Opinion ID: 2544410
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the admission of Defendant's drawings and writings violated CRE 404(b).

Text: Defendant next contends that pursuant to CRE 404, the trial court should have excluded Defendant's drawings and writings and all testimony pertaining thereto as impermissible character evidence. Defendant argues that the drawings and writings were evidence of Defendant's bad character which the prosecution was offering for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith when he murdered Peggy Hettrick. The prosecution responds that Defendant's drawings and writings, as well as the testimony pertaining to them, are admissible under CRE 404(b): they were not being offered to prove Defendant's character in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith but to prove his motive for the crime, his deliberation of the crime, his planning and preparation of the crime, his opportunity to commit the crime, and his subsequent knowledge of the crime. The drawings and writings admitted at trial add up to more than 1000 pages. Each page was not admitted individually. Some productions were admitted as a single exhibit based on where they were discovered. For example, People's Exhibit 61 is a paper evidence bag which contained all the items taken from Defendant's backpack. The majority of the productions, however, were contained in notebooks, folders, or three-ring binders. The prosecutor admitted the entire notebook, folder or binder as a single exhibit. Certain drawings or portions of a narrative were tabbed and identified using the page number on which they appeared. These tabbed pages were referred to throughout the trial by various witnesses. People's Exhibit 90 provides a good example of the way in which the prosecution presented its evidence. The exhibit, a red spiral notebook taken from Defendant's bedroom, contained about 70 sheets of paper. Almost every page had something written on it. Many pages contained homework assignments, notes from class, or mundane scribbles and doodles. Interspersed throughout the notebook were the drawings and writings at issue. Often, there were several drawings on a single page. Of the more than seventy pages, only eleven pages were tabbed and specifically referred to at trial. There were at least twenty notebooks, folders and binders admitted at trial which were similar to this exhibit. Each time, the prosecution specifically tabbed and referred to only a handful of the pages contained in the exhibit. Of the more than 1000 pages presented to the jury, there were less than 140 pages singled out by the prosecution. Prior to trial, Defendant objected to the admission of the drawings and writings on the basis of CRE 404. The trial court overruled the objection. Defendant raised the same objection each time the prosecutor moved to introduce one of Defendant's productions. However, Defendant did not specifically object to the evidence on the grounds that it was cumulative and therefore unduly prejudicial under CRE 403. Notably, the Defendant did not ask the trial court to redact clearly irrelevant portions of the notebooks, such as Defendant's notes and homework assignments. CRE 404(b) prohibits the admission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts when offered to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. CRE 404(b). There are three basic reasons CRE 404(b) excludes evidence of character when offered to prove that a criminal defendant acted in conformity therewith. First, there is the danger that the jury will convict a defendant to penalize him for his past deeds or simply because he is an undesirable person. State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Minn.1981). Second, there is the possibility that a jury will overvalue the character evidence in assessing the guilt for the crime charged. Id.; see also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948) (The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge. (internal footnotes omitted)). Finally, it is unfair to require an accused to be prepared not only to defend against immediate charges, but also to disprove or explain his personality or prior actions. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d at 63. In sum, there is a significant danger of unfair prejudice when evidence of bad character is admitted at trial. When character evidence is offered to show action in conformity therewith, this danger substantially outweighs its probative value for this purpose. