Opinion ID: 541804
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Services Provided at King's View

Text: 43 Michelle was hospitalized at King's View because of an acute psychiatric crisis. Her wild and destructive rages rendered her not only unable to benefit from education, but, indeed, generally uncontrollable. 44 At King's View, Michelle's program consisted of a residential/therapeutic program coordinated with an on-grounds classroom program. She spent her day in a variety of therapy programs including individual therapy, pottery, and animal care. These therapies were provided by various persons who met the state licensing or training requirements for hospital medical staff. Psychiatric nurses supervised the residential component of Michelle's program and were trained to complement her total treatment program. By law, a licensed physician, though not necessarily the primary treating physician, was required to supervise Michelle's overall treatment program. On the other hand, none of Michelle's therapy was actually provided by psychiatrists, nor did she require the prescription of psychotropic medication. 45 Because school districts are required by state law to provide education to school-aged patients confined to hospitals, see Cal.Educ.Code Sec. 56167, King's Canyon Unified School District provides classroom instructors, both regular and special education teachers, to meet the educational needs of children in King's View. Michelle received approximately one to two hours per day of classroom instruction during her time at King's View. Michelle's program at the hospital was implemented not by the Individualized Education Program (IEP) designed by the school system, but was instead determined by a medical team, supervised by a licensed physician. The amount of time spent in the classroom was determined by the hospital staff, and dependent upon her other treatment needs. 46 B. The Services Are Not Primarily To Aid Michelle To Benefit From Special Education But Rather Are Excludable Medical Services 47 Michelle was hospitalized primarily for medical, i.e. psychiatric, reasons, and therefore the District Court erred when it determined hospitalization to be a related service for which Clovis was responsible under the Act. 48 The psychotherapeutic services Michelle received at King's View may be qualitatively similar to those she would receive at a residential placement, and it is clear that some psychological services are explicitly included within the definition of related services under the Act when pupils need such services to benefit from their special instruction. However, the intensity of Michelle's program indicates that the services she received were focused upon treating an underlying medical crisis. Where, as here, a child requires six hours per day of intensive psychotherapy, such services would appear medical in that they address a medical crisis. 49 Further, although Michelle could be helped by treatment by psychologists rather than psychiatrists, it stands to reason that the high cost of her placement is due to the status of King's View as a medical facility, requiring a staff of licensed physicians, a high staff to patient ratio, and other services which would not be available or required at a placement in an educational institution. While the cost of medical and hospital services is not dispositive, the Court in Tatro noted that the Secretary of Education, in promulgating the regulations, excluded the services of a physician or hospital partly because such services are far more expensive than the services, for example, of a school nurse. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 893, 104 S.Ct. at 3377. Clearly hospital care is, and was understood by Congress and Secretary of Education to be, a far more expensive proposition than an educational residential placement and a greater burden than the states could ordinarily be expected to shoulder in their budgets for education. 50 This conclusion is also supported by the failure of Congress to include hospitalization explicitly as a related service or placement under the Act. As the Supreme Court wrote in Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1539, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1982) [i]f Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. Similarly, in Board of Education v. Rowley the Court found that the EHA does not require states to maximize the potential of each handicapped child, noting that any other view would be contrary to the fundamental proposition that Congress, when exercising its spending power, can impose no burden upon the states unless it does so unambiguously. 458 U.S. 176, 190 n. 11, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3042 n. 11, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1981). We, too, recognize the unfairness of requiring school districts to pay for hospitalization on the basis of broad interpretations of ambiguous language in funding statutes such as the EHA. 51 Our decision is further supported by the state's characterization of hospitals such as King's View. Under section 1412(6) of the Act, the state educational agency is responsible for assuring that all educational programs for handicapped children ... shall meet education standards of the State educational agency. Thus the underlying policies which direct the establishment of individualized educational programs and their implementation are left to the discretion of educators and parents within the state. See Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208-09 nn. 30, 31, 102 S.Ct. at 3051-52 nn. 30, 31. In California, hospitals such as King's View come under the jurisdiction of the State Department of Health Services. 4 They are not included as educational placement options for handicapped pupils in that state. See Cal.Educ.Code Secs. 56360, 56167. The District Court was not free to substitute its own standards for educational programs for those of the state. See Doe v. Anrig, 651 F.Supp. at 430 (school district not financially responsible for placement at a psychiatric hospital as institution was not a state approved special education facility); Darlene L. v. Illinois State Board of Education, 568 F.Supp. 1340, 1345-46 (N.D.Ill.1983) (upholding a state regulation excluding psychiatric hospitals as placement options for handicapped pupils under the Act.) 52 Furthermore, King's View hardly provided Michelle with any educational services. Rather, the local school district sent both regular and special education teachers to King's View to meet the educational needs of Michelle and other children who were patients there. Because King's View does not provide its patients with educational services, it differs substantially from facilities found by other circuits to be residential placements within the ambit of 34 C.F.R. Sec. 300.302 for which school districts are financially responsible. In Jefferson County Board of Education v. Breen, 853 F.2d 853, 857 (11th Cir.1988), the Eleventh Circuit required a school district to pay for a child's placement at The Ranch, a Brown school, as the school had the facilities to provide the child with an integrated program of educational and other supporting services. The Breen court expressly refused to place the child in a psychiatric hospital, finding that such a placement was inappropriate under the Act as the hospital lacked the facilities to provide the child with an appropriate education. Id. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Clevenger v. Oak Ridge School Board, 744 F.2d 514 (6th Cir.1984), required the school district to pay for the placement of a seriously emotionally disturbed youth at San Marcos School, a Brown school, on the grounds that the school could meet the child's educational and related needs. Id. at 516. The absence of educational services provided by King's View indicates that the room and board were medically as opposed to educationally related. They were thus outside the purview of 34 C.F.R. Sec. 300.302 which provides that where placement in a public or private residential program is necessary to provide special education and related services to a handicapped child, the program including non-medical care and room and board, must be at no cost to the parents. (Emphasis added). 53 In fact, the educational services which the school district provided Michelle at King's View are those encompassed by the Act itself which states that special education includes specially designed instruction at home, at hospitals and at institutions. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(16). In enacting this provision, Congress sought to ensure that children confined to hospitals or homes for either physical or mental illnesses would not be denied an education. School districts, therefore, are required to send tutors and other trained specialists to both homes and hospitals to meet the educational needs of handicapped children. However, section 1401(16) does not require school districts to pay the costs of a child's room and board at home and similarly does not require them to pay the room and board costs at a hospital. 54 Michelle may well be entitled to funds from other social agencies to cover the costs of her hospitalization, but the school district is not the proper agency for such relief. OTHER ISSUES 55 Some brief mention must be made of the other issues presented in the appeals on the merits. Sectarian Status Of King's View 56 The federal regulations governing the use of federal grant monies for education explicitly prohibit the use of such funds for religious purposes. 34 C.F.R. Sec. 76.532. Similarly, California prohibits the state from contracting with a sectarian hospital for instructional services. Cal.Educ.Code Sec. 56361.5(a). 57 At trial Clovis moved to amend its pleading and offer testimony on the issue of King's View's affiliation with the Mennonite church. At that time, the District Court denied the motion and excluded Clovis' proffered testimony relating to the decertification, considering the matter one for decision by the state courts. In its letter decertifying King's View, the State Department of Education wrote that Michelle may remain [at King's View] pending the outcome of the litigation because [t]he Department does not believe it is wise to administratively decide an issue that is properly before the court and federal law appears to disallow any interference with a Hearing Officer's decision by the state agency, except by appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction. In its final judgment, the District Court effectively determined the issue to have been mooted by the Superintendent's decision not to move Michelle. We agree. The Shorey Cross-Appeal 58 At trial, the District Court indicated that, because its decision constituted an appeal from the administrative hearing in this case, it could not order placement beyond the end of the 1985-86 school year to which the administrative hearing officer's decision applied. In their cross-appeal, the Shoreys contend that the District Court erred in failing to grant their motion to amend the judgment to extend Michelle's placement. Because we reverse the order of the District Court ordering Clovis to pay for Michelle's placement while at the same time we require the school district to pay for such placement during the pendency of the review proceedings under the stay-put provisions of 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(3), we need not decide whether there was any error in the failure of the District Court to extend that placement for another year. 59 The Shoreys also contend that the state defendants, in aligning themselves with appellant Clovis in this action, have violated EHA's requirements of finality and impartiality, 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(b)(2) and (e)(1), by renouncing and seeking to overturn [their] own decision. This argument is meritless. Under the EHA, parents must be accorded the right to take disputes as to the identification, assessment, and placement of handicapped children to an impartial due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415. States are accorded the option of providing either for hearings by a local or intermediate educational agency with review by a state agency, or for a single hearing by a state level agency. Impartiality is ensured by the requirement that the hearing may not be conducted by an employee of an agency which is either directly or indirectly involved in the education or care of the child. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(b)(2); Robert M. v. Benton, 634 F.2d 1139, 1141-42 (8th Cir.1980). California has implemented a system of single, state level hearings. Although the State Department of Education in this case is in the seemingly unique position of challenging an administrative determination rendered in its name by an independent hearing officer, the Office of Administrative Hearings in this case is not an employee of the State Department of Education and there is no indication that his decision in this case was not impartial. 60 Under the EHA, the decision of the hearing officer is final and enforceable unless appealed. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(1) and (3). It has been treated as such in this case. The state defendants have simply aligned themselves with Clovis, which properly brought this appeal. In short, neither the impartiality of the administrative decision nor its finality are threatened by the state defendants' posture in this case. Attorneys' Fees Award 61 In view of our disposition on the merits of the case, it is apparent that Michelle Shorey was not a prevailing party and therefore was not entitled to attorneys' fees under 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(4). 62 The judgment of the District Court is REVERSED. The order granting attorneys' fees to Michelle is also REVERSED. Each party will bear its own costs on appeal.