Opinion ID: 202116
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merits of the Recusal Claim

Text: 105 Before turning to the heart of the argument for recusal, we first dispose of the government's argument that Judge Pérez-Giménez was actually biased against it. The government argues there were two proofs of actual bias: first, that the judge was predisposed against a key witness in the government's case, FBI Special Agent Ivan Vitousek, and second, that the judge was politically biased against prosecutions of former NPP officials. The government uses two incidents to support its claim of actual bias. 106 First, in moving for recusal, the government attached an affidavit from FBI Special-Agent-in-Charge (SAC) Fraticelli, which stated that on or about June 19, 2004, while he was in transition to the SAC position, he was summoned to a meeting with then-Chief Judge Laffitte and Judge Pérez-Giménez in Judge Laffitte's chambers. Fraticelli reported that Judge Laffitte expressed concern about recent media leaks in several high-profile cases, and [b]oth federal judges stated that . . . [Agent] Vitousek was responsible, noting that the leaks were more prevalent in cases for which he was the case agent. 107 This filing provoked the filing by Vazquez-Botet on December 12, 2005 of an affidavit from Judge Laffitte, as well as Judge Pérez-Giménez' response in the December 15, 2005 order. Judge Laffitte and Judge Pérez-Giménez deny having been so blunt as to say Agent Vitousek was responsible, and Judge Laffitte says he only pointed out the coincidence that leaks were more prevalent in cases in which Vitousek was case agent. Judge Laffitte did say that before the meeting, Judge Pérez-Giménez informed him that the leak investigation pointed to . . . Vitousek. Judge Pérez-Giménez does not address this point. 108 When Fraticelli questioned Vitousek, Vitousek denied being the source of any leak, and Fraticelli reported that fact back to Judge Pérez-Giménez in June 2004, as well as the government's position that any leaks did not come from the FBI. No action was taken as to the allegations against Agent Vitousek thereafter. There has never been a finding that Agent Vitousek was a source of leaks. Far from proving actual bias, this episode shows responsible actions by two judges legitimately concerned about maintenance of grand jury secrecy in their district. 109 The government also argues that there is other evidence of a predisposition by the district judge against Agent Vitousek, and indeed, against the government in criminal prosecutions of NPP officials. That evidence, it says, is found in our opinion in United States v. Rivera Rangel, 396 F.3d 476 (1st Cir.2005). In Rivera Rangel, another political corruption case, the jury returned a verdict of guilty against an NPP official who had been the executive assistant to the governor. The same judge as in this case set aside the verdict and alternatively ruled that the defendant was entitled to a new trial because government agents (including Agent Vitousek) had improperly failed to produce exculpatory evidence. This court held that both actions were in error, reversed, and remanded. Id. at 482-86. The court did not, however, base its reversal on any demonstration of actual bias. 110 Pursuant to our statutory power to reassign as may be just under the circumstances, 28 U.S.C. § 2106, we also instructed in the mandate that the case, on remand, be reassigned to a different judge. That statutory standard, again, does not depend on there being actual bias. See, e.g., Conley v. United States, 323 F.3d 7, 15 (1st Cir.2003) (en banc) (remanding to new judge, despite having no doubt about the good faith of the district judge, where remanding to original judge would put him in a very awkward position); Mawson v. United States, 463 F.2d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (ordering that on remand a new judge be assigned both for the [original] judge's sake, and the appearance of justice). 111 Again, we think the prosecution quite overreaches in its contention that the Rivera Rangel case somehow establishes actual bias in this case by the district judge.
