Opinion ID: 2669817
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discussion of Maryland Law

Text: To determine whether this question regarding section 19501’s import warrants certification to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, we first consider whether the provision’s meaning “may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation.” Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-603. For the reasons we lay out in Part II of this Order, section 19-501 cannot render SSA liable for negligence. However, as the Homebuyers point out in their briefs, under their interpretation of section 19-501, “SSA [c]ould be directly liable . . . not only for actions taken within the scope of employment, but also for the intentional torts of its employees and for its employees’ civil rights violations, without need to prove any additional negligence by SSA in its hiring, training or supervision.” Notably, the 14 district court dismissed the Homebuyers’ Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), tortious interference with contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against SSA because Speed was not acting within the scope of his employment when he prepared to execute the arsons. Antonio, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 773, 775. Under the Homebuyers’ interpretation of section 19-501, SSA could be liable for these counts even though Speed exceeded the scope of his employment, indicating that section 19-501’s meaning may be determinative of these issues. Second, we evaluate whether we may ascertain section 19501’s scope based on a “controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of [Maryland].” Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-603. Maryland’s courts have not interpreted the statute, so we look first to its plain meaning to determine whether we can deduce section 19-501’s import without certifying a question. See Oaks v. Connors, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (Md. 1995) (“[I]f the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.” (quoting Jones v. State, 647 A.2d 1204, 1206 (Md. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Homebuyers emphasize the statute’s use of the word “while,” 15 contending that the inclusion of that word indicates that section 19-501 is best read to hold a licensed security guard agency responsible not only for an employee’s acts in “conducting the business of the agency”—as understood in the common law doctrine of respondeat superior—but also for those additional acts that take place “at the same time that” the employee is doing so. In essence, the Homebuyers argue that section 19-501’s plain meaning renders security guard agencies liable for actions that their employees commit while on duty, regardless of whether the employee was furthering the employer’s interests. SSA contends that the Homebuyers “overlook the common, everyday meaning of the phrase ‘while . . . conducting the business of the agency,’” pointing out that employees cannot conduct their employers’ business while they commit crimes. Accordingly, SSA argues that section 19-501’s plain meaning is coextensive with respondeat superior. Because these interpretations are equally plausible, we cannot rely on section 19-501’s plain meaning to interpret the statute. “If the meaning of [a statute’s] plain language is ambiguous or unclear, to discern legislative intent, [the court] look[s] to the legislative history, prior case law, the purposes upon which the statutory framework was based, and the statute as a whole.” Bost v. State, 958 A.2d 356, 361 (Md. 2008). We first consider whether Maryland’s case law can shed light on 16 section 19-501’s meaning. In an “often-quoted” passage, the Court of Appeals of Maryland distinguished acts “done while prosecuting the master’s business” from acts “done by the servant in furtherance thereof,” implying that the former has a wider scope than the latter: The simple test [for determining whether an employer is vicariously liable for its employee’s acts] is whether they were acts within the scope of his employment; not whether they were done while prosecuting the master’s business, but whether they were done by the servant in furtherance thereof, and were such as may fairly be said to have been authorized by him. See Sawyer v. Humphries, 587 A.2d 467, 470 (Md. 1991) (quoting Hopkins Chem. Co. v. Read Drug & Chem. Co. of Balt. City, 92 A. 478, 479-80 (Md. 1914)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The language “prosecuting the master’s business,” see id., is very similar to the phrase “conducting the business of the agency,” Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 19-501. This case law therefore suggests that the Homebuyers’ position—that section 19-501 is a broad provision that can render a security guard agency liable even if its employee did not act within the scope of his or her employment—may be correct. The Homebuyers also contend that the legislative history of the Maryland Private Detectives Act, Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 13-601, supports their interpretation of section 19-501 because the Maryland Security Guards Act stemmed from the 17 Maryland Private Detectives Act. Econ. Matters Comm., Bill Analysis: H.B. 42, H.D. 410-42 (Md. 1996) (“House Bill 42 separates the current provisions of law governing the certification of security guards and the regulation of security guard services from the Maryland Private Detectives Act.”). Section 13-601 contains the same language that is at issue in this case but applies to “private detective agenc[ies]” rather than “licensed security guard agenc[ies].” Compare Md. Code Ann., Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 13-601, with id. § 19-501. When it passed the bill that enacted section 13-601 in 1986, the Maryland Senate declined to adopt a proposed amendment that replaced “while the employee is conducting the business of the agency” with “if the acts are within the scope of this subtitle.” Senator Kelly & Md. Ass’n of Contract Guard Servs., Amendment to Senate Bill No. 968, S. 396-968 (Md. 1986). The amendment’s stated purpose was “[c]larif[ying] that agencies are not liable for acts committed outside the scope of employment.” Id. In other words, the amendment’s drafters aimed to make section 13-601’s language mirror the common