Opinion ID: 1506593
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Iffley Street Property

Text: [¶ 4] The record reveals the following facts pertinent to the Iffley Street property. In December 1984 Alfred arranged for his daughter, Teri Berenson, to purchase the Iffley Street property with funds he provided. The deed was recorded in the Cumberland County Registry of Deeds and that same day, at Alfred's request, Teri conveyed an easement over the Iffley Street lot to Your Home, Inc. Shortly thereafter, again at Alfred's request, Teri executed and delivered a deed to the Iffley Street lot to Your Home, Inc. Lawrence notarized both deeds. Alfred did not record either deed until September 1995. [¶ 5] In July 1993 Teri executed and delivered a deed to the Iffley Street property to her brother, Lawrence, in an effort to help Lawrence solve a problem he was having with Alfred concerning the Farnham Street property. Alfred argues that at the time of the December 1984 conveyance to Teri, Teri had at most a contingent remainder interest subject to a resulting trust. Lawrence contends that no resulting trust was created when Alfred paid for the purchase of the Iffley Street property because Alfred gave the property to Teri originally as a contingent gift, and ultimately as a final irrevocable gift. [¶ 6] We need not determine the exact nature of the December 1984 transaction because, regardless of the capacity in which Teri held title to the property in December 1984, she conveyed the entire property to Your Home, Inc. in January 1985. The conveyance of title to property requires a manual transfer of the deed and an intent to pass title between a grantor and grantee. Poling v. Northup, 652 A.2d 1114, 1115 (Me. 1995). On January 3, 1985, Teri executed a warranty deed to Your Home, Inc. Lawrence notarized the deed and Teri delivered the deed to Alfred. Alfred has retained possession of the deed since that date. [¶ 7] There is no dispute that the deed from Teri to Your Home, Inc. was delivered to Alfred. There is a presumption that a deed found in the possession of the grantee was delivered by the grantor who executed and acknowledged it. Sachelie v. Connellan, 141 Me. 267, 273, 43 A.2d 300 (1945). This presumption is even stronger in cases involving a voluntary conveyance as opposed to an ordinary bargain and sale. Shaw v. McKenzie, 131 Me. 248, 249, 160 A. 911 (1932). Only clear and convincing evidence can overcome the presumption. Id. at 249, 160 A. 911. [¶ 8] The sole issue here is whether the parties intended that title to the Iffley Street property pass from Teri to Your Home, Inc. when the deed was delivered. We answer this question in the affirmative. When the physical possession of a deed is transferred from one party to another, there is a presumption that both parties intended to effect an immediate transfer of the title, in accordance with the terms of the deed. Coombs v. Fessenden, 116 Me. 304, 306, 101 A. 465 (1917). [¶ 9] The record reveals that Teri failed to overcome the presumption that she and Alfred both intended to effect an immediate transfer of title when she delivered the deed to Your Home, Inc. in January 1985. Teri testified that she executed and delivered the deed to the Iffley Street lot to Your Home, Inc. solely because Alfred asked her to do so. The record is devoid of evidence indicating that Teri did not intend to transfer the property to Your Home, Inc. at that time. See Coombs, 116 Me. at 307, 101 A. 465 (well settled rule of law is that after conveyance of real estate a declaration of the grantor in disparagement of his grant, made in the absence of the grantee, is never admissible in evidence against the grantee). The trial court did not make any findings as to Teri's intent at the time of the January 1985 conveyance and we find no evidence to rebut the presumption arising from Alfred's possession that both parties intended to effectuate an immediate transfer of the Iffley Street property. [¶ 10] Contrary to Lawrence's contention, the presumption in favor of delivery is not rebutted by Alfred's failure to record his deed until 1995. The fact that the deed was unrecorded for many years does not change the effect of Teri's delivery of the deed to Alfred. [¶ 11] Teri's 1993 deed to Lawrence has no effect because, by notarizing the deed from Teri to Your Home, Inc., Lawrence had actual knowledge that she had already conveyed the same property to Your Home, Inc. See Bartlett v. Pullen, 586 A.2d 1263, 1265 (Me.1991) (unrecorded conveyance ineffectual against anyone other than grantor and persons having actual knowledge). Furthermore, Lawrence's assertion that he believed in 1993 that Teri owned the Iffley Street property is unavailing. Before purchasing real estate, a purchaser should clear up the doubts which apparently hang upon the title, by making due inquiry and investigation. If a party has knowledge of such facts as would lead a fair and prudent [person], using ordinary caution, to make further inquires, and he avoids the inquiry, he is chargeable with notice of the facts which by ordinary diligence he would have ascertained. Gagner v. Kittery Water Dist., 385 A.2d 206, 207 (Me.1978) (quoting Knapp v. Bailey, 79 Me. 195, 204, 9 A. 122, 124 (1887)). Lawrence testified that he remembered notarizing the 1985 deed to Your Home, Inc., but that he understood in 1993 that Teri owned the Iffley Street property. According to Lawrence, he believed that Teri owned the property because she told him about conversations that she had with [Alfred] on more than one occasion and because Teri believed that it was her property. Lawrence admitted that he did not discuss the pending conveyance with Alfred. Lawrence made no effort to determine whether Alfred in fact owned any interest in the Iffley Street property. Lawrence's failure to take appropriate steps to clarify the doubts concerning title to the Iffley Street property can only been seen as a failure of due inquiry. Lawrence was not a bona fide purchaser of the Iffley Street lot because he had knowledge that the property had already been conveyed to Your Home, Inc. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it determined that Lawrence held title to the Iffley Street property in fee.