Opinion ID: 1156663
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Jersey Maid Decision

Text: Almost 50 years ago we held an ostensibly similar grant of power to an administrative agency unconstitutional under article VI, section 1. ( Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock (1939) 13 Cal.2d 620, 651-652 [91 P.2d 577]; see also Pacific Coast Casualty Co. v. Pillsbury (1915) 171 Cal. 319, 322 [153 P. 24] [commission that is authorized to finally settle liability disputes between employers and employees exercises judicial power] [dictum]; Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury (1916) 172 Cal. 407, 411-413 [156 P. 491] [same] [dictum].) Plaintiff asserts Jersey Maid controls this case, and requires that we affirm the trial court. As we explain below, however, we decline to apply Jersey Maid's holding to the challenged remedial powers in this case. Jersey Maid involved a broad constitutional challenge to the Milk Stabilization Act. In creating the act, the Legislature expressly declared that production and distribution of milk was a business affected with a public interest. (13 Cal.2d at p. 626.) The declaration explained that milk was a necessary product and its availability vital to the public health and welfare. Because of unfair, unjust, destructive and demoralizing trade practices that constituted a constant menace to California's citizens and degraded the quality of available milk, and because health regulations alone could not cure the problem, the Legislature explained, it is the policy of this State to promote, foster and encourage the intelligent production and orderly marketing of commodities necessary to its citizens ... and to eliminate speculation, waste, improper marketing, unfair and destructive trade practices, and improper accounting for milk purchased from producers. (13 Cal.2d at pp. 626-627.) To this end, the Legislature enacted a detailed plan that, inter alia, allowed the Director of Agriculture to establish minimum prices for milk in order to promote quality in the industry and protect the public. This court upheld most of the act's provisions against various due process and equal protection challenges. (13 Cal.2d at pp. 636-651, 652-660.) We specifically rejected numerous attacks grounded on the notion that the act unconstitutionally conferred legislative power on the director, by allowing him to decide whether to set minimum prices, and to fix such prices. In addition, we rejected broad challenges (asserting violations of both the judicial powers and legislative powers clauses (Cal. Const., arts. VI, § 1, IV, § 1)), to the director's authority to employ judicial power ... in that he is empowered to hold hearings at which evidence is produced and findings of fact are made by him. (13 Cal.2d at p. 659.) Nonetheless we invalidated  on grounds that it violated the Constitution's judicial powers clause  a provision allowing the director to entertain and resolve complaints by milk producers against milk distributors. The challenged section permitted the director to determine the amount of damage, if any, to which a complainant is entitled as a result of a failure of the distributor to pay for fluid milk or fluid cream as in this chapter provided, and in such case the director may make an order directing the offender to make reparation and pay to such person complaining such amount on or before the date fixed in the order. (13 Cal.2d at p. 651.) [5] Responding to the contention that this provision improperly clothed the director with judicial power, we stated, There can be no answer to this contention. No citation of authority is necessary to support the same. While the attorney-general does not concede the invalidity of this provision of said section, he makes no attempt to defend its constitutionality, and we must therefore assume that he recognizes the serious defect in this provision of said section.... ( Id. at pp. 651-652.) This summary statement constitutes the court's entire discourse on the issue. Plaintiff asserts the director's power held unconstitutional in Jersey Maid is indistinguishable from the Board's authority to determine excess rents and order reparations under section 1809, subdivision (b). Plaintiff's premise is that the damages which the Jersey Maid court found to be beyond the agency's powers were merely restitutive in nature (i.e., the difference between the minimum price and the actual price). She reasons that because the milk board was prohibited from adjudicating and awarding such restitution in Jersey Maid, the Board here is likewise prohibited from doing the same (and, it follows, from imposing treble damages). Precise interpretation of Jersey Maid is difficult; discussion of the damages issue was, at best, conclusory. It may be, as plaintiff suggests, that the court considered an award of damages of any kind to be beyond the board's powers. But because the Jersey Maid court did not explain or articulate the nature of the serious defect of the statutory provision, it is unclear whether that decision was based on plaintiff's view, or on some other rationale. For example, the Jersey Maid decision might have rested on a conclusion that the provision was unconstitutional because it did not specifically provide for judicial review of the administrative determination. (See post, pp. 361-362 [discussing the principle of check].) [6] (3) When, as here, a decision treats an issue in a summary and conclusory manner, and is virtually devoid of reasoning, its authoritative status is undermined. ( City of Berkeley v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 515, 533 [162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 606 P.2d 362].) Moreover, we note that Jersey Maid addressed an issue of first impression without discussing precedents from other jurisdictions, or the policy implications of its rule. ( I.J. Weinrot & Son, Inc. v. Jackson (1985) 40 Cal.3d 327, 336 [220 Cal. Rptr. 103, 708 P.2d 682].) Most important, as we explain below, the intervening five decades of case law show that unquestioning and rigid adherence to Jersey Maid's holding would place us out of step with every sister-state court of this country that has considered administrative awards of restitutive damages. Given this fact, we decline to treat Jersey Maid with the same deference we would normally accord an earlier opinion under the doctrine of stare decisis. (4) We thus consider afresh the limits placed by article VI, section 1 of our Constitution on the remedial powers of administrative agencies.