Opinion ID: 2829923
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brosky’s Destruction of Evidence Claim

Text: This Court has applied an inconsistent standard when reviewing a motion to dismiss a defendant’s indictment due to the government’s failure to preserve exculpatory evidence. United States v. Grenier, 513 F.3d 632, 635 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The standard of review to be applied for a motion to dismiss an indictment is somewhat unclear.”). We have previously reviewed such motions de novo and for clear error. Compare United States v. Wright, 260 F.3d 568, 570 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying de novo review to a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss a defendant’s indictment on the ground that the government failed to preserve exculpatory evidence), with United States v. Cody, 498 F.3d 582 (6th Cir. 2007) (reviewing for clear error a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss an indictment where the government lost or destroyed exculpatory evidence). Brosky’s challenge fails under either standard of review. Brosky’s motion to dismiss is based on the government’s alleged destruction of evidence obtained during the November 2010 search of Brosky’s residence and a nearby orchard. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal defendants must be afforded “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). “[T]he Court has developed what might loosely be called the area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence” in order to protect this Fourteenth Amendment right. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has established two tests to determine whether a government’s failure to preserve evidence amounts to a due process violation. The first test, established in Trombetta, applies in cases where the government fails to preserve material exculpatory evidence, while the second test, established in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), applies in cases where the government fails to preserve “potentially useful” evidence. Wright, 260 F.3d at 570. 1 The Smiths appealed their sentences and convictions. On November 6, 2013, a panel of this Court affirmed their sentences. United States v. Smith, Nos. 12-5895, 12-5896 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2013) (unpublished). Nos. 12-6263/6512/6617 United States v. Collins, et al. Page 7 Under Trombetta, to be deemed constitutionally material, evidence “must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” 467 U.S. at 489. In such cases, “[t]he destruction of material exculpatory evidence violates due process regardless of whether the government acted in bad faith.” Wright, 260 F.3d at 571. Meanwhile, under the Youngblood standard, in cases “where the government fails to preserve evidence whose exculpatory value is indeterminate and only potentially useful,” the defendant must demonstrate: (1) that the government acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the evidence; (2) that the exculpatory value of the evidence was apparent before its destruction; and (3) that the nature of the evidence was such that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 218 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 5758). In order to establish bad faith, “a defendant must prove official animus or a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Brosky argues that government agents impermissibly destroyed equipment suspected of being used to manufacture methamphetamine before that equipment could be tested for fingerprints that might have linked it to an individual named Joseph Ore rather than to Brosky. Joseph Ore had been living with Brosky during 2009 and had previously been arrested for manufacturing methamphetamine. Brosky argues that local law enforcement officers “concealed knowledge about the true ownership of the items discovered” during the search. Brosky’s Br. at 26. The government contends that any evidence obtained from the equipment could “just as easily” have been considered “inculpatory as exculpatory” and that officers’ public health and safety concerns counseled in favor of destroying any materials related to the manufacture of methamphetamine. Appellee’s Br. at 25. The district court denied Brosky’s motion to dismiss, noting that despite Brosky’s focus on Joseph Ore’s previous criminal history, “there is nothing about the existence of a methamphetamine lab near his own home that could possibly be favorable to Brosky.” (R. 343, Memorandum Opinion and Order, Page ID # 1496.) Having determined that the physical evidence at issue in this motion did not constitute material exculpatory evidence, the district Nos. 12-6263/6512/6617 United States v. Collins, et al. Page 8 court further held that Brosky “failed to argue that the government acted in bad faith when it destroyed the lab” and that this destruction cannot therefore form the basis of denial of the due process claim for destruction of “potentially useful evidence.” (Id. at 1497.) Regardless of whether we apply a de novo or clear error standard of review, the district court did not err in denying Brosky’s motion to dismiss. First, the Trombetta test does not apply in this case since the equipment destroyed by the government does not constitute material exculpatory evidence. The evidence at issue here lacked “exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed.” Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489. Second, Brosky has failed to establish a due process violation under Youngblood. In addition to the fact that there is no apparent exculpatory value to the destroyed items, Brosky has not shown that any evidence was destroyed because of “official animus” or a “conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence,” as required to establish a due process violation under Youngblood. Jobson, 102 F.3d at 218. Consequently, the district court did not err by denying Brosky’s motion to dismiss his indictment on the ground that law enforcement destroyed exculpatory evidence.