Opinion ID: 2581010
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's motion for court-ordered immunity

Text: On March 28, 1991, during the presentation of the defense case at trial, defendant requested that the trial court grant immunity to Solvang. Citing People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 974, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608 ( Hunter ), In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 29, 241 Cal.Rptr. 263, 744 P.2d 374 ( Martin ), and Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith (3d Cir.1980) 615 F.2d 964, 972 ( Smith ), defendant asserted in his motion that the court should grant Solvang immunity in order to redress the prosecution's asserted interference with defendant's right to present exculpatory evidence in his defense and to ensure defendant's right to a fair trial. The trial court, in denying the motion, observed that many courts  including this court (see Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d 957, 973, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608)  have recognized that the power to confer immunity is granted by statute to the executive, that is, to the prosecution (see § 1324), and have questioned whether a trial court possesses inherent authority to grant such immunity. Indeed, addressing this question in People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373, our court characterized as doubtful the proposition that the trial court has inherent authority to grant immunity. ( Id., at p. 460, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373; see also, e.g., Carter v. United States (D.C.1996) 684 A.2d 331, 338-339 [citing and agreeing with the overwhelming number of courts ... that have rejected the concept of judicially imposed immunity, and noting that `there is considerable force to the Government's apprehension that defense witness immunity could create opportunities for undermining the administration of justice by inviting cooperative perjury among law violators'].) Nevertheless, in Lucas as in Hunter and other cases ( In re Williams (1994) 7 Cal.4th 572, 610, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 64, 870 P.2d 1072 ( Williams ); People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 619, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635 ( Cudjo )), we proceeded to assume that such inherent judicial authority exists and to address whether the defendant met the stringent requirements described in Hunter and Smith under which such relief conceivably might be warranted. The trial court in the present case undertook this same approach in considering (and ultimately denying) defendant's motion for court-ordered immunity. Following that same approach here, we conclude that assuming the trial court possessed authority to order transactional or use immunity for Solvang, the court did not err in failing to do so on the facts of this case. We acknowledged in Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d 957, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608, that it was possible to hypothesize cases in which a judicially conferred use immunity might possibly be necessary to vindicate a criminal defendant's rights to compulsory process and a fair trial. ( Id., at p. 974, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608.) We reviewed the one case which has clearly recognized such authority  Smith, supra, 615 F.2d 964  and highlighted two `clearly limited' circumstances (both articulated in Smith ) in which judicially conferred use immunity might be constitutionally necessary. ( Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 974, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608.) The first of the two tests outlined in Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d 957, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608, would recognize the authority of a trial court to confer immunity upon a witness when each of the following three elements is met: (1) the proffered testimony [is] clearly exculpatory; [ (2) ] the testimony [is] essential; and [ (3) ] there [is] no strong governmental interest[ ] which countervail[s] against a grant of immunity. ( Id. at p. 974, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608, citing Smith, supra, 615 F.2d 964, 972.) [23] The trial court declined to make an express finding on the first element of this test, but, the People assert, necessarily made implied negative findings on either the second or third element (or both) of this test. Upon review, we conclude that defendant has failed to carry his burden of establishing the third element of this first test outlined in Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d 957, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608. (See Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th 572, 603, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 64, 870 P.2d 1072 [defendant has burden of establishing alleged interference with his right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses].) The evidence presented at the hearing on the motion suggested that Solvang had given directly contradictory statements to the police and to the defense investigator regarding the events of the crime. His statements to the defense suggested that Solvang himself may have been the killer  and if that were true, there certainly would have been a strong governmental interest in not granting Solvang immunity (either transactional or use) from prosecution. Moreover, even under the version of the facts related in Solvang's statement to the police, Solvang himself may have been guilty as an aider and abettor of the homicides, in that he admitted that, prior to the killings, he had given advice to defendant that would facilitate the commission of the murders. Under these circumstances, the prosecution reasonably would have been skeptical concerning which (if either) of Solvang's versions of the events was true. Contrary to defendant's assertions, even a grant of use immunity would have substantially burdened the People. Had such immunity been conferred, at any later prosecution of Solvang in connection with the homicides at issue in this case the district attorney would have been forced to prove that the evidence offered was not obtained or derived from Solvang's immunized testimony at defendant's trial. (See People v. Cooke (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1370, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 506.) Moreover, conferral of such immunity would have facilitated perjury by Solvang, who had shown himself to be of questionable veracity ( id., at p. 1371, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 506), and at the same time it would have substantially limited the prosecution's ability to conduct a full and free-ranging cross-examination of Solvang at defendant's trial (so as to narrow the scope of testimony that Solvang later might claim had tainted any subsequent prosecution). Based upon these considerations, and given Solvang's apparent complicity and culpability, the prosecution clearly had a strong governmental