Opinion ID: 1349797
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Analysis of referee's findings

Text: (1) `[A] referee's conclusions of law are subject to independent review, as is his resolution of mixed questions of law and fact. [Citations.] ... The referee's findings of fact, though not binding on the court, are given great weight when supported by substantial evidence. The deference accorded factual findings derives from the fact that the referee had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their manner of testifying.' ( In re Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 584, 603 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 727, 822 P.2d 435]; see also In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 585 [11 Cal. Rptr.2d 531, 835 P.2d 371]; In re Cordero (1988) 46 Cal.3d 161, 180-181 [249 Cal. Rptr. 342, 756 P.2d 1370].) ( In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 109 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 74, 860 P.2d 466].) Petitioner challenges the referee's first finding, i.e., that before May 21, 1979, the police did not enlist Oglesby as an agent to solicit incriminating information from petitioner. This is a mixed finding of fact and law, subject to our independent review. The People, on the other hand, challenge the referee's second finding, i.e., that the information obtained by Oglesby after May 21 was secured in violation of petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights. We need initially address only petitioner's challenge to the first finding because, as explained below, if we conclude that the pre-May 21, 1979, evidence was not obtained in violation of petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights under Massiah, supra, 377 U.S. 201, and its progeny, any such violation that occurred thereafter would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we focus on our referee's conclusion that before May 21, 1979, Oglesby did not obtain information in violation of petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights. Petitioner stresses various facts (set out in our referee's synopsis of his findings, ante, at pages 588-593) which, in his view, establish that from the moment Oglesby met petitioner (in early April 1979), Oglesby was a government agent who was used to solicit information from him. He focuses on Oglesby's longstanding prior working relationship with law enforcement (and Lieutenant Fitzgerald in particular), and claims the referee erred by finding that Oglesby became an agent of the state only after May 21, 1979. In order to analyze petitioner's contention, we first briefly review the high court cases that underlie petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim. In Massiah, supra, 377 U.S. 201, codefendants were indicted for possession of narcotics. Thereafter one of the defendants decided to cooperate with the government's prosecution of his codefendant (Massiah), by allowing the police to place a radio transmitter in his (the informer's) car. Subsequently, the informer engaged Massiah in conversation while the police listened by radio. The police testified to the incriminating statements they overheard. The court found a violation of Massiah's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and held the statements inadmissible against him at trial. It concluded that once the Sixth Amendment right attaches, a defendant is denied that right when state agents deliberately elicit incriminating statements from him in the absence of his counsel. ( Massiah, supra, 377 U.S. at p. 206 [12 L.Ed.2d at p. 250].) Henry, supra, 447 U.S. 264, involved informant Nichols, a jailmate of Henry, who was charged with bank robbery. Nichols had been a paid confidential informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). An FBI agent told Nichols to be alert to any statements made by prisoners, but not to initiate or engage in any questioning of Henry regarding the bank robbery. After Nichols was released from jail, the agent contacted him and learned that Nichols and Henry had conversed about the bank robbery. The agent paid Nichols for that information, and Nichols testified at Henry's trial. The court found it significant that Nichols had been a paid Government informant for more than a year; moreover, the FBI agent was aware that Nichols had access to Henry and would be able to engage him in conversations without arousing Henry's suspicion. ( Henry, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 270 [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 122].) The court stated: Even if the agent's statement that he did not intend that Nichols would take affirmative steps to secure incriminating information is accepted, he must have known that such propinquity likely would lead to that result. ( Id., at p. 271 [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 122].) Finally, the court concluded, [b]y intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. ( Id., at p. 274 [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 125].) In Maine v. Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 159 [88 L.Ed.2d 481, 106 S.Ct. 477], the court again found a Sixth Amendment violation. There, an informer, Colson, recorded conversations with his codefendant, Moulton, after Moulton was indicted. In those conversations Moulton raised and rejected a plan to eliminate witnesses, and both suggested creation of false alibis (conformed, as closely as possible, to what really happened) as a joint defense to be advanced at trial. In the process, Colson professed an inability to recall the events of their crimes, and he repeatedly asked Moulton to remind him about the details of what happened. ( Id., at p. 166 [88 L.Ed.2d at p. 489].) As a result, Moulton made numerous incriminating statements that were introduced against him at trial. ( Ibid. ) The Moulton court concluded: [K]nowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel being present is as much a breach of the State's obligation not to circumvent the right to the assistance of counsel as is the intentional creation of such an opportunity.... [T]he Sixth Amendment is violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent. ( Maine v. Moulton, supra, 474 U.S. at p. 176 [88 L.Ed.2d at p. 496].) [8] Significantly, the high court also rejected the government's argument that the intrusion was justified by its need to continue an investigation of suspected ongoing criminal activities, i.e., the elimination of state witnesses: [L]aw enforcement officials investigating an individual suspected of committing one crime and formally charged with having committed another crime obviously seek to discover evidence useful at a trial of either crime. In seeking evidence pertaining to pending charges, however, the Government's investigative powers are limited by the Sixth Amendment rights of the accused. To allow the admission of evidence obtained from the accused in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights whenever the police assert