Opinion ID: 2582262
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Appeal for Sympathy

Text: One disputed issue was whether the torture-murder special circumstance was true. Regarding this issue, the prosecutor argued, I want you to think for a moment, go back in time if you can . . . to that night October 7th, 1987, and to think about how that violence started. And clearly at the time that that knife was pulled on Rosellina, how it was brought out, how desperate she must have been, she was willing to grab on to the blade of an open knife in order to defend herself. And I want you to also think about the pain that that must cause to have your flesh sliced open to the bone, not one time, but multiple times. And I'm sorry that this is the difficult things we have to discuss, but I held off. I think it is time we do so now because the defense has raised the issue of torture. . . . And I want you to think then what it's like then to be down on the ground. Your hands have been slashed open. How useless. How helpful are they now? And you are slashed repeatedly. And what are you thinking? When is it going to end? Am I going to die? Is this it? And if I'm going to die, why doesn't he just cut my throat? Why doesn't he knock me out? That doesn't happen. Defendant claims this argument was an improper appeal to the jury's sympathy for the victim. Although generally an appeal for sympathy for the victim is out of place during an objective determination of guilt ( People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1057, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 174, 846 P.2d 756), the argument was specifically directed to the torture issue. While the victim's awareness of pain is not an element of the torture-murder special circumstance ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1228, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811 ( Cole )), it is not irrelevant. Asking the jury to consider the victim's pain was directly relevant to a disputed issue. We agree, however, that the rhetorical questions at the end of this discussion might have moved from appropriate argument regarding torture to an improper attempt to invoke sympathy. The trial court might well have sustained an objection to this part of the argument had defendant made one. But the main thrust of this argument, that defendant tortured his victim, was permissible; any impropriety in the latter comments was harmless.
Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of first degree murder and the finding of the torture-murder special circumstance. In determining evidentiary sufficiency, the court reviews the entire record, in the light most favorable to the judgment, for the presence of substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence sufficiently reasonable, credible, and of such solid value that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.) The same standard of review applies in considering circumstantial evidence and the support for special-circumstance findings. ( Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 104-105, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296.) Sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict. The court instructed on four theories of first degree murder: (1) deliberate and premeditated murder, (2) robbery felony murder, (3) torture-murder, and (4) murder by lying-in-wait. The jury apparently rejected the felony-murder theory, acquitting defendant of robbery and finding not true the related robbery-murder special circumstance allegation. The prosecutor's deliberate and premeditated murder and lying in wait theories rested in part on defendant's having gone to the store intending to rob. Accordingly, it is not clear that the jury relied on either of these theories. Because the jury found true the torture-murder special circumstance and because murder by torture constitutes murder in the first degree (§ 189), we focus on that theory. Murder by torture requires a killing committed with a willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any other sadistic purpose. It need not be proven that the victim actually suffered pain. However, there must be a causal relationship between the torturous act and death. ( People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 466-467, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 122 P.3d 968 ( Elliot ).) The jury may infer the intent to inflict extreme pain from the circumstances of the crime, the nature of the killing, and the condition of the body. We have, however, cautioned against giving undue weight to the severity of the wounds. Horrible wounds may be as consistent with a killing in the heat of passion or an explosion of violence, as with the intent to inflict cruel suffering. ( Id. at p. 467, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 122 P.3d 968.) Here defendant stabbed Lo Bue over four dozen times. Six life-threatening wounds to the neck, back, and chest, while quite serious, were not immediately fatal. The location of most of the blood spatters supports a conclusion that the young woman was on or near the floor when the majority of the wounds were inflicted. Because her trachea was slashed, she would have experienced labored breathing and made gurgling sounds as she struggled to bring air into a lung ultimately pierced through several times. Blood flowing around the lung finally prevented it from expanding with air. It would have taken a number of minutes for Lo Bue to expire. During the attack, defendant inflicted scores of wounds, many on an unresisting victim. They were distributed over the victim's face, head, neck, and both the front and back of her torso. In contrast to life-threatening wounds that injured major organs or penetrated into the chest cavity, the autopsy surgeon described many of the wounds as superficial. He clarified, however, that they were not mere scratches. They severed all layers of the skin and went into the underlying tissue, to various depths, producing gaping injuries. They would have caused significant bleeding. Some of the wounds were in clusters; others were widely separated. Defendant told Rosalind Wathel that his victim begged him to stop but he persisted because it felt good, and that he just kept doing it even after she got quiet. He told Tina Whaley that the victim kept coming back and that she just wouldn't die. Both Wathel and William Speed described defendant as bragging about the killing. Defendant testified that he committed the act in a frenzy but the evidence supports a different conclusion. There were no knives at the shop and the victim did not carry one. There was, however, a distinctive knife missing from the family home. From this testimony the jury could have found that he took the knife with him and lied at trial about taking the knife from the victim. Hilt marks are left when an attacker plunges a knife so forcefully into a body that the blade penetrates all the way to the hilt and the impact causes bruising. A frenzied attack might involve such injuries. No hilt marks were found in connection with any of the 51 wounds. By his own account, as Lo Bue lay dead or dying, defendant put money and checks from the store, along with the murder weapon and a telephone receiver bearing his fingerprints, into a bag and left the scene with his child. Once home, he washed blood from himself and his son. Later that night, he took his family with him and bought cocaine, which he shared with his wife and mother-in-law at a rented motel room. Considering the totality of these facts, the jury had more than ample support for its conclusion that defendant acted with the willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain for a sadistic purpose. [17] It was not required to accept, and was justified in rejecting, defendant's testimony to the contrary. Defendant challenges Wathel's credibility, as he did at trial, but her credibility was for the jury, not a reviewing court, to determine. ( People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303-304, 228 Cal.Rptr. 228, 721 P.2d 110.) Her testimony was consistent with the physical evidence. Defendant also argues that he did not bind the victim. Binding may take place in some instances of torture, but is not required to prove it. ( Elliot, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 468, fn. 4, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 122 P.3d 968.) Based on the circumstances here it appears that defendant did not need to resort to binding to overpower and control his victim. The evidence also supports the true finding as to the torture-murder special circumstance. To find the torture-murder special circumstance true, the jury had to find that `[t]he murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture.' (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18).) ( Elliot, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 469, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 122 P.3d 968.) At the time of the crime, section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18), also provided that torture required proof of the infliction of extreme physical pain no matter how long its duration. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18) as approved by vote, Prop. 7, § 6, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978); see People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 993, 244 Cal. Rptr. 905, 750 P.2d 794; see also People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 140, fn. 14, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887 [noting statute has been amended in this regard].) Here, as we have explained, the nature of the victim's many wounds and the circumstances surrounding the killing support the conclusion that defendant intended to kill her, that the murder involved torture, and that defendant inflicted extreme physical pain.

