Opinion ID: 2283146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: amount of the financial awards

Text: In dissolving this twenty-year marriage the trial court awarded the family home to the plaintiff along with the responsibility for future taxes, mortgage payments, and utility bills. According to a competent appraiser the value of the house was $65,000; a $5000 mortgage remained unpaid. Two other pieces of real estate were awarded to the defendant. Those properties were unmortgaged and had a combined value of $57,000. Various items of tangible personal property were awarded to the parties. The trial court ordered no division of the plaintiff's $32,000 in savings accounts but ordered the plaintiff to make up any deficits in the educational trust accounts which she had established for the three children from funds inherited from her mother. The plaintiff was awarded periodic alimony of $300 per week and the sum of $7500 toward her counsel fees. [3] The trial court was presented with financial affidavits from each of the parties at four different dates during the pendency of this suit. The defendant testified at length about his employment and salary history. The trial court found that he had earned approximately $45,000 per year as an airline pilot although his income was substantially less at the time of trial; and that his income potential was far superior to that of the plaintiff who has no particular skills or business experience to offer and who, at the time of trial, was employed as a teacher's helper earning $80 net per week. In marital dissolution proceedings, under appropriate circumstances the trial court may base financial awards on the earning capacity rather than the actual earned income of the parties; Lucy v. Lucy, 183 Conn. 230, 234, 439 A.2d 302 (1981); Miller v. Miller, 181 Conn. 610, 611-12, 436 A.2d 279 (1980); when, as here, there is specific evidence of the defendant's previous earnings. Compare Schmidt v. Schmidt, 180 Conn. 184, 190, 429 A.2d 470 (1980). Although no single statutory factor is preferred over all the others, the financial circumstances of the parties are highly significant in the determination of any monetary awards. Leveston v. Leveston, 182 Conn. 19, 22, 437 A.2d 819 (1980); Valante v. Valante, 180 Conn. 528, 429 A.2d 964 (1980). The trial court in its memorandum of decision gave particular attention to the financial circumstances of the parties, past, present, and future. The trial court also discussed such other statutory factors as the length of the marriage, the age, health, occupation and employability of the parties, and the causes for the dissolution. See General Statutes § 46b-82. With respect to the financial awards in a dissolution action, great weight is given to the judgment of the trial court because of its opportunity to observe the parties and the evidence. Gallo v. Gallo, 184 Conn. 36, 50, 440 A.2d 782 (1981); Fattibene v. Fattibene, 183 Conn. 433, 442, 441 A.2d 3 (1981); deCossy v. deCossy, 172 Conn. 202, 204, 374 A.2d 182 (1977). Because the trial court reasonably could have concluded as it did; Gallo v. Gallo, supra, 51; Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 177 Conn. 259, 263, 413 A.2d 854 (1979); it did not abuse its discretion in its alimony and property assignment decisions. The defendant cites the fact that the plaintiff had at least $30,000 in liquid funds as a further indication that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding $7500 in counsel fees to the plaintiff. No claim is made that the amount charged by the plaintiff's attorneys was less than $7500 nor that the amount of the fee is unreasonably large. See Presutti v. Presutti, 181 Conn. 622, 638, 436 A.2d 299 (1980). General Statutes § 46b-62 permits the trial court to award counsel fees in accordance with their respective financial abilities and the statutory criteria for an alimony award. The memorandum of decision adequately addressed the parties' finances and the other statutory criteria. Specific findings addressed to the award of counsel fees are not required. deCossy v. deCossy, supra, 206. As with alimony, § 46b-62 requires the consideration of several factors and the application of judicial discretion before an award of counsel fees is made. The single fact that the plaintiff had a savings account with a balance greater than the amount of counsel fees awarded does not make that award an abuse of discretion. The 1973 revision of the dissolution statutes first established statutory authority for an award of counsel fees and thereby abrogated the common-law rule that an allowance to prosecute or defend would be awarded only where the recipient spouse did not have sufficient funds to pay the expenses of litigation. Arrigoni v. Arrigoni, 184 Conn. 513, 518-19, 440 A.2d 206 (1981); Murphy v. Murphy, 180 Conn. 376, 380, 429 A.2d 897 (1980). Whether a spouse has ample liquid funds with which to pay counsel fees; see Koizim, v. Koizim, 181 Conn. 492, 501, 435 A.2d 1030 (1980); can only be determined by examining the total financial resources of the parties in light of the statutory criteria. Compare Gallo v. Gallo, supra, 38, 49-50; Fattibene v. Fattibene, supra, 443; North v. North, 183 Conn. 35, 40, 438 A.2d 807 (1981); Presutti v. Presutti, supra; El Idrissi v. El Idrissi, 173 Conn. 295, 301-302, 377 A.2d 330 (1977); deCossy v. deCossy, supra; Spalding v. Spalding, 171 Conn. 220, 230, 368 A.2d 14 (1976). The record indicates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its award of counsel fees to the plaintiff. There is no error.