Opinion ID: 2825258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Hanover Ins. Co. v. N. Bldg. Co., 751 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate where the admissible evidence reveals no genuine issue of any material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916, 922 (7th Cir. 2001). A fact is “material” if it is one identified by the law as affecting the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. We “construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013). Here, Sweatt is the non-moving party. So we construe all facts and reasonable inferences in his favor. 4 Under the CMP, the parties must file a “joint” statement of undisputed facts. 10 No. 14-2451
Our discussion begins with Sweatt’s FELA claims. The FELA affords redress to injured employees of railroad companies that are engaged in interstate commerce. 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.; see also Conrail v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542 (1994) (“Cognizant of the physical dangers of railroading that resulted in the death or maiming of thousands of workers every year, Congress crafted a federal remedy that shifted part of the human overhead of doing business from employees to their employers.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In crafting this remedy, Congress imposed a threeyear statute of limitations. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (“No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless commenced within three years from the day the cause of action accrued.”). In cases like this one, where the statute of limitations is at issue, the date of accrual is key. Accrual is defined in two parts: notice of injury and notice of cause. See Fries v. Chicago & Nw. Transp. Co., 909 F.2d 1092, 1095 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[O]nce a plaintiff is in possession of the critical facts of both injury and governing cause of that injury the action accrues even though he may be unaware that a legal wrong has oc- curred.”) (citation omitted). Actual notice is not required for accrual. Tolston v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 102 F.3d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 1996). After a condition manifests itself, the question becomes whether the plaintiff knew or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the cause of his injury. Id. Here, Sweatt was on notice of his injuries and the cause of his injuries as early as May or June 2009. Sweatt testified that he first observed his hand and shoulder pain in the summer months of 2009: “I started having [shoulder] pain No. 14-2451 11 during 2009 … like in the summer.” When asked if it was “in June or July or August,” he answered, “I know it was … warm. It might have been before then.” Dr. Coates corroborated that testimony. He testified that Sweatt first noticed his hand pain in May of 2009. And Nurse Practitioner Valentin’s notes from Sweatt’s November 19, 2009, appointment states that he experienced “pain in his hands for quite a while now.” Clearly then, Sweatt’s injury manifested itself well before November 30, 2009—the critical three-year mark from his filing in district court. See Green v. CSX Transp., Inc., 414 F.3d 758, 763 (7th Cir. 2005) (“When the specific date of injury cannot be determined because an injury results from continual exposure to a harmful condition over a period of time, a plaintiff’s cause of action accrues when the injury manifests itself.”). Sweatt’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. He first argues that “intermittent pain associated with a minor injury” is insufficient to trigger accrual of a claim under the FELA. We do not disagree with that proposition of law, see Green, 414 F.3d at 764; we disagree with its applicability to this case. Sweatt’s own testimony belies the notion that he experienced “intermittent pain associated with a minor injury.” Indeed, he described his shoulder pain as “unbearable,” particularly when using the claw bar.5 He testified that he needed help from his coworkers to use that tool. And by November 30, 2009 (exactly three years before he filed this action), Dr. Coates opined that Sweatt could no longer per- 5 We are unsure why Sweatt questions the district court’s reliance on this fact. It is beyond dispute that he testified to enduring “unbearable” pain. 12 No. 14-2451 form the work as a Trackman.6 To be sure, Sweatt testified that he did not miss work as a result of these injuries. But his effort in working in the face of injury does not forestall the date of accrual. Sweatt next argues that he was unaware that his malady was anything more than muscle soreness. This plea of ignorance is similar to the argument the appellant advanced in Fries. In that case, the appellant argued that the statute of limitations for his FELA claim was tolled until a doctor diagnosed him with the relevant injury. 909 F.2d at 1095. We rejected that argument, and held that a plaintiff cannot wait until he receives a medical diagnosis to begin pursuit of his claim. Id. We are not alone in this approach. In the cause-ofinjury context, the Fifth Circuit also rejects the use of a medical diagnosis as a starting point for the statute of limitations. See Emmons v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 701 F.2d 1112, 1122 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[W]e think it sufficient for purposes of commencement of the limitations period that the plaintiff knew his complained of condition was work related, and that it is not additionally necessary that he have been formally so advised by a physician.”). Regarding cause of injury, Sweatt immediately linked his pain to his employment with Union Pacific. He testified that he first noticed the pain when he started doing a lot of tamping on the railroad tracks. He called his shoulder pain “unbearable,” particularly when he would use the claw bar—a tool specific to his job at Union Pacific. Nurse Practitioner 6Dr. Coates performed corrective surgery on Sweatt’s shoulder in March 2010. No. 14-2451 13 Valentin’s November 19, 2009, note corroborates the workrelated nature of the injury. She wrote that Sweatt “does repetitive motion at his job” (emphasis added). And Dr. Coates also testified that Sweatt associated the pain with his work. This connection is no leap of logic. After all, Sweatt had performed heavy-duty jobs at Union Pacific for a period of nearly three years. Like a machinist who, after years working in a loud, industrial room, develops hearing loss, Fries, 909 F.2d at 1093–94, Sweatt knew or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that his injuries were caused by his work for Union Pacific. Based on our de novo review of the record, Sweatt’s FELA claims for the injuries to his shoulder and hands began to accrue well before November 30, 2009. That puts them outside the relevant three-year period, rendering them timebarred by the statute of limitations.
