Opinion ID: 213796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: grounds 3a and 4

Text: The district court dismissed Cooper's petition, including Grounds 3A and 4, as procedurally defaulted based on the state court's dismissal of them under state procedural rules. Ground 3A is a Due Process, Fair Trial, and Equal Protection claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, based on the prosecutor's alleged misconduct, specifically improper vouching and commentary regarding the credibility of witness Donnell Wells. Ground 4 is a separate Due Process, Fair Trial, and Equal Protection claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, based on the trial court's allegedly improper questioning and vouching for Wells's credibility. According to Cooper, the Nevada Supreme Court denied Grounds 3A and 4 on the basis of the law of the case, stating that it had already considered and rejected similar claims raised by Cooper in his first post-conviction petition and that its earlier decision could not be avoided by more detailed and precisely focused argument. Cooper argues that Grounds 3A and 4 were denied as already litigated and therefore are properly presented for federal review. We disagree. As a preliminary matter, Respondents argue that this issue is not properly before the court. However, this argument is without merit. The Certificate of Appealability (COA) covers the issue of whether the district court properly dismissed appellant's third amended habeas petition as procedurally defaulted. Cooper's contentions with respect to Grounds 3A and 4 concern the question of whether the district court erred in finding these claims defaulted. Therefore, they are properly before this panel. See Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1079 n. 4 (9th Cir.2006) (addressing an issue relevant to a certified issue because it is `predicate to an intelligent resolution of the question presented') (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996)). With respect to Ground 3A, Cooper's third state habeas petition raised this claim for the first time. [1] On July 24, 2000, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment [dismissing all claims in Cooper's third state habeas petition] except in regard to Cooper's claim that a witness to the murder, Donnell Wells, had recanted his trial testimony and alleged that he had been pressured and paid to testify. Although the Nevada Supreme Court recognized the possibility that Cooper could show cause and prejudice with respect to the Brady violation, it held as to the remaining contentions in appellant's petition [including Ground 3A], the district court did not err in determining that appellant failed to demonstrate adequate cause or prejudice to excuse the procedural defects. The court's law of the case statements to which Cooper refers occurred during the subsequent appeal only on the narrow issue of Brady. On March 2, 2006, the Nevada Supreme Court found that Cooper failed to demonstrate prejudice from the Brady violations, despite showing cause. In finding no prejudice, the state court rejected Cooper's claim that Wells's recantation was inherently prejudicial because the prosecution and court improperly bolstered his testimony. In so holding, the state court referenced its September 21, 1988 decision, which held there was no improper bolstering (the factual bases for Grounds 3A and 4) and declined to revisit that opinion or find increased risk of prejudice due to the alleged bolstering because the state court had already rejected those bolstering claims on the merits. We therefore disagree with Cooper's contention that the Nevada Supreme Court denied Grounds 3A and 4 on the basis of the law of the case, stating that it had already considered and rejected similar claims raised by Cooper. Cooper refers to the March 2, 2006 Nevada Supreme Court decisiona decision reviewing a limited remand to the state district court for an evidentiary hearing on whether the Brady violation (recanted testimony) was excused from procedural default by a showing of cause and prejudice. The limited remand for an evidentiary hearing with respect to prejudice from the Brady violation shaped a limited final decision by the state supreme court, holding only that there was no prejudice from the Brady violation and not itself denying Grounds 3A and 4. Cooper argued that the misconduct underlying Grounds 3A and 4 heightened the prejudice from the Brady violationin finding no prejudice, the Nevada Supreme Court merely noted it had already rejected those claims of misconduct and thus declined to find the risk of prejudice was heightened. Rather than deciding the question of whether Ground 3A should be dismissed (and on what basis), the Nevada Supreme Court merely referenced its prior rulings with respect to alleged improper bolstering to support its final decision that there was no prejudice from any Brady violation. Its earlier decision on July 24, 2000, is thus the relevant one for purposes of procedural default on Ground 3A and, in that decision, it held that Cooper had failed to demonstrate adequate cause or prejudice to excuse the procedural defects. With respect to Ground 4, Cooper never exhausted this claim in state court in the first place. Unlike Ground 3A, which Cooper raised in his third state habeas petition, Cooper never alleged Ground 4 of the federal petition, that the court violated his due process rights through improper bolstering. Thus, the district court did not err in finding this claim procedurally defaulted. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (unexhausted claims that would be untimely if the petitioner attempted to exhaust them now are procedurally defaulted). We therefore affirm the district court's finding that Grounds 3A and 4 were procedurally defaulted.