Opinion ID: 2976607
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Hall’s Sentence Is Procedurally Reasonable

Text: Hall argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district judge (1) placed an undue amount of weight on the sentencing range calculated under the advisory Guidelines and (2) failed to explain clearly the reasons for the sentence imposed.2 We discuss those contentions in turn. First Hall argues that the district judge sentenced him while operating from the erroneous “premise that the Guidelines range . . . was . . . presumptively reasonable.” [Blue Br. 26] To support his claim Hall points to that part of the sentencing hearing transcript where the district judge addressed Hall’s motion for a downward departure as well as Guidelines Sections 5K2.0 and 4A1.3. Under Section 5K2.0(a)(2) a court may “depart” from the calculated Guideline range based on circumstances that the Sentencing Commission may not have considered adequately when determining that range. Under Section 4A1.3(b)(1) a “downward departure” may be warranted when “the defendant’s criminal history category substantially over-represents the 2 Although Hall also argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the judge failed to consider all of the pertinent Section 3553(a) factors, based on the Ming Liou criterion quoted in the proceeding paragraph we address that subject later, in the next section dealing with the substantive reasonableness of Hall’s sentence. 10 seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes.” Hall contends that the district judge approached Hall’s sentencing from the perspective that he could not abandon the calculated Guidelines range unless the conditions of either Section 5K2.0 or Section 4A1.3 were met and that this revealed a fundamental misconception of how sentencing should operate post-Booker–that is, that what matters now is not necessarily the “correctness” of a departure under the Guidelines but rather the overall reasonableness of the sentence in Section 3553(a) terms. Hall’s argument fails for two reasons. First, our circuit continues to recognize the vitality of “downward departures,” even post-Booker.3 As we explained in United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 477 (6th Cir. 2006): The assertion that departures are obsolete has an element of truth--for there is now no mandatory guideline range from which to depart--and does properly shift the focus of our review to reasonableness. Nevertheless, the appropriate Guideline range--including Guideline departures--must still be considered. Because Guideline “departures” are a part of the appropriate Guideline range calculation, we believe that Guideline departures are still a relevant consideration for determining the appropriate Guideline sentence. This Guideline sentence is then considered in the context of the section 3553(a) factors. Under the teaching of McBride, the district judge did not err when he framed part of his decision in the context of whether a “downward departure” from the range calculated under the advisory Guidelines was appropriate.4 3 To be sure, we have at the same time recognized “that there is not complete agreement among the courts over whether Guideline-based ‘departures’ truly even exist at this point” (McBride, 434 F.3d at 477, citing United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 2005) and United States v. Wing, 433 F.3d 622, 633 (8th Cir. 2005) (Loken, C.J., concurring) as examples of differing jurisprudence on the subject). 4 It should not be forgotten that it was Hall himself who styled his initial motion to the judge as a “motion for downward departure.” 11 Second, any contention that the district judge erred by placing too much weight on the calculated Guidelines range is further negated by the judge’s next discussing (just as McBride prescribes) the “Guideline sentence . . . in the context of the section 3553(a) factors” (id.). For purposes of procedural reasonableness we must separately examine whether a district judge, at the least, recognizes that Section 3553(a) calls for the consideration of other factors besides the calculated range. That was plainly done here: At the very outset of the sentencing hearing the district judge stated he “will discuss the advisory guideline calculation and the factors discussed in [Section] 3553 that are relevant to this case” (emphasis added). Then he proceeded to discuss a number of the factors set out in Section 3553(a), including the need to avoid sentencing disparities between similarly situated defendants, the nature of the offense, the personal history of the defendant and the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment. In sum, the district judge plainly did not place an undue amount of weight on the sentencing range calculated under the advisory Guidelines. Instead, per McBride, he properly considered the merits of Hall’s “motion for downward departure” before proceeding to consider the appropriateness of that calculated range in light of the other Section 3553(a) factors. We next address Hall’s argument that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district judge failed to give sufficiently clear reasons for the sentence he imposed. Rita v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007) described what constitutes a sufficient articulation of the reasons underlying a sentence: The sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority. 12 Just how much reasoning is enough “varies according to context,” but “ Rita indicates that when a sentencing judge concurs with the Sentencing Commission’s conclusion that a within- Guidelines sentence is appropriate for a given defendant, the explanation for the sentence generally need not be lengthy” (Ming Liou, 491 F.3d at 338). Here, as in Ming Liou, the district judge adverted to a number of the mitigating circumstances and Section 3553(a)-related factors that Hall presented as reasons for imposing a sentence below the range that had been calculated under the advisory Guidelines. For example, the judge cited Hall’s turbulent childhood, his positive work history and ongoing Bible studies, the remorse Hall felt for the crime he committed and his youth and “potential vulnerability in prison.” Given that recital, Hall’s argument boils down to the contention that “the district court did not specifically explain why it was not more moved” by Hall’s personal circumstances “or why they were less of a concern than the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense and to promote respect for the law” (Ming Liou, 491 F.3d at 340). But from the record it is “clear that the sentencing judge listened to each argument” and simply decided that such circumstances did not outweigh other relevant Section 3553(a) factors (Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2469). At bottom the procedure employed here did not fall short of the expectations articulated in Rita, so it cannot be said that Hall’s sentence is procedurally unreasonable.