Opinion ID: 2981051
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: o’neal’s claims

Text: A. Sufficiency of the Evidence O’Neal raises a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to his conviction for conspiracy to distribute, and possess with intent to distribute, five kilograms or more of cocaine hydrochloride and fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 846. We find the evidence sufficient to support a criminal conviction if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). The “defendant claiming insufficiency of the evidence bears a very heavy burden,” United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 393 (6th Cir. 2007), as we will reverse the “judgment -9- Nos. 11-5388/11-5777 United States of America v. Michael Currier/Ralph T. O’Neal, III for insufficiency of the evidence only if [the] judgment is not supported by substantial and competent evidence upon the record as a whole,” United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 522 (6th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To convict for conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, “the government must [prove]: (1) an agreement to violate drug laws, in this case 21 U.S.C. §§ 841; (2) knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) participation in the conspiracy.” United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672, 677 (6th Cir. 2009). O’Neal contends that while the evidence may establish that he sold drugs to confidential informants, the government failed to prove the requisite agreement to conspire. The government need not adduce a formal, verbal agreement because a “tacit or material understanding among the parties will suffice.” United States v. Avery, 128 F.3d 966, 970-71 (6th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) Such an understanding may be gleaned from: Drug conspiracies often assume a vertical pattern of distribution, where each successive distributor sells a lower volume to any particular customer . . . . In a drug distribution “chain” conspiracy, it is enough to show that each member of the conspiracy realized that he was participating in a joint venture, even if he did not know the identities of every other member, or was not involved in all the activities in furtherance of the conspiracy. Evidence of repeat purchases provides evidence of more than a mere buyer-seller relationship, and the quantity of drugs may also support an inference of conspiracy. United States v. Robinson, 547 F.3d 632, 641 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal citations and alterations omitted). Here, the government presented testimony of co-conspirators from which the jury could reasonably find O’Neal guilty of conspiring to distribute, and possess with intent to distribute, five or more kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride and fifty grams or more of cocaine base. Co-conspirator - 10 - Nos. 11-5388/11-5777 United States of America v. Michael Currier/Ralph T. O’Neal, III Cooper testified that during the seven-year conspiracy, O’Neal supplied him with roughly thirty kilograms of cocaine. The government introduced a recorded telephone conversation between O’Neal and Harvey, in which Harvey complained of being short changed during a controlled purchase. O’Neal blamed Cooper for the mistake and said that he was unsure whether he could trust Cooper anymore. Additionally, Drug Enforcement Special Agent James Blanton testified that O’Neal confessed to trafficking between twelve and seventeen kilograms of cocaine, which he obtained from multiple sources in multiple states. Given the co-conspirator testimony, recorded conversations of O’Neal’s, and O’Neal’s own confession, “any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (emphasis omitted). B. Dismissal of O’Neal’s Pro Se Motions O’Neal contends that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing many of his pretrial pro se motions as untimely, without considering their merits. Prior to trial, O’Neal filed a number of untimely motions, raising meritless arguments such as the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction in his criminal proceedings. Although “pleadings submitted pro se will be accorded a measure of leniency to assure that meritorious claims will not be dismissed for inartful draftsmanship,” Wolfel v. United States, 711 F.2d 66, 67 (6th Cir. 1983), the district court’s dismissal of untimely and meritless pretrial motions was within its discretion, as the decision was not “arbitrary, unjustifiable or clearly unreasonable,” Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 794 F.2d at1148. C. District Court’s Failure to Identify Alternate Jurors Following his conviction, O’Neal filed a motion for new trial, alleging a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c). O’Neal contends that the district court erred by failing to “ensure - 11 - Nos. 11-5388/11-5777 United States of America v. Michael Currier/Ralph T. O’Neal, III that a retained alternate [juror] does not discuss the case with anyone until that alternate replaces a juror or is discharged.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c). The district court denied O’Neal’s motion for new trial, finding no evidence of a Rule 24(c) violation. We review a district court’s decision to deny a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Wettstain, 618 F.3d 577, 590 (6th Cir. 2010). The alleged error occurred when the district court charged the jury and instructed them to retire and deliberate on the verdict. Because the court had not previously designated which two of the fourteen jurors were alternates, all fourteen returned to the jury room to begin deliberations. After approximately ten minutes, the court recognized its error, removed the two alternate jurors and instructed them on their role as alternates. Once the alternate jurors were removed, the district court delivered the verdict form and trial exhibits to the jury in the deliberation room. The twelve jurors then returned to deliberate and subsequently reached a guilty verdict on all eleven counts. The district court acknowledged its error, but concluded that the error did not warrant a new trial. Under these circumstances, the district court did not act arbitrarily in concluding that the alternate jurors’ presence for the first ten minutes of deliberations, before the twelve non-alternate jurors received the verdict form or trial exhibits, was not grounds to grant a new trial. See United States v. DeBoer, 966 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding an alternate juror’s presence in the deliberation room for approximately three minutes as the jury “select[ed] a foreman and commence[d] its deliberations” to be harmless). - 12 - Nos. 11-5388/11-5777 United States of America v. Michael Currier/Ralph T. O’Neal, III D. Constitutionality of Section 841(b)(1)(A) under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments O’Neal challenges the constitutionality of § 841(b)(1)(A)’s mandatory life sentence for defendants with two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense, contending that it violates his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment, and his Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy. We have previously considered and rejected all of O’Neal’s arguments. In United States v. Kelsor, we reiterated our rejection of the “contention that the enhancement of a sentence under § 841(b) on the basis of prior felony drug convictions violates double jeopardy.” 665 F.3d 684, 701 (6th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Pruitt, 156 F.3d 638, 645-46 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Flowal, 163 F.3d 956, 963 (6th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, our decision in Kelsor expressly rejected O’Neal’s contention that § 841(b)(1)(A) is cruel and unusual punishment because the “imposition of a life sentence without parole for a third felony drug conviction is not ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” 665 F.3d at 701; see also United States v. Hill, 30 F.3d 48, 50-51 (6th Cir. 1994). Finally, we have found that the lack of discretion afforded to sentencing judges under § 841(b)(1)(A)’s mandatory life sentence requirement does not offend due process. See United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1034 (6th Cir. 1990) (rejecting defendant’s argument that § 841(b)(1)(A) violates due process because it prevents consideration of mitigating evidence and individualized sentencing determinations).