Opinion ID: 2155795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The excluded evidence.

Text: Dr. Anderson contends that the trial judge unduly restricted the testimony of David Ijeh, M.D., who was Mrs. J.'s psychiatrist during most of the period relevant to this case. In his brief, counsel for Dr. Brown has adopted Dr. Anderson's argument on this point. [6] Dr. Ijeh testified both as a fact witness and as an expert witness for the defense. [7] He related that he had seen Mrs. J. on December 30, 1996, on January 28, 1997, on April 8, 1997, and on June 9, 1997. During this period, Mrs. J. had complained of auditory hallucinations (hearing imaginary voices), visual hallucinations (seeing imaginary things, including, e.g., shadows and mice), and depression. Dr. Ijeh prescribed a number of medications, including Prozac, Resperidol, Mellaril, and Sinequan. Mrs. J. testified, however, that in spite of her continuing complaints of hallucinations and depression, she did not take these medicines as prescribed by Dr. Ijeh. Instead, she turned the prescriptions over to the prosecutors. While Dr. Ijeh was on the witness stand, government counsel asked for leave to approach the bench and requested a proffer from Dr. Anderson's attorney as to the nature of the proposed expert testimony. Dr. Anderson's attorney stated that Dr. Ijeh would give the diagnosis he reached from talking to [Mrs. J.]. This diagnosis, according to counsel, would be schizoid affect[ive] disorder. Id. [8] The judge inquired why Dr. Ijeh's diagnosis was relevant. Counsel argued that I have a right to bring out from this man why he prescribed medicine, what was the reason. The judge disagreed: I don't see why you have a right to present it. You can certainly bring out that he prescribed medicine. You can bring out things, the kind of things you wanted to bring out, that she reported to him that she was hallucinating, but you can't  I don't want the label. I think it's a loaded label that has zero probative value. Dr. Anderson's attorney insisted that there's a reason that he's prescribing medication. He just [is] not doing it willynilly. The judge responded that [t]he issue in the case isn't whether she was properly prescribed medication, and he stated that I'll qualify him as an expert with the understanding we're not going to be getting into diagnosis. (Emphasis added.) It was perhaps arguable, at this point, that the judge was excluding only the label  schizoid affect[ive] disorder  rather than the condition which the forbidden label described. It soon became apparent, however, that the judge's ruling was not confined to a prohibition against the mention of the medical name of Mrs. J.'s affliction. Dr. Ijeh was permitted to testify that he prescribed Prozac and other medications for Mrs. J., but the judge repeatedly sustained the prosecutor's objections to defense questions as to why Dr. Ijeh prescribed these medications and even as to what the medications were used for. [9] Dr. Anderson's attorney ultimately complained that the exclusion of [Dr. Ijeh's] observations. . .  why he prescribed medication[,] and what the medication is for[]is harming me in my right to cross[sic] examination. He argued that the prohibited direct examination was directly relevant to this woman and her ability to perceive[,] her cognitive effects[,] and her ability to testify about those events. The judge adhered to his prior ruling.