Opinion ID: 1368513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Determination of Guardianship

Text: For his last point for reversal, Appellant contends that the probate court erred in granting Appellees' petition for permanent guardianship and in simultaneously finding that he was not a suitable guardian for Dana. We review probate proceedings de novo, but we will not reverse the decision of the probate court unless it is clearly erroneous. Amant v. Callahan, 341 Ark. 857, 20 S.W.3d 896 (2000); Babb v. Matlock, 340 Ark. 263, 9 S.W.3d 508 (2000). When reviewing the proceedings, we give due regard to the opportunity and superior position of the probate judge to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Id. Based on the testimony presented below, we cannot say that the probate court's decision was clearly erroneous. Pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 28-65-210 (1987), three things must be proved before a guardian may be appointed: (1) the person for whom guardianship is sought is a minor or otherwise incapacitated; (2) a guardianship is desirable to protect the needs of that person; and (3) the person to be appointed guardian is qualified and suitable to act as such. Where the incapacitated person is a minor, the key factor in determining guardianship is the best interest of the child. Bennett v. McGough, 281 Ark. 414, 664 S.W.2d 476 (1984); Trammell v. Isom, 25 Ark.App. 76, 753 S.W.2d 281 (1988); Marsh v. Hoff, 15 Ark.App. 272, 692 S.W.2d 270 (1985); Monroe v. Dallas, 6 Ark.App. 10, 636 S.W.2d 881 (1982). Preferential status may be given to the natural parents of the child under Ark.Code Ann. § 28-65-204 (Supp.1999). This preference, however, is but one factor that the probate court must consider in determining who will be the most suitable guardian for the child. See Marsh, 15 Ark.App. 272, 692 S.W.2d 270. Indeed, any inclination to appoint a parent or relative must be subservient to the principle that the child's interest is of paramount consideration. See Bennett, 281 Ark. 414, 664 S.W.2d 476. In the present case, the probate court found that it was in the best interest of the child, Dana Nacole Blunt, that Appellees be appointed as her permanent guardians. The court found: (1) Appellees were the biological grandparents of the child; (2) Appellees owned their own home, were gainfully employed, and had a stable living environment in Phillips County; (3) Dana had gone through private daycare in Phillips County and was presently enrolled in the public school system there and was doing well as a student; (4) testimony of daycare teachers established that Dana was a well-rounded, happy child; (5) a home study established that Appellees' home was suitable and desirable and that Appellees possessed the ability to care for the instant and future welfare and happiness of Dana; and (6) Appellees had contributed continual financial support to both Dana and her mother, including the payment of prenatal care, cost of the birth, and hospital bills. On the other hand, the probate court concluded that Appellant, even if legally determined to be Dana's biological father, was not suitable to be the child's guardian. [2] The court found that Appellant, who is thirty-two years old, was in transition, as he had only been employed at his current job for one week prior to the hearing, and he did not have a home of his own. The probate court found that there was no credible evidence to support Appellant's testimony that he had provided support for Dana all of her life. Rather, the court found that, other than two checks totaling $325, the only regular support provided by Appellant was during a thirteen-month period while he was in the United States Army. Once he was discharged, however, following Valeria's death, Appellant ceased making any payment toward Dana's support. The probate court found this lack of support significant, in light of the fact that Appellant admitted that he had expended over $500 per month for the support and ownership of a car during that same period. Perhaps most significantly, the probate court found that there was credible evidence from two witnesses detailing Appellant's physical abuse of Valeria, even while she was seven or eight months pregnant with Dana. The probate court found that Appellant was not a suitable guardian for Dana, even if he was the child's biological father. The court found that Appellant had not assumed his parental responsibilities, such as providing care, supervision, protection, and financial support for the child. Ultimately, the probate court found that Dana is in an environment that she is used to, surrounded by an extended family that has been a major part of her young life. The court found that it would be quite disruptive to the child to be moved from her current environment, particularly because her mother, who was her primary care giver, had died so recently. The court thus concluded that it was in the child's best interest that Appellees be appointed as her permanent guardians. We cannot say that the probate court's ruling in this case was clearly erroneous, taking into consideration all the testimony presented and the probate court's superior position to weigh and assess the credibility of the witnesses and their testimony. We disagree with Appellant that the preference found in section 28-65-204 automatically attaches to a child's natural parent. That section provides in pertinent part: The parents of an unmarried minor, or either of them, if qualified and, in the opinion of the court, suitable, shall be preferred over all others for appointment as guardian of the person. (Emphasis added.) A plain reading of that provision demonstrates that only a natural parent who is both qualified and, in the opinion of the probate court, suitable shall be preferred over all others to be the child's guardian. The probate court in this case accepted Appellant's assertion that he was the child's natural father, but nonetheless found that he was not suitable to serve as the child's permanent guardian. Appellant has failed to offer any convincing argument or authority that would justify a reversal of that ruling. Accordingly, we affirm the probate court's decision. Apart from the issues pertaining to the merits of this appeal, Appellant has filed a motion to strike several portions of Appellees' brief as being unsubstantiated or patently false. We agree that the statements reflected in the motion are offensive. By way of illustration only, Appellees' brief states: The Appellant, by his own description is a typical `dead-beat' parent, if he is indeed a parent. He has according to the testimony in the case below, contributed only $175.00 to the direct support of the child individually that is documentable. This statement is both inflammatory and false. As set out above, the trial court specifically found that Appellant had contributed to Dana's support, in the form of regular allotments to Valeria, while he was in the Army. We thus grant the motion to strike. While we do not impose sanctions against Appellees' counsel in this instance, we take this opportunity to caution the bar that an attorney who knowingly makes a false statement of material fact to a tribunal risks sanctions under Rule 3.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Affirmed.