Opinion ID: 2546552
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Hughes' Other Issues

Text: ¶ 64 Hughes challenges the sufficiency of the evidence upon which he was convicted. He asks this court to look closely at the evidence and challenges the conclusions drawn by the trial court. Additionally, he challenges the testimony of two witnesses and the court's reliance thereon. ¶ 65 But in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court does not determine whether it believes the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt .... `the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ' State v. Green, 94 Wash.2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). Determinations of credibility are for the fact finder and are not reviewable on appeal. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wash.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990). ¶ 66 Hughes has not met his burden of showing that no rational trier of fact could have found facts supporting his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm his conviction.
¶ 67 Hughes also asks this court to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing because he was denied his right of allocution. The record reflects that the trial court failed to ask Hughes if he wished to speak. Failure by the trial court to solicit a defendant's statement in allocution constitutes legal error. See In re Pers. Restraint of Echeverria, 141 Wash.2d 323, 336, 6 P.3d 573 (2000). However, Hughes failed to object at trial and raises this issue for the first time on appeal. [17] Further, he has not shown that he was prejudiced by the error. According to RAP 2.5(a)(3), if the trial court's failure to request a defendant's statement is not a manifest error affecting a constitutional right we need not consider it for the first time on appeal here. ¶ 68 Hughes appears to assert that the right to allocution is a constitutional right that cannot be denied. This court has held to the contrary: a defendant's right of allocution is derived from state statutes. Its legal provenance under state law is not constitutional in nature. Echeverria, 141 Wash.2d at 335, 6 P.3d 573 (explaining that State v. Happy, 94 Wash.2d 791, 620 P.2d 97 (1980) was decided on a statutory, not constitutional, basis). Because the right at issue is statutorily based and is not a constitutional right, and because Hughes failed to raise this objection at trial, this court does not have to address his allocution claim on review. See RAP 2.5(a). We do not vacate his sentence for violation of the right to allocution.
¶ 69 Hughes challenges the restitution imposed ($145,000) based on ecological and monetary values being arbitrary and an abuse of discretion because the market value of the trees stolen was assessed as $4,465 at trial. The trial court has great power and discretion in issuing restitution. State v. Enstone, 137 Wash.2d 675, 679, 974 P.2d 828 (1999); State v. Fleming, 75 Wash.App. 270, 274, 877 P.2d 243 (1994). A restitution order will only be reversed if Hughes shows an abuse of discretion by the trial court, which exists when the trial court's determination is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. Enstone, 137 Wash.2d at 679, 974 P.2d 828 (evaluating appeal of restitution order pursuant to RCW 9.94A.142, and citing State v. Davison, 116 Wash.2d 917, 919, 809 P.2d 1374 (1991); State v. Cunningham, 96 Wash.2d 31, 34, 633 P.2d 886 (1981)). ¶ 70 RCW 9.94A.753(1) [18] directs the trial court to impose restitution at a sentencing hearing. The amount of restitution should be based on easily ascertainable damages. RCW 9.94A.753(3). However, the amount of harm or loss need not be established with specific accuracy. Fleming, 75 Wash.App. at 274, 877 P.2d 243. Evidence supporting restitution `is sufficient if it affords a reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not subject the trier of fact to mere speculation or conjecture.' Id. at 274-75, 877 P.2d 243 (quoting State v. Pollard, 66 Wash.App. 779, 785, 834 P.2d 51 (1992) (quoting State v. Mark, 36 Wash.App. 428, 434, 675 P.2d 1250 (1984))). To determine the amount of restitution, the trial court can either rely on a defendant's acknowledgment or it can determine the amount by a preponderance of evidence. State v. Hunsicker, 129 Wash.2d 554, 558-59, 919 P.2d 79 (1996); State v. Ryan, 78 Wash.App. 758, 761, 899 P.2d 825 (1995). Where a defendant disputes facts relevant to the determination of restitution, the State must prove the amount by a preponderance of the evidence at an evidentiary hearing. State v. Dedonado, 99 Wash.App. 251, 256, 991 P.2d 1216 (2000). Case law does not define evidentiary hearing in the restitution context. However, Black's Law Dictionary defines the term as [a] hearing at which evidence is presented, as opposed to a hearing at which only legal argument is presented. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 738 (8th ed.2004). ¶ 71 There is no independent requirement that the amount set in restitution be equal to a calculation determined at trial. And Hughes points to no concrete basis upon which to find that the method of calculating the damages violated the trial court's discretion. Hughes contends that the amount of restitution should be based on the market value, citing RCW 9A.56.010(18)(a), which defines value as the market value. In RCW 9A.56.010, the term value and its definition is relevant to defining the various degrees of theft which are based, in part, on the values of the objects stolen. See RCW 9A.56.010,.030-.050. Because the definition of value he asserts resides in the theft and burglary statute, not in the SRA which governs sentencing, it does not pertain to restitution. ¶ 72 The SRA, chapter 9.94A RCW, governs restitution and the calculation thereof as part of sentencing. See, e.g., State v. Edelman, 97 Wash.App. 161, 166, 984 P.2d 421 (1999) ([U]nder the sentencing reform act, restitution is part of an offender's sentence.). RCW 9.94A.030(34) defines restitution for purposes of the SRA to be a specific sum of money ordered by the sentencing court to be paid by the offender to the court over a specified period of time as payment of damages. The sum may include both public and private costs. It does not require the value to be based on market value. And it considers both private and public costs, which supports considering the real value of the trees and the harm to the environment. ¶ 73 The trial court here conducted a sentencing hearing at which evidence was presented. The State put on two witnesses, both of whom defense counsel chose not to cross examine. RP (May 23, 2003) at 3-21. Defense counsel had the opportunity to put on evidence, and chose only to admit two exhibits. Id. at 22. The trial court relied on testimony from a forest expert on the real value of the trees stolen (including both ecological and monetary components), not the market value. But that value constituted an ascertainable amount, which the State proved beyond mere speculation or conjecture. Hughes has not satisfied his burden of showing that the court's restitution order was manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. We affirm the restitution order.