Opinion ID: 1224193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: insufficiency of the evidence and/or verdict was against law

Text: Child's final argument is that this court should grant a new trial pursuant to rule 59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, because the evidence was not sufficient to support the jury's verdict that Gonda was not negligent or, alternatively, because the verdict was against law  i.e., the law set forth in the jury instructions. Rule 59(a) gives the trial court discretion to grant a new trial on a number of grounds, including [i]nsufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law. Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6). Our standard of review on this issue has been stated as follows: Where the trial court has denied the motion for a new trial, its decision will be sustained on appeal if there was an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision .... The trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial will be reversed only if the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust. Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982) (second emphasis added) (quoting McCloud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977)). To support an insufficiency of the evidence claim on appeal, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. McCorvey v. State Dep't of Transp., 868 P.2d 41, 44 (Utah 1993) (quoting Crookston, 817 P.2d at 799). However, with this in mind, we emphasize that `[i]t is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.' State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980)). So long as some evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's findings, we will not disturb them. See id. The evidence that Child marshals in support of the jury's verdict may be summarized as follows: Gonda testified that she remembers slamming on her brakes when she saw the Volkswagen immediately in front of her and that she was probably traveling between 50 and 55 miles per hour because she always travels the speed limit in rainy weather. Gonda's passenger testified that it was daylight at the time of the collision, that he observed no activity on the part of Deller's vehicle that caused him to think it might enter the roadway, and that there was no alternative Gonda could have taken to avoid the collision. The driver of the vehicle following Gonda testified that she (the driver) didn't have time to put her brakes on until Deller's vehicle was right there and that she thought Deller's vehicle, as soon as it started to move, would be hit by Gonda's vehicle because there was not enough room for anybody to do anything. The driver heading north on Highway 89, who was in the left turn lane just opposite Deller, testified that it was daylight at the time of the collision, that in his judgment there was no need for automobile lights to be on at the time the collision occurred, and that Deller's turning movement was very abrupt and very quick. Finally, Child's expert witness testified that Gonda had between two and three seconds to react in order to avoid the collision, and Gonda's expert witness testified that Gonda had nowhere to go between the time Deller's vehicle started moving and the time of the collision and that there was no time for Gonda to brake prior to the collision. Notwithstanding this evidence, Child asserts that the jury rejected the overwhelming weight of the direct and circumstantial evidence presented concerning Gonda's negligence. He then attempts to demonstrate the insufficiency of the evidence in favor of the jury's verdict by marshaling all of the evidence that he maintains is against the verdict. His approach, however, fails for two reasons. First, as we have previously stated, it is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses. Child ignores this principle, because he asks this court in his brief to [weigh the evidence in support of the jury's verdict] against the avalanche of evidence [against the verdict] and conclude that the jury was wrong in finding that Gonda was not negligent. This court does not, and will not, reweigh the evidence and determine where it preponderates. [6] Second, in challenging the jury's verdict, Child has failed to fully comply with our marshaling requirement. While setting forth a great deal of evidence, he has so slanted it in his favor that in many instances he has inaccurately represented the record. For instance, he states that the evidence showed that Gonda was not wearing her eye glasses at the time of the accident and that at the time her deposition was taken a year later, her driver's license required her to wear glasses. However, he fails to state that the evidence also showed that (1) her glasses had been prescribed only for reading; (2) her visual acuity without corrective lenses was 20/25 in one eye and 20/30 in the other; and (3) her license had the eye glass restriction on it simply because she had worn her glasses when she took her driver's license test, but she later obtained a new license that does not require her to wear glasses. Moreover, Child fails to indicate that the court instructed the jury that Utah law requires drivers of private vehicles to have uncorrected visual acuity of at least 20/40. The jury therefore could have rejected any implication that Gonda was negligent in not wearing glasses at the time the accident occurred. Child also cites Gonda's testimony that she did not know the direction she was traveling at the time of the accident, the path she had driven prior to the accident, or where she was going. However, Child fails to cite the evidence from the record indicating that Gonda did not know the direction on a compass in which she was traveling, that she could not remember the path she had driven from her friend's house in Kearns, Utah, to the accident site, and that she did not know where she was going because she was taking her friend on an errand to pick up a part from a business and he had been giving her instructions on how to get there. It is an absolute requirement of marshaling that the party state fully and accurately all of the evidence on an issue and then show, as a matter of law, that the evidence does not support the verdict. Child has failed to meet this requirement. Moreover, the avalanche of evidence that Child has marshaled against the verdict raises questions of weight and credibility, which are matters within the exclusive province of the jury. Because Child has failed to meet his burden of showing that the evidence supporting the verdict was completely lacking or so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust, we reject Child's argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. As a final issue, Child argues that the jury's verdict was against law  i.e., against the law set forth in the jury instructions. Specifically, Child cites to the law set forth in the following jury instructions regarding a driver's duty to (1) exercise reasonable care at all times to avoid placing others in danger; (2) observe others using the road; (3) keep a proper lookout; and (4) refrain from heedlessly relying on the right-of-way. However, even if Child's evidence may have created an inference that Gonda violated one or more of the aforementioned duties, when we view the evidence in the light most favorable to Gonda, we are satisfied that the evidence was clearly sufficient to support the jury's verdict that Gonda was not negligent. Therefore, we hold that the jury's verdict was not against law as Child claims.