Opinion ID: 453004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: propriety of the prosecutorial argument in this case

Text: 119 Brooks complains of 12 separate portions of the prosecutor's argument in the sentencing phase of this case. We discuss each seriatim. 120 1. Brooks first complains of Whisnant's brief expressions of his own personal belief in the death penalty. An attorney's personal opinions are irrelevant to the sentencing jury's task. United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir.1978). 42 We will consider the effect of these statements in Part V. 121 2. Following the initial expression of belief in the death penalty, Whisnant represented that the Georgia crime rate had gone up since 1964, the date of the last state execution. Brooks argues that this statement, along with the assertion that we didn't have this kind of murder ... when we had capital punishment, was improper. 122 Whisnant's reference to the increasing crime rate concerned the need for deterrence. Although there was no record evidence on the crime rate, the reference was acceptable because the increase in crime is within the common knowledge of all reasonable people. Tenorio v. United States, 390 F.2d 96, 99 (9th Cir.) (prosecutorial reference, in prosecution for importation of heroin, to the destruction and the human waste which arises from the use of heroin acceptable as common knowledge), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 874, 89 S.Ct. 169, 21 L.Ed.2d 145 (1968); see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 n. 34, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2931 n. 34, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (noting 123% increase in murders from 1964 to 1974). Thus, the mere reference to an increasing crime rate was not improper. 123 The more crucial claim is that there is no support for the part of the argument attributing the increase in crime to the absence of executions. There was no record evidence of the deterrent effect of capital punishment. 124 As we have noted in Part III.B. of this opinion, deterrence is a valid consideration of a sentencing jury in a capital case. Although the Supreme Court has recognized the inconclusive nature of the scholarly debate on the subject, it has also held that capital punishment has little or no deterrent effect on some murders while undoubtedly deterring other such crimes. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2930, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). In addition to recognizing some causal link between the penalty and deterrence, the Court held that the general issue of deterrence was a complex factual issue best left for resolution by legislatures. It thus deferred to the Georgia legislature's decision that capital punishment is appropriate in some cases. Id. at 186, 96 S.Ct. at 2931. The prosecutor need not adduce evidence, therefore, to prove the link between death and deterrence. An argument such as the one made by Whisnant, urging the jurors to consider the deterrent effect of the penalty, is not improper. 43 125 3. Whisnant discussed the victim by emphasizing her youth, attractiveness, and kind disposition. Brooks argues that these remarks were wholly irrelevant and highly prejudicial. 126 It would be clearly improper for a prosecutor to urge the imposition of death because of the race, religion, sex, or social status of the victim. Any reference to such potentially prejudicial characteristics must be undertaken only with the greatest of care and only when the reference is relevant to some legitimate issue in the case. Excessive focus on the characteristics of the victim, even if no explicit link is drawn between those factors and the punishment sought, may also be improper when the effect is to inject irrelevant considerations into the sentencing decision. See, e.g., Vela v. Estelle, 708 F.2d 954 (5th Cir.1983) (two witnesses, a well-known football player and the victim's widow, testified in great detail that murder victim was kind, inoffensive, a star athlete, a church usher and choir member, a social worker with underprivileged children of all races, a college student holding down two jobs, and the father of a three-year old child--when all such evidence was irrelevant to any issue and legally inadmissible; the failure of counsel to object contributed to a finding of ineffective assistance), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 736, 79 L.Ed.2d 195 (1984). While argument focusing on the victim can be dangerous, not all prosecutorial references to the victim are improper. The fact that there is a victim, and facts about the victim properly developed during the course of the trial, are not so far outside the realm of circumstances of the crime that mere mention will always be problematic. It is not necessary that the sentencing decision be made in a context in which the victim is a mere abstraction. 127 Here, Whisnant asked the jury to remember the person who is not here ... Carol Jeannine Galloway. He then ticked off some personal attributes shown by the evidence, i.e., that she was a pretty, 23-year old, unmarried woman living with her parents and that she was a considerate person of high morals. These comments did personalize the victim, but they were brief enough that we cannot conclude that they injected prejudicial or irrelevant material into the sentencing decision. 128 4. Whisnant also mentioned the Galloway family. By way of rebutting an attempted defense argument based on sympathy for Brooks' family, the prosecutor reminded the jury of the Galloway's tragedy and noted that next week when it's Thanksgiving and they are sitting around the table, Carol Jeannine won't be there, and never will be there again. This true statement was no more than a compelling statement of the victim's death and its significance, relevant to the retributive function of the death penalty. It was proper. 