Opinion ID: 1206069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues raised by defendant workman

Text: In his first assignment of error, defendant Workman argues that the trial court erred by granting the State's motion for joinder and by denying his motions for severance made prior to trial and during trial. Specifically, defendant Workman argues (1) that joinder of defendants' trials resulted in the exclusion of evidence critical to his theory of defense, and (2) that joinder of defendants' trials resulted in the admission of prejudicial evidence that could not have been offered had he been tried separately. We disagree. Charges brought separately against two or more defendants may be joined when the offenses charged: 1. Were part of a common scheme or plan; or 2. Were part of the same act or transaction; or 3. Were so closely connected in time, place, and occasion that it would be difficult to separate proof of one charge from proof of the others. N.C.G.S. § 15A-926(b)(2)(b)(1) to (3) (1988). While public policy is strongly in favor of consolidation, State v. Nelson, 298 N.C. 573, 260 S.E.2d 629 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929, 100 S.Ct. 1867, 64 L.Ed.2d 282 (1980), a motion for joinder must nevertheless be denied whenever it is necessary to ... a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of ... [a defendant]. N.C.G.S. § 15A-927(c)(2)(a) (1988). The decision to join cases for trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and [a]bsent a showing that a defendant has been deprived of a fair trial by joinder, the trial [court's] discretionary ruling on the question will not be disturbed. Nelson, 298 N.C. at 586, 260 S.E.2d at 640. Defendant concedes that joinder in this case was permissible under the statute. We must therefore determine whether the decision by the trial court to join defendants' trials deprived defendant Workman of a fair trial. First, defendant Workman argues that joinder of defendants' trials deprived him of a fair trial by excluding evidence critical to his theory of defense. Specifically, he argues that the trial court erred by refusing to allow his expert witness, Dr. Frank Wood, to testify that Workman had related, in an interview session, that on the day of the murder, it was defendant Shoffner who implanted a robbery/murder script in defendant Workman's mind. On direct examination, Dr. Wood testified that, in his opinion, Workman suffered from attention deficit disorder (ADD). Defendant Workman then attempted to elicit testimony from Dr. Wood regarding an event that occurred within the store that [Dr. Wood] found significant to [his] diagnosis. The State and defendant Shoffner objected, and the jury was sent out of the courtroom. Dr. Wood testified on voir dire that defendant Workman told him that defendant Shoffner suggested that they rob an establishment using the fish fillet knife and that if you rob a place, you can't have any witnesses. Dr. Wood further testified that defendant Workman rejected this idea. However, according to Dr. Wood, the screams of Shoffner and Mrs. Drake, and particularly defendant Shoffner's scream, acted as a triggering mechanism, causing defendant Workman to believe the robbery was taking place. In Dr. Wood's opinion, the combination of defendant Workman's ADD, aggravated by alcohol use, defendant Shoffner's scream and the robbery/murder script implanted in defendant Workman's mind by defendant Shoffner, rendered Workman unable to exercise any self-control and unable to plan or reflect upon his actions when he killed Mr. and Mrs. Drake. Following much discussion between the parties and the trial court, the court ruled: THE COURT: ... [Dr. Wood] may testify as to the screams without attributing them to anybody and he may testify as to robbery being in his mind, Mr. Workman's mind.... .... THE COURT: And then to his opinion and his opinion may deal with ... Workman's mental state, his mental processes and also his impulses and whether or not he would have self-control under those findings. Before the jury, Dr. Wood testified, in part, as follows: Q. Did you learn of something that occurred in the store when [defendant Workman] walked into the store that had an effect on him? A. Yes. Not when he walked in, after he had walked in and gone to the back. Q. Okay. And what was that? A. That he heard two screams. Q. And what effect, in your opinion, did that have on [defendant Workman's] mind when he heard those screams. A. I believe they made him panic and I believe that the reason they made him panic is that ... they made him think that the robbery had started. [DEFENSE COUNSEL FOR SHOFFNER]: Objection. Move to strike, Your Honor. THE COURT: Sustained. Members of the jury, disregard the last statement by the witness. Q. In your opinion, after [defendant Workman] heard the scream, what occurred in [his] mind? A. He panicked, in my opinion, and at that point was under such heavy arousal from that panic that he was unable to control himself and act voluntarily. Q. And how did the scream play into thatinto this arousal and his ability to control himself? A. It triggered an idea, an image, I would even say a script which had been deposited [DEFENSE COUNSEL FOR SHOFFNER]: Objection. A. in his mind THE COURT: Overruled. A. and the idea was to the effect that if stores get robbed, witnesses have to be [DEFENSE COUNSEL FOR SHOFFNER]: Objection. Motion to strike, Your Honor. THE