Opinion ID: 868147
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether RRA is a “Plant Pest” and Thus Within the

Text: Scope of APHIS’s Regulatory Authority The primary issue we must determine is whether APHIS has interpreted the meaning of “plant pest” in the PPA too narrowly. The plaintiffs maintain that it has, and that the term includes all genetically engineered plants and organisms that have an environmentally adverse effect on plants. According to the plaintiffs, APHIS has discretion under the PPA to regulate RRA, which, if correct, would require the agency, pursuant to the ESA, to consult with the FWS about the crop’s effects on endangered plant and animal species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); see Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1020 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The parties all agree that under the PPA, APHIS regulates organisms that are “plant pests.” The PPA defines a “plant pest” as any “living stage” of a list of organisms, or articles CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY V . VILSACK 23 “similar to or allied with” organisms, “that can directly or indirectly injure, cause damage to, or cause disease in any plant or plant product.” 7 U.S.C. § 7702(14). While neither the statute nor the regulations further define the type of “injury,” “damage,” or “disease” a plant pest must cause, all of the organisms that APHIS lists as plant pests can cause widespread physical damage or destruction of plants. With respect to genetically engineered plants, the regulations specifically define the term “regulated article” as a genetically engineered organism that is created using an organism that is itself a plant pest. 7 C.F.R. § 340.1. The regulations go on to specify that, as such, the “regulated article” must injure plants. 7 C.F.R. § 340.2 n.4 (“An[] organism belonging to any taxa [that 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 lists as a plant pest] is only considered to be a plant pest if the organism ‘can . . . injure, or cause disease, or damage in any plants or parts thereof. . . .’”). The plaintiffs’ concern is with two types of harm genetically modified RRA can cause: transgenic contamination of conventional alfalfa and increased herbicide use. These alleged harms may well be adverse environmental and economic effects. APHIS contends, however, they do not constitute plant disease, injury, or damage, which are the harms that the statute requires. The agency therefore concludes that RRA is not a “plant pest.” In support of its position, APHIS points out that, as a matter of historical practice, it has previously assessed the plant pest properties of genetically modified crops such as cotton, corn, and soybeans. In conducting these plant pest assessments, APHIS does not consider whether the genetically modified plant could cross-pollinate with and alter 24 CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY V . VILSACK the genetic structure of other plants. This policy is consistent with APHIS’s classification of other plants that could crosspollinate and destroy the crop value in the process (such as canola with other types of rapeseed, and field with sweet corn). The agency has never classified a plant as a “plant pest” based on such cross-pollination effects. APHIS explains this is because it does not consider such alteration to be a plant pest harm within the meaning of the statute. The agency has similarly never considered the possible consequences associated with increased herbicide use, including creation of herbicide resistant weeds, to be “plant pest” injuries. APHIS explains such harms do not constitute physical damage or injury to other plants. APHIS’s consistent interpretation, which is also the best interpretation of this particular statutory language, must be taken into account. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“consistency” of agency interpretations with “earlier and later pronouncements” is a factor to consider in deciding whether to defer to agency interpretation); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001). The plaintiffs nevertheless argue that APHIS’s interpretation of the meaning of plant pest is too narrow. They contend that we should hold that RRA is a plant pest because the RRA plant results from the transfer of genetic material from the Agrobacterium. Since the statute in 7 U.S.C. § 7702(14)(H) defines a plant pest to be “[a]ny article similar to or allied with any of the articles specified,” the plaintiffs assert that the RRA plant is “allied with” the Agrobacterium. Thus, the plaintiffs’ theory is that transgenic contamination and increased glyphosate use are harms caused by the Agrobacterium, and therefore must also be “plant pest” harms under the PPA. CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY V . VILSACK 25 The plaintiffs’ logic is a stretch because it fails to deal with the language of the statute defining plant pest harm as injury, disease, or damage to other plants. See 7 U.S.C. § 7702(14). Although the regulations classify Agrobacterium itself as a plant pest, the Agrobacterium’s plant pest properties are “disarmed” and can no longer injure other plants once the bacterium’s genetic material is inserted into the genetic structure of conventional alfalfa. 70 Fed. Reg. at 36,918 (“APHIS determined that the vectors and other elements [of the Agrobacterium] were disarmed [in the RRA plant] . . . .”). RRA is thus no more likely to injure or damage other plants than is conventional, nonmodified alfalfa. Id. We do not suggest that the genetic engineering is without possible economic consequences. APHIS’s final EIS noted that transgenic contamination could economically hurt farmers who raise conventional alfalfa and market their crop as organic. The contamination of conventional alfalfa with the glyphosate-resistant gene could close foreign markets to U.S.