Opinion ID: 835910
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court's Denial of Defendant's Demurrer

Text: Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by overruling his pretrial demurrer to the indictment, in which, among other things, he raised a number of constitutional challenges to Oregon's death-penalty statutes. The trial court denied defendant's demurrer because it concluded that none of his arguments was well taken. Defendant first contends that the trial court should have sustained his demurrer because, according to defendant, ORS 163.150(1)(a) and its related jury instruction set out in ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) [5] violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [6] That is so, defendant argues, because neither ORS 163.150(1)(a) nor the jury instruction set out in ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) sufficiently limit the aggravating evidence that the state may introduce or that a jury may consider in relation to the question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D), that is, [w]hether the defendant should receive a death sentence. Before addressing the merits, we consider the state's argument that this court should not consider defendant's constitutional claims because those challenges were not raised properly by a demurrer. According to the state, because defendant challenges the constitutionality of only the sentencing statute for aggravated murder, his claims do not relate to a defect appearing on the face of the indictment and are not among the grounds for a pretrial demurrer under ORS 135.630. [7] For that proposition, the state relies upon this court's decision in State v. Pinnell, 319 Or. 438, 877 P.2d 635 (1994). In that case, the defendant had demurred to the possible application of the true-life sentencing option [8] to his particular case upon the ground that such an application would amount to an unconstitutional imposition of an ex post facto law. Id. at 443-44, 877 P.2d 635. This court held that the trial court had not erred in overruling the defendant's demurrer because this court concluded that the possibility of an unconstitutional application of that sentencing option to the defendant's case was not a defect appearing on the face of the accusatory instrument or otherwise grounds for demurrer under ORS 135.630. Id. at 444, 877 P.2d 635. By contrast to the defendant in Pinnell, however, defendant here raises facial challenges to the constitutionality of Oregon's sentencing statute for aggravated murder. In City of Portland v. Dollarhide, 300 Or. 490, 495-96, 714 P.2d 220 (1986), this court explained that, when a defendant is charged under a criminal law for which only an allegedly invalid penalty is provided, the defendant may challenge that penalty provision by a pretrial demurrer because, without a valid penalty, the charge cannot stand. [9] See also ORS 135.630(4) (The defendant may demur to the accusatory instrument when it appears upon the face thereof    [t]hat the facts stated do not constitute an offense[.]). That reasoning applies here. Under ORS 163.105(1)(a), [10] when a defendant is convicted of aggravated murder, the trial court must sentence the defendant according to the statutory sentencing provisions set out in ORS 163.150. The parts of ORS 163.150 that defendant challenged here apply only when the trial court submits to a jury the sentencing option of death. ORS 163.150(1)(a); [11] ORS 163.150(3)(a) (1997). [12] However, when, as in this case, the defendant is eligible for the death sentence, and the state elects to present evidence for the purpose of sentencing the defendant to death, then the trial court must submit to the jury that sentencing option, and it must apply those parts of ORS 163.150 that defendant challenged as unconstitutional to determine the defendant's penalty. See ORS 163.150(1). Thus, because, as in Dollarhide, defendant's constitutional challenges related to the only penalty provision that applied to the charges of aggravated murder against defendant here, defendant properly raised those challenges by a pretrial demurrer. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 324 Or. 396, 429-34, 927 P.2d 1073 (1996) (considering defendant's constitutional challenges to Oregon's death-penalty statutes raised by demurrer). We turn to the merits of defendant's first constitutional claim. As noted, defendant argues that ORS 163.150(1)(a) and its related jury instruction set out in ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) violate the Eighth Amendment because those statutes do not limit sufficiently the aggravating evidence that the state may introduce or that the jury may consider in relation to the question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D), that is, [w]hether the defendant should receive a death sentence. Defendant essentially argues that, because ORS 163.150(1)(a) and ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) allow the state to introduce, and the jury to consider, aggravating evidence in relation to the question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D), but do not provide guidance as to the meaning of that term, the statutes do not prevent the state from introducing, or the jury from relying upon, factors that are irrelevant or constitutionally impermissible in deciding whether to impose a death sentence under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D). We disagree. We begin by providing background to place defendant's argument in context. As noted, in addition to the three other statutory questions that a jury must answer before a defendant may be sentenced to death, ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) requires a jury to decide [w]hether the defendant should receive a death sentence. This court previously has explained that the question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) frames a discretionary determination for the jury and, therefore, does not carry a burden of proof. See Moore, 324 Or. at 432, 927 P.2d 1073 (so stating). In 1995, the legislature amended ORS 163.150(1)(a) to provide explicitly that, in addition to mitigating evidence that the defendant may offer, a trial court also may admit victim impact evidence, as well as aggravating evidence that is specifically relevant to a jury's determination under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D). That statute provides, in part: In the [sentencing proceeding], evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence including, but not limited to, victim impact evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim or the impact of the crime on the victim's family and any aggravating or mitigating evidence relevant to the [question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D)].  ORS 163.150(1)(a) (emphasis added). Subsequently, in 1997, the legislature also amended ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B), the statutory jury instruction that a trial court must give to guide a jury's determination of the question under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D). ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) provided: The court shall instruct the jury to answer the question in paragraph (b)(D) of this subsection `no' if, after considering any aggravating evidence and any mitigating evidence concerning any aspect of the defendant's character or background, or any circumstances of the offense and any victim impact evidence as described in subsection (1)(a) of this section, one or more of the jurors believe that the defendant should not receive a death sentence. Defendant in this case was sentenced under the 1997 version of ORS 163.150. With that context in mind, we consider defendant's first constitutional claim. As this court observed in State v. Compton, 333 Or. 274, 283-84, 39 P.3d 833 (2002), the United States Supreme Court has explained that, in the selection phase of a death-penalty proceeding, [13] [w]hat is important    is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (emphasis in original). In providing such an individualized determination, the Court has stated that the States may adopt capital sentencing processes that rely upon the jury, in its sound judgment, to exercise wide discretion. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 974, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994). The Court has cautioned that a state may not attach an aggravating label to, or allow a jury to draw adverse inferences from, constitutionally protected conduct or factors that are irrelevant or constitutionally impermissible, such as the race or the religion of the defendant. See, e.g., Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 166-68, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (state may not introduce evidence of defendant's membership in Aryan Brotherhood as bad character evidence); Zant, 462 U.S. at 885, 103 S.Ct. 2733 (state may not attach aggravating label to factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to sentencing process, such as defendant's race, religion, or political affiliation). However, subject to that constitutional limitation, the Court has stated that, under the Eighth Amendment, a jury is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983). In providing that a jury may have wide discretion under the Eighth Amendment in determining whether to impose a death sentence, the Supreme Court also has rejected the notion that a trial court must guide a jury's discretion by prescribing standards for the jury's evaluation of aggravating or mitigating facts and circumstances that either the state or the defendant might have introduced. Zant, 462 U.S. at 875, 103 S.Ct. 2733 (so stating). To that end, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 161, 203-04, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), the Court found no constitutional difficulty when the trial judge had instructed the jury that, in determining what sentence was appropriate[,] the jury was free to consider the facts and circumstances, if any, presented by the parties in mitigation or aggravation. Similarly, in Zant, the Court approved a jury instruction that, under the same state statute at issue in Gregg, informed the jury to consider all facts and circumstances presented in [extenuation], mitigation[,] and aggravation of punishment as well as such arguments as have been presented for the State and for the Defense[.] 462 U.S. at 878-80, 889 n. 25, 103 S.Ct. 2733. See also Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 978, 114 S.Ct. 2630 (noting approval of jury instructions in Zant and Gregg ). As the foregoing cases illustrate, the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the state from introducing a wide range of evidence for the jury's consideration in determining whether to impose a death sentence. Those cases also make clear that a jury instruction that directs a jury to consider both aggravating and mitigating facts and circumstances that either the state or the defendant might have introduced at trial does not offend the Eighth Amendment by providing insufficient guidance as to the evidence that a jury properly may consider as either aggravating or mitigating in determining the appropriate sentence. Applying those standards here, we conclude that ORS 163.150(1)(a) and the jury instruction set out in ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) do not violate the Eighth Amendment in the manner that defendant contends. As noted, ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) requires a trial court to instruct a jury that, in deciding whether the defendant should receive the death sentence, the jury must consider any aggravating evidence and any mitigating evidence concerning any aspect of the defendant's character or background, or any circumstances of the offense (as well as any relevant victim impact evidence). That instruction informs the jury that the jury may base its discretionary decision to impose the death sentence upon only evidence that has been presented at trial. In addition, ORS 163.150(1)(a) limits the evidence that may be admitted in a death-penalty sentencing proceeding to evidence    that the court deems relevant to sentence. Under those statutes, then, a defendant may prevent a jury from considering evidence that is irrelevant or constitutionally impermissible by objecting to the admission of that evidence at trial. In addition, if a defendant is concerned that the jury might draw an improper inference from evidence introduced in relation to another issue at trial, nothing in ORS 163.150 prohibits a defendant from seeking a jury instruction that cautions against the jury's improper consideration of that evidence in determining whether to impose a death sentence. We conclude that the trial court did not err in rejecting defendant's facial constitutional challenge to ORS 163.150(1)(a) and ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997). [14] In addition to the argument set out above, defendant also argues that the trial court erred in overruling his demurrer because, defendant contends, ORS 163.150 does not allow meaningful judicial review of the jury's decision to impose the death sentence and because the statute does not provide comparative sentencing review. This court previously has considered and rejected those same challenges. See Moore, 324 Or. at 429-34, 927 P.2d 1073 (concluding that ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) allows for meaningful judicial review of jury's decision to impose death sentence and rejecting defendant's argument that Due Process Clause requires excessiveness review in death-penalty cases); State v. Cunningham, 320 Or. 47, 67-68, 880 P.2d 431 (1994) (rejecting defendant's argument that comparative sentencing review of death sentences required under Eighth Amendment). Because we adhere to those prior rulings, and because further discussion would not benefit the public, the bench, or the bar, we decline to discuss defendant's claims. [15]