Opinion ID: 797848
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Agent DePodesta's Testimony

Text: 15 Mr. James' defense theory was that he was an innocent person who had been set up by Dubon, a career criminal looking to save himself from prison and from other drug dealers to whom he was indebted. Mr. James' attorney pursued this theory in her opening statement and on cross-examination of the Government's first witness, Agent Daniel Dick of the United States Secret Service, by questioning Agent Dick about Dubon's background. Anticipating a similar cross-examination of Agent DePodesta, the Government sought permission to question Agent DePodesta on Dubon's background as a cooperating informant and on Dubon's experience with Mr. James in order to provide context to the investigation and to explain why the Government had chosen to work with Dubon. The Government proffered that Agent DePodesta would testify about what Dubon had told him about prior drug deals with Mr. James. 16 As we have noted earlier, prior to trial, the district court had ruled that the Government could not offer such testimony unless the defendant had opened the door to the prior acts. At trial, Mr. James did not object to the Government's eliciting testimony from Agent DePodesta on direct examination regarding Mr. James' prior drug deals with Dubon in anticipation of questioning by Mr. James' attorneys on cross-examination regarding Dubon's background. Indeed, Mr. James' attorneys stated explicitly that they were prepared to open the door to this testimony because of their anticipated cross-examination. 17 There was no error in the district court's decision to admit Agent DePodesta's testimony regarding Mr. James' prior dealings with Dubon. Before the Government elicited the testimony, the district court had issued a limiting instruction cautioning that any testimony regarding prior dealings between Mr. James and Dubon could be considered by the jurors only for purposes of providing context for the Government's decision to work with Dubon and, if it should become an issue, Dubon's credibility. The district court specifically stated that such testimony could not be considered to determine whether Mr. James committed the uncharged offenses. We presume that jurors follow instructions given them unless there is an overwhelming probability that the jury was unable to follow the instruction as given. United States v. Eberhart, 434 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir.2006). The defendant bears the burden of establishing this overwhelming probability. Id. 18 The testimony elicited from Agent DePodesta tracks the limitations imposed by the district court. Before questioning Agent DePodesta regarding what Dubon had told him about Mr. James, the Government questioned him about the events on the day on which Mr. James was arrested. The Government then questioned Agent DePodesta as to how he had come to work with Dubon and Dubon's work with other officers on other cases. The Government then asked Agent DePodesta a total of three questions related to Dubon's prior dealings with Mr. James, all of which led to a line of questioning regarding the steps taken to assess the reliability of the information received from Dubon. Mr. James did not object to this testimony or to the limiting instruction. 19 An out of court statement is hearsay when it is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). We have held that statements offered to provide context for other admissible statements are not themselves hearsay because they are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See United States v. Van Sach, 458 F.3d 694, 701-02 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that recorded statements by a confidential informant introduced only to provide context for the defendant's admissions on the [same] recordings are not offered for their truth); United States v. Tolliver, 454 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir.2006) (same). We also have suggested that informants' statements offered to explain why authorities targeted a particular defendant and to dispel an accusation of improper motive would not be offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and thus would not constitute hearsay. See United States v. Silva, 380 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir.2004) (noting that testimony regarding an informant's tip could be relevant to demonstrating why the Government targeted the defendant rather than the truth of the tip itself, but that no such argument had been advanced in that case). Furthermore, statements offered to rebut arguments the defense raises on cross-examination are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to rehabilitate the witness and likewise are not hearsay. See United States v. Whitaker, 127 F.3d 595, 604 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that testimony elicited in response to the defendant's suggestion on cross-examination that the witness had formed his conclusions incorrectly was not offered for its truth but to rehabilitate the witness). 20 The district court's limiting instructions confined the jury's consideration of Dubon's statements to Agent DePodesta to non-hearsay purposes. The testimony elicited from Agent DePodesta conformed to those limiting instructions. Agent DePodesta's testimony regarding Mr. James' prior dealings with Dubon were not excludable as hearsay. 21 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment bars out-of-court testimonial statements unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant and the declarant is unavailable to testify. Van Sach, 458 F.3d at 701. However, the Sixth Amendment does not bar out-of-court statements when the statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; thus, the Sixth Amendment poses no bar to the admission of non-hearsay statements. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); Van Sach, 458 F.3d at 701; Tolliver, 454 F.3d at 665. When out-of-court statements are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied if the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the person repeating the out-of-court statement. See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 85 L.Ed.2d 425 (1985). Because Agent DePodesta's testimony as to Dubon's prior dealings with Mr. James was not hearsay and Mr. James had the opportunity to cross-examine Agent DePodesta, there is no violation of the Confrontation Clause. 22 Furthermore, the testimony elicited from Agent DePodesta was not inadmissible under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 404(b) prohibits evidence of prior crimes when such evidence is offered to suggest that the defendant acted in conformity with a particular character trait. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). However, the testimony elicited here was limited to providing context for the investigation, not to prove the charged offenses. Absent any showing that the jury could not follow the court's cautionary instruction, we presume that the jury limited its consideration of the testimony in accordance with the court's instruction. 23 There was no error in allowing Agent DePodesta's testimony regarding Mr. James' prior dealings with Dubon.