Opinion ID: 741492
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim

Text: A cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is a recognized exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 683 (Cal.1992). As required by Gantt, Taber ties her cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy to specific provisions of public policy codified in California's overtime statutes. Id. at 688. If an employee is entitled to overtime pay under California law, the employer may not abrogate its obligation to pay such compensation by written agreement. Further, absent an explicit wage agreement, a fixed salary does not serve to compensate an employee for statutory overtime worked. Because the California wage and hour laws are modeled to some extent on federal laws, federal cases may provide persuasive guidance. However, [some of California's exemptions are narrower than the FLSA and] [t]he employer bears the burden of proving an employee is exempt. Exemptions are narrowly construed against the employer and their application is limited to those employees plainly and unmistakably within their terms. Nordquist v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., Inc., 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 221, 225-26 (Cal.Ct.App.1995) (emphasis added, citations and footnote omitted). Compare Magana v. Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, No. 95-16120, 1997 WL 212509, at  11 (9th Cir. May 1, 1997) (exemptions to the FLSA are narrowly construed and employers have the burden of proving employees fit plainly and unmistakably within an exemption's terms). On remand, the district court must first require Murdoch to meet its burden of proving that Taber was not entitled to overtime because she was plainly and unmistakably an exempt employee. Nordquist, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d at 226. Murdoch claims Taber was exempt because she was an outside salesperson under the terms of California Labor Code section 1171 and California Code of Regulations section 11040(2)(J). Although Taber concedes that she spent more than half of her time working away from Murdoch's office, she contends that she does not fit within the definition of outside salesperson because she sold nothing and took orders for nothing. Moreover, Taber says she never explicitly agreed that Murdoch would not be required to pay her overtime, and was never advised that she was considered an outside salesperson or an exempt employee. Given the contentions of the parties, we find resolution of this threshold issue to be fact dependent and not susceptible to summary judgment. 2 If Murdoch meets its burden and proves Taber was exempt from receiving overtime under California law, then Taber cannot tie her claim to a violation of public policy by Murdoch and the inquiry ends. However, if Murdoch fails to prove Taber was an exempt employee, it seems that the district court should then require Taber to bear the burden of proving that Murdoch's claim that it terminated her because of poor job performance was a pretext for the real reason for which she alleges she was terminated (i.e., because she complained about not receiving overtime to which she was legally entitled). We are not aware of any decision published by a California court which specifically employs the burdens of proof used in discrimination cases for cases involving retaliatory discharges in violation of public policy. However, we note that the district court referred to the shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and on appeal, the parties each discuss terms such as prima facie case and pretext. 3