Opinion ID: 1640607
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sheriff Hale's supervisory liability

Text: `Supervisory officials are not liable under section 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.' They may, however, be liable under section 1983 `when there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.' Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396-97 (11th Cir.1994) (citations omitted). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated in Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d at 1269: `The causal connection can be established when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so. The deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.' (Quoting Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir.1990).) The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals also noted that the causal connection may be established and supervisory liability imposed where the supervisor's improper `custom or policy ... result[s] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.' Hartley, 193 F.3d at 1269 (quoting Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir.1991)).
With respect to a history of widespread abuse, Jenkins alleges in her complaint that Sheriff Hale, as the supervisor of the jail, is liable for the alleged violations of Hodge's constitutional rights because, she argues, [Sheriff] Hale ... [was] on notice that a widespread problem existed wherein inmates of the County Jail were not receiving medical treatment for serious medical needs. Jenkins's brief, Exhibit B. Jenkins further alleges that the constitutional deprivations were obvious, flagrant, rampant and/or of continu[ed] duration. In her complaint, Jenkins supports the allegations with references to statements made by Sheriff Hale in his March 2007 complaint for a declaratory judgment in the Jefferson Circuit Court in Hale v. Jefferson County et al., (CV-2007-01040) (the DJA). These references in her complaint allege that, in the complaint in the DJA, Sheriff Hale admitted to a troubling pattern with respect to inmate health care at the county jail. Jenkins's complaint then identifies, from the DJA complaint, eight lawsuits or notices of claims [that have been] filed ... [that] demonstrate that [Sheriff] Hale is fully aware this troubling pattern exists. She alleges in her complaint that [s]ome of these instances and others ... placed [Sheriff Hale] ... on notice of widespread problems of inadequate medical care in the County Jail and his need to correct the inmates' constitutional deprivations and that [Sheriff Hale] ... failed to correct the widespread problems and constitutional deprivations. Jenkins's brief, Exhibit B (emphasis omitted). Jenkins concludes that [Sheriff Hale's] ... conduct proximately caused Hodge's death. Sheriff Hale argues that by interjecting the DJA into these proceedings, [Jenkins] has plead[ed] herself out of the litigation. Sheriff Hale's petition at 20. Sheriff Hale argues that the DJA demonstrates that the problem of inmate medical care was not widespread, given the fact that the complaint in the DJA references only nine incidents over a three-year period, one of which is the incident involving Hodge. Furthermore, Sheriff Hale argues that not all of these incidents occurred before December 2004 and, thus, would not serve as notice of the alleged widespread violations. Finally, Sheriff Hale asserts that the existence of the DJA proves that he was, in fact, attempting to improve inmate health care. This matter is before us because the trial court declined to dismiss the § 1983 claim against Sheriff Hale, not because of the denial of a summary-judgment motion; therefore, we do not address whether Jenkins's reference to the DJA would constitute substantial evidence of her claim. [7] We agree with Jenkins that she has sufficiently pleaded this issue to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. See Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. HealthSouth Corp., 979 So.2d 784, 791 (Ala.2007) (`In making this determination, [whether the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle her to relief under 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.,] this Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether she may possibly prevail.' (quoting Nance v. Matthews, 622 So.2d 297, 299 (Ala.1993))). Jenkins's complaint alleges the existence of widespread constitutional violations, alleges that those violations were obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences, and alleges that Sheriff Hale was aware of those violations and failed to take corrective action. Hartley, 193 F.3d at 1269. Therefore, Jenkins's complaint ... allege[s] the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, Alabama Dep't of Youth Servs., 880 So.2d at 402. Thus, in light of Jenkins's allegation of widespread abuse with respect to medical care for inmates, Sheriff Hale has not demonstrated that he is entitled to a dismissal based on qualified immunity or that he has a clear legal right to mandamus relief on this issue.
Jenkins also alleges that Sheriff Hale had in place at the jail the following four specific policies and/or customs that, she alleges, proximately resulted in Hodge's death: (a) policy and/or custom of failing to adequately staff the jail with medical personnel; (b) policy and/or custom of failing to train deputies and/or jail personnel on how to respond to an inmate's request for medical attention; (c) policy and/or custom in place of failing to administer the correct dosage of medications and/or antibiotics to inmates of the County Jail; (d) policy and/or custom of failing to monitor and/or properly treat inmates of the County Jail who have known serious medical problems. Jenkins's brief, Exhibit B. [8] Sheriff Hale argues: As set out in the DJA, Jefferson Metropolitan Health Care Authority and/or Jefferson County d/b/a Cooper Green Hospital and/or Jefferson Health System controlled the provision of inmate healthcare at the Jails. Therefore, these entities that were responsible for providing inmate healthcare enacted the customs or policies relating thereto. .... Because the aforementioned entities undertook and controlled the provision of inmate healthcare, Sheriff Hale did not establish or promulgate policies or customs regarding the provision of inmate healthcare at the Jails. Sheriff Hale's petition at 24. In support of this argument, Sheriff Hale cites Williams v. Limestone County, 198 Fed.Appx. 893 (11th Cir.2006), an unpublished decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in which that court noted that supervisory officials are entitled to rely on medical judgments made by medical professionals responsible for prisoner care. 198 Fed.Appx. at 897. However, even if this Court were to find Williams persuasive, at least one of the policies alleged by Jenkins to have enabled Jefferson County jail officials to allegedly deprive Hodge of her constitutional rights, that is, the policy and/or custom of failing to train deputies and/or jail personnel on how to respond to an inmate's request for medical attention, is not related to medical judgments made by medical professionals responsible for prisoner care. Williams, supra. Sheriff Hale also cites Fretwell v. Deese, No. 2:04cv878-WHA (M.D.Ala. July 25, 2006)(not reported in F.Supp.2d), an unpublished order adopting the findings of the magistrate judge, in which the district court recognized that [t]he law does not impose upon correctional officials a duty to directly supervise health care personnel, to set treatment policy for the medical staff, or to intervene in treatment decisions where they have no actual knowledge that intervention is necessary to prevent a constitutional wrong. Again, however, at least one of the policies Jenkins alleges contributed to the alleged deprivation of Hodge's constitutional rights was unrelated to medical treatment, medical care, or medical judgment. Therefore, neither Williams nor Fretwell demonstrates that Sheriff Hale is entitled to a dismissal of Jenkins's § 1983 claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Under Hartley, Jenkins was required to plead that Sheriff Hale's improper `custom or policy ... resulted in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights,' Hartley, 193 F.3d at 1269. In her complaint, Jenkins alleges that [Sheriff Hale]... had policies and/or customs in place that caused medical treatment to be denied to inmates of the County Jail and that the failure of [Sheriff Hale] ... to correct these policies and/or customs ... enabled Sheriff's Deputies, jail personnel and/or medical personnel to deprive Hodge ... of [her] constitutional right. Jenkins's brief, Exhibit B. Jenkins's complaint... allege[s] the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, Alabama Dep't of Youth Servs., 880 So.2d at 402. Therefore, at this stage of the proceedings, Sheriff Hale is not entitled to a dismissal of Jenkins's § 1983 claim against him based on qualified immunity and, thus, is not entitled to mandamus relief on this issue.