Opinion ID: 761232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: LMRDA Claim

Text: 32 Section 101(a)(1) of Title I of the LMRDA provides: 33 Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws. 34 29 U.S.C. § 411. Plaintiffs claim that the Union violated their rights under § 101(a)(1) by, inter alia, (1) intimidating Union members opposed to the Agreement, (2) coercing members to sign the Jean petition for a second vote, and (3) violating the Union's bylaws in the manner discussed above in Part II.A. 35 In support of their contention, plaintiffs rely on Farkas v. Rumore, 881 F.Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y.1995), and Members for a Better Union v. Bevona, 972 F.Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y.1997). In both Farkas and Bevona, Southern District courts held that once a union has provided its members with the right to vote, the union must extend that right in a meaningful manner. See Farkas, 881 F.Supp. at 888-89 (finding summary judgment inappropriate where plaintiffs alleged that union officials violated Section 101(a)(1) by, inter alia, holding a vote two days after a tentative agreement was reached and lying about terms of the agreement); Bevona, 972 F.Supp. at 244-45 (holding that [a] fair referendum assuring the equal right to vote under § 101(a)(1) includes the right of members to have the vote scheduled at a time when they can exercise their vote and the right to be free from intimidation or fear of reprisal....). These cases, however, which the district court distinguished on their facts, are no longer good law. 36 In Members for a Better Union v. Bevona, 152 F.3d 58 (2d Cir.1998), we vacated the district court decision relied on by plaintiffs, and narrowed the scope of claims which may be brought under § 101(a)(1). Relying on the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 101(a)(1) in Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 85 S.Ct. 292, 13 L.Ed.2d 190 (1964), we stated that to be viable, a claim under § 101(a)(1) must ... allege the denial of some privilege or right to vote which the union has granted to others. Bevona, 152 F.3d at 65. Specifically, we held that plaintiffs' allegations in that case--that (1) the timing of a union vote may have dissuaded members from voting, and (2) the vote was tainted by the actions of union leaders--failed to allege discrimination under § 101(a)(1) and that dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was therefore appropriate. See id. at 67. 37 As was true in Bevona, plaintiffs in this case have failed to state a valid LMRDA claim. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, while chock full of alleged misconduct by Union officials and Times's foremen, contains no allegation that plaintiffs were the subject of discrimination or were denied a right to vote that the Union granted to other members. See id. We therefore vacate the district court's decision on plaintiffs' LMRDA claim and remand for the district court to dismiss the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). See id.