Opinion ID: 2960198
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Insufficient Clarity

Text: Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(d), “[a] party who objects to any portion of the instructions . . . must inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for the objection before the jury retires to deliberate.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d) (emphasis added). As this court has recognized, the specificity requirement is not to be taken lightly, because it helps to ensure that the objection is squarely and clearly presented to the district court, which guarantees 1 For example, the majority notes defense counsel’s statement that “the jurors are thinking, if he just makes the idea of sex more appealing, he could be convicted of a crime which could be just pure cybersex without any intent to induce or persuade. And that is not covered by the statute.” App. at 150.4; see also Maj. Op. at [10] n.3 (quoting this language). As I illustrate below, when this statement is viewed in its context, it is clear that the government and the district court only perceived the defense as raising objection B. -29- that the court of first instance has a meaningful opportunity to consider and correct any error prior to review by a court of appeals. See United States v. Weintraub, 273 F.3d 139, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying plain error review to defendant’s jury charge objection because “it was insufficiently particular to raise the question now presented and thus preserve it for appeal. By failing to draw the district court’s attention to the problem that Weintraub now complains of, the defendants deprived the district court of the opportunity to correct its putative error.”); see also Skelly, 442 F.3d at 99 (conducting plain error review because “[t]he defendants . . . failed to raise a specific objection to the omission of [certain] language from the charge”). The importance of preservation for purposes of appellate review cannot be understated: Rule 30 provides that no party may assign as error any portion of the charge unless that party objects to it before the jury retires to consider its verdict. The purpose of this provision is to give the trial court an opportunity to correct any error or omission in the charge before the jury begins its deliberations. If prompt objection is made as the rule requires, the error can then be corrected. As the Supreme Court has said: Orderly procedure requires that the respective adversaries’ views as to how the jury should be instructed be presented to the trial judge in time to enable him to deliver an accurate charge and to minimize the risk of committing reversible error. The objecting party must state distinctly the matter to which it objects and the ground of its objections. The objection must be specific enough so that the trial court can perceive the basis on which it is claimed that the instruction was erroneous. -30- . . . Accordingly, where the court and opposing counsel understand the defendant’s position, even a vague objection should be held sufficient. 2A Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 484 (3d ed. 2000) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)). Conversely, where the trial court and opposing counsel do not understand the defendant’s objection because it was not “state[d] distinctly,” the requirements of Rule 30 have not been met. A defendant’s failure to state his objection with sufficient clarity to apprise the district court of his position results in plain error review. Cf. United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1343 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“Where, as here, the defense fails to specify sufficiently the portion of the charge to which it objects, and therefore fails to comport with Rule 30, we will reverse only if the instruction is ‘plain error’ – if the error causes a substantial miscarriage of justice. . . . Of course, for those objections that the defendants raised with sufficient particularity to apprise the trial judge of their dissatisfaction, we do not demand ‘plain error’ in order to reverse.”). When, as here, an objection is made at trial but is at best ambiguous, or when the appellant’s objection focuses on a different problem than that targeted on appeal, it is unpreserved. See United States v. Vasquez, 267 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2001) (“During the charge conference, Vasquez did object to the aspect of the charge -31- involving heroin and cocaine trafficking, but the basis for his objection is ambiguous. . . . Where an appellant states distinctly, under Rule 30, the grounds for objecting the charge below, but urges a different ground on appeal, the objection is not properly preserved on appeal and we therefore review for plain error. Vasquez’s situation falls squarely within this rule . . . .”). In this case, if defense counsel meant to object to the inclusion of the “more appealing” language itself (objection A), he never made this clear at trial. His objection was too general and imprecise to apprise the district court that the defense was seeking the deletion of the “more appealing” clause,2 and it therefore failed to provide the 2 At no point did defense counsel make explicit that he was advocating the omission of the “more appealing” language altogether. Although he specifically requested the insertion of “with him,” he never requested the removal of “more appealing.” Furthermore, his objections about “cover[ing] noncriminal conduct” were more general objections to “the charge,” not specific objections to the “more appealing” language. See App. at 150.6 (“That is their enticement charge, which, to me, your Honor, covers noncriminal conduct and lowers the burden of proof . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 150.3 (“And this charge, here, covers a wide variety of noncriminal conduct.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 150.7 (“[T]he charge, as given, lowers the burden of proof . . . .). A general objection to -32- district court an opportunity to correct the error. Nor did defense counsel’s statements at trial adequately inform opposing counsel of the position that Joseph now asserts on appeal. The record shows that both the district court’s and the government’s responses throughout the charge conference addressed and focused solely on the omission of “with him,” demonstrating that it was this objection – and not any broader challenge to the “more appealing” language – that was in fact conveyed to and perceived by the district court and the government.3 “the charge” does not indicate what particular aspect of the proposed enticement charge defense counsel found problematic. 3 The majority construes defense counsel’s statement, “if he just makes the idea of sex more appealing, he could be convicted of a crime which could be just pure cybersex without any intent to induce or persuade,” App. at 150.4, as raising objection A. However, the responses from the government and district court – and indeed defense counsel himself – centered on the insertion of “with him,” indicating that their understanding was that defense counsel was actually raising objection B: The Defense: But it needs to be, he needs to be attempting to induce or persuading someone he believes to be a minor to engage. -33- The Court: Yeah. The Defense: The statute is intended that he engage in a sexual act with him, and – The Government: No, to make it more appealing to someone. The Defense: With him, but the way that charge – The Government: That’s not necessarily true. It could be that he makes it more sexually appealing to a friend of his, too, but in this particular case, yes, everybody understands that what we’re charging him with is making the act of sexual contact more appealing with him, not with somebody else. The Defense: You have no problem to amending the charge to a word like that? The Government: To with him? -34- The Court: No – The Defense: You need to prove that he was intended to induced or persuaded [sic], whichever, induce or entice . . . or persuade in equal contact with him. That would be illegal. The Government: It is in the charge. It is under the government’s theory of the case. The Defense: I remember that it wasn’t in there last time . . . . Id. at 150.4-.5 (emphasis added). In this exchange, defense counsel never argued for the complete omission of the “more appealing” language from the charge. Instead, he asked the government to agree to amend the charge to add “with him” to that clause. Indeed, the suggestion to expand upon or clarify the “more appealing” clause is incompatible with the suggestion to strike it in its entirety because the former presumes retention of the “more appealing” language. See also id. at 150.7 (The Defense: “It does no -35- Furthermore, during the charge conference, defense counsel had several opportunities to voice an objection to the “more appealing” language itself and make clear to the district court and to the government that he was objecting to more than just the omission of “with him.” Defense counsel, however, remained silent.4 Thus, any one any harm to clarify it by adding it [i.e., “with him”] to that section of the charge . . . .”). 4 For example, during phase II of the charge conference, defense counsel said nothing during the following colloquy: The Court: Okay. I’m looking at the paragraph at the bottom. I instruct you . . . . The government only needs show, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant attempted to convince or influence the victim to engage in a sexual act or made the possibility of the sexual activity more appealing. Now, I gather that stays in, right? The Government: Right. -36- broader objection that defense counsel may have raised (or intended to raise) was not made clear to the district court, which cannot fairly be said to have been apprised of the argument. Cf. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 895 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, joined by O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, J.J.) (“The very word ‘review’ presupposes that a litigant’s arguments have been raised and considered in the tribunal of first instance.”).