Opinion ID: 396265
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Washington common law

Text: 8 Washington common law provides that a landlord will be liable to a tenant for harm caused by: 9 (1) latent or hidden defects in the leasehold 10 (2) that existed at the commencement of the leasehold 11 (3) of which the landlord had actual knowledge 12 (4) and of which the landlord failed to inform the tenant. 13 Stoebuck, The Law Between Landlord and Tenant in Washington: Part I, 49 Wash.L.Rev. 291, 342 (1974); Flannery v. Nelson, 366 P.2d 329, 59 Wash.2d 120 (1961). Central to the latent defect theory is that there is no liability if the defect is open and visible to the tenant, so that he does or should see it. Stoebuck, 49 Wash.L.Rev. at 353; Peterson v. Betts, 165 P.2d 95, 107, 24 Wash.2d 376 (1946). 14 The Youngers contend that all four elements of the common law tort claim based on a concealed dangerous condition known to the lessor are fulfilled in this case. First, they argue that the absence of a smoke detector a small device that by Army regulation is installed on the second floor ceiling above the staircase was an obscure defect the average person would not discover. See Thomas v. Housing Authority of Bremerton, 426 P.2d 836, 840, 71 Wash.2d 69, 75 (1967). 15 Second, it is undisputed that no smoke detector was present in the Youngers' assigned dwelling at the outset of their tenancy (or at any time before the fire). 16 Third, it is also uncontested that the U.S. Army had actual knowledge of the absence of smoke detectors. The district court noted that the Government's documents indicate awareness of the need for smoke detectors in military family housing since at least 1974. The Government, moreover, was engaged in a program to bolster fire safety by installing smoke detectors in all military family housing by the end of 1978. 17 Fourth, there is no evidence that the Youngers were informed of the lack of smoke detectors and the fire safety risks inherent in residing in a wooden dwelling without smoke detectors or a second story exit. 18 A grant of summary judgment is proper only when, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the adverse party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 640 (9th Cir. 1980). 19 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Youngers, summary judgment was inappropriate. The court's statement that the absence of a smoke detector was an apparent deficiency was a prerequisite to the district court's conclusion that the Youngers' suit failed under Washington common law. The court's ruling stated that the absence of such detectors was readily apparent to the plaintiffs. (emphasis added). By reaching a conclusion on this genuine issue of material fact a fact issue which is pivotal to the Youngers' latent defect theory the district court committed reversible error. 20 The Government attempts to ameliorate the district court's error by asserting that whether the absence of smoke detectors was latent or apparent is an immaterial factual dispute. The Government argues that, as a matter of law, the absence of a smoke detector is not a defect because that condition did not start, spread, or intensify the fatal fire. 21 In this context, defect is synonymous with a dangerous condition which would lead a reasonable person to suspect the existence of an unreasonable risk of harm. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971), section 63 at 401-402. Thus, the question arises whether the lack of a smoke detector in a recently renovated military family housing unit that had no second story fire exit presented an unreasonable risk of harm. Obviously, such a condition did not start, spread, or intensify the fire. However, viewing the scant evidence in the light most favorable to the Youngers, it is reasonable to advance the proposition that the absence of smoke detectors constitutes a defect or dangerous condition. The Government's arguments are appropriately aimed at the causation element of the Youngers' negligence cause of action. 22