Opinion ID: 1470611
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exceptions to Exhaustion of Tribal Court Remedies

Text: The Supreme Court has outlined four exceptions to the exhaustion rule: (1) when an assertion of tribal court jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith; (2) when the tribal court action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions; (3) when exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the [tribal] court's jurisdiction; and (4) when it is plain that tribal court jurisdiction is lacking, so that the exhaustion requirement would serve no purpose other than delay. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff makes brief arguments concerning the first three exceptions, none of which is persuasive. The district court correctly held that there is no evidence of bad faith or harassment in the record. Plaintiff has failed to identify  and the record does not reveal  any express jurisdictional prohibition[ ] against tribal court jurisdiction. And, as discussed above, Plaintiff will have an adequate opportunity to challenge the tribal court's jurisdiction in the tribal appellate court; she simply must wait until trial is complete. Exhaustion therefore is not futile. We focus on the fourth exception: whether it is plain that the tribal court lacks jurisdiction. If jurisdiction is `colorable' or `plausible,' then the exception does not apply and exhaustion of tribal court remedies is required. Atwood, 513 F.3d at 948. In their unique relationship with the United States, Indian tribes retain a certain amount of inherent sovereign power. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981). But the Supreme Court has [s]tress[ed] that Indian tribes cannot exercise power inconsistent with their diminished status as sovereigns. Id. For example, tribes cannot exercise their inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 205-07, 124 S.Ct. 1628, 158 L.Ed.2d 420 (2004). The question is murkier with respect to the exercise of a tribe's inherent civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. Where, as here, the nonmember is a defendant in the tribal court action, whether tribal courts may exercise jurisdiction over a nonmember defendant may turn on how the claims are related to tribal lands. Smith v. Salish Kootenai Coll., 434 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc). We begin our analysis with Montana, the pathmarking case concerning tribal civil authority over nonmembers. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997). In Montana, the Supreme Court addressed whether a tribe may regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers on reservation lands owned in fee by nonmembers (fee lands). 450 U.S. at 557, 101 S.Ct. 1245. The Court held that civil regulation of nonmembers on fee lands is governed by the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe. Id. at 565, 101 S.Ct. 1245. But it described two exceptions to that general rule: To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of non-members who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. Id. at 565-66, 101 S.Ct. 1245 (citations omitted). The Court held that neither exception applied to hunting and fishing regulations concerning fee lands. Id. at 566, 101 S.Ct. 1245. But the Court was clear that such regulation is permissible concerning lands belonging to the tribe: The Court of Appeals held that the Tribe may prohibit nonmembers from hunting or fishing on land belonging to the Tribe ... and with this holding we can readily agree. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that if the Tribe permits nonmembers to fish or hunt on such lands, it may condition their entry by charging a fee or establishing bag and creel limits. Id. at 557, 101 S.Ct. 1245 (citation omitted). Ownership status of the land also played an important role in the Supreme Court's decision in Strate. There, the Court held that tribal courts lack jurisdiction over claims against nonmembers arising out of traffic accidents on a state highway that passes through reservation lands. 520 U.S. at 442, 117 S.Ct. 1404. Key to the Court's analysis was its holding that the short stretch of state highway that passed over reservation lands was equivalent, for nonmember governance purposes, to alienated, non-Indian land. Id. at 454, 117 S.Ct. 1404 (footnote omitted). The Court noted that tribes retain considerable control over nonmember conduct on tribal land, id., and expressly declined to consider whether tribal courts would have jurisdiction over accidents occurring on a tribal road, id. at 442, 117 S.Ct. 1404. Ownership status of the land is not necessarily dispositive. In Hicks, the Supreme Court addressed whether a tribe can regulate state wardens executing a search warrant for evidence of an off-reservation crime. 533 U.S. at 358, 121 S.Ct. 2304. The Court rejected the argument that the tribe has regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers on reservation lands owned by the tribe simply because of that ownership status: [T]he existence of tribal ownership is not alone enough to support regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers. Id. at 360, 121 S.Ct. 2304. The Court held that the same principles underlying the two Montana exceptions also applied to civil regulation of nonmembers on lands owned by the tribe. Id. The Court then balanced the tribe's interest in regulating activity by state wardens with the state's interest in investigating off-reservation crimes and held that the state's interest outweighed that of the tribe. Id. at 361-65, 121 S.Ct. 2304. In responding to the concurrence's argument that tribal ownership of the land should have played a larger role in the analysis, the majority stated: [W]e acknowledge that tribal ownership is a factor in the Montana analysis, and a factor significant enough that it may sometimes be dispositive. We simply do not find it dispositive in the present case, when weighed against the State's interest in pursuing off-reservation violations of its laws. Id. at 370, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). We have held repeatedly that determining the scope of tribal court jurisdiction is not an easy task. See, e.g., Smith, 434 F.3d at 1130 (Sixteen years ago, we observed that `[t]here is no simple test for determining whether tribal court jurisdiction exists.' The statement is no less true today. (alteration in original) (quoting Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir.1989))). Here, however, we need not make a definitive determination of whether tribal court jurisdiction exists; we must decide only whether jurisdiction is plausible. Atwood, 513 F.3d at 948. We conclude that tribal court jurisdiction is plausible here. The tribe seeks to enforce its regulations that prohibit, among other things, trespassing onto tribal lands, setting a fire without a permit on tribal lands, and destroying natural resources on tribal lands. The Supreme Court has strongly suggested that a tribe may regulate nonmembers' conduct on tribal lands to the extent that the tribe can `assert a landowner's right to occupy and exclude.' Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (quoting Strate, 520 U.S. at 456, 117 S.Ct. 1404). The tribal regulations at issue stem from the tribe's landowner's right to occupy and exclude. Trespass regulations plainly concern a property owner's right to exclude, and regulations prohibiting destruction of natural resources and requiring a fire permit are related to an owner's right to occupy. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (discussing a landowner's right to occupy and exclude); Strate, 520 U.S. at 455-56, 117 S.Ct. 1404 (same). Accordingly, the tribe's ownership of the land may be dispositive here. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 370, 121 S.Ct. 2304 ([T]ribal ownership is a factor in the Montana analysis, and a factor significant enough that it may sometimes be dispositive. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 359, 121 S.Ct. 2304 (suggesting strongly that regulations concerning a landowner's right to occupy and exclude are permissible against nonmembers). We reject Plaintiff's argument that the Court's holding in Hicks forecloses tribal court jurisdiction. The Court did hold, in Hicks, that tribal courts lacked jurisdiction notwithstanding tribal ownership of the land. But the crux of the Court's reasoning was that the state's strong interest in executing its criminal warrants concerning an off-reservation crime out-weighed the tribe's interest in regulating the activities of state wardens. Id. at 370, 121 S.Ct. 2304. The Court expressly stated that its holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law. We leave open the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general. Id. at 358 n. 2, 121 S.Ct. 2304. Here, of course, Plaintiff cannot assert any state interest to be balanced against the tribe's strong interest in enforcing its regulations governing trespass, prevention of forest fires, and preservation of its natural resources. Furthermore, the tribe makes a compelling argument that the regulations at issue are intended to secure the tribe's political and economic well-being, particularly in light of the result of the alleged violations of those regulations in this very case: the destruction of millions of dollars of the tribe's natural resources. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 566, 101 S.Ct. 1245 (A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.). Accordingly, even if we applied the two Montana exceptions without regard to the Supreme Court's instruction that ownership of the land may be dispositive in some cases, we reach the same conclusion: In the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the tribal court plainly lacks jurisdiction. [5]