Opinion ID: 1890216
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Actively Practicing v. Retired

Text: In interpreting section 538.225.2, the first question posed is which phrase or phrases substantially the same specialty modifies. The Spradlings contend that substantially the same specialty modifies within five years of retirement from actively practicing, so that the health care provider only must have practiced substantially the same specialty as the defendant if he or she is retired. Defendants claim, however, that it also modifies actively practicing, so that whether the health care provider actively practices or is retired, he or she must have substantially the same specialty as the defendant. This Court was faced with another situation involving the applicability of a modifier in Norberg v. Montgomery, 351 Mo. 180, 173 S.W.2d 387 (1943). At issue in Norberg was the following statutory language: Wherever in this act the term accounting officer shall appear, it shall be deemed to mean the county clerk, county comptroller, county auditor, accountant or other officer or employee keeping the principal records of the county. Section 10934, RSMo 1939. The parties' dispute in Norberg centered on which words keeping the principal records of the county modified: other officer or employee or all of the positions named. Norberg, 173 S.W.2d at 389. This Court took a two-step approach in its interpretation of the statute. Id. at 389, 390. First, it considered all sections of the county budget law and harmonized them to give effect to the legislature's intent. Id. at 389. From its review of the county budget law, this Court determined that the legislature's intent was that keeping the principal records of the county modified all the positions named. Id. at 390. It found that the accounting officer must keep the principal records of the county, but depending on the county, that person may be the county clerk, county comptroller, county auditor, accountant, or other officer or employee. Id. Next the Court determined that the grammatical construction of the statute supported its interpretation. Id. Under the last antecedent rule, relative and qualitative words are to be applied only to the words or phrases preceding them. Id. The relative and qualitative words are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote. Id. In reaching its holding that the phrase keeping the principal records of the county modified all of the officers named, the Court found that the last antecedent rule is not always mandatory in statutory interpretation. Id. It is merely an aid to construction and will not be adhered to where extension to a more remote antecedent is clearly required by consideration of the entire act. Id. Where several words are followed by a clause as much applicable to the first and other words as to the last, the clause should be read as applicable to all. Id. In applying this two-step approach here, the legislative intent first must be discerned. The intent of the legislature in passing House Bill 393 was to strengthen the requirements for filing a medical malpractice action. House Bill 393 was yet another legislative response to the public concern over the increased cost of health care and the continued integrity of that system of essential services. See Mahoney, 807 S.W.2d at 507. The effect of the revisions to section 538.225, including the adoption of a definition for legally qualified health care provider, was to dismiss medical negligence lawsuits that lack even color of merit at an early stage of litigation. See id. While the legislature intended to protect medical professionals from baseless lawsuits, it also intended to protect the public from rising health care costs as a result of baseless lawsuits. See id. To adopt the Spradlings' proposed interpretation of the statute would not meet the legislature's purpose. If this Court were to adopt the Spradlings' proposed interpretation, only those health care providers within five years of retirement would have had to practice substantially the same specialty as the defendant. That interpretation would not follow the legislature's intent. To honor that intent, substantially the same specialty must modify actively practicing as well as within five years of retirement from actively practicing. The grammatical construction of section 538.225 supports this interpretation. Using the last antecedent rule, the Spradlings' proposed interpretation would not be correct because substantially the same specialty would modify only within five years of retirement from actively practicing. It would not extend to modify actively practicing. Considering the legislature's intent in passing House Bill 393 and the grammatical construction of the statute, substantially the same specialty is as applicable to actively practicing as it is to within five years of retirement from actively practicing. The trial court did not err in its interpretation that substantially the same specialty applies to actively practicing health care providers, such as Dr. Mathis.