Opinion ID: 3032120
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Catholic Bishop, DeBartolo & constitutional

Text: avoidance [5] In interpreting the NLRA, as in interpreting other statutes, we must consider at the outset whether a proposed construction of the Act “would give rise to serious constitutional questions.” NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979). “If so, we must first identify the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed before concluding that the Act” creates a constitutional quandary. Id. (quotation omitted). It bears emphasis that in making this inquiry, we need not decide whether the First Amendment does protect the Carpenters’ bannering, or even whether it probably does. Rather, “we make a narrow inquiry whether [granting Overstreet’s request for an injunction] presents a significant risk that the First Amendment will be infringed.” Id. at 502. Our need to avoid creating a “significant risk” to the First Amendment affects both how we proceed to interpret the statute at issue and the degree to which we take into account Overstreet’s view of the statute. “[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid 6566 OVERSTREET v. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“DeBartolo”).14 Moreover, because constitutional decisions are not the province of the NLRB (or the NLRB’s Regional Director or General Counsel), the tasks of evaluating the constitutional pitfalls of potential interpretations of the Act and of interpreting the Act to avoid those dangers are committed de novo to the courts. Cf. id. at 574-75 (refusing to accord deference to the NLRB’s interpretation of § 8(b)(4) because of need to avoid First Amendment concerns absent clear congressional intent). In DeBartolo, the NLRB had interpreted the Act to prohibit union handbills urging customers to avoid patronizing a mall, because one of the mall’s tenants was using a non-union contractor to build its store. Id. at 570. After considering at some length, but not deciding, the union’s free speech arguments, the Court concluded that adjudicating the assertions “would require deciding serious constitutional issues.” Id. at 576. The Court therefore went on to “independently inquire whether there is another interpretation, not raising these serious constitutional concerns, that may fairly be ascribed to § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).” Id. at 577 (emphasis added). In addition to affecting the degree of deference accorded the Board, the underlying free speech issues influenced the Court’s decision in DeBartolo in a second way: Because of the constitutional concerns, the Court went on to interpret § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) narrowly, holding that the statute’s “ ‘nonspecific, indeed vague’ ” terms — providing that unions may not “threaten, coerce, or restrain any person,” 29 U.S.C. 14 DeBartolo reached the Supreme Court twice. See Edward J. DeBartolo Crop. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 463 U.S. 147 (1983). Because we refer only to the Court’s second opinion in this case, we do not differentiate between the Court’s first and second opinions. OVERSTREET v. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS 6567 § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) — “should be interpreted with ‘caution’ and not given a ‘broad sweep.’ ” DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 578 (quoting NLRB v. Drivers, 362 U.S. 274, 290 (1960)); see also BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 535-36 (2002) (describing DeBartolo as case in which Court found that “the statutory provisions and their legislative history indicate[ ] no clear intent to reach” the asserted unfair labor practice and so “simply read the statute not to cover it, thereby avoiding the First Amendment question altogether”) (citing DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 578-88).15 Applying these precepts, we turn first to the question whether interpreting the Act to prohibit the Carpenters’ bannering activity would pose a “significant risk” of sanctioning a violation of the First Amendment. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502. If so, then the position of the NLRB is not entitled to special consideration. DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 574-75. Instead, in that circumstance, the Carpenters could be held to have committed an unfair labor practice only if the statute clearly prohibits the union’s conduct. BE&K Constr., 536 U.S. at 535-36. Overstreet has no “fair chance” of so demonstrating. Miller, 19 F.3d at 456.