Opinion ID: 151087
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hall's Intelligence Level

Text: Hall argues that his trial counsel Smedley failed to present expert testimony, such as that given by Taffett, regarding Hall's low intellectual capabilities. Hall contends that such testimony would have supported (1) Hall's motion to suppress his confession, by showing that he did not understand his rights, and (2) his defense against Leak's accusations that Hall planned the crime. In response, the State argues that Hall's trial counsel was not deficient in not retaining an education expert because: Hall could read his Miranda rights; the officers also read him his rights at least twice; Hall twice stated he understood them; Hall signed the waiver forms; and thus trial counsel could reasonably conclude no educational expert was needed. The State further argues that Hall's low intelligence would not have prevented the introduction of his confession and thus counsel's performance was not deficient for this reason too. We need not decide the performance question because Hall has failed to establish the requisite prejudice in any event. For example, after hearing Taffett's testimony, the state trial court, in denying Hall's motion for new trial, stated, While an accused's intelligence and literacy are important factors to be considered in determining whether he intelligently and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights and made a confession, weak intellect or illiteracy alone will not render a confession inadmissible. The state trial court also stated that defendant's intelligence and age were considered fully at the hearing on the motion to suppress and throughout each of the trials. The state trial court denied Hall's motion for trial even after hearing Taffett's expert testimony about Hall's low intelligence. The trial court had the opportunity to evaluate Hall's level of intelligence and the credibility of his testimony that he did not understand his Miranda rights. Simply put, Hall has failed to show that evidence of Hall's intelligence would have made a difference in the state court's finding that the confession was voluntary. The Alabama Criminal Court of Appeals affirmed the state trial court's ruling, stating only that None of the claims raised by the appellant indicate that his counsel rendered deficient performance that resulted in prejudice so as to require a new trial under the strict standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, supra .  [42] Hall has not shown that the Alabama Court of Appeals' conclusionthat there was no reasonable probability that expert evidence of Hall's low intelligence would have resulted in any difference in the admission of his confession or the outcome of the trialwas contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or based on an unreasonable determination of facts. Similarly, as for whether evidence of his intellectual abilities would have successfully supported Hall's defense at trial, Hall testified at length for the jury, and the jury also heard evidence about Hall's social interactions with his friends, including the coordination of plans to attend the dance, his multiple conference calls, his involvement in a rap group, as well as his possible involvement in gang activity. This evidence gave the jury ample opportunity to evaluate Hall's intelligence level and his social skills. It was neither unreasonable nor contrary to clearly established federal law for the state courts to conclude that additional expert testimony on Hall's intelligence would not have raised a reasonable probability of a different verdict.