Opinion ID: 2032509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: County Clerk's Authority

Text: On appeal, the collector asserts that the subject to language in section 16 does not change substantively the legislative aspects of tax collection. The collector argues that section 16 merely allows the county clerk increased authority in accepting the filing of a levy ordinance after the levy has already been made. The collector cites In re Collector's Application for Judgment for Taxes Paid Under Protest for the Year 1988 (1992), 223 Ill.App.3d 896, 166 Ill.Dec. 79, 585 N.E.2d 1101 (hereinafter, Crosfield Chemicals ), as deciding the construction issue here. The collector asserts that the term subject to is susceptible of several ordinary meanings and, depending on its context, can indicate a subordination of rights, an imposition of liability, or a conditional promise. The collector argues that the term can also indicate simply a subsequent and nonsubordinating condition as is the case in real estate transfers where a conveyance is stated as subject to a mortgage or a lien of taxes. See Life Savings & Loan Association of America v. Bryant (1984), 125 Ill.App.3d 1012, 81 Ill.Dec. 577, 467 N.E.2d 277. The collector refers to the statutory construction principle requiring the harmonization of statutes relating to the same subject so as to give effect to their presumed legislative intent. (See Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm'n (1990), 139 Ill.2d 24, 52, 150 Ill.Dec. 578, 563 N.E.2d 465.) The collector contends that the Debt Reform Act was intended to allow taxing districts a degree of timing flexibility in the sale and issuance of bonds so that they might financially benefit by obtaining lower interest rates. The collector claims that, with the Act, certain pre-Act avoidance practices by taxing districts are no longer necessary. The objectors respond by rejecting the construction of section 16 adopted in Crosfield Chemicals. They assert simply that the subject to language of section 16 makes both the creation of a levy and the filing of the ordinance dependent on the county clerk's agreement. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, a reviewing court must first ascertain the statute's meaning by applying ordinary rules of construction and then decide whether, as construed, the statute comports with constitutional requirements. In interpreting a statute, the primary rule of construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature. (See Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar (1990), 138 Ill.2d 178, 189, 149 Ill.Dec. 286, 561 N.E.2d 656.) Courts should look to the language of the statute as the best indication of legislative intent, giving the terms of the statute their ordinary meaning. (See Opyt's Amoco, 149 Ill.2d at 277, 172 Ill.Dec. 390, 595 N.E.2d 1060.) Whenever possible, each word or phrase in a challenged statute is to be given some reasonable meaning. ( Opyt's Amoco, 149 Ill.2d at 277, 172 Ill.Dec. 390, 595 N.E.2d 1060.) Where the meaning of a statute is unclear from the statutory language itself, a court may look beyond the language employed and consider the purpose of the law and the evils the law was designed to remedy. See Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc. (1994), 158 Ill.2d 76, 196 Ill.Dec. 655, 630 N.E.2d 820. If there is doubt as to the construction to be given a legislative enactment, the doubt must be resolved in favor of an interpretation which supports the statute's validity (see Rehg v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 152 Ill.2d at 512, 178 Ill.Dec. 731, 605 N.E.2d 525); statutes will be construed to avoid an unconstitutional result (see Sayles v. Thompson (1983), 99 Ill.2d 122, 75 Ill.Dec. 446, 457 N.E.2d 440). Statutes should also be construed in conjunction with other statutes addressing the same subject. People v. Badoud (1988), 122 Ill.2d 50, 55, 118 Ill.Dec. 407, 521 N.E.2d 884. Additionally, in construing statutes relating to the levying and collection of taxes, this court has sought to give them a reasonable and commonsense meaning, so as to avoid making it difficult or impossible for taxes to be levied and collected. People ex rel. Nash v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. (1935), 359 Ill. 435, 439, 194 N.E. 560. The term subject to has a number of ordinary meanings depending on context. Subject to may mean either contingent or conditional upon, or it may also mean exposed to. (See Websters New World Dictionary of the American Language 1417 (2d coll. ed. 1974).) The term is described as likely to be conditioned, affected, or modified in some indicated way or having a contingent relation to something and [usually] dependent on such relation for final form, validity, or significance. (See Websters Third New International Dictionary 2275 (1993).) From these sources, it is clear that the term usually is indicative of a subordinate relationship, but that it can also denote a nonsubordinate or equivalent relationship which is merely qualified in some manner. Accordingly, the term, as used in section 16, does not necessarily indicate that the levy process is subordinate to or dependent upon an agreement of the county clerk to accept the filing of the ordinance. While, clearly, the term establishes some manner of relationship between levying and the agreement of the county clerk, the relationship is better considered by examining context. Under the doctrine of the last antecedent, relative or qualifying words or phrases in a statute serve only to modify words or phrases which are immediately preceding and do not modify those which are more remote. (See City of Mount Carmel v. Partee (1979), 74 Ill.2d 371, 24 Ill.Dec. 546, 385 N.E.2d 687; People v. Thomas (1970), 45 Ill.2d 68, 256 N.E.2d 794.) Applying this doctrine, it is a governmental unit's tax levying for the payment of bond indebtedness at any time before bonds are issued which is qualified by a county clerk's agreement to accept the filing of an ordinance at that time. More importantly, however, the subsequent term within the provision, notwithstanding that such time, refers specifically to the previously stated time frame, at any time, when the particular levy is made and its related ordinance filed. This subsequent term serves to limit the county clerk's opportunities for agreeing to accept filing to only those instances where the attempted filing time is beyond the usual date for closure of the tax books. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 120, par. 643. The appellate court in Crosfield Chemicals similarly construed the language of section 16 with relation to the timing of filing. The clerk's only decision was whether the tax levy has been filed prior to the finalizing of the tax books   . ( Crosfield Chemicals, 223 Ill.App.3d at 901, 166 Ill.Dec. 79, 585 N.E.2d 1101.) Crosfield Chemicals did not adhere to the literal language in construing section 16, but relied on a reasonable construction of the provision in light of the general purposes and objects of the legislation. (See Crosfield Chemicals, 223 Ill. App.3d at 899, 166 Ill.Dec. 79, 585 N.E.2d 1101.) Crosfield Chemicals also considered other statutes which addressed the clerk's role in the tax collection process. (See Crosfield Chemicals, 223 Ill.App.3d at 899, 166 Ill.Dec. 79, 585 N.E.2d 1101.) Because section 16 is less than clear, we engage in similar analysis. The purposes of the Debt Reform Act are expressed in section 2 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 17, par. 6902). In section 2, the General Assembly expressed its findings that there had been significant change in the bond market and its practices, concerning the issuance of local governmental bonds, and that various inconsistent and outdated Illinois laws resulted in higher costs to governmental units due to the sale and issuance of bonds at unnecessarily high rates. The General Assembly therefore found it advisable and in the best interests of residents of local governmental units to provide supplemental authority regarding the issuance and sale of bonds to accommodate such market practices and the provisions of current federal income tax law. Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 17, par. 6902(d). The Revenue Act of 1939 provides the procedural framework for the levying, valuation, assessment, extension and collection of property taxes by local governmental units. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 120, par. 482 et seq.) The Revenue Act also prescribes the duties, responsibilities and role of the county clerk in that process. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 120, pars. 608 through 610.1, 638.) The Illinois Municipal Code provides the actual authority for municipalities to levy taxes (Ill. Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 24, par. 8-3-1), and to issue bonds payable with taxes (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 24, par. 8-4-1). Similarly, the Park District Code provides the authority for park districts to levy taxes (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 105, par. 5-1), and the School Code provides authority for schools to levy taxes for general purposes (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 122, pars. 17-1, 17-2) and to pay indebtedness on bonds (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 122, par. 19-12). Section 16 of the Local Government Debt Reform Act provides supplemental authority to such local governmental units to collect taxes for the payment of general obligation bonds. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 17, par. 6916.) Section 16 prescribes the role of the county clerk in this process. As such, even though debt-service levies constitute a procedure separate and distinct from the annual levy ( Board of Education of Township High School District No. 211 v. Kusper (1982), 92 Ill.2d 333, 338, 65 Ill.Dec. 868, 442 N.E.2d 179), the Revenue Act and section 16 are in pari materia and may be construed together to determine the intent of the legislature. ( Cf. People ex rel. Joseph v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. (1959), 18 Ill.2d 61, 162 N.E.2d 350 (section 638 of Revenue Act and section 17-11 of the School Code construed together).) Illinois common law also speaks to the intended scheme of property taxation. A local governmental unit vested with the power to tax is charged with the duty of ascertaining and fixing the sum of money necessary for its purposes, and its action in ordering or directing that such sum be raised constitutes the levy. ( People ex rel. Carr v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. (1925), 316 Ill. 410, 413-14, 147 N.E. 492; see also People ex rel. Haas v. Amax Zinc Co. (1984), 130 Ill.App.3d 580, 585, 85 Ill.Dec. 764, 474 N.E.2d 724 (tax levy occurs at time that levy ordinance or resolution is passed or adopted by local taxing body).) The time required by statute for making tax levies is mandatory. (See People ex rel. Joseph v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 18 Ill.2d at 63, 162 N.E.2d 350; People ex rel. Ward v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Ry. Co. (1936), 365 Ill. 202, 206, 6 N.E.2d 119.) Consequently, at the point that a levy ordinance or a copy of the levy is presented for filing to the county clerk, the act of levying by the local governmental unit is complete. Moreover, any error or informality of an officer in making, certifying or filing the levy which does not affect the substantial justice of the levy does not vitiate or avoid the levy. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 120, par. 717. After a tax is once levied or imposed, i.e., ordered to be laid,further proceedings, such as extending, assessing and collecting the tax, are administrative. ( People ex rel. Carr v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co., 316 Ill. at 414, 147 N.E. 492.) The county clerk extends taxes where the levy is complete.    