Opinion ID: 517318
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: aydinian

Text: 19 Harout Aydinian raised two challenges to the jury instructions given by the trial judge. Aydinian challenged the court's refusal to charge the jury with the following requested instruction regarding his status as a government informant: 20 In this case, there has been evidence submitted that [d]efendant, Aydinian, was a Government informant. There can be no conspiracy between a Government informer who secretly intends to frustrate the conspiracy and other members of the conspiracy because it takes two to conspire and a government informer is not a true conspirator. 21 Although the requested jury instruction is factually correct, it implies that a government informant can never be a conspirator. However, it is true that where a co-conspirator is a government agent or where an informant acts at the direction of the government, that information can not be guilty of conspiracy. United States v. Lively, 803 F.2d 1124 (11th Cir.1986). These circumstances do not exist in this case. Aydinian still continued to purchase and distribute cocaine even after he began providing the FBI with information about Johnson and his operation. Aydinian merely selected the information he wanted to reveal to the FBI, carefully concealing his own involvement with Johnson. Accordingly, the requested jury instruction incorrectly described the situation involved in this case. Therefore, the district court properly refused to charge the jury as requested. 22 Aydinian's second objection challenged the instruction the trial judge gave regarding Aydinian's decision not to testify. Aydinian contends that by giving the following instruction the court erred by using should instead of must. 23 The jury should remember the defendant has the right not to take the stand and testify. Therefore, the jury should not draw any adverse inferences with respect to a defendant merely because that defendant has chosen not to testify. 24 Aydinian's argument is merely one of semantics. A quick look at the dictionary reveals that the two words are synonyms and interchangeable. Should past tense of shall; must; ought (used to indicate duty, proprietary, expediency). Random House College Dictionary 1218 (rev. ed. 1980). In a similar case, the Ninth Circuit held that: Any semantic difference between may and shall in the context of the standard instruction in such cases could not affect the outcome of a trial, and clearly had no adverse affect upon appellants in this case. United States v. Cervantes-Gonzalez, 472 F.2d 611, 612 (9th Cir.1973). 25 Moreover, during voir dire the judge instructed the jury panel that: 26 The defendant has a right not to testify. You are permitted no inference whatsoever if he exercises his right not to testify. You may not infer guilt nor innocence. You may not suggest it by virtue of the fact that the defendant chooses not to testify. It is a totally neutral factor. 27 When comparing the two instructions, it becomes clear that the words should and must are in fact synonyms, neither word carrying any more strength or validity then the other. 28 Even if this instruction was erroneous, the conviction could only be reversed if it was plain error, as Aydinian failed to raise this objection at trial. The plain error doctrine only permits reversal in exceptional circumstances where the error is so plain that the trial judge and the prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it. United States v. Sloan, 833 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir.1987). Accordingly, it was not plain error for the district court to use should instead of must in its instruction.