Opinion ID: 1945980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Religion-Based Challenge to the Peremptory Strike was Preserved for Appeal.

Text: As the majority correctly observes, defense counsel's [2] challenges to the prosecutor's peremptory strikes were initially and primarily focused on counsel's perception that the prosecutor's peremptory strikes revealed a systematic effort to exclude young black males from the jury. As voir dire progressed, however, and the prosecutor explained his strikes, defense counsel's arguments evolved and focused on the challenge based on religious affiliation, and in no uncertain terms objected to the strike of Juror 333 on such basis. The majority bases its conclusion that only plain error review is necessary on the grounds that defense counsel's objections were untimely and not sufficiently precise to alert the trial judge to the legal basis for the challenge. I disagree. First, the timing of an objection to a peremptory strike cannot be made before the reason for the strike is revealed. Here, the religious basis for the strike of Juror 333 surfaced well into the process, as the prosecutor was trying to explain that the strike of that juror was not race-based. In making that explanation, the prosecutor for the first time stated that the reason for the strike was that he believed Juror 333 looked like those people who follow Louis Farrakhan who could not be fair to the Government. This was immediately followed by defense counsel's objection to the court that He [the prosecutor] could have asked him, Your Honor. [3] The trial court then ruled that the prosecutor's strikes were not race-based, noting, however, that the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation for striking Juror 333 was not based on facts, observations and information and responses obtained during the voir dire, but on the prosecutor's gut if you will reaction and he cited particularly the bow tie, the close cropped hair and other issues. The trial court concluded that [c]onsidering the fact that all other responses have been adequately made by [the prosecutor], I have to allow him that 1 on his gut feeling. [4] After completing the last two rounds of peremptory challenges and discussing certain other new matters brought up by the prospective jurors on the panel, the trial judge, without objection, released the remaining venire and the proceedings broke for a much-delayed lunch. Immediately after the lunch break, the trial judge returned to the issue of Batson challenges with respect to the peremptory strike of Juror 333. At that point, defense counsel clearly made alternative arguments for the challenge of the prosecutor's peremptory strike of Juror 333: 1) the prosecutor's explanation for striking Juror 333 on the basis of his appearance (bow tie, closely cropped hair and white shirt) was pretextual because Juror 1, who had not been struck, also had close cropped hair and wore a bow tie, and 2) the race-neutral reason given by the prosecutor for striking Juror 333, that he was a Muslim, was itself improper. [5] Other defense counsel joined the objection, emphasizing the impermissible religious basis for the strike [6] and, at one point, further suggesting that, with respect to Islam, discrimination on the basis of religion also amounted to race discrimination. [7] Based on this record, I conclude that defense counsel objected that the strike was impermissible as soon as the prosecutor's attempt to give a race-neutral explanation for his strike revealed a religious basis. As these objections were made before the jury was sworn, they were timely. See Tursio v. United States, 634 A.2d 1205, 1209 (D.C.1993). Second, defense counsel's objections were of such nature and specificity as to put the issue squarely before the trial court. Although, at the time of trial in this case, neither the Supreme Court nor this court had extended Batson beyond race-based challenges, we had given strong indications supporting that proposition. In a case in which the defendant had requested that all Catholics be stricken from the jury on the ground that no Catholic could fairly judge the credibility of the priests who were the victims of the crime, we held that [a] prospective juror who is otherwise competent to serve on a jury may not be disqualified merely because of religious belief or status. The mere potentiality for bias based on religious affiliation cannot justify the elimination of a prospective juror. Only the demonstration of an actual bias may provide such a justification. Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d 951, 953 (D.C.1977) (citation omitted). We also adopted the same argument that appellant makes in this case, that the position that all members of a religion should be excluded is `suspect' under the `equal protection' provisions of the Constitution. Id. at 954 (citing Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 n. 8, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976)). Defense counsel in this case, rather presciently, used the term Batson generically, much as we do today, as encompassing various types of impermissible discrimination in the jury selection process, not as referring solely to race. [8] No doubt the majority is correct that defense counsel did not present the trial court with the finely honed argument presented on appeal. That is true in most cases, as few trial counsel have the luxury of time and reflection, in the heat of an ongoing pretrial proceeding, that is available on appeal. Defense counsel were reacting on the spot to the prosecutor's unfolding explanations. It would be difficult, however, to miss the intensity of counsel's objections, which not only castigated the prosecutor, but took the unusual, and perhaps risky, additional step of expressing shock at the trial court's view of the law on the subject of religion-based peremptory strikes. Moreover, the legal basis for counsel's challenges was broadly presented to the trial court. Counsel's objections were framed in terms of references to the Muslim religion or Muslim practice, people of the Muslim religion and belong[ing] to a certain religious group, see supra note 5, and counsel argued that the strike was because of their religious views or ... presume[d] ... views, see supra note 7. Counsel cast their challenges to the religion-based strike in terms of its involving a suspect category, a clear indication of the equal protection basis for their claim. See supra note 7. They also made clear that their objections were based in part on the First Amendment. See supra note 5. Further, counsel at several times distinguished between impermissible discrimination based on religious affiliation and religious beliefs that could justify a strike, see supra notes 5, 6, & 7, noting that the proper procedure would be to inquire about the juror's religious affiliation and, more importantly, his religious beliefs to ascertain whether they are incompatible with jury service. [9] Finally, the trial court's ruling shows that the judge was aware that counsel's objections were not limited to race. Upon hearing the various defense counsel's race and religion-based challenges to the prosecutor's peremptory strikes, the trial court ruled: With respect to the strikes about which [the prosecutor] was asked to give his explanation, if with 1 exception I indicated that [the prosecutor's] explanation was appropriate and demonstrated a justifiable reason for the striking of those jurors with his peremptory challenges. With 1 juror [no. 333], I indicated that the justification given by [the prosecutor] was less than acceptable. However, out of 30 strikes, I am allowing [the prosecutor] to have 1 gut feeling on a strike. Even though the justification was less than acceptable with respect to that one juror, I am permitting it. The trial court's clear statement that the prosecutor's justification for striking Juror 333 was less than acceptable must be understood in the context of the race and religion-based challenges made by defense counsel. The trial court definitely ruled that the strike was not race-based. [10] Having satisfied the trial judge that there was no racial animus to the peremptory strike, the prosecutor would have had no need for further explanation of the strike unless it was understood that there was another basis for the challenge, different than the one based on race. Therefore, the trial court's statement that the prosecutor's explanation was less than acceptable must have referred to the challenge that the strike was impermissibly based on religious affiliation. The trial court decided, nonetheless, to let one out of thirty strikes go without further scrutiny [e]ven though the justification was less than acceptable with respect to that one juror. [11] On this record, therefore, I conclude that the objection to a religion-based peremptory strike was presented to and decided by the trial court, and is reviewable on the merits on appeal.