Opinion ID: 2614564
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: trial court's refusal to use a special verdict form

Text: ¶22 Collins' third assignment of error is the trial court's refusal to employ his proposed special verdict form. Whether a trial court correctly refused to give a special verdict form is a question of law. See State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 655 (Utah 1995). However, a court has considerable discretion in accepting proposed special verdict forms. See, e.g., Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah 1989). ¶23 The form Collins proposed consisted of two questions: 1. Based upon a preponderance of the evidence, did Plaintiff discover, or should he have discovered, his legal injury prior to March 24, 1991. 2. State the date, or describe the event, upon which you determine that Plaintiff discovered or should have discovered his legal injury. Instead, the trial court presented the jury with a special verdict form Dr. Wilson proposed, which was substantively similar to question 1 of Collins' proposed form: Based upon a preponderance of the evidence as against Dr. Wilson, did plaintiff discover or should he have discovered prior to March 24, 1991, his legal injury as the phrase `discovery of injury' is defined in these instructions? ¶24 Collins asserts that the jury was required under Utah law to specify exactly what event they determined should have placed him on notice of his legal injury. However, this is not the legal test accepted in Utah. The statute of limitations does not require a plaintiff to receive full enlightenment concerning the cause and date of his legal injury. Instead, it is enough that the jury determined, in Collins' own proposed language, [b]ased upon a preponderance of the evidence, that Collins discovered or should have discovered his legal injury prior to March 24, 1991. Collins argues that, absent the jury's identifying a specific date of discovery, the trial court and the appellate courts are left to guess what the jury was thinking. However, in this case the evidence is sufficiently straightforward to eliminate such guesswork. ¶25 The jury did not experience some mystical epiphany in reaching their verdict; rather, their verdict was based upon the totality of the evidence, following four days of testimony and evidence, including evidence of numerous conversations and letters between the Collinses and their doctors discussing the possible connection between the surgery and Collins' motility problems. We therefore cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to use Collins' proposed verdict form.