Opinion ID: 2499605
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Subsection (5): Shall Be Commenced

Text: ¶ 15 Unless context dictates otherwise, shall denotes a mandate. Pearson v. Dist. Court, 924 P.2d 512, 516 (Colo.1996). As such, section 40-6-115(5) mandates that all actions for judicial review of PUC orders be commenced in one of two district courts. Whether this is a mandatory venue or a jurisdictional requirement is ambiguous from the mandatory meaning of shall, since both are types of mandate. ¶ 16 The meaning of commence is clear enough: it means to initiate a suit. It is synonymous with bring an action, which means [t]o sue; institute legal proceedings. Black's Law Dictionary 219 (9th ed. 2009). Where an action is commenced is the same place as where it is brought. See People ex rel. Lackey v. District Court, 30 Colo. 123, 128, 69 P. 597 (1902) (equating shall be brought with shall be commenced). ¶ 17 Of course, this is different from where an action is tried. See id. at 127, 69 P. 597 (distinguishing the place for the commencement of actions from the place of trial). Venue is traditionally defined as place of trial, see Fletcher, 17 Colo. at 96, 28 P. 326, but we have recognized more recently that venue may also relate[] to the locality where an action may be properly brought. Borquez, 751 P.2d at 641; see also Black's Law Dictionary 1695 (9th ed. 2009) (defining venue more vaguely as [t]he proper or a possible place for a lawsuit to proceed,  which may encompass the place of commencement or trial (emphasis added)). ¶ 18 Accordingly, we cannot determine from the words of the statute alone whether shall be commenced limits jurisdiction or mandates venue. We look to external aids to determine legislative intent. The most availing constructive aid in this instance is our reference to similar statutes. The General Assembly has passed a number of venue statutes, and their language is instructive. ¶ 19 Section 22-33-108, C.R.S. (2011), for example, provides for jurisdiction over juvenile school attendance matters in its subsection (1): Those courts having jurisdiction over juvenile matters in a judicial district shall have original jurisdiction over all matters arising out of the provisions of this article. Subsection (1.5) provides further: All proceedings brought under this article shall be commenced in the judicial district in which the child resides or is present. § 22-33-108(1.5)(a) (emphasis added). The latter requirement is not jurisdictional in nature but venue-driven, as noted in the transfer provisions of paragraphs (1.5)(b) and (c): When a court transfers venue pursuant to... this subsection (1.5) .... § 22-33-108(1.5)(c). ¶ 20 Section 19-5-204, C.R.S. (2011), provides that [a] petition for adoption shall be filed in the county of residence of the petitioner or in the county in which the placement agency is located. (Emphasis added.) The legislature titled this section Venue. Ch. 138, sec. 1, § 19-5-204, 1987 Colo. Sess. Laws 806. Although where headings are added by the revisor of statutes no implication or presumption of a legislative construction is to be drawn therefrom, we properly can use a legislatively selected heading as an aid in construing a statute. U.M. v. Dist. Court, 631 P.2d at 167. ¶ 21 Section 19-3-201, C.R.S. (2011), provides, All proceedings brought under this article shall be commenced in the county in which the child resides or is present. (Emphasis added.) Section 19-6-102, C.R.S. (2011), provides, A petition filed under this section shall be brought in the county in which the child resides or is physically present, or in any county where the obligor parent resides, or in any county where public assistance is or was being paid on behalf of the child. (Emphasis added.) The legislature called both of these sections Venue. Ch. 138, sec. 1, §§ 19-3-201, -6-102, 1987 Colo. Sess. Laws 760, 811. ¶ 22 Section 16-13-307, C.R.S. (2011), regarding suits over public nuisance, provides a jurisdictional subsection (1): The several district courts of this state shall have original jurisdiction of proceedings under this part 3. Subsection (2) provides, An action to abate a public nuisance shall be brought in the county in which the subject matter of the action, or some part thereof, is located or found or in the county where the public nuisance act, or any portion thereof, was committed. (Emphasis added.) The legislature affixed the heading Jurisdiction-venue-parties-process. Ch. 122, sec. 5, § 16-13-307, 1987 Colo. Sess. Laws 633. As subsection (1) is clearly the jurisdiction piece, it follows that subsection (2) provides for venue, and not jurisdiction. Cf. U.M. v. Dist. Court, 631 P.2d at 167 (reasoning, in a similar situation, that Section 19-6-109 consists of three subsections; the first two explicitly treat jurisdiction. It follows that the `venue' portion of the statutory heading was intended to apply to subsection (3).). ¶ 23 These are just a few of the statutes throughout the code limiting venue, and not jurisdiction, by specifying the county or counties where an action shall be commenced, or using substantively identical language. It follows that, in place-based forum provisions, the legislature uses shall be commenced to erect venue requirements. ¶ 24 On the other hand, Borquez, the case on which the PUC relies, involved a statute for judicial review of administrative driver license revocations which provided, Within thirty days of the issuance of the final determination of the department under this section, a person aggrieved by the determination shall have the right to file a petition for judicial review in the district court in the county of the person's residence. 751 P.2d at 641 (quoting § 42-2-122.1(9)(a), C.R.S. (1984 Repl.)). Taking into account the language of other related statutes, we explained that as a matter of construction this section was controlling as to forum for driver license revocations. Id. at 644. No part of the section, section 42-2-122.1, included any other forum provisions. We held that, [e]xamined in the context of the other sections of title 42, the language of this provision is persuasive that the legislature intended not simply to specify proper venue, but rather to prescribe that review of administrative license revocations under section 42-2-122.1 may be obtained only in the district court of the driver's residence. Id. at 643. We also interpreted the statutory language that a person shall have the right to file a petition to characterize section 42-2-122.1(9)(a) as a statutorily provided right of review. Id. at 644. Because it was the sole provision setting out the right to file, a failure to comply with the Borquez statute constituted a failure to exercise a statutorily provided right of review ... a jurisdictional defect, mandating dismissal. Id. at 644. ¶ 25 In this case, unlike in Borquez, the statute at issue includes a separate subsection which clearly prescribes jurisdiction. See § 40-6-115(1). In contrast to stand-alone language setting out a right to file, section 40-6-115(5) prescribes only where an action[] for review, whose parameters are set out in subsections above, shall proceed. For these reasons, we do not reach the conclusion that a failure to comply with section 40-6-115(5) constitutes a failure to exercise a statutorily provided right of review. Borquez, 751 P.2d at 644. In Borquez we also used the language of related statutes to conclude that the provision was jurisdictional. Id. at 643. Here, the language of other statutes points to venue instead. Thus, we distinguish Borquez from the case before us. ¶ 26 A failure to comply with section 40-6-115(5), coupled with compliance with section 40-6-115(1), constitutes only a failure to file in the correct venue, a procedural, and not a substantive or jurisdictional, defect. Spencer, 67 P.3d at 3; Fletcher, 17 Colo. at 96, 28 P. 326. Therefore transfer, and not dismissal, is the proper remedy. See Spencer, 67 P.3d at 7; People v. Dist. Court, 78 Colo. at 530, 242 P. 997; cf. Trans Shuttle, 58 P.3d at 50.