Opinion ID: 2548863
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: challenges under article vi, section 1 of the utah constitution

Text: ¶ 23 Safe Havens argues that the challenged provisions violate article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, which reserves to the people the right to initiate legislation. Safe Havens contends that under our ruling in Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, 54 P.3d 1069, the legislature is required to enact legislation that implements and enables the exercise of the people's right to initiative, id. at ¶ 27, and that the newly-amended initiative statute, instead of enabling that right, unduly burdens the ability to place an initiative on the ballot. The State contends that the provisions are reasonable regulatory measures that are nondiscriminatory, and thus, unlike the provision struck down in Gallivan, the challenged provisions do not unduly burden the initiative process. In order to evaluate the constitutionality of the Senate District Requirement, the Signature Removal Provision, and the One-Year Requirement, we must first determine the appropriate standard of review applicable to legislative enactments challenged under article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
¶ 24 Safe Havens proposes two alternative standards by which this court should review the challenged provisions. First, Safe Havens suggests that, under the language of Gallivan, the initiative right cannot be unduly burden[ed] or diminish[ed], see id. at ¶ 28, and that under this standard each challenged provision imposes undue burdens on the initiative right, and none enables or facilitates the right. In the alternative, Safe Havens proposes that, because the right to initiative is a fundamental right, see id. at ¶ 24, this court should apply the same heightened scrutiny standard that we applied to the multi-county signature requirement at issue in Gallivan. Under this standard, the burden of proof shifts to the State to show that a challenged provision actually and substantially furthers a valid legislative purpose and is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal. Id. at ¶ 42 (quoting Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 582-83 (Utah 1993)). ¶ 25 The State counters that legislative enactments are imbued with a presumption of constitutionality, and heightened scrutiny would not be appropriate in this case because [s]uch a level of scrutiny is not required by state [or] federal law, will unduly interfere with [l]egislative authority to establish the procedures for initiatives, and will cause tremendous turmoil in election law requirements. Rather, the State suggests that the level of scrutiny for such constitutional challenges should vary depending upon the circumstances, the rights involved, and the impact on those rights, and that the circumstances of this case call for only a rational or reasonable basis level of scrutiny. ¶ 26 In Gallivan, we stated that [t]he reserved right and power of initiative is a fundamental right under article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution. 2002 UT 89 at ¶ 24, 54 P.3d 1069. As we explained in that case, Initiative is the power of a voter to directly legislate via exercising the right to vote. Like the right to vote generally, the initiative right guarantees participation in the political process. It is a constitutionally guaranteed right that forms an implicit part of the life of a free citizen in a free society. The initiative right encourages political dialogue and allows the general populace to have substantive and meaningful participation in enacting legislation that impacts society. It is democracy in its most direct and quintessential form. Id. at ¶ 25 (internal quotations and citations omitted). ¶ 27 Further, [t]he voters' right to initiative does not commence at the ballot box: The voters' right to legislate via initiative includes signing a petition to get the proposed initiative on the ballot. Id. at ¶ 26. Thus, [t]he right to vote on an initiative cannot exist without the voters' unfettered right to legislate through initiative, which necessarily begins with the circulating and signing process. Id. Because the people's right to directly legislate through initiative and referenda is sacrosanct and a fundamental right, Utah courts must defend it against encroachment and maintain it inviolate. Id. at ¶ 27. ¶ 28 While we continue to recognize that the initiative right is fundamental under our state constitution, we also note that the ability to legislate through the initiative process is solely a state-created right and would not exist in the absence of a state provision creating the right. See Save Palisade Fruitlands v. Todd, 279 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir.2002); Dobrovolny v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir.1997); Gallivan, 2002 UT 89 at ¶ 104, 54 P.3d 1069 (Thorne, J., dissenting). This right, though fundamental under our state constitution, is not unfettered, but comes with a built-in limitation. Article VI, section 1 states, The legal voters of the State of Utah in the numbers, under the conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may[ ] initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as provided by statute.... Utah Const. art. VI, § 1, cl. (2)(a)(i) (emphasis added). This constitutional provision, while granting the right to initiative, simultaneously circumscribes that right by granting the legislature leave to regulate, by statute, the manner in which the right is exercised. Not only is the legislature granted the authority to do so, but it is required to enact legislation to enable the people to exercise their reserved power and right to directly legislate through initiative. Gallivan, 2002 UT 89 at ¶ 28, 54 P.3d 1069 (citing Owens v. Hunt, 882 P.2d 660, 661 (Utah 1994)). ¶ 29 In carrying out this duty, the legislature may not pass laws that unduly burden or diminish the people's right to initiate legislation. Id. Due to the fundamental nature of the right of initiative ..., the vitality of ensuring that the right is not effectively abrogated, severely limited, or unduly burdened by the procedures enacted to enable the right and to place initiatives on the ballot is of paramount importance. Id. at ¶ 27. This does not mean, however, that the legislature may never pass regulations that have the effect of making it more difficult to enact legislation by initiative. Indeed, we recognized in Gallivan that there are circumstances in which the legislature may legitimately impose restrictions that may, through their operation, make it more difficult to place an initiative on the ballot. Id. at ¶ 53. We observed that [t]he legislature can impose restrictions  such as requiring a particular form of petition, setting reasonable time frames to ensure the efficiency of the process, or requiring signers to be registered voters  which would have the effect of making it more difficult to get initiatives on the ballot, but only to the extent that those restrictions comport with article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, do not violate other constitutional provisions, and further legitimate legislative purposes such as deterring fraud, ensuring the efficiency of the process, or ensuring a modicum of numerical support for an initiative. Id. Thus, it is clear from Gallivan that each legislative enactment regulating the initiative process need not be subjected to heightened scrutiny review. ¶ 30 In Gallivan, we addressed the constitutionality of the multi-county signature requirement, a precursor to the current Senate District Requirement. In addition to obtaining a certain number of signatures statewide, the multi-county signature requirement required sponsors of initiatives to obtain signatures from registered voters in each of at least twenty of Utah's twenty-nine counties equal to 10 percent of all the votes cast for governor during the last gubernatorial election in the respective county in which the votes for governor were cast. Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-201(2)(a) (1998). The appellants in Gallivan challenged the requirement under the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution. See Utah Const. art. I, § 24. Consequently, in declaring the provision to be unconstitutional, we applied a heightened standard of scrutiny in accordance with our established uniform operation of laws analysis. Gallivan, 2002 UT 89 at ¶¶ 34-64, 54 P.3d 1069. ¶ 31 Under that analysis, a statutory provision may be unconstitutional if it creates a classification that is discriminatory; that is, if it creates a classification that treats the members of the class or subclasses disparately. Id. at ¶ 43 (citing State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 997 (Utah 1995)). If a discriminatory classification exists, the court then determines whether that classification is constitutionally permissible. Id. The level of scrutiny applied to legislative enactments under the uniform operation of laws analysis varies depending on the nature of the classification and the nature of the right at issue. See id. at ¶¶ 39-40. Where a legislative enactment implicates a `fundamental or critical right' or creates classifications which are `considered impermissible or suspect in the abstract,' we apply a heightened degree of scrutiny. Id. at ¶ 40 (quoting Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1995)). A provision subject to this heightened degree of scrutiny will be constitutional only if it (1) is reasonable, (2) has more than a speculative tendency to further the legislative objective and, in fact, actually and substantially furthers a valid legislative purpose, and (3) is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal. Id. at ¶ 42 (quoting Lee, 867 P.2d at 582-83). ¶ 32 The multi-county signature requirement at issue in Gallivan was found to create a discriminatory classification because it had a disparate impact on urban and rural voters. Because this geographic distribution requirement was based on counties, which are not population based, it had the effect of diluting the power of urban registered voters and heightening the power of rural registered voters in relation to an initiative petition, and thus allowed voters in rural counties to wield a disproportionate amount of power in the determination of whether an initiative qualifie[d] to be placed on the ballot. Id. at ¶ 45. Consequently, because the multi-county signature requirement created a discriminatory classification and also impacted the fundamental right of initiative, we determined that the provision was subject to heightened scrutiny under our uniform operation of laws analysis. Id. at ¶¶ 41-46. Because the provision did not withstand this level of scrutiny, we declared it unconstitutional. Id. at ¶ 64. ¶ 33 The present case is distinguishable from Gallivan. There, heightened scrutiny was particularly appropriate because there were two constitutional values that required due recognition: (1) the uniform operation of laws provision in article I, section 24, which disfavors discriminatory classifications that have a disparate impact on similarly situated parties, and (2) the right to initiative granted to the citizens of Utah by article VI, section 1. See Lee, 867 P.2d at 581. This is not the case here. Safe Havens does not challenge the initiative statute under the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution. Safe Havens concedes that the challenged provisions do not create impermissible or suspect classifications