Opinion ID: 3210755
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reinstatement Remedies

Text: As a final argument, Somerset contends that, even if we reject its legal challenges to the Board’s findings of unlawful labor practices, we should not enforce the Board’s proposed remedies in full. Specifically, it contends that Napolitano, Claudio, Jacques, and Wells should not be reinstated because they would put patients at risk. The Board does indeed have a “delicate responsibility” in the healthcare services context to “balanc[e] ... conflicting legitimate interests” in a way that safeguards patients and “effectuate[s] national labor policy.” Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501 (1978) (internal quotation marks 33 omitted). In reviewing the Board’s determination, though, our “judicial role is narrow,” and an order of the Board “must be enforced” if it is rationally “consisten[t] with the Act” and “supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Id. That principle accords with our generally deferential standard of review for the Board’s remedial orders, which we review for abuse of discretion. Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 400, 405 (3d Cir. 1990) (en banc). Moreover, “[r]einstatement is the conventional correction for discriminatory discharges,” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941), and we are particularly hesitant to overturn that choice of remedy. The crux of Somerset’s argument is that, even if those four employees were unlawfully dismissed in retaliation for their unionizing activities, the Board failed to consider whether reinstatement was appropriate in light of safety concerns. That, however, is not a fair assessment of the Board’s remedial analysis. In applying the Wright Line test, the Board evaluated both whether Somerset acted with a discriminatory motive and “would have reached the same decision absent the protected conduct.” 251 NLRB at 1087. Therefore, the analysis for unfair labor practices in this case necessarily incorporated the question of whether safety concerns should preclude reinstatement because, if the employees were putting patients at risk, they could have been fired regardless of Somerset’s motives. If Somerset could not prove that it would have discharged the four employees for unsafe conduct, it also could not show that the misconduct would have disqualified them from reinstatement. As we have already recognized, substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that the alleged performance deficiencies were merely pretextual reasons for dismissing 34 Napolitano, Claudio, Jacques, and Wells. We therefore also conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in determining that the safety concerns Somerset raises against reinstatement are likewise pretextual and invalid. Of greater concern to us is Somerset’s claim that the Board improperly ignored the evidence and expert opinion from the § 10(j) proceedings before the District Court for temporary injunctive relief. The District Court reviewed the record developed before the ALJ, and it held eight days of additional evidentiary hearings and two days of oral argument. The additional evidence included expert testimony on patient safety not presented to the ALJ. The Court then issued a 129page opinion discussing the case in exacting detail and concluded that reinstatement of Wells and Jacques would endanger Somerset’s patients more than it would advance the purposes of the NLRA. Five months later, the Board issued its own decision to the contrary, ordering the reinstatement of both Wells and Jacques, without “specifically address[ing] the particular allegations against Jacques and Wells that motivated the district court to deny them interim reinstatement.” (J.A. 2.) We later ruled that the District Court’s decision was moot and instructed it to vacate its order, observing that a § 10(j) proceeding “gives a district court authority to enter temporary interim relief” even as the Board retains “exclusive authority to decide the merits of the case.” Lightner, 729 F.3d at 237 (internal quotation and editorial marks omitted). The NLRA is structured to allow dual (and potentially dueling) proceedings, as the Board has authority to make determinations to prevent unfair labor practices under § 10(a) and the district courts are separately empowered to 35 evaluate petitions for temporary relief under § 10(j). 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(a), (j). If a district court comes to one conclusion about appropriate temporary relief in a § 10(j) proceeding, that does not preclude the Board from reaching a contrary conclusion on the merits under the power granted by § 10(a). As one court has put it, the Board has exclusive jurisdiction to render initial decisions in these labor matters and the courts [of appeals] merely review such decisions under a “substantial evidence” standard. This is not affected by the fact that the district court judge who heard the Section 10(j) petition had before him the same record that the ALJ had in the unfair labor practices proceeding. NLRB v. Kentucky May Coal Co., 89 F.3d 1235, 1240 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160). In the sphere of labor relations, Congress has created an environment in which the district courts “attempt to predict what the eventual outcome of the Board’s proceedings will be and to act accordingly. If the eventual outcome turns out to be different from what was predicted, however, it is obviously the prediction, not the outcome, that must be rejected.” NLRB v. Q-1 Motor Express, Inc., 25 F.3d 473, 477 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994).13 13 We are not insensitive to Somerset’s frustration over the course of proceedings in this case. The NLRB initiated the § 10(j) action in the District Court. Somerset was forced to defend itself exhaustively in those proceedings and did so with some success, only to have the Court’s decision effectively overturned five months later by an administrative 36 In its 2015 Order, the Board did expressly consider the District Court’s § 10(j) determination and reached a different conclusion, finding that the safety concerns were merely pretextual. As to Jacques, the Board said that “before and after the incident in question,” Somerset routinely made her a charge nurse, “a position reserved for high-performing nurses.” (J.A. 2.) Somerset’s contemporaneous actions thus indicate that it “did not actually consider Jacques a threat to patient safety.” (J.A. 2.) As to Wells, the Board observed that she had, for months prior to the election, made scheduling errors similar to those for which she was discharged. It was not until after the election that Somerset initiated rapidly escalating discipline, indicating that even Somerset did not see Wells’s errors as endangering patient safety until it wanted an excuse to dismiss her. The Board therefore had substantial evidence to conclude that Somerset’s own actions establish that Jacques and Wells do not pose a danger to agency entitled to significant deference on judicial review. One may question the fairness and efficiency of giving the NLRB two bites at the apple, once before a district court and once before the Board, but that is the structure the NLRA creates in bifurcating adjudication of temporary and permanent relief. The wisdom of using judicial resources as was done here, and of giving the NLRB more than one opportunity to go after a private party for the same alleged wrongdoing, is for Congress to address, not us. 37 patient safety. We will not, therefore, overturn the reinstatement remedy.14 14 Somerset also argues that Wells would have been discharged regardless of any retaliatory action because, following her discharge, Somerset discovered evidence of misconduct that would have led to her dismissal on nonretaliatory grounds. Somerset is correct that, if it can show it would have discharged Wells anyway based on afterdiscovered evidence, reinstatement is an inappropriate remedy. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360 (1995) (“[E]ven though the employer has violated the Act, we must consider how the after-acquired evidence of the employee’s wrongdoing bears on the specific remedy to be ordered.”). Specifically, Somerset contends that “Wells [] violated Somerset’s Technology Policy ... by forwarding a series of emails containing confidential Somerset information from her work computer to her home email address without permission.” (Opening Br. at 55.) The Board does not contest the fact that Wells sent Somerset scheduling information to herself. But it points out that it “deferred the matter to compliance proceedings ..., which will provide an opportunity to litigate whether this evidence affects Wells’ entitlement to reinstatement and backpay.” (Answering Br. at 56 n.8 (citing J.A. 8 n.11).) The Supreme Court has blessed this form of deferral in cases where the standard remedy of reinstatement and backpay has to be tailored to particular circumstances. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 902 (1984) (“This Court and other lower courts have long recognized the Board’s normal policy of modifying its general reinstatement and backpay remedy in subsequent compliance proceedings as a means of tailoring the remedy to suit the individual circumstances of each 38