Opinion ID: 865844
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the court of appeals erred in the

Text: APPLICATION OF THE PORTER CASE. 5 ¶7. The issue here pertains to Evans’s desire to introduce testimony concerning the precise measurement of alcohol in her bloodstream at the time she was driving and arrested. The State argued at trial that Porter v. State, 749 So. 2d 250 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999), bars any attempt to introduce evidence that precludes a finding that Evans was guilty under Section 63-11-30(1)(c) of the Mississippi Code, which is the DUI-per-se portion of the statute governing blood-alcohol levels. See Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1)(c) (Rev. 2004). The defense counters that Porter is distinguishable and inapplicable to the matter at hand. Evans argues that the holding in Porter bars only the admission of evidence in an attempt to prove that alcohol consumption did not impair the driver. Evans claims that she is attempting to introduce evidence that her BAC was below the legal limit at the time she was driving, and she is not attempting to prove that her alcohol consumption failed to impair her driving. This Court agrees with Evans’s assertion and with the Court of Appeals opinion 4 regarding the inapplicability of the Porter decision. ¶8. The circuit court judge accepted the interpretation of Porter offered by the State whereby the defense is prohibited from introducing evidence from either expert or lay witnesses regarding alcohol consumption because this is a “DUI-per-se case,” and an admissible Intoxilyzer test result showed Evans’s BAC to be over the legal limit. The State explained, and the circuit court agreed, that if this evidence on alcohol consumption was inadmissible, Dr. Rosenhan’s expert testimony then became irrelevant. This is because, in order for the expert to formulate his opinion about Evans’s BAC at the time she was pulled 4 Portions of the analysis concerning issue number one are taken in whole or in part from the Court of Appeals’ majority decision. 6 over, evidence on consumption would have to be admitted to apply his retrogradeextrapolation formula 5 to the facts of the case. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court and held that Porter was inapplicable to this case because Evans was attempting to introduce evidence to prove her blood-alcohol content was below the legal limit, rather than attempting to prove she was not intoxicated. ¶9. We agree with the Court of Appeals and Evans that Porter is distinguishable and not controlling in the instant case. In Porter, after being arrested, the defendant submitted to an Intoxilyzer analysis of his BAC at the police station. Porter, 749 So. 2d at 253. His BAC was determined to be .164%. Id. at 253 (¶5). Porter sought to present evidence that would rebut what he termed “the ‘presumption’ that his blood alcohol content of .164% impaired his ability to operate his vehicle.” Id. at 254-55 (¶13). There was no issue regarding a lapse of time between Porter’s arrest and the test. At trial, the circuit court granted the State’s motion in limine, and the Court of Appeals found no error. Id. at 255 (¶15). ¶10. To properly understand Porter’s holding in light of our current DUI laws, we must analyze the history of the DUI statute. As the Porter court explained, since an amendment to the DUI statutes in 1983, it is a “per se” violation to operate a vehicle when the defendant’s BAC, as shown through a chemical analysis, is over the legal limit, which at that time was .10%.6 Id. at 255 (¶14) (citing Fisher v. City of Eupora, 587 So. 2d 878, 888 5 Although the Court of Appeals has addressed the issue and application of retrograde extrapolation, this Court has not yet ruled on the admissibility of such testimony. 6 In 2002, this standard was changed to .08%. See Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30 (1)(c) (Rev. 2004). 7 (Miss. 1991)). This Court explained in Fisher that since 1983, there is no longer a statutory “presumption” that a person is intoxicated if he is over the legal limit for BAC, but instead, it is a “per se” violation under Section 63-11-30. Id. This is the “presumption” that Porter was attempting to rebut. Further, in 1991, Section 63-11-39(2), a statute allowing the introduction of evidence on whether or not a person was under the influence of intoxicating liquor which impaired a person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle, was repealed. Id. at 255 (¶15). Because of this repeal, the Court of Appeals found Porter’s argument nullified, as he could not enter evidence that he was not impaired, because he was prosecuted for a DUI-perse violation, and not impairment. Id.7 ¶11. Currently, the pertinent Mississippi DUI statute provides in part that it is unlawful for any person to drive or operate a vehicle in Mississippi if he is: (a) under the influence of intoxicating liquor; . . . or (c) has an alcohol concentration of eight one-hundredths percent (.08%) or more for persons at or above the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages in Mississippi. Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1)(a) and (c) (Rev. 2004). Section 63-11-30(1)(a) is referred to as “common-law DUI,” and it is distinguishable from Section 63-11-30(1)(c), which is referred to as “per-se DUI.” “Common-law DUI” is often used to prosecute defendants when BAC test results are unavailable, or the defendant’s BAC tests are under 7 In his separate opinion, Justice Kitchens correctly points out that the admissibility of evidence is to be governed by the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. See Whitehurst v. State, 540 So. 2d 1319, 1323 (Miss. 1989). Nonetheless, this Court has followed statutory provisions regarding evidentiary matters that are not in conflict with the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Miss. R. Evid. 1103 (“[a]ll evidentiary rules, whether provided by statute, court decision or court rule, which are inconsistent with the Mississippi Rules of Evidence are hereby repealed.”) (emphasis added). 8 the legal limit, but there is sufficient evidence to prove the defendant’s ability to operate a vehicle was impaired by the consumption of alcohol. Leuer, 744 So. 2d at 268 (¶¶6-7). This evidence of impairment may include slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, or erratic driving. However, in Evans’s case, we do not have any such “impairment” evidence, only her BAC level. Thus, Evans was not prosecuted under the common-law DUI statute, but for a per-se violation under Section 63-11-30(1)(c). ¶12. We read Porter to stand for the proposition that in a DUI-per-se case, the defendant cannot offer evidence regarding whether or not he was under the influence which would impair his ability to drive a vehicle.8 However, we do not read Porter as holding that in a DUI-per-se case, evidence regarding the consumption of alcohol cannot be introduced to prove whether or not the defendant was at a certain BAC when she was driving a motor vehicle. In the instant case, Evans was not offering Dr. Rosenhan’s testimony on retrograde extrapolation to prove she was not impaired when she was pulled over. Instead, she offered it to prove that she did not have a BAC of .08% or more when she was pulled over; thus, she did not violate Section 63-11-30(1)(c). ¶13. The State interprets Evans’s argument to be that, although her BAC was over the legal limit when she was tested, she was not impaired an hour earlier when she was driving; thus, Evans is really trying to prove, through Dr. Rosenhan’s testimony and other evidence, that her alcohol consumption did not impair her ability to drive. We find the State misinterprets Evans’s argument and her immediate purpose for introducing the evidence. Evans offered 8 However, this type of evidence properly could be offered for a violation of Section 63-11-30(1)(a). 9 the evidence to prove her BAC was not above the legal limit when she was pulled over. Thus, we agree with the analysis and decision of the Court of Appeals finding that Porter is inapplicable in this matter, because Evans was not offering evidence to prove she was not impaired. II. WHETHER THIS COURT MAY UNDERTAKE THE ISSUE OF THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE EXPERT WITNESS. ¶14. The issue here centers around whether the trial court made a proper determination on the qualifications of Dr. Rosenhan as an expert witness. The Court of Appeals undertook the issue and found Dr. Rosenhan to be a qualified expert witness. However, this Court finds that the trial judge never made a determination of the qualifications of Dr. Rosenhan as an expert witness. He also made no finding on the reliability of his testimony. The trial judge is the gatekeeper who assesses the value of the testimony. Tunica County v. Matthews, 926 So. 2d 209, 213 (Miss. 2006). ¶15. The trial judge ruled that the testimony of Dr. Rosenhan was not admissible due to the holding in the Porter case. However, as the Court of Appeals correctly found, Porter is inapplicable to the facts of this case. In light of this, we must determine whether the trial judge ruled on the qualifications of Dr. Rosenhan as an expert witness and the admissibility of his testimony. In reviewing the record, it is apparent that the trial judge never made a finding on the qualifications of Dr. Rosenhan as an expert witness. Neither did he review the reliability of the testimony consistent with the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. The trial judge stated that he was allowing a record to be made and that was “the only purpose for hearing” the evidence. Since the trial judge is vested with gatekeeping responsibility, it is his duty to 10 determine whether or not a witness is qualified and whether the testimony is reliable, consistent with the standard set out in the Rules of Evidence. See Tunica County, 926 So. 2d at 213. The decision by the Court of Appeals on the qualifications of Dr. Rosenhan as an expert was inappropriate, because the circuit court had not made a determination on Dr. Rosenhan’s qualifications to testify. Since the trial court is vested with the responsibility of making an initial determination, and this was not done, we must disagree with the Court of Appeals on this issue. Therefore, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals erred in making a determination of the qualifications of Dr. Rosenhan, because the issue was not properly before it. ¶16. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, although for different reasons, and we reverse the conviction and sentence of the circuit court. We remand this matter to the circuit court for a new trial consistent with this opinion. ¶17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED. THE JUDGMENT OF THE MONROE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS REVERSED AND THIS CASE IS REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL. WALLER, C.J., CARLSON, P.J., RANDOLPH, LAMAR, AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR. KITCHENS, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY GRAVES, P.J. AND DICKINSON, J.