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 219, at 107 (rev. ed.2001). Accordingly, when offered for this purpose  often described as the defendant's propensity to commit a particular crime  evidence of other acts is always inadmissible. See People v. Rath, 44 P.3d 1033, 1038 (Colo.2002); People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo.1990) (In other words, evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is inadmissible if the logical relevance of the proffered evidence depends upon an inference that a person who has engaged in such misconduct has a bad character and the further inference that the defendant therefore engaged in the wrongful conduct at issue.). When offered for any other purpose, however, the evidence is not necessarily barred. Rath, 44 P.3d at 1038; CRE 404(b); Mueller and Kirkpatrick, supra § 4.15, at 214 (The rule adopts an inclusionary rather than exclusionary approach making evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts potentially admissible subject to FRE 403, where offered for any relevant purpose that does not require an inference from character to conduct. Thus, FRE 404(b) does not require the proponent to force the evidence into a particular listed pigeonhole but only to show a relevant purpose other than proving conduct by means of the general propensity inference ... .). Rule 404(b) itself lists motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, [and] absence of mistake or accident as examples of reasons for which evidence of other crimes may be admissible. CRE 404(b). `As the rule indicates, there are numerous other uses to which evidence of criminal acts may be put, and those enumerated are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive.' Rath, 44 P.3d at 1038 (quoting 1 Charles T. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 659) (John W. Strong, 5th ed.1999). A trial court has substantial discretion in deciding whether to admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for purposes other than to show that an accused acted in conformity with his bad character on a specific occasion, and only where there is an abuse of discretion will that ruling be disturbed. People v. Willner, 879 P.2d 19, 26 (Colo.1994); see also People v. Ibarra, 849 P.2d 33, 38 (Colo.1993). We have developed a four-part test for trial courts to use when determining the admissibility of other acts evidence. Spoto, 795 P.2d at 1318; Rath, 44 P.3d at 1038. Such evidence is admissible if (1) it relates to a material fact; (2) it is logically relevant by tending to make that material fact more probable or less probable; (3) its logical relevance does not depend on the intermediate inference that CRE 404 prohibits  that the defendant committed the crime charged because of the likelihood that he acted in conformity with his bad character; and (4) its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. Spoto, 795 P.2d at 1318; Rath, 44 P.3d at 1038; Willner, 879 P.2d at 24. It is not sufficient for the party seeking admission of other acts evidence to merely list the litany of permissible uses for such evidence. On the contrary, the prosecution must articulate a precise evidential hypothesis by which a material fact can be permissibly inferred from the prior act independent of the use forbidden by CRE 404(b). Spoto, 795 P.2d at 1319.
The prosecution presented multiple theories of logical relevance. First, pursuant to Dr. Meloy's testimony, Defendant's drawings and writings pairing sex and violence were relevant to Defendant's motive for the crime. Second, those drawings and writings that fall into the five categories of rehearsal fantasy as explained by Dr. Meloy were relevant to Defendant's deliberation of the crime. Third, Defendant's drawings and writings evincing a hatred of women were also relevant to Defendant's motive for the crime. Fourth, those drawings and writings reflecting specific aspects of Ms. Hettrick's murder were relevant to Defendant's preparation, planning, deliberation, or, if created after Ms. Hettrick was killed, guilty knowledge, of the crime. Fifth, drawings and writings concerning survival knives were relevant to Defendant's knowledge of such weapons. Finally, other drawings and writings, such as maps of the crime scene and a calendar with the date of the murder circled, were relevant to Defendant's opportunity to commit the crime, plan to commit the crime, preparation for the crime, or if created after the crime was committed, to Defendant's subsequent knowledge of the crime. Each of these theories of logical relevance is a precise evidential hypothesis by which a material fact  be it motivation, deliberation, preparation, planning, opportunity, or guilty knowledge  can be permissibly inferred from the drawings and writings independent of the prohibited character inference. Accordingly, the vast majority of the drawings and writings are admissible under the Spoto test. We now examine each of these theories of logical relevance in greater detail.
