Opinion ID: 853070
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Inconsistent Theories of Defense

Text: The defendant next claims that his right to counsel was violated because his trial counsel contradicted the defendant's trial testimony that he did not intend to kill his wife. The defendant argues that his lawyer (1) made statements during his closing argument insinuating that the defendant did intend to kill his wife, and (2) presented a defense of voluntary manslaughter rather than accident. The defendant argues that [t]his inconsistency forced the jury to decide not only whether to believe the State's version or Boesch's, but also whether they believed Boesch's or his own lawyer's. Br. of Appellant at 37. The State responds that the issue of inconsistent theories of defense is waived because it was not raised in the defendant's petition. The facts alleged in the petition in support of the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are as follows: 1) trial counsel instructed me to present false testimony over my objections; 2) trial counsel failed to listen to my recitation of events leading to the death of my wife and to recognize the potential accident defense; 3) trial counsel conceded my guilt by admitting in opening statement that I killed my wife (this was done without my consent); 4) [trial counsel] insisted upon a defense of voluntary manslaughter (i.e. sudden heat) over my objections; 5) trial counsel insisted, over my objections, that the only issue was whether I acted in sudden heat and would not even consider my claim that I did not intend to kill my wife.... P.C.R. Record at 13-14. While inconsistent defenses is not explicitly asserted in the petition, we find that the defendant's appellate claims on this point are within the issues raised in the his petition. The defendant testified that while swimming in their pool, his wife told him for the first time that she was having an affair with his brother and that she wanted a divorce. The defendant admitted that an argument and physical struggle ensued, during which he grabbed his wife with both hands and pulled her about as hard as he could into the pool by her ankle, pushed her under the water at least twice, and grabbed her around the neck and squeezed. He also testified that they were hollering, shoving, wrestling, and screaming, and that at some point he realized things had gotten out of hand and that he should not be doing what he was doing. Trial Record at 1101-10. The defendant stated that he had never been so mad, Trial Record at 1150, and that he pushed her under the water because he did not want to hear what she was saying. Trial Record at 1106. The defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance when his counsel asserted in his closing argument that the defendant did, in fact, intend to kill his wife, saying: His intention was to punish. His intention was to inflict pain. His intention was to repay her ... Br. of Appellant at 33 (quoting Trial Record at 1245). This quoted segment of defense counsel's closing statement, however, is incomplete and misleading in its failure to disclose material facts. What counsel actually said was:  I don't think that that was his intention; death. His intention was to inflict pain. His intention was to repay her for the pain he [sic] just inflicted on her [sic], but it wasn't an intent to kill which is something you need to have a murder.  Trial Record at 1245-46 (emphasis added). He repeated this assertion just a few statements later: He didn't think he killed her, and it never was his intent to kill her.... He did squeeze her neck, but he did it in sudden rage. Trial Record at 1251-52. The jury was instructed that the defendant was charged with murder by knowingly or intentionally killing his wife. Trial Record at 110. The defendant argues that his trial testimony insisted that he did not have any intent to kill Saundra. Br. of Appellant at 33. His testimony does not dispute, however, that the killing may have occurred knowingly. A person acts knowingly if when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so. Ind.Code § 35-41-2-2(b). The defense counsel's closing statement repeatedly asserted that the defendant did not intend to kill his wife. Trial Record at 1245-46, 1251-52. But, despite the claim of no intentional killing, the fact that the defendant had forcefully choked his wife remained as strong evidence of a knowing killing. To address this evidence, the defendant's attorney urged the jury to consider the alternative lesser offenses of reckless homicide, involuntary manslaughter, and voluntary manslaughter, strongly arguing for the presence of sudden heat. Considered in its totality, counsel's argument did not contradict his client. The defendant offers Sherwood v. State, 717 N.E.2d 131 (Ind.1999) in support of his argument that discrepancies in defense theories between a defendant and his or her counsel constitute ineffective assistance. The defendant in that case was denied his request to proceed pro se, and was instead forced to submit to a hybrid representation scheme whereby he and an appointed attorney presented conflicting defenses. This Court there held that forced representation by counsel upon a defendant who wished to conduct his own defense violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. Id. at 136. But this issue is not presented in the present case. In light of the defendant's testimony, it was neither unreasonable nor inconsistent for counsel to present a voluntary manslaughter defense as an alternative defense strategy. We reject the defendant's claims that his trial counsel's closing statement denied or contradicted his trial testimony that he did not intentionally kill his wife. This conduct of trial counsel was not deficient.