Opinion ID: 1791677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the state of mississippi should reimburse effort alexander for the monies paid at the tax sale and for survey costs and attorney's fees.

Text: ¶ 21. After finding that Ella should be vested with title to Parcel 15, the chancellor turned his attention to other issues and stated, inter alia: Now in his counterclaim, Mr. Alexander seeks compensation for damages and equitable relief in the nature of reimbursement. The evidence indicates that he had paid $500 per year in taxes for the last two years, for the years 2001 and 2002 taxable years payable in 2002 and at the beginning of 2003 for which he should be reimbursed. He has paid the State of Mississippi $3,162.50, has incurred survey costs, as well as attorney fees. The Court knows of no authority under the present situation in which attorney fees may be awarded. They are.......... generally awarded only in cases of fraud, contempt, or by previous contract, or in the case of the Mississippi litigation act when a frivolous matter has been filed. Obviously, this is not frivolous. It is not by contract, there is no contempt, and certainly no fraud. Accordingly, the request for attorney fees must be denied. The $3,162.50 which was paid by Mr. Alexander to the State of Mississippi again was because of the erroneous assessment by DeSoto County and subsequently so (sic) by the State of Mississippi, none of which should be imputed to the plaintiff, and that request must likewise be denied. The Court knows of no authority for the awarding of damages for the cost of a survey. However, certainly for the past two years taxes in the amount of $1,000, that amount is hereby assessed to [Ella Daniel] as a judgment in favor of [Alexander] and shall be enrolled as a lien on the aforesaid real estate. (Emphasis added). The issue obviously before the chancellor, as laid out in the pleadings, was whether Ella Daniel, not the State of Mississippi or DeSoto County, should reimburse Alexander for the $3,162.50 he paid at the tax sale. ¶ 22. Other than an equitable argument, Alexander cites in his brief only one case as a basis to persuade us to afford him relief by way of reimbursement for monies expended and fees incurred. In Herbrandson v. Thompson, 808 So.2d 975 (Miss.Ct.App.2001), the Court of Appeals was confronted with the issue of whether the trial court appropriately allowed evidence to support damages not specifically set out in the pleadings in a suit for breach of contract on an agreement between two parties for one of the parties to take possession of two mares until each mare's foal was born and weaned. The Court of Appeals found no error in the trial judge's allowing evidence to prove damages incurred after the complaint was filed. Alexander uses this case as a springboard to then assert that the ruling that [Alexander] should eat the cost associated with confirming title is inequitable and results in a windfall to the State of Mississippi. ¶ 23. While Alexander understandably would like for Ella, DeSoto County, and/or the State of Mississippi to reimburse him for all monies expended since he is no longer the owner of Parcel 15, the chancellor quite appropriately denied him relief. [14] We find Alexander's reliance on Herbrandson to be misplaced. The Court of Appeals in Herbrandson simply held that the trial judge did not err in allowing proof of damages incurred after the filing of the complaint and thus not specifically pled. This is altogether different than today's case where Alexander, without any citation of authority, is asking us to find that DeSoto County and/or the State of Mississippi should reimburse him for his damages. ¶ 24. In its prayer for relief contained in its answer to Ella Daniel's amended complaint to set aside the tax deed, the State asserted, inter alia: [S]ince the State of Mississippi merely sold the above-described property to Effort Alexander, pursuant to Sections 29-1-1 et seq. of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended, and said property was certified to it by the DeSoto County Chancery Clerk, the State of Mississippi asserts that its appearance at a hearing on the Amended Complaint to Set Aside Order and Cancel Deed is not necessary, that the State of Mississippi consents to a hearing on the Plaintiff's prayer for relief at any time and requests that a copy of the final Order be forwarded to it. Evidently, the Attorney General, like the chancellor, saw no such demand from Alexander. A review of the pleadings reveals that certainly Alexander wanted to recoup whatever monies he could, but he made that demand of Ella, not the State. ¶ 25. This having been said, we acknowledge that which even Alexander does not acknowledge  the existence of Miss.Code Ann. § 29-1-87 (Rev.2000), which states in pertinent part: If the State of Mississippi, through the auditor or land commissioner's office, has heretofore issued or shall hereafter issue a patent or patents for any lands to which the state holds no title, or which did not belong to it at the time of the issuance of such patent or patents......the land commissioner shall investigate the case and report to the attorney general, who, if he shall find the lands so patented did not belong to the state, shall so report to the land commissioner. If the land commissioner shall find that ......the patentee did not acquire any land or title under such patent, he shall mark such patent or patents...... cancelled, and take them or a duly certified copy to the auditor of public accounts, who shall file the same as a voucher in his office and shall issue his warrant in favor of the patentee or his or her assignees, heirs, or representatives for the amount paid to and retained by the state for such cancelled patent or patents. ¶ 26. As an aside, we acknowledge the obvious  that the office of state land commissioner has been abolished. Miss.Code Ann. § 7-11-4 (Rev.2002) states in pertinent part that [t]he words `state land commissioner,' `land commissioner,' `state land office' and `land office' shall mean the secretary of state wherever the appear in sections......29-1-87. [15] We readily acknowledge that Section 29-1-87 may have afforded Alexander relief, had he chosen in his pleadings and at trial to avail himself of this statute as against the State of Mississippi. However, when considering this statute, we are again faced with the reality that Alexander never put the State of Mississippi on notice that if the chancellor divested him of title to the property, he, as a patentee, was seeking a warrant in the amount of the monies he paid for the property at the time that he received the forfeited tax land patent from the State. His pleadings are silent as to this issue as clearly evidenced by the chancellor's ruling. We have been consistent in holding that we need not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal, which practice would have the practical effect of depriving the trial court of the opportunity to first rule on the issue, so that we can then review such trial court ruling under the appropriate standard of review. See, e.g., Triplett v. Mayor & Aldermen of Vicksburg, 758 So.2d 399, 401 (Miss.2000) (citing Shaw v. Shaw, 603 So.2d 287, 292 (Miss.1992)). ¶ 27. For these reasons, we find no merit in this assignment of error. ¶ 28. We acknowledge that Alexander has filed a pro se supplemental brief, and after careful consideration of his pro se supplemental brief, we find that the additional issues raised are without merit and that no discussion is needed here on these issues.