Opinion ID: 1823218
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Was the petition timely?

Text: Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R.App. P., provides: The petition [for the writ of mandamus] shall be filed within a reasonable time. The presumptively reasonable time for filing a petition seeking review of an order of the trial court or of a lower appellate court shall be the same as the time for taking an appeal. If a petition is filed outside this presumptively reasonable time, it shall include a statement of circumstances constituting good cause for the appellate court to consider the petition, notwithstanding that it was filed beyond the presumptively reasonable time. Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R.App. P., states that appeals as of right shall be filed within 42 days of the judgment or order from which relief is sought. As noted above, on January 25, 2006, the trial court ordered Orkin to produce the disputed records. Orkin filed its petition for the writ of mandamus on April 19, 2006. The Touarts argue that the presumptively reasonable time for filing the petition began to run on January 25 and that Orkin's petition, filed more than 42 days thereafter, was untimely. Orkin argues that March 8, 2006  the date the trial court announced in open court that it would deny Orkin's motion for reconsideration  is the earliest possible date for calculating the presumptively reasonable time for filing a petition for a writ of mandamus. If March 8 is the commencement date for determining the presumptively reasonable time for purposes of Rule 21(a)(3), Orkin's petition was timely. The timeliness issue hinges on the effect given the filing of Orkin's motion for a protective order. Orkin filed that motion on February 24, 2006. [4] The Touarts argue that the filing of that motion did not toll Orkin's obligation to file its petition with this Court within 42 days of January 25, 2006. They cite Ex parte Troutman Sanders, LLP, 866 So.2d 547, 550 (Ala. 2003), in support of their position. This Court held in Troutman Sanders that a motion for reconsideration of a trial court's order denying a motion to dismiss did not toll the time for filing a petition for the writ of mandamus under Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R.App. P. 866 So.2d. at 550. Orkin argues that Troutman Sanders did not involve a discovery dispute and that it is therefore inapplicable here. Orkin states that in Ex parte Reynolds Metals Co., 710 So.2d 897 (Ala.1998), this Court held that a party seeking relief from a discovery order must ask the trial court for a protective order under Rule 26(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., before filing a mandamus petition. Because it sought a protective order on February 24 and did not file a mandamus petition until that request was denied on March 8, Orkin argues that its petition was timely. Based on the authority of Ex parte Reynolds Metals Co., Orkin further argues that its mandamus petition would have been premature had Orkin filed it before the trial court ruled on its motion for protective order. We agree with Orkin. Orkin complied with its procedural obligations to contest the trial court's discovery orders. Orkin moved for a protective order within the 30-day period in which the contested production was compelled. [5] It filed this petition after the trial court denied that motion. We reaffirm the principle that the party seeking a writ of mandamus in a discovery dispute must properly move for a protective order under Rule 26(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.[, before petitioning for the writ]. Ex parte CIT Communication Fin. Corp., 897 So.2d 296, 298 (Ala.2004); Ex parte Sargent Indus., Inc., 466 So.2d 961, 963 (Ala.1985) (a party's failure to seek a protective order from the trial court bars mandamus relief because a protective order is the appropriate procedural device for limiting or prohibiting discovery). This sequencing promotes the sound policy of afford[ing] the trial court the opportunity to address its alleged error before a party seeks mandamus relief from an appellate court to correct the alleged error. Ex parte Reynolds Metals Co., 710 So.2d at 900. Furthermore, in a petition challenging a discovery ruling, the petitioner cannot demonstrate the lack of another adequate remedy  one of the prerequisites for the extraordinary relief of the writ of mandamus  without first filing a motion for a protective order. Because Orkin filed a motion for a protective order with the trial court and filed its mandamus petition within 42 days from March 8, the date the trial court entered a ruling on the motion, Orkin's filing was made within a presumptively reasonable time within the meaning of Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R.App. P. [6]