Opinion ID: 23915
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Objection to the Jury Instruction

Text: Dien contends that the jury instructions concerning the Trading with the Enemy Act violations were erroneous in that they did not take into account the changes in the law wrought by the lifting of the embargo against Vietnam. He asserts that 31 C.F.R. § 500.201(c), which prohibits individuals from using third countries as conduits to export goods to an embargoed country, ceased to apply when the embargo was lifted. He submits, therefore, that the shipment of goods from the United States to the non-embargoed third country could not be a violation of the Trading with the Enemy Act. He argues that in this rare case, where the embargo was lifted prior to the arrival of the goods in the embargoed country, the government was required to prove that the goods were shipped from the United States to Vietnam with the specific intent that the goods arrive in Vietnam while the embargo was still in effect. Specifically, Dien argues that the portion of the instruction that informed the jury that “proof that the commodities actually arrived in the country of Vietnam 3 Counts Five and Fourteen were forfeiture provisions, requiring the defendant to forfeit Dien’s Auto Salvage and all proceeds resulting from the violations. A jury trial was held on the forfeiture counts on May 27, 1999; however, the defendant pleaded guilty before the jury returned its verdict. 4 is not required for an export to have occurred” was erroneous.4 4 The relevant portions of the jury instructions given for the Trading with the Enemy Act violations are as follows: Counts II and III [sic] charge the defendants with exporting military vehicles and vehicle parts to Vietnam in violation of the Trading with the Enemy Act. Title 50, United States Code, Appendix 5 and 16 gives the President of the United States authority to regulate or prohibit the importing, exporting, or otherwise dealing with property in which a foreign company or foreign national has an interest. For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that the defendants exported goods to the country of Vietnam. Second, that at the time of the exporting, the United States had an embargo against the Country of Vietnam under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Third, that the defendants exported goods without first obtaining a license from the Department of Commerce. Fourth, the defendant acted knowingly and willfully. That is, when he exported the goods to Vietnam, he was acting voluntarily and purposefully with a specific intent to do something the law forbids. That is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law. In Counts III and IV of the indictment, the United States has charged the defendant with exporting commodities to Vietnam in violation of the Trading with the Enemy Act. I instruct you that an export includes a transfer to any person or entity of goods or technology within the United States with the knowledge or intent that the goods or technology will be shipped, transferred, or transmitted to an unauthorized recipient. Consequently, proof that the commodities actually arrived in the country of Vietnam is not required for an export to have occurred. . . . . I do instruct you that between April of 1975 and February 3rd of 1994 the United States had an embargo against the country of Vietnam under the Trading with the Enemy Act. The word knowingly, as this term has been used from time to time in these instructions, means that the act was done voluntarily and intentionally, not because of mistake or accident. You may find the defendant had knowledge of a fact if you find that the defendant deliberately closed his 5 We find that the charge was not erroneous in instructing jurors as to either the act or the mental state required to violate the Trading with the Enemy Act. We review challenges to jury instructions for only an abuse of discretion. Battle v. Memorial Hosp. at Gulfport, 228 F.3d 544, 555 (5th Cir. 2000). The standard of review applied to a defendant’s claim that the jury instruction was erroneous is “‘whether the court’s charge, as a whole, is a correct statement of the law and whether it clearly instructs jurors as to the principles of the law applicable to the factual issues confronting them.’” United States v. Wise, 221 F.3d 140, 147 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 193 F.3d 852, 871 (5th Cir. 1999)). “A district court has broad discretion in framing the instructions to the jury and this Court will not reverse unless the instructions taken as a whole do not correctly reflect the issues and law.” United States v. McKinney, 53 F.3d 664, 676 (5th Cir. 1995). Dien was charged with violating §§ 5 and 16 of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (the “TWEA”), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1990), and its underlying regulations, specifically 31 C.F.R. eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him. While knowledge on the part of the defendant could not be established merely be [sic] demonstrating the defendant was negligent, careless, or foolish, knowledge could be inferred if the defendant deliberately blinded himself to the existence of a fact. 6 § 500.201. Section 5 of the TWEA authorizes the President, or an agency he delegates, in specific circumstances,5 to regulate or prohibit various transactions involving any property in which a designated foreign country or national of that foreign country has an interest. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b).6 The President has 5 Currently, the President may use his economic powers under the TWEA only during times of war, as was the case when the TWEA was originally enacted. See Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411. In 1933, the President’s authority was expanded to deal with both wartime and peacetime national emergencies. See Act of Mar. 9, 1933, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1. In 1977, the President’s power was again limited to use only during wartime. See Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. 95-223, § 101(a), 102, 91 Stat. 1625 (substituting “During the time of war, the President may . . .” for “During the time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President, the President may . . .”). However, the 1977 amendments limiting the President’s use of this authority to times of war also allowed the President to continue to exercise any “authorities” that had been executed by the President as a result of a national emergency prior to the amendment. See id. § 101(b),(c). Because the embargo against Vietnam predated the 1977 amendments, the President was allowed to, and did, continue it. See, e.g., Presidential Determination No. 93-38: Extension of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 58 Fed. Reg. 51209 (signed on Sept. 13, 1993) (extending for one additional year the presidential authorities under the Trading with the Enemy Act). For a more complete history of the TWEA, see Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 225-30 (1984); Miranda v. Secretary of the Treasury, 766 F.2d 1, 2-5 (1st Cir. 1985). 6 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) provides in relevant part: (1) During the time of war, the President may, through any agency that he may designate, and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise— . . . . (B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or 7 delegated that authority to the Secretary of the Treasury, who has in turn delegated it to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”). See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 226 n.2 (1984). Furthermore, 50 U.S.C. app. § 16 criminalizes violations of the TWEA and the regulations issued under it. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 16.7 Pursuant to its authority under the TWEA, OFAC promulgated 31 C.F.R. § 500.201, which provides: (b) All of the following transactions are prohibited, except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury (or any person, agency, or instrumentality designated by him) by means of regulations, rulings, exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest, by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States . . . . 50 U.S.C. app. § 5. 7 Section 16 provides in relevant part: (a) Whoever shall willfully violate any of the provisions of this Act [sections 1 to 6, 7 to 39 and 41