Opinion ID: 782341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trademark Claims Based on the Unauthorized Use of the Registered Trademark Tiger Woods

Text: 11 ETW claims that the prints of Rush's work constitute the unauthorized use of a registered trademark in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, and Ohio law. Because trademark claims under Ohio law follow the same analysis as those under the Lanham Act, our discussion of the federal trademark claims will therefore encompass the state trademark claims as well. 2 Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749, 754 (6th Cir.1998)(citing Daddy's Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy's Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 288 (6th Cir.1997)). 12 ETW claims that Jireh infringed the registered mark Tiger Woods by including these words in marketing materials which accompanied the prints of Rush's painting. The words Tiger Woods do not appear on the face of the prints, nor are they included in the title of the painting. The words Tiger Woods do appear under the flap of the envelopes which contain the prints, and Woods is mentioned twice in the narrative which accompanies the prints. 13 The Lanham Act provides a defense to an infringement claim where the use of the mark is a use, otherwise than as a mark,... which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods ... of such party[.] 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4); see San Francisco Arts and Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 565, 107 S.Ct. 2971, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987); Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imports and Exports, Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 319 (6th Cir.2001)(Under the doctrine of `fair use,' the holder of a trademark cannot prevent others from using the word that forms the trademark in its primary or descriptive sense.)(emphasis in the original); Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 270 (2nd Cir.1995)([F]air use permits others to use a protected mark to describe aspects of their own goods[.]). In evaluating a defendant's fair use defense, a court must consider whether defendant has used the mark: (1) in its descriptive sense; and (2) in good faith. Victoria's Secret Stores v. Artco Equip. Co., 194 F.Supp.2d 704, 724 (S.D.Ohio 2002); see also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir.2002). 14 A celebrity's name may be used in the title of an artistic work so long as there is some artistic relevance. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997 (2nd Cir.1989); New York Racing Ass'n v. Perlmutter Publ'g, Inc., No. 95-CV-994, 1996 WL 465298 at  (N.D.N.Y. July 19, 1996) (finding the use of a registered mark on the title of a painting protected by the First Amendment). The use of Woods's name on the back of the envelope containing the print and in the narrative description of the print are purely descriptive and there is nothing to indicate that they were used other than in good faith. The prints, the envelopes which contain them, and the narrative materials which accompany them clearly identify Rush as the source of the print. 3 Woods is mentioned only to describe the content of the print. 15 The district court properly granted summary judgment on ETW's claim for violation of its registered mark, Tiger Woods, on the grounds that the claim was barred by the fair use defense as a matter of law. 4 16 III. Trademark Claims Under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) Based on the Unauthorized Use of the Likeness of Tiger Woods 17 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), provides a right of action to persons engaged in interstate and foreign commerce, against deceptive and misleading use of words, names, symbols, or devices, or any combination thereof, which have been adopted by a ... merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured by others[.] Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405, 408 (6th Cir.1963); see also Frisch's Restaurant, Inc. v. Shoney's, Inc., 759 F.2d 1261, 1264 (6th Cir.1985); Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 647 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916, 103 S.Ct. 231, 74 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982). 18 ETW has registered Woods's name as a trademark, but it has not registered any image or likeness of Woods. Nevertheless, ETW claims to have trademark rights in Woods's image and likeness. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides a federal cause of action for infringement of an unregistered trademark which affords such marks essentially the same protection as those that are registered. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768, 112 S.Ct. 2753, 120 L.Ed.2d 615 (1992)([I]t is common ground that § 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks and that the general principles qualifying a mark for registration under § 2 of the Lanham Act are for the most part applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under § 43(a).). 