Opinion ID: 1861999
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Judge's Interrogation

Text: Rule 614(b), North Dakota Rules of Evidence, provides: Interrogation by court. The court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party. The Procedure Committee Notes to this rule state that it is an adoption of Rule 614 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 614(b), F.R. Evid., states: The authority of the judge to question witnesses is also well established. McCormick § 8, pp. 12-13; Maguire, Weinstein, et al., Cases on Evidence 737-739 (5th Ed. 1965); 3 Wigmore § 784. The authority is, of course, abused when the judge abandons his proper role and assumes that of an advocate, but the manner in which interrogation should be conducted and the proper extent of its exercise are not susceptible of formulation in a rule. The omission in no sense precludes courts of review from continuing to reverse for abuse. [7] The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 614(b), F.R.Evid., is consistent with our perception of the trial judge's role under Rule 614(b), N.D.R.Ev., and our scope of review on appeal. See State v. Olson, 244 N.W.2d 718 (N.D.1976). To determine, however, whether the judge's interrogation of witnesses was proper or, conversely, unduly prejudicial to the defendant and therefore an abuse of the judge's discretion, is a formidable task. [8] We must, on the one hand, vigilantly protect the defendant's right to a fair trial [U.S.Const. Amend. VI; N.D.Const. Art. I, § 13], but, on the other hand, we must allowand even encouragethe trial judge to clarify testimony and ferret out elusive facts so long as he does so impartially. As we said in State v. Olson, supra, 244 N.W.2d at 722, we are aided in evaluating the trial judge's interrogation of a witness by a summary of cases contained in 3 Weinstein & Berger, Evidence ¶ 614[03], at 614-13 and 614-14: Factors that an appellate court may consider in evaluating the impact of the judge's questioning are whether the witnesses' testimony needed clarification, whether the witnesses were unusually hesitant and in need of assurance, whether the court used leading questions, whether the court interfered with cross-examination, whether the court's interruptions favored one side exclusively, whether the court instructed the jury to arrive at their own conclusions, whether the parties were being adequately represented, and whether an objection to the questioning was made. [Footnotes omitted.] The trial judge in this case actively participated in the examination of most witnesses. Yodsnukis has pointed out many examples of the judge's interrogation that, he asserts, were prejudicial to him and therefore an abuse of discretion. Most of the judge's questions were, in our opinion, designed solely to clarify the examined witnesses' testimony. By posing these questions, the judge acted properly and, we believe, should be commended for his attempt to make the facts comprehensible to the jury. We are troubled, however, by the trial judge's examination of a policeman, Officer Ralph Downey, who had investigated the robbery. Following direct examination by the State's Attorney and cross-examination by the attorney for Yodsnukis, the trial judge questioned Officer Downey: Q. Did you check what the weather conditions had been September 22nd or 21st or 23rd during that time? A. The night of the 22nd it had been raining. The afternoon of the 23rd when I was out in the area there it was still dreary and dampt [ sic ] and kind of misting a little bit. Q. Do you know what the mean temperature or the average temperature for Grand Forks vicinity would be for approximately to September 22nd? A. September can be a fairly warm month but I know that this particular day I was wearing a topcoat so it was a little cool. Q. The point of my question is: Would it be common for people to be wearing stocking caps? A. No I wouldn't think so except for the fact that it was raining. Q. September, I suppose, your average day in September would probably run 60 degrees or better? A. Possibly. Q. If it wouldn't be raining? A. Yes. Q. Well about how long have you lived in Grand Forks? A. In Grand Forks itself for 25 years. Q. I was just thinking in terms of common experiences of what people do. Do you think it would be common for people to wear stocking caps? A. I would think no that a stocking cap would not be worn that time of the year normally. Q. Particularly by young people, would they be running around with a stocking cap on? A. I wouldn't think so. Q. Well, in your work as a detective, would that indicate anything to you? A. Well Q. I'm speaking or inquiring in terms of the robber wearing the stocking cap? A. Maybe someone wouldn't think about it but I would have a tendency to wonder about someone wearing a stocking cap in that type of a situation, but again the average man on the street probably wouldn't think anything of it. Q. To me wouldn't it indicate an attempt to disguise your hair for instance? A. I would think so. In my line of work and in my experience would be towards that and I have a tendency to suspect that but maybe these gentlemen here or people in the jury might not think anything of that. Q. What about the Defendant's hair when you observed him, how did it appear to you? A. Well his hair then was considerably longer than it is now and it could be many times situations like that has been used to tuck the hair up to make it look shorter where a robbery is concerned or anything of that nature. Q. You say it was considerably longer, how would you describe it? A. Well, it was down over his ears and it was much more rough shot [ sic ] than it is now. It was kind of straggly. Q. Could it have been covered by this stocking cap? A. Oh yes. In conformance with Rule 614(c), N.D.R. Ev., the attorney for Yodsnukis objected to the judge's interrogation at the first available opportunity out of the presence of the jury. On the issue of the stocking cap, Officer Downey's testimony needed no clarification, and Officer Downey himself did not appear hesitant or in need of assurance. Although the judge interrogated witnesses for both sides, in large part favoring neither side, the leading questions posed to Officer Downey might well have led jurors to believe that the judge thought the robber wore a stocking cap to conceal his long hair. A jury might have properly drawn this inference from the testimony of various witnesses, but that inference should have been developed by the State, not the trial judge. [9] In his questioning of Officer Downey, the judge removed the robe of impartiality that he wore at all other times throughout the trial and, in so doing, acted in a manner prejudicial to Yodsnukis. The prejudicial effect of the judge's interrogation is heightened when we remember that, as this court trenchantly observed in State v. Hazlett, 14 N.D. 490, 105 N.W. 617 (1905), jurors are quick to be influenced by any opinion that they think the trial judge harbors about the merits of the case or the weight of certain evidence. Because of the unclear record as to the ground for the trial court's denial of the motion for new trial, and because of the isolated, yet prejudicial, instance of the trial judge's improper interrogation of a witness, we conclude that the interest of justice required that Yodsnukis receive a new trial and that the trial court therefore abused its discretion in denying the motion for new trial. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's denial of the motion for a new trial, and remand for a trial on the merits. Were we faced on this appeal with either the issue of the polygraph results alone or the issue of the judge's interrogation alone, we might be inclined to reach a different result. Reversed and remanded. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and PEDERSON, PAULSON and SAND, JJ., concur.