Opinion ID: 1917882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Complaint: The Right to a Judicial Determination As to the Constitutionality of Statutes.

Text: At the outset, it should be observed that we express no opinion as to the merits of the respondents' case. Nor, on demurrer, are we concerned with whether respondents can prove their allegations at trial. Merchandising Corp. v. Marine Nat. Exchange Bank (1960), 12 Wis. (2d) 79, 106 N. W. (2d) 317. Whether any part of a statute may be upheld is a question of law for the courts. Stewart v. Stanley (1941), 199 La. 146, 5 So. (2d) 531. A regulatory statute cannot masquerade as an absolute exercise of police power. It must be reasonable. Whether it transcends the constitution must be decided by the court. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Warner (1950), 77 N. D. 721, 45 N. W. (2d) 196. A person claiming to be aggrieved by the application of a statute to his particular circumstances is entitled to challenge the constitutional foundation of that statute in our courts. The clear distinction must be understood between the right to a judicial determination as to the statute's constitutionality, and the scope of judicial review which the court will undertake and what effect will be given to the evidence adduced at trial. A fair balance must be struck, in construing pleadings, between the status of a regularly enacted statute and the onerous burden of invalidating the statute. Proper balancing of the rules of pleading and the right to judicial review promote justice. There is no dispute as to the rule that, All acts of legislative bodies are presumed to be constitutional unless established otherwise by a competent tribunal. Courtesy Cab Co. v. Johnson (1960), 10 Wis. (2d) 426, 431, 103 N. W. (2d) 17. In cases challenging the constitutionality of statutes we do not sit as judges of the merits of the controversy, as is done in other cases. Borden Co. v. McDowell (1959), 8 Wis. (2d) 246, 99 N. W. (2d) 146. We will not weigh the relative merits of this legislation. Courts are not concerned with the overall merits or wisdom of statutes. State v. Dried Milk Products Co-operative (1962), 16 Wis. (2d) 357, 114 N. W. (2d) 412; State v. Ross (1951), 259 Wis. 379, 48 N. W. (2d) 460. But, the court does become judicially concerned where the statute clearly contravenes some constitutional provision. Thielen v. Metropolitan Sewerage Comm. (1922), 178 Wis. 34, 189 N. W. 484; Knoll v. Shaler (1923), 180 Wis. 66, 192 N. W. 399. We are obligated only to weigh statutes on the scales of reasonableness. See State v. Redmon (1907), 134 Wis. 89, 114 N. W. 137. The exercise of state police power must rest upon reasonable grounds. The means adopted thereby must be a reasonable accomplishment of that purpose. Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Milwaukee (1936), 223 Wis. 251, 270 N. W. 336. In Nebbia v. New York (1934), 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940, it is said that the police power must be such that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process. Further, that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. The burden on the challenger is heavy. All legislative acts are constitutional unless it appears they are unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. State ex rel. McCormack v. Foley (1962), 18 Wis. (2d) 274, 118 N. W. (2d) 211. Whether the scale will be tipped on the side of constitutional mandates which condemn statutory inroads into constitutional sanctuaries or on the side of the presumption of constitutionality of legislative enactments is ultimately resolved by the answer to this question: Is the legislative choice without a reasonable basis? Onsrud v. Kenyon (1941), 238 Wis. 496, 300 N. W. 359. [4] A narrow view of what are ultimate facts or conclusions of law must not be indulged in when a statute is challenged. Constitutional rights are too fundamentaltoo important not to be considered by this court. (A complaint must nevertheless meet minimum requirements for pleadings.) We should not lose sight of the function of courts in our society. That a statute will be upheld if there is any reasonable basis for it necessarily implies a determination of that very question, with the proviso that the court will not weigh the evidence. Our duty was stated in State ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham (1892), 81 Wis. 440, 477, 51 N. W. 724: How, then, can this court declare what the statutory law is, without first determining whether it conflicts with the constitution? Without this power, this court would have no judicial functions whatever, and would be a useless appendage of the government. . . . `By a course of judicial decisions reaching from the earliest history of American government to the present day, without a dissenting voice, it has been adjudged that courts of justice have the right and are in duty bound to test every law by the constitution as the fundamental and paramount law of the land, governing all derivative power and the exercise thereof. . . . To contend that this is not so would be to assert that the legislative branch of the government is supreme in its authority.'