Opinion ID: 171227
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Continued Public Employment

Text: We first review Plaintiff's claim that Defendants violated his constitutionally protected property interest in continued public employment. It is well-established constructive discharge from employment is actionable under § 1983 if an employee possesses a protectable property or liberty interest in his employment. Lighton v. Univ. of Utah, 209 F.3d 1213, 1221 (10th Cir.2000). In the employment context, a property interest is a legitimate expectation in continued employment. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We determine whether such a property interest exists by looking at state law. Id.; see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976). Under Wyoming law, [p]roperty interests in continued public employment are created and defined by independent sources such as state statutory law, regulations or the terms of employment. Lucero v. Matthews, 901 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Wyo. 1995); see also Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (explaining state statutes or terms of appointment may provide employees with protected property interests in employment). Essentially, a Wyoming public employee whose employer may fire him at will for any reason or for no reason at all does not possess a property interest in continued public employment, but an employee who may be fired only for cause, such as [a] nonprobationary, as well as a tenured, public employee[,] is entitled to written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. Lucero, 901 P.2d at 1120 (explaining a nonprobationary employee whose job was statutorily and constitutionally protected was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard and could only be fired for cause); see also Parker v. Bd. of Regents of the Tulsa Junior Coll., 981 F.2d 1159, 1160 (10th Cir.1992) (analyzing whether a tenured public employee who could have been terminated only for `just cause' had voluntarily resigned from her position, thus waiving her right to her protected property interest in continued public employment). In this case, a state statute, a town ordinance and resolution, and an employment contract all purportedly define Plaintiff's terms of employment. We now consider whether any of these documents provided Plaintiff with a constitutionally protected property interest in continued public employment