Opinion ID: 17520
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ADA’s Interactive Process

Text: To understand why I believe Rizzo’s claim fails, it is necessary to review the basic outlines of the ADA’s statutory framework. Under the Act, the general rule is that an employer shall not “[1] 28 Burroughs v. FPP Operating Partners, L.P., 28 F.3d 543, 546 (5th Cir. 1994). 29 In re Letterman Bros. Energy Sec. Litig., 799 F.2d 967, 972 (5th Cir. 1986)). 17 discriminate against [2] a qualified individual with a disability [3] because of the disability . . . .”30 Addressing these requirements in reverse order, a “disability” includes a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of an individual's major life activities.31 CWLC grants that Rizzo’s hearing impairment constitutes a disability. It is important to note, however, that the ADA requires employers to accommodate limitations, not disabilities.32 “The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual.”33 With regard to the second requirement, a qualified individual is one who can perform the essential functions of the job held with or without reasonable accommodation.34 The ADA, however, permits an employer to impose qualification standards that tend to screen out the disabled so long as those standards are shown to be “job- related” and “consistent with business necessity.”35 Such qualifications standards “may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”36 The Act defines “direct threat” as meaning “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable 30 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 31 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 32 See Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 164 (1996). 33 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j), App. (1995). 34 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). 35 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6). 36 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (emphasis added). 18 accommodation.”37 Finally, the ADA defines discrimination as including an employer’s failure to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . unless such [employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such [employer] . . . .”38 In general, “it is the responsibility of the individual with the disability to inform the employer that an accommodation is needed.”39 Once the employee makes such a request, “[t]he appropriate reasonable accommodation is best det ermined through a flexible, interactive process that involves both the employer and the qualified individual with a disability.”40 Thus, once an accommodation is properly requested, the responsibility for fashioning a reasonable one is shared between the employee and employer. This is only logical, as an employee will typically have better access to information concerning his limitations and abilities whereas an employer will typically have better access to information regarding possible alternative duties or positions available to the disabled employee. Fitting these two halves into a whole, the employer and employee can work together to determine how best to restructure the employee’s duties and work place in a manner that accommodates the employee’s limitations but does not pose an undue hardship on the employer. If, at the end of this process, the employer fails to provide the disabled employee 37 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3). 38 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 39 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9, App. (1995). 40 Taylor, 93 F.3d at 164 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9, App. (1995)). 19 a reasonable accommodation, it is liable under the ADA.41 On the other hand, if the employee does not participate in the process in good faith, he is precluded from recovering from the employer.42 The Act, therefore, (1) requires an employer reasonably to accommodate known limitations stemming from a disability; (2) permits an employer to take into account safety risks posed by such limitations; and (3) envisions an interactive process between the employer and the employee both at the initial stage when the employee must inform the employer of his disability and any limitations stemming therefrom and request an accommodation, and at the reasonable accommodation stage when the employer and employee must work together to determine how best to accommodate such limitations. 2. Requirement that Employee Participate in ADA’s Interactive Process in Good Faith As CWLC asserts that it is not liable to Rizzo under the ADA because Rizzo failed to help CWLC determine what, if any, limitations she experienced as a result of her hearing loss, it is the third aspect of the statutory scheme in which we are interested. In Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc.,43 we considered a situation very similar to that of the present suit. There, an employee brought an ADA claim, in which he asserted that his employer had failed reasonably to accommodate his bipolar disorder mental disability.44 Although the employee alerted his employer that he suffered a bipolar disorder, he did not identify any limitations that he experienced as a result of the condition.45 41 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 42 See infra notes 22-35 and accompanying text. 43 93 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 1996). 44 Id. at 159. 45 Id. at 164. 