Opinion ID: 615540
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Arbitration Law

Text: AVL argues that our interpretation of Carmack conflicts with federal arbitration law. We have previously explained: Federal arbitration law is codified in the three chapters of Title 9 of the United States Code. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), enacted in 1947, comprises the first chapter. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, implementing the treaty of the same name, was enacted in 1970. This statute, commonly called the Convention Act, comprises the second chapter. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208. The third chapter, implementing the Inter American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, is not relevant to this case. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-307. Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 547 F.3d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir.2008). AVL cites both the FAA and the Convention Act. The Convention Act was intended to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts. Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. at 538, 115 S.Ct. 2322 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, [i]t is well-settled that `questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.' Balen v. Holland Am. Line Inc., 583 F.3d 647, 652 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)). That preference, however, applies only if there is no independent basis in law or equity for revocation. Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. at 538-39, 115 S.Ct. 2322 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 115 S.Ct. 834, 130 L.Ed.2d 753 (1995)). Like any statutory directive, the Arbitration Act's mandate may be overridden by a contrary congressional command. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987). The burden is on the party opposing arbitration, however, to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue. Id. at 227, 107 S.Ct. 2332. When Congress intends to create an exception to the FAA, such an intent `will be deducible from [the statute's] text or legislative history,' or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985)) (alteration in original and citations omitted). As we have explained, the plain text of Carmack prohibits household carriers from forcing a shipper to agree to arbitrate his claims as a condition to contracting. Thus, there is a contrary congressional command that overrides the FAA's mandate to enforce arbitration agreements. AVL argues that the FAA's mandate in favor of arbitration implicitly repealed Carmack because the FAA was more recently enacted. See In re Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 581 (9th Cir.1991) ([W]here provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154, 96 S.Ct. 1989, 48 L.Ed.2d 540 (1976)). We reject AVL's argument because the relevant provisions of Carmack were enacted after the FAA and the Convention Act. The Federal Arbitration Act was codified in 1925, see 43 Stat. 883, and enacted in 1947, see 61 Stat. 669. The Convention Act was enacted in 1970. See 84 Stat. 692. Since 1970, the Carmack Amendment has been reenacted twice and materially amended. Carmack was first enacted as 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) in 1906, then reenacted as 49 U.S.C. § 11707 in 1978, [9] amended by the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 [10] and finally reenacted and recodified as sections 11706 and 14706 in 1995. [11] Although Carmack as a whole is older than the FAA, the relevant language in Carmack was enacted more recently than the FAA. Thus, we infer that Congress intended Carmack to be a minor exception to the FAA. Cf. United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1052 n. 10 (9th Cir.2007) (noting in dicta that there is no repeal-by-implication problem when a later statute simply addresses one particular application [of the former statute] and carves out an exception (alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted)).