Opinion ID: 2756498
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Stay of Proceedings Pending Exhaustion

Text: Mr. Lee also asserts that rather than granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the court should have stayed the proceeding for ninety days so he could properly exhaust his administrative remedies. Mr. Lee is correct that under the pre-PLRA version of § 1997e, courts were directed to stay actions not administratively exhausted “‘if the court believed that such a requirement would be appropriate and in the interests of justice.’” Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263, 1265 (10th Cir. 1997) (brackets omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) (1994)), abrogated on other grounds by Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). However, under the current version of the statute, which we are bound to apply, “[n]o action shall be brought . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1997)); accord Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (noting “[t]he current exhaustion provision differs markedly from its predecessor. Once within the discretion of the district court, exhaustion in cases covered by § 1997e(a) is now mandatory.”); Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 403 F.3d 1134, 1140–41 (10th Cir. 2005) (“42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) requires exhaustion of administrative -9- remedies as a precondition to bringing litigation, and requires dismissal where a litigant has failed to complete such exhaustion.”). Thus, Mr. Lee was not entitled to a stay of proceedings pending proper exhaustion of his administrative remedies and the district court correctly dismissed the complaint.