Opinion ID: 2584210
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Is a fire fighter attending a 12-week training program a LEOFF Plan II member?

Text: ¶ 18 The City filed a motion for summary judgment in the trial court, contending that the court lacked jurisdiction over Locke's suit against the City because Locke was a fire fighter trainee and therefore not a LEOFF member entitled to sue under RCW 41.26.281. The trial court denied summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that the evidence revealed that the City enrolled Locke as a fire fighter and that the relevant law did not distinguish between fire fighter trainees and fully trained fire fighters. We review summary judgment de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court. City of Sequim v. Malkasian, 157 Wash.2d 251, 261, 138 P.3d 943 (2006). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). ¶ 19 LEOFF defines `[f]ire fighter' as [a]ny person who is serving on a full time, fully compensated basis as a member of a fire department of an employer and who is serving in a position which requires passing a civil service examination for fire fighter, and who is actively employed as such. RCW 41.26.030(4)(a). The Department of Retirement Systems has also promulgated an administrative code governing the definition of a fire fighter. According to the code, a fire fighter is someone employed in a uniformed fire fighter position by an employer on a full-time, fully compensated basis, and as a consequence of . . . employment, . . . [has] the legal authority and responsibility to direct or perform fire protection activities that are required for and directly concerned with preventing, controlling and extinguishing fires. WAC 415-104-225(2). The WAC further defines `[f]ire protection activities' to include incidental functions such as housekeeping, equipment maintenance, . . . fire safety inspections, lecturing, performing community fire drills. . . . These activities qualify as fire protection activities only if the primary duty of [the] position is preventing, controlling and extinguishing fires. WAC 415-104-225(2)(a). According to WAC 415-104-225(2)(d), a person is a fire fighter, regardless of [his or her] rank or status as a probationary or permanent employee or [his or her] particular specialty or job title. ¶ 20 In the instant case, the evidence at summary judgment revealed that Locke passed the City of Seattle Public Safety Civil Service Commission fire fighter examination on June 26, 1999, with a score of 94.66  placing him in the top 25 percent of all exam takers. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 2060, 2120. As a result of Locke's exceptional score, the City offered him employment as an entry level Fire Fighter in a March 27, 2000 letter. Id. at 2121-22 ([C]ongratulations on your appointment as an entry level Fire Fighter.). The letter further explained that upon acceptance of the offer of employment Locke would enter recruit training  a 12-week program beginning April 19, 2000. Locke reported to recruit training as directed on April 19, 2000. Locke also filled out a State of Washington Department of Retirement Systems Enrollment Form, which listed his job title as FIRE FIGHTER and enrolled him in LEOFF Plan II. Id. at 2123. On September 15, 2003, the Seattle Fire Department sent Locke a letter confirming that, Since the effective date of your appointment to Fire Fighter, April 19, 2000, you have been a LEOFF II Retirement System member. Id. at 2125. ¶ 21 The City argues that this evidence was insufficient to establish that Locke was a fire fighter. Specifically, the City contends that Locke was not a fire fighter because he was a member of a recruit class. The City likewise argues that Locke was not a fire fighter because he did not have the legal authority and responsibility to direct or perform fire protection activities. WAC 415-104-225(2). ¶ 22 We reject the City's arguments and hold that Locke was a fire fighter for purposes of LEOFF. The evidence established that Locke was serving in a position which requires passing a civil service examination for fire fighter, within the meaning of RCW 41.26.030(4)(a). Even under the WAC definition of fire fighter, Locke had the legal authority to perform fire protection activities, even if those activities were done in relation to training. As amicus curiae International Association of Fire Fighters notes, fire fighters often undergo regular training exercises throughout their career and are fire fighters during their training periods. As the Court of Appeals in this case observed, the city's proposed narrow definition of `fire fighter' . . . discounts the value placed by the legislature upon those who undertake the risks involved in fire fighter training. Locke, 133 Wash.App. at 712, 137 P.3d 52. Accordingly, we affirm on this issue.