Opinion ID: 1801687
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the Officers Used Reasonable Care in Using Deadly Force.

Text: The record here demonstrates that in plaintiffs' federal action, the issue of whether the officers exercised reasonable care in using deadly force was raised, submitted for decision, and actually decided against plaintiffs in resolving their section 1983 claim. The section 1983 claim in plaintiffs' federal court complaint alleged in part that the officers shot and killed Hernandez without reasonable cause, and that the shooting was unreasonable and entirely unjustified by Hernandez's actions. During the federal trial, the officers testified at length about the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the shooting. In relevant part, the jury instructions regarding the section 1983 claim stated the following: (1) [a] law enforcement officer has the right to use such force as is reasonably necessary under the circumstances to make a lawful arrest, and [a]n unreasonable seizure occurs when a law enforcement officer uses excessive force in making a lawful arrest; (2) [t]he use of deadly force is only justified when a reasonable law enforcement officer would reasonably believe that there was an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others at the time the force was used; (3) [w]hether force is reasonably necessary or excessive is measured by the force a reasonable and prudent law enforcement officer would use under the circumstances; (4) [t]he reasonableness inquiry . . . is an objective one, and [t]he reasonableness of the use of force should be judged in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the police from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight; (5) [s]ome of the things you may want to consider in determining whether the defendant used excessive force are the severity of the crime at issue, whether the plaintiff posed a reasonable threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting detention or attempting to escape; and (6) [i]n deciding whether excessive force was used, you should consider the totality of the circumstances at the time. As noted above, based on these instructions, the jury, by special verdict, found that Cooper, Devee and Luna had not violate[d] Hernandez's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by using excessive force against him. As also noted above, in later granting Sanchez's posttrial motion for judgment, the federal court found that Sanchez's use of deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances, because he found himself in a situation that he reasonably believed would threaten his life if he did not act immediately. In the wrongful death claim now at issue, plaintiffs allege that the officers acted without due care, cause or provocation in killing Hernandez, that [t]he shooting . . . occurred as a result of the absence of due care for the safety of others and constituted an unreasonable, unwarranted, and excessive use of force, and that the officers unreasonably and unjustifiably killed . . . Hernandez without cause or provocation. On this record, the Court of Appeal correctly concluded that with respect to the actual shooting, the negligence issue in plaintiffs' wrongful death claimwhether the officers acted with reasonable care in shooting Hernandezis precisely the issue resolved [against plaintiffs] by the federal jury and the trial court when each specifically concluded from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, taking into account the facts and circumstances confronting them, the officers' conduct was objectively reasonable. In arguing otherwise, plaintiffs assert that the standard of reasonableness applicable in a section 1983 action based on excessive force is not the same as the standard of reasonableness applicable in a negligence action under California law. According to plaintiffs, the Fourth Amendment standard focuses the analysis on balancing the concerns of the government with the extent of the intrusion, whereas the California standard involves no such balancing and focuses only on the reasonably prudent person. Moreover, plaintiffs assert, quoting Harris v. Grimes (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 180 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 791] ( Harris ), Lucas v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 277 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 655] ( Lucas ), and Mattson v. City of Costa Mesa (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 441 [164 Cal.Rptr. 913] ( Mattson ), reasonableness under section 1983 and reasonableness under state negligence law `are not the same' in that a section 1983 violation requires `a state of mind more blameworthy' than that required for negligence; `[t]o be entitled to relief under section 1983, [a] plaintiff must . . . show intentional conduct in circumstances in which the offending governmental employees were legally bound to know that their conduct would deprive the plaintiff of civil rights.' (3) Plaintiffs' arguments are unpersuasive. Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, the United States Supreme Court has never suggested that a fact finder, in determining whether a particular seizure was reasonable, should conduct a balancing of governmental and private interests. Instead, the high court has itself conducted this balancing in (1) concluding that police may not use . . . deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, (2) announcing the applicable standard of reasonableness, i.e., whether police had probable cause to believe the suspect posed a threat of serious physical harm to themselves or to others, and (3) enumerating the factors that must be considered in determining whether a challenged seizure was reasonable. ( Tennessee v. Garner (1985) 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 [85 L.Ed.2d 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694]; see also Scott v. Harris (2007) 550 U.S. 372 [167 L.Ed.2d 686, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1778-1779]; Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 U.S. 386, 396-397 [104 L.Ed.2d 443, 109 S.Ct. 1865] ( Graham ).) Consistent with these principles and the factors the high court has identified, the federal court in this case did not instruct the jury to conduct some abstract or nebulous balancing of competing interests. Instead, as noted above, it instructed the jury to determine the reasonableness of the officers' actions in light of the totality of the circumstances at the time, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the plaintiff posed a reasonable threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting detention or attempting to escape. The same consideration of the totality of the circumstances is required in determining reasonableness under California negligence law. (See Commercial U. A. Co. v. Pacific G. & E. Co. (1934) 220 Cal. 515, 522 [31 P.2d 793] [jury's duty in a negligence action is to determin[e] whether under all the facts and surrounding circumstances, the conduct in question was that of persons of ordinary prudence and discretion].) Moreover, California's civil jury instructions specifically direct the jury, in determining whether police officers used unreasonable force for purposes of tort liability, to consider the same factors that the high court has identified and that the federal court's instructions in this case set forth. (Judicial Council of Cal. Civ. Jury Instns. (2008) CACI No. 1305.) Thus, plaintiffs err in arguing that the federal and state standards of reasonableness differ in that the former involves a fact finder's balancing of competing interests. (4) Plaintiffs' effort to differentiate the two standards also fails insofar as it rests on an asserted difference between the requisite mental states. As to plaintiffs' section 1983 action, the federal court's instructions explained that the standard of reasonableness is an objective one and directed the jury to determine the reasonableness of the officers' actions objectively and without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. These instructions were consistent with binding high court precedent, which states: [T]he `reasonableness' inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are `objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. [Citations.] An officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional. [Citation.] ( Graham, supra, 490 U.S. at p. 397, italics added.) On this record, plaintiffs are incorrect in asserting that, because the reasonableness standard at issue in the section 1983 action involved `a state of mind more blameworthy' than the reasonableness standard under California negligence law, issue preclusion does not apply. [9] The decisions plaintiffs cite Lucas, Mattson, and Harris do not require a different conclusion. The court in Lucas did not, as plaintiffs assert, broadly hold that [r]easonable conduct under a [federal] civil rights violation is different from a negligence action because a civil rights violation `describes a state of mind more blameworthy.' Rather, the Lucas court reached the far narrower conclusion that the particular constitutional violation there alleged as the basis for the section 1983 claimfailing to render medical care to an inmaterequired proof of deliberate indifference, and that this standard. . . describes a state of mind more blameworthy than [m]ere negligence. ( Lucas, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 287.) The constitutional violation plaintiffs alleged here in their section 1983 claim was different and involved a standard of reasonableness, not deliberate indifference. In Mattson, which involved an excessive force claim, the court, in holding that a prior federal judgment did not have preclusive effect as to the issues of lack of probable cause and excessive force, reasoned: From the record before us it appears possible that the federal jury determined no more than that defendants . . . lacked the requisite mens rea. ( Mattson, supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at pp. 445-446.) The record before us does not leave open this possibility because, as explained above, the federal court followed high court precedent and instructed the jury to determine reasonableness without regard to [the officers'] underlying intent or motivation. [10] In Harris, which also involved an excessive force claim, the court declined to apply collateral estoppel as to the issue of reasonableness, reasoning that because the plaintiff asserted the officer had accidentally fired his gun and the federal jury rendered a general verdict [against the plaintiff] without any special findings, the jury could have reached its verdict for any number of reasons other than finding the shooting was a reasonable use of force. ( Harris, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 187.) Here, plaintiffs do not claim, and there is no evidence, that the officers fired accidentally, and the instructions and special verdict foreclose the possibility that the jury reached its verdict for reasons other than the reasonableness of the officers' actions. Because of these distinctions, Lucas, Mattson, and Harris are inapposite. [11] We therefore agree with the Court of Appeal that the federal proceedings collaterally estop plaintiffs from recovering on the theory that the officers acted negligently in using deadly force.