19 The Lanham Act defines a trademark as including any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof used by a person to identify and distinguish his or her goods ... from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. The essence of a trademark is a designation in the form of a distinguishing name, symbol or device which is used to identify a person's goods and distinguish them from the goods of another. See Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. at 768, 112 S.Ct. 2753 (In order to be [protected], a mark must be capable of distinguishing the [owner's] goods from those of others.). Not every word, name, symbol or device qualifies as a protectable mark; rather, it must be proven that it performs the job of identification, i.e., to identify one source and to distinguish it from other sources. If it does not do this, then it is not protectable as a trademark. See J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 3:1 (2002). 20 [A] trademark, unlike a copyright or patent, is not a `right in gross' that enables a holder to enjoin all reproductions. Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 35 (1st Cir.1989)(citing Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1374 (Fed.Cir.1983)). 21 Here, ETW claims protection under the Lanham Act for any and all images of Tiger Woods. 5 This is an untenable claim. ETW asks us, in effect, to constitute Woods himself as a walking, talking trademark. Images and likenesses of Woods are not protectable as a trademark because they do not perform the trademark function of designation. They do not distinguish and identify the source of goods. They cannot function as a trademark because there are undoubtedly thousands of images and likenesses of Woods taken by countless photographers, and drawn, sketched, or painted by numerous artists, which have been published in many forms of media, and sold and distributed throughout the world. No reasonable person could believe that merely because these photographs or paintings contain Woods's likeness or image, they all originated with Woods. 22 We hold that, as a general rule, a person's image or likeness cannot function as a trademark. Our conclusion is supported by the decisions of other courts which have addressed this issue. In Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579 (2nd Cir.1990), the Second Circuit rejected a trademark claim asserted by the daughters of baseball legend Babe Ruth. The plaintiffs objected to the use of Ruth's likeness in three photographs which appeared in a calendar published by the defendant. The court rejected their claim, holding that a photograph of a human being, unlike a portrait of a fanciful cartoon character, is not inherently `distinctive' in the trademark sense of tending to indicate origin. Id. at 583. The court noted that Ruth was one of the most photographed men of his generation, a larger than life hero to millions and an historical figure[.] Id. The Second Circuit Court concluded that a consumer could not reasonably believe that Ruth sponsored the calendar: 23 [A]n ordinarily prudent purchaser would have no difficulty discerning that these photos are merely the subject matter of the calendar and do not in any way indicate sponsorship. No reasonable jury could find a likelihood of confusion. 24 Id. at 585. The court observed that [u]nder some circumstances, a photograph of a person may be a valid trademark — if, for example, a particular photograph was consistently used on specific goods. Id. at 583. The court rejected plaintiffs' assertion of trademark rights in every photograph of Ruth. 25 In Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.Supp. 1339, 1363-1364 (D.N.J.1981), the court rejected a claim by the estate of Elvis Presley that his image and likeness was a valid mark. The court did find, however, as suggested by the Second Circuit in Pirone, that one particular image of Presley had been consistently used in the advertising and sale of Elvis Presley entertainment services to identify those services and that the image could likely be found to function as a mark. 26 In Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, the plaintiff asserted trademark rights in the design of the building which houses the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in Cleveland, Ohio, and claimed that defendant's poster featuring a photograph of the museum against a colorful sunset was a violation of its trademark rights. 134 F.3d at 751. This court, with one judge dissenting, reversed the judgment of the district court which granted plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction. After reviewing the evidence, the majority concluded: 27 In reviewing the Museum's disparate uses of several different perspectives of its building design, we cannot conclude that they create a consistent and distinct commercial impression as an indicator of a single source of origin or sponsorship. To be more specific, we cannot conclude on this record that it is likely that the Museum has established a valid trademark in every photograph which, like Gentile's, prominently displays the front of the Museum's building. 28 Id. at 755. In reaching this conclusion, this court approved and followed Pirone and Estate of Presley. 29 Here, ETW does not claim that a particular photograph of Woods has been consistently used on specific goods. 6 Instead, ETW's claim is identical to that of the plaintiffs in Pirone, a sweeping claim to trademark rights in every photograph and image of Woods. Woods, like Ruth, is one of the most photographed sports figures of his generation, but this alone does not suffice to create a trademark claim. 30 The district court properly granted summary judgment on ETW's claim of trademark rights in all images and likenesses of Tiger Woods. 7 31 IV. Lanham Act Unfair Competition and False Endorsement Claims, Ohio Right to Privacy Claims, and the First Amendment Defense
