Opinion ID: 695252
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing For Plaintiff's Appeal

Text: 3 Before we may address whether the district court followed our instructions on remand with respect to the structuring of Lee's trust, we must first address whether Lee's natural parents have standing to appeal the court's determination for Lee. Because Lee is a minor, this appeal must be brought by an appropriate representative with the authority to pursue litigation on Lee's behalf. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c). When the district court recognized a potential conflict of interest between Lee and his parents, the court appointed Judith Finn to act as Lee's guardian ad litem. This appointment raises the threshold question of whether Lee's parents have retained the authority to pursue an appeal for Lee. 4 In Finn's capacity as guardian ad litem, she helped draft the trust agreement adopted by the district court, which provides a full reversion to the government of any remaining trust funds at the time of Lee's death. Finn has maintained at all times during these proceedings that the reversion is necessary to insure Lee's continued good care by eliminating the possibility that Lee's parents could profit from his premature death. 5 Before Finn's appointment, Lee's parents had hired attorney Stephen Wolfe to pursue the claims they were bringing on Lee's behalf. When the guardian ad litem was appointed, Wolfe nevertheless continued as Lee's only counsel of record. Ignoring the guardian ad litem's view that a reversionary trust was needed to protect Lee's life and health, attorney Wolfe advocated a non-reversionary trust before the district court. Because the guardian ad litem believes that the reversionary trust that the district court adopted on remand furthers Lee's best interest, she has not pursued an appeal on Lee's behalf. Attorney Wolfe, however, is now attempting to bring this appeal by Lee's parents on Lee's behalf to challenge the reversionary trust. Because we hold that Lee's parents lack standing to assert this claim, see Garrick, 888 F.2d at 689-93, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 6 In Garrick, the mother of two minor children tried to bring an appeal on the children's behalf to challenge the way a magistrate had structured the children's settlement fund in a trust. Id. As in this case, the district court had appointed a guardian ad litem for the children because of their mother's potentially adverse interests, and the guardian ad litem had not appealed the trust provisions on the children's behalf. Id. at 692-93. We held that the court's appointment deprived the mother of standing to represent her children in the same action for which the guardian ad litem was appointed. Id. at 693. Once appointed, the guardian ad litem is 'a representative of the court to act for the minor in the cause, with authority to engage counsel, file suit, and to prosecute, control and direct the litigation.'  Id. (quoting Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir.1974)). Because the guardian ad litem was thus the only party with standing to challenge the trust provisions on the children's behalf, the mother was barred from bringing such an appeal. Id.; see Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Ctr. Inc. v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281, 285-86 (1st Cir.1982) (refusing next friend standing when appointed guardian objected to the suit). 7 Applying Garrick in Hull I, this court held that the guardian ad litem--and not the parents--represents Lee in these proceedings. 971 F.2d at 1505. Accordingly, we decided that the guardian ad litem's views as to a fully reversionary trust were relevant, whereas [t]he parents' refusal to consent to a fully reversionary trust is irrelevant, particularly in light of their alleged conflict of interest in this case. 971 F.2d at 1505-06. The policy reasons articulated in Garrick for having one person represent a minor are present here as well. Allowing two parties ... to represent the minor children, we explained in Garrick, interferes with the orderly development of the lawsuit because the minor children could take inconsistent positions through their multiple representatives--which is precisely what has occurred with respect to Lee's reversionary trust. 888 F.2d at 693. Because the guardian ad litem has not appealed the reversionary trust on Lee's behalf, and Lee's parents lack standing to do so, the structure of the trust remains beyond our jurisdiction to review. 1 8 We note, however, that on the record before us it does not appear that the district court conducted further proceedings consistent with our instructions in Hull I before it adopted the trust structure that Lee's parents are attempting to challenge on Lee's behalf. Hull I required the district court to focus only on what is in the best interest of Lee, and it appears from the record that the court erroneously considered that the judgment could provide a windfall to Lee's parents. Compare Hull I, 971 F.2d at 1505 (holding that the court need not and should not consider whether the parents might receive a  'windfall' upon Lee's untimely death), with Appellant's App. at 75-76 (recording district court's explanation that the primary rationale for the reversionary trust was the windfall concept). Moreover, even if a reverter was in Lee's best interest, we find nothing in the record to suggest that Lee's best interest would be served by a reverter specifically to the government--the tortfeasor--rather than to another potential recipient such as a charity of Lee's choice or chosen by his guardian. The selection of the beneficiary of the reverter interest, just as the decision to adopt a reverter in the first place, must be made solely from Lee's perspective and the question should be what would best advance Lee's interests and preferences. Although we are troubled by these matters, we have concluded that we lack appellate jurisdiction to address them, and we must therefore rely on the ability of the district court to conduct further proceedings if and when they are warranted by the circumstances or are requested by the parties. 2