Opinion ID: 663689
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the fairness objections

Text: 21 The movants opposing the release of the Report remind us that the Special Division, in connection with any release of the Final Report, shall make such orders as are appropriate to protect the rights of any individual named in the Report. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(b)(3) (1982) (emphasis added). They note the contrast between this mandatory duty and the permissive language empowering us to order the release of the Report: The division of the court may release to the Congress, the public, and others such portions of the Report as the division deems appropriate. Id. They charge, accurately, that the Report repeatedly accuses named individuals of crimes, although in many instances the individual was never indicted, if indicted was never convicted, or if convicted the conviction was reversed. These accusations include charges that named individuals were guilty of a conspiracy charged in a count that was dismissed before trial, that various named public officials engaged in efforts to obstruct justice, where such individuals were never indicted, let alone convicted, and instances in which the Report charges that individuals were factually guilty even though the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had reversed the only conviction relevant to the charge under discussion. Our review of the Report confirms that the movants' charges are accurate. The Report is rife with accusations of guilt of criminal conduct against persons never indicted or convicted. 22 The movants then argue that the Court cannot, consistent with its obligation to protect the rights of the individuals named, allow the release of what they fear will be considered an official document accusing them and others of crimes when, in some instances they have never been afforded even the determination of probable cause by a grand jury, let alone a constitutionally governed trial at which the government would have the burden of proving them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a strong argument. In the courts of the United States, any person charged with a felony has the right to have a grand jury pass on the probable cause to believe him guilty and has the further right, with a plethora of attendant constitutional protections, to stand innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury of his peers. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI. 23 The Independent Counsel, though not the normal type of federal prosecutor, is a federal prosecutor. As Attorney General and later Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson observed: 24 The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America. His discretion is tremendous. He can have citizens investigated and, if he is that kind of person, he can have this done to the tune of public statements and veiled or unveiled intimations. 25 Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 JUDICATURE 18, 18 (1940) (address delivered at the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys, April 1, 1940). 26 Consistent with the power and responsibility of their office, prosecutors do not issue reports, and they do not pronounce persons guilty of crimes who have not been indicted, tried, and convicted. The filing of reports by Independent Counsels is a complete departure from the authority of a United States Attorney and is contrary to the practice in federal grand jury investigations. In re Sealed Motion, 880 F.2d 1367, 1369-70 (D.C.Cir.1989).
27 Unfortunately for movants, and perhaps for the tradition of fairness, the statute does require that the Independent Counsel file a report. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(b)(1) (1982). It is on that statutory requirement that the Independent Counsel relies in urging that we should release his Report even though it contains accusations of crime. As he notes, the purpose of the Final Report is to ensure the accountability of the Independent Counsel to the government of the United States and the public by providing a detailed and official record of the activities of the [independent counsel] which may be reviewed and analyzed at the appropriate time. S.REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 70-71 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4286. This reflects the sui generis nature of the independent counsel, in that he is an officer performing an executive function almost entirely without oversight from the Executive Branch of government. See generally, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705-09, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2626, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 28 Independent Counsel specifically relies on the legislative mandate that the Report required by the statute is to include the reasons for not prosecuting any matter within the prosecutorial jurisdiction of such independent counsel which was not prosecuted. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(b)(2) (1982). He rightly contends that this compels him to comment on cases that were not taken to grand juries and potential charges that were not prosecuted. 29 It is not clear that this section has anything to do with comments on convictions that were ultimately vacated or reversed on appeal, but at least as to the greater portion of the unproven accusations the statute bears relevance. While it is clear that the statute supports the power of the prosecutor to comment, it is not clear that it supports the form that the present comments take. It is one thing for a report to say we did not prosecute the allegations of the obstruction of justice against John Doe because we did not have sufficient evidence to constitute probable cause; and quite another to say John Doe was guilty, but we didn't prosecute him because we could not prove it; and still a third to say the Court of Appeals reversed John Doe's conviction, but he was factually guilty anyway.
