Opinion ID: 413469
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Theresa's Appeal

Text: 33 Theresa raises three issues on appeal. First, she contends that the District Court erred in permitting Sgt. Hallums to testify as to his opinion that Theresa was removing the rear license plate from the Buick. Second, she contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction as an accessory after the fact to armed bank robbery. Finally, Theresa contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to the elements of the offense of being an accessory after the fact to armed bank robbery. Because we find these contentions to be without merit, we affirm Theresa's conviction. 34 Prior to trial, Theresa moved the court to preclude Sgt. Hallums from testifying that, in his opinion, Theresa was removing the rear license plate from the blue and white Buick. The motion was denied and, at trial, Sgt. Hallums was permitted to testify that Theresa was removing the license plate. 35 The admissibility of opinion testimony, pursuant to Rules 701 and 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and his decision will be overturned only if it constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Cox, 633 F.2d 871 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 844, 102 S.Ct. 159, 70 L.Ed.2d 130 (1981); Unitec Corp. v. Beatty Safway Scaffold Co. of Oregon, 358 F.2d 470 (9th Cir.1966). Opinion testimony of a lay witness is admissible if it is (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Fed.R.Evid. 701. We believe that Sgt. Hallums' opinion testimony was rationally based on his perceptions and was helpful to a determination of a fact in issue. At the time of Sgt. Hallums' arrival at the Tucson Inn, the rear license plate was still affixed to the Buick. Theresa was at the rear of the Buick and was holding an instrument that appeared to be a screwdriver. Shortly thereafter the rear license plate was missing. No one else had approached the vehicle. While it would have perhaps been better had the District Court limited Sgt. Hallums to statement of the underlying facts, we find no abuse of discretion in the admission of Sgt. Hallums' opinion testimony. Even were we to find the admission of Sgt. Hallums' opinion to be error, however, it would not justify reversal. Theresa's fingerprints were found on the Nevada license plate found in Room 123. At the time of her arrest, Theresa had on her person two screws fitting the rear license plate bracket of the blue and white Buick. Accordingly, the admission of Sgt. Hallums' opinion testimony was, at most, harmless error. See United States v. Cox, 633 F.2d at 876. 36 Theresa next contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. 28 In particular, she argues that insufficient evidence was presented to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she knew Michael used a gun in the commission of the robbery. 37 At the outset, we note that actual knowledge, as an element of the offense of being an accessory after the fact, may be shown entirely through circumstantial evidence. United States v. Mills, 597 F.2d 693, 696 (9th Cir.1979). Michael escaped from the scene of the robbery in a blue and white Buick accompanied by at least one and possibly two other black persons. Theresa was later seen removing the license plate from the Buick. The jury could have rationally inferred that Theresa was one of the persons in the Buick at the time of the escape and that she saw and heard Michael shoot at Larry Hill. Further, the jury could have inferred that Theresa saw Michael enter the car with a drawn gun. Moreover, Theresa had the key to Room 123 in her possession at the time of her arrest. The chrome-plated revolver used in the commission of the robbery was later found in Room 123. The jury could have rationally concluded that Theresa saw the gun in the room and knew that Michael had used it in the commission of the robbery. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Theresa knew Michael used a gun in robbing the Savings & Loan. 38 Finally, Theresa contends that the jury instructions were inadequate to inform the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Theresa knew Michael was armed in order to find her guilty as an accessory after the fact to armed bank robbery. 29 We disagree. 39 The adequacy of jury instructions is determined by an examination of the instructions as a whole. United States v. Mills, 597 F.2d at 700. In instructing the jury, the District Judge stated at the outset that the jury was not to single out any one instruction alone ... but [was to] ... consider the instructions as a whole and each in the light of all the others. The trial judge then stated the elements of the offense of armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(d). In stating these elements, he stated that use of a gun in the commission of the bank robbery was an essential element of the offense under Sec. 2113(d). He then instructed the jury that, in order to find Theresa guilty as an accessory after the fact, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that she knew that Michael Curtis Burnette ... [committed] the bank robbery ... in violation of Title 18, United States Code Section 2113(d). The trial judge defined the requisite knowledge as actual knowledge that Michael had violated 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(d). Theresa contends that the trial judge should have completely restated the elements of a violation of Sec. 2113(d) when instructing the jury as to the elements of being an accessory after the fact to armed bank robbery. According to Theresa, the trial judge erred by referring to the code section without restating the elements of a violation of that section. We disagree. The trial judge had previously stated in full the elements of a violation of Sec. 2113(d). He had told the jury to consider each instruction in light of all others. Although it might have been preferable for the court to reiterate the elements of Sec. 2113(d), we believe the jury was clearly instructed that Theresa must have had actual knowledge of each element of Sec. 2113(d), including knowledge of the use of a gun, in order to be guilty as an accessory after the fact to armed bank robbery. 30 We therefore conclude that the jury instructions, taken as a whole, sufficiently informed the jury that Theresa's knowledge that Michael was armed was an essential element of the offense of being an accessory after the fact to armed bank robbery.