Opinion ID: 2758259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Coercion and Enticement

Text: The jury also found Mr. Brinson guilty of Coercion and Enticement under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). This finding was supported by the evidence. Section 2422(b) makes it illegal to  use any facility or means of interstate commerce  to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce any individual 25  who is younger than 18  to engage in prostitution or any other criminal sexual activity. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2012). Based on the trial evidence, the jury could reasonably have found Mr. Brinson guilty of this offense. For example, the jury could have relied on the Facebook.com exchange between “Twinchee Vanto” (Mr. Brinson) and A.H. From that exchange, the jury could reasonably infer that Mr. Brinson was using the internet to knowingly entice A.H. (a minor) into the prostitution trade. E. Use of a Facility in Interstate Commerce in Aid of Racketeering Enterprise The jury also found Mr. Brinson guilty of Use of a Facility in Interstate Commerce in Aid of Racketeering Enterprise under 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (2012). This finding was supported by the evidence. Section 1952(a)(3) makes it illegal to use any facility in interstate commerce with the intent to “promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate . . . unlawful activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (2012). The phrase “unlawful activity” includes “any business enterprise involving . . . prostitution offenses.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(1) (2012). Based on the evidence, the jury could reasonably find Mr. Brinson guilty of this offense. As discussed above, the evidence indicated that Mr. 26 Brinson had used the internet and cellular phones as part of his prostitution business. F. Obstruction of Justice The jury also found that Mr. Brinson had committed the crime of Obstruction of Justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d) (2012). For this finding, the evidence was sufficient. Section 1591(d) prohibits a person from obstructing, attempting to obstruct, or in any way interfering with or preventing the enforcement of § 1591. Based on the trial evidence, the jury could reasonably have found Mr. Brinson guilty. The prosecution presented evidence that Mr. Brinson had tried to prevent a subpoenaed witness (Lovely Richardson) from testifying before a federal grand jury. For instance, Ms. Richardson testified that Mr. Brinson had called her from jail and encouraged her to ignore a subpoena. IV Aplt. App. at 579-82. During her testimony, Ms. Richardson read from a transcript of that telephone call: Richardson: So . . . You think I should go? Brinson: No. For What? . . . . Richardson: I don’t know. I might not. I know something. It’s – it’s cool but I might go. Brinson: No. I’m telling you no. You want me to say no? 27 Richardson: (laughter) Brinson: I can’t get more clear than that. No, or what? Richardson: Okay. Damn. Okay. VI Aplt. App. at 1061-62. Based on this exchange and Ms. Richardson’s testimony, the jury could reasonably infer that Mr. Brinson was trying to prevent Ms. Richardson from testifying before the grand jury. Thus, the jury could reasonably have found Mr. Brinson guilty of obstructing justice.