Opinion ID: 2552849
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶ 52 The issue before the court is whether an employee can recover workers' compensation benefits for an injury that occurs during recreational activity occurring during his weekend off. Mr. Giovanelli's claim and the majority opinion may be analyzed in three steps: (1) Is the activity covered by the applicable Washington workers' compensation statute; (2) Does Washington recognize a broader traveling employee doctrine providing coverage for injury during travel; if so, is Giovanelli eligible; and (3) Is Giovanelli's activity covered as within the course of employment or was it a distinct departure on a personal errand?
¶ 53 Our first inquiry should be whether Washington statutory provisions allow Giovanelli's claim. The pertinent statute is our Industrial Insurance Act, Title 51 RCW. The act requires that courts construe it broadly to permit redress of employee injuries. Scott v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 77 Wash.2d 888, 890, 468 P.2d 440 (1970); Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 92 Wash.2d 631, 635, 600 P.2d 1015 (1979). Even applying this canon of statutory interpretation, we must decide the issue using Washington statutes and case law rather than adopting any new test. The legislature is the proper forum to amend our statutes. This court must apply the statute and may consider relevant Department of Labor and Industries' rules as appropriate. ¶ 54 This case is easily resolved by analyzing the Washington Industrial Insurance Act to determine if Giovanelli was injured in the course of employment as required by RCW 51.08.013(1). During a Sunday off, Giovanelli and Champ decided to walk the two or three blocks from their hotel to a nearby park because they saw a flyer advertising Music in the Park. See BIIA, Ex. 9, at 3, Witness Statement of Sonny Champ (Aug. 15, 2001) (We were going to the park. I was going to walk over to the park with him. . . . Cause we seen a sign that said, Music in the Park.). Champ was also looking for cigarettes. Id. ¶ 55 The statute explains the scope of coverage for employment injuries in a relevant definition: Acting in the course of employment means the worker acting at his or her employer's direction or in the furtherance of his or her employer's business which shall include time spent going to and from work on the jobsite, as defined in. RCW 51.32.015 and 51.36.040, insofar as such time is immediate to the actual time that the worker is engaged in the work process in areas controlled by his or her employer, except parking area. It is not necessary that at the time an injury is sustained by a worker he or she is doing the work on which his or her compensation is based or that the event is within the time limits on which industrial insurance or medical aid premiums or assessments are paid. RCW 51.08.013(1) (emphasis added). Additionally, this same statute goes on to allow liability for injury during some social activities that are held to be within the course of employment. However, this provision, RCW 51.08.013(2)(b), is narrow and specifically exempts most social or recreational activity, not providing coverage for: An employee's participation in social activities, recreational or athletic activities, events, or competitions, and parties or picnics, whether or not the employer pays some or all of the costs thereof, unless: (i) The participation is during the. employee's working hours, not including paid leave; (ii) the employee was paid monetary compensation by the employer to participate; or (iii) the employee was ordered or directed by the employer to participate or reasonably believed the employee was ordered or directed to participate. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 56 Here, Giovanelli was clearly engaged in such a social or recreational activity when he decided to attend a concert on his day off. He met none of the exceptions in the statute; he was not paid monetary consideration by the employer or ordered or directed to go to the park. It was not during his scheduled work hours. Attending a concert or purchasing cigarettes on a day off does not fit into any of the three expressly limited categories of social and recreational activities that are covered within the statute as course a employment under (i) through (iii) quoted above. ¶ 57 It is notable that most recreational and social activity is expressly precluded from workers' compensation coverage by the quoted statute with very limited, specific exceptions. Id. Additionally, the statute defines the course of employment as activity during a limited travel status, i.e., to include time spent going to and from work on the jobsite. RCW 51.08.013(1). Here, Giovanelli does not meet