Opinion ID: 441810
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: There is a Substantial Government Interest in the Parade Ordinance.

Text: 30 In Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949), the Supreme Court upheld a city's power to protect its citizens from modes of expression that constitute a public nuisance. The Court decided that the state had a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from the unwelcome noise of sound trucks. Similarly, in Vincent, 104 S.Ct. at 2130, the Court found a substantial government interest in avoiding the visual clutter caused by signs posted on public property. 31 On similar grounds, we concluded in Rosen that the state has a legitimate interest in parade ordinances. We acknowledged the substantial governmental interest in regulating parades, when large groups use public streets and disrupt traffic by causing major arteries to be closed and transportation rerouted. 641 F.2d at 1247. We reaffirm that reasoning here. 32 B. The Parade Ordinance is Not the Least Restrictive Means of Serving the Government Interest. 33 Although there is a substantial government interest in preventing parades from obstructing traffic, the Richmond 20-day advance notice requirement is not the least restrictive means for achieving that end. 34 Initially, it is indisputable that the Richmond parade ordinance restricts access to a public forum. Public streets are the prototypal example of a public forum. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 S.Ct. 954, 964, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939) (Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public.). Since the Richmond ordinance restricts access to the streets, it is subject to a particularly high degree of scrutiny. Public fora represent areas within which tolerance for inhibitions on speech, petition, and assembly is at a minimum, and the government's burden of justification is at its highest. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 684 (1978). For example, public fora cannot be put off limits to first amendment activity solely to spare public expense. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939). Moreover, laws regulating public fora cannot be held constitutional simply because they leave potential speakers alternative fora for communicating their views. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 1245, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1974); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939). 8 Public fora have achieved a special status in our law; the government must bear an extraordinarily heavy burden to regulate speech in such locales. 35 It is also indisputable that the Richmond parade ordinance substantially inhibits speech. First, all advance notice requirements tend to inhibit speech. The simple knowledge that one must inform the government of his desire to speak and must fill out appropriate forms and comply with applicable regulations discourages citizens from speaking freely. See Rosen, 641 F.2d at 1249. Second, the delay inherent in advance notice requirements inhibits speech. By requiring advance notice, the government outlaws spontaneous expression. Immediate speech can no longer respond to immediate issues. The quantity of effective speech is limited. For these reasons, we have struck down an ordinance that required one business day's advance notice by those who wished to distribute literature or otherwise communicate with the public at an airport. Id. 36 The harms of advance notice requirements are particularly pointed in parade registration schemes: [T]iming is of the essence in politics .... [W]hen an event occurs, it is often necessary to have one's voice heard promptly, if it is to be considered at all. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 163, 89 S.Ct. 935, 945, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). A delay of even a day or two may be intolerable when applied to  'political' speech in which the element of timeliness may be important. Carroll v. Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182, 89 S.Ct. 347, 352, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968). See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 392, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 1374, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962). Parades are public events. Participatory enthusiasm is vital to their success. The size of a crowd and its enthusiasm for a cause may generate sufficient passion to sway the undecided. Thus, simple delay may permanently vitiate the expressive content of a demonstration. A spontaneous parade expressing a viewpoint on a topical issue will almost inevitably attract more participants and more press attention, and generate more emotion, than the same parade 20 days later. The later parade can never be the same. Where spontaneity is part of the message, dissemination delayed is dissemination denied. 37 There is one other fundamental objection to the Richmond parade ordinance. The law does not discriminate against a particular viewpoint on its face, and there is no evidence of an improper legislative purpose in enacting the law. Within that framework of facial neutrality, however, we must examine restrictions on speech with particular care when their effects fall unevenly on different viewpoints and groups in society. See L. Tribe, supra, at 683. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the invidious effect of permitting facially neutral laws to discriminate against disfavored viewpoints and speakers. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146, 63 S.Ct. 862, 864, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943). See also Vincent, 104 S.Ct. at 2133 n. 30 (acknowledging special solicitude of the courts for forms of expression that may be stifled by content-neutral laws). Commentators have enthusiastically endorsed this analysis. See, e.g., Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup.Ct.Rev. 1, 30. Cf. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup.Ct.Rev. 233, 257. Common sense drives the point home: however neutral the government's intentions in enacting a law, the operation of that law may have a vastly uneven impact. There is no equality in a law prohibiting both rich and poor from sleeping under the bridges of Paris; there is no equality in a law prohibiting anonymous pamphleteering by both popular and unpopular groups, see Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 80 S.Ct. 536, 4 L.Ed.2d 559 (1960); and there is no equality in a law prohibiting spontaneous parades on both topical and perennial issues. Cf. Rosen, 641 F.2d at 1249 (advance notice requirements discourage topical speech). That being so, the government must go a great distance to justify a parade registration scheme. Here, the government has not travelled that distance. 38 The government, in fact, makes almost no attempt to prove that a 20-day advance notice requirement is the least restrictive means of achieving its interest in regulating traffic. It simply asserts, without citation to authority, that 20 days notice constitutes a fair balance between Richmond's interest in safety and the paraders' interest in speaking. Both empirics and logic, however, are to the contrary. 39 Empirically, most cities are able to protect their interests in traffic control with advance notice periods of substantially less than 20 days. San Francisco requires only 24 hours advance notice of parades. See City and County of San Francisco, Municipal (Police) Code Sec. 366. Boston has required three-day advance notice. See Progressive Labor Party v. Lloyd, 487 F.Supp. 1054, 1056 (D.Mass.1980). In 1970, Professor Blasi found that nine of the 22 municipalities responding to his inquiry, including Dallas, Denver, and Oakland, had no advance notice requirements whatsoever. Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 Mich.L.Rev. 1482, 1526 n. 170 (1970). Only three of the municipalities had advance notice requirements of more than six days. Id. at 1524 n. 161. The mean advance notice period was New York City's 36-hour requirement. 40 There is also no basis in logic for cities to demand notice far in advance of parades. Policemen and newsmen are frequently deployed on less than two days notice. Id. at 1526. Data on competing uses of the streets can be researched fairly quickly. [E]ffective warning to disinterested citizens will likely be at the same time and place twenty-four hours before the demonstration. Id. Richmond cannot legitimately argue that a 20-day advance notice requirement is the least restrictive means of protecting its interest in regulating traffic. 41 Finally, all available precedent suggests that a 20-day advance notice requirement is overbroad. The only advance notice requirements to be upheld by courts have been dramatically shorter than 20 days. See A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717, 735 (D.C.Cir.1975) (upholding two-day notice requirement); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 84 (2d Cir.1968) (upholding two-day notice requirement). See also Jackson v. Dobbs, 329 F.Supp. 287 (N.D.Ga.1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.1971) (upholding ordinance requiring marchers to obtain a permit by 4:00 p.m. on the day preceding a march); York v. City of Danville, 207 Va. 665, 152 S.E.2d 259 (1967) (striking down a 30-to 60-day advance notice requirement). Accordingly, we hold that the City of Richmond's requirement of 20 days advance notice to receive a parade permit violates the First Amendment. 42