Opinion ID: 1176393
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mens Rea and Concurrence.

Text: Defendant was charged with two multiple-murder special circumstances as defined in subdivision (a)(3) of section 190.2: The defendant has in this proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree. Defendant contends that this special circumstance has the unique structure of a crime including both mens rea and actus reus. The mens rea is argued to be, not just general criminal intent, but the specific intent to plan to commit more than one murder, or to kill the victim of a first degree murder knowing the same conduct is likely to result in the death of at least one other person, or to kill the victim of the first degree murder with knowledge of having previously committed a murder of the first or second degree. In the same vein, defendant contends that the act and the intent must be concurrent, and thus the special circumstance does not apply to a second degree murder committed after a first degree murder unless the second degree murder was already contemplated in some fashion when the first degree murder was committed. To the extent these contentions are premised on the reduction of one of the two murder convictions from first degree to second degree, the contentions must fail as we have concluded that both first degree murder convictions must be affirmed. (39) In any event, a special circumstance is sui generis  neither a crime, an enhancement, nor a sentencing factor. ( People v. Garcia (1984) 36 Cal.3d 539, 552 [205 Cal. Rptr. 265, 684 P.2d 826]. See also, Poland v. Arizona (1986) 476 U.S. 147 [90 L.Ed.2d 123, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 1755].) Because the multiple-murder special circumstance does not define a crime separate from the qualifying murders, there is no need to impose a mental element requirement. The statutory language plainly requires no particular mental state and, indeed, is addressed to circumstances at the time of conviction, not at the time of the commission of the qualifying offenses. Any doubts on this score were resolved by People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 595-596 [238 Cal. Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350], construing the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)) and rejecting an argument that the death penalty is appropriate only when a defendant commits murder after he has been put on notice by a previous murder conviction that if he repeats the crime he might suffer the ultimate punishment. (P. 595.) Hendricks also held that the order of the commission of the homicides is immaterial. (P. 596, fn. omitted.) Although defendant attempts valiantly to distinguish Hendricks, his efforts are unavailing. The special circumstances for prior murder convictions and for multiple-murder convictions are closely related and must be construed harmoniously to require neither a specific mental state nor a particular order of commission of the homicides. [15]