Opinion ID: 729726
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Eighth Circuit Caselaw Regarding Similar Testimony

Text: 96 Although the district court correctly precluded Dr. Underwager from testifying about the ultimate issue of the children's credibility, he should have been allowed to testify regarding the suggestibility of the techniques employed in this case and whether they could have affected these children's memories. 97 We see no essential difference in this testimony, and in a qualified expert opining that an abuse victim's symptoms are consistent with sexual abuse syndrome, battered woman syndrome, battered child syndrome and other recognized syndromes. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 70 (1991) (evidence of battered child syndrome related to intent and its admission did not violate due process); United States v. Norquay, 987 F.2d 475, 479 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming admittance of expert rape trauma syndrome evidence over defendant's objections that this amounted to admission of others' opinions of victim's credibility because witnesses were not allowed to state whether they believed the victim had indeed been raped), abrogated on other grounds, United States v. Thomas, 20 F.3d 817 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc); United States v. Simpson, 979 F.2d 1282, 1287-88 (8th Cir. 1992) (recognizing battered woman syndrome), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 943 (1993); United States v. Whitetail, 956 F.2d 857, 859 (8th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417, 419-20 (8th Cir. 1987) (expert can inform jury of characteristics found in sexually abused children and describe characteristics alleged victim exhibits). 98 In United States v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 1994), we rejected the defendant's argument that an expert impermissibly vouched for a sexual abuse victim's credibility because implicit in the expert's testimony was the opinion that the victim was telling the truth. We concluded that an expert may inform the jury of the characteristics of sexually abused children generally and may describe characteristics exhibited by the alleged victim, but may not state an opinion that abuse has in fact occurred. Id. Likewise, in United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 1993), we determined that an expert may inform the jury of characteristics found in sexually abused children and describe characteristics the alleged victim exhibits. We stated that expert opinions are not inadmissible merely because they embrace the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact, but they cannot be phrased in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria or merely tell the jury what result to reach. Id. 99 Finally, in our landmark case of [United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 1986)], we stated that general testimony about a [child] victim's ability to separate truth from fantasy, the expression of an opinion on the similarities between a victim's claim and the evidence, and the comparison of behavioral and testimonial patterns of a particular victim with the behavioral patterns observed in victims in general, were all admissible in certain circumstances. Bachman v. Leapley, 953 F.2d 440, 442 (8th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Plenty Arrows, 946 F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1989) (no abuse of discretion where district court allowed health therapist to testify that victim's behavior consistent with that of other sexually abused children); Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1239-41 (8th Cir. 1991) (expert testimony readily admissible where psychologist testifies to mental aberrations in human behavior, when such knowledge will help jury to understand relevant issues in case, including helping jury to evaluate which of victim's conflicting statements were more credible, and expert does not express her opinion as to which statements were more credible or whether victim suffered from battered woman syndrome), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 913 (1991). 100 Here, Dr. Underwager was not testifying as to whether the children were credible, but rather to whether they were subjected to suggestive practices. The district court erred in excluding that important testimony. 101 In assessing the prejudice from the exclusion of this evidence, we do so against the backdrop of other alleged errors depriving these defendants of a fair trial.