Opinion ID: 223677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Majority's Legal Errors

Text: The majority compounds its analytical problems, and wrongfully denies Petitioner a writ of habeas corpus, by misconstruing the standard for Brady materiality and applying its skewed legal framework to its unsupportable version of the facts. The majority purports to review the state court's adjudication of Petitioner's Brady claim to ensure that the state court did not unreasonably appl[y] Brady to the facts of [Petitioner's] case. (Maj. Op. at 677.) However, under the guise of according the state court decision AEDPA deference, the majority abdicates its duty on habeas to search for constitutional error with painstaking care, Kyles, 514 U.S. at 422, 115 S.Ct. 1555, and rubber stamps the state court's opinion. Thus, the majority adopts the state supreme court's legal errors, and integrates them into its analysis of Petitioner's Brady claim. In formulating the requirements for Brady materiality, the majority states that the Brady standard is not met if the petitioner shows merely a reasonable possibility that the suppressed evidence might have produced a different outcome; rather a reasonable probability is required.... In Kyles, the Supreme Court elaborated ... that Brady materiality is not a sufficiency of evidence test. Nor does Brady require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in ... a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.... [T]he obligation of a reviewing court [is] to consider the totality of the evidence  and not merely exculpatory facts in isolation  when evaluating a claim of error for its prejudicial effect. (Maj. Op. at 678-80 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).) Furthermore, quoting Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 383, 386, 175 L.Ed.2d 328 (2009), the majority states that [i]n evaluating the question of prejudice, it is necessary to consider all the relevant evidence that the jury would have had before it if the defense had pursued a different path  not just the mitigation evidence the defense could have presented, but also the other evidence that almost certainly would have come in with it. (Maj. Op. at 679 (internal modifications omitted).) Thus, according to the majority, a reviewing court, when considering a defendant's claim of prejudice, must evaluate the weight of mitigating and aggravating evidence regarding the defendant's guilt, rather than simply tallying instances of mitigation. ( Id. at 679-80 (internal emphasis omitted).) After describing the facts implicating Petitioner, the majority applies this standard to conclude that because of the considerable evidence of [Petitioner's] guilt, ( id. at 681), the report is not material under Brady and its progeny. The majority makes three significant missteps in its materiality formulation. First, by stating that the Brady standard is not met if the petitioner shows merely a reasonable possibility that the suppressed evidence might have produced a different outcome; rather a reasonable probability is required, ( id. at 678), the majority distorts the meaning of reasonable probability. The Supreme Court has stated that the touchstone of materiality is a `reasonable probability' of a different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not whether [a] defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555. Rather, [a] `reasonable probability' of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. at 435. Kyles contrasted reasonable probability with likely to illustrate that the materiality burden, while high, does not require a showing that disclosure of the exculpatory evidence would likely have produced a different result. The majority, however, contrasts probability with possibility, tacitly changing the meaning of the word probability in the materiality context to require a likelihood of a different result for Brady materiality. Second, although the majority recites the correct legal standard for determining Brady materiality, the majority nonetheless applies a sufficiency of the evidence standard in assessing the report's materiality. The Supreme Court stated unequivocally in Kyles that Brady materiality is not a sufficiency of evidence test, and emphasized that [a] defendant need not demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough left to convict. The possibility of an acquittal on a criminal charge does not imply an insufficient evidentiary basis to convict. Id. at 434-35, 115 S.Ct. 1555. Nevertheless, in finding that the report is immaterial, the majority lists the inculpatory evidence presented at Petitioner's trial, and finds that the report alone does not affect the considerable evidence of [Petitioner's] guilt. (Maj. Op. at 681.) The majority simply tallies up the inculpatory pieces of evidence and pits them against what it regards as the single piece of exculpatory evidence suppressed in this case, without evaluating the quality and strength of the various pieces of evidence. In so doing, the majority ignores both the qualitative nature of the