Opinion ID: 2087167
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Misuse of Supervisory Authority

Text: McDunn also argues that if this court has jurisdiction to hear this case, it is a misuse of that jurisdiction, for our supervisory authority should be used only with restraint and when appropriate. McDunn notes that this court has used its supervisory authority in the past when trial courts were not acting within their jurisdiction ( People v. Williams (1988), 124 Ill.2d 300, 124 Ill.Dec. 577, 529 N.E.2d 558; Doherty v. Caisley (1984), 104 Ill.2d 72, 83 Ill.Dec. 361, 470 N.E.2d 319; People v. Breen (1976), 62 Ill.2d 328, 342 N.E.2d 31), where cases were not necessarily appealable, but compelling reasons existed for review ( Crane Paper Stock Co. v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. (1976), 63 Ill.2d 61, 344 N.E.2d 461), and to answer recurring discovery questions in criminal cases ( People ex rel. Carey v. Stray horn (1975), 61 Ill.2d 85, 329 N.E.2d 194). McDunn finds a common factual situation in these cases that is absent from the present case: a party called upon the court to use its power to remedy oft-recurring misuses of judicial power, or was asked by a party to resolve important recurring questions relating to tension between legislative fiat and supreme court rule. As just noted, however, this court's supervisory authority is not limited by any rules or means for its exercise. It is `bounded only by the exigencies which call for its exercise [and as] new instances of these occur, it will be found able to cope with them.' ( In re Huff, 352 Mich, at 418, 91 N.W.2d at 613, quoting 14 Am.Jur. Courts § 265 (1938).) We find it hard to imagine a more important case than this to invoke our supervisory authority, where the appellate court has fashioned an order that McDunn acknowledges is unconstitutional and, if so, would have a major impact on our court system. Moreover, as also just noted, the fact that no party has called upon this court to hear this matter does not affect our jurisdiction under our supervisory authority. McDunn also argues that it would be a misuse of our supervisory authority to hear this matter because this court has already given its imprimatur to the appellate court's 1992 decision. McDunn believes this happened when this court denied Williams' petition for leave to appeal the appellate court's 1990 decision finding McDunn's election contest timely filed. ( McDunn v. Williams (1990), 204 Ill. App.3d 332, 149 Ill.Dec. 791, 562 N.E.2d 255, appeal denied (1990), 135 Ill.2d 558, 151 Ill.Dec. 384, 564 N.E.2d 839.) However, this court's denial of Williams' 1990 petition for leave to appeal is in no way relevant to the appellate court's 1992 order allowing both Williams and McDunn to fill one judicial vacancy.