Opinion ID: 449746
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Priority of Removal and Transfer.

Text: 21 Appellants initially claim this court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal because this case was improperly removed from Texas state court and improperly transferred from Texas federal court to Arizona federal court. 22 There is no indication that this argument was presented to the district court. Matters relating to the subject matter jurisdiction of this court and the district court are nonetheless freely reviewable. Clayton v. Republic Airlines, Inc., 716 F.2d 729, 730 (9th Cir.1983). 23 Appellee contends that the propriety of the removal from Texas state court to Texas federal court, and the transfer from Texas federal court to Arizona federal court has been adjudicated by Texas federal district court, by the Fifth Circuit, and by the United States Supreme Court. Whether our consideration of these issues is barred by res judicata or on some other ground is a question of law freely reviewed on appeal. See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc ). 24 Whether appellants may attempt to collaterally attack the propriety of removal and transfer where, as here, prior to transfer, appellants obtained review of the removal and transfer issues by seeking a writ of mandamus from the Fifth Circuit and thereafter a writ of certiorari is a first impression issue in this circuit. But compare Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 340 n. 9, 80 S.Ct. 1084, 1088 n. 9, 4 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1960) (suggesting in dicta that a transfer did not preclude transferee court from determining whether it had jurisdiction or venue) with Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162 (3d Cir.1982) (distinguishing Blaski and barring reconsideration of jurisdiction and venue issues by transferee court where transferor court already decided the issue) and Skil Corp. v. Millers Falls Co., 541 F.2d 554, 556 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029, 97 S.Ct. 653, 50 L.Ed.2d 631 (1976). The better rule is to bar reconsideration of these matters unless there is some indication that appellants were not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate these matters before the transferor court. See 1B Moore's Federal Practice paragraphs 404 and 404 (2d ed. 1982). 25 In this case, there are particularly compelling reasons for not allowing relitigation of the issue of the propriety of transfer and removal, appellants having litigated the merits of their case in a federal forum and for a second time in state court. After appellees' removal of the second state court proceeding, appellants vigorously contested such removal and filed a motion for remand. Appellants also objected to appellee's motion to transfer. Having chosen both the time and manner by which they obtained appellate review of the district court's removal and transfer order, appellants should not now be permitted to claim that review was inadequate and nonbinding. Skil Corp., 541 F.2d at 559. 26 Assuming res judicata is not a bar to reconsideration of allegations concerning the removal and transfer of this matter, both the removal and transfer were proper. This action was properly removed on the ground of diversity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1441. The Hatches reside in the Southern District of Texas, while Reliance has its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. The matter in controversy exceeded $10,000 exclusive of interest. 1 27 This matter was properly transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1404(a). When the case was removed to the United States District Court in Texas it became a federal case, and section 1404(a) applied. As the district court noted, section 1404(a) requires two findings--that the district court is one where the action 'might have been brought' and that the 'convenience of parties and witnesses in the interest of justice' favor transfer. The district court in Texas made detailed findings on both questions. It concluded that the action was properly transferred to the federal district court in Arizona. Appellants' contention that transfer to Arizona was improper because the action could not have been removed there from Texas state court is meritless. In determining whether an action might have been brought in a district, the court looks to whether the action initially could have been commenced in that district. See, e.g., Hoffman, 363 U.S. at 343-44, 80 S.Ct. at 1089-90; Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 620, 84 S.Ct. 805, 811, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964). Appellants, while choosing not to, could have commenced this action in the district court of Arizona. Transfer to that district pursuant to section 1404(a) was proper. 28