Opinion ID: 6327334
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Preserving Subsection (1)(e)

Text: ¶26 We see no available limiting construction that would sufficiently narrow the phrase “intended to harass” to render it constitutional. See Hickman, 988 P.2d at 636–43 (supplying a limiting construction for the term “threat” but concluding no limiting construction would sufficiently narrow the phrase “act of harassment” in section 18-8-706, C.R.S. (1998)). Viewed in its entirety, the rest of the harassment statute forecloses this approach by proscribing other forms of unprotected speech, leaving no alternative, constitutional construction to ascribe to the phrase at issue. See Smith, 862 P.2d at 943–44 (“In construing a statute, we presume that every part . . . was intended to be effective.” (quoting Thiret v. Kautzky, 792 P.2d 801, 807 (Colo. 1990))). Subsection (1)(e)’s other terms prohibit true threats and obscenity, and we previously held that subsection (1)(h) outlaws fighting words, see People ex rel. VanMeveren v. Cnty. Ct., 551 P.2d 716, 719 (Colo. 1976). Thus, the term 15 “intended to harass” in subsection (1)(e) impermissibly leaches into areas of protected speech. With no alternative, constitutional construction available, we turn to whether a partial invalidation can save subsection (1)(e). ¶27 “A court may sever one section of a statute from the whole if ‘partial invalidation will rid the statute of the constitutional infirmity of overbreadth.’” Hickman, 988 P.2d at 643 (quoting People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935, 940 (Colo. 1991)). We need not, and thus do not, invalidate the entire statute. Instead, we hold only that the phrase “intended to harass” in subsection (1)(e) is unconstitutionally overbroad. Our partial invalidation does nothing to disturb the other prohibitions in subsection (1)(e) against communications that are made “in a manner intended to . . . threaten bodily injury or property damage . . . or that [are] obscene.”5 § 18-9-111(1)(e). 5Although we identify the challenged phrase, consistent with the district court, as “intended to harass,” the effect of our ruling is to excise only the words “harass or” from subsection (1)(e) as indicated by strikethrough font below: A person commits harassment if, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, he or she . . . [d]irectly or indirectly initiates communication with a person or directs language toward another person, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, telephone network, data network, text message, instant message, computer, computer network, computer system, or other interactive electronic medium in a manner intended to harass or threaten bodily injury or property damage, or makes any comment, request, suggestion, or proposal by 16