Opinion ID: 4542662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Benson’s September 20, 2017, Statements Benson claims his statements to Negrete on September 20, 2017, should have been suppressed because he was subjected to custodial interrogation and was not advised of his Miranda rights. Benson argues he was detained by Negrete during the encounter as evidenced by his attempt to return to his apartment and Negrete’s continued questioning. [4-6] Miranda v. Arizona 6 prohibits the use of statements derived during custodial interrogation unless the prosecution demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards that are effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda requires law enforcement to give a particular set of warnings to a person in custody before interrogation, including that he or she has the right to remain silent, that any statement he or she makes may be used as evidence against him or her, and that he 3 See State v. Stevens, 290 Neb. 460, 860 N.W.2d 717 (2015). 4 State v. Mendez-Osorio, 297 Neb. 520, 900 N.W.2d 776 (2017); State v. Jedlicka, 297 Neb. 276, 900 N.W.2d 454 (2017). 5 Mendez-Osorio, supra note 4; Jedlicka, supra note 4. 6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). See, also, State v. Juranek, 287 Neb. 846, 844 N.W.2d 791 (2014). - 964 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BENSON Cite as 305 Neb. 949 or she has the right to an attorney. 7 These warnings are considered prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant during custodial interrogation. 8 [7-10] Miranda warnings are required only when a suspect interrogated by the police is in custody. 9 The ultimate inquiry for determining whether a person is in custody is whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of degree associated with a formal arrest. 10 Custody is to be determined based on how a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would perceive his or her circumstances. 11 Stated another way, a seizure under the Fourth Amendment occurs only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave. 12 [11] In considering whether a suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes, relevant considerations include, but are not limited to the location of the interaction, who initiated the interaction, the duration of the interaction, the type and approach of questioning, the freedom of movement of the suspect, the duration of the interaction, and whether the suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of the interaction. 13 Here, Benson was not in custody during his interaction with Negrete on September 20, 2017. Benson initiated the interaction by asking Jefferson to call and report the pickup as stolen. Negrete was assigned the task of taking the stolen vehicle report and arrived at Benson’s apartment complex, where he made contact with Benson. Throughout the conversation, 7 Miranda, supra note 6. See, also, Juranek, supra note 6. 8 State v. Montoya, 304 Neb. 96, 933 N.W.2d 558 (2019). 9 Id. 10 Id. 11 Id. 12 See State v. Schriner, 303 Neb. 476, 929 N.W.2d 514 (2019). 13 See Montoya, supra note 8. See, also, U.S. v. Axsom, 289 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 2002); State v. Rogers, 277 Neb. 37, 760 N.W.2d 35 (2009). - 965 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BENSON Cite as 305 Neb. 949 the parties’ discussion was centered on the alleged theft of Benson’s pickup, which he requested to have documented in the report. The majority of the conversation occurred outside in the apartment’s parking lot. Benson’s movement was not substantially restricted, and at one point, the parties separated with Negrete returning to his vehicle and Benson going to his apartment to get proof of identification. The interaction was not uncommonly long, and at the conclusion, Benson was not placed under arrest. Benson argues that his movement was restricted when, after Negrete asked for identification, Benson turned to get his identification from his apartment but Negrete continued to question him in the parking lot instead. Contrary to Benson’s argument, this exchange is insufficient to show Benson was restricted in his movement or ability to leave and terminate the conversation. This exchange occurred shortly after the conversation began with Negrete’s getting Benson’s name and asking whether he had any identification on him. Benson did not have his identification with him, and Negrete asked him whether his identification was in the apartment. At that point, Benson turned to go back to apartment, but before he left, Negrete shifted the conversation by asking questions about the theft Benson sought to report. In context, Benson was not turning to leave and terminate the conversation but was, instead, seeking to continue the interaction by getting the documentation he thought Negrete wanted. This exchange, on its own, does not demonstrate that Benson was in custody requiring Miranda warnings. Benson also points to Ratliff’s participation in assigning Negrete to take the report. Benson argues that this fact, coupled with Negrete’s previous knowledge of Womack’s homicide and the use of his body camera to record the interaction, establishes that Negrete’s taking of Benson’s report was “plainly to gain a statement from a homicide suspect in a manner that the suspect would not at all anticipate or contemplate.” 