Opinion ID: 778658
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenges to the defendants' convictions

Text: 30

31 Garcia argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on grounds that the prosecution violated his plea agreement in an earlier case. He claims that his earlier guilty plea barred this prosecution because the government agreed not to charge him for acts which he committed prior to the date of the plea agreement and which he disclosed to the government, provided they were not crimes of violence or violations of Title 26 of the United States Code. 32 We review de novo the legal question of whether the government's conduct violates the terms of the plea agreement, 1 but Garcia bears the burden of proving the facts establishing a breach of the agreement — specifically, paragraph 9 providing that the government agrees [n]ot to charge Defendant with any other criminal violations concerning activities committed prior to the date of this agreement which the Defendant makes known to the United States and which did not involve crimes of violence or Title 26 offenses — by a preponderance of the evidence. 2 The uncontroverted evidence offered at the hearing on Garcia's motion established that Garcia did not disclose the crimes for which he is charged within the instant indictment. Garcia did not prove that the government breached paragraph 9 of his plea agreement by indicting Garcia in cause number 4:98-CR-47. We affirm the district court's denial of Garcia's motion to dismiss on these grounds.
33 Pineda argues that the district court erred in denying his motions to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds because his indictment in an earlier case barred this prosecution for possession with intent to distribute heroin. 3 34 [W]hether a prosecution violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is a question of law and is reviewed de novo, but the district court's factual findings are reviewed only for clear error. 4 Pineda's challenge to the indictment fails. Pineda may be charged with conduct in a conspiracy count, as overt acts, in the instant indictment (4:98-CR-47) for criminal conduct of which he has previously been convicted under a different indictment (4:98-CR-3) under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 5 Even to the extent conduct charged in Counts 1, 19-21, 23-25, and 28 of the instant indictment was used as relevant conduct in sentencing Pineda in cause number 4:98-CR-3, there is no violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause in the indictment for this conduct in the instant cause. Moreover, the sentences imposed on Pineda in the two cases run concurrently. 6 35 Collateral estoppel completely bars a subsequent prosecution only when a fact `necessarily determined' in the first prosecution is an essential element of the offense charged in the subsequent prosecution. 7 The facts necessary to the determination of Pineda's guilt for possession with intent to distribute heroin in cause number 4:98-CR-3 are not essential elements of the conspiracy charge in Count 1 of the instant indictment, even if alleged therein as overt acts. 8 The court did not err in denying Pineda's motion to dismiss.
36 Favela argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss Counts 1, 4, 5, and 13 of the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. He argues that he pled guilty in an earlier prosecution in state court to the exact transactions listed in Overt Acts 5, 6, and 16 in Count 1 of the instant indictment and that his prior conviction in state court is for the same alleged criminal conduct listed in Counts 1, 4, 5, and 13, all requiring the same elements, except for the conspiracy charge in Count 1. Favela argues that his claim is excepted from the dual sovereignty doctrine because of the comprehensive interaction between the state and federal agencies involved in his arrest. 9 37 It is well-established that, [u]nder the dual sovereignty doctrine, successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns for crimes arising out of the same acts are not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, unless `prosecution by one sovereign is used as a tool for successive prosecution by another sovereign.' 10 However, [w]hen a defendant claims collusion between federal and state law enforcement officials, the defendant has the burden of producing evidence to show a prima facie double jeopardy claim. 11 The district court's determination of whether the defendant has come forward with evidence to show a prima facie case of collusion between the federal and state government is a factual finding we review only for clear error. 12 38 Favela's double jeopardy claim is without merit. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, there is no double jeopardy violation in any overlap that may exist between Favela's state court drug convictions and substantive counts or overt acts charged in the instant indictment. Favela has not established any clear error in the district court's finding that there was no collusion between the federal and state prosecutors in this case or, more specifically, that there was no evidence that the state prosecution of Favela was merely a tool of the federal authorities. The district court did not err in denying Favela's motion to dismiss. 39
