Opinion ID: 1348839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: stipulated reversals erode public confidence in the judiciary

Text: In this case, the Court of Appeal explained its denial of the parties' application for stipulated reversal in part by stating that the reversal of a judgment not thought to be legally erroneous simply to effectuate settlement would trivialize the work of the trial courts and undermine the integrity of the entire judicial process. I agree. Public respect for the courts is eroded when this court decides that a party who has litigated and lost in the trial court can, by paying a sum of money sufficient to secure settlement conditioned on reversal, purchase the nullification of the adverse judgment. (See Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur (1991) 76 Cornell L.Rev. 589, 631 [hereafter Rewriting History ].) Thus, this court's adoption of a rule establishing a strong presumption in favor of stipulated reversal will reinforce an already too common perception that the quality of justice a litigant can expect is proportional to the financial means at the litigant's disposal. The potential damage to public confidence in the judiciary can be readily appreciated by contemplating an extension of the majority's holding in this case  that is, that parties are entitled to a stipulated reversal absent extraordinary circumstances  to the judgments and decisions of appellate courts. The majority's reasoning would readily permit such an extension. Yet I doubt that the majority would be as receptive to the parties' arguments about the benefits of settlement if the parties were seeking to annul by stipulation a decision of this court. For example, suppose that the Regents of the University of California had been displeased by this court's opinion in Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120 [271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 793 P.2d 479, A.L.R.4th 3659], believing it afforded inadequate protection to socially valuable medical research, and had made plaintiff Moore a settlement offer on condition that this court vacate its opinion. If Moore had accepted the offer, the parties could have joined in a stipulation that rehearing be granted and review be dismissed as improvidently granted. Granting the parties' request in such a case might avoid a costly trial and possibly result in a savings of tax dollars. Even so, I suspect the majority would never consider these to be sufficient grounds to obliterate its own work product. But the work product of our trial courts deserves respect too. Trial courts are the focal point of the judicial system, providing the final resolution for the vast majority of the lawsuits filed each year. On an appeal, a trial court's judgment on the merits is presumed to be correct. ( Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [86 Cal. Rptr. 65, 468 P.2d 193].) To casually discard a presumptively correct trial court judgment, without any showing of legal error, cannot help but demoralize trial judges and jurors. If this court by its actions shows little regard for the work of trial courts, we can hardly expect the public to hold them in high esteem.