Opinion ID: 752499
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: jury instruction on aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt

Text: 147 In his sixth claim, Mr. Duvall contends that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because the district court failed to instruct the jury that it had the option to return a life sentence regardless of its finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. 8 Under Oklahoma law, a jury is free to decline to impose the death penalty even if it finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. See Burrows v. State, 640 P.2d 533, 544 (Okla.Crim.App.1982). Nonetheless, the Constitution does not demand that the state must affirmatively structure in a particular way the manner in which juries consider mitigating evidence. Buchanan v. Angelone, --- U.S. ----, ----, 118 S.Ct. 757, 761, 139 L.Ed.2d 702 (1998). Instead, the state may shape and structure the jury's consideration of mitigation so long as it does not preclude the jury from giving effect to any relevant mitigating evidence.... [T]he standard for determining whether jury instructions satisfy these principles [is] 'whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of relevant evidence.'  Id. (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1198, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990)). 148 In accordance with these principles, Instruction No. 6 provided: 149 Should you unanimously find that one or more aggravating circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt, you would be authorized to consider imposing a sentence of death. 150 If you do not unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the aggravating circumstances existed, you are prohibited from considering the Death Penalty. In that event, the sentence must be Imprisonment for Life. 151 R. at 174 (emphasis added). 152 We hold that Instruction No. 6 adequately afforded the jury an opportunity to consider mitigating evidence. The trial court did not instruct the jury that they must assess death if they found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Instead, the trial court instructed the jury that they were authorized to consider imposing a sentence of death upon the finding of an aggravating circumstance. Because the instruction did not prevent consideration of mitigating circumstances, and because no juror would have understood it to do so, the instruction is constitutionally permissible. See Buchanan, --- U.S. at ----, 118 S.Ct. at 761 (approving instruction stating that when an aggravating circumstance is present beyond a reasonable doubt, then you may fix the punishment at death.) (emphasis added). 153 Mr. Duvall's reliance on Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702 (11th Cir.1987) is misplaced. In Kemp, like this case, the jury instructions stated that the jury would be authorized to consider the death penalty upon finding a statutory aggravating circumstance. Id. at 732. Unlike this case, however, the instructions in Kemp then stated that if an aggravating circumstance were found, the form of your verdict would be ... death. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held that the jury instruction was unconstitutional because the inconsistency created by the use of both permissive and mandatory language created an unacceptable risk that an average juror would conclude that the existence of an aggravating circumstance necessitated a death sentence. Id. at 733. 154 Unlike the instruction in Kemp, the instruction in this case contains only permissive language, which informs the jury that they were not required to impose the death penalty upon a finding of an aggravating circumstance. Instruction No. 6 does not contain the same inconsistency as the instruction at issue in Kemp, and thus does not suffer from the same constitutional infirmity. See Thomas v. State, 811 P.2d 1337, 1347 (Okla.Crim.App.1991) (distinguishing Kemp). We are confident that the instruction adequately apprised the jury of its option not to recommend the death sentence. Moore v. Butler, 819 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir.1987) (approving instruction that informed the jury that it may consider imposing the death penalty upon finding an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt). In sum, we hold that the instructions sufficiently preserved, under the Constitution, the jury's responsibility and authority to exercise its discretion in the sentencing determination. Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377, 1394 (10th Cir.1989). Therefore, Mr. Duvall is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground. 155