Opinion ID: 1168260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: exercise of authority by commission under statute

Text: We find that the security deposit rule was promulgated by the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission according to proper enabling authority under RCW 80.01.040 and RCW 80.36 which grants power to the Commission to regulate telecommunications in the public interest and to [m]ake such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out its other powers and duties. In addition, the trial record and administrative record support the Commission's decision to promulgate the rule upon adequate fact-finding proceedings required by former RCW 34.04, administrative procedure act. [2] There is no evidence that the Commission's findings were in error or were reached by means not authorized by the Commission's rulemaking authority under RCW 80.01.040 and RCW 80.36. In fact, the trial record indicates that the security deposit rule was adopted only after extensive comments were received during the proceedings leading to adoption of the rule. Based upon the small business economic impact statement prepared by the Commission's staff and the comments received from various interested parties, [3] the Commission concluded that ITC defaults pose a significant threat of unsecured losses, resulting in rate increases to captive LEC ratepayers. The Commission agreed with Pacific Northwest Bell that the existing deposit rule was inadequate because it was based on payment history alone and was not an accurate measure of an ITC's current stability, liquidity or ability to pay short-term debt. The Commission authorized criteria under the new deposit rule for extending access to ITC's based on continuing financial strength of the entities, and not merely on past payment record. [2] The security deposit rule ultimately adopted reflects the Commission's balancing of ratepayer protection with reasonable, workable credit requirements which do not inhibit growth of a competitive telecommunications industry. Moreover, neither the reasonableness of a rule nor the factual basis which leads an agency to adopt a rule is properly the concern of the court under former RCW 34.04.070. Weyerhaeuser v. Department of Ecology, 86 Wn.2d 310, 314, 545 P.2d 5 (1976). See also Federated Am. Ins. Co. v. Marquardt, 108 Wn.2d 651, 655, 741 P.2d 18 (1987); Brannan v. Department of Labor & Indus., 104 Wn.2d 55, 60, 700 P.2d 1139 (1985); Asarco, Inc. v. Puget Sound Air Pollution Control Agency, 51 Wn. App. 49, 56, 751 P.2d 1229, review granted, 111 Wn.2d 1001 (1988).