Although novel, the prosecution's first two theories of logical relevance  that those drawings and writings pairing sex and violence [1] are relevant to show Defendant's motive, and that those drawings and writings falling into the five categories of rehearsal fantasy [2] are relevant to show deliberation  meet the first two prongs of the Spoto test. Material facts to which the other acts evidence must relate under the first two prongs of the Spoto test can be either ultimate facts  such as whether Defendant committed the crime, whether he possessed the requisite intent, [3] and whether he deliberated upon the murder  or intermediate or evidential facts, themselves probative of ultimate facts. See Rath, 44 P.3d at 1039-40; see also Vialpando v. People, 727 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Colo.1986) ([A] fact of consequence to the determination of the action also includes facts bearing circumstantially upon the weight or probative value to be given other evidence in the case. (internal quotations omitted)). Plan, scheme, design, modus operandi, and motive, while not usually elements or ultimate facts themselves, are among, or closely related to, those examples of permissible reasons enumerated in the rule and are well-accepted methods of proving the ultimate facts necessary to establish the commission of a crime, without reliance upon an impermissible inference from bad character. Rath, 44 P.3d at 1040. Here, Dr. Meloy testified that perpetrators of sexual homicide are often sexually aroused by their violent fantasies, and these fantasies can therefore become the primary drive mechanism, or motive, for a sexual homicide. He further testified that fantasy productions may serve as a rehearsal for a sexual homicide. The trial court found that this testimony was reasonably reliable, and we have held that this conclusion was not manifestly erroneous. Accordingly, pursuant to Dr. Meloy's testimony, those drawings and writings pairing sex and violence, as well as those falling into the five categories of rehearsal fantasy, are logically relevant to whether Defendant had motive to commit the crime, and whether Defendant prepared to commit the crime. Defendant's motive and preparation are themselves relevant to the ultimate issues of whether he committed the actus reus of the crime, and whether he did so with the requisite intent and deliberation. Because they are evidence of motive and deliberation, those drawings and writings pairing sex with violence, as well as those falling into the five categories of rehearsal fantasy identified by Dr. Meloy, are logically relevant to material facts in the case and therefore satisfy the first two prongs of the Spoto test. Willner, 879 P.2d at 26-27 (evidence of prior bad acts admissible under Spoto to prove intent and deliberation). Because the logical relevance of this chain of inference does not rely on Defendant's propensity to act a certain way, the third prong of Spoto is likewise satisfied. [4] Murderers often have bizarre motivations for their conduct  motivations that would not readily occur to most jurors. Edward J. Imwinkelried, People v. Ewoldt: The California Supreme Court's About-Face on the Plan Theory for Admitting Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Misconduct, 28 Loy. L.A. L.Rev. 473, 483 (1995) (internal footnotes omitted). Accordingly, many acts appearing at first blush to be unrelated character evidence are in actuality elements of a common scheme hatched by a warped criminal mind. Id. (noting that [t]he accused written or oral statements may be evidence that the accused harbored such a plan (internal quotations omitted)). As such, the seemingly unrelated acts are being offered for a relevant noncharacter purpose and thus should be admissible under CRE 404(b). Id. This case is demonstrative of this point. Through Dr. Meloy's testimony, the prosecution established that these drawings and writings actually established Defendant's motive for the crime and may also have served as preparation for the crime. Motive and preparation are the relevant noncharacter purposes for which the drawings and writings were offered. The logical relevance of the drawings and writings to show motive and preparation does not depend on the inference that the defendant committed the crime charged because of the likelihood that he acted in conformity with his bad character. Admission of the writings and drawings to prove motive and preparation therefore satisfies the third prong of the Spoto test.
Defendant's drawings and writings evincing a hatred of women [5] also satisfy the first three prongs of the Spoto test. They are evidence of motive. Although we have never before considered whether evidence of misogyny can be admitted under CRE 404(b), we find support for our conclusion in the jurisprudence of other states. In People v. Hoffman, 225 Mich.App. 103, 570 N.W.2d 146 (1997), the Michigan Court of Appeals considered whether other-acts evidence tending to establish the defendant's hatred of women could be admitted pursuant to Michigan Rule of Evidence 404(b). [6] The court defined motive as the cause or reason that moves the will and induces action. Hoffman, 570 N.W.2d at 148 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (rev. 5th ed.)). The court admitted that [t]he distinction between admissible evidence of motive and inadmissible evidence of character or propensity is often subtle. Id. However, there is a distinction, and the court offered a hypothetical to demonstrate it. A white assailant attacks a black man. The assailant makes no demands