Opinion ID: 2982964
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lack of Probable Cause for the Forfeiture

Text: Langston alleges that the forfeiture—as distinct from the initial seizure, which he does not challenge—violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the officers had no probable cause to believe that he was involved in drug activity, and therefore no basis to initiate forfeiture under the CSA.14 He further argues that because he was deprived of his property by an unreasonable second or continued seizure, his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law 13 Currently found in MCR § 2.109(B)(1), the rule provides: “The court may allow a party to proceed without furnishing security for costs if the party’s pleading states a legitimate claim and the party shows by affidavit that he or she is financially unable to furnish a security bond.” 14 To be subject to forfeiture under the CSA, the property must be something “of value that is furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance, an imitation controlled substance, or other drug in violation of this article that is traceable to an exchange for a controlled substance . . .” M.C.L. § 333.7521. -16- No. 14-1664, Langston v. Charter Township of Redford, et al. were also violated. Redford responds that because officers had probable cause to arrest Langston and the search and seizure were performed incident to that lawful arrest, the subsequent forfeiture does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. The district court agreed, finding that under Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 1999), the forfeiture was not distinct from the initial seizure, which occurred incident to a lawful arrest. In Fox v. Van Oosterum, this court held that the Plaintiff had no Fourth Amendment claim based on police seizing his wallet and refusing to return his driver’s license contained in the wallet. Id. at 349-53. “The refusal to return the license here neither brought about an additional seizure nor changed the character of the [prior] seizure from a reasonable one to an unreasonable one because the seizure was already complete when the defendants refused to return the license.” Id. at 350. “[T]he Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s interest in retaining possession of property but not the interest in regaining possession of property.” Id. at 351. “Once that act of taking the property is complete, the seizure has ended and the Fourth Amendment no longer applies.” Id. Langston argues that Fox is inapplicable because here the forfeiture was under the CSA and was therefore distinct from the lawful seizure. He does not, however, point to any authority supporting this theory. Because Langston’s property was seized incident to his lawful arrest,15 it was not seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. For the same reason, his related Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims must fail. 15 Warrantless searches and seizures are permitted incident to custodial arrests, either at the time the arrest is made, or later, when the arrestee arrives at the place of detention. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803 (1974). -17- No. 14-1664, Langston v. Charter Township of Redford, et al.