Opinion ID: 1323198
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: meaning of a life sentence

Text: Williams complains that the trial court refused to let him, at the penalty stage of trial, argue the meaning of a life sentence. Williams reasons that because the prosecution could not argue that parole or pardon might be available to the defendant in a life sentence, the defendant should have the right to argue to a jury that the lesser sentence is a sentence for life imprisonment, until the defendant dies. Any lesser definition would have to deal with parole, pardon, and probation. [2] We reject this inventive but spurious argument. If the jury is not to be concerned with what may later happen to a defendant sentenced to the penitentiary, no inference can be drawn or argued one way or the other as to whether he will serve his full term. A reduced sentence is not the responsibility of the judiciary but of the executive department, Hinton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 492, 496, 247 S.E.2d 704, 706 (1978); Dingus v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 846, 852, 149 S.E. 414, 415 (1929), and argument as to what that department might do encroaches upon the separation of their functions. [3] Hinton, 219 Va. at 496, 247 S.E.2d at 706. Since the Commonwealth is not permitted to argue about the possibility of a reduced sentence by way of probation, parole, or pardon, because the jury might be inclined to handicap the length of its sentence to factor in that possibility, the obverse is equally true. If the defendant is permitted to argue his inability to obtain a reduced sentence, there is an equal danger that the jury may reduce its sentence because of its feeling that probation, parole, or pardon is not probable. In an unvarying line of decisions we have held that the Commonwealth's Attorney may not argue the possibility of executive clemency, Dingus, 153 Va. at 851-52, 149 S.E. at 415, nor may the court make any comment to the jury about what might happen after the sentence is imposed. Hinton, 219 Va. at 496, 247 S.E.2d at 706; Wansley v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 412, 417, 137 S.E.2d 865, 869 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 922, 85 S.Ct. 920, 13 L.Ed.2d 806 (1965); Jones v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 273, 276, 72 S.E.2d 693, 694 (1952). This principle applies in capital murder cases as well. Poyner, 229 Va. at 432, 329 S.E.2d at 836; Peterson, 225 Va. at 296-97, 302 S.E.2d at 525; Clanton, 223 Va. at 55, 286 S.E.2d at 179-80; Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 531, 273 S.E.2d 36, 48 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1011, 101 S.Ct. 2347, 68 L.Ed.2d 863 (1981); Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 214, 257 S.E.2d 784, 792 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049, 100 S.Ct. 741, 62 L.Ed.2d 736 (1980). Indeed, in Poyner we held that a trial judge was correct in refusing to define life imprisonment for a jury, simply reminding the jury of its duty to punish the defendant in accordance with the law stated in the instructions if they should find guilt. We pointed out that [t]he jury has no right to be advised of post-sentencing events. 229 Va. at 432, 329 S.E.2d at 836. We decline to permit defendants to inject such a manifestly improper and unfair consideration into a jury argument in a criminal case.