Opinion ID: 6333805
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: twice the maximum punishment authorized

Text: by section 841(b) of this title; and (2) at least twice any term of supervised release authorized by section 841(b).69 Section 860(e)(1) defines a playground as “any outdoor facility . . . intended for recreation, open to the public, and with any portion thereof containing three or more separate apparatus intended for the recreation of children.”70 By convicting Zayas under § 860(a), the jury necessarily concluded that he distributed fentanyl within 1,000 feet of the playground attached to the Busy Bee day care facility. The day care is located across the street from Price’s house, where the delivery took place. The Busy Bee’s owner testified about the characteristics of the facility, including the attached playground. The facility itself is privately owned and comprises the entire bottom level of a building. Members of the general public may pay to enroll in the day care. Attached to the rear of the day care center is a fenced-in play area, containing several pieces of plastic equipment for enrolled children to use. The fence is secured by a latch. Zayas moved for a Rule 29 acquittal on this Count arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the 69 21 U.S.C. § 860(a). 70 Id. § 860(e)(1) (emphasis added). 19 Busy Bee playground satisfied the statutory definition of playground under § 860(e)(1). Specifically, he asserted that the attached playground is not “open to the public.”71 The jury was instructed that a conviction for this offense could be sustained by finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Zayas knowingly and intentionally possessed with intent to distribute fentanyl “within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising a daycare center with an attached outdoor playground.”72 The jury, however, was not provided with the statutory definition of a playground. Only after the jury returned a guilty verdict did the District Court deny Zayas’s motion for acquittal, finding, as a matter of law, the playground was open to the public within the meaning of § 860(e)(1). We now join several other circuit courts of appeals in holding that the definition of a playground must be proven as an element of § 860(a).73 In United States v. McQuilkin, we held that § 860 is a substantive offense separate from § 841(a)(1); it is not a sentencing enhancement.74 We reasoned that “it requires a separate and distinct element—distribution 71 App. at 696. 72 App. at 734. 73 See United States v. Rojas Alvarez, 451 F.3d 320, 328 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding “the congressional definition of playground must be proven as an element of a § 860(a) offense”); United States v. Migi, 329 F.3d 1085, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The Government must prove four elements to meet the definition of a ‘playground.’”); United States v. Horsley, 56 F.3d 50, 51–52 (11th Cir. 1995) (affirming a conviction where the evidence was sufficient to establish that the elements of the definition of “playground” as established by Congress); United States v. Clanton, 32 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision) (“From these facts, a rational trier of fact could conclude . . . that the playgrounds in issue were open to the public . . . .”); United States v. Parker, 30 F.3d 542, 552–53 (4th Cir. 1994) (concluding, because Congress chose to define playground in a specific manner, proof must be adduced to each of the four-part definition in § 860(a) to sustain a jury’s conviction). 74 78 F.3d 105, 108 (3d Cir. 1996). 20 within 1,000 feet of a school.”75 Thus, due process requires that a conviction under § 860(a) be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt of all the elements of that offense.76 These include the distribution, or possession with intent to distribute, a controlled substance “within 1000 feet of (1) an ‘outdoor facility,’ which is (2) ‘intended for recreation,’ (3) ‘open to the public,’ and also (4) contains ‘three or more separate apparatus intended for the recreation of children.’”77 Here, the jury was asked to weigh the evidence of Zayas’s intent to distribute a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a playground without knowing the government had to prove that the area next to the Busy Bee constituted a playground under § 860(a). When examining the adequacy of a jury charge, “we determine whether the instruction, viewed as a whole in the light of the evidence, fairly and adequately submits the issues to the jury.”78 “[W]here terms are not readily understood by the jury or where the possibility of confusion concerning a term exists, the court should define or explain such term.”79 Unlike many other facilities enumerated in § 860(a), such as elementary schools or universities, Congress provided a specific definition for a playground.80 To sustain a conviction under § 860(a), the government must prove a playground meets the statutory definition in § 75 Id. at 108–09. 76 See United States v. Harra, 985 F.3d 196, 211 (3d Cir. 2021) (“Once the Government chooses to charge a particular offense, it undertakes the burden to ‘convince the trier of all the essential elements of guilt.’” (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970))). 77 Rojas Alvarez, 451 F.3d at 328 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 860(e)(1)). 78 United States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118, 1128 (3d Cir. 1985). 79 United States v. Whitehead, 176 F.3d 1030, 1040 (8th Cir. 1999) (alternation in original) (quotation marks omitted). 80 See United States v. Smith, 13 F.3d 380, 382 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding conclusory statements describing a park as a “playground” were insufficient to prove the within 1,000 feet of a playground element of § 860(a)). 21 860(e)(1). That requires that the facility be open to the public.81 The ordinary term “playground” has varied meanings. “We refer to standard reference works such as legal and general dictionaries in order to ascertain the ordinary meaning of words.”82 The Oxford English Dictionary defines a playground as “[a] piece of ground used for playing on, esp. one attached to a school or in a public park.”83 Merriam-Webster defines it as “a piece of land used for and usually equipped with facilities for recreation especially by children” or “an area known or suited for activity of a specified sort.”84 But because Congress limited the reach of the statute to playgrounds “open to the public,” not all playgrounds, as defined above, are “playgrounds” as defined by Congress. Therefore, in Zayas’s case, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that his distribution of fentanyl occurred near a playground as defined in the statute, rather than a “playground” in the ordinary sense of the term. The jury was never informed of that. Whether a playground is open to the public is a mixed question of law and fact that is typically submitted to the jury.85 Since whether the Busy Bee playground was open to the public was not properly submitted to this jury, Zayas’s conviction under § 860(a) can only stand if the court’s omission was harmless.86 This is unlike the factual determination of whether Zayas knew that Price was pregnant when he sold her the fatal dose of drugs. Here, the failure to instruct the jury on the statutory definition of a playground and then asking the jury to 81 Rojas Alvarez, 451 F.3d at 328. 