Opinion ID: 657321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cosgrove's Remaining Claims

Text: 25 Under Title VII, discrimination can be demonstrated through evidence of either 'disparate treatment' or 'disparate impact.' To show 'disparate treatment,' the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 2784, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988). 'Disparate impact' is based upon the premise that some employment practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination. Id. at 987, 108 S.Ct. at 2785. The evidence in 'disparate impact' cases usually focuses on statistical disparities, rather than specific incidents, and on competing explanations for those disparities. Id. Cosgrove submitted evidence for both tests. 26 During discovery, Cosgrove focused on four male employees in her department. At trial, she sought to support her claim of sex discrimination in compensation and promotions through a comparison with the compensation and advancement of other male Sears employees. 5 Sears' expert witness, Dr. Joan Haworth, performed her own analysis of employees comparable to Cosgrove in compensation and promotion. The information that Sears provided revealed that: (1) during the year 1976-77, women in similar positions to Cosgrove averaged a 13.0% salary increase, as opposed to Cosgrove's 7.0%, and 8.4% for men; (2) Cosgrove made checklist status in the longest period of time as compared to all but one of the five women chosen by Dr. Haworth who were similarly situated at Sears; and (3) of the five persons in Departments 607 and 618 who were promoted to a checklist position, both male and female, all achieved the position faster than Cosgrove, the average being two years. Thus, statistically, Cosgrove failed to demonstrate gender discrimination through either 'disparate treatment' or 'disparate impact' with regard to pay increases and promotions, since all but one of the similarly situated employees compared with her during the trial, both male and female, were promoted faster than Cosgrove, and received correspondingly higher salaries. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court regarding Cosgrove's gender discrimination claim is affirmed.
27 Cosgrove based her claim of sexual harassment on remarks allegedly made by two male co-workers, and an offensive note received from an anonymous source. While these events are unacceptable, they do not rise to the level required to make a prima facie case of sexual harassment. As the district court correctly found, the harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment. This principle was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 367, 368, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (When the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult' ... that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive [so as] to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment,' ... Title VII is violated.) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2404-05, 2405, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)). In order to establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment based upon a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that she is a member of a protected group; (2) that she was the subject of unwelcome advances; (3) that the harassment was based upon her sex; and (4) that the harassment affected a term, condition or privilege of employment. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63-69, 106 S.Ct. at 2403-07. A plaintiff must also demonstrate in a hostile work environment case that the supervisor's [or co-worker's] actions should be imputed to the employer. Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir.1992). 28 Cosgrove failed to establish a prima facie case. While Cosgrove is clearly a member of a protected group, and was the subject of unwelcome remarks and advances based upon her gender, she failed to demonstrate that (a) the alleged harassment affected a term, condition or privilege of her employment with Sears, or (b) that the actions of her co-workers should be imputed to Sears. Accordingly, she failed to prove sexual harassment, and that portion of the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 29
30 Cosgrove's claim of post-termination retaliation is without merit. While she claims that Sears 'black-listed' her, she offered no substantive evidence or proof that Sears in any way lied about her performance at Sears. The district court correctly concluded that this argument was strained and unpersuasive. Therefore, the judgment of the district court is affirmed on this point.