Opinion ID: 3001084
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The One-Year Removal Limit in Diversity Cases

Text: Price also seeks refuge in the one-year limitation found in the second paragraph of § 1446(b). Section 1446(b) provides: The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been 10 No. 06-2072 filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter. If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable, except that a case may not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year after commencement of the action. (Emphasis added.) Price claims that the emphasized language prevents removal in all diversity cases more than one year after the case was commenced; the defendants counter that the one-year bar applies only to cases that were not removable when initially filed. The most obvious problem with Price’s argument is that it rests on the illogical premise we have already rejected: that the removal clock somehow continues to run after a lawsuit has been voluntarily dismissed. It goes without saying that a dismissed case cannot be removed; removal time limits do not continue to run after a case has been dismissed. The Prices voluntarily dismissed their lawsuit two weeks after it was filed, and their counsel failed—intentionally, it seems—to give the defendants notice of its reinstatement. The defendants filed for removal eight days after first receiving service of any sort of notice of the reinstated lawsuit. This is well within the one-year bar, even assuming it has any relevance here.6 6 Although not necessary to our decision here, we note that every circuit to have considered the question (albeit in very different procedural contexts) has held that the one-year bar is applicable (continued...) No. 06-2072 11 Before moving on, we pause to emphasize the absurdity of Price’s arguments about the timeliness of the removal. Neither the language of nor the purposes behind the time limits contained in § 1446(b) could possibly support a reading that the limits run against defendants who are unaware of the pending claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (removal shall be sought within 30 days of receipt of the complaint or within 30 days of receiving the first removable pleading) (emphasis added); Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999) (“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.”); Wilson v. Intercollegiate (Big Ten) Conference Athletic Ass’n, 668 F.2d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1982) (“The purpose of the 30-day limitation is twofold: to deprive the defendant of the undeserved tactical advantage that he would have if he could wait and see how he was faring in state court before deciding whether to remove the case to another court system; and to prevent the delay and waste of resources involved in starting a case over in a second court after significant proceedings, extending over months or even years, may have taken place in the first court.”). 6 (...continued) to cases that are not initially removable. See Brown v. Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 284 F.3d 871, 873 (8th Cir. 2002); Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 534 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1076, (2000); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deshotel, 142 F.3d 873, 886 (5th Cir. 1998); Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1316-17 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 963 (1998). The clause containing the one-year bar is part of the paragraph specifically addressing the time limits for cases that are not initially removable; its placement in this paragraph indicates that it modifies only the immediately preceding language in the same paragraph, not the more general time limitation contained in the preceding paragraph. 12 No. 06-2072 That an attorney could in good faith expect to prevail on such baseless arguments is difficult to fathom.