Opinion ID: 6496578
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Deciding the Motion without a Hearing

Text: [¶21] Motions are governed in part by Rule 6(c)(4) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, which states in relevant part: “A request for hearing may be served by the moving party or any party affected by the motion within 20 days after service of the motion. The court may, in its discretion, determine such motions without a hearing.” This rule expressly gives the district court the discretion to decide a motion without a hearing. See In re U.S. Currency Totaling $7,209.00, 2012 WY 75, ¶ 19, 278 P.3d 234, 239 (Wyo. 2012). “A district court enjoys considerable latitude in determining the procedural scheme it will follow in reaching its determinations, and we will not reverse such procedural decisions absent an abuse of discretion.” Simek v. Tate, 2010 WY 65, ¶ 12, 231 P.3d 891, 7 896 (Wyo. 2010) (citing Meyer v. Hatto, 2008 WY 153, ¶ 11, 198 P.3d 552, 555 (Wyo. 2008)). “Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.” Sears v. Sears, 2021 WY 20, ¶ 13, 479 P.3d 767, 772 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Johnson v. Clifford, 2018 WY 59, ¶ 8, 418 P.3d 819, 822 (Wyo. 2018)). When deciding if the district court abused its discretion, the ultimate issue is whether it “could reasonably conclude as it did.” Id. [¶22] Rule 7(b)(1)(B) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure requires motions to “state with particularity the grounds for seeking the order.” We have previously recognized a complaint should show the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Tuttle v. Lee, 2018 WY 104, ¶ 8, 425 P.3d 998, 1000 (Wyo. 2018) (stating a motion to dismiss will be sustained when the complaint shows on its face the plaintiff is not entitled to relief); see also Harris v. Grizzle, 599 P.2d 580, 583 (Wyo. 1979) (citing Watts v. Holmes, 386 P.2d 718, 719 (Wyo. 1963)). The same holds true for motions: Courts cannot grant a hearing in every motion filed, since those of a frivolous nature would impede the progress of those which are meritorious; thus, where the motion is clearly without substance and only another attempt to burden the court with frivolous contentions, a hearing is unnecessary and the motion should be denied. In addition, a court need conduct a hearing only when the allegations and moving papers are sufficiently definite, specific, nonconjectural, and detailed enough to conclude that a substantial claim is presented and that there are disputed issues of material fact which will affect the outcome of the motion. 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading § 337 (Feb. 2022) (footnotes omitted). If a motion does not show the movant is entitled to relief, a district court acts within its discretion by denying the motion without a hearing. See generally Schneider v. State, 2022 WY 31, ¶ 16, 505 P.3d 591, 595 (Wyo. 2022) (finding a court must hold a hearing on an application to remove an ignition interlock device if an applicant makes a prima facie showing of good cause); 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 458 (“The applicant is entitled to a hearing . . . if the material submitted by the applicant contains allegations of operative facts demonstrating that relief is warranted, and the facts sufficient to support granting relief are challenged by the opposing party.”) (footnote omitted). We will therefore evaluate whether Husband’s 8 motion7 made a prima facie showing8 that he was entitled to relief, requiring the district court to hold a hearing to receive additional evidence.
