Opinion ID: 169475
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Breach of Contract and Estoppel Claims

Text: Plaintiffs assert pendent state law causes of action for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. They argue that their employment contracts and promises made by the Academy gave them a right to rescind their resignations and that the failure of the Board to accept those rescissions was a breach of their contracts. The district court rejected these claims after it determined Plaintiffs' resignations were effective upon receipt by the Board. On this point, Plaintiffs' employment contracts are unambiguous. The contacts state this agreement may be terminated at any time by either of the Parties, provided that a minimum of two (2) week's [sic] written notice is given, Aplt.App. at 1362, which clearly indicates that the right to terminate is a unilateral one, not requiring acceptance. Indeed, Plaintiffs' resignation letters were dated March 1, 1999, and all stated that their final day of work would be March 12, 1999, exactly ten working days (or two work weeks) in the future. Two of the letters even noted that the March 12 end date was in accordance with the terms of my contract, id. at 351, 357, and a third stated [i]n accordance with my contract, it is my intention to continue teaching for two weeks, id. at 356. Consequently, the Academy was not required to accept Plaintiffs' resignations to make them effective, nor was the Academy required, as a matter of contract, to accept Plaintiffs' attempts to rescind their contracts. [8] Plaintiffs nonetheless claim that, pursuant to its course of dealing, the Academy had established that resignations were not effective until acted upon by the Board. However it is [o]nly where the terms of an agreement are ambiguous or are used in some special or technical sense not apparent from the contractual document itself that the court may look beyond the four corners of the agreement in order to determine the meaning intended by the parties. Pepcol Mfg. Co. v. Denver Union Corp., 687 P.2d 1310, 1314 (Colo.1984). Consequently, if the relevant contract provision is unambiguous, the course of dealing may not override the document's plain meaning. See Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 34:7 (4th ed. 1990) ([C]ustom can only supply incidents to a contract where the contract is ambiguous on the point to which the party seeks to apply the custom.). Here, the contracts unambiguously state that Plaintiffs had the unilateral power to terminate their contract provided two-weeks' notice was given. Evidence of the Academy's course of dealing may not be used to contradict this unambiguous term. Plaintiffs also claim breach of contract and estoppel based on the Academy's failure to process their March 12 grievance complaints in a timely manner. Because Plaintiffs voluntarily resigned their positions, and the internal grievance procedure was aimed at addressing the grievances of employees, these claims are moot. See Comm. for First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1524 (10th Cir.1992) (noting that a claim becomes moot when no reasonable expectation exists that the alleged violation will recur and interim . . . events have eliminated the effects of the alleged violation). In any event, Plaintiffs' grievances were processed and denied in writing by the Board on May 18, 1999. See Aplt.App. at 368.