Opinion ID: 1215982
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Comments by the Prosecutor

Text: Defendant also complains that he was prejudiced by other statements made by the prosecutor. During closing argument following the guilt phase, the prosecutor remarked: And I consider it significant that the police from Bountiful[, Utah] who testified on the stand were getting between ten and fifteen reports of incidences daily from the Gronemans during 1982... . Defendant points out that this comment is exaggerated and that the use of the phrase, I consider it significant, interjected the personal opinion of the prosecutor. [29] This Court has established a test to determine whether a prosecutor engaged in misconduct and whether that misconduct constitutes reversible error. A prosecutor's actions and remarks constitute misconduct that merits reversal if the actions or remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict and, under the circumstances of the particular case, the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant. [30] Application of these principles to the prosecutor's comments convinces us that reversal is not warranted. Although the comment above exaggerated the facts, it concerned a point peripheral to the issue of defendant's guilt, and it would be impossible to identify it as unfairly prejudicing the jury with respect to the issue of defendant's guilt. Another guilt phase comment that defendant asserts as prejudicial, placed in context, is as follows: I am not trying to tell you that I think Carla Sagers is a wonderful person. I think she's confused but she's not a killer and there has been nothing to refute what she said went on inside that house on May 25 and May 26. There has been nothing to rebut that. I kind of would like to wonder what would happen, for instance, if the Mormon Tabernacle Choir observed the whole killing, how would [defense counsel] attempt to discredit them? Think about that one. There's no better evidence, ladies and gentlemen, than eyewitness testimony, and we can't read people's minds. We don't know what they did or what they said or what they thought. The State isn't required by proof beyond a reasonable doubt to prove to you 100 percent of what went on. All we can do is submit to you facts and let you draw conclusions from those facts, and I would certainly like to have a mind reader or the ability to mind read what goes on. But there is nothing whatsoever to refute the testimony of Carla Sagers and what occurred inside that house. And we know she was there because her identification and description of the crime fits. She wasn't taken back to the scene of the crime by Officer Chapman. She told what had happened and what had occurred.... (Emphasis added.) The foregoing statement was made during the prosecutor's rebuttal of defense counsel's closing argument, in which a vigorous attack was made on Sagers' credibility. Although certainly unwise and hyperbolic, the remark cannot be construed as an attempt to inflame the jurors by appealing to their religious feelings. Finally, defendant claims that the following statements by the prosecutor in the penalty phase prejudiced his trial: As I indicated to you in the guilt phase of this hearing, you have a responsibility as jurors to balance and weigh and to truthfully and candidly deliberate. You cannot do that out of fear or sympathy or capriciousness or throwing up of your hands attitude saying this is too heavy of a decision for me to make. If you are cowards and you must say to yourselves, The law has no meaning and we can randomly go about intentionally, knowingly killing people,[] and that is the signal that you will portray unless you find the appropriate sentence in this case and can live with it within your conscience knowing the risks associated with it, knowing the behavior and temperaments of Mr. Tillman, and your own common sense and experience and your past experience in this particular case. Now, I will have a chance to talk to you in brief rebuttal if I choose to do so. [Defense counsel] has a chance now to discuss with you the aspects of the sentence as he deems fit, and then you will have a chance to deliberate and you may say to yourselves, Well, it's easy for [the prosecutor] to say, but as he indicated to you in the first phase, you probably watched a man age, a 36-year-old man, in fact, I probably can't pass myself off as 36 like Elroy has done, but if I have conveyed to you any meaning other than the most serious and solemn of duties to present to you in this case, I apologize for that because it's a serious and solemn duty and I wouldn't be asking you for the penalty of death under any other circumstances or conditions than serious and solemn responsibilities and duties. Defendant claims that the above comments appealed to the passions of the jury and improperly interjected the prosecutor's personal appeal for the death penalty. Once again, we concede that the prosecutor resorted to unwise and unnecessary hyperbole in his comments, but we are unable to identify any prejudicial reference to improper factors for jury deliberation. While we find no reversible error in the above language, the ends of justice are best served by prosecutors who confine their arguments in all criminal cases, and especially in death penalty cases, within the boundaries of scrupulous fairness. The State's obligation is to assure that justice is done. That obligation does not include or authorize over-reaching, exaggeration, or any form of personalizing by the prosecutor in the deliberation process. [31]