Opinion ID: 2811263
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wyatt’s Testimony Regarding Madrid’s Ph.D.

Text: Wyatt testified that Madrid obtained a Ph.D., “but it was actually a degree from a degree mill.” Madrid’s counsel contemporaneously objected, contending that there was no predicate laid for the testimony and that it was merely Wyatt’s opinion. The district court sustained counsel’s objection, but Wyatt continued to testify that he conducted research into the online university where Madrid received his Ph.D., and that it is considered to be a degree mill. The district court overruled Madrid’s further objections. Wyatt continued, “[the university] was investigated. A number of articles were written about it, that the individual who founded it wound up going to prison for tax evasion, and it was basically just a guy operating out of a store front.” Madrid contends that the admission of this evidence violated the Federal Rules of Evidence and requires that we vacate his conviction. “A district court’s admission of evidence, if objected to, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Nelson, 732 F.3d 504, 516-17 (5th Cir. 2013). 23 Even when the district court abuses its discretion by admitting inadmissible evidence, however, we must “view the error in relation to the entire trial[,] . . . determine whether the inadmissible evidence contributed to the jury’s verdict and reversal is warranted only if the evidence had a 23Here, Madrid objected at trial to Wyatt’s testimony as “hearsay” and argued that it “lacked a foundation.” Despite the Government’s arguments to the contrary, we conclude that this objection was sufficiently specific to properly preserve the issue. See generally United States v. Neal, 578 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 2009) (“To preserve error, an objection must be sufficiently specific to alert the district court to the nature of the alleged error and to provide an opportunity for correction.” (citing United States v. Ocana, 204 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 2000)). We will therefore conduct our review under the abuse of discretion standard. See Nelson, 732 F.3d at 516-17. 34 Case: 13-50414 Document: 00513091274 Page: 35 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 13-50414 substantial impact on the verdict.” United States v. Wells, 262 F.3d 455, 463 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Generally, a witness may not testify to a matter unless the witness has personal knowledge of it. Fed. R. Evid. 602. Here, Wyatt expressly conceded that his testimony was not based on personal knowledge but, rather, was based on information he learned by reading unspecified articles. Assuming without deciding that the admission of this testimony amounts to an abuse of discretion, we find no reversible error. The quality of Madrid’s Ph.D. was not a substantial piece of evidence in the government’s case and had little probative value as to the critical issues. Considering the record in its totality— which included testimony of a coconspirator and ample circumstantial evidence—we conclude that Wyatt’s testimony about Madrid’s Ph.D. did not have a substantial impact on the verdict and, therefore, any error in the admission of Wyatt’s testimony about Madrid’s Ph.D. was harmless. Accord United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding harmless error where the improper admission of the defendant’s prior conviction “added little to the government’s case” as compared with “the detailed testimony of the two co-conspirators[] [and the] significant amount of strong circumstantial evidence”).