Opinion ID: 3183161
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: m. EDT.

Text: 18. On October 3, 2014 at 9:33 p.m. EDT, the Foundation’s president wrote to Defendant, Vincent, “[Michel] is a good friend of the organization and supports our cause but is not a board member.” (emphasis added) 19. Vincent and Klein failed to follow up on that statement. They did not ask any further questions about [Michel’s] role (if any) with the Foundation. They made no effort to determine whether [Michel] was actually a part of the Foundation after its president explicitly said he was not a board member. They did not even seek to obtain the Foundation’s articles of incorporation, which reveal that [Michel] is neither an officer nor director of the Foundation. Yet, in the first paragraph of the Article, Defendants refer to the Foundation as “his own,” in reference to Pras. These allegations are significant because they purport to show that two days before the article was published the defendants had actual knowledge that Michel was not a board member of the organization, but nonetheless published the article claiming 32 Case: 15-11453 Date Filed: 03/07/2016 Page: 33 of 39 the Foundation was Michel’s “own.” Michel argues that this shows, at a minimum, a reckless disregard for the truth. It does not. The complaint here really alleges that the reporters should have conducted more investigation after receiving the email from the Foundation’s president. But, again, the failure to investigate does not give rise to a finding of actual malice. And, indeed, the reporters engaged in more investigation than the plaintiff credits them for. Even if the reporters stopped all efforts before receiving that email, there is still no basis from which a reasonable inference of actual malice can be drawn. This is made particularly clear by the portion of the article that reports on the email itself. The defendants noted in the article that “Michel was listed as a board member on the group’s Web site early last week. By Friday, his name had disappeared, and Mike Jean told The Post the Grammy winner wasn’t a board member.” Far from intentionally avoiding the truth, the defendants included information contrary to their conclusions in the text of the article itself. In doing so, they undermined Michel’s claim that they acted with actual malice. See, e.g., Silvester, 839 F.2d at 1498. Even in light of the email from the Foundation’s president, there is no indication that the article’s characterization of Michel’s relationship with the Foundation was fabricated by the defendants, wholly imaginary, based on an unverified anonymous phone call, inherently improbable, or obviously worthy of 33 Case: 15-11453 Date Filed: 03/07/2016 Page: 34 of 39 doubt. See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732. The characterization was based on sources inside the Foundation and the Foundation’s own (since revised) website. No facts alleged in the complaint give rise to an inference that any of these sources were as dubious as an unverified anonymous phone call. Nor is it inherently improbable that Michel would be affiliated with a charity focused on Haiti given his selfdescribed reputation as a “world-renown[ed] philanthropist” who has “devoted much of his life to assisting those in need in Haiti and elsewhere around the world.” In short, the allegations presented in this portion of the complaint fail to give rise to a reasonable inference of any of the hallmarks of actual malice. In reply, Michel offers two additional arguments in favor of finding actual malice, but these arguments must be discounted because they depend on facts that were not pled in his complaint. First, Michel claims in his briefing before this Court that the article’s concluding sentence -- “Michel said NY Cares would be paid.” -- was an outright falsehood because Michel never made such a statement to the defendants or, in fact, to any individual claiming to represent the New York Post. Michel argues that the defendants demonstrated actual malice by attributing imaginary statements to him. But in his complaint, Michel did not allege that this statement was false or misrepresented him. That assumes significance because he did specifically cite in his complaint to many other allegedly false statements. Michel cannot now use his briefing to add new allegations and argue that those 34 Case: 15-11453 Date Filed: 03/07/2016 Page: 35 of 39 new assertions support his cause of action. Sterling Fin. Inv. Grp., Inc. v. Hammer, 393 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The law in our circuit is clear that arguments not presented in the district court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.” (internal quotation marks omitted); Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A plaintiff may not amend her complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.”). Moreover, without any allegation that Michel had been credited with statements he did not make, the district court had no basis from which to draw a reasonable inference that the defendants had acted with actual malice by attributing the statement to Michel. Thus, absent any allegations about the falsity of the article’s final sentence, Michel’s argument is unpersuasive. We also discount Michel’s arguments regarding the “Post’s ongoing campaign” against him. Michel claims that this campaign -- which consists of 10 stories in an eight-month period, significantly more media attention than Michel has received from other news sources -- implies actual malice on the part of the defendants. This argument fails because it depends on facts -- namely, the contents of the other articles -- that were not pled in Michel’s complaint. As for the one additional article that was included, Michel makes no allegation that it contains false or defamatory statements. Regardless, without a more detailed pleading, Michel’s argument should not be considered on a motion to dismiss. 35 Case: 15-11453 Date Filed: 03/07/2016 Page: 36 of 39 In short, Michel’s complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the defendants published the challenged article with actual malice. Because the district court may be affirmed on any ground appearing in the record, this finding is sufficient to affirm the district judge in large part even if the challenged statements were definitively false and did not constitute expressions of opinion. But this conclusion would not support dismissing the complaint with prejudice, as the district judge did. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) advises courts to freely give parties leave to amend their complaints. Here, there is no reason to believe that allowing Michel leave to amend his complaint would be futile or that some other substantial reason exists to deny leave. See Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1341–42 (11th Cir. 2014). A dismissal based on the failure to plead facts giving rise to an inference of actual malice should be without prejudice and the plaintiff should have the opportunity to amend his complaint.