Opinion ID: 2375683
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: separation of powers and adjudication of facts

Text: ¶ 18 The trial court also found that RCW 90.03.330(3) violates the separation of powers under the state constitution because it purports to make a legislative determination of adjudicative facts concerning the `good standing' of particular water rights. CP at 617-18. We disagree. Separation of powers is violated when the legislature oversteps its role and adjudicates facts. Justice Brachtenbach ably explored the difference between a legitimate exercise of legislative authority and a usurpation of the judicial fact finding role in City of Tacoma v. O'Brien, 85 Wash.2d 266, 534 P.2d 114 (1975), a case examining a statute that made certain fuel contracts voidable in the face of skyrocketing oil prices. As we often find, we cannot improve on his words: All these cases involve the element of adjudication, and we believe that a finding of economic impossibility is similarly adjudicatory. A legislature can declare that economic impossibility shall constitute, in the future, a defense in actions involving contractual disputes. A legislature can find that a worldwide shortage of petroleum exists. Finding that existing contracts, entered into at least 6 months prior to the legislation, have become economically impossible to perform, however, is a legal conclusion, a result which follows from examination and consideration of circumstances in a particular case and interpretation and application of legal principles to those facts. As Mr. Justice Holmes wrote in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226, 29 S.Ct. 67, 53 L.Ed. 150 (1908); A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter.... O'Brien, 85 Wash.2d at 272, 534 P.2d 114. Thus, when the legislature passes a statute premised on finding an adjudicative fact, it may violate separation of powers. But the legislature did not engage in any adjudication of facts. Rather, the relevant 2003 amendments simply confirmed that the right represented by a water right certificate issued before Theodoratus continued to be a right in good standing, RCW 90.03.330(3). Confirming existing rights was a legislative policy decision, not a factual adjudication. ¶ 19 Of course, a statute is not constitutional simply because separation of powers is not offended. The retroactive application of laws may violate the ex post facto doctrine, affect vested rights and violate due process, or affect other judicial functions. Hale, 165 Wash.2d at 507, 198 P.3d 1021 (citations omitted) (citing Schmidt, 143 Wash.2d at 672-73, 23 P.3d 462; Varga, 151 Wash.2d at 195, 86 P.3d 139). But while RCW 90.03.330(3) removes the shadow from water certificates that might have been challenged under Theodoratus, this is a facial challenge to an exercise of general legislative authority. ¶ 20 If any of those water rights were litigated and adjudicative facts developed, they are not in this case. Further, while it may be possible to construe rights in good standing to mean that the legislature validated water rights that had been held invalid, the statute can also be construed to mean that such water rights will be treated like any other vested right represented by a water right certificate. We will give statutes constitutional constructions when possible. In re Pers. Restraint of Matteson, 142 Wash.2d 298, 307, 12 P.3d 585 (2000). Whether the application of the statute unconstitutionally unsettles a vested, judicially recognized right is better considered in a due process challenge. In this challenge, we are only considering unchallenged water rights. There is no encroachment on the judicial role that would offend separation of powers principles.