Opinion ID: 2001306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: support action

Text: Turning to the support action, we must first grapple with a jurisdictional question. We have before us separate appeals from a support order and from an order modifying the support order. The latter order was entered in the lower court after the appeal from the former order was taken. Wife, appellant in No. 3208 Philadelphia 1982, the appeal from the modified order, contends that for this reason the court was without power to modify its earlier order. The proceedings which created this problem are somewhat irregular and protracted. Wife filed a complaint for support on November 4, 1981. The court entered an interim order on December 3, 1981, providing for $400 per week support for the children and none for Wife. Hearings were then held on three dates in March and April 1982. No further action was taken by the court or the parties until September 23, 1982, when Husband filed a petition to modify the December 3 order. His modification petition averred, inter alia, that Kimberly was attending college and had consented to the use of her custodial funds to pay college expenses. On October 4, 1982, the court entered a support order awarding $300 per week to Wife and $600 per week to the children. It appears from the record and the trial court's opinion that this order was entered as an original order and the modification petition was not considered. However, on October 29, 1982, the court held a hearing on the modification petition. On November 1, 1982, before the court took further action, the parties cross-appealed the October 4 order at Nos. 3117 and 3168 Philadelphia, 1982. Nevertheless, the court proceeded on November 5, 1982 to enter the modified order which Wife has appealed at No. 3208 Philadelphia 1982. The foregoing chronology reveals that the court below attempted to modify a support order after an appeal had been taken and that its action in modifying was based on a petition to modify an earlier order which had already been supplanted. We are compelled to conclude that the court acted beyond its power in modifying its October 4, 1982 order. Generally, the taking of an appeal divests the lower court of jurisdiction. Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a). This rule has been applied to modifiable orders as well, such as alimony, Morelli v. Morelli, 316 Pa.Super. 54, 462 A.2d 789 (1983), and child custody, Ferencak v. Moore, 300 Pa.Super. 28, 445 A.2d 1282 (1982). Therefore, the court was without jurisdiction to modify its October 4, 1982 order unless the case falls within one of the exceptions enumerated in Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b) and (c). We hold that it does not. Rule 1701(b) allows the lower court to grant reconsideration of an order which has been appealed. It is not clear to us that a petition to modify a support order based on changed circumstances is the same as a request to reconsider the order. Reconsideration implies asking the court to reassess the facts and circumstances on which the prior order was based. However, even if we assume arguendo that the two are equivalent for Pa.R.A.P. 1701 purposes, the rule allows reconsideration only if a timely application for reconsideration is filed and the court enters an order granting reconsideration within thirty days. In the instant case, no timely request for reconsideration was filed. Husband's September 23, 1982 petition to modify the December 3, 1981 order was rendered moot by the court's order of October 4, 1982. No petition to modify the October 4, 1982 order, based on changed circumstances since its entry, was filed. [6] Furthermore, the court's November 5, 1982 modification order is dated beyond the thirty-day period, and no earlier order expressly granting reconsideration was entered. Husband argues that the trial court's action is permissible under Rule 1701(c), which allows the trial court to act with respect to certain items or issues where the appeal was taken only with respect to other issues, i.e. issues collateral to those involved in the modification request. Husband cites Commonwealth v. Mazzocone, 8 D. & C.3d 309 (C.P. Chester Co. 1978) in support of his position. Mazzocone, however, involved a question of the court's power to modify a support order when an appeal was pending only as to arrearages. The court held that it could modify the order because the issue of prospective payments was distinct from and collateral to the issue of arrearages. In the instant case, though, the appeal is not so narrow in scope. The parties' cross-appeals raise numerous issues, effectively placing the entire order, not just a portion thereof, before the appellate court. The child support issues raised in Husband's petition to modify are clearly not separate from or collateral to the issues involved in the appeals from the court's October 4, 1982 order. See Litt v. Rolling Hill Hospital, 293 Pa.Super. 