Opinion ID: 2600008
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The only process due was the procedures established by statute

Text: ¶ 32 Other than providing plaintiffs notice and a hearing on the special benefits question at some point before levying an assessment, CID was obligated under article I, section 3 only to follow the law set forth by the legislature. A settled rule of due process is that a democratically elected legislature has the prerogative to establish the procedures by which a local government entity is created or its boundaries expanded. A person does not have the constitutional right to notice, a hearing, or the right to object. See, e.g., Parosa, 52 Wash.2d at 193, 324 P.2d 438 ([I]t is within the power of the legislature to authorize the inclusion of the property of nonconsenting owners.); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79, 28 S.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 151 (1907) (The state... at its pleasure, may ... expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, ... with or without the consent of the citizens.); Cherry v. City of Hayti Heights, 563 S.W.2d 72, 87 (Mo.1978) ([T]he power to create a municipal corporation is a political function, resting solely in the legislative branch and not subject to due process requirements for notice.); Bd. of County Com'rs v. Sims, 252 Ind. 531, 535, 251 N.E.2d 9 (1969) ([T]he legislature has jurisdiction over all of its instrumentalities, including municipal corporations, and may abolish, alter or incorporate such instrumentalities as it sees fit in the performance of its legislative functions. The legislature is not required to give notice to anyone affected by its legislation.). The process due when a municipal corporation forms or expands is by the grace of the legislature, not by constitutional commandment. ¶ 33 In Parosa, a group of citizens claimed that the incorporation of a municipal corporation by petition deprived them of their property without due process of law. 52 Wash.2d at 192, 324 P.2d 438. They lamented that the petitioners for incorporation could set the boundaries arbitrarily, and the objecting citizens would have no process whereby they could exclude their land. Id. Rejecting their due process claim, we decided that when land is added to a municipal corporation's territory in accordance with a statute, [n]o question of due process is involved. Id. at 193, 324 P.2d 438. The statutory conditions by which a municipal corporation's boundaries are set are a political question, solely within the province of the legislature. Id. at 194, 324 P.2d 438. [6] ¶ 34 Consistent with Parosa, we hold that as long as the boundaries were set here in accordance with the pertinent statutes, article I, section 3 is satisfied. [I]t is not for this court to say what additional standards would be desirable. Parosa, 52 Wash.2d at 194, 324 P.2d 438. Plaintiffs do not argue that the notice published in the Tri-City Herald breached RCW 87.03.565, that the CID board's resolutions failed to comply with chapter 87.03 RCW, or that CID committed any other statutory violation-except for improperly validating some petitions. To that issue we now turn.