Opinion ID: 1458112
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The CPA's Purpose is to Regulate Radioactive Materials

Text: The CPA is preempted because it regulates within the field that is occupied by the AEA. [8] It is abundantly clear from the text of the CPA that it is intended to regulate both nonradioactive hazardous substances and radioactive hazardous substances in order to protect health and environmental safety. The Policy section of the CPA, which corresponds to § 2 of I-297, is telling as to the State's intent to regulate radioactive safety. Section 2(1) describes Hanford as a dump for radioactive and/or hazardous or toxic wastes[.] RCW 70.105E.020(1) (emphasis added). Subsection 4 warns that Washington's economy could be harmed from any accident releasing radiation [.] RCW 70.105E.020(4) (emphasis added). Subsection 6 expresses the state policy of protecting residents from cancer-causing substances, including radionuclides[.] RCW 70.105E.020(6). The substantive provisions of the statute also squarely regulate both the nonradioactive and radioactive components of hazardous waste. For example, the first sentence of § 4(2) states: Any facility owner or operator of a site storing, managing, processing, transferring, treating, or disposing of mixed wastes shall apply for and obtain a final facility permit under [the HWMA], this chapter, and [RCRA], before transporting to, storing or disposing at, the facility any additional mixed wastes not generated at the facility. RCW 70.105E.040(2). This section imposes a condition on the ability of facility owners to accept mixed waste that is generated off-site. Simply because the permit is issued under the RCRA does not require the term mixed waste to be interpreted in a way that excludes the radioactive component, an interpretation that would be at odds with the interpretation of the Washington Supreme Court. Similarly, § 6(1) directs Ecology to order site owners and operators where mixed wastes are believed to be disposed to cease disposal and initiate investigations. RCW 70.105E.060(1)(a). Some provisions in the CPA regulate pure AEA radionuclides. For example, under § 4(6)(b), Ecology is directed to not issue or modify a permit if there has been a release of radionuclides at the site or facility. RCW 70.105E.040(6)(b). Section 5 requires Ecology toconsider releases... of radioactive substances or radionuclides as hazardous substances and to require corrective action for, or remediation of, such releases[.] [9] RCW 70.105E.050(1). The purpose of the CPA is evident in these provisions: to regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of radioactive materials, among other materials, in order to protect the health and safety of Washington residents and the environment. Such regulation, however laudable its purpose, invades the province of the AEA. The Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Kentucky is particularly instructive. 252 F.3d at 816. There, the court addressed whether the AEA preempted state permit conditions on the disposal of radioactive waste in a landfill. The conditions prohibited the DOE from placing solid waste with more than a de minimis amount of radioactivity in a landfill and further prohibited the DOE from disposing of solid waste that contained radionuclides in a landfill without approval from Kentucky's Division of Waste Management. Id. at 820. The court noted that these permit conditions specifically limit the amount of `radioactivity' and `radionuclides.' Id. at 823. It explained that the state seeks to impose these conditions to protect human health and the environment. The permit conditions therefore represent an opportunity by the [state] to regulate materials covered by the AEA based on the [state's] safety and health concerns, and are thus preempted. Id. As in Kentucky, the State here seeks to impose conditions on the disposal of AEA materials out of concern for the health and environmental risks that increased contamination will cause. This type of regulation falls squarely within the field preempted by the AEA. The State attempts to sidestep the preemption issue by shifting the applicable definitions, contending that it is reasonable to read mixed waste within the operative provisions of the CPA as limited to the materials that may be regulated under the RCRA and the HWMA. This construction is neither reasonable nor legally permissible. The State's argument fails at the outset because we are bound by the Washington Supreme Court's opinion that mixed waste includes more than the materials regulated under the RCRA and the HWMA. See Reinkemeyer v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 166 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that [w]e are bound by the answers of state supreme courts to certified questions just as we are bound by state supreme court interpretations in other contexts.). The Supreme Court has explained that state courts are the ultimate expositor of state law [and] we are bound by their constructions except in extreme circumstances[.] Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). In other words, the State cannot re-litigate its argument that mixed waste should be read narrowly without invoking one of the few established grounds for disregarding a state court interpretation of state law. Reinkemeyer, 166 F.3d at 984. The State does not point to any obvious subterfuge to evade consideration of a federal issue or a violation of federal law that could undercut the Washington Supreme Court's analysis. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 1881; Reinkemeyer, 166 F.3d at 984. The State's position is somewhat curious because it was at the State's urging that the district court certified to the state supreme court questions that would determine whether mixed waste included substances that were not regulated under the RCRA or the HWMA. See Hoffman, 116 P.3d at 1001-02. The court answered in the affirmative. Id. at 1006. In arriving at this construction, the court rejected the arguments that the State and the Sponsors advance now that the CPA's reference to `hazardous substances' is necessarily limited to only those materials that have been released or pose a threat of release [making] the CPA ... coextensive with the HWMA and the RCRA. Id. at 1004 (emphasis in original). The court refused to ignore the direct cross-references incorporating the expansive definition of `hazardous substances' in RCW 70.105.010(14). Id. Ecology's contention that the word `waste' limits the application of otherwise clear and unequivocal statutory definitions to circumstances of `release or threatened release' is wholly without merit. Id. The court pointedly noted that it was left with a choice between two alternatives: a plain language interpretation based on the statutory definitions of `mixed waste' and `hazardous substance,' as espoused by the United States, or Ecology's position which would artificially eliminate much of the substance of these definitions. Id. at 1005. In the end, Ecology's artificial limitation would require [the court] to ignore long-held rules of statutory interpretation. Id. The State now argues that, under United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), we cannot invalidate a statute as unconstitutional if there is a reasonable, constitutional construction. It is equally true, though, that we cannot rewrite the statute to impose an artificial, unreasonable definition, Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988); United States v. Buckland, 289 F.3d 558, 564 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc), nor can we hold that the CPA is co-extensive with the RCRA and the HWMA when the state supreme court has expressly ruled otherwise. A key purpose of the CPA is to regulate the radioactive component of mixed waste, as well as the nonradioactive component, for health and safety reasons. Accordingly, the CPA is preempted by the AEA. Except for limited powers ceded to the states, and not disputed here, the federal government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns. Pac. Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 212, 103 S.Ct. 1713.