Opinion ID: 170512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Enmund/Tison violation

Text: Gilson next argues, citing the Supreme Court's decisions in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140, (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), that the imposition of the death penalty violates his Eighth Amendment rights because the jury in his case did not unanimously find either that he personally participated in the killing of Shane Coffman or that he possessed the requisite intent to make him eligible for the death penalty. a) The decisions in Enmund and Tison In Enmund and Tison, the Supreme Court explored the degree of culpability necessary for the imposition of capital punishment in cases involving felony-murder convictions. In doing so, both cases looked to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788, 102 S.Ct. 3368 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Enmund, the Court explicitly dealt with two distinct subsets of all felony murders. . . . Tison, 481 U.S. at 149, 107 S.Ct. 1676. At one pole was [defendant] Enmund himself; the minor actor in an armed robbery, not on the scene, who neither intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental state. Id. The Court held that capital punishment was disproportional in these cases, and thus violative of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 150, 107 S.Ct. 1676. At the other pole was the felony murderer who actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill. Id. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment posed no hurdle to the imposition of capital punishment in such cases. In Tison, the Court expanded on the principle of proportionality by addressing two related cases that fell between the categories of felony-murder expressly addressed in Enmund. The petitioners in Tison, two brothers, had assisted their inmate father and another convict in escaping from prison. During the course of the escape, the group's car broke down and one of the brothers flagged down a passing car which contained a family of four. The group proceeded to kidnap and rob the family. While the brothers were nearby, the father and the other convict shot and killed all four members of the kidnapped family. Neither brother attempted to assist the victims before, during, or after the shooting. Moreover, both brothers continued on with the two escapees and the group was not apprehended until several days later. Id. at 151-52, 107 S.Ct. 1676. The Supreme Court concluded that although neither petitioner actually-killed or specifically intended to kill any of the victims, the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit them from being subjected to the death penalty. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that [a] critical facet of the individualized determination of culpability required in capital cases is the mental state with which the defendant commits the crime. Id. at 156, 107 S.Ct. 1676. Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition, the Court noted, is the idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished. Id. In turn, the Court noted that the reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable mental state, a mental state that may be taken into account in making a capital sentencing judgment when that conduct causes its natural, though also not inevitable, lethal result. Id. at 157-58, 107 S.Ct. 1676. Ultimately, the Court held that major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement. Id. at 158, 107 S.Ct. 1676. Although not cited by Gilson, the Supreme Court's decision in Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 106 S.Ct. 689, 88 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986), is also relevant to our Enmund/Tison analysis. Cabana was a procedural case in which the Court determine[d] in whose hands the [ Enmund/Tison -mandated] decision that a defendant possesses the requisite degree of culpability properly lies. 474 U.S. at 378, 106 S.Ct. 689. In addressing that issue, the Court emphasized that its ruling in Enmund d[id] not concern the guilt or innocence of the defendant and establishe[d] no new elements of the crime of murder that must be found by the jury. Id. at 385, 106 S.Ct. 689. Continuing, the Court noted that [t]he decision whether a particular punishment  even the death penalty  is appropriate in any given case is not one that [it] ha[d] ever required to be made by a jury. Id. To the contrary, the Court noted, the decision whether a sentence is so disproportionate as to violate the Eighth Amendment in any particular case, like other questions bearing on whether a criminal defendant's constitutional rights have been violated, has long been viewed as one that a trial judge or an appellate court is fully competent to make. Id. at 386, 106 S.Ct. 689. Thus, the Court stated, Enmund does not impose any particular form of procedure upon the States. Id. If a criminal defendant's conduct satisfies the Enmund or Tison requirements for imposition of the death penalty, the Court held, the Eighth Amendment itself is not violated by his or her execution regardless of who makes the determination of the requisite culpability. . . . Id. In other words, [a]t what precise point in its criminal process a State chooses to make the Enmund, determination is of little concern from the standpoint of the Constitution. Id. Thus, the Court held, when a federal habeas court reviews a claim that the death penalty has been imposed on one who does not meet the Enmund or Tison requirements for imposition of the death penalty, the court's inquiry cannot be limited to an examination of jury instructions. Rather, the court must examine the entire course of the state-court proceedings against the defendant in order to determine whether, at some point in the process, the requisite factual finding as to the defendant's culpability has been made. Id. at 387, 106 S.Ct. 689. If it has, the Court held, the finding must be presumed correct by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), . . . and unless the habeas petitioner can bear the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption, the court is obliged to hold that the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Enmund [and Tison ] is not offended by the death sentence. Id. at 387-88, 106 S.Ct. 689. b) The OCCA's rejection of Gilson's Enmund/Tison claim Gilson first raised his Enmund/Tison claim on direct appeal. The OCCA rejected the claim on the merits, stating as follows: [Gilson] contends in his second assignment of error that his death sentence violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as Article II, § 9, of the Oklahoma Constitution because his conviction under 21 O.S.1991, § 701.7(C), failed to establish eligibility for the death sentence. In the first of several subpropositions, [Gilson] argues the State failed to prove he in fact killed, attempted to kill or was a major participant in a felony showing reckless indifference to human life. He contends that his death sentence can stand only if each of the theories underlying his murder conviction constitutionally justifies the imposition of a capital sentence. The State argues in response that the facts in this case are sufficient to support a finding that [Gilson] was eligible for the death sentence. Initially we note the record shows that after the verdicts were rendered, defense counsel moved to strike the Bill of Particulars arguing that [Gilson] was no longer constitutionally eligible for the death penalty because the jury failed to find unanimously that he committed any intentional act which led to the death of the victim. This objection has properly preserved the issue for appellate review. As addressed in Proposition I, the verdict in this case was a general verdict of guilt for first degree murder with the jury disagreeing as to the underlying factual basis. Therefore, we will review that factual basis in light of the applicable law to determine death eligibility. In Wisdom v. State, 918 P.2d 384 (Okl. Cr.1996), we held that a defendant convicted of First Degree Murder by Child Abuse who actually killed the victim by his/her own hand was eligible for the death sentence. [Gilson] acknowledges this ruling but urges reconsideration. We decline the offer, (citation omitted). Here, the evidence supports a finding that [Gilson] actually killed the victim. [Gilson] participated in beating the victim prior to the time he was taken to the bathroom. [Gilson] was in the bathroom with the victim and Coffman, and after Coffman left the room, was seen exiting the bathroom immediately before Shane was found dead. This evidence certainly renders [Gilson] eligible for the death sentence. This Court has not previously ruled on whether a defendant convicted of First Degree Child Abuse Murder by permitting child abuse is death eligible. Both [Gilson] and the State direct us to Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987) for the application of the death penalty to a defendant who does not kill by his/her own hand. In Tison, a felony-murder case in which the defendant himself did not kill, the Supreme Court held that a defendant who did not actually commit the act which caused death, but who was a major participant in the felony and who had displayed reckless indifference to human life, may be sufficiently culpable to receive the death penalty. 481 U.S. at 158, 107 S.Ct. at 1688. The Supreme Court stated: Similarly, we hold that the reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable mental state, a mental state that may be taken into account in making a capital sentencing judgment when that conduct causes its natural, though also not inevitable, lethal result. Id. at 481 U.S. at 157-58, 107 S.Ct. at 1688. Tison modified the Supreme Court's holding in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), that the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the death penalty on one . . . who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed. Id., 458 U.S. at 797, 102 S.Ct. at 3376. Although this Court has held that an Enmund/Tison analysis does not apply in the case of the actual killer, (citation omitted), we find it does apply in a case where the defendant was not the actual killer, (citation omitted). In as much as one of the underlying theories of this case is murder by the permitting of child abuse, we apply the analysis used in Enmund and Tison. Here, the evidence shows [Gilson] was a major participant in the felony. Acting jointly with Coffman, he took Shane outside the trailer and was party to conduct which elicited screams from the child. He and Coffman took Shane back inside the trailer, they both took him back to the bathroom and they both remained with him in the bathroom for periods of time. This evidence clearly supports the conclusion that his participation was major and substantial. [Gilson] argues that, at worst, his conduct was that of an omission-of failing to protect the victim from a potentially dangerous situation-and not that of knowingly permitting the abuse to occur. To the contrary, [Gilson]'s conduct was not merely the nonperformance of what ought to be done, as in cases of criminal omissions, (citation omitted). His active participation in the abuse occurring inside his small trailer is very different from a passive act of failing to provide what is required by law. We next determine whether [Gilson] displayed reckless indifference to human life. In discussing this term in Tison, the Supreme Court stated [a] critical facet of the individualized determination of culpability required in capital cases is the mental state with which the defendant commits the crime. 