Opinion ID: 794148
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prospective Relief for Federal Law Claims

Text: 38 With respect to remedies of federal law violations, the PLRA provides that [t]he court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1); see also Benjamin v. Fraser, 343 F.3d 35, 56 (2d Cir.2003) ([T]he PLRA requires the court to make particular findings . . . when it identifies [federal] violations.). 39 Although the PLRA's requirement that relief be `narrowly drawn' and `necessary' to correct the violation might at first glance seem to equate permissible remedies with [legal] minimums, a remedy may require more than the bare minimum [federal law] would permit and yet still be necessary and narrowly drawn to correct the violation. Benjamin, 343 F.3d at 54. A remedy may be deemed to be properly drawn if it provides a practicable means of effectuati[on] even if such relief is over-inclusive. Id. (concluding that comprehensive window repair program at prison was necessary to remedy due process violation and narrowly drawn [g]iven the impracticability of the court examining each window). 40 The district court acknowledged that it was required to make need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings under the PLRA. See Handberry II, 219 F.Supp.2d at 533. It noted that [m]uch of the relief requested by plaintiffs falls beyond the scope of `least intrusive' and `narrowly drawn.' Id. The court decided, however, that the City defendants, by their own admission or by failing to dispute the findings of the monitor, remain non-compliant with applicable state and federal law after years of litigation and that the court was therefore compelled to order compliance. Id. The court concluded that [t]he order filed herewith . . . is crafted in a way that is narrowly drawn and extends no further than necessary to achieve compliance while keeping in mind public safety and the operation of the criminal justice system. Id. The court further made specific findings regarding the defendants' provision of educational services. The City defendants argue that the court nonetheless did not satisfy the PLRA's need-narrowness-intrusiveness requirements. 41 1. Applicability of Injunction to All DOC Inmates. The City defendants contend that paragraph six of the injunction, which purports to apply [its terms] to all DOC facilities is overbroad because [t]he plaintiff class . . . consists only of inmates who, inter alia, are incarcerated at DOC facilities on Rikers Island. Appellants' Br. at 55 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Handberry II, 219 F.Supp.2d at 530). 42 While the district court did describe the plaintiff class as consisting of inmates housed on Rikers Island, see Handberry II, 219 F.Supp.2d at 530, the plaintiff class is defined as all inmates under the age of twenty-one in the custody of the New York City Department of Correction who have not yet received their high school diploma or its equivalent. Handberry v. Thompson, No. 96 Civ. 6161 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.20, 1996) (stipulation and order for provisional class certification and notice to the class). We are aware that the defendants' Education Plan and the special monitor's final report address solely the provision of services at Rikers Island jails. We think it is clear that this is because, as evidence submitted by the City defendants seems to establish, DOE only provides educational services at Rikers Island jails; inmates at DOC's remaining four jails, the Borough Houses must transfer to a Rikers Island jail to receive such services. Am. Decl. of Esteban Colon ¶¶ 10-11, Handberry, No. 96 Civ. 6161 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.21, 1999). Thus, the district court did not err in ordering relief on the basis of the facts before it for the entire class. We therefore reject the City defendants' contention that paragraph six is impermissibly broad. 43 2. IDEA Screening Provisions. The Child Find provisions of the IDEA establish that the state must have policies and procedures to ensure that [a]ll children with disabilities . . . in need of special education and related services[] are identified, located, and evaluated and [that] a practical method [must be] developed and implemented to determine which children with disabilities are currently receiving needed special education and related services. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A). In its opinion, the district court declared that although the Education Plan listed five different mechanisms for identifying inmates eligible to receive special education and/or related services[,] . . . the City defendants have failed to consistently rely on these mechanisms. Handberry II, 219 F.Supp.2d at 540. Paragraph nineteen of the injunction thus requires the defendants to comply with the requirements of 20 U.S.C. § 1421(a)(3)(A), 34 C.F.R. § 300.125, and 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(a)(2), and [to] implement screening procedures to locate, identify, and evaluate all eligible inmates with disabilities. August 28, 2002, Order ¶ 19. 