Opinion ID: 1637371
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Out-of-State Hospital

Text: The Counties further contend that Medical Center, a Minnesota hospital, does not fall within the definition of hospital as that term is defined in SDCL 28-13-27(1), and is precluded from obtaining reimbursement. Counties further argue that expanding the definition of hospital would ignore the plain meaning of the statute without legislative approval. SDCL 28-13-27 provides in part: Unless the context otherwise plainly requires, terms used in §§ 28-13-27 to 28-13-36, inclusive, shall mean: (1) `Hospital,' any hospital in the state of South Dakota, duly licensed by the state department of health, serving the public as such, and providing hospitalization for the sick and injured; (2) `Emergency case,' hospitalization provided under circumstances certified by a duly licensed physician as necessitating immediate hospital care and attention; ... Medical Center admits that it does not fit the statutory definition of hospital because it is not located within the state of South Dakota. However, Medical Center asserts that Counties interpretation of subsection (1) fails to recognize its preface which provides, [u]nless the context otherwise plainly requires[.] Here, the Flandreau Hospital decided that it was unable to provide Levitt with adequate care due to the nature of her injuries. In fact, no hospital in South Dakota possessed the expertise to treat her severe and extensive burns. The facts show that this was an emergency case necessitating immediate hospital care and attention under SDCL 28-13-27(2). In this context, Medical Center argues that the factual circumstances plainly required that the term hospital include an out-of-state hospital such as Medical Center, utilized in an emergency capacity when there was no in-state hospital able to provide the necessary care to the injured party. The trouble with Medical Center's argument is that the language says unless the context otherwise plainly requires and not unless the factual situation otherwise plainly requires. One of the primary rules of statutory construction is to give words and phrases their plain meaning and effect. Board of Regents v. Carter, 89 S.D. 40, 46, 228 N.W.2d 621, 624-625 (1975). This court has ruled that we assume statutes mean what they say and that the legislators have said what they meant. American Rim and Brake, Inc. v. Zoellner, 382 N.W.2d 421, 424 (S.D. 1986); Crescent Electric Supply Co., v. Nerison, 89 S.D. 203, 210, 232 N.W.2d 76, 80 (1975). When the language of a statute is clear, certain, and unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction, and this court's only function is to declare the meaning as clearly expressed in the statute. Matter of Aiken, 296 N.W.2d 538, 540 (S.D.1980); State Highway Commission v. Wieczorek, 248 N.W.2d 369, 372 (S.D.1976). Whether or not an out-of-state hospital should recover as against a county [2] involves many matters, including taxation, indigency, poor relief, licensing of health care facilities, reciprocity between states, and public policy. Obviously, these are matters for the legislature. Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative. CERTIFICATION QUESTION ANSWERED. WUEST, C.J., HENDERSON, J., and FOSHEIM, Retired Justice, concur. MORGAN, J., concurs specially. MILLER, J., not having been a member of the Court at the time this action was submitted to the Court, did not participate.