Opinion ID: 1699223
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Direct Liability of the City for the Acts or Omissions of the Fire Department

Text: On the one hand, a city is under no statutory duty to provide fire protection. Williams v. City of Tuscumbia, 426 So.2d 824, 825 (Ala.1983); see § 11-43-140, Ala.Code 1975 (Cities and towns may maintain and operate a volunteer or paid fire department and may do any and all things necessary to secure efficient service....) (emphasis added). On the other hand, this Court held in Ziegler v. City of Millbrook, 514 So.2d 1275 (Ala.1987), and in Williams that the City of Millbrook and the City of Tuscumbia, respectively, by creating professional fire departments, had thereby undertaken a duty to provide skillful fire protection. This Court further held that, if the unskillfulness of the firefighters employed by the City of Millbrook and the City of Tuscumbia, respectively, caused a breach of that duty, the respective cities would be directly liable for the breach. Ziegler and Williams, however, are distinguishable from the case now before us. The fire departments created by the City of Millbrook and the City of Tuscumbia were professional fire departments rather than volunteer fire departments. Because, in creating a volunteer fire department, a city is relegated to the vagaries of volunteer manpower, the undertaking by the city is too indistinct to support a legally enforceable duty to provide skillful fire protection. The plaintiffs argue that the $10-per-fire stipend for expenses, which the City paid to the firefighters, constituted substantial evidence that the firefighters received compensation from the City and, therefore, constituted substantial evidence that the firefighters were professionals rather than volunteers. However, the plaintiffs presented neither evidence contradicting the firefighters' testimony that the $10-per-fire stipend was strictly reimbursement of expenses nor affirmative evidence that the $10-per-fire stipend was compensation for services. Thus, the undisputed evidence established that the firefighters were neither obliged to respond to a fire nor compensated for their services. The payment of the token $10-per-fire stipend for expenses does not constitute substantial evidence contrary to this conclusion. We hold that in creating a volunteer fire department, a city does not thereby undertake a legally enforceable duty to provide skillful fire protection. Accordingly, without reaching the issue whether the City was due substantive immunity from the plaintiffs' claim for direct liability for the acts or omissions of the firefighters, we affirm the summary judgment on that direct liability claim on the ground that the City did not owe a duty to provide skillful fire protection.