Opinion ID: 1913318
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 41

Heading: did the trial court err in overruling holland's motion to have certain color photographs of the victim changed to black and white photographs, and in overruling holland's objections to the admission of certain color photographs?

Text: ¶ 180. Even on the merits, Holland's argument fails. Holland claims that the trial court erred in admitting the photographs of the victim into evidence and in failing to grant his motion to change the photographs to black and white photographs. The motion to exclude these photographs is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and the motion to change the photographs to black and white is without merit. ¶ 181. The photographs in question, Exhibits 14, 42,43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, and 49, were introduced during the guilt phase of Holland's first trial. Holland did not challenge their introduction at the guilt phase of that trial on appeal to this Court. This claim is res judicata. Jordan v. State, 518 So.2d 1186, 1189 (Miss. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 818, 109 S.Ct. 57, 102 L.Ed.2d 35 (1988). Holland accepted the trial court's ruling on this issue at the guilt phase of this trial by not raising any claim of error relating to them on appeal. This portion of this claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. This issue cannot be relitigated on this appeal. ¶ 182. Holland has cited no authority holding that the photographs should be changed to black and white from color. Without the citation of authority this claim is without merit. Roberson, supra. The color photographs were admitted during the guilt phase of first trial, and that portion of the trial was not reversed. ¶ 183. In addition, Holland stated during the motion hearing that he did not object to the photographs if they were changed to black and white. When the State sought to introduce the photographs at trial, Holland objected again claiming that they were not relevant to the aggravating circumstances, were not probative of anything and were inflammatory. The trial court held that the photographs were probative and would be admitted. ¶ 184. The two guidelines for admission of gruesome photographs, as given in McNeal v. State, 551 So.2d 151, 159 (Miss. 1989), are (1) whether the proof is absolute or in doubt as to the identity of the guilty party, (2) whether the photos are necessary evidence or simply a ploy on the part of the prosecutor to arouse the passion and prejudice of the jury. The standard of review on this issue is abuse of discretion. See, Griffin v. State, 557 So.2d 542, 549 (Miss. 1990). ¶ 185. Again, it is clear that the proof identifies Holland as the guilty party, based not only upon the conviction, but also upon Holland's confession and the physical evidence. Holland, 587 So.2d at 851-74. Second, the evidence is relevant to establish that the murder was committed during the commission of a rape, and to prove the heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravator. See Shell v. State, 554 So.2d 887, 902 (Miss. 1989), rev'd in part on unrelated grounds by Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 313, 112 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). ¶ 186. Photographs are admissible in the discretion of the trial court, and this Court will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. Givens v. State, 618 So.2d 1313, 1317 (Miss. 1993). In Parker v. State, 514 So.2d 767, 771 (Miss. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014, 108 S.Ct. 1487, 99 L.Ed.2d 715 (1988), this Court stated, Some `probative value' is the only requirement needed to buttress a trial judge's decision to allow photographs into evidence. Here, the photos were probative of the especially heinous aggravating factor in this case as well as to the testimony of Robert Burris, Jerry Douglas and Dr. Paul McGarry. See Shell v. State, 554 So.2d at 902. There is no violation of this Court's ruling in McNeal regarding the photographs in question, all of which had already been introduced into evidence during the guilt phase of the trial. The trial court properly allowed the introduction of these photographs. First under Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242 (Miss. 1976), this Court set out the procedures for the conduct of a sentencing proceeding with bifurcation. In regards to the presentation of evidence at the sentencing phase, the Court held: At the sentencing hearing, the question to be decided by the jury is whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment. At this hearing, the State may elect to stand on the case made at the first hearing, if before the same jury, or may reintroduce any part of the evidence adduced at the first hearing which it considers to be relevant to the particular question of whether the defendant shall suffer death or be sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 1256. (emphasis added) ¶ 187. As understood by the trial court and the State, this procedure set forth in Jackson has remained accepted procedure in the trial of death penalty cases even after the adoption of the statutory scheme by the legislature. Hill v. State, 432 So.2d, 427, 441 (Miss.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977, 104 S.Ct. 414, 78 L.Ed.2d 352 (1983); In re Jordan, 390 So.2d 584, 585 (Miss. 1980); Irving v. State, 361 So.2d 1360, 1367 n. 1 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913, 99 S.Ct. 2014, 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979). The State reintroduced this evidence during the sentence phase of this trial conducted after remand. There is no merit to this issue.