Opinion ID: 1387582
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Case Status and Jurisdiction Process

Text: The third issue of this appeal, untested in this jurisdiction, is the pleading process whereby the grandparents seek to effectuate claimed visitation rights under the newly enacted statute, as now first litigated at a time after entry of the original divorce decree. The terminology of the statute may call into question whether the grandparents have any right to become involved until after the initial divorce has been concluded. Subsequent to the death or remarriage    or after a divorce or judicial separation, the court may   . Section 20-2-113(c). Since the issue is not before us in this case, we decline to consider the question at this time, Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. City of Riverton, 70 Wyo. 84, 247 P.2d 660 (1952), except to note that the Wyoming statute lacks the detail or specificity afforded in many other jurisdictions. In this case, the paternal grandparents, as uncaptioned intervenors, enunciated the visitation claim under the statute by petition filed concurrently with the father in the divorce docket long after the original divorce decree entry, to effect a result of amending the prior custody orders and divorce decree. The other 47 grandparent-visitation statutes are of various kinds and character. Some specifically provide for rights of intervention pre-divorce, some specifically prohibit intervention pre-divorce, and other statutes and some cases specifically provide that an independent lawsuit is required. [9] Four questions are raised which are novel in this jurisdiction and not answered by statute: (1) May an independent action be used or is it required? (2) Is intervention in a divorce proceeding permitted? (3) Is compliance with Rule 24, W.R.C.P., required for intervention? (4) Is intervention permissive or of right? Complexities abound, including the simple question for trial resolution as to whether the grandparents' petition is simply a subterfuge to increase the period of partial custody or visitation for the noncustodial parent. Shriver v. Shriver, 7 Ohio App.2d 169, 219 N.E.2d 300 (1966); Matter of Adoption by M, 140 N.J. Super. 91, 355 A.2d 211 (1976). [10] Doubling the Oklahoma visitation-custody, as in this case, could seem to test the limitations of judicial discretion and would only give fire to the litigative nightmare to which the families and these two boys have been subjected since the original decree was entered in 1979. Compare the factual situation with that in Kudler v. Smith, Colo. App., 643 P.2d 783 (1981), cert. denied 459 U.S. 837, 103 S.Ct. 83, 74 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). Of paramount consideration is the present and future welfare of the children. Their welfare must be provided for with as little uncertainty as possible. All other considerations, including the wishes, rights and happiness of parents are subordinate thereto. Nelson v. Murray, 58 Del. (8 Storey) 516, 211 A.2d 842 (1965). See extensive case citations in Annot., 90 A.L.R.3d 222, 232, including appendix, with cases from 20 states. [11] Cases on grandparent visitation are numerous and increasing. The Annotation at 90 A.L.R.3d 222, supra, encompasses 63 pages, with cases from 23 states, as numbering with the current supplement in excess of 100. At least a half dozen current law journal notes or comments can likewise be found on this subject. Various sociological developments in our current society can immediately be recognized. [12] Case law and statutory precedent relating to all four procedural concerns can be found. Often the decision turns on the particular statute or a specific rule of procedure in that jurisdiction. No statute with the same phraseology as Wyoming's can be found in another state which would encompass precedential authority for determination of the decision to be made by this court. Clearly, if we are to determine that the grandparents can advance their litigative interest in visitation through participation in the divorce case, then in some fashion an intervention process, either actual or pro forma, is required. See School District No. 9 v. District Boundary Board, Wyo., 351 P.2d 106 (1960). Lacking even a motion to intervene under Rule 24, we hold that the court lacked jurisdiction in this case to enter the order granting a specifically claimed statutory right of visitation in behalf of nonparties to the divorce proceeding. [13] Since jurisdiction was involved, it is further determined that the failure of the issue to be raised in either the trial court or by present brief is not waived under the purview of Rule 12(h)(3), W.R.C.P.: Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. Pease Brothers, Inc. v. American Pipe & Supply Co., Wyo., 522 P.2d 996 (1974); Steffens v. Smith, Wyo., 477 P.2d 119 (1970). Determining the intent of the legislature, analyzing the orderly process of the adjudicatory system in compliance with the rules of procedure, and the concurrent recognition of the need for expeditious resolution of the issues raised by the best interest of the child, do not easily afford an answer to the four questions raised. As required for the further resolution of the litigative interests between the paternal grandparents and the mother, we would then address the four jurisdictional procedural questions earlier listed. [14] See Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. City of Riverton, supra.