Opinion ID: 2368807
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Confrontation and Cross-Examination

Text: With an exception not applicable here, the pretrial detention statute provides that no person shall be ordered detained unless on the basis of information presented by proffer or otherwise to the judicial officer there is a substantial probability that the person committed the offense .... D.C. Code 1973, ง 23-1322(b)(2)(C). My colleagues interpret the statute to say the government as a general rule may use proffer and other hearsay testimony to establish sufficient support for the findings required under ง 23-1322, subject to the trial court's discretion to require better proof, presumably at the defendant's require better proof, presumably at the defendant's urging. See ante at 1337-1339. I disagree. To save the constitutionality of the statute, I would establish the opposite presumption by interpreting ง 23-1322 to grant the accused the right, as a general rule, to confront and cross-examine those individuals who have provided adverse information. Thus, I would allow the government to proceed by proffer or hearsay only when it can show good cause why a witness should not be called to give live testimony. In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Goldberg, supra 397 U.S. at 269, 90 S.Ct. at 1021. Although the pretrial detention hearing does not necessitate the comprehensive examination of witnesses required when the court or the jury must resolve guilt or innocence, credibility and veracity remain at issue. In Goldberg, for example, the Court held that even the temporary loss of welfare benefits pending a more complete hearing was severe enough to require confrontation rights. See id. at 270, 90 S.Ct. at 1021. In the case of pretrial detention, where the accused has so much more at stake, I do not believe we should downplay such a basic, due process rightโas the majority doesโby presumptively authorizing proffer and other hearsay to sustain the necessary showing. The public's interest in pretrial detention, however, on occasion will justify an exception to the general right of confrontation. In Morrissey, supra, although recognizing that individuals faced with preliminary revocation of parole have a basic confrontation right, the Supreme Court articulated a limitation: when the hearing officer determines that an informant would be subjected to risk of harm if his identity were disclosed, he need not be subjected to confrontation and cross-examination. Id. 408 U.S. at 487, 92 S.Ct. at 2603; see Vitek, supra 445 U.S. at 494-96, 100 S.Ct. at 1264-65. [9] Thus, concerns for the safety or well-being of government witnesses and their ability to testify both before and at trial dictate a similar limitation for pretrial detention hearings. If, for example, the government can present evidence, such as a doctor's testimony, that a rape victim would suffer emotional harm when forced to testify so soon after the event, this reason probably should suffice to justify a proffer of her testimony instead. In summary, I would follow the Court's approach in Morrissey, supra, and announce as a general rule the right of the defense to confront and cross-examine all government witnesses essential to the case for detention, see id. 408 U.S. at 487, 489, 92 S.Ct. at 2603, 2604, except that the government may proceed instead by proffer if it can show good cause (as in the example given above) why it should not call the witness personally. Id. at 489, 92 S.Ct. at 2604; accord, Vitek, supra 445 U.S. at 495-96, 100 S.Ct. at 1264-65. [10] I believe this suggested approach to confrontation and cross-examination is sufficiently compatible with a statute requiring information presented by proffer or otherwise to save its constitutionality if so construed. [11]