Opinion ID: 196263
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Issues Going To The Verdict

Text: 43 The appellants 4 --principally Pagan-San-Miguel--have raised six other claims of error concerning the district court's conduct of the trial: (1) the limitation of Pagan-San-Miguel's cross-examination of two government witnesses, (2) the admission of an incriminating statement made by Pagan-San-Miguel, (3) the refusal to grant a mistrial after allegedly improper remarks were made during closing statements, (4) the jury instruction on Sec. 924(c)(1), (5) the jury instruction on the defendants' flight from the crime scene, and (6) the allowance of a read-back of testimony by a government witness to the jury during its deliberation. None of these claims of error provides a ground for reversal. 44
45 Pagan-San-Miguel complains that the district court erred in cutting off his cross-examination into the penalties Castillo-Ramos would have faced on firearms counts which were dropped against him. Pagan-San-Miguel attempted to establish bias by showing that the government had been able to procure Castillo-Ramos' cooperation by deciding not to charge Castillo-Ramos under the firearms counts in the second superseding indictment. After questioning on this topic, Pagan-San-Miguel asked Castillo-Ramos whether his attorney had informed him that if he had been found guilty of the possession of the firearm during the commission of a drug offense [he would be] sentenced to thirty-five years in addition to the drug offense. The district court sustained an objection to this question on the ground that, because defendants faced the same firearms charges, it was an impermissible attempt to inform the jury about the defendants' possible punishment on the firearms counts. 46 Pagan-San-Miguel claims that this truncating of his cross-examination impermissibly interfered with his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. We disagree. Pagan-San-Miguel had a sufficient opportunity to expose potential biases, including any bias resulting from any benefit Castillo-Ramos received as a result of his cooperation. Pagan-San-Miguel was able to ask Castillo-Ramos repeatedly whether he had received a benefit for his testimony. Any probative value of information about the precise number of years Castillo-Ramos would have faced had he been charged for the firearms offense was slight. The district court properly decided that the value of the information was outweighed by the potential for prejudice by having the jury learn what penalties the defendants were facing. 47 Although cross-examination is an important component of a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights under the confrontation clause, a defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses is not unlimited. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). A district court is entitled to cut off cross-examination that may create prejudice or confusion of the issues, or may be harassing or unduly repetitive. Id. Assuming that the minimal constitutional threshold level of inquiry was allowed, as here, a trial court has discretion in limiting cross-examination. A trial court does not abuse its discretion if there is sufficient evidence before the jury (absent the excluded evidence) from which the jury could make a discriminating appraisal of the possible biases and motivations of the witnesses. Brown v. Powell, 975 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1992), cert. dismissed, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1035, 122 L.Ed.2d 179 (1993). That was the case here. 48
49 Pagan-San-Miguel argues that the district court erred by not conducting a hearing out of the jury's presence, pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3501(a), 5 to determine the voluntariness of his incriminating statements. Police Officer Samuel Jusino testified that Pagan-San-Miguel, while being held following his arrest, told Jusino that he would make three hundred thousand dollars out of [the drug venture] and, once the arrest signals were given, that he ran and hid himself underneath a metal plank, and if he had found a hole he would have gone through that place. 50 Before the issue of a Jackson v. Denno hearing may be raised on appeal, the issue of voluntariness must have been placed before the district court in a timely and coherent manner. See United States v. Santiago Soto, 871 F.2d 200, 201 (1st Cir.) (failure to raise the issue of voluntariness in a way that would have alerted the trial judge that a Jackson v. Denno hearing was desirable waives right to hearing), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 831, 110 S.Ct. 103, 107 L.Ed.2d 66 (1989); see also United States v. Berry, 977 F.2d 915, 918 (5th Cir.1992) (a generic objection to the admissibility of the confession was insufficient to put the court on notice that defendant sought a Jackson v. Denno hearing and therefore the court's ruling was reviewed for plain error). Pagan-San-Miguel failed to place the issue properly before the trial court here. 51 Pagan-San-Miguel did not specifically object to the admissibility of the statements on voluntariness grounds. He never specifically requested a voluntariness hearing during trial. He never raised the voluntariness issue in his pre-trial motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement personnel. He never raised voluntariness in his objection to the statement at trial. His objection was a narrow foundational one not going to voluntariness--that at the time of Officer Jusino's testimony no one had yet testified that Miranda warnings had been given to Pagan-San-Miguel before he made the incriminating statements. The court specifically asked Pagan-San-Miguel whether his objection as to foundation was a suppression request and Pagan-San-Miguel informed the court that it was not. Indeed during the colloquy with the district court over the testimony, Pagan-San-Miguel conceded that there [was] evidence that [Miranda ] warnings were properly made and there was a waiver. Given his disclaimer that he was seeking suppression of the statement and the total absence of any evidence that the statements were made involuntarily, Pagan-San-Miguel did not sufficiently apprise the district court that voluntariness was an issue. Thus, Pagan-San-Miguel's claim to a Jackson v. Denno hearing has been waived. 52 There also is no colorable claim here that the district court was nevertheless obliged to hold a voluntariness hearing sua sponte. See Santiago Soto, 871 F.2d at 202 (recognizing, without adopting, a rule that such a hearing must be given sua sponte under circumstances, such as a defendant's apparent abnormal mental or physical condition, obvious ignorance or lack of awareness, raising a serious question over voluntariness). At best, Pagan-San-Miguel's argument is that he was so shell-shocked by the events that transpired on the beach that the court must have been alerted to the possibility that he did not understand the Miranda warnings that were given to him and that, as a result, his statements made hours later were involuntary. Undoubtedly a defendant who suddenly becomes aware the police are on to him suffers a jolt, but that jolt does not incapacity make. 53
54 Pagan-San-Miguel argues that certain remarks made during the closing arguments were unduly prejudicial. He points to four remarks, one made by the attorney for Pava-Buelba and three made by the government. None provides a basis for reversal. 55 Pava-Buelba's attorney, in an apparent effort to distinguish his client and to distinguish the firearms charges from the drug charges, made the following remarks to the jury:I ask you to please keep in mind that the fact that there are a number of defendants here [does] not mean that they were all to be treated as one. And the fact that they were being charged with five different counts does not mean that you had to find them guilty or innocent or all the same, but that you could choose and pick. And that you could discern among the evidence and determine which, if any, were guilty of any of the counts charged. 56 Some might be guilty of one or more. Some might be guilty of none. And I ask you to please be careful watching the evidence so that you will be able to distinguish between each and every individual and each and every count. 57 Pagan-San-Miguel objected to these remarks, arguing they implied that Pava-Buelba was guilty of the drug offenses and thus implicated the other defendants. The district court sustained the objection. Pagan-San-Miguel's later motion for a mistrial was denied, but the court offered to provide a curative instruction, which all defendants declined. Pagan-San-Miguel argues that a curative instruction would have been pointless and that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial. 58 Fatal to Pagan-San-Miguel's claim, however, is that to require a new trial, we must conclude ... that, despite the instruction, the misconduct was likely to have affected the trial's outcome. United States v. Capone, 683 F.2d 582, 585-86 (1st Cir.1982) (internal citations omitted). In the context of the full record, these statements could not have had any impact on the outcome of the trial. The evidence of Pagan-San-Miguel's complicity on the drug counts was overwhelming. Moreover, a curative instruction would have solved any spillover problem created by the statements. 59 Pagan-San-Miguel also challenges the government's statement that Carlos Pagan-San-Miguel can't deny his association with [Fontalvo], that terrible, terrible person that was described to you. Pagan-San-Miguel argues this was an impermissible comment from a prosecutor on an accused's failure to testify. We think it was not. The government did not say that Pagan-San-Miguel didn't deny his association, only that he can't deny his association. Even assuming that this comment cut too close to the line, there is no reason to conclude that the prosecutor intentionally drew attention to the appellant's silence at trial. United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 980 (1st Cir.1995). And the evidence was otherwise so overwhelming that this comment could have had no effect on the jury's judgment. Id. at 977. 60 Pagan-San-Miguel's next two challenges are to the government's statements that the firearm found under the jeep would be used to protect the very cocaine that was being illegally smuggled into Puerto Rico and that Carlos Pagan-San-Miguel bragged about having bought the firearms. Pagan-San-Miguel argues that the first was misleading in that it suggested that the jury could convict the defendant for planning on using the firearm once it had arrived in Puerto Rico, an offense not charged in the indictment. Pagan-San-Miguel's reading is strained, at best. The first statement was consistent with the evidence and the government's theory. There is no plausible argument that this statement was likely to have affected the outcome of the trial or was so egregious that a new trial is needed as a sanction. See Capone, 683 F.2d at 587. While the second statement appears to have exaggerated the evidence, there was no objection and it does not amount to plain error. See Taylor, 54 F.3d at 977. 61
