Opinion ID: 220659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dulin's Theories

Text: It is undisputed that Dulin presented a prima facie case of racial discrimination and that the Board asserted a nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his contract, namely its dissatisfaction with his performance as Board Attorney based on his inattention at Board meetings, his failure to proactively offer legal opinions, and its distrust of his legal advice. It was Dulin's burden to prove that the Board intentionally discriminated against him based on his race by showing that the Board's nondiscriminatory reason was false or by showing that, while the nondiscriminatory reason was true, race was another motivating factor in his termination. The Board satisfied its burden of production and the sole remaining issue was discrimination vel non.  Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (internal quotation omitted). Dulin argued that the three black members of the BoardFlaggs, Foster, and Parker made a race-based decision about his contract and that the white members of the BoardMalouf and Waldropwent along to get along. Because the Board could only act by quorumhere, three of five members' votesand the Board's decision to terminate Dulin's contract was unanimous, Dulin needed only to establish that three of the Board members votes were motivated by racial animus.
To support his pretext argument, Dulin testified that no Board member had complained to him about his performance. The hospital's former administrator testified that no Board member had raised complaints regarding Dulin's performance, and the reporter testified that the Board members did not complain at the League meeting about Dulin's performance. One Board member testified that he had complained to Dulin at least once about his failure to review the Board's contracts and the Board's desire for Dulin to be proactive about providing the Board with advice. A question of fact exists as to whether or not the Board had expressed concerns about Dulin's performance to Dulin. However, a factual dispute about whether Board members voiced concerns to Dulin is not sufficient to create an issue of material fact regarding whether they were dissatisfied with his performance. Even if the jury were to resolve the disputed question in his favor, it would not be able to conclude that the Board's asserted nondiscriminatory reasons for firing Dulin were false. The relevant testimony and exhibits showed that the five Board members were all, for similar reasons, dissatisfied with Dulin's performance as Board Attorney. Dulin submitted no evidence showing that his legal advice was correct, that the Board was pleased with his advice, or that he was proactive or even attentive at Board meetings. [3] Cf. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 144, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (discussing petitioner's substantial showing that respondent's explanation was false based on evidence that he had properly maintained records and was not responsible for failure to discipline employees).
Dulin relied on the remarks made by Moore, Foster, and Malouf at the League meeting to show that race was a motivating factor in the Board's decision to terminate his contract. When evaluating whether race-based comments are sufficient evidence of discrimination, this court has held that: [The comments] must be (1) related [to the protected class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member]; (2) proximate in time to the [complained-of adverse employment decision]; (3) made by an individual with authority over the employment decision at issue; and (4) related to the employment decision at issue. Jenkins v. Methodist Hosp. of Dallas, Inc., 478 F.3d 255, 261 (5th Cir.2007) (quotation omitted); Rubinstein v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 400-01 (5th Cir.2000) (concluding that alleged remarks by individuals affiliated with a hospital did not create a material fact issue on pretext or motivating factor). None of the comments made at the League meeting meet the second requirement, that of temporal proximity. The Board decided to replace Dulin in August 2006 and, in January 2007, selected a new Board attorney who began work in February. The Board continued to pay Dulin in accordance with his contract until April 2007. Dulin has not argued that comments made in August 2005, one year before the Board decided to replace him and nearly two years before it terminated his contract were proximate to the Board's employment decision. [4] In any event, comments made a year before a plaintiff's termination are not proximate. See, e.g., Jackson v. Cal-Western Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir.2010). The comments by Moore and other League members at the League meeting also fail the third prong: requiring the speaker to have authority over the employment decision at issue. Dulin argues that Moore's comments are relevant because he was capable of influencing the votes of three of the five Board members: Flaggs, Parker, and Foster. Even if the court were to assume that this attenuated connection is legally sufficient and to assume that Moore could influence Flaggs and Parker because he was a member of the Leflore County Board of Supervisors, [5] Dulin presents no basis for Moore's influence over Foster except for the fact that both men are black. The mere fact that individuals share a race is an improper basis on which to stake influence; Dulin's reliance on it is indicative of the weakness of his evidence. Further, Moore's, Flaggs's, Parker's, and Foster's uncontradicted testimony was that neither Moore nor the League (nor anyone else) influenced their decisions. [6] This testimony is corroborated by the statements of all five Board members at the August 2006 Board meeting at which they unanimously agreed to terminate Dulin's contract. [7] Finally, even if the court were to assume that the comments made by Board members at the League meeting were both temporally proximate to their decision to terminate Dulin's contract and race based, [8] they would fail the third prong because they could not have been made or adopted by a quorum of the Board (only two Board members attended the meeting). For all of these reasons, none of the comments at the League meeting can show that Dulin's race was a motivating factor in the Board's unanimous decision to terminate his contract.