40 In reviewing the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress, we review the district court's factual findings, including its credibility choices, for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. 13 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the district court, here the government. 14 41 A search conducted pursuant to consent is excepted from the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements. 15 In order to satisfy the consent exception, the government must establish that consent to search was freely and voluntarily given and that the individual who gave consent had authority to do so and must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was voluntary and effective. 16 Additionally, the government has the burden of proving that the search was conducted within the scope of the consent received. 17 42 Consent need not be given by the defendant himself. In the context of searches, it is well established that the police may conduct a warrantless search of an area without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment if a third party with common control over the area consents to the search. 18 43 The voluntariness of consent is a question of fact to be determined from a totality of the circumstances, and we review the district court's finding of voluntariness for clear error. 19 `Where the judge bases a finding of consent on the oral testimony at a suppression hearing, the clearly erroneous standard is particularly strong since the judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.' 20 This court considers six factors in evaluating the voluntariness of consent to search, all of which are relevant, but no one of which is dispositive or controlling. 21 The consent, however, may not be given simply in acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. 22
44 Pineda argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence found in the warrantless search of his house and the outbuildings behind his house on November 23, 1997, based on the allegedly invalid consent obtained from Pineda's wife. 45 Pineda first contends that his wife's consent was involuntarily given. The district court, after hearing conflicting testimony at a suppression hearing, found that: Pineda's wife was not placed under arrest prior to, or coerced into, signing the form; an INS agent explained the form to Pineda's wife in Spanish and advised her of her rights to refuse consent and to require a search warrant; Pineda's wife was not threatened or promised anything and did not appear to be distraught; Pineda's wife cooperated in the search and pointed out heroin in a closet; based on the court's observations at the hearing, she was intelligent enough to know what was being asked of her; and she was aware that incriminating evidence was at the house because she pointed heroin out herself. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and giving due deference to the credibility determinations of the district court, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in its findings and that, under the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not err in concluding that Pineda's wife's consent was voluntarily given. 46 Pineda also argues that the government failed to prove that his wife had authority to give consent to search the house and the outbuildings. He argues that the record does not support the government's reliance on her joint access or control over the residence and outbuildings or that the officers reasonably believed that she was authorized to consent. The district court found that Pineda's wife has authority to consent to the search of the house and outbuildings, because she lived there with her husband and mutually used the property and had joint access to and control over it. Based upon our review of the record as a whole, we conclude that the district court's findings are not clearly erroneous and that, at the very least, the circumstances surrounding Pineda's wife's giving consent to search are such that reasonable officers could have believed that she was authorized to consent to a search of her marital residence. 23 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Pineda's motion to suppress.
47 Jose Meza argues that the district court erred in denying a motion to suppress evidence taken from Alfonzo Meza's house — the blue house — in a search on May 14, 1997. We note that Alfonzo Meza filed the motion to suppress the fruits of this search, not Jose Meza. On appeal, the issue of the district court's alleged error in denying the motion to suppress the drugs, guns, and other evidence recovered from the house is specifically raised only by Jose Meza. Jose Meza's argument on appeal may be adopted by Alfonzo Meza through Rule 28(i), because the facts are not specific to Jose Meza vis-à-vis Alfonzo Meza and because Alfonzo clearly has standing to challenge the search of his residence. We conclude, in any event, that neither defendant is entitled to relief on this point of error. 48 To begin with, contrary to Jose Meza's contention, the police did not require probable cause or a warrant to ask Alfonzo Meza whether any weapons were located in the house, where there is no indication that asking him this question amounted to a Fourth Amendment seizure. 24 Nor was probable cause required once the officers obtained Alfonzo Meza's consent to seize the gun he identified as being in his bedroom on a shelf. 25 49 Jose Meza argues that Alfonzo Meza's consent to a search for the gun he identified was not given freely and voluntary. In support of this claim, Jose Meza notes that: seven police officers were present, constituting a show of force and grounds for assuming that the search was inevitable; the police officer asked Alfonzo about weapons only after the officers serving the arrest warrant for Jose Meza searched the house and did not find Jose; Alfonzo was never read a Miranda warning before being asked about weapons; Alfonzo was never advised that he had the right to refuse consent to search for the gun; and there is no evidence that ownership of the gun in his house was illegal. 