Opinion ID: 2637824
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instructional Error As to Issues of Consent

Text: Defendant argues the trial court prejudicially erred by refusing his request to give the jury two instructions involving consent as a defense to the crime of rape: CALJIC No. 1.23.1, [12] which defines consent as a defense to rape, and CALJIC No. 10.65, [13] which instructs the jury that a reasonable mistaken belief as to consent constitutes a defense to the crime of rape. He further argues the remaining instructions given to the jury insufficiently defined the defense of consent in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, trial by jury, to present a defense, and to fair and reliable capital guilt and penalty phase trials. We disagree. (8) In criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury's understanding of the case. ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].) A trial court's duty to instruct, sua sponte, on particular defenses arises `only if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.' ( People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 424 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1].) (9) In refusing defendant's request, the trial court correctly concluded that CALJIC No. 10.65 was not supported by the evidence. CALJIC No. 10.65 is based upon our decision in People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337], which held that a defendant's reasonable and good faith mistake of fact regarding a person's consent to sexual intercourse is a defense to rape because it negates the wrongful intent required for the crime. ( Id. at p. 155.) In People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d 961], we clarified when the instruction is required. We explained that, in order for the Mayberry defense to apply, the defendant must have honestly and in good faith, albeit mistakenly, believed that the victim consented to sexual intercourse based upon evidence of the victim's equivocal conduct, and the defendant's mistake regarding consent [must have been] reasonable under the circumstances. ( People v. Williams, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 360-361.) Thus, because the Mayberry instruction is premised on mistake of fact, the instruction should not be given absent substantial evidence of equivocal conduct that would have led a defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe consent existed where it did not. ( Id. at p. 362.) Here, as the trial court noted, the record is devoid of any equivocal conduct on the part of Sophia Torres, or of any evidence that defendant reasonably mistook her conduct for consent. In fact, defendant claimed that he had only met her for the first time that night and that, other than observing her being chased by two women, he had no contact with her at the park where she was found dead. He claimed that he was only meeting her to buy methamphetamine and otherwise never did drugs with or partied with her. Therefore, without evidence of Sophia's equivocal conduct or that defendant reasonably mistook her conduct for consent, the record provided no support for the instruction. The reasons for the trial court's refusal to give CALJIC No. 1.23.1 are less clear. After declining to give CALJIC No. 10.65, the court inquired about CALJIC No. 1.23.1, and defense counsel explained that it defined consent, but then stated, I've just realized that that instruction probably has meaning if you give 10.65, which the court has refused. The court then stated that it would refuse the instruction, and defense counsel stated, It's an accurate statement of the law, and I still want it, but that's because I still want 10.65. The trial court then refused the instruction. Further complicating matters, the prosecutor had earlier suggested that defense counsel was entitled to argue, if he wants to, that they had consensual sex, and at closing arguments both sides argued the issue of whether defendant and Sophia had consensual sex on the night of the crimes. Additionally, defendant relies on the testimony of Dr. Robert Failing, the state's pathologist, who found no bruising, tearing, or trauma to the victim's vagina, although he also testified that this finding was not necessarily inconsistent with a sexual assault. We need not decide whether this evidence or counsel's arguments required the trial court to supply CALJIC No. 1.23.1's definition of consent because any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824].) (10) The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 10.00, defining the crime of rape. The instruction makes clear that the acts against the victim must occur against that person's will, which it in turn defines as without the consent of the alleged victim. Nothing indicates that the jury was confused or required a definition of consent. In fact, the definition of consent in CALJIC No. 1.23.1 arguably is less beneficial to defendant than its common or ordinary dictionary meaning [14] because it not only requires agreement but also knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction involved. Therefore, defendant may have benefited from the jury's considering only the plain meaning of the word consent, as opposed to the definition contained in CALJIC No. 1.23.1. (See People v. Carapeli (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 589, 593-594 [247 Cal.Rptr. 478].) As a result, defendant fails to demonstrate prejudice.