Opinion ID: 2167564
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Circuit Court Abused its Discretion by Instructing the Jury on Plaintiff's Claim of Future Lost Income

Text: Of the $1,122,261.21 damage award returned by the jury, $292,026.40 was allocated for plaintiff's claimed future lost earnings. On appeal to the appellate court, Kemlite urged the court to reverse and vacate that award. Kemlite maintained that the trial court erred by instructing the jury regarding future lost earnings and by allowing the jury to calculate [plaintiff's] future lost earnings. 293 Ill.App.3d at 272, 227 Ill.Dec. 828, 688 N.E.2d 309. The appellate court ruled that the evidence yielded no reasonably certain proof as to [plaintiff's] continued incapacity (293 Ill.App.3d at 273, 227 Ill.Dec. 828, 688 N.E.2d 309) and reversed the jury award as to this element of damages. On cross-appeal before this court, plaintiff argues that the appellate court erred in vacating plaintiff's future lost income award. A litigant has the right to have the jury clearly and fairly instructed upon each theory which [is] supported by the evidence. Leonardi v. Loyola University, 168 Ill.2d 83, 100, 212 Ill.Dec. 968, 658 N.E.2d 450 (1995); Ervin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 65 Ill.2d 140, 145, 2 Ill.Dec. 333, 357 N.E.2d 500 (1976); see also Shaheed v. Chicago Transit Authority, 137 Ill.App.3d 352, 360, 92 Ill.Dec. 27, 484 N.E.2d 542 (1985). `Whether the jury would have been persuaded is not the question. All that is required to justify the giving of an instruction is that there be some evidence in the record to justify the theory of the instruction.' Leonardi, 168 Ill.2d at 101, 212 Ill.Dec. 968, 658 N.E.2d 450, quoting Lowe v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 124 Ill.App.3d 80, 118, 79 Ill.Dec. 238, 463 N.E.2d 792 (1984); Wrighthouse v. Brown, 52 Ill.App.2d 191, 196, 201 N.E.2d 752 (1964). The evidence may be insubstantial; a reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence or decide whether a particular result is warranted. Leonardi, 168 Ill.2d at 100, 212 Ill.Dec. 968, 658 N.E.2d 450. The question of what issues have been raised by the evidence is within the discretion of the trial court. Leonardi, 168 Ill.2d at 100, 212 Ill.Dec. 968, 658 N.E.2d 450. A future lost earnings award compensates plaintiff for impairment of plaintiff's earning capacity. Antol v. Chavez-Pereda, 284 Ill.App.3d 561, 573, 219 Ill.Dec. 812, 672 N.E.2d 320 (1996). Impairment of earning capacity is calculated by deducting the amount plaintiff is capable of earning after his injury from the amount he was capable of earning prior to his injury ( Antol, 284 Ill.App.3d at 573, 219 Ill.Dec. 812, 672 N.E.2d 320; Patel v. Brown Machine Co., 264 Ill.App.3d 1039, 1061, 201 Ill.Dec. 902, 637 N.E.2d 491 (1994)), and awarding plaintiff the difference. Expert testimony is not necessary to establish loss of future earning ability. Patel, 264 Ill.App.3d at 1061, 201 Ill.Dec. 902, 637 N.E.2d 491. The plaintiff may testify that his injuries diminished his capacity to work, and the appearance of [the] plaintiff on the witness stand and his testimony as to the nature of his injuries and their duration is sufficient to take the question of impaired earning capacity to the jury. Shaheed, 137 Ill.App.3d at 360, 92 Ill.Dec. 27, 484 N.E.2d 542; see also Antol, 284 Ill.App.3d at 574, 219 Ill.Dec. 812, 672 N.E.2d 320. [E]vidence that plaintiff's injury [is] permanent and that it prevented him from continuing employment [is] generally sufficient to permit a jury to arrive at a calculation of lost future wages. Antol, 284 Ill.App.3d at 574, 219 Ill.Dec. 812, 672, N.E.2d 320; Lewis v. Cotton Belt Route-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 217 Ill.App.3d 94, 117, 159 Ill.Dec. 995, 576 N.E.2d 918 (1991) (once plaintiff introduces evidence of permanent injury, the jury should be instructed as to loss of future earnings). The appellate court vacated the award for lack of reasonably certain proof to sustain the claim of lost future earnings. 