Opinion ID: 2548547
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: First Amendment Prior Restraint Law

Text: The First Amendment limits the choices the government may make in its efforts to regulate or prohibit speech, but it does not bar all government attempts to regulate speech, and it does not absolutely prohibit prior restraints against publication. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976); Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1252 (Colo.1999), aff'd, 530 U.S. 703, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000). The term prior restraint describes administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550, 113 S.Ct. 2766, 125 L.Ed.2d 441 (1993). Prior restraint of publication is an extraordinary remedy attended by a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1317, 114 S.Ct. 912, 127 L.Ed.2d 358 (1994) (Blackmun, J., in chambers); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971). The thread running through [the prior restraint cases] is that prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights. Neb. Press, 427 U.S. at 559, 96 S.Ct. 2791. To justify a prior restraint, the state must have an interest of the highest order it seeks to protect. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533, 109 S.Ct. 2603, 105 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). The restraint must be the narrowest available to protect that interest; and the restraint must be necessary to protect against an evil that is great and certain, would result from the reportage, and cannot be mitigated by less intrusive measures. CBS, Inc., 510 U.S. at 1317, 114 S.Ct. 912 (citing Neb. Press, 427 U.S. at 562, 96 S.Ct. 2791). The decisions of the United States Supreme Court teach that free discussion of public policy issues and criticism of public officials cannot be restrained. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 717, 722, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). Accordingly, the courts cannot enjoin newspapers from publishing contents of a classified federal government study on United States war policy. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 714, 91 S.Ct. 2140. Nor can a speculative concern about the impact of pre-trial publicity on prospective jurors justify a prior restraint. Neb. Press, 427 U.S. at 563, 570, 96 S.Ct. 2791. Nor can a judge who allowed reporters to attend the trial of a juvenile  notwithstanding a state statute closing such trials  prohibit the news media from publishing the juvenile's name or photograph. Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311-12, 97 S.Ct. 1045, 51 L.Ed.2d 355 (1977). Additionally, potential harm to an economic interest is not sufficient to justify a prior restraint. CBS, Inc., 510 U.S. at 1318, 114 S.Ct. 912. In cases dealing with the conflict between truthful reporting and state-protected privacy interests, the Supreme Court  when reviewing the validity of sanctions following publication  has held unconstitutional a civil damages award entered against a television station for broadcasting the name of a rape-murder victim it had obtained from publicly available courthouse records. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 472-73, 496-97, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975). Likewise, two newspapers learned the name of a juvenile offender from talking to witnesses and subsequently published the name, despite a state statute forbidding such publication. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 99-100, 99 S.Ct. 2667, 61 L.Ed.2d 399 (1979). The Supreme Court held that the indictment of the two newspapers for violating the statute was unconstitutional. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 105-06, 99 S.Ct. 2667. The Supreme Court also invalidated a sanction imposed for publication of an article identifying judges whose conduct was being investigated, despite the state's provision for confidentiality in judicial discipline proceedings. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 831, 845-46, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 56 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that protecting the privacy of rape victims is a highly significant state interest, requiring courts to consider both the First Amendment and the compelling privacy interests in the particular factual context of the case in reaching their decisions. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 530, 537, 109 S.Ct. 2603. We continue to believe that the sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes between First Amendment and privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case. Id. at 533, 109 S.Ct. 2603. In Florida Star, the Sheriff's Department publicly posted a police report containing a sexual assault victim's name. Id. at 527, 109 S.Ct. 2603. Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court determined that a civil damages award against the newspaper for revealing the name violated the First Amendment. Id. at 541, 109 S.Ct. 2603. But the Court said it was not holding that truthful publication is automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of personal privacy within which the state may protect the individual from intrusion by the press, or even that a state may never punish publication of the name of a victim of a sexual offense. Id. at 541, 109 S.Ct. 2603. We therefore turn to Colorado's rape shield statute, which serves purposes the Supreme Court identified in Florida Star as being of the highest order.