Opinion ID: 2595437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: verdict form wrongful discharge and negligent misrepresentation

Text: On plaintiff Raymond Wilkinson's wrongful discharge and negligent misrepresentation claims against defendant Shoney's, Inc., we find in favor of: ____________ Plaintiff Raymond Wilkinson ____________ Defendant Shoney's Inc. The jury marked an X in the line showing a finding in favor of Wilkinson and went on to fill in the rest of the verdict form finding damages for lost earnings and benefits of $53,982, future lost earnings and benefits of $96,749, and $7,540 in lost medical expenses. Shoney's asserts the form was clearly erroneous because the jury may have found for Wilkinson only on the negligent misrepresentation claim and may have awarded some or maybe all of the damages on that basis. It relies on Munsell v. Ideal Food Stores, 208 Kan. 909, Syl. ¶ 7, 494 P.2d 1063 (1972) (trial court erred in submitting only one general verdict to the jury allowing it to return one verdict determining damages in a lump sum under all four counts of plaintiff's petition.). This verdict form appears at least in part to have been the result of Shoney's arguments to the trial court that under Mahler, the damages on a negligent misrepresentation claim are limited to the pecuniary loss caused by the misrepresentation. During this discussion in the trial court, the suggestion was made that a claim of pain and suffering should not to be submitted for the negligent misrepresentation claim: THE COURT: 9.01 would not be necessary at all. I could put negligent misrepresentation in with the MR. BOATRIGHT: [Shoney's counsel] The contract. THE COURT: The 14.22 youyou understand what he's saying? MR. NICESWANGER: [Wilkinson's counsel] I do, Your Honor. The court and parties discussed the risks to the parties and the difficulties that might result on appeal. But, the instructions on the elements of the claims were separately given, and the verdict form that was utilized apparently met with the approval of both parties. More importantly, it was not objected to by Shoney's and, as we have stated above, appears at least in part to have arisen out of the desire of Shoney's to limit the damages that might have been separately assessed if separate verdict forms were utilized. Shoney's actions are not precisely invited error (see Hawkinson v. Bennett, 265 Kan. 564, 585, 962 P.2d 445 [1998]), but the manner in which the verdict form was formulated by the court appears to have its roots in the discussion previously described. It should also be noted that the two different claims are conjunctively joined by and, which allows an equally plausible argument that both claims were found by the jury to exist. In the absence of a properly preserved objection by Shoney's, we are not prepared to hold that it may now obtain a new trial on an issue to which their own actions and contentions contributed. The verdict form is not clearly erroneous. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not allowing Shoney's to present after-acquired evidence of sexual harassment? In late 1994, a former Shoney's waitress, Shelly Nelson, filed an EEOC complaint claiming that Wilkinson sexually harassed her at work in 1987. It is Shoney's theory that Wilkinson would have been fired in 1994 based on Nelson's allegations, thereby diminishing his claim for lost earnings. Shoney's claims the trial court erred in refusing to allow it to present this after-acquired evidence in the form of the complaint and testimony of Juanita Presley that if Wilkinson had still been employed at Shoney's at the time of the complaint, she would have recommended terminating his employment. A proffer of Presley's testimony and a copy of the complaint was made. Presley was not the one who investigated the Nelson complaint for Shoney's. The trial court found that Shoney's had not laid a proper foundation for her to give a termination recommendation based only on the complaint. The court also noted that Shoney's failed to subpoena or take the deposition of Nelson to offer some substantiation of the complaint and that the jury would not have the opportunity to evaluate Nelson's credibility in order to weigh whether the company would rationally have fired Wilkinson based on her complaint. The court found the allegations were not substantial, and it had the right to exclude the evidence as being too prejudicial. See K.S.A. 60-445; State v. Knighten, 260 Kan. 47, 53, 917 P.2d 1324 (1996). We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit this evidence in the manner it was presented. Neither was this evidence required to be admitted under the principles of Gassman v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society, Inc., 261 Kan. 725, 728-29, 933 P.2d 743 (1997). The fact an employee was guilty of misconduct is one part of the three-prong test of McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 130 L. Ed.2d 852, 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995), and it is also required that the misconduct would have justified discharge and the employer would have discharged the plaintiff had the employer known of the misconduct. These requirements were not satisfied here. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Shoney's employee Hughes to testify? The standard of review for a trial court's ruling regarding the admission of evidence is whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Lumley, 266 Kan. 939, Syl. ¶ 1, 976 P.2d 486 (1999). Wilkinson asserts that Lawrence Hughes, Shoney's corporate representative, was not identified as a witness until just before trial even though the pretrial order seems to have required witnesses to be identified almost a year earlier, before the end of 1995. Shoney's made various arguments that it wanted Hughes as a fact witness on Shoney's employment policies, rehire policy, and retention of store managers, and to minimize Wilkinson's claimed damages. Wilkinson objected to Hughes testifying based on failure to timely designate him as a witness, the lack of opportunity to depose him, and his lack of knowledge of Wilkinson's employment progress because he had never been his supervisor. Wilkinson argues further that while a proffer was made it was not a sufficient one. These were all issues for the trial judge to weigh and resolve. The trial court sustained the objection to Hughes' testimony, citing failure to designate, prejudice, the fact it was the last day of trial, as well as lack of relevancy. Shoney's has failed to show an abuse of discretion in this matter. WILKINSON'S CROSS-APPEAL Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on Wilkinson's defamation claims? Wilkinson's defamation claims were based on statements made during the unemployment compensation proceedings, as well as other statements made to and by Shoney's employees. Wilkinson asserts the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on his claims of defamation against NEC and Shoney's. We do not agree. Any of the statements made in connection with the proceedings before the KDHR were privileged. See Clear Water Truck Co., Inc. v. M. Bruenger & Co., Inc., 214 Kan. 139, 141-43, 519 P.2d 682 (1974) (communications or statements given in the course of, and relevant to, quasi-judicial administrative proceedings are absolutely privileged). The statements made by Shoney's employees mainly concerned Wilkinson and the fact that a complaint had been made against him by DeLapp. These statements were not defamatory because DeLapp had complained of sexual harassment by Wilkinson. Truth is an absolute defense to an action of defamation, Froelich v. Werbin, 219 Kan. 461, 462, 548 P.2d 482 (1976), and the statements made were, in general, truthful. Wilkinson also asserts a claim of self-defamation. This claim has been made for the first time on appeal and will not be considered. Brock v. Richmond-Berea Cemetery Dist., 264 Kan. 613, Syl. ¶ 6, 957 P.2d 505 (1998). The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on Wilkinson's defamation claims. Did the trial court err in not granting discovery sanctions against Shoney's? Finally, Wilkinson appeals the trial court's decision not to grant discovery sanctions against Shoney's. Our standard of review on this issue is abuse of discretion. See Shay v. Kansas Dept. of Transportation, 265 Kan. 191, Syl. ¶ 1, 959 P.2d 849 (1998). This matter was hotly contested. Wilkinson filed and the trial court ruled on several motions to compel. Some motions were not ruled on at pretrial and were left pending until after the interlocutory appeal was dismissed at which time the trial court heard arguments and denied the motion for sanctions. The facts relevant to discovery are complex and in dispute, with each side complaining about the other's behavior. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wilkinson's motions for sanctions under the circumstances of this case. Summary of holding The State of Kansas does not recognize the tort of malicious defense, and the judgments for malicious defense against Shoney's and NEC are reversed. The award of punitive damages against Shoney's is reversed. There was substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's ruling that Wilkinson's contract of employment was entered into in Kansas. Whether Shoney's breached its implied employment contract and wrongfully discharged Wilkinson was a question for the jury. The trial court erred in submitting Wilkinson's claim of negligent misrepresentation to the jury. The verdict form was not clearly erroneous, and the verdict of the jury on the implied contract/wrongful discharge claim is affirmed. Shoney's has failed to show abuse of discretion regarding the exclusion of its after-acquired evidence of sexual harassment and the testimony by Hughes. Wilkinson's claims of defamation and discovery sanctions in his cross-appeal are denied. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. MCFARLAND, C.J., SIX, J., and DAVIS, J., not participating. KNUDSON, J., WAHL, S.J., and JACKSON, S.J., assigned. [1]