Opinion ID: 2516126
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reference to Proximate Cause Rather than Moving Force

Text: Defendants identify error in the district court's use of proximate cause rather than moving force in Question Two to identify Cash's causation burden. Because they point to nothing in the record indicating that they specifically requested that the district court use the latter phrase in Question Two, this argument is also waived. In any event, defendants cannot demonstrate abuse of discretion because proximate cause, although derived from tort law, fairly describes a plaintiff's causation burden with respect to a municipal liability claim under § 1983. See, e.g., Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir.2008) (equating moving force with proximate cause for purposes of Monell liability); Smith v. District of Columbia, 413 F.3d 86, 102 (D.C.Cir.2005) (same); see also Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 833 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing application of [o]rdinary principles of causation used throughout the law of torts to Monell claims).