Opinion ID: 2355897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Single Judgment

Text: The defendant also argues that the trial justice erred by entering a single judgment for plaintiffs' wrongful death claim. The defendant contends that the jury should have been instructed to render a separate verdict with respect to economic loss damages and survival damages for pain and suffering. Rhode Island's Wrongful Death Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 7 of title 10, sets forth two separate causes of action. Section 10-7-1 provides for recovery for the death itself, whereas § 10-7-5 and § 10-7-7 provide for survival damages, which includes damages for medical expenses, lost earning capacity until the time of death, pain and suffering. Importantly, § 10-7-10 and § 10-7-2 make clear that damages for the wrongful death itself shall be awarded to the decedent's next of kin and not to the estate itself. However, § 10-7-6 provides that survival damages shall be awarded to the estate itself for proper distribution thereafter. According to defendant, combining the compensatory damages award for plaintiffs' wrongful death and survival claims prejudiced his children, Jennifer and Jeremy Swain, who are named as contingent beneficiaries in Shelley's will. The defendant argues that the Slayer's Act operates to exclude him from inheriting under Shelley's will, pursuant to § 10-7-6, and that survival damages would pass through Shelley's estate to Jennifer and Jeremy as contingent beneficiaries. At the outset, we pause to note our concern over the fact that these plaintiffs were permitted to maintain an action for survival damages. Section 10-7-6 specifies that actions for survival damages may be maintained only by the executor or administrator of the decedent's estate. Nevertheless, defendant never challenged plaintiffs' capacity to maintain this action. Instead, the trial justice proceeded to instruct the jury with respect to both wrongful death and survival damages. Although she instructed the jury with respect to both types of damages, the trial justice failed to ask the jury to distinguish between the two types of damages in their verdict. The defendant did not object to any of the trial justice's instructions, even though he was offered an opportunity to raise any objections, and the jury returned a verdict setting forth a single award of compensatory damages for wrongful death. Our review of the record reveals that the first time defendant attempted to inform the trial justice of this error was in his motion for a new trial, in which he informed the trial justice that he was concerned that the award of Shelley's entire probate estate to her parents disenfranchised his children, who were named as contingent beneficiaries under Shelley's will. Rule 51(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the protocol for objecting to a trial justice's instruction to the jury. Rule 51(b) provides, in relevant part, that [n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the party's objection. We cannot emphasize enough the importance of making a timely objection to the jury instructions before the jury deliberates. As we have frequently pointed out, Rule 51(b) `bars a party from challenging an erroneous instruction unless [the party] lodges an objection to the charge which is specific enough to alert the trial justice as to the nature of [the trial justice's] alleged error.' Mead, 899 A.2d at 443 (quoting Majewski v. Porter, 121 R.I. 757, 764-65, 403 A.2d 248, 252 (1979)). Absent a sufficiently specific objection, the trial justice cannot be expected to divine the nature of counsel's objection. Id. at 444 (citing Seabra v. Puritan Life Insurance Co., 117 R.I. 488, 503, 369 A.2d 652, 661 (1977)). Furthermore, it is of no significance that defendant later attempted to assert the rights of the contingent beneficiaries in his motion for a new trial. The defendant contends that, pursuant to Rule 59 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, he was entitled to challenge the legal concept reflected in the instruction even though he had not objected at the time that the instruction was given. The defendant's contention flies in the face of our long-standing rule that jury instructions that are not objected to become the law of the case and are binding on both the jury and the trial justice when he or she passes on a motion for a new trial. Sarkisian v. The NewPaper, Inc., 512 A.2d 831, 836 (R.I.1986); see also Bajakian v. Erinakes, 880 A.2d 843, 852 (R.I.2005) (There having been no objection to this instruction, it became the law of the case and was binding upon the trial justice when he considered the motion for a new trial.); Candido v. University of Rhode Island, 880 A.2d 853, 856 (R.I.2005); ADP Marshall, Inc. v. Brown University, 784 A.2d 309, 316 (R.I.2001); Zawatsky v. Cohen, 463 A.2d 210, 212 (R.I.1983). We cannot fault the trial justice for denying defendant's motion for a new trial with respect to this error because she was bound by her instruction to the jury, which was the law of the case. Although we believe that our law already is abundantly clear in this respect, if any ambiguity remains in the minds of some, we now settle it once and for all. It is true that Rule 59 now permits alleged errors of law to be addressed in the context of a motion for a new trial. However, it would be a mistake to read that language as authorizing a party to raise an entirely new issue at the Rule 59 stage. Such a reading would be inconsistent with the venerable and frequently articulated principle that contentions not raised at trial are deemed waived. See 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2809 at 94-99 (1995) (noting that in the federal court context, motions for a new trial frequently are denied because the legal rulings belatedly complained of were not objected to during the trial itself). What the present version of Rule 59 does authorize is a Win this one for the Gipper type of argument, in which counsel seeks to convince the trial justice of the soundness of a legal argument that counsel previously had made at a pre-verdict state of the trial. See John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations: A Collection of Passages, Phrases and Proverbs Traced to their Sources in Ancient and Modern Literature 674 (16th ed. 1992) (attributing Win this one for the Gipper to legendary coach Knute Rockne's inspirational reference to Notre Dame's first All-American football player, George Gipp). We recognize that defendant elected to proceed pro se at trial, yet that decision does not excuse him from adhering to the procedural rules that govern what transpires in court. Even if a litigant is acting pro se, he or she is expected to familiarize himself or herself with the law as well as the rules of procedure. Sentas v. Sentas, 911 A.2d 266, 271 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Faerber v. Cavanagh, 568 A.2d 326, 330 (R.I.1990)). The trial justice gave defendant ample opportunity to present any objections to the court before the jury began deliberating, at which time defendant assured the trial justice that he had no objections. Having waived the opportunity to raise such objections, defendant cannot now raise this argument on appeal. Therefore, we will not interfere with the compensatory damages judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs in excess of $1.5 million (exclusive of interest).