Opinion ID: 2385655
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fifth Amendment Right to Remain Silent and to Counsel

Text: When appellant first arrived at the homicide office, at about 8:50 a.m., Detective Brooks read him his rights from the PD 47 and appellant stated that he would talk about the incident. When Brooks began to take a statement from him at approximately 9:30 a.m., however, appellant, upon being readvised of his rights, said that he did not wish to answer questions but was willing to speak without an attorney present. When pressed by Brooks for an explanation, appellant stated that he understood his rights and did not wish to talk about the murder until he spoke with an attorney. See supra. Appellant argues that this assertion of his rights to remain silent and to counsel was contravened when, minutes after Brooks left, Williams entered the room and, in response to appellant's statement I had to sacrifice him, asked appellant who it was that he had to sacrifice and where the body was. Appellant further contends that even if he initiated the conversation with Williams, he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights. Our analysis begins with a review of the trial court's findings. The trial court's finding on the issue of whether appellant's Miranda rights were violated is ambiguous. It appears that the court formulated an exigent circumstances exception to Miranda, premised upon the fact that the primary duty of the police was to determine whether the victim was dead or alive. According to the court, the need to obtain information to possibly save a life was sufficient to suspend the prophylactic measures of Miranda.  The court stated that if the police knew the decedent was dead... they should not have asked him what park [he was] talking about.... They should not have asked him that even if he did start talking to them. And there isn't any question but that Jackson [v. United States, 404 A.2d 911 (D.C.1979)] is against that. We choose not to reach the constitutionality of an exigent circumstances exception to Miranda, and similarly do not address whether such an exception might fall within the purview of New York v. Quarles, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984), even were we to assume Quarles to be of retroactive effect. In reviewing a trial court's factual findings on a motion to suppress, the decision as to the validity of a waiver will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. Hawkins v. United States, 461 A.2d 1025, 1032 (D.C.1983), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 734, 79 L.Ed.2d 193 (1984); Bliss v. United States, 445 A.2d 625, 631 (D.C.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117, 103 S.Ct. 756, 74 L.Ed.2d 972 (1983); Wilson v. United States, 444 A.2d 25, 29 (D.C.1982). Here, a review of the record reveals no explicit finding by the trial court on the issue of initiation or waiver, although the court did state, in the context of ruling that appellant's confession was voluntary, that appellant had abandoned ... his constitutional rights for the purpose of doing what he thought he might be able to do in someone else's interest. Although we find the trial court's comments at best ambiguous on this critical point, our review of the record leads us to conclude that appellant did knowingly and intelligently waive his rights. The nature and permissible scope of contacts between law enforcement officials and an accused were defined nearly twenty years ago in the landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), in which the Supreme Court held that the prohibition against compelled self-incrimination, contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, requires that an accused be advised that he has the right to remain silent and the right to have an attorney present prior to custodial interrogation. Id. 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. Specifically, the Court stated that if the individual in custody indicates that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease, id. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1627 (footnote omitted), and [i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. Id. The critical facts in the case at bar implicate the core rationale of Miranda, for it is beyond dispute that appellant clearly invoked both his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. To determine whether appellant knowingly and intelligently waived these rights, we focus our attention on two particularly apposite Supreme Court cases, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), and Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), which clarified and expanded upon the principles set forth in Miranda. In Edwards, the Court reconfirmed and emphasized that the reinterrogation of an accused in custody who has asserted his right to counsel is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny. 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885. Consequently, the Court held that a valid waiver of the right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation is not satisfied by an accused's response to further interrogation by the police even if the accused is readvised of his rights. Id. at 484, 101 S.Ct. at 1884. Rather, the Court held that an accused is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversation with the police. Id. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1885. Edwards did not further delineate the contours of the initiation requirement. A later decision, Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 103 S.Ct. 394, 74 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) (per curiam) provided only minimal clarification of the scope of the requirement, holding that respondent's request for a polygraph examination met the initiation test. Id. 459 U.S. at 47, 103 S.Ct. at 396. Elucidation, however, is provided by the recent plurality decision in Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983). In that case, Justice Rehnquist, in an opinion joined by three other Justices, held that following an assertion of rights the initiation test was satisfied by respondent's question to a police officer, Well, what is going to happen to me now? Id. 103 S.Ct. at 2835. Justice Rehnquist elaborated: Although ambiguous, the respondent's question in this case as to what was going to happen to him evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation; it was not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship. It could reasonably have been interpreted by the officer as relating generally to the investigation. Id. Justice Marshall, in a dissent joined by three other Justices, noted