Opinion ID: 848766
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: application of the dearden test

Text: In Dearden, supra at 265, 269 N.W.2d 139, the statute at issue granted the Department of Corrections exclusive jurisdiction over penal institutions. The statute indicated that it was intended to repeal other provisions of law that were inconsistent with the department's administration of the penal system and indicated that the Michigan Corrections Commission was to address `all matters relating to the unified development of the penal institutions... of the state....' Id. at 266, 269 N.W.2d 139 quoting M.C.L. § 791.202(1). The statute thus evidenced a legislative intent to immunize the department from local zoning ordinances when establishing state penal institutions. Id. at 267, 269 N.W.2d 139. In my judgment, the circumstances involved in Dearden materially differ from the circumstances in this case. Although, like the statute in Dearden, subsection 1263(3) contains exclusive jurisdiction language, the exclusive jurisdiction applies specifically to the review and approval of plans and specifications for the construction, reconstruction, or remodeling of school buildings and site plans for those school buildings. This language, in my view, reflects an intent to grant the state superintendent a more limited authority that relates specifically to the oversight of construction and site plans for particular school buildings. Whereas the statutory scheme in Dearden reflected a legislative intent to provide the Department of Corrections with broad authority to oversee and develop a statewide system of penal institutions, the relevant statute here reflects an intent to empower the superintendent to oversee a much narrower area relating to construction and site plans for school buildings. This is not surprising in view of the fact that principal authority over schools, unlike prisons, has traditionally reposed with local communities. [9] In regard to the application of the Dearden test, this Court indicated in Burt Twp, supra at 666, 593 N.W.2d 534, that the party claiming to be exempt must show a clear legislative intent to exempt the particular activities from local zoning. The lead opinion effectively inverts this test, asserting that the statutes pertaining to township zoning and planning do not expressly require school districts to comply with local zoning regulations. Ante at 218. However, given the broad land-use authority that the Legislature has granted to townships, it would hardly be expected that these statutes would also affirmatively enumerate those entities obligated to comply with their zoning requirements. To assume otherwise is to suggest that, unless express compliance is mandated, then compliance is not required. Following this reasoning to its logical conclusion, one would have to assume that no entity must comply with local zoning authority because no such entities are listed. The lead opinion's analysis improperly shifts the burden to the township to demonstrate that its generally applicable zoning and land-use regulations are applicable to a particular entity. In my judgment, the school district, the party claiming exemption, has not met its burden. Rather, the relevant statutory provisions do not evidence a clear legislative intent to immunize local school districts from local zoning ordinances.