The court gave instructions on second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses. Defendant claims the instructions could have informed the jury that convictions for the lesser crimes of second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter required an intent to kill. His theory as to all of these contentions is essentially the samethe jury might have found he did not intend to kill his victim and, in that event, it would have had no choice but either to convict him of first degree murder or to acquit him entirely. We need not decide whether the court should have instructed differently, because the jury found that the torture-murder special circumstance was true. Error in failing to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense is harmless when the jury necessarily decides the factual questions posed by the omitted instructions adversely to defendant under other properly given instructions. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 646, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.) The court instructed that a torture-murder special circumstance requires the intent to kill. (See § 190.2, subd. (a)(18); Elliot, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 469, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 122 P.3d 968.) When the jury found this special circumstance true, it found defendant intended to kill under other properly given instructions. That being the case, it could have found defendant guilty of either second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter, even under defendant's interpretation of the court's instructions, had it doubted that the remaining elements of first degree murder were proven. The special circumstance finding also shows the jury rejected any possible theory supporting involuntary manslaughter.
First degree torture murder requires a causal relationship between the torturous act and the death. ( Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1207, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811.) The trial court concluded the evidence raised no question of causation and did not directly instruct the jury on this requirement. Instead, it gave instructions identical to those given in Cole, at pages 1207-1208, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811. As in Cole, defendant ascribes error. We reject the contention as in Cole. The court told the jury that murder which is perpetrated by torture is murder of the first degree. (Italics added.) The italicized words signify a causal connection. Accordingly, there is no reasonable likelihood that [the jury] understood there need be no such causal relationship. . . . ( Id. at p. 1208, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811.) Any error would also have been harmless. Here there was no question of causation and defendant did not raise one. He did not dispute that Lo Bue died at his hands or that he alone inflicted the fatal wounds. His defense involved state of mind, not causation. The finding of murder-by-torture encompasses the totality of the brutal acts and the circumstances which led to the victim's death. [Citations.] The acts of torture may not be segregated into their constituent elements in order to determine whether any single act by itself caused the death; rather, it is the continuum of sadistic violence that constitutes the torture. ( People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 530-531, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100.) The multiple stab wounds both constituted the torture and were the cause of death. Accordingly we find that even if the trial court's failure to instruct expressly on the causal relationship had been erroneous, it would have been harmless under any standard. ( Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1209, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811.)
Defendant contends the court erred in failing to instruct that evidence of provocation could be considered in determining whether any intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain was deliberate and premeditated. The court did instruct that the jury could consider any provocation for such bearing as . . . it may have on whether the defendant killed with or without deliberation and premeditation. Defendant argues that the jury would infer from this instruction that it could not consider provocation in deciding whether he deliberately and premeditatedly inflicted torture. However, defendant did not ask the court to clarify or amplify this instruction and, accordingly, he may not complain on appeal that it was incomplete. ( Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1211, 17 Cal. Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811.) Moreover, we find no reasonable likelihood the jury would parse this instruction so finely as to find a negative inference that it could not consider provocation regarding defendant's mental state in inflicting torture. Logically, whatever relevance any provocation had on the mental state with which defendant killed would apply to his mental state regarding infliction of torture. Accordingly, [t]here is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have understood these instructions to foreclose them from considering evidence of provocation, if any, in connection with murder by torture. ( Id. at p. 1212, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811.)
Defendant contends the court erred in not instructing the jury that it had to agree unanimously on the theory by which he was guilty of first degree murder. We have repeatedly rejected the claim and continue to do so. ( Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1221, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811; see also Schad v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555.) Further, the jury's finding that the torture-murder special circumstance was true shows that it unanimously agreed on that theory. The only requirement for torture murder not included in the special circumstance finding is that, for the special circumstance, the acts of torture need not have caused the death. ( People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 842-843, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 840, 996 P.2d 1152 ( Bemore ).) However, as noted above, in this case there was no issue of causation.
