Opinion ID: 2343654
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Court of Special Appeals's Denial of Petitioner's Request

Text: We must next examine the issue properly before us in this case: whether the Court of Special Appeals should have decided the issues on appeal when the trial court granted a new trial, before the intermediate appellate court filed its opinion, and whether the intermediate appellate court acted properly when it denied Petitioner's request to withdraw its opinion and dismiss the appeal. Petitioner argues that once the Circuit Court granted him a new trial, there no longer existed any judgment to be reviewed. He contends that by eliminating the final judgment, the Circuit Court rendered the appeal moot. According to Petitioner, because courts are not charged with the task of deciding moot or abstract questions, the Court of Special Appeals should have withdrawn its opinion and dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The State counters that the case was not moot at the time that the Court of Special Appeals filed its reported opinion, because there still remained an existing controversy between the parties. The State contends that Petitioner's insufficiency of the evidence claim was still in controversy when the court filed its opinion, making Petitioner's mootness claim untenable. We disagree. In our view, Petitioner's appeal became moot the instant that the Circuit Court granted him a new trial. We have said that [i]t is generally recognized that the effect of granting a new trial is to leave the cause in the same condition as if no previous trial had been held. Snyder v. Cearfoss, 186 Md. 360, 367, 46 A.2d 607, 610 (1946); see also Cook v. Toney, 245 Md. 42, 50, 224 A.2d 857, 861 (1966) (holding that when the new trial was granted, the verdict and judgment were eliminated entirely and the case was put back in the same condition as if no trial had ever been held). When a court orders a new trial, the beneficial procedural incidence of the order is to reestablish the equality in law of the parties, which was lost, by restoring them to the position of the litigants at the beginning of the trial before a jury. State v. Balt. Transit Co., 177 Md. 451, 454, 9 A.2d 753, 754 (1939). Because the Circuit Court's grant of a new trial eliminated the judgment of conviction, there no longer remained a judgment for the Court of Special Appeals to affirm, reverse, or vacate, thus rendering the appeal moot. It is well settled that [a]ppellate courts do not sit to give opinions on abstract propositions or moot questions, and appeals which present nothing else for decision are dismissed as a matter of course. State v. Ficker, 266 Md. 500, 506-07, 295 A.2d 231, 235 (1972) (citations omitted); See also In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 906 A.2d 915 (2006) (citations omitted). We consider a case moot when there is no longer any existing controversy between the parties at the time that the case is before the court, or when the court can no longer fashion an effective remedy. In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 452, 906 A.2d 915, 927; In re Karl, 394 Md. 402, 410, 906 A.2d 898, 902 (2006); GMC v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 365, 879 A.2d 1049, 1063 (2005); See also Hammen v. Balt. County Police Dep't, 373 Md. 440, 449, 818 A.2d 1125, 1131 (2003); Robinson v. Lee, 317 Md. 371, 375, 564 A.2d 395, 397 (1989) (citations omitted). Consistent with the holdings of those cases, we conclude that the Circuit Court's grant of a new trial eliminated the controversy between the parties, which was the subject of the appeal, such that the mandate of the Court of Special Appeals, as a matter of law, should have read, appeal dismissed. Lloyd v. Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 39, 111 A.2d 379, 380 (1954) (noting that appellate courts do not sit to give opinions on abstract propositions or moot questions, and appeals which present nothing else for decision are dismissed as a matter of course); Peterson, 315 Md. at 82, 553 A.2d at 677 (stating further that `[g]enerally when a case becomes moot, we order that the appeal or the case be dismissed without expressing our views on the merits of the controversy.' Nevertheless, there is no constitutional prohibition which bars th[e] [appellate] [c]ourt from expressing its views on the merits of a case which becomes moot during appellate proceedings.) (citations omitted). See also GMC, 388 Md. at 365, 879 A.2d at 1063 (quoting Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279, 380 A.2d 12 (1977)); Bishop v. Governor of Maryland, 281 Md. 521, 524-25, 380 A.2d 220, 223 (1977) (citations omitted). The State points to a public policy benefit served by reported judicial decisions. The State's point is well taken. There is a public benefit derived from published opinions, which is the reason appellate courts are sometimes willing to decide moot questions where `it appears . . . that there are important issues of public interest raised which merit an expression of our views for the guidance of courts and litigants in the future.' Robinson, 317 Md. at 376, 564 A.2d at 397 (citing In re Special Investigation No. 281, 299 Md. 181, 190, 473 A.2d 1, 5 (1984)). See also Hammen, 373 Md. at 450, 818 A.2d at 1131 (explaining that this Court generally dismisses moot actions without a decision on the merits but that we retain the constitutional authority to express our views on the merits of a moot action in some circumstances). While we have, on prior occasions, discussed our view on the merits of moot questions when such discussions were important to the case at issue or future cases, we nonetheless dismissed those appeals pursuant to our mandate, as the mandate represents the judgment of the Court. [11] The Court of Special Appeals should have dismissed the appeal and reflected that disposition in its mandate, once it learned that the Circuit Court had granted Petitioner a new trial. [12] For example, in Peterson, we granted certiorari to decide whether the Court of Special Appeals had misapplied Maryland Rule 4-346(c), which provides that a revocation of probation hearing `shall be held before the sentencing judge, whenever practicable.' Peterson, 315 Md. at 76, 553 A.2d at 674. Peterson violated his probation and had a probation revocation hearing conducted by a judge who was not the sentencing judge, despite the objections of Peterson's counsel. The Court of Special Appeals held that the judge who presided over the violation of probation hearing violated Rule 4-346(c) because he made no findings as to the practicality of having the sentencing judge preside over the proceedings. The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted. Despite the issuance of the writ of certiorari, another probation revocation hearing was held before