Opinion ID: 1187510
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: frink's consent to search his car

Text: The police did not have a warrant when they searched Frink's car, and Frink argues that no exception to the warrant requirement is applicable. The state maintains a warrant was not necessary because Frink consented to both searches. We find that Frink consented to the searches, [25] and therefore do not examine the alternate theories offered by the state to validate the search. A search conducted without a warrant will ordinarily be regarded as per se unreasonable unless it falls within one of the previously delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967); Erickson v. State, 507 P.2d 508, 514 (Alaska 1973). One of those exceptions is a search to which an individual voluntarily consents. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 358 n. 22, 88 S.Ct. at 515 n. 22, 19 L.Ed.2d at 586 n. 22; Sleziak v. State, 454 P.2d 252, 256 (Alaska), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 921, 90 S.Ct. 252, 24 L.Ed.2d 202 (1969). When the state asserts any exception to the warrant requirement, the state has the burden of proof. State v. Stump, 547 P.2d 305, 307 (Alaska 1976). In Erickson v. State , we explained the state's burden when it asserts the consent exception to the warrant requirement: Note however, that consent to a search, in order to be voluntary, must be unequivocal, specific and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion, and is not lightly to be inferred. 507 P.2d at 515 (footnote omitted). The trial court found the state had proven Frink voluntarily consented and ruled the fruits of the searches admissible: [Y]ou take into account the totality of the circumstances, and the circumstances as I understood them in this case were such that Mr. Frink had in fact consented to that search because he was a person who knew what his rights were and therefore at the time that he allowed them to search his car when they asked him to do so, when they asked him to step out, to search his car, he did, and he voluntarily consented to the search. Resolution in conflicts of testimony at the suppression hearing are left to the trial judge. Sleziak v. State, 454 P.2d 252, 260 n. 22 (Alaska), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 921, 90 S.Ct. 252, 24 L.Ed.2d 202 (1969); Weltz v. State, 431 P.2d 502, 505 (Alaska 1967). The trial court evaluated the totality of circumstances surrounding the search to determine if Frink voluntarily consented to it. The totality of circumstances test for voluntariness of a consent search is the prevailing federal standard, articulated by the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). In formulating its totality of circumstances analysis, the Court in Schneckloth sought guidance from cases involving the voluntariness of confessions: In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne [when the defendant confessed] ..., the Court has assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstances  both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. Some of the factors taken into account have included the youth of the accused, his lack of education, or his low intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep. In all of these cases, the Court determined the factual circumstances surrounding the confession, assessed the psychological impact on the accused, and evaluated the legal significance of how the accused reacted. ..... ... [We] agree with the courts of California that the question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. 412 U.S. at 226-27, 93 S.Ct. at 2047-2048, 36 L.Ed.2d at 862-63 (footnote and citations omitted). [26] The record clearly supports the trial court's conclusion that Frink voluntarily consented to the search. Though the police did not specifically tell Frink that he had the right to refuse their request, they did nothing to indicate that he had to comply with their request and the totality of circumstances surrounding the search does not suggest Frink consented because his will was overborne. Frink was a thirty-eight year old, intelligent, successful businessperson. The police questioned him for only a few minutes, and he immediately complied with their requests. Frink himself testified at the suppression hearing a number of times that he gave permission for the searches. A. Hogan appeared to be in charge and he asked permission to search the car, which I granted. Q. Had  what had he communicated to you prior to that? A. Just who he was, said he was a police officer. Q. Did you have information at that time as to why they were questioning you? Had they communicated anything to you at that time? A. No. Q. And what occurred then? A. Well, I don't remember the exact language but I said, yes, they could search the car for anything they wanted. Q. And did you know what they wanted? A. No. Q. And what did they do at that point? A. Hogan, I believe, was the one who search  excuse me  was the one who searched it. He looked in the glove compartment first and then he searched the rear of the car and removed the 2 spent shotgun shells. There were several other shells back there  he didn't seem interested in those  from a rifle and a pistol I have. ..... Q. After that, what else did he inspect? A. Then he asked for the keys and I unlocked the trunk. He went through that. ..... Q. And you did give them permission to look around your car? A. Yes, sir. [emphasis added] [27] Even after his lawyer arrived and Frink was specifically advised of his Miranda rights and his right to refuse to consent to a search, Frink signed a release form, consenting to a further search of his car. Frink testified at trial that he permitted the searches because he had nothing to hide: I didn't have any reason not to. There wasn't anything back there that I didn't want him to see. The court's statement in United States v. Smith, 308 F.2d 657, 663 (2d Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 906, 83 S.Ct. 717, 9 L.Ed.2d 716 (1963), is relevant here: On the [one] hand, if the defendant permits a warrantless search of his home or establishment in the mistaken belief that he has nothing there which will incriminate him, it has been held that the search has been voluntarily consented to. [28] Frink implicitly admits the record supports a finding of voluntariness under Schneckloth but argues that Alaska's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures requires a different consent standard. [29] Frink argues that the state, to show consent, must specifically prove that he knew of his right to refuse to allow the search. The Court in Schneckloth rejected that argument, [30] and we do not believe that the Alaska Constitution requires a different standard for noncustodial consent searches.