Opinion ID: 1852083
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the chancellor failed to maintain neutrality during the hearing and at times, appeared to be co-counsel for christopher ayars

Text: ¶ 23. Powell cites several instances during trial where the chancellor asked questions of witnesses. She claims that by doing so, the chancellor became co-counsel for Ayars and denied her a fair trial.
¶ 24. Powell contends that during the trial, the chancellor repeatedly rehabilitated and/or cross-examined witnesses. On one occasion, Jessica Utley expressed concern about testifying because she did not want to harm her relationship with Powell. This prompted the chancellor to question Utley about her contact with Powell regarding her testimony. Utley admitted phoning Powell and telling her what questions might be asked of her and her proposed answers. When asked by the chancellor why she phoned Powell, Utley responded, I didn't want her to be mad at me for coming today.
¶ 25. During cross-examination of Ayars, Powell's attorney asked him about his duties as manager of the Junior Food Mart, namely the fact that he is on call twenty-four hours each day. Ayars stated that he was on call but that he also has other employees who may assist him. After the attorneys completed examination of Ayars, the chancellor questioned him about the circumstances under which he might be called to the store.
¶ 26. Powell also complains about the chancellor's questioning of James Utley, the father of Powell's older children. After Utley testified about his good relationship with Powell, the chancellor asked If y'all were getting along so fine, why are you not still living with her? When Utley stated that they did not get along while they were living together, the chancellor asked Utley to give him an example of something about which the couple might argue. The chancellor also asked Utley questions about his children with Powell. They lived with Utley after they separated, and later the daughter went to live with Powell.
¶ 27. Powell's cousin, Christopher Jennings, testified that he and Powell passed Ayars while traveling to Hattiesburg and that Ayars liked to run us off the road. The chancellor asked Jennings what he meant, to which Jennings responded that Ayars was [j]ust driving crazy. The chancellor informed the witness, [w]ell you gone [sic] have to describe what happened. You just going to have to tell what he did. Don't be using terms like `driving crazy' or `like to have run us off the road.' You're going to have to tell me what happened. After the witness gave inconsistent versions of the events, the chancellor stated, I asked which was it? Was he coming at `em, driving them, or was he behind them? That's what I want to know. It seems to me it would be a pretty simple question. For a traumatic event like that, somebody ought to be able to remember whether he was coming toward me or coming behind me.... When Powell's attorney asked the witness, where did he swerve at you? How did he swerve at you?, the witness failed to respond, and the chancellor remarked Lengthy pause.
¶ 28. Finally, Steve Smith, a friend of Powell's, testified that on one occasion, Ayars became angry while holding the baby and handed her to Powell in a hostile manner. After Powell's attorney asked the witness [h]e shook the baby?, Ayars's attorney objected. The chancellor sustained the objection, stating [y]ou don't have to show us what he did. All you need to do is tell us what happened. Smith then remarked he handed the baby to her like that. That's the best way I can put it. ¶ 29. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 614(b) specifically provides that the court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party. However, it is grounds for reversal if the trial judge abuses the authority to call or question a witness by abandoning his impartial position as a judge and assuming an adversarial role. West v. State, 519 So.2d 418, 422-24 (Miss.1988). In order to obtain a review of the question of propriety of remarks or conduct of the judge during a trial, the remarks must be especially called to the attention of the trial judge when made, and a correction requested or a proper objection made at the time. Tippit v. Hunter, 205 So.2d 267, 271 (Miss.1967). A limitation on this rule occurs when the conduct of the trial judge, on the entire record, was so reprehensible and prejudicial as to deny a fair trial or due process of law. Jackson Yellow Cab Co. v. Alexander, 246 Miss. 268, 277, 148 So.2d 674, 678 (1963). ¶ 30. This Court has listed some of the circumstances under which a trial judge may question witnesses, explaining: There is the frightened or excited witness to whom, by a few discreet and sympathetic interrogatories by the court, normal mental processes may be restored; there is the recalcitrant, stubborn, or extremely partisan witness upon whom it may become necessary to place the power of the court itself in order to make the witness disgorge all, instead of only a part, of the material facts actually known to him; there is a witness whose testimony is confused and in a fog, and counsel either fails to clear it up with reasonable promptness or, as often happens, adds to the confusion by a confused course of examination.... Griffin v. State, 171 Miss. 70, 156 So. 652, 653 (1934). The Court further noted that the powers of a chancellor are broader than those of a circuit judge when he sits as both judge and jury. Id. ¶ 31. Powell contends that she did not receive a fair trial as a result of the chancellor's behavior. She complains that the chancellor impeached the Utleys when they attempted to testify in her favor. Powell further argues that the chancellor attempted to rehabilitate Ayars after he admitted he is on call twenty-four hours a day. She notes that the chancellor actually tried Christopher Jennings after he recalled the incident in which Ayars allegedly ran him off the road and engaged in a blistering diatribe and cross-examination.... Lastly, Powell argues that the chancellor prohibited Steve Smith from physically demonstrating the manner in which Ayars angrily handed the baby to Powell when there was no objection to his doing so. ¶ 32. At trial, Powell failed to object to any of the aforementioned questions asked by the chancellor. She may not object to them for the first time on appeal. While it appears that the chancellor tread closely along the line between adversary and impartial factfinder, we hold that this issue is without merit. Though there is an exception to the procedural bar, it is limited to instances in which the chancellor's conduct was so reprehensible so as to deny a party a fair trial. Jackson Yellow Cab Co. v. Alexander, 148 So.2d at 678. That is not found in this case.