Opinion ID: 1101181
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court erred in overruling jones' objection to the admission into evidence of prior, unrelated crimes at his trial.

Text: ¶ 11. Jones first argues that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting into evidence his fourteen-year-old prior felony convictions for distribution of heroin. The State concedes that the admission of these priors was error, but nevertheless argues that the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence against Jones, emphasizing the eyewitness testimony of Officer Kitchens and the tape that was played for the jury (the very tape that Officer Kitchens and the lower court described as poor quality). ¶ 12. The dispositive rule in this case is Miss. R. Evid. 609(b) which provides in pertinent part: Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed ... unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by the specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence. Miss. R. Evid. 609 [2] (emphasis added). ¶ 13. As Rule 609(b) plainly dictates, the first step an offering party must take in order to impeach a witness with evidence of a prior conviction that is more than ten-years-old is to provide the opposing party with advance, written notice of the intent to introduce such evidence. Next, the offering party must meet a threshold burden of showing, prima facie, the probative value of the prior conviction. McGee v. State, 569 So.2d 1191, 1195 (Miss. 1990); Signer v. State, 536 So.2d 10, 13 (Miss. 1988); McInnis v. State, 527 So.2d 84, 88 (Miss. 1988); Johnson v. State, 525 So.2d 809, 812 (Miss. 1988). In short, the offering party must show how the prior conviction suggest[s that] the witness [is] less than credible. McInnis, 527 So.2d at 88. ¶ 14. After this threshold showing, the trial court is then required to conduct an on-the-record weighing of the probative value of the proffered prior conviction versus the prejudicial effect of the prior crime. McGee, 569 So.2d at 1195 ( citing Peterson v. State, 518 So.2d 632, 636-37 (Miss. 1987)) (providing the five factors to be used by the trial court in determining if the prior conviction is more probative or prejudicial). The purpose of this on-the-record balancing requirement is so that on appeal this Court can more easily ascertain whether or not the trial judge has abused his discretion in granting or denying admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment purposes. McGee, 569 So.2d at 1195 ( quoting Johnson, 525 So.2d at 812). ¶ 15. In cases in which lower courts fail to conduct the required balancing test, this Court has done one of two things. In some cases, we performed the balancing test ourselves. See Peterson, 518 So.2d at 637; Johnson, 525 So.2d at 812. However in those cases where the accused's credibility was central to his defense or where the evidence was hotly disputed, we took a different course and remanded the case for retrial. See McGee, 569 So.2d at 1197 ( citing Signer, 536 So.2d at 12-13); Pugh v. State, 584 So.2d 781, 785 (Miss. 1991). ¶ 16. Here, not one rule concerning the admission into evidence of convictions more than ten years old was adhered to. The State did not provide Jones with advance, written notice of its intent to use the fourteen-year-old convictions. Nor did the State carry its threshold burden of showing, prima facie, the probative value of the prior convictions. Still further, the trial court failed to conduct an on-the-record weighing of the probative value and prejudicial effect of the prior convictions in a case in which Jones' credibility was central to his defense and where the account of the incident came down to opposing stories from Jones and Kitchens. Clearly, Rule 609(b) was violated. ¶ 17. In Townsend v. State, 605 So.2d 767 (Miss. 1992), we were faced with a similar situation involving the admission into evidence of prior convictions. There, the appellant was convicted of burglary. At his trial, the lower court admitted into evidence two prior burglary convictions that were seven-years-old, ruling that the credibility of the appellant was a prime element in the jury's decision. Id. at 769. The appellant appealed the decision, and this Court ruled that the impeachment, using the prior burglary convictions, should not have been allowed for the following reasons. First, we noted that burglary was not necessarily a crime affecting one's veracity. Secondly, we noted that the prior convictions were seven years old, a fact which greatly lessened their probative value. Also, the prior crimes were identical to the crime charged, i.e., burglary. We therefore cautioned that prior convictions must only be used to attack credibility and not to show `a propensity on the part of the defendant to have acted on the present occasion in conformity with the criminal character suggested by the previous conviction.' Id. at 770-71 ( quoting McGee, 569 So.2d at 1195); see also Pugh, 584 So.2d at 785. We further explained that since the appellant was the only defense witness, his credibility was crucial to the defense, and even though credibility was central to the jury's decision-making, the low probative value of the seven-year-old convictions militated against their admission into evidence. Townsend, 605 So.2d at 771. There, we reversed and remanded, stating in a footnote: Some members of the Court are of the view that the lower court erred but that the error was harmless under the overwhelming evidence of guilt. However, lower courts and prosecuting attorneys must not commit errors on the speculation that the Supreme Court will affirm on the ground of harmless error. Cases must be tried and evidence must be admitted according to the law. Id. at 771 n. 1. ¶ 18. Here, the State concedes error but nevertheless argues that the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence against Jones. This Court is unpersuaded by this argument. The tape, which is emphasized by the State as an example of the overwhelming evidence against Jones, was described by the State's key witness and the trial court as poor quality, not to mention the fact that it is missing from the record. Moreover, even though Officer Kitchens provided eyewitness testimony of the drug transaction and identified Jones as the drug seller, Jones disputed every detail of the officer's testimony. ¶ 19. Thus, Jones' credibility becomes a critical piece of evidence, thereby making the admission of the prior convictions even more damaging and harmful if relied upon by the State and jury as substantive evidence of Jones' guilt in the present matter, which is what appears to have been the State's purpose because during closing argument the prosecutor referred to Jones as a six time convicted heroin dealer. Such reliance on prior convictions to show present guilt is improper and will not be sanctioned. McLemore v. State, 669 So.2d 19, 22 (Miss. 1996) (cautioning that prior crimes must be used only to attack an accused's credibility as the risk is great that a jury may conclude the accused committed the present crime because he had a prior criminal tendency). ¶ 20. It is, therefore, this Court's conclusion that Rule 609(b) was not adhered to and that the admission of the fourteen-year-old heroin distribution convictions was manifestly prejudicial, warranting reversal and remand. [3] ¶ 21. REVERSED AND REMANDED. PRATHER and SULLIVAN, P.JJ., and McRAE, J., concur. DAN LEE, C.J., concurs in result only. PITTMAN, J., specially concurs with separate written opinion joined by McRAE, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and MILLS, JJ. SMITH, J., not participating.