Opinion ID: 151423
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of Consolidation

Text: The Board argues that because, under the Authority's unit determination, the General Counsel and the Board will be forced to negotiate one contract together, the General Counsel will need the consent of the Board in exercising his supervisory authority over his employees. That much is clear. Whether the Board and the GC would both need to sign a collective bargaining agreement or whether the Board alone could make such an agreement binding upon the GC, remains unclear. The Authority's decision is silent on this matter, its briefs offered no clarification, nor did counsel when asked at oral argument. In either case, however, the General Counsel would need the Board's consent in order to negotiate an agreement with the representative of his employees. The Authority argues its determination is nonetheless consistent with § 3(d) because the Board, in negotiating with the Union, must and will respect the General Counsel's independent authority under § 3(d). It points out that for decades the General Counsel and the Board have engaged in coordinated bargaining over labor issues, which has usually resulted in similar or identical terms and working conditions for Board-side and GC-side employees. In light of this history of cooperation, the Authority reasons, it is reasonable to assume, as did the Authority [in making its appropriate unit determination], that future incumbents would not ignore the limitations of § 3(d) and usurp control of the working conditions of employees of the other components. The Authority can assume but it cannot provide any assurance the Board and the General Counsel will be able to treat each labor issue as either a matter entirely of Board-side or of GC-side concern or agree upon issues of common concern; [] nor is there good reason to assume the history of coordination between the two will survive consolidation of their employees into a single bargaining unit. Good fences make good neighbors, as Robert Frost observed, but the Authority proposes to take down the fence. Neither we nor the Authority can blithely disregard the potential for discord in what have hitherto been viable collective bargaining relationships. Significantly, the Authority offers no indication how a disagreement between the Board and the General Counsel could be resolved were one to develop. We suppose the General Counsel could force an impasse and elicit an unfair labor practice complaint that he is refusing to bargain, maintain his position of legal right through the various levels of review before the Authority, and eventually the court of appeals, thereby ultimately safeguarding his authority against intrusion. Empowering the Board to put the General Counsel to that considerable burden, however, in the sensitive context of collective bargaining is itself an undue interference with his supervisory authority. We conclude, therefore, that by subjecting the General Counsel's exercise of his supervisory authority to the consent of the Board, the Authority's unit determination conflicts with § 3(d) of the Act.