Opinion ID: 788147
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sweatpants

Text: 147 As we explained above, Yunkin testified that Lambert wore his sweatpants-which the police eventually obtained and which contained Show's blood on them-the morning of Show's murder. Lambert argues that the Commonwealth-specifically the prosecutor, John Kenneff-knew that Lambert did not wear Yunkin's sweatpants that morning and nonetheless elicited testimony from Yunkin to the contrary. She also argues that the Commonwealth switched the sweatpants at the PCRA Hearing. That is, she argues that the Commonwealth replaced the sweatpants from the trial with a different pair, which it offered into evidence at the PCRA Hearing and told the PCRA Court were the same sweatpants as those from the trial. 148
149 The Supreme Court has long held that the state's knowing use of perjured testimony to obtain a conviction violates the Fourteenth Amendment. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216, 63 S.Ct. 177, 87 L.Ed. 214 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791 (1935). In United States v. Agurs, the Supreme Court characterized this line of cases as finding it fundamentally unfair to the accused where the prosecution's case includes perjured testimony and [ ] the prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury. 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). The same is true when the government, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears at trial. United States v. Biberfeld, 957 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir.1992) (citing Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153, 92 S.Ct. 763). 150 In such circumstances, the conviction must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Id. In United States v. Bagley, the Court explained: Although this rule is stated in terms that treat the knowing use of perjured testimony as error subject to harmless error review, it may as easily be stated as a materiality standard under which the fact that testimony is perjured is considered material unless failure to disclose it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 473 U.S. 667, 679-80, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). 151 Thus, in order to make out a constitutional violation Lambert must show that (1) Yunkin committed perjury; (2) the government knew or should have known of his perjury; (3) the testimony went uncorrected; and (4) there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the verdict. The state trial court and PCRA Court concluded that Lambert had in fact worn Yunkin's sweatpants and Yunkin therefore did not perjure himself. These factual determinations preclude a finding of constitutional error, and we review them under the applicable AEDPA standard. 152 At trial Lambert's counsel, Roy Shirk, strongly urged Judge Stengel to conclude that Lambert did not wear Yunkin's clothes on the day of Show's murder, and he developed testimony to support this argument. He elicited testimony from Yunkin's friend, Vincent Orsi, that Yunkin would wear the sweatpants to bed, bumming around the house. App. 950. Lambert testified that although she told the police that she wore a red flannel shirt and black sweatpants the morning of Show's murder, she had lied to them in order to protect Yunkin. To contradict the reason Yunkin gave for why Lambert wore his clothing-i.e., she was well into her pregnancy-Shirk elicited testimony that Lambert was barely showing at that stage of her pregnancy. And he had the following exchange with Yunkin on cross-examination: 153 Q. So basically what you are telling us here this morning, Michelle was wearing all your clothing? 154 A. Correct. 155 Q. The sweat pants were yours. 156 A. Correct. 157 Q. The red flannel was yours. 158 A. Correct. 159 Q. The jergo was yours. 160 A. Correct. 161 Q. I'm going to show you what's been marked Commonwealth Exhibit 10. That's your jacket? 162 A. Yes, it is. Extra large. 163 Q. Extra large? 164 A. Correct. 165 Q. I'm going to show you what's been marked Commonwealth Exhibit 9. They are your sweat pants? 166 A. Yes. 167 Q. In fact you used to wear them to bed and you used to wear them while you were lounging around. You used to wear these quite a bit, didn't you? 168 A. Yes. 169 Q. Now you indicated that Michelle was pregnant at the time, is that correct? 170 A. Yes. 171 Q. You indicated she was seven months pregnant. 172 A. Around there, yes. 173 Q. Around six months? 174 A. Between six and seven. 175 Q. She wasn't really heavy at the time, was she? She wasn't showing a lot. 176 A. Not really, no. 177 Q. But it's your testimony that she left the house that day basically clothed in your clothing. 178 A. True. 179 App. 273-74. 180 During his closing argument, Shirk argued that all the evidence suggested that Lambert did not wear Yunkin's clothing. The relevant portion of his closing went as follows: 181 The assumption we're supposed to make is that my client, due to her pregnancy, wore Mr. Yunkin's clothes, perhaps to be more comfortable because she was pregnant and obviously bigger than she normally is; although Chief Glick, in his testimony, indicated she really wasn't showing that much. I find it, or the defense finds it, incredible. 182 Would you hold up that jacket. 183 Mr. Jeffries: (Complying with the request.) Mr. Shirk: That is for a fray in the morning that was going to last, whatever, an hour or two, three, she would wear this for comfort; and the clothing she put on to wear the rest of the day, or at least the clothing that Detective-Trooper Solt indicated he believed she had on that evening, the difference in size. She was going to spend a lot more time in this—(holding up a sweater)—and she had to wear that for comfort a few hours in the morning. 184 (Holding up a pair of pants.) 185 This is what she wore the rest of the day, compared to them. 186 You may sit down. Thank you. 187 (Mr. Jeffries returned to the defense table.) 