Opinion ID: 778740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Literal Infringement of the '182 Patent

Text: 45 Following the jury verdict finding that Ficosa infringed claim 1 of the '182 patent, Ficosa moved for JMOL, arguing there was no substantial evidence of infringement under the district court's claim construction of clip (28). At trial, Ficosa had argued in favor of the claim construction eventually adopted by the district court; Teleflex had argued for a substantially broader claim construction. Although Ficosa prevailed in its claim construction arguments, the jury decided the ultimate issue of infringement of the '182 patent in favor of Teleflex. 46 A two-step process is used in the analysis of patent infringement: first, the scope of the claims are determined as a matter of law, and second, the properly construed claims are compared to the allegedly infringing device to determine, as a matter of fact, whether all of the limitations of at least one claim are present, either literally or by a substantial equivalent, in the accused device. See Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 988, 50 USPQ2d 1607, 1609 (Fed. Cir.1999). The first of these two steps is performed by the court and is subject to de novo review by this court. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1456, 46 USPQ2d at 1174; Markman, 52 F.3d at 979, 34 USPQ2d at 1329. The second step in the infringement analysis requires a factual comparison of the claimed invention to the accused device, which is done by the fact finder. See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338, 14 L.Ed. 717 (1853). If tried to a jury, the jury's factual findings pursuant to the second step are reviewed by this court for lack of substantial evidence, see Genentech, 29 F.3d at 1565, 31 USPQ2d at 1168-69, as part of this court's reapplication of the JMOL standard. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1467, 46 USPQ2d at 1172. [S]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 859, 20 USPQ2d 1252, 1259 (Fed.Cir.1991) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). 47 In this case, the parties disagree as to whether the district court correctly performed the first step with regard to the clip (28) limitation in claim 1 of the '182 patent. Teleflex contends that clip (28) should be construed to mean any device, of any shape, that holds two things together and also performs the functions of being manually insertable into and manually removable from a locked position. Teleflex argues that the claim language does not support the construction applied by the district court, clip is defined nowhere in the specification or the prosecution history, and the district court committed a cardinal sin of claim construction by importing limitations from the written description into the claims. See SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Adv. Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340, 58 USPQ2d 1059, 1062 (Fed.Cir.2001). Ficosa argues that the district court correctly construed the claim term clip (28). 48 The parties also disagree as to whether the jury correctly performed the second step in the infringement analysis of the '182 patent. Ficosa argues that under the construction of clip (28) as determined by the district court, the record lacks substantial evidence on which the jury could have based its finding of infringement. Teleflex argues that under either the district court's construction of clip (28) or Teleflex's preferred construction, substantial evidence appears in the record supporting the jury's verdict of infringement of the '182 patent. 49 We address each of the first and second steps of the infringement analysis below. Regarding the first step, we conclude that claim terms take on their ordinary and accustomed meanings unless the patentee demonstrated an intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by redefining the term or by characterizing the invention in the intrinsic record using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope. Regarding the second step, substantial evidence appears in the record to support the jury's verdict of infringement, and therefore we affirm the district court's denial of Ficosa's motion for JMOL.
