Opinion ID: 2995304
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of the September 1999 Seizure

Text: and Degenhardt’s Explanations Calhoun also asserts that evidence of the September 1999 seizure and Degenhardt’s corresponding explanation of the importance of sugar and stamps in Bogan’s and Calhoun’s enterprise should have been excluded. We see no need to engage in our standard Rule 404(b) analysis to resolve Calhoun’s meritless argument because it is clear from the record that the evidence of the September 1999 seizure was intricately related to the assault upon Officer Degenhardt. See United States v. Ryan, 213 F.3d 347, 349 (7th Cir. 2000) (dispensing with 404(b) analysis when evidence was intricately related to the offense charged in the indictment). This circuit has a well- established line of precedent that allows evidence of uncharged acts to be introduced at trial if the evidence is intricately related to the acts charged in the indictment. United States v. Gibson, 170 F.3d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 1999). Under the intricately related doctrine, the admissibility of Bogan’s and Calhoun’s wine-making turns on: whether the evidence is properly admitted to provide the jury with a complete story of the crime on trial, whether its absence would create a chronological or conceptual void in the story of the crime, or whether it is so blended or connected that it incidentally involves, explains the circumstances surrounding, or tends to prove any element of, the charged crime. United States v. Ramirez, 45 F.3d 1096, 1102 (7th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In the factual situation before us, the evidence of the wine-making activity of Bogan and Calhoun serves to complete and answer a conceptual void in the history of the crime. To the lay juror, most likely unfamiliar with the manufacturing of prison intoxicants and the currency of the prison black market, it would seem less than reasonable and likely that the mere confiscation of a small quantity of sugar and a few postage stamps would serve to provoke a violent assault and reaction of the magnitude testified to at trial. Indeed, a pall of incredibility might be cast upon the government’s case if it claimed that two prisoners severely assaulted and beat a prison guard merely for confiscating such ordinary household items (sugar and stamps). It is only when the juror is informed of the panorama of events and past history of the entire picture of the production and sale of liquor in a prison setting that the violent attack after the confiscation of the sugar and stamps makes sense. In other words, the testimony of Degenhardt regarding Bogan’s and Calhoun’s wine- making activity completed the story of the crime charged and was necessary to enable the jury to fully understand and make sense of their vicious attack upon Officer Degenhardt. Gibson, 170 F.3d at 682. Calhoun further argues that their wine- making scheme was so different from the act of the charged crime that it should have been excluded. But we have never held that the uncharged criminal activity under the intricately related doctrine must be identical to the charged activity. Indeed, in a similar case, we held that evidence of a previous sexual exploitation conviction was intricately related to the prosecution of an arson case because it was essential to tell a complete story and explain the defendant’s motive. See United States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1233 (7th Cir. 1994) (defendant burned down dwelling where his wife slept to prevent her from reporting his ongoing sexual abuse of his children). As in Menzer, the evidence of Bogan’s and Calhoun’s wine-making activities (and prior confiscation of wine-making paraphernalia and proceeds) are exceedingly probative as to [their] motive to violently assault Officer Degenhardt, who had on two separate occasions thwarted their underground entrepreneurial scheme. Id. at 1234. Calhoun also offers a weak and unconvincing argument in his attempt to demonstrate that the district judge abused her discretion in admitting the evidence of the defendants’s wine-making. In his argument, Calhoun reaching for straws suggests that the government could have shown their motive to beat Officer Degenhardt simply by informing the jury that he had confiscated contraband from their cells, leaving out the details of what he confiscated and for what purpose the inmates used it. In short, he contends that while the evidence of their wine making might be relevant, it was too prejudicial. But, as we noted earlier, ’relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial . . . . Rule 403 was never intended to exclude relevant evidence simply because it is detrimental to one party’s case; rather, the relevant inquiry is whether any unfair prejudice from the evidence substantially outweighs its probative value.’ Lloyd, 71 F.3d at 1265 (quoting Cook v. Hoppin, 783 F.2d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 1986)) (emphasis in original). ’Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only if it will induce the jury to decide the case on an improper basis, commonly an emotional one, rather than on the evidence presented.’ Denberg, 212 F.3d at 994 (quoting United States v. Long, 86 F.3d 81, 86 (7th Cir. 1996)). In this instance, the evidence of Bogan’s and Calhoun’s wine-making gave the jury a more, not less, accurate picture of the circumstances surrounding the charged crime, and the trial judge did not abuse her discretion to admit it. Ramirez, 45 F.3d at 1103.