Opinion ID: 323207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Case Against the Organizers (Jenkins, Scott, Acorn and Pitre)

Text: 28
29 Both in their brief and at oral argument appellants Jenkins, Scott, Acorn and Pitre relied heavily upon the contention that the Disciplinary Board's procedures did not comply with minimum procedural due process because the students lacked notice of any conspiracy charge. They point out that the college's entire case depends upon its ability to tie them into a conspiracy, since otherwise they are not shown by any of the facts found by the Disciplinary Board to have committed any prohibited acts. They conclude that since the charges on which they were tried did not allege the existence of a conspiracy, they were thus tried and disciplined upon charges that were not even made against them. In this fashion they seek to cut their own actions away from the conduct of others who acted in concert with them and who were found guilty and did not appeal (e.g., Thibodeaux and Campbell). 30 In considering this argument we will assume, without deciding, that there was no supportable finding of solely individual violations, unconnected with group activity, by any of these four students. This leads us to the intermediate position advocated by appellants-- that the college's case against them depends upon its ability to tie them into a conspiracy. We do not agree, however, with appellants' conclusion that they lacked notice of a conspiracy charge. Since we believe that sufficient notice of a conspiracy charge was given, any finding by the Disciplinary Board of a conspiracy was proper and in compliance with due process standards. 31 The classic starting point for an inquiry into the rights of students at state educational institutions of higher learning is Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930, 82 S.Ct. 368, 7 L.Ed.2d 193 (1961), a case in which students were disciplined without being provided any notice or opportunity for hearing. It was in this context that Judge Rives said that 32 . . . due process requires notice and some opportunity for hearing before a student at a tax-supported college is expelled for misconduct . . . The notice should contain a statement of the specific charges and grounds which, if proven, would justify expulsion under the regulations of the Board of Education. 33 294 F.2d at 158. The Court was very much aware of the distinction between any notice and sufficient notice: 34 The evidence clearly shows that the question for decision does not concern the sufficiency of the notice or the adequacy of the hearing, but is whether the students had a right to any notice or hearing whatever before being expelled. 35 294 F.2d at 154. Commenting on this case in his article The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand.L.Rev. 1027, 1072 (1969), Professor Charles A. Wright stated that 'no court since Dixon has denied that the student must be given prior notice of the grounds on which the charge is based.' In this case we do not depart from these precedents, since the question for our decision concerns sufficiency of notice rather than the question in Dixon of whether notice need be given at all. 36 We realize that the oft-quoted dictum in Dixon says that the notice should contain a statement of 'specific charges and grounds' and that a 'student cannot be punished on the basis of some ground other than that stated in the written charge.' 22 Vand.L.Rev. 1027, 1072 (1969), citing Hammond v. South Carolina State college, 272 F.Supp. 947, 950 (D.S.C.1967) and Woody v. Burns, 188 So.2d 56, 57 (Fla.App.1966). Judge Rives also recognized, however, that 'the minimum procedural requirements necessary to satisfy due process depend upon the circumstances and the interest of the parties involved.' 294 F.2d at 155. The standards of procedural due process are not absolutes. Due process in the context of this case is not to be equated with that essential to a criminal trial and the notice of charges need not be drawn with the precision of a criminal indictment. See Linwood v. Board of Education, 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027, 93 S.Ct. 475, 34 L.Ed.2d 320 (1972). 37 College administrators should not be held to the strict requirements of criminal law relating to giving notice of conspiracy. Although here the notice given to appellants could undoubtedly have been drafted with more precision, the charges do include numerous allegations of group or concerted actions. The document entitled 'Information of Disciplinary Hearing Board' clearly sets forth the type of conduct included in the Board's finding of conspiracy. 4 Appellants were referred to as 'organizers,' 'leaders,' and 'instigators.' The November 7 letter advised the students that they were charged with the violation of 'inciting to riot.' Again it is important to note the distinction between a college disciplinary proceeding and a criminal trial. The judicial gloss given to the word 'conspiracy' in the field of criminal law should not carry into another area where laymen operate in an altogether different context. The charges, the hearing, and the findings all evidence the fact that the 'conspiracy' here involved was the group activity, and the individual participation in that group action. There is no doubt in our minds that the notice given to appellants was in sufficient detail to fairly enable them to present a defense at the Disciplinary Board hearing. 38 A reading of the record clearly reveals that appellants understood the nature of the charges against them. Their counsel was quite prepared to refute those charges at the hearing and conducted ardent cross-examination of the college's witnesses. Assuming the written charges were deficient, the appellants had more than two weeks between their November 15-16 hearing and the later hearing ordered by the district court in which to prepare a defense to the charge of conspiracy. Under the particular circumstances of this case, we believe that appellants had sufficient notice of the specific charges and grounds (i.e., conspiracy) developed at the Disciplinary Board hearing to support their suspensions.
39 In its 'Finding of Facts' the Disciplinary Hearing Board only made reference to the existence of a conspiracy in its statement as to Jenkins: 40 A conspiracy existed between Larry Jenkins, Louis C. Scott, Jo Ann Acorn, Elmer Glenn Pitre, Larry Campbell, Ernest Brown and others to disturb the peace and cause disruptive actions at the college. 41 Appellants argue that this means we should review the sufficiency of the evidence against the other individuals based upon their own separate findings of facts and absent the conspiracy finding. 42 We disagree. The 'Finding of Facts' wa contained in a single document addressed to the attorneys for the students and for the college and contained statements as to all six appellants, plus findings as to those original plaintiffs who did not appeal. It seems clear that the Board meant for the findings of conspiracy between Jenkins, Scott, Acorn, Pitre and others to apply to each of these named individuals. We do not think it unreasonable to incorporate these findings in the statements of facts as to each of those students mentioned as being a member of the group. 43 The evidence clearly shows that, at least as to Jenkins, Scott and Acorn, these 'leaders,' 'organizers,' and 'instigators' of the boycott did provoke group action which led to violence. They did so not only by the simple expedient of making speeches urging a boycott, but by actively going about the campus in an effort to gain support for the protest. They stimulated many members of the student body to an emotional state which erupted into the serious and destructive violence of the evening of November 2, 1972. The record in this case demonstrates that these three students, from time to time and in varying degrees, had a strong power and influence over the conduct of their fellow students. The mere use of the descriptive term 'peaceful boycott' cannot, under the circumstances of this case, be used to immunize and shield what was actually done. 44 The case against Pitre is not as strong as that against the other three organizers. Nevertheless, the record supports the Board's finding that he was a part of the group as an active participant in the series of meetings which led to the disruptions. 45