and takes no money or property; the assailant and the victim do not know each other. The crime is seemingly an inexplicable act of random violence. Later, when the assailant is arrested and charged with the crime, the prosecutor discovers that the defendant has attacked several other people in the past. The court reasoned: Absent a proper purpose (such as to prove a common plan, scheme, or other exception), this other-acts evidence would be inadmissible because its only relevance is to establish the defendant's violent character or propensity towards violence. However, if ... all the defendant's prior victims were African-American and [the] defendant had previously expressed his hatred toward blacks, then the evidence of the defendant's prior assaults would be admissible to prove the defendant's motive for his conduct. By establishing that the defendant harbors a strong animus against people of the victim's race, the other-acts evidence goes beyond establishing a propensity toward violence and tends to show why the defendant perpetrated a seemingly random and inexplicable attack. Id. at 149. Based on this line of reasoning, the court concluded that evidence that defendant hates women and previously had acted on such hostility establishes more than character or propensity. Here, the other-acts evidence was relevant and material to defendant's motive for his unprovoked, cruel, and sexually demeaning attack on his victim. Id. But see State v. Johnson, 71 Ohio St.3d 332, 643 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (1994) (holding that hatred of women indicates evidence of a character trait that must be excluded). Reasoning that [a]bsent the other-acts evidence establishing motive, the jurors may have found it difficult to believe the victim's testimony that defendant committed the depraved and otherwise inexplicable actions, the Michigan Court of Appeals also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the other-acts evidence. Id. at 149-50. Hoffman drew its hypothetical, and its reasoning from State v. Crumb, 277 N.J.Super. 311, 649 A.2d 879 (1994). There, the court reversed the trial court and held that evidence of a defendant's bigotry was admissible to establish the defendant's motive for randomly attacking an elderly black man. Crumb, 649 A.2d at 884. This evidence consisted of drawings and writings produced by the defendant that sanctioned white supremacy and contained various racial epithets. Id. at 881. The court reasoned that a wider range of evidence should be admissible to establish motive or intent than is permitted in support of other issues because [o]therwise there would often be no means to reach and disclose the secret design or purpose of the act charged in which the very gist of the offense may consist. Id. at 882. Accordingly, the court held that [a]ll evidentiary circumstances, which are relevant to or tend to shed light on the motive or intent of the defendant or which tend fairly to explain his actions are admissible in evidence against him although they may have occurred previous to the commission of the offense. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Reasoning that the written material expressing defendant's hostility toward and hatred of black people is compelling powerful evidence of a motive which helps explain an otherwise inexplicable act of random violence, the court held that the evidence was admissible. Id.; cf. United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir.1983) (holding that evidence of other acts is admissible if it is linked together in time and circumstances with the crime charged, or if it forms an integral and natural part of the account of the circumstances of the crime, or is necessary in order to complete the story of the crime on trial, and therefore affirming the trial court's admission of evidence establishing defendant's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood because it formed the context, motive, and set-up for the crime and was necessary to make the crime comprehensible to a jury (internal citations and quotations omitted)); cf. also People v. Nicolaus, 54 Cal.3d 551, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893, 906-07 (1991) (holding that writings of the defendant revealing his extreme dislike of religion, and in particular Christianity, were admissible to prove motive); People v. Olguin, 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596, 601 (1994) (holding that evidence of gang activity and affiliation is admissible where it is relevant to issues of motive and intent). We are persuaded by the reasoning of Hoffman and Crumb. Dr. Meloy testified that one of the primary reasons perpetrators of sexual homicide fantasize is to express deeply felt hostility towards women. This hostility eventually crescendos into a sexual homicide where the female victim is degraded, treated as a sex object, and sexually mutilated. Thus, Defendant's hatred of women, as exemplified in many of his drawings and writings, is not just a motive for the crime, but for why the crime was committed in this specific manner. Cf. People v. Mendoza, 876 P.2d 98, 103 (Colo.App.1994) (holding that evidence of gang affiliation was admissible as motive where it was offered not to prove that defendant was more likely to kill because he was a gang member, but because his membership in a particular gang established a motive for why he was more likely to murder a particular victim after deliberation). As such, Defendant's drawings and writings reflecting his hatred of women satisfy the first three prongs of the Spoto test.