44 We do not see how this prospective relief, which tracks the statutory language of the IDEA's Child Find requirement precisely, can be viewed as unnecessary, overbroad or over-intrusive. The City defendants nonetheless argue that the district court's order was improper because the court found no inmates with a disability who should have been referred for evaluation, but were not. Appellants' Br. at 55. But we fail to see how this contention relates to the question of whether the City defendants have failed to meet their affirmative obligation to screen eligible inmates for disabilities. Indeed, the IDEA's apparent purpose in requiring screening is to find eligible inmates who might otherwise not be identified — without an effective screening mechanism in place, it is impossible for the City defendants, or anyone else, to identify inmates who should be referred for evaluation. We therefore reject their argument with respect to paragraph nineteen of the injunction. 45 3. Initial Meeting with Special Education Team. Paragraphs twenty-one and twenty-two of the injunction are an altogether different matter. The district court ordered that those inmates previously identified as in need of special education services, as well as those not previously identified, meet with a school based support team or pupil personnel team within five days of the request by an agency or of a referral from the Child Assistance Program (CAP) database. August 28, 2002, Order ¶¶ 21-22. We do not think these meetings are required by the IDEA. 46 The IDEA's evaluation requirement, enforced through paragraph nineteen of the injunction, see supra Part II.B.2, constitutes a significant step toward developing the IDEA's primary device for delivering special education services: the IEP. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4); Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep't of Educ., 397 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir.2005). The IEP, developed by educators in conjunction with the child's parents, sets forth a specific and particularized plan for each child's development. It must contain, inter alia, a statement of the child's goals and steps to be taken to transition the child to the least restrictive environment. See id. §§ 1412(a)(4), 1436(d). Because of the timing constraints associated with the transient nature of the Rikers Island population, the defendants use a Temporary Education Plan (TEP) for students with disabilities that serve[s] as the student's IEP until release from Rikers Island and entrance into a school program where a new, more permanent IEP is required. Rikers Island Standard Operating Procedures 4 (July 1997) (Rikers Island SOP Manual). A TEP appears to be similar in most respects to an IEP, although it is developed based on a single diagnostic academic placement test rather than, as with the IEP, using multiple assessment tools. See August 28, 2002, Order ¶¶ 17-18; 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2). 47 The plaintiffs contend that the five-day meeting requirement of paragraph twenty-one, which applies to those inmates who have already been identified through CAP as needing special educational services, is crucial to these evaluation procedures and, therefore, to the development of the TEPs. The City defendants respond that the five-day meeting is not necessary to ensure the provision of educational services, that it will not help facilitate the development of TEPs, and that it is excessively burdensome. We agree with the City defendants. 48 Under paragraph twenty-six of the injunction, as to which we affirm, see infra Part II.B.4., [a] TEP must be developed and implemented within thirty school days of the student's commencing participation in any BOE school or program at the Rikers Island Academies. Paragraph twenty-one is thus not necessary to avoid inmates languishing for lengthy periods without having their TEPs developed and implemented, because the City is required to develop and implement them within thirty days. Indeed, these meetings would not appear to be particularly helpful for the creation of TEPs since TEPs are developed based on the information stored in the CAP database and diagnostic tests, not on what the inmate might tell the school-based support team during the course of the initial meeting. 49 Moreover, inmates need not await the development of their TEPs in order to start receiving educational services. In its opinion, the district court refused the plaintiffs' request that the City be required to provide educational services within ten days, because [n]o evidence has been submitted . . . that the City defendants have failed to provide services within ten days of incarceration. 219 F.Supp.2d at 533. At the same time, such meetings would threaten to divert the City's already scarce resources away from the provision of actual educational services. We therefore vacate paragraph twenty-one of the injunction. 50 The five-day meeting requirement in paragraph twenty-two of the injunction is not only not required by the IDEA but appears to violate it. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I) provides that [t]he agency proposing to conduct an initial evaluation to determine if the child qualifies as a child with a disability as defined in section 1401 of this title shall obtain informed consent from the parent of such child before conducting the evaluation. 