Opinion ID: 1700472
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Definition of Sudden Quarrel

Text: The district court administered the following jury instruction defining sudden quarrel: `SUDDEN QUARREL' the phrase `sudden quarrel' does not necessarily mean an exchange of angry words or an altercation contemporaneous with an unlawful killing and does not require a physical struggle or other combative corporal contact between the parties. Derry contends that the jury instruction administered by the district court erroneously defined sudden quarrel. In his proposed jury instruction, Derry asked the district court to define sudden quarrel as follows: A sudden quarrel is a legally recognized and sufficient provocation which causes a person to lose normal self control. The phrase sudden quarrel does not necessarily mean an exchange of angry words or an altercation contemporaneous with an unlawful killing and does not require a physical struggle or other combative corporal contact between the parties. In considering manslaughter, you should consider: whether Mr. Derry acted under the impulse of a sudden quarrel which clouded his reason and prevented rational action; whether a sudden quarrel excited Mr. Derry and obscured or disturbed his power of reason to the extent that he acted rashly, without due deliberation and reflection, rather than from judgment; whether, under all the facts and circumstances as disclosed by the evidence, a reasonable time had elapsed from the time of the sudden quarrel to the time of the act for passion to subside and reason to resume control of his mind; and whether the suspension of reason, if shown to exist, arising from the sudden quarrel, continued from the time of the quarrel until the very instant of the act. If Mr. Derry killed Veronica C. Derry upon a sudden quarrel, you should find him guilty of manslaughter. Assuming, without deciding, that Derry is correct in arguing that the district court's definition of sudden quarrel was erroneous, we nevertheless hold that the allegedly erroneous jury instruction did not constitute prejudicial error. To establish reversible error from a court's refusal to give a requested instruction, an appellant has the burden to show that (1) the tendered instruction is a correct statement of the law, (2) the tendered instruction is warranted by the evidence, and (3) the appellant was prejudiced by the court's refusal to give the tendered instruction. State v. Trackwell, 244 Neb. 925, 509 N.W.2d 638 (1994); State v. Myers, 244 Neb. 905, 510 N.W.2d 58 (1994). Before an error in the giving of instructions can be considered as a ground for reversal of a conviction, it must be considered prejudicial to the rights of the defendant. State v. Jones, 245 Neb. 821, 515 N.W.2d 654 (1994). The district court in the case at bar properly administered a step instruction, wherein it instructed the jury to consider the crime of manslaughter only if they found that the State did not prove that Derry was guilty of second degree murder. In State v. Pribil, 224 Neb. 28, 395 N.W.2d 543 (1986), we held that this court will presume that `the jury followed the court's instruction and did not consider any of the purported lesser-included offenses after the defendant was found guilty of the primary charge against him.' Id. at 33, 395 N.W.2d at 547-48 (quoting State v. Murphrey, 220 Neb. 699, 371 N.W.2d 702 (1985)). The jury found Derry guilty of second degree murder. Under the step instruction administered by the district court, the jury never reached the question of whether Derry committed the crime of manslaughter. Pursuant to Pribil, we assume that the jury obeyed the district court's instructions. Thus, we find that the jury never had the opportunity to apply the district court's definition of sudden quarrel. Since the jury never reached the question of whether Derry was guilty of manslaughter, he could not have been prejudiced by the erroneous instruction administered by the district court. See State v. Jones, supra .