Opinion ID: 1129263
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of the Local Act

Text: The scope of Act No. 2001-546, § 7, is a threshold issue. This is so, because the sole basis for Bharat's claims is its contention that § 7 applies to the City. Bharat insists that the tax authorized by the ordinance exceeds by 3% the 14% tax limitation contained in § 7 of Act No. 2001-546. Bharat contends, in other words, that § 7 caps the amount of lodgings taxes the City may levy, and that the lodgings taxes authorized by the ordinance exceeded the § 7 cap. Thus, if § 7 does not even apply to the City, then there is no basis for Bharat's challenge to the ordinance, the trial court erred in holding that the ordinance violated Act No. 2001-546, and the constitutional issue asserted in the City's counterclaim is moot. We review questions of statutory construction and interpretation de novo, giving no deference to the trial court's conclusions. Pitts v. Gangi, 896 So.2d 433, 434 (Ala.2004). See also Donnelly v. Doak, 346 So.2d 414 (Ala.1977); Phenix City Bd. of Educ. v. Teague, 515 So.2d 971 (Ala.Civ.App.1987). Moreover, we are obliged to construe statutes so as to avoid conflicts with constitutional provisions if possible. James v. Todd, 267 Ala. 495, 505, 103 So.2d 19, 27 (1957) ([w]here a statute is capable of two constructions, one which renders it [constitutionally] valid and the other invalid, the construction which will uphold its validity must be adopted). Nevertheless, this Court is also bound to construe statutes according to their plain meaning. Underwood v. Medical Clinic Bd. for City of Montgomery, 904 So.2d 264, 267-68 (Ala.2004). Bharat insists that the limitation contained in Section 7 of [Act No. 2001-546] applies to municipalities in Jefferson County, including the City of Homewood. Bharat's brief, at 34. Indeed, § 7 states: Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the total amount of all lodging taxes levied in Jefferson County shall not exceed 14 percent. (Emphasis added.) On its face, Act No. 2001-546, therefore, plainly applies to lodgings taxes assessed by municipalities located within Jefferson County, including the City. Moreover, Bharat points out that the lodgings-tax burden in Jefferson County before the imposition of the tax authorized by the ordinance is 11%, the product of a general act and five local acts. See Ala. Code 1975, § 40-26-1 (4% to be deposited in the State Treasury, § 40-26-20); Act No. 2001-546 (3% to be allocated to the Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center Authority); Act No. 95-783, a local act (1% to be allocated to the Greater Birmingham Convention and Visitors Bureau), as amended by Act No. 97-273, a local act; Act No. 79-126, a local act (1% to be allocated to the Greater Birmingham Convention and Visitors Bureau); and Act No. 794, Ala. Acts 1969, a local act (1% to be paid to Greater Birmingham Convention and Visitors Bureau); and Act No. 525, Ala. Acts 1965, a local act (1% to be paid to the Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center Authority). It is undisputed that counties have no authority to levy a lodgings tax. It is similarly undisputed that municipalities do have authority to levy a lodgings tax, pursuant to § 11-51-202(b). Thus, Bharat contends, the only rational interpretation of § 7 is that it applies to the only entities in Jefferson County with the statutory authority to levy lodgings taxes  municipalities. We agree, and we conclude that the trial court did not err in holding that the limitation on lodgings taxes in Act No. 2001-546, § 7, applies to municipalities located in Jefferson County. This conclusion necessarily requires us to consider whether Act No. 2001-546, § 7, violates § 105 of the Alabama Constitution.