Opinion ID: 677610
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Questioning of AY's witnesses.

Text: 40 Finally, AY points to the district court's questioning of several of its witnesses as evidence of unacceptable judicial bias. AY notes four particular instances where the district judge posed more than one or two follow-up questions: (1) the examination of AY's expert accounting witness, Holder, about the definition of the term acquire; (2) the questioning of one of AY's auditors about the appropriateness of listing, as inventory of the FPI partnerships, plants for which FPI had paid Agretech but which Agretech had not acquired and thus did not exist; (3) the questioning of another of AY's auditors about whether AY had correctly calculated net realizable value in its audit of the 1985-I partnership; and (4) the examination of a former FPI employee about a $500,000 invoice paid to FPI by Agretech for consulting services that in fact had never been rendered. 41 These questions do not constitute sufficient grounds for reversal. First, the judge instructed the jury at the beginning of the trial that they were not to consider my questioning of a witness, even if it may become lengthy, as an indication of what I feel about the case in general, or the testimony of that witness in particular. Such an instruction can help alleviate[ ] any appearance of impartiality the judge's questioning may have conveyed. Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 710. 42 Second, a district judge has the undeniable right to examine witnesses and call the jury's attention to important evidence. Id. at 709. In Kennedy, we held that even though the district judge's questioning was not marked by complete indifference [and instead sometimes was] quite pointed and intemperate, reversal was not required. Id. We noted that the trial judge's questioning filled only eight pages of a 400-page trial transcript and that the court [did not] dominate questioning of the witnesses so as to preempt counsel's function. Id. Similarly, the district judge's questioning here filled only 12 pages of a 3,000-page transcript and came nowhere close to preempting counsel. Reversal [is not] required where the judge emphasizes evidence; nor where the judge expresses skepticism, provided that the witness has an opportunity to respond. Kern, 899 F.2d at 780. Such was the case here. 2