30 It is of course a wholly different question whether we should allow the release of the Report, it having been made in the accusatory form. There is no precedent that clearly guides our hand in drafting an answer. The nearest authority offered by any contestant comes from movants opposing release of the Report who compare the document to grand jury reports naming persons as having been criminal actors without making a formal indictment against which the persons named can defend. Federal case law contains a few examples of such presentment and generally condemns the practice. 31 For example, in United States v. Briggs, the Fifth Circuit noted that [c]ommon law grand juries at times issued nonindicting reports. 514 F.2d 794, 801 (5th Cir.1975). Nonetheless, that circuit noted that it could find no substantial authority permitting a federal grand jury to issue a report accusing named private persons of criminal conduct. Id. at 802. It further noted that various courts have struck down with strong language efforts by grand juries to accuse persons of crime while affording them no forum in which to vindicate themselves. Id. (citing, inter alia, In re United Elec., Radio, and Mach. Workers, 111 F.Supp. 858, 867-68 (S.D.N.Y.1953)). 32 Movants argue, and we agree, that the fear of such condemnation by a grand jury arises in part from the fact that the grand jury report bears an official imprimatur, issued under the Court's aegis. They further contend that we should treat the Independent Counsel's Report just the same. That is, we should consider that it is issued with the Court's imprimatur, as the Court appointed the Independent Counsel, defined his jurisdiction, and most importantly, determined whether and to what extent to release the Report. See In re Sealed Motion, 880 F.2d at 1376-77. 33 We lay aside for the moment the matter of determining whether and to what extent to release the Report, as that is the very question before us. Aside from deciding that question, appointing and defining the jurisdiction of the Independent Counsel is all that we have done about the Independent Counsel and all that we are going to do. The Independent Counsel does not operate under our supervision and his acts, including the writing of the Report, do not bear our aegis. Indeed, if the Independent Counsel Act did vest us with supervisory power over the essentially executive functions performed by the attorneys we appoint, the statute would be constitutionally suspect as a breach of the separation of powers defined by Articles I, II & III of the Constitution. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 680-84, 108 S.Ct. at 2613-15. As one member of this Special Division has noted, the Supreme Court in Morrison carefully construed the Act to place severe limitations on this Court's authority over the Independent Counsel in order to save the constitutionality of the Act, consistent with the duty of courts  'to construe a statute in order to save it from constitutional infirmities.'  In re North, (Walsh Show Cause Order), 10 F.3d at 837 (Butzner, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 682, 108 S.Ct. at 2614). 34 In short, the Report will not bear the imprimatur of the Court, nor is it issued under this Court's aegis. While we understand the movants' fear that it will be so perceived by the public, we are herein doing all we can to alleviate that misconception. 35 The Report and most specifically the unlitigated accusations contained in the Report are the Independent Counsel's. They are not the Court's. In a very real sense, the Independent Counsel's Report is no more a product of the Court than some statement made by a prosecutor to the news media. In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993), the Supreme Court acknowledged that [s]tatements to the press may be an integral part of a prosecutor's job, and they may serve a vital public function. But in these respects a prosecutor is in no different position than any other executive officials who deal with the press.... Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2618 (internal citation omitted) (citing National District Attorneys Ass'n, National Prosecution Standard 107, 110 (2d ed. 1991)). Here, the drafting of the Report may be a statutory duty of the Independent Counsel, but it is not part of any function of this Court and the Court places no imprimatur upon it. Therefore, though we find the objections of those movants who seek to have us rescind the release of the Report weighty, we do not find them to be controlling.
36 In the end, we find the four standards suggested by the Senate Report to be useful, and again we subject the question before us to analysis under their rubric. We do so expressly noting that these factors are by no means exclusive and were not even suggested as such by the body that forwarded them in its Report. Nonetheless, they are useful. To restate, we ask: 37 whether the subjects of the investigation have already been disclosed to the public; whether the subjects do not object to the filings being released to the public; whether the filings contain information which is already publicly known; and whether the court filings consist of legal or factual rulings in a case which should be publicly available to understand the court's rules and precedents or to follow developments in a particular manner. 38 S.REP. NO. 123, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150. 39 As to the first--whether the subjects of the investigations have already been disclosed to the public--in this case, they generally have. For better or for worse, during the course of the past seven years, the Independent Counsel's actions have led to the indictments of fourteen persons, four well publicized trials, and media accounts, which this panel will not undertake to count, but which probably number alongside cross ties on a railroad or stars in the sky. On Top Of Old Smokey (American Folk Song). While there are some persons named in the Report who have not previously been the subject of indictment, conviction, or general media attention, neither are those persons named in such fashion as to make the release a great concern of theirs. This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of release. 