Opinion ID: 1442022
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Coercion of Juror Lizana.

Text: Defendant's second contention is that Juror Roy Lizana was coerced to return a sentence of death. We disagree. On the sixth day of deliberations, the jury's requests for clarification for the first time focused on a single, allegedly recalcitrant juror. On that day, the jury submitted a question: We have one juror who continues to use insanity or mental disturbance as a mitigating circumstance even though you, the judge, have said we can't use it. He refuses to discuss the case any more. Is there anything you can do, being he is disregarding your ruling completely? Following a discussion with counsel and over the objection of defense counsel, the court determined that a hearing was in order to ascertain whether the juror was in fact refusing to deliberate. The court summoned the jurors and asked them collectively whether there was any among them who felt he or she could not or would not consider the evidence and follow the court's instructions. There was no response. The court then secured from the foreman the name of the allegedly offending juror (Roy Lizana). At this time defense counsel asked the court to determine the numerical division of the jury. The court refused to do so and excused all jurors except Mr. Lizana. After cautionary warnings concerning the limited nature of the examination it was conducting, the court obtained Lizana's assurance that he was not using insanity as a mitigating circumstance and that he was following the court's instructions in that regard. The entire colloquy follows: [Court:] Mr. Lizana, before I ask you any questions, sir, I want to caution you. I don't want you to give me any of your thinking whatsoever. You have a right to your own private thinking. What I am obligated to go into is the subject matter of the note which indicates that you were considering something as a mitigating factor that I indicated there was no evidence of. Any of your other reasons for what your thinking is are not my concern at this time. They are your own concern. You may have a thousand reasons for any particular way you intend to vote, and those reasons may all be valid reasons. The only problem that I have to find out at this time is are you disregarding the court's instruction that was given to you that Mr. Haskett is presumed sane and that this may not be considered as a mitigating factor. That is all you have to answer. You don't have to answer me another thing. Do you understand? [Lizana:] I understand what you said. That wasn't my idea. That was the question. That was the question they sent in to you. [Court:] That is all I want to know. Then, as far as you are concerned, are you following the court's instruction on this particular point? [Lizana:] Yes, I am. [Court:] That is all I want to know. As far as I am concerned, that is sufficient. But I can only go on what I have heard. Then it's your assurance that you are not using this as a mitigating circumstance and you are following the court's instruction as far as whatever conclusions you have come to; is that correct? [Lizana:] I figure if he was, we wouldn't be sitting in here now. If he was judged insane, we wouldn't have had to come in. Leave it at that. [Court:] Don't tell me any more. All I want is your assurance. That is sufficient for me. Though pressed by the prosecution to ask further questions to test Lizana's credibility concerning his alleged refusal to deliberate, as to which the court had not yet questioned Lizana, the court refused, stating that its only concern was whether Lizana was unwilling or unable to follow the court's instruction: In any other case, somehow I might consider going into a jury deliberative processes, but in this case where we all are aware that any individual who is exercising mercy can hang up a jury, I am not going to go into a situation  if he were hanging up a jury because his sole reason is that he will not follow the court's instructions on a particular point, then I might go into it further. But if he has other reasons on which he is basing his disagreement, and that is what he has represented to me, ... I would not go into deliberative processes where we have a situation in which an individual, one individual, decides to exercise mercy and question him on that. Nonetheless, despite its expressed reluctance to question Lizana on his alleged refusal to deliberate, the court recalled Lizana and asked several questions: Mr. Lizana, relax. This is just to be sure that I understand you. Do you use insanity or mental disturbance as a mitigating circumstance? Lizana responded, No, ma'am. The court asked, Do you refuse to discuss the case with other jurors? Lizana stated, No. I never did refuse to deliberate. And to the question, Are you willing to continue deliberating?, Lizana answered, I am. The court thereafter directed the jury to continue deliberating, and on the afternoon of the following day the jury reached its verdict of death. Defendant urges that the court proceedings in relation to Juror Lizana were fatally coercive. His attack is multifaceted. Not only does defendant question the propriety of conducting a hearing at all, he also asserts that a combination of factors in this case lead to the inevitable conclusion that the juror was coerced. Our review of the record, including the court's conduct and remarks, discloses no impropriety. In People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478 [250 Cal. Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081] we addressed the issue of alleged coercion due to the trial court's remarks during an inquiry into possible juror misunderstanding or misconduct. There, as here, the defendant claimed that, in obviously stressful circumstances, with assertedly only a single juror holding out against the death penalty, certain of the court's remarks unfairly coerced the minority juror. We found no impropriety. The court's comments in the instant case are even more innocuous than those in Keenan, where the alleged recalcitrance concerned ability or willingness to impose the death penalty. The duty of the court to conduct the inquiry is well settled. (See People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 519-520 [224 Cal. Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251] [once a juror's inability to perform his duty is called into question, a hearing to determine the facts is clearly contemplated, and the failure to conduct a hearing is an abuse of discretion]; People v. Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d 478.) (8) We stated in Keenan that when a trial court learns during deliberations of a jury-room problem which, if unattended, might later require the granting of a mistrial or new trial motion, the court may and should intervene promptly to nip the problem in the bud. ( Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 532.) We cautioned, however, that any intervention must be conducted with care so as to minimize pressure on legitimate minority jurors. ( Id. at p. 533.) (9) Here, the court had ample grounds to conduct an inquiry based upon the foreman's note which suggested that a juror was refusing to perform his duties. Defendant nevertheless maintains that, even assuming that an inquiry was necessary, factors or circumstances peculiar to this case rendered the inquiry inherently coercive. We consider each of the factors and find that, neither singly nor in combination, do they import coercion in the otherwise properly conducted proceeding. First, defendant states that the trial judge singled out the only holdout juror and suggested to him that he was not obeying his oath after the numerical split and direction of the vote was known and revealed. Defendant is wrong in several respects. There is no indication that Lizana was the last, lone, holdout juror who opposed the death penalty. Indeed, all that was revealed by the foreman's notes to the court was that one juror allegedly was not following the court's instructions and was refusing to deliberate. The numerical split and direction of the vote was not known or revealed. The court was careful to avoid learning the jury's division on the ultimate question of life or death and, as pointed out previously, rejected defense counsel's request to secure the count. Finally, although both before and during the hearing Lizana was necessarily aware that he was being accused of refusing to perform his duties, at no time was it suggested that he was disobeying his oath. The court at all times was discreet and sensitive to allay any fears Lizana might have had as to the purpose of the inquiry. The record belies defendant's claims that Lizana was identified and berated for not obeying his oath, that the trial judge suggested she believed the foreman's note accusing Lizana of disobeying her orders, and that, by her answers and instructions, the trial judge implied that she agreed with the jurors who were voting for death. Defendant mischaracterizes the record further when he asserts that the judge's instructions had the ring of flat orders not to vote for life. To the contrary, the judge's comments expressed a concern not to impose any view on Lizana and indicate that the judge was sensitive and concerned to protect Lizana's right to vote for life on the basis of mercy or for any reason other than insanity. Unlike in People v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d 810, 816 [69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 442 P.2d 353], there was no urging of an agreement and no pressuring to reach a verdict. Nor did the judge encourage Lizana to reconsider his position in light of the positions taken by the other jurors, as in People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835 [139 Cal. Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997, 97 A.L.R.3d 73]. There is no indication that Lizana opposed a death verdict as such; the dispute among the jurors was clearly focused on the applicability of the factors to be considered in reaching the verdict. We find no impropriety in the manner in which the trial judge conducted the hearing. The second factor cited by defendant as adding pressure and coercion of verdict was the presence in the courtroom of the family members of the victims when Lizana was subjected to the court's inquiry. Be that as it may, the defendant's family members were also present. We find no relevance in the fact that some members of the victim's family were sitting on the plaintiff's side of the courtroom, closest to the jury box. The only case cited by defendant is a Mississippi case ( Fuselier v. State (Miss. 1985) 468 So.2d 45) in which the appellate court found error in permitting the victim's daughter to sit at the prosecutor's table. The third factor which, it is alleged, tended to coerce Lizana's decision was the knowledge that a prior jury had returned a verdict of death. On voir dire each juror was told that the case had been sent back to this court on a retrial on the penalty phase only because of some legal errors. That the prior verdict was death was revealed in the course of the trial in comments by the prosecutor, defense counsel, and witnesses. Defendant's grandmother testified, for example, that she was present at the first trial when they give him the gas chamber. Defendant cites no authority to suggest that knowledge of the prior verdict is necessarily coercive. There was no objection at the trial at any time when the information was revealed. We are persuaded that the jury selection procedures and the instructions given adequately protected against any coercive influence from the knowledge that a prior jury had returned a death verdict. Fourth, defendant complains that misinformation as to the consequences of a failure to reach a verdict may have swayed Lizana to join the majority. When the jury had asked, What happens if we have a split jury, the court replied, A mistrial would be declared, and the jury dismissed. Defendant urges that the court should have advised, in accord with former section 190.4, subdivision (b), that the defendant would in that circumstance have been sentenced to life without possibility of parole. We decided this issue contrary to defendant's position in People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480 [244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803]. We found no error in the trial court's refusal to educate the jury on the legal consequences of a possible deadlock. We also noted the policy reasons for the holding: [A]ny juror inclined against a finding that death was the appropriate penalty would have realized he could prevail simply by refusing to participate in good faith in the deliberations: by remaining obdurate and causing a jury deadlock, he would have in effect a veto power over the verdict. ( Id. at p. 515.) (Accord, People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 552 [262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129] [also tried under the 1977 death penalty statute].) In People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744 [248 Cal. Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310] we likewise found no error in the failure of the court to instruct the jury on the consequences of a deadlock under the 1978 death penalty law. The final coercive factor, urges defendant, is the court's responses to the jury's inquiry concerning insanity and mental disturbance. The thrust of the argument is that they were coercive because they were erroneous. Having decided that the responses were not erroneous, we reject the contention that Lizana was improperly swayed by the comments. In sum, we conclude that the court did not err in conducting an inquiry and, further, that the manner in which the inquiry was conducted was not coercive. (10) (See fn. 11.) Neither singly nor in combination did the factors cited by defendant coerce Juror Lizana to return a verdict of death. [11]