112 The judge does not have to be subjectively biased or prejudiced, so long as he appears to be so. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 553 n. 2, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). Subsection (a) of 28 U.S.C. § 455 requires recusal in some circumstances where subsection (b) does not. Id. The recusal statute, by its terms, operates both ways, whether the appearance is of partiality in favor of a defendant or in favor of the government. Partiality in favor of the government may raise a defendant's due process concerns. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). Just as there is a prohibition against a judge adjudicating a case where he was also an investigator for the government, Johnson v. Carroll, 369 F.3d 253, 260 (3d Cir.2004), there is a prohibition against a judge adjudicating a case where he has become an investigator against the government. 113 The defendants rely heavily on the principle that a judge's rulings and statements in the course of proceedings before him or her rarely provide a basis for recusal under § 455(a). See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147. That principle applies even to misjudgments: a judge's erroneous rulings will not ordinarily be enough to warrant a writ of mandamus to the judge to recuse himself or herself. 20 See In re Boston's Children First, 244 F.3d at 168 n. 7; see also Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (ordinary admonishments (whether or not legally supportable) to counsel and to witnesses were inadequate to establish bias or prejudice where they occurred in the course of judicial proceedings, and neither . . . relied upon knowledge acquired outside such proceedings nor . . . displayed deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible) (emphasis omitted). 114 Here, though, the government's complaints focus on the delay of trial due to the court's conducting an investigation of the prosecution, which investigation is ancillary to its rulings in the main criminal case. This petition is not about a judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration, Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556, 114 S.Ct. 1147, nor about judicial remarks . . . that are critical of counsel or a party, id. at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147. A judge's investigation of a prosecutor's office under the label of government misconduct as to the grand jury is not just a ruling in the ordinary course. It poses the risk that the line be crossed between executive and judicial roles, and between the formulation and evaluation of positions in litigation. In re United States, 398 F.3d at 618. This fact means that recusal is not precluded here by the extrajudicial source rule. 115 Recusal motions are difficult from the point of view of both the district court judge and the reviewing appellate court. The trial judge has a duty not to recuse himself or herself if there is no objective basis for recusal. See Snyder, 235 F.3d at 45-46 & n. 1; Blizard v. Frechette, 601 F.2d 1217, 1221 (1st Cir.1979); In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 391 (1st Cir.1961). A district judge, faced with a recusal motion, is also being asked to step outside herself or himself and take the objective view of an informed outsider. That is difficult for even a saint to do. Moreover, the trial judge has been in the heat of the proceedings, and objectivity, though sought, may be elusive. That is especially so when the proponent of the motion to recuse argues that there is actual bias on the judge's part. 116 For our part, an appellate court has no wish to encourage strategic moves by a disgruntled party to remove a judge whose rulings the party dislikes. [T]he disqualification decision must reflect not only the need to secure public confidence through proceedings that appear impartial, but also the need to prevent parties from too easily obtaining the disqualification of a judge, thereby potentially manipulating the system for strategic reasons, perhaps to obtain a judge more to their liking. In re Allied-Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 970 (1st Cir.1989). 117 The statutory standard we apply here, that there is no reasonable basis to question the impartiality of the judge, has high aspirations. The standard does not depend on a showing of actual bias. It requires instead that there be no reasonable question, in any informed person's mind, as to the impartiality of the judge. Under § 455(a), what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance, and [q]uite simply and quite universally, recusal [is] required whenever `impartiality might reasonably be questioned.' Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)); see also In re Boston's Children First, 244 F.3d at 167; In re United States, 158 F.3d at 31. [J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136, 75 S.Ct. 623). The very purpose of § 455(a) is to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible. Id. at 865, 108 S.Ct. 2194. 118 The appellate court is more removed and hence more objective. We are struck by the district court's insistence, in the course of denying the recusal motion, not only on continuing an investigation that had already yielded results not showing any government wrongdoing, but also on resuscitating leak claims that had been dormant for over a year. We are struck by its orders that the government disclose yet further information as to the return of the indictment by the third grand jury, even when the government had already provided explanations, despite there being little basis in the law or in fact for the inquiry. Of particular concern is the decision by the district court to delay the trial, apparently in order to reserve the power to dismiss the indictment, when there was never any realistic basis to consider dismissal of the indictment as a remedy. 119 We conclude that the cumulative effect is to establish a reasonable basis for questioning the impartiality of the district court judge. In light of that conclusion, we order recusal of the present district judge and that the case be assigned on remand to a different judge. 21 We do so with no criticism of the judge, who was faced with a series of difficult issues. We also order that on remand the case be promptly set for trial. And, in the absence of any new evidence of government misconduct under Rule 6, we order termination of the present investigation. See In re United States, 398 F.3d at 619-20.