Opinion ID: 782740
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Witness Lewis's Prejudicial Statement

Text: 33 During the direct examination of Lewis, the prosecutor questioned him about a conversation he had with Officer Ron Doyle a matter of hours before Zuern killed Pence: 34 Question: What did you tell Officer Doyle? 35 Answer: I told Officer Doyle, Officer Doyle, can we talk, could we rap? I'm telling you, you know, Zuern has a shank or a knife or whatever you want to call it. I said, He is crazy, man, he is in here for murder, and he won't hesitate to do it again. 36 At that point, Petitioner's counsel moved for a mistrial, which the court denied. The court did, however, instruct the jury to disregard Lewis's comment: 37 The Court: Members of the jury, you are admonished at this time that any testimony just offered was a gratuitous remark by the witness, and is excluded from your consideration as any part of the evidence in this matter. 38 The dispute here is not over the propriety of Lewis's comments (which everyone agrees were improper), but rather over the appropriate remedy. When reviewing the trial decision of a federal district court, the standard of review for a decision not to grant a mistrial is abuse of discretion. United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1263 (6th Cir.1991). When conducting habeas review of a trial decision of a state court not touching on a specific provision of the Bill of Rights, the standard of review is even higher: reversal is not warranted unless the comment was potentially so misleading and prejudicial that it deprived [the defendant] of a constitutionally fair trial. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 641-42, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974) (noting that not every trial error or infirmity which might call for application of supervisory powers correspondingly constitutes a `failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice'). Specifically, habeas review of this state decision involves the narrow [review] of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power that [a federal appellate court] would possess in regard to (its) own trial court. Id. 39 Given this standard of review, we turn to the question of whether a mistrial should have been granted. In United States v. Forrest, 17 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 1994), we listed five factors to consider in determining whether a mistrial is warranted after an improper reference: (1) whether the remark was unsolicited, (2) whether the government's line of questioning was reasonable, (3) whether the limiting instruction was immediate, clear, and forceful, (4) whether any bad faith was evidenced by the government, and (5) whether the remark was only a small part of the evidence against the defendant. Id. at 920. 40 In Forrest, the trial judge specifically directed the prosecutor to warn a witness (an ATF agent) not to testify to Forrest's criminal past. Id. Nonetheless, the agent twice referenced the fact that Forrest had been imprisoned for robbery. Id. We found that the agents `blurting' seem[ed] anything but accidental, but that the trial judge had given a clear admonition and the prosecution had offered ample other evidence of guilt. Id. at 921. Although noting that it was a close question we found no abuse of discretion in the district court's failure to grant a mistrial. Id. That case was decided in the stricter supervisory capacity of direct review, not in a habeas corpus petition. 41 In Zuern's case, the first four Forrest factors weigh in favor of the Warden (the remark was unsolicited, the line of questioning reasonable, the limiting instruction immediate and clear, and evidence of bad faith is absent). Forrest involved an improper statement about a robbery conviction in the context of a cocaine distribution trial. Zuern's case involves an improper statement about a prior murder in the context of a murder trial. The prejudice faced by Zuern is greater than that faced by Forrest. Not only is murder a much more heinous crime than robbery, but the inappropriate propensity evidence is of far greater weight (compare a robber is likely to distribute cocaine with a murderer is likely to commit murder). Nevertheless, the failure to grant a mistrial did not constitute a denial of fundamental fairness.