Opinion ID: 147900
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether, assuming a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable seizure, the right was clearly established

Text: Even assuming that Agent Durastanti did violate Mr. Thomas' constitutional right against an unreasonable seizure, we must determine whether that right was clearly established. See Perez v. Ellington, 421 F.3d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir.2005) (If our de novo review of Plaintiffs' version of the facts reveals that they do not amount to a violation of a clearly established right, we can reverse on an interlocutory basis.). The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains. Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992); see Smith v. Cochran, 339 F.3d 1205, 1215 (10th Cir.2003). While there does not have to be a case that is factually identical, it must still be apparent to a reasonable officer in light of pre-existing law that his conduct was unlawful. Price-Cornelison v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103, 1118 (10th Cir.2008); see Walker, 451 F.3d at 1151. The plaintiff bears the burden of citing to us what he thinks constitutes clearly established law. Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534-35 (10th Cir. 1995). On appeal, Mr. Thomas relies upon the two cases that the district court identified as providing the clearly established law that Agent Durastanti violated. First, the court cited Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir.2001), as establishing that `the pointing of firearms ... should be predicated on at least a perceived risk of injury or danger to the officers or others, based upon what the officers know at that time.' Aplt.App. 783. Second, the court cited Ryder v. City of Topeka, 814 F.2d 1412, 1417 (10th Cir.1987), to support the proposition that officers cannot use deadly force to prevent the escape of a suspect. Aplt.App. 783. Neither case clearly establishes the law with regard to the specific context of the case presented here. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, for the proposition that the inquiry into whether the law is clearly established `must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition'). Holland is not factually analogous. In Holland, the police pointed firearms at children and held the children at gunpoint after the officers had gained complete control of the situation. 268 F.3d at 1193. Here, in contrast, there was a rapidly developing situation and the officers clearly did not have complete control of the events that were unfolding. While Holland clearly states that the display of weapons should be predicated on a perceived risk of danger based on what an officer knows at the time, none of the risks or concerns identified by Agent Durastanti had been obviated when his weapon was displayed. Holland simply does not clearly establish that an officer may not draw his weapon when there is a rapidly developing situation with a traffic stop and the officers' concerns have not been obviated. Ryder likewise does not clearly establish that Agent Durastanti could not use deadly force in attempting to stop the Lincoln. Ryder repeats the Supreme Court's rule that a police officer may not seize a fleeing, non-dangerous suspect by shooting him. 814 F.2d at 1417. However, Ryder also states that police may use deadly force to apprehend a fleeing suspect where the officers have probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm. Id. at 1418. As discussed above, that is the situation presented in this case; the Lincoln posed an immediate threat of significant bodily injury or death to the agents and therefore Agent Durastanti was justified in using deadly force. Far from showing that Agent Durastanti violated clearly established law, Ryder suggests that Agent Durastanti's actions comported with clearly established law. A more analogous case is Robinson, where an INS agent identified himself as police, told the driver to put his hands up, and pointed his firearm at the driver. 415 F.3d at 1254. The driver began to move forward at a speed of one to two miles per hourrather than get crushed, the officer shot the driver. Id. The Eleventh Circuit had no difficulty concluding that the officer could use deadly force to stop a slow moving vehicle about to injure him. Id. at 1256. In addition to finding no constitutional violation, the court also held that no clearly established law suggested otherwise. Id. at 1256-57. Finally, the court declined to entertain other factual disputes concerning the circumstances under which the officer fired his gun. Id. at 1257. Mr. Thomas argues that Robinson is distinguishable because here the Lincoln was moving slowly towards Agent Durastanti and posed no real threata contention that we have rejected above as inconsistent with the latitude given officers and qualified immunity. The dissent contends that we have ignored the most relevant disputed facts, specifically how Agent Durastanti ended up in front of the Lincoln and where he was when the first shots were fired, in addition to placing too great a focus on a relevant disputed fact, the speed of the Lincoln. Yet the dissent also urges that in disregarding the factual dispute regarding the Lincoln's speed, Dissent at 672, we have misapplied Scott, 550 U.S. at 372, 127 S.Ct. 1769, as the entire sequence of events was not recorded and Mr. Thomas's version of the events is not blatantly contradicted by the record. Finally, the dissent contends that the law was clearly established in January 2006 based upon general principles concerning the use of deadly force. [I]t was unreasonable to step deliberately in front of the Lincoln and use deadly force to try to stop its flight from a traffic stop. Dissent at 674 n. 12. We must disagree with the dissent's analysis. As we have explained, the events must be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable, even if mistaken, officer. Agent Durastanti observed what appeared to be a stolen vehicle being driven in a reckless manner as though in flight, something more than a mere traffic violation. The Lincoln then submitted to a uniformed state trooper's show of lawful authority until it began pulling out of the parking lot. Agent Durastanti observed this. Once the Lincoln pulled away, Officer Durastanti was certainly entitled to assist in regaining control of the situation even if it brought him into close proximity of the Lincoln. See Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d 1065, 1075 (10th Cir.2010) (the Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least restrictive means in investigating a threat). The video makes it clear that the Lincoln did not stop, but rather continued while Agent Durastanti's efforts to assist placed him in a dangerous situation, notwithstanding that the Lincoln may have been moving slowly and deliberately. Given the close proximity of the agents, we have no doubt that the Lincoln was being driven in such fashion as to endanger human lifethat of the agents. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769. Moreover, we have explained that even if the video does not conclusively establish the speed of the Lincoln, qualified immunity is warranted. Given Mr. Thomas's version of the events and what the record establishes, we have addressed the legal question of whether the force was excessive. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1769. We cannot say that the use of deadly force in these circumstances was objectively unreasonable; courts have little difficulty in concluding that an officer's reasonable perception that a vehicle may be used as a weapon may allow for the use of deadly force. See McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1207 (11th Cir.2009) (We have... consistently upheld an officer's use of force and granted qualified immunity in cases where the decedent used or threatened to use his car as a weapon to endanger officers or civilians immediately preceding the officer's use of deadly force.). The fact that flight from a traffic stop may have precipitated these events does not make the vehicle any less dangerous. Of course, each case turns on its own facts and circumstances. See Zia Trust Co. ex rel. Causey v. Montoya, 597 F.3d 1150, 1154-55 (10th Cir.2010) (upholding the denial of qualified immunity in deadly force case where van was stuck on a retaining wall and officer was fifteen feet away). In these close confines, Agent Durastanti's actions (even if mistaken) were within the range of reasonableness allowed law enforcement agents under the excessive force and qualified immunity doctrines. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004). REVERSED.