Opinion ID: 147686
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standing to Bring Suit

Text: McAlpine appeals the district court’s finding that he lacked standing to pursue his conversion claim because HCC owned the airplane. Standing requires an injury in fact, “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing [standing].” Id. (citations omitted). McAlpine cannot meet his burden with “mere allegations,” but must “‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts.’” Id. (quoting F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(e)). That is, McAlpine must raise a genuine issue of material fact as to standing. Croft v. Governor of Tex., 562 F.3d 735, 746 (5th Cir. 2009). Although we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “once the moving party meets its initial burden of pointing out the absence of a genuine issue for trial, the burden is on the nonmoving party to come forward with competent summary judgment evidence establishing the existence of a material factual dispute.” Clark v. America’s Favorite Chicken Co., 110 F.3d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). At issue here is whether McAlpine personally suffered an injury in fact. Defendants contend, and the district court found, that the airplane belonged to HCC and that McAlpine suffered no injury himself. McAlpine argues that: (1) he did in fact own the airplane, and (2) even if he did not own the airplane, he had a “right of possession” that Defendants violated. 6 Case: 09-10407 Document: 00511129562 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/02/2010 No. 09-10407 1. Whether McAlpine established a fact issue concerning ownership of the airplane “Generally, corporations have an existence separate and distinct from that of their shareholders . . . and an individual shareholder cannot secure a personal recovery for an alleged wrong done to a corporation . . .” Thomas v. N.A. Chase Manhattan Bank, 994 F.2d 236, 243 (5th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted). This remains true even for close corporations and sole shareholders. Id. McAlpine contends that he presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he owned the airplane. At all relevant times, HCC was the registered owner of the airplane. McAlpine and his father testified in depositions that McAlpine’s father transferred ownership of HCC to McAlpine in 2003 or 2004. In response to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, McAlpine provided the district court with a handwritten, notarized statement by his father purporting to transfer all HCC stock to McAlpine. Assuming that ownership of HCC passed from father to son, McAlpine was, at most, a shareholder in HCC, which owned the airplane. Although McAlpine may have presented sufficient competent evidence to raise a fact issue as to the ownership of HCC, he has not presented any evidence creating a fact issue as to the ownership of the airplane.1 In the alternative, McAlpine contends that HCC was “defunct” and thus the aircraft automatically distributed to him as the sole shareholder of HCC. McAlpine did not, however, present any evidence at summary judgment that supported these assertions.2 McAlpine therefore failed to “come forward with 1 McAlpine also argues that, because shareholders are equitable owners of a corporation’s assets, as HCC’s sole owner, he could have given the airplane to himself without following any corporate formalities. McAlpine did not suggest below, and he does not claim before this Court, that he actually did cause HCC to give him the airplane. A legal hypothetical, standing without factual support, cannot create a genuine fact issue. 2 McAlpine contends that he was not required to present evidence of HCC’s dissolution because it was a Delaware corporation and Delaware corporate law does not necessitate a formal dissolution. McAlpine did not raise this argument below, and it is therefore waived. 7 Case: 09-10407 Document: 00511129562 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/02/2010 No. 09-10407 competent summary judgment evidence establishing the existence of a material factual dispute.” Clark, 110 F.3d at 297 (citations omitted). 2. Whether McAlpine established a fact issue concerning his right to immediate possession of the aircraft McAlpine next argues that he presented sufficient evidence to establish a fact issue as to his right to possess the airplane. Defendants, he contends, did not challenge his right to possession at summary judgment, but instead only challenged his ownership of the plane. Therefore, McAlpine argues that he was not required to set forth evidence that he had a legal right to possess the airplane, and that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Defendants on the conversion claim. As discussed above, “once the moving party meets its initial burden of pointing out the absence of a genuine issue for trial, the burden is on the nonmoving party to come forward with competent summary judgment evidence establishing the existence of a material