Opinion ID: 2298767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: New Party Petitions

Text: Appellant poses the question of whether the signature validation standard discussed in Fire-Rescue applies to validation of petition signatures in both the referendum context and in the context of new party petitions. To the extent that Appellant's question focuses on whether Title 6 of the Election Law Article is applicable to new party petitions, the statutory language clearly states that it is. Our holdings in Doe and Fire-Rescue, while specifically addressing referendum petitions, apply equally to validation procedures for all petitions covered under § 6-203(a). To the extent that Appellees attempt to raise constitutional claims related to § 6-203, or to Appellant's actions in construing the mandates of the statute, those claims are not properly before this Court. The trial court did not address constitutional claims in its grant of summary judgment, and any constitutional issues Appellees apparently urge us to address have not been sufficiently explained. Therefore, we resolve the issues presented to us in light of principles of statutory construction, and we decline to address any constitutional claims. Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl.Vol.), § 6-101(i) defines a petition as: [A]ll of the associated pages necessary to fulfill the requirements of a process established by the law by which individuals affix their signatures as evidence of support for: (1) placing the name of an individual, the names of individuals, or a question on the ballot at any election; (2) the creation of a new political party; or (3) the appointment of a charter board under Article XI-A, § 1A of the Maryland Constitution. Additionally, Md.Code (2002, 2010 Repl. Vol.), § 6-102(a) of the Election Law Article, addressing applicability of Title 6, provides: Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this title applies to any petition authorized by law to place the name of an individual or a question on the ballot or to create a new political party. Pursuant to the plain and unambiguous language of those statutes, the Legislature clearly intended for the statutory provisions in Title 6, including, inter alia, § 6-203, to be equally applicable to both referendum petitions and new party petitions. Thus, our holdings in Doe and Fire-Rescue regarding the mandatory nature of the requirements in § 6-203(a) are not limited to factual situations involving referendum petitions. Rather, the requirements of § 6-203(a) apply to new party petitions, such as the petitions at issue in this case, as well. Appellees also contend that this Court must interpret the relevant statutory provisions, as the trial judge did, so as to avoid any constitutional claims. They suggest that their interpretation of those provisions will avoid the substantial constitutional issues that would arise under [Appellant's] competing construction. Discussing the importance of ballot access rights, Appellees emphasize that [o]nce the authenticity of the [petition] signatures and the identity of the signers is admitted, any denial of voting rights based on the particular way a voter writes his name cannot survive even the most delicate judicial scrutiny. Appellees reiterate that they did not ask for the trial court to declare the statute at issue unconstitutional; before this Court, they claim that, because the trial court adopted a construction of the statute that avoided constitutional issues, there was no need to request a declaration of unconstitutionality. Appellant lists several reasons in support of its position that this Court should not consider Appellees' constitutional claims. First and foremost, Appellant doubts that such issues have been preserved for review by this Court because Appellees did not request and argue for, or receive, a declaration from the [C]ircuit [C]ourt that the State Board's application of the law in its petition guidelines is unconstitutional as applied to new party petitions. Additionally, Appellant maintains that this Court should, and can, decide the issues before it on grounds that do not involve addressing constitutional claims. Lastly, Appellant contends that Appellees offered no evidence in the [C]ircuit [C]ourt on how, or to what extent, the validation standard of [Election Law] § 6-203 burdens their speech or associational rights. Thus, according to Appellant, Appellees have not met their burden of proving infringement of their constitutional rights. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-131(a), an appellate court ordinarily will not consider any point or question unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court[.] The purpose of this Rule is two-fold: (a) to require counsel to bring the position of their client to the attention of the lower court at the trial so that the trial court can pass upon, and possibly correct any errors in the proceedings, and (b) to prevent the trial of cases in a piecemeal fashion, thus accelerating the termination of litigation. Fitzgerald v. State, 384 Md. 484, 505, 864 A.2d 1006, 1018 (2004) (quoting Cnty. Council v. Offen, 334 Md. 499, 509, 639 A.2d 1070, 1075 (1994)); see State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 189, 638 A.2d 107, 113 (1994); Zellinger v. CRC Dev. Corp., 281 Md. 614, 620, 380 A.2d 1064, 1067-68 (1977); Hewitt v. State, 242 Md. 111, 113-14, 218 A.2d 19, 20-21 (1966). Moreover, [o]rdinarily, an appellate court should review a grant of summary judgment only on the grounds relied upon by the trial court. Blades v. Woods, 338 Md. 475, 478, 659 A.2d 872, 873 (1995) (citations omitted); Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Le, 324 Md. 71, 79, 595 A.2d 1067, 1071 (1991); Finci v. Am. Cas. Co., 323 Md. 358, 387, 593 A.2d 1069, 1083 (1991). The trial judge in this case declined to address the constitutionality of either the statutory provisions at issue or Appellant's actions in interpreting those provisions. In fact, counsel for Appellees explicitly stated during the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, Now we are of course not asking for the statute to be declared unconstitutional here. Appellees also conceded the same point in their Brief to this Court. Thus, Appellees did not argue, and the trial judge did not find, a constitutional violation pertaining to the issues in this case. In his Order, the trial judge merely determined what he perceived to be the correct interpretation and application of our holding in Fire-Rescue, taking into account what he concluded was the overriding consideration [of] whether the signer can be identified as the registered voter. Accordingly, we decline to address constitutional claims that were not raised in, or decided by, the trial court. Furthermore, we are unsure, based upon Appellees' arguments before the trial court and before this Court, exactly what constitutional rights Appellees claim are being violated by Appellant's current guidelines for implementing the statute at issue. Appellees raise their constitutional arguments in a vague manner without expressly directing us to which provisions of the Federal Constitution or the Maryland Constitution have been violated, or will be violated if we accept Appellant's construction of the relevant statutory provisions. This Court cannot be expected to supplement arguments of the parties that have not been addressed with sufficient specificity anywhere in the record. See Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 552, 735 A.2d 1061, 1074 (1999) (asserting that arguments not presented in a brief or not presented with particularity will not be considered on appeal (citation omitted)). We agree with Appellant that there are no constitutional issues for this Court to address in this case. The focus of our review is on the contention that Fire-Rescue created a new standard to be utilized in petition signature validation cases. We clarify in this opinion that Fire-Rescue primarily dealt with signature legibility, but, nonetheless, that case reaffirmed the conclusion in Doe that the petition signature requirements under § 6-203(a) are mandatory. In this case, we need not, and do not, address claims not argued by Appellees in the trial court, nor addressed by the trial judge in his grant of summary judgment. In addition, contrary to Appellees' argument in the present case, an application of the principle of constitutional avoidance is unnecessary in this Court's analysis of the issues presented. [12]