Opinion ID: 1191734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Facts which may be considered

Text: To exempt an act from a possible referendum, the existence of a true emergency of a particular kind must be factually proven. The burden should be on the one who asserts that the exemption is applicable since the constitional rule is clearly otherwise, and we presume that the act is subject to referendum unless the contrary is clearly proven. Humiston, 61 Wash.2d at 776, 380 P.2d 735. [15] The court often gleans these facts from what appears upon the face of the act, aided by the court's judicial knowledge. State ex rel Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wash.2d 772, 778, 380 P.2d 735 (1963) (quoting State ex rel. Hoppe v. Meyers, 58 Wash.2d 320, 326, 363 P.2d 121 (1961)). When the Legislature includes a statement of fact in the statute upon which it bases its declaration of emergency, the court will generally give such factual finding considerable deference. We have always held to the rule that the legislative declaration of the facts constituting the emergency is conclusive, unless, giving effect to every presumption in its favor, the court can say that such legislative declaration, on its face, is obviously false and a palpable attempt at dissimulation. State ex rel. Hamilton v. Martin, 173 Wash. 249, 257, 23 P.2d 1 (1933) (emphasis added). In State ex rel. Hamilton v. Martin , the Legislature passed a law appropriating money to alleviate statewide unemployment. Id. at 253-54, 23 P.2d 1. There the Legislature included an emergency clause. Id. at 252, 23 P.2d 1. However, the Legislature also stated specific facts supporting a state of emergency including `Discontent, social unrest and incipient insurrection exist. Acts of insurrection are occurring.' Id. at 256-57, 23 P.2d 1 (quoting Laws of 1933, ch. 65, ง 1, referred to as the Bond Act). Further, the court in that case was able to take judicial notice [16] of the widespread hunger and privation existing in 1933 which will, if unrelieved, inevitably lead to disorder and reprisal and found it to be reasonable that the law was designed to prevent insurrection by civilized methods, rather than by violence and bloodshed. Id. at 256, 259, 23 P.2d 1. Because of the specific facts set out in the law, along with the court's judicial knowledge, the law was deemed a true emergency of the kind enumerated by the constitution and a referendum was not constitutionally required. However, this deference is afforded only when the Legislature factually states the nature and scope of the emergency. We have never given the Legislature such deference when all it includes is a naked emergency clause without additional factual support for the alleged underlying emergency itself. In Humiston, one of our most recent cases on the issue, we held, despite the fact that the insertion of an emergency clause was identical to the one used in the Stadium Act, the law there making bingo and cardrooms lawful in certain situations was nevertheless subject to referendum. 61 Wash.2d at 774, 380 P.2d 735. We reasoned that [t]he face of the act is patently devoid of any facts relating to an emergency (with the exception of the emergency clause itself). Id. at 778, 380 P.2d 735. This rule goes back to the very first referendum case we decided. In State ex rel. Brislaum v. Meath, 84 Wash. 302, 305, 147 P. 11 (1915), the issue was whether the Legislature's insertion of an emergency clause alone, without inclusion of the underlying facts of emergency, would be sufficient to establish an emergency upon review by this court. We began by noting that while the judiciary is hesitant to place restraints upon legislative discretion, the Legislature's declaration of emergency goes not to legislative discretion, but to its constitutional powerโthe Legislature may circumvent the people's right of referendum only if an emergency of a particular kind truly exists. Id. at 314, 147 P. 11. The court wrote: `The said legislative declaration [of emergency] has no greater effect and is no more binding upon the court than if the Legislature had declared that a certain measure is or is not constitutional. In such contingency that question would still remain for the courts to determine.' Id. at 316, 147 P. 11 (citations omitted). We have repeatedly adhered to the rule set out in Brislawn. In State ex rel. Kennedy v. Reeves, 22 Wash.2d 677, 157 P.2d 721 (1945), the Legislature inserted a boilerplate emergency clause identical to that used in the present case into an act on timber resource use. When a citizen called for a referendum, this court wrote