Opinion ID: 378303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wrongful Prevention.

Text: 24 Foley additionally argues that appellees wrongfully prevented appellant from performing the contract. Appellant's original and second amended complaint charged that Williams and Standard Brands obstructed, hindered, interfered with and delayed the performance of plaintiff's work. Foley charges it did not have sufficient time to complete its work because Williams and Standard Brands failed to erect the structural steel in sufficient time; Williams failed to coordinate the project; and Williams and Standard Brands failed to furnish steel and machinery in accordance with the contract schedule. 25 The Supreme Court of Arkansas has awarded damages due to delay on the basis of unreasonable hindrance. In Housing Authority v. Forcum-Lannom, Inc., 248 Ark. 750, 454 S.W.2d 101 (1970) the contract provided that the plaintiff-contractor should notify the defendant's engineer when the utility lines to be removed were encountered so that this engineer could notify the local owner and attempt to get prompt action. The court specifically found: 26 (T)hat the defendant was under a duty of cooperation to do whatever was necessary in the project area to enable plaintiff to perform its contract in an orderly manner and that defendant breached this duty in that it failed to use its best efforts to secure the removal of the utilities, underground and overhead, and that such failure unreasonably hindered and delayed the contractor in the performance of the contract. 27 Id. 454 S.W.2d at 104. Additionally, the court found in general: 28 (T)hat there were numerous and disrupting delays and suspensions, and that the contractor was never in a position to plan and follow any normal sequence in which the work was to be done on the project; that such delays and suspensions of work in excess of those which a contractor could or should reasonably anticipate as being normal, usual and customary in the performance of a contract of this nature. 29 Id. 30 In addition to his argument based on the express terms of the contract, Foley bases his wrongful prevention claim on the existence of an implied provision in every contract: 31 It is hornbook law that an implied provision of every contract is that neither party to the contract will do anything to prevent performance thereof by the other party or commit any act that will hinder or delay performance. 32 Peter Kiewit Sons' Company v. Summit Construction Co., 422 F.2d 242, 257 (8th Cir. 1969), and Investors Thrift Corporation v. Hunt, 387 F.Supp. 517, 524 (W.D.Ark.1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1161 (1975). 33 This implied obligation was recognized in L. L. Hall Construction Company v. United States, 379 F.2d 559, 563, 177 Ct.Cl. 870 (1966): 34 (I)t is clear from the cases cited by the parties and the numerous other decisions of this court, that where the Government unreasonably hinders or delays a contractor's performance, even though it does not prevent the eventual completion of the contract, it has breached its implied obligation not to delay the contract, in the absence of a clause expressly exempting it from such liability. 35 We are aware of the existence of an extension of time clause, Section 1C, Article 26, 7 in the specifications of this present case and that if the Contractor (subcontractor) be delayed at any time in the progress of the Work by any act or neglect of Owner (contractor)    then the time of completion shall be extended   . Although such a clause, in conjunction with additional facts, may be indicative that a defendant did not obligate itself to complete certain work by a certain time, Burgess Construction Company v. M. Morrin & Son Company, Inc., 526 F.2d 108, 114 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 866, 97 S.Ct. 176, 50 L.Ed.2d 146 (1976), it does not necessarily provide an exemption from damages for delay. In Commerce International Company v. United States, 338 F.2d 81, 167 Ct.Cl. 529 (1964) the plaintiff-contractor's only recourse for delay was to seek an extension of the time of his performance as the contract was absent any warranty for delay damages. However, the court remarked: 36 But this general principle presupposes that the Government has met the ever-present obligation of any contracting party to carry out its bargain reasonably and in good faith.    It would be intolerable if the Government could disregard that responsibility, or were free to stretch its tardiness for however long it fancied, without sterner control than the mere prolongation of the completion date of the contract. 37 Id. at 85. 38 In the present case, it may be Foley's burden to prove that any unreasonable or undue delay was tied to appellees' breach of their implied obligation of reasonable cooperation. However, we cannot find in the district court's decision that a ruling was made on this issue. We therefore find that the court failed to rule on appellant's theory of an implied obligation and remand this issue to the district court for a decision based upon the evidence already presented. 8 39 The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and remanded in part for further decision in accordance with this opinion.