Opinion ID: 2089638
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Personal Jurisdiction Over JAG in GMH's Cross-claim

Text: I also respectfully dissent from the majority's dismissal of GMH's answer and cross-claim. The majority's holding that GMH could make JAG a party only by personally serving its answer on JAG pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03 is based on a misunderstanding of the relationship between the Mechanics' Lien Statute and the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. The majority explains that because the Mechanics' Lien Statute does not set forth the procedures for service of a summons to commence a lien action, the rules of civil procedure apply. Under rule 3.01, one is not a party to an action until served. Thus, the majority concludes that a lien claimant named as a defendant has the right to maintain an action to foreclose his or her own particular mechanics' lien only by formally serving a cross-claim pursuant to rule 4.03. It is true that the Mechanics' Lien Statute does not set forth rules for service of process. However, this does not mean that the statute fails to provide rules for making one a party to a mechanics' lien action. Under the rules of civil procedure, service and party status are inextricably linked. One must be served to be a party. Under the rules for establishing party status detailed in the Mechanics' Lien Statute, however, one can be a party without being served. In arguing that party status is always a function of service of process, the majority improperly imposes a rule applicable in ordinary civil actions on statutory mechanics' lien actions. This directly contradicts the Mechanics' Lien Statute as well as prior decisions of this court. Our holding in Sandberg v. Palm, 53 Minn. 252, 54 N.W. 1109 (1893), involves a situation directly analogous to that of the instant case. In Sandberg, the property owner's agent executed a contract to sell the land to Burkey, who engaged several laborers to construct four buildings on the land. Sandberg, one of the laborers, filed an action in Ramsey County to foreclose his mechanics' lien because he had not been paid for his services. In that action, Hammer, another lien claimant who was named by Sandberg as a defendant, filed an answer to foreclose on his (Hammer's) particular mechanics' lien. The district court determined that although Sandberg's action to foreclose was filed within 1 year after the date of the last item of work on Sandberg's lien, Sandberg did not properly serve the summons on the landowner until after the 1-year statutory period had passed. Nevertheless, the district court entered judgment in favor of Hammer even though it dismissed Sandberg's action. On appeal, we explicitly rejected the property owner's argument that no other lien claimant could appear in an action to assert his or her particular lien when an original plaintiff who did not commence the foreclosure action properly was procedurally barred from asserting his lien. Instead, we held that a plaintiff commences an action to foreclose on a mechanics' lien by filing a complaint and a notice for lis pendens and serving a summons. Id. at 255, 54 N.W. at 1109. Once a plaintiff commences an action to foreclose a lien, any other lien claimant who intends to assert their lien may do so by filing an answer. Id., 54 N.W. at 1109. Once the answer is filed, judgment is not dependent on the disposition of the original plaintiff's claim. Id., 54 N.W. at 1109. Under Sandberg, GMH properly commenced an action to foreclose its lien against JAG by filing its answer even though Ryan failed to serve a summons on JAG within the statutory period. Similarly, in Olson & Serley Sash & Door Co. v. Juckem, 163 Minn. 375, 204 N.W. 51 (1925), we emphasized that any individual lien claimant may commence an action to foreclose a mechanics' lien but, once an action is commenced, all the other claimants who have been joined as party defendants must file an answer to assert their own particular mechanic's lien. Id. at 377, 204 N.W. at 51. After such a lien claimant files an answer, his action to enforce his lien is independent of the original plaintiff's action. Id., 204 N.W. at 52. We held that the filing of the answer is the essential thing. Filing it is a substitute for the service of the summons [once] an action to foreclose is commenced. It keeps the lien alive whether the plaintiff's action was begun in time or not, and whether the plaintiff prevails or is defeated. Id., 204 N.W. at 52; Bauman v. Metzger, 145 Minn. 133, 140, 176 N.W. 497, 500 (1920) (holding that filing an answer commences an action to foreclose a lien). Under Olson, GMH commenced its action against both JAG and JDC when it filed its answer, whether Ryan's action was begun in time or not. Service by GMH was irrelevant and unnecessary. The results in Sandberg and Olson are consistent with the statutory language and goals of the Mechanics' Lien Statute. Of course, they are inconsistent with the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure precisely because mechanics' lien actions are excepted from the requirements contained in the rules to the extent that they are inconsistent or in conflict with the rules. Minn. R. Civ. P. 81.01(a) & App. A. The Mechanics' Lien Statute specifies the manner in which one is made a party to a mechanics' lien action. A lienholder asserts his or her lien by filing a complaint or answer with the court administrator, within one year after the date of the last item of the claim as set forth in the recorded lien statement. Minn.Stat. § 514.12, subd. 3. After a plaintiff files the complaint, all other lienholders must be made defendants in the action and the named defendants are only required to file their answer with the district court administrator. The statute mandates that [n]o copies of such complaint or answer need be served on any party, upon demand, or otherwise. Minn.Stat. § 514.11. In fact, these defendants are prohibited from commencing any action on their own if a notice of lis pendens was filed with the county recorder. Minn.Stat. § 514.12, subd. 2. Under the Mechanics' Lien Statute, service of process is not necessary to make one a party to a lien action. Because this rule is directly at odds with rule 4.03, the procedures specified under the Mechanics' Lien Statute take precedence. Here, the summons and complaint naming GMH as one of the defendants was filed with the district court on December 4, 1998, and notice of lis pendens was filed with the Carver County Recorder, thus complying with the requirements of the statutory provisions governing the commencement of mechanics' lien actions. The notice in the summons only directed GMH to file its answer, which it did within 20 days of service of the complaint. The notice did not say any further steps were required by GMH. In fact, GMH was prohibited by statute at that time to commence any action on its own if, as was done here, a notice of lis pendens was filed with the county recorder. Accordingly, when GMH filed its answer with the court, it was in compliance with all of the statutory requirements. GMH properly joined the parties and issues. In sum, in dismissing GMH's cross-claim action against JAG, the majority improperly imports the rules of civil procedure into our mechanics' lien jurisprudence. In doing so, it ignores and overrules our century-old standards regarding the legal effect of an answer filed by a defendant in an already-commenced action to foreclose a mechanics' lien. The practical result of the majority opinion is that foreclosure of a lien will now require a stipulation regarding proper service by the plaintiff or service of all the answers of the multiple defendants on the property owner and all other codefendants. This will create uncertainty, enhance the expense of litigation, and undermine the remedial purpose of the lien statutes. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority's dismissal of GMH's answer and cross-claim.