Opinion ID: 2572520
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the District Court Err in Denying Tiffany's Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal?

Text: At the conclusion of the State's case in chief, Tiffany moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the State had failed to prove the corpus delicti independent of her confessions. She based her argument upon the testimony of the Pathologist, who stated that death caused by drowning, smothering, or SIDS does not leave any evidence of causation discoverable by autopsy. If the victim forcibly resists, or excessive force is applied, there may be evidence of certain types of traumatic injury that may occur in connection with the smothering. He found no evidence of trauma during Nathan's autopsy, but, because the very young typically do not resist smothering, the lack of trauma did not disprove that Nathan was smothered. Because the autopsy did not disclose any traumatic injury, disease, or congenital abnormality that could have caused Nathan's death, and he was under six months of age, the Pathologist diagnosed his cause of death as SIDS. It is the diagnosis given when there is an otherwise unexplained death of an infant. His autopsy, however, neither proved nor disproved Tiffany's statement that she smothered Nathan. According to the Pathologist, if Tiffany's statement is credible, then he would say that Nathan died because of smothering. If her statement is not credible, then he would say that Nathan died of SIDS. Tiffany argues that she cannot be convicted of manslaughter unless there is other evidence, independent of her out-of-court statements, showing that Nathan's death was caused by criminal action. Absent such evidence, she contends that she is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. In State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 70 P. 1051 (1902), this Court first addressed the issue of whether a criminal conviction could be based solely upon the extrajudicial confessions or statements of the defendant. In Keller the defendant was convicted of violating the quarantine laws by bringing into Idaho within forty days of the governor's quarantine proclamation issued on March 19, 1901, sheep that had been held, herded, ranged within, or driven through Box Elder County, Utah. The State's evidence consisted of the governor's proclamation and the testimony of a witness who stated that on April 12, 1901, he went to the defendant's sheep camp in Oneida County, Idaho, that the defendant had a band of about 2,000 sheep there, and that the defendant had stated that he had wintered the sheep on the desert and then two or three days ago had brought them through Box Elder County, Utah, into Idaho. At the close of the State's case, the defendant asked the court to instruct the jury to return a verdict in his behalf because of the insufficiency of the evidence, which motion the court denied. He then appealed, contending that his motion should have been granted because the State failed in its case in chief to prove the corpus delicti. This Court recognized the general rule that the fact that a crime has been committed cannot be proved by the extrajudicial confessions or statements of the prisoner, and that there must be some evidence or corroborating circumstances tending to show that a crime has been committed, aside from such confessions or statements. 8 Idaho at 704, 70 P. at 1052. With respect to the corroborating evidence, this Court recognized, Full proof of the body of the crime, the corpus delicti,independently of the confessions, is not required by any of the cases; and in many of them slight corroborating facts were held sufficient. 8 Idaho at 705, 70 P. at 1052 (citation omitted). This Court then held that in this case there was sufficient corroborating evidence and so the court did not err in denying defendant's motion. The only corroborating evidence offered in the State's case in chief was the witness' testimony that on April 12, 1901, he saw the defendant tending the band of sheep in Oneida County, Idaho. The State offered no corroborating evidence that the defendant had held, herded, ranged within, or driven his sheep through Box Elder County, Utah, or that he had brought them into Idaho after, rather than before, the governor's proclamation. We next considered the issue in State v. Downing, 23 Idaho 540, 130 P. 461 (1913), in which the defendant was convicted of attempting to rape a thirteen-year-old girl. The State had offered into evidence extrajudicial statements of the defendant, and he contended on appeal that there was insufficient other evidence to establish the corpus delicti of the crime. This Court noted that the applicable rule of law was, Full proof of the body of the crime, the corpus delicti, independently of the confession, is not required by any of the cases; and in many of them slight corroborating facts are held sufficient. 23 Idaho at 544, 130 P. at 462. The girl had not testified, and the State's case rested largely upon the testimony of a witness named Fix. She testified that the defendant came into Fix's room in his stocking feet, that a few minutes later the girl came into the room with her hair down and her clothes unfastened, that she threw her arms around Fix's neck and told her that the defendant had tried to have sexual intercourse with her, and that the defendant responded, I didn't hurt you, did I? In holding that there was sufficient corroborating evidence independent of the defendant's statement, this Court said, Some of the circumstances corroborating the alleged confession of the defendant in this case are his appearance in the room of witness Fix in his stocking feet, and, shortly after, the girl's coming in crying and in a disheveled condition. We think the corroboration was sufficient. 