Opinion ID: 55118
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Count Six & Duplicity

Text: Mathis contends the district court erred in failing to require the Government to select the subsection of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) under which it intended to proceed. Mathis argues Count Six was duplicitous because it charged two separate crimes, violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii). Count Six charged Mathis with conspiracy to commit money laundering and cited both subsections of § 1956(a)(1). 5 We review a trial court’s decision that a conspiracy charging two objectives is not duplicitous de novo. See United States v. Burton, 871 F.2d 1566, 1573 (11th Cir. 1989). While it is true that a count in an indictment may not charge two substantive crimes, it has long been the law that a conspiracy may have two objectives. See Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 54, 63 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1942) (“The allegation in a single count of a conspiracy to commit several crimes is not duplicitous, for ‘The conspiracy is the crime, and that is one, however diverse its objects.’”). In this case, the conspiracy count simply charged two objectives for the conspiracy, not duplicitous offenses. The trial court so instructed the jury; therefore, no error occurred.