Opinion ID: 811752
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Evidentiary and Trial Error

Text: We quickly dispose of DeSimone's claim that all evidence as to the Disk Shield was extrinsic to the charges and should have been excluded as impermissibly prejudicial evidence of other crimes under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1) and 403. Evidence intrinsic to the crime for which the defendant is charged and is on trial is not governed by Rule 404(b). United States v. Epstein, 426 F.3d 431, 439 (1st Cir. 2005). Since the indictment expressly charged that the Disk Shield scheme gave rise to DeSimone's mail fraud, evidence -18- relating to this scheme is not other crimes evidence and it does not fall within the scope of Rule 404(b). DeSimone also argues the government failed to prove the Disk Shield scheme used the mails, rendering evidence pertaining to the scheme inadmissible. He is wrong for a number of reasons. First, the Disk Shield was part of an overall fraudulent scheme to promote investment in new inventions to a group of investors through a series of lies. It is clear that the mails were used in the overall scheme, especially as to the DrinkStik. The government did not need to show as well use of the mails particular to the Disk Shield. The government need only prove that use of the mails was 'incident to an essential part of the scheme' or 'a step in the plot,' United States v. Stergios, 659 F.3d 127, 133 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710–11 (1989)), not that it was involved in every step of a particular scheme. Further, whether the sum of the evidence showed the Disk Shield scheme used the mails is unrelated to whether evidence of this scheme was admissible at trial. DeSimone finally argues that the Disk Shield evidence was needlessly cumulative and should have been excluded under Rule 403. This argument is without merit. The Disk Shield evidence, pertaining as it did to a mail fraud scheme expressly charged in the indictment, was plainly relevant and neither unfairly prejudicial nor needlessly cumulative. And even if the Disk Shield -19- fraud had not been charged, this evidence also demonstrated DeSimone's modus operandi in duping victims. 2. Evidence of DeSimone's Escape and Conviction for Escape DeSimone next challenges the admission of evidence regarding (1) his 2008 escape from prison and his flight, and (2) his conviction for that escape.7 As a precursor to admissibility [of evidence of flight], the government must present sufficient extrinsic evidence of guilt to support an inference that a defendant's flight was not merely an episode of normal travel but, rather, the product of a guilty conscience related to the crime alleged. United States v. Benedetti, 433 F.3d 111, 116 (1st Cir. 2005). DeSimone argues that the government did not present sufficient predicate evidence that DeSimone's escape was the product of a guilty conscience concerning the mail fraud conduct. He bases his argument on the fact that he turned himself into the Marshals three and a half days after his escape, and also asserts that he escaped in order to defend himself and help his family. The government must present only enough extrinsic evidence to furnish circumstantial badges of 7 After the district court denied DeSimone's pre-trial motion in limine to exclude this evidence, it was DeSimone who brought up the fact of his prior conviction for escape during his crossexamination of McKittrick, and the fact of his escape in his crossexamination of Lindsay, all in an attempt to cast doubt on these witnesses' credibility. We need not reach the government's argument that as a result DeSimone waived this argument under Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000). -20- guilt. Id. at 117. Given that DeSimone escaped from prison two days after learning from his wife that FBI agents were searching his house, attempted to raise money during his flight and turned himself in only after these attempts failed, the trial court had an adequate foundation for finding that DeSimone's flight was the product of a guilty conscience as to these charges. Moreover, there was overwhelming evidence of DeSimone's guilt. DeSimone next attacks the admission of evidence of his escape under Rule 403, saying the escape evidence only went to show his purported bad character. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the prejudice generated by evidence of DeSimone's escape did not substantially outweigh its probative value. The court reduced the possibility of unfair prejudice by instructing the jury that [i]ntentional flight after a Defendant is accused of a crime is not alone sufficient to prove that he or she is guilty. Flight does not create a presumption of guilt. See United States v. Fernández-Hernández, 652 F.3d 56, 70 n.11 (1st Cir. 2011). There was no abuse of discretion in the district court's admission of the conviction for escape and determination that the probative value of this conviction, under Rule 403, outweighed its prejudicial effect to DeSimone. The government offered the conviction in its case in chief as evidence of DeSimone's consciousness of guilt. It added that if DeSimone chose to testify -21- the conviction was also admissible under Rule 609. For the same reasons testimony as to his escape was admissible as consciousness of guilt, the conviction was properly admitted. See United States v. Brito 427 F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 2005). Moreover, the court minimized the prejudice to DeSimone with its instruction as to all three of DeSimone's prior convictions (including filing a false tax return and obtaining money under false pretenses) that [t]he fact that the Defendant was previously convicted of another crime does not mean that he committed the crimes for which he is now on trial. 