Opinion ID: 1177186
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the propriety of a post-acquittal civil contest over life insurance proceeds

Text: There is nothing unique about requiring a post-acquittal civil contest to determine a slayer's eligibility to recover. An acquittal on a criminal charge is never a bar  not even between the government and the accused  to a civil action arising out of the same facts on which the criminal proceeding was based. The difference in the relative burdens of proof in the criminal and civil actions precludes the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion). Acquittal on a criminal charge merely reflects the existence of a reasonable doubt. It never rules out the possibility that a preponderance of the evidence, adduced in a civil contest, could show that the acquitted slayer did stand in the status of a person who took the life of the insured by a felonious, intentional and unjustified act. [12] Oklahoma law affords other examples in the context of which a prior acquittal in the criminal case is not even prima facie evidence in a related civil action. Proof of acquittal does not of itself tend to show want of probable cause in a civil suit for malicious prosecution or false imprisonment. [13] In malicious prosecution litigation a defendant may collaterally attack a judgment in a criminal case by showing that the plaintiff, though acquitted, was actually guilty of the crime charged. [14] Similarly here, the slayer's acquittal is a fit subject for a collateral attack by proof showing that the widow, though acquitted, was actually guilty of taking the decedent's life in a felonious, intentional and unjustified manner. [15] I hence accede both to the court's pronouncement and its judgment.