Opinion ID: 700502
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: evidence seized during a prior arrest

Text: 23 Basinger sought to exclude testimony regarding certain items that had been seized during a 1991 traffic stop and arrest in California. Over his objection, Officer Hablitzel testified that he had stopped Basinger for an equipment violation regarding the car he was driving. Hablitzel noticed an illegal switch-blade knife on Basinger's belt, and on that basis arrested Basinger. Hablitzel conducted a search of Basinger's car pursuant to the arrest and discovered (1) approximately 1 1/4 gram of methamphetamine, (2) $10,440 cash, and (3) a 90-pound drum of red phosphorous in the trunk. 24 Basinger argues that testimony regarding the seized items should have been suppressed because Hablitzel's search was illegal. He alternatively argues that the testimony was inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) and 403 as prior bad acts evidence. 25 This court reviews the denial of Basinger's motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds de novo and reviews the trial court's factual findings for clear error. United States v. Becker, 23 F.3d 1537, 1539 (9th Cir.1994). The court reviews the lower court's rulings under Rules 404(b) and 403 for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Houser, 929 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir.1990).
26 Basinger essentially asks us to determine the constitutionality of the 1991 arrest and subsequent search. Such an assessment is unnecessary, however, because the Fourth Amendment does not bar admission of this evidence, even assuming the search was illegal. See United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 725 F.2d 471, 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837, 105 S.Ct. 134, 83 L.Ed.2d 74 (1984). 27 Here, as in Lopez-Martinez, there is no suggestion ... of any bad faith or collusion by the officers involved in the 1991 and the instant cases; the [officer] in [1991] did not have the [instant] proceedings in [his] 'zone of primary interest.'  725 F.2d at 476 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3034, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976)). Thus, even if the 1991 search was illegal, exclusion of the evidence in the present case would be unwarranted because exclusion would have a minimal deterrent effect. See id.
28 Hablitzel's testimony is more appropriately challenged under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Under that rule, evidence of prior acts may not be admitted to prove a defendant's character, but it may be admitted for other purposes, such as to show knowledge and intent, if it satisfies the following requirements: 29 (1) it must prove a material element of the offense for which the defendant is now charged; (2) in certain cases, the prior conduct must be similar to the charged conduct; (3) proof of the prior conduct must be based upon sufficient evidence; and (4) the prior conduct must not be too remote in time. 30 United States v. Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir.1993). In addition, the probative value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect under Rule 403. Id. 31 The seized evidence satisfies Rules 404(b) and 403. 3 First, knowledge and intent are essential elements of both charged offenses in this case. See 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841, 856. The drum of red phosphorous found in Basinger's car on a previous occasion tends to make Basinger's knowledge that methamphetamine was manufactured (allegedly using the red phosphorous method) in the shed more probable than it would be without the evidence. The presence of red phosphorous, especially in conjunction with the presence of methamphetamine and cash, also increases the probability that Basinger intended to manufacture methamphetamine and intended to use the site for the manufacture, distribution, or use of methamphetamine. See Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d at 603. 32 Second, Basinger's previous possession of red phosphorous, especially in conjunction with his possession of methamphetamine, bears a sufficient factual similarity to the instant charges (manufacturing and maintaining a place to manufacture methamphetamine using the red phosphorous method) to satisfy the similarity requirement. See id. 33 Third, testimony by the searching and arresting officer is sufficient evidence that the prior act occurred. Cf. United States v. Hinton, 31 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir.1994) (low threshold for this requirement is satisfied by uncorroborated testimony by victim that prior acts had occurred), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 773, 130 L.Ed.2d 669 (1995). Fourth, evidence of acts that occurred in 1991 is not too remote. See Houser, 929 F.2d at 1373 (evidence of five-year-old prior conviction not too remote). 34 The district court did not make an explicit finding that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. However, that failure does not render admission of the evidence improper in this case, because the lower court implicitly made the necessary finding by admitting the evidence after expressly noting his awareness of Rule 403's balancing requirement. See United States v. Ramirez-Jiminez, 967 F.2d 1321, 1326 (9th Cir.1992) (necessary finding was implicitly made where lower court admitted evidence after receiving pretrial motion noting that court had to weigh probative value and prejudice). 35 Admission of the evidence under Rule 403 was not an abuse of discretion. As described above, the evidence is probative of Basinger's knowing manufacture of methamphetamine using the red phosphorous method, and of his knowing or intentional maintenance of a place to manufacture methamphetamine using that method. The evidence is prejudicial only to the extent that it tends to prove the fact justifying its admission, namely that [Basinger] had knowledge. Ramirez-Jiminez, 967 F.2d at 1327. That does not constitute unfair prejudice. Moreover, the district court gave a limiting instruction, which reduces the danger of unfair prejudice. See Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d at 604.