Opinion ID: 2637645
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Heading: Satisfaction of Constitutional and Statutory Particularity Requirements with a Warrant Identifying a Person to be Arrested by a Description of His Unique DNA Profile

Text: On August 21, 2000, a complaint was filed, and one day later, a corresponding arrest warrant issued against John Doe, unknown male for charges based on the sexual assault against Deborah L. on August 25, 1994. In the complaint John Doe was described by his unique 13-loci DNA profile. That description was incorporated by reference into the arrest warrant. [24] (9) Defendant contends the prosecution was not commenced within the six-year statute of limitations because the `particularity' requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, our state Constitution's article I, section 13, and Penal Code section 804, subdivision (d), were not met in the case by the prosecuting authority's use of the unknown suspect's DNA profile, as a description of the unknown suspect, in the `John Doe' complaint and `John Doe' arrest warrant. [25] We agree with the Court of Appeal, that an arrest warrant, which indentifies the person to be arrested by incorporation of the [unique] DNA profile of the assailant, satisfies the statutory particularity requirement of section 804, subdivision (d) read in the light of section 813, subdivision (a) and pertinent constitutional provisions.
(10) As relevant here, our statute of limitations provides that prosecution for an offense punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for eight years or more shall be commenced within six years after commission of the offense (§ 800), and a felony prosecution is commenced when an arrest warrant is issued, provided the warrant names or describes the defendant with the same degree of particularity required for an indictment, information, or complaint. (§ 804, subd. (d).) Section 813, subdivision (a), provides, in pertinent part, that the magistrate shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the defendant only when a complaint is filed with a magistrate charging a felony originally triable in the superior court ... if, and only if, the magistrate is satisfied from the complaint that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed it. Section 815 provides: A warrant of arrest shall specify the name of the defendant or, if it is unknown to the ... issuing authority, the defendant may be designated therein by any name. As relevant here, section 959, paragraph 4 similarly provides that [t]he accusatory pleading is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the defendant is named, or if his name is unknown, that he is described by a fictitious name, with a statement that his true name is ... unknown. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing ... the persons ... to be seized. (Italics added.) According to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 4(b)(1) (18 U.S.C.), a warrant shall contain the defendant's name or, if it is unknown, name or description by which the defendant can be identified with reasonable certainty.  (Italics added.) The California Constitution, article I, section 13 provides that a warrant may not issue, except on probable cause ... particularly describing the ... persons ... to be seized.
Defendant contends a John Doe arrest warrant accompanied by a DNA genetic profile does not constitute a means of description `reasonable to the circumstances' because, rather than describ[ing] the person to be arrested, it only identifies a defendant by the use of a fictitious name without any description whatsoever and therefore does not describe that person with sufficient certainty. Defendant argues that a fictitious name or a John Doe name is insufficient to identify anyone, and therefore is insufficient to identify anyone with particularity. (11) Under both federal and state law, an accusatory pleading or arrest warrant may issue with a fictitious name provided it names or describes the person being charged with reasonable certainty. (See, e.g., Cabell, supra, 153 U.S. at p. 85 [an arrest warrant must truly name [the person charged], or describe him sufficiently to identify him]; People v. Montoya, supra, 255 Cal.App.2d at pp. 142-143; Ernst v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 710, 718 [163 Cal.Rptr. 861].) As the court in Montoya explained, [w]here a name that would reasonably identify the subject to be arrested cannot be provided, then some other means reasonable to the circumstances must be used to assist in the identification of the subject of the warrant .... ( Montoya, supra, 255 Cal.App.2d at p. 142, italics added, citing U.S. v. Swanner (E.D.Tenn. 1964) 237 F.Supp. 69, 71, see also Blocker v. Clark (1906) 126 Ga. 484 [54 S.E. 1022]; 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2003) § 35.1(g).) [26] (12) We first consider whether the arrest warrant that issued in this case satisfied the Fourth Amendment's requirement, as well as our state Constitution's requirement, that a warrant must particularly describe the person to be seized. The relevant language of article I, section 13 of the California Constitution parallels the relevant language of the Fourth Amendment, and the issue of particularity resolves itself identically under both federal and California standards. ( People v. Tockgo (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 635, 640, fn. 2 [193 Cal.Rptr. 503] ( Tockgo ).) (13) In the context of the Fourth Amendment, `[p]articularity is the requirement that the warrant must clearly state what is sought.' ( U.S. v. Towne (9th Cir. 1993) 997 F.2d 537, 544.) It is familiar history that indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of `general warrants' were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment. ( Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 583 [63 L.Ed.2d 639, 100 S.Ct. 1371], fn. omitted.) The particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment helps to ensure that a search or seizure will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches [or seizures] the Framers intended to prohibit. ( Maryland v. Garrison (1987) 480 U.S. 79, 84 [94 L.Ed.2d 72, 107 S.Ct. 1013], fn. omitted; see also People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1296 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259] [The purpose of the `particularity' requirement of the Fourth Amendment is to avoid general and exploratory searches by requiring a particular description of the items to be seized.].) However, a warrant need only be reasonably specific ( U.S. v. Hayes (9th Cir. 1986) 794 F.2d 1348, 1354), and the specificity required `varies depending on the circumstances of the case and the type of items involved.' ( U.S. v. Rude (9th Cir. 1996) 88 F.3d 1538, 1551; see also U.S. v. Bridges (9th Cir. 2003) 344 F.3d 1010, 1016; U. S. v. Jones (7th Cir. 1995) 54 F.3d 1285, 1289-1290.) The constitutional and statutory requirements of particularity are satisfied if the warrant imposes a meaningful restriction upon the objects to be seized. ( Burrows v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 238, 249 [118 Cal.Rptr. 166, 529 P.2d 590].) The requirement of reasonable particularity is a flexible concept, reflecting the degree of detail available from the facts known to the affiant and presented to the issuing magistrate. ( Tockgo, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d at p. 640; see United States v. Ventresca (1965) 380 U.S. 102, 108-109 [13 L.Ed.2d 684, 85 S.Ct. 741]; Spinelli v. U.S. (8th Cir. 1967) 382 F.2d 871, 886, revd. on other grounds (1969) 393 U.S. 410 [21 L.Ed.2d 637, 89 S.Ct. 584].) Here, at the time the John Doe arrest warrant issued and the John Doe complaint was filed in this case, there was no more particular, accurate, or reliable means of identification available to law enforcement than the suspect's unique DNA profile. In the context of a search of a place, the Fourth Amendment requirement of particularity and our state statutory particularity requirement in section 1525 [27] are met if the description is such that the officer ... can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended. ( Steele v. United States No. 1 (1925) 267 U.S. 498, 503 [69 L.Ed. 757, 45 S.Ct. 414]; see People v. Coulon (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 148, 152 [78 Cal.Rptr. 95].) While a search warrant must describe items to be seized with particularity sufficient to prevent a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings, the test for determining the validity of a warrant considers whether any reasonable probability exists that the officers may mistakenly search another premise. ( U.S. v. Mann (9th Cir. 2004) 389 F.3d 869, 876.) State courts that have considered the validity of a warrant that described the suspect by his DNA profile have concluded that a unique DNA profile qualifies as a reasonable means of identifying the subject of a warrant or complaint when that DNA profile is the best description available. (See People v. Martinez (N.Y.App.Div. 2008) 52 A.D.3d 68 [855 N.Y.S.2d 522] ( Martinez ); State v. Danley (Ohio Ct.Com.Pl. 2006) 2006 Ohio 3585 [853 N.E.2d 1224] ( Danley ); State v. Davis (Ct.App. 2005) 2005 WI App 98 [281 Wis.2d 118, 698 N.W.2d 823]; State v. Dabney (Ct.App.2003) 2003 WI App 108 [264 Wis.2d 843, 663 N.W.2d 366] ( Dabney ); cf. State v. Belt (2008) 285 Kan. 949 [179 P.3d 443, 450] ( Belt ) [approving the practice in the abstract, but affirming dismissal where charging documents did not set forth suspect's unique DNA profile].) For the reasons stated below, we find these authorities persuasive. (14) A warrant or complaint `is an accusation against a person, and not against a name,' and `[w]hen the name is unknown, the person may be identified with the best description available.' ( Danley, supra, 853 N.E.2d at p. 1227, quoting, inter alia, Dabney, supra, 663 N.W.2d 366; see Commonwealth v. Laventure (2006) 586 Pa. 348 [894 A.2d 109, 116, fn. 7] [When a name cannot be provided, `some other means reasonable to the circumstances' may be used to assist in the identification.]; 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 302.) The Dabney court correctly noted that case law suggests that the complaint and warrant satisfy the sufficiency standard when the description clearly demonstrates that the `law enforcement authorities had probable cause to suspect a particular person of committing a crime.' Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 646 (7th Cir. 1981). ( Dabney, supra, 663 N.W.2d at pp. 371-372.) We agree with Dabney that, for purposes of identifying `a particular person' as the defendant, a DNA profile is arguably the most discrete, exclusive means of personal identification possible. ( Id. at p. 372; accord, Danley, supra, 853 N.E.2d at p. 1227.) As the Dabney court explained, `A genetic code describes a person with far greater precision than a physical description or a name.' Meredith A. Bieber, Comment, Meeting the Statute or Beating It: Using `John Doe' Indictments Based on DNA to Meet the Statute of Limitations, 150 U. Pa. L.Rev. 1079, 1085 (2002). ( Dabney, supra, 663 N.W.2d at p. 372.) In Belt, the Supreme Court of Kansas recently considered whether a John Doe arrest warrant that describes the suspect by a unique marker profile on a DNA autoradiograph identifies the suspect with sufficient particularity and reasonable certainty to satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and its state's statutory codification of that constitutional standard with regard to Kansas arrest warrants (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2304(1)). ( Belt, supra, 179 P.3d at pp. 449-450.) Quoting Cabell, supra, 153 U.S. at page 85, Belt first noted that there is precedent to support the contention that a warrant need not provide the name of a suspect, so long as it describes the suspect `sufficiently to identify' him or her. ( Belt, supra, 179 P.3d at p. 449.) Although the state conceded that the particular warrants at issue in Belt contained insufficient identifying information because, at most, they mentioned only DNA loci common to all humans ( ibid. ), Belt stated that, in the abstract, it agreed with the proposition that a warrant identifying the person to be arrested for a sexual offense by description of the person's unique DNA profile, or incorporating by reference an affidavit containing such a unique profile, can satisfy constitutional and statutory particularity requirements. ( Id. at p. 450.) For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, we conclude that the arrest warrant in question, which described the defendant by his 13-loci DNA profile and included an explanation that the profile had a random match probability such that there was essentially no chance of its being duplicated in the human population except in the case of genetically identical sibling, complied with the mandate of our federal Constitution that the person seized be described with particularity. [28] ( Maryland v. Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 84.) [29] For the reasons stated above, we likewise conclude the arrest warrant in question described the defendant with sufficient particularity to avoid a violation of the warrant particularity requirement of our state Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.) (15) We now turn to the specific particularity requirement set forth in section 804, subdivision (d), namely, that, a felony prosecution is commenced when an arrest warrant is ... issued, provided the warrant names or describes the defendant with the same degree of particularity required for an indictment, information, or complaint.  (Italics added.) The statutory scheme that allows a qualifying arrest warrant to commence prosecution for purposes of the statute of limitations clearly incorporates the standards of particularity required by our state and federal Constitutions. The specific rules by which the sufficiency of our state accusatory pleadings, including an indictment, information, and complaint, is determined are prescribed in our Penal Code. (§ 948.) While an accusatory pleading must specify the names of the parties (§ 950), the code provides that, [w]hen a defendant is charged by a fictitious or erroneous name, and in any stage of the proceedings his true name is discovered, it must be inserted in the subsequent proceedings, referring to the fact of his being charged by the name mentioned in the accusatory pleading. (§ 953.) With regard to the name of the accused, section 959 similarly provides that an accusatory pleading is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom: [¶] ... [¶] 4. That the defendant is named, or if his name is unknown, that he is described by a fictitious name, with a statement that his true name is to the grand jury, district attorney, or complainant, as the case may be, unknown. Section 960 provides that [n]o accusatory pleading is insufficient, nor can the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of form which does not prejudice a substantial right of the defendant upon the merits. In People v. Erving (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 283 [11 Cal.Rptr. 203], the indictment charged `Jane Doe (Charlene)' and described her as `female Negro, 39 years, 5'7, weight 165 pounds, olive complexion.' ( Id. at p. 284.) The court found meritless defendant's argument the indictment was defective in that the person allegedly indicted was not adequately named or described in the indictment so that she could be identified, although the prosecution conceded that the indictment contained an erroneous weight (165 pounds instead of 110 pounds) and there was some dispute regarding her complexion. ( Id. at p. 290.) Citing Erving, the court in People v. McCrae (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 725 [32 Cal.Rptr. 500], similarly rejected an argument that the accused was not adequately named or described so that he could be identified as the defendant herein. ( Id. at p. 728.) In McCrae, the defendant was charged by the fictitious name of `John Doe Bill' and described as `Male Negro, 30-35 yrs., 5'7-5'10, 150-160 lbs., black hair, brown eyes,' while his true name was William Martin McCrae and his own description of himself corresponded closely, though not exactly, with that set forth in the indictment. ( Id. at p. 728; see also People v. Le Roy (1884) 65 Cal. 613, 615 [4 P. 649] [fact that defendant was designated by different names in the information was not a ground for setting it aside under § 995].) The court in McCrae cited an early case of this court, People v. Kelly (1856) 6 Cal. 210, which, in upholding the constitutionality of section 953 and discussing how it avoids the delay and expense of remanding a prisoner for a new indictment when a misnomer is found, observed that names are but sounds to designate particular individuals, and, as such, are employed to describe the person charged with the crime, and that use of a name in an accusatory pleading, such as an indictment, is only designed to identify the person. ( Kelly, at p. 213.) Here, we conclude the use of a fictitious name and the description of defendant's unique DNA profile adequately described defendant with the particularity required for an indictment, information, or complaint under section 950 et seq. We simply add that, in any event, the fact that defendant was first described by a fictitious name and his unique DNA profile did not tend to prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. ( People v. Goscinsky (1921) 52 Cal.App. 62, 64 [198 P. 40].) The fact that defendant was so identified until a cold hit match provided his true name in no way interfered with his defense to the charge or created a miscarriage of justice. ( Ibid. ) (16) We conclude that, when there is no more particular, accurate, or reliable means of identification available to law enforcement, an arrest warrant or a complaint that describes the person to be arrested by a fictitious name and his unique DNA profile, or incorporating by reference an affidavit containing such a unique DNA profile, satisfies the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the California Constitution, and subdivision (d) of section 804. [30]