Opinion ID: 1233143
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Violation of Safety Statute or Standard

Text: The third requirement of the statute involves proof that the specific unsafe working condition constituted a violation of a state or federal safety statute whether cited or not, or constituted a violation of a commonly accepted and well-known safety standard within the industry or business of the employer which statute or standard was specifically applicable to the particular working condition involved, as contrasted with a statute or standard generally requiring safe working conditions. Id. § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii)(C). The appellee's expert testified at trial that the following OSHA regulations had been violated: 1) 29 C.F.R. 1910.22 (1983), which requires work places be kept clean and sanitary; 2) 29 C.F.R. 1910.37 (1983), which requires that exterior ways of exit access be substantially level and if there is a change in elevation, such elevation shall be negotiated by a stair or ramp; 3) 29 C.F.R. 1910.132 (1983), which requires that personal protective equipment be worn when handling hazardous materials; and 29 C.F.R. 1910.145 (1983), which requires that cans be labeled and danger signs be placed to define specific hazards and hazardous materials. The appellant attempted to refute these violations through their own expert testimony which indicated that the potential violations presented by the appellee pertained to corrosive material [15] and that it was his opinion the hot grease was not corrosive for the purposes of the regulations. Moreover, the only possible violation which occurred was of the general duty clause which guarantees each worker a safe and healthful place, but a violation of this regulation alone is insufficient to prove the requirement of the statute. Significantly, the appellee's expert further testified that in addition to the specific OSHA violations, the grease disposal practice was also in violation of a commonly accepted and well-known safety standard within the industry or business of the employer. Specifically, the appellee's testimony was that based on his background in the restaurant industry [16] [t]he industry standards for disposing of the hot grease would have been to drain the grease into a container which could have been tightly sealed and could have transmitted or transferred that hot grease to another container without the possibility of the hot grease escaping the container. The appellant put on no evidence to contradict that this was the standard for the restaurant industry. Consequently, we find that the appellee sufficiently proved this statutory requirement.