Opinion ID: 765918
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Business Records Evidence

Text: 19 The government produced substantial documentary evidence against Turner and Kelly. During its case-in-chief, the government introduced Cochran Gardens' time cards and payroll records clearly showing overlaps between the times Turner and Kelly were allegedly working at Cochran Gardens and the times reflected on the police department duty rosters. Turner and Kelly contend that the district court erred in admitting these records into evidence over their hearsay objections. We may reverse a district court's determination regarding the admissibility of evidence only upon a showing that the district court clearly abused its discretion. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Eason, 17 F.3d 1126, 1131 (8th Cir. 1994). As we explain below, we conclude that the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in admitting the time card and payroll evidence in this case. 20 We first reject Turner and Kelly's argument that the time card and payroll evidence contained hearsay upon hearsay. 4 The fact that a business document may contain entries in different forms or even from different sources does not necessarily imply that a hearsay upon hearsay problem exists. When a single business record contains different information recorded directly from multiple sources, or on multiple occasions, there may be several instances of hearsay, but there is only one layer of hearsay. For example, if one employee records his time on a time card each day and a supervisor signs the card prior to submitting it to the payroll department, the time card contains hearsay entries from both the employee and the supervisor, but only one layer of hearsay. On the other hand, when the source of information and the recorder of that information are not the same person, the business record contains hearsay upon hearsay. If both the source and recorder of the information were acting in the regular course of the organization's business, however, the hearsay upon hearsay problem may be excused by the business records exception to the rule against hearsay. See Grogg v. Missouri Pac. R. R. Co., 841 F.2d 210, 213-14 (8th Cir. 1988); Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Because the defendants offer no credible assertion that an outsider to the chain of producing the time card and payroll records (i. e., a person not acting in the regular course of Cochran Gardens' business) provided any of the information contained in those records, we conclude that the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in admitting the records over the defendants' hearsay upon hearsay objection. 21 Having rejected the defendants' hearsay upon hearsay argument, we must next consider whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting the time cards and payroll records under the business records exception. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Rule 803(6) allows for the admission of business records 22 made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the... record..., all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness. 23 Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). 24 In this case, the government called Ms. Calea Stovall-Reid, the records custodian for the St. Louis Housing Authority, to lay the foundation for the introduction of the time cards and payroll records. 5 As the custodian, Ms. Stovall-Reid's testimony would normally be sufficient to lay the foundation for the introduction of Cochran Gardens' business records. Ms. Stovall-Reid, however, had never seen the documents until shortly before the trial. Out of an abundance of caution, the government read into evidence the former testimony of Ms. Norma Bell, the records custodian who laid the foundation for the introduction of the time cards and payroll records at the first trial. 6 Notwithstanding the testimony of Ms. Stovall-Reid and Ms. Bell, Turner and Kelly contend that the government failed to lay a sufficient foundation for the introduction of the time card and payroll evidence, and, therefore, the district court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence under the business records exception to the rule against hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). As with most evidentiary decisions, we may reverse a district court's determination of the adequacy of the foundation laid for the admission of evidence only if the district court clearly abused its discretion. See United States v. Franks, 939 F.2d 600, 602 (8th Cir. 1991). 25 A sponsoring witness need not possess or even see the records in question before trial. See United States v. Coohey, 11 F.3d 97, 99-100 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that a sponsoring witness could authenticate phone records even though she had not seen or possessed the records prior to trial). In Coohey, we specifically noted that even if the witness was not the keeper of the records and did not prepare them,... [that] would not impede her ability to testify that the records were authentic. Id. at 100. See also id. at 100 n. 2 (applying the same rationale to arguments specifically directed to the foundation required under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)). Evidence is admissible if the trial Judge is satisfied, after consideration of such factors as the nature of the evidence, the circumstances surrounding its preservation and custody, and the likelihood that it has been tampered with, that the evidence has not in all reasonable probability been changed in any significant respect. Id. at 100. Further, Rule 803(6) is satisfied if the custodian'demonstrates that a document has been prepared and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity.' Franks, 939 F.2d at 602 (quoting United States v. Pfeiffer, 539 F.2d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 1976)). Having reviewed the relevant portions of the trial transcript, we conclude that the testimony of Ms. Stovall-Reid and Ms. Bell sufficiently established that the time cards and payroll records had been prepared and kept in the regular course of Cochran Gardens' business. Further, Brunson's and Givens's testimony established how the time entries on the time cards were made. We cannot say, therefore, that the district court clearly abused its discretion in admitting the time card and payroll evidence over the defendants' objections. 26 Finally, Turner contends that his confrontation rights were violated when the district court allowed the government to read Ms. Bell's former testimony into evidence. Because Ms. Bell was unavailable to testify at the second trial, and she testified at the first trial under oath and was then subject to cross-examination by Turner, there would normally be no problem reading her former testimony into evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (permitting the introduction of an unavailable witness's former testimony if the party against whom the testimony is now offered... had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination). Furthermore, Turner does not argue that the time cards and payroll records were improperly admitted at the first trial. Rather, Turner asserts that his confrontation rights were violated in the instant case because he was unable to impeach Ms. Bell's credibility with new evidence regarding Ms. Bell's alleged illegal activities, as contained in an FBI memo. We find this argument unpersuasive. 27 The government read Ms. Bell's former testimony into evidence solely to lay the foundation for the admission of the time card and payroll evidence. There is no credible assertion that the evidence contained in the FBI memo was either directly admissible or proper subject matter for cross-examination. The record does not show that Ms. Bell had been convicted on any felony grade charges related to the alleged illegal activities, and we reject the naked assertion that such evidence relates to Ms. Bell's motive or bias to testify falsely in laying the foundation for the business records in question. Simply stated, the district court did not infringe Turner's confrontation rights by permitting the government to read Ms. Bell's former testimony into evidence. 28 We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the time card and payroll evidence. We further hold that the district court did not violate Turner's confrontation rights when it permitted the government to read Ms. Bell's former testimony into evidence.