Opinion ID: 4511189
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Declaration/Private Cause of Action

Text: ¶36 As an alternative to its claim that the Town failed to construct the new field road to the standards required by the condemnation petition (the Petition Standards Claim), DSG says the Town took on a statutorily-imposed obligation to improve the field road to town road standards when it dedicated it as the Hauge Parkway (the Town Road Claim). Specifically, it says this 15Because we hold that claim preclusion does not apply here, we need not reach DSG's alternative argument that we should create an exception to the claim preclusion doctrine for use in eminent domain cases. 16The Town says we can affirm the decision of the court of appeals on the basis that it satisfied its obligation to construct the new field road, arguing that this leaves nothing further to litigate. We disagree. To be sure, the Town did build a new field road, but whether that road satisfies the standards required by the condemnation petition is another question entirely. 24 No. 2017AP2352 obligation arises when a town formally declares that a town road exists and improves that road, opening it for public travel . . . . So it asked for a declaration that the Town must comply with its statutory obligation or, in the alternative, an award of damages sufficient to allow DSG to perform the construction the Town has refused to do. The Town says DSG is entitled to neither form of relief because it dedicated the Hauge Parkway as a town parkway, not a town road, so the standards applicable to town roads have no applicability. In any event, it says, the statute on which DSG relies creates no private cause of action against the Town. ¶37 As a preliminary matter, we must address some lack of precision in the way the parties have addressed this issue. The parties both bundled together DSG's alternative claims for relief and analyzed the resulting package according to a single rubric. They each used a different rubric, but neither of them accounted for the essential differences between the two types of claims. DSG, for example, says it may pursue declaratory judgment as well as its alternative demand for damages pursuant to the longrecognized right to compel a municipal entity or officer to perform its mandatory duties. Typically, such relief is available through a writ of mandamus. See Voces De La Frontera, Inc. v. Clarke, 2017 WI 16, ¶11, 373 Wis. 2d 348, 891 N.W.2d 803 (Mandamus is a remedy that can be used 'to compel a public officer to perform a duty of his office presently due to be performed.' State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶27, 262 Wis. 2d 720, 665 N.W.2d 155.); Beres v. City of New Berlin, 34 Wis. 2d 229, 232, 25 No. 2017AP2352 148 N.W.2d 653 (1967) (However, this court has taken the position that a writ of mandamus will issue to enforce the performance of plain imperative duties of a ministerial character imposed on a public body such as a city council.); State v. City of Madison, 170 Wis. 133, 136, 174 N.W. 471 (1919) (Where there is a plain duty, as here involved, it is a well-recognized and longestablished doctrine that compliance therewith may be enforced by mandamus.). The Town on the other hand, says DSG is not entitled to either a declaration of rights or damages because the statutes on which it relies do not create a private cause of action. Neither of these analytical rubrics is capable of properly addressing both of DSG's claims. ¶38 So we must analyze DSG's declaratory judgment claim separately from its claim for damages. After identifying the claimed deficiencies in the new field road, DSG's complaint demands judgment against the [Town] declaring that the [Town] is obligated to improve and maintain all portions of the park road declared to exist by the Town of Perry Resolution, dated October 17, 2011, to County and Town standards for a Town road. DSG's request for damages, on the other hand, has nothing to do with declaring rights, but concentrates entirely on whether the municipality's failure to comply with a statutory obligation imposes civil liability in favor of a specific party. Therefore, we will address DSG's Town Road Claim as a request for a declaration of rights, and the alternative demand for damages as an assertion of a private cause of action against the Town.