[¶23] We will initially address Husband’s argument the MSA is void due to mutual mistake. If we determine a mutual mistake exists, we may reform or cancel a contract. Hansen v. Little Bear Inn Co., 9 P.3d 960, 964 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Mathis v. Wendling, 962 P.2d 160, 164 (Wyo. 1998)). Husband asserts the parties were mutually mistaken about whether their adult children would consent to the transfer of the Paris apartment. In the alternative, he argues the parties were mutually mistaken in their belief “the Paris apartment could be divided and transferred to [Husband] as his sole and separate property.” He contends the district court should have considered additional evidence before it enforced the MSA “by its terms alone.” [¶24] While parol evidence is usually inadmissible when a contract is unambiguous, we make exceptions in the case of mutual mistake.9 Mathis v. Wendling, 962 P.2d 160, 164 (Wyo. 1998). “A contract is voidable on grounds of mutual mistake when both parties independently make a mistake at the time the contract is made as to a basic assumption of the contract, unless the party seeking avoidance bears the risk of the mistake.” Kendrick v. Barker, 2001 WY 2, ¶ 19, 15 P.3d 734, 740 (Wyo. 2001) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152 (1981)). The mistake, however, must have been a mutual one. There must have been a meeting of the minds and a contract actually entered into, but, by reason of the mistake, the instrument as written does not express what was really intended by the 7 Husband attached several documents to his motion. These attachments consisted primarily of emails and other documents containing hearsay that would not be admissible evidence under the Wyoming Rules of Evidence. See Heimer v. Heimer, 2021 WY 97, ¶¶ 21–25, 494 P.3d 472, 479–80 (Wyo. 2021). Although Husband verified his pleading and swore the statements in his motion were true and correct to the best of his knowledge, this does not transform the hearsay statements in these documents into admissible evidence. Husband could have attached affidavits from the adult children or other witnesses to his motion, but he did not. Wife’s motion and response to Husband’s motion suffer from the same deficiency. We will therefore only consider the sworn statements in the motions, and we will not consider the hearsay statements contained in the attachments. 8 “Prima facie means ‘[s]uch evidence as is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.’” Schneider v. State, 2022 WY 31, ¶ 15 n. 2, 505 P.3d at 595 n. 2 (Wyo. 2022) (quoting Wyo. Bd of Land Comm’rs v. Antelope Coal Co., 2008 WY 60, ¶ 12, 185 P.3d 666, 669 (Wyo. 2008)). 9 While the district court incorrectly concluded it could not consider parol evidence when determining the motions to enforce or vacate the MSA, [R. Vol. 3 at 677] we are free to affirm a district court’s ruling on any basis appearing in the record. Prancing Antelope I, LLC v. Saratoga Inn Overlook Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 2021 WY 3, ¶ 41, 478 P.3d 1171, 1182 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Black Diamond Energy of Delaware, Inc. v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Comm’n, 2020 WY 45, ¶ 45, 460 P.3d 740, 753 (Wyo. 2020)). 9 parties. Both the mistake and its mutuality must be established by evidence that is clear and satisfactory. Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625, 641 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting Russel v. Curran, 206 P.2d 1159, 1166–67 (Wyo. 1949). The party claiming the mistake must also establish by clear and convincing evidence the mistake did not result from his own negligence. Hansen, 9 P.3d at 964 (quoting Patel v. Harless, 926 P.2d 963, 966 (Wyo. 1996)). [¶25] Mistake means “a belief that is not in accord with the facts.” Hansen, 9 P.3d at 964 (quoting Section 151 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981)). The word “mistake” is not used “to refer to an improvident act, including the making of a contract, that is the result of such an erroneous belief.” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 151 cmt. a (1981)). Furthermore, the erroneous belief must “relate to the facts as they exist at the time of the making of the contract,” and a “party’s prediction or judgment as to events to occur in the future, even if erroneous,” does not constitute a “mistake.” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 151 cmt. a). [¶26] We discussed the definition of “mistake” in Hansen. In that case, Mr. Hansen and Mr. Boling purchased stock in the Little Bear Inn. 9 P.3d at 962. They subsequently agreed Mr. Boling would purchase Mr. Hansen’s stock. Id. As part of their agreement, Mr. Boling was required to secure his purchase obligation by obtaining a life insurance policy with a premium of less than $150.00. Id. at 962–63. However, after the contract was signed, Mr. Boling learned he was uninsurable at any price. Id. at 963. Mr. Hansen then sought recission of the contract on the grounds of mutual mistake. Id. The district court found Mr. Hansen failed to carry his burden of showing mutual mistake. Id. We agreed and found although neither party believed Mr. Boling would be uninsurable before entering into the contract, “the failure to adequately predict this result [was] not a mistake of the parties, but merely poor prognostication.” Id. at 965. [¶27] Applying this precedent to the facts of this case, Husband cannot use a claimed mistake about the children’s future consent to the transfer or sale of the Paris apartment to invalidate the MSA. Even if the parties were mutually mistaken about whether the children would consent to the transfer or sale of the Paris apartment, this was an erroneous prediction about a future event. It is not the type of mistake that would allow the district court to invalidate the MSA under the doctrine of mutual mistake. [¶28] A party cannot assert the doctrine of mutual mistake if he “bears the risk of the mistake.” Kendrick, ¶ 19, 15 P.3d at 740 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152 (1981)). A party bears the risk of the mistake when “he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient.” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154(b) (1981)). In such a situation, there has been no mistake, but instead 10 “conscious ignorance of the future.” Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154, cmt. c (1981)). [¶29] This rule applies to a party’s knowledge about the ownership of a piece of real property. Anderson v. Sanchez, 373 P.3d 860 (Nev. 2016). In Anderson, the parties had signed a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) which awarded a piece of property to the husband in exchange for a cash payment to the wife. Id. at 862. After signing the MOU, the husband attempted to withdraw from the agreement because his sister had an interest in the property based on an oral contract that had been entered into several years earlier. Id. The district court denied husband’s motion to set aside the MOU and entered a divorce decree that incorporated the terms of the MOU. Id. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed, finding the husband bore the risk of the mistake. Id. at 863. It found: If [husband] did not have sufficient knowledge of the legal consequences of any oral agreement with [his sister], he was aware of the facts underlying his claim that the Wilson property was the subject of an equitable trust and therefore not appropriate for distribution under the MOU, and he could have pursued the issue further rather than agreeing to settlement. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154(c) (indicating that the court may allocate the risk of mistake to a party when it is reasonable under the circumstances); cf. Janusz v. Gilliam, 404 Md. 524, 947 A.2d 560, 567 (2008) (holding that a mutual mistake of law was not grounds to rescind a property settlement agreement particularly where both parties were represented by counsel during the negotiations and were on equal footing to know or learn of the relevant law). Thus, [husband] bore the risk of mistake when he entered into the MOU despite being aware of his limited knowledge. Id. [¶30] Consistent with the holding in Anderson, Husband cannot assert there was a mutual mistake about the transferability of the Paris apartment. Husband was keenly aware the Paris apartment was owned by the SCI. He unilaterally placed the ownership of the apartment into the SCI, even though it was purchased with joint funds. Before and during the mediation, Husband had the opportunity to confer with his French attorney about the transferability of the apartment under French law. He likewise had the opportunity to confer with the parties’ children about whether they would consent to such a transfer. Husband treated his limited knowledge about the transferability of the Paris apartment and the children’s consent as sufficient and signed the MSA. Husband bore the risk of any mistake about the transferability of this asset and has not shown the mistake did not result from his own negligence. We conclude Husband’s motion did not make a prima facie 11 showing he was entitled to invoke the doctrine of mutual mistake to invalidate the MSA.