293 Ill.App.3d at 273, 227 Ill.Dec. 828, 688 N.E.2d 309. The appellate court derived this standard from Brown v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 162 Ill.App.3d 926, 114 Ill.Dec. 165, 516 N.E.2d 320 (1987), in which the appellate court was asked to decide whether evidence adduced at trial sustained the jury award. Brown, 162 Ill. App.3d at 927, 114 Ill.Dec. 165, 516 N.E.2d 320. The quantum of proof necessary to prevail on a claim is different, however, from the measure of evidence needed merely to send an issue to the jury. See Patel v. Brown Machine Co., 264 Ill.App.3d at 1062, 201 Ill.Dec. 902, 637 N.E.2d 491. As stated above, plaintiff need only furnish some evidence probative of his claim to earn a jury instruction on that claim, and neither the trial court nor a court of review must be convinced of the persuasiveness of that evidence before the issue may be submitted to the jury for its deliberations. Indeed, after ruling that damages for lost future income would be awarded only on a showing that the loss was reasonably certain to occur ( Brown, 162 Ill.App.3d at 936-37, 114 Ill.Dec. 165, 516 N.E.2d 320), the Brown court stated: In addition, there must be an evidentiary basis in order for a court to give a jury instruction on future disability and lost wages. Brown, 162 Ill.App.3d at 937, 114 Ill.Dec. 165, 516 N.E.2d 320. Thus, even the Brown court recognized, albeit implicitly, the narrower margin of proof required at the instruction conference. We note as well that the Brown court's estimation of proof necessary to justify the damage award arose in the context of a discussion about conjectural and speculative evidence. The Brown court quoted authorities ruling that `[m]ere surmise or conjecture' is insufficient proof of an existing fact or future condition. Brown, 162 Ill. App.3d at 936-37, 114 Ill.Dec. 165, 516 N.E.2d 320, quoting Stevens v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 306 Ill. 370, 377, 137 N.E. 859 (1922). We agree. Our conclusion that some evidence of a claim will get that claim to a jury does not mean that the evidence can be untrustworthy and still earn an instruction. While only some evidence is needed to warrant an instruction, inherently that evidence must be reliable and grounded in more than mere possibilities. See Lewis, 217 Ill.App.3d at 117, 159 Ill.Dec. 995, 576 N.E.2d 918. In support of his claim in this case, plaintiff introduced the testimony of Dr. Timothy Payne, an orthopedic surgeon and physician. He first treated plaintiff on June 29, 1990. At that visit, plaintiff reported that he had slipped and fallen on some fiberglass and injured his lower back. At the time Payne saw plaintiff, plaintiff was not working. Plaintiff related a history of a single, prior back injury to Payne, and also indicated he had had occasional aches and pains in his back prior to the fall of June 1990, although he did not indicate that prior to 1990, he had any difficulty functioning. Upon examination, Payne found plaintiff had limitation in the range of motion in his lumbosacral spine. Plaintiff complained of pain on palpitation in the midline of the lower back, as well on the right and left sides of the spine. He had decreased sensation in his left foot and ankle. Payne concluded from X rays that plaintiff had a long-standing, significant degenerative condition in his low back at the time he presented to [Payne] on June 29, 1990. Payne opined that the degenerative process facilitated [plaintiff's] complaints of pain and enhanced his discomfort following the fall in June 1990. The fall triggered protracted pain, which resulted in plaintiff's receiving treatment. Payne initially treated plaintiff with anti-inflammatory medications and epidural injections in an attempt to relieve plaintiff's pain. After approximately two years, Payne determined that his conservative treatment of plaintiff's back-therapy, medication, injections, myelogram, rigid external back brace-was inadequate, so he sent him to Dr. Kamal Ibrahim for a surgical consultation. Dr. Ibrahim performed a spinal fusion on plaintiff. Following the surgery, plaintiff wore a brace for a period of time, progressed to conventional therapy to promote flexibility in and strengthen the lower back, and then went to a work-hardening program. When Payne saw plaintiff in October 1993, he found that plaintiff had done well in the work-hardening program. Based on plaintiff's performance there, Payne felt plaintiff could return to his original job if it was available: plaintiff had good flexibility, he could lift 25 pounds and intermittently 50 pounds, and plaintiff did not have the complaints of pain he had prior to surgery. Payne also believed that these weight restrictions on plaintiff are permanent. Payne admitted that there is a trade off with the surgery of the type performed on plaintiff. While the fusion relieved his pain, it also resulted in a loss of motion in the back. After reviewing Banner's written description of the activities required of a roll-off driver, including lifting requirements, Payne agreed that plaintiff was on the cusp or border of [the] physical requirements of the job. He also stated that he recommended a trial return to work to see if plaintiff could tolerate it. Based on plaintiff's performance in the work-hardening program, Payne believed that the lifting aspects of plaintiff's job would be no problem, although Payne did admit that he could not predict what would happen if plaintiff was