Opinion ID: 1602553
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Barnes Was Denied a Speedy Trial?

Text: Whether Barnes was denied a speedy trial actually is not a matter of dispute. Both Barnes and the State agree that, in the very least, 423 days transpired before Barnes was finally brought to trial on March 23, 1989. See Appellant's Brief at 3; Appellee's Brief at 5. This Court's computation of time reveals that 576 days transpired from the date of arraignment to the date of the trial. Of the 576 days, continuances involved 158 days. Thus, the total number of days which transpired from arraignment to trial  not including the time of continuances  is 418 days ( i.e., 576 days - 158 days = 418 days). This means the prosecution missed the statutory deadline for a speedy trial by 148 days ( i.e., 418 days - 270 days = 148 days). See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-17-1 (Supp. 1990) (Unless good cause be shown, and a continuance duly granted by the court, all offenses for which indictments are presented to the court shall be tried no later than ... (270) days after the accused has been arraigned.). Accordingly, the State concedes that  it would appear that § 99-17-1 was violated.  Appellee's Brief at 5. While conceding that it would appear that [the speedy-trial statute] was violated, the State contends that Barnes should be procedurally barred from raising the speedy-trial issue on appeal since he failed to raise the issue at the trial level. Appellee's Brief at 5-6 (citing Colburn v. State, 431 So.2d 1111 (Miss. 1983); Callahan v. State, 419 So.2d 165 (Miss. 1982)). In Colburn, this Court held that, because the appellant failed to question the constitutionality of a statute at the trial level, he could not raise the question on appeal. 431 So.2d at 1113. And in Callahan, this Court held that, because a constitutional question was not raised in the lower court or in the assignments of error on appeal, the question may not be addressed. 419 So.2d at 171. Barnes counters that the State's contention should be rejected because: (1) the State's only authoritative support  Colburn and Callahan  are not factually nor philosophically analogous to the case sub judice; and (2) this Court has held that a party may not be procedurally barred from raising issues for the first time on appeal if the error affects fundamental rights. Appellant's Reply Brief at 1 (citing Read v. State, 430 So.2d 832, 837 (Miss. 1983) (Error affecting fundamental rights are exceptions to the rule that questions not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.) (quoting Brooks v. State, 209 Miss. 150, 155, 46 So.2d 94, 97 (1950)). Alternatively, Barnes counters that the State's contention should be rejected because this Court has held: [B]efore there can be a waiver of a constitutional right, [he] must [have been] given a meaningful and realistic opportunity to assert the right. Appellant's Reply Brief at 1 (quoting Read, 430 So.2d at 838). Barnes explains that he was not provided a meaningful and realistic opportunity to assert the right because he was denied effective assistance of counsel. This conveniently leads to the second issue presented on appeal.