Opinion ID: 48706
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: conflict of interest/waiver of right to counsel

Text: 130 Fields makes two related arguments surrounding his trial attorney's alleged conflict of interest. He argues, first, that the district court's refusal to appoint unconflicted substitute counsel rendered his waiver of counsel involuntary. 33 Second, he contends that the district court neglected its duty to inquire about an apparent conflict of interest. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347-48, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). The Government acknowledges that our review of these issues is de novo. See United States v. Jones, 421 F.3d 359, 362-63 (5th Cir.2005).
131 As the trial date approached, Fields filed a request asking the trial court to appoint new counsel. He represented that if the Court d[id] not allow him new trial counsel, that he intend[ed] to represent himself. Fields had threatened several times to invoke his right to represent himself but ultimately withdrew those motions. The district court held an ex parte hearing on Fields's latest motion. 132 At the hearing, Fields's lawyers informed the court that they had tried in vain to persuade Fields that going pro se would be a grave mistake. Additionally, Fields's lead attorney, Swanton, advised the court of one other issue that's come up concerning his co-counsel, Peterson: 133 Back in 1987 . . . [,] there is a small entry in [Fields's] juvenile record that indicates Mr. Peterson[,] when he was working for the McLennan County district attorney's office[,] either authorized prosecution of Mr. Fields for a—if I remember it correctly, it was a burglary of a habitation case. I'm not sure that Mr. Peterson was actually directly involved in the prosecution. Frankly, Mr. Peterson cannot remember being involved in that, and it simply may be that somebody from the police or probation department called somebody at the D.A.'s office and asked for permission to file a petition. We have talked to Mr. Fields about that and while we don't really perceive it as a conflict, Mr. Peterson has certainly worked diligently on this case and that has never been an issue through the two years of representation. We talked to Mr. Fields about that and let him know that somebody somewhere down the line may see that as a perceived conflict of interest and that if he had any concerns about that, he should talk with the Court about it. 134 . . . . 135 We'd certainly be happy to offer information or testimony from Mr. Peterson if you thought that was necessary as to what he thinks his involvement was in that prosecution and put something on the record in that regard. 136 The entry to which Swanton referred states, On 3-20-87 Scott Peterson, Assistant District Attorney, authorized the filing of a delinquency action against Sherman. Fields's juvenile record does not reflect any further involvement in the action by Peterson. 137 After Swanton's representation, the court allowed Fields to speak about his request to replace his attorneys. Fields expressed generalized suspicio[n]s that his attorneys were in league with the Government. He voiced disagreement with his attorneys' strategy, indicating that they were pursuing mitigation for the penalty phase when I repeatedly profess my innocence. Their strategy guarantees me the death penalty. 138 At a subsequent hearing, Fields expressed generically, [M]y attorneys and I have a major conflict of interest . . . . Fields never mentioned any specific concern that Peterson had authorized delinquency proceedings against him as a twelve-year-old. The district court did not seek further information concerning the purported conflict. Ultimately, the court denied Fields's request for new counsel and permitted him to proceed pro se.

139 A court violates the Sixth Amendment if it allows a defendant to represent himself without first obtaining a valid waiver of counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Medina, 161 F.3d 867, 870 (5th Cir.1998). A defendant cannot be forced to choose between conflicted counsel and no counsel at all, and any waiver of counsel that results from those circumstances is not valid. See Dunn v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 302, 307 (5th Cir.1998). 140 However, indigent defendants have no right to appointed counsel of their choice. See, e.g., United States v. Breeland, 53 F.3d 100, 106 n. 11 (5th Cir.1995). Rather, [a] defendant's refusal without good cause to proceed with able appointed counsel constitutes a voluntary waiver of that right. Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d 753, 757 (5th Cir.1984). The question [of voluntariness] therefore boils down to whether [Fields] demonstrated good cause for the substitution of assigned counsel. McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir.1981). One form of good cause for new counsel—the only one relevant here—is to show that counsel labored under a conflict of interest. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir.1973).
