Opinion ID: 2973336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Summary Judgment on WPA Claims

Text: A. Dismissal of Claims Against Dobson Individually Jones sued both the Allen Park Police Department and Chief Dobson under the WPA. The district court dismissed the claims against Chief Dobson individually because it found that he did not meet the definition of an “employer” under the WPA. Section 1 of the WPA provides that an “employer” is “a person who has 1 or more employees. Employer includes an agent of an employer and the state or a political subdivision of the state.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.361. Because the plain language of the statute explicitly includes an agent of an employer, we believe that the Michigan legislature expressly intended to allow suit against an agent of an employer when that agent violates the WPA. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.361; see also Phinney v. Perlmutter, 564 N.W.2d 532 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (allowing a senior research associate at a university research institute to sue the institute’s director under the WPA). We therefore conclude that the district court erred in determining that the WPA claims against Dobson individually should be dismissed. However, as the district court recognized, Dobson is the only agent of the city named in the complaint, and the claims against Dobson individually and against the city are indistinguishable. Because we conclude below that no genuine issue of material fact remains for trial and the city is entitled to judgment on the WPA claim, the district court’s error is harmless. B. Claims Actionable 1. Whether All of Jones’s Claims are Barred by the Limitations Period As a preliminary matter, the defendants argue that Jones’s WPA claim is barred in its entirety because Jones’s testimony in the Madrigal matter, the cause for the retaliation complained of, took 5 place more than ninety days before Jones filed his complaint. This argument is meritless. The WPA makes each act of retaliation actionable and makes no reference to the complaint’s being filed within ninety days of the event giving rise to the retaliatory conduct. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.363(1) (stating that a plaintiff may bring a civil action “within 90 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this act,” not within ninety days of the event giving rise to the violation of the act). 2. Which Claims are Actionable Section 3 of the WPA provides the limitations period applicable in WPA claims, stating: “[a] person who alleges a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief, or actual damages, or both within 90 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this act.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.363(1). Jones argues that each of Dobson’s allegedly retaliatory actions was in some way motivated by Dobson’s desire to keep Jones from testifying in the Madrigal matter or his anger at Jones for testifying. He argues that the actions are thus a part of a “continuing course of conduct” that is actionable under the WPA and not single incidents that are each subject to the 90-day limitations period. The district court found that the “continuing violations” doctrine applies to cases brought under the WPA, citing Sumner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 398 N.W.2d 368 (Mich. 1986), but that the doctrine did not apply in this case because there was no continuous policy of discrimination that manifested itself in ways that would not “trigger an employee’s awareness of and duty to assert his rights.” Although we conclude that the district court correctly found that Michigan has adopted the “continuing violation” doctrine with regard to the WPA, see Phinney, 564 N.W.2d at 551 (citing Sumner), we think that the viability of that doctrine in Michigan has been called into doubt since the 6 district court entered its decision in this case. See Garg v. Macomb Co. Cmty. Mental Health Servs., 696 N.W.2d 646, 656-59 (Mich. 2005) (overruling Sumner). We need not decide whether Michigan courts are likely to continue to allow the continuing violations doctrine to be used to toll the statute of limitations on WPA claims because Jones has not made a showing sufficient to find a continuing violation. In evaluating whether such a continuing course of conduct exists, Michigan courts have considered: (1) whether the alleged acts involve the same type of discrimination; (2) whether the alleged acts are recurring or isolated; and (3) the degree of permanence of the act—i.e., whether it should indicate to the employee that he or she should assert his or her rights. Phinney, 564 N.W.2d at 552 (citing Sumner, 398 N.W.2d at 383). Jones has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the theory applies in his case because, as the district court noted, “the allegations regarding his discipline charge and denial of promotion or overtime are isolated employment decisions having a degree of permanence that would trigger an employee’s awareness of and duty to assert his rights.” Jones argues that the five allegedly retaliatory actions are not isolated incidents because they were all motivated by the same animus. However, motivation pertains only to the first prong of the three-part analysis; Jones does not address whether the alleged acts of