Opinion ID: 694896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wrongful Infliction of Intentional Injury.

Text: 26 Jacobsen-Wayne's third claim is entitled wrongful infliction of intentional injury. I have searched the Hawaii reports, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Prosser, and Harper and James, in vain for any such tort. There is no such tort. 27 The substance of the claim alleged under that heading is that the doctor intentionally wrote a false report which caused emotional injury to Ms. Jacobsen-Wayne. We are required to review a 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo, and to determine whether the facts stated could amount to a claim upon which relief could be granted. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957). Reading this most liberally to Ms. Jacobsen-Wayne, the claim is one for intentional infliction of mental distress. 28 Hawaii recognize the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress. Fraser v. Blue Cross Animal Hospital, 39 Haw. 370 (1952). In Fraser, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the cause of action was available even in the absence of physical injury to property or person. It gave three elements that must be present: 29 (1) that the act is intentional; (2) that it is unreasonable; and (3) that the actor should recognize that it is likely to result in illness. 30 Id. at 375. The second element, unreasonableness, has been defined by the Hawaii Supreme Court as meaning: without just cause or excuse and beyond all bounds of decency. Id. Hawaii equates this with the term outrageous used in the Restatement of Torts. Chedester v. Stecker, 664 Haw. 464, 43 P.2d 532 (Haw. 1982) (citing 1 Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 46 (1946)). 31 The district court correctly held that as a matter of law, Dr. Kam's actions were not unreasonable. Under Hawaii law, whether an act is unreasonable for the purposes of this tort is first a question for the court, and only left to the jury when reasonable persons could differ. Fraser v. Blue Cross Animal Hospital, 39 Haw. at 377 (1952). The Hawaii Supreme Court stated that a court should decide whether the facts alleged would ... justify any finding that the [alleged acts] ... were unreasonable and beyond the bounds of decency. Id. at 377. 32 The case is nothing like the examples of outrage in the Restatement. See Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 46 (1977). Nor does it resemble the bombardment of improper dunning letters and collection techniques by creditors, the subject of Chedester. Chedester, 643 P.2d at 534. Dr. Kam did not act unreasonably in expressing his opinion to Hyatt Regency's risk manager, regardless of whether it might foreseeably cause Ms. Jacobsen-Wayne distress. The report was not addressed to her, and the doctor cannot be said to have intentionally directed his conduct toward her. It would be unreasonable to require a physician writing an independent medical report to sugar coat it, depriving his employer of his honest advice, in order to avoid upsetting the sensitivities of the subject of his report. 33 Ms. Jacobsen-Wayne's brief accuses the doctor of gender bashing, and claims that gender bashing was the outrage. The report is 42 single spaced pages, providing a comprehensive discussion of Ms. Jacobsen-Wayne's entire medical history. The gender bashing she claims is that the report mentions that she had an abortion, that her husband had died of cancer recently causing her distress, that her son had been in trouble with the law, causing her further distress, and that she had a hysterectomy. Plaintiff's theory is that these were irrelevant, and that mentioning them in the course of the lengthy report reflected gender bias. The district court properly dismissed this claim. 34 As with many independent medical examination reports, the issue on which the doctor had to advise was whether the subject's complaint were caused by the accident for which compensation was sought, or by other things. A doctor could reasonably opine that distressing family circumstances and other medical conditions were relevant to the subject's inability to function fully in the workplace. Ms. Jacobsen-Wayne had reported numerous medical problems, all of which she related to her falls at work involving the peacock and the nut bag, and the car accident when she was being driven to the doctor. The symptoms she complained of included: sleeplessness, depression, anemia, cold sweats, blurred vision, headaches, abdominal pains, pains in her neck, back, hands, chest, numbness in her hands and arms, among others. There were also several other falls and accidents. Her treatment had included extensive medication for emotional problems, including: Prozac, Amitriptyline, Limbitrol, Flexeril, Dalmane and Xanax, among others. Dr. Kam expressed the opinion, based on his examination of the patient, and his review of her extensive medical history, that significant preexisting psychosocial problems rather than the work related injuries were what interfered with her ability to work. There was no outrage to that, regardless of whether the doctor mentioned family problems and medical conditions which could only befall females in the course of reaching and expressing that opinion. 35 This case should be disposed of consistently with Wong. Wong v. Panis, 7 Haw. App. 414, 772 P.2d 695, 701 (Haw Ct. App. 1989). Wong affirms a summary judgment dismissing a claim of intentional infliction of mental distress based on abusive questions asked a plaintiff in litigation. The court explained that the alleged abuses were not outrageous or beyond the bounds of decency and that the defendants were entitled to present the Panises' side of the running dispute and to vindicate their position. That the questions were embarrassing did not make them so unreasonable as to create liability for an intentional tort. 36 The case is unlike Marshall. Marshall v. University of Hawaii, 9 Haw. App. 21, 821 P.2d 937 (Haw. Ct. App. 1991). There an associate professor was denied tenure because of a sexual harassment complaint asserted during his tenure review process. Id., 821 P.2d at 946. The college did not follow its own procedures regarding the sexual harassment complaint, did not require a showing regarding the more than six months delay in filing the complaint after the alleged harassment as its own regulations required, and did not require the complaining party to put the complaint in writing as required by its regulations. Id. The professor alleged that the complaint was maliciously instigated by the defendants, yet he was not allowed to conduct discovery to find out why the college departed from policy, and whether the departure was maliciously motivated. These allegations were bolstered by the fact that the allegations were brought forth near the eve of his tenure confirmation. The court in Marshall held that there was a genuine issue of fact regarding reasonableness which, in the truncated condition of discovery, precluded summary judgment. Id. at 947. 37