Opinion ID: 2104596
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sexually Offensive Comments and Gestures

Text: We must note that the specific matters before this Review Tribunal as they relate to Judge Barr's sexually offensive comments and gestures are not whether his behavior constituted sexual harassment as such. Likewise, we do not address whether Judge Barr's comments and gestures were inadvertent expressions of unconscious juvenile prejudices or the result of an ingrained pattern of speech. We acknowledge, without hesitation, that while all forms of behavior that cross the legal threshold of sexual harassment would constitute judicial misconduct, many forms of offensive interpersonal behavior that would otherwise violate the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct may not meet the legal definition of sexual harassment. Nonetheless, while we address the issues of whether Judge Barr's lewd and offensive comments and gestures violated the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, we note that the charges of misconduct against him do equate to a form of sexual harassment. Gender bias in general, and sexual harassment in particular, is personally offensive, extraordinarily invasive, psychologically damaging, and deeply embarrassing to the intended victim. See In the Matter of Seaman, 133 N.J. 67, 627 A.2d 106, 110 (1993). It is insulting, belittling, and inappropriate in an exchange between a judge and attorney and is to be condemned for the simple reason that it is wrong. Sexual harassment in the administration of justice is harmful and offensive conduct which clearly indicates a lack of respect for the judge's victim, and, by reasonable extension, a lack of respect for the citizens of the State of Texas at large. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS, § 10.28 (2d ed.1995). For the above reasons, this Review Tribunal has chosen to maintain the anonymity of the various complainants by referring only to their initials, despite the fact that the charges against Judge Barr have become public and the privacy of each of the complainants has been shattered. Charges of judicial misconduct are ordinarily made public when found in formal proceedings brought by the Texas Judicial Conduct Commission. The Texas Judicial Conduct Commission followed conventional practice and used the full names of each of the complainants in its notice of formal proceedings, and ultimately in its petition for removal. In the future, we urge that disciplinary cases involving abuse of the judicial office through sexual harassment, or other activities that serve to humiliate or degrade those with whom a judge comes into contact, should preserve the anonymity of the alleged victim. The purpose behind that practice is to protect the victim's privacy and encourage reporting of such offenses. See Seaman, 627 A.2d at 110. Many of the findings which form the general background to the events that are the subject of the complaint against Respondent are not controverted nor materially disputed. [7] The record in the instant case establishes, and Respondent concedes, the following finding of the Special Master and ultimately the Commission: Throughout Judge Barr's tenure on the bench, he has periodically addressed the female Assistant District Attorneys in his court as babes. In a permissive society, it is irrelevant whether a judge's conduct or speech is no different from that of the ordinary person, since improper conduct which may be overlooked when committed by the ordinary person, even an attorney, cannot be overlooked when committed by a member of the Texas judiciary. See Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Heitzler, 32 Ohio St.2d 214, 291 N.E.2d 477, 482 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967, 93 S.Ct. 2149, 36 L.Ed.2d 687 (1973). By seeking and accepting the responsibilities of the office of judge, regardless of the level of office, a judge undertakes to conduct herself or himself both officially and personally in accordance with the highest standards that the citizens of Texas can expect. See id. On June 12, 1991, the Supreme Court of Texas entered an order creating a task force to study gender bias in the Texas legal system. The formation of the Gender Bias Task Force of Texas was prompted by increasing national concern over the treatment of women in our nation's courts, both as litigants and as legal professionals. GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE OF TEXAS, FINAL REPORT, at 1 (1994). Women in the courts in any capacity may find themselves subjected to inappropriate, overly familiar and demeaning forms of address, comments on their appearance, their clothing, and their bodies, sexist remarks and jokes, and unwelcome verbal and physical advances. [8] WOMES IN THE LAW § 15.04[1] (C.H. Lefcourt ed., Release # 2, July 1988); JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS, § 3.09 (2d ed.1995). In the instant case, Judge Barr does not contest the factual finding nor the finding of willfulness, that throughout his tenure on the bench, which dates to 1988, he has periodically addressed the female Assistant District Attorneys in his court as babes. While we need not define babe in its most derogatory and sexist sense, [9] we note that at a minimum, it connotes a young girl and/or a naive and inexperienced person. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 83 (10th ed.1997). Given the above, we find Judge Barr's sexist manner in addressing female Assistant District Attorneys in his court as babes to be inappropriate because it undermines an attorney's role in the judicial process by indicating that she is not to be taken seriously and thus jeopardizes the proper administration of justice by hindering the female attorney from properly representing her client, in this case, the State of Texas. We find that Judge Barr's admitted actions in addressing female prosecutors as babes were willful conduct that was clearly inconsistent with the proper performance of his duties, cast public discredit upon the judiciary of the State of Texas, as well as on the administration of justice, and thus are violative of Article V, Section 1-a(6)A of the Texas Constitution [10] and Canons 3B(3), [11] (4), [12] and (6) [13] of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct. The record in the instant case establishes, and Judge Barr concedes, the additional findings of the Special Master and ultimately the Commission: In November 1995, while presiding over a criminal trial, Respondent was approached by an Assistant District Attorney, Ms. L.D., to be allowed to return to her office while the jury was deliberating. Respondent, in replying to her request, stated, You are so nice to look at, if you leave, all I'll have to look at all afternoon is swinging dicks. In 1995 Respondent hosted a Christmas party for his court personnel. The party took place at Respondent's residence. At the party, Respondent motioned to an Assistant District Attorney, Ms. K.A., by crooking his index finger as if he wanted her to approach. Upon approaching, Respondent stated to her, I just wanted to see if I could make you come [reach sexual orgasm] with one finger. [14] The Assistant District Attorney was present at Respondent's residence for the party by virtue of her official relationship with the court. At the same Christmas party 1995, Respondent approached an Assistant District Attorney, Ms. L.D. and asked her if she was leaving the party. When Ms. L.D. replied in the negative, Respondent stated, Well, then you must be on your period. Women always carry around their purses when they're on their period. The Assistant District Attorney was present at Respondent's residence for the party by virtue of her official relationship with the court. Shortly after the Christmas party, in January 1996, during a break in a criminal trial over which Respondent presided, Respondent motioned to yet another Assistant District Attorney, Ms. S.R., by crooking his index finger as if he wanted her to approach. Upon approaching, Respondent stated to her, I just wanted to see if I could make you come [reach sexual orgasm] with one finger, and then laughed. Once again, we note that Judge Barr, has conceded the inappropriateness of each of the above loathsome and wretched comments, including his willfulness of voicing such comments, and has purportedly apologized to his victims, regardless of whether or not they were offended by his remarks. Judge Barr's statements in each of the above accounts confound judicial reason and are the antithesis of judicial discretion. Of greater concern is the fact that on each of the four occasions shown above, the victims of his comments were women who had to appear in his courtroom or were otherwise under his supervision. Comments made to Assistant District Attorneys L.D. and S.R. were made during the course of judicial proceedings, i.e., during the course of a criminal trial while taking a break, and while a jury was deliberating a citizen's freedom. It is not material to the issues raised in the instant case whether Judge Barr's disgusting and repulsive comments reflect a misguided sense of humor, an insecurity, an inability to relate on an acceptable basis with individuals of the opposite sex, or some other maladjustment. It is not material that we feel a sense of sadness and appreciate the tragic consequences of his lack of social graces, judicial propriety and judicial restraint. Judge Barr's conduct not only diminishes his dignity, but also the public's respect for the judiciary of the State of Texas as a whole. This flaw in Judge Barr's judicial temperament is inconsistent with service as a jurist in the State of Texas. We find that Judge Barr's actions shown above constituted intentional and willful conduct, as admitted. The actions of Judge Barr, taken together, were violative of Canons 3B(3),(4), and (6) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, were clearly inconsistent with the proper performance of his duties, cast public discredit upon the judiciary of the State of Texas as well as on the administration of justice and thus are likewise violative of Article V, Section 1-a(6)A of the Texas Constitution. Finally, the Special Master found, and the Commission ultimately adopted the following two findings: In January 1996, during the trial of a criminal case, an Assistant District Attorney, Ms. S.R., questioned a witness asking whether he had seen any evidence of another individual being capable of fabrication or lying. Respondent sustained a defense objection to the question. Ms. S.R. then asked the witness the following question: In your treatment of her and the knowledge that you have of her and her life and family, have you developed an opinion as to her character for being truthful. Respondent immediately asked counsel to approach the bench at which time he leaned forward toward the Assistant District Attorney and stated, I can't believe you just asked that question. I feel like coming across the bench and slapping the crap out of you. Respondent had occasion to preside over a case in which one of the parties was represented by a local attorney, Mr. K.S.S. The case had been set for hearings on more than one occasion, and on the particular date in point, Mr. K.S.S. did not appear in court, but instead sent one of his associates to attempt to reset the case. After a discussion at the bench, the associate related a remark made by Mr. K.S.S. about the court, to which Respondent replied, from the bench, [Mr. K.S.S.] can go screw himself.... Respondent's comment was quoted in an article appearing in the Texas Lawyer. In reviewing the above, the Special Master found, and the Commission adopted such findings, that Respondent violated Canons 3B(3) and (4). As noted earlier, Canons 3B(3) and (4) provided in pertinent part as follows: B. Adjudicative Responsibilities.