Opinion ID: 1364184
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: availability as a witness

Text: The principle issue raised by appellant is the propriety of calling him, over objections, as a witness in his own commitment hearing. We stress, preliminarily, the two separate and distinct testimonial privileges here involved. In a criminal matter a defendant has an absolute right not to be called as a witness and not to testify. (Amend. V of the U.S. Const. and art. I, § 15, of the Cal. Const. as codified in Evid. Code, § 930.) Further, in any proceeding, civil or criminal, a witness has the right to decline to answer questions which may tend to incriminate him in criminal activity (Evid. Code, § 940). However, as we shall develop more fully, notwithstanding these privileges, no witness has a privilege to refuse to reveal to the trier of fact his physical or mental characteristics where they are relevant to the issues under consideration. Several features of the applicable statutes (§§ 6500-6512) persuade us that commitment of mentally retarded persons must be deemed essentially civil in nature. The commitment is not initiated in response, or necessarily related, to any criminal acts; it is of limited duration, expiring at the end of one year and any new petition is subject to the same procedures as an original commitment (§ 6500.1); the petitioner need not be a public prosecutor, but may be any parent or other person designated by the court (§ 6502). The sole state interest, legislatively expressed, is the custodial care, diagnosis, treatment, and protection of persons who are unable to take care of themselves and who for their own well being and the safety of others cannot be left adrift in the community. The commitment may not reasonably be deemed punishment either in its design or purpose. It is not analogous to criminal proceedings. (1) The predominantly civil character of the proceedings created by sections 6500-6512 establishes that appellant did not have an absolute right, as does a defendant in a criminal action, not to be called as a witness and not to testify. ( Black v. State Bar (1972) 7 Cal.3d 676, 685 [103 Cal. Rptr. 288, 499 P.2d 968]; In re Vaughan (1922) 189 Cal. 491, 495-497 [209 P. 353, 24 A.L.R. 858]; People v. Whelchel (1967) 255 Cal. App.2d 455, 460 [63 Cal. Rptr. 258].) As expressed by the highest authority, the historic purpose of the privilege against being called as a witness has been to assure that the criminal justice system remains accusatorial, not inquisitorial. ( Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1, 11 [12 L.Ed.2d 653, 661-662, 84 S.Ct. 1489]; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n. (1964) 378 U.S. 52, 55 [12 L.Ed.2d 678, 681-682, 84 S.Ct. 1594]; Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 485-486 [95 L.Ed. 1118, 1123-1124, 71 S.Ct. 814].) The extension of the privilege to an area outside the criminal justice system, in our view, would contravene both the language and purpose of the privilege. (2a) It follows from the foregoing that while appellant could properly be called as a witness at his commitment proceeding, like any other individual in any proceeding, civil or criminal, he could not be required to give evidence which would tend to incriminate him in any criminal activity and which could subject him to criminal prosecution. (3) Referring to the sweeping nature of the privilege against self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court has said: `The privilege can be claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory ... it protects any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used.' [Fn. omitted.] (Italics added.) ( In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-48 [18 L.Ed.2d 527, 557, 87 S.Ct. 1428], from conc. opn. by Justice White in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n., supra, 378 U.S. 52, 94 [12 L.Ed.2d 678, 704].) As we have noted previously, no mentally retarded person may be committed unless such person is a danger to himself or others (§ 6500.1). (2b) To the extent that the necessary elements of mental retardation and dangerousness may be established by evidence of criminal conduct, such evidence must, in its entirety, be elicited from sources other than the individual who is the subject of the commitment proceeding. In the matter before us the trial court, referring to Tyars, observed that This is not a proceeding in which he could refuse to testify on the grounds that his testimony might tend to incriminate him. This was error. As we have explained, appellant could clearly have refused to testify regarding any criminal conduct in which he might have engaged or about any other matter which would tend to implicate him in criminal activity. Because appellant's counsel initially objected to Tyars testifying, we infer no waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination by counsel's failure to renew his initial self-incrimination objection in response to subsequent specific questions. In the light of the trial judge's clear expression of his position on the issue such repeated objections would have been futile. (4) We are of the view, however, that the foregoing error does not require a reversal under these circumstances. There was overwhelming evidence of appellant's severe and irreversible mental retardation from both medical experts. The testimony of these two witnesses in conjunction with that of the psychiatric technician who, along with others, had been the objection of appellant's repeated assaultive behavior established beyond question that he was a danger to himself and others. No contrary evidence was introduced. Given the weight and nature of the uncontradicted evidence supporting the allegations of the petition it is clear that any erroneous questioning of the appellant was harmless beyond all reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California (1966) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065].) (5) We conclude that, while appellant could not be questioned about matters that would tend to incriminate him, he was subject to call as a witness and could be required to respond to nonincriminatory questioning which may have revealed his mental condition to the jury, whose duty it was to determine whether he was mentally retarded. Reason and common sense suggest that it is appropriate under such circumstances that a jury be permitted fully to observe the person sought to be committed, and to hear him speak and respond in order that it may make an informed judgment as to the level of his mental and intellectual functioning. The receipt of such evidence may be analogized to the disclosure of physical as opposed to testimonial evidence and may in fact be the most reliable proof and probative indicator of the person's present mental condition. (See People v. Ellis (1966) 65 Cal.2d 529, 533-534 [55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 421 P.2d 393] [voice identification not within the privilege against self-incrimination]; People v. Arnold (1966) 243 Cal. App.2d 510 [52 Cal. Rptr. 475] [handwriting identification not within the privilege against self-incrimination].) Similarly, a defendant even in a criminal proceeding may be required to give real or physical evidence in contrast to communications or testimony in the sense of disclosing knowledge. Thus the criminal defendant may be asked to stand, wear clothing, hold items, or speak words. ( People v. Ellis, supra, at pp. 533-534; People v. Sims (1976) 64 Cal. App.3d 544, 552 [134 Cal. Rptr. 566].) It was proper for the jury to have the benefit of its own observations of Tyars' responses, both in manner and content, to the court's questions. Appellant Tyars' remaining contentions necessitate only brief comment.