retaliation are of the same type of or have manifested themselves such that he should have been on notice that his rights had just been violated. Jones felt that he had been wronged in each of these circumstances and after each separate incident he voiced his frustrations about the allegedly poor treatment, but did not assert his rights by filing a timely civil action with regard to any of these acts of alleged retaliation. Jones filed his complaint on February 27, 2003. Therefore, only those actions which occurred on or after November 28, 2003, fall within the 90-day limitations period. Jones does not 7 contest the defendants’ assertion that the only claims falling within that time frame are those asserting that he was subjected to a hostile environment because of the circulation of rumors in the workplace and that he was denied tobacco sting overtime opportunities. Accordingly, only those claims are subject to analysis under the WPA. The substantive provisions of the WPA are found in the Michigan Compiled Laws at § 15.362, which provides that: [a]n employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by that public body, or a court action. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.362. To establish a prima facie case of a violation of the WPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he was engaged in a protected activity, (2) he was discharged from employment, threatened, or otherwise discriminated against, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the discharge. David v. ANA Television Network, Inc., 208 F.3d 213 (Table), 2000 WL 222575 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Shallal v. Catholic Soc. Servs. of Wayne Co., 566 N.W.2d 571, 574 (Mich. 1997)). Once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case under the WPA, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the challenged action was taken for a legitimate reason. Smith v. Gentiva Health Servs. (USA) Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (citing Eckstein v. Kuhn, 408 N.W.2d 131 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)). The burden of proof remains at all times on the plaintiff. Id. 8 Jones argues that “[t]here is no doubt that a jury could reasonably conclude that Plaintiff was harassed and retaliated against for his potential testimony and actual testimony in the Madrigal matters.” Jones engaged in activity protected by the WPA when he provided deposition testimony in the Madrigal lawsuit and when he testified before the City Commission investigating the Madrigal matter. He therefore has met the first prong of his prima facie case. But review of the record makes it clear that as to each of the claimed acts of retaliation, he cannot establish at least one of the other prongs. a. Hostile Environment The hostile environment claim alleges that unidentified persons were spreading rumors that Jones would be demoted or fired. Michigan courts look to the law regarding what constitutes an “adverse employment action” in civil rights actions to determine whether the plaintiff in a WPA claim has satisfied the second element of the prima facie case. See, e.g., Heckmann v. Detroit Chief of Police, 705 N.W.2d 689 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). These cases hold that an adverse employment action is “an employment decision that is materially adverse in that it is more than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Id. at 697. Typically, this includes termination, demotion, diminished pay, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished responsibilities, or other unique indices. Id. Isolated rumors being spread around the office from an unidentified source are not the kinds of actions that are actionable under the WPA, as such rumors are not the type of actions that rise to the level of an “adverse employment action” and are not attributable to the employer. Hence, Jones’s hostile environment claim fails at the second prong. b. Lost Opportunity for Overtime on Tobacco Stings 9 The lost opportunity to sign up for overtime is a tangible employment action sufficient to satisfy the second prong of Jones’s prima facie case. However, to show causation, Jones must show that his employer was on notice that he was participating in the protected activity and that his participation in the protected activity led to the adverse employment action. Gentiva, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 762; Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (stating that, in retaliation cases, the question is whether the employer would have reached the same decision even if the plaintiff had not engaged in protected conduct). Jones’s evidence shows that the reason he was not aware of the overtime opportunities was because the person responsible (either an inspector in the detective bureau or the Chief) did not post the job. Jones put forth no evidence showing that the Chief purposely did not post it, that it was the Chief’s decision not to do so, or that the motivation for not posting it was to deprive Jones of the ability to work overtime. The only pieces of evidence tending to show that the lack of a posting was motivated by the Chief’s retaliatory motives are Jones’s own deposition statements expressing his unsubstantiated opinion that retaliation was the cause. This is not sufficient to meet the causation element of the prima facie case.