among Utah citizens. In fact, the challenged provisions do not create any classifications but apply equally to all Utah citizens. ¶ 34 Rather, Safe Havens challenges the amended initiative statute solely under article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution. Safe Havens argues only that the provisions infringe on the initiative right, which is a right that, though fundamental, is self-limiting in that it grants to the legislature the authority to regulate the initiative process. We repeat that, in carrying out this duty, the legislature may not unduly burden or diminish the initiative right. See Gallivan, 2002 UT 89 at ¶¶ 27-28, 54 P.3d 1069; Owens, 882 P.2d at 661. However, each legislative enactment challenged under article VI, section 1 need not be subjected to heightened scrutiny review. Common sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must play an active role in structuring elections, and subjecting every initiative regulation to heightened scrutiny would tie the hands of [s]tates seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992). Thus, applying heightened scrutiny to each and every provision challenged under article VI, section 1 is neither required nor appropriate. ¶ 35 In promulgating the appropriate standard of review, we reiterate that [i]t is axiomatic that laws enacted by the legislature are presumed to be constitutional and that the legislature is accorded wide latitude in complying with constitutional directives such as the one contained in article VI, section 1. Owens, 882 P.2d at 661. The essential task for a court in conducting an article VI, section 1 analysis is to determine whether the enactment unduly burdens the right to initiative. In making this determination, a court should assess whether the enactment is reasonable, whether it has a legitimate legislative purpose, and whether the enactment reasonably tends to further that legislative purpose. In evaluating the reasonableness of the challenged enactment and its relation to the legislative purpose, courts should weigh the extent to which the right of initiative is burdened against the importance of the legislative purpose. ¶ 36 Additionally, in ascertaining the underlying legislative purpose, while this court should not indulge highly speculative hypotheses as to a statute's purpose in applying the presumption of constitutionality, Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 373 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., concurring in part) (citing Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 671 (Utah 1984)) (further citations omitted), neither are we limited to `those purposes that can be plainly shown to have been held by some or all legislators.' Ryan, 903 P.2d at 427 (quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 641 (Utah 1989)) (applying lower level scrutiny under uniform operation of laws analysis). We will make our determination `on the basis of reasonable or actual legislative purposes.' Blue Cross, 779 P.2d at 641 (quoting Malan, 693 P.2d at 671 n. 14). Thus, we do not require exact proof of the legislative purposes; it is enough if a legitimate purpose can be reasonably imputed to the legislative body. Ryan, 903 P.2d at 427; see also Blue Cross, 779 P.2d at 641. ¶ 37 The standard that we announce today does not purport to require the [l]egislature to find the least restrictive manner of furthering its purpose, but because this standard requires the court to consider the burden imposed by the measure and the importance of the underlying legislative purpose, it does not allow such wide latitude as to virtually abandon judicial review. See Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 373 (Stewart, J., concurring in part). Hence, this standard, though bearing a resemblance to our traditional minimal scrutiny review, requires a more exacting analysis. We now proceed under this standard of review to evaluate the remaining three provisions challenged by Safe Havens.
¶ 38 A person seeking to place an initiative on the ballot for a vote of the people must obtain legal signatures equal to 10% of the cumulative total of all votes cast for all candidates for governor at the last regular general election at which a governor was elected, both on a statewide level and in each of at least twenty-six of Utah's twenty-nine senate districts. Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-201(2)(a) (2003). Safe Havens does not contest the statewide 10 percent requirement, but challenges only the requirement that it must meet the 10 percent threshold in at least twenty-six senate districts. ¶ 39 Safe Havens argues that the Senate District Requirement unduly burdens the right to initiative because the requirement makes it harder to pass law by initiative than it is to pass law by legislation. Safe Havens complains that because it takes only fifteen senators to pass legislation, but an initiative sponsor must meet the 10 percent threshold in twenty-six of twenty-nine senate districts, the Senate District Requirement does not honor the principle that [t]he power of the legislature and the power of the people to legislate through initiative and referenda are coequal, coextensive, and concurrent and share equal dignity. Gallivan, 2002 UT 89 at ¶ 23, 54 P.3d 1069 (internal quotations omitted). In addition, Safe Havens contends that the legislative record indicates that this provision was passed merely to ensure that any issue that qualifies for the ballot has support in areas of Utah outside the Wasatch Front and that, according to Gallivan, [c]ountering the possibility of localized legislation is not a legitimate legislative purpose. Id. at ¶ 57. Safe Havens reasons that this requirement, like the one struck down in Gallivan, gives the minority control of the initiative