Opinion ID: 780275
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Johnson's Failure to Seek Counseling Within 45 Days

Text: 21 In her filings with USPS, Johnson gave two different dates as to when the harassing conduct at issue occurred. In her Request for Counseling, dated June 24, 2000, Johnson listed August 8, 1999, as the date of the conduct, but in her formal EEO Complaint of Discrimination, dated September 8, 2000, Johnson alleged that the harassment took place on October 12, 1999. Even if one accepts the later date for the harassment, Johnson would have had to seek counseling no later than November 26, 1999, in order to comply with the limitations period in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a). Instead, she first sought counseling approximately seven months later, on June 19, 2000. Thus, as Johnson concedes, her request was untimely. 22 Notwithstanding the untimeliness of her request for counseling, Johnson argues that she should be allowed to proceed with her lawsuit because she complained regularly to her supervisors about the harassing conduct, thus complying with USPS's Zero-Tolerance Policy for sexual harassment, as set forth in the Learner's Workbook for new employees. The Policy provided, in relevant part: 23 Postal employees who believe that they are the victims of sexual harassment should immediately bring the situation to the attention of an impartial supervisor or manager.... 24 In addition, postal employees may seek relief through any of the following: 25 The Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint process. 26 Grievance arbitration procedure for bargaining unit employees under the collective bargaining agreements. 27 The grievance procedures for nonbargaining employees. 28 Reporting any possible criminal misconduct to the Postal Inspection Service. 29 We find some merit in Johnson's contention that this language is somewhat misleading. It appears to suggest that employees should, first and foremost, take their concerns about harassment to a supervisor or manager, while the EEO complaint process is simply an additional, non-mandatory option that they may pursue. The wording is unfortunate in this regard, and it is certainly understandable that an employee, relying solely on the Zero-Tolerance Policy, might believe that she had preserved her rights so long as she notified her supervisor or manager about the harassment. 30 However, the Zero-Tolerance Policy was not the sole information available to Johnson. On the page of the Workbook immediately preceding the Policy, there is a chart detailing the time limits for the various steps to be taken in filing an EEO complaint. Moreover, as the magistrate judge pointed out, there is no basis in law to suggest that an employee's complaints to her supervisors satisfy the requirement that the aggrieved employee seek EEO counseling prior to filing a formal complaint or suing in court. Slip op. at 6-7. Cf. Leorna, 105 F.3d at 551 & n. 3 (holding that filing of an administrative complaint did not meet the requirement that the employee seek counseling prior to filing). 31 Johnson also argues on appeal, as she did below, that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied to excuse her failure to request counseling within the limitations period. 4 Specifically, she maintains that USPS deceived and misled her when: (1) her supervisor told her that she would be fired if she filed a sexual harassment complaint and that, as a casual employee, she had fewer rights than a regular employee; and (2) the Zero-Tolerance policy was worded to make it sound as if EEO complaint procedures were simply additional and non-mandatory. 32 The supervisor's alleged comments are very troubling, and unquestionably inaccurate as statements of the law. However, even if one accepts fully Johnson's account of them, they are not sufficient to sustain an equitable estoppel. Looking to the three considerations set forth in Santa Maria, supra, even given that (1) the supervisor certainly should have known that casual employees and regular employees had the same rights vis-# 2A# -vis filing EEO complaints, and (2) Johnson's supervisors had notice that the harassment was going on, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the reason Johnson missed the deadline here—by six months—was because of what the supervisor said to her. Johnson herself testified in her deposition that she complained more than once a week to her supervisors from approximately the time that [she] started until the time that [she] was laid off. Moreover, nothing the supervisor allegedly said to her — that she should go home and sleep on her decision to file a complaint, that she had fewer rights than regular employees, or that she might be terminated for complaining — bore on the applicability of the deadline for the requirement to seek informal counseling. 33 This is a different scenario from that in Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1980), which Johnson urges should govern in this case. In Cooper, an employee in the agency's personnel office allegedly told the plaintiff that, as a white male, he was not allowed to file a discrimination charge; as a result, he did not file an administrative discrimination charge until almost a year after the alleged conduct. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court should not have dismissed the case, on the grounds that, if the plaintiff had evidence to support his account of what the employee told him and of his reliance thereupon, he could have established grounds for equitable estoppel. Id. at 1214. 34 As to the Zero-Tolerance Policy, as discussed above, we agree with Johnson that its wording may be somewhat misleading. However, even if we take her at her word that she was in fact misled, the Policy cannot support an equitable estoppel claim for one simple reason: There is nothing in the record to suggest evidence of improper purpose on the part of the defendant, or of the defendant's actual or constructive knowledge of the deceptive nature of its conduct with regard to the Policy. Insofar as Johnson bases her claim on the fact that her supervisors did not take the actions they were supposed to take under the Policy, that point bears on the merits of her claim against her employer, but it does nothing to suggest that USPS promulgated the Zero-Tolerance policy with an intent to trick its employees into not filing EEO complaints, or that USPS knew or had reason to know that its employees would be so tricked. 35 Accordingly, nothing about either Johnson's understanding of the requirements for filing an EEO complaint or USPS's conduct rises to a level sufficient to warrant equitable estoppel or equitable tolling of the 45 day deadline. We affirm the magistrate judge's disposition of this claim. 36