Opinion ID: 1207988
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Statute to Each Offense

Text: Because a single serious injury can enhance sentencing for more than one offense, we must also decide whether each felony offense for which defendant was convicted  aggravated assault, kidnapping, and two sexual assaults  was involving: (a) the intentional or knowing infliction (b) of serious physical injury (c) upon another, and (d) was committed while defendant was on probation for a felony offense. The sentencing provisions of § 13-604.02(A) are triggered for each felony offense that meets all of the above requirements. Criminal statutes are not strictly construed, but instead are construed according to the fair meaning of their terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law. A.R.S. § 13-104; see also State v. Calderon, 171 Ariz. 12, 14, 827 P.2d 473, 475 (App. 1991). One of the critical questions in applying § 13-604.02(A) is how the word involving should be construed. For purposes of the statute, the definition must be confined within reasonable limits. The definitions of involving include [t]o contain as a part; include ... to relate closely: connect ... to require as a necessary accompaniment: entail ... to have an effect on. American Heritage Dictionary 950 (3d ed. 1992); Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 617 (10th ed. 1993). An offense is not involving a serious physical injury merely because the injury occurs at roughly the same time as the offense or increases the possibility the crime may occur. If the defendant inflicts the injury at the same time he commits the offense, then the offense is more likely to be involving the injury. It is not, however, a requirement that the injury occur simultaneously with the commission of the offense. The injury must be closely related to the offense, included as a necessary accompaniment to the offense, though not necessarily a statutory element of the offense, or have an effect on the offense. Where multiple offenses are at issue, as here, if the injury is much more closely related to one offense than another, then the injury may only properly enhance the sentence of the offense or offenses to which the injury is more closely related. This is not a bright line test. Whether an offense is involving a serious physical injury must be determined on a case-by-case basis using the factors we have listed here. In addition to the word involving, another critical question is how the further limiting and qualifying words intentional or knowing infliction are to be construed. These words more narrowly focus the applicability of the statute on felons who purposefully inflict injury during the commission of a particular offense. Under this statute, the legislature did not provide that the enhanced sentence apply to felony offenses that generally involved serious physical injury as a result of a defendant's criminal conduct. The legislature specifically focused the operation of the statute only on those felony offenses involving intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury. Each felony offense where the statute is sought to be applied must be analyzed to determine whether the serious physical injury which resulted was inflicted by the defendant intentionally and knowingly during the commission of that felony offense. Clearly, the legislature has not crafted § 13-604.02(A) simply as an umbrella to lump different crimes together during a course of criminal activity to enhance each sentence.
Because serious physical injury was a necessary element of defendant's aggravated assault conviction, the aggravated assault necessarily involved the injury for purposes of sentence enhancement under § 13-604.02(A). Counsel for defendant conceded that the same element could be the basis for both the aggravated assault conviction and the finding of dangerousness for the aggravated assault. See, e.g., Caldera, 141 Ariz. at 638, 688 P.2d at 646. Defendant objects only to the finding of dangerousness for the kidnapping and sexual assault charges. The aggravated assault was involving the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury upon another and was committed while defendant was on probation for a felony offense. Accordingly, the trial court properly sentenced defendant to life imprisonment for the aggravated assault offense.
Serious physical injury is not a necessary element of kidnapping. However, A.R.S. § 13-1304(A) defines kidnapping as the knowing restraint of another person with intent to commit one of several enumerated acts, including physical injury or sexual assault. Thus, a serious physical injury could provide both a means of restraining the victim and a basis for finding the necessary intent for kidnapping. The question remains whether the injury and the kidnapping were sufficiently related in this case to find that the kidnapping offense was involving the serious physical injury within the meaning of § 13-604.02(A). We find that they were. The victim's testimony indicates that the pounding of the victim's face occurred during the kidnapping, rather than before, as the court of appeals' opinion suggests. Greene, 177 Ariz. at 219, 866 P.2d at 887. The victim testified that defendant grabbed her, started dragging her toward the embankment, punched her, and then started dragging her again. Further, the injury did not just happen to occur simultaneously with an independent act of kidnapping. The record suggests that defendant purposefully inflicted the injury to disable the victim and carry out the kidnapping. He could have chosen to tie up the victim, but instead his method of restraint was to disable by severe physical abuse. The felony offense of kidnapping was involving the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury upon another and was committed while defendant was on probation for a felony offense. Accordingly, we hold that the kidnapping sufficiently involved the injury to the victim's face and nose for purposes of enhancing defendant's sentence under § 13-604.02(A).
As with kidnapping, serious physical injury is not a required element of sexual assault, but can nevertheless be related to the offense. In this case, however, the sexual assault offenses were not sufficiently related to the face and nose injury to involve serious physical injury under the meaning of § 13-604.02(A). The record indicates that serious physical injury to the victim's face and nose was inflicted both before and after the sexual assaults: defendant caused the injury by punching the victim during the kidnapping while he dragged her away and by kicking her face after committing the second sexual assault. Nothing in the record suggests, however, that defendant intentionally or knowingly inflicted a serious physical injury to the victim during or in direct relation to the sexual assaults. We do not suggest that an injury must always occur during the commission of an offense to be related for purposes of sentence enhancement. We hold that in this case, where the injury occurred during the other offenses and was more closely related to those other offenses, the necessary statutory requirement of involving was not met. Defendant committed kidnapping and aggravated assault to enable him to sexually assault the victim and to thwart identification. The serious physical injury was not closely related to the sexual assaults, was not a necessary accompaniment to the sexual assaults, and the injury did not have an effect on the sexual assaults. The sexual assaults were not felony offenses involving the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury upon another, as that term (serious physical injury) is defined by statute. Defendant committed sexual assault by intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse with the victim without her consent. See A.R.S. § 13-1406(A). Defendant injured the victim when he committed the sexual assaults  all victims of sexual assault suffer both physical and emotional injuries as a result of an assault. However, any injury the victim suffered as a result of the acts defendant committed that were necessary to satisfy the elements of the crime of sexual assault was not so severe that it constituted a physical injury that created a risk of death, caused serious and permanent disfigurement, serious impairment of health, or loss or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily organ or limb. See A.R.S. § 13-105(31). In fact, in 1989 the legislature amended the sexual assault statute to include a discrete sentence enhancement provision similar to the statute at issue in this case. Now, if a defendant commits a sexual assault involving the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury, and the defendant has a prior conviction for sexual assault, then the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment. A.R.S. § 13-1406(C). Nor can we say that the sexual assaults involved serious physical injury separate from the face and nose injury. The victim appears to have suffered only serious physical injury to her face and nose, under § 13-105(31). The pain, roughness, and scratching inflicted during the sexual assaults do not meet the statutory requirement of reasonable risk of death, serious and permanent disfigurement, serious impairment of health, or loss or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily organ or limb. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in sentencing defendant under § 13-604.02(A) for the sexual assault counts.