power and is likewise unconstitutional. Id. at ¶ 61. ¶ 40 In its brief, the State explains the legislative purposes underlying the Senate District Requirement as follows: [The legislature] sought to exercise its constitutional authority to set forth the numbers of signatures for an initiative to get on to the ballot, to do so in a manner that ensured that there was a modicum of support before the matter would appear on the ballot, and, since it is a statewide issue, to ensure that that support was throughout the statewide population, and finally to do so in a manner that was non-discriminatory and constitutional. These purposes have support in the text of the legislative debates regarding the passage of S.B. 28. ¶ 41 The Senate District Requirement does not run afoul of Gallivan, where the challenged legislative enactment actually worked to counter localized legislation by giving disproportionate weight to rural votes as compared to urban votes. See id. at ¶ 45. Because the multi-county signature requirement addressed in Gallivan was based on geographically-drawn counties, rather than on numerical population, it discriminated against urban voters by diluting the voting power of the four urban counties, where more than three-fourths of Utah's population resides, in favor of the twenty-five rural counties containing less than one-fourth of the statewide population. Id. at ¶¶ 45-46, 49. Therefore, we found the provision to be unconstitutional because it created a discriminatory classification that could not withstand heightened scrutiny. Id. at ¶¶ 46-64. ¶ 42 The Senate District Requirement does not prompt the same constitutional concerns that we addressed in Gallivan. By basing the signature requirement on evenly divided, population-based senate districts, the legislature has not created a discriminatory classification or caused a disparate impact among classes or subclasses. Thus, whereas in Gallivan the legislature intended that the rural minority would act as a check and a balance on the urban majority, the Senate District Requirement does not assign disproportionate power to any particular group of voters. Rather, it ensures that there is support for a particular initiative spread, more or less, evenly throughout the state. We hold this to be a legitimate legislative purpose. ¶ 43 Further, the principle that [t]he power of the legislature and the power of the people to legislate through initiative and referenda are coequal, coextensive, and concurrent and share equal dignity, id. at ¶ 23 (internal quotation omitted), is not offended by the requirement that an initiative sponsor meet the 10 percent threshold in at least twenty-six senate districts. Affording equal dignity to the power of the people and of the legislature to initiate legislation does not necessarily mean that the same procedures will be followed in each instance. Rather, the right of the people to initiate legislation is afforded due consideration as long as the procedures enacted to enable the right are reasonable and reasonably tend to further a legitimate legislative purpose. We conclude that the Senate District Requirement does not unduly burden the initiative right, but is a reasonable means of achieving the legitimate legislative purpose of ensuring a modicum of support for an initiative throughout the statewide population.
¶ 44 Safe Havens contends that the burdens imposed by the Senate District Requirement are magnified when viewed in conjunction with the Signature Removal Provision[ ]. The initiative statute provides that [a]ny voter who has signed an initiative petition may have his signature removed from the petition by submitting a notarized statement to that effect to the county clerk. Utah Code Ann. § 20A 7 205(3)(a)(i). Safe Havens does not challenge the right of a voter to remove his signature, but rather the time period in which a signature may be removed. ¶ 45 The initiative statute provides that initiative sponsors must submit all of the gathered signatures to the county clerks by June 1, at which point the county clerks must verify that all the names are of persons who are over eighteen years old, are residents of Utah, and are registered voters. Id. § 20A-7-206(1) to -206(3). The county clerks must deliver the signatures to the lieutenant governor by July 1, whereupon, the lieutenant governor will declare whether the initiative petition is sufficient. Id. §§ 20A-7-201(2)(b),-206(3)(c). Any voter who has signed the petition is allowed to remove his or her signature up until the time that the petition is submitted to the lieutenant governor. See id. § 20A-7-205(3)(c). ¶ 46 Safe Havens argues that the timing of this provision unduly burdens the initiative right, with no legitimate legislative justification, because it allows initiative opponents unfettered access to petition signers during the month of June (after sponsors are prohibited from submitting additional replacement signatures), during which time signers may remove their names from the petition. Thus, Safe Havens asserts, initiative opponents may defeat an initiative by focusing on one or two (or at most, four) [s]enate districts in which sponsors have cleared the 10 [percent] hurdle by the narrowest margin. ¶ 47 In Halgren v. Welling, this court recognized the right of a petitioner to withdraw his signature, stating that `[n]o authority has been found which denies to a petitioner the right to withdraw his name while the petition is being circulated and before it has been presented to the person or body with whom it is required to be filed.' 