Opinion ID: 1939618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: nature of the state's title

Text: The Attorney General contends: While as against third parties the state has title to the premises, nevertheless, it holds the same for the county and city in proportion to the unpaid taxes levied by and due each. Furthermore, at the date of the fire, the city had the right to redeem the property from the tax sale for the benefit of either itself or the original owner. As of April 10, 1963, the date of the fire, the statute neither authorized nor required taking by any state agency of the action which would have been necessary to abate this fire hazard.    Thus the state held only bare legal title for the benefit of the local taxing units. The controlling statute [3] contains the following provision: Any municipality may at any time prior to the first Tuesday in November following the vesting of title in the State of Michigan, withhold from sale any lands lying within its boundaries by filing with the Department of Conservation an application for such withholding, which application shall accurately describe such lands by their legal descriptions according to the records of the Auditor General or the Department of Conservation. Such withholding shall only be effective until the first Tuesday in November of the year following the date of withholding and shall not affect the right of the state to take possession of such lands and manage and rent the same during the period they are withheld. In Baker v. State Land Office Board (1940), 294 Mich 587, this Court reviewed the economic conditions which led to widespread tax delinquency in this state resulting in the passage of laws dealing with delinquent tax sale procedures and right of redemption. In upholding the new legislation, it was decided, inter alia, that the right of redemption is not a constitutional right but exists only as permitted by statute, that such rights as arose under the provisions of the statute governing sales for tax delinquency are subject to abridgment by the legislature for the reason they are remedial in nature, and that no vested rights arise out of redemption provisions of a decree entered pursuant to a remedial statute governing tax sales. In James A. Welch Co., Inc., v. State Land Office Board (1940), 295 Mich 85, the Court approved the contention of defendant that (p 93): `Upon the vesting of title absolute in the state, the state's sovereign power of imposing and enforcing the collection of taxes thus reached its completion and fruition, and the particular parcels of land ceased to be amenable to the tax laws of the state, as state-owned land is not taxable.    Such land can be disposed of only on conditions prescribed by the legislature.' The Court said plaintiff ceased to have any more interest in the title to the lands described in its petition than any stranger to that title. What we said in the case of Rosin v. State Land Office Board (1946), 314 Mich 482, makes clear the extent of the state's title and its responsibility over the condition of the property (p 486): When the state acquired title on June 3, 1943, plaintiff as former owner had no more interest in the title than any stranger to the title. James A. Welch Co., Inc., v. State Land Office Board (1940), 295 Mich 85. The statutes plainly indicate that the withholding of the property from scavenger sale at the request of the City of Detroit, for a limited period of time, did not affect the state's title or its right to manage the property and collect rents therefrom. After the state acquired title it collected $6,460 rental from plaintiff, the former owner, while allowing him to remain in possession. He is not entitled to recover the rent which the state required him to pay for the occupancy. Emmons v. State Land Office Board (1943), 305 Mich 406.