Opinion ID: 347528
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: use of mitchell's testimony before congressional committees

Text: 140 Appellant Mitchell contends that the trial court committed constitutional error in permitting the Special Prosecutor to use testimony given by Mitchell under subpoena to the Senate Select Committee in July, 1973 and to the House Judiciary Committee in July, 1974. Mitchell objects to the use of this testimony as a basis for the charge of perjury to the Senate Committee contained in Count 6 and in cross-examination on critical aspects of the other charges. 161 141 Appellant argues that since he was subpoenaed after the Special Prosecutor had targeted him as a potential defendant, and even after he was indicted in the case of the House Judiciary Committee, he was a virtual or putative defendant with an absolute right to stand mute. Faced with the Hobson's choice of answering committee questions or stating (on national television) that his answers would tend to incriminate him, Mitchell charges he was perforce compelled to answer the committees' questions, and the use of this testimony at his trial violated his Fifth Amendment privilege not to be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. 162 We reject Mitchell's contention. 142 1. Mitchell relies principally on Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and several cases in the lower courts extending the safeguards of Miranda to putative defendants called before the grand jury, 163 as recognizing a right to invoke silence which serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. 164 143 a. The Miranda warnings were developed in response to the compulsion believed inherent in police custodial interrogation. The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether they extend to the context of a grand jury inquiry. Four Justices in United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 48 L.Ed.2d 212 (1976), deemed the transplanting of the Miranda warnings from the original context of extra-judicial confessions or admissions procured in a hostile, unfamiliar environment which lacked procedural safeguards to the  wholly different context of questioning before a grand jury inquiring into criminal activity under the guidance of a judge, to be an extravagant expansion never remotely contemplated by this Court in Miranda   . 425 U.S. at 579, 580, 96 S.Ct. at 1778. Earlier, in Beckwith v. United States,425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976), a unanimous Court declined to require that Miranda warnings be given in a noncustodial criminal tax investigation even though the focus of the investigation was on the taxpayer when he was interviewed. The Court made clear that it was the custodial nature of the interrogation which triggered the necessity for adherence in the specific requirements of its Miranda holding, and that a person does not become the focus of a criminal investigation for purposes of triggering Miranda until he  'has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.'  425 U.S. at 347, 96 S.Ct. at 1616. 165 144 b. Assuming arguendo that a putative defendant called before the grand jury may stand mute and refuse to answer questions put to him without invoking the stated ground of self-incrimination, and that this rationale applies to the legislative committee context, 166 we find the trial court did not err in permitting the Special Prosecutor to use Mitchell's testimony. The perjury charge in Count 6 was based on Mitchell's Senate Committee testimony that there was neither discussion nor instruction concerning destruction of the Gemstone file at a June 19, 1972 meeting in his apartment. The Supreme Court was unanimous in Mandujano that the Fifth Amendment privilege provides no protection for the commission of perjury, 167 at least where the false answers could not be said to have been procured by Government tactics or procedures so inherently unfair as to violate due process. While not expressly on point, Mandujano states a principle that would authorize the Special Prosecutor's use of Mitchell's testimony in impeachment by contradiction. Such impeachment is also sanctioned by Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), and Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975): (T)he shield provided by Miranda is not to be perverted to a license to testify inconsistently, or even perjuriously, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 583, 96 S.Ct. at 1780, quoting Oregon v. Hass, supra, 420 U.S. at 723, 95 S.Ct. 1215. 145 c. Seeking to avoid the impact of these rulings, Mitchell argues that in both cases the Court specifically found that the confessions used for impeachment purposes were neither involuntary nor coerced, 168 and claims Mitchell's statements before the congressional committees, after his right of silence had been asserted and wrongfully denied, 'cannot be other than the product of compulsion.'  169 As Hass makes clear, the Court's references to coerced or involuntary confessions are to the voluntariness standard of the pre-Miranda cases, which excluded confessions or statements induced by police behavior so egregious as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined   . 170 In Hass the police had given the required warnings but continued questioning notwithstanding the suspect's request to telephone his lawyer. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, found that the pressure on the suspect was no greater than that on any person in like custody or under inquiry by any investigating officer, and that questions of police abuse, coercion or duress are to be meas ured by the traditional standards for evaluating voluntariness and trustworthiness. 171 146 Mitchell's dilemma simply does not fit the pre-Miranda coerced confession rulings. Mitchell was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings. He was not subjected to any physical ordeal. The hearings were held in public. The inquiring congressmen repeatedly indicated that they would abandon any question that met with invocation of the self-incrimination privilege. The House Judiciary Committee informed Mitchell in advance that his appearance would not be required if he announced an intention to rely on the Fifth Amendment. There was absolutely no effort made to overcome Mitchell's will and produce statements not freely self-determined. 147 2. We have met Mitchell on his home ground, pointing out that even if his Fifth Amendment rights had been violated by the Committee's questioning it was permissible to use his non-coerced testimony in the perjury count and for impeachment purposes. 148 But we would not want in such an important case to leave the implication that we accept Mitchell's claim that the Self-Incrimination Clause embodies an absolute right of silence. Appellant has mistaken what is a narrow exception, born of very special circumstances, for the general rule. 149 a. Mitchell was merely required to follow the usual path for asserting the privilege against self-incrimination. Generally the privilege must be claimed to be respected. The reason for this is that government acting within its proper sphere and by proper process Mitchell does not argue that the committees were acting otherwise has a right to everyone's testimony, and that the Fifth Amendment privilege addresses only a relatively narrow scope of inquiries, which the individual being questioned is in the best position to identify. Unless a witness objects a government ordinarily may assume that its compulsory processes are not eliciting testimony that he deems to be incriminating. Only the witness knows whether the apparently innocent disclosure sought may incriminate him, and the burden appropriately lies with him to make timely assertion of the privilege. If, instead, he discloses the information sought, any incriminations properly are viewed as not compelled. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655, 96 S.Ct. 1178, 1183, 47 L.Ed.2d 370 (1976). See also United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 439-442, 63 S.Ct. 409, 87 L.Ed. 376 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 150 This principle, often stated by the Court, and the operative principle of many decisions, 172 was squarely decided in United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 763, 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970). A unanimous Court held that an individual under compulsion to make disclosures as a witness in a civil case brought by the Government, while at the same time the target of a pending criminal investigation, lost the benefit of the privilege when he revealed information without claiming the privilege. Justice Stewart pointed out that the individual answered the interrogatories in the civil case while represented by counsel. His failure at any time to assert the constitutional privilege leaves him in no position to complain now that he was compelled to give testimony against himself. Id. at 9-10, 90 S.Ct. at 768. 151 b. The general rule is subject to a few narrowly delineated exceptions where the privilege against self-incrimination need not be expressly claimed, and where there is a right of silence. These exceptions are simply not applicable to Mitchell's case. The exceptions fall into essentially two categories. 152 The first category of exception is exemplified by the Miranda decision, involving situations so rife with coercion as to deny an individual the ability freely to choose to remain silent and where the inquiring government is acutely aware of the potentially incriminatory nature of the disclosures sought. 173 The Miranda safeguards were promulgated as a prophylactic measure for an inherently coercive situation altogether lacking in procedural niceties, poles apart from proceedings in courts or other official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery. 174 153 We are not called upon to anticipate whether in the review already granted the Supreme Court will affirm lower court rulings extending Miranda to the grand jury situation. These rulings are based on the premise that there is coercion in the grand jury situation, not overcome by the judicial supervision available, since the witness under subpoena obligation may not be aware that he is a potential defendant, and therefore not on alert to avoid incriminating disclosures, and he does not have a lawyer at his side during the questioning. 175 The image of a trap for the unwary underlies the Ninth Circuit's view: The imposing ex parte nature of grand jury inquisitions, coupled with the predicable ignorance of many lay witnesses about the intricacies of the privilege against self-incrimination, creates a foreseeable probability that the witness will subject himself to criminal liability. 176 However the Supreme Court may rule on the grand jury issue, Mitchell's case is not comparable. Mitchell had counsel by his side at all times, knew he was a potential defendant, was appreciative of the consequences of his actions, and could have readily asserted the privilege if he so wished. 154 The purpose of the grand jury inquiry is to obtain information about criminal activities in order to determine whether to return an indictment and launch a criminal proceeding. Although the grand jury's focus may extend beyond the particular witness, it has been found smack(ing) of entrapment to bait a witness already suspected of being guilty of a precise offense into either committing perjury or offering incriminating testimony. 177 By contrast, the congressional committees subpoenaed Mitchell for purposes independent of the criminal proceedings that were the bailiwick of the Special Prosecutor. The committee's purpose was to expose the workings of an unprecedented national scandal as a basis for proposing corrective legislation, and in the case of the House Judiciary Committee to decide whether to return a bill of impeachment against former President Nixon. They had a right to Mitchell's testimony, except where by timely and explicit interposition of the self-incrimination privilege Mitchell identified potentially incriminating matters and gave the committees the opportunity to proceed further with their inquiry by conferring immunity from use in a subsequent criminal proceeding. This is the process contemplated by the Fifth Amendment for asserting the privilege in the course of investigations of official misconduct. 178 155 c. The second exception from the general rule requiring assertion of the privilege involves situations where the very invocation of the privilege is likely to result in criminal sanctions. We do not require the defendant in a criminal trial to take the stand and assert the privilege in open court, and indeed we do not permit comment on the failure to testify in one's own defense, 179 because of the likelihood that the jury will infer guilt from the mere assertion of the constitutional privilege. 180 Indeed, the fear of disproportionate impact on the jury has led us to extend this principle to a non-party witness who indicates his intention to invoke the privilege, irrespective of whether his testimony would be favorable to the defense or the prosecution. 181 Another line of cases involves gambling excise tax and reporting measures, where the Supreme Court has held that the privilege could be exercised by simply failing to make the required disclosures. The Court reasoned that because of the pervasive criminal regulation of gambling activities, and the fact that the taxes and disclosures were required only of gamblers, a group inherently suspect of criminal activities, disclosures made in connection with the taxes were likely to result in criminal sanctions, and assertion of the privilege would not remove the compulsion as it would identify the claimant as a gambler. 182 156 Mitchell cannot claim to have been under a similar compulsion to forego assertion of the privilege. While his assertion might lead to public speculation or opprobrium, the public would not be in a position to impose or precipitate criminal sanctions, and hence failure to assert the privilege is not justified in law. 183 The courts would always be open to hear the contention that the consequence of a publicized assertion of the privilege was pretrial publicity so pervasive and so harmful as to prevent a fair trial at the time and in the place at which he was tried. 184 This issue is considered in Part II of our opinion. 157 It is only in the exceptional case that the privilege can be relied upon without claiming it, and Mitchell's case does not come within the recognized exceptions. 158 We find no error in the Special Prosecutor's use of Mitchell's testimony before the committees as the basis for the perjury count and in impeachment by contradiction of Mitchell's assertions on the stand. 159