Opinion ID: 471806
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jones' Pay and Promotion Claims

Text: 46 a. Equal Pay 47 Jones asserts that Flagship discriminated against her in pay under both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. The former statute provides: 48 No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.... 49 29 U.S.C. Sec. 206(d)(1) (emphasis added). 50 Unlike Title VII, the burden of persuasion may shift from the plaintiff to the defendant in a suit under the Equal Pay Act. 51 The plaintiff's having made out a prima facie case has different ramifications under the Equal Pay Act than it has under Title VII. Under the Equal Pay Act, the plaintiff has the burden of proof to show that an employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes 'for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.'  Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 2228, 41 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1974). If the plaintiff meets this burden, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show that the differential is justified under one of the Act's four exceptions. Id. at 196, 94 S.Ct. at 2229, 41 L.Ed.2d at 11. The exceptions are affirmative defenses on which the employer has the burden both of production and of persuasion. Id. at 197, 94 S.Ct. at 2229, 41 L.Ed.2d at 11. In other words, the burden shifts to the employer once a plaintiff shows that she was paid less than a male who was performing substantially the same job. 52 Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1136 (5th Cir.1983). 53 Thus, in order to establish a claim under the Equal Pay Act, the plaintiff must show (1) that her employer is subject to the Act; (2) that she performed work in a position requiring equal skill, effort and responsibility under similar working conditions; and (3) that she was paid less than members of the opposite sex. To establish equal work, the plaintiff need only prove that the skill, effort and responsibility required in the performance of the jobs is substantially equal. Pearce v. Witchita County, City of Witchita Falls, Texas Hospital Bd., 590 F.2d 128, 133 (5th Cir.1979). The Act necessarily requires a plaintiff to compare her skill, effort, responsibility and salary with a person who is or was similarly situated. 54 Jones based her pay complaints at trial on salary comparisons with four male employees whom she regarded as having comparable qualifications and responsibilities: Jared Metze, Ken Diebold, Jim Lawther and Joseph Primavera. 55 Metze. Jones compared her position to Metze's when the latter was Manager of Personnel Relations from April, 1972, to July, 1974. Metze's employee record card reveals that he earned $271.16 per week at his hire and $380.80 per week when promoted to Director of Public Affairs. Jones, meanwhile, earned $403.85 per week when hired in 1979. Thus, assuming that Metze's job was substantially similar to Jones' job as EEO Manager, the district court correctly concluded that Jones failed to establish that she earned less than Metze for equal work. 56 Diebold. Jones did not introduce Diebold's employee record card at trial. Consequently, even if the jobs of Jones and Diebold were substantially similar, Jones failed to show that she earned less than Diebold. 57 Lawther. Flagship hired Lawther as Specialist in Employee Relations three months before Jones joined the company. Lawther and Jones both started at $403.85 per week. Beginning in December, 1980, Lawther earned $20 per week more than Jones following his promotion to Manager of Union Contract Administration. Lawther, who had been a high school teacher for 12 years, and a teachers' union representative for two years prior to his hire, was involved in collective bargaining negotiations and affirmative action programs at 46 locations. Based on our review of the record, we cannot disagree with the district court's finding that Jones and Lawther did not engage in jobs requiring substantially equal skill, effort and responsibility. 58 Primavera. Jones testified that she had comparable qualifications to Primavera, one of her supervisors. However, as Jones' testimony demonstrates, Primavera's supervisory duties differed from Jones' EEO duties for the company. Although the court below did not address Jones' comparison with Primavera, we find that Jones and Primavera did not engage in substantially similar jobs. 59 In regard to her equal pay claim under Title VII, Jones was required to show that Flagship intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of her sex. 8 Jones first testified that the company refused to evaluate her job performance in accordance with company policy--evaluations, according to Jones, which would have resulted in a salary raise. Flagship, on the other hand, offered evidence to show that Jones' evaluation for 1981 was postponed due to Jones' two-month absence for sick leave. Metze testified that he delayed the process in order to help Jones obtain a positive evaluation. We cannot say, based on the record before us, that Flagship's failure to evaluate Jones in 1981 constituted discrimination in pay. 60 Jones also testified that Flagship paid its employees at the prevailing market rate and that she earned less than that rate. However, as the district court held, there is no requirement that an employer pay its employees at market rate. We must, therefore, affirm the district court's ruling that Jones failed to establish a discrimination in pay claim under either the Equal Pay Act or Title VII. 61 b. Failure to Promote 62 In a suit alleging sex discrimination in an employer's failure to hire or promote, the plaintiff must prove the following to establish a prima facie case: (1) that she was a member of a protected group; (2) that she applied for a position for which she was qualified; (3) that she was rejected; and (4) that after she was rejected, the employer promoted, hired, or continued to seek a member of the opposite sex for the job. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 187, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Uveida v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425, 1428 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 791, 88 L.Ed.2d 769 (1986). Plemer, 713 F.2d at 1135. Where the plaintiff claims discrimination in promotion on the basis that jobs for which she was qualified were never posted or otherwise opened for formal applications, she must establish that the company had some reason or duty to consider her for the post. Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1133 (11th Cir.1984). 63 The district court found that Jones did not submit any evidence that she applied for a position for which she was qualified and rejected, and which was later filled by a male employee. Our review of the record, moreover, discloses no evidence that Flagship had a duty or a legitimate reason to consider Jones for another position within the company. Consequently, we affirm the district court's ruling that Jones failed to make out a discrimination in promotion claim under Title VII.