Opinion ID: 901532
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Do the Restrictions in SDCL 46-8-1.2 Apply to Water Pipelines?

Text: [¶ 13.] Lewis & Clark argues that SDCL 46-8-1.2 does not apply to water pipelines. However, neither the text nor history of the relevant enactments support its argument. [¶ 14.] We first observe that the text of SDCL 46-8-1.2 provides  [n]o routes acquired under the provisions of this chapter may be located within two hundred fifty feet of a dwelling house. (emphasis added). Because Lewis & Clark is attempting to acquire its route under a statute in (SDCL ch. 46-8), the restrictions in SDCL 46-8-1.2 plainly apply. [¶ 15.] This conclusion is also supported by the text of SDCL 46-8-1, which provides that eminent domain may be utilized in the manner provided by law. (emphasis added). Because Lewis & Clark is utilizing this statute to condemn private property, it must do so in the manner provided by law. And, the manner provided by law must include the restrictions and conditions in SDCL 46-8-1.2 because these statutes are construed in pari materia. The object of the rule of [in] pari materia is to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the legislature. It proceeds upon the supposition that the several statutes [are] governed by one spirit and policy, and [are] intended to be consistent and harmonious in their several parts and provisions. MB v. Konenkamp, 523 N.W.2d 94, 97-98 (S.D.1994) (citing State v. Chaney, 261 N.W.2d 674, 676 (S.D.1978)). Statutes must be construed in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of person or things, or have the same purpose or object. Goetz v. State, 2001 SD 138, ¶ 26, 636 N.W.2d 675, 683 (citing 2B Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 51:03 (6th ed 2000)). [¶ 16.] Here, SDCL 46-8-1 and 46-8-1.2 must be read in pari materia because they are in the same chapter, they relate to the same thing, and they have the same purpose or object. In fact, these statutes were reenacted and amended by the same Legislature, at the same time, and in the same bill as a part of a comprehensive water policy revision. See 1983 SD Sess Laws ch 314, §§ 131, 134. Reading these statutes in pari materia, SDCL 46-8-1.2 must be read as a restriction and condition on the general right of eminent domain granted under SDCL 46-8-1. [¶ 17.] The history of these provisions also supports this conclusion. It is... an established principle of statutory construction that, where the wording of an act is changed by amendment, it is evidential of an intent that the words shall have a different construction. South Dakota Subsequent Injury Fund v. Federated Mut. Ins., 2000 SD 11, ¶ 18, 605 N.W.2d 166, 170 (citing South Dakota Subsequent Injury Fund v. Casualty, 1999 SD 2, ¶ 18, 589 N.W.2d 206, 209-10) (quoting In re Dwyer, 49 S.D. 350, 207 N.W. 210, 212 (1926)). Here, amendments to SDCL 46-8-1.2 reflect legislative intent to broaden the statutory restrictions from routes taken for waterways to all routes acquired for the application of water for public use, including pipelines. [¶ 18.] The first version of the setback restriction found in SDCL 46-8-1.2 was enacted in 1890 and was codified in 1903, 1919, and 1939. [2] It was then reenacted in 1955 and codified in 1960 and 1967. [3] Thereafter, it remained unchanged until 1983. Under the pre-1983 versions, the setback restrictions were limited to a setback from waterways. The pre-1983 versions provided [n]o routes for waterways shall be located ... within fifteen rods of the dwelling house or other buildings on the premises or across any orchard or garden, without the written consent of the owner. See SDCL 46-8-2 (1967) (emphasis added). However, the 1983 amendment broadened the setback restrictions by removing the limitation to waterways and broadly stated:  [n]o routes acquired under the provisions of this chapter may be located within two hundred fifty feet of a dwelling house or other buildings on the premises or across any orchard or garden without written consent of the owner. 1983 SD Sess Laws ch 314, § 134 (emphasis added); SDCL 46-8-1.2. Because the 1983 amendments broadened the restrictions to all routes taken under provisions of SDCL ch 46-8, the restrictions obviously apply to routes for other waterworks such as pipelines. [¶ 19.] Lewis & Clark, however, argues that the removal of the limiting term waterways was mere inadvertence, and therefore, the Legislature did not intend to broaden the statutory restrictions. Lewis & Clark's argument presumes that the 1983 Legislature did not intend a change when it amended the language of SDCL 46-8-1.2. We cannot, however, presume such inadvertence in legislative amendments. On the contrary, [w]hen an amendment is passed, it is presumed the legislature intended to change existing law, Federated Mut. Ins., 2000 SD 11, ¶ 18, 605 N.W.2d at 170, and intended to alter the meaning of the statute to comport with the new terms. Delano v. Petteys, 520 N.W.2d 606, 609 (S.D.1994) (citing John Morrell & Co. v. Dep't of Labor, 460 N.W.2d 141 (S.D.1990)). [¶ 20.] Any doubt about legislative inadvertence is conclusively rebutted by other provisions of the 1983 Act. As previously noted, 1983 SD Sess Laws ch 314, section 134 reworded today's version of the setback requirement found in SDCL 46-8-1.2. Following that change in section 134, sections 138 and 139 made specific references to the word pipeline in enumerating the types of waterworks that were on the minds of the legislators in adopting this comprehensive revision. [4] These specific references to pipelines reflect that the Legislature's replacement of the term waterways with the broader phrase no routes acquired was not inadvertent. On the contrary, the contemporaneous reference to water pipelines reflects that the new language was intended to encompass routes for water pipelines. [5] Consequently, we hold that the restrictions in SDCL 46-8-1.2 apply to all routes acquired under the provisions of this chapter, which includes water pipelines.