Opinion ID: 2348609
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Treating a Motion as Conceded

Text: Super. Ct.Crim. R. 47-I(c) states that once a motion is filed, the non-moving side may oppose the motion. However, [i]f the opposition is not filed within the prescribed time, the Court may treat the motion as conceded. Super. Ct.Crim. R. 47-I(c) (last sentence). Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12-I(e) and Super Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 7(b)(2) contain identical provisions. The conceded motion provision is a judicial housekeeping device intended to serve the cause of judicial efficiency and case management and to benefit [] the administration of justice. National Voter Contact, Inc. v. Versace, 511 A.2d 393, 397 (D.C.1986). In some instances where the judge treats a motion as conceded, the judge has in fact simply granted the motion without an examination of the merits of the motion. For example, in Newton v. United States, 613 A.2d 332, 335 (D.C.1992), the judge entered an order vacating Newton's convictions on the mistaken belief that the motion to vacate had been conceded by the government (under Super. Ct.Crim. R. 47-I(c)). Upon learning of its mistake, the trial court set aside the order. On appeal, we referred to the order vacating as a  pro forma order. Newton, supra, 613 A.2d at 332, 335. In Cobb, we dealt with a motion treated as conceded under Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 7(b)(2) (then R. 7(b)(1)(v)). Appellant sought review of a Superior Court order which treated a motion to dismiss filed by appellee as conceded and denied appellant's motion to reinstate her complaint. Although we found no abuse of discretion in treating the motion as conceded, we did find an abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion to reinstate the complaint and remanded with instructions that the trial court allow appellant to file her opposition to the motion to dismiss, and thereafter consider and decide the motion to dismiss on its merits. Cobb, supra, 462 A.2d at 464. [3] In contrast stand cases such as Kurth v. Dobricky, 487 A.2d 220 (D.C.1985), Mahaise v. United States, 722 A.2d 29 (D.C. 1998), and Super. Ct.Crim. R. 118(c). Kurth was a civil case where the trial court dealt with a motion for summary judgment. When the motion went unopposed, the court treated the motion as conceded and granted the motion simply because no opposition was filed. Kurth, supra, 487 A.2d at 224 (internal citations omitted). We held that the trial court was not free to treat the motion as automatically conceded, given the requirement of Rule 56(c) [4] that the court itself must examine the record to confirm that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant, on the basis of the undisputed material facts, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing Milton Properties, Inc. v. Newby, 456 A.2d 349 (D.C. 1983)). We stated in so holding that [n]o defense to an insufficient showing is required. Id. (citing MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 56.22[2] (2d ed.1982)). As codified in Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c)'s specific instructions, this concept requires the trial judge to examine the record for a prima facie showing of the elements required for summary judgment when the motion is made. That is, the specific instructions for dealing with motions for summary judgment must be followed before the court may apply the general instructions for treating a motion as conceded. In Mahaise, we reviewed the trial court's decision to deny a motion for sealing an arrest record without a hearing. Although the government submitted no sworn materials with its opposition, the motion was not taken as conceded. Instead the court denied the motion because Mahaise's affidavit did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that he did not commit the offense with which he was charged. Mahaise, supra, 722 A.2d at 30. Since the affidavit was lacking, we held that it did not require ... a response from the government. Id. [5] Finally, Rule 118(c) states: If it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any accompanying exhibits and documents, the record of any prior proceedings in the case, and any response which the prosecutor may have filed, that the movant is not entitled to relief, the Court ... shall deny the motion. Super. Ct.Crim. R. 118(c) (emphasis added). [6] In the context of motions for sealing arrest records, Super. Ct.Crim. R. 118(c) essentially codifies the rubric, as is the case with Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c), on summary judgments that no defense to an insufficient showing is required. See Kurth, supra, 487 A.2d 220. The general principle discernible from our cases construing Super. Ct.Crim. R. 47-I(c) and its counterparts is that it may properly be utilized only where the movant has established a prima facie entitlement to relief. [7]