Opinion ID: 1839902
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Apportionment of Council Districts

Text: Plaintiffs contend that the council districts are unfairly apportioned and that the Charter as a whole is therefore invalid. The boundaries of the council districts are contained in the Charter. They were drawn by the Legislature from 1966-1967 population estimates made by the Jacksonville-Duval Area Planning Board. The estimates were made according to generally accepted techniques used in making estimates of population, and there is no evidence that they were not substantially correct. No other evidence has been offered of the present population of the council districts. Plaintiffs based their contention of malapportionment on the Legislature's use of current population estimates instead of the population figures shown in the 1960 decennial census. Plaintiffs contend that use of the last decennial federal census was required by Article VII, § 5, of the Constitution and § 11.031, Florida Statutes. The constitutional provision cited by plaintiffs eliminated a former provision of the Constitution which required the state to make a decennial census. The new provision provides that the Legislature is no longer required to do this and that the last preceding federal census shall be the state census and `shall control in all population acts and constitutional apportionments, unless otherwise ordered by the legislature.' Section 11.031, Florida Statutes, provides that no `special city, county or district census shall be effective for any purpose   '. In their attack on the charter plaintiffs contend that the use of current population estimates was a violation by the Legislature of these provisions. If plaintiffs' contention were accepted the effect would be to hold a legislative act invalid because the legislature did not conform to a prior act which the Legislature itself had passed in a case where the only constitutional provision invoked expressly gives discretion to the Legislature. The constitutional provision and the statute are both intended to provide a means for determining definitely when various population acts apply. They also govern when reapportionment is needed under Article VII of the Constitution or when county commissioners reapportion their districts under Article VIII, § 5. Needless, to say, the Legislature is authorized under Article VII, § 5 to use population figures other than the last federal census if in its judgment current figures would create a more equal apportionment. The propriety of the Legislature's use of current figures was demonstrated at the hearing. There have been substantial shifts of population in Duval County since 1960. If the 1960 census figures were applied to the council districts as drawn by the Legislature, the variation would be as high as 24% above the average and as low as 36% below the average. Using current figures the maximum variation is only 11.82%, well within the federal guidelines. Toombs v. Fortson, 241 F. Supp. 65, U.S.D.C.N.D. Ga.: 1965, affirmed without opinion, 384 U.S. 210, 86 S.Ct. 1464, 16 L.Ed.2d 482; Swann v. Adams, 263 F. Supp. 225, U.S.D.C., S.D. Fla.: 1967. If plaintiffs' contention were accepted and reapportionment were ordered on the basis of the 1960 census figures, this Court would be in the incongruous position of not only setting aside an act of the Legislature which was authorized by the constitutional provision involved but also ordering a reapportionment which would violate the federal Constitution as interpreted in recent Supreme Court cases. Plaintiffs cite Swann v. Adams, 263 F. Supp. 225 (1967), a reapportionment case in which a three-judge court accepted 1960 census figures as meeting the minimal federal requirements in the absence of more reliable population data. Needless to say, there is a vast difference between (a) using 1960 census figures in a reapportionment case to draw new district lines when those figures are the best available and (b) using 1960 census figures to attack an apportionment made by the Legislature from reliable current population estimates, especially in a case where substantial population shifts have occurred since 1960. Since the only current figures now available are those used by the Legislature, no purpose would be served in ordering reapportionment or striking down the Charter. In any event, reapportionment will automatically occur under Section 5.02 of the Charter as soon as the 1970 Federal census figures become available. I conclude that plaintiffs' attack on the apportionment of council districts has no merit. The plaintiffs made a separate attack on those portions of the Charter contained in the two amendatory Acts, Ch. 67-1535 and 67-1547, adopted by the Legislature within a few days after the adoption of the original Charter, Ch. 67-1320. The basis of this attack is that the amendments contained in these Acts were not enacted in accordance with the requirements of Article III, Section 16, Florida Constitution, that, when amended, the act as revised or section, or subsection of a section, or paragraph of a subsection of a section, as amended, shall be reenacted and published at length. The plaintiffs relied on the decisions of this court in Lipe v. City of Miami, 141 So.2d 738 (Fla. 1962) and Auto Owners Insurance Co. v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 153 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1963) in support of their contention in this respect. This contention was disposed of by the trial judge as follows: The Lipe case involved the validity of an amendment to the charter of the City of Miami relating to the civil service system. The amendment added a new subparagraph (c) to an existing section. Without any introduction, the subparagraph listed certain job titles. The parent section of the original act began with language making it clear the jobs listed in the section were `unclassified'. Although it