Opinion ID: 2625590
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: We review the court of appeals' decision in People v. Vanrees, 80 P.3d 840 (Colo.App. 2003), which held that a criminal defendant need not comply with the pleading requirements of the insanity statute in order to introduce evidence of his mental slowness to contest the culpable mental element of the crime charged. In addition, that court reversed Vanrees's convictions for the crimes requiring the culpable mental state of knowingly, reasoning that the trial court's instruction given during jury deliberation wrongfully precluded the jury from considering evidence of Vanrees's mental slowness as it related to the crimes requiring the mental state knowingly. The People sought certiorari review of the court of appeals' decision, arguing that evidence of a defendant's mental slowness is not admissible to counter the required culpable mental state of the crime charged (mens rea) unless the defendant's mental slowness satisfied the threshold set forth in Colorado's affirmative defense of impaired mental condition. [1] Thus, the People argue that because he did not comply with the pleading requirements of the insanity-impaired mental condition statute, evidence of Vanrees's mental slowness had no bearing on whether he acted with the culpable mental state of knowingly when he committed the crimes requiring this culpable mental state. Mental slowness does not fit the statutory definition of mental disease or defect unless mental slowness rises to the level of a severely abnormal mental condition[] that grossly and demonstrably impair[s] a person's perception or understanding of reality. § 16-8-101.5(2)(b), C.R.S. (2005). We conclude that evidence of mental slowness in this case does not meet the threshold requirements of the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition and that the defendant may introduce relevant evidence of his mental slowness to counter or to contest factually whether he formed the culpable mental state of the crimes charged. Thus, the trial court acted properly by admitting evidence of Vanrees's mental slowness to contest his guilt for the crimes requiring the culpable mental state of knowingly. Turning to the issue concerning the instruction given during jury deliberations, we reverse the holding of the court of appeals. We reason that when the trial court informed the jury that it could consider any evidence, other than intoxication to determine whether Vanrees possessed the culpable mental state of knowingly, this directive permitted the jury to consider evidence of Vanrees's mental slowness as to whether he acted knowingly. Thus, we hold that this supplemental instruction did not preclude the jury from considering his mental slowness. Hence, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this case to that court with directions to return this case to the trial court to reinstate its original judgments of conviction for the following crimes: attempted second degree murder, attempted first degree sexual assault, and first degree burglary.