Opinion ID: 2514606
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Application of the principal thrust or gravamen test was error

Text: (7) The Court of Appeal's application of the principal thrust or gravamen test also fails because it contravenes the statutes' plain meaning and confuses the broad interpretation called for under section 425.16 with the narrow reading required for the section 425.17(b) exception. The principal thrust or gravamen test has been used to determine whether an action fits within the scope of the anti-SLAPP protection provided by section 425.16 when a pleading contains allegations referring to both protected and unprotected activity. (See, e.g., Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 188.) The Court of Appeal incorrectly concluded that the same approach should govern here. The principal thrust or gravamen test serves the Legislative intent that section 425.16 be broadly interpreted. Thus, a plaintiff could not deprive a defendant of anti-SLAPP protection by bringing a complaint based upon both protected and unprotected conduct. The anti-SLAPP statute specifically permits the striking of a cause of action. The exception provided for in section 425.17 operates in the opposite manner. As an exception, it is to be narrowly interpreted ( Ballard, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 400), lest it swallow the rule found in the anti-SLAPP statute. The Legislature also made this general rule of construction explicit in the language it chose. It requires that, under section 425.17(b) an action, as opposed to a cause of action, must be brought solely in the public interest. The Court of Appeal's analysis of section 425.17(b) renders the term solely as surplusage, a result cautioned against by the rules of statutory construction. ( People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 980-981 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 261, 135 P.3d 669].) An examination of section 425.17, subdivision (c), dealing with commercial speech, reveals that the choice of words was intentional. Subdivision (c) provides for the exemption of a cause of action, rather than an action as a whole, as required under subdivision (b). The Legislature clearly distinguished between an action and a cause of action in drafting subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 425.17, and treated them differently. (See also § 425.17, subds. (d)(2), (e).) It expressly provided that the public interest exception only applies if the entire action is brought solely in the public interest. If individualized relief is sought, a plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of the anti-SLAPP statute in order for the action to proceed. ( Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1067 [28 Cal.Rptr.3d 933]; cf. Northern Cal. Carpenters Regional Council v. Warmington Hercules Associates (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 296, 300 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 918].)