Opinion ID: 415225
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Use of Character Evidence

Text: 75 Shaw next claims that the government's repeated emphasis on his prior convictions and previous contacts with the law was improper, prejudicial use of character evidence in violation of Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(1) and 404. 76 1. Initially, Shaw challenges admission into evidence of his 1974 convictions for rape and assault with intent to rape. Evidence of a prior conviction is permissible under Rule 609(a)(1) so long as a conviction is for a crime punishable for more than one year, the probative value of the evidence exceeds its prejudicial effect, and so long as the evidence is used only to impeach. Shaw claims that the trial judge failed to weigh the prejudicial effect of admitting his prior convictions against its probative value. Such an on-the-record determination was mandated by this Court in United States v. Preston, 608 F.2d 626, 639 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 2162, 64 L.Ed.2d 794 (1980). Further the trial court's holding will be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Id. See also United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1273, 1276 (5th Cir.1977). 77 Before trial, the parties had stipulated that Shaw had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year. Before Shaw took the stand, the trial court ruled that it was proper to allow proof of the nature, or at least the name, of the offense where the fact of the felony conviction was already before the jury. The court reasoned that such proof would result in less prejudice to Shaw than would allowing the jury to speculate as to whether the prior offenses were similar shootings or murders. These considerations evince the trial judge's observance of concerns voiced in Preston. His comments manifest a determination that the prejudicial effect upon Shaw would be minimized if the nature of his convictions were revealed to the jury. A remand for such a determination would be both superfluous and a waste of judicial resources. 78 2. Shaw next complains that certain cross-examination questioning was improper use of character evidence, in violation of Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. That rule embodies the well-settled principle that evidence of a person's character is generally not admissible for the purpose of showing that a person acted in conformity with his or her character on a particular occasion. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 910 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1244, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) 12 79 On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Shaw whether he had been drinking on Christmas night and whether he became violent when drinking. Shaw's attorney objected, but his objection was overruled on the ground that whether Shaw was intoxicated was directly relevant to his state of mind and intent under F.R.E. 404(b). Shaw responded by denying that drinking caused him to be violent, but now claims that the government was trying to show, not that he had been drinking and violent on the night in question--arguably relevant to his ability to commit premeditated murder--but what character traits he exhibited while drinking. The purpose, Shaw contends, was to show the jury that if he became intoxicated and violent in the past, he would become intoxicated and violent in the future--i.e., that on the night of December 25, Shaw acted in accordance with his character. 80 Rule 404 is a rule of inclusion, United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 432 (2d Cir.1978), which admits evidence of other acts relevant to a trial issue except where such evidence tends to prove only criminal disposition. United States v. Brown, 562 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir.1977); United States v. Boyd, 595 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir.1978). The rule is exclusionary only as to evidence admitted to establish bad character as such; it very broadly recognizes admissibility of prior crimes for other purposes. See Fed.R.Evid. Rule 404(b); United States v. Beechum, supra, 582 F.2d at 910. The trial court must determine that the evidence is relevant to some issue at trial other than to prove the character of the defendant for the purpose of showing that he acted in conformity therewith, and that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. United States v. Benton, 637 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Aleman, 592 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir.1979). When the admission of such evidence is challenged on appeal, the duty of the appellate court is to assess its relevancy and probative value, and the district court's ruling will be reversed [r]arely and only after a clear showing of prejudicial abuse of discretion. United States v. Davis, 546 F.2d 583, 592 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1701, 52 L.Ed.2d 391 (1977). 81 Here, there is no showing that the government was attempting to convince the jury that Shaw was a bad man. Shaw's propensity for aggression when drinking was probative of whether he possessed the requisite intent deliberately to shoot a rifle into a passing car. Whether Shaw became disproportionately aggressive while drinking had relevance to establishing an element of the crime charged--premeditation--as being more probable than it would have been without such evidence. In addition, the likelihood of unfair prejudice accruing to Shaw as a result of the questioning was virtually nonexistent. As stated earlier, Shaw denied that he acted violently when intoxicated, and stated that his drinking that night had no effect on his behavior. The government made no attempt to rebut this denial by extrinsic evidence. Balancing the question's probative value against its possible prejudicial effect, we find that the trial judge's ruling was not a clear abuse of his discretion. United States v. Vincent, 648 F.2d 1046, 1051 (5th Cir.1981). 82 3. Shaw finally claims that the government's repeated references to his criminal record went beyond legitimate efforts to attack his credibility, but rather were attempts to convict him because of bad character. He cites comments by the prosecutor in closing argument that Shaw cared nothing for the law, that one of the arresting officers knew Shaw, ... knew what sort of man he was, that the prosecutor didn't see any reason to give any credibility to anything that a convicted rapist, a double-convicted rapist and admitted liar will tell you. A careful review of closing argument, however, convinces us that the prosecutor's statements in full context were proper attempts to impeach Shaw's credibility or to prove his willingness to violate the law which prohibited him from carrying a firearm. We do not consider them attempts to link Shaw's prior conviction with the likelihood that he would have committed a crime on the present occasion. 83