Opinion ID: 2531907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Miscellaneous Jury Charges

Text: CSX next contends that the trial court committed reversible error in several of its other instructions to the jury. First, CSX argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that CSX was not required to furnish its employees with the latest, best, or most perfect equipment available and that it should not be held liable for continuing to use equipment after later improvements had been discovered, provided the plaintiff had a reasonably safe place to work. The trial court substantially gave this charge, stating: The extent of the Defendant's duty was to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances at the time and place in question to provide the Plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work. Now, under the law the Defendant had a duty to use reasonable care to provide the Plaintiff with reasonably safe and suitable tools, appliances and machinery with which he was to do his work. Appliances, in order to be reasonably safe and suitable, need not necessarily be the latest or the best which could have been provided to do the work. Consequently, we find no error as to this claim. Next, CSX argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it was not to return a verdict in favor of Miller simply because he had been injured. The trial court instructed the jury as follows: [I]n order to recover under [the FELA negligence claim], the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the following: Number 1, that the Defendant was negligent in one or more of the particulars claims. And Number 2, that the Defendant's negligence proximately caused in whole or in part some injury and consequent damages sustained by the plaintiff.... [I]f you are not satisfied from the evidence or the Plaintiff has not met his burden by a preponderance of the evidence, that the negligence of the Defendant proximately caused in whole or in part some injury and consequent damage to the Plaintiff, then your verdict should be for the Defendant. .... The Defendant, however, was not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the workplace. The extent of the Defendant's duty was to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances at the time and place in question to provide the Plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work. .... If ... the preponderance of the evidence does not support the Plaintiff's claim under the FELA for negligence, then your verdict would be for the Defendant on this claim then you should next consider the Plaintiff's claim under the Locomotive Inspection Act. .... If you should find from a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant did violate the provisions of the Locomotive Inspection Act or [§ 229.119(a)] as alleged by the Plaintiff, and that the violation was a proximate cause in whole or in part in bringing about or actually causing the Plaintiff's injuries, then the Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the Defendant those damages which you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiff actually sustained as a result of that violation without any requirement of a showing of negligence on part of the Defendant. The trial court did not err in refusing to give CSX's requested instruction, because it was clear from the instruction given by the trial court that the jury could not render a verdict in favor of Miller simply because he was injured. The trial court's instruction to the jury made it very clear that it could not render a verdict in favor of Miller unless he established by a preponderance of the evidence his FELA negligence claim and his FELA absolute-liability claim. Therefore, we find no error as to this claim. Finally, CSX argues that the trial court erred in giving a portion of Miller's requested jury instruction no. 10, which is Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil (A.P.J.I.), instruction no. 17.02. Specifically, CSX contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the nature of CSX's duty by electing to include the following sentence in its charge, despite the A.P.J.I. committee's recommendation not to do so: This duty is absolute and continuous and cannot be delegated by the defendant to another. A.P.J.I. 17.02. The Committee's Notes on Use of this sentence state: The Committee does not recommend that the sentence which is in brackets which reads, `This duty is absolute and continuous and cannot be delegated by the defendant to another' be used except in those cases where a contention or suggestion is made that the duty to maintain the tracks or the equipment has been delegated to a third party, such as a siding situation. Committee Notes on Use, A.P.J.I. 17.02. Miller argues that CSX opened the door to this charge by continuously arguing throughout the trial that Miller's trade union was ultimately responsible for the locomotive seats that CSX used and that allegedly caused Miller's injury. We agree with Miller. CSX informed the jury during its opening statement that members of the union were on the committee that recommended the seats Miller alleged caused his injury. Throughout the course of the trial CSX sought to establish that union members had been involved in selecting the seats placed in the locomotives. Miller objected to this line of questioning based on CSX's nondelegable duty of care to provide a safe workplace. In response to Miller's objection, CSX sought an instruction from the trial court directing Miller not to object to the line of questioning based on CSX's nondelegable duty of care, stating: [W]e'll deal with that at the charge conference. At the charge conference, the trial court overruled CSX's objection to giving that portion of the charge referring to CSX's duty as being absolute and nondelegable. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court erred in giving that portion of the charge relating to CSX's duty of care being nondelegable. A party is entitled to have the jury charged on the issues being litigated. See Rivers, supra .