Opinion ID: 2548593
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assuming Wallace was in Custody, Whether he Validly Waived his Miranda Rights

Text: Additionally, even assuming that Wallace was in custody for Miranda purposes, we hold that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel. The circuit court's ruling that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving that Wallace waived his Miranda rights is founded on Wallace's refusal to execute a written waiver of rights. Relying on this court's decision in State v. Hoey, 77 Hawai'i 17, 881 P.2d 504 (1994), the circuit court determined that Wallace's refusal to sign the waiver of rights portion of Form 103, followed by his agreement to nevertheless talk with police, amounted to an ambiguous and equivocal waiver of rights requiring clarification by Officer Adachi. We disagree. In Hoey, the defendant, Hoey, indicated during the course of being advised of his Miranda rights in a custodial interrogation that he did not have money to buy a lawyer. 77 Hawai'i at 22, 881 P.2d at 509. On appeal, Hoey claimed that this statement should have been construed to be a request for counsel because it demonstrated that he did not understand his right to court-appointed legal representation. Id. at 33-34, 881 P.2d at 520-21. In addressing this contention, the court in Hoey began its analysis with the proposition that if a defendant makes an unequivocal request for counsel while being Mirandized, all questioning must terminate until counsel is present. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471-72, 86 S.Ct. at 1626-27. In other words, once an accused has expressed his desire to deal with police interrogators only through counsel, he cannot be further questioned until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 [101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d 378] ... (1981); State v. Ikaika, 67 Haw. 563, 566, 698 P.2d 281, 284 [284] (1985); State v. Brezee, 66 Haw. 162, 657 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1983). This principle creates a bright-line rule that once the right to counsel has been invoked[,] all questioning must cease. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 [105 S.Ct. 490, 494, 83 L.Ed.2d 488] ... (1984) (per curiam). See also Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646 [104 S.Ct. 1338, 1343, 79 L.Ed.2d 579] ... (1984). State v. Mailo, 69 Haw. 51, 53, 731 P.2d 1264, 1266 (1987). Id. at 34, 881 P.2d at 521 (brackets, ellipses points, and emphasis in original). The Hoey court observed, however, that: The cases cited above[ ] ... do not reach the issue of a defendant's equivocal invocation of Miranda rights, and the jurisdictions that have addressed it are split into three camps regarding whether cessation of questioning is required or whether the interrogating police officer may seek to clarify the meaning of a defendant's ambiguous statements. Those in the first camp have held that a defendant's ambiguous expression of interest in the presence of an attorney requires that further questioning cease altogether. Those in the second have required clarifying questions with regard to the defendant's comprehension or waiver of the right to counsel as a necessary precondition to further substantive questioning. Those in the third have found an effective waiver despite an ambiguous assertion of the right to counsel. Id. at 34-35, 881 P.2d at 521-22 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Hoey court observed further that, in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), the United States Supreme Court unqualifiedly sided with the third camp. Id. at 35, 881 P.2d at 522. On the issue raised by Hoey, this court held: we choose to afford our citizens broader protection under article I, section 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution than that recognized by the Davis majority under the United States Constitution by aligning ourselves with the jurisdictions in the second camp described above. Accordingly, we hold that (1) when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal request for counsel during custodial interrogation, the police must either cease all questioning or seek non-substantive clarification of the suspect's request, and (2) if, upon clarification, the defendant unambiguously and unequivocally invokes the right to counsel, all substantive questioning must cease until counsel is present. Conversely, we hold that if, upon clarification, the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives the presence of counsel, substantive questioning may continue. Id. at 36, 881 P.2d at 523 (emphases added). With regard to Hoey's ambiguous statement that he did not have the money to buy a lawyer, this court opined that one could easily draw the conclusion that Hoey had failed to understand that he could have a free lawyer appointed for him and that if he could have afforded a lawyer, he would have wanted one present. Id. at 37, 881 P.2d at 524 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Moreover, the detective's failure to clarify Hoey's ambiguous statement, which