Opinion ID: 20144
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defamation and Slander Claims

Text: 33 First Martineau contends that his supervisor, Kolodziej, defamed him on four occasions. Martineau alleges that (1) Kolodziej said that Martineau had overreacted to his performance evaluation; (2) Kolodziej denied asking to see Martineau's green card; (3) Kolodziej told Martineau that he was fired for sexual harassment; and (4) Kolodziej said that Martineau was insane, delusional and irrational. For the reasons discussed by the district court, we hold that these allegations do not raise issues of material fact to support these defamation claims. Absent these underlying issues of material fact, Martineau is legally unable to show that ARCO should be held liable for ratifying these statements by Kolodziej. 34 Martineau also asserts that Kolodziej's statements to another ARCO employee that Martineau was insane, delusional and irrational amounted to slander per se. As the district court noted, [s]tatements are slanderous per se if they are so obviously harmful to the person harmed that no proof of their injurious effect is necessary to make them actionable. Matters characterized as slanderous per se are statements that affect a person injuriously in his office, profession, or occupation. Simmons v. Ware, 920 S.W.2d 438, 451 (Tex. App. 1996). We conclude that none of the alleged statements fall within the category of per se slander. 35 In the alternative, Martineau contends that ARCO is liable under a theory of self-defamation because he had to repeat Kolodziej's defamatory statements to prospective employers which caused further injury. Martineau's self-defamation theory fails for two reasons. First, the record is unclear as to whether Martineau actually mentioned these statements to potential employers. 36 Second, Martineau's legal reasoning is unsound. Although the Texas Supreme Court has never adopted this theory, Martineau cites two intermediate Texas appellate courts which held that an employer may be liable for the employee's own publication of the employer's defamatory statements under certain circumstances. First Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696, 701 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439, 446 (Tex. App. 1985). Both cases rely comment m on Section 577 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The Restatement requires the defamed person to show that when he published the remark, (1) he was unaware of the defamatory nature of the statement, and (2) circumstances indicated that the communication to the third party would be likely. 37 Martineau contends that the district court erred in finding he had not shown a lack of awareness of the defamatory statements because neither Ake nor Rico relied on the first Restatement requirement. Nevertheless the district court correctly notes that the first requirement is essential because otherwise the defamed party is under no duty to mitigate its damages by refraining to self-publish known defamatory statements. Doe v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 855 S.W.2d 248, 259 (Tex. App. 1993), aff'd as modified on other grounds, 903 S.W.2d 347, 356 (Tex. 1995). 38 For these reasons, we affirm. 39 AFFIRMED.