Opinion ID: 2747273
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: On a Highway

Text: The difference between this case and Nelson and Enriquez is the location of the vehicle. In Nelson and Enriquez the vehicles were clearly on public highways. Compare Nelson, 281 Va. at 214, 707 S.E.2d at 816, with Enriquez, 283 Va. at 513, 722 S.E.2d at 253. In this case, Sarafin was on private property, namely, his own driveway. The question remains whether Code § 18.2-266 is violated when the operation of the vehicle occurs on a private way. Code § 18.2-266 contains an explicit on a highway requirement for the operation of mopeds. However, the statute 9 includes no explicit language requiring an operator of a motor vehicle to be on a highway to sustain a conviction under Code § 18.2-266. Sarafin invites us, based on his reading of the definition of operator contained in Code § 46.2-100, 3 to imply an on a highway requirement for illegal operation of a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. We decline this invitation for several reasons. First, we agree with the Commonwealth that the plain language of Code § 18.2-266 demonstrates there is no on a highway requirement for the operation of motor vehicles. The General Assembly clearly knows how to impose an on a highway requirement, but chose not to do so where the operator of a motor vehicle is intoxicated. In Code § 18.2-266, the General Assembly prohibits the operation of mopeds, [] on the public highways of this Commonwealth while the operator is intoxicated. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, the General Assembly included a public highway requirement in Virginia’s implied consent statute, 3 Code § 46.2-100 defines operator as: every person who either (i) drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on a highway or (ii) is exercising control over or steering a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle. (Emphasis added.) 10 Code § 18.2-268.2. Of course, the implied consent law is based upon the premise that a user of public roads in the Commonwealth consents to have samples of his blood, breath, or both blood and breath taken for a chemical test to determine the alcohol, drug, or both alcohol and drug content of his blood, if he is arrested for violation of § 18.2-266, 18.2-266.1, or subsection B of § 18.2-272 or of a similar ordinance within three hours of the alleged offense. Id. [W]hen the General Assembly has used specific language in one instance, but omits that language or uses different language when addressing a similar subject elsewhere in the Code, we must presume that the difference in the choice of language was intentional. See Zinone v. Lee's Crossing Homeowners Ass'n, 282 Va. 330, 337, 714 S.E.2d 922, 925 (2011)(citing Hollingsworth v. Norfolk Southern Railway, 279 Va. 360, 366-67 & n.2, 689 S.E.2d 651, 654-55 & n.2 (2010); Halifax Corp. v. First Union National Bank, 262 Va. 91, 100, 546 S.E.2d 696, 702 (2001). Based on this well-established rule of statutory construction, we hold that Code § 18.2-266 contains no on a highway requirement for the operation of motor vehicles. Our conclusion is further supported by the fact that Code § 18.2-266 applies equally to motor vehicles, engines and trains. Trains are operated on privately-owned tracks, not 11 public highways. See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1996)(quoting Osgood v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 60 A. 137, 140 (Vt. 1905))(A railroad corporation holds its station, grounds, railroad tracks . . . as its private property.); Coonce v. Missouri P. R. Co., 358 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Mo. 1962)(A railroad track is private property and the railroad generally has the exclusive right to the use of its tracks.). Sarafin urges us to impose a public highway requirement for the operation of motor vehicles, which would require us to read engine[s] or train[s] out of the statute. If the General Assembly had intended to segregate the operation of trains from the operation of motor vehicles, it certainly knows how to do so. 4 Because Code § 18.2-266 applies equally to motor vehicles, engines and trains, and trains only operate on private tracks, we would have to carve out an implicit private way exception for motor vehicles in order to grant Sarafin relief. This would require us to usurp the legislative function of the General Assembly, which we refuse to do. Instead we are bound by the plain meaning of the statute, which compels our conclusion that Code § 18.2-266 4 The General Assembly has segregated the operation of aircraft and watercraft while under the influence from the operation of motor vehicles while under the influence. Code § 29.1-738 prohibits operation of watercraft while under the influence of alcohol and Code § 5.1-13 prohibits operation of aircraft while under the influence of alcohol. 12 contains no private way exception for the operation of motor vehicles. In its argument before this Court, the Commonwealth noted that we have previously upheld convictions for driving under the influence in two cases where the vehicles were on private property. See Valentine v. County of Brunswick, 202 Va. 696, 697, 699, 119 S.E.2d 486, 486-87, 488 (1961); Williams v. City of Petersburg, 216 Va. 297, 298, 301, 217 S.E.2d 893, 894, 896 (1975). While those cases involved convictions under county drunk driving ordinances, the ordinances at issue were similar to Code § 18.2-266. Therefore, our reasoning in Valentine, 202 Va. at 698-99, 119 S.E.2d 487-88, and Williams, 216 Va. at 299, 217 S.E.2d at 895, supports our conclusion that Code § 18.2-266 has no on a highway requirement. Finally, Sarafin argues that this Court incorporated an on a highway requirement into the rule it announced in Enriquez, when we stated that: When an intoxicated person is seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle on a public highway and the key is in the ignition switch, he is in actual physical control of the vehicle and, therefore, is guilty of operating the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol within the meaning of Code § 18.2- 266. 283 Va. at 517, 722 S.E.2d at 255 (emphasis added). However, the issue in Enriquez was not whether the defendant was on a 13 public highway, but rather, whether the defendant was in actual physical control of his vehicle. Neither of the parties in Enriquez briefed or argued any contention that Code § 18.2-266 contained an on a highway requirement. Because the reference to on a highway was not essential to the Court's judgment, it is unbinding dicta. See Harmon v. Peery, 145 Va. 578, 583, 134 S.E. 701, 702 (1926) (Obiter dicta are such opinions uttered by the way, not upon the point or question pending, . . . as if turning aside . . . from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).