Opinion ID: 2095393
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Supremacy Clause and Preemption Principles

Text: The Supremacy Clause, in article VI of the Constitution, may entail pre-emption of state law either by express provision, by implication, or by a conflict between federal and state law ( New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v Travelers Ins. Co., 514 US 645, 654 [1995]). It is never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated state regulation, but instead [courts] have addressed claims of pre-emption with the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law ( id. ; see Nealy v US Healthcare HMO, 93 NY2d 209, 217 [1999]). The presumption against preemption is especially strong with regard to laws that affect the states' historic police powers over occupational health and safety issues ( see De Canas v Bica, 424 US at 356-357) and is overcome only if it `was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress' to supplant state law ( New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v Travelers Ins. Co., 514 US at 655, quoting Rice v Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 US 218, 230 [1947]). Several distinct preemption doctrines have evolved under the Supremacy Clause. Express preemption applies where Congress explicitly declares that a federal law is intended to supersede state law ( see e.g. Sprietsma v Mercury Marine, 537 US 51, 62-63 [2002]). Implied preemption takes two forms. The first, referred to as field preemption, occurs if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field `as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it' ( Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc., 505 US 504, 516 [1992], quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v De la Cuesta, 458 US 141, 153 [1982] [internal quotation marks omitted]). The second type, conflict preemption, establishes that a state statute is void to the extent that it actually conflicts with a valid federal statute. A conflict will be found where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility . . . or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress ( Ray v Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 US 151, 158 [1978] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Silkwood v Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 US 238, 256 [1984]; Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v Paul, 373 US 132, 142-143 [1963]; Guice v Charles Schwab & Co., 89 NY2d 31, 39 [1996], cert denied 520 US 1118 [1997]).