Opinion ID: 2639069
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Two Faces of Entanglement

Text: Under venerable establishment clause precedent, however, the exemption itself is problematic. To put it bluntly, the government may generally separate the religious from the secular to decide how it will dispense its benefits, but it cannot parse a bona fide religious organization into secular and religious components solely to impose burdens on the secular portion. As noted, ante, the constitutional basis for the distinction seems indisputable. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that government action may burden the free exercise of religion in two different ways: by interfering with a believer's ability to observe the commands or practices of his faith [citations], and by encroaching on the ability of a church to manage its internal affairs. ( Catholic University, supra, 83 F.3d at p. 460; see, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (1993) 508 U.S. 520, 531-533, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 ( Lukumi ); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, supra, 344 U.S. at p. 116, 73 S.Ct. 143 [free exercise clause protects power of religious organizations to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine].) If Catholic Charities were a religious employer it would be exempt from the WCEA's requirement to include coverage for contraceptives in its group healthcare policy. Under the act, a religious employer must satisfy all of the following criteria: (A) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the entity. [¶] (B) The entity primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the entity. [¶] (C) The entity serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the entity. [¶] (D) The entity is a nonprofit organization as described in Section 6033(a)(2)(A)i or iii, of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. (Health & Saf.Code, § 1367.25, subd. (b)(1).) As the majority notes, Catholic Charities does not qualify as a `religious employer' under the WCEA because it does not meet any of the definition's four criteria. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 292, 85 P.3d at p. 75, italics added.) But Catholic Charities would be a religious employer if the Legislature had not designed the exemption narrowly enough to exclude it. [2] The plaintiffs contend the Legislature has deliberately defined the Catholic Church in a manner entirely inconsistent with Catholic religious teaching, to exclude critical, constitutive elements of the Catholic Church  i.e., the Church's healthcare, social service and educational ministries  from the definition of `religious employer' included in the exemption provisions. The high court `has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment Clause.' ( Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos (1987) 483 U.S. 327, 334, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 ( Amos ).) At the same time, acknowledging that churches often regard the community services provided by affiliated nonprofits as a means of fulfilling religious duty and providing an example of the way of life a church seeks to foster ( id. at p. 344, 107 S.Ct. 2862 (conc. opn. of Brennan, J.)), the court concluded the case-by-case determination of whether an affiliated nonprofit is religious or secular is inappropriate under the free exercise clause. ( Id. at pp. 341-342, 107 S.Ct. 2862 (conc. opn. of Brennan, J.) [Religion includes important communal elements for most believers. They exercise their religion through religious organizations and these organizations must be protected by the [Free Exercise] Clause.... [R]eligious activity derives meaning in large measure from participation in a larger religious community].) Even after Smith, it seems quite clear the government may not discriminate among religions ( Larson v. Valente (1982) 456 U.S. 228, 253, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33) or engender a risk of politicizing religion ( id. at pp. 253-254, 102 S.Ct. 1673) or purport to exempt religious but not secular activities ( Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 301, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213; Espinosa v. Rusk (10th Cir.1980) 634 F.2d 477, 480-481, affd. (1982) 456 U.S. 951, 102 S.Ct. 2025, 72 L.Ed.2d 477). In National Labor Relations Board v. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago (1979) 440 U.S. 490, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 59 L.Ed.2d 533 ( Catholic Bishop ), the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) certified unions as bargaining agents for lay teachers in church-affiliated schools. The NLRB asserted it was required to decline jurisdiction only when schools were `completely religious' and not just `religiously associated.' ( Id. at p. 493, 99 S.Ct. 1313.) The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the NLRB's standard as a `simplistic black or white, purported rule' which offered no guide to discretion. ( Id. at p. 495, 99 S.Ct. 1313.) `The real difficulty is found in the chilling aspect that the requirement of bargaining will impose on the exercise of the bishops' control of the religious mission of the schools.' ( Id. at p. 496, 99 S.Ct. 1313.) The Supreme Court, after acknowledging that the NLRB's attempt to distinguish between `completely religious' and `religiously associated' was a recognition of its intrusion into areas protected by the religion clauses, construed the National Labor Relations Act so as to avoid deciding whether jurisdiction was constitutionally permissible under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. ( Catholic Bishop, at p. 499, 99 S.Ct. 1313.) Nevertheless, the court expressed concern that NLRB jurisdiction would inevitably involve inquiry into the good faith of the position asserted by clergy-administrators and its relationship to the school's religious mission, and the very process of inquiry would impinge on rights guaranteed by the religion clauses. ( Catholic Bishop, at p. 502, 99 S.Ct. 1313.) In Universidad Central de Bayamon v. NLRB (1st Cir.1985) 793 F.2d 383, 387, the NLRB sought to avoid the problem by exempting `pervasively sectarian' schools. The controlling opinion in Universidad Central de Bayamon found board jurisdiction posed just as great a risk as the Supreme Court envisioned in Catholic Bishop, supra, 440 U.S. 490, 99 S.Ct. 1313. For the Board to exercise jurisdiction over an educational institution where `the inculcation of religious values is at least one purpose of the institution' and `to promise that courts in the future will control the Board's efforts to examine religious matters, is to tread the path that Catholic Bishop forecloses.' ( Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB (D.C.Cir.2002) 278 F.3d 1335, 1342 ( Great Falls ), quoting Universidad Central de Bayamon v. NLRB , at p. 402.) In Great Falls, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the NLRB's latest effort  the substantial religious character test  because the multifaceted analysis created the same concerns as the approach rejected in Catholic Bishop. Moreover, the court invoked a long line of precedents which have made it clear that religious tests, inquiries into religious perspectives, or generally trolling through a person's or institution's religious beliefs is `not only unnecessary but also offensive.' ( Great Falls, supra, 278 F.3d at pp. 1341-1342, quoting Mitchell v. Helms (2000) 530 U.S. 793, 828, 120 S.Ct. 2530, 147 L.Ed.2d 660; Amos, supra, 483 U.S. 327, 340, 345, 107 S.Ct. 2862 (conc. opn. of Brennan, J.).) The court in Great Falls thus suggested a broad exemption which would avoid the pitfalls of having the government determine what is religious or how much religion is sufficient. The court would exempt any school which purports to provide a religious environment; is organized as a nonprofit; and affiliated with, or owned, or operated, or controlled directly or indirectly by a recognized religious organization or entity whose membership is determined at least in part with reference to religion. ( Great Falls, supra, 278 F.3d at p. 1343.) The point of this bright-line test was to avoid delving into religious doctrine or motive and to avoid coercing a religiously affiliated educational institution to alter its religious mission to meet regulatory demands. ( Id. at p. 1345.) This approach responds to a longstanding concern that the religious liberty protected by the Constitution ought not to depend on a determination by state authority as to what is a religious cause. ( Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. at p. 307, 60 S.Ct. 900.) Of course, the cited cases are distinguishable. The controversy here does not involve solicitation, or potential chilling effects, religious schools, administrative discretion, or ad hoc determinations. In reality, this case is worse. Here we are dealing with an intentional, purposeful intrusion into a religious organization's expression of its religious tenets and sense of mission. The government is not accidentally or incidentally interfering with religious practice; it is doing so willfully by making a judgment about what is or is not religious. This is precisely the sort of behavior that has been condemned in every other context. The conduct is hardly less offensive because it is codified. Definition may be just as pernicious as ongoing monitoring if its purpose is to suppress or burden religious conduct. ( Espinosa v. Rusk, supra, 634 F.2d at p. 481 [The conception of religion entertained by the City ... was that it had to be purely spiritual or evangelical. Thus, the charitable activity of the church having to do with the feeding of the hungry or the offer of clothing and shelter to the poor was deemed subject to regulation. This broad definition of secular is part of the problem].)