Opinion ID: 1786003
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Second Installment

Text: Judgment for the entire $100,000 paid under both installments was proper only if, as the trial court evidently found, the parties had agreed that Thompson could recover the $62,000 he paid in the second installment under the same terms as the first installment. As we previously noted, however, payment of the second installment was accompanied by a writing that is substantially illegible. Ordinarily, the best evidence of [the] intent [of the parties] is the [written] contract itself; if an agreement is `complete, clear and unambiguous on its face[, it] must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms.' Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 177-78 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 562, 569, 750 N.Y.S.2d 565, 780 N.E.2d 166, 170 (2002)). However, `[w]hen the parties undertake to put their agreement in writing and express its crucial terms by characters or symbols so illegible that the tribunal established to try the facts cannot determine the signification of that which is on the paper, then no contract in writing has been made.' 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 31:13 (4th ed.1999) (quoting Aradalou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 225 Mass. 235, 240, 114 N.E. 297, 299 (1916) (emphasis added)). In this case, as we have already stated, approximately one third of the July document is illegible, and BDD contested its very admission on that ground. In fact, at least three lines of crucial text are virtually nonexistent. Neither party disputes the existence of a contract between BDD and Thompson in relation to the second installment. Nor is there any dispute as to its essential terms. The parties agree, for example, that Thompson paid $62,000 in return for an additional 3.5% interest in the condominium-development project. The parties disagree only as to whether Thompson could elect to recover his payment under the same terms as those expressed in the sell-back agreement. Thus, the second installment involved essentially an oral contract. The terms of an oral contract can be established through [parol] evidence, and a determination of those terms is for the trier of fact. Comstock Constr., Inc. v. Sheyenne Disposal, Inc., 651 N.W.2d 656, 661 (N.D.2002) (emphasis added). See Linton v. E.C. Cates Agency, Inc., 113 P.3d 26, 30 (Wyo.2005) (The terms and conditions of [an] oral contract and the intent of the parties are generally questions of fact.). To resolve the disputed sell-back issue relating to the second installment, the trial court was required to, and did, receive oral testimony as to the intent of the parties. It is well established that [w]hen a trial court hears ore tenus testimony `its findings on disputed facts are presumed correct and its judgment based on those findings will not be reversed unless the judgment is palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust.' New Props., L.L.C. v. Stewart, 905 So.2d 797, 799 (Ala.2004) (quoting Philpot v. State, 843 So.2d 122, 125 (Ala.2002)). The trial court's judgment comports with this rule. Thompson testified that the $62,000 payment was the second part of a two-part loan he was making to BDD. He testified that the contract stipulated that he was entitled to a return of $100,000 at 15% interest. McCay himself testified that he understood he was receiving the second installment under the same terms  as the first installment. (Emphasis added.) BDD contends that the first installment and the second installment relate to entirely separate agreements and argues that the parties . . . could have included the sell-back provision in the [July document] if that was their intention. BDD's brief, at 39. We do not agree with this argument about what the July document does not contain. In fact, because of the condition of that document, no assertion as to what it does or does not contain can be verified. Under the disputed facts as developed in the trial of this case, the judgment was not palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust. In conclusion, the sell-back agreement was unambiguously triggered by the procurement of engineering reports, soil tests, and plans and specifications, and travel in connection with the contemplated condominium-development project. Thompson was clearly entitled to recover the $38,000 first installment with interest at the rate of 15% under that written agreement. Also, BDD has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in awarding the $62,000 second installment with interest at the rate of 15%. For these reasons, the judgment is affirmed. AFFIRMED. COBB, C.J., and SEE, SMITH, and PARKER, JJ., concur.