Opinion ID: 3149418
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: On November 21, 2008, Officer John Larkin — while employed as a police officer by the City of Marysville (Marysville) — sustained injuries to his face and body in the course of duty. A workers‟ compensation judge (WCJ) was assigned to review Larkin‟s application for benefits. When considering Larkin‟s application, the WCJ determined that Larkin was indeed entitled to workers‟ compensation benefits, but not to the maximum indemnity levels available under section 4458.2. As of July 2010, when the WCJ adjudicated Larkin‟s case, Marysville had paid Larkin temporary disability benefits of $671.07 per week from December 9, 2008, through April 29, 2010, for a total of $31,523.58. Marysville had likewise covered Larkin‟s injury-related medical treatments. After including educational incentive pay of $8.33 per month that had not previously been considered, the 2 The Court of Appeal in its opinion, and the parties in their briefing before this court, refer to section 4458.2‟s “maximum benefits.” Because section 4458.2 operates by setting “weekly earnings” — for disability indemnity purposes — at the “maximum” levels in section 4453, “maximum benefits” are equivalent to “maximum indemnity levels” or “maximum indemnity payments.” We use these latter two terms throughout this opinion. 2 WCJ determined Larkin‟s earnings to be $1,008.47 per week.3 Interpreting sections 4458.2 and 3362, the WCJ found that they did not apply to regularly sworn, salaried officers like Larkin. The WCJ‟s analysis focused on the operation of section 3362, concluding “it would be illogical and unnecessary to create a statute [such as section 3362] to confer employment on a person who is so obviously an employee [under section 3351] for purposes of workers‟ compensation.” In light of the WCJ‟s ruling, Larkin was not entitled to the maximum indemnity levels set out in section 4453.4 (See § 4458.2.) 3 The WCJ did not calculate Larkin‟s prospective temporary disability indemnity benefits, but in finding Larkin‟s weekly earnings to be $1,008.47, it appears that Marysville would have been obligated to make weekly payments to Larkin totaling two-thirds of this amount. (§ 4653 [“If the injury causes temporary total disability, the disability payment is two-thirds of the average weekly earnings during the period of such disability, consideration being given to the ability of the injured employee to compete in an open labor market.”].) 4 Section 4453, subdivision (a) (section 4453(a)) sets the limits used to calculate disability indemnity levels. The schedule of earnings is tied to the date of injury and is presented as a range, such that an injured employee‟s average weekly earnings for workers‟ compensation purposes are “[n]ot less than” a certain amount and not “more than” another. (Ibid.) Section 4453, subdivision (c) (section 4453(c)) governs the actual calculation of average weekly earnings, including for those employed on what amounts to a full-time basis: “Between the limits specified in subdivisions (a) and (b), the average weekly earnings, except as provided in Sections 4456 to 4459, shall be arrived at as follows: [¶] (1) Where the employment is for 30 or more hours a week and for five or more working days a week, the average weekly earnings shall be the number of working days a week times the daily earnings at the time of the injury.” (§ 4453(c)(1).) The last earnings range enumerated in the statute by a specific dollar amount governed injuries occurring between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2006. (§ 4453(a)(10) [setting the range between $189 and $1,260 or “1.5 times the state average weekly wage, whichever is greater”].) For injuries like Larkin‟s, which occurred on or after January 1, 2007, average weekly earnings were “increased by an amount equal to the percentage increase in the state average weekly wage as compared to the prior year,” as reported by the United States Department of Labor. (Ibid.) Had the WCJ found section 4458.2 applicable to (footnote continued on next page) 3 Following this hearing, Larkin petitioned the Board for reconsideration. He argued that the two statutes‟ plain language entitled regularly sworn, salaried peace officers to maximum indemnity levels. The Board disagreed, finding the WCJ‟s reasoning persuasive and denying Larkin‟s petition.5 Larkin then sought a writ of review from the Court of Appeal. In affirming the Board‟s order, the Court of Appeal interpreted section 4458.2 to avoid what it deemed an “absurd result.” It concluded that the policy considerations underlying section 4458.2 and section 3362, as well as other similar statutes, reflected a legislative interest in encouraging volunteer service to support police and fire agencies “by providing maximum benefits to volunteers injured in providing such service.” The court also noted that because Larkin, as a regularly sworn, salaried peace officer, met the definition of “employee” under section 3351, he was entitled to the full range of workers‟ compensation benefits available to all employees, whether peace officers or not. (§ 3351 [“ „Employee‟ means every person in the service of an employer under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed . . . .”].) Although the Court of Appeal did not enumerate which benefits Larkin was eligible to receive as an employee, all those who fall under section 3351 are eligible to receive benefits such as temporary disability and medical payments, among others. (§§ 4650 et seq. [mandating temporary (footnote continued from previous page) Larkin, he would have been entitled to two-thirds of the maximum average weekly earnings, taking into account the increase in the state average weekly wage. (See § 4453(a)(10); see also § 4653 [setting temporary total disability payments as twothirds of average weekly earnings].) 5 The Board adopted and incorporated the WCJ‟s report in its entirety. 4 disability indemnity payments where an injury causes temporary disability], 4600 [requiring employers to cover certain medical care for injured employees].) Given the reach of section 3351, the Court of Appeal found no reason for a “special statute” like section 3362 to apply to officers like Larkin. The Court of Appeal also evinced concern about the effects of Larkin‟s interpretation, which it believed would leave volunteer peace officers without workers‟ compensation if injured in the line of duty. Accordingly, the court concluded that sections 4458.2 and 3362 apply only to volunteer peace officers. We then granted Larkin‟s petition for review to address a single question: Whether section 4458.2 instead applies also to regularly sworn, salaried peace officers.