the statutory exceptions and is not entitled to payment from his employer under the Washington statutory scheme. ¶ 58 A next consideration is the Washington Administrative Code (WAC), which considers injuries of employees (arguably) on travel status. A particularly germane section explains which injuries are considered work related and which are not. See WAC 296-27-01103(2)(f). The regulation reads in relevant part: How do I decide whether an injury or illness is work-related if the employee is on travel status at the time the injury or illness occurs? Injuries and illnesses that occur while an employee is on travel status are work-related if, at the time of the injury or illness, the employee was engaged in work activities in the interest of the employer.  Examples of such activities include travel to and from customer contacts, conducting job tasks, and entertaining or being entertained to transact, discuss, or promote business (work-related entertainment includes only entertainment activities being engaged in at the direction of the employer). WAC 296-27-01103(2)(f) (emphasis added). The WAC then notes that a travel status employee who is checked into a motel establishes a `home away from home' and activities outside that home should be evaluated on the standard above. WAC 296-27-01105(2)(a). Giovanelli cannot prevail under this plain interpretation of Washington law adopted by the appropriate agency. His concert attendance activity was not designed to transact, discuss, or promote business and cannot be construed as furthering the interest of the employer as required by the regulation. WAC 296-27-01103(2)(f). ¶ 59 Giovanelli argues that Washington has applied a coming and going rule allowing coverage to employees who are injured while commuting to and from work and that such coverage applies to the current case. See Bolin v. Kitsap County, 114 Wash.2d 70, 76-77, 785 P.2d 805 (1990) (transportation to and from work is within the course of employment if it is customary or contractual and is for the mutual benefit of the employer and the employee); see also Puget Sound Energy, Inc. v. Adamo, 113 Wash.App. 166, 169, 52 P.3d 560 (2002); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 94 Wash.2d 875, 880, 621 P.2d 147 (1980). This coming and going rule is actually found in the statute, quoted supra, which shall include time spent going to and from work on the jobsite. This does not cover the time of Giovanelli's injury because he was crossing a street to attend a concert, not coming and going to and from work. Further, there was no claim that Giovanelli's excursion to the park concert would provide even a residual benefit for the employer.
¶ 60 Our second inquiry is whether the scope of Washington's travel status rule extends to cover solely recreational activities. A narrow application is required by the Washington statutes, supra, which provides the appropriate definition of travel status. ¶ 61 An employee in travel status is acknowledged in Washington only as defined in our statutory scheme. This status is correctly applied to employees when coming and going to and from the work site. Recognizing that the legislature is the appropriate forum to amend perceived deficiencies in Washington's workers' compensation laws, this court will construe that law to protect workers, but will not rewrite it. ¶ 62 Respondent notes that Professor Arthur Larson's basic definition of the traveling employee doctrine is similar to our Washington standard (but not identical). See Resp't Dep't's Answer to Pet. for Review at 12. But a fair reading of Professor Larson's analysis does not extend coverage to this case. See Pet'r's Mot. for Discretionary Review at 17-18 (arguing that Larson's definition only applies to traveling in rental cars to the hotel, sleeping in hotels or eating in restaurants). Larson's complete definition includes the following limitations: An employee whose work entails travel away from the employer's premises is generally considered to be within the course of his or her employment continuously during the trip, except when there is a distinct departure on a personal errand. 