Opinion ID: 200824
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alternative Salvage Efforts Were Underway

Text: 11 While Coast Guard rescue efforts were underway, radio traffic about the NORTHERN VOYAGER was overheard by a commercial salvor named Michael Goodridge based in Newburyport, Massachusetts. At 9:03 a.m., just minutes after Captain Haggerty first radioed for Coast Guard assistance, Goodridge placed a telephone call to Station Gloucester. He told them that he had dive gear and pumps and asked whether they needed assistance. Station Gloucester responded that they were busy and they were going to handle it. 12 At 9:04 a.m., Captain Haggerty informed the Coast Guard by radio that he thought the water was coming up through the vessel's rudder-post. He conjectured that the NORTHERN VOYAGER might ah, dropped the rudder. Earlier, he had explained that the vessel had lost its steering capability. 13 Several minutes later, the Coast Guard transmitted an Urgent Marine Information Broadcast stating that it ha[d] received a report that the Fishing Vessel Voyager is taking on water and requesting that all vessels keep a sharp lookout, assist if possible, [and] report all sightings to the U.S. Coast Guard. This was the Coast Guard's only attempt to solicit outside assistance. 14 Himself a diver, Goodridge, who continued to monitor developments over his radio, recognized that the vessel was going to need a diver to correct the problem. Accordingly, he began loading up his truck. At 9:15 a.m., Goodridge placed a telephone call to Cape Ann Divers to see if anyone was available to assist him. At 9:33 a.m., he reported to Station Gloucester that he was en route, with diving gear, and that his estimated time of arrival was one hour. 15 At 10:03 a.m., several minutes before the decision to evacuate was made, Goodridge hailed Station Gloucester on radio channel 16. He was told to switch to channel 12, a frequency not being used by anyone on the scene. Goodridge stated that he was boarding a vessel at Cape Ann Marina, and asked if he should bring extra pumps or whether just diving assistance was necessary. 16 Station Gloucester responded that it wasn't sure, the situation was unstable, and it needed to keep [the] frequency clear. 1 Goodridge interpreted this to mean that he shouldn't tie up the channel. He stated that he would be there in a little bit, and he got off the radio. Shortly thereafter, everyone was evacuated from the NORTHERN VOYAGER. 17 At about 10:44 a.m., when Goodridge was about a mile from the Northern Voyager, he contacted Station Gloucester by radio hoping to establish contact with the captain. At that point, Goodridge had just seen the 47-footer heading back with the crew. Station Gloucester told him to call by land line. When Goodridge called back on his cellular phone, he was told that he could talk to the captain when he arrived back at the station. 18 Goodridge said that he did not attempt to contact the 47-footer directly because he had [b]een told twice to stay off the radio. He didn't bother going to the station to talk to the captain because he assumed that, based on the Coast Guard reports, the boat was too far gone for him to take the necessary time. 19 According to plaintiffs' expert, Goodridge was in a position to reach the NORTHERN VOYAGER by 10:50 a.m., well before it sank. Goodridge stated at his deposition that he had the skill and equipment necessary to dive under the NORTHERN VOYAGER and plug the hole formerly containing the rudder post, and the task would have taken him only a couple minutes. 2 However, he needed to talk to somebody in the NORTHERN VOYAGER crew before making such an attempt in order to find out if the engines were running. Without this knowledge, it was too risky to dive near the propellers, as he would have had to do to plug the rudder tube. 20 Captain Haggerty stated that he did not know any commercial salvors in the Gloucester area and thought that the Coast Guard was working on getting commercial assistance. At no time before the captain was put ashore in Gloucester, however, did he learn, nor was he told by the Coast Guard, that a salvor was approaching with additional pumps and with dive gear. 3 If the captain had been in contact with Goodridge and had been made aware of his concerns about the engine running, the captain would have shut off the engines before evacuating, rigged a Jacobs ladder in order to facilitate a possible return to the boat, and communicated this information to Goodridge.