Some of Defendant's drawings and writings reflect specific aspects of the murder. For example, pools of blood, bloody drag trails, distinctive scratch marks on victims' faces, and victims with their arms positioned above their heads can be found throughout Defendant's productions. In one instance, there is a picture of an assailant dragging a victim by the armpits; blood drips from her back, and her heels leave a bloody drag trail behind. Forensic investigators suspect that this is precisely how Peggy Hettrick was moved from the street into the field where she was found. There is no need for an extended discussion of why these productions were admissible. We agree with the court of appeals that these drawings and writings are sufficiently similar to the actual crime to be admissible under CRE 404(b) independent of Dr. Meloy's testimony  although his testimony that fantasy can serve as a rehearsal for the crime certainly bolsters this conclusion. If created before the crime was committed, the drawings and writings reflecting aspects of the crime constitute evidence of Defendant's preparation for and planning of the crime, and thus ultimately of his deliberation and intent. See Longoria v. Nevada, 99 Nev. 754, 670 P.2d 939, 940 (1983) (holding that both defendant's planning activity and the manner of killing as it bears upon a pre-existing reflection to take the victim's life in a particular way are relevant to premeditation and deliberation). If created after the commission of the crime, these drawings and writings are evidence of Defendant's subsequent knowledge of the crime and thus of his identity as the perpetrator. [7] See Kennard v. People, 171 Colo. 194, 465 P.2d 509, 511 (1970) (As concerns the issue of intent and guilty knowledge and the relationship thereto of evidence of other offenses, what one does after his alleged commission of a criminal act may be as revealing as that which he has done before.); see also People v. Lamirato, 180 Colo. 250, 504 P.2d 661, 665 (1972) (upholding the admission of evidence that defendant committed theft three days after the offense for which he was charged for the purpose of showing plan, scheme, design, intent or guilty knowledge.); People v. Snyder, 874 P.2d 1076, 1077-1081 (Colo.1994) (upholding the admission of subsequent sexual assault for the purpose of proving plan, motive, and intent to commit prior sexual assault). Both of these evidentiary hypotheses are independent of the prohibited propensity inference. Likewise, many of Defendant's drawings are detailed depictions of survival knives similar to the knife which investigators and the coroner believe was used to kill Peggy Hettrick. These drawings and writings are admissible to prove Defendant's knowledge of such weapons. Other drawings and writings, such as maps of the crime scene and a calendar with the date of the murder circled, are patently relevant to Defendant's opportunity to commit the crime, plan to commit the crime, preparation of the crime or, if created after the crime was committed, of his subsequent knowledge of the crime. [8] The relevance of these productions is also independent of the prohibited propensity inference.
The fourth prong of the Spoto analysis requires us to determine whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The trial court is accorded considerable discretion in this determination, and we will not disturb its ruling on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Dist. Court, 869 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Colo.1994). To demonstrate an abuse of discretion, Defendant must show that the trial court's decision was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Nuanez, 973 P.2d 1260, 1263 (Colo.1999). In deference to the trial court's exercise of discretion, a reviewing court assume[s] the maximum probative value that a reasonable fact finder might give the evidence and the minimum unfair prejudice to be reasonably expected. People v. Lowe, 660 P.2d 1261, 1264 (Colo.1983). We have observed that this test, encapsulated in CRE 403, strongly favors the admission of evidence. See, e.g., People v. Dist. Court, 869 P.2d at 1286 (Colo.1994); see also United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 797 (8th Cir.1980) (stating that balance should be struck in favor of admissibility). By requiring that the probative value of the evidence in question be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the rule makes clear that the need for exclusion must be great, since exclusion is a drastic remedy and less restrictive measures, such as cautionary instructions to the jury, may suffice to reduce the danger of prejudice to an acceptable level. People v. Dist. Court, 785 P.2d 141, 147 (Colo.1990) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it