Opinion ID: 1441398
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testimony of Third Examiner

Text: [¶ 24] The Appellant also contends that the District Court exceeded its authority under 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3864(4)(A) (Supp.1998) [5] in allowing the testimony of a third examiner at the hearing. The court explained that it admitted the testimony of the third examiner because it found nothing in section 3864(4)(A) that limits the number of examiners to two. [¶ 25] We review a trial court's interpretation of a statute for errors of law. See Koch Refining Co. v. State Tax Assessor, 1999 ME 35, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1251, 1252; Estate of Jacobs, 1998 ME 233, ¶ 4, 719 A.2d 523, 524. We first examine the plain meaning of the statute to give effect to the legislative intent. See Koch Refining Co., 1999 ME 35, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d at 1252; Estate of Whittier, 681 A.2d 1, 2 (Me.1996). We `consider the whole statutory scheme for which the section at issue forms a part so that a harmonious result presumably the intent of the Legislature, may be achieved.' Estate of Jacobs, 1998 ME 233, ¶ 4, 719 A.2d at 524 (quoting Davis v. Scott Paper Co., 507 A.2d 581, 583 (Me.1986)). [¶ 26] The Legislature could have used the word only, if it had intended to limit the number of examiners to two. Section 3864(4)(A), however, merely directs that the court cause the person to be examined by 2 examiners. 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3864(4)(A). The authority given to the court in section 3864(5)(C)(2) [6] to admit any testimony as long as it is relevant further supports interpreting section 3864(4)(A) to permit admitting the testimony of a third examiner. 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3864(5)(C)(2) (1988). [¶ 27] Thus, it was not error for the court to admit the testimony of the third examiner. We do not need to address the other evidentiary issues in the present context of this case. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.