Opinion ID: 480806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of Pearce.

Text: 22 The State has argued in its brief that the Pearce doctrine is inapplicable to this case. The State also argued that the goal of Pearce was to stop vindictiveness in sentencing by the same trial judge who had been reversed by an appellate court, and here, the two life sentences were imposed by two different judges, negating the application of Pearce. 23 Because of the State's concession at oral argument, we need not decide in this case whether Pearce is narrowly limited to judges only, or whether it can apply to other sentencing entities as well. In this regard counsel for the State conceded at oral argument that the Pearce doctrine could be applicable, under the right factual circumstances, to the actions of the parole board. Counsel argued, however, that the facts in this case did not justify application of Pearce. After examining the district court's findings and the record, we think otherwise. 24 We thus conclude that, under the State's concession and the facts of this case, it was proper to apply the Pearce doctrine to the actions of the Board. In reaching this conclusion, however, we emphasize that the general applicability of the Pearce doctrine to parole boards is still an open issue in this Circuit. We stress, as did the district court, that this opinion is dictated by the unique facts of this case, and hold only that under the facts of this case, the rationale in Pearce applies to the actions of this parole board. 25