Opinion ID: 1124510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Commission Bias

Text: Pursuant to ARJD 3(6), the respondent judge may challenge any member of the Commission for cause. The Commission must hear the challenge and may disqualify any Commissioner who by reason of actual or implied bias would ... either be prevented from adjudicating the matter in a fair and impartial manner or, by reason of facts creating an appearance of impropriety, be prevented from adjudicating the matter in a manner consistent with maintenance of public confidence in the Commission. Id. A challenge for implied bias must be allowed on a showing of any of the grounds relating to jurors which are enumerated in NRS 16.050. ARJD 3(7). Prior to the formal hearing, appellant filed a motion to disqualify Commission members Frank Brusa, Drennan A. Clark, Billy Gene Fuller, Michael R. Griffin, Alan J. Lefebvre and Sally Loehrer. The Commission denied the motion. On appeal, appellant contends that because the Commissioners who sat at the preliminary hearing determined that perjury charges should be investigated and filed against him based upon his testimony at the preliminary hearing, [11] they could not reasonably be perceived to be unbiased. The Commission disagrees, arguing that in the absence of actual bias, there is nothing improper about combining investigatory, prosecutorial and adjudicatory powers in one body. The Commission cites Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975), wherein the Supreme Court held that the combination of investigatory, prosecutorial and adjudicatory powers in a medical discipline panel did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act or due process of law. The Larkin Court explained: Judges repeatedly issue arrest warrants on the basis that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person named in the warrant has committed it. Judges also preside at preliminary hearings where they must decide whether the evidence is sufficient to hold a defendant for trial. Neither of these pretrial involvements has been thought to raise any constitutional barrier against the judge's presiding over the criminal trial and, if the trial is without a jury, against making the necessary determination of guilt or innocence. Id. at 56, 95 S.Ct. at 1469. However, in his reply brief, appellant's position was clarified as follows: Contrary to the Commission's understanding of the argument, [APPELLANT] does not contend that the Commission was inevitably biased against him simply because it combines investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. Instead, it was the facts and circumstances of this particular case which realized the potential for unfairness identified by this Court in Rudin v. Nevada Real Estate Advisory Commission, 86 Nev. 562, 565, 471 P.2d 658, 660 (1970). The Commission's conclusion that there was probable cause to believe appellant had committed perjury during the probable cause hearing does not necessarily demonstrate actual or implied bias on the part of the Commissioners who made the probable cause determination. Probable cause determinations are by no means a determination of guilt. Proof by clear and convincing evidence that appellant had committed perjury would still be required at the formal adjudicatory level. Thus, the fact that some of the Commissioners previously had found there was probable cause to believe appellant had committed perjury does not require that they be disqualified from participating in the formal hearing.