Opinion ID: 2087875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: michael e. mason, jr.

Text: Mason argues that the trial court erred (1) by denying his motion for severance; (2) in admitting an out-of-court identification of Mason; (3) in admitting a prior consistent statement by the government's chief witness; (4) in limiting his cross-examination of the government's firearm expert; and (5) in failing to sua sponte declare a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct. [13] Mason first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance. Mason specifically contends that his trial should be severed from his codefendants because the admission of various co-defendant statements would unduly prejudice him. The denial of a severance motion rests within the broad discretion of the trial court. Jennings v. United States, 431 A.2d 552, 556 (D.C.1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135, 102 S.Ct. 2964, 73 L.Ed.2d 1353 (1982). Therefore, this court will reverse only upon a showing of an abuse of that discretion. See id. While it is true that, in a joint trial of co-defendants, certain precautions must be taken to avoid conflict with the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that full redaction of a statement to eliminate any reference to a co-defendant, combined with a limiting instruction to the jury to consider the statement only against the declarant defendant, satisfies the requirement of the Confrontation Clause. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). In this case, the trial court admitted statements made by Anderson to his old girlfriend, Nitiya Miller, and to the police that they had just robbed some niggers in Northeast. The trial court ruled that Anderson's statements were admissible as to him if properly redacted to eliminate any references to co-defendants and accompanied by a limiting instruction. Therefore, Miller testified at trial that after she asked Anderson who did he get, he replied, I robbed some niggers in Northeast. The trial court also instructed the jury that this statement could be considered only in its evaluation of the case against Anderson and could not be attributed to the other defendants in this case with respect to its evaluation in the case against them. Because the statement contained no reference to anyone but Anderson and the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mason's motion for severance. [14] Mason also contends that the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding an out-of-court identification of himself. Mason argues that Michael Lewis' testimony regarding Ronnie Sloan's non-verbal identification of Mason as the shooter was inadmissible hearsay. [15] Mason moved in limine to exclude this portion of Lewis' testimony on the grounds that there was insufficient indicia of reliability. The trial court denied Mason's motion. Therefore, we must review such an evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. See ( William T.) Johnson v. United States, 452 A.2d 959, 960 (D.C.1982). Pre-trial out-of-court identifications are admissible at trial when the identifier is available for cross-examination. See Paris v. United States, 515 A.2d 199, 205 (D.C.1986); Harley v. United States, 471 A.2d 1013, 1015 (D.C.1984); Rice v. United States, 437 A.2d 582, 583 (D.C.1981); Morris v. United States, 398 A.2d 333, 336-38 (D.C.1978). Such identification evidence is admissible through the testimony of either the identifier or witnesses present at the prior identification. See Paris, 515 A.2d at 205; Rice, 437 A.2d at 583. Because Sloan was not only available for cross-examination at trial, but was in fact cross-examined on this issue of his non-verbal identification of Mason, Lewis' testimony was not hearsay and was properly admitted. Mason also argues that the trial court erred in admitting a prior consistent statement made by Dominique Williams and elicited during the testimony of LaTonya Abrom. The trial court has broad discretion with respect to the admission or exclusion of prior consistent statements. Prophet v. United States, 602 A.2d 1087, 1094 (D.C.1992) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Therefore, we may find error only where the trial court abused that discretion. See id. This court has held that [a]s a general rule, prior statements consistent with a witness' trial testimony are inadmissible on the theory that mere repetition does not imply veracity. Reed v. United States, 452 A.2d 1173, 1180 (D.C.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 839, 104 S.Ct. 132, 78 L.Ed.2d 127 (1983) (internal quotations omitted). However, we have recognized an exception where there is a suggestion of fabrication or of a motive to lie at trial. Prophet, 602 A.2d at 1093; see Yelverton v. United States, 606 A.2d 181, 184 (D.C. 1992). Therefore, a party may introduce a witness' prior consistent statement to rebut such a suggestion if the prior statement was made at a time when the witness did not have a motive to fabricate. Reed, 452 A.2d at 1180. In this case, during Mason's cross-examination of Dominique Williams, Williams testified that Mason had been abusive to her and that, at some undetermined time, she had told him she was going to get him for beating her. Through this testimony, Mason attempted to demonstrate that Williams had fabricated her story to the police in order to get back at him, falsely implicating him in the killings. The government later alerted the court that it intended to elicit from