Opinion ID: 853980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Woods' Remaining Ineffectiveness Claims

Text: Woods alleges a plethora of other deficiencies in the handling of his case and argues that the postconviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. To establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. More recently, the Supreme Court of the United States held that prejudice resulting from ineffective assistance is not established unless the error rendered the result of the proceeding fundamentally unfair or unreliable. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). The two prongs of Strickland are separate and independent inquiries; hence [i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice... that course should be followed. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Consistent with this directive, we assume, without deciding, that Woods could establish that trial counsel's performance fell below prevailing professional norms in one or more respects. [26] Woods nonetheless must show a reasonable probability of a different result but for the alleged errors. The postconviction court found in detailed findings that Woods had not shown prejudice. There is no need to repeat these findings here. It suffices to say that Woods makes no colorable claim that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to an opposite conclusion as to the required showing of prejudice. For that reason alone, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief. Spranger v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1117, 1119-20 (Ind.1995). The individual incidents of allegedly deficient performance are too numerous to list or even summarize here. The brief filed on behalf of Woods deals with nearly every action or inaction by trial counsel, but makes no effort to establish prejudice from the supposed errors. At one point, Woods even suggests that proof of prejudice is not required and refers to the postconviction court's finding that no prejudice was shown on a particular point as the incorrect legal standard to apply in determining whether the Sixth Amendment was violated. Woods, not the postconviction court, is incorrect on that point. We are aware that the duty to search for constitutional error with painstaking care is never more exacting than it is in a capital case. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987). Nonetheless, Woods' failure to point to anything contradicting the postconviction court's finding of lack of prejudice permits an uncomplicated disposition of the rest of the appeal notwithstanding the serious nature of the proceedings. Because this is a death penalty case, and for that reason only, we briefly address the ineffectiveness claims, roughly in the order that they are presented but with some consolidation due to redundant argument. Woods first alleges a variety of areas of possible investigation that were not but might have been pursued. The postconviction court found no prejudice from any of these and no serious contention is made attacking that finding. Although several challenges related to jury selection were preserved and rejected on direct appeal, Woods, 547 N.E.2d at 785-86, 791, Woods argues that counsel's handling of voir dire fell below prevailing professional norms. The objections to counsel's performance in voir dire include fifteen shortcomings identified by Woods' expert on death penalty defense standards in the postconviction court. Woods concludes his discussion of this list by complaining that the postconviction court failed to explore the issues of whether any jurors actually were seated who should not have been. He fails to explore that subject in this appeal and for that reason presents no claim for reversal. Woods next attacks the content of counsel's opening and closing arguments at the guilt phase, as well as other tactical trial decisions (e.g., failure to cross-examine witnesses or object to evidence, and failure to argue theories such as sudden heat that were supposedly more consistent with the mitigation evidence). Woods seeks to avoid the obvious point that classic tactical choices of this sort hardly ever support a claim of ineffective assistance because they are matters of trial strategy, Douglas v. State, 663 N.E.2d 1153 (Ind.1996), by contending that counsel's performance was so uninformed that no presumption of strategic decision should attach. However, Woods has not elaborated how any alternative argument or tactic would possibly, much less reasonably probably, have changed the outcome. Trial counsel Johnston testified in postconviction that we honestly felt we had a very difficult case. It was very difficult to win on the guilt phase. Woods concedes in this appeal that there was overwhelming evidence of his participation in the crime. In light of the powerful evidence of guiltincluding a confession held on direct appeal to have been properly admitted, Woods, 547 N.E.2d at 786-87we cannot say that the convictions were a fundamentally unfair or unreliable result. Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 369, 113 S.Ct. 838. Woods next points to numerous alleged omissions at the penalty phase, including failure to give an opening statement or call Woods to the stand, failure to assemble and present a complete social or life history of Woods for mitigation purposes, and failure to make an effective presentation of the mitigation evidence that was gathered. The argument (not unfamiliar in postconviction) boils down to (1) counsel should have done more; and (2) counsel was ineffective with respect to what little was done. Neither contention withstands scrutiny here. As noted, counsel's choices related to opening or closing argumentand, for that matter, the decision whether the defendant should testifyare strategic calls that will rarely support a Sixth Amendment violation. Indeed, counsel Johnston testified in postconviction that he feared Woods would be beat up by the prosecutor if he took the stand. With respect to the mitigation evidence, the postconviction court found that the evidence offered at the postconviction hearing was cumulative of the evidence presented at trial. Woods' contention to the contrary is wholly conclusory; and he concedes that at least some of this evidence was duplicative. In any event, Woods has not explained what any witness would have said, or any investigation would have uncovered, that might have led to a different sentence. He focuses on postconviction testimony illustrating difficulties in his upbringing, particularly related to his abusive mother. These arguments were not only made at trial but credited: on direct appeal we agreed with the trial court's determination that Woods' turbulent childhood was a significant mitigating circumstance. Woods, 547 N.E.2d at 782. Thus, even assuming the postconviction evidence on this point was not cumulative, prejudice has not been proved because Woods' surroundings were accepted as a mitigating factor at sentencing without the postconviction testimony. See also Hough v. State, 690 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ind.1997) (prejudice was not established because defendant's personality disorder and abusive family background were not necessarily entitled to mitigating weight), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. July 23, 1998) (No. 98-5826). [27] The next contention is that the postconviction court erred in summarily dismissing several claims alleging that numerous procedural, constitutional and instructional issues not litigated either at trial or on direct appeal supported a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. In the eight pages devoted to this argument, nowhere does Woods explain what these issues are. Rather, he incorporates the claims by reference by listing the relevant postconviction court findings on these issues in a footnote. It is apparent from the findings that some of the argumentssuch as allegedly deficient handling of voir direduplicate Woods' other claims. Others (e.g., prosecutorial misconduct) were resolved against Woods on direct appeal. For each argument, the postconviction court found that Woods offered no evidence or authority to support his contention or failed to show a reasonable probability of a different result but for the error. Because Woods points to nothing in the record showing these findings to be clearly erroneous, this presents no basis for reversal. Woods' remaining ineffectiveness claims are miscellaneous in nature and, because they are meritless, amenable to summary disposition. Woods raises a laundry list of undeveloped challenges to the jury instructions. It is difficult to determine whether these claims allege ineffective assistance for failure to object to or proffer a particular instruction, or are direct (and thus untimely) challenges to rulings at trial on instructing the jury. These arguments, if not defaulted for failure to raise them as free standing claims on direct appeal, [28] are waived for lack of cogency and failure to cite to the record. Armstead v. State, 538 N.E.2d 943, 945 (Ind. 1989). Finally, Woods contends that the postconviction court erred in finding certain claims to be res judicata because they were or could have been raised on direct appeal. Woods maintains that his petition for postconviction relief asked that these issues be addressed as both free standing claims and ineffective assistance for failure to raise each issue on direct appeal; therefore the finding of procedural default was error. This assertion presents no basis for reversal. [29]