129 5. The discussion of the prosecutor's practice of seeking death only in a few cases during the past years was improper. That claim was unsupported in the evidence and, at best, irrelevant. Conner v. State, 303 S.E.2d at 276 (The portion of the prosecutor's argument referring to his prior criminal experience and the frequency with which he had sought the death penalty was not supported by any evidence and, moreover, was not relevant to any issue in the case. The argument therefore was improper). Furthermore, it improperly implied to the jury that the prosecutor's office had already made the careful judgment that this case, above most other murder cases, warranted the death penalty. In this respect, the argument is similar to a prosecutorial argument at trial to the effect that we only prosecute the guilty. Such an argument is clearly improper because: 130 The remark is, at the least, an effort to lead the jury to believe that the whole governmental establishment had already determined the appellant to be guilty on evidence not before them. ... [Citation omitted]. Or, arguably, that may be construed to mean that as a pre-trial administrative matter the defendant has been found guilty as charged else he would not have been prosecuted and that the administrative level determination is either binding upon the jury or else highly persuasive to it. 131 Hall v. United States, 419 F.2d 582, 587 (5th Cir.1969). Because the jury is empowered to exercise its discretion in determining punishment, it is wrong for the prosecutor to undermine that discretion by implying that he, or another high authority, has already made the careful decision required. This kind of abuse unfairly plays upon the jury's susceptibility to credit the prosecutor's viewpoint. The effect of this improper argument will be considered carefully in Part V of this Section. 132 6. Brooks next complains that the prosecutor improperly diluted the jury's sense of responsibility by arguing that it would not be responsible for Brooks' death. Arguments that trivialize the task of a sentencing jury--for example, arguments suggesting that appellate courts will correct any errors--are barred under Georgia law. Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142, 240 S.E.2d 37 (1977). The prosecutor's reference to the role of other participants in the criminal justice system, e.g., the investigating police, the grand jury, and the prosecutorial staff, according to Brooks' interpretation, was an attempt to undermine the jury's sole responsibility for the awesome life or death decision by suggesting that the decision was shared with others in the criminal justice system. 133 However, the more apparent purpose of Whisnant's argument was simply that Brooks himself was responsible for his plight. He argued that Brooks was a grown man, knew what he was doing on the day of the crime, and that Brooks himself--not the investigating police, the grand jury, the prosecutorial staff or the jury--was responsible for his punishment. Such an argument was not improper. 134 Although an attempt by the prosecutor to dilute a jury's sense of responsibility for deciding the case clearly would be improper, the best argument that Brooks can make here is that the challenged remarks are ambiguous. 44 The Supreme Court has directed, however, that a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 647, 94 S.Ct. at 1873. Thus, we discount the improper interpretation urged by Brooks. 135 7. Whisnant argued that Brooks himself believed in the death penalty, as evidenced by the killing of Galloway, and noted that the victim did not have lawyers or a judge or any other procedural safeguards. Brooks asserts that this comment was an attempt to provoke a negative reaction against him merely because he was exercising the procedural rights to which he was entitled. 136 It is improper to urge that a criminal defendant's exercise of constitutional rights is a ground for discrediting his defense. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (Fifth Amendment right to remain silent at trial commands that prosecutor and judge not make adverse comment about defendant's exercise of the right). Similarly, it is wrong to imply that the system coddles criminals by providing them with more procedural protections than their victims. A capital sentencing jury's important deliberation should not be colored by such considerations. 137 Although the remarks, as interpreted in the manner urged by Brooks, clearly would be improper, the more obvious interpretation of the argument is not. Correctly anticipating a defense argument that the death penalty is bad, 45 Whisnant argued that Brooks himself believed in the death penalty. The thrust of the argument was that Brooks' execution of Galloway in a manner much more horrible than a procedurally proper, legal execution demonstrated Brooks' belief in the death penalty. Following the command of Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 647, 94 S.Ct. at 1873, that a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intended an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning, we doubt that the jury understood the remark in the improper way suggested by Brooks. 