Opinion ID: 158785
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Regulation of conduct outside New Mexico

Text: 67 Defendants argue that section 30-37-3.2(A), properly construed, only addresses intrastate conduct. As the Pataki court stated in rejecting that same argument, that analysis is unsupportable in light of the text of the statute itself . . . and the reality of Internet communications. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 169. Section 30-37-3.2(A) contains no express limitation confining it to communications which occur wholly within its borders. Rather, it applies to any communication, intrastate or interstate, that fits within the prohibition and over which [New Mexico] has the capacity to exercise criminal jurisdiction. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 169-70. 68 Moreover, the nature of the Internet forecloses the argument that a statute such as section 30-37-3.2(A) applies only to intrastate communications. Even if it is limited to one-on-one e-mail communications, as defendants assert section 30-37-3.2(A) properly is limited, there is no guarantee that a message from one New Mexican to another New Mexican will not travel through other states en route. See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 171; see also Cyberspace, Communications, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 751 (virtually all Internet speech is . . . available everywhere). Thus, section 30-37-3.2(A) cannot effectively be limited to purely intrastate communications over the Internet because no such communications exist. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 171. We therefore agree with the district court that section 30-37-3.2(A) represents an attempt to regulate interstate conduct occurring outside New Mexico's borders, and is accordingly a per se violation of the Commerce Clause. 9 69