Opinion ID: 1155642
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Appellant's absence during the settlement of jury instructions in which the insanity defense was withdrawn

Text: Appellant argues that her constitutional right to be present at all stages of trial was violated because her attorney, without her consent, waived her presence during the conference settling jury instructions. According to Appellant, the waiver was improper under State v. Okumura, 58 Haw. 425, 570 P.2d 848 (1977). Appellant further contends that there is nothing in the record to indicate that she voluntarily absented herself from the trial. The State, however, argues that Appellant's presence was not required under Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) 43(c)(3). [7] We agree. It has long been recognized in the American criminal justice system that a defendant has a right to be present at all stages of his trial. Okumura, 58 Haw. at 427, 570 P.2d at 851 (citation omitted); see also State v. Texidor, 73 Haw. 97, 828 P.2d 280 (1992). This right is founded upon the confrontation and due process clauses of both the Hawaii and United States Constitutions. See Okumura, 58 Haw. at 427, 570 P.2d at 851. Therefore, in a proceeding where the jury is present or testimony is given, the defendant's presence is constitutionally required. However, a defendant's absence from a conference settling jury instructions, whether waived or not, does not implicate protected rights because the conference does not involve the jury's presence or witness testimony. Moreover, the constitutional requirement that a defendant be present at all stages of his trial was codified in HRPP 43. [8] See Okumura, 58 Haw. at 427, 570 P.2d at 851. Because the HRPP was patterned after Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, case law arising from it is instructive. See Okumura, 58 Haw. at 428 n. 4, 570 P.2d at 851 n. 4. Therefore, we may follow federal case law in determining whether the conference settling jury instructions is a conference or argument upon a question of law under HRPP 43. Federal courts have held and we agree that a defendant does not have a constitutional or statutory right to attend a conference determining the legal instructions with which the trial court will charge the jury. Several cases have held that settling jury instructions is a conference or argument upon a question of law. See United States v. Sherman, 821 F.2d 1337, 1339 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Graves, 669 F.2d 964, 972 (5th Cir.1982). Appellant's reliance on Okumura is misplaced. The sole issue in Okumura was whether the defendant was voluntarily absent from the courtroom within the meaning of HRPP 43. Okumura was absent from the courtroom during the closing arguments, the court's instructions to the jury, and the rendering of the jury's verdict. Okumura later appealed on the ground that he was deprived of his right to be present at all stages of his trial. Unlike Okumura, we conclude that Appellant was not deprived of a constitutional right. Therefore, it is unnecessary for us to address whether Appellant voluntarily absented herself from the conference settling the jury instructions. Similarly, because Appellant had no constitutional right to be present, it was not error for Appellant's attorney to waive her presence. Appellant also argues that she was entitled to an instruction on every defense having any support in the evidence, no matter how weak, inconclusive, or unsatisfactory the evidence may have been. See State v. Pinero, 70 Haw. 509, 525, 778 P.2d 704, 715 (1989). Thus, when her counsel withdrew an instruction on the defense of insanity, she was deprived of her right to have the jury consider all defenses. Appellant's argument is without merit. Although the record is silent with respect to defense counsel's reasoning, the decision appears tactical. At the opening of the trial, defense counsel told the jury that the evidence would lead them to conclude that Appellant did not have control of her mental faculties due to a mental condition and emotional disturbance. Defense counsel also told the jury that they would find Appellant not guilty of murder in the first degree and that they would decide whether she was guilty of manslaughter or should be acquitted by reason of insanity. Because the insanity defense instruction was withdrawn after all the evidence was submitted, it appears that defense counsel changed his strategy in order to give Appellant a clear opportunity for a manslaughter verdict rather than an outright acquittal based on marginal evidence of legal insanity. Defense counsel's tactical decision at trial will not be questioned by a reviewing court. State v. Antone, 62 Haw. 346, 352, 615 P.2d 101, 106 (1980) (citation omitted). Lawyers require and are permitted broad latitude to make on-the-spot strategic choices in the course of trying a case. Id. In State v. El'ayache, 62 Haw. 646, 649, 618 P.2d 1142, 1144 (1980), this court stated that: [o]ne of the legitimate interests in the criminal trial process is the right of defense counsel to make an appropriate judgment on the trial tactics and procedure to be employed in defense of his client based upon his knowledge of the facts and law of the case.... It appears that Appellant's defense counsel chose to rely on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance instead of the insanity defense. The testimony presented indicates that the extreme emotional disturbance defense was a better choice. [9] After defense expert, Dr. Furukawa, testified that Appellant's cognitive and volitional control were not substantially impaired, the insanity defense was seriously weakened. We conclude that defense counsel's determination not to rely upon the insanity defense was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. See State v. Antone, 62 Haw. at 348, 615 P.2d at 104.