Opinion ID: 2802975
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cross-Examination Using Smith’s 1999 Letter

Text: We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, and we will disturb an evidentiary ruling only where the decision to admit or exclude evidence was “manifestly erroneous.” United States v. Samet, 466 F.3d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 2006). Moreover, even if a ruling was “manifestly erroneous,” we will still affirm if the error was harmless. United States v. Miller, 626 F.3d 682, 688 (2d Cir. 2010). The error was harmless if it is not likely that it contributed to the verdict. United States v. Gomez, 617 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2010). “The following factors must be weighed in determining whether the wrongful admission of evidence constituted harmless error: (1) the overall strength of the prosecutor's case; (2) the prosecutor’s conduct with respect to the improperly admitted evidence; (3) the importance of the wrongly admitted testimony; and (4) whether such evidence was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Upon review of the record, we conclude that allowing portions of this letter to be read during cross-examination of the defendants, without context and without any limiting instruction, was “manifestly erroneous.” Although the letter was never admitted into evidence, the district court nonetheless permitted the government to simply read to the jury the most prejudicial and inflammatory portions of the letter under the guise of asking questions. (See, e.g., Gov’t App’x 652 (“Did Mr. Smith, your business partner, write: . . . ?”).) The fact that the 1999 letter was permitted to be used in this manner in the cross-examination of McGinn, who testified that he had never received the letter, was especially prejudicial and improper. 17 No. 13-3164-cr However, to vacate a conviction on this basis, allowing the prosecution to use the 1999 letter in the manner that it did, cannot have been harmless – we must be able to “conclude with fair assurance” that the improper use of evidence “did not substantially influence the jury.” United States v. Groysman, 766 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2014). Considering the overall strength of the government’s case and the fact that the letter was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence, we find that the district court’s treatment of the 1999 letter was harmless error. As previously noted, the government adduced substantial evidence that McGinn and Smith, among other things, directed that money be diverted from various accounts and entities for improper purposes, ordered MS&C’s accounting staff to make false entries intended to conceal unauthorized transactions, misappropriated millions of dollars for themselves and offered false explanations and directed the creation of false documents in response to the FINRA investigation. When considered in the context of a record containing substantial evidence of the defendants’ guilt, we cannot conclude that the improper use of the document had a substantial impact on the result of the trial. B. Whether Reading Portions of the Letter Constituted a Constructive Amendment or Variance Because defendants raise their constructive amendment claim for the first time on appeal, we review it for plain error. United States v. Bastian, 770 F.3d 212, 219 (2d Cir. 2014). “To prevail on a constructive amendment claim, a defendant must demonstrate that the terms of the indictment are in effect altered by the presentation of evidence and jury instructions which so modify essential elements of the offense charged that there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant may have been convicted of an offense other than that charged in the indictment.” United States v. D’Amelio, 683 F.3d 412, 416 (2d Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original, quotation marks omitted). A variance occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are not 18 No. 13-3164-cr changed, but the evidence at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged. However, the “proof at trial need not, indeed cannot, be a precise replica of the charges contained in an indictment [and] this court has consistently permitted significant flexibility in proof, provided that the defendant was given notice of the ‘core of criminality’ to be proven at trial.” United States v. Heimann, 705 F.2d 662, 666 (2d Cir. 1983). Defendants’ argument that the use of excerpts from Smith’s 1999 letter constituted a constructive amendment or prejudicial variance is unavailing. The government’s arguments, the indictment, and the evidence introduced at trial all related to charged conduct that occurred from 2006 to 2010. The jurors were further instructed that, to find the defendants guilty of conspiracy, they had to find that, for some time between September 29, 2006 and April 20, 2010, the defendants had entered into an unlawful agreement to commit mail or wire fraud. McGinn and Smith also had sufficient notice of the “core of criminality to be proven at trial,” as they had been warned from the beginning that portions of the letter could be admitted and the evidence adduced at trial did not establish facts different from those alleged in the indictment. Heimann, 705 F.2d at 666. Accordingly, we conclude that there was no constructive amendment or fatal variance.