Opinion ID: 3066487
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scallen’s Arguments

Text: Scallen first contends that the district court abused its discretion in failing to allow him to amend his counterclaims. In particular, Scallen argues that the district court’s dismissal of his third motion to amend, filed after remand from this court, was an abuse of discretion. Scallen argues that the dismissal for untimeliness was improper because this court’s remand effectively “turned the clock back to May 16, 2000, the date Scallen filed his second motion to amend.” The University responds that Scallen’s motion to amend was properly denied because he sought to file new counterclaims that were barred under the mandate rule and that untimeliness is a proper basis for denial of motions to amend after the close of discovery. We agree that Scallen’s third motion to amend was properly denied as untimely. Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 136566 (10th Cir. 1993). Scallen’s claim that the clock was effectively turned back to the denial of his second motion to amend is incorrect because Scallen did not expressly argue, in his original appeal, that the denial of his second motion to amend was error. Thus, he cannot now challenge that decision. Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 236 F.3d 1342, 1347-49 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 04-1281, -1282 4 Additionally, Scallen argues that the district court improperly dismissed as untimely his motion seeking a declaration that the University’s commercial activities, i.e., its patent-related activities, were not immune under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. Although raised in the form of a motion, Scallen’s arguments are more appropriately viewed as challenging the district court’s dismissal of his counterclaims as barred by the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. Scallen relies heavily on language in Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the University of California, 143 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998), to support his claim that patent-related activities are commercial and not subject to sovereign immunity. Although Genentech hinted that such a proposition might be tenable in the context of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, Genentech did not decide the issue. Id. at 1453-54. Moreover, the case was subsequently vacated by the Supreme Court in view of its then-recently decided case College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999). Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Genentech, Inc., 527 U.S. 1031 (1999). In Florida Prepaid, the Supreme Court said, Nor do we think that the constitutionally grounded principle of state sovereign immunity is any less robust where, as here, the asserted basis for constructive waiver is conduct that the State realistically could choose to abandon, that is undertaken for profit, that is traditionally performed by private citizens and corporations, and that otherwise resembles the behavior of “market participants.” 527 U.S. at 684. Although Florida Prepaid also involved immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, the quoted language undercuts any sliver of support Scallen may have derived from our language in Genentech. Scallen has not directed this court to any analogous waiver in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, and we have found none. 04-1281, -1282 5 Scallen also contends that in waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity by filing suit in federal court, the University has waived all immunity, both state and federal, for all claims asserted by Scallen. We have already decided that the University waived Eleventh Amendment immunity only for compulsory counterclaims. Regents of the Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1124-26 (Fed. Cir. 2003). That issue may not be relitigated now. To the extent that our prior decision has not disposed of this issue, waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity does not, in and of itself, constitute waiver of the University’s sovereign immunity under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. Scallen also argues that NMSA § 41-4-21 constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act for employer-employee relationships and that his counterclaims fall within this exception. As the University points out, however, “[t]hat section was designed to preserve employment relations, not to provide a waiver of immunity.” Rubio v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch. Dist., 744 P.2d 919, 922 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). Scallen argues that the University violated his First Amendment academic freedom rights by filing inaccurate and/or false documents with the Patent and Trademark Office. Scallen raises this claim for the first time on appeal. Although district courts have a duty to liberally construe pro se plaintiffs’ pleadings, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), the record in this case evinces no denial or derogation of Scallen’s First Amendment academic freedom rights. Scallen argues that the appropriate statutes of limitations have not begun to run on any of his counterclaims because all of the wrongs involved in the counterclaims are continuing to this day. Scallen makes no effort, however, to support this assertion. Scallen points to no evidence suggesting that he should not have been aware of the 04-1281, -1282 6 alleged wrongs identified in his counterclaims until after June 16, 1997, the date two years prior to his counterclaim filing date. See LaMure v. Peters, 924 P.2d 1379, 138384 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (looking to “the point at which the [claimants] knew or should have known that they were damaged” as the appropriate time to begin the statute of limitations period under a claim of continuing harm). Scallen raises numerous arguments regarding the University’s purported unwillingness to seek to profit from the technology at issue in this case and the University’s purported obligation to return the rights to the technology to Scallen and Knight upon its decision not to seek to profit from the technology. All of these arguments are based on allegations of breach of contract, impracticability, or fraud stemming from a failure to perform contractual duties. As the University properly points out, however, Scallen raised none of these issues in his pending counterclaims. Moreover, as the University also properly points out, these entirely new claims were first raised on December 1, 2003 in the form of a motion, after our remand to consider which counterclaims were compulsory. Thus, the district court’s dismissal of Scallen’s “motion” as untimely was proper. Scallen argues that the district court abused its discretion in awarding costs against him where the University engaged in litigation misconduct and that the district court improperly awarded $4,256.99 in costs that were not authorized. The University responds that Scallen did not timely raise the litigation misconduct issue and thus has waived it and that the $4,256.99 in costs associated with the special master were authorized. The University is correct that Scallen has shown no abuse of discretion in the district court’s failure to deny costs to the University where Scallen failed to timely 04-1281, -1282 7 raise an argument against such an award. Moreover, the Order of Reference and Amended Order of Reference of the district court cannot be construed as disallowing any fees of the special master after the due date for the specified reports, especially where the district court tasked the special master with preparing an additional document. Finally, Scallen argues that Judge Conway should be recused under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) because of alleged prejudicial conduct toward Scallen and Knight. Scallen’s contention that Judge Conway showed prejudice is wholly without merit. Although Knight filed a motion before the district court addressing this issue, Scallen did not join that motion, and he cannot now object to its denial. Correge v. Murphy, 705 F.2d 1326, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Moreover, merely failing to rule in a litigant’s favor on disputed issues of law does not raise a reasonable question as to a Judge’s impartiality. See Caravalho v. Pugh, 177 F.3d 1177, 1178-79 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[M]ere disagreement with the merits of a district court decision, which decision was clearly correct, does not support recusal of the judge.”).