Opinion ID: 324541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the post--verdict events

Text: 66 There remain for consideration two additional arguments by Anderson. One is that his conviction of bribery is fatally inconsistent with Brewster's conviction of receiving unlawful gratuities. The other is that the imposition of consecutive sentences was legally erroneous. Like Anderson's other contentions on this appeal, we find these claims unavailing.
67 While the jury found Anderson guilty of bribery, it acquitted Brewster of that offense and fixed his guilt instead at unlawful receipt of gratuities. 133 Anderson claims that these verdicts are fatally inconsistent, and that reversal of his conviction is accordingly required. He argues that the Government's evidence details such a course of conduct between Brewster and himself that no distinction between their acts or intent could rationally be drawn. He reasons that in the presence of such factual similarity the jury erred in finding that he corruptly intended to give money to Brewster to influence his official action, but that Brewster lacked a corresponding intent in the receipt of such monies. 68 We note initially that inconsistent verdicts are not self-vitiating. 134 Beyond that, the verdicts as to Anderson and Brewster, respectively, are not per se inconsistent. The payment and the receipt of a bribe are not interdependent offenses, 135 for obviously the donor's intent may differ completely from the donee's. Thus the donor may be convicted of giving a bribe despite the fact that the recipient had no intention of altering his official activities, or even lacked the power to do so. 136 69 As ever so recently we recognized, these mental elements are the factors differentiating the offense of bribery from the lesser offense of unlawfully receiving gratuities. 137 Here, on the evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that Anderson gave Brewster monies with corrupt intent to influence his vote on the proposed rate-increase legislation, and that Brewster, though insensitive to any influence, accepted the monies with knowledge that Anderson's purpose was to reward him for his stance on such legislation.
70 The trial judge imposed separate sentences on each of the three counts upon which Anderson was convicted, and expressly directed that the terms of imprisonment and fines operate consecutively and cumulatively. 138 The allegations of these counts were similar, differing only as to dates and amounts of alleged payments to Brewster. Anderson contends that at best the Government's evidence showed that his dealings with Brewster were all part and parcel of a single design--in his words, 'three installments of the same transaction' 139 --with the result that consecutive sentences were improper. We disagree. 71 The principles guiding our decision have been fully staked out. '(T)he statutes are first examined to ascertain if they will bear interpretation as creating separate offenses. If so the court then inquires whether Congress also intended 'to pyramid the penalties' . . . or only to establish a different degree or type of offense.' 140 The solutions to these questions--the appropriate unit of prosecution and the appropriate mode of sentencing--are first to be sought in the intention of the legislature. 141 We think the legislative history of the bribery statute under which Anderson was convicted requires an affirmative answer to each of the questions. 72 The statute was enacted in 1962, 142 and in it Congress consolidated former bribery and unlawful-gratuity laws into one. 143 Concomitantly, in companion statutes, Congress extensively regulated payments to public officers and conflicts of interest. 144 The congressional objective was broad, 145 hardly less comprehensive than that inspiring forerunning legislation. 146 Very significantly, Congress specifically noted that enactment of the consolidated statute was not designed to narrow judicial interpretations of earlier bribery statutes, but rather to assure that the scope of those interpretations would be accorded universal application. 147 Under prior bribery laws consecutive sentences for payments individually made for the single purpose of influencing the same person had been upheld. 148 73 We think the same treatment is a permissible alternative under the present statute. Congress has decided that bribery and kindred practices imperil the very nature of democratic government. It has legislated a vigorous attack on those practices. The only intention we can reasonably ascribe to Congress is that bribers may be punished separately for separate acts of bribery. 149 We note, too, that courts construing other bribery laws have discarded the 'installment' theory of bribery 150 in favor of the view that each bribe warrants a separate penalty. 151 We are persuaded to the same action here. 74 And so we conclude our review. Upon careful consideration of Anderson's contentions in light of the record, we have found no error. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of his conviction has been affirmed. 152