Opinion ID: 2814911
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: vcpa

Text: Under the VCPA, a supplier in a consumer transaction cannot use any “deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, or misrepresentation in connection with a consumer transaction.” Va. Code § 59.1-200(14). But the VCPA does not apply to “mortgage lenders,” which are defined as “any person who directly or indirectly originates or makes mortgage loans.” Va. Code § 59.1-199(D); id. § 6.2-1600. The district court granted MBCC summary judgment on this claim because “MBCC functioned as a mortgage lender, thus, no VCPA can lie against [it] as a matter of law.” (J.A. 169.) 18 Alternatively, it observed that the applicable limitations period (Va. Code § 59.1-204(A)) barred Poindexter’s claim. Poindexter disputes both rulings, contending that MBCC is not a “mortgage lender” under the relevant code sections because it did not “originate[] or make[]” the loan to purchase the Audi. Rather, the initial car loan was between Poindexter and HDL; Poindexter began making payments on the loan; HDL assigned the loan to MBCC; and while MBCC obtained additional security for the loan in the form of the Deed of Trust, that process did not “magically transf[orm] the original loan from a vehicle loan to a mortgage loan.” (Opening Br. 10.) Poindexter also asserts that a reasonable jury could conclude that she timely filed her action since she exercised due diligence upon learning of MBCC’s misrepresentation that the lien would be released upon satisfying her obligation. We disagree. Poindexter misreads the VCPA’s exemption to require MBCC to be the originator of the underlying obligation. To the contrary, the statutory definition of a “mortgage lender” includes “any person who directly or indirectly originates or makes a mortgage loan.” See Va. Code § 6.2-1600. Although the vehicle loan originated with HBL and then was transferred to MBCC, MBCC and Poindexter entered into a “modification” of the vehicle-loan agreement, which converted the vehicle loan into a “mortgage loan” with the lien on Poindexter’s real estate. 19 (J.A. 96, 142.) MBCC thus “directly or indirectly . . . originat[ed] or ma[d]e” a “mortgage loan” for purposes of the VCPA exemption. Poindexter also failed to proffer evidence that her arrangement with MBCC did not satisfy the VCPA definition of a “mortgage loan.” Certainly, the terms used by the parties demonstrate their intent that the arrangement be considered a mortgage loan. That was the entire purpose of Poindexter’s voluntary application to participate in MBCC’s Home Owner’s Choice program. Based on the record before us, it appears that the loan was “made to an individual [Poindexter], the proceeds of which [were] to be used primarily for personal . . . purposes [purchasing the Audi], which loan [was] secured by a . . . deed of trust.” § 6.2-1600. For years, Poindexter benefited through tax deductions from having the loan classified as a “mortgage loan” as a result of her specific agreement with MBCC (not HBL), and she cannot now evade its consequences. The district court thus did not err in holding that her claim failed as a matter of law or in granting MBCC summary judgment. In light of this conclusion, we need not address whether Poindexter’s claim is also barred by the statute of limtiations. 20