Opinion ID: 1864317
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: criminal mischief: the substantive offense

Text: Regarding the criminal charge against Pierce, the offense of criminal mischief is statutorily defined in § 28-519(1): A person commits criminal mischief if he or she: (a) Damages property of another intentionally or recklessly. The statutory characterization or definition of criminal mischief is self-subsistent or self-contained, that is, the statute proscribing criminal mischief specifies all the essential parts or constituents of the crime, which is committed if the actor intentionally or recklessly damages the property of another. Pecuniary loss, mentioned in § 28-519(2), (3), and (4), is not an element of the criminal offense designated as criminal mischief. Rather, pecuniary loss determines the grade of the offense and relates to the punishment which may be imposed on conviction for the offense of criminal mischief, an aspect of Pierce's case which will be discussed later in this opinion. Intent is the state of the actor's mind when the actor's conduct occurs. State v. Craig, 219 Neb. 70, 361 N.W.2d 206 (1985).  Intentionally means willfully or purposely, and not accidentally or involuntarily. State v. Schott, 222 Neb. 456, 462, 384 N.W.2d 620, 624 (1986). The intent involved in conduct is a mental process and may be inferred from the conduct itself, the actor's language in reference to the conduct, and the circumstances surrounding an incident. State v. Schott, supra . When an element of a crime involves existence of a defendant's mental process or other state of mind of an accused, such elements involve a question of fact and may be proved by circumstantial evidence. State v. Hoffman, 227 Neb. 131, 140, 416 N.W.2d 231, 237 (1987). The fact of the dented fender and bent bumper on Lynch's pickup certainly establishes that Pierce caused damage to Lynch's property in the collision between the vehicles. Whether Pierce intentionally caused the damage to Lynch's pickup was a question for the jury in view of Pierce's apparent animosity toward Lynch and the circumstances of the collision, including Pierce's yelling obscenities at Lynch and circumstances surrounding the vehicular impact. The State presented evidence with probative value to sustain a finding of Pierce's guilt of criminal mischief. We conclude that the evidence against Pierce and the evidentiary inferences for the State warranted submission of the case to the jury. The district court correctly overruled Pierce's request for a directed verdict of acquittal.