Opinion ID: 773414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: is there a gap in the title vii limitations periods

Text: 24 The District Court granted summary judgment on Burgh's Title VII claim, applying the Pennsylvania two-year statute of limitations to Title VII as a gap-filler and running the limitations period from the date on which Burgh could have requested a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Under this application of limitations, the court found Burgh's claim to be untimely. 25 It is well-established that, if Congress has created a cause of action and not specified the period of time within which a claim must be asserted, a court may infer that Congress intended state limitations periods to apply and may borrow such periods and engraft them onto the federal statute. See Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 367; see also id. (citing, inter alia, Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179-82, 49 L. Ed. 2d 415, 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976) (state limitations period applies to Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981) and O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 58 L. Ed. 980, 34 S. Ct. 596 (1911) (same as to Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1983)). We have borrowed two-year personal injury limitations periods from the states and imposed them in both 1981 claims, see Zubi v. AT&T Corp., 219 F.3d 220, 222 (3d Cir. 2000), and 1983 claims. See Nelson v. County of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1012 (3d Cir. 1995). Where, however, Congress explicitly provides a limitations period in the text of the statute, that period is definitive. There is no need to borrow a state period. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395, 90 L. Ed. 743, 66 S. Ct. 582 (1946). 26 Contrary to the Borough's arguments, Title VII is not a statute without a limitations period. Congress did provide a statutory limitations period for employment discrimination claims; in fact, Congress provided two periods. First, a complainant has 180 days from the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice within which to bring a discrimination charge before the EEOC, see 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1), or 300 days where there has been cross-filing with a state agency under state law. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1). Second, a complainant has 90 days from receipt of the right-to-sue letter to bring an action in court. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1); see also Seitzinger, 165 F.3d at 239; Mosel, 789 F.2d at 252. Both periods have been treated as statutes of limitations. See Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393; Figueroa, 188 F.3d at 176. The latter limit is strictly enforced and a delay of even one day will bar a claim. See Figueroa, 188 F.3d at 176. 27 These two periods together represent the congressional determination of the relevant and proper time limitations under Title VII. The imposition of an additional limitations period is inconsistent, and indeed in direct conflict, with the plain language of the federal statute. There is no gap to fill and thus no need to import a state limitations period as a gap-filler. The statute by its terms establishes the two appropriate time requirements that a complainant must satisfy in order to bring a timely claim. 28 Furthermore, the two-year limitations period urged by the Borough would conflict with the timetables established in Title VII. See Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 368-69 & n.23. For example, in the most basic case, if a complainant requests and receives a right-to-sue letter exactly 180 days after he files his EEOC charge, the statute gives him 90 days to bring his action in court, see 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1), while the borrowed state limitations period would give him two full years (640 additional days) to file his action. To complicate matters further, a complainant would have no guidance as to which limitations period controlled. In the instant case, Burgh unquestionably satisfied the timing requirements established by the text of the statute: He received the right-to-sue letter on December 1, 1998, and filed his civil action on February 26, 1999, 87 days later. There is no time period provided in the statute that Burgh failed to satisfy. 29 The Borough recognizes this conflict but nonetheless argues that the borrowed state limitations period should apply here, relying on a decision from the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Rode v. Dellarciprete, 646 F. Supp. 876 (M.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988). But the Borough misreads Rode. In Rode, the District Court dismissed a 1983 claim as untimely under a borrowed state two-year limitations period. See Rode, 646 F. Supp. at 882. But the court did not dismiss the Title VII claim as untimely. In fact, a careful review of Rode shows that the District Court found plaintiff's Title VII allegations were not barred by laches, as alleged by defendants, since defendants had not shown that the delay had caused them any prejudice. See id. at 883. 30 Moreover, other courts of appeals have rejected the argument that state statutes of limitations should be borrowed in Title VII cases. The Ninth Circuit held that the time limits for filing a charge with the EEOC and for giving notice to the employer of that charge are a Congressionally established statute of limitations and there is no basis under the statute to import a different period from state law. See Kirk v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 578 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1978). Concurring specially, Judge Hufstedler stated that Title VII's time provisions fully define the steps which must be taken by a Title VII litigant to preserve his or her right to sue. State statutes of limitations are not borrowed because there is no gap to fill. Id. at 824. The Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Draper v. United States Pipe and Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 522 (6th Cir. 1975), noting the specific time periods for filing a charge with the EEOC and for commencing a civil action after receipt of the right-to-sue letter, and holding that Title VII establishes its own statute of limitations, and state law is irrelevant in determining whether a private individual has lost his right of action under Title VII through the passage of time. 31 We can also derive guidance from our decision in Waddell v. Small Tube Prods., Inc., 799 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1986), a case involving procedural delays similar to those in the instant case. In Waddell, the plaintiff filed a failure-to-rehire charge with the PHRC in February 1977; this charge was referred to the EEOC for cross-filing in March 1977. In April 1977, the PHRC dismissed the charge and notified the plaintiff, but not the EEOC, of that dismissal. The PHRC did not send any notification to the EEOC until November 1981, more than 4 years later. In the meantime, the plaintiff wrote two letters to the EEOC inquiring about his case, the first in April 1977, the second in September 1977. In May 1983, the plaintiff learned that he could request a right-to-sue letter, which he did; he received the letter in June 1983 and brought suit in August 1983, within 90 days of receipt of the letter. The issue then was whether the plaintiff's claim should be barred by the equitable doctrine of laches, based on the plaintiff's failure to diligently pursue his claim, either administratively or by seeking a right-to-sue letter at an earlier time. See id. at 74-75. We ultimately remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether the defendant had established the elements of a laches defense. See id. at 79-80. There is, however, no mention in Waddell of any statute of limitations; nor is there any suggestion that the plaintiff had violated a statutory limitations period -- either federal or state -- in bringing his civil action more than seven years after filing the administrative charge and almost six years after his last letter to the EEOC. 32 We note, finally, that the limitations scheme provided for in Title VII is consistent with Congress's intent that most complaints be resolved through the EEOC rather than by private lawsuits. See Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 366 (discussing Senate Report). Congress's concern that the fair operation of Title VII required a time limitation was focused on when a charge was filed with the EEOC and a defendant received notice of that charge. Id. at 371. The benchmark, for purposes of a statute of limitations, is not the last phase of the multistage scheme, but the commencement of the proceeding before the administrative body. Id. at 372. Title VII establishes a clear period of 180 days following the alleged unlawful employment decision to file an administrative charge with the EEOC (or parallel state agency) and to provide notice of the charge to the defendant ten days later. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1). This notice gives the defendant the opportunity to gather and preserve evidence in anticipation of court action. See Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 372-73. Statutes of limitations exist, in part, to ensure such notice to the adversary. See Barnes v. The Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 151-52 (3d Cir. 1998) (The theory [of statutes of limitations] is that even if one has a just claim it is not unjust to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation.) (citations omitted). 33 Congress wanted cooperation and voluntary compliance to be the primary means of resolving claims in an informal and noncoercive manner. See Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 367-68; Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 93 (holding that the statutory plan of Title VII was aimed at correcting discrimination through informal administrative conciliation). This goal of resolving problems by conciliation is better met by enacting a limitations period for filing a court action that runs from the receipt of the right-to-sue letter at the end of the administrative process rather than from the date of the unlawful employment practice. 34 For all the above reasons, we conclude that there is no gap in Title VII that requires the grafting on to it of any state limitations period. Burgh's Title VII claim, filed within the statutory period of 90 days from receipt of the right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, was timely filed and may go forward. 35