Opinion ID: 735004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The presumption rebutted?

Text: 49 We conclude that Mr. Johnston has raised a triable issue as to whether Ms. Goss participated in the procurement of the Trust so as to raise a presumption of undue influence. Once such a presumption arises, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce evidence that either (1) the confidential relationship had been severed before the critical events in controversy or (2) the settlor actually received independent and competent advice about the disposition of his estate. Maheras, 897 P.2d at 273. However, merely demonstrating that there is a genuine triable issue as to whether a presumption of undue influence has arisen is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. While the burden of production shifts at this stage to the defendant, the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. See id. at 272 (holding that the burden of persuasion in a will contest based on undue influence rests on the contestant); id. at 273 n. 19 (highlighting the distinction between the burden of production and the burden of persuasion). Therefore, at the summary judgment stage, the defendants must produce evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of undue influence, and Mr. Johnston retains the ultimate burden of demonstrating that there is a genuine factual dispute about the evidence they produce. Cf. Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir.1995) (discussing the application of the summary judgment standard to a multi-stage, burden-shifting, substantive legal standard). 50 There is no question that the relationship between Father and Ms. Goss was not severed before the execution of the trust. This leads us to consider the fifth Maheras factor. The district court concluded that, because it found no triable issue as to the presumption of undue influence, it did not need to consider whether Father had received independent and competent advice from either Murphy or Boring. We therefore consider this question de novo. 51 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the term independent advice means: 52 that the donor had the preliminary benefit of conferring fully and privately upon the subject of the [instrument] with a person who was not only competent to inform him as to its effect, but who was, furthermore, so disassociated from the interest of the [beneficiary] as to be in a position to advise with the donor impartially and confidentially as to the consequences to himself of the proposed benefaction. 53 Estate of Gerard, 911 P.2d at 271 (quoting Estate of Carano, 868 P.2d at 707). We conclude that the record does not reflect unambiguously that Father was given an opportunity to consult independently with either of the advisors. As previously noted, Ms. Goss was present at all of the meetings and made all of the contacts, and the record does not reflect that she ever left Father alone with either advisor. Both Murphy and Boring testified that they did not recall ever speaking to Father on the phone before the execution of the trust. We conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Ms. Goss did not meet the burden of production required of a defendant to whom the presumption of undue influence has attached. See In re Estate of Seegers, 733 P.2d at 424 (no independent consultation where the lawyer who prepared the will was hired by the beneficiary and had a considerable relationship with the beneficiary and his family). 54 The district court emphasizes language in some of the Oklahoma cases requiring that the influence be of the sort that destroys the free agency of the [settlor] at the time when the instrument is made and which, in effect, substitutes the will of another for that of the [settlor]. Myers v. Myers, 266 P. 452, 455 (Okla.1927) (citations omitted). Similarly, the appellees argue that the influence must destroy the grantor's free agency, ... in effect, substituting the will of another for that of the grantor. See Aple's Br. at 19 (quoting In re Estate of Webb, 863 P.2d at 1121 (quoting Watkins v. Musselman, 239 P.2d 418, 423 (Okla.1951))). While we have no reason to doubt that undue influence is still defined in those terms, we can only observe that we are bound by the two-prong, five-factor analytic framework that was established in Maheras and followed in the Oklahoma Supreme Court's most recent statements of the law in this area. See Estate of Gerard, 911 P.2d 266 (Okla.1995) (following the Maheras framework); Estate of Carano, 868 P.2d 699 (Okla.1994) (same). In the same vein, excessive reliance must not be placed on Hubbell, 441 P.2d 1010. To the extent that the law of Oklahoma has evolved in the period between Hubbell and the more recent decisions in Maheras and Estate of Gerard, the analysis of these later cases of course controls our decisions.