40 Second--whether the subjects do not object to the filings being released to the public--in this case, some subjects object to release and some move for release. The easy out would be to order the release of those portions bearing on the subjects who want release and deny release as to those who oppose it. This will not work. Movants seeking release and movants opposing are the subjects of accounts as intertwined and inseparable as fibers within the strands of a woven rope. Candidly, more movants oppose than support release. But the vast majority of the persons named in the Report have not expressed an opinion one way or the other. Consistent with our phraseology borrowed from the Senate report, we would count those among the subjects who do not object to the release. However, counting noses does not decide the question. Even if only one person objected, and fairness compellingly directed withholding for his sake, we could withhold the Report in the face of one hundred who did not join in his objection. On balance, we find this factor to weigh against release, but only slightly. 41 Third--whether the filings contain information which is already publicly known--this is a factor which weighs most strongly in favor of release. Not only is the information widely known, it is widely known incorrectly. The Report rehashes interim reports, trial documents, and other matters that have been either formally or informally released in the past. In addition, there have been leaks. While the Court did all in its power to prevent release of the Report during the pendency of the comment period, the Court's power was not enough. There have been media accounts of parts of the Report during this pendency. See, e.g., Max Boot, Walsh's Iran/Contra Probe Comes to an End as Whimper, Not Bang, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR , Dec. 9, 1993, (The World) at 1; Robert L. Jackson & Ronald J. Ostrow, Final Iran-Contra Report Faults Reagan and Bush, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1993, at A1; Report Criticizes Reagan and Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1993, Sec. 1 at 31. The Independent Counsel himself has given statements to the media describing what he intended the Report to contain. Those statements, leaks, and media accounts were made without the right of reply by the subjects, were partial, and were in the judgment of this Court more unfair to the persons named than will be the present release of the completed Report with the comments of the named persons and this Court's express repudiation of imprimatur. 42 We understand that the calculus just recited may be a dangerous precedent. That is, some might suggest that a future Independent Counsel wishing to ensure the release of his report would go on television and make comments accusing the subjects of his report of crimes so that the Court could later find that the contents of the report were already public. As this Court has no supervisory power, there would be little we could do about it. As the Independent Counsel is virtually without supervision, there would be little anyone could do about it. This danger may be inherent in the nature of the Independent Counsel. 43 Nonetheless, despite the danger in the precedent, we do think that the reality of the partial public knowledge of the information in the Report weighs strongly in favor of releasing the whole. Particularly is this true, as some movants and some commenters want the Report released because in their view the Report would support a conclusion that they had engaged in no wrongdoing. We therefore weigh this factor in favor of release. We do so with the recognition that the rights of those persons accused of crimes for which they were never convicted are being compromised. We feel however that the protections afforded them by the formal withholding of an informally publicized Report would be ephemeral. Their right of comment, both in the Report and other fora, may do them more good than the order they seek from us. 44 Fourth--whether the Court filings consist of legal or factual rulings in a case which should be publicly available to understand the court's rules and precedents or to follow the developments in a particular matter--our treatment of this factor is short. The filings do not consist of either legal or factual rulings. Insofar as this weighs at all, it weighs against disclosure. However, it has little weight. If our answer had been yes, that might be a factor tipping toward release. Where the answer is no, it affects the balance little one way or the other. 45 In sum, we accept the seriousness of the fairness complaints of movants who have been accused of crime while afford[ed] ... no forum in which to vindicate themselves. Briggs, 514 F.2d at 802. However, given all the facts and circumstances as they now prevail in this unique case, we will order release. Particularly, we weigh in favor of release the fact that the accusations are made without the imprimatur of the Court, have already been made in other highly publicized fora, and that the contents of the Report are being bandied at large in fragmentary form. We think the rights of all persons named are better protected by a full release with a contemporaneous right of comment than by withholding. 46 The four standards suggested by the Senate report and employed by us are ultimately for the service of the overriding goal suggested by an earlier Senate. As we noted above, the purpose of the Final Report is to ensure the accountability of the Independent Counsel to the government and the public. S.REP. NO. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 70-71. The American public is particularly entitled to this accountability where the subject of the investigation and the investigation itself have been widely publicized of long duration and great expense. While we are not so naive as to suppose that controversy, publicity, and public questioning, either of the institutions and persons investigated or the Independent Counsel, will promptly cease upon revelation of the Report, we nonetheless think it in the national interest that the public, its representatives in the political branches, and its surrogates in the media have as full an access to the fruits of the investigation as possible, consistent with the fairness dictates of the law. Therefore, not only do we conclude that the microbalance provided by the four enumerated factors favors disclosure, but we further conclude that the macro determination of public interest impels us toward the same conclusion.