Opinion ID: 1925538
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: failure to dismiss count three

Text: Davis argues that he was immune from prosecution for sexual battery upon Mrs. Davis, and the court's erroneous failure to dismiss Count Three unduly prejudiced him on the remaining counts. Count Three charged Davis with sexual battery under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-95 (Supp. 1991), which reads in pertinent part: A person is guilty of sexual battery if he or she engages in sexual penetration with: (a) Another person without his or her consent ... Davis argues on appeal that he could not be prosecuted for a sexual battery on his wife because of Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-99 (Supp. 1991), which states: A person is not guilty of any offense under sections 97-3-95 through 97-3-103 if the alleged victim is that person's legal spouse and at the time of the alleged offense such person and the alleged victim are not separated and living apart. Davis is, of course, correct that if he had himself solely perpetrated this atrocity, then under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-99 he was immune from prosecution. This overlooks, however, Miss. Code Ann. § 97-1-3 (Supp. 1972), which states: Every person who shall be an accessory to any felony, before the fact, shall be deemed and considered a principal, and shall be indicted and punished as such; and this whether the principal have been previously convicted or not. The fact that Davis may have been immune from prosecution had he solely on his own committed the battery does not also give him immunity if it was committed by someone else and he had aided and abetted its commission. Compare Wages v. State, 210 Miss. 187 at 190, 49 So.2d 246 at 247 (1950) (where evidence demonstrated that defendant was at least an accessory, he could be liable as principal). See also Rozell v. State, 502 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); People v. Damen, 28 Ill.2d 464, 193 N.E.2d 25 (1963); Cody v. State, 361 P.2d 307 (Okla. Crim. 1961); State v. Digman, 121 W. Va. 499, 5 S.E.2d 113 (1939); Kitchen v. State, 101 Tex.Crim. 439, 276 S.W. 252 (1925). See also Annotation, Criminal Responsibility of Husband for Rape, or Assault to Commit Rape, on Wife, 24 A.L.R.4th 105 (1983). Under the rule that all persons present, aiding and abetting in the commission of a felony, may be convicted as principals, a husband may be guilty of the crime of rape upon his wife where it appears that the act of intercourse with the wife was accomplished by a man other than the husband, and that the husband perceived it to be done or assisted the other in its execution. 65 Am.Jur.2d §§ 27, 29 pp. 775-777. By Instruction S-3-B, the circuit court properly instructed the jury that if Brown himself committed the sexual battery upon Mrs. Davis, and Davis aided and assisted Brown in its commission, then the jury should return a verdict of guilty. This instruction concluded, however, with the following sentence: However if you should find from the evidence in this case that Charles Ralph Davis alone committed the act of sexual battery then you must find him not guilty as an accessory to sexual battery. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty. Moreover, even if it were error to submit the guilt or innocence of Davis of the charge of sexual battery to the jury, it was cured by the jury's verdict. Hudson v. State, 199 Miss. 406, 408, 24 So.2d 779, 780 (1946); Davis v. State, 151 Miss. 883, 119 So. 805, 806 (1929). Russell v. William, 168 Miss. 181, 190, 150 So. 528, 530 (1933); Dicus v. Republic Paint & Varnish Works, 128 Miss. 189, 192, 90 So. 729, 730 (1922). Testimony and evidence pertaining to Mrs. Davis' having been sexually assaulted by some foreign object following Brown's having raped her was competent as part of a continuing offense that night aside from Count Three. Proof of another crime is permissible where the offense charged and that offered to be proved are so interrelated as to constitute a single transaction or occurrence or a closely related series of transactions. Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743, 758 (Miss. 1991). See also Wheeler v. State, 536 So.2d 1347, 1352 (Miss. 1988); McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130, 136 (Miss. 1987); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 759 (Miss. 1984). The State has a legitimate interest in telling a rational and coherent story of what happened. Mackbee v. State, 575 So.2d 16, 28 (Miss. 1990); Brown v. State, 483 So.2d 328, 330 (Miss. 1986). The evidence pertaining to the sexual battery upon Mrs. Davis being competent and relevant as part of a continuing occurrence that fateful night, even if Davis had been immune from prosecution under Count Three, the error in submitting the issue of his guilt or innocence thereunder was harmless in view of the jury's verdict.