Opinion ID: 767478
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The National Park Service Organic Act and Policies

Text: 28 Under the National Park Service Organic Act, the Secretary of the Interior may ... provide in his discretion for the destruction of such animals and of such plant life as may be detrimental to the use of any said parks, monuments, or reservations. 16 U.S.C. S 3. Because the Organic Act is silent as to the specifics of park management, the Secretary has especially broad discretion on how to implement his statutory mandate. See Daingerfield Island Protective Soc'y v. Babbitt, 40 F.3d 442, 446 (D.C.Cir.1994); see also Bicycle Trails Council v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1454 (9th Cir.1996) (adopting the district court's opinion); Intertribal Bison Coop. v. Babbitt, 25 F.Supp.2d 1135 (D. Mont. 1998). Still, a finding of detriment is necessary before the Park Service may engage in a controlled harvest such as the one proposed by the Park Service in its deer management program. Intertribal Bison Coop. v. Babbitt, at 1138 (pursuant to S 3 of the Organic Act and Park Service policy a finding of detriment is necessary to justify a controlled harvest, ... but an explicit finding of detriment is not otherwise necessary to justify the destruction of wildlife ....); see also General Regulations for Areas Administered by National Park Service, 48 Fed. Reg. 30,252, 30,264 (1983) (controlled harvest will be utilized only when a finding of 'detriment,' based on scientific documentation, has been made by the superintendent, and it is determined that removal is an acceptable method of resource management). 29 The Park Service claims that it made a sufficient finding of detriment to justify the destruction of the deer under the Organic Act when it concluded that overbrowsing by deer in the historic woodlots and cropfields was detrimental to the purposes of the parks. 3 As is reflected at several points in the record, the Park Service determined that the over browsing was preventing it from achieving the parks' objectives of preserving the historic appearance of the woodlots and cropfields, components of the landscape critical to the understanding and interpretation of the historic events that took place in each park. See, e.g., ROD at 2, A.R. at 3571 (Management objectives for maintaining landscape components, specifically historic woodlots and cropfields, were developed to enhance visitor understanding of each park's events). For example, in its Record of Decision initiating the deer management program, the Park Service concluded that 30 [d]ata from the [Storm Report] showed that the woodlots and cropfields could not be maintained in a way necessary to achieve park objectives. The high level of deer browsing was preventing a sufficient number of tree seedlings from becoming established, which is needed to perpetuate the historic woodlots. The agricultural program was unable to grow historical crops to maturity in Eisenhower NHS and the southern part of Gettysburg NMP due to deer browsing. 31 Id. at 3, A.R. at 3572. The Court concludes that Park Service made a sufficient finding of detriment on the record to satisfy the requirements of the Organic Act. 32 Plaintiffs contend, however, that the finding of detriment made by Park Service is arbitrary and capricious because it is inconsistent with the alleged admission by the Park Service in its draft management plan that the cropfields and woodlots do not need protection because they do not reflect the historic landscape. Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, the draft management plan contains no such admission. The plan proposes to eliminate only non-historic woodlands. See Draft GMP at 122. The perpetuation of the historic woodlots and croplands is still necessary to achieve park objectives under the draft management plan. Nothing in the record suggests that the threats to these historic resources from deer overbrowsing-i.e., the suppression of oak and white ash seedlings and excessive crop loss--are any less likely to occur in the new management regime than at the time the Park Service issued its decision to institute the deer management program. The finding of detriment by the Park Service therefore is not undermined by the draft management plan and may still justify the destruction of deer under the Organic Act. 33 If the Organic Act were the only authority limiting the management discretion of the Park Service, the analysis would end here. But the Park Service has further bound its own discretion through the adoption of Management Policies. 4 The Management Policies provide that 34 [u]nnatural concentrations of native species caused by human activities may be controlled if the activities causing the concentrations cannot be controlled.... Animal populations or individuals will be controlled ... in cultural or development zones when necessary to protect property orlandscaped areas. 35 National Park Service Management Policies (Park Service Management Policies), Plaintiffs' Exhibit I at 4:6. Plaintiffs argue that the Park Service has violated these policies because it has opted to control the deer overpopulation without first exhausting the available means to regulate the human activitiescausing the overpopulation. In particular, plaintiffs again point to the draft management plan as evidence that the deer population could be reduced by controlling human activities such as the decisions of the Park Service regarding the maintenance of Gettysburg's woodlands and cropfields. 