Opinion ID: 1246954
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: contingent fee contract in divorce action void

Text: 6. In the second place, testimony as to the fee arrangement was relevant and material from the standpoint that, although a divorce suit is on its face merely a controversy between husband and wife, the state occupies the position of a third party charged with the duty of protecting the public welfare. [13] Since the continuance of the marriage relation is deemed essential to the public welfare, the state is interested in its preservation. Sound public policy demands that, when differences arise between parties to a marriage, no obstacle shall be placed in the way of their reconciliation. Consequently, it is not fitting that it should be for the interest of an attorney that there should be no reconciliation. If compensation for an attorney's services is contingent on the securing of a divorce, or if the amount to be paid for his services is proportioned to the amount of alimony to be received, the attorney is in such a position that his interest would be against a reconciliation of the parties. Annotation, 30 A.L.R. 188. A contract for the payment of a fee to an attorney contingent upon his procuring a divorce for his client or contingent in amount upon the amount of alimony and property awarded to the wife is void as against public policy. This rule has been expressly recognized by this court since 1917 and all officers of the court are charged with notice of its existence. Klampe v. Klampe, 137 Minn. 227, 163 N.W. 295. We pointed out in that case that the law does not favor divorce and that any agreement for divorce, or any collateral bargaining promotive of it, is unlawful and void. [14]