Opinion ID: 1675893
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mindful of the foregoing, we turn to specifics of the case.

Text: First considered is defendant's claim to the effect investigators Wilson and Adams wrongfully persisted in questioning him after he had expressed a desire to consult an attorney. On that subject the record discloses this dialogue between the prosecutor and Michael A. Wilson while the latter was testifying in chief as a State's witness: Q. (By Mr. Ivers) When you were at the Webster City Police Station, did the defendant ask for an attorney or state that he desired to speak with an attorney or have an attorney present? A. Yes, sir, he did. Q. And did he attempt to contact an attorney? A. Yes, sir, he did. Q. Did you assist in that attempt? A. I handed him a telephone book and a phone and that's it. Q. Did he call more than one lawyer? A. He tried several, and received no answer at any of them. Q. Did he continue his pursuit or at some point did he stop and indicate that he was willing to go ahead with the interrogation without the presence of an attorney? A. He had made the statement and the exact words I cannot tell you, it was something to the effect to hell with it, all they do is cost money anyway. Q. Are those the only words he utilized? A. He made reference that he didn't feel they were going to do him anything except take money from him as far as doing him any justice. Later, at close of defense counsel's cross-examination of William A. Adams this exchange occurred between the presiding judge and said witness: THE COURT: Now, what time was it that you went to the police station? A. It must have been getting real close to 4 or 4:30, right in that neighborhood. THE COURT: And did the defendant immediately start trying to contact the lawyer after he was given his Miranda warnings? A. Yes, sir. THE COURT: Now, various times you referred to interrogation of the defendant, you referring to interrogation while he was at the police station? A. Yes, sir. THE COURT: You continued to ask him questions after he requested a lawyer? A. Yes, sir. In the same vein, when Adams was asked by the prosecutor whether defendant had requested an attorney his answer was Yes, sir, and we gave him a telephone book and he placed several telephone calls. Also, as to waiver of counsel, this same witness, in response to another inquiry by the presiding judge, stated:    I guess he [defendant] decided he didn't want one  . (emphasis supplied). The question now posed is whether any inculpatory statements made by Hilpipre after he had manifested a desire to consult an attorney should have been suppressed. At the outset, this statement in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), comes into play: If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present at that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. The same principle was thus applied in State v. Moon, 183 N.W.2d 644, 649 (Iowa 1971): [W]henever an in-custody accused in any manner or at any time invokes his right to counsel, any questions thereafter asked    constitute a part of the Miranda proscribed interrogation process. (emphasis supplied). As already noted, an accused may waive right to counsel during any custodial interrogation process. In that event, however, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence such waiver was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently effected. In this respect the record discloses nothing more than confusion, uncertainty and ambivalence on defendant's part as to whether he should continue his previously futile efforts to secure legal advice. Such patently falls far short of a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of right to counsel. VII. We need not, however, rest a reversal upon the foregoing alone. More specifically, it is to us evident any self-incriminating statements given by defendant were elicited by proscribed promissory leniency. This is first demonstrated by these questions put to the witness Wilson and his responses thereto: Q. Did you ever tell him [defendant] that it might be better if he told you because then you could file lesser charges on him and you wouldn't have so much to hassle with? A. I read two or three different charges that could be pressed against him and I told him at the time that I had intended, which I did do, charge him with assault with intent but there were worse charges that could be brought against him if I so desired.    Q. Did you explain to him the difference between a misdemeanor and an indictable misdemeanor or a felony? A. I told him the difference between a misdemeanor and a felony. Q. You felt that you had the discretion as to what charges to file in regards to this, is that correct? A. Yes, sir, I did. Later, during examination of investigator Adams this colloquy occurred: Q. Yeah, okay. Were you ever present when Mr. Wilson talked to the defendant in regards to the charges that could be or would be filed against the defendant. A. Yes, sir, he read several charges to him. Q. Do you know for a fact or by hearing Mr. Wilson indicate that some were felonies and some of them were not felonies? A. Yes, sir, I think one or two of them were felony charges. Q. What was thestrike that. While you were present and did Mr. Wilson ever indicate to the defendant that if he cooperated he would file the one that he eventually did file against him? A. Yes, he indicated that there would only be one charge filed against him should we have cooperation from him. Q. And that would have been the misdemeanor then, is that correct? A. The Q. Well, the indictable misdemeanor as you understood it? A. Yes, sir. Additionally, Hilpipre was assured that if he cooperated in the giving of a statement the investigators would assist him in possibly not going to jail. In State v. Mullin, 249 Iowa 10, 85 N.W.2d 598 (1957), an investigating officer told the accused more mercy would be accorded him if he told the truth about what happened whether he committed the offense or not. This court, in condemning such conduct said: [I]t seems clear these statements were such as might well raise in the mind of the accused the hope that if he made the so-called confession he would receive better treatment, less severe punishment, and more mercy than if he denied his guilt and was tried and found guilty of the offense by the jury. Statements so obtained consistently have been termed involuntary, not only by the courts of his jurisdiction, but throughout the country. Id. at 13, 85 N.W.2d at 600. [T]he statement by the officer flattered the hope' of the defendant and was certainly in the nature of an inducement to speak or admit his guilt.    [A] confession wrung from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in such questionable shape as to merit no consideration.    [W]hen the officer or officers    explain just how it will be better or wiser for the accused to speak, these statements may suddenly become more than an admonishment and assume the character of an assurance or promise of special treatment which may well destroy the voluntary nature of the confession in the eyes of the law. Id. at 15-16, 85 N.W.2d at 601. Supportive of Mullin, supra, is State v. Ware, 205 N.W.2d at 701, where we noted: Cross-examination of [one of the investigating officers] disclosed, however, before [the defendant] made the aforesaid incriminating statement [another officer] had said to defendant `it would go easier if he wanted to tell us anything.' And Id. at 703 is this statement: [W]e are satisfied the aforesaid `not so subtle' promissory leniency expressed by [the investigating officers] induced the then frightened defendant to incriminate himself. [Citation]. It is to us evident any incriminatory statements elicited from defendant, oral or written, were the product of vitiating promissory leniency, therefore not voluntarily made or executed.