Opinion ID: 2369836
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Composition of Grand and Petit Juries

Text: Defendant contends that the Camden County jury-selection system violated his rights to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community and to equal protection of law, and also violated his statutory right to a randomly-drawn representative jury, in violation of the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:70 and:71.
In evaluating the constitutional challenge, we briefly review the principles set forth in State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 215-38, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987). Without restating the principles in detail, we may summarize by stating that under the constitutional guarantees, selection of both grand and petit juries must be free from any taint of discriminatory purpose and the jurors must be drawn from pools that represent a fair cross-section of the community. To prove either an equal-protection or a fair-cross-section claim, defendant must (1) identify a constitutionally-cognizable group, that is, a group capable of being singled out for discriminatory treatment; (2) prove substantial underrepresentation over a significant period of time; and (3) show discriminatory purpose either by the strength of his statistical showing or by showing the use of racially non-neutral selection procedures to support the inference of discrimination raised by substantial underrepresentation. State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 215-16, 524 A. 2d 188. In sum, we primarily focus on the cognizability of the group in question, the substantiality of the underrepresentation, and the possible causes of it. For purposes of this appeal, we shall accept that the assertedly underrepresented minorities (Blacks, Hispanics, and Puerto Ricans) would meet the first prong of the test. We shall also accept, for purposes of this appeal, the statistics set forth in defendant's brief with respect to the representation of those minorities. The data are as follows: UNDERREPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES Camden County DATA STANDARDS OF REPRESENTATIVENESS Qual. Stat. Pop'n. Pool Absolute Comparative Sign. GROUP (%) (%) (%) (%) (sd) ----------------------------------------------------------------- Blacks 13.37 9.57 3.8 28.42 2.27 Hispanics 3.27 .93 2.34 71.56 2.59 Puerto Ricans 2.65 .47 2.18 82.26 3.28 In Ramseur we explained the meaning of those various standards of representativeness. 106 N.J. at 219-27, 524 A. 2d 188. We shall not repeat them here except in the simplest terms. Absolute disparity measures the difference between the proportion of the subject group in the general population and its proportion to the jury pool, that is, the qualified list. Comparative disparity builds on that figure by using the absolute-disparity figure and constructing a ratio to measure the magnitude of the disparity given the difference in population size. For example, a four-percent absolute disparity in a fifty-percent population represents an eight-percent comparative disparity, whereas that same four-percent absolute disparity in a population of eight percent is a fifty-percent comparative disparity. The comparative-disparity standard is more likely to register underrepresentation of smaller groups. The smaller the group, the more significant is any deviation. The third approach, the statistical significance test, measures the likelihood that aspects of the selection process do not operate randomly. That test is an entirely statistical analysis in which the statistician assumes absolute neutrality in the selection process and measures the statistical likelihood of deviation from the expected. In Ramseur, we gave the following example. The jury-selection process in which two groups are being compared can be likened to filling a box with a population of one thousand slips of paper of which six hundred are pink and four hundred are grey, and having someone randomly select a sample of one hundred slips. The expected number of pink slips would be sixty and the expected number of grey slips would be forty. That is, in any drawing there would be a sixty percent probability of drawing a pink slip and a forty percent probability of selecting a grey one. However, a statistician would not be surprised if the number of pink slips deviated from the expected. Statisticians measure that deviation by a formula that enables them to tell whether the result is so far from the expected as to demonstrate the result was not random or by chance. A complex mathematical formula determines that standard deviation. For example, in the case of the one-hundred-slip sample, a statistician expects that the standard deviation would be plus or minus 4.8 slips. (Calculations omitted, see Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 221 n. 44, 524 A. 2d 188.) If the result of a drawing were to yield only thirty pink slips, that would be approximately six standard deviations (6 X 4.8) away from the expected. A statistician assumes that a result more than two or three standard deviations from the expected would be suspect. In this case the statistics submitted with respect to underrepresentation of minorities are not disturbing except with respect to the comparative disparity of Hispanics and Puerto Ricans. As we noted in Ramseur, if these cases [dealing with underrepresentation of groups] have a common thread, it is that a comparative disparity well over fifty percent is strong evidence of underrepresentation cognizable under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. 