Opinion ID: 777309
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Claimed Obligation of CVS/Revco To Maximize Omni's Profits

Text: 12 It is well established that a court may not admit extrinsic evidence in order to determine the meaning of an unambiguous contract. See, e.g., Seiden Associates, Inc. v. ANC Holdings, Inc., 959 F.2d 425, 428 (2d Cir.1992); 67 Wall Street Co. v. Franklin National Bank, 37 N.Y.2d 245, 248-49, 371 N.Y.S.2d 915, 918, 333 N.E.2d 184 (1975); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213 (1979). As to such a contract, a party is precluded from introducing extrinsic evidence of the contract's purpose in order to vary the plain meaning of the writing, Investors Insurance Co. of America v. Dorinco Reinsurance Co., 917 F.2d 100, 104 (2d Cir.1990), or in order to increase [a party's] obligations where those obligations were explicitly outline[d] in the contract itself, Gerard v. Almouli, 746 F.2d 936, 939 (2d Cir.1984). 13 The proper interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law for the court, and a dispute on such an issue may properly be resolved by summary judgment. See, e.g., Seiden Associates, Inc. v. ANC Holdings, Inc., 959 F.2d at 428. We review de novo questions as to the ambiguity and meaning of the language of a contract, see, e.g., Gil Enterprises, Inc. v. Delvy, 79 F.3d 241, 245 (2d Cir.1996); Werbungs Und Commerz Union Austalt v. Collectors' Guild, Ltd., 930 F.2d 1021, 1026 (2d Cir.1991), and as to the propriety of summary judgment, see, e.g., Bowman v. Allstate Insurance Co., 238 F.3d 468, 470 (2d Cir.2001). 14 We see no ambiguity in the duration term of the Agreement at issue here. Although Omni indicates that it expected its contractual relationship with Revco to last beyond March 1998, the Agreement itself provided for a duration of a period of not less than one (1) year, commencing March 3, 1997 (Agreement at 2), and imposed no lengthier obligation. Whatever Omni's greater hopes or expectations may have been, they were not part of the parties' ultimate agreement. Indeed, Omni concedes as much when it acknowledges that Omni Quartz requested from Revco that it make a written three-year agreement to run the Omni Quartz program (Omni brief on appeal at 13), and that in March 1997 Revco ultimately agreed to commit to a one-year program (Omni brief on appeal at 14 (emphasis added)). Omni's contention that CVS/Revco's notification in December 1997 that CVS/Revco would not continue the relationship with Omni beyond March 1998 constituted a breach is thus contrary to the unambiguous terms of the Agreement, and the district court properly refused to allow Omni to offer extrinsic evidence that the parties intended to impose a longer obligation on Revco in order to maximize the benefit to Omni. 15 Nor does the record permit an inference that CVS/Revco's December 1997 notification ended the relationship prior to March 1998. Any suggestion by Omni that CVS/Revco discontinued its sales of Omni watches prior to March 1998 is belied by Omni's admission that Omni continued to supply watches to Revco stores through July 1998. 16 In sum, we see no error in the district court's conclusions that the Agreement as written did not require CVS/Revco to continue the relationship beyond March 1998 and that CVS/Revco's decision not to continue beyond that point was not a breach of contract. Nor has Omni called our attention to any evidence in the record to suggest that the district court erred in concluding that there was no genuine issue to be tried as to CVS/Revco's good faith in the performance of its obligations to sell Omni watches during the one-year term specified in the Agreement. 17