Opinion ID: 2974752
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Negligence.

Text: To successfully allege a negligence claim pursuant to Kentucky law, Hilderbrand must prove: (1) a legal duty owed to her by the United States, (2) a breach of that legal duty, and (3) an injury directly caused by that breach. See Rich for Rich v. Kentucky Country Day, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (citing M. & T. Chemicals, Inc. v. Westrick, Ky., 525 S.W.2d 740 (1974)). Under Kentucky common law, the duty owed by landowners to visitors depends on whether the visitor was a trespasser, a licensee, or an invitee. Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Hardin v. Harris, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 172, 174-75 (1974)). Here, Hilderbrand came “upon the land in [a] capacity connected with the business of the possessor[,]” and is thus an invitee. Id.; see also Rojo, Inc. v. Drifmeyer, 357 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Ky. 1962). “‘Slip and fall’ cases are traditionally based on the duty of care that a possessor of land owes to an invitee.” Lanier v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 99 S.W.3d 431, 432 (Ky. 2003). -5- Case No. 04-5676 Hilderbrand v. US Dept of Army and USA In Kentucky, it is well-established that: a landowner owes invitees “a duty to use ordinary care to have his premises in a reasonably safe condition for use in a manner consistent with the purpose of invitation, or at least not to lead them into a dangerous trap or to expose them to an unreasonable risk, but to give them adequate and timely notice and warning of latent or concealed perils which are known to him but not to them.” Caplan v. United States, 877 F.2d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. Manis, 433 S.W.2d 856, 857 (Ky. 1968)). Kentucky’s case law regarding premises liability has developed within three distinct categories, the first of which is applicable here. Horne v. Precision Cars of Lexington, Inc., 170 S.W.3d 364, 368 (Ky. 2005). “The first category holds that the owner of a business premises has no duty to protect invitees from injuries caused by ‘natural outdoor hazards which are as obvious to an invitee as to an owner of the premises.’” Id. (citing Standard Oil Co., 433 S.W.2d at 858 (snow and ice) (emphasis added)). Specifically, Kentucky courts have stated: where there is no act on the part of the landlord creating a greater danger than was brought about by natural causes, the dangers that are created by the elements, such as forming of ice and the falling of snow, are universally known and unless the landlord has contracted to provide against these dangers, all persons on his property must assume the burden of protecting themselves therefrom. Caplan, 877 F.2d at 1317 (quoting Standard Oil Co., 433 S.W.2d at 858). “[N]atural outdoor hazards which are as obvious to an invitee as to the owner of the premises do not constitute unreasonable risks to the former which the landowner has a duty to remove or warn against.” Caplan, 877 F.2d at 1317 (quoting Corbin Motor Lodge v. Combs, 740 S.W.2d 944, 945 (Ky. 1987)) (holding that where the hazard was created by the natural elements and the platform plaintiff slipped -6- Case No. 04-5676 Hilderbrand v. US Dept of Army and USA on was outside, wet, contained a “glare of ice,” in broad daylight, and plaintiff was fully aware of ice and snow accumulation, no duty was breached); see also Caudill v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, No. Civ-A-2005-58, 2006 WL 1464793,  (E.D. Ky. May 23, 2006) (slip copy) (holding ice in defendant’s parking lot on which plaintiff fell was an “open and obvious” outdoor hazard); Corbin Motor Lodge v. Combs, 740 S.W.2d 944 (Ky. 1987) (holding that the risk presented by icy sidewalk was “open and obvious,” for purposes of determining restaurant operator’s liability for injuries sustained when patron slipped and fell on sidewalk; weather outside was so terrible that interstate highway near restaurant had been closed to traffic, and patron had traversed sidewalk in question and knew that it was slick); Rogers v. Prof’l Golfers Ass’n of Am., 28 S.W.3d 869, 872 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000) (wet grassy hillside open and obvious natural condition as a matter of law). “An exception to this rule occurs when the owner undertakes protective measures that, in fact, heighten or conceal the nature of the hazardous condition, thus making it worse.” Horne, 170 S.W.3d at 368 (citing Estep v. B.F. Saul Real Estate Inv. Trust, 843 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991)). Hilderbrand contends both that the snow and ice that she slipped on was neither open nor obvious, and that the Army’s attempt to clear the snow “rearranged the ice and snow into smallish piles and ridges that created a new hazard.” In support of her allegations, she submitted three photographs of the scene, purportedly taken by her husband. We are unpersuaded. According to Hilderbrand’s own testimony, the snow and ice she slipped on was an “open and obvious” hazard, and, thus, the Army did not owe her a duty. Hilderbrand admitted in her deposition that she saw the snow and ice on the ground at the parking lot; she testified that the sidewalk in front of the personnel -7- Case No. 04-5676 Hilderbrand v. US Dept of Army and USA office was “wet” and “icy;” and she stated that she saw “black ice” or “brownish white” snow or ice prior to her fall. In short, the treacherous hazards of the sidewalk was both open and obvious, and, accordingly, the Army did not owe Hilderbrand a duty. Regardless, even if a duty was owed, the aforementioned admissions are sufficient to defeat her claim of negligence. See Gaff v. Johnson Oil Co., 45 F. App’x 499, 501 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (“Kentucky law is not generous to business invitees who suffer an injury as a result of a risk created by an obvious, outdoor natural condition such as ice.”).