Opinion ID: 715681
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether government must request information

Text: 7 The Government argues that the district court erred in applying the safety valve provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which the Sentencing Commission adopted verbatim in U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. 1 We review a sentencing court's decision to apply § 5C1.2 for clear error. See United States v. Rodriguez, 60 F.3d 193, 195 n. 1 (5th Cir.) (court's refusal to apply § 5C1.2 is a factual finding reviewed for clear error), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 542, 133 L.Ed.2d 446 (1995). However, a district court's interpretation of the safety valve provision is reviewed de novo. Id. 8 The Government argues that the district court should not have applied the safety valve because Flanagan did not satisfy subsection five. Subsection five provides that, by the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant must have truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence he has regarding the offenses. 9 At the second sentencing hearing, the Government argued that Flanagan had not complied with subsection five, to which the district court inquired whether the Government had ever asked Flanagan for any such information. The Government responded that although no requests for information had been made, it did not believe that it had the responsibility to do so. The court replied that the Government could not complain regarding Flanagan's lack of answering questions if you don't ask him the questions. 10 This Court has not addressed the question whether the Government has the burden of attempting to solicit information from the defendant in the context of the safety valve provision. The Fourth Circuit, however, has addressed this specific question and determined that the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that he has supplied the Government with truthful information regarding the offenses at issue. United States v. Ivester, 75 F.3d 182, 185-86 (4th Cir.1996). In Ivester, the Fourth Circuit deemed the language of § 3553(f)(5) plain and unambiguous in that it obligated defendants to affirmatively demonstrate that they have provided truthful information to the Government. 75 F.3d at 184-85. The Fourth Circuit also acknowledged that the construction it gave to § 3553(f) was consistent with other Circuits' opinions that had analyzed this provision. Id. at 185. 2 See United States v. Acosta-Olivas, 71 F.3d 375, 378 (10th Cir.1995); United States v. Rodriguez, 69 F.3d 136, 143 (7th Cir.1995). United States v. Wrenn, 66 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1995). 11 In Wrenn, supra, the defendant argued that he had complied with subsection five when, unbeknownst to him, he was recorded by an undercover agent discussing his plans to distribute cocaine and when he pleaded guilty to the charges against him. The First Circuit rejected this rather innovative argument, explaining that [s]ection 3553(f)(5) contemplates an affirmative act of cooperation with the government.... Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 12 Additionally, in Rodriguez, the district court refused to apply the safety valve provision, stating that the defendant had not provided the names of certain persons involved in the offense. 69 F.3d at 143. On appeal, the defendant argued that such a failure should not disqualify him from the application of the safety valve because the court did not hold a hearing on the issue or make a finding that the other persons existed. The Seventh Circuit explained that the defendant was ineligible for the safety valve because he had furnished no information regarding the offense and that the failure to identify his coconspirators was just an example of the kind of information the defendant failed to provide. If the defendant did not know the identity of the persons referred to by the district court, then he at least should have communicated that fact to the government in order to qualify for the reduction. Id.; see also Acosta-Olivas, 71 F.3d at 379 (opining that defendant must disclose all his knowledge of the offense to the Government, including the conduct of his coconspirators). 13 Likewise, we conclude that the language of the safety valve provision indicates that the burden is on the defendant to provide the Government with all information and evidence regarding the offense. There is no indication that the Government must solicit the information. Further, the provision explains that if the information is not useful to the Government or if the Government is already aware of the information, the court is not precluded from finding that the defendant has sufficiently complied with subsection five, thus illustrating that the focus of subsection five is on the defendant's providing information, rather than on the Government's need for information. 3 14 Moreover, as a general rule, the party seeking the adjustment in the sentence is the party that has the burden of proving the facts to support the adjustment. United States v. Ayala, 47 F.3d 688, 690 (5th Cir.1995). It would appear anomalous to place the burden on the Government to solicit information from the defendant in the context of the safety valve provision in cases in which the Government is aware of all the relevant or useful facts of the offense. 15 Accordingly, we hold that the defendant has the burden of ensuring that he has provided all the information and evidence regarding the offense to the Government. This he must do no later than at the time of the sentencing hearing regardless whether the Government requests such information. In short, defendants cannot claim the benefit of [the safety valve provision] by the mere fact that the Government never sought them out for debriefing. Ivester, 75 F.3d at 185-86. 16 Because the district court's interpretation of the provision erroneously placed the burden on the Government, it is not clear from the record whether Flanagan was willing to provide the Government with the required information at the time of sentencing. We therefore remand the case for the limited purpose of determining whether the safety valve provision was available to Flanagan. Specifically, the district court should determine whether Flanagan failed to provide the Government with the information based on the court's erroneous interpretation of the provision. Acosta-Olivas, 71 F.3d at 380. If so, the court shall allow him the opportunity to comply with the provision as set forth in this opinion and if satisfied that he has so complied, the court may utilize the safety valve provision and reimpose the sentence last imposed. If not, the safety valve statute is not available, and the district court should vacate the sentence last imposed and proceed to resentence the defendant without the benefit of such provision.