Opinion ID: 1093220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: did the trial court err in admitting evidence of an additional conviction of the appellant in addition to those set out in the indictment?

Text: In setting up its case against Clem Jimpson for the shooting of Linda Grantham, the District Attorney's office sought the additional assignment of habitual offender status against Jimpson, pursuant to § 99-19-83 of the Miss. Code Ann. (1987 Supp.) which reads as follows: Every person convicted in this state of a felony who shall have been convicted twice previously of any felony or federal crime upon charges separately brought and arising out of separate incidents at different times and who shall have been sentenced to and served separate terms of one (1) year or more in any state and/or federal penal institution, whether in this state or elsewhere, and where any one (1) of such felonies shall have been a crime of violence shall be sentenced to life imprisonment, and such sentence shall not be reduced or suspended nor shall such person be eligible for parole or probation. The indictment which charged Jimpson listed two specific felony convictions for the purposes of this statute, one for burglary and larceny and the other for murder. These convictions were properly proven at the sentencing hearing following the trial. Evidence of a third conviction for assault and battery was also introduced, over the objection of defense counsel. The trial court accepted this evidence for review pursuant to Presley v. State, 474 So.2d 612 (Miss. 1985). It is not clear from the record why the prosecution offered evidence of the third conviction into evidence since Presley is generally relevant for the possible reduction of a disproportionate sentence. Id. at 620. Thus, if anything, Jimpson would be benefitted by a successful Presley review. Under § 99-19-83, proof of two convictions is sufficient to imprison a defendant for life. The trial judge has no discretion in the sentencing phase; therefore, introduction of a third conviction is largely irrelevant and certainly must be considered harmless error. For this reason, it is the opinion of this Court that this assignment of error is without merit.