Opinion ID: 184204
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: A Injury in Fact

Text: The majority opinion appropriately begins its analysis of standing on the first factor of the Lujan test, even though EPA concedes that this element is met. As standing is a necessary element of federal-court jurisdiction[,] the Court must consider it to ensure that Barnum possesses constitutional standing. See Thomas v. Mundell, 572 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir.2009). The majority finds that this prong is satisfied because Barnum alleges that the value of its property decreased due to the listing of Redwood Creek's in the Section 303(d) listing, saying that a specific, concrete, and particularized allegation of a reduction in the value of property owned by the plaintiff is sufficient to demonstrate injury-in-fact at the pleading stage. Majority at 898. However, this rule actually leads to exactly the opposite result. Economic injury, such as a decrease in property value, is often a sufficient basis for standing. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992); San Diego County Gun Rights Committee v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir.1996) (citing Central Ariz. Water Conservation Dist. v. EPA, 990 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir.1993)). Nonetheless, a general averment that conduct may decrease property value is not sufficient where that harm is not yet concrete and remains speculative. Here, under either theory of harm, any injury that Barnum may suffer related to its property value is highly speculative and would depend upon the occurrence of a long chain of future events, including: Redwood Creek remaining on California's CWA Section 303(d) listing for temperature and sediment, California developing a temperature and sediment TMDL for Redwood Creek, California developing a TMDL that affects timber, and finally, California applying that plan in a manner that affects Barnum. If any of these contingent eventsthese are only a few examplesdoes not occur, then there would be no reason for Barnum's property value to fall. As any injury alleged by Barnum is speculative and uncertain, I disagree with the majority that this prong of the standing inquiry is met. Barnum is unable to identify any particular conduct that plausibly caused a decrease in property value. Barnum is also unable to explain any decrease in value other than by vaguely pointing to market factors, and even then only positing what the public perceives whether accurately or not. These allegations are not sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements of standing. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 168, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (Allegations of possible future injury do not satisfy the requirements of Article III); Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 593 F.3d 923, 930 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing where the precise injury could not be identified); Louisiana Envt'l Action Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1382-84 (D.C.Cir.1996) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing where injury depended upon a future chain of events). As such, I would affirm the district court's ruling on this ground.