Opinion ID: 1133683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Whether Instruction 15 (defining felonious child abuse) was constitutional and supported by the evidence.

Text: ś 154. Rubenstein next argues the jury was improperly instructed on the elements of felonious child abuse. Specifically, Rubenstein claims the instruction was unconstitutionally vague and not supported by the evidence. The State correctly points out that Rubenstein did not raise an objection to the felonious child abuse instruction at trial. Therefore, this issue is procedurally barred. See Williams, 684 So.2d at 1203. ś 155. Although the issue is procedurally barred, we will briefly address the merits of Rubenstein's challenge to the instruction. Rubenstein contends the instruction was inadequate and not supported by the evidence. Instruction 15 stated, [u]nder the laws of the State of Mississippi, felonious child abuse is defined as intentional torture in such a manner as to cause serious bodily injury or the death of any child. Miss.Code Ann. Section 97-5-39(2)(a) provides: Any person who shall intentionally (i) burn any child, (ii) torture any child or, (iii) except in self-defense or in order to prevent bodily harm to a third party, whip, strike or otherwise abuse or mutilate any child in such a manner as to cause serious bodily harm, shall be guilty of felonious abuse of a child. . . . Jury Instruction 15 accurately tracks the language of the felonious child abuse statute. [T]his Court has `consistently held that instructions in a criminal case which follow the language of a pertinent statute are sufficient.' Byrom v. State, 863 So.2d 836, 880 (Miss.2003) (quoting Crenshaw v. State, 520 So.2d 131, 134 (Miss. 1988)). ś 156. Furthermore, the language of Section 97-5-39(2)(a) is not vague. The statute provides a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited. Faraga v. State, 514 So.2d 295, 303 (Miss.1987). Moreover, this Court has held that `the intentional act of murdering a child by any manner or form constitutes felonious child abuse and, therefore, constitutes capital murder under Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2).' Brawner v. State, 872 So.2d 1, 16 (Miss.2004) (quoting Stevens v. State, 806 So.2d 1031, 1044 (Miss.2001)). Therefore, Instruction 15 was not unconstitutional. ś 157. According to Dr. Hayne's testimony, four-year-old Krystal would have experienced panic and terror while being strangled. Additionally, Dr. Hayne said she would have experienced pain and suffering from compression of those structures of the neck, not only light[-]headedness, but certainly air starving and the like. ś 158. Furthermore, Krystal was discovered nude on a bed with her legs spread open. The State submits that Krystal's state of undress and location cannot be totally disregarded. In Brown v. State, 690 So.2d 276, 281 (Miss.1996), Dr. Hayne, the forensic pathologist, found no evidence of sexual assault. However, the victim was found nude with her bra pulled behind her head, and the girl's wounds indicated abuse. Id. We stated: Although it was not necessary to prove sexual battery or rape, evidence supporting the State's theory that Brown went to the Boyd house to have sex with Evangela is not totally irrelevant. While Dr. Hayne, the forensic pathologist, found no evidence of sexual assault, the girl's body was discovered nude with her bra pulled behind her head. Her wounds indicate that she had been abused, struck and mutilated consistent with the definition of felonious abuse and/or battery of a child provided in § 97-5-39. Id. at 291. ś 159. The State also asserts that, based on expert testimony, it is reasonable to infer that Krystal may have witnessed her parents' murders before her death. Both Darrell and Annie had multiple stab wounds, and both Dr. Hayne and Dr. Bass testified all three were killed at roughly the same time. ś 160. We cannot say Instruction 15 was unsupported by the evidence. Thus, we find this assignment of error is without merit.