Opinion ID: 2318562
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is Analysis of the Zappone Factors Necessary in this Case?

Text: Before evaluating precisely what level of administrative jurisdiction the Legislature intended to grant the MIA over money had and received/statutory violation claims like Carter's, we address Carter's arguments that (1) the Legislature did not vest any jurisdiction in the MIA over his claim or (2) in the alternative, it indicated clearly that the MIA has concurrent jurisdiction. We conclude that Carter's arguments are unsustainable. In enacting the Insurance Article, the Legislature accorded aggrieved consumers, like Carter, an administrative remedy for being charged allegedly excessive insurance premiums. We grant that the Commissioner may file, on his/her initiative, a complaint against a title insurer. See § 2-201(a) (stating that, to enforce this article, [t]he Commissioner may bring an action in a court of competent jurisdiction... or an order issued by the Commissioner under this article). Nonetheless, also a consumer may file such a complaint with the Commissioner, who then proceeds on the consumer's behalf. See § 2-108 ([T]he Commissioner ... has the powers and authority ... reasonably implied from this article; shall enforce this article ... and ... may conduct examinations and investigations of insurance matters as necessary to fulfill the purposes of this article.); Brief of Appellant at 22 (stating that § 2-108 indicat[es] that a person `may' file a complaint with the Commissioner); § 2-109(a)(1) (The Commissioner may adopt regulations to ... carry out this article....); COMAR § 31.02.01.02(B)(2) (2007) (`Administrative complaint' means a document that ... [i]s received by the Commissioner from any person ... and ... alleges a violation of ... a law or regulation enforced by the Commissioner....); COMAR § 31.02.01.02(B)(4)(b) (`Determination' includes... [a] decision as to whether a person against whom an administrative complaint has been received violated a law, regulation, or order.) (emphasis added). Indeed, the nondescript language of the statute suggests that consumers and insurers alike may request hearings. See § 2-210(a)(2) (The Commissioner shall hold a hearing ... on written demand by a person aggrieved by any act of, threatened act of, or failure to act by the Commissioner....); Muhl v. Magan, 313 Md. 462, 467, 545 A.2d 1321, 1323-24 (1988). [11] In any event, if the insurer requested the hearing, the aggrieved consumer is not required to, but is allowed to intervene and, thereafter, become a party. See § 2-213(c) (The Commissioner shall allow any person ... to become a party by intervention if ... the financial interests of the person will be directly and immediately affected by an order of the Commissioner resulting from the hearing.); see also COMAR § 31.02.01.07(C)(2) (same). We conclude that the Insurance Article imbues the MIA with jurisdiction over claims like Carter's, which allege a violation of § 27-216. Moreover, we do not agree (as Carter asserts in the alternative) that the Article limns clearly this jurisdictional grant as concurrent. Carter suggests that, taken together, Zappone and Mardirossian settle the matter. In Zappone, we considered whether the General Assembly intended that a consumer, with common law claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, must seek relief first through the administrative regulatory apparatus. See Zappone, 349 Md. at 50, 706 A.2d at 1062-63. As part of our analysis, we examined the language of the Unfair Trade Practices Title and concluded that the General Assembly has clearly stated that the administrative remedy is not exclusive. Zappone, 349 Md. at 68, 706 A.2d at 1071. Moreover, we recognized that [w]hile there are no applicable provisions in [Title 27] stating as much, the statutory language does suggest that the administrative remedy is not to be primary. Id. The primary statutory language upon which we relied in expressing this view appeared in one of the penalty provisions of the Insurance Article (Art. 48A, § 215(d), now § 27-103(e)) and read that [n]o order of the Commissioner pursuant to this section ... shall in any way relieve or absolve any person affected by such order from any other liability, penalty, or forfeiture under law. Based on the any way relieve language, we concluded that the General Assembly did not intend, under circumstances like those in [ Zappone ], to preclude claimants from pursuing a recognized independent tort remedy without first invoking and exhausting the administrative remedy under [Title 27]. Id. (emphasis added). We held, in other words, that the Legislature installed in the agency concurrent jurisdiction over wrongs like those inflicted upon Ricardo Zappone, which violated the common law and the statute. Five years later, in Mardirossian, we were presented with a certified question from the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland: Does Maryland law provide a judicial cause of action, entirely independent of the Maryland Insurance [Article], for a claim to compel specific performance on an oral contract for disability insurance? After a relatively succinct analysis, we held that (1) oral contracts to provide insurance policies are enforceable, (2) through a common law [claim] ... of specific performance, and (3) the Insurance Article did not modify[] or supplant Maryland common law contract enforceability principles. Mardirossian, 376 Md. at 649, 831 A.2d at 64-65. Again, we found persuasive § 27-103(e), which states that [a] cease and desist order issued under this section ... does not relieve any person affected by the order from any other liability ... under law. Id. Proceeding to reflect upon an uncertified and unasked question, we volunteered that: While not specifically asked in the certified question, we also agree with the [aggrieved consumer] ... that the administrative remedy under §§ 27-103 through 27-105 is neither exclusive nor primary. The Maryland common law contract remedy is fully concurrent, and may be pursued in court without exhausting the administrative remedy under §§ 27-103 through 27-105. Mardirossian, 376 Md. at 649, 831 A.2d at 65 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Thus, we implied in dicta that the Legislature granted the agency concurrent jurisdiction over wrongs like those inflicted upon Aris Mardirossian, which sounded in the common law and the statute. The language of Zappone and Mardirossian stands in critical distinction to the present case. In Zappone and Mardirossian, the behavior of the defendants violated the Insurance Article. Nevertheless, the consumers possessed a recognized independent tort remedy and a common law contract remedy, respectively, and, therefore, could seek relief outside of the administrative regulatory scheme. Taken together with the language in the statute, regarding in any way relieve and, later, does not relieve, we were able to conclude that the Legislature did not intend the Insurance Article to subsume or swallow the entirely independent causes of action stated in Zappone and Mardirossian. The Legislature did not express the same intent with respect to claims, like those in the present case, alleging, as we see it, purely statutory violations. Indeed, if anything, we find indicia suggesting that the Legislature evinced a preference for primary jurisdiction as to such claims. For example, many of the relevant penalty provisions of the Insurance Article begin with the phrase [i]f the Commissioner finds or [i]f the Commissioner believes, implying that the MIA, not the courts, should take the first cut at such claims. Moreover, the statute intimates that some remedies, such as the revocation of a license to sell insurance, may be imposed only by the Commissioner and, thus, are limited to the administrative forum. See § 4-113 (The Commissioner shall ... revoke a certificate of authority if....). In any event, it is enough for present purposes that sufficient uncertainty exists to justify a Zappone analysis in Carter's case. See Zappone, 349 Md. at 62, 706 A.2d at 1068 (While sometimes the Legislature will set forth its intent as to whether an administrative remedy is to be exclusive, or primary, or simply a fully concurrent option, most often statutes fail to specify the category in which an administrative remedy falls. Consequently various principles[, i.e., factors] have been applied by this Court to resolve the matter.).