Opinion ID: 1057858
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Mootness of Appeal

Text: Because the Petitioner reached the age of nineteen and, therefore, was entitled to release from the order of commitment before the disposition by the Court of Appeals, the State contends that the mootness doctrine precludes our review. We disagree. The mootness doctrine provides that before the jurisdiction of the courts may be invoked, a genuine and existing controversy, calling for present adjudication of the rights of the parties must exist. State ex rel. Lewis v. State, 208 Tenn. 534, 347 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tenn.1961) (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Eshelman, 227 F. 928, 932 (N.D.Cal.1914)). Courts may not issue advisory rulings. See Super Flea Mkt. of Chattanooga, Inc. v. Olsen, 677 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tenn.1984). However convenient or desirable for either party that the questions mooted in the case be authoritatively settled for future guidance, the court is not justified in violating fundamental principles of judicial procedure to gratify that desire. State ex rel. Lewis, 347 S.W.2d at 48 (quoting S. Pac. Co., 227 F. at 932). There are exceptions to the rule. A court may review the merits of an appeal when the appeal involves issues of great importance to the public and to the administration of justice, or when the appeal involves issues capable of repetition yet evading review. See Dockery v. Dockery, 559 S.W.2d 952, 954-55 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1977). With regard to the former exception, this Court has emphasized that the issue must be one of great public importance, as where it involves a determination of public rights or interests under conditions which may be repeated at any time. McCanless v. Klein, 182 Tenn. 631, 188 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tenn.1945) (quoting 1 C.J.S. Actions § 17). With regard to the latter, there must be a reasonable expectation that the acts provoking the litigation will reoccur, that judicial remedies may not be effective if the acts do reoccur, and that the same party will be prejudiced. See State v. Montgomery, 929 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Tenn.Crim.App.1996). In this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that [u]pon reaching this milestone, [the Petitioner] no longer face[d] the risk of future incarceration for his juvenile offenses. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-1-103(c) (2005) (noting that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court continues until the age of eighteen or, under limited circumstances, the age of nineteen). The Court of Appeals also found that no exception to the mootness doctrine was applicable: Counsel for [the Petitioner] asserted at oral argument that, based upon his personal experience, this issue arises frequently in juvenile cases across the state. Yet, he conceded that he could provide no statistical or other data to support his claim. The record before this Court does not establish the frequency with which the juvenile courts fail to conform their orders to the rule set forth in the Appendix to the Tennessee Rules of Juvenile Procedure. Thus, we have no way to determine whether the issues in this case are of great importance to the administration of justice or whether cases like this will occur again and evade effective judicial review. (quoting McIntyre v. Traughber, 884 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tenn.Ct.App.1994)). By focusing on the age of the Petitioner and the related statutory provisions regarding jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals overlooked that a probation violation entered in juvenile court may have a subsequent adverse effect. For example, a prior probation violation in juvenile court may be considered as a sentence enhancement factor for an adult upon a subsequent conviction. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(8) (2006). Our holding in State v. Jackson, 60 S.W.3d 738, 743-44 (Tenn. 2001), illustrates that point: [W]e hold today that section 40-35-114[16] is not the exclusive means for using juvenile court records to enhance sentences in subsequent adult criminal proceedings. Because probation violations are not delinquent acts as that term is defined by our legislature, factor (20) does not prevent these violations from being considered under other enhancement factors. . . . Moreover, because measures less restrictive than confinement have failed, the application of [section 40-35-114(8)] is also proper. Id. (emphasis added). In our view, this appeal presents a genuine and existing controversy, calling for present adjudication. See State ex rel. Lewis, 347 S.W.2d at 48. It follows that there is no need to consider the applicability of any exceptions to the mootness doctrine. There are two collateral issues worthy of comment. First, the Court of Appeals determined the Petitioner's age and custodial status during oral argument. The appropriate avenue for the determination of post-judgment facts is contained in Rule 14 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure: If a motion to consider post-judgment facts is granted or the appellate court acts on its own motion, the court, by appropriate order, shall direct that the facts be presented in such manner and pursuant to such reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard as it deems fair. Tenn. R.App. P. 14(c) (emphasis added); see also Tenn. R.App. P. 14(a) (identifying mootness as one of the grounds for consideration). Second, the Court of Appeals faulted the Petitioner for causing additional delay by failing to seek an accelerated review of the juvenile court's ruling in the circuit court. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-1-159(a) (2005). [3] The Petitioner instead filed a petition under the Juvenile Post-Commitment Procedures Act and then appealed the circuit court's judgment under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-302 (2005). Section 37-1-302 allows a juvenile to seek the protections afforded under the Act even after the time for an appeal under section 37-1-159 has expired. The notice of appeal was filed more than one year before his nineteenth birthday and his appellate brief was served within five months of the notice. The State filed several requests for extensions before filing its briefs. Oral argument was postponed from February until April of 2006. The opinion of the Court of Appeals was released only fourteen days after the Petitioner had reached the age of nineteen. Under these circumstances, the Petitioner cannot be assigned any blame for choosing to seek relief under the Juvenile Post-Commitment Procedures Act.