14 14 Brief for appellant at 30. - 966 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BENSON Cite as 305 Neb. 949 [12] Regardless of Ratliff’s or Negrete’s intent, the test for determining custody is an objective inquiry that does not depend on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officer or person being interrogated. 15 Instead, the question is determined based on how a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would perceive the circumstances. 16 As the district court found, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would not have believed he or she was unable to leave or terminate the interaction. Benson initiated the interaction, which occurred in an open, neutral space; the subject of the interaction was limited to Benson’s report on his allegedly stolen pickup; Benson was not restricted in his movements; and the interaction was a relatively short one after which Benson was not arrested. Benson was not in custody, and Negrete was not required to provide Miranda warnings. Accordingly, the district court did not err in declining to suppress Benson’s September 20, 2017, statements. Benson’s September 23, 2017, Statements Benson assigns the district court should have suppressed his statements to Davis on September 23, 2017, because he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. [13,14] To be a valid waiver of Miranda rights, a waiver must be knowingly and voluntarily made. 17 A waiver is knowing if it is made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. 18 A waiver is voluntary if it is the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than through intimidation, coercion, or deception. 19 Whether a knowing and voluntary waiver 15 Montoya, supra note 8. 16 Id. 17 See, State v. Hernandez, 299 Neb. 896, 911 N.W.2d 524 (2018); State v. Burries, 297 Neb. 367, 900 N.W.2d 483 (2017). 18 Id. 19 Id. - 967 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BENSON Cite as 305 Neb. 949 has been made is determined by looking to the totality of the circumstances. 20 There is no dispute that the September 23, 2017, interview occurred after Benson was fully advised of his Miranda rights and that Benson issued a waiver of those rights and agreed to speak with Davis. There is also no dispute that Benson had reason to believe the interview would concern the report of his allegedly stolen pickup, which report Benson indicated to Mois he wished to make because he was worried about reports it was involved in a homicide. Benson, instead, argues this Miranda waiver was insufficient because he did not know that he was a suspect in Womack’s homicide and that Davis had evidence contradicting his report. Benson also claims Davis misled him during the interview by using Benson’s lack of knowledge presumably to gain a “tactical edge” in the interview and get Benson to incriminate himself. 21 [15] While waiver must be knowingly made, law enforcement is not required to inform a suspect of all aspects of the investigation prior to the waiver of the suspect’s Miranda rights. In Colorado v. Spring, 22 the U.S. Supreme Court stated, “‘[W]e have never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights.’” The Court explained: This Court’s holding in Miranda specifically required that the police inform a criminal suspect that he has the right to remain silent and that anything he says may be used against him. There is no qualification of this broad and explicit warning. The warning, as formulated in Miranda, conveys to a suspect the nature of his 20 Id. 21 Brief for appellant at 34. 22 Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576-77, 107 S. Ct. 851, 93 L. Ed. 2d 954 (1987). - 968 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BENSON Cite as 305 Neb. 949 constitutional privilege and the consequences of abandoning it. Accordingly, we hold that a suspect’s awareness of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment privilege. 23 Davis was not required to disclose his strategy for the interview or his knowledge of contradictory evidence prior to Benson’s waiver. Davis was not required to explain to Benson the interrogation strategy Davis planned to use or to disclose to Benson the evidence Davis possessed contradicting Benson’s stolen vehicle report. Davis was merely required to advise Benson of his Miranda rights. Davis read Benson a sufficient explanation of these rights, and Benson chose to waive them. Benson cites several instances where he claims Davis made misleading statements that indicated he was concerned only about the return of Benson’s allegedly stolen pickup, and, as such, Benson argues such representation prohibited a knowing and voluntary waiver because it caused Benson to be unaware of the actual topic of discussion. It is unclear how Benson is claiming these statements led to an invalid waiver, because they were made after Benson was read and waived his Miranda rights. Regardless, and contrary to Benson’s argument, he was informed of the nature of the interview. As explained above, Benson had called Mois seeking to report his pickup as stolen due to concerns it may have been involved in Womack’s shooting. He then provided a report to Negrete alleging someone had stolen the pickup the day before Womack was killed. It is unchallenged that all parties understood the September 23, 2017, interview as followup to this report. [16] Benson also takes issue with Davis’ shift in questioning from asking questions to clarify Benson’s report to confronting Benson on evidence contradicting his report. As 23 Id., 479 U.S. at 577. - 969 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BENSON Cite as 305 Neb. 949 explained above, Davis was not required to reveal his interrogation strategy prior to Benson’s waiver. Additionally, to the extent Benson’s argument could be claiming that the difference in interview strategy would necessitate a further waiver, we have previously stated that law enforcement officers “‘are not required to rewarn suspects from time to time.’” 24 The Miranda rule and its requirements are met if a suspect receives adequate Miranda warnings, understands them, and has an opportunity to invoke the rights before giving any answers or admissions. 