Opinion ID: 2063276
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Evidence Regarding the Upstairs Shop

Text: Petitioners attempted to introduce testimony about the Birdcage Shop with respect to two issues: appropriateness of the premises for a license, see D.C.Code 1973, § 25-115(a)(6), and fitness and good character of the applicant, see id. § 25-115(a)(1). The Board excluded this evidence as irrelevant to both issues. We hold that the Board did not abuse its discretion in so ruling. We emphasize at the outset that, while administrative proceedings are governed by more liberal and flexible evidentiary standards than judicial proceedings, the agencies are invested with a correspondingly greater discretion than trial judges in determining the admissibility of evidence. See Kopff v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, D.C.App., 381 A.2d 1372, 1385 (1977). Because there is no jury to shield, agencies may tend to resolve any doubts in favor of admitting the evidence. Nevertheless, the DCAPA mandates the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence. D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 1-1509(b). The Alcoholic Beverage Control Board itself has incorporated more specific evidentiary guidelines into its own regulations. The evidence at Board hearings is limited to material evidence relative to the issues arising in the proceeding as may be necessary to protect the public interest or to prevent injustice. Evidence will be excluded in the discretion of the Board if it is repetitious or redundant. The Board shall determine the materiality, relevance and probative value of any evidence submitted. [3 DCRR § 20.5 (emphasis added).] In addition to the discretion conferred upon the agency in evidentiary rulings, we have also acknowledged that an agency's interpretation of the statutes and regulations it administers will be sustained unless shown to be unreasonable or in contravention of the language or legislative history of the statute. DeLevay v. District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Commission, D.C.App., 411 A.2d 354, 359 (1980); see Dupont Circle Citizens Association v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission, D.C. App., 431 A.2d 560, 565 (1981). Thus we must accord considerable respect not only to the Board's evidentiary rulings themselves, but also to the Board's interpretation of the regulations that govern its evidentiary standards, as well as the Board's interpretation of the underlying statutory requirements for obtaining a liquor license, D.C. Code 1973, § 25-115, which the agency has been charged with administering. Where, as here, the Board has relied in part upon its own internal procedural regulations, we are particularly hesitant to second-guess its interpretation, as long as the agency is within the bounds of reason. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Fund, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524-25, 543-45, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 1202, 1211-12, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978); Dupont Circle Citizens Association v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission, supra at 565. The focus of our inquiry accordingly centers on whether the agency abused its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence as irrelevant.
Before granting a license, the Board must find [t]hat the place for which the license is to be issued is an appropriate one considering the character of the premises, its surroundings, and the wishes of the persons residing or owning property in the neighborhood of the premises in which the license is desired. D.C.Code 1973, §§ 25-115(a)(6). Petitioners contest the Board's ruling that the evidence relating to the Birdcage Shop was irrelevant to this statutory requirement. Though the Board is required to consider the  character of the premises [and] its surroundings,  id. (emphasis added), the Board ruled that the premises did not include the second floor of the building (where the Birdcage Shop had been located), [8] and the Board construed the term surroundings to include only existing surroundings, and not past or former surroundings. [9] In light of the Board's considerable discretion in ruling on evidentiary questions, see Kopff v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, supra at 1385, and in interpreting its own statutes and regulations, DeLevay v. District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Commission, supra at 359, we can find nothing at all unreasonable about the Board's ruling on this issue. See also Jameson's Liquors, Inc. v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, D.C.App., 384 A.2d 412, 418-20 (1978) (proximity of gas station to liquor store was insufficient in itself to support a finding that drink and drive atmosphere would be created).
Petitioners next contend that the Board erred in excluding the Birdcage Shop evidence with respect to the statutory requirement that each corporate officer of the applicant be of good moral character and generally fit for the trust to be in him reposed. D.C.Code 1973, § 25-115(a)(1). The Board ruled that the only evidence it would consider relevant to the applicant's moral character or fitness would be evidence of illegal activity. Board member Williams explained: When I stated the position of the Board, I stated two bases on which it was irrelevant. And even if we could strain to find some relevance in it, that the only basis would be identification of some illegal activity. Now, unless you are prepared to give us some evidence of illegal activity, we understand what a bong is, and we don't need him on the stand to tell us what a bong is. If there was some evidence of the sale of illegal apparatus, goods, merchandise, or services of any kind, then we'd be glad to hear that because that is highly relevant. But to keep banging and banging away at water pipes, we're just not prepared to spend all of the rest of the afternoon dealing with water pipes. Similarly, Board member O'Donnell stated: [U]nless there's a violation of the law. . . it has no bearing and should not be permitted in this record. We hold that the Board's interpretation of § 25-115(a)(1), and its concomitant exclusion of the disputed evidence as irrelevant, was reasonable and consistent with the terms of the statute. See DeLevay v. District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Commission, supra at 359; Kopff v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, supra at 1385. Arguably, an interpretation to the contrary on these facts would raise serious constitutional questions. [10] The petitioners concede that the business activity in question herethe sale of water pipes and cigarette rolling papersis lawful. See William v. United States, D.C.App., 304 A.2d 287, 289 (1973). What applicant would reasonably suspect that adherence to the requirements of the law could constitute bad moral character? [11] Moreover, were the Board to withhold this license urged by petitioners, its action would be inherently arbitrary and capricious, as well, for it would be based on unarticulated and unannounced standards, Miller v. District of Columbia Board of Appeals and Review, D.C.App., 294 A.2d 365, 369 (1972), [ quoted in Woods v. District of Columbia Nurses' Examining Board, supra, at 373]; see Lewis v. District of Columbia Commission on Licensure to Practice the Healing Art, supra at 1152-53. The Board avoided this quagmire by construing the statutory requirement of good moral character and general fitness in the circumstances of this case simply to proscribe illegal conduct and no more. [12] Consistent with this interpretation, the Board did not abuse its discretion by excluding the proffered evidence.