Opinion ID: 1731448
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct During Examination of Witnesses

Text: Jones alleges that, during direct and cross-examination, the prosecutor committed six acts of misconduct that deprived him of a fair trial. First, Jones argues that the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony that Jones's wife had an attorney present during an interview with law enforcement, thereby suggest[ing] to the jury that [she] had counsel present because she or her husband had something to hide. But Jones fails to present any law indicating that such questioning is improper, and only speculates as to the negative impact of the questioning. Thus, we cannot conclude that the prosecutor's conduct constituted an error, much less an error that was plain. Second, Jones contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting sympathy for Charles and Andrew Jensen regarding the family hardships caused by Linda's murder. Jones argues that the testimony prejudiced his ability to establish Mr. Jensen as an alternative perpetrator. A prosecutor is permitted to talk about what the victim suffers and to talk about accountability, in order to help persuade the jury not to return a verdict based on sympathy for the defendant. State v. Montjoy, 366 N.W.2d 103, 109 (Minn.1985). But a prosecutor should not emphasize such matters to such an extent as to divert the jury's attention from its true role of deciding whether the state has met its burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Here, the prosecutor asked only a few questions on this topic. Further, most of the questions were posed to Linda's husband, who Jones alleged was the perpetrator of the crime. We conclude that this questioning did not constitute error, much less error that was plain. Third, Jones argues that the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony that Andrew Jensen took a polygraph examination, which invited the jury to conclude that Charles Jensen had also taken and passed a polygraph and that Jones had either failed or refused to take a polygraph test. The State responds that Andrew's answer to the prosecutor's question was uninvited. Polygraph examinations are inadmissible. See, e.g., State v. Riley, 568 N.W.2d 518, 527 (Minn.1997); State v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn.1985). Therefore, we consider whether this error prejudiced Jones. Here, the prosecutor did not highlight the response or make any further reference to it during the trial. Further, Jones's argument that Andrew's answer implied that Charles Jensen passed the polygraph and Jones did not is pure speculation, and we reject it. Thus, the State has demonstrated that Andrew's answer was not prejudicial and did not affect Jones's substantial rights. See State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 394 (Minn.2007) (finding error harmless where erroneously admitted testimony was brief and was not persuasive evidence of defendant's guilt). Fourth, Jones argues that the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony of Jones's aggressive sales tactics as a car salesman to imply that he acted consistently with his aggressive character by murdering Linda. See Minn. R. Evid. 404(a) (evidence of a character trait not admissible to prove action in conformity with the trait on a particular occasion). Jones relies on State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736 (Minn.2003), to support his argument. In Ray, the prosecutor persistently asked leading questions aimed to elicit testimony that the district court had previously ruled inadmissible. Id. at 744-45. But Jones has alleged no such conduct in this case. While we do not endorse the prosecution's elicitation of this testimony, our independent review of the record reveals nothing to substantiate Jones's claim that the prosecutor mentioned Jones's sales tactics to inflame the jury against him. Fifth, Jones argues that it was misconduct to elicit testimony that he engaged in an extramarital affair with another woman while his wife was in the hospital with an emotional breakdown. A prosecutor may not make gratuitous character attacks on a defendant. State v. DeWald, 463 N.W.2d 741, 745 (Minn. 1990). While the mention of Jones's wife's hospitalization at the time of his affair undoubtedly painted Jones in a bad light, we cannot say that it constituted a gratuitous or unfair attack on his character. [5] Sixth, Jones argues that the prosecutor improperly asked him, would you agree that    a reasonable person might well conclude that you would rather climb a tree and tell a falsehood than stand on the ground and tell the truth? The State argues that the question concerned Jones's credibility and was based on Jones's own testimony. It is well settled that a prosecutor may not give his own opinion of the credibility of a witness during closing argument. State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776, 786 (Minn.2006). Here, the prosecutor's question challenging Jones's veracity was extremely argumentative, and the State's attempt to justify it on the ground that it was linked to the perspective of a reasonable person lacks merit. But the State has demonstrated that this conduct did not prejudice Jones's right to a fair trial. Specifically, Jones's credibility and trustworthiness were seriously damaged by his admission that he had sex with Linda the morning of the murder and that he had changed his story several times between the murder and the second trial.