Opinion ID: 2441233
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Offer for Sale

Text: The issue is one of statutory interpretation. [3] The principal opinion sets out the relevant statutory language. Mr. Hendricks was convicted of delivery of cocaine. Delivery includes a sale. A sale includes offer therefor. Thus, what is prohibited is to offer a controlled substance for sale. As the majority notes, offer is not a defined term. As the State urges, we give undefined statutory terms their plain meaning. To determine the ordinary meaning of a term, this Court consults standard English language dictionaries. [4] There are two relevant definitions of offer. One emphasizes the physical presentment of the object: [T]o present for acceptance or rejection: hold out: TENDER, PROFFER.... [5] The sense urged by the State is to declare one's readiness or willingness, [6] as the evidence shows Mr. Hendricks did. But that sense of offer is used with an infinitive object.... The statute does not hold liable for a sale one who offers to sell a controlled substance. That would criminalize the act of declaring one's readiness to commit a crimewhat the State claims that this statute does. But both the State's brief and the majority opinion emphasize the difference in meanings. The conduct at issue here is repeatedly describednever as offer for salebut only with the phrase offer to sell. That phrase much more accurately describes the conduct, but is not what the legislature chose to criminalize. Thus, Mr. Hendricks's argument, which the majority purports to find nonsensical is directly on point. If the legislature had chosen to criminalize mere words declaring one to be willing to engage in criminal conduct, it could have done so by proscribing the conduct offer to sell. [7] Instead, what the legislature actually did was to prohibit the presentment of drugs for sale. Thus, proof of the physical presence of drugs is a required element of the crime of offering drugs for sale. This is eminently reasonable in light of the substance-centered nature of the drug statute. The list of controlled substances is long, technical and concerned with details about whether the controlled substance contains salts or precursors of drugs, what its purity and chemical composition are. [8] Penalties are based upon the actual weight of the substance in question. [9] As appellant points out, the legislature has separately criminalized (with a much less severe penalty) the delivery of an imitation controlled substance. [10] This is not, as the majority misconceives it, an argument about the power of the legislature to provide two statutes that may be violated by the same conduct. It is an argument about legislative intent. It makes no sense for the legislature to have enacted a separate crime for delivering an imitation controlled substance whenin every single casesuch conduct would already violate the more severe and easier to prove crime of offering to sell a controlled substance. The more reasonable explanation is that the legislature merely intended to specify that a sale did not have to be consummated in order to be prohibited. The focus of this crime is delivery. The presentment of a substance comes much closer to delivery than does mere discussion. I am not blind to the fact that the conduct of Mr. Hendricks and his association with his sister's drug sale give rise to the strong inference that he was engaged in nefarious activity. Perhaps if the officer had returned the next day, Mr. Hendricks would have consummated the sale. Mr. Hendricks might have been chargeable as a conspirator or accomplice to his sister's sale. The legislature has provided numerous weapons to combat even the anticipation of drug transactions. On his conduct alone, Mr. Hendricks might have been charged with an attempt to deliver cocaine. But all of these theories have higher, more specific evidentiary burdens than the one the State suggests, which requires evidence of words, not deeds. We are not freemerely because we find this conduct reprehensibleto expand the legislature's words to cover it. By doing so we risk the danger recognized by the court of appeals of punish[ing] those making sarcastic or insincere statements motivated by bravado. If the legislature wishes to criminalize such behavior, it must speak more clearly than it has. Until then, we are compelled to interpret its penal laws strictly in favor of the accused. [11] Despite the majority's inability to understand Mr. Hendricks's brief, he raises a crucially important question. It should at least be answered. Since the majority finds his appellate counsel's brief so flawed, I hope it will be willing to answer the question when he presents his motion to recall the mandate. I respectfully dissent.