Opinion ID: 2809833
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: brown’s claims on direct appeal

Text: Before assessing the merits of Brown‟s motion for a new trial on remand, we need to address the claims raised by Brown in his direct appeal to this Court. Our evaluation of these claims is necessarily based on what the trial judge and parties knew at the time of Brown‟s trial. We conclude that none of these claims have merit, and therefore affirm his judgment of convictions. Brown argues that the Superior Court erred in admitting into evidence recordings of his telephone calls obtained through the court-ordered wiretap. He contends that the police lacked probable cause to obtain a warrant to record his cell phone conversations because the police only had a “mere suspicion” that he would arrange a drug deal with Brooks.31 Brown did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the magistrate‟s determination that there was probable cause to wiretap Brooks‟ main 29 See App. to Supp. Reply Br. at 23-24 (Corrective Action Request Form, Oct. 6, 2014); id. at 25-26 (Corrective Action Request Form, Oct. 9, 2014); id. at 27-29 (Corrective Action Request Form, Feb. 27, 2015). 30 Supp. Reply Br. at 4. 31 Opening Br. at 12. 11 telephone number. Instead, Brown challenges the breadth of the “net” cast by the wiretap to include the number Brooks was using on the date of Brown‟s arrest.32 Under 11 Del. C. § 2407(c)(1), a judge is permitted to authorize a wiretap if she determines “on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant” that: a. There is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense enumerated in § 2405 of this title [including dealing in narcotic drugs]; b. There is probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through the interception; c. Normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous; and d. There is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which or the place where the wire, oral or electronic communications are to be intercepted are being used or are about to be used in connection with the commission of the offense or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by an individual engaged in criminal activity described.33 To establish probable cause, the Superior Court in issuing the wiretap warrant only needed to find that the State had presented facts which, under the totality of the circumstances, suggested there was a fair probability that Brooks had committed, or was about to commit, a crime.34 As the Superior Court noted in denying Brown‟s motion to suppress the wiretap evidence in this case, “[t]he determination of probable cause by the issuing magistrate is entitled to great deference by a reviewing court.”35 The Superior Court authorized the wiretap on Brooks‟ phone number on May 25, 2012, after it reviewed the State‟s Affidavit in Support of Application for Interception of 32 Opening Br. at 13. 33 11 Del. C. § 2407(c)(1). 34 State v. Maxwell, 624 A.2d 926, 930 (Del. 1993). 35 State v. Brown, 2013 WL 4051050, at  (Del. Super. July 30, 2013) (citing State v. Perry, 599 A.2d 759, 765 (Del. Super. 1990)); see also Jensen v. State, 482 A.2d 105, 111 (Del. 1984). 12 Wire Communications. The Superior Court in Brown‟s case was within its discretion to find that the State‟s Affidavit provided a sufficient factual basis to determine that there was probable cause to authorize the wiretap. The State‟s Affidavit, a detailed 84 page document, stated that Brooks obtained a new pre-paid cell phone every forty-five days in an effort to avoid monitoring by the police. The State‟s Affidavit also explained that Brooks used a pattern to distribute the new number to his network: Brooks would call his contacts from the old phone number, tell them to answer the next call, and then call again from the new number minutes later. This pattern helped the police to identify Brooks‟ new phone numbers throughout the investigation, including the one he was using on the day that Brown was arrested. The State‟s Affidavit thus provided a sufficient factual basis for the magistrate to find probable cause to believe that Brooks was using a particular phone number, and that wiretapping that number would yield evidence of drug dealing. Because the police had probable cause to obtain the wiretap on Brooks‟ phone, the evidence that was obtained from his calls—including the drug deal he arranged with the unknown man later identified as Brown—was admissible. As a result, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown‟s motion to suppress the evidence of the calls arranging the drug deal. Brown also claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence seized from him after his arrest. He argues