Opinion ID: 3051586
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the workers’ job performances were

Text: satisfactory [4] Diaz, Mancilla, and Moreno have each established a triable issue of fact regarding the second element of the prima facie case. Diaz and Mancilla generally performed dependably and without incident. Deficiencies in their performance were relatively minor and infrequent. The issue is closer for Moreno because he damaged Eagle Produce property three times over the course of approximately four years and once violated a company safety rule, but those incidents were also relatively infrequent. Moreover, there is no evidence that Moreno caused any of the damage intentionally or recklessly, and his supervisor generally found him to be dependable. [5] The same cannot be said of Renteria, who over an extended period openly violated Eagle Produce’s policy DIAZ v. EAGLE PRODUCE 3531 against solicitation on company property and continued to do so even after receiving a warning from Brandt. Considering that behavior, no reasonable juror could find that Renteria’s performance was satisfactory. See Mungro v. Giant Food, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 2d 518, 522 (D. Md. 2002) (citing cases for the proposition that “[a] plaintiff who violates company policy and fails to improve his performance despite a warning has not demonstrated satisfactory performance”). Because Renteria has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, we do not complete the remainder of the McDonnell Douglas analysis with respect to his claim. [6]2. Whether the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination Although it is a close question, we conclude that Diaz, Mancilla, and Moreno have also created a triable issue of fact concerning the fourth and final requirement for a prima facie case. This conclusion draws support from a variety of circumstantial evidence.
Including Plaintiffs, the average age of the sixteen workers laid off or discharged from Crew 94 in 2001 and 2002 is 48.4.3 3 We derive the figures used in this analysis from the employees’ dates of birth, hire, and last pay check, as listed in the Eagle Produce Employees Chart and amended by the exhibits attached to Defendants-Appellees’ Supplemental Statement of Facts in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment. At oral argument, Eagle Produce suggested that the Chart was an improper basis for a statistical analysis. If the argument is that the Chart is inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, we reject the argument as waived. The district court already ruled that the Chart is admissible, and Eagle Produce did not contest that decision in its brief on appeal. See Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We review only issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief.”). If Eagle Produce is arguing simply that the Chart contains inaccuracies, our analysis accounts for them by incorporating into the Chart the amendments provided in Defendants-Appellees’ Supplemental Statement of Facts. 3532 DIAZ v. EAGLE PRODUCE Three of those workers were 20, 21 and 30 years old, respectively. While the majority fell within the age category protected by the ADEA, most were also hired after the age of forty. One was hired at 69 years of age, only a year and a half before the disputed layoffs. Another was hired in July 2001 at age 65. Several others were hired when they were in their mid- to late-forties. Sixteen other workers were hired for Crew 94 in 2001 and 2002 and not subsequently discharged. Their average age at the time of hiring was 38.75. Nearly half of them were 40 or more years old, including one who was 63 and two who were 57. On its own, this evidence would suggest that an inference of discrimination is not warranted. Eagle Produce laid off many of the Crew 94 employees, including Plaintiffs, only shortly after hiring them at what were already relatively advanced ages. Diaz was hired at 51 and laid off four years later at 55. Moreno was hired at 65 and laid off at 66. Mancilla was hired at 58 and laid off at 63. If Eagle Produce was biased against older workers, it presumably would not have hired Plaintiffs in the first place. The temporal proximity between each Plaintiff’s hiring and layoff also makes it unlikely that age later developed as the reason for the discharges. The difference in physical and mental capacity between an average 65 year-old and an average 66 year-old, or between a 58 year-old and a 63 year-old, is not significant enough to warrant an inference of anything but the most arbitrary bias. See Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270-71 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[W]here the same actor is responsible for both the hiring and the firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a short period of time, a strong inference arises that there was no discriminatory motive.”). That the average age of the workers hired during the twoyear period is approximately nine and a half years younger DIAZ v. EAGLE PRODUCE 3533 than the average age of those laid off—38.75 versus 48.4 years—also fails to justify an inference of age discrimination. The disparity is not so stark as to suggest bias rather than pure chance. See O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996) (“In the age discrimination context . . . an inference [of discriminatory intent] cannot be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.”); Hartley v. Wis. Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that replacement employees must be at least ten years younger than their predecessors to justify a presumption of age discrimination). This is particularly true because the two data sets of sixteen workers are too small to form a reliable basis for analysis. See Palmer, 794 F.2d at 539 (finding certain statistical evidence of employment discrimination unpersuasive because the sample size was too small). [7] A different picture emerges, however, when we consider the data with Brandt in mind. He first began to make personnel decisions for Crew 94 when he was hired as a supervisor in May 2001. The average age of the workers hired before that date was 44.29. For the period of May 2001 to January 2002, during which Daffern and Brandt both made personnel decisions, the average age of Crew 94 hirees dropped to 40.8. Once Brandt took over as the sole hiring authority, the average age dropped still further to 35.28. By contrast, the average age of workers laid off from Crew 94 increased slightly from 46.2 during the period of Daffern’s and Brandt’s joint supervision to 51.1 after Brandt became the sole supervisor. In short, the disparity between the average age of those hired and those laid off increased from slightly less than two years to nearly 16 years once Brandt started to make personnel decisions. This evidence suggests that although Eagle Produce was not responsible for discriminatory hiring practices prior to Brandt’s advent, Brandt used his authority to replace older workers with younger counterparts. [8] Reasonable jurors could find that this interpretation of the data supports an inference of discrimination. Viewing the 3534 DIAZ v. EAGLE PRODUCE statistical evidence with Brandt in mind helps to explain how Eagle Produce could both hire Plaintiffs without regard to age and also terminate their employment because of age shortly thereafter. Because Brandt did not work at Eagle Produce until May 2001, he could not preclude the hiring of Mancilla in approximately 1996, Diaz in 1997, and Moreno in 2000. However, he could lay off these workers because of their ages in the winter of 2002.
[9] The inference of discrimination also draws support from Brandt’s knowledge that his hirees were on average substantially younger than the workers he laid off. Brandt did not know the precise ages of Diaz, Moreno, and Mancilla, but he must have possessed a general sense that these individuals were relatively advanced in age because he personally observed them at the farm on a regular basis. See Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (on-the-job contact is sufficient to warrant an inference of an employer’s knowledge of age). Because of his final position as the sole hiring authority for Crew 94, the crew’s moderate size, and his daily contact with its workers, Brandt also must have known that the individuals he hired in 2002 were younger than those he laid off. Id. In concluding otherwise, the district court failed to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. See Jones, 557 F.2d at 1310. iii. The decision not to fire several younger, less experienced workers [10] Reasonable jurors could find that Brandt’s decision not to lay off several substantially younger workers with less experience than Diaz, Moreno, and Mancilla also supports an inference of discrimination. One worker was 19 years old and had approximately five months of experience in Crew 94 at the time Plaintiffs lost their jobs. Another was 21 years old and had approximately two years of experience in Crew 94. DIAZ v. EAGLE PRODUCE 3535 Another was 36 and possessed about 1.5 years of experience. Still another was 42 and had two months of experience. At the very least, these individuals had no more experience at the Aguila farm than Diaz, Moreno, and Mancilla, who worked there for 4, 1.5, and 5 years, respectively. Nevertheless, Brandt chose not to fire any of these younger workers during the seasonal slowdown. iv. The qualifications of Plaintiffs relative to their replacements [11] Evidence concerning the job experience of Diaz and Moreno relative to that of their replacements provides additional support for an inference of discrimination. Seven individuals were hired around or shortly after the dates on which Plaintiffs lost their jobs. Due to a lack of evidence, the qualifications of three of those hired cannot be determined. Two others were hired successively to operate a grading machine with which Diaz, Moreno, and Mancilla had no experience. Accordingly, they cannot be viewed as replacements. The