Opinion ID: 1261998
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpretation of Immigration Statutes by BIA and Federal Courts

Text: At issue in this case is the relationship between INA § 245(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), permitting discretionary adjustment of status, INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II), providing that previously removed aliens who reenter the country without permission are inadmissible, and INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) providing for reinstatement of prior orders of removal and barring any relief under the INA for those inadmissible pursuant to section 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II). Also at issue is the effect, if any, of 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(e) on these statutes.
Delgado argues that she is eligible for adjustment of status pursuant to the special adjustment of status provision, notwithstanding the reinstatement provision, because [b]y its express language section 1255(i) is available to aliens who enter the United States without inspection. See Pet'r's Br. On Appeal at 8. Delgado argues that the adjustment of status provision cures inadmissibility pursuant to § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II). The government's position is that, although the special adjustment of status provision authorizes aliens who entered the United States without inspection to apply for adjustment of status, see INA § 245(i)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1)(A)(i), such adjustment is limited to aliens who are admissible to the United States for permanent residence. Id. § 245(i)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(2)(A). According to the government, because Delgado is inadmissible pursuant to INA § 212(a)(9)(c)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(c)(i)(II), she is not eligible for adjustment of status. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the government that Delgado is not eligible for adjustment of status pursuant to INA § 245(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). We are not persuaded by Delgado's reliance on case law holding that the special adjustment of status provision exempts individuals from inadmissibility pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(c)(i)(I). See Padilla, Caldera v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir.2005); Acosta v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 550 (9th Cir.2006). Section 1182(a)(9)(c)(i)(I) provides that any alien who has been unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than [one] year is inadmissible. Padilla-Caldera held that the special adjustment of status provision trumped inadmissibility pursuant to section 1182(a)(9)(c)(I) for an alien who had reentered the United States illegally after having departed at the direction of the INS. Padilla-Caldera is distinct from the case at bar, most notably by the fact that the alien in that case did not violate a removal orderhe re-entered the country illegally after having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year, not after having been removed from the United States, as Delgado was. The Padilla-Caldera court itself noted the distinction, relying on earlier Tenth Circuit precedent holding that where section 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) applies, the reinstatement provision also applies, barring aliens inadmissible under 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) from seeking any relief' under the immigration statutes. 453 F.3d at 1243 (explaining that [t]he imposition of additional punishment for those inadmissible under 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II)namely 1231(a)(5) [the reinstatement provision], which bars this class of aliens from seeking `any relief makes 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) distinguishable) (citing Berrum-Garcia v. Comfort, 390 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir.2004) (alterations added)). [3] Acosta is equally unavailing. Acosta relied on. Padilla-Caldera, which, as discussed, distinguished inadmissibility pursuant to section 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) from inadmissibility pursuant to section 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I). Acosta also relied on Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 783, 793-95 (9th Cir.2004), see 439 F.3d at 554 (Our reasoning in Perez-Gonzalez appears to control the issue now before us.), which, as set forth in greater detail below, has been overruled by the Ninth Circuit, see Gonzales v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir.2007). Delgado concedes that other circuit courts have Held that the special adjustment of status provision does not cure inadmissability pursuant to § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II), to which the reinstatement provision applies. Although this Court has not yet ruled on this issue, five sister circuits have so held. See Lino v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 1077, 1079 (7th Cir. 2006) ([The reinstatement provision] plainly precludes a previously removed alien who has since illegally reentered the United States from adjusting her status under § 245(i).); De Sandoval v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 440 F.3d 1276, 1284-85 (11th Cir.2006); Berram-Garcia, 390 F.3d at 1163 (holding that once a petitioner's prior removal order has been reinstated, he no longer qualifies for any relief under the INA, regardless of whether his application was filed before or after the reinstatement decision, was made); Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 21 (1st Cir.2004) (holding