25 In consideration of all of the above, Benson’s waiver of his Miranda rights before the interview with Davis was knowingly and voluntarily given and the district court did not err in declining to suppress Benson’s September 23, 2017, statements. Search Warrant For Benson’s Cell Phone Data Benson’s assignment that the district court erred in failing to suppress his cell phone data centers on his argument that the search warrant granting access to this data was invalidly deficient due to misstatements of the warrant and the application’s drafting and approval date. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that warrants may not be granted “but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The Nebraska Constitution, under article I, § 7, similarly provides that “no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.” [17-20] In reviewing the strength of an affidavit submitted as a basis for finding probable cause to issue a search warrant, 24 Burries, supra note 17, 297 Neb. at 389, 900 N.W.2d at 504. 25 Id. - 970 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BENSON Cite as 305 Neb. 949 an appellate court applies a totality of the circumstances test. 26 The question is whether, under the totality of the circumstances illustrated by the affidavit, the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for finding that the affidavit established probable cause. 27 Probable cause sufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant means a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found. 28 In evaluating the sufficiency of an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant, an appellate court is restricted to consideration of the information and circumstances contained within the four corners of the affidavit, and evidence which emerges after the warrant is issued has no bearing on whether the warrant was validly issued. 29 Benson argues that the application and search warrant fail to provide an “accurate timeline for the events” and make no “chronological sense” due to their use of an incorrect drafting and approval date. 30 As such, Benson claims, they fail to provide sufficient probable cause. We disagree with Benson’s description that the application and warrant fail to provide an accurate timeline of the events to establish probable cause. The incorrect dates used in the application and warrant were limited to descriptions of when the application and warrant were drafted and approved. These dates are not part of the factual basis the State alleged established probable cause. Instead, the narrative portion of the application, where Davis provided a factual basis for the search, lists correct dates in the timeline of the offense and investigation. Misstating the date the application and warrant were drafted and approved is irrelevant to establishing the timeline of events to determine probable cause. 26 State v. Goynes, 303 Neb. 129, 927 N.W.2d 346 (2019). 27 Id. 28 Id. 29 Id. 30 Brief for appellant at 37. - 971 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BENSON Cite as 305 Neb. 949 [21,22] A search warrant and application’s indicating incorrect dates of their drafting and signing is not per se fatal to the validity of a warrant. 31 Misstatements within an application and warrant may still produce a valid warrant if the rest of the warrant and attached application cures any defect resulting from the scrivener’s error when read together. 32 For instance, in the context of warrants and applications misstating addresses of a place to be searched, we have held that even if the numerical address is wrong, a warrant may still be valid if the description is adequate to direct the officer to the correct place for the search. 33 In this case, the totality of the warrant and its attachments establishes that the date misidentified as the date of drafting and approval was a typographical error and sufficiently identifies September 20, 2017, as the correct date of drafting and approval. As noted above, the narrative section of the warrant correctly lists dates in the timeline of the offense and investigation. This section describes events occurring subsequently to September 18, including reference to the execution of a different search warrant on September 20. Additionally, an order to seal was attached to the search warrant which was signed by the court at the time of the search warrant’s approval and was dated September 20, 2017. We conclude the warrant and application’s identification of September 18, 2017, as the drafting and approval date was a scrivener’s error corrected when the warrant and its attachments are read together. Moreover, the misuse of these dates does not affect the description of the timeline of the offense and investigation which the State offered as the basis for probable cause. As such, the error did not invalidate the warrant and the district court did not err in declining to suppress Benson’s cell phone data. 31 See State v. Stelly, 304 Neb. 33, 932 N.W.2d 857 (2019). 