Opinion ID: 1308212
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Events Between Judge Waters' Award and the Motion to Alter or Amend

Text: When Herrmann expressed discontent over Judge Waters' award to Flangas and Ross, it does not appear the attorneys were intractable. The record reflects that after negotiations, Flangas executed and delivered to respondent's attorney, Martillaro, a letter reciting as follows: December 5, 1973 Carl Martillaro Attorney at Law 308 North Curry Carson City, Nevada Re: Herrmann Estate Dear Carl: This is to inform you that the absent heir attorney fee in the above entitled estate will be discounted to the sum of $25,000.00 if paid on or before the 20th day of December, 1973. April 1974 P.L.F. Sincerely, Peter L. Flangas PETER L. FLANGAS As this document shows, Flangas initially agreed to discount the awarded fee to $25,000, if it was paid on or before December 20, 1973. Later, as a result of further negotiations, Flangas amended the letter agreement in hand-writing, by striking the words December and 1973, substituting the words April and 1974, and initialing the changes. (The handwritten entries are reflected in italics, above.) Then, believing the amended letter to be worthy of official memorialization, Martillaro or Herrmann caused it to be filed in the Herrmann Estate proceeding on December 26, 1973. It is on record there, file-stamped December 26, 1973, by the Deputy Clerk, Kathryn Sheehy. April 20, 1974, came and went, and Herrmann failed to pay Flangas and Ross $25,000 or, indeed, anything at all. [6] He failed to pay other Estate creditors. Indeed, although respondent Herrmann found sufficient liquid assets to finance sprees of drinking and high-stakes gambling, he paid his sisters nothing on their specific bequests. [7] Even after Mr. Herrmann failed to pay Flangas the discounted sum of $25,000 by the negotiated deadline of April 20, 1974, Flangas and Ross did not press him aggressively on their own behalf. It appears, however, that the decedent's daughters pressed Flangas both by telephone and by letter to expedite payment of their bequests. [8] Informal demands on Herrmann and his attorney proved futile. Accordingly, on May 16, 1974, Flangas filed a petition which recited Herrmann's failure to pay the special bequests to the sisters, and Flangas asked the court to protect his clients by an order directing Herrmann to show cause why he should not be removed, or why sanctions should not be imposed. At this point in time, Flangas requested no relief whatever on behalf of himself and Ross. [9] Judge Waters' successor entered an order to show cause, which Flangas had submitted to him, directing Herrmann to appear in court on July 3, 1974, and to explain why sanctions should not be imposed. The record indicates that when Herrmann appeared, he did not contend that he was ignorant of Judge Waters' order, or that Judge Waters' order was otherwise unenforceable. Rather, he sought to excuse his non-performance by claiming he lacked available cash. Thereupon, Judge Waters' successor granted Flangas and Ross leave to file another petition after six months if Herrmann remained in default of his duties. Herrmann did remain in default, failing either to pay the cash legacies to the nonresident heirs, or to pay the fees and costs of administration encompassed by Judge Waters' order. Accordingly, when six months had elapsed, Flangas and Ross filed a petition to compel distribution and pay fees, on February 12, 1975. It was out of these proceedings, initiated by Flangas and Ross, that attempts to impeach Judge Waters' judgment in their favor eventually evolved. On February 12, 1975, Judge Waters' successor entered an order directing respondent Herrmann to appear in court on February 26, 1975, to show cause why he should not forthwith obey that certain Order of this Court entered November 29, 1973, by distributing the assets of the estate of Walter E. Herrmann, deceased to the legatees and paying the fees ordered. The matter at issue, i.e., how to rectify Herrmann's defaults under the terms of Judge Waters' order, was not resolved on that date, however. It apparently was established on February 26 that, in addition to failing to pay the special bequests, fees and other debts, Herrmann was remiss in regard to various matters, such as filing accounts. Therefore, Judge Waters' successor ordered respondent Herrmann to render an accounting to the court on March 26, 1975, together with a liquidation plan as an addendum. The successor judge also continued until March 26 the hearing on the petition of Flangas and Ross to compel distribution and pay fees. When Herrmann and his counsel appeared on March 26, they attempted to suggest that Judge Waters' award of fees had been compromised by agreement down to the sum of $25,000. Somewhat inconsistently, they also attempted to re-shape the hearing from one initiated to consider Herrmann's defaults into one challenging the validity of Judge Waters' award of fees. Judge Waters' successor repeatedly repulsed