Opinion ID: 2972067
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: summary judgment on the issue of damages

Text: Hrometz claimed compensatory and punitive damages under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMDRA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 411, 412.
In order to prove loss of rights and benefits, Hrometz must show both the availablity of the fringe benefits or a compensable loss. Applying Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 82 F.3d 615, 623 (5th Cir. 1996), Hrometz has failed to establish “replacement expenses actually incurred in connection” with the expulsion and the benefits. Furthermore, he did not seek comparable services during his expulsion; therefore, he has suffered no replacement costs or damages. -5- No. 03-4431 Hrometz v. Int’l Assoc. of Bridge Hrometz additionally claims that during his expulsion he worked 4,845 fewer hours than average members of comparable experience. However, a union hall hiring system is not a guarantee of employment, and each ironworker’s employment status over a given period of time is unique. Also, a significant portion of the “missing” hours are attributable to Hrometz as, from his expulsion until September 1996, he did not return to the union hall to sign the “off work” list. In response, Hrometz claimed that he was unknowingly laid off at the instigation of Local 550. Although he believes he would have been “called back” to work by a single employer for the entire period, there is no evidence showing that his March 1996 job was of any significant duration. There is likewise no evidence of prejudice against Hrometz in the referral of jobs from the list. Indeed, the district court found that after signing the referral list Hrometz was consistently referred for work. Accordingly, summary judgment on this issue was correct.
“Generally, this circuit allows damages for emotional distress to be awarded upon a showing of intimidation, marital problems, weight loss, loss of sleep, shock, or humiliation.” Thompson v. Office and Prof’l Employees Intern. Union, AFL-CIO, 74 F.3d 1492, 1508 (6th Cir. 1996) (internal quote omitted). A claim of emotional distress resulting from a LMRDA violation must be supported by physical manifestations – actual injury is a required element. Petramale v. Local No. 17 of Laborers’ Intern. Union of N. Am., 847 F.2d 1009, 1012 (2d Cir. 1988). In Petramale the plaintiff’s claims that he was “moody and argumentative; [that] he and his wife quarreled;” and that he was “nervous and unable to sleep at night” were sufficient to allow a jury verdict. Id. Hrometz offers similar proof here, claiming he became difficult to live with, and -6- No. 03-4431 Hrometz v. Int’l Assoc. of Bridge that he suffered anxiety which resulted in insomnia and lost sleep. However, he has not visited a doctor for psychiatric treatment or for his sleep loss, and offers only his own testimony that he has suffered these ailments. Unlike the plaintiffs in Thompson and Petramale, Hrometz has not presented corroborating evidence. Therefore, Hrometz has not raised sufficient questions of fact to overcome the motion for summary judgment.
Punitive damages are also allowed under the LMDRA “only upon a showing of a defendant’s malice or reckless or wanton indifference to a plaintiff’s rights.” Argentine v. United Steel Workers, 287 F.3d 476, 483 (6th Cir. 2002). Hrometz alleged that he was subjected to harassment and intimidation from union members instigated by Local 550; however, he has not presented evidence that he was personally threatened by a particular member of the union, or that officers of Local 550 ordered or condoned such behavior. He also asserted the right to continued union membership or expulsion only after proper process. Both unions complied with the disciplinary provision of the union constitution. Although the provision has since been enjoined from enforcement by this court, see Hrometz I, 227 F.3d at 603, the enforcement of that provision at the time of Hrometz’s expulsion was not a malicious or wanton indifference to Hrometz’s rights. Hrometz has not presented affirmative evidence to show that either union or the individual defendants acted with the requisite malice or recklessness to entitle him to punitive damages. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25 (1986). B. Amount of attorney’s fees and costs awarded to Hrometz. -7- No. 03-4431 Hrometz v. Int’l Assoc. of Bridge The LMRDA allows awards of attorney’s fees and costs under the “common benefit” theory. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 8 (1973). “The central issue for a court in determining the applicability of the common benefit theory is whether the members of the [union] shared in the benefit of the suit in the same way as [Hrometz].” Argentine, 287 F.3d at 489. The “common benefit” conferred here is the right to seek redress in the courts. The purpose of attorney fee awards under the LMDRA is “to spread the costs of litigation proportionately among [] beneficiaries.” Id. No Sixth Circuit precedent precludes awarding attorney’s fees attributable to a plaintiff’s unsuccessful damages claims; however, there is also nothing appearing to require such an award. Indeed, this court has stated that the fee award burden should operate in proportion to the common benefits received. See Shimman v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 18, 744 F.2d 1226, 1236 (6th Cir. 1984). Here, the district court determined that the “need for and potential benefits derived from” the award of fees was best served when limited to fees attributable to the common benefit – the injunctive relief. The court determined that Hrometz’s damage claims were too personal, and thus were ineligible for consideration of attorney’s fees – a reasonable interpretation of the principle of common benefit. To compel the International and Local 550 to pay attorney’s fees for Hrometz’s damages claims would place an inequitable portion of the burden on the union members sharing in the “victory” on the injunction. The award of fees and costs related to the injunction is, however, equally shared among the beneficiaries as a whole. See Argentine, 287 F.3d 489. Therefore, the award of attorney’s fees excluding the damage phase was not an abuse of discretion. In computing attorney’s fees, the magistrate judge performed a meticulous analysis of the submitted billing records, arguments, and comments of all parties. The calculations appear well -8- No. 03-4431 Hrometz v. Int’l Assoc. of Bridge reasoned, and fairly balanced the concerns of the International and Local 550 and the requests of Hrometz. Thus, its adoption by the district court was not an abuse of discretion. C. Sanctions against Hrometz. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, “[a]ny attorney ... who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” Sanctions under this statute are appropriate where an attorney “falls short of the obligations owed by a member of the bar to the court and which, as a result, causes additional expense to the opposing party.” Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1049 (6th Cir. 1996). However, the final award of sanctions must be reasonably related to the misconduct. In this case, some sanctions were appropriate, but an award of nearly $5,000 was excessive. At the time of the deposition, the International was permitted to inquire as to whether Hrometz had discussed his testimony with his attorney. The testimony went to the heart of Hrometz’s claim for emotional damages, and if it had been influenced by Hrometz’s consultation with his lawyer during the break, the International may have argued that the claim should be accorded less weight. Instead, the groundless assertion of privilege prevented Hrometz from answering the question.4 Therefore, the International’s decision to resolve the dispute in compliance with the local rules and, when that failed, to litigate, was reasonable. 4 The International did not inquire as to the substance of any conversation counsel and Hrometz may have had. The district court correctly concluded that it did not implicate the attorneyclient privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 282 (6th Cir. 1964) (discussing the essentials of the attorney-client privilege). -9- No. 03-4431 Hrometz v. Int’l Assoc. of Bridge The question, then, is whether the court abused its discretion in approving the amount of sanctions requested by the International. In support of its application for fees under § 1927, the International included an affidavit attesting to the reasonableness of the hourly rates charged by its counsel. Additionally, the application included a bill of costs, with entries for each activity related to the discovery dispute, the amount of time spent on each activity, and the total amount owed. The application, therefore, is facially adequate. See, e.g., Building Serv. Local 47 Cleaning Con. v. Grandview, 46 F.3d 1392, 1402-1403 (6th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, the district court did not examine the fee request to determine whether the hours of work claimed were in fact reasonably necessary; the court instead granted the entire amount on the grounds that, but for the obstructionist conduct of Hrometz’s counsel, “International was forced to research, prepare and file their discovery dispute, attend the hearing before the magistrate judge, appeal the magistrate judge’s findings, re- depose Plaintiff, and prepare the motion and reply brief on the issue of sanctions.” While this is true, it does not follow that all of the work performed during the discovery dispute was reasonably incurred because of the conduct of Hrometz’s counsel. 28 U.S.C. §1927. A review of the International’s fee request reveals that certain of the tasks consumed an unreasonably high number of hours. Following the April deposition, the International spent roughly 7.5 hours researching the law, preparing the initial letter request, and preparing the certification letter. This was reasonable as it came at the beginning of the dispute. However, as the initial preparation work dealt with the same legal issue as the hearing before the magistrate judge, further research and preparation to the extent of 8 hours was unreasonable. It was equally unreasonable to - 10 - No. 03-4431 Hrometz v. Int’l Assoc. of Bridge spend 9.3 additional hours preparing the appeal of the magistrate judge’s decision; no new issues were raised at this stage, and the dispute still centered on the groundless assertion of privilege. Of course, the International’s time for travel to, and presence at, the hearing before the magistrate judge should be reimbursed fully. It is the extended preparation time which we question. However, we cannot determine from the International’s fee request which hours were devoted to preparation and which to travel. Accordingly, we remand to the district court with instructions that it first determine which of the nearly 17.3 hours during June 19, 2001 to July 17, 2001, were devoted to travel and fully reimburse for those hours. Second, the court should award fees for no more than 6 hours of preparation work during that period, i.e., June 19, 2001 to July 17, 2001, including time for phone calls and correspondence. The fees sought by the International for the periods prior to but excluding June 19, 2001, and after but excluding July 17, 2001, are not duplicative and we cannot say they are unreasonable. We therefore affirm the award of the fees incurred during those periods. The district court should recalculate the award of fees and costs accordingly. The grant of summary judgment to the defendants is AFFIRMED on the issues of compensatory and punitive damages and the award of attorney’s fees and costs. However, the issue of sanctions against counsel for Hrometz is REMANDED for reconsideration of the amount consistent with this opinion. - 11 -