Opinion ID: 884043
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did the District Court err by failing to appoint counsel to represent Finley during a post-trial hearing on counsel's effectiveness?

Text: Finley contends that the District Court denied him his right to counsel's undivided loyalty by failing to appoint counsel to represent him in the post-trial hearing on his counsel's effectiveness. Specifically, Finley argues that the District Court should not have allowed Finley's counsel to confront him regarding the sufficiency of his allegations and then take the stand and rebut those allegations. The State counters that Finley did not challenge the District Court's resolution of his complaints regarding the assistance of his counsel; that he, therefore, waived his right to appeal his counsel's conflict in loyalty; and that he chose to have the same counsel represent him though the sentencing hearing. Additionally, Finley argues that because the District Court treated the post-trial hearing as a postconviction hearing, it had a duty pursuant to § 46-21-201(2), MCA, to appoint counsel for Finley. However, the State correctly notes in this regard that a postconviction hearing is a separate proceeding, available after a defendant has been sentenced, and applicable where there is no adequate remedy of appeal. See § 46-21-101, MCA. Moreover, § 46-21-201(2), MCA, was enacted in 1991, and therefore did not apply to the post-trial hearing held in April of 1990. Accordingly, we reject Finley's contention that he was entitled to appointment of counsel under § 46-21-201(2), MCA. That does not end our inquiry, however. At the outset, we note that a trial court's decision whether to grant a motion for substitution of counsel is discretionary and will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Morrison, 848 P.2d at 516. On the facts here, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in not appointing counsel to represent Finley at the post-trial hearing. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, section 24 of the Montana Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel. This right is comprised of two correlative rights, the right to counsel of reasonable competence and the right to counsel's undivided loyalty. State v. Christenson (1991), 250 Mont. 351, 355, 820 P.2d 1303, 1306 (citing McMann v. Richardson (1970), 397 U.S. 759, 770-71, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1448-49, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773; and Wood v. Georgia (1981), 450 U.S. 261, 271-72, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 1103-04, 67 L.Ed.2d 220, 230). The duty of loyalty is perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties, and breach of that duty is therefore accorded a presumption of prejudice if the defendant is able to show that (1) counsel actively represented conflicting interests, and (2) that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected counsel's performance. Christenson, 820 P.2d at 1306. Therefore, if a trial court determines that the defendant and his counsel have a conflict so great that it results in a total lack of communication or if counsel fails to render effective assistance, new counsel should be appointed. State v. Zackuse (1991), 250 Mont. 385, 385, 833 P.2d 142, 142. Moreover, a criminal defendant's right to counsel arises at every critical stage of the proceedings against him. United States v. Wadsworth (9th Cir.1987), 830 F.2d 1500, 1510 (citing Coleman v. Alabama (1970), 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387). This Court has defined a critical stage in a proceeding as any step of the proceeding where there is potential substantial prejudice to the defendant. State v. Robbins (1985), 218 Mont. 107, 111, 708 P.2d 227, 231. In Robbins, the defendant contended that the district court did not appoint counsel for him prior to his arraignment and therefore denied his right to assistance of counsel during a critical stage of the proceedings against him. Robbins, 708 P.2d at 230. We noted that a defendant may challenge a district court's failure to provide counsel in any critical stage of the proceedings where potential substantial prejudice inheres in the absence of counsel. Robbins, 708 P.2d at 230. Similarly, in Wadsworth, the defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to grant his motion for substitution of counsel. During a hearing on the competency of the defendant's counsel, counsel defended his own actions when he should have represented the defendant by dedicating his sole efforts to the effective representation of his client's interests. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d at 1506. At the hearing, the district court asked the defendant to explain to the court what he felt was inadequate about his counsel. The district court then asked defendant's counsel to present his viewpoint on the matter. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d at 1507. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the proceeding conducted by the district court on the defendant's motions resulted in the denial of the defendant's right to counsel at that hearing because the defendant was entitled to counsel at that critical stage of the proceedings against him. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d at 1511. The Court of Appeals held that the district court should have suspended the proceedings and appointed an attorney for the defendant at the competency of counsel hearing, as soon as it became apparent that [counsel] had taken an antagonistic position on a matter concerning his client's right to counsel and to prepare for trial. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d at 1511. In the instant case, Finley's right to counsel attached at the post-trial hearing in which the District Court asked him to explain his complaints and then allowed his counsel to take the stand and rebut Finley's allegations. The potential for substantial prejudice to Finley existed at the post-trial hearing qualifying the hearing as a critical stage in the proceedings. Thus, Finley had a constitutional right to counsel at the post-trial hearing on his complaints of ineffectiveness of counsel. In effect, Finley was without counsel at this point in the proceedings because his own attorney testified against him. We are not persuaded by the State's argument that Finley had to make a contemporaneous objection to his counsel's testimony or waive the right to appeal the issue. It is ludicrous to expect Finley, who was not representing himself as a pro se defendant, to have had the knowledge or wherewithal to object and therefore contradict the District Court and his counsel, especially where, as here, our review of the record demonstrates that he was clearly intimidated. Moreover, Finley's choice to proceed at sentencing with the counsel who had just testified against him or to represent himself, pro se was in reality, no choice at all. See Enright, 758 P.2d at 782. The District Court erred by failing to appoint an attorney for Finley at the post-trial hearing when it became apparent that counsel was taking an antagonistic position toward his client. A conflict of interest such as the one present here, where counsel takes the stand in opposition to his client and to rebut his client's allegations of ineffectiveness, renders the assistance of that counsel ineffective for purposes of that proceeding. The District Court should have determined that Finley and his counsel had a conflict so great that Finley should be appointed new counsel, at least for purposes of the competency hearing. Because a presumption of prejudice extends to conflicts such as the one between Finley and his counsel, we conclude that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to appoint counsel to represent him at the post-trial hearing under the circumstances here. Since Finley did not have effective assistance of counsel at the post-trial hearing, we conclude that it is appropriate that the trial court appoint him new counsel and rehear his claims of ineffectiveness, and we remand for further proceedings in this regard.