Defendant also contends the court erred in instructing on the torture-murder special circumstance. He argues the instruction was deficient because: (1) it did not require a premeditated intent to inflict torture; (2) it did not say that the pain inflicted must be in addition to the pain of death; and (3) it confused the jury by saying that defendant must have inflicted pain but the victim's awareness of pain was not required. We rejected each contention in Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pages 1226-1228, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811, and continue to do so. (See also Elliot, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 476-479, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 122 P.3d 968.)
Defendant contends the torture-murder special circumstance is vague and overbroad in two ways. First, he claims it fails to satisfy the nexus that must exist between the alleged torture and the victim's death. We have rejected this claim previously and do so now. ( Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 843, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 840, 996 P.2d 1152.) Moreover, whatever might be the outer limits of the statute in this regard, the act of torture, here the stabbing, was also the cause of death. ( Id. at pp. 843-844, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 840, 996 P.2d 1152.) Second, defendant claims that the requirement of extreme physical pain, in effect at the time of this crime, is too vague. He claims this phrase is no more precise than language such as especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, which the United States Supreme Court has found void for vagueness. ( Maynard v. Cartwright (1988) 486 U.S. 356, 363-364, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372.) We have already effectively rejected this contention. The narrowing construction absent in Maynard is present here. In People v. Davenport [(1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861], this court construed the torture special circumstance as requiring proof that the defendant intended to kill and torture the victim, and inflicted extreme pain upon a living victim. Thus, unlike the vaguely worded aggravating circumstances of `especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel' ( Maynard, supra, 486 U.S. 356[, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372]), the torture special circumstance involved here has been construed narrowly by this court and its constitutionality has been upheld. [Citations.] ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 454, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388.) Defendant asserts that his current contention is different, because now he claims the word extreme is itself vague, a claim not specifically considered in our previous cases. To the extent this is so, this new challenge is no more convincing than the ones already rejected. The word extreme has a commonsense meaning[] which the jury may be expected to apply. ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 189, 51 Cal. Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980 [noting that, in the context of the torture-murder special circumstance, we used the word `extreme' to narrow and clarify the meaning of a special circumstance].)

The district attorney's original notice of aggravating evidence pursuant to section 190.3 listed defendant's assault on his wife, his arson of Tina Whaley's apartment, and his assault on Rosalind Wathel, but included nothing about his juvenile behavior. On November 19, 1992, the day the defense began presenting its penalty phase evidence, the prosecutor served on defense counsel a petition for disclosure of defendant's juvenile court records in Santa Clara County. On the next court date, November 23, 1992, the court granted the petition over defendant's objection. During cross-examination the same day, defendant admitted he was sent to a boy's ranch when he was about 15 years old for assaulting two school janitors and an off-duty police officer. No details of these incidents were mentioned. On November 30, 1992, after defendant finished testifying, the prosecutor moved to present evidence of defendant's juvenile crimes as either rebuttal or evidence in his case-in-chief. He said he had not given earlier notice because he had only recently become aware of defendant's juvenile record. Defense counsel objected, and stated that he had informed the prosecutor of defendant's juvenile record much earlier. The prosecutor responded that he did not remember. Counsel argued that defendant would be prejudiced by a late presentation of this evidence because he had already testified. The court ruled that the juvenile crimes were not admissible in rebuttal but, after reviewing then-recent authority, ruled that the evidence is admissible on the basis of newly discovered evidence by the prosecution. It permitted the prosecutor to reopen his case-in-chief to present the evidence. Regarding defendant's claim of prejudice, it stated, The only prejudice the Court perceives is the necessity or the opportunity of the defendant being recalled in some form of surrebuttal or additional evidence taken by way of other witnesses to rebut the evidence that the People are now offering. Defense counsel requested a three-week continuance to meet the new evidence. After further discussion, the court granted a week's continuance with the understanding that defendant could ask for another week if needed. At a status conference on December 3, 1992, defendant unsuccessfully renewed his objection. On December 7, 1992, the prosecutor presented the evidence. Defendant then produced three witnesses who testified in mitigation about those incidents. Defendant contends that he received untimely notice and that the court erred in allowing the prosecution to present the evidence. We recently summarized the applicable law. Section 190.3 provides that, with exceptions not relevant here, `no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial.' The purpose of this provision `is to advise an accused of the evidence against him so that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense at the penalty trial.' ( People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 96[, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].) `[W]here the prosecution learns of evidence it intends to use in aggravation at the penalty phase for the first time after trial has commenced, exclusion of this evidence under section 190.3 is not necessarily compelled. [Citation.] Under such circumstances, the defendant is entitled to prompt notice of the newly discovered evidence, and, if necessary, to a reasonable continuance to enable him or her to prepare to meet that evidence. If the prosecutor's delay in affording notice is unreasonable or unexcused, or if the delay would prejudice the defense, the court must exclude the evidence.' ( Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 619, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) The prosecutor stated he gave notice of the newly discovered evidence as soon as he knew of it, and the trial court did not find to the contrary. Defendant argues the prosecutor could have, and should have, discovered his juvenile records sooner than he did. [I]n the absence of prejudice to defendant, the notice, given promptly after the prosecution actually learned of the incident, was adequate. ( Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 620, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) Defendant argues he was prejudiced by the late notice, but fails to substantiate that claim. In the absence of any indication that the delay in notice had in some fashion affected the manner in which defense counsel handled the prior proceedings, the appropriate remedy for a violation would ordinarily be to grant a continuance as needed to allow defendant to develop a response. ( People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 334, 261 Cal.Rptr. 348, 777 P.2d 121; accord, Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1153, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) Here, defendant was given a one-week continuance, with the possibility of additional time if needed. He presented three witnesses who testified about the incidents. Accordingly, he was fully allowed to develop a response. Defendant claims prejudice because with earlier notice, he could have told the jury about his involvement in the assaults during direct examination. He claims the manner in which the assault evidence was presented undoubtedly raised the question, in the minds of the jurors, of why [he] did not mention these incidents when discussing his life history in direct examination. Defendant could have testified about the incidents after the prosecution presented the evidence, just as he called other witnesses to address the events. These witnesses largely absolved defendant from wrongdoing. If the jury believed this testimony, it would readily have understood why defendant felt no need to mention the incidents on direct examination. Because prejudice has not been shown, we need not consider the Attorney General's alternate argument that the evidence of the juvenile incidents would have been admissible on rebuttal. (See People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1071, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 230, 824 P.2d 1277.)
