Opinion ID: 1836985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Failing To Consider Statutory Mitigators

Text: Butler next argues the trial court erred in failing to consider, as a separate mitigating circumstance, the evidence presented concerning his impaired mental capacity due to cocaine use. Although a jury instruction on this mitigator was given, the State maintains Butler abandoned this as a separate mitigator when it was not discussed in the defense sentencing memorandum to the trial judge. The memorandum included the statutory mental mitigator of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and the seven nonstatutory mitigators requested, including Butler's long-term substance abuse problem. The record indicates the trial judge considered and weighed all of the mitigating evidence offered by the defense. Section 921.141(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), requires specific findings as to both aggravating and mitigating factors. The State may not prevent the sentencer from considering any relevant mitigators and, likewise, the sentencer may not refuse to consider any mitigating evidence. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). In Campbell v. State, 571 So.2d 415 (Fla.1990), this Court sought to clarify and make more uniform the application of the law pertaining to mitigators by stating: When addressing mitigating circumstances, the sentencing court must expressly evaluate in its written order each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant to determine whether it is supported by the evidence and whether, in the case of nonstatutory factors, it is truly of a mitigating nature. See Rogers v. State, 511 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020, 108 S.Ct. 733, 98 L.Ed.2d 681 (1988). The court must find as a mitigating circumstance each proposed factor that is mitigating in nature and has been reasonably established by the greater weight of the evidence.... The court next must weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating and, in order to facilitate appellate review, must expressly consider in its written order each established mitigating circumstance. Although the relative weight given each mitigating factor is within the province of the sentencing court, a mitigating factor once found cannot be dismissed as having no weight. To be sustained, the trial court's final decision in the weighing process must be supported by sufficient competent evidence in the record. Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So.2d 1327, 1331 (Fla.1981). Id. at 419-420 (footnotes omitted). The trial court adequately considered the impaired capacity mitigator. Butler's argument to the contrary is belied by the sentencing order itself. The sentencing order explicitly discusses the impaired capacity issue. The judge considered this factor in the discussion of the HAC aggravator. The trial judge stated the defense offered the impaired capacity evidence in the form of Dr. Maher's testimony to mitigate the State's position that the crime was torturous. The court then pointed out that the defense failed to present testimony at trial that substantiated the claim that Butler was in fact impaired by his use of cocaine and other substances at the time of the murder. [7] For these reasons, the court concluded the crime was heinous, atrocious, and cruel. See Brown v. State, 721 So.2d 274 (Fla.1998) (finding, despite defendant's use of cocaine and alcohol on the night of the murder, that no evidence was presented that he was actually intoxicated at the time of the crime or that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his act was impaired); Cooper v. State, 492 So.2d 1059 (Fla.1986) (finding consumption of alcohol and marijuana on the day of the murder without more does not compel a finding of the diminished capacity mitigator). Therefore, the trial judge's conclusion that the weight of the HAC aggravator was not diminished by this proposed mitigator was proper. Butler's use of cocaine and alcohol was also explored by the trial judge during the discussion of the statutory mitigating circumstances of under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and as a separate nonstatutory mitigating factor of long-term substance abuse. The trial judge followed the Campbell directive in discussing all the mitigating evidence presented.