Opinion ID: 2979236
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ready, Willing, & Able Buyer

Text: Appalachian’s next argument is that, even in the absence of an oral sales agreement, there is nonetheless a genuine issue of material fact as to whether KST was a ready, willing, and able buyer. As noted above, we will assume that a broker may recover in the absence of a contract of sale. What is clear, however, is that the broker must show that the prospective purchaser—in this case KST—was ready, willing, and able buy on the seller’s terms. Parks v. Morris, 914 S.W.2d at 548. That entails showing (1) what the terms were and (2) that they originated with and were approved by the seller. To do so, Appalachian points again to the affidavit of Scott Tepper, who avers that, “[o]n March 15, 2005, KST communicated directly with Mr. Sigmon and indicated that we were ready, willing, and able to buy Mr. Sigmon’s businesses on Mr. Sigmon’s terms.” Tepper Aff. at ¶ 9. The affidavit also states that, “[e]ven after receiving [word that Sigmon was not prepared to sell], KST - 11 - No. 08-6258 Sigmon v. Appalachian Coal Properties, Inc. remained ready, willing, and able to purchase his businesses pursuant to the terms set by Mr. Sigmon and agreed upon at the March 9, 2005 meeting.” Id. at ¶ 11. Again, however, the Tepper affidavit falls short of establishing a disagreement as to material facts sufficient to prevent summary judgment. Nowhere in the Tepper affidavit is there any specific indication that Sigmon said, for example, “These particular terms are the terms on which I will sell my companies.” The affidavit simply states that the terms described in the draft letter of intent (which indicates that no agreement was reached) were Sigmon’s. That statement is conclusory and represents an ultimate legal conclusion, not a specific fact from which a legal conclusion may be derived. See Galindo, 754 F.2d at 1216. Appalachian points to nothing else in the record that might furnish the specific factual basis necessary to conclude that Sigmon had accepted, endorsed, proposed, or requested the terms discussed at the meeting and embodied in the draft letter of intent. Thus, we conclude that summary judgment is proper on Appalachian’s breach-of-contract claim.