. . . `Whether the legislature has transcended its power and passed an act in conflict with the constitution is essentially a question of law, and must necessarily be passed upon by the courts.' [5] It is clear that the court has the obligation to take judicial notice, where it can, to uphold a statute. Ritholz v. Johnson (1944), 244 Wis. 494, 12 N. W. (2d) 738. And, it is the duty of the attorney general to appear on behalf of the people of this state to show why the statute is constitutional. Sec. 269.56 (11), Stats. But, where the court has no adequate knowledge of the facts pertaining to the subject of the lawsuit, nor can it satisfactorily inform itself of such facts, a trial should be had. Ritholz v. Johnson, supra . Whether a trial will be had, or judicial notice taken, is a matter of discretion reposing in this court. Associated Hospital Service v. Milwaukee (1961), 13 Wis. (2d) 447, 109 N. W. (2d) 271. In State v. Chippewa Cable Co. (1963), 21 Wis. (2d) 598, 602, 124 N. W. (2d) 616, it is said: The type of issue presented by an allegation that a statute violates the constitution, and a denial thereof or demurrer thereto, does not fit exactly into the usual classification of issues as fact or law. Primarily, it is an issue of law, but because of principles controlling judicial review of legislative acts, the issue often is: Whether there may be reasonably conceived in the mind of the court facts which the legislature could have deemed to exist and which would form a reasonable basis upon which the statute may constitutionally rest. The process of judicial notice may be adequate to resolve the question under some circumstances, but particularly where economic regulation is involved, it may be necessary for a court to make a judicial investigation of facts outside the ordinary scope of judicial notice. . . . It is clear, however, that where judicial notice can be taken of facts sufficient to form a reasonable basis upon which the statute may constitutionally rest, the assembling of further facts by way of trial could serve no useful purpose, and the Ritholz procedure need not be followed. The challenge raised by the respondents is of sufficient magnitude to warrant a judicial inquiry. Certainly, the studies made by the boards on the railroad issues, raise sufficient doubt about the entire subject of full-crew legislation. Whether facts will be presented at a trial to elevate that doubt to prove that there is no reasonable basis for the statute must abide the result of a hearing. Appellants argue that respondents are required to negate every conceivable basis which may reasonably support the statute's constitutionality, citing State v. Texaco (1961), 14 Wis. (2d) 625, 111 N. W. (2d) 918. In that case it was the opponent of the statute, Texaco, which demurred thereby attempting to preclude a full hearing on the merits. There, this court affirmed the order of the trial court which overruled the demurrer. Texaco does not apply any rule other than there must be a showing of no reasonable basis for a statute. For the pleader to set forth the minute details of proof in the pleading is neither required nor proper pleading. The complaint fully and fairly advises the appellants and the court of what is claimed. Handy v. Holland Furnace Co. (1960), 11 Wis. (2d) 151, 105 N. W. (2d) 299; Aldrich v. Skycoach Air Lines Agency (1954), 266 Wis. 580, 64 N. W. (2d) 199; Wauwatosa v. Milwaukee (1954), 266 Wis. 59, 62 N. W. (2d) 718. The issue is very narrow in this case; the proof, however, might have to be very broad. Allegations of unconstitutionality without supporting factual allegations are conclusions of law and improper. See Bieser v. Woods (1941), 347 Mo. 437, 147 S. W. (2d) 656; Juengel v. Glendale (Mo. 1942), 161 S. W. (2d) 408; Springfield v. Kable (1940), 306 Ill. App. 616, 29 N. E. (2d) 675. In Laun v. Kipp (1914), 155 Wis. 347, 355, 145 N. W. 183, it is said: Technical accuracy in statements of fact is not required. Facts need not, necessarily, be expressly alleged. No very narrow idea is to be indulged in as to what is a legal conclusion and what a matter of fact, or mixed law and fact. . . . All reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of the pleader. All facts expressly stated and all reasonably inferable therefrom, giving to the language of the pleading the broadest meaning which it will reasonably bear, are to be regarded as sufficiently alleged to meet any challenge for insufficiency. In its simplest