Opinion ID: 757025
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Essential Nature of Plan

Text: 281 Ajaj argues that the district court failed to instruct the jury that to convict Ajaj as a member of the conspiracy, it had to find that he agreed to the essential nature of the plan. According to Ajaj, the essential nature of the plan charged in the indictment was a scheme to bomb a populated structure in an urban area. Ajaj argues that the court constructively amended the indictment by instructing the jury that Ajaj could be convicted of conspiracy if he shared in any of the conspiracy's four objectives and that this instruction rendered the conspiracy count duplicitous. See United States v. Aracri, 968 F.2d 1512, 1518 (2d Cir.1992) (An indictment is duplicitous if it joins two or more distinct crimes in a single count.). Ajaj's arguments are meritless and we conclude that the district court committed no error. 282 To convict a defendant on a conspiracy charge, the government must prove that the defendant agreed to the  'essential nature of the plan' ... and on the 'kind of criminal conduct ... in fact contemplated.'  Gleason, 616 F.2d at 16 (citations omitted). The defendant must be shown to have agreed to commit a particular offense and not merely a vague agreement to do something wrong. United States v. Provenzano, 615 F.2d 37, 44 (2d Cir.1980) (emphasis added; citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A court's jury charge comports with this rule when it sets forth the essential nature of the plan by accurately describing the essence of the [conspiracy's] underlying illegal objective[s], United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 690 (2d Cir.1992), and then instructs the jury that the government must demonstrate  'an agreement as to the objective[s] of the conspiracy,'  Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 63 (citation omitted); see United States v. Attanasio, 870 F.2d 809, 816-17 (2d Cir.1989). The government is not required to demonstrate that the defendant agreed to all of the conspiracy's objectives, as long as the defendant shared some knowledge of the [conspiracy's] unlawful aims and objectives. United States v. Heinemann, 801 F.2d 86, 93 (2d Cir.1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Gleason, 616 F.2d at 16 ([D]efendant need not know every objective of the conspiracy to be convicted as a member.). 283 Here, the court instructed the jury in accordance with these requirements. The court instructed: Before you can find that the defendant you are considering was a member of the conspiracy, you must conclude that you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and willfully associated himself with the intent to aid in the accomplishment of the purpose of the conspiracy. The district court then instructed the jury on the essential nature of the plan by tracking the language of the relevant bombing statutes that comprised the conspiracy's objectives. 284 And we know the purposes are to damage and destroy and attempt to damage and destroy by means of fire and explosives, buildings, vehicles and other real and personal property used in interstate commerce. To damage and destroy by means of fire and explosives, buildings, vehicles and other personal property, in whole or in part owned, possessed, or leased to the United States or departments and agencies of the United States, to transport in interstate commerce explosives with knowledge and intent that the explosives were to be used unlawfully to damage and destroy buildings, vehicles, and other real and personal property, and to damage, disable, destroy, and place and caused to be placed explosives and other destructive substances in, upon, and in proximity to motor vehicles which were used, operated, and employed in interstate commerce. 285 The district court then instructed the jury that the government was not required to prove that the defendant agreed to all of the conspiracy's objectives. Rather, the court instructed that to convict Ajaj of conspiracy, [w]hat is necessary is the defendant must have participated with knowledge of at least some of the basic aims and purposes of the conspiracy and with the intention of aiding in and accomplishing those unlawful ends. By accurately describing the essence of the underlying conspiratorial objectives as set forth in the indictment, the court guarded against the possibility that Ajaj would be convicted of merely entering into a general agreement to engage in unspecified criminal conduct. United States v. Rosenblatt, 554 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir.1977); see United States v. Gallerani, 68 F.3d 611, 618 (2d Cir.1995) (instructions were erroneous when the jury could convict the defendant of conspiracy without finding that he had any of the objectives alleged in the indictment). The court also guarded against a constructive amendment of the indictment. See Wallace, 59 F.3d at 337. Contrary to Ajaj's argument, Count One of the Southern District indictment did not charge Ajaj with conspiring to bomb a populated structure in an urban area but with conspiring to secure four distinct criminal objectives. 286 We briefly dispose of Ajaj's remaining arguments. By charging the jury that Ajaj could be convicted as a member of the conspiracy if he shared some of the conspiracy's objectives, the court's charge did not thereby render the conspiracy count duplicitous. The court's instructions, as well as the indictment, charged Ajaj with membership in a single conspiracy with multiple criminal objectives. See Aracri, 968 F.2d at 1518 (The allegation in a single count of a conspiracy to commit several crimes is not duplicitous, for the conspiracy is the crime and that is one, however diverse its objects. (citation, internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). Furthermore, the district court was not required to specifically instruct the jury, as an element of the conspiracy charge, that Ajaj could be convicted as a conspirator only if he agreed to the essential nature of the plan. See generally Edward J. Devitt et al., Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 28.03 (4th ed.1990) (setting forth essential elements of conspiracy instructions). The court's careful jury charge apprized the jury of the essence of the conspiracy's underlying illegal objectives and instructed the jury that Ajaj could be convicted of conspiracy only if he agreed to one or more of the objectives. We therefore affirm those jury instructions.