Opinion ID: 1687180
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: further prejudicial argument

Text: As noted during the course of the trial, the child witness Caprice Mangum was not giving an answer satisfactory to the prosecuting attorney, and he asked her if she was afraid. The circuit judge protected West's rights by excusing the jury immediately following the question. Then, out of the presence of the jury the prosecuting attorney asked her if West had threatened her. She replied, Yes. In closing argument the following transpired: BY MR. PETERS: ... What did Mr. Gore say? He's got his future. It's your decision to decide where he [West] spends that future. Caprice is still out there. BY MR. GORE: I object to that now  BY MR. PETERS: Gary is still out  BY MR. GORE:  if the Court please. He's getting out of line. He's trying to  BY THE COURT: Sustained  BY MR. GORE: Would the Court instruct the Jury to disregard that? BY THE COURT: Sustained. The Jury disregard this line of argument by the District Attorney. BY MR. PETERS: He has got his future. It's up to you people to decide where he spend its. Thank you. The district attorney thus concluded his argument, following which the court announced a recess for lunch. The following then transpired: BY MR. GORE: Excuse me, Your Honor. In order to protect my client, in view of Mr. Peters' remarks about Caprice being scared and having her future out there, I respectfully move the Court to grant a mistrial. BY THE COURT: Motion denied. I want to make sure the Jury understood that I instructed them to disregard that line of argument by the District Attorney. Do any of you feel that you cannot do so? (NO RESPONSE BY JURORS) BY THE COURT: Apparently none. The argument of the district attorney was blatantly inflammatory and outside the evidence before the jury. Although the court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the comment, he overruled the motion for a mistrial without having first determined as a fact from the jury that they could disregard this argument. The court then, rather than asking and requiring an affirmative promise from each of the jurors that they could disregard the argument, simply concluded by their silence to his question whether they could disregard the argument, that apparently they could. It is doubtful that this line of argument could have been erased by the most conscientious effort on the part of the circuit judge. The perfunctory treatment of the highly prejudicial comment in this case gives no comfort of removing the prejudice. It is true in most cases, where an isolated prejudicial question or comment by the prosecution is promptly objected to and the objection sustained, and particularly when the circuit judge instructs the jury to disregard the incident, there is a presumption the action on the part of the trial court cured the error. See: Hubbard v. State, 437 So.2d 430 (Miss. 1983); Williams v. State, 427 So.2d 100 (Miss. 1983); Polk v. State, 417 So.2d 930 (Miss. 1982); Edwards v. State, 413 So.2d 1007 (Miss. 1982); Duke v. State, 340 So.2d 727 (Miss. 1976); Forrest v. State, 335 So.2d 900 (Miss. 1976); Holifield v. State, 275 So.2d 851 (Miss. 1973); and Showers v. State, 227 So.2d 452 (Miss. 1969). This presumption is not without limitation, however. In Killingsworth v. State, 374 So.2d 221 (Miss. 1979), we reversed for inflammatory remarks by the prosecuting attorney despite the trial court's sustaining objections thereto. In this case, involving a death penalty, we must hold this argument, especially when considered with the comment upon West's failure to testify, mandates reversal. See: Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798, 810 (Miss. 1984). In view of our decision, it is unnecessary to address some troubling assignments of error as to the penalty phase of the trial. [5] REVERSED AND REMANDED. PATTERSON, C.J., DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, and SULLIVAN, JJ., concur. ANDERSON, J., and WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., dissent.