could not be determined from the language of the amendment, the effect of the amendment was to categorize the positions listed in the new subparagraph (c) as unclassified jobs in which civil service rights did not accrue. The effect of the amendment on the civil service rights of the employees in the listed jobs could not be determined from the amendment itself. The court held that the test of compliance with Article II [III], § 16, was whether the amendment is intelligible in itself without `reference' to the act it purports to amend. In the Auto Owners case suit was brought on a contractor's bond given pursuant to Chapter 255, Florida Statutes. The defendant relied upon a one-year statute of limitations contained in an amendment which added a second subsection to Section 255.05. The subsection which was added required persons supplying labor or material to give notice to the contractor within 90 days after performance of the work or delivery of the materials. The section had not previously contained any statute of limitations. The new section also contained a one year statute of limitations on `the surety bond required in this section'. The provision requiring the surety bond and specifying its purpose was in the first subsection of the section which was not republished in the amendment. Under the circumstances the amendment referring to the bond made no sense without republication of the entire section. The court followed the Lipe case and held that the amendment violated Article III, § 16. Under these cases when is the constitutional provision violated? In Lipe the court took care to point out that it should overthrow only such acts `as clearly offend the spirit and meaning of the Constitution.' (Emphasis added). It further observed: `We further feel constrained to point out to all concerned that the language used here to describe the contemplated evils by the last portion of Section 16, Article III    should be strictly limited to the facts of this case, keeping ever in mind that each succeeding case must of necessity stand or fall upon the language of the statutory revision or amendment involved. If the statutory enactment is complete and intelligible in itself without reference to the act it purports to amend, Article III, § 16, of the Constitution of the State of Florida is satisfied.' The two cases do not say how much `reference' is required to the original statute for a violation of Article III, § 16 to exist. The explicit terms of the constitutional provision contemplate that in a proper case reenactment of a single paragraph of a sub-section is sufficient. Speaking literally, no paragraph, section or group of sections has meaning without some reference to the act which is being amended. If the constitutional provision were construed to require republication whenever any reference is required it would be unworkable. Every act would have to be re-stated in its entirety for an amendment to be effective. Needless to say, this is not necessary. The draftsman of an act may assume that members of the Legislature are acquainted with the general purpose of the original act, with its over-all framework, with the manner in which the section fits into that framework, and with the meaning of any defined terms in the legislation. The facts in Lipe and Auto Owners demonstrate what is meant by `reference' and provide a guide for deciding when more than the actual amended language must be republished to comply with the constitutional mandate. In both of those cases the effect of the amended section itself could not be understood without reference to the original act. Under the circumstances, I conclude that when a section, sub-section or paragraph is amended enough of the act being amended must be republished to make the meaning of the provision published intelligible from its language and to insure that no unexpected meaning results from the combination of that language and other language in the Act. The Webster case [Webster v. North Orange Memorial Hospital Tax District, 1966, 187 So.2d 37] which was a bond validation case confirms this reasoning. Chapter 59-1657 had created a special hospital district in Orange County. The chapter was a comprehensive act establishing the district, describing the territory covered by it, creating a Board of Trustees, enumerating their powers and giving them the power to operate hospitals, borrow money and issue bonds. Section 8 of the Act provided for a referendum election to authorize the issuance of bonds to construct a hospital. These were to be general obligations of the district. The bonds were not issued and no hospital was constucted. Later, Chapter 63-1701 was passed. It amended only Section 7 of the original Act, which had authorized the trustees to borrow $20,000.00 and to issue `notes'. The single section of Chapter 63-1701 amended Section 7 to authorize the issuance of revenue bonds. At the next session of the Legislature Chapter 65-2003 was passed. It purported to amend Chapter 63-1701, although its actual effect was to amend Section 7 of the original Chapter, 59-1657. The original Chapter was not mentioned in the amending Act. A single section was republished to amend the terms of the bonds which the trustees were authorized to issue. The Section described the trustees only as `the Board of Trustees'. The name of the taxing district did not appear in the bill. The only reference to it was in the title of the Act. The latest amendment was attacked on the ground that it violated Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution since it was not intelligible without reference to the original act. The Supreme Court rejected the contention using the following language and citing Lipe and Auto Owners as authority: `As to Chapter 65-2019, amended by reference to title only, or without republication of the basic Act, this Statute we find to be complete, coherent, and intelligible when read in isolation so that it is not