Opinion ID: 2552553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged Pattern of Misconduct Warranting Reversal

Text: Defendant contends that the foregoing occurrences, considered together, established a pattern of misconduct that warrants reversal. His claims fail for want of a sufficient factual predicate: there was no misconduct.
At the penalty phase, it became necessary to replace a sitting juror with an alternate. The court did so by choosing one of the alternates by random draw. (See § 1089.) Defendant asserts that the prosecutor should have agreed to depart from the statutory procedure for replacing an ill seated juror and stipulate that the trial court could select the sole female alternate juror. He claims that the prosecutor's failure to do so violated the federal constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws ( Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ( Batson )), the state constitutional right to a jury drawn from a representative crosssection of the community ( People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 ( Wheeler )), and his rights to a reliable and fundamentally fair trial under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. On the morning of March 13, 1995, after the parties had rested their cases at the penalty phase, but before closing arguments began, the trial court learned that, one of the seated jurors was ill and could not return to court for several days. The defense initially agreed that the seated juror likely could be excused for cause, but ultimately asked the court to ask the juror's doctor how long he would be absent. The prosecutor agreed. During the discussion about the juror's health the prosecutor asked about the method that would be used to pick an alternate if it proved to be necessary. Defense counsel replied, I did not know it was open for discussion. My experience has always been that jurors or alternates are selected in the order in which they are numbered. The court replied, Well, actually the Code says you are to draw, unless there's an agreement to the contrary. The prosecutor asked about the order in which the alternates were numbered, and the court replied that the first alternate was Miss [C.], and the other three, in order, were Mr. [M.], ... Mr. [C] and ... Mr. [S.]. Alternate Number 1 is the only lady among the alternates. Without commenting on the gender of any of the alternates, the prosecutor said, We would vote for following the procedure in the Code that we just select them out of the hat. That's the way it has been done in, I think, every trial that I have ever had. The court replied, Well, the law is that you do that unless there's an agreement to do something else. Unless there is an agreement to do something else, that's what we will do. After lunch that day the trial court announced that it had been informed the juror could not return for a week and suggested he be replaced. The prosecution agreed, but defense counsel objected, asking that the trial be continued until the juror could return and commenting that the continuance would be for only three court days. The prosecution again said it preferred to replace the juror by random draw from among the alternates, and the court ruled against defendant, finding good cause to replace the ill juror (see § 1089). The clerk drew at random from a box the name of alternate juror Keith C, a male. When trial resumed the next day, Keith C. took his seat as a member of the jury and the parties proceeded with closing argument. In replacing the ill juror by random drawing, the trial court was following the mandate of section 1089. As relevant here, section 1089 provides: If at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or her duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefore, the court may order the juror to be discharged and draw the name of an alternate, who shall then take a place in the jury box, and be subject to the same rules and regulations as though the alternate juror had been selected as one of the original jurors. (Italics added.) We turn to defendant's Batson-Wheeler claim. A prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the basis of group bias violates a defendant's right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under the state Constitution ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748; People v. Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th 536, 553, 15 Cal. Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344) and the defendant's right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. 79, 88, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69) Defendant argues that the Batson-Wheeler prohibitions logically apply to a prosecutor's decision (as he views the prosecutor's action) to exclude an alternate juror from joining the jury based on gender. Defendant did not raise a Batson-Wheeler challenge at trial, and has forfeited the claim. A defendant who believes the prosecution is improperly using peremptory challenges for a discriminatory purpose is required to `raise a timely objection and make a prima facie showing that jurors are being excluded on the basis of racial or group identity.' ( People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 709, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682, 101 P.3d 568, italics added.) The foregoing rule also applies when a party invokes a Batson-Wheeler claim based on a novel theory that the protection conferred by those cases extends to the method of replacing an excused juror with an alternate. Turning to the merits, we see no Batson-Wheeler violation. The trial court mentioned in an inconsequential aside (inconsequential because section 1089 specifies a random drawing of an alternate to replace a seated juror) that the first alternate juror was the only woman among the four alternates. But the prosecutor never said anything about the gender of any of the alternate jurors or did anything to preclude her or reduce her chance of joining the seated jurors. Rather, the prosecutor merely deferred to the provisions of the Penal Code. He simply asked for an alternate juror to be picked at random because that is what section 1089 specifies and he had never heard of substituting a juror by any other method. Defendant's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims are forfeited because he did not present them to the trial court. ( People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th 428, 435, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765.) In any event, those claims lack merit. The court followed the rule set forth in section 1089, and insofar as there were legal grounds to discharge the ill juror and replace that juror with an alternate, no constitutional violation occurred. (See People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th 381, 461-463 & fn. 20,127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.)
