Opinion ID: 1855013
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: nature of the defect

Text: ¶ 30. We now turn to the consequences of a defective notice of appeal. We considered whether a defect in a summons was fundamental or technical in Gaddis v. LaCrosse Products, Inc., 198 Wis. 2d 396, 542 N.W.2d 454 (1996). There we analyzed the requirements of Wis. Stat. §§ (Rules) 801.09(3) and 802.05 to determine whether the plaintiff's failure to sign a summons was a technical defect. 198 Wis. 2d at 399-400. In a more recent case, Burnett v. Hill, 207 Wis. 2d 110, 557 N.W.2d 800 (1997), we analyzed the requirements of Wis. Stat. §§ (Rules) 801.02 and 801.11 to determine whether the plaintiff's service of a publication summons was only technically defective. In Burnett the plaintiff had mailed the defendant an unauthenticated copy of a publication summons along with authenticated copies of the original summons and complaint. 557 N.W.2d at 802. ¶ 31. In each of those cases, we considered whether the defective service of a pleading was a fundamental defect that nullified the pleading, or whether the defect in service was merely technical. To answer that question we analyzed the purposes of the rule and the type of action involved. If the purpose of the rule was fulfilled, the defect was not fundamental but technical. If the defect was only technical, we then considered the impact of the defect  did it result in prejudice to the opposing party? ¶ 32. In both of those cases, we found that the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the relevant service requirements, but we concluded that the defects were not fundamental. Further, we ultimately determined that the opposing parties were not prejudiced by such defects. [19] ¶ 33. In a case preceding Gaddis and Burnett, we considered an insurance company's service of an unauthenticated photocopy of an authenticated summons and unauthenticated complaint on a co-defendant. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, 167 Wis. 2d 524, 481 N.W.2d 629 (1992). There we concluded that the insurance company had failed to meet its burden under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 801.02(1) for service of process, and that such a failure was a fundamental defect. The defect in service deprived the circuit court of personal jurisdiction over the defendants. 167 Wis. 2d at 535. In that instance, the existence of prejudice was irrelevant. 167 Wis. 2d at 533. ¶ 34. Although U.S. Fire and Jadair did not invoke the Gaddis/Burnett analysis in their briefs, we find it an applicable framework under which to analyze the defective notice of appeal here. At oral argument, counsel for U.S Fire argued that, under the Gaddis/Burnett analysis, when a nonlawyer signs and files a notice of appeal on behalf of a corporation, the notice of appeal is fundamentally defective and voids the appeal. The attorney for Blueprint denied that Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.10 requires an attorney's signature, and thus Blueprint contends that the Gaddis/Burnett analysis does not apply. Alternatively, Blueprint's request for a case-by-case approach parallels the Gaddis/Burnett consideration of whether a technical defect results in prejudice to the opposing party. [20] ¶ 35. We consider the purposes of both Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.10 and Wis. Stat. § 737.50. The purpose of the Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.10 requirement for a notice of appeal is to give notice to the respondent of the order or judgment being appealed. The purpose of a timely notice of appeal is also to confer jurisdiction on the court of appeals. Whether or not the court of appeals has jurisdiction of Blueprint's appeal is the ultimate question we must answer on this review. U.S. Fire does not contend that the notice of appeal filed by Mr. Rachanski on behalf of Blueprint failed to provide notice of the appeal. The notice of appeal was also filed in a timely fashion. Thus, the notice purpose of Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.10 is met. But our analysis of the defect does not stop there. ¶ 36. The primary purpose of the unauthorized practice of law statutes is, as we have already noted, to protect the public. See also, SCR 20:5.5 Unauthorized practice of law, Comment. [21] Our rules of procedure are also designed, in part, to protect the public. For example, Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 802.05 [22] places a professional obligation on the attorney, as an officer of the court, to satisfy himself or herself as to the legal grounds for the action, defense or motion. McMillan-Warner Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kauffman, 159 Wis. 2d 588, 593, 465 N.W.2d 201 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing Clausen, 59 Marq. L. Rev. at 48). [20] ¶ 37. In contrast, when a nonlawyer signs and files a notice of appeal on behalf of a corporation, the assurances required by Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.05, that the appeal is well-grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, are not present. The nonlawyer is not bound by the rules of professional responsibility, SCR 10:01, 10:02, nor is the nonlawyer speaking on his or her own behalf. Rather, the nonlawyer is making representations for the corporation. ¶ 38. In this case, a nonlawyer signed and filed the notice of appeal on behalf of the corporation, Blueprint. The purpose of protecting the public, including any other shareholders of the corporation, was not met. In other cases, Wisconsin courts have concluded that when a notice of appeal is flawed, the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See, e.g., Weina v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 177 Wis. 2d 341, 347, 501 N.W.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1993) (court refused to allow petitioners to be granted intervenor status in appeal, where jurisdictional time limit for the commencement of an appeal would be circumvented); Dobberfuhl v. Madison White Trucks, Inc., 118 Wis. 2d 404, 347 N.W.2d 904 (Ct. App. 1984) (absent a timely filing of the notice of appeal, the appeal must be dismissed). An effective notice of appeal is jurisdictional and an appellate court will not permit amendment of a fundamentally defective notice of appeal to save jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mills, 142 Wis. 2d 215, 418 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1987) (defect of failure to file notice of appeal could not be corrected by amending notice to substitute appellant's attorney as appellant). ¶ 39. It is true that the failure to comply with a requirement of the rules of appellate procedure, other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal or cross-appeal, will not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the appeal. [23] But here we face a failure to comply with the statute prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law. The requirement that only attorneys licensed to practice law in this state may sign and file a notice of appeal on behalf of a corporation is more than a technical requirement. It is a fundamental requirement imposed by the legislature. Abandoning that requirement in this case would diminish the protection that the legislature has afforded the public. Abandoning that requirement would also mean that any lay person, on behalf of someone else, could invoke the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. That cannot be the law in this state. In this case, failure to comply with the unauthorized practice of law statute voids the appeal. ¶ 40. U.S. Fire has conceded a lack of prejudice. Under the Gaddis/Burnett analysis, however, once we determine that a defect is fundamental, we need not consider prejudice. Gaddis, 198 Wis. 2d at 402. [21] ¶ 41. Contrary to Blueprint's argument, we are not being too harsh when we concurrently apply the statutes governing the unauthorized practice of law and the proper filing of a notice of appeal. Only a lawyer can sign and file a notice of appeal on behalf of a corporation. When a nonlawyer represents a corporation in this manner, the notice of appeal is fundamentally defective, and the court of appeals is without jurisdiction. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court of appeals decision granting U.S. Fire's motion to dismiss Blueprint's appeal. By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.