Opinion ID: 1618117
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court properly denied appellant's directed verdict motion on the charge of first-degree burglary.

Text: Appellant next argues that he should have received a directed verdict of acquittal on the offense of first-degree burglary. KRS 511.020. Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence presented to show he entered Witcher's house intending to commit a crime. In particular, Appellant argues that on the night in question, he was excessively intoxicated and, hence, unable to form the intent to commit a crime. KRS 501.080. KRS 511.020 states: (1) A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when, with the intent to commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building, and when in effecting entry or while in the building or in the immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime: (a) Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or (b) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or (c) Uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument against any person who is not a participant in the crime. A trial court's decision regarding a directed verdict motion is reviewed under the standard articulated in Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.1991): On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony. On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. Id. at 187. Under this standard, the trial court properly denied Appellant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of first-degree burglary. The evidence presented allows a reasonable juror to believe that Appellant was inside Witcher's house with the intent to commit a crime. Deloe testified that the steak knife Appellant brandished at the hospital came from a set of knives she owned, strongly implying that the knife was stolen. Further, the destroyed pillowcase, cut-up car seat, and displaced beer amply support the inference that Appellant was looking for something to steal or that he intended to commit the crime of criminal mischief. See Anastasi v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Ky.1988) (Intent can be inferred from the actions of an accused and the surrounding circumstances. The jury has wide latitude in inferring intent from the evidence.). The evidence of his intoxication was not so compelling as to completely negate the issue of intent. Hence, it was not unreasonable for a jury to find Appellant guilty of first-degree burglary. The trial court properly denied the motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of first-degree burglary.