138 8. Arguing against the wisdom of imposing a life sentence on Brooks, Whisnant focused on the future dangerousness of the defendant. He suggested that Brooks might kill a guard or a fellow prisoner. He even noted the possibility that he might escape and asked Whose daughter will it be next time? Similar remarks were part of an argument found fundamentally unfair by this court in Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940 (11th Cir.1983). Although these arguments were dramatic, they were directly relevant to the consideration of whether Brooks would remain a threat to society. 46 Our discussion above demonstrates that such consideration is a proper element in the sentencing jury's decision. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). A legitimate future dangerousness argument is not rendered improper merely because the prosecutor refers to possible victims. In this case, the arguments about Brooks' future dangerousness were appropriate inferences from the record before the jury. 139 9. It was clearly improper for Whisnant to argue that death should be imposed because it is cheaper than life imprisonment. The factual assertion was completely unsupported. More important, cost is not accepted as a legitimate justification for the death penalty. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 187, 96 S.Ct. at 2931 (accepting deterrence and retribution as justifications for penalty). The jury cannot be exhorted to impose death for that reason. This improper argument will be analyzed further in Part V. 140 10. Whisnant's lengthy discussion of the war on crime and his analogy of jurors to soldiers contains both proper and improper elements. 141 Discussion of crime in the Columbus community, well within the common knowledge of the jury, was appropriate as part of Whisnant's argument about the need for deterrence. The point of this discussion was driven home at the close of the war on crime speech when Whisnant returned to the following conclusion: 142 You can bring back the death penalty and you can tell William Brooks, and you can tell every other criminal like him, that if you come to Columbus and Muscogee County, and you commit a crime, and it's one of those crimes that's punishable by death, and if the aggravating circumstances are there, you're going to get the electric chair.... 143 Arguments about general or special deterrence may be considered by the jury. 144 The reminder to the jury that the buck stops with you today was an appropriate reference to the fact that the jury must make the ultimate decision. 145 Finally, the analogy of the death penalty to killing in a war was appropriate insofar as it implied that imposing death, while difficult, is at times sanctioned by the state because of compelling reasons (national security or deterring crime). While the phrase enemy of society was harsh, we do not seriously fault its application to one whose crime is so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 184, 96 S.Ct. at 2931. 146 Our acceptance of part of this argument cannot blind us to its obvious faults. The principal fault of the analogy is that a capital sentencing jury under the Georgia statutory scheme is bound to exercise broad discretion in its determination of a just punishment. This discretion is simply not analogous to the role of a soldier who is ordered to kill the enemy. Using the soldier metaphor, and coupling it with a challenge to the jurors' patriotism--When [the soldiers] did a good job of killing ..., we decorated them and gave them citations; if we can send a 17-year old young man overseas to kill an enemy soldier, is it asking too much to ask you to go back and vote for the death penalty in this case against William Brooks--misrepresents the task the jury is charged by law to carry out. See, e.g., Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 63 S.Ct. 561, 87 L.Ed. 734 (1943). The main thrust of death penalty jurisprudence since Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), has been the need for guided discretion in the sentencing body's individualized consideration of the capital defendant. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, supra. Conceiving of the jurors as soldiers undermines the crucial discretionary element required by the Eighth Amendment. Discussing the broad criminal element and then seeking death for Brooks because he's a member of the criminal element undermines the requirement that sentencing consideration be individualized by introducing the improper suggestion that Brooks be killed merely because he is a criminal. In these respects, the war on crime argument was improper. In Part V, we will consider factors that mitigated the argument and carefully weigh its impact on the jury. 147 11. Whisnant analogized Brooks to a cancer on the body of society. While dramatic, the metaphor went directly to the appropriate concern for whether Brooks would continue to be a threat to society. The evidence before the jury supported Whisnant's assertion that he would be dangerous. 148 12. Finally, Whisnant described the facts as follows: 149 He was just walking along with a pistol in his pocket, and decided well, I'll make a hustle, to use their language, his language. 150 Brooks claims this remark was a racial slur, the word their used to highlight the fact that he was black to the all-white jury. 151 Even if brief, use of race as a factor in closing argument obviously would be improper, United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.1973), and would have great potential for prejudice. We conclude, however, that the challenged reference was not a racial slur. Witness Marvin Brown had testified that Brooks, in telling Marvin about the crime, had used the term hustle to indicate that he had robbed the victim. Thus, Whisnant's reference to their language was simply quoting Brown and, by implication, Brooks. 152