Opinion ID: 2263311
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The trial judge allegedly abused his discretion by refusing to ask during voir dire whether the jury members would give more weight to a police officer's testimony than to any other testimony.

Text: Before trial, Miller submitted a proposed list of voir dire questions. One of the questions reads as follows: Police officers may testify at trial. Would the fact that a police officer testified affect your ability to render a fair and impartial verdict in this case? Alternate version: Can you give the same weight to a Police Officer's testimony as to any other fact witness? In a sidebar conversation before beginning jury selection, the trial judge explained to defense counsel why he was not going to ask the proposed question: I think this question has particular relevance when the case is one that's kind of been developed by police conduct, meaning they've been active participants and they become the realit's their issue of credibility. . . . I think in this case what they're going to be testifying to is either events or statements made by others and so I'm not finding it as critical here. You have in the jury questionnaire information concerning whether or not they have any family or friends who are in the law enforcement field, so I don't think it's necessary in this case. . . . During voir dire, the clerk asked the prospective jurors, Do you have any biases or prejudice, either for or against the State or the defendant? The clerk also asked if the prospective jurors knew any of the potential witnesses, one of whom was Detective Joe Szcerba. One of the prospective jurors came forward. When the trial judge asked what prompted her to come forward she indicated that her husband was a New Castle County Police Officer. The trial judge then determined that the prospective juror knew Joe Szcerba as a regular officer, but that she and her family did not socialize with him on a regular basis. The trial judge next asked whether the fact that the prospective juror's husband was a New Castle County Police Officer would affect her ability to fairly and impartially consider the evidence. She responded, possibly. Rephrasing the question the trial judge asked: would you tend to give greater credence and testimony to the police officer because of the role that they have? The prospective juror responded in the affirmative. The trial judge clarified this response by asking, If there was a conflict between the testimony of a lay witness and an officer, would you give the benefit to the officer? The prospective juror said that she would; whereupon the trial judge excused her. Initially, the trial judge ruled that the police officers' testimony would not be that critical because the police would be testifying to events or statements made by others. The trial judge knew that counsel had the jury questionnaire responses and could determine from them whether any prospective jurors had family or friends who were law enforcement officers. Understandably, the trial judge believed those responses would allow counsel to exercise a peremptory challenge should they question a prospective juror's objectivity. After the juror came forward in response to the question about whether any member of the venire might know a prospective witness, the trial judge asked substantially the same question Miller proposed to ask the entire venire. The trial judge then excused that prospective juror because she claimed that she would find a police officer more credible than a lay witness (even though the police officer's testimony was not critical in this case.) We address below whether this methodology sufficiently identified prospective jurors who would tend to believe a police officer over any other witness and whether in this case such a juror on the panel ultimately selected might have unfairly prejudiced Miller. Miller appeals the trial judge's initial ruling claiming that the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to grant voir dire as to extra weight jurors might give to police officer testimony. He alleges that the [t]he failure to allow this voir dire coupled with the police officer's improper questions on the videotape exacerbated the unfairness of this trial, and violated the defendant's due process rights. It is well-settled that the extent of a voir dire examination of prospective jurors and the questions to be permitted lay within the broad discretion of the trial judge. [3] The exercise of that discretion is restricted only by constitutional requirements and the essential demands of fairness. [4] Accordingly, any limitation the trial judge imposes on the defendant's right to have prospective jurors questioned will not constitute an abuse of discretion unless the broad discretion reposed in the trial judge has been clearly abused to the prejudice of the defendant. [5] We have never before squarely addressed the issue of whether the trial judge must always ask the jury venire whether they would give more weight to or assign more credibility to a police officer's testimony than they would any other fact or opinion witness. Miller cites only Gray v. State [6] to support the proposition that the trial judge abused his discretion by not automatically doing so in this case. According to Miller, in Gray we presumed the relevance of the question that the trial judge denied in this case. In Gray, like here, the defendants claimed that the trial judge abused his discretion by failing to ask prospective jurors certain questions relating to jurors' potential biases because the case involved several inflammatory aspects. In concluding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion, we explained the procedure he followed in conducting voir dire and noted that he asked Would you give the testimony of a police officer more credence than others merely because he is a police officer? [7] In Gray, despite his paring-down of the questions submitted from the 83 questions the defendants submitted to the 23 questions he actually used, the trial judge did not merely go through the motions; rather he conducted an examination designed to elicit answers which provide an objective basis for his evaluation of whether [each] prospective juror can render an impartial verdict upon the evidence and the law. [8] Whalen v. State, [9] is also relevant to the issue here. In Whalen, the defendant submitted 58 questions to the trial judge for preliminary submission to the entire jury venire. The trial judge rejected all questions the defendant requested, including question 21 of 58: Will you give the testimony of a police officer more credence than that of other witnesses merely because he is a police officer. [10] The trial judge did, however, ask the prospective jurors, among other things, whether they were related to any police officer, had any friends in the police department or law enforcement agencies, or if their jobs caused them to work with the Delaware State Police. [11] We held that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion and, therefore, rejected the defendant's contention that the trial judge abused that discretion by declining to submit the defendant's requested questions to the panel. [12] Neither Gray nor Whalen provide clear guidance to the question of whether a bright line rule should apply to questions for the venire when police officer testimony may be contradicted at trial by civilian witnesses. A leading case on this subject in the federal system is Brown v. United States. [13] A jury convicted the defendant in Brown of assault with intent to commit robbery for attacking a victim and taking property from his person. Two military police officers