Opinion ID: 1614942
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 58

Heading: Rebuttal of Presumption of Prejudice

Text: In his 10th assignment of error, Bjorklund argues that the reviewing judge erred in finding that the presumption of prejudice created by the ex parte contact was rebutted by the State with proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional error was harmless. We disagree. As the reviewing judge correctly noted in his order, it is `only a prejudicial error, that is, an error which cannot be said to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, which requires that a conviction be set aside.' See State v. Menuey, 239 Neb. 513, 476 N.W.2d 846 (1991). As we have previously stated, reversal is not required if the record affirmatively shows the ex parte communication had no tendency to influence the verdict. State v. Mahlin, 236 Neb. 818, 464 N.W.2d 312 (1991); State v. White, 191 Neb. 772, 217 N.W.2d 916 (1974). In this case, as the reviewing judge found: The prayers were very short in nature and were not interpreted by the jurors as being comments by Judge Endacott on the evidence to be presented in the case or on how the case should be decided. From the time the twelve jurors were selected and sworn up to the time the case was submitted to the jurors for their deliberation, Judge Endacott continued to remind the jurors of their duty to keep open minds and base their verdict only on the evidence presented. As noted above, every juror testified that at the time of the communication, they did not believe that the trial judge was commenting on the evidence or trying to influence their verdict. The ex parte contact occurred over 25 days prior to the submission of the case to the jury; the trial judge fully and properly instructed the jury on the burden of proof and on the fact that the jurors must not construe any statements, actions, or rulings of the court in the trial of this case ... as reflecting an opinion of the court as to how this case should be decided; and the trial judge consistently reminded them throughout the trial to keep an open mind and to base their verdicts solely on the evidence produced. The record affirmatively demonstrates that the communication had no tendency to affect the verdict and that the State rebutted the presumption of prejudice with proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the error that did occur was harmless. Thus, we conclude this assignment of error to be without merit. Additionally, we note that Judge Merritt did not err in overruling Bjorklund's second motion for new trial. A motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and unless an abuse of discretion is shown, the trial court's determination will not be disturbed. State v. McCormick and Hall, 246 Neb. 271, 518 N.W.2d 133 (1994). We conclude that any error committed by the trial judge in engaging in this ex parte contact with the jury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Bjorklund, in his statement to Sorensen, admitted that he and Barney were carrying out their fantasy of raping a woman, that they abducted Harms, that they each raped her, that Bjorklund then choked her, and that he then fired five rounds from a .38-caliber revolver into her head. We also conclude that the reviewing judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant Bjorklund a new trial on the basis of that ex parte contact. Despite our conclusion that any error regarding the ex parte communication in this case was harmless, ex parte communications should be avoided except in unusual circumstances where communication is essential and counsel cannot be reached. In such cases, a verbatim record should be made and counsel and the defendant advised on the record of the contact as soon as practical after it occurs.