Opinion ID: 771935
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Connection Between the Car and Interstate Commerce

Text: 17 The federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. 2119, applies to [w]hoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm[,] takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation. Defendant argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the government failed to prove a sufficient connection between Klein's car and interstate commerce. 18 As a threshold matter, we disagree with Defendant's assertion that our review is de novo. Defendant is not arguing that 18 U.S.C. 2119 is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, 1 or that the statute is insufficient in all cases to confer jurisdiction on district courts. Rather, he is challenging the sufficiency of the government's evidence that this car was transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce. That is a question of fact. See United States v. Nukida, 8 F.3d 665, 672 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating, in a prosecution for tampering with consumer products affecting interstate commerce, that the determination of whether [the defendant's] actions resulted in sufficient effects on interstate commerce is essentially factual); see also United States v. Newton, 65 F.3d 810, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1995) (in a prosecution for carjacking, treating the question of the car's nexus to interstate commerce as a question of fact). Because Defendant is challenging the sufficiency of the government's evidence on this factual element of the offense, the appropriate standard of review is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that the government proved a sufficient connection to interstate commerce beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 812. 19 Defendant acknowledges that he failed to challenge the sufficiency of the government's evidence at trial.The proper way for [a defendant] to challenge the sufficiency of the government's evidence pertaining to the jurisdictional element of affecting interstate commerce is a motion for acquittal under Rule 29, presented at the close of the government's case-in chief. Nukida, 8 F.3d at 672-73. Because Defendant did not move for a judgment of acquittal, we review for plain error. United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 551 (9th Cir. 1995). Plain error is (1) error that is (2) plain or, in other words, clear or obvious under current law, and (3) affects substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-35 (1993). 20 Here, there was no error. Section 2119 is unusually plain. By its terms, all it requires by way of interstate nexus is a single interstate crossing. Newton, 65 F.3d at 811. Defendant concedes that the government proved that Klein's car had crossed state lines at least twice before the carjacking; once from Wisconsin to Minnesota for a funeral and once, in May 1998, when Klein drove from Wisconsin to Wyoming. And the car crossed state lines on a third occasion: during the carjacking, which began in Wyoming and ended in Nevada. Similar evidence was held to be sufficient in Newton: The [car] in this case twice passed from California to other states. Both times it did so in interstate commerce, notwithstanding the fact that the purpose of the trips may have been recreational rather than purely commercial. Id. at 811-12. Consistent with Newton, we conclude that the government presented sufficient evidence to establish that Klein's car has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce and thereby to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of 18 U.S.C. 2119. 2 21