Opinion ID: 186272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: OCSLA Jurisdiction

Text: 27 The Commission also concluded that it had jurisdiction under OCSLA to regulate the NPI gathering facilities and that WFS's violations of that statute's open access and nondiscrimination requirements, see 43 U.S.C. § 1334(f)(1)(A), provided an alternative justification for the remedies set out in the Order. See Order, 100 FERC at 61,914-15; see also Order on Rehearing, 103 FERC at 61,668-69. Ordinarily, we do not entertain direct appeals from the orders of the Commission undertaken pursuant to OCSLA authority; OCSLA gives the district courts first crack at judicial review. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1). Where, however, an agency order arising from a common factual background and addressing a common question of law relies on two statutory bases that give rise to separate paths for judicial review, we have held that, notwithstanding OCSLA's grant of jurisdiction to the district courts, the entire order should be reviewed in a comprehensive and coherent fashion, and that review should take place in the court of appeals. Shell Oil Co. v. FERC, 47 F.3d 1186, 1195 (D.C.Cir.1995); see also id. at 1195 n. 19. So here. 28 WFS, relying on our recent decision in The Williams Companies v. FERC, 345 F.3d 910 (D.C.Cir.2003), contends that FERC's orders exceed its authority under OCSLA. We agree. 29 In The Williams Companies, we held that FERC regulations requiring OCS operators to file certain information concerning their pricing and service structures exceeded the authority granted to the Commission under Section 5(f) of OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1334(f). 345 F.3d at 914-16. We examined the language of the statute and observed that the text does not provide FERC with a general power to enforce OCSLA's open access provisions, but rather merely assign[s] it a few well-defined tasks. Id. at 914, 916. Subsection 5(f)(1)(A) mandates only that every permit, license, ... or other grant of authority for the transportation by pipeline on or across the outer Continental Shelf of oil or gas shall require the firms in question to provide open and nondiscriminatory access. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(f)(1), (f)(1)(A) (emphases added). The Commission, in its capacity as a licensor under the NGA, thus is required to impose the OCSLA mandated conditions in its licenses for OCS operations and has authority to enforce those conditions. See The Williams Cos., 345 F.3d at 914. Finding no statutory basis, however, for general powers to create and enforce open access rules on the OCS, we affirmed the district court's vacatur of the rules. Id. at 916. 30 The Williams Companies would seem to doom both the Commission's assertion of broad authority to enforce open access and nondiscrimination principles on the OCS and its OCSLA-based reclamation of jurisdiction over the rates charged by WFS. See Order, 100 FERC at 61,914-15; Order on Rehearing, 103 FERC at 61,668-69. The Commission, though, raises two arguments in an effort to distinguish that decision. Both are unconvincing. 31 First, FERC argues that our decision in The Williams Companies was limited to rulemakings and does not extend to adjudicatory matters between parties. FERC Br. 55. While it is true that The Williams Companies resolved a challenge to FERC regulations, its rationale was not limited to that context. Indeed, we concluded that the text of Section 5(f)(1) of OCSLA unambiguously constrained FERC's authority to its role as licensor and did not grant the Commission a general power to enforce OCSLA's open access provisions. 345 F.3d at 914. Nothing in our opinion supports the Commission's proposed distinction between rulemakings and adjudications. Whether the Commission acts in a rulemaking or adjudicatory capacity, its authority under OCSLA is limited by the plain language of the statute to that of a licensor. 32 The Commission alternatively argues that it was enforcing the open access and nondiscrimination conditions in an OCSLA license — Transco's tariff. WFS, the Commission contends, became subject to Transco's conditions when it acted in concert with Transco to frustrate the Commission's regulation of the pipeline. See FERC Br. 56-57. Even if Transco's NGA tariff sufficed as a permit, license, ... or other grant of authority under Section 5(f)(1) of OCSLA, and even if we had not already rejected the Commission's application of its Arkla Gathering test to extend NGA jurisdiction to WFS, we could not sustain the Commission's assertion of OCSLA jurisdiction on this basis, for it is nowhere present in either the Order or the Order on Rehearing. It is axiomatic that we may uphold agency orders based only on reasoning that is fairly stated by the agency in the order under review, see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943);  post hoc rationalizations by agency counsel will not suffice, Western Union Corp. v. FCC, 856 F.2d 315, 318 (D.C.Cir.1988). 33