36 The Park Service asserts that the Court does not need to reach the merits of plaintiffs' argument because plaintiffs have misread the Management Policies. The Park Service maintains that the statement that [a]nimal populations ... will be controlled in cultural ... zones when necessary to protect property or landscaped areas is meant as an exception to the preceding sentence requiring that the Park Service attempt first to control human activities before looking to control the animal populations. As a result, the Park Service argues that once it found that Gettysburg and Eisenhower were cultural zones with landscaped areas in need of protection, it was entitled to control the deer population directly without first seeking to control human activities. 5 37 While the language of the Management Policies could be interpreted either as plaintiffs read it or as the Park Service does, the interpretation of the Park Service is plausible; it certainly is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the policies and therefore must prevail over plaintiffs' reading. See Everett v. United States, 158 F.2d at 1367. The first excerpted sentence describes two alternatives for addressing overpopulation of native species--control of the animal population and control of the human activities that caused the unnatural concentrations or overpopulation--and announces a preference for the latter. The second excerpted sentence discusses only one of these two alternatives--control of the animal population--in the context of cultural or development zones. When these two sentences are juxtaposed, the reading of the second sentence as an exception to the first sentence's preference for the control of human activities is not unreasonable. If the Park Service intended to express a preference for the control of human activities when addressing overpopulation in cultural or development zones, it is reasonable to expect that it would have explicitly discussed this alternative technique in the second sentence, as it had in the first. It did not do so. The interpretation of the Management Policies proffered by the Park Service is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the plain terms of the policies and therefore is entitled to deference. B. NEPA 38 Plaintiffs challenge the deer management program under NEPA on two grounds. First, they argue that the Park Service did not consider many reasonable alternatives in its final EIS. Second, they argue that the Park Service must prepare a supplemental EIS as a result of the changes in park management that are considered in the draft management plan. Because the Court finds that the Park Service considered a full range of reasonable alternatives and was within its discretion by opting not to prepare a supplemental EIS, the Court concludes that the Park Service fully complied with NEPA's procedural requirements.
39 The regulations implementing NEPA require an agency to specify the underlying purpose and need to which the agency is responding and to [r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and for alternatives which were eliminated from detailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their having been eliminated. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.13, 1502.14. The courts have recognized that these requirements are interrelated because the goals of an action delimit the universe of the action's reasonable alternatives.City of Burlington v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 195 (D.C.Cir.1991).The setting of the objectives and the range of alternatives to be considered by an agency are governed by a rule of reason. See City of Grapevine v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 17 F.3d 1502, 1506 (D.C.Cir.1994); City of Burlington v. Busey, 938 F.2d at 195. The Court must uphold an agency's definition of objectives so long as the objectives that the agency chooses are reasonable, and ... uphold its discussion of alternatives so long as the alternatives are reasonable and the agency discusses them in reasonable detail. City of Burlington v. Busey, 938 F.2d at 196. 40 Plaintiffs assert that the Park Service unfairly narrowed its objective for the deer management program from the perpetuation of historic resources to the control of deer population so as to eliminate reasonable alternatives. This argument is not supported in the record. In an internal memorandum drafted early in the NEPA process, the Park Service asserted that the objective of the program was not to reduce the deer population but to perpetuate the significant elements of the cultural landscape. Program Review and Project Data Sheet for Deer Management at GETT, A.R. at 168. In the Final EIS, the Park Service stated that a management action is needed to control the browsing effects of white-tailed deer in the parks. Final EIS at 13, A.R. at 2210. In the context of the Storm Report's conclusion that the over browsing of the deer was threatening the historic resources of Gettysburg, see Storm Report at 4, A.R. at 220, these statements of objective are the same. 41 Even if the Park Service's alteration of the objective's wording were suspicious, any suspicions are allayed by its thorough consideration of all alternatives. In its draft EIS and its final EIS, the Park Service initially considered and rejected a wide range of non-lethal alternatives, including alternatives such as fencing and altering cropfield patterns as suggested by plaintiffs. See Draft EIS, A.R. at 1892; Final EIS, A.R. at 2225-26. The Park Service then proceeded to evaluate in more detail the five alternatives it considered most viable. See Final EIS at 30-42, A.R. at 2227-41; see also supra at note 1. It is apparent from a review of both the draft EIS and the final EIS that the Park Service weighed all of the reasonable alternatives and came to a fully-informed decision. This is all that NEPA requires. