Opinion ID: 771186
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: AWCPA's Effect on Separate Copyright Protection for PGS Works

Text: 72 Nothing in the text of the AWCPA expressly eliminates or retains separate PGS protection for conceptually separable PGS works attached to buildings. As previously noted, this absence of a clear statutory mandate favors preserving the existing, historical rights of PGS artists. The conclusion that Congress did not alter the availability of separate protection is buttressed by a reasonable interpretation of the legislative history. Although the legislative history is ambiguous, its discussion of the concept of election of protection  and treatment of monumental works of architecture, in my view, support the conclusion that Congress did not intend to eliminate separate protection for PGS works attached to buildings. Moreover, I do not believe the elimination of the separability test to determine the copyrightability of architectural works and the limit of one architectural work per structure command a contrary result.
73 The AWCPA's legislative history reflects Congress' express desire that the extension of copyright protection to buildings as constructed not affect an author's pre-AWCPA ability to obtain copyright protection for architectural blueprint plans, drawings and models. See H.R. R EP. NO. 101-735, at 19 (Protection for architectural plans, drawings, and models as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works under section 102(a)(5), title 17, United States Code, is unaffected by this bill.). In addition, Congress specifically stated that an architect should be able to elect both forms of protection concurrently: 74 The bill's intention is to keep these two forms of protection separate. An individual creating an architectural work by depicting that work in plans or drawing [sic] will have two separate copyrights, one in the architectural work (section 102(a)(8)), the other in the plans or drawings (section 102(a)(5)). Either or both of these copyrights may be infringed and eligible separately for damages. [I]n cases where it is found that both the architectural work and the plans have been infringed, courts or juries may reduce an award of damages as necessary to avoid double remuneration, but the basic concept of elec tion of protection[fn 41] is important and must be preserved. 75 Id. (emphasis added). Of course, if the architect elects coverage under section 102(a)(8), then section 120(a) applies to limit the scope of the architect's exclusive rights in his copyright -if the building is in a publicly visible place, he cannotprevent others from creating two-dimensional reproductions of the building. 76 Footnote 41 in the above quoted passage addresses the situation where there is an artistic work incorporated into a building. In my view, this cryptic and ambiguous footnote can reasonably be read to support the notion that the AWCPA did not alter the availability of separate protection of PGS works attached to buildings: 77 The Subcommittee was aware that certain works of authorship which may separately qualify for protec tion as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works may be permanently embodied in architectural works. Stained glass windows are one such example. Elec tion is inappropriate in any case where the copyright owner of a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work embodied in an architectural work is different from the copyright owner of the architectural work. 78 Id. at 19 n.41. Congress' use of the present tense in the first sentence -may separately qualify -is evidence that separate copyright protection for PGS works that are part of architectural works remains available. If there is a conceptually separable section 102(a)(5) PGS work permanently embodied in a section 102(a)(8) architectural work, the architect can elect protection under either or both sections provided he owns the copyright interest in the PGS work. If a separate artist created the PGS work (and has not assigned the copyright to the architect), 7 the architect is limited to a copyright in the building as constructed and a copyright in the blueprint plans, whereas the artist retains a copyright in the PGS work. 8 The scope of the architect's copyright in the building, of course, is limited by section 120(a). Because section 120(a) only applies to limit the scope of rights of a copyright in an architectural work, however, it has no effect on the artist's copyright in his PGS work. As Professor Ginsburg has stated, if a building contains elements separately protectable as pictorial, graphic or sculptural works (for example, a gargoyle), the unauthorized pictorial representation of that element may be an infringement of the pictorial, graphic or sculptural work (not of the work of architecture). Ginsburg, supra at 995. The artist's PGS copyright is still limited by the fair use doctrine of section 107, though, which will protect the average tourist from infringement liability but will prevent most unauthorized commercial exploitations of images of the work. 79 This reading of the legislative history is consistent with the rationale underlying Congress' explicit decision to provide a blanket photograph exemption -section 120(a) -rather than relying on the fair use doctrine. See H.R. REP. NO. 101735, at 22. As the House Report accompanying the AWCPA noted: 80 Millions of people visit our cities every year and take back home photographs, posters, and other pictorial representations of prominent works of architecture as a memory of their trip. Additionally, numerous scholarly books on architecture are based on the ability to use photographs of architectural works. These uses do not interfere with the normal exploitation of architectural works. Given the important public purpose served by these uses and the lack of harm to the copyright owner's market, the Committee chose to provide an exemption, rather than rely on the doctrine of fair use, which requires ad hoc determinations. 81 Id. Congress was aware of the commercial market for posters and postcards of famous or interesting buildings, and it did not want its extension of copyright protection to constructed architectural works to affect that market. But Congress did not address the commercial market for posters and postcards of specific, copyrighted PGS works that are embedded in, or in some other way a part of, a building. 9 Entrepreneurs desiring to sell postcards that featured a building's attached artwork always needed to obtain a license from the PGS artist or risk a copyright infringement suit. In this way, the PGS artists were in a position to control the commercial exploitation of two-dimensional reproductions of their independent, creative contribution to a larger work. I interpret the absence of explicit congressional intent to eliminate that ability to be further evidence that the AWCPA was not intended to affect the separate copyright ability of PGS works incorporated into buildings.
