Opinion ID: 6112850
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: dmca

Text: Next, Marquardt argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the DMCA claim because Plaintiffs’ statutory right was not “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. The DMCA prohibits unauthorized removal or alteration of “copyright management information,” such as the title, the author, or copyright owner of the work. 8 Case: 20-20530 Document: 00516180318 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/26/2022 No. 20-20530 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c). Marquardt contends that it was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation that the information removed from the Gill Biography was “copyright management information” protected by the DMCA. We decline to consider the merits of Marquardt’s qualified immunity defense against the DMCA claim because it is untimely. Marquardt first raised his defense in a motion to dismiss, which was rejected by the district court. Marquardt did not appeal the ruling, but raised qualified immunity again at summary judgment, noting that “the weakness of Plaintiffs’ arguments that they own the copyright in the first place are now apparent,” such that there was no clearly established right at the time of the alleged violation. Now, in the instant appeal of the denial of summary judgment, he seeks appellate review of the district court’s prior ruling on his motion to dismiss, contending that the motion-to-dismiss denial is “merged into” the summary judgment denial. Not so. A district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity is a final appealable decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); see Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996) (making clear that an appeal is available from denials of an immunity defense at both the pleading and summary judgment stages). The denial is subject to the 30-day time limit for appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Therefore, Marquardt had 30 days after the district court denied his motion to dismiss to file a notice of appeal. Having failed in this, Marquardt now attempts to revisit the identical qualified immunity argument on appeal via his summary judgment motion, which, notably, is premised upon the “weakness of Plaintiffs’ arguments” and not the absence of triable issues of fact. This approach is improper. See Armstrong v. Tex. State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 30 F.3d 643, 644 (5th Cir. 1994) (dismissing as untimely appeal of summary judgment denial, where 9 Case: 20-20530 Document: 00516180318 Page: 10 Date Filed: 01/26/2022 No. 20-20530 defendants raised the same pleadings-based qualified immunity defense in both the motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, but failed to appeal prior denial of the motion to dismiss). We conclude that, for purposes of this appeal, Marquardt lost his right to challenge the denial of qualified immunity against the DMCA claim, because it is premised upon the same arguments as his non-appealed motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we dismiss this part of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to untimeliness. See Sudduth v. Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n, 830 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 2016) (“It is well established ‘that the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case . . . is a jurisdictional requirement.’”) (quoting Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007)).