One witness testified that he observed defendant kick a high school custodian four or five times. The prosecutor asked whether defendant seemed to be enjoying it. The witness responded, Yeah. Defense counsel objected that the answer was speculation, irrelevant, and inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352. The court overruled the objection. Although defendant contends the court erred in overruling the objection, the court acted within its discretion. ( Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1124-1125, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) The witness testified that defendant seemed to enjoy kicking the custodian. Because the witness was a percipient witness, he spoke from personal observation. He was competent to testify that defendant's behavior and demeanor were consistent with enjoyment. A history of enjoyment in the infliction of pain is relevant at the penalty phase. Defendant also argues the question called for improper opinion evidence. He did not object on that basis at trial, and he may not make that argument on appeal. ( People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 302, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742.) Such an objection would have failed. Generally, a lay witness may not give an opinion about another's state of mind. However, a witness may testify about objective behavior and describe behavior as being consistent with a state of mind. Defendant objected to the evidence that he set fire to Tina Whaley's apartment, arguing it was a crime against property, not a crime of violence under section 190.3, factor (b). (See People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 776, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) The court found that it involved the use or attempted use of force or violence to persons, and properly overruled the objection. The arson of Whaley's home could reasonably be considered an attempt to intimidate her by an implied threat of violence. ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 824, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481 [admitting evidence of car arson].) Moreover, the structure involved was an apartment building. Defendant's conduct put other residents and firefighters in physical danger. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 392, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34.)
After the trial court ruled that the prosecution could present evidence of defendant's assault on an off-duty police officer, counsel sought discovery of the officer's personnel records. (See Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305.) The court conducted an in camera review of the records and denied the motion. At defendant's request we have independently reviewed the records and conclude the trial court properly exercised its discretion in not ordering the records disclosed. ( Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 827, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.)
Defendant contends the court erred in permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine him in various ways. On direct examination, defendant testified his parents separated when he was 13 or 14 years old. His mother got a job and a new boyfriend, which meant he had more responsibility around the house, becoming a mother and father to my brother and sisters. He also described an incident when he was 15 years old in which his father got mad at my mother and started to knock her down to the ground. And I jumped him to stop him from beating on her. On cross-examination, defendant was asked whether he had also assaulted his mother when he was 15 years old. Defendant denied doing so, but later admitted he had been arrested and referred to the juvenile probation authorities that year because his mother had said he had assaulted her. He again denied committing the assault. Defense counsel did not object to this questioning. Later, over defense counsel's objection on relevance and hearsay grounds, the court permitted the prosecutor to ask defendant whether his mother had reported to the police that he had assaulted her. Defendant said yes, but he also said the charges were dropped after they did the investigation and found out that is not true. Later still, over defense counsel's objection as irrelevant and beyond the scope of direct examination, the court permitted the prosecutor to ask whether defendant was returned to juvenile hall because you were a failure and living with your aunt. Defendant said yes. Over a relevance objection, the court permitted the prosecutor to ask defendant whether, when he was 15 years old, he had been reported for assaulting two janitors and an off-duty police officer at school and sent to a boys ranch. Defendant said he had been but could not remember his age at the time. Defendant contends this cross-examination about his juvenile record was irrelevant. He notes that neither he nor any other defense witness had mentioned his juvenile record, so it was not proper rebuttal. The contention lacks merit. [18] When defendant testified he had assumed increased responsibilities at home, had become a mother and father to his siblings, and had protected his mother from his father, evidence that he had a juvenile record for acts of violence during that time period became relevant in rebuttal. ( People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 191-192, 284 Cal.Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290.) [T]he purpose of rebuttal in this context is to present a more balanced picture of the defendant's personality. ( In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 208, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 892 P.2d 1287 ( Ross ).) As did the petitioner in Ross, defendant argues that evidence of his juvenile record, as distinct from the criminal behavior itself, was not admissible. The argument fails because this evidence was to be used as rebuttal. `. . . The rebuttal evidence was not necessarily offered to establish past criminal activity on defendant's part but rather to rebut defendant's claim of good character. [Citation.] The prosecution's evidence was highly probative of defendant's character as a juvenile. . . .' ( Id. at p. 209, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 892 P.2d 1287.) Evidence that defendant's own mother, whom he claimed to have protected from his father, and to have helped so much when she got a job, reported him to the police for assault was highly probative of his character regardless of the truth of the report. Moreover, Bob Creamer, defendant's juvenile probation officer, testified that in 1980, defendant had a sustained juvenile petition. The