Opinion ID: 2037407
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting state's motion to suppress the victim's prior sexual conduct.

Text: Mitchell asserts that the rape-shield statute was used to deprive him of his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine S.D. regarding her prior sexual conduct. The facts relevant to this issue are as follows. Mitchell first had sexual contact with S.D. in April or May of 1984, when he inserted the butter knife into her vagina to break her hymen. A few weeks later, he raped her at the lake cabin. At this time, S.D. had not had sexual intercourse with anyone other than Mitchell. In mid-summer, 1984, S.D. had sexual intercourse with the young man Mitchell had been preparing her to have sex with. S.D. was not taking birth control pills at this time; however, other protection was used to prevent pregnancy (condoms). In April, 1985, S.D. first started taking birth control pills. Shortly thereafter, S.D. had sexual intercourse with another young man. State filed a motion to suppress this prior sexual conduct and Mitchell also filed a rape-shield motion. Mitchell sought to show by confronting and cross-examining S.D. that: 1. In the time periods alleged in Counts I (butter knife) and II (lake cabin), S.D. was in fact having a sexual relationship with the individual whose name is part of her story involving Mitchell, but that Mitchell was not a party to that sexual relationship. 2. S.D. lied under oath on at least one occasion about her motivation for going on the birth control pill, which relates to Count IV (sex to prevent indefinite grounding). 3. S.D. had a bias towards Mitchell for grounding her for inappropriate conduct involving an incident of sexual relationship with another person, which was the predicate to Count IV. After hearing arguments on the motions, the trial court ruled that evidence of S.D.'s prior sexual conduct was of no relevance and would be highly prejudicial to her. The statutes provide: In prosecutions for rape, evidence of specific instances of a victim's prior sexual conduct shall not be admitted nor reference made thereto before the jury or jury panel, except as provided in this section. Whenever a party proposes to offer evidence concerning a victim's prior sexual conduct, the court shall first conduct a hearing in the absence of the jury and the public to consider and rule upon the relevancy and materiality of the evidence. SDCL 23A-22-15. In Blalack we said: As a general rule, the admission of evidence concerning a rape victim's prior sexual conduct is precluded by SDCL 23A-22-15. This statute, like rape-shield statutes in other jurisdictions, represents a legislative determination that in most instances, such evidence is not relevant and highly prejudicial to the victim. (Citations omitted.) In [ ] limited situations[,]... evidence of a victim's previous sexual encounters [may be] relevant and material to a fact at issue in the case[. Under these circumstances] the determination of the admissibility of this evidence is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court to be exercised after an in camera hearing. (Citations omitted.) Blalack, 434 N.W.2d at 57. This court will not interfere with this determination absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id.; Sabag v. Continental South Dakota, 374 N.W.2d 349, 354 (S.D.1985); State v. McNamara, 325 N.W.2d 288, 291 (S.D. 1982). [A]n abuse of discretion `refers to a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against reason and evidence.' State v. Lykken, 484 N.W.2d 869, 874 (S.D.1992) (quoting State v. Woodfork, 454 N.W.2d 332, 335 (S.D. 1990)). In the present case, we cannot find a clear demonstration of abuse of discretion. We fail to see how S.D.'s relationships with two other young men bear any relevance to whether Mitchell was guilty of statutory rape. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting State's motion to suppress.