Opinion ID: 48706
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Duty to Inquire

Text: 146 We now turn to Fields's argument that the district court failed to inquire into the conflict at issue. His argument fails for two reasons.
147 First, the court adequately investigated the potential conflict. It held an ex parte hearing on Fields's motion for substitute counsel. At that hearing, the court listened to Fields's lead attorney speak about the conflict. The attorney described the nature of the prior prosecution, the approximate date on which it took place, and the extent of Peterson's involvement in it. The court also heard Fields's counsel's opinion that the issue was not really a conflict and had not affected the quality of Fields's representation. Afterward, the court gave Fields the opportunity to discuss the alleged conflict, which he declined to do. 148 Fields complains that the court did not affirmatively question the parties involved. Yet, the purpose of the duty to inquire is to assure that the court is apprised adequately of the nature of a conflict and its potential impact on counsel's capacity to represent the defendant. See United States v. Humphrey, 287 F.3d 422, 437 (6th Cir.), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Leachman, 309 F.3d 377 (6th Cir.2002). Here, that purpose was satisfied because discussions the court heard on the record apprised it sufficiently of the relevant facts. See Holleman v. Cotton, 301 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir.2002) (noting, while addressing a duty-to-inquire issue, the presumption that attorneys make truthful representations to the court); United States v. Haren, 952 F.2d 190, 195 (8th Cir.1991) (A district court may give substantial weight to defense counsel's representations regarding conflicts of interest.). Those facts showed that the conflict was insubstantial. 149 Where a conflict appears serious and the existing information available to the court is limited, probing and specific questions indeed may be required. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 3 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.9(b) (3d ed.2000). But that is not the case here. The duty to inquire is not so formalistic as to require affirmative questioning when such is rendered unnecessary because the parties have volunteered all the relevant information for a court to determine that no substantial conflict exists. [T]he trial court did not have a duty to inquire any further. See Dunn, 162 F.3d at 307.
150 Second, even if the court should have made a greater inquiry, Fields has made no showing, as distinguished from mere speculation, that the district court would have learned anything material from that inquiry. See United States v. Fish, 34 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir.1994) (examining whether the alleged failure of the court to delve deeper into the alleged conflict resulted in its lacking any material information to make the conflict determination). A failure to inquire would not, in and of itself, be Sixth Amendment error warranting reversal. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002). Moreover, without showing that the court failed to elicit information that would have revealed a substantial conflict, Fields cannot show that any failure to inquire affected the voluntariness of his waiver of counsel. Fields's unsupported hypothesizing that he might not have waived counsel had the court explained to him the kinds of conflicts tolerated by law is not sufficient. 151 Finally, we note that Fields's (1) suspicions that his attorneys were in cahoots with the Government and (2) generic assertions of a conflict of interest did not impose upon the court a duty to inquire further. The Supreme Court has stated that merely a vague, unspecified possibility of conflict does not trigger a duty to inquire. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168-69, 122 S.Ct. 1237. Fields's nebulous statements raised nothing more than a vague, unspecified possibility of conflict. 37 152 Indeed, Fields's previous requests for new counsel reflect that he misunderstood the term conflict of interest. He used the term to signify a conflict between his own view of appropriate trial strategy and that of his counsel. 38 Mere disagreement about strategic litigation decisions is not a conflict of interest. See, e.g., United States v. Corona-Garcia, 210 F.3d 973, 977 n. 2 (9th Cir.2000). In context, then, Fields's unspecified assertions of a conflict appear even more benign. 153 In conclusion, Fields's claims surrounding Peterson's alleged conflict of interest fail. 154