Opinion ID: 169651
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Expressions of Opinion

Text: To state a cause of action for defamation under Colorado law, the plaintiff must allege (1) a defamatory statement concerning another; (2) published to a third party; (3) with fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special damages or the existence of special damages to the plaintiff caused by the publication. Williams v. Dist. Ct., Second Judicial Dist., 866 P.2d 908, 911 n. 4 (Colo.1993). This case turns on the first element. The specific issue before us is how to distinguish a defamatory statement from a protected expression of opinion. We must consider two sources of law to resolve the issue. One is the Restatement. The Restatement recognizes two types of defamatory communication: (1) statements of fact, see Restatement § 565, and (2) expressions of opinion, see id. § 566. Of the latter, the Restatement states: A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion. Id. § 566. The other source is the United States Supreme Court's discussion in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), of the constitutional protection for expressions of opinion. In resolving contentions that a statement is a protected expression of opinion, the Colorado Supreme Court has referred to both the Restatement and Milkovich. To the extent that it adopts the Restatement as a matter of state common law, we are bound. To the extent that it relies on Milkovich, however, we follow the Colorado court's interpretation of the United States Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence only insofar as we agree with that interpretation. Accordingly, it is important that we compare Milkovich 's holding to the Restatement's provisions to determine whether the latter provides greater protection than Milkovich in the circumstances of this case. If it does, we must predict whether the Colorado Supreme Court would recognize that additional restriction on defamation claims. We begin with an analysis of Milkovich. The Milkovich Court rejected the suggestion that it add to previous doctrine a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled `opinion.' 497 U.S. at 18, 110 S.Ct. 2695. In its view, use of the term opinion obscures analysis, and the purposes to be served by such an exemption were already well served by existing doctrine. Concerning the first point the Court observed that expressions of `opinion' may often imply an assertion of objective fact. Id. It explained: If a speaker says, In my opinion John Jones is a liar, he implies a knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones told an untruth. Even if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if his assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false assertion of fact. Simply couching such statements in terms of opinion does not dispel these implications; and the statement, In my opinion Jones is a liar, can cause as much damage to reputation as the statement, Jones is a liar. As Judge Friendly aptly stated: [It] would be destructive of the law of libel if a writer could escape liability for accusations of [defamatory conduct] simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the words `I think.' See Cianci [ v. New Times Pub. Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir.1980)]. It is worthy of note that at common law, even the privilege of fair comment did not extend to a false statement of fact, whether it was expressly stated or implied from an expression of opinion. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 566, Comment a (1977). Milkovich at 18-19, 110 S.Ct. 2695. The Court then stated that existing doctrine adequately protected freedom of expression without the creation of an artificial dichotomy between `opinion' and fact. Id. at 19, 110 S.Ct. 2695. In particular, it pointed to precedent providing that a statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law, at least in situations . . . where a media defendant is involved. Id. at 19-20, 110 S.Ct. 2695. Accordingly, it continued, a statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection. Id. at 20, 110 S.Ct. 2695. The Court further observed that `rhetorical hyperbole' is protected by doctrine requiring that allegedly defamatory statements (such as the characterization of a union dissident as a traitor) reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts. Id. (brackets omitted). We note four differences between § 566 and the Supreme Court's formulation of the constitutional standard in Milkovich. First, § 566 requires that the statement (in the form of an opinion) impl[y] the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts. In other words, an opinion is not actionable if it is based on defamatory facts that are disclosed. Milkovich, in contrast, observes that [e]ven if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if his assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false assertion of fact, id. at 18-19, 110 S.Ct. 2695, thereby suggesting that the opinion is not constitutionally protected. The difference between the two formulations, however, is more apparent than real. As noted in the comments to § 566, although an opinion based on disclosed defamatory facts is not itself subject to liability, the disclosure of the defamatory facts on which the opinion rests may still create liability if the facts themselves are false; it is the publication of the defamatory facts, however, rather than the expression of opinion, that is actionable. See § 566 cmt. b (when speaker states facts on which opinion is based, [t]he statement of facts and the expression of opinion . . . are separate matters . . ., and at common law either or both could be defamatory); id. cmt. c illus. 5 (If the defendant bases his expression of a derogatory opinion . . . on his own statement of false and defamatory facts, he is subject to liability for the factual statement but not for the expression of opinion.); § 578 (liability of republisher). Thus, Restatement § 566 is no more protective than Milkovich, and we need not decide whether the Colorado Supreme Court would impose a limitation on the defamation tort beyond what Milkovich requires in this regard. A second difference between Milkovich and § 566 is that Milkovich protects statements that are not provably false only if they are on matters of public concern. 