141 A district court need not appoint substitute counsel on conflict-of-interest grounds if it is satisfied that any conflict does not risk compromising the defendant's representation. United States v. Solomon, 42 Fed.Appx. 88, 91 (10th Cir.2002) (unpublished). 34 As the Eighth Circuit has held, a defendant is only entitled to substitute counsel if the court finds significant interference with an existing attorney's ability to provide zealous representation. See United States v. Boone, 437 F.3d 829, 839 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 172, 166 L.Ed.2d 123 (2006). This follows logically from the proposition that defendants are not entitled to appointed counsel of their choice. That rule would be rendered a nullity if insubstantial complaints entitled defendants to substitute counsel. 142 Indeed, the only precedent we have found touching the specific issue sub judice, Dunn v. Johnson, indicates that the conflict asserted must be significant to warrant substitute counsel. See 162 F.3d at 307. Dunn argued that his waiver of counsel was involuntary because his appointed attorneys had a conflict of interest. In support of this claim, Dunn asserted that, prior to his trial, he had filed a malpractice suit against his attorneys. We did not recognize this as a significant enough conflict of interest to render Dunn's waiver involuntary, pointing out that the malpractice suit . . . had been dismissed as frivolous three years before his second trial. Id. 35
143 Applying these principles to the case at bar, the supposed conflict of interest was not sufficiently substantial such that Fields was entitled to substitute counsel. Importantly, this is not a case where a defendant's attorney previously was actively involved in prosecuting the defendant. The record indicates that Attorney Peterson did nothing more than sign off summarily on a request to initiate delinquency proceedings against Fields. Moreover, the juvenile adjudication occurred fifteen years before Fields's capital trial. Also, it is important that Fields's counsel did not perceive it as a conflict. District courts reasonably may rely on defense counsel's assessment regarding the potential for conflict. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978) (stating that the appointed attorney is in the best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial). 144 Our conclusion is bolstered by Hernandez v. Johnson, 108 F.3d 554, 558-61 (5th Cir.1997), where we addressed a similar alleged conflict of interest. In Hernandez, the defendant claimed that his lawyer had a conflict of interest because he previously had served as the elected district attorney when some of the defendant's prior convictions were obtained. Id. at 558. During that service, Hernandez's attorney had signed a motion requesting psychiatric evaluation of appellant . . ., signed a motion to dismiss a related indictment after Hernandez pled guilty, and . . . approved Hernandez's plea bargain. Id. at 558-59. We held that the attorney's previous involvement in Hernandez's prosecution was not personal or substantial enough to give rise automatically to an actual conflict, reasoning that he was only tenuously and nominally connected to the prior cases against Hernandez and that the attorney's service for the state ended nine years before. Id. at 560. Likewise, Peterson's involvement was nominal and tenuous, rather than personal or substantial. 145 Fields speculates, however, that Peterson may have continued under a duty to the State of Texas not to undermine the finality and integrity of the prosecution he authorized against Fields. Since Peterson would have a duty in capital sentencing proceedings to attack Fields's past convictions, Fields reasons, this created a conflict of interest. There are at least three problems with this argument. First, we rejected a similar argument in Hernandez, a death-penalty case. Second, Fields cites no authority for the expansive duty he claims Peterson may have owed to Texas, whose service Peterson left long before Fields's trial. See Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435, 1452 (7th Cir.1997) (rejecting a conflict-of-interest claim where the attorney's supposedly conflicting loyalty to the Government was extremely speculative and remote). Third, Fields has given no indication that there was any good faith basis for attacking the juvenile adjudication at issue. Under the circumstances, Peterson did not labor under a conflict of interest substantial enough to significantly threaten his ability to provide Fields with effective representation. That being so, Fields's waiver of counsel was voluntary. 36
146 We now turn to Fields's argument that the district court failed to inquire into the conflict at issue. His argument fails for two reasons.
147 First, the court adequately investigated the potential conflict. It held an ex parte hearing on Fields's motion for substitute counsel. At that hearing, the court listened to Fields's lead attorney speak about the conflict. The attorney described the nature of the prior prosecution, the approximate date on which it took place, and the extent of Peterson's involvement in it. The court also heard Fields's counsel's opinion that the issue was not really a conflict and had not affected the quality of Fields's representation. Afterward, the court gave Fields the opportunity to discuss the alleged conflict, which he declined to do. 148 Fields complains that the court did not affirmatively question the parties involved. Yet, the purpose of the duty to inquire is to assure that the court is apprised adequately of the nature of a conflict and its potential impact on counsel's capacity to represent the defendant. See United States v. Humphrey, 287 F.3d 422, 437 (6th Cir.), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Leachman, 309 F.3d 377 (6th Cir.2002). Here, that purpose was satisfied because discussions the court heard on the record apprised it sufficiently of the relevant facts. See Holleman v. Cotton, 301 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir.2002) (noting, while addressing a duty-to-inquire issue, the presumption that attorneys make truthful representations to the court); United States v. Haren, 952 F.2d 190, 195 (8th Cir.1991) (A district court may give substantial weight to defense counsel's representations regarding conflicts of interest.). Those facts showed that the conflict was insubstantial. 149 Where a conflict appears serious and the existing information available to the court is limited, probing and specific questions indeed may be required. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 3 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.9(b) (3d ed.2000). But that is not the case here. The duty to inquire is not so formalistic as to require affirmative questioning when such is rendered unnecessary because the parties have volunteered all the relevant information for a court to determine that no substantial conflict exists. [T]he trial court did not have a duty to inquire any further. See Dunn, 162 F.3d at 307.
150 Second, even if the court should have made a greater inquiry, Fields has made no showing, as distinguished from mere speculation, that the district court would have learned anything material from that inquiry. See United States v. Fish, 34 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir.1994) (examining whether the alleged failure of the court to delve deeper into the alleged conflict resulted in its lacking any material information to make the conflict determination). A failure to inquire would not, in and of itself, be Sixth Amendment error warranting reversal. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002). Moreover, without showing that the court failed to elicit information that would have revealed a substantial conflict, Fields cannot show that any failure to inquire affected the voluntariness of his waiver of counsel. Fields's unsupported hypothesizing that he might not have waived counsel had the court explained to him the kinds of conflicts tolerated by law is not sufficient. 151 Finally, we note that Fields's (1) suspicions that his attorneys were in cahoots with the Government and (2) generic assertions of a conflict of interest did not impose upon the court a duty to inquire further. The Supreme Court has stated that merely a vague, unspecified possibility of conflict does not trigger a duty to inquire. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168-69, 122 S.Ct. 1237. Fields's nebulous statements raised nothing more than a vague, unspecified possibility of conflict. 37 152 Indeed, Fields's previous requests for new counsel reflect that he misunderstood the term conflict of interest. He used the term to signify a conflict between his own view of appropriate trial strategy and that of his counsel. 38 Mere disagreement about strategic litigation decisions is not a conflict of interest. See, e.g., United States v. Corona-Garcia, 210 F.3d 973, 977 n. 2 (9th Cir.2000). In context, then, Fields's unspecified assertions of a conflict appear even more benign. 153 In conclusion, Fields's claims surrounding Peterson's alleged conflict of interest fail. 154