Opinion ID: 1956367
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Adkins Appeal

Text: The first issue for review concerning Adkins is whether the trial court erred in refusing to continue the case due to Adkins's absence at trial. Adkins alleges that the court forced his attorney to try the case without allowing any opportunity to procure Adkins's attendance. The record shows that the case was continued twice, and that on three occasions when the case was set for trial Adkins was absent. When the case was set for September 20, 1982, the trial court informed the parties that if Adkins failed to appear before the court at that time no more continuances would be granted. The grant or denial of a motion for a continuance is discretionary with the trial court and will not be reversed unless gross abuse of discretion is shown. Perdue v. Mitchell, 373 So.2d 650, 652 (Ala. 1979). Adkins has not shown this Court that the trial court abused its discretion in this case. Accordingly, the trial court will not be reversed for denying his motion for a continuance. Adkins's next contention of error is that the court issued an attachment for him based upon a subpoena issued August 10, 1982, which was executed by C.P. Lyons and J. Max Brasher, a co-defendant in the case. Rule 45(c), A.R.Civ.P., prohibits a party to an action from serving a subpoena in that action. The record affirmatively shows that on July 7, 1982, Adkins was served with the same subpoena informing him of the September 20, 1982, trial date. That subpoena was executed by one Ingram and one Purser, neither of whom were parties to the case. The record also discloses another subpoena informing Adkins of the June 3, 1982, trial date issued on May 28, 1982, and executed by one Tice on June 1, 1982. Any error, therefore, in the service of the subpoena issued August 10, 1982, and served by Brasher and Lyons on August 25, 1982, was not prejudicial to Adkins, because Adkins had been notified of the trial dates numerous times by other duplicative subpoenas. Adkins claims that the trial court erred in making certain statements in front of the jury. [1] A review of the record and the context in which the statements complained about were made shows that those statements were not comments on the evidence and were not prejudicial. The observations in question were made to counsel and were either expressive of the reason for the court's ruling on objections by counsel or for the purpose of directing the line of questioning away from topics which would not help the jury to decide the case. See Buzzanca v. Hagwood, 265 Ala. 404, 91 So.2d 703 (1956) (court's comments were not comments on the evidence). Additionally, the court instructed the jury as follows at the beginning of the case: Likewise, statements made by the Court are not evidence in the case either, and are not to be so considered by you. Again, during the oral charge, the court instructed: Likewise, statements made by the Court are not evidence in the case either and should not be considered by you. First, those statements were not prejudicial, and the court committed no error for which we should reverse. Second, the court instructed the jury to disregard its comments. Therefore, Adkins's contention that the trial court usurped the function of the jury to determine the credibility of the evidence is without merit. Adkins alleges that the trial court failed to comply with Rule 51, A.R.Civ.P., which states: At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may file and, in such event, shall serve on all opposing parties written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury, but the court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are completed. The record shows that the court told the parties, prior to closing arguments: Gentlemen, I would be inclined to let both counts of negligence and wantonness go to the jury. Therefore, counsel were generally informed that the court would instruct the jury on wantonness and negligence. The rule is designed to afford counsel an opportunity to know in advance of the argument, the guiding principles under which the argument should be made. Dallas Railway & Terminal Co. v. Sullivan, 108 F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir.1940). Furthermore, the trial court stated: Gentlemen, I'm sorry. Let the record show that I requested counsel on Friday or Thursday to get me the written charges so that I would have an opportunity to go over them and that counsel has favored the Court this morning after nine o'clock with about a hundred and fifty some odd written charges, requested charges, and that I just don't have time to look at all of those charges and I wish I did, but that the Court will look at those charges and try to cover everything that is requested that is felt material and pertinent to this case. And then, if I don't, I will give counsel the chance to call that to my attention after I have finished my oral charge and I willbut as far as having an opportunity of reading the charges before the argument, I haven't been able to do that. The trial court's reference to charges pertains to those requested by Madison, Brasher, and the City of Winfield. Adkins, apparently relying on his co-defendants, did not request any charges of his own. The trial court, in accord with Rule 51, asked the parties to submit their requests in time for him to read them. Therefore, it is Adkins, and not the trial court, who failed to comply with Rule 51. The trial court did not commit error on this point. The next allegation of error which Adkins makes is that Jimmy Dickerson, a juror, was allowed to consult with Mr. Tweedy, a partner of Harvey Jackson, the attorney representing Adkins's co-defendants in the case. The jury returned the same verdict against Mr. Jackson's clients as against Adkins; therefore, it is impossible to conclude from the record that the consultation had any prejudicial effect on the jury against Adkins. Additionally, the record shows that the attorney for the Weldons and an attorney for the City of Winfield had notes reflecting that Dickerson had responded on voir dire that he was represented by Mr. Tweedy in a land transaction. Yet, none of the parties moved to strike Mr. Dickerson from the jury. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court committed any reversible error in allowing Dickerson to consult with Tweedy during the trial. For all of the reasons discussed previously, the trial court did not commit any error which would require a new trial for Adkins, and, accordingly, the court properly denied Adkins's motion for a new trial. The next issue before us is whether it is proper to allow the verdict to stand against Adkins alone, when the other defendants' motions for new trial must be granted. Rule 59, A.R.Civ.P., states in part: A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties .... (Emphasis added.) This Court addressed the issue of partial new trials in Young v. Woodward Iron Co., 216 Ala. 330, 335, 113 So. 223, 228-29 (on rehearing) (1927). In that case, the Court stated: At common law a judgment against two or more defendants jointly was regarded as an entirety, so that a reversal of the judgment as to one defendant required a reversal as to all. This rule, founded chiefly upon technical considerations, and now generally disfavored by the courts has been recognized as existing in this state. [Citations omitted.] In later cases, while the general rule is not defined, exceptions have been recognized, and the force of the old rule is now materially weakened. North Alabama Traction Co. et al. v. Hays, 184 Ala. 592, 64 So. 39; Southern R. Co. et al. v. Harris, 207 Ala. 534, 93 So. 470. As noted in the text of 2 Ruling Case Law, 268, § 220: `The tendency of modern decisions is, however, to modify the strictness of the common-law rule to the extent of holding that a judgment, though joint in form, is not necessarily entire, and that, where it is several in effect, and the adjudication as to one cannot affect the rights of the others, such judgment may be reversed as to some and affirmed as to others.' The majority of decisions following the rationale of Young, and allowing a new trial for some defendants and not others, concerns defendants who received jury verdicts in their favor and whose interests would not be affected by a partial new trial. See, e.g., Trimble v. Bramco Products, Inc., 351 So.2d 1357 (Ala.1977); Harnischfeger Corp. v. Harris, 280 Ala. 93, 190 So.2d 286 (1966). On the other hand, the decisions in which this Court has held that the entire case must be remanded for a new trial deal with co-defendants whose interests are closely related. See, e.g., Lloyd Wood Construction Co., v. Con-Serv., Inc., 285 Ala. 409, 232 So.2d 649 (1970) (defendants were principal and surety on a bond); Toranto v. Hathaway, 219 Ala. 520, 122 So. 816 (1929) (defendants were master and servant). In the case at bar, the adjudication of the interests of defendants Madison, Brasher, and City of Winfield would have no effect on the interest of Adkins. Therefore, the verdict and judgment as they relate to Adkins will stand, because the trial court committed no error with respect to him. Because of the errors discussed above, the judgment as it relates to Madison, Brasher, and the City of Winfield must be reversed, and the cause remanded. Because Adkins failed to show any errors committed against him, the judgment denying his motion for a new trial is affirmed. It is so ordered. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART. TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES and SHORES, JJ., concur.