Opinion ID: 217719
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preclusion Under the CAA

Text: Sierra Club first argues that the statutory language of the CAA establishes the only way in which a citizen suit may be precluded by a state action, and that those circumstances were not present here. Aplt. Br. at 31-32. Under the CAA, a citizen suit may not be commenced if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of the United States or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but in any such action in a court of the United States any person may intervene as a matter of right. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B). Sierra Club's argument that the CAA's statutory language embodies Congress's intent to displace the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, and the common law doctrines of issue and claim preclusion is not persuasive. Numerous courts have applied § 1738 and the common law preclusion doctrines to citizen suits under the CAA or Clean Water Act (CWA) where, at the time the citizen suit was commenced, the State or Administrator was not diligently prosecuting an enforcement action. See, e.g., Ellis v. Gallatin Steel Co., 390 F.3d 461, 473-74 (6th Cir. 2004); Friends of Milwaukee's Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 382 F.3d 743, 757-65 (7th Cir.2004); Froebel v. Meyer, 217 F.3d 928, 933-37 (7th Cir. 2000); United States EPA v. City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d 1394, 1403-05 (8th Cir. 1990); Wilder v. Thomas, 854 F.2d 605, 616-21 (2d Cir.1988); see also St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., LLC, 500 F.Supp.2d 592, 601-03 (E.D.La.2007) (expressly rejecting argument that the CAA's statutory language establishes the only way in which a citizen suit may be precluded). To be sure, an exception to § 1738 will not be recognized unless a later statute contains an express or implied partial repeal. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). The CAA contains no express language concerning § 1738 or the preclusive effect of related state court proceedings. Thus, any repeal must be implied. The Supreme Court ha[s] seldom, if ever, held that a federal statute impliedly repealed § 1738. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 380, 116 S.Ct. 873, 134 L.Ed.2d 6 (1996) (citations omitted). A federal statute can impliedly repeal § 1738 only if there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two statutes. Id. at 381, 116 S.Ct. 873 (quotation marks and citation omitted). There is no such conflict here. The CAA's commencement bar to citizen suits applies only if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting  an enforcement action. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has explained Congress's deliberate use of verb tense in the citizen suit provision of the CWA. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 59-60, 108 S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987). As the Fourth Circuit has observed, the verb tenses used in [the commencement bar to citizen suits in the CWA] and the scheme of the statute demonstrate that the bar was not intended to apply unless the government files suit first (and is diligently prosecuting such suit). Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Am. Recovery Co., Inc., 769 F.2d 207, 208 (4th Cir.1985); see also Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc., 644 F.3d 483, at 493-94, 2011 WL 1642860, at  (7th Cir. May 3, 2011) (analyzing verb tenses of similarly worded commencement bar in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act). The commencement bar does not apply herewhere the Administrator or the State was not diligently prosecuting an enforcement action at the time the citizen suit was filedand therefore does not conflict with our application of § 1738 or common law preclusion principles. Applying the doctrine of issue preclusion, the district court held that Sierra Club's citizen suit is barred by the Council's 2005 and 2007 Orders. Aplt.App. at 345. The court explained that it need not consider the Wyoming district court's order in its preclusion analysis. Id. at 346. Under our preclusion analysis, we conclude that Sierra Club's citizen suit is barred, but on a slightly different rationale than the district court's. First, the issue of whether Two Elk engaged in continuous construction is precluded by the Wyoming district court's March 12, 2009 Order. In addition, as the federal district court concluded, the issue of whether Two Elk commenced construction before May 29, 2005 is precluded by the Council's 2005 Order.