Opinion ID: 776048
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Younger Analysis

Text: 56 We now turn to the merits of the Department's Younger abstention argument. Under the Younger abstention doctrine, federal courts should not 'interfere with state court proceedings by granting equitable relief such as injunctions of important state proceedings or declaratory judgments regarding constitutional issues in those proceedings ' when a state forum provides an adequate avenue for relief. Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational and Prof'l Licensing, 240 F.3d 871, 875 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Rienhardt v. Kelly, 164 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999)). We review de novo a district court's application of the Younger abstention doctrine, see Taylor v. Jaquez, 126 F.3d 1294, 1296 (10th Cir. 1997), recognizing that abstention is the exception, not the rule. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992). It should be 'rarely . . . invoked, because the federal courts have a virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them.' Roe #2 v. Ogden, 253 F.3d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 705). 57 Younger requires that a federal court refrain from hearing an action over which it has jurisdiction when [the] federal proceedings would (1) interfere with an ongoing state judicial proceeding (2) that implicates important state interests and (3) affords an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims. J.B. v. Valdez, 186 F.3d at 1291. Once a court finds that the required conditions are present, abstention is mandatory. See, e.g., Amanatullah v. Colorado Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999) (Younger abstention is non-discretionary; it must be invoked once the three conditions are met, absent extraordinary circumstances.). 58 It is apparent that federal enforcement of some of the SEP's provisions would significantly interfere with state court proceedings. Particularly problematic in light of Younger are the provisions governing assessment and treatment planning conferences for children entering the Department's custody and periodic review of the Department's plans for those children. These provisions require that the Department conduct two conferences one for assessment of the child and another to create a long-term plan of services for the child while in the Department's custody. In addition, the Department is required to review the long-term plan every six months to ensure it remains appropriate. The provisions set forth detailed requirements for the contents of each plan, 2 as well as a number of restrictions on the Department's planning flexibility. For example, unless the Children's Court so orders against the documented advice of the Department, the SEP precludes the Department from recommending emancipation for children who are twelve years old or younger, and requires that children aged twelve to fourteen receive counseling before a plan of emancipation can be established. Further, the SEP bars the Department from setting a permanency planning goal of long-term foster care unless no other goal is appropriate and a social worker consultant supervisor has approved the plan. The Department is also barred from maintaining a plan of Return Home for more than fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months that a child is in custody unless special circumstances exist or the Children's Court so orders against the documented recommendation of the Department. It is against this background that we conduct our Younger analysis. 59 Appellants do not contest the district court's finding that the case at bar implicates important state interests. Although the members of the plaintiff class are each individually engaged in ongoing proceedings before the family court, see N.M. Stat. 32A-4-16 et seq. (creating jurisdiction in Children's Court to adjudicate status of allegedly abused and neglected children), 3 Appellants contend that their class suit is at most parallel to the state court proceedings. Further, Appellants argue that we should reverse the district court because the systemic relief sought in this case is not available in the New Mexico Children's Court. 60 A court should not abstain from exercising its jurisdiction based merely on the presence of parallel state and federal suits. See, e.g., Green v. City of Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 1097-99 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, we recognize that this is not the typical Younger case in which a federal court is asked either to enjoin an action from proceeding in state court, cf., e.g., Younger, 401 U.S. at 38-39 (considering suit to enjoin Los Angeles district attorney from enforcing state law alleged to be unconstitutional), or to issue a declaratory judgment that would have essentially the same effect as an injunction. Cf., e.g., O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680, 695 (5th Cir. 1982). Enforcement of the SEP, however, requires interference with the operations of the Children's Court in an insidious way in that the SEP expressly prevents the Department's employees from recommending a range of planning options for children who are in the Department's custody. This limitation has an effect not unlike that of an injunction or declaratory judgment because the Department is precluded ever from presenting certain options to the Children's Court. Therefore, the state court is, for all practical purposes, precluded from considering these options. Courts, albeit in different contexts, have frequently observed that independent, vigorous advocacy is essential to the operation of our adversary system and as such essential to the rule of law. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 121 S.Ct. 1043, 1050-51 (2001) (An informed, independent judiciary presumes an informed, independent bar. . . . By seeking to prohibit the analysis of certain legal issues and to truncate presentation to the courts, the enactment under review prohibits speech and expression upon which courts must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial power.); Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (The paramount importance of vigorous representation follows from the nature of our adversarial system of justice. This system is premised on the well-tested principle that truth as well as fairness is 'best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question.' (citations omitted)); Walters v. Nat'l Assoc. