Opinion ID: 2056690
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sanctions Historically Considered Punishment

Text: [¶ 38] For the second Mendoza-Martinez factor, we consider whether sanctions imposed by SORNA of 1999 have historically been regarded as punishment. 372 U.S. at 168, 83 S.Ct. 554. In Smith, the Supreme Court considered Alaska's statute in light of the colonial punishments of public shaming, humiliation, and banishment, and concluded that the dissemination of truthful information in furtherance of a legitimate governmental objective could not be considered punishment. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 97-98, 123 S.Ct. 1140. The use of the Internet to disseminate sex offender registrant information did not alter the Supreme Court's conclusion. See id. at 99, 123 S.Ct. 1140. The Court found that [t]he purpose and the principal effect of notification are to inform the public for its own safety, not to humiliate the offender. Widespread public access is necessary for the efficacy of the scheme, and the attendant humiliation is but a collateral consequence of a valid regulation. Id. Maine's statutory scheme is indistinguishable in this respect and, for the reasons articulated by the Supreme Court in Smith, we conclude that Internet posting pursuant to SORNA of 1999 is not punitive in purpose or effect. However, Internet posting aside, there is another aspect of Maine's statutory scheme that is distinguishable from that considered in Smith. [¶ 39] The unique history of the development of sex offender registration laws in Maine is integral to the question of whether the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 to offenders who were sentenced on or after June 30, 1992, and before September 18, 1999, should be regarded as punishment. [10] SORA of 1991 authorized sentencing judges, as part of the sentencing process, to waive an offender's duty to register. See 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11003(4)(D) (Supp.1992). This same sentencing authority was continued in SORNA of 1995. See 34-A M.R.S. § 11121(6)(D) (Supp.1996). In addition, a statutory provision enacted contemporaneously with SORNA of 1995 explicitly provided:  As part of a sentence, the court shall order every natural person who is a convicted sex offender ... to satisfy all requirements set forth in the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1152(2-C) (Supp.1996) (emphasis added) (enacted by P.L. 1995, ch. 680, § 4). [¶ 40] As previously discussed, the District Court determined that Letalien's conviction was in 1996, and thus the version of the sex offender registration statute in effect at the time of his conviction was enacted in 1995, effective in 1996 [SORNA of 1995]. P.L. 1995, ch. 680, § 13 (effective July 4, 1996) (codified at 34-A M.R.S.A. §§ 11101-11144 (Supp.1996)). Section 4 of P.L. 1995, ch. 680, provided: As part of a sentence, the court shall order every natural person who is a convicted sex offender ... to satisfy all requirements set forth in the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. P.L. 1995, ch. 680, § 4 (codified at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1152(2-C) (Supp.1996)). Although this provision was in effect on August 30, 1996, the day Letalien was convicted, the separate section of the public law establishing the registration requirements provided, This chapter applies to all sex offenders sentenced or placed in institutional confinement under Title 15, section 103 on or after September 1, 1996. P.L. 1995, ch. 680, § 13 (codified at 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11102 (Supp.1996)). Thus, while the sentencing provision in the 1995 Public Law was in effect and controlled Letalien's sentence imposed on August 30, 1996, the registration provisions of SORNA of 1995 specifically applied to sex offenders sentenced on or after September 1, 1996. [¶ 41] In this appeal, the State has not assigned as error the District Court's legal conclusion that Letalien was subject to SORNA of 1995. Nonetheless, its brief proceeds from the premise that Letalien's registration requirement arose initially under Chapter 11 [(SORA of 1991)]. Letalien's brief on appeal also treats SORA of 1991 as the applicable law. [¶ 42] We have not previously addressed whether offenders who were sentenced on or after July 4, 1996, but before September 1, 1996, were subject to SORNA of 1995 through the operation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1152(2-C) (Supp.1996). We decline to resolve the question in this case because it has not been cited as error, it has not been briefed, and it does not bear on the outcome. In addition, the registration requirements for Letalien were the same under both laws. Whether Letalien was originally subject to SORA of 1991 or SORNA of 1995, sex offender registration was an integral part of the sentencing process and, thus, the resulting sentence. Unlike the sentence imposed on offenders after the effective date of SORNA of 1999 (September 18, 1999), the sentences of offenders imposed after the effective date of SORA of 1991 (June 30, 1992), and continuing after the effective date of SORNA of 1995 (July 4, 1996), rested, at least in part, on the sentencing court's exercise of judicial discretion. We thus reject the State's contention that those offenders whose registration obligations [under SORNA of 1999] arose after they had been sentenced received no prior court `determination' or `sentence' to comply with SORNA. [¶ 43] Because sex offender registration was required to be part of Letalien's criminal sentence, the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999's requirements to Letalien modified and enhanced a portion of his criminal sentence. The requirement that he register for fifteen years, with the possibility of early termination after five years, has been superseded by the requirement that he register for life with no possibility of early termination. Although the State correctly points out that courts may order defendants to comply with various civil regulatory provisions as a condition of probation if the court imposes a partially or wholly suspended sentence, the fact remains that sex offender registration was required to be an integral part of the original sentencing process and resulting sentence for Letalien's crime of gross sexual assault at the time of his conviction. Because of this, the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime after its commission. Joubert, 603 A.2d at 869 (quoting Collins, 497 U.S. at 42, 110 S.Ct. 2715). The second Mendoza-Martinez factor suggests that SORNA of 1999 is punitive as applied to those offenders who were originally made subject to SORA of 1991 or SORNA of 1995. [11]