82 The AWCPA's treatment of monumental, nonfunctional works of architecture illustrates that Congress knows how to express clearly its intent to change the manner in which a specific subject matter is protected under the Copyright Act. According to the House Report: Monumental, nonfunctional works of architecture are currently protected under section 102(a)(5) of title 17 as sculptural works. These works are, nevertheless, architectural works, and as such, will no[w] be protected exclusively under section 102(a)(8). H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20 n.43. 10 When Congress looked at this class of works, which under the 1976 Copyright Act had been afforded full copyright protection as sculptural works, see H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55, and intended to eliminate that protection and replace it with protection solely as architectural works, it made its intent clear in the legislative history. Logically then, if Congress similarly had intended the AWCPA to eliminate separate PGS copyright protection for PGS works imbedded in architectural works, it would have done so expressly as well. 83 According to Judge Tashima's concurrence, Congress' treatment of monumental works lends support to the proposition that it intended to remove from PGS classification those works that were previously protectable as sculptural works and protect them solely as architectural works. See Conc. at 15230. This view seems to conflate monumental works with sculptural works. But monumental works are a small subset of sculptural works (at least, they were), and sculptural works, in turn, are a subset of PGS works. Congress specifically singled out this subset of PGS works for special treatment. It explicitly removed monumental works from PGS classification and placed them under the rubric of architectural works, and said nothing as to sculptural or PGS works in general. 84 Congress' treatment of monumental works makes sense because monuments, which are generally nonfunctional, frequently blur the line between sculpture and architecture. Significantly, the rationale for changing the treatment of monuments does not transfer well to conceptually separable PGS works attached to architectural works. Unlike monumental, nonfunctional works of architecture, which are, nevertheless, architectural works, PGS works attached to an architectural work are not themselves works of architecture. Despite being attached to an architectural work, they are, nevertheless, PGS works and should be entitled to all of the exclusive rights Congress has extended to works of that classification. 85
According to the House Report: 86 By creating a new category of protectible subject matter in new section 102(a)(8), and, therefore, by deliberately not encompassing architectural works as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works in existing section 102(a)(5), the copyrightability of architectural works shall not be evaluated under the separability test applicable to pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works embodied in useful articles. There is considerable scholarly and judicial disagreement over how to apply the separability test, and the principal reason for not treating architectural works as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works is to avoid entangling architectural works in this disagreement. 87 H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20 (footnotes omitted). While it is true that Congress did not want architects to have to survive the morass of separability in order to obtain copyright protection for their creations, there is nothing in the AWCPA that suggests Congress intended to prevent sculptors and other artists who created PGS works that were attached to buildings from attempting to satisfy the difficult separability test and thereby gain full PGS copyright protection for their works. I believe this distinction between the copyrightability of architectural works and the copyrightability of PGS features that are part of architectural works is critical. Because buildings themselves traditionally have been considered useful articles, see 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT S 2.08[D][2][a], at 2-121 to 2-122, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for an architect to obtain a copyright in a functional building if he were forced to satisfy the conceptual separability test. See Michael F. Clayton & Ron N. Dreben, Copyright Protection for Architectural Works: Congress Changes the Rules , 4 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 15 (Mar. 1992) (Given the inherent difficulty of physically or conceptually separating a building's design from its `utilitarian' aspect or function, copyright protection for structures in this country [was] virtually nonexistent [prior to the AWCPA].). In contrast, there is nothing inherently more difficult about applying the conceptual separability test to PGS features that are part of buildings than to PGS features that are part of other useful articles, yet Congress has not eliminated the test in those other contexts. Absent clear instruction from Congress, I believe we should continue to apply the conceptual separability test to determine the 120(a)(5) copyrightability of PGS works that are in some way a part of an architectural work. This approach has been employed for years and gives meaning to the extant rights of artists and architects. 88 The concurrence reads the AWCPA as replacing the conceptual separability test for PGS works embedded in architecture with a clear, bright-line rule. Its interpretation of the Act, however, sheds little light on the complicated interaction between the copyright protection of PGS works and architectural works. The concurrence proposes two very different ways of treating PGS works attached to, or embedded in, architectural works. On the one hand, it suggests Congress intended to paint with a broad brush, using the AWCPA to wipe out entirely PGS rights for all works embedded in buildings. On the other hand, it suggests an entirely different, and far narrower, reading of the Act in which Congress intended only to draw a fine line separating PGS protection from architectural work protection. This, as I explain below, is not so different from the current conceptual separability scheme. 