Opinion ID: 1937155
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Letter Carriers

Text: In Letter Carriers, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether federal law preempts a nonunion employee's state libel action against a union. In an effort to increase its membership, a local union published a List of Scabs in its newsletter. 418 U.S. at 267, 94 S.Ct. at 2773, 41 L.Ed.2d at 752. The scab list contained the names of all letter carriers who refused to join the union. Id. On one occasion, the union also reprinted the following well-known piece of trade union literature, generally attributed to author Jack London: The Scab After God had finished the rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire, He had some awful substance left with which He made a scab. A scab is a two-legged animal with a corkscrew soul, a water brain, a combination backbone of jelly and glue. Where others have hearts, he carries a tumor of rotten principles. When a scab comes down the street, men turn their backs and Angels weep in Heaven, and the Devil shuts the gates of hell to keep him out. No man (or woman) has a right to scab so long as there is a pool of water to drown his carcass in, or a rope long enough to hang his body with. Judas was a gentleman compared with a scab. For betraying his Master, he had character enough to hang himself. A scab has not. Esau sold his birthright for a mess of pottage. Judas sold his Savior for thirty pieces of silver. Benedict Arnold sold his country for a promise of a commission in the British Army. The scab sells his birthright, country, his wife, his children and his fellowmen for an unfulfilled promise from his employer. Esau was a traitor to himself; Judas was a traitor to his God; Benedict Arnold was a traitor to his country; a SCAB is a traitor to his God, his country, his family, and his class. Id. at 268, 94 S.Ct. at 2773, 41 L.Ed.2d at 752-53 (emphasis added). The nonunion letter carriers successfully sued for libel in state court, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Id. at 269-70, 94 S.Ct. at 2774, 41 L.Ed.2d at 753. The United States Supreme Court reversed on preemption grounds. Id. at 286-87, 94 S.Ct. at 2782, 41 L.Ed.2d at 763. As a threshold matter, the Court held the framework of Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 86 S.Ct. 657, 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1966), governed disputes between nonunion workers and unions over scab lists. Id. In Linn, a manager at a detective agency alleged a union defamed him; the union had distributed leaflets which, in an attempt to organize the agency's employees, alleged he robbed and lied to his employees. 383 U.S. at 56, 86 S.Ct. at 659-60, 15 L.Ed.2d at 586. Balancing the State's interest in providing its citizens with redress for tortious conduct against Congress' statutorily expressed desire to foster a robust labor debate, the Linn Court held federal labor law did not completely pre-empt the application of state laws to libels published during labor disputes ... as long as appropriate substantive limitations were imposed to insure that the freedom of speech guaranteed by federal law was protected. Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 271, 94 S.Ct. at 2775, 41 L.Ed.2d at 754 (emphasis added). As a substantive limitation, the Court in Linn adopt[ed] by analogyas opposed to constitutional compulsionthe New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), actual malice standard for defamation: libel actions under state law were pre-empted by the federal labor laws to the extent that the State sought to make actionable defamatory statements in labor disputes which were published without knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at 272-73, 94 S.Ct. at 2775, 41 L.Ed.2d at 755. Letter Carriers applied the Linn analysis even though Letter Carriers did not involve the traditional labor dispute between union and management, but instead a nonunion member's action against a union. The Court reasoned: Basic to the right guaranteed to employees in § 7 to form, join or assist labor organizations, is the right to engage in concerted activities to persuade other employees to join for their mutual aid and protection ... [including a right] to use all lawful propaganda to enlarge their membership.... [O]ne of the primary reasons for the law's protection of union speech is to insure that union organizers are free to try peacefully to persuade other employees to join the union without inhibition or restraint. Accordingly, we think that any publication made during the course of union organizing efforts, which is arguably relevant to that organizational activity, is entitled to the protection of Linn .... Unions have a legitimate and substantial interest in continuing organizational efforts after recognition. Whether the goal is merely to strengthen or preserve the union's majority, or is to achieve 100% employee membership ... these organizing efforts are equally entitled