Opinion ID: 2272501
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Superior Court lacked personal jurisdiction over Mond.

Text: Charlton relies on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(1) (1977) [4] to support the proposition that the situs of the defamation, venue and jurisdiction, is (sic) where the defamatory information was received. Though the situs of the alleged injury was certainly in the District because the allegedly defamatory material reached some who were indisputably District residents, we have found no case that would allow personal jurisdiction over Mond based solely on that fact. Nor do the cases Charlton relies upon support this position. [5] Had Charlton claimed personal jurisdiction over Mond as one who caus[ed] tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District of Columbia, [6] his argument would have had more merit. But he cannot so argue, since Mond's phone calls originated in Maryland. Instead, Charlton must prove jurisdiction [7] under D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(4), which requires additional contacts between a defendant and the forum when the predicate act to the alleged injury originates outside the District. [8] Therefore, the proposition that the situs of a tort is located in the jurisdiction where the damage occurred, while true, does not help Charlton's jurisdictional argument. Because there is no basis for personal jurisdiction based on the phone calls themselves, [9] Charlton needed to prove additional contacts between Mond and the District of Columbia. But even after discovery had been completed, Charlton failed to present evidence of any such contacts. The cases that Charlton relies on fail to support his argument. [10] The closest case on point is Blumenthal v. Drudge, where the court held that jurisdiction existed over Drudge, a California resident who was accused of defaming a White House staffer by publishing a story about him on his web site. [11] In holding so, however, the court did not rest its decision solely on the fact that the defamatory story was available to or directed at District of Columbia residents. Instead, it concentrated on the additional multiple and persistent contacts between the defendant and the forum. [12] Charlton misinterprets Drudge when he argues that any defendant who knows the effect of his actions will be suffered in a particular forum ... should also expect to be brought into court there. [13] Here, both Charlton and Mond were Maryland residents. Charlton's business was registered in Maryland. The contract was negotiated and executed in Maryland. Charlton's work on Mond's house took place entirely within Maryland pursuant to licenses and permits issued by Maryland authorities. Other than the allegedly defamatory phone calls themselves, which originated in Maryland, Charlton has presented no evidence of persistent conduct by Mond in the District. Thus, based on the facts before us, the proper forum to resolve this dispute is a Maryland court.