Opinion ID: 1481116
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Rogers.

Text: Mr. Rogers does not argue that the trial court erred by vacating the guardianship. He contends nonetheless that his pre-filing conduct was not sanctionable because before filing the petition, he spoke with Mr. Anderson and several others who knew Ms. Jumper, all of whom allegedly agreed that she needed someone to look after her affairs. How can the proceeding I initiated be branded as `meritless,' Mr. Rogers asks, when people close to Ms. Jumper, and even Ms. Ellison, the court-appointed counsel for Ms. Jumper, agreed that a guardianship for her was proper? As the trial court observed, however, the problem was not simply the filing of the Petition, but some of the representations made therein. Particularly problematic was Mr. Rogers' checking off a box alleging that Ms. Jumper had property that [would] be wasted or dissipated unless property management [was] provided. Mr. Rogers argued that he checked this box merely to convey his concern for the disposition of Ms. Jumper's assets. The trial court found, however, that Mr. Rogers' excuse was a poor one because neither Mr. Anderson nor Mr. Rogers ever had any evidence of any wrongdoing on Col. Verfurth's part. There is no reason to believe that the trial court's assessment of the evidence was deficient, much less that it was clearly erroneous. And Mr. Rogers fails to cite any authority for his apparent view that it is permissible to file what inevitably turns into a costly (both financially and emotionally) guardianship petition simply to conduct a fishing expedition into potential misconduct by others. Also problematic was Mr. Rogers' failure to advise the court at the first hearing on the Petition that Ms. Jumper had counsel (Ms. Kincaid), and that Ms. Jumper, with Ms. Kincaid's assistance, had executed a number of estate-planning documents. As described above, Mr. Rogers conceded that on the day before the hearing he received Ms. Kincaid's letter in which Ms. Kincaid wrote that she was Ms. Jumper's attorney. Further, the letter, which Mr. Rogers was pretty sure he read before the hearing, explicitly stated that all of [Ms. Jumper's] planning arrangements [were] in effect, and that [i]n the event that Miss Jumper is no longer able to handle her financial affairs or make her own medical decisions, appropriate arrangements have already been made, and individuals appointed, to address these matters on Miss Jumper's behalf. D.C. Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(1) states that [a] lawyer shall not knowingly. . . fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer. When he filed the Petition, Mr. Rogers indicated that Ms. Jumper almost certainly was not represented by counsel. Rule 3.3(a)(1) required Mr. Rogers to correct that surely material misstatement, but he did not. Although this omission technically speaking came after Mr. Rogers filed the Petition, because it occurred before the first hearing on the Petition, one might plausibly argue that this conduct should be considered in determining whether Mr. Rogers initiated [the] action in bad faith. Jung, 844 A.2d at 1108. [7] We need not decide, however, whether Mr. Rogers initiated the Petition in bad faith so as to justify sanctions because the trial court plainly did not abuse its discretion in holding that Mr. Rogers' post-filing conduct was sanctionable. It is elementary that [d]uring the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate or cause another to communicate about the subject of the representation with a person known to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other person or is authorized by law or a court order to do so. D.C. Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2(a). Even if Mr. Rogers did not know when he filed the Petition that Ms. Kincaid represented Ms. Jumper in connection with the 2001 Trust, he clearly should have become aware of that fact on the day before the hearing when Ms. Ellison forwarded to him a letter from Ms. Kincaid describing Ms. Kincaid's representation of Ms. Jumper. At the latest, Mr. Rogers must have become aware that Ms. Kincaid was Ms. Jumper's lawyer by September 2002, when Ms. Sloan disclosed the existence of the 2001 Trust in her emergency petition. Yet even after the guardianship was vacated, Mr. Rogers drafted legal documents for Ms. Jumper and participated in tape-recorded meetings with her, all without inviting Ms. Kincaid or any of the attorneys who had represented Ms. Jumper over the years. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that this was sanctionable. Mr. Rogers readily admits preparing the documents and meeting with Ms. Jumper. Mr. Rogers claims, however, that there was nothing wrong with his doing so because at the meetings he identified himself as Mr. Anderson's attorney, and Ms. Jumper allegedly denied having an attorney. Assuming for the sake of argument that Ms. Jumper was unrepresented, [8] that does not help Mr. Rogers. D.C. Rule of Professional Conduct 4.3(a)(1) states that [i]n dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not . . . [g]ive advice to the unrepresented person other than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the lawyer's client. The rationale for the rule is that [a]n unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer will provide disinterested advice concerning the law even when the lawyer represents a client. Id., cmt. [1]. Accordingly, [i]n dealing personally with any unrepresented third party on behalf of the lawyer's client, a lawyer must take great care not to exploit these assumptions. Id. The rule and its rationale are tailor-made for this case. Ms. Jumper was on record as being frustrated by Mr. Anderson's involvement in the Petition. What is more, the documents that Mr. Rogers prepared for Ms. Jumper's signature were intended to benefit Mr. Anderson by giving to him Ms. Jumper's assets. As a result, it is clear as day that when Mr. Rogers met with Ms. Jumper and discussed the proceedings, there was at least a reasonable possibility that Ms. Jumper's interests would conflict with Mr. Anderson's interests. Whether Mr. Rogers should be disciplined under the Rules of Professional Conduct is a decision for the Office of Bar Counsel to consider in the first instance. For the purposes of this case, however, especially because Ms. Jumper by Mr. Rogers' own assertion was in such a frail state that she needed a guardian and conservator, the trial court was well within its discretion in holding that Mr. Rogers' actions warranted sanctions. [9] Finally, we see no basis for disturbing the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Rogers engaged in an unjustified maneuver that he undertook in bad faith when he noticed a deposition of Dr. Schneider, Ms. Jumper's personal physician. Discovery in probate proceedings may be had only upon order of the Court. Super. Ct. Prob. R. 312. Mr. Rogers did not seek or obtain such an order when, in February 2003  long after the merits of the guardianship petition were concluded  he sent to Dr. Schneider a notice stating that he was going to take her deposition for possible use at trial. The trial court's holding that this maneuver was in derogation of the rules, and thus further justified sanctions, was not an abuse of discretion. [10]