Opinion ID: 2974091
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officer Davis’s Testimony

Text: Thompson also contends that the prosecutor denied him a fair trial by eliciting evidence of his post-Miranda silence. At trial, the following exchange took place between Officer Juan Davis and the prosecutor: -6- No. 05-1793 USA v. Thompson Q: At some point and time did you have any other contact with Mr. Thompson? A: Well, yes. Upon confiscation of suspected cocaine, I placed the Defendant under arrest and I recovered some U.S. currency which I turned over to the OIC then I advised the Defendant of his constitutional rights, which I didn’t get any—receive any response from that. Q: Now in terms of confiscating money from—I’m sorry, not confiscating. So that we’re clear, when you say a confiscation, what does that mean to you? The Supreme Court established in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-20 (1976), that the prosecution may not use a defendant’s post-Miranda silence “to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.” Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 763 (1987) (quotation omitted). Thompson argues that the prosecutor violated Doyle by eliciting evidence of his post-arrest silence. The government maintains that it did not act improperly because it did not intend to elicit such testimony. We discern no plain error. This is not a case like Doyle and its progeny, in which “the trial court . . . permitted specific inquiry or argument respecting the defendant’s post-Miranda silence.” Id. at 764; see United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1222 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e have held that if the prosecution mentions the defendant’s silence only in passing, and makes no specific inquiry or argument about the defendant’s post-arrest silence, there is no due process violation.”). It is evident from the exchange in this case that the prosecutor had no intention of eliciting testimony regarding Thompson’s silence. “Doyle does not impose a prima facie bar against any mention whatsoever of a defendant’s [invoking his Miranda rights], but instead guards against the exploitation of that constitutional right -7- No. 05-1793 USA v. Thompson by the prosecutor.” Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir. 1991). “[T]he inadvertent mention” of a defendant’s post-Miranda silence does not by itself offend Doyle. See id. Thompson additionally complains that the prosecution introduced his post-arrest statements without proving that he waived his Miranda rights. Specifically, Davis testified that Thompson provided his address and other biographical information in response to Davis’s questions. But “[t]his court has adopted the view that . . . the routine gathering of biographical data for booking purposes should not constitute interrogation under Miranda,” United States v. Clark, 982 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted), and the district court did not plainly err by admitting Davis’s testimony. 3. Testimony that Only Thompson Was Charged with a Felony Thompson accuses the prosecution of improperly eliciting testimony that the police arrested Thompson and only issued citations to the other individuals at the house during the raid. Such testimony, Thompson asserts, “conveyed the clear and unmistakable message that only [he] could be responsible for the alleged crimes” and “implied that the government possessed additional but unexpressed knowledge that [he] was guilty.” We disagree that this testimony conveyed such a clear and unmistakable message, and Thompson offers no case law to support his position. Assuming the testimony to be improper, we nevertheless conclude that Thompson fails to meet his “burden of showing that the prosecutorial misconduct in the present case was so exceptionally flagrant that it constitutes plain error.” Modena, 302 F.3d at 635 (quotation omitted). -8- No. 05-1793 USA v. Thompson