Opinion ID: 1445637
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the plaintiff adequately plead and prove a cause of action for false and fraudulent misrepresentation?

Text: Defendant suggests that plaintiff at most had an action for fraudulent concealment and that because this theory was not plead or proved, plaintiff must fail. Defendant is correct that concealment and misrepresentation are separate causes of action. We have stated: Of course, it is correct that misrepresentation and concealment both may constitute actionable fraud, and in some cases may factually be but two sides of the same legal coin. Where failure to disclose a material fact is calculated to induce a false belief, the distinction between concealment and affirmative misrepresentation is tenuous. Both are fraudulent. However, mere failure to disclose a fact, although it may be fraudulent, is not equivalent to affirmation of the contrary fact. See Dash v. Jennings, 272 App.Div. 1073, 74 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1947). Schock v. Jacka, 105 Ariz. 131, 133, 460 P.2d 185, 187 (1969). Defendant argues that since there was no evidence to show that the defendant or its salesman deliberately concealed the fact that the car had been damaged and repaired, the actions of the salesman toward Mrs. Donald are therefore in the nature of a mere nondisclosure and not a fraudulent misrepresentation. We do not agree. The 9 elements of fraud required by this court, Moore v. Meyers, 31 Ariz. 347, 253 P. 626 (1927), have been satisfied, and while we would have no difficulty in affirming a judgment based upon fraudulent concealment, we believe that an action for fraudulent misrepresentation can also be maintained. The automobile in question was represented to Mrs. Donald as a new executive demonstrator. Although defendant claims this is merely puffery, a new executive demonstrator is something quite different than a wrecked executive demonstrator. King v. O'Reilly Motor Company, 16 Ariz. App. 518, 494 P.2d 718 (1972). DID THE EVIDENCE WARRANT THE IMPOSITION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES? Finally, the defendant contends that the record does not contain evidence sufficient to warrant the imposition of punitive damages, suggesting that the verdict of the jury was motivated by prejudice against automobile dealers. We do not agree. The failure of defendant to inform the plaintiff that the automobile had been previously wrecked was a reckless indifference to the rights and safety of Mrs. Donald or any other prospective buyer. We have said: Punitive damages are not to compensate plaintiff for the loss sustained, but rather to punish defendant for his conduct. Such damages are applicable where there is a `reckless indifference to the interest of others.' McNelis v. Bruce, 90 Ariz. 261, 367 P.2d 625; Restatement of the Law, Torts, § 908, Comment b. Nielson v. Flashberg, 101 Ariz. 335, 341, 419 P.2d 514, 520 (1966). This question was settled by our Court of Appeals in a remarkably similar case in which a purchaser of a demonstrator, represented to be as good as new by the salesman, found out a year later that the car had been involved in an accident. The Court of Appeals stated: In noting that punitive damages were properly awarded in Sarwark, [Sarwark Motor Sales, Inc. v. Husband, 5 Ariz. App. 304, 426 P.2d 404] where the defendant repeatedly contended that his company did not turn back the mileage on a car, and in Lewis v. Worldwide Imports, Inc., [238 Or. 580, 395 P.2d 922] supra, where the defendant sold a previously wrecked car as `a demonstrator in the condition of a new car,' we believe that a review of the record herein supports a jury finding that O'Reilly conducted itself with `reckless indifference to the interests of others,' Nielson v. Flashberg, supra; McNelis v. Bruce, 90 Ariz. 261, 367 P.2d 625 (1961); and that such conduct is in violation of societal interests to such an extent as to warrant punishment so as to deter further wrongdoing. (citations omitted) King v. O'Reilly Motor Company, supra, 16 Ariz. App. at 523, 494 P.2d at 723. Often, the function of punitive damages in effect is to legitimate the jury's giving vent to its sense of outrage at the conduct of the defendant and to relieve it of the sometimes difficult task of quantifying the degree to which the plaintiff has literally been harmed. Further, punitive damages are assessed to deter conduct of a serious antisocial or irresponsible nature, such as exhibited by defendant here. We believe the instructions were correct as to punitive damages. IS THE PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL RELIEF? The plaintiff (appellee) asked in her answering brief that we set aside the order of the trial court granting a new trial as to damages only and affirm on appeal the verdict of the jury. It has been held that an appellate court will consider cross-questions by the appellee when they support the actions of the trial court. City of Kingman v. Havatone, 14 Ariz. App. 585, 485 P.2d 574 (1971). When, however, such cross-assignments seek to set aside the judgment or order appealed from or, as here, seek to enlarge on appeal the relief the appellee seeks, then the party must file an appeal or cross-appeal as the case may be. Maricopa County v. Corporation Commission, 79 Ariz. 307, 289 P.2d 183 (1955); Santanello v. Cooper, 106 Ariz. 262, 475 P.2d 246 (1970). The order granting the motion for new trial limited to the issue of damages only is affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur.