Opinion ID: 888972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: ISSUE 2. Did the District Court err in denying Morrisey's motion to dismiss for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial?

Text: ¶ 51 We analyze a speedy trial claim pursuant to the four-factor balancing test set out in State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204, 338 Mont. 442, 167 P.3d 815. We examine the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the accused's responses to the delay, and any prejudice to the accused and then balance these four factors with any other relevant circumstances to determine whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 106-112; State v. Billman, 2008 MT 326, ¶ 11, 346 Mont. 118, 194 P.3d 58. ¶ 52 Whether a defendant has been denied the right to a speedy trial presents a question of constitutional law. Billman, ¶ 8. This Court reviews de novo a district court's legal conclusions to determine whether the court correctly interpreted and applied the law. Billman, ¶ 8. But we review the factual findings underlying the court's speedy trial ruling to determine whether those findings are clearly erroneous. Ariegwe, ¶ 119

¶ 53 The State charged Morrisey on September 4, 2002, with deliberate homicide and tampering with evidence (the latter charge was dismissed on the last day of trial); however, he was arrested in relation to those charges on September 3, 2002. His trial commenced on November 14, 2005. This constitutes a quite significant delay of 1,168 days between accusation and trial. This delay is considerably greater than the 278-day delay in Billman, the 408-day delay in Ariegwe, and the 507-day delay in State v. Rose, 2009 MT 4, 348 Mont. 291, 202 P.3d 749. Thus, the State has a heavy burden to justify the delay and to show that Morrisey was not prejudiced. See Ariegwe, ¶¶ 62, 123; Billman, ¶ 18; Rose, ¶ 46. Still, while the length of the delay here is substantial, it is but one factor in the analysis. Indeed, whereas the 278-day delay in Billman amounted to a speedy trial violation, the 408-day delay in Ariegwe and the 507-day delay in Rose did not. See Billman, ¶ 52; Ariegwe, ¶ 155; Rose, ¶¶ 88-92. This is because the speedy trial right is necessarily relative and depend[ent] upon circumstances. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2188, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 54 Under Factor Two, we identify each period of delay, attribute the delay to the appropriate party, and assign weight to each period based on the specific cause and motive for the delay. Billman, ¶ 20; Ariegwe, ¶¶ 63-67. Delay is charged to the State unless the accused caused the delay or affirmatively waived the speedy trial right for that period. Billman, ¶ 20; Ariegwe, ¶ 65 ¶ 55 First Trial Setting: February 18, 2003, which constitutes a 168-day delay from the date of accusation (i.e., from Morrisey's arrest). The District Court selected this trial date at Morrisey's December 12, 2002 arraignment, which we note was the court's earliest feasible opportunity for doing so. However, the arraignment was originally scheduled for November 21, 2002, and was continued on motion of defense counsel who was scheduled to be out of town on personal matters. According to the motion, Morrisey waived his speedy trial right with respect to this continuance. Thus, of the 168 days, we attribute the period of November 21 to December 12 (21 days) to Morrisey, [10] and we attribute the balance (147 days) to the State as institutional delay. See Billman, ¶ 22; Ariegwe, ¶ 125. ¶ 56 Second Trial Setting: May 12, 2003 (an additional 83 days of delay). Morrisey requested a continuance, explaining that by virtue of the complexity of this case, the February 18 trial date was unrealistic. He noted that the incident giving rise to the homicide charge had occurred over 14 years earlier and that he needed additional time to investigate, locate potential witnesses, and complete discovery. He stated that he was waiving his speedy trial right with respect to this continuance. We thus attribute the 83 days to Morrisey as legitimate delay related to preparing his defense. ¶ 57 Third Trial Setting: July 28, 2003 (77 days). This postponement was also at Morrisey's request because additional time was needed to prepare his defense. The delay is likewise attributable to Morrisey. ¶ 58 Fourth Trial Setting: September 8, 2003 (42 days). Again, Morrisey filed a motion to continue because he needed additional time to locate and interview potential witnesses, because he was still waiting on certain discovery from the prosecution, and because he was waiting for the reports on evidence that the State had sent to the State Crime Lab for analysis. Given these reasons, responsibility for the 42-day delay is shared equally by Morrisey and the State. ¶ 59 Fifth Trial Setting: December 1, 2003 (84 days). Morrisey filed a motion to continue, citing the same reasons articulated in his previous motion. The State filed a response, stating that it did not oppose a continuance and noting that it was waiting for DNA results from the State Crime Lab. The State also asserted that it had provided Morrisey with all discovery currently in its possession. Responsibility for the 84-day delay is thus shared equally by Morrisey and the State. ¶ 60 Sixth Trial Setting: May 17, 2004 (168 days). Morrisey requested a continuance, again citing the complexity of this case, the quantity and nature of the evidence and the significant number of witnesses. He also noted that he was still waiting on reports from the State Crime Lab. The State filed a response, stating that it did not object to a continuance and requesting that the court not set trial