Opinion ID: 1170873
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Expert Testimony on Shoe Impressions

Text: Investigators at the scene of the murder took several photographs of the ground outside the window that had been forced open. At trial, Department of Justice criminalist Faye Springer testified on the similarity between some of the footprints visible in the photographs and the imprint left by the shoes defendant was wearing at his arrest. Defendant sought to suppress this testimony both before and during the trial; neither motion was granted. Springer identified a number of the footprints as matching those of defendant. In other photographs, her identification was less definitive. She further testified that impressions on the periphery of several of the photographs were probably made by Huffman's shoes. Referring to the quality of the photography, she admitted that Huffman's prints had been treated as secondary in all the photographs. Located toward the edges of the photographs, his prints were less in focus and sometimes inadequately illuminated, making identification difficult. Springer stated that if she had been at the scene, she would have taken more pictures of each print and, in order to plot the entire scene, more overviews. (13a) Defendant claims that the prosecution failed to adequately preserve the footprint evidence. With better photographs of the footprints, he contends, it would have been possible to determine if Huffman's impressions were made after those of defendant, thereby exculpating defendant. In People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal.3d 641, 649-650 [117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 527 P.2d 361], we held that due process required the People to preserve breathalyzer ampoules for later retesting by defendants charged with driving while intoxicated. This duty to preserve evidence applies whenever there is a reasonable probability that it might constitute favorable evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence. Hitch was later extended to require the preservation of a semen sample taken from a rape victim ( People v. Nation (1980) 26 Cal.3d 169, 177 [161 Cal. Rptr. 299, 604 P.2d 1051]) and a urine sample of a suspected narcotics user ( People v. Moore (1983) 34 Cal.3d 215, 221-222 [193 Cal. Rptr. 404, 666 P.2d 419]). For purposes of discussion, we shall assume that Hitch remains fully vital after the decision of the United States Supreme Court in California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479 [81 L.Ed.2d 413, 104 S.Ct. 2520]. (See generally People v. Griffin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1011, 1020-1022 [251 Cal. Rptr. 643, 761 P.2d 103]; People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 774, fn. 18 [251 Cal. Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260].) Defendant does not dispute the identification of his footprints, but rather argues that the police should have taken more and better photographs. He believes this would have shown that Huffman was the last entrant into the apartment. His contention must fail, however, because due process does not require that the prosecution obtain any particular evidence or conduct specific tests. ( People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 851 [183 Cal. Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93].) The police cannot be expected to `gather up everything which might eventually prove useful to the defense.' ( Ibid. ) Here, the police made a photographic record of the most prominent impressions outside the presumed point of entry, and the photographs are of reasonable quality. Defendant does not assert that this photographic evidence was not properly preserved, or that he was denied an opportunity to conduct his own analysis of it. Due process demands no more.
(14a) In his motion to suppress the footprint evidence, defendant also objected to any expert testimony by Springer, who would later identify the impressions as having been made by defendant's boots. He asserts that the probative value of her testimony was outweighed by its prejudicial effect and that the court abused its discretion by admitting it. (Evid. Code, § 352.) We conclude otherwise. Surely the probative value of the identity of footprints outside the point of entry into the apartment is substantial. And the prejudice is nonexistent. Defendant argues that the evidence makes his conviction more likely, but that is manifestly not the sense in which section 352 uses the word prejudice. Rather, the statute uses the word in its etymological sense of prejudging a person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors. (See generally People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638 [250 Cal. Rptr. 659 [758 P.2d 1189].) Such prejudging did not occur here. Because the court ruled Springer's testimony admissible without making an explicit weighing of its probative value against its prejudicial effect, defendant alleges the ruling was error. We disagree. In his motion to suppress defendant attempted to undermine the reliability of Springer's proffered testimony, but did not argue that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. Defendant's sole reference to section 352 in relation to this testimony appears only incidentally at the top of his notice of motions to suppress evidence, followed by several items of evidence to which he objects. Such a reference, however, was insufficient to trigger the duty defendant claims the court violated.
(15a) The final issue regarding Springer's footprint testimony and the photographic evidence is that they do not meet the minimal requirements of the Kelly-Frye test. ( Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir.1923) 293 Fed. 1013 [54 App.D.C. 46, 34 A.L.R. 145]; People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 [130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240].) Defendant urges us to hold that the evidence of the footprints and the analysis based on it fail to meet the requirements of the Kelly-Frye test because the investigation  especially the photographing of the impressions  was carried out in a defective manner. Defendant relies for this conclusion on testimony by Springer and another prosecution witness that the footprint evidence was not collected in a scientifically acceptable manner. He mischaracterizes their statements. Although Springer felt that better photographs could have been taken of the prints, she also testified that her identification of at least one impression as made by defendant's boot was conclusive. This hardly renders the identification unreliable. Furthermore, the Kelly-Frye rule tests the fundamental validity of a new scientific methodology, not the degree of professionalism with which it is applied. (See, e.g., People v. Coleman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 775.) Careless testing affects the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility, and must be attacked on cross-examination or by other expert testimony. Finally, defendant does not show that he raised a Kelly-Frye objection at trial. For all these reasons the contention must fail.