23 Idaho at 544-45, 130 P. at 462. The next case addressing this issue was State v. Wilson, 51 Idaho 659, 9 P.2d 497 (1932), in which the defendant was convicted of injuring a public jail. Three other codefendants used hacksaws to cut through the steel floor of a tank in which they were incarcerated at the Bannock County jail. They crawled through the hole and the space between the floor of the tank and the jail floor. They were apprehended as they were cutting through the iron bars in a window. The defendant had visited the jail before the attempted escape. When questioned by the police, he stated that he had purchased hacksaws at the hardware store and acid at the drug store and that he had delivered those items to someone at the county jail, who reimbursed him for their actual cost. The proprietor of the drug store testified that eight or nine days before the attempted escape, the defendant had asked him what kind of acid would eat through soft iron over hard steel, and that he had told the defendant that hydrochloric acid would eat through both. An employee of the drug store testified that five days before the escape attempt, the defendant came into the drug store and purchased twelve ounces of hydrochloric acid. No hydrochloric acid was found at the scene of the attempted escape, although one of the codefendants had told a police officer that a bottle of hydrochloric acid had been sent to another codefendant, but the bottle was dropped and broken. There was also a hacksaw found in the window of the jail at the time the codefendants were apprehended, but the opinion does not indicate that it was identified as the type sold at the hardware store where the defendant claimed to have purchased the ones he delivered to the jail. One of the issues raised by the defendant on appeal was that there was no sufficient evidence corroborating his extrajudicial admissions to sustain a conviction. We held that slight corroborating facts are sufficient and that there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the defendant's admissions and establish his guilt. In State v. Van Vlack, 57 Idaho 316, 65 P.2d 736 (1937), the defendant challenged on appeal the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury as follows: The jury are instructed that they cannot convict defendant alone upon his own confession, unless the same is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect defendant with the offense committed, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of an offense. On appeal, the defendant relied upon a treatise that cited the Texas case of Cox v. State, 69 S.W. 145 (Tex.Crim.App.1902), which had approved that instruction. In addressing the issue, this Court noted in Van Vlack that Cox v. State had been modified in a later decision of the Texas court, Ingram v. State, 78 Tex. Crim. 559, 182 S.W. 290 (App.1915), holding that confessions may be used to aid even the proof of the corpus delicti not alone the connection of the defendant with the crime. 57 Idaho at 354, 65 P.2d at 753. This Court then held: The requested instruction was furthermore clearly erroneous in this, that it went beyond the law as heretofore laid down by this court as to what evidence, in addition to the confessions of the defendant, is necessary to sustain a conviction and did not state that slight corroborating facts are sufficient, which has clearly been the rule in this State since 1902. 57 Idaho at 354-55, 65 P.2d at 753. Finally, in State v. Urie, 92 Idaho 71, 437 P.2d 24 (1968), the defendant was convicted of obtaining money by false pretenses in connection with a scheme to defraud an insurance company by concocting a story that one James F. Fraley had received serious injuries resulting in permanent paralysis from a fall into an elevator pit at a bean storage facility. The defendant made statements concerning Fraley's accidents and injuries to a representative of the insurance company and to counsel for the insurance company and the bean company, and on two later occasions voluntarily changed portions of his statement, making the purported liability of the bean company and its insurer appear more certain. After Fraley settled with the insurance company, and failed to pay the defendant his share of the settlement, the defendant contacted counsel for the bean company and made a statement setting out in detail that his entire prior story had been false for the purpose of obtaining money to be divided between Fraley and himself. The statement was reduced to writing and later signed by the defendant. On appeal, the defendant argued that there was no evidence corroborating his extrajudicial statement that he had committed a crime. When addressing the issue, this Court first noted: This court has frequently held that an extra-judicial confession, standing alone, is not sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of some corroborating circumstances. However, slight corroboration will suffice. While the evidence adduced at the trial might not be sufficient, in the absence of appellant's extra-judicial confession, to sustain a conviction thereon, it is not necessary to establish independently of the confession each element of the corpus delicti. 92 Idaho at 73, 437 P.2d at 26 (citations omitted). This Court then held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to corroborate the defendant's confession, pointing out two factors. First, the medical evidence at the defendant's trial showed that Fraley's left leg was not paralyzed, as he had alleged in his claim. Second, the defendant's course of conduct lent credibility to his statement. [Defendant] twice changed portions of his story with the result that the purported liability of the bean company and its carrier was irrefutably established for all intents and purposes. 92 Idaho at 73, 437 P.2d at 27. This Court then added that Fraley and the defendant were longstanding friends and that a crime of this particular nature would be difficult, if not well impossible, to prove with any degree of certainty in the absence of a confession on the part of one or both parties involved. Id. In summary, since 1902 the law in Idaho has been that while an extrajudicial confession or admission, standing alone, is not sufficient to convict an accused, only slight corroborating facts are necessary to uphold the conviction. The corroborating evidence need not be sufficient to establish each element of the corpus delicti. State v. Urie, 92 Idaho 71, 437 P.2d 24 (1968). In a case involving the unlawful killing of a human being, the corpus delicti consists of two elements: (1) the death of the person named in the charge as dying or being dead, and (2) that the death was by the criminal action or means of the defendant. State v. Cutler, 94 Idaho 295, 486 P.2d 1008 (1971). In this case, Tiffany's extrajudicial statements that she had killed Nathan were corroborated by the facts that Nathan was dead, that he died while under the exclusive care of Tiffany, and that her statements about how she killed him were consistent with the autopsy results. The district court did not err in denying Tiffany's motion for a judgment of acquittal.