106 N.J. at 220, 524 A. 2d 188 (quoting State v. Lopez, 107 Idaho 726, 733, 692 P. 2d 370, 377 (Ct.App. 1984)). With respect to the comparative disparity concerning underrepresentation of Hispanics and Puerto Ricans, we are satisfied that that does not demonstrate a constitutional underrepresentation because of the very small percentage of the population pool thereby represented. A comparative disparity of about fifty percent may or may not be adequate to show such underrepresentation, depending in part on the size of the group in question. State v. Lopez, supra, 107 Idaho at 733, 692 P. 2d at 377. The absolute disparity becomes magnified when converted to a measurement of comparative disparity because of the smallness of the sample used. The statistical-significance test confirms the inefficacy of the comparative-disparity figure. In the case of Hispanics and Puerto Ricans, the statistical significance of the discrepancy is very close to the two or three standard deviations from the expected and thus is not constitutionally suspect. But even were those numbers themselves to straddle the borderline of substantial underrepresentation, we would look to the circumstances surrounding the statistical showing to determine its full constitutional import. Generally speaking, when jury-selection systems have been found to be constitutionally underrepresentative on the basis of statistical showings of underrepresentation, objective selection criteria such as voting registration and drivers' licenses, as were used in this case, are not present. See State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 225, 524 A. 2d 188. In addition, courts have looked at the time period over which violations are alleged. That inquiry goes to the existence of a history of exclusion. In this case, as in Ramseur, we have evidence based on only one survey of 500 jurors from a 1984 mailing. Not only does the survey fail to cover a significant period of time, but reforms were apparently made to the system the following year, rendering the data and resulting conclusions at least partly outdated. Given the borderline nature of the disparities shown, we do not find inadequacies that rise to constitutional dimension.
N.J.S.A. 2A:70-4 requires the assignment judge of a county to merge the lists of registered voters and holders of motor vehicle licenses to compile a single list from which all jurors shall be selected. Defendant makes specific objections that he asserts demonstrate such a deviation from established statutory requirements that the indictment must be dismissed. For purposes of this appeal we shall accept defendant's version of the record. (The State will be free in any collateral proceedings to dispute these assertions.) (1) Elimination of Zip Codes. In the mailing of questionnaires before the spring of 1985, seven or eight zip codes were eliminated from the drivers' license lists. The population within Camden County for those zip codes represented over one-fifth of the whole county population. The various jury-selection officials agreed that most of the zip codes were eliminated because they embraced areas that fell partially outside of Camden County. (2) Failure to Eliminate Duplicates. This is the match-merge problem that we described in State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 130-31, 549 A. 2d 792 (1988). The computers fail to recognize that some people use different names on voting or driver lists, resulting in two Jones at the same address. (3) History File Exclusion. Once a juror in Camden has been excused for one reason or another, the name is put in a history file. Often a juror who may be disqualified at one time (as for pregnancy) could be later qualified, but insufficient attention was paid to the history file to restore names to the eligible list. The result, claims defendant, is that as many as two-thirds of the eligible jurors are in that category of ineligibility. (4) Inactive-Voter File. The inactive-voter file was used to cull names from the jury list, but the fact that one does not vote does not mean that one is not eligible to serve as a juror. Although there may be some who are removed from voting lists because they have died or moved, there was an insufficient explanation of why that practice should be followed, especially in the case of persons whose names appeared on the motor-vehicle lists. (5) High No-Response Rate. Defendant points to inaction by the jury commissioners in the face of a persistently high no-response rate of up to 32.8%. That means that 32% of the people to whom questionnaires had been sent simply failed to return them or otherwise to show why they should be included or excluded from the juror lists. A court directive requires that a no-response rate above 15% be reported to the assignment judge. (6) Improper Disqualification. Defendant claims that the non-retention of the received questionnaires of disqualified jurors made it impossible to resolve conflicting testimony regarding (1) medical disabilities regularly allowed without documentation; (2) exemptions for care of minor children; (3) exclusion of students who were county residents; and (4) exclusion of teachers even during summer months. That was described by defendant as making it very easy for county residents to avoid jury service and compounds the other defects set forth in his brief. In