jury could reasonably infer that this sustained petition related to the assault. Evidence of the sustained petition would both rebut defendant's claim that the charges had been dropped and his testimony about his good character. Under the circumstances, the prosecution was not required to relitigate the allegations of the sustained petition in order to use it in rebuttal. (See People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 367-369, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846 (conc. opn. of George, C.J.) [rejecting a hearsay objection to use of convictions to show prior criminal activity for sentencing purposes]; People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 747, 280 Cal.Rptr. 440, 808 P.2d 1197 [upholding admission of juvenile court adjudication as evidence of criminal activity].) On direct examination, defendant testified that he had unexpectedly been released from jail at midnight on the night of the Whaley arson. On cross-examination, the prosecutor established that defendant had entered into a special program, and signed a contract that required him to return to jail. He was supposed to have returned to jail at the time he set the fire. He did not return, but instead went to Texas. In doing so he committed a crime to which he later pled guilty. Defendant claims the question regarding whether failing to return to jail was a crime was irrelevant, and that the court erroneously overruled his objection below. The testimony was relevant. It directly rebutted the clear implication in defendant's direct examination that he had been unconditionally released from jail at that time. It was proper to fully amplify his testimony by inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding his assertions. . . . ( Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 822, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865.) Moreover, some of his witnesses had testified that, around this time, defendant was a good employee, thus implying that he was a responsible person. This rebuttal evidence was admissible to present a more balanced picture of the defendant's personality. ( Ross, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 208, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 892 P.2d 1287.) Defendant also claims the question whether a crime had been committed was improper opinion evidence. He did not object on this basis; the claim is not cognizable. ( Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 822, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865.) Further, defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to a crime in connection with his absconding. He knew the facts; no opinion was required. The prosecutor asked defendant whether it was true that he did not know a single person who could come into this courtroom and speak on your behalf. The court overruled defense counsel's objection on relevance and vagueness grounds. Defendant said that two childhood friends, the only friends that I ever had, could speak for him. In response to further questioning, he said that no one who knew him well could testify about his character. He agreed that the witnesses who did testify on his behalf did not know him well, and that the persons who knew him best are his parents, Yvonne Chatman, Tina Whaley, and Rosalind Wathel. Defendant argues that his knowledge of whether any persons could testify as a character witness on his behalf was irrelevant. On the contrary, these questions established that defendant's character witnesses did not know him well, and that those who knew him best did not speak on his behalf. The point was relevant to the jury's evaluation of the case in mitigation.
Defendant's juvenile probation officer, Bob Creamer, testified in rebuttal. Defendant challenges portions of that testimony. Creamer testified that he had frequent contact with defendant's father, usually in response to a complaint by his father about [defendant's] behavior. The court overruled defendant's objection and motion to strike this testimony. Creamer also testified that during his supervision, defendant never reported that his father was abusing him. On redirect examination, over defendant's foundation objection, Creamer testified that the father's complaints were very inconsistent with someone who's abusing their child, because a person would not want to have contact with probation or police or any kind of an investigative organization to complain about things that are irritating you if you're dealing with them by abusing your child. Defense counsel then elicited Creamer's testimony that a child abuser might think he was acting appropriately and not consider his conduct abusive. Creamer also could not say whether defendant's father hit defendant with a belt as defendant had testified. Defendant's contention that Creamer's testimony about the father's complaints was irrelevant fails. Creamer did not go into detail regarding the complaints, so the testimony was rather innocuous. The mere fact that the jury heard that defendant's father complained about him could hardly have prejudiced defendant. The testimony was relevant to the jury's evaluation of defendant's own claim that his father had abused him. Defendant also contends that the prosecution did not establish that the juvenile probation officer had sufficient expertise to render an opinion that the conduct of [defendant's] father was inconsistent with his being a child abuser. Assuming defendant's foundation objection was sufficient to preserve this issue ( Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 908, fn. 6, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93), there was no error. The prosecution established that Creamer had substantial expertise. He had been a probation officer for 22 years, part of which he spent investigating child abuse cases. He held a college degree and a teaching credential, as well as a year and a half of graduate study in psychology and physiology. Creamer also testified over objection that in his opinion, defendant was not particularly truthful when it wasn't to his advantage, and impressed [him] as being violent. He was volatile and like a ticking time bomb. The testimony was proper rebuttal. Defendant testified that he had become like a mother and father to his siblings and had protected his mother. Creamer's testimony was relevant to defendant's credibility and to present a more balanced picture of his personality. The admission of rebuttal evidence is a matter for the sound discretion of the trial court, which was properly exercised here. ( People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 912, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712.)
