Opinion ID: 2232175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Police Discretion

Text: The majority upholds the warrantless inventory search in the present case also because the trooper's opening of defendant's closed cigarette case constituted a reasonable exercise of judgment on the officer's part. However, the very essence of an inventory search is that a police officer does not exercise any discretion. The officer does not decide to search based on his or her judgment that certain conditions are present. ( Opperman, 428 U.S. at 383, 96 S.Ct. at 3104, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1013-14 (Powell, J., concurring).) A police officer cannot be given complete, if any, discretion in choosing whether to search or not to search closed containers found during an inventory search. See generally Wells, 495 U.S. at 10, 110 S.Ct. at 1638, 109 L.Ed.2d at 10 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The inventory search in the present case did not meet fourth amendment requirements. The trooper did not open defendant's closed cigarette case based on any standard police policy, including the general order. Rather, he testified that he acted based on his experience.The trooper's personal experience does not constitute a standard police procedure. (See United States v. Kordosky (7th Cir.1990), 909 F.2d 219, 221, on remand (1991), 921 F.2d 722 (appeals court remanded case to district court to determine whether the standard practice of a police officer regarding inventory searches constituted official police policy or merely his personal judgment).) I agree with the result in Willhite, where the court rejected an officer's decision to search behind a car seat, a decision which made sense to the officer based on his personal experience. The court concluded: That is precisely the kind of individual discretion that a policy for inventories has to preclude. The seized items should have been suppressed. Willhite, 110 Or.App. at 574, 824 P.2d at 422. I lastly note that the State does not and, based on the evidence, could not contend that defendant's automobile was abandoned in the context of the fourth amendment. Abandoned property lies outside of the zone of protection offered by the fourth amendment. ( People v. Dorney (1974), 17 Ill.App.3d 785, 787, 308 N.E.2d 646; see People v. Arnett (1991), 217 Ill.App.3d 626, 632, 160 Ill.Dec. 448, 577 N.E.2d 773.) Because fourth amendment concerns are not applicable when an automobile is abandoned, it may be seized by the police without a warrant and examined with no limitations on the scope, intensity, or objectives of the examination. The automobile and its contents may be retained for use as evidence. ( Duncan v. State (1977), 281 Md. 247, 263, 378 A.2d 1108, 1118.) Whether property is abandoned is a question of fact requiring an examination of the intent and actions of the defendant. The party asserting abandonment bears the burden of proof by clear, unequivocal, and decisive evidence. Dorney, 17 Ill.App.3d at 787-88, 308 N.E.2d 646. The record in the present case shows that the windows of defendant's car were rolled up, the doors were locked, and the keys were not in the ignition. Also, Main, who was defendant's friend, was present during the impoundment and defendant attempted to take possession of her automobile the next morning. These facts would not support the contention that defendant intended to abandon her automobile in the context of the fourth amendment. As in Wells, the warrantless inventory search in the present case was not sufficiently regulated to satisfy the fourth amendment. I would affirm the appellate court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.