Opinion ID: 2486429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: McCRAY's Request During the Penalty Phase

Text: In his final Faretta -related claim, McCRAY argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing him to give his penalty-phase closing argument because the request for self-representation was untimely, the trial court previously found that McCRAY was incapable of self-representation, he had been previously adjudicated incompetent, he frequently disrupted the proceedings, and he demonstrated a lack of understanding of the legal system. He also contends that the trial court conducted an inadequate Faretta inquiry after McCRAY elected to conduct his closing argument. Prior to penalty-phase closing arguments, defense counsel represented to the court that McCRAY again wished to address the jury. Counsel stated that he had advised McCRAY that if he chose to pursue this option, McCRAY would have to engage in self-representation. McCRAY acknowledged that he had spoken to counsel about this matter and that he wanted to give the argument. After the trial court informed McCRAY and defense counsel that it would only allow one of them to give a closing, McCRAY responded, All right. Then I'll do it. The trial court then issued the following admonitions: THE COURT: All right. You understand that the argument is going to be limited to whether or not it ought to be death or life, don't you? I mean what you did up here previously [i.e., McCRAY's narrative, penalty-phase testimony discussing lingering doubt] was not proper but I allowed it anyway. You understand? .... So when you get up for that closing argument you will limit your argument to whether the jury ought to recommend death or recommend life based on the mitigation and aggravation. I don't know if you're prepared to talk about that or not but that's what you need to discuss, so would you rather that [defense counsel] do that or you want to do it? McCRAY responded that he understood these warnings and reaffirmed his decision to present the closing. The following exchange then took place: THE COURT: All right. You know that were down to final arguments, correct? McCRAY: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And you understand that [defense counsel] have been representing you throughout this trial, correct? McCRAY: Yes. THE COURT: And now at the final argument you want to do the final argument on behalf of yourself, correct? McCRAY: Yes. THE COURT: And you understand that you're not trained in the law, correct? McCRAY: Yes. THE COURT: You didn't go beyond whatwhat kind of education do you have? McCRAY: I have a 12th grade education. THE COURT: What does that mean? Did you go through high school? McCRAY: I graduated. THE COURT: All right. Did you go to college? McCRAY: No. THE COURT: How old are you? McCRAY: I'm 28. THE COURT: And what kind of work experience have you had over the years? Have you ever worked in the court system at all? McCRAY: No, I haven't. THE COURT: You know the dangers and disadvantages of representing yourself? McCRAY: Yes, sir, I do. THE COURT: You understand that [defense counsel] is trained in law and has got many years experience handling these type cases? McCRAY: Yes, sir, I do. THE COURT: You understand he understands what to say to try to convince the jury to save your life? McCRAY: Yes, I do. THE COURT: You understand that you're kind of at a disadvantage if you get up there and try to do that? McCRAY: Not really at a disadvantage. THE COURT: So you understand what you're getting into here, right? McCRAY: Yes, I do. THE COURT: All right. Ill allow you to do it. All right. During his closing argument, McCRAY chose not to argue for mitigation at all; instead, McCRAY focused on lingering doubt. Thereafter, defense counsel resumed their role representing McCRAY for the remainder of the proceedings. As other courts have recognized, a trial court's decision on a defendant's belated request for self-representation after the trial begins is reviewed for an abuse of discretion: [S]ome federal courts have recognized that if a defendant proceeds to trial with counsel and asserts his right to self-representation only after a trial has begun, the court may deny the defendant's request, or may otherwise limit or condition the request. [ United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1096 (4th Cir. 1997).] See also United States v. Young, 287 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir.2002). In Florida, it has been held that after a trial has begun with the defendant being represented by counsel, the decision of whether to allow a defendant to proceed pro se rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Lyons v. State, 437 So.2d 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). When exercising this discretion, the trial court should make inquiry of the defendant as to why the defendant desires to represent himself. The trial court must then balance the legitimate interest of the defendant against the potential disruption of the proceedings already in progress. Id. at 712. Thomas v. State, 958 So.2d 995, 996 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). Moreover, where issues of mental health arise, the Supreme Court in Edwards gave trial courts more discretion in the context of a Faretta inquiry to examine a defendant's mental competency and mental capacity to represent himself. Muehleman v. State, 3 So.3d 1149, 1159 (Fla.2009) (citing Tennis, 997 So.2d at 378). In Mora, 814 So.2d at 328-29, this Court held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing defendant Mora to give a closing statement after his counsel had addressed the jury. On appeal, Mora argued that the trial court abused its discretion by offering to Mora the