Opinion ID: 885077
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence on Counts III, IV and V

Text: ¶ 83 Southern next argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the one count of kidnaping, and the two counts of sexual intercourse without consent (Counts III, IV and V, respectively), which occurred on June 10, 1996. Southern contends that DNA evidence and fingerprint evidence excludes him as the assailant. Southern also points out some inconsistencies in this victim's testimony and thus, in effect, attacks her credibility. Southern also contends that, although footprints link him to the crime scene, this evidence was insufficient to convict him on Counts III, IV and V because mere presence at the scene of a crime does not establish guilt. ¶ 84 The victim of the offenses charged in Counts III, IV and V testified that, after her assailant raped her the first time in her house, he blindfolded her, tied her hands behind her back, placed her in a car, drove her to her bank and attempted to cash some checks which were in her checkbook. Deborah Hewitt (Hewitt), a forensic scientist at the Montana State Crime Lab, testified that she found a latent finger print on a plastic insert which was inside the victim's checkbook. Nevertheless, Hewitt testified that the print did not match either the victim or Southern. Southern points this out and, in effect, argues that the fingerprint exonerates him as the assailant. Notwithstanding, Hewitt explained that this result did not exonerate Southern as the assailant; it only meant that the print that she found was not Southern's print. Thus, the fingerprint on the checkbook insert did not exonerate Southern. ¶ 85 The victim of the offenses charged in Counts III, IV and V also testified that the assailant raped her the first time on a comforter which was on her bed. Matthews, however, testified that the DNA testing showed that Southern could be excluded as the contributor of a semen stain which was found on the comforter. Similarly, Streeter testified that the DNA tests showed that Southern could be excluded as the person who left the semen stain on the comforter. Southern asserts that this evidence exonerates him as this victim's assailant. ¶ 86 However, although the DNA testing showed that Southern did not leave the semen stain on the comforter, neither Matthews nor Streeter testified that the DNA results excluded Southern as the assailant. Rather, Matthews and Streeter stated that it was only possible to exclude Southern as the person who left the semen sample on the comforter. In sum, despite Southern's argument, neither Matthews nor Streeter's testimony excluded him as the assailant. ¶ 87 Moreover, Matthews testified that the DNA from the semen stain was consistent with the victim's DNA profile and that it was possible that it could have come from one of the victim's sons. Matthews also stated that the stain could have been left on the comforter years prior to the attack. In addition, the victim testified that her grown and married children had stayed in the bedroom when they had come to Helena to visit her. Furthermore, the victim's testimony was consistent with the conclusion that the stain on the comforter did not come from the assailant. In fact, the victim testified that her assailant had difficulty maintaining an erection and did not ejaculate. Thus, this evidence supports the State's hypothesis that the semen stain was left by one of the victim's sons. ¶ 88 Next, although we agree with Southern that presence at a crime scene is insufficient, by itself, to prove criminal liability, see State v. Johnston (1994), 267 Mont. 474, 481, 885 P.2d 402, 406 (citing State ex rel. Murphy v. McKinnon (1976), 171 Mont. 120, 125, 556 P.2d 906, 909), the evidence in the instant case not only placed Southern at the crime scene but also established that he was the assailant when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Consequently, we reject Southern's argument that the evidence only placed him at the crime scene. ¶ 89 Finally, as we stated above, this Court will not set aside a jury's credibility determinations on appeal. Ahmed, 278 Mont. at 212, 924 P.2d at 686 (citations omitted). Thus, we will not address Southern's argument concerning this victim's credibility. ¶ 90 In sum, having reviewed the record, we hold that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Southern committed the offenses of kidnaping and sexual intercourse without consent as charged in Counts III, IV and V.