Opinion ID: 2160119
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Common Law Privilege for Testimony in Administrative Proceedings

Text: In Maryland, a witness who testifies in the course of judicial proceedings is protected by an absolute privilege against liability for defamatory statements made during the testimony. Adams, supra, 288 Md. at 3, 415 A.2d 292; Korb v. Kowaleviocz, 285 Md. 699, 701-04, 402 A.2d 897 (1979). In Korb, we reaffirmed our adherence to the so-called English Rule, followed in a minority of American jurisdictions, under which the protection of this immunity is not dependent upon the relevance of the testimony to the subject matter of the judicial proceeding. 285 Md. at 701-04, 402 A.2d 897. The absolute privilege for judicial testimony is based upon sound considerations of public policy. As our predecessors observed in Hunckel v. Voneiff, 69 Md. 179, 187, 14 A. 500 (1888), it is of the greatest importance to the administration of justice that witnesses should go upon the stand with their minds absolutely free from apprehension that they may subject themselves to an action of slander for what they may say while giving their testimony. See also Adams, supra, 288 Md. at 5, 415 A.2d 292. The absolute nature of this privilege is intended not merely to protect the witness from ultimate liability, but to protect him from the annoyance of suit itself. Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md. 188, 192, 434 A.2d 547 (1981). The absolute privilege extends not only to oral testimony given in open court, but also to statements contained in documents which have been filed in a judicial proceeding. DiBlasio, supra, 233 Md. at 522, 197 A.2d 245; Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 227, 14 A. 518 (1889). Statements contained in documents prepared for possible use in a pending judicial proceeding, but never actually filed in the proceeding, are similarly shielded by absolute immunity. Adams, supra, 288 Md. at 8-9, 415 A.2d 292. See generally Annotation: Libel and Slander: Application of Privilege Attending Statements Made in Course of Judicial Proceedings to Pretrial Deposition and Discovery Procedures, 23 A.L.R.3d 1172 (1969). Professors Prosser and Keeton have suggested that an informal complaint to a prosecuting attorney or a magistrate is to be regarded as an initial step in a judicial proceeding, and so entitled to an absolute, rather than a qualified immunity. W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts, § 114, at 819-20 (5th ed. 1984) (citations omitted). In Gersh, supra, we addressed for the first time the question of whether the absolute privilege afforded judicial testimony should extend as well to defamatory statements made in the course of administrative proceedings. The allegedly defamatory statements in that case were published by a witness testifying at a public hearing before the Baltimore City Community Relations Commission. In the ensuing defamation action, the defendant maintained that his testimony before the Commission was protected by an absolute privilege. After reviewing the relevant case law from other jurisdictions, we concluded that [t]he nature and scope of such proceedings are too varied to be circumscribed by specific criteria. Rather, [the question of] whether absolute witness immunity will be extended to any administrative proceeding will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis and will in large part turn on two factors: (1) the nature of the public function of the proceeding and (2) the adequacy of procedural safeguards which will minimize the occurrence of defamatory statements. 291 Md. at 197, 434 A.2d 547. Applying these principles to the facts of that case, we observed that the Commission's hearing  which was essentially an ordinary open public meeting  lacked the procedural safeguards traditionally provided in judicial proceedings. Furthermore, we found that [t]he public benefit to be derived from testimony at Commission hearings of this type is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the possible damage to individual reputations to warrant absolute witness immunity. Id. at 196, 434 A.2d 547. We therefore declined to extend absolute immunity to the defendant's testimony before the Commission.