Opinion ID: 758022
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Parties' Intent to be Bound

Text: 27 Maiellano next argues that the parties did not intend to be legally bound by the arbitral award, but only to have it serve as a contractual advisory. The district court properly rejected this argument. As the district court noted, both arbitration agreements stated unambiguously that the arbitration was to finally resolve the dispute and the arbitrators found that the parties intended to be bound by their award. Absent extraordinary circumstances, a confirming court is not to reconsider the arbitrator's findings. See Fotochrome, 517 F.2d at 516-18; Halley Optical Corp. v. Jagar Int'l Mktg. Corp., 752 F.Supp. 638, 640 (S.D.N.Y.1990); International Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Industrial Y Comercial, 745 F.Supp. 172, 181 (S.D.N.Y.1990). Moreover, as discussed above, awards under arbitrato irrituale are contractually binding on the parties even if they are not automatically enforceable. See, e.g., Butera, n. 4167; Colella Legnami S.p.A., n. 4039. See also Bernini, Italian Arbitration, supra, at 544; Choi, Judicial Enforcement, supra, at 195-96; cf. Michael H. Strub, Jr., Note, Resisting Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Under Article V(1)(E) and Article VI of the New York Convention: A Proposal for Effective Guidelines, 68 Tex. L.Rev. 1031, 1058 (April 1990) (arguing that parties should state explicitly their intention not to be bound and that words such as final in arbitration agreement indicate intent to be bound) [hereinafter Strub, Resisting Enforcement ]. Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining that the arbitration award at issue was binding upon the parties under the Convention.