3. Denial of DeSimone's Motion for a Mistrial DeSimone argues that the court should have granted his motion for a mistrial because one of the government's witnesses, Louis Stein, failed to testify as the government had promised8 when it opposed DeSimone's motion in limine. DeSimone's theory is that but for this representation the evidence of his flight would have been inadmissible, and its admission was so harmful as to require a mistrial. Our review is for manifest abuse of discretion. United States v. Freeman, 208 F.3d 332, 339 (1st Cir. 2000). The district court disagreed with DeSimone's contention that Stein had 8 The government proffered that Stein would testify that Rocco DeSimone told him that the reason why he fled, the reason why he escaped from prison was this case, that he didn't want to go to jail for the rest of his life. Stein testified, instead, that DeSimone said he escaped to help his family and that he felt McKittrick was framing him in the DrinkStik investigation. -22- failed to testify as promised and, in any event, correctly noted that the evidence was admissible because it's the timing of all the events that's really the critical connection between the escape and the consciousness of guilt. Stein's testimony provided no basis to exclude evidence of DeSimone's flight, much less order a mistrial. 4. Admission of Evidence Purported to Be Hearsay DeSimone argues there was error in admitting testimony about two statements attributed to his wife, Gail DeSimone: (1) FBI agent Steven Morley's testimony that during the FBI's search of DeSimone's home, he heard Gail tell DeSimone by telephone that agents were searching for evidence regarding the Disk Shield and DrinkStik; and (2) McKittrick's testimony that Gail told him that Johnson had been to DeSimone's house. DeSimone incorrectly argues that these statements were hearsay. The district court admitted Morley's testimony regarding Gail's statements not for the truth of the matter asserted, but to show that DeSimone was put on notice of the FBI search. See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa, 818 F.2d 1020, 1026 (1st Cir. 1987). As to McKittrick's report of Gail's (false) statements that Johnson had visited their house, these statements were not admitted for their truth and so were not inadmissible hearsay. -23- 5. Identification of DeSimone's Voice DeSimone next claims that the court erred in allowing a witness, Brian DesMarteau, to testify that he spoke with DeSimone over the telephone when he had no prior familiarity with DeSimone's voice. Fed. R. Evid. 901 requires only a reasonable probability, United States v. Barrow, 448 F.3d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 2006), that the speaker in the conversation was DeSimone. DesMarteau testified that he was an appraiser of businesses, and that the conversation he described was an interview to see if I would be able to assess the value of a particular asset that they were considering for sale. The speaker also identified himself as DeSimone to DesMarteau. The government introduced into evidence a letter agreement from DesMarteau to DeSimone and McKittrick confirm[ing] that you (Client) have retained Nationwide Valuations (Nationwide) to provide valuation consulting services. This document, signed by DeSimone and memorializing an agreement reached in a conversation, provided adequate grounds for concluding that DeSimone was party to the conversation. 6. Failure of Court Sua Sponte to Declare Mistrial After a Witness's Testimony, Elicited by the Defense, that DeSimone Had Previously Pled Guilty DeSimone claims error in the district court's failure sua sponte to declare a mistrial after Malone, on cross-examination by defense counsel, referred to the fact that Mr. DeSimone pleaded guilty. This was a reference to DeSimone's initial guilty plea in -24- this case, which he withdrew. DeSimone did not move for a mistrial before the district court. Instead, after Malone's statement, the district court sua sponte asked counsel if they had [a]ny bright ideas, to which defense counsel responded [y]ou can certainly instruct the jury. I had no idea he was going to say that. I asked those questions I did, but I think you can instruct them. The court then, as defense counsel requested, gave a strong instruction to the jury both to disregard the comment and about the presumption of innocence. Defense counsel did not object. We review the district court's failure to declare a mistrial sua sponte for plain error. United States v. Lopez Garcia, 672 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2012). Here, there was no error at all. Moreover, the district court minimized any prejudice by instructing the jury to disregard the statement that the witness just made and artfully implying that it related to DeSimone's prior involvements with the criminal justice system. 