Opinion ID: 1275251
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Misstatement of Law on Burden of Proof.

Text: (7) Defendant argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by misstating the applicable law in suggesting to the jury, in closing argument, that it was incumbent on defendant to raise a reasonable doubt concerning his guilt, and to do so not just by providing evidence he was not the killer, but by affirmatively showing who the killer was. Defendant notes it is improper for the prosecutor to misstate the law generally ( People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 538 [262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129]), and particularly to attempt to absolve the prosecution from its prima facie obligation to overcome reasonable doubt on all elements ( People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1215 [275 Cal. Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159]). This, defendant contends, is what the prosecutor did in arguing the defense wanted Kenny Mitchell's testimony in the record, despite the falsity of his story, because They had to come up with another possible suspect to create in your minds that reasonable doubt that they want you to have when you enter that jury deliberation room. [3] Defendant concedes his trial counsel failed to object to these remarks, but urges he should be excused from the usual consequences of such failure (see People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1215 [waiver of error by failure to object]) because counsel thereby rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. In the context of the whole argument and the instructions, we see no reasonable likelihood (see People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072 [25 Cal. Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40]) the jury construed the prosecutor's remarks as placing on defendant the burden of establishing a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. When the prosecutor made the challenged comment, he had just finished reviewing the evidence presented in the prosecution's case-in-chief, with the evident aim of demonstrating he had succeeded in proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. As in People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at page 1215, the prosecutor then could legitimately argue that in order persuasively to cast doubt on the prosecution's case, the defense of third party culpability would need to identify a possible perpetrator. Accordingly, defendant fails to establish either misconduct or, it follows, ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 691-692 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 695-697, 104 S.Ct. 2052].)