ability to become co-counsel even though there was significant testimony that Mora had a mental disorder. Id. at 328. Prior to trial, Mora had undergone a competency evaluation, after which the trial court found Mora competent to proceed. Id. at 325. Citing a trial court's discretion in this regard, the Court found no merit in Mora's argument. See id. at 328. In concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Mora to give a brief closing statement, this Court relied on the following facts from the record: Here, the trial court engaged Mora in an extensive colloquy before allowing him to give a closing statement. During that colloquy, the trial court asked Mora what issues he was going to talk about, limited Mora to new issues not raised by [defense counsel], and suggested to Mora again not to give a closing statement. Mora stated that his attorney had advised him not to give a closing argument. Id. at 329. In this case, the record reflects that in January 2006, the trial court found that there was substantial, clear and convincing information that [McCRAY] currently has a serious mental health illness or defect that has rendered him incompetent to proceed in this case at this time.  (Emphasis added.) Nearly three years later, McCRAY's competency had been restored, and in September 2008, the trial court expressly declared McCRAY competent to proceed, and in doing so, never once found McCRAY to be suffering from a severe mental health illness. Here, as in Mora, the trial court questioned McCRAY before allowing him to give the closing. During the colloquy, the court informed McCRAY of the nature of a penalty-phase closing, warned McCRAY to limit his argument to whether the jury should recommend life or death based on the mitigation and aggravation, discussed with McCRAY that his attorneys were trained in the law and had many years of experience with these types of cases, explained that he would be at a disadvantage to argue the closing, and again inquired as to whether McCRAY understood that his role was to convince the jury to save his life. Based on the record, we reject McCRAY's contention that the trial court abused its discretion because the court had previously observed McCRAY's disruptive behavior, had repeatedly prohibited McCRAY from engaging in self-representation on prior occasions, and had commented that McCRAY was not capable of representing [himself] in this type of case following McCRAY's second request. First, while it is true that McCRAY disrupted various portions of his guilt-phase proceeding, he was never once removed during the penalty phasethe proceeding at issuewhich occurred several weeks after the guilt phase. Second, the record shows that with McCRAY's prior requests for self-representation, the court did not vacillate on its decision to allow McCRAY to proceed pro se; aside from his third request, McCRAY's previous requests were all equivocal and the trial court did not err in failing to conduct any type of Faretta hearing. Third, the trial court's limited comment about McCRAY's ability to represent himself following the second request is not dispositive because it did not foreclose McCRAY's continuing ability to make a clear and unequivocal declaration of any desire to assert a right of self-representation. See Bell v. State, 699 So.2d 674, 677 (Fla.1997) (We find that the judge's limited comment that appellant was not competent to represent himself as counsel or co-counsel did not foreclose appellant's continuing ability to make a clear and unequivocal declaration of any desire to assert a right of self-representation.). Lastly, to the extent that McCRAY now relies on the inappropriate nature of his lingering-doubt argument made during the closing, we decline McCRAY's invitation to engage in a post-hoc review of the trial court's decision by considering statements made by McCRAY after the fact. See Muehleman, 3 So.3d at 1160 ([T]he fact that Muehleman was granted his request to represent himself, and subsequently chose to present no mitigation whatsoever, does not establish that the trial court erred in allowing him to follow that chosen path.). In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing McCRAY to conduct his closing argument, even if it ultimately was to his own detriment. McCRAY also argues that even if the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing him to proceed, the court engaged in a constitutionally insufficient Faretta inquiry. The record directly refutes this claim. Here, prior to McCRAY's closing argument the trial judge took the following steps: he advised McCRAY of the penalty-phase closings limited scope (i.e., why the jury should not recommend death); he warned McCRAY that he was not trained in the law; he explained to McCRAY that his counsel was trained in the law and that giving his own closing would put him at a disadvantage; and he questioned McCRAY regarding his age and experience in the legal field. Further, the record reflects that during the guilt phase, which took place several weeks before, after one of McCRAY's numerous requests to allegedly proceed pro se, the trial judge inquired as to his prior work history and informed McCRAY that he would be bound by the same rules of evidence and procedure with which lawyers must comply. While the courts colloquy concerning the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation may have been somewhat brief, which the State acknowledges, this Court has held that [i]t [is] enough for [the defendant] to be alerted generally to the difficulties of navigating the legal system. Potts, 718 So.2d at 760 (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Hill v. State, 688 So.2d 901, 905 (Fla.1996)). Accordingly, we deny relief as to this claim. [8]