Opinion ID: 1236100
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cross-examination of Ms. Brenda Frum Regarding Mental Health History

Text: The Appellant also alleges that the lower court erroneously prevented the Appellant from cross-examining prosecution witness Ms. Brenda Frum regarding her mental health history, allegedly including visitation to a domestic violence center and other counseling on undisclosed dates. The precise nature of the counseling and the underlying reasons for seeking counseling remain unknown. Prior to trial, the Appellant had requested information regarding Ms. Frum's mental history, based upon a reference in Ms. Frum's pretrial statement. [7] Despite defense counsel's request for any additional information possessed by the State, the State did not provide any information to the Appellant prior to trial. [8] At trial, the State initiated inquiry into the issue by requesting a bench conference and asking the lower court to prevent the defense from questioning Ms. Frum concerning her mental health history. Specifically, the State explained: [W]e wanted to clarify if Ms. Frum's statementshe talks about at some point receiving some treatment for mental health.... [W]e wanted to know if the Courtmove the Court to prohibit that to being cross-examined for cross-examination purposes. We don't think that has any bearing on her credibility. As far as I can tell, these problems are some years back and are not current, and so they wouldn't have any bearing on her credibility at that time. We have not taken any steps to obtain her records, and we don't have that information, and we just think it would be unfair to cross-examine this witness on that mental health history. When the lower court asked the Appellant's counsel whether he had intended to cross-examine Ms. Frum concerning her mental health issues, he responded: Well, I was going to basically do a question concerning what you were there for. What did you receive the treatment for. She brought it up herself, and I don't know. I couldn't get those records. The Appellant's counsel also alluded to a letter he had sent to the State the prior week about Ms. Frum, asking [the State] to make the inquiry and provide me anything that had happened. The Appellant's counsel indicated that the State apparently has not received that, and so it's an issue up in the air. The lower court ruled that Appellant's counsel could make inquiry as long as it relates only to her present situation. The lower court explained: As far as stuff that happened years ago or that is not ongoing, no. The court continued: Obviously, if there's something going on that might affect her credibility right now, he's entitled to know it. Subsequent to additional discussion concerning whether the burden was upon the defense to prove that something in the mental health history would affect credibility, the lower court ended the discussion by stating: I'm not going to let you get into it. It's too late. So I guess we're back where I started from. The Appellant's counsel said, No questions? The lower court answered, No questions.
The State maintains that because no effort was made by Appellant's counsel to vouch the record regarding this mental history issue and no in camera examination [9] was requested, the Appellant waived the right to protest this ruling on appeal. In State v. McClure, 184 W.Va. 418, 400 S.E.2d 853 (1990), this Court addressed a situation in which defense counsel had been prevented from questioning a State witness regarding suspected prejudice against the defendant. The McClure Court relied upon syllabus point one of Horton v. Horton, 164 W.Va. 358, 264 S.E.2d 160 (1980), as follows, to conclude that defense counsel had failed to preserve the issue for appellate review: If a party offers evidence to which an objection is sustained, that party, in order to preserve the rejection of the evidence as error on appeal, must place the rejected evidence on the record or disclose what the evidence would have shown, and the failure to do so prevents an appellate court from reviewing the matter on appeal. See also Syl. Pt. 8, Torrence v. Kusminsky, 185 W.Va. 734, 408 S.E.2d 684 (1991). We expressed in McClure that [t]he failure of a party to preserve the rejected evidence essentially precludes this Court from determining whether the rejection constitutes reversible error. 184 W.Va. at 425, 400 S.E.2d at 860. We concluded that the defendant in McClure failed to vouch the record and failed to preserve the evidence otherwise. In the absence of vouching, this Court cannot determine whether the court's ruling was prejudicial, and in line with the ruling in syllabus point 1 of Horton v. Horton, supra, the Court believes that it has been effectively precluded from reviewing the question presented by the defendant. 184 W.Va. at 425, 400 S.E.2d at 860.
