Opinion ID: 867120
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutor’s reference to “jail calls”

Text: Roux cites an incident that occurred during trial as a second way in which the government undermined the presumption of innocence. During the cross-examination of Roux, the government played recordings of certain telephone conversations that Roux had while he was incarcerated prior to trial. (The recordings were offered to suggest that Roux had attempted to coach prospec20 No. 10-2192 tive witnesses to support his assertions as to his employment history.) The parties had discussed the recordings prior to trial and had agreed that there would be no mention that Roux was incarcerated at the time of the calls. Yet, when the prosecutor sought to introduce the recordings, he announced: At this time, Judge, I would move to introduce an exhibit that contains these jail phone calls. I discussed this with [defense counsel] with regard to the foundation. There is a stipulation for foundation. We had a witness present, but there’s [a] stipulation about foundation. R. 81 at 185, Tr. 588 (emphasis added). Roux’s counsel objected to the description of the recorded conversations as “jail phone calls,” and at sidebar informed the court of the parties’ prior agreement not to refer to them as such. The court admitted the recordings after confirming that the recordings themselves would (further) identify them as jailhouse telephone calls. Roux moved for a mistrial, which the court denied. Roux contends that the court erred in refusing to declare a mistrial given the prosecutor’s disclosure that he had been incarcerated prior to trial. The disclosure was indeed unfortunate, although it appears to have been inadvertent: the transcript of the sidebar conversation suggests that the prosecutor did not even realize that he had described the conversations as “jail calls” until defense counsel so informed him. R. 81 at 186, Tr. 589. In any case, we have no reason to believe that the single reference to “jail calls” deprived Roux of a No. 10-2192 21 fair trial. The jury was properly instructed as to the presumption of innocence in both the initial and final jury instructions. The one-time disclosure that Roux had been in jail prior to trial gives us no reason to doubt that the jury honored that presumption. See United States v. Johnson, 624 F.3d 815, 821-22 (7th Cir. 2010) (recordings of defendant’s jailhouse telephone calls, which began with announcements identifying them as calls made from county jail, did not unduly prejudice defendant). D. Cross-examination of defendant as to lack of corroborating evidence Roux was the one and only defense witness. As we have noted, Roux denied that he had taken the sexually explicit photographs of EV or that he had forced her to take the photographs herself; he also denied that he had ever touched any of Roberta’s daughters inappropriately. Roux testified that at one point in time, he had been in the hospital and that when he was dis- charged, a doctor had advised him not to engage in sexual activity while he was recovering and/or indicated that the medication Roux had been prescribed might render him unable to engage in such activity. (EV had testified that it was at this point in time when Roux had first asked her to have intercourse with him, telling her he was dying; she refused.) Roux also testified that he was working odd jobs as a handyman for various individuals during the times that the government was suggesting he would have been at home alone and, for example, downloading the charged photographs to the 22 No. 10-2192 family computer and then transferring them to a USB drive. The prosecutor followed up on both of those points during cross-examination. As to the physician who had told Roux that he should not or could not engage in sexual activity, the prosecutor asked Roux to state the doctor’s name and indicate where his office was. Roux answered both questions. After having Roux confirm that his medical records would be on file with that doctor, the prosecutor asked Roux, “And they [the records] should reflect what you’re telling this jury, right?” R. 81 at 172, Tr. 575. Roux agreed that they would. On the matter of Roux’s employment, the prosecutor asked Roux a series of questions aimed at establishing that he had not produced the sorts of records that would back up his claims that he had been working. For example, the prosecutor asked Roux whether he had payroll records for the time period during which he had lived with Roberta, and when Roux said that there were boxes of such records in Roberta’s basement, the prosecutor inquired, “What have you done to get those?” and “Well, you’ve tried to get them, haven’t you, or haven’t you?” R. 81 at 177, Tr. 580. Roux said that he had tried, but without success. Next, the prosecutor, after having Roux confirm that his attorneys had an investigator working on his behalf, moved on to tax returns. Roux indicated those too were in the boxes in Roberta’s basement, and among other things they would show that he had “claimed” EV (presumably as a dependent) on his return. The prosecutor observed, “That No. 10-2192 23 would show—if you had those forms here in court, you could show that, right?” R. 81 at 177, Tr. 580. To which Roux responded, “If I had them, yes.” R. 81 at 177, Tr. 580. Finally, in discussing various individuals who might be able to confirm his work history, the prosecutor asked Roux questions like “And why can’t he back you up?” and “So if you were there during these times in May, they could back you up, right?” R. 81 at 182-83, Tr. 585-86. Only after the last of these questions was asked did Roux’s counsel begin to object. At that point, the judge, without being asked, took the opportunity to remind the prosecutor, in the jury’s presence, that Roux was presumed innocent and bore no obligation to present evidence: