Opinion ID: 2161654
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable Zoning Regulations.

Text: If only the uses permitted under Milwaukee zoning ordinances for Parking Districts are applicable to the south 60 feet, such uses are those specified in sec. 16-7.3 of the City of Milwaukee Code as follows: In a parking district, no building, structure, or premises shall be used which is arranged, intended, or designed to be used for an occupancy or use other than that specified herein. 1. In a parking district, a premises may be used for . . . parking . . . of private noncommercial motor vehicles except that commercial vehicles with a rated capacity not exceeding one and one-half tons may be permitted to park on a parking lot . . . provided for customer use, . . . 2. The development and maintenance of the premises for the . . . parking of motor vehicles shall be in compliance with the following regulations:. . . . . h. Parking lots shall not be used for automobile repair work or servicing of any kind other than that which may be legally performed upon a public street; or for the sale, display, demonstration or advertising of merchandise or service of any kind; or for the dead storage of motor vehicles . . . above the ground or by placing a `For Sale' sign on such motor vehicles. During the course of trial defendants introduced in evidence a certified copy of Ordinance No. 58 of the city of Milwaukee enacted June 8, 1925, which amended the city's zoning ordinance. Among other things, Ordinance No. 58 provided: Where a district boundary line divides a lot in single ownership at the time of the passage of this chapter, the regulations for either portion of such lot may extend to the entire lot, but not more than 50 feet beyond the boundary line of the district for which such regulations are established. Cities Service asserts that this provision was in effect in 1931, when a building permit was issued for the erection of the filling station, which had the effect of changing the north 50 of the south 60 feet of the premises into a Local Business use district. Ordinance No. 58 purported to amend sec. 9-24 of the then existing zoning ordinance. As used in sec. 9-24, lot was defined as follows: A lot is a parcel of land in single ownership occupied by not more than one building and the accessory buildings or uses customarily incident to it including such open spaces as are required by this chapter. . . . In 1931, when the first filling station was erected, a two-story residence stood to the rear which was then occupied and remained until torn down in 1956. Thus there were two buildings on the premises, the filling-station building and the house, neither of which was accessory to the other. Therefore, it would seem that the premises failed to meet the above-quoted definition of lot. However, we find it unnecessary to decide this point because of the effect we accord to the 1958 amendment to the zoning ordinance. Cities Service also claims that the building permit issued in 1942 recognized a use of the south 60 feet of the premises which was inconsistent with this portion being zoned a residence-use district. The answer to this is that a building inspector cannot change a zoning-use district by issuing a permit in violation of a zoning ordinance. Actually the 1931 and 1942 permits did not violate the zoning ordinance although the applications for the permits indicated the owner's intent to put to an illegal use an adjoining portion of the land not occupied by the building covered by the permit. There was evidence that for a few years prior to the tearing down of the two-story residence in 1956 some repairing of automobiles had been done commercially in a coach house appurtenant to the residence and located on the south 60 feet of the premises. These repair operations were begun long after the zoning ordinance had been enacted at a time when that portion of the premises was included in a residence-use district. Thus these repair operations constituted an illegal nonconforming use upon which Cities Service can predicate no right. Wilson v. Kunstmann (1959), 7 Wis. (2d) 387, 96 N. W. (2d) 709; David A. Ulrich, Inc., v. Saukville (1959), 7 Wis. (2d) 173, 96 N. W. (2d) 612. Cities Service also introduced in evidence a certified copy of Ordinance No. 35 enacted May 10, 1915, relating to business sections and fire-district lines. This ordinance has nothing to do with zoning since it had been enacted five years prior to the 1920 zoning ordinance, and, therefore, it has no materiality on the use-district zoning of the south 60 feet of the instant premises. We further determine that the effect of the 1958 amendment of the zoning ordinance whereby the south 60 feet were changed to a Parking District use, which change was made at Cities Service's request, is to restrict the use that can be made of these 60 feet to that permissible in a Parking District. Cities Service argues against this result by asserting that, in securing this amendment, it did not intend to waive any rights it already possessed to make a different use of these 60 feet than would be permitted in a Parking District. However, we fail to perceive how the issue of waiver is material. Having secured the change it requested in the zoning law, it is bound thereby. For the reasons stated, we conclude that the uses to which Cities Service may put the south 60 feet of its premises are restricted to those permitted in a Parking District as set forth in the previously quoted provisions of the city zoning ordinance relating to permissible uses in such a district.