Opinion ID: 1328762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the trial court err in denying defense counsel's motion to be relieved?

Text: Appellant argues he was unfairly prejudiced and denied effective assistance of counsel because the trial court denied defense counsel's motion to be relieved. We disagree. The trial court did not deny the motion. Rather, defense counsel withdrew the motion, leaving nothing for the trial court to rule upon. However, the record contains a pro se letter addressed to the trial court four days before the start of appellant's trial asking for help firing his attorney. The record contains no action by the court in response to this letter. The State argues the court properly took no action on this letter in the absence of a request by trial counsel that the motion be renewed. In support of this statement, the State cites State v. Stuckey, 333 S.C. 56, 58, 508 S.E.2d 564, 564 (1998), which held [s]ince there is no right to hybrid representation, substantive documents filed pro se by a person represented by counsel are not accepted unless submitted by counsel. However, Stuckey goes on to state, Nothing in this order shall be construed to limit any party's right to file a pro se motion seeking to relieve his counsel. Id., 508 S.E.2d at 565. The rule against hybrid representation does not bar pro se motions to relieve counsel. Nevertheless, there is no reversible error here. A motion to relieve counsel is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Hyman, 276 S.C. 559, 562, 281 S.E.2d 209, 211 (1981), overruled on other grounds, State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991). Appellant bears the burden to show satisfactory cause for removal. Id. Appellant made only the most conclusory arguments why counsel should have been relieved: Mr. Runyon is not representing my interests and is not fully prepared for this case. I do not feel comfortable going to court with him as my lawyer. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant appellant's request for new counsel mere days before the start of appellant's trial for murder.