Opinion ID: 398952
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Unilateral Wage Changes

Text: 22 Since its withdrawal from the multiemployer bargaining unit was untimely and unexcused by financial circumstances, Priester was obligated to sign and honor the collective bargaining agreement negotiated in its behalf. NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 89 S.Ct. 541, 21 L.Ed.2d 546 (1969). The union charged, and the Board found, that Priester instead had unilaterally decreased the agreed pay scale. In opposing enforcement, Priester renews arguments it made before the Board regarding the proper interpretation of the contract. 10 23 Unilateral changes in wages or other mandatory subjects of bargaining constitute unlawful refusals to bargain. First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, --- U.S. ----, ----, 101 S.Ct. 2573, 2578, 69 L.Ed.2d 318 (1981); NLRB v. Haberman Construction Corp., 641 F.2d 351, 357 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5), (d). To determine whether Priester had unilaterally changed the negotiated wage scale, the Board had to interpret the collective bargaining agreement. Such interpretations are well within the Board's authority. NLRB v. Strong, supra, 393 U.S. at 360-61, 89 S.Ct. at 544-45; NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 429-30, 87 S.Ct. 559, 564-65, 17 L.Ed.2d 486 (1967). 24 As an aid in interpreting the agreement, the ALJ heard extrinsic evidence regarding the meanings the parties assigned to its various provisions. The inquiry was essentially factual. NLRB v. System Council T-6, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 599 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Independent Stave Co., 591 F.2d 443, 447 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 829, 100 S.Ct. 55, 62 L.Ed.2d 37 (1979). The ALJ's findings relevant here were affirmed by the Board. Our standard of review is familiar: factual findings by the NLRB are to be upheld if supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. NLRA § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). 11 25 Attempting to reduce the scope of its liability, Priester first argues that the agreement applies only to union members. The Board affirmed the ALJ's finding that the evidence indicated that the parties intended the contract to apply to all carpenter employees of association employers, not merely to union members. The ALJ found that the contract referred to both members and employees, and relied primarily on the uncontradicted testimony of the union representative that the contract applied to all carpenter employees. No evidence was presented of a contrary practice during the long history of agreements between the union and the association. Priester urges that since the Board also found that apprentice in the contract referred to the union's apprentice program, the entire agreement should be viewed as applying only to union members. This view, however, is unsupported by testimony and not borne out by prior practice of the union and the association. Substantial evidence is in accord with the Board's finding. 26 Priester's second contention is that the Board erred in concluding that the contractual term journeyman applied to all carpenters hired by association members, except participants in the union's apprentice program. Conceding that apprentice referred only to enrollees in the union's apprentice program, Priester argues that the NLRB's interpretation of journeyman would impair the attractiveness of that program by paying higher journeyman's wages to all others doing carpentry work. Priester's interpretation, however, is unsubstantiated by testimony. No evidence was introduced suggesting that journeyman was to be applied to employees equipped with specific skills. Instead, the assumption apparently underlying the agreement was that the employers would not hire unskilled carpenters unworthy of journeyman's wages. An interpretation calling for an on site appraisal of an employee's skills is untenable, since it would leave the employee's rate of compensation entirely to the employer's discretion. 27 Priester further contends in any event that the provision should have been construed against the union because of evidence that the union committed the oral agreement to writing. Collective bargaining agreements, however, are not rigidly governed by the same old common-law concepts, which control private contracts. Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pacific Railroad, 385 U.S. 157, 160-161, 87 S.Ct. 369, 371, 17 L.Ed.2d 264 (1966); see Kaufman and Broad Home Systems, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, 607 F.2d 1104, 1108-09 (5th Cir. 1979); Certified Corp. v. Teamsters Local 996, 597 F.2d 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 1979); Amcar Division, ACF Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 422, 429 (8th Cir. 1979); Darnel v. East, 573 F.2d 534, 537 (8th Cir. 1978). Even if this maxim of construction were controlling with respect to collective bargaining agreements generally, we would not apply it here. Contracts are to be construed against the drafter only as a matter of last resort, when doubt persists after applying all of the ordinary processes of interpretation, including all existing usages, general, local, technical, trade and the custom and agreement of the two parties with each other, having admitted in evidence and duly weighed all the relevant circumstances and communications between the parties ... 3 A. Corbin, Contracts § 559 (1960). It does not serve as an alternative to construing a contract as the parties intended. Board of Trade of San Francisco v. Swiss Credit Bank, 597 F.2d 146, 149 (9th Cir. 1979). Here, the ALJ weighed testimony and reached a practical interpretation supported by substantial evidence considering the record in its entirety. 28 Finally, the company submits that the Board and the ALJ misinterpreted the following provision setting forth the geographic scope of the agreement: 29 (T)he Association recognizes the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and other conditions of employment for the employee within and under the jurisdiction of the Union in the following Counties: Lauderdale, Kemper, Neshoba, Clarke, and Newton Counties in Mississippi, Choctaw and Sumter Counties Alabama west of Highway 17 including the cities bordering Highway 17 inside their city limit lines. The Association recognizes that the Union also represents the following Counties or parts thereof which is not part of this Agreement: Jones, Jasper, Smith, Simpson, Covington, and Wayne Counties in Mississippi, Washington County in Alabama. 30 Priester contends that it should not have been held liable for underpayments on projects within the counties not part of this Agreement. At the hearing, the parties agreed that the final sentence of the above provision was inserted into the agreement because of a merger between the union and another local representing the counties enumerated in that sentence. The parties also agreed that the purpose of the final sentence was to allay the employers' concern that the agreement might be construed to bind employers not represented by the Meridian Contractors Association. The union representative testified that the association expressly agreed that the contract wage scale would apply to carpenters employed by the association when operating in the counties listed in the final sentence. The company's only witness on this point, Ralph Priester, admitted that he could not remember whether such a commitment was made, but did declare that it was impossible for him to have made such a promise. The ALJ credited the union representative's more specific recollection of the negotiations, and the Board affirmed. Credibility determinations by an ALJ are rarely disturbed, NLRB v. Proler International Corp., 635 F.2d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Southern Plasma Corp., 626 F.2d 1287, 1293 (5th Cir. 1980), and we do not find the ALJ's choice here to have been inherently unreasonable. 31 Priester characterizes the above provision as unambiguous and protests the ALJ's resort to extrinsic evidence to shed light on its meaning. The language of the provision, however, seems far from clear. Since the verb is grammatically takes a singular subject, it is not entirely certain what subject is not a part of this Agreement. Further, assuming that the plural form of the verb was intended and that the enumerated counties are not a part of the agreement, the significance of that exclusion remains ambiguous. Admission of extrinsic evidence to resolve an ambiguity is proper in interpreting any contract. Moreover, as noted above, rules governing the interpretation of ordinary contracts are not strictly applicable to collective bargaining agreements. Rigid restrictions on the admission of parol evidence in this context are inappropriate. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Lodge No. 1194 v. Sargent Industries, 522 F.2d 280, 282 (6th Cir. 1975); Tolbert v. Union Carbide Corp., 495 F.2d 719, 721 (4th Cir. 1974); Communications Workers of America v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 337 F.2d 455, 459 (9th Cir. 1964). 32 The Board properly found that Priester had unilaterally altered wages governed by the collective bargaining agreement which it was bound to heed because of its continuing membership in the employers association. Accordingly, the NLRB's remedial order is 33 ENFORCED.