Opinion ID: 767661
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Miller's post-December 11, 1995 claim and the direct method of proof.

Text: 25 With respect to Miller's discrimination claims that survive the statute of limitations (those occurring on and after December 12, 1995), [w]e must determine whether [Miller] presented a question of fact as to whether [American Family]treated her less favorably because of her pregnanc[ies]. Marshall v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 157 F.3d 520, 525 (7th Cir. 1998). There are two ways in which Miller could do so. Id.; see also Kennedy, 140 F.3d at 722. She could proceed under the 'mixed motives' or direct method . . . by producing sufficient evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to create a triable issue as to whether pregnancy was a motivating factor in her discharge. Id. Alternatively, Miller could avoid summary judgment by using the indirect, burden-shifting approach. See id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). 26 In the district court, Miller employed both methods. Before us, she argues only the direct method. She relies on King's alleged statement of April 16, 1996 (You just have to stop having kids, and I'll get you up to mid-range in a couple of years.) as direct evidence that American Family violated the PDA from December 12, 1995 until her termination. 5 27 When a plaintiff proceeds under the direct proof method, allegedly discriminatory statements are relevant, as the district court correctly recognized, only if they are both made by a decisionmaker and related to the employment decision at issue. Stopka v. Alliance of American Insurers, 141 F.3d 681, 688 (7th Cir. 1998). As we said in Chambers, 17 F.3d at 1004, there has to a be a link between the alleged prejudice of the manager and the adverse action at issue: 28 Liability under Title VII does not turn on the bigotry of company managers unless that bigotry resulted in injury to the plaintiff. . . . There therefore needs to be a link between an [American Family] manager's alleged prejudice, and the decisions that [Miller] is challenging. 29 In this case, the district court put this principle succinctly when it noted, even if King were a bigot, [Miller] cannot make a claim unless his bigotry harmed her. 30 American Family made its decisions on Miller's 1994 and 1995 salaries before King arrived. Thus, even if these salaries were unlawfully low, King could not have been responsible for them. As a result, his April 1996 statement has no probative value for the legality of those earlier salaries. See Kennedy, 140 F.3d at 724 ([E]ven if Goldberg's comment could be viewed as discriminatory, it does not serve as evidence plaintiff was terminated for discriminatory reasons because Goldberg, even though plaintiff's supervisor, was not a decision maker as to the decision at issue.); see also Gleason, 118 F.3d at 1140. 6 31 That leaves only two compensation decisions for which King was responsible: Miller's April 16, 1996 raise (when he made the not having kids remark) and his July 1996 refusal to give her an even bigger raise. As to the first, Miller's counsel acknowledged at oral argument that Miller did not advise her supervisors that she was pregnant with her latest child until mid-May, one month after King told her about her raise. Her claim of pregnancy discrimination with respect to her April 1996 raise cannot be based on her being pregnant if King did not know she was. It must, instead, be predicated on a more general displeasure with women who have missed work because of past pregnancies. Given that American Family is 64% female and its employees frequently take maternity leaves (indeed, Miller took four, totaling 30 weeks), we are skeptical the evidence would support the existence of such a claim. 32 But even if it would have, Miller's April 1996 raise was the biggest in her unit. King cannot be guilty of pregnancy discrimination--of treating Miller less favorably than her heretofore-non- pregnant co-workers--by giving her a raise that was bigger than the raises he gave all her non- pregnant colleagues. As the district court put it, even if [King's] statement is evidence of discriminatory motive, the job action to which the comment was tied was not adverse; concurrently with the comment, [Miller] received the largest [raise] of any employee in the department. This is fatal to Miller's claim, for without a materially adverse job action, discrimination is not actionable. See Rabinovitz, 89 F.3d at 488; see also Chambers, 17 F.3d at 1004 (Liability under Title VII does not turn on the bigotry of company managers unless that bigotry resulted in injury to the plaintiff.). 33 What remains, then, is Miller's argument that King discriminated against her by not agreeing to her July 1996 demand for even more money. The district court also rejected this argument, observing that not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action. Smart v. Ball State University, 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996). It noted that in Rabinovitz, we held that the loss of a bonus is not an adverse employment action in a case . . . where the employee is not automatically entitled to the bonus, 89 F.3d at 488-89, and that here, Miller has not argued that she was automatically entitled to an even larger raise. It reasoned that this case was in line with Rabinovitz: If, absent entitlement, failure to receive any bonus or [raise] is not a material adverse job action, it follows that King's discretionary decision to award plaintiff the largest [raise] in her department[, but not to give her the even larger raise she demanded,] cannot be a material adverse job action. . . . whatever [King's] personal beliefs. We find the district court's reasoning entirely sound. 34 Miller similarly complains that King's failure to make a good faith effort to obtain more funds from which to give her an even bigger raise (allegedly because of his anti-pregnancy bias) is an adverse action. After meeting with Miller on June 27, 1996, King spoke with the Human Resources Division about obtaining more funds for Miller but did not press his inquiry. We do not find it remarkable, however, that King did not vigorously try to obtain more money for Miller after their meeting. She had just finished calling him--her supervisor--incompetent and a political hack, and she did so in the presence of his supervisor (whom she also called incompetent) before threatening to quit if she did not get her way. Given Miller's unusual strategy, it is surprising that King made any effort to garner more funds. 35 Nevertheless he did, and we do not fault American Family for King's efforts, even if he did not go to the mat for Miller. King had a limited pool of money from which to award raises. From this limited pool, he gave Miller the largest raise in her unit. Then, after she threatened to quit and personally insulted him, he still made an effort (albeit a relatively minor one) to obtain even more money for her. 7 Under company procedures, King would then have had to have gone to his Vice-President to obtain more money for Miller, no doubt requiring an extraordinary request for a subordinate who had just insulted him in front of his boss. Under these circumstances, not taking that extra step was not an adverse action. See Rabinovitz, 89 F.3d at 488-489, supra. 8