Defendant claims he was overcharged under section 190.3, factor (b), because the trial court (1) permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence under factor (b) that fell outside its scope, and (2) gave a special instruction that (a) listed individual instances of possible aggravating conduct under more than one criminal statute, and (b) segmented single criminal courses of conduct (i.e., criminal transactions) into separate offenses. He maintains that the court compounded the errors by failing to instruct the jury not to double-count defendant's misconduct under separate penal provisions, by giving a biased instruction on his possessing a contraband razor in jail, and by failing to give CALJIC No. 12.42. He claims that the foregoing acts and omissions violated factor (b) and the reliable penalty determination required by the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution.
Before the penalty phase began, defendant moved to exclude evidence of certain alleged acts that in his view did not amount to criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. (§ 190.3, factor (b).) As relevant to this appeal, defendant argued at two hearings that the following acts did not fall under factor (b): his struggle with Stephanie C. on September 10, 1993; his attempts to escape from the Reno police after his arrest on September 20, 1993; and his struggle with sheriffs deputies in jail on January 14, 1994. The trial court granted defendant's motion in minor part, but, in the main, ruled that the evidence of each incident fell within the ambit of factor (b). On appeal, defendant renews his argument that the evidence of these events should have been excluded because it did not lie within the scope of Section 190.3, factor (b). We disagree in each case. As noted, defendant showed up at Stephanie C.'s workplace and pushed her to the ground. That was battery (§ 242). He struggled with Reno police officers and they had to summon a van they use to control combative prisoners. Those were violent (see § 69) and willful (see § 148, former subd. (a); Stats.1990, ch. 1181, § 1, p. 4930) physical acts of resistance against the officers in the performance of their duties involving either violence or the threat of it. In the January 14, 1994, incustody incident, defendant had to be subdued by sheriffs deputies and told them, I was looking to stick your ass. Each of the foregoing incidents constituted criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. (§ 190.3, factor (b).) Because the evidence was properly introduced under factor (b), there was no violation of defendant's right to a reliable penalty determination under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. ( People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th 970, 1051-1054, 47 Cal. Rptr.3d 467,140 P.3d 775.)

The prosecution sought an instruction, based on CALJIC No. 8.87, listing 16 possible aggravating acts for the jury's consideration under section 190.3, factor (b). Defendant requested a different instruction which listed far fewer criminal acts. After hearing argument, the trial court gave the prosecution's instruction. Defendant argues that the instruction improperly allowed the jury to double-count the same conduct under more than one statutory provision. We rejected a similar claim in People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119. In Davis, defendant was charged in [a] samurai sword incident with misdemeanor battery and brandishing, [and] was convicted of brandishing only. At the prosecutor's request, and over defendant's objection, the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider the samurai sword incident in aggravation for brandishing, battery, and assault with a deadly weapon. It instructed the jury on the elements of all three offenses ( Id. at p. 543, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119.) As here, the defendant argued the court should have instructed the jury on only one crime per incident. We disagreed. Evidence of prior violent conduct is admitted under Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b), `to enable the jury to make an individualized assessment of the character and history of the defendant to determine the nature of the punishment to be imposed.' [Citation.] ``[I]t is not [only] the fact of conviction which is probative in the penalty phase, but rather the conduct of the defendant which gave rise to the offense.'` [Citation.] Indeed, Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b), `expressly permits proof of any violent criminal activity regardless of whether it led to prosecution or conviction.' [Citation.] [ķ] It is thus irrelevant that defendant was not convicted of, or formally charged with, the crime of assault with a deadly weapon. The jury was properly permitted to consider defendant's conduct in aggravation if it determined that the elements of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Id. at p. 544, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119.) Defendant offers no convincing reason why we should depart from the conclusion we reached in Davis. We reject his claim that the court's action improperly inflated the case in aggravation. His Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claim, predicated as it is on his state law claim, also fails. ( People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th 463, 544, fn. 40, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119.) Finally, under the reasoning of Davis, we do not discern any violation of defendant's due process rights. The instructions were permissible under state law.
