Opinion ID: 1098147
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of Grand Jury Testimony

Text: La. Const. art. 5, § 34(A), which provides for the establishment of one or more grand juries in each parish, mandates that the secrecy of grand jury proceedings shall be provided by law. [5] In furtherance of the constitutionally mandated goal of grand jury secrecy, the Legislature adopted La.Code Crim. Proc. arts. 433 and 434. Article 433 specifies who may be present during the grand jury proceedings. [6] Article 434, which mandates that the testimony of witnesses be kept secret and prohibits any person with access to confidential information concerning grand jury proceedings from revealing that information, provides in pertinent part: A. Members of the grand jury, all other persons present at a grand jury meeting, and all persons having confidential access to information concerning grand jury proceedings, shall keep secret the testimony of witnesses and all other matters occurring at, or directly connected with, a meeting of the grand jury. However, after the indictment, such persons may reveal statutory irregularities in grand jury proceedings to defense counsel, the attorney general, the district attorney, or the court, and may testify concerning them. Such persons may disclose testimony given before the grand jury, at any time when permitted by the court, to show that a witness committed perjury in his testimony before the grand jury. A witness may discuss his testimony given before the grand jury with counsel for a person under investigation or indicted, with the attorney general or the district attorney, or with the court. (emphasis added). Article 434, while stating the general requirement that the testimony of a witness before the grand jury not be publicly disclosed, provides two specific exceptions to the requirement of grand jury secrecy. The first exception allows a person to reveal any statutory irregularities in the grand jury proceedings and to testify concerning the irregularities. This exception may only be invoked after an indictment, and the information must be revealed to a specified authority. The second enumerated exception permits a person to disclose testimony given before the grand jury, when permitted by the court, to show that a witness committed perjury. Another exception to the requirement of grand jury secrecy was established by this court in State v. Peters, 406 So.2d 189 (La.1981). [7] The Peters decision required the prosecutor to disclose a witness' grand jury testimony to the defendant because that testimony contained material exculpatory evidence which the prosecutor was required to turn over to the defendant under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The rule of Peters simply was that an exception to the statutory requirement of secrecy of grand jury testimony must be recognized when constitutionally required. In the present case, the use of defendant's grand jury testimony as direct substantive evidence of his guilt does not fall under either of the two exceptions enumerated in Article 434, and an exception to the statutory requirement of secrecy is not constitutionally required. The prosecutor contends, however, that use of the grand jury testimony, under the unusual circumstances of this case, does not undermine the purpose of the secrecy of grand jury testimony. In State v. Revere, 232 La. 184, 194-95, 94 So.2d 25, 29 (1957), this court discussed the need for secrecy in grand jury proceedings: Not only has the grand jury been, traditionally, an inquisitorial body charged with determining whether probable grounds for suspicion of a crime exists, but, from its very beginning, its sessions have been surrounded by a cloak of seclusion and secrecy that has been jealously guarded and preserved during the intervening centuries as the only means of insuring that it be permitted the freedom of action necessary for a vigorous and effective discharge of its duties. The reasons underlying this necessity for secrecy are manyfold. Among them are: (1) It promotes freedom in the disclosure of crime; (2) prevents coercion of grand jurors through outside influence and intimidation and thus permits a freedom of deliberation and opinion otherwise impossible; (3) protects the safety and freedom of witnesses and permits the greatest possible latitude in their voluntary testimony; (4) prevents perjury by all persons appearing before the grand jury; (5) prevents the subornation of perjury by withholding facts that, if known, the accused or his confederates might attempt to disprove by false evidence and testimony; (6) avoids the danger of the accused escaping and eluding arrest before the indictment can be returned; and (7) keeps the good names of the persons considered, but not indicted, from being besmirched. Thus it may be seen that the secrecy that has from time immemorial surrounded the grand jury sessions is not only for the protection of the jurors and the witnesses, but for the state, the accused, and, as has been said, for society as a whole. In In re Grand Jury, 98-2277 (La.4/13/99), 737 So.2d 1, 6, this court, quoting Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218-219, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979), elaborated further on the need for secrecy of grand jury proceedings: We consistently have recognized that the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. In particular, we have noted several distinct interests served by safeguarding the confidentiality of grand jury proceedings. First, if preindictment proceedings were made public, many prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that those against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony. Moreover, witnesses who appeared before the grand jury would be less likely to testify fully and frankly, as they would be open to retribution as well as to inducements. There also would be the risk that those about to be indicted would flee, or would try to influence individual grand jurors to vote against indictment. Finally, by preserving the secrecy of the proceedings, we assure that persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule. For all these reasons, courts have been reluctant to lift unnecessarily the veil of secrecy from the grand jury. The foregoing considerations for the legislative mandate of secrecy clearly are designed primarily for a non-target witness and are not significant when a target of the investigation voluntarily testifies before the grand jury with counsel present. See 2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 344 (12th ed. 1955). Not one of these reasons for maintaining the secrecy of grand jury proceedings is applicable in the present case. At the time that defendant testified before the grand jury, he had already been arrested for murder and had been identified as the target of the grand jury investigation. And because he was subsequently indicted, one could hardly say that the use of his testimony would besmirch his good name or subject him to ridicule. Moreover, the use of the testimony of a person already arrested for the crime would hardly discourage prospective witnesses from coming before the grand jury for fear that those against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony; the use of such testimony would not make other witnesses less likely to testify fully because of possible retribution or inducement; and the use of such testimony would not create the risk that a person about to be indicted would flee or would attempt to influence individual grand jurors to vote against indictment. Perhaps more significantly, this defendant, already facing criminal charges, knowingly and voluntarily, and in the presence of his attorney, waived his right to remain silent and his right not to incriminate himself. A person has a constitutional right not to give evidence against himself or be a witness against himself. U.S. Const. Amend. V, cl. 3; La. Const. art. I, § 16. However, that right can be waived if done knowingly and voluntarily. A person also has a statutory right to have his testimony before a grand jury held in secrecy, but there is no apparent reason why that right cannot also be waived, unless the rights of others are affected or the integrity of grand jury proceedings is undermined. Here, defendant, while under criminal charges, knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent and not to incriminate himself. Knowing he was the target of the investigation, he told the grand jury, without compulsion and with his attorney present, his version of the occurrence. Defendant took his chances of persuading the grand jury not to indict him, and he lost. Exclusion of the testimony that defendant intended to be exculpatory would serve absolutely no purpose associated with the secrecy of grand jury testimony or with the fairness of criminal proceedings. We conclude that the trial judge properly admitted the evidence.