such efforts, stating inter alia: The Executor could have appealed Judge Waters' determination of fees back in 1973. The appeal time has run, and you are attempting to, in effect, go behind a judgment, Mr. Martillaro. Later, while examining Mr. Flangas as a witness, Mr. Martillaro once more attempted to question the value of his services. Again, Judge Waters' successor stated: The Trial Court has done everything that it was required to do through Judge Waters, that is in settling the issues. From there you would go to the Supreme Court. This court has acted. Subsequently, on April 11, 1975, Martillaro filed a document entitled Motion to Amend or Alter the Order of November 29, 1973. By its terms, this motion was not filed on behalf of Ralph Herrmann, but instead was purportedly filed on behalf of Ruth Fern Estep and Fern Herrmann. Notably, however, no substitution of attorneys designating Martillaro as counsel for Estep or the other non-resident heirs, in place of Flangas and Ross, was ever filed  even though NRS 155.140 explicitly imposed on Flangas and Ross continuing status as counsel for the non-resident heirs. The record does not reveal why Mr. Martillaro purported to proceed on behalf of persons other than his own client, Ralph Herrmann. Whatever the reason may have been, his motion invoked the names of surrogate movants, and it was but sparsely supported by legal citations. The attached brief of Points and Authorities consisted only of references to NRCP Rule 52(b); NRAP Rule 4; In Re Hansen's Estate, 50 Nev. 16, 248 P. 891 (1926); and Bowman v. Bowman, 27 Nev. 413, 76 P. 634 (1904). Later in this opinion, we will critique such authorities  which are distinctly not controlling. Reply points and authorities were duly filed on behalf of Flangas and Ross, citing cases we will also review later. Events After the Motion to Alter or Amend, Culminating in the Disqualification of the Successor Judge and in Judge McKibben's Assumption of Jurisdiction The successor judge did nothing reflected by the official court file for some 4½ months. [10] Then, on August 27, 1975, he entered a Memorandum of Decision and Orders, which declared: The following matters, but not limited thereto, should appropriately be reviewed and, where and if applicable, be reconsidered: (1) All attorneys fees, in light of the time and hours, travel, expenses, manners in which the Estate may have benefitted [sic] from the services rendered, and what ordinary and extraordinary services might have been rendered by respective counsel; (2) the Executors [sic] fee in light of his services rendered in detail, with reference to any ordinary and extraordinary services rendered; (3) the matter of the Federal Estate Taxes; (4) the matter of the satisfaction of the legacies; (5) the status of the several law suits pending; (6) the payment of the Appraisers, and any other expenses of the Estate, perhaps not herein specifically referred to; (7) the status and disposition of the Testimentary Trust; and (8) the status of any credits or debits or liabilities of the Estate. The document then concluded with a purported order, which recited, inter alia: That all counsel and the Executor will file with the Clerk of the Court within twenty (20) days from the date hereof separate Petitions for Compensation and Cost Reimbursement. In addition to setting forth the amount which the Court is requested to allow, the Petition(s) shall contain by attachment or otherwise, specific and detailed information supporting the entitlement for such amount, including time and hours, dates of rendition of services, the nature of services rendered, results achieved which have directly benefitted [sic] the Estate, (or client  see NRS 150.060(3), and such other information considered to be relevant and material to the question of compensation and cost reimbursement. Flangas and Ross challenged such order by a petition to this court, seeking a writ of prohibition, which we denied on the ground that our intervention by way of extraordinary writ was unwarranted. A denial so grounded is never treated as an adjudication on the merits, but constitutes merely a determination that propriety of the questioned action can await review by appeal, in the ordinary course. However, the successor judge treated our order as one to be implemented by even broader orders of his own, and on December 17, 1975, he proceeded to file a document entitled Orders Incidental to Supreme Court's Denial of Writ of Prohibition. Therein, inter alia, he directed as follows: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Executor's counsel CARL F. MARTILLARO, ESQ., and co-counsel for absent heirs JOHN TOM ROSS, ESQ., and PETER L. FLANGAS, ESQ., file with the Clerk of the Court within thirty (30) days from the date hereof separate petitions for compensation and cost reimbursement, the same to be verified. In addition to setting forth the amount which the Court is requested to allow in each instance (including, if applicable, an allegation of the amount of any statutory fees