26 No. 2017AP2352 ¶39 A plaintiff may demand a declaration of rights pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.04(2), which says: Any person . . . whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. We said in Tooley v. O'Connell that a declaration of rights is available only if the plaintiff satisfies the following four conditions: (1) There must exist a justiciable controversy that is to say, a controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. (2) The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse. (3) The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy that is to say, a legally protectible interest. (4) The issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination . . . . 77 Wis. 2d 422, 433-34, 253 N.W.2d 335 (quoted source omitted; ellipses in original). ¶40 DSG says we must declare that the Town has a duty to improve the Parkway to town road standards because of the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 82.50(1). This statutory subsection says that [t]he following minimum geometric design standards are established for improvements on town roads . . . . The balance of the subsection describes the design standards applicable to 27 No. 2017AP2352 roads of varying traffic loads. Id.17 DSG argues that this must assuredly impose on the Town an affirmative obligation with respect to the Parkway because the identified standards are minimums. If the road falls below this standard, DSG says, it must necessarily violate the statute. And if there is no affirmative obligation to comply with the statute, DSG concludes, there would have been no point in enacting it in the first place. ¶41 We conclude that DSG's Town Road Claim does not satisfy Tooley's first or fourth requirements. That is, DSG does not have a claim of right in how the Town chooses to exercise its discretion under the terms of Wis. Stat. § 82.50. And although the Town's exercise of discretion may eventually resolve to a particular course of action, that undecided course of action cannot be ripe for adjudication at this time. ¶42 The same statute establishing the minimum standards for town roads vests in the Town a certain degree of discretion with respect to complying with them. Specifically, it provides that [t]he department [of transportation] may approve deviations from the minimum standards in special cases where the strict application of the standards is impractical and where such deviation is not contrary to the public interest and safety and the intent of this section. Wis. Stat. § 82.50(2). Before the department can 17The statute provides different standards for local service roads, roads with intermittent traffic, roads with less than 100 daily cars, roads with 100-250 daily cars, roads with 251-400 daily cars, roads with 401-1000 daily cars, roads with 1001-2400 daily cars, and roads with over 2400 daily cars. See Wis. Stat. § 82.50(1). 28 No. 2017AP2352 approve a deviation, of course, there must be a request to deviate. Nothing in the statutes controls the circumstances in which the Town may apply for such a deviation, which indicates the application is left to its discretion. This is consistent with the broader statutory framework relating to town roads, in which the legislature has decreed that [t]he town board shall have the care and supervision of all highways under the town's jurisdiction . . . . Wis. Stat. § 82.03(1)(a); see also § 82.03(4) (The town board shall direct when and where all highway funds shall be expended.). So if the Town can apply to the department of administration for relief from the standards imposed by § 82.50, then compliance with those standards is subject to at least some cognizable amount of discretion. And in the presence of such discretion, declaratory relief is inappropriate because the rights are not yet fixed: Courts will not declare rights until they have become fixed under an existing state of facts . . . . Voight v. Walters, 262 Wis. 356, 359, 55 N.W.2d 399 (1952); see also Olson v. Town of Cottage Grove, 2008 WI 51, ¶43, 309 Wis. 2d 365, 749 N.W.2d 211 (The facts on which the court is asked to make a judgment should not be contingent or uncertain . . . .); Wis. Stat. § 806.04(6) (The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.). ¶43 Notwithstanding these principles, DSG says, we have previously enforced a town's road-related obligations. Specifically, it refers us to State ex rel. Cabott, Inc. v. Wojcik, 29 No. 2017AP2352 47 Wis. 2d 759, 177 N.W.2d 828 (1970), and State ex rel. Wollner v. Schloemer, 200 Wis. 350, 228 N.W. 487 (1930). It says this brace of cases establishes that Wisconsin law has long recognized that a private cause of action for mandamus may be stated when a town violates clear duties imposed upon it by law with regard to highways and other plain statutory duties. ¶44 But neither Cabott nor Wollner suggests there is a cognizable claim in the way a town exercises its discretionary road-related responsibilities. In Cabott, we addressed a statute that required towns to keep [highways] passable at all times, and further required that [w]hen any highway under [the town's] charge becomes impassable [it] shall put the same in passable condition as soon as practicable. Wis. Stat. § 81.03 (1969-70). We said the statutory command to keep the highways passable was mandatory and unequivocal, even if the manner of making it passable was subject to the town's discretion. Cabott, 47 Wis. 2d at 768. There is no comparable duty under Wis. Stat. § 82.50. The Town's ability to apply for a deviation from the standards contained in that statute mean we cannot consider them mandatory and unequivocal. Similarly, in Wollner we considered a statute that said no town board shall discontinue . . . any highway when such discontinuance would deprive the owner of lands of access therefrom to the public highway. 