Opinion ID: 4502284
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Reopen and to Reconsider

Text: On December 8, 2015, some eighteen months after removal, Daoud, then apparently in Egypt and represented by counsel, filed a motion to reopen removal proceedings as to his three requests for relief based on purported changed country conditions in Sudan. Daoud also characterized his motion as a motion to reconsider the IJ's conclusions that his robbery conviction constituted an aggravated felony and that he was competent during his removal proceedings, from which he had not earlier taken an appeal to the BIA. Because his motion was outside the ninety-day deadline for motions to reopen and the thirty-day deadline for motions to reconsider, Daoud offered two arguments: (1) the two deadlines should be equitably tolled; and (2) his motion to reopen fell within the exception to the deadline for changed country conditions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). In support of his equitable tolling argument, Daoud argued that he faced two extraordinary circumstances that prevented him from filing either on time. He argued that upon his removal to Sudan some 140 days after the IJ's decision, he was imprisoned in Sudan, and he suffered from severe mental illness. He simply asserted that he acted with due diligence in pursuing - 8 - his motion by seeking assistance in filing his motion [w]ithin weeks of his arrival in Egypt after his escape from Sudan. As to changed country conditions, Daoud introduced some evidence that he had been imprisoned and tortured by Sudanese officials. He argued that this evidence was material and previously unavailable, satisfying the statutory changed country conditions exception to the ninety-day filing deadline. On February 9, 2016, the IJ issued a written decision denying Daoud's motion. The IJ concluded that she did not need to reach the post-departure bar issue because even if the bar did not apply, Daoud's motion would fail in any event. As to Daoud's changed country conditions argument, the IJ concluded that, even accepting Daoud's version of events as true, he was not eligible for the exception to the filing deadline. The IJ stated that even if Daoud were detained and tortured, these harms were based upon a change in [Daoud's] personal circumstances brought about by his criminal convictions and subsequent removal to Sudan, which is not a basis for reopening proceedings. Further, the IJ concluded that Daoud ha[d] not established that conditions ha[d] materially changed [in Sudan] since the Court first considered his asylum application. The IJ declined to equitably toll the filing deadline for Daoud's motion to reopen because Daoud had not shown he exercised due diligence. The IJ noted that even assuming Daoud - 9 - could not have filed his motion while detained in Sudan, Daoud had (1) provided no evidence of how much time had elapsed between his escape from Sudanese prison, his arrival in Egypt, and his filing of the motion to reopen, and (2) he had not described in his own declaration any of the steps he took, or obstacles that he faced, in pursuing his [m]otion. The IJ specifically addressed Daoud's assertions that in her earlier oral decision, she had erred in assessing his competency and declining to apply safeguards. The IJ noted that although she had erroneously stated there were no indicia of incompetency, she had nevertheless proceeded as if Daoud had presented indicia of incompetency and conducted the necessary competency assessment. Specifically, the IJ stated that given Daoud's testimony and demeanor over the course of the December 12 hearing, she found that Daoud's testimony was fully coherent, responsive to the questions asked of him, and that his answers were appropriate in all pertinent respects. Further, when Daoud testified about his mental health, the IJ asked Daoud follow up questions about the nature of his mental state and ensured that he understood the questions he was asked. The IJ concluded that she had properly determined that Daoud was competent, so no safeguards were needed. Viewing Daoud's motion as a motion to reconsider, the IJ declined to equitably toll the deadline for the same reasons as - 10 - for the denial of the motion to reopen. Accordingly, the IJ denied Daoud's dual motion. The IJ also declined to reopen or reconsider sua sponte, explaining that Daoud had not made a prima facie showing that he is eligible for the relief he seeks, had not established exceptional circumstances warrant[ing] reopening, and that serious doubts had been raised about his credibility.