Opinion ID: 901910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether Steichen's right to due process was violated by the admission of other acts evidence.

Text: [¶ 5.] As part of its case-in-chief, the State presented the testimony of the two children who were named victims of the charged offenses. Additionally, the State offered testimony of four other children who claimed Steichen had sexually molested them. The State also presented limited testimony of incidents of Steichen's violence towards his wife and other family members. The testimony of the other children and the references to Steichen's violence were allowed under SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule 404(b)) as other acts evidence. SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule 404(b)) restricts the use of other acts evidence as follows: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. SDCL 19-12-5. The trial court determined that the other acts evidence was admissible to show motive, common scheme and plan, opportunity, lack of mistake or accident, and continuing course of criminal conduct. The trial court further determined that the other acts evidence was more probative than prejudicial. [¶ 6.] On appeal, a majority of this Court found no error in admitting the other acts evidence under SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule 404(b)) to show motive, common plan or scheme, opportunity and a continuing course of criminal conduct. Steichen, 1998 SD 126, ¶¶ 16-34, 588 N.W.2d at 874-78. This Court determined, however, that it was error for the trial court to admit the evidence to show lack of mistake or accident. Even so, the error was determined harmless because Steichen's case was not prejudiced by the circuit court's decision. Id. ¶ 26, 588 N.W.2d at 876 (citation omitted). [¶ 7.] Steichen now seeks habeas corpus relief, claiming that the admission of the other acts evidence deprived him of a fair trial and violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. XIV. With such a challenge, Steichen has the burden of establish[ing] an error which demonstrates a violation of due process. This burden is much greater than that required on direct appeal and is even greater than the showing of plain error on direct appeal. See Loop v. Class, 1996 SD 107, ¶ 23, 554 N.W.2d 189, 193 (citations omitted). On habeas review: The inquiry is not `whether the circuit court erred in admitting the particular testimony,' but `whether the admissions resulted in a trial so fundamentally unfair as to deny [Steichen] due process of law. In making this determination we must review the totality of the facts in the case and analyze the fairness of the particular trial under consideration.' Id. (quoting Rainer v. Dep't of Corrections, 914 F.2d 1067, 1072 (8th Cir.1990) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1099, 111 S.Ct. 993, 112 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1991)). Our review of a constitutional question is de novo. Moeller v. Weber, 2004 SD 110, ¶ 42 n. 3, 689 N.W.2d 1, 15 n. 3 (citing State v. Dillon, 2001 SD 97, ¶ 12, 632 N.W.2d 37, 43). [¶ 8.] As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Nebinger v. Ault, [r]ulings on the admission or exclusion of evidence in state trials rarely rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation. 208 F.3d 695, 697 (8th Cir.2000). Only `when an evidentiary ruling is so egregious that it results in a denial of fundamental fairness,' may it violate due process and warrant habeas relief. Harris v. Wolfenbarger, 2007 WL 2421545,  12 (E.D.Mich.) (quoting Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 512 (6th Cir.2003)). Consequently for habeas relief, Steichen must show under the totality of the circumstances, error `so gross . . . conspicuously prejudicial . . . or otherwise of such magnitude that it fatally infected the trial and failed to afford [Steichen] the fundamental fairness which is the essence of due process.' See Loop, 1996 SD 107, ¶ 23, 554 N.W.2d at 193 (quoting Rainer, 914 F.2d at 1072 (citations omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1099, 111 S.Ct. 993, 112 L.Ed.2d 1077). The habeas applicant must show that there is a reasonable probability that the error complained of affected the outcome of the trial i.e., that absent the alleged impropriety, the verdict probably would have been different. Harris v. Bowersox, 184 F.3d 744, 752 (8th Cir.1999) (quoting Carter v. Armontrout, 929 F.2d 1294, 1296 (8th Cir.1991)); see Rodriguez v. Weber, 2000 SD 128, ¶ 1, 617 N.W.2d 132, 136 (concluding that there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the errors not occurred). [¶ 9.] We already determined on appeal that most of the other acts evidence did not adversely prejudice Steichen. Steichen's renewed challenge to the other acts evidence also fails to warrant relief. A review of the entire trial record shows that the other acts evidence admitted in Steichen's trial was not of such magnitude that it fatally infected the trial or its outcome. See Loop, 1996 SD 107, ¶ 23, 554 N.W.2d at 193 (citations omitted). The State presented sufficient evidence to convict Steichen. Both victims testified that Steichen abused them sexually. K.C., the sixteen-year-old babysitter, testified in detail regarding Steichens repeated sexual abuse. H.F., Steichen's seven-year-old step-daughter was not as detailed in her testimony because of her age. Other witnesses, however, corroborated H.F.'s allegation of sexual abuse. The doctor who examined H.F. testified that H.F.'s injuries were consistent with a child who had been sexually abused. In addition, the social worker and psychotherapist who met with H.F. testified that H.F.'s behavior was consistent with a child who had been sexually abused. The evidence concerning Steichen's violence to family members was only referenced in the