Opinion ID: 1249253
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The University's Mission

Text: The University, for its part, submits that its overarching purpose is to educate students, and contends that it may constitutionally support activities which further this expansive goal. Student government, lobbying and extracurricular activities groups, the University argues, serve important educational interests by training students in self-government, providing an organized forum to discuss and debate public issues of the day, exposing students to a multiplicity of cultural and political viewpoints and developing social and rhetorical skills. The University is undoubtedly correct that its essential mission is to educate and that student government and extracurricular activities supplement this worthy goal. Education is unquestionably a valuable end in itself. But the constitutional issue is whether the University's mission serves an important state interest, and whether the funding of student groups engaged in speech which plaintiffs oppose serves reasonably to effectuate that interest. As explained below, I conclude that both questions must be answered in the affirmative. That the state derives important benefits from an informed and enlightened citizenry is a proposition almost too familiar to warrant discussion. Political and educational philosophers from Plato to Thomas Jefferson and John Dewey have observed that the principal object of education is to prepare youth for the fullest participation in society. In teaching the student the university is simultaneously training the citizen. Indeed, they are but two sides of the same coin. To perform responsibly not just as citizen, but as worker, family member, friend and neighbor, a student must acquire both knowledge as well as the critical power of choice and self-direction. A liberal education consists of more than simply achieving an acquaintance with the great poets, philosophers, scientists and statesmen, although that is assuredly an important element; it is also learning the arts of investigation, criticism, discrimination and communication, skills which facilitate a lifetime of learning and social participation. The work of a university cannot, therefore, be measured strictly in terms of courses, curricula, and examinations. Dewey wrote, The only way to prepare for social life is to engage in social life. (Dewey, Moral Principles in Education (1909), p. 14, italics added.) As valuable as the pursuit of knowledge is for its own sake, the university also has a major responsibility for the development of an enlightened and engaged citizenry. Neglect this duty, and apathy and incivility will surely result. Thomas Jefferson spoke often of the critical role higher education plays in preserving a republic of free, informed and self-reliant citizens. As he observed in characteristically pithy fashion: If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be. [5] Consistent with these views, Jefferson considered the founding of the University of Virginia to be among his most notable legacies, for the future of the nation ultimately depended on the knowledge and civic values of each succeeding generation. As the United States Supreme Court recently observed: Each generation must learn anew ... the ideas and aspirations which the Constitution's written terms embody. ( Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) 505 U.S. ___, ___ [120 L.Ed.2d 674, 730 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2833.] Foremost among these lessons is the importance of toleration. To endure the speech of false ideas ... and then to counter it is part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society, a society which insists upon open discourse towards the end of a tolerant citizenry. ( Lee v. Weisman (1992) 505 U.S. ___, ___ [120 L.Ed.2d 467, 483 112 S.Ct. 2649, 2657.] Although these thoughts are conventional, their implications for the constitutional issues before us are significant. For if, as I believe, the nation's fundamental civic values are forged in the intellectual fires of its college campuses, then clearly the University's educational mission serves an important if not compelling governmental interest. And if, as I further believe, the ability to form and express one's own opinions and tolerate those of others lies at the heart of a free society, then the mandatory student fee clearly serves to effectuate this transcendent national interest, by contributing to the nearly limitless variety of speech and opinion on the university campus. Without such funding, moreover, I have no doubt that the campus would lose much of the diversity which is its lifeblood. The practical realities cannot be ignored. The wherewithal to fund even a modest program lies beyond the limited means of most student groups. Remove the mandatory fee and centralized ASUC distribution, and funding would rapidly become a balkanized affair dependent on the vicissitudes of private donations and the fortuity of wealth. By divorcing the University from the funding process, furthermore, students would cease to be linked by a common bond to the tolerant support of all points of view. ( Carroll v. Blinken, supra, 957 F.2d at p. 1002.) Therefore, I conclude that the modest mandatory fee which affords every student group the opportunity to sponsor films and speakers, to produce and distribute leaflets and flyers, is a reasonable and necessary means of effectuating the University's vital national mission. Obviously, not all of the speech and activities funded by the mandatory student fee will be agreeable to all of the students all of the time. However, as Keller and Abood instruct, the critical question is not whether speech is controversial or commands the assent of every student, but whether it serves reasonably to effectuate the University's compelling educational mission. Subject to the limitations set forth below, I would hold that it does. [6]
