Opinion ID: 1288147
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged Failure to Present Evidence About How the Shots Were Fired

Text: Terrell argues in his cross-appeal that trial counsel should have presented testimony showing that apparent soot residue on the corner of the victim's house, where the State argued that Terrell began firing at the victim, was never tested and that the downward angle of the shots could have been due to something other than Terrell's defective wrist. Terrell has presented no test results of his own from the apparent soot residue, and so he has failed to show prejudice arising out of what testing trial counsel might have actually done. Trial counsel could have cross-examined the State's witnesses about the failure of the State to do such testing; however, the jury would not have been swayed by such cross-examination for the following two reasons: first, the jury would almost certainly have believed the residue was truly soot in light of the other evidence; and, second, the key to the case was whether Terrell opened fire and began pursuing the victim and not the largely inconsequential detail of where he might have been located when he began his attack. At trial, the State presented testimony showing that Terrell had a defective wrist, which the State argued could account for the fact that the initial shots ricocheted off the victim's driveway rather than striking him. In the habeas court, Terrell presented expert testimony stating that the State's theory of where the attacker had been located and of why shots were fired downward was not the only possible explanation of the evidence. Instead, Terrell's new expert testimony suggested that the angle of fire could have been due to the attacker's having been in a different location than the State theorized and due to the attacker's having shot with poor aim during the pursuit of the fleeing victim. Given the other evidence of Terrell's guilt, this new testimony would not have in reasonable probability led the jury to have reasonable doubt of Terrell's guilt or to harbor residual doubt at the sentencing phase sufficient to cause them to select a penalty other than death. There is also no reasonable probability that the jury would have found the evidence more mitigating if it had concluded that Terrell was indeed the attacker but that he committed the crime in the particular manner that Terrell's expert hypothesizes.