Opinion ID: 786772
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Compliance With EPA's Part 197 in Construction Authorization

Text: 164 Nevada alleges that NRC violated the NWPA and EnPA by permitting construction of the Yucca Mountain repository without first determining that there is a reasonable expectation that the repository will comply with the EPA standards. Nevada maintains that, because NRC is required under both the NWPA and EnPA to promulgate licensing requirements and criteria that are consistent with the EPA standards, NRC must ensure that the proposed repository will meet those standards before it authorizes construction. According to Nevada, however, NRC's pertinent regulation, section 63.31, does not require the Commission to find that DOE's application for construction authorization complies with the EPA standards set out in part 197, see 40 C.F.R. pt. 197, or that the application satisfies the EPA standards as incorporated in part 63. Nevada points to paragraph 63.31(a)(3)(ii), which provides that, in making its construction authorization decision, NRC must simply consider whether the site and design comply with the performance objectives and requirements contained in subpart E (requiring compliance with EPA standards set forth in subpart L of part 63, see 10 C.F.R. § 63.113(b)). In Nevada's view, NRC has [c]learly... unlawfully reserved for itself the discretion to authorize repository construction even in the face of authoritative evidence that it will not comply with NRC's own (and EPA's) safety requirements. Petitioners' Br. at 56. 165 NRC in turn asserts that Nevada offered no hint of this argument during NRC's rulemaking proceedings and, as a consequence, cannot now challenge section 63.31 on this ground. Respondent's Br. at 26. While Nevada does not deny that it failed to raise the argument below, offering no citation in the voluminous record where it did so, it counters that it did not have to. Petitioners' Reply Br. at 12-13. Nevada maintains that its oversight was both understandable and excusable in that EPA did not propose its standards until after the window for public comment on part 63 had closed, and thus, the timing of NRC's rulemaking proceedings discourag[ed] the public from commenting on the interrelationship of the two agencies' regulations. Petitioners' Reply Br. at 12-13. We are unconvinced. 166 It is a hard and fast rule of administrative law, rooted in simple fairness, that issues not raised before an agency are waived and will not be considered by a court on review. See United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37, 73 S.Ct. 67, 69, 97 L.Ed. 54 (1952) (Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.); see also Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 562 (D.C.Cir.2002) ([T]here is a near absolute bar against raising new issues — factual or legal — on appeal in the administrative context.); Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., 134 F.3d at 1111 (`Our cases ... require complainants, before coming to court, to give the [agency] a fair opportunity to pass on a legal or factual argument.' (quoting Wash. Ass'n for Television & Children, 712 F.2d at 681 (alteration and emphasis in original))). The rule applies with no less force to a statutory interpretation claim not brought to an agency's attention: [R]espect for agencies' proper role in the Chevron framework requires that the court be particularly careful to ensure that challenges to an agency's interpretation of its governing statute are first raised in the administrative forum. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1063, 1074 (D.C.Cir.1994); see also Ohio v. EPA, 997 F.2d 1520, 1528 (D.C.Cir.1993); Linemaster Switch Corp. v. EPA, 938 F.2d 1299, 1308-09 (D.C.Cir.1991). Nevada failed to raise this claim before NRC and consequently waived it.