Opinion ID: 1846581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: misidentification

Text: ¶ 19. Next, Givens asserts that his conviction is based on misidentification by Hampton and Foman. Essentially, Givens gives a detailed analysis as to the five factors outlined in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), which a trial court should consider in determining whether an in-court identification has been impermissibly tainted by law enforcement investigatory identification procedures. These five factors include: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the time of confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Id. Since the trial judge was in a position to adequately assess these five factors and [w]e will only disturb the order of the trial court where there is an absence of substantial credible evidence supporting it[,] we find this issue also to be meritless. There is substantial credible evidence to support the identification of Givens as Cooper's killer. Outerbridge v. State, 947 So.2d 279, 282 (Miss. 2006). Both Hampton and Foman had an opportunity to watch Givens repeatedly hit Cooper in the head with multiple bricks. While Foman admitted that it was dark outside and there was inadequate lighting, which caused him to be unable to describe Givens's clothing that night, Foman had known Givens his entire life. In addition, during the trial, Hampton testified she had glaucoma, but she also had known Givens his entire life. Both witnesses were certain that Givens was who man who killed Cooper. Neither witness wavered from his or her original statement identifying Givens. The jury was properly instructed on how it was to consider the identification testimony. The jury, by its verdict, obviously believed that the identification testimony of Hampton and Foman, when considered with all the other evidence, was credible. Jurors are permitted, indeed have the duty, to resolve the conflicts in the testimony they hear. They may believe or disbelieve, accept or reject, the utterances of any witness. No formula dictates the manner in which jurors resolve conflicting testimony into findings of fact sufficient to support their verdict. That resolution results from the jurors hearing and observing the witnesses as they testify, augmented by the composite reasoning of twelve individuals sworn to return a true verdict. A reviewing court cannot and need not determine with exactitude which witness or what testimony the jury believed or disbelieved in arriving at its verdict. It is enough that the conflicting evidence presented a factual dispute for jury resolution. Jones v. State, 920 So.2d 465, 472-73 (Miss.2006) (citing Jackson v. State, 614 So.2d 965, 972 (Miss.1993)). The trial judge instructed the jury via instruction number six concerning the identification evidence, as follows: The Court instructs the Jury that in reaching your verdict you are to consider all of the evidence concerning the entire case and the circumstances surrounding the crime. One of the issues in this case is the identification of Billy Givens as the perpetrator of the crime. As with each element of the crime charged, the State has the burden of proving identity beyond a reasonable doubt, and before you convict Billy Givens you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification of Billy Givens. If, after considering all of the evidence concerning the crime and the witness' identification of Billy Givens as the person who committed the crime, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he is the person who committed the crime, then you must find him not guilty. Identification testimony is an expression of belief or impression by the witness. You must judge its value and reliability from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the crime and the subsequent identification. In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider the following: 1) Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to observe the offender? 2) Did the witness observe the offender with an adequate degree of attention? 3) Did the witness provide an accurate description of the offender after the crime? 4) How certain is the witness of the identification? 5) How much time passed between the crime and the identification? If after examining all of the testimony and the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt that Billy Givens was the person who committed the crime, then you must find Billy Givens not guilty. Thus, taking the totality of the record before us, we are unable to find that the trial judge abused her discretion by allowing the in-court identification of Givens by Hampton and Foman. Outerbridge, 947 So.2d at 282 (citing Johnston v. State, 567 So.2d 237, 238 (Miss.1990)). This issue therefore is without merit.