Opinion ID: 2564099
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brisbane Is Incorrect

Text: ¶ 91 The majority in Brisbane was clearly erroneous in concluding the legislature used the terms county and legislative body interchangeably (and implying the legislature does not know the difference). 125 Wash.2d at 349, 884 P.2d 1326. The only support for the Brisbane majority's conclusion in this regard is a paltry footnote that fails to accurately describe the cited statutory provision. Id. at 350 n. 18, 884 P.2d 1326. The Brisbane majority's footnote example of interchangeable use of terms actually shows the legislature is aware of the distinction between the term county and the specific term county legislative body. Our cases also require us to assume the legislature knows the difference, and chooses its language. ¶ 92 The Brisbane majority's footnote quotes only RCW 36.70A.040(3), concerning adoption of comprehensive land use plans. 125 Wash.2d at 350 n. 18, 884 P.2d 1326. In that quotation is a reference to subsection (2) and the date the county legislative body takes action as required by subsection (2). Id. The footnote fails to mention that subsection (2) deals only with counties that are not automatically required to plan under the GMA but that nevertheless choose to opt in and become GMA counties. Subsection (2) states: The county legislative authority of any county that does not meet . . . [the] criteria established under subsection (1) of this section may adopt a resolution indicating its intention to have subsection (1) of this section apply to the county. RCW 36.70A.040 (emphasis added). The legislature was clear that only the legislative authority, through adoption of a resolution may decide for a county to opt in to GMA requirements. In subsection (3), the legislature further stated the action undertaken in subsection (2) must be by the legislative authority and not by the county generally. ¶ 93 By assuming the legislature was merely careless in its use of the terms county and legislative body, the Brisbane majority denigrates the legislature. Careful reading of the statute, as is this court's duty, undermines the Brisbane majority's opinion. ¶ 94 Moreover, instead of following Anderson and looking at the specific wording of the statute at issue to determine whether referendum rights existed, the Brisbane majority looked at the wording of the other provisions in the GMA. See Brisbane, 125 Wash.2d at 350 n. 18, 884 P.2d 1326. There is no precedent supporting the Brisbane majority. Anderson was limited to reviewing the specific statutory provision delegating the authority to adopt the ordinance at issue in that case (RCW 36.70A.210). Anderson held RCW 36.70A.210(2) was [a]t the heart of determining whether referendum rights were available and did not even discuss or review other sections of the GMA. Anderson, 123 Wash.2d at 155, 868 P.2d 116. Contrary to the Brisbane majority, the focus should not be on mere presence of both words in a statutory provision, but what term is specifically used when the legislature delegates power under the GMA. ¶ 95 Finally, the majority in Brisbane gave no recognition of the presumption favoring the right of referendum. This disregard of citizens' right to referenda is clearly erroneous. As discussed below, it is also harmful.