Opinion ID: 2804551
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: In an analogous context, this court has held that denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration was not an immediately appealable collateral order, even though the denial of the original motion--a cross-motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds-- might have qualified for immediate review. Fisichelli v. City Known as Town of Methuen, 884 F.2d 17, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Lora v. O'Heaney, 602 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 2010). We reach the same conclusion here, and explain our reasoning as follows. This circuit uses a four-part test for determining whether an order is sufficiently collateral to be directly appealed prior to entry of a final order ending the district court litigation. Under this test, the order must involve: (1) an issue essentially unrelated to the merits of the main dispute, capable of review without disrupting the main trial; (2) a complete resolution of the issue, not one that is unfinished or inconclusive; (3) a right incapable of vindication on appeal from final judgment; and (4) an important and unsettled question of controlling law, not merely a question of the proper exercise of the trial court's discretion. United States v. Sorren, 605 F.2d 1211, 1213 (1st Cir. 1979); see also Espinal-Dominguez v. Puerto Rico, 352 F.3d 490, 496 (1st Cir. 2003). - 5 - The last of these criteria poses a hurdle too high for the Tribe because its appeal of the Rule 59(e) Motion does not encompass review of the merits of the underlying Motion to Dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. See Fisichelli, 884 F.2d at 19 ([A]ppealing from the denial of a motion to rehear . . . cannot resurrect a party's expired right to contest the appropriateness of the order underlying the motion to rehear.). True, there are some circumstances in which review of a ruling on a timely motion for reconsideration may be considered to encompass the issues raised in the original motion. See McKenna v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 693 F.3d 207, 213-14 (1st Cir. 2012). Extending that latitude to encompass an untimely motion to reconsider, however, would defeat the principle of finality in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 by allowing a party to file at any time a motion for reconsideration rehashing its original argument and then, when that motion is denied, make whatever appeal it had previously foregone. See Fisichelli, 884 F.2d at 19 (noting that allowing a motion to reconsider to revive an expired right to appeal would mean a dilatory defendant would receive not only his allotted bite at the apple, but an invitation to gnaw at will). Thus, if we were to entertain this appeal, we would be deciding only whether the district court abused its discretion in - 6 - denying the untimely Rule 59(e) Motion. See Global NAPS, Inc. v. Verizon New Eng., Inc., 489 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining that denials of motions for reconsideration are reviewed for abuse of discretion). An appeal that directly challenges only the trial court's exercise of discretion in denying a Rule 59(e) motion, rather than the original ruling of law, usually concerns merely a question of the proper exercise of the court's discretion, rather than an important and unsettled question of controlling law, and thus usually fails to pass the fourth part of Sorren's collateral order test.1 Sorren, 605 F.2d at 1213; cf. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313-20 (1995) (holding that the denial of a defendant's motion for summary judgment based on a qualified immunity defense is an immediately appealable collateral order only if the denial was based on a ruling of law and not a determination of contested fact). That the Rule 59(e) Motion itself was untimely, and thus a possible nullity, see Morris v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 430 F.3d 500, 502 (1st Cir. 2005), 1 That being said, we do not answer the question of whether we would have interlocutory jurisdiction over the denial of a request, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 or 60, to revisit the immunity defense when a new fact that speaks to that defense arises after an initial motion to dismiss has been denied and the deadline for appeal or filing a reconsideration motion has passed. One example that comes to mind is a motion based on a new revelation that a waiver that initially appeared to be properly authorized pursuant to express tribal procedures was actually forged. - 7 - further supports the conclusion that this appeal presents an issue too far removed from controlling questions of law, and too focused on questions of discretion, to qualify under the collateral order doctrine.2