Opinion ID: 1745700
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err in Allowing Witness Dr. Galvez to Give Various Expert Opinions?

Text: Here Mrs. May argues the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Rodrigo Galvez to give two expert opinions; first, that Mr. May's wound was not a contact wound, and, second, that the location of Mr. May's wound was not consistent with the usual location of self-inflicted gunshot wounds. Taking the first opinion, Mrs. May argues that the case of Austin v. State, 324 So.2d 245 (Miss. 1975), requires reversal. In Austin this Court held it error to allow a pathologist to testify to the position of a shooting victim's arm at the time the fatal shot was fired, when the question was whether the victim had been an aggressor. Id. at 248. The obvious rationale of the Austin decision in the murder/self defense context is that such testimony would amount to an opinion on the ultimate fact, effectively invading the province of the jury. See Taylor v. State, 452 So.2d 441, 449 (Miss. 1984) (Where insanity is not the defense, the determination of the ultimate fact of murder or manslaughter is left to the jury and is not subject to expert opinion testimony.) (citing Austin v. State, 324 So.2d 245 [Miss. 1975]). We decided Austin, however, based on our law of evidence prior to our Rules of Evidence. Mrs. May was tried in February 1986; thus, this case is governed by the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, and Austin is of value only to the extent it is consistent with the Rules. See M.R.E 1103. Under M.R.E 702: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. The comment makes clear that Rule 702 does not relax the traditional standards for determining that the witness is indeed qualified to speak an opinion on a matter within his purported field of knowledge. Nor does 702 relax the requirement that the scientific principle from which the expert's opinion is derived `must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs.' The comment specifically cites House v. State, 445 So.2d 815 (Miss. 1984), for a useful guide to what fields of knowledge have gained general acceptance. There can be little question that forensic pathology is a field of knowledge having gained general acceptance. Dr. Galvez was qualified to testify as an expert in forensic pathology. Likewise, forensic psychiatry is recognized as a proper field of expertise, especially for competency determinations. Mrs. May objects that Dr. Galvez should not have been allowed to testify to his opinion that Mr. May's wound was not a contact wound because he lacked ballistics training. This appears to be essentially a complaint that Galvez was testifying outside his area of expertise. However, as the state notes, Dr. Galvez testified on voir dire that he had examined approximately 150 gunshot wounds and, based on this and other training and experience, including much training in ballistic areas, the trial found Dr. Galvez qualified to render an opinion on whether Mr. May was killed by a contact wound. Generally, under our new Rules of Evidence, the decision of whether or not an expert witness is qualified to testify is within the trial court's discretion. See Detroit Marine Engineering v. McRee, 510 So.2d 462, 467 (Miss. 1987); Hooten v. State, 492 So.2d 948 (Miss. 1986). The test is whether a witness possesses peculiar knowledge or information regarding the relevant subject matter which is not likely to be possessed by a layman. McRee, 510 So.2d at 467; Henry v. State, 484 So.2d 1012, 1015 (Miss. 1986). There does not appear to be an abuse of discretion in allowing Dr. Galvez to testify concerning the proximity of the firearm to the wound. It is not clear, however, that the location of an upper body wound has been accepted by the field of forensic psychiatry or forensic pathology as a general indication of whether the wound was self-inflicted. Thus, Dr. Galvez's observation may be nothing more than that. This type of opinion seems more like the type of conjecture or speculation that should not be admitted. Mrs. May also suggests that it was error to allow Dr. Galvez to give his opinion that Mr. May's wound was not consistent with what is normally found to be the location of a self-inflicted wound. This seems more a question whether Dr. Galvez should have been allowed to express an opinion on the ultimate fact. Courts have been divided on whether expert testimony should be allowed on the question of whether a wound is self-inflicted. See Annot., Admissibility, in homicide prosecution, of opinion evidence that death was or was not self-inflicted, 56 A.L.R.2d 1447 (1957 & Supp.). The majority of courts that have considered the question, however, hold that such opinions are generally admissible. This, of course, would seem to be the proper rule in light of Rule 704, which does not preclude opinion evidence on the ultimate issue. Every expert opinion embracing the ultimate fact is not per se admissible, however. The opinion still must be helpful to the trier of fact. Hughes v. Tupelo Oil Co., Inc., 510 So.2d 502 (Miss. 1987); Dale v. Bridges, 507 So.2d 375 (Miss. 1987). Questions which simply allow the witness to tell the jury what result to reach are impermissible, as are questions asking the witness for a legal conclusion. Dale, 507 So.2d at 378, see Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir.1983). The court in Owen noted, however, that the task of separating impermissible questions which call for overbroad or legal responses from permissible questions is not a facile one. 698 F.2d at 240. Having in mind these standards, it seems to us that the prosecution's questions did not elicit overbroad or legal responses. This is the exchange of which Mrs. May complains: Q. Dr. Galvez, can you tell the jury whether or not what is reflected in your psychiatric literature to which you have referred, and in your own experience as a psychiatrist/pathologist, that you have been able to detect any pattern or patterns of gunshot wounds made by shotguns with any individuals who have committed suicide by the use of a shotgun? A. Yes, sir. Q. Would you tell the jury what those are, please? A. Well, usually, the individual will put the muzzle inside the mouth, or either to the side of the head, and the side of the head would be dictated by whether the person was right-handed or left-handed. That is the first choice. And, another choice is aiming at the heart, and the abdomen. Q. And, Doctor, when you say to the side of the head, to what area are you referring? A. To the temple area, either the right temple or the left temple. BY MR. LACY: We have no further question, your honor. (R. 295) These questions did not evoke an overbroad or legal response. The opinion was reasonably factually specific to the question of whether this particular wound was similar to those found on other suicide victims. This does not in and of itself decide admissibility, however. As noted above, the opinion must still be helpful to a determination of the case. See the official comment to M.R.E. 704. In other words, the opinion must be helpful to the trier of fact. Thus, an opinion which covers facts within the common knowledge or experience of lay people will not be helpful and therefore inadmissible. See Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 738 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.1984). Although the testimony outlined above may approach simple conjecture, we think it sufficiently outside the common experience to be the subject of a helpful expert opinion. Dr. Galvez gave specific, detailed reasons why he thought May's wound was not the result of contact or close proximity of the shotgun barrel to the skin. Galvez only testified that from reading studies and from his experience in studying self-inflicted gunshot wounds, individuals committing suicide usually put the gun muzzle to the side of the head at the temple, or put it inside the mouth, or aim it at the heart or the abdomen. Thus, the opinion is not objectionable on the grounds that the basis of the opinion was not divulged. In all, we find no reversible error in allowing either opinion into evidence.