Opinion ID: 848681
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Decoding the Majority Opinion

Text: The Legislature's grant of standing to any person in MCL 324.1701(1) is unquestionably broader than Lee's judge-made standing test. The majority retains its firm belief that Lee's standing test is grounded in the constitutional separation of powers. By repeatedly asserting that the Legislature may not confer standing more broadly than Lee, the majority has impliedly decided the very constitutional question they accuse this dissent of improperly reaching. It appears that, from the majority's mistaken perspective, the MEPA's citizen-suit provision is unconstitutional because the Legislature's attempt to confer standing on any person under MEPA violates the separations of powers. Moreover, it is the majority who, in Lee, created the constitutional dilemma that must be resolved in this case. As previously discussed, Lee unnecessarily imported the federal constitution's article III case or controversy constraints on standing into Michigan law. It should also be noted that in Lee, the parties had not raised or briefed the applicability of Lujan or article III of the federal constitution. On its own initiative, the Lee majority raised Lujan's standing test and transformed standing in Michigan into a constitutional question. I fundamentally disagree with the majority's perception of judicial discipline and duty. It is not necessarily evidence of judicial discipline to dodge the ultimate issue in a case, be the issue of constitutional dimension or not. Nor is it disciplined to import into Michigan law federal constitutional constraints that the people  the ratifiers of the Michigan Constitution  have not adopted. Moreover, where the Court specifically requests that an issue be briefed (as this Court did in this case) and the issue is squarely presented, dodging the question destabilizes the law. It is particularly inappropriate where the parties must bear the cost of further unnecessary litigation or where the decision creates confusion for the bench and the bar. In this case, it is a proper exercise of judicial duty and power to answer the constitutional question presented by this Court regarding whether Lee's judge-made standing test supercedes the Legislature's authority to confer standing. Further, while purporting to act with judicial restraint by leaving the constitutionality of MCL 324.1701(1) in doubt, the majority attempts to chart a course for the resolution of issues not even before the Court by suggesting that plaintiffs may not simply rely on the affidavits to prove that standing exists. Ante at 815. The majority confuses the issue of standing with a court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Ante at 815. The majority erroneously suggests that the circuit court can reverse this Court's unanimous decision that plaintiffs have standing. Id. However, this Court's decision that plaintiffs have standing controls that issue. The majority then hints that plaintiffs' affidavits may be insufficient either to survive a motion for summary disposition or to meet the plaintiff's burden of proof. For this, the majority cites an irrelevant and nonbinding United States Supreme Court dissenting opinion in a federal case involving federal law. The plain language of MEPA and this Court's own MEPA decisions are a far more appropriate guide for the circuit court on remand. MEPA instructs: When the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that the conduct of the defendant has polluted, impaired, or destroyed or is likely to pollute, impair, or destroy the air, water, or other natural resources or the public trust in these resources, the defendant may rebut the prima facie showing by the submission of evidence to the contrary. The defendant may also show, by way of an affirmative defense, that there is no feasible and prudent alternative to defendant's conduct and that his or her conduct is consistent with the promotion of the public health, safety, and welfare in light of the state's paramount concern for the protection of its natural resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction. Except as to the affirmative defense, the principles of burden of proof and weight of the evidence generally applicable in civil actions in the circuit courts brought under this part. [MCL 324.1703(1).] As this Court previously held, the necessary showing to establish a plaintiff's prima facie case is not not restricted to actual environmental degradation but also encompasses probable damage to the environment as well. General rules of evidence govern this inquiry, and a plaintiff has established a prima facie case when his case is sufficient to withstand a motion by the defendant that the judge direct a verdict in the defendant's favor. [ Nemeth v. Abonmarche Dev., Inc., 457 Mich. 16, 25, 576 N.W.2d 641 (1998) (citations omitted).] This Court has emphasized that MEPA's, very efficacy ... will turn on how well circuit court judges meet their responsibility for giving vitality and meaning to the act through detailed findings of fact. Ray, supra at 307-308, 224 N.W.2d 883.