Opinion ID: 786701
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court Improperly Discounted the Information Provided by Simoneau

Text: 28 In the July 23 Order the district court made the following findings regarding the weight it had given the information provided by Simoneau: 29 Although Simoneau described the Lanfort trailer his contact was to be driving and the exit at which they were supposed to meet, the law enforcement agents had no experience upon which to base the credibility of Simoneau's information. Upon arriving at the exit, the agents did observe a Lanfort truck. However, defendant was not at the trailer. Rather, the agents searched him out at a restaurant. Upon questioning by the agents, defendant set forth his intended itinerary and stated that he was not meeting anyone there. Moreover, defendant was not evasive or inconsistent in his answers to the agents' inquiry. Mere presence at a New York State Thruway exit with a certain type of vehicle, despite the description of the exit and vehicle by someone arrested with 142 pounds of marijuana, is insufficient to establish probable cause to arrest. 30 (GA 215-16.) 31 In the November 6 Order, the district court summarily rejected the automobile exception as justification for the search by reference to its July 23 Order: 32 Likewise, the objects seized from the cab cannot be saved under the automobile exception, which allows officers to conduct a warrantless search of containers within a car if they have probable cause to believe such containers contain contraband. It has already been determined that the Officers did not have probable cause to arrest Gagnon prior to the search. 33 (GA 228 (citations omitted).) 34 Here, the district court improperly discounted Simeoneau's information. Simoneau, who at the time was believed to be a participant in the crime at issue, gave the information to Customs Agents face-to-face after he was apprehended with 142 pounds of marijuana, circumstances that ordinarily would suggest reliability. 4 See, e.g., Canfield, 212 F.3d at 719; Salazar, 945 F.2d at 50-51; Miller, 925 F.2d at 699; Jackson, 560 F.2d at 121. 35 In addition, the information Simoneau provided was specific and it was corroborated, almost entirely, by the Officers prior to the search. For example, Simoneau told Customs Agents that he was to meet Eric Gagnon at the Fox Run truck stop at Exit 21B of the New York State Thruway — hundreds of miles away from the Port of Champlain where Simoneau was stopped — and that the trailer Gagnon would be towing would have Lanfort written on the side and would be empty. (GA 218.) Although not mentioned by the district court, Agent Harris testified that Customs Agents also reported that Simoneau said he was to meet Gagnon between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. (GA 114.) Trooper Swan observed the tractor trailer with Lanfort on the trailer enter the Fox Run truck stop on April 4, 2002 at approximately 7:20 p.m., ( id. ) exactly as Simoneau had predicted. 36 Then, after Agent Harris called the United States Attorney's Office, additional information that was provided by Simoneau was corroborated by the Officers. Defendant confirmed that he was Eric Gagnon, a Canadian truck driver. (GA 219-20.) Also, the Officers confirmed that Gagnon was driving the only trailer in the parking lot that bore the name Lanfort on its side and that the trailer he was towing was empty. (GA 219-20.) Although a criminal informer may be less reliable than an innocent bystander, Caldarola, 298 F.3d at 163, and corroboration of innocent behavior may be less dispositive than corroboration of criminal activity, see Pena, 961 F.2d at 339, Simoneau's information was corroborated by the Officers in all material respects, and, considering the totality of the circumstances, his entire account may be credited, Gates, 462 U.S. at 237-238, 103 S.Ct. 2317; Canfield, 212 F.3d at 719-20; Wagner, 989 F.2d at 73. Because the numerous details provided by Simoneau were corroborated, that information should have been credited despite the fact that, as the district court stated, the law enforcement agents had no experience upon which to base the credibility of Simoneau's information. (GA 214). Gates, 462 U.S. at 244, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Thus, the district court erred in considering only Gagnon's [m]ere presence at a New York State Thruway exit with a certain type of vehicle, (GA 214-15), in failing to recognize the extent to which the information Simoneau provided was corroborated as the evening progressed and by failing to consider that information in its probable cause determination. 37 B. The District Court Improperly Concluded that the Defendant Did Not Deny Knowing Simoneau and Was Not Evasive 38 In the July 23 Order finding no probable cause, the district court found that defendant was not evasive or inconsistent in his answers to the agents' inquiry at the truck stop. (GA 214.) In the November 6 Order, the district court found: 39 Miserendino asked Gagnon if he knew a `Daniel Simoneau.' (Tr., p. 23). Upon hearing the name `Daniel,' but not together with the name `Gagnon,' Gagnon responded `Daniel Gagnon, my brother I know.' (Tr., p. 187). Miserendino then continued to ask Gagnon if he knew Simoneau and Gagnon continued to respond that Daniel Gagnon was his brother. (Tr., p. 23). 40 (GA 220.) 41 The following testimony by defendant Gagnon on direct examination at the suppression hearing is relevant on this issue: Q: All right. Now, after this conversation [with the Officers] about whether you knew this Daniel Simoneau, what happened next? 42 A: Okay. I said to them — after that, I said — they asked me again. And I said no, I don't know Daniel Simoneau; I know Daniel, it's [sic] my brother. 