Opinion ID: 1406121
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: is the uninsured owned vehicle exclusion prohibited by statute?

Text: Alternatively, the Hillmans argue that even if the ATV is a motor vehicle under the policy, the uninsured owned vehicle exclusion set out as exclusion number 4 in the uninsured motorists section of the policy, supra p. 3, is impliedly prohibited by law. In 1983, AS 28.20.440 provided: [2] (b) The owner's policy of liability insurance shall ... . (2) insure the person named and every other person using the vehicle ... against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the vehicle [as provided herein] ...; (3) contain coverage in the amounts set out in (2) of this subsection for the protection of the persons insured under the policy who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury or death arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor vehicle, except that this coverage may be waived in writing by the insured on or before the effective date of the policy. The Hillmans argue that the uninsured owned vehicle exclusion contravenes this statute. There is extensive case law on the question whether statutory sections similar to AS 28.20.440(b)(3) relating to the scope of uninsured motorists coverage preclude giving effect to similar uninsured owned vehicle exclusions. The Supreme Court of Arizona, in Calvert v. Farmer's Insurance Co. of Arizona, 144 Ariz. 291, 697 P.2d 684 (1985), has listed some twenty-six states [3] which have refused to give effect to uninsured owned motor vehicle exclusions. [4] There is also contrary authority, though it is a distinct minority view. [5] We align ourselves with the majority position on this question. Our statute prohibited coverage narrower than that which was statutorily prescribed. As the Supreme Court of Florida stated in a similar case: Insurers or carriers writing automobile liability insurance and reciprocal uninsured motorist insurance are not permitted by law to insert provisions in the policies that they issue that exclude or reduce the liability coverage prescribed by law for the class of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of motor vehicles because of bodily injury. Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So.2d 229, 234 (Fla. 1971). All that the statutory coverage requires is that the person injured be insured and that he or she be entitled to recover damages from the operator of the uninsured motor vehicle arising out of the use of the uninsured motor vehicle. Those conditions are met in this case. Statutory coverage bears no relationship to the occupancy of any particular motor vehicle by the person insured. For the policy to impose as a coverage limitation a requirement that the person insured not be occupying an owned uninsured vehicle plainly conflicts with the mandated coverage: The purpose of the statute is to protect completely, those willing to accept its protection, from all harm, whatever their status  passenger, driver, pedestrian  at the time of injury, produced by uninsured motorists. The only restrictions are that the plaintiff must be an insured, the defendant motorist uninsured, and that plaintiff be legally entitled to recover. Elledge v. Warren, 263 So.2d 912, 918-19 (La. App. 1972). They are insured when injured in an owned vehicle named in the policy, in an owned vehicle not named in the policy, in an unowned vehicle, on a motorcycle, on a bicycle, whether afoot or on horseback or even on a pogo stick. ... . ... [O]nce uninsured motorist coverage is purchased, the insured and his relatives insured for liability have insured motorist protection under all circumstances. Uninsured motorist coverage, like no fault coverage, is personal and portable. Bradley v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 1, 294 N.W.2d 141, 152 (1980) (footnote omitted). Nationwide points to a statutory change now contained in AS 28.20.445(d): (d) Uninsured and underinsured motorists coverage does not apply to bodily injury or death or damage to or destruction of property of an insured (1) while occupying a motor vehicle owned by, but not insured by, the named insured or the insured's spouse or relative residing in the same household... . This section took effect on January 1, 1985, more than a year after the accident in question. Nationwide argues that this change must be read as a clarification of pre-existing law, rather than a change in law. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, an amendment to an unambiguous statute is generally presumed to indicate a substantive change in the law. Torkko/Korman/Engineers v. Penland Ventures, 673 P.2d 769, 773-74 (Alaska 1983). Second, the inquiry as to whether a legislature which has amended a statute intends to change or merely clarify the statute is usually fruitless. While the legislature is fully empowered to declare present law by legislation, it is not institutionally competent to issue opinions as to what a statute passed by an earlier legislature meant. If the legislature were in some form to declare its opinion as to the meaning of prior law, that declaration would be entitled to the same respect that a court would afford to, for example, an opinion of a learned commentator; that is, the court would examine the reasoning offered in support of the opinion and either reject or accept it based on the merit of the reasons given. However, instances where the legislature offers reasons in support of an opinion as to the meaning of prior law are very rare. It is possible to argue that the legislature has knowledge superior to a disinterested commentator because there may be some legislators in the current legislature who were also members of the legislature which passed the prior law and thus have special insight into the intent of the legislature. However, the force of this is dispelled when one considers that it is not permissible to allow a legislator to testify on the question of his unexpressed legislative intent or on the unexpressed legislative intent of others. Kenai Peninsula Borough School Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Educ. Assoc., 572 P.2d 416 (Alaska 1977). In the present case, AS 28.20.440(b)(2) was enacted in 1966, whereas AS 28.20.445 was enacted in 1984. The 1984 legislation was not accompanied by any language or committee reports expressing an opinion as to the meaning of the 1966 statute. Thus, even if we could ascertain what the collective judgment of the 1984 legislature was as to the meaning of the 1966 act, we would have no grounds for giving weight to that opinion.