Opinion ID: 697890
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: New Jersey Comprehensive Employee Protection Act.

Text: 38 As noted above, district courts sitting in diversity actions must apply the choice of law provisions of the forum state. Klaxon Co., 313 U.S. at 496; Erie, 304 U.S. at 80. When the cause of action is one for tortious conduct, Virginia applies the law of the site of tortious activity. Ryder, 790 F.Supp. at 641. Boginis' claim of wrongful termination under CEPA is a claim of tortious wrongful termination, and is therefore governed by the law of New Jersey. CEPA reads in pertinent part as follows: 39 An employer shall not take any retaliatory action against an employee because the employee does any of the following: 40 a. Discloses ... to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer ... that the employee reasonably believes is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law ... 41 ... 42 c. Objects to ... any activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonably believes ... is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law.... 43 N.J. Stat. 34:19-3. 44 It is not disputed that Boginis complained to Cervasio that Crim did not have a real estate license, in the good faith belief that Crim's conduct violated New Jersey law. It is not disputed that Cervasio was a supervisor, and that Cervasio asked Crim to obtain a license. It is not disputed that Cervasio, by employing Crim without his obtaining a license, might have been an accomplice in Crim's violation. It is disputed whether MORI fired Boginis because of Boginis' objection to Crim's employment without a license. 45 Under a literal reading of the statute, if Boginis was fired for his actions, he should be protected by the statute. Boginis complained to a supervisor about conduct Boginis reasonably believed violated the law. Boginis complained not to Crim, but rather to Crim's supervisor, Cervasio. Because the statutory language is clear, we need go no further in examining the policies behind the statute. 46 The district court ruled that under New Jersey law, CEPA did not apply because objections about illegality to someone who is involved in the illegality are not the type of statements contemplated by the statute. The New Jersey Supreme Court has previously rejected the same argument. See Abbamont v. Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ., 138 N.J. 405, 650 A.2d 958, 963 (1994) (affirming appellate court's reversal of trial court's ruling that a CEPA plaintiff is required to make his disclosure to someone other than a supervisor responsible for remedying the wrongdoing). 47 The district court further found that Boginis' claim could not survive summary judgment because he had not shown sufficient evidence that he was fired in retaliation for his complaints, rather than as part of MORI's alleged downsizing or for insubordination. Boginis has produced evidence that Cervasio told Boginis that he intended to fire him the same day Boginis and Cervasio argued about Crim. Boginis has also produced evidence that Cervasio's claimed reason for firing Boginis, that MORI was downsizing the New Jersey operation, was false; Boginis claims that the New Jersey office was looking to hire another sales manager at the same time he was fired. Enough was shown by Boginis to survive summary judgment, in that, if a reasonable jury concludes that MORI's downsizing claim was false, a reasonable jury might further conclude that the falsity was intended to cover up firing Boginis for whistleblowing. We therefore remand Boginis' CEPA claim for trial.