that [e]ection 241(a)(5) . . . bars aliens who have illegally reentered the United States after having previously been deported from applying for relief'); Warner v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 534, 540 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that aliens whose prior orders of removal are reinstated under § 241(a)(5) should not be eligible for relief under § 245(i) because § 241(a)(5) states that aliens who fall under this provision may not apply for any relief under this chapter); Flores v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir.2003); see also Padilla v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that an alien who illegally reenters is not eligible for adjustment of status because the reinstatement provision controls). The government further argues that the BIA has interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) in the same way and that the BIA's interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778; Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424-25, 119 S.Ct. 1439. In Matter of Torres-Garcia, the BIA dismissed an appeal of an IJ's ruling that an alien who had reentered illegally after having been removedand was therefore inadmissible pursuant to § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II)was ineligible for adjustment of status and ineligible for any waiver of that ground of inadmissibility. 23 I. & N. Dec. 866, 867, 877 (B.I.A.2006). Although Torres-Garcia primarily was concerned with the alien's lack of eligibility for waivers of inadmissibility, we agree with the government that the BIA's. position is that an alien inadmissible pursuant to § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) is ineligible for adjustment of status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). We now join our sister circuits in holding that an alien who is ruled inadmissible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II), as a result of having reentered this country illegally after having been removed, is ineligible for adjustment of status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i).
An individual who has reentered the United States illegally after having been removed is permanently inadmissible, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II), but such an individual may request permission to reapply for admission pursuant to the consent to reapply provision, as described above. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii). Delgado claims that the ten-year waiting period before she may avail herself of the consent to reapply provision is cured by 8 C.F.R. § 212.2, entitled Consent to reapply for admission after deportation, removal or departure at Government expense. The BIA has expressly held, however, that 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 does not operate as a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9), which pertains to aliens previously removed. Torres-Garcia held: As the language, structure, and regulatory history of 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 make clear, the regulation was not promulgated to implement current section 212(a)(9) of the Act [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) I Instead, it was published in response to significant legislative changes brought about by the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (IMMACT). 23 I. & N. Dec. at 874. Torres-Garcia further provides: [W]hile 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.2(e) and (i)(2) authorize aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States to seek permission to reapply for admission retroactively in conjunction with an application for adjustment of status, the very concept of retroactive permission to reapply for admission, i.e., permission requested after unlawful reentry, contradicts the clear language of section 212(a)(9)(C), which in its own right makes unlawful reentry after removal a ground of inadmissibility that can only be waived after the passage of at least 10 years. Id. at 874-75. Torres-Garcia explained that the consent to reapply provision clearly specifies the conditions under which waivers of inadmissibility may be granted. It extends no discretion to the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland. Security to augment those conditions or to create other less restrictive waivers by regulation. Id. at 875. Torres-Garcia explained that waivers for individuals inadmissible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) are limited to those `seeking admission more than 10 years after the date of the alien's last departure from the United States. Id. (quoting INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii)). Delgado relies on Perez-Gonzalez, which held that 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 permitted an alien who was present in the United States but inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) to seek retroactive permission to reapply for admission in conjunction with an application for adjustment of status under section the special adjustment of status provision. 379 F.3d at 793-95. Torres-Garcia, however, expressly rejected Perez-Gonzalez. Torres-Garcia held: With all due respect, we believe the Ninth Circuit's analysis regarding the availability of a retroactive waiver of the ground of inadmissibility set forth at section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) contradicts the language and purpose of the Act and appears to have proceeded from an understandable, but ultimately incorrect, assumption regarding the applicability of 8 C.F.R. § 212.2. 