Opinion ID: 724899
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 6 Count III of the indictment charged Copus with unlawfully making a destructive device, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(f). 1 Copus maintains that there was insufficient evidence to support a verdict that his home-made detonators constituted destructive devices as that term is defined in the National Firearms Act. The National Firearms Act defines a destructive device as: 7 (1) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas (A) bomb, (B) grenade, (C) rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, (D) missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, (E) mine, or (F) similar device; 8 . . . . . 9 (3) any combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any device into a destructive device as defined in subparagraphs (1) and (2) and from which a destructive device may be readily assembled. 10 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f). Congress specifically excluded from the above definition any device which is neither designed nor redesigned for use as a weapon. Id. 11 When considering a challenge on direct appeal to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, we must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). [O]nly when the record is devoid of any evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which a jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may a conviction be reversed. United States v. Johnson, 26 F.3d 669, 684 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 940, 115 S.Ct. 344, 130 L.Ed.2d 300 (1994). In this case, Copus failed to move for a judgment of acquittal either at the close of the evidence or within the seven-day period following the verdict, Fed.R.Crim.P. 29. This failure results in the waiver of any challenge on appeal to the sufficiency of the evidence absent a manifest miscarriage of justice. United States v. Archambault, 62 F.3d 995, 998 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Baker, 40 F.3d 154, 160 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1383, 131 L.Ed.2d 237 (1995). 12 We believe that no manifest miscarriage of justice results from sustaining the verdict on Count III. Under § 5845(f)(1), a destructive device includes any explosive ... bomb ... or ... similar device. The government presented evidence that the home-made detonators were fully assembled devices, each consisting of (1) a metal casing containing explosive powder that was epoxied shut and (2) a fuse. This type of assembly comports with the definition of the word bomb offered by Copus himself: a container filled with explosive ... material to be set off by impact or by a timing device. (Reply Br. 9). Moreover, the government presented evidence that each detonator was capable of exploding and causing property damage and bodily injury. Thus, there was ample evidence to support a finding that the detonators were bombs or similar devices. 13 Copus attempts to overcome the straightforward analysis outlined above by relying on the statutory exception to the definition of a destructive device. The statutory exception states that the definition of a destructive device shall not include any device which is neither designed nor redesigned for use as a weapon. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f). Copus argues that there was no proof beyond a reasonable doubt that his home-made detonators were intended to be used as weapons. He contends that, without evidence that he intended to use the detonators as weapons, there was insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the detonators were destructive devices within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f). 14 In support of his view that the government had to prove that he intended to use the detonators as weapons, Copus relies on United States v. Worstine, 808 F.Supp. 663 (N.D.Ind.1992). In Worstine, the defendant was charged with unlawfully manufacturing, possessing, and transferring unregistered firearms, in violation of the National Firearms Act. The government charged that the devices in question qualified as destructive devices: one was a galvanized metal pipe bomb and the others were explosive devices consisting of 3- to 4-inch plastic PVC tubing containing gun powder and enclosed with PVC end caps. 15 The district court found that, despite the defendant's claim that he was merely attempting to create a firecracker and not any sort of weapon, the galvanized metal pipe qualified as a destructive device under § 5845(f). With respect to the PVC devices, however, the court found that they were not clearly designed as weapons and that it appeared that the defendant's subjective intent was indeed to create firecrackers. Based on the totality of the circumstances, including the objective design of the PVC devices and the defendant's alleged subjective intent to create firecrackers, the court concluded that the PVC devices fell within the statutory exception to the definition of a destructive device. Id. at 669. 16 It is undisputed that, in this circuit, the defendant's subjective intent is relevant to determining whether a combination of parts qualifies as a destructive device under § 5845(f)(3). Burchfield v. United States, 544 F.2d 922, 924 (7th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S.Ct. 1602, 51 L.Ed.2d 806 (1977); United States v. Tankersley, 492 F.2d 962, 966 (7th Cir.1974). However, Copus' home-made detonators were fully assembled devices and so § 5845(f)(1) (covering any bomb or similar device) applies rather than § 5845(f)(3). 