32 ETW's claims under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), include claims of unfair competition and false advertising in the nature of false endorsement. ETW has also asserted a claim for infringement of the right of publicity under Ohio law. The elements of a Lanham Act false endorsement claim are similar to the elements of a right of publicity claim under Ohio law. In fact, one legal scholar has said that a Lanham Act false endorsement claim is the federal equivalent of the right of publicity. See Bruce P. Keller, The Right Of Publicity: Past, Present, and Future, 1207 PLI Corp. Law and Prac. Handbook, 159, 170 (October 2000). Therefore, cases which address both these types of claims should be instructive in determining whether Jireh is entitled to summary judgment on those claims. 33 In addition, Jireh has raised the First Amendment as a defense to all of ETW's claims, arguing that Rush's use of Woods's image in his painting is protected expression. Cases involving Lanham Act false endorsement claims and state law claims of the right of publicity have considered the impact of the First Amendment on those types of claims. We will begin with a discussion of the scope of First Amendment rights in the context of works of art, and will then proceed to examine how First Amendment rights have been balanced against intellectual property rights in cases involving the Lanham Act and state law rights of publicity. Finally, we will apply the relevant legal principles to the facts of this case.
34 The protection of the First Amendment is not limited to written or spoken words, but includes other mediums of expression, including music, pictures, films, photographs, paintings, drawings, engravings, prints, and sculptures. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995)([T]he Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of expression.); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (Music, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977)(There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First Amendment protection.); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-120, 93 S.Ct. 2680, 37 L.Ed.2d 492 (1973)([P]ictures, films, paintings, drawings, and engravings... have First Amendment protection[.]); Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2nd Cir.1996)([V]isual art is as wide ranging in its depiction of ideas, concepts and emotions as any book, treatise, pamphlet or other writing, and is similarly entitled to full First Amendment protection.). 35 Speech is protected even though it is carried in a form that is sold for profit. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150, 80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959) (It is of course no matter that the dissemination [of books and other forms of the printed word] takes place under commercial auspices.); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976)(paid advertisement); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397, 87 S.Ct. 534, 17 L.Ed.2d 456 (1967) (`That books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment.') (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-502, 72 S.Ct. 777, 96 L.Ed. 1098) (1952); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) (solicitation to pay or contribute money). The fact that expressive materials are sold does not diminish the degree of protection to which they are entitled under the First Amendment. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756 n. 5, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). 36 Publishers disseminating the work of others who create expressive materials also come wholly within the protective shield of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991)(both the author and the publishing house are speakers for purposes of the First Amendment); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 286-88, 84 S.Ct. 710 (finding New York Times fully protected by the First Amendment for publishing a paid editorial advertisement). See also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). 8 37 Even pure commercial speech is entitled to significant First Amendment protection. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993); Bd. of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989); Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976). Commercial speech is speech which does `no more than propose a commercial transaction[.]' Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762, 96 S.Ct. 1817 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973)); see also Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp., 447 U.S. at 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343 (articulating a four part test to bring commercial speech within the protection of the First Amendment). 38 Rush's prints are not commercial speech. They do not propose a commercial transaction. Accordingly, they are entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment. Thus, we are called upon to decide whether Woods's intellectual property rights must yield to Rush's First Amendment rights.
