Opinion ID: 1986196
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the bifurcated trial

Text: The defendant argues that the trial justice committed reversible error in declining to grant defendant's request for a bifurcated trial. The gist of defendant's argument is that a single trial deprived him of the opportunity to present two inconsistent theories of defense to two different triers of fact. In short, defendant claims that his testimony that the crime of murder of the Brendel family was committed by four unknown assailants was inconsistent with his claim of lack of criminal responsibility due to his mental illness as presented by a clinical psychologist who found him to be suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. Essentially the claim of lack of criminal responsibility due to mental illness (insanity) is a plea of confession and avoidance pursuant to which a defendant concedes the commission of the crime but claims that he or she is not responsible for his or her act because by reason of mental illness he or she was unable to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law. See State v. Johnson, 121 R.I. 254, 399 A.2d 469 (1979). In State v. Smith, 512 A.2d 818 (R.I. 1986), we considered the question of bifurcating a trial wherein a defendant raises the defense of insanity but also wishes to present evidence that he or she did not in fact commit the crime with which he or she is charged or wherein the defendant wishes to put the state to its proof concerning the elements of the crime. We stated unequivocally that a bifurcated trial is neither constitutionally mandated nor statutorily authorized. Id. at 820 (citing People v. Alerte, 120 Ill. App.3d 962, 974, 76 Ill.Dec. 452, 460, 458 N.E.2d 1106, 1114 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1105, 105 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed.2d 773 (1985)). In the course of this opinion we examined decisions from other jurisdictions that have allowed bifurcated trials in circumstances in which a defendant seeks to present a substantial defense on the merits. See, e.g., State v. Ward, 301 N.C. 469, 272 S.E.2d 84 (1980); State v. Boyd, 167 W. Va. 385, 280 S.E.2d 669 (1981). However, we declined to adopt the rules enunciated in the foregoing cases and determined that a single trial on the issues of guilt and insanity was preferable because it had the effect of conserving judicial resources and avoiding the inherent unfairness of giving the accused two chances at acquittal. Smith, 512 A.2d at 822 (citing State v. Haseen, 191 N.J. Super. 564, 567, 468 A.2d 448, 449 (1983)). We pointed out that the choice in presenting inconsistent defenses is a choice made by the defendant. 512 A.2d at 821. We further noted that attempting to draw a logical and administratively feasible line between the evidence of the insanity defense and the evidence supporting the defense on the merits is a `herculean task.' Id. at 822 (citing Louisell & Hazard, Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial, 49 Cal. L. Rev. 805, 820 (1961)). In summary we concluded that a single proceeding within which the jury is given the entire picture of the case and in which both the issue of insanity and the issue of defense on the merits are considered in a joint trial is a preferable course to follow. Smith, 512 A.2d at 822. We reaffirm this holding. In a trial for murder, as in the case at bar, not only is the defendant entitled to a fair trial but so also are the people of the State of Rhode Island entitled to a fair trial. Fairness of presentation is not enhanced or supported when two juries are given inconsistent defenses without being aware of the totality of the circumstances that may only be made apparent by presentation of all issues in one proceeding. The state in its argument points out that at the time of the request for bifurcation, the nature of defendant's proposed presentation on the merits was unknown. The state also points out that defendant was not timely in asserting the defense of insanity. However, our holding in State v. Smith, supra , and our reaffirmation of that holding would not be dependent upon these circumstances even if defendant presented an indication of a substantial defense on the merits. Our position that he would not be entitled to a bifurcated trial would be unchanged. Consequently the trial justice committed no error in denying defendant's request for a bifurcated trial on the issues of insanity and his defense on the merits.