Opinion ID: 620046
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: SORNA: Tenth Circuit Litigation

Text: In the years since its passage, the Tenth Circuit has rejected numerous constitutional challenges to SORNA. The court has held that § 16913—SORNA’s registration provision—does not violate the Due Process Clause, the nondelegation doctrine, or the Ex Post Facto Clause. See, e.g., Lawrance, 548 F.3d at 1333-34; United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 935-40 (10th Cir. 2008). We also have held that Congress acted within its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting § 2250(a)(2)(B)—SORNA’s criminal provision applicable to sex offenders who fail to register and travel in interstate or foreign commerce. See Lawrance, 548 F.3d at 1337; Hinckley, 550 F.3d at 940. Most recently, we held that Congress acted within its authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause when it enacted § 2250(a)(2)(A)—SORNA’s criminal provision that applies to federal sex offenders, including those who do not travel interstate. See Yelloweagle, 643 F.3d at 1289.2 We reached this conclusion based on the assumption that § 16913—SORNA’s registration provision—was constitutional. See id. Specifically, we stated: “[O]perat[ing] on the assumption that § 16913 is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause . . . we conclude that Congress has the authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact § 2250(a)(2)(A) in order to criminally enforce its validly enacted registration provision, § 16913.” Id. We assumed 2 On appeal, Mr. Carel asserts a facial challenge to the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(A), but this challenge is foreclosed by our decision in Yelloweagle. 5 § 16913 was valid because the defendant-appellant “waived his challenge to § 16913.” Id. Despite all the constitutional challenges to SORNA that have been asserted in the Tenth Circuit, we have not expressly addressed whether Congress acted within the scope of its authority when it required federal sex offenders to comply with § 16913’s registration requirements. 3 3 Two other circuits—the Fifth and the Ninth—have directly addressed the constitutionality of applying § 16913 to federal sex offenders. See United States v. Kebodeaux, 647 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc opinion pending); United States v. George, 625 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2010). Although they offered different reasons for doing so, both circuits upheld § 16913 as a constitutional exercise of Congress’s legislative authority. See Kebodeaux, 647 F.3d at 146 (“Congress had the authority under Article I of the Constitution to devise a narrow, non-punitive collateral regulatory consequence to this particular high-risk category of federal criminal convictions. . . . Accordingly, we conclude that [SORNA’s] application to intra-state violations . . . by sex offenders convicted under federal law is constitutional.”); George, 625 F.3d at 1130 (“SORNA’s registration requirements are valid based on the federal government’s direct supervisory interest over federal sex offenders.” (quotations omitted)). Additionally, although they have not addressed application of § 16913 to federal sex offenders who do not cross state lines, at least six other circuits have concluded that § 16913 is constitutional. See United States v. Pendleton, 636 F.3d 78, 88 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Section 16913 is a law made in pursuance of the constitution, because it is necessary and proper for carrying into Execution Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.” (quotations and citations omitted)); United States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2010) (“To the extent that § 16913 regulates solely intrastate activity, its means are reasonably adapted to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power, and therefore proper.” (quotations and citations omitted)); United States v. DiTomasso, 621 F.3d 17, 25 n.8 (1st Cir. 2010) (“The defendant suggests that the registration requirement contained in § 16913 itself exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. This suggestion is incorrect. The Necessary and Proper Clause . . . provides Congress with ample authority to regulate local activity as part of a general scheme regulating interstate commerce.”); United States v. Vasquez, 611 F.3d 325, 331 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[Section] 16913 is a logical way to help ensure that the government will more effectively be able to track sex offenders when they do cross state lines. To the extent that § 16913 regulates solely intrastate activity, the regulatory means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power.”); United States v. Howell, 6