Opinion ID: 1433861
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consideration of Prior Unadjudicated Criminal Acts

Text: Defendant makes several claims regarding the jury's consideration of unadjudicated criminal activity as a circumstance in aggravation. (ง 190.3, factor (b).) He acknowledges this court has previously upheld the use of such evidence at the penalty phase. ( People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480.) He argues, however, that he was denied his constitutional right to an impartial fact finder and reliable penalty determination because the same jury that decided his guilt could not be expected to evaluate this evidence without bias or prejudice. We have considered and rejected this argument in People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pages 204-205, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480, and find no reason to reconsider our conclusions. We have also previously determined that the use of factor (b) evidence does not run afoul of the statute of limitations. ( People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 981-982, 251 Cal. Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475.) Nor was the jury required unanimously to agree defendant committed the alleged crimes. ( People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 99, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127.) On this record, we find no error by virtue of the trial court's failure to repeat the presumption of innocence instruction given prior to guilt phase deliberations. At the beginning of the penalty phase, the court expressly alerted the jury that [m]ost of the rules that I gave you before ... will apply to this case. Nothing in the court's subsequent penalty instructions suggested the jury should disregard the earlier admonition that a criminal defendant is presumed innocent, and a reasonable juror would assume it continued to apply. ( People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 561, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420.)