damages the defendant's case. All effective evidence is prejudicial in the sense of being damaging or detrimental to the party against whom it is offered. Id. at 147. Accordingly, proffered evidence which calls for exclusion as unfairly prejudicial is given a more specialized meaning of an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, commonly but not necessarily an emotional one, such as sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution, or horror. Id. As the Fifth Circuit aptly observed: Relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial; but it is only unfair prejudice, substantially outweighing probative value, which permits exclusion of relevant matter under Rule 403. Unless trials are to be conducted as scenarios, or unreal facts tailored and sanitized for the occasion, the application of Rule 403 must be cautious and sparing. Its major function is limited to excluding matters of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect. United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir.1979) (emphasis in original). The balancing required by Rule 403 contemplates the consideration of such factors as the importance of the fact of consequence for which the evidence is offered, the strength and length of the chain of inferences necessary to establish the fact of consequence, the availability of alternative means of proof, whether the fact of consequence for which the evidence is offered is being disputed, and, if appropriate, the potential effectiveness of a limiting instruction in the event of admission. Vialpando, 727 P.2d at 1096. The admission of Defendant's drawings and writings certainly had the potential for unfair prejudice. However, the drawings and writings also had substantial probative worth. As our preceding discussion indicates, the drawings and writings were essential to the prosecution's theory of the case. They establish the motive for the crime; they indicate preparation for the crime; they reflect Defendant's knowledge of the crime; and they provide a basis by which the jury can evaluate the weight it should give Dr. Meloy's testimony. See Vialpando, 727 P.2d at 1096 (holding that evidence should not have been excluded under CRE 403 in part because doing so would deprive[ ] the defendant's expert witnesses of an important foundational component which the jury might well have utilized in evaluating the validity of the opinion evidence elicited during the trial). Indeed, Defendant's drawings and writings provide a plausible explanation for Peggy Hettrick's death. Cf. Imwinkelried supra, § 6:12 (commenting that evidence of other acts is admissible to explain relevant conduct where explanation for the conduct is actually needed). Dr. Meloy testified that unlike many other types of homicides, where a motive may be fairly obvious, the motive in a sexual homicide is typically intrinsic, internal, [and] very psychological for the individual. The prosecution theorized that not only do Defendant's fantasy productions reveal his motive for the crime but they may have actually served as a rehearsal for it as well. As we have explained, whether Defendant had a motive to commit the crime and whether he prepared for the commission of the crime are directly relevant to whether Defendant committed the actus reus of the crime, whether he did so with the requisite intent, and whether he deliberated prior to committing the crime  all elements of the offense that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in a first degree murder case. The drawings and writings were essentially the only way to prove these elements. With these drawings and writings, and Dr. Meloy's interpretation thereof, the prosecution was able to present a cogent and plausible theory of the crime. Without them, the jury would be faced with deciding whether Defendant is guilty of a seemingly inexplicable act of random violence. Finally, we note that defense counsel did not request a limiting instruction when this evidence was introduced, and at the close of evidence, when the trial court offered to instruct the jury on the limited purpose for which this evidence could be considered, defense counsel refused. Cf. People v. Gladney, 194 Colo. 68, 71-72, 570 P.2d 231, 233 (1977) (observing that defense counsel often chooses not to request a limiting instruction for strategic or tactical reasons, and therefore holding that a trial court's failure to give such an instruction on its own motion is not reversible error). Given the importance of the drawings and writings to the prosecution's theory of the case, and the absence of alternative means of proof available, we conclude that admitting the vast majority of the drawings and writings was not an abuse of discretion.