481 U.S. at 157, 107 S.Ct. at 1687. The Court further stated: A narrow focus on the question of whether or not a given defendant intended to kill, however, is a highly unsatisfactory means of definitively distinguishing the most culpable and dangerous of murderers. Many who intend to, and do, kill are not criminally liable at all-those who act in self-defense or with other justification or excuse . . . On the other hand, some nonintentional murderers may be among the most dangerous and inhumane of all-the person who tortures another not caring whether the victim lives or dies, or the robber who shoots someone in the course of the robbery, utterly indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob may have the unintended consequence of killing the victim as well as taking the victim's property. This reckless indifference to the value of human life may be every bit as shocking to the moral sense as an intent to kill. . . . ([I]n the common law, intentional killing is not the only basis for establishing the most egregious form of criminal homicide. . . . For example, the Model Penal Code treats reckless killing, `manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life,' as equivalent to purposeful and knowing killing). Enmund held that when intent to kill results in its logical though not inevitable consequence-the taking of human life-the Eighth Amendment permits the State to exact the death penalty after a careful weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Similarly, we hold that the reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable mental state, a mental state that may be taken into account in making a capital sentencing judgment when that conduct causes its natural, though also not inevitable, lethal result. Id., at 481 U.S. at 157-58, 107 S.Ct. at 1687-38. In making the above determination, the Supreme Court also looked to the laws of several states and found that in the states which authorize capital punishment for felony-murder the greater the defendant's participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life. Id., 481 U.S. at 153-54, 107 S.Ct. at 1685-86. This Court has addressed reckless indifference to human life only as it pertains to those who actually killed. In doing so, we found a reckless indifference to human life turns largely on the facts of the case, but was evidenced in part by the defendant's creation of a desperate situation inherently dangerous to human life. Hain v. State, 919 P.2d 1130, 1146 (Okl.Cr.), cert, denied 519 U.S. 1031, 117 S.Ct. 588, 136 L.Ed.2d 517 (1996), and the defendant's causing the serious conscious physical suffering and death of the victim. Brown v. State, 989 P.2d 913, 931 (Okl. Cr.1998). The facts in the present case support a finding that [Gilson] acted with reckless indifference to human life. Acts in which [Gilson] participated outside the trailer caused injury to the child which elicited screams of pain. The child was brought back inside the trailer with swollen arms, a soft spot on his head, and irregular breathing. The victim had to be carried to the bathroom, an act in which [Gilson] again participated. Further acts in which [Gilson] participated inside the bathroom caused the victim to again scream and cry. [Gilson] was aware of the struggle between Coffman and the victim in which the victim was injured and property in the bathroom was damaged. [Gilson]'s argument focuses on the elements of the offense of permitting child abuse and asserts that terms willfully and knowingly contained in the statute and jury instruction on first degree murder by permitting child abuse are not the equivalent of reckless indifference for human life. The elements of the offense of first degree murder by permitting child abuse have previously been addressed in this opinion. We found the evidence in this case supported a finding of the existence of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, we look beyond those elements and find [Gilson]'s conduct illustrated a reckless indifference to human life. The evidence supports a finding that [Gilson] subjectively appreciated that his conduct would likely result in the taking of innocent life. This is sufficient to make him eligible for the death penalty. In this opinion, we have previously compared the crime of child abuse murder to the crime of felony-murder for purposes of determining sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction. Such a comparison of the two offenses is again warranted during this discussion of the applicability of the death penalty. The eligibility of a defendant convicted of child abuse murder by the permitting of child abuse is similar to that of a nontriggerman convicted of felony-murder. In Hatch, 701 P.2d at 1040, a non-triggerman was sentenced to death for his participation in the underlying felonies. Hatch and co-defendant Ake forced their way into the victim's home, ransacked the home at gunpoint and repeatedly threatened to kill the family of four who occupied the house. Ake instructed Hatch to go outside, turn the car around, and listen for the sound. Hatch did as he was told. Ake then shot each family member and fled the scene with Hatch. The two adult victims died while the two children survived. Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1, 4 (Okl. Cr.1983). In reviewing Hatch's death sentence, this Court stated: In Enmund, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty cannot be constitutionally imposed against one who is convicted of felony murder for a killing occurring during the course of a robbery who neither kills, does not intend that life be taken, nor contemplates that lethal force will be employed by others. The evidence against appellant was that he entered his victims' home with a shotgun in hand. His confederate entered too with a loaded handgun. Appellant held the victims at gunpoint while Ake looted the home and attempted to rape his victims' twelve year old daughter. Appellant also took a turn attempting to rape her. Appellant frequently threatened the lives of his victims as they lay hog-tied on the floor. After a discussion as to their plan of action, appellant went outside and turned his automobile around while he waited for the sound, as Ake had instructed him to do. We agree with the trial court's finding that the Defendant Hatch contemplated that a killing was not only possible, but probable and further that lethal force probably be employed. Therefore, we find that appellant's sentences of death are justified and are in compliance with Enmund and we AFFIRM each. Hatch, 701 P.2d at 1040. The death sentence for a non-triggerman has also been upheld in other jurisdictions. In Florida v. White, 470 So.2d 1377 (Fla.1985), the defendant and two companions gained entrance to a home under a subterfuge. All three men were armed and wore masks. They tied up the people in the house and ransacked it. When one of the assailants' mask fell from his face, the three assailants discussed killing the victims. The defendant verbally opposed any killing. The two other assailants shot the victims, killing six of the eight. The three assailants then gathered up their loot and returned to the defendant's motel room where the loot was divided. The Supreme Court of Florida found that Enmund did not bar the imposition of the death penalty due to the defendant's presence both before, during and after the murders; his full and active role in capturing, intimidating and guarding the victims; his failure to disassociate himself from either the robbery or the murder while verbally opposing any killing; and the lack of any evidence he acted under coercion. In Fairchild v. Norris, 21 F.3d 799 (8th Cir.1994), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held the evidence supported a finding that the defendant non-triggerman was eligible for the death penalty. In that case, the defendant and an accomplice kidnapped, raped and killed a woman. The Court found the defendant fully participated in the kidnapping of the victim-followed her to her car, forced her inside at gunpoint, and took money from her purse. Upon arriving at a deserted house, he subsequently raped her. The defendant was outside of the house when the victim was shot by the accomplice. However, the defendant had been present when the gun was initially shown to the victim and death threats were made. The Eighth Circuit found the defendant's participation in the armed robbery, kidnapping and rape; his leaving the victim alone with the armed accomplice, and his failure to be deterred in his conduct by the victim's pleas for mercy were sufficient for a reasonable juror to find that he was a major participant in the felonies and that he acted with reckless indifference to human life. Accordingly, evidence in the present case of [Gilson]'s full, active and knowing participation in the underlying acts of child abuse inflicted upon Shane, his failure to disassociate himself from those acts of abuse perpetrated by Bertha Coffman, and his failure to either be deterred in his conduct or respond in any positive manner to what surely must have been pleas for mercy from the victim, were sufficient for a reasonable juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a major participant in the child abuse and that he acted with reckless indifference to human life. [Gilson] next argues his death sentence should be modified as an Enmund/Tison analysis was not done by the trial court and it would be improper for this Court to conduct such a review on appeal. In Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 106 S.Ct. 689, 88 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986), the Supreme Court stated that the Eighth Amendment does not require that a jury make the findings required by Enmund; an appellate court, a trial judge, or a jury may make the requisite findings. Id. at 474 U.S. at 392, 106 S.Ct. at 700. This Court can review the record and make the findings required by Enmund and Tison. Reviewing the evidence in this case, we find the facts support a finding that [Gilson]'s major participation in the felony of child abuse, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement. Gilson I, 8 P.3d at 919-22 (internal paragraph numbers omitted). Following the issuance of the OCCA's decision, Gilson filed a petition for rehearing with the OCCA arguing that the Supreme Court had just issued its decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) [5] , and that, in light of Apprendi only a jury could make the requisite Enmund/Tison findings. On August 29, 2000, the OCCA issued an order denying Gilson's petition for rehearing and stating, in pertinent part, as follows: We have reviewed Apprendi and find it is not applicable. In Apprendi the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional the New Jersey hate crime statute. The New Jersey statute provided for an extended term of imprisonment if the trial judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant in committing the underlying, criminal offense acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity. The Supreme Court said it was unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. 