Opinion ID: 2814151
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Loyalty Oath Affidavits

Text: As a preliminary matter, defendants argue that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated § 2-1-114 because they cannot show an injury in fact. Under Article III of the United States Constitution, the federal judicial power extends only to “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III. “The doctrine of standing gives meaning to these constitutional limits by ‘identify[ing] those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.’” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). To establish Article III standing, plaintiffs must show (1) an “injury in fact,” (2) a “causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,” and (3) a “likel[ihood]” that the injury “will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants contend that plaintiffs have not demonstrated an injury in fact because there is no evidence that the statute has been, or would be, enforced. The injury in fact requirement ensures that the plaintiffs have a “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.” Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2341 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). To be sufficient, the injury must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual and imminent” rather than “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” Id. A threatened injury can qualify as an injury in fact if the threatened injury is “certainly impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013). Plaintiffs have sufficiently established that they suffered an injury due to the Tennessee statute. While defendants have not enforced or threatened to enforce this statute against plaintiffs or any other political party, they also have not explicitly disavowed enforcing it in the future. In such situations, the Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs have standing to challenge statutes. See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 302 (1979) (holding that fear of prosecution was not imaginary or speculative where “the State has not disavowed any intention of invoking the criminal penalty provision”); see also Platt v. Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline of Ohio Sup. Ct., 769 F.3d 447, 452 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that No. 14-5435 Green Party of Tenn., et al. v. Hargett, et al. Page 13 plaintiff had standing where state refused to disavow the enforcement of the statute as applied to plaintiff). We do the same here and find that plaintiffs have constitutional standing.
Plaintiffs argue that Section 2-1-114 unconstitutionally impairs their free speech rights by requiring a minor or new political party to file an affidavit stating that the party does not advocate the overthrow of local, state, or national government by force or violence before its nominees are placed on the ballot. The Supreme Court in Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb struck down a nearly identical statute, holding that loyalty oaths are unconstitutional and violate the First Amendment. 414 U.S. 441, 446 (1974). The Court stated: “the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Id. at 448 (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, we conclude that Section 2-1-114(1) violates plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to free speech. We note that the district court held the entirety of Tennessee Code Annotated § 2-1-114 unconstitutional. However, Tennessee Code Annotated § 2-1-114(2) simply requires a party’s rules of operation to be filed with the Tennessee Secretary of State and is unrelated to the loyalty oath requirement. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Section 2-1-114(1) but reverse the grant of summary judgment as to Section 2-1-114(2)’s filing requirement.