Opinion ID: 35393
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plaintiffs' Counter-Arguments

Text: 13 In spite of our well-established procedure for Rule 60(b) motions during the pendency of an appeal, plaintiffs argue that their notice of appeal did not divest the district court of jurisdiction to grant their motion. We find plaintiffs' arguments unconvincing.
14 Plaintiffs claim that they were forced to file a notice of appeal in order to preserve their appellate issues while the district court was considering their Rule 60(b) motion. Plaintiffs, however, do not point to any authority suggesting that this forced situation creates an exception to the general rule that the district court's jurisdiction is divested upon filing the notice of appeal. Furthermore, we have previously determined that our procedure — an appellant may make a motion to the court of appeals for a remand if the district court indicates an intention to grant the Rule 60(b) motion — will relieve a party from being forced to elect between two available remedies. Winchester, 68 F.3d at 949. 3 This argument, therefore, is without merit.
15 Plaintiffs cite cases stating that a district court may entertain, or even grant, a Rule 60(b) motion regardless of a pending appeal. See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 1547, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) ([T]he pendency of an appeal does not affect the district court's power to grant Rule 60 relief.); Ingraham v. United States, 808 F.2d 1075, 1080-81 (5th Cir.1987) ([A] Rule 60(b) motion may be entertained in the district court at any time within a year of judgment, regardless of the pendency or even the completion of an appeal.); Ames v. Miller, 184 F.Supp.2d 566, 575 (N.D.Tex.2002) (The fact that the judgment sought to be set aside had been affirmed on appeal does not impair the trial court's ability to grant Rule 60(b) relief.). Plaintiffs also cite Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 97 S.Ct. 31, 50 L.Ed.2d 21 (1976), in which the Supreme Court held that the District Court may entertain a Rule 60(b) motion without leave by this Court. Id. at 31. 16 These cases do not support plaintiffs' position. Contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, Ingraham is not inconsistent with our procedure described in Winchester. Ingraham merely states that the district court may entertain the Rule 60(b) motion, and the ability to entertain or consider the motion at any time and without leave of the appellate court does not compel the conclusion asserted by plaintiffs that the district court may also grant the motion without such leave. 4 Standard Oil and Ames dealt with a clearly different procedural issue — the ability of the district court to dispose of a Rule 60(b) motion after a completed appeal, rather than during the pendency of an appeal. See Standard Oil, 97 S.Ct. at 31; Ames, 184 F.Supp.2d at 570-71, 573, 575. The power of the district court to act on a Rule 60(b) motion after the appellate court has finished with the case raises different problems, and Standard Oil is the case that resolved this issue. 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2873 (2d ed.1995) (emphasis added); see also, Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of Superior Cal. v. Babbitt, 70 F.Supp.2d 1, 2-3 (D.D.C.1999) (The Standard Oil court did not address whether a district court had jurisdiction during the pendency of an appeal.). Standard Oil and Ames, therefore, are not applicable here. 17 Although appearing to directly and strongly support plaintiffs' position, Stone also does not control in the case sub judice. First, the statement in Stone that the pendency of an appeal does not affect the district court's power to grant Rule 60 relief was dicta. Stone, 115 S.Ct. at 1547. The Supreme Court in Stone merely analogized the procedure for Rule 60(b) motions to a motion for reconsideration of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals as secondary support for its holding that filing a timely motion for reconsideration with the Board of Immigration Appeals did not toll the time for filing an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the Board's underlying decision. Id. at 1541, 1547. Because Stone did not in any way involve Rule 60(b), the statement at issue cannot be construed as an alternative holding. 18 It has long been settled that the filing of a Rule 60(b) motion more than ten days after entry of judgment, even though such filing be timely, does not toll the time for filing notice of appeal. And, the jurisprudence that a district court is without jurisdiction to grant a thus filed Rule 60(b) motion while an appeal is pending, absent remand by the court of appeals, has to no extent ever been based on any thought that such filing of the Rule 60(b) motion tolled the time for filing notice of appeal; rather, it has been based on the concept that while the case is pending in the court of appeals, the district court, absent some form of remand or permission by the court of appeals, lacks jurisdiction over the case except to act in furtherance of the appeal. 19 While this circuit has not expressly addressed what effect, if any, this Stone dicta may have on our established procedure for Rule 60(b) motions (filed more than ten days after entry of judgment) when an appeal is pending, other courts have explicitly recognized that the statement in Stone is dicta and thus have not modified their similar Rule 60(b) approach. See Concept Design Elec. & Mfg. Inc. v. Duplitronics, Inc., 104 F.3d 376, 1996 WL 729637, at -4 (Fed.Cir. Dec. 19, 1996) (unpublished); TA Instruments, Inc. v. Perkin-Elmer Corp., No. 95-545-SLR, 2000 WL 152130, at  n. 1 (D.Del. Jan. 24, 2000) (To date the Third Circuit has not addressed the effect, if any, of the Stone dicta on its procedure concerning Rule 60(b) motions.); Phillips v. Corestates Bank, N.A., 33 F.Supp.2d 419, 421 n. 5 (D.Vi.1999); A.P. v. McGrew, No. 97 C 5876, 1998 WL 808879, at  (N.D.Ill. Nov. 16, 1998). 5 Likewise, in cases following Stone we have continued to follow the same procedure established prior to Stone. See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Perambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, No. 02-20042, 2003 WL 21027134, at  (5th Cir. Mar. 5, 2003) (per curiam); Rutherford v. Harris County, Tex., 197 F.3d 173, 190 (5th Cir.1999); Winchester, 68 F.3d at 949 (decided in November 1995, some seven months after Stone ). So have other circuits. See, e.g., Mahone v. Ray, 326 F.3d 1176, 1179-80 (11th Cir.2003); Boyko v. Anderson, 185 F.3d 672, 674-75 (7th Cir.1999); Fobian v. Storage Tech. Corp., 164 F.3d 887, 890-91 (4th Cir.1999). 6 20 Second, this statement from Stone relied on Standard Oil, and as pointed out supra, Standard Oil dealt with a different procedural situation from that involved in this case. 7 21 Taking all this into account, we hold that Stone does not affect our previously established approach where the appeal remains pending when the district court acts. 22 Plaintiffs also make a brief attempt at arguing that we have allowed a district court to grant a motion for reconsideration after the filing of a notice of appeal and without the filing of a motion for leave, citing Oliver v. Home Indemnity Co., 470 F.2d 329, 331 (5th Cir.1972), as evidence of this. While plaintiffs' statement about the result in Oliver is correct, we have previously deemed the Oliver decision an anomaly that we have consistently declined to follow in subsequent cases. Winchester, 68 F.3d at 949. Furthermore, as one panel of this court cannot overrule another, Oliver cannot be binding on us because it contravenes Ferrell, the case in which we set out the proper procedure for dealing with Rule 60(b) motions during the pendency of an appeal. Id. Thus, this argument is unavailing.