39 The district court did not specifically discuss ETW's false endorsement claim in granting summary judgment to Jireh. The gist of the false endorsement claim is that the presence of Woods's image in Jireh's print implies that he has endorsed Jireh's product. See McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, § 5:30 (2d ed.2000)(hereinafter McCarthy on Publicity and Privacy). Courts have recognized false endorsement claims under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act where a celebrity's image or persona is used in association with a product so as to imply that the celebrity endorses the product. 40 False endorsement occurs when a celebrity's identity is connected with a product or service in such a way that consumers are likely to be misled about the celebrity's sponsorship or approval of the product or service. See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir.1997)(animatronic robotic figures resembling actors in Cheers television program used to advertise chain of airport bars modeled on Cheers set); Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir.1996)(athlete's name and accomplishments used in television advertisement for Oldsmobile automobiles); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.1992)(imitation of singer's unique voice used in radio commercial advertising Dorito Chips); White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir.1992)(female robot bearing resemblance to television celebrity, Vanna White, turning letters in what appeared to be the Wheel of Fortune game show set in television commercial advertising electronics products); Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F.Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y.1985)(photograph of Woody Allen look-alike in national advertising campaign for video club). 41 In Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 626 (6th Cir.2000), we noted: 42 A false designation of origin claim brought by an entertainer under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act in a case such as this is equivalent to a false association or endorsement claim, see Waits, 978 F.2d at 1110, and the mark at issue is the plaintiff's identity. See White, 971 F.2d at 1399-1400. 43 Id. at 626. 44 In the ordinary false endorsement claim, the controlling issue is likelihood of confusion. This court has formulated an eight-factor test to determine the likelihood of confusion. See Landham, 227 F.3d at 626; Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir.1988). However, for the reasons discussed below, we conclude that where the defendant has articulated a colorable claim that the use of a celebrity's identity is protected by the First Amendment, the likelihood of confusion test is not appropriate because it fails to adequately consider the interests protected by the First Amendment. 45 In Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2nd Cir.1989), Ginger Rogers, the surviving member of one of the most famous duos in show business history, brought suit against the producers and distributors of a movie entitled Ginger and Fred. The film was not about Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire, but about two fictional Italian cabaret performers who imitated Rogers and Astaire and became known in Italy as Ginger and Fred. Rogers asserted claims under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The Second Circuit began its analysis by noting that [m]ovies, plays, books, and songs are all indisputably works of artistic expression and deserve protection. Id. at 997. The court concluded that [b]ecause overextension of Lanham Act restrictions in the area of titles might intrude on First Amendment values, we must construe the Act narrowly to avoid such a conflict. Id. at 998. 46 The Second Circuit court rejected Rogers' argument that First Amendment concerns are implicated only where the author has no alternative means of expression. Her argument was based on Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566-67, 92 S.Ct. 2219, 33 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972), where the Supreme Court held that respondents had no First Amendment right to distribute handbills in the interior mall area of petitioner's privately-owned shopping center, noting that respondents had adequate alternative means of communication. Noting that this test had been applied by several courts in the trademark context, the Rogers court rejected the no alternative means test because it does not sufficiently accommodate the public's interest in free expression[.] 875 F.2d at 999. The court concluded: We believe that in general the Act should be construed to apply to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression. In the context of allegedly misleading titles using a celebrity's name, that balance will normally not support application of the Act unless the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work. 47 Id. 48 Although Rogers produced some evidence of consumer confusion, the court found: 49 The survey evidence, even if its validity is assumed, indicates at most that some members of the public would draw the incorrect inference that Rogers had some involvement with the film. But that risk of misunderstanding, not engendered by any overt claim in the title, is so outweighed by the interests in artistic expression as to preclude application of the Lanham Act. 50 Id. at 1001. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision granting summary judgment to the defendants. 