Opinion ID: 749842
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: remand for dismissal of state constitutional claims

Text: 18 Ms. Bauchman asserts defendants' conduct violated her state as well as federal constitutional rights. More specifically, she alleges the defendants' policies and actions (1) constitute the enactment of a law respecting the establishment of religion and infringing plaintiff's right of conscience in violation of Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of Utah, (2) have prevented [her] from freely exercising her own religion ... in violation of Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of Utah, (3) deprived [her] of her freedom of speech ... in violation of Article I, Section 15 of the Constitution of Utah, and (4) deprived [her] of her rights to a public education free from sectarian control in violation of Article X, Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah. After disposing of Ms. Bauchman's federal claims, the district court dismissed Ms. Bauchman's state constitutional claims on the merits, concluding the state constitutional provisions upon which Ms. Bauchman relies are not self-executing and contain no provisions or mechanism for a court action or remedy. The district court further ruled Ms. Bauchman's state law claims were barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann., § 63-30-3(1). 19 The district court considered Ms. Bauchman's state law claims under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Pendent jurisdiction is exercised on a discretionary basis, keeping in mind considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The United States Supreme Court has counseled, pendent jurisdiction need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to exist.... Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139. If federal claims are dismissed before trial, leaving only issues of state law, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice. Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 619, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988); Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139. 20 The district court dismissed Ms. Bauchman's federal claims on the pleadings. We are upholding that decision. The state law questions presented in this appeal concern whether the Utah Constitution provides a private right of action against government establishment of religion, infringement of freedom of conscience and sectarian control of public schools. Utah courts have never squarely addressed this issue. Accordingly, any exercise of federal jurisdiction over Ms. Bauchman's state claims seriously implicates principles of comity. Under these circumstances, Carnegie-Mellon University and Gibbs counsel us to leave the development and application of private causes of action under the Utah Constitution to the Utah courts. See Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 669 (10th Cir.1995). The beneficial effect of permitting a Utah state court to determine the private rights of action under the Utah Constitution far outweighs any negative consequences (i.e., delay) of declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction. We therefore decline to review the merits of Ms. Bauchman's state law claims. Instead, we conclude the district court abused its discretion by exercising jurisdiction over those claims and remand Ms. Bauchman's state law claims to the district court with instructions to dismiss without prejudice for want of federal jurisdiction.