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28, 100 S.Ct. 497, 62 L.Ed.2d 433 (1980) (NEPA is only procedural and does not mandate a substantive result); Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 532 (D.C.Cir.1993) (NEPA does not dictate agency policy or determine the fate of contemplated action). 42 Plaintiffs raise only one alternative not considered in the Final EIS--the cutting of the non-historic woodlands pursuant to the draft management plan. This cannot be viewed as a reasonable alternative, however, because it would not further the objective of reducing browsing in historic areas. As the draft management plan noted, the cutting of the nonhistoric woodlands would not reduce the desired deer population density. See Draft GMP at 255. Since it is deer population density that needs to be controlled in order to preserve the parks' historic resources, cutting the nonhistoric woodlands would not further the deer management program's objective. Furthermore, the record suggests that cutting non-historic woodlands may even exacerbate the problem by driving the deer into the historic areas. See Storm Report at 5, A.R. at 211 (deer displaced by fencing would be forced into other areas where their impact would be intensified). Cutting the non-historic woodlands therefore is not an alternative that the Park Service had to consider.
43 An agency is required to prepare a supplemental EIS if [t]here are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.09. [N]ot every change requires [a supplemental EIS]; only those changes that cause effects which are significantly different from those already studied require supplementary consideration. Corridor H Alternatives, Inc. v. Slater, 982 F.Supp. 24, 30 (D.D.C.1997). The decision to prepare a supplemental EIS is again governed by the rule of reason and reviewed by the courts under the arbitrary or capricious standard of the APA. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 373-75, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) ([A]n agency need not supplement an EIS every time new information comes to light after the EIS is finalized. To require otherwise would render agency decision making intractable). Because the decision whether to prepare a supplemental EIS involves technical issues within the agency's area of expertise, courts generally defer to the 'informed discretion of the responsible federal agencies.'  Id. at 377 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976)). 44 Plaintiffs argue that the draft management plan, issued after the preparation of the final EIS, contains new proposals for managing Gettysburg's historic resources that will have a significant impact on the deer population, thus requiring the Park Service to prepare a supplemental EIS. Under the preferred alternative of the draft management plan, nonhistoric woodlands will be cut, other woodlands will be thinned to take on the appearance of historic woodlots and new field patterns may reduce the availability of crops to the deer. See Draft GMP at 122-28. Plaintiffs argue that these steps will lead to a reduction in the deer population. Once again, plaintiffs have improperly focused the inquiry. The deer management program is intended to maintain the deer population density, not the total deer population. To constitute significant new circumstances or information requiring a supplemental EIS, the draft management plan would have to have a significant effect on the deer population density needed to sustain the historic properties of the parks. 45 Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the draft management plan would have any impact on the desired deer population density. 6 After years of study, the Park Service has determined that a deer population density of 25 deer per forested square mile is the appropriate level necessary to conserve the historic resources of Gettysburg and Eisenhower. The target density is intended to ensure that there are adequate seedlings to regenerate the young oak and white ash trees that make up the historic woodlots and to ensure adequate crop production to tell the stories of the parks. See, e.g., Final EIS at 9,12, A.R. at 2206, 2209. The proposals in the draft management plan to cut non-historic woodlands, convert other woodlands into historic woodlots and change agricultural field patterns do not cause effects which are significantly different from those already studied. Corridor H Alternatives, Inc. v. Slater, 982 F. Supp. at 30. Specifically, the Park Service found that the historic resources will not be changed under the draft management plan in a manner that alters the need to control over browsing through the maintenance of the desired deer population density. Because the Court has no reason to question the exercise of discretion by the Park Service in its area of expertise, it concludes that the decision not to prepare a supplemental EIS was not arbitrary and capricious. 7