Opinion ID: 1199771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Issue One Allocation Versus Offset

Text: The Hospital contends the trial court's refusal to allocate fault among the Hospital, Dr. Herndon and Dr. Lush violated RCW 4.22.070(1). [2] This statute, as well as its interplay with the related provisions in RCW 4.22.070(2) and RCW 4.22.060, was recently interpreted in Washburn v. Beatt Equip. Co., 120 Wn.2d 246, 840 P.2d 860 (1992). [3] The Hospital contends that just as in Washburn, the percentages of fault should have been allocated among all the defendants, including the settling defendants, and the Hospital's responsibility for damages should have been limited according to the percentage of its fault. See Washburn, 120 Wn.2d at 290-99. [1, 2] While the Hospital is correct that former RCW 4.22.070(1) mandates allocation as the appropriate method of apportioning responsibility for the plaintiffs' award, the Hospital failed to claim its right to allocation by producing evidence of the fault of another party. Nor did the Hospital preserve this issue for appeal by making an offer of proof during trial. As such, the Hospital has not given us any basis upon which we can say that the statute's allocation procedure even applies, much less provide us with a basis for remanding for allocation. [4] RCW 4.22.070 is not self-executing. It does not automatically apply to each case where more than one entity could theoretically be at fault. Either the plaintiff or the defendant must present evidence of another entity's fault to invoke the statute's allocation procedure. Without a claim that more than one party is at fault, and sufficient evidence to support that claim, the trial judge cannot submit the issue of allocation to the jury. Indeed, it would be improper for the judge to allow the jury to allocate fault without such evidence. If the plaintiff signals an intention to present evidence of fault solely against one defendant, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the defendant to provide proof that more than one entity was at fault. The Hospital failed to present any evidence of the possible negligence of Dr. Lush and Dr. Herndon. Instead, the Hospital chose the legal theory that there was no negligence in this case. Moreover, the Hospital did not even take a clear position on the issue of whether allocation of fault was required under Washington's statutes. The Hospital cannot now be heard to complain it was not afforded allocation. Although the record indicates the trial court decided upon offset as the appropriate method of apportioning damages, the trial judge also indicated he would allow evidence of how the doctors screwed up and about what. 5 Report of Proceedings, at 23-24. If the judge's ruling on the issue of offset or allocation of damages did not foreclose the subject of the doctors' negligence during trial, then the Hospital simply failed to meet its burden of presenting evidence sufficient to invoke allocation under RCW 4.22.070(1). On the other hand, even if we assume the judge meant to prohibit any evidence of the doctor's negligence, the Hospital is still not entitled to allocation because it failed to make an offer of proof and thus preserve the issue for appeal. [3-5] Under Rule of Evidence 103(a)(2), a party may not challenge a trial court's ruling excluding evidence unless the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked. Here, an offer of proof was required, for nothing in the context of the pretrial oral arguments on this issue gave the trial court any indication as to how the doctors might have been negligent or at fault in this case. An offer of proof serves three purposes when a trial judge is considering the exclusion of evidence: [I]t informs the court of the legal theory under which the offered evidence is admissible; it informs the judge of the specific nature of the offered evidence so that the court can assess its admissibility; and it creates a record adequate for review. State v. Ray, 116 Wn.2d 531, 538, 806 P.2d 1220 (1991). While the offer of proof need not be in detail, Ray, 116 Wn.2d at 539, the offer must communicate to the trial court the substance of the evidence in question so as to make clear to the trial court what is being offered in proof, and why the offer should be admitted over the opponent's objections, so the court may make an informed ruling. Ray, 116 Wn.2d at 539. However, at no point during the trial court's pretrial allocation/offset rulings did the Hospital present any evidence or make any offer of proof regarding fault of Dr. Herndon or Dr. Lush. The trial court was left entirely in the dark as to the substance of the testimony the Hospital would have produced to show fault. The trial judge stated on the record during postjudgment motions he would have considered a proper offer of proof during the pretrial motions. An offer of proof was essential at this point to show the judge there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the question whether more than one entity bore fault. The offer of proof would have informed the trial court of the legal theory under which the evidence of the doctors' fault should have been admitted. [5] Moreover, an offer of proof was critical for the purpose of creating an adequate record for review. Even if the parties understood the trial judge as having definitively decided on offset, an offer of proof would have created a record from which this court could determine whether the case should be remanded for allocation. Without such an offer, it is impossible for us to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact about allocation for the jury. [6] The Hospital nevertheless contends a sufficient showing of proof was made. The Hospital points out the same trial judge had conducted the reasonableness hearings as to the settlement agreements between the plaintiffs and Dr. Herndon and Dr. Lush. During those hearings the parties presented evidence regarding the fault of the doctors' acts. This argument is unpersuasive. The reasonableness hearings were held years before the rulings at issue here. The first reasonableness hearing was held in February 1989 and the second was held in April 1990, yet the allocation/offset rulings were made in late November/early December 1991. Moreover, at no point during the allocation/offset colloquy did the Hospital attempt to resubmit these materials or even refer the court to their existence. Under these circumstances the trial judge cannot be expected to remember the substance of evidence presented to him years earlier. It was not until the oral argument of posttrial motions, after approximately 5 weeks of trial, that the Hospital made any offer of proof on this point. Although we have sometimes held a posttrial offer of proof is sufficient to preserve appellate review, see Ray, 116 Wn.2d at 539-43, it is not sufficient here. In this case, the Hospital made a deliberate choice at trial not to present evidence of the doctors' negligence or fault. Such evidence would have undercut its own theory of defense. The Hospital's theory was that Brandan's cardiac arrest was unrelated to any of the care he had received following his catheterization; the arrest was due to sudden choking. Under this theory, the arrest was a sudden and unforeseeable event, thus no party, not the Hospital, not Dr. Lush and not Dr. Herndon, could have been negligent. Most importantly, the Hospital's choice was independent of the trial court's ruling excluding evidence. The Hospital had chosen its theory of defense  sudden aspiration  prior to the trial court's final rulings on allocation and exclusion of evidence of the doctors' negligence. The Hospital's trial brief set out this theory of defense, and it was dated 2 days prior to the trial judge's final rulings. [7] Thus, the Hospital deliberately chose, as a matter of its own trial strategy, not to pursue the fault of Dr. Herndon and Dr. Lush at trial; not to make an offer of proof at the critical time when the trial judge was deciding whether to exclude the relevant evidence; not to take any clear position about allocation of fault during the pretrial rulings; not to try to present any such evidence at trial; not to propose a jury verdict form addressing the issue; not to create a record from which an appellate court might remand for allocation. Then, following 5 weeks of trial and an adverse jury verdict, the Hospital attempts to create an issue for appeal by making an offer of proof as to the doctors' negligence and arguing apportionment of fault was required under Washington's statutes. A posttrial offer of proof is not sufficient under these circumstances to preserve appellate review. Whereas under Ray, we want to encourage parties to make offers of proof at least by the time of postjudgment motions in order to give trial judges opportunity to review their earlier evidentiary rulings, we will not allow parties to take positions inconsistent with those taken at trial.