Opinion ID: 1750818
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Effect of Void Affidavit of Complaint

Text: Because the affidavit of complaint in this case was not made before a magistrate or a neutral and detached court clerk capable of making a probable cause determination, the affidavit of complaint failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 3. It was, therefore, void ab initio and ineffective to commence prosecution against the Defendant for his alleged DUI offense on August 15, 2004. See Best, 614 S.W.2d at 795 (recognizing that, where a defendant is arrested without a warrant, the failure to obtain an affidavit of complaint terminates the prosecution). The State, following the lead of the intermediate appellate court, argues that the Defendant's prosecution in this case was nevertheless commenced within the one-year limitations period because the Defendant and/or his counsel appeared in court prior to August 15, 2005, thereby satisfying the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-2-104. The Defendant contends to the contrary and asserts in his reply brief before this Court that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in relying upon the language in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-2-104 under the facts of this case, [10] arguing that an appearance must be based on a valid charging instrument, not a void one. In support of his contention, the Defendant makes a compelling argument: If [the Court of Criminal Appeals' application of section 40-2-104] is allowed to stand, once the Defendant or counsel enters the courtroom, any and all challenges to an illegal charging instrument are then forfeited. Of course, if the Defendant does not appear in court he is subject to forfeiture of his bond and re-arrest, at which time his forced appearance before the court would also cause forfeiture of his challenge to an illegal charging instrument. Accepting the lower court's interpretation renders Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) not only unenforceable, but moot. As recited above, a prosecution may be commenced so as to toll the running of the limitations period upon the defendant's making an appearance in general sessions court for the purpose of continuing the matter  or for any purpose involving the offense.  Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-2-104 (emphases added). This Court has previously recognized that section -104 provides for the commencement of a prosecution by several methods, all deemed to provide the defendant with sufficient notice of the crime. State v. Tait, 114 S.W.3d 518, 522 (Tenn.2003). Thus, the terms the matter and the offense as used in the last clause of section -104 necessarily refer to a crime that has been charged. A lawful accusation is an essential jurisdictional element of a criminal trial, without which there can be no valid prosecution. State v. Morgan, 598 S.W.2d 796, 797 (Tenn.Crim.App.1979); see also Myers v. State, 577 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Tenn.Crim.App.1978) (holding that, where a municipal court's records reflected a total absence of any sort of charging document ... the city judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the defendant's plea and ... the resulting judgment must be considered void). This Court has long recognized that, prior to formal accusation, [a] defendant's rights are protected by the statute of limitations. State v. Baker, 614 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tenn.1981) (citing United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), and Marion, 404 U.S. at 322-23, 92 S.Ct. 455). Accordingly, we hold that a defendant's court appearance may serve to commence a prosecution under section 40-2-104 so as to toll the statute of limitations only where that appearance is made in response to an offense that has been charged. The only purported charging instrument contained in the record before us that was issued prior to the expiration of the limitations period is the affidavit of complaint. We have determined that the affidavit of complaint was void ab initio. It did not, therefore, serve to charge the Defendant with any offense. See State v. Wilson, 6 S.W.3d 504, 507 (Tenn.Crim. App.1998) (recognizing that [u]nder Tennessee law, if a warrant does not meet procedural and constitutional requirements, it is [void]). Because the Defendant had not been charged with any offense, his appearances in court were not for the purpose of continuing the matter or for any purpose involving the offense within the meaning of section -104. Accordingly, his appearances did not serve as a commencement of the prosecution for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations. See Wilson, 6 S.W.3d at 507 (recognizing that [a] void warrant invalidates all subsequent proceedings emanating from the warrant) (citing State v. Campbell, 641 S.W.2d 890 (Tenn. 1982)). The only non-void charging instruments contained in the record on appeal in this case were issued more than one year after the alleged offense occurred and therefore after the limitations period had expired: the general sessions court issued an arrest warrant in September 2005 (after the judge had the arresting officer reexecute his affidavit of complaint and then finding the necessary probable cause to issue the warrant), and the grand jury issued an indictment subsequent to that. Because the limitations period had expired before these instruments were issued, they are of no force or effect for prosecuting the Defendant for the DUI offense he allegedly committed in August 2004. In sum, the State failed to charge the Defendant with a crime until after the limitations period had expired. Accordingly, the State is time-barred from pursuing this prosecution.