Opinion ID: 445224
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissions and Administrative Practice of the EPA

Text: 41 Our unwillingness to wrest a standardless and openended revocation authority from a silent statute is strengthened by examination of EPA's own commitment to revocation authority--a commitment that has been qualified and tepid at best. 42
43 In its brief and at oral argument, EPA conceded that a correct initial waiver could not be revoked and that any subsequent action against the fuel or fuel additive must perforce be taken in a proceeding under section 211(c). 66 By correct, EPA apparently means that the initial waiver must have been warranted by the record compiled at the time the waiver was granted; only if the original waiver decision was fundamentally wrong because the record, upon re-examination, actually did not support the necessary showings may the waiver be revoked. 67 44 Because there is no issue now before us as to the original administrative record justifying the Petrocoal waiver, however, revocation is unwarranted on the agency's own view of the statute. In its notice of proposed revocation, EPA advanced three reasons for reconsidering the Petrocoal waiver. Two of the reasons appear to be make-weights by EPA's own admission; the third is based on new evidence and reflects no deficiency in the agency's original determination. Since this last reason seemingly prompted the Administrator's second thoughts about Petrocoal, we consider it first. 45 The chronology of events, 68 EPA's notice soliciting comments on whether to reconsider the Petrocoal waiver, 69 and the agency's notice of proposed revocation, 70 all show that EPA's principal concern is that cars using Petrocoal will exceed the limits imposed on evaporative emissions of hydrocarbons. Whatever the validity of this concern, it in no way impugns the validity of the original waiver--the Administrator's concern is based, as he put it, on new data. 71 As he stated in his Federal Register notice proposing revocation: Based on information submitted in response to the May 2, 1983 Federal Register notice, and other information provided to the Agency since the grant of Petrocoal waiver, the Agency is today proposing to revoke that waiver. 72 The Administrator's answer to American Methyl's argument that expiration of the sixty-day period for judicial review precludes reconsideration, leaves no issue before us as to the adequacy of the original waiver. In a footnote, the Administrator pointed out that the sixty-day time limit was inapplicable because the information on evaporative emissions became available after the period had expired:Moreover, regardless of the merits of American Methyl's argument with respect to MVMA's original petition for reconsideration, the petition as supplemented and the comments in response to the May 2, 1983 Federal Register notice clearly present new information not available to the Agency during the comment period.... 73 46 EPA's primary reason for revoking American Methyl's waiver does not relate to a defect in the original grant; thus, under EPA's own interpretation of its powers, a revocation proceeding is not warranted in this case. 74 47 EPA's remaining two reasons for reconsidering the Petrocoal waiver, although they relate to the original waiver grant, are red herrings. In six trim paragraphs of his eight-page, triple-columned, single-spaced notice of proposed revocation, the Administrator now finds that he had no basis for approving the particular alcohol blend used in Petrocoal when he approved the waiver in 1981. 75 Intervenors Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association raised precisely this contention in their petition for administrative reconsideration filed on 4 December 1981, 76 yet EPA took no action until presented with new data on evaporative emissions a year-and-a-half later. Tellingly, if the Administrator was concerned about the high alcohol content of Petrocoal, one would hardly expect him to dismiss out of hand American Methyl's offer to reduce the percentage of alcohol. 77 48 In the pages of the Federal Register the Administrator also professes concern over whether some test samples of Petrocoal contained the metallic additive CV-100. 78 The presence of the additive in test samples but not in the fuel actually marketed could mean that Petrocoal at the pump fails to perform like the Petrocoal submitted for testing and approved by EPA. Yet in a letter denying American Methyl a hearing on this question, the agency declared that the issue itself is not significant enough to warrant imposition of full trial-type hearing procedures and adopted the analysis in American Methyl's memorandum of April 27, which recognized that the presence of CV-100 is at best an ancillary matter, unlikely to influence EPA's final decision. 79 49 Because the Administrator points to no defects in his original approval of the Petrocoal waiver, he may not--according to his own interpretation of section 211(f)--reopen that waiver. He may proceed to regulate Petrocoal, if he thinks it necessary, under the powers conferred upon him by section 211(c). 50
51 Independent of EPA's admissions before this court, the agency's prelitigation administrative practice belies its professed belief in an implied revocation authority. In seven years of administering section 211(f), American Methyl is the first manufacturer subjected to a revocation proceeding. 80 In a prior case, when assertion of such authority would have been appropriate, the Administrator made no mention of it and instead relied on his power under section 211(c), a course of conduct exemplifying the understanding of section 211 we adopt today. 52 A brief recitation of a proceeding involving the Sun Petroleum Products Company exposes the novelty of EPA's construction of section 211. The Administrator conditioned the grant of Sun Petroleum's waiver on disclosure of a proprietary additive's chemical composition; he reserved the right to revoke the waiver if, after receiving a petition for reconsideration, he determines that based on new data and information not available prior to the public disclosure of the proprietary additive's chemical composition, the applicant is not entitled to the waiver. 81 53 General Motors subsequently filed a petition for reconsideration in the Sun Petroleum proceeding. Because the initial waiver provided for reconsideration, the Administrator applied the same standard of review that he applied to Sun Petroleum's initial application. 82 The Administrator denied General Motor's petition and thereby removed the revocation contingency in Sun Petroleum's waiver. Revealingly, in describing his remaining authority under the Clean Air Act, the Administrator said: 54 This [waiver] does not preclude GM or others from continuing to research this question and developing sufficient date [sic] to support a future rulemaking in this area. I retain the authority under Section 211(c) of the Act to control or prohibit this blend or other alcohol/gasoline blends if new data are presented to warrant such action. 83 55 Taking EPA's past administrative practice as implementing the proper reading of section 211, the agency is without authority to revoke a noncontingent waiver, based on new evidence, nearly two-and-one-half years after its initial approval. 84 Combined with Congress's understanding of section 211 and the consistency of that understanding with the statutory design, the Sun Petroleum precedent constitutes a tacit admission that section 211(f) does not impliedly authorize the reconsideration of waivers in these circumstances. 85