Opinion ID: 1370667
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: On Second Motion for Rehearing.

Text: FEDERICI, District Judge. There are three motions before the Court: (1) a motion for leave to file a second motion for rehearing, (2) a motion to recall the mandate, and (3) a motion for review by a full five-judge Court to pass upon a jurisdictional question not heretofore presented to or ruled upon by the Court, involving the question of whether an indispensable party is lacking in this cause. The motion for leave to file a second motion for rehearing should be granted because the motion is based on a completely new jurisdictional ground of lack of an indispensable party to this action, to wit, the Las Vegas Grant created in 1903. See § 8-6-1, N.M.S.A., providing as follows: The district court of San Miguel County, in the state of New Mexico, is vested with jurisdiction to manage, control and administer that land claim known as `The Las Vegas Land Grant,' confirmed by the Act of Congress on the 21st day of June, A.D. 1860 (12 Stat. 71), to the Town of Las Vegas. Intervenor Town of Las Vegas was not yet in existence as a corporate entity on June 21, 1860, and was and is now within the exterior boundaries of the Las Vegas Grant. It is elementary that such a jurisdictional question may be raised for the first time in this Court. See, Miller v. Klasner, 19 N.M. 21, 140 P. 1107; Hugh K. Gale Post No. 2182 V.F.W. v. Norris, 53 N.M. 58, 201 P.2d 777, and Rubalcava v. Garst, 56 N.M. 647, 248 P.2d 207. See also the exact parallel case of Ex parte Priest v. Board of Trustees of the Town of Las Vegas, 16 N.M. 692, 120 P. 894, wherein the Territorial Supreme Court of this State (apparently affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States) held that in a prior action to quiet title a judgment there obtained attempting to quiet title to lands within the exterior boundaries of the Las Vegas Grant was void for the reason that the Town of Las Vegas had not been made a party. This was so held notwithstanding, as pointed out in the opinion, that at the time of the prior suit to quiet title in 1894 the Town of Las Vegas was a mere aggregation of people without corporate organization. This present jurisdictional challenge is a very serious one not heretofore raised or invoked by any of the parties, nor suggested by the Court as this Court might well have suggested, and which this writer now also suggests. Leave to file a second motion for rehearing should be granted to the end that this Court formally pass on this vital jurisdictional question which this writer deems to be of sufficient utmost importance to warrant this Court looking into the matter fully, and if found by this Court to be a good ground of jurisdictional attack would be controlling in this case. Thereupon the case would merely be sent back to the lower court with instructions to proceed further whenever any necessary indispensable party or parties will have been brought before that court, or a new action instituted with all indispensable parties in court. Leave should be granted to appellants to file a second motion for rehearing. The motion to recall the mandate should also be granted as a corollary of and along with the granting of the motion for leave to file a second motion for rehearing. The motion calling for a five-judge Court should be granted to determine the new jurisdictional issue of whether the Las Vegas Grant is an indispensable party to this cause, and in fact a five-judge Court should also pass upon whether the motion for leave to file a second motion for rehearing should be granted on this new and vital jurisdictional question. The second motion for rehearing was heard in this case just a few days before the retirement of Justice SADLER from this Court. In conference after the hearing this writer announced to the other Justices that he desired to write and circulate an opinion expressing his views on the new matters urged at the rehearing and by this writer deemed controlling. It was a physical impossibility to prepare and circulate such an opinion prior to Justice SADLER'S retirement. The Justices understood that and this writer was given time to prepare his opinion. The date of rehearing was May 3 and the announced date of Justice SADLER'S retirement was May 15. This writer circulated his opinion on rehearing May 19. Prior to May 15 the majority denied the motion for rehearing and directed the clerk to issue the mandate to the lower court. The motion for rehearing was denied and mandate issued before this writer was able to circulate his views by way of his opinion to the other participating Justices. We are now faced with the present three motions being passed upon subsequent to the retirement of Justice SADLER. Justice SADLER was succeeded by Justice MOISE who signed one of the briefs of amici curiae herein. Justice CARMODY, now presently on the bench since January 1, was not on the bench at the time the original majority and dissenting opinions were handed down and of course the same five Judges sat in the case on motion for rehearing on May 3 and of course Justice CARMODY did not participate for there already was a full Court sitting in the matter at that time. He is however a member of the Court at this time. It is the view of this writer that Justice CARMODY is eligible to sit in judgment in the present three motions, or if he declines, it is the view of this writer that then the presently constituted four members originally hearing the case (including this writer called in as a District Judge) should call in a second District Judge to the end that this important jurisdictional question be heard by a full five-judge Court. The reasons therefor will