Opinion ID: 2167257
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: penalty range

Text: During a pre-trial conference in chambers, the trial court instructed the attorneys that he would not allow them to discuss the penalty range of Young's charge during closing arguments: Alright. Now, also on the record, Mr. Barber has never done this, but it has been done. If we get to  we should get to the closing arguments early afternoon, neither the Commonwealth or the defendant shall be allowed to argue to the jury the penalty range in the guilt phase. Young contends the jury recommended the maximum sentence of twenty (20) years in his case as a result of his trial counsel's failure to voir dire the jury panel to determine if they would be able to consider the full range of penalties and by what he refers to as prosecutorial misconduct by the Commonwealth during its sentencing phase closing argument. While Young concedes he did not preserve these errors for appellate review, he asks us to consider them under RCr 10.26. Although the record indicates that Young's trial counsel did not address the penalty range during voir dire, we fail to see how Young's observation of this fact states any reviewable claim of error. The trial court merely cautioned counsel to avoid mentioning the penalty range during closing arguments. While Young asserts that the trial court's stricture denied him the right to gain information which would determine whether his jury would consider the entire range of punishment, we believe the trial court articulated the scope of its ruling, and we can find nothing in the record to support Young's assertion that his counsel believed the trial court had restricted voir dire on this topic. We hold, therefore, that this portion of Young's argument fails to state any claim of error, and we decline further comment. Young argues that the attorney for the Commonwealth committed prosecutorial misconduct during his closing argument by appealing to the jury to set a community standard, to send a message throughout this community [that if] you start manufacturing methamphetamine in Muhlenberg County . . . you're gonna receive the maximum punishment that we can give you, and [t]o send a message to these people to discontinue this type of activity. Young argues this Court has previously condemned this type of argument in Damron v. Commonwealth [10] and Payne v. Commonwealth. [11] As Young made no contemporaneous objection to the prosecutor's statements, he asks us to find that the Commonwealth's alleged misconduct constituted [a] palpable error which affect[ed] his substantial rights and determine that manifest injustice has resulted from the error. [12] Although the appellate courts in this state have addressed issues relating to the content of prosecuting attorney's closing arguments on a number of occasions, we note that the vast majority of these cases predated bifurcated sentencing procedures, [13] address properly preserved errors, and analyze prejudice with the defendant's presumption of innocence as unspoken context. [14] Young asks us to reverse his sentence and remand his case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing because of allegedly improper arguments made exclusively during the sentencing phase of his trial after the jury had already determined Young's guilt, and to which he made no objection at trial. RCr 10.26 review differs from review of preserved errors in that the critical determination for this Court in a palpable error case is whether the defendant suffered manifest injustice. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Cook v. Bordenkircher, [15] that errors may occur for reasons, such as gamesmanship, which we believe to be inconsistent with a manifest injustice finding: Although failure to object does not bar relief, it, too, is a significant consideration. . . . We can only wonder whether trial counsel erred or whether they deliberately failed to object to prevent correction of the error and have an issue on which to appeal in an otherwise error-free trial where proof of guilt was compelling. [16] Accordingly, we feel it appropriate to examine the criteria relevant for palpable error review of alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct in sentencing phase closing arguments. An appellate court's review of alleged error to determine whether it resulted in manifest injustice necessarily must begin with an examination of both the amount of punishment fixed by the verdict and the weight of evidence supporting that punishment. [17] Other relevant factors, however, include whether the Commonwealth's statements are supported by facts in the record [18] and whether the allegedly improper statements appeared to rebut arguments raised by defense counsel. [19] Finally, we must always consider these closing arguments as a whole [20] and keep in mind the wide latitude we allow parties during closing arguments. [21] After examining the record, we hold that Young did not suffer manifest injustice as a result of the prosecution's sentencing phase closing argument. While the jury did recommend the maximum sentence of twenty (20) years, the Commonwealth introduced overwhelming evidence that Young manufactured methamphetamine on a relatively large scale. Although Young characterizes the Commonwealth's statements as improper comment on the consequences of the jury's verdict by focusing on general deterrence of drug activity, we find the prosecutor's statements reasonably supported by the trial record and responsive to defense counsel's contention that the jury should recommend the minimum sentence because, among other reasons, Young had never been  never sold drugs  never been convicted of selling drugs. The full text of the Commonwealth's sentencing phase closing argument clarified the send a message to drug dealers rhetoric and made it clear that the Commonwealth wanted the jury to know that Young's methamphetamine manufacturing placed him in the drug trafficking stream of commerce. We also note that Kentucky's sentencing procedures do not give juries absolute sentencing authority. KRS 532.070(1) leaves the final determination regarding sentencing up to the trial court: When a sentence of imprisonment for a felony is fixed by a jury pursuant to KRS 532.060 and the trial court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and to the history and character of the defendant, is of the opinion that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary but that the maximum term fixed by the jury is unduly harsh, the court may modify that sentence and fix a maximum term within the limits provided in KRS 532.060 for the offense for which the defendant presently stands convicted. [22] Here, Young made a specific request for leniency to the trial court prior to final sentencing, and the trial court denied his request and imposed the jury's recommended sentence. While KRS 532.060 does not insulate all sentencing phase errors from palpable error review, we believe Kentucky's sentencing procedures provide an additional layer of protection from prejudice which we should consider in the context of RCr 10.26 review in this case. Because of all of the above considerations, we do not believe Young is entitled to RCr 10.26 relief.