Opinion ID: 1934122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Alleged Uncertainties of the Contract.

Text: The Chancellor held that the contract was so uncertain in the following respects as to bar enforcement by specific performance: first, and most important, with regard to the location of the land to be retained by the sellers and hence the exact description of the land to be sold to the purchaser; second, as to who was to pay the cost of the survey; and third, with regard to the terms of the deed of trust. Description of the Land. The basis of the Chancellor's finding that the contract was indefinite as to the description of the land was that there was no specification and no testimony as to where the beginning line was to be drawn in order to omit from the entire farm the acreage which was to be retained by the sellers under the terms of the contract. We do not agree with this view of the evidence. The property sold is described in the first paragraph of the contract as the Dawson Farm containing 80 acres more or less, also known as Mary J. Boland Farm in Montgomery County in the State of Maryland. The second paragraph incorporates Schedule A on the reverse side as a part of the contract and contains the covenant of the sellers (previously quoted) to deliver eighty (80) acres of land with 4 room tenant house [,] such land having a frontage of 866.5 feet on Old Route 240. The provisions of Schedule A providing for the release of acreage have already been quoted. As will be recalled, the first paragraph of that Schedule called for the release of acreage fronting on Old Route 240 beginning at the northeast corner of said property for $1000 an acre, that each such acre should have a frontage of not less than 200 feet, that land not fronting on that road should be released for $500 per acre, and that All acres released shall be contiguous. The second paragraph of Schedule A describes the area excluded from the contract of sale and so to be retained by the sellers as the residence and outbuildings occupied by the sellers situated on a parcel of land with 200 foot frontage on Old Route 240 and a depth sufficient to take care of remaining acreage in excess of the eighty (80) acres covered by this contract. The evidence showed that Mr. Dawson in May, 1955, had furnished to Mr. Measell a copy of a recorded plat of the three lots which the Dawsons had acquired and which had been part of the Boland farm. A copy of this plat is in evidence. The easterly boundary of the three lots is a straight line bounding on Old Route 240, with a total length of 1066.5 feet. The northerly boundary runs in a more or less westerly direction from that road by three different courses, the first of which is roughly at a right angle to Old Route 240 and extends for 872 feet. The southerly boundary of the tract runs westerly from Old Route 240, also almost at a right angle thereto (though not quite parallel with the beginning of the northern boundary) and extends for a distance of 3029.5 feet. The buildings reserved to the sellers are all located within the tract reserved to them if the southernmost 200 feet of the frontage on Old Route 240 constitute the easterly line of that tract. Reading Schedule A and other parts of the contract together (and Schedule A is a part of the contract), it is clear that the northeastern corner of the tract is included in the land to be sold; and bearing in mind that all lots to be released must be contiguous, it also seems clear that the area to be sold was intended to be a single, unbroken tract fronting on Old Route 240 and extending 866.5 feet southwards from the beginning point at the northeastern corner. That leaves the southernmost 200 feet of frontage on that road as the portion reserved to the sellers. The evidence indicates that the location of the land taken by the State Roads Commission (and of the piece of land cut off by the parcel so taken from the balance of the farm owned by the Dawsons) is established by State Roads Commission plats. It would therefore appear a relatively simple task to compute from those plats and from the plat furnished by the sellers to Mr. Measell the exact acreage owned by the sellers east of the land acquired by the Commission, and the testimony shows that this was about 86 or 87 acres. It would then present no difficult problem to a surveyor to locate precisely the bounds of the tract to be retained by the sellers, using the southernmost 200 feet of their land fronting on Old Route 240 as the eastern line, the southern boundary of the entire tract as the southern line, and by then completing a parallelogram of appropriate area by using as the northern boundary a line parallel to the southern boundary extending westward (for a distance determined as stated below) from the northern end of the sellers' 200-foot frontage on Old Route 240, and by running a closing line southward parallel to Old Route 240 for 200 feet. The length of the northern and southern lines would be determined by merely dividing the number of square feet to be retained by the sellers by 200. Since an acre contains 43,560 square feet, the length of the northern and southern boundary lines would be 217.8 feet for each acre to be retained by the sellers. In this connection, it may be noted that the southern boundary runs without change of course for 3029.5 feet west of Old Route 240. It would, therefore, not be necessary to resort to a tract having a shape other than that of a parallelogram in order to take care