91 Utah 16, 29, 63 P.2d 550, 556 (1936) (quoting In re Initiative Petition No. 2, City of Chandler, 170 Okla. 507, 41 P.2d 101, 102 (1935)) (further citations omitted). The court continued, Neither do any of the authorities recognize the right of a petitioner to withdraw his name from a petition after it has been finally acted upon and the prayer thereof has been granted by the person or body who is required to act upon it. Id. (quotation omitted). ¶ 48 Safe Havens suggests that it would be completely in keeping with this [c]ourt's pronouncement in Halgren  if this court were to institute a scheme, similar to that followed in some other states, in which signers could remove their names up until the petitions are submitted to the county clerks. See e.g., Rekart v. Kirkpatrick, 639 S.W.2d 606, 607 n. 1 (Mo.1982) (quoting Mo.Rev.Stat. § 116.110 (Supp.1981)) (holding that signatures may be withdrawn only up until the time that the initiative petition is completed and filed). However, in Halgren, this court considered and rejected that type of scheme, stating that [t]he weight of authority is that the withdrawal may be made at any time before the petition has been acted upon. 91 Utah at 30, 63 P.2d at 556. Further, this court is committed to the doctrine, in the absence of statute, which permits withdrawal after filing a petition and before action thereon is taken. 91 Utah at 29, 63 P.2d at 556 (internal quotation omitted). In Halgren, we clearly intended to allow the right to withdraw one's signature after the initiative petition was submitted to the county clerks, and before the county clerks delivered the petition to the lieutenant governor for final action. ¶ 49 Although we recognize the potential difficulty this provision may cause to initiative sponsors, such a regulation is reasonable in light of the importance of protecting the right of a voter to withdraw his signature, which, in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, continues up until the petition is finally acted upon by the lieutenant governor. Utah voters have the ability to decide whether or not to support a particular initiative, and [t]here is no substantial reason why a person who has once signed a petition may not, at any time before the petition has been acted upon, withdraw his name, and if timely done, his name should not be counted. Halgren, 91 Utah at 30, 63 P.2d at 556.
¶ 50 Finally we address the constitutionality of the One-Year Requirement. Under this provision, initiative sponsors are required to qualify the petition for the regular general election ballot no later than one year after the application is filed. Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-202(4)(a) (2003). If initiative sponsors are unsuccessful in obtaining the requisite number of signatures within one year's time, the sponsors must submit a new application and collect signatures again. Id. § 20A-7-202(4). This provision, introduced by S.B. 28, replaced a similar requirement in the previous initiative statute that allowed sponsors two years in order to obtain the needed number of signatures. Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-202(4) (1998). Safe Havens contends that this new requirement has no legitimate legislative purpose, but was passed simply to make it more difficult to place initiatives on the ballot. ¶ 51 Although there is little in the record pointing to the precise legislative purpose underlying the One-Year Requirement, the State indicates that all of the provisions challenged by Safe Havens are designed to ensure ... that there be an orderly, known and efficient process. Further, in its discussion of the One-Year Requirement in particular, the State alludes to a number of other possible legislative purposes, citing American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092 (10th Cir.1997). There, the Tenth Circuit upheld a regulation of Colorado's initiative procedure that required initiatives to qualify within six months. Id. at 1096, 1098-99. Proponents of the regulation assert[ed] several interests: preserving the integrity of the state's elections, maintaining an orderly ballot, and limiting voter confusion. Id. at 1099. The State also maintains that the One-Year Requirement does not unduly burden the initiative process, pointing to three prior initiatives that sponsors qualified for the ballot within six weeks, three months, and five months, respectively. ¶ 52 It is clear that the legislature, in carrying out its duty to regulate the initiative process, has the authority to set time limits. Utah Const. art. VI, § 1 (The legal voters of the State of Utah in the numbers, under the conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may [] initiate any desired legislation....). Indeed, the legislature must set such time limits if the initiative process is to proceed in any kind of order. We only require that these time limits be reasonable in that they do not unduly burden the right to initiative. In Tobias v. South Jordan City Recorder, we approved a thirty-five-day statutory time limit for submitting referenda. 972 P.2d 373 (Utah 1998). We acknowledge[d] that the statutory timetable is extremely short and that [s]ponsors of referendum petitions must move promptly to gather the required number of signatures, but nonetheless approved the time limit. Id. at 374. The signature requirements for initiative petitions are somewhat more exacting than those required for referendum petitions; however, based on the evidence before us, we cannot articulate any basis upon which a one-year time period would be unreasonable. Setting a one-year window in which initiative sponsors must demonstrate support for their cause is not an unreasonable restraint on the initiative right, but rather merely ensures that there is an orderly, known, and efficient process. Thus, this requirement, like the Senate District Requirement and the Signature Removal Provision, does not violate article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, but is a reasonable, regulatory provision.