was demonstrably inconsistent with [the detective]' s explanation of Hoey's Miranda rights, left unresolved the question whether Hoey had waived the right to counsel at his interrogation. Id. This court held, therefore, that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving that Hoey voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel at his interrogation, as guaranteed by article I, section 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution. Id. The facts of the instant case stand in stark contrast to the facts in Hoey. Unlike in Hoey, it is undisputed here that Wallace fully understood his Miranda rights. Specifically, Officer Adachi advised Wallace using Form 103 that: WARNING OF RIGHTS Before we ask you any questions, we want to tell you about your rights. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advise [sic] before we ask you any questions and to have your lawyer with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. .... As stated by the circuit court in FOFs 31 and 32: 31. Officer Adachi[ ] ... read each line to Defendant, out loud, explained each right, and had Defendant initial next to each right, indicating Defendant understood the right. 32. Officer Adachi then had Defendant sign his name on the form indicating Defendant understood his rights. [ [5] ] (Emphases added.) Consequently, this case does not present the issue in Hoey whether an ambiguous or equivocal request for counsel was made during custodial interrogation. Nor does this case present the related issue in Hoey whether the defendant understood the right to counsel. Rather, we are asked to address the issue whether Wallace's refusal to execute a written waiver of Miranda rights precludes a valid waiver in this case. Hoey is, therefore, non-dispositive. Turning to the issue of waiver, it is well established that, [a]fter a defendant has been adequately apprised of his `Miranda' rights, he `may waive [effectuation of] these rights provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.' State v. Luton, 83 Hawai'i 443, 454, 927 P.2d 844, 855 (1996) (quoting State v. Kaahanui, 69 Haw. 473, 478, 747 P.2d 1276, 1279 (1987) (citation omitted)) (brackets in original). To determine whether a valid waiver was given, this court must once again examine the entire record and make an independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness based on the totality of circumstances. State v. Kekona, 77 Hawai'i 403, 406, 886 P.2d 740, 743 (1994). In the present matter, notwithstanding that Wallace refused to sign the waiver of rights portion of Form 103, it is uncontroverted, and the circuit court found in FOF 37, that [Wallace] stated he was willing to talk to police [,] but he was not signing the form. [6] This court has observed that an explicit statement of waiver is not invariably necessary to support a finding that the defendant waived the right to remain silent or the right to counsel guaranteed by the Miranda case. State v. Henderson, 80 Hawai'i 439, 442 911 P.2d 74, 77 (1996) (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 375-76, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Butler, 441 U.S. at 370-71, 99 S.Ct. 1755, the defendant, after being orally advised of his Miranda rights, refused to sign a written waiver form, stating I will talk to you but I am not signing any form. Nevertheless, the defendant agreed to speak with officers, thereafter making inculpatory statements. Id. at 371, 99 S.Ct. 1755. The United States Supreme Court held that the defendant's rejection of the written waiver did not preclude a finding that the suspect had waived his rights, reasoning: An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but it is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case. ... The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution's burden is great; but in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated. Id. at 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755 (emphases added). [7] Our examination of the record compels us to conclude that Wallace knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Specifically, the record reflects that Wallace was adequately and effectively apprised of his rights. Butler, 441 U.S. at 374, 99 S.Ct. 1755. Indeed, as previously indicated, Wallace does not dispute that he understood the warnings given to him. Furthermore, it is compelling to specify what the record in this case does not show regarding the circumstances of Wallace's waiver. Notwithstanding that Wallace refused to execute a written waiver of rights, it is undisputed that he said nothing when advised of his right to the assistance of a lawyer. At no time did [Wallace] request counsel or attempt to terminate ... questioning. Butler, 441 U.S. at 371, 99 S.Ct. 1755. Additionally, there is no evidence whatsoever controverting Officer Adachi's account of the encounter at which the challenged statements were made. Nor does Wallace allege any facts that have traditionally cast doubt upon a finding of knowing and voluntary waiver, e.g.: (1) that the interrogation was lengthy or preceded by an incommunicado