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed various acts of misconduct. Again, to complain of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal, defendant must have objected and requested a jury admonition. ( Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 841, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) Defendant contends the prosecutor twice referred to evidence outside the record while arguing objections in front of the jury. Defendant presented evidence that his father was arrested for abusing his siblings. During the arresting officer's testimony, the prosecutor objected to a statement by one of defendant's sisters on hearsay grounds. Discussing whether the statement was a spontaneous declaration, the prosecutor argued that the witness was describing an event that didn't happen that day. A bit later, he stated, Your honor, . . . you're putting me in a very uncomfortable situation, but I've got a transcript of what took place because the children were deposed at a preliminary examination and they said clearly there was nothing of that type that happened that day. And you keep makingI don't know how you want me to. Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor testifying. The prosecutor said, I've been trying to do it out of the presence of the jury, but you keep forcing me to enunciate it, so I will. Nothing happened of that sort that day, and I have the testimony of the children to that effect. And there's a misunderstanding here. He also said, There's two distinct events going on here. And he, in answer to the question by counsel, was immediately supplying information relating that something happened on a different date. And that's not a spontaneous statement. At this point, the witness said he had had contact with the family on two occasions, and he was able to distinguish between the two. Later, the prosecutor objected again and a hearing was held outside the presence of the jury. Eventually, the court overruled the prosecutor's hearsay objection, and the testimony continued. Defendant contends the prosecutor's reference to the preliminary hearing transcript was improper. However, he did not request the jury be admonished to disregard the comments. The issue is not cognizable. An admonition could have cured any harm. The prosecutor never said that the alleged events did not happen, but only that they occurred on different days. The prosecutor's statement that there were two different incidents was not prejudicial. Indeed, the fact that police were called on two separate days would have added weight to defendant's claim that his father was a violent man. On cross-examination, defendant was asked whether any of his father's siblings live[d] locally while you were growing up. In response to a relevance objection, the prosecutor argued any of these brothers and sisters who live locally would have some knowledge of the extent of the treatment that this defendant received and what it was like for him growing up, and I'm curious if any of these people are going to come in and testify to it. The court permitted the question for that limited purpose, and defendant testified that some of them did live locally. Defendant contends the prosecutor also referred to evidence outside the record in his response to the relevance objection. Again, his failure to object or request an admonition renders the issue not cognizable. In any event, the prosecutor did not inform the jury of anything. Instead, to show that the question was relevant, he merely argued an inference the jury could draw from an answer that some siblings lived locally. There was no misconduct. The prosecutor asked defendant whether his father, mother, aunts and uncles were going to testify. Each time the court sustained a relevance objection. Once, when defendant answered that he did not know, the answer was stricken and the jury directed to disregard it. Defendant claims the prosecutor's questions were misconduct. Beyond sustained objections and a stricken answer, defense counsel sought no further admonition. These questions sought legitimate testimony to support the proper argument that defendant failed to call logical witnesses who could have corroborated some of his testimony. ( People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 262-263, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107 ( Wash ).) The fact that these witnesses did not testify was relevant. The questions may have been premature and unnecessary. Their nonappearance would eventually be evident, but the questions caused no prejudice. On cross-examination, defendant insisted he could not remember actually stabbing his victim. He also denied telling William Speed, Tina Whaley, and Rosalind Wathel anything to the contrary and, in response to questions, said they were lying. In a contention similar to his guilt phase argument, defendant contends the were they lying questions were improper. The contention lacks merit for the reasons given in the guilt phase discussion. ( Ante, pt. II.C.5.a.) One of defendant's high school teachers testified that defendant did not relate much with other students but was more of a loner. He was quiet, cooperative, pleasant, and not a problem of any kind. On cross examination, the prosecutor asked whether she had heard about the defendant's assault on the two school janitors. Defendant objected on the basis that it was improper cross-examination and unduly prejudicial. The court sustained the objection, finding that the question did not impeach the witness's testimony and that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. Another defense witness who worked for a church in Houston, testified that defendant was hard working and reliable, a model employee. On cross examination, the witness testified that defendant never stole from him or the church even though he had the opportunity to do so. At this point, the prosecutor asked, But had you heard at the time he was working for you he's committing burglaries on the outside? Defendant objected. The court effectively sustained the objection, stating it did not think there's any evidence that this witness has testified to his character. Over objection, the court permitted the prosecutor to ask the witness whether defendant had told him about a time that he worked . . . on another job drunk and took a swing at his boss. The witness answered, No. Defendant unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial based on these questions. The court clarified its view that if a witness limited his testimony to merely employment, employer, non-personal testimony, I think I will rule under [Evidence Code section] 352 that any other have-you-heard questions as to character is inappropriate and will be excluded. The prosecutor assured the court that he had a good-faith belief that the questions were factually based. Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in asking the have you heard questions regarding the school assault and the burglaries. The claim is not cognizable because defense counsel did not request an admonition. When he moved for a mistrial, counsel argued that an admonition would have been unavailing. As discussed below, we discern neither misconduct nor prejudice. Within the sound exercise of its discretion the court could have allowed the questions. Penalty phase rebuttal evidence is proper if it relates directly to a particular character trait defendant offers in his own behalf. ( Ross, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 207, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 892 P.2d 1287.) Here, the first of the witnesses testified that defendant was quiet, cooperative, pleasant, and not a problem of any kind. The second witness testified that defendant was a model employee and never stole from him even though he had the opportunity to do so. This testimony made it reasonable for the prosecutor to ask defendant's teacher about defendant's assault on the janitors and his employer about the burglaries. The prosecutor could reasonably have asked these questions in good faith. In general, have you heard questions regarding acts or conduct inconsistent with the witness's testimony are appropriate, so long as the prosecutor has a good faith belief that the acts actually occurred. ( People