Opinion ID: 689910
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Other of the Prosecutor's Closing Arguments

Text: 43 Both Ingram and McChristian claim that the prosecutor made numerous other unfair closing arguments. They contend that all of these arguments were unfair attacks on defense counsel and were intended to inflame the jury. 44 [I]n fashioning closing arguments, prosecutors are allowed reasonably wide latitude and are free to argue reasonable inferences from the evidence. United States v. Enriquez-Estrada, 999 F.2d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir.1993) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Ordinarily[,] cautionary instructions or other prompt and effective action[s] by the trial court are sufficient to cure the effects of improper comments. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Juries are presumed to follow such cautionary instructions. Id. In this case, the district court instructed the jury thoroughly that comments of counsel during closing arguments are not evidence and that the jury was to decide the facts. 3 45 [P]rosecutorial misconduct invites reversal if it appears more probable than not that the alleged misconduct affected the jury's verdict. Id. (internal quotations omitted); United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296, 1301 (9th Cir.1987) (holding reversal justified only when misconduct denies the defendant a fair trial by materially affect[ing] the verdict). Nonetheless, the district judge's view of the context ... is highly relevant. The district judge is in a much better position to evaluate the prosecutor's conduct and its impact. This court properly accords considerable deference to the trial court's view of such matters. United States v. Sanchez-Robles, 927 F.2d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir.1991) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, that a prosecutor's remarks were made in response to defense counsel's arguments, as an invited reply, may justify the remarks. Young, 470 U.S. at 14-20, 105 S.Ct. at 1045-49; United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d 855, 861-62 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944, 102 S.Ct. 2010, 72 L.Ed.2d 466 (1982). 46 Further, the presence of a factually strong case against a defendant runs contrary to the notion that improper remarks by the prosecutor materially affected the verdict. See Hall v. Whitley, 935 F.2d 164, 165-66 (9th Cir.1991). This factor is important in this case, in which evidence of the defendants' guilt is strong. Ingram admitted to the jury that he paid $20,000 for the methamphetamine and that he had a scale so that he could weigh drugs. He admitted that he had been involved in several drug deals before. McChristian was videotaped entering a room and asking Mr. Daggett, the confidential informant, where the dope was and trying to set up a smaller deal when the original deal fell through. Both Ingram and McChristian took active roles (and were videotaped) at the final negotiation. Both handled the methamphetamine on videotape and discussed how they planned to take a sample and test it. McChristian carried a sample out of the room. 47 Appellants have objected to many comments made by the prosecutor. We have examined them separately and cumulatively. We reviewed most of them (the ones unobjected to at trial), for plain error. Young, 470 U.S. at 14-20, 105 S.Ct. at 1044-49. We reviewed the three statements to which the defense did object at trial under the harmless error standard. United States v. Endicott, 803 F.2d 506, 513 (9th Cir.1986). Although we believe both counsel behaved objectionably at trial, we do not find reversible error because: 1) The jury was carefully, thoroughly and repeatedly instructed that counsel's argument is not evidence; 2) The evidence of guilt was overwhelming; and 3) Defendant's argument invited most if not all of the objectionable comments.