back in his job and faced with a situation where he might have to do more. Payne believed that there is always [the] possibility that plaintiff might not be able to perform the duties of a roll-off driver, but based on Payne's exam of plaintiff on January 12, 1994, [plaintiff's] weightlifting capabilities fell within the parameters of the job, [plaintiff] had no complaints of back or leg pain, and Payne could not say that plaintiff could not do the job. The last time Payne saw plaintiff, plaintiff had no complaints of pain in his back or legs, other than some aches and pains. Payne said these aches and pains were no major problem. Payne's notes of that visit also indicated that plaintiff had done quite nicely since he had surgery. Payne testified that the fusion of plaintiff's spine would not preclude him from engaging in everyday activities like sitting, standing, walking, carrying suitcases upstairs, yard work, helping someone move or shoveling snow. Payne admitted that if plaintiff should come back to him after attempting to perform as a roll-off driver and told Payne that, despite plaintiff's ability to perform in the controlled setting of a work-hardening program, plaintiff could not do the work of a roll-off driver, then Payne would say, Fine, then obviously you can't do it. I wouldn't pursue it. Dr. Payne stated that plaintiff was a good patient who followed his directions. Payne agreed that, during the presurgery period, plaintiff was working hard to try and get himself back to work. Beginning in October 1992, Dr. Kamal Ibrahim, an orthopedic surgeon, treated plaintiff. Plaintiff came to see Ibrahim at the recommendation of Dr. Payne. Ibrahim testified that plaintiff complained of lower back pain with occasional radiation and numbness down both legs, all the way to the ankles. Dr. Ibrahim determined that plaintiff had degenerative changes in his lower back that predated his fall. However, prior to June 1990, plaintiff had been functioning without symptoms. The injury of June 1990 aggravated the preexisting condition, so that [t]he fall brought on the symptoms that he complained of. He performed surgery on plaintiff, which included an internal fixation of the affected area of the spine, with rods and screws. He also fused several vertebrae of plaintiff's spine together, from L-3 to the sacrum, using bone grafts from plaintiff's hip. In Dr. Ibrahim's opinion, plaintiff had exhausted all other, more conservative alternatives to surgery before surgery was performed in February 1993. After the surgery, plaintiff went through a period of physical therapy, a rehabilitation program and a work-hardening program. Dr. Ibrahim last saw plaintiff in October 1993, after plaintiff completed work hardening. The fact he completed the work-hardening program indicated to Dr. Ibrahim that the surgery had been a success. It fused very well and it eliminated his symptoms. He said he had no plan to remove the hardware from plaintiff's back. Dr. Ibrahim had no record of restrictions or limitations that he specifically placed on plaintiff post-surgery. However, he testified that he generally tells his patients not to lift more than 50 pounds above the waist or 20 pounds over the head. This is to avoid putting extra pressure on the nonfused spine. Dr. Ibrahim's records do indicate that he told plaintiff to go back to work after plaintiff reported the results of the work-hardening program. Plaintiff is 51 years old and currently lives in a trailer park. Six months before trial, he sold his home in Joliet and moved into the trailer park in Tennessee. At the time of trial, he was living off of the proceeds of the sale of his home. Plaintiff left his family's home in Tennessee when he was 17. He started working for Banner in 1969, when he was 24 years old. Before that, he briefly worked as a laborer for a glass company, an automobile bumper manufacturer, a roofing materials manufacturer and a bakery. Each of those jobs required lifting. At Banner, plaintiff worked first as a garbage man on a residential route. After three years, plaintiff became a roll-off driver. On the day of the accident, June 22, 1990, plaintiff slipped and fell as he was attempting to remove the compactor container from the Kemlite site. He felt a sharp pain radiating across his back and down both legs to his feet. He hauled that container and two more that day, despite feeling pain in his back; the pain got worse during the course of the day. He went to a clinic for treatment on both June 22 and June 25, 1990. He never went back to work for Banner after June 22, 1990. Prior to the fall, he had three injuries to his back, but he would not characterize any of them as a major problem, nor were they incidents that in and of themselves caused him any pain. He received