Opinion ID: 2607459
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Tape-recorded Statements

Text: Defendant willingly participated in two separate interviews with detectives before his arrest. The interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed, and involved about six and one-half hours of dialogue. (11a) Defendant claims the court erred in denying his midtrial motion to play the tapes for the jury. As we will explain, no basis for reversal appears. On direct examination, the prosecution asked Detective Biondi to recount defendant's statements on a narrow range of interview topics, particularly the time defendant left Progressive and arrived home the day of the crimes. According to Biondi, defendant consistently maintained that he left Progressive around 2 p.m., and stated at one point that he arrived home as early as 2:30 p.m. This information conflicted with testimony previously given by two prosecution witnesses (the gardener and Brenda) that defendant had not left Progressive by 3:30 p.m. and that he arrived home at 5 p.m. On cross-examination of Biondi, defense counsel tried to elicit defendant's interview statements on two subjects not previously raised. The prosecutor objected on hearsay grounds. Outside the jury's presence, defense counsel explained he was laying a foundation for introduction of the entire tape-recorded interviews. Counsel asked that the tapes be played so that the jury could assess his state of mind. The prosecutor conceded that defendant could introduce any testimony or taped portion of the interviews that clarified excerpts already given by Biondi, but insisted no such clarification was necessary here. The court ruled defendant's state of mind was not in issue and denied the motion to admit the tapes. The court also sustained the prosecutor's hearsay objections and limited cross-examination of Biondi to topics raised on direct examination. Defense counsel subsequently cross-examined Biondi at length concerning defendant's statements about the timing of his movements the day of the crimes. Related sections of the transcribed interviews were also read into evidence. On at least two subsequent occasions, defendant renewed his request to play the tapes. Each time, the court cited its prior ruling and denied the motion. Thereafter, defendant testified he was tired during the interviews and did not know when he left Progressive or arrived home on Labor Day. Defendant contends the tapes suggest that he was disoriented during the interviews and that his time estimates were mere guesses made in response to highly suggestive questioning. The court assertedly erred in excluding this evidence under state law because it rebutted any inference that he lied to police. Defendant also suggests the court's ruling violated various federal constitutional guarantees (due process, presentation of a defense, and reliable death judgment). (12) Defendant correctly observes that where one party has introduced part of a conversation, the opposing party may admit any other part necessary to place the original excerpts in context. (Evid. Code, § 356; People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1174 [259 Cal. Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730].) It follows that if excerpts of a recorded conversation are admitted in a form  such as participant testimony or written transcripts  that creates a misleading impression, the recording itself may be proffered as necessary to correct that misimpression. (11b) For several reasons, however, no reversible error occurred here. In the first place, any claim that evidence was wrongly excluded cannot be raised on appeal absent an offer of proof in the trial court. (Evid. Code, § 354.) Defendant made no offer of proof as to how the tapes of his police interviews might correct any misimpressions allegedly created by the testimony and transcripts actually before the jury. In addition, a trial court has broad discretion to exclude evidence it deems irrelevant, cumulative, or unduly prejudicial or time-consuming. (Evid. Code, § 352.) Here, the court heard the entire tape recording of defendant's interviews before trial. In denying defendant's midtrial motion to play the tapes, the court rejected a vague claim that the tapes were necessary to illustrate a pertinent state of mind. One reasonable inference is that the court implicitly exercised its discretion and concluded the tapes would not materially assist the defense. Finally, we have independently reviewed the tapes and conclude it would have been an abuse of discretion to admit them on the theory now urged. Defendant speaks in a relaxed and confident tone throughout, and no evidence of psychological coercion or strain appears. The tapes amply support Detective Biondi's testimony that defendant was adamant about the time he claimed to have left the crime scene. Thus, any failure by the court to exercise its discretion in excluding the tapes was harmless under any standard.