2 With respect to whether the defendant's intentions are relevant under § 5845(f)(1), Worstine does not represent the only view taken by the courts on this issue. United States v. Morningstar, 456 F.2d 278, 280 (4th Cir.) (stating in dictum that devices identified in § 5845(f)(1) are covered regardless of their intended use), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S.Ct. 135, 34 L.Ed.2d 153 (1972); see also United States v. Markley, 567 F.2d 523, 527 (1st Cir.1977) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that the home-made incendiary devices fell within the provisions of § 5845(f)(1) regardless of their intended purpose), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951, 98 S.Ct. 1578, 55 L.Ed.2d 801 (1978). 17 Yet even assuming that we were to accept the reasoning of Worstine, it does not help Copus. The court in Worstine did not hold that the government was required to prove that the defendant subjectively intended to use the device in question as a weapon. Rather, the court in Worstine merely determined that, where the objective purpose of a device is not clear, the trier of fact may look to the defendant's subjective intent, as one element of the totality of the circumstances, to decide whether the device qualifies as a destructive device. Worstine, 808 F.Supp. at 669. 18 In the present case, our task is not to determine whether we would find that the detonators were designed as weapons if we were sitting as jurors. Rather, on appeal, we must simply determine whether there was sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that the home-made detonators were designed for use as weapons. The detonators were both built like bombs and were capable of producing bomb-like effects: each consisted of (1) a metal casing containing explosive powder that was epoxied shut and (2) a fuse; and each had the capacity to explode causing both a blast thermal effect and fragmentation, which in turn could cause property damage and bodily injury. Copus stated that he allegedly intended to use the detonators to blow up stumps, but the jury was not required to accept this explanation. Indeed, other evidence casts doubt on Copus' explanation. First, the government presented evidence that the detonators would not be effective in blowing up stumps, which is what Copus claimed was their intended use. Second, Copus had attached detonators to several other explosive devices he had constructed, including grenades, pipe bombs, and a makeshift incendiary device. Given the objective design characteristics of the detonators as well as the evidence undermining Copus' alleged reason for manufacturing the detonators, the record is not devoid of evidence from which a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that these devices were designed for use as weapons. 19 Copus argues that the detonators were not designed for use as weapons because the legislative history of the National Firearms Act demonstrates that the prohibitions involving destructive devices were aimed at military-type weapons such as mines, grenades, bombs, and large-caliber weapons like bazookas, mortars, and anti-tank guns. His position finds support in United States v. Posnjak, 457 F.2d 1110, 1116 (2d Cir.1972). However, we have refused to subscribe to this view. See Burchfield, 544 F.2d at 924-25 (components for home-made bomb qualify as destructive device); Tankersley, 492 F.2d at 966 (same). Nor does Copus' position reflect the prevailing view among the other circuits. See United States v. Ragusa, 664 F.2d 696, 699 (8th Cir.1981) (crude, improvised bomb constituted destructive device), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133, 102 S.Ct. 2958, 73 L.Ed.2d 1349 (1982); Markley, 567 F.2d at 526-27 (rejecting Posnjak view and concluding that home-made bomb could qualify as a destructive device); see also United States v. Peterson, 475 F.2d 806 (9th Cir.) (incendiary device made from a highway warning flare), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846, 94 S.Ct. 111, 38 L.Ed.2d 93 (1973); United States v. Ross, 458 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir.1972) (Molotov cocktail). 20 Copus also argues that his home-made detonators produced a significantly smaller explosive effect than the bombs or similar devices that Congress intended to prohibit under § 5845(f)(1). The language of § 5845(f)(1) does not support Copus' view that only bombs or similar devices of a certain minimum explosive capacity can qualify as destructive devices. Section 5845(f)(1) refers to any bomb or similar device and fails to limit that language by reference to any minimum explosive charge. In contrast, § 5845(f)(1)(D), which describes the type of missile that qualifies as a destructive device, specifically refers to a minimum explosive charge. In order to qualify as a destructive device, a missile must have an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f)(1)(D). The fact that Congress chose to require a minimum explosive charge for a missile but not for a bomb counsels strongly against reading any such requirement into the statutory language. 21 The only possible limit we discern from the statutory language is that the device must have been designed or redesigned as a weapon. In the present case, although the explosive capacity of Copus' detonators may have been smaller than the explosive capacity of a grenade, mine, or military-type bomb, Copus' detonators could qualify as weapons. The prosecution introduced evidence that an explosion of one of Copus' devices could cause property damage and bodily injury. 22 Accordingly, we reject Copus' position that the detonators fall under the statutory exception to the definition of destructive devices either because they were not military-type weapons or because of their smaller explosive capacity. We hold that the evidence presented was sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that the detonators were designed as weapons and otherwise qualified as destructive devices under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f)(1). The jury's implied finding that the detonators were designed for use as weapons resulted in no manifest miscarriage of justice.