Opinion ID: 1377985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: erosion of judicial and professional integrity

Text: As a consequence of the intrinsic ethical difficulties raised by the contract, it seems to me self-evident that its judicial approval will inevitably damage the integrity of both bench and bar. Not only does the contract permit, indeed invite, legal and tactical decisions which may be self-serving and contrary to the client's best interests, but the appearance of impropriety further taints the arrangement. As noted, an ethical shadow is cast over the lawyer-client relationship. Both the reality and the image of the financial arrangement between attorneys and client are suspect, human nature and temptation being what they are. Contracts of the type herein presented will appear to the eye and ear of the average layman as indistinguishable from run-of-the-mill commercial or public relations agency agreements. In my view, the engrafting of this device on the judicial process will inevitably dilute public acceptance and understanding of legal advocacy founded on a fiduciary relationship of complete trust and confidentiality between attorney and client which is directed solely toward the advancement and vindication of the client's legal rights, not counsel's fiscal advantage. Counsel cannot simultaneously wear the hat of a literary or theatrical agent whose goal is commercial promotion and the hat of a counselor at law who is guided by strict ethical constraints. My colleagues approve a contractual arrangement which has been specifically condemned by the American Bar Association (ABA) Code of Professional Responsibility. The ABA code, Ethical Consideration (EC) could not be more explicit: EC 5-4 If, in the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer is permitted to receive from his client a beneficial ownership in publication rights relating to the subject matter of the employment, he may be tempted to subordinate the interests of his client to his own anticipated pecuniary gain. For example, a lawyer in a criminal case who obtains from his client television, radio, motion picture, newspaper, magazine, book, or other publication rights with respect to the case may be influenced, consciously or unconsciously, to a course of conduct that will enhance the value of his publication rights to the prejudice of his client. To prevent these potentially differing interests, such arrangements should be scrupulously avoided prior to the termination of all aspects of the matter giving rise to the employment, even though his employment has previously ended. (Italics added.) Similarly, the latest Discussion Draft of ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, insists upon substantially higher professional standards. The proposed rules prohibit outright this form of contractual arrangement, declaring: An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary rights concerning the subject matter of the representation involves incompatible standards for the lawyer's performance, one being effectiveness in representing the client and the other being performance that has literary value. (Comment, Proposed Rule 1.9(d), 48 U.S.L. Week, No. 32, p. 8, Feb. 19, 1980, italics added.) One federal court recently described life-story arrangements between attorney and client as a practice which deserves judicial condemnation. ( United States v. Hearst (N.D.Cal. 1978) 466 F. Supp. 1068, 1083 [53 A.L.R. Fed. 110], affd. in part and vacated in part (9th Cir.1980) 638 F.2d 1190, cert. den., sub nom., Hearst v. United States (1981) 451 U.S. 938 [68 L.Ed.2d 325, 101 S.Ct. 2018], italics added.) The rejection of such contracts is not new. Ten years ago the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function, Approved Draft 1971, supplement section 3.4 provided:  It is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer, prior to conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to his employment, to enter into any agreement or understanding with a client or a prospective client by which he acquires an interest in publication rights with respect to the subject matter of his employment or proposed employment. (Italics added.) To me, these collective ethical judgments are strongly persuasive. We should not affix our seal of judicial approval on that which should be scrupulously avoided, or on that which involves incompatible standards. We cannot sanction as fair and reasonable to the client under California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 5-101, that practice which deserves judicial condemnation and which involves unprofessional conduct for a lawyer. California citizens are entitled to ethical standards for their lawyers which are no lower than those of practitioners nationwide. The maintenance of judicial integrity has been a fixed principle in our jurisprudence. ( Elkins v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 206, 215 [4 L.Ed.2d 1669, 1676, 80 S.Ct. 1437].) In California we have recently emphasized that `It is essential that the public have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of our system of criminal justice.' ( People v. Superior Court ( Greer ) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 268 [137 Cal. Rptr. 476, 561 P.2d 1164], quoting from People v. Rhodes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 180, 185 [115 Cal. Rptr. 235, 524 P.2d 363].) The majority's conclusion is also contrary to recent decisions by both this court and the federal courts. In People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739 [170 Cal. Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837] (cert. den., sub nom., California v. Chadd (1981) 452 U.S. 931 [69 L.Ed.2d 431, 101 S.Ct. 3066]) we were faced with the question whether a defendant in a capital case could plead guilty without the concurrence of counsel. The Chadd majority placed heavy emphasis on the public interest involved, adding that before Faretta [v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525)] this court squarely held that a capital defendant has no right to waive his automatic appeal: `It is manifest that the state in its solicitude for a defendant under sentence of death has not only invoked on his behalf a right to review the conviction by means of an automatic appeal but has also imposed a duty upon this court to make such a review. We cannot avoid or abdicate this duty merely because defendant desires to waive the right provided for him. In other contexts it has been held that a defendant's waiver or attempted waiver of a right is ineffective where it would involve also the renunciation of a correlative duty imposed upon the court.' ( People v. Stanworth (1969) 71 Cal.2d 820, 833 [80 Cal. Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889]; accord, People v. Teron (1979) ... 23 Cal.3d 103, 115, fn. 7 [151 Cal. Rptr. 633, 588 P.2d 773].) (P. 752, italics added.) California courts have repeatedly emphasized that Although a defendant may waive rights which exist for his own benefit, he may not waive rights which belong also to the public generally. ( People v. Werwee (1952) 112 Cal. App.2d 494, 500 [246 P.2d 704]; People v. Stanworth, supra, 71 Cal.2d 820, 833-834 and cases cited therein.) We have previously adhered to the basic principle enunciated in Massie v. Sumner (9th Cir.1980) 624 F.2d 72, 74 (cert. den. (1981) 449 U.S. 1103 [66 L.Ed.2d 828, 101 S.Ct. 899]) and cited approvingly in Chadd (28 Cal.3d, at p. 753) that: `The state of California has a strong interest in the accuracy and fairness of all its criminal proceedings.' The majority now approves, however, a defendant's choice, over trial court rejection, of counsel whose legal representation of him is steeped in conflict  both potential and actual  by virtue of the retainer agreement. The result of the majority's new standard is to elevate a defendant's choice of counsel above the court's correlative duty, emphasized by us in Stanworth, to assure that he has effective counsel free of conflict. The pivotal role of the judiciary in preserving unimpaired the fidelity of the justice system has been recently stressed by the United States Supreme Court which put it this way: In an adversary system of criminal justice, there is no right more essential than the right to the assistance of counsel. But that right has never been understood to confer upon defense counsel the power to veto the wholly permissible actions of the trial judge. It is the judge, not counsel, who has the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of a fair and lawful trial. `[T]he judge is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct....' ( Lakeside v. Oregon (1978) 435 U.S. 333, 341-342 [55 L.Ed.2d 319, 326-327, 98 S.Ct. 1091].) Defendant insists he wants particular counsel, and counsel want to represent him. Why do not defendant and counsel ask the trial court to appoint counsel with compensation for their services on the basis of standard fees? If the reason for refusing to follow this procedure is because of the loss of pecuniary gain to counsel from the contract, it is at this point, in my view, that the trial court, sensitive to the conflicting interests created by the agreement, watchful both for defendant's interests and the functioning reality and appearance of the criminal justice system was fully justified in declining to accept the agreement. Not only is it the court which must make the ultimate decision, but as we have previously summarized: [U]ltimately the issue involves a conflict between a client's right to counsel of his choice and the need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility. `The preservation of public trust both in the scrupulous administration of justice and in the integrity of the bar is paramount.... [The client's recognizably important right to counsel of his choice] must yield, however, to considerations of ethics which run to the very integrity of our judicial process.' ( Comden v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 906, 915 [145 Cal. Rptr. 9, 576 P.2d 971, 5 A.L.R. 4th 562], cert. den., 439 U.S. 981 [58 L.Ed.2d 652, 99 S.Ct. 568].) The foregoing principle, expressed in a civil case, has even greater force when applied, as here, to a defendant who is faced with the most serious of criminal charges.