Opinion ID: 789126
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Relevance of Pattern-or-Practice Evidence to Making a Prima Facie Showing

Text: 25 Williams presented evidence in the district court that the prosecutor in his case had a pattern and practice of discriminating on the basis of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Specifically, Williams points to two California Supreme Court cases that involved the same prosecutor whose actions are at issue here: People v. Turner, 42 Cal.3d 711, 714, 230 Cal.Rptr. 656, 726 P.2d 102 (1986), and People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75 (1991). All three cases, Turner, Fuentes, and this case, involved an African-American or Latino defendant on trial in a capital case. Although Williams does not need this pattern-or-practice evidence to make out his Batson claim, this evidence buttresses his prima facie case and makes even more clear that issuance of a COA was warranted. 26 The Turner trial took place prior to Williams' trial: Turner was sentenced to death in 1980, and Williams' trial commenced in February, 1981. The California Supreme Court reversed the judgment in Turner because the prosecution failed to sustain its burden of showing that the challenged prospective jurors were not excluded because of group bias, and ... the court failed to discharge its duty to inquire into and carefully evaluate the explanations offered by the prosecutor. Turner, 42 Cal.3d at 728, 230 Cal.Rptr. 656, 726 P.2d 102 (citations omitted). The facts and circumstances of the Turner jury selection are remarkably similar to the Williams jury selection, but with one difference (Williams' counsel did not object): 27 At the time of the crimes defendant was a young Black man on parole. The two persons he was accused of murdering were White, and both were well known and respected members of the community. At least three Blacks were in the venire summoned to hear the case; all three were called to the jury box, examined, and passed for cause. The prosecutor then struck all three Blacks from the jury by peremptory challenge. Defendant objected vigorously but in vain: the jury that ultimately tried him was all White. 28 Turner, 42 Cal.3d at 715, 230 Cal.Rptr. 656, 726 P.2d 102. After examining the prosecutor's proffered explanations for his strikes, the court found ample reason to suspect that they were not bona fide. Id. at 721-29, 230 Cal.Rptr. 656, 726 P.2d 102. The court ultimately concluded that [t]he record demonstrated] that the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike Black prospective jurors in a racially discriminatory manner for the apparent purpose of obtaining an all-White jury to try this Black defendant for crimes against White victims. Id. at 714, 230 Cal.Rptr. 656, 726 P.2d 102. 29 The Fuentes trial took place a few years after Williams' trial. See Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d at 722, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75. The California Supreme reversed the judgment in Fuentes because the trial court failed to conduct the requisite evaluation after it impliedly found that the defense had established a prima facie case of racially discriminatory jury challenges by the prosecutor and expressly characterized some of the prosecutor's proffered excuses as totally unreasonable and others as very spurious. Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d at 713, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75. Although the reversal technically turned on the trial court's error in assessing the defendant's jury discrimination claim, Justice Mosk noted in his concurrence: 30 Nevertheless, I believe that we must place the ultimate blame on its real source — the prosecutor. It was he who unconstitutionally struck Black prospective jurors. The record compels this conclusion and permits none other. This was no technical or inadvertent violation. This prosecutor knew that such conduct was altogether improper. The trial court told him as much. And so did we. Only a few months earlier, in People v. Turner (1986) 42 Cal.3d 711, 230 Cal.Rptr. 656, 726 P.2d 102, this court attempted to teach this same prosecutor that invidious discrimination was unacceptable when we reversed a judgment of death because of similar improper conduct on his part. He failed — or refused — to learn his lesson. The result is another reversal — and another costly burden on the administration of justice. 31 Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d at 722, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75 (emphasis in original). 32 In short, this same prosecutor discriminated against African-Americans in his exercise of peremptory challenges before Williams' trial, and he continued to engage in this reprehensible and unconstitutional practice after Williams' trial. We simply cannot, as the panel did, dismiss the circumstances revealing the prosecutor's pattern and practice of racial discrimination as irrelevant because they are not `the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges' at Williams's trial. Williams I, 384 F.3d at 584 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712). To do so turns Batson on its head. 33 In Batson, the Court explained that under Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), a black defendant could make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination on proof that the peremptory challenge system as a whole was being perverted to strike blacks for racial reasons. Batson, 476 U.S. at 80, 106 S.Ct. 1712. 34 For example, an inference of purposeful discrimination would be raised on evidence that a prosecutor, in case after case... is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors ... and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries. 35 Id. at 91-92, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (citation omitted). After acknowledging that requiring proof of repeated striking of blacks over a number of cases ... has placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof, [and rendered] prosecutors' peremptory challenges... largely immune from constitutional scrutiny, id. at 92-93, 106 S.Ct. 1712, the Court held that defendants  may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial, id. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (emphasis added). In its holding, the Court urged courts to be flexible in their view of what kinds of evidence could constitute a prima facie showing. Id. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Given the fact that [t]he reality of practice, amply reflected in many state- and federal-court opinions, shows that the challenge may be, and unfortunately at times has been, used to discriminate against black jurors ..., [the Court] requir[ed] trial courts to be sensitive to the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Id. at 99, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Thus, the purpose of Batson was to lower the bar for establishing a prima facie case and to open the door to different methods of proving racial discrimination in the jury selection process. See generally, id.; see also, Paulino, 371 F.3d at 1092 ( Batson's inference standard was intended significantly to reduce the quantum of proof previously required of a defendant who wished to raise a claim of racial bias in the jury selection procedure, and thus is not onerous. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 36 Nothing in Batson changed the fact that Swain pattern-or-practice evidence creates an inference of purposeful discrimination, and nothing in Batson can be construed as holding that such evidence is irrelevant. Rather, Batson merely held that other kinds of evidence were also sufficient to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Batson lessened, not increased the burden of establishing a prima facie case. 37 Indeed, the Court has made clear the continuing relevance of pattern-or-practice evidence in cases following Batson. In Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991), the Court explained: 38 Because Batson did not change the nature of the violation recognized in Swain, but merely the quantum of proof necessary to substantiate a particular claim, it follows that a defendant alleging a violation of equal protection of the law under Swain necessarily states an equal protection violation ... subject to the more lenient burden of proof laid down in Batson. 39 Id. at 420, 111 S.Ct. 850. 40 In Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) ( Miller-El I ), the Court considered both evidence specific to the petitioner's trial and Swain pattern-or-practice evidence in determining that the Fifth Circuit should have granted a COA on the petitioner's Batson claim. Id. at 340-47, 123 S.Ct. 1029. The Court specifically noted that in our threshold examination, we accord some weight to petitioner's historical evidence of racial discrimination by the District Attorney's Office... presented at the Swain hearing. Id. at 346, 123 S.Ct. 1029. As the Court explained, [t]his [pattern-or-practice] evidence, of course, is relevant to the extent it casts doubt on the legitimacy of the motives underlying the State's actions in petitioner's case. Id. at 347, 123 S.Ct. 1029. 2 41 In sum, disregarding the prosecutor's pattern and practice of racial discrimination in jury selection directly conflicts with Batson and its progeny. 3 42 Consideration of the trial-specific evidence together with the pattern-or-practice evidence compels a finding that Williams established a prima facie case that the prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. See, e.g., Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 347, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (Our concerns ... are heightened by the fact that, when presented with this [pattern-or-practice] evidence, the state trial court somehow reasoned that there was not even the inference of discrimination to support a prima facie case. This was clear error....). 4 43