Opinion ID: 2535269
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of the Doctrine of Estoppel or Waiver

Text: We are met at the threshold by the taxpayers' contention that in several instances former counsel for the County admitted that § 95 rendered the retroactive feature of Act No. 2009-811 void. The taxpayers contend that, in light of former counsel's admission, judicial estoppel prevents the County from taking a contrary position in this proceeding. In the alternative, the taxpayers argue that the County has waived the position it takes in this appeal. We conclude that neither the doctrine of judicial estoppel nor the doctrine of waiver applies. In Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So.2d 1236, 1244 (Ala.2003), quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750-51, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001), this Court recognized an essential element of judicial estoppelthe party attacked for asserting an inconsistent position must have been successful in the prior proceeding so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create the perception that either the first court or the second court was misled. No such circumstance exists here. Nor can the County be held to have waived its position for failing to assert the mootness of this proceeding based on Act No. 2009-811 in its application for rehearing in Jefferson County I. As previously noted, the issue of the effect of Act No. 2009-811 was not before us in Jefferson County I, and any argument on rehearing asserting the applicability of Act No. 2009-811 would have violated our rule prohibiting new matters from being argued for the first time on rehearing and would not have been considered. See Chism v. Jefferson County, 954 So.2d 1058, 1106 (Ala.2006).