Opinion ID: 1194950
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 1983 Prior Felony Conviction.

Text: (2) As already mentioned, the trial court found true three of the four prior felony conviction allegations. Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding that his 1983 conviction for assault constituted a serious felony under section 1192.7, subdivision (c), and thus a strike under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subd. (d)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1)). The Court of Appeal rejected defendant's claim. In so doing, the court erred. The evidence presented by the People to prove this strike consists entirely of an abstract of judgment. The abstract shows a plea of guilty in 1983 to the charge of violating former section 245, subdivision (a) (now subdivision (a)(1), and hereafter referred to as section 245(a)(1)). The statute prohibits the commi[ssion] [of an] an assault upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm or by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.... ( Ibid. ) The clerk of the superior court filled out the space on the abstract of judgment form labeled crime with the abbreviation ASLT GBI/DLY WPN, which accurately reflected the statutory language. This evidence, standing alone, did not prove that defendant had pled guilty to a serious felony as defined in section 1192.7, subdivision (c). Under that section, as relevant here, only those crimes are serious felonies in which the defendant personally inflict[ed] great bodily injury on any person, other than an accomplice, or ... personally use[d] a firearm ( id., subd. (c)(8)), or personally use[d] a dangerous or deadly weapon ( id., subd. (c)(23)). One may thus violate section 245(a)(1) in two ways that would not qualify as serious felonies under section 1192.7, subdivision (c): First, one may aid and abet the assault without personally inflicting great bodily harm or using a firearm. Second, one may commit the assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury without, however, actually causing great bodily injury or using a deadly weapon. Accordingly, the least adjudicated elements of the crime defined in section 245(a)(1) are insufficient to establish a serious felony. (See generally, People v. Equarte (1986) 42 Cal.3d 456, 465 [229 Cal. Rptr. 116, 722 P.2d 890]; see also, e.g., People v. Sohal (1997) 53 Cal. App.4th 911, 915 [62 Cal. Rptr.2d 110]; People v. Williams (1990) 222 Cal. App.3d 911, 914-915 [272 Cal. Rptr. 212]; People v. Davis (1996) 42 Cal. App.4th 806, 814 [49 Cal. Rptr.2d 890].) Certainly the prosecution was entitled to go beyond the least adjudicated elements of the 1983 conviction and use the entire record to prove that defendant had in fact personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) or personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)). ( People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 355-356 [243 Cal. Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150].) However, the People failed to do so. They offered only the abstract of judgment, which proved nothing more than the least adjudicated elements of the charged offense. The evidence supporting this strike allegation was thus insufficient, and the finding must therefore be reversed. The Court of Appeal, which found the evidence sufficient to support the strike finding, reasoned as follows: It is possible  from the proof offered  appellant may not have `personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon' yet still have been convicted as alleged. But as a reviewing court determining sufficiency of the evidence neither possibilities nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt are our concern. The error in this reasoning, of course, is that when the record does not disclose any of the facts of the offense actually committed, the court will presume that the prior conviction was for the least offense punishable under the foreign law. ( People v. Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 355.) The People, who had the burden of proof, offered no evidence to show otherwise. The People assert that defendant has raised this claim for the first time on appeal. To the contrary, defendant at the outset mounted the most complete challenge possible to the strike allegation: He demanded a trial. The People also theorize that, [i]f [defendant] had any uncertainty of the status of the prior conviction as charged in the information, [he] should have demurred. That defendant, by not demurring, waived the right to challenge the allegation as uncertain, is true. (See People v. Equarte, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 466-467.) But defendant could not waive his right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on which the allegation was found true until it was found true and, then, only by failing to file a timely notice of appeal. In this, however, he did not fail. Thus, the challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is properly before us. For these reasons, the finding that defendant's 1983 conviction for assault constitutes a strike under section 667, subdivision (d)(1), must be reversed. [6]