Opinion ID: 1667075
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: But we must consider whether such an unauthorized sentence falls under § 29-2320, which provides that we may reverse a sentence found to be excessively lenient. The question arises because absent specific statutory authorization, the State, as a general rule, has no right to appeal an adverse ruling in a criminal case. [10] Section 29-2320 allows the State to appeal a sentence in a felony conviction when the prosecutor reasonably believes, based on all of the facts and circumstances of the particular case, that the sentence is excessively lenient. [7] As already discussed, the court violated § 28-932 by giving Alford credit for time served while awaiting separate trials on a first degree murder charge and on the unrelated assault by a confined person charge. In effect, the court imposed a sentence that was less than that demanded by law. We conclude that a sentence which is less than that demanded by law is, by definition, excessively lenient. [11] We note that in appeals brought under § 29-2320, it has always been a fundamental part of our abuse of discretion standard of review to ensure that the sentence was imposed in accordance with those laws that limit the trial court's sentencing discretion. When an appellate court is reviewing a sentence for its leniency, a sentence imposed by a district court that is within the statutorily prescribed limits will not be disturbed on appeal unless there appears to be an abuse of the trial court's discretion. [12] It is not only a proper, but a necessary, part of our review for excessive leniency that we first consider whether the sentence conforms to the mandates of the sentencing statutes. Accordingly, in State v. Hamik, [13] in considering whether the defendant's sentence was excessively lenient, we first considered the State's argument that the defendant's sentence of probation for first degree sexual assault violated the mandatory minimum term provided by law. Only after we had concluded that the sentence was within the statutorily prescribed limits did we consider the State's argument that even if lawful, the circumstances of the case demanded a harsher punishment. We observe that in a different context, we said that [s]ection 29-2320 does not extend to the appeal of a sentence that is not in conformity with the law. [14] To the extent we suggested that § 29-2320 does not encompass appeals by a prosecutor who argues a sentence is excessively lenient because it falls below statutory sentencing parameters, we disapprove of this statement. We hold that for purposes of § 29-2320, a sentence that falls below the prescribed sentencing limits is simply an example of leniency. We find merit to the State's appeal, and in accordance with the authority granted by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2322 (Reissue 2008), we remand the cause with directions to vacate the credit for time served.