Opinion ID: 203380
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Compliance with CERCLA Section 122

Text: The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the Consent Decree complied with CERCLA. The appellants claim that the Decree violates CERCLA because it does not comply with 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6)(A), which requires that a covenant not to sue include an exception allowing the President to sue for future liability that arises out of new developments, because it provides for an unconditional release of future liability for Citizens. The parties dispute whether the third and fourth parties waived this argument by not sufficiently presenting it below. Regardless of whether it was waived, the argument fails. Section 122 of CERCLA plainly applies to settlements involving the United States, and the third and fourth parties have presented no convincing argument why we should disregard the clear language of the statute and extend it to settlements involving states and state agencies. See Arizona v. Components Inc., 66 F.3d 213, 217 (9th Cir.1995) (noting that provisions of section 122 are not applicable to state settlements in which the EPA is not involved). The purpose of CERCLA section 122 is both to authorize the President to enter into agreements with persons to perform response actions and to impose specific restrictions on his doing so. There is no evidence that Congress intended for states to be similarly restricted in entering into consent decrees. [13] Even so, the Consent Decree here does give parallel protection to the State. If there are new problems at the Site in the future, Maine is entitled to seek additional costs from the City if necessary.