Opinion ID: 1881795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of Evidentiary Error

Text: As can be seen by this language, the trial court erred in ruling on the admissibility of the character evidence pertaining to the victim when it was not sure exactly whether the evidence sought to be admitted pertained to reputation only or whether it also included evidence of specific acts committed by the decedent. To the extent that the evidence sought to be admitted pertained to the decedent's reputation only, it was error for the trial judge to exclude it. However, if the defendant also sought to admit evidence of specific acts of violence or turbulence committed by the decedent, it was not error for the trial judge to exclude it. We find that the evidentiary error committed by the trial court was not harmless. We recently adopted the highly probable standard for determining nonconstitutional harmless error in People v. Gearns, 457 Mich. 170, 577 N.W.2d 422 (1998). Under that standard, `[u]nless the appellate court believes it highly probable that the error did not affect the judgment, it should reverse.' People v. Mateo, 453 Mich. 203, 219, 551 N.W.2d 891 (1996), quoting Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error (Ohio State Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 34-35. We cannot say that there is a high probability that the inclusion of evidence pertaining to the deceased's violent character would not have affected the judgment. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, the defense rested on three theories: intoxication, self-defense, and accident. Although the theories of self-defense and accident may seem inconsistent, according to the defendant, he drew his knife in self-defense, but the actual stabbing occurred by accident when the two men collided. Because an important theory of defendant's case was self defense, character evidence tending to show the victim's violent character should have been admitted to show (1) that the victim was the likely aggressor, and (2) the defendant acted out of self defense. [1] Therefore, we remand Harris for a new trial on the basis of evidentiary error committed in the first trial.