Opinion ID: 50384
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Resisting, Standing, and Permit Statutes

Text: We turn first to the three statutes--Resisting, Standing, and Permit--that the district court determined were inapplicable to Plaintiffs’ conduct. Columbia has not contested on appeal the district court’s conclusion that the statutes were inapplicable; however, we emphasize the fact that, as shown below, even taking the officers’ allegations as true, Plaintiffs’ conduct could not have violated the statutes. Section 14:108, the Resisting statute, provides that it is an offense to intentionally interfere with an officer making a lawful arrest, seizing property, or serving process. Louisiana courts have limited the reach of this statute to interference with those actions alone. State v. Huguet, 369 So. 2d 1331, 1333 (La. 1979); State v. Joseph, 759 So. 2d 136, 140 (La. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Green, 706 So. 2d 536, 539 (La. Ct. App. 1997). Because Plaintiffs were not interfering with an arrest, seizure of property, or service of process, the Resisting statute could not have been applied to their actions.8 The Standing statute, section 32:143, states that “[n]o person shall stand, or park a vehicle” within fifteen feet of a fire hydrant, within twenty feet of a crosswalk, or within twenty 8 Although the police officers did arrest Russell, the DVD does not reflect, and Columbia does not contend, that Plaintiffs interfered with that arrest in any way. 18 feet upon the approach to any stop light. Although Plaintiffs were “standing” within these areas, “stand” is defined in section 32:1(71) as temporarily halting a vehicle. Therefore, the statute is inapplicable to human beings, such as SPF members, who are standing in these areas. Finally, the Permit statute, section 14:326, requires groups to obtain a permit before staging a parade, march, or demonstration. However, the statute only applies to parishes with populations of at least 450,000. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:326(C). Caldwell Parish, in which Columbia is located, clearly did not meet this population threshold; therefore, Plaintiffs were not required to obtain a permit before demonstrating in Columbia. As a result, Plaintiffs’ conduct, as alleged by Columbia’s police officers, would not have resulted in the violation of any of these statutes. Consequently, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officers were motivated to restrict Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights on the basis of these statutes. By this we are not saying that there is a fact issue regarding the First Amendment anytime an individual’s rights are restricted by application of a content-neutral statute and the individual is subsequently determined to be not guilty of violating that statute. Nor are we holding that it is appropriate to assume the officers were motivated by the content 19 of Plaintiffs’ demonstration just because Plaintiffs were not in violation of the statutes. Rather, we are simply stating that the absence of any allegations by the officers that would have supported a finding that Plaintiffs were violating the Resisting, Standing, and Permit statutes creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officers were actually motivated to restrict Plaintiffs’ demonstration on the basis of those statutes.