Opinion ID: 1384933
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: were statements by pierce improperly admitted into evidence?

Text: Zinn argues that the court improperly admitted into evidence Scartaccini's and Sliger's testimony of Pierce's statement to them on the way to the Jemez Mountains in which Zinn had told Pierce to get rid of the victim. We note that Zinn did not object to the introduction of this testimony when Scartaccini testified as to Pierce's statement. Six days after Scartaccini testified, Sliger testified to the same effect, and only then did Zinn object. It is obvious that by the time Sliger testified, the jury had had ample opportunity to reflect upon the substance of Scartaccini's testimony. It would have been of little effect for the trial court to have sustained Zinn's objection to Sliger's testimony, even assuming there had been grounds for doing so, because the statement objected to had already been planted  properly  in the jurors' minds. Nonetheless, we will undertake an analysis of Zinn's argument as to the introduction of Sliger's testimony. The admissibility of Pierce's statement is governed by SCRA 1986, 11-801(D)(2)(e), which allows into evidence a statement that otherwise would be hearsay when the statement is made by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Under prior decisions it was well-settled that [o]ut of court statements made by a co-conspirator about matters relating to the conspiracy are not admissible unless and until a prima facie case of conspiracy is shown by other independent evidence. State v. Harge, 94 N.M. 11, 17, 606 P.2d 1105, 1111 (Ct.App. 1979), rev'd sub nom., Buzbee v. Donnelly, 96 N.M. 692, 634 P.2d 1244 (1981). This decision, however, is qualified by that in State v. Mead, 100 N.M. 27, 665 P.2d 289 (Ct.App.), modified sub nom., State v. Segotta, 100 N.M. 498, 672 P.2d 1129 (1983), where the court of appeals held, We have pointed out that the foundational requirement of proof of a conspiracy by independent evidence need not be met at the time the State offers the co-conspirator's statement. The trial court may rule conditionally. Id. 100 N.M. at 30, 665 P.2d at 292. Here the record provides abundant independent evidence to substantiate the testimony of Scartaccini and Sliger. While their testimony is the only evidence depicting what took place within the motel room, there is more than sufficient corroborating evidence as to the events leading up to the kidnapping and sexual assaults to render Scartaccini's and Sliger's testimony credible as to the kidnapping, sexual assaults and murder. Further, the events which took place after the victim was transported from the motel room until she was murdered strengthen both Scartaccini's and Sliger's story as well as the corroborating testimony provided by the other witnesses. The gist of conspiracy is the agreement, and such agreements are rarely susceptible of direct proof. Consequently, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conspiracy conviction. State v. Johnston, 98 N.M. 92, 95, 645 P.2d 448, 451 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982). From our reading of the record, there can be no reasonable doubt that Zinn, Pierce, Sliger and Scartaccini entered into agreements to kidnap and sexually assault the victim, and that at least Zinn and Pierce conspired to murder the victim. Independent evidence of a conspiracy to commit murder comes from the Zinn-Pierce meeting at Jerry's Lounge immediately before the trip to Jemez, and from the Zinn-Pierce telephone conversation immediately before the killing. It is this sequence of events, taken from Zinn's clear conspiratorial involvement to that point of time, that is independent evidence from which it could have been inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that Zinn conspired to transport the victim to Jemez and that he conspired in her death which followed immediately after his telephone call from Albuquerque to Jemez. Thus, because substantial independent evidence appears in the record as to the conspiracies, the trial court did not err in admitting testimony as to Pierce's statement. Moreover, even if this were not the case, the Supreme Court has ruled recently that the trial court is not required to ignore the statement being offered if the content of the statement itself is reasonably supportive of a conspiracy when taken together with the other independent evidence of the conspiracy. Bourjaily v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 95 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). Zinn makes the further argument that even if the testimony was properly admitted under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, the testimony was nonetheless prejudicial because the State did not show that Pierce was unavailable. Thus, Zinn argues, he was denied his constitutional right to confront a witness (Pierce) testifying against him. Zinn's argument as to this point is without merit. The Supreme Court has also recently ruled that there is no requirement under the Confrontation Clause for the prosecution to show that a nontestifying co-conspirator is unavailable to testify when his out-of-court statement is offered into evidence against the defendant/co-conspirator. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986). Zinn next argues that Pierce's other out-of-court statements and assertions were improperly admitted, such as his statements that he had never killed a woman before and he would make Zinn pay for having been ordered to kill the victim. We conclude that the trial court properly admitted this statement as a present sense impression under SCRA 1986, 11-803(A). The remainder of Zinn's challenges to the evidence are without merit. Finally, we dispose of Zinn's last challenge on appeal in which he attacks the trial court's instructions to the jury as to the felony murder count. Zinn argues that because only Pierce's statements could have justified the instruction which the court gave, because only those statements could have served as a predicate for causality under the felony murder instruction, the felony murder verdict must be reversed. Since, however, we have ruled above that Pierce's statements were admissible, Zinn's argument as to this point is without merit. The judgment and sentence of the trial court is affirmed in its entirety. IT IS SO ORDERED. SCARBOROUGH, C.J., and RANSOM, J., concur. STOWERS, J., not participating. WALTERS, J., concurring on issues one and two, dissenting as to issue three.