Opinion ID: 2211595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: provision of audiotape player to jury

Text: Although the foregoing determinations resolve this appeal, we nonetheless consider one of the other issues that Dixon assigns as error because it is likely to recur as an issue during a retrial. An appellate court may, at its discretion, discuss issues unnecessary to the disposition of an appeal where those issues are likely to recur during further proceedings. Gestring v. Mary Lanning Memorial Hosp., 259 Neb. 905, 613 N.W.2d 440 (2000). Dixon asserts that the district court erred in admitting exhibits 3 and 4 of his recorded conversation with Vasa on February 21, 1995, because there was inadequate foundation to do so. Dixon also argues that there was insufficient foundation for exhibits 59 and 60, which are redacted copies of exhibits 3 and 4, respectively, that were submitted to the jury. Suffice it to say that if Dixon is retried and adequate foundation is elicited at that trial, tape recordings of relevant and material conversations may properly be admitted into evidence. See, State v. Pearson, 215 Neb. 339, 338 N.W.2d 445 (1983); State v. Loveless, 209 Neb. 583, 308 N.W.2d 842 (1981); State v. Myers, 190 Neb. 146, 206 N.W.2d 851 (1973). The tape recordings were critical items of evidence and are likely to be offered when Dixon is retried; we therefore proceed to address the procedure by which such exhibits should be presented to the jury if properly admitted into evidence. Five minutes after the jury retired to deliberate in the instant case, the jury requested that the trial judge provide it with an audiotape playback machine. The trial judge, in open court outside of the presence of the jury, advised Dixon and counsel for both parties that I've received a request from the jury for a recorder or player and speaker, which is presumably to listen to Exhibit 3. We digress to note that the record reflects that exhibit 3 (later redacted and submitted to the jury as exhibit 59) was played in open court at trial and that immediately after it was played, Vasa testified again regarding portions of the conversation, including Dixon's statement, I just felt like blasting on [the victim]. While testifying at trial, Vasa was reading from a transcript of the very same conversation contained in exhibit 3. This procedure was allowed at trial because there were places on the tape recording where the conversational exchange was very quick and the conversation between Dixon and Vasa was difficult to understand when heard only once. Dixon objected to the jury's request for the audiotape playback machine; his objection was overruled, and the jury was provided a tape player and exhibits 59 and 60 for unsupervised use in the jury room. Dixon contends on appeal that by letting the jury hear and rehear exhibits 59 and 60, the court allowed the jury to place undue emphasis on a small portion of the evidence adduced at trial. The precise question to be answered in this appeal is whether the district court erred in the procedure it utilized before the court in allowing the jury to rehear portions of exhibits 59 and 60 during deliberations. The general rule is that allowing a jury to rehear only portions of the evidence after they have commenced deliberations is not to be encouraged, but it is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Halsey, 232 Neb. 658, 441 N.W.2d 877 (1989). Although trial courts have been given latitude in deciding whether to allow a jury to reexamine exhibits such as audiotapes, we think that it would be instructive to review the principles that we utilize in reviewing whether such reexamination constitutes an abuse of discretion. The traditional common-law rule is that a trial court has no discretion to submit depositions and other testimonial materials to the jury room for unsupervised review, even if properly admitted into evidence at trial. (Emphasis supplied.) Chambers v. State, 726 P.2d 1269, 1275 (Wyo.1986). Thus, previously played portions of tape recordings, like testimony of an actual witness at trial, generally should not be reheard by jurors. See State v. Jacob, 253 Neb. 950, 574 N.W.2d 117 (1998). Jurors must rely upon their memory of what they heard the witness say, be it from a live witness or a tape recording. Id. The common-law rule is designed to curtail the principal danger involved in allowing the jury to rehear only a part of the evidence; that is, the jury may give undue emphasis to the part of the evidence which is reheard. State v. Halsey, supra . We do not ordinarily stray from the common-law rule, i.e., a trial court should not allow unrestricted review of previously played portions of tape recordings, any more than a court would allow unrestricted rereading of the testimony of an actual witness at trial. State v. Jacob, supra . When a jury makes a request to rehear certain evidence, the common-law rule requires that a trial court discover the exact nature of the jury's difficulty, isolate the precise testimony which can solve it, and weigh the probative value of the testimony against the danger of undue emphasis. If, after this careful exercise of discretion, the court decides to allow some repetition of the tape-recorded evidence for the jury, it can do so in open court in the presence of the parties or their counsel or under other strictly controlled procedures of which the parties have been notified. Chambers v. State, supra . Accordingly, once a tape recording is properly admitted as testimonial evidence, such evidence should be marked as any other exhibit and included in the record for review in the event of an appeal. After being admitted, however, the exhibit should be played once in open court so that the jury can hear the tape in the same manner that it does other evidence. See, State v. Myers, 190 Neb. 146, 206 N.W.2d 851 (1973); 75B Am.Jur.2d Trial § 1689 (1992 & Cum.Supp.2000). It is only under circumstances where the jury makes a request to rehear certain evidence during deliberations that the trial court must proceed to weigh the probative value of the evidence against the danger of undue emphasis, in open court in the presence of both parties or their counsel, before determining whether portions of the evidence should be reheard by the jury. Applying these established principles, we conclude that the district court erred in not conducting an examination into the reasons for the jury's request to rehear portions of exhibit 59 or 60 and in not weighing the probative value of the requested evidence against the danger of undue emphasis before the court granted the jury's request to rehear certain evidence. Moreover, the district court erred in submitting exhibits 59 and 60 to the jury for unsupervised and unrestricted review within the confines of the jury room, under any circumstances. In reaching these conclusions, we do not share the dissent's view that the playing of Dixon's tape-recorded statements and Vasa's subsequent reading from a verbatim transcript of the tape recording at trial were akin to playing at trial a tape recording of an actual crime in progress. See, e.g., State v. Myers, supra . We express no opinion as to whether any portion of exhibits 59 or 60 should have been reheard by the jury because the record does not reflect the reasons for the jury's request. This court, however, has observed on many other occasions that such a practice is `fraught with some danger to a fair trial, and ought to be indulged in with caution.' State v. Halsey, 232 Neb. 658, 663, 441 N.W.2d 877, 881 (1989) (quoting Barton v. Shull, 70 Neb. 324, 97 N.W. 292 (1903)). For the sake of completeness, we note that the evidence contained in exhibits 59 and 60 does not pertain to the attempted theft by unlawful taking conviction, and our affirmance of that count remains intact. We do not consider any other errors assigned by Dixon in this appeal.