7. The Government's Cross-Examination of DeSimone DeSimone challenges the government's cross-examination of him in two respects. First, he argues that its cross-examination contained numerous improper questions that had no evidentiary basis, such as asking DeSimone if he told various people, who never testified, that he knew famous celebrities, had collected additional investments, or was involved in other inventions, though he did not object to these questions at trial. DeSimone -25- does not explain why these were errors, much less how he was harmed, and the record shows that he falsely claimed to have known prominent people, thus providing a basis for the questions. DeSimone next asserts that the government improperly asked DeSimone to comment on the credibility of other witnesses. “[I]t is improper for an attorney to ask a witness whether another witness lied on the stand. United States v. Thiongo, 344 F.3d 55, 61 (1st Cir. 2003). This rule is not read broadly. It is not improper to ask one witness whether another was wrong or mistaken, since such questions do not force a witness to choose between conceding the point or branding another witness as a liar. United States v. Gaines, 170 F.3d 72, 81-82 (1st Cir. 1999). There is no error in simply asking a witness if he agreed with or disputed another witness's testimony. United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 25 (1st Cir. 2006). In cross-examining DeSimone, the government asked him without objection whether other witnesses had offered testimony that was untruthful, not true, or untrue. The government asked DeSimone whether witnesses were giving false testimony or testimony that was inaccurate, and DeSimone's objections to these questions were overruled. The government correctly concedes that [t]he instances of 'untruthful testimony' . . . and 'giving false testimony' . . . are somewhat closer to the line. Indeed, they -26- went over the line. It also correctly argues that not true does not necessarily imply deliberate falsity. There was certainly no plain error as to the unobjectedto questions, and no harm from those as to which an objection was made. Even if the government's questions intruded into the jury's role, the line of questioning was harmless. There were obvious inconsistencies between DeSimone's testimony and that of other witnesses which were apparent to the jury. Any error could not have contribute[d] to the verdict, United States v. Cudlitz, 72 F.3d 992, 999 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. RullanRivera, 60 F.3d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1996)). The cumulative error doctrine is of no use to DeSimone because the only identified error was harmless. B. Attacks on the Forfeiture and Restitution Orders and Sentencing DeSimone challenges the district court's orders on forfeiture and restitution and his sentence. We review factual findings at forfeiture hearings and sentencing for clear error. United States v. Reiner, 500 F.3d 10, 18 (1st Cir. 2007) (forfeiture); United States v. Shinderman, 515 F.3d 5, 18 (1st Cir. 2008) (sentencing). 1. Forfeiture: The Ownership of the Renoir Painting The court found that Dyer had been fraudulently induced to exchange a Renoir painting for one percent of Falcon, Limited, and ordered DeSimone to forfeit the painting. DeSimone now asserts -27- that Dyer owned one-half of the Renoir and that DeSimone owned the other half, basing his argument on a declaration by Dyer that his losses included $1,600,000 Half of Renoir painting. He claims that he should only have been ordered to forfeit half the painting. His argument fails. Although Dyer's declaration and his testimony created ambiguity concerning the extent of his ownership of the Renoir, the district court sensibly relied on DeSimone's own record of the transaction. It stated that Allan H. Dyer exchange[d] 'Paysage a Cagnes' 1915 painting oil on canvas by Pierce-August [sic] Renoir for 1% of Falcon LTD equal to 100 (one hundred) shares. No more was needed.
DeSimone perfunctorily argues that the court should not have increased his offense level at sentencing based on the number of victims, since there were only eight victims, because the jury found DeSimone not guilty on the counts (counts 2 and 5) related to Dennis Mortimer and David Durning, and the remaining individuals indicated as victims never testified. There was no error. A court may consider acquitted conduct in determining the applicability vel non of a sentencing enhancement, United States v. Paneto, 661 F.3d 709, 715 (1st Cir. 2011), and a court's consideration of evidence at sentencing is not circumscribed by rules of evidence, United States v. Zapata, 589 F.3d 475, 485 (1st -28- Cir. 2009), or the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, United States v. Rodriguez, 336 F.3d 67, 71 (1st Cir. 2003).
Finally, DeSimone asserts for the first time on appeal that the district court's restitution order is in error because it includes the value of a Monet painting that was not an actual loss related to the mail fraud allegations. DeSimone's premise is wrong. While the district court did not itemize the specific losses comprising the $3,230,000 in restitution owed to Dyer, this sum plainly includes the three transactions with Dyer that DeSimone recorded -- i.e., $2,415,000 in forgiven debt, plus a Renoir that IRS agent Niro valued at $800,000 -- plus another $15,000 that Dyer gave to Falcon. The Monet did not factor into the calculation.