Opinion ID: 340805
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Judith's Appeal.

Text: 23 Judith Jones was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute heroin, one count of using a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin and one count of using a telephone to facilitate a conspiracy to distribute heroin. She challenges on appeal the district court's refusal to sever her trial from Sylvester's and to dismiss for lack of sufficient evidence. 24 To convict a person for conspiracy to commit a crime it is not necessary to prove that the defendant knew all of the conspirators or was aware of all the details, but it must be shown that the person knowingly contributed . . . efforts in furtherance of it. United States v. Hester,465 F.2d 1125, 1127 (8th Cir. 1972) (quoting Nassif v. United States, 370 F.2d 147, 152 (8th Cir. 1966)). Knowledge is also essential for a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). 25 The evidence shows that Judith may have on one occasion accompanied Sylvester to a meeting with Cannon. 2 This was the February 19, 1976 meeting. At this meeting the woman involved did not participate in the transaction, but was 30 yards away in the parking lot. 26 Other than the fact that Sylvester and Judith are married, the only other evidence allegedly linking Judith to the conspiracy are her two telephone conversations with Cannon. On March 17, 1976 in a telephone conversation, Judith directed Cannon to the body shop where you went before. The conversation did not demonstrate that Judith had knowledge of the transaction which had previously transpired at the body shop or of one which might take place. Judith testified that she often relayed messages for her husband and that she did not participate in any drug sales. 27 In a telephone conversation on April 8, 1976 Judith told Cannon that an individual referred to as she would meet him at the pharmacy, and then the two of them would go to the doctor. When Cannon said he did not have a car, Judith said she would call him. Judith later called Cannon and told him that he was already gone. The government argues that the first statement was in code and that the subsequent calls demonstrate that Judith knew the code and that known use of a code demonstrates knowledge of the conspiracy. An equally strong inference from this evidence is that Judith was merely relating a message for her husband, which she testified she did not always understand. 28 Evidence must do more than merely raise suspicion or possibility of guilt. Surmise cannot be permitted in a criminal case. We are not persuaded that the evidence was sufficient to convince a fair minded jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Judith knowingly participated in the alleged conspiracy or that she knowingly used a communications facility in furtherance of a conspiracy to distribute heroin or in furtherance of a distribution of heroin. We order vacation of her convictions. See United States v. Kelton, 446 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1971). See also United States v. Shahane, 517 F.2d 1173, 1177 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893, 96 S.Ct. 191, 46 L.Ed.2d 124 (1975); United States v. Steinhilber, 484 F.2d 386, 389 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Jensen, 462 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1972). 29 The judgment of conviction of Sylvester Jones in case No. 76-1537 is affirmed; the judgment of conviction of Judith Jones in case No. 76-1536 is ordered reversed and the cause is remanded with direction to enter a judgment of acquittal.