context that Steichen was the disciplinarian of the family. The family-violence testimony was brief and not detailed. Thus, under the totality of the circumstances the admission of the other acts evidence did not deprive Steichen of his due process right to a fair trial. [¶ 10.] Steichen also bases his due process claim on the trial court's failure to properly instruct the jury. Steichen claims that the jury should have been instructed to consider the other acts evidence only if the jury first found by a preponderance of the evidence that the acts had occurred. Steichen did not propose such an instruction or otherwise object to the instruction given by the trial court. At the time of Steichen's trial, we had not had an opportunity to specifically address the burden of proof of other acts evidence. Subsequently, in State v. Wright, we determined that [b]efore a jury may consider facts relating to other acts as proof of an issue relevant to the present offense; the jury must conclude the defendant committed the other acts by a preponderance of the evidence. 1999 SD 50, ¶ 14, 593 N.W.2d 792, 799 (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1501, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988)). Our pronouncement in State v. Wright, conformed to Huddleston v. United States. Id . [¶ 11.] In Huddleston v. United States , the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether the trial court must make a preliminary finding before `similar act' and other Rule 404(b) evidence is submitted to the jury. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685, 108 S.Ct. at 1499. The Court concluded that Federal Rule 404(b) evidence should be admitted if there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the similar act. Id. Evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b), the Court said, only if it is relevant. . . . In the Rule 404(b) context, similar act evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor. Id. at 689, 108 S.Ct. at 1501. Whether the admission of the 404(b) evidence violated constitutional due process was not addressed in either Wright or Huddleston. [¶ 12.] The United States Supreme Court did, however, address a similar due process issue in Estelle v. McGuire. 502 U.S. 62, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). In Estelle, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder in the death of his 6-month old daughter. Id. at 64, 112 S.Ct. at 478. The child was brought to the hospital after she turned blue and stopped breathing. Id. Unable to be revived, she died shortly thereafter. Id. at 65, 112 S.Ct. at 478. Her body showed severe bruising on various parts of her body. Id. at 64-65, 112 S.Ct. at 478. The defendant denied harming the child and claimed that her injuries resulted from falling from a couch or perhaps by intruders who entered the residence while he was out of the room. Id. at 65, 112 S.Ct. at 478. Prosecutors introduced evidence that the child had prior injuries including broken ribs and rectal tears to prove battered child syndrome. Id. [¶ 13.] The defendant, McGuire, sought habeas relief claiming that his due process rights were violated because the evidence should not have been admitted and because the jury instruction allowed the jury to consider the prior injury evidence for more than simply proof of the battered child syndrome. Id. at 70, 112 S.Ct. at 481. The Estelle Court found that admission of the prior injury evidence did not violate the defendant's federal constitutional rights because evidence of battered child syndrome was relevant to show intent. Id. at 69, 112 S.Ct. at 480. Likewise, the Court found the jury instruction did not violate due process. Id. at 70, 112 S.Ct. at 481. [¶ 14.] The Court applied the following due process standard of review for jury instructions: The only question for us is whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. It is well established that the instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. In addition, in reviewing an ambiguous instruction, . . . we inquire whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. And we also bear in mind our previous admonition that we have defined the category of infractions that violate `fundamental fairness' very narrowly. Beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation. Id. at 72-73, 112 S.Ct. at 482 (internal citations omitted). [1] McGuire claimed that despite the lack of any direct evidence linking him to those injuries, the instruction directed the jury to find that he had committed them. Id. at 73, 112 S.Ct. at 483. The Court rejected this argument because the instruction included the words, if the Defendant committed other offenses, which left it to the jury to decide. Id. The Court concluded from the record that to the extent that the jury may have believed McGuire committed the prior acts and used that as a factor in its deliberation, we observe that there was sufficient evidence to sustain such a jury finding by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 73-74, 112 S.Ct. at 483. McGuire also claimed that the instruction amounted to a propensity instruction allowing the jury to convict based on his prior actions. Id. at 74, 112 S.Ct. at 483. The Court rejected his argument because of the limiting instruction that told the jury that the prior injuries could not be considered to prove that [McGuire] is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit crimes. Id. at 75, 112 S.Ct. at 483. [¶ 15.] In comparison, the instruction given in Steichen's trial was as follows: Evidence has been introduced that the defendant committed offenses or acts other than that which is now charged. Although evidence of this nature is allowed, it may be used only to show: motive, absence of mistake or accident, common plan or scheme, opportunity, and continuing course of criminal