Opinion ID: 4560853
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Anti-Union Animus

Text: “The remaining element, anti-union animus, may be ‘inferred from purely circumstantial as well as direct evidence.’” Airgas USA, LLC, 916 F.3d at 561 (quoting W.F. Bolin Co., 70 F.3d at 871). Such circumstantial evidence evincing anti-union animus includes the company’s expressed hostility towards unionization combined with knowledge of the employees’ union activities; inconsistencies between the proffered reason for [discipline] and other actions of the employer; disparate treatment of certain employees compared to other employees with similar work records or offenses; a company’s deviation from past practices in implementing the [discipline]; and proximity in time between the employees’ union activities and their [discipline]. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting W.F. Bolin Co., 70 F.3d at 871); see also FiveCAP, 294 F.3d at 778. We find that substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that anti-union animus motivated Haas’s discharge. First, the Board relied on Roemer’s general anti-union animus, as 13 Case Nos. 19-2356/2397, National Labor Relations Board v. Roemer Industries, Inc. demonstrated by the discrimination against Merrick that led to the earlier litigation in Roemer I (which was still unresolved at the time of Haas’s termination), and Roemer’s other unfair labor practices at issue in the underlying complaint such as Roemer’s unilateral increase and rescission of a pay raise, direct dealing with employees, and coercive statements to employees. An employer’s conduct both before and after the termination can be properly considered in determining the “true motivation” for the discharge. See SCA Tissue N. Am. LLC v. NLRB, 371 F.3d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Local Lodge No. 1424, Int’l Assoc. of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 416 (1960)) (considering conduct before the discharge and outside the statute of limitations in assessing anti-union animus); id. at 990 (citing NLRB v. Rich’s Precision Foundry, Inc., 667 F.2d 613, 619–20, 626 (7th Cir. 1981)) (finding Board’s consideration of posttermination conduct proper). Second, the Board relied on the timing of Haas’s termination. Haas, Merrick, and Hrabowy all testified that Haas distributed the “No Open Shop” stickers shortly before his termination. Haas testified that he distributed the stickers approximately two weeks before his termination, which is certainly close enough temporally to support an inference of animus. See Airgas USA, LLC, 916 F.3d at 563–64 (finding period of “just under a month” between protected activity and discipline supported finding of animus); NLRB v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 750 F.2d 524, 529 (6th Cir. 1983) (three weeks). Even Merrick’s longer estimate of two months falls within the time frame that this court has acknowledged supports a finding of animus. See Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 939 F.3d at 815 (holding that even a time period of three months can “raise concerns” about animus). The termination also came shortly after the incident in August in which O’Toole required Haas to go repeat his question about increased union tensions to at least a dozen other employees. 14 Case Nos. 19-2356/2397, National Labor Relations Board v. Roemer Industries, Inc. This timing is particularly notable against a backdrop of Roemer’s tolerance for similar job-related conduct from Haas over the years. See Conley, 520 F.3d at 643–44 (finding anti-union animus when employer terminated an employee for previously tolerated conduct). As both parties emphasize, Haas has been disciplined for similar conduct regularly throughout his forty-year tenure at Roemer. Yet Roemer always offered Haas some form of leniency or relief until his display of union support at what likely seemed, at the time, to be the zenith of conflict between Roemer and the Union in the deadlocked contract negotiation. The ALJ and the Board were not persuaded that Roemer was “ultimately exhausted” with this conduct precisely when union tensions were flaring. See Dkt. 7 at 1170 (citing Garvey Marine, Inc. v. NLRB, 245 F.3d 819, 825 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).7 Finally, the Board noted that Roemer’s justifications for Haas’s termination have not been consistent. O’Toole wrote that Haas was disciplined for failing to adhere to the “Theory of Constraints methodology,” even though the Board found that non-managerial employees receive no training in the Theory of Constraints. Fraley testified that she recommended that Haas be disciplined for insubordination, but his discipline did not follow the ordinary protocol for insubordination in which the insubordinate employee would be sent home immediately. Fraley also testified that she had recommended terminating Haas, even though she had previously stated that she did not play any role in his termination. 7 Roemer argues that Conley is inapposite because it did not involve a progressive disciplinary policy. But the point is that Roemer had previously applied its own disciplinary policy with some degree of leniency toward Haas, offering him a “last chance agreement” or allowing him to opt for punishment short of discharge. Roemer’s reliance on NLRB v. Cook Family Foods, Ltd. is unconvincing because that case involved employees who performed poorly during a training program and were terminated when they were unable to perform their duties after the training period had ended. See 47 F.3d 809, 817 (6th Cir. 1995). In contrast, Haas was a forty-year employee with a consistent track record of similar conduct. And in none of Roemer’s cases did the employer require the discriminatee to walk around the office repeating a statement about union-related stress as an act of self-flagellation shortly before termination. 15 Case Nos. 19-2356/2397, National Labor Relations Board v. Roemer Industries, Inc. Relying on Electrolux Home Products, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 34, 2019 WL 3562131 (Aug. 2, 2019), Roemer argues that the Board improperly based its decision on temporally distant events and gave insufficient weight to “comparator” evidence of other employees who displayed “Fair Contract Now” signs but were not terminated. We disagree. As an initial matter, Roemer’s argument about comparator evidence is unpersuasive because it relies exclusively on evidence about other employees who displayed “Fair Contract Now” signs; it presents no evidence of any other employee who engaged in the same conduct as Haas, including but not limited to producing and distributing the “No Open Shop” bumper stickers. As to the temporal relationship, the Board in Electrolux found that a single display of anti-union animus seven months before the discharge was insufficient to find that the discharge was motivated by animus. See id. at –5. The Board emphasized that the record contained countervailing evidence against the finding that the employer harbored anti-union animus because the employer had “quickly reached an interim agreement” with the union on certain issues and had “begun meeting and bargaining in good faith.” Id. at . In contrast, the activity at issue here happened either two weeks or two months before the discharge, and the record demonstrates a litany of contemporaneous unfair labor practices that Roemer does not now contest. Roemer also contends that the Board erred by relying exclusively on general union animus and failed to find the requisite causal link between animus and the adverse employment action. Roemer relies on Tschiggfrie Properties, Ltd., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 2019 WL 6320585 (Nov. 22, 2019) for support. However, as we have recently explained, that case holds only that “‘the General Counsel does not invariably sustain his burden’ at the first step of the Wright Line analysis ‘by producing . . . any evidence of the employer’s animus or hostility toward union or other protected activity.” Challenge Mfg. Co., LLC v. NLRB, --- F. App’x ---, 2020 WL 3060747, at  16 Case Nos. 19-2356/2397, National Labor Relations Board v. Roemer Industries, Inc. (June 9, 2020) (quoting Tschiggfrie Props., Ltd., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 2019 WL 6320585, at ). Here, the Board did not rely solely on general union animus, but instead made specific factual findings connecting Haas’s protected activity to the termination. See id. (holding that Board’s nexus finding was sufficient when the ALJ “found that the timing of [the employee’s] discharge and the evidence of disparate treatment supported an inference of anti-union animus connected to the discharge” (internal quotation marks omitted)).