The University's discretion to fund student activities through the mandatory fee is not without limit. On the contrary, as noted earlier the interests that justify the mandatory fee define the uses to which it may legitimately be put. The University's goal is to encourage a diversity of expression on campus, not to promote a particular ideological orthodoxy or partisan agenda. As the University's own policies provide, therefore, funding of student government and student activities groups and operations must be neutral and must not be used to support political candidates or ballot measures. Indeed, the use of such funds for partisan political purposes would violate the strictures of our holding in Stanson v. Mott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 206, 209-210 [130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 551 P.2d 1], that absent clear and explicit legislative authorization, a public agency may not expend public funds to promote a partisan position in an election campaign. [7] Nor should the mandatory fee be used to support student activities groups engaged in expressive activities off campus, including the currently funded ASUC lobbies. The purpose of the mandatory fee is to expose students to a diversity of views and to facilitate direct student participation in the University's ongoing intellectual discourse. Off-campus expression may be just as educational as on-campus speech for those involved, but the critical difference is that it benefits only those involved; it does not contribute to the campus discussion of ideas, and other students do not have the opportunity to hear and debate the views of off-campus speakers. [8] Finally, inasmuch as the purpose of the University is to serve as a marketplace of ideas in which students are encouraged to speak and participate, any use of the mandatory fees to interfere with such expression would also exceed the constitutional mandate. Thus, the University may properly deny funds to any group or activity which violates reasonable time, place and manner regulations or otherwise threatens to disrupt the educational process. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, Associational activities need not be tolerated when they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education. ( Healy v. James, supra, 408 U.S. 169, 189 [33 L.Ed.2d 266, 284].) For example, the funding of activities designed to deny access to a particular course or professor would exceed the constitutionally permissible uses of the mandatory student fee. And when advocacy presents an imminent threat to campus order through the promotion of racial genocide, for example, the University may properly deny recognition and funding. ( Id. at pp. 189-192 [33 L.Ed.2d at pp. 284-286].)
The foregoing analysis is consistent with every reported decision involving First Amendment challenges to the collection and use of a general mandatory student activities fee. Indeed, it closely tracks that of Judge Kaufman for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the most recent decision to date, Carroll v. Blinken, supra, 957 F.2d 991, 1001, certiorari denied ___ U.S. ___ [121 L.Ed.2d 224, 113 S.Ct. 300]. There, state university students sought to enjoin as unconstitutional under Keller and Abood the use of a portion of their mandatory student fee ($55 per semester) to fund a particular student organization, the New York Public Interest Research Group (NYPIRG). There, as here, the federal court noted that the mandatory fee was used to fund a great variety of student groups, including athletic, social, recreational, service, ethnic and political organizations. ( Id. at p. 993.) While acknowledging the First Amendment intrusion on dissenting students, the Court of Appeals concluded that the University's mission amply justified the infringement. A university where NYPIRG petitions against nuclear power, where environmental groups advocate greater recycling, where opponents of South Africa debate opponents of divestment, and partisans of a dozen other causes press their cases is a university fulfilling its traditional mission in a free society. Were it otherwise, college would be a very quiet, intellectually diminished and ultimately irrelevant place. ( Id. at p. 1001.) [9] Although the federal court thus upheld the use of the mandatory fee to support NYPIRG's on-campus activities, it disallowed the use of such funds for its off-campus lobbying and statewide administrative costs. As the court explained: Students opposed to NYPIRG can be made to tolerate some compromise of their First Amendment rights when the benefits