Opinion ID: 2525171
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Expert Rebuttal Evidence

Text: [¶ 24] After the defense rested, the prosecution notified the court that it would present a rebuttal witness. That witness offered expert testimony on proper forensic interviewing techniques of child abuse victims, the frequency with which physical evidence of sexual abuse is found, and the general behavior of child abuse victims. The defense's objection during the testimony on grounds that the testimony was improper rebuttal was overruled, and a subsequent motion for mistrial on grounds of discovery violations and improper rebuttal evidence was denied. [¶ 25] The record shows that despite a pretrial order requiring the prosecution to provide discovery under W.R.Cr.P. 16 and 26.2, the expert testified without notice to the defense. In Seivewright v. State, 7 P.3d 24 (Wyo.2000), we held that when a defendant alleges that the State has failed to comply with W.R.Cr.P. 26.2, the district court is required to hold a hearing and determine if any discovery violation has occurred, and the failure for the district court to hold a hearing is reversible error. Id. at 28. In this case, Warner waited until after the expert had testified before moving for a mistrial on grounds that he had not received pretrial notice that the expert would testify and had not been given her curriculum vitae, but he did not specify a W.R.Cr.P. 26.2 violation. Under these circumstances, Seivewright would not apply; instead, we apply an abuse of discretion standard to the trial court's failure to grant a motion for mistrial for violation of the pretrial order. See Lawson v. State, 994 P.2d 943, 946-47 (Wyo.2000). [A] mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy which should be resorted to only when there has been an error so prejudicial that justice could not be served by continuing the trial. Ramirez v. State, 739 P.2d 1214, 1220 (Wyo.1987). The discovery violation did not warrant granting a mistrial. [¶ 26] Warner contends that Ms. Huylar testified that she did not recall her interview with CM and refreshed her memory from her report. He contends that the defense's direct examination elicited only that Ms. Huylar's report indicated CM's mother was doubtful about the allegations, that CM alleged repeated intercourse, and that CM's physical examination did not show any evidence of repeated penetration. In direct examination Ms. Huylar did not offer any opinion about CM's credibility, her delay in reporting the abuse, how victims behaved as a result of threats or any other topics addressed by Dr. Tubach. Those issues were brought out during the State's cross-examination of Ms. Huylar. That cross-examination effectively had Ms. Huylar concede that her interviewing technique of CM was different as night and day from what she currently does, and that it was common for a child to refuse to speak further and say nothing had happened. Plainly, the record supports Warner's contentions that the State's rebuttal evidence was not admitted to rebut any evidence presented by the defense. [¶ 27] In sexual assault cases, expert testimony may be used to explain a victim's behavior. Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, ¶ 12, 18 P.3d 1164, ¶ 12 (Wyo.2001). The admission of evidence in rebuttal which is objected to as not proper rebuttal but which tends to discredit the defendant's case is within the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Alexander, 78 Wyo. 324, 345, 324 P.2d 831, 839 (1958), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 850, 80 S.Ct. 1630, 4 L.Ed.2d 1733 (1960). Rebuttal evidence is also proper if it tends to refute or contradict the effect of the opponent's evidence. Id. Rebuttal evidence would also be proper to explain the effect of the opponent's evidence; however, it is improperly admitted if rebuttal evidence concerns issues not raised by the opponent. Id. [¶ 28] The expert evidence offered in this case can be classified as falling within the emerging field of social framework and syndrome evidence and is considered a proper subject for expert testimony, particularly in sexual assault cases. See Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 54 (Wyo.1999); Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920, 928 (Wyo.1999). The question presented, however, is whether the State may offer this type of expert testimony to rebut Ms. Huylar's testimony concerning the facts of her investigation. On similar facts, we found that a DFS investigator had been offered by the defense as a hostile witness with expertise discrediting the credibility of the victim. Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 905 (Wyo.2000). Consequently, the defense opened the door to the State's cross-examination of that witness eliciting testimony that the investigator did believe that the victim had been truthful during the investigation. Id. at 906. In this case, the defense's direct examination did not raise any issues that the State could properly rebut by an expert witness whom it had prepared but failed to give notice of to the defense. The trial court erred in admitting this evidence. [¶ 29] Evidentiary rulings that are in error will not be disturbed on appeal if the error is harmless. Ryan, 988 P.2d at 52. Warner contends that the error is reversible because the State effectively used the rebuttal expert to vouch for the credibility of CM. Expert testimony vouching for the victim's credibility violates W.R.E. 702; however, incidental bolstering of the victim's credibility alone does not make the expert testimony improper. Chapman, ¶ 20. Testimony about the general symptoms common to victims of sexual abuse and how those symptoms relate to the victim is permissible; testimony that the expert believed the victim's account or determined that the victim had been raped is reversible error. Id. Warner claims that the prosecutor used hypothetical questions that were thinly concealed references to the specific facts of CM's testimony in an attempt to bolster her credibility. Warner does not present an argument that use of a hypothetical question is reversible error, and we will not address it. We do not reverse when an expert's testimony has the incidental effect of supporting the victim's credibility. Id. Incidental bolstering of the victim's credibility alone does not make the expert testimony improper. Focusing on general information within her expertise and testifying how those symptoms related to the victim do not violate our rule against vouching. Id. [¶ 30] Our concern, therefore, is whether it is harmless error to improperly admit expert rebuttal testimony. The factors examined in our earlier harmless error analysis are applicable here, and we again conclude that this error is also harmless, primarily because evidence against Warner was overwhelming, and this inadmissible evidence was not the basis for the jury's conviction. Additionally, we do not find that the two errors combined to deprive Warner of a fair trial. [¶ 31] Nevertheless, the record indicates that not only did the prosecutor violate a W.R.E. 404(b) pretrial ruling, the prosecutor ignored the pretrial order requiring that he notify the defense of expert witnesses, sought to circumvent that order by having a prepared expert witness testify on rebuttal rather than in his case-in-chief, and, in doing so, has walked a fine line. Our rule is well-settled that the prosecution must present all of his evidence on an issue and is prohibited from splitting its presentation of the evidence in order to gain an unfair advantage over the defense. Alexander, 78 Wyo. at 345, 324 P.2d at 839. In addition, the prosecutor's failure to disclose his expert injected potentially reversible error into this case. Seivewright, 7 P.3d at 28. Paying attention to the rule that conduct which offends the public sense of fair play is harmful error, Ryan, 988 P.2d at 52-53, we have satisfied ourselves that Warner was not prejudiced by any deliberate, intentional, or reckless conduct on the part of the State, and this conviction is affirmed.