Opinion ID: 1386274
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Motion to Exclude Electrophoretic Evidence Relating to Dried Semen Stains

Text: (15a) Prior to trial, defendant moved in limine to exclude evidence linking him to the attack on Marcie D. through the electrophoretic analysis of dried semen stains discovered on her body. He claimed that such evidence was inadmissible under the Kelly-Frye rule. ( People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 [130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240]; Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir.1923) 293 Fed. 1013 [34 A.L.R. 145].) (16a) Under the Kelly-Frye rule as strictly defined, admissibility of expert testimony based upon the application of a new scientific technique depends on a preliminary showing of general acceptance of the new technique in the relevant scientific community. ( People v. Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30, following Frye v. United States, supra, 293 Fed. at p. 1014.) Under the rule as more broadly stated, the admissibility of such evidence also requires (1) testimony as to general acceptance given by a person properly qualified as an expert to give an opinion on the subject ( People v. Kelly, supra, at p. 30, italics deleted), and (2) testimony as to the use of correct scientific procedures ... in the particular case ( ibid. ) given, of course, by a person properly qualified as an expert to give an opinion on that subject. Of course, the party offering the evidence has the burden of proving its admissibility. (E.g., People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 206.) The weight of his burden is by a preponderance of the evidence. That is the general burden of proof [e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.... (Evid. Code, § 115.) No exception appears. (15b) The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. The electrophoretic evidence in question showed that the semen found on Marcie's body could have been deposited by about 1.5 percent of the male Caucasian population, including defendant. The People introduced evidence to satisfy the Kelly-Frye rule both as strictly defined and as more broadly stated, and made argument in support. They called two expert witnesses: Robert E. Garbutt, a criminalist with the Sacramento County District Attorney's Laboratory of Forensic Services; and Brian Wraxall, a forensic serologist with the Serological Research Institute in Emeryville. By contrast, defendant offered no evidence and set forth virtually no argument. The question was litigated in light of our decision in People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440], reversed on other grounds sub nomine California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837], which had been handed down more than three months earlier. In Brown, we concluded that the trial court therein erred by ruling admissible, against a Kelly-Frye objection, certain evidence of the electrophoretic analysis of dried semen stains offered by the People. (40 Cal.3d at pp. 528-535.) Our reason was that the People failed to meet their burden in that particular proceeding as to the general acceptance of such analysis in the relevant scientific community, which we implied was forensic chemistry. ( Ibid. ) After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion. It concluded, in substance, that the Kelly-Frye rule applied to the electrophoretic evidence in question, that the People met their burden, and hence that the evidence was admissible under the rule. Called at trial by the People, Garbutt subsequently testified on the basis of the electrophoretic analysis that the semen found on Marcie's body could have been deposited by about 1.5 percent of the male Caucasian population, including defendant. Defendant now contends that the trial court's ruling was erroneous. (16b) On appeal, a Kelly-Frye ruling is reviewed independently. The reason is this: the core issue of the general acceptance of the new scientific technique in the relevant scientific community is scrutinized under that standard ( People v. Reilly (1987) 196 Cal. App.3d 1127, 1134-1135 [242 Cal. Rptr. 496]). The resolution of each of the other questions underlying the ruling is reviewed under the test appropriate thereto. As relevant here, the determination on the qualifications of an expert is examined for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 39.) This evidently extends to the expert who gives testimony on general acceptance  including the issues of his credentials and impartiality ( People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 530). The determination on the use of correct scientific procedures in the particular case is also examined for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Reilly, supra, at pp. 1154-1155.) (15c) After independent review, we conclude that the trial court's ruling was proper. The People effectively conceded for purposes of defendant's motion that the electrophoretic analysis of dried semen stains was a new scientific technique. They then proceeded to establish all that was required of them by a preponderance of the evidence. They showed the general acceptance of such analysis in the relevant scientific community of forensic chemistry. They offered the expert testimony of Wraxall to prove this point. They also offered the expert testimony of Garbutt to prove the use of correct scientific procedures in this case. Their evidence was sufficient. Defendant challenges the ruling. As will appear, he is unsuccessful. Defendant's attack is directed broadly at the determination of the general acceptance of electrophoretic analysis of dried semen stains in the relevant scientific community of forensic chemistry. But on the record made by the parties, the trial court expressly found such acceptance, and we independently agree. Defendant's attack is directed specifically at Wraxall's qualifications to give an opinion on the subject. He finds fault with the witness's credentials and more fault still with his impartiality. (17) On this record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's implicit determination that Wraxall was sufficiently credentialed. What is required here are academic and professional credentials which equip [the witness] to understand both the scientific principles involved and any differences of view on their reliability. ( People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 530.) The court could reasonably have found such credentials. Wraxall had extensive professional achievements and associations. Evidently, he had not earned all the academic degrees usually held by scientists in the field. But he had in fact done significant scientific work. Indeed, he had published several papers in refereed scientific journals. On this record, we also find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's express determination that Wraxall was impartial. For present purposes, impartiality turns on whether the expert is so personally invested in establishing the technique's acceptance that he might not be objective about disagreements within the relevant scientific community. ( People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 530.) The court could reasonably have resolved the issue in the negative. (18, 19)(See fn. 10.) To be sure, Wraxall had been involved in the development and promotion of electrophoretic analysis since the middle 1960's, both intellectually and financially. But such involvement does not appear fatal to the requisite objectivity. [10]