Opinion ID: 694812
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant Rivera

Text: 9 Counsel raises the potential issue of whether the career offender provision of the sentencing guidelines, U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.1(A), was properly applied to increase Rivera's base offense level when he was already given a higher sentence under the criminal statute, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b)(1)(B), due to his prior felony convictions. This double enhancement argument has been squarely rejected by this court. See United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1365 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1026 (1993); United States v. Moralez, 964 F.2d 677, 682-83 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 293 (1992). As with every circuit that has addressed the issue, see United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384, 1394 n. 20 (5th Cir.) (listing cases), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 217 (1993), we have held that the method the Sentencing Commission used to calculate a sentence term under the career offender provision is of no consequence where the sentence is sanctioned by Congress. Moralez, 964 F.2d at 683. The range of 30 years to life calculated under the guidelines as applied to Rivera was within the statutory range of 10 years to life. In fact, Congress expressly mandates that the Commission should assure that certain career offenders receive a sentence of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994(h). Section 4B1.1 implements this mandate. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.1, comment. (backg'd.). Thus, any appeal challenging the application of the career offender provision based on a double enhancement argument would be frivolous. 10 In his response to counsel's motion to withdraw, Rivera also raises several potential issues relating to his sentence. None of them has any merit. Rivera, whose sentence was enhanced due to his 1982 and 1986 state drug convictions, questions the constitutionality of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 851(e), which provides a five year statute of limitation on any challenge to the validity of any prior conviction at sentencing. He also submits that despite the five year limitation period, trial counsel should have attempted to collaterally attack the prior state convictions. Rivera did not raise the constitutionality issue before the district court, and thus on appeal, the argument would be reviewed only for plain error. Drake v. Clark, 14 F.3d 351, 355 (7th Cir.1994). Moreover, section 851(e) has been upheld against constitutional challenge. See United States v. Jenkins, 4 F.3d 1338, 1343 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 668, 673 (11th Cir.1992). Rivera relies on United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 902, 914-16 (9th Cir.1994), which was the only case that had held Sec. 851(e) to be unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit, however, has since withdrawn Davis in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Custis, 114 S.Ct. 1732 (1994), which held that there is no constitutional right to collaterally attack prior convictions used for sentence enhancement except for convictions obtained in violation of a plaintiff's right to counsel. 4 See United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1438 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1147 (1995). 11 In any event, in addition to being time-barred, any challenge to Rivera's prior convictions would have been barred by our decision in United States v. Mitchell, 18 F.3d 1355 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 640 (1994). Federal sentencing hearings are not the appropriate forum to examine the validity of prior convictions even though such convictions may be used to enhance a present sentence. Id. at 1360-61. Because there are alternative means for attacking an invalid prior conviction that allow a defendant to protect adequately his constitutional guarantees, we held in Mitchell that a district court should not entertain a collateral attack at sentencing except for those challenges that manifest, from a facial review of the record, a presumptively void prior conviction. Id. at 1361. The exception stated in Mitchell may have been further narrowed by the Supreme Court's decision in Custis to allow collateral attack only on prior convictions obtained in the absence of counsel. See United States v. Killion, 30 F.3d 844, 846 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 954 (1995). Even claims of ineffective assistance of counsel would not present a facial invalidity of a prior conviction. See Custis, 117 S.Ct. at 1738; see also United States v. Billops, 43 F.3d 281, 288 (7th Cir.1994). Rivera was counseled in his state criminal proceedings. Any ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning trial counsel's failure to collaterally attack Rivera's prior state convictions on this record would be frivolous. 12 Finally, Rivera raises the potential question of whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994(h) in including conspiracy to commit a controlled substance offense among the offenses which qualify a defendant for sentencing enhancement as a career offender under Sec. 4B1.1 of the guidelines. Although two circuit courts have accepted this argument, see United States v. Bellazerius, 24 F.3d 698, 700-02 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 375 (1994); United States v. Price, 990 F.2d 1367 (D.C.Cir.1993), this court in United States v. Damerville, 27 F.3d 254 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 445 (1994), has declined to follow their reasoning and has joined the six other circuits that have rejected this precise attack on Sec. 4B1.1. See, e.g., United States v. Piper, 35 F.3d 611, 618 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1118 (1995); United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 888 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 939 (1995). In any event, there is an additional basis for the application of Sec. 4B1.1 to Rivera's case; Rivera was convicted of not only the conspiracy count but also two distribution counts. The conviction of each of the distribution counts triggers the career offender provision. Thus any challenge to the application of Sec. 4B1.1 to Rivera's case would be frivolous.