Opinion ID: 1456313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legislative History and Agency Interpretation of USERRA

Text: Perhaps recognizing the difficulty of his textual argument, Middleton also turns to USERRA's legislative history to persuade us that Congress intended that no statute of limitations apply. But the only ambiguity we find concerning USERRA is in its legislative history, not in the statute's actual language. And where a statute's language is clear, we look to the legislative history only to determine whether Congress expressed a clear intention to the contrary of the literal application of that language. See Bowlds v. Gen. Motors Mfg. Div. of the Gen. Motors Corp., 411 F.3d 808, 811 (7th Cir.2005). We find no contrary intention here. Middleton cites congressional reports to support his argument, which are often of limited use in discerning congressional intent. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518-19, 113 S.Ct. 1562, 123 L.Ed.2d 229 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Even so, the reports to which Middleton refers us speak solely to Congress's intention that USERRA not be subject to state statutes of limitations. See H.R.Rep. No. 103-65(I), at 39; [2] S.Rep. No. 103-158, at 70. [3] Congress expressed no desire for USERRA claims to be immune from § 1658(a)'s limitations period. Of course, under USERRA's predecessor, the VRRA, the express provision that no state statute of limitations should apply effectively meant that no statute of limitations appliedthere was no federal statute of limitations until 1990. But USERRA came four years after § 1658, and Congress was well aware that it had recently enacted a catch-all limitations period governing any claim under a subsequent act. We see no clear congressional intent contrary to the statutory language. Middleton also asks us to adopt the Department of Labor's interpretation of USERRA. The DOL is charged with promulgating rules for administering USERRA, 38 U.S.C. § 4331(a), and its position has been that the law is not subject to § 1658, see USERRA Preamble, 70 Fed. Reg. 75,246, 75,287-88 (Dec. 19, 2005). In the preamble to its final rule (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 1002.311), the DOL noted that it has long taken the position that no Federal statute of limitations applied to actions under USERRA but that at least one district court had reached the opposite conclusion. USERRA Preamble, 70 Fed. Reg. at 75,287. After considering comments on the issue, the DOL stated that it would maintain its original position that no statute of limitations applied to USERRA, but it noted that the issue will ultimately be resolved by the courts. Id. at 75,288. The DOL then offered the following advice: Until the issue is resolved, potential USERRA plaintiffs would be well advised to file USERRA claims within section 1658's four-year period. Accordingly, the Department has amended section 1002.311 to acknowledge that at least one court has held that 28 U.S.C. 1658 applies to actions under USERRA, and that individuals asserting rights under USERRA should determine whether the issue of the applicability of the Federal four-year statute of limitations has been resolved and, in any event, act promptly to preserve their rights under USERRA. Id. We disagree with Middleton's argument that we should defer to the DOL's interpretation. First, we defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute only where `Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue' through the statutory text. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 665, 127 S.Ct. 2518, 168 L.Ed.2d 467 (2007) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). That Congress did not articulate a statute of limitations in USERRA perhaps suggests some ambiguity, but there is no ambiguity in the limitations provision of § 1658, which applies to any act of Congress enacted after December 1, 1990, unless that law otherwise provides. Congress did not otherwise provide in USERRA. Second, in explaining its position in the preamble, the DOL relied heavily on pre- Jones case law and the inconclusive legislative history we have just discussed. See USERRA Preamble, 70 Fed.Reg. at 75,287-88. Third, although the preamble to 20 C.F.R. § 1002.311 states that the DOL believes no statute of limitations applies to USERRA, the rule itself is much less certain: USERRA does not have a statute of limitations, and it expressly precludes the application of any State statute of limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.311. The DOL is correct that USERRA does not have a limitations periodCongress did not include an express statute of limitations within the statute. The DOL's rule then hedges. It explains that at least one court has applied § 1658's four-year statute of limitations, that laches may also apply, that any individual with a USERRA claim should determine whether this issue has been resolved by the courts, and that the individual should act promptly. Id. The DOL's uncertainty on this issue further persuades us to withhold any deference its interpretation might otherwise be due. Accordingly, USERRA's legislative history and the DOL's interpretation of the law do not convince us that Congress intended to immunize USERRA claims from § 1658.