Opinion ID: 4537714
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Forfeiture Order

Text: ¶ 15. The trial court held a forfeiture hearing pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 354. In the forfeiture hearing, the State presented testimony from an employee at the Humane Society, various photographs of defendants’ home and the animals, the testimony of Trooper June, and the affidavit of probable cause she wrote in support of the warrant. Defendants did not object to admission of the affidavit, but objected to admission of the hearsay statements from landlord and contractor that were included in the affidavit. The State argued that because affidavits of police officers are admissible in forfeiture proceedings under 13 V.S.A. § 354(f)(2), hearsay within the affidavits is likewise admissible. The court stated that “your hearsay objection would normally apply, and those portions would not be admitted,” but that “I’m not clear whether the intent of the statute is to get rid of that.” The court reserved ruling at the time. ¶ 16. In its subsequent written ruling, the court concluded that under § 354(f)(2) the hearsay statements within the affidavit were admissible. It noted: While it is true that normally one exception to the hearsay rule, such as the business records exception, does not mean that hearsay of other types within the document is admissible, this statute is not phrased in terms of a narrow exception to the hearsay rule. Instead, it broadly states that affidavits “shall be admissible.” The court understood the statute to mean “that everything in the affidavit is admissible, including the hearsay report that animals were caged for up to nine hours.” ¶ 17. Based on the affidavit and other evidence, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that “the dogs were restrained for many hours at a time in cages that were too small for the number of dogs,” that they were “denied drinking water for long periods of time,” and that they were denied adequate medical attention. It found that “the birds were denied adequate water and sanitation,” and “the ferrets and the bearded dragon were denied clean drinking water.” It therefore granted the motion for forfeiture as to these animals.3 3 Before the hearing, the State dropped its forfeiture claim as to one dog who belonged to the defendants’ daughter, and defendants stipulated to the forfeiture of seven animals, including 7 ¶ 18. On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay statements contained in Trooper June’s affidavit. The State does not defend the trial court’s legal interpretation of § 354(f)(2), but argues that even if the hearsay was improperly admitted, the error was harmless. We conclude that the hearsay was improperly admitted and cannot conclude that the error was harmless. We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to make further findings.
¶ 19. We review the trial court’s interpretation of 13 V.S.A. § 354(f)(2) without deference. See Lambert ex rel. Estate of Lambert v. Beede, 2003 VT 75, ¶ 9, 175 Vt. 610, 830 A.2d 133 (mem.) (“The issue on appeal here—the interpretation of [a statute]—is not subject to a deferential standard of review because it is a question of law.”). Applying this standard, we conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law in admitting the hearsay evidence. Hearsay is generally not admissible except as provided by law. Section 354 creates an exception to the hearsay requirement for the affidavit itself, but it does not by its plain language create an exception for otherwise-inadmissible statements contained within the affidavit. The broader structure of the statute reinforces that it only exempts the affidavits themselves from the requirements of the hearsay rule. The statute provides a relaxation as to the form in which the testimony is received, not its content. The hearsay statements by landlord and contractor should have been excluded. ¶ 20. Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the Vermont Rules of Evidence, by other rules prescribed by this Court, or by statute. V.R.E. 802. Hearsay within hearsay is permitted “if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule.” V.R.E. 805; see also State v. Godfrey, 2010 VT 29, ¶ 38, 187 Vt. 495, 996 A.2d 237 (noting “evidentiary problems” with string of hearsay statements where “defendant does not argue that each level of hearsay falls under an exception”). the four puppies, two guinea pigs, and a hamster. After the hearing, the court found that the State had not met its burden with regard to the cat and denied forfeiture of the cat. 8 ¶ 21. Nothing in § 354 creates an exception to the hearsay rule for all layers of hearsay within an affidavit. Section 354 provides that in the context of animal forfeiture proceedings, affidavits of law enforcement officers are admissible evidence. In relevant part, the statute states that “[a]ffidavits of law enforcement officers, humane officers, animal control officers, veterinarians, or expert witnesses of either party shall be admissible evidence that may be rebutted by witnesses called by either party.” 13 V.S.A. § 354(f)(2). Under § 354(f)(2), the affidavit of a police officer may be admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted, even though it is an outof-court statement by the police officer. Section 354(f)(2) creates a limited exception to the hearsay rule for affidavits of law enforcement officers, but there is no indication in the statute that the Legislature intended to create a blanket exception for not just the affidavit itself but also any hearsay statements contained within it. ¶ 22. The structure of the statute further reinforces this conclusion. The statute requires the party offering an affidavit pursuant to the statute to provide at least five days’ notice and make the affiant available at the hearing by telephone if requested. 13 V.S.A. § 354(f)(2). These safeguards—advance notice and making the affiant available—do not apply to hearsay statements within the affidavit. Under the State’s reading, the State would be required to make the officer who authored an affidavit available for cross-examination, but would not be required to take any steps to make available the declarant of incriminating statements contained in the affidavit. Given the absence of any safeguards relating to the hearsay statements within an affidavit admissible under the statute, we are especially reluctant to infer, in the absence of any language supporting this inference, that the Legislature intended for 13 V.S.A. § 354(f)(2) to create a blanket exception to the hearsay rule for all statements contained in the affidavit. For these reasons, the hearsay statements in the affidavit were improperly admitted.