32 Id. 33 See, State v. Groves, 239 Neb. 660, 477 N.W.2d 789 (1991); State v. Walters, 230 Neb. 539, 432 N.W.2d 528 (1988). - 972 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BENSON Cite as 305 Neb. 949 Motion to Sever Benson assigns the district court erred in failing to sever the tampering charges. Benson argues the charges are not sufficiently similar to allow for joinder in that the tampering counts have no elemental similarities, were not a common scheme or plan, and concern acts which occurred nearly 17 months after Womack’s killing, which precipitated the other counts. Benson asserts he was prejudiced by this joinder because the State offered evidence to establish the tampering clauses that improperly bolstered Jefferson’s and Guitron’s testimony and “mudd[ied] the evidentiary waters” for the jury. 34 [23-25] There is no constitutional right to a separate trial. 35 Instead, the joinder or separation of charges for trial is governed by § 29-2002, which states, in relevant part: (1) Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment, information, or complaint in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors, or both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. .... (3) If it appears that a defendant or the state would be prejudiced by a joinder of offenses in an indictment, information, or complaint . . . the court may order an election for separate trials of counts, indictments, informations, or complaints, grant a severance of defendants, or provide whatever other relief justice requires. Summarized, whether offenses were properly joined involves a two-stage analysis: (1) whether the offenses were sufficiently related to be joinable and (2) whether the joinder was 34 Brief for appellant at 41. 35 See State v. Briggs, 303 Neb. 352, 929 N.W.2d 65 (2019). - 973 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BENSON Cite as 305 Neb. 949 prejudicial to the defendant. 36 There is a strong presumption against severing properly joined counts. 37 [26,27] While § 29-2002 presents two separate questions, there is no error under either subsection (1) or (3) if joinder was not prejudicial, and a denial of a motion to sever will be reversed only if clear prejudice and an abuse of discretion are shown. 38 An appellate court will find such an abuse only where the denial caused the defendant substantial prejudice amounting to a miscarriage of justice. 39 A defendant appealing the denial of a motion to sever has the burden to show compelling, specific, and actual prejudice. 40 Severe prejudice occurs when a defendant is deprived of an appreciable chance for an acquittal, a chance that the defendant would have had in a severed trial. 41 In the instant case, we need not consider whether the tampering counts were sufficiently related to be properly joined under § 29-2002(1), because Benson has failed to show prejudice from the joinder. Essentially, Benson argues that the evidence of the tampering counts, which indicated he did not want Jefferson or Guitron to provide the State damaging testimony, influenced the jury’s verdicts because it made him look guilty and added unwarranted emphasis to Jefferson’s and Guitron’s testimony. [28,29] Prejudice from joinder cannot be shown if evidence of one charge would have been admissible in a separate trial of another charge. 42 Benson does not explain why evidence 36 See id. See, also, State v. Cotton, 299 Neb. 650, 910 N.W.2d 102 (2018), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Avina-Murillo, 301 Neb. 185, 917 N.W.2d 865 (2018). 37 Cotton, supra note 36. See, also, Briggs, supra note 35. 38 See Briggs, supra note 35. 39 See id. 40 See id. 41 Id. 42 State v. Golyar, 301 Neb. 488, 919 N.W.2d 133 (2018). See, also, Cotton, supra note 36. - 974 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BENSON Cite as 305 Neb. 949 of Benson’s telephone calls with Jefferson and Guitron would be inadmissible in a separate trial on the other three charges. Evidence of a defendant’s attempted intimidation or intimidation of a State’s witness is relevant evidence of a defend­ ant’s “‘conscious guilt’” that a crime has been committed. 43 Accordingly, Benson’s calls with Jefferson and Guitron could be admissible as relevant to Benson’s consciousness of guilt in a separate trial. [30] Additionally, joined charges do not usually result in prejudice if the evidence is sufficiently simple and distinct for the jury to easily separate evidence of the charges during deliberations. 44 The jury in this case would have been able to easily separate the evidence of the charges during deliberations in that the evidence that Benson tampered with witnesses was distinct. While the telephone calls may have been relevant to the other charges and a consciousness of guilt, it was clear they were offered to show Benson was attempting to get Jefferson and Guitron not to participate in his prosecution. Because Benson failed to establish prejudice from the joinder of the charges, the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Benson’s motion to sever. Sufficiency of Evidence On his sufficiency of the evidence assignment of error, Benson first argues that the State presented insufficient evidence on the second degree murder, use of a deadly weapon, and possession of a deadly weapon charges. Benson argues the State failed to meet its burden to show that he was in the pickup at the time of the shooting and that he fired the gun. As Benson acknowledges, the State did present evidence as to these elements. Evidence was received that Benson owned the pickup that was identified by witnesses and video as being the pickup from which the shots were fired that hit Womack and resulted in his death. Gunshot residue was 43 State v. Thorpe, 280 Neb. 11, 24, 783 N.W.2d 749, 761 (2010). 