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 371 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ([T]he citizen's right of access to the independent, private bar is itself an aspect of liberty that is of critical importance in our democracy.); 4 In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 236 (1962) (An independent judiciary and a vigorous, independent bar are both indispensable parts of our system of justice.); Heffernan v. Hunter, 189 F.3d 405, 413 (3d Cir. 1999) (The right of a litigant to independent and zealous counsel is at the heart of our adversary system and, indeed, invokes constitutional concerns.). A federal court's enforcement of a decree that bars an attorney from acting as an independent advocate for an outcome he or she believes is appropriate similarly interferes with the operations of a state court. The SEP therefore implicates that prong of Younger which counsels for abstention when the federal jurisdiction would interfere with an ongoing state proceeding. 61 In their petition for rehearing, Appellants contend that applying Younger under these circumstances would stretch the abstention doctrine beyond recognition. However, the cases cited by Appellants do not suggest that Younger abstention is inappropriate under these circumstances. Appellants rely on the Fifth Circuit's holding in Ciudadanos Unidos de San Juan v. Hidalgo Cty. Grand Jury Comm'ners, 622 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1980), that abstention is improper where the relief is directed to a time prior to the initiation of any actual judicial proceedings. Id. at 830 n.49. The complaint in that case challenged the exclusion of certain groups from the grand jury pool; the court emphasized that the requested relief can be fully accomplished and evaluated before any actual proceedings are commenced [and] before even the grand jury's consideration of any indictments. Id. Here, the SEP's restrictions are ongoing, and they impact the conduct of the proceedings themselves, not just the body charged with initiating the proceedings. 62 The other cases cited by Appellants do not establish the limits of Younger abstention. See, e.g., Crawley v. Hamilton City. 63 Comm'ers, 744 F.2d 28, 30 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding Younger inapplicable where the plaintiffs are not attempting to use the federal courts to shield them from state court enforcement efforts). 5 64 Although not directly on point, a more relevant case is O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), in which the Supreme Court, reversing the Seventh Circuit, upheld the dismissal of a 1983 suit on Younger grounds. The suit alleged that various officials in an Illinois county, including two judges, unfairly targeted blacks for criminal prosecution. Id. at 491-92, 94 S. Ct. 669. The two judges allegedly engaged in certain unfair practices regarding the setting of bond and sentencing. And while there was no specific indication as to the type of injunctive relief that might be justified, the Seventh Circuit had suggested that it might include a requirement of periodic reports of various types of aggregate data on actions on bail and sentencing. Id. at 493 n.1, 94 S. Ct. 669 (quotation omitted). 65 The Supreme Court held that such a suit could not be heard in federal court. In language that is at least indirectly supportive of our holding, the Court reasoned: 66 Respondents do not seek to strike down a single state statute, either on its face or as applied; nor do they seek to enjoin any criminal prosecutions that might be brought under a challenged criminal law. . . . What they seek is an injunction aimed at controlling or preventing the occurrence of specific events that might take place in the course of future state criminal trials. The [proposed] order . . . would be operative only where permissible state prosecutions are pending against one or more of the beneficiaries of the injunction. Apparently the order would contemplate interruption of state proceedings to adjudicate assertions of noncompliance by petitioners. This seems to us nothing less than an ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings which would indirectly accomplish the kind of interference that Younger v. Harris . . . sought to prevent. 67 Id. at 500, 94 S. Ct. 669. Even though [t]he Court of Appeals disclaimed any intention of requiring the District Court to sit in constant day-to-day supervision of these judicial officers, the periodic reporting system it thought might be warranted would constitute a form of monitoring of the operation of state court functions that is antipathetic to established principles of comity. Id. at 501, 94 S. Ct. 669 (quotation and footnote omitted). Given the availability of other avenues of relief open to respondents for the serious conduct they assert, and the abrasive and unmanageable intercession which the injunctive relief they seek would represent, the Court held that the federal courts could not hear the suit. Id. at 504, 94 S. Ct. 669. 68 In Suggs v. Brannon, 804 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1986), the Fourth Circuit applied O'Shea's reasoning to a complaint challenging state officials' enforcement of anti-obscenity laws. The complaint alleged that officials had been harassing adult book store employees, repeatedly arresting them, and subjecting them to inordinately high bail amounts. The plaintiffs tried to circumvent Younger by emphasizing that they do not seek to enjoin the state prosecutions or even to obtain a declaratory judgment that the obscenity statutes are unconstitutional. Id. at 278. Rather, they seek injunctive relief only against bad faith enforcement of the obscenity laws that chill their first amendment rights without due process of law, issuing court orders barring them from the bookstores where they are employed, fixing excessive bail, intimidating them by threats of future prosecutions, and engaging in illegal searches and seizures. Id. The court held that abstention was proper because [e]ntry of such an injunction would require the district court to direct and monitor part of the state proceedings. Id. at 279. Other courts have echoed this reasoning. See, e.g., Bonner v. Circuit Court, 526 F.2d 1331, 1336 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying Younger because complaint seeking to enjoin state officials from violating Constitution would require nothing less than an ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings (quoting O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 500)). 