Opinion ID: 170622
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Time Elapsed and Statutory Tolling

Text: 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), enacted as a part of AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 101, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217 (1996), provides a one-year time limit for filing a federal habeas petition upon a state conviction. It explains when the clock begins to tick and what circumstances stay its gears. AEDPA’s clock starts running when (A) direct appellate review ends, (B) any state-created impediment to filing is lifted, (C) a retroactive constitutional right is first recognized, or (D) the basis for the claim was reasonably discoverable—whichever comes last. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Mr. Sherratt was convicted on March 23, 2000 and sentenced on May 23, 2000. The state Court of Appeals affirmed on June 28, 2001. The deadline to petition the Utah Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari is thirty days, see Utah R. -3- App. P. 48(a), but Mr. Sherratt requested and received an extension of time to August 27, 2001. He missed the extended deadline by two days, so direct appellate review ended and Mr. Sherratt’s conviction became final on August 27, 2001, when “the time for seeking [direct] review” expired. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Mr. Sherratt asserts no newly created constitutional right that might be relevant under (C). He argues under (B) that the state created an “impediment” to the filing of his petition by denying him access to statutes including AEDPA. The averments in his filings establish, however, that he was not denied access to statutes and other materials; he had simply to request them. During the time he claims to have been unable to file his federal petition, Mr. Sherratt was vigorously pursuing state claims: two habeas petitions, as well as countless motions concerning “void jurisdiction,” recusal of judges, and the like. Where a petitioner’s claims “are similar to those raised in his direct appeal and motion for state post-conviction relief, [this] undercut[s] his argument that lack of access caused his delay.” Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998); accord Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034–35 (9th Cir. 2005). Finally, Mr. Sherratt’s allegation of an impediment lacks the specificity we require. “It is not enough to say that the . . . facility lacked all relevant statutes and case law or that the procedure to request specific materials was inadequate.” Miller, 141 F.3d at 978. The fact that a -4- petitioner “simply did not know about the limitation in the AEDPA until it was too late,” while regrettable, is not a basis for tolling. Id. Under (D), the one-year limitation period on presenting a claim does not run until the “factual predicate of the claim . . . could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Mr. Sherratt does not quarrel with the district court’s interpretation of his claims, and we adopt its admirable untangling of his arguments: This petition raises the following grounds for habeas relief: (1) The original criminal complaint against Petitioner was unsworn. (2) The original information charging Petitioner was unverified and unsworn. (3) Petitioner’s rights were violated when he was arraigned, bound over and taken to trial before the same judge. (4) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel, both at trial and on direct appeal. . . . (5) The prosecution altered evidence (i.e., two victim statements that did not match up), used contradictory evidence to support the probable cause statement, allowed false testimony at trial, and allowed religious beliefs to bolster witness testimony and credibility. (6) Petitioner was denied his right to religious freedom when he was convicted based on false testimony about the beliefs of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS). (7) The trial judge was biased by his LDS beliefs. (8) The prosecution withheld Brady evidence from Petitioner (i.e., the victim’s ten-page letter about her abuse by Petitioner). (9) New evidence showed that the victim did not confess to her LDS church leader, as she testified. And, (10) the prosecutor gave answers to a potential prosecution witness the morning of trial. R., Vol. VIII, Doc. 29, at 1–3 (footnote omitted). The district court correctly determined that the factual predicates for claims (1) through (7) were reasonably available at or before the time Mr. Sherratt’s -5- conviction was made final by the completion of his direct appeals. 1 As to claim (8), Mr. Sherratt states that he discovered the allegedly withheld evidence in June, 2002, and as to claim (9), he states that the new evidence concerning the victim was “available for scrutiny by September 1, 2002.” R., Vol. II, Doc. 4, at 67. The facts underlying claim (10) were discoverable, at the latest, on September 8, 2003. Therefore, AEDPA’s one-year clock was triggered, for different claims, at four different times. For argument’s sake, we will employ the date most favorable to Mr. Sherratt. Under § 2244(d)(2), time is tolled while “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending.” On August 9, 2002, 347 days after his conviction became final, Mr. Sherratt filed his first 1 As to grounds (1) and (2), Mr. Sherratt argues vigorously that the lack of a sworn complaint or information deprived the state trial court of jurisdiction over his prosecution; he contends on appeal that the district court erred by failing to reach these issues before dismissing his complaint for untimeliness. See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2007) (noting that “jurisdictional questions ordinarily must precede merits determinations in dispositional order”). However, the state court’s jurisdiction vel non is a merits issue, not a jurisdictional issue, on federal habeas. Mr. Sherratt also filed a motion with the district court, purportedly under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), to set aside his “void” convictions. He argues that the court should have entertained the motion because there is no time limit on filing a 60(b)(4) motion. However, that rule—a familiar friend of the frivolous litigator, to whom any adverse ruling is “void” and in excess of jurisdiction—is a rule of civil procedure and thus not available to challenge criminal judgments, nor may it be used to challenge state judgments of any sort in federal court. At best, in its discretion a district court may choose to interpret a 60(b)(4) motion attacking a state criminal judgment as a § 2254 petition, but all the strictures of AEDPA will apply. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531–32 (2005); cf. id. at 534–35 (explaining proper role of Rule 60(b) in habeas cases). -6- petition in state court for a writ of habeas corpus. 2 The petition was denied on August 21, 2002, and appeals were pending until the Utah Supreme Court denied certiorari on January 2, 2004. 3 The AEDPA time limit would have begun running on September 8, 2003, but was tolled because of the pendency of the first state habeas petition. On November 19, 2003, overlapping his first petition, Mr. Sherratt filed a second state habeas petition. 4 The clock remained tolled by the second petition; that petition was denied January 23, 2004, and Mr. Sherratt did not timely appeal. 5 Accordingly, Mr. Sherratt’s state post-conviction proceedings came to a close on February 23, 2004. The clock then began to run, and from that 2 The petition was filed in court on June 28, 2002, but the required filing fee was not paid until August 9. A petition is not “properly filed” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) until any required fee has been paid or waived. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8–9 (2000); Habteselassie v. Novak, 209 F.3d 1208, 1210–11 (10th Cir. 2000). The court below based its calculations on the more generous June 28 date for filing, recognizing that the outcome would be the same either way; we will use the correct date of August 9. 3 Mr. Sherratt sought, and was denied, certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. But the time limit for a § 2254 petition is not tolled by the pendency of a petition for certiorari from the United States Supreme Court to a state court. Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1083 (2007). 4 Filed October 27, 2003; fee paid November 19. 5 He did untimely appeal, see Sherratt v. Friel, No. 20040541-CA, 2004 WL 2320366 (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2004), and certiorari was ultimately denied by the Utah Supreme Court on April 5, 2005. The pendency of an untimely appeal, however, is not considered “time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending,” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). -7- date Mr. Sherratt waited 623 days, until November 7, 2005, to file his § 2254 petition in federal court. Consequently, under § 2244(d), all of Mr. Sherratt’s claims were untimely—by 258 days, or more for those claims discoverable earlier.