5 Since it seems that it will often be difficult as a practical matter to secure parental consent within such a narrow time frame, the defendants argue that the five-day meeting for inmates not previously identified through CAP as in need of special educational services violates this provision of the IDEA. The plaintiffs respond that the meeting is necessary only to determine whether an evaluation will be required. We are not convinced by the plaintiffs' response. What, after all, does such a determination entail if not a substantive evaluation of whether or not the student requires special educational services? Even if the full diagnostic test is not given to the student, the school-based support team might well make decisions as to whether further evaluation is necessary to which a parent has not yet consented. The parental consent provisions of the IDEA seem to be intended to preclude precisely such administrative usurpation of the parent's role. We conclude that the five-day meeting requirement of paragraph twenty-two violates the IDEA, and we therefore vacate it. 51 4. Provision of TEPs. In paragraph twenty-six of the injunction, the district court ordered the DOE to develop TEPs for students who do not have current IEPs within thirty school days of enrollment. In deciding to order this relief, the court concluded that the City defendants had failed to develop and implement TEPs and had thereby deprived students of the special education services to which they are legally entitled. Handberry, 219 F.Supp.2d at 541-42. The City defendants do not contest this conclusion. They argue instead that the thirty-school-day deadline for TEP implementation is excessively burdensome, Appellants' Br. at 57, because existing Rikers Island procedures establish a twenty-school-day waiting period before the SBST team must meet with the student to begin developing a TEP. As we have noted, however, those procedures also state that every effort will be made to ensure that students have a TEP prior to their release from Rikers Island. Rikers Island SOP Manual at 4. And the City defendants report that most entitled inmates are incarcerated for less than 30 calendar days, Appellants' Br. at 57 n. 24, and that the majority are released after ten business days. Id. at 7. These facts suggest that, by the City defendants' own procedures, students should be provided with a TEP within thirty days. In light of the fact that the deadline for TEP development is more generous than that which would logically follow from the City defendants' own procedures, we do not think that the thirty-school-day deadline for TEP implementation fails the PLRA's need-narrowness-intrusiveness test. See Benjamin, 343 F.3d at 55. 52 The defendants also assert that the last two sentences of paragraph twenty-six of the August 28, 2002, Order contravene the IDEA by eviscer[ating] the parental informed consent requirements. Appellants' Br. at 57. Those sentences provide: The TEP shall be created by an IEP/TEP team in accordance with 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.344. If for any reason a required member of the IEP/TEP team fails to participate (either in person or telephonically), the reason(s) for his or her nonparticipation shall be documented in the TEP itself. August 28, 2002, Order ¶ 26. Under 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B), the IEP team is defined to include a disabled child's parents, and under 34 C.F.R. § 300.344, the DOE shall ensure that the IEP team includes the child's parents. However, [a] meeting may be conducted without a parent in attendance if the public agency is unable to convince the parents that they should attend. In this case the public agency must have a record of its attempts to arrange a mutually agreed on time and place . . . . 34 C.F.R. § 300.345(d). The August 28, 2002, Order, in requiring that the City defendants comply with applicable law, and in mandating that the reasons for absence of a required member be noted in the TEP itself, August 28, 2002, Order ¶ 26, reinforces rather than eviscerate[s] the requirements of the IDEA. 53 The City defendants further contend that paragraph twenty-seven of the injunction, which requires that a TEP shall, inter alia, include measurable annual and short term academic and social/behavioral objectives as determined to be necessary for each student to improve performance, August 28, 2002, Order ¶ 27, is overbroad because all items, except annual goals and dates for initiation and duration of services, are already listed on a TEP and annual goals are meaningless in a jail setting. Appellants' Br. at 58. On this issue, we agree with the defendants. Although the IDEA requires that the IEP includes a statement of measurable annual goals, including academic and functional goals, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II)(aa)-(bb), it would be absurd to apply annual goals to students who only reside in the jail for a matter of weeks. Cf. Yerdon v. Henry, 91 F.3d 370, 376 (2d Cir.1996) (Where an examination of the statute as a whole demonstrates that a party's interpretation would lead to absurd or futile results ... plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole, that interpretation should be rejected.) (internal citation and quotation omitted); King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221, 112 S.Ct. 570, 116 L.Ed.2d 578 (1991) ([T]he cardinal rule [is] that a statute is to be read as a whole . . . since the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.) (internal citation omitted). Thus, this provision of the PLRA does not apply to the plaintiffs in this case, and the section of paragraph 27 requiring adherence to annual goals is hereby vacated. 