200 Wis. at 352 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 80.02 (1929-30)). The duty not to discontinue in such circumstances was mandatory and unequivocal. The ensuing writ of mandamus commanded the town to reopen the 30 No. 2017AP2352 highway, but did not specify the manner of doing so inasmuch as that was left to the town's discretion. Wollner, 200 Wis. at 352. ¶45 Our opinion in State ex rel. Wisniewski v. Rossier, 205 Wis. 634, 238 N.W. 825 (1931), reinforces the lesson that we lack the authority to direct the Town's exercise of its discretionary authority. There, we said the crucial question . . . [was] whether a town, or its officers, may be compelled by mandamus to repair and maintain a highway in a safe condition. Id. at 635. Referring to our decision in Wollner, we said we never intended to hold that mandamus may be invoked in this state to compel a town board to repair or to maintain a highway. Id. at 637. ¶46 Although Wisniewski, Cabott, and Wollner addressed the significance of a town's discretion in the context of a writ of mandamus,18 we think the lesson is no less important in determining whether a person has a claim of right in how a town exercises its discretion (the first Tooley prerequisite to a declaration of rights). Although we may review a town's exercise of discretion to ensure it stays within proper parameters, it is not for the judiciary to tell the town how to exercise its discretion in the 18State ex rel. Althouse v. City of Madison, 79 Wis. 2d 97, 106, 255 N.W.2d 449 (1977) ([W]hen the action sought to be compelled is discretionary, mandamus will not lie.); State ex rel. Thomas v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 343, 349, 198 N.W.2d 675 (1972) ([M]andamus will not lie to control the manner in which a governmental body or officer exercises his statutorily-conferred discretion.). 31 No. 2017AP2352 first instance.19 Because Wis. Stat. § 82.50 does not impose on the Town a mandatory and non-discretionary obligation to improve the Parkway to town road standards, DSG can have no cognizable claim of right until, at the earliest, the town's discretionary authority resolves to a particular course of action. And because that has not yet occurred, DSG's Town Road Claim is also not ripe for review.
¶47 There are instances in which private parties may sue public officers for damages based on their failure to comply with statutory obligations. But as the Town observes, a private right of action is created only when (1) the language or the form of the statute evinces the legislature's intent to create a private right of action, and (2) the statute establishes private civil liability rather than merely providing for protection of the public. Grube v. Daun, 210 Wis. 2d 681, 689, 563 N.W.2d 523 (1997). The first element of the analysis focuses on the legislature's intent, which we find in the statute's language. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (We assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory language.). The second element reflects the 19See, e.g., Nowell v. City of Wausau, 2013 WI 88, ¶24, 351 Wis. 2d 1, 838 N.W.2d 852 (Thus, the scope of certiorari review is limited to: (1) whether the [municipality] kept within its jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was such that it might reasonably make the order or determination in question. (alteration in original)). 32 No. 2017AP2352 general rule 'that a statute which does not purport to establish a civil liability, but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the public as an entity, is not subject to a construction establishing a civil liability.' McNeill v. Jacobson, 55 Wis. 2d 254, 259, 198 N.W.2d 611 (1972). Nor will a cause of action be implied to protect an interest other than the one specifically protected by the statute. Id. ¶48 DSG says Wisconsin law, has long recognized that a private cause of action . . . may be stated when a town violates clear duties imposed upon it by law with regard to highways[.] But the balance of its argument makes it clear that it was addressing not a right to seek damages, but its ability to seek relief in the form of a declaration of rights or writ of mandamus (which we addressed above). Nothing in its briefs describes how we could understand Wis. Stat. §§ 82.03 or 82.50 as making the Town answerable to DSG in damages for failure to improve the Parkway to town road standards. ¶49 Our review of these statutes confirms that it contains no language evidencing a clear expression of intent to create a private right of action for a town's failure to comply with its standards. Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56, 81, 307 N.W.2d 256 (1981). Nor does any provision in the statutes suggest its terms exist to protect a private interest rather than providing for protection of the public. Grube, 210 Wis. 2d at 689. We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 82.50(1) does not create a private cause of action. 33 No. 2017AP2352