Brady materiality inquiry, and the serious credibility issues undermining the evidence against Petitioner. This constitutes legal error. Third, in an attempt to bolster its finding of immateriality, the majority asserts that the report is cumulative, and thus not material for Brady purposes, stating that [w]here the undisclosed evidence merely furnishes an additional basis on which to challenge a witness whose credibility has already been shown to be questionable or who is subject to extensive attack by reason of other evidence, the undisclosed evidence may be cumulative, and hence not material. ( Id. at 681) (quoting Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486 (6th Cir.2000).) The majority mistakes the report's potential purpose. As discussed further below, because the case against Petitioner was significantly weaker than the majority suggests, the report casts further doubt on Petitioner's guilt, and illuminates additional avenues that the defense could have pursued, thereby highlighting the existing difficulties with Petitioner's conviction and sentence. [3] Thus, contrary to the majority's contention, the report was far from cumulative. In finding the report cumulative, the majority also misunderstands the legal definition of cumulative evidence. Our Court has expressed frustration that [o]ur cases ... do not tell us clearly when evidence becomes sufficiently different to no longer be `cumulative' or at what level of generality one must compare the evidence. Vasquez v. Bradshaw, 345 Fed.Appx. 104, 120 (6th Cir. 2009). However, we have most often stated that new evidence is not cumulative if it differs both in strength and subject matter from the evidence actually presented at [trial]. Goodwin v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 301, 327 (6th Cir. 2011); see also Tibbetts v. Bradshaw, 633 F.3d 436, 444 (6th Cir.2011) (finding that evidence that deals with the exact same subject as the evidence presented at the petitioner's trial was cumulative because in order to establish prejudice, the new evidence that a habeas petitioner presents must differ in a substantial way  in strength and subject matter from the evidence actually presented.... (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Landrum v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 905, 930-32 (6th Cir.2010) (finding undisclosed evidence cumulative when [t]rial counsel presented most of the same facts because [t]he petitioner must present new evidence that differs both in strength and subject matter from the evidence actually presented ... not cumulative mitigation evidence); Beuke v. Houk, 537 F.3d 618, 645 (6th Cir.2008) (To establish prejudice, the new evidence that a habeas petitioner presents must differ ... in strength and subject matter  from the evidence actually presented at sentencing.... evidence [that] mirrors the evidence introduced during the penalty phase is insufficient to meet this standard); Johnson v. Bagley, 544 F.3d 592, 603 (6th Cir.2008) (finding that petitioner's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate mitigation evidence, and finding that [c]ompetent counsel could have put on evidence that differed in ... strength and subject matter  from the evidence actually presented at sentencing (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Vasquez, 345 Fed.Appx. at 120 (describing this as our most skeptical formulation). The degree of difference necessary for new evidence to be non-cumulative may depend on the strength of the evidence against a petitioner. See Vasquez, 345 Fed.Appx. at 120. The report presents entirely new information, factually unrelated to any of the evidence available to Petitioner at the time of his trial, and which was untouched by the credibility problems affecting some of the trial evidence. No other piece of evidence connected with Petitioner's case suggested that Ogle was not killed on March 8, 1986, and no other evidence came from Ogle's high school classmates who were otherwise uninvolved with Petitioner's trial. Particularly because of the weakness of the case against Petitioner  indeed the evidence against Petitioner was largely circumstantial with only Heard's substantially untenable testimony directly implicating Petitioner  the report was not cumulative. See id. It is irrelevant that the report could have served a similar purpose as evidence actually presented at Petitioner's trial. The majority opinion, therefore, commits three significant errors in its formulation of the Brady materiality inquiry. It first raises the quantum of proof required for a showing of materiality under Brady by misconstruing the meaning of reasonable probability, and effectively defining it as a likelihood. The majority then compounds its error by transforming its materiality inquiry into a sufficiency of the evidence test, and finds that the report is not material because it does not discount the inculpatory evidence presented at Petitioner's trial. Third and finally, the majority hastily dismisses the report as cumulative despite the wholly new evidence it contained.