54 5. Continuum of Services. In their Reply Brief, the City defendants assert for the first time that paragraphs thirty-two and thirty-four of the district court's injunction are overbroad. The City defendants contend that these provisions are not based on any violation of an inmate's federal rights. Appellants' Reply Br. at 25. Paragraph thirty-two requires that [a] range of special educations services shall be available . . . to meet the needs of disabled students, including but not limited to, general classroom instruction, with supplementary aids and services, skills support classes, resource rooms; and self-contained classes for students with intensive needs. August 28, 2002, Order ¶ 32. The district court concluded that the City defendants' amorphous one-size-fits-all `skills class' either taught by a special education teacher or by a subject area teacher in consultation with a special education teacher . . . is less than what the City defendants are required to provide under the terms of the original Education Plan and falls far short of the sort of individualized services required by the IDEA. Handberry, 219 F.Supp.2d at 543. 55 Under the IDEA, the City defendants must provide [a] free appropriate public education. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); see also id. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (stating that such free appropriate public education must emphasize[] special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs). In so doing, the City defendants must ensure that a continuum of alternative placements is available to meet the needs of children with disabilities for special education and related services, including instruction in regular classes [and] special classes, and the provision for supplementary services [ ]such as resource room. 34 C.F.R. § 300.551; see also id. §§ 300.5, 300.301. The City defendants do not dispute that they did not provide the required continuum of services to students with disabilities. We are unpersuaded by their argument that the district court erred in ordering them to do so. 56 Similarly, paragraph thirty-four requires that the DOC furnish space to enable the DOE to provide counseling services. The IDEA requires that the DOE provide related services, including counseling. 34 C.F.R. § 300.24(a). The district court found that the space provided for such counseling was inadequate. The City defendants responded that they would make space in the George R. Vierno Center available for counseling. The court incorporated this response into the order. We do not see how this portion of the order can be deemed unnecessary, overbroad, or over-inclusive. 57 6. Responsibility for Costs of Special Monitor. The City defendants argue that paragraph forty-seven should be vacated to the extent that it requires City defendants and the State to pay for the special monitor on the ground that these expenses should be borne by the judiciary under 18 U.S.C. § 3626. Appellants' Br. at 59. Section 3626(f)(4) establishes that, if the court appoints a special master, his or her compensation must be paid with funds appropriated to the Judiciary. Id. § 3626(f)(4). 58 This argument is foreclosed by our decision in Benjamin v. Fraser, supra. There we concluded that the Office of Compliance Consultants (OCC), which had been appointed to monitor compliance with consent decrees concerning prison conditions, was not a special master within the meaning of the PLRA. Benjamin, 343 F.3d at 44-47. We reasoned that the OCC did not have the ability to convene and to regulate hearings, to rule on the admissibility of evidence, to subpoena and swear witnesses, and to hold non-cooperating witnesses in contempt. Id. at 45. We noted that [t]he master's responsibilities typically culminate in a report. If the report includes findings of fact, they are binding in non-jury actions unless clearly erroneous. Id. We decided that while the OCC's reports aided the court in assessing compliance efforts, the OCC did not exercise quasi-judicial power and was therefore not a special master. Id. at 47. The PLRA's requirements regarding the compensation of special masters therefore did not apply to OCC. Id. 59 Here, the district court appointed Dr. Meisel to assess the City defendants' compliance with this order and provide the court and counsel with semi-annual reports specifically identifying any areas of noncompliance. August 28, 2002, Order ¶ 46. The court determined that [t]he reports may also contain recommendations for further modifications to the Education Plan as amended by this Order and that [t]he monitor in her report may also recommend specific changes in BOE and DOC policies and procedures. Id. In using the special monitor's first such report, the district court used it as an aid in assessing the City defendants' compliance with the terms of the Education Plan and the requirements of the IDEA. See Handberry, 219 F.Supp.2d at 530. The court adopted specific factual findings that it found to be uncontroverted by the defendants. Id. at 532. As is clear from this use of the monitor's previous report, and from the terms of the district court's order reappointing Dr. Meisel as special monitor, Dr. Meisel has not been given a mandate to exercise quasi-judicial powers, such as finding facts that would be binding on the court absent clear error. See Benjamin, 343 F.3d at 45. We conclude that Dr. Meisel is thus not a special master within the meaning of the PLRA. The City defendants' argument that paragraph forty-seven is invalid thus fails.