Opinion ID: 1190975
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Unfortunate Commingling of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments' Guaranties of the Right to Counsel

Text: In Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 89 L.Ed.2d 631, 106 S.Ct. 1404 (1986), the accused requested counsel at arraignment. Prior to meeting with appointed counsel, and while in custody following arraignment, two police officers interviewed the accused regarding the charge upon which the accused had just been arraigned. At that interview, the officers advised the accused of his Miranda rights, which the accused waived. In that case, the Court unfortunately phrased the issue as whether the accused had validly waived the right to counsel at the postarraignment custodial interrogation, a right derived from two sources: the Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination at custodial interrogations, and the Sixth Amendment guaranty of the assistance of counsel at postarraignment interrogations. Today, Stewart firmly grasps to the Court's holding therein: [T]he assertion of the right to counsel [is] a significant event, ... We conclude that the assertion is no less significant, and the need for additional safeguards no less clear, when the request for counsel is made at an arraignment and when the basis for the claim is the Sixth Amendment. We thus hold that, if police initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (1981)). [1] Accepting the rule set forth in Michigan v. Jackson, supra , Stewart's argument still fails to distinguish the fact that in that case the arraignment triggering the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was on the same charge for which the accused was interrogated. In the case at hand, the state apparatus positing the government against the defendant, the situation out of which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel arises, was not in place as to the six burglary charges at issue today. Stewart confessed to the six burglaries on April 30 and May 1, 1985. The information on the burglary charges was not filed until November 19, 1985. While by no means dispositive, an analogy can be drawn between the case at hand and the Court's recent holding in Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 920, 107 S.Ct. 828 (1987). Therein, the issue was whether the accused had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel when he said `he was willing to talk about [the incident] verbally but he did not want to put anything in writing until his attorney came.' Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. at 526. In finding the rule in Edwards is inapplicable in such a situation, the Court held: To conclude that respondent invoked his right to counsel for all purposes requires not a broad interpretation of an ambiguous statement, but a disregard of the ordinary meaning of respondent's statement. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. at 529-30. Likewise, to find that Stewart invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel on the present charges merely by requesting the appointment of counsel at his arraignment on the unrelated charge is to disregard the ordinary meaning of that request. Certainly any possible confusion is subsequently cured by the Miranda warnings given immediately prior to interrogation on facts surrounding an investigation wholly unrelated to the preceding arraignment. Nevertheless, Stewart and the majority of the Court of Appeals rely almost exclusively on Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 100 L.Ed.2d 704, 108 S.Ct. 2093 (1988), wherein the accused invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel during a custodial interrogation. Subsequently, interrogation ceased, but the accused did not meet with counsel. Nevertheless, the police reinitiated interrogation, but on an unrelated charge. Emphasizing the virtues of a bright-line rule, a majority of the Court in that case held the rule in Edwards prohibited reinterrogation, despite the fact that the basis of the first interrogation, during which the accused requested counsel, was unrelated to the charges at issue during the second interrogation. [2] It must be borne in mind, the basis for the rule in Arizona v. Roberson, supra , arising out of the assumptions in Miranda, is that the accused considers himself unable to deal with the pressures of custodial interrogation without legal assistance. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683. Thus, the Court reasoned, any further interrogation presents the potential for a violation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, regardless of the topic covered in the subsequent interrogation. In contrast, in the case at hand, Stewart never invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. That is to say, during the inherently coercive setting of custodial interrogation, Stewart never requested counsel. In fact, given the Court's analysis in other cases involving separate and independent investigations, it is apparent that the Arizona v. Roberson, supra , rule is inapplicable in the case at hand. For example, in Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 88 L.Ed.2d 481, 106 S.Ct. 477 (1985), after formal proceedings had been initiated against the accused, the government electronically wired an accomplice/informant to record the accused's incriminating statements. Focusing on the origin of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court held statements made regarding charges already brought were inadmissible. Whereas, the statements that were made that merely incriminated the accused in new crimes, uncharged at the time of the taping, were not similarly violative: [T]o exclude evidence pertaining to charges as to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time the evidence was obtained, simply because other charges were pending at that time, would unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest in the investigation of criminal activities. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180. In a footnote, the Court continued, [i]ncriminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth Amendment right has not yet attached, are, of course, admissible at a trial of those offenses. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180 n. 16. See also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 96 S.Ct. 321 (1975) (a suspect who is arrested on robbery charges, who invokes his right to silence, may be questioned later about an unrelated murder). [3]