Opinion ID: 2133433
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: frye analysis

Text: When a court is faced with an offer of a novel form of expertise which has not yet received judicial sanction, it must conduct an initial inquiry to determine whether the new technique or principle is sufficiently reliable to aid the jury in reaching accurate results. State v. Baue, 258 Neb. 968, 607 N.W.2d 191 (2000). In this state, where the rules of evidence apply, the admissibility of an expert's testimony, including an opinion, which is based on a scientific principle or on a technique or process which utilizes or applies a scientific principle, depends on general acceptance of the principle, technique, or process in the relevant scientific community. State v. Buckman, 259 Neb. 924, 613 N.W.2d 463 (2000); Sheridan v. Catering Mgmt., Inc., 252 Neb. 825, 566 N.W.2d 110 (1997). Stated otherwise, Nebraska has adhered to the Frye test, under which the proponent of the evidence must prove general acceptance by surveying scientific publications, judicial decisions, or practical applications, or by presenting testimony from scientists as to the attitudes of their fellow scientists. Buckman, supra ; Sheridan, supra . Under the standard of helpfulness required by Neb. Evid. R. 702, a court may exclude an expert's opinion which is nothing more than an expression of how the trier of fact should decide a case or what result should be reached on any issue to be resolved by the trier of fact. State v. Reynolds, 235 Neb. 662, 457 N.W.2d 405 (1990), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Messersmith, 238 Neb. 924, 473 N.W.2d 83 (1991). When an expert's opinion on a disputed issue is a conclusion which may be deduced equally as well by the trier of fact with sufficient evidence on the issue, the expert's opinion is superfluous and does not assist the trier in understanding the evidence or determining a factual issue. Id. The Schafersmans argue, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that Wass' diagnosis of multiple mineral toxicity was not novel and, thus, that the Frye test does not apply. We disagree. The testimony of Wass and Reed clearly establishes the novelty of the theory underlying Wass' conclusions regarding the cause of the illnesses afflicting the Schafersmans' cows. In originally promulgating the Frye test, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia stated that while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923). The deduction at issue in this case, Wass' opinion on the cause of the illnesses afflicting the Schafersmans' cows, is not derived from a principle or procedure that has gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. Wass' opinion is dependent upon the underlying theory of multiple mineral toxicity, and the evidence at trial established that this theory is not generally accepted in any scientific field. Nor does the record reveal any other basis to support Wass' conclusions regarding the causal connection between the Envirolean and the illnesses. For instance, Wass admittedly did not conduct a differential diagnosis to rule out other potential causes of any illnesses. Differential diagnosis, or differential etiology, is a standard scientific technique of identifying the cause of a medical problem by eliminating the likely causes until the most probable one is isolated. See, e.g., Glastetter v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., Nos. 00-3087, 00-3467, 2001 WL 630651 (8th Cir. June 8, 2001); Hardyman v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 243 F.3d 255 (6th Cir.2001); Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir.1999); Jennings v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 331 Or. 285, 14 P.3d 596 (2000). See, also, In re Diet Drugs, No. MDL 1203, 2001 WL 454586 (E.D.Pa. Feb.1, 2001); Kelley v. American Heyer-Schulte Corp., 957 F.Supp. 873 (W.D.Tex. 1997) (noting that observed association between exposure and condition may reflect true cause-effect relationship or spurious finding, and to distinguish between these alternatives, it is necessary first to consider confounding factors). A reliable differential diagnosis can provide suitable foundation for an expert opinion, see Kelley, supra ; however, Wass admitted that he did not perform tests in this instance to rule out other potential causes of the illnesses among the Schafersmans' cows. Essentially, the only basis for Wass' opinion, other than his theory of multiple mineral toxicity, was that since the cows consumed the feed and then became ill, the feed must have caused the illness. First, the assumption that correlation proves causation presents fallacious post hoc propter hoc reasoning that cannot be said to be helpful to the trier of fact under Neb. Evid. R. 702, even absent the application of a more stringent Frye or Daubert analysis. See, Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308 (5th Cir.1999); Nelson v. American Home Products Corp., 92 F.Supp.2d 954 (W.D.Mo.2000) (discussing fallacy of post hoc propter hoc reasoning). See, also, Glastetter v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., supra (stating that association is not scientifically valid proof of causation). Second, this reasoning can be deduced equally by the trier of fact; Wass' opinion on the matter is superfluous and again fails to assist the trier in determining a factual issue. See State v. Reynolds, 235 Neb. 662, 457 N.W.2d 405 (1990), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Messersmith, 238 Neb. 924, 473 N.W.2d 83 (1991). In short, Wass' theory of multiple mineral toxicity did not meet the requirements of the Frye test, and Wass offered no other reasoning or scientific analysis that would support his opinion on causation. The district court abused its discretion in permitting Wass to testify regarding multiple mineral toxicity and in allowing Wass to offer his opinion that any illnesses among the Schafersmans' cows were caused by the presence of Envirolean in the feed. As this error was clearly prejudicial to Agland, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the judgment of the district court and remanding the cause for a new trial. That determination, however, does not end our analysis.