Opinion ID: 2612687
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: disposition in the water court

Text: Both the master-referee and the water court upheld the application of the reserved rights doctrine in Colorado and rejected arguments made by various water users, most notably Denver, that no such rights exist. [21] The water court rejected arguments to the effect that the federal government had ceded to Colorado all title and exclusive authority over waters located on the public lands and federal reservations and, therefore, subsequently lacked the power to reserve water. [22] The water court's key rulings were that: (1) the United States had the power, both before and after Colorado's admission to statehood in 1876, to reserve water to itself by withdrawal and reservation of certain lands from the public domain; (2) only appurtenant waters unappropriated at the time of the reservation could be affected by the withdrawal or reservation; (3) the necessary intent to reserve water may be implied from the purpose(s) of the reservation; (4) the quantity of water reserved is that minimal amount necessary to fulfill the purpose(s) for which the reservation was originally created; (5) reserved waters may be used only to fulfill the actual primary reservation purpose(s); (6) a priority date as of the date of the reservation attaches to reserved rights; (7) reserved water rights are subordinate in priority to all appropriations initiated prior to the date of the reservation, whether or not adjudicated by Colorado law; (8) reserved water rights are merely the right to use water and do not represent federal title to or ownership of water; (9) reserved rights constitute a unique exception to Colorado's otherwise absolute ownership of water in natural streams within its boundaries; (10) reserved rights are appurtenant to the lands with which they are reserved; and (11) reserved rights are available to the United States only in its proprietary capacity and not in its sovereign capacity and, therefore, may not be used by federal concessionaires, permittees, and lessees. More specifically, the water court concluded as follows: A. Purposes of Reservations The water court found as a matter of fact and law the intent necessary to reserve water with respect to each of the major reservations at issue. The water court, however, rejected the federal government's contentions as to the purposes of the reservations in many instances and, accordingly, decreed water rights more limited in quantity and more restricted in permissible use than the United States had originally sought. In particular, the water court held that: (1) no water had been reserved for maintaining minimum instream flows in national forests; (2) no water had been reserved for instream flows for recreational boating purposes at Dinosaur National Monument; (3) reserved rights for public waterholes and springs reserved under 43 U.S.C. งง 141 and 300 (1976) were limited to the amount needed for human and animal drinking water; and (4) reserved rights for two mineral hot springs did not include water necessary for geothermal power production purposes. B. Priority Dates The water court accepted the federal government's contention that reserved rights take a priority equivalent to the date of the reservation. It held, however, that such rights are nevertheless subordinate in priority to appropriations initiated prior to the date of the reservation whether or not they had been adjudicated under Colorado law on that date or thereafter. C. Quantification of Decreed Rights The water court held that the federal government was required by state law, by the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. ง 666 (1976), and by its own consent to quantify its reserved rights. It awarded absolute decrees establishing water rights for all existing diversions and off-stream uses in national parks, national forests, and national monuments for which reserved water was sought in an amount serving existing uses. In addition, the water court entered conditional decrees apportioning certain amounts of additional reserved water for future diversions and impoundments in the national forests and monuments and in Rocky Mountain National Park. See section 37-92-305, C.R.S.1973. The water court also awarded conditional decrees for an unquantified amount of water for existing and future diversions and impoundments from all reserved public waterholes, springs, and mineral hot springs; it allowed the federal government four years from the date of the decree to quantify its claims and to submit them for judicial approval. However, the water court held that the reservations of public waterholes and springs pursuant to 43 U.S.C. งง 141 and 300 (1976) reached only water sources which were not tributary to any running stream. Conditional decrees were also awarded for minimum stream flows and lake levels in national parks and monuments, but the water court rejected all claims for such rights in national forests. It allowed five years for quantification of minimum stream flow claims for the purposes it recognized in Rocky Mountain National Park and in the national monuments generally, and allowed six months for quantification of instream right claims for fish habitats in Dinosaur National Monument. The water court rejected, in their entirety, the United States' claims for instream flows for recreational boating in Dinosaur National Monument. All of the conditional water rights were subjected to the requirement that the United States report quadrennially regarding its progress in reducing the reserved waters to actual beneficial use. However, the United States was allowed five years to make its report as to minimum stream flows, so as coincide with the scheduled quantification of its claims. With respect to each of the reservations for which water rights were decreed, the water court held that the original claims and the forthcoming quantifications would fix the maximum extent of federal reserved water rights for all time. Future claims for additional amounts were to be cognizable only under Colorado's prior appropriation doctrine. The water court declined to rule upon several reserved rights claims for public waterholes which had been inadvertently omitted from the federal government's formal water applications. D. Defeasibility of National Forest Reserved Rights The water court subjected all