9 51 In Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub. Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2nd Cir.1989), the Second Circuit held that the Rogers test is not limited to literary titles but is generally applicable to Lanham Act claims against works of artistic expression. Like Rogers, ETW argues that the district court should have considered whether alternative means existed for Jireh to express itself without violating Woods's intellectual property rights. 10 We agree with the Second Circuit's conclusion that the no alternative means test does not sufficiently accommodate the public's interest in free expression. 52 In Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.2002), the Ninth Circuit adopted and applied the Rogers test where the plaintiff asserted Lanham Act claims against the producer of a song entitled Barbie Girl which evoked the image of plaintiff's famous doll. The court held that in the case of expressive speech, its traditional likelihood of confusion test fails to account for the full weight of the public's interest in free expression. 296 F.3d at 900. After expressly adopting the Rogers standard as its own, the court set forth the following analysis: 53 Applying Rogers to our case, we conclude that MCA's use of Barbie is not an infringement of Mattel's trademark. Under the first prong of Rogers, the use of Barbie in the song title clearly is relevant to the underlying work, namely, the song itself. As noted, the song is about Barbie and the values Aqua claims she represents. The song title does not explicitly mislead as to the source of the work; it does not, explicitly or otherwise, suggest that it was produced by Mattel. The only indication that Mattel might be associated with the song is the use of Barbie in the title; if this were enough to satisfy this prong of the Rogers test, it would render Rogers a nullity. We therefore agree with the district court that MCA was entitled to summary judgment on this ground. 54 296 F.3d at 902. Thus, both the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have held that in Lanham Act false endorsement cases involving artistic expression, the likelihood of confusion test does not give sufficient weight to the public interest in free expression. Both courts rejected the no alternative means test. They held instead that the Lanham Act should be applied to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression. They agreed that the public interest in free expression should prevail if the use of the celebrity's image has artistic relevance, unless it is used in such a way that it explicitly misleads as to the source of the work. 11 55 In Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir.2003), we joined the Second and Ninth Circuits in holding that the likelihood of confusion and alternative means tests do not give sufficient weight to the public interest in freedom of expression. In Parks, we adopted the Rogers test as the law of the Sixth Circuit: 12 56 The application of Rogers in Mattel, as well as in cases decided in other circuits, persuades us that Rogers is the best test for balancing Defendants' and the public's interest in free expression under the First Amendment against Parks' and the public's interest in enforcement of the Lanham Act. We thus apply the Rogers test to the facts before us. 57 Id. at 451-52 (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999).
58 ETW claims that Jireh's publication and marketing of prints of Rush's painting violates Woods's right of publicity. The right of publicity is an intellectual property right of recent origin which has been defined as the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity. See McCARTHY ON PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, § 1:3. The right of publicity is a creature of state law 13 and its violation gives rise to a cause of action for the commercial tort of unfair competition. Id. 59 The right of publicity is, somewhat paradoxically, an outgrowth of the right of privacy. See McCARTHY ON PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, § 1:4. A cause of action for violation of the right was first recognized in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2nd Cir. 1953), where the Second Circuit held that New York's common law protected a baseball player's right in the publicity value of his photograph, and in the process coined the phrase right of publicity as the name of this right. 60 The Ohio Supreme Court 14 recognized the right of publicity in 1976 in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St.2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976). 15 In Zacchini, which involved the videotaping and subsequent rebroadcast on a television news program of plaintiff's human cannonball act, the Ohio Supreme Court held that Zacchini's right of publicity was trumped by the First Amendment. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the First Amendment did not insulate defendant from liability for violating Zacchini's state law right of publicity where defendant published the plaintiff's entire act. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977). Zacchini is the only United States Supreme Court decision on the right of publicity. 61 There are few Ohio decisions defining the contours of the right of publicity in the aftermath of Zacchini. In Vinci v. American Can Co., 9 Ohio St.3d 98, 459 N.E.2d 507 (1984), the Ohio Supreme Court merely reaffirmed its recognition of the right and devoted the remainder of its opinion to the issue of class action certification. Vinci was an Olympic gold medal weight lifter who brought a class action on behalf of himself and other Olympic athletes whose names and likenesses were used on a series of disposable drinking cups promoted by a partnership between the Minute Maid Corporation and the United States Olympic Committee. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the action could be maintained as a class action. After remanding the case to the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals, that court, with one judge dissenting, upheld the grant of summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the mention of the athletes' names within the context of accurate, historical information was incidental to the promotion of the Dixie Cups by the partnership and that the reference to the athletes and their accomplishments was purely informational[.] Vinci v. American Can Co., 69 Ohio App.3d 727, 729, 591 N.E.2d 793, 794 (1990). 62 In Bajpayee v. Rothermich, 53 Ohio App.2d 117, 372 N.E.2d 817 (1977), the Ohio Court of Appeals for Franklin County held that the plaintiff's right of publicity was violated where the defendant presented plaintiff's pharmacological research paper as his own before the American Society of Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics. 63 Finally, in Parma International, Inc. v. Bartos, 1990 WL 11716, No. 89CA004573, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 508 (Feb. 7, 1990), the Ohio Court of Appeals for Lorain County reversed a trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant where the defendant had continued to use the plaintiff's name and likeness on the packaging of its product and in its advertising literature after the plaintiff ceased his employment with the defendant. The issue in Parma International was whether the plaintiff had consented to the continued use of his name and likeness. 64 When the Ohio Supreme Court recognized the right of publicity, it relied heavily on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652. See Zacchini, 47 Ohio St.2d at 230, 351 N.E.2d 454. The court quoted the entire text of § 652(C) of the RESTATEMENT, as well as comments a., b., c. and d. Id. 65 The RESTATEMENT originally treated the right of publicity as a branch of the right of privacy and included it in a chapter entitled Invasion of Privacy. In 1995, the American Law Institute transferred its exposition of the right of publicity to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, Chapter 4, § 46, in a chapter entitled Appropriation of Trade Values. The current version of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION defines the right of publicity as follows: 66 Appropriation of the Commercial Value of a Person's Identity: The Right of Publicity 67 One who appropriates the commercial value of a person's identity by using without consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate under the rules stated in §§ 48 and 49. 68 Id. 69 In § 46, Comment c, Rationale for Protection, the authors of the RESTATEMENT suggest that courts may justifiably be reluctant to adopt a broad construction of the right. 70 The rationales underlying recognition of a right of publicity are generally less compelling than those that justify rights in trademarks or trade secrets. The commercial value of a person's identity often results from success in endeavors such as entertainment or sports that offer their own substantial rewards. Any additional incentive attributable to the right of publicity may have only marginal significance. In other cases the commercial value acquired by a person's identity is largely fortuitous or otherwise unrelated to any investment made by the individual, thus diminishing the weight of the property and unjust enrichment rationales for protection. In addition, the public interest in avoiding false suggestions of endorsement or sponsorship can be pursued through the cause of action for deceptive marketing. Thus, courts may be properly reluctant to adopt a broad construction of the publicity right. See § 47. 71 In § 47, Comment c, the authors of the RESTATEMENT note, The right of publicity as recognized by statute and common law is fundamentally constrained by the public and constitutional interest in freedom of expression. In the same comment, the authors state that [t]he use of a person's identity primarily for the purpose of communicating information or expressing ideas is not generally actionable as a violation of the person's right of publicity. Various examples are given, including the use of the person's name or likeness in news reporting in newspapers and magazines. The RESTATEMENT recognizes that this limitation on the right is not confined to news reporting but extends to use in entertainment and other creative works, including both fiction and non-fiction. Id. The authors list examples of protected uses of a celebrity's identity, likeness or image, including unauthorized print or broadcast biographies and novels, plays or motion pictures. Id. According to the RESTATEMENT, such uses are not protected, however, if the name or likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work that is not related to the identified person, and the privilege may be lost if the work contains substantial falsifications. Id. 72 We believe the courts of Ohio would follow the principles of the RESTATEMENT in defining the limits of the right of publicity. The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Zacchini suggests that Ohio is inclined to give substantial weight to the public interest in freedom of expression when balancing it against the personal and proprietary interests recognized by the right of publicity. This suggestion is reenforced by the decision in Vinci. 