Opinion ID: 2185892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court improperly admitted testimony of other acts witnesses to show proof of opportunity, common scheme or plan, motive, intent and lack of mistake or accident.

Text: On appeal, Werner contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the other acts testimony. Specifically, Werner claims that the trial court improperly admitted the evidence because it failed to specify a particular exception to SDCL 19-12-5 (Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)) and because the other acts testimony was too remote. Finally, Werner claims it was improper to allow the other acts testimony to be presented before State established the basic elements of the crime. The trial court's decision to admit other act evidence will not be overruled absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Chapin, 460 N.W.2d 420 (S.D.1990). The admissibility of other acts testimony is governed by SDCL 19-12-5, which is almost identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Recently, in State v. Basker, we discussed the two-step approach which must be followed when the trial court is ruling on the admissibility of other acts testimony: (1) Whether the intended purpose for offering the other acts evidence is relevant to some material issue in the case, and (2) Whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 468 N.W.2d 413, 415 (S.D.1991), State v. Dickey, 459 N.W.2d 445 (S.D.1990); State v. Klein, 444 N.W.2d 16 (S.D.1989); State v. Champagne, 422 N.W.2d 840 (S.D.1988). The first inquiry pertains to the factual relevancy of the evidence, since evidence of other bad acts is inadmissible to prove bad character. For example, whether the proffered evidence has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Basker, 468 N.W.2d at 416. The second inquiry concerns legal relevancy: Whether the probative value of the proffered evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Id.; SDCL 19-12-3 [1] (Fed.R.Evid. 403). Furthermore, the trial court must identify the exception: In each case in which bad act evidence is sought to be admitted, the trial court should identify the applicable exception and perform an analysis of the facts and nature of the prior bad acts. Chapin, 460 N.W.2d at 422. The list of exclusions in the statute is not exhaustive as evidenced by the language such as. [T]he statute lists the most usual instances in which `other acts' will be admissible as long as proof of the intended purpose is relevant to some material issue in the case. Champagne, 422 N.W.2d at 842; State v. Dokken, 385 N.W.2d 493 (S.D. 1986). The trial court held three evidentiary hearings on the other acts evidence. State filed interviews of seventeen witnesses describing Werner's sexual contact with them. At trial, eleven of these women were subpoenaed to testify. All of the women testifying at trial were, at various times, members of Werner's parish. Except for two women, the sexual contact always occurred during a church-related activity. Both women who claimed the contact did not take place at church-related activities stated the contact occurred when Werner drove them home after babysitting. One woman testified that in addition to the sexual contact initiated during church activities, that Werner, who was an emergency medical technician, fondled her while she was being transported in an ambulance. These women were from 12 to 16 years old when Werner first initiated contact with them. The trial court examined the factual relevancy of the proffered testimony and concluded that this testimony was factually relevant to the issues on trial for the purpose of proving opportunity, common scheme or plan, motive, intent, and absence of mistake or accident. Once factual relevancy is determined, the trial court must perform a balancing test to determine whether the prejudicial effect of the evidence substantially outweighs its probative value. Werner claims the other acts testimony was too remote from the acts charged. When standing on its own, the testimony from these women may appear remote in time. In fact, the other acts evidence spanned several years. However, in determining probative value, remoteness must be considered with other factors, such as reliability and necessity. State v. Titus, 426 N.W.2d 578 (S.D.1988). Furthermore, [t]he trial court must consider the nature of the offenses, the similarity of occasions and locations as well as the time elapsed between incidents. Id. at 580. [W]hether prior acts are too remote must realistically depend on their nature. State v. Wedemann, 339 N.W.2d 112 (S.D. 1983). Moreover, each case depends upon its own particular facts as to a limitation, regarding vintage, on the remoteness. Admission of prior acts must realistically depend upon their nature. Titus, 426 N.W.2d at 582 (Henderson, J., concurring specially). It is evident that the nature of Werner's other bad acts and his modus operandi showed that he would develop a relationship of trust with the young girl and her family through the church. The other acts complained of almost exclusively occurred through a church-related activity and took place consistently for almost a thirty-year period. In this case, the trial court determined that the acts had probative value as evidence of the crimes charged and that there was a substantial need for this evidence in order to prove the crimes with which Werner was charged. The court further found that there was no other evidence of equal probative value, and the introduction of this evidence would not confuse the issues, would not mislead the jury, would not cause undue delay, and would not constitute a needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The court performed this delicate balancing test and decided the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value. Werner's acquittal on two charges seems to support that determination. We believe the trial court did exactly what we required in Basker and Chapin. There was adequate information to properly perform the balancing test required by SDCL 19-12-5. The trial court performed a meaningful analysis and identified the specific exceptions under which the testimony was admitted. Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury that the other acts evidence was to be considered only for the purpose of showing opportunity, common scheme or plan, motive, intent, and absence of mistake or accident. The jury's acquittal on two counts indicates it followed this instruction. We reiterate that the determination of whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect is a question left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Titus, 426 N.W.2d at 580; Champagne, 422 N.W.2d at 842; State v. Grooms, 399 N.W.2d 358, 361 (S.D.1987); Dokken, 385 N.W.2d at 497. Finally, Werner claims it was improper to present the testimony of the other acts witnesses before State established the basic elements of the crime and that this testimony was presented only to show Werner's bad character. We disagree. This chronological evidence was both factually and legally relevant to the charges against Werner. It was not admitted for the improper purpose of showing bad character. Furthermore, [A]s a general rule it is preferable to delay the admission of 404(b) evidence until after the defense rests because it places the trial court in the best position to determine whether the issue sought to be proved by the extrinsic act evidence is really in dispute, and if so, to assess its probative worth and possible prejudicial effect. United States v. Estabrook, 774 F.2d 284, 289 (8th Cir.1985). However, where it is made clear at the outset of the trial that the defendant's principal defense is lack of knowledge or intent, and thus the issue is unarguably in dispute, the government may ... introduce the [other acts] evidence in its case-in-chief. Id. In this case, the trial court had ample opportunity to determine whether there was a real dispute. Werner denied having sexual contact with any of the victims currently accusing him. [2] He claimed that the contact was in the nature of comforting, joking or playing and that he had no intent to sexually gratify himself. At the time defense counsel objected to State's introduction of other's acts evidence, the trial court had already held three hearings on the issue. Moreover, the order of proof is within the sound discretion of the trial court and an appellate court will reverse only if there is an abuse of that discretion. Dodds v. Bickle, 77 S.D. 54, 85 N.W.2d 284 (1957); 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 354 (1991). In this case, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to introduce the testimony of the other acts witnesses prior to establishing the elements of the crime charged. We reiterate that the other acts testimony could hardly be said to paint Werner as a bad person, since the jury saw fit to acquit him on two counts.