conduct. You may not consider it as tending to show in any other respect the defendant's guilt of the offense with which he is charged in this trial. You are not required to consider this evidence, and whether you do is a matter within your exclusive province. Additionally, the trial court instructed that the jury was the sole determiner of the credibility of the witnesses and that guilt must be determined beyond a reasonable doubt. Unlike the jury instruction in Estelle v. McGuire , the instruction here told the jury that it could not use the other acts evidence to determine Steichen's guilt. The instruction, however, did not clearly indicate that the other acts could be considered for the limited purposes only if the jury logically believed the defendant committed them. Thus, the instructions left ambiguity as to the whether the jury first had to find that the other acts had been committed by Steichen. Consequently, we need to review the instructions to determine `whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way' that violate[d] the Constitution. Id. at 72, 112 S.Ct. at 482 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1198, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990)). [¶ 16.] Admittedly, the challenged jury instruction did not specifically tell the jury to determine that Steichen committed the other acts before considering them for the limited purposes enumerated. Nevertheless, because of other jury instructions, it was unlikely that the jury considered the other acts without first believing that Steichen had committed them. See Id. at 74, 112 S.Ct. at 483. [¶ 17.] One of the other instructions in Steichen's case told the members of the jury that they were the sole and exclusive judges of . . . the credibility of the witnesses. Steichen's other acts of sexual molestation came from witnesses who explicitly testified that Steichen had molested them. Members of the jury had to judge the credibility of those witnesses. If the jury believed their version of the facts, the jury would have concluded that Steichen had committed the other acts. Conversely, if the jury did not believe the witnesses, the jury would not have concluded that Steichen had molested the other children. The same can be said of the brief testimony concerning Steichen's violence toward his family. Additionally, another instruction directed that the jury was not required to consider [the other acts] evidence, and whether [the jury did was] a matter within [its] exclusive province. [¶ 18.] When a jury instruction is challenged based on a violation of due process, we look at the challenged instruction in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Id. at 72, 112 S.Ct. at 482 (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400-01, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973)). Having considered the instruction in the context of the other instructions and the trial record, we find there is not a `reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way' that violates the Constitution. Id. (quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380, 110 S.Ct. at 1198). [¶ 19.] Additionally, the trial court utilized other sources to protect Steichen against unfair prejudice from the Rule 404(b) other acts evidence. The United States Supreme Court in Huddleston recognized the prejudicial risk of admitting Rule 404[b] evidence and discussed how the Federal Rules of Evidence provided protections against unfair prejudice. 485 U.S. at 691, 108 S.Ct. at 1502. [P]rotection against such unfair prejudice, the Court said, emanates . . . from four . . . sources. Id. Those sources are as follows: [F]irst, from the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose; second, from the relevancy requirement of Rule 402-as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, from the assessment the [circuit] court must make under Rule 403 to determine whether the probative value of the similar acts evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and fourth, from Federal Rule of Evidence 105, which provides that the [circuit] court shall, upon request, instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted. Id. at 691-92, 108 S.Ct. at 1502 (internal citations omitted). [¶ 20.] In Steichen's direct appeal, we analyzed these sources of protection against unfair prejudice and concluded that they had been applied and that Steichen could show no prejudice. Steichen, 1998 SD 126 ¶ 31, 588 N.W.2d at 877. After determining relevancy, the trial court determined that the probative value of the other acts evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect. The trial court admitted the evidence for a limited purpose and repeatedly cautioned the jury of its limited admissibility. The trial court further instructed the jurors that they were not required to consider the other acts evidence, and whether they did was a matter within [their] exclusive province. The trial court advised the jury that the other acts evidence could not be considered as tending to show in any other respect the defendant's guilt of the offense with which he is charged in this trial. The jury was also instructed on the elements of the charged crimes and that Steichen was presumed innocent unless the jury was satisfied from all the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that [Steichen] was guilty. [¶ 21.] We have recognized the need to specifically tell the jury to find the defendant committed the other acts by a preponderance of the evidence before considering the acts under SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule 404(b)). In this case, based on the totality of the circumstances, failure to do so was not so gross or unduly prejudicial that it tainted the trial. Thus, Steichen has failed to show that his trial was so fundamentally unfair that he was deprived of due process.