Opinion ID: 608132
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Psychological injury to victims

Text: 28 McAninch contends that the court's finding of extreme psychological injury is not supported by the record, and that it therefore did not constitute a valid basis for departure. 29 The presentence report contained information about the impact of the harassing conduct on the victims of the counts to which McAninch pleaded guilty, as well as on the victims of the dismissed counts. In justifying the proposed departure for psychological injury, the report referred to individuals in addition to those who were the targets of the specific conduct charged in counts three, nine and ten. 30 The court also had before it with respect to this ground of departure letters from several victims detailing individual experiences of harassment. For example, the wife of the man who had been sent the threatening items that were the subject of count nine wrote that she had never felt so vulnerable and helpless in her life. (Presentence Report attachment (Williams letter) at 3.) After receiving that letter, I would come home from work to find my daughter huddled in the corner of the sofa with a kitchen knife in her hand.... I felt it was entirely possible that the next step the harasser would take would be to confront us directly. (Id. at 2.) Some of the letters included in the presentence report were from the victims of dismissed counts. 31 The district court found that McAninch had harassed his victims to an extreme degree.... placing them in extreme fear ... that the next mention of [McAninch], the next contact would be at the door. (S.T. at 40-41.) The court adopted the recommendation of the government and presentence report to depart upward pursuant to section 5K2.3 of the guidelines due to the psychological injury McAninch inflicted on those he chose to harass. In doing so, the court did not specify to which victims it referred. 32 The district court's desire to depart upward on this basis was understandable in view of the psychological trauma McAninch visited upon his victims, a consequence that was not necessarily reflected in the applicable offense level. Nonetheless, we cannot uphold this basis for departure because the court did not clearly limit its consideration of psychological injury to the counts of conviction, as is required under Castro-Cervantes. United States v. Fine, 975 F.2d 596, 602 (9th Cir.1992) (en banc) (explaining holding of Castro-Cervantes). In light of this determination, we do not address McAninch's concerns regarding the existence or extent of injury to particular victims or reach the Lira-Barraza factors.