Opinion ID: 2001513
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: As to Due Process Guarantees:

Text: The plaintiff contends that § 8127 lacks a proper public purpose. When reviewing economic legislation, the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the statute bear a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 reh'g denied, 456 U.S. 950, 102 S.Ct. 2023, 72 L.Ed.2d 476 (1982); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 83 S.Ct. 1028, 10 L.Ed.2d 93 (1963). We apply this standard to the analogous provision of the Delaware Constitution, Art. I, § 9. [5] As has been noted, § 8127 eliminates a cause of action, after six years from substantial completion of construction, regardless of whether an action has accrued. The Statute, like similar ones in 46 other states and the District of Columbia, was enacted in response to changes in the common law which greatly increased the liability of builders and architects. Case law abolished the rule which terminated the liability of builders and architects upon completion and acceptance of the structure, absent privity with the owner. Since an ordinary statute of limitations did not begin to run until either the date of the injury or its discovery, those involved in construction were subject to possible liability throughout their professional lives and into retirement. At the urging of those involved in the construction industry, the Legislature placed an absolute outer limit on the duration of this liability. Klein v. Catalano , Mass.Supr.Jud.Ct., 386 Mass. 701, 437 N.E.2d 514, 520 (1982); Becker v. Hamada, Inc., 455 A.2d at 355; Cudahy v. Ragnar Benson, Inc., D.Colo., 514 F.Supp. 1212, 1217 (1981); O'Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal, Mich.Supr., 410 Mich. 1, 299 N.W.2d 336, 340 (1980); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, N.J.Supr., 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662, 664 (1972); See Collins, Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders  an Examination of Constitutionality, 29 Fed'n Ins. Couns. Q. 41, 41-46 (1978); Note, Architectural Malpractice: A Contract Based Approach, 92 Harv.L.Rev. 1075, 1081 (1979); Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders  Blueprints for Non-action, 18 Cath.U.L.Rev. 361 (1969). As the Superior Court stated, limiting the duration of liability is a well recognized and legitimate public purpose. 462 A.2d at 424. Such limitation erases unasserted, ancient claims and decreases those instances in which a defendant must respond to assertions when evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. Developments in the law: Statutes of Limitation, 63 Harv.L.Rev. 1177, 1185 (1950). See Keller v. President, Directors and Company of Farmers Bank of the State of Delaware, Del.Super., 24 A.2d 539 (1942); Klein v. Catalano , at 520; Rosenberg v. North Bergen, at 667-668. [T]hose engaged in the design and construction of real property may have to mount a defense when `[a]rchitectural plans may have been discarded, copies of building codes in force at the time of construction may no longer be in existence, persons individually involved in the construction project may be deceased or may not be located.' Klein v. Catalano, supra, at 520, citing Howell v. Burk, N.Mex.Ct.App., 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (1977). In enacting § 8127, the General Assembly has balanced the injured party's right to a remedy with the perceived need to limit builder and architect liability. The General Assembly could have reasonably concluded that six years would allow sufficient time for meritorious claims to accrue. See O'Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal, supra ; Klein v. Catalano , at 521. [6] Accordingly, we agree with the Superior Court and hold that § 8127 bears a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective; that, therefore, the Statute does not violate the due process guarantees of either the Federal or State Constitution in this regard.