of the excess over 80 acres which is to be retained by the sellers and excluded from the tract to be conveyed to the purchaser. See Loughran v. Ramsburg, 174 Md. 181, 197 A. 804. Starting with the premise that the 200-foot frontage on Old Route 240 is the eastern line of the tract to be retained by the sellers, we have assumed above that the southern line of that tract would be the southern boundary of their entire tract. Any other supposition would seem to us to border on the absurd, to borrow a phrase employed in Moran v. Fifteenth Ward B. & L. Assn., 131 N.J. Eq. 361, 25 A.2d 426, in which case the issue was which twenty-seven feet of frontage on a certain street out of a total of a little over fifty-six feet owned by the seller, was intended to be covered by a contract of sale. We think it clear that the contract here involved contemplated an even width from north to south of the tract retained and that the closing line at the west should run parallel to the eastern boundary. The contract calls for  a depth, not varying depths, for this tract. (Italics supplied.) It has been held in a number of cases in other jurisdictions that in the absence of wording to the contrary, boundary lines of conveyed property are to run straight and be parallel to their opposite numbers. Collins v. Dresslar, 133 Ind. 290, 32 N.E. 883; Mendota Club v. Anderson, 101 Wis. 479, 78 N.W. 185; Smith v. Nelson (Mo.), 19 S.W. 734. We think that this phase of the case is covered by what was said in Neuland v. Millison, 188 Md. 594, 604, 53 A.2d 568: In order to obtain specific performance, `the description must be such as to enable the court to determine with certainty, with the aid of such extrinsic evidence as is admissible under the rules of evidence, what property was intended by the parties to be covered thereby. The description need not be given with such particularity as to make a resort to extrinsic evidence unnecessary. Reasonable certainty is all that is required.' Powell v. Moody, 153 Md. 62, 66, 137 A. 477, 478. Cf. Helmik v. Pratt, supra [153 Md. 685, 139 A. 559]. A description may be sufficient although the contract necessarily contemplates a survey to prepare a more complete description. Powell v. Moody, supra, 153 Md. 67, 137 A. 477. Cost of a Survey. Both parties proceeded during the summer and at least a part of the fall of 1955 on the assumption that a survey of the property was necessary. On August 4th Mr. Dawson wrote to Mr. Sigler asking that the deposit of $1,000 which had been made by the purchaser with Mr. Sigler be turned over to Mr. Dawson because he needed it very badly to finish this house and get this land surveyed. The title company handling the matter reported that it found the title satisfactory and was prepared to put through the settlement as soon as a survey was made and a proper description of the land based thereon was furnished. Difficulties developed over the choice of a surveyor. One selected by Mr. Dawson was not on the title company's list of approved surveyors. For some time, up to early October, it appeared that Mr. Dawson was going to have the survey made; later he refused. Efforts were made to divide the cost. Finally, Mr. Baker sent surveyors to the property to make the survey, but Mr. Dawson ordered them off the land. Still later Mr. Baker offered to accept a deed without a new survey being made. Our study of the case leads us to think that the appellant is correct in taking the position stated in his brief that a survey would be desirable but not necessary. If a survey was necessary to an effective conveyance, the purchaser, or his assignee, we think, should have furnished it, in the absence of any contrary agreement, because of his undertaking to pay the costs of conveyancing. However, its absence does not bar the appellant from specific performance. The contract did not make time of the essence, the appellant was justified in expecting that the appellees would have the survey made at least up to a few days before the settlement date provided for by the contract, and after it became evident that the appellees would not do so, the appellant sought to have the survey made at his own expense. We think he was not too late, since time was not of the essence. See Chapman v. Thomas, 211 Md. 102, 126 A.2d 579, and cases therein cited, and Loughran v. Ramsburg, supra . Indefiniteness as to the Terms of the Deed of Trust. The absence from the contract of many usual terms found in deeds of trust or mortgages, such as covenants to pay taxes or insurance (the latter of which appears of trifling importance in this case) and provisions with regard to foreclosure is not fatal. The Code (1957 Ed.), Article 21, Sec. 68, states that the following forms shall be sufficient to convey real or personal property. Then follow several sections setting forth forms of deeds and other instruments. Among them is Section 71, which is captioned Form of Deed of Trust to Secure Debts, Indemnify Securities, or Other Purposes and reads as follows: 71. This deed, made this _______ day of _______________, in the year _________, by me, _____________________, witnesseth, that whereas (here insert the consideration for making the deed,) I, said ________________, do grant unto _____________________, as trustee, the following property, (here describe the property,) in trust for the following purposes, (here insert the purposes of the trust, and any covenant that may be agreed upon). Witness my hand and seal. Test: A.B. [SEAL.] In many respects a deed