COURT: Overruled. A. I'm not sure I got to finish. Q. Okay. Please finish your answer. A. The idea being that if stores do get rob[bed], witnesses have to be killed. Q. And in your opinion, do you have an opinion as to whether or not this idea originated in [defendant Workman's] mind? A. Yes. Q. And what is your opinion? A. My opinion is that that idea did not originate in [defendant Workman's] mind. From this evidentiary record, it is clear defendant Workman was able to present testimony from Dr. Wood to the jury to the effect that defendant Workman panicked and did not act voluntarily when he heard two screams inside Carlton's Grocery. Further, Dr. Wood was able to testify that these screams triggered a robbery/murder script that did not originate in defendant Workman's mind. The only evidence the jury was not permitted to hear was that defendant Workman identified defendant Shoffner as being the person who implanted the robbery/murder script in his mind. Defendant Workman, however, contends that the identity of the person responsible for implanting the robbery/murder script in his mind is admissible under Rule 705 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Rule of Evidence 705 provides that an expert may testify regarding his or her opinion without first disclosing the underlying facts or data, unless an adverse party requests otherwise.... The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 705 (1992). This Court has previously recognized that Rule 705 does not ... make the bases for an expert's opinion automatically admissible. State v. Baldwin, 330 N.C. 446, 456, 412 S.E.2d 31, 37 (1992). Only if an adverse party requests disclosure must the trial court require the expert to disclose the underlying facts of his opinion. Id. It is clear that the trial court's decision excluding the basis of Dr. Wood's opinion was correct. First, neither the State nor counsel for defendant Shoffner requested that Dr. Wood disclose the basis of his opinion. Second, defendant Workman's self-serving hearsay statements that the robbery/murder script was originated by defendant Shoffner were not inherently reliable, particularly since defendant Workman had informed the trial court that he would not testify on his own behalf and, therefore, was unavailable for cross-examination by either the State or defendant Shoffner. See Baldwin, 330 N.C. at 457, 412 S.E.2d at 37-38 (psychological expert not allowed to testify regarding the substance of any self-serving, exculpatory statements made by the defendant during interviews unless or until the defendant testifies regarding matters relating to those statements). Third, the exclusion of Dr. Wood's basis for his opinion did not deprive defendant of the full force of his defense. As the portions of Dr. Wood's testimony reproduced above amply demonstrate, the jury heard the complete substance of Workman's defense. The crux of Workman's defense, that the robbery/murder script originated somewhere other than defendant Workman's own mind, was relayed to the jury. Finally, defendant Workman himself acknowledged during the trial that the identity of the person who actually implanted the script into defendant's mind was not necessary to explain Dr. Wood's testimony when he stated, [T]he doctor doesn't have to say where [the script] came from, but it's crucial, Judge, that he says it didn't originate with [defendant Workman.] We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence regarding the identity of the person responsible for implanting the robbery/murder script in defendant Workman's mind. Finally, defendant Workman contends that joinder of defendants' trials resulted in the admission of prejudicial rebuttal evidence that could not have been offered had he been tried separately. Defendant Shoffner testified on his own behalf that he had no intent to rob anyone on the day of the murders. The State responded with the rebuttal testimony of Detective Randall Pitts, who indicated that the day after the murders, when defendant Shoffner made his statement to police, he stated that Workman had proposed that the two commit a robbery, and Shoffner said, Okay. Defendant Workman contends this rebuttal testimony was received in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), which prohibits the admission of incriminating statements made by nontestifying codefendants. We note first that this testimony was offered by the State in rebuttal. At that point in the trial, codefendant Shoffner had already testified and was available for cross-examination by codefendant Workman. Bruton therefore does not apply in this instance. Further, Rule 10 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that in order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must make a timely objection. See N.C.R.App.P. 10(b)(1). Defendant Workman did not voice an objection, on any grounds, to the elicited testimony he now contends was improper and prejudicial; thus, he has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. Even alleged errors arising under the Constitution of the United States are waived if defendant does not raise them in the trial court. State v. Jaynes, 342 N.C. 249, 263, 464 S.E.2d 448, 457 (1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 2563, 135 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1996). Defendant Workman has waived appellate review of this issue by failing specifically and distinctly to argue