another judge; however, neither party objected. Upon our review of the case, we determined that it was clear that the present appellate proceedings ha[d] become moot because both parties agreed to appear before the non-sentencing judge. Peterson, 315 Md. at 79-80, 553 A.2d at 675. We therefore stated that there was `no longer an existing controversy between the parties, so there [wa]s no longer any effective remedy which the court c[ould] provide,' but asserted that there is no constitutional prohibition which bars this Court from expressing its views on the merits of a case which becomes moot during the appellate proceedings. . . . We will do so, however, `only in the rare instances which demonstrate the most compelling circumstances.' Peterson, 315 Md. at 79-80, 82, 553 A.2d at 675-76, 677 (citations omitted). We concluded that the circumstances represented one of those `rare instances' in which the Court should express its views on the merits of a moot case. Peterson, 315 Md. at 82-83, 553 A.2d at 677. As a result, this Court examined Rule 4-346(c) to discern the legislative intent and concluded that [w]e disapprove of the Court of Special Appeals' construction and application . . . of Rule 4-346(c). If this case were not moot, we would reverse the Court of Special Appeals' judgment. . . . Peterson, 315 Md. at 85, 553 A.2d at 679. In our mandate, we reflected our holding of mootness by vacating the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals with directions to vacate the judgment of the Circuit Court. Peterson, 315 Md. at 90, 553 A.2d at 681. Similarly, in Chertkov v. State, 335 Md. 161, 642 A.2d 232 (1994), we examined whether a sentencing court could alter a sentence, without the consent of both parties, that it had imposed pursuant to a binding plea agreement. We expressly determined that we would first have to address whether the State had a right to appeal the court's modification of sentence and thereafter concluded that it did not have such a right. Chertkov, 335 Md. at 166-71, 642 A.2d at 235-37. Nonetheless, we stated that [o]rdinarily our decision to dismiss the appeal would end our inquiry. When, however, the matter raised, and which we cannot reach because of our ruling on a threshold issue, is one of substantial importance, we will make an exception. Chertkov, 335 Md. at 170, 642 A.2d at 237. We therefore expressed our views as to whether a binding plea agreement precludes a trial court from modifying an imposed sentence, and then issued our mandate dismissing the appeal. Chertkov, 335 Md. at 171-75, 642 A.2d at 237-39. See generally Robinson, 317 Md. 371, 564 A.2d 395 (discussing the issue before the Court to provide guidance for future litigants, even though we acknowledged that it was moot, and remanding the case to the court below with directions to dismiss on grounds of mootness); Hammen, 373 Md. 440, 818 A.2d 1125 (2003) (addressing an issue, although moot, on the basis that the issue could reoccur in the future, but then reflecting the issue's moot status in the mandate). The State argues that the reported opinion responded to a question of first impression in Maryland  whether aiding and abetting is sufficient to convict one of a CDS possessory offense  that is of importance. Based on that, the State maintains, the Court of Special Appeals should not be required to dismiss the appeal. Similar to Peterson and Chertkov, there is no reason the Court of Special Appeals could not issue an opinion to elucidate the issue and provide guidance for future cases, if it decided that the issue before it was important enough to discuss, even though the issues had become moot. The intermediate appellate court's opinion, however, would, at most, constitute dicta because the court would still have to reflect that the issues were moot, by dismissing the appeal and reflecting that disposition in its mandate. See, e.g. Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 725, 490 A.2d 1228, 1245 (1985) (asserting that [w]hile what we say in this posture may be characterized as obiter dicta, we feel an urgency to speak in the hope of avoiding the burden of further appeals with respect to the issues discussed). Therefore, even though the intermediate appellate court apparently decided to let stand its published opinion, the mandate would still have to reflect appeal dismissed because the issues before the court had become moot as to Cottman's case. By parity of reasoning, the mandate also should have been accompanied by a consistent editorial change in the opinion, at its end, where the unofficial mandate appears because it otherwise would be inconsistent with the proper formal mandate. The State argues further that Petitioner had ample time under the Maryland Rules to dismiss his appeal, but essentially waived his right to dismiss his appeal by waiting for the Court of Special Appeals to file its opinion. Maryland Rule 8-601 states specifically that [a]n appellant may dismiss an appeal without permission of the Court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the filing of the opinion of the Court. According to the State, because the Circuit Court granted Petitioner a new trial on August 18, 2005, he had more than enough time to dismiss his appeal before October 31, 2005, the date when the Court of Special Appeals filed its opinion. The State contends that, instead, Petitioner ignored the timeline provided by the Maryland Rules because he hoped to obtain a favorable result from the Court of Special Appeals, eliminating the need for a new trial. The State maintains that to order withdrawal of the filed opinion would reward Petitioner for seeking to obtain relief simultaneously in two separate courts. [13] We are in accord with the State that Petitioner should have followed the timeline set forth in the Maryland Rules and timely dismissed his appeal, in accordance with Rule 8-601 (by dismissing without the permission of the court before the appellate court filed its opinion on October 31, 2005). Had he done so, by dismissing his appeal at the latest, by October 31, 2005, instead of on November 4, 2005, further proceedings in the appellate courts would have been unnecessary. [14] Notwithstanding, a party cannot waive life into a moot case, because mootness is something that an appellate court may notice on its own, even if no party raises the issue. Because the issues on appeal were moot, the intermediate appellate court could not have issued its mandate affirming or reversing a judgment that no longer existed at the time that it filed its opinion. Given the posture of the case before the Court of Special Appeals, that court could choose to maintain the expression of its views on the novel legal issue raised by leaving its reported opinion on the books; however, it did not have authority to affirm or reverse the prior judgment of the Circuit Court.