69 The reasoning of O'Shea and its progeny suggests that federal court oversight of state court operations, even if not framed as direct review of state court judgments, may nevertheless be problematic for Younger purposes. And other cases establish that the federal court's role need not focus on a particular state court proceeding to fall within the scope of Younger. For example, in Williams v. Rubiera, 539 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth Circuit applied Younger to a complaint seeking a declaration that state court defendants were entitled to court-appointed counsel for crimes punishable by a fine, but not imprisonment. Id. at 471-72. The Fifth Circuit held that abstention was required because [i]f relief were granted in this case it would have the effect of a federal court telling a state court how to run an ongoing criminal prosecution, i.e., whether it could constitutionally try the defendant without appointed counsel. Id. at 473. This would have the intrusive impact on the state proceeding that Younger and its progeny abhorred. Id. at 474. 70 Similarly, in Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992), the Eleventh Circuit held that Younger barred federal courts from hearing a 1983 suit challenging Georgia's indigent defense system. The complaint sought the following relief: 71
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76 (2) a court order that uniform standards be promulgated and adopted governing the representation of indigent [sic] consistent with the judgment in this case; 77 (3) monitor the implementation of those standards; 78 (4) award attorney's fees and other proper relief. 79 Id. at 676. The plaintiffs sought to avoid Younger by contending that they do not seek to contest any criminal conviction, nor to restrain any criminal prosecution, and that they seek only to have this Court consider systemic issues which cannot be raised in any individual case. Id. at 677. The Sixth Circuit nevertheless applied Younger, reasoning that a decree of the sort requested by the plaintiffs would, inevitably, interfere with every state criminal proceeding. Id. In some regard, the SEP's requirements will have a discernible impact on juvenile court proceeding in New Mexico albeit not to the same degree as the order requested in Luckey. 80 The fact that the SEP's requirements constrain the State's attorneys, rather than the court directly, does not preclude Younger's application, for the reasoning reflected in the above line of cases applies not just to state court judges, but to officers of the court. For example, in J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981), the plaintiffs brought suit challenging state court probation officers' practice of preparing social histories of juvenile defendants and providing them to the court before disposition of the cases. The histories included extensive personal histories of the defendants, but were not made available to the defendants themselves. See id. at 1082. The Sixth Circuit held that the Supreme Court case law requires abstention if federal intervention would cause interference with such a state proceeding and the federal issue can be raised in the state proceeding. Id. at 1084. Under this standard, the court observed that the juvenile court's predisposition use of social histories is an integral part of [its] handling of cases, and that the proposed relief would entail[] ongoing federal court interference with the daily operations of the juvenile court. Id. at 1084. Under these circumstances, Younger abstention was required. Id. at 1085. 81 Younger governs whenever the requested relief would interfere with the state court's ability to conduct proceedings, regardless of whether the relief targets the conduct of a proceeding directly. See News-Journal Corp. v. Foxman, 939 F.2d 1499, 1511 (11th Cir. 1991) (abstaining from hearing newspaper's challenge to state court's pre-trial gag order because an injunction impermissibly would restrict the ability of the trial court to impanel an impartial jury); Kevorkian v. Thompson, 947 F. Supp. 1152, 1164 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (holding that enjoining state from prosecuting defendant would violate Younger). 82 The relevant case law supports abstention where, as here, federal court oversight of state court proceedings is required, coupled with significant restrictions on the freedom of attorneys to present information to the court. Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to apply Younger, especially given the Supreme Court's recent emphasis on the importance of independent and unfettered advocacy to the operation of the courts. See Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1050-51. Accordingly, Younger mandates that the federal courts abstain from enforcing at least some of the SEP's provisions. 83 After concluding that Younger requires abstention in this case, the district court simply applied Younger to the entire SEP without verifying that the enforcement of each provision would interfere with state court proceedings. A provision-by-provision Younger analysis appears prudent, however, for the fact that one provision may not be enforceable in light of Younger does not necessarily warrant voiding the entire consent decree (see SEP at 9-10 (providing that State is relieved from performing particular provision if that performance is rendered impossible)), or dismissing the entire action. Cf. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930-31 (1975) (dismissing claims of one plaintiff pursuant to Younger, but allowing co-plaintiffs' claims to proceed because they did not pose risk of interference with ongoing state court proceedings); Ballard v. Wilson, 856 F.2d 1568, 1571-72 (5th Cir. 1988) (dismissing claims for injunctive relief pursuant to Younger, but allowing claim for monetary damages where such claim was not cognizable in state court proceedings). 84 Some of the SEP's provisions may be characterized as stand-alone provisions, amenable to enforcement independent of the more problematic provisions. While this issue is best left for the district court to resolve on remand, this court offers some preliminary observations. Enforcement of the provisions governing training of social workers (SEP at 2-3), the development of a computerized management information system (SEP at 7), and qualifications for social workers (SEP at 7-8) do not appear to risk interference with state court proceedings. As discussed above, the provisions governing assessment and treatment planning conferences present a stronger risk of running afoul of Younger. Also, federal enforcement of the provision calling for the use of state-created Citizen Review Boards may be problematic. Under state law, the Board reviews the disposition of children in the Department's custody prior to judicial review. The Board then submits a report to the Children's Court, which becomes part of the child's permanent court record. See NM ST 32A-8-5, 32A-8-6. In making the Citizen's Review Board proceedings enforceable by a federal district court, the SEP asks the federal court to review the operation of a mechanism that is an essential part of the state court proceedings. This certainly suggests a risk of improper interference with state proceedings under Younger. See DeSanti, 653 F.2d at 1085-86 (applying Younger abstention where plaintiff sought to enjoin probation officers' practice of preparing social histories of juvenile defendants because the juvenile court's use of the histories is an integral part of [its] handling of cases). Many of the remainder of the SEP's provisions appear to be procedural, setting forth the means by which the State can exit the decree's requirements, and it is not obvious, at least on the record before us, that they would pose Younger problems. 85 However, rather than making decisions as to which provisions do, and do not, violate Younger, we deem it more prudent to remand for further briefing and findings by the district court. The various SEP provisions may present complexities not apparent on the record before us. Thus, the district court should determine in the first instance which, if any, of the SEP's provisions can be enforced in light of Younger. 86 Finally, we must consider whether the state proceedings offer adequate opportunities for Appellants to raise their claims. In opposing abstention on the grounds that the federal remedy requested is not available in state court, [p]laintiffs bear the burden of proving that state procedural law barred presentation of their claims in the New Mexico Children's Court. J.B. v. Valdez, 186 F.3d at 1292. As an initial matter, it is clear that the Children's Court has the power to consider federal claims, including claims of procedural due process violations. See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Ruth Anne E. (In re Ruth Anne E.), 974 P.2d 164, 171 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing Children's Court for failing to grant continuance on procedural due process grounds to allow incarcerated parent to attend hearing to terminate parental rights); T.B. v. State (In re T.B.), 913 P.2d 272, 276 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming Children's Court's rejection of a motion for attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988 in light of the Children's Court's dismissal of a due process claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983). 87 Appellants contend, however, that it is not enough that they may be able to raise their federal claims in the context of their individual proceedings before the Children's Court. Rather, they argue that abstention is inappropriate because the Children's Court Rules of Civil Procedure make no provision for class actions, and therefore the Children's Court will never be presented with a set of facts that would enable it to grant the systemic injunctive relief they sought against the Department in the present action. 88 We assume without deciding that the Children's Court is not authorized to hear class actions and other representative suits. 6 However, we could find no case, and Appellants cite none, that hold that a party is entitled to avoid the effects of the Younger abstention doctrine in cases where relief is available to individual litigants in ongoing state proceedings but not to represented parties in a class action. See J.B. v. Valdez, 186 F.3d at 1292 (abstaining in light of court's conclusion that plaintiffs fail to clearly show that the Children's Court could not have adjudicated these federal claims during the periodic review process). Moreover, we note that Appellants have not attempted to raise their procedural due process claims in their individual proceedings. [W]hen a litigant has not attempted to present his federal claims in related state-court proceedings, a federal court should assume the state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987). Here, the Appellants have failed unambiguously to show that the relief they seek, including structural relief, would not effectively be available through the Children's Court. III. CONCLUSION 89 We affirm the district court's ruling that Appellants' claims are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, albeit for different reasons than were reflected in the district court's opinion. Some of Appellants' claims may run afoul of the Younger abstention doctrine, but we vacate and remand so that the district court may determine whether any of the SEP's provisions may be enforced in light of Younger. The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.