of a varied extracurricular life, hands-on civics training, and robust campus debate are all around them to approvingly take part in, actively oppose, or merely witness dispassionately firsthand. [Citations.] These benefits vanish when NYPIRG money is spent in the halls of the state legislature or at the main offices in New York City. SUNY Albany's interests, however substantial, are still, after all, those of the university and its community, not that of an independent statewide organization. ( Carroll v. Blinken, supra, 957 F.2d at p. 1002.) [10] Kania v. Fordham, supra, 702 F.2d 475 also involved a challenge by state university students from the University of North Carolina to the use of their mandatory student fees. Relying on Abood, the students charged that the partial funding of a student newspaper compelled them to support views with which they disagreed, in violation of the First Amendment. The federal circuit court rejected the challenge, holding that funding by mandatory student fees is the least restrictive means of accomplishing an important part of the University's central purpose, the education of its students. ( Id. at p. 480.) In this regard, the court noted a crucial distinction between Abood and the present case lay in the fact that the mandatory fees in Abood ... enhanced the power of one, and only one, ideological group to further its political goals. In contrast, [the student newspaper] increases the overall exchange of information, ideas, and opinions on the campus. ( Ibid. ) Although rendered prior to Keller and Abood, a number of state decisions have also rejected First Amendment challenges to the use of mandatory student fees. In Larson v. Board of Regents of University of Neb. (1973) 189 Neb. 688 [204 N.W.2d 568], state university students relied on an important predecessor to Abood, International Machinists v. Street, supra, 367 U.S. 740, [11] to challenge as unconstitutional the use of mandatory student fees to fund the student newspaper and speakers program, alleging that the mandatory fee system require[d] them to contribute to the support of political views and doctrines with which they disagree[d]. (204 N.W.2d at p. 570.) Applying what was for all intents and purposes an Abood analysis, the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected the claim, concluding there were important distinction[s] between the political activities of a labor union and extracurricular activities at a university. ( Ibid. ) Within reasonable limits, it is appropriate that many different points of view be presented to the students. ( Id., 204 N.W.2d at p. 571.) Lace v. University of Vermont (1973) 131 Vt. 170 [303 A.2d 475] is similar. There, state university students alleged that the use of their mandatory student fee, which funded over 100 student activities groups, a speakers bureau and the campus newspaper violated their First Amendment rights by compelling them to support `persons advocating positions and views with which they wholly disagree.' ( Id. at p. 477.) Distinguishing the labor union situation, the Vermont Supreme Court upheld the expenditures as a means of encouraging various and divergent student organizations to inject a spectrum of ideas into the campus community. ( Id. at p. 479.) And in Good v. Associated Students of Univ. of Washington (1975) 86 Wn.2d 94 [542 P.2d 762], the Washington Supreme Court rejected a similar First Amendment challenge, holding that the use of a mandatory student fee to support a campus speakers bureau, student resolutions on contemporary political issues and other extracurricular activities groups served the paramount educational goal of promoting an infinite range of ideas, theories and beliefs. ( Id., 542 P.2d at p. 769; see also Arrington v. Taylor (M.D.N.C. 1974) 380 F. Supp. 1348, 1364 [distinguishing the use of mandatory student fees to provide a forum wherein others may express their views from the use of mandatory dues by a state bar or labor union]; Veed v. Schwartzkopf (D.Neb. 1973) 353 F. Supp. 149, affd. without opinion, 478 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir.1973), cert. denied (1974) 414 U.S. 1135 [38 L.Ed.2d 760, 94 S.Ct. 878] [university is not constitutionally prohibited from use of mandatory student fees to support student association, newspaper and speakers program which provide a forum for the expression of divergent opinions]; see also Cantor, supra, 36 Rutgers L. Rev. at pp. 46-51; Note,  Fee Speech: First Amendment Limitations on Student Fee Expenditures (1984) 20 Cal. Western L. Rev. 279; Gibbs & Crisp, The Question of First Amendment Rights vs. Mandatory Student Activities Fees (1979) 8 J.L. & Ed. 185.).) Galda v. Rutgers (3d Cir.1985) 772 F.2d 1060, on which plaintiffs chiefly rely, is inapposite. There, the court held that a separate mandatory fee imposed for the sole purpose of supporting one organization, the New Jersey Public Interest Research Group (NJPIRG), which was otherwise ineligible to receive money from the general student activities fee because it was an independent rather than a student organization, infringed the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. In so ruling, however, the Galda court emphasized that its holding was a narrow one and may perhaps best be explained by eliminating