form the complaint alleges that firemen are unnecessary; that the requirement that firemen be part of the crew in freight trains and in yard service bears no reasonable relationship to safety, and results in an unreasonable financial burden upon respondents; and, therefore, the statutes which require under the circumstances firemen violate enumerated sections of the state and federal constitutions. If respondents are able to sufficiently demonstrate that firemen are not needed and serve no useful purpose, and their function bears no relation to the safety of the crew or the public within the bounds of reasonQuery: Have not the respondents met their burden of proof? It would seem that the allegations that firemen perform no necessary function in the operation of the train and that their presence in the crew has no relation to safety represent an ultimate collection of those facts which the respondents must prove. What was said in Larson v. Lester (1951), 259 Wis. 440, 443, 49 N. W. (2d) 414, is apposite: The statement may be a conclusion of law, but this court has said: `. . . Where the ultimate fact essential to a cause of action is brought into existence by a series of detail acts and events, it is entirely competent and sufficient to plead those detail acts according to their legal effect, . . . . . `Matters of mixed law and fact, the ultimate of which is, in a broad sense, a fact, may be pleaded according to their legal effect . . . every reasonable intendment must be indulged in in favor of the pleading.' . . . Thauer v. Gaebler (1930), 202 Wis. 296, 232 N. W. 561, was an action by a minority shareholder on behalf of defendant corporation to require other defendants to account for and repay certain moneys. Defendants claim the allegations that certain increases in salaries to the officers are excessive and unreasonable, or excessive and unlawful, are but conclusions of law. The court said they are really statements of mixed conclusions of fact and law, the ultimate of which is, in a broad sense, a conclusion of fact, and consequently may be pleaded according to their legal effect. In State ex rel. Week v. State Board of Examiners (1947), 252 Wis. 32, 30 N. W. (2d) 187, it appears that the general allegation that certain portions of a statute are in violation of the Fourteenth amendment by depriving the party of his right to property without due process of law are sufficient. Appellants argue that the complaint does not allege anything to take it out of the three Arkansas full-crew cases, especially the Norwood Case. [6] Full-crew laws are intended for the safety of the public, of the passengers, and employees of the railroad. Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. Corp. in Nebraska (8th Cir. 1940), 108 Fed. (2d) 897; see also Union Pacific R. Co. v. Anderson (1941), 167 Or. 687, 120 Pac. (2d) 578; Bressler v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (1950), 152 Neb. 732, 42 N. W. (2d) 617; New York Central R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm. (1953), 160 Ohio St. 236, 115 N. E. (2d) 842. Whether the basis for these laudable purposes exists under present conditions is another question. Full-crew laws are penal and in derogation of the common law. State v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (1931), 205 Wis. 252, 237 N. W. 132; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Illinois Central R. Co. (1962), 243 Miss. 851, 138 So. (2d) 908; Bressler v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., supra . The Arkansas full-crew cases are not controlling. The net effect of the United States supreme court's decisions were that the subject of full crews is a proper one for state regulation. The first two cases were decided upon a record. In the first case the court said the laws were enacted for the protection of those engaged in interstate commerce. The court did, however, express its doubt as to the necessity of the law. In the second case the court held that, as in the first case, the testimony did not establish that the statute was an arbitrary exercise of power. In the third case the pleadings alleged changing circumstances and improvements in the safe operation of the trains. The court said (at p. 255): The burden is on the plaintiff by candid and direct allegations to set forth in its complaint facts sufficient plainly to show the asserted invalidity. . . . There is no showing that the dangers against which these laws were intended to safeguard employees and the public no longer exist or have been lessened by the improvements in road and equipment or by the changes in operating conditions there described. And, for aught that appears from the facts that are alleged, the same or greater need may now exist for the specified number of brakemen and helpers in freight train and switching crews. . . . There