Opinion ID: 1980188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The standard in the District.

Text: We now turn to the showing, if any, that Gause and Wilkey must make in order to secure the right to inspect and copy non-public records relevant to Gause's jury motion. We note first that the highest court of our neighboring jurisdiction of Maryland has adopted the unqualified right standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Test. See Lewis v. State, 332 Md. 639, 632 A.2d 1175 (1993). The question before the court in Lewis, however, was not a difficult one, for Maryland has a statute  Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 8-212(b)  which is, for all practical purposes, identical to 28 U.S.C. § 1867(f). Id. at 1177. Rejecting the State's argument that a defendant must make a prima facie case showing a defect in the jury selection system, the court stated: The plain language of § 8-212(b) is dispositive. That subsection confers a right of pre-motion inspection.... The language employed in § 8-212(b) is inconsistent with the State's position. Had the General Assembly intended the sequence for which the State contends, the last sentence of § 8-212(b) should have provided, in effect, that the parties may inspect during the pendency of the motion and in preparation for the hearing thereon. Id. at 1178. A different result has been reached, however, in jurisdictions in which there was no equivalent of 28 U.S.C. § 1867(f). In California, although a defendant is not required to present a prima facie case of underrepresentation of a distinctive group to obtain discovery of non-public jury information, he or she must make a particularized showing supporting a reasonable belief that underrepresentation in the jury pool or the venire exits as the result of practices of systematic exclusion. People v. Jackson, 13 Cal.4th 1164, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254, 1268 (1996); see also Roddy v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 151 Cal.App.4th 1115, 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 307, 322 (2007) (quoting Jackson ). In Jackson, the court stated in pertinent part: Here we consider not whether defendant has made a prima facie case, but the prior question of whether defendant was wrongly denied the discovery of information necessary to make such a case. A defendant who seeks access to this information is obviously not required to justify that request by making a prima facie case of underrepresentation. Rather, upon a particularized showing supporting a reasonable belief that underrepresentation in the jury pool or the venire exists as the result of practices of systematic exclusion, the court must make a reasonable effort to accommodate the defendant's relevant requests for information designed to verify the existence of such underrepresentation and document its nature and extent. Id. at 1268. Similarly, in a decision which predated Test, the Supreme Court of Florida required a defendant seeking such discovery to make a showing of facts sufficient to raise a suspicion that the ... jury pool was improperly constituted. Rojas v. State, 288 So.2d 234, 236 (Fla.1973). As we understand these decisions, the burden on the defendant is not a demanding one. It appears to be roughly comparable to the reasonable articulable suspicion standard applied by the Supreme Court (albeit in the entirely different context of stop and frisk) in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and the approach we adopt is not intended to be more demanding than that in Terry. Indeed, as the court noted in Jackson, the use of a merits standard as a precondition for discovery is premature and illogical. The government agrees that a  prima facie case approach is too exacting and unwarranted. In our view, however, the reasonable belief standard adopted by the Supreme Court of California in Jackson, with doubtful cases to be resolved in the defendant's favor with respect to access to discovery, is appropriate for the District of Columbia and well-suited to the circumstances of this jurisdiction. [10] It is a matter of common knowledge that the Superior Court is an extremely busy urban court. We take judicial notice that its criminal caseload is substantially greater than that of a United States District Court. [11] In her testimony in support of the adoption of the DCJSA, former Corporation Counsel Inez Smith Reid (now an Associate Judge of this court) stated that the Federal system is inadequate to service the demands of the Superior Court's heavier jury trial caseload and use of larger juries. To Establish an Independent Jury System for the District of Columbia: Hearing on H.R. 2717 and H.R. 2946 Before the Subcomm. on Judiciary and Education and the H. Comm. on the District of Columbia, 99th Cong. 34 (1985). As the Supreme Court of Florida has explained, to provide the defendant in every jury-triable case the right to conduct an unrestricted investigation, without so much as an affidavit based upon information and belief, that the panel was improperly drawn, would amount to a fishing expedition of broad range. Rojas, 288 So.2d at 237. Indeed, the court wrote, [s]uch a course would consume enormous amounts of time and energy of our already overburdened trial courts, with concomitant delays in their calendars, and would be especially injurious to the prompt disposition of justice. Id. In the District of Columbia, it is no longer impossible for a defendant's attorney to determine, without an unqualified right of inspection before a Jury Motion is filed, whether there is reason to believe that the juror selection system is in contravention of constitutional or statutory requirements. In the present case, for example, Gause's counsel moved the court, shortly before oral argument, to supplement the record with information from the Odell Powell case, in which the defendant made a claim similar to those presented by appellants in this case. A few days after oral argument of the present appeals, Judge Boasberg issued a comprehensive opinion in which he discussed, in considerable detail, jury selection practices in the District, as well as their racial consequences. [12] The Public Defender Service represents defendants both in Powell and in Gause, and it is surely a resource available to other defense counsel in cases of this kind. [13] If there is in fact reason to believe that constitutional or statutory violations have occurred, [14] it should not be unduly difficult for a competent attorney to satisfy the relatively modest standard set forth herein. If, on the other hand, a defendant in an urban jurisdiction such as ours were permitted (as Gause has sought) to examine records going back five years, to interview and depose court officials, without any kind of pre-motion showing at all, then there may be no sound reason for counsel to refrain from demanding such discovery in any case triable by a jury. Counsel could request a voucher for an expert witness at taxpayer expense; a trial judge's refusal to authorize an expert might plausibly be challenged on appeal. Where an attorney has not submitted a voucher, or has failed to file a Jury Motion or a request to inspect juror selection records, this could arguably constitute non-frivolous grounds for a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. To provide these kinds of perverse incentives to counsel to make such requests and demands, with no requirement of any showing at all that unlawful discrimination may have occurred, is not required by the Constitution or by our statute, and in our view, such a regime would not be in the interests of justice. [15] We recognize that the elimination of racial and other unlawful discrimination is a policy to which our nation, and this capital city, have accorded the highest priority. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972); Harris v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human Rights, 562 A.2d 625, 626 (D.C.1989). This is especially important with respect to our justice system. Indeed, [d]iscrimination on the basis of race, odious in all respects, is especially pernicious in the administration of justice. Selection of members of a grand jury [or petit jury] because they are of one race and not another destroys the appearance of justice and thereby casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process. The exclusion from grand jury service [or jury service] of ... any group otherwise qualified to serve, impairs the confidence of the public in the administration of justice. As this Court repeatedly has emphasized, such discrimination `not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84 (1940) (footnote omitted). Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555-56, 99 S.Ct. 2993, 61 L.Ed.2d 739 (1979). Where there is evidence  or at least some reason to believe  that prohibited discrimination may have occurred, considerations of cost are secondary. But where the defendant cannot make even the modest showing required by Jackson and adopted in this opinion, a fishing expedition, Rojas, 288 So.2d at 237, cannot and should not be countenanced. [16]