Opinion ID: 795155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification

Text: 16 Plaintiffs also appeal on behalf of other potential claimants who were at the restaurant during the raid but did not join the lawsuit, arguing the district court should have certified their case as a class action. The district court initially denied certification on the ground of untimeliness. Subsequently, however, the court amended its prior order and denied certification based on the plaintiffs' failure to meet two elements set forth in Rule 23—numerosity and commonality. 17 Whether the district court applied the correct legal standard in its decision to grant or deny class certification is reviewed de novo. Shook v. El Paso County, 386 F.3d 963, 967 (10th Cir.2004). However, [w]hen the district court has applied the proper standard in deciding whether to certify a class, we may reverse that decision only for an abuse of discretion. Id.
18 This lawsuit had been pending for five years before the plaintiffs moved for class certification. They filed at the latest possible opportunity—the final day of the motions period. At that point, discovery had already closed and a two-week jury trial was just over two months away. Because granting certification at that point would have resulted in extending the motions period, reopening discovery, and rescheduling trial, the district court rejected the motion for untimeliness, finding it to be unfair to the defense and impracticable for the court. The court based its decision on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1), which states, When a person sues or is sued as a representative of a class, the court must—at an early practicable time —determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action. (emphasis added). 19 Subsequently, however, realizing that this circuit interprets Rule 23(c)(1) to require the trial court to take up class action status in a timely manner whether requested to do so or not by a party or parties, where it is an element of the case. Horn v. Assoc. Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d 270, 274 (10th Cir.1977) (emphasis added), the district court amended its order and provided additional reasoning on the merits of the certification request. In its revised order, the district court concluded Rule 23(c)(1) was not intended to create a basis for automatic denial of a party's request for class certification. 20 We agree with the district court on this point. As we explained in Horn, Rule 23(c)(1) places the onus on the court to make a determination irrespective of whether the parties have requested class action status. Therefore, it does not create an independent basis for denying a party's motion. Nor do the 2003 amendments to this Rule alter our analysis. Neither the language itself, which was changed from as soon as practicable to at an early practical time, nor the accompanying Advisory Committee Notes provide a reason to disturb our precedent on this issue. 4 Accordingly, we turn to the district court's subsequent evaluation of the plaintiffs' request based on the requirements specifically set forth in Rule 23.
21 A class may be certified only if all four of the following prerequisites are met: 22
23 (2) Commonality: there are questions of law or fact that are common to the class; (3) Typicality: the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and 24 (4) Adequacy of representation: the representative parties will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. 25 Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). A party seeking class certification must show under a strict burden of proof that all four requirements are clearly met. Reed v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1307, 1309 (10th Cir.1988). 26 In its amended order, the district court denied the motion based on the first and second elements—numerosity and commonality. The plaintiffs challenge the court's determination on each of these elements. 27 Numerosity. In order to meet this element, [t]he burden is upon plaintiffs seeking to represent a class to establish that the class is so numerous as to make joinder impracticable. Peterson v. Okla. City Housing Auth., 545 F.2d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir.1976). Here, the district court concluded that, although the number of putative class members—eighty-four— was not insignificant, it was not such an overwhelmingly large number as to be prohibitive of joinder. Nor was there any problem locating the remaining individuals for joinder since all the names and addresses of potential plaintiffs had been provided during discovery. 28 The plaintiffs argue that the district court should have followed cases from other jurisdictions which hold numerosity may be presumed at a certain number. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir.1995) (presuming numerosity at forty members); see also Polich v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 258, 261 (D.Mont.1987) (finding sixty potential members sufficient to support a presumption that joinder was not practicable). Our circuit has never adopted such a presumption. To the contrary, we have specifically stated there is no set formula to determine if the class is so numerous that it should be so certified. Rex v. Owens ex rel. State of Okla., 585 F.2d 432, 436 (10th Cir.1978). Indeed, because it is such a fact-specific inquiry, we grant wide latitude to the district court in making this determination. Johnson by Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992). Here, the district court carefully reviewed the record and made an appropriate judgment call. We therefore find no abuse of discretion. 29 Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that joinder would be impracticable in their case based on the unique circumstances of the putative class. According to the current plaintiffs, the remaining potential class members may be deterred from joining the litigation as named plaintiffs because (1) their English was limited, and (2) they were fearful of the legal system. The district court found this argument unpersuasive, noting that many of the named plaintiffs also spoke little or no English, yet they had managed to file claims. Further, the court found the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate any factual basis for concluding the remaining individuals were deterred from filing claims based on some unique fear of the legal system. The only indication submitted was a vague and conclusory affidavit by one plaintiff that purported to describe the motives of others. The district court found the solitary affidavit inadequate to support the serious allegations underlying the argument, especially since the plaintiffs had access to the other individuals yet took no steps to obtain specific facts relevant to their reasons for not suing the City. In any event, even if the class were certified, the remaining individuals would eventually have had to come forward to join the class irrespective of their views about the judicial process. 30 In sum, we cannot conclude the district court abused its discretion in finding that joinder was practical and that the potential class members could have filed individual claims against the City. 31 Commonality. In the principal case on Rule 23(a) commonality, General Telephone Company of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982), the Supreme Court held members of a putative class must possess the same interest and suffer the same injury. In that case, the Supreme Court denied class certification to a group of Mexican-Americans pursuing similar Title VII claims on the basis that they had failed to provide a specific presentation identifying the questions of law or fact that were common. Id. at 158, 102 S.Ct. 2364. The Court emphasized the necessity of rigorous analysis by the district court before granting class certification because of the potential unfairness to the class members bound by the judgment if the framing of the class is overbroad. Id. at 161, 102 S.Ct. 2364. 32 The district court retains discretion to determine commonality because it is `in the best position to determine the facts of the case, to appreciate the consequences of alternative methods of resolving the issues of the case and . . . to select the most efficient method for their resolution.' J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1289 (10th Cir.1999) (quoting Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 825 (10th Cir.1995)). Whether a case should be allowed to proceed as a class action involves intensely practical considerations, most of which are purely factual or fact-intensive. Each case must be decided on its own facts, on the basis of `practicalities and prudential considerations.' Monreal v. Potter, 367 F.3d 1224, 1238 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Reed, 849 F.2d at 1309 (citing United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402-03, 406 n. 11, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980))). 33 Here, in examining the facts of the case, the district court determined the plaintiffs presented divergent fact patterns which ma[d]e this case inappropriate for class action status. Dist. Ct. Order, Nov. 2, 2004, at 5. Specifically, the court observed, 34 The jury's determination of reasonableness [which is central to these plaintiffs' claims] will rely on numerous factors which differ significantly as to many plaintiffs such as (1) how long the plaintiffs were detained; (2) where the plaintiffs were detained; (3) whether the plaintiff is an owner, employer, customer, or bystander, and (4) the degree of force used with each plaintiff, among many others. It seems clear to the court that the jury may award damages to some of the plaintiffs but find that others are not entitled to damages. 35 Id. 36 In light of the district court's thorough examination of the relevant facts, and acknowledging the court's broad discretion in assessing commonality, we conclude it did not abuse its discretion in determining the essential element of commonality was not met. 5