Opinion ID: 2050844
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Overview: The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws

Text: A full understanding of current choice-of-law methodology, including its development, is necessary to properly apply it to the above-identified conflicts. Traditionally, questions of choice of law have been solved by applying the law of the place of the wrong ( lex loci delicti ), resulting in the rights and liabilities of the parties being determined by the local law of the State where the injury occurred. The doctrine was relatively easy to apply, provided predictability of outcome, and discouraged forum shopping. Mitchell v. United Asbestos Corp., 100 Ill.App.3d 485, 491, 55 Ill.Dec. 375, 426 N.E.2d 350 (1981). As another court described the prior rule: The conflict of laws rule in tort cases used to be simple. It was lex loci delicti the law of the place where the tort occurred was the law applicable to the case. Kaczmarek, 836 F.2d at 1057. Summarizing the prior rule, the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws directed a court to apply the lex loci delicti to a choice-of-law issue in a tort case, regardless of the nature of the contacts the parties may have possessed with other states. Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws §§ 377, 378 (1934); see Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842, 844 (7th Cir.1999) (applying Illinois law; discussing lex loci delicti ); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, ch. 7, Topic 1, Introductory Note 1, at 412-13 (1971) (discussing history of prior rule). This approach [ lex loci delicti ] was criticized, and eventually in most states abandoned, because it sometimes resulted in the application of the law of a state that had little connection with the events giving rise to the suit. Kaczmarek, 836 F.2d at 1057. `The basic theme running through the attacks on the place of the injury rule is that wooden application of a few overly simple rules, based on the outmoded vested rights theory, cannot solve the complex problems which arise in modern litigation and may often yield harsh, unnecessary and unjust results.' Ingersoll, 46 Ill.2d at 47, 262 N.E.2d 593, quoting Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 13, 203 A.2d 796, 801 (1964). By the early 1950s, increasing dissatisfaction with the vested-rights-based approach led the American Law Institute to draft a second restatement of conflict of laws. The field was evolving so rapidly that achieving consensus was difficult, and the project required 17 years, from 1953 to 1971, to complete. What began as an update, based on criticisms of the traditional rules as too broad and inflexible, transformed into a radically different approach to choice of law. R. Crampton, D. Currie & H. Kay, Conflict of Laws: CasesCommentsQuestions 117 (5th ed.1993). Agreeing with criticism of the lex loci delicti doctrine, the Ingersoll court adopted the principles outlined in the proposed draft of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. Ingersoll, 46 Ill.2d at 47-48, 262 N.E.2d 593. One scholar has described the Second Restatement as a document that could notand cannotbe fairly called a `restatement' of anything. Instead, it is an amalgamation of different conflict approaches, producing a document of a distinctly normative character. P. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some Observations and an Empirical Note, 56 Md. L.Rev. 1232, 1237 (1997). Indeed, the Second Restatement is by far the most popular among the modern methodologies, being followed [as of 2004] in 22 states in tort conflicts. E. Scoles, P. Hay, P. Borchers & S. Symeonides, Conflict of Laws § 2.23, at 98 (4th ed.2004). Except with respect to the relatively few areas for which it provides clear rules, the Second Restatement's methodology has three principal features: (1) the policies of section 6; (2) the concept of the most significant relationship; and (3) the lists of particularized connecting factors. Section 6 is the cornerstone of the entire Restatement. Scoles, Conflict of Laws § 2.14, at 59. Section 6 provides as follows: (1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law. (2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relevant interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6, at 10 (1971). These multiple and diverse principles are not listed in any order of priority, and some of them point in different directions. Thus, in tort cases, for example, these principles, by themselves, do not enable courts to formulate precise choice-of-law rules. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6, Comment c, at 12-13 (1971); accord Scoles, Conflict of Laws § 2.14, at 60. In some ways, § 6 was a logical response to the perceived flaws of the traditional rules. Critics had identified a variety of concerns that these rules failed to take into account, and § 6 offers a kind of `laundry list' response that enables the court to consider all of them when appropriate. Crampton, Conflict of Laws: CasesCommentsQuestions, at 117. Another fundamental concept of the Second Restatement's methodology is the concept of the most significant relationship. While section 6 enunciates the guiding principles of the choice-of-law process, the most-significant-relationship formula describes the objective of that process: to apply the law of the state that, with regard to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship with the parties and the dispute. (Emphasis in original.) Scoles, Conflict of Laws § 2.14, at 61. For example, in a tort case, the general principle that a court applies is: The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(1), at 414 (1971). One scholar has described section 145 as nearly as amorphous as section 6. 56 Md. L.Rev. at 1238-39. Lastly, the Second Restatement provides a list of the factual contacts or connecting factors that the forum court should consider in choosing the applicable law. In a tort case, for example, section 145(2) provides as follows: (2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2), at 414 (1971). In applying the principles of section 6 to these contacts to determine the state with the most significant relationship, the forum court should consider the relevant policies of all potentially interested states and the relevant interests of those states in the decision of the particular issue. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145, Comment e, at 419 (1971). Thus, section 145 is no more definite than section 6, and perhaps even less so. On top of the `factors' listed in section 6, section 145 adds a generous dollop of territorial and personal contacts. 56 Md. L.Rev. at 1239. Also, section 145 explicitly refers to a selective, issue-oriented approach to determining choice-of-law for a particular issue presented in a tort case. Each issue is to receive separate consideration if it is one which would be resolved differently under the local law rule of two or more of the potentially interested states. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145, Comment d, at 417 (1971). By prescribing this analytical approach, the Second Restatement authorizes the process of depecage, which refers to the process of cutting up a case into individual issues, each subject to a separate choice-of-law analysis. Ruiz v. Blentech Corp., 89 F.3d 320, 324 (7th Cir.1996) (applying Illinois law); accord Scoles, Conflict of Laws § 2.14, at 61 (explaining  depecage ). Thus, the choice-of-law principles outlined in section 6 are effectively applied only to the facts of an individual case. Mitchell, 100 Ill.App.3d at 494, 55 Ill.Dec. 375, 426 N.E.2d 350; Pittway Corp. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 641 F.2d 524, 526-27 (7th Cir.1981) (applying Illinois law) (The relative importance of all the alleged contacts, including the place of injury, must be independently evaluated on a case-by-case basis with respect to the particular issue involved, the character of the tort, and the relevant policies of the interested states); accord Phillips v. General Motors Corp., 298 Mont. 438, 446, 995 P.2d 1002, 1007 (2000) (Any analysis under the Restatement approach is necessarily driven by the unique facts, issues, applicable law, and jurisdictions implicated in a particular case).