Defendant contends that giving the following prosecution-proposed instruction regarding the evidence of his possessing a contraband razor blade in jail (see § 4574, subd. (a)) was unfairly tilted toward the prosecution's case: Every person who while confined in a county jail possesses any deadly weapon is guilty of a felony. [ķ] An object should be evaluated as to its potential use when determining whether it is a deadly weapon. Defendant maintains that the instruction was one-sided and argues that because section 4574 proscribes possessing a deadly weapon in jail without any intent requirement ( People v. Grayson (2000) 83 Cal. App.4th 479, 486, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 701), either the trial court should not have allowed an instruction on these incidents or, if it was to be given, CALJIC No. 12.42 should have been given to require the jurors to find that defendant intended to use the razor blades within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (b). Possessing a contraband razor in jail (§ 4574, subd. (a)) is a violent offense for purposes of section 190.3, factor (b). ( People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1178, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353.) Defendant's claim regarding CALJIC No. 12.42 must be rejected. At the time, CALJIC No. 12.42 provided as follows: In determining if the instrument or object in this case was a weapon of the kind within the law as stated, you may consider the circumstances attending any possession of the instrument or object by the defendant, such as the time and place of its possession; the destination of the possessor; any alteration of the object from its standard form; and evidence, if any, indicating its intended use by the possessor for a dangerous rather than a harmless purpose. (CALJIC No. 12.42 (5th ed.1988).) CALJIC No. 12.42, however, is inapplicable to a charge under section 4574, subdivision (a). The use note to CALJIC No. 12.42 accurately observes, This instruction is essential when the questioned object is an innocent-appearing utensil capable of use as a dangerous object. In such a case, the trier of fact must find criminal intent on the part of the possessor before finding him or her guilty of the offense. As we explained, discussing a statute proscribing possession of a slugging weapon, The Legislature here sought to outlaw the classic instruments of violence and their homemade equivalents; the Legislature sought likewise to outlaw possession of the sometimes-useful object when the attendant circumstances, including the time, place, destination of the possessor, the alteration of the object from standard form, and other relevant facts indicated that the possessor would use the object for a dangerous, not harmless, purpose. ( People v. Grubb (1966) 63 Cal.2d 614, 620-621, 47 Cal.Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100.) The Legislature thus decrees as criminal the possession of ordinarily harmless objects when the circumstances of possession demonstrate an immediate atmosphere of danger. Accordingly the statute would encompass the possession of a table leg, in one sense an obviously useful item, when it is detached from the table and carried at night in a `tough' neighborhood to the scene of a riot. On the other hand the section would not penalize the Little Leaguer at bat in a baseball game. ( Id. at p. 621, 47 Cal.Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100.) The same considerations do not apply to section 4574, which contains no intent requirement ( People v. Grayson, supra, 83 Cal. App.4th 479, 486, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 701; see also People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 325, 333-534, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52). In sum, CALJIC No. 12.42 ... [is] inapplicable.... Section 4574, subdivision (a) prohibits the unauthorized possession of deadly weapons by confined inmates at all times, in all (confined) places, at all destinations, regardless of alteration. ( People v. Savedra (1993) 15 Cal. App.4th 738, 743,19 Cal.Rptr.2d 115.)
