Opinion ID: 36896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defamation and Invasion of Privacy Claims

Text: Anderson next contends that the district court improperly granted summary judgment for the defendants on her defamation (slander) claims against them. In support of this claim, she first argues that the City is not immune from her tort claims under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Her arguments on this topic are copied verbatim from her original response to the City’s motion for summary judgment. She argues, inter alia, that she has alleged a violation of a constitutional right, and she claims that under the Texas Tort Claims Act, sovereign immunity is waived when an injury is caused by a condition or use of 18 tangible personal property. She then concludes that the City is not immune from her tort claims because she had a property interest in her employment. Second, Anderson argues that her defamation claims against defendants McCain, Puente and Meeks are not barred by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. She claims, inter alia, that judges and other public servants can be held liable for tortiously injuring other citizens by acting in violation of specific constitutional provisions. She then notes that the City convened a threat assessment meeting regarding her on March 16, 2000, at which members of the committee stated that Anderson was a threat. Based on these statements, she concludes that certain city employees defamed her and engaged in a conspiracy to deprive her of her constitutional rights. Finally, Anderson argues that her invasion of privacy claim against Meeks is not barred by official immunity because, inter alia, he acted in bad faith by requiring her to submit to an involuntary fitness for duty exam. The court first turns to Anderson’s claim that the City is not immune from her torts claims because she had a property interest in her employment. Anderson is correct that under the Texas Tort Claims Act, sovereign immunity is waived for “injury caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property.” Medrano v. City of Pearsall, 989 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1991, no pet.). “Tangible property,” 19 however, is defined as “property that is capable of being handled, touched, or seen.” Birdo v. Williams, 859 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. App.--Houston 1993, no writ); see also Thomas v. Brown, 927 S.W.2d 122, 128 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (“Tangible personal property refers to something that has a corporeal, concrete, and palpable existence.”). Anderson’s employment is not corporeal, concrete property of this sort. Accordingly, the City’s sovereign immunity is not waived with respect to Anderson’s tort claims, and the City is entitled to summary judgment on them. With respect to Anderson’s defamation (slander) claims against McClain, Puente and Meeks, Anderson has pointed to no specific statements about her made by them during the March 16, 2000 threat assessment meeting. Similarly, while Anderson vaguely alludes to a conspiracy to deprive her of unspecified constitutional rights, she points to no statements that McClain, Puente, or Meeks made in furtherance of this conspiracy. Moreover, as the City correctly notes in its response, Anderson only alleged in her amended complaint that McClain, Puente, and Meeks defamed her during the July 27, 2000 pre-termination hearing. As to this claim, McClain, Puente, and Meeks’s participation in this administrative hearing was quasi-judicial in nature. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-17 (1978); O’Neal v. Miss. Bd. of Nursing, 113 F.3d 62, 65, 67 (5th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, they are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity 20 with respect to their activities at this administrative hearing, and the district court properly granted summary judgment in their favor on this claim. Finally, as for Anderson’s invasion of privacy claim against Meeks, the doctrine of official immunity protects government officials in Texas from suit for acts done in good faith as part of their official duties. See City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994). Likewise, the Supreme Court has held that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Anderson cites no evidence or authority for her claim that Meeks violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of hers, nor has she offered any evidence that he acted in bad faith. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment in his favor on this claim.