Opinion ID: 683558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: motion for discovery of investigative file

Text: 14 On the morning of his scheduled criminal trial on September 14, 1993, Mr. Bastanipour filed a motion in limine requesting disclosure of an investigative file in connection with the unrelated prosecution of the informant, Mr. Long, for bank fraud. Mr. Bastanipour sought disclosure of the file for the purpose of uncovering motivation, bias, and interest, and to determine if Giglio or Brady evidence exists,.... In addition, Mr. Bastanipour claimed that disclosure of the file would enable him to look for information concerning 15 the nature and timing of the government's investigation of [Mr. Long]; ... participants, victims and agents; the onset of Mr. Long's awareness of his criminal liability; contacts made with him by the victim(s) and/or investigating agencies; the timing of the return of the Information; whether any government employee interfered with or attempted to discourage the prosecution;.... 16 A hearing was held in the district court on this motion on September 14, 1993. During the hearing, the government represented that the plea agreement between it and Mr. Long contained all agreements between Mr. Long and the government related to that conduct.... There are no other promises made. The government also informed the court that all Brady or Giglio information was contained in the plea agreement. The district court denied Mr. Bastanipour's motion and invited the government to produce the investigative file under seal for in camera review. The government submitted the file to the court on September 15, 1993. 17 Mr. Bastanipour argues on appeal that the district court's denial of his motion for discovery was contrary to Rule 16, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. He also urges that the denial offends the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), insofar as the information contained in the file might have been material to his defense. The defendant also maintains that the district court's ruling denying his motion for discovery violated his Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses in his own defense. We review a district court's denial of discovery in a criminal case for abuse of discretion. United States v. Reed, 2 F.3d 1441, 1446 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 898, 127 L.Ed.2d 90 (1994). 18 The government's duty to turn over evidence under both Rule 16, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Brady arises only where evidence is material to the defendant's defense. Rule 16(a)(1)(C), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides (with emphasis added) that the 19 government shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs ... or copies thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of the government, and which are material to the preparation of the defendant's defense.... 20 Further, the United States Supreme Court in Brady held that upon request of the defendant the government is obligated under the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States to produce evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to the issue of guilt or punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196. See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). 21 Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383. Moreover, due process requires the disclosure of evidence which impeaches the credibility of a key prosecution witness. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). 22 We find that the district court's denial of Mr. Bastanipour's motion for discovery of the government's investigative file of Mr. Long was a proper exercise of its discretion. Mr. Bastanipour's request to review the contents of the file was based on nothing more than his speculation that the file might contain evidence which he could use to impeach Mr. Long. There was no demonstration by the movant that material evidence was contained in the file or that any evidence was suppressed by the government. In the absence of such a showing, we cannot conclude that the defendant's due process rights were violated. See United States v. Romo, 914 F.2d 889, 898-99 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1122, 111 S.Ct. 1078, 112 L.Ed.2d 1183 (1991) (defendant not entitled to discovery material under Brady where there was not even a hint that impeaching evidence was contained therein or where he made no showing by affidavits or otherwise that any evidence was suppressed by the government). The fact that the government submitted the file to the district court for in camera review also negates any argument that the government suppressed favorable or material information. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1002, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987). 23 Furthermore, Mr. Bastanipour has not established that there was a reasonable probability that disclosure of the investigative file would have affected the outcome of the trial. Had the investigative file, in fact, turned up the evidence that Mr. Bastanipour was searching for--evidence that Mr. Long had enlisted him in the drug transaction so that he could restore favor with the FBI--it would have been merely cumulative. This is so because Mr. Bastanipour presented evidence at trial showing that Mr. Long had initiated contact with him. Evidence that Mr. Long knew he was being investigated in connection with the bank fraud before the negotiations for the heroin sale began was also presented by the defendant. In addition, the record discloses that Mr. Bastanipour impeached Mr. Long on cross-examination, with his own testimony and with the testimony of Mr. Long's accomplice in the bank fraud, Kenneth Jurich. 24 As to Mr. Bastanipour's additional argument that his rights under the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment were violated by the district court's denial of his motion for discovery, he failed to raise this argument before the district court, and therefore, has waived it on appeal. United States v. Harty, 930 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Gurgone v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 262, 116 L.Ed.2d 215 (1991). 25