Opinion ID: 627205
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Mapping Regulations Embody a Permissible Construction of the IDEA

Text: Having determined that the IDEA is ambiguous with respect to whether schools must provide mapping, we proceed to Chevron step two to ask whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. At step two, we focus on whether the [agency] has reasonably explained how the permissible interpretation it chose is `rationally related to the goals of' the statute. Village of Barrington, Ill., 636 F.3d at 665 (citation omitted); see also Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. FCC, 412 F.3d 145, 151 (D.C.Cir.2005) (A `reasonable' explanation of how an agency's interpretation serves the statute's objectives is the stuff of which a `permissible' construction is made. . . . (citations omitted)); Bell Atl. Tel. Cos., 131 F.3d at 1049 ([W]e will defer to the [agency's] interpretation if it is reasonable and consistent with the statutory purpose and legislative history. (citations omitted)). As noted above, in order for Appellants to prevail on their Chevron step-two claim, we must find that the Mapping Regulations are manifestly contrary to the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (citations omitted). We can make no such finding on the record in this case. The Department justified the Mapping Regulations based on a number of related considerations. We think each is rationally related to the goals of the IDEA and supported by the record. The Department considered whether schools must provide mapping during the day, on campus, for students to benefit from special education. The Department concluded that this was not necessary: Although the cochlear implant must be properly mapped in order for the child to hear well in school, the mapping does not have to be done in school or during the school day in order for it to be effective. . . . [Mapping] services and costs are incidental to a particular course of treatment chosen by the child's parents to maximize the child's functioning, and are not necessary to ensure that the child is provided access to education, regardless of the child's disability, including maintaining health and safety while in school. Final Regulations, 71 Fed.Reg. at 46,569-70. The Department was entitled to consider the fact that mapping need not take place at school or during school hours to be effective. Appellants do not dispute the proposition that, so long as a student's cochlear implant is routinely mapped somewhere, that student will benefit from special instruction. This concession is significant at Chevron step two, because the Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted the related services provision by reference to services that must be provided in order to get students to, or keep students in, school. For example, in Garret F., the Court summarized the provision as generally encompassing services that enable a disabled child to remain in school during the day, because such services provide the student with `the meaningful access to education that Congress envisioned.' 526 U.S. at 73, 119 S.Ct. 992 (citation omitted). And in Tatro, the Court was even clearer in stating that if a particular medication or treatment may appropriately be administered to a handicapped child other than during the school day, a school is not required to provide nursing services to administer it. 468 U.S. at 894, 104 S.Ct. 3371. Appellants counter that in the preamble to its final regulations, the Department acknowledged that allow[ing] a child to sit in a classroom when the child's hearing aid or cochlear implant is not functioning is to effectively exclude the child from receiving an appropriate education. Final Regulations, 71 Fed.Reg. at 46,571. But Appellants take this statement out of context. The Department made this point to explain why schools are responsible under section 300.113 for the routine checking of the external components of cochlear implants i.e., for checking that the device is turned on, that the settings are correct, and that the cable is connectedbut not for mapping the implant. Appellants also argue that we should not push Garret F. and Tatro so far as to allow the Department to limit schools' obligations under the related services provision to those services that must be offered during school hours. They claim that with such broad authority the Department could functionally write many of the listed services out of the IDEA. Their concern is overstated. As Garret F. and Tatro demonstrate, there are certain servicescontinuous nursing services for ventilator-dependent students and clean intermittent catheterizationthat absolutely must be provided during school hours. See 526 U.S. at 69-73, 119 S.Ct. 992, 468 U.S. at 890-91, 104 S.Ct. 3371. This conclusion is buttressed by the administrative record here, which illustrates that even certain audiology services must be provided during the day i.e., checking the batteries, settings, and cables of cochlear implants. Furthermore, the Department has not said that school districts are categorically excused from providing other services whenever those services could be provided outside of school hours, so we have no reason to address this issue. Should the Department take this position in the future, affected parties will be free to challenge it. In promulgating the Mapping Regulations, the Department also considered the technical expertise required to map cochlear implants. See Final Regulations, 71 Fed.Reg. at 46,571 ([T]he distinguishing factor between those services that are not covered under the Act, such as mapping, and those that are covered, such as verifying that a cochlear implant is functioning properly, in large measure, is the