Defendant claims the court erred in violation of various constitutional rights by refusing to give this instruction he requested regarding his age: One of the factors for you to consider in determining the penalty is the age of the defendant at the time of the offense(s). Defendant was 19 years [old] when he committed the crimes of which you have found him guilty. You may consider that had he been under 18 years old when the crimes were committed, he would not be subject to the death penalty. Chronological age, by itself, is a matter over which the defendant has no control, and which is not relevant to the choice of penalty. However, the factor relating to `defendant's age,' as set forth in these instructions, refers to any matter concerning defendant's age, maturity, and judgment that common experience or morality might indicate to be relevant to the issue of penalty. You shall therefore give any such agerelated factors consideration in arriving at a judgment as to penalty. The trial court said it had a problem with defendant's proposed instruction, which it regarded as argumentative. [I]f I gave this, the court continued, I think I ought to give one for the People about the negative things they can dredge up about the Defendant's young age, and that is he had committed an awful lot of crimes by the time he was 18: Accordingly, the trial court refused defendant's proposed special instruction and gave the standard section 190.3, factor (i) instruction regarding defendant's age, instructing the jury that it shall consider, if applicable, [t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime. (CALJIC No. 8.85 (5th ed.1988).) The instruction was argumentative and the trial court properly refused to give it. In People v. Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th 518, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137, we stated that the trial court properly refused to give the following instruction: `An individual under 18 is not subject to the death penalty. You may consider the fact that Mr. Brown was 19 at the time of this offense.' ( Id. at p. 564, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137.) We stated that the trial court correctly refused the proffered instruction. `[T]he general rule is that a trial court may refuse a proffered instruction if it ... is argumentative, or is duplicative.' [Citation.] `Although instructions pinpointing the theory of the defense might be appropriate, a defendant is not entitled to instructions that simply recite facts favorable to him.' [Citation.] By instructing the jury that those younger than 18 years old are legally ineligible for the death penalty, the proffered instruction highlighted a single, mitigating aspect of defendant's age â that he had only recently become eligible for the ultimate penalty â and was thus improperly argumentative. ( Id. at pp. 564-565, 3 Cal. Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137.) Defendant's proposed instruction was similarly argumentative and, hence, properly refused.
Defendant argues that the trial court violated various constitutional rights when it failed to instruct the jury that there was no burden of proof on either party. Jurors who believe[d] the burden should be on the defendant to prove mitigation in [the] penalty phase would continue to believe that, he contends. There is no burden of proof or persuasion on either party at the penalty phase of a capital trial. (E.g., People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th 287, 394, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432.) Nevertheless, we reject defendant's contention that the jury must expressly be so instructed. To be sure, it is not error if a trial court chooses to instruct the jury in the broad terms defendant would have preferred, i.e., that there is no burden of proof on either party. ( People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 960, 245 Cal.Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395 [case tried under 1977 death penalty law], cited with approval in People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 739, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 326, 140 P.3d 657 [case tried under 1977 death penalty law]; see also People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1031, 248 Cal.Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017 [in case tried under 1977 death penalty law, [b]y stipulation of the parties, the court had also instructed that `for this phase of the proceeding there is no burden of proof on either side of the case'].) But defendant benefited from a more precise and helpful instruction regarding the jury's task: the court properly instructed the jurors that they were free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider, and that [t]o return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. This satisfied instructional requirements regarding the lack of a burden of proof or persuasion at the penalty phase. (See People v. Hughes, supra, at p. 394, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432 [quoting materially identical instructional language in rejecting a claim that prosecutorial remarks shifted to the defendant the burdens of proof and persuasion of showing that he deserved to live].)
