Opinion ID: 856488
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Matias-Pablo’s Claims for Relief

Text: Matias-Pablo argues that he has met the standards required to be granted asylum as well as withholding of removal under both the INA and the CAT. As a preliminary matter, because Petitioners expressly waived their right to appeal to the BIA their claims to relief under the CAT, see A.R. at 18 (Resp. BIA Br. at 4), we need not address Matias-Pablo’s CAT-related arguments. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (stating that orders of removal are reviewable only if “the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right”); Ramani v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 554, 560 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that “only claims properly presented to the BIA and considered on their merits can be reviewed by this court in an immigration appeal”). In order for Matias-Pablo to be eligible for asylum, he “must be a refugee, which means that [he] must be unwilling to return to his . . . home country ‘because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’” Stserba v. Holder, 646 F.3d 964, 972 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). If an applicant is able to establish past persecution, we apply a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). However, “[t]he government may rebut this presumption by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that conditions in the country have changed so fundamentally that the applicant no longer has a wellfounded fear of future persecution.” Bi Xia Qu v. Holder, 618 F.3d 602, 606 (6th Cir. 2010). Further, the asylum applicant must establish “a link between the acts of persecution and the petitioner’s protected-group identity.” Stserba, 646 F.3d at 972. This requires that the applicant 7 No. 12-3819 Matias-Pablo et al. v. Holder demonstrate that he “was specifically targeted by the government for abuse based on a statutorily protected ground,” as opposed to being the victim of indiscriminate violence or mistreatment. Gilaj v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 275, 285 (6th Cir. 2005). If the applicant can show that he meets the definition of a refugee, he also “bears the burden of establishing that the favorable exercise of discretion [by the Attorney General] is warranted.” Cruz-Samayoa v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1145, 1150–51 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). In order to qualify for withholding of removal under the INA, Matias-Pablo “faces ‘a more stringent burden than what is required on a claim for asylum.’” Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 365 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Liti v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 631, 640 (6th Cir. 2005)). Withholding of removal requires the applicant to demonstrate that “there is a clear probability that he will be subject to persecution if forced to return to the country of removal.” Singh, 398 F.3d at 401 (internal quotation marks omitted). This requires a showing that the applicant’s “life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of removal on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). The BIA, agreeing with the IJ, found that Matias-Pablo did not establish that the mistreatment he suffered in Guatemala was on account of a statutorily protected ground, and that accordingly, he could not establish past persecution to support his claim for asylum. See A.R. at 4 (BIA Dec. at 2). Matias-Pablo challenges this determination, arguing that he demonstrated that the persecution he suffered was based on political opinion or race. See Pet. Br. at 8. Upon review, we hold that 8 No. 12-3819 Matias-Pablo et al. v. Holder substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Matias-Pablo did not demonstrate that there was a nexus between the harms he suffered and a statutorily protected ground. The Supreme Court has held that “forced recruitment” by Guatemalan guerrillas “in order to carry on their war against the government and pursue their political goals” does not necessarily amount to persecution on account of political opinion. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992). The Elias-Zacarias Court held that in order to meet the “on account of” prong of asylum eligibility, an applicant must demonstrate that the persecution he suffered was “on account of the victim’s political opinion, not the persecutor’s.” Id.; see Pascual v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 483, 487 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that a government’s conscription of its citizens into military service and “punish[ment of] those who do not fulfill their duty . . . does not by itself ordinarily rise to the level of persecution on the basis of political opinion”); Mateo v. Gonzales, 217 F. App’x 476, 483 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Although Mateo might have refused to join the guerrillas because he opposed their tactics, his refusal does not necessarily lead to an inference that he was threatened by the guerrillas on account of his political opinion.”). Accordingly, that Matias-Pablo suffered harm while participating in the Civil Patrol does not necessarily demonstrate persecution based on the expression of a political opinion. See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482. The BIA found instead that MatiasPablo “was forced to participate in the civil patrol because all the men in his village were required to participate in order to assist the Guatemalan army in securing the country from the guerrillas.” A.R. at 4 (BIA Dec. at 2). This finding is supported by Matias-Pablo’s testimony at the hearing that he was “obligated” to join the Civil Patrol, and that “[e]verybody had to do it,” or else they would 9 No. 12-3819 Matias-Pablo et al. v. Holder be beaten. Id. at 209, 214 (Hr’g Tr. at 92, 97). There is no indication in the record that the guerrillas sought to punish Matias-Pablo based on his political beliefs. Rather, the harm Matias-Pablo suffered in Guatemala at the hands of the Guatemalan government appears to have been based on the mandatory nature of participation in the Civil Patrol, and the government’s generalized mission to combat the guerrillas. Thus, the record does not compel reversal of the BIA’s determination that the harms Matias-Pablo suffered were not on account of a political opinion.1 Matias-Pablo also argues that the persecution he suffered was on account of his race as a Mayan, contending that the “the soldiers singled out the Mayans, including [Matias-Pablo], for harsh treatment due to their race.” Pet Br. at 13. He points to his asylum application, in which he wrote that he “suffered threats and intimidation at the hands of the military who hunted and apprehended hundreds of people all Mayan Mam like myself.” A.R. at 443 (Form I-589 at 5). However, although the IJ credited Matias-Pablo’s account of the military’s raids on his village, the IJ noted that MatiasPablo had offered no testimony to establish that the villages were being pillaged because the inhabitants were Mayan. See id. at 65 (IJ Dec. at 27 n.7). Instead, the testimony indicates that the burning of the villages and the bombing that affected Matias-Pablo were part of the general civil strife during the Guatemalan civil war. We recognize that Matias-Pablo and his family may have suffered losses during the war, a time during which some Guatemalans may have suffered because 1 We also reject Matias-Pablo’s contention that the IJ erred by not considering the testimony of Graciela and Olvidio as corroborating evidence for his claims. See Pet Br. at 14. The IJ’s adverse credibility finding as to Graciela and Olvidio is supported by substantial evidence, see infra Part II.C, and accordingly, the IJ need not have credited their testimony. 10 No. 12-3819 Matias-Pablo et al. v. Holder of their Mayan identity. See Domingo-Francisco v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 322 F. App’x 849, 851 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting “the published reports and articles of record, including the country report, support an inference that [the petitioners] could have suffered violence because of their Mayan identit[ies]”). But we are constrained by the substantial-evidence standard. The testimony and other evidence that Matias-Pablo has offered, alone, does not compel the conclusion that Matias-Pablo suffered past persecution on account of his Mayan race. See Haider, 595 F.3d at 281. We also conclude that the BIA’s determination that Matias-Pablo did not establish a wellfounded fear of future persecution is supported by substantial evidence. The BIA found that “[t]here is no proof in the record that anyone seeks to harm the lead respondent based on his past service in the civil patrol” and that “[a]part from the lead respondent’s speculations, the record lacks evidence indicating that anyone in Guatemala may currently seek to harm him upon his return.” Id. at 4 (BIA Dec. at 2). We have held that “an applicant cannot rely on speculative conclusions or mere assertions of fear of possible persecution, but instead must offer reasonably specific information showing a real threat of individual persecution.” Mapouya v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 396, 412 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 624–25 (6th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a petitioner’s application for asylum even though the evidence indicated that there was “widespread human rights abuse by the Iranian government,” because the petitioner “presented no credible evidence that he will be singled out for different treatment if he is deported back to Iran”). 11 No. 12-3819 Matias-Pablo et al. v. Holder The civil war ended in Guatemala in 1996. See A.R. at 427 (1997 Country Rep. at 2). Guatemala is now a democratic republic, and the 2008 Country Report stated that “there were no reports that the government or its agents committed any politically motivated killings.” Id. at 398 (2008 Country Rep. at 1). In a series of similar cases, this court has rejected claims of a fear of future persecution in Guatemala because of the long passage of time since the ending of the civil war. See, e.g., Mendez-Coronado v. Holder, 374 F. App’x 601, 605 (6th Cir. 2010); Ralios Morente v. Holder, 401 F. App’x 17, 23 (6th Cir. 2010); Velasquez-Garcia v. Holder, 336 F. App’x 517, 523 (6th Cir. 2009); Pascual, 514 F.3d at 488. Matias-Pablo has provided no specific information about why the government would believe he had joined the guerrillas, or that either former guerrillas or former military officials will seek to harm him if he returns to Guatemala. Accordingly, the evidence does not compel a reversal of the BIA’s determination that Matias-Pablo did not demonstrate a wellfounded fear of future persecution. Because Matias-Pablo cannot demonstrate either past persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground or a well-founded fear of future persecution, he cannot succeed on his claim for asylum. See Stserba, 646 F.3d at 972. Furthermore, because Matias-Pablo has not met the requirements for establishing eligibility for asylum, he also cannot meet the heightened requirements for withholding of removal. See Berri v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 390, 397 (6th Cir. 2006).