Opinion ID: 1959334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: DSS Intervention

Text: In its motion to intervene, DSS asserted an interest in Bonnie's petition to terminate David's parental rights on two bases: first, that it affected DSS's rights as Bonnie's assignee to collect child support from David and, second, that the petition was against public policy, contrary to the rights of the child, and not in the best interest of either Pamela or the State. Although both David and Bonnie initially objected to the intervention and David continued to grumble about it from time to time, neither party has raised it as an issue in this appeal. Because the matter is of such obvious and central importance, however, we think it appropriate to make clear our view that the intervention was proper. As Pamela's father, David had a duty to support the child during his life and her minority. Bonnie had been receiving AFDC and other welfare benefits for most of Pamela's life and was receiving them even on the date of the evidentiary hearing in September, 1987. Under applicable law and the various assignments, DSS had a continuing right to enforce David's support obligation in order to recover at least part of the funds it was obliged to pay for Pamela's sustenance. Unlike an adoption, where another person is available to support the child, the effect of a termination here would simply be to end David's duty of support without any legally obligated substitute. That would have left DSS with a continuing obligation to pay benefits but no ability to recover from the person legally and contractually bound. Quite apart from any eligibility for permissive intervention under Md. Rule 2-214(b), we think that DSS had a right of intervention under Rule 2-214(a). It claimed an interest in the transaction that was the subject of the action and was so situated, given the alignment of David and Bonnie, that disposition of the action would, as a practical matter, impair or impede its ability to protect that interest.