his agreement with the plurality that to constitute `initiation' under Edwards, an accused's inquiry must demonstrate a desire to discuss the subject matter of the investigation. Id. at 2840 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He disagreed, however, with the application of that standard to the case at bar. [10] Applying these guidelines to the facts before us, we hold that appellant initiated conversation within the meaning of Edwards and Bradshaw. Specifically, we view appellant's statement to Williams that I had to sacrifice him, as expressing a desire to discuss the investigation. [11] Even though it is not entirely clear from the record whether appellant spoke these words while rhyming, we point out that Williams testified that it appeared that appellant was looking at and talking to him. Indeed, appellant's statement is arguably as provocative as the one in Hawkins v. United States, supra , where we held that appellant initiated questioning by stating that he `wanted to get it off his chest.' 461 A.2d at 1031-32. Our inquiry does not end with a finding that appellant initiated conversation. The second step of the analysis requires the government to prove a valid waiver of the previously asserted right to have counsel present during interrogation. [12] Bradshaw, supra, 103 S.Ct. at 2834-35. The Court in Edwards stated: If, as frequently would occur in the course of a meeting initiated by the accused, the conversation is not wholly one-sided, it is likely that the officers will say or do something that clearly would be interrogation. In that event, the question would be whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence had occurred, that is, whether the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so under the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities. 451 U.S. at 486 n. 9, 101 S.Ct. at 1885 n. 9. Specifically, we look to the `particular facts and circumstances surrounding [the] case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1758, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)); see Bradshaw, supra, 103 S.Ct. at 2835; Hawkins, supra, 461 A.2d at 1032. Turning first to appellant's conduct, there is no doubt that his rhyming was in and of itself bizarre, and its subject matter, referring to a pact with God and the devil, was at best unusual. Still, Brooks testified that when appellant was not rhyming, he was responsive to questions and that there was nothing inappropriate or otherwise strange about his conduct. Williams also stated that appellant appeared to understand his questions and looked at him when he spoke. Moreover, the trial court, noting that appellant did some unusual things, stated that appellant's behavior may had been prompted by his anxiety and nervousness. [13] In addition, the record is devoid of any alleged attempts to coerce or trick appellant, and appellant had been in custody but a short period of time. Appellant had had prior contact with the criminal justice system as a juvenile. He showed an awareness of his rights by his waiver of them at the outset and subsequent invocation of them. [14] Furthermore, the trial court indicated that appellant had a reservoir of intelligence and understanding. Finally, we emphasize in accordance with Edwards, supra, that the fact that appellant initiated the conversation (and wrote on the PD 118) supports a finding of waiver. We have already noted that appellant's statement was not equivocal or vague. As in Hawkins, supra, appellant's statement, I had to sacrifice him, almost solicited inquiry. While we do not hold that the statement of its own force satisfies the waiver requirement, see Wyrick v. Fields, supra, 459 U.S. at 48-49, 103 S.Ct. at 396-397, we nonetheless recognize it to be a compelling factor. On the basis of all of these factors, we find that the record supports a knowing and intelligent waiver. Clearly, our task would be easier had Williams readvised appellant of his rights prior to questioning him. [15] It would certainly be naive to expect that Williams did not hope to obtain some indication as to the whereabouts of the victim who might yet have been alive. The point is, however, that new warnings were not constitutionally mandated given appellant's initiation of discussion about the investigation and the totality of the circumstances. To require new warnings would be an unjustifiable restriction on reasonable police questioning. Wyrick v. Fields, supra, 459 U.S. at 49, 103 S.Ct. at 397. Edwards designed a prophylactic rule to protect an accused who has asserted his rights from badgering by police. Oregon v. Bradshaw, supra, 103 S.Ct. at 2834. The type of police conduct that the Edwards rule was designed to curtail did not occur in this case. For similar reasons, we conclude that appellant's assertion of his right to remain silent was not violated. In Hawkins, supra, we recognized that the same standard applies to determine the admissibility of statements after either the right to remain silent or to counsel is asserted. 461 A.2d at 1029. Thus, we look to congruent factors such as 1) whether appellant was advised of and orally acknowledged his rights, 2) whether questioning immediately ceased, 3) the length of time between interrogations, and 4) whether Miranda warnings were again given. See, e.g., McKeamer v. United States, 452 A.2d 348, 351 (D.C.1982); Wilson v. United States, supra, 444 A.2d at 29; United States v. Alexander, 428 A.2d 42, 49 (D.C.1981). We stress again that in the case at bar, appellant was not reinterrogated until after he initiated a conversation. This case, therefore, is unlike Wilson, supra, where detectives persistently and consistently interrogated [appellant] intending to elicit incriminatory statements at locations increasingly more coercive. 444 A.2d at 29. This case is also unlike Alexander, supra, where a detective admitted that he had made statements to and used techniques on appellant designed to elicit inculpatory statements. 428 A.2d at 51. Nor, finally, is it similar to McKeamer, supra, where appellant had a low IQ, no prior experience with the criminal justice system, and had invoked her rights at the scene of the crime, but the arresting officer failed to inform investigating police detectives of appellant's prior assertion of rights. 452 A.2d at 351. In the case at bar, Williams knew that appellant had asserted his rights; neither he nor Brooks reinitiated questioning. See Calaway v. United States, 408 A.2d 1220, 1225 (D.C.1979); In re W.B.W., 397 A.2d 143, 145-46 (D.C. 1979). In short, appellant's assertion of his right to remain silent was scrupulously honored. Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 459, 86 S.Ct. at 1619.