Opinion ID: 295464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: capacity of administratrices to sue.

Text: 28 The wives of both of the deceased passengers filed complaints in their status as administratrices on behalf of their respective estates. In their complaint, they alleged that they were entitled under Puerto Rican law to recover damges for each beneficiary of the estate. American specifically denied this allegation in its answer, but it did not raise again the issue of the administrices' capacity to sue until after the plaintiffs rested at trial, a year later. Then when plaintiff Wallace sought to amend the pleadings to conform with the evidence by including as beneficiaries of the estate two of the decedent's children by an earlier marriage, American raised the issue of the administratrices' capacity to sue. 29 F.R.Civ.P. 17(b) states that the capacity of a representative to sue is determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held. Although Rule 17(a) provides that an executor may sue on behalf of the estate, that provision does not apply in local jurisdictions that have contrary laws. 3A J. Moore, Federal Practice P17.03, at 101-102 (1970). Normally, Puerto Rico requires heirs to sue or be sued individually. E.g., Heirs of Belaval v. Acosta, 64 P.R.R. 104 (1944). We do not believe, however, that the Puerto Rican rule requires a reversal in this case. The amended complaint was filed by the administratrices one year before the trial when American first argued the issue of capacity to sue. A hearing on various motions for summary judgment had been held several months before trial, but American made no mention of this particular issue. It is true that American's answer denied the administratrices' capacity to sue, but F.R.Civ.P. 9(a) requires not only that a defendant make a specific negative averment if he challenges a plaintiff's authority to sue in a representative capacity, but also that the averment include 'such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge'. American merely denied each and every averment in the relevant paragraph of the amended complaint; no mention was made of the reason for the denial. 30 We assume that the requirement of supporting particulars is to be read with the requirements of F.R.Civ.P. 17(a) which provides that there shall be no dismissal of a complaint on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until after a reasonable time has been allowed for substitution of the proper party. Read together, these two rules require a defendant to do more than this defendant did by way of raising an objection to representative capacity. American should have made clear its objections to the capacity of the administratrices as soon as possible. The correct parties could have then been promptly substituted, and the case would have proceeded without interruption. By holding back until the eleventh hour, American could only be hoping to gain a victory by sowing confusion. 31 The improper pleading did not prejudice American in any way; from the outset, American knew who were the real parties in interest and what their claims were. Under the circumstances, we hold that American waived the defense of capacity to sue. 5 Cf. Greene v. Goodyear, 112 F.Supp. 27 (M.R.Pa.1953); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Acadia Co., 173 F.Supp. 292 (S.D.N.Y.1959), aff'd 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960). We further hold that the court below was correct in permitting the Wallace administratrix to amend the pleadings under F.R.Civ.P. 15(b) to conform with the evidence by adding the individual claims of the decedent's two children by an earlier marriage to the claims of the decedent's other children set forth in the amended complaint. These new claims were fully litigated without objection before amendment was sought. American was not prejudiced. 32