Opinion ID: 1382539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The Hospital's Claim of Insufficient Evidence of Illegal Discriminatory Action in the Hospital's Imposing a Light Duty Assignment

Text: As we have previously held herein, the law recognizes the right of an employer to take reasonable job-related precautions in a fashion that is consistent with the duty of reasonable accommodation, while inquiring or obtaining medical information about an employee's fitness for duty. Thus, the mere fact that the Hospital sent Mr. Stone for an independent medical examination did not prove a case of disability discrimination  nor did the mere fact that he was placed in a light duty assignment while he was awaiting such an examination and its results prove a case of disability discrimination. The Hospital argues that based on its right to take such precautions, even if Mr. Stone had protected status as a person with a disability within the meaning of the law, what the Hospital did was permissible. Mr. Stone, however, points to the fact that the Hospital chose to not even consult several of their own doctors who had examined Mr. Stone (including the chief of their medical staff); to the fact that the Hospital chose to not exercise their right to require drug testing; and to the fact that the the Hospital invoked its light duty policy in an unprecedented fashion and against the advice of an employee's personal physician. Mr. Stone argues that these facts, if proven, constituted evidence from which a jury could find that the Hospital had acted in bad faith, unreasonably, in a fashion that was not job-related and was inconsistent with business necessity, and/or was violative of the duty of reasonable accommodation. We are not unmindful of the equitable and legal force of Mr. Stone's contentions. Indeed, the Hospital in its briefs concedes that a jury could find that these were bad decisions by the Hospital. However, the Hospital asserts  and we agree  that there are strong countervailing equitable and legal considerations. Chief among these is the fact that Mr. Stone was continued at his full ambulance paramedic rate of pay as a dispatcher, despite the fact that the regular pay for dispatchers was less than the pay rate for ambulance paramedics. Upon our review of the record, the evidence that Mr. Stone was actually forced to work fewer hours as a dispatcher  so that he necessarily lost a significant amount of money while he worked as a dispatcher  was slim. The evidence tended to show that had Mr. Stone wished to he could have received essentially the same wages during the 4 months that he worked as a dispatcher that he as a driver, albeit with a bit more effort. In this regard, we observe that Mr. Stone's major complaint in his testimony at trial was not the fact that he lost money by being required to work as a dispatcher  but the fact that his job, in which he took a great deal of pride and satisfaction, was changed  as he saw it, in an unfair fashion. Finally, it is worth comparing Mr. Stone's complaint with the complaints of the plaintiffs in the numerous disability discrimination cases that we have examined in this opinion. We do not believe that any of those plaintiffs  even the unsuccessful ones  were complaining of a temporary transfer to another job at the same rate of pay, and with no long-term or permanent job detriment, pending the outcome of a medical examination that was facially justified. [26] Understanding the considerations on both sides, we must make our decision in this case in a fashion that reflects the law's due regard for the need of employers to respond flexibly to perceived or suspected impairments in a fashion that promotes employee and workplace safety without violating the law's prohibitions against disability discrimination. Based on all of the foregoing, we believe that under the facts of this case, a temporary transfer of an employee to another suitable full-time position, at the employee's regular rate of pay and without any long-term or permanent detriment to the employee, pending the results of an otherwise permissible medical examination related to a perceived or suspected mental or physical impairment, and absent otherwise egregious circumstances, is not prohibited disability discrimination under our Human Rights Act, W.Va.Code, 5-11-1 et seq. Applying this conclusion to Mr. Stone's claim, we conclude that he presented insufficient evidence to sustain a jury finding of illegal disability discrimination. Consequently, the circuit court's judgment must be reversed, and this matter remanded for entry of judgment for the Hospital.