Opinion ID: 2576153
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Heading: Jury selection failure to remove jurors for cause

Text: Defendant contends the trial court violated his right to a fair and impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by refusing to excuse for cause three jurors who asserted they always would vote for the death penalty for certain forms of murder. Defendant challenged Jurors L., Q., and V. for cause after each made conflicting statements concerning whether he or she inevitably would vote for the death penalty for an intentional, deliberate, or premeditated murder. The trial court denied each of these challenges. Defendant used a peremptory challenge to excuse Juror V. from the panel of regular jurors, and used another peremptory challenge to remove Juror Q. from the panel of alternate jurors. Juror L. was excused on other grounds. Defendant used all 20 of his available peremptory challenges to the prospective regular jurors, [22] and also exhausted the peremptory challenges available to him to challenge the prospective alternate jurors. [23] The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the sentencing jury in a capital case to be impartial to the same extent required at the guilt phase. ( Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 726-728, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492; see also id. at p. 740, 112 S.Ct. 2222 (dis. opn. of Scalia, J.) [clarifying the constitutional basis of the court's holding]; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 666, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752.) Article I, section 16 of the California Constitution provides the same guarantee. (See People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 666-667, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752; People v. Johnson (1993) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1210, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1.) To achieve the constitutional imperative of impartiality, the law permits a prospective juror to be challenged for cause only if his or her views in favor of or against capital punishment would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror' in accordance with the court's instructions and the juror's oath. ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, quoting Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 975, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 121, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) Under our state law, a defendant who wishes to preserve a claim of error in the improper denial of a challenge for cause must: (1) use a peremptory challenge to remove the juror in question; (2) exhaust his or her peremptory challenges or justify the failure to do so; and (3) express dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately selected. (See People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th at pp. 910-911, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103; People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 667, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 120-121, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) Here, defendant used peremptory challenges to remove Jurors V. and Q. and exhausted all of his peremptory challenges in selecting the jurors. He did not, however, express dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately seated. [24] We decline, however, to find defendant's claim forfeited on this basis, because language in past cases suggested that counsel's expression of dissatisfaction with the jury was not always a necessary prerequisite to challenging on appeal a trial court's decision denying a challenge for cause. ( People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 911, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103; see People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 121, fn. 4, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887; People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1087-1088, 259 Cal.Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659.) This case was tried in early 1989, before the law was clarified with respect to the preservation of claims involving the allegedly erroneous denial of challenges for cause. Accordingly, we shall reach the merits of defendant's claim. (See People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 416, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391 [declining to find claim of erroneous denial of challenge for cause forfeited, because the law was in a state of flux on this point at the time of defendant's 1993 trial].) To establish that the erroneous inclusion of a juror violated a defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury, the defendant must show either that a biased juror actually sat on the jury that imposed the death sentence, or that the defendant was deprived of a peremptory challenge that he or she would have used to excuse a juror who in the end participated in deciding the case. ( Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 85, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80; People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 667, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 121, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887; People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1087-1088, 259 Cal.Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659.) Here, defendant used peremptory challenges to remove Jurors Q. and V. from the panels of prospective regular and alternate jurors, and Juror L. was excused for other reasons. Accordingly, none of these jurors sat on the jury that ultimately decided defendant's case. Further, defendant does not identify any sitting juror whom he challenged for cause. (See Ross v. Oklahoma, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 86, 108 S.Ct. 2273; People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 114, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166.) Defendant did file a motion seeking to quash the entire jury panel on the ground that it did not include any jurors from the Hollywood area where the crime was committed. But defendant neither presses that claim here, nor suggests that the absence of [persons residing in Hollywood] was in any way related to the failure to remove [Jurors L., Q., and V.] for cause. ( Ross v. Oklahoma, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 86, 108 S.Ct. 2273.) Defendant thus fails to demonstrate that the jury that tried his case was not impartial. ( Ibid. ) Finally, defendant fails to identify any juror whom he would have excused had he not used his peremptory challenges to remove Jurors V. and Q. ( Ross v. Oklahoma, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273; People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 418-419, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391; cf. People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 668, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752.) Accordingly, focusing on the 12 jurors who actually decided defendant's case, as we must (see Ross v. Oklahoma, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 86, 108 S.Ct. 2273), we conclude that defendant has not established that his right to an impartial jury was violated. In any event, the trial court properly denied each of defendant's challenges for cause. Applying Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, we have stated that `[i]n a capital case, a prospective juror may be excluded if the juror's views on capital punishment would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of the juror's duties. [Citations.] A prospective juror is properly excluded if he or she is unable to conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate. [Citation.]' [Citation.] In addition, `[o]n appeal, we will uphold the trial court's ruling if it is fairly supported by the record, accepting as binding the trial court's determination as to the prospective juror's true state of mind when the prospective juror has made statements that are conflicting or ambiguous. [Citations.]' ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 987, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) Here, each of the challenged jurors initially expressed some variation of the view that he or she would vote for the death penalty in all cases of intentional, deliberate, or premeditated murder. Nonetheless, after the trial court and sometimes the prosecutor explained that the death penalty was not mandatory if the defendant was found guilty of murder with special circumstances, but instead that there would be a separate penalty phase at which the parties would have the opportunity to present aggravating and mitigating evidence relevant to punishment, each juror expressed a willingness to consider all of the evidence and both available penalty options before deciding on the appropriate punishment. The record thus supports the trial court's conclusion that none of the challenged jurors held views that would prevent or substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties. ( Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424, 105 S.Ct. 844; People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 987, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) At a minimum, because the jurors' statements were ambiguous or conflicting, the trial court's determination of each juror's true state of mind is binding on us. ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 987, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) Defendant asserts that he used all of his peremptory challenges to excuse these jurors, leaving him no peremptory challenges when the final juror was seated. To the extent this assertion can be interpreted as a claim that the trial court arbitrarily deprived defendant of peremptory challenges due him under state law in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law (see Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 65 L.Ed.2d 175), this claim must fail. Defendant received and exercised the 20 peremptory challenges allotted to him under state law. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 231.) State law required him to use those peremptories to cure any erroneous denials of challenges for cause. ( People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1248, fn. 4, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251, overruled on other grounds in People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 835, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) Defendant received all that was due him under state law. ( Ross v. Oklahoma, supra, 487 U.S. at pp. 88-91, 108 S.Ct. 2273; People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1248, fn. 4, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251.)