Opinion ID: 2519885
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Best Interest of the Child and Genetic Testing

Text: Although not strictly necessary to the disposition of this case, we address the following issue in order to make clear that the ICA correctly applied Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Doe, 88 Hawai`i 159, 963 P.2d 1135 (App.1998) [hereinafter, CSEA ], and that CSEA continues to be good law notwithstanding this opinion. The family court, before deciding whether to order genetic testing in this case, conducted evidentiary proceedings in order to determine if such testing would be in Son's best interests. See supra note 2. HRS § 584-11(a) (Supp.1995) stated in relevant part that [t]he court may, and upon request of a party, shall, require the child, mother, or alleged father to submit to genetic tests, including blood tests. (Emphasis added.) In CSEA, the ICA held that the language of HRS § 584-11(a) was mandatory and did not permit the family court to consider whether such testing was in the best interests of the child before ordering testing. See CSEA, 88 Hawai`i at 174, 963 P.2d at 1150. Nonetheless, the family court in this case ruled that language in HRS § 584-13(c), conditioning an order for testing on whether such testing was practicable, permitted the family court to refuse to order the testing if it was not in the best interest of Son. This latter ruling by the family court was error. HRS § 584-13 addresses pre-trial settlement issues and provides in relevant part: (a) On the basis of the information produced at [a mandated] pre-trial hearing, the judge conducting the hearing shall evaluate the probability of determining the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship in a trial and whether a judicial declaration of the relationship would be in the best interest of the child. On the basis of the evaluation, an appropriate recommendation for settlement shall be made to the parties, which may include any of the following: (1) That the action be dismissed with or without prejudice; (2) That the matter be compromised by an agreement among the alleged father, the mother, and the child, in which the father and child relationship is not determined but in which a defined economic obligation is undertaken by the alleged father in favor of the child and, if appropriate, in favor of the mother, subject to approval by the judge conducting the hearing. In reviewing the obligation undertaken by the alleged father in a compromise agreement, the judge conducting the hearing shall consider the best interest of the child, in the light of the factors enumerated in section 576D-7, discounted by the improbability, as it appears to him, of establishing the alleged father's paternity or nonpaternity of the child in a trial of the action. In the best interest of the child, the court may order that the alleged father's identity be kept confidential. In that case, the court may designate a person or agency to receive from the alleged father and disburse on behalf of the child all amounts paid by the alleged father in fulfillment of obligations imposed on him; or (3) That the alleged father voluntarily acknowledge his paternity of the child. (b) If the parties accept a recommendation made in accordance with subsection (a), judgment shall be entered accordingly. (c) If a party refuses to accept a recommendation made under subsection (a) and genetic tests, including blood tests have not been taken, the court shall require the parties to submit to genetic tests, if practicable. Thereafter the judge shall make an appropriate final recommendation. If a party refuses to accept the final recommendation, the action shall be set for trial. (Emphases added.) The purpose of HRS § 584-13 is to encourage settlement and to give the family court a broad range of options in pursuing this goal. However, the language of subsection (c), consistent with HRS § 584-11, mandates that genetic testing be performed (where it has been requested by a party) if the parties cannot reach a settlement. The commentary to the analogous UPA section demonstrates that the mandatory testing requirement in subsection (c) was designed to further the goal of settlement: The settlement procedures contemplated by this Section are voluntary. If any party refuses to accept a settlement recommendation, the action will be set for trial. It is expected, however, that, as soon as reliable blood test evidence becomes available on a large scale, the great majority of cases will be settled consensually in the light of such evidence. (Emphasis added.) Consequently, we agree with the ICA that the language conditioning genetic testing on such testing being practicable refers only to the practical aspects of completing the testing and does not permit the family court to consider the best interest of the child in deciding whether to order testing in the first place. See ICA Op. at 99 Hawai`i at 34, 52 P.3d at 288. [7] Accordingly, the family court erred in concluding that it was permitted to consider whether genetic testing was in Son's best interest before ordering the testing. The family court's error was harmless, however, because the family court correctly ruled that Mother was precluded from bringing the action in the first place. The proper course of action should have been to dismiss Mother's complaint before even considering testimony concerning Son's best interest.