102 [120] S.Ct. [at] 2362-63. The Court further said [i]t is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., 102 [120] S.Ct. at 2363. The Supreme Court continued by finding the principles involved in its decision in Apprendi did not render invalid prior case law holding that it is not necessary for a jury in a capital case to make every finding of fact underlying the sentencing decision. Finally, this Court has previously considered and rejected the argument that the principles guiding our decision today render invalid state capital sentencing schemes requiring judges, after a jury verdict holding a defendant guilty of a capital crime, to find specific aggravating factors before imposing a sentence of death. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-649 [110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511] (1990); id., at 709-714 [110 S.Ct. 3047] (Stevens, J., dissenting). For reasons we have explained the capital cases are not controlling: Neither the cases cited, nor any other case, permits a judge to determine the existence of a factor which makes a crime a capital offense. What the cited cases hold is that, once a jury has found the defendant guilty of all the elements of an offense which carries as its maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may be left to the judge to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather than a lesser one, ought to be imposed. . . . The person who is charged with actions that expose him to the death penalty has an absolute entitlement to jury trial on all the elements of the charge. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S., at 257, n. 2 [118 S.Ct. 1219] (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted). 102 [120] S.Ct. at 2366. Accordingly, we find Apprendi does not render invalid the rule of Cabana, i.e., that the Eighth Amendment does not require that a jury make the findings required by Enmund; an appellate court, a trial judge, or a jury may make the requisite findings. Cabana, 474 U.S. at 392, 106 S.Ct. at 700. This Court was legally entitled to make the Enmund/Tison findings in [Gilson]'s direct appeal. Further, under Oklahoma law, in order to return a verdict of guilty, the jury is required to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, each element of the offense charged. In the sentencing phase of a capital case, the jury is required to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of the aggravating circumstances alleged and whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating evidence. This is the basis upon which the death sentence is imposed, not any findings as to culpability which might be required by Enmund/Tison. In Apprendi, the defendant entered guilty pleas and waived his right to a jury determination of the issues. For the foregoing reasons, we find Apprendi is not controlling, and rehearing on the issue is denied. Gilson v. State, No. F-98-606 (Okla.Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2000) (Order Denying Rehearing and Directing Issuance of Mandate). c) Gilson's entitlement to federal habeas relief on this claim Gilson asserts three challenges to the OCCA's decision, which we will proceed to address in turn. First, Gilson argues that, [biased on the verdicts rendered [in his case], there [wa]s no jury finding [that he] actively participated in any criminal acts sufficient to satisfy the Enmund/Tison standards. Aplt. Br. at 49. In connection with that argument, Gilson, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi, asserts that he has a right to a jury determination of his Enmund-Tison death-eligibility. Aplt. Br. at 51. In other words, he appears to be suggesting that the OCCA, in denying his petition for rehearing, unreasonably applied Apprendi The key question in deciding Gilson's Enmund/Tison claim, in light of the standards outlined in § 2254(d), is whether the OCCA's resolution of that same claim in the context of Gilson's direct appeal was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as it existed at the time of the OCCA's decision (July of 2000). See Stevens v. Ortiz, 465 F.3d 1229, 1235-38 (10th Cir.2006) (noting that a federal habeas court must identify and apply the clearly established Supreme Court precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final). At that time, Apprendi had just been issued, and there was no clear indication by the Supreme Court that it intended for Apprendi to overrule or undermine-the key holdings in Cabana, i.e., that Enmund established] no new elements of the crime of murder that must be found by the jury, and that [t]he decision whether a particular punishment  even the death penalty  is appropriate in any given case is not one that [is] required to be made by a jury, 474 U.S. at 385, 106 S.Ct. 689. Indeed, there has yet to be any such clear indication. [6] Therefore, to allow Gilson to obtain federal habeas corpus relief on the basis of an argument that has yet to be conclusively decided by the Supreme Court, and that was essentially unavailable to the OCCA at the time it decided his direct appeal, is contrary to the dictates of § 2254(d). In his second challenge to the OCCA's decision, Gilson argues that allowing the OCCA to make Enmund/Tison -related findings would effectively negate[] the jury's