an alternative, legitimate reason for their surveillance invites abuse by law enforcement personnel in the form of fabricated investigations and risks the evisceration of the Sixth Amendment right recognized in Massiah. ... Consequently, incriminating statements pertaining to pending charges are inadmissible at the trial of those charges, notwithstanding the fact that the police were also investigating other crimes, if, in obtaining this evidence, the State violated the Sixth Amendment by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to the assistance of counsel. ( Maine v. Moulton, supra, 474 U.S. at pp. 179-180 [88 L.Ed.2d at pp. 498-499], fns. omitted.) The high court's most recent pronouncement on the issue came in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, supra, 477 U.S. 436, and this time the court rejected a Sixth Amendment challenge. The facts showed that when the defendant (Wilson) entered his jail cell he met the informer (Lee), and began narrating a story about why he was arrested. ( Id., at p. 439 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 371-372].) Although Lee advised Wilson that his story `didn't sound too good' ( id., at pp. 439-440 [91 L.Ed.2d at p. 372]), the trial court found, and the high court agreed, that Lee `at no time asked any questions with respect to the crime,' and that he `only listened to [Wilson] and made notes regarding what [Wilson] had to say.' ( Id., at p. 440 [91 L.Ed.2d at p. 373]; see also id., at p. 460 [91 L.Ed.2d at p. 385].) The court stated: `[T]he Sixth Amendment is not violated whenever  by luck or happenstance  the State obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached,' [citations][.] [A] defendant does not make out a violation of that right simply by showing that an informant, either through prior arrangement or voluntarily, reported his incriminating statements to the police. Rather, the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.  ( Kuhlmann v. Wilson, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 459 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 384-385], italics added.) The Kuhlmann v. Wilson court concluded that because the defendant's statements were `spontaneous' and `unsolicited' ( supra, 477 U.S. at p. 460 [91 L.Ed.2d at p. 385]), the Sixth Amendment did not forbid their admission in evidence even though the jailhouse informant had apparently been deliberately placed near the defendant so that he would be in a position to hear any incriminating statements. [9] (2a) Petitioner claims the government should be accountable for Oglesby's conduct prior to May 21, 1979, because, he asserts, the evidence adduced at the hearing established (i) a prior working relationship between Oglesby and the police, from which it might be inferred that the police encouraged Oglesby to elicit information from petitioner, and (ii) police conduct that directly motivated Oglesby to elicit incriminating information from petitioner. (See People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1241.) As we explain, we agree with the referee: Petitioner failed to meet his burden to establish that, before May 21, 1979, the police used Oglesby as an agent to elicit incriminating information from petitioner. (3) As an initial matter, we reject petitioner's suggestion that a Sixth Amendment violation is established if only he can show that the police had a prior working relationship with Oglesby. Such evidence may, depending on the circumstances, give rise to an inference that the police encouraged the informant to elicit incriminating information (see People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1241); but it does not, by itself, establish such an agency or illegal directive. In fact, as Kuhlmann v. Wilson, supra, 477 U.S. 436, makes clear, the Sixth Amendment is not violated simply because the police arrange with an informant to accept information that he obtains ( id., at p. 459 [91 L.Ed.2d at p. 384]), and as we made clear in our opinion on the appeal in this case, a general police policy of encouraging inmates to provide useful information does not transform inmates into police agents. ( People v. Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1141.) (2b) Arguably, the evidence  particularly that concerning Oglesby's assistance and testimony in the Bracero Mexican Mafia case  supports a conclusion that Oglesby had a prior working relationship with Fitzgerald before Oglesby was incarcerated on a murder charge. It is far more problematic, however, whether the evidence supports a conclusion that Fitzgerald in particular, or the government in general, sought to arrange for Oglesby to [take] some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks. ( Kuhlmann v. Wilson, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 459 [91 L.Ed.2d at p. 385].) Our referee concluded the evidence did not establish that point by a preponderance of the evidence. After independent review of the evidence and our referee's findings, we share our referee's conclusion. Petitioner asserts the record suggests that Fitzgerald encouraged Oglesby to procure information, and promised that he (Fitzgerald) would pass that information to the district attorney, and likewise advise the district attorney of Oglesby's helpful information given in the past. Petitioner focuses on the following testimony by Fitzgerald at the most recent evidentiary hearing: The court: And did you ever in any way indicate to Mr. Oglesby that in some way, he should be given consideration in this [i.e., Oglesby's] case for his testimony in Williams' case? The witness: My statement to him has been the same that I've made to many people that wind up in the county jail for one reason or another. `I will go to the District Attorney with the information you give me. I will make it known to the District Attorney, whatever information you have given me in the past. And that's all I can do.' The court: Did you deviate from this practice in the Oglesby-Williams matter? The witness: No, sir. Petitioner asserts this establishes that Fitzgerald directly motivated Oglesby before May 21, 1979, to elicit incriminating information from petitioner. We cannot agree. Fitzgerald testified he could not remember whether the described conversation occurred before or after May 21, 1979. Our referee made no finding as to when this conversation took place, and petitioner provides us with no evidence that the conversation occurred before May 21, 1979. Accordingly, we reject petitioner's claim that the above quoted testimony standing alone establishes that Oglesby's elicitations were `directly motivated' by Fitzgerald. We must agree with our referee that the record does not establish that the government induced Oglesby, prior to May 21, 1979, to elicit incriminating information from petitioner. Accordingly, we conclude that petitioner has not met his initial burden under Kuhlmann v. Wilson, supra, 477 U.S. at page 459 [91 L.Ed.2d at page 385], and that the pre-May 21, 1979, evidence was not illegally obtained.