Opinion ID: 186209
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Legal Framework Under Title VII

Text: 29 Title VII provides, in relevant part, that it is unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race ... or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, disparate-treatment claims under Title VII are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The McDonnell Douglas framework establishes an allocation of the burden of production and an order for the presentation of proof in such cases. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2746, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). 30 Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden of doing so is not onerous. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). McDonnell Douglas identified the paradigmatic elements of a prima facie case in a Title VII claim involving a failure to hire. Under this formulation, the plaintiff must show: (i) that he belongs to a [protected class]; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of [the plaintiff's] qualifications. 31 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. 32 The Supreme Court has emphasized that the McDonnell Douglas model of the prima facie case is not intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic and that its requirements can vary depending upon the factual context. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, 122 S.Ct. 992, 995, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978)). With this in mind, the court in Stella v. Mineta articulated an alternative formulation of the Title VII prima facie case, pursuant to which a plaintiff must establish that (1) she is a member of the protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination. 284 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C.Cir.2002) (quoting Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 452 (D.C.Cir.1999)). This alternative formulation is designed to accommodate the wide variety of employment discrimination claims that extend beyond the typical failure-to-hire situations of the sort confronted in McDonnell Douglas. However, the formula articulated in Stella does not supplant McDonnell Douglas 's paradigmatic elements of a prima facie case. McDonnell Douglas 's formulation of the required elements of a prima facie case remains the standard in typical failure-to-hire cases. See, e.g., Morgan v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 328 F.3d 647, 650 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 881, 124 S.Ct. 325, 157 L.Ed.2d 146 (2003). 33 The decision in Stella also held that a plaintiff in a Title VII case is not required to show that she was disadvantaged in favor of a person outside of the protected class. 284 F.3d at 146. In other words, in order to make out a prima facie case, it is not necessary for an African-American plaintiff to show that she was disadvantaged by the employer's hiring of a Caucasian applicant, or for a female plaintiff to show that a male was hired in her stead. In reaching this result, Stella adopted the position followed by the vast majority of our sister circuits that have ruled on this issue. Id. at 145-46. The employer's hiring of a person of the same race or sex as the plaintiff might be relevant in assessing the merits of a plaintiff's claim beyond the stage of the prima facie case, but it is not a factor in the plaintiff's establishment of a prima facie case. As the Third Circuit noted in Pivirotto v. Innovative Systems, Inc., 191 F.3d 344 (3d Cir.1999), even if a plaintiff is replaced by someone within her class, she could still demonstrate that the employer treated her worse than others because she was a member of the protected class. Id. at 353. For example, a female employee may have been treated differently from similarly situated male employees. Id. at 353-54. 34 McDonnell Douglas principally demands that the alleged discriminatee demonstrate at least that his rejection did not result from the two most common legitimate reasons on which an employer might rely to reject a job applicant: an absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in the job sought. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n. 44, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866 n. 44, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). As the Supreme Court has noted, [e]limination of these reasons for the refusal to hire is sufficient, absent other explanation, to create an inference that the decision was a discriminatory one. Id. Therefore, to require a Title VII plaintiff to show that someone outside of her protected class was hired or promoted in her stead would be to graft an additional element onto the McDonnell Douglas model of the prima facie case. Stella forecloses this possibility. 35 Once a prima facie case has been established, the plaintiff in a Title VII action creates a rebuttable `presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against' him. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1481, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094). Establishment of a prima facie case triggers the employer's burden to produce admissible evidence that, if believed, would establish that the employer's action was motivated by a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-56, 101 S.Ct. at 1094-95. The employer's burden is one of production, not persuasion. Id. 36 When the employer meets this burden, the McDonnell Douglas framework — with its presumptions and burdens — disappear[s], and the sole remaining issue [i]s discrimination vel non.  Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43, 120 S.Ct. at 2106 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The plaintiff at this point must be given an opportunity to prove that the employer's professed reason for its actions is, in fact, a pretext for discrimination. If the factfinder rejects the defendant's proffered explanation, this permits — but does not compel — the factfinder to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. 37 The ultimate question, once the employer has met its evidentiary burden, is whether intentional discrimination may be inferred from all the evidence before the trier of fact. This includes (1) the plaintiff's prima facie case; (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer's proffered explanations for its actions; and (3) any further evidence of discrimination that may be available to the plaintiff (such as independent evidence of discriminatory statements or attitudes on the part of the employer). Dunaway v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 763 (D.C.Cir.2002) (quoting Waterhouse v. Dist. of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 993 (D.C.Cir.2002)). However, if the plaintiff establishes the elements of a prima facie case, and the defendant remains silent or otherwise fails to meet its burden of production, judgment must be rendered for the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094; see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 510 n. 3, 113 S.Ct. at 2748 n. 3. 38