Opinion ID: 1961286
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motions to Pass and Sever

Text: DePina and Monteiro also claimed that the trial justice's refusal to sever their cases from Teixeira's produced a two-fold error. First, the trial justice's denial of their motions forced them to defend against allegations by the state and by their codefendant. Second, the erroneous denial of their motions to sever constituted grounds for a new trial. Again, we disagree. A defendant is not entitled to severance as a matter of right; severance is an issue directed to the sound discretion of the trial justice. State v. Gibbons, 418 A.2d 830, 834-35 (R.I.1980). We reverse a trial justice's denial of a motion to sever only when a defendant shows that he has in fact suffered prejudice sufficiently substantial to impinge upon his right to a fair trial. Id. at 835. Here, DePina and Monteiro have argued that astatement made by Teixeira's counsel during closing argument constituted the requisite level of prejudice and thus deprived them of their right to a fair trial. Specifically, they alleged that Teixeira's counsel improperly implicated codefendants by speculating: If this did happen,    and this stabbing did take place, without her [Reverdes] having been able to hear what he [Teixeira] said,    isn't it as reasonable to assume that he could have been saying, `Stop, stop'? This Court has held that such comments neither represent antagonistic defenses, nor do they warrant reversal of the denial of the motion to sever. Gibbons, 418 A.2d at 835. Although DePina and Monteiro contended that this statement planted the seeds of prejudice [that] would soon blossom into guilty verdicts, we have held that a contention that a defendant would have a better chance of acquittal if tried separately is insufficient grounds to reverse the denial of a motion to sever. Bustamante, 756 A.2d at 767. Further, we have held that immediate, cautionary instructions can cure adverse comments. State v. Oliveira, 774 A.2d 893, 912 (R.I.2001). In this case, after the defense objected to the prosecutor's comment, the trial justice gave a cautionary instruction, directing the jury to disregard comments of counsel that were unsupported by evidence. He then reiterated this cautionary instruction in his jury instructions. Having reviewed the record in its entirety, we are satisfied that DePina and Monteiro were not prejudiced by Teixeira's defense. The defendants next argued that this erroneous denial of their motion to sever established grounds for a new trial, and thus that the trial justice improperly denied their motion for a new trial. In light of our holding that the trial justice properly denied their motion to sever, we conclude that this secondary claim of error is unsupportable. Moreover, defendants in essence premised their motion for a new trial on an alleged errorof law at trial, namely, the denial of a motion to sever. Rule 33 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly prohibited such an argument: [4] The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to the defendant if required in the interest of justice, except that a new trial may not be granted for error of law occurring at the trial. We conclude, therefore, that the trial justice properly denied defendants' motion to sever and for a new trial on this ground. The defendants also argued that the trial justice's denial of their motion to pass was reversible error because of the antagonistic closing argument of Teixeira. [5] The denial of a motion to pass a case and declare a mistrial lies within the discretion of the trial justice and will be disturbed only if it is clearly wrong or if the trial justice has abused his or her discretion. State v. Campbell, 691 A.2d 564, 569 (R.I.1997); State v. Figueroa, 673 A.2d 1084, 1091 (R.I.1996) (The trial justice possesses `a front-row seat' at the trial and can best determine the effect of the improvident remarks upon the jury.) (quoting State v. Tempest, 651 A.2d 1198, 1207 (R.I.1995)). In this case, the trial justice examined the testimony of the witnesses and concluded that Teixeira's closing statement neither mischaracterized the evidence nor drew unfair inferences. At sidebar, the trial justice reiterated that the jury had been instructed before the beginning of the trial  and would be again instructed  that closing arguments did not constitute evidence. In our opinion, the trial justice's denial was not clearly wrong, and defendants' motion to pass was properly denied.