Opinion ID: 2466508
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the bullington exception

Text: Six months after DiFrancesco was decided, the Supreme Court decided Bullington , and, for the first time, held that the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause applied equally to sentencing and to determinations of guilt or innocence. Bullington at 449, 101 S.Ct. at 1863-64, 68 L.Ed.2d at 286 (Powell, J. dissenting). In Bullington , the defendant was found guilty of capital murder at his first trial. During the penalty phase of his first trial, the jury was given only two sentencing options: death or life without eligibility for probation or parole for 50 years. The jury returned a verdict of life without eligibility for probation or parole for 50 years. The defendant then successfully appealed his conviction and was granted a new trial. Upon retrial, the prosecution gave notice to the defendant that it would again seek the death penalty. The Bullington Court held that the imposition of the death penalty at the defendant's new trial was barred by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution [b]ecause the sentencing proceeding at [the defendant's] first trial was like the trial on the question of guilt or innocence, the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause to one acquitted by a jury also is available to him, with respect to the death penalty, at his retrial. Bullington at 446, 101 S.Ct. at 1862, 68 L.Ed.2d at 284. At the heart of the Court's reasoning was that the Missouri capital sentencing procedure explicitly required a jury to determine whether the prosecution had proved its case. Id. at 444, 101 S.Ct. at 1860-61, 68 L.Ed.2d at 282. Subsequent cases make clear that the case that the prosecution failed to prove in Bullington was whether Bullington deserved the death penalty. See, e.g., Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 153 n. 3, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 1754 n. 3, 90 L.Ed.2d 123, 131 n. 3 (1986). Thus, the question we answer today is whether Kentucky's capital sentencing procedure so closely resembles Missouri's capital sentencing procedure that Eldred's sentence of Life-25 at his first trial precludes the Commonwealth from seeking the death penalty at Eldred's retrial, due to the Commonwealth's failure to prove that Eldred deserved the death penalty at his first trial. Bullington was reaffirmed in Arizona v. Rumsey, supra . In Rumsey , the defendant was sentenced to death at retrial after having been sentenced to life without parole for 25 years at his first trial. The Rumsey Court concluded that Bullington controlled and, therefore, the imposition of the death penalty violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Rumsey at 210, 104 S.Ct. at 2309-10, 81 L.Ed.2d at 171. The Rumsey Court reached this conclusion by comparing Arizona's capital sentencing procedure to Missouri's capital sentencing procedure as described in Bullington . The Rumsey Court first identified the characteristics of the Missouri capital sentencing procedure that made it comparable to a trial for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause: The discretion of the sentencerthe jury in Missouriis restricted to precisely two options: death, and life imprisonment without possibility of release for 50 years. In addition, the sentencer is to make its decision guided by substantive standards and based on evidence introduced in a separate proceeding that formally resembles a trial. Finally, the prosecution has to prove certain statutorily defined facts beyond a reasonable doubt in order to support a sentence of death. Rumsey at 209, 104 S.Ct. at 2309, 81 L.Ed.2d at 170 (emphasis added). The Rumsey Court then set forth the characteristics of the Arizona capital sentencing procedure that likewise made it comparable to a trial for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause: The sentencerthe trial judge in Arizonais required to choose between two options: death, and life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years. The sentencer must make the decision guided by detailed statutory standards defining aggravating and mitigating circumstances; in particular, death may not be imposed unless at least one aggravating circumstance is found, whereas death must be imposed if there is one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The sentencer must make findings with respect to each of the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the sentencing hearing involves the submission of evidence and the presentation of argument. The usual rules of evidence govern the admission of evidence of aggravating circumstances, and the State must prove the existence of aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Rumsey at 209-210, 104 S.Ct. at 2309-10, 81 L.Ed.2d at 170-171 (emphasis added). Because of the similarities between the two sentencing procedures, the Rumsey Court found that Arizona's capital sentencing procedure was indistinguishable from Missouri's for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 210, 104 S.Ct. at 2309-10, 81 L.Ed.2d at 171. The Rumsey Court ultimately held that [a]pplication of the Bullington principle renders respondent's death sentence a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause because respondent's initial sentence of life imprisonment was undoubtedly an acquittal on the merits of the central issue in the proceedingwhether death was the appropriate punishment for respondent's offense. Id. at 211, 104 S.Ct. at 2310, 81 L.Ed.2d at 171. Kentucky's capital sentencing procedure shares a number of characteristics with both Missouri's and Arizona's capital sentencing procedures that were found to be determinative by the Rumsey Court: Kentucky has a bifurcated proceeding for sentencing in capital cases; the jury is guided by detailed statutory guidelines as to aggravating and mitigating circumstances; the death penalty cannot be recommended by a jury unless it finds the presence of least one of the statutory aggravating factors and so designates this finding in writing; the sentencing hearing involves the submission of evidence and presentation of argument in a trial-like proceeding; and the Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any aggravating factors. The only discernible and relevant difference between Kentucky's capital sentencing procedure and the procedures of Missouri and Arizona, is that, under Kentucky's procedure, the jury is not restricted to only two choices in the range of punishment that it may recommend. In Kentucky, upon finding a defendant guilty of a capital crime, the jury may recommend death, life without possibility of parole for 25 years, life imprisonment, or a term of years not less than 20 years. KRS 532.030(1). There are two important exceptions to the general rule set forth in Stroud and reaffirmed in Pearce. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957), held that a defendant convicted of second-degree murder, who successfully attacks his conviction on appeal, cannot be convicted of first-degree murder at retrial. Green established the principle that conviction of a lesser-included offense operates as an implied acquittal of the greater offense. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), held that a defendant may not be retried if he obtains a reversal of his conviction on the ground that the evidence presented against him at trial was legally insufficient to convict him. The Bullington Court found that both the exceptions of Burks and Green applied to its case at bar and relied on these exceptions to establish the exception it created in Bullington . Bullington at 444-445, 101 S.Ct. at 1860-1862, 68 L.Ed.2d at 282-283. Thus, the Bullington exception to the general rule of Stroud and Pearce can be viewed as resting on either of two alternative grounds [1] : 1) unless the State produces sufficient evidence to support the death penalty at a defendant's first trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the State from seeking the death penalty at retrial; and/or 2) a sentence of less than death acts as an implied acquittal of death penalty. We find that, because neither the exception of Burks or Green applies to Kentucky's capital sentencing procedure, Bullington does not preclude the Commonwealth from seeking the death penalty against Eldred at his new trial.