Opinion ID: 710261
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Lipp's motion to suppress

Text: 75 Lipp challenges the district court's ruling that the evidentiary items seized from his truck were admissible as fruits of a consensual search. Lipp contends that although he consented to a search of the passenger cab of his truck, his consent did not extend to the rear camper shell area. Thus, Lipp argues, the evidence seized from the rear of the truck--marijuana seeds, residue, processed marijuana, camouflage netting, a 9 mm handgun, and a machete--should have been excluded at trial. 76 The scope of a consent search is limited by the breadth of the consent given. United States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1514 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1207, 111 S.Ct. 2802, 115 L.Ed.2d 975 (1991). In the instant case, Lipp was pulled over for a defective license plate light. Trooper Weigel issued Lipp a warning and then asked Lipp for permission to search the car for guns or contraband. Lipp replied, Yeah, go ahead and look if you want. After searching the passenger cab and finding some knives, trash bags and a set of brass knuckles, Trooper Weigel opened up the camper shell and conducted a search of the truck's bed. At no time during this search did Lipp object or attempt to confine the scope of the search. In denying Lipp's suppression motion, the trial judge found that Lipp consented to the search, that Lipp's consent was specific and voluntarily given, and that the search of the rear camper area did not exceed the scope of the search. We agree. 77 The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent is that of  'objective' reasonableness--what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect? Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1803-04, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). In Jimeno, the Court held that a suspect's consent to search his car for drugs included consent to search a container in the car that might reasonably hold drugs. Id. at 249, 111 S.Ct. at 1802-03. In so holding, the Court noted that the suspect had given the police officer a general consent to search the car, and had placed no explicit limitation on the scope of the search. Id. at 251, 111 S.Ct. at 1803-04. We too have held that where a suspect does not limit the scope of a search, and does not object when the search exceeds what he later claims was a more limited consent, an officer is justified in searching the entire vehicle. See, e.g., Pena, 920 F.2d at 1515 ([F]ailure to object to the continuation of the search under these circumstances may be considered an indication that the search was within the scope of the consent.); United States v. Deases, 918 F.2d 118, 122 (10th Cir.1990) (Consent to search a car means to search the entire car and whatever is in it, unless such consent is otherwise restricted.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1233, 111 S.Ct. 2859, 115 L.Ed.2d 1026 (1991). Lipp's argument may be disposed of in a similar fashion. Trooper Weigel asked Lipp generally if he could search the car for drugs or contraband. Lipp consented, but placed no limits on the search. Neither did he later object when the search extended to the bed of the truck. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the search of Lipp's truck was valid. 78