Opinion ID: 1280555
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Width of the Easement

Text: II. The findings of fact made by the trial court do not justify the breadth and particularity of its conclusions of law. As noted in the judgment; Many courts have been reluctant to fix the precise width of easements. As will be explained, we think this a wise reluctance. The matter is considered with a somewhat different procedural background in Scheer v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 158 Neb. 668, 64 N.W.2d 333. In that case the easement was acquired by condemnation. The condemnation proceedings did not refer to width except to specify the pipe would be three and one-half inches in diameter. The trial court quieted title to the real estate except a right-of-way across said real estate 3 ½ inches wide and 4,046 feet long obtained for pipeline purposes in a condemnation proceeding. In reversing, the Nebraska Court said at 64 N.W.2d, loc. cit. 337: The decree of the district court should have quieted title to plaintiff's lands subject to the easement of the defendant for a pipeline across said lands to the extent reasonably required for the laying, relaying, maintaining, and operating the pipeline and the appurtenances thereto. Adequate remedy exists for determining the width of the easement reasonably required if it becomes controversial. Dormer v. Dreith, 145 Neb. 742, 18 N.W.2d 94. In 17 Am.Jur., Easements, § 97, p. 996, it is said: `If a grant is specific in its terms, it is decisive of the limits of the easement. If an easement is not specifically defined, the rule is that the easement need only be such as is reasonably necessary and convenient for the purpose for which it was created.' We think the same rule applies irrespective of the method by which the easement was created. Where an easement is not specifically defined in a condemnation proceeding under the power of eminent domain, its enjoyment is ordinarily limited only by the necessity for its use under which the easement was acquired. [Emphasis supplied] Here there is no evidence and no factual finding concerning the presently intended necessities of the parties. All evidence goes to sound industrial and engineering practices in connection with construction, maintenance and removal of pipelines of this general type and age. There is no evidence as to what is intended or necessary as to this particular pipeline. On the other hand plaintiffs seek a pronouncement that they can put a building over the pipeline. There is no evidence they intend to do so in the immediately foreseeable future and no evidence of any reasonable need to do so. In resolving these conflicts the trial court by way of declaratory judgment based on contract construction found as a matter of law the plaintiffs would have no right to build anywhere within 25 feet of either side of the line and no right to erect other obstructions in such area. This latter prohibition apparently is intended to prohibit any type covering of the fifty foot area so as not to inhibit aerial inspection of the line for leaks. All of this controversial finding is for the announced purpose of aiding the parties in a collateral lawsuit involving condemnation of an easement for the second, larger line. The judgment reads into the easement grant precise limits as to width of easement which were not put there by the parties. As will be noted, the courts have read into such instruments a general rule of law that such easements include such width as is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the easement. They have usually refrained, except where necessity dictates, from defining such widths in precise terms. The reason for such judicial restraint is apparent when the facts of the decided cases are examined. Since this is a pipeline case, with the special problems raised by the emergence of that industry, we shall confine our analysis of the cases largely to that field. [3] In Williams v. Northern Natural Gas Company, 136 F.Supp. 514, an Iowa case decided by the Honorable Henry Graven as judge of the Northern District of Iowa, trial at law for damages, the grant was to operate pipe lines across grantor's property. The pipeline company felt a need to move the line due to instability of the soil in which it had been placed. The line was moved some 50 feet. In laying the new line, the company used a width of from 100 to 200 feet. The court held that such use of grantor's property was consistent with the easement and neither caused a new burden on the servient tenant nor used a width wider than reasonably necessary to lay the new line. We do not pass on the holding. We note only that use of 200 foot width was legally condoned as reasonably necessary under the facts and circumstances of the case. In constrast to the above case we note a condemnation case, Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation v. Terzia, La.Ct.App., 138 So.2d 874, 876, 877, where a 20 inch gas pipeline was to be laid. The