Opinion ID: 2750180
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: City’s Liability Insurance

Text: The plaintiffs also assign error to the jury being informed that the city had liability insurance on the date of Simcha’s fall. After the jury was so informed, the trial justice instructed the jury that such information was offered simply for the purpose of demonstrating ownership or control and was not to be considered for the purpose of determining the negligence of any party. Rule 411 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence provides that “[e]vidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.” However, the rule also explicitly states that it “does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control   .” Id. In light of this, the trial justice found that evidence that the city had liability insurance was relevant to the issue of control over the - 16 - Cliff Walk and was, therefore, admissible. Additionally, the trial justice found that plaintiffs had opened the door to this evidence by placing a document into evidence indicating that the city had insurance. As we stated above, the admissibility of evidence is committed to the trial justice’s discretion. See Morel, 64 A.3d at 1179. Additionally, a party that opens the door to certain evidence on a particular issue is hard pressed to complain of the opposing party casting further light on the newly exposed threshold. See United States v. Joost, 133 F.3d 125, 128 (1st Cir. 1998) (“A party who opens a door cannot be heard to complain that the adverse party strolled through the doorway.”); State v. Pona, 66 A.3d 454, 470 (R.I. 2013). However, because plaintiffs conceded that the city had liability insurance covering the Cliff Walk during the relevant time, there was no need for the jury to hear prolonged testimony or see extensive documentary evidence on this point. Rather, the jury was given a simple instruction by the trial justice. 8 “Although a trial justice’s instructions are not ‘evidence,’ we review [his] instruction on insurance under Rule 411 to determine whether it violated the spirit of the rule.” Oden v. Schwartz, 71 A.3d 438, 454 (R.I. 2013). We review “issues pertaining to jury instructions    de novo.” Id. (quoting State v. Vargas, 991 A.2d 1056, 1060 (R.I. 2010)). Here, the trial justice correctly acknowledged that control and responsibility were salient issues. See Berman I, 991 A.2d at 1046 n.9. This fact is highlighted by language contained in 8 After plaintiffs conceded that the city had liability insurance covering the Cliff Walk for the relevant time, the trial justice instructed the jury as follows: “I am going to inform you that at the time of Mr. Berman’s fall on August 17, 2000, the City of Newport had insurance against liability for that event. Now this is not being offered to you as to whether anyone was negligent, the State or the City or anyone else for that matter. It’s simply being offered to you as evidence of ownership or control of the Cliff Walk at that time. And it’s not to be considered by you in rendering a verdict on the issue of damages    to either Mr. or the then Mrs. Berman.” - 17 - the document mentioning insurance introduced by plaintiffs. In detailing what took place at a meeting between city, state, and federal officials regarding maintenance of the Cliff Walk, a participant at the meeting stated that “[t]he entire ensuing discussion then centered on the issue of ownership with all sides trying to avoid any responsibility for ownership.” Further, the fact that the city had already settled did not preclude the state from trying to show that the city was the responsible party. As we have said, a “remaining joint tortfeasor is free to assert the settling joint tortfeasors’ liability in their absence. This holding, in our opinion, encourages settlement but does not prejudice the rights of the nonsettling defendants.” Cooney, 640 A.2d at 530. While we acknowledge that “the trial justice might more appropriately have refrained from using the phrase ‘[had insurance against liability for that event]’ in [his] instruction, we cannot say that the use of this phrase so pervaded the minds of the jurors that they were rendered incapable of arriving at a fair and impartial verdict.” Oden, 71 A.3d at 455. Indeed, the instruction expressly told the jurors that the information was “not being offered    as to whether anyone was negligent    [a]nd it’s not to be considered    in rendering a verdict on the issue of damages.” “[I]t is well settled that the members of the jury are presumed to follow the trial justice’s instructions,” and we see no reason to upset that presumption here. Oden, 71 A.3d at 455 (quoting State v. Clark, 754 A.2d 73, 80 (R.I. 2000)). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial justice did not err in his instruction regarding liability insurance and the limited purpose for which it could be considered.