Opinion ID: 1829550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the jefferson county board of supervisors/election commission is empowered to deny certification

Text: Counsel for the Election Commission also argues that the duties of the Election Commission are purely ministerial and confined to mere computation. Counsel cites a number of cases holding that the supervisors are clothed with no power to hear and determine complaints of the illegal registration or illegal voting; that the Election Commission are canvassers controlled by the returns of the inspectors and have no power to go behind them or inquire into fraud or irregularity. The Supreme Court of Alabama has so held. See, e.g., Sears v. Carson, 551 So.2d 1054 (Ala.1989); Reed v. City of Montgomery, 376 So.2d 708 (Ala. 1979). Alternatively, this Court concludes that the Election Commission has no authority itself to refuse to certify a candidate elected to office on the ground that such candidate failed to comply with particular provisions of the Fair Campaign Practices Act. This Court finds it unnecessary to consider other grounds asserted by Germany in view of its decision that Reuben Davis' challenge is barred by § 17-15-22. In accordance with this opinion, it is hereby declared by the Court that Jeff Germany is the certified winner of the election for Jefferson County Commissioner, District 1. Jeff Germany also asks for an injunction enjoining the Election Commissioners from revoking his certificate of election. Such is unnecessary in view of the position of the Election Commissioners that they have no power to revoke Germany's certificate of election in any event. Each party shall bear his or their own costs. This order concludes all matters at issue in this case. Done this 11th day of January, 1991. /s/ Marvin Cherner CIRCUIT JUDGE The Fair Campaign Practices Act was enacted by the Legislature in 1988. Its primary laudable purpose was to require candidates for public office in Alabama to disclose campaign contributions and expenditures prior to elections. It repealed parts of the Corrupt Practices Act, § 17-22-1 et seq., which required disclosure only after the election. To accomplish this purpose, the legislature included sanctions for violation of the statute. For a failure to file a statement required by the statute prior to the election, § 17-22A-21 provides the harshest penalty of all: A certificate of election or nomination shall not be issued to any person elected or nominated to state or local office who shall fail to file any statement or report required by this Chapter. Thus, any candidate who fails to file a statement that is required to be filed by the Fair Campaign Practices Act, prior to the election for the purpose of informing the voting public of the sources of his contributions and the subject of his expenditures, shall forfeit the election. For the candidate who does not fail to file a statement before the election, but who files such a statement late, § 17-22A-22(b) prescribes and applies punishment in the form of a criminal penalty. These two distinct sanctions, forfeiture of the election for those candidates who fail to file the disclosure statements required by the statute prior to the election, and criminal fines for candidates who file such disclosure statements prior to the election but not within the time prescribed by the statute, carry out the legislative intent of full disclosure before the election; but these sanctions do not require a candidate who discloses his contributions and expenditures before the election (but not within the time provided by the statute) to forfeit the election. That sanction is too harsh to visit upon a candidate who has not failed to file the statements required, but has merely filed them late. After all, this candidate is the candidate chosen by the people as their representative, even though his disclosure statement was filed untimely. The people's choice should prevail even if the candidate is in violation of the time constraints of the statute, if he files his disclosure statements prior to the election. A fair reading of the Fair Campaign Practices Act leads one inescapably to the conclusion that the Legislature made a clear distinction between penalties that would apply to those candidates who fail to file disclosure statements and those candidates who merely file them late. It is not surprising that it did so. It was designed to differ from the Corrupt Practices Act, which provided only the harsh sanction of removal of the candidate's name from the ballot. [3] The purpose of the Fair Campaign Practices Act is to aid the voting public in choosing its state and county officials. Its purpose is not to deny the voting public its choice of representative, even if he or she has failed to meet a statutory deadline for filing disclosure statements, so long as he or she nevertheless has filed the statements prior to the election. The penal provisions of the Fair Campaign Practices Act have been addressed by this Court in only one case. In Megginson v. Turner, 565 So.2d 247 (Ala. 1990), this Court affirmed a trial court's ruling that Megginson could not be certified as the Democratic nominee because he had filed his statement naming his principal campaign committee more than five days after his announcement and declaration of candidacy. Megginson cited Jones v. Phillips, 279 Ala. 354, 185 So.2d 378 (1966); Owens v. Heartsill, 279 Ala. 359, 185 So.2d 382 (1966); Herndon v. Lee, 281 Ala. 61, 199 So.2d 74 (1967), and Kirksey v. Democratic Party of Alabama, 495 So.2d 638 (Ala.1986), as authority for its holding. However, those cited cases were decided under the Corrupt Practices Act, which did not provide the separate sanctions that the Fair Campaign Practices Act provides. All candidates are, of course, subject to the five-day requirements of § 17-22A-4. If one fails to file a statement required by that section before the election, § 17-22A-21 applies the sanction: forfeiture of the election. If one files the statement required by § 17-22A-4 before the election, but not within the five days required by that section, § 17-22A-22(b) applies. To the extent that Megginson v. Turner, supra, holds to the contrary, it is overruled. The Fair Campaign Practices Act marks a new day in Alabama campaign practices. It requires full and complete disclosure by all candidates for public office of the sources of all contributions and the subject of all expenditures. It requires this disclosure prior to the election. If it is not made before the election, the candidate may not be certified to the office if he wins the election, § 17-22A-21. It requires this disclosure shortly after one becomes a candidate. If it is not made within the time required, but before the election, the candidate is subject to the penalties provided by § 17-22A-22(b). Its purpose is to inform the voting public of the source of a candidate's financial support. This purpose is served by the sanctions provided for in the Act. This Court has no authority to enlarge the sanctions provided for in the legislation itself. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. AFFIRMED. HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, ADAMS, STEAGALL, KENNEDY and INGRAM, JJ., concur. MADDOX and HOUSTON, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.