Opinion ID: 2653672
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: p.p., 20.

Text: ¶14 In defining a child-parent relationship, § 40-4-211(6), MCA, imposes a lengthy list of conjunctive factors that all must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Despite Moats’s efforts to establish that she “willingly accepted and performed the responsibilities and obligations of co-parenting with her daughter,” however, the District Court determined that Moats’s relationship with S.J.H. and J.B.H. was that of an involved grandmother, not a parent. The record supports this conclusion. ¶15 Unlike the facts that were found persuasive in M.M.G. or L.F.A., the District Court here determined that Moats’s care was sporadic, and that her presence had been even a disruptive factor in the family’s life. The court found that Hansen and Brandi’s relationship was “negatively impacted by [Moats’s] interference or involvement.” She did not provide care to S.J.H. during the time he lived in New York or Washington. The 6 court provided the following analysis of Moats’s claim that she established a child-parent relationship: [Moats’s] assertion is not persuasive. Brandi qualified for a housing voucher which paid all but $47 of the rent. Brandi received HRDC assistance for child care. Brandi received food stamps for her and the children. [Moats’s] Social Security disability income of approximately $800 per month is her sole source of income and was used primarily for her own support. Without Brandi and the public assistance support she received, [Moats] would have likely had a difficult time providing for herself. While [Moats] no doubt provided some babysitting and assistance to Brandi, it was as a caring grandmother[,] not [as] a parent. ¶16 The court ultimately found that, while “[Moats] has a strong grandparent bond with [S.J.H. and J.B.H.], [she] has not established a parent-child relationship between her and [S.J.H.] or her and [J.B.H.].” Although Moats submitted evidence to show that she attended the children’s medical appointments, took them to school and day care, and stepped in when Hansen was not present, the testimony revealed significant conflicts that the District Court was in the best position to resolve. “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party” and “do not consider whether evidence supports findings that are different from those made by the district court.” As oft-repeated in matters of child custody, “the trial court determines the credibility of witnesses and the weight assigned to their respective testimony.” A.P.P., ¶ 7. ¶17 Because all elements of the statute must be met by clear and convincing evidence for a person other than a natural parent to be awarded a parental interest, we decline to address Moats’s arguments under the other elements of § 40-4-228(2), MCA. In particular, without proof of a child-parent relationship, a court need not proceed to determine whether the natural parent engaged in conduct that is contrary to the 7 child-parent relationship. This Court recognizes the District Court’s findings in the dissolution action regarding Hansen’s history of domestic violence. The District Court expressed its concern that “there is potential for James to model inappropriate behavior to his children.” Section 40-4-212, MCA, explaining the “best interests of the child” standard, provides, “(1) The court shall determine the parenting plan in accordance with the best interest of the child. The court shall consider all relevant parenting factors, which may include but are not limited to: . . . (f) physical abuse or threat of physical abuse by one parent against the other parent or the child.” This factor, and others listed in the statute, are for a court to consider when allocating arrangements between parents or persons who have a proven parent-child relationship. Without that relationship, another person may not ask the court to restrict a natural parent’s rights in a civil parenting proceeding.