Opinion ID: 2994741
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of Section 3B1.4

Text: As a preliminary matter, we feel compelled to address the validity of section 3B1.4. Though Ramsey did not challenge the validity of the provision before this court,/2 the Sixth Circuit has addressed the issue, and found the provision to be inapplicable to defendants who have not attained the age of twenty-one. Upon consideration, we respectfully disagree with the Sixth Circuit, and find that the Sentencing Commission did not abuse its discretion when it promulgated section 3B1.4 to include all defendants, regardless of age. Congress created the Sentencing Commission in order to establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system. 28 U.S.C. sec. 991(b)(1) (1994); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367-70, 109 S. Ct. 647, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1989). In addition to promulgating a set of sentencing guidelines, see sec. 994(a)(1), the Commission is expected to periodically review the guidelines, and revise them as necessary. See sec. 994(o). Any amendments to the guidelines are submitted to Congress and automatically take effect 180 days after submission, unless Congress modifies or disapproves an amendment. See sec. 994(p). Ten years after the creation of the Commission, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 1994 HR3355, sec. 140008, 108 Stat. 2033 (1994). This Act included a large list of directives to the Sentencing Commission commanding the amendment of existing guidelines, and promulgation of new ones. The precursor to section 3B1.4 directed the Sentencing Commission to promulgate guidelines or amend existing guidelines to provide that a defendant twenty-one years of age or older who has been convicted of an offense shall receive an appropriate sentence enhancement if the defendant involved a minor in the commission of the offense. Id. sec. 140008 (emphasis added). The Commission undertook this task, but when it promulgated the new guideline, it eliminated the requirement that the defendant be at least twenty-one to be subject to the enhancement. Thus, section 3B1.4 reads as follows: If the defendant used or attempted to use a person less than eighteen years of age to commit the offense or assist in avoiding detection of, or apprehension for, the offense, increase by two levels. U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.4 (emphasis added). The resulting enhancement is thus applicable to defendants of all ages. See id.; see also Butler, 207 F.3d at 844 (Clay, J.). The Supreme Court has held that the Commission enjoys significant discretion in formulating guidelines. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. at 377. In United States v. Hill, 48 F.3d 228 (7th Cir. 1995), we stated that when the Commission is exercising this delegated power, the courts cannot interfere or second-guess unless the Commission oversteps constitutional bounds. Id. at 231. The Eighth Circuit took this language further, holding that, [g]iven Congress’s supervisory role, the Sentencing Commission’s formulation of the Guidelines is not subject to judicial review unless the Commission oversteps constitutional bounds. United States v. Vincent, 167 F.3d 428, 431 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Hill, 48 F.3d at 231), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 848 (1999). Since our decision in Hill, however, the Supreme Court has clarified the level of discretion accorded to the Sentencing Commission. Broad as that discretion may be . . . it must bow to the specific directives of Congress. In determining whether [the Amendment] accurately reflects Congress’ intent, we turn, as we must, to the statutory language. United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757, 117 S. Ct. 1673, 137 L. Ed. 2d 1001 (1997) (finding that the Commission’s revised commentary to a guideline was inconsistent with the plain language of the original congressional directive, and thus had to give way. LaBonte). The issue, then, is whether the Commission obeyed the specific directive of Congress. In the original statutory language, Congress directed that an enhancement be applied to all defendants age twenty-one and older. See Pub. L. No. 103- 322, sec. 140008. The Sixth Circuit found that by eliminating the age restriction, section 3B1.4 was a direct overruling of an explicit Congressional declaration. Butler, 207 F.3d at 850 (Jones, J., concurring). Because the Commission did not obey the specific congressional directive, the court would not apply the guideline. See id. at 849-52. Yet, another view is possible: that the Commission did promulgate a guideline that encompassed the directive of Congress. Under section 3B1.4, defendants age twenty-one or older will receive a sentence enhancement if the defendant used a minor in the commission of the offense. The Commission simply expanded the provision to encompass a greater number of defendants./3 This and at least one other circuit have found that it is within the Commission’s statutory