necessary to refer to the books in order to relate it to the Chapter amended or Chapter 59-1657.' An examination of the various amendments to the charter in light of this test case makes it clear that most of them stand on their own feet. They are intelligible by themselves without more than a knowledge of the general purpose and framework of the charter. This is demonstrated by an examination of each amendment individually. The opinion then discusses in detail each separate amendment and concludes that most of them could not possibly be susceptible to attack under Article III, Section 16, supra. We are, however, particularly impressed with Judge Larkin's conclusion that the circumstances in which the amendments were adopted were different from those in the cases cited. As stated by Judge Larkin:    Chapters 67-1535 and 67-1547, the two amendments of the original Act which are under attack in this proceeding were passed at the same session of the Legislature within nineteen days after passage of the basic Charter. The latest of the two amendments, Chapter 67-1547, was introduced in the Senate only 14 days after the basic charter had been sent to the Governor for signature. All three acts resulted in one charter and were the culmination of a single continuing process of legislation. Under these circumstances it is highly unlikely that the members of the Legislature were confused. The dangers which the constitutional provision was intended to protect against did not exist. Even if some amendments did not meet the test, justification may well exist under the particular circumstances for a more liberal application of Article III, Section 16.    We are in complete agreement with the logic of this argument and think that it is conclusive of the validity of the amendments as against the attack under Article III, Section 16, in the case presented here. This being so, we think it is unnecessary to do more than advert briefly to two other points made by Judge Larkin, namely, (1) that the plaintiffs are not directly affected by the amendments in question and therefore have no standing to attack them, and (2) the amendatory provisions could be deleted without striking down the entire Charter. Ample authority in support of these statements is cited. Plaintiffs also attacked the validity of the referendum in which the Charter was adopted by the voters. Their contention in this respect, and his disposition thereof, are well stated by Judge Larkin as follows: Plaintiffs contend that the notice was defective because the Legislature amended the charter before the referendum without giving any additional notice and because the last amending act, although it had been passed some four weeks before the referendum, did not become effective until August 4, 1967, four days before the referendum and after the ballots had been published as required by law. These circumstances do not affect the validity of the referendum. All the acts had been passed and their provisions were widely publicized well before the referendum. Notice required by the charter was published and the fact that one of the acts did not technically become law until very shortly before the election was immaterial. This situation is analogous to the one in Willets v. North Bay Village, 60 So.2d 922, (Fla. 1952). In that case a referendum to approve a new charter was called at a meeting of the city council attended by less than a quorum. The council's action was clearly defective. Nevertheless the charter approved at the referendum was upheld. The Court said: `It is perfectly clear that the notice given served all the purposes of a legal one. Whether it was a directory or a mandatory prerequisite to a legal election, we do not have to decide. The rule seems approved on good authority that whether mandatory or directory, informalities or irregularities which do not affect the result of an election, will not render it invalid. This is all the more true as to the expression of the popular will when that is satisfied. `It is quite true that the election call, having been made by two councilmen, was not regular, but since the people got the notice and went to the polls and voted, it served the same purpose as if it had been regular.' This case is even stronger. In North Bay Village the call never had any validity. Here the amending act having been passed and publicized four weeks before the election finally did become law. Thus the kind of defect that existed in North Bay Village is not present in this case. The legal requirements of a referendum election were prescribed in Hill v. Milander, 72 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1954). In that case, the issue was whether the question on the ballot adequately informed the electors of the proposition on which they were voting. The Court upheld the description on the ballot and said: `In numerous instances we have held that the only requirements in an election of this kind are that the voter should not be misled and that he have an opportunity to know and be on notice as to the proposition on which he is to cast his vote.    `All that the Constitution requires or that the law compels or ought to compel is that the voter have notice of that which he must decide.' I conclude that these requirements are met in this case by the publication of the notice as required by the Legislature and the wide publicity given the Charter, including the amendments, prior to the referendum election. The other contentions made by plaintiffs respecting the invalidity of the charter, or various provisions thereof, have been carefully considered. We find that they are devoid of merit and that no useful purpose would be served in further extending this lengthy opinion by a discussion thereof. For the reasons stated, the opinion here reviewed should be and is hereby Affirmed. ERVIN, C.J., DREW, CARLTON, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., and TAYLOR, Circuit Judge, concur.