hereinafter now be stated. The jurisdictional issue of lack of an indispensable party is, as already pointed out, a completely new issue in this case and in the opinion of this writer is a controlling factor in the present disposition of this case. Simple fairness and justice requires that since appellants have asked for a full Court on this new phase of this litigation, a full Court should sit in judgment. This writer solicits Justice CARMODY'S participation herein, and if he should decline, this writer invites the three other Justices to join the writer in calling in another District Judge so we may have a full Court. What this writer is suggesting in this portion of this opinion is not in conflict with the prior holdings of this Court as set out in the cases of Flaska v. State, 51 N.M. 13, 177 P.2d 174, and State ex rel. State Game Commission v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421. At this point in this opinion this writer is urging a full Court for the purpose of at least passing on a new fundamental jurisdictional question not raised before nor passed upon by the prior full Court  a matter not involved in either the Flaska or the Red River Valley cases, supra. Certainly to this extent the case at bar differs and is distinguishable from said two prior cases. If but for this limited jurisdictional purpose this writer is of the opinion that an exception or distinction should be found to the Flaska and Red River Valley cases. Even the remaining members of the presently constituted four participating Judges should concur to at least this limited extent, if not all the way as will now be pointed out. This writer now expresses the view that the Flaska and Red River Valley cases should now be overruled in so far as they hold that a succeeding Justice cannot participate in motions for rehearing if he was not a participating Justice in the case in which an opinion had already been filed and in which motions for rehearing were filed in the interim. It might be argued that these holdings should not be overruled in a pending case. The answer to this argument is two-fold. First, the ruling was adopted in a pending case (Flaska case), was it not? In fact, the ruling was announced while there was actually another case pending involving the same situation, namely, the Red River Valley case, as will hereinafter be more fully pointed out. Further, the ruling in the Flaska case was announced not only while these two cases were pending, but at a time when the prior actual practice and procedure had always been to the contrary in this Court, as will also hereinafter be more fully pointed out. Secondly, if those rulings are deemed erroneous then of necessity they must and can be overruled by judicial action of this Court only in a pending case  either this case or another case. If this Court is now of the view that the holdings of the Flaska and Red River Valley cases should be overruled, now is the proper time, to the end that litigants desiring a full Court to completion in a case shall have that right. Where can it be pointed out that this right to a full Court has been abused? If the right is to be abused obviously the right can be abused by insisting upon a four-Judge Court just as easily as insisting upon a five-Judge Court. No better argument can be found for the reversal of the Flaska and Red River Valley cases on this point than that found in the language of Justice SADLER'S final dissenting opinion on page 281 of 51 N.M., on page 467 of 182 P.2d in State ex rel. State Game Commission v. Red River Valley Company. Justice SADLER pointed out that the Flaska ruling was erroneous:    because of a contrary practice long prevailing in this State as demonstrated by the decisions of this court on rehearing in the cases of State v. Armstrong 31 N.M. 220, 243 P. 333; Odell v. Colmor Irrigation & Land Co., 34 N.M. 277, 280 P. 398, and State v. Pate, 47 N.M. 182, 138 P.2d 1006, in each of which a judge or judges participated on rehearing as successor to some judge no longer on the court who had participated in rendering the original decision. (Emphasis of writer.) No doubt, an exhaustive search of the New Mexico Reports will disclose many other cases, other than those mentioned by Justice SADLER, in which this practice was followed prior to the Flaska case. It is interesting to note that the original opinion in the Red River Valley case was filed on September 24, 1945, whereas the original opinion in the Flaska case was filed more than a year later, on December 5, 1946. The first rehearing was denied in the Red River Valley Company case on March 26, 1946, and the first rehearing was denied in the Flaska case later, on December 31, 1946. Now, then, it was in the second motion for rehearing in these cases that the same situation arose about a succeeding Justice participating in a case in which a opinion had already been filed and in which a motion for rehearing had been filed in the interim. Here, interestingly, we find that although the original decision in the Red River Valley Company case had been filed more than a year prior to the original decision in the Flaska case, and although the first rehearing had been likewise first denied in the Red River Valley Company case, nevertheless, the ruling here in question on second rehearing was filed in the Flaska case on February 19, 1947, prior to the ruling on rehearing in the Red River Valley Company case on a second rehearing which was handed down later again, on June 18, 1947. At any rate, when the matter came up in the Red River Valley Company case this Court was then faced with the sandwiched-in ruling of the Flaska case. Not having participated, because of recusation in the Flaska case, and finding himself in the minority in the Red River Valley Company case, is it any wonder that Justice SADLER was frustratingly constrained to say in his final dissenting opinion in the Red River Valley Company case, as follows: Since under the Flaska decision the motion must stand denied by operation of law, it would avail nothing for two opposing minorities on the court to debate the merits of their respective views. Suffice it to say that such an unsatisfactory ending to a case involving issues so important is to be deplored.  (Emphasis of Writer). History does repeat itself even under entirely different circumstances, and Justice SADLER'S words of yesteryears again reverberate an echo of nostalgia to this case. Elaborating somewhat on Justice SADLER'S last memorable dissenting opinion in the Red River Valley Company case this writer would add to the cases on prior prevailing practice cited by Justice SADLER (and there must be many others) the case of Seaberg v. Raton Public Service Company, 43 N.M. 161, 87 P.2d 676. The original opinion was handed down in the later part of the year 1938. On that opinion the Court was divided four to one, the majority being Justices ZINN, BICKLEY, SADLER, and BRICE. The dissenter was Justice HUDSPETH. On considering the motion for rehearing the Court withdrew the original opinion and substituted a new one. This occurred February 15, 1939. In the iterim, Justice HUDSPETH'S term had expired, and Justice MABRY had taken office. The report notes that Justice HUDSPETH had dissented from the original opinion; but all five members of the Court, including Justice MABRY, the new member, joined in the final opinion. Justice SADLER in the aforesaid dissent mentions Odell v. Colmor Irrigation & Land Company, supra. In that case the original opinion was handed down January 28, 1924. It was unanimous, joined in by Justices BRATTON, PARKER and BOTTS, the full three-judge Court as then constituted by law. On rehearing, the Court adhered to the same main result but modified it slightly. This decision on rehearing was rendered January 16, 1929. The law now provided for a five-judge Court. The four Justices participating were WATSON, PARKER, CATRON, and SIMMS. Justice BICKLEY, the remaining member of the five-man court, disqualified and did not participate. Here, there was a lapse of time of almost five years, and Justice PARKER was the only remaining member of the Court which rendered the original decision, yet three new Justices participated with him in the final opinion on rehearing. If the rulings in the Flaska and Red River Valley Company cases are to continue as being the law in this state, any possible set of circumstances could make them appear very ridiculous. For example, this writer recalls a short time ago that there was a Judicial Council meeting held at Taos, and in attendance there were three members of the Supreme Court, Justices McGHEE, CARMODY and MOISE. Let us suppose that they had just filed a majority opinion prior to making the trip to Taos in which Justices LUJAN and COMPTON had dissented. Let us suppose further, and God forbid, that these three eminent jurists who had been in Taos were riding back to Sante Fe together and became involved in an automobile accident resulting in the death of all three of them. Let us suppose still further that a motion for rehearing was filed, in this particular case, in which the grounds for rehearing were absolutely and without question valid, based perhaps on a controlling statute overlooked, or any number of valid reasons  something on which any lawyer or judge would agree that there had just been a mistake made. Under the holding in the Flaska and Red River Valley cases the litigants and the Court would be helpless to do anything about it because anyone succeeding these three jurists would be unable to participate, not only because the Flaska holding would not permit them, but because there would be no remaining surviving Justice who had participated in the majority to vote with the two dissenters for a rehearing. An erroneous opinion would have to remain the law of the State until it was overruled in a subsequent case. The above hypothetical situation may sound ridiculous. It is not beyond the realm of possibility. Many another hypothesis might be surmised by most any searching soul. Suffice it to say that the one hypothetical situation mentioned graphically points out, at least to this writer, how ridiculous was and can be the result reached in the Flaska and Red River Valley cases, and these cases should be overruled on this point of practice and procedure. On the motion that a five-judge Court hear the pending three motions before this Court it is the view of this writer that: (1) this is the time and proper case in which to overrule the Flaska and Red River Valley cases on this point; and (2) that in any event, since the matters urged on second motion for rehearing deal with an entirely new jurisdictional question, there should be a five-judge court to pass not only upon whether the jurisdictional attack is well taken, but on the question of whether leave should be granted to file a second motion for rehearing on this question. In other words, if this Court will not overrule the Flaska and Red River Valley cases it should, in this case, at least find an exception or distinction to the Flaska and Red River Valley cases for the purpose of passing on the new jurisdictional question raised. To recapitulate as to the whole of this opinion, it is the view of this writer that all three motions now pending herein, namely, motion for leave to file second motion for rehearing, motion to recall mandate, and motion for a five-judge Court should be granted en toto. McGHEE, J., concurs.