Opinion ID: 544587
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: EPA's Interpretation of the Term Discarded

Text: 31 As we have noted in a prior decision, EPA's regulatory authority under RCRA Subtitle C extends only to the regulation of 'hazardous waste.' Because 'hazardous waste' is defined as a subset of 'solid waste,' ... the scope of EPA's jurisdiction is limited to those materials that constitute 'solid waste.'  AMC, 824 F.2d at 1179. 7 Cf. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6903(5) (defining hazardous waste as subset of solid waste). Petitioners argue that three of the six wastes at issue in this case (K064, K065, and K066) are not solid wastes, because they are not discarded within meaning of RCRA, but are instead beneficially reused in mineral processing operations. Final Brief of Consolidated Petitioners at 12. 32 The primary smelting operations that generate these three wastes produce large volumes of wastewater that the smelting company must treat before discharging it. Many smelting operations use surface impoundments to collect, treat, and dispose of the wastewater. These impoundments continuously produce sludges, which precipitate from the wastewater. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6903(26A) (defining sludge to cover any solid, semisolid or liquid waste generated from a municipal, commercial, or industrial wastewater treatment plant). 33 Petitioners' basic claim is that sludges from wastewater that are stored in surface impoundments and that may at some time in the future be reclaimed are not discarded. The agency, however, exercising its expert judgment, has concluded that, because these sludges are the product of wastewater and are stored in impoundments that threaten harm to the health and environs of those living nearby, these materials are discarded. 34 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), guides our review of the agency's interpretation of RCRA. Under Chevron 's well-settled two-step test, we begin by considering whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue; if it has, then we must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Id. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. If Congress has not directly spoken to the precise issue, then we will defer to the agency's reading of the statute as long as it is permissible, id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2781, that is, so long as it is reasonable and consistent with the statutory purpose. Ohio v. Department of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 441 (D.C.Cir.1989). 35 This court has recently had occasion to consider the meaning of the term discarded in RCRA under the first step of Chevron analysis. In American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729 (D.C.Cir.1990) (API ), we concluded that the term discarded was marked by the kind of ambiguity demanding resolution by the agency's delegated lawmaking powers. See API, at 740-741. Petitioners direct us to nothing whatsoever in the language, overall structure, or legislative history of the statute, nor do we know of anything therein, that shows the term discarded to be any less ambiguous regarding sludges stored in surface impoundments than it was regarding the materials at issue in API. 36 To support their claim that RCRA forecloses EPA regulation of these sludges, petitioners invoke this court's decision in AMC, 824 F.2d 1177. At issue in AMC was whether EPA could, under RCRA, treat as solid wastes materials that are recycled and reused in an ongoing manufacturing or industrial process. Id. at 1186 (emphasis in original). We held that the agency could not treat such materials as solid wastes, because they have not yet become part of the waste disposal problem; rather, they are destined for beneficial reuse or recycling in a continuous process by the generating industry itself. Id. (emphasis in original). Because such materials were never disposed of, abandoned, or thrown away, we concluded, they were not discarded within the meaning of RCRA. Id. at 1193. 37 Petitioners read AMC too broadly. AMC 's holding concerned only materials that are destined for immediate reuse in another phase of the industry's ongoing production process, id. at 1185 (emphasis added), 8 and that have not yet become part of the waste disposal problem, id. at 1186. Nothing in AMC prevents the agency from treating as discarded the wastes at issue in this case, which are managed in land disposal units that are part of wastewater treatment systems, which have therefore become part of the waste disposal problem, and which are not part of ongoing industrial processes. Indeed, API explicitly rejected the very claim that petitioners assert in this case, see Final Brief of Consolidated Petitioners at 12-13, namely, that under RCRA, potential reuse of a material prevents the agency from classifying it as discarded. See API, at 740-741. 38 Because Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question at issue, we must consider whether the agency's interpretation of the term discarded was permissible, see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2781, that is, reasonable and consistent with the statutory purpose, Ohio v. Department of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 441. In this case, the agency determined that material placed in wastewater treatment surface impoundments where it is capable of posing a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported or disposed of, or otherwise managed, 40 C.F.R. Sec. 261.11(a)(3), by leaching into the ground, is discarded material, and hence a solid waste. As the agency notes, because of their propensity to leak hazardous materials into the environment, surface impoundments are a central focus of RCRA's regime. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. Secs. 6901(b)(7), 9 6924(k) 10 , (o ), 6925(j). In addition, Congress made clear in the legislative history of RCRA its concern to regulate hazardous materials in surface impoundments. See, e.g., H.R.REP. NO. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1976); S.REP. NO. 284, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-16 (1983). In light of this evidence, we conclude that the agency's interpretation of discarded is both reasonable and consistent with the statutory purposes of RCRA. 39