Opinion ID: 1187510
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: prosecutor's failure to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury

Text: Before the grand jury, the prosecutor extensively questioned Kipling Dam about his identification of Frink's car as the car he had seen idling in front of Hillier's house the morning of the homicide. The prosecutor did not ask Dam to identify or describe the car occupant. After the prosecutor's direct examination, a grand juror asked Dam: Q: Could you identify the man who was sitting in the car? A: No, I couldn't. It was too dark in there. It was very early in the morning. Q: Was he sitting there when you left? A: Yes, he was. Dam had initially indicated to a police investigator that the individual in the car might have been twenty to thirty years old, possibly with long hair. A taped interview with Dam conducted a week later by a police investigator contains the following exchange: Q: Did you get a look at the occupant at all? A: Not a clear look, just a shadow type, he slumped down and I couldn't tell the age, he seemed to have long hair, I couldn't really tell at all. Frink is over thirty [17] and has short hair. He urged the trial court to dismiss the indictment because of the prosecutor's failure to present Dam's description of the car occupant to the grand jury. The trial court denied the motion, finding the discrepancy between Dam's statement to the police and his testimony to the grand jury was not that critical. On appeal, Frink argues that the prosecutor failed to present evidence to the grand jury, and that this violated Criminal Rule 6(q), Frink's right to an independent and unbiased grand jury, and his right to due process of law. The state contends the prosecutor has no duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, and that the omitted evidence did not tend to negate guilt to any significant degree. We hold that the prosecutor has a duty to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury pursuant to Criminal Rule 6(q) and that the prosecutor did not violate that duty in this case. Criminal Rule 6(q) provides in part: When the grand jury has reason to believe that other available evidence will explain away the charge, it shall order such evidence to be produced and for that purpose may require the prosecuting attorney to subpoena witnesses... . The grand jury shall find an indictment when all the evidence taken together, if unexplained or uncontradicted, would warrant a conviction of the defendant. A requirement that the prosecutor present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury is implicit in the mandate of Criminal Rule 6(q). The grand jury cannot be expected to call for evidence of which it is kept ignorant. Johnson v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.3d 248, 251, 539 P.2d 792, 794 (1975). [T]he vital function [of the grand jury is] protection of the innocent against oppression and unjust prosecution. State v. Gieffels, 554 P.2d 460, 464 (Alaska 1976). Accord, Burkholder v. State, 491 P.2d 754, 757 (Alaska 1971); State v. Shelton, 368 P.2d 817, 819 (Alaska 1962). The grand jury cannot fulfill this function unless it hears evidence tending to refute, as well as establish, guilt. It is the prosecutor who mainly presents evidence to the grand jury, [18] and if the prosecutor does not present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, it probably will not hear such evidence. In Johnson v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.3d 248, 539 P.2d 792 (1975), the court interpreted a statute similar to Criminal Rule 6(q) [19] to require a prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury: [T]he adversary system does not extend to grand jury proceedings... . [I]f the district attorney does not bring exculpatory evidence to the attention of the grand jury, the jury is unlikely to learn of it. We hold, therefore, that when a district attorney seeking an indictment is aware of evidence reasonably tending to negate guilt, he is obligated under section 939.7 to inform the grand jury of its nature and existence, so that the grand jury may exercise its power under the statute to order the evidence produced. Id. 539 P.2d at 796. Although this court has never examined the issue, the trial court's long and well-reasoned opinion in State v. Gieffels , Nos. 75-4048 Cr. and 75-5594 Cr. (3d Dist., Alaska, Feb. 2, 1976), dismissed two indictments due to prosecutorial omissions of exculpatory evidence. [20] The American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function (Approved Draft 1971) imposes a similar obligation in section 3.6(b): The prosecutor should disclose to the grand jury any evidence which he knows will tend to negate guilt. Such a requirement is fully consistent with the proper role of the district attorney in a criminal prosecution. As a representative of the state, a district attorney should seek justice, not simply indictment or conviction. The ABA commentary to section 3.6 states that the obligation to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury flows from the basic duty of the prosecutor to seek a just result. [21] The court in Johnson stated: The duty of the district attorney is not merely that of an advocate. His duty is not to obtain convictions, but to fully and fairly present to the court the evidence material to the charge upon which the defendant stands trial... . ( In re Ferguson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 525, 531, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594, 598, 487 P.2d 1234, 1238.) 539 P.2d at 796. We do not believe that the prosecutor's failure to question Dam about the description of the car occupant violated this duty. Although Dam had told the police that the car occupant might have had long hair, the consistent thrust of Dam's observations was that he could not identify the car occupant. Dam was fully questioned at trial about the details of his earlier statement. We think the prosecutor's presentation of Dam's testimony and Dam's response to the grand juror's question was a reasonable and fair presentation of Dam's observation. This case illustrates an important fact about the prosecutor's duty to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Dam's earlier statements in the police reports were certainly evidence that was discoverable and properly developed by Frink's attorney at trial. But the prosecutor's obligation to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury does not turn the prosecutor into a defense attorney; the prosecutor does not have to develop evidence for the defendant and present every lead possibly favorable to the defendant. A comparison of the omitted evidence in this case with the omitted evidence in Johnson and Gieffels is instructive. In Johnson, a magistrate, after hearing the defendant's testimony, dismissed a complaint charging the defendant with the sale of amphetamines. The defendant testified that he was not involved in the sale, but was present during it to inform on the person doing the selling. The district attorney then took the case before the grand jury and failed to tell the grand jury about the defendant's testimony that had caused the magistrate to dismiss the complaint. Gieffels was a circumstantial evidence case in which Gieffels, who was alleged to have carried a .38 revolver, was accused of having shot and killed a bartender in the course of robbing the bar. The exculpatory evidence not presented in that case was that the deceased was killed with a .44 caliber weapon. [22] We have found that Criminal Rule 6(q) imposes on the prosecutor a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, a duty the prosecutor did not violate in this case. We need not evaluate Frink's contention that the state constitution independently imposes such a duty. [23] Our finding that the prosecutor did not violate the duty imposed by Rule 6 means that the prosecutor would not have violated any constitutionally-imposed duty of disclosure. [24]