Opinion ID: 3012591
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the Restitution Order Violate Apprendi?

Text: The District Court ordered Syme to pay $100,000 in restitution to the HCFA (a $300,000 restitution order less a $200,000 credit) pursuant to the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. S 3663. Syme contends that the restitution order violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Syme failed to raise this objection in the District Court, and therefore we review for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); see also supra note 4. The operative rule from Apprendi is as follows: Other than the fact of prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 490. We consider restitution orders made pursuant to criminal convictions to be criminal penalties. United States v. Edwards , 162 F.3d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that restitution ordered under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. S 3663A, constitutes punishment for the purpose of Ex Post Facto Clause analysis); United States v. Sleight, 808 F.2d 1012, 1020 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding that under the Federal Probation Act, restitution remains inherently a criminal penalty); United States v. Palma , 760 F.2d 475, 479 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that a restitution ordered under the VWPA is a criminal penalty). We therefore hold that restitution ordered under 18 U.S.C. S 3663 constitutes the penalty for a crime within the meaning of Apprendi. The jury in this case was not charged with finding the amount of restitution owed to the HCFA. Therefore, the question is 40 whether the District Court's restitution order increased beyond the statutory maximum the penalties that Syme faced. If so, the order violated Apprendi. Section 3663(a)(1)(A) of the VWPA provides: The court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense under this title, . . . may order, in addition to or, in the case of misdemeanor, in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to any victim of such offense . . . . 18 U.S.C. S 3663(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The highlighted language specifically indicates that restitution orders are penalties that a district court may impose when sentencing a defendant for any offense under title 18. Restitution orders have long been treated as part of the sentence for the offense of conviction, and not, as Syme appears to contend, separate enhancements to the underlying offense. See, e.g., Sleight , 808 F.2d at 1020 (holding that restitution . . . is imposed as a part of sentencing); Palma, 760 F.2d at 479 (noting that the legislative history of the VWPA amply demonstrates that Congress intended restitution to be an integral part of the sentencing process). Therefore, because the language of section 3663 specifically applies that section to all offenses defined in title 18, and because it has been the traditional practice of district courts to include restitution as part of the sentence for the offense of conviction, we think that the appropriate place to look for the statutory maximum as that term applies in the Apprendi context, is the restitution statute itself. But section 3663 does not specify a maximum amount of restitution that a court may order. The statute provides guidelines that a sentencing judge may use to determine the amount of restitution, but does not prescribe a maximum amount. The Apprendi rule therefore does not apply to restitution orders made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3663, because Apprendi applies only to criminal penalties that increase a defendant's sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum. 530 U.S. at 490.