Opinion ID: 748839
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Title I of the Rehabilitation Act Creates Enforceable Rights

Text: 23 Courts and commentators have spilled much ink and caused many trees to be felled discussing whether a statute based on the Spending Clause establishes rights that a beneficiary of the statute may enforce. We, therefore, pause to assess the current state of the law in this area before we evaluate whether Title I creates any enforceable rights. 24 In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990), the Supreme Court clarified the criteria for making this determination. Wilder involved the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A), which required states to submit a plan to be eligible for federal funding. In part, the plan had to provide that the state would pay Medicaid providers through the use of rates ... which the state finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate.... Wilder, 496 U.S. at 503, 110 S.Ct. at 2514 (quoting 42 U.S. § 1396a(a)(13)(A)). Virginia hospitals sued the state under § 1983 to challenge its method of setting reimbursement rates as not reasonable and adequate. The Court held that § 1396a(a)(13)(A) conferred a right within the meaning of § 1983 for three reasons: 1) the statute was intended to benefit the putative plaintiff, 2) it imposed a binding obligation on the governmental unit rather than merely expressing a congressional preference for a certain kind of conduct, and 3) the plaintiff's interest was not too vague and amorphous as to be beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce. Id. at 509, 110 S.Ct. at 2517. 25 Two years later, the Supreme Court re-addressed the issue of whether a Spending Clause statute confers a right enforceable through § 1983 in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). This suit involved the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (Adoption Act), which established a program for reimbursing states for expenses incurred in administering foster care and adoption services. For a state to receive federal payments, the Secretary of Health and Human Services must have approved the plan, and the plan must provide, among other things, that  'in each case, reasonable efforts will be made'  to prevent removing a child from his home or to allow a removed child to return home. Id. at 351, 112 S.Ct. at 1364 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)). A class of plaintiffs sued the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services and two of its administrators for allegedly violating § 671(a)(15) by failing to make these reasonable efforts. See id. at 352-53, 112 S.Ct. at 1364-65. 26 The Supreme Court held that § 671(a)(15) did not create an enforceable right under § 1983. See id. at 364, 112 S.Ct. at 1370-71. In making this determination, two facts were repeatedly noted. First, the Court emphasized that § 671(a)(15) required only that a state have a plan providing that the state will make reasonable efforts to prevent removing a child or to make it possible to return a removed child to his home. See id. at 358, 361-62, 112 S.Ct. at 1367-68, 1368-69. Second, it stressed that nothing in the Adoption Act nor its regulations elaborated on what reasonable efforts might entail. See id. at 357-62, 112 S.Ct. at 1366-69. 27 The Suter analysis immediately raised questions because it did not explicitly reference the established framework which the Court used two years earlier in Wilder. Instead, the Court distinguished Suter from Wilder, explaining that Wilder relied in part on the fact that the statute and regulations set forth in some detail the factors to be considered in determining the methods for calculating rates. Id. at 359, 112 S.Ct. at 1368. Thus, the Supreme Court left the obligation of harmonizing these cases to the various Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Howe v. Ellenbecker, 8 F.3d 1258, 1262 n. 5 (8th Cir.1993) (explaining how Suter weakened earlier precedent in vital respects), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1005, 114 S.Ct. 1373, 128 L.Ed.2d 49 (1994); Chan v. City of New York, 1 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir.1993) (adopting the Wilder analysis or, to the extent that it differs, the Suter analysis); Stowell, 976 F.2d at 68 (recognizing it is both prudent and possible to synthesize the teachings of Suter with the Court's prior precedents). 28 This Court addressed the problem in Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.1992). Clifton, a benefits recipient of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, sued the Director of the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services under § 1983 for a temporary deprivation of his welfare benefits. See id. at 284. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(6)(i), however, requires all state AFDC plans to include provisions that protect a recipient from having his assistance suspended or reduced if that person is facing a reduction or termination of benefits. Like the statutory provision at issue in Suter, § 205.10(a)(6)(i) created only an enforceable right to insist that Wisconsin adopt a plan that satisfies the regulation's requirement. See Clifton, 969 F.2d at 284. In his case, Clifton did not dispute that Wisconsin's plan meets the regulation's requirement. Id. He, therefore, had no right enforceable under § 1983. 29 This holding is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Wilder because Clifton asserted a different challenge than the Wilder plaintiffs. Wilder was a suit over the legality of the state plan: the plaintiffs in Wilder alleged that the state plan itself violated the Boren Amendment because the rates were not reasonable and adequate. Id.; see Wilder, 496 U.S. at 503-04, 110 S.Ct. at 2514-15. In allowing the plaintiffs to use § 1983, the Supreme Court in Wilder held simply that health care providers could sue to enforce their right to a state plan that did not violate the Boren Amendment; it did not hold that providers had a right to challenge any deviation the state might make from a plan that did comply with federal law. Clifton, 969 F.2d at 285. Because Clifton alleged an isolated violation of a concededly legal plan and because § 205.10(a)(6) affords him only the right to a plan that complies with the regulation's requirements, Clifton did not have a statutory right to enforce under § 1983. Id.; see also Procopio v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 325, 332 n. 12 (7th Cir.1993) (refusing to allow use of § 1983 because of Clifton's understanding of this Supreme Court precedent). 30 This limited application of § 1983 also traces the interactive federal-state scheme of Spending Clause statutes. These statutes do not mandate the creation of social service plans. They simply guarantee federal funds if a state elects to provide services that satisfy the federal requirements. Because § 1983 enforces only rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws, a plaintiff may utilize § 1983 only to the extent that a state plan which receives federal funding does not conform to one of the federal requirements. Section 1983, therefore, is not an appropriate means of remedying an isolated violation of an otherwise legal plan. See Albiston v. Maine Comm'r of Human Servs., 7 F.3d 258, 263 (1st Cir.1993) (differentiating federal-state funding statutes enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause that place the onus of compliance with the statute's substantive provisions on the federal government and those that impose a direct obligation on the States) (emphasis in original). 31 Thus, Suter left the basic Wilder framework intact, but added a further threshold inquiry, applicable in cases involving 'federal-state funding statutes' enacted pursuant to the 'Spending Clause.'  Albiston, 7 F.3d at 263 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17-18, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1539-40, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981). As Congress enacted Title I of the Rehabilitation Act under the Spending Clause, we first evaluate whether Mallett properly asserts claims under provisions that impose a direct obligation on the States. Then, we apply the three-part Wilder analysis to determine whether these provisions create enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 32
33 Mallett claims that DVR's program violates the federal guidelines and regulations governing the Act. By 1989, DVR had adopted a policy that disfavors graduate school assistance and encourages vocational objectives which require no graduate level training. 6 According to Mallett, this policy violates the Rehabilitation Act's mandate of providing highly individualized services to each beneficiary. In its barest form, Mallett argues that this policy prevents the State from adopting a plan that satisfies a direct obligation which the statute places on the State. It is precisely this type of claim that § 1983 may enforce for federal-state funding statutes enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause like the Rehabilitation Act. 34 We therefore turn to the three-part Wilder analysis to determine whether Mallett may enforce this alleged right. Neither party disputes that Mallett is an intended beneficiary. States that participate in Vocational Rehabilitation Services Program must provide services to all handicapped individuals, and DVR accepted Mallett into its program as a handicapped individual who satisfied the Act's criteria. See 29 U.S.C. § 711(e). Thus, Mallett satisfies the first prong. 35 The Rehabilitation Act also imposes a binding obligation on participating states to provide individual rehabilitation services. The Act contains thirty-six detailed requirements for all state plans, one of which is an individualized written rehabilitation program meeting the requirements of section 722 of this title. See 29 U.S.C. § 721(a)(9)(B). Each individualized written rehabilitation program must be designated to achieve the employment objective of the individual, consistent with the unique strengths, resources, priorities, concerns, abilities, and capabilities, of the individual. Id. § 722(b)(1)(B)(i). The services provided are any goods or services necessary to render an individual with handicaps employable, including ... vocational and other training services. Id. § 723(a)(3). Together, these provisions impose explicit requirements on federally funded state rehabilitation programs that meet the second prong of the Wilder analysis. See Miller by Miller v. Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315, 1318 (7th Cir.1993) (concluding that obligatory services in the Medicaid program meet Wilder's second prong); Stowell, 976 F.2d at 69 (deciding that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(c)(1) is not an enforceable right as it provides incentives--not commands--to the States). 36 Finally, Mallett's interest is not so vague and amorphous that it is beyond the judiciary's competence to enforce it. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509, 110 S.Ct. at 2517. Title I requires that individualized written rehabilitation programs must be consistent with the unique strengths, resources, priorities, concerns, abilities, and capabilities, of the individual. 29 U.S.C. § 722(b)(1)(B)(i). This language is specific, unambiguous, and mandatory. The term's meaning does not vary with the circumstances of each case so as to be insusceptible to judicial enforcement. Albiston, 7 F.3d at 264. Rather, it provides clear notice to the States that they, by accepting funds under the Act, would indeed be obligated to comply with these provisions. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25, 101 S.Ct. at 1544. At its barest level, Mallett's assertion is a question of statutory construction. It is unquestionably within the competence of the judiciary to perform this type of analysis. Thus, the requirement of an individualized written rehabilitation program in § 722(b) creates an enforceable right. See Marshall v. Switzer, 10 F.3d 925, 929 (2d Cir.1993) (permitting beneficiary of Title I of Rehabilitation Act to challenge failure to provide mandatory service under sec.sec. 721(a)(8), (a)(9) through § 1983); McGuire, 734 F.Supp. at 112 (concluding that sec.sec. 722, 723 create rights enforceable under § 1983); Ryans, 542 F.Supp. at 847 (same). 37
38 Mallett asserts that DVR violated its own procedures 7 in closing his file. Specifically, he alleges that his DVR supervisor failed to certify that Mallett was not capable of graduating from law school in violation of § 722(c) 8 and that he was unable to submit additional evidence in his appeal to an impartial hearing officer in violation of § 722(d)(2). 9 Unlike Mallett's claim against DVR Policy 5.9.4., however, these claims do not assert that DVR has failed to establish a plan that satisfies the Rehabilitation Act requirements. Mallett just alleges that DVR fails to satisfy these federal requirements in its handling of his case. 39 This Court in Clifton refused to permit a plaintiff to use § 1983 in this manner. See 969 F.2d at 285. Spending Clause statutes like the Rehabilitation Act do not afford beneficiaries of the underlying state plan a right to enforce every transgression of federal requirements to receive funding. The Rehabilitation Act's established set of administrative procedures are sufficient to protect against a supervisor or a hearing officer who fails to comply with agency procedures. We see no reason to alter the application of Clifton's holding in this instance. 40 Mallett also suggests that there is a binding obligation upon DVR, under § 722(b), to give him an individualized IWRP which allows [financial] assistance at institutions of higher learning. Appellant's Br. at 15. This argument, however, is fundamentally flawed as Congress did not provide this right. Section 722(b) only includes the right to an individualized written rehabilitation program [that] is jointly developed, agreed upon and signed by ... such eligible individual ... and ... the rehabilitation counselor. 29 U.S.C. § 722(b)(1)(A) (emphasis supplied); see Buchanan v. Ives, 793 F.Supp. 361, 366 (D.Me.1991) ( '[J]oint' participation does not mean giving a client the final or exclusive decision making authority to determine his own goal.). Furthermore, § 722(b) provides a handicapped individual with an IWRP that is designed to achieve the employment objective of the individual, consistent with the unique strengths, resources, priorities, concerns, abilities, and capabilities, of the individual. Id. § 722(b)(1)(B)(i). There is no provision within § 722(b), however, or within any other section of Title I, that guarantees a handicapped individual the right to financial assistance at an institution of higher learning. 10 41 Thus, most of Mallett's claims do not satisfy the first portion of our analysis. However, Mallett may contend that DVR's policy disfavoring graduate school funding violates rights guaranteed in 29 U.S.C. § 722 and enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as long as Congress did not foreclose private enforcement of Title I. 42