Opinion ID: 2328929
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The legal right to foreclose

Text: Young argues next that, since it had a legal right to foreclose on the property which served as collateral for the loan, its efforts to do so could not, as a matter of law, constitute retaliation prohibited under the DCHRA. We reject this argument as well. D.C.Code § 1-2525(a), part of the DCHRA, makes it unlawful to coerce, threaten, retaliate against, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of ... any right granted or protected under [the DCHRA]. See Schoen v. Consumers United Group, Inc., 670 F.Supp. 367, 373-377 (D.D.C.1986). The statute contains no safe harbor for otherwise lawful acts done for an improper retaliatory purpose. See Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 515 A.2d at 1101 (threatening employee that she would never work in the District of Columbia again if she pressed her discrimination claim amounted to unlawful retaliation under section 1-2525(a)). Federal courts interpreting the analogous anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, [28] to which we look for guidance in interpreting our local statute, [29] have held that the employer's filing of a lawsuit in retaliation for an employee's complaints of discrimination violates the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII. E.g., EEOC v. Levi Strauss & Co., 515 F.Supp. 640, 643 (N.D.Ill.1981) (A literal reading of the [anti-retaliation] statute obviously outlaws all retaliatory acts including lawsuits filed in state tribunals (citations omitted)); EEOC v. Virginia Carolina Veneer Corp., 495 F.Supp. 775, 777-778 (W.D.Va.1980), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cassidy v. Virginia Carolina Veneer Corp., 652 F.2d 380 (4th Cir.1981). Under these Title VII decisions, [30] the fact that the employer may have a valid legal claim does not preclude the employee from establishing that the employer's motive in asserting the claim was impermissible retaliation. Levi Strauss, supra, 515 F.Supp. at 644 (even though employer had a legal right to bring the lawsuit, allegation of employer's retaliatory motive is sufficient to defeat employer's motion to dismiss). We agree with these federal cases and apply their rationale here to the DCHRA. We hold, specifically, that the employer's filing of a lawsuit in retaliation for the employee's complaints of discrimination is a violation of D.C.Code § 1-2525. Whether the employer had such a retaliatory motive is a question of fact for the jury (or the judge in a non-jury trial), and, like other types of claims in which motive or intent is in issue, is not well suited to disposition on a motion for summary judgment. See Spellman v. American Security Bank, 504 A.2d 1119, 1122 (D.C.1986); Willis v. Cheek, 387 A.2d 716, 719 (D.C. 1978); Attorney General v. Irish People, Inc., 254 U.S.App.D.C. 229, 233, 796 F.2d 520, 524 (1986). For these reasons we affirm the trial court's denial of Young's motion for partial summary judgment on the retaliation claim.