50 We note first that many of these observations cut in favor of a finding of voluntariness. For example, that Alfonzo was not in custody and that the police were not required to read him a Miranda warning. 26 Moreover, while knowledge that incriminating evidence would be found does not necessarily weigh against a finding of voluntary consent, 27 the absence of an obvious crime in the ownership of a gun certainly does not render consent involuntary. Further, we have held consent to be voluntary even in the face of greater shows of force than the presence here of seven officers, some in uniform and none with weapons drawn or displaying force beyond their presence in numbers. 28 Furthermore, [w]hile knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor in determining voluntariness, the failure to advise an individual of the right to withhold consent is not determinative in and of itself. 29 51 We also note that, after hearing testimony at the suppression hearing, the district court found that Alfonzo Meza voluntarily gave oral consent to search the house for the gun. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and crediting the district court's credibility determinations, we conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, Alfonzo Meza's consent to search for the gun in his room was voluntarily given. 52 However, having obtained this consent to search and having proceeded to the room where Alfonzo indicated the gun was located on a shelf, an officer accompanying the officer who was given consent to search for the gun moved a cooler over to the shelf to allow the shorter, searching officer to reach the gun. Jose Meza argues that, in so doing, the police exceeded the scope of the consent to search and violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that this violation tainted the subsequent consent Alfonzo gave to search the entire house. 30 We disagree. The uncontroverted evidence shows that the cooler was moved only in order to effectuate the search for the gun, for which consent was voluntarily given. As such, the officers did not exceed the scope of the consent, 31 and, as the district court found, the heroin found under the cooler was in plain view. 32 53 We further conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, the subsequent consent to search was voluntarily given. The district court, after hearing testimony at the suppression hearing, found that: Alfonzo Meza gave written consent to further search the residence; the consent form informed Alfonzo of his right to refuse consent; Alfonzo was cooperative and was not in custody at the time; there were no coercive police procedures used; and Alfonzo was free to leave and did so. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and giving due deference to the district court's credibility determinations, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in its findings and that the district court correctly concluded that Alfonzo Meza's consent was voluntarily given. We hold that the district court did not err in refusing to suppress the fruits of the search of Alfonzo Meza's residence. 54
55 Jose Meza argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, and thereafter admitting, his videotaped confession of March 26, 1998. He argues that he was intoxicated when he gave the statement and, as such, despite being given a Miranda warning, his confession was not the product of his free and rational choice and he did not freely and voluntarily waive his constitutional rights to counsel and silence. 56 In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, we give credence to the credibility choices and fact finding by the district court unless they are clearly erroneous, but the ultimate issue of voluntariness is a legal question reviewed de novo.  33 Likewise, a district court's determination regarding the validity of a defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights is a question of law reviewed de novo, but this court accepts the factual conclusions underlying the district court's legal determination unless they are clearly erroneous. 34 57 We have rejected a challenge similar to Jose Meza's in United States v. Garcia Abrego, 35 wherein the defendant argued that that the drugs that Mexican officials administered to him, coupled with the solicitousness of U.S. law enforcement officials, rendered his custodial statement involuntary. 36 There, we concluded that [t]he record contains ample evidence from which the district court could conclude that the drugs that Mexican authorities administered to Garcia Abrego did not impair his mental capacity and that Dr. Coleman's testimony that Garcia Abrego did not appear impaired and evinced none of the symptoms of a Valium overdose, together with the testimony of the officers who interviewed Garcia Abrego that he appeared in no way impaired, provided an adequate basis for the district court's conclusion that Garcia Abrego's mental capacity was not impaired as a result of the drugs that he had been administered earlier in the day. 37 We further observed that the district court was free to accord great weight to the testimony of those individuals who actually observed Garcia Abrego prior to his interview with law enforcement authorities. 38 58 Similarly, here, Jose Meza presented his own testimony that he did some speed about an hour before being taken into custody and that he did not remember being arrested or being read a Miranda warning. He also testified that he had been arrested and read Miranda warnings several times previously and understood his rights each time. Jose Meza also presented the testimony of a licensed chemical dependency counselor who testified that, based on a review of portions of the videotaped statement, Jose Meza appeared to be on some kind of amphetamine. 