Opinion ID: 414052
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Cook Affidavit

Text: 8 The May 8 warrant was granted on the strength of drug related conversations intercepted under the April 23 warrant. Thus, there is no doubt that if the April 23 warrant falls, so does the May 8 warrant. Chief Judge Munson upheld the earlier warrant against the defendants' challenge that the supporting affidavit failed to demonstrate that other investigative procedures had been used or were unlikely to succeed if tried, stating that marginally sufficient facts were presented to justify a reasonable belief that normal investigative measures would be unavailing. United States v. Lilla, 534 F.Supp. 1247, 1260 (N.D.N.Y.1982). In reaching this conclusion, Judge Munson stated that common sense would suggest that Michael Lilla's operation involved several individuals, one of whom was in Florida supplying Lilla's brother with cocaine. While we agree with this observation, we do not think that it follows that the statutory requirement of exhausting other investigative procedures was complied with, or even said to have been complied with. 9 Judge Munson held that the validity of the warrant must be measured by New York law. For practical purposes the federal and New York statutory requirements are the same. 2 Both require a showing that investigative procedures less intrusive than a wiretap have been tried or are unlikely to succeed if tried. We have previously cited the parallel provisions together, e.g., United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 529 n. 6 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 931, 98 S.Ct. 2831, 56 L.Ed.2d 776 (1978), and cited alternatively federal and state cases. Id. at 530. New York's highest court has held that the New York statute was designed to harmonize  'state standards for court authorized eavesdropping warrants with federal standards,'  People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12, 26, 385 N.E.2d 541, 547, 412 N.Y.S.2d 801, 807 (1978) (quoting Governor's Memorandum, L. 1969, ch. 1147, N.Y.Legis.Ann. 586 (1969)), and we discern no difference between the federal and state case law relating to this requirement. 3 10 The Supreme Court has told us that the requirement is simply designed to assure that wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime, United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n. 12, 94 S.Ct. 977, 983 n. 12, 39 L.Ed.2d 225 (1974), and while traditional surveillance techniques need not be exhausted first if they are impractical or costly and inconvenient, United States v. Robertson, 504 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913, 95 S.Ct. 1568, 43 L.Ed.2d 778 (1975), nevertheless Congress--and, we may add, the New York legislature-- 11 evinced the clear intent to make doubly sure that the statutory authority be used with restraint .... These [wiretap] procedures were not to be routinely employed as the initial step in criminal investigation. Rather, the applicant must state and the court must find that normal investigative procedures have been tried and failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. 12 United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 1826, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). To this end, both the New York and the federal statute require a full and complete statement explaining whether other investigative procedures have been tried and have failed, or appear unlikely to succeed or are too dangerous. Although the required showing is to be tested in a practical and commonsense fashion, S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 101, reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2112, 2190; People v. Versace, 73 A.D.2d 304, 307, 426 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (App.Div.1980), an affidavit offered in support of a wiretap warrant must provide some basis for concluding that less intrusive investigative procedures are not feasible. 13 Previous cases from our own court show the care taken, even when wiretap warrants have been upheld, to ensure that normal investigative procedures have been tried or at least considered. For example, in United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980, 97 S.Ct. 493, 50 L.Ed.2d 589 (1976), a case involving a major New York City drug conspiracy, ongoing nonwiretap surveillance had indicated that one of the defendants was likely involved in an expansive narcotics operation. 4 The issuance of a wiretap warrant was upheld on the ground that normal investigative techniques had become increasingly unsuccessful. Id. at 1011. Similarly, in United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d at 530, the supporting affidavit set forth that on thirteen specific dates normal investigative techniques had been attempted but the subjects were difficult to 'tail' because they were 'very careful and ... constantly changing routes.'  United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981, 100 S.Ct. 484, 62 L.Ed.2d 408 (1979), which involved a New Jersey statutory provision virtually identical to the New York and the federal provisions, illustrates the sort of investigative procedures that might be utilized before resorting to wiretapping. 5 In Vazquez the prosecutor's office had interviewed informants, had conducted physical surveillance, and had checked bank, telephone, motor vehicle, utility, and police records. Id. at 1282. Finally, In United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 868 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 2020, 72 L.Ed.2d 474 (U.S.1982), the affidavit described attempts to have a confidential informant introduce an undercover agent to the defendant in hopes that the agent might ferret out the identity of his sources, but the defendant spurned the agent and demanded that he leave the vicinity. As in Fury, attempts to tail the defendant proved futile. 