LaTonya Abrom a prior consistent statement made to her by Williams. The statement made by Williams was a description of the events surrounding the murders. [16] Abrom testified that Williams had made the statement to her shortly after the shootings and before Williams had given her statement to the police. The trial court therefore found that the statement was used to rebut a charge of recent fabrication and that there was no basis on which it could conclude that Williams' statement was made at a time when she had a motive to fabricate. We disagree. Because it was never made clear when, according to Williams, Mason had beaten her and she accordingly had threatened to get him, and Abrom did not testify as to exactly when Williams made the consistent statement to her, the trial court could not properly find that the alleged influence or motive to fabricate, Mason's physical abuse of Williams, postdated her statement to Abrom. Under such circumstances, the trial court erred in admitting Williams' statement to Abrom. The admission of Williams' statement to Abrom, however, was harmless error. As this court has previously noted, `the objection to the introduction of prior consistent statements is at bottom based on the principle of irrelevance ... [t]herefore, the harm that may occur even if the jury should draw such an inference is less serious than the inadmissible introduction of clearly prejudicial evidence.' McKenzie v. United States, 659 A.2d 838, 841 n. 9 (D.C.1995) (quoting Jordan v. United States, 633 A.2d 373, 377 (D.C.1993)). Here, Sloan, the surviving victim, identified Mason as the one who shot him. Miller, Anderson's old girlfriend, also identified Mason as one of the people who came to her house with Anderson at the time that they opened the safe, counted the money, and divided up the property. We therefore conclude that the strength of the evidence against Mason offset any prejudice from the admission of Williams' statement. [17] Mason also contends that the trial court erred in limiting his cross-examination of the government's firearm expert. Mason specifically argues that he was precluded from pursuing his theory of the case when the trial court sustained objections to certain questions he posed to the firearm expert. The evidence showed that at least four bullets were fired into the two Lewis girls, and another three or four bullets were fired into Sloan. During the examination of the firearm expert, Mason attempted to demonstrate that he was not the sole shooter by trying to elicit testimony that seven and eight-shot revolvers are rare. However, this evidence would not have demonstrated that Mason could not have fired all of the shots. The evidence showed that Mason would have had time to reload his weapon. Because Mason has failed to demonstrate any reasonable possibility that the evidence he sought to elicit from the firearms expert would have altered the outcome of the trial, we find no reversible error. Mason finally argues that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte declare a mistrial due to an improper statement made by the prosecutor during her closing argument. Specifically, the prosecutor stated that [i]t's kind of ironic that our system allows ... Mason, ... Anderson, and ... Dancy to have a jury and a judge and have argument and everything else. That's precisely what they denied those three people. The decision to grant a mistrial is subject to the broad discretion of the trial court and our standard of review is deferential. Wright v. United States, 637 A.2d 95, 100 (D.C.1994). This court is only inclined to reverse [i]n extreme situations threatening a miscarriage of justice. Id. (citing Goins v. United States, 617 A.2d 956, 958 (D.C.1992)). When analyzing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, it is first necessary to determine whether the prosecutor's actions were improper. Diaz v. United States, 716 A.2d 173, 179 (D.C.1998) (citation omitted). Assuming the prosecutor's statements were improper here based on the fact that the trial court sustained Mason's objection to the statements, we must nevertheless determine if the comments constitute substantial prejudice that warrants reversal. Id. at 181. This court weighs four specific factors when considering the impact of a prosecutor's misconduct: 1) the gravity of the misconduct, 2) the direct relationship to the issue of guilt, 3) the effect of corrective instructions by the trial court, and 4) the strength of the government's case. Id. (citing Hammill v. United States, 498 A.2d 551, 554 (D.C. 1985) (citations omitted in original)). Based on these four factors, we cannot conclude that Mason suffered substantial prejudice. First, the prosecutor's error was not so egregious as to influence the jury to take a specific course of action. There was ample independent evidence against Mason for a jury to find him guilty. Second, the comment bore only a tenuous relationship to the issue of guilt. There was enough evidence presented at trial that such a comment did not distort the specific proof in the case. Third, there was no request for a curative instruction. Finally, as stated before, the evidence presented at trial was strong enough that such a statement could not have substantially affected the jury's decision. Therefore, although the prosecutor's statement was irrelevant and better left unsaid, we cannot conclude that it was so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. See Lee v. United States, 668 A.2d 822, 831 (D.C. 1995). [18]