Opinion ID: 1209868
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the district court gave proper weight to and properly exercised its discretion in considering the statements of jackson's passengers and their parents at sentencing.

Text: Wersland contends that the district judge abused his discretion in sentencing by considering, as he stated, vindicating the victim and reassuring society and imposing just moral blame in fashioning Wersland's sentence. Wersland claims that vindicating the victim and reassuring society and imposing just moral blame are not criteria allowed to be considered by the court in imposing a sentence. A period of confinement is reasonable if, at the time of sentencing, it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case. State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145, 814 P.2d 401, 405 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992) (quoting State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct.App.1982)). Although the trial courts are to consider these four criteria when determining a sentence, they are not required to use only the specific words contained in these objectives and no others when articulating the sentence they are imposing. In the present case, the court clearly relied on the factors listed in Broadhead, supra . The fact that the court expressed these factors somewhat differently than stated in the Broadhead opinion does not constitute an abuse of discretion. In any event, the phrases used by the court, vindicating the victim and imposing just moral blame, are simply alternative ways of stating the fourth objective, punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Thus, we hold that the district court did not erroneously apply the principles set forth in State v. Broadhead, supra . Wersland also argues that the district court placed undue reliance on the impact statements of the alleged non-victims and that her case should therefore be remanded. We disagree. As we held above, I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e) does not necessarily limit victims to be only those named in an information or complaint. In this case, Jori Sexton, Michelle Revels and their families were victims of Wersland's crime of driving under the influence of alcohol. They submitted impact statements to the presentence investigator, as they were entitled to do under I.C. § 19-5306, which were then included in the presentence report. The contents of a presentence report are mandated by Supreme Court rule. I.C.R. 32. Additionally, a sentencing court has broad discretion in determining what evidence to admit at a sentencing hearing. Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 214, 731 P.2d 192, 209 (1986); State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581, 584, 618 P.2d 759, 762 (1980); State v. Kerrigan, 123 Idaho 508, 511, 849 P.2d 969, 972 (Ct. App.1993); State v. Bivens, 119 Idaho 119, 120, 803 P.2d 1025, 1026 (Ct.App.1991). See also State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 470, 816 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Ct.App.1991) (A sentencing judge may properly conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited, either as to the kind of information he may consider or the source from which it may come.) I.C. § 19-5306, entitled Rights of victim during investigation and prosecution of the crime, sets forth a list of specific rights of the victim in the investigation or prosecution of a criminal case, and provides statutory support for a broad-based inquiry during sentencing. State v. Kerrigan, 123 Idaho at 510, 849 P.2d at 971. We therefore hold that the district court appropriately considered the impact statements of the surviving victims and their parents and gave them proper weight.