Opinion ID: 752168
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Removal of Venireperson

Text: 61 Mr. Castro argues the trial court improperly removed a venireperson, Patricia Lumbers, because of her stated views regarding the imposition of the death penalty. He raised this issue in his direct appeal and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected it on its merits, as did the federal district court. We agree. 62  '[A] juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.'  Davis v. Executive Dir., 100 F.3d 750, 777 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1703, 137 L.Ed.2d 828 (1997) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 420, 105 S.Ct. 844, 850, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)). Moreover, [a] trial judge's determination of a potential juror's bias ... is a factual finding entitled to the presumption of correctness contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Id. Because issues of credibility and demeanor are crucial to the trial judge's determination, our review of that determination is quite deferential. Id. at 777-78; see also Witt, 469 U.S. at 429, 105 S.Ct. at 854-55. 63 In response to questions, Ms. Lumbers stated repeatedly that she did not know whether she could actually impose the death penalty on an individual. The trial judge described her position as follows: She does not know, no matter what this evidence is, whether she can give the death penalty. R. Vol. III, Ex. J at 2560. The judge then asked her [n]ow am I missstating [sic] you? to which she responded No, sir. Id. Given our deferential standard of review, we cannot say that the judge's decision to exclude her was error.