Opinion ID: 793479
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of the Bullets and Simpson's Post-Arrest Statements

Text: 17 Simpson alleges the three bullets recovered from his person, as well as the statements he made to police some two hours after discovery of his outstanding arrest warrant, are inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. We review these claims de novo. Brown, 49 F.3d at 1348-49. 18 Although the United States Supreme Court has refused to adopt a per se, or but for, rule that would make inadmissible any evidence, whether tangible or live-witness testimony, where such evidence is obtained through a chain of causation that began with an illegal arrest, United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978), we note, once again, the familiar precept that the indirect fruits of an illegal search or arrest should be suppressed when they bear a sufficiently close relationship to the underlying illegality. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990). Nevertheless, evidence obtained under these circumstances may be admissible if the unlawful conduct has become so attenuated or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance so as to remove the `taint' imposed upon that evidence by the original illegality. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980). 2 19 In this case, Simpson's initial seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. The three bullets and his post-arrest statements were obtained, respectively, after police discovered the outstanding warrant for his arrest. The only question is whether there was sufficient attenuation to dissipate the taint of Simpson's unlawful seizure such that the bullets and his post-arrest statements are admissible. When determining if sufficient attenuation exists, we must focus on three specific factors: (1) the time elapsed between the illegality and acquisition of the evidence; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). 20 In instances where the intervening circumstance is the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant, courts have held the first factor the time elapsed between the initial illegality and the acquisition of the evidence — is less relevant because the intervening circumstance is not a voluntary act by the defendant. See United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 522 (7th Cir.1997). In these cases, there is no chance that the police have exploited an illegal arrest by creating a situation in which [the] criminal response is predictable. Id. (internal citations omitted). 3 Here, the intervening circumstance is an arrest warrant, not a voluntary act by Simpson. Therefore, our review need not focus on the first Brown factor. Instead, the appropriate analysis must consider the nature of the intervening circumstance and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. 21 Where the discovery of an arrest warrant constitutes the intervening circumstance, it is an even more compelling case for the conclusion that the taint of the original illegality is dissipated. Id. Accordingly, we rule Simpson's outstanding arrest warrant constitutes an extraordinary intervening circumstance that purges much of the taint associated with the officers' unconstitutional conduct. 22 The final issue is whether Officers Morgan and Cronin acted purposefully and flagrantly to violate Simpson's Fourth Amendment rights. The purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct is considered the most important factor because it is directly tied to the purpose of the exclusionary rule — deterring police misconduct. United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 464-65 (7th Cir.2003). Application of the exclusionary rule, however, does not serve this deterrent function when the police action, although erroneous, was not undertaken in an effort to benefit the police at the expense of the suspect's protected rights. United States v. Fazio, 914 F.2d 950, 958 (7th Cir.1990). 23 Courts have found purposeful and flagrant conduct where: (1) the impropriety of the official's misconduct was obvious or the official knew, at the time, that his conduct was likely unconstitutional but engaged in it nevertheless; and (2) the misconduct was investigatory in design and purpose and executed in the hope that something might turn up. Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. 2254; see also United States v. Cantu, 230 F.3d 148, 160 (5th Cir.2000); United States v. Causey, 818 F.2d 354, 358-59 (5th Cir.1987). 24 Simpson alleges Officers Morgan and Cronin acted purposefully and flagrantly because no reasonable officer would confuse him with Shade in light of the dramatic physical disparities between the two men. However, there is no evidence that either officer acted with the knowledge his conduct was likely unconstitutional, illegal, or improper. Instead, the facts demonstrate Officer Cronin believed, albeit erroneously, that Simpson was Shade when he tackled and arrested him. Similarly, Officer Morgan continued in pursuit even after realizing the suspect was not Shade under the belief the suspect was intentionally trying to evade police. We note that law enforcement may conduct an investigative stop when a suspect flees from the police without provocation, and where the area in question is known for heavy narcotics trafficking. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). In this case, however, the district court found, and we will assume for purposes of this appeal, that there was insufficient suspicion to justify an investigative stop based, in part, on the lack of physical similarities between Shade and Simpson. Yet the officers' unreasonable mistake of fact on this point does not constitute the type of blatantly unconstitutional or flagrant behavior condemned in Brown. 25 Moreover, there is no indication Officers Cronin and Morgan pursued Simpson in a purposeful effort to gather evidence against him. Instead, both officers initially pursued Simpson under the belief he was Shade. See Green, 111 F.3d at 523 (noting officers were not engaged in an effort to gather evidence against the defendant where they believed the defendant was another person). Even though Officer Morgan realized the man he was chasing was not Shade, neither Morgan, nor any other officer, exploited Simpson's unconstitutional seizure. The three bullets and Simpson's subsequent inculpatory statements were obtained only after discovery of the outstanding warrant for his arrest, which itself provided officers with independent grounds to search and question him. 26 Therefore, we rule the three bullets recovered from Simpson's person, as well as his post-arrest statements, were not obtained through an improper exploitation of his arrest and, as such, this evidence is admissible. 27