188 Mr. Shirk: You Honor, I think even the clothing is consistent with the defendant's testimony. 189 Vinnie Orsi suggested that Mr. Yunkin wore them to bed any time he was over there, wore them around leisurely. Mr. Yunkin admitted from the stand he wore those sweat pants to bed. Lisa Lambert, in her testimony, said, interestingly enough, just off the cuff: He got up that morning, had his sweat pants on, threw something on and away they went. 190 Probably very likely what happened, he was getting up early that morning, just kept on his sweat pants, threw on his red flannel, his jergo, and away they went. It would seem incredible that they got up that time in the morning and he wears these to bed all the time, he took them off to give them to her to put on. Difficult to believe. I think the clothing is consistent with her statement. 191 App. 1289-90. 192 After Judge Stengel found Lambert guilty, she again advanced her argument regarding Yunkin's sweatpants in her post-verdict motion seeking an arrest of judgment and a new trial. Addressing the argument that the evidence regarding the sweatpants rendered the verdict against the weight of the evidence, Judge Stengel wrote: [F]or defendant to argue that the killer was wearing Mr. Yunkin's clothing and, therefore, must have been Mr. Yunkin is ludicrous.... The court listened to the testimony regarding the clothing, observed the size of the garments and the size of the people involved, i.e., Ms. Lambert, Ms. Buck and Mr. Yunkin, and found there to be no question raised by the fact that the clothing appeared to be Mr. Yunkin's. App. 1633. As Judge Stengel later put it: The only real question was whether [Lambert] could have worn sweatpants owned by the larger Yunkin. This was resolved by the court's observations of the sweatpants, of Mr. Yunkin, of Ms. Lambert, and the conclusion that Ms. Lambert could certainly have worn the garment. PCRA Decision 204. 193 Lambert urges us to conclude that the trial court's finding of fact was unreasonable given the record before it and that the only reasonable conclusion was that Yunkin wore the sweatpants the day of the murder. Her argument is this: Since Yunkin was 6'1 tall and weighed 190 pounds and he admittedly wore the sweatpants at times, it was impossible for Lambert (who was 5'6 tall and weighed 143 pounds at the time) to have worn them. 194 In order to accept Lambert's argument, however, we must make several speculative leaps that find no support in the record. First, we must infer that it was physically impossible for Lambert to fit into a pair of sweatpants that would have fit the larger Yunkin. Alternatively, we must assume that people always wear clothes that fit them perfectly-that is, people never wear clothes that are large on them-and that it is therefore unreasonable to conclude that either Lambert or Yunkin wore sweatpants that did not properly fit them. But neither of these suggestions is supported by the record or common sense. 195 The PCRA Court considered Lambert's argument and reached the same conclusion. Petitioner suggests that the sweatpants in 1992 were so large, the Court explained, that Ms. Lambert would be `swimming in them.' But, the Court concluded, [t]here is simply no testimony or even any argument to this effect. PCRA Decision 209-10. 196 We agree with this conclusion. Against the weight of Lambert's speculative argument is a conclusion by a finder of fact who had the opportunity of observing both Lambert and the sweatpants during the trial itself. Lambert's counsel was free to argue that Yunkin's clothes were too big for Lambert to wear, but the judge was free to disregard those arguments and to base his findings on his own observation. 197 Thus Lambert's claim that the prosecution must have knowingly relied on perjured testimony because the sweatpants did not fit collapses. Lambert's vehement disagreement with the prosecutor's theory — and with the judge's finding — does not amount to a good faith basis to allege perjury. There is simply no foundation in the record for this allegation. 198
199 Lambert argues that she is nonetheless entitled to relief due to the Commonwealth's misconduct at the PCRA hearing. Specifically, Lambert argues that at the PCRA hearing, the Commonwealth offered into evidence sweatpants that were different than those offered into evidence at trial. In other words, she argues that the Commonwealth switched evidence and produced different sweatpants than those used at trial. Lambert Br. 41. The PCRA Court rejected Lambert's argument, because it found that there was no proof that the sweatpants admitted into evidence as Commonwealth's Exhibit 9 in 1992 have ever been altered, changed, or substituted. PCRA Decision 209. 200 To support her switching claim before the PCRA Court, Lambert offered testimony that the sweatpants at the trial tested positive for blood, while the sweatpants at the PCRA hearing did not. In addition, a textile expert opined that the sweatpants at the PCRA hearing were sized boy's extra large and that a 6'1 individual who weighed one hundred and ninety pounds-Yunkin's approximate height and weight at the time of the murder-could not fit into them. Lambert's trial counsel, Roy Shirk, also testified at the PCRA hearing that, to the best of his recollection, the sweatpants at the PCRA hearing were smaller than those at trial. He also opined that the sweatpants at the PCRA hearing would not fit Yunkin. 201 On the other hand, the Commonwealth offered evidence that the officer who logged the contents of the bag found in the dumpster behind K-Mart listed the sweatpants that were eventually admitted into evidence at the trial as ladies dress `black' sweatpants (appears small size). App. 7015. This would tend to contradict Lambert's bald assertion that the sweatpants at trial were so huge that she could not wear them. The forensic scientist who performed the test to check for blood prior to the trial, Donald P. Bloser, Jr., testified that the markings he made on the sweatpants from trial still appeared (albeit faded) on the sweatpants at the PCRA hearing. Bloser also testified that the sweatpants tested very weak for blood prior to trial in 1992 and that he found no presence of blood when he retested other evidence (such as the ski hats) that had also tested very weak for blood in 1992. App. 2759. 