law rule. The Senate gave no reason for its decision not to incorporate the proposed language into the bill. The Homebuyers urge us to conclude that the Senate’s decision not to adopt the proposed amendment supports its interpretation of section 19-501. However, because the Senate 18 did not explain the reasoning behind its choice, we cannot assume it rejected the amendment because it did not want to codify the common law rule. As SSA points out in its brief, it is just as likely that the Senate declined to incorporate the proposed amendment’s language into the bill because it believed the existing language already codified respondeat superior. See Auto. Trade Ass’n of Md., Inc. v. Ins. Comm’r, 437 A.2d 199, 203 (Md. 1981) (“[T]he fact that a bill on a specific subject fails of passage in the General Assembly is a rather weak reed upon which to lean in ascertaining legislative intent.”). We therefore cannot glean section 19-501’s meaning from the Senate’s decision not to adopt the amendment. The Homebuyers also contend that the Senate’s statements regarding section 13-601’s purpose indicate that their interpretation of section 19-501 is correct. Senate Bill 968, which included the provision that ultimately became section 13-601, specified that, “for the most part, the proposals under the bill find their basis in actual law and practice and do not deviate substantially from the current law as it is now applied. There is no attempt under the revision to change existing policy.” S. Econ. & Envtl. Affairs Comm., Summary of Committee Report, Senate Bill 968: Private Detectives, S. 396-968, at 2 (Md. 1986). The Senate also explained that it intended section 13-601 to “clarify[] provisions of Article 56, Section 19 81(a)(1).” S. Econ. & Envtl. Affairs Comm., Bill Analysis, Senate Bill 968: Private Detectives, S. 396-968, at 7 (Md. 1986). In 1985, immediately prior to the enactment of section 13-601, article 56, section 81(a)(1) provided that: The holder of any [private detective or security guard agency] license issued under the provisions of this subtitle may employ to assist him in his work and in the conduct of his business as many persons as he may deem necessary, and he shall at all times during such employment be accountable for the good conduct in the business of each and every person so employed. Md. Code. Ann., Art. 56, § 81(a)(1) (Supp. 1985). To determine whether the Senate’s goal of clarifying this provision without altering its function elucidates the meaning of section 13-601 or section 19-501, we must construe section 81(a). How section 81(a) worked in practice is far from clear. Maryland’s courts never interpreted the provision, and other states’ courts have reached differing conclusions when interpreting similar language from other statutes. For example, in Borg-Warner Protective Services Corp. v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687 (Ct. App. 1999), the California Court of Appeal considered the meaning of a statute containing the following language: “A licensee shall at all times be legally responsible for the good conduct in the business of each of his or her employees or agents, including his or her manager,” id. at 689-90 (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7582.15) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court held that the statute 20 codified respondeat superior. Id. In Simmons, Inc. v. Pinkerton’s, Inc., 762 F.2d 591, 595-98 (7th Cir. 1985), however, the Seventh Circuit construed a similar statute as rendering security guard agencies strictly liable for their employees’ torts. Accordingly, the fact that the Maryland Senate intended section 13-601 “to clarify provisions of article 56, section 81(a)(1)” and not to “deviate substantially from the current law as it is now applied” sheds little light on the operation of section 19-501 because we cannot ascertain section 81(a)(1)’s meaning. Finally, we note that, under Maryland law, “it is a longstanding rule of statutory interpretation that the common law will not be repealed by implication.” Suter v. Stuckey, 935 A.2d 731, 743 (Md. 2007). Pursuant to this canon of construction, [t]he rules of the common law are not to be . . . overturned except by clear and unambiguous language. In order to hold that a statute has abrogated common law rights existing at the date of its enactment, it must clearly appear that they are repugnant to the act, or the part thereof invoked, that their survival would in effect deprive it of its efficacy and render its provisions nugatory. Id. at 744 (quoting Lutz v. State, 172 A. 354, 356 (Md. 1934)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, when the General Assembly is silent regarding whether a statute abrogates the common law, Maryland’s courts interpret the statute in 21 conformity with the common law unless (1) “the provisions can[not] be given full effect without derogation from the common law” or (2) the “statute deals with an entire subject-matter,” thereby “abrogating the common law as to that subject.” Id. The General Assembly was silent regarding whether it intended section 19-501 to abrogate the common law, and neither of these exceptions apply in this case. This canon of construction therefore suggests that Maryland’s courts would interpret section 19-501 in conformity with the common law. The existing legal landscape in Maryland offers clues that support both the Homebuyers’ and SSA’s positions. As we explain above, Maryland precedent distinguishes acts “done while prosecuting the master’s business” from acts “done by the servant in furtherance thereof,” imposing liability only for the latter acts. Sawyer, 587 A.2d at 470. This language suggests that section 19-501—which renders security guard agencies liable for acts their employees commit “while the . . . conducting the business of the agency”—extends beyond the common law. However, pursuant to one of Maryland’s canons of statutory construction, we should interpret section 19-501 in conformity with the common law because the General Assembly did not explicitly abrogate the common law when it enacted the statute. In light of these conflicting indicators of section 19-501’s meaning and the fact that this issue may be determinative of the success of several 22 of the Homebuyers’ claims, we decline to interpret the statute and seek the Court of Appeals of Maryland’s guidance. 5