that the police did not have probable cause to arrest him at the time Sergeant Skinner stopped Brown‟s vehicle, and all of the 13 evidence obtained as a result “were the fruits of the illegal arrest.”36 Brown emphasizes that the police did not actually see him take part in a drug transaction, nor did the police recognize him as a known suspect involved in Brooks‟ drug syndicate. Brown asserts that it was premature for the police to assume he was the unknown caller, when it could have been Price, the man who left Brooks‟ house before Brown arrived. But, as this Court has observed, “[a] finding of probable cause does not require the police to uncover information sufficient to prove a suspect‟s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or even to prove that guilt is more likely than not.”37 To establish probable cause, the police are only required to present facts suggesting that a “fair probability exists that the defendant has committed a crime.”38 “The possibility that there may be a hypothetically innocent explanation for each of several facts revealed during the course of an investigation does not preclude a determination that probable cause exists for an arrest.”39 Probable cause is determined by the totality of the circumstances, as viewed by a reasonable police officer given her training and experience.40 “To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide „whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to‟ probable cause.”41 36 Opening Br. at 11. 37 Maulo v. State, 27 A.3d 551 (Del. 2011) (quoting State v. Maxwell, 624 A.2d 926, 930 (Del. 1993)). 38 Jarvis v. State, 600 A.2d 38, 42-43 (Del. 1991). 39 Maxwell, 624 A.2d at 930. 40 Miller v. State, 4 A.3d 371, 373-74 (Del. 2010). 41 Stafford v. State, 59 A.3d 1223, 1229 (Del. 2012) (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)). 14 In this case, the Superior Court found that “[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances, . . . a fair probability existed that Brown purchased cocaine and crack cocaine at Brooks‟ house, and that when he departed probable cause existed to believe he was then in possession of the drugs just purchased.”42 The Superior Court was within its discretion to find that Sergeant Skinner had probable cause to arrest Brown. Based on the events leading up to Brown‟s arrest, an objectively reasonable officer who had listened to Brooks and the unknown man arrange a drug deal could have believed that Brown was the unknown man, that he purchased drugs as planned during the telephone calls, and that he still possessed those drugs at the time he was stopped. Contrary to Brown‟s argument, it was reasonable for the police to infer that the unknown man captured on the wiretap was Brown, both because Brown arrived at Brooks‟ house close to the time that the drugs were scheduled to be picked up and because the police had ruled out Price, who was not “unknown” to them.43 Moreover, given the content of the discussion captured on the wiretap, it was reasonable for the police to infer that Brown and Brooks—who the police knew to be a cocaine dealer—had engaged in a drug deal when they were out of the camera‟s view, and that 42 State v. Brown, 2013 WL 4051046, at  (Del. Super. July 30, 2013). 43 See App. to Answering Br. at 128 (Tr. Of Wiretap Motions, Test. of Skinner) (“The reason why we focused in on [Brown‟s] green van specifically is because no one else arrived there that we didn‟t already know. And what I mean by that is John Price had arrived, and we already knew what phone John Price was using and the vehicle he was driving and who he was, so when the green van arrived, we put two and two together and figured that was the person requesting the cocaine that I had heard on the telephone calls leading up to my going out to that area with the patrol vehicle.”). Indeed, Price was profiled as a known member of Brooks‟ syndicate in the Affidavit in Support of Application for Interception of Wire Communications that the State submitted to obtain the wiretap which later captured Brown‟s telephone calls. App. to Answering Br. at 18 (State‟s Affidavit). 