Opinion ID: 1660871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the evidence establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?

Text: The defendant contends that he did not form the intent to kill as required for conviction of first-degree murder as defined in sec. 940.01, Stats., [1] and consequently his conviction for attempted first-degree murder cannot be sustained. The defendant testified that he was not angry with his wife and had no intention of hurting her. He merely wanted to frighten his mother-in-law. Shortly after the incident, when questioned by police, he stated he thought that he had shot his mother-in-law rather than his wife and remembered only the first allegedly accidental shot, but not the subsequent three shots. However, an examination of the record reveals that at the time of the shooting, the defendant, his wife and his father-in-law were the only people in the dining room. The defendant's mother-in-law was in an adjoining bedroom with the door closed and heard him say, You don't love me shortly before the first shot was fired. His father-in-law was holding his hands in such a manner that for the most part he was facing the defendant and the defendant was facing his wife. The father-in-law testified, ... he was much stronger and I couldn't take the shots off, I mean by moving, I couldn't throw the gun far enough away to keep the shots from entering into her body. She was shot four times with bullets from a .38-caliber double action revolver that had a 13½ pound trigger pull. It is a general rule, applicable in all criminal cases, including those where a specific intent is an element of the crime, that accused, if sane, is presumed to intend the necessary or the natural and probable consequences of his unlawful voluntary acts, knowingly performed. 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, p. 121, sec. 35; State v. Vinson (1955), 269 Wis. 305, 309e, 68 N. W. 2d 712, 70 N. W. 2d 1; State v. Carlson (1958), 5 Wis. 2d 595, 604, 93 N. W. 2d 354. In the instant case, the natural and probable consequence of the act was death, and the law so presumes. This presumption can, of course, be rebutted by evidence to the contrary, which rebuttal evidence must be considered and evaluated by the trier of fact. On review the test to be applied is `whether the evidence adduced, believed and rationally considered by the jury, was sufficient to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' This test is equally applicable where trial has been to the court. Alston v. State (1966), 30 Wis. 2d 88, 100, 140 N. W. 2d 286. State v. Waters (1965), 28 Wis. 2d 148, 153, 135 N. W. 2d 768. The credibility of the witnesses is properly the function of the jury or the trier of fact, in this case the trial judge. It is only when the evidence that the trier of fact has relied upon is inherently or patently incredible that the appellate court will substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder, who has the great advantage of being present at the trial. Gauthier v. State (1965), 28 Wis. 2d 412, 416, 137 N. W. 2d 101, certiorari denied, 383 U. S. 916, 86 Sup. Ct. 910, 15 L. Ed. 2d 671. On the question of the sanity of the defendant, the testimony of the expert psychiatrists indicates that the defendant's intentions were directed at his mother-in-law rather than his wife. However, under the facts of this case, his motivation is immaterial insofar as it excuses his actions. His acts and their near-fatal consequences bespeak the intention which the trial court determined he possessed. In his remarks, at the time of sentencing, the trial judge made the following pertinent observation: ... so between murder and attempted murder there is just the fortuitous circumstance and the grace of God that saved the victim from death on the part of the defendant here. We conclude that the evidence adduced, believed and rationally considered was sufficient to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.