Opinion ID: 2279889
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Patrick Russ

Text: Prior to being summonsed, Mr. Russ was also required to complete a Qualification Questionnaire for Jury Service. On it he was asked whether he had been the victim of a crime within the previous year. He responded in the negative, when, in fact, within the relevant time period, his house had been burglarized. [11] Again, on voir dire, he was asked, [H]as any member of this panel or their families or their close friends ever been the victim of a crime of violence? Mr. Russ did not respond, either affirmatively or negatively. Testifying at the hearing on Hunt's second petition for post-conviction relief, he explained his nondisclosure: A. Well, this wasโthat was my first time ever being on a trial and I was nervous, and I just didn't think with what I responded. On cross-examination, Mr. Russ conceded that he considered the crime to have been one of violence, but denied having an ulterior motive or a desire to hurt anyone in not disclosing the fact of his victimization. Hunt challenges Mr. Russ's presence on the panel that resentenced him, stating that his intentional nondisclosure gives rise to a presumption of bias. Specifically, he states, Juror Russ's status as a victim of a violent crime reasonably would have made him harsh on crime. He adds further that, because the State failed to produce evidence to rebut this presumption, he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. We disagree. Under the principles outlined supra, Hunt's ability to challenge Mr. Russ's presence on the jury is limited by waiver principles. Looking, as we must, to pertinent case law, statutes, and rules, see Curtis, 284 Md. at 150, 395 A.2d at 474, we note that, in order to mount a successful attack against the juror, Hunt was required to demonstrate that the fact of Mr. Russ's victimization would have provided a basis upon which to challenge him for cause. He failed to produce any evidence that established Mr. Russ's predisposition. Instead, he relied upon the proposition that nondisclosure automatically begets entitlement to a new sentencing hearing. In so doing, he did not satisfy his burden of proof. Thus, as with juror Void, Hunt has waived the right to raise the issue at this stage in the proceedings. Further, this procedural default precludes any consideration of the issue, since, in the absence of any proof of bias on the part of Mr. Russ, there was no showing that this default caused any prejudice to Hunt. See Walker, 343 Md. at 648, 649-50, 684 A.2d at 438, 439. We hold that Hunt's failure to avail himself of the various remedies at his disposal during trial resulted from inexcusable procedural defaults that provide him with no foundation upon which to predicate a challenge against jurors Void and Russ in the instant collateral attack upon his conviction and sentence.