Opinion ID: 1330381
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Heading: apac's liability to third parties

Text: Dorrell argues that the APAC-SCDOT contract does not limit APAC's liability for negligent injury to third parties. We agree. A tortfeasor may be liable for injury to a third party arising out of the tortfeasor's contractual relationship with another, despite the absence of privity between the tortfeasor and the third party. Barker v. Sauls, 289 S.C. 121, 122, 345 S.E.2d 244, 244 (1986) (citing Terlinde v. J.F. Neely, Sr. , 275 S.C. 395, 399, 271 S.E.2d 768, 770 (1980)). The tortfeasor's liability exists independently of the contract and rests upon the tortfeasor's duty to exercise due care. Id. (citing Edward's of Byrnes Downs v. Charleston Sheet Metal Co., 253 S.C. 537, 542, 172 S.E.2d 120, 122 (1970)). This common law duty of due care includes the duty to avoid damage or injury to foreseeable plaintiffs. See Terlinde, 275 S.C. at 399, 271 S.E.2d at 770 (stating that the key inquiry in determining whether to impose liability is foreseeability, not privity). In a negligence action, a plaintiff must show that the (1) defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, (2) defendant breached the duty by a negligent act or omission, (3) defendant's breach was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and (4) plaintiff suffered an injury or damages. Steinke v. South Carolina Dep't of Labor, Licensing and Reg., 336 S.C. 373, 387, 520 S.E.2d 142, 149 (1999) (citations omitted). The Court must determine, as a matter of law, whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Id. In the present case, we hold that APAC owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, Dorrell, based on (1) the contractual relationship between APAC and SCDOT and (2) a common law duty of care. APAC's broad duty to the traveling public is established in at least two separate provisions of the contract. First, the section of the contract titled Required Contract Provisions Federal-Aid Construction Contracts under the heading Safety: Accident Prevention states, in part, the following: The contractor shall provide all safeguards, safety devices and protective equipment and take any other needed actions as it determines ... to be reasonably necessary to protect the life and health of employees on the job and the safety of the public.... Second, the Red Book, [2] which is part of the contract, includes the following mandate: 107.09 Public Convenience and Safety. The Contractor shall at all times conduct work in such a manner as to provide for and insure the safety and convenience of the traveling public.... We also note that under the contract, the work was to be done in accordance with the Specifications and in a good and workmanlike manner. Therefore, based on the plain language of the contract, APAC had a duty to provide for the safety of the traveling public and to perform the work in a workmanlike manner. This duty arises out of APAC's contractual relationship with SCDOT, and the absence of privity between APAC and motorists such as Dorrell does not eliminate this duty. In addition to its duties under the contract, APAC owed a common law duty to exercise due care, which existed independently of the contract with SCDOT. See Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber and Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 346, 384 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1989) (finding a homebuilder owes a legal duty to refrain from constructing housing that he knows or should know will pose serious risks of physical harm to foreseeable parties); Smith v. Fitton and Pittman, Inc., 264 S.C. 129, 133, 212 S.E.2d 925, 926 (1975) (finding that an independent contractor had a duty of care to leave the premises in a safe condition, free from any hazards to safety that he may have created); Rogers v. Scyphers, 251 S.C. 128, 133, 161 S.E.2d 81, 84 (1968) (finding a building contractor owed a duty of reasonable care that extended to homebuyers and members of the buyer's family); McKissick v. J.F. Cleckley & Co., 325 S.C. 327, 345, 479 S.E.2d 67, 76 (Ct.App.1996) (stating that it was proper for the trial judge to charge the jury with the elements of common law negligence to determine whether a paving company negligently performed its work, indicating that the paving company owed a duty of care based in common law); St. Clair v. B.L. Paving Co., 270 Pa.Super. 277, 411 A.2d 525, 526 (1979) (finding that a paving company, which left a road surface six inches about the shoulder, owed a duty to third persons over and above compliance with the contract provisions). This duty of care included, at minimum, a duty to pave the road in a manner that provided for the safety of the traveling public, including Dorrell. Moreover, at oral argument before this Court, APAC's counsel explained that, in the area where the accident occurred, the road surface was already nine inches above the shoulder. Knowing this, APAC proceeded to lay the asphalt, adding another three inches, and increasing the drop to approximately twelve inches. These facts alone create a jury question as to whether APAC breached its duty of care. Accordingly, we hold that the APAC-SCDOT contract did not limit APAC's liability for negligent injury to third parties. Like all motorists that traveled the stretch of highway recently repaved by APAC, Dorrell was a foreseeable plaintiff, and APAC's duties to Dorrell stemmed from both the APAC-SCDOT contract and the common law.