Opinion ID: 793667
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reep's Challenges4

Text: 31 Reep first argues that the charges against him should have been dismissed on double jeopardy grounds. We disagree. 32 Reep initially was indicted separately from the other Appellants. Just before jury selection began for Reep's trial, the Government informed the district court that Government witness Curtis Roberson had failed to appear despite his promise to do so. The court issued a material witness warrant, and Roberson was taken into custody. The court conducted a hearing, at which Roberson testified that he was confused regarding his duty to appear. J.A. 233. Roberson also testified that he was taking numerous medications, including an anticonvulsant, an antidepressant, and an antipsychotic. The district court directed that Roberson be taken into custody as a material witness. After the jury was sworn, the court learned that Roberson had not been provided with his medications during the five days he had been in custody. The court questioned Roberson, who stated that he felt [a] little weak, id. at 243, and somewhat confused. The court granted Reep's request for a mistrial on the ground that Roberson's competency was suspect and he needed a psychiatric evaluation. 33 Thereafter, Reep was indicted along with the other Appellants. Prior to trial, Reep moved to bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that he had been forced to move for a mistrial by the Government's failure to ensure that Roberson was provided with his medications. Reep argued that even if the Government did not intend to provoke a mistrial, its conduct had been so reckless as to be the functional equivalent of intent to cause a mistrial. Id. at 221. The district court denied the motion. 34 While Reep now concedes the absence of any evidence that the Government acted with intent to provoke a mistrial, he continues to press his claim that the Government was so reckless in not ensuring delivery of Roberson's medications that it should be deemed to have acted intentionally. We disagree. 35 The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. U.S. Const. amend. V. This clause protects a criminal defendant from facing repeated prosecutions for the same offense, Or. v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 671, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982), and accordingly, the government is generally allowed only one opportunity to compel a defendant to stand trial, Ariz. v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978). However, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply when a defendant requests or consents to a mistrial, unless the prosecutor has engaged in conduct intended to provoke a mistrial. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 675-76, 102 S.Ct. 2083. The Kennedy intent exception is reserved for conduct intended to `goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial. Id. at 676, 102 S.Ct. 2083. Further, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the prosecution acted with specific intent to provoke a mistrial. U.S. v. Borromeo, 954 F.2d 245, 247 (4th Cir. 1992). 36 Reep provides no support for his claim that reckless conduct can be equated to intentional provocation of a mistrial request. Even if we were to accept this proposition, however, the facts here do not support a finding of recklessness. Officials at the local jail where Roberson was housed assured the Government that Roberson would receive his medications. The Government sought to ensure that Roberson received his medications by offering to obtain the medications and bring them to the jail—an offer that the jail refused because it prohibits anyone from bringing medications into the jail. Additionally, the United States Marshal Service requested that a doctor examine Roberson. It thus cannot be said that the Government was reckless with respect to Roberson's need to be provided with his medications.
37 Reep next complains that the district court erred in restricting his cross-examination of certain witnesses. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. See U.S. v. Turner, 198 F.3d 425, 429 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating standard of review). 38 The Constitution guarantees the right of a criminal defendant to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the [defendant] the opportunity of cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (emphasis & internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, [c]ross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Id. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105. Nevertheless, the district court retains wide latitude ... to impose reasonable limits on ... cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Del. v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). With these principles in mind, we review Reep's particular claims.
39 Moore, Jr. testified about Reep's involvement in the conspiracy during the summer and fall of 2001. According to this testimony, Moore wanted to help Reep reestablish himself in the drug business following his release from prison in May 2001. Moore provided Reep with cocaine to sell in exchange for Reep accepting deliveries of cocaine and for allowing the conspiracy to use an automobile paint shop where he worked to remove cocaine that had been concealed in vehicles. 40 On cross-examination, Reep's counsel questioned Moore, Jr. at length about his agreement to cooperate with the Government, his truthfulness, and his ability to accurately recall the events of the summer of 2001. The district court first asked Reep's counsel to conclude cross-examination after he had been questioning Moore, Jr. for approximately one hour. Reep's counsel proceeded with further cross-examination concerning statements Moore, Jr. had made when he was arrested. The court directed counsel to move on after the Government stipulated that this questioning had laid an adequate foundation for a subsequent witness' testimony. Counsel asked a few more questions, and then closed his cross-examination. 41 The district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination. Reep was allowed to thoroughly explore issues relating to Moore, Jr.'s recall of events and his motives for testifying. Any further testimony on these subjects would have been cumulative. See U.S. v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734, 744-45 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding further inquiry into contents of police officer's disciplinary file because further inquiry would have been cumulative).