2 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW ch. 25 (2006) (emphasis added). Even if applying the general principles articulated by Larson, this court logically should recognize the exception for distinct departure on a personal errand as an integral part of the rule. Id. ¶ 63 This construction is supported by Washington case law that defines which activities are within the course of employment. See Shelton v. Azar, Inc., 90 Wash.App. 923, 933-34, 954 P.2d 352 (1998) (citing Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Johnson, 84 Wash.App. 275, 278, 928 P.2d 1138 (1996)). [2] Under the Azar articulation, only a limited coverage for the traveling employee is allowed by our statutes. Id. This does not extend employer liability to distinctly personal errands. ¶ 64 Our reading is also supported by the coming and going rule in this court's Bolin decision and the furtherance of the employer's interest language in Azar. Both of these standards are found in the statute RCW 51.08.013(1). The appropriate statutory interpretation of covered recreational activities is found in the WAC, supra, and is consistent with our application. See RCW 51.08.013(2)(b). ¶ 65 Professor Larson would argue that injuries that occur during a limited range of activities, such as eating at a hotel, sleeping or bathing, are usually compensable where an employee is in travel status. 2 LARSON & LARSON, supra, ch. 25. However, exclusively social activities outside of work times such as bar hopping or concert attendance are not compensable under our statutory scheme or under Larson's rule. While Larson's thesis reasonably argues for allowance for the necessities of traveling life, this court will only approve a standard that applies and comports with established Washington statutory law. ¶ 66 The limiting language in Azar derives from our statutes and limits coverage to acts that are `required of him by his contract of employment, or by specific direction of his employer; or . . . was engaged at the time in the furtherance of the employer's interest.' 90 Wash.App. at 933-34, 954 P.2d 352 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson, 84 Wash.App. at 278, 928 P.2d 1138 (quoting Lunz, 50 Wash.2d at 278, 310 P.2d 880)). Again, it is undisputed that Giovanelli and his supervisor, Champ, were on their day off. They were crossing the street to a park because they had seen a flyer advertising Music in the Park. Champ was also looking for cigarettes. See BIIA, Ex. 9, at 3; BIIA Tr. (Apr. 25, 2003) at 45. These activities were personal, totally unrelated to the employer's interests, and on a nonwork weekend day. ¶ 67 Consistent with Washington statutes and the limitations in earlier cases, the inquiry should also consider whether Giovanelli's excursion had as a purpose to further the employer's interest. See, e.g., Hilding v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 162 Wash. 168, 173, 298 P. 321 (1931) (this case relied on a definition similar to Azar's, holding that it is appropriate to cover injuries of employees when they occur in the furtherance of their employer's business). ¶ 68 The majority improperly frames Giovanelli's actions in narrow language, asserting that there is little distinction between covered activities like sleeping in hotels or eating in restaurants, and the uncovered activity of crossing the street on a day off. [3] Rather, a fair reading of the entire transcript shows that Giovanelli was searching for personal entertainment. The concert was an activity that was not in the furtherance of his employer's business interests. ¶ 69 Another decision requiring performance of a beneficial duty to the employer is found in Burris v. General Insurance Co. of America, 16 Wash.App. 73, 75, 553 P.2d 125 (1976). In that case, an employee was covered because he was injured in a private automobile driving on the way to a distant work site. Id. The court held that Burris was within the scope of employment because he was traveling at his employer's direction and the employer benefited. Id. This was statutorily covered as going to and from work on the jobsite. RCW 51.08.013(1). Employers may be liable when they control a worker's actions or benefit from such actions, but this liability terminates when the employee engages in an independent detour. ¶ 70 Employees who must travel as part of their job description may also be covered in activities that are a necessary incident of this travel (i.e., eating, sleeping, and bathing). Even the Larson test, strictly construed, would only cover employees who travel away from the employer's premises on business trips while engaged in such activities. See 2 LARSON & LARSON, supra, § 25.01. Personal detours outside of those necessary to perform the assigned job, or necessary to travel, are not covered under Washington law. ¶ 71 I would conclude that Giovanelli is not entitled to compensation for injury when going to a concert on his weekend off under the RCW or WAC. Supporting this conclusion is another problem; Giovanelli does not qualify as an employee in travel status. Travel status (or traveling employees) includes only those who are required to travel for the benefit of their employer. See RCW 51.08.013, ¶ 72 Mr. Giovanelli's prior history with SaintGobain indicates that he was offered a job in Washington because he was an experienced brick mason with skills beneficial to Saint-Gobain. However, an