73 This court first encountered the right of publicity in Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.1980), where the issue presented was whether the heirs of Elvis Presley retained his right of publicity after his death. We concluded that they did not. We held that under Tennessee law, [t]he famous have an exclusive legal right during life to control and profit from the commercial use of their name and personality. Id. at 957. Noting that the Tennessee courts had not addressed the issue, we decided the case in the light of practical and policy considerations, the treatment of other similar rights in our legal system, the relative weight of the conflicting interests of the parties, and certain moral presuppositions concerning death, privacy, inheritability and economic opportunity. Id. at 958. 74 In Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.1983), a majority of this court, with Judge Kennedy dissenting, held that television comedian and talk show host Johnny Carson's right of publicity was invaded when defendant used the phrase with which Carson was commonly introduced on his television program. In Carson, we held that a celebrity has a protected pecuniary interest in the commercial exploitation of his identity. Id. at 835. 75 In Landham, 227 F.3d at 625-26, this court held that Landham, a fringe actor who played supporting roles in several motion pictures, had failed to show a violation of his right of publicity when defendant marketed an action figure of a character he had played but which did not bear a personal resemblance to him. This court found that Landham had failed to show that his persona had significant value or that the toy invoked his persona as distinct from that of the fictional character he played. 76 There is an inherent tension between the right of publicity and the right of freedom of expression under the First Amendment. This tension becomes particularly acute when the person seeking to enforce the right is a famous actor, athlete, politician, or otherwise famous person whose exploits, activities, accomplishments, and personal life are subject to constant scrutiny and comment in the public media. In Memphis Development Foundation, 616 F.2d at 959, this court discussed the problems of judicial line drawing that would arise if it should recognize the inheritability of publicity rights, including the question [a]t what point does the right collide with the right of free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment? In Carson, after noting that the First Amendment protects commercial speech, Judge Kennedy opined in her dissent that public policy requires that the public's interest in free enterprise and free expression take precedence over any interest Johnny Carson may have in a phrase associated with his person. Carson, 698 F.2d at 841. In Landham, we noted the careful balance that courts have gradually constructed between the right of publicity and the First Amendment[.] 227 F.3d at 626. 77 In a series of recent cases, other circuits have been called upon to establish the boundaries between the right of publicity and the First Amendment. In Rogers, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Rogers' right of publicity claim, noting that commentators have advocated limits on the right of publicity to accommodate First Amendment concerns. 875 F.2d at 1004 n. 11. That court also cited three cases 16 in which state courts refused to extend the right of publicity to bar the use of a celebrity's name in the title and text of a fictional or semi-fictional book or movie. Id. at 1004. 78 In White, television celebrity Vanna White, brought suit against Samsung Electronics, alleging that its television advertisement which featured a female-shaped robot wearing a long gown, blonde wig, large jewelry, and turning letters in what appeared to be the Wheel of Fortune game show set, violated her California common law right of publicity and her rights under the Lanham Act. The Ninth Circuit, with Judge Alarcon dissenting in part, reversed the grant of summary judgment to defendant, holding that White had produced sufficient evidence that defendant's advertisement appropriated her identity in violation of her right of publicity, and that the issue of confusion about White's endorsement of defendant's product created a jury issue which precluded summary judgment on her Lanham Act claim. In so holding, the court rejected the defendant's parody defense which posited that the advertisement was a parody of White's television act and was protected speech. 79 A suggestion for rehearing en banc failed. Three judges dissented from the order rejecting the suggestion for a rehearing en banc. See White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.1993). Judge Kozinski, writing the dissenting opinion, observed, Something very dangerous is going on here.... Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it. Creativity is impossible without a rich public domain. 989 F.2d at 1513. Later, he commented: 80 Intellectual property rights aren't free: They're imposed at the expense of future creators and of the public at large.... This is why intellectual property law is full of careful balances between what's set aside for the owner and what's left in the public domain for the rest of us[.] 81