Opinion ID: 202612
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The General Counsel's Allegations

Text: 37 As a preliminary matter, the Board contends that the Unions are barred under Section 10(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), from arguing that the General Counsel alleged a § 8(a)(5) unilateral change violation because the Unions did not move for reconsideration of the Board's sua sponte holding. 7 See Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 665-66, 102 S.Ct. 2071, 72 L.Ed.2d 398 (1982) (holding that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider whether the Board had erred in finding that certain picketing was lawful because no party had raised the issue to the Board, either during the initial proceedings or on motion for reconsideration); Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276, 281 n. 3, 95 S.Ct. 972, 43 L.Ed.2d 189 (1975) (holding that the Court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the Board in a motion for reconsideration). Section 10(e) does not, however, deprive the court of jurisdiction if the Union gave the Board `adequate notice' of the argument it seeks to advance on review. Am. Postal Workers Union v. NLRB, 370 F.3d 25, 28 (D.C.Cir.2004); see also NLRB v. St. Regis Paper Co., 674 F.2d 104, 108 n. 4 (1st Cir.1982) (refusing to hear an argument that was not presented to the Board either initially or via a motion for reconsideration). 38 It is unfair to say that the Board did not have adequate notice of the Unions' position that the General Counsel raised a § 8(a)(5) unilateral change claim. The General Counsel's brief to the Board argued the unilateral change claim, the Company's failure to bargain to impasse, and the Unions' lack of waiver of its statutory right to bargain. According to the Board's own discussion below, these arguments are relevant only to § 8(a)(5) claims, and not to § 8(d) contract modification claims. Bath Iron Works Corp., 345 N.L.R.B. No. 33, at 3 (The `unilateral change' case and the `contract modification' case are fundamentally different. . . . The allegation [in a `unilateral change' case] is a failure to bargain. . . . [A] defense to a unilateral change can be that the union has waived its right to bargain.). It seems clear, then, that the Board had adequate notice that the General Counsel and the Unions believed that the § 8(a)(5) unilateral change issue was before the Board, and therefore the issue was preserved for appeal. 39 Although the General Counsel's Consolidated Complaint could have been clearer, it does in fact allege both a § 8(a)(5) unilateral change violation and a § 8(d) contract modification violation. The Complaint alleges that the Company engaged in the conduct described . . . without [the Unions'] consent. In the next subparagraph, the Complaint alternatively alleges that the Company engaged in the conduct described . . . without affording [the Unions] an opportunity to bargain with respect to this conduct and the effects of this conduct. Again, as the Board explained below, consent is only relevant to a § 8(d) violation, and bargaining is only relevant to a § 8(a)(5) violation. Thus, the former allegation describes a § 8(d) contract modification without the Unions' consent, whereas the latter alternative allegation describes a § 8(a)(5) unilateral change without bargaining with the Unions. 40