Opinion ID: 891699
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Applying the Test for Good Cause to Guthrie

Text: {42} Ironically, the Court of Appeals in Guthrie appeared to be headed in the very direction we set forth today, with one exception. The Court stated, [t]he weaker the probative value, the greater the need for confrontation, and, hence, the greater the need to justify the absence of the witness. Guthrie, 2009-NMCA-036, ¶ 20, 145 N.M. 761, 204 P.3d 1271. We would state it differently; the weaker the probative value, the greater the need for live testimony and confrontation. On the other hand, the Court stated, [t]he stronger the probative value, the lesser the needs of confrontation and justification. Indeed, with a showing of sufficiently probative or reliable hearsay evidence, there is no need to show good cause for the absence of the witness. Id. {43} The trial court should focus its analysis on the relative need for confrontation to protect the truth-finding process and the substantial reliability of the evidence, as we have outlined in this Opinion. If that need is significant, and the court specifies the reasons why, then the witness must appear and be subject to confrontation, regardless of the reasons for his or her absence. Conversely, if the need for confrontation is not significant, as discussed earlier, and the court specifies why, then it does not matter whether the witness is available. Simply put, the reasons for the witness's absence are, for the most part, irrelevant to the balancing process we set forth. A court's focus should instead be on the need for, and utility of, confrontation with respect to the truth-finding process and in light of the particular case at hand, including the specific charge pressed against the probationer. {44} Our Court of Appeals may have felt bound by Phillips in continuing to focus on the reason for the witness's absence. Therefore, we overrule Phillips. With some revisions as indicated, we endorse the Court of Appeals' balancing analysis; namely, the stronger the probative value and reliability of the evidence, the less the need for confrontation. {45} Applying our spectrum or sliding scale analysis, Guthrie falls decisively on the good cause end and does not require confrontation. Several reasons support our conclusion. First, Defendant did not contest the allegation that he failed to complete his treatment at the rehabilitation center, thus precluding a due process complaint under Morrissey 's requirement for a hearing on contested facts. 408 U.S. at 488, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (The parolee must have an opportunity to be heard and to show, if he can, that he did not violate the conditions, or, if he did, that circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation does not warrant revocation.). Indeed, Defendant never offered any evidence in mitigation to explain his absence. {46} Second, the key evidentiary fact of Defendant's non-compliance with residential treatmentan objective, negative, and rather routine factwas easily and reliably established to a reasonable degree of certainty by a written statement from the treatment center. Here the testifying probation officer had a fax from the treatment center saying as much. While it would have been preferable to introduce the fax itself into evidence, and better yet with an affidavit, in this case the fax was in the probation file and the probation officer testified to its contents relating to routine matters, like those in Gomez, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d at 691. Olivas also testified that Defendant did not report to his probation officer, did not pay probation costs, and did not complete treatment. As noted in Gomez, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d at 690, even a live witness with personal knowledge would likely have referred to the file to make many of these assertions. {47} Third, based on this record, little to nothing could be gained by testimony from a treatment center representative or from Chavez, the absent probation officer. Live testimony would have been of little use to gauge Chavez's demeanor, truthfulness, and credibility. Chavez was known to Defendant, so identity was not at issue. There was no known need to impress upon a probation officer the seriousness of revocation. Neither Chavez nor any representative from the treatment center had any known motive to fabricate or deceive. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485-86, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (reasoning it would be unfair to assume that the [probation] officer bears hostility against the [probationer] that destroys his neutrality; realistically the failure of the [probationer] is in a sense a failure for his supervising officer). {48} Finally, in this particular case, the district judge made his own observations essentially taking judicial noticethat it would have been factually impossible for Defendant to have completed treatment as required, given the time and place of his arrest. In so doing, the judge not only corroborated the State's hearsay evidence, but also provided an independent source supporting the State's hearsay allegation that Defendant had violated his probation. In effect, the judge made the functional equivalent of specific finding of good cause for not requiring confrontation. While the content of the State's hearsay evidence was central and important to the State's case against Defendant, when no doubt is cast upon otherwise reliable evidence, the centrality of that evidence does not make confrontation any more essential. Defendant only attacked Olivas's testimony on hearsay grounds; he did not dispute the accuracy of the evidence or bring to light any mitigating circumstances. {49} Although the judge made no explicit findings of good cause, and we do exhort district judges in the future to explain their rulings in more detail, the test for validity of the finding need not be so formulaic. The record supports, and incontrovertibly so, the judge's finding that Defendant violated the terms of his probation. Accordingly, the district court should have been affirmed.