20 To the contrary, the employee told his supervisor that he was “all right” and that he would be able to meet, and likely exceed, the goals that had been set for him.46 We held that Taylor could not prevail on his claim,47 stating that “[w]hen the nature of the disability, resulting limitations, and necessary accommodations are uniquely within the knowledge of the employee and his health-care provider, a disabled employee cannot remain silent and expect his employer to bear the initial burden of identifying the need for, and suggesting, an appropriate accommodation.”48 The Seventh and Tenth Circuits have similarly held that an employee cannot prevail on his ADA claim if his failure to provide medical information prevented his employer from fashioning a reasonable accommodation. In Beck v. University of Wisconsin Board of Regents,49 the Seventh Circuit confronted an ADA claim by an employee based on her depression.50 After the employee supplied her employer with a letter from her doctor stating that she “may require some reasonable accommodation so that she does not have a recurrence of this condition [the depression],”51 the employer requested that the employee sign a release to allow it to obtain further information.52 The employee, however, neither signed the release nor attended a meeting scheduled to discuss possible 46 Id. at 159-60. 47 Id. at 165-66. 48 Id. at 165. 49 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1996). 50 Id. at 1132-33. 51 Id. at 1133. 52 Id. 21 accommodations.53 She subsequently brought suit, asserting that her employer had failed reasonably to acco mmodate her disabilities. The Seventh Circuit held that, by refusing to sign the medical release form or provide the University with sufficient information about her medical conditions, Beck was responsible for the breakdown in the interactive process envisioned by the ADA and thus could not prevail on her ADA claim.54 Employing identical reaso ning, the Tenth Circuit held in Templeton v. Neodata Services, Inc.55 that an employee who had refused to provide her employer with certification from her physician that she was physically able to perform the essential duties of her position following an automobile accident in response to the employer’s reasonable request for such information was precluded from recovering under the ADA.56 3. Interactive Process and Employer’s Legitimate Safety Concerns In the present case, CWLC too requested that Rizzo provide them with certification that she could perform a function —— safely transporting the children in the van —— that Rizzo admits —— more accurately, insists —— constituted an essential function of her position. The suit, however, diverges somewhat from the above-examined cases in that Rizzo complains not that CWLC failed to reduce or restructure her duties to accommodate limitations she suffers as a result of her hearing loss, but rather that CWLC impermissibly reduced and restructured her duties based on stereotypes and 53 Id. 54 Id. at 1137; see also Steffes v. Stephan Co., 144 F.3d 1070, 1073 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Because [employee] failed to hold up her end of the interactive process by clarifying the extent of her medical restrictions, [employer] cannot be held liable for failing to provide reasonable accommodations.”). 55 162 F.3d 617 (10th Cir. 1998). 56 Id. at 619. 22 generalizations. Thus, whereas in Taylor, Beck, and Templeton, the question of the employer’s liability centered on what the employer had failed to do, here the question of CWLC’s liability hinges on what CWLC actually did. This is a potentially significant distinction. The ADA does not permit an employer to make adverse employment decisions based solely on the fact that an employee has a disability without determining that the disability affects the employee’s ability to perform his essential duties.57 Generally, then, an employer must investigate before acting —— that is, before restructuring the employee’s duties in a way that might constitute an adverse employment decision —— rather than the reverse, as CWLC did here. Nevertheless, this general rule must give way in a situation in which the employee’s job necessarily entails ensuring the safety of others and the employer has reasonable grounds for believing that the employee’s disability might jeopardize his ability to perform that safety function adequately. Such a result flows not only from the structure of the ADA, but from common sense as well. As stated above, burden of proof issues aside, t he ADA permits an employer to require that an employee not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by 57 See Taylor, 93 F.3d at 164 (Policy that employers must not presume that disabled employee suffers limitations is “supported by E.E.O.C.’s interpretive guide: employers Although the Act forbids discrimination based on stereotypes, an employer is entitled to make employment decisions based on reasonable accommodation.58 Moreover, although the language of the ADA does not mandate that an employer conduct a pre-termination or pre-duty restructuring investigation, it certainly encourages such investigations by requiring that an employer take no action with regard to a disabled employee based on uneducated generalizations and stereotypes.59 Indeed, the EEOC advises that “the employer must determine whether a reasonable accommodation would . . . eliminate” the direct threat60 —— a determinat ion the employer will often only be able to make after investigating the employee’s capabilities and limitations. It