89 The first approach is unnecessarily broad and threatens to alter deeply the relationship between artist and architect, not to mention art and architecture. The concurrence believes thelegislative history of the Act reveals that Congress intended to make the new protection given to architectural works under section 120 the exclusive remedy for PGS works embodied in an architectural work. Conc. at 15226. This reading of the Act suggests any PGS work that can be considered part of a building automatically loses its PGS identity and protection. Such a work is entitled to receive only the lesser degree of protection afforded to architectural works. The rule makes no consideration for size of the work or degree to which the work is incorporated into a building. If an artist created even the smallest painting on the front of a building, she would lose PGS copyright protection in that work. This provides a great disincentive for artists to collaborate with architects. 90 The second approach posited by the concurrence tries to avoid this problem by setting forth a narrower, functionality based test. Under this view, the AWCPA applies only to PGS works that are so functionally a part of a building that application of the conceptual separability test would render the section 120(a) exception for reproduction of architectural works meaningless. Conc. at 15226. But this approach hardly creates clarity. At best, it preserves the status quo by serving as a proxy for conceptual separability. After all, it, too, requires a trial court to make a factual determination as to the degree of functionality a PGS work retains once it is considered part of an architectural work. Here, the district court found only that the streetwall had functional aspects and that, therefore, it was part of the architectural work. It did not apply any sort of functionality test to discern whether the streetwall was so functional that granting it PGS protection would have rendered application of section 120(a) to the 801 building meaningless. In fact, we have no idea from the district court's findings whether Warner Bros. could have filmed the 801 building without capturing a part of Zanja Madre. 91 Moreover, a test based solely on functionality creates yet another element of confusion because, in the legislative history of the AWCPA, Congress utilizes the term functionality as part of its proposed test for determining the copyright ability of architectural works. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20-21, and supra n.6. According to the House Report, an architectural work is copyrightable only to the extent its design elements are not functionally required. With this in mind, the application of a functionality test for PGS works embedded in architecture might produce an ironic result. Under the concurrence's view, if a PGS work is deemed a functional part of a building, it loses its PGS protection and gains architectural work protection. But the very fact it has been determined to be functional  arguably may defeat the copyrightability of the building itself, since in order for the architectural work to be copyrightable its design elements may not be functionally required. 92 I recognize there is, on the surface, a degree of uncertainty in leaving alone the current scheme of protection for PGS works. In extreme cases, it may allow an entire architectural work to gain PGS protection, a result seemingly in tensionwith the goal of the AWCPA. This would happen, for instance, where a PGS work so fully dominated an architectural work that reproduction of the architectural work would be impossible without infringing the artist's PGS copyright. This would seem to be a rare case, however, and the current regime is equipped to handle it. In such a circumstance, as has been the case until now, a trial court could find that the PGS work was so integrated into the architectural work that it was not conceptually separable and, therefore, effectively lost its PGS status. Upon this finding, the PGS work would be protectable only as part of the architectural work. This, of course, preserves ambiguities at the margins, but law cannot be applied to the arts with mathematical precision. 93 Other difficulties that might arise from my reading of the AWCPA, moreover, remain unresolved by the concurrence. The concurrence's view, for example, still forces a commercial exploiter to determine whether a PGS element of a building is separately copyrighted since the piece may not be so functional a part of the architectural work as to render applicability of section 120(a) meaningless. To a commercial exploiter, degree of functionality should be no easier to determine than conceptual separability. 94 Ultimately, the only way to maneuver cleanly around these admittedly difficult problems is to read (as the concurrence suggests) the AWCPA so broadly as to eliminate fully the rights of any PGS work that is even a modest part of an architectural work, with no attention given to size of the work, placement, impact on the building, degree of functionality or possible conceptual separability. I believe this goes too far. It would discourage an artist from painting even a small work on a building. A sculptor would rightfully be wary of placing a piece too close to a building, or on a pedestal made with the same themes or patterns as the architectural work. The AWCPA need not be read to compel such a drastic result. 95
96 Representative Kastenmeier, the House sponsor of the AWCPA, clarified that what is protected by section 102(a)(8) is the design of a building or other three-dimensional structure. The term `design' is intended to encompass both the overall shape of a structure as well as protectible individual elements. 136 CONG. REC. E259, E260 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). He emphasized, however, that there is only one `architectural work' per structure; separate registrations may not be sought for multiple protectible elements in any given structure. Id. If an architect were able to copyright individual architectural elements as architectural works, it would retard the progress of architecture by preventing others from using, adapting or modifying those elements in new, useful and interesting ways. See id. (This provision recognizes both that creativity in architecture frequently takes the form of a selection, coordination, orarrangement of unprotectable individual elements into an original, protectable whole, and that an architect may incorporate new, protectable design elements into otherwise standard, unprotectable building features.). The nature of architecture as a utilitarian art form justifies this limitation on copyright protection. That same concern does not carry over into the nonutilitarian world of sculpture. Accordingly, the statement that there is only one architectural work per structure does not mean there cannot be multiple protectable PGS works in a structure.