Defendant raises additional challenges to California's death penalty statute and to other aspects of California law, as interpreted by this court and as applied at his trial. We adhere to the decisions that have rejected similar claims, and decline to reconsider such authorities, as follows: The death penalty law adequately narrows the class of death-eligible offenders. ( People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 276, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123.) Section 190.3, factor (a), is not unconstitutionally overbroad, arbitrary, capricious, or vague, whether on its face ( People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1165, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321) or as applied to defendant. The death penalty law is not unconstitutional for failing to impose a burden of proof â whether beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence â as to the existence of aggravating circumstances, the greater weight of aggravating circumstances over mitigating circumstances, or the appropriateness of a death sentence. ( People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 401, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244.) Except for section 190.3, factor (b), no burden of proof is constitutionally required at the penalty phase. ( People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 43, 32 Cal. Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591.) And is there no constitutional requirement that the jury find aggravating factors unanimously. ( People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 709-710, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640.) Neither Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, nor Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, has changed our prior conclusions regarding burden of proof or jury unanimity. ( People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th 970, 1068, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775.) There is no requirement that the jury prepare written findings identifying the aggravating factors on which it relied. ( People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 619, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 22,139 P.3d 492.) The statutory scheme is not unconstitutional insofar as it does not contain disparate sentence review (i.e., comparative or intercase proportionality review). ( People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th 970, 1067, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775.) Allowing consideration of unadjudicated criminal activity under section 190.3, factor (b) is not unconstitutional as a general matter; moreover, and contrary to defendant's argument, it does not render a death sentence unreliable. ( People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th 698, 729, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682, 101 P.3d 568.) Neither Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, nor Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, affects our conclusion that factor (b) is constitutional. ( People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 221-222, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717.) The use of such adjectives in the sentencing factors as extreme (§ 190.3, factors (d), (g)) and substantial ( id., factor (g)) is constitutional. ( People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 614, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076.) There is no requirement that the jury be instructed on which factors are mitigating and which are aggravating. ( People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 299, 25 Cal. Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990.) The guaranty of equal protection of the laws does not require this court to give capital defendants the same sentence review afforded other felons under the determinate sentencing law. ( People v. Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th 916, 970, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 70 P.3d 277.) The judgment and sentence against defendant do not violate international law. ( People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th 970, 1066, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775.) Nor does California's asserted status as being in the minority of jurisdictions worldwide that impose capital punishment, or this jurisdiction's asserted contrast with the nations of Western Europe in that we impose capital punishment and they purportedly either do not or do so only in exceptional circumstances, result in any violation of the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution. ( People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th 1, 47-48, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591.) The record contains no suggestion that defendant is a foreign national or a dual national.
Defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the asserted errors requires us to reverse the judgment. We disagree. We have found no reversible error in any particular instance, and any errors that may have' occurred do not, separately or together, entitle defendant to relief. His trial was fair.
As to count four, the jury found defendant guilty of kidnapping for robbery under section 209, subdivision (b). With regard to this count, it also found true that the victim suffered bodily harm and death, and that defendant intentionally inflicted great bodily injury on her. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of life imprisonment without possibility of parole on this count. Defendant contends the court erred. We agree. At the time of the crime, section 209, subdivision (b), provided: Any person who kidnaps or carries away any individual to commit robbery shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with possibility of parole. (Stats.1990, ch. 55, § 3, p. 394, italics added.) It appears the trial court relied On section 209, subdivision (a), for the sentence it imposed. Subdivision (a) provides that the sentence for kidnapping for ransom is life without the possibility of parole when bodily harm is involved. (See People v. Nguyen (2000) 22 Cal.4th 872. 884, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 178, 997 P.2d 493.) However, as we explained in Nguyen, in 1976, section 209 was reconfigured, segregating the crime of kidnapping for ransom, extortion or reward into subdivision (a) of the section and that of kidnapping for robbery into subdivision (b). ( Ibid. ) In contrast to section 209, subdivision (a), [t]he new subdivision (b) of section 209 ... made no reference to bodily harm, nor did it retain the increased penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. ( People v. Nguyen, supra, at pp. 884-885, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 178, 997 P.2d 493.) In other words, by its terms the statute did not carry over [from the prior version of section 209] to the crime of kidnapping for robbery, now set forth in new section 209, subdivision (b), a linkage of `bodily harm' with an increased penalty. ( People v. Nguyen, supra, at p. 885, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 178, 997 P.2d 493.) Because defendant was convicted of kidnapping for robbery under section 209, subdivision (b), rather than kidnapping for ransom under section 209, subdivision (a), the punishment for that count should have been life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Accordingly, we will modify the judgment to change the sentence on count 4 from life imprisonment without possibility of parole to life imprisonment with possibility of parole.