Opinion ID: 2622530
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: Appellate courts have de novo review of cases decided on the basis of documents and stipulated facts. Lightner v. Centennial Life Ins. Co., 242 Kan. 29, Syl. ¶ 1, 744 P.2d 840 (1987). We have likewise stated that when issues of statutory construction are involved, these are questions of law over which we have unlimited review. Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 263 Kan. 875, 879, 953 P.2d 1027 (1998). In construing the statutes in issue, we refer to certain basic rules of statutory construction by which we are bound: It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. [Citation omitted.] The legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the language of the statutory scheme it enacted. In re Marriage of Killman, 264 Kan. 33, 42-43, 955 P.2d 1228 (1998). In order to ascertain the legislative intent, courts are not permitted to consider only certain isolated part or parts of an act but are required to consider and construe together all parts thereof in pari materia. Kansas Commission on Civil Rights v. Howard, 218 Kan. 248, Syl. ¶ 2, 544 P.2d 791 (1975). When the legislature revises an existing law, it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the law as it existed prior to the amendment. [Citations omitted.] Hughes v. Inland Container Corp., 247 Kan. 407, 414, 799 P.2d 1011 (1990). Do the provisions of the UCCJA apply to this Kansas guardianship proceeding? The Gateleys argue that by failing to cross-appeal the trial court's application of the UCCJA, the Wards have abandoned their contention at the trial court that it does not apply to the facts of this case. Examination of the Wards' arguments in the trial court and in their brief on appeal show they have not abandoned this contention at any time during these proceedings. We must first determine if the UCCJA applies to the Kansas guardianship proceedings under the facts of this case, and only if it does, are we then required to determine if it has been properly applied by the trial court. The statutory provisions by which guardians and conservators are appointed in Kansas are set forth in K.S.A. 59-3001 et seq., and the following specific provisions apply: A natural guardian of a minor may be either the father or the mother but [i]f either parent of a minor dies, has been found to be a disabled person or has had parental rights terminated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the other shall be the natural guardian. K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 59-3002(e). Stanley T. Ward was clearly the natural guardian of Jaclynn Ward at the time the guardianship and conservatorship proceedings were instituted in Norton County, Kansas, on January 24, 2000. K.S.A. 59-3003 states: A natural guardian shall have the right to the custody of the natural guardian's minor child and the right to exercise control over the person of the natural guardian's minor child as provided by law, unless a guardian has been appointed for the minor. Stanley T. Ward was exercising these rights. The provision of greatest interest is K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 59-3009, which relates to the contents of the application for the appointment of a guardian or conservator. At the time of the Kansas appointment, it stated: (a) Any person may file in the district court of the county of the residence or presence of the proposed ward a verified petition for the appointment of a guardian. The requirements for the petition were contained in subsection (b): (b) If the proposed ward or proposed conservatee is alleged to be a minor the petition shall state: (1) The proposed ward or proposed conservatee is a minor; (2) the name, age, residence and present address of the proposed ward or proposed conservatee, if known to the petitioner; (3) the name and address of the natural guardian, guardian, conservator and custodian, if any, of the proposed ward or proposed conservatee, if known to the petitioner, and if not known that the petitioner has made diligent inquiry to learn their names; (4) the general character and probable value of the real and personal property, including the amount and sources of income, of the proposed ward or proposed conservatee, if known to the petitioner; (5) the names and addresses of witnesses by whom the truth of the petition may be provided; (6) the reasons for the need for the appointment of a guardian or conservator, or both; (7) a request that the court make a determination that the proposed ward or proposed conservatee is a minor, make one or more of the orders provided for by K.S.A. 59-3010 and 59-3011 and amendments thereto, and appoint a guardian or a conservator, or both; and (8) the name, address, and relationship to the proposed ward or proposed conservatee, if any, of the person whom the court is requested to appoint as a guardian or as a conservator. It is significant that when the Kansas guardianship proceedings were initiated, there was not an express statutory reference by the UCCJA to the guardianship provisions, nor did the guardianship provisions make the UCCJA a part of, involved in, or related to the contents of the application for appointment of a guardian or a conservator. This is of upmost importance as we consider whether the UCCJA applied to the guardianship proceedings in the present case because the 2000 Kansas Legislature enacted the Kansas Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) as sections 31 through 72 of House Substitute for Senate Bill No. 150. See L. 2000, ch. 171, § § 31-72; K.S.A. 38-1336 et seq. Part of this enactment amended K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 59-3009(b) as it relates to the contents of a petition for appointment of a proposed ward or conservatee: (b) If the proposed ward or proposed conservatee is alleged to be a minor the petition shall state: (1) The proposed ward or proposed conservatee is a minor; (2) the name, age, residence and present address of the proposed ward or proposed conservatee, if known to the petitioner; (3) the information required including that information required by section 51, and amendments thereto, if the petition seeks appointment of a guardian for the minor; (3) (4) the name and address of the natural guardian, guardian, conservator and custodian, if any, of the proposed ward or proposed conservatee, if known to the petitioner, and if not known that the petitioner has made diligent inquiry to learn their names; (4) (5) the general character and probable value of the real and personal property, including the amount and sources of income, of the proposed ward or proposed conservatee, if known to the petitioner; (5) (6) the names and addresses of witnesses by whom the truth of the petition may be provided; (6) (7) the reasons for the need for the appointment of a guardian or conservator, or both; (7) (8) a request that the court make a determination that the proposed ward or proposed conservatee is a minor, make one or more of the orders provided for by K.S.A. 59-3010 and 59-3011 and amendments thereto, and appoint a guardian or a conservator, or both; and (8) (9) the name, address, and relationship to the proposed ward or proposed conservatee, if any, of the person whom the court is requested to appoint as a guardian or as a conservator. L. 2000, ch. 171, § 77; K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 59-3009. This provision became effective July 1, 2000, but did not apply as of the date of the petition in issue in the instant appeal. The provisions of K.S.A. 38-1356 which replaced the UCCJA and are now part of the UCCJEA read as follows: (a). Subject to subsection (e), in a child-custody proceeding, each party, in its first pleading or in an attached affidavit, shall give information, if reasonably ascertainable, under oath as to the child's present address or whereabouts, the places where the child has lived during the last five years, and the names and present addresses of the persons with whom the child has lived during that period. The pleading or affidavit must state whether the party: (1) Has participated, as a party or witness or in any other capacity, in any other proceeding concerning the custody of or visitation with the child and, if so, identify the court, the case number, and the date of the child-custody determination, if any; (2) knows of any proceeding that could affect the current proceeding, including proceedings for enforcement and proceedings relating to domestic violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights, and adoptions and, if so identify the court, the case number, and the nature of the proceeding; and (3) knows the names and addresses of any person not a party to the proceeding who has physical custody of the child or claims rights of legal custody or physical custody of, or visitation with, the child and, if so, the names and addresses of those persons. (b) If the information required by subsection (a) is not furnished, the court, upon motion of a party or its own motion, may stay the proceeding until the information is furnished. (c) If the declaration as to any of the items described in subsection (a)(1) through (3) is in the affirmative, the declarant shall give additional information under oath as required by the court. The court may examine the parties under oath as to details of the informant furnished and other matters pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the disposition of the case. (d) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any proceeding in this or any other state that could affect the current proceeding. (e) If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleading under oath that the health, safety, or liberty of a party or child would be jeopardized by