v. Payton (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1050, 1066-1067, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 526, 839 P.2d 1035.) Although bad faith is not a prerequisite to misconduct ( People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 822-823, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673), the record here establishes no reprehensible conduct of any kind. It is not misconduct to ask a question in good faith even if the court exercises its discretion by sustaining an objection. We also see no prejudice. Later, the prosecutor did present evidence regarding the assault on the custodians, so asking about it could not itself have caused prejudice. He did not prove any burglary. But the court instructed the jury, Statements made by the attorneys during the trial are not evidence. . . . If an objection was sustained to a question, do not guess what the answer might have been. Do not speculate as to the reason for the objection. Do not assume to be true any insinuation suggested by a question asked a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it enables you to understand the answer. It also instructed, Where on cross-examination a witness is asked if he or she has heard of reports of certain conduct of a defendant inconsistent with the traits of good character to which the witness has testified, such questions and the witness's answers thereto may be considered only for the purpose of determining the weight to be given to the opinion of the witness or to his or her testimony as to the good reputation of the defendant. Such questions and answers are not evidence that the reports are true, and you must not assume from them that the defendant did in fact himself or herself consistently conduct himself or herself inconsistently with such traits of character. We assume the jury followed these instructions, and that any prejudice from the brief reference to burglaries was thus avoided. ( Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 168, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960.) One of defendant's cousins testified about the assault on the off-duty police officer. The prosecutor asked on cross-examination whether the witness had told his mother about the incident. Defense counsel objected as irrelevant. The prosecutor replied that the question went to credibility. Defense counsel asked, Why is that credibility? The prosecutor responded, Because none of this is the truth. Defense counsel objected to that improper statement and move[d] for assignment of misconduct that the prosecutor [is] stating his personal opinion. The court overruled the original objection, but also instruct[ed] the jury to disregard all statements of counsel as I've previously done. They're not to be construed in any manner, shape or form. I instruct counsel to refrain from future banter. Outside the jury's presence counsel moved that the prosecutor be cited for contempt and requested a further admonition. The prosecutor responded that he had not expressed a personal opinion but merely argued the question was relevant to show that the witness was lying. After having the record reread, the court ruled its admonition was sufficient. It is misconduct for a prosecutor to argue his personal opinion of the evidence if the jury might infer that the opinion is based on information or evidence outside the record. ( Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 781-782, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) Given the context in which the comment was made and the court's prompt admonition, it is unlikely that the jury drew any improper conclusion from the prosecutor's comment, let alone the conclusion that the comment reflected information outside the record. It is hardly a revelation to learn that an opposing lawyer considers a witness's testimony untrue. No factual information was provided and the court's prompt admonition cured any potential prejudice. During penalty phase argument, the prosecutor noted defendant's evidence of abuse as a child but also the lack of expert testimony connecting any such abuse with defendant's adult crimes. He argued that without that testimony, the jury should not rely on the evidence for any purpose but sympathy. He then argued, Before the defense explains the value of this evidence, as abuse must have, they should first explain to you why they spent a preposterous amount of money At this point, defense counsel objected to the argument as an appeal to passion and impact of whatever the case might cost andper any side, as improper. The prosecutor responded, What I'm trying to do is explain how shaky the defense is, because it fails to present a competent expert to explain it and what I'm asking is if they were willing to examine one witness, why didn't they spend the same amount of money to examine their own client. The court overruled the objection and, [o]nce again, instruct[ed] the jury that statements of counsel are not to be construed as evidence. The prosecutor then continued to argue, What I was saying to you is that before the defense suggests any additional value to this evidence they should first explain to you why they spent a preposterous amount of money for a psychologist to examine the witness Rosalind Wathel, and yet, did not present the testimony of any expert who examined Erik Chatman. Very simply, why didn't they call a psychologist? Why didn't they call a psychiatrist who had something meaningful to say about Chatman? I would suggest to you that there was no one. There was no one who could corroborate this testimony. Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the passion of the jurors, denigrated defense counsel, and referred to evidence outside the record. The prosecutor's overall point, which the jury could readily understand, was that the defense had presented no expert evidence connecting the claimed abuse with defendant's crimes and that, had such evidence existed, the defense would have presented it. Comment on the failure to call logical witnesses is legitimate. ( Wash, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 262-263, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107.) The fact that the defense went to great lengths to examine the witness Wathel strengthened this argument. It is true that neither the jury nor the prosecutor knew whether defense counsel had spent money examining defendant, but the court again admonished the jury that statements of counsel were not evidence, and the point was unimportant. There was no reasonable likelihood the jury gave the comments any improper meaning, and no prejudice occurred. ( Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663, 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.) Occasionally and without objection, the prosecutor referred to defendant as a monster in his argument. Defendant now contends the references were improper, but because he did not object, the claim is not cognizable. An admonition could have cured any harm. Moreover, if the crime was committed as the prosecutor urged, it was not misconduct for him to label it as monstrous. The comment was permissible. ( People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 1002-1003, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874, and cases cited.) Defendant contends that the prosecutor misstated the law governing the evidence in mitigation, by arguing that the jury could not consider certain evidence as a matter of law. (See Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4-8, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1.) The issue is not cognizable. Defendant failed to object and an admonition would have cured any harm. Moreover, we have reviewed the comments defendant cites and find no impropriety. The prosecutor never argued that the jury was not legally allowed to consider any mitigating evidence. He only argued that factually some of the evidence did not mitigate the crimes. Although a jury may not be prevented from considering mitigating evidence, the prosecutor may argue that the evidence does not, in fact, support a particular mitigating factor. ( People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 764, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302 ( Cleveland ).) The prosecutor here did no more.