factual dispute.” Id. (citations omitted). In addition, “[i]f a party fails to assert a legal reason why summary judgment should not be granted, that ground is waived and cannot be considered or raised on appeal.” Vaughner v. Pulito, 804 F.2d 873, 878 n.2 (5th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, and their briefs in support, covered more than McAlpine claims. Defendants generally denied McAlpine’s standing to bring suit, not merely as an owner of the airplane. With McAlpine’s lack of evidence in support of standing thereby “point[ed] out,” McAlpine had an obligation to set out facts showing a genuine fact issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). A right to possession is an incident of an interest in property at the time of its conversion. Jones v. Boswell, 250 S.W.3d 140, 143–44 (Tex. 8 Case: 09-10407 Document: 00511129562 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/02/2010 No. 09-10407 App.—Eastland 2008, no pet.).3 As discussed above, however, McAlpine did not raise a fact issue as to whether he owned the airplane or had legal possession of it. Nor did he claim, or present evidence to the effect that he held a lien or any other interest in the property that would entitle him to its immediate possession. Therefore, he failed to create a fact issue, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.4 C. The Motion to Alter or Amend the District Court’s Judgment Finally, McAlpine argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) despite his presentation of newly discovered evidence and the need to correct a clear error of law. In his motion to alter or amend the judgment, McAlpine raised several arguments concerning what he considered to be the district court’s failure to take into account all of the evidence in the light most favorable to him at summary judgment. He accused Defendants of perjury, malice, and acting in bad faith. He also accused the court of failing to enforce Defendants’ discovery obligations, improperly granting a protective order in favor of Defendants, and allowing two of his attorneys to withdraw from his representation without his signed consent and without hearings. In an appendix to his motion, he presented photographs allegedly showing damage to the airplane that had not been part of the summary judgment record and deposition testimony concerning his fraud and misrepresentation claims, which are not part of this appeal. The district court found that McAlpine failed to present any new evidence 3 In addition, as McAlpine notes, such a right may be established by actual possession at the time of the conversion. Gardner v. Jones, 570 S.W.2d 198, 200–01 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ). However, in this case, the alleged conversion occurred after McAlpine transferred possession of the airplane. 4 Because the district court did not err when it found that McAlpine did not have standing to pursue his conversion claim, we do not address the district court’s determination that McAlpine presented no evidence of damages stemming from Defendants’ alleged actions. 9 Case: 09-10407 Document: 00511129562 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/02/2010 No. 09-10407 that had been unavailable at the time of summary judgment and continued to fail to present any competent evidence of his ownership of the airplane. McAlpine concedes that his Rule 59(e) motion presented only one piece of “new” evidence: deposition testimony that allegedly supports Porsche’s involvement in the alleged conversion of the plane, and the continuation of the retrofitting program after Hurricane Charley. Porsche, however, never contested its involvement in the program. The record also supports the continuation of the retrofitting program. Neither fact, however, supports McAlpine’s fraud and misrepresentation claims, which he premised on the inadequacy of the retrofittings performed after Hurricane Charley. McAlpine also contends that he was due Rule 59(e) relief to correct a “manifestly unjust” result. He argues that the district court clearly erred by finding that he did not have standing because the district court (1) improperly relied on FAA registration data, (2) ignored evidence that HCC had become defunct, and (3) ignored evidence of damages. As to McAlpine’s first argument, although the summary judgment order mentions the airplane’s FAA registration, it relies on the absence of evidence set forth by McAlpine. As to his second, McAlpine brought forth no evidence that HCC had dissolved, but only made an assertion in a brief in opposition to summary judgment. And as to his third, McAlpine misstates the district court’s finding at summary judgment, as it found that McAlpine had not presented any competent evidence that he had suffered damages as a result of Defendants’ actions. McAlpine’s motion to alter or amend the judgment merely recapitulated his prior arguments and claims, while accusing the district court and Defendants of improper conduct. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying it.