Opinion ID: 807363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Shelby Lee Young

Text: Young bought one- and two-ounce quantities of cocaine base from another coconspirator that he divided and sold. He sold crack cocaine to law enforcement during three of the 14 controlled buys and was present for a fourth. In the three controlled buys, Young sold 3.64 grams, 4.89 grams, and 4.17 grams of crack cocaine, respectively. The presentence report attributed to him 63.79 grams of cocaine base. Young pled guilty to a lesser-included offense. He had an extensive criminal background of ten adult convictions, including two prior felony drug convictions. With seven criminal history points, Young had a total offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of VI, for a range of 188 to 235 months. Young requested a downward variance from his designation as a career offender. At sentencing, the district court noted the serious nature of Young’s offense. The court said it had considered the career offender enhancement and Young’s history and characteristics. (“I have considered his age, his childhood, his history, his education, his lack of education. He also does not have a substantial work history. In considering the Sentencing Guidelines, I have considered the Career Offender Guideline, the extent to which it enhances what his sentence would otherwise be, and the extent to which it exhibits the will of Congress.”). The court sentenced Young to 188 months, the bottom of the guidelines range. Young appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him. He requests that this court abolish the presumption of reasonableness and “find that any application of the Guidelines is an abuse of discretion as the Guidelines have corrupted the integrity of the Judicial Branch.” He contends that any consideration of the Guidelines is unreasonable and unconstitutional. -3- This court reviews Young’s constitutional challenge to his sentence de novo. United States v. Carpenter, 487 F.3d 623, 625 (8th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court requires courts to examine the Guidelines as one factor under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See, e.g., Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 90 (2007) (“In accord with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the Guidelines, formerly mandatory, now serve as one factor among several courts must consider in determining an appropriate sentence.”); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“As a matter of administration and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark.”); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 352 (2007) (“This Court’s Sixth Amendment cases do not . . . prohibit the sentencing judge from taking account of the Sentencing Commission’s factual findings or recommended sentences.”); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (“Without the ‘mandatory’ provision, the Act nonetheless requires judges to take account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals.”). The district court properly considered the sentencing guidelines, specifically noting that the Guidelines were an important “but not in any way controlling factor to be considered.” Young’s arguments are without merit.