Opinion ID: 6318096
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Removal Proceedings and BIA Decision

Text: In January 2018, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against Silva.3 In March 2019, DHS amended the charges of removal against Silva. Those amended charges stated that Silva was removable for, among other things, having been convicted of an aggravated felony in the form of an offense relating to obstruction of justice . . . for which the term of imprisonment was at least one year. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1101(a)(43)(S).4 Silva objected to those amended charges of removal. 2 Silva's plea leaves no doubt that he intended to obstruct a reasonably foreseeable investigation. To the extent our dissenting colleague argues to the contrary, the state court conviction precludes such a holding. 3 This case has a long procedural history involving an initial termination of removal proceedings against Silva and a reinstatement of proceedings against him on different charges of removal. We describe only those later proceedings which led to this appeal. 4 The amended charges also stated that Silva was removeable for having been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). That charge of removal was based on Silva's Massachusetts accessoryafter-the-fact conviction and an earlier Massachusetts state conviction for receiving stolen property in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 60. The IJ and the BIA ultimately did not rely on this alternative ground for removal because of updated criminal documents filed with the IJ by Silva reflecting that a Massachusetts state court had allowed his motion to vacate his - 5 - In a written decision in May 2019, the IJ held that Silva's Massachusetts accessory-after-the-fact conviction was categorically an offense relating to obstruction of justice under the INA and so was a proper ground for removal as an aggravated felony.5 The IJ relied on the BIA's decision in Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 27 I. & N. Dec. 449, 452-60 (B.I.A. 2018), underlying removal order vacated in Valenzuela-Gallardo v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2020).6 plea for several prior convictions, including his conviction for receiving stolen property. They declined to decide what effect, if any, that state court decision would have on Silva's removal proceedings. The only issue for our review is the IJ's and the BIA's determination about the aggravated felony charge for removal. 5 [T]o determine whether an alien's conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony under th[e INA], [courts and the agency] 'employ a categorical approach by looking to the statute . . . of conviction, rather than to the specific facts underlying the crime.' Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1567-68 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 483 (2012)); see also De Lima v. Sessions, 867 F.3d 260, 262-63 (1st Cir. 2017). Under that approach, we ask whether 'the state statute defining the crime of conviction categorically fits within the generic federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony.' Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1568 (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013)); see also De Lima, 867 F.3d at 262-63. [W]e presume that the state conviction 'rested upon . . . the least of th[e] acts' criminalized by the statute, and then we determine whether that conduct would fall within the [generic] federal definition of the crime. Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1568 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010)); see also De Lima, 867 F.3d at 263. 6 Valenzuela Gallardo, applying the categorical approach, held that the generic definition of obstruction of justice includes - 6 - Silva then filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. In a written decision in December 2019, the IJ denied all three forms of relief from removal. The IJ concluded that Silva's aggravated felony conviction for accessory after the fact rendered him statutorily ineligible for asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(2)(B)(i), and that the conviction was a particularly serious crime which barred his application for withholding of removal, see id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). The IJ also concluded that Silva did not provide sufficient evidence to support his application for CAT protection. Silva appealed to the BIA. In May 2020, the BIA denied that appeal. The BIA, referencing Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, adopted and affirmed the IJ's decision, holding that Silva's Massachusetts accessory-after-the-fact conviction was categorically an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice. The BIA also held that the IJ did not clearly err in finding that Silva's Massachusetts accessory-after-the-fact crimes involving: (1) an affirmative and intentional attempt (2) that is motivated by a specific intent (3) to interfere with an investigation or proceeding that is ongoing, pending, or 'reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.' 27 I. & N. Dec. at 456 (emphasis added) (quoting Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2018)) (citing United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995)). Applying that generic federal definition of obstruction of justice, the IJ concluded that the elements of Silva's Massachusetts accessory-after-the-fact conviction were a categorical match. - 7 - conviction was a particularly serious crime for purposes of withholding of removal, and affirmed the denial of all forms of relief. This timely petition for review followed.