follows that, during the period that such an investigation is being conducted, the employer must be permitted to assign to other employees, for a reasonable period of time, those duties in which the safety of others was entrust ed t o the (possibly) disabled employee to other employees. If this were not so, the ADA would be requiring an employer to expose itself to potentially massive liability in an effort not to discriminate on the basis of disability.61 Even more importantly, if the ADA did not permit an employer to reassign such duties during the course of a reasonable investigation, it would be placing in harm’s way all those whose safety is entrusted to the (possibly) disabled employee. There is no evidence that Congress intended to place an employer in such a Catch-22 situation —— either discriminate or endanger your business and the safety of others. To the 58 See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). 59 See supra note 36. 60 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(r), 1630.9, Interp. Guidance (emphasis added). 61 As we have reiterated on several occasions in ADA cases presenting concerns over an employee’s ability to drive safely, “[w]oe unto the employer who put such an employee behind a wheel of a vehicle owned by the employer which was involved in a vehicular accident.” Chandler, 2 F.3d at 1395 (quoting Collier v. City of Dallas, 798 F.2d 1410 (1986) (unpublished)). In this case, of course, the danger was not so much to other drivers as to the children entrusted to Rizzo’s care. 24 contrary, the ADA’s clearly-announced recognition of an employer’s potential safety concerns belies such a result. Thus, the ADA’s complementary policies of prohibiting unjustified discrimination on the basis of disability, requiring employers to rest their employment decisions on the actual capabilities and limitations of their employees, and permitting employers to factor into their decision-making process legitimate safety concerns dictate that an employer be permitted to remove from an employee an essential duty that necessarily places the employee in charge of the health and safety of others while the employer determines whether any threat exists. I hasten to emphasize that an employer does not have carte blanche to take any action with regard to an employee whose alleged disability may pose a risk to the safety of others; the employer must always act reasonably under the circumstances. As underscored above, before removing a duty from an employee because of the employee’s disability, an employer must have reasonable grounds for suspecting that the employee, in fact, poses a direct threat to the health and safety of others —— a fact-intensive inquiry that must be determined on a case-by-case basis. If the employer does not have such grounds, the general rule described above, preventing an employer from taking unjustified adverse employment actions against a disabled employee based on stereotypes and generalizations, applies.62 Moreover, an employer must conduct its investigation as quickly as practicable, particularly when, as here, the nature of the job is such that the employee is forced to suffer some hardship in terms of hours or pay as a result of the suspension of some of his duties. The ADA permits an employer to remove a duty from an employee while it conducts a reasonable investigation of safety 62 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 25 risks. The ADA, however, prohibits an employer from taking an adverse employment action against an employee based solely on the basis of the employee’s disability.63 Again, whether the employer abuses its right to investigate safety concerns either by impermissibly prolonging the investigation or by unnecessarily and unreasonably rearranging the employee’s duties during the investigation, thereby crossing the line between reasonable investigation and adverse employment action, will typically be a question of fact. Nevertheless, when an employer acts on a reasonable concern that the employee cannot safely care for those entrusted to him in the course of his duties and removes such duties from the employee while attempting to determine whether he, in fact, poses a direct threat, the employee must cooperate with the employer’s investigation —— just as the case law tells us that he must cooperate with the employer’s efforts to fashion a reasonable accommodation.64 If the employee fails to cooperate —— for example, by refusing to provide the employer with medical information about his condition when the information is uniquely within his control —— he cannot recover under the ADA.65 4. Rizzo’s Claim When I apply these standards to CWLC and Rizzo, it is clear to me that Rizzo’s ADA claims are precluded by her failure to provide CWLC with a report from her audiologist that she could safely supervise the children entrusted to her care while driving the van. First, CWLC had reasonable grounds for removing the van-driving duties from Rizzo. It had received not one but two reports that 63 Rizzo I, 84 F.3d 763. 