Opinion ID: 766381
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Extraterritoriality--One Person, One Vote

Text: 51 In their final equal protection challenge, Plaintiffs allege that H.B. 269 unconstitutionally compounds the voting disenfranchisement for some residents in the Cleveland Public School District living in the Village of Bratehahl, Linndale, Newburgh Heights and part of Garfield Heights, because these residents do not vote in the Cleveland mayoral elections. According to Plaintiffs, non-Cleveland residents who reside in the same school district lose their elective opportunity to vote for the person who appoints individuals to their school board, thus depriving them of equal protection under the law. We disagree. 52 Although the parties do not explicitly say so, they essentially dispute whether H.B. 269 violates the one-person, one-vote doctrine under the Equal Protection Clause. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), the Supreme Court held that courts could decide equal protection challenges to state congressional apportionment and paved the way for judicial review of state and municipal elections. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18, 84 S.Ct. 526, 535, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964), the Court further articulated the one-person, one-vote standard for evaluating these challenges to congressional districts and elections. Over time, the Court subjected legislation that infringed on the one-person, one-vote rule to strict scrutiny and expanded the rule to include elections of state legislators, county officials, and even trustees of a community college. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1385, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964) (elections of state legislators); Avery v. Midland County, Tex., 390 U.S. 474, 484-85, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 1120-21, 20 L.Ed.2d 45 (1968) (county officials); Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metro. Kansas City, Mo., 397 U.S. 50, 53-54, 90 S.Ct. 791, 793-94, 25 L.Ed.2d 45 (1970) (trustees of a community college district). 53 Residency is the key element in determining whether legislation violates the one-person, one-vote doctrine. See Holt v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68, 99 S.Ct. 383, 389, 58 L.Ed.2d 292 (1978). Some cases raise issues of voter inclusion, in which residents within a certain area are excluded from voting on particular matters. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 90 S.Ct. 1990, 26 L.Ed.2d 523 (1970). Other cases focus on voter dilution, such as the permissibility of allowing non-resident voters to vote in district elections and potentially dilute the voting power of the residents. See Spahos v. Mayor of Savannah Beach, 207 F. Supp. 688 (S.D. Ga.), aff'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 206 (1962); Bd. of County Comm'r of Shelby County, Tenn. v. Burson, 121 F.3d 244, 247-48 (6th Cir. 1997); Duncan v. Coffee County, 69 F.3d 88, 92 (6th Cir. 1995). Still other cases, such as this one, address voter disenfranchisement when a municipality has some control over non-residents who cannot vote in municipal elections, i.e., cases of extraterritorial jurisdiction. See Holt, 439 U.S. at 68, 99 S.Ct. at 389. Here, one Plaintiff is not a resident of the City of Cleveland and does not vote in theCity's mayoral elections even though the mayor appoints a school board that encompasses Plaintiff within its jurisdiction. Accordingly, this case raises issues of extraterritoriality in which the City of Cleveland extends its authority over those non-residents who do not participate in City of Cleveland elections. 54 In Holt, the Supreme Court held that residents of an unincorporated community did not have a constitutional right to participate in the political processes of the City of Tuscaloosa simply because the corporation's residents were subject to Tuscaloosa's police and sanitary regulations. Holt, 439 U.S. at 69-70, 99 S.Ct. at 389-90. In reaching this decision, the Court determined that the fact that the state extended certain powers of city agencies beyond their borders did not require the city to grant the franchise to rural residents because they were not residing within the geographic entity known as the City of Tuscaloosa. Duncan, 69 F.3d at 93. Holt thus illustrates that non-residents do not necessarily have the right to vote in a city election simply because the city has some limited authority over the non-residents. Holt, 439 U.S. at 69, 99 S.Ct. at 389 (The argument that extraterritorial extension of municipal powers requires concomitant extraterritorial extension of the franchise proves too much.). 55 As a counterpoint to Holt, Plaintiffs argue that language from the Supreme Court's decision in Kramer v. Union School District, controls the outcome. In Kramer, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that allowed local residents to vote for their school district only if they owned real property within the school district or were parents of children enrolled in the school district. Applying strict scrutiny, the Court found an equal protection violation and, for our purposes, provided some important dicta: 56 Nor is the need for close judicial examination affected because the district meetings and the school board have general legislative powers. Our exacting examination is not necessitated by the subject of the election; rather, it is required because some resident citizens are permitted to participate and some are not. For example, a city charter might well provide that the elected city council appoint a mayor who would have broad administrative powers. Assuming the council were elected consistent with the commands of the Equal Protection Clause, the delegation of power to the mayor would not call for this Court's exacting review. On the other hand, if the city charter made the office of mayor subject to an election in which only some resident citizens were entitled to vote, there would be presented a situation calling for our close review. 57 Kramer, 395 U.S. at 629-30, 89 S.Ct. at 1891 (emphasis added). At first blush, the language in Kramer seemingly conflicts with Holt. On closer examination, however, the language in Kramer refers to residents within the school district who lack the right to vote. The lesson of Holt and Kramer is an important one: If residents of the relevant jurisdiction are excluded from participation, as in Kramer, then the court subjects the legislation to strict scrutiny. If, however, the legislation merely concerns extraterritorial jurisdiction over non-residents, courts employ rational basis review, granting the States wide latitude to create political subdivisions and exercise state legislative power. Holt, 439 U.S. at 71, 99 S.Ct. at 390. 58 As we mentioned above, extraterritorial voters in the outer Cleveland suburbs are not residents of the City of Cleveland and surely do not deserve the right to vote in Cleveland mayoral elections. Although Plaintiffs are residents of the municipal school district, no elections occur within that jurisdiction from which Plaintiffs are excluded. If the municipal school boards were elected bodies and only the Cleveland residents could vote in the school board election, then the relevant geopolitical entity would be the municipal school district, Kramer likely would apply, and problemsof voter inclusion would arise. This case, however, concerns an appointive system that appears more like the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction seen in Holt than the outright denial of the right to vote in Kramer. Even the above quoted language from Kramer states that a delegation of power to the mayor would require only rational basis review. We accordingly subject H.B. 269 to rational basis review. 59 Under this lesser standard, we defer to the Ohio Legislature's creation of the appropriate jurisdiction (municipal school districts), which, as in Holt, defined a political area in which some residents could vote in municipal elections and others could not. Based on the need to modify and improve the established school system that was failing the City of Cleveland and its schoolchildren, Ohio legislatively defined a municipal school district as a geopolitical entity with an appointive school system and granted the Mayor of Cleveland extraterritorial jurisdiction for the appointment of the school board. In light of Holt, we believe the State has the power to do so and has presented a rational basis for enacting the statute. Plaintiffs retain the right to vote in national and state elections and if they want to change the appointive system at issue here, both those within and those outside of the City of Cleveland may use their elective voice to challenge state legislators and the governor as a means to overturn H.B. 269. Indeed, state legislators obviously anticipated some of the polemical issues surrounding municipal school districts because they ensured at least one member of the school board would be from an area other than Cleveland, a guarantee that did not exist for non-Cleveland residents prior to the enactment of H.B. 269. 60 We believe H.B. 269 establishes a rational school system that relates to the legitimate state interest of improving public schools. We thus affirm the district court on this issue and find no equal protection violation under federal or state law.