Opinion ID: 1457672
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Dedman's Constitutional Challenge

Text: Dedman contends that if Arkansas law forbids a marriage between a grandfather and his adopted granddaughter, then the Arkansas marriage statute is unconstitutional. Dedman bases her claim on the Supreme Court's precedent establishing the fundamental importance of the right to marry. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978) (striking down as unconstitutional a Wisconsin statute that barred those paying child support from getting married without court approval). The government responds by arguing that Dedman has no standing to challenge Arkansas's marriage statute. We need not resolve such difficult questions; Dedman raises this constitutional challenge for the first time on appeal. At trial, Dedman's counsel objected only to the interpretation of the Arkansas marriage statute, not to its constitutionality. J.A. at 237 (Tr. at 134:8-10) (And just so the record is clear, I would object to the Court taking judicial notice because that statute doesn't address a second generation adoption.). Because Dedman raises her objections on constitutional grounds only now on appeal, we review simply for plain error. Under that standard, we conclude that the district court did not commit plain error. While constitutional challenges are typically reviewed de novo, when the argument was not raised at the district court Sixth Circuit precedent requires application of the plain error standard. United States v. Barton, 455 F.3d 649, 652 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 748, 166 L.Ed.2d 579 (2006). Under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, we may consider a plain error that affects substantial rights ... even though it was not brought to the court's attention. FED.R.CRIM.P. 52(b). In applying this rule: First, we are to consider whether an error occurred in the district court. Absent any error, our inquiry is at an end. However, if an error occurred, we then consider if the error was plain. If it is, then we proceed to inquire whether the plain error affects substantial rights. Finally, even if all three factors exist,... we must decide whether the plain error affecting substantial rights seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Martin, 438 F.3d 621, 628 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 620, 630 (6th Cir.1993)). We will, therefore, apply plain-error review to Dedman's constitutional argument. We assume arguendo that Dedman has standing to advance her constitutional claims. Similarly, we also assume for purposes of this case that Arkansas's marriage statute is unconstitutional. If the statute were unconstitutional, then the district court would have committed error when it applied the statute; but even so, we could reverse only if the error were plain. In establishing whether an error is plain, the Supreme Court has held that [a]t a minimum, [a] court of appeals cannot correct an error pursuant to Rule 52(b) unless the error is clear under current law. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997); United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 620, 630 (6th Cir.1993). The question before us then becomes whether any such error is plain under current law. We conclude that the district court did not commit plain error in applying the Arkansas marriage statute even assuming that the statute is unconstitutional. Although the Colorado Supreme Court has overturned a marriage statute that forbade a marriage between two adopted siblings not related by blood on the grounds that prohibiting marriage between adopted children fails even to satisfy minimum rationality requirements, Israel v. Allen, 195 Colo. 263, 577 P.2d 762, 764 (1978), there have been hardly any other suggestions that such statutes are unconstitutional. In fact, the Arkansas Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of its incest statute on the basis that sexual relations between adopted family members are just as damaging to the family as sexual relations between those related by blood. Heikkila v. State, 352 Ark. 87, 98 S.W.3d 805, 807-08 (2003) (stating that the protection of the incest law extends to step-relationships as well as blood relationships because sexual activity in step-relationships is equally disruptive of the family as would be sexual activity between blood relations); Camp v. State, 288 Ark. 269, 704 S.W.2d 617, 619 (1986) ([S]tepchildren and adopted children have been added to the crime of incest because society is as concerned with the integrity of the family, including step and adoptive relationships as well as those of blood relationships, and sexual activity is equally disruptive, whatever the makeup of the family.). Such arguments upholding the constitutionality of Arkansas's incest statute would be equally applicable to marriage statutes; if a sexual relationship between adopted family members would threaten the family, so too must marriage. Any possible unconstitutionality of Arkansas's marriage statute is not clear under current law. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. To be explicit, nothing we say today should foreclose any later court from determining the constitutionality of Arkansas's marriage statute, [6] but today we hold only that a ruling of unconstitutionality would not be clear from the precedent that exists today. Therefore, we hold that even if Dedman has standing to bring this constitutional challenge, and even if the district court committed error, any such error was not plain error. Dedman's constitutional challenge thus fails.