Opinion ID: 1351510
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Ex Parte Communication With a Juror

Text: During voir dire, several venire persons were excused on the basis of anticipated financial hardship, but prospective juror Fascina stated she would not suffer any financial hardship by serving as a juror in defendant's trial, estimated to last six weeks. Fascina was ultimately selected as one of the twelve jurors to try defendant's case. The evidentiary phase of the guilt trial commenced on September 15, 1982. On that same date, Phyllis Sandahl, the personnel administrator for Fascina's employer, wrote to the court relating her company's policy of paying its employees for a maximum of 10 days of jury service and requesting employees to seek excusal from service for any longer period. The trial judge responded to the employer by letter on September 16, 1982. He noted Fascina was a sitting juror in defendant's case, described the seriousness of the charges, and expressed surprise at the company's 10-day policy, saying he was informed the company would pay Fascina for the duration of the trial. It was further stated in the letter that this new revelation came, at a very bad time. In order to excuse her in the middle of the trial I would have to declare a mistrial and run the risk of freeing a man against whom a large amount of evidence has already been presented. I am certain that such a result would not be desired by your company. The court's letter concluded: Your re-consideration in this matter is vital. Fascina's employer wrote back the next day to inform the trial judge that Fascina would be allowed 20 paid days for jury service and an extended unpaid leave of absence that would not affect her position with the company. On September 22, 1982, the jury returned its verdicts of guilt. The trial judge then summoned Fascina, who had served as foreperson of the jury, over for a side-bar discussion. He told her he understood she was not being paid for her service, and asked her if the situation was causing her undue hardship. She replied in the negative. He also asked her if she wished to be relieved; she replied she had come this far and felt it was her duty to continue serving on the jury. [6] Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel was a party to this conversation, nor had they been notified of the trial judge's letter to Fascina's employer. (12a) Defendant first argues we can infer from the dates on the trial judge's letter and the letters from Fascina's employer that the judge's letter was hand carried. From that he urges Fascina thus may well have read the letter, with its arguably misleading statements that the employer's revelation came at a bad time, that a large amount of evidence had been produced, and that to excuse Fascina would risk freeing a dangerous man. This information, defendant argues, could have signaled to Fascina that the trial judge believed defendant was guilty, thereby prejudicing Fascina against defendant. Although the record does not unequivocally establish whether Fascina in fact read the trial judge's letter during trial, it could certainly support such an inference. Phyllis Sandahl, the personnel administrator for Fascina's employer, filed an affidavit in which she stated it would have been my normal practice to show the trial judge's letter to Fascina, and she added, I believe I showed her the letter at that time and that she read it. [7] Furthermore, Fascina's testimony at the hearing to settle the record provides additional evidence from which we may conclude she read the letter. She answered in the affirmative when asked if she had occasion to read the letter. When she was then asked whether she had read the letter before or after her side-bar conversation with the judge, she replied, I would think it was before, but I won't swear to it, because I don't know, I don't remember. Even assuming Fascina read the letter on the day it was written, we conclude no prejudice resulted. While the trial judge may have exaggerated the amount of evidence which, by that point, had been introduced at trial, the ultimate evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming  including fingerprint evidence and his confession. Moreover, it must have been fairly obvious to Fascina that the possibility of her being dismissed from the case came at a bad time, since all concerned had already come through a lengthy voir dire process. Finally, defendant overstates the ominous tone of the trial judge's letter; Fascina was already aware of the seriousness of the capital murder and related charges which defendant faced. In short, assuming Fascina read the letter prior to or at the start of trial, under the facts and circumstances she could not have been biased or prejudiced against defendant as a result thereof. [8] Defendant also argues that the trial judge's ex parte side-bar communication with Fascina requires reversal of all his convictions, claiming the communication violated his constitutional rights to the effective assistance of counsel and to be present at all critical stages of his trial. (13) It is well settled that the trial court should not entertain, let alone initiate, communications with individual jurors except in open court, with prior notification to counsel. ( Paulson v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 1, 7 [22 Cal. Rptr. 649, 372 P.2d 641].) This rule is based on the precept that a defendant should be afforded an adequate opportunity to evaluate the propriety of a proposed judicial response in order to pose an objection or suggest a different reply more favorable to the defendant's case. [Citations.] ( People v. Garcia (1984) 160 Cal. App.3d 82, 88 [206 Cal. Rptr. 468].) While the rule against ex parte communications with jurors is based on a defendant's constitutional right to personal presence at all critical stages of his trial and on his right to counsel, [t]here is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial. The ... conclusion that an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror can never be harmless error ignores these day-to-day realities of courtroom life and undermines society's interest in the administration of criminal justice. ( Rushen v. Spain (1983) 464 U.S. 114, 118-119 [78 L.Ed.2d 267, 273, 104 S.Ct. 453], italics in original, fn. omitted [per curiam opn.].) Although such communications violate a defendant's right to be present, and represented by counsel, at all critical stages of his trial, and thus constitute federal constitutional error, reversal is not required where the error can be demonstrated harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Rushen v. Spain, supra, at pp. 117-120 [78 L.Ed.2d at pp. 272-274]; People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 850 [183 Cal. Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93]; see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 20-21 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 708-709, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065].) (12b) Such was the case here. The record and settled statement reflect that Fascina advised the court her continued service on the jury would not cause her any financial hardship. She confirmed that she was never pressured to remain on the jury, and that her decision to continue serving was entirely her own. We conclude that although it was improper for the trial judge to communicate with Fascina without the knowledge of defense counsel (cf. People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 815-816 [248 L.Ed.2d 126, 755 P.2d 310]), the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [9]