The duties which he is required to perform in the extension of taxes are prescribed by law, and are neither legislative nor judicial but purely ministerial in character. ( People ex rel. Carr v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co., 316 Ill. at 414, 147 N.E. 492.) A county clerk has no power to levy taxes or determine whether taxes have been legally assessed; his duties in the extension of taxes are purely ministerial. ( City of Rockford v. Gill (1979), 75 Ill.2d 334, 342, 26 Ill.Dec. 669, 388 N.E.2d 384.) The county clerk's duty is to fix the amount of taxes that will be extended. (See People ex rel. Toman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. (1941), 377 Ill. 547, 37 N.E.2d 169.) It is the levy which creates the tax, and the extension by the county clerk is merely a formal step necessary to enable the authorities to collect the tax. People ex rel. Loehr v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. (1922), 301 Ill. 541, 547, 134 N.E. 314. The filing of ordinances and resolutions directing extension of the tax levy is jurisdictional and authorizes the county clerk to act. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 120, par. 643; People ex rel. Chamberlain v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. (1943), 383 Ill. 212, 216, 49 N.E.2d 19.) Failure of the governmental unit to file the required documents directing the extension of taxes authorizes the county clerk to refuse to extend the levy until such filing occurs. (See Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 120, par. 643.) However, any error or informality in certifying or filing the levy documents not affecting the substantial justice of the levy may be corrected by subsequent amendment. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 120, par. 717; People ex rel. Davis v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. (1971), 48 Ill.2d 176, 268 N.E.2d 411. Pursuant to the Revenue Act, the county clerk has a duty to honor the levy ordinance and may extend only those taxes which are legally authorized. ( People ex rel. Carter v. Touchette (1955), 5 Ill.2d 303, 306, 125 N.E.2d 473; see also Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 120, pars. 643, 644; People ex rel. Village of Inverness v. Barrett (1962), 38 Ill.App.2d 334, 187 N.E.2d 349.) A county clerk may not refuse to extend the levy in a legally authorized amount on the ground that the levy is void for failure to comply with statutorily prescribed procedures. ( City of Rockford, 75 Ill.2d at 342, 26 Ill.Dec. 669, 388 N.E.2d 384.) However, the refusal of the county clerk to either extend taxes ( People ex rel. Village of Inverness, 38 Ill.App.2d 334, 187 N.E.2d 349), or his inadvertent failure to extend taxes on certain property ( People ex rel. Loehr v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. (1922), 301 Ill. 541, 547, 134 N.E. 314) does not vitiate the tax levy. If a tax is prevented from being collected for any year because of an omission, error or other cause, the taxable amount due may be added to the following year's taxes. Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 120, par. 703. County clerks begin the process of extending taxes by preparing the collector's books (applying final multiplier as certified by Department of Revenue, after receipt of assessments from the county's board of review or board of appeals and application of an equalizer factor received from the Department of Revenue). (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 120, pars. 639 through 654.) County clerks have discretion to add small amounts for uncollectible taxes before calculating the tax rate. The actual percentage rests in the county clerk's discretion. People ex rel. Nash v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. (1935), 361 Ill. 248, 197 N.E. 758. The Revenue Act further provides that the clerks shall deliver the tax collection books to the collectors by December 31 or as soon thereafter as the collectors are duly qualified. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 120, par. 653.) This court has expressly declined to hold that the statute's command to deliver the tax books on the date specified is one which is mandatory. ( People ex rel. Ward v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Ry. Co., 365 Ill. at 206, 6 N.E.2d 119.) While, as mentioned previously, failure to certify or file a tax levy ordinance by the time specified for filing is not fatal, tax levy ordinances must be filed by the time that the county clerk closes the tax collection books. ( People ex rel. Euziere v. Rice (1937), 290 Ill.App. 514, 8 N.E.2d 683.) With delivery of the books, the county clerks certify the tax rates for the various districts to the county and town collectors. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 120, par. 654.) Taxes are not due until the tax books are delivered into the hands of the collectors. Sexton v. Sikking (1900), 90 Ill.App. 667. Considering the purposes of the Debt Reform Act, the tax collection scheme of the Revenue Act, the prescribed duties of the county clerk, and case law interpreting the scheme as well as the clerk's duties, section 16 may be reasonably construed as follows. A governmental unit may levy a tax for the payment of bond indebtedness at any time before the bonds are issued, but the county clerk may decide whether to extend the tax for the next collection when the usual time has passed for closing and delivering the tax books. Further, we conclude that, as construed, section 16 does not authorize encroachment by the county clerk into legislative processes. Clearly, the act of filing the levy ordinance does not affect substantively a governmental unit's authority in levying. Concomitantly, a county clerk's decision to accept the filing of the levy ordinance, tantamount to accepting jurisdiction to extend the tax, could not intrude the clerk into the legislative process of levying the tax. We find no constitutional infirmity on this basis.