Opinion ID: 73353
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Seventh Circuit’s Yang Decision

Text: Although involving former INA § 106(a)(10),142 the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1187 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, Katsoulis v. INS, 118 S. Ct. 624 (1997), also contains an instructive analysis of the Suspension Clause and Congress’ plenary power to remove judicial review over immigration decisions to the full extent permitted by the Constitution. The specific facts and legal issues in Yang are an important background to its holding that the INA does not preclude all judicial review of deportation orders against criminal aliens. After finding that Yang’s conviction for concealing stolen firearms was a deportable offense under INA § 241(a)(2)(C), the immigration judge ordered Yang deported because of this conviction, among other reasons.143 On his petition for direct review in the court of appeals, Yang argued, inter alia, that he was not 141 Magano-Pizano, 152 F.3d at 1220. 142 The Seventh Circuit in Yang interpreted INA § 106(a)(10) as it existed following IIRIRA’s first amendment, but before it was amended the second time and moved to INA § 242(a)(C)(2). See footnotes 74 and 83 supra and 176 infra. 143 Id. at 1189. 71 deportable under INA § 241(a)(2)(C) because his conviction for concealing stolen firearms was not a crime involving the “possession” of a firearm.144 Although prior to IIRIRA’s repeal of § 2241 habeas, Yang was still faced with a similar judicial review bar in former INA § 106(a)(10) which provided that “[a]ny final order of deportation against an alien who is deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section [designated sections omitted] . . . shall not be subject to review by any court.”145 According to the INS, Yang was not entitled to judicial review of his final deportation order because the BIA already had determined that he was an alien deportable based on one of the sections referenced in INA § 106(a)(10).146 Like Boston-Bollers, the Seventh Circuit held that INA § 106(a)(10)’s restrictions on judicial review of Yang’s deportation order did not violate the Due Process Clause 144 Id. at 1191. 145 INA § 106(a)(10), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) (1995). 146 Id. at 1192. The Yang case actually involved petitions for review by four aliens in separate deportation proceedings. Id. According to the Seventh Circuit, in three of these four consolidated cases, the INS contended that the court lacked jurisdiction if the BIA determined that an alien was deportable based on one of the referenced criminal offenses. Id. Conversely, the court noted that in one of these cases, the INS adopted a different position. Id. Specifically, in the fourth case, the INS argued that the court retained jurisdiction over whether the alien facing deportation was actually an alien deportable for an enumerated offense. Id. 72 or Article III.147 The Seventh Circuit also discussed how the review protected by the Suspension Clause is not co-extensive with § 2241 habeas as follows: Aliens may seek the writ that Art. I § 9 cl. 2 preserves against suspension. But we are reluctant to place weight on its availability, because the Supreme Court long ago made it clear that this writ does not offer what our petitioners desire: review of discretionary decisions by the political branches of government. [Citations omitted.] There is a vast gulf between the non- suspendable constitutional writ and the Administrative Procedure Act. [Citations omitted.] Similarly, in cases under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, “[a] a federal court may not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law.” Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41, 104 S. Ct. 871, 875, 79 L.Ed. 29 (1984). [Citations omitted.] Likewise with errors of federal law. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 752, 99 S. Ct. 1465, 1472, 59 L.Ed. 2d 733 (1979) (error “by an executive agency in interpreting its own regulations surely does not raise any constitutional concerns”); Czerkies, 73 F.3d at 1443 (“The government does not violate the Constitution every time it mistakenly denies a claim for benefits.”). As a practical matter, the right to obtain review, in any court, on the theories our petitioners advance is gone. That is the point of the legislation. Congress wanted to expedite the removal of criminal aliens from the United States by eliminating judicial review, not to delay removal by requiring aliens to start the review process in the district court rather than the court of appeals. Yang, 109 F.3d at 1195 (emphasis supplied). The Seventh Circuit in Yang recognized, as did the Second Circuit in Henderson, that Congress wanted to 147 Id. at 1197. 73 eliminate review in the district courts and allow review only in the court of appeals. In addition to its Suspension Clause discussion, the Seventh Circuit in Yang explained how the INA does not abrogate all judicial review for criminal aliens because courts always have jurisdiction to determine whether a jurisdictional bar applies and to consider constitutional attacks on any such jurisdictional bar.148 The Seventh Circuit explained succinctly that “a court has jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction.”149 The Seventh Circuit found that the language of INA § 106(a)(10) did not condition its restriction on judicial review merely on the Attorney General’s saying that an alien is deportable for one of the enumerated criminal offenses.150 Instead, the language of INA § 106(a)(10) conditioned its restriction on judicial review on there being “an alien” “who is deportable” “by reason of having committed a criminal offense” enumerated in the statute.151 The Seventh Circuit noted that “[w]hen judicial review depends on a particular fact or 148 Id. at 1192. 