Opinion ID: 1433861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Mental state for lesser included offenses

Text: Without much elaboration, defendant contends the instructions on the mental states necessary to prove the lesser included offenses of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter were more likely to have Confused the jury and caused the jury to assume that [defendant's] mental state was the crux of these offenses. [8] Contrary to defendant's premise, the perpetrator's mental state is precisely the crux of the distinction between first and second degree murder and between murder and manslaughter. (See งง 187, 188, 189, 192; see generally, 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) งง 452-55, pp. 508-513; id., งง 487-489, pp. 549-553; id., งง 511-517, pp. 577-585.) The instructions correctly stated the law and were not likely to confuse the jury when considered in context and in relation to each other. ( People v. Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 538-540, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251.) Since defendant did not request clarification or amplification, further consideration on appeal has been waived. ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 171, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1192, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235,885 P.2d 1.) Moreover, any alleged ambiguity in the second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter instructions could not have prejudiced defendant when the jury found him guilty of first degree murder.