Opinion ID: 379270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: interpretation of the plea agreement

Text: 14 This court's decision in United States v. Arnett, No. 79-1243, --- F.2d ---- (9th Cir., Nov. 26, 1979), sets out the law of this circuit regarding the interpretation of plea bargains. The defendant in Arnett pled guilty to one count of a multiple-count indictment in return for the government's promise to take no position as to the appropriate sentence. At the sentencing hearing, the government did not oppose Arnett's request for probation, but Arnett was nonetheless sentenced to prison. Two days later, Arnett moved for a reduction of sentence 6 under Rule 35, but did not advance any new reasons warranting leniency. The government responded to this motion in writing, stating that no new reasons for leniency had been advanced, circumstances had not changed, and that there was no reason for the court to change its mind. Arnett moved to strike the government's response, claiming that it constituted a violation of the plea agreement. The government argued that the time of sentencing had passed and that the plea agreement was therefore no longer in effect. The district court found for the government, and the Rule 35 motion was denied. 15 On appeal, this court ruled that ambiguities in plea bargains are to be resolved by looking to the facts of each case since (w)hat the parties agreed to in the . . . plea bargain is a question of fact. Id., at ----. Good-faith disputes as to the terms of a plea agreement are to be resolved by the district court in which the plea was originally submitted. Remand was therefore appropriate for a finding on the intended meaning of time of sentencing. 7 16 The Arnett holding regarding the intent of the parties is inapplicable to the case before us. Here, unlike Arnett, the intent of the parties becomes clear upon an examination of the language of the plea agreement and the conduct of the parties. Consequently, there is no need for remand for the purpose of interpreting the plea agreement.
17 In Arnett there was a legitimate factual dispute between the parties regarding the applicability of the plea agreement to a post-sentence proceeding. That kind of dispute did not exist in the instant case with respect to the July 20th hearing. The government has never argued that the plea agreement was not in force at the July 20th hearing. Instead, the government's sole contention is and has been that its comments did not violate the plea agreement. For example, the government's response to Bronstein's objection at the July 20th hearing (that the government was violating the agreement) was that it was attempting to correct the factual misrepresentation that Bronstein had voluntarily disclosed the errors in the tax return for 1973 to the I.R.S. 8 This clearly indicates that the government perceived the plea agreement to be in effect at that time. Accordingly, it is clear that the intent of the parties, as demonstrated by their conduct and by the language of the agreement, was that the agreement cover the July 20th hearing.
18 Remand for findings is not required on the intended meaning of the factual misrepresentation language contained in the plea agreement. The agreement is clear on its face. 19 At the July 20th hearing, the defense represented that Bronstein had made a good-faith effort to voluntarily disclose errors in the corporate return for 1973 and had relied on Pelletier to file a correct amended return. The majority of the government's comments (enumerated 1-6 above) were made in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement in an attempt to correct the factual representation that Bronstein had attempted to make a voluntary disclosure. 20 However, the government's comments regarding Bronstein's alleged and unrelated criminal conduct were not directed to the representation regarding voluntary disclosure or to any other factual misrepresentation made by the defendant, and were therefore beyond the limits set out in the plea agreement. Resentencing was warranted because of this breach of the plea agreement, Santobello v. New York, supra, 404 U.S. at 263, 92 S.Ct. at 499, and the trial judge erred in denying the defendant's motion. Remand for resentencing is therefore mandated. 9 21 The decision below is vacated. We remand to the district court for resentencing in light of Santobello v. New York, supra, 404 U.S. at 263, 92 S.Ct. at 499.