Opinion ID: 2509294
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Access to Prosecution Witness

Text: Defendant contends the prosecution violated his Sixth Amendment and other constitutional rights by denying him access to a prosecution witness, Rauni Campbell. Specifically, he argues that the trial court erred when it refused to order Campbell to be brought before the court for a Franks hearing ( Franks v. Delaware, supra, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667); that the prosecutor prevented him from interviewing the witness before she testified; and that the trial court abused its discretion by withholding her out-of-state address from the defense out of concern for her safety. (§ 1054.7.) Under Franks v. Delaware, supra, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667, a defendant has a limited right to challenge the veracity of statements contained in an affidavit of probable cause made in support of the issuance of a search warrant. When presented with such a challenge, the lower court must conduct an evidentiary hearing if a defendant makes a substantial showing that (1) the affidavit contains statements that are deliberately false or were made in reckless disregard of the truth, and (2) the affidavit's remaining contents, after the false statements are excised, are insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. The defendant must establish the statements are false or reckless by a preponderance of the evidence. ( Id. at pp. 155-156, 98 S.Ct. 2674; People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1297, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) Innocent or negligent misrepresentations will not defeat a warrant. ( Franks, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 154-155, 98 S.Ct. 2674.) Moreover, `there is a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit. To merit an evidentiary hearing[,] the defendant['s] attack on the affidavit must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine.... The motion for an evidentiary hearing must be accompanied by an offer of proof ... [and] should be accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons. Affidavits or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be furnished, or an explanation of their absence given.' ( People v. Benjamin (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 264, 272, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 520, quoting People v. Sandlin (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1310, 1316, 281 Cal. Rptr. 702.) Finally, [a] defendant who challenges a search warrant based upon an affidavit containing omissions bears the burden of showing that the omissions were material to the determination of probable cause. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1297, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) During the suppression hearing, defense counsel asked that Ms. Campbell be ordered to testify regarding two statements made by Officer Kong in the affidavit supporting the search warrant for defendant's residence. Kong stated that as he approached the courtyard in Campbell's apartment complex, defendant fled through the courtyard apartment. Defense counsel maintained that Campbell would testify defendant did not flee but left the apartment in the normal fashion. Kong was also quoted as saying Campbell told him defendant had told her he had done something very bad. Defense counsel claimed that what Campbell actually told Kong was that defendant said they had done something very bad. The trial court found that defendant failed to meet the foundational requirements set forth in Franks and denied the motion. We review denial of a Franks hearing de novo. ( People v. Benjamin, supra, 77 Cal. App.4th at p. 271, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 520.) We conclude the trial court acted properly. Defense counsel's motion was unaccompanied by any of the evidentiary material required of the moving party. [21] At most, he provided no more than conclusory contradictions of the affiant's statements insufficient for the `substantial preliminary showing' required by Franks. ( Benjamin, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 272, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 520.) He also failed to demonstrate that, even if the statements were inaccurate, they were material to the determination of probable cause. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1297, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) Defendant claims that the prosecution also denied him access to Campbell prior to her trial testimony. In this connection, he challenges the trial court's order withholding her address from defendant because of concern that he had conspired to threaten her safety. His claims are without merit. At some point, apparently early in the case, there was an in camera proceeding at which the trial court granted the prosecution's request that Ms. Campbell's out-of-state address not be disclosed to defendant based on allegations that he had conspired with others to kill her and another witness. While defendant complained about his lack of access to Campbell in connection with his Franks motion, he made no attempt to compel disclosure of her address. On November 21, 1994, the prosecutor agreed to make Campbell available to the defense by phone. Two days later the prosecutor represented that Campbell had declined to speak to the defense. The defense made no response to the prosecutor's representation nor did it seek disclosure of her address or telephone number. On December 5, the prosecutor informed the trial court that Ms. Campbell would testify the next day. The prosecutor agreed to make her available to the defense. The following day, the prosecutor reported that he had introduced the defense investigator to Ms. Campbell and she had declined to speak to him. When defense counsel complained that he had been deprived of the ability to interview her, the trial court observed, [j]ust to be clear, the prosecutor several times has indicated that Miss Campbell does not want to talk to the defense. And she apparently delivered that message herself to the defense investigator today. The defense then requested her current address in order to gather information about her reputation in her current community. The prosecutor reminded the court that Campbell had been relocated to protect her based on information that defendant had been involved in a plan to jeopardize her life. He also noted that he was unaware of any efforts by the defense to have investigated Campbell's reputation in the community at the time of the offense. The trial court observed that information about Campbell's reputation in her new community, in which she had lived for only a brief time, was of minimal relevance, if any. It also observed that because she had been defendant's girlfriend, the defense had at its disposal some knowledge about her with which to investigate her reputation. Finally, it cited concerns about her security and denied the request for further discovery of her address. A defendant has a right to the names and addresses of prosecution witnesses and a right to have an opportunity to interview those witness if they are willing to be interviewed.  ( Reid v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1332, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 714, italics added.) A defendant does not have a fundamental due process right to pretrial interviews or depositions of prosecution witnesses. ( People v. Municipal Court ( Runyan ) (1978) 20 Cal.3d 523, 530-531, 143 Cal.Rptr. 609, 574 P.2d 425.) Discovery of a prosecution witness's address, moreover, may be limited out of concern for the witness's safety. (§ 1054.7; In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122, 136, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 851 P.2d 42.) Orders under this section are subject to review for abuse of discretion. (See Alvarado v. Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1121, 1135-1136, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 149, 5 P.3d 203.) Here, the prosecution provided defendant access to the witness but she refused to speak to the defense. Her refusal does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant also challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to disclose the witness's address. On the record before us, where there appears to have been a credible allegation of potential injury to the witness, we find no abuse of discretion. In any event, since he failed to make this request until the day before Campbell testified, we fail to see how he could have been prejudiced by the denial of his motion. Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim that his statutory discovery rights, his right to counsel, or any other constitutional right were violated.