level of expertise required.). The agency noted that [o]ptimization services, such as mapping, are generally provided at a specialized clinic. Id. at 46,570. Moreover, the agency described that [t]he maintenance and monitoring of surgically implanted devices require the expertise of a licensed physician or an individual with specialized technical expertise beyond that typically available from school personnel. Id. at 46,571. Indeed, the American Academy of Audiology informed the Department that it will not even let a candidate sit for its Board Certification examination without two years of experience, 450 hours of contact with individuals with cochlear implants, and fifty hours of case management experience. See Academy Letter, J.A. 43. Thus, the Department concluded that mapping is distinct from the routine checking of acoustical hearing aids and of the external components of a cochlear implant, both of which can be performed by trained lay persons, teachers, and school nurses. Final Regulations, 71 Fed.Reg. at 46,571. The Department was also clearly aware of the fact thatdue in part to the expertise required to map a cochlear implant and in part to the cost of equipment and softwaremapping imposes a substantial financial burden on school systems. See, e.g., Neault Letter, J.A. 48; Academy Letter, J.A. 44. These considerationsexpertise and costare rationally related to the IDEA's purpose. This proposition emerges clearly from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the medical services component of the related services provision in Garret F. and Tatro. Schools are required to provide medical services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A). In other words, certain medical services are excluded from coverage. To clarify what services are excluded, the Department adopted regulations in 1983 that, inter alia, define medical services as services provided by a licensed physician. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 892, 104 S.Ct. 3371 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(b)(4) (1983). In Tatro, the Court held that clean intermittent catheterizationwhich clearly qualified as a related servicewas not excluded as a medical service, noting that it could be provided by nurses, rather than by licensed physicians. In reaching this holding, the Court explained that the Department's interpretation of medical services was a reasonable interpretation of congressional intent. 468 U.S. at 892, 104 S.Ct. 3371. The Court continued: [T]he Secretary could reasonably have concluded that [the medical services exclusion] was designed to spare schools from an obligation to provide a service that might well prove unduly expensive and beyond the range of their competence. Id. The Court reaffirmed this holding in Garret F. See 526 U.S. at 74, 119 S.Ct. 992 ([In Tatro, w]e referenced the likely cost of the services and the competence of school staff as justifications for drawing a line between physician and other services, but our endorsement of that line was unmistakable. (citation omitted)); see also id. at 77, 119 S.Ct. 992 (explaining that Department was entitled to [d]efin[e] `related services' in a manner that accommodates the cost concerns Congress may have had). Appellants argue that while the Department was entitled to take cost and expertise into account when interpreting medical services, it may not do so in interpreting audiology services. Appellants' Br. at 44. They reach this conclusion based on two premises: First, Congress clearly intended to include some medical services (those services `for diagnostic and evaluation purposes') and exclude others (notably, medical treatments), id.; and, second, Congress did not restrict coverage of `audiology services' in the same way, id. Based on these premises, Appellants conclude, there is no statutory basis for inferring that Congress intended to exclude some `audiology services,' much less that it intended to differentiate between audiology services based on the degree of expertise required. Id. But this is nothing more than a repackaged version of Appellants' Chevron step-one argument. We have already explained that there is a statutory basis for inferring that Congress intended to exclude some audiology services. Starting from that baseline, the Department was clearly entitled to consider cost and expertise in determining which services to include. Appellants are correct to point out that in enacting the IDEA, Congress plainly required schools to hire various specially trained personnel to help handicapped children, such as `trained occupational therapists, speech therapists, psychologists, social workers and other appropriately trained personnel.' Tatro, 468 U.S. at 893, 104 S.Ct. 3371 (citation omitted). But we do not believe that the Mapping Regulations are inconsistent with that intent. Even under the Regulations, schools may still be required, pursuant to a child's IEP, to train personnel to perform routine monitoring of the external components of cochlear implants and acoustical hearing aids as well as to hire or retain specialists to provide other supportive audiology services such as speech and language therapy, assistive listening devices, appropriate classroom acoustics, auditory training, educational interpreters, cued speech transliterators, and specialized instruction. Final Regulations, 71 Fed.Reg. at 46,570. Thus, we think that the Mapping Regulations satisfy the IDEA's educational purpose. Appellants separately argue that the Mapping Regulations fail at Chevron step two, because the Department made an error in tracking the IDEA's legislative history. When Congress considered the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, the Senate Committee initially proposed amending the related services and assistive technology device provisions to exclude a medical device that is surgically implanted, [ and ] the post-surgical maintenance, programming, [and] replacement of such device, [and] an external device connected with the use of a surgically implanted medical device. S.REP. NO. 108-185, at 8 (2003) (emphasis added); see also id. at 102, 107. Congress ultimately enacted a narrower amendment, excluding only a medical device that is surgically implanted, [and] the replacement of such device. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(B), (1)(B). Yet, surprisingly, the Department explained that the Mapping Regulations reflect[ed] the language in the Senate Report (S.Rpt.) No. 108-185, p. 8, which states that the Senate committee did not intend that mapping a cochlear implant, or even the costs associated with mapping . . . be the responsibility of a school district. Final Regulations, 71 Fed.Reg. at 46,569-70. Appellants, on the other hand, contend that the drafting history demonstrates Congress's intent that mapping be considered a related service and that the Department relied on an obsolete committee report to contravene that intent. At the outset, we agree with Appellants that the Department's citation of the Senate Report in the preamble to the rulemaking is inexplicable. The Senate Report is based on legislative language that was withdrawn from the final bill. It is incontrovertible, therefore, that the Report is not persuasive or even relevant authority. We think the most plausible explanation is that the Department simply made a mistake in citing the Report. The Department's efforts to explain why the citation was proper, see Appellees' Br. at 40-42, are specious at best. Be that as it may, however, Appellants' legislative history argument has only limited traction. Appellants suggest that the Department's misconstruction of the legislative history should change our analysis at Chevron step two. This argument is entirely unpersuasive. The Department's mistake in this instance does not, without more, discredit the Department's judgment in adopting the Mapping Regulations. Nor does the mistake, without more, show that the Department's Mapping Regulations are flawed for want of reasoned decision making. The record here clearly demonstrates that the Department did not rely solelyor even much at allon the Senate Report in promulgating the Mapping Regulations. Indeed, we have already discussed the various, valid policy considerations that informed the Department's rulemaking. Appellants also argue that the actual legislative history of the 2004 amendments to the IDEA should be dispositive at Chevron step two, because it reveals that the Mapping Regulations are contrary to Congress's intent. But that reasoning is simply incorrect as a matter of law. Unenacted statutory text certainly may inform an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous term. This court reiterated that proposition recently in Village of Barrington: [Intervenor] dismisses the relevance of this legislative history, stating that inferences of legislative intent from unenacted legislation are unreliable. [Intervenor's] caution is well taken, but only to a point. Although we would be uncomfortable relying on such legislative history at Chevron step one, we think it may appropriately guide an agency in interpreting an ambiguous statutejust how the Board used it here. 636 F.3d at 666 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellants are urging the inverse proposition, however i.e., that an agency frustrates Congress's intent by not attaching dispositive weight to an inference that can be drawn from unenacted text. And we are aware of no authority supporting that approach to statutory interpretation. See Edison Electric Inst. v. EPA, 2 F.3d 438, 451 (D.C.Cir. 1993) (per curiam) ([W]e need only note that the deletion of a word or phrase in the throes of the legislative process does not ordinarily constitute, without more, evidence of a specific legislative intent. (citations omitted)). Finally, we note that prior to the 2004 amendments to the IDEA, several courts had interpreted the Actas implemented by the Department's then-existing regulationsto require schools to offer mapping, pursuant to children's IEPs. See, e.g., A.U., ex rel. N.U., 501 F.Supp.2d at 1143-44; Beth P., 2003 WL 260728, at -5. But these decisions do not render the Department's construction of the IDEA impermissible. The Supreme Court confronted a comparable situation in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 162 L.Ed.2d 820 (2005). There, the Court explained that when an agency adopts an interpretation of a statute that conflicts with a prior, otherwise controlling court decision interpreting the same statute, the judicial decision trumps. . . only if [it] holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion. Id. at 982, 125 S.Ct. 2688. This proposition follows from Chevron itself. Id. And here, none of the pre-2004 decisions dealing with mapping under the IDEA are binding in this Circuit, and none held that the Act is unambiguous with respect to mapping. Thus, none of those decisions can trump the agency's construction of the statute. In sum, in promulgating the Mapping Regulations, the Department considered whether mapping was necessary for students to benefit from their education; whether mapping had to be provided during school hours, at a school campus; whether mapping could be provided by laypersons, teachers, and other trained educational professionals; and whether mapping imposed an excessive financial burden on schools. These considerations are rationally related to the purposes of the IDEA. Therefore, the Mapping Regulations are entitled to our deference.