14 The New York cases are quite to the same effect. Thus, where the location of the subjects of the investigation precludes the use of informants or nonwiretap surveillance, see People v. Penna, 53 A.D.2d 941, 942, 385 N.Y.S.2d 400, 402 (App.Div.1976) (isolated dwelling in extremely rural setting), wiretap warrants have been upheld. Wiretaps have also been approved where the police have attempted and failed to infiltrate a criminal conspiracy involving individuals with prior records who were careful and evasive following the unsuccessful use of search warrants, People v. Versace, 73 A.D.2d at 308, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 64, and where the nature of the offense is such that only electronic surveillance can produce the evidence necessary for conviction. See People v. Teicher, 52 N.Y.2d 638, 655-56, 422 N.E.2d 506, 515, 439 N.Y.S.2d 846, 855 (1981) (videoelectronic surveillance of dentist suspected of sexually abusing female patients while they were heavily sedated upheld). Wiretap warrants have been invalidated, however, where the record indicated that other procedures might have been used successfully. For example, in People v. Brenes, 53 A.D.2d 78, 80, 385 N.Y.S.2d 530, 531-32 (App.Div.1976), aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 41, 364 N.E.2d 1322, 396 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1977), it was held that the State failed to establish that normal investigative procedures were unavailing where, as here, informers and undercover operatives had access to the building and were able to observe the comings and goings of suspected couriers. In contrast to those New York cases and cases from our own court where wiretap warrants have been upheld, in this case, as in Brenes, the use of the wiretap was merely a useful additional tool and therefore should never have been authorized. 53 A.D.2d at 80, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 532. 15 Neither the New York nor the federal statute requires that any particular investigative procedures be exhausted before a wiretap may be authorized. Wiretaps are neither a routine initial step nor an absolute last resort. Note, The United States Courts of Appeals: 1975-76 Term Criminal Law and Procedure, 65 Geo.L.J. 209, 247 (1976). The requirement of a full and complete statement regarding procedures attempted or considered prior to the application for a wiretap serves both to underscore the desirability of using less intrusive procedures and to provide courts with some indication of whether any efforts were made to avoid needless invasion of privacy. Like other courts, we reject generalized and conclusory statements that other investigative procedures would prove unsuccessful. United States v. DiMuro, 540 F.2d 503, 510-11 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct. 733, 50 L.Ed.2d 749 (1977); United States v. Feldman, 535 F.2d 1175, 1178-79 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940, 97 S.Ct. 354, 50 L.Ed.2d 309 (1976); United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 849-50 (3d Cir.1976); United States v. Kalustian, 529 F.2d 585, 589-90 (9th Cir.1975); see also United States v. Williams, 188 U.S.App.D.C. 315, 580 F.2d 578, 589, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 832, 99 S.Ct. 112, 58 L.Ed.2d 127 (1978) (affiant's conclusion as to the need for wiretap upheld when read in conjunction with other portion of affidavit containing detailed descriptions of the investigative events attempted prior to wiretap request). 16 The record in this case does not support the conclusion that other investigative procedures were either unlikely to succeed or were too dangerous to use. If anything, the record establishes the contrary proposition: the normal investigative procedures that were used were successful. Trooper Cook was able, through his informant, to make a buy from Michael Lilla and was told that Lilla's brother was in Florida working on a cocaine and marijuana deal. Lilla was apparently not apprehensive about dealing with Cook; he told Cook to call a week or so after the initial marijuana purchase to check on the status of the cocaine and marijuana that was to be sent up from Florida. Yet the affidavit does not reveal what, if any, investigative techniques were attempted prior to the wiretap request. Instead, the affidavit merely asserted that no other investigative method exists to determine the identity of individuals who might have been involved with Lilla. The affidavit fails to specify the facts upon which Cook based this conclusion; there is no indication why simple surveillance of Lilla's place of work or his home would not have been useful. The affidavit does not enlighten us as to why this narcotics case presented problems different from any other small-time narcotics case; if anything, Lilla operated more openly than most and with less care in terms of evading detection. In short, we agree with counsel at argument who stated that the only useful purpose that might be served by the trooper's affidavit in this case is as an exhibit at a police training academy of how not to conform to the federal and state statutory requirements. 17 The Government argues that physical surveillance of the auto body shop where Lilla worked would have been unavailing because legitimate customers as well as drug purchasers would come to call. But the drug-related customers at the auto body shop would presumably have no interaction with the shop concerning their cars, a matter that might have been easily detected by simple surveillance of those who visit the shop or through examination of the shop's business records. The Government's argument that this was a far flung ... conspiracy involving numerous unknown persons whose identity could be discovered only through wiretapping simply does not square with common sense. 6 We see no reason why surveillance of Michael Lilla or the use of informants could not have yielded this information. The affidavit supporting the application for the wiretap does nothing to allay our fears that the State in this case relied on wiretapping as a substitute for standard investigative procedures, a result that both the New York and the federal statutes are designed to avoid. 7 The statutory requirements are not so lightly to be regarded.