Opinion ID: 1463806
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Costs Claim[7]

Text: Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives district courts the power to tax costs in favor of a prevailing party. These awards, however, must fit within 28 U.S.C. § 1920, which enumerates the costs that a district court may tax. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441-42, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 96 L.Ed.2d 385 (1987). The section at issue in this case, § 1920(4), states that a judge may tax costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case. District courts have broad discretion over the award of costs to a prevailing party under § 1920, and we review such a decision for abuse of discretion. Zotos v. Lindbergh Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d 356, 363 (8th Cir.1997). An abuse of discretion occurs where the district court rests its conclusion on clearly erroneous factual findings or erroneous legal conclusions. Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 503-04 (8th Cir.2006). Here, the district court declined to tax as costs Baptist Health's expenses related to copying documents to be produced in discovery. Baptist Health cross-appeals this holding and, in the event we reverse the district court, argues that costs for scanning documents and reproducing Electronically Stored Information (ESI) fall within copies of any materials as used in § 1920(4). Because there is no allegation of erroneous factual findings, we address whether the district court's holding hinges on erroneous legal conclusions. The threshold issue here is whether the district court erred in declining to tax discovery-related copying expenses. It is unclear whether the district court ruled as a matter of law or as a matter of its discretion. We believe, however, that it is fair to read the opinion as an exercise of the district court's discretion. Therefore, we confine our holding to the conclusion that the district court did not abuse its discretion. We reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, Baptist Health does not cite, nor are we aware of, any decision that requires a district court to tax discovery-related expenses. We note that there are cases suggesting that a district court may tax costs for discovery-related copying. See, e.g., Slagenweit v. Slagenweit, 63 F.3d 719, 721 (8th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (upholding award of costs for a deposition copy, despite the fact that the deposition was not introduced at trial). These cases are at most permissive, and do not compel the district court to tax such costs. Moreover, cases from other circuits that have explicitly addressed discovery-related copying costs have done so only to the extent that they have found a district court did not abuse its discretion in taxing such costs. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. W & O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 623 (11th Cir.2000); Illinois v. Sangamo Const. Co., 657 F.2d 855, 867 (7th Cir.1981). Second, numerous district courts within the Eighth Circuit have refused to tax discovery-related copying costs. See, e.g., Jones v. Nat'l Am. Univ., No. CIV. 06-5075-KES, 2009 WL 2005293, at  (D.S.D. July 8, 2009) (stating that copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case covers only the cost of actually trying a case in the courtroom); Moore v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 4:06CV757 CDP, 2007 WL 1445591, at  (E.D.Mo. May 11, 2007) (same); Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. Trisko, 66 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1093-94 (D.Minn.1999) (same); Emmenegger v. Bull Moose Tube Co., 33 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1133-34 (E.D.Mo.1998) (same). Given this, we cannot find that the district court abused its discretion. Because we affirm the district court on this threshold issue, we do not reach the issue of whether costs for scanning documents and reproducing ESI are taxable under § 1920(4).