Opinion ID: 167660
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Scarborough v. United States

Text: 59 Although the body armor statute does not fit within any of the Lopez categories, it is supported by the pre- Lopez precedent of Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977), which held that Congress intended a felon-in-possession statute to prohibit possession of any firearm that had moved in interstate commerce. Scarborough decided only a question of statutory interpretation about a previous version of the felon-in-possession statute, but the decision assumed that Congress could constitutionally regulate the possession of firearms solely because they had previously moved across state lines. See Brent E. Newton, Felons, Firearms, and Federalism: Reconsidering Scarborough in Light of Lopez, 3 J.App. Practice & Process 671, 674 (2001). 60 The constitutional understanding implicit in Scarborough — that Congress may regulate any firearm that has ever traversed state lines — has been repeatedly adopted for felon-in-possession statutes by this Court. In United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396 (10th Cir.1995), we announced without fanfare that the post- Lopez jurisdictional hook in § 922(g) was enough to ensure constitutionality. Id. at 400 (Section 922(g)'s requirement that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce is sufficient to establish its constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. (internal quotation marks omitted)). In United States v. Farnsworth, 92 F.3d 1001, 1006 (10th Cir.1996), following Bolton, we rejected an as-applied challenge and found it sufficient that the defendant's gun had been manufactured in a different state from that in which it was found. 92 F.3d at 1006. Most recently, in United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582 (10th Cir.2000), we considered a challenge based not only on Lopez but also on Morrison and Jones. In rejecting the challenge, we based our holding squarely on Scarborough and on our own line of precedents, even though in dicta we described § 922(g)(1) as a regulation of items sent in interstate commerce, and the channels of commerce themselves. Dorris, 236 F.3d at 584-86 (calling Scarborough a case in which the Supreme Court passed on the very question Mr. Dorris presents us and noting that [t]his Court has twice considered § 922(g)(1)'s post- Lopez constitutionality in Bolton and Farnsworth ). 61 Other circuits have similarly continued to follow Scarborough, though some have expressed doubts about its continuing validity. See, e.g., United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir.2003) (considering Scarborough to be unaltered by Jones ); United States v. Lemons, 302 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir.2002) (noting ample Seventh Circuit precedent upholding § 922(g)(1) because of its jurisdictional hook and suggesting that if Lopez undercuts this approach, it is for the Supreme Court to so hold); United States v. Cortes, 299 F.3d 1030, 1037 n. 2 (9th Cir.2002) (noting that doubts have been raised but choosing, [u]ntil the Supreme Court tells us otherwise, to follow Scarborough unwaveringly); United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997, 1004 (5th Cir.1997) (evenly divided court en banc) (Higginbotham, J.) (upholding § 922(o), the ban on possession of machine guns, but relying on the third Lopez category instead of the more expansive approach in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971), a predecessor case to Scarborough, and noting that [i]t is not for us to say that Bass cannot survive Lopez ); id. at 1016 n. 25 (Jones, J.) (finding the statute unconstitutional under the three Lopez categories yet noting that [w]e are not at liberty to question Scarborough, despite its tension with Lopez ); United States v. Smith, 101 F.3d 202, 215 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that Scarborough, not Lopez, applies to statutes with a jurisdictional hook); United States v. Kuban, 94 F.3d 971, 973 n. 4 (5th Cir.1996) (noting the powerful argument against the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) but regarding Scarborough as barring the way for an inferior federal court); id. at 976-78 (DeMoss, J., dissenting in part) (distinguishing the statute in Scarborough and finding its holding in fundamental and irreconcilable conflict with the rationale of Lopez ); United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 571 (6th Cir.1996) (following Scarborough ); id. at 577-82, 97 S.Ct. 1963 (Batchelder, J., concurring) (distinguishing Scarborough because it did not reach the constitutional question, concluding that despite its jurisdictional hook § 922(g)(1) fits none of the Lopez categories, but nevertheless concurring because of prior Sixth Circuit precedent); United States v. Shelton, 66 F.3d 991, 992 (8th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (following Scarborough ); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 587-88 & n. 28 (3d Cir.1995) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2119, a carjacking statute, because of its jurisdictional hook and noting that until the Supreme Court is more explicit on the relationship between Lopez and Scarborough a lower court is not at liberty to overrule existing Supreme Court precedent); id. at 593-97 & n. 13 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority for relying on Scarborough, which was devoid of any Commerce Clause analysis, and insisting that a jurisdictional hook could make an application of a statute constitutional only if it also fell within one of the three Lopez categories); but see United States v. Luna, 165 F.3d 316, 321 n. 16 (5th Cir.1999) (noting the uncertainty surrounding the application of Scarborough  and instead basing its holding on the Lopez categories). 62 The two courts outside this Circuit that have considered the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 931 have taken a similar approach. One found the question controlled by Scarborough and Third Circuit precedents upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). See United States v. Kitsch, 307 F.Supp.2d 657, 660-61 (E.D.Pa.2004). The other relied on Sixth Circuit precedents upholding § 922(g), the presence of the jurisdictional hook, and the persuasive authority of Kitsch. See United States v. Marler, 402 F.Supp.2d 852, 854-55 (N.D.Ohio 2005). 63 Because Mr. Patton's bulletproof vest moved across state lines at some point in its existence, Congress may regulate it under Scarborough, even though it does not fall within any of the three categories the Court now recognizes for Commerce Clause authority. The prohibition on possessing body armor cannot be distinguished from the prohibitions on possessing firearms that we have upheld. As noted above, firearms are more broadly regulated than body armor. But in Bolton, Farnsworth, and Dorris this Court never treated the constitutionality of the firearm statutes as turning on the scope of the regulatory scheme. Consequently, this difference between body armor and firearms is not relevant under the Scarborough line of analysis. Following our precedent, we conclude that 18 U.S.C. § 931 does not exceed congressional power under the Commerce Clause. 64 Like our sister circuits, we see considerable tension between Scarborough and the three-category approach adopted by the Supreme Court in its recent Commerce Clause cases, and like our sister circuits, we conclude that we are bound by Scarborough, which was left intact by Lopez. Even if we were not persuaded that Scarborough remains the case which directly controls, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997), we would still be compelled to follow its reasoning by prior decisions of this Court, which have continued to adhere to Scarborough despite Lopez and the subsequent cases. See Bolton, 68 F.3d at 400; Farnsworth, 92 F.3d at 1006; Dorris, 236 F.3d at 584-86. Any doctrinal inconsistency between Scarborough and the Supreme Court's more recent decisions is not for this Court to remedy. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 237, 117 S.Ct. 1997. We suspect the Supreme Court will revisit this issue in an appropriate case — maybe even this one.