Opinion ID: 150593
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ham

Text: Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ham, see Townsend, 601 F.3d at 1157, the record establishes that Rubin kept records indicating the race of employees who were appointed to chief officer positions. Furthermore, when Ham asked Rubin why he was not appointed to an Assistant Chief position, Rubin 16 showed him a document showing the racial composition of various AFRD ranks and told Ham that he did not have “any business being a battalion chief” if Rubin had to explain diversity to him. These facts, if true, would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Rubin declined to promote Ham because of his race. A reasonable public official could not have believed that refusing to promote Ham because of his race was lawful, because we have held that “it was clearly established [as early as] 1999 that it was unlawful for a public official to make a [race-based] decision concerning . . . promotion.” Williams v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 341 F.3d 1261, 1272 (11th Cir. 2003). Thus, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Ham, establishes that Rubin’s conduct violated clearly established law. See Townsend, 601 F.3d at 1157. Pursuant to Foy, however, Rubin is still entitled to qualified immunity if the record indisputably shows that his failure to promote Ham was based, at least in part, on a factor other than race. See Foy, 94 F.3d at 1535; Stanley, 219 F.3d at 1296. On appeal, Rubin generally argues that his appointments to Assistant Chief positions were based on “subjective criteria,” such as an employee’s qualifications, “commitment to organization, personality, work habits, and personal observation.” These general assertions do not constitute indisputable evidence that Rubin was motivated by lawful considerations, because Rubin cites no evidence in the record 17 indicating that Ham was, in fact, less qualified than Slaughter, Lovelace, and Meadows. In the R&R, the magistrate noted that Rubin had expressed concern about Ham’s commitment to AFRD based on his refusal to accept a transfer to Section Chief. However, on appeal, Rubin does not cite this as a lawful consideration motivating his decision not to appoint Ham. Even if Rubin had raised this issue on appeal, he would not be entitled to qualified immunity because the record indicates that Ham did not refuse the transfer until after he filed the instant lawsuit, in February 2007, whereas the alleged discrimination occurred in 2005, when Lovelace, Slaughter, and Meadows were appointed to Assistant Chief positions. Accordingly, because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Ham, shows that Rubin violated Ham’s clearly established right to be free from employment discrimination on the basis of race, and because the record fails to indisputably show that Rubin’s failure to appoint Ham to an Assistant Chief position was based, at least in part, on lawful considerations, the district court did not err in denying Rubin qualified immunity with respect to Ham’s discrimination claims. See Koch, 221 F.3d at 1295; Stanley, 219 F.3d at 1296.