Opinion ID: 2396947
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Miranda Violation

Text: The government is constitutionally precluded by the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause from using at trial a defendant's incriminating statement made while in custody unless the defendant has been advised of his right to remain silent (as a means of safeguarding the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination) and to be represented by an attorney before he is interrogated. [8] See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442, 86 S.Ct. 1602; Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000). The burden is on the government to prove that the unwarned statement of a suspect in custody was voluntarily given without police coercion. See Martin v. United States, 567 A.2d 896, 907 (D.C. 1989) (citing, inter alia, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972)). Of course, not all statements obtained by the police after a suspect has been taken into custody are necessarily the product of coercion. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is ... admissible in evidence. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602. A compelling influence, moreover, need not take the form of express questioning by the police. Rather, the notion of interrogation in Miranda broadly comprises both express questioning and any words or actions on the part of the police  other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody  that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682 (footnotes omitted). In ascertaining whether an incriminating statement is the result of a compelling police influence, the focus is primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. Id. ; see also Stewart v. United States, 668 A.2d 857, 865-66 (D.C.1995). To ward against unexpected perceptions, however, we evaluate the normally foreseeable effect of the officer's remark or conduct, keeping in mind any peculiar susceptibilities of the suspect then known to the police. [9] Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682; Hawkins v. United States, 461 A.2d 1025, 1030 (D.C.1983). Though the test focuses on the suspect's perceptions, where a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one which the police should have known was reasonably likely to have that effect. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. 1682. In this case, the trial court denied the motion to suppress appellant's statement on the ground that Detective Rivera's response to appellant, no, but let me tell you he told us what happened, was not the functional equivalent of interrogation. Specifically, the trial court considered that the detective's comment did not evince a degree of compulsion similar to the Christian burial speech found to be coercive in Brewer, 430 U.S. at 392-93, 97 S.Ct. 1232. We review the denial of a motion to suppress statements for Miranda violations with deference to the trial court's findings of evidentiary fact. See Jones v. United States, 779 A.2d 277, 281 (D.C.2001) (en banc) (citing In re E.A.H., 612 A.2d 836, 838 (D.C.1992)). However, whether on the duly established facts, [appellant] was subjected to custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id. (quoting Reid v. United States, 581 A.2d 359, 363 (D.C.1990)). Applying these principles, we conclude that the court's sole reliance on Brewer was mistaken and that the detective's comment was the functional equivalent of interrogation under Innis. Brewer is a Sixth Amendment case falling outside the jurisprudence that informs the meaning of interrogation under the Fifth Amendment and Miranda. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 n. 4, 100 S.Ct. 1682 (The definitions of `interrogation' under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, if indeed the term `interrogation' is even apt in the Sixth Amendment context, are not necessarily interchangeable, since the policies underlying the two constitutional protections are quite distinct.); see also Stewart, 668 A.2d at 866 n. 8. Under the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees the right to counsel, the government may not deliberately elicit an incriminating response from a person formally charged with a crime in the absence of the accused's lawyer. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). For Sixth Amendment purposes, therefore, the focus is on the police officer's action and intent, not on an objective evaluation of the police actions' effect on the suspect that is relevant under the Fifth Amendment. Although Brewer was discussed in the Innis decision, it was dismissed as inapposite by the majority, see Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 n. 4, 100 S.Ct. 1682, and its relevance to Justice Stevens's dissent was dependent on the particular facts surrounding Innis's interrogation. Under Justice Stevens interpretation of the record, [a]lthough [Innis's claim] involves Fifth Amendment rights and the Miranda rules designed to safeguard those rights, [Innis's] invocation of his right to counsel makes the two cases indistinguishable. In both cases the police had an unqualified obligation to refrain from trying to elicit a response from the suspect in the absence of his attorney. Id. at 310 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. 1682 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In this case, unlike Innis, appellant did not invoke his Sixth Amendment right to counsel before making the incriminating statement. [10] Thus, whether Detective Rivera's words fell below the degree of deliberate elicitation deemed sufficient in Brewer to constitute a Sixth Amendment violation does not address the question of whether there was the functional equivalent of interrogation  as viewed from the suspect's perspective  that would implicate the Fifth Amendment. Applying the Fifth Amendment's focus on the reasonably foreseeable perceptions of the suspect, appellant contends that Detective Rivera should have known that the combination of telling [him] that he was being charged with second-degree murder and that Corey Bush `told [the police] what happened' would likely elicit an incriminating response, such that the detective's words were the functional equivalent of express questioning requiring Miranda warnings under Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682. The government responds by arguing that merely confronting a suspect with the fact that a cohort has given a statement, as opposed to relating its inculpatory content, is not an impermissible ploy nor designed to elicit a response and, therefore, does not constitute the functional equivalent of express questioning. We agree with appellant. Although this case is somewhat unique in that appellant was confronted only with the bare fact that Bush had given a statement to the police without being told expressly that he had inculpated appellant, several considerations suggest that Detective Rivera should have known that under the circumstances his words were likely to elicit an incriminating response from appellant. First, Detective Rivera's words sufficiently posited appellant's guilt in contravention of the Supreme Court's admonitions against such tactics. