Opinion ID: 2143062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Sheahan's Appeal

Text: Sheahan argues that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in his favor because he had no duty to protect Josh from a criminal attack. Sheahan contends that no special relationship existed between Sheahan and Josh that would give rise to a common law duty to warn or protect Josh from harm. Moreover, Sheahan did not voluntarily undertake to protect Josh from third-party criminal attacks, which would fit within the exception to the special relationship rule. Sheahan also argues that the appellate court's decision extends respondeat superior liability to unreasonable and impermissible bounds. Sheahan maintains that David was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time that he stored the Beretta. Finally, Sheahan argues that summary judgment in his favor also is warranted because the manner in which David's Beretta was stored was not the proximate cause of Josh's shooting. Rather, the manner in which the Beretta was stored merely furnished a condition that made the shooting possible. In response, plaintiffs deny that their claim involves special relationships or preventing criminal attacks. In fact, plaintiffs argue that there was no criminal attack in this case, because Billy did not intend to shoot or harm anyone, and was not convicted of a criminal offense, but was only adjudicated delinquent. Plaintiffs also deny that they alleged a voluntary undertaking. Rather, plaintiffs' allegations of duty are premised on common law and statutory grounds. Plaintiffs claim that Sheahan owed a duty under common law and statute to secure the handgun. Further, plaintiffs contend that the shooting in this case was foreseeable. With regard to respondeat superior, plaintiffs argue that the issue is not properly before this court because it was not an issue in the appellate court. Although the appellate court addressed scope of employment, plaintiffs assert that because scope of employment was not at issue, that portion of the opinion was dicta. Assuming, arguendo, the issue is properly before this court, plaintiffs contend that David was acting within the scope of his employment. Plaintiffs note that Sheahan required David to keep his weapon secured at home, which demonstrates that Sheahan controlled David's use of the Beretta during off-duty hours. Further, Sheahan could regulate David's storage of the weapon only if David was acting within the scope of his employment. In addition, the fact that Sheahan filed charges against David before the Cook County sheriff's merit board, alleging a violation of the sheriff's rules concerning weapon storage, establishes that David was acting within the scope of his employment. Plaintiffs maintain that Sheahan would have no authority to discipline David if David was not acting in the scope of his employment. We first address plaintiffs' claim that the issue of respondeat superior is not properly before this court. It is well settled that when the appellate court reverses the trial court, and the appellee in the appellate court brings the case to this court for further review, that party may raise any questions properly presented by the record to sustain the judgment of the trial court, even if those questions were not raised or argued in the appellate court. In re R.L.S., 218 Ill.2d 428, 437, 300 Ill. Dec. 350, 844 N.E.2d 22 (2006). In Sheahan's motion for summary judgment in the trial court, in addition to raising arguments concerning duty, proximate cause and tort immunity, Sheahan argued that he was entitled to summary judgment because the shooting did not occur within the course and scope of David's employment. As noted, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sheahan based on its finding that Sheahan owed no duty to Josh. Plaintiffs then appealed that finding. In addressing the trial court's finding that Sheahan owed no duty to Josh, the appellate court addressed the issue of respondeat superior. Sheahan then raised the issue of respondeat superior in his petition for leave to appeal and brief in this court. Accordingly, it is clear that the issue of respondeat superior is properly before this court. We next address the merits of the appellate court's finding that David was acting within the scope of his employment when he stored his weapon, as a finding that David was not acting within the scope of his employment would be dispositive. In general, a person injured by the negligence of another must seek his remedy from the person who caused his injury. Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp., 224 Ill.2d 154, 163, 308 Ill.Dec. 782, 862 N.E.2d 985 (2007). However, the relationship of employer and employee sets forth an exception to the general rule. Bagent, 224 Ill.2d at 163, 308 Ill.Dec. 782, 862 N.E.2d 985. Pursuant to the theory of respondeat superior, an employer can be liable for the torts of his employee when those torts are committed within the scope of the employment. Bagent, 224 Ill.2d at 163, 308 Ill.Dec. 782, 862 N.E.2d 985. Under respondeat superior, an employer's vicarious liability extends to the negligent, willful, malicious or even criminal acts of its employees, when those acts are committed within the scope of employment. Bagent, 224 Ill.2d at 163-64, 308 Ill.Dec. 782, 862 N.E.2d 985. Illinois courts look to the Second Restatement of Agency (the Restatement) for guidance in determining whether an employee's acts are within the scope of employment. Bagent, 224 Ill.2d at 164, 308 Ill.Dec. 782, 862 N.E.2d 985. The Restatement identifies three general criteria used in determining whether an employee's acts are within the scope of employment. The Restatement provides: (1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master  [.]    (2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958). This court has held that all three criteria of section 228 must be met in order to conclude that an employee was acting within the scope of employment. Bagent, 224 Ill.2d at 165, 308 Ill.Dec. 782, 862 N.E.2d 985. It is plaintiff's burden to show the contemporaneous relationship between the tortious act and the scope of employment. Bagent, 224 Ill.2d at 165, 308 Ill.Dec. 782, 862 N.E.2d 985. With regard to the scope of employment issue, the appellate court held that this case was controlled by its decision in Gaffney v. City of Chicago, 302 Ill.App.3d 41, 236 Ill.Dec. 40, 706 N.E.2d 914 (1998), and, therefore, that David was acting within the scope of his employment. 378 Ill.App.3d at 517, 316 Ill.Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559. In Gaffney, a patrolman employed by the Chicago police department came home from work, unloaded his revolver, and placed the revolver and the bullets in an unlocked metal cabinet near the stairway leading to his basement. Gaffney, 302 Ill. App.3d at 44, 236 Ill.Dec. 40, 706 N.E.2d 914. The officer's minor son later took the revolver and bullets to a party, and shot and killed a boy. Gaffney, 302 Ill.App.3d at 44, 236 Ill.Dec. 40, 706 N.E.2d 914. The plaintiff sued the officer for negligent storage of his weapon, and sued the City of Chicago under a respondeat superior theory. Gaffney, 302 Ill.App.3d at 43, 236 Ill.Dec. 40, 706 N.E.2d 914. A jury found both defendants liable, and in answer to a special interrogatory, found that the officer was acting within the scope of his employment when he stored the weapon. Gaffney, 302 Ill.App.3d at 43, 236 Ill.Dec. 40, 706 N.E.2d 914. The circuit court granted the City's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that the officer was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time he stored the gun at his home. Gaffney, 302 Ill.App.3d at 43-44, 236 Ill.Dec. 40, 706 N.E.2d 914. On appeal, the appellate court reversed. The appellate court noted that the officer had testified that he was required to own a gun; that he would not be allowed to report for work if he did not have a gun; and that he brought his guns and bullets home every day because the police department did not provide him with a locker in which to store his weapon at work. Gaffney, 302 Ill.App.3d at 46, 236 Ill.Dec. 40, 706 N.E.2d 914. The officer also testified that he did not lock the cabinet or the gun because his life had been threatened several times and `because I'm a Chicago police officer. If I heard someone screaming, would I have time to get that gun, I don't know. Would I attempt to, hopefully.' Gaffney, 302 Ill.App.3d at 46, 236 Ill.Dec. 40, 706 N.E.2d 914. In addition, the officer stated that as a Chicago police officer, he was required to respond to emergencies at all times, even if not on duty, and that he sometimes might need a gun to respond effectively to an emergency if he had it readily available. Gaffney, 302 Ill.App.3d at 46, 236 Ill.Dec. 40, 706 N.E.2d 914. With regard to the three criteria set forth in the Restatement, the appellate court held that the officer's storage of the gun at home was incidental to the requirement of his employment that he respond to any emergency that occurs in his presence. Gaffney, 302 Ill.App.3d at 51, 236 Ill.Dec. 40, 706 N.E.2d 914. The appellate court acknowledged that normally at-home storage of one's personal effects would likely be considered an act of a personal nature, but in this case the police department both trained its officers in off-duty weapon storage and could discipline officers for improper safeguarding of weapons while off duty. Gaffney, 302 Ill.App.3d at 52, 236 Ill.Dec. 40, 706 N.E.2d 914. The appellate court next held that the officer's conduct occurred substantially within the authorized time and space limits of the employment, although the appellate court also concluded that the fact that conduct occurred outside the time and space limits is not dispositive. Gaffney, 302 Ill.App.3d at 52, 236 Ill.Dec. 40, 706 N.E.2d 914. The appellate court recognized that the officer was off duty when he stored his weapon, but noted that with respect to emergencies, the officer was on call 24 hours a day. Gaffney, 302 Ill. App.3d at 53, 236 Ill.Dec. 40, 706 N.E.2d 914. Therefore, it was not unreasonable to conclude that the time and space of the officer's employment were unlimited with respect to actions incidental to his response to an emergency. Gaffney, 302 