Opinion ID: 1202924
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Adequacy of Defendant's Representation by Counsel

Text: [43] The only entirely new point raised in the amicus curiae brief concerns the adequacy of the representation afforded defendant by the attorney whom he selected to conduct his defense in the trial court. Two aspects of his trial counsel's actions are specified as showing his lack of competence: His handling of the voir dire examination and his failure to object to some of the prosecutor's conduct. His courteous deportment toward the deputy district attorney is said to have prevented him from protecting defendant's rights. In handling the voir dire examination, he is said to have persistently emphasized that the prosecution's witnesses were all honest and positive in their identifications, and that the burden of proof was cast upon defendant to show his innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. Actually, he primarily stated that his client acknowledged that the acts were perpetrated and only contended that he did not commit them. His remarks could not possibly have had the untoward impact upon the jury attributed to them. [44] But even if we concede that defendant's attorney may not have used the best of strategy in handling the voir dire examination and in failing to challenge some of the prosecutor's remarks, defendant still has not made that type of showing which alone would compel us to conclude that he was deprived of due process within the meaning of the constitutional guarantees. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) The handling of the defense by counsel of the accused's own choice will not be declared inadequate except in those rare cases where his counsel displays such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a farce or a sham. ( Lunce v. Overlade [7th Cir.], 244 F.2d 108, 110; see also Taylor v. United States [9th Cir.], 238 F.2d 409, 413-414, cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 [77 S.Ct. 817, 1 L.Ed.2d 761]; United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen [7th Cir.], 166 F.2d 976, 980-981; Hendrickson v. Overlade [N.D. Ind.], 131 F. Supp. 561, 562-564.) The record in this case does not even remotely approach such a situation. Defendant's sole defense lay in his claim that his identification by the victims was incorrect. His counsel vigorously cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses to test their memories, and assiduously attempted to establish an alibi and to show defendant's good character. He at most committed what in retrospect may be claimed to be mistakes in judgment by following certain strategy employed. Such mistakes, if any, do not constitute a denial of due process. ( United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy [3d Cir.], 203 F.2d 407, 426, cert. denied sub nom. Maroney v. United States ex rel. Darcy, 346 U.S. 865 [74 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed. 375].)