Opinion ID: 454755
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: United States as Defendant

Text: 21 In addition to finding liability by individual defendants, the district court awarded Bivens- type compensatory and punitive damages against the United States and the United States Air Force absent an express waiver--and despite the spirited assertion--of sovereign immunity. 568 F.Supp. at 1171. We reverse. 22 The district court viewed its order awarding damages directly against the United States as the natural and logical extension of Supreme Court precedent recognizing and extending liability for so-called constitutional torts. 568 F.Supp. at 1167. Relying upon both Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), and subsequent cases concerning the scope of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, 4 the district court held that[n]ot overlooking the fact that the Owens [sic] decision addressed the issue of a municipality being held liable in a Sec. 1983 action, the issue of a federal sovereign violating its own Constitution is indistinguishable. Accordingly, this Court finds that the federal government is not immune from an action brought against it as a result of its agents having violated the Fifth Amendment rights of a United States citizen.... We cannot help but recognize and enforce the natural and logical extension of Butz and Owens [sic], which leads us inescapably to conclude that just as state agencies and state officers are both liable for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, so also federal agencies and federal officers should be and are liable for constitutional violations under Bivens. 23 568 F.Supp. at 1167 (emphasis in original). 24 We cannot accept the district court's proposition that Bivens and Owen logically compel the United States to be held liable in damages for the constitutional torts of its officers. 5 It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 2965, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983). Admittedly, there is considerable appeal to the proposition that a remedy for a constitutional violation ought not to be defeated by the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. 6 We consider the issue foreclosed against plaintiff, however, by a long line of Supreme Court cases, see, e.g., Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 409, 413, 13 L.Ed. 185 (1850); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 196, 207, 1 S.Ct. 240, 249, 27 L.Ed. 171 (1882); Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388, 59 S.Ct. 516, 517, 83 L.Ed. 784 (1939); Mitchell, supra. The proposition is also contrary to the implication of our own decision in Holloman v. Watt, 708 F.2d 1399, 1401-02 (9th Cir.1983), where we held a Bivens remedy unavailable against federal officials being sued, not in their individual capacity for their individual actions, but simply because of the offices they hold. See also Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971, 980 (9th Cir.1984). It follows that the district court's award of compensatory and punitive damages against the United States and the United States Air Force must be reversed.