Opinion ID: 547641
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plache

Text: 19 Plache sought to suppress the testimony of an attorney, Michael Lipman, with whom he had consulted on several occasions about the ELMAS Program. Lipman was allowed to testify that the ELMAS Program was selling non-exempt securities that needed to be registered before they could lawfully be sold. Lipman further testified that he told Plache that he could not continue representing him unless Plache agreed immediately to cease promoting the ELMAS Program. Plache contends that the allowance of this testimony was error because it violated his attorney-client privilege. The Government responds that he waived the privilege by testifying about Lipman's advice before the grand jury. Plache contends he was tricked into doing so. 20 In his appearance before the grand jury, Plache was asked what he did after he received a questionnaire from the SEC inquiring about the ELMAS Program. He responded: 21 I immediately took it to Jim Attarian and sought his counsel as to what would be the proper way to handle this, and he said to go and find an attorney. And so I found an attorney in San Diego with the law firm of Finley & Kumble, and his name was Michael Lipman. I met him several times and he expressed concern about the concept of this being an exempt security. I returned and shared those thoughts with Jim Attarian, and his response was that because Michael Lipman had been, I think, a U.S. Attorney--anyway, working for the government in some area--that he had a narrow, slanted prejudiced view and that he would recommend using Russell Smith. 22 It was at this point that Plache waived his attorney-client privilege. Plache contends that the Government tricked him into waiving the privilege when the Government attorney stated I don't want to get into an attorney-client privilege. I'm interested really in what you told Attarian rather than what Lipman told you as far as a legal consultation. Plache's immediate response was [i]t was basically that Mr. Lipman felt that the investor groups, as ELMAS [had] wanted them set up, would not meet the Regulation D, I think that's what it is, Reg. D, for an exempt security. 23 In the context of this questioning, we conclude that there was no trickery involved to invoke this testimony. The Government sought to avoid his testifying further about what Lipman told him, but rather to concentrate on what he told Attarian. Plache's answer simply did not heed the Government's attorney's advice. In any event, the earlier statement had already resulted in a waiver of the privilege. The Government's statement, of which Plache complains, had nothing to do with the initial waiver. 24 Plache also contends under the circumstances any disclosure was inadvertent. However, we have noted that  'inadvertence' of disclosure does not as a matter of law prevent the occurrence of waiver, Weil, 647 F.2d at 24, and is only one factor to be considered. Clady, 770 F.2d at 1433. Plache's disclosure, in any event, was not inadvertent. He purposefully testified about what Lipman had told him. 2 25 Plache asserts waiver is unwarranted because he was unrepresented before the grand jury and he was compelled to respond to the Government questioning by way of a grand jury subpoena. While a counsel for a grand jury witness may not be present in the grand jury room, Plache was advised of his right to consult with an attorney waiting outside the grand jury room during the proceedings. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 1778-79, 48 L.Ed.2d 212 (1976). Although Plache indicated he understood this right, he declined to exercise this right. The Government did not ask any questions directed to Plache's conversations with counsel. 26 Under the circumstances, we conclude the district court properly found that Plache voluntarily disclosed his privileged attorney communication, thereby waiving the privilege on all other communications on the same subject. Weil, 647 F.2d at 25.