Opinion ID: 1825230
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Overruling motion for a different trial judge.

Text: Defendant contends trial court abused its discretion in not recusing himself because of their prior courtroom encounters. He does not make a satisfactory record disclosing details of these encounters or their number. Apparently defendant jumped bail and failed to appear on a charge before this judge, who then issued a warrant for his arrest. Defendant surrendered two and one-half years later in California. Either on that offense or on an unrelated charge, trial court apparently declined to approve a plea bargain because he felt defendant deserved a stiffer sentence. Iowa R.Crim.P. 10(9)(c) expressly authorizes a pretrial motion for change of judge. Former section 778.2, The Code 1977, authorized a venue change if the judge's prejudice prevented a fair and impartial trial. In State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 323-24 (Iowa 1976), we adopted canon 3(C)(1) of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct as a general guideline for trial courts and an objective standard for review in these situations. The relevant portion of canon 3(C)(1) provides: A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: (a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. . . . We there observed, [O]nly personal bias or prejudice, as distinguished from judicial predilection, constitutes a disqualifying factor. 242 N.W.2d at 324. Defendant has the burden of establishing prejudice with allegations of fact. Id. Trial court's decision will not be overturned unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Id.; State v. Gartin, 271 N.W.2d 902, 913 (Iowa 1978). Defendant relies on past judicial encounters with trial court. To whatever extent these experiences educated trial court on defendant's character, it provides no basis for prejudice requiring a different judge. The alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1710, 16 L.Ed.2d 778, 793 (1966). See also Smith, 242 N.W.2d at 324. Accord, Sexton v. Kennedy, 519 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1975) (prior decision against litigant and limitation of oral argument time in prior appeal); Berry v. Sigler, 373 F.2d 835, 836 (8th Cir. 1967) (familiarity with litigant's prior legal difficulties and previous contempt citation); Hodgdon v. United States, 365 F.2d 679, 686 (8th Cir. 1966) (litigant's previous attempts to initiate proceedings against trial court); Cox v. United States, 309 F.2d 614, 619-20 (8th Cir. 1962) (trial court remembered sentencing defendant in a criminal case many years previously); State v. Schafer, 5 Conn.Cir.Ct. 669, 673-74, 260 A.2d 623, 626-27, appeal denied, 158 Conn. 644, 257 A.2d 46 (1969) (trial court's participation fifteen years earlier in adverse ruling on defendant's parole request); State v. Kimmel, 202 Kan. 303, 305, 448 P.2d 19, 22 (1968) (knowledge of accused's past record); Stallard v. State, 6 Md.App. 560, 562, 252 A.2d 267, 269 (1969) (trial court presided over previous trial of defendant and recalled prior record); Milburn v. State, 50 Wis.2d 53, 61, 183 N.W.2d 70, 74 (1971) (knowledge of defendant's criminal record); Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1369 (1968). Many of these cases hold that trial court's rulings in the course of trial create no grounds for recusation. We find no abuse of discretion in trial court's refusal to recuse himself.