Ill.App.3d at 53, 236 Ill.Dec. 40, 706 N.E.2d 914. Finally, the appellate court held that the officer's conduct was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to serve his employer. The appellate court based its finding on the fact that one of the reasons the officer kept the gun and cabinet unlocked was because he might need it in the event of an emergency. Gaffney, 302 Ill.App.3d at 54, 236 Ill.Dec. 40, 706 N.E.2d 914. Further, the fact that the officer stored the gun in contravention of the police department's recommendations did not establish that the storage was outside the scope of employment. Gaffney, 302 Ill.App.3d at 55, 236 Ill.Dec. 40, 706 N.E.2d 914. The appellate court therefore held that the officer was acting within the scope of his employment when he stored his gun. Relying on Gaffney, the appellate court in this case held that David's storage of the gun was incidental to his employment. 378 Ill.App.3d at 517, 316 Ill.Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559. The appellate court noted that officers stored their weapons at home and received specific training and materials on proper storage. 378 Ill.App.3d at 517, 316 Ill.Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559. In addition, Sheahan disciplined officers for improper storage. 378 Ill.App.3d at 517, 316 Ill.Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559. The appellate court acknowledged that David did not carry his weapon to work daily, nor did he store it unlocked in order to respond to any emergency in his presence. 378 Ill.App.3d at 517, 316 Ill.Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559. Nonetheless David testified he owned the firearm because of his job and was annually certified to use the firearm, as required by Sheahan. 378 Ill. App.3d at 517, 316 Ill.Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559. The appellate court also held that David was acting within the authorized time and space limits of his employment. 378 Ill. App.3d at 517, 316 Ill.Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559. The appellate court noted that officers were expected to store their weapons at home and, although David testified that he did not carry his gun to work, he did testify that, at one time, he owned the gun for work purposes. 378 Ill.App.3d at 517-18, 316 Ill.Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559. In addition, David would be required to use the gun in an emergency, was certified annually to use the firearm, and was disciplined by Sheahan for improper storage. 378 Ill.App.3d at 517-18, 316 Ill.Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559. The appellate court did not discuss whether David's conduct was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to serve his employer. The appellate court concluded that David was acting within the scope of his employment and that Sheahan was liable for David's alleged tortious acts. 378 Ill.App.3d at 518, 316 Ill.Dec. 823, 880 N.E.2d 559. At the outset we note that the appellate court erred in not addressing whether David's conduct was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to serve his employer. As noted, this court in Bagent held that all three criteria must be met to conclude that an employee was acting within the scope of employment. Bagent, 224 Ill.2d at 165, 308 Ill.Dec. 782, 862 N.E.2d 985. For the same reason, we find that the appellate court in Gaffney erred in holding that the second criteriawhether the conduct occurred substantially within the authorized time and space limits of the employment was relevant but not dispositive. See Gaffney, 302 Ill.App.3d at 52, 236 Ill.Dec. 40, 706 N.E.2d 914 (the fact that conduct occurred outside the time and space limits is not dispositive). We again emphasize that all three criteria of section 228 must be met in order to find that an employee was acting within the scope of employment. Turning to the substance of the appellate court's ruling, we find that the appellate court erred in finding that David was acting within the scope of his employment and that Sheahan is liable for David's tortious acts. Contrary to the appellate court's conclusion, this case is factually distinguishable from Gaffney. In contrast to Gaffney, David testified that he was not required to own a gun and did not need to carry a gun to work once he was promoted to lieutenant in 1997 or 1998. David testified that he did not get rid of his guns, even though he did not carry a weapon in performing his duties, because he wanted the guns for protection and in case he was transferred to a different position where he would need a weapon. In fact, the last time David had seen or touched the Beretta prior to the May 5, 2001, shooting was in the summer of 2000, when David did his yearly qualification with the sheriff's department at the firing range. David also testified that when he was off duty, he was not required to respond to a crime by attempting to stop the crime himself. Rather, his duty was to call 911 and report the crime to the proper authorities. Gerald O'Sullivan, Michael Ryan and Leroy Marcianik confirmed that correctional officers are not