Opinion ID: 1060569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 29

Heading: Witherspoon Violations

Text: The appellant next contends that the jury selection process in his capital trial violated Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). Specifically, he argues that the statements of two of the prospective jurors, Barbara Brooks and Dennis Spellings, concerning the death penalty did not justify their excusal for cause. The right to trial by jury secured by our state and federal constitutions necessarily contemplates that the jury will be unbiased and impartial. See Wolf v. Sundquist, 955 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn.App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn.1997) (citing Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220, 66 S.Ct. 984, 985, 90 L.Ed. 1181 (1946); Ricketts v. Carter, 918 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tenn.1996); Durham v. State, 182 Tenn. 577, 188 S.W.2d 555, 558 (1945)). In its constitutional sense, impartiality envisions not only freedom from jury bias against the defendant but also freedom from jury bias in the defendant's favor. Id. (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219-20, 85 S.Ct. 824, 835, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70-71, 7 S.Ct. 350, 351, 30 L.Ed. 578 (1887); Houston v. State, 593 S.W.2d 267, 272 (Tenn.1980), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 543 (Tenn.1992); Toombs v. State, 197 Tenn. 229, 270 S.W.2d 649, 650 (1954)). Essentially, an impartial juror is one who is free from personal bias or prejudice and will find the facts and apply them to the law. See Wolf v. Sundquist, 955 S.W.2d at 629; see also Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 417, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 2914, 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423, 105 S.Ct. 844, 851-52, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Eason v. State, 65 Tenn. 466, 469 (1873). To ensure an impartial jury, the Tennessee Supreme Court has adopted the rationale of the United States Supreme Court in determining the eligibility of prospective jurors in a capital case. In Witherspoon v. Illinois , the Supreme Court held that a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment. This standard was clarified in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852: That standard is whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' We note that, in addition to dispensing with Witherspoon 's reference to automatic decision making, this standard likewise does not require that a juror's bias be proved with unmistakable clarity. See also State v. Alley, 776 S.W.2d 506 (Tenn.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S.Ct. 758, 107 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990); State v. Williams, 690 S.W.2d 517, 522 (Tenn.1985). The Supreme Court also acknowledged that the questions asked and answered during the voir dire process do not always reveal a juror's bias with absolute certainty; however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 425-26, 105 S.Ct. at 853. Therefore, deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. Id. Indeed, in State v. Alley , our supreme court held that the trial court's finding of bias of a juror because of his views of capital punishment shall be accorded a presumption of correctness and the burden shall rest upon the appellant to establish by convincing evidence that determination was erroneous. Alley, 776 S.W.2d at 518; see also Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980).
During individual voir dire, Barbara Brooks was called as a potential juror. When asked by District Attorney General Woodall whether she could impose the death penalty in this case, Ms. Brooks responded that she could not do so for religious reasons. Despite further questioning by General Woodall, Ms. Brooks maintained that she did not believe in the death penalty and that she could not and would not impose such a sentence. The trial court, as well, questioned Ms. Brooks regarding whether she could impose the death penalty. In response to the court's questioning, she again stated that she could not impose the death penalty no matter what the crime was because she does not believe that a person's life should be taken because of it. She further admitted that the death penalty is out of the question for [her] and she would never consider imposing the death penalty on the appellant or anyone else. Defense counsel, in an attempt to rehabilitate Ms. Brooks, asked her whether she could fairly consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and keep an open mind as to the three possibilities for sentencing in this case, to which Ms. Brooks responded affirmatively. The court again questioned Ms. Brooks as to whether she could impose the death penalty if it was called for by the law and the facts. Although Ms. Brooks responded that she could consider the sentence of life without the possibility of parole and that she could hear the evidence, she stated I don't think I could be fair at that because of the death penalty ... the only thing that hinders me is when you said death penalty. That's where it stops with me. Despite this statement, defense counsel was again able to illicit answers from Ms. Brooks that raised concern as to her position on the death penalty. As a result, the trial court instructed Ms. Brooks to just say how you feel. After further equivocation by the prospective juror, the trial court asked her point blank if the death penalty was out; she responded, Forget it. At that point, the State challenged Barbara Brooks for cause and the court sustained the challenge finding: ... I finally put it to her as blank, I said, The death penalty is out? She said, The death penalty is out, the death penalty is out. I will not impose it and she said it multiple, multiple times. Although Ms. Brooks' position on the death penalty was ambiguous at certain times during her voir dire examination, we can reach no rational conclusion other than finding that Ms. Brooks had a definite opposition to imposing the death penalty. Giving deference to the trial court who was able to observe this prospective juror, we conclude that the constitutional standard for excusing jurors due to their views on the death penalty was met.
Later that same day, Dennis Spellings was called for individual voir dire. The following dialogue occurred between Mr. Spellings and General Woodall: GENERAL WOODALL: ... Can you fairly consider the death penalty along with other forms of punishment? MR. SPELLINGS: That's a tough question. GENERAL WOODALL: As it should be.... [T]he law in the State of Tennessee is if the aggravating circumstances ... outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose the death penalty. Can you do that or do you have personal convictions or religious convictions that would prevent you from doing it? MR. SPELLINGS: It's a tough question to ask straight forward. I really don't have an answer. ... GENERAL WOODALL: Well, can you make that decision? Do you think that you could vote to impose the death penalty? MR. SPELLINGS: Honestly I don't. GENERAL WOODALL: Are you saying you don't think you could or maybe you could or you just don't know? MR. SPELLINGS: When we're talking about when push comes to shove, I don't know. GENERAL WOODALL: ... So are you saying you don't know whether you could or you won't? MR. SPELLINGS: I don't know. Defense counsel also attempted to elicit a definite position from Mr. Spellings, but was unsuccessful. The trial court interrupted and asked Mr. Spellings, After you hear all the proof, then you could make a decision as to whether or not death should apply? Mr. Spellings responded, I'll be honest with you. I'd rather not make that decision. During the court's discourse with Mr. Spellings, Mr. Spellings replied, at one point, that he could follow the law as instructed by the court, but later admitted that he did not know if he could follow the law as related to the death penalty. The State challenged Mr. Spellings for cause, relying on Mr. Spellings admission that he did not know whether he would follow the law. The trial court sustained the challenge, explicitly finding: This is the first time we've run into this where a person just ... won't answer the question or he feels like he can't answer the question. As I interpret the law that means that we have to get commitment from a juror that they would follow the law and that they would consider the death penalty under certain circumstances. I don't think that a juror is disqualified if they just continue to persistently say, I don't know what I would do. That's like a juror who's really saying will you affirm to uphold the law and he would say, Well, I just can't answer that. If you had a juror and you put him in the box and you say Do you swear to tell the truth? and he says, I can't say whether I will or not, you wouldn't let him testify. It takes an affirmative statement by a juror that he would consider all the penalties ... and would not exclude the death penalty as a possibility. I think the statements by this juror render him unqualified to served on the jury. Again, this court gives deference to the decision of the trial court who was able to observe the prospective juror. The record demonstrates that Mr. Spellings could not state with certainty that he could perform his duties as a juror in accordance with his oath. Accordingly, the trial court properly excused this juror for cause. This issue is without merit.