Opinion ID: 1907308
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Additional Mental Health Expert

Text: In his first claim, Marshall argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise as error on direct appeal the trial court's denial of his motion for appointment of an additional mental health expert. [2] Marshall alleges that as a result of the trial court's ruling, he was deprived of his right to a competent mental health expert pursuant to Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). Ake requires that a defendant be afforded access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. Id. at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087. The issue of appellate counsel's ineffectiveness is appropriately raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1069 (Fla.2000). However, in order to grant habeas relief on the basis of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, this Court must determine whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of the result. Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So.2d 798, 800 (Fla.1986); see also Freeman, 761 So.2d at 1069. The defendant has the burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or overt act upon which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be based. Freeman, 761 So.2d at 1069. Prior to trial, defense counsel requested that a mental health expert be appointed to examine Marshall for competency and sanity, as well as for the existence of possible mitigating circumstances. Defense counsel specifically requested that Dr. Joel Klass, with whom the public defender's office had previously worked, be appointed. The trial court granted the motion and appointed Dr. Klass to examine Marshall. Subsequent to Dr. Klass' s examination, however, defense counsel filed a motion for an additional mental health expert, expressing counsel's dissatisfaction with both Dr. Klass's examination of Marshall and his correspondence with defense counsel. Accordingly, in the motion defense counsel requested that an additional mental health expert be appointed to evaluate Marshall. The trial court held a hearing on Marshall's motion, during which defense counsel reiterated claims from the motion for an additional mental health expert, including a claim that Dr. Klass apparently spent no more than one hour with Marshall, and that aside from two short letters, he had failed to communicate with defense counsel or inform counsel of what tests, if any, were administered and what evidence might be gathered in mitigation. The State opposed Marshall's motion, arguing that (1) it would be a waste of the trial court's time and the county's money to appoint an additional expert, since Dr. Klass had completed an evaluation and simply needed to communicate with defense counsel in accordance with the trial court's order, and (2) the additional expert specifically requested, a Dr. Robert Berland, was not qualified to perform the desired work. The State suggested that the trial court order Dr. Klass to comply with its previous order appointing him. Thereafter, the trial court orally denied Marshall's motion for an additional mental health expert. In so doing, the trial court noted that based upon its prior experience with Dr. Klass, it did not believe he was incompetent, nor had defense counsel shown Dr. Klass was incompetent. However, the trial court indicated that it would order Dr. Klass to comply with its previous order and to conduct another interview of Marshall if necessary. The trial court subsequently entered a written order denying Marshall's motion and requiring Dr. Klass to comply with its previous order and submit a written report to defense counsel in addition to communicating with defense counsel by telephone. As noted above, Marshall contends appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the trial court's denial of his motion for an additional mental health expert on direct appeal. In our most recent opinion concerning Marshall, we indicated that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to get the trial court to appoint an additional expert and that the issue regarding the appointment of an additional expert was adequately documented in the record and could have been raised on appeal. Marshall, 854 So.2d at 1248. To be effective, however, appellate counsel is not required to raise every conceivable issue on appeal. See Atkins v. Dugger, 541 So.2d 1165, 1167 (Fla.1989). Moreover, appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for not raising on appeal an issue with little or no merit. See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So.2d 637, 643 (Fla.2000) (If a legal issue `would in all probability have been found to be without merit' had counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the failure of appellate counsel to raise the meritless issue will not render appellate counsel's performance ineffective.). A trial court's ruling on a motion for appointment of experts will be affirmed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. See San Martin v. State, 705 So.2d 1337, 1347 (Fla.1997); Sliney v. State, 699 So.2d 662, 671 (Fla.1997); Martin v. State, 455 So.2d 370, 371-72 (Fla.1984). In San Martin, this Court explained the applicable standard when a defendant alleges error in the trial court's decision to not appoint an expert: In evaluating whether there was an abuse of discretion, courts have applied a two-part test: (1) whether the defendant made a particularized showing of need; and (2) whether the defendant was prejudiced by the court's denial of the motion requesting the expert assistance. San Martin, 705 So.2d at 1347 (citing Dingle v. State, 654 So.2d 164, 166 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)). In the instant case, the trial court's order denying Marshall's request for an additional mental health expert specifically ordered Dr. Klass to comply with the court's previous order, submit a written report to defense counsel on the issues specified in that order, and communicate with defense counsel for the purposes of pretrial preparation. Although the trial court declined to appoint an additional mental health expert, it sought to remedy the specific difficulties defense counsel was reportedly experiencing with Dr. Klass by ordering Dr. Klass to comply with the court's initial order of appointment, as well as communicate with defense counsel. Notably, defense counsel made no subsequent representations to the trial court that he continued to experience difficulties with Dr. Klass or that Dr. Klass had failed to comply with the trial court's order. Nor did trial counsel contest the trial court's refusal to appoint an additional mental health expert in Marshall's motion for a new trial. Under these circumstances and in light of the trial court's order directing Dr. Klass to comply with its initial order of appointment, we conclude that Marshall has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for appointment of an additional mental health expert. [3] Accordingly, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this claim on direct appeal.