Opinion ID: 2614979
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The second amended complaint

Text: Soebbing argues that the district court denied him procedural due process by granting his motion to amend his first amended complaint and immediately thereafter granting Carpet Barn summary judgment as to the proposed second amended complaint. In so doing, argues Soebbing, the district court did not give him adequate notice pursuant to NRCP 56(c) [4] and an opportunity to respond to the motion for summary judgment as to the proposed second amended complaint. We agree. Although district courts have the inherent power to enter summary judgment sua sponte pursuant to rule 56, that power is contingent upon giving the losing party notice that it must defend its claim. United States Dev. Corp. v. Peoples Federal Sav. & Loan, 873 F.2d 731, 735 (4th Cir.1989). The notice should provide the full ten days described in rule 56(c). Id. In U.S. Dev. Corp., when respondent moved for summary judgment, appellant moved to amend the complaint (by adding a new count) and, at the same time, opposed the motion for summary judgment. Id. at 733-34. Respondent did not seek summary judgment on the proposed new count. Id. at 734. The district court simultaneously granted appellant's motion to amend and respondent's motion for summary judgment on the original complaint. The district court also entered summary judgment sua sponte on appellant's new claim, holding that it did not add anything new to the claims alleged. Id. The court rejected respondent's argument that the new count did not add anything new: [Respondent] contends that summary judgment on the new count was appropriate because the count did not contain any additional facts that would create a genuine issue of material fact. This argument misses the point. Appellants' right to notice and an opportunity to be heard on its claim has nothing to do with the merits of its case. Once the district court allowed the claim to be added to the complaint, it could be disposed of only in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure and the dictates of due process. Id. 873 F.2d at 736 (emphasis added). Thus the court held that regardless of a claim's merit, a district court may not sua sponte enter summary judgment against it until the claim's proponent has been given notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Id.; accord Reese v. Sparks, 760 F.2d 64, 66 (3d Cir.1985). We agree with the reasoning in U.S. Dev. Corp. and conclude that Soebbing was not given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed new complaint. [5] In fact, the district court granted judgment against this complaint before Soebbing filed it. As noted in U.S. Dev. Corp., courts should be cautious of last-second amendments alleging meritless claims in an attempt to save a case from summary judgment: the proper method to deal with such tactics is to deny leave to amend on grounds of futility. U.S. Dev. Corp., 873 F.2d at 736, n. 4. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the summary judgment as to the first amended complaint and reverse the summary judgment as to the second amended complaint. Because of our disposition of this case, we need not address Soebbing's appeal from the order denying his motion to re-tax costs. Accordingly, we remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [6]