28 In addition, an investigator from the Commonwealth, James Gallagher, testified about a photograph he took using the sweatpants in evidence at the PCRA hearing. He took a photograph in which he laid the sweatpants against cardboard box lids that had also appeared in a photograph of the sweatpants from trial. The Court concluded that the two photographs looked substantially similar. 202 Given the record before it, the PCRA court's factual determination that the sweatpants were not switched is reasonable. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion, and the evidence to the contrary is considerably weaker. 203 More important, Lambert's switching claim provides no basis for habeas relief. She argues that the Commonwealth's attempt to uphold Lambert's conviction on evidence contradictory to that used to convict her violates `the most basic notions of due process.' Lambert Br. 41. In support of this proposition, she cites Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 99 S.Ct. 2190, 60 L.Ed.2d 743 (1979), Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 2000), and Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir.1997). 204 In Dunn, the Court of Appeals had affirmed a conviction based on facts that had been adduced at trial but that neither supported the offense charged in the indictment nor provided the foundation for the jury's conviction. The Supreme Court held that appellate courts are not free to revise the basis on which a defendant is convicted simply because the same result would likely obtain at trial. 442 U.S. at 107, 99 S.Ct. 2190. In other words, a defendant's due process rights are violated when his conviction is affirmed on an offense that he was not charged with and that was not presented to the jury or court that tried him. 205 Smith and Thompson involved instances where the government offered contradictory theories in two separate trials to convict two individuals for the same crime. The Thompson court held that when no new significant evidence comes to light a prosecutor cannot, in order to convict two defendants at separate trials, offer inconsistent theories and facts regarding the same crime. 120 F.3d at 1058. The Smith court concluded that the State's use of factually contradictory theories constituted `foul blows' and deprived [the defendant] of due process and rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. 205 F.3d at 1051. 206 To a certain degree Dunn and Smith/Thompson represent different sides of the same coin. Dunn requires a certain degree of vertical consistency (between trial and appeal) in the theories the government offers, while Smith and Thompson require a certain degree of horizontal consistency (between two trials). Both lines of cases are inapposite, however, because they do not provide a basis for habeas relief here. 207 Lambert's argument suffers from the same fundamental flaw that we identified in the petitioner's argument in Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222 (3d Cir.2002). There, we explained: 208 The fundamental flaw in Gattis' argument is that in the decisions of which he complains the state courts did not uphold [his] conviction on a charge that was neither alleged in an indictment nor presented to a jury at trial. [ Dunn, 442 U.S. at 106, 99 S.Ct. 2190]. The allegedly different theory of guilt was not presented on direct appeal in support of his conviction but in the course of a post-conviction hearing held in connection with his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to present expert testimony concerning the implausibility of the state's account of the murder. The Superior Court and Delaware Supreme Court did not affirm his conviction based on the state's theory but merely found his ineffectiveness claim unpersuasive. The state's theory played a small role, if any, in the courts' reasoning. In this context Dunn and [ Cola v. Reardon, 787 F.2d 681 (1st Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 398, 93 L.Ed.2d 351 (1986)] are simply not applicable. 209 Id. at 238. 210 Similarly, and more importantly, habeas proceedings are not the appropriate forum for Lambert to pursue claims of error at the PCRA proceeding. As we explained in Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941 (3d Cir.1998): 211 The federal courts are authorized to provide collateral relief where a petitioner is in state custody or under a federal sentence imposed in violation of the Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255. Thus, the federal role in reviewing an application for habeas corpus is limited to evaluating what occurred in the state or federal proceedings that actually led to the petitioner's conviction; what occurred in the petitioner's collateral proceeding does not enter into the habeas calculation. We have often noted the general proposition that habeas proceedings are hybrid actions; they are independent civil dispositions of completed criminal proceedings. Federal habeas power is limited ... to a determination of whether there has been an improper detention by virtue of the state court judgment. 212 Id. at 954-55 (internal citations omitted); see also Morris v. Cain, 186 F.3d 581, 585 n. 6 (5th Cir.1999); Williams-Bey v. Trickey, 894 F.2d 314, 317 (8th Cir.1990). To be sure, error in state collateral proceedings may affect the deference we owe the court's findings under § 2254(d) and 2254(e)(1). But, as we admonished in Hassine, alleged errors in collateral proceedings, such as Lambert's claim that the prosecution switched the sweatpants, are not a proper basis for habeas relief from the original conviction. It is the original trial that is the main event for habeas purposes. 213