Opinion ID: 1122718
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: motions to amend

Text: We agree with the superior court that the Shooshanians' motion to add Thermal Efficiency as a party defendant was properly denied. Alaska Civil Rule 15(a) requires that a party, who wishes to amend his complaint after a responsive pleading has been filed, seek leave of the court. The trial court has broad discretion to decide whether to grant leave to amend, Wright v. Vickaryous, 598 P.2d 490, 495 (Alaska 1979), and the supreme court will interfere with the exercise of that discretion only when it has been abused. Merrill v. Faltin, 430 P.2d 913, 915 (Alaska 1967). The Shooshanians had an opportunity to join Thermal Efficiency in May 1981 when they submitted their first amended complaint. Thermal Efficiency argues that, in fact, the Shooshanians had the opportunity to amend their complaint at any time from March 1979, when Thermal Efficiency answered Borden's third-party complaint, to January 6, 1982, the final date set by the trial court for any motions to amend the pleadings to be filed. During this period of approximately thirty-two months, the Shooshanians did not take any action to discover whether they had a claim against Thermal Efficiency. Thermal Efficiency argues that, because of the Shooshanians' undue delay in moving to amend, joinder at such an advanced point in the proceedings would be prejudicial to them. The Shooshanians do not reply to these contentions. If a party would be prejudiced by a proposed amendment, the court must apply a balancing test to decide whether the amendment should be granted, weighing the degree of prejudice to the opposing party against the hardship to the movant if the amendment is denied. Wright v. Vickaryous, 598 P.2d at 495 n. 13; Merrill v. Faltin, 430 P.2d at 915. Among the factors to be considered in evaluating prejudice to the opposing party are the added expense if the motion is granted and whether trial will be significantly more burdensome or lengthy. Estate of Thompson v. Mercedes-Benz, Inc., 514 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Alaska 1973). It is a long established maxim of equity jurisprudence that parties may not sleep upon their rights. See, e.g., Baxter v. Redevco, Inc., 279 Or. 117, 566 P.2d 501, 503 (1977); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976). The Shooshanians had ample opportunity to join Thermal Efficiency as a defendant yet did not attempt to do so until their complaint against Borden was dismissed. Although it had notice of the subject matter of the suit against Borden, Thermal Efficiency had prepared to defend as a third party and not as a principal defendant. Prior to trial, Thermal Efficiency settled its differences with Borden and thus did not intend to litigate the case. To allow joinder at this point would require additional delays and substantial expense on the part of Thermal Efficiency. This outweighs the hardship imposed on the Shooshanians by denying their dilatory motion. We find, therefore, that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant the Shooshanians leave to amend their complaint.
We further find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Shooshanians' motion to supplement their dismissed complaint with additional allegations of personal injury. Borden and Thermal Efficiency maintain that the Shooshanians' attorney abandoned their personal injury claim in the course of opposing Borden's motion for production of income tax documents. The Shooshanians' memorandum in opposition stated that [t]hese returns are not relevant to the case before the court, and in no way could lead to any relevant evidence. Plaintiffs' claim is not based upon wage loss or personal injury. The Shooshanians do not respond to Borden's and Thermal Efficiency's argument, but instead maintain that their supplemental complaint alleges new injuries arising since the original complaint. In deciding this matter, we turn to Civil Rule 15(d), which expressly permits supplementing a complaint even though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief... . [1] Thus, the failure of the Shooshanians to include personal injury claims in their original pleadings does not necessarily bar their inclusion now because Rule 15(d) specifically permits omissions in prior pleadings to be cured in this fashion. See 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1505, at 544-546 (1971). [2] Unless the trial court has abused its discretion, its decision on a Rule 15(d) motion will not be disturbed. See Mobile Mechanical Contractors v. Carlough, 566 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir.1977); Reid v. International Union of United Auto, Aerospace & Agricultural Workers, 479 F.2d 517, 520-21 (10th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076, 94 S.Ct. 592, 38 L.Ed.2d 483 (1973). 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1504, at 543 (1971). We must therefore decide whether the superior court abused its discretion in refusing to permit the Shooshanians to supplement their complaint. Although Rule 15(d) is to be interpreted liberally, see, e.g., Bell v. United States, 71 F.R.D. 349, 353 (D.N.H. 1976); 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1504, at 542 (1971); Garrison v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 20 F.R.D. 190, 191 (W.D.Pa. 1957), the deciding factors in determining whether supplementation should be allowed are whether it will promote the economic and speedy disposition of the entire controversy between the parties, will not cause undue delay or trial inconvenience, and will not prejudice the rights of any of the other parties to the action. Lerman v. Chuckleberry Pub., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See generally Rowe v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 421 F.2d 937, 942-44 (4th Cir.1970); 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1504, at 542-43 (1971). The record in this case supports the court's decision to deny the Shooshanians' motion by showing that the Shooshanians were guilty of undue delay or laches. See Parker v. Broadcast Music, 30 F.R.D. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Garrison v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 20 F.R.D. 190 (W.D.Pa. 1957). [3] Specifically, the Shooshanians waited until two days after Judge Moore entered the order of dismissal to file their Rule 15(d) motion. They did not allege that they were unaware until then of information regarding their personal injuries. The course of discovery would have differed significantly had that issue been presented earlier. As it was, the Shooshanians did not schedule any physicians as trial witnesses, nor had any physical examinations been conducted. In short, the Shooshanians have failed to state one valid reason why they had no prior knowledge of their personal injuries, which were allegedly suffered as a result of the installation of the urea formaldehyde. Had the allegation of personal injury been put forward at an earlier time, Borden would have been allowed to prepare a defense in response. We believe that the superior court's denial of the motion was necessary to avoid undue prejudice toward Borden. Our liberal policy toward amending complaints and supplementing pleadings does not require the absence of all restraint. Were that the case, leave of court would not be required by Civil Rule 15(d). We conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Shooshanians' motion to supplement their complaint.