Opinion ID: 3052709
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: 2d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1986). However, although

Text: retrospective competency hearings are disfavored, see Drope, [420 U.S. at 183]; Blazak v. Ricketts, 1 F.3d 891, 894 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993) . . . , they are per- missible whenever a court can conduct a meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospectively the competency of the defendant. See Evans, 800 F.2d at 888; [de Kaplany, 540 F.2d at 986]. While the passage of time is significant in determining whether such a hearing can be held, Pate, 383 U.S. at 387, medical reports contemporaneous to the time of the initial hearing greatly increase the chance for an accurate retrospective evaluation of a defendant’s competence. See Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 215-16 (9th Cir. 1973). See also Ray v. Bowen, 843 F.2d 998, 1006 (7th Cir. 1988). Under Moran, the two major factors we consider are the passage of time and the availability of medical reports contemporaneous to the time of the initial hearing. Both here weigh in McMurtrey’s favor. We also note that the Tenth Circuit set out a helpful framework. See United States v. Collins, 430 F.3d 1260, 1267 (10th Cir. 2005). Pate itself illustrated an example of a retrospective competency determination that was inadequate. There, the Supreme Court highlighted several difficulties in conducting a retrospective competency hearing. This court summarized these problems in noting that the Court in Pate reasoned that the inability of the jury to observe the demeanor of the accused, the fact that expert testimony would have had to have been based solely on the printed record, and the six-year lapse between the time of trial and the proposed post-conviction hearing combined to compromise such a hearing beyond redemption. 11252 MCMURTREY v. RYAN de Kaplany, 540 F.2d at 986 n.11. The Supreme Court and this circuit have also found retrospective competency hearings lacking or impossible on other occasions. See, e.g., Drope, 420 U.S. at 183; Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403 (1960); Tillery v. Eyman, 492 F.2d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 1974); Moore, 464 F.2d 666-67. [7] In this case, the evidentiary hearing occurred thirteen years after McMurtrey’s trial. When the case first returned to the trial court, the trial judge refused to hold a hearing, stat- ing: The Court further finds that if the Federal Courts want to intervene in this matter, they can proceed with the evidentiary hearing. I already ruled in 1988 six years ago on the matter . . . this Court saw [McMurtrey], the jury saw him all the time throughout the case. But he wasn’t insane, he wasn’t under the influence of drugs during the trial. The record is clear. [8] Judge Arnold later changed his mind and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. The absence of relevant and potentially dispositive evidence, however, was apparent. Both parties conceded that McMurtrey’s medical records were incomplete and that there was no evidence to show which of the prescribed medications were actually administered. Further, no mental health expert examined McMurtrey immediately prior to the trial or during the trial, and so there are no contemporaneous medical opinions regarding McMurtrey’s competency. Even Judge Arnold conceded that “of course this case is so old, I don’t remember a lot of things.” [9] We therefore conclude that because of the thirteen-year delay, the lack of contemporaneous medical opinions, and the lack of medical records, the state trial court could not in 1994 meaningfully determine whether McMurtrey had been competent at trial in 1981. Consequently, we find that the 1994 eviMCMURTREY v. RYAN 11253 dentiary hearing did not cure the state trial court’s failure to hold a timely competency hearing.