is no statement as to present efficiency of switching crews compared with that when the 1913 Act was passed, but it reasonably may be inferred that larger cars and heavier loading of today make for a lower switching expense per car or ton. While cost of complying with state laws enacted to promote safety is an element properly to be taken into account in determining whether such laws are arbitrary or repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . there is nothing alleged in that respect which is sufficient to distinguish this case from those in which we have upheld the laws in question. Conditions may have changed sufficiently to warrant reexamination of Wisconsin law. [7] We think the reasoning in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Driscoll (1938), 330 Pa. 97, 104, 198 Atl. 130, is most appropriate to this case. The opinion is long and will not be quoted at length. The following is pertinent to our discussion: But this challenge against the constitutionality of the Full Crew Act depends entirely on facts. We cannot determine whether the Act is confiscatory, unreasonable and arbitrary, or whether it does not reasonably tend to promote safety, until facts are presented to show the existence of any of these effects. Prima facie, the Act is valid and must be so considered by us until its invalidity appears. Whether the measure promotes safety, or has a tendency to do so, must indubitably turn on facts and circumstances regarding that subject, and the relation which the provisions of the Act bear to safety. An analysis of the statute and the statute's requirements is necessary; we must compare these with the incidents of transportation, including the causes which create the need for safeguards, and the methods now employed to obtain the safety of the public and employees. When the result is reached, if it is found the statutory protection is of such slight consequence, or is so incidental as to cause the provisions of the Act to be wholly impractical, and not in promotion of the safety it seems to strive for, then its operation would be unreasonable and arbitrary. This situation could only be developed by evidence. In these circumstances, of course, it would be error to refuse to hear evidence. [Cases cited.] The Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Driscoll Case (1939), 336 Pa. 310, 336, 9 Atl. (2d) 621, was a decision on the merits. The full-crew law was held invalid. There was a 7,000 page record and 282 findings of fact. The court said the fact that the legislature has promulgated such regulations by its own general statute does not exempt them from judicial review. Further, the court said: What impressd us most was the highly speculative possibility of the danger of accidents alleged to exist. The resultant effectiveness of the Act under these circumstances could only be out of all reasonable proportion to the cost involved, . . . Respondents argue that Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona (1945), 325 U. S. 761, 65 Sup. Ct. 1515, 89 L. Ed. 1915, is on point in respect to the issue of undue burden upon interstate commerce. It is not. Enough has been said on this point earlier in this opinion. [8] As to the Arizona case, it is sufficient to say that the record made it abundantly clear that the Arizona Train Limit Law (which regulated the length of trains) substantially impaired the operation of interstate railroads. The regrouping of trains, made necessary to comply with the state law, had a stultifying effect on the free flow of commerce. Full-crew laws, on the contrary, do not necessarily have that effect. We conclude that the complaint does state sufficient facts to entitle the respondents to a trial as to the constitutionality of the challenged portions of the full crew statutes. The memorandum decision filed by the trial court directed the defendants . . . to advise the plaintiff railroads and the court by way of answer what they maintain is a reasonable justification for the imposition of the fireman requirement upon the plaintiffs in all of their yard and over-the-road freight operations conducted in Wisconsin. We disagree as to the learned trial court's placement of the burden of proof. The burden of proof in this case is upon the respondent railroads to show that the statute is unconstitutional. The appellants should be free to choose the method and extent of their defense. The order entered pursuant to the memorandum decision does not order the appellants to answer in any particular manner, and should be affirmed in this form. The subject matter of the instant action is far too vital to be summarily disposed of by demurrer upon inadequate information contained in the record on demurrer. Gregory III v. Madison Mobile Homes Park (1964), 24 Wis. (2d) 275, 278, 128 N. W. (2d) 462. By the Court. Order affirmed.