Opinion ID: 3004297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Telling Rhonda to File an EEOC Charge

Text: Gross next argues that he also engaged in constitutionally protected speech when he “encouraged” his daughter to file an EEOC charge in response to Rodish’s conduct. This argument is a non-starter for two reasons. First, like the previous issue, we see no evidence that Gross spoke on a matter of public concern. The record gives hardly any indication of what Gross’s “encouragement” actually entailed—Gross merely points us to his deposition, where he said, “I told her to go to the EEOC.” Nothing in the record suggests that Gross had any motive other than to help his daughter seek redress. See id. Again, Gross contends that his knowledge of other incidents of harassment involving other officers is sufficient to infer Gross’s intent to raise a matter of public concern. As we discussed above, we disagree. The record fails to show that Gross encouraged other officers to file EEOC charges, nor does it show that Gross encouraged his daughter to file the charge to vindicate the interests of other female officers or to expose a pattern of harassment in the police department. Thus, neither the content (which is almost entirely unknown) nor the context of Gross’s statements to his daughter indicates that he spoke on a matter of public concern. Alternatively, Gross fails to show that any defendant knew that he told his daughter to file an EEOC charge. 20 No. 06-4042 This bears on the second step of the ordinary First Amendment retaliation analysis—causation. Gross identifies several statements in the record in which witnesses heard Loren-Maltese say that she did not trust Gross or his daughter because of “this EEOC thing” and that “you’re lucky your daughter has a job.” 2 But those statements indicate Loren-Maltese’s displeasure with Rhonda filing the EEOC charge, not with Gross’s telling her to file. Gross fails to cite any evidence that LorenMaltese or any other defendant knew what Gross told his daughter—or even whether he told his daughter anything at all. But what Gross told his daughter is the speech we’re concerned with here. To the extent filing an EEOC charge constitutes “speech,” it was Rhonda’s 2 Gross also alleges that Loren-Maltese stated in her deposition that she fired Gross “because of ‘his daughter,’ ” (Gross’s Br. 19 (quoting R.171 ¶ 37)), which Gross claims is evidence that LorenMaltese retaliated against Gross for approaching her about Rhonda’s situation and his encouraging Rhonda to file an EEOC charge. This argument mischaracterizes the evidence. Loren-Maltese said that she did not reappoint Gross to the BOFPC in part because she believed Rhonda received favorable treatment from the police commission. For example, she testified that she was aware of complaints about Rhonda for which other officers would have been brought up on charges before the commission. (Loren-Maltese Dep. 85, Apr. 13, 2005.) Loren-Maltese’s references to “his daughter” did not pertain to Rhonda’s EEOC charges or any allegations of sexual harassment in the police department. Accordingly, these statements are irrelevant to Gross’s First Amendment retaliation claims. No. 06-4042 21 speech, not Gross’s. The record contains no evidence that Gross participated in the filing of the charge or as a witness in the EEOC proceedings. Cf. Salas v. Wis. Dep’t of Corrs., 493 F.3d 913, 925 & n.8 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that participation as witness on EEOC charge con- stituted protected speech, but noting that parties did not address fact that plaintiff-witness had not yet testified). And Gross cites no authority that shows how he can recover under the First Amendment for retaliation based on what his daughter said or did. Because Gross failed to produce any evidence that the defendants were aware of his speech, Gross cannot demonstrate a triable issue of fact that his discharge was at all motivated by his encouraging his daughter to go to the EEOC. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision on this issue as well.