Opinion ID: 2758566
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Giovenco’s Conviction

Text: We review a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo in the light most favorable to the prosecution. United States v. Seidling, 737 F.3d 1155, 1159–60 (7th Cir. 2013). If any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we must uphold the jury’s conviction. Id. A mail fraud conviction requires three elements: (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) the use of the mailing system for the purpose of executing the scheme, and (3) the defendant’s participation in the scheme with the intent to defraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1341; Seidling, 737 F.3d at 1160. 6 Nos. 13-3283 & 13-3537 Giovenco’s challenge centers on the third element. He argues that because he was fired before the six charged mailings were sent, he cannot be considered a participant in the scheme. Essentially, Giovenco claims he withdrew from the scheme, precluding conviction. Withdrawal, however, is not a recognized defense to mail fraud. United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1981). This is because unlike conspiracy where withdrawal is an available defense, no agreement is necessary for mail fraud liability. Id. at 1240. See also United States v. Adeniji, 221 F.3d 1020, 1026 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The joint agreement that is essential to a defendant’s liability for the crime of conspiracy is not a prerequisite to a conviction for mail fraud.”). While conspiracy punishes membership in an agreement to commit illegal activity, mail fraud punishes the act of using the mail system to further a scheme to defraud. Read, 658 F.2d at 1240. Therefore, “[a] party’s ‘withdrawal’ from a scheme is … no defense to the crime because membership in the scheme is not an element of the offense.” Id. Instead, association and participation in the criminal venture are sufficient for liability. Id. See also Adeniji, 221 F.3d at 1026 (concluding adequate evidence of “knowing participation in the … scheme” was sufficient to support a mail fraud conviction). This fundamental distinction between conspiracy and mail fraud is also consistent with the longstanding rule that a mail fraud conviction does not require proof that a defendant personally mailed the letters at issue. United States v. Daniel, 749 F.3d 608, 615 (7th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Briscoe, 65 F.3d 576, 583 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that the government need only prove that a scheme existed in which use of mails Nos. 13-3283 & 13-3537 7 was reasonably foreseeable). All that is required is that “the use of the United States mail system was reasonably foreseeable to [the defendant] and that an actual mailing occurred in furtherance of the scheme.” Daniel, 749 F.3d at 615. The undisputed facts presented at trial show Giovenco’s participation in the mail fraud scheme. The government presented testimony that Giovenco admitted to investigators that he and Potter founded ICS as an MBE for the purpose of obtaining contracts from RCN. He also stated he knew ICS received its payments from RCN in the form of checks mailed to Potter’s residence. Although Giovenco no longer worked for ICS at the time of the charged mailings, it was reasonably foreseeable that the mailings would continue to occur as a result of his prior participation. In fact, the relevant mailings were caused by Giovenco—he signed the very contract that obligated RCN to send the checks in issue. Based on these facts alone, Giovenco’s conduct satisfies the participation with intent to defraud element of mail fraud. As to the remaining elements, the record contains ample evidence in support of both the existence of a scheme and the use of the mailing system to execute the scheme, neither of which Giovenco challenges. Because a rational trier of fact could have found all three essential elements of mail fraud beyond a reasonable doubt, Giovenco’s conviction must stand.