Opinion ID: 24
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Crime Victims and the Federal Restitution Statutes

Text: Before turning to the issues specific to this appeal, we provide a brief sketch of the network of federal statutes affecting crime victims' rights to restitution.
The VWPA authorizes a district court in criminal sentencing proceedings to order `in addition to or . . . in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to any victim' of the offense. United States v. Acosta, 303 F.3d 78, 86 (1st Cir.2002)(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)). The purpose of the statute is to insure that the wrongdoer make good[], to the degree possible, the harm he has caused his victim. United States v. Vaknin, 112 F.3d 579, 582 (1st Cir.1997)(quoting S.Rep. No. 97-532, at 31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2536). When the VWPA was enacted in 1982, it represented a tectonic shift in the criminal restitution regime, transforming criminal restitution from a sporadically imposed condition of probation into the sentencing norm in cases involving quantifiable economic loss. Id. (explaining that federal judges were not able to impose criminal restitution as a condition of probation until 1925 when Congress passed the Federal Probation Act and, even after that, used the power sparingly). In its earlier forms, the VWPA did not define who was a victim eligible for restitution. In 1990 the Supreme Court filled that gap, construing the statute to authorize an award of restitution only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction, and not counts which were dismissed. Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413, 421, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 109 L.Ed.2d 408 (1990)(recognizing that [t]he essence of a plea agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses). Congress responded in short order, amending the VWPA to provide that [f]or purposes of restitution, a victim of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity means any person directly harmed by the defendant's conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy or pattern. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2)). In such cases, like this one, the district court may now order restitution without regard to whether the conduct that harmed the victim was conduct underlying the offense of conviction. Acosta, 303 F.3d at 86-87. In 1996 Congress amended the VWPA again, retaining the specific definition of victim for crimes involving a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of activity and adding more generally that the term `victim' means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996)(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2)).
Also in 1996, Congress enacted the MVRA, which  compels a sentencing court to order a defendant convicted of certain crimes, including crimes against property, to make restitution to his victim. United States v. Innarelli, 524 F.3d 286, 292-93 (1st Cir.2008)(emphasis added); see 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. To that end, the statute directs district courts to order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim's losses . . . without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A). The definition of victim under the MVRA is substantively identical to that set forth in the VWPA, as amended. Id. 3663A(a)(2); see, e.g., United States v. Chalupnik, 514 F.3d 748, 753 (8th Cir.2008) (MVRA and VWPA contain identical definitions of the term `victim'). The MVRA's changes reflect a[] fundamental shift in the purpose of restitution away from its strictly penal origins; [t]he new restitution scheme is not merely a means of punishment and rehabilitation, but an `attempt to provide those who suffer the consequences of crime with some means of recouping the personal and financial losses.' United States v. Perry, 360 F.3d 519, 530 (6th Cir.2004)(quoting H.R.Rep. No. 104-16, at 5 (1995)).
This shift towards a more compensatory regime found further expression in the CVRA, enacted in 2004. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771. The CVRA enshrines a panoply of crime victims' rights, including rights to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, [or] sentencing and to full and timely restitution as provided in law. Id. §§ 3771(a)(4), (a)(6). The CVRA obligates district courts in criminal proceedings to ensure that the crime victim is afforded [such] rights and requires government prosecutors to make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the[ir] rights. Id. §§ 3771(b)(1), (c)(1). It further provides that the crime victim or the crime victim's lawful representative, and the attorney for the Government may assert the [victim's] rights. Id. § 3771(d)(1). Critically for purposes of this appeal, the CVRA states, under the heading Enforcement and limitations: The [victim's] rights . . . shall be asserted in the district court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is underway, in the district court in the district in which the crime occurred. The district court shall take up and decide any motion asserting a victim's right forthwith. If the district court denies the relief sought, the movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals may issue the writ on the order of a single judge pursuant to circuit rule or the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court of appeals shall take up and decide such application forthwith within 72 hours after the petition has been filed. In no event shall proceedings be stayed or subject to a continuance of more than five days for purposes of enforcing this chapter [this section]. If the court of appeals denies the relief sought, the reasons for the denial shall be clearly stated on the record in a written opinion. Id. § 3771(d)(3) (emphasis added). In the alternative, the statute provides that  [i]n any appeal in a criminal case, the Government may assert as error the district court's denial of any crime victim's right in the proceeding to which the appeal relates. Id. § 3771(d)(4)(emphasis added). [7] The CVRA defines crime victim for purposes of its provisions as a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of Columbia. Id. § 3771(e). Notwithstanding the general shift in the restitution statutes towards a more compensatory regime, the law in this circuit remains that restitution ordered as part of a criminal sentence is a criminal penalty, not a civil remedy. United States v. Ziskind, 471 F.3d 266, 270 (1st Cir.2006). But see United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1122 & n. 4 (10th Cir.2007) (stating that the MVRA does not inflict criminal punishment, and thus is not punitive, but acknowledging that many courts hold otherwise).