Opinion ID: 728907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Harassment Claims

Text: 29 Harassment based on membership in a protected class is one form of employment discrimination. In sex discrimination cases, we have recognized that workplace harassment may take either of two forms. It may consist of promises of favorable treatment or threats of unfavorable treatment calculated to coerce an employee into submitting to unwelcome sexual advances (i.e., quid pro quo harassment). Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st Cir.1988). Alternatively, it may consist of offensive, gender-based conduct that is severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment--an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive and is subjectively perceived by the victim to be abusive. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 370, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). While the concept of quid pro quo harassment has no application to race discrimination cases, the concept of hostile environment harassment does. Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.1991); Johnson v. Teamsters Local Union No. 559, 1995 WL 355304 (D.Mass.1995), appeal docketed, No. 87-215 (1st Cir. Oct. 25, 1995). 30 Hostile environment harassment is readily distinguishable from job status discrimination, another type of employment discrimination that occurs when action is taken that adversely affects an employee's job status, remuneration or benefits and it is based upon the employee's membership in a protected class. See, e.g., Tart v. Hill Behan Lumber Co., 31 F.3d 668, 672 (8th Cir.1994). Thus, when both harassment and job status discrimination claims are made, they are analyzed separately. See, e.g., Lipsett, 864 F.2d 881 (sex discrimination); Edwards v. Wallace Community College, 49 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir.1995) (race discrimination). A job status discrimination claim is not converted into a harassment claim simply because it is labeled as such. 31 In this case, Lattimore's harassment claims are hostile work environment claims. Moreover, although the administrative charge relating to the denial of workers' compensation benefits and continued STD status uses the word harassment, that label does not alter the fact that the harassment claims are based entirely upon the comments allegedly made by Mitchell and upon the allegation that Mitchell coerced Lattimore to perform tasks inconsistent with his medical restriction. Clearly the alleged harassment must have occurred on or before March 16, 1989, because that is when Lattimore ceased work and, therefore, was no longer subject to any hostile work environment. That is confirmed by Lattimore's brief which describes the harassment claims as being for the March 1989 events which led to Lattimore's total disability. Appellee's Br. at 2. 32 Polaroid does not seriously question whether the March 1989 conduct alleged by Lattimore was so severe and pervasive that it created a hostile work environment. Polaroid's principal argument is that the harassment claims are barred because they are beyond the scope of the administrative charge filed by Lattimore. 33 Both Title VII and Chapter 151B require an employee to file an administrative charge as a prerequisite to commencing a civil action for employment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f); Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B, §§ 5-9. The purpose of that requirement is to provide the employer with prompt notice of the claim and to create an opportunity for early conciliation. See Powers v. Grinnell Corp., 915 F.2d 34, 37 (1st Cir.1990) (addressing charge requirements under the ADEA); Ruffino v. State Street Bank and Trust Co., 908 F.Supp. 1019, 1037 (D.Mass.1995). 34 That purpose would be frustrated if the employee were permitted to allege one thing in the administrative charge and later allege something entirely different in a subsequent civil action. Consequently, we have stated that, in employment discrimination cases, [t]he scope of the civil complaint is ... limited by the charge filed with the EEOC and the investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of that charge. Powers, 915 F.2d at 38 (quoting Less v. Nestle Co., 705 F.Supp. 110, 112 (W.D.N.Y.1988)); see also Johnson v. General Electric, 840 F.2d 132, 139 (1st Cir.1988). 35 In cases where, as here, the employee acts pro se, the administrative charge is liberally construed in order to afford the complainant the benefit of any reasonable doubt. Westphal v. Waukesha Dresser/Waukesha Engine Div., 855 F.Supp. 1009, 1015 (E.D.Wis.1994); Pickney v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 568 F.Supp. 687, 690 (E.D.Ark.1983). As we have said, an employee is not required to comprehensively set forth with literary exactitude all of the facts and theories upon which his or her claim is based. See Powers, 915 F.2d at 38 (citations omitted). 36 However, pro se status does not relieve an employee of the obligation to meet procedural requirements established by law. See United States v. Michaud, 925 F.2d 37, 41 (1st Cir.1991). Even a pro se complainant is required to describe the essential nature of the claim and to identify the core facts on which it rests. Id. Moreover, the latitude extended in pro se employment discrimination cases does not allow the complainant to file general charges with the [administrative agency] ... and then expect that this allegation will permit all claims of race-based discrimination in a subsequent law suit. Tart, 31 F.3d at 673 (quoting Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1112 (7th Cir.1992)). Nor does it entitle the complainant to make a specific claim based on one set of facts and, later, assert an entirely different claim based on a different and unrelated set of facts. Pickney, 568 F.Supp. at 690. 37 In this case, Lattimore's administrative charge plainly and specifically describes his claim to be that he was discriminated against because, unlike white workers who had been injured and applied for workers' compensation benefits, he was directed to return to work and was fired when he refused. Those allegations relate solely to employment decisions made by Polaroid after Lattimore's March 16 injury and cannot reasonably be construed to include any harassment by Mitchell before Lattimore's injury. 38 Indeed, there are indications that Lattimore himself did not consider the events occurring before March 16 to be part of his administrative charge. The pro se complaint that Lattimore filed in the District Court nearly three years later, although more detailed than the administrative charge, also focused entirely on Lattimore's removal from STD status and his subsequent termination which he attributed to his application for workers' compensation benefits and the fact that he was black. Like the administrative charge, it failed to mention any pre-injury harassment by Mitchell or anyone else. That claim was not raised until ten months later when an amended complaint was filed by Lattimore's counsel. 39 For many of the reasons already mentioned, we further find that the harassment claims were not reasonably within the scope of an agency investigation of Lattimore's administrative charge. An investigation is a systematic inquiry into a particular matter. When it is launched in response to a charge of employment discrimination, the direction and scope of the investigation are guided by the allegations contained in the charge. Although an investigation is not strictly confined to allegations in the charge, it is not a fishing expedition that should be expected to extend to matters unrelated to the charge. 40 Here, Lattimore's charge focused exclusively on his termination and the events leading up to it, all of which occurred after his injury. It contains no hint of any claim that, before his injury, Lattimore was harassed by Mitchell or anyone else. It makes no mention of Mitchell or any incidents of harassment. 41 The two claims are based upon different facts that are separate and distinct both qualitatively and temporally. In addition, they relate to the conduct of different individuals. The record indicates that the decision to discontinue Lattimore's STD status was made by the Board and that the termination decision was made by Montes after consulting with Polaroid's human resources department. On the other hand, it was Mitchell who engaged in the alleged harassment. Therefore, it is difficult to see how Mitchell's conduct before March 16 reasonably could be expected to be within the scope of an agency's investigation of the charge. See Tart, 31 F.3d at 672-73. 42 Our finding in this regard is buttressed by MCAD's Notice of Final Disposition which indicates that, in fact, its investigation did not extend to any alleged harassment by Mitchell. MCAD's findings focus exclusively on Lattimore's termination and do not include any reference to claims of pre-injury harassment. 43 Having decided that the harassment claims are beyond the scope of Lattimore's administrative charge, we conclude that judgment as a matter of law should be entered in favor of Polaroid with respect to the harassment claims made pursuant to both Title VII and Chapter 151B. Accordingly, there is no need for us to consider Polaroid's arguments that the Title VII harassment claim fails due to the absence of any evidence that Polaroid knew or should have known of the alleged harassment and/or that the Chapter 151B harassment claim is time barred.