. 19 For those noncomplying school districts which HEW believes require transportation remedies, the amendments clearly eliminate use of the fund-termination option to induce busing. 63 At the same time, nothing in their language or legislative history impairs two HEW activities in this context. First, the agency still may negotiate with the noncomplying district to encourage adoption of a voluntary transportation plan. 64 The second activity is obvious. As the district court concluded, nothing in the amendments precludes HEW from referring such cases to the Department of Justice, with recommendations for appropriate legal action. 65 This option is especially meaningful, given the Department's historic role in civil rights enforcement, 66 its experience in helping to develop desegregation plans, and its authority to intervene in private suits as well as initiate enforcement actions. 67 20 Appellants contest the sufficiency of this referral option by claiming that time-consuming litigation will impermissibly forestall the requisite remedy. 68 This is an issue which clearly requires concrete development, and is not susceptible to resolution in the abstract. We cannot agree with the district court that litigation promises great if not greater promptness than fund-termination by the agency. 69 Yet it is possible that litigation could conceivably stretch no longer or not much longer than the time period required by the administrative alternative. Thus, as a facial challenge to the amendments, appellants' argument cannot succeed. Further, the Department of Justice is not limited to a litigative strategy; it may conduct negotiations and seek settlements, where appropriate. 21 Finally, the Department is under a strict obligation to avoid delay. To avoid constitutional doubts, we must proceed on the assumption that Congress intended the Department of Justice to act with the greatest dispatch. Otherwise the amendments may be seen as a tool of delay to avoid dismantling unconstitutionally segregated school systems. The courts no longer countenance all deliberate speed as the time-frame for dismantling unconstitutionally segregated school systems. Instead, the obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school systems at once. 70 22 This obligation to guard against delay applies with equal force to HEW when it seeks to procure compliance. The government argues that the amendments do not prevent HEW from threatening referral to the Department of Justice in order to increase HEW's leverage in persuading offending districts to voluntarily reassign students. 71 We agree, with this proviso: HEW cannot delay in taking necessary steps to bring about compliance. In Adams v. Richardson, the district court held with our approval that if HEW fails during a substantial period of time to achieve voluntary compliance, (it has) a duty to commence enforcement proceedings. 72 In sum, HEW referral to the Department of Justice for action must not be hindered by delays due to either agency. 73
23 The amendments would be constitutionally flawed if they diluted rather than enforced equal protection guarantees. 74 As construed, however, these amendments do not pose this problem. We concluded above that these amendments do not preclude the threat of fund-termination for non-complying districts except if deployed to induce a busing remedy. With that exception, HEW can still use this enforcement tool which appellants characterize as the single most effective remedy for desegregating schools receiving federal aid. 75 As the amendments also leave in place the enforcement options at the Department of Justice, we cannot find that on their face they restrict, abrogate, or dilute the guarantee of equal protection. 76 Where a choice of alternative enforcement routes is available, and the one preferred is not demonstrably less effective, Congress has the power to exercise its preference. 77
24 Absent discriminatory effect, judicial inquiry into legislative motivation is unnecessary, as well as undesirable. 78 Obviously, the foreseeable effect 79 of these amendments is increased litigation for court-ordered desegregation, and settlements supervised by HEW and the courts not unremedied segregation. 80 Thus, statements by individual congressmen that reveal opposition to busing or to student assignment to achieve desegregation, 81 do not by themselves establish constitutional flaws in the amendments. 82 25