incarceration, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476, 86 S.Ct. 1602; (2) that the defendant lacked education, Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 742, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966); (3) that the defendant exhibited weakness of will or mind, Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 196-97, 77 S.Ct. 281, 1 L.Ed.2d 246 (1957); or (4) that there were hostilities incident to the defendant's arrest or custodial interrogation, Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 38, 88 S.Ct. 189, 19 L.Ed.2d 35 (1967). See State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 452 A.2d 634, 637 (1982). To the contrary, the record plainly reflects that Wallace freely agreed to talk with Officer Adachi. Wallace points out that courts in other jurisdictions have construed a refusal to sign a police waiver form as an ambiguous assertion of the suspect's right to counsel and to silence[,] citing United States v. Heldt, 745 F.2d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir.1984); United States v. Van Dusen, 431 F.2d 1278 (1st Cir.1970); United States v. Nielsen, 392 F.2d 849 (7th Cir.1968); Millican v. State, 157 Ind.App. 363, 300 N.E.2d 359 (1973); and People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57, 371 N.E.2d 819 (1977). These cases are, however, distinguishable on their facts. Unlike the instant case, the defendant's refusal to execute a written waiver in Nielsen, Millican, and Heldt was coupled with additional facts mitigating against effective waiver. Specifically, in Nielsen and Millican, the respective defendants explicitly indicated that they would not sign a written waiver form until they had talked to an attorney. Nielsen, 392 F.2d at 852; Millican, 300 N.E.2d at 360. Only in this context did the Nielsen and Millican courts construe the defendants' subsequent willingness to talk as an equivocal invitation, requiring inquiry before continuing the questioning to determine whether [the] apparent change of position was the product of intelligence and understanding or of ignorance and confusion. Nielsen, 392 F.2d at 853; Millican, 300 N.E.2d at 363 (quoting Nielsen ). Additionally, in Heldt, the defendant, upon being advised of his Miranda rights, told [the FBI agent] he understood his rights but did not wish to waive them, that he refused to sign the waiver form, and that he told [the FBI agent] he did not wish to answer questions.  745 F.2d at 1276 (emphases added). It was under these circumstances that the Heldt court held that the FBI agent's subsequent exhortation to `answer questions anyway' was improper[,] and the prosecution had failed to sustain its burden of proving a knowing and voluntary waiver. Id. at 1278. As for Coleman and Van Dusen, Coleman involved the waiver of the right to counsel in the context of a lineup wherein the defendant refused to execute a statement acknowledging that he had been informed of the right to counsel. 401 N.Y.S.2d 57, 371 N.E.2d at 822. In Van Dusen, the defendant was given an advice of rights form to read prior to questioning but was not orally advised of his rights. 431 F.2d at 1279-80. The defendant refused to execute the waiver of rights portion of the form. Id. at 1280. However, when asked by the FBI agents, the defendant indicated that he understood his rights and was willing to talk. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that in the face of his refusal to sign the waiver, the agents should have orally advised him of his Miranda rights. Id. Although observing that an oral presentation of ... rights would have added little[,] the Van Dusen court suggested in dictum that it would have been prudent for the agents to advise the accused that his failure to sign the waiver would not prevent statements from being used against him. Id. Still, the Van Dusen court expressly rejected this proscriptive code approach[,] stating [i]t would, we think, be folly to try to cast this principle in the form of a specific required practice. Id. at 1280-81. The Van Dusen court continued, [i]ndeed, were we so to rule, a suspect could, by refusing to sign and subsequently talking freely, enjoy the luxury of an immunity bath at no price at all. Id. at 1280. Moreover, the Van Dusen court ultimately held that the prosecution had met its burden of proving waiver. Id. at 1281. As reflected supra, each of the cases cited by Wallace involves factual circumstances critically distinct from the instant case; consequently, his reliance upon them is unavailing. Accordingly, because (1) [r]efusal to sign a waiver form or a written statement, although some evidence of the absence of waiver, may be outweighed by affirmative conduct indicative of a knowingly and intelligently made decision not to remain silent and to waive the right to counsel, Harris, 452 A.2d at 637, and (2) as discussed supra, the circumstances of the instant case evince that Wallace's undisputed willingness to speak constituted an explicit, affirmative act evidencing a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver, we hold that the prosecution satisfied its burden of proof.