Opinion ID: 2823838
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Road to Mickens

Text: Â¶18Â Â Â Â Â Â Â A defendant seeking post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel resulting from an attorneyâs alleged conflict âmust demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyerâs performance.â Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348. To understand what these words mean, we examine the context in which they emerged and how the Supreme Court has construed them. Â¶19Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In Holloway, the trial court appointed a public defender to represent three codefendants, despite objections that the codefendantsâ conflicting interests would necessarily compromise the public defenderâs ability to effectively represent each of them. 435 U.S. at 477. The trial court repeatedly denied motions for appointment of separate counsel. The Supreme Court noted that the danger with this concurrent representation lies âin what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process.â Id. at 490 (emphasis in original). For instance, conflicting representations can prevent an attorney from pursuing strategies favorable to one client that might inculpate another, like seeking a plea deal in exchange for testimony against a codefendant. Id. Holloway established an automatic reversal rule when counsel is forced to represent codefendants over a timely objection, unless the trial court first determines that no conflict exists. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168 (citing Holloway, 435 U.S. at 488). Â¶20Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In Sullivan, two private attorneys represented the defendant and his alleged co-conspirators, who were tried separately. 446 U.S. at 337â38. After the jury convicted him of murder, Sullivan argued that his attorneysâ conflicting interests denied him effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 338. Significantly, no one had objected to the concurrent representation at trial. Id. at 337â38. Â¶21Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The Court explained that although concurrent representation of codefendants almost always involves conflicts, a reviewing court may presume that counsel was ineffective only when the trial court denied a defendant the opportunity to show that the conflict imperiled his right to a fair trial. Id. at 348. The Court reasoned: Holloway requires state trial courts to investigate timely objections to multiple representation. But nothing in our precedents suggests that the Sixth Amendment requires state courts themselves to initiate inquiries into the propriety of multiple representation in every case. Defense counsel have an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representations and to advise the court promptly when a conflict of interest arises during the course of trial. Absent special circumstances, therefore, trial courts may assume either that multiple representation entails no conflict or that the lawyer and his clients knowingly accept such risk of conflict as may exist. Indeed, as the Court noted in Holloway, trial courts necessarily rely in large measure upon the good faith and good judgment of defense counsel. Id. at 346â47 (citations omitted). Thus, without a defendantâs objection, the mere fact that an attorney concurrently represented codefendants was insufficient to prompt a court to initiate an inquiry into possible conflicts of interest. Id. Â¶22Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The Sullivan Court held that to obtain reversal absent objection, a defendant must show that a conflict actually affected the adequacy of the representation. Id. at 348â49. âThis requires showing both that counsel was placed in a situation where conflicting loyalties pointed in opposite directions (an âactual conflictâ) and that counsel proceeded to act against the defendantâs interests (âadversely affect[ing] his performanceâ).â 3 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure Â§ 11.9(d) (3d ed. 2013). Â¶23Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Holloway and Sullivan apply to conflicts arising from multiple concurrent representation. The Supreme Court later announced a different standard for other ineffectiveness claims. In Strickland, the defendant sought post-conviction relief, alleging that counsel was ineffective during his sentencing proceeding. 466 U.S. at 675. The Court held that the purpose of the right to counsel is to ensure a fair trial and to justify reliance on the verdict, and therefore âany deficiencies in counselâs performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution.â Id. at 692. âThe defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counselâs unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.â Id. at 694. Â¶24Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Sullivan, then, occupies a middle ground between Hollowayâs per se reversal rule and Stricklandâs requirement that a defendant demonstrate prejudice to the outcome of the trial. See Dunlap, 173 P.3d at 1073 n.24 (âThe [Sullivan] standard operates as an exception to the normal requirements of Strickland.â). The Sullivan exception applies âneeded prophylaxis in situations where Strickland itself is evidently inadequate to assure vindication of the defendantâs Sixth Amendment right to counsel.â Mickens, 535 U.S. at 176. Â¶25Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In the years immediately following Sullivan, it was unclear whether defendants needed to show a separate adverse effect in addition to a conflict of interest when addressing ineffective assistance claims based on multiple concurrent representation. The Supreme Court created some confusion in Wood when it vacated the defendantsâ convictions and remanded with the instruction that â[i]f the court finds that an actual conflict of interest existed at that time . . . it must hold a new revocation hearing that is untainted by a legal representative serving conflicting interests.â 450 U.S. at 273â74. Conspicuously absent from this instruction was any mention of an adverse effect resulting from the conflict, leading some courts to conclude that a separate showing was not required. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171â72 (rejecting the argument that Woodâs remand instruction eliminated the need to show adverse effect). Â¶26Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Before Mickens, this court concluded that a defendant need not separately show that counselâs performance was adversely affected by a conflict. Castro, 657 P.2d at 944â45. In Castro, the defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer simultaneously represented the district attorney for the same judicial district in unrelated proceedings. Id. at 936. This dual representation created âa real and substantial conflict that placed the defense attorney in a situation inherently conducive to and productive of divided loyalties.â Id. at 945. We concluded that â[a] lawyer representing such conflicting interests cannot avoid being adversely affected at various stages of the criminal prosecution of an accused,â and we reversed and remanded without considering what adverse effect, if any, the concurrent representation may have had. Id. at 944â46. 6 Â¶27Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Two years later, in Armstrong v. People, 701 P.2d 17, 26 (Colo. 1985), Justice Quinn, who penned the majority opinion in Castro, specially concurred to argue that âthe Supreme Court did not intend to require proof of adverse effect as a necessary component of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on an actual conflict of interest.â But the majority in Armstrong did not resolve the tension between Sullivanâs requirement that a defendant show an adverse effect and Woodâs suggestion that an âactual conflict of interestâ alone suffices. Id. at 20â21. Â¶28Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Mickens resolved this tension. In Mickens, the Supreme Court clarified that the phrase âactual conflict of interestâ in Woodâs remand instruction was shorthand for Sullivanâs holding: As used in the remand instruction, however, we think âan actual conflict of interestâ meant precisely a conflict that affected counselâsÂ performanceâas opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties. It was shorthand for the statement in Sullivan that âa defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of hisÂ representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.â 535 U.S. at 171 (emphasis in original). â[T]he Sullivan standard is not properly read as requiring inquiry into actual conflict as something separate and apart from adverse effect. An âactual conflict,â for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counselâs performance.â Id. at 211 n.5. Thus, a defendant who alleges that a conflict of interest deprived him of effective assistance of counsel must show (1) that counsel had a conflict of interest (2) that adversely affected the representation. Â¶29Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Because Castro eliminated the need for defendants to demonstrate an adverse effect, Mickens implicitly overruled it; therefore, we do so explicitly now.