82 United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm’n v. Pena, 126 F.3d 193, 197–98 (3d Cir. 1997)). 83 Playground, Oxford English Online Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/145499? redirectedFrom=playground#eid (last visited Mar. 6, 2022). 84 Playground, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/playground (last visited Mar. 6, 2022). 85 See Horsley, 56 F.3d at 52 (affirming the district court’s submission of whether a playground was open to the public to the jury as a factual issue “since it could not be resolved without reference to the evidence in the record”). 86 See Neder, 527 U.S. at 10. 22 determine whether the Busy Bee playground satisfied the definition in § 860(a) was not harmless. The government’s contention that this playground was open to the public is solely based on the testimony of the Busy Bee’s owner who reported that the day care facility itself is open to the general public on a fee basis. The government therefore argues that is sufficient for any jury to reasonably infer that the attached playground is similarly open to the public. We are unpersuaded. The term “open to the public,” as used in the statute, implicates the accessibility of the playground. In the statute’s penalty section (a), the words “public” and “private” are often used to identify applicable types of facilities.87 Examples include a “public or private college,” a “public or private youth center,” and “public swimming pool.”88 Therefore, “public” and “private” in the statute are adjectives that modify the proprietary nature of each facility. Playground, however, is distinctly conditioned in section (e) and must be “open to the public.”89 Public is thus used as a noun, modified by “open to.” Therefore, the playground must be accessible to the general public rather than being publicly maintained or owned. That the Busy Bee allows members of the general public to enroll in its day care facility and thereby gain access to the attached playground does not, without more, make the playground itself accessible to the general public. In fact, when asked at trial whether the playground “is . . . open to the general public for use,” the owner responded that it was not.90 The government’s assertion that the Busy Bee playground is open to the public because anyone can gain access to it by enrolling in the day care center would negate the congressional restriction on the reach of the statute. It is hard to imagine a playground that would not be “public” under the government’s broad reading. A member of the general public could gain access to even the most restrictive facilities by paying a fee and satisfying any other membership requirements. The most restrictive private club is, after all, accessible to any member 87 21 U.S.C. § 860(a). 88 Id. 89 Id. § 860(e). 90 App. at 428. 23 of the public who joins the club and pays applicable fees. We therefore reject the government’s invitation to stretch this statute to include the Busy Bee playground. We also consider that the Busy Bee playground is surrounded by a fence secured with a latch. While the existence of a latched fence is not dispositive of whether a playground is or is not open to the public, it is certainly relevant to the inquiry. Without evidence that the secured fence serves some purpose other than keeping the public out and restricting access, we can only conclude that the fence serves to exclude the general public from the recreational area it encompasses. Moreover, in interpreting whether the Busy Bee playground is accessible to the public, we are persuaded by the very helpful and thoughtful analysis of an analogous state statute by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Curlee v. State.91 There, in concluding that evidence was insufficient to support the “open to the public” element of the Texas drug-free zone statute, the court relied largely on the owner’s apparent intention to control and limit access to the playground.92 Curlee involved a church playground surrounded by a chain link fence with four gates.93 Evidence showed that two of the gates were locked, one with a deadbolt, the other with a padlock, while the other two gates could have been locked in a similar manner.94 The Court in Curlee concluded that the locked gates signified that the church intended to assert dominion and control over access to the playground. That those attempts were less than perfect, or even inadequate, to keep members of the general public out, did not transform the playground into one that was “open to the public.”95 91 620 S.W.3d 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). The Texas statute criminalizing possession within 1,000 feet of a playground, like § 860(a), requires that the playground be “open to the public.” See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.134(a)(3)(B). 92 Curlee, 620 S.W.3d at 780–81. 93 Id. at 781. 94 Id. 95 Id. 24 The fencing surrounding the Busy Bee playground similarly suggests the owner sought to exert at least some level of control over access to the playground and preclude access by the general public, even though that exercise of dominion was far from perfected. The fence contained a single gate secured with a latch, and it is unclear from the record whether it could be, or was intended to be, locked. Nevertheless, the fact that it may not have been locked cannot be interpreted as an open invitation to members of the general public to “come on in” and use the Busy Bee’s facilities for recreation. It is also fair to assume that a member of the general public would not conclude he or she was permitted to enter and use the playground just because the gate may not have been locked. Accordingly, we will vacate Zayas’s conviction on Count 3 for selling a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a playground as defined in § 860(e)(1), and we will remand for resentencing on that Count.