Opinion ID: 1257657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the depuy i mandate is presumptively enforceable unless the depuys show on remand the existence of a res judicata bar to its enforcement

Text: Hoeme moved below for the successor judge's assistance to enforce the terms of both the injunction decree and of this court's mandate in Depuy I. Because Hoeme viewed the mandate affirming the injunction as broader in scope than the relief afforded him by the oral midappeal directives, he sought an order directing the entire road dike to be removed rather than one that would be limited to requiring the pipe to be placed in the dike. Hoeme is, of course, favored by a presumption that the mandate in Depuy I is unconditionally enforceable. The procedural consequence of this presumption  which gives effect to the mandate and also makes the terms of the injunctive relief fully enforceable  would shift to the Depuys the entire burden of showing that the 1977 ruling of the predecessor judge constitutes a terminal postdecree order that must be given res judicata effect. Ordinarily, the terms of this court's mandate would prevail over anything to the contrary. [31] The one exception  found to be present here  applies when the case goes on appeal from an unstayed or unsuperseded decree and during the appeal's pendency the trial court exercises its plenary power over the enforcement of that unsuperseded or unstayed decision. [32] In any postdecree enforcement proceeding a party would have but one opportunity  a single whack, [33] so to speak  to secure a trial court's ruling on what steps are required for full and complete compliance with the injunction's terms. Under the restrictions imposed by the one-whack principle, the terms of a final order dispositive of that issue, once rendered in a postdecree, midappeal enforcement proceeding, would control over any contrary terms of the mandate. Because the injunction decree was neither stayed nor superseded, the deceased predecessor judge retained full cognizance over the methods as well as the terms to be prescribed for its enforcement. Should the predecessor judge's 1977 ruling, when memorialized upon remand, reflect that his oral directives were issued to serve as but an interlocutory provisional postdecree arrangement, or if the ruling in some other way should prove not to bear the attributes of a complete and final disposition that concluded a postdecree enforcement proceeding, no res judicata effect could be accorded any of these directives. This is so because they would not qualify as part of an appealable postdecree order. [34] If, on the other hand, the predecessor judge's oral, open-court decision was in fact a terminal, postdecree, midappeal order  i.e., one that fully brought to an end the contempt proceeding then pending  the unappealed postdecree order would, under the one-whack principle, qualify for res judicata effect and control over the Depuy I mandate. Even if the 1977 ruling had erroneously narrowed the scope of the 1976 injunction, later affirmed by this court's mandate, the former would nonetheless control over the latter. [35] In sum, this court's mandate in Depuy I is presumptively enforceable unless the Depuys succeed on remand in showing that the predecessor judge's 1977 ruling meets the attributes for the application of a res judicata bar. The burden is cast on the Depuys. They can satisfy the onus by showing that (1) the predecessor judge had rendered an appealable order fully dispositive of a postdecree enforcement proceeding and (2) Hoeme allowed that decision to become final by not challenging its terms on appeal. [36]