Opinion ID: 2424396
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Judge Erroneously Deprived Fritzinger of His Right to a Hearing to Develop and Present Evidence of Mary's Sexual Conduct.

Text: Under 11 Del. C. § 3508(a), [5] evidence of a complaining witness's previous sexual conduct may be admissible at trial to attack the credibility of the complaining witness if the parties and court follow a prescribed statutory vetting process. Specifically, the defendant must submit to the court a written motion that identifies the evidence he wishes to introduce and its relevance to the case at hand. [6] This motion must be accompanied by an affidavit explaining the specific offer of proof tending to prove that evidence. [7] The statute mandates that if the court finds this offer of proof sufficient, it shall order a hearing outside the presence of the jury, and allow the defendant to question the complaining witness in order to develop the evidence more fully. [8] If, at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge independently determines that the evidence is relevant, then she may issue an order defining the contours of the questioning relating to that evidence that the defendant may pursue at trial. [9] In this case, Fritzinger filed the appropriate motion, accompanied by the required affidavit, both related to his proffered evidence of Mary's previous sexual conduct. [10] The trial judge conducted an in camera review of Mary's CAC interview, which was one element of the evidence Fritzinger identified in the motion. But, the judge did not permit Fritzinger to question Mary at a hearing outside the presence of the jury. Despite her ruling, the judge must necessarily have determined that the offer of proof was sufficient, because she proceeded, based on her in camera review, to permit Fritzinger to pursue certain, very limited, lines of questioning at trial. [11] The plain text of Section 3508(a) states that if the trial judge determines the offer of proof is sufficient, then she shall order a hearing where the defendant can question the complaining witness and further develop the evidence the defendant wishes to introduce at trial. The hearing is not permissive; it is mandatory. Only after that hearing may the judge determine the parameters of the trial questions relating to that evidence. By denying Fritzinger the hearing mandated by Section 3508(a), the trial judge erred. The State argues this error was harmless because the judge allowed Fritzinger to ask some questions about Mary's previous sexual conduct at trial, which placed the critical issuea potential alternate source of Mary's sexual knowledge despite her young agebefore the jury. We conclude that the error was not harmless. The trial judge committed legal error which prevented Fritzinger from learning information potentially valuable to his defense. For example, without the hearing, Fritzinger had no opportunity to know the extent or timing of Mary's previous sexual conduct, or the identity of her previous abusers. Any or all of this information could have helped Fritzinger construct a defense to these significant charges. He had a statutory right, on these facts, to explore those issues at a hearing, and the judge erred by denying him that hearing.