Opinion ID: 2527692
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court's Ashworth Inquiry

Text: {¶ 40} In January 2005, about 16 months before trial, Short first expressed an interest in waiving mitigation. He asked the trial court's permission to withdraw a motion to suppress, change his plea to guilty, and proceed without any mitigation. At defense counsel's request, the trial court ordered a psychological evaluation pursuant to State v. Ashworth (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 56, 706 N.E.2d 1231. The next month, the clinical psychologist's report concluded, Mr. Duane Short is currently competent    to Waive Presentation of Mitigating Factors for Sentencing. {¶ 41} Then, on the day the penalty phase began, the trial court addressed defense counsel as follows: [I]t's my understanding    that the Defendant    does not intend to present any additional    mitigating evidence other than that which was presented in the trial phase, is that correct? Defense counsel affirmed that that was correct. {¶ 42} The trial court asked counsel whether they had discussed with Short his right to present mitigation evidence and had explained what mitigation evidence consists of. Counsel reported that they had done so, and also that they had made a thorough investigation of mitigating evidence    including inquiries of family members and other persons. {¶ 43} The trial court then addressed Short, stating: It's my understanding    that you    did not want then and you do not want now any additional assistance in the presentation of mitigating evidence   . Short replied: That's correct. Short affirmed that he had consulted with his counsel about mitigation and that they had fully explained it to him. {¶ 44} The court also delved into Short's specific understanding of mitigation. Short explained in his own words what he understood mitigation to mean and why it was important: mitigation meant factors that could result in causing the jury to sway the case to give me more of a possibility of    a more in-depth look into what happened and possibly    a lighter sentence. Short told the court that it was important: [I]t would give the jurors, like I said, for a more indef [sic]perspective than them just considering what the prosecution had presented to weigh more accurately their sentencing phase, I guess. {¶ 45} The court explained to Short that the defense had the burden of going forward with evidence of mitigating factors, while the state had the burden of proving that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors, and that a death sentence could be imposed only if the prosecutor met its burden. Short said he understood. {¶ 46} The court asked Short whether he understood that without evidence in mitigation, it may be difficult    for the jury to impose anything other than the death sentence. Short emphatically affirmed that he understood: I certainly do. Later in the colloquy, he restated in his own words: [I]t could very well cost me my life if I don't put on any mitigation. I understand that fully. {¶ 47} In a written decision, the trial court made the following findings: {¶ 48} (1) Short understood the choice between life and death; {¶ 49} (2) He had the ability to make a knowing and intelligent decision not to present mitigating evidence; {¶ 50} (3) He fully understood the ramifications of that decision; {¶ 51} (4) He had the ability to reason logically; {¶ 52} (5) He understood his right to present mitigating evidence; {¶ 53} (6) He understood the meaning of mitigating evidence; {¶ 54} (7) He understood the importance of mitigating evidence; {¶ 55} (8) He understood the use of mitigating evidence to offset the aggravating circumstances; {¶ 56} (9) He understood the effect of failing to present mitigation. {¶ 57} Short did not present any mitigating evidence to the jury in the penalty phase. However, his counsel did argue for a life sentence. Based on guilt-phase evidence, counsel argued that Short had committed the murders while suffering from severe emotional distress due to the breakup of his marriage, that he did not plan the murders in advance, and that his 38 years of life should not be judged exclusively on his actions during a seven-hour period.