62 Pagan-San-Miguel argues that the court erroneously instructed the jury on an essential element of the firearms offense, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1). That section requires that the defendant have carried the firearm during and in relation to ... [a] drug trafficking crime. The district court, however, instructed the jury that it was enough if the defendant knowingly carried the firearm during the commission of the crime of drug trafficking. In so doing, the district court appears to have relied on obsolete statutory language. Before 1984, Sec. 924(c)(1) provided that it was a crime to carry a firearm during the commission of any [federal] felony. In 1984, however, Congress amended the language adding the phrase during and in relation to, to make clear that the firearm must be linked to the underlying felony to come within the scope of the statute. S.Rep. No. 225, supra, at 312-13, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3490-92. 63 Because Pagan-San-Miguel did not object to the instruction, the instruction is reviewed for plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). Pagan-San-Miguel argues that the court's use of the phrase during the commission of was plain error, claiming it omitted an essential element of the offense and it broadened the scope of the conduct under which the jury could convict. 64 The actual charge given here undercuts Pagan-San-Miguel's argument. 6 The district court emphasized that the carrying of the firearm must be linked to the specific underlying drug offense for which the defendants were convicted: 65 First, it must be proven that a[ ] defendant[ ] committed a crime of drug trafficking for which he may be prosecuted in the United States. And second, that during the commission of the crime of drug trafficking the defendant[ ] knowingly carried a firearm. 66 In light of the actual instruction given, Pagan-San-Miguel's attack on the instruction does not rise to the level of plain error. 67 Pagan-San-Miguel also argues that the instruction allowed the jury to convict for a crime not charged in the indictment because the firearms charge was limited to Count 2 of the three drug counts. Pagan-San-Miguel has not and cannot articulate how, in the context of this case, such a possibility created a miscarriage of justice or seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Olano, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1779, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). 68
69 Pagan-San-Miguel also argues that the district court erroneously instructed the jury about his flight and concealment. This argument is meritless. As long as there is an adequate factual predicate supporting an inference of guilt on the crime charged, as there was here, evidence of the accused's flight may be admitted at trial to show consciousness of guilt. See United States v. Hernandez-Bermudez, 857 F.2d 50, 52 (1st Cir.1988). 70
71 Pagan-San-Miguel and Luciano-Mosquera assert that the district court committed error when it failed to take certain precautions in allowing the testimony of Castillo-Ramos, the boat captain, to be read back to the jury at the jury's request, during deliberations. Counsel did not object to the procedures followed; in fact, what happened was by agreement among counsel. 7 To prevail, defendants must show plain error. 72 It certainly would have been preferable for the district court to have taken some precautions. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 27 F.3d 1403, 1408-09 (9th Cir.1994) (reversing a conviction where district court failed to take precautions to prevent undue emphasis on the witness testimony that jury reviewed during deliberation), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1147, 130 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1995). But counsel did not object and the standard set by Olano is not met. In light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt on the drug counts to which Castillo-Ramos' testimony went, the read-back did not result in a miscarriage of justice, nor did the absence of such precautions seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. There is no evidence that anything untoward happened in the jury room and no reason to think the reporter did anything other than properly read the pertinent portions of the record. 73 Pagan-San-Miguel and Luciano-Mosquera also argue they were never consulted by either of their attorneys or the court about whether they would waive their right to be present during the read-back. Although the defendant's right to be present at every stage of the proceedings may be waived by the defendant, it is less clear whether the defendant's attorney can waive it. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 & n. 24, 108 S.Ct. 646, 658 & n. 24, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). Nevertheless, Pagan-San-Miguel and Luciano-Mosquera were present at the time Castillo-Ramos actually gave his testimony and so could confront their accuser. There was no plain error.