Opinion ID: 521941
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Vacation Time

Text: 35 Tipton finally contends that the provision setting forth the number of weeks of vacation that would accrue annually also supports her position that the agreement was a binding one-year contract. We disagree. The vacation provision neither required Tipton to remain in her employment for a year nor obligated CIBC to retain Tipton for at least a year. Tipton has cited no case standing for the proposition that a vacation provision in a contract can be used to establish the durational term of that contract, and we refuse to hold as such today. 36 In sum, we agree with the district court that this employment agreement is unambiguous and states no definite term of employment. The three provisions Tipton refers to in the agreement do not support her position that this was a one-year employment contract, nor do they create an ambiguity as to the duration of the contract. Since the contract included no durational term, it established an at-will employment relationship that could be terminated by either party at any time. That being the case, CIBC was under no obligation to retain Tipton for a full year, and CIBC did not breach the contract by firing Tipton after she had been with the Company only four months. 3 C. Inadmissible Evidence 37 Tipton contests the district court's decision to admit into evidence a personal reference from a non-appearing witness. The reference was completed at Tipton's request by a business and social colleague of Tipton, and submitted by Tipton to the Emory University School of Business Administration in connection with her application to graduate business school. The reference stated, among other things, that because of her strong intelligence [Tipton] sometimes works poorly with less skilled superiors. Tipton contends that this out-of-court statement was introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted and does not fall within any exception to the hearsay rule. 38 CIBC contends that the statement was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(C), which provides in pertinent part: 39 A statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he statement is offered against a party and is ... a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject. 40 Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(C). Tipton contends that she did not see the reference before it was submitted to Emory, and therefore, did not authorize such a statement concerning her job skills. 41 We need not decide whether the district court erred in admitting the statement. Assuming arguendo that the statement was improperly admitted, such error would not warrant a reversal unless the evidence was likely to have substantially swayed the court as the factfinder. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). In the instant case, the district court cited several reasons for Tipton's discharge including her insubordinate remarks to Cropley, her inability to work under Cropley's authority, and her blatant challenges to Cropley's authority. We are unwilling to say that the statement in the reference substantially swayed the district court's decision-making process. Consequently, we hold that the admission of the statement, even if error, was only a harmless one. D. Disqualification 42 At the time Tipton filed the instant suit, she was being represented by another attorney in defense counsel's law firm in an unrelated property dispute. When defense counsel's law firm discovered the alleged conflict, it sent a letter to Tipton withdrawing their representation of Tipton in the property dispute. Tipton filed a motion to disqualify CIBC's counsel, but the motion was denied by the district court. 43 Tipton contends that attorneys or law firms must be disqualified from representing a party in a legal action if they have acquired knowledge of the affairs of an opposing party through an attorney-client relationship with the opposing party, and could use such knowledge to the detriment of the opposing party. See ABA Code of Prof. Resp., DR5-105(D); American Can Co., v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir.1971); Amoco Chem. Corp. v. MacArthur, 568 F.Supp. 42 (N.D.Ga.1983). In this case, however, the attorney involved in Tipton's estate representation submitted an affidavit stating that she had never discussed her representation of Tipton with the lawyers in her firm representing CIBC except in immaterial ways specifically identified in the affidavit. Moreover, CIBC's attorneys attested that they had obtained no confidential information with respect to Tipton from the attorney representing Tipton in the property dispute. After reviewing the record and the applicable statutory and case law, we find that the district court properly denied Tipton's motion for disqualification. E. Costs for Defending this Appeal 44 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1912 and Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, CIBC moves this court to assess damages and double costs against Tipton for bringing this frivolous appeal. We do not agree that Tipton's appeal was frivolous, and therefore, CIBC's request for costs is hereby denied.