Defendant contends the jury was misinstructed. The trial court correctly instructed that before a juror could consider any criminal act in aggravation that juror must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did in fact commit such criminal acts. (See People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53-54, 188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279.) It did not define reasonable doubt as part of its penalty instructions, although it had done so at the guilt phase. Defendant contends the court erred in not defining reasonable doubt again. He notes that the court also instructed the jury at the penalty phase to [d]isregard all other instructions given to you in other phases of this trial and argues that these instructions left the penalty jury uninformed as to the definition of reasonable doubt. The court should have redefined reasonable doubt at the penalty phase. However, as in People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 685, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213, [a]ny possible error arising from the court's failure to [do so] was harmless. Absent any suggestion to the contrary, the jury would likely have assumed the reasonable doubt the court referred to at the penalty phase had the same meaning as the term had during the guilt phase. There is no reasonable likelihood ( People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 525, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385) the jury would have believed the reasonable doubt analysis it was required to engage in at the penalty phase was somehow different than the reasonable doubt analysis it had already engaged in at the guilt phase. That the court would not have changed the meaning of such an important term without saying so is a commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the trial [that is] likely to prevail over technical hairsplitting. ( Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 381, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316.) Additionally, the jury did not request a further explanation of the reasonable doubt standard, as it surely would have done had it been confused as to the meaning of reasonable doubt. ( Holt, at p. 685, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) Defendant relies primarily on People v. Elguera (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1214, 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 910, which found prejudicial error for failure to instruct on the reasonable doubt standard. The case is distinguishable. The Elguera trial court did not mention reasonable doubt at all in its instructions, not even to say the defendant had to be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Although it had discussed reasonable doubt during jury selection, the instruction was not given to actual jurors, but to prospective jurors who at the time did not know whether they would ultimately serve in the case. As a result, the members of the panel could well have viewed the court's remarks as hypothetical and thus have failed to give the instruction the same focused attention they would have had they been impaneled and sworn. ( Id. at p. 1222, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 910.) Here, by contrast, the court instructed that the jurors had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had committed another crime before they could consider it in aggravation. Further, the jury had actually applied the reasonable doubt standard at the guilt phase, and found in defendant's favor regarding some allegations. The trial court refused defendant's request to instruct the jury that it must not consider as an aggravating factor the existence of any special circumstance if you have already considered the facts of the special circumstance as a circumstance of the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. [¶] In other words, do not consider the same facts more than once in determining the presence of aggravating factors. We rejected the identical claim of error in People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 288-290, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193. In the absence of misleading argument, not present here, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instructions given it in a legally improper manner. ( Id. at p. 290, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193.) Defendant challenges the court's refusal to instruct that the jury could consider in mitigation any mental or emotional disturbance he has suffered. He argues that because the court instructed the jury in terms of section 190.3, factor (d), which requires the jury to consider whether the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when he committed the offense, the jury was precluded from considering a disturbance that was less than extreme. The argument fails. The court also told the jury to consider any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or background that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial. This catchall instruction allowed consideration of any nonextreme mental or emotional disturbance. ( Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 190, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960.) Defendant contends that CALJIC No. 8.88, the standard penalty phase concluding instruction, is constitutionally flawed in various respects. We have repeatedly upheld this instruction and continue to do so. Use of the words so substantial does not render the instruction impermissibly vague. ( People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 858, 3 Cal. Rptr.3d 733, 74 P.3d 820.) Use of the term warrants does not render the instruction overbroad and permissive. ( Ibid. ) The instruction need not state that the prosecution has the burden of proof with respect to the appropriate punishment. ( Ibid. ) The jury need not make written findings or achieve unanimity as to specific aggravating circumstances. Except as to other crimes, it need not find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances are true. ( People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1233, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487 ( Young ).) Nor need the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating ones, or that the death penalty is appropriate. ( Ibid. ) The instruction need not relate that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole means the defendant will never be paroled. ( Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 635-636, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) The instruction does not improperly omit that the jury must return a verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if it finds that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors, or that it may return a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole even in the complete absence of any mitigating evidence. ( People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 600, fn. 20, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1231, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068.) The jury may constitutionally consider unadjudicated criminal activity in aggravation. ( Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 642, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) Contrary to defendant's contention, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 do not affect these conclusions. ( Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 642, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.)
Defendant's contention that the cumulative effect of the asserted errors was prejudicial, fails. There was no significant error to accumulate. Defendant received a fair trial.
Defendant challenges California's death penalty law on grounds we have repeatedly rejected. Given the catchall factor (k) of section 190.3, the wording of some of the other factors listed in that section does not prevent full consideration of mitigation. ( People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 439, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) The statute does not unconstitutionally fail to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. ( Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1233, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487.) Prosecutorial discretion in charging special circumstances or seeking the death penalty is not unconstitutional. ( Ibid. ) Intercase proportionality review is not required. ( Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 768, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302.) We do undertake intracase proportionality review on request to determine whether the penalty is disproportionate to the defendant's personal culpability.... ( Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 768, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302.) Defendant does not specifically request intracase proportionality review, but the death penalty he faces is not disproportionate to his conduct. Defendant acted alone when he stabbed his victim to death. The jury found, on proper and substantial evidence, that the killing involved torture. Defendant committed other crimes of violence, both before and after he murdered Rosellina Lo Bue. The death sentence does not shock the conscience. ( Id. at p. 769, fn. 11, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302.)