Sweatt’s next issue concerns his prima facie cases of age and race discrimination. He brings these claims in light of Union Pacific’s failure to hire him as a Security Officer.7 Because Sweatt did not present direct evidence that he was discriminated against, the district court resorted to the burdenshifting method of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 7 Given the briefing in this case, it is unclear whether Sweatt’s race discrimination claim is brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, or the Civil Rights Acts of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Appellant’s Br. 36.) Sweatt’s complaint alleges a violation under § 1981, so our analysis proceeds under that statute. 14 No. 14-2451 792, 802–05 (1973).8 Under this method, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied for and was qualified for an open position; (3) despite his qualifications, he was rejected for the position; and (4) a similarly situated person outside his protected class was hired for the position instead, or the position remained open. Gore v. Ind. Univ., 416 F.3d 590, 592 (7th Cir. 2005). We note that this familiar burden-shifting framework also applies to age discrimination claims under the ADEA. Krchnavy v. Limagrain Genetics Corp., 294 F.3d 871, 875 (7th Cir. 2002). In any event, if a plaintiff can establish this prima facie case, then the defendant must present evidence demonstrating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring the plaintiff for the position. Norman-Nunnery v. Madison Area Tech. Coll., 625 F.3d 422, 432 (7th Cir. 2010). The plaintiff must then present evidence that the stated reason for not hiring was merely pretextual. Zaccagnini v. Chas. Levy Circulating Co., 338 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2003). Pretext is defined as “a dishonest explanation, a lie rather than an oddity or an error.” Peele v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 326 (7th Cir. 2002). Here, Sweatt cannot make out a prima facie case for either age- or race-based discrimination. Specifically, he fails to establish the final prong dealing with similarly situated indi- 8Although the district court laid out the McDonell Douglas framework, it proceeded directly to analysis of pretext. Sweatt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 12 C 9579, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76156, at -23 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2014). No. 14-2451 15 viduals.9 Although similarly situated individuals “need not be identical in every conceivable way,” they “must be ‘directly comparable’ to the plaintiff ‘in all material respects[.]’” Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012). This record reveals no candidates for the Security Officer position—past or present—who were comparable to Sweatt in all material respects, and yet were treated more favorably than he was (i.e. hired). We begin our analysis with Sweatt’s race discrimination claim under § 1981. Union Pacific offered nineteen people jobs as Security Officers in the past five years. Sweatt uses these individuals as his comparators. Discovery revealed their racial makeup: fifteen were Caucasian, three were Hispanic, and one was African-American. Nine of these individuals hailed from the Northern Region where Sweatt sought his Chicago position. Of those individuals, one was outside Sweatt’s protected class and was untruthful on the topic of traffic citations in his paper application. He was hired. But importantly, that candidate immediately rectified the discrepancy in his paper application during his interview. Sweatt, by contrast, did not. During Sweatt’s interview, he denied being arrested, and he corrected himself only when confronted by Agent Weller with the specific details of the arrest. That makes Sweatt and this particular comparator qualitatively different. 9 Union Pacific appears to concede that Sweatt was qualified for the position of Security Officer, which satisfies prong 2 of Sweatt’s prima facie case. Although we doubt that an applicant who is not forthright in an interview is qualified for a position that depends on honesty and integrity, we accept Union Pacific’s concession for purposes of our analysis. 16 No. 14-2451 The same story plays out when we consider individuals hired by Union Pacific for Security Officer outside the Northern Region. Three individuals from this pool also had prior arrests and/or charges brought against them. Unlike Sweatt, however, each of these individuals forthrightly admitted to their prior misdeeds during the interviews. Collectively, then, these comparators are not comparable to Sweatt in all material aspects. It’s not the initial lie; it’s the cover-up, the persistence in the lie. Sweatt, unlike each of his purported comparators, engaged in the latter activity. The comparators, therefore, are not directly comparable in all material respects, Coleman, 667 F.3d at 846, and Sweatt cannot establish his prima facie case for race discrimination. Sweatt’s alternative argument, that members outside his protected racial class were treated more favorably than he was because some of their summary reports do not state that they had background checks performed, is also unavailing. The fact that a summary report does not contain language indicating that a background check was performed does not mean that it was not performed. It simply means that the check, if one occurred, was not included in the report. And even if this argument somehow satisfied Sweatt’s prima facie case, which it does not, Sweatt presents no evidence suggesting that Union Pacific’s reason for not hiring him—his dishonesty during the interview—is pretextual. EEOC v. Target Corp., 460 F.3d 946, 960 (7th Cir. 2006) (“To satisfy [pretext], a plaintiff must show that (a) the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason was dishonest; and (b) the employer’s true reason was based on discriminatory intent.”). Our § 1981 analysis applies with equal force to Sweatt’s ADEA claim. Sweatt was born on August 6, 1956, so on the No. 14-2451 17 date of his interview, March 16, 2011, he was fifty-four. Under the ADEA, that means he was a member of a protected class, 29 U.S.C. § 631 (“The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age.”), which covers prong 1 of his prima facie case. Union Pacific does not contest prongs 2 or 3. It does not have to. Because once again, the insurmountable hurdle for Sweatt is prong 4. None of Sweatt’s purported comparators made the same fatal mistake that Sweatt made during his interview— persisting in a lie about criminal history. As a result, his comparators are not similar in all material respects, and Sweatt cannot make out his prima facie case for age discrimination. Before we address Sweatt’s argument regarding the district court’s CMP, we pause to make some final observations on the discrimination claims. We do not doubt Sweatt’s explanation that the Flossmoor arrest was a misunderstanding, that the judge tossed the case, and that Sweatt remained friends with all relevant parties. But these facts, which we accept as true, do not change the fact that Sweatt was not forthcoming about the incident during his interview. In the context of an interview for a position where honesty and integrity are paramount (Girard told him so), Sweatt’s lack of candor understandably served as the death knell for his candidacy. Sweatt offers no evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that the true reason behind the failure to hire was age or race discrimination. C. The District Court’s Summary Judgment Procedure Sweatt argues that the district court’s CMP denies a nonmovant the ability to respond to the movant’s statement of facts. He further argues that the CMP prohibits a non18 No. 14-2451 movant from submitting additional facts that he believes would defeat the motion. This, he contends, contravenes Local Rule 56.1. And in this case, he claims, it prejudiced him below. We disagree. Our analysis begins with the relevant portion of Judge El- lis’s CMP: Motions for summary judgment and responses must comply with Local Rules 56.1(a)(1)–(2) and 56.1(b)(1)–(2), as well as the procedures outlined herein. Parties are directed to file a joint statement of undisputed material facts that the parties agree are not in dispute. The joint statement must in- clude—for each undisputed fact—citations to ad- missible evidence. The joint statement of undisputed material facts shall be filed separately from the memoranda of law and shall include the line, para- graph, or page number where the supporting mate- rial may be found in the record. The parties may not file—and the court will not consider— separate documents of undisputed facts. If the nonmoving party refuses to join in the statement, the moving party will nevertheless be permitted to file the motion, accompanied by a separate declaration of counsel explaining why a joint statement was not filed. Failure to stipulate to an undisputed fact without a reasonable basis for doing so may result in sanctions. Judge Sara L. Ellis, Case Management Procedures, available at http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.7thcircuitbar.org/resource/res mgr/2014_materials/Ellis.pdf (last visited July 24, 2015) (emphasis in original). No. 14-2451 19 This CMP is concerned solely with a statement of undisputed material facts to which both parties agree. Nothing in this CMP prohibits one party from responding to another party’s version of the disputed facts. And nothing in this CMP prohibits a party from submitting additional facts, as the need may arise. The laudable goal of this CMP is to remove the chaff from the grain in a given case, thereby allowing the parties—and the court—to focus on the facts that are actually in dispute. Judge Ellis’s CMP does not disadvantage a party. If a par- ty refuses to agree to a joint statement, that party can still proceed with its motion for summary judgment. It simply must include a statement explaining why the joint statement was not filed. We note that in this case, the district court allowed Sweatt to amend the joint statement by including five additional facts. That procedure inured to Sweatt’s benefit here. Further, by its own terms, the CMP conforms to the Local Rules of the Northern District of Illinois. The relevant Local Rule, 56.1, directs each party to file “a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue … .” N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1 (emphasis added). That rule aspires to the goal achieved by Judge Ellis’s CMP—agreeing that certain material facts are beyond dispute. In practice, however, there is a difference between contending that a fact is beyond dispute and agreeing that a fact is beyond disputed. Local Rule 56.1(3) focuses on the former. The Committee Comment acknowledges this fact. N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1 cmt. (“The judges of this Court have observed that parties fre- quently include in their LR56.1 statements facts that are unnecessary to the motion and/or are disputed.”) (emphasis 20 No. 14-2451 added). Judge Ellis’s CMP, on the other hand, encourages the parties to work together to focus on the latter. We find no fault in that. And we certainly find no inconsistency between the CMP and Local Rule 56.1. Because we find Local Rule 56.1 wholly consistent with Judge Ellis’s CMP, we need not discuss Sweatt’s remaining argument concerning Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 (allowing a judge to “regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075, and the district court’s local rules”). It is without merit.