plain error as required by Rule 10(c)(4) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, we overrule defendant Workman's first assignment of error. In his second assignment of error, defendant Workman contends he was deprived of his constitutional right to be present during a stage of his capital trial. This constitutional deprivation, according to defendant Workman, arises from the fact that various venires of jurors were preliminarily sworn, oriented and qualified generally for jury service by a deputy clerk of court in a jury assembly room outside defendant Workman's presence. Defendant Workman notes further that no court reporter was present during these proceedings to record the events as they transpired. The Confrontation Clause in Article I, Section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution guarantees an accused the right to be present in person at every stage of his trial. State v. Payne, 320 N.C. 138, 139, 357 S.E.2d 612, 612 (1987). This right to be present extends to all times during the trial when anything is said or done which materially affects defendant as to the charge against him. State v. Chapman, 342 N.C. 330, 337-38, 464 S.E.2d 661, 665 (1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 2560, 135 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1996). A defendant's right to be present during all stages of his capital trial is a nonwaivable right, Payne, 320 N.C. at 139, 357 S.E.2d at 612, and we have imposed a duty upon the trial court to insure a defendant's presence throughout the trial, id. The violation of this right is subject to a harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt standard of review. State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 381 S.E.2d 635 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 497 U.S. 1021, 110 S.Ct. 3266, 111 L.Ed.2d 777 (1990). The record reveals, and defendant Workman himself acknowledges in his brief on this point, that defendant Workman's case was called for trial 24 January 1994. It is quite clear that defendant Workman was present when jury selection began for his trial: [DEFENDANT WORKMAN'S COUNSEL]: Oh, one other matter, Your Honor. During jury selection when the time comes for the lawyers to introduce themselves, we would ... like to let our client stand up and introduce himself to the jury. Does the [c]ourt have any problem with that? THE COURT: Yes, I do. The [c]ourt will be introducing all parties. Any other matters? Well, due to the time, only about 15 minutes before the lunch break, I think we'll wait and start at two o'clock and have the jurors brought up at that time and begin the jury selection process at that point rather than bring them up here and send them to lunch. Does everyone agree with that? [DEFENDANT SHOFFNER'S COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Any other matters before we take the lunch recess? Okay. The court will be in recess until two o'clock. (A noon recess was taken.) (The defendants are present in the courtroom.) (The prospective jurors were brought into the courtroom.) THE COURT: I'd like to extend a welcome to those of you who are here for jury service. We're very pleased to have you here this afternoon. Very shortly we're going to begin the jury trial of a couple of criminal cases and these cases are being consolidated for one trial ... and I'm going to be talking to you a little bit about the cases and you need to listen very carefully. Defendant's right to be present at all stages of his trial does not include the right to be present during preliminary handling of the jury venires before defendant's own case has been called. See State v. Rannels, 333 N.C. 644, 430 S.E.2d 254 (1993); State v. Cole, 331 N.C. 272, 415 S.E.2d 716 (1992). Defendant Workman had no right to be present when prospective jurors were preliminarily sworn, oriented and qualified for jury service in general, without regard to any particular case or trial. Further, because defendant Workman's trial had not yet commenced, these proceedings could not have been conducted during a stage of defendant Workman's capital trial. Defendant Workman further argues under this assignment of error that N.C.G.S. § 15A-1211(b) was violated because a deputy clerk of court, rather than the trial court, allegedly examined the basic qualifications of the prospective jurors. It is true that the trial court must decide all challenges to the panel and all questions concerning the competency of jurors. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1211(b) (1988). However, this statute further provides that while a defendant may make a challenge to the jury panel, the challenge: (1) May be made only on the ground that the jurors were not selected or drawn according to law. (2) Must be in writing. (3) Must specify the facts constituting the ground of challenge. (4) Must be made and decided before any juror is examined. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1211(c). In the case sub judice, defendant Workman never followed this specific procedure. Indeed, the record reflects that defendant never challenged the jury panel selection process and never once voiced to the trial court any objection to the allegedly improper handling of the jury venires prior to the call of his case for trial before a jury. In light of the fact that defendant failed to follow the procedures clearly set out for jury panel challenges and further failed, in any manner, to alert the trial court to the alleged improprieties, we hold this portion of this assignment of error is without merit. This assignment of error is overruled. Lastly, defendant Workman argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the admission of cowboy boots, a T-shirt and blue jeans seized from defendant Workman's trailer. Defendant Workman filed a pretrial motion to suppress this evidence, arguing that police entry into his trailer to effectuate his arrest was unlawful as it was allegedly made without reasonable cause to believe he was present inside the trailer as required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-401(e)(1)(b). The trial court concluded as a matter of law that officers had probable cause to believe that defendant was inside the trailer and that the entry into the trailer was not in violation of defendant Workman's constitutional rights. The trial court further concluded as a matter of law that the discovery of the cowboy boots and the T-shirt was the result of Detective Pitts seeing them in plain view, that Detective Pitts had a right to be in the trailer after making a lawful entry and that their discovery was inadvertent. Therefore, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress those items. The trial court did, however, grant defendant's motion to suppress as to the blue jeans. We find no error in the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress with regard to the cowboy boots and T-shirt. Entry into a private premises by police in order to make an arrest is governed by N.C.G.S. § 15A-401(e)(1) and (2). This statute provides in part: (1) A law-enforcement officer may enter private premises or a vehicle to effect an arrest when: a. The officer has in his possession a warrant or order for the arrest of a person or is authorized to arrest a person without a warrant or order having been issued, b. The officer has reasonable cause to believe the person to be arrested is present, and c. The officer has given, or made reasonable effort to give, notice of his authority and purpose to an occupant thereof, unless there is reasonable cause to believe that the giving of such notice would present a clear danger to human life. (2) The law-enforcement officer may use force to enter the premises or vehicle if he reasonably believes that admittance is being denied or unreasonably delayed, or if he is authorized ... to enter without giving notice of his authority and purpose. N.C.G.S. § 15A-401(e)(1), (2) (1988) (emphasis added). In the present case, defendant Workman only argues that the trial court's conclusion that officers had reasonable cause to believe defendant Workman was inside the trailer was erroneous. Defendant Workman argues that because his car was not at the trailer when officers arrived to execute the arrest warrant, the officers did not have reasonable cause to believe defendant Workman was inside the trailer. We disagree. The trial court's findings of fact provide ample evidence from which to conclude that the officers had reasonable cause to believe defendant Workman was inside his trailer when they entered. The trial court found as fact that defendant Shoffner met with Detective Pitts and made statements implicating himself and defendant Workman in the attempted robbery of Carlton's Grocery. Defendant Shoffner stated that defendant Workman cut the throats of both victims. Defendant Shoffner led Detective Pitts to the approximate area where the knife used in the murders was thrown, and it was recovered. Defendant Shoffner took Detective Pitts down a dead-end road and pointed out defendant Workman's trailer; defendant Shoffner identified a blue Monte Carlo parked in front of the trailer as belonging to defendant Workman. Detective Pitts dispatched three officers to defendant Workman's trailer with instructions to stay out of sight and to watch the road to see if defendant Workman left in his car. Detective Pitts and Detective Millard Shepherd then obtained an arrest warrant for defendant Workman on two counts of first-degree murder. At approximately 11:30 p.m., after obtaining the arrest warrant, officers noticed that lights were on inside the trailer; although Detective Pitts did not notice defendant Workman's car, the officers sent by Detective Pitts to watch the trailer indicated that they did not observe anyone leave the trailer. As Detective Pitts approached the trailer, he heard noises inside. After waiting approximately three minutes after the officers' presence and purpose were announced, officers entered the trailer. While looking for Workman, Detective Pitts observed, in plain view, a pair of cowboy boots and a T-shirt with blood on them. Detective Pitts then secured a search warrant for the trailer. Under these facts and circumstances, the officers had reasonable cause to believe that defendant Workman was inside his trailer at 11:30 p.m. on a Sunday night, when lights were on inside the trailer and noises were heard inside. Further, no officer stationed outside the trailer, for the express purpose of watching the trailer to see if Workman left, saw anyone leave. Based upon the trial court's findings of fact, it properly concluded that the officers did not make an unlawful entry into the trailer requiring suppression of the T-shirt and cowboy boots seen in plain view and later seized pursuant to a search warrant. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.