Opinion ID: 2594806
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Competency Standard

Text: Defendant contends that California's standard for competence, as embodied by CALJIC No. 4.10, fails to meet the standard articulated for federal due process purposes in Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824. In Dusky, the court stated that the test of a defendant's competency to stand trial is whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him. ( Ibid. ) Consistent with CALJIC No. 4.10, the jury was instructed that a person charged with a criminal offense is deemed mentally competent to be tried for the crime charged against him, if [¶] 1. He is capable of understanding the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him; [¶] 2. He comprehends his own status and condition in reference to such proceedings; and [¶] 3. He is able to assist his attorney in conducting his defense in a rational manner. Defendant maintains that a person who is able to assist an attorney in conducting his defense in a rational manner does not necessarily have sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding as required by Dusky. He asserts that, while assisting demands only the minimal passive rationality required to answer an attorney's question as to some aspect of the case, consulting denotes an active participation and exchange between attorney and client rather than the passive assent of the client to the attorney's promptings. Thus, he argues that the capacity to consult rationally imports a higher level of cognition and judgment than that required to assist. We have previously observed that the language of section 1367, from which CALJIC No. 4.10 is drawn, does not match, word for word, that of Dusky. But as the Court of Appeal noted in James H. v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 169, 177 [143 Cal.Rptr. 398], `To anyone but a hairsplitting semanticist, the two tests are identical.' ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 816, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481; accord, People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 893, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23, 116 P.3d 494.) Indeed, as the Attorney General points out, the United States Supreme Court has itself used a formulation similar to California's to describe the standard of competency. ( Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 402, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 [Requiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel (italics added)].) We reject defendant's claim that California's formulation of the competency standard fails to comport with federal due process requirements.