Opinion ID: 853762
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fingerprints and DNA Testing of John Jennings[5]

Text: On August 22, 1997, after her deposition was taken by the defense, fingerprint examiner Diane Donnelly took the fingerprints of Theresa Jones' boyfriend, John Jennings. Donnelly generated a report, dated September 2, the first day of jury selection, that compared a number of unidentified latent fingerprints from the crime scene with those submitted by Jennings, and found no matches. According to the State, it did not receive Donnelly's report until the evening of September 9, and it turned the report over to the defense early the following morning. In addition, the prosecutor's office directed a detective to transport Jennings for a blood draw on August 22. DNA analysis excluded Jennings as the contributor of any of the unknown DNA from the crime scene. Defense counsel objected to both the admission of the fingerprint comparisons and DNA analysis of Jennings on the ground of its late disclosure. The State responded that it requested this analysis after identifying the defense theory that someone else, possibly Jennings, had committed the murders. Dye initially sought exclusion of the evidence, but was instead granted a continuance until the noon hour. The trial court observed that it agreed with the State in that I believe that they had a duty and an obligation to try to compare these prints, even at this late date. So although it is a violation of discovery rules, due to the circumstances there will be no sanctions imposed. We find the State's explanation for the belated disclosure more than adequate under the circumstances. Although its late decision to test these materials was a reasonable response to an expected defense trial theory, it nevertheless ran the risk, in the event of either a fingerprint or DNA match, of providing the defense with powerful evidence to bolster its case. However, the results instead exculpated Jennings. This at most forced a minor adjustment to the defense theory that some unidentified person may have committed the killings. Dye alleges prejudice based on his opening statement to the jury in which he hemmed himself in ... by telling the jury that there would be no dispute about the scientific evidence.... [Dye] could not later challenge the scientific evidence about which he did not yet know. In addition, Dye's opening statement spoke in generalities about the possibility that someone other than Dye had committed the killings: We are not going to be able to tell you who killed these children. We do not know. However, Dye made no specific mention of Jennings by name as the possible perpetrator during opening statement. His expressed decision not to challenge the scientific evidence hardly prevented him from challenging scientific evidence not yet known at the time of his opening statement. The trial court granted a continuance to allow Dye's expert to compare the fingerprints. Had Dye's expert concluded that any of the prints found at the crime scene were Jennings', he could have presented this to the jury through his expert and also pointed out the belated disclosure of the State's comparisons in cross-examination of Donnelly. Dye did not offer the testimony of his fingerprint expert, and the obvious inference is that his expert's conclusions were similar to those of Donnelly. The trial court's continuance until the noon hour was an adequate remedy under these circumstances and Dye has demonstrated no prejudice as a result of this ruling.