or compensation) the Petitioner shall also contain by attachment or otherwise specific and detailed information supporting the entitlement to such amount, including reference to time and hours, dates of rendition of services, the nature and extent of such services rendered, any claimed extraordinary services, the complicated nature of the work required, and the benefits derived by the estate or beneficiary(s), as applicable; shall make specific reference to results achieved which have directly benefited the estate (or client) and shall further set forth such other information considered to be relevant and material to the application or petition for fees or commissions and costs reimbursement. It should be noted, inter alia, that the two ex parte proclamations just mentioned apparently undertook to sweep aside Judge Waters' order as to fees entirely, without either notice or hearing, and to direct Flangas and Ross to file a highly detailed, verified petition for an entirely new award. This Flangas and Ross have consistently declined to do, contending instead that the successor judge lacked jurisdiction to impose such demands upon them. On February 17, 1976, they filed a Response of Attorneys for Absent Heirs, wherein they advised the successor judge that they had not maintained time records, and that they therefore had gone back through their files attempting to reconstruct the general time spent in working on this estate. Because no time records had been maintained, work was indicated in terms of days on which they believed they had worked, rather than hours of work. They said they would assume an average of eight hours per day. They noted that, based on this reconstruction, they believed the time justified $210,000 in fees, if $75 were adopted as a reasonable hourly rate. They did not, however, ask the court to award them any fees based on this reconstruction. Rather, they contended the court was without jurisdiction to alter their fees of $70,000 and urged that the fees as previously awarded should be acknowledged, affirmed and ordered. [11] On April 19, 1976, the successor judge responded with a Memorandum and Orders Appointing Special Master, wherein he noted dissatisfaction with the responses of Flangas and Ross, and went on to name a Reno attorney as a special master, ostensibly vesting said attorney with wide-ranging inquisitorial powers. In addition to instructing the master to inquire into all of the matters mentioned in his prior ex parte orders, the successor judge even directed a probe into other matters such as the decedent's domiciliary intent. Then, on June 28, 1976, Judge Waters' successor entered another ex parte order, purporting to remove Flangas and Ross without notice, and to appoint yet another Reno attorney to represent the non-resident heirs. This order recited in part: THOMAS R.C. WILSON III, ESQ., is ordered to proceed in this matter in terms of preparation for the special master's proceedings with due diligence and to forthwith contact and be in touch with all said absent heirs with a view to adequately protecting the interests of said absent heirs in all respects in these and any related proceedings. Although preparations for a hearing before the special master consumed several months, only their culmination is important to understanding the factual background of this appeal. After Ross and Flangas took the deposition of James Sims on November 29, 1976, the successor judge yielded to demands by Flangas and Ross, and disqualified himself on December 6, 1976. His order of withdrawal began by noting that he had presided in a substantial number of various and sundry criminal, as well as civil proceedings, and that he had presided in a manner considered to be with the utmost impartiality. He went on to emphasize that he was disqualifying himself voluntarily, in order to allow the attorneys and executor to have the feeling that they were, without question, having and enjoying a full and fair trial. He concluded by stating: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that ..., District Judge, does hereby remove himself from the above-entitled proceeding for the reasons above-stated. IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the Honorable Peter I. Breen, District Judge of Department 7 of the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Washoe, is hereby appointed to preside in the above-entitled proceedings in the place and stead of the undersigned Judge. [12] Upon challenge for bias, Judge Breen also ultimately capitulated and disqualified himself; however, in the meantime, Judge Breen had discharged the special master, indicating that he intended to preside personally over the inquiry ordered by Judge Waters' successor. By the time Judge Breen was forced off the case, Judge Waters' successor had been named to a seat on another court, and had himself been succeeded on the bench of the First Judicial District by Judge McKibben. Upon Judge Breen's disqualification, Judge McKibben therefore assumed jurisdiction of the case.