Opinion ID: 1375344
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: On September 28, 1977, Miller was indicted on charges of attempted rape in the first degree, attempted murder, attempted sodomy in the first degree, kidnaping, and four counts of sexual abuse in the first degree. [1] On July 10, 1978, the circuit court granted Miller's motion for acquittal on the ground of mental disease or disorder excluding responsibility. The circuit court found Miller dangerous and committed him to the Hawai`i State Hospital, where he was to be held in maximum security because of his high degree of dangerousness. Prior to the current petition, the circuit court denied five requests for release filed by Miller between 1980 and 1989. On June 25, 1991, Miller once again sought release. The circuit court held hearings in August and October of 1992. Only one of the experts who testified at the hearing considered Miller mentally ill, dangerous, and unfit to be released. After hearing all the evidence and the arguments of counsel, the circuit court denied Miller's petition for conditional release. In its findings of fact, the circuit court found by clear and convincing evidence that Warren Miller currently suffers from a mental disease, disorder or defect of sexual sadism and antisocial personality. The court further found by clear and convincing evidence that a conditional release from [Hawai`i] State Hospital would pose a mild danger to others in the community. Although Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 704-411(4) (1993) places the burden on the insanity acquittee to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she is fit to be released, the circuit court adopted the clear and convincing burden of proof based on its conclusion that: [t]he United State[s] Supreme Court has ruled in [ Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992),] that a State cannot continue the commitment of a defendant in a mental institution unless the State can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has a mental illness and is dangerous. On appeal to the ICA, Miller claimed that the circuit court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous because the state failed to meet its burden of proof, either by a preponderance of the evidence under HRS § 704-411(4), or by clear and convincing evidence mandated by Foucha. The ICA's majority opinion rejected the clear and convincing burden test that the circuit court imported from Foucha. The majority also disagreed with Miller's argument that Foucha and Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983), require application of the clear and convincing burden of proof. The court distinguished both of these cases, indicating that Jones was inapposite because Miller is an insanity acquittee, rather than a civil committee, and that Foucha was distinguishable because the state had not relinquished its claim that Miller was mentally ill, as Louisiana had in Foucha. Thus, the ICA held: (1) Miller's motion [for conditional release] must be granted unless the State (a) alleges that Miller (i) suffers from one or more mental illnesses, and (ii) is dangerous, and (b) proves by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the alleged mental illnesses are mental illnesses as defined by law; and, if the State satisfies the above requirements, the burden then shifts and (2) Miller's motion must be denied unless Miller proves by a preponderance of evidence that (a) he is not then suffering from one or more of the alleged mental illnesses; (b) he is not then dangerous; or (c) his dangerousness does not result from any of his mental illnesses. Therefore, we vacate and remand for reconsideration in the light of this opinion. The ICA therefore vacated the circuit court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings because the evidentiary hearing was conducted without a clear understanding of which side had to prove what and to what degree. The ICA also directed the circuit court to make a specific finding as to whether Miller suffered from a legally recognized mental illness. The ICA referred the circuit court to HRS § 704-400 (1993), which defines a mental illness as a physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect, not including abnormality manifested only by repeated penal or otherwise antisocial conduct, that results in the person's lack of substantial capacity to either appreciate the wrongfulness of the person's conduct or to conform the person's conduct to the requirements of law. According to the ICA, it is unclear from the circuit court order if Miller's diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder constitutes a legal mental illness, or an abnormality manifested only by repeated penal or otherwise antisocial conduct. The dissenting opinion in Miller argued that Foucha mandates an insanity acquittee be afforded the same procedural protections that are provided to the civil committee. The dissent also had serious reservations about finding Miller legally mentally ill under either [the preponderance of the evidence or the clear and convincing evidence] standard. Both Miller and the state filed an application for a writ of certiorari. Because this case presents an important issue concerning the release of insanity acquittees from a mental health facility, we granted certiorari.