Opinion ID: 2607459
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Hair Comparison Evidence

Text: Criminalist Garbutt testified that the pubic hair found underneath Kimele's body almost certainly came from a Black person; that it was inconsistent with pubic hair samples provided by the victims and Sean Collins; and that it was consistent with a sample of defendant's pubic hair. Garbutt explained that he microscopically compared the crime scene specimen with the various samples to determine whether they were similar in length, shape, pigment, damage, and component structure. Before trial, defendant moved to exclude all hair comparison evidence on grounds it was irrelevant, prejudicial, and inadmissible under the Kelly/Frye rule. ( Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir.1923) 293 Fed. 1013, 1014 [54 App. D.C. 46, 34 A.L.R. 145]; People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 30 [130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240].) The rule requires the proponent of evidence based on a new scientific technique to competently establish its general acceptance within the relevant scientific community. Here, the trial court explicitly overruled each of defendant's pretrial objections based on testimony by one expert  Garbutt  at an evidentiary hearing. The court also denied subsequent motions to strike Garbutt's trial testimony after it was admitted and after it was discussed during cross-examination of prosecution serologist Blake. (17) On appeal, defendant argues that use of hair comparison analysis to include a defendant in the class of possible donors is a new scientific technique, and that Garbutt, a career criminalist, was not qualified to testify on whether it has been generally accepted for this purpose. Defendant also complains that admission of Garbutt's trial testimony violated certain federal constitutional guarantees (due process and reliable death judgment). However, no reversible error occurred. As found by the court below, Garbutt's method was not new when offered at defendant's 1986 evidentiary hearing and trial. Hair comparison evidence that identifies a suspect or victim as a possible donor has been routinely admitted in California for many years without any suggestion that it is unreliable under Kelly/Frye. ( People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 799 [281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865]; People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 823 [254 Cal. Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460]; People v. Wolff (1920) 182 Cal. 728, 738 [190 P. 22]; People v. Smith (1987) 188 Cal. App.3d 1495, 1504 [234 Cal. Rptr. 142]; People v. Thomas (1986) 180 Cal. App.3d 47, 51 [225 Cal. Rptr. 277]; People v. Bowen (1982) 137 Cal. App.3d 1020, 1029 [187 Cal. Rptr. 614]; People v. De La Plane (1979) 88 Cal. App.3d 223, 238 [151 Cal. Rptr. 843]; People v. Allen (1974) 41 Cal. App.3d 196, 201-202 [115 Cal. Rptr. 839].) It would have been anomalous for the court to conclude that Garbutt's testimony involved an unfamiliar procedure at this late date. ( People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1158 [265 Cal. Rptr. 111, 783 P.2d 698].) No Kelly/Frye showing was necessary, and Garbutt's qualifications to make such a showing were irrelevant. Defendant next claims that absent any indication defendant belonged to a small percentage of people who could have donated the pubic hair, Garbutt's trial testimony meant nothing at all. However, as noted above, California courts have long assumed that hair comparison evidence of the sort admitted here has some logical bearing on defendant's commission of the charged crimes. (See, e.g., People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d 771, 799 [Black pubic hair in victim's vehicle consistent with defendant's hair]; People v. Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d 808, 823 [foreign hair on victim's body consistent with defendant's hair]; People v. Smith, supra, 188 Cal. App.3d 1495, 1504 [foreign hair on victim's body consistent and inconsistent with defendant's hair]; People v. Thomas, supra, 180 Cal. App.3d 47, 51 [pubic hair on victim's bed consistent with defendant's hair]; People v. Allen, supra, 41 Cal.3d 196, 201-202 [hair at crime scene consistent with defendant's hair].) The court properly rejected defendant's claim that the evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.