Opinion ID: 21493
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judgment as a Matter of Law and Alternative Motion for New Trial

Text: 8 TDCJ challenges the district court's denial of its renewed post judgment motion for judgment as a matter of law, and its alternative motion for a new trial. This court reviews a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. See Keller Richards Manufacturing Co., 817 F.2d 1197 (5th Cir. 1987). We review a district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. See Scott v. University of Mississippi, 148 F.3d 493, 504 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Travis v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys., 122 F.3d 259, 263 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1148, 118 S.Ct. 1166, 140 L.Ed.2d 176 (1998)). A motion for judgment as a matter of law ... in an action tried by jury is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 367 (5th Cir.1997) (internal quotations and citation omitted). If reasonable persons could differ in their interpretation of the evidence, then the motion should be denied. Baltazor v. Holmes, 162 F.3d 373, 373 (5th Cir. 1998). A post-judgment motion for judgment as a matter of law should only be granted when the facts and inferences point so strongly in favor of the movant that a rational jury could not reach a contrary verdict. Waymire v. Harris County, Texas, 86 F.3d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 1996). We accord great deference to the jury's verdict when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, viewing all the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict. Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc) (quoting Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), overruled on other grounds). 9 Under the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence; once established, the prima facie case raises an inference of unlawful discrimination. Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L.Ed. 2d 407 (1993). If the defendant meets its burden, the presumption raised by the plaintiff's prima facie case disappears. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10. The plaintiff is accorded the opportunity to demonstrate that the defendant's articulated rationale was merely a pretext for discrimination. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507-08; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. However, in a case such as this one when there has been a trial on the merits, we need not address the sufficiency of the prima facie case, but instead we will proceed to the ultimate question of whether the plaintiff presented enough evidence for a jury to find that discrimination occurred. Baltazor, 162 F.3d at 373 (citing Harrington, 162 F.3d at 367).
10 TDCJ argues that there was not sufficient evidence presented for a reasonable juror to find that TDCJ engaged in racial and gender discrimination when it failed to promote Thomas to the position of Captain of Correctional Officers. Thomas sought promotion to this position in December 1996 and January 1997. The posting for the position stated the minimum qualifications for the position. These qualifications included four years full-time correctional custody/law enforcement experience, two years of supervisor position experience, at least one year of mid-level manager experience, and 30 semester hours from an accredited college or university. The posting also stated that cultural diversity and sensitivity training was preferred. 11 Ultimately, three white male officers were promoted to the position of Captain. At trial Thomas demonstrated that she met all of the qualifications for the position including over 15 years of experience as a correctional officer, ten years as a sergeant, one and a half years of mid-level supervisory experience, and the required college hours. Thomas also presented evidence that she had completed her cultural diversity and sensitivity training. There was ample testimony from various correctional officers and administrators at TDCJ who testified that Thomas had an excellent record. One fellow officer testified that he had never worked with anyone he felt would be a better Captain. TDCJ argues that Thomas was less qualified because the three white males promoted all had more mid-level supervisory experience, and gave better answers at the interview. Thomas presented counter evidence showing that one of the officers who was ultimately promoted represented on his application that he had only 18 hours of college credits, and the minimum qualifications stated that 30 hours of college credit were required. 1 One of the other officers who was ultimately promoted stated on his application that he had 38 hours of college credit, and his transcript ultimately showed he had completed only 32 hours. Therefore, although we acknowledge that there was conflicting evidence presented to the jury regarding TDCJ's failure to promote Thomas, ultimately we conclude that Thomas presented evidence of sufficient force and persuasiveness to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that TDCJ engaged in gender and racial discrimination.
12 To establish a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must establish: (1) the employee engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took adverse employment action against the employee; and (3) a causal connection exists between that protected activity and the adverse employment action. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak, 104 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1997). The ultimate question in an unlawful retaliation case is whether the defendant discriminated against that plaintiff because she engaged in conduct protected by Title VII. Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 304 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996). Thomas engaged in protected activity by filing two EEOC claims against TDCJ for failure to provide her with housing and failure to promote her to Captain of Correctional Officers. Thomas plead that since her EEOC complaints, she was unable to transfer out of Estelle Unit or be promoted. 2 Thomas presented several incidents as circumstantial evidence that TDCJ was engaging in retaliation against her. First, Thomas presented evidence that when she was ultimately given a house in February 1998, the house was in deplorable condition. Upon inspection of the house, Thomas and others who accompanied her testified that the house had kitchen cabinets torn off, stains from dog feces on the carpet, and filthy bathrooms. Thomas also presented evidence that after her EEOC charges she was disciplined twice, and she had never received any disciplinary actions in the 18 years prior to the filing of her charges. Thomas also presented evidence that one of her superiors shouted at her about her filing grievances against TDCJ. Although, these incidents occurred after Thomas applied for promotion, they occurred during the time period in which she applied for transfers. The jury could properly consider these incidents as indications of TDCJ's motives in their failure to promote or transfer Thomas. Thus, Thomas presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that TDCJ failed to promote or transfer her because she engaged in protected activity.