497 U.S. at 19, 110 S.Ct. 2695. Section 566 has no such restriction, see § 566 cmt. c at 173 (Although it is . . . possible that [the Supreme Court will treat] private communications on private matters . . . differently, the logic of the constitutional principle would appear to apply to all expressions of opinion of the first, or pure, type.). That difference is not material in this case, however, because the statements by Aetna and CIGNA are undoubtedly on matters of public concern. In the context of the First Amendment, a matter is of public concern when it is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of publication. City of San Diego, Cal. v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004). Whether . . . speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by [the expression's] content, form, and context . . . as revealed by the whole record. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985) (brackets and ellipses in original, internal quotation marks omitted). Although TMJI contends that the Aetna and CIGNA bulletins were not on matters of public concern, we think this contention untenable. Indeed, its pleadings below are inconsistent with its present position. The amended complaint states that The acts of Aetna and/or CIGNA [in publishing the bulletins] . . . denied suffering and injured persons the availability and use of the Christensen partial prosthetic implants and denied the public a necessary medical device . . . and . . . have, therefore, caused and continue[d] to cause great distress, pain, and suffering to the many persons who could benefit from the Christensen partial prosthetic implant. Aplt. App. at 13 (Amended Complaint). It added that dentists, oral surgeons, dental and medical clinics, and hospitals, and their patients, have relied and continue to rely upon the factual truthfulness and accuracy of the . . . statements made and disseminated by Aetna and/or CIGNA . . . regarding [TMJI]. Id. at 12. Even on appeal, TMJI's opening brief recites that approximately 30 million Americans suffer from TMJ disorders and that at least 100,000 patients had received TMJ implants between 1988 and 1998. Twenty-five thousand of its devices have been used by at least 800 hospitals and clinics. Because thousands of people, including those with TMJ disorders, those who have received or are seeking implants, and physicians and dentists treating TMJ-disorder patients, have a legitimate interest in the utility of TMJI's devices, the matter is undoubtedly of public concern. Any distinction between the Restatement and Milkovich on this issue is therefore inconsequential here. The third difference between § 566 and the Milkovich formulation is that Milkovich states that the not-provably-false test may apply only where a media defendant is involved, 497 U.S. at 19-20, 110 S.Ct. 2695, whereas § 566 contains no such requirement. We doubt that Aetna and CIGNA could properly be described as media defendants. In this respect, then, § 566 may well impose a restriction on TMJI's claim not imposed by the federal constitution. Accordingly, we must decide whether the Colorado Supreme Court would extend this protection even if not required to do so by federal constitutional law. We are confident that it would  that is, that it would not confine the reach of the protection of not-provably-false statements to those made by media defendants. Indeed, in a pre- Milkovich opinion the Colorado Supreme Court applied § 566 to a private defendant (the plaintiff's supervisor). See Bucher, 595 P.2d at 241. And more recently the Colorado Supreme Court discussed Milkovich's not-provably-false standard without a mention of the United States Supreme Court's possible media-defendant restriction and affirmed the dismissal of a claim against a defendant who had written letters to the editor without any discussion of whether the author of such letters is a media defendant. See Keohane, 882 P.2d 1293. The fourth and final difference we note between the § 566 and Milkovich formulations is in the expression of the ultimate test for whether a statement is actionable. The Restatement asks whether a statement implies the allegation of [an] undisclosed defamatory fact[ ]. Restatement § 566. Milkovich asks whether a statement is provable as false and is not rhetorical hyperbole, Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19-20, 110 S.Ct. 2695. Again, however, we believe that the tests are essentially identical in application. If no fact is implied by a statement, then there is no way to prove it false. And Milkovich 's rhetorical-hyperbole standard is simply a recognition that an expression of opinion that appears to imply an allegation of fact (such as, X is a traitor) may, in context, be mere hyperbole that a reasonable person would not view as a factual assertion. Apparently the Colorado Supreme Court also views the two formulations as congruent. In two pre- Milkovich opinions the court followed § 566 and determined whether an allegedly defamatory statement implied undisclosed defamatory facts. See Bucher, 595 P.2d at 241; Burns, 659 P.2d at 1358-60. Then in Keohane, 882 P.2d 1293, the Colorado Supreme Court stated that the standard in its precedents was subsequently fortified by Milkovich,  id. at 1297. As it explained: Milkovich and Burns . . . provide the necessary framework to determine if a statement is protected. This framework involves two inquiries. The first inquiry is whether the statement is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21 [110 S.Ct. 2695]. The second inquiry is whether reasonable people would conclude that the assertion is one of fact. Id. The factors relevant to the second inquiry are: (1) how the assertion is phrased; (2) the context of the entire statement; and (3) the circumstances surrounding the assertion, including the medium through which the information is disseminated and the audience to whom the statement is directed. Burns, 659 P.2d at 1360. Keohane, 882 P.2d at 1299 (footnotes omitted). The second inquiry is necessary only if the first inquiry is answered in the affirmative. See also id. at 1300-03; Wilson, 126 P.3d at 280 (citing Keohane for proposition that [c]ourts determine whether a statement is protected as opinion by inquiring first whether the statement is susceptible of being proved true or false. If the answer is yes, courts then inquire whether reasonable persons would conclude that the assertion is one of fact). In sum, we find little difference between § 566 and the Milkovich standard; and to the extent that the differences are relevant in this case, we are confident that Colorado would apply the more restrictive § 566 formulation. We now apply the above analysis to the parties' arguments on appeal.