64 See supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text. 65 See id. 26 children were unable to get Rizzo’s attention even though the children were yelling her name to her.66 Given the potential risk to the children and others of a driver who might not be able to hear important aural signals or whose attention the children might not be able to get in the case of a safety crisis, CWLC was not unreasonable in seeking to investigate the matter further.67 Second, it was not CWLC, but Rizzo, who unreasonably delayed the investigation of the matter. Only Rizzo, in conjunction with her audiologist, could provide the medical information necessary to determine whether she posed a risk to the children.68 Rizzo, of course, did furnish CWLC with half of the information it requested —— a report that she could hear the sirens of emergency vehicles. Although she testified inconsistently regarding the matter, Rizzo asserts that CWLC prevented her from providing them with the information it had requested. More specifically, Rizzo claims that additional testing regarding her ability to supervise the children “was no longer necessary.” As an initial matter, in a situation such as this in which an employer has temporarily removed a duty from an employee because of safety concerns and the information sought by the employer is of the type that is uniquely within the employee’s ability to control, it is far from clear that a single remark to the effect that the employee need not provide the information, made after the employer has 66 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 67 Cf. Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding insulin-dependent driver was not otherwise qualified individual with disability under ADA); Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993) (same under Rehabilitation Act). 68 See Taylor, 93 F.3d at 165 (“When the nature of the disability, resulting limitations, and necessary accommodations are uniquely within the knowledge of the employee and his health-care provider, a disabled employee cannot remain silent and expect his employer to bear the initial burden of identifying the need for, and suggesting, an appropriate accommodation.”). 27 admittedly informed the employee that it is just that information that they require to reinstate the removed duty, is sufficient to support a finding that the employer prevented the employee from providing the information. Rizzo did not testify that Ryan forbade her from bringing her audiologist to observe her at work. In fact, Rizzo testified that she did not even question Ryan as to why the information was no longer needed. Nevertheless, it not necessary to decide the issue based on this single breakdown of interaction. Rizzo admits that, in her exit interview, Adame asked what CWLC could do to keep her from quitting. At that point, because of the type of information involved, the burden was on Rizzo to provide CWLC with proof that she could drive the van and supervise the children safely. Accordingly, she —— not CWLC —— was required to raise the issue of further testing before quitting and seeking to recover for disability discrimination. CWLC reasonably requested specific information to determine whether Rizzo was a direct threat to the safety of the children and, then, at a minimum, reopened the door for her to provide that information at the exit interview. Rizzo, however, chose to leave her position with CWLC because she believed that CWLC would not reinstate her driving duties “even if all the tests came back to prove that [she] was qualified.” Her choice forecloses the possibility of recovering under the ADA. Lastly, within the specific context of temporarily suspending Rizzo’s duties to investigate its legitimate safety concerns, CWLC did not unnecessarily or unreasonably rearrange Rizzo’s duties. The majority concludes that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that, by removing Rizzo from van driving duties, thereby reducing her hours, and by assigning her to kitchen duty and split shift, CWLC took an adverse employment action against Rizzo. I would agree were this the typical case presenting no direct threat issue; however, if the ADA permits an employer to 28 reshuffle an employee’s duties during a reasonable investigation of its legitimate safety concerns, the employer must be allowed temporarily t o take actions that would otherwise constitute adverse employment actions. The issue is not whether the employer took action that negatively affects the employee’s status —— e.g., reducing his hours or reassigning him to less desirable duties —— it is whether the employer unreasonably and unnecessarily took such action. Rizzo testified that she felt stigmatized by her new duties and split schedule. She admitted, however, that they were duties shared by all CWLC employees to varying degrees and that others also worked split shifts. She further admitted that she told CWLC that she did not want to work with school-aged children. Essentially, her claim that she suffered an adverse employment action, therefore, turns solely on the fact that CWLC required that she not to drive the van until she proved she could do so safely. That, however, is exactly what the ADA permits CWLC to do. Therefore, as a matter of law, CWLC’s decision cannot constitute an adverse employment action. CWLC had reasonable grounds for temporarily removing Rizzo from van-driving duty while it investigated whether she posed a safety risk to the children or others. CWLC did not treat Rizzo unreasonably during the investigatory period by unnecessarily diminishing her work or pay or assigning her to oppressive duties; and it was not CWLC, but Rizzo, who unnecessarily delayed the investigation. Because Rizzo failed to provide the crucial medical information to CWLC prior to quitting, she is responsible for the breakdown in the interactive process required by the ADA. She is thus precluded from recovering under that Act.