of trust is a mortgage ( Manor Coal Co. v. Beckman, 151 Md. 102, 133 A. 893), but in some respects there are differences. ( LeBrun v. Prosise, supra . ) Recently, they have been brought more closely into line with each other through extending the same priorities to a purchase money deed of trust as to a purchase money mortgage. (Acts of 1955, Ch. 369, effective shortly before the contract here involved was made; Code (1957), Art. 66, Sec. 4.) Some terms of the deed of trust are spelled out. It is to be on the premises sold and is to secure an aggregate of $29,000, payable on or before eleven years from date of settlement, with interest at the rate of 5% per annum, and payable $2,000 or more each year, plus interest. In addition, there are the release provisions set forth in Schedule A, and any amounts paid pursuant to those provisions are, we think, to be in addition to the minimum payments of $2,000 a year. Any balance remaining unpaid at the end of eleven years is then due. All of these provisions can readily be covered by the deed of trust, and we find no inconsistency between them. This case falls under the second decision (based upon an amended declaration) in Applestein v. Royal Realty Corporation, 181 Md. 171, 28 A.2d 830, rather than under the first decision in that case which is reported in 180 Md. 274, 23 A.2d 684. See also Quillen v. Kelley, 216 Md. 396, 140 A.2d 517. Another term of the contract relating to the deed of trust can readily be met  that the trustees shall be named by the persons secured, the Dawsons. The contract shows that the deed of trust is to secure a part of the purchase price, and the deed of trust should so state. We should have no doubt that if the question presented was whether or not a deed of trust in some particular form was in conformity with the contract, it would be found to be so if it were in any form in general use in Montgomery County. That, however, is not the precise question before us, and no actual form of deed of trust has been tendered by the purchaser or offered in evidence. Doubtless such a form could readily be procured, and the appellant has expressed a willingness to execute any such form in use by the title company handling the settlement. The appellees, however, have rejected any such offer and stand on their contention that the contract as drawn is too indefinite to be specifically enforced and say that there is no proof of any customary form. A consequence of this position may be that they will wind up with a less desirable instrument than they could easily have had for their own protection. If they should find themselves in that position, it would seem that they would simply have to take what the contract calls for. Hartsock v. Mort, 76 Md. 281, 291, 25 A. 303; Quillen v. Kelley, supra . They point out the absence of any foreclosure provisions, and it is certainly true that no default clauses with a power of sale exercisable upon default are spelled out. It may also be quite true, as they contend, that there is no one standard or customary form of deed of trust in general use in Montgomery County dealing with such matters. However, we think that there is no serious difficulty in inferring from the terms of the contract a right of foreclosure which the beneficiaries of the trust may enforce in the event of default in the payment when due of any of the sums, principal or interest, specified in the contract. In Manor Coal Co. v. Beckman, supra , there was a deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage which had been executed to secure bonds issued by a coal company. The holders of a majority of these bonds exchanged them for bonds of another coal company. The holders of a minority of the bonds called upon the trustee under the deed to exercise the power of sale conferred thereunder, which the trustee refused to do. This Court held that the minority bondholders could enforce their lien in a court of equity under its general chancery jurisdiction. A deed of trust such as is provided for here is just what this Court declared the deed of trust in the Manor Coal Co. case to be: a conveyance of land as security for a debt. The addition of a power of sale did not change its character any more than the addition of a power of sale changes the character of a mortgage. (See 151 Md. at 115.) Quite possibly, as stated in Jones on Mortgages, 7th Ed., Secs. 358, 1134, the sellers could protect themselves against loss through any failure of the purchaser to pay taxes by paying the taxes themselves and obtaining reimbursement out of the proceeds of sale, and by subrogation they could maintain a priority over junior incumbrancers, if there were any. Cf. Young v. Omohundro, 69 Md. 424, 16 A. 120. The appellees' claim of vagueness based upon the absence of any provision as to who should procure and pay for a survey in connection with a release is without force. The contract does not obligate them to do so; and if the purchaser wants a release and needs a survey to obtain it, he must undertake to get it and pay for it. We think that the contract contemplates the payment of interest annually, except that if a release is sought, interest must be paid on the principal sum paid for the release up to the date of the release. The absence of a defeasance clause is likewise of no significance. The deed of trust is to secure payment of the purchase price. When it is paid, the purchaser is entitled to a release. That is implicit in the contract and could be made explicit in the deed of trust.