Opinion ID: 166199
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Application Approach

Text: 49 The second interpretive camp rejects the Registration approach. The Application approach interprets Title 17 using a policy-based methodology. A representative case is from the Fifth Circuit. In Apple Barrel Productions, Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386-87 (5th Cir.1984), the court, without much elaboration, held that federal jurisdiction is satisfied merely by proving payment of the required fee, deposit of the work in question, and receipt by the Copyright Office of a registration application. See also Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1108 (5th Cir.1991) (same). These courts are also in good company. According to one of the leading treatises on copyright law, this is the preferable approach since it most efficaciously facilitates the judicial protection of copyrights through infringement actions. See Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, Vol. 2 § 7.16[B][1][a], p. 7-154-56. 50 Looking to the Act, courts adopting the Application approach conclude that because a copyright owner can sue regardless of whether an application for registration is ultimately granted or rejected, delaying the date on which a copyright owner can sue is a senseless formality. See Nimmer, § 7.16[B][1][a] [i]; Apple Barrel Prod., Inc., 730 F.2d at 386-87 (citing Nimmer); Foraste v. Brown Univ., 248 F.Supp.2d 71, 77 n. 10 (D.R.I.2003) (discussing rationale for Application approach). These courts also rely on the language of § 408, that registration is not a condition of copyright protection, and § 410(d), that once a copyright is registered, the effective date of the registration relates back to the date the Copyright Office received the last of the filing materials (i.e., the deposit, fee, and application). See 17 U.S.C. § 410(d); Foraste, 248 F.Supp.2d at 77 n. 10. 51 Finally, these courts look to the date of the application for registration as a condition to filing an infringement action, [but] issuance of a registration certificate is a condition to statutory damages and other statutory remedies. Nimmer, § 7.16[B][1][a][i]. Thus, the argument goes, a copyright owner can get into court without being held hostage by the vagaries of the Copyright Office in its ministerial act of issuing the certificate. See International Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass'n v. Power Washers of N. Am., 81 F.Supp.2d 70, 72 (D.D.C.2000) (adopting the Application approach because it best effectuate[s] the interests of justice and promote[s] judicial economy). 8 52 The Application approach, at first glance, has some appeal. Indeed, as discussed above, it is odd that one can possess a copyright but be unable to file suit until it is voluntarily registered by the copyright holder. What is more, the scheme allows an infringer to dilute a copyright until a government official is able to sift through and approve what is surely a large stack of copyright registration applications. 9 Courts adopting the Application approach plausibly claim that their approach provides a sort of rough justice because it allows copyright owners to file suit while still maintaining the requirement that an owner obtain a certificate before a court can invoke the remedies contained in Title 17. See Nimmer, § 7.16[B][1][a]. 53 Whatever the practical force of this argument, we cannot ignore the plain meaning of the statute, nor change the legislative scheme. See Strategy Source, Inc., 233 F.Supp.2d at 4 (To conclude that registration or the refusal of registration. . . are not jurisdictional prerequisites is to disregard the plain language of these statutes and to in effect re-write them.). There are three reasons we think the Application courts' statutory analysis is wrong. First, this approach requires a topsy-turvy reading of Title 17. Title 17's language does not convey certain remedies and benefits upon application and other remedies and benefits upon registration. The remedies are part of a single package. 54 Second, the argument that copyright holders are left without a remedy until registration begs the question. Congress created significant incentives for registration under the Act. Every remedy outlined in Title 17, including injunctions, is conditioned upon a copyright owner having registered the copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (permitting only those copyright owners who have met the requirements of section 411, to institute an action for [] infringement). It is not illogical for Congress to condition the remedies of the Act to those who register under the Act. Congress could very reasonably have concluded that these rights and remedies are the carrot to induce registration and the stick is the lack of federal court jurisdiction until registration is accomplished. 55 Finally, the Application approach allows for shifting legal entitlements. If, for example, an applicant could obtain the advantage of the presumption that the copyright is valid upon application, see 17 U.S.C. § 408(c), but then, after examination the Register of Copyrights determined the material is not copyrightable, the presumption of validity would swing back and forth. 10 Such a predicament would generate uncertainty in copyright litigation that the Act was designed to moderate. 56 In conclusion, we reject the proposition that § 411 confers federal court jurisdiction for an infringement action upon mere submission of a copyright application to the Copyright Office. In our view, the statute requires more: actual registration by the Register of Copyrights. Until that happens, an infringement action will not lie in the federal courts.