Opinion ID: 6108164
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion for Mistrial Based on Juror Misconduct

Text: For his second point on appeal, appellant argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying his motion for mistrial made after it was discovered, during the guilt-innocence-phase deliberations, that a juror had used his cell phone to look  up something, and had shared that information with the other jurors. He argues on appeal that it was an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to deny his motion for mistrial without giving him the opportunity to question the jurors under oath about the extraneous information. In response, the State argues that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial because appellant sought to question the jurors about what was discussed during deliberations, which would have violated Ark. R. Evid. 606, and juror misconduct is appropriately investigated by the court on a motion for new trial. The State further contends that appellant failed to meet his burden of proof to show a reasonable probability of prejudice because he did not call any witnesses or present further evidence and that a juror looking up the definition of hung jury does not demonstrate a reasonable possibility of prejudice. We begin by recognizing that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial before an impartial jury is a fundamental element of due process. Elmore v. State , 355 Ark. 620 , 623, 144 S.W.3d 278 , 280 (2004) (citations omitted). Implicit in the right to an impartial jury trial is the right to have the jury's verdict be based solely on the evidence presented in the case. Johnson v. State , 423 Md. 137 , 31 A.3d 239 , 246 (2011) (citing Couser v. State , 282 Md. 125 , 383 A.2d 389 , 397 (1978) ; accord Turner v. Louisiana , 379 U.S. 466 , 472-73, 85 S.Ct. 546 , 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965) ([T]he 'evidence developed' against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel.); Patterson v. Colorado , 205 U.S. 454 , 462, 27 S.Ct. 556 , 51 L.Ed. 879 (1907) (The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print).) We have made it clear that a mistrial is a drastic remedy and should be declared when there has been an error so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing the trial, or when it cannot be cured by an instruction. Holsombach v. State , 368 Ark. 415 , 246 S.W.3d 871 (2007). The trial court has wide discretion in granting or denying a motion for mistrial, and absent an abuse of that discretion, the trial court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Id. Following an allegation of juror misconduct, the moving party bears the burden of proving both the misconduct and that a reasonable possibility of prejudice resulted from it. Id. We defer to the superior position of the trial court to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and the prejudicial effect of the misconduct, if any. Id. Here, around the time the court received a note from the jury asking, If we do not all agree on guilty or not guilty on the first page, how do we handle this? the court was alerted to the possibility that Juror 4 had looked something up on his cell phone. The court informed counsel, called that juror into the courtroom, swore him in, and asked whether he had used his cell phone to look up something that he did not understand. The juror testified that he had, in fact, looked something up, that he had done so before [he] had even thought about it in spite of the court's instructions, 4 and that he had shared that information with the other jurors. Defense  counsel moved for a mistrial and also asked to voir dire the jury to find out what Juror 4 had told them. After hearing lengthy arguments regarding how to proceed, the trial court ultimately removed Juror 4, replaced him with an alternate juror, and allowed deliberations to continue. The court appeared to believe that it was constrained by Arkansas Rule of Evidence 606(b) from asking any questions other than what it had asked Juror 4. No curative instruction was requested or given. After trial, appellant filed a motion for new trial in which he argued that the jury committed misconduct by considering outside information, regardless of what information Juror 4 looked up; that the split verdict (hung on kidnapping and guilty on the other charges) showed a reasonable probability that the outside information influenced a juror's vote; and that the court violated his right to substantive due process by denying his motion for mistrial without allowing him an opportunity to show prejudice by asking the jurors what extraneous information they learned. The State responded that the motion should be denied because it failed to provide any new information for the court to consider and because there was no evidence that the extraneous information created a reasonable probability-not a mere possibility-of prejudice. The court held a hearing, and after considering the arguments of counsel, denied the motion for new trial. Appellant later filed an amended motion for new trial, this time attaching an affidavit of defense attorney Andrew Thornton stating that he had contacted Juror 4 and discovered that he had looked up the definition of hung jury during deliberations at appellant's trial. He told Thornton that he was pretty sure the definition was [i]f the jury is not unanimous or is a majority, the judge sends them back for more deliberations, and if no consensus is made, there's a mistrial. The juror did not wish to talk further about the case or sign an affidavit. The trial court entered an order treating the amended motion for new trial as one for reconsideration and denying it. Arkansas Rule of Evidence 606, Competency of Juror as Witness, provides in pertinent part as follows: (b) Inquiry into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received, but a juror may testify on the questions whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. The purpose of this rule is to balance the freedom of secret jury deliberations with the ability to correct an irregularity in those deliberations. Davis v. State , 330 Ark. 501 , 511, 956 S.W.2d 163 , 168 (1997). We do not read the language of Rule 606(b) to preclude the questioning of Juror 4 as to what he had researched on his cell phone and shared with the other jurors. Rather, a juror may testify on the question[ ] whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention, and what that information consisted of is an integral part of the testimony and is necessary for deciding whether a reasonable possibility of prejudice exists. In short, there is nothing in  either Rule 606(b) or any precedent of which we are aware that would have prevented the circuit court from undertaking a reasonable inquiry into the nature of the extraneous information when it was brought to the court's attention during deliberations. We are troubled by the trial court's denial of the motion for mistrial without a proper inquiry into the extrinsic information presented to the jury by Juror 4, but we conclude that there was no reasonable probability of prejudice to appellant in this particular case. A definition of the term hung jury is unlikely to result in prejudice to appellant, particularly in this case where the jury was, in fact, hung on the first count, kidnapping, and appellant received a mistrial on that charge. The definition of hung jury did not concern appellant's claim of innocence or the degree of his guilt. Researching the factual history of the case or even the definition of a term included in the elements of an offense would be much more likely to be prejudicial. In Franks v. State , 306 Ark. 75 , 811 S.W.2d 301 (1991), the jurors used a dictionary to look up the definition of premeditation. This court affirmed the denial of Franks's motion for new trial, writing: While we agree that, generally, it is misconduct for a jury to seek out reading material without the knowledge of the court and the parties, prejudice does not occur in every case. Furthermore, this court has observed that a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial. State v. Cherry , 341 Ark. 924 , 931, 20 S.W.3d 354 , 358 (2000). We hold that appellant could not show a reasonable possibility of prejudice in this case, and we therefore affirm on this point.