Opinion ID: 1444402
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count Eleven A: Riegle Matter

Text: As we have previously set forth, on August 3, 1993, defendant Eddie Riegle appeared before petitioner without counsel, accompanied only by Gary Whitley, an inactive attorney who was present as a character witness. After refusing to accept the negotiated plea bargain and insisting that Riegle serve time in jail, petitioner granted Riegle's request for time to consider the matter, and Riegle left the courtroom. Kimberly Fletcher, the public defender, was present in court at the time and observed these proceedings. As Riegle and Whitley left the courtroom, they asked Fletcher to accompany them. After determining that Riegle qualified for representation by the public defender, Fletcher returned to the courtroom with Riegle, informed petitioner that Riegle qualified for representation and had asked her to represent him, and asked to be heard on the matter. According to Fletcher, she started to negotiate on Riegle's behalf, and petitioner talked to [her] as though [she] was the attorney of record. At this point, Fletcher believed she was representing Riegle, because petitioner's previous practice in similar circumstances had been to accept her representation without formally stating that he was appointing the public defender. Fletcher repeatedly asked petitioner to go on the record, but petitioner refused. As we have also previously explained, during the court proceedings, petitioner discussed the matter by telephone with the park ranger who had arrested Riegle. Given petitioner's comments about Riegle after the call, Fletcher concluded that petitioner could not be fair and impartial, and she indicated that she would attempt to disqualify him. Although Fletcher had been discussing the case with petitioner for at least 10 minutes at this point, petitioner replied that Fletcher was interfering in a case in which she had not been appointed. Fletcher reminded petitioner that in the outer hall she had qualified Riegle for representation and that petitioner had been dealing with her as Riegle's attorney. Petitioner then suggested that Riegle did not qualify for representation, and he asked for a qualification form. He had not previously made a similar request of Fletcher during her almost four years as public defender, and he had not mentioned a concern about Riegle's eligibility for public representation before Fletcher's remark about disqualification. Fletcher cited these facts as further evidence of petitioner's bias in the case. Petitioner replied: Fine. You're emotionally involved in this case. You're way out of line, and I'm going to remove you and appoint conflict counsel. Petitioner did not, at this point, refer to Riegle's qualification for public representation. When petitioner finally called the case, he indicated that Riegle was requesting a public defender and that he was appointing Linda Thompson instead of Fletcher. Fletcher objected, explaining that no conflict existed and that petitioner had refused to call the case, had asked for a public defender application, and had stated unsupported conclusions about Riegle's eligibility for representation. Petitioner then stated: The record should also reflect that Ms. Fletcher has interceded in this case without being requested or without appointment. [¶] And I think she's become personally and emotionally involved in this case, so I'm disqualifying her to represent this defendant. Fletcher again objected, reiterating that petitioner had no grounds for removing her and stating that the Court's behavior has been inappropriate in this matter. Petitioner then stated: Ms. Fletcher, you're getting close to contempt. And I would suggest that you sit down and be quiet. According to Fletcher, petitioner was angry when this was going on, once [she indicated her intent to disqualify] him. On this record, we agree with the Commission's unanimous finding that petitioner committed prejudicial misconduct in refusing to appoint Kimberly Fletcher while immediately appointing another public defender to represent Riegle. Petitioner raised a question regarding Fletcher's representation of Riegle only after she indicated her intent to disqualify him. His request for a qualification form for Riegle was contrary to his prior practice. He appointed a substitute public defender without inquiring or commenting further about Riegle's eligibility. These facts indicate that petitioner's purported concern about Fletcher's alleged failure to qualify Riegle for representation was merely a pretext for his decision to exclude Fletcher from the case because of her expressed intent to disqualify him. In so retaliating against Fletcher, petitioner committed prejudicial misconduct. [16] (See In re Rasmussen (1987) 43 Cal.3d 536, 538, 236 Cal. Rptr. 152, 734 P.2d 988 [judge committed misconduct in displaying a lack of impartiality to, and petty harassment of attorneys who filed affidavits of prejudice against him, and in discouraging the exercise of peremptory disqualification rights by inappropriate means].)