Opinion ID: 769722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional Component

Text: 6 The constitutional component of the ripeness inquiry is often treated under the rubric of standing and, in many cases, ripeness coincides squarely with standing's injury in fact prong. 3 Sorting out where standing ends and ripeness begins is not an easy task. Indeed, because the focus of our ripeness inquiry is primarily temporal in scope, ripeness can be characterized as standing on a timeline. Cf. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) (describing mootness as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame.) (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973)). The overlap between these concepts has led some legal commentators to suggest that the doctrines are often indistinguishable. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 677,681 (1990). And, in measuring whether the litigant has asserted an injury that is real and concrete rather than speculative and hypothetical, the ripeness inquiry merges almost completely with standing. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153, 172 (1987). 7 Whether the question is viewed as one of standing or ripeness, the Constitution mandates that prior to our exercise of jurisdiction there exist a constitutional case or controversy, that the issues presented are definite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93 (1945). In assuring that this jurisdictional prerequisite is satisfied, we consider whether the plaintiffs face a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement, Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979), or whether the alleged injury is too imaginary or speculative to support jurisdiction. Id. We need not delve into the nuances of the distinction between the injury in fact prong of standing and the constitutional component of ripeness: in this case, the analysis is the same. 8 We have held that neither the mere existence of a proscriptive statute nor a generalized threat of prosecution satisfies the case or controversy requirement. See, e.g., San Diego County Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1996). In a somewhat circular argument, the landlords contend that they are presently injured because they must violate the housing laws to remain true to their religious beliefs, even though their beliefs counsel against violating secular law. This argument is essentially another way of saying that the mere existence of a statute can create a constitutionally sufficient direct injury, a position that we have rejected before and decline to adopt now. See id. ( `[t]he mere existence of a statute . . . is not sufficient to create a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III.'  (quoting Stoianoff v. Montana, 695 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1983))). Rather, there must be a genuine threat of imminent prosecution. Id. at 1126. 9 In evaluating the genuineness of a claimed threat of prosecution, we look to whether the plaintiffs have articulated a concrete plan to violate the law in question, whether the prosecuting authorities have communicated a specific warning or threat to initiate proceedings, and the history of past prosecution or enforcement under the challenged statute. Id. at 1126-27. Applying these three factors here, we conclude that the landlords' claimed injury--their fear of enforcement or prosecution--fails the constitutional component of the ripeness inquiry 4 . 10 Turning to the first prong, it is clear that even if concrete plan does not mean cast in stone, the Constitution requires something more than a hypothetical intent to violate the law. Thomas and Baker claim that they have refused to rent to unmarried couples in the past, yet they cannot say when, to whom, where, or under what circumstances. They pledge their intent to do so in the future, yet again they cannot specify when, to whom, where, or under what circumstances. A general intent to violate a statute at some unknown date in the future does not rise to the level of an articulated, concrete plan. 11 In San Diego County, we held that a similarly expressed intent to engage in conduct proscribed by the Crime Control Act failed to demonstrate that the claimed injury -the threat of prosecution -was reasonable. Id. at 1126-27.  `[S]uch `some day' intentions -without . . . specification of when the some day will be -do not support a finding of the `actual or imminent' injury that our cases require.'  Id. at 1127 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564). The landlords' expressed intent to violate the law on some uncertain day in the future -if and when an unmarried couple attempts to lease one of their rental properties -can hardly qualify as a concrete plan. Because their free speech claims are similarly contingent on such some day intentions and are inextricably linked with the prohibited conduct, they suffer the same infirmity. 5 12 As for the second factor, a specific threat of enforcement, the record is devoid of any threat -generalized or specific -directed toward Thomas and Baker. Although we do not always require plaintiffs to await arrest or prosecution before entertaining a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, see Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298, the threat of enforcement must at least be credible, not simply imaginary or speculative. Id. When plaintiffs `do not claim that they have ever been threatened with prosecution, that a prosecution is likely, or even that a prosecution is remotely possible,' they do not allege a dispute susceptible to resolution by a federal court. Id. at 298-99 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971)). No action has ever been brought against the landlords to enforce the marital status provision. There has been no specific threat or even hint of future enforcement or prosecution. Nor could there be, as neither Thomas nor Baker can identify any tenants turned away due to their marital status and no prospective tenant has ever complained to the state or municipal authorities, formally or informally. In fact, appellant Haley never heard of either Thomas or Baker before this action was filed. The threat of enforcement based on a future violation -which may never occur is beyond speculation. 13 The third factor to be considered is the history of enforcement under the statute. In the twenty-five years that these housing laws have been on the books, the record does not indicate even a single criminal prosecution, and of the two reported instances of civil enforcement, only one raised the freedom of religion issue presented here. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm., 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994) (holding that enforcement of the anti-discrimination provisions did not violate right to free exercise of religion); Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm., 779 P.2d 1199 (Alaska 1989) (holding that the marital status provision was intended to protect unmarried couples). 6 These enforcement actions stemmed from complaints filed by actual, prospective tenants. Unlike other cases in which we have held that the government's active enforcement of a statute rendered the plaintiff's fear of prosecution reasonable, Adult Video Ass'n v. Barr, 960 F.2d 781, 784 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, 509 U.S. 917 (1993),adopted in pertinent part sub nom. Adult Video Ass'n v. Reno, 41 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1994), here the record of past enforcement is limited, was civil only, not criminal, and in any event was in each case precipitated by the filing of complaints by potential tenants. 7 In Swanner and Foreman, the enforcement agency was faced with real people involved in a real controversy, not hypothetical requests for an advisory opinion. Indeed, the agencies are now surely aware of these landlords and still have launched no enforcement proceedings. At most, the past prosecution factor is a neutral one in this case. 14 Considering the applicable factors, we hold that any threat of enforcement or prosecution against the landlords in this case -though theoretically possible -is not reasonable or imminent. The asserted threat is wholly contingent upon the occurrence of unforeseeable events: whether the landlords retain their rental properties; whether an unmarried couple will seek to lease available property; whether the couple, having been denied tenancy, will file a complaint or communicate the alleged discrimination to the enforcement agencies; and whether the enforcement agencies will decide to prosecute. The landlords do not at this time confront a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement, Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298, and thus this dispute is not justiciable, because it is not ripe for court review. Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732 (1998).