Opinion ID: 2116215
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: guilty plea evidence

Text: In his next assignment of error, Larsen, by relying on State v. Robertson, 219 Neb. 782, 366 N.W.2d 429 (1985), argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a guilty plea made by his codefendant Briney to charges arising out of his participation in the murders of Clinchers and Nelson. The record shows that during the State's direct examination of Briney, after Briney had already detailed his participation in the murders, the prosecutor asked Briney whether, since agreeing to testify on behalf of the State, he had pleaded guilty in juvenile court to being an accessory after the fact for his part in the same crimes for which Larsen was being tried. Over Larsen's objection, Briney replied in the affirmative. In State v. Robertson, supra , we held that evidence of a codefendant's conviction was inadmissible and denied the defendant her right to a fair trial. However, we observed, in State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456, 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998), that our holding in State v. Robertson, supra , relied primarily on the lack of relevance of a codefendant's conviction to the defendant's guilt and held that to the extent that Robertson and State v. Greeno, 230 Neb. 568, 432 N.W.2d 547 (1988), indicate that evidence of a codefendant's guilty plea or conviction lacks relevance regardless of the purpose for which it is offered, they are hereby overruled. State v. Lotter , 255 Neb. at 507, 586 N.W.2d at 627. In so holding, we stated that whether a codefendant's guilty plea is admissible evidence turns upon whether it was properly offered to help the jury assess the codefendant's credibility or was improperly offered as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt. Generally, evidence that another person has been convicted of the same crime for which the defendant is on trial is not admissible as proof of the guilt of the defendant. Id. The same evidence, however, may be admissible for other reasons. For instance, under proper instruction, evidence of a codefendant's guilty plea or conviction may be elicited by the prosecutor on direct examination so that the jury may assess the credibility of the witness that the government asks it to believe. Id. (citing United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir.1981)). In State v. Lotter , we concluded that because the prosecutor did not emphasize the plea agreement on direct examination of the codefendant, it was not improper for the prosecution to briefly offer evidence of a codefendant's guilty plea so long as it was relevant to the codefendant's credibility at trial. As in State v. Lotter, supra , because the prosecutor in her direct examination of Briney did not emphasize the guilty plea and only offered the same after Briney had extensively detailed his participation in the murders, we are persuaded that the prosecution in the instant case was also attempting to blunt a predictable effort by the defense to impeach Briney's credibility with the plea agreement. Therefore, we determine that the evidence of Briney's guilty plea was offered for a legitimate, relevant purpose, that is, as evidence of Briney's credibility and not as substantive evidence of Larsen's guilt. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting such evidence. Nonetheless, because evidence of a codefendant's guilty plea is amenable to misuse, we held in State v. Lotter, supra , that even when such evidence is admissible, a curative instruction is required when requested by the defendant's counsel. Normally, the danger of misuse of a codefendant's guilty plea may be averted by adequate cautionary instructions that make it clear to laypeople that evidence of a witness' own guilty plea can be used only to assess credibility. See United States v. Halbert, supra. No curative instruction was given to the jury in State v. Lotter, supra ; however, because the defense counsel did not ask the court to give such an instruction or object to the absence of such an instruction, we concluded that the defendant could not complain on appeal about incomplete instructions. In the instant case also, a curative instruction was not given to the jury. However, as in State v. Lotter , because the record shows that Larsen did not request a curative instruction or object to the absence of such an instruction, Larsen is now precluded from complaining on appeal about incomplete jury instructions. See, also, Wallace v. Lockhart, 701 F.2d 719 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 934, 104 S.Ct. 340, 78 L.Ed.2d 308. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit and not grounds for a reversal.