Opinion ID: 173414
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Safari Club May be Entitled to Intervene as of Right

Text: Safari Club contends it satisfies Rule 24's elements. It argues its interest in the management and conservation of wildlife at Rocky Mountain National Park and other national parks may be impaired if WildEarth succeeds in its case. Safari Club also argues the National Park Service will not adequately represent that interest. We agree, in part. First, Safari Club demonstrated a sufficient interest, for purposes of Rule 24(a)(2), in maintaining and furthering the use of culling at RMNP and other national parks for wildlife management and conservation purposes. [7] Cf. Clinton, 255 F.3d at 1252 (concluding that organizations whose purpose is the protection and conservation of wildlife have a protectable interest). During the administrative decision-making process, Safari Club submitted comments to the NPS demonstrating its interest in and support of the chosen plan, which utilizes culling as a wildlife management and conservation tool. Moreover, the record demonstrates that the NPS intends to cull elk at RMNP. The plan also evidences the NPS's willingness to consider the use of culling at national parks other than RMNP. Safari Club's articulated interest in furthering the use of culling as a means of wildlife management and conservation, which it pursued during the NPS's administrative proceedings, is not too speculative under our case law to support intervention as of right. As a final interest, Safari Club has a strong organizational interest in defending and preserving the NPS's interpretation of the Organic Act and individual national park enabling statutes, including the Rocky Mountain National Park Act. If WildEarth were to prevail on its broad legal contentions, this case could establish a precedent that prohibits hunting on these public lands for the purpose of culling overpopulated wildlife absent specific statutory authorization. In sum, Safari Club has sufficient cognizable interests in the WildEarth litigation to satisfy the first intervention requirement. Second, Safari Club also meets the impairment element. It demonstrated that its interest in maintaining and furthering the use of culling as a wildlife management and conservation tool at RMNP and other national parks might be impaired if the district court decides in WildEarth's favor. In its complaint, WildEarth requests, among other things, declaratory judgment that hunting is culling and that, therefore, culling violates the Organic Act and the RMNP Act. WildEarth also seeks an injunction barring the NPS from culling elk at RMNP. If WildEarth is granted the relief it requests, the NPS would be prohibited from employing culling as a means of managing and conserving wildlife at RMNP. Such a result would directly impair Safari Club's interest. Further, a practical effect of declaratory judgment in WildEarth's favor may be preventing or, at the very least, significantly discouraging the NPS from utilizing culling for wildlife management and conservation purposes at other national parks. See Coalition, 100 F.3d at 844 (stating that we may consider any significant legal effect in the applicant's interest; and that, for purposes of Rule 24(a)(2), sufficient impairment may result from the stare decisis effect). In short, Safari Club has shown that its interest in the litigation might be impaired if it is not allowed to intervene. Finally, Safari Club demonstrated they may satisfy Rule 24(a)(2)'s inadequate representation element. However, because the district court denied Safari Club's motion to intervene without reaching the adequacy of representation element, we conclude the best course is to remand the case for the district court to consider the issue in the first instance. The district court found that Safari Club did not identify an interest at risk of impairment and ended its analysis of the elements of intervention as of right there. Rather than confront the inadequate representation issue for the first time on appeal, we will leave it to the district court to examine initially. See AIMCO v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 593 F.3d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir.2010) ([T]he better practice on issues raised [in] but not ruled on by the district court is to leave the matter to the district court in the first instance.) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). We note that a brief from the NPS addressing the adequacy of representation may prove useful in deciding the issue. In sum, the district court erred by concluding Safari Club did not meet the interest and impairment elements, and by not considering whether the NPS can adequately represent Safari Club's interest.