Opinion ID: 1890890
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the Instant Proposed Expenditure.

Text: At the outset we are met by respondent's contention that costs may not be taxed against the state in the absence of a statute so authorizing, and, therefore, the payment of money from the state treasury to provide a fund for security for costs would be illegal. In support of this contention, respondent cites Noyes v. State (1879), 46 Wis. 250, 251-253, 2 N. W. 1; Frederick v. State (1929), 198 Wis. 399, 400, 224 N. W. 110; State v. Gether Co. (1931), 203 Wis. 321, 315, 234 N. W. 331; and Frankenthal v. Wisconsin R. E. Brokers' Board (1953), 3 Wis. (2d) 249, 257, 11 N. W. (2d) 352, 89 N. W. (2d) 825. All of these cases arose in Wisconsin courts and involved the issue of taxing costs against the state. Nevertheless, when a state voluntarily enters the courts of another sovereign as a party plaintiff, it thereby waives its sovereign immunity and subjects itself to liability for costs in the same manner as any other litigant.  Anno. 72 A. L. R. (2d) 1379, 1393, sec. 6; North Dakota v. Minnesota (1924), 263 U. S. 583, 44 Sup. Ct. 208, 68 L. Ed. 461; Cf. Clark v. Barnard (1883), 108 U. S. 436, 447, 2 Sup. Ct. 878, 27 L. Ed. 780. We turn next to the question of whether the attorney general could legally authorize the expenditure from the state treasury which is represented by the instant check which respondent refused to sign. Sec. 3, art. VI, Wis. Const., provides, The powers, duties, and compensation of the . . . attorney general shall be prescribed by law. Because of this constitutional provision, the attorney general has no common-law powers. State v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co. (1908), 136 Wis. 179, 190, 116 N. W. 900; State ex rel. Haven v. Sayle (1918), 168 Wis. 159, 163, 169 N. W. 310; and State v. Snyder (1920), 172 Wis. 415, 417, 179 N. W. 579. Sec. 14.53, Stats., provides in part as follows: 14.53 DUTIES OF ATTORNEY GENERAL. The attorney general shall: (1) Represent state. Appear for the state and prosecute or defend all actions and proceedings, civil or criminal, in the supreme court, in which the state is interested or a party, and attend to and prosecute or defend all civil cases sent or remanded by the supreme court to any circuit court in which the state is a party; and, when requested by the governor or either branch of the legislature, appear for the state and prosecute or defend in any court or before any officer, any cause or matter, civil or criminal, in which the state or the people thereof may be in anywise interested.  (Italics supplied.) Sec. 14.12, Stats., which appertains to the duties of the governor, provides in part, The governor, whenever in his opinion the rights, interests, or property of the state have been or are liable to be injuriously affected, may require the attorney general to institute and prosecute any  proper action or proceeding for the redress or prevention thereof; . . . (Italics supplied.) A significant distinction between the corresponding provisions of secs. 14.53 (1) and 14.12, Stats., is that the former makes specific reference to actions in which the people of the state may have an interest, as well as those in which the state has an interest, whereas the latter does not. We must also look at the appropriation statute covering the office of attorney general because of the aforequoted clause appearing in sec. 14.42 (4), Stats., by which the state treasurer is charged to pay sums authorized by law if there be appropriate funds therein to pay the same, . . . There would not be appropriate funds in the state treasury to pay a voucher of the attorney general if it was not for a purpose covered by the legislature's appropriation to the office of attorney general. If the instant check comes under the appropriation to the attorney general's office in effect at the time of respondent's refusal to sign the check, it must do so under these words of sec. 20.180 (3), namely, a sum sufficient for the payment of expenses incurred by the attorney general, his deputy or assistants in the prosecution or defense of any action or proceeding in which the state may be a party or may have an interest, for any . . . clerk of court's fees, . . . or any other expense actually necessary to the prosecution . . . of such cases ; . . . (Italics supplied.) It will be noted that this statute makes no reference to any action or proceeding in which the people of the state may be interested. We are of the opinion that the quoted provisions of secs. 14.53 (1), 14.12, and 20.180 (3), Stats., must be construed together. We deem that the state does have an interest in any litigation which it brings in the capacity of parens patriae to enforce constitutional rights of its citizens. Furthermore, it would seem highly illogical, if sec. 14.12 were  to be so narrowly interpreted as to exclude this type of action from those the governor is empowered to direct the attorney general to bring, when sec. 14.53 authorizes the attorney general to institute such an action at the direction of the governor. We, therefore, hold that the governor is authorized. under sec. 14.12 to direct the attorney general to commence a parens patriae type of action to enforce the constitutional rights of its citizens, and that the payment of the expenses of such litigation comes under the appropriation provided in sec. 20.180 (3). It is firmly established by the decisions of this court that the state is the proper party plaintiff to test the validity of an apportionment law in order to protect the constitutional right of its citizens to an equitable apportionment. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham (1892), 81 Wis. 440, 51 N. W. 724, and State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham (1892), 83 Wis. 90, 53 N. W. 35. See also the comment on these two cases made in Income Tax Cases (1912), 248 Wis. 456, 494, 495, 134 N. W. 673, 135 N. W. 164. We deem the state a proper party to institute such an action where the constitutional rights of its citizens sought to be enforced arise under the federal constitution as well as under the state constitution. In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the attorney general, acting at the direction of the governor, was authorized by secs. 24.12 and 14.53, Stats., to bring the federal court action underlying this controversy. Nevertheless, respondent stresses the federal court's initial decision of May 23, 1962 (reported in 205 Fed. Supp. 673), that the state standing alone did not have legal capacity to maintain the action. The basis for this determination was that the equal-protection-of-the-laws and due-process clauses of the Fourteenth amendment refer only to the right of  any person,  and that a state is not a person. The opinion also pointed out that, under  Title 28 U. S. C., sec. 2343, the federal courts have consistently held that the state does not qualify as a person. Nevertheless, after the complaint was amended by joining five individuals as parties plaintiff, the federal court refused to dismiss the state as a party plaintiff. We are firmly of the opinion that as long as the state remained as a party plaintiff, it was the duty of the attorney general to vigorously prosecute the action. If he determined in good faith that the prosecution of the action would be furthered by the state's contributing the $3,500 required by the federal court to be deposited as security for costs in connection with the action, such $3,500 would constitute a proper expense under sec. 20.280 (3), Stats. It necessarily follows that the $3,500 was a sum authorized by law under sec. 14.42 (4), and that it was the duty of respondent to sign the check when it was presented for her signature.