Opinion ID: 1103188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: failure to prove damages

Text: ¶ 16. Missala contends that Odom had an affirmative duty to provide support for her contention of damages and failed. Missala argues that the trial court committed error by permitting the jury to consider punitive damages. Since issues two and four are interrelated they will be discussed simultaneously. ¶ 17. In order for damages to be awarded, Odom was required to provide substantial proof to the jury so it could have a reasonable basis to assess her loss. Purina Mills, Inc. v. Moak, 575 So.2d 993, 998 (Miss.1990). The record reflects that Odom presented proof to the court through lay witness testimony, expert witness testimony and documentation. ¶ 18. Odom's expert witness, Jerry Levens, presented evidence on the current value of Missala's stock at the time of the trial. Levens testified that based on recent valuations of Missala, he conservatively valued the worth of the corporation at $3.55 million. Therefore, Odom's 10% interest in Missala was worth $355,000. Levens based his testimony on documents in evidence. This testimony, along with the documents in evidence, provided the jury with ample evidence of the amount of damages to which Odom was entitled. ¶ 19. Moreover, Missala accepted Levens's estimate that Missala had a net worth of $3.55 million. Missala's own expert witness, Ken Lefoldt, agreed that Levens had valued the company properly and conservatively. Lefoldt simply testified that the value of Odom's 10% share in Missala should be reduced for two reasons: (1) Missala is a closely held corporation, so the stock was less marketable than publicly traded stock and (2) Odom's 10% interest was a minority interest, so the lack of control associated with that 10% diminished the stock's value. Lefoldt concluded that the 10% interest was not worth $355,000, but rather $120,000. Nonetheless, Missala recognized Odom's interest, which warranted damages although the actual amount of damages was still at issue. Based upon the expert testimony of Levens and Lefoldt and the documents in evidence, the jury had sufficient proof provided as to the value of a 10% interest in Missala. ¶ 20. Due to Missala's mismanagement, Odom's 10% interest in Missala lost some of its value. Levens, in his valuation of the stock for purposes of determining the value of Odom's 10% interest for assessing damages on her freeze out claim, also included the valuation of the I'm Alone, an asset that Missala sold in December 1998 for $450,000. Levens valued the I'm Alone at $650,000; however, his valuation included only the value of the I'm Alone as a vessel and not the value of the income gained from use of the I'm Alone as a charter boat. Although Missala alleged that the sale was a solid business decision, Lefoldt, Missala's expert witness, agreed that the $200,000 allocated for the sale of the I'm Alone should be included in the valuation. Therefore, Missala's own expert resolved that the I'm Alone was sold for significantly less than its actual value. ¶ 21. Additionally, Odom provided evidence that Missala had mismanaged assets by assigning Charles and Robert a right of first refusal on a valuable piece of property at no cost. This evidence was ample to create an issue of fact for the jury on Odom's claim of mismanagement. The trial court properly submitted the mismanagement claim to the jury. The jury's verdict was within the bounds of its discretion and was not so excessive as to evince bias, passion, or prejudice. This Court has stated that it will not overturn a jury's verdict unless no reasonable juror could find damages in the amount that the jury awarded. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 807 So.2d 382, 389 (Miss.2001). Based upon the evidence presented by expert testimony as to Missala's valuation, the jury's verdict of $120,000 compensatory damages was reasonable. In proving evidence of mismanagement, Odom had also proven damages. We find no manifest error by the trial court. ¶ 22. The evidence presented and the claims that Odom asserted against Missala are appropriate claims for which punitive damages may be sought. Corporate freeze out is an intentional tort that is committed with willful and wanton disregard for the right of the shareholder who is frozen out. Odom asserted in her complaint and presented evidence at trial that Missala committed gross negligence by breaching its fiduciary duty to her as a minority shareholder and not permitting her to participate as a shareholder. Both are claims for which punitive damages can be awarded in Mississippi. Because Odom presented evidence sufficient to create issues of fact for the jury on these claims, the judge was well within his discretion to allow the jury to consider an award of punitive damages. MIC Life Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 825 So.2d 616, 617 (Miss.2002). For these reasons, we find no error. REQUEST FOR SPECIAL VERDICT FORM ¶ 23. Missala asserts that it was error for the trial court to allow multiple inconsistent claims to be submitted to the jury on a general verdict. Missala argues a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories is more appropriate. ¶ 24. According to the Miss. R. Civ. P. 49(b), the court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact ... the court, in its discretion, may submit to the jury, together with instructions for a general verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict. Previously, this Court has held that the decision to instruct the jury by means of a special verdict or a general verdict with interrogatories is within the discretion of the trial court and will be overturned only on a showing that the lower court abused its discretion. W.J. Runyon & Son, Inc. v. Davis, 605 So.2d 38, 49 (Miss.1992), overruled on other grounds, Richardson v. APAC-Miss., Inc., 631 So.2d 143 (Miss.1994). ¶ 25. The record contains no request by Missala of either a special verdict or a general verdict with interrogatories. At the hearing on Missala's motion for a new trial, the trial court addressed this issue, stating that if either side had requested special interrogatories, I would have certainly considered that. But neither side requested any special interrogatories on the issue of damages as to the particular claims, and, therefore, the jury was instructed as requested by the parties. Failure to object to an instruction at trial bars that issue on appeal. Jones v. State, 776 So.2d 643, 653 (Miss.2000). We find no error because the trial court acted within its discretion and Missala failed to object at trial. AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ¶ 26. Missala argues that the trial court erred in granting an award of attorney's fees and expert witness fees. Missala argues that it has a constitutional right to a jury trial on any disputed fact question, including Odom's claim for attorney's fees and costs. Missala further contends that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees by means of a post-trial motion. ¶ 27. It is proper for the trial court to hold a hearing after the trial of the case to hear evidence on the issue of attorney's fees. Smith v. Dorsey, 599 So.2d 529, 550 (Miss.1992). At the hearing, the trial court determined that the amount of attorney's fees requested was reasonable but took the decision whether to award those fees under advisement. Ultimately, the trial court found that an award of attorney's fees was appropriate because it determined that punitive damages were appropriate and because the jury awarded Odom punitive damages. ¶ 28. This Court has held that the trial court is the appropriate entity to award attorney's fees and costs. Turner v. Terry, 799 So.2d 25, 39 (Miss.2001). A trial court's decision on attorney's fees is subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. Id. at 39. Missala has presented no evidence that either the decision to award attorney's fees and expenses or the measure of that award were an abuse of the trial court's discretion. ¶ 29. Missala's contention that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees in a post-trial motion is meritless. The record reflects that the motion was appropriate because the complaint and amended complaint specifically prayed for attorney's fees and costs. ¶ 30. For these reasons, we find no error and uphold the award of attorney's fees and costs. JURY INSTRUCTIONS ¶ 31. Missala asserts that the trial court erred by granting instructions 4, 5, 6, 7, 7A, 8 and 8A and refusing instructions D-1, D-11A and D-13A. ¶ 32. Missala contends jury instructions 4, 5, 6, 7, 7A, 8 and 8A should not have been submitted to the jury for consideration. The record reflects that Missala did not object to any of the referenced instructions. Therefore, Missala has failed to preserve this issue for appeal. Lucas v. Miss. Housing Auth. No. 8, 441 So.2d 101, 105 (Miss.1983). Moreover, [i]t is the rule of this Court that no assignment of error based on the giving of an instruction to the jury will be considered on appeal unless a specific objection was made to the instruction in the trial court stating the particular ground or grounds for such objection. Watson v. State, 483 So.2d 1326, 1329 (Miss.1986). ¶ 33. Missala asserts that proposed jury instructions D-1, D-11A and D-13A should have been granted. The standard of review for challenges to jury instructions is as follows: [T]he instructions are to be read together as a whole, with no one instruction to be read alone or taken out of context. A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case. However, the trial judge may also properly refuse the instructions if he finds them to incorrectly state the law or to repeat a theory fairly covered in another instruction or to be without proper foundation in the evidence of the case. Humphrey v. State, 759 So.2d 368, 380 (Miss.2000). ¶ 34. Missala complains of the trial court's refusal of D-1, which reads as follows: The court instructs the Jury to find for the Defendant, Missala Marine Services, Inc. We find that this instruction contains no statement of the law and is a peremptory instruction. Consequently, this assignment of error is without merit. ¶ 35. Missala next complains of refused instructions D-11A and D-13A. ¶ 36. Refused instruction D-11A states: If you find for the Plaintiff in this case, you are not authorized to find for the plaintiff for any amount beyond reasonable compensation for the damages sustained by the Plaintiff, if any. You are not authorized to award any damages in the nature of a penalty or attorney's fees, nor are you bound by any estimates of damages made by the attorneys representing the parties in this suit. You are not authorized to award damages based upon the alleged value of the shares of stock of the Defendant, Missala Marine Services Corporation. If you find for the Plaintiff, you must therefore confine your verdict to reasonable compensation for the damages actually sustained, if any, by the Plaintiff as a result of the conduct of the Defendant or Defendants. ¶ 37. Refused instruction D-13A states: If you are to determine that the Plaintiff has successfully proved the elements of her claims and that she is entitled to recovery in this case, you are limited to compensating the Plaintiff through an award of monetary damages in this court. By choosing to bring her claims in this court, Plaintiff has requested that she be compensated through the award of money and not through any equitable relief which you may deem appropriate. In other words, you are not to consider whether or not the company should be dissolved or liquidated or Plaintiff should transfer or sell her stock or be given certain rights in the company. A plaintiff's offer to transfer her shares cannot be ordered. The only award in favor of the Plaintiff which you or his court can give is money damages. ¶ 38. We find that the trial judge refused these instructions because he believed that the jury would be fairly instructed by all of the instructions as a whole. The trial judge gave instructions 8 and 8A, which were comprehensive damages instructions. Consequently, we find this assignment of error is without merit.