Opinion ID: 799311
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Liability of the Division for Washington's Conduct

Text: An employer is presumptively liable for sexual harassment in violation of Title VII if the plaintiff was harassed not by a mere coworker but by someone with supervisory (or successively higher) authority over the plaintiff, although in certain circumstances an affirmative defense may be available. See, e.g., Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275. If the harassment culminate[d] in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment, the employer is held strictly liable, and [n]o affirmative defense is available. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257; see, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808, 118 S.Ct. 2275. In the absence of a tangible employment action, the employer may avoid liability by establishing, as an affirmative defense on which it has the burden of proof, two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257; see Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Ferraro v. Kellwood Co., 440 F.3d 96, 101-02 (2d Cir.2006); Petrosino, 385 F.3d at 225. The Division in the present action asserted such an affirmative defense in its answer to the Complaint, but it is not clear from the present record whether the defense is available. Redd has complained that Washington's harassment on September 15 culminated in a suspension that began on September 16, the length of which an arbitrator found was unwarranted, and the results of which included Redd's loss of priority on a transfer list and an undesirable reassignment to an office where her parolee supervision responsibilities exposed her to greater dangers. ( See, e.g., Redd brief on appeal at 6, 7, 33-36.) Neither the availability nor the viability of the Division's defense was fully briefed in the district court, and that court did not address the defense because of its ruling that Redd's hostile work environment claim failed as a matter of law, see 2010 WL 1177453, at  n. 1. To the extent that the affirmative defense is available, we note that the record suggests that there are factual issues to be tried. In asserting the defense, the Division did not indicate that it had taken any preventive or corrective action; rather, it contended that no such action was required because Redd did not sufficiently complain about Washington's conduct. It is undisputed that, with respect to Washington's alleged sexual harassment, Redd did not file complaints in writing; she testified in her deposition that to file such complaints would have subjected her to criticism from her coworkers ( see Redd Dep. at 143-45). However, Redd testified that she complained orally to Burgos. ( See id. at 144-45.) Burgos, the Division's Director of Human Resources, acknowledged that his office investigates harassment complaints and that it disciplines supervisors found to be engaging in activity that could be described as sexually harassing (Burgos Dep. 22-23). And despite testifying that he did not recall whether Redd had complained about Washington directly to his office ( id. at 51), his testimony indicated that it was sufficient for Redd to make a complaint directly to Burgos himself: He testified as a general matter that [i]f you made a complaint to me or my office, ... it would be investigated. ( Id. at 6 (emphasis added).) Burgos did not dispute Redd's assertion that she had complained to him that Washington was sexually harassing her. Rather, in his affirmation he stated that he did not recall receiving any  written sexual harassment complaint by PO Redd against Area Supervisor Washington (Burgos Aff. ¶ 9 (emphasis added)). In his deposition, he stated [his] recollection ... that [Redd] complained that Ms. Washington bumped Redd and that Redd viewed that as sexual harassment. (Burgos Dep. 50-51.) Redd, conducting Burgos's deposition pro se, immediately disputed Burgos's characterization of Redd's description to him of Washington's actions, stating, I didn't put in the complaint that she bumped me. I put in the complaint that she felt my breast on three different occasions  ( id. at 51 (emphases added)). While Redd's colloquy is not evidence, her deposition testimony that she had complained about Washington to Burgos is evidence, and we think it well within the leeway that is normally to be afforded a pro se litigant for the court to infer that such a face-to-face assertion of detail as to precisely what she had reported would be included in her testimony at trial. In any event, as a jury would not be required to believe Burgos's testimony that Redd, in complaining to him, had described Washington's physical contact as simply a bump[ing], a court considering whether the Division has established its defense as a matter of law would be required to disregard that characterization. In sum, if the affirmative defense is available, there appears to be a factual dispute to be resolved as to the sufficiency of Redd's complaints about Washington's conduct.