Opinion ID: 4660028
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Heading: Creation of a Tenancy by the Entirety

Text: A tenancy by the entirety is a common-law estate unique to married couples, with a right of survivorship where the surviving spouse retains the entire interest rather than acquiring the decedent’s interest. Tenancy by the Entirety, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Wyoming law recognizes tenancy by the entirety in personal property. Id. at 485 (“It appears that Wyoming is among the minority of states which recognize tenancy by the entirety in personal property.”); Wambeke v. Hopkin, 372 P.2d 470, 475–76 (Wyo. 1962); Wyo. Stat. § 34-1-140 (tenancy by the entirety “as to any interest in real or personal property” may be established “by designating in the instrument . . . the names of such . . . tenants by the entirety”). Radiance points out that while tenancy by the entirety was once presumed at common law, it is now disfavored in Wyoming. Anselmi, 52 B.R. at 487. This only means, however, that “the existence of a tenancy by the entirety -9- will not be presumed . . . in the absence of an express intent to create a right of survivorship.” Id. In Wambeke the Wyoming Supreme Court laid out two alternative ways to prove the creation of a tenancy by the entirety in personal property: 1. Each of the four unities of interest, time, title, and possession must be present, with the added unity of person for a tenancy by the entirety; or 2. In the absence of one or more of the first four unities, it must be evident from the language of the instrument itself that the parties thereto intended to create a right of survivorship. 372 P.2d at 476. The parties agree that the required unities of interest are lacking with respect to the Fidelity account, so the only way the Crows can establish a tenancy by the entirety is by the second alternative described in Wambeke. Whether a particular document constitutes an “instrument” within the meaning of Wambeke is a matter on which the parties strongly disagree. Radiance argues for a narrow definition, and its position is effectively that an investment account like the one at issue here can never be held as a tenancy by the entirety. Radiance contends an “instrument” within the meaning of Wambeke was narrowly defined by the bankruptcy court in Anselmi: “As used by the Wambeke court, ‘instrument’ might include bills, bonds, conveyance, leases, mortgages, contract, promissory notes, deeds, and other similar writing whereby ‘chattel is embodied -10- in a document.’” Anselmi, 52 B.R. at 492 (quoting Restatement (2d) of Conflicts, §§ 248 & 249 cmt. h). Radiance also notes that Wyo. Stat. § 34-1-140 provides that a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety “may be established” in an “instrument of conveyance or transfer.” Radiance argues there is nothing in this case that fits this definition of “instrument.” We disagree with Radiance’s position, which would unduly narrow tenancies by the entirety in Wyoming. The relevant passage of Anselmi reads: [A] careful reading of Wambeke indicates that, in this context, [“instrument”] refers to those writings which give formal expression to a legal act or agreement for the purpose of creating, securing, modifying, or terminating a right. As used by the Wambeke court, “instrument” might include bills, bonds, conveyance, leases, mortgages, contract, promissory notes, deeds, and other similar writing whereby “chattel is embodied in a document.” 52 B.R. at 492 (emphasis added). The first sentence provides an apt definition, and is consistent with Wyoming cases that inquire whether the “creating instrument” evidences a clear intention to create a tenancy by the entirety. See, e.g., Choman v. Epperly, 592 P.2d 714, 718 (Wyo. 1979) (citing cases). On the other hand, the second sentence on which Radiance relies is only an example—it indicates the definition of instrument “might include” a document in which the chattel is embodied, not that it is limited to such a document. Similarly, § 34-1- 140 states that a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety “may be established” in an instrument of conveyance or transfer—not that it can only be established in such a manner. -11- The Wyoming Supreme Court recently confirmed that § 34-1-140 does not prescribe the only method of creating a right to survivorship. In Fleig v. Estate of Fleig, 413 P.3d 63 (Wyo. 2018), the court held that a husband and wife held a bank account as a joint tenancy with right of survivorship because the membership account contract between the couple and the bank unambiguously evidenced an intent to create a right of survivorship. Id. at 643. 3 Radiance complains Fleig does not involve a tenancy by the entirety. But tenancy by the entirety is merely one species of a right of survivorship, and Wyoming cases treat joint survivorship and tenancy by the entirety interchangeably for analytical purposes. Indeed, the Wambeke standard itself, which indisputably addressed whether a tenancy by the entirety had been created, used the phrase “right of survivorship.” 372 P.2d at 476. Here, the application to open the Fidelity account is a “creating instrument,” and it gave formal expression to an agreement between Fidelity and the Crows to create rights. The application contains a handwritten note expressly labeling the account as a tenancy by the entirety. We therefore find it is “evident from the language of the instrument itself that the parties thereto intended to create a right of survivorship.” Wambeke, 372 P.2d at 476. 3 In addition, other Wyoming cases have accepted bank account signature cards as evidence of intent to create a right of survivorship. See, e.g., Nat’l Bank of Newcastle v. Wartell, 580 P.2d 1142, 1145–46 (Wyo. 1978). -12- Radiance further argues, however, that the application itself contains language allowing either spouse to dispose of the assets of the account without the consent or approval of the other. Citing Anselmi, Radiance argues this provision is inconsistent with the very concept of a tenancy by the entirety. We disagree. Anselmi concludes only that the unity of interest is missing where either spouse is capable of voluntarily alienating the property without consent of the other. 52 B.R. at 491. But the second alternative under Wambeke “recognizes the existence of a joint tenancy without the four unities if the intention to create such is evident.” Choman, 592 P.2d at 715 (emphasis added). In this case, all the parties agree that the four unities are lacking and that a tenancy of the entirety can be proved only by a demonstration of intent based on the language of the instrument itself. We find the Crows proved that requisite intent under the second alternative.