specific findings. Aplt. Br. at 53. In connection therewith, Gilson argues that [s]ome of his jury believed he did nothing more than `permit' Coffman to commit the physical abuse, and in doing so these jurors specifically rejected a finding [that he] even participated with another in the crime. Id. at 49. To properly address this argument, we turn first to the jury instructions that were employed at Gilson's trial to determine what facts the jury necessarily had to have found in reaching its verdict on the firstdegree murder charge. The state trial court gave the following instruction outlining the essential elements of the firstdegree murder charge: No person may be convicted of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE unless the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime. These elements are: First, the death of a child under the age of eighteen; Second, the death resulted from the willful or malicious injuring, torturing or using of unreasonable force; Third, by the defendant and/or another engaged with the defendant . . . AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE No person may be convicted of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE unless the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime. These elements are: FIRST, the death of a child under the age of eighteen; Second, the death resulted from the willful or malicious injuring, torturing or using of unreasonable force; Third, which was knowingly permitted; FOURTH, by a person responsible for the child's health or welfare. State ROA  Case No. CF96-245, File # 6 at 946 (Instruction No. 6). The state trial court also gave the following instructions that provided more detail regarding how the jury was to apply the elements of firstdegree murder: You are further instructed as to the following Definitions: Direct Result  Immediate consequence which is not separated from its initial cause by other, independent factors. Id. at 947 (Instruction No. 7). No person may be convicted of FIRST DEGREE MURDER unless his conduct or the conduct of another person for which he is criminally responsible caused the death of the person allegedly killed. A death is caused by the conduct if the conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the death and the conduct is dangerous and threatens or destroys life. Id. at 948 (Instruction No. 8). No person may be convicted of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE unless both the fact of the death of the person allegedly killed and the fact that his death was caused by the conduct of another person are established as independent facts and beyond a reasonable doubt. Such proof must consist of evidence which is wholly independent of any confession made by the defendant. Such evidence, however, may be circumstantial and need not include proof of the identity of the person who caused the death. Id. at 949 (Instruction No. 9). You are instructed that, although your verdict as to guilt of the crime of FIRST DEGREE MURDER must be unanimous, you need not agree unanimously as to the theory upon which you arrive at that verdict. Id. at 954 (Instruction No. 14). You are further instructed as to the following Definitions: Knowingly  With personal awareness of the facts. Malicious  The term imports a wish to vex, annoy or injure another person. Person Responsible for a Child's Welfare  Includes a parent, legal guardian, custodian, foster parent, a person eighteen years of age or older with whom the child's parent cohabitates or any other adult residing in the home of the child. Torture  Infliction of great physical pain. Unreasonable Force  More than that ordinarily used as a means of discipline. Willful  Purposeful. Willful is a willingness to commit the act or omission referred to, but does not require any intent to violate the law, or to acquire any advantage. Id. at 958 (Instruction No. 18). In light of these instructions and the results indicated on the verdict form, it is indisputable that all twelve jurors agreed that the death of Shane Coffman resulted from the willful or malicious injuring, torturing or using of unreasonable force. As noted, however, the jurors were divided on which of the two alternative theories supported the murder conviction. One or more of the jurors found beyond a reasonable doubt that Gilson and/or another engaged with him, i.e., Bertha Coffman, committed the willful or malicious injuring, torturing or using of unreasonable force. In other words, this group of jurors found beyond a reasonable doubt that Gilson took an active part, either alone or together with Bertha Coffman, in the specific acts that directly resulted in Shane Coffman's death. See generally Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 751 (1993) (defining the term engage as to involve or entangle (as a person) in some affair or enterprise); id. (defining the term engaged as involved esp. In a hostile encounter). The second group of jurors (which, like the first group, would have encompassed anywhere from one to eleven jurors) found beyond a reasonable doubt that Gilson was a person responsible for Shane Coffman's health or welfare and that Gilson knowingly permitted another person, Bertha Coffman, to commit the specific acts that directly resulted in Shane Coffman's death. Importantly, nothing about this second group's findings necessarily meant, as suggested by Gilson, that they specifically rejected a finding [that he] even participated with another in the crime. Aplt. Br. at 49. As noted, the jury instructions required the jury to focus on the specific acts that directly resulted in Shane Coffman's