44 Briggs, supra note 35. - 975 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BENSON Cite as 305 Neb. 949 discovered inside the pickup along with a casing that matched the same weapon as the casing found at the scene. Benson’s cell phone location put him in the area around the time of the shooting, and the Hy-Vee video showed Benson driving the truck 3 hours before the shooting. Gunshot residue was found on clothes matching the clothes Benson was wearing in the Hy-Vee video. Witnesses testified as to statements Benson made indicating his participation. Guitron testified that Benson texted her around the time of the incident that he had “just got in2 sum shitt” but could not text anything about it. Figueroa testified that she talked with Benson about the shooting and that he said, “‘Well, yeah, I mean, if somebody like that came in my property, then, yeah, I’d shoot him, too.’” Finally, Stockdale testified that in talking with Benson about his case, Benson said that he “‘got rid of the gun after [he] smoked the dude’” and that he was worried about the forensics on the hooded sweatshirt and whether investigators would find gunpowder on it. The court also received evidence of Benson’s consciousness of guilt in his lying to law enforcement about the pickup’s being stolen the night before the homicide and contacting witnesses to encourage their noncooperation with the prosecution of his case. Benson seeks to overcome this evidence by contesting the credibility of Stockdale and Figueroa and the weight of the evidence of gunshot residue and the cell phone location. However, an appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh evidence when determining the sufficiency of the evidence. 45 The jury, as the finder of fact, heard Stockdale’s and Figueroa’s testimony, weighed the evidence of the gunshot residue and cell phone location evidence, and determined Benson was in the pickup and was the shooter. We conclude, viewing the evidence in the 45 See Mendez-Osorio, supra note 4; Jedlicka, supra note 4. - 976 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BENSON Cite as 305 Neb. 949 light most favorable to the State, that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of these essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. As to the two counts of tampering with a witness, Benson claims the State failed to meet its burden to prove he intended to tamper with or obstruct Jefferson and Guitron from testifying or cooperating with law enforcement. Benson argues that the State did not offer any evidence to directly establish intent and that it was “just as plausible” that he wanted the two women, with whom he was in romantic relationships, “not [to] cross paths as they likely would if both participated in the investigation.” 46 When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there was again sufficient evidence for the jury to find the essential elements of the tampering charges. Benson was charged under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-919(1) (Reissue 2016), which provides, in relevant part: (1) A person commits the offense of tampering with a witness . . . if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation of a criminal . . . matter is pending . . . , he or she attempts to induce or otherwise cause a witness or informant to: (a) Testify or inform falsely; (b) Withhold any testimony, information, document, or thing; (c) Elude legal process summoning him or her to testify or supply evidence; or (d) Absent himself or herself from any proceeding or investigation to which he or she has been legally summoned. The State’s evidence of Jefferson’s and Guitron’s telephone calls with Benson provided sufficient basis for finding the required elements that Benson knew of his pending criminal case and that he acted to induce or cause Jefferson and Guitron 46 Brief for appellant at 48. - 977 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. BENSON Cite as 305 Neb. 949 to refuse to comply with several subpoenas in the prosecution of that case. The recordings of these calls include Benson’s statement to Jefferson regarding her subpoena from the county attorney’s office, “‘You are not going to go down there.’” Also included is Benson’s statement to Guitron, “‘You don’t have to come and you don’t have to testify against me.’” Even if Benson were correct that the only reason for his telephone calls was to prevent Jefferson and Guitron from crossing paths, there was still evidence that he attempted to induce them not to testify or cooperate with law enforcement. Under § 28-919, a defendant’s reasons for attempting to induce a witness to commit any of the acts enumerated in it are not relevant. We find that the State did present sufficient evidence for the jury to find the existence of the essential elements under § 28-919(1).