Opinion ID: 198296
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waived Claims of Error

Text: 18 We briefly mention at the outset those claims that the complaining defendants have not adequately preserved. First, Durfee moved for severance immediately before the government called Matthew O'Brien as a rebuttal witness but not before trial. By failing to raise the issue before trial, he has waived his right to pursue it here. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(5); United States v. McLaughlin, 957 F.2d 12, 18 (1st Cir.1992). 19 Second, Fogarty claims that venue was not properly established as to the counts charging conspiracy to commit the robbery of the D'Angelo Sandwich Shop in Stoneham, Massachusetts and possession and transportation, respectively, of firearms by a felon. It is settled beyond peradventure that venue is a personal privilege which can be waived. United States v. Santiago, 83 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir.1996). Fogarty did not challenge venue on the conspiracy count until his motion for judgment of acquittal, and he challenges venue as to the firearms counts for the first time on appeal. His failure to raise these challenges prior to trial prevents him from raising them now. See id. (citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(2) (mandating waiver of most defenses that could have been, but were not, raised prior to trial)). 20 Third, LiCausi challenges the sentences he received for his four convictions for using a firearm during a violent crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). He was sentenced under the statute to one five-year term for his first violation and three twenty-year terms for his second and subsequent violations, all to be served consecutively to each other and to the sentences imposed for his other offenses. LiCausi preserved an objection to these sentences based on the proposition that a defendant must have already served the five-year sentence for his first offense before a twenty-year sentence could be imposed. 2 LiCausi abandoned this argument on appeal, thereby waiving it. See United States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir.1991). He argues instead that multiple sentences imposed under § 924(c) in one proceeding, while required to run consecutively to non-s 924(c) sentences, may run concurrently with each other. The law is clear that a defendant may not raise arguments for the first time on appeal that he did not seasonably address to the trial court. See id. at 55 (A criminal defendant, dissatisfied with the district court's rulings at sentencing yet persuaded that his original arguments lacked merit, cannot switch horses mid-stream in hopes of locating a swifter steed.). LiCausi's claim, then, is dead on arrival. 21 Having disposed of these contentions, we may now address those that were properly preserved. 22