Opinion ID: 185408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: By failing to challenge the validity of his plea in his directappeal, Stewart procedurally defaulted the claim he nowmakes. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622(1998). Stewart can raise his claim on collateral review onlyif he can first demonstrate either cause and actual prejudiceor that he is actually innocent. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).1 We begin by noting that the districtcourt did not consider whether Stewart's procedural defaultcould be excused. Rather, it held that Stewart was notentitled to relief because his claim was meritless. Stewart,mem. at 3. We therefore limit our review to the legalquestion presented in Stewart's habeas corpus motion, settingaside the questions of whether his procedural default may beexcused and whether Stewart should ultimately obtain relief. At the time of Stewart's arrest, 18 U.S.C. s 924(c)(1)provided: Whoever, during and in relation to any ... drugtrafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm, shall, inaddition to the punishment provided for such crime ..., besentenced to imprisonment for five years. Several monthsafter Stewart pleaded guilty, this Court issued its decision inUnited States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (percuriam). The Harris defendants had been convicted of violating s 924(c)(1) by receiving guns in exchange for drugs. Thedefendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the gunswere not used in relation to a drug crime because they wereused as a medium of exchange in a trade for drugs and notas offensive or defensive weapons. Id. at 261. We rejectedthis argument and held that s 924(c) requires no more thanthat the guns facilitate the predicate offense in some way. Id. Specifically, we explained that this requirement is met'[i]f the firearm is within the possession or control of a personwho commits an underlying crime ..., and the circumstancesof the case show that the firearm facilitated or had a role inthe crime.'  Id. (quoting United States v. (Richard) Stewart,779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir. 1985)). We concluded that oncethe [firearm] passed into appellants' hands the facilitativenexus was satisfied. Id. The following year, in Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223(1993), the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a defen__________ 1 Although the motion we review in this case is Stewart's secondmotion for collateral review, the limitations established by theAntiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.104-132, s 105, 110 Stat. 1214, 1220, do not apply because Stewartfiled the present motion two days before the Act's effective date. dant who had traded a gun for drugs. Id. at 225. The SmithCourt held that one who transports, exports, sells, or tradesa firearm 'uses' it in violation of s 924(c)(1). Id. at 234-35. In arriving at this holding, the Court described a number ofdifferent everyday meaning[s] for use, including: toemploy, to avail oneself of, and to derive service from. Id. at 228-29 (internal quotes omitted). In light of thesedefinitions, the Court explained that the Smith defendant hadused a gun as an item of barter ... to bring him the verydrugs he sought. Id. at 229. Echoing our decision inHarris, the Court noted that the gun at least must 'facilitat[e], or ha[ve] the potential of facilitating,' the drug trafficking offense. Id. at 238 (quoting (Richard) Stewart, 779 F.2dat 540). Two years later, the Supreme Court issued its Baileydecision, which clarif[ied] the meaning of 'use' unders 924(c)(1). 516 U.S. at 142. In Bailey, the Court held thats 924(c)(1) requires evidence sufficient to show an activeemployment of the firearm by the defendant, a use thatmakes the firearm an operative factor in relation to thepredicate offense. Id. at 143. In its discussion, the Courtagain emphasized that use should be given its 'ordinaryand natural' meaning. Id. at 145 (quoting Smith, 508 U.S. at228). Distinguishing between the terms use and carry ins 924(c)(1), the Court explained that a firearm can be usedwithout being carried, e.g., when an offender ... barters witha firearm without handling it. Id. at 146. The Courtunderscored that its decision is not inconsistent with Smith,explicitly recognizing that the active-employment understanding of 'use' certainly includes ... bartering. Id. at 148. In Bailey's wake, five of our sister circuits have consideredwhether a person who receives a gun in exchange for drugsuses the gun within the meaning of s 924(c). Three ofthose circuits have held that a receiving defendant uses thegun, see United States v. Ramirez-Rangle, 103 F.3d 1501,1506 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ulloa, 94 F.3d 949, 956(5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1509(8th Cir. 1996), while two have held that he does not, seeUnited States v. Warwick, 167 F.3d 965, 975-76 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Westmoreland, 122 F.3d 431, 435 (7thCir. 1997). Consistent with the ordinary meaning approach employedby the Supreme Court in Smith and Bailey, we cannot seehow a defendant uses a gun when he receives it during adrug transaction. The recipient has not employed the gun,availed himself of the gun, or derived any service from thegun by simply trading his drugs for it. Cf. Smith, 508 U.S. at229. Indeed, nothing in a person's acceptance of a gunembodies the active employment demanded by the Court inBailey. See 516 U.S. at 142. We therefore agree with theSixth and Seventh Circuits that a person who receives a gunin a trade for drugs has not used the gun in violation ofs 924(c). As the Seventh Circuit succinctly stated in United States v.Westmoreland, there is no grammatically correct way toexpress that a person receiving a payment is thereby 'using'the payment. 