Opinion ID: 2105313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 27

Heading: This Court's Independent Review

Text: In death penalty cases, section 565.035 calls on this Court to make a review of the whole record, independent of the findings and conclusions of the judge and jury, and to assess, among other matters, the strength of the evidence. Section 565.035.3(3). State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47 (Mo. banc 1998). If there was strong evidence that Wolfe committed these murders, the death penalty would be appropriate under the law and the facts of these crimes. These were brutal, bloody and thoroughly despicable murders of an elderly couple to rob them. A careful review of the record in this case leaves considerable doubt as to whether or not Dannie Wolfe committed these murders. The state's case rests largely on the testimony of Ms. Cox. Her story has numerous flaws, is refuted as to the time of death, and is unsupported by any physical evidence linking Wolfe to these murders. That leaves the jailhouse confession story told by Paul Hileman, whose testimony proves only that he would say anything to get out of prison. The prosecution's late disclosure of Hileman and even later disclosure of his letters, conceded to be violations of our rules, can most charitably be construed as a reluctance to use this witness at all. This Court should be especially reluctant to rely on this testimony to affirm a sentence of death. In Chaney , this Court, in a 4-3 split, affirmed a murder conviction but, upon assessing the strength of the evidence, set aside the death sentence under the proportionality review statute, section 565.035. 967 S.W.2d at 60. If the three dissenting judgesCovington, Robertson and Whitewere correct that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, the defendant may be wrongly imprisoned but at least he will not be wrongly executed. In Chaney , there was physical evidence linking the defendant to the victim at the time the murder occurred, and evidence of concealment by defendant, as well as other circumstantial evidence that the majority found sufficient to support the verdict. But, as the principal opinion notes, there was no eyewitness, unlike this case where the principal opinion affirms a sentence of death on the basis of Jessica Cox's story. If there is a difference between this case-where there is no physical evidence linking Wolfe to these murders, and Chaney , where there is such evidence  it is that there was stronger evidence in Chaney than in this case. In Chaney , this Court followed the statute and reviewed the strength of the evidence to ascertain whether the death penalty should be imposed. The principal opinion now refers to that review as being asked to serve as a thirteenth or super juror. However, in Chaney , the Court acted as a super juror because the statute so requires and the Court found the evidence too weak to justify the death sentence  contrary to the jury's finding. The majority chooses to examine only the evidence and inferences favorable to the verdict in making its review in this case. That standard is appropriate to determine whether the evidence supports the conviction. The jury here believed the testimony of Ms. Cox or Hileman, or both, and that testimony is sufficient to uphold this conviction (putting aside, for now, the evidentiary rulings that would warrant a new trial). A review of all of the evidence, not just the evidence favorable to the verdict, should be constitutionally required as a matter of due process of law. [10] The United States Supreme Court interprets the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to require such a review when punitive damages are assessed against a defendant. See Honda Motor Co. Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 114 S.Ct. 2331, 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994) and BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). Oberg, for example, post-verdict determination that there was evidence to support the jury's verdict was held to be insufficient to satisfy due process and that judicial review of the amount awarded is a required procedural safeguard. 512 U.S. at 432, 114 S.Ct. 2331. Similarly, Gore teaches that the reviewing court must be satisfied that the punitive-damages defendant's conduct was sufficiently reprehensible so that the punishment imposed is not disproportionate, 517 U.S. at 575, 116 S.Ct. 1589. If that is the standard for reviewing punitive damages judgments in civil cases, can we justify a lesser standard where the defendant faces a punishment that requires not a loss of money but his life? The question is particularly pertinent in this case. Where there is no physical evidence linking Wolfe to these killings, we must determine whether the testimony here was sufficiently believable to justify a death sentence. [11] The purpose of the review required by section 565.035.3 is to safeguard against execution of those who may not be guilty. This review is not just for the defendant, it is for ourselves. The honorable reputation of our legal system is tarnished by ordering the execution of those who may not be guilty. By examining only the evidence and inferences favorable to the verdict, the majority is willing to bet the honor of our system on the word of a witness who has trouble with the truth and a jailhouse snitch. I am unwilling to take that gamble. Section 565.035 requires an independent review. A review of the record leaves substantial doubt as to Wolfe's guilt. To vote to affirm the sentence of death on the strength of this record is simply indefensible.