-grown alfalfa. It could also force farmers of conventional alfalfa to incur additional costs testing and certifying that their alfalfa is not contaminated with the glyphosate-resistant gene. These concerns, however, are not the result of plant pest harms as defined under the PPA. APHIS thus has no power to regulate the adverse economic effects that could follow RRA’s deregulation. The plaintiffs also maintain that because RRA results in more use of the herbicide glyphosate, the harms associated with increased glyphosate usage are plant pest harms under the PPA. We recognize, of course, that deregulating RRA is expected to result in increased use of herbicides. Indeed, RRA was developed so farmers could apply significantly greater amounts of herbicides to alfalfa fields. The increased 26 CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY V . VILSACK use of herbicides can be potentially damaging to the environment. But the PPA addresses only the harms caused by plant pests to other plants and APHIS can regulate RRA only if it causes plant pest harms. See 7 U.S.C. § 7702(14). The environmental harms the plaintiffs cite are not plant pest harms. Moreover, the RRA plant itself does not cause the harm produced by herbicides. It is the application of herbicides to fields of RRA, not the RRA plant, that results in such harm. APHIS stresses it has no authority to regulate the use of herbicides like glyphosate. The Coordinated Framework tasks the EPA, under FIFRA, with regulating herbicide use, and it does so through labeling instructions that the herbicide user must comply with. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991–92 (1984) (noting that amendments to FIFRA in 1972 “transformed FIFRA from a labeling law into a comprehensive regulatory statute . . . [that] regulated the use, as well as the sale and labeling, of pesticides” (citation omitted)); Coordinated Framework, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,302. The PPA was enacted to protect plants, but not to control the burgeoning use of chemicals in crop production. For these reasons, we cannot interpret the language of the PPA, which Congress has not materially amended since 1957, to address the alleged harms that may result from the modification of a plant’s genome. The job of updating Title 7 of the United States Code to address the potential harms caused by genetic modification (including transgenic contamination and increased herbicide use) is a job for Congress, not this court, to undertake. Pursuant to the language of the statute, we must rule that RRA is not a plant pest under the meaning of the term in the PPA and the regulations. CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY V . VILSACK 27 II. APHIS’s Unconditional Deregulation of RRA Violated Neither the ESA nor NEPA. The plaintiffs argue that before APHIS decided to deregulate RRA, the agency should have consulted with the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) about the adverse environmental effects that RRA’s deregulation may have on endangered and threatened plants and animals. The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) imposes a duty on an agency to consult with the FWS or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries Service when an agency action may adversely affect a listed species or its critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a); see Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1011. The ESA’s consultation duty is triggered, however, only when the agency has authority to take action and discretion to decide what action to take. There is no point in consulting if the agency has no choices. The Supreme Court recognized the principle in National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 655 (2007), when it said that “the ESA’s requirements would come into play only when an action results from an exercise of agency discretion.” See Karuk, 681 F.3d at 1021 (recognizing that Home Builders “harmonizes the ESA consultation requirement with other statutory mandates that leave an agency no discretion to consider the protection of listed species” (citation omitted)). In Home Builders, the Supreme Court held that once the EPA had determined that Arizona met the statutory requirements under the Clean Water Act for the transfer of regulatory authority over the state’s National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permitting program, the EPA had no duty to consult because the transfer was a nondiscretionary act. Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 655. 28 CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY V . VILSACK Here, once APHIS concluded that RRA was not a plant pest because it did not cause plant pest injury to plants, the agency had no jurisdiction to continue regulating the crop. The agency’s deregulation of RRA was thus a nondiscretionary act that did not trigger the agency’s duty to consult under the ESA. Accordingly, the district court correctly ruled that APHIS’s deregulation of RRA did not violate the ESA. Nor did the district court err in entering summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiffs’ NEPA claim. That claim rested on the contention that APHIS should have considered partial deregulation as an alternative to full deregulation. NEPA requires that an agency take a “hard look” at the environmental effects of a proposed action that could significantly affect the environment by evaluating all reasonable alternatives to the proposed action. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a); Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1159 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 21 (2008). Here, there were no reasonable alternatives to deregulation because the agency lacks jurisdiction to regulate RRA. APHIS was not required to look at alternatives to the unconditional deregulation of RRA absent any jurisdiction to adopt them. See S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. FERC, 621 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[NEPA] does not expand the jurisdiction of an agency beyond that set forth in its organic statute . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY V . VILSACK 29