Opinion ID: 551345
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Flores Appeal

Text: 57 Sarah Flores appeals from the district court's denial of her petition to intervene. Her petition was based upon her interest in the outcome of the suit as a candidate in the election that stood to be invalidated. Under the plan adopted by the district court, she would be eligible to run for election in the new Hispanic district. Under the status quo, she was scheduled to participate in a runoff election against one other candidate. The district court dismissed her petition to intervene because it was untimely and because, in any event, the interests that she claimed to advocate either were already represented in the case or had not been proven to exist. 58 A party is entitled to intervene as of right under Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 24(a)(2) if that party moves to do so in a timely fashion and asserts an interest in the subject of the litigation, shows that the asserted interest stands to be impeded or impaired if the litigation goes forth without intervention, and demonstrates that the interest is not adequately represented by the parties to the litigation. Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir.1983). In determining whether a motion to intervene is timely, a court must consider whether intervention will cause delay that will prejudice the existing parties. United States v. Oregon, 745 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir.1984). 59 Where a would-be intervenor does not demonstrate interests sufficiently weighty to warrant intervention as of right, the court may nevertheless consider eligibility for permissive intervention under Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 24(b)(2). Courts will allow such intervention where the intervenor raises a claim that has questions of law or fact in common with the main case, shows independent grounds for jurisdiction, and moves to intervene in a timely fashion. Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir.1989), aff'd, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1679, 109 L.Ed.2d 74 (1990). The decision to grant or deny this type of intervention is discretionary, subject to considerations of equity and judicial economy. Id. at 530-31. Sarah Flores sought both intervention as of right and, in the alternative, permissive intervention in the proceedings below. The district court denied intervention on either ground. 60 This ruling was correct. Flores knew that this lawsuit was pending at the time when she decided to run in the election, and knew that part of the relief sought was a redistricting plan that could affect the outcome of that election. She did not petition to intervene until four months after she declared her candidacy, which was almost two years after the proceedings had been instituted. While Flores points out that the entry of a trial into a new stage may be the appropriate point for intervention, such is only the case where the new phase develops as a result of a change in the law or the factual circumstances. See United States v. Oregon, 745 F.2d 550 (9th Cir.1984). Here, the new phase came about in the general progression of the case to a close. It was a foreseeable part of a chain of events. Therefore, Flores' delay cannot be excused on this ground. Introduction of a new party at that late stage could have resulted in irreversible prejudicial delay in a case where time was of the essence.