59 The government presented the testimony of Billy Meeks, an experienced Plano Police Department detective who interviewed Jose Meza and who had prior dealings with him. Meeks testified that he read Jose Meza a Miranda warning and that Jose responded that he understood and that he was willing to talk. Meeks also testified that there was no indication that Jose Meza was under the influence of any controlled substance and that, when asked prior to the interview, Jose Meza stated that he had last used cocaine or heroin eleven days before. Meeks further testified that Jose Meza was not in handcuffs, was not threatened or made any promises, and was aware of questions asked and was responsive. 60 The district court also viewed portions of the videotape itself. It then found that: the interview took place one hour after arrest; Jose Meza was informed of the charges and read a Miranda warning; no coercion was used and no promises were made; and Jose Meza looked alert on the videotape, was lucid and responsive, was quite articulate talking to Meeks and answering Meeks's questions, and appeared to be understanding the conversation, despite occasionally yawning and scratching himself. On the strength of these findings, which we conclude were not clearly erroneous, we conclude that the government proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Jose Meza voluntarily confessed and validly waived his Fifth Amendment rights following a Miranda warning. 39 As such, we affirm the district court's denial of Jose Meza's motion to suppress his videotaped statement.
61 Joinder of defendants is proper if co-defendants are alleged to have participated in the same act or transactions constituting the offense. 40 Generally, persons indicted together should be tried together, especially in conspiracy cases. 41 Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14, a [d]istrict court may grant a severance `[i]f it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together.' 42 62 We review the denial of a severance motion for an abuse of discretion. 43 Our standards for challenges to a district court's denial of a motion to sever are well-settled: To prevail, `the defendant must show that: (1) the joint trial prejudiced him to such an extent that the district court could not provide adequate protection; and (2) the prejudice outweighed the government's interest in economy of judicial administration.' 44
63 Jose Solis argues that the district court erred in denying him a severance because he was forced to trial with his brother, who was charged with numerous overt acts which Jose Solis argues produced a spill-over effect leading to Jose's convictions, and that he was afraid to testify on his own behalf. 45 He argues that he was convicted on guilt by association. 46 64 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a severance for Jose Solis. The grounds raised by Jose Solis do not rise to the level of a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise one of Jose Solis's specific trial rights or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence, and the district court issued sufficient cautionary instructions to the jury. 47 Moreover, the jury acquitted some of the alleged co-conspirators, supporting an inference that the jury sorted through the evidence, however complex, and considered each defendant and each count separately. 48
65 Mendez argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to sever because he was prejudiced by being tried with co-defendants with prior convictions admitted in evidence against them and by the cumulatively prejudicial combination of evidence, offenses, and defendants and confusion of identities. Mendez's arguments do not merit reversal, especially where, as here, the district court gave proper cautionary and limiting instructions sufficient to mitigate the risks of prejudice of which Mendez complains, 49 and where it cannot be said that the jury could not be expected to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to separate defendants. 50 We conclude that the district court did not err in denying Mendez's motion to sever. 66 Mendez, however, also argues that the district court erred by denying his motions to sever, for mistrial, and for new trial based on Jose Solis's admission of the existence of a conspiracy during his closing argument. He argues that this admission by a non-testifying co-defendant violates his Fifth Amendment due process and Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. 67 We review the denial of motions for mistrial and for new trial for abuse of discretion. 51 We reject Mendez's argument. First, it is not at all clear that Jose Solis actually admitted the existence of the conspiracy. Throughout the closing, his attorney alternately referred to the alleged conspiracy and the conspiracy. Second, to the extent that the statement did admit the existence of the conspiracy, the district court gave cautionary instructions that argument and statements of counsel are not evidence, as we have found sufficient to cure such prejudice in a similar case, in which one defendant's attorney indicated it was his belief that the evidence was sufficient to establish his client's guilt on one of the counts. 52 Furthermore, because the closing argument was not evidence, there was no denial of Mendez's rights secured by the Confrontation and Due Process Clauses. 53 68 Furthermore, to the extent Mendez sought a mistrial and severance on these grounds, we have held that one co-defendant's admitting a conspiracy was not a mutually antagonistic defense that required severance. 54 No particular co-defendant was implicated, so the statement does not implicate Bruton concerns. 55 We find no error in the district court's denial of Mendez's motions to sever, for mistrial, and for new trial.