¶ 23. We conclude that on this record, the error was not harmless. We determine that the standard for harmless-error review in this context is a clear-and-convincing standard. Under that 9 standard, we conclude that this error was not harmless because the trial court assigned significance to the duration of the animals’ conditions in concluding that forfeiture was warranted, and apparently relied on the hearsay reports in the affidavit in assessing the duration of their conditions. However, we conclude that the evidence, excluding the hearsay statements, would be legally sufficient to support an order of forfeiture if the trial court so finds. We therefore remand to the superior court for further findings or reversal. ¶ 24. Because the standard of proof in a forfeiture proceeding is clear and convincing evidence, 13 V.S.A. § 354(f)(1), we will apply the same standard in our harmless-error analysis. We have not previously determined what standard applies to clams of harmless error in forfeiture proceedings. In general, we have applied a harmless-error standard consistent with the standard of review in the underlying proceeding. For instance, in criminal proceedings, the harmless-error standard is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Haskins, 2016 VT 79, ¶ 17, 202 Vt. 461, 150 A.3d 202. The same harmless-error standard applies under the Indian Child Welfare Act, which employs a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in proceedings to terminate an Indian parent’s rights. In re G.F., 2007 VT 11, ¶ 16, 181 Vt. 593, 923 A.2d 578 (mem.). But see In re R.W., 2011 VT 124, ¶ 17, 191 Vt. 108, 39 A.3d 682 (holding that in termination-of-parental-rights proceeding “an error warrants reversal only if a substantial right of the party is affected” (quotation omitted)). Thus, in order to uphold the trial court’s decision, we must be satisfied to a clear and convincing standard that the court would have reached the same conclusion had it properly refused to admit the hearsay. ¶ 25. The trial court relied on the duration of the dogs’ conditions in ordering forfeiture. In a forfeiture proceeding, the State has the burden of “establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the animal was subjected to cruelty, neglect, or abandonment in violation of section 352 or 352a of this title.” 13 V.S.A. § 354(f)(1). In this case, the trial court concluded that the State had met its burden under subsections (3) and (4) of § 352, which are as follows: A person commits the crime of cruelty to animals if the person: 10 .... (3) Ties, tethers, or restrains an animal, either a pet or livestock, in a manner that is inhumane or is detrimental to its welfare. . . . (4) Deprives an animal that a person owns, possesses, or acts as an agent for of adequate food, water, shelter, rest, sanitation, or necessary medical attention or transports an animal in overcrowded vehicles. In its conclusions of law, the trial court emphasized the length of time the animals were kept in the conditions Trooper June observed. It found that “the dogs were restrained for many hours at a time in cages that were too small for the number of dogs,” and that those conditions were inhumane and detrimental to the dogs’ welfare. (Emphasis added.) It also found that “the dogs (including a nursing mother) were denied drinking water for long periods of time.” (Emphasis added.) ¶ 26. In supporting these conclusions, the trial court relied on the hearsay statements at issue. In admitting all of the hearsay statements, the court specifically noted that this was “including the hearsay report that the animals were caged for up to nine hours.” The State admits that the length of time the animals were crated was not supported by Trooper June’s eyewitness testimony. Although Thomas Ferguson also testified that the dogs were “in the crate a little more than usual” during construction, including several hours on the day the animals were seized, the trial court did not cite or credit this testimony in its decision. The court cited only the hearsay statements to support its findings regarding the length of time the animals were crated. Given the court’s repeated references to the length of time the dogs were restrained and denied drinking water, we cannot conclude to a clear and convincing standard that the court would have reached the same conclusion without reliance on the hearsay testimony.4 4 The State seems to minimize the significance of this testimony by arguing that “[t]he statute contains no minimum period of time during which an animal must be restrained in a manner that is inhumane or detrimental to its welfare, nor a minimum period of time during which it may be deprived of adequate food, water, sanitation, or necessary medical attention.” However, as a matter of common sense, the length of time an animal is restrained may be relevant to whether the restraint is “inhumane,” and the length of time an animal goes without food, water, or sanitation is relevant to whether the animal’s needs are “adequate[ly]” met. 13 V.S.A. § 352(3)-(4). Based on 11 ¶ 27. However, we do not reverse outright because the admissible evidence presented could support a forfeiture order if the trial court so found. The hearsay evidence was not the only evidence available to the court. We therefore remand to the trial court to weigh the evidence without the hearsay statements and decide whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the animals were subject to abuse, neglect, or abandonment.5 See In re R.W., 2011 VT 124, ¶ 18, 191 Vt. 108, 39 A.3d 682 (remanding where we could not conclude trial court would have reached same conclusion under correct standard and declining to weigh evidence in first instance). Affirmed as to the criminal proceedings; remanded as to the forfeiture proceedings. FOR THE COURT: