Opinion ID: 2581350
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Failure to Fully and Properly Instruct the Jury

Text: [¶ 26] Garnick contends that the trial court erred in refusing several jury instructions she offered. The function of jury instructions is to give the jury guidance with respect to the applicable law. A trial court is not obligated to give an offered instruction, so long as the jury is adequately instructed on the law as it pertains to the case at hand. We do not reverse a trial court's rulings on an instruction unless it is demonstrated that the instruction was necessary to impart to the jury the proper principles of law that are applicable to the case and, further, that the proponent of the refused instruction can show prejudice. Ormsby, 997 P.2d 465 at 471; Reese v. Board of Directors of Memorial Hospital of Laramie County, 955 P.2d 425, 427 (Wyo.1998). [¶ 27] Garnick first contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give the following premises liability instruction: Teton County School District No. 1 must use ordinary care to keep the obstacle course in a reasonably safe condition for the purpose for which it was reasonably intended. In connection with that duty, the school district also has the affirmative duty to protect students against dangers known to exist by it and also to protect against dangers which it should discover by the use of reasonable care. It is contended that the instruction is loosely based on our holding in Rhoades v. K-Mart Corporation, 863 P.2d 626, 629 (Wyo.1993), as well as W.P.J.I.C. 9.03 (1994), which provides: A landlord must use ordinary care to keep the [stairs, hallways, walks, and so forth] in a reasonably safe condition for the purpose for which the [stairs, hallways, walks and so forth] were reasonably intended. [¶ 28] Without reciting all of the instructions given, suffice it to say we are persuaded that the message intended to be conveyed to the jury, by that proposed instruction, was adequately conveyed to the jury by other instructions. It is also abundantly clear that Garnick was permitted wide latitude in arguing her point to the jury that the School was negligent with respect to the set-up and use of the obstacle course. In addition, this case was not really postured as a premises liability case, although an instruction like that offered might well have been given without prejudice to the School. Finally, we do not see that Garnick was prejudiced by the failure of the trial court to give the instruction. [¶ 29] Next, Garnick contends that the trial court erred in failing to give its theory of the case instruction: The plaintiff in this case is Jessica Garnick. The defendant in this case is Teton County School District No. 1. Jessica Garnick claims as follows: The railing to mat jump located in the obstacle course was dangerous and the school district employees should not have permitted its use. The railing was too high to jump from, the mat was too small to adequately protect obstacle course participants and the obstacle course instructions were inadequate. [¶ 30] For this proposition, Garnick relies on Bigley v. Craven, 769 P.2d 892, 894-98 (Wyo.1989) (citing Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (Wyo.1987)); also see Langdon v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation, 494 P.2d 537, 541 (Wyo.1972). It is true those cases require that a trial court give a theory of the case instruction but only if it is also a clear declaration of the law. An instruction that is not consistent with law should be refused. Short, 731 P.2d at 1200. The offered instruction is not a statement of the law that would govern the facts in this case but a statement of the facts that tend to support Garnick's legal theory. In argument to the jury, Garnick was permitted full rein in this regard. However, the authority cited does not require a trial court to give the jury an instruction that summarizes a party's factual contentions. We find no error in the refusal of the offered instruction. [¶ 31] Garnick also contends that the trial court erred in failing to give a concurrent cause instruction: There may be more than one cause of injury, that is, there may be concurrent causes. Concurrent causes do not always occur simultaneously. One cause may be continuous in operation and joined with another cause at a later time. [¶ 32] The offered instruction is an accurate recitation of W.P.J.I.C. 3.05 (1994), but we do not consider the instruction to have been necessary or appropriate under the circumstances of this case. Concurrent cause, of necessity, requires the actions of at least a third party, or force, (although there may be a fourth, a fifth, etc. ). 3 Stuart M. Speiser, Charles F. Krause, Alfred Gans, The American Law of Torts, § 11.5 (1986); Natural Gas Processing Company v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1186-87 (Wyo.1994). Here, the proposed instruction does not appear to relate to the theories presented to the jury which were that the School was negligent (Garnick's theory) and that Garnick was negligent (the School's theory). The instruction would have served no purpose under the circumstances of this case, and there was no error in the trial court refusing it.