Opinion ID: 197100
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Sufficiency of the Government's Evidence

Text: 53 Smith argues that his conviction rests on insufficient evidence. In reviewing this claim, we must determine whether, after viewing the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the government's case, a rational factfinder could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecution has proved the essential elements of the offense. United States v. O'Brien, 14 F.3d 703, 706 (1st Cir.1994). In so doing, this court defers to the jury as to all credibility judgments, and need conclude only that the evidence, taken in its entirety, supports a judgment of conviction. Id. Because the evidence in this case was more than sufficient under this standard, Smith's claims are without merit. 54 Smith argues that there was no evidence indicating that he possessed a handgun on the evening in question, hence no proof that he possessed ammunition as well. Smith points to the fact that, while Veneau and Tetreault both testified that the man in the back seat handed an object to Yanovitch and that the latter proceeded to shoot Viens, they did not go so far as to state that Smith passed a firearm to Yanovitch. 55 However, the testimony of Veneau and Tetreault, together with the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom and from the other evidence, is ample to establish Smith's involvement. Veneau said that he never saw Brian Smith with a gun, but that was because he did not know anyone named Brian Smith. Veneau's assertion that the man in the middle passed what Veneau believed to be a gun to Yanovitch, when coupled with evidence that Smith was the man in the middle, supports the conviction. Tetreault testified that she did not recognize the object while it was being passed to Yanovitch, but noted that she saw that it was a gun when Yanovitch got out of the car with it. This testimony, in conjunction with all the other evidence at hand, including the subsequent shooting and Duggan's testimony that he had seen Smith with a handgun earlier, was adequate to establish Smith's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 56 J. Four-Level Increase in Smith's Guideline Sentencing Range 57 On appeal, Smith challenges the factual findings that served as the foundation for the four-level enhancement of his Guideline Sentencing Range (GSR). Since Smith's counsel properly objected to these findings at the sentencing hearing, this court's review is limited to clear error. United States v. Powell, 50 F.3d 94, 102-03 (1st Cir.1995). Under the circumstances, we ask only whether the court clearly erred in finding that the government proved the disputed fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 103. We hold that the factual findings were amply supported on the record and that the court did not commit clear error in assessing a four-level increase to Smith's GSR. 58 Smith alleges that the district court clearly erred when it increased his GSR based upon its finding that he transferred the firearm to Yanovitch in connection with another felony offense. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 2K2.1(b)(5) (Nov.1995). 12 Smith claims that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient, especially as there was an absence of proof that Smith knew that Yanovitch intended to use the gun to shoot Viens. 59 The evidence at trial was sufficient to show that Smith and Viens became involved in a dispute about a firearm at a Boston bar; that the two men left the bar together; that, when Smith reached inside his jacket, Viens punched him; and that Smith was pulled into the back seat of the car, from where he handed a gun to Yanovitch, who proceeded to shoot Viens. From this, it was reasonable for the district court to infer that Smith gave his handgun to Yanovitch intending and expecting the latter to use it against Viens. 13 As this was a reasonable and permissible interpretation, it justified the four-level enhancement of Smith's GSR. 60 K. The Attachment of the Sentencing Hearing Transcripts to Smith's Presentence Report 61 At the sentencing hearing, Smith asked the district court to order deleted from the PSR reference to certain state convictions. These convictions had been vacated prior to the hearing, and, as a result, Smith no longer could be sentenced as an armed career criminal, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (Supp.1996), although he could still be sentenced as a felon-in-possession. The district court stated on the record during the sentencing hearing that the challenged convictions had been set aside and ordered the transcript containing its remarks to be attached to the PSR as an indication that these convictions were no longer valid. Deeming attachment of the transcript to be an adequate corrective, the court refused to direct the probation officer to revise the PSR itself. 62 Smith did not object to the court's procedure at the time, but on appeal complains that the Bureau of Prisons uses these PSRs to allocate the prison population among its institutions and programs. According to Smith, the Bureau's personnel is not likely to pay attention to the sentencing hearing transcript. Consequently, Smith argues that he has been unduly prejudiced by the district court's order. He asks us to order proper corrections to be made to his PSR. 63 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1) requires a sentencing court to address each relevant matter in the PSR which is controverted by the parties. 14 The court must make either a finding or a determination that none is necessary. Not intended as an onerous requirement, the sentencing court's determinations can be simply entered onto a form which is then appended to the report. Advisory Committee Notes to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D) (the predecessor of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(1)), 1983 Amendments. 64 In United States v. Bruckman, 874 F.2d 57, 63-64 (1st Cir.1989), this court noted that the purpose behind the Rule's writing requirement is to protect the defendant's due process rights and to provide the reviewing court with a clear record of the disposition below. Smith does not here complain that the district court mishandled or misread the vacated convictions so as to sentence him improperly in this case. Rather, he fears that appending the transcript, rather than physically revising the PSR, is an insufficient way to alert future prison authorities to the true status of the prior convictions. Whether or not this is a realistic fear we cannot say. Smith did not raise this concern before the district judge, who was best situated to pass on it. Precedent indicates that the appending of a hearing transcript will comply with the Rule. 15 If, in a particular case, there are practical reasons to do more, we have no doubt that the district court, if asked, would look into the matter, with the help of the probation officer. As we say, Smith did not raise the issue below; absent his having done so, we can find no error cognizable on appeal. We add that it is still not too late for Smith's concerns to be attended to administratively--assuming they have any legitimacy, which we cannot ascertain from the record before us--by simply appending a suitable notation to the PSR updating the status of the prior convictions. Whether this or some other measure is necessary we leave entirely to the appropriate authorities. L. Yanovitch's Sentence 65 Yanovitch challenges the factual findings made by the district court as a basis for his sentence. We review his claims for clear error. Powell, 50 F.3d at 102-03. We are satisfied that the record below amply supports the sentencing court's factual findings and that Yanovitch's allegations are baseless. 66 Yanovitch contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish that he attempted to shoot Viens in the head, and that he had the intent to kill him. If anything, Yanovitch argues, the evidence at trial demonstrated that he acted in the heat of passion and in the absence of malice aforethought; there was no indication, according to Yanovitch, that he had the necessary state of mind for attempted murder. Nevertheless, the district court found that Yanovitch's conduct conformed to the charge of assault with intent to murder, and, based upon that finding, sentenced him under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1. On appeal, Yanovitch argues that a reasonable person would conclude that the incident in question was an aggravated assault or, at most, an assault with an attempt to commit manslaughter, either of which would require application of U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2. 16 67 Yanovitch's argument merits little discussion in light of the evidence at trial which was also summarized in his PSR, and the tape recording of Veneau's interview with Boston Police. 17 This evidence obviously supports the sentencing court's determination that Yanovitch shot Viens with the intent to kill him. The court did not clearly err when it sentenced Yanovitch pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1. 68 Affirmed.