reserved rights decreed for national forest lands, whether conditional or absolute, to appropriation by other water users. It interpreted 16 U.S.C. ง 481 (1976), a provision of the Organic Act for the national forest system, as establishing that the availability of water supplies for private domestic, mining, milling, and agricultural use was the overriding purpose of all national forests. The water court also interpreted section 481 to make the water rights of the United States in the national forests defeasible upon private appropriation for one of the statutory purposes, irrespective of whether the appropriation was initiated prior to or subsequent to the date of the reservation. E. Administration of Water Rights Relying on the McCarran Amendment, Colorado law, and the consent of the government, the water court held that the absolute decrees awarded to the United States were to be administered by the State Water Engineer. In addition, all changes in federal water use were held to be subject to Colorado change-in-use procedures. See section 37-92-302, C.R.S.1973. The water court also held that change-in-use proceedings were a necessary prerequisite to any application of reserved waters to land reserved at a different time from that portion with which the particular waters were reserved. The court decreed that no change-in-use decree was to be entered authorizing the use of reserved waters for a use outside a primary reservation purpose. Similarly, the water court prohibited any use of reserved water on lands outside a federal reservation. F. Estoppel Claims The water court held that the United States could be estopped from asserting reserved water rights irrespective of whether it acted in a governmental or proprietary capacity. To estop the federal government, the court required a moving party to show justifiable detrimental reliance upon an affirmative and material misrepresentation of fact by the government as to the existence of federal reserved water rights. The water court ultimately upheld the estoppel claims made by three parties, although it rejected sweeping claims of estoppel by numerous parties as legally or factually unsound. It estopped the United States from asserting reserved rights conflicting with the appropriative rights of the Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District and the Twin Lakes Reservoir and Canal Co. in the federal Fryingpan-Arkansas water reclamation project. The water court interpreted the project's operating plan as federal recognition of the Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District's water rights priorities, but rejected a claim that the operating plan constituted a quitclaim of all federal water rights not expressly reserved therein. The court also determined that the federal grants of rights-of-way and contractual water exchanges with Twin Lakes Reservoir and Canal Co. contemplated by the Fryingpan-Arkansas operating plan estopped the United States from asserting reserved rights to the detriment of Twin Lakes. In addition, the water court concluded that the United States was estopped to assert reserved water rights in any manner which would interfere with Denver's water rights recognized by the Blue River Decree. The Blue River Decree is a consent decree formulated in 1955 as a result of prior litigation between Denver and the United States in United States v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, No. 2782 (D.Colo.1955). The United States has taken no appeals from any of the estoppel provisions in the water court's decree. G. Claims for Appropriative Rights The basic factual determinations on appropriative rights claims were made by the standing water referees in Water Division Nos. 4, 5, and 6 and were generally undisputed. The United States was granted all of the appropriative rights it asserted with the exception of a few claims which, apparently, were omitted from its formal water rights applications and statements of claim, and which the water court accordingly declined to consider. Two legal issues respecting the government's appropriative rights, however, were preserved for the master-referee's consideration. The master-referee ruled that the United States' claim for appropriative rights for instream use of water for fire protection, wildlife and livestock watering, and recreation was valid and entitled to recognition notwithstanding the absence of a permanent man-made diversion structure. Moreover, notwithstanding the contrary provisions of the Water Right Determination and Administration Act, sections 37-92-301 et seq., C.R.S.1973, the master-referee ruled that the United States was entitled to antedation of its appropriative rights so as to allow a true priority based upon the date of actual appropriation. Since the federal government had formerly been immune from suit to determine its water rights, the master referee noted that its absence from all previous adjudications was privileged and, accordingly, that it could neither be bound nor prejudiced by the priorities determined therein. No objections were made to these rulings, except for an unsuccessful objection by the federal government to the master-referee's refusal to consider the few appropriative claims which had been inadvertently omitted from the water rights applications and statements of claims. H. Filing Fees In these consolidated proceedings, the United States paid $3,728 in filing fees pursuant to the Colorado Water Right Determination and Administration Act, supra, and the predecessor Colorado Water Adjudication Act of 1943, C.R.S.1963, 148-9-7 et seq. Payments were made under protest on the theory that the United States had not consented to liability for such fees. [23] The water court held, however, that the United States, by consenting to suit through the McCarran Amendment, became subject like other parties to the obligation to pay routine filing fees. The water court also held that the statutory exemption from filing fees available to the State of Colorado and its subdivisions and instrumentalities, but not to the United States, did not discriminate impermissibly against the federal government. See section 37-92-302(1)(d), C.R.S.1973. For the reasons expressed herein, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand this case to the water court with directions to modify its decree in accordance with the views stated in this opinion.