Opinion ID: 1831943
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: judicial participation in plea negotiations

Text: In Warner, we considered whether it was permissible for the trial judge to participate in plea negotiations and, if so, what restrictions apply. The specific question before the Court was whether a sentence was per se invalid where the trial court, over the State's objection, advise[d] a defendant regarding what sentence would be imposed pursuant to a plea of guilty, and accept[ed] the defendant's subsequent guilty plea. Warner, 762 So.2d at 509. After noting that several states, the federal system, and the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to Guilty Pleas have expressly prohibited judicial participation in plea negotiations, and considering the pros [4] and cons [5] of allowing judicial participation in plea negotiations, we ultimately decided to permit limited judicial participation with certain safeguards adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Cobbs, 443 Mich. 276, 505 N.W.2d 208 (1993). See Warner, 762 So.2d at 513. Therefore, although we did not prohibit judicial participation in plea negotiations, we imposed several limitations on that participation, which we concluded were necessary to minimize the potential coercive effect on the defendant, to retain the function of the judge as a neutral arbiter, and to preserve the public perception of the judge as an impartial dispenser of justice. Id. (emphasis supplied). The first restriction we placed on judicial participation is that the trial judge could not initiate the plea dialogue. See Warner, 762 So.2d at 513. However, the judge may ... participate in such discussions upon request of a party and [o]nce involved, the court may actively discuss potential sentences and comment on proposed plea agreements. Id. at 513-14. The question from the defendant's perspective for the court's consideration is: Knowing what you know today, what do you think the sentence would be if the defendant pled guilty, as charged? Id. at 514 (emphasis supplied). Second, we made clear that the judge must neither state nor imply alternative sentencing possibilities which hinge upon future procedural choices, such as the exercise of a defendant's right to trial. Id. (emphasis supplied). Further, although the preliminary evaluation made by the judge is not binding, the defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere in reliance on that evaluation has the absolute right to withdraw the plea if the judge later determines that a greater sentence must be imposed. See id. Finally, we required that a record be made of all plea negotiations involving the trial judge. See id. We also briefly addressed the situation where a plea was either not entered or was withdrawn. Recognizing that [a] judge's candid statement of how a case appears at an early stage of the proceeding does not prevent the judge from deciding the case in a fair and evenhanded manner later, when additional facts become known, we concluded that the judge who participated in the plea bargaining process will not automatically be subject to recusal. Id. (emphasis supplied). It was with these restrictions and caveats that we sought to accommodate[] the competing interests involved and allow for the benefits of judicial participation while protecting the integrity of the judicial system and the rights of defendants. Id. at 512-13. We emphasized that although the delineated safeguards apply in those cases where a trial court agrees to be an active participant in plea bargaining discussions, the court may decline to assume such a role. Id. at 514. Our decision in Warner was not the first time this Court addressed the issue of judicial participation in plea negotiations. More than twenty years before Warner, this Court decided Davis v. State, 308 So.2d 27 (Fla.1975), in which we declined to condemn judicial participation in plea bargaining per se due to our confidence that the trial judges of this state [would] take all necessary precautions to assure that defendants' rights are protected by appropriate safeguards. Davis, 308 So.2d at 29. The Warner decision was a refinement of Davis, in which we delineated certain minimum procedural safeguards, applicable prospectively to such participation. See Warner, 762 So.2d at 510. Therefore, Warner did not, as Byrd and Wilson contend, implement a new policy in this State with respect to judicial participation in plea negotiations. Instead, Warner involved a very narrow holding that permits a trial judge to respond to a request from a defendant as to what sentence the judge would impose in exchange for a guilty plea. Warner was never intended to create a constitutional right to the sentence offered by the judge or to give the defendant an expectancy that the sentence would be no higher if the defendant decided not to plead guilty. Accordingly, we do not agree with Byrd and Wilson that our opinion in Warner mandates that a presumption of vindictiveness arise in all cases where a higher sentence is imposed after the judge has participated in the plea discussions. We conclude that [t]he possibility of vindictiveness, found to exist in Pearce, is not inherent in the process set forth in Warner. See Colten, 407 U.S. at 116, 92 S.Ct. 1953. Further, we recognize that it is to the defendant's advantage, in a case where there are no plea negotiations with the State, to ascertain from the judge what the sentence would be if the defendant pleaded guilty. Thus, we are mindful that imposing a presumption of vindictiveness in cases where the Warner procedures have been followed, might, to the detriment of... [the] defendant ... diminish the likelihood that the trial judge would participate in plea discussions at a defendant's request. Colten, 407 U.S. at 119, 92 S.Ct. 1953. Nevertheless, imposition of a harsher sentence, without explanation on the record after judicial participation in the plea negotiations, does raise concerns that were not present in the United State Supreme Court opinion in Smith. As previously noted, in Smith there was no judicial participation in the plea negotiations and the trial judge stated reasons on the record for the harsher sentence. See 490 U.S. at 796-98, 109 S.Ct. 2201. Therefore, we now face the question of the appropriate analysis to utilize in determining when a presumption of vindictiveness arises. In answering this question, it is instructive to review the relevant decisions of the district courts of appeal issued both before and after Warner.