Opinion ID: 2570822
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attacks in which the employer's action or inaction gave the assailant access to the victim

Text: Temple argues that Princess facilitated his attack because a coworker helped Callahan identify his victim and because Princess failed to enforce policies which would have kept Callahan away from him. We affirm the Board's conclusion that case law on these issues does not support Temple's claim.
Temple argues that Princess facilitated the attack because a restaurant employee helped Callahan identify his victim. Yet in several cases in which coworkers were more clearly instrumental in bringing an attacker to his victim, courts found that the resulting injuries did not arise from work. In Transactron, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, an employee hid in the women's restroom from her angry husband. [40] A coworker told the husband where to find her; he entered the restroom and shot her. The court held that compensation could not be predicated upon a coworker giving directions to an assailant. [41] Similarly, in Fair v. People's Savings Bank , a court found that an employer did not facilitate a lethal assault where a supervisor, who knew that the employee feared her boyfriend but did not know that he was armed, told the boyfriend the employee's location. [42] In light of this precedent, the Board properly concluded that a Princess staff member's action in helping Callahan identify Temple did not amount to facilitation by Princess of Callahan's attack.
In extreme cases, employers may facilitate assault by failing to protect an employee from danger. Princess's failure to protect Temple, however, is not factually comparable to the acts of the employers in cases in which compensation was awarded. In Murphy v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, the employee's husband and attacker had told the employee's supervisor the precise time and location where he intended to kill his wife. The supervisor did not warn the employee, nor did he grant her repeated requests for a leave of absence. [43] The court found that her assault and death were work related. [44] In Carter v. Penney Tire & Recapping Co., a roofer warned his employer that he expected to be attacked. [45] The employer told him to return to work, and guaranteed his safety. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that gunshot wounds subsequently sustained by the employee on the worksite arose from his employment and were compensable. [46] These cases are distinguishable from Temple's because they involved foreknowledge as well as significant misconduct or assumption of responsibility by management. Several cases have rejected claims based on employers' failure to protect employees from assault. In Epperson v. Industrial Commission, the employee had asked the security guard at work not to admit her husband to the building. [47] The husband came to the workplace in search of her, and she met with him within view of the security guard. Following a calm conversation, he shot her. Epperson argued that the assault was exacerbated by employment because she had depended on the security guard. But the court rejected this argument because Epperson did not warn the guard that her husband might be armed or violent, and she did not indicate any distress or need for assistance during their encounter. [48] Johnson v. Drummond, Woodsum, Plimpton & MacMahon , P.A. drew on Epperson in denying compensation to an employee who told the receptionist not to let her husband into the building, but told her manager that he would not harm her, and spoke calmly with her husband in the lobby before he shot her. [49] Courts also rejected claims that personally motivated assaults were facilitated by an employer who let the assailant into the workplace in Transactron [50] and Fair, [51] two cases discussed above, involving coworkers who directed assailants to their victims. Given that employers' failure to protect employees from assault did not constitute facilitation under the facts of the cases discussed above, the Board correctly concluded that Princess's inaction in this case also does not constitute facilitation.
Temple's argument that Princess facilitated the attack by failing to protect him focuses on the restaurant's policies of greeting new guests promptly in the front area, having managers on duty, and prohibiting non-employees from visiting the waiters' staging area. These policies should have shielded Temple from harm, he argues, but Princess did not uphold these policies on the morning of the attack. Very few cases address the role of workplace security policies in workers' compensation cases. A review of these few cases, along with consideration of the purpose of workers' compensation statutes and general policy concerns, convinces us that Princess's failure to enforce these policies did not facilitate Callahan's attack on Temple. We therefore affirm the Board's conclusion on this issue, as well. Employers' failure to enforce a policy has generally not provided a basis for compensating resulting injuries in the workplace. Although Professor Larson discusses liability arising from employers' failure to adhere to statutory or regulatory safety requirements, he does not treat internal employer policy as a source for special employer obligations. [52] One case which indirectly considered the question, Devault v. General Motors Corp., did not find that the employer's inadequate enforcement of security policy facilitated a personally motivated attack. [53] In Devault, the employee was assaulted at work by an off-duty coworker who was admitted to the workplace despite the fact that he had the wrong badge for the shift and only on-duty workers were supposed to be allowed inside. The court found that the injury was not work related, in part because of evidence that the employer had a flexible enforcement policy concerning admissions. [54] The dissent argued that the employer did facilitate the assault because it was negligent in admitting the assailant despite his lack of a badge for that shift. [55] In several other cases involving workplace assault, courts stated or implied that injuries were not compensable, in part because the employers did all that could reasonably be expected of them under the circumstances. [56] In Transactron, the court emphasized, without drawing a legal conclusion, that the employers' actions conformed with existing security measures. [57] None of these cases directly supports the proposition that failure to uphold security policies might be grounds for finding employer facilitation, and we decline to reach such a conclusion on the facts of this case. Temple's argument also confuses the logic of workers' compensation with that of tort law. As we have explained in the past, the workers' compensation system is based on a political compromise . . . whereby the employer bears the initial cost of injuries that arise from employment related risks, regardless of `fault,' and the employee surrenders his common-law right to sue in tort. [58] The underlying premise of this system is that liability is based upon the existence of an employment relationship, not upon a determination of culpability. [59] Temple's argument would make negligence and fault the basis for workers' compensation. This is inconsistent with the underlying logic of workers' compensation and with the rule of AS 23.30.045(b), that compensation is payable irrespective of fault as a cause for the injury.