Opinion ID: 2626902
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the de facto parent doctrine is constitutional

Text: ¶ 91 Finally, my belief that Jones is a de facto parent and thus entitled to standing is constitutional. The Constitution of the United States, specifically the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion). To protect this fundamental right, parents are entitled to a presumption that a fit parent acts in the best interests of his or her child. See id. at 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (`The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.' (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979))). This presumption cannot be rebutted simply because a state judge believes a `better' decision could have been made. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73, 120 S.Ct. 2054. ¶ 92 Troxel is the preeminent case addressing a parent's fundamental rights in the context of third-party visitation. Troxel addressed the application of a Washington statute that allowed `any person' to petition for visitation rights `at any time' and gave a court the authority to grant visitation if it `serve[d] the best interest of the child.' Id. at 67, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (quoting Wash. Rev.Code § 26.10.160(3) (1994)). The plurality held that, as applied, the statute violated the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. Id. at 66-67, 120 S.Ct. 2054. According to the plurality, the statute exceeded the bounds of due process because its breadth allowed any third party to bring a visitation petition, and it did not afford a parent's decision any deference despite the parental presumption. Id. at 67-68, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Rather, the visitation statute allowed a court to overturn any parent's decision regarding visitation based solely on its determination of the child's best interest, id. at 67, 120 S.Ct. 2054, which was precisely what the district judge in the case had done, id. at 68-70, 120 S.Ct. 2054. ¶ 93 However, the de facto parent doctrine does not violate a parent's due process rights under Troxel. The de facto parent doctrine is not nearly as broad as the statute at issue in Troxel. It does not grant any third party standing, but only those persons who have satisfied the stringent requirements of de facto parenthood. Moreover, a finding of de facto parent status does not amount to a judge's determination that a better decision could have been made with regard to visitation, but rather, to a finding that the parental presumption does not apply when a legal parent creates and fosters a parent-child relationship between his or her child and a third party. [12] Also, when a judge makes a determination that a party is a de facto parent, the judge is only determining that the party has standing and is thus entitled to a hearing on the best interests of the child. Thus, the judge's decision that a party is a de facto parent is not a determination of what visitation arrangement is best. See T.B. v. L.R.M., 567 Pa. 222, 786 A.2d 913, 919-20 (2001) (A determination of standing simply implies that the party has a substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation and . . . does not speak to [a third party's] chance of success on the merits.). ¶ 94 Moreover, nothing in Troxel suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits third-party visitation in all contexts or always requires a rebuttal of the parental presumption. In fact, the Troxel plurality specifically limited its holding to the sweeping breadth of the Washington statute, noting that it had not considered whether the Due Process Clause always requires a showing of harm as a prerequisite to third-party visitation. 530 U.S. at 73, 120 S.Ct. 2054. The Court also stated that it was not defining the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context. [13] Id. ¶ 95 Therefore, I do not believe that the Due Process Clause is violated under Troxel when a judge grants a de facto parent standing in a visitation matter. I recognize that a parent has a right to make decisions regarding the upbringing of his or her child. However, a parent exercises this right when he or she invites a third party to form a parental relationship with his or her child and thereafter actively fosters the relationship. By incorporating the legal parent's intent into our de facto parent test, I am giving deference to the legal parent's decisions. However, once a legal parent exercises this right and creates a de facto parent relationship between the child and another, the legal parent has a reduced expectation of privacy and autonomy. A parent who encourages the formation of such a relationship cannot later unilaterally sever the connection or complain that a court has violated his or her rights by protecting the relationship. As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained in V.C. v. M.J.B .: [A] parent has the absolute ability to maintain a zone of autonomous privacy for herself and her child. However, if she wishes to maintain that zone of privacy she cannot invite a third party to function as a parent to her child and cannot cede over to that third party parental authority the exercise of which may create a profound bond with the child. 163 N.J. 200, 748 A.2d 539, 552 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926, 121 S.Ct. 302, 148 L.Ed.2d 243 (2000). ¶ 96 This approach is consistent with post- Troxel decisions that have granted third parties standing where the third party has a substantial relationship with the child. [14] For instance, this court determined that Utah's grandparent visitation statute was constitutional and upheld a grant of visitation, against the father's objection, where the maternal grandparents had lived with the child and interacted with her on a daily basis prior to the death of the child's mother. Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, ¶¶ 1-4, 144 P.3d 1083. As recognized in S.T.T., when a family is divided by events such as divorce, a situation may arise where the child's interests differ from those of the parent. Id. ¶ 30. The de facto parent test would provide[] guidance to courts in determining whether the petitioning [third party] ha[s] established circumstances under which the courts can, nevertheless, supersede the parent's decision, just as courts may do when the third party seeking visitation is a grandparent. Id. ¶ 35. As this court has previously recognized, situations exist in which visitation with a third party may be in the best interests of a child despite the legal parent's objections, and like Utah's grandparent visitation statute, the de facto parent test would, I believe, survive constitutional scrutiny. ¶ 97 In conclusion, the recognition of de facto parenthood would not infringe upon the general right of parents to raise their children in the manner they deem appropriate. Rather, de facto parenthood addresses only the specific circumstances that arise when a parent consents to and fosters a de facto parent relationship between the parent's child and another party. It merely recognizes that when a parent encourages another to form a de facto parent relationship with a child, the parent and the third party are not the only parties affected by the decision. There is another interested party: the child. In these situations, in order to properly address the best interests of the child, it is appropriate to grant the de facto parent standing. ¶ 98 I therefore conclude that under Utah common law, de facto parents should have standing to seek visitation, despite the objections of a biological or legal parent. De facto parenthood recognizes that when a natural parent fosters such a relationship, the child is also affected and ought to be protected from losing a relationship with someone who is, as far as the child is concerned, a parent.