Opinion ID: 197630
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: applying the plra

Text: 48 The plaintiffs have a fallback position. They contend that, even if the PLRA is constitutional, the 1979 consent decree should remain intact because (1) the district court previously made findings sufficient to save the decree by operation of the Act, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(2), or (2) if the findings to date are inadequate, the district court should have conducted an inquiry into whether a violation of a federal right exists currently (or probably will come into existence if the strictures of the consent decree are lifted) before implementing the PLRA's termination provision. We reject both contentions. 49 Answering the question of whether prison conditions constitute an ongoing violation of a federal right under the PLRA necessitates both a definition of the right at stake and an assessment of a specific compendium of prison conditions. Accordingly, such a question comprises a mixed question of fact and law, the answer to which we review along a degree-of-deference continuum, ranging from plenary review for law-dominated questions to clear-error review for fact-dominated questions. Johnson v. Watts Regulator Co., 63 F.3d 1129, 1132 (1st Cir.1995). Here, the question is more factual than legal: inasmuch as the double bunking of pretrial detainees does not in and of itself violate the Constitution, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 541, 99 S.Ct. at 1875, the district court's conclusion that the double bunking of which the plaintiffs continue to complain is not in violation of a federal right must be challenged, if at all, principally on the facts. Thus, the standard of review is highly deferential. See Huguley v. General Motors Corp., 999 F.2d 142, 146 (6th Cir.1993). 50 We have carefully reviewed the record and culled out the sparse factual findings that the court made in the relevant time frame. No useful purpose would be served by examining these findings in minute detail. Judge Keeton concluded that they did not satisfy the requirements of section 3626(a) or (b). See D. Ct. Op., 952 F.Supp. at 880. A trial court generally is thought to be the best interpreter of its own prior rulings and findings, see, e.g., Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Steam Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1066-67 (1st Cir.1987); Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir.1987), and this case is no exception. At any rate, we agree with Judge Keeton's conclusion. It is simply implausible to suggest, on this record, that the district court's assessment of the existing factual findings is clearly erroneous. 51 The plaintiffs' follow-on argument gains them no ground. As to the conditions that presently exist, we defer to the district court's intimate familiarity with this protracted litigation and to its informed evaluation of current prison conditions. See D. Ct. Op., 952 F.Supp. at 880 (observing that no evidence is before the court to support findings that defendants are not in compliance with the terms of the modified Consent Decree). Deference is especially appropriate here since, under the terms of an order that it entered on June 14, 1994, the district court for some time had been receiving and evaluating periodic reports from the Sheriff concerning incidents of assaultive behavior, rape, disease, and the like at the Nashua Street jail. 52 As to what the future may bring, we cannot criticize Judge Keeton's reluctance to play the oracle. Presented with the opportunity to make further findings before deciding the defendants' motions, the judge declined. He noted several cogent reasons why it made sense to leave the question of whether a violation of a federal right might follow the termination of prospective relief under the consent decree to another day. See id. 53 We discern no error. This is neither the time nor the place to press an inherently speculative claim of harm to come. The PLRA imposes no obligation on the trial court to make a predictive inquiry into future conditions before terminating an existing consent decree, and we are not aware of any other basis for burdening the court with such a requirement. Quite often, [p]resent fears are less than horrible imaginings. William Shakespeare, Macbeth, act 1, sc. 3 (1605). If, in this instance, the plaintiffs' trepidation proves justified, they remain free to initiate a new round of proceedings designed to show that post-termination prison conditions actually do violate their federally protected rights.