Opinion ID: 675190
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Questioning of Defense Witness

Text: 8 Evans contends that the court erred by questioning the defense insurance law expert, Edward Birrane. There was considerable conflict at trial over whether Meadowlark was licensed as an insurance company in Maryland and whether the answer to this question determined the legality of Meadowlark's surety bond sales in Maryland. 3 After Birrane, a former Maryland Insurance Commissioner, had been questioned extensively on the difference between licensed and unlicensed insurers and on whether the Meadowlark surety bonds could legally be sold in Maryland, the court intervened in recross examination: 9 Q. [by prosecutor] Employees in your department weren't allowed to take money from people they were regulating; were they? 10 A. No. 11 THE COURT: Nor were they allowed to take money from companies whether they were licensed or not licensed in the state? 12 THE WITNESS: That's correct. 13 THE COURT: Can't take from either one? 14 THE WITNESS: No. The employees in the Insurance Division were not permitted to take money from any insurer or any insuring entity. 15 THE COURT: Whether they were licensed to do business in the state or not licensed; isn't that correct?THE WITNESS: That is correct, Your Honor. I am sorry. 16 THE COURT: All right, thank you. You may step aside. 17 Transcript at 472-73. According to Evans, the court's questions left the jury with the impression that either, a) the mere acceptance of gratuities without a quid pro quo, or, b) the acceptance of monies for a legitimate unrelated purpose would sustain a conviction in this case. Appellant's Brief at 22. Evans points out that neither of these scenarios would violate the Hobbs Act because extortion under color of official right requires a quid pro quo for an official action. See Evans v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 1889, 119 L.Ed.2d 57 (1992) (Government need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts); McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273-74, 111 S.Ct. 1807, 1816-17, 114 L.Ed.2d 307 (1991) (extortion under color of official right requires benefit in exchange for performing or abstention from performing an official act). 18 We have always been reluctant to disturb a judgment of conviction 'by reason of a few isolated, allegedly prejudicial comments of a trial judge,' United States v. Bland, 697 F.2d 262, 265 (8th Cir.1983), particularly in a long trial. United States v. Lueth, 807 F.2d 719, 727 (8th Cir.1986). In this case, we cannot say that these few isolated questions misled the jury in any way. The district judge stated in a side bar that he was merely clearing up the possible misimpression, which he felt the defense was encouraging, that a Self-Insurance Program manager would not violate the Hobbs Act by accepting a bribe from an unlicensed insurance company. Transcript at 476. We understand the court's concern from our own review of the transcript. 19 The trial judge has the prerogative, and at times the duty, of eliciting facts he deems necessary to the clear presentation of the issues. Dranow v. United States, 307 F.2d 545, 572 (8th Cir.1962). To this end, the judge may question witnesses so long as he preserves an attitude of neutrality. Id. We do not think that the district court stepped beyond these bounds. The court merely pointed out that the licensing dispute was irrelevant to the question of whether Evans accepted a bribe to perform an official function. We certainly do not find that the district court's comments throughout the trial were sufficiently one-sided and distractive to defendant's case to deprive him of a fair trial. United States v. Van Dyke, 14 F.3d 415, 418 (8th Cir.1994) (emphasis added). Indeed, this exchange is the only allegedly prejudicial commentary in five hundred pages of transcript. 20 If the jury had been misled at all, the district court's Hobbs Act instruction cured any misperceptions and clearly set forth the quid pro quo for official conduct requirement. 4 Accordingly, we find no error in the court's questions.