Opinion ID: 1222698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: Appellant next argues that the immunity provision of § 27-12-103(a) should be construed to mean that employers should have the same liability for culpable negligence as do co-employees. Again, this argument would have us ignore the clear language of that section and it disregards the distinction between employers and employees. In Markle v. Williamson, Wyo., 518 P.2d 621, 624 (1974), we rejected the bald-faced fiction that a co-employee becomes merged in the employer. There was no basis then and there is no basis now for such a contention in Wyoming. The language of § 27-12-103(a) is clear in its limitation of actions against employers, and its separate limitation of actions against co-employees. [5] As we said in Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo., 622 P.2d 1349, 1353 (1981): There is no doubt that the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act would preclude a suit against the corporate employer unless the employment was unlawful or illegal. Jordan v. Delta Drilling Company, Wyo., 541 P.2d 39, 48 (1975). However, while the Act creates liability without fault, it also allows an injured employee to bring a third-party action against coemployees who are personally responsible for the victim's injuries if these coemployees were culpably negligent. § 27-12-103, W.S. 1977; Abeyta v. Hensley, Wyo., 595 P.2d 71, 73-74 (1979).    The immunity from suit exists for an employer contributing to the worker's compensation fund without regard to negligence, whether culpable or ordinary.