Opinion ID: 510207
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Agency Action

Text: 31 Our review is governed by section 706(2)(A) of the APA, which permits us to set aside agency action only if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. We are mindful, of course, that the scope of review under the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2866, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). On the contrary, this standard is  'highly deferential' and presumes the validity of agency action. Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 719 F.2d 1159, 1164 (D.C.Cir.1983). Nevertheless, the reviewing court must satisfy itself that the agency has examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.'  State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. at 2866 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168, 83 S.Ct. 239, 246, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962)). Stated most simply, our task is to determine whether the agency's decisionmaking was 'reasoned,'  American Horse Protection, 812 F.2d at 5, i.e., whether it considered the relevant factors and explained the facts and policy concerns on which it relied, and whether those facts have some basis in the record. 32 At the time it announced its decision to place the PAC positions into the excepted service, and again before the district court, OPM reasoned as follows: (1) It was obligated under the Luevano consent decree to discontinue the PACE, and no other competitive examination was available to replace it; (2) restrictions in federal employment were expected to result in substantially reduced external hires into many PAC positions; and (3) the cost of developing and validating new competitive examinations would be prohibitive and unwarranted in view of the number of PAC positions that would have to be filled by external hiring. 47 Fed.Reg. 38,257 (1982). 33 With respect to the first premise, NTEU argues that, under the Luevano consent decree, OPM was obligated not merely to drop the PACE but to develop alternative competitive examinations to replace it; therefore, it is urged, OPM may not rely on the unavailability of other examinations as a basis for converting the PAC positions to the excepted service--especially in light of its decision to discontinue the PACE more than two years before it was required to do so. We note, however, as did the district court, that the government's compliance with the consent decree is not properly before us in this case. We are reviewing a rulemaking decision, not an action to enforce a decree entered in other litigation or to impose a sanction for contempt of court. We need not decide whether the decree mandated the development of new examinations, or whether it required OPM to continue using the PACE until there were new examinations to replace it, as NTEU suggests and OPM disputes. Putting the Luevano decree aside, therefore, we can hardly say that OPM's decision to abandon sooner rather than later, a competitive examination that was alleged to be racially discriminatory was arbitrary and capricious. 34 With respect to the second and third links in OPM's chain of reasoning, NTEU objects that OPM may not use cost as an overarching consideration, when that rationale is totally unrelated to the requirements of the statute. In other words, it maintains that OPM's authority to make exceptions from the competitive service when necessary for conditions of good administration does not permit the agency to take cost into account. Rather, it claims, there must be something in the nature of the position that makes competitive tests impractical. 35 Congress expressly provided that OPM should consider conditions of good administration in deciding whether exceptions from the competitive service are necessary; and OPM is directed to make such exceptions when it is not practicable to administer competitive exams. It can hardly be said that it is practicable, much less consistent with good administration, to spend money without limitation in order to produce something that will provide a relatively modest benefit to either the quality of the federal work force or to a relatively small number of individuals. NTEU's damn the cost approach is far too broad to fit within the concept of good administration; OPM could reasonably take cost into account. 36 While OPM asserts that it considered costs in making its decision, [s]tating that a factor was considered ... is not a substitute for considering it. Getty v. Federal Savings and Loan Ins. Corp., 805 F.2d 1050, 1055 (D.C.Cir.1986). OPM did not have any evidence, so far as the record reveals, of how much it would cost to develop the necessary examinations, or of how many job openings it would need to fill through external PAC hiring, nor, hence, of the development cost per hire. Unable to point us to any data of the sort it would have considered if it had considered cost in any meaningful way, OPM urges us to defer to its expert judgment regarding the cost of developing new examinations. There is no indication in the record, however, that OPM ever made an expert judgment about what those costs would be. As the district court noted, despite plaintiffs' challenge to their cost justification as a bald and unsubstantiated claim, defendants have come forward with no figures indicating what the cost of alternative tests would be, nor any other evidence demonstrating that they undertook any sort of cost-benefit analysis. Accordingly, on the record before us, we simply do not know whether OPM examine[d] the relevant data and made a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. at 2866. We are therefore constrained to find that OPM's action in this case was arbitrary and capricious.