Opinion ID: 889643
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Presumed Prejudice versus Actual Prejudice under Federal Law

Text: ¶ 20 `The theory of our [trial] system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print.' Skilling, 130 S.Ct. at 2913 (brackets in Skilling ) (quoting Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462, 27 S.Ct. 556, 558, 51 L.Ed. 879 (1907)). A defendant can establish that jurors drawn from the community cannot judge his case impartially and unswayed by outside influence, thus necessitating a change of venue, by two methods: he can demonstrate that the jury pool is actually prejudiced against him, or he can demonstrate that juror prejudice should be presumed from prejudice in the community and pretrial publicity. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 803, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2038, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975); U.S. v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 307-08 (4th Cir.2003); Foley v. Parker, 488 F.3d 377, 387 (6th Cir.2007); U.S. v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir.2001); Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 1997); House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1023-24 (10th Cir.2008); see also e.g. Skilling, 130 S.Ct. at 2913-25 (analyzing the defendant's claims of presumed prejudice and actual prejudice). ¶ 21 [P]rejudice is presumed where `pretrial publicity is so pervasive and prejudicial that we cannot expect to find an unbiased jury pool in the community.' House, 527 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Goss v. Nelson, 439 F.3d 621, 628 (10th Cir.2006)); see also U.S. v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1181 (1st Cir.1990) (prejudicial, inflammatory publicity about the case has so saturated the community as to render it virtually impossible to obtain an impartial jury); U.S. v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1150 (11th Cir.2006) (en banc) (prejudicial publicity has saturated the community, and there is a reasonable certainty that the prejudice prevents the defendant from obtaining a fair trial). To justify a presumption of prejudice under this standard, the publicity must be both extensive and sensational in nature. Angiulo, 897 F.2d at 1181. ¶ 22 The seminal case on presumed prejudice is Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963). There, the defendant's videotaped confession to authorities was repeatedly broadcast to the relatively small community over the local television station, resulting in a kangaroo court which derailed due process and quashed any hope of a fair trial in that locale. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726, 83 S.Ct. at 1419. The Supreme Court held that the spectacle of Rideau personally confessing in detail to the crimes with which he was later to be charged, to the tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it, in a very real sense was Rideau's trialat which he pleaded guilty to murder. Any subsequent court proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hollow formality. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726, 83 S.Ct. at 1419 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court reached this conclusion without pausing to examine a particularized transcript of the voir dire examination of the members of the jury. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 727, 83 S.Ct. at 1419-20. Prejudice was presumed. ¶ 23 The Supreme Court also presumed prejudice in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1508, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966), due to the massive, pervasive and prejudicial publicity that occurred before and during Sheppard's trial on the charge of murdering his wife. Not only was the case made notorious by the virulent publicity about Sheppard and the murder, but numerous pictures of the jurors, with their addresses, appeared in the newspapers, exposing them to expressions of opinion from both cranks and friends. Moreover, bedlam and a carnival atmosphere reigned at the courthouse during trial, with newsmen taking over practically the entire courtroom and hounding most of the participants in the trial, especially Sheppard. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 353-55, 358, 86 S.Ct. at 1517-18, 1520. Due to the inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated the community and the disruptive influences in the courtroom, the Supreme Court concluded that Sheppard's trial had been inherently lacking in due process. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 351-52, 363, 86 S.Ct. at 1516-17, 1522-23; see also e.g. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1629, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965) (presuming prejudice where the media's overzealous reporting efforts led to considerable disruption of the proceedings and denied the judicial serenity and calm to which [the defendant] was entitled). ¶ 24 The rationale underlying presumed prejudice is that we simply cannot rely on jurors' claims that they can be impartial, and we therefore declare the publicity to be prejudicial as a matter of law. U.S. v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1182 (10th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2889, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) ([A]dverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.); Hayes, 632 F.3d at 511 (We may give little weight to a prospective juror's assurances of impartiality where the general atmosphere in the community or courtroom is sufficiently inflammatory. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); U.S. v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1176-77 (10th Cir.1991) (In rare cases, the community is so predisposed that prejudice can be presumed, and venue must be transferred as a matter of law.); LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure vol. 6, § 23.2(a), 264 ([P]rejudicial publicity may be so inflammatory and so pervasive that the voir dire simply cannot be trusted to fully reveal the likely prejudice among prospective jurors.). The principle of presumed prejudice is rarely applicable and is reserved for extreme situations. See Hayes, 632 F.3d at 508; Campa, 459 F.3d at 1143; accord Skilling, 130 S.Ct. at 2915 (A presumption of prejudice, our decisions indicate, attends only the extreme case.). The bar facing the defendant seeking to prove presumed prejudice is, correspondingly, extremely high. McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1182. Thus, it has been said that to establish presumptive prejudice, the defendant must show that an irrepressibly hostile attitude pervade[s] the community and that the publicity dictates the community's opinion as to guilt or innocence. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1176. It likewise has been said that prejudice cannot be presumed unless the trial atmosphere has been utterly corrupted by press coverage. Campa, 459 F.3d at 1144 (internal quotation marks omitted). Circumstances amounting to a circus atmosphere or lynch mob mentality would justify a presumption of prejudice. Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d 1557, 1566 (10th Cir.1994). So would proceedings that are entirely lacking in the solemnity and sobriety to which a defendant is entitled in a system that subscribes to any notion of fairness and rejects the verdict of a mob. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799, 95 S.Ct. at 2036. The reviewing court must find that the publicity in essence displaced the judicial process, thereby denying the defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial. McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1181. ¶ 25 Where circumstances are not so extreme as to warrant a presumption of prejudice, the defendant may claim actual prejudice. Actual prejudice exists when voir dire reveals that the jury pool harbors actual partiality or hostility against the defendant. Foley, 488 F.3d at 387; Hayes, 632 F.3d at 508; see also House, 527 F.3d at 1024 (actual prejudice manifests at jury selection when voir dire reveals that the effect of pretrial publicity is so substantial as to taint the entire jury pool). The voir dire testimony and the record of publicity must reveal the kind of wave of public passion that would make a fair trial unlikely by a jury empaneled from that community. House, 527 F.3d at 1024 (internal quotation marks omitted). The relevant question is whether prospective jurors' responses reflect such fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt of the defendant. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1035, 104 S.Ct. at 2891. Impartiality does not mean jurors are totally ignorant of the case. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how an intelligent venireman could be completely uninformed of significant events in his community. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1178 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Foley, 488 F.3d at 387.