Opinion ID: 3010735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State Action and Commercial Speech

Text: Turning to the substantive issues, we readily dispose of two initial matters. First, the United States Constitution guarantees freedom of expression only against infringement by the state, not by private actors. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Group of Boston, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 2344 (1995). In this case, however, the parties agree that SEPTA is a state actor, as is its licensee, TDI, and that their actions are constrained by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Second, the posters come within the ambit of speech fully protected by the First Amendment. The defendants argue that because callers to the 1-800 number listed on the poster may receive information advertising the services of medical malpractice attorneys, CBM's message is thereby transformed into commercial speech, and should receive substantially less constitutional protection. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983). But the speech at issue does not advertise goods or services, nor does it refer to a specific product or service. The 1-800 number listed on the poster does not even connect callers to CBM. Any economic motive of CBM for posting the advertisement is very attenuated at best. See U.S. Healthcare v. Blue Cross of Gr. Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 932-933 (3d Cir. 1990). The speech involved is accordingly not commercial, at least in the sense that it is afforded less protection under the First Amendment.