during January 2004 due to other homicide trials the County Attorney's Office would be prosecuting that month. This delay is therefore attributable to both Morrisey and the State. ¶ 61 Seventh Trial Setting: August 23, 2004 (98 days). Morrisey requested a 90- to 120-day continuance because he was still trying to locate and interview potential defense witnesses and because the State had endorsed over 100 witnesses, many of whom still needed to be interviewed. Defense counsel stated in the motion that he had proceeded with due diligence in preparing the case but that additional time and funds were needed to complete his investigation. He also noted that the State had recently filed an amended information adding an alternative charge of deliberate homicide by accountability. The State filed a response, stating that it did not object to a continuance and requesting that trial be set for August 2004. Morrisey waived his speedy trial right with respect to this continuance; thus, we attribute these 98 days to him. ¶ 62 Eighth Trial Setting: November 1, 2004 (70 days). Morrisey and the State filed a joint stipulation on August 17, 2004. They noted that the trial needed to be continued because the District Court was presently in the midst of a lengthy civil trial ( Sunburst School Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc. ). They stipulated to reset trial for November 1, 2004. This delay is attributable to the State as institutional delay related to the court's docket. ¶ 63 Ninth Trial Setting: April 4, 2005 (154 days). Morrisey requested a continuance, noting that the State had recently exhumed Dolana's remains to have them scientifically tested. Morrisey stated that he would be obtaining independent testing and that he needed time to consult with his experts and interview the State's experts. In addition, he noted that his petition for a writ of supervisory control (related to the denial of his motion to suppress) was pending before this Court. Morrisey stated that he was waiving his speedy trial right with respect to this continuance. We thus attribute the delay to him. ¶ 64 Tenth Trial Setting: October 17, 2005 (196 days). On March 18, 2005, Morrisey and the State filed a joint Stipulation to Continue Trial. The forensic anthropologist retained by Morrisey had just recently completed his examination of Dolana's remains, and the State intended to have his opinions and conclusions reviewed by its own expert. The parties stated that they would provide the Court with a joint recommendation as to a proposed resetting of the trial. Thus, the District Court vacated the April 4 trial date. Yet, by August the court had not heard anything from the parties and was understandably concerned about the mounting delay without a pending trial date. See Ariegwe, ¶ 72 ([T]he primary burden to assure that cases are brought to trial is on the courts and the prosecutors. (internal quotation marks omitted)). The court accordingly ordered the parties to appear for a status hearing. At the hearing, the State explained that it was waiting on a report from its expert. The court, however, noted that Morrisey had been incarcerated since September 2002; and while recognizing that forensic examinations had been ongoing, the court said that it was not willing to let this case drag on indefinitely. The court thus inquired about the parties' availability and then set trial. Given these circumstances, the 196-day delay is attributable to both Morrisey and the State. ¶ 65 Eleventh (and Final) Trial Setting: November 14, 2005 (28 days). The State filed a motion to continue, attaching a joint stipulation by Morrisey and the State. Morrisey had to undergo cataract surgery and was not expected to recover in time for trial on October 17. The State asked that the continuance be charged to Morrisey, and the District Court did so. We agree and, thus, attribute the 28 days to Morrisey. ¶ 66 Summary: Unquestionably, the delay of 1,168 days in bringing Morrisey to trial was substantial; however, the parties share equal responsibility for 490 days (42%), and Morrisey waived another 356 days (30%). That leaves 322 days (28%), which were attributable to Morrisey's requests for additional time to prepare his defense, to his cataract surgery, and to institutional circumstances beyond his and the State's control (e.g., the District Court's docket and the time needed to process evidence at the State Crime Lab). Significantly, there is no evidence of any dilatory tactics, purposeful foot-dragging, negligence, or bad-faith delay on the part of the prosecution. To the contrary, the delay here was due largely to the complexity of the case and the parties' need for additional time to investigate and prepare for a trial that was based on events which had occurred over 14 years earlier. We conclude, therefore, that Factor Two weighs heavily against finding a violation of Morrisey's right to a speedy trial.
¶ 67 Under the third speedy trial factor, we evaluate the accused's responses to the delay, i.e., his or her acquiescence in and objections to pretrial delays. Ariegwe, ¶ 110 The totality of the accused's responses to the pretrial delays is indicative of whether he or she actually wanted a speedy trial. Billman, ¶ 31; Ariegwe, ¶ 79. Here, the record reflects that Morrisey wanted to proceed to trial as expeditiously as possible and that he only requested continuances in order to conduct the necessary investigations, to prepare his defense, and to address a medical emergency (prior to the cataract surgery, Morrisey was almost blind). We also note that Morrisey filed a timely motion asserting his right to a speedy trial. Accordingly, Factor Three weighs in Morrisey's favor.
