Opinion ID: 2162163
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Restitution Amount Properly Exceeded Trial Evidence

Text: Benton submits that the maximum amount of restitution she could be ordered to pay is limited to the evidence presented during her criminal trial. Therefore, Benton contends that the Superior Court erred by ordering her to pay an amount of restitution in excess of $2,300. Benton bases this claim on the trial testimony by an accountant for the Association. According to that accountant, prior to trial he had only been able to determine that Benton had embezzled at least $2,300 and had attempted to conceal that theft by her lapping scheme. Benton's contention disregards the legal distinction between evidence that is either relevant or necessary to establish the elements of an offense at a criminal trial and evidence that is admissible at a hearing to determine the appropriate amount of restitution. There is no constitutional or statutory mandate that the complete economic consequences of a defendant's illegal conduct be established at the criminal trial. In fact, the complete economic consequences of a crime would frequently be irrelevant and inadmissible during the criminal trial, e.g., out-of-pocket losses and other expenses. [3] There are separately enumerated statutory factors, however, which either permit or require the complete economic ramifications of the convicted defendant's illegal conduct to be taken into account by the sentencing judge for purposes of ordering restitution. [4] Benton was charged with Falsification of Business Records [5] and Felony Theft. [6] The State met its burden by proving the elements of those offenses at the criminal trial. The State presented evidence that Benton had embezzled more than $500 from the Association and had falsified records in order to conceal her theft. The jury was convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Benton was guilty of both crimes. The Delaware Criminal Code imposes separate statutory responsibilities upon the Superior Court for the purposes of sentencing. Section 841(d) provides that, [u]pon conviction, the sentencing judge shall require full restitution to the victim for any monetary losses suffered. . . . Accordingly, Section 4106(b) directs the sentencing judge to determine the nature and amount of restitution, if any, to be made to each victim of the crime of each convicted offender. The statutory criteria for making that determination are set forth in Section 4106(a): [a]ny person convicted ... shall be liable to each victim of the offense for the value of the property or property rights lost to the victim and for the value of any property which has diminished in worth as a result of the actions of such convicted offender and shall be ordered by the court to make restitution. If the court does not require that restitution be paid to a victim, the court shall state its reason on the record. The convicted offender shall also be liable for direct out-of-pocket losses, loss of earnings and other expenses and inconveniences incurred by victim as a direct result of the crime. . . . [7] Thus, the statutory scheme for restitution expressly provides for the victim to recover for the value of the property rights lost or diminished by the defendant's criminal conduct, as well as direct out-of-pocket losses, loss of earnings and other expenses and inconveniences. [8] In determining the amount of restitution to order for the total actual theft by Benton, the Superior Court relied upon the testimony of the Association's accountant, who had also testified at the criminal trial, and the testimony of the Association's president. The accountant had testified, based on his pretrial review of the Association's financial records, that Benton had embezzled at least $2,300. At the restitution hearing, the president of the Association described the post-trial calculations which reflected Benton's embezzlement of more than $3,600 in additional money from the Association. The Superior Court properly admitted evidence regarding the full amount of Benton's actual theft at the restitution hearing. [9] In addition to restitution for the total amount stolen, Section 4106(a) contemplates that a restitution award will include compensation to the victim for out-of-pocket losses and other expenses directly resulting from the defendant's criminal acts. The Superior Court's restitution order included the $7,460 accountant's fee charged for the reconstruction of the Association's financial records that had been falsified by Benton as part of her embezzlement scheme. The Superior Court also ordered for restitution of 90% of the accountant's fee required to determine the extent of the money missing as part of the lapping scheme ($6,660) and one-half of the amount charged by the Association's accountants to prepare for trial ($1,336). The total accountant's fee included in the Superior Court's order of restitution was $15,456. [10] The Superior Court correctly concluded that Section 4106(a) authorized it to order restitution for the accounting fees incurred by the Association. The record reflects that those out-of-pocket expenses were incurred as a result of Benton's theft from the Association and her falsification of the Association's business records. In cases of embezzlement, accounting fees for restoration of financial records and preparation of the case against the defendant are properly awarded to the victim as part of the amount of restitution for out-of-pocket expenses. [11]