what is not at stake. This case does not address the problem presented by a state university's allocation of a mandatory non-refundable student activity fee. We are not concerned here with the question whether an organization with [NJ] PIRG's philosophic outlook may be funded through the general activities fund as are other campus organizations representing diverse views. [¶] In short, we do not enter the controversy on whether a given campus organization may participate in the general activities fee despite the objections of some who are required to contribute to that fund. See, e.g., Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir.1983.... ( Id. at p. 1064, italics added.) Galda v. Rutgers, supra, 772 F.2d 1060, held only that a separate assessment to support one organization which expressed only one viewpoint violated the First Amendment rights of dissenting students. In so holding, it again emphasized the distinction between the special funding of NJPIRG, and the traditional funding of campus groups through a general student activities fee. As the court explained: There is room for argument that a university's role of presenting a variety of ideas is a sufficiently compelling reason for some infringement of First Amendment rights just as is the need for labor peace in the union dues cases. That contention loses its force, however, when an outside organization independent of a university and dedicated to advancing one position, is entitled to compelled contributions.... In that situation a university's ability to insure a balance in access is infringed, if not prevented, in some circumstances and the quid pro quo for payment to a forum disappears. [¶] Generally, when an activity fund comes into existence, all student groups on campus are free to compete for a fair share. That is not the situation here where the mandated contribution is earmarked for only one organization, an organization which has no obligation to use any part of the fund for the benefit of a group which pursues a different philosophy. (772 F.2d at p. 1067, italics added.) We are not confronted here with a separate mandatory assessment earmarked for one independent organization, but rather a general student activities fee in which all student groups on campus are free to compete for a fair share. ( Galda v. Rutgers, supra, 772 F.2d at p. 1067.) Thus, as Galda itself repeatedly emphasizes, that case is not apposite to our decision. [12]
The analysis does not end with the conclusion that certain activities may be funded through the mandatory student fee and others may not. As noted earlier, the United States Supreme Court has outlined a minimum set of procedures by which a union or integrated bar may meet its constitutionally compelled requirement of assuring that compulsory dues are not expended on nongermane activities. The high court summarized these procedures in Chicago Teachers v. Hudson, supra, 475 U.S. 292, as follows: [T]he constitutional requirements for the Union's collection of agency fees include an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decision-maker, and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending. ( Id. at p. 310 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 249]; see Keller v. State Bar, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 16-17 [110 L.Ed.2d at pp. 15-16]; see also Gibson v. The Florida Bar (11th Cir.1990) 906 F.2d 624, 627-633, cert. granted Mar. 18, 1991, cert. dism. as improv. granted Dec. 4, 1991.) As discussed above, the University's discretion to fund student activities through the mandatory fee is not without constitutional limits. These include expenditures to support partisan political candidates or ballot measures, off-campus activities, and activities which interfere with the freedom of expression of other members of the campus community. Students who believe that a proposed expenditure violates these constitutional restrictions should have a convenient and expedient means of challenging it. Although we do not have a fully developed record regarding the University's fee setting and collection process, I believe, as the high court observed in Keller, supra, 496 U.S. 1, that the University could certainly meet its Abood obligation by adopting the sort of procedures described in Hudson.  (496 U.S. at p. 17 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 16].) I note in this regard that the ASUC already prepares a detailed annual budget, including line item expenditures of student activities groups, which must be reviewed and approved by the ASUC Senate and the University. An appropriate remedial system would provide for general notice of the approved budget, the opportunity to file a written objection to a particular expenditure within a specified time period, an escrow for the pro rata amount of the objecting students' fees at issue pending determination of the merits of the objection, and an impartial arbitration panel. (See Gibson v. The Florida Bar, supra, 906 F.2d at pp. 627-632.) As in Keller, however, I would leave open the question whether one or more alternative procedures tailored to the University's unique conditions would likewise satisfy its constitutional obligations. (496 U.S. at p. 17 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 16].)
