Opinion ID: 2624500
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Instructions Regarding Prior Unadjudicated Criminal Activity

Text: The trial court instructed the jurors they could consider in aggravation the following allegations of incidents of unadjudicated criminal activity under section 190.3, factor (b): the assault and battery of Ruth Story; the assault and battery of Beverly Manning; the assault and battery of Frank Auer; the assault and battery of Kenneth Dotson; the two assaults and batteries of Jerre Brown; the assault and battery of Rosie Blackmon; the threat to Donna Hatch; the threats to Frank Sexton, Thomas McArdle, Patrick O'Connor and Brandon Armstrong; the assault, battery and attempted rape of Patricia Robinson; the assault and battery of Thomas Ryan; the assault and battery of William Hanson; and the assault of Johnnie Christiansen. The court further instructed the jurors that before they could consider these allegations as factors in aggravation, they must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant in fact committed those acts. The court also instructed that they need not unanimously agree regarding each circumstance in aggravation. Defendant argues the failure to require unanimity as to factors in aggravation allowed the jurors to impose a penalty of death based on unreliable factual findings that were not subjected to the test of a unanimous jury verdict. We have rejected this argument, and concluded that the United States Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348] and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428] have not altered these conclusions. ( People v. Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th 310, 365-366.) Defendant fails to persuade us to revisit this issue. Defendant further argues the court's instructions failed to limit the criminal acts the jurors could consider as factors in aggravation to those specifically alleged by the prosecution. He argues the jurors might have concluded that the list of assaults set forth in the instruction was a list of examples of the types of criminal activities they could consider, rather than a list of the specific criminal actions they could consider. We disagree. The court instructed as follows: The mitigating circumstances I've just read for your consideration are given as examples of some of the factors that you may take into account and as reasons for deciding not to impose a death sentence in this case. You should not limit your consideration of mitigating circumstances to these specific factors.  So, the factors in mitigation really are cited by way of example and not by way of limitation. On the other hand, the factors in aggravation and those essentially are the first three matters I mentioned, the facts and circumstances of the crime itself, any prior felony convictions, and any other criminal activity by Mr. Hamilton which involves the use or attempted use of force or violence or express or ... implied threat to use force or violence. Those are the only circumstances in aggravation which the law permits you to consider. You're not allowed to consider any other facts or circumstances as circumstances in aggravation as a basis for determining that the death penalty is the appropriate penalty in this case.  (Italics added.) Contrary to defendant's argument, these instructions clearly informed the jurors they were specifically limited to the listed criminal acts they could consider in aggravation.