observed the incident, gave chase, and captured the defendant. Their testimony constituted the bulk of the government's case. [14] Before jury selection, the defendant requested that the trial judge direct the following question to the jury venire: Would you give greater credence to the testimony of a law enforcement officer merely because he is an officer as compared to any other witness? [15] The trial judge denied the request. In reversing, the D.C. Circuit explained that [a]lthough the trial court possesses a broad discretion as to the question to be asked on voir dire, the exercise of that discretion is subject to the essential demands of fairness. [16] The Court then set forth the general rule that: when important testimony is anticipated from certain categories of witnesses, whose official or semi-official status is such that a juror might reasonably be more, or less, inclined to credit their testimony, a query as to whether a juror would have such an inclination is not only appropriate but should be given if requested.... [17] Applying the general rule, the Court concluded that: Responses to the requested query might have supplied the defense counsel, or indeed, the prosecutor, with relevant and useful information for exercising peremptory challenges or challenges for cause. We hold that ... failure to inquire of the jury panel as requested regarding possible predilections concerning police testimony was reversible error in this case [18] In many cases, however, [f]ailure to make appropriate inquiry, when requested, does not necessarily require reversal; the issue turns on the degree of impact which the testimony in question would be likely to have had on the jury and what part such testimony played in the case as a whole. [19] Several years later, the Ninth Circuit elaborated on this (essentially) harmless error rule by setting forth a four factor test to determine whether a trial judge's error in voir dire by failing to ask the question of whether prospective jurors would be unduly influenced by the testimony of a law enforcement officer served to deny a defendant the right to have his claims decided by a fair and impartial jury. [20] The question of whether the error is reversible hinges on: 1) The importance of the government agent's testimony to the case as a whole; 2) The extent to which the question concerning the venireperson's attitude toward government agents is covered in other questions on voir dire and on the charge to the jury; 3) The extent to which the credibility of the government agent-witness is put into issue; and 4) The extent to which the testimony of the government agent is corroborated by non-agent witnesses. [21] Over the years this Brown-Baldwin rule [22] has become the majority rule among the federal circuits. [23] Indeed, many State courts have adopted a rule similar to that in Brown. [24] We have discussed Brown once before. In Parson v. State [25] we considered, among other things, whether the trial judge committed reversible error by not excusing for cause certain members of the venire who stated that they would tend to believe the testimony of a police officer more readily than that of a lay-witness. [26] There, three prospective jurors, two of whom were actually seated on the jury and one of whom the defendant peremptorily challenged, stated in substance that they would tend to believe more readily a police officer when he is testifying as to matters for which he is trained, and which he learned about in the course of the performance of his duty. [27] All of the prospective jurors, however, testified that if the testimony concerned was not directly related to or growing out of the performance by the policeman of his duties as an officer that they would treat his testimony as that of any other witness. [28] The trial judge denied the defendant's challenge for cause. [29] The defendant in Parson relied on Brown [30] to support his argument. We concluded that Brown was inapplicable and noted that Brown held only that it was reversible error not to allow the questioning of a prospective juror upon the subject of whether or not he would give greater weight toward policemen's testimony. [31] We continued by noting that the Court in Brown did not rule upon the question of whether or not the witnesses answering in the affirmative should be excused for cause. In point of fact, the questions were allowed in the case at bar and, therefore, there is no violation of the holding in ... Brown.  [32] Accordingly, we held there was no error in the refusal of the trial judge to dismiss the jurors for cause. [33] The rationale articulated in Brown provides a substantial reason to adopt the Brown-Baldwin rule in Delaware, namely that responses to the requested query might have supplied the defense counsel, or indeed, the prosecutor, with relevant and useful information for exercising peremptory challenges. [34] This is true even if, as happened in Parson, the trial judge does not abuse his discretion by failing to excuse for cause a prospective juror who answers affirmatively that he will give police officers' testimony greater weight than that of lay witnesses. Thus we join the majority of the federal circuits in concluding that where government [law enforcement] agents are apt to be key witnesses, the trial court, particularly if seasonably requested, should ordinarily make inquiry into whether prospective jurors are inclined to have greater faith in the agents' testimony merely by virtue of their official positions. [35] Moreover, we will apply the harmless error analysis of the Baldwin court to determine whether the failure to do so served to deny the defendant the right to have his claims decided by a fair and impartial jury, again, examining: (1) The importance of the government agent's testimony to the case as a whole; (2) The extent to which the question concerning the venireperson's attitude toward government agents is covered in other questions on voir dire and on the charge to the jury; (3) The extent to which the credibility of the government agent-witness is put into issue; and, (4) The extent to which the testimony of the government agent is corroborated by non-agent witnesses. [36] When a party requests the trial judge to ask the venire if any member of the venire would be more likely to believe the testimony of a police officer than the testimony of any other fact or opinion witness, the trial judge should address the Baldwin factors and rule accordingly. [37] Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the trial judge erred here by refusing to ask the venire Miller's proposed question or a variation of the question proposed, we are satisfied that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the police officer's testimony was not central to the State's case. Rather the case rested primarily on Alicia's testimony corroborated by the testimony of her brother. Second, the credibility of the police officer was not really an issue at trial; instead, consistent with the above, the credibility determinations related largely to the defendant's videotaped statement and Alicia's and Anthony's trial testimony. Third, the trial judge used the jury questionnaire to determine whether any prospective juror was related to or friends with a law enforcement officer. This ultimately resulted in the trial judge excusing a prospective juror whose husband was a police officer. Fourth, to the extent any corroboration was necessaryand it arguably was notAlicia's testimony was sufficiently corroborated by Anthony's testimony. Examining all of the factors here, we conclude that even if there was error, it was harmless. Accordingly, Miller's claim on this issue must fail. [38]