42 During a recess, Reep's attorney observed two Government witnesses, Officer Heath Eckstein (who had just testified) and Officer John Poch (who was about to testify), talking in the hallway. According to counsel, the officers were going over a report that Officer Eckstein held in his hand. J.A. 1393. Although the court allowed Reep's counsel to question Officer Poch regarding the conversation, after counsel exceeded the bounds set by the court for this examination, the court questioned the officers. Both officers — who were partners in the investigation of the conspiracy—admitted having a conversation, but denied discussing the trial. 5 The court refused to allow Reep's counsel to further cross-examine the officers about their conversation. Reep contends that this refusal was an abuse of discretion. 43 When a party alleges a violation of a sequestration order, the court may allow the matter to be explored through cross-examination. U.S. v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1175 n. 8 (1st Cir. 1993). The party alleging a violation bears the burden of demonstrating that a violation in fact occurred. U.S. v. Meggers, 912 F.2d 246, 250 (8th Cir. 1990). Here, both Reep's counsel and the district court examined the officers regarding the potential violation of the sequestration order without producing any indication that the officers had discussed the case. The district court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting further cross-examination. 6
44 Each time a Government witness testified about the conspiracy without mentioning Reep, Reep's counsel cross-examined the witness about the witness' lack of knowledge of Reep's involvement. After several of these instances, the district court concluded that such examination was beyond the scope of direct, and refused to allow Reep's counsel to continue in this manner. 45 This ruling was not an abuse of discretion. Nothing precluded Reep's counsel from arguing to the jury that witnesses knowledgeable about the conspiracy had not identified Reep. He did not need to cross-examine such witnesses in order to make this point.
46 Reep next maintains that he was denied a fair trial by the excessive interference of the district court. For example, with respect to Reep's cross-examination of Moore, Jr., Reep contends that [o]n at least fourteen(14) occasions ... the district court interrupted counsel's cross-examination sua sponte and without government-initiated objection. Br. of Appellants at 51 (July 23, 2004). Reep maintains that on these occasions counsel was unfairly rebuk[ed] and chid[ed]. Id. Reep also maintains that the district court should not have intervened in counsel's questioning of Reep's expert witness. When, as here, the defendant objects to interference by the district court, review is for abuse of discretion. 7 U.S. v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 1272 (4th Cir. 1995). 47 Rule 614(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a district. court may interrogate witnesses called by the parties. Additionally, the court is required to exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence. Fed. R.Evid. 611(a). The court must exercise this control in order to make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth and to avoid needless consumption of time. Id.; see id. (providing that control also may be exercised to protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment). Nevertheless, it is critically important that the court retain the general atmosphere of impartiality required of a fair tribunal. U.S. v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 678 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). When the district court oversteps its bounds to the prejudice of the defendant, a violation of due process has occurred. Id. at 679.
48 Reep first complains of the manner in which the district court intervened in his counsel's cross-examination of Moore, Jr. On several occasions, the district court interrupted cross-examination— e.g., by admonishing counsel that a question had been asked and answered. We have carefully reviewed the transcript, and we find nothing improper in the actions of the court. Counsel's cross-examination of Moore, Jr. was repetitive in the extreme, and the district court was well within its discretion to attempt to curb counsel's tendency to ask the same question over and over.
49 Reep called a professor of pharmacology, Dr. William Cooke, as an expert regarding the drugs Government witness Roberson was taking and their potential effect. After listing the psychoactive drugs Roberson was taking, Dr. Cooke testified that taking the drugs in therapeutic dosages could result in confusion, decreased reasoning capacity, and short-term memory loss. After cross-examination by the Government, the district court engaged in the following colloquy with Dr. Cooke: 50 THE COURT: ... [A]re these compounds used to treat people suffering from bipolar disease? 51 THE WITNESS: They can be used for that purpose, yes. 52 THE COURT: And when these particular drugs are used, psychiatrists are trained to prescribe these drugs in the appropriate dosage; is that correct? 53 THE WITNESS: Yes. From experience, that's right. 54 THE COURT: And the psychiatrist not only prescribed these drugs, but they are required to monitor these drugs to be sure that they are having the effect that they prescribed them for in the first place; is that correct? 55 THE WITNESS: That would be the ideal circumstance, yes. 56 J.A. 2190. On redirect, Reep's counsel established that monitoring of the patient does not necessarily mean that the patient will not suffer the cognitive effects described in Dr. Cooke's direct testimony. 57 Reep complains that the questioning by the district court blunted Dr. Cooke's testimony by making the jury think that monitoring would avoid any adverse effects on Roberson's memory. To the extent this is true, however, Reep's counsel established on redirect that memory loss could occur even with physician monitoring. Additionally, Roberson's difficulties with his memory were evident from his testimony for the Government, and were further illuminated by counsel's extensive cross-examination.
