Opinion ID: 543063
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Racketeering and RICO Conspiracy.

Text: 13 We need not differentiate between the first two counts for purposes of appellant's sufficiency challenge. In this case, there is a considerable overlap. Count 2 is premised on 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(c), which makes it unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise ... affect[ing] interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.... To prove such a substantive RICO violation, the prosecution must show (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity, which in turn necessitates (5) the commission of two or more predicate crimes. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3285, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985). 14 On the other hand, Count 1 is premised on 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(d), which renders it unlawful for any person to conspire to violate certain provisions of RICO, including section 1962(c). To convict for such a RICO conspiracy, the prosecution must prove (1) that a common plan existed (2) to conduct an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, that (3) the defendant knowingly joined the venture, and (4) embarked upon, or agreed to carry it out, by committing, or agreeing to the commission of, two or more predicate crimes in connection with his enterprise participation. See Boylan, 898 F.2d at 241; United States v. Torres Lopez, 851 F.2d 520, 528 (1st Cir.1988), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1144, 103 L.Ed.2d 204 (1989); United States v. Angiulo, 847 F.2d 956, 964 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928, 109 S.Ct. 314, 102 L.Ed.2d 332 (1988). 15 Inasmuch as the conspiracy charge in this case posits the commission of the very racketeering activity which count 2 charges substantively, the proof required to uphold the guilty verdict on Count 1 would perforce suffice to uphold the guilty verdict on Count 2. 5 We concentrate, therefore, on Ruiz's challenge to Count 1. 16 1. Applicability. Ruiz begins by arguing that Congress did not intend RICO to reach the type of conduct which occurred here. The statute, he exhorts, was enacted as an antidote to certain organized crime activities and was never intended to encompass acts such as Ruiz carried out to support his drug habit. The plea is bootless; the Court has explicitly rejected the notion that any such limiting principle constrains RICO's scope. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 2905, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989) (Congress ... chose to enact a more general statute ... not limited in application to organized crime.); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495, 105 S.Ct. at 3284 (Section 1962 [was directed toward] 'any person'--not just mobsters). RICO prosecutions need not have an organized crime nexus. 17 2. Pattern of Racketeering Activity. Defendant's participation in the LPD is admitted. Moreover, the parties stipulated that the LPD was an enterprise the conduct of which affected interstate commerce. Thus, we consider the alleged pattern of racketeering activity. 18 Under RICO, proof of a pattern requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(5), commonly described as predicate acts, predicate crimes, or simply predicates. The jury convicted Ruiz on counts 7-10. It cannot be gainsaid that these four convictions, not challenged on appeal, each constituted a predicate act in the basic RICO sense. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(1)(D) (defining racketeering activity to include, inter alia, numerous drug offenses). In addition, each time Ruiz accepted cocaine as payment for forbearance (i.e., not arresting a dealer), he violated M.G.L. ch. 268A, Sec. 2(b). Each such violation was itself capable of qualifying as a predicate act. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(1)(A). Ruiz nonetheless asserts that these crimes do not show racketeering activity because the necessary concatenation is lacking between them and the enterprise (the LPD). The assertion will not withstand the most cursory scrutiny. 19 Ruiz's acquisition of cocaine, and his quid pro quo conduct, were inextricably intertwined with his authority and activities as an employee of the LPD. His ability to intimidate dealers with the power of arrest, his access to RMV data and inside information anent warrants, his assistance in transporting cocaine, and his ability to supply ammunition were all made possible through, or facilitated by, his employment. In fine, defendant's illegal activities were clearly helped along by the authority vested in him as a police officer and by the reactions (fear and timorousness in some instances) which a police officer, uniquely, has the ability to engender in others by virtue of his position. The necessary nexus between a racketeering enterprise and predicate crimes can be based on circumstantial as well as direct evidence and can be guided by reasonable inference. In this situation, there was ample room for the jury to find a snug fit between defendant's acts and the enterprise. 20 Forging a link between appellant's criminality and his participation in the LPD does not end this phase of our inquiry. It is well settled that something more than proof of two predicate acts is needed to prove that a pattern took shape. Boylan, 898 F.2d at 249-50. The something more has two principal components: relatedness and continuity. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. at 3285 n. 14 (it is continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern) (quoting S.Rep. No. 91-617 (1969)). We think that both components were present in this case. 21 For a prosecution to succeed, the predicate crimes must be sufficiently related to one another and threaten to be more than an isolated occurrence. Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 30 (1st Cir.1987). Relatedness necessitates showing that the predicates have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3575(e). In this instance, the various acts which Ruiz performed were closely aligned and had a number of obvious similarities. All were intended to aid his criminal associates. All were intended to earn cocaine for his own use, usually in the form of PUQs. The main method of operation--forbearance--was repeated over and over again. Subsidiary methods, e.g., peddling information, furnishing bullets, escorting dealers, were also repeated. The numerosity of the defendant's acts, the drug trafficking involvement of those with whom he dealt, and the collocation of so many common characteristics, Boylan, 898 F.2d at 251, were more than enough to prove the essential relationship. 22 We move next to continuity. To establish a RICO pattern, the racketeering predicates must amount to, or constitute a threat of, continuing criminal activity. See H.J. Inc., 109 S.Ct. at 2900-01; Boylan, 898 F.2d at 250; Fleet Credit Corp. v. Sion, 893 F.2d 441, 445 (1st Cir.1990). Continuity demands a case-by-case approach; it may be demonstrated, for example, by proving a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time, or by proving that the predicates are a regular way of ... conducting or participating in an ongoing and legitimate RICO 'enterprise,'  or by proving that the predicates form a closed period of repeated conduct. H.J. Inc., 109 S.Ct. at 2902. In the final analysis, it is temporality which constitutes the core of continuity. See Boylan, 898 F.2d at 250; Fleet Credit, 893 F.2d at 445-47. 23 In the case before us, the prosecution cleared this hurdle with consummate ease. Over the course of a six year period, Ruiz regularly received cocaine from traffickers in exchange for protecting them from arrest and supplying them with various types of confidential information and services. The jury could certainly have found that Ruiz's standard operating procedure was to use his official position to facilitate commission of an extended series of related predicates. The fact that the activity continued for so long fully buttressed the conclusion that Ruiz had set up shop and was engaged in a regular way of doing illicit business under the aegis of the enterprise. Indeed, the very facts which established relatedness were in this case also probative of continuity. Cf. Boylan, 898 F.2d at 250 (in practice, proof of continuity often overlaps with proof of relatedness). Continuity was abundantly proven. 24 3. RICO Conspiracy. To establish a RICO conspiracy, of course, more is needed than showing a defendant's participation in racketeering activity: the existence of a conspiratorial scheme, and defendant's entry into it, must likewise be demonstrated. The mainspring of a conspiracy is the existence of a common plan, explicit or implicit, among the conspirators. The agreement, whether tacit or express, may be proven by circumstantial as well as express evidence. United States v. Rivera-Santiago, 872 F.2d 1073, 1079 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 3227, 106 L.Ed.2d 576 (1989). The defendant's intent is critical: In order to prove that a defendant belonged to and participated in a conspiracy, the government must prove two kinds of intent; intent to agree and intent to commit the substantive offenses. Id. In this situation, Ruiz's intent to engage in racketeering activity is beyond further challenge, see supra Part II(A)(2). It remains for us to assess, from the totality of the evidence, whether a rational jury could have found beyond reasonable doubt that Ruiz's efforts were knowingly directed toward the accomplishment of a common goal or overall plan, United States v. Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 17 (1st Cir.1984); and whether the plan included Ruiz's agreement, express or implied, to participate in the LPD's affairs through the commission of a pattern of racketeering activity. See Boylan, 898 F.2d at 241-43. 25 There is no reason to tarry at this juncture. It is not necessary that all defendants participate in all racketeering acts, know of the entire conspiratorial sweep, or be acquainted with all other defendants. Id. at 242; see also Angiulo, 847 F.2d at 969. Fillipon's testimony alone, if credited by the jury, was sufficient to establish the charged conspiracy and defendant's knowing participation in it. The witness' credibility was for the talesmen--not for an appellate court. See, e.g., Jimenez-Perez, 869 F.2d at 12; United States v. Molinares-Charris, 822 F.2d 1213, 1220 (1st Cir.1987). Furthermore, the circumstantial evidence, including the plausible inferences therefrom, pointed toward a finding that a RICO conspiracy existed and that appellant was at its epicenter. 26 It is apodictic that a criminal jury is free to select among conflicting constructions of the evidence. As we recently wrote: The proof need not rule out reasonable alternative hypotheses of innocence so long as the record, in toto, viewed favorably to the government, substantiates a finding of guilt. Boylan, 898 F.2d at 251. Based on the extensive evidence presented at Ruiz's trial, portions of which we have heretofore summarized, the factfinders were fully enfranchised to conclude that the charged conspiracy existed; that appellant willfully joined in it; and that the gist of the unlawful agreement was to conduct LPD business through a pattern of racketeering activity. The law, as we have said, is not so struthious as to compel a criminal jury to ignore that which is perfectly obvious. Ingraham, 832 F.2d at 240. 27 For these reasons, then, we deem the evidence adequate to sustain defendant's convictions on counts 1 and 2. 28