Opinion ID: 1679735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING INSTRUCTIONS D-I-5a AND D-I-13a?

Text: The trial court granted Instructions D-I-5a and D-I-13a over the appellant's timely objection. Instruction D-I-5a reads as follows: The court instructs the jury that the fact that the court has submitted the case to the jury to decide is no indication one way or the other, as to what the verdict of the jury should be and must not be so considered by the jury. Further, when you retire to the jury room you must first place the responsibility for the accident in which Maranda Ann Whittley was injured and you should not consider, and you are not to be concerned with, the question of damages against The City of Meridian unless and until you first find from the evidence, under the instructions of the court, that The City of Meridian is, in fact, liable to plaintiffs; further, that plaintiffs are entitled to damages over and above the total amount of money already paid or guaranteed to be paid, as shown by the evidence, by Taylor Properties, Ltd. and Payson Casters, Inc. In a case such as this, where requested, the court always instructs the jury on the measure of damages. Such instructions in the measure of damages are given so that the jury may be enlightened on all legal phases of the case, but the jury must not think because these instructions have been given on this subject that they must award any damages whatever to the plaintiffs against the defendant, The City of Meridian, over and above the total amount of money already paid or guaranteed to be paid, as shown by the evidence, by Taylor Properties, Ltd. and Payson Casters, Inc. You have no right to compromise in your verdict between the question of liability and the amount of damages; if you find, according to the law as given to you in the written instructions of the court, under the evidence in the case, that the defendant, The City of Meridian, is not liable, then the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover any sum from the defendant, The City of Meridian, whatsoever, and it is your sworn duty to so find by your verdict. D-I-13a reads as follows: The court instructs the jury that the fact that Taylor Properties, Ltd. and Payson Casters, Inc., or those acting on their behalf, have paid, and agreed to pay, guaranteed sums of money or value, as shown by the uncontradicted proof in this case, regardless of whether Maranda Ann Whittley lives or dies, is a fact and circumstance which you must consider in arriving at your verdict in this case. If you find from the evidence that such sums so paid, and being paid by and on behalf of Taylor Properties, Ltd. and Payson Casters, Inc., constitute payment in full for plaintiffs' claims herein, regardless of the question of legal liability, then plaintiffs' claims against The City of Meridian herein are satisfied and barred, and, if you so find, then your verdict should be for the defendant, The City of Meridian. In other words, The City of Meridian is entitled to credit herein on all such sums so paid by or on behalf of Taylor Properties, Ltd. and Payson Casters, and such payment must be taken into consideration by you in arriving at your verdict. At trial, the attorney for Maranda objected to these instructions arguing that the instructions had the effect of instructing the jury that they could not give the appellant a verdict unless the amount the jury determined was owed by the City of Meridian was in excess of what was guaranteed to be paid by the defendants who had settled out of court with Maranda Ann Whittley. Garcia v. Coast Electric Power Association, 493 So.2d 380, 385 (Miss. 1986) recognizes that there are two acceptable procedures used to determine the damages due to a plaintiff where co-defendants are involved and one co-defendant has settled with the plaintiff. The first procedure, similar to the one used at trial in the instant case, allows the defendant to show, either by the plaintiff or proper witnesses or evidence, that a settlement has been made with one or more of the defendants and the amount of that settlement. The jury is then instructed that if it returns a verdict for the plaintiff, the amount returned would be reduced by the amount of the settlement made with the plaintiff by the other defendant. Bogdahn v. Pascagoula Street Railway and Power Co., 118 Miss. 668, 79 So. 844 (1918) and Wood v. Walley, 352 So.2d 1083 (Miss. 1977). The second acceptable procedure allows the parties to stipulate, outside of the presence of the jury, that a settlement has been made by one or more of the defendants and the amount of the settlement. The jury would not be informed of the settlement or the payment, and, if a verdict were returned for the plaintiff, the trial judge would reduce the amount awarded by the jury by the amount of the settlement by the other defendant or defendants. This Court, in Garcia, recognized the second procedure to be the most preferable but stated that the use of either procedure would not constitute reversible error. Garcia at 385. We hereby modify Garcia and hold that the first procedure wherein the jury is informed of the amount of settlement is not acceptable. To inform a jury of the amount of a settlement prior to its returning a verdict for a joint tort feasor or co-defendant would certainly unnecessarily influence a jury in its decision. It is unreasonable to believe that a jury which had been informed that a settlement of $2,544,275 had been entered into by the plaintiff would not be affected in returning its verdict. The tendency to determine that the plaintiff had already been adequately compensated would be too tempting. Such temptation can easily be prevented by use of the procedure wherein the jury is informed of the existence of a settlement but not the amount of settlement (if settlement occurs after trial begins then it will be necessary to inform the jury why the defendants are no longer present). If the jury returns a judgment in excess of the settlement the judge can simply adjust the judgment by the amount of the settlement. Another reason for our modifying Garcia is to inform a jury of the amount of a structured settlement is to surely mislead them. The amount a defendant is required to pay via a structured settlement should be considered at its actual present cash value of the settlement rather than the total of a flow of monies over a period of time. The trial court shall, of course, in adjusting any verdict, consider only the present value of the settlement figure and not the flow of income over a period of time. This Court reverses and remands for a new trial in conformity with this opinion.