disclosure of identifying information, the information must be sealed and may not be disclosed to the other party or the public unless the court orders the disclosure to be made after a hearing in which the court takes into consideration the health, safety, or liberty of the party or child and determines that the disclosure is in the interest of justice. It is now clear that from and after July 1, 2000, the above provision of the UCCJEA statutorily applies to and must be a part of the contents of a Kansas guardianship petition and proceeding. No such reference previously existed as to the UCCJA, and, based on the statutory construction rules that we have previously set forth, [w]hen the legislature revises an existing law, it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the law as it existed prior to the amendment. Hughes, 247 Kan. at 414. The UCCJA was not part of or applied to Kansas guardianship provisions prior to July 1, 2000. At the time the UCCJA was enacted in Kansas, the guardianship provisions were already in existence. Had the legislature intended the UCCJA to apply to guardianships, it could have done so. This legislative failure to do so is strong evidence that the UCCJA did not apply to Kansas guardianship proceedings prior to July 1, 2000. While the presumption regarding legislative change is a strong indication as to what the previous law was in Kansas, it can be argued that the enactment of the UCCJEA and the amendments now contained in K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 59-3009 did nothing more than recognize statutorily our existing law that the UCCJA applied to Kansas guardianship proceedings. Before resolving this question, we return to the Kansas guardianship provisions to determine whether they were properly applied in this case. If the UCCJA does apply to our facts, then a different notice requirement might exist; however, if it does not apply, K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 59-3010(b) states: If the petition is filed on behalf of the minor by ... the natural guardian of the minor [which it was in this case], the time of the hearing designated in the order may be forthwith and without notice. It is then apparent that the immediate hearing on the application of Stanley T. Ward was statutorily authorized and the immediate appointment was proper. Finally, it was also proper for the appointees to be parties designated by the minor's natural guardian, as K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 59-3014(a) states: [T]he court in appointing a suitable guardian or conservator shall give priority in the following order: (1) To the nominee of a minor over the age of 14 years who is not a disabled person. (2) to the nominee of a natural guardian [applicable to our facts and justifying the Donna and Dave Ward appointment as designated by the natural guardian, Stanley T. Ward]. From our foregoing discussion, it is apparent that the Kansas guardianship provisions were properly followed and the appointment of the Wards was proper unless the intervention of the UCCJA makes those proceedings subject to all of its provisions. The most important part of the factual scenario in this case is that this is not a contest involving two living parents, and all of the cases and statutory provisions which have involved or construed such situations are simply not applicable to our set of facts. While the Gateleys argue that in every decided case the UCCJA has been applied to guardianship situations, an examination of cases from other states show that factual, statutory, and rule differences exist where such holdings have been made. For example, see Ray v. Ray, 494 So.2d 634, 637 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (UCCJA held applicable to guardianship proceeding in Georgia where living mother and father were involved in a custody determination); In re Wonderly, 67 Ohio St.2d 178, 423 N.E.2d 420 (1981) (UCCJA applicable to guardianship proceeding, where grandparents attempted custody change 9 years after surviving parent's testamentary designation of children's custody); Matter of Guardianship of Walling, 727 P.2d 586, 590 (Okla. 1986) (UCCJA applicable to guardianship proceedings because Oklahoma District Court Rule 8.2 so states); Gribkoff v. Bedford, 76 Or. App. 695, 711 P.2d 176 (1985) (UCCJA applied to guardianship proceedings where neither mother or father were caring for child who was being raised by maternal and paternal grandparents who resided in separate states); In Interest of A.E.H., 161 Wis.2d 277, 468 N.W.2d 190 (1991) (Wisconsin guardianship was a custody proceeding under UCCJA but California had relinquished jurisdiction and Wisconsin assumed jurisdiction). In addition, the Missouri Court of Appeals in In re Estate of Patterson, 652 S.W.2d 252 (Mo. App. 1983), held that under specific state statutes the UCCJA was deemed to apply to appointments