mandate to legislate more broadly than Congress. See United States v. Lauer, 148 F.3d 766, 770 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding the Commission’s discretion to broaden the statutory definition of financial institution through the Guidelines’ commentary); United States v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145, 159-60 (2nd Cir. 2000) (holding that the Commission was fully empowered, under [28 U.S.C. sec. 994], to adopt the definition of ’financial institution’ currently contained in the Guidelines, even though the definition is broader than that suggested [by Congress]). As long as the Commission’s guideline is not at odds with the congressional directive, it is within the commission’s discretion to enlarge the category of defendants to whom an enhancement will apply. See LaBonte, 520 U.S. at 757; Ferrarini, 219 F.3d at n.11; see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 377. Further, the Commission is governed by more than just the congressional directive to amend the guidelines. The Commission’s governing statute requires it to consider the possible relevance of age in establishing categories of defendants for use in the guidelines. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 994(d)(1) (1994). With respect to this particular enhancement, Congress also directed the Commission to consider the possible relevance of the proximity in age between the offender and the minor(s) involved in the offense. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, sec. 140008(b)(4), 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). Further, one of the Commission’s responsibilities is to ensure uniformity in sentencing. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 991(b)(1)(B) (1994). It is possible that, after considering the relevance of age to this enhancement, the sentencing commission concluded that a nineteen year old defendant exerts as much influence over the minors he recruits as does a twenty-one year old defendant, with the potential to cause an equal amount of harm. The two categories of defendants would thus deserve equal punishment. The argument that the Commission obeyed the congressional directive is weakened somewhat by the legislative history of section 140008. The original Senate version of the provision provided for the enhancement to apply to defendants eighteen years of age or older./4 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1993, Senate amendment no. 1170, 103rd Cong., 139 Cong. Rec. S15,638 (1993). This proposal was essentially rejected by the proposed House versions, which all state that the enhancement would apply only to defendants twenty-one years or older./5 See, e.g., 140 Cong. Rec. H8772-03 (1994); 140 Cong. Rec. H7372-01 (1994). Though we found no discussion in the record explaining the change, the eighteen year old formulation was eventually rejected in favor of the narrower formulation. The final version of the provision, codified in Pub. L. 103-322, section 140008, used the House’s twentyone years or older formulation. Further, discussions about the solicitation of a minor enhancement often referenced a group of provisions providing for mandatory minimum sentences for defendants twenty-one or older. Minimum sentences were discussed for defendants who sell drugs to a juvenile, buy drugs from a juvenile, use a juvenile to sell drugs, or use a juvenile to avoid detection of a drug offense. See, e.g., 140 Cong. Rec. S12496-01 (1994). The age limit thus seems to have been, at least initially, part of a coordinated plan to punish twenty-one year old (or older) defendants. Admittedly, it is possible that the Commission might not have given sufficient weight to the congressional directive. However, Congress’ expression of intent as to sec. 3B1.4 did not begin and end with its enactment of sec. 140008. Butler, 207 F.3d at 845 (Clay, J.). Congress could have rejected or amended the Guideline before it went into effect. The Commission submitted the draft of section 3B1.4 to Congress on May, 1, 1995, in the form of Amendment 527. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25074, 25086 (May 10, 1995). The Commission stated that the amendment implemented the original congressional directive in a slightly broader form. Id. On October 30, 1995, Congress considered and rejected some of the amendments proposed on May 1, 1995, see Pub. L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334 (1995), but did not act to modify or disapprove Amendment 527./6 Thus, the amendment became effective on November 1, 1995. See U.S.S.G. app. C (1998). Particularly in light of its rejection of other proposed amendments, by not taking action with respect to section 3B1.4, Congress implicitly accepted the Commission’s elimination of the age restriction./7 We thus find that the Sentencing Commission did not misread congressional intent, but rather was exercising reasonable discretion in promulgating a guideline that reaches defendants under age twenty-one. We will now consider the appropriateness of applying the enhancement to Mr. Ramsey.