Opinion ID: 2182893
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sudden Emergency Instruction

Text: Aetna's final argument to support its appeal of the denial of its motion for a new trial contended that the trial justice erred by charging the jury with a sudden emergency instruction. Aetna argued that this instruction was not supported by the facts of the case and was prejudicial because it could be seen as reducing the standard of care to which Skaling should be held by the jury in evaluating hiscontributory negligence. We agree that the instruction should not have been given, but we do not believe that Aetna was prejudiced by the error. This Court has previously held that the sudden emergency doctrine recognizes that individuals confronted with sudden and unexpected events demanding immediate action cannot be held to the same standard of care required of one in no such predicament. Roth v. Hoxsie's Arco Service, Inc., 121 R.I. 428, 432, 399 A.2d 1226, 1228 (1979). Although a standard of reasonableness is applied, the exigent situation is but one factor that a jury may consider when evaluating the conduct at issue. Id. Any charge given to a jury must apply to the facts in evidence in the specific case. Brodeur v. Desrosiers, 505 A.2d 418, 422 (R.I.1986). We agree with Aetna that the evidence here does not support a sudden emergency instruction. Skaling was not confronted with a situation in which he had to make a split-second or instinctive decision. He had time to consider what course of action to take, as evidenced by his testimony that he decided to bring a blanket on his rescue attempt because he knew that a blanket could be useful in treating shock. This situation, therefore, could not be categorized as a sudden emergency. The mere fact that a trial justice incorrectly charged the jury, however, does not result in reversible error. An erroneous charge warrants reversal only when the jury could have been misled to the resultant prejudice of the complaining party. DiPetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co., 729 A.2d 677, 692 (R.I.1999). Two observations support our conclusion that the sudden emergency instruction did not prejudice Aetna. First, based on all the evidence in the case, we are led to conclude that in the absence of the instruction, the jury would not have awarded Skaling less than $300,000 in damages. The purpose of the sudden emergency instruction in this case was to guide the jury in its evaluation of Skaling's contributory negligence. The jury did attribute 10 percent of Skaling's damages to his ownnegligence and, consistent with that finding, reduced its award of $1,305,000 to $1,174,500. This reduction had no effect on Aetna's liability because the damage award was still far in excess of the $300,000 limit of the insurer's liability. It would have been necessary for the jury to determine that Skaling's own negligence proximately caused 77 percent of his damages before the award would have been reduced below the liability cap of the UM policy. In light of the evidence, therefore, it is our conclusion that the absence of the erroneous instruction would not have resulted in the jury's finding that Menard's undisputed negligence caused no more than 23 percent of Skaling's damages. Second, our determination that the sudden emergency instruction was not prejudicial also rests on the fact that the trial justice should have given an instruction on the rescue doctrine. Under this rule of law, one who attempts to rescue a person in imminent danger caused by the negligence of another cannot be charged with contributory negligence, as long as the rescue attempt is not reckless. Ouellette v. Carde, 612 A.2d 687, 689 (R.I.1992). Here, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that Menard's negligence in driving the Jeep onto the bridge was the proximate cause of Webber's injury and that Skaling was engaged in a non-reckless attempt to rescue Webber. If the trial justice had charged the jury accordingly, he would not have instructed jurors on contributory negligence  save if they found Skaling's conduct was reckless  and the damages awarded by the jury would not have been reduced. Skaling neither appealed the trial justice's instruction to the jury on contributory negligence nor did he challenge the absence of an instruction on the rescue doctrine. Therefore, the damages as determined by the jury remain undisturbed. Because Aetna was not prejudiced by the inclusion of the sudden emergency instruction, the erroneous charge to the jury was not reversible error.