Opinion ID: 895480
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Efficient and Practical Litigation

Text: Certified EMS argues that this holding will prolong litigation by forcing defendants to defend meritless claims. For two reasons, we disagree. First, if there is at least one valid theory, the defendant will be engaged in further litigation regardless of the merits of the remaining theories. Defending those theories would not be unduly burdensome. The converse is not true. To require an expert report for each and every theory would entangle the courts and the parties in collateral fights about intricacies of pleadings rather than the merits of a cause of action, creating additional expense and delay as trial and appellate courts parse theories that could be disposed of more simply through other means as the case progresses. Cf. Scoresby, 346 S.W.3d at 549 (applying a “lenient standard” to a plaintiff’s right to cure a deficient report, noting that approach “avoids the expense and delay of multiple interlocutory appeals and assures a claimant a fair opportunity to demonstrate that his claim is not frivolous”). 10 This leads to our second point. The expert report requirement is a threshold mechanism to dispose of claims lacking merit, but reports are not the only means to address weak subsets of those claims. The original and amended petitions inform a defendant of the claims against it and limit what a plaintiff may argue at trial. Discovery allows a claimant to refine her pleadings to abandon untenable theories and pursue supported ones. Summary judgment motions permit trial courts to dispose of claims that lack evidentiary support. But while a full development of all liability theories may be required for pretrial motions or to convince a judge or jury during trial, there is no such requirement at the expert report stage. See Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 879. It may be difficult or impossible for a claimant to know every viable liability theory within 120 days of filing suit, and the Act reflects this reality. It strictly limits discovery until expert reports have been provided, and we have held that the statute’s plain language prohibits presuit depositions authorized under Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE § 74.351(s); TEX . R. CIV . P. 202; In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d at 418. The Act requires the expert report to summarize the expert’s opinions “as of the date of the report,” recognizing that those opinions are subject to further refinement. Id. § 74.351(r)(6). Discovery can reveal facts supporting additional liability theories, and the Act does not prohibit a claimant from amending her petition accordingly. Under Certified EMS’s reasoning, a claimant would have to serve an expert report each time a new theory is discovered. Not only would that be impractical, it would prohibit altogether those theories asserted more than 120 days after the original petition was filed—effectively eliminating a claimant’s ability to add newly discovered theories. See id. § 74.351(a) (requiring that 11 expert report be filed “not later than the 120th day after the date the original petition was filed”). We see no indication that the Legislature intended such a result. In sum, an expert report that adequately addresses at least one pleaded liability theory satisfies the statutory requirements, and the trial court must not dismiss in such a case. To the extent other cases hold differently, we disapprove of them.