Opinion ID: 613928
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mechanism exhaustion under the MMWA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit

Text: Judicial interpretation of the MMWA begins with the plain language of the statute. If the text of the statute is clear, this court looks no further in determining the statute's meaning. K & N Eng'g, Inc. v. Bulat, 510 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). The key question in this case is whether Congress mandated that the [exhaustion provision] be `jurisdictional.' Henderson, 131 S.Ct. at 1203. (emphasis added). The Henderson Court reiterated the readily administrable bright line test from Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp . for deciding such questions: we look to see if there is any `clear' indication that Congress wanted the rule to be `jurisdictional.' 131 S.Ct. at 1203 (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006)). To indicate such a preference, Congress can [1] speak in jurisdictional terms or [2] refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the [district court]. Id. at 1204 (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982)); accord Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516, 126 S.Ct. 1235. Congress, of course, need not use magic words in order to speak clearly on this point. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1203. The analysis might also turn on the `legal character' of the requirement, which we discern[ ] by looking to the condition's text, context, and relevant historical treatment. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 1246, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010) (citations omitted); see Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004) ([L]itigants [should use] the label `jurisdictional' not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's adjudicatory authority. (emphasis added)). Section 2310(d)(1) of the MMWA ties Mechanism exhaustion to the jurisdiction of the courts by expressly incorporating § 2310(a)(3): (d) Civil action by consumer for damages, etc.; jurisdiction; recovery of costs and expenses; cognizable claims (1) Subject to [the exhaustion requirement in] sub-section[](a)(3) . . . of this section, a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter, or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief (A) in any court of competent jurisdiction in any State or the District of Columbia; or (B) in an appropriate district court of the United States, subject to paragraph (3) of this subsection. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (emphasis added). There is no doubt that § 2310(d)(1) is a jurisdiction-granting provision, because: (1) the subsection heading includes the label jurisdiction, § 2310(d); (2) it speaks in jurisdictional terms by specifying which courts may hear MMWA claims, Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515, 126 S.Ct. 1235; and (3) it identifies the classes of cases that fall within courts' adjudicatory authority under the MMWA, see Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455, 124 S.Ct. 906. Therefore, because Congress incorporated § 2310(a)(3)'s exhaustion requirement into the jurisdictional provisions of § 2310(d)(1), the exhaustion provision must be treated as jurisdictional. [2] The majority correctly notes that the MMWA's exhaustion provisionproviding that a consumer may not commence a civil action . . . unless he initially resorts to [an informal dispute settlement procedure], § 2310(a)(3)is not, standing alone, jurisdictional in character. Maj. Op. at 1041-42. However, the majority ignores the fact that Toyota never made this argument, and the district court, therefore, did not address it. Instead, Toyota argued that Congress imbued § 2310(a) with jurisdictional character by incorporating the exhaustion provision into a clearly jurisdiction-granting sub-section of the statute. The majority dismisses this argument as requiring [n]o serious analysis, because the incorporation is not sufficiently sweeping and direct to convey an intent to tie exhaustion to jurisdiction. Maj. Op. at 1042. One can reach this conclusion only by ignoring the Supreme Court's most recently elucidated indicia of Congressional intent: (1) speak[ing] in jurisdictional terms, or (2) refer[ring] in any way to the jurisdiction of the courts. Henderson, 131 S.Ct. at 1204 (quoting Zipes, 455 U.S. at 394, 102 S.Ct. 1127). Nowhere in its opinion does the majority employ this readily administrable bright line rule. [3] Id. at 1203 (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515-16, 126 S.Ct. 1235). When this standard is applied, it becomes clear that incorporating the exhaustion requirement into a subsection that both speaks in jurisdictional terms and refer[s] in [some] way to the jurisdiction of the [courts], id., conveys an intent to tie exhaustion to jurisdiction. In sum, Congress is free to attach the conditions that go with the jurisdictional label at its discretion, even in cases where we would prefer to call [the provision] a claim-processing rule. Id. This attachment need not be consistent with other statutes. Our inquiry simply turns on whether Congress has tied jurisdiction to the exhaustion requirement; in this case, it clearly has. I would therefore affirm on this issue and hold that the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider Maronyan's claims until she exhausts Toyota's Mechanism.