Opinion ID: 1943879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Restriction of Cross-Examination of Simpson

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it restricted the defense cross-examination of Jamyra Simpson. Specifically, appellant complains that the trial court improperly prevented cross-examination on the following subjects: (1) alleged prior armed robberies of drug dealers by Simpson; (2) Simpson's prior dealings with a police officer and the bias that might have resulted from the officer's presence at the scene of the triple murder; (3) alleged cellular telephone conversations between Simpson and appellant; and (4) Simpson's alleged registration of a car in the days after the triple murder. As appellant acknowledges, the trial court has considerable discretion to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination. See Scull v. United States, 564 A.2d 1161, 1164 (D.C.1989); cf. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (right to cross-examine is not without limits). [T]he trial court may in its discretion limit cross-examination `into matters having little relevance or probative value to the issues raised at trial.' Payne v. United States, 516 A.2d 484, 498 (D.C.1986) (quoting Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 855 (D.C.1978)). In reviewing the trial court's determinations for abuse of discretion, we consider whether meaningful cross-examination was precluded by the trial court's rulings. See Flores v. United States, 698 A.2d 474, 479 (D.C.1997). Because our review of the record reveals that none of the trial court's restrictions precluded meaningful cross-examination, we conclude that the trial court did not err. We deal with each of appellant's contentions below.
In Newman v. United States , relied on by appellant, we held that the defense could question a witness about a crime committed by that witness which bore similarity to the charge against the defendant both to show the witness's motive to lie and to imply that the witness might have actually committed the charged offense. Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 254-57 (D.C.1997) (relying on Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1 (D.C.1996) (en banc), and its explication of the relevance of reverse- Drew  evidence, Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App. D.C. 11, 331 F.2d 85 (1964)). However, Newman turned on a number of similarities between the crimes, including a similar modus operandi, similar treatment of victims, a very short timetwo weeksbetween the two criminal events, and proffered testimony that affirmatively indicated that the defendant was not at the scene of the charged crime. See 705 A.2d at 256-57. The record before us reflects that the prior robberies in which Simpson was allegedly implicated had occurred more than three years before the triple murder. Moreover, beyond the fact that the victims were believed to be drug dealers, defense counsel proffered no similarities between those earlier robberies and the triple homicide. Because appellant's proffer was comprised of nothing beyond prior bad acts highly attenuated from his charged offenses, the trial court did not err in excluding the proposed cross-examination.
Appellant also sought to cross-examine Simpson for bias stemming from her arrest earlier in 1996 on charges related to gun possession. Those charges were eventually dropped after a police officer amended the charges on a police report, thus creating confusion as to the proper charges. Appellant alleges that, because the same officer was on the scene of the triple murder when Edwin Knight gave the police Simpson's name, Simpson may have falsified testimony in return for continued favorable treatment in the triple murder investigation. The trial court ruled that, because appellant had failed to proffer any evidence of any ongoing relationship between Simpson and the officer or of how she might have benefitted from her earlier contact with him, no bias had been shown and the proposed cross-examination should not be permitted. [A] trial court does not abuse its discretion by precluding cross-examination where the connection between the facts cited by defense counsel and the proposed line of questioning [is] too speculative to support the questions. McGriff v. United States, 705 A.2d 282, 285 (D.C.1997) (internal quotations omitted). Our review of defense counsel's proffer confirms that any suggestion of Simpson's bias on this point was unsupported speculation. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court acted without error in preventing this line of questioning.
Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by foreclosing defense counsel's cross-examination of Simpson as to the conversations that she may have had with appellant on his cellular telephone. Upon the government's objection, the trial court ruled that the questions were outside the scope of direct examination. Because the direct examination of Simpson had not gone into her communication with appellant via his cellular telephone, the trial court did not err in limiting the scope of cross-examination to those areas actually covered by the direct examination. See Guzman v. United States, 769 A.2d 785, 790 (D.C.2001); Chambers v. United States, 564 A.2d 26, 30 (D.C.1989), overruled in part on other grounds by Berroa v. United States, 763 A.2d 93, 96 & n. 6 (D.C.2000). Further, we note that defense counsel's stated goal of this line of questioning was to establish how frequently [Simpson] talked to [appellant], and that the trial court explicitly permitted the defense to cross-examine Simpson about the frequency of her communications with appellant.
On cross-examination, Simpson denied ever owning or registering a blue Chevrolet automobile. Defense counsel attempted to impeach Simpson by introducing into evidence a Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) registration document in her name which had been registered on the day after the triple murder. After hearing testimony from a DMV investigator, the trial court sustained the prosecution's objection on the ground that DMV procedures would have permitted another person to register the car under Simpson's name. Determinations of relevance are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Dockery v. United States, 746 A.2d 303, 307 (D.C.2000). Even taking as valid appellant's contention that it would be relevant if Simpson registered a car the day after the triple murder and lied about it on the stand, the fact that the registration document could have been executed by anyone provides a valid basis for excluding such evidence. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in preventing admission of the automobile registration form for impeachment purposes.