Opinion ID: 1670616
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Validity of Residency and Representation Requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution

Text: The plaintiffs also allege that the statute's one-year residency requirement for appointment to a civil service board violates the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. T.C.A. § 6-54-114(a). Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has consistently recognized, however, that the amendment protects only individuals from violations of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 514, 59 S.Ct. 954, 963, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939). Moreover, this Court has affirmed that [a] municipal corporation, created by a state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities under the Federal Constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator. City of Knoxville v. State ex rel. Hayward, 175 Tenn. 159, 169, 133 S.W.2d 465, 469 (1939), quoting Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40, 53 S.Ct. 431, 432, 77 L.Ed. 1015 (1933). The Civil Service Merit Board of the City of Knoxville, as an administrative board of a municipality, is thus precluded from raising a Fourteenth Amendment claim in this matter. To the extent that the individual plaintiffs may advance an equal protection argument in this case, traditional Fourteenth Amendment analysis is applicable. Thus, if a statutory classification interferes with a fundamental right, or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class, it is subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976). In such situations, the legislation will be upheld only if it is necessary to promote a compelling state interest, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388, 98 S.Ct. 673, 682, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978), if the means employed are the least intrusive or restrictive available, and if those means are necessary to achieve the desired end. Georges v. Carney, 546 F. Supp. 469, 473 (N.D.Ill. 1982), aff'd 691 F.2d 297 (7th Cir.1982). If, however, the legislation does not affect fundamental rights or suspect classes, it may be sustained if a rational basis exists for such legislative action. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516-17, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976). The individual plaintiffs contend that both the right to be considered for appointive office and the right to travel from community to community are affected adversely by durational residency requirements. They also argue that the combination of those rights subjects the statutory residency requirement to strict scrutiny such that the statute may be upheld only if necessary to effectuate a compelling state interest. The United States Supreme Court has held, however, that there is no fundamental right to run as a candidate for elective public office. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43, 92 S.Ct. 849, 855-56, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972). The equal protection clause does guarantee the right to be considered for [public] office without the burden of invidious discriminatory disqualifications. Wellford v. Battaglia, 485 F.2d 1151, 1152 (3rd Cir.1973), citing Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362, 90 S.Ct. 532, 541, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970). But we find no invidious discrimination reflected in the qualifications set out in T.C.A. § 6-54-114. Moreover, if the right to run for office is not considered fundamental, certainly the right to be appointed to public office should not be held to be a fundamental right. See Langmeyer v. Idaho, 104 Idaho 53, 656 P.2d 114, 118 (1982). Some courts have nevertheless employed a strict scrutiny analysis in examining durational residency requirements to run for public office. In doing so, they have recognized that the residency requirement also infringes on the fundamental right of citizens to vote for the candidates of their choice. See, e.g., Wellford v. Battaglia, supra . Such a fundamental right would not obtain in this case, however, because the right to vote is not implicated here. Furthermore, strict scrutiny is not necessarily applicable in this case merely because the constitutional right to travel is involved. As one federal court has noted: [I]t has ... been established that durational residency requirements are not per se infringements of the right of interstate travel triggering strict scrutiny. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406, 95 S.Ct. 553, 560, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa Co., 415 U.S. 250, 258-59, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1082, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974); Matthews v. Atlantic City, [84 N.J. 153, 417 A.2d 1011, 1019 (1980)]; Walker v. Yucht, [352 F. Supp. 85, 94-95 (D.Del. 1972)] ... On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that durational residency restrictions on certain other benefits or privileges do sufficiently implicate the right to travel so as to require strict scrutiny: non-emergency medical care for indigents, Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa Co., supra , welfare benefits, Shapiro v. Thompson, [394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969)], and voting, Dunn v. Blumstein, [405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972)]. Joseph v. City of Birmingham, 510 F. Supp. 1319, 1332 (E.D.Mich. 1981). Only in situations in which a classification penalizes the exercise of the right to travel is the compelling state interest analysis applicable. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa Co., supra, 415 U.S. at 258, 94 S.Ct. at 1082; Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, 405 U.S. at 340, 92 S.Ct. at 1002; Beil v. City of Akron, 660 F.2d 166, 168-69 (6th Cir.1981) (upholding one-year durational residency requirement for candidacy for city council). Although any durational residence requirement imposes a potential cost on migration, the Court in Shapiro cautioned that some `waiting-period[s] ... may not be penalties.' 394 U.S., at 638 n. 21, 89 S.Ct. at 1333. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa Co., supra, 415 U.S. at 258-59, 94 S.Ct. at 1082. As noted in Joseph v. City of Birmingham, supra : The crucial inquiry in the Supreme Court's `penalty' analysis is whether the underlying benefit denied to recently arrived residents is itself a fundamental right (such as voting) or a basic necessity of life (such as welfare benefits for indigents)... . If the underlying benefit or privilege does not come within these two currently identified categories, then laws which deny the benefit to recently arrived residents do not `penalize' the fundamental right of interstate travel; therefore, such laws may be reviewed by the traditional rational basis test. 510 F. Supp. at 1332. The one-year residency requirement of T.C.A. § 6-54-114(a) does not penalize the constitutionally protected right of travel. As with the one-year residency requirement for city commission candidates at issue in Joseph : [T]he requirement does not impair any underlying fundamental right, such as voting or freedom of speech. Second, candidacy is not a basic necessity of life, the deprivation of which would have `dire' or `cruel' effects on recently arrived residents. It is also abundantly clear that the [requirement] could only have a tenuous, remote, and incidental effect on actual interstate travel. Far from being a real impediment to the exercise of this constitutional right, it is barely imaginable that a person would be deterred from moving to [Knoxville] from another state [or municipality] because he or she would be unable to [be considered for appointment to the Civil Service Merit Board of the City of Knoxville] that year. 510 F. Supp. at 1333 (citations omitted). As a result, strict scrutiny is not required in this matter. It follows that if the residency requirement is rationally related to a legitimate state objective, the legislation should be held to be constitutional. See also Hankins v. Hawaii, 639 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (D.Hawaii 1986); Langmeyer v. Idaho, 104 Idaho 53, 656 P.2d 114, 117 (1982). The State of Tennessee has a legitimate interest in ensuring that members of municipal civil service boards are familiar with the problems associated with civil service employment in the area. Moreover, the state is legitimately interested in allowing local legislative bodies which must confirm appointments to civil service boards the opportunity to become familiar with the qualifications and character of individuals nominated for such positions. The one-year residency requirement is rationally related to these legitimate state objectives. In fact, we have previously held that providing the individuals who must select and ratify a public officeholder with an opportunity to become acquainted with the candidate's ability, character, personality, and reputation constitutes even a compelling state interest that justifies the five-year residency requirement for election to judicial office. Hatcher v. Bell, 521 S.W.2d 799, 803-04 (Tenn. 1974). We likewise hold that the one-year residency requirement of T.C.A. § 6-54-114 does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In a footnote in their brief, the plaintiffs also assert that the reservation of one position for a minority and one position for a woman contained in the statute at issue violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. However, they did not include this allegation in their complaint and have not argued the merits of the issue before this Court. There is no indication in the record that the issue was ever argued before the trial court. It has, therefore, been waived. Furthermore, even if the plaintiffs had not waived their additional equal protection clause challenge, it is unclear whether they are proper parties to raise such a challenge. In the footnote addressing the issue, the plaintiffs concede that the Knoxville Civil Service Merit Board already meets the requirement and expects to continue to meet the requirement in the future.  (Emphasis added.)