of a guardian of the persons but not to a guardian of the estate of two minor children. Also see Annot., Applicability of UCCJA or PKPA, 78 A.L.R.4th 1028. In light of the specific changes in the laws of Kansas to make guardianship proceedings subject to the UCCJEA subsequent to July 1, 2000, and the clearly different reasons which appear to be the basis for the decisions in other states, we hold the UCCJA was not applicable to Kansas guardianship proceedings at the time the proceedings in this case were instituted. Furthermore, the Kansas cases relied on by both sides to this appeal are not definitive of the question of whether the UCCJA must be applied to Kansas guardianship proceedings in this case. The Gateleys' reliance on In re Marriage of Mosier, 251 Kan. 490, 836 P.2d 1158 (1992), and In re Marriage of Harris, 20 Kan. App.2d 50, 883 P.2d 785, rev. denied 256 Kan. 995 (1994), is misplaced. In both cases both parents were still living and the analysis therein is simply not applicable to our factual situation. Likewise, the Wards' contention that In re Stremel, 233 Kan 136, 660 P.2d 952 (1983), and In re Miller, 228 Kan. 606, 620 P.2d 800 (1980), support their argument that the UCCJA does not apply to the guardianship proceedings under the facts of this case is not persuasive. Neither case related to the applicability of the UCCJA. Stremel involved issues of venue between two Kansas district courts and Miller involved an adult ward. The precise questions which faced the Court of Appeals in In re Marriage of Osborne, 21 Kan. App.2d 374, 901 P.2d 12 (1995), are not before us, and we decline to comment on the holding therein which involved a conflict between a surviving mother and a stepmother. The case is not dispositive on the question of applying the UCCJA to guardianship proceedings, and we reject the Wards' suggestion that the time Jaclynn Ward has been in Kansas should be considered in rendering our decision. None of the Kansas cases have sufficient applicability to change or alter our conclusion that the legislative change making the UCCJEA applicable to guardianship provisions made by the 2000 Kansas Legislature recognized and confirmed that the UCCJA did not apply to Kansas guardianship proceedings prior to July 1, 2000. Our decision that the UCCJA did not apply to the guardianship and conservatorship proceedings in this case requires that the trial court be affirmed if its ruling is correct for any reason even though it relied upon the wrong ground or assigned erroneous reasons for its decision. KPERS v. Reimer & Koger Assocs., Inc., 262 Kan. 110, 118, 936 P.2d 714 (1997). The result we reach is not altered or changed by the decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in S.W. v. Duncan, 24 P.3d 846 (Okla. 2001), involving the parties to our appeal. That opinion appears to have recast its previous ruling in Turley v. Turley , which, at the time Stanley T. Ward removed his daughter from the State of Oklahoma, relied on Ingles v. Hodges, 562 P.2d 845 (Okla. 1977) to hold: Upon the death of the parent into whose custody children are placed by a decree of divorce, the children stand, with relation to the surviving parent and all the world as if no divorce had been entered. Turley, 638 P.2d at 470. The S.W. v. Duncan opinion further stated: We thus agree that father obtained custody rights of his child upon the death of the custodial parent. 24 P.3d at 851-52. We therefore hold that the natural guardian of the minor had lawful custody of the minor when she was moved to Kansas and when the guardianship and conservatorship proceedings were commenced. The district court of Norton County, Kansas, properly exercised jurisdiction in this case and in appointing the designees of the natural father (the Wards) as guardians and conservators; it properly denied the maternal uncle and aunt's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and to enforce Oklahoma court orders; and it properly granted the paternal uncle and aunt and natural father's motion to cancel the registration of the Oklahoma custody decree. The issues were different, but we have said in other cases that child custody is a fundamental right of a parent, protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In re Guardianship of Williams, 254 Kan. 814, 819-20, 869 P.2d 661 (1994), citing Sheppard v. Sheppard, 230 Kan. 146, 630 P.2d 1121 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 919 (1982). While we cannot undo the bitterness of a divorce or the tragic accidental death of a mother, the result we reach allows the surviving parent and natural guardian to control the future care, protection, training, education, and nurturing of his minor child. Based on what we have said and held, it is clear the PKPA is not applicable in this case and the trial court properly so held. We need not reach or comment on other arguments raised by the Gateleys. Affirmed.