122 F.3d at 435. Quite simply, a seller doesnot 'use' a buyer's consideration. Id. at 436. For example,when a person pays a cashier a dollar for a cup of coffee inthe courthouse cafeteria, the customer has not used thecoffee. He has only used the dollar bill. We see no difference when a person pays for a gun with drugs. In response to Stewart's motion, the Government contendsthat Harris is still the law of this Circuit. This contention isbased on the Supreme Court's statement that our Harrisdecision came to the same conclusion as the EleventhCircuit decision the Court affirmed in Smith. 508 U.S. at227. While the Government's suggestion may be alluring, theinterpretation of use we employed in Harris does notsurvive after Bailey. In making this argument, the Government essentially asksus to interpret Smith more broadly than the Court itself didin Bailey. The Bailey Court carefully noted that its holdingwas not inconsistent with the interpretation it announced inSmith. 516 U.S. at 148. The Court, however, explained thatthe Smith decision addressed only whether that particularuse (bartering) came within the meaning of s 924(c)(1). Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, the Smith Court only conclude[d] that using a firearm in a guns-for-drugs trade mayconstitute 'us[ing] a firearm' within the meaning ofs 924(c)(1). 508 U.S. at 237 (emphasis added). The BaileyCourt explained that this conclusion adhered to an activemeaning of the word use because it was clear that thedefendant had 'used' the gun. 516 U.S. at 148. In fact, theSmith Court made clear that the defendant had  'used' hisMAC-10 in an attempt to obtain drugs by offering to trade itfor cocaine. 508 U.S. at 228. There is no similar way to saythat the recipient of a gun has used the gun when he offersto trade his drugs for it. Neither Smith nor Bailey concluded that receiving a firearm in a drugs-for-guns trade constitutes using a firearm. In this case, Stewart bartered for afirearm, he did not barter with a firearm like the Smithdefendant. See United States v. Ulloa, 94 F.3d 949, 958 (5thCir. 1996) (Politz, J., dissenting). Accordingly, neither Baileynor Smith foreclose Stewart's claim, and, read together, thosedecisions foreclose the possibility that Harris is still viable. As the Government correctly notes, the Bailey Court didlist bartering as an example of an activity that fall[s]within 'active employment.'  516 U.S. at 148. But thatlanguage by the Supreme Court must be taken in context. The Supreme Court included bartering in a list of examplesof active employments that might fall within the s 924(c)(1)definitions of use. The Supreme Court did not purport tobe encompassing every possible situation involving barter as aviolation of that statute. Significantly, that discussion followed the Court's analysis of Smith, in which the defendant'suse of a firearm had been the trading of it for drugs. Incontext, therefore, the Supreme Court's understanding ofCongress's intent to afford the term use its active connotation, id. at 148, includes situations in which a defendantbarters a firearm in return for drugs. The Supreme Court'sinclusion of the word bartering in the list of active usesimplies no more than that. It does not compel a conclusionthat a person who barters drugs to acquire a firearm hasused the firearm, as opposed to using the drugs. As weexplained above, a person who receives a gun has not actively employed the gun--that is, he has not used it within anyordinary understanding of the word use. The Government next argues that the reasoning in Warwick and Westmoreland is unpersuasive because those casespresented very different factual situations than the onebefore us. Appellee's Br. at 17. The Government suggeststhat both cases turned on conclusions that the defendantsmerely acquiesced to receiving guns as payment for drugs. See id. (citing Warwick, 167 F.3d at 975-76, and Westmoreland, 122 F.3d at 435-36). In contrast, the Governmentclaims that Stewart initiated and negotiated the exchange ofdrugs for guns. We do not understand why this supposedfactual distinction should affect the purely legal questionpresented in this case. It does not matter whether a drugdealer initiates a drugs-for-guns transaction or simply agreesto (and does) trade drugs for guns in lieu of money (or someother consideration). Under either scenario, the drug dealerhas not used the gun within the meaning of s 924(c). In any case, nothing in the record shows that Stewart orany of his co-conspirators initiated the idea of trading theirdrugs for guns. Indeed, the officers first injected guns intotheir discussions by stating that they were running guns. The record reflects that Stewart wanted to obtain guns, but itonly states that he and his co-conspirators asked to purchasethe guns for money. While the defendants and the officersdiscussed the gun transactions and finalized the transaction of guns for drugs, nothing in the record shows that thedefendants asked to trade drugs for the guns. Certainly, thedefendants agreed to such a transaction, but there is no moreevidence that they initiated the exchange of drugs (as opposed to money) for guns than there was in Westmoreland orWarwick. Finally, the Government argues that even under the interpretation of use we adopt today Stewart's conviction shouldbe upheld because he pleaded guilty to conspiring to violates 924(c)(1). In other words, the Government believes thatStewart acknowledged he conspired to use a gun in relationto a later drug trafficking crime. To buttress this belief, the Government cites Stewart's plea colloquy, during which theprosecutor claimed that the Government could have proventhat Stewart conspired to obtain firearms to use and carrythem during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. Yet, the Government proffered no facts to support a conviction on this ground. See In re Sealed Case, 153 F.3d 759, 771(D.C. Cir. 1998). Furthermore, the signed plea agreementdoes not allude to such a theory. Instead, it merely statesthat Stewart engaged in a Conspiracy to Obtain One orMore Firearms During and in Relation to a Drug TraffickingCrime.