Opinion ID: 567270
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Individual Defendants' Culpability

Text: 119 To impose liability under section 1983 on an individual defendant, the defendant's act or omission must cause the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. The element of causation is individualized and focus[es] on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir.1988). Further, the plaintiff must establish individual fault ... as to each individual defendant's deliberate indifference. Id. at 634 (emphasis added). 120 When examining the liability of supervisors, It is clear that the supervisors are not subject to vicarious liability, but are liable only for their own conduct. Bergquist v. County of Cochise, 806 F.2d 1364, 1369 (9th Cir.1986); see also Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir.1989) (supervisory officials are not liable for actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability); Hunt v. Dental Dep't, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.1989) (supervisor is not vicariously liable for the fault of personnel at the prison). 121 We have clarified the need for proof of a supervisor's individual fault: 122 A supervisor may be liable if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. 123 Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646 (emphasis added). The sufficient causal connection may be shown by evidence that the supervisor implement[ed] a policy so deficient that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights....'  Id. (quoting Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir.1987)). However, an individual's general responsibility for supervising the operations of a prison is insufficient to establish personal involvement. Ouzts v. Cummins, 825 F.2d 1276, 1277 (8th Cir.1987). The evidence of the individual defendants' conduct must be examined in light of these principles. 2 124 Redman failed to present any evidence of wrongful conduct by Sheriff Duffy. There is no evidence Sheriff Duffy was personally involved in the transfer of Clark to the jail's general population or the assignment of Redman to a cell with Clark. There also is no evidence Sheriff Duffy implemented the policies identified by the majority. The only evidence concerning Sheriff Duffy's responsibility for Redman's injuries is testimony by Captain Beall that Sheriff Duffy was the head of the department. Reporter's Transcript, Vol. II, at 160. 125 The majority bases Sheriff Duffy's liability on his general supervisory responsibility over all county detention facilities. The majority concludes the jury could find Sheriff Duffy liable because there was evidence of Sheriff Duffy's ultimate direction of operations at the South Bay Detention Facility. This evidence is not sufficient to show that Sheriff Duffy was personally involved in wrongful conduct, that he participated in implementing a deficient policy, or that his actions caused Redman's injury. 126 In its attempt to avoid imputing the acts of subordinates to Sheriff Duffy to hold him vicariously liable, the majority relies on unsupported allegations in the complaint linking Sheriff Duffy to overcrowding of the jail. Contrary to these allegations, no evidence was produced at trial that Sheriff Duffy was responsible for, or even aware of, the alleged overcrowding at SBDF. The majority also cites with approval the portion of the complaint alleging Sheriff Duffy acted with deliberate indifference by continu[ing] operations at [SBDF] despite such [overcrowding].... If this is true, to avoid liability, presumably sheriffs should cease operations at all jails which have an inmate population that exceeds design capacity; or perhaps they should arbitrarily release prisoners until the design capacity is not exceeded. Another option might be to transfer inmates to some undercrowded facility, but this presumes a fact not in evidence: that such a facility exists. These options, of course, are not viable. Yet by relying on overcrowding, the majority subjects Sheriff Duffy to liability without any showing that he knew about the alleged overcrowding or could have done anything about it if he did. 127 The majority apparently concludes Captain Beall is responsible for Redman's injuries because he approved policies generated by the staff at the SBDF. See Reporter's Transcript, Vol. II, at 175. The majority identifies the relevant policy as that of placing aggressive homosexuals into the general population. The majority first attributes this policy to the County even though the County had no such policy and despite the absence of any evidence that Captain Beall was a policy-maker. The majority then equates this policy with a practice at the SBDF for which it holds Captain Beall responsible. 128 Even assuming Captain Beall was responsible for this practice because he directed the placement of inmates at the SBDF, neither placing Clark into the jail's general population nor placing Redman in Clark's cell was deliberately indifferent to Redman's interest in personal security. As discussed in preceding Section B, the jail officials did not act with deliberate indifference by placing Clark into the jail's general population. The majority ignores the fact that there is no evidence Clark posed a threat to any heterosexual inmate while Clark was in the jail's general population prior to his transfer to the homosexual module or while in a low-security housing dorm after his transfer from the homosexual module. Moreover, as previously stated, Captain Beall was not aware of any sexual assaults at the SBDF prior to the assault in this case. 129 The majority also concludes a reasonable jury could find Captain Beall was deliberately indifferent because he was responsible for Redman's placement into the general population. The majority opinion states Captain Beall recogniz[ed] a particular risk to young inmates, and ignored this risk by placing young inmates into the general population. The majority apparently believes Clark was a threat to Redman because Redman was classified as a young and tender inmate requiring special housing. There is no evidence, however, that Redman was ever classified as a young and tender inmate or any other type of inmate requiring special housing. Deputy Green and Captain Beall testified they did not believe Redman fit the classification of a young and tender inmate or any other type of inmate requiring special housing. Reporter's Transcript, Vols. I & II, at 126, 208. Inmates not requiring special housing were placed into the general population. Id. at 176. Although Redman was initially housed in the young and tender module, pretrial detainees often were placed in that module so that jail officials could easily locate the detainees for transportation to court. Id. at 199, 202, 248.