Opinion ID: 1143673
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Differing Standards of Proof.

Text: The Murrays assert that collateral estoppel is inappropriate because they had a heavier burden of proof in BW than they do in this case. They are correct in asserting that one factor courts can consider in determining the fairness of issue preclusion is whether the party to be precluded has a better chance of prevailing in the subsequent action because he bears a lesser burden of proof than in the first action. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(4) (1981). It is also true that in BW the Murrays had the burden of proving the validity of their landlord lien as an affirmative defense. Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 294 (Alaska 1976), declined to follow on other grounds by East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 90 L.Ed.2d 865, 876 (1986). In this case, the Feights claim that the re-entry was forcible. The Murrays assert that the re-entry was with consent. Although they also designate consent as an affirmative defense, this does not change the fact that the assertion of consent raises no new matter but simply denies the existence of one of the elements in plaintiff's case. Id. at 295. As such, consent is an issue regarding which the Feights have the ultimate burden of proof. Id. Nonetheless, the burden the Murrays failed to meet in the BW action was not their ultimate burden of proof. Rather, the issue of consent was resolved on a motion for summary judgment. [3] All inferences of fact were to be drawn in the Murrays' favor as the non-moving party. [4] Alaska Rent-A-Car v. Ford Motor Co., 526 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Alaska 1974); Alaska R.Civ.P. 56(c). All the Murrays had to do to defeat BW's motion was to set forth specific facts showing that [they] could produce evidence reasonably tending to dispute or contradict the movant's evidence and thus demonstrate that a material issue of fact exist[ed]. State, Dept. of Highways v. Green, 586 P.2d 595, 606 n. 32 (Alaska 1978). The Murrays were not required to establish that they would ultimately have prevailed at trial. Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc., 526 P.2d at 1139; Gablick v. Wolfe, 469 P.2d 391, 395 (Alaska 1970). Thus if anything, the Murrays' burden in BW was less than the burden they face here. The Murrays apparently claim that the issue of consent was not raised in such a way that they had an opportunity to respond. This argument is patently absurd. Admittedly, the key evidence on lack of consent  Richard Friedman's affidavit describing the re-entry  was filed several months after BW had filed its reply brief in support of its summary judgment motion. But the Friedman affidavit was filed almost a month before the court ruled on the motion. The Murrays do not contend that they were in any way prevented from filing a responding affidavit, which presumably could have been executed by either Ed Stahla or Peter Murray since both were present at the re-entry. The Murrays do not claim, nor is it plausible that they could claim, that the trial court would have prohibited them from filing such an affidavit after it had allowed BW to file the Friedman affidavit. In their motion for reconsideration in BW, the Murrays apparently asserted that portions of Peter Murray's deposition contradicted Friedman's affidavit, creating a disputed issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Mr. Murray's deposition testimony can best be characterized as evasive and says in essence that Murray told Friedman he was changing the locks and the rest could be settled in court and that Friedman did not actively prevent them from changing the locks. The trial court correctly found that this ambiguous testimony did not raise a genuine issue of material fact. The Murrays had a more than adequate opportunity to present evidence to meet their comparatively light burden of establishing a question of fact in BW. Their burden here, if anything, is heavier. Thus, the differing burdens of proof factor weighs in favor of, not against application of collateral estoppel.