Opinion ID: 1189026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of a Strike for Cause

Text: During jury selection, the trial court denied Williams's motion to strike juror Kay Barfield for cause based on her attitudes toward the death penalty. Williams did not exercise one of his remaining peremptory challenges, commenting she was good for the defense. After the final juror was seated, Williams renewed motions for cause regarding three jurors against whom he had exercised peremptory strikes, but he did not renew his motion regarding Barfield, and she served on the jury. Williams raised the denial of his motions to strike the other three on direct appeal; it is not clear whether he challenged the seating of Barfield. [9] The Supreme Court of Arkansas held, Williams did not show he was forced to accept a juror who should have been excused for cause. Williams I, 991 S.W.2d at 573. On appeal, Williams argues that refusing to strike juror Barfield for cause violated his right to a fair and impartial jury in a capital case. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 726-28, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). Although it appears this issue was procedurally barred in the state courts, the district court reviewed the voir dire of Barfield at length and concluded that Williams failed to show that Barfield should have been excused for cause. After careful review of the record, we agree. The issue was whether Barfield's views would prevent or substantially impair performance of her duties as a juror, an issue on which deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424-25, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (quotation omitted). Williams failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the trial court's finding of no actual bias was constitutionally infirm.