Opinion ID: 684143
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ingels' Evidence of Pretext

Text: 32 Both sides agree that Ingels has made a prima facie case of discrimination for the purposes of this appeal. Further, Ingels does not challenge the district court's finding that Thiokol alleged a valid, nondiscriminatory reason for Ingels' discharge. Thus, on this appeal the sole issue regarding Ingels' age discrimination claim is whether Ingels has presented enough evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Thiokol's proffered reasons for his discharge were pretextual. 33 As noted above, Thiokol alleges that the RIF of 162 employees was necessary because of the partial termination of the small I.C.B.M. contract and the decline in the aerospace and defense industry. Thiokol claims that it instructed its managers to determine what functions had to be done in their areas and which of their employees were essential to perform these functions. In addition, they were instructed to determine who had the skills to absorb the remaining duties of the employees who were terminated in the RIF. Thus, Thiokol claims that its managers, Kelly and Scivally, chose Ingels as one of the RIF candidates because he was performing functions that could easily be assumed by others and because others in the department were performing tasks that could not be easily transferred. In particular, Thiokol alleges that Ingels was spending most of his time performing two tasks--standardization and proofreading--that others could take up without difficulty. 34 Ingels makes a passing effort to challenge the bona-fide nature of the entire RIF program, but we can easily dismiss that challenge. Although Ingels presents some evidence that the partial cancellation of the I.C.B.M. contract did not affect the workload in his unit or his work, Thiokol does not solely claim that it fired Ingels because work he was doing on the missile program disappeared. Instead, it offered evidence that Thiokol as an organization needed to cut positions because of the lost contract and bad economic conditions in general. Thus, Ingels' evidence that the cutback did not personally affect him is not enough to suggest that the decision to fire workers was pretextual. 35 Most of Ingels' evidence of pretext focuses on why he personally was chosen for the layoff. In particular, Ingels points to alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the key decisionmakers--Kelly and Scivally--as evidence that Thiokol may be lying about the reasons it chose to release Ingels. The first alleged inconsistency is between Kelly and Scivally regarding the process by which they chose the names for layoff. As noted above, Scivally claims that he was asked to prepare a totem pole for his department and that he, in turn, asked the supervisors who reported to him to totem-pole their employees so that he could accomplish this task. Kelly, on the other hand, testified that he was unfamiliar with totem-poles and that he was merely asked for the names of the two most expendable employees in his department. He claims that he submitted only these two names--Ingels and Bennett--in no order of preference. Kelly claims that he had no part in the decision of whether to retain Bennett over Ingels. 36 We fail to see in this any evidence of pretext. It is nothing more than recollections by two different employees as to the individual manner in which they carried out their jobs. To the extent there is any inconsistency at all, it goes only to process and not to purpose or motivation, and could not provide a sufficient basis for a jury to find pretext for age discrimination. Similarly, the fact that Kelly had some confusion about the extent of Ingels' time spent on standardization does not show pretext, nor does it negate the testimony of those in the chain of decision that they exercised their business judgment in selecting Ingels for the RIF program rather than another employee because of consideration of versatility. Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1426-27 (10th Cir.1993) (The ADEA is not a vehicle for reviewing the propriety of business decisions.); Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768, 772 (10th Cir.1988) (same). 37 Ingels' other evidence is similarly ineffectual. He asserts that earlier RIF programs were conducted under different rules that would have given him greater rights to transfer to another position within the company. However, as we point out in a subsequent part of this opinion, Ingels has no contractual right to the preservation of rules used in earlier RIF programs. There is no showing that the rules used in the 1989 RIF program were a pretext for any ulterior motive or that those rules were applied discriminatorily to Ingels. In fact, the evidence is that those rules were applied equally to all 161 employees affected by the 1989 RIF. 4 38 Our review of the record satisfies us that the district court was correct in concluding that Ingels has not shown that the 1989 RIF program, as applied to him, was pretextual. Thus, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Thiokol on this claim.