Opinion ID: 2302385
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Ordinance or Law Exclusion

Text: We reach the same conclusion with respect to the second policy exception cited by Peerless, the Ordinance or Law exclusion. The terms of that exclusion warn that the policy does not cover a loss caused by any ordinance or law regulating the construction, repair, or demolition of a building or other structure, unless specifically provided under this policy.  (Emphasis added.) Again, an ambiguity arises when these terms are read together with the terms of the Special Ultra Plus coverage summary, which promises coverage above and beyond the base policy, and says that Ordinance or Law Compliance for Buildings ( required after a loss ) is Included. An ordinary reader could reasonably conclude that the endorsement specifically provides for losses caused by ordinance compliance, which would vitiate the exclusion found in Section I. Our conclusion here was strongly portended by our holding in Mallane, 658 A.2d at 21. The plaintiff in Mallane sought uninsured-motorist coverage under his brother's automobile insurance policy. See id. at 19. The declaration page of the policy, which the Court held was part of the agreement, designated plaintiff as a named driver. See id. The defendant insurance company argued that the plaintiff nonetheless was not an insured under the terms of the policy because he was not a covered person, and that the terms of the policy were unambiguous. See id. This Court agreed with the plaintiff that the declaration page gave rise to an ambiguity, and that even when the Court considered the terms of the policy in their entirety, a reasonable reader would be warranted in concluding that a driver named on the declaration page was covered. See id. at 20-21. The Mallane court held that reasonable expectations of coverage raised by the declaration page cannot be contradicted by the policy's boilerplate unless the declaration page itself clearly so warns the insured. Id. at 21 (quoting Lehrhoff v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 271 N.J.Super. 340, 638 A.2d 889, 892 (1994)). We hold the same to be true of a coverage summary that is incorporated into the insurance policy. See id.; see also Grenga, 556 A.2d at 1000 (holding that when a declaration page listed uninsured motorist coverage, but that coverage was not included in the policy, the insurance company was required to provide such coverage to the insured). Like a declaration page, the contents of an insurance coverage summaryparticularly when it is found within the four corners of the policy, as it is hereare of paramount importance because it is common knowledge that the detailed provisions of insurance contracts are seldom read by the consumer. Grenga, 556 A.2d at 1000 (citing Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 118 R.I. 321, 329, 373 A.2d 810, 813 (1977)). Even if purchasers do read the full terms of the agreement, as perhaps they should, there is no guarantee that they will be able to decipher them with much clarity. There can be no question that summaries written by an insurance company are necessarily relied upon by consumers as reasonably clear statements about what they have purchased. Even though the summary refers to itself as a brief description and directs the reader to your agent, policy, and endorsements, it in no way gives any clue that the coverage will contradict, or be any different from, that which is set forth in the summary. Consistent with this reasoning and our own precedent, the ambiguities discussed here are strictly construed against the insurer, the author of the agreement. See Bliss Mine Road Condominium Association, 11 A.3d at 1085. Accordingly, we hold that the trial justice did not err when she determined that the policy was ambiguous, and further hold that the plaintiffs are entitled to coverage for the repairs that were necessary to bring their home into compliance with the applicable building code.