Opinion ID: 2581959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Continuances of January 30, 2002, and April 3, 2002, Trial Dates

Text: [¶ 11] In an order filed November 14, 2001, the district court set the case for a jury trial beginning January 30, 2002. Based on his preliminary discussions with the appellant in October 2001, and on Mr. Whitney's demand, the appellant's trial counsel (trial counsel) developed a theory that Officer Vranish improperly focused on ascertaining the appellant's identity during the traffic stop, rather than on removing the appellant from the minivan or otherwise disabling the minivan. According to this theory, Officer Vranish's conduct was extreme and outrageous and therefore proximately caused the victim's death. Trial counsel informed the appellant that this was a difficult defense, but the appellant insisted on pushing this defense on trial counsel. In mid-December, trial counsel considered consulting an expert on driving while under the influence arrest procedures and contacted Robert LaPier. The two discussed Mr. LaPier's fees, and trial counsel submitted case materials to Mr. LaPier for his review. [¶ 12] Trial counsel also stated that even before he was assigned the case (and certainly before the October 11, 2001, preliminary hearing), he heard rumors in the general community and one of the rumors was that the police officers h ad actually bumped... the [appellant's] vehicle and had bumped the vehicle off the road, causing it to run into the pedestrian. Recognizing the seriousness of the allegations and the seriousness of the rumor, trial counsel preliminarily developed another theory that the police bumped the appellant's vehicle during the pursuit. Trial counsel contacted an investigator, who went to the crime scene, obtained and examined the police reports, interviewed people who worked in the area, and according to trial counsel, even talked to the police. The police told the investigator that they were inspecting their vehicles and they were taking photos and those photos could be made available to him. Honestly, I don't know if [the investigator] told [trial counsel] that or not, that there were  I believe he told me that he had talked with the police and there was no damage to the vehicles. I don't know if he transmitted to me the idea that there were actual photos of the police vehicles. Neither trial counsel, nor the investigator, examined the minivan at that time. Based on this investigation, the investigator concluded that there was simply no evidence of any kind of contact between the police vehicle and the [appellant's] vehicle and trial counsel concluded that there was not a scintilla of evidence to suggest that the police officer's vehicle had come into contact with the minivan and dropped that defense strategy in October or November of 2001. [7] [¶ 13] Just prior to Christmas, the public defender's office authorized trial counsel to retain Mr. LaPier, and trial counsel relayed that information to the appellant. Trial counsel felt that it was likely we would have to request a continuance of the January 30 trial date and stated that the appellant did not appear happy with that. In early January 2002, trial counsel also requested, and participated in, a discovery meeting with the prosecution, where he met with law enforcement officers from several agencies, received documents, and listed additional discovery items to be provided by the prosecution. To that point, trial counsel felt that the prosecution had complied with discovery. Everything I've requested of them has been provided to me and I've been satisfied with what I've received from the State. [¶ 14] On January 17, 2002, a Joint Motion For Continuance was filed by the appellant, through his attorney, and the prosecutor. The motion, signed by trial counsel and the prosecutor, stated that the appellant had acquired the services of an expert witness, who is not available to testify on the date presently set for trial, that the parties needed additional time to complete discovery, and requested that the trial be continued until after March 15, 2002, to allow sufficient time for the parties to complete the discovery process. Trial counsel stated, however, that he felt it was in [the appellant's] best interest to request a continuance and I requested a continuance. I got with [the prosecutor]. I asked if he had any problem with the continuance of the January 30 case. I told him why and he had no objection. I made it a joint motion. We filed it with the Court. The district court, finding just cause for the motion, vacated the January 30th trial setting and reset the matter for trial on April 3, 2002. According to trial counsel, the district court did not consult trial counsel prior to issuing this trial setting. Upon receiving the setting, trial counsel immediately called Mr. LaPier and discovered that he was not available to testify during the April 3, 2002, setting. [¶ 15] On March 12, 2002, trial counsel and the prosecutor filed a second Joint Motion To Continue Jury Trial. The motion, signed by trial counsel and the prosecutor, stated that the appellant's expert witness, Mr. LaPier, was not available to testify during the April 3rd trial setting, but would be available to testify if the trial were rescheduled for April 24, 2002. [8] The district court continued the April 3rd trial setting and reset the trial for April 24, 2002. [¶ 16] The relationship between the appellant and trial counsel had admittedly become strained, and according to counsel, the appellant wasn't communicating with me. This is evident in the record, as the appellant began filing ex parte, pro se motions with the district court complaining about the appellant's relationship with trial counsel and also in response to the above-described motions to continue the trial. [¶ 17] On February 21, 2002, the appellant filed several documents with the district court. In a handwritten letter, styled as a Motion To Appeal Continuance, the appellant stated that trial counsel was acting on his own behalf in requesting the January 17th continuance, that the appellant had never waived his right to a speedy trial and I want my right to a speedy trial, and that trial counsel had been given sufficient amount of time to prepare himself for my defense. [¶ 18] On March 28, 2002, the appellant filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel, wherein he requested that the district court remove conflicted trial counsel. In an affidavit attached to the motion, the appellant stated that his right to a fast and speedy trial was waived solely by [the public defender] and the appellant did not consent freely to this waiver because trial counsel informed the appellant that the continuance was required due to the fact that my counsel needed extra time to prepare an expert witness in my defense and a local newspaper article stated that it was the prosecution's expert witness, not the appellant's, that needed extra time to prepare. In a February 27, 2002, letter, Lois Whitney (the appellant's mother) stated that in addition to this newspaper article, she spoke with a private attorney regarding the case and he related that the expert witness was for the prosecution. According to trial counsel, however, I would note that I did not speak to the newspaper when they ran the article. I don't believe even [the prosecutor] spoke to the newspaper but, somehow, the newspaper made it sound like it was a prosecutor's request for continuance. I've explained on more than one occasion that that was not the case, that the continuance was due to the fact that we were hiring Mr. LaPier as the Defense's expert witness. And so at this point in time, on this motion, ... what they're saying is I was working in collusion with [the prosecutor]; and I will categorically deny that. The only thing I was working with [the prosecutor] on was getting this on the Court's docket in a timely manner. [¶ 19] On April 4, 2002, the appellant filed a Motion to Appeal Continuance that was actually dated February 19, 2002, which motion mirrored his February 21, 2002, filing. On April 5, 2002, the appellant filed a Motion for Discovery requesting the police record of Officer Vranish and any and all records pertaining to the patrol car that is identified as in pursuit of the Defendant on September 29, 2001 and a hearing on his pending motions. [¶ 20] On April 22, 2002, the appellant filed a motion to dismiss because the prosecution allegedly allowed the minivan to be lost improperly concealed and/or destroyed. According to the motion, damage to the rear end side to the vehicle and markings on the vehicle can only indicate that [the] vehicle was struck from behind, prior to striking the victim, and without the minivan the appellant could not defend himself against the charges.... [¶ 21] At some point, due to these filings, trial counsel sought his supervisor's assessment of the circumstances, and co-counsel was appointed. Trial counsel stated that he had a total lack of communication with the appellant as early as March 2002, and the appellant was angry, wouldn't speak to me completely, and got up and left the room and wouldn't prepare for trial, basically. There is some indication in the record that the situation began to improve once co-counsel was appointed.