Plaintiffs also assert that the University lacks the requisite statutory and constitutional authority to impose a mandatory student activities fee. Several grounds are advanced to support this claim. As will appear, none is meritorious. Originally created by statute in 1867 (Stats. 1867-1868, ch. CCXLIV, p. 248), the University of California achieved constitutional status in 1879. (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 9.) The California Constitution declares the University of California to be a public trust and places its governance in the hands of the Regents. (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 9, subd. (a).) The Regents are vested with the legal title and the management and disposition of the property of the university.... (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 9, subd. (f).) The Regents' authority includes all the powers necessary or convenient for the effective administration of its trust, including the power ... to delegate to its committees or to the faculty of the university, or to others, such authority or functions as it may deem wise.... ( Ibid. ) The courts have construed this constitutional authority as giving the Regents virtual autonomy in self-governance. ( Regents of University of California v. City of Santa Monica (1978) 77 Cal. App.3d 130, 135 [143 Cal. Rptr. 276]; accord, Cal. State Employees' Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1968) 267 Cal. App.2d 667, 671 [73 Cal. Rptr. 449].) As we have stated: [T]he power of the Regents to operate, control and administer the University is virtually exclusive. ( San Francisco Labor Council v. Regents of University of California (1980) 26 Cal.3d 785, 788 [163 Cal. Rptr. 460, 608 P.2d 277], internal quotation marks omitted.) In light of these provisions, plaintiffs' assertion that the University lacks the requisite authority to impose a mandatory student fee is patently without merit. The Legislature has expressly authorized the creation of a student body organization and the collection of mandatory student activities fees for the California State University system. (Ed. Code, § 89300.) The funds collected may be used for such purposes of the student body organization as are approved by the trustees. (Ed. Code, § 89302.) Although parallel statutory provisions are not provided for the University, none is needed. The University is a constitutional entity whose powers derive therefrom. The Regents' authority to exercise all the powers necessary or convenient for the effective administration of its trust, including the power ... to delegate to its committees or to the faculty of the university, or to others, such authority or functions, as it may deem wise.... (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 9, subds. (a), (f)) plainly encompasses the power to authorize the adoption, by a vote of two-thirds of the student body, a mandatory activities fee similar to that of the state college system. Plaintiffs further contend that the Regents have exceeded their constitutional mandate by delegating to the ASUC, which they characterize as a private entity, the authority to administer and manage the student funds. On the contrary, the ASUC is clearly a creature of the University; the Regents authorized it, and retain ultimate responsibility for its supervision of student affairs. The chancellor, by virtue of the authority of the Regents, regularly monitors the ASUC Senate and oversees and approves the annual ASUC budget. Moreover, under the University's written policies, the chancellor is empowered to make audits of the finances of student governments, exercise control over expenditure of their funds ... and where necessary may take action to ensure that any activity under control of student governments is operated in accordance with sound practices ... Thus, the ASUC plainly acts under the authority and close supervision of the Regents and the University. Relying on this court's decision in Stanson v. Mott, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, petitioners further contend that the University lacks clear and explicit authority to use public funds for partisan campaign purposes. Stanson held that a public agency requires clear and explicit legislative authority to engage in what it characterized as informational lobbying ( id. at pp. 209-210), and suggested, without holding, that the use of public funds for partisan campaigning presented a serious constitutional question. ( Id. at p. 219.) Applying these principles, we held that the Director of the California Department of Parks and Recreation had exceeded his authority in authorizing the expenditure of more than $5,000 of public funds to promote passage of a bond issue for the acquisition of park land and recreational facilities. ( Id. at p. 220.) Although the ASUC Senate may adopt resolutions on political issues, the University does not sanction the expenditure of ASUC revenues to fund partisan election campaigning. Moreover, as previously noted, there is clear and express constitutional authority authorizing the expenditure of funds for the ASUC student government. (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 9, subd. (f).) Stanson v. Mott, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, is thus inapposite. Plaintiffs also assert that use of the mandatory activities fee to subsidize student religious groups violates the establishment clause (U.S. Const., Amend. I; Cal. Const., art. I, § 4.) and article IX, section 9, subdivision (f) of the California Constitution, which states that the University shall be entirely independent of all political or sectarian influence.... As earlier noted, the trial court made a factual finding, sustained by the record, that while some religious groups had registered with the University, no group whose activities are essentially religious in nature, i.e., devoted to proselytizing, conducting religious services or restricting membership to persons of a particular faith, had received ASUC funds. Nor has the University violated the constitutional injunction against political influence. This section, by its terms, proscribes partisan interference in the internal affairs of the University, not political activity by the University. Moreover, as previously discussed, the ASUC may not fund activities designed to advance partisan political positions. Thus, the mandatory student fee does not contravene the political neutrality clause. [13]