Opinion ID: 2271826
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Revaluation of Marital Estate

Text: Before she issued her bench decision on October 5, 2005, the trial justice said that she had given the parties six weeks after the trial to submit more current appraisals of the real property in the marital estate. Notwithstanding that latitude, Andrew did not submit appraisals until October 3, 2005, and Dorothy's appraisals flew in on October 5, 2005; thus, both were submitted well beyond the six-week time limit. [15] On April 13, 2007, Dorothy moved under Rule 59 of the Family Court Rules of Procedure for Domestic Relations, that the trial justice determine the present fair market values of all three (3) parcels of real estate and their present balances of the mortgages and that she order that the amount of Dorothy's interest in the two New York co-ops be deducted from Andrew's interest in the Narragansett real estate because of the time lapse between the hearing on October 5, 2005, and the decision pending entry of final judgment in April 2007. As a result of that delay, Dorothy argued, the value should be taken into account at the time of the actual distribution. On June 11, 2007, the trial justice held a hearing with regard to Dorothy's motion and ruled that the proper time for valuation of the marital assets is at the time of the hearing on the complaint for divorce and she declined to revisit the value of the marital estate. Dorothy argues that the trial justice erred when she refused to accept professional appraisals of the marital estate both at the time of the bench decision and when she denied Dorothy's Rule 59 motion. Dorothy maintains that the proper time to value the property is at the time of judgment, which was not entered in this case until nearly two years after the bench decision, and that the trial justice therefore erred when she declined to accept the professional appraisals and instead relied on Andrew's unreliable testimony about the value of the New York and Rhode Island real estate. Conversely, Andrew argues that the trial justice properly valued the properties as of the time of trial, and thus she did not err when she declined to revalue them at a later date. We agree with Andrew, and hold that the trial justice committed no error when she declined to accept the parties' appraisals before she issued her bench decision and later when she denied Dorothy's Rule 59 motion. This Court has held that marital assets should be valued as of the date of trial unless there are compelling circumstances warranting a deviation. Gervais v. Gervais, 735 A.2d 214, 214 (R.I.1999) (mem.) ( Gervais II ) (attributing this rule to our holding in Gervais I ) (citing Saback v. Saback, 593 A.2d 459, 461 (R.I.1991) (holding trial justice should distribute the marital assets at the time of trial and ordering assessment of assets as of the time of the entry of judgment where trial justice's bench decision distributed assets that were nonexistent at that time) and Briceno v. Briceno, 566 A.2d 397, 397 (R.I. 1989) (holding that in the absence of compelling circumstances    the trial justice should value marital assets as of the time of trial)); see also Gervais I, 688 A.2d at 1308 (holding that trial justice erred when he valued the marital estate    prior to the trial). We acknowledge that we also have referred to the appropriate time for valuation as the time of final judgment or order. Ruffel, 900 A.2d at 1187 (holding that date of the final order resolving the    equitable-distribution issues was appropriate valuation date); Cardinale v. Cardinale, 889 A.2d 210, 228 (R.I.2006) (holding wife's interest in certain property should be determined on date of final judgment). However, although Ruffel and Cardinale refer to the date of final judgment or order as the proper time for valuation, these dates were also when all the equitable issues were purported to be resolved, rather than the when the final judgment of divorce was entered. Ruffel, 900 A.2d at 1186-87 (divorce final on December 16, 2002, but equitable distribution unresolved until December 29, 2003, order following November 26, 2003, bench decision) (citing Cardinale, 889 A.2d at 228); Cardinale, 889 A.2d at 220 (divorce final on April 1, 2003, with final judgment resolving all equitable issues entered on June 1, 2004). Therefore, the proper date for valuation of marital assets is at the time when all equitable issues are resolved, which in divorce cases, should be at the time of trial. See Cardinale, 889 A.2d at 228 (holding that bifurcated proceedings are inappropriate in divorce cases and all the issues between the parties shall be adjudicated in a single proceeding). Here, the trial justice did just that on October 5, 2005, when she purported to resolve all issues relating to the equitable distribution of the parties' marital property. In doing so, she properly valued the real estate based on the evidence produced at trial. Unlike the situations in Ruffel and Cardinale, in which the final divorce decrees were entered before the equitable distribution issues were resolved, the Currys' divorce became final after the trial justice had distributed the marital assets and liabilities between them. In this case, because no written order memorializing this October 5, 2005, bench decision was entered, and because the decision pending entry of final judgment, entered on April 4, 2007, refers back to the bench decision, we hold that October 5, 2005, was the appropriate date for valuation of the assets. See Ruffel, 900 A.2d at 1182, 1186-87 (holding date of final order resolving the equitable distribution, which was issued approximately one month after the bench decision, was the appropriate termination date for the valuation of assets). This is so because that is the date when the issues were resolved. Further, the trial justice did not abuse her discretion when she declined to accept belated offers of valuations before she issued her bench decision. The trial justice afforded the parties ample time to submit more recent appraisals, but they did not do so. Therefore, the trial justice did not err when she relied on the evidence of the property values as was adduced during the trial, because this was the only information on the record when she made her decision. Nor did the trial justice err when she denied Dorothy's Rule 59 motion requesting that the trial justice revalue the properties because of the lapse of time between the bench decision on October 5, 2005, and the decision pending entry of final judgment on April 4, 2007. The trial justice properly valued the property at the time of trial, when all equitable issues were resolved and, in our view, no compelling circumstances exist to warrant deviation from this usual date of valuation. Gervais II, 735 A.2d at 214. We are not persuaded by Dorothy's argument that the lapse of time, the fluctuation of the real estate market, or the assertion of the questionable reliability of the    owner opinion valuations used in the bench decision are sufficiently compelling to warrant deviation from the usual date of valuation. Id. (holding that mere allegations are not sufficient to justify a deviation). It is time for this litigation to end. This couple, who married in 1968, have been involved in divorce proceedings since 1996, a period of thirteen years. Such an unconscionable delay serves no one's interest, and is repugnant to the interests of justice.