50 We begin our claim construction analysis, as always, with the words of the claim. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1576 (Fed.Cir.1996). The claim language defines the bounds of claim scope. Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 619-20, 34 USPQ2d 1816, 1819 (Fed. Cir.1995). [T]he claims define the scope of the right to exclude; the claim construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the claim. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248, 48 USPQ2d 1117, 1120 (Fed.Cir.1998). [T]he language of the claim frames and ultimately resolves all issues of claim interpretation. Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023, 43 USPQ2d 1545, 1548 (Fed.Cir.1997). 51 The words used in the claims are interpreted in light of the intrinsic evidence of record, including the written description, the drawings, and the prosecution history, if in evidence. Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331, 59 USPQ2d 1401, 1407 (Fed.Cir.2001). The intrinsic evidence may provide context and clarification about the meaning of claim terms. York Prods., Inc. v. Cent. Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1572, 40 USPQ2d 1619, 1622 (Fed.Cir.1996). Such intrinsic evidence is the most significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582, 39 USPQ2d at 1576. 52 In the absence of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor's claim terms take on their ordinary meaning. York Prods., 99 F.3d at 1572, 40 USPQ2d at 1622. We indulge a heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366, 62 USPQ2d 1658, 1662 (Fed.Cir.2002). The ordinary meaning of a claim term may be determined by reviewing a variety of sources, including the claims themselves, see Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357, 52 USPQ2d 1029, 1033 (Fed.Cir.1999), other intrinsic evidence including the written description and the prosecution history, see, e.g., DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314, 1324, 57 USPQ2d 1889, 1894 (Fed.Cir.2001), and dictionaries and treatises, see, e.g., Schaefer Fan Co. v. J & D Mfg., 265 F.3d 1282, 1288-89, 60 USPQ2d 1194, 1199 (Fed.Cir.2001) (approving district court use of dictionaries to determine ordinary meaning); Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1105, 39 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed.Cir.1996) (citing footwear treatise for definition of shoe upper). But in any event the ordinary meaning must be determined from the standpoint of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art. See Zelinski v. Brunswick Corp., 185 F.3d 1311, 1316, 51 USPQ2d 1590, 1593 (Fed. Cir.1999). 53 Among the intrinsic evidence, the specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582, 39 USPQ2d at 1576. One purpose for examining the specification is to determine if the patentee has limited the scope of the claims. Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 882, 56 USPQ2d 1836, 1839 (Fed.Cir.2000). For example, an inventor may choose to be his own lexicographer if he defines the specific terms used to describe the invention with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480, 31 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed.Cir.1994). Such a definition may appear in the written description, see Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388, 21 USPQ2d 1383, 1386 (Fed.Cir.1992), or in the prosecution history, see Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582, 39 USPQ2d at 1576 (citing Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578, 38 USPQ2d 1126, 1129 (Fed.Cir.1996)). 54 The specification may limit the scope of the claims via other routes. The specification may assist in resolving ambiguity where the ordinary and accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope of the claim to be ascertained from the words alone. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1554, 42 USPQ2d 1737, 1741 (Fed. Cir.1997), overruled on other grounds by Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1467, 46 USPQ2d at 1172. The patentee may demonstrate an intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope. See SciMed, 242 F.3d at 1344, 58 USPQ2d at 1065. 55 Likewise, the prosecution history may demonstrate that the patentee intended to deviate from a term's ordinary and accustomed meaning, i.e., if it shows the applicant characterized the invention using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction during the administrative proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office. Arguments and amendments made during the prosecution of a patent application and other aspects of the prosecution history, as well as the specification and other claims, must be examined to determine the meaning of terms in the claims. Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576, 34 USPQ2d 1673, 1676 (Fed.Cir. 1995). In particular, the prosecution history (or file wrapper) limits the interpretation of claims so as to exclude any interpretation that may have been disclaimed or disavowed during prosecution in order to obtain claim allowance. Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452, 227 USPQ 293, 296 (Fed.Cir.1985). 