court held: In the case before us plaintiff contends that a minimum of a fifty foot width is necessary for the purposes of maintenance, and to the contrary it is urged on behalf of defendant that a thirty foot width is completely adequate for such purpose. The record contains some material and pertinent testimony in support of each of these contentions, but we do not find that plaintiff has sustained its claim as to the necessity of a fifty foot grant by a preponderance of the evidence. It must be conceded that the fifty foot area would be more convenient, agreeable and satisfactory to plaintiff, but it cannot be concluded that such a width is necessary. In the event of any need for the use of heavy equipment in connection with repairs or maintenance, the rights of ingress and egress, which are inherent in the use of the servitude granted, would authorize plaintiff to enter upon and use additional necessary areas subject to the co-existing right of defendant to claim damages occasioned thereby. [Emphasis supplied] In Lone Star Gas Co. v. Childress, Tex. Civ.App., 187 S.W.2d 936, 937, 940 plaintiff sought damages incident to removal of a pipeline. The trial court assessed damages and added: `[A] strip of land thirty feet wide for each right-of-way grant will be sufficient and reasonable for all use by the defendant under its easements,  .' The appellate court in reversing observed: Since the deeds do not confine the defendant's use to a strip of land thirty feet wide, it is elementary that the court could not redefine the terms of the grant and restrict the use granted by the instruments on the testimony of a district foreman, absent fraud, accident or mistake. `It is elementary that no agent has any implied authority to surrender the vested rights of his principal,   .' Bell v. Moody, Tex.Civ.App., 147 S.W.2d 852, writ dism., points 3-4, p. 855. See also: 2 Tex.Jur. p. 446, sec. 51; Kentucky River Coal Corp. v. Williams, 226 Ky. 93, 10 S.W.2d 617. It is clear to us that the amount of space reasonably needed in the past in any particular operation is a question of fact, and the testimony of the district foreman on such issue would be pertinent. But the defendant is entitled to use in the future as much of the land as each occasion may reasonably demand, and such testimony does not authorize the court to deprive the defendant of what has been legally granted to it by the terms of the right-of-way deeds. In determining the width of the easement in absence of specified width, we must be cognizant that the rights of the parties are correlative. Each must use his right with due regard to the rights of the other. The use must be reasonable. 2 Thompson on Real Property, 1961 Replacement, § 427, p. 699. The right of an owner of an easement and the right of the owner of the land are not absolute, but are so limited, each by the other, that there may be a reasonable enjoyment of both. Where a reservation of a right-of-way is made in a deed, the grantor only retains an easement to use the reserved part as a right-of-way, and the grantee may use the reserved part as he sees fit so long as it does not prevent the grantor from using it. Whether a particular use of the land by the servient owner, or by someone acting with his authorization, is an unreasonable interference is a question of fact for the jury. The owner of the servient estate may build over the easement if the use is not interfered with there being no right to light and air to the easement. We will not attempt to analyze the cases further. Their pattern is consistent with the expression of opinion of the experts on both sides in this case; i. e. under certain circumstances the company may need as much as 200 feet width and under other circumstances and by using smaller equipment the company may be able to operate its line with a 15 foot width. The trial court acknowledged this disparity in its findings of fact. We think it was incorrect to conclude as a matter of law the instrument granted a 50 foot width; no more, no less. We hold the only construction to be given this contract at this time is that the easement carries with it the right to use such width of property as is reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of the easement, Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 253, (1953). Plaintiffs have failed to prove that the only rights granted to the Defendant in said right-of-way contract is the right to come upon the land of the Plaintiffs to manually repair and inspect the 4 inch pipeline, with such hand tools as may be necessary to perform this function. Their petition should therefore have been dismissed as to the request for such finding. Similarly, the facts found by the trial court do not establish acquisition of a 50 foot right-of-way as a matter of law. Defendants did not seek establishment of a specific width but pleaded the right to use 50 feet as an affirmative defense. Dismissal of plaintiffs' petition therefore disposes of this feature of the case.