15 Brown was still in possession of those drugs minutes later, when Sergeant Skinner stopped his vehicle.44 Because the police had probable cause to arrest Brown, there was no reason to exclude the fruit of the search of his body incident to that arrest, i.e., the drugs that Sergeant Skinner found.45 Brown‟s last claim on direct appeal is more sensitive, given the alleged improprieties by OCME employees that came to light after his trial. As originally argued, Brown claimed that the State did not properly establish the chain of custody of the cocaine evidence. He contended that the discrepancies between the amounts and types of cocaine reported on the evidence bag labels and in the Medical Examiner‟s report showed that the drug evidence had been misidentified or tampered with. Brown objected to the admission of the cocaine evidence at trial, which the Superior Court overruled.46 We review trial court rulings on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.47 “The proper standard for the admission of items into evidence over a chain of custody objection is whether there is a reasonable probability that the evidence offered is what the proponent says it is—that is, that the evidence has not been misidentified and no 44 Cf. State v. Lum, 1978 WL 187981 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 1978) (holding that the police had probable cause to arrest defendants when the parties planned a drug transaction in wiretapped telephone conversations, and then met as planned in the conversations). 45 See Stafford v. State, 59 A.3d 1223, 1231 (Del. 2012) (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973)). 46 Opening Br., Ex. E (Trial Court Bench Ruling on Admission of Cocaine, Sept. 10, 2013) (“I don‟t think there‟s any reasonable possibility that the drugs got mixed up with some other drugs that were not on his person into those envelopes and from there the chain goes on without trouble. I think the objection goes to the weight of the evidence. So your objection is overruled. The item will be admitted.”). 47 McNair v. State, 990 A.2d 398, 401 (Del. 2010); Stickel v. State, 975 A.2d 780, 782 (Del. 2009). 16 tampering or adulteration has occurred.”48 Brown‟s central argument is that there were too many discrepancies between the Police Evidence report and the Medical Examiner report, including in the number of bags, the type (powder vs. crack), and the weight of the cocaine, to support a “reasonable probability” that there had been no tampering or misidentification of the evidence. Given what the State itself has concluded regarding the improprieties by OCME employees, it is perhaps conceivable that the discrepancy between the amount of cocaine Brown claims to have been arrested with and the amount reported by OCME might have been the result of someone in the chain of custody taking some of the cocaine for their personal use, or errors consistent with a larger pattern of sloppiness.49 But at the time of trial, before there was any awareness of problems in evidence-handling by OCME employees, the Superior Court was entitled to credit the forensic examiner‟s testimony. If true, her explanation of the differences between the amounts reported and the type of cocaine observed in each bag satisfied a reasonable probability that the evidence had not been misidentified. The amount of drugs seized from Brown after his arrest and the amount of drugs logged into evidence by OCME roughly matched, and both amounts 48 Word v. State, 2001 WL 762854,  (Del. June 19, 2001); see also McNally v. State, 980 A.2d 364, 371 (Del. 2009) (“In chain of custody issues, the party attempting to admit the evidence must eliminate possibilities of misidentification and adulteration, „not absolutely, but as a matter of reasonable probability.‟”) (quoting Tricoche v. State, 525 A.2d 151, 153 (Del. 1987)). 49 Of course, it could also be that the difference in weights was so minor that there was no material discrepancy at all, consistent with the Superior Court‟s finding. There are a myriad of “mights” in the world. In this case, Brown claims to have had at least 28 grams of cocaine, which he purchased from his upstream supplier and then intended to resell to a downstream purchaser. Shocking as it may seem, the possibility exists that Brown‟s supplier did not give him the full amount that he paid for, but an amount still indisputably above the statutorily relevant 20 grams. 17 totaled more than 20 grams of cocaine, the minimum requirement for a Tier 4 offense. The trial judge was also able to observe the evidence personally, and have the forensic examiner explain which bags of cocaine she had identified as powder or “chunky.”50 Moreover, the State presented all the witnesses necessary to establish the chain of custody, including the seizing officer (Sergeant Skinner), the packaging officers (Sergeant Lloyd and Master Corporal Lavere), and the forensic chemist (Phillips).51 As the Superior Court correctly noted, when there is no clear abuse of discretion, any breaks in the chain of custody go only to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. 52 Because there was a reasonable probability at the time of Brown‟s trial that the evidence had not been misidentified or adulterated, we find that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the cocaine seized from Brown.