Opinion ID: 1838830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Strickland Test and Presumed Prejudice

Text: In his dissent, Judge Bowen correctly noted that the Strickland test for prejudice, excluding those instances of presumed prejudice, is outcome-determinative in nature; that is, it must appear that, absent the lawyer's error, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different. Judge Bowen correctly states that such an outcome-determinative test is simply not the proper criterion for measuring prejudice in the context of a Batson error, and he says, Applying this measure of prejudice to a Batson error would be, in effect, requiring the appellant to prove that, had blacks not been unfairly removed from his jury, the factfinder might have acquitted him! 575 So.2d 131 (Bowen, J., dissenting). It is the assumption cited by Judge Bowen that Batson was designed to combat: Just as the Equal Protection Clause forbids the States to exclude black persons from the venire on the assumption that blacks as a group are unqualified to serve as jurors [citation omitted], so it forbids the States to strike black veniremen on the assumption that they will be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is black. The core guarantee of equal protection, ensuring citizens that their State will not discriminate on account of race, would be meaningless were we to approve the exclusion of jurors on the basis of such assumptions, which arise solely from the jurors' race. 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 23-24. If an outcome-determinative test is used, then no black appellant could prove prejudice unless he relied on the very assumption that Batson condemns. In Batson, the Court noted the importance of maintaining fairness within our system of justice so as not to undermine public confidence. In Ex parte Jackson, 516 So.2d 768 (Ala.1986), we required the retroactive application of Batson. In doing so, we noted, Although we know that the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether Batson v. Kentucky is to be applied retroactively, this Court does not need to await revelation from the federal judiciary.... 516 So.2d at 772. Strickland was decided two years before Batson, so it did not anticipate claims of alleged ineffectiveness in the context of the Batson issue. Had Strickland anticipated that issue, we are certain it would have included that issue as one of those in regard to which prejudice is presumed. We need not await enlargement of Strickland by the federal courts to hold that prejudice is presumed where Batson violations are established in the context of a charge of ineffective counsel.