Opinion ID: 2387745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Purpose of the ICWA

Text: ¶ 12 At issue then is whether § 1911(b) should be construed so narrowly and whether this construction complies with Congressional intent and the purpose of the ICWA. In arguing that the specific inclusion in § 1911(b) of only foster care placement and termination of parental rights proceedings indicates an intent to exclude transfers of the other child custody proceedings defined by 25 U.S.C. § 1903, [7] the State promotes the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, i.e., the mention of one thing in a statute implies exclusion of something else. See gen., Spiers v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 1951 OK 276, ¶ 21, 206 Okla. 510, 244 P.2d 852, 856. However, the rule should be applied only as an aid in arriving at intention and should never be followed when doing so would override the intended purpose of the act. Public Service Company of Oklahoma v. State ex rel. Corporation Commission, 1992 OK 153, 842 P.2d 750. COCA agreed with the State that a transfer to tribal court at the preadoptive placement stage was precluded because § 1911(b) does not mention it. We acknowledge § 1911(b) mentions transfers of only foster care placement and termination of parental rights proceedings in the absence of good cause to the contrary.... We must therefore determine whether Congress intended to exclude transfers of pre-adoptive placement and adoptive placement proceedings to tribal court. [8] ¶ 13 We must read § 1911(b) as it is written. The court shall transfer foster care placement and termination of parental rights proceedings absent objections and a showing of good cause to the contrary. Reading what is contained in the statute, however, does not require us to read into the statute what is not there, i.e., that transfers may only be granted if requested before a termination of parental rights proceeding is concluded. ¶ 14 When considering the ICWA as a whole, as we must, we first look to the Congressional declaration of policy stated in 25 U.S.C. § 1902, [9] i.e., the protection of the best interests of Indian children, the stability and security of Indian tribes and families, and the preservation of Indian values and culture to be reflected in the placement of Indian children in foster and adoptive homes. [emphasis added] The Supreme Court considered this statement of policy and purpose in Holyfield upon determining that Congress did not intend to rely on state law for the definition of domicile: [I]t is clear from the very text of the ICWA, not to mention its legislative history and the hearings that led to its enactment, that Congress was concerned with rights of Indian families and Indian communities vis-a-vis state authorities. [footnote omitted] More specifically, its purpose was, in part, to make clear that in certain situations the state courts did not have jurisdiction over child custody proceedings. Indeed, the congressional findings that are a part of the statute demonstrate that Congress perceived the States and their courts as partly responsible for the problem it intended to correct. 490 U.S. at 44-45, 109 S.Ct. at 1606 [emphasis in original]. In a footnote accompanying the above text, the Court stated: This conclusion in inescapable from a reading of the entire statute, the main effect of which is to curtail state authority. See especially §§ 1901, 1911-1916, 1918. [emphasis added]. 490 U.S. at 45, 109 S.Ct. at 1607. With that purpose in mind, we cannot construe § 1911(b), as a matter of law, as an expression of intent to preclude tribal court jurisdiction when transfer is requested after parental rights are terminated. ¶ 15 Recognizing the importance of Indian children to Indian tribes, the Supreme Court also quoted approvingly from a case of the Utah Supreme Court which had become a well-known case on the ICWA, In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (1986): [10] [I]t is precisely in recognition of this relationship [between Indian tribes and Indian children], however, that the ICWA designates the tribal court as the exclusive forum for the determination of custody and adoption matters for reservation-domiciled Indian children, and the preferred forum for nondomiciliary Indian Children. [State] abandonment law cannot be used to frustrate the federal legislative judgment expressed in the ICWA that the interests of the tribe in custodial decisions made with respect to Indian children are as entitled to respect as the interests of the parents. [emphasis added.] Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 52-53, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 1610, quoting In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969-970 (Utah, 1986).