State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A. 2d 188, we considered whether discrepancies in statutory or administrative directives with respect to jury selection necessitated the dismissal of an indictment. We repeat what we said there: We do not construe our state's statute as requiring dismissal of the indictment whenever the statutory commands are breached, regardless of the nature or effect of the violations or the intent of those who committed them. Id. at 231-32, 524 A. 2d 188. The judicial power to dismiss an indictment is not to be exercised except on the clearest and plainest grounds, and an indictment should stand unless manifestly deficient or palpably defective. State v. Wein, 80 N.J. 491, 501, 404 A. 2d 302 (1979); State v. Weleck, 10 N.J. 355, 364, 91 A. 2d 751 (1952). We said that violations of our jury-selection regulations should warrant a dismissal of an indictment only where they substantially undermine the randomness and objectivity of the selection mechanism or cause harm to the defendant. State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 232, 524 A. 2d 188. With respect to the selection of petit juries, we recognize that in some circumstances the special fundamental role played by the petit jury in our system of criminal justice may call for reversal of the conviction because of improper selection procedures, even in the absence of a showing of prejudice. State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 406, 129 A. 2d 417 (1957); State v. Wagner, 180 N.J. Super. 564, 567, 435 A. 2d 1190 (App.Div. 1981). In Kociolek, the trial court had employed one of its regular criminal panels, contrary to a statute requiring the special drawing of a forty-eight-member panel prior to trial for murder. A majority of the Court agreed that that violation alone would have required reversal, even absent a showing of actual prejudice. The Court described the statutory requirement as a course of procedure so imperative in expression as to bar waiver by the defendant or his counsel where the indictment is for treason or murder. 23 N.J. at 406-07, 129 A. 2d 417. State v. Wagner, supra , involved an even more blatant violation of the statutory provisions governing the selection of petit juries that required jurors' names to be [d]rawn from the box, one at a time. 180 N.J. Super. at 567, 435 A. 2d 1190 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:74-1). The trial court simply seated the first fourteen jurors to enter the courtroom and replaced excused jurors by calling on other jurors seated in various rows by going right down the row. Id. at 566, 435 A. 2d 1190. Those are such plain and blatant violations of law that they cannot be condoned. But what we have here are inefficiencies rather than invidiousness. There is no suggestion whatsoever that any of the failings were in any way intended to undermine the randomness of the jury-selection process. Underrepresentation is not defined by comparing the representation that would have occurred randomly with the actual representation of the group on the jury. Rather, underrepresentation must be proved, by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as grand jurors. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1280, 51 L.Ed. 2d 498, 510 (1977). In addition, although defendant is indeed entitled to have his challenge based on the array and not the individual panel chosen, we note simply that of the twelve-person panel actually chosen for the trial and penalty phases, two of the five men were black and two of the seven women were black. Of the four alternates, all women, one was black. Although the procedures used obviously implicated the randomness of the selection process, there is no showing that they substantially undermined the randomness principle. When, as here, the purpose of the official's action was not impermissibly to exclude members of a cognizable group, the asserted statutory violations do not call for a dismissal of the indictment or a reversal of the conviction. Defendant interprets the opinion of the court below as not calling for a correction or improvement in the noted deficiencies, but we are certain that the motion judge who now sits as the assignment judge intended his opinion to have that effect. When he said that the Camden County Selection Process had to be corrected, but that the deviations from the New Jersey Jury Selection Statutes directives do not rise to a level constituting grounds for relief, we are certain he intended that changes be made. In sum, although the noted deficiencies may be considered somewhat more than merely technical, here, as in State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 469, 575 A. 2d 435 (1990), and State v. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 131, 549 A. 2d 792, there was no evidence that the grand- and petit-jury panels, as composed, were not representative of the community, nor was there any suggestion that the independence of the grand or petit jury had been compromised. None of these practices reduced a minority's representation to impotence or restrict[ed] unreasonably the possibility that the petit jury will comprise a representative cross-section of the community. State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 529, 511 A. 2d 1150 (1986). The methods used were in no sense an attempt to undermine or inject invidious discrimination into randomness. The goal was an objectively random list that reached substantially all eligible sectors of the juror pool.