Although the vast majority of drawings and writings are admissible under the theories of logical relevance we have discussed, there are a few drawings and writings that are nothing more than evidence of Defendant's violent nature. These drawings and writings do not pair sex with violence, do not fall into one of the five categories of rehearsal fantasy, do not evince a hatred of women, do not reflect specific aspects of the crime, and thus do not reveal defendant's motive, preparation, plan, opportunity, or guilty knowledge. Accordingly, the only possible chain of inference the jury could have drawn from these productions was that Defendant had a bad character and killed Peggy Hettrick because of it. This is, of course, the precise inference prohibited by Rule 404, and the admission of these drawings was erroneous. [9] That error, however, was harmless. CRE 103(a) provides that [e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected. CRE 103(a). Likewise, C.A.R. 35(e) instructs appellate courts to disregard any error not affecting substantial rights of parties. The harmless error rule is an obvious recognition of the fact that `[a] perfect trial is an impossibility and minor mistakes will inevitably occur.' People v. Gaffney, 769 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Colo. 1989) (quoting Callis v. People, 692 P.2d 1045, 1053 (Colo.1984)). The proper inquiry in determining a harmless error question is not whether there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict without the improperly admitted evidence, but, rather, whether the error substantially influenced the verdict or affected the fairness of the trial proceedings. Id.; accord Callis, 692 P.2d at 1053. If a reviewing court can say with fair assurance that, in light of the entire record of the trial, the error did not substantially influence the verdict or impair the fairness of the trial, the error may properly be deemed harmless. Id.; accord, Tevlin v. People, 715 P.2d 338, 341 (Colo.1986); People v. Quintana, 665 P.2d 605, 612 (Colo.1983). There were more than 1000 pages of Defendant's drawings and writings admitted at trial. Most of the drawings and writings were created in spiral notebooks or kept in three-ring binders which were admitted into evidence in their entirety. Several of these notebooks or binders contained one or a handful of drawings or writings that, under Spoto, should not have been admitted. However, the vast majority of these pages were properly admitted under CRE 404(b). The improperly admitted pages were not emphasized or relied on by the prosecution in presenting its case. In addition to the writings and drawings, the prosecution presented substantial other evidence linking Defendant to the murder. First, Defendant's behavior on the morning after the murder aroused suspicion. By his own admission, Defendant was at the crime scene on the morning after the murder. Rather than report his finding to the police, he went to school as if he found nothing at all. Second, the murder occurred around the fourth anniversary of his mother's sudden death. Both the victim and Defendant's mother had long, wavy red hair and Defendant admitted to seeing the victim around the neighborhood. Third, the crime was likely committed by a left-handed individual. Defendant was left-handed. Fourth, the crime required specialized weapons: a serrated knife and a scalpel. Defendant owned six survival knives and at least one of the knives contained a scalpel. Fifth, Defendant told a detective that he had thought about committing this type of murder in the past. Finally, Defendant knew specific details about the crime scene  such as the color of the victim's socks or the manner in which she was dragged  that he would not have been able to learn solely by seeing the victim the next morning. Many of the inadmissible productions which we find harmless were, admittedly, violent. However, to determine whether the admission of a particular drawing or writing was harmless, we must look at the entire record. The jury received hundreds of pages of drawings and writings which we have concluded were properly admitted under CRE 404(b). These productions contained scenes of sex and violence, blitz attacks, piquerism, attacks against strangers, and violence against women. Obviously, these productions contained a substantial level of violent fantasies. We conclude, based upon the totality of the evidence presented in this case, that this jury, having been exposed to violent images through admissible evidence, was not substantially influenced by similar images of violence contained in the inadmissible productions. We also note that many of Defendant's productions contained evidence of his prejudices. Defendant harbored prejudice, to some degree, against nearly every culture, lifestyle, or ethnicity other than his own. His prejudices were typically exhibited by the sporadic use of ethnic slurs. Occasionally, his productions cast a particular minority group as the target of violence. The trial court, had Defendant requested, would likely have required the prosecutor to redact the inflammatory language prior to presenting the drawing or writing to the jury. Defendant made no such request. Simply because evidence of Defendant's prejudice came before the jury we are not automatically required to find reversible error. The question is whether the jury's exposure to Defendant's prejudices substantially influenced their verdict or affected the fairness of the proceedings. In this case, we conclude that the answer is no. The evidence of Defendant's prejudices was not so overwhelming that it substantially influenced the outcome of the trial or affected the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. We do not believe that the jury's passions were so inflamed by the evidence of Defendant's prejudices that it was unable to overlook the ethnic slurs. The court instructed the jury to reach its verdict based on a fair and impartial evaluation of the evidence presented. We conclude that the evidence supports the jury's verdict beyond a reasonable doubt and we give that verdict its effect. See Stewart v. Rice, 47 P.3d 316, 322 (Colo.2002) (noting that we will defer to a jury's verdict when the jury is properly instructed and the record contains evidence to support their findings). In light of the entire record, we can say with fair assurance that the erroneous admission of the inadmissible evidence did not substantially influence the verdict or impair the fairness of the trial. This error was therefore harmless.