that the Legislature cannot defeat the constitutional right [to referendum] ... by merely inserting [an emergency clause].... Id. at 681, 157 P.2d 721. The court reasoned that, It would be scandalous indeed if the constitutional right of referendum could be thwarted by the mere use of [an emergency clause and] .... `[i]f this can be done, the right of referendum is a dead letter in this state.' Id. at 681-82, 157 P.2d 721 (quoting oral argument). Is this not the exact result of the majority opinion? The rule in Humiston is: the legislature has no right to tack an emergency clause onto an act in order to prevent the people from exercising their right of referendum, unless that act is clearly within the exception set forth in the amendment. 61 Wash.2d 772, 776, 380 P.2d 735 (1963) (emphasis added). Here, the Legislature used a boilerplate [17] emergency clause without even attempting to justify any exception to the right of referendum. In fact, the Legislature merely copied the constitutional provision into the statute. Perhaps a few indisputable facts are subject to judicial notice such as the failure of the earlier referendum and the fact of a special session; [18] however, potentially disputed facts cannot be noticed but must be found the old fashioned wayโwith a judge, trial, witnesses, cross-examination, etc. See footnote 16, supra. Quite the contrary to the rule stated in Humiston, I find my brethren in the majority delve extensively into extraneous debatable matters neither reflected in the text of the statute nor within notice of the judiciary. For example, we are told about small children expressing their affection of baseball to the Governor. Majority at 1057. We are told about hearsay testimony from interested persons which says nothing about any real or imagined immediate threat to the public peace, health, or safety. We are told what a good public investment this will be. [19] Perhaps most interestingly, we are told that this unusual piece of legislation slid through a special session of the Legislature with bipartisan support from not only legislators and the executive, but also from a united front of business, labor, and professional sports entrepreneurs, each of whom would hope to benefit at taxpayers' expense. Majority at 1057. But we are told nothing about the views of taxpayers who voted down a similar measure in King County. [20] I presume these references to matters outside the judicial notice rule were simply made in the interest of thoroughness. Certainly they would have no proper influence on the outcome of this constitutional question if we applied the established rule of law. To summarize the established rule, when the Legislature tacks on an emergency clause without telling what the emergency is, and judicially noticeable facts (see footnote 16, supra ) do not clearly support its presence, we presume no emergency and strike the clause. However, when the Legislature goes further and tells us what the nature of the emergency is, we give such factual findings deference but do not abdicate our judicial duty to independently draw the correct legal conclusion. While the referendum process may be burdensome and the people may at times decline to spend or act as a majority of the Legislature would prefer, that is no reason to alter the mandatory constitutional division of power between the people and the Legislature. As the Court of Appeals stressed when discussing the importance of initiatives and referendums: The people have a right to adopt any system of government they see fit to adopt. In its workings, it may not meet their expectations; it may be unwieldy and cumbersome; it may tend to inconvenience and prodigality; it may be the expression of a passion or sentiment rather than of sound reason; but it is the people's government and, until changed by them, must be observed by the legislature and protected by the courts. Save Our State Park v. Hordyk, 71 Wash. App. 84, 90, 856 P.2d 734 (1993) (citing State ex rel. Brislawn v. Meath, 84 Wash. 302, 320, 147 P. 11 (1915)). [21] Unless the people repeal the constitutional right of referendum, we must uphold their right to pass on all issues other than those which actually and truly fall within the narrow exception. The words of this court 50 years ago are as true now as then: To uphold a legislative declaration of emergency such as this would destroy the referendum and would permit the legislature, or a group of electors barely sufficient to invoke an initiative, to impose its will upon the majority.... State ex rel. Robinson v. Reeves, 17 Wash.2d 210, 217, 135 P.2d 75, 146 A.L.R. 280 (1943). [22]