58 Reep also maintains that even if the district court did not abuse its discretion in any particular instance, he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of the interventions by the court. Any such cumulative effect, however, was ameliorated by the instructions to the jury. In its pre-trial instructions, the district court informed the jury, 59 [I]t is sometimes the duty of the Court to admonish or warn an attorney who out of zeal for his or her cause does something which is not in keeping with the rules of evidence or procedure. If this should happen, do not permit this to have any effect on your evaluation of the merits of any evidence that comes before you. 60 Id. at 384. Additionally, during the jury charge, the court reminded the jurors that 61 it is the duty of the Court to admonish an attorney who out of zeal for his or her cause does something which the Court believes is not in keeping with the Rules of Evidence or Procedure. You are ... to draw absolutely no inference against the side to whom an admonition of the Court may have been addressed during the trial of this case. 62 Id. at 2373-74. Jurors are presumed to adhere to cautionary instructions issued by the district court. U.S. v. Abdullah, 162 F.3d 897, 904 (6th Cir. 1998).
63 Reep's counsel began presentation of Reep's case on the afternoon of the seventh day of trial. After counsel had presented several witnesses, he informed the court that he had eight more witnesses; counsel stated, I don't think there will be any problem finishing today. J.A. 2093. After Reep's counsel had presented five more witnesses, he represented that he had three remaining; further discussion with the court reduced this number to two. Counsel stated, The last witness I have is... Dr. Cooke. Id. at 2170. Following Dr. Cooke's testimony, however, counsel informed the court that he needed to think about presenting one or two more witnesses before he was prepared to rest. Id. at 2194. The court insisted that counsel decide immediately whether he would present additional witnesses; after counsel declined to do so, the court declared that Reep's case was rested. Reep appeals this ruling as an abuse of discretion, see U.S. v. Janati, 374 F.3d 263, 273-74 (4th Cir. 2004), arguing that counsel should have been allowed to consider the matter during the evening recess and rest or present additional witnesses the following morning. 8 64 We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion here. Reep's counsel repeatedly and unequivocally stated that he did not plan to call any witnesses after Dr. Cooke. In light of these representations, and given that the court day was not yet finished, it was not improper for the district court to insist that Reep either present additional witnesses at that time or rest his case. Reep's complaint that the Government was treated with more deference is unavailing. After the Government completed its case in chief, the district court allowed the Government to delay the formal act of resting its case to the following morning so that the Government could ensure that its exhibits were in order. The Government made clear that it was willing to rest its case that afternoon, however, and did not indicate a desire to consider calling additional witnesses. Thus, Reep was not treated unfairly in comparison to the treatment the Government received.
65 During his closing argument, Reep's counsel gave the jury four definitions of reasonable doubt. During the fourth definition, the district court interjected, saying, I hate to interrupt you, but not even the Court is permitted to define reasonable doubt in the Fourth Circuit for the jury, so, respectfully, do not attempt to define it for them. J.A. 2277. The court then referred to counsel's definition of reasonable doubt while instructing the jury: 66 Now, ladies and gentlemen, let me say one more word about reasonable doubt. You've heard the concept of reasonable doubt. During the closing arguments [counsel for Reep] attempted to define the word reasonable doubt. The law for the Court is simple. The Court is not permitted to attempt to define the word reasonable doubt.... And that is because the courts have found that the definition is a selfevident definition and there is no better way of explaining the concept. All efforts to explain reasonable doubt simply lead[ ] to more confusion. So you're not bound to accept [counsel's] definitions of reasonable doubt. So not even the Court is going to attempt to give you that definition. So we're telling you to rely on your reasonable understanding of the concept of the word reasonable doubt. It's a selfevident definition. 67 Id. at 2338-39. Reep now argues that the district court abused its discretion in interrupting closing argument and in instructing the jury that the argument was improper. See U.S. v. Patterson, 150 F.3d 382, 389 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating standard of review). 68 It is well settled in this circuit that a district court should not attempt to define the term `reasonable doubt' in a jury instruction absent a specific request for such a definition from the jury. U.S. v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1300 (4th Cir. 1995). A district court may also restrict counsel from defining the phrase. Patterson, 150 F.3d at 389. Here, the district court allowed counsel to define reasonable doubt three times, prohibiting only the presentation of a fourth definition. There was no abuse of discretion.