required to carry a weapon when they are off duty, and in fact do not need a weapon to perform their duties. Correctional officers also are not required to respond to emergencies when they are off duty, and are not required to keep their weapons available at all times. Based on the preceding testimony, we find as a matter of law that none of the three general criteria for determining whether an employee's acts are within the scope of employment have been met in this case. With regard to the first criteria, David's negligent storage of his guns was not the kind of conduct David was employed to perform, nor was it incidental to his employment. The appellate court found David's negligent storage of the gun was incidental to his employment because there was testimony that officers stored their guns at home, Sheahan trained officers on proper storage, and Sheahan disciplined officers for improper storage. While these facts might support a finding that David was acting within the scope of his employment if David was required to carry a gun at work like the officer in Gaffney, the fact remains that at the time Billy shot Josh, David was not required to, and did not, carry a gun as part of his employment. The appellate court also found significant David's testimony that he owned the weapon because of his job and that he was annually certified to use the firearm pursuant to Sheahan's requirements. David testified, however, that Cook County sheriff's officers were required to annually qualify with firearms even if they do not own a weapon. Moreover, while it is true that David purchased the Beretta in connection with his job, the Beretta was purchased at a time when David carried a gun back and forth to work every day. David stopped carrying a gun to work when he became a lieutenant in 1997 or 1998. At that point, David was not required to keep the Beretta for purposes of his employment, but chose to do so. Contrary to the appellate court's finding, none of these facts establish that David's negligent storage of his weapon was in the performance of his employment or incidental to his employment. For the same reasons, David's negligent storage of the gun was not within the authorized time and space limits of his employment. Unlike the police officer in Gaffney, David was not on call 24 hours a day, was not required to respond to emergencies at all times, and was not required to respond to a crime by attempting to stop the crime himself. In contrast to Gaffney, David's employment was not unlimited with respect to actions incidental to his response to an emergency. Consequently, even under the most liberal interpretation of the time and space requirement, it is clear that David's negligent storage of the gun in this case was not within the scope of his employment. Similarly, there is no evidence that David was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to serve his employer when he negligently stored his gun. As noted, the appellate court in this case did not address this factor in its respondeat superior analysis. Gaffney held that the officer's conduct in negligently storing his weapon was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to serve his employer, because one of the reasons the officer kept the gun and cabinet unlocked was because he might need it in the event of an emergency. Gaffney, 302 Ill.App.3d at 54, 236 Ill.Dec. 40, 706 N.E.2d 914. Gaffney acknowledged that the officer also testified that he kept the gun and cabinet unlocked in order to protect his family, but noted that the third criteria in the respondeat superior analysis is satisfied as long as the employee is motivated in part by a desire to serve the employee, even if he is also motivated by personal considerations. Here, in contrast, there was no evidence that David's negligent storage of the gun was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to serve Sheahan. As discussed, David did not keep the Beretta unlocked in order to respond to an emergency. David kept the Beretta, and thus stored the Beretta, for his own protection and in case he needed it in the future. Although summary judgment is generally inappropriate when scope of employment is at issue, if no reasonable person could conclude from the evidence that an employee is acting within the course of employment, a court should hold as a matter of law that the employee was not so acting. Bagent, 224 Ill.2d at 170-71, 308 Ill.Dec. 782, 862 N.E.2d 985. Here, no reasonable person could conclude from the evidence that David was acting within the scope of his employment when he negligently stored his weapon. Consequently, Sheahan was entitled to summary judgment in his favor on the issue of respondeat superior. The appellate court erred in finding that David was acting within the scope of employment and that Sheahan was thereby liable for David's allegedly tortious acts. Because we find that Sheahan was entitled to summary judgment based upon respondeat superior, there is no need to address Sheahan's remaining arguments concerning duty and proximate cause, nor do we need to remand to the trial court for consideration of Sheahan's immunity claims.