Opinion ID: 1254428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: unconstitutionality of sections 3-1-607 and 3-1-608, mca

Text: The parties differ in their interpretation of the key language of Art. VII, § 10, which provides that  Any holder of a judicial position forfeits that position by ... filing for an elective office other than a judicial position...  (Emphasis added.) This provision applies to all judges in this state. The challenged statutes, however, (sections 3-1-607 and 3-1-608, MCA) prevent only district judges and supreme court justices from seeking other judicial office without forfeiting their office. The constitutional delegates, in drafting Art. VII, § 10, did not intend that a forfeiture of office would result if a judge filed for other judicial office. The State, however, interprets Art. VII, § 10, as creating a vacuum into which the legislature was clearly empowered to move and to enact the statutes declaring a forfeiture of judicial office when district judges and supreme court justices file for other judicial office. The petitioners rely not only on the language of Art. VII, § 10, but also on the record of the constitutional proceedings which clearly establishes the intent of the delegates to permit judges to file for other judicial office without forfeiting their own offices. Forfeiture of office was intended as the result only when a judge filed for a legislative or executive position. (See Part I, supra.) The State concedes that the delegates had this intent, but nonetheless argues that the delegates somehow drafted a provision that did not reflect this intent. The State argues that this Court is bound by what was drafted rather than by what was intended. The State's interpretation of Art. VII, § 10, would permit the legislature to enact the forfeiture sanctions imposed by the challenged statutes. According to the State, Art. VII, § 10, does not declare what happens if a judge files for a judicial position  it only declares that a forfeiture results if a judge files for a nonjudicial office. Because the provision does not affirmatively declare that judges can file for other judicial office without suffering forfeiture of their own office, the State contends that the legislature may step into this vacuum and enact laws declaring what does happen when a judge files for other judicial office. With this as its premise, much of the State's brief is devoted to the theoretical basis on which it believes the legislature has the authority to enact so-called resign to run statutes. The cases cited in this analysis, however, do not apply to a situation where the question turns on the interpretation to be given to a resign to run constitutional provision. The question, of course, involves the interpretation to be given Art. VII, § 10. The State argued in its briefs that no ambiguity in the language exists and that its interpretation is the only reasonable one. Yet, in oral argument before this Court, the State conceded that petitioners' interpretation of Art. VII, § 10, is a reasonable one. Despite this concession of two diametrically opposed reasonable interpretations of the constitutional provision, the State refused to concede that an ambiguity exists that can be resolved only by reference to the record of the constitutional proceedings. The record, of course, supports the petitioners' interpretation of the constitution. The constitutional prohibition against judges seeking nonjudicial offices while still holding judicial office is but part of a general constitutional scheme declaring directly or indirectly the rights of office holders in all branches of government to seek other office while still holding office. The legislative article (Art. V) does not expressly mention whether a legislator can file for another elective office without forfeiting his legislative office, but Art. V, § 9, indirectly places restrictions on other office holding. It further prohibits a member of congress or a public office holder in this state from simultaneously holding office as a legislator. The executive article (Art. VI, § 5(2)) expressly provides that executive office holders ... may be a candidate for any public office during his term. (Emphasis added.) The judicial article is clearly the most restrictive  it imposes severe sanctions on office-seeking by judicial office holders. Any judge holding office in this state forfeits his office if he files for any office  other than a judicial position. (Art. VII, § 10, supra.) Though it does not mention filing for a legislative or an executive office, the crystal clear message of this provision requires a judge to forfeit his judicial office if he files for either a legislative or an executive office. It is equally clear, however, that the constitutional delegates did not intend a forfeiture of judicial office to result if a judge filed for other judicial office. The language, other than a judicial position, shows that the delegates intentionally left the door open for judicial office holders to file for other judicial office without forfeiting their offices as a condition to seeking other judicial office through the election process. The State's position would permit the legislature to close a door which the constitutional delegates intentionally left open. The door was left open because the delegates perceived a public benefit in opening up the judicial election process to judges who desired to move from lower courts to the district court and from district court to the supreme court, or from a justice on the supreme court to a chief justice on the supreme court. (See Part I, supra.) While Art. VII, § 10, does not affirmatively declare that judicial candidates can run for other judicial office without incurring forfeiture of their own office, its intent is sufficiently clear. To say that a judge forfeits his office if he files for a non-judicial office is but another way of saying that a sitting judge can file for other judicial office without forfeiting his office. Sections 3-1-607 and 3-1-608, MCA, forbid what Art. VII, § 10, authorizes, and they are therefore in conflict with this constitutional provision. This opinion shall constitute a declaratory judgment holding that sections 3-1-607 and 3-1-608, MCA, are unconstitutional. The request for declaratory relief is granted. HARRISON, SHEEHY and WEBER, JJ., concur. APPENDIX A 3-1-607. Supreme court justice or district court judge not to run for office  resignation required. (1) If a person occupying the office of chief justice or associate justice of the supreme court or judge of a district court of the state of Montana becomes a candidate for election to any elective office under the laws of the state of Montana, he shall immediately, and in any event at or before the time when he must file as a candidate for such office in any primary or special or general election, resign from his office of chief justice, associate justice, or district judge. (2) The resignation becomes effective immediately upon its delivery to the proper officer or superior. (3) The resignation requirement applies except when the person is a bona fide candidate for reelection to the identical office then occupied by him or for another nonpartisan judicial office the term of which does not commence earlier than the end of the term of the office then occupied by him. APPENDIX B 3-1-608. Forced vacancy. In the event of a failure to resign, the office of chief justice, associate justice, or district judge automatically becomes vacant and the former occupant has no further right, power, or authority therein for any purpose and no right to any emoluments thereof, notwithstanding the fact that a successor is not appointed or elected. The vacancy becomes operative to deprive the person of the emoluments of the office in order to carry out the policy of this section and 3-1-607.