Opinion ID: 566819
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 24 Before proceeding to the merits of WMOT's appeal, we must dispose of a threshold challenge to our jurisdiction. WMOT filed its notice of appeal fifty-four days after the district court entered its order dismissing WMOT's petition under section 853(n). The government now contends that WMOT's appeal is untimely under Fed.R.App.P. 4(b). Rule 4(b) provides in pertinent part: In a criminal case the notice of appeal by a defendant shall be filed in the district court within 10 days after the entry of ... the judgment or order appealed from.... (Emphasis added). The government maintains that WMOT's appeal was taken in a criminal case, and that it therefore was filed after the appeal time set forth in Rule 4(b) had expired. 25 In contrast, WMOT asserts that Rule 4(b) is inapplicable because it is not appealing in a criminal case. WMOT instead contends that it is appealing from a judgment entered in a civil case, and that the time for appeal accordingly is controlled by Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1). Because Rule 4(a)(1) provides that a notice of appeal must be filed within sixty days if the United States is a party, 4 WMOT insists that its appeal was timely filed. 26 Whether an appeal from an order dismissing a petition under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) is governed by Rule 4(b) or Rule 4(a)(1) is, surprisingly, a question of first impression. The government's position on this issue is straightforward. It concedes that this is not an appeal from a criminal conviction, but asserts that it is nonetheless an appeal in a criminal case. The government emphasizes that the instant appeal is from a dismissal of WMOT's petition to amend the order of forfeiture, which the district court entered as part of its sentence of Lavin. WMOT, on the other hand, construes the phrase in a criminal case much more narrowly. It asserts that the shorter appeal time prescribed by Rule 4(b) applies only to appeals taken from criminal prosecutions, and that, as a result, appeals taken from a proceeding under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) are governed by the more generous appeal period of Rule 4(a)(1). Having reviewed the jurisprudence, we subscribe to WMOT's narrower construction of Rule 4(b). 27 The term criminal case in Rule 4(b) generally is construed narrowly to encompass only a prosecution brought by the government to secure a sentence of conviction for criminal conduct. 9 J. Moore, B. Ward, & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice p 204.15, at 4-132 (2d ed. 1991). Conversely, the term civil case in Rule 4(a)(1) generally is construed broadly to include any action that is not a criminal prosecution. Id. p 204.08, at 4-29. As a result, proceedings that essentially are civil in nature are deemed to be civil cases, even though they derive from a prior criminal prosecution. For example, habeas corpus cases, proceedings to vacate a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and actions dealing with the forfeiture of a criminal bail bond all are civil for purposes of Rule 4(a)(1). See id. p 204.08, at 4-30--4-31. 28 Applying these principles to the case at bar, we are convinced that a proceeding under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n), which is closely analogous to a bail forfeiture proceeding, is a civil case for purposes of Rule 4(a)(1). 5 As the government concedes, a hearing to adjudicate the validity of a third party's interest in forfeited property is not a criminal prosecution, i.e., an action commenced by the government to secure a sentence of conviction for criminal conduct. In fact, petitioners such as WMOT are barred by 21 U.S.C. § 853(k)(1) from intervening in the true criminal case. 6 Given that our decision in this appeal will have absolutely no effect on Lavin, the criminal defendant, we think that the government strains reason in attempting to characterize a proceeding under section 853(n) as a criminal case. 7 We therefore hold that WMOT's notice of appeal, which was filed fifty-four days after the entry of the order appealed from, was timely under Rule 4(a)(1). We turn now to the merits: whether WMOT's status as a victim of embezzlement was sufficient to confer standing under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B). 29