149 Id. 150 Id. 151 Id. 74 legal conclusion, then a court may determine whether that condition exists.”152 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit held that INA § 106(a)(10) permitted courts to exercise jurisdiction to determine these three threshold issues in order to decide whether the jurisdictional bar in INA § 106(a)(10) applies: (1) whether the person is an alien, (2) whether the alien is deportable, and (3) whether deportation is based on an enumerated criminal offense.153 Without as extensive a discussion as in Yang, the Fifth Circuit in Anwar v. INS, 116 F.3d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1997), likewise concluded that even under INA § 106(a)(10)’s restrictions on judicial review, it could still exercise some jurisdiction over the alien’s petition for review.154 The Fifth Circuit noted that under INA § 152 Id. at 1192 (citing Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947), for the proposition that the court retains jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction). 153 Id. at 1191-92. 154 As did the Ninth Circuit in Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 1997), the Fifth Circuit in Anwar applied the pre-IIRIRA version of INA § 106(a)(10). 116 F.3d at 144. However, unlike in Coronado-Durazo, the fact that the pre-IIRIRA version of INA § 106(a)(10) applied in Anwar meant that the court could exercise jurisdiction over the alien’s petition for review. Specifically, the court in Anwar noted that prior to IIRIRA, INA § 106(a)(10) precluded the judicial review of a deportation order of an alien who was deportable under INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii) (i.e. for multiple criminal convictions of crimes involving moral turpitude) only if both “predicate offenses” were also covered by INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i). Id. An alien was deportable under INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i) only if the alien had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which crime occurred within five years of when the alien entered the United States and for which the alien was sentenced to confinement for one year or more. Id. Because one of Anwar’s crimes had occurred more than five years after he entered the United States, the court concluded that his multiple convictions did not fall under INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i) and thus did not fall under the jurisdictional bar of the pre-IIRIRA INA § 106(a)(10). Id. We note that the Fifth Circuit has recognized an inconsistency between an earlier Fifth 75 106(a)(10), “unamended by IIRIRA,” judicial review was precluded if deportation was based on two convictions for a crime involving moral turpitude only if both of the convictions occurred within five years of when the alien entered the United States.155 Because one of Mr. Anwar’s criminal convictions occurred more than five years after he entered the United States, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the jurisdictional bar of INA § 106(a)(10) did not apply.156 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit proceeded to review the alien’s petition.157 Despite its lack of extensive discussion, the Anwar decision illustrates the same concept followed in Yang. The Fifth Circuit did not simply decline to exercise jurisdiction based on the INS’ asserted grounds for deportation. Instead, Circuit decision, Pichardo v. INS, 104 F.3d 756 (5th Cir. 1997), and a portion of the Anwar decision that is not at issue in this case. Okoro v. INS, 125 F.3d 920, 924-25 (5th Cir. 1997)(noting the inconsistency between these two decisions); Anwar, 116 F.3d at 143 n.2. In Pichardo, the Fifth Circuit applied the version of INA § 106(a)(10) that included IIRIRA’s first amendment to this section - the amendment adding the phrase “without regard to the date of their commission” to INA § 106(a)(10). However, the court in Anwar applied INA § 106(a)(10) “unamended by IIRIRA.” 116 F.3d 143. The court in Okoro decided to follow the earlier decision of Pichardo. Okoro, 125 F.3d at 925. Nevertheless, neither Pichardo nor Okoro diminish the aspect of the Anwar decision that illustrates the jurisdictional analysis discussed in Yang. Indeed, as was the case in Anwar and Yang, the court in Pichardo also exercised its jurisdiction to the extent necessary to determine whether it could exercise further jurisdiction. 104 F.3d 758-59. In addition, as discussed below, Okoro expressly adopts a holding that is very similar to the holding in Yang. Okoro, 125 F.3d 925. 155 Id. at 143-44. 156 Id. 157 Id. at 144. 76 the Fifth Circuit conducted its own review of the allegations supporting deportation to determine whether these allegations prohibited further judicial review. Finding that the judicial-review limiting provisions of INA § 106(a)(10) did not apply, the Fifth Circuit proceeded to entertain the alien’s claims.158 Moreover, in a subsequent decision, the Fifth Circuit expressly adopted the aspect of the Yang decision holding that the court of appeals can exercise jurisdiction in order to determine whether a jurisdictional bar precludes further jurisdiction. Okoro v. INS, 125 F.3d 920, 925 (5th Cir. 1997). Okoro involved a 158 Likewise, the First Circuit in Choeum v. INS, 129 F.3d 29, 38 (1st Cir. 1997), found the jurisdictional bar in INA § 106(a)(10) did not apply because the deportation order was based on a criminal offense not covered by that section. Although the alien had other criminal offenses which were not charged in the deportation proceedings, the court held “that the INS cannot, consistent with due process and the statutory and regulatory requirements governing its own proceedings, substitute new grounds for deportation at this stage of the proceedings, solely for the purposes of depriving the federal courts of jurisdiction.” 