¶ 68 Lastly, under Factor Four, we consider whether the pretrial delay prejudiced the accused in light of the interests that the speedy trial right protects: (i) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, (ii) minimizing anxiety and concern caused by the presence of unresolved criminal charges, and (iii) limiting the possibility that the accused's ability to present an effective defense will be impaired. Ariegwe, ¶ 111. We have long recognized these three interests as relevant to the analysis of prejudice. See e.g. City of Billings v. Bruce, 1998 MT 186, ¶ 68, 290 Mont. 148, 965 P.2d 866; State v. Keller, 170 Mont. 372, 380-81, 553 P.2d 1013, 1018-19 (1976). As noted ( see ¶ 53, supra ), the State has a heavy burden to show that Morrisey was not prejudiced, given the substantial delay of 1,168 days in this case. ¶ 69 The District Court determined that Morrisey had been subjected to oppressive pretrial incarceration, having been incarcerated on unproven charges for over three years. Cf. Ariegwe, ¶ 90 ([T]he longer the pretrial incarceration, the more likely it has been oppressive and the more likely the accused has been prejudiced by the delay.). Next, the court determined that the delay in bringing Morrisey to trial had not aggravated the anxiety and concern inherent in being accused of a crime. The court noted that Morrisey had never moved the court for a reduction of his bail. Lastly, the court determined that Morrisey's ability to present an effective defense had not been impaired. In this regard, Morrisey's position was that he suffered prejudice because certain witnesses either had died or could not be located. He also claimed that some of his witnesses had difficulty recalling the events in question after so many years. But the District Court observed that Morrisey had not subpoenaed a single witness for any of the previous trial dates and that he had offered nothing more than speculation as to what testimony the unlocated or deceased witnesses would have provided. ¶ 70 On appeal, the parties focus on the impairment issue and present no arguments related to the first two speedy trial interests (oppressive pretrial incarceration, and anxiety and concern). Morrisey again claims that the pretrial delay impaired his ability to present an effective defense. He contends that one of the other suspects in Dolana's death committed suicide in July 2004 before Morrisey could interview him. As the State points out, however, Morrisey had ample time to interview this witness prior to his death. Morrisey also contends that he was unable to locate a witness named Soloria who (according to Morrisey) told the police that she saw Dolana hiding and jumping out of a truck on the day she disappeared. Morrisey asserts that Soloria's testimony would have established . . . that Morrisey was not involved in her disappearance since he did not own a truck. But, as the State points out, Morrisey does not explain how Soloria's unavailability was due to the pretrial delay in this case. ¶ 71 We agree with Morrisey that time may erode the accuracy of witness testimony and exculpatory evidence, thereby impairing the defendant's ability to present an effective defense. Ariegwe, ¶ 98 We also agree that impairment of one's defense is the most difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove, since time's erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony can rarely be shown. Ariegwe, ¶ 99 But the period at issue here is the time between accusation and trial, not the time between Dolana's disappearance and trial ( see footnote 9, supra ), and Morrisey fails to explain how the delay between his arrest in September 2002 and his trial in November 2005 impaired his ability to present an effective defense. As discussed under Factor Two, a substantial portion of the delay was requested by Morrisey for the express purpose of conducting investigations, having evidence tested, locating and interviewing potential witnesses, and preparing his defense to the charges. If anything, therefore, the record suggests that Morrisey's ability to prepare his defense was benefited, not prejudiced, by the continuances in his trial. ¶ 72 We conclude that, notwithstanding the presumption of prejudice in this case ( see ¶ 53, supra; Ariegwe, ¶ 49), Factor Four does not weigh significantly in Morrisey's favor. Although the pretrial incarceration was oppressive in terms of duration, Morrisey has not demonstrated aggravated anxiety and concern or an impaired ability to present an effective defense as a consequence of the delay.
¶ 73 We last determine whether Morrisey was deprived of his right to a speedy trial in light of the facts of the case and the weight assigned to each of the four factors discussed above. Rose, ¶ 87. None of the factors is dispositive by itself; rather, the factors are related and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. Ariegwe, ¶ 153 Moreover, each factor's significance depends on the unique facts and circumstances of the case. Ariegwe, ¶ 105; Billman, ¶ 11. Here, on one hand, the pretrial delay was substantial and Morrisey wanted to proceed to trial as expeditiously as possible. But, on the other hand, he requested or waived much of the delay so that he could properly prepare his defense, and there is no evidence of negligence or bad-faith delaying tactics on the part of the prosecution. Given these latter considerations and the lack of significant prejudice caused by the delay, we conclude that Morrisey was not denied his right to a speedy trial.