Opinion ID: 2478526
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was properly denied

Text: {¶ 55} The fifth and sixth propositions of law address the trial court's denial of Ketterer's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. {¶ 56} While the case was on remand for resentencing, Ketterer filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas on the basis that (1) his pleas were based on a misunderstanding of the sentence he would receive (i.e., he believed that he would not receive the death penalty), (2) he relied on statutes that have now been declared unconstitutional in Foster, (3) the prosecutor suppressed exculpatory evidence, and (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. {¶ 57} Crim.R. 32.1 states: A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea. [A] presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be freely and liberally granted. State v. Xie (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527, 584 N.E.2d 715. {¶ 58} Ketterer raises the same grounds raised in the trial court in arguing that the presiding judge erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. He argues that the three-judge panel should have granted his motion to withdraw his pleas under the standard that such motions should be freely and liberally granted. {¶ 59} In response, the state argues that res judicata bars Ketterer's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because on the first appeal, this court rejected his attacks on his pleas. Res judicata bars the assertion of claims against a valid, final judgment of conviction that have been raised or could have been raised on appeal. State v. Perry (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 39 O.O.2d 189, 226 N.E.2d 104, paragraph nine of the syllabus. Ohio courts of appeals have applied res judicata to bar the assertion of claims in a motion to withdraw a guilty plea that were or could have been raised at trial or on appeal. See State v. McGee, 8th Dist. No. 91638, 2009-Ohio-3374, 2009 WL 1965292, ¶ 9; State v. Totten, 10th App. No. 05AP-278 and 05AP-508, 2005-Ohio-6210, 2005 WL 3113456, ¶ 7 (collecting cases). {¶ 60} In Ketterer's first appeal, this court considered most of the claims that Ketterer raised on remand as a basis to withdraw his guilty pleas. We found that Ketterer was adequately informed of his rights before pleading guilty; that his plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made; and that his counsel was not ineffective in providing him advice on his guilty pleas. State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 13-14, 75-79, and 80-90. Thus, res judicata was a valid basis for rejecting these claims. {¶ 61} In addition, the state invokes State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Belmont Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 97-98, 9 O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 162, to argue that the court lacked jurisdiction to vacate Ketterer's guilty pleas. In Special Prosecutors, this court held that Crim.R. 32.1 does not vest jurisdiction in the trial court to maintain and determine a motion to withdraw the guilty plea subsequent to an appeal and an affirmance by the appellate court. While Crim.R. 32.1 apparently enlarges the power of the trial court over its judgments without respect to the running of the court term, it does not confer upon the trial court the power to vacate a judgment which has been affirmed by the appellate court, for this action would affect the decision of the reviewing court, which is not within the power of the trial court to do. Id. at 97-98, 9 O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 162. {¶ 62} On appeal, this court affirmed Ketterer's convictions and death sentence. State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 12. Ketterer's appeal was later reopened and his case was remanded for the limited purpose of resentencing him on his noncapital offenses. 113 Ohio St.3d 1463, 2007-Ohio-1722, 864 N.E.2d 650. Under the authority of Special Prosecutors, the panel had no authority to consider Ketterer's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, let alone grant him a new trial. {¶ 63} Finally, this court's decision in State v. Boswell, 121 Ohio St.3d 575, 2009-Ohio-1577, 906 N.E.2d 422, does not apply to the present case. Boswell considered the effect of a void sentence on a defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Unlike the situation in Boswell, Ketterer's noncapital sentences are not void. As discussed below, procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191 apply to remedy any defects in imposing postrelease control because Ketterer was resentenced after July 11, 2006. See State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, ¶ 34. {¶ 64} Based on the foregoing, the trial court properly denied Ketterer's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.