Opinion ID: 184507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Effect of Pending Requests

Text: Timely petitions for judicial review of the April 1996,January 1997, and July 1997 Rules were respectively filed onJuly 6, 1996, January 21, 1997, and September 15, 1997. See42 U.S.C. s 6976(a)(1) (establishing 90-day filing window). While these petitions for judicial review were pending, petitioners submitted to EPA a Petition for Amendment of LandDisposal Restrictions Phase III--Spent Potliner on July 9,1996, and a Petition for Amendment of RCRA Rule Regarding Spent Potliner on April 11, 1997. A party's pending request for agency reconsideration renders the underlying action nonfinal, regardless of the orderof filing with respect to that party. Wade v. FCC, 986 F.2d1433, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also TeleSTAR, Inc. v. FCC,888 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United Transp. Union v. ICC,871 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Thus, if petitioners' filings atEPA sought agency reconsideration, they would operate todeprive this court of jurisdiction over the July 6, 1996, andJanuary 21, 1997, petitions for judicial review. They wouldnot affect the September 15, 1997, petition for judicial review,which challenged EPA's July Rule, because the filings dealtsolely with the rules promulgated earlier. A request for a new rulemaking, however, would not poseany problem for our subject matter jurisdiction. See American Mining Congress v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1185 (D.C. Cir.1990). Once a rule is final, an agency can amend it onlythrough a new rulemaking. See American Petroleum, 906F.2d at 739-40. In this case, EPA promulgated both atreatment standard, which it treated as a final rule, and anational capacity variance, which it extended twice. Since petitioners' filings with the Agency not only attacked thetreatment standard but also requested an extension of theexisting national capacity variance, it is hard to characterizethem as solely requests for reconsideration, or for a newrulemaking. RCRA's provision governing agency petitionsdoes not distinguish among requests for promulgation,amendment, or repeal. 42 U.S.C. s 6974(a). We shalltherefore assume, arguendo, that petitioners sought agencyreconsideration. After the submission of briefs in this case but before oralargument, petitioners informed EPA that they were herebywithdraw[ing] any and all such requests then pending.9 Attachment to Petition for Review (Dec. 17, 1997). Theyimmediately filed a new petition for judicial review and amotion to consolidate it with the earlier petitions, which wegranted. Petitioners' actions, although late in the day, havecured the jurisdictional defect. See United Transp. Union,871 F.2d at 1118; TeleSTAR, 888 F.2d at 134. Their newpetition, filed on December 17, 1997, is timely with respect tothe April 1996 and January 1997 Rules because the 90-daystatute of limitations was tolled by the pending administrativerequests for reconsideration. See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386,392 (1995); ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482U.S. 270, 284-85 (1987). Although neither Stone nor Locomotive Engineers addressed the situation of a party withdrawinga request for reconsideration, rather than the agency takingfinal action on it, this court recently held that withdrawal hadthe same effect on the time within which to appeal. We seeno reason why the principles of the general tolling rule shouldnot be applied when an optional administrative petition toreconsider is withdrawn rather than being acted upon by theagency. Los Angeles SMSA Ltd. Partnership v. FCC, 70F.3d 1358, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1995). __________ 9 EPA conceded at oral argument that any jurisdictional defectwas cured by the withdrawal of the pending petitions. It is, ofcourse, this court's duty to satisfy itself of jurisdiction independently. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541(1986).