Opinion ID: 1820473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: THE ADMISSIBILITY OF McFEE'S PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS

Text: As explained above, during the cross-examination of David McFee, the state moved to introduce two prior inconsistent written statements of his. The state offered the first statement after examining McFee in relation to it. Throughout McFee's testimony he freely admitted that he had made the statement. He was cross-examined as to all of the inconsistencies between the statement and his testimony. He freely admitted those inconsistencies and asserted the falsity of the statement. It was after the state had fully used the statement to impeach McFee's credibility that it offered the document itself into evidence. At that point the defense objected on the ground that McFee had admitted making the statement and the inconsistencies therein. The trial court overruled that objection and accepted the statement into evidence. As to the second statement, the state offered it into evidence prior to examining McFee regarding its inconsistency with his testimony. The state merely established that McFee had made the statement and signed it. The defense objected that no foundation had been laid for admitting the statement and because the statement had not been provided to the defense under the rules of discovery. The court overruled both objections and admitted the second statement into evidence. This Court recently decided the case of Moffett v. State, 456 So.2d 714 (Miss. 1984). In that case the state was permitted to introduce into evidence a prior out-of-court statement made by a witness who admitted that he had made the statement and insisted that its contents were untrue. We addressed the admissibility of the witness' statement as follows: Where the non-party witness admits having made the prior, out-of-court statement, the statement where reduced to written form, should never be introduced into evidence. If the witness confesses or admits having made prior inconsistent statements, ordinarily there is no necessity for further proof, as by the admission of the prior inconsistent written statement. Davis v. State, 431 So.2d 468, 473 (Miss. 1983); Sims v. State, 313 So.2d 388, 391 (Miss. 1975); Hammons v. State, 291 So.2d 177, 179 (Miss. 1974); Hall v. State, 250 Miss. 253, 264, 165 So.2d 345, 350 (1964); see Hubbard v. State, 437 So.2d 430, 434 (Miss. 1983); (obviously for impeachment purposes); Murphy v. State, 336 So.2d 213, 216-17 (Miss. 1976) (defendant entitled to instruction that prior inconsistent statement may not be used as proof of guilt).       There is a more practical reason why the statement should not have been given to the jury. The average juror will have a difficult enough time without the statement sitting in his lap keeping distinct in his mind that which he has heard as evidence and what he has been told may be considered for impeachment only. Many suggest it is folly to think juries can  or will even attempt to  keep this distinction in mind. (Emphasis added) Moffett at 719, 720. Just as the admission of the witness' statements in Moffett constituted reversible error, so do the admission of McFee's statements in the instant case. McFee's first statement was admitted after he fully acknowledged making the statement and the inconsistencies contained therein. The second statement was admitted into evidence before any predicate was laid showing it was inconsistent with McFee's testimony at trial. As in Moffett, the error of admitting these statements into evidence was compounded when the district attorney argued them as substantive evidence of Fuselier's guilt during closing arguments. The district attorney told the jury David McFee testified for him but, you know, after I got through cross-examining David McFee I felt like he made as good a witness for the state of Mississippi as he did for Eric Fuselier, because David McFee, if you will read his statement which is in evidence, he admits about ninety percent of it. As we stated in Moffett: No resort to notions of death is different or heightened scrutiny, see, e.g., Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798, 810 (Miss. 1984); Laney v. State, 421 So.2d 1216, 1217 (Miss. 1982), is necessary for us to conclude that such errors so infected the proceedings below that [the defendant] has been denied a fair trial. Moffett at 721.