[¶31] In Wyoming, we recognize fraud will vitiate a contract. Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1089 (Wyo. 1999). Husband alleged Wife committed fraud when she “affirmatively represented to [him] (through the mediator) that the adult children, who are the owners of the SCI which owns the Paris apartment, would consent to the transfer.” He asserted “[t]he issue of consent was misrepresented by [Wife], and thus was fraudulent.” He also claimed he reasonably relied on Wife’s “misrepresentation” when he signed the MSA. [¶32] In a pleading or a motion, fraud must be alleged with “particularity.” See W.R.C.P. 7(b)(1)(B); W.R.C.P. 9(b); Mantle v. North Star Energy & Constr. LLC, 2019 WY 29, ¶ 81, 437 P.3d 758, 786–87 (Wyo. 2019); Bender v. Phillips, 8 P.3d 1074, 1078 (Wyo. 2000); Girard Trust Bank v. Martin, 557 F.2d 386, 389–90 (3d Cir. 1977). To prevail on a fraud claim, a party must prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the defendant made a false representation intended to induce the plaintiff to act; (2) the plaintiff reasonably believed the representation was true; and (3) the plaintiff relied on the false representation and suffered damages as a result. Action Snowmobile & RV, Inc. v. Most Wanted Performance, LLC, 2018 WY 89, ¶ 9, 423 P.3d 317, 321 (Wyo. 2018). In addition, the party claiming fraud “must show that the misrepresentation was made intentionally, with knowledge of its falsity, or that the maker of the misrepresentation was at least aware that he did not have a basis for making the statement.” Excel Const., Inc. v. HMK Eng’g, Inc., 2010 WY 34, ¶ 33, 228 P.3d 40, 48–49 (citing Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 2003 Wy 102, ¶ 42, 75 P.3d 640, 656 (Wyo. 2003); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 526 (1977)). Fraud is never presumed. Mantle, 2019 WY 29, ¶ 81, 437 P.3d at 787 (citing Bitker v. First Nat’l Bank in Evanston, 2004 WY 114, ¶ 12, 98 P.3d 853, 856 (Wyo. 2004)). [¶33] In this case, Husband alleged Wife’s statement about the children’s consent was a fraudulent misrepresentation. However, he never actually alleged Wife’s statement was false at the time it was made, or she did not have a basis for making the statement. Instead, he alleged he learned sometime after the mediation the children would not consent to the transfer. Because Husband failed to allege the essential elements of fraud, his motion did not make a prima facie showing he was entitled to relief on that ground.
[¶34] In the proceedings below, Husband asserted the MSA was impossible to perform, and thereby asserted the doctrine of impracticability rendered the MSA void. A party to a contract may invoke the rule of impracticability to excuse his performance “when supervening circumstances render performance of one of the conditions of the contract 12 impracticable.” Star Valley Ranch Ass’n v. Daley, 2014 WY 116, ¶ 26, 334 P.3d 1207, 1213 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting Mortenson v. Scheer, 957 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Wyo. 1998)). Where, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary. Mortenson, 957 P.2d at 1306 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 261 (1979)). We have said “[i]mpracticability of performance is a strict standard that can only be invoked when the circumstances truly dictate the impracticability.” Mortenson, 957 P.2d at 1306 (citing Barrett v. Ballard, 662 P.2d 180, 184 (Mont. 1980)). The doctrine cannot be invoked “when, under the contract, one party assumes the risk that fulfillment of a condition precedent will be prevented. The obligor is expected to provide in the contract for contingencies that are foreseeable.” Mortenson, 957 P.2d at 1306 (internal citations omitted). [¶35] Husband knew about the ownership structure of the Paris apartment, and he had the opportunity to consult with French counsel about the feasibility of transferring the apartment from the SCI to himself. The words “sole and separate property” do not appear in the MSA. Rather the document merely states Husband “shall receive” the Paris apartment. We “will not write terms into a contract under the guise of contract interpretation.” Schell v. Scallon, 2019 WY 11, 433 P.3d 879, 885 (Wyo. 2019) (citing Gumpel v. Copperleaf Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 2017 WY 46, ¶ 42, 393 P.3d 1279, 1293– 94 (Wyo. 2017). [¶36] The district court found the MSA did not indicate or even suggest the performance of the agreement is contingent on any other event. There is nothing in the MSA to suggest the children’s consent was a basic assumption on which the contract was made. The parties could have made the children’s consent a prerequisite for their performance, but they did not. Therefore, Husband’s motion failed to make a prima facia showing he was entitled to relief under the doctrine of impracticability. It is not impossible or impracticable for Husband to “receive” the Paris apartment, even without the children’s consent. By signing the MSA, Wife disclaimed any interest she might have in the apartment. Husband will “receive” the Paris apartment, subject to the ownership structure he chose to create. The MSA can be performed as written, and Husband cannot use the doctrine of impossibility to void the agreement. [¶37] Husband’s motion failed to make a prima facie showing he was entitled to relief on the grounds of mutual mistake, fraud, impracticability, or impossibility. The district court 13 did not abuse its discretion when it denied Husband’s motion to vacate the MSA without a hearing.