Opinion ID: 1413920
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Picopa's Incorporation

Text: We further believe that Picopa's status as a corporation also weighs heavily against a finding that Picopa is a subordinate economic organization. In White Mountain Apache, we stated: In the court below respondent judge also ruled that FATCO was a de facto corporation [and therefore not immune from suit]. In order for a de facto corporation to exist there must be (1) a valid law under which a corporation with the powers assumed might be incorporated; (2) a bona fide attempt to organize a corporation under such law; and (3) an actual exercise of corporate powers. 18 Am.Jur.2d, Corporations § 51, p. 595. In the instant case there is no allegation nor is there any evidence that there was any attempt to incorporate FATCO; therefore, there is no basis for the finding that FATCO is a de facto corporation. 107 Ariz. at 7, 480 P.2d at 657. Thus, we alluded to the materiality of corporate status in our subordinate economic organization analysis. We cannot agree with the court of appeals' opinion that Picopa's incorporation is insignificant in determining the outcome of this case. See Namekagon Development Co. v. Bois Forte Reservation Housing Authority, 395 F. Supp. 23, 26-27 (D.Minn. 1974) (analogizing Indian corporations to corporations created by the United States government and suggesting in dicta that corporate status implies a waiver of immunity), judgment aff'd, 517 F.2d 508 (8th Cir.1975). Tribal sovereign immunity does not apply to individual Indians, but only to Indian tribes and their subordinate economic organizations. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172, 97 S.Ct. 2616, 2621, 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977) (immunity not extended to individual Indians); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 60 S.Ct. 653, 84 L.Ed. 894 (1940) (recognition of tribal immunity); White Mountain Apache (immunity of subordinate economic organizations). Here the Community created an artificial individual, a corporation, and charged it with all the power to act to the same extent as natural persons might or could do.... SRO-85-84 ¶ C. No extrinsic evidence shows that this corporation was intended to act or did act as an extension of tribal government. This artificial individual is not, therefore, a subordinate economic organization and is not entitled to assert the tribal immunity defense. See Puyallup, 433 U.S. at 172, 97 S.Ct. at 2621.