Opinion ID: 2792988
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony as to Future Dangerousness

Text: Gonzales maintains that he is also entitled to a COA because the district court improperly permitted the prosecution to present expert witness testimony from Dr. Gripon as to future dangerousness during the mitigation phase of his trial. Gonzales argues that the State failed to establish that Dr. Gripon’s testimony was sufficiently reliable to be admissible as required by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 3 Gonzales properly raised his Daubert claim before the CCA on direct appeal and the CCA rejected the claim on the merits. Due to binding precedent, Gonzales cannot show that jurists of reason would debate whether the state court’s denial of his claim was unreasonable. In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Supreme Court held that psychiatric testimony predicting a capital defendant’s future dangerousness is not per se improper. Id. at 898-99. Gonzales’s arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, our court has consistently held that Daubert did not overrule 3Although the State discerned five separate points of error raised by Gonzales as to expert testimony regarding future dangerousness, all of Gonzales’s arguments focus exclusively on the reliability of Dr. Gripon’s future dangerousness testimony under Daubert. 12 Case: 14-70006 Document: 00513000966 Page: 13 Date Filed: 04/10/2015 No. 14-70006 Barefoot for the proposition that expert testimony regarding future dangerousness is permissible. See, e.g., Williams v. Stephens, 761 F.3d 561, 571 (5th Cir. 2014) (maintaining that expert future dangerousness testimony is permissible under Barefoot and stating that petitioner’s “contention that the Supreme Court may overrule Barefoot in light of Daubert is completely speculative”); Roberts v. Thaler, 681 F.3d 597, 608-09 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Barefoot stands for the proposition that expert testimony predicting a defendant’s future dangerousness is not per se inadmissible.”); Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 456 n.1 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). Because expert evidence predicting a capital defendant’s future dangerousness is permissible under Barefoot, jurists of reason would not debate whether the CCA reasonably determined that Dr. Gripon’s testimony was properly allowed.