Opinion ID: 1684698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: relevant time frame.

Text: The rationale articulated in Atkins for prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded offenders was that such offenders have diminished personal culpability because they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders, 536 U.S. at 318, 122 S.Ct. at 2250 (footnote omitted); and that the execution of such offenders does not further the goals of either retribution, because a mentally retarded offender's crimes do not reflect a consciousness materially more depraved than that of any other person guilty of murder, id. at 319, 122 S.Ct. at 2251 (internal citation and quotation omitted), or deterrence, because capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation, id. (internal citation and quotation omitted), and the execution of a mentally retarded offender is unlikely to deter other mentally retarded persons from committing similar crimes. Id. at 320, 122 S.Ct. at 2251. The Court did not state as a rationale that, e.g., the offender does not have the ability to understand that he or she is about to be executed or why, KRS 431.213(2) (definition of insanity for purpose of death penalty exemption), or has no capacity to come to grips with his own conscience or deity. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 2601, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of an insane offender who was sane when he committed the offense). If diminished personal culpability is the rationale for not executing a mentally retarded offender, logic dictates that the diminished culpability exist at the time of the offense, not necessarily at the time of the execution. Both Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, 122 S.Ct. at 2252, and KRS 532.140(1) prohibit imposition of the death penalty on a mentally retarded offender. Presumably, a person becomes an offender at the time of the offense. If the relevant time frame were the time of execution, there would exist the possibility that the IQ test would be significantly skewed by potential depression, tension, and anxiety on the part of [the] defendant, or that the defendant may arguably perceive a stronger motivation to malinger where the reality of facing the death penalty becomes more immediate. [18] United States v. Beckford, 962 F.Supp. 748, 762 n. 13 (E.D.Va.1997) (upholding constitutionality of requirement in 21 U.S.C. § 848(1) of pretrial notice and pretrial examination for purpose of penalty phase mental health defenses, including exemption from death penalty because of mental retardation). That requirement spares both the Commonwealth and the defendant the time-consuming burdens of death-qualifying a jury and conducting a futile death-penalty sentencing trial. Accord State v. Williams, 831 So.2d 835, 860 (La.2002); State v. Flores, 135 N.M. 759, 93 P.3d 1264, 1269 (2004). The issue is more semantical than real. Since mental retardation is a developmental disability that becomes apparent before adulthood, Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321-22, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2643, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993) (citing DSM-III 29 (1987) and Mental Retardation 16-18 (1992)), it would be exceedingly rare for the condition to develop after the offense. And since mental retardation, as contrasted with mental illness, is generally regarded as a permanent, relatively static condition, id. at 323, 113 S.Ct. at 2644 (citing S. Brakel, J. Parry & B. Weiner, The Mentally Disabled and the Law 37 (3d ed.1985)), though it may be ameliorated somewhat through education and habilitation, James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 414, 424 n. 54 (March/May 1985), it would be equally as rare for the condition to recede during the interim between the offense and the execution. We find nothing unconstitutional or contrary to Atkins in the requirement in KRS 532, 135 that mental retardation be determined prior to trial. Of course, that requirement would be unconstitutional if applied to a defendant who was tried and sentenced to death prior to July 13, 1990, and, thus, who had never been afforded an opportunity to assert and prove entitlement to the exemption. Appellant is not within that category.