Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Absences Before and During Guilt Phase (Lewis)

Text: Lewis claims violations of his statutory and constitutional rights to be present at various proceedings. He cites Penal Code sections 977 and 1148. He also invokes his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and under parallel provisions of the state Constitution. The first incident occurred at a pretrial hearing on October 16, 1992. At that time, Lewis was representing himself, and was litigating the admissibility of the white powder found in a plastic bag at the Mount Olive Church after the capital crime. Oliver's counsel then requested an ex parte sidebar conference with the court. Lewis did not ask to approach the bench or join the legal discussion. Lewis now claims he was denied his right to be present at the bench conference. Even assuming the claim is not waived in whole or part for failure to object below, it lacks merit. Lewis complains that both he and his advisory counsel were absent from sidebar. However, it appears the statutory and constitutional right to personal presence at a criminal proceeding does not apply in this situation. (See People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, 741-742, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) Lewis cites no authority for the assumption that his right to be present extended either to him while acting as his own counsel, or to advisory counsel who was assisting him in that capacity. We therefore decline to find error on this ground. The next complained-of absences occurred on February 10 and 11, 1993, shortly after Lewis slit his wrists in jail, and was placed on a suicide watch. As we later discuss, the wounds were superficial and were made in an apparent attempt to establish his mental incompetence to stand trial. Specifically, on February 10, 1993, the first day of jury deliberations at the guilt phase, the trial court announced that Lewis had made an ineffectual attempt to injure himself and was being held elsewhere, apparently under medical observation, in restraints. The court commented that it thought Lewis was again attempting to delay the proceedings, and asked Lewis's counsel how they wished to proceed. During the discussion, one of Lewis's attorneys said he thought Lewis was feigning behavior in another attempt to establish his incompetence to continue with the trial. On February 11, 1993, the trial court announced that the jury had reached a verdict. Lewis was under suicide watch at the time, and his counsel agreed to accept the verdict in his absence. The court received the verdict, and the clerk read it. Lewis's self-inflicted injuries, which he apparently caused in order to feign incompetence and obstruct the proceedings, constituted volitional conduct for which he may properly be deemed to have absented himself from the proceedings, and to have waived any right to be present. (See People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th 92, 143-148, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980 [defendant engaged in disruptive conduct within and without the courtroom and could not benefit on appeal from his own misconduct]; see also Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 U.S. 337, 345-346, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 [involving disruptive conduct within the courtroom]; People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 531, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 115 P.3d 417, citing § 1043, subd. (b)(1) [same]; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 253-254, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643 [same].) In any event, the trial court implicitly found under section 1148 that the interest of justice required it to receive the verdict in Lewis's absence. It was unclear when Lewis would return to the courtroom. The court was understandably concerned that an open-ended delay would interfere with the proceedings. No error occurred. The last challenged absence involves events on February 22, 1993. This incident occurred when Lewis's counsel sought a mental competence hearing between the time of the guilt and penalty trials. On that date, the court commented about the creative array of talents [Lewis] has for delay. We believe that Lewis was present in court on this occasion. He was in the adjoining holding cell and, the record explains, could hear the proceedings. It appears to have been the court's practice to pipe the court proceedings into the holding cell when one or more of the defendants was there, as often occurred. Lewis was free to return to the courtroom at any time and to address the court's comment. We cannot conclude on this record that the court's remark was made in Lewis's absence.