129 F.3d at 40. Also, without extensive discussion, the Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 108 F.3d 210, withdrawn by 123 F.3d 1322, 1323 (9th Cir. 1997). The alien facing deportation in Coronado-Durazo claimed that the immigration judge and BIA had erroneously concluded that the alien’s conviction for solicitation to possess cocaine was a deportable offense under INA § 241(a)(2)(B)(i) as an offense “relating to a controlled substance.” 123 F.3d at 1324. In both of its opinions in Coronado-Durazo, the Ninth Circuit began with the premise that if the alien’s conviction constituted a deportable offense, the court “lack[s] jurisdiction to review the final order of deportation issued by the INS” because of INA § 106(a)(10) as amended by the AEDPA. 108 F.3d at 211; 122 F.3d at 1323. Without discussing the issue, in both opinions, the Ninth Circuit proceeded on the premise that, under the terms of INA § 106 (10), it could review whether the offense upon which deportation was based was a deportable offense. 108 F.3d at 211; 123 F.3d at 1323. See also Mendez-Morales v. INS, 119 F.3d 738, 739 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that the petitioner was deportable for conviction of an aggravated felony and therefore jurisdiction was barred); Perez v. INS, 116 F.3d 405, 408 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing agency’s findings that the petitioner’s crime made him deportable and rendered judicial review unavailable). 77 petition for review by an alien facing deportation under INA § 241(a)(2)(A)(ii),159 which provided for the deportation of any alien with two or more convictions of crimes involving moral turpitude.160 As a “threshold matter,” the Okoro court examined its own jurisdiction in light of INA § 106(a)(10), as amended by IIRIRA, which precluded judicial review of any final deportation order “against an alien who is deportable by reason of having committed . . . any offense covered by [INA] section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii)161 for which both predicate offenses are covered by [INA] section 241(a)(2)(A)(i)162.”163 Thus, the court held that its jurisdiction depended on whether the alien was deportable based on convictions covered by INA § 241(a)(2)(A)(i) & (ii), as follows: To determine whether this jurisdictional bar applies to [the alien’s] petition for review, we must examine whether the underlying offenses relied on by the INS to deport [the alien] are (1) crimes involving moral turpitude, (2) not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, and (3) for which [the alien] was 159 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1996). 160 125 F.3d at 922-23. 161 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. 1996). 162 This section is the same jurisdictional bar interpreted by the court in Yang. Compare Okoro, 125 F.3d at 925 with Yang, 109 F.3d at 1188. For a discussion of the amendments to INA § 106 (a)(10) by both the AEDPA and IIRIRA and the successor to INA § 106(a)(10) now found in INA § 242(a)(2), see footnote 83 supra. 163 125 F.3d at 923. 78 sentenced to one year or more of imprisonment, regardless of actual confinement. Id. at 925 (citing Yang, 109 F.3d at 1192). After determining that all three of these elements applied to the alien, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the alien’s petition for review.164 In this same vein, this Court’s decision in Boston-Bollers also exercised jurisdiction both over the legal issue of whether AEDPA § 440(a)(10)’s enactment of INA § 106(a)(10) applied retroactively and over whether that retroactive application violated Mr. Boston-Bollers’ constitutional rights. This Court in Boston-Bollers was not required to determine the three threshold issues that the courts did in Yang or Anwar, because the permanent resident alien facing deportation in Boston-Bollers conceded his alien status, criminal conviction, and deportability.165 The parties did not dispute that the alien’s petition for direct review fell within the expressed jurisdiction-limiting language of INA § 106(a)(10). Nevertheless, in Boston-Bollers this Court exercised jurisdiction over the alien’s petition for direct review in the court of appeals attacking the constitutionality of the judicial review restrictions in INA § 106(a)(10). 164 125 F.3d at 927. 165 Boston-Bollers, 106 F.3d at 353. 