Opinion ID: 2330409
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Fault Grounds for Divorce

Text: We next address the petitioner's argument that the trial court's finding of fault grounds was against the clear weight of the evidence. The petitioner argues that nothing happened, until the date of the parties' separation [in July 2000], and that there was no further aggression thereafter. Whether the irremediable breakdown of the marriage was caused by irreconcilable differences or the petitioner's fault was a factual question for the trial court. Hampers, 154 N.H. at 279, 911 A.2d 14. We will affirm the trial court's factual findings unless the evidence does not support them or they are legally erroneous. Id. The trial court found that the Respondent has proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Petitioner's treatment of the Respondent during the course of the parties' marriage constitutes treatment which has endangered the Respondent's health and reason within the meaning of RSA 458:7[,] V. RSA 458:7 provides, in pertinent part, that the trial court shall grant a divorce in favor of the innocent party . . . [w]hen either party has so treated the other as seriously to injure health or endanger reason. RSA 458:7, V. The statute does not require proof of conduct that would have affected an average or reasonable person, but only that the health or reason of the complaining spouse was actually affected. In the Matter of Gronvaldt & Gronvaldt, 150 N.H. 551, 553, 842 A.2d 87 (2004). In its narrative order, the trial court found that the following conduct endangered the respondent's health and reason: [T]he Petitioner, during the parties' marriage, was possessive and controlling of the Respondent. . . . . . . The Petitioner restricted the Respondent's freedom by isolating her from family and friends; forbidding her to talk with neighbors and parents of [the child's] schoolmates; . . . and ordering her not to speak with anyone at church. The Petitioner enforced isolation on the Respondent by threatening to punish [the parties' child] for the Respondent's wrongdoing. When the Petitioner was angry with the Respondent, he disabled her car or took her keys to prevent her from going to work or from going out. On July 14, 2000, the Petitioner became enraged that the Respondent was taking [the parties' child] to a friend's home. He began screaming, disconnected the telephones, barricaded doorways with his body, grabbed the Respondent and [the child] so they could not leave the parties['] home, pushed the Respondent and [the child] into a door and against a wall, causing both the Respondent and [the child] to be physically injured. Subsequent to the issuance of the restraining order, the Petitioner threatened the Respondent by telling her that there are going to be some Sicilian neckties around here. . . . When the Petitioner was angry with the Respondent, he would sit inside the marital residence and shoot at targets in the back yard. The Respondent was frightened of the Petitioner throughout the marriage and feared that he was capable of killing her. The actions of the Petitioner, during the parties' marriage, caused the Respondent significant emotional distress, causing her to seek the assistance of a Pastoral Counselor. Additionally, in granting the parties' specific requests for findings, the court found that: (1) the petitioner denigrated, belittled and humiliated the respondent and called her degrading names; (2) the petitioner cut off the respondent financially when he was angry with her; and (3) without the respondent's knowledge and permission, the petitioner had the respondent's mail diverted to his post office box in Epsom. All of these findings have support in the record, including the respondent's testimony and that of a psychologist. Among other things, the psychologist testified that the petitioner was emotionally volatile. The trial judge was in the best position to evaluate the evidence, measure its persuasiveness and assess the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 554, 842 A.2d 87. Because the record supports the trial court's findings, we find no error in its decision to grant a divorce on the ground that the petitioner so treated the respondent as seriously to injure her health or endanger her reason. Id.