Opinion ID: 220255
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Compensation Plan

Text: Davis's next contention is that the new compensation plan Time Warner implemented sometime around his return was racially discriminatory, as was Time Warner's refusal to allow negotiation of the plan's terms. He contends that Cleboski masterminded the plan, which shifted some commissionable responsibilities from the inside sales team to the outside sales team, thereby negatively impacting his potential earnings and those of the other African Americans on the inside sales team while increasing the potential earnings of the mostly white outside sales team. Davis asserts that he and his African American coworkers could see that the plan would severely reduce their possible commissions and they would lose at least 30% ... of their future income, while Schmitt would be relatively unaffected in light of her lower sales. It is not entirely clear from Davis's rambling appellate briefing whether he is asserting a disparate treatment claim, a disparate impact claim, or both. (Both are cognizable under Title VII. See Lewis v. City of Chi., Ill., ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2191, 2197, 176 L.Ed.2d 967 (2010).) In his summary judgment brief before the district court, however, Davis unambiguously identified his contention as a disparate treatment wage claim. Dist. Ct. Dkt. 39 at 13. We confine our analysis accordingly. See, e.g., Brown v. Auto. Components Holdings, LLC, 622 F.3d 685, 691 (7th Cir.2010). As with his termination-related disparate treatment claim, Davis may proceed past the summary judgment stage only if he presents evidence from which a rational trier of fact could reasonably infer that Time Warner reduced his compensation (undoubtedly a materially adverse action, see Herrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir.2002)) and denied him the opportunity to negotiate the terms of the plan because of his race. In addition to the evidence of racial animus associated with his termination, Davis points us to Cleboski's involvement with the plan and Time Warner's reliance on unspecified marketing and budgetary concerns as the reason for the changes as evidence of Time Warner's discriminatory intent. We fail to see how a rational jury could infer from this evidence that the compensation plan was enacted for discriminatory reasons. The plan applied to all current and future members of the inside sales team, including Schmitt, who is white. Davis dismisses this as collateral damage, but it would strain credulity to conclude that Time Warner consciously enacted a discriminatory plan  either to halt rumors or simply to disfavor African Americans  only to apply it even-handedly to all current and future members of the inside sales team. (This is where a developed disparate impact claim might have been able to help Davis.) Moreover, Coleman testified that inside salespeople had the opportunity to switch to the outside sales team  which, according to Davis, received huge pay increases as a result of the compensation plan. (Rodgers and Schmitt both eventually made the switch.) It would be wholly inconsistent to intentionally discriminate while simultaneously giving the alleged targets of the discrimination an unfettered option to remove themselves from the situation. We reach the same conclusion with respect to Time Warner's refusal to permit negotiations as to the terms of the plan, inasmuch as that may be considered a materially adverse employment action. Davis has presented testimony indicating that negotiations were allowed in 2004, 2005, and 2006. (Time Warner disputes this.) This evidence does little for his claim of racial discrimination: the composition of the inside sales team had been constant since early 2005, when negotiations were ostensibly permitted. And, like the changes to the compensation plan, the negotiations ban was equally applicable to all members of the inside sales team. A rational jury could not conclude from the evidence in the record that the compensation plan or its take-it-or-leave-it nature was motivated by discriminatory intent. We affirm the grant of summary judgment on these issues.
Davis's final contention is that Time Warner adjusted its compensation plan and otherwise adversely changed his working conditions to retaliate against him after he complained to Cleboski and the EEOC about workplace discrimination. As to the latter, he points mainly to the hostile performance improvement plan he was forced to sign. [6] Davis once more relies exclusively on the direct method. As we noted earlier, that means that Davis can overcome summary judgment on a retaliation claim only by making a tripartite showing: (1) that he engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) that he suffered a materially adverse employment action, and (3) that the protected activity is causally related to the adverse employment action. Jones, 613 F.3d at 671. There is no real dispute that Davis's EEOC filings, see Silverman, 637 F.3d at 740, and informal comments to Cleboski constitute protected activity, see Casna, 574 F.3d at 427. It is similarly uncontested that a reduction in compensation is a materially adverse employment action. See Herrnreiter, 315 F.3d at 744. Time Warner contends that the performance improvement plan does not amount to an adverse employment action, and we agree. [N]ot everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action. Oest v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 240 F.3d 605, 613 (7th Cir.2001). Performance improvement plans, particularly minimally onerous ones like that here, are not, without more, adverse employment actions. See Cole v. Illinois, 562 F.3d 812, 816-17 (7th Cir.2009); Oest, 240 F.3d at 613 ([J]ob-related criticism can prompt an employee to improve her performance and thus lead to a new and more constructive employment relationship.). That leaves us with only one adverse action to consider: the changes to the compensation plan. [7] Davis contends that the changes can be traced to his complaints of discrimination. We do not believe a reasonable jury could reach the same conclusion on the evidence in this record. The compensation plan was developed and implemented around the same time that Davis lodged his complaints, but correlation is not the equivalent of causation. Undisputed record evidence shows that Time Warner changed its compensation plan annually, and Davis happened to file his claims around the time of year in which the changes were generally made. Without some evidence linking the complaint(s)  the date on which the second EEOC complaint was filed is absent from the record  to the compensation plan, a rational jury would be hard-pressed to connect the two. See Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 734 (7th Cir. 2008). Its struggle would be made even more challenging by the fact that the compensation plan applied to the entirety of the inside sales team, even those who did not express any complaints of discrimination. Additionally, to the extent that Davis relies on his informal complaint to Cleboski, he has not demonstrated that anyone involved with the creation of the compensation plan other than Cleboski was aware that any such complaint had been made. See Durkin v. City of Chi., 341 F.3d 606, 615 (7th Cir.2003) (An employer cannot retaliate if there is nothing for it to retaliate against.).