death. Although the second group of jurors had to have found that Bertha Coffman, with Gilson's knowing permission, committed those acts, that does not mean that this group necessarily also found that Gilson played no other role in the offense. Stated differently, it is entirely possible that this second group of jurors found that Gilson played an active role in severely abusing Shane Coffman in the hours prior to his death, but that Bertha Coffman committed the final act or acts that resulted in Shane's death. Indeed, such a finding could have been directly derived from a combination of witnesses' testimony: testimony from the surviving children regarding severe abuse jointly perpetrated by Gilson and Bertha Coffman in the hours leading up to Shane's death, and Bertha Coffman's own testimony that she was in the bathroom alone with Shane just prior to his death and that Gilson entered the bathroom on two occasions during that time period to fix the shower doors. The next question is whether any of the OCCA's Enmund/Tison culpability findings were inconsistent with the jury's findings. The OCCA found that Gilson active[ly] participat[ed] in the abuse of Shane Coffman, Gilson I, 8 P.3d at 920, and in so doing acted with reckless indifference to human life. Id. at 921. More specifically, the OCCA found that Gilson participated [in acts] outside the trailer [that] caused injury to the child which elicited screams of pain, brought [the child] back inside the trailer with swollen arms, a soft spot on his head, and irregular breathing, carried [the child] to the bathroom, participated [in acts] inside the bathroom [that] caused the [child] to scream and cry, and was aware of the struggle between Coffman and the [child] in which the [child] was injured and property in the bathroom was damaged. Id. The OCCA also found that Gilson subjectively appreciated that his conduct would likely result in the taking of innocent life. Id. In sum, the OCCA found that Gilson's major participation in the felony of child abuse, combined with reckless indifference to human life, [wa]s sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement. Id. at 922. We conclude that none of the OCCA's findings were inconsistent with the factual findings that the jury necessarily had to have made in reaching its verdict on the first-degree murder charge. In particular, the OCCA's findings regarding Gilson's active participation in the events leading up to the death of Shane Coffman, and Gilson's reckless indifference to human life, are not inconsistent with or precluded by the findings of those jurors who determined that Gilson knowingly permitted, rather than directly committed, the specific acts that directly resulted in Shane's death. Thus, we reject Gilson's assertion that the OCCA's findings effectively nullified the jury's verdict on the first-degree murder charge. In his third and final challenge to the OCCA's decision, Gilson argues that the facts and evidence in his case simply d[id] not support a finding of death eligibility under Enmund and Tison. Aplt. Br. at 55. More specifically, Gilson takes issue with [t]he OCCA's finding [that he] was a `major participant' in the offense and showed `reckless indifference for human life'. . . . Id. On federal habeas review, we must presume the OCCA's factual determinations are correct and such a presumption may only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Willingham v. Mullin, 296 F.3d 917, 922 (10th Cir.2002). Unless the OCCA's factual determinations are shown to be clearly wrong and objectively unreasonable, we may not overturn them on federal habeas review. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 324, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). Reviewing the record in light of these standards, we readily reject Gilson's arguments. Although each of the eyewitnesses to the events leading up to the murder (Bertha Coffman and the four surviving children) gave slightly differing accounts, their, testimony, particularly when combined with the physical evidence found at the trailer and the results of the autopsy performed on Shane Coffman, was more than sufficient to support each of the OCCA's Enmund/Tison findings. In particular, Tranny Coffman testified that on the day he last saw Shane (i.e., the day of Shane's death), Gilson disciplined Shane inside the trailer by beating him with a board, later that day Gilson accompanied Shane and Bertha Coffman outside the trailer and Shane could be heard screaming, Gilson and Coffman then jointly carried Shane back inside the trailer and placed him on the couch, as Shane sat on the couch, Tranny observed that Shane's arms were swollen, his head had a soft spot on it, and he was breathing in a weird fashion (i.e., making gargling-type sounds), Gilson then carried Shane to the bathroom, and at some point thereafter Shane could be heard inside the bathroom. Tranny's testimony was bolstered by that of his brother, Isaac Coffman, who testified that he used the bathroom that day, observed Shane in the bathtub with some of his hair gone, bruises on his arms and legs, making funny noises and failing to respond to questions from Isaac. In addition to this testimony, all five witnesses testified more generally that Gilson routinely disciplined the children, including Shane, by beating them with various objects. Considered together, this evidence was more than sufficient to support each of the OCCA's findings regarding Gilson's actions and mental state. [7] In sum, we conclude that the OCCA's decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, the principles outlined in Enmund and Tison.