to the protection of § 7 and § 1 [of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), [2] which is codified at 29 U.S.C. section 151 et seq. ]. Id. at 277, 279, 94 S.Ct. at 2778-79, 41 L.Ed.2d at 758, 759 (citations omitted). [F]ederal policies favor[] uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate in labor disputes.... Id. at 273, 94 S.Ct. at 2776, 41 L.Ed.2d at 755. The Court made clear its decision was based upon federal labor law and the supremacy clause, not the First Amendment [3] : [Although our duty] to insure that the speech involved is not protected under federal law ... has been most often recognized in the context of claims that the expression involved was entitled to First Amendment protection, the same obligation exists in cases involving speech claimed to be protected under the federal labor laws. This obligation, derived from the supremacy of federal labor law over inconsistent state regulation, requires us to determine whether any state libel award arising out the publication of the union newsletter involved here would be inconsistent with the protection for freedom of speech in labor disputes recognized in Linn. Id. at 282, 94 S.Ct. at 2780, 41 L.Ed.2d at 760-61 (citations omitted, emphasis added); see John P. Ludington, Defamation: Designation as Scab, 65 A.L.R.4th 1000, 1002 (1988) ( Letter Carriers held the Federal Constitution, under the supremacy clause, precludes a state defamation suit for the use of the word `scab' if the use of the word was in the course of activity protected by the federal labor laws and if the word was not used with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or notthe familiar New York Times test.) Analyzing the plaintiffs' claims, the Letter Carriers Court held federal labor law and the supremacy clause protected the union's use of the word scab, as well as the London reprint. 418 U.S. at 282-87, 94 S.Ct. at 2780-82, 41 L.Ed.2d at 761-63. The Court first pointed out that a scab is commonly defined as one who refuses to join a union, and because this statement was factually true, it could not serve as the basis of a libel judgment. Id. at 282-83, 94 S.Ct. at 2780, 41 L.Ed.2d at 761. Nor did it matter that scab is a pejorative term, because Vigorous exercise of this right to persuade other employees to join must not be stifled by the threat of liability for the overenthusiastic use of rhetoric or the innocent mistake of fact ... epithets such as scab, unfair, and liar are commonplace in these struggles and not so indefensible as to remove them from the protection of § 7, even though the statements are erroneous and defame one of the parties to the dispute.... [F]ederal law gives a union license to use intemperate, abusive, or insulting language without fear of restraint or penalty if it believes such rhetoric to be an effective means to make its point. Id. at 277-78, 283, 94 S.Ct. at 2778, 2781, 41 L.Ed.2d at 758, 761 (citations omitted). In holding the reprint of London's definition of a scab, which referred to the plaintiffs as characterless traitors with rotten principles, was protected speech, the court concluded these characterizations were clearly not factual statements but instead in a loose, figurative sense [demonstrated] the union's strong disagreement with the views of those workers who oppose unionization. Expression of such opinion, even in the most pejorative terms, is protected under federal labor law.... However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.... Permitting state libel judgments based on publication of this piece of literature would be plainly inconsistent with the union's justifiable reliance on the protection of federal law. Id. at 284, 286, 94 S.Ct. at 2781, 2782, 41 L.Ed.2d at 762-63 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 805 (1974)). The Court, however, warned use of this writing or other similar rhetoric in a labor dispute could be actionable, particularly if some of its words were taken out of context in such a way as to convey a false representation of fact. Id. at 286, 94 S.Ct. at 2782, 41 L.Ed.2d at 763. That is, a state law defamation claim is not preempted if the plaintiffs show the defendant made a false statement of fact with actual malice, i.e. with a knowing or reckless disregard of the truth. [I]t must be emphasized that malicious libel enjoys no constitutional protection in any context.... The malicious utterance of defamatory statements in any form cannot be condoned.... Linn, 383 U.S. at 63, 86 S.Ct. at 663, 15 L.Ed.2d at 590. Lower courts have thus permitted state tort actions where there is a false representation of fact and actual malice is shown. See, e.g., Kirk v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 934 F.Supp. 775, 790 (S.D.Tex.1995) (denying defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' defamation claim where plaintiffs generated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants had falsely accused plaintiffs of appropriating union funds for personal use).