Opinion ID: 2690786
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of R.C. 2929.06(B)

Text: {¶ 16} As a threshold question, we must determine whether R.C. 2929.06(B) is applicable to White’s case. White contends that R.C. 2929.06(B), even if applied retroactively, does not authorize the trial court to empanel a new jury for resentencing under the circumstances of this case. {¶ 17} R.C. 2929.06(B) provides: Whenever any court of this state or any federal court sets aside, nullifies, or vacates a sentence of death imposed upon an offender because of error that occurred in the sentencing phase of the trial   , the trial court that sentenced the offender shall conduct a new hearing to resentence the offender. If the offender was tried by a jury, the trial court shall impanel a new jury for the hearing.    At the hearing, the court    shall follow the procedure set forth in [R.C. 2929.03(D)] in determining whether to impose upon the offender a sentence of death   . {¶ 18} White contends that R.C. 2929.06(B) is inapplicable to his case because his death sentence was not vacated “because of error that occurred in the sentencing phase of the trial.” White’s sentence was vacated because the trial court erroneously overruled a challenge for cause during jury selection. According to White, since the fatal error occurred during jury selection, it did not occur “in the sentencing phase.” {¶ 19} We note that one common pleas court has agreed with White’s reading of R.C. 2929.06(B), holding that an error occurring during voir dire 6 January Term, 2012 “could not have occurred during the sentencing phase.” State v. Jackson, Allen C.P. No. CR-2002-0011 (Nov. 21, 2006), slip op. at 4, on remand from State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 53, 2005-Ohio-5981, 836 N.E.2d 1173. {¶ 20} However, it is relevant to note that voir dire is not a substantive part of trial; rather, it is a mechanism to seat an impartial jury so that the due process rights of a defendant are protected. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729-730, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992) (explaining that the Constitution does not provide for voir dire, but only that the defendant be afforded an impartial jury; voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his constitutional right to an impartial jury will be honored). But an error in the jury-selection process that is not relevant to a guilt determination may become relevant at the time of sentencing, as in this case, in which the only bias issue concerned the juror’s views on the death penalty. Thus, we must interpret what “in the sentencing phase” means as used in R.C. 2929.06(B). While we must be mindful that, although criminal statutes are strictly construed against the state, R.C. 2901.04(A), they should not be given an artificially narrow interpretation that would defeat the apparent legislative intent. In re Clemons, 168 Ohio St. 83, 87-88, 151 N.E.2d 553 (1958). {¶ 21} It is evident that the intent of R.C. 2929.06(B) was to abrogate Penix and to make all capital offenders whose death sentences are set aside eligible for a death sentence on resentencing. The statutory language at issue was taken, with only minor alteration, directly from Penix. Penix states: [W]hen a case is remanded to the trial court following vacation of the death sentence due to error occurring at the penalty phase of the proceeding, the trial court, in resentencing the offender, is limited to the sentences of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty full years of imprisonment or life 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment. (Emphasis added.) 32 Ohio St.3d 369, 513 N.E.2d 744, syllabus. {¶ 22} R.C. 2929.06(B) was intended to abrogate Penix. The statutory language was taken (with minor changes) directly from Penix. We may therefore infer that the statutory language is intended to mean whatever the similar language in Penix meant. The language in Penix, “error occurring at the penalty phase of the proceeding,” does not mean only “error occurring during the penalty phase” but includes all errors that cause the death penalty to be set aside without affecting the guilt-phase verdict. See State v. Scott, 8th Dist. No. 53120, 1988 WL 132574, -8,  (Dec. 9, 1988) (where guilt-phase error was harmless as to conviction but fatal to death sentence, defendant was to be resentenced under Penix). Therefore, the language of R.C. 2929.06(B) has that meaning also. {¶ 23} White’s proposed reading of the statute would create an odd dichotomy between sentencing-phase errors that invalidate a death sentence without affecting the conviction and errors having precisely the same effect but that happen to occur at some other point during the proceedings. Errors of the first type would be covered by R.C. 2929.06(B), so that a new jury could be empaneled for resentencing, and the defendant could receive a death sentence on remand. Errors of the second type would not be covered by R.C. 2929.06(B) and would entitle the defendant to avoid a death sentence. {¶ 24} Such a distinction would be completely arbitrary. White suggests no reason why the General Assembly would want to treat resentenced capital offenders differently based on when the error that invalidated the death sentence occurred. {¶ 25} Accordingly, we reject White’s proposed interpretation of R.C. 2929.06(B) and hold that R.C. 2929.06(B) applies where an aggravated-murder 8 January Term, 2012 conviction with a death specification has been affirmed, but the death sentence has been set aside for legal error, when the error infects and thus invalidates the sentencing phase of the trial. In such a case, R.C. 2929.06(B) permits empanelment of a new jury to resentence the offender.