Opinion ID: 1195377
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The driver's side pouch was in plain view.

Text: The United States Supreme Court, in Coolidge [v. New Hampshire], held that three factors are required to merit a legitimate plain view observation: (1) prior justification for the intrusion; (2) inadvertent discovery[]; and (3) probable cause to believe the item is evidence of a crime or contraband. 403 U.S. [443,] 465-473 [91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)].... This court has implicitly adopted all three of the Coolidge requirements in [ State v.] Powell [, 61 Haw. 316, 603 P.2d 143 (1979)]. ... Under the plain view doctrine, the requirement of exigent circumstances may be an issue where, because of the warrantless intrusion, the police were placed in plain view of the evidence. However, once the intrusion is justified, there is no requirement of exigency to seize evidence in plain view. ... This interpretation has been upheld... by the Supreme Court ...: The context in which the [ Coolidge ] plurality used the phrase, [plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence,] however, indicates that it was merely a rephrasing of its conclusion ... that in order for the plain-view doctrine to apply, a police officer must be engaged in a lawful intrusion or must otherwise legitimately occupy the position affording him a plain view. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 n. 3 [103 S.Ct. 1535, 1541 n. 3, 75 L.Ed.2d 502] (1983).... .... In valid plain view observations, the intrusion has already lawfully occurred, and the seizure of the evidence in question is an extension of the exception to the warrant requirement. Therefore, as stated by the Supreme Court, `[p]lain view' is perhaps better understood, ... not as an independent `exception' to the Warrant Clause, but simply as an extension of whatever the prior justification for an officer's `access to an object' may be. Brown, 460 U.S. at 738-39 [103 S.Ct. at 1541-42].... Based on the foregoing, we hold that, where a governmental agent is engaged in a lawful intrusion and inadvertently observes evidence of a crime, the seizure of such evidence does not require any further constitutional protection. Wallace, 80 Hawai`i at 397-98, 910 P.2d at 710-11 (quoting Meyer, 78 Hawai`i at 314, 316-17, 893 P.2d at 165, 167-68) (some brackets and ellipsis points added and some in original) (footnote and emphases omitted). As noted above, Officer Unga engaged in a lawful intrusion into the truck. In the course of this investigation, he observed a blue bag on the floor of the truck, out of which was protruding the butt of a gun. Accordingly, the gun was in plain view. Jenkins suggests that, inasmuch as the blue bag had a Velcro flap, the gun could not have been plain view. Jenkins's characterization of the situation is overly restrictive. It is possible that the flap on the bag was not closed when Officer Unga found it or that the end of the gun was protruding out of the cover because the bag was too small to contain it. Moreover, both the circuit court judge and the jury appear to have believed Officer Unga's testimony that he was able to see the butt of the gun. As we have stated, the credibility of witnesses falls within the province of the trier of fact, see Mattiello, 90 Hawai`i at 259, 978 P.2d at 697, and should not be second-guessed by this court. Inasmuch as (1) Officer Unga's traffic stop was not pretextual, (2) there were probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify a search of the truck and seizure of the black pouch, and (3) the gun in the blue bag was in plain view, Jenkins has failed to demonstrate that the guns were unlawfully secured. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in denying Jenkins's motion to suppress evidence.