Opinion ID: 1770148
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the claimant's property right

Text: Initially, we must determine whether the claimant's interest that it contends was adversely affected constitutes property within the purview of eminent domain law. It is undisputed that the claimant is the owner of the land that it avowedly seeks to develop. Ownership is the right that confers on a person direct, immediate, and exclusive authority over a thing. The owner of a thing may use, enjoy, and dispose of it within the limits and under conditions established by law. La.C.C. art. 477 (1979). The State does not contend that there are any legal limits or conditions that would prevent the claimant from subdividing its land. Accordingly, the claimant has a right of ownership to use and enjoy its land by developing it as it may choose, including residentially. Because this right is recognized by law as a right that the claimant has with respect to the land it is a property right that is protected by the constitutional provisions. Next, in determining whether the claimant's right to develop its land was taken or damaged, it must be taken into consideration that Civil Code articles 667 and 668 impose legal limitations on a landholder's right of ownership in two important respects. Art. 667. Limitations on use of property Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still he can not make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him. Art. 668. Inconvenience to neighbor Although one be not at liberty to make any work by which his neighbor's buildings may be damaged, yet every one has the liberty of doing on his own ground whatsoever he pleases, although it should occasion some inconvenience to his neighbor. Thus he who is not subject to any servitude originating from a particular agreement in that respect, may raise his house as high as he pleases, although by such elevation he should darken the lights of his neighbors's [neighbor's] house, because this act occasions only an inconvenience, but not a real damage. First, although, in principle, a landowner may use and enjoy his property as he sees fit, Article 667 provides that he may not exercise his right in such a way as to cause damage to his neighbors. Second, although, in principle, the landowner may exclude any interference with his property, he is bound by Article 668 to tolerate certain inconveniences resulting from the lawful use of another neighbor's property. A. Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes, 4 La.Civil Law Treatise § 34 (1983) [hereinafter Yiannopoulos on Servitudes], citing La.C.C. art. 477 (1979 and Supp.1991); Critney v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 353 So.2d 341 (La.App. 1st Cir.1977); Balis, Civil Law Property 87 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek), and other authorities. Accordingly, in order to decide whether the State caused any damage to the claimant's right of ownership, we must determine whether the State's construction activities resulted in inconveniences that must be tolerated by the claimant under Article 668 or, rather, resulted in more serious inconveniences or interference that may be suppressed under Article 667. This is not always easy to determine. Broad language in certain court decisions might be taken to mean that there is no distinction between compensable and noncompensable damage, but the jurisprudence as a whole indicates that not all damage is recoverable under Article 667. In fact, as Professor Yiannopoulos has observed, cases properly anchoring responsibility on this article either involve damage caused through fault or damage caused by constructions, by escaping dangerous substances, such as dammed water or sewage, and by ultrahazardous activities, such as dynamite blasting, spraying noxious chemicals, and pile driving operations by heavy equipment. No case has been found in which a landowner or other person was held liable under Article 667 for non-negligent acts and activities that were not ultrahazardous. Yiannopoulos on Servitudes, supra, § 50, at 139-40, citing extensive authorities. For all other non-negligent acts, works, and activities that cause damage or inconvenience to neighbors, Professor Yiannopoulos recommends that the concept of abuse of right of ownership should be used to establish the line of demarcation between acts that constitute a lawful exercise of ownership and those that are forbidden by Article 667. Id., citing D'Albora v. Tulane University, 274 So.2d 825, 832 (La. App. 4th Cir.1973); J. Cueto-Rua, Abuse of Rights, 35 La.L.Rev. 975 (1975), and other authorities. We are not prepared to say that, in all cases, a landowner must prove an abuse of right of ownership before he may suppress or recover for a violation of Article 667 by a neighbor. But we think that in a case, such as the present one, in which there is no allegation or evidence of personal injury or physical damage to property, it is consistent with the principles of the Civil Code and our jurisprudence to require proof of the presence of some type of excessive or abusive conduct to hold a landowner responsible under Article 667. Thus, the limitations established by Article 667 upon the State's use and enjoyment of its land, and the requirements imposed by Article 668 on the claimant to tolerate some inconvenience, also serve to mark the boundaries of each party's respective right to develop its land. Because the claimant's right to enjoy its property is not absolute but extends only as far as the law allows it, La.C.C. art. 667-669, unless the obligations and limitations of neighborhood are violated, the property rights of the claimant have not been violated. In other words, as long as the activities on the State's land do not exceed the level of causing the claimant some inconvenience, there can be no taking or damaging of the claimant's property right.