In syllabus point four of State v. Richey, 171 W.Va. 342, 298 S.E.2d 879 (1982), we delineated basic rules of cross-examination, as follows: Several basic rules exist as to cross-examination of a witness. The first is that the scope of cross-examination is coextensive with, and limited by, the material evidence given on direct examination. The second is that a witness may also be cross-examined about matters affecting his credibility. The term credibility includes the interest and bias of the witness, inconsistent statements made by the witness and to a certain extent the witness' character. The third rule is that the trial judge has discretion as to the extent of cross-examination. This Court also specified the standard of review for allegations of errors in cross-examination in the syllabus of State v. Wood, 167 W.Va. 700, 280 S.E.2d 309 (1981): The extent of the cross-examination of a witness is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court; and in the exercise of such discretion, in excluding or permitting questions on cross-examination, its action is not reviewable except in case of manifest abuse or injustice. Syl. pt. 4, State v. Carduff, 142 W.Va. 18, 93 S.E.2d 502 (1956). We also specified that [t]he discretion of the trial court includes whether a witness' testimony can be impeached by the introduction of evidence of a psychiatric disability. State v. Allman, 182 W.Va. 656, 658, 391 S.E.2d 103, 105 (1990). Thus, the establishment of parameters of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the lower court. Absent manifest abuse or injustice, this Court upon appellate review is not to disturb the resolutions of the lower court. The State maintains that the Appellant in the present case essentially sought to embark on a fishing excursion during cross-examination. The State also emphasizes the absence of any indication, other than the rather innocuous pretrial statement regarding counseling, that Ms. Frum was not a credible witness or that her statements were false or even suspect. There was also no indication that the State had any particular document or any evidence that could have been provided to the defense. Moreover, even the Appellant recognizes that the burden of proof is generally upon the party seeking to use the evidence in an attempt to prove that the mental disability is sufficient to affect credibility. We have also recognized the sensitive nature of the evidence and the potential for abuse and have required a showing that the psychiatric disorder affects the credibility and that an expert has had a sufficient opportunity to make the diagnosis of psychiatric disorder before the evidence can be used to impeach a witness. Id. at 658, 391 S.E.2d at 105. In syllabus point five of State v. Harman, 165 W.Va. 494, 270 S.E.2d 146 (1980), we held as follows: Evidence of psychiatric disability may be introduced when it affects the credibility of a material witness' testimony in a criminal case. Before such psychiatric disorder can be shown to impeach a witness' testimony, there must be a further showing that the disorder affects the credibility of the witness and that the expert has had a sufficient opportunity to make the diagnosis of psychiatric disorder. Upon thorough examination of the cross-examination issue, we conclude that the Appellant failed to adequately preserve any alleged error for appeal. The Appellant failed to vouch the record regarding the rejected issues and failed to request an in camera hearing to assess the validity of his concerns. Further, even if the alleged error had been properly preserved for appeal, we are constrained to observe our limitations in the scope of review of exclusions from evidence. We have consistently emphasized the significant discretion afforded to trial courts in fashioning appropriate parameters of cross-examination. In evaluation of the lower court's exclusion, we find no manifest abuse or injustice regarding the scope of cross-examination of Ms. Frum. We are forced to this conclusion notwithstanding the obvious lack of specific information available to the Appellant with which to vouch the record or frame a proffer. The Appellant could have requested the opportunity to conduct cross-examination in camera so that all concerned could have been better informed regarding the nature of any prior mental health problems and thereby developed a more adequate record. Additionally, even if we were to find error in the limitation of cross-examination, we have consistently held that erroneous evidentiary rulings alone do not necessitate reversal. State v. Blake, 197 W.Va. 700, 478 S.E.2d 550 (1996). This Court is obligated to reverse where the improper exclusion of evidence places the underlying fairness of the entire trial in doubt or where the exclusion affected the substantial rights of a criminal defendant. Id. at 702, 478 S.E.2d at 552, Syl. Pt. 4, in part. Making this determination involves the assessment of the likelihood that had the jury heard the excluded evidence, its outcome would have been affected. Id. at 709, 478 S.E.2d at 559. Rule 103(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence provides: Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected.... Id. Under Rule 103(a), to warrant reversal, two elements must be shown: error and injury to the party appealing. Error is harmless when it is trivial, formal, or merely academic, and not prejudicial to the substantial rights of the party assigning it, and where it in no way affects the outcome of the trial. Stated conversely, error is prejudicial and ground for reversal only when it affects the final outcome and works adversely to a substantial right of the party assigning it. Reed v. Wimmer, 195 W.Va. 199, 209, 465 S.E.2d 199, 209 (1995). If it were conceded that error occurred in the limitation of cross-examination, and that such error was properly preserved, we would most likely view the error as harmless. Given the extensive evidence of direct sexual transgressions against the victim of the crimes charged, as well as the testimony of numerous other victims which demonstrated a particularly probative history of similar transgressions, the exclusion of the mental health history of one witness could scarcely prejudice the substantial rights of the Appellant, and we discern no reasonable possibility that the exclusion affected the outcome of the trial.