56 The role of the specification in construing the claims is in dispute in this case. As we have often stated, the claims must be read in view of the specification, see Markman, 52 F.3d at 979, 34 USPQ2d at 1329, but limitations from the specification are not to be read into the claims, see Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186, 48 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed.Cir.1998). That claims are interpreted in light of the specification does not mean that everything expressed in the specification must be read into all the claims. Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 957, 220 USPQ 592, 597 (Fed.Cir.1983). In SRI International v. Matsushita Electric Corp., we explained that our focus must be on the claims: 57 If everything in the specification were required to be read into the claims, or if structural claims were to be limited to devices operated precisely as a specification-described embodiment is operated, there would be no need for claims. Nor could an applicant, regardless of the prior art, claim more broadly than that embodiment. Nor would a basis remain for the statutory necessity that an applicant conclude his specification with claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112. It is the claims that measure the invention. 58 775 F.2d 1107, 1121, 227 USPQ 577, 585 (Fed.Cir.1985) (en banc) (plurality opinion). 59 Ficosa argues that where only one embodiment is disclosed in the specification, claim terms are limited to the embodiment disclosed, citing Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 53 USPQ2d 1065 (Fed.Cir.1999), Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 53 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed.Cir. 1999), and Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 59 USPQ2d 1865 (Fed. Cir.2001). A review of these cases and others demonstrates that our precedent establishes no such rule. 60 In Toro, we considered whether a claim that recited a cover including a restriction ring should be construed to require attachment of the ring to the cover. 199 F.3d at 1300, 53 USPQ2d at 1068-69. The specification described an embodiment showing the ring permanently attached to the cover and listed advantages of permanent attachment: it automatically restricts the size of air inlet depending upon which operation is being conducted without having the operator manually insert or remove a replaceable ring. Id. at 1301, 53 USPQ2d at 1069. In our opinion concluding that including required attachment, we emphasized that the specification and drawings provided context for construction of the claims. Id. We noted that clear statements of scope in the specification and prosecution history determined the correct claim construction. Id. at 1302, 53 USPQ2d at 1070. 61 In Wang, we construed the claim term frame to be limited to character-based protocols, even though the ordinary meaning of the term could arguably be applied to bit-mapped protocols. 197 F.3d at 1382, 53 USPQ2d at 1166. Although we noted that the only system described and enabled in the specification used a character-based protocol, we also noted that the intrinsic evidence did not describe bit-mapped protocols as included in the invention, and a person skilled in the art would not have understood bit-mapped protocols to be included. Id., 197 F.3d 1377, 53 USPQ2d at 1165. The applicant during prosecution distinguished the pel [picture element] level from the character level, and presented the invention as involving a character-based system. Id. at 1384, 53 USPQ2d at 1165. We described the correct approach to the inquiry: 62 Although precedent offers assorted quotations in support of differing conclusions concerning the scope of the specification, these cases must be viewed in the factual context in which they arose. Whether an invention is fairly claimed more broadly than the preferred embodiment in the specification is a question specific to the content of the specification, the context in which the embodiment is described, the prosecution history, and if appropriate the prior art ... 63 Id. at 1383, 53 USPQ2d at 1165. 64 In Bell Atlantic, we construed the term modes to be limited to the three categories described in the specification. 262 F.3d at 1273, 59 USPQ2d at 1875. Although the term's ordinary meaning may have supported a broader reading, id. at 1269, 59 USPQ2d at 1871, we found that the patentees defined the term `mode' by implication, through the term's consistent use throughout the '786 patent specification. Id. at 1273, 59 USPQ2d at 1874. We also noted that the claim language and the prosecution history supported this construction. Id., 262 F.3d 1258, 59 USPQ2d at 1875. Thus, we construed modes based on clear indications throughout the intrinsic evidence. Id. at 1273-74, 59 USPQ2d at 1874-76. 65 In sum, the number of embodiments disclosed in the specification is not determinative of the meaning of disputed claim terms. As we explained in CCS Fitness, an accused infringer cannot overcome the heavy presumption that a claim term takes on its ordinary meaning simply by pointing to the preferred embodiment or other structures or steps disclosed in the specification or prosecution history. 