Opinion ID: 184058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: The District Court Abused Its Discretion When it Dismissed Anna Finzsch's Complaint.

Text: Anna Finzsch persuasively argues that the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed her complaint without first affording her notice or an opportunity to be heard. Finzsch filed her complaint on July 15, 2009, six months after the manufacturers moved to dismiss the associated complaints of the other family members. The district court did not associate Finzsch's complaint with the complaints of the other family members until July 21, 2009. On August 21, 2009, the district court dismissed all of the associated complaints, including Finzsch's. The district court dismissed Finzsch's complaint before she had served a summons and complaint on the manufacturers, and before the manufacturers had moved to dismiss her complaint. The manufacturers contend that these inconsequential procedural differences make no difference, but we disagree. The district court failed to afford Finzsch due process when it dismissed her complaint. A district court can only dismiss an action on its own motion `as long as the procedure employed is fair.' Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir.2006) (quoting Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir.1998)). To employ fair procedure, a district court must generally provide the plaintiff with notice of its intent to dismiss or an opportunity to respond. Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1069 (11th Cir.2007); see also Jefferson Fourteenth Assocs. v. Wometco de P.R., Inc., 695 F.2d 524, 527 (11th Cir. 1983). There is an exception to our general rule against dismissal without notice if the complaint is patently frivolous or if reversal ... `would be futile,' Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1127 n. 99 (11th Cir.2001) (quoting Wyatt v. City of Bos., 35 F.3d 13, 15 n. 1 (1st Cir.1994)), but that exception is inapposite. Finzsch's complaint is not frivolous, and we cannot say that a reversal would be futile even though we are dubious about the likelihood that Finzsch's complaint will survive a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens. None of our precedents about sua sponte dismissals involve forum non conveniens, but sua sponte transfers to another federal venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), offer a helpful analogy that buttresses our conclusion that the district court was required to give Finzsch notice and an opportunity to be heard. Section 1404(a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens to permit change of venue between federal courts. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 253, 102 S.Ct. at 264. Notably, there is a long-approved practice of permitting a court to transfer a case sua sponte under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), but only so long as the parties are first given the opportunity to present their views on the issue. Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986). Before transferring sua sponte under section 1404(a), the judge should, at minimum, issue an order to show cause why the case should not be transferred, and thereby afford the parties an opportunity to state their reasons. Starnes v. Small, 512 F.2d 918, 934 (D.C.Cir.1974). Notice is required even though [d]istrict courts [are] given more discretion to transfer under § 1404(a) than they had to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 253, 102 S.Ct. at 265. The district court abused its discretion because it failed to provide [Finzsch] with notice of its intent to dismiss or an opportunity to respond. Martinez, 480 F.3d at 1069; see also Jefferson Fourteenth Assocs., 695 F.2d at 527. Finzsch had not even served process on the manufacturers when the district court dismissed her complaint. See, e.g., Smith v. Boyd, 945 F.2d 1041, 1043 (8th Cir.1991) (holding that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint as long as the dismissal does not precede service of process). The manufacturers made no appearances in Finzsch's action and filed no motion to dismiss against Finzsch. Put simply, [t]he type of sua sponte dismissal here at issuea dismissal on the court's own initiative, without affording the plaintiff either notice or an opportunity to be heardis disfavored in federal practice. Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 36 (1st Cir.2001). We reverse the dismissal of Finzsch's complaint and remand her action for further proceedings.