Opinion ID: 864962
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the jury’s verdict was against the

Text: OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 32 ¶43. In alleging that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a new trial, Glasper asserts that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. See URCCC 10.05 (2). As we have recently noted, it is not uncommon for defendants in criminal cases to blur the arguments regarding the legal sufficiency of the evidence as opposed to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 843 (Miss. 2005). When we are confronted with a claim that the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we are called upon to consider the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Id. However, when, as here, a criminal defendant on appeal attacks a trial court’s refusal to grant a new trial, we consider a standard of review different than that considered in review of a denial of a j.n.o.v. motion. When reviewing a denial of a motion for a new trial based on an objection to the weight of the evidence, we will only disturb a verdict when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice. Herring v. State, 691 So.2d 948, 957 (Miss.1997). We have stated that on a motion for new trial, the court sits as a thirteenth juror. The motion, however, is addressed to the discretion of the court, which should be exercised with caution, and the power to grant a new trial should be invoked only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict. 895 So. 2d at 844 (quoting Amiker v. Drugs For Less, Inc., 796 So.2d 942, 947 (Miss. 2000)). Additionally, the evidence is viewed and weighed in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. Herring, 691 So.2d at 957. ¶44. Glasper addresses this issue by submitting “questions, inconsistencies or discrepancies” which “would or should have raised a reasonable doubt in the minds of the 33 jurors” concerning the confessions such as the “constant threats, pressure, trickery, innuendo and promises” made by the interrogating officers; the “suddenness” of the confession; the recorder being cut on and off throughout the tape-recorded statement; and, the “lack of evidence” concerning the reading and explanation of the Miranda rights to Glasper. Likewise, Glasper asserts that a reasonable doubt should have been raised in the minds of the jurors as to Ellzey’s credibility when the jury heard the inconsistencies between her trial testimony and her prior out-of-court statements. Glasper also claims that the fingerprint testimony was highly suspect and there was a lack of DNA evidence. In making these various assertions, Glasper has presented to us “a classic jury case.” Indeed this evidence was quite appropriately submitted to the jury so that the jury could determine what weight and credit it chose to give to this evidence. Certainly, in considering all the evidence presented to the jury in the light most favorable to the verdict, we unhesitatingly find that the verdict was not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence such that to leave the verdict undisturbed would sanction an unconscionable injustice. Accordingly, we find this assignment of error to be meritless.