69 Garcia argues that the district court erred in admitting into evidence the government's exhibits 615-631, a series of charts summarizing evidence of communications between the defendants. We review a district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and consider whether any error is harmless. 56 70 We find no error in admitting the charts. The charts were drawn from competent evidence before the jury, which was available to the defendants at trial and was subject to cross-examination. 57 Moreover, the jury was properly instructed concerning use of the charts and the limitations thereof. 58 Furthermore, even if there was error in the use of the charts or the testimony of Agent Scott Douglas introducing them, Garcia does not argue that it affected one of his substantial rights. 59 The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this summary evidence.
71 Mendez argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting hearsay statements, through the non-hearsay definition of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) for co-conspirator statements, from Chris Cooper, Honey Parsa, Jonathon Kollman, Meghann LaBonte, and Santiago Mejia regarding the source of drugs and hearsay statements from himself, because these statements were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy. We review `the admission of hearsay evidence under the non-hearsay definition of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) for abuse of discretion.' 60 Under our precedent, [t]he proponent of admittance under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) the existence of a conspiracy, (2) the statement was made by a co-conspirator of the party, (3) the statement was made during the course of the conspiracy, and (4) the statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 61 72 After reviewing the evidence offered in connection with these statements, we affirm the district court's rulings admitting the challenged co-conspirators' statements and taped conversation. The government offered adequate evidence in support of the district court's rulings admitting these statements, and the district court's findings in support of those rulings were not clearly erroneous. 62 Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
73 Mendez also argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting redacted summaries of Arturo Meza's statement and Jose Meza's statements in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights as developed by Bruton and its progeny. 74 We conclude that there was no Bruton error in the admission of the summaries of the confessions of Arturo Meza and Jose Meza. The summaries contain no references to co-defendants, or specifically Mendez, even as a neutral pronoun. 63 Additionally, the district court provided proper limiting instructions. 64 We affirm the district court's admission of the summaries of the statements of Jose Meza and Hilario Meza into evidence. 65 75
76 Garcia argues that the district court erred in overruling his objection to the prosecutor's alleged comment on his refusal to testify and his right to remain silent in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. We review de novo whether a prosecutor's argument is an impermissible comment on the defendant's right not to testify. 66 77 We apply a two-tiered test to [a defendant's] claim that the prosecutor improperly commented on his failure to testify, the first tier of which is to determine whether the comments at issue were constitutionally impermissible. 67 We conclude that the prosecutor here did not make a constitutionally impermissible comment by stating: This is a circumstantial case, it's a look back in time and piecing together of evidence that Defendants didn't want you or I to discover. Garcia objected to this statement at trial, and the district court gave a cautionary instruction and overruled the objection. The prosecutor then clarified his argument to the jury by stating that, [c]learly, when people are engaged in criminal conduct, they don't want to be caught. And that's the point I'm trying to make. 78 Under these facts, the prosecutor's manifest intent was not to comment on the defendant's silence and the character of the remark was not such that the jury would naturally and necessarily construe it as a comment on the defendant's silence. 68 The more plausible explanation for the remark was that given by the prosecutor after the objection was overruled. This comment was constitutionally permissible, and we reject this point of error. 69 79
80 Arturo Meza argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal as to Count 12 when the government offered insufficient evidence that any of the events described therein occurred on August 19, 1997, in the Eastern District of Texas, as required for venue. Mendez raises the same argument and also argues that the government failed to prove venue for the most prejudicial overt acts charged against him in Count 1. 70 81 We review the district court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. 71 Where a defendant argues that the government failed to adduce evidence sufficient to support venue for a particular count, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict. 72 According to statute, [w]hen an offense is begun in one district and completed in another, venue is proper in any district in which the offense was `begun, continued, or completed,' 73 and venue is properly based on a preponderance of the evidence showing the commission of any single act that was part of the beginning, continuation, or completion of the crime. 