288 F.3d at 1366, 62 USPQ2d at 1662. We hold that claim terms take on their ordinary and accustomed meanings unless the patentee demonstrated an intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by redefining the term or by characterizing the invention in the intrinsic record using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope. 66 In this case, nothing in the intrinsic evidence indicates that clip (28) should be limited to a single pair of legs. The language of asserted claim 1 does not support limiting the claim to a single pair of legs. Neither single nor pair of legs appears in claim 1. Neither the specification nor the prosecution history includes an expression of manifest exclusion or restriction demonstrating an intent to limit clip (28) to a single pair of legs. The term clip is not defined in the specification or in the prosecution history, and although the specification describes only one embodiment of the clip, no clear statements of scope limit the term clip to having a single pair of legs. Furthermore, the ordinary meaning of clip is not restricted to having a single pair of legs. The expert witnesses for Ficosa agreed that the ordinary meaning of clip is broad enough to encompass the accused Ficosa device in this case. 67 The district court thus erred by importing the single pair of legs limitation from the specification into the claim. Instead of using the specification as context, the district court apparently limited the clip (28) recited in claim 1 to the embodiment described in the specification. We have cautioned against limiting the claimed invention to preferred embodiments or specific examples in the specification. See Comark, 156 F.3d at 1186, 48 USPQ2d at 1005 (quoting Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1563, 231 USPQ 833, 835 (Fed. Cir.1986)). The specification describes only one embodiment of the claimed clip (28), but in the circumstances of this case the record is devoid of clear statements of scope limiting the term appearing in claim 1 to having a single pair of legs. Absent such clear statements of scope, we are constrained to follow the language of the claims, rather than that of the written description. See SRI, 775 F.2d at 1121, 227 USPQ at 585. To the extent that the district court construed the term clip to be limited to the embodiment described in the specification, rather than relying on the language of the claims, we conclude that the district court construed the claim term clip (28) too narrowly. We construe the term clip (28) in claim 1 to mean a structure that provides the dual functions of disposing the clip around and holding the female member through the slots in the female member and extending through the slots into the groove in the male member to lock the members together.
68 Notwithstanding this error by the district court, [w]hen we determine on appeal, as a matter of law, that a trial judge has misinterpreted a patent claim, we independently construe the claim to determine its correct meaning, and then determine if the facts presented at trial can support the appealed judgment. Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1560, 35 USPQ2d 1801, 1806 (Fed.Cir.1995). We may affirm the jury's findings on infringement or validity issues if substantial evidence appears in the record supporting the jury's verdict and if correction of the errors in a jury instruction on claim construction would not have changed the result, given the evidence presented. See Weinar v. Rollform Inc., 744 F.2d 797, 808, 223 USPQ 369, 376 (Fed.Cir.1984) ([A] reversal ... is not available to an appellant who merely establishes error in instructions.... Where the procedural error was `harmless,' i.e., where the evidence in support of the verdict was so overwhelming that the same verdict would necessarily be reached absent the error, or the error was cured by an instruction, a new trial would be mere waste and affirmance of the judgment is required.), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084, 105 S.Ct. 1844, 85 L.Ed.2d 143 (1985). Under these circumstances, the error in claim construction is harmless and does not require a new trial. See Ecolab Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., 285 F.3d 1362, 1374, 62 USPQ2d 1349, 1357 (Fed.Cir.2002) (When the error in a jury instruction could not have changed the result, the erroneous instruction is harmless. (internal quotations omitted)). 69 In this case, the claim construction error by the district court had the effect of narrowing the scope of asserted claim 1. Thus, under the correct construction, claim 1 encompasses a broader scope of subject matter. If a reasonable juror could have found literal infringement under a more narrow reading of claim 1, then the same reasonable juror could not have avoided finding literal infringement under the correct, broader construction of the claim. Thus, the district court's error was harmless. See Ecolab, 285 F.3d at 1374, 62 USPQ2d at 1357; Weinar, 744 F.2d at 808, 223 USPQ at 376. 70 The record shows that Teleflex's expert testified concerning the operation and structure of the accused device, including the details of the Ficosa clip. The accused Ficosa cable, including the clip, was available to the jury, as was a detailed diagram of the Ficosa clip. Because the details of the Ficosa device were presented to the jury, we cannot say that substantial evidence was lacking in support of the jury's finding of infringement of claim 1 of the '182 patent. The district court's denial of Ficosa's motion for JMOL of non-infringement of the '182 patent is affirmed.