Opinion ID: 1167064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: disney

Text: The commission concluded that petitioner committed wilful misconduct in banishing Prosecutor Susan Disney from his court, thus limiting the district attorney's options in making personnel assignments. The master had reached a similar conclusion. Disney was assigned to the court on being employed as a deputy in the fall of 1978. She criticized petitioner's handling of the Rogers matter that October. They had a strained discussion of the incident but made efforts to get along and by March 1979 had developed a workable relation. In March petitioner was served with the commission's first amended notice of formal proceedings; it charged misconduct in Rogers. (The charge was later rejected by the master and dismissed by the commission.) Petitioner believed Disney was the source of the charge. He told District Attorney Tepper that he felt betrayed and would prefer that Disney not be assigned to his court. In April 1979 Disney was present in Judge Hamilton's court during proceedings in the May case, which had been transferred from petitioner's court. When May expressed dissatisfaction at petitioner's handling of the case Hamilton told May how to communicate with the commission. On April 17 petitioner was served with the commission's second amended notice charging misconduct in May. (That charge also was rejected by the master and dismissed by the commission.) Petitioner assumed Disney had steered May to the commission and again complained to Tepper. On learning that May's source of information was Hamilton, petitioner apologized to Tepper and Disney. Petitioner had no further contact with Disney until July 11, when Tepper assigned her two cases in petitioner's court. Petitioner had no advance notice of the assignment. When she arrived he called her into chambers, criticized her complaining to the commission in Rogers, and told her she was not welcome in his court and was to leave. She asked about her cases; he said they would be handled in normal course. He refused her request to set out in the docket that she was forbidden to appear. In fact the defendants never appeared, and bench warrants were issued. There is no evidence, however, that Disney was informed during the conversation that their nonappearance was the reason the cases would not proceed. Petitioner called Tepper and tried to arrange a discussion of differences. Tepper testified, however, that petitioner's condition for resolution was that he expected some apologies and that he expected that she wouldn't be involved in communicating incidents to third parties about the operation of his court. Tepper also stated he told petitioner that to have one of two deputies barred from petitioner's court did create some problems for us. At the time of the hearings before the master Disney had not returned to petitioner's court. Petitioner argues that he properly disclosed his bias to enable Tepper to protect the People's right to an impartial judge. But what effect the disclosure might have on assignment of deputy district attorneys was for Tepper, not petitioner, to decide. Petitioner also contends his conduct was equivalent to recusing himself for possible prejudice. Recusal, though, would require assigning cases to another judge; petitioner retained the cases and barred a particular prosecutor from his court. (17) Petitioner's apparent purpose in excluding Disney was to prevent her reporting his conduct to the commission. He claims his principal concern was that she did not consult him before reporting. Consultation was not required; its absence did not justify the ban from his court, which we conclude was wilful misconduct. Petitioner contends he was denied due process because the misconduct found by the commission varied materially from that charged. The commission concluded: The effect of preventing Disney from performing her official duties, banishing her from his court, limited the District Attorney's options in making personnel assignments and thus did obstruct a public officer from performing official duties to that extent. This constituted wilful misconduct in office. That conclusion was based on this allegation in the third amended notice: You have willfully and unlawfully resisted, delayed and obstructed a public officer in the discharge or attempt to discharge the duties of his office in that on or about July 11, 1979, you refused, for improper personal reasons, to allow Susan Disney, a duly appointed deputy District Attorney of El Dorado County, to appear in the Justice Court, El Dorado Judicial District, on matters duly and lawfully assigned to her. Petitioner argues that the charge (1) was not sustained because Disney's appearance on July 11 was thwarted not by his excluding her but by defendants' nonappearance, and (2) omitted the commission's conclusion that the effect of the exclusion was to limit the district attorney's personnel assignment options. The notice may be reasonably understood to charge obstruction of the district attorney by not permitting his deputy to appear. Even if understood to refer only to obstruction of Disney, the allegation of interfering with her attempt to discharge official duties was proved. Further, there was interference with her actual performance of duty to ascertain and report back why the cases assigned to her did not proceed. Petitioner argues that if he had known the commission's proposed conclusion he could have elicited evidence on the extent to which his conduct limited Tepper's options in making personnel assignments. Proof of a lesser administrative burden would not have excused petitioner's acts. He was not denied due process.