Opinion ID: 1914917
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Designation of State's Representative

Text: Prior to trial, the State filed a notice designating Brent Lottman, a deputy sheriff for Nemaha County, as its representative for trial, citing Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-615(2) (Reissue 1995) and State v. Jackson, 231 Neb. 207, 435 N.W.2d 893 (1989). Freeman filed an objection to the designation, arguing that Lottman was not a contemplated party under § 27-615(2) and was a material witness of a factual nature. The district court entered an order granting the State's motion to designate Lottman as its representative for trial. Freeman argues that Lottman should not have been present during the entire trial because the court had previously entered a sequestration order and because Lottman was a roommate of Laferriere, a Peru State College student who danced with the victim at the party. Section 27-615 provides that a party may request the exclusion of witnesses during a trial. The rule does not authorize exclusion of, inter alia, an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney. See id. In Jackson, the State designated its expert witness as its representative and the trial court allowed the expert, a doctor, to remain in the courtroom throughout the trial despite a sequestration order. On appeal, we affirmed the trial court's action in allowing the doctor to be present. Also, in State v. Canbaz, 259 Neb. 583, 611 N.W.2d 395 (2000), an expert psychological witness was allowed to remain in the courtroom during the testimony of the defendant's psychological expert. This court approved, noting that the State was limited in its ability to obtain information prior to trial concerning the defendant's mental state. Freeman argues that because Lottman was involved with the investigation into this incident and interviewed him, Lottman was a key witness for the State and should not have been allowed to hear the testimony of other witnesses. In Jordan v. State, 101 Neb. 430, 163 N.W. 801 (1917), this court held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow a sheriff, who was also a witness, to remain in the courtroom despite a sequestration order. The trial court told the defendant he could file an affidavit of prejudice, but the defendant did not file one, and this court found no error because the sheriff was an officer of the court. While this court has not ruled on the issue recently, several federal cases have held that it is permissible for a law enforcement officer to be present during a trial even where a sequestration order has been entered. See, United States v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Shearer, 606 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Woody, 588 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 928, 99 S. Ct. 1263, 59 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1979). We find no error in the district court's permitting Lottman to remain in the courtroom as the State's representative throughout the trial. This assignment of error has no merit.