Opinion ID: 2514008
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Compliance with our prior order of remand

Text: Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, when an appellate court decides a rule of law, that decision governs the same issues in subsequent proceedings. [11] The doctrine only applies to issues previously determined, not to matters left open by the appellate court. [12] On remand, the district court redetermined and awarded Wheeler Springs damages, but refused to award Wheeler Springs interest, costs, and attorney fees, on the basis that this relief was not mandated under the law of the case of the first appeal. In our remand order, however, we specifically instructed the district court to award Wheeler Springs rent and other charges due to Wheeler Springs under the various lease agreements with the Tenants. Each of the respective lease agreements expressly provided for interest, costs, and attorney fees. [13] Thus, because the law of the case on the original appeal mandates these awards, we conclude that the district court erred in its failure to provide Wheeler Springs this relief. In light of our original order of reversal and remand, Wheeler Springs also requested restitution for the monies it paid the judgment, costs, and attorney feesto the Tenants. As noted, the district court refused to award restitution, concluding that such a request was also beyond our order of reversal and remand. We have stated: `Upon the reversal of the judgment against him, the appellant is entitled to the restitution from the respondent of all the advantages acquired by the latter by virtue of the erroneous judgment.' [14] The Restatement of Restitution § 74 (1937), extends this principle: A person who has conferred a benefit upon another in compliance with a judgment, or whose property has been taken thereunder, is entitled to restitution if the judgment is reversed or set aside, unless restitution would be inequitable or the parties contract that payment is to be final.... To permit one who has collected money upon a judgment later reversed to retain the same would in most cases result in unjust enrichment. [15] Although we have recognized the principle of restitution when a judgment is reversed, we have yet to decide whether the district court has the inherent authority to grant an order of restitution when we have not expressly ordered it. However, other jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the trial court has inherent authority to order restitution when a judgment has been reversed, even though the appellate court did not expressly order such relief. [16] The California Court of Appeal has stated that a motion for restitution upon a reversed judgment is within the sound discretion of the court and such a motion may be denied in exceptional cases. [17] Here, the district court erroneously concluded that it was without discretion under the law of the previous appeal to award restitution of the monies paid pursuant to the original judgment. Because we embrace a new rule concerning the satisfaction of money judgments pending appeal, and given the scope of the original remand, we conclude that Wheeler Springs was entitled to restitution upon reversal of the judgment against it. Wheeler Springs' failure to obtain a supersedeas bond or stay of execution does not affect its entitlement to this equitable relief. [18] The Tenants argue that they would suffer prejudice if they were required to pay restitution because of the substantial amount of time that has elapsed. But, it is said that the respondent who collected upon the judgment immediately becomes a trustee for his opponent with respect thereto. [19] Wheeler Springs' appeal was pending when the Tenants received payments on the judgment; therefore, we conclude that the Tenants' prejudice argument is without merit, as they were on notice that the judgment might be reversed. In addition to restitution for the paid judgment, we conclude that Wheeler Springs is entitled to restitution for the attorney fees it paid to the Tenants. We note, however, that the Tenants are responsible for restitution of the attorney fees, and not the Tenants' attorney as Wheeler Springs contends. The general rule in Nevada is that attorney fees are not recoverable unless authorized by agreement or by statute or rule. [20] The statutes that permit an allowance of attorney fees specifically state that such an award is recoverable by the prevailing party; thus, the client, not the attorney, is awarded the attorney fees. [21] Also, the lease agreements provide that either the landlord or the Tenant, whichever is the prevailing party, shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees. Whatever arrangement exists between the Tenants and their attorneys does not affect the Tenants' obligation to pay an attorney fee award under the lease or repay restitution of such an award reversed in the prior appeal.