Opinion ID: 1102262
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Venue in Actions against Public Bodies

Text: Article 42, which essentially provides for venue at the home base of the entity sued, has no provision for venue in actions against the state or political subdivisions of the state. Rather, the provisions for these entities are set forth in La.Rev.Stat. 13:5104, which provides: A. All suits filed against the state of Louisiana or any state agency may be instituted before the district court of the judicial district in which the state capitol is located or in the district court having jurisdiction in the parish in which the cause of action arises. B. All suits filed against a political subdivision of the state or against an officer or employee of a political subdivision for conduct arising out of the discharge of his official duties or within the course and scope of his employment shall be instituted before the district court of the judicial district in which the political subdivision is located or in the district court having jurisdiction in the parish in which the cause of action arises. (emphasis added). Section 5104 does not fit neatly into any of the three categories of venue established by the Code. At least prior to the 1985 amendment changing the word may in Subsection B to shall, Section 5104 appeared to provide a general rule of venue similar to Article 42's provision for venue at the defendant's home base, with a specific exception similar to Article 74. When the word may was used in both subsections, Section 5104 arguably could have been construed either as providing for preferred venue in one of two parishes or as providing for general venue subject to all of the exceptions. The legislative change in the wording of Subsection B to shall has been construed by several intermediate courts to mean that the venue for actions against a political subdivision is in one of the two specified parishes and no other, given the rule of construction that shall is mandatory. See Texaco, Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish Government, 529 So.2d 1128 (La.App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 533 So.2d 359 (La.1988); Revolta v. Regional Transit Auth., 607 So.2d 963 (La.App.4th Cir.1992); Commercial National Bank in Shreveport v. First National Bank of Fairfield, Texas, 603 So.2d 270, cert. denied, 605 So.2d 1151 (La.1992). This court has not addressed this issue directly. [3] In the context of venue, the permissive may and the mandatory shall have often been interchanged. Indeed, Article 42, the general venue statute, employs the word shall to define the general venue for different types of defendants, yet is subject to the numerous statutory exceptions. See Gurtler, Hebert & Co. v. Marquette Casualty. Co., 145 So.2d 145 (La.App. 4th Cir.1962)(holding that may in venue provision involving enforcing private works is mandatory); see also 3 A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 67.04 (5th ed.1992)(noting that venue provisions should be liberally construed). Nevertheless, the fact that the Legislature in 1985 expressly deleted the word may and substituted the word shall in Section 5104 B indicates a legislative intent that a single political subdivision can be sued only in one of the two specified parishes and that no other exceptions are applicable. When a single political subdivision is the only defendant, the choice of venues provided by Section 5104 B is logical and consistent with the legislative intent that a political subdivision generally must be sued at its home base or in the parish which gave rise to the cause of action. And even when a political subdivision is one of several defendants, that legislative intent arguably is still applicable, especially when a parish of proper venue under Section 5104 B is also proper venue for the other defendants. However, when two political subdivisions located in different parishes are joined as defendants and alleged to be joint or solidary obligors as to the same transaction or occurrence, additional policy considerations enter into the determination of legislative intent. The policy considerations permeating the entire Code of Civil Procedure (expounded in Article 5051's mandate that the articles of the Code are to be construed liberally and with due regard for the fact that rules of procedure implement the substantive law and are not an end in themselves), as well as the Code's judicially efficient objective of promoting joinder of actions and parties, dictate that courts should avoid the judicial inefficiency and the probability of inconsistent results when several trials are required for the same operative facts in intertwined actions. The entire theme of the Code is to avoid multiple trials of the same operative facts whenever possible. Against this background, one can easily conclude that the Legislature, in amending Section 5104 B, did not envision the situation of two political subdivisions sued as solidary obligors in one action arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, with each asserting its right to be sued in the parish where it is located. If this logical conclusion is correct, the situation in which each of two political subdivisions is demanding its right to preferred venue, thereby requiring the judicial inefficiency of two separate trials with the probability of inconsistent results as to liability or damages or both, is an unprovided for situation not contemplated by the Legislature to be covered by Section 5104 B. There are other considerations supporting this decision. Under the rationale of Weber v. Charity Hosp. of La. at New Orleans, 475 So.2d 1047(La.1985), if the negligence of both defendants is proved, the School Board will be solidarily liable for the medical malpractice damages (although the damages attributable exclusively to the original tort will be owed exclusively by the initial tortfeasor). A common venue for the cumulated actions is indispensable for the just and proper adjudication of the claims for the solidarily owed damages and for indemnification of the initial tortfeasor against the second. Moreover, La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 1111 allows a defendant to bring in by third party petition any person who is or may be liable for all or part of the principal demand. Venue need not be proper for the incidental demand as long as venue is proper for the principal demand. [4] La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 1034. Thus in the present case, even if plaintiffs had not joined Lane Memorial in the principal action, the East Feliciana Parish School Board could bring Lane Memorial into this action by third party demand for indemnification for the medical malpractice damages (for which they allegedly are solidarily liable, although Lane Memorial is not liable for the initial damages). Lane Memorial, once brought into the present action properly by the Board, would be required to try the medical malpractice claim on the incidental demand, and it is highly unlikely that the Legislature intended to prohibit plaintiff from trying their medical malpractice claim against Lane Memorial in the same action. Accordingly, in this type of multiple political subdivision setting, we decline to construe the legislative intent of Section 5104 B as giving each political subdivision the right to demand being tried in its choice of venue, without regard to the inefficiency and inconsistency that the Code's theme is designed to prevent. Viewing this as an unprovided for situation not envisioned by the Legislature in adopting Section 5104 B, we resolve the problem by applying the doctrine of ancillary venue.