Opinion ID: 1095462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: logan and killebrew

Text: With these defendants we are faced with the question of whether they were members of boards which authorized their contracts. Logan maintains his contract was authorized by the Board of Trustees of the Long Beach Municipal Separate School District, not the city board of Long Beach. Similarly, Killebrew contends the Quitman County Board of Education authorized his contract and not the Quitman County Board of Supervisors. It is true that school districts are agencies of the state, and have a separate and distinct identity from that of the city or county in which they are located. As we held in Harrell v. City of Jackson, 229 Miss. 815, 92 So.2d 240 (1957), trustees of municipal separate school districts, even though they may be appointed by the city board, are not agents of the municipality in carrying out their duties. Members of county school boards and, in some instances, trustees of a municipal separate school district are elected by statute. See: Miss. Code Ann. § 37-5-1 (1972), -7-203 (Supp. 1985); -7-207 (Supp. 1985). It is also true, however, that school districts have no authority to levy taxes, but are dependent solely upon appropriations made by the state and municipality or county, as the case may be, of which they are a part. See: Miss.Code Ann;. §§ 37-19-37 (Supp. 1985); -19-39 (Supp. 1985); -57-1 (1972); -57-3 (1972); -57-105 (Supp. 1985). Moreover, no school board may vote to spend funds not made available to it from state appropriations and local taxation. In pertinent part, Miss. Code Ann. § 37-61-3 (1972) states: § 37-61-3. Use of school funds, generally. The minimum education program funds of the county and municipal school districts and the funds derived from the supplemental school district tax levies authorized by law shall be used exclusively for the support, maintenance and operation of the schools in the manner provided by law for the fiscal years for which such funds were appropriated, collected, or otherwise made available, and no part of said funds shall be used in paying any expenses incurred during any preceding fiscal year. [Emphasis added] Also, Miss. Code Ann. § 37-61-19 (1972) states in pertinent part: § 37-61-19. Expenditures shall be limited to budgeted amounts; personal liability for excess. ... It shall be the duty of the county boards of education, the county superintendents of education, and the boards of trustees of all school districts, including municipal separate school districts, in making or approving contracts for transportation, selecting, approving, contracting with, and fixing the salaries of superintendents, principals, and teachers, and in expending other available school funds or incurring obligations payable therefrom to limit the amount of such expenditures to the funds made available for such purposes during the fiscal year, and it shall be unlawful for any contract to be entered into or any obligation incurred or expenditure made in excess of the funds available for such purposes for such fiscal year. [Emphasis added] See also Railroad School Township v. First State Bank, 73 Ind. App. 358, 126 N.E. 342, 344 (1920); Union Graded School Dist. No. 5 v. Ford, 169 Okl. 410, 37 P.2d 258, 259 (1934); Crosby v. P.L. Marguess & Co., 226 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Tex. 1950). It therefore follows that a tax levy by a city board or county board of supervisors serves the same function as an appropriation bill by the Legislature. The schools are dependent upon the tax levies and the state appropriation for their survival. A condition precedent to any expenditure by the school district is that sufficient funds have been made available to it by local taxation as well as state appropriation. Without them the teachers could not be paid. [22] We are again reinforced in this interpretation by the action of the voters of this State in rejecting proposed amendments to § 109 which specifically would have made contracts such as Logan's and Killebrew's lawful. See proposed 1984 and 1986 amendments, supra. We hold that where a portion of the salaries derived by public school teachers under their teaching contracts comes from discretionary local tax levies, a teacher cannot make a valid contract with a school district while he is on the board of the governing authority which makes such tax levies, or within one year after his term on the governing board expires. Such a contract violates § 109. It therefore follows that insofar as Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-105(3)(h) attempts to make an exception and authorize such a contract, it is at cross purposes with § 109 and unconstitutional. As was aptly stated in Commonwealth v. Withers, 266 Ky. 29, 98 S.W.2d 24, 25 (1936): It is a salutary doctrine that he who is intrusted with the business of others cannot be allowed to make such business as object of profit to himself. This is based upon principles of reason, of morality, and of public policy. These are principles of the common law and of equity which have been supplemented and made more emphatic by the foregoing and other statutory enactments. The Supreme Court of Missouri in Githens v. Butler County, 350 Mo. 295, 165 S.W.2d 650 (1942), stated the general rule: At common law and generally under statutory enactment, it is now established beyond question that a contract made by an officer of a municipality with himself, or in which he is interested, is contrary to public policy and tainted with illegality; and this rule applies whether such officer acts alone on behalf of the municipality, or as a member of a board of [or] council.    The fact that the interest of the offending officer in the invalid contract is indirect and is very small is immaterial.    It is impossible to lay down any general rule defining the nature of the interest of a municipal officer which comes within the operation of these principles. Any direct or indirect interest in the subject matter is sufficient to taint the contract with illegality, if the interest be such as to affect the judgment and conduct of the officer either in the making of the contract or in its performance. In general the disqualifying interest must be of a pecuniary or proprietary nature. Id. at 652, citing 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, § 773. Neither Logan nor Killebrew have properly assigned as error that the local tax levy provided such an insignificant part of their salaries as to be inconsequential and could not have affected their judgment as board members.