74 We have held that, [a]lthough the government must prove venue by the preponderance of the evidence, circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to establish venue. 75 82 Our review of the record convinces us that there was sufficient evidence that the heroin distributed as alleged in Count 12 was transported from the Eastern District of Texas on August 19 and delivered as part of the conspiracy to an apartment that, as the government stipulated, is located in the Northern District of Texas. 76 We note that, under Pinkerton liability, the government need not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Arturo Meza himself transported the drugs from the Eastern District, but only that he or one of his co-conspirators did so. The district court did not err in ruling that there was sufficient evidence that one or more of the Meza brothers traveled with the heroin alleged in Count 12 from the Eastern District. As for Mendez's second argument, venue is not required over all overt acts alleged in Count 1, and so his argument on this score is without merit. 77 83
84 In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether a rational jury could have found that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on each element of the offense, drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence and viewing all credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the verdict. 78 We do not evaluate the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. 79
85 To sustain a conviction for conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 841, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: `(1) the existence of an agreement between two or more persons to violate narcotics law; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the agreement; and (3) the defendant's voluntary participation in the agreement.' 80 It is well-settled that [a] jury may infer these elements from circumstantial evidence. 81 86 Jose Solis, Pineda, Favela, Hilario Solis, and Mendez argue that the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions for conspiracy under Count 1 of the indictment. 82 The extensive evidence contained in the record and marshaled in the government's brief, however, affirms that these challenges are meritless. Thus, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, adequately supports the jury's findings beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an agreement between two or more persons to distribute heroin and cocaine, that each of these defendants knew of the agreement, and that each voluntarily participated. 83
87 Jose Solis, Pineda, Favela, Hilario Solis, and Mendez, however, also challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions for several substantive counts of the indictment. We have recently summarized the requirements for the government to prevail on a charge of a substantive violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1): The essential elements of possession with the intent to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 are 1) knowledge, 2) possession, and 3) intent to distribute the controlled substances. 84 88 The government notes that the defendants can, in the absence of direct personal involvement, be held liable for the substantive counts charged against them based on Pinkerton liability. 85 A party to a continuing conspiracy may be criminally liable for a substantive offense committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy, even though the party does not participate in the substantive offense, or have any knowledge of it. 86 The government also correctly notes that the jury was instructed on a Pinkerton theory of liability as is required. 87 89 We have further held, however, that [a] party to a conspiracy may be held criminally responsible for a substantive offense committed by a coconspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy [only] if the offense was reasonably foreseeable and was committed during that party's membership in the conspiracy. 88 Distribution and possession with intent to distribute offenses are reasonably foreseeable acts in furtherance of a conspiracy to distribute drugs. 89 90 Our review of the record convinces us that, with the exception of Pineda's challenge to his convictions for Counts 6 and 9, these defendants' arguments as to sufficiency of the evidence under the substantive counts charged against them are without merit based on the evidence presented at trial and, insofar as the defendants claim to have had no personal involvement in any particular drug transaction, on the basis of Pinkerton liability. Even drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence and viewing all credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the verdict, however, we conclude that there was no evidence of personal involvement by Pineda in the transactions charged in Counts 6 and 9, as the government itself admitted at trial. Furthermore, the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Pineda was a member of the conspiracy at a time prior to August 1997 and therefore at the time of the transactions on June 8, 1997 (Count 6) and July 23, 1997 (Count 9) so as to support Pineda's convictions of Counts 6 and 9 under a Pinkerton theory.
91 We affirm the district court's denial of the motions for acquittal of Jose Solis, Favela, Hilario Solis, and Mendez and of Pineda as to Counts 1, 12, 14-15, 18-25, and 27-28, but we reverse Pineda's conviction on Counts 6 and 9, vacate his life sentences as to Counts 6 and 9, and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal on these counts and resentencing, if necessary.