97, 100 n. 2, 437 A.2d 1008, 1010 n. 2 (1981) (Pa.R.A.P. 1701(c) intended to prevent a pending appeal from affecting `separate disputes between other parties or involving separate subject matter.' (citation omitted)). Since the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter its November 5, 1982 order, we must vacate the order on these grounds. The cross-appeals from the October 4, 1982 support order, though, are properly before this court. [7] Husband is the primary appellant; he contends that Wife is not entitled to receive support because she withdrew from the marital domicile without legal cause, because Husband has established grounds for a fault divorce, and because Wife is economically independent and able to support herself. He further maintains that the court erred in entering a support order in favor of children who are independently wealthy and who are economically independent, (Husband's Brief in No. 3117 Philadelphia 1982 at 18), and that the court failed to properly consider the actual needs of the children and Wife's ability to contribute to their support. Wife's cross-appeal consists of a contention that the October 4, 1982 support order should be made retroactive to December 3, 1981, the date she filed her complaint for support. With respect to the issues surrounding the support of Wife, we agree with the trial court's findings that Wife had sufficient legal cause to leave the marital home and that Husband did not establish that he was entitled to a fault divorce. We do not agree with Husband that Wife's income and other resources disqualify her from receiving any support. Although Wife earned $26,000 in 1981 working only part-time, the court clearly took this fact into consideration and nevertheless found that she was entitled to additional support to maintain the high standard of living which the parties enjoyed before their separation. We agree with the trial court as a matter of legal principle and economic judgment. Husband is under a duty, to the extent he is able, to maintain his family's standard of living at a level consistent with their station in life before the separation. Commonwealth ex rel. Goichman v. Goichman ; Dunbar v. Dunbar, 291 Pa.Super. 224, 435 A.2d 879 (1981): Commonwealth ex rel. Levinson v. Levinson, 99 Montg.Co.L.R. 199 (C.P. Montg.Co. 1975). Wife's earnings are a far cry from Husband's six-figure income, and her working hours were limited for legitimate reasons related to the care of her children. We are therefore unable to conclude from the record before us that Wife is not entitled to any support or that Husband is unable to pay. However, we cannot affirm the trial court's order as to Wife's support or the children's, because the order in its entirety is based on an error of law. The trial court entered its support order subsequent to its decision in the orphans' court action. Both matters were heard before the same judge. In its opinion in the support action, the court stated, Defendant's right to the use of custodial funds for the children's support was resolved by this court in Sutliff v. Sutliff and Collins, No. 107 Orphans 1982. The court clearly took the custodial property into consideration in formulating the support order. Husband goes so far as to argue in his brief that because the children hold substantial assets, the support order is excessive and should be reduced or terminated. Both the trial court's and Husband's positions are entirely contrary to the principles we have set forth above concerning the proper role of the children's custodial funds and other assets. Husband has a primary duty to meet his support obligations out of his own resources, and he clearly has ample income and assets to do so. The court erred in taking the children's custodial property into consideration in setting the amount of support, and in holding that the custodial property was an acceptable source of Husband's support payments. Since the court's belief that the children's assets should enter into the support calculation may have affected its judgment of Husband's ability to pay or of the aggregate support needs of the household consisting of Wife and the children, that portion of the order providing for the support of Wife may also have been tainted by this improper consideration. In this regard, the reasoning of the Appellate Court of Connecticut in Weisbaum is relevant: The effect of the court's order here was to permit the defendant to discharge from the custodial funds those other obligations which the court imposed on him. It may be that upon a rehearing the court will impose the same obligations without the access to those funds; but on this record we cannot be certain of that. It is appropriate, therefore, that the rehearing which we order embrace those obligations as well. Weisbaum v. Weisbaum, 2 Conn.App. at 274, 477 A.2d at 693. Therefore, we reverse and remand the entire support action to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because we wish to afford the trial court great latitude on remand to fashion a just and equitable order, we will not grant at this time the relief Wife requests in her cross-appeal, namely the amendment of the support order to make it retroactive to the date of filing of the complaint. However, we instruct the trial court to reconsider on remand the effective date of any order it enters. There is a sound policy favoring retroactivity in most cases, because the party entitled to support should not be penalized for having to resort to time-consuming court proceedings, Commonwealth ex rel. Kinsey v. Kinsey, 277 Pa.Super. 156, 419 A.2d 708 (1980). Our rules of procedure provide that a support order shall be effective from the date of the complaint unless the order states otherwise. Pa.R.C.P. 1910.17(a). Moreover, we have indicated in prior decisions that it is preferable for the trial court to state on the record its reasons for denying retroactivity if it does so. Kinsey; Commonwealth ex rel. Bishop v. Bishop, 234 Pa.Super. 