Opinion ID: 1127469
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedure Used in Dismissal from Jury Pool

Text: Defendants argue that the jury commissioner excluded jurors without any guidelines or standards, thus violating defendants' constitutional rights. A.R.S. ง 21-315 (1990) gives the jury commissioner authority to excuse individuals from the qualified jury list [w]here a person's answers to a questionnaire indicate that he is unqualified for jury service or, in the opinion of the jury commissioner, state grounds sufficient to be excused from jury service. In a pretrial hearing, the jury commissioner testified regarding the procedures she used in selecting the jury pool. She sent out 9800 questionnaires from the master jury list (in a county with a population of 100,000), receiving less than half in return. Other than noncitizens and convicted felons, those who were dismissed were judgment calls. The presiding judge of the superior court had delegated the responsibility of excusing jurors to her. The questionnaire did not ask about race, nationality, or place of origin. Based on the answers in the questionnaire, she excused those who were elderly and could not serve or those who had small children and were unable to get babysitters. Those who returned the questionnaire and did not ask to be excused were determined to be qualified jurors who could be randomly selected for telephone contact the day before a particular trial was to begin. The commissioner called people at work and at home during daytime hours. For this particular trial, the commissioner intended to call about 150 potential jurors. Those without telephones were not notified, and messages were not left on machines. A.R.S. ง 21-331(A) (1990) requires prospective jurors to be summoned by giving personal notice, by leaving written notice at their residence, or by mail. Defendants argue that excluding those without phones and not providing written notice is a statutory violation because it amounts to systematic exclusion of the poor who cannot afford telephones. These procedures do not deny defendants their right to a jury drawn from a cross section of the community. See Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 623, 832 P.2d at 640 (Although some prospective jurors were excused by the Commissioner's office due to hardship, defendant was still afforded an ample pool from which to select a fair and impartial jury.). The jury commissioner properly exercised her discretion in excusing potential jurors, id., and properly used the telephone to give personal notice to potential jurors, State v. Mojarro Padilla, 107 Ariz. 134, 137, 483 P.2d 549, 552 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 92 S.Ct. 718, 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972). Granting excuses based on the application of neutral criteria to prospective jurors' individual situations does not constitute systematic exclusion. State v. Sanderson, 182 Ariz. 534, 539, 898 P.2d 483, 488 (App. 1995).