23 I & N. Dec. at 873. We decline to adopt the reasoning of Perez-Gonzalez. Moreover, Perez-Gonzalez has been expressly overruled by the Ninth Circuit. See Gonzales, 508 F.3d 1227. Gonzales held that Chevron deference was owed to the agency's interpretation of the statutes as set forth in Torres-Garcia, even though that interpretation differed from prior Ninth. Circuit precedent interpreting the immigration statutes. We agree with the Gonzales court and accord Chevron deference to the BIA's holding that an applicant who is inadmissible under subsection (a)(9)(C)(i)(II) is ineligible to apply for adjustment of status from within the United States and is bound by the consent to reapply provision, which requires that he seek permission to reapply for admission from outside of the United States after ten years have passed since his most recent departure from the United States. Id. at 1242. Delgado argues Torres-Garcia is not controlling because that case ignores a provision in the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 (VAWA) that creates a waiver to the bar to admissibility contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii)n At the time Torres-Garcia was decided, section 813(b) of VAWA provided that [t]he Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of State shall continue to have discretion to consent to an alien's reapplication for admission after a previous order of removal, deportation, or exclusion. Fub.L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (enacted Jan. 5, 2006). That provision was removed pursuant to an amendment to VAWA made effective August 12, 2006. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. Notwithstanding the effective dates of the VAWA provision relied on by Delgado, we find no relevance of that provision to inadmissibility pursuant to section 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II). That provision does not mention section 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) nor can it be read to apply to that section. Section 813(b)(2) also provides that it is the sense of Congress that [the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of State] should particularly consider exercising this authority in cases under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. . . . Delgado does not allege that VAWA or the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 applies to her. We must reject Delgado's argument that the BIA was required to consider a discrete provision of an unrelated statute. 3. Effect of Filing for Adjustment of Status Prior to Issuance of Order of Reinstatement Delgado argues that she is entitled to adjudication of her application for adjustment of status because she submitted her application prior to the issuance of the order of reinstatement. Delgado again relies on Perez-Gonzalez, 379 F.3d at 795, which prohibited reinstatement proceedings until after adjudication of petitioner's application for adjustment. As has been shown, Perez-Gonzalez is unavailing because it has been overruled by Gonzales, which explained: In August 2004, we held that a previously removed alien unlawfully present in the United States was eligible to adjust his status under the special adjustment provision provided that he filed an 1-212 waiver application prior to the initiation of reinstatement proceedings, notwithstanding the bar to relief from removal contained in [the] reinstatement provision and inadmissibility provision for previously removed aliens unlawfully present in the United States. . . . We hold today that we are bound by the BIA's interpretation of the applicable statutes in In re Torres-Garcia, even though that interpretation differs from our prior interpretation in Perez-Gonzalez. Pursuant to In re Torres-Garcia, plaintiffs as a matter of law are not eligible to adjust their status because they are ineligible to receive 1-212 waivers. 508 F.3d at 1231. Finally, Delgado reasons that she has applied for adjustment of status affirmatively by submitting her application prior to the issuance of the reinstatement order. She argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), the reinstatement provision, bars only defensive applications (i.e. applications submitted in response to a removal order) because the term relief denotes defensive applications. Delgado has made no showing to support her argument that relief should apply only to defensive applications. We believe that the statute itself provides that the bar to relief is prospective and not conditioned upon the issuance of an order reinstating the prior order of removal. The reinstatement provision provides that an alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under the INA. See INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (emphasis supplied). We stand with the First Circuit in its interpretation of the statute: Section 241(a)(5) [the reinstatement provision] subjects an illegal reentrant to three independent consequences: reinstatement of the prior deportation order, ineligibility for any relief, and removal. Grammatically, section 241(a)(5) does not make ineligibility for relief dependent upon reinstatement of the prior deportation order. And even if it did, section 241(a)(5) expressly makes reinstatement retroactive to the date of the original deportation order. Lattab, 384 F.3d at 16. Moreover, we consider Delgado's application defensive. At the time she applied for adjustment of status, Delgado had already reentered illegaily after having been removed, and accordingly was ineligible for any relief under the immigration statutes. In any event, with the issuance of the reinstatement order, her application ripened into a defensive one and the fact that an application for adjustment of status was on file with the CIS has no effect on the authority of the Attorney General to reinstate her prior order of removal.