600, 341 A.2d 153 (1975). In the instant case, the trial court did not provide us with such a statement of its reasons for denying retroactivity. We instruct the court to state on the record its reasons should it choose on remand not to make the order retroactive to the date of the complaint. With respect to the appeal at No. 3208 Philadelphia 1982 from the court's November 5, 1982 order in the support action, we have held that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter that order and have accordingly vacated it. Nevertheless, we are compelled to comment briefly on certain substantive aspects of that appeal because as a practical matter, the court below will be or may become aware when considering our remand of certain facts contained in Husband's petition for modification. In addition to averring that the couple's oldest daughter Kimberly had begun attending college since the entry of the December 3, 1981 support order, Husband's petition refers to and incorporates as exhibits two letters signed by Kimberly. Exhibit A is a letter To the Court dated August 30, 1982 which states in pertinent part: Please be advised that after much consideration of all the factors involved, I have decided that my interests are best served by my receiving funds for my support directly from the custodians of my funds. I hereby withdraw my request that my mother receive these funds for my support. Exhibit B is a letter dated August 26, 1982, addressed Dear Father, which reads in part (emphasis added): I am told by my attorney that you will see that my college tuition and other expenses are paid only if I request that you do this out of my custodial funds. Having no choice in the matter, I hereby make such a request. The circumstances surrounding these letters, especially the letter of August 30, were the subject of much hotly disputed testimony at the hearing. Wife's position is that Kimberly was coerced into signing the August 30 letter as a condition of receiving her college tuition money from Husband. Kimberly testified that the letter was presented to her by her father at a last-minute meeting concerning her tuition payment. She further testified that she believed she would not receive the money if she did not sign the letter, that she did not wish to sign it, and that she was surprised by the conditions Husband was suddenly attempting to impose. Husband contends, on the other hand, that Kimberly made her own decision to sign the letter, and that she did not need to do so to obtain money for college. He now argues that these letters constitute an effective revocation by Kimberly of her prior written consent, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.3(4), to the support action commenced by her mother. The trial court appears not to have made any findings with respect to this dispute, and it is here that our concern lies. The trial court simply stated in its opinion that the circumstances surrounding the execution of that letter [the August 30 letter] are such that the real reason for its execution is not clear. Since the court proceeded to enter an order reducing the prior support order and providing that Kimberly's college and incidental expenses be paid out of her custodial accounts, we must assume that the court further believed that the exact circumstances surrounding the execution of the letters was irrelevant. Presumably this was because the court, adhering to its earlier conclusion in the orphans' court action, believed that Husband was free to pay Kimberly's support and education expenses out of her custodial property regardless of whether the court so ordered or Kimberly so requested. Based on our holding in the appeal from the orphans' court decision, we must state emphatically that such is not the case. In considering on remand the amount of support to be awarded to Kimberly, whom we must now recognize as over age eighteen and attending college, the trial court shall apply the principles discussed above with respect to the role of custodial funds in determining and satisfying the support obligation to be imposed on a parent of a child over age eighteen and attending college. In making such a determination, the wishes of the child are relevant and may be considered. See section 5309(a) of the UGMA, 20 Pa.C.S. § 5309(a), entitling a minor over age fourteen to petition the court for an accounting by the custodian, and section 5305(c), allowing a minor over age fourteen to petition the court to order the custodian to pay over such funds as are necessary for the minor's support, maintenance, and education. However, this means that if there is a dispute as to the child's wishes, the court must engage in the necessary factfinding to determine what they actually are. The trial court shall conduct the proceedings on remand in accordance with these principles. Having considered all issues properly raised by the parties in these appeals, we enter the following dispositive order: The order of August 5, 1982 in No. 107 Orphans' 1982 is affirmed, but the custodians shall conduct themselves in the future in a manner consistent with this opinion. The order of October 4, 1982 in No. 859 Support 1981 is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The order of November 5, 1982 in No. 859 Support 1981 is vacated.