remaining two workers were Javier Gastelum (28) and Jesus F. Valdez (21). Gastelum purportedly had 15 years of experience driving a tractor at the time he was hired. Valdez had around five years of experience with a tractor and “knew a little” about that line of work. This evidence creates a triable issue of fact as to whether Diaz and Moreno were at least as qualified as their successors. Diaz had driven tractors and performed general farm labor for eleven years. Valdez was no more qualified in terms of length of experience. Gastelum had driven a tractor longer than either Diaz or Moreno, but it is unlikely that this difference made Gastelum more qualified in any meaningful sense. The parties do not dispute that the job did not require specialized training, and the learning curve was not such that years of experience were required for mastery. 3536 DIAZ v. EAGLE PRODUCE [12] The district court erred in weighing against Plaintiffs the absence of evidence that particular, less-qualified, younger workers were hired in their steads. It is true that, due to high turnover in Crew 94, Plaintiffs are unable to identify their individual replacements. However, we treat the last element of the prima facie case with “flexibility.” Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1996). To support an inference of discrimination an employee need not demonstrate that one particular individual was designated as his replacement; evidence that a group of younger and comparably or less-qualified employees assumed the plaintiff’s responsibilities is sufficient. See Rodriguez-Torres v. Carribean Forms Mfr., Inc., 399 F.3d 52, 59 (1st Cir. 2005). It is therefore enough that Diaz and Moreno identified Gastelum and Valdez as their collective replacements.4 B. Facial legitimacy of the explanations for the layoffs [13] Moving to the next stage of the analysis, we conclude that Eagle Produce did not offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for the layoff of Diaz. To suffice under McDonnell Douglas, an employer’s explanation must explain why the plaintiff “in particular” was laid off. Davis v. Team Electric Co., ___ F.3d ___, No. 05-35877, slip op. at 3191 (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2008); see also McDonnell Douglas 4 Unlike Diaz and Moreno, Mancilla has failed to create a triable issue concerning whether he was replaced by younger workers who were equally or less qualified. There is no evidence that he was actually replaced by any of the younger workers. Because Mancilla was not employed in Crew 94, none of the individuals subsequently hired to that group can fairly be viewed as his replacements. Nevertheless, the remaining circumstantial evidence is still cumulatively sufficient to permit reasonable jurors to infer that Mancilla was discriminated against because of his age. See Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case for . . . ADEA claims on summary judgment is minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.”); Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1281 (evidence of replacement is not essential where a discharge occurs in the context of a general workforce reduction). DIAZ v. EAGLE PRODUCE 3537 Corp., 411 U.S. at 803 (concluding that the employerpetitioner satisfied its burden at this stage by specifying “[the employee’s] participation in unlawful conduct . . . as the cause for his rejection”). On its own, the explanation that Diaz was discharged as part of a general reduction in force fails this requirement. Workforce reduction explains why Eagle Produce laid off a group of its workers, but it does not explain why Diaz was chosen to be part of that group. Because no other explanation was given with respect to Diaz, Eagle Produce failed to satisfy its burden at stage two on his claim, and summary judgment was inappropriate.5 [14] Eagle Produce did, however, provide legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanations for the layoffs of Moreno and Mancilla by stating that they were each chosen to be part of the reduction in force because of damage caused to company property. Those explanations were individualized, unlike the explanation given to Diaz, and reflected concerns about job performance unrelated to the workers’ protected status. See Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 746 (9th Cir. 2003) (performance-related concerns satisfied stage two under 5 Our prior cases do not require otherwise. Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2002), stated in dictum that a seasonal reduction in force and an employee’s poor job performance “[b]oth constitute a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating” an employee. Because the employee in Aragon was discharged in the context of a reduction in force and selected to be part of the reduction because of poor performance, id. at 657-58, Aragon did not decide whether a reduction in force, standing alone, can suffice under stage two of McDonnell Douglas. Moreover, the quoted text from Aragon cited exclusively to