Opinion ID: 1659641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Houston's next broad assignment goes to the relationship of State's witnesses Murphy, James and Bryant with the offense here involved.

Text: In that regard defendant initially claims it was incumbent upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt these testifying parties were not accomplices in the stealing of tires from Arco. This contention is without merit. At the threshold defendant, not the State, at all times insisted Murphy, James and Bryant aided and abetted Houston in stealing the tires from Arco. Resultantly the burden was upon him to so prove by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. True, 190 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Iowa 1971); 7 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2060(e) at 341 (3d ed. 1940); 1 Underhill's Criminal Evidence, § 175 at 335 (5th ed., Herrick, 1956). An examination of the record discloses, however, trial court instructed the jury it was incumbent upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Murphy and Bryant were not accomplices. In light of the foregoing this instruction was improper but inured to defendant's benefit so he is not now in a position to effectively complain. The record also discloses, trial court properly held and advised the jury that James was an accomplice as a matter of law. See State v. Jennings, 195 N.W.2d 351, 357 (Iowa 1972); State v. Schreck, 258 Iowa 218, 222, 137 N.W.2d 914 (1965); 1 Underhill's Criminal Evidence, § 175 at 335 (5th ed., Herrick, 1956). III. Furthermore, by appropriate instructions, the jury was duly permitted to determine whether Murphy and Bryant were in fact accomplices. See State v. Schreck, supra; State v. Jensen, 289 Minn. 444, 184 N.W.2d 813, 815 (1971); 7 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2060(e) at 341-342 (3d ed. 1940); 1 Underhill's Criminal Evidence, § 175 at 335 (5th ed., Herrick, 1956). And in response to interrogatories accordingly propounded the jury found these two witnesses did not stand in that position. See generally State v. Barnes, 204 N.W.2d 827, 828-829 (Iowa 1972); State v. Jennings, 195 N.W.2d at 356; State v. Jones, 115 Iowa 113, 115-119, 88 N.W. 196 (1901); 1 Underhill's Criminal Evidence, § 175, n. 8 at 330 (5th ed., Herrick, 1956); 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 126; 23 C. J.S. Criminal Law § 792. It therefore follows defendant's assertion that Murphy and Bryant were accomplices is without substance. Thus corroboration as to these witnesses was not required. See State v. Armstrong, 203 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Iowa 1972). This in turn means testimony by Murphy and Bryant legitimately tended to corroborate that of accomplice James. See State v. Jennings, 195 N.W.2d at 356-357; State v. Bell, 258 Iowa 779, 781-783, 140 N.W.2d 375 (1966). See generally 1 Underhill's Criminal Evidence, §§ 182-185 (5th ed., Herrick, 1956). IV. Houston next asserts Murphy, Bryant and James were illegally promised immunity by the county attorney and this served to disqualify them as witnesses. More specifically defendant contends the county attorney improperly purchased the testimony of these prospective witnesses by promising they would not be prosecuted. For reasons later disclosed it is unnecessary to here determine the power or authority of a prosecutor, in this jurisdiction, to so bind the State. See generally the Code 1966, Sections 622.14-622.16, 741.4; 1 Underhill's Criminal Evidence, § 180 (5th ed., Herrick, 1956); 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §§ 150-152; Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 1439. See also 21 Drake L.Rev. 331 (1972). The aforesaid purchase of evidence theory, though novel, is not persuasive. It would more aptly appear that by promise of immunity, if any, the county attorney merely removed a possible barrier to a willing response on the testimonial call of these three witnesses. See generally 8 Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 2280-2284 (McNaughton Rev.1961). See also Murphy v. Waterfront Com'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L. Ed.2d 678 (1964); cf. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L. Ed.2d 212 (1972); Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Com'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 92 S.Ct. 1670, 32 L.Ed.2d 234 (1972). In any event such did not disqualify them from testifying or negate their testimony. See generally Code §§ 622.1-622.3; 2 Wigmore on Evidence, § 580 at 707-708 (3d ed. 1940); 1 Underhill's Criminal Evidence, § 178 (5th ed., Herrick, 1956); Annot., 120 A.L.R. 751. Furthermore it is clearly established an assurance of prosecutorial abstinence, regardless of its effectiveness, goes only to credibility of the promisees. See State v. O'Meara, 190 Iowa 613, 624, 177 N.W. 563 (1920); Burkhalter v. State, 493 S.W.2d 214 (Tex.Cr.App., 1973); 1 Underhill's Criminal Evidence, § 181 (5th ed., Herrick, 1956). See also 21 Drake L.Rev. at 335-337. Significantly the record unquestionably reveals Murphy was given no assurance of immunity. Also the defense was permitted to thoroughly cross-examine Murphy, Bryant and James as to any such promises which may have been made to them. See State v. Bell, 258 Iowa at 781-783, 140 N. W.2d at 377-378. Thus nondisclosure of evidence is not here involved. Moreover the jury was given this pertinent instruction: It appears without controversy that the witnesses, Joseph C. James and Glenn A. Bryant, were willing to waive their constitutional rights against self-incrimination and testify in this case because of a promise of immunity they had received from the County Attorney. It is proper for you to consider such fact together with all the other facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence in determining what weight and credibility, if any, you give to the testimony of each of said witnesses. By virtue of the foregoing it is apparent defendant here again pursues a futile course.