countervailing interest in not granting him either use or transactional immunity. The second of the two tests referred to in Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d 957, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608, as authorizing a trial court to grant immunity to a defense witness, would recognize such authority when the prosecutor intentionally refused to grant immunity to a key defense witness for the purpose of suppressing essential, noncumulative exculpatory evidence, thereby distorting the judicial factfinding process. ( Id., at p. 975, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608; see Smith, supra, 615 F.2d 964, 969 [inquiring whether prosecution acted with the deliberate intention of distorting the factfinding process]; see also United States v. Westerdahl (9th Cir.1991) 945 F.2d 1083, 1086-1087 ( Westerdahl ) [defense-requested immunity should be granted when the defense witness would provide relevant testimony and the prosecution intentionally has distorted the factfinding process, which may be shown when the government relies heavily upon the immunized testimony of a government witness while denying immunity to a defense witness whose testimony would directly contradict that of the government witness].) The trial court implicitly found that this test was not met here. There is no doubt that Solvang's testimony would have been relevant. But defendant has not met his burden of establishing that the prosecution's treatment of Solvang constituted an intentional distortion of the factfinding process with reference to (i) the upgrading, at the recommendation of the Richmond police, of Solvang's November 4, 1989, misdemeanor firearm charge to a felony charge; (ii) the arrest, by the San Pablo police, of Solvang on outstanding warrants shortly after his September 12, 1990, interview with the defense team; and (iii) the prosecution's refusal to grant immunity to Solvang, while granting limited immunity to other witnesses. Contrary to defendant's speculation that the prosecution orchestrated the upgrading of the November 4, 1989, firearms charge against Solvang two days after obtaining a detailed statement from Solvang largely incriminating defendant, there is no evidence that the prosecution prompted the Richmond police to reevaluate and upgrade the November 4, 1989 misdemeanor firearms charge. The record reveals instead that a Richmond detective sergeant, while reviewing reports that had been submitted to him ... recognized the name of Maurice Solvang as a person who may have been a convicted felon and ... did some checking to determine that in fact ... Solvang was a convicted felon and ... on that basis he modified the charges ... to reflect ... the additional charge of felon in possession of a firearm. Also, contrary to defendant's speculation that the prosecution arranged to have Solvang arrested in retaliation for his September 12, 1990, interview with the defense team, the evidence presented at the hearing on the immunity motion neither established nor reasonably implied any such connection, and suggested instead that Solvang's arrest immediately following his September 12 interview was the direct result of Donna Guthrie's disturbing the peace complaint, the investigation of which, by the San Pablo police, disclosed the existence of two warrants for Solvang's arrest. Finally, contrary to defendant's speculation that the prosecution sought to pressure and punish Solvang after learning of his September 12, 1990, interview with the defense by refusing to grant him immunity while granting immunity to other witnesses, the record shows that beginning at the December 6, 1989, preliminary hearing, the prosecution consistently had declined to grant Solvang immunity. Although the prosecution granted very limited use immunity to witnesses Coghlan and Guillory, the People did not rely heavily upon immunized testimony (cf. Westerdahl, supra, 945 F.2d 1083, 1087) in proving their case. We find no support for the hypothesis that the prosecution changed its position concerning the propriety of immunity for Solvang in response to his September 12, 1990, interview with the defense team. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant has failed to satisfy the second test referred to in Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d 957, 975, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608, which potentially authorizes a trial court to grant immunity to a defense witness when the prosecution has acted with the deliberate intention of distorting the factfinding process. (See Smith, supra, 615 F.2d 964, 969; Westerdahl, supra, 945 F.2d 1083, 1086-1087.) Defendant also asserts a general claim of interference with his right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. (See Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1, 29-32, 241 Cal.Rptr. 263, 744 P.2d 374; Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th 572, 603-609, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 64, 870 P.2d 1072.) To demonstrate such a violation, defendant is required to establish, among other things, (i) prosecutorial misconduct  that is, activity that was wholly unnecessary to the proper performance of [the prosecution's] duties and was of such a character as `to transform [a defense witness] from a willing witness to one who would refuse to testify,' and (ii) interference with the fact finding process  that is, a causal link between the misconduct and [the defendant's] inability to present witnesses on his own behalf. ( Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 31, 241 Cal.Rptr. 263, 744 P.2d 374; Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 603, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 64, 870 P.2d 1072.) In this regard, the trial court stated: I'm not persuaded that there has been anything that the District Attorney or the police agencies have done which constitutes misconduct; that is to say, a governmental interference with the defendant's [Sixth] Amendment right to produce witnesses. [¶] This is not a situation where Solvang was some kind of a willing defense witness who was transformed into one who has refused to testify. It's not a situation where a witness has been arrested outside of the courtroom in the presence of other witnesses. There simply has been no showing that prosecution intimidation was a substantial cause of Solvang's present refusal [to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds]. The trial court then speculated that perhaps Solvang presently was refusing to testify because he himself was fearful of retaliation by defendant. [24] The court concluded that, in any event, there's been no connection between what may have been revealed to [the defense team] on July 26, 1990, and September 12th, 1990, no showing that [the] prosecution was aware of any of that, that might somehow provide the basis for an inference that Solvang's arrest was an effort to threaten or intimidate him. We find the trial court's conclusions adequately supported by the record. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for court-ordered immunity.