employee who is not directed to be at a specific location as part or the employment, but merely leaves home to seek out better employment, is not covered. ¶ 73 Giovanelli relies on an out-of-state case (construing different statutes) to argue for coverage. See Chi. Bridge & Iron v. Indus. Comm'n, 248 Ill.App.3d 687, 618 N.E.2d 1143, 188 Ill.Dec. 573 (1993). In Chicago Bridge, the claimant was injured when he drove to a jobsite, as directed by his employer, in Minnesota. Id. at 689, 188 Ill. Dec. 573, 618 N.E.2d 1143. That court held that the claimant's 19 year exclusive history with the company was an important factor in determining that he should be treated as a traveling employee. Id. at 693, 188 Ill.Dec. 573, 618 N.E.2d 1143. Citing Chicago Bridge, Giovanelli contends that he was actually hired in Pennsylvania and that traveling to Washington was a necessary incident of employment. ¶ 74 Chicago Bridge is distinguishable because the worker in that case was based in Illinois, injured in Minnesota, and filed a workers' compensation claim in the home state of Illinois. Here, Giovanelli relies on the same case to prove the exact opposite proposition: that he should receive workers' compensation benefits not in his home state, but in Washington, where the injury occurred, on his time off.
¶ 75 I briefly continue the analysis to consider whether Giovanelli's coverage as an employee was further restricted due to his distinct departure on a personal errand. 2 LARSON & LARSON, supra, ch. 25. ¶ 76 The fact that an employee is paid during the excursion does not change the personal nature of the errand, which is the appropriate focus of inquiry. Giovanelli was not paid, but did receive per diem. We must inquire into the nature of the activity and whether it was in the course of employment; the mere existence of per diem pay is not controlling. [4] Belnap v. Boeing Co., 64 Wash. App. 212, 220, 823 P.2d 528 (1992) (an employee being paid his full salary while on leave does not determine whether the activity was within the course of employment). [5] Similarly, the fact that Giovanelli was eligible to work on weekends does not change the result. On these facts, Giovanelli was not working on the Sunday in question. This court must inquire whether the nature of the activity, walking to a concert in the park, was within the course of his employment. ¶ 77 A business traveler can indulge in social or recreational activities he or she chooses; however, these activities are not covered by employer liability under workmens' compensation laws. [6] ¶ 78 Application of this simple test would also relieve courts from determining whether a myriad of recreational activities are tangentially related to employment. Although courts employ several tools for statutory interpretation, these tools do not include an eraser. We must apply the entire statute, not merely that language which supports a particular position. Giovanelli's assertion that he was merely crossing the street from his hotel when injured would effectively delete the proviso `acting at his . . . employer's direction or in the furtherance of . . . employer's business' from the statute. RCW 51.08.013(1). ¶ 79 An excursion to attend a concert is not within the course of employment because its purpose is distinctly personal rather than business oriented. See Johnson, 84 Wash. App. at 278, 928 P.2d 1138 (Washington worker who was injured while working on a personal project at home during normal working hours, but while on paid administrative leave, was not in the course of employment). [7] ¶ 80 It is inconsistent with Washington's statutory system to allow continuous coverage for recreational activities by a travel status employee, no matter how high risk (from basketball to boating to bungee jumping). Our statutory compensation scheme is based on an insurance principle; the State collects premiums for hours of paid employment, with the premium adjusted in accordance with the risk experience of the work. One underlying assumption is that time off is not ensured. While the case before this court involves a self-insured employer, the ramifications for our state workers' compensation system are serious. The majority's acceptance of Giovanelli's expansive argument will drain resources from legitimate Washington workers' claims in the future. ¶ 81 I would conclude that our statutory scheme does not require this employer to ensure employees for injury during a personal errand on a nonwork day. Giovanelli may well have a claim against the automobile driver who injured him (and he may already have collected on this claim). However, our Industrial Insurance Act coverage is not appropriately expanded by this court, a task constitutionally left to the Washington legislature.