Opinion ID: 2550843
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does SB 84 Violate The Separation of Powers Doctrine?

Text: Smith first challenges SB 84 on the ground that it violates the constitutionally-mandated separation of powers between the judicial and the legislative branches, by overturning our decision in Smith I. Smith points out that Section 5 makes the new definition of legal parent retroactive, and that Section 6 prohibits a court from holding that Smith I has preclusive effect in determining whether Guest is a legal parent of ANS. Read together, Smith contends, those sections violate Delaware's separation of powers requirement, because a legislature cannot dictate how a court should apply the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata when determining the effect of court judgments that have become final. Smith analogizes this case to Evans v. State , where this Court determined that House Bill No. 31 (HB 31) was unconstitutional because it specifically recited that the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in the case of Evans v. State, 2004 WL 2743546 (Del.Supr.), is null and void. [30] In Evans, we held that it was constitutionally impermissible for legislation to require[] its own [retroactive] application in a case already adjudicated [and] reverse a determination once made, in a particular case. [31] Therefore, we found that the legislation challenged in Evans violated Article IV, §§ 1 and 11 of the Delaware Constitution, because it purported to exercise judicial power in a specific case. [32] Smith's argument is unpersuasive, for three reasons. First, it is well-recognized that the legislature may limit or bar the application of judge-made common law, [33] including preclusion doctrines such as collateral estoppel and res judicata. [34] Legislation of that kind does not amount to the General Assembly exercising judicial power, nor does it raise a separation of powers issue. [35] Second, Evans is materially distinguishable from this case. In Evans, the General Assembly explicitly sought to render null and void this Court's final judgment in a prior case. Indeed, HB 31 expressly referenced the previous case name and citation in its text. [36] In the case of SB 84, that did not occur. Unlike HB 31, Section 6 of SB 84 does not identify a specific case, either by case name or citation. [37] Further, the Senate debates on SB 84 show that that bill was introduced specifically in response to this Court's implicit invitation in Smith I, wherein we observed that [p]roviding relief in such situations [like Guest's] is a public policy decision for the General Assembly to make. [38] Unlike what occurred in Evans, SB 84 was not enacted to overrule retroactively our decision in Smith I. Third, SB 84, as applied to this case, does not retroactively reverse our Smith I decision or render it null and void. Smith I held that Guest lacked standing to petition for custody, because she was not a parent within the meaning of the then-applicable statutory definition. [39] That determination was not predicated upon, nor did this Court address, the merits of whether Guest was a de facto parent or had custody rights to ANS. Smith I addressed only the issue of standing. A litigant's standing to sue (or lack thereof) may change over time. [40] Here, the General Assembly enlarged the categories of statutorily-recognized parent-child relationships. That change in the statutory definition of parent, in turn, enlarged the categories of litigants with standing to petition for custody. [41] Under the newly enacted version of 13 Del. C. § 8-201 (as amended by SB 84), de facto parents, such as Guest, are now parents who have standing to petition for child custody under 13 Del. C. § 721(a). SB 84 did not change the outcome of our decision in Smith I, however, because Smith I interpreted an earlier version of the law. That is, Guest and other de facto parents would still lack standing if they were to petition for custody under the pre-amendment version of Section 8-201, since the legal definition of parent at that time did not include a de facto parent. [42] Because SB 84 did not reverse or render null and void our decision in Smith I, the separation of powers rationale of Evans v. State is inapplicable.