Opinion ID: 1975483
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Private Factors

Text: Dismissal might nonetheless have been warranted if the private factors of Gulf Oil militated in favor of another forum. See, e.g., Forgotson v. Shea, 491 A.2d 523, 526-28 (D.C.1985) (affirming dismissal of suit by Maryland resident against New York partnership, despite fact that plaintiff worked in District office of the partnership, where most partners lived and worked in New York and would suffer hardship if required to litigate in the District). In this case, however, witnesses and evidence will be at least as available in the District as in Arlington, [7] and PTC maintains a significant presence in the District. The most the trial judge could say in this regard was that [i]n terms of ease, expense and expedience, it appears that the more convenient forum is Virginia (emphasis added). But that conclusion applies an erroneous standard when, as here, the public factors weigh in favor of retaining jurisdiction of the case, for [t]he `purpose of the [inconvenient forum] doctrine. . . is to avoid litigation in a seriously inconvenient forum, rather than to ensure litigation in the most convenient forum.' Cresta v. The Neurology Ctr., P.A., 557 A.2d 156, 161 (D.C.1989) (citation omitted; emphasis by Cresta ); see Hechinger Co. v. Johnson, 761 A.2d 15, 20 (D.C.2000) (same). Indeed, the most serious risk of inconvenience would appear to be to Blake's claim under the DCHRA if she cannot litigate it in the District. Both parties acknowledge the uncertainty of whether a Virginia court would entertain a claim under the DCHRA. See Sartori v. Soc'y of Am. Military Eng'rs, 499 A.2d 883, 889 n. 9 (D.C.1985) (noting but not attempting to answer question of whether Virginia courts would entertain cause of action based on the DCHRA). The trial judge shared this concern, but reasoned that Blake could pursue the DCHRA claim or an equivalent one, i.e., under Title VII, in the Virginia courts and then seek to reinstate her suit in the District if the relief afforded her there proved inadequate. When, however, the District's connection with the acts generating the claim is as sizable as we have seen it to be in this case, that analysis puts the cart before the horse. [8] Blake should not have to exhaust her remedies, so to speak, in Virginia before seeking recourse here from alleged discrimination grounded so heavily in local activity. The judgment of the Superior Court is, therefore, Reversed.