79 Before we conclude our discussion of the Yang decision, we note that the Tenth Circuit in Berehe v. INS, 114 F.3d 159, 161 (10th Cir. 1997), declined to follow the Yang approach. In Berehe, the court applied IIRIRA § 309(c)(4)(G), which is a transitional rule restricting the judicial review of the deportation of certain criminal aliens, as follows: [T]here shall be no appeal permitted in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section 212(a)(2) or section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act . . . or any offense covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) of such Act . . . for which both predicate offenses are, without regard to their date of commission, otherwise covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i) of such Act . . . . IIRIRA § 309(c)(4)(G).166 Rejecting the Yang approach, the court concluded that this language did not “permit the court to review the merits of whether an alien is 166 According to the court in Berehe, the transitional rule found in IIRIRA § 309(c)(4)(G) applied when deportation proceedings were commenced before IIRIRA’s general effective date of April 1, 1997 but the final order of deportation or exclusion was entered more than thirty days after IIRIRA’s September 30, 1996 date of enactment. 114 F.3d at 161. Because the proceedings to deport the alien in Berehe commenced before April 1, 1997 and the order of deportation was issued after October 30, 1996, the court concluded that the transitional rule governed the judicial review of the alien’s deportation order. Id. IIRIRA § 309(c)(4)(G) is similar to both INA § 106(a)(10) as amended by IIRIRA and new INA §242(a)(2)(C). See footnotes 74 and 83 supra and 170 infra. Since 1996, the following four distinct statutes have restricted the judicial review of orders deporting, excluding or removing certain criminal aliens from the United States: (1) INA § 106(a)(10) as enacted by the AEDPA § 440(d), (2) INA § 106(a)(10) as first amended by IIRIRA § 309(d), (3) INA § 242(a)(2)(C) as enacted by IIRIRA § 306(a)(2), and (4) the transitional rule in IIRIRA § 309(c)(4)(G) which was applied in Berehe. See footnote 83 supra for a discussion of the amendments to INA § 106(a)(10). 80 validly deportable by reason of having committed one of the enumerated criminal offenses.” Berehe, 114 at 161. In reaching this conclusion the court specifically reasoned that: To permit judicial review into the validity of the INS's determination that an alien is deportable by reason of having committed one of the listed crimes, in the guise of making a determination as to the court's jurisdiction, is to permit review of the very fact or condition that the statute appears on its face to be precluding from review. We conclude that such review is contrary to Congress's intent to expedite deportation of criminal aliens. Id. at 162. However, we observe two additional points about the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Berehe. First, although professing to follow Berehe, the Tenth Circuit in a subsequent case reviewed constitutional and statutory claims raised by an alien who had been found deportable for a reason enumerated in INA § 106(a)(10) before the court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Wittgenstein v. INS, 124 F.3d 1244, 1245 (10th Cir. 1997). Second, in Berehe, the Tenth Circuit did not discuss IIRIRA’s elimination of § 2241 habeas jurisdiction to review immigration matters, the fact that jurisdiction to review immigration matters remains under only the INA, and the consequent effect of criminal aliens being deprived of all judicial review under the INA. The Seventh Circuit in Yang recognized these aspects of the problem and analyzed in considerable detail the 81 potential constitutional issues arising from the limitations placed on its jurisdiction. Accordingly, in addition to being persuaded by the Seventh Circuit’s construction of INA §106(a)(10), we are convinced that the court in Yang reached its conclusion after giving appropriate consideration to the issues arising from such severe restrictions on judicial review. J. INA §§ 242(b)(9) and (d) Require Final Removal Order Before outlining our conclusions, we discuss another important IIRIRA mandate that our sister circuits, in our view, have not given sufficient weight. Prior to IIRIRA, judicial review of the INS’ deportation decisions was unavailable before the entry of a final deportation order. That result was implicit in former INA § 106(a)167 which provided that review in the courts of appeal was the “sole and exclusive procedure” for challenging a final deportation order, and which required exhaustion of administrative remedies as a prerequisite to obtaining judicial review.168 IIRIRA strengthened these pre-existing limitations on judicial review. In addition to retaining a mandatory exhaustion provision, IIRIRA added 167 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1994). 168 See Massieu v. Reno, 91 F.3d 416, 421 (3d Cir. 1996); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 938 (1983). 82 INA § 242(b)(9) which now expressly provides that judicial review is available of only “a final order.”169 Congress has chosen to delay federal court review of all claims of aliens against whom removal proceedings have been instituted until the conclusion of the administrative proceedings. Neither the district court nor this Court can override that decision. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992) (stating “where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required”); Alexander v. Hawk, ___ F.3d ___ (11th Cir. Nov. 5, 1998). This exhaustion requirement is statutorily mandated by the INA and not judicially created. Although judicially developed exhaustion requirements might be waived for discretionary reasons by courts, statutorily created exhaustion requirements bind the parties and the courts. When a statute requires exhaustion, a petitioner’s failure to do so deprives this court of jurisdiction. Importantly, mandatory statutory exhaustion is not satisfied by a judicial conclusion that the requirement need not apply due to futility. 169