Opinion ID: 2971868
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis Under the Federal Probation Act

Text: The district court properly tolled Hurley’s probation sentence. Under the FPA, a district court could order that probation commence after parole completion. See United States v. Einspahr, 35 F.3d 505, 506 (10th Cir. 1994) (consecutive probationary sentence presumed to begin after parole completion); United States v. Williams, 15 F.3d 1356, 1359 n.3 (6th Cir. 1994) (“A paroled convict is still, as a matter of law ‘in custody’ [and a consecutive] probationary sentence begins . . . after [he] has ‘served’ the remainder of his . . . ‘custodial’ sentence.”). Further, tolling is appropriate where a probationer’s own conduct removes him from probationary supervision—as in this case, where Hurley was imprisoned on an unrelated offense. See United States v. Gerson, 302 F.2d 430, -3- No. 03-6451 United States v. Hurley 431 (6th Cir. 1962). Thus the district court properly tolled Hurley’s probation until completion of his parole. The FPA also allowed district courts to revoke, modify conditions of, or change the period of probation, so long as the total period of probation does not exceed five years. Williams, 15 F.3d at 1358. Because the district court acted within its authority by modifying the probation period, it had jurisdiction to revoke Hurley’s probation. Therefore, we affirm. -4-