Opinion ID: 1788669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: directed verdict on burglary charge

Text: Robey contends that he was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of burglary in the first degree because he had permission to be inside the apartment. The evidence presented at trial was that the victim gave Robey permission to come inside her apartment to sleep on the couch. Robey declined and said he would probably spend the night with a friend. However, the victim placed a pillow and blanket on the couch for Robey. She left the door to her apartment unlocked so he could let himself in should he decide to spend the night there. She testified that Robey, whom she identified by his voice, entered but made no effort to sleep on the couch. Instead, he entered her bedroom and forcibly raped her. Robey testified he had permission to enter her apartment and that the sex was consensual. The trial court, noting the official commentary to KRS 511.020 which provides that any person who enters property under privilege may still commit an offense of burglary if he remains on that property beyond the termination of his privilege, refused to grant Robey a directed verdict on the burglary charge. The issue presented is whether Robey can be convicted of burglary in the first degree, in addition to the substantive crime for which he is being charged (rape), when he lawfully enters the victim's premises to commit a crime against the victim (rape). The elements of first-degree burglary as set out in KRS 511.020(1) are as follows: A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when, with the intent to commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building, . . . . KRS 511.090(1) states: A person enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises when he is not privileged or licensed to do so. Although the burglary statute indicates that a person who enters property under privilege may still commit the offense of burglary if he remains on the property beyond that privilege, the fact remains that a crime against property is an essential element of burglary. In Tribbett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 561 S.W.2d 662, 664 (1978), the defendant was lawfully admitted to the premises and was involved in the death of the invitee. He subsequently remained on the premises to make off with the invitee's possessions. We held that inasmuch as the defendant was a mere licensee, that upon the death of the licensor, the license ceased, and the privilege to be upon the premises ceased. Therefore, when he remained to make off with the licensor's possessions, he remained unlawfully within the meaning of the burglary statute. Commentary to KRS 511.020. However, the essential element necessary for the burglary offense was not met at the death of the licensor. It was the failure to leave and the subsequent offense against the property that triggered the gravamen of the offense. In Hedges v. Commonwealth, Ky., 937 S.W.2d 703 (1996), the defendant was under a domestic violence protective order, secured by his estranged wife, forbidding him from disposing or damaging their property. After she permitted him to enter their apartment, he saw a man diving out the window, and proceeded to destroy their property. The wife was not injured. The defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree. We reversed and ruled that the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on the burglary charge. We held that misconduct by one rightfully on the premises should not convert that conduct into burglary, and that the mere violation of a DVO without intent to commit an independent crime, was impermissible to support a finding of burglary. We further stated that even if the defendant did enter the apartment with the intent to commit a crime, the burglary statute further requires that the defendant either knowingly entered or unlawfully remained in the apartment, and that he then committed an independent crime satisfying the elements of the burglary offense, after his permission to be on the property had been withdrawn. Since no evidence was cited to show that the defendant knew his permission to be in the apartment had been withdrawn at the time he destroyed the property, he was entitled to a directed verdict. In the present case, the evidence introduced indicated that Robey entered the apartment with permission and thereafter entered the victim's bedroom and raped her. There was no evidence to indicate that his privilege to be in the apartment had been withdrawn prior to the time he committed the independent criminal act. Unlike the facts in Tribbett , Robey immediately left the premises and removed no property belonging to the victim. We must therefore conclude that the elements required to constitute the offense of burglary in the first degree were not met. Robey's motion for a directed verdict on the burglary charge should have been sustained as it would have been unreasonable for the jury to find him guilty under the facts presented. This Court in Hedges, supra , restated the standard set forth in Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky. 816 S.W.2d 186 (1991), for a directed verdict in criminal cases: [I]f under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then is the defendant entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.