Opinion ID: 728946
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jack kime's arguments:

Text: 5 Kime and Bell objected to the district court's proposed reasonable doubt instruction 1 based on Eighth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 3.11 and proposed the following additional sentence: A reasonable doubt is one that fairly and naturally arises from the evidence or lack of evidence produced by the Government. The district court rejected Kime's proposed addition and elected to proceed instead with the unadorned version of the model instruction. Kime and Bell both claim error. 6 We review the formulation of jury instructions by the district court for abuse of discretion. United States v. Parker, 32 F.3d 395, 400 (8th Cir.1994). We find none. The jury instructions as a whole effectively communicated the defendants' point without the proposed addition to the reasonable doubt instruction: In particular, Instruction No. 13 instructed the jurors on the presumption of innocence, and Instruction No. 4 instructed the jurors to use their reason and common sense to draw deductions or conclusions from the facts established by the evidence. The defendant is not entitled to a particularly worded instruction where the instructions given, when viewed as a whole, correctly state the applicable law and adequately and fairly cover the substance of the requested instruction. Id. This Court has repeatedly approved the particular reasonable doubt instruction in issue here, United States v. Simms, 18 F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir.1994), and while such a lack of evidence instruction may be useful, the district court, in its discretion, may decline to employ it. United States v. Smith, 602 F.2d 834, 838-39 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 902, 100 S.Ct. 215, 62 L.Ed.2d 139 (1979).
7 Among the evidence seized from Asphalt Maintenance & Repair, the conspiracy's cover business, were several incriminating books. Some of these publications were devoted to the subject of illegal drugs. These included: The Secret Garden, Marijuana, Manufacturing Methamphetamine, Marijuana Grower's Guide, Psychedelic Chemistry, and Construction and Operation for Clandestine Drug Laboratories. Other titles covered burglary and theft-related topics, such as: Techniques of Safecracking, Techniques of Burglar Alarm Bypassing, How to Make Your Own Professional Lock Tools, Vol. 1-4, Techniques of Safe and Vault Manipulation, and The Complete Guide to Lockpicking by Eddie the Wire. These books were admitted into evidence over Kime's objection. While Government witness and former co-conspirator Randy Groves testified that the books belonged to Kime, he also admitted that he had never seen any member of the conspiracy, including Kime, read the books and that some of them appeared to have never been opened. Kime argues that these books should have been excluded under Fed.R.Evid. 403 because the risk of unfair prejudice greatly outweighed their probative value. The Government argues that the books are at least probative of Kime's criminal intent, especially when viewed in conjunction with the additional evidence of the conspiracy's involvement in drug distribution and armed robbery. 8 Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence gives the district court discretion to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Fed.R.Evid. 403. We accord great deference to the district court's application of the Rule 403 balancing test and will reverse only for a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Rabins, 63 F.3d 721, 726 (8th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1031, 134 L.Ed.2d 109 (1996). 9 Again we find no abuse of discretion. The risk of prejudice from these inflammatorily-titled publications is very real, but we do not view it as unfair prejudice. Whether or not Kime actually had the opportunity to read and exploit the techniques contained in these books, his mere possession of them is clearly probative of his criminal intent. The drug-oriented publications obviously bear on his interest in the charged drug distribution and conspiracy crimes as tool[s] of the drug-trafficking trade. United States v. Ford, 22 F.3d 374, 381-82 (1st Cir.) (admission of book entitled Secrets of Methamphetamine Manufacture in trial of defendant charged with distribution of cocaine and marijuana was relevant under Rule 401 and not unduly prejudicial under Rule 403), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 900, 115 S.Ct. 257, 130 L.Ed.2d 177 (1994). 10 While the burglary-related publications would not ordinarily prove relevant in defining an individual's criminal intent to distribute drugs, that is not the case here. The record is rife with evidence indicating that the Kime organization's modus operandi included the theft of rival drug dealers' product, proceeds, and firearms. As such, the possession of these books is further evidence of Kime's criminal intent in regard to this particular aspect of the charged conspiracy.
11 Des Moines drug dealer James Nelson testified at trial that he had been pistol-whipped, shot in the arm, and robbed of approximately $30,000 by members of Kime's organization. Over defense objections, the district court admitted into evidence police photographs of the robbery scene at Nelson's house, photographs of the wounds inflicted on Nelson during the robbery, and Nelson's derringer. Kime argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to exclude this evidence under Rule 403 because there was no relevant reason to admit this evidence other than to inflame the jury by showing them the bloody pictures of the violent assault. 12 We believe that this evidence was properly admitted as corroborating Groves, Brown, and McGee's testimony implicating Kime in the robbery. In addition, the photographs documenting Nelson's gunshot wound and head injuries were also probative of why Nelson misidentified Bell, who was indisputably incarcerated at the time of the robbery, as one of his assailants. Neither do we find this evidence particularly prejudicial as unduly gruesome or confusing. We find no abuse of discretion.
13 The affidavit in support of the Government's application for the interception of wire and oral communications contained the testimony of three confidential informants. After the Government subsequently disclosed the identities of two of them, Kime moved for disclosure of the third, designated in the affidavit as CI-1. The district court denied Kime's motion. Kime argues that he was entitled to learn the identity of the third confidential informant in order to challenge the sufficiency of the affidavit used to procure the search warrant for the wiretaps and video surveillance. 14 We review the district court's pretrial ruling of whether to compel disclosure of a confidential informant's identity for abuse of discretion. United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 877 (8th Cir.1991). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the need for disclosure, ... and the court must weigh the defendant's right to information against the government's privilege to withhold the identity of its confidential informants. Id. There must be some showing that the disclosure [of the confidential informant's identity] is vital to a fair trial. United States v. Curtis, 965 F.2d 610, 614 (8th Cir.1992). This inquiry will necessarily turn on the particular facts of each case. Harrington, 951 F.2d at 877. 15 The district court found that Kime had not met that burden, and we agree. It was never anticipated that CI-1 would be called to testify at trial, and he or she was not. Kime argues that the disclosure of CI-1's identity was necessary to test the veracity of his or her testimony and, consequentially, the quantum of probable cause behind the affidavit offered in support of the Government's application for the interception of wire and oral communications. But Kime offers no basis other than bald speculation for his assertion that such a disclosure and an opportunity to interview CI-1 would allow him to impeach CI-1's affidavit testimony. The movant's burden requires more than mere speculation that the testimony of the informant might prove to be helpful to the defense. Curtis, 965 F.2d at 614. Even if such a disclosure would have been helpful to the defense on some level, there is nothing indicating it would have had a material effect on Kime's motion to suppress the intercepted communications. In order to override the government's privilege of nondisclosure, defendants must establish beyond mere speculation that the informant's testimony will be material to the determination of the case. Harrington, 951 F.2d at 877. Kime has not met this burden by piling speculation on top of conjecture. Review of the affidavit shows that the testimony of CI-1 played a comparatively minor role and was not essential to the issuing judge's probable cause determination. Notwithstanding CI-1's testimony, we believe the testimony of the two disclosed informants standing alone would have sufficed to establish probable cause to issue the challenged warrant. See United States v. Dunlap, 28 F.3d 823, 825 (8th Cir.1994) (affirming sufficiency of warrant notwithstanding challenged statements). We find no abuse of discretion.