Opinion ID: 772937
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Propriety of the Independent Medical Examination

Text: 36 Tice's next ADA claim is that CATA violated the provisions of 42 U.S.C. S 12112(d)(4) by requesting a medical examination that was not consistent with business necessity. Tice alleges that this improper examination resulted in an injury to him, because the delay occasioned by the requirement prevented him from working for the minimum six weeks necessary to interrupt the expiration of his two years of medical leave, eventually resulting in his discharge. Therefore, Tice requests monetary damages to remedy the alleged violation. 37 We have held that Tice is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, and it is not clear from the text of the ADA itself whether nondisabled individuals are permitted to sue for violations of S 12112(d). See, e.g., Watson v. City of Miami Beach, 177 F.3d 932, 935 (11th Cir. 1999) (declining to reach the question whether nondisabled individuals have a cause of action for violations of S 12112(d)); Armstrong v. Turner Indus., 141 F.3d 554, 559 (5th Cir. 1998) (same). As have many of our sister circuits, we leave for another day the question whether the ADA permits nondisabled individuals to sue, because it is clear that in this case, CATA's requirement of an IME was permissible under the statute. The evidence surrounding CATA's request amply demonstrates that the examination was consistent with business necessity, and Tice has submitted virtually no evidence of his own in rebuttal. 38 Throughout the course of his dealings with CATA, Tice complained of severe pain and difficulty walking to the point of requiring narcotic medication. Moreover, he had apparently experienced spasms that interfered with his use of his legs such that CATA had received complaints about reckless driving. There is no question that such a history raised legitimate safety concerns about Tice's ability to drive a bus. Tice does not even appear to dispute that CATA had cause to inquire about his medical condition. Rather, Tice submits that CATA should have been content with being permitted to question Dr. Kuhlengel instead of forcing Tice to undergo a new medical examination. Therefore, we will review the information CATA had at the time of its request for an IME. 39 In July 1995, during Tice's medical leave, Dr. Kuhlengel wrote to CATA explaining that if Tice were to receive surgery, his chances of being able to return to his job were good to excellent, but that if he did not receive surgery, his prognosis for return to full duties is limited. In April 1996, Tice informed CATA that he would be undergoing surgery in July of that year, but in June he submitted the note from Dr. Kuhlengel stating that he could perform his duties with special seating. Around this time, he also informed CATA that he had canceled the planned surgery. While Tice was on leave, CATA informed him that to return, he would be required to submit doctor's certification that he could drive without risk. The certificate actually submitted did not mention risk or the safety of Tice or of his passengers, and, in fact, a supplement to the certificate was sent a few days later stating that Tice would be able to man new lift equipped buses with associated duties as tolerated (emphasis added). When CATA requested that Dr. Kuhlengel provide more information about Tice's condition, Dr. Kuhlengel explained by letter that I, as you are, am very concerned about passenger safety, and I'm relying on Mr. Tice's assessment of his capabilities, in that he feels he can perform the duties under safe conditions. 40 Such evidence allows no serious dispute that CATA was fully justified in its decision not to rely exclusively on Dr. Kuhlengel for an assessment of Tice's ability to perform his job. Dr. Kuhlengel had first recommended surgery, and provided no explanation as to his change of opinion. His diagnosis rested largely on Tice's own evaluation of his abilities, and his Return to Work Certificate essentially (and tautologically) stated no more than that Tice would be able to perform his duties as much as Tice could perform them. We believe that, under these facts, CATA's unwillingness to rely on Dr. Kuhlengel's opinion was reasonable, and that its request for an IME was consistent with business necessity in order to ensure the safety of its passengers. See, e.g., Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 804, 809 n.2 (6th Cir. 1999) (once an employee's ability to perform his job has been placed in doubt, an employer may require a medical examination with a doctor of its choosing); Yin v. California, 95 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1996) ([W]hen health problems have had a substantial and injurious impact on an employee's job performance, the employer can require the employee to undergo a physical examination designed to determine his or her ability to work. . . .). 41 Tice contends that CATA's request for an IME was not consistent with business necessity because CATA had never before or since requested an IME. Tice particularly emphasizes that on one occasion, an employee diagnosed with sleep apnea was permitted to return to work after four months' absence with only a doctor's certification as to his abilities. We find this evidence insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to the business necessity of CATA's request for an IME from Tice. 42 The ADA's requirement that an IME be consistent with business necessity is an objective one. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1119 n.6 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining that an employer's subjective belief in the necessity of a practice with discriminatory impact is not sufficient to escape Title VII liability). That is, even a good faith mandatory medical examination by an employer may nevertheless give rise to liability if the court determines that the examination was unwarranted. Cf. Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 193 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that there is no reasonable mistake defense to a claim of discrimination on the basis of disability where the mistake is premised on a generalized misunderstanding of the effects of the plaintiff 's disability). However, an employer's standard practice with regard to medical examinations is certainly relevant evidence of what is necessary (as suggested above, CATA did not usually require them), and, just as we routinely hold that evidence of differential treatment among similarly situated employees is probative on the issue of discrimination in Title VII suits, see, e.g., Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 353-54 (3d Cir. 1999), an employer's differential application of a medical examination requirement is relevant evidence of what is necessary to the employer's business. 43 Nonetheless, we do not believe that Tice has produced evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to the necessity of the IME to which he was subject. If we are to compare the application of an IME requirement across employees, we must first establish that the employees are, in fact, similarly situated. 10 But Tice has submitted no details regarding this other (sleepy) employee; we do not know, for instance, the exact nature of that employee's illness, or whether the doctor who signed his Return to Work Certificate provided more details about the employee's condition than did Dr. Kuhlengel about Tice's impairment. Tice cannot survive summary judgment on such a minimal record. 44 Moreover, any comparison between employees must be made with an eye to the ultimate inquiry, i.e., the necessity of the examination of the plaintiff. Although disparate treatment across employees may assist the factfinder in an otherwise uncertain case as to what the job really requires, it cannot suffice to create an issue of fact as to necessity in a case such as this one, where the evidence is overwhelming that CATA had good reason to be doubtful of Tice's abilities and to distrust the opinions of Dr. Kuhlengel. 45 For these reasons, we conclude that the IME was job-related and fully consistent with business necessity, and will affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment to CATA on the issue of CATA's compliance with the medical examination provisions of 42 U.S.C.S 12112(d).