Dulin also relied on evidence of comments made by various Board members at occasions outside of the League meeting to show that his race was a motivating factor in the Board's decision. Dulin testified that Malouf approached him the day following the League meeting and stated that Flaggs, Foster, and Parker wanted to replace him. Malouf then suggested that Dulin submit a letter to the Board declaring his intention to retire at some point in the future. Dulin testified that he did submit such a letter and the Board did not respond. Malouf's comments to Dulin were not proximate in time to Dulin's termination. They also fail the first prong of the test because they did not mention race. Next, Moore and Flaggs both testified that they had a conversation approximately three months prior to the League meeting in which Moore suggested that the Board replace Dulin. These comments also were not proximate in time to the Board's decisions on Dulin and did not include any mention of Dulin's race. Moreover, Flaggs did not respond to, much less agree to implement, Moore's suggestion. Similarly, Moore and Parker testified that they had a very similar conversation approximately three months after the League meeting. Moore's comments and Parker's non-response were not proximate in time to the Board's employment decision and did not mention race. Neither Flaggs nor Parker attended the League meeting and Dulin offered no other evidence that their decisions to terminate Dulin's contract were motivated by racial animus. Finally, all five Board members discussed Dulin at the August 2006 Board meeting and decided that he should resign or retire within thirty to ninety days. Their comments, while proximate in time, fail the first prong of the test because the only statements that relate in any way to race expressed that: (1) the League was out of bounds in requesting that the Board fire Dulin; (2) the Board should not have fired Dulin after the League meeting; (3) the League has its own agenda; (4) the League had no influence over the Board's decisions; (5) the League had treated the Board members badly at that meeting; and (6) the Board members would not be returning to League meetings.
In sum, Dulin did not meet his burden to present legally-sufficient evidence on which the jury could conclude that the Board intentionally discriminated against him based on his race. Because he did not satisfy his burden, the district court properly granted judgment to the Board under Rule 50(a)(1). Whether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in any particular case will depend on a number of factors. . . includ[ing] the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Dulin presented a weak prima facie case and did not satisfy his burden to show that the Board's offered nondiscriminatory justification was false. Where the plaintiff creates only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there is abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred, judgment for the movant is appropriate. Id. This is an apt summary of Dulin's case. Judgment as a matter of law for the Board was appropriate.
Dulin's argument that his qualifications were clearly superior to those of Sanders was similarly unsupported by the evidence. The bar for showing pretext through superior qualifications is high; differences in qualifications are generally not probative evidence of discrimination unless those disparities are of such weight and significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in question. Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuela SA, 266 F.3d 343, 357 (5th Cir.2001) (internal quotation omitted). Dulin elicited testimony that Sanders was an attorney admitted in Mississippi, practicing in Greenwood, that she had been appointed by the Mississippi governor to serve as a state judge for at least one year, that she had possibly worked with the Rural Service. In addition, the three Board members who testified stated that they were pleased with her performance as Board attorney, especially in comparison to Dulin's, because she was much more attentive and proactive about alerting them to possible legal issues and offering her legal opinion. Dulin failed to present any other evidence of Sanders's qualifications or lack thereof that would enable the jury to determine that the disparities in qualifications are so significant that no impartial person could have selected Sanders to replace Dulin. See id.