Opinion ID: 880025
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issue 1. Loss of Earning Capacity

Text: Kuenning contends that the two knee injuries have significantly reduced his earning capacity because he now works in pain. Kuenning asserts that he cannot work efficiently as a roofing and framing carpenter and must limit himself to finish carpentry. Kuenning also asserts that his ability to perform his duties as a ski patrolman have been slightly impaired and his stamina has decreased. On review of this issue, we note the general rule that the claimant bears the burden of establishing a right to compensation. Gierke v. Billings Gazette (Mont. 1986), 730 P.2d 1143, 1148, 43 St.Rep. 2322, 2329. In order to prevail under § 39-71-703, MCA (1985), a claimant must show an actual diminution in present earning capacity and such a loss must be measured on the open labor market. Dunn v. Champion International Corp. (Mont. 1986), 720 P.2d 1186, 1191, 43 St.Rep. 1124, 1129. A claimant's earning capacity consists of the market demand for labor and claimant's ability to supply such labor. This ability must be defined by the claimant's age, education, background, work experience and qualifications. Holton v. F.H. Stoltze Land & Lumber Co. (1981), 195 Mont. 263, 266, 637 P.2d 10, 12. Simply put, the more labor skills a claimant possesses, the larger his labor market. Kuenning's skills gave him solid ability to earn in the open labor market. He has Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation and Emergency Medical Technician certifications. He has one college degree and is one quarter away from having two additional college degrees in photography and English literature. However, throughout these proceedings Kuenning made no attempt to quantify his earning capacity on the open market. He ignored repeated requests by the State Compensation Fund to document his loss of earning capacity. Instead, Kuenning continually restricted his focus to ski patrol and carpentry. Within this limited market, Kuenning's primary evidence consisted merely of his unsubstantiated testimony about decreased efficiency. We note that Kuenning retained his ski patrol job. Furthermore, Kuenning presented no objective evidence that he lost any carpentry jobs for which he had applied. His own testimony undercuts his contention of lost earning capacity: Q. So you haven't lost any carpentry employment because of your knee injuries; is that correct? A. Actual employment, no. Kuenning's only support came from the deposition of his expert, a rehabilitation counselor. However, the counselor restricted his evaluation to carpentry and ski patrol. The counselor concluded that Kuenning works at an 80 percent post-injury efficiency. The counselor's testimony was effectively rebutted by Big Sky's expert, a vocational evaluation coordinator. The coordinator looked at the open labor market and placed Kuenning in a much better position than the average rehabilitation client. The coordinator found numerous occupational categories in which Kuenning would have transferable skills, especially in the areas of television and radio communications. These categories were matched to employers in the Bozeman area. The coordinator testified that Kuenning, with his educational background, was almost overqualified to work as a ski patrolman and carpenter. The coordinator concluded that Kuenning had many job opportunities and had not suffered any earning loss. In summary, we note that the purpose of workers' compensation is to protect the worker against economic loss. Hafer v. Anaconda Aluminum Company (Mont. 1984), 684 P.2d 1114, 1116, 41 St.Rep. 1403, 1405. However, we will not allow the compensation fund to subsidize a claimant's pursuit of specialized employment when other work is available. Section 39-71-703, MCA (1985), tailors compensation to the actual damage a claimant suffers to his earning capacity. Kuenning's evidence of loss of earning capacity in ski patrol and carpentry is marginal at best. His evidence of loss in the open market is nil. We hold that the Workers' Compensation Court properly concluded that Kuenning did not meet his burden of proof under § 39-71-703, MCA (1985).