43 (GA 168.) Also relevant is the following testimony by defendant Gagnon on cross examination: 44 MR. MORENO: Ask him if he understood that the sergeant asked him if he knew someone by the name of Daniel Simoneau back on the day that he was talking to the sergeant. 45 A: Yes. 46 Q: Okay. And you said no? 47 A: No, I said no, no, I said no, I know a George Gagnon, he's my brother. 48 MR. MORENO: Did he say George or Daniel, ma'am? 49 INTERPRETER BARRETT: I'm sorry. I got that wrong. Daniel Gagnon. Excuse me. 50 (GA 186.) Indeed, on appeal, the defendant admits that he denied knowing Simoneau when questioned by the Officers: Gagnon said that the only Daniel he knew was Daniel Gagnon, his brother and did not know a `Daniel' Simoneau. (Defendant's Brief at 6-7.) He correctly identified himself and said that the only Daniel he knew was his brother, who is named Daniel. (Defendant's Brief at 16.) 51 Accordingly, the district court's conclusion that the defendant did not deny knowing Simoneau and, thus, its finding that Gagnon was not evasive in responding to the agents' questions were clearly erroneous. 52 C. The District Court Improperly Included in its Probable Cause Determination the Probable Cause Determination of the Assistant United States Attorney 53 In its November 6 Order, the district court noted that the automobile exception did not apply and added: 54 In addition, the United States Attorney's Office itself told Harris that the officers did not have probable cause to search the cab without a warrant, or probable cause to get a warrant in the first place (Tr., pp. 117-18, 136). This exception, thus, does not apply. 55 (GA 227-228 n. 13.) The district court's consideration of the Assistant United States Attorney's subjective view of the presence or absence of probable cause, however, was error. 56 First, the record does not disclose what facts were related to the Assistant United States Attorney upon which his view about probable cause was based. Thus, there is no way to judge the reliability of the Assistant's view. 57 Second, the inquiry was made prior to the Officers' encounter with Gagnon. Thus, the factual recitation could not have included Gagnon's false denial of knowing Simoneau, a fact that, as we have held above, is significant. 58 Finally, a law enforcement officer's mistaken belief that probable cause did not exist at the time is irrelevant to a court's later determination of whether probable cause existed at the time. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality) ([T]he fact that the officers did not believe there was probable cause... would not foreclose the State from justifying Royer's custody by proving probable cause.); United States v. Treto-Haro, 287 F.3d 1000, 1006 (10th Cir.2002); United States v. Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir.2001). 59 Accordingly, the district court erred by including in its determination of probable cause the determination of the Assistant United States Attorney made prior to the Officers' contact with the defendant. 60 D. The District Court Failed to Consider the Totality of the Circumstances within the Officers' Knowledge Prior to the Search of the Defendant's Tractor Trailer 61 As we have held above, the district court failed to consider certain relevant facts and improperly considered other facts in making its determination that probable cause did not exist to search Gagnon's truck. Because we review that determination de novo, Joyner, 201 F.3d at 74, we now consider the totality of the circumstances before the district court. Accordingly, we consider whether the Officers had sufficient knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information to justify a person of reasonable caution in believing that an offense was being committed by Gagnon and, more specifically, whether there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime, Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 733, 104 S.Ct. 2085, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317), would be found in the cab of his tractor trailer and the blue duffel bag therein. 62 Here, Simoneau had been detained at the Port of Champlain driving a truck containing 142 pounds of marijuana. He told the Customs Agents that he was driving to meet Eric Gagnon at the Fox Run truck stop at Exit 21B of the New York State Thruway between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. to exchange trailers with Gagnon. He also told Agents that Gagnon would be driving a tractor trailer with Lanfort on the side and that the trailer would be empty. Simoneau, reasonably believed to be a participant in the crime under investigation, provided this information in a face-to-face encounter, and the information was shown to be reliable when the Officers observed a Lanfort tractor trailer pull into the Fox Run truck stop at Exit 21 B on the Thruway between 7:00 and 8:00 P.M. Eric Gagnon was confirmed to be the driver of the tractor trailer, which was the only Lanfort trailer in the lot and was found to be empty. Not only was all of Simoneau's information confirmed in every detail, thus increasing reliability, but the officers had additional reason to suspect that Gagnon was involved in an illegal enterprise when he falsely denied knowing Simoneau. On these facts, probable cause existed to believe that Gagnon was committing a crime and that evidence thereof, whether drugs, money or drug records, would be found in the cab of the truck described by Simoneau or in the blue duffle bag therein.