Opinion ID: 6218015
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intervention as a Matter of Right

Text: This court review’s a circuit court’s statutory interpretation de novo, as it is this court's responsibility to determine what a statute means. Douglas Companies, Inc. v. Walther, 2020 Ark. 365, 609 S.W.3d 397. Likewise, denial of a motion to intervene as a matter of right is reviewed de novo. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Bass, 2015 Ark. 178, at 8–9, 461 S.W.3d 317, 323. In Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC v. Gulfside Casino Partnership, 2021 Ark. 17, 614 S.W.3d 811, we held that if a putative intervenor satisfies the requirements for intervention as of right specified by Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4 24(a)(2), the circuit court cannot deny the motion to intervene. Apart from the threshold timeliness requirement, Rule 24(a)(2) establishes three requirements for intervention of right: (1) the applicant must have a recognized interest in the subject matter of the primary litigation; (2) the applicant’s interest might be impaired by the disposition of the suit; and (3) the applicant’s interest is not adequately represented by existing parties. See Bass, 2015 Ark. 178, at 14, 461 S.W.3d at 326.
We first consider Bayer’s contention that, in denying its motion to intervene, the circuit court relied on an inapplicable section of the APA rather than Rule 24. As noted previously, the circuit court based its decision to deny intervention on section 25-15-212(g). It notes that the instant litigation challenges an agency rulemaking, whereas section 25-15212 applies only to appeals of agency adjudications. See Ark. Code Ann. § 25-15-212(a) (“In cases of adjudication, any person . . . who considers himself or herself injured in his or her person, business, or property by final agency action shall be entitled to judicial review of the action under this subchapter.”). Bayer contends that an adjudication is “an agency process for the formulation of an order.” Ark. Code Ann. § 25-15-202(1)(A). Further, an order is “the final disposition of an agency in any matter other than rulemaking.” Ark. Code Ann. § 25-15-202(6). Bayer asserts that appellees challenge a rulemaking, not an adjudication, which means that their complaint is brought under section 25-15-207––not section 25-15-212. It asserts that section 25-15-207 does not limit review to the agency record. Thus, the circuit court erred in holding that section 25-15-212(g) applies to this litigation and prevents Bayer’s intervention. We find this argument compelling. 5 While both judicial review of adjudications and declaratory judgments are provided for under the APA, the scope and relevant procedures are not interchangeable. As provided in section 25-15-212(h), (h) The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. It may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) In excess of the agency's statutory authority; (3) Made upon unlawful procedure; (4) Affected by other error or law; (5) Not supported by substantial evidence of record; or (6) Arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion. By comparison, under section 25-15-207 of the APA,, the purpose of declaratory judgment serves a much different purpose: The validity or applicability of a rule may be determined in an action for declaratory judgment if it is alleged that the rule, or its threatened application, injures or threatens to injure the plaintiff in his or her person, business, or property. We hold that section 25-15-212 of the APA, does not bar the granting of circuit court clearly erred in denying Bayer’s motion to intervene. based on section 25-15-212. Because we find this argument dispositive on this subpoint, we need not consider Bayer’s alternative argument that even if section 25-15-212(g) does apply, it would not bar intervention. However, our determination that the circuit court’s rationale for denying Bayer’s motion to intervene was incorrect does not end our inquiry. Because the APA provides no standard for intervention, Rule 24 applies. We must therefore consider whether Bayer met the requirements of Rule 24. because we will affirm if the circuit court reached the right result, even though it stated the wrong reason. See Bushong v. Garman Co., 311 Ark. 228, 6 843 S.W.2d 807 (1992). Bayer argues that it was entitled to intervene as a matter of right because it satisfied all the requirements stated in Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 24. Bayer asserts that the motion was timely; it has protectable interests in the enforcement of the agency rule at issue and in defending the federal registration and label for its low-volatility dicamba herbicide; resolution of appellees’ claims could impair Bayer’s interests; and none of the parties adequately represent Bayer’s interests. We agree. We first note that Bayer’s motion to intervene was filed just twenty days after the appellees filed their complaint. In McLane Co. v. Davis, 342 Ark. 655, 659, 33 S.W.3d 473, 475 (2000), we set forth the criteria whereby we might judge timeliness: (1) how far have the proceedings progressed; (2) has there been any prejudice to other parties caused by the delay; and (3) what was the reason for the delay. Id. There has been no appreciable delay in Bayer’s filing, and no prejudice is indicated because the circuit court entered a temporary restraining order prior to Bayer’s filing. We next consider whether Bayer has a sufficient “interest” to support a right to intervene. Our inquiry is guided by Cherokee Nation Businesses, supra. There, in our de novo review, we determined that Cherokee had a sufficient interest in the litigation based on its status as the only qualified applicant for the Pope County casino license and a contractual economic development agreement with Pope County. Id. And, as in the case before us, the putative intervenor had only a monetary interest in the outcome of the litigation. The rule governing the application of Dicamba directly affects the product’s marketability. This analysis dovetails with the second factor enumerated in Rule 24: whether the putative 7 intervenor’s interest might be impaired by the disposition of the suit. Bayer has asserted that by allowing less application time, it will sell less product and denigrate the “VaporGrip” technology, which imposes a reputational injury. We hold that the second factor has been established. Finally, Bayer was required to show that its interest is not adequately represented by the Plant Board. We agree with Bayer that appellees’ complaint directly challenges whether the Plant Board reviewed “the best, reasonably obtainable scientific, technical, economic evidence and information available showing the need for, consequences of, and alternatives to the existing rule.” As both Bayer and appellees contend, much of that information was presented by Bayer. In effect, Bayer is in a position to defend the information that persuaded the Plant Board to extend the application time for Dicamba in the 2021 Dicamba Rule. As such, we hold that Bayer’s interest in this area is not adequately represented by the Plant Board. Thus, we hold that the circuit court clearly erred in denying Bayer’s motion to intervene. We therefore reverse the circuit court’s denial of the motion to intervene and order that it allow Bayer to intervene as a matter of right. Having so held, it is not necessary to consider Bayer’s alternative argument concerning permissive intervention. Reversed and remanded. Brett D. Watson, Attorney at Law PLLC, by: Brett D. Watson; and Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, by: A. Elizabeth Blackwell and Stefani L. Wittenauer, for appellant. Richard Mays Law Firm, PLLC, by: Richard H. Mays, for appellees. 8