treatment from Dr. Payne for two years, but still experienced difficulties with his back and legs. Plaintiff suffered from numbness in his legs, difficulty sleeping and inability to walk one block. Plaintiff testified that he couldn't do anything. Prior to his surgery, plaintiff obtained employment as a security guard for two or three months. The job required him to walk rounds around the facility he was guarding, and the pain and numbness in his legs and back prevented him from doing the necessary walking. Following his surgery, plaintiff was incapacitated for two months. Thereafter, he wore a back brace for four months, and then completed physical therapy. After completing a work-hardening program, plaintiff believed he was ready to return to work. Both Drs. Payne and Ibrahim released plaintiff to return to work without restrictions. However, Banner would not allow him to work because he had been off work for more than one year. Plaintiff averred that he has tried to return to work since his surgery. Plaintiff tried bartending but was unsuccessful. He stated that his back still bothers him too much to do a day's work. He has also tried to do work similar to that of a roll-off driver. His brother owns a junkyard and plaintiff tried for two months to drive a tow truck for his brother's business. Driving the tow truck, or wrecker, is similar to being a roll-off driver, because it requires the driver to do many of the same activities-getting in and out of the cab, bending over, lifting. He said he lacked the flexibility necessary to do the job and could not drive for long periods of time. He would like to return to work as a roll-off driver. Before his injury, he had planned on retiring at age 60 or 62. Currently, however, he has no other plans for employment. He does nothing on a day-to-day basis other than yard work around his home. Plaintiff stated that he is trained only for plant work and driving a truck. As for his back, he still has pain there, but he can live with it. He cannot bend over as he could in the past. He no longer has pain in his legs and he is not regularly taking any prescription medications. He is not regularly seeing any doctor for back treatment. Prior to his injury on June 22, 1990, plaintiff earned $13.77 per hour, or $35,000 per year, as a roll-off driver. He also worked overtime, for which he received time and a half. Plaintiff said that he received no pay for the work he performed as a tow truck driver for his brother. He was trying to see if he could give [his brother] a hand and help out. As a bartender, he earned $5 to $6 dollars per hour. He received approximately the same salary as a security guard. The some evidence standard controlling our inquiry requires plaintiff to scale only a modest evidentiary threshold. We hold that plaintiff satisfied that standard in this case. Admittedly, Banner refused to re-employ plaintiff for reasons only indirectly related to plaintiff's back injury, and plaintiff did not indicate that he has approached his union, the Teamsters, for help in obtaining employment. Further, plaintiff produced no proof that he has actually applied elsewhere for employment as a roll-off driver. Nonetheless, plaintiff testified that he unsuccessfully tried to drive a wrecker for his brother, a job that plaintiff said required essentially the same tasks required of a roll-off driver. Although his attempt to work as a security guard occurred before the surgery that plaintiff said relieved some of his symptoms, plaintiff stated he was equally unsuccessful in his attempts to hold a job as a bartender. The testimony of the medical witnesses indicated that plaintiff had permanent lifting restrictions placed on him as a result of the injury and subsequent surgery. The process of fusing portions of plaintiff's spine also forever limited his mobility. Even though plaintiff's treating physicians placed no restrictions on his ability to return to work, plaintiff's primary treating physician based his opinion solely on plaintiff's performance in a work-hardening program; he could not testify how plaintiff would perform in response to the exigencies of the real workplace. Whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to actually prevail on this aspect of his damages case is not before us. The sole question presented to the appellate court, and on appeal to this court, is whether adequate proof existed to warrant a jury instruction for lost future earnings. We find that plaintiff produced at least some evidence of a permanent injury that has prevented him from continuing his prior employment. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by instructing the jury to consider whether plaintiff could recover this measure of damages, and if so, how to calculate those damages.