Opinion ID: 176235
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Holmes Youthful Trainee Act

Text: This court has previously considered whether a conviction under the YTA can constitute an aggravated felony under the federal Immigration and Naturalization Act. Uritsky v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 728 (6th Cir.2005). In the course of holding that it could, we summarized the YTA in these terms: The YTA provides that if an individual pleads guilty to a criminal offense, committed on or after the individual's seventeenth birthday but before his or her twenty-first birthday, the court of record having jurisdiction of the criminal offense may, without entering a judgment of conviction and with the consent of that individual, consider and assign that individual to the status of youthful trainee. Mich. Comp. Laws § 762.11(1). Further, If consideration of an individual as a youthful trainee is not terminated and the status of youthful trainee is not revoked as provided in section 12 of this chapter, upon final release of the individual from the status as youthful trainee, the court shall discharge the individual and dismiss the proceedings. Mich. Comp. Laws § 762.14(1) (footnote omitted). Moreover, An assignment of an individual to the status of youthful trainee as provided in this chapter is not a conviction for a crime and ... the individual assigned to the status of youthful trainee shall not suffer a civil disability or loss of right or privilege following his or her release from that status because of his or her assignment as a youthful trainee. Mich. Comp. Laws § 762.14(2). Id. at 730. The public policy behind the YTA is clear: to give youthful offenders a chance to wipe their records clean provided that they do not violate their status as youthful trainees. The YTA contains the following provision for revocation of youthful training status: The court of record having jurisdiction over the criminal offense referred to in section 11 of this chapter may, at any time, terminate its consideration of the individual as a youthful trainee or, once having assigned the individual to the status of a youthful trainee, may at its discretion revoke that status any time before the individual's final release.... Upon termination of consideration or revocation of status as a youthful trainee, the court may enter an adjudication of guilt and proceed as provided by law. If the status of youthful trainee is revoked, an adjudication of guilt is entered, and a sentence is imposed, the court in imposing sentence shall specifically grant credit against the sentence for time served as a youthful trainee in an institutional facility of the department of corrections or in a county jail. Mich. Comp. Laws § 762.12 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). In this case, petitioner's Michigan probation officer moved the trial court for an order for discharge of probation for these reasons: A warrant for violation of probation was signed on 6/9/04, due to Technical violations. On 5/14/05 the defendant pled guilty to violation of probation and case was closed without improvement by Your Honor. The trial judge signed an order of probation discharge. As already noted, an order of dismissal was subsequently entered by the trial court. The Michigan trial court did not follow up its dismissal with an adjudication of guilt as authorized by the YTA. There is nothing in the record to indicate whether this was an oversight or whether the trial court elected to abandon the case because petitioner was in federal custody and had pleaded guilty to a felony drug charge. In any event, the government concedes that no judgment appears to have been entered. The federal statutory scheme for drug trafficking crimes requires that a prior felony drug conviction has become final before it can be used to enhance the sentence. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). We have observed that a conviction becomes final for the purpose of [federal] sentencing when the time for taking a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction has expired. United States v. Miller, 434 F.3d 820, 823 (6th Cir.2006). Whether a prior conviction is final pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) is a question of federal law. Id. at 823-24. In Miller, we considered nearly the identical issue that confronts us here: whether a sentence of probation under Georgia's first-offender drug sentencing scheme constitutes a `prior conviction for a felony drug offense [that] has become final,' as provided in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Id. at 821-22. We noted that the Georgia courts had determined that first-offender status takes the place of a sentence and renders the case final for purposes of appeal. Id. at 824. Thus, we upheld the use of the Georgia statute to enhance the federal sentence despite the fact that defendant had served his Georgia two-year probationary sentence without incident and no formal judgment was ... entered in the Georgia case. Id. at 823. Likewise, no formal judgment was entered in this case, although the Michigan trial court could have entered an adjudication of guilt after petitioner's probation was revoked. Mich. Comp. Laws § 762.12. Consistent with Miller, we hold that plea of guilty to a felony drug offense qualifies as a prior conviction for federal sentencing purposes when the defendant is assigned as a youthful trainee pursuant to the YTA. Indeed, Michigan's own sentencing scheme supports this view by defining conviction to include assignment to youthful trainee status. Mich. Comp. Laws § 777.50(4)(a). If Michigan authorizes the use of YTA adjudications to calculate a defendant's prior record, it makes sense to consider those adjudications as predicate felonies under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), in accordance with Miller. With respect to whether a YTA adjudication represents a final judgment, Michigan Court Rule 7.202(6)(b)(i) defines a final judgment or final order in a criminal case to include an order dismissing the case. Mich. Ct. Rule 7.202(6)(b). As already mentioned, the trial court entered an Order of Dismissal in this case on July 27, 2005. Finally, we emphasize that this case comes to us not on direct appeal but as a motion to vacate based upon the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Given our holding that the district court properly considered petitioner's YTA adjudication in calculating petitioner's federal sentence, it follows that petitioner has not shown that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to challenge the prior Michigan conviction as final. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Moreover, counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). On the contrary, it appears that counsel negotiated a favorable disposition for his client by not only securing the dismissal of the second count of the indictment but by convincing the government to allow him to plead guilty to the possession of a lesser amount of crack cocaine. In short, petitioner has demonstrated neither ineffective representation nor prejudice.