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455-56, 86 S.Ct. 1602; Innis, 446 U.S. at 299, 100 S.Ct. 1682. From the perspective of a reasonable observer in the circumstances of appellant's custody, see Hawkins, 461 A.2d at 1030 n. 8  specifically, three and one-half hours of sitting handcuffed in a station house interview room  the detective's comment that Bush had told them what happened had the effect of conveying to appellant that the police possessed evidence of his guilt. Appellant discovered through Detective Rivera that Bush was not being detained after having made his statement to the police, all the while remaining in custody himself. The obvious implication was that Bush had provided information that simultaneously liberated Bush from being subjected to further detention and questioning while turning the focus of the police investigation on appellant. Second, the unresponsive and postured nature of Detective Rivera's words is suggestive of a purposeful design likely to elicit an incriminating response. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. 1682 (explaining that where the practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one that the police should have known was reasonably likely to do so). The statement, he told us what happened, was not responsive to appellant's preceding question asking whether Bush had been detained. As the trial court noted, Detective Rivera answered the questions the defendant was asking and added the statement, ... he told us what happened. The introductory emphasis, but let me tell you, also indicates deliberation in making the remark. We believe the seemingly calculated nature of the detective's remark is persuasive evidence of a designed practice, unlikely to be one that the detective could not have known would reasonably prompt an incriminating response from appellant. Any remaining doubt about the designed nature and likely effect of Detective Rivera's words is eliminated by our third consideration, namely, the context surrounding the remark. The tripartite approach evident here combines classic interrogation techniques in which the interrogator (1) establishes authority (I'm running the show and you are going to be charged with murder II), (2) confronts the suspect with evidence against him (but let me tell you, he told us what happened), and (3) creates a verbal vacuum (ten to fifteen seconds of silence) in which the first person to break the silence constitutes the losing party. See FRED INBAU & JOHN REID, ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS 213-22 (4th ed. 2001), cited with approval in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449-55, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (referring extensively to the 1962 edition). This multifaceted approach, facilitated by Detective Rivera's admonition that [n]obody [is] to advise him of his rights until I do, produced exactly its intended result in this case. In United States v. Alexander, 428 A.2d 42 (D.C.1981), a suspect in custody asserted her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in the absence of counsel, after which the interviewing detective stated, we know what happened, or we know you are responsible for the stabbing. [11] Id. at 45. We held that in making that comment the officer had continued to interrogate the suspect despite her invocation of Fifth Amendment protections and, therefore, her rights were not scrupulously honored as required by Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). See Alexander, 428 A.2d at 51. We explained that the officer's remark, in light of Innis, [is] contrary to the [trial] court's conclusion that nothing done by the detective constituted interrogation. Id. We additionally cited the detective's testimony during the suppression hearing that he subjectively intended to make her talk as buttressing the conclusion that the suspect's rights had not been scrupulously honored, but noted that [e]ven without the admission by [the detective], the events suggest[ed] those coercive circumstances prohibited by Miranda.  Id. Although Alexander focused on whether the police had scrupulously honored the suspect's assertion of her Fifth Amendment rights after Miranda warnings had been given, the court's analysis of whether interrogation had occurred under Innis is equally applicable to our present inquiry into whether there was interrogation such that Miranda warnings should have first been given. If the statement by the detective in Alexander, we know what happened, constitutes interrogation, a fortiori, the facts here also constitute interrogation since Detective Rivera's words more forcefully suggested that Bush  a person appellant knew had first-hand knowledge  had supplied information inculpating him to the police. [12] This case may be distinguished, moreover, from prior decisions of this court that have affirmed the admission of incriminating custodial statements. In Hawkins, 461 A.2d at 1027, the suspect invoked his right to silence after having received Miranda warnings. The homicide detective then left the interview room, and a police sergeant entered to introduce[ ] himself to [the suspect], and told [the suspect] he was going to process him. At that point, [the sergeant] also told [the suspect] that he was here on a charge of homicide in reference to a shooting that had occurred on the prior date at 9:30 p.m., and that an investigation revealed that he was responsible.  [The sergeant] then began to type one of the police reports. Within just minutes, ... [the suspect] stated that he had been thinking it over and he decided that he wanted to get it off his chest. [The suspect] was then advised of his Miranda rights a third time; and he signed a waiver of his rights on another PD 47 card. Id. (italicized text indicates challenged remark). We concluded that the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination had been scrupulously honored and that the statements were not the product of interrogation, see id. at 1028, reasoning that the sergeant's words were consistent with his stated intention to process the suspect. See id. at 1029. The court noted first that the words an investigation revealed might well be viewed as less threatening than the statement `we know' made in Alexander and, second, that an officer other than the one who actually observed the suspect assert his rights had made the challenged remark. Id. ; see also id. at 1031 (designating by reference all the factors that distinguish Alexander as providing a basis for the conclusion that the sergeant's remarks did not constitute the functional equivalent of express questioning). In contrast to the sergeant's comment made in the course of administrative processing in Hawkins, Detective Rivera's statement here, let me tell you he told us what happened, cannot plausibly be considered incidental to Detective Rivera's stated purpose of introducing himself. [13] Indeed, none of the factors used by the court to distinguish Alexander is present here. The comment he told us what happened clearly could be viewed as more threatening than the statement we know in Alexander because, as discussed above, it suggests that the government had a witness willing to speak to his first-hand knowledge. Likewise, the same officers who failed to advise appellant of his Miranda rights also made the challenged remark. Furthermore, Detective Rivera's revelation that Bush had made a statement followed by the lapse of ten to fifteen seconds of silence cannot be construed as actions normally attendant to arrest and custody. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682. According to Detective Rivera's testimony, neither he nor Sergeant Manning carried any item relevant to processing appellant into the interview room. Thus, neither Detective Rivera's revelation nor the silence that followed appears to have been prompted by the need to process paperwork or handle other routine administrative matters. Cf. Hawkins, 461 A.2d at 1029 (crediting officer's testimony that his purpose in stating, an investigation revealed that [you] are responsible, was purely administrative). Instead, the evidence supports the conclusion that the detective added the comment about Bush's statement and sat in needless silence for ten to fifteen seconds, hoping to prompt an incriminatory response. As the Supreme Court has recognized, silence in the face of an accusation creates an inference of guilt and therefore acts as a powerful inducement on the accused to speak either for fear that his failure to make answer would be considered against him, or of hope that if he did reply he would be benefited thereby. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 563-64, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897); see also Robinson v. United States, 606 A.2d 1368, 1371 (D.C.1992) (discussing standard for adoptive admission by silence of a codefendant's statement). Also distinguishable is Brown, in which a detective formally introduced himself fifteen to twenty minutes after the suspect's arrival in an interview room. Without having first given Miranda warnings, the detective told the suspect that he was under arrest in connection with the death of a Mr. Bernard Brown. Then, according to [the detective], without any reason or ... any provocation, [the suspect] just came out and said `Oh, I heard about this, you know, they are trying to put that beef on me,' adding that `I don't even know that boy' and `[I] wasn't even out there when this occurred.' [The detective] again testified that the moment ... I explained to him that it was in reference to Bernard Brown, he spurted that out, just sputtered [and] went on with it, denying that he knew the victim or was even out there. [The detective] immediately stopped [the suspect] at that point, saying you need to stop. I need to read you your rights. You have that right. [The suspect] was then read his Miranda rights, and indicated on the rights card that he did not want to speak further without an attorney present. 737 A.2d at 1017. We reversed the trial court's decision to suppress the statement, concluding that the detective's words, while striking a responsive chord, did not rise above the `subtle compulsion' inherent in arrest which the Innis Court refused to equate with interrogation. Id. at 1020 (citation omitted). In arriving at this conclusion, we reasoned that [the suspect] was not held incommunicado for long before [the detective] introduced himself. And the police did not carr[y] on a lengthy harangue in [his] presence, did not expressly ask him anything, did not even hint at the nature or strength of the evidence against him, did not give him false or minimizing information about his plight, and did not even hold a conversation with him  the first preparatory step of [a detective] experienced in conducting investigations, They did none of these things before he just came out, in [the detective's] words, and denied being at the scene of the killing or knowing the victim. Id. at 1020-21 (internal citations omitted). The present case is quite different. Appellant was held incommunicado, handcuffed to a chair in an interview room for approximately three and one-half hours before Detective Rivera spoke with him. Detective Rivera's remark that Bush had told police what happened was made within the context of a conversation with appellant and strongly hinted, if only by implication, that evidence against appellant was mounting. Furthermore, it cannot be said that appellant just came out with his statement when it followed ten to fifteen seconds of expectant silence after the detective's remark, and was introduced in a manner that clearly indicates that appellant was responding to the news that Bush had been freed as a result of the statement he gave to the police. Rather than blurting his own unbidden account, appellant broached his statement with contradistinction:  No, I'm going to tell you what happened. The phrasing of appellant's introduction reflects that he was prompted by the news that Bush had made a statement and the significance  pondered over the course of ten to fifteen seconds  that Bush's statement potentially held for his on-going custody. On these facts, it cannot be said that appellant freely and voluntarily offered his statement without compelling influences. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602. We are convinced that the seemingly benign transmittal of information to [appellant]... resembles the kind of mental games that largely generated the Miranda decision itself. Brown, 737 A.2d at 1021 (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 299, 100 S.Ct. 1682). The detective's instruction that [n]obody [is] to advise him of his rights until I do underscores the plan to intimidate appellant by purposely withholding the advisement of rights meant to counteract the pressure inherent in custodial interrogation required by the Supreme Court in Miranda. This is not to be countenanced for, as the Supreme Court has recently emphasized in an analogous context, [s]trategists dedicated to draining the substance out of Miranda cannot accomplish by training instructions what Dickerson held Congress could not do by statute. Missouri v. Seibert, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 2613, 159 L.Ed.2d 643, 2004 U.S. Lexis 4578,  (June 28, 2004) (holding that police technique of eliciting an initial unwarned confession followed by a second warned statement violates Miranda ). Appellant's statement was the coerced product of the functional equivalent of express questioning and, therefore, should have been suppressed because it was made in the absence of Miranda warnings.