Opinion ID: 2332641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: framework for analysis

Text: [¶ 13] I would conclude that when a defendant such as Rees challenges the admission of his out-of-court statement, the following analysis applies: 1. the court must look to the privilege against self-incrimination to determine whether the statement was compelled by an external force. If so, the statement will not be admissible over an assertion of the privilege. If the court finds that statement has not been compelled, 2. the court must next look to principles of due process to determine whether the admission of the statements in light of the actions of the State would violate concepts of fundamental fairness. If principles of due process would not result in the exclusion of the statement, 3. the court must determine whether any of the Rules of Evidence would require the exclusion of the statements. In particular, if the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement render it so inherently unreliable that it is not probative, it will not be admissible for the truth of the matters asserted therein, and 4. finally, if the court determines that the statement is inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief, the basis for its exclusion will have a bearing on whether the statement is admissible at trial for any other purpose. [3] [¶ 14] Because it is not clear whether the Court today rests its decision entirely on the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination or on a combination of privilege and due process concepts, I address the two areas of analysis separately. I will also address the Court's mistaken conclusion that its holding today is required by our decisions in State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120 (Me.1982), and State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620 (Me.1972).