Opinion ID: 867577
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Olson's Identification

Text: ¶ 11 Prion moved to suppress Olson's pretrial identification as unduly suggestive, unreliable, and in violation of his constitutional rights. Prion claimed that photographs viewed by Olson were suggestive because each was a single photograph, and they listed the defendant's name and the fact that he was incarcerated. The trial court noted the weakness of the identification but nevertheless allowed it into evidence. [1] ¶ 12 At trial, Olson identified Prion as the man he saw with Vicari on the night she disappeared. Olson had seen photographs of Prion on two earlier occasions. The first was August 1993 when the police showed Olson a mug shot of Prion. At that time, Olson could not identify Prion. He stated that the person in the photograph did not look familiar. ¶ 13 The second occasion occurred when Olson saw separate photographs of both the defendant and Vicari on the cover of the January 1995 Tucson Weekly. Prion's photograph supplied his name and date of birth and indicated that he was incarcerated. Moreover, the Weekly labeled Prion as the prime suspect in the Vicari murder. After viewing this photograph, Olson identified Prion as the man who was with Vicari on the night she disappeared. ¶ 14 We review orders regarding motions to suppress on an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 603, 832 P.2d 593, 620 (1992). Pretrial identifications which are fundamentally unfair implicate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. 229, 241, 25 P.3d 717, 729 ¶ 23 (2001) (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297-98, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967)); see also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). To show a due process violation, the defendant must prove that the circumstances surrounding the pretrial identification created a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification and that the state was responsible for that suggestive pretrial identification. State v. Williams, 166 Ariz. 132, 135-39, 800 P.2d 1240, 1243-47 (1987). ¶ 15 There is no need to perform a Biggers analysis when the identification is not the result of state action. Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. at 241, 25 P.3d at 729 ¶ 24 (Because the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment ... cannot be established, due process is inapposite.) (citation omitted). We find no state action here which resulted in the identification. The article and photograph were published by the Tucson Weekly. The article was written by a freelance writer not employed by the Tucson Police Department. While the writer had some contact with the police and misrepresented herself to others as having the approval of the police, we agree with the trial court that she was not an agent of the Tucson Police Department nor the Pima County Attorney ... and had no direct contact or cooperation from Det. Salgado. ¶ 16 As this court noted in Nordstrom, due process concerns may be implicated where a minimal threshold of reliability is not met. Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. at 241, 25 P.3d at 729 ¶ 26. While Olson's identification of Prion was weak, we believe the state demonstrated at least the threshold standard of reliability set forth in Williams, 166 Ariz. at 137, 800 P.2d at 1245. ¶ 17 Defense counsel thoroughly cross examined Olson regarding his identification. Prion presented the testimony of another bar employee to discredit Olson. He also presented testimony from a psychologist regarding problems inherent in eyewitness identification. The jury heard that Olson could not identify Prion from the photograph shown him by the police in August 1993. ¶ 18 Any complaints concerning the identification go to its weight and credibility, not its admissibility. Such matters are of course for the jury to consider. Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. at 242, 25 P.3d at 730 ¶ 27. In our view, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Olson's identification of Prion.