Opinion ID: 2329283
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Complaints to Bar Counsel

Text: Respondent also based his claims of defamation on Mr. Grossman's letter to Bar Counsel. The consistent decisional law of this court has held that D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 19(a) prohibits a litigant from maintaining a cause of action based on an ethical complaint to Bar Counsel. See, e.g., Weaver v. Grafio, 595 A.2d 983, 988 (D.C.1991); In re Nace, 490 A.2d 1120, 1123-24 (D.C. 1985); see also Solomon v. Supreme Court of Fla., 816 A.2d 788, 790 (D.C.2002) (citing Rule XI, § 19(a) for the proposition that this jurisdiction generally provides immunity to all its bar disciplinary participants). Despite the plain meaning of Rule XI, § 19(a), and the consistent interpretation given the rule by this court, respondent maintains that Rule XI, § 19(a) is ambiguous, and that his actions did not violate Rule 3.1 because the defamation suit came within that rule's exception for a good-faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. As noted above, the plain text of Rule XI, § 19(a) makes clear that no claim or action predicated on complaints to bar counsel may be instituted or maintained. Respondent fails to cite a single case which has held that an attorney may maintain a legal action based on an ethical complaint to Bar Counsel. And with good reason; the case law of this court weighs entirely against a suit such as the one respondent filed against the District and its attorneys. This court has held that it has the authority to declare immune from suits or action under the law of the District of Columbia, the conduct of those who provide information or make complaint to the Board. Our rule does so. In re Nace, 490 A.2d at 1124 (interpreting D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 9(a), the verbatim predecessor to Rule XI, § 19(a)). Since Nace, we have consistently held that Rule XI, § 19(a) means what it says; that complaints made to Bar Counsel are absolutely privileged, and those making such complaints are absolutely immune from suit. See, e.g., Weaver, 595 A.2d at 988 (holding that by the very terms of the rule, [the complainant] cannot be held liable for sending a copy of the [complaining] letter to the Board on Professional Responsibility); Solomon, 816 A.2d at 790 (citing Rule XI, § 19(a) for the proposition that this jurisdiction generally provides immunity to all its bar disciplinary participants). Respondent nonetheless maintains that Rule XI, § 19(a) is ambiguous because in contrast to the term absolute privilege used in the Rule, no similar adjective modifies the word immunity. He therefore argues that the immunity granted by the rule is not necessarily absolute. As a matter of textual interpretation, it would be difficult to give effect to the term absolute privilege without similarly construing the word immunity. Privilege is defined as a special legal right, exemption, or immunity granted to a person or class of persons. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1234 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). The phrase employed in the rule, absolute privilege, is defined as a privilege that immunizes an actor from suit, no matter how wrongful the action might be. Id. Therefore, whether one turns to the plain meaning of the terms employed in Rule 19(a), or the interpretation of the Rule found in our cases, it cannot seriously be maintained that Rule 19(a) is ambiguous in its provision of an unqualified immunity resulting from its grant of absolute privilege. Under the circumstances, such an argument would not be made in good faith as required by the permissive clause of Rule 3.1.