Opinion ID: 2635796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A Qualifying Circumstance Existed Because Ms. Olea Temporarily Resided in Utah

Text: ¶ 32 Before reaching the question of Mr. O'Dea's knowledge, we first discuss the existence of a qualifying circumstance. A qualifying circumstance under Utah Code section 78-30-4.14(10)(a) is any of the following that occurs between the date of conception and the date the mother executes a consent to adoption: (i) the child or the child's mother resided, on a permanent or temporary basis, in the state of Utah; (ii) the mother intended to give birth to the child in the state of Utah; (iii) the child was born in the state of Utah; or (iv) the mother intended to execute a consent to adoption or relinquishment of the child for adoption: (A) in the state of Utah; or (B) under the laws of the state of Utah. In interpreting statutes we look first to the statute's plain language to determine its meaning. H.U.F. v. W.P.W, 2009 UT 10, ¶ 32, 203 P.3d 943 (internal quotation marks omitted). We read the plain language of a statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under the same and related chapters. Id. Accordingly, [w]e seek an interpretation that renders all parts of a statute relevant and meaningful, and interpretations are to be avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When discerning the plain meaning of the statute, terms that are used in common, daily, nontechnical speech, should, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent, be given the meaning which they have for laymen in such daily usage. Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672, 675 (Utah 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 33 The Center argues that a qualifying circumstance existed under section 78-30-4.14(10)(a)(i) because Ms. Olea temporarily resided in Utah. [4] It seems that the district court and the parties assumed that Ms. Olea was residing on a temporary basis in Utah when she made the call to Mr. O'Dea. We address this conclusion to make clear that a qualifying circumstance must itself exist before a determination of the father's knowledge of the qualifying circumstance is determined. ¶ 34 This court has defined the term reside as [t]o dwell permanently or for a length of time; to have settled abode for a time. Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Utah 1980) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have also recognized that the term resident has no precise, technical, and fixed definition applicable in all contexts and to all cases. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 645 P.2d at 674. With these previously established concepts in the background, we interpret section 78-30-4.14(10)(a)(i) in a way that gives meaning to the term temporarily and also takes into account the unique situation addressed by the Utah adoption framework. ¶ 35 The time period between conception and relinquishment of the child for adoption is brief. Childbearing and adoption also carry unique emotional decisions and considerations. The legislature has, therefore, specifically stated that an unmarried mother, faced with the responsibility of making crucial decisions about the future of a newborn child, is entitled to privacy, and has the right to make timely and appropriate decisions regarding her future and the future of the child. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2)(b). ¶ 36 We decline to adopt a rule that establishes a minimum amount of time a mother must remain in Utah to become a temporary resident. While it is unclear from the record exactly how long Ms. Olea was located in Utah around the time of the birth, the totality of the circumstances in this case suggests that Ms. Olea temporarily resided in Utah. As discussed below, Mr. O'Dea has not presented a compelling argument that he was not put on notice that a qualifying circumstance existed or presented a compelling argument as to why Ms. Olea's presence in Utah did not constitute a temporary residence. We, therefore, find that the district court was not in error in determining the existence of a qualifying circumstance.