Opinion ID: 1575632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: other claimed trial court errors

Text: Defendant raises several other allegations of trial error and concludes each Point Relied On by stating he was thereby denied his right to a fair trial. However, these issues involve claims of non-constitutional trial error, none of which were preserved at the trial level as constitutional issues. Constitutional issues must be raised at the earliest possible time. Christiansen v. Fulton State Hosp., 536 S.W.2d 159 (Mo.1976). The first such issue arose when one of the jurors openly cried during the showing of the videotaped deposition of T.N. at the end of the state's case. At the conclusion of the deposition, defense counsel first moved for a mistrial and then moved alternatively to disqualify the juror and to replace her with an alternate juror. The trial court denied both motions. Defense counsel did not request a voir dire of the jury nor of this particular juror. In State v. Stith, 660 S.W.2d 419 (Mo.App. 1983), defendant moved to voir dire the jury because information published in a newspaper article during trial may have caused the jury to form an opinion based on the newspaper article. The trial court overruled the motion. The court of appeals held that such a motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and the exercise of that discretion will be disturbed on appeal only when the record shows a manifest abuse of discretion. The appeals court said the trial court must make a determination as to whether the publicity creates a dangerous, substantial prejudice to the accused. The trial court's denial of the motion did not constitute manifest abuse of discretion and, therefore, was not set aside on appeal. In Stith , the court of appeals cited State v. Schlagel, 490 S.W.2d 81 (Mo.1973), also a newspaper publicity case wherein this Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to question the jury during trial concerning a newspaper article. The Court said that each case must be decided on its facts and in the exercise of the trial court's discretion. It is important to note that, unlike the newspaper cases where the jury was exposed to information not properly a part of the record, in the present case the juror's response was to properly admitted evidence intended to be viewed and considered by the jury. In State v. Woodrome, 758 S.W.2d 136 (Mo.App.1988), the court held that whether the entire panel is tainted by a statement of a panel member is in the trial court's discretion. In deciding there was no abuse of discretion, the court pointed out that [o]rdering a mistrial is drastic and should be done only in circumstances where no other action would remove the prejudice claimed. Id. at 137. Likewise, the substitution of an alternate juror for a regular juror during trial is a matter entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. Milam v. Vestal, 671 S.W.2d 448, 453 (Mo.App.1984), citing 9 C. Wright and A. Miller, § 2484, p. 476 (1971) (replacement of jurors discretionary). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial nor in refusing to replace the crying juror, who was responding to the evidence properly admitted in this case. Defendant's claim of error in this respect is without merit. Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in sustaining the prosecution's objection to evidence of conduct and statements by T.N.'s mother, Cindy Naucke, to show her feelings of bias and prejudice against the defendant. On direct examination of Barbara Ginther, a friend who defendant began dating after he separated from Cindy Naucke, defense counsel asked whether Ms. Ginther had contact with Cindy Naucke since 1985. Ms. Ginther started to relate an incident that had occurred at defendant's house before his marriage to Cindy Naucke was dissolved. Ms. Ginther testified she drove up to the house, the defendant came out to tell her Cindy was there, and Cindy came out and threw a brick. The answer was interrupted by an objection, which the trial court sustained. Defense counsel explained at the bench that this was offered to show Cindy Naucke's ill will toward defendant, which defendant claimed motivated her to make the child abuse charge against defendant. However, defendant made no offer of proof. Although the partial answer, which went into the record ahead of the objection, to some extent discloses the nature of the evidence, it is not disclosed when this incident occurred in relation to the charges that were brought in this case in October 1989. If the incident occurred, as the questioning indicated, before the dissolution of the marriage of defendant and Cindy Naucke, it occurred at least two years prior to the time Cindy Naucke claimed defendant abused T.N. The same type of evidence was rejected in the direct examination of Brad Lewis, a friend of the defendant, called as a witness by defendant. Mr. Lewis had attended Bob and Cindy's wedding on June 25, 1983, and had visited in their home thereafter. He was asked, Did you ever hear Cindy Naucke make any threats to Bob Naucke? The prosecution's objection was sustained and no offer of proof was made. Absent an offer of proof, it is not clear what Mr. Lewis' answer would have been, but assuming it would have been Yes, it is still impossible to tell when such a threat was made. Assuming it was during the marriage of Cindy Naucke and the defendant and before they separated, it would have been from 3½ to 4½ years prior to any allegations of child abuse by Cindy Naucke. Evidence of occurrences or statements of this type at or near the time Cindy Naucke brought the child abuse charges against defendant would be admissible impeachment evidence to show the bias of the witness. Furthermore, such evidence is not limited to cross-examination but may be shown by extrinsic evidence. State v. Johnson, 700 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. banc 1985). However, in Johnson we also stated: Notwithstanding these established evidentiary principles, the authority of a party, and in particular a criminal defendant, to show the existence and extent of a witness' bias, prejudice or hostility is subject to the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. at 817. More importantly, the actions or statements evidencing the bias must be shown by a proper offer of proof to have been close enough in time to the matters at issue to be relevant. In this instance, the absence of such an offer of proof, coupled with what information can be gleaned from the record concerning the timing of these occurrences, fails to demonstrate that they were relevant and admissible. At the very least, the admission of this evidence was discretionary with the trial court under the rule stated in Johnson . The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence. Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred by openly exhibiting bias against him and by injecting itself into the case. Defendant cites Supplemental Legal File p. 1 as support for the claim in his brief that during a break in defendant's direct testimony for a bench conference, the judge yelled at the defendant in the presence of the jury for drinking the court reporter's water. In the handwritten order by the trial judge dated August 30, 1990, page 1 of the Supplemental Legal File, the court acknowledged that during defendant's direct examination, the court admonished defendant that he should not be drinking the court reporter's water. Defendant advised the court that he had received permission to drink the water. This occurrence was an unfortunate misunderstanding, but it did not constitute the sort of thing for which a court on appeal could or would be expected to reverse an otherwise valid conviction. Defendant also complains that the trial court exhibited bias against the defendant by cutting off defendant and refusing to allow him to explain his answers. We have studied the entire record and we do not find evidence of bias either for or against the defendant. We point out that the defendant took the stand to give his own testimony after lunch on Friday afternoon, October 28. The trial judge had given the jury the option of either coming back on Saturday to complete the trial or going over until Monday. The jury decided to return on Saturday. As of the lunch hour on Friday, the defendant still had to give his direct and cross-examination and also call his main expert witness. Furthermore, the court needed to hold the instruction conference, read the instructions to the jury, and complete closing arguments before the case could be submitted on Saturday. Defendant's testimony was completed on Friday afternoon. Defendant called his expert Saturday morning. The expert completed his direct and cross-examination and two rounds of redirect. Instructions were read beginning at 1:20 P.M. Saturday. Closing arguments began immediately thereafter and were completed so that the case was submitted to the jury at 2:55 P.M. Saturday. The jury returned its verdict at 5:55 P.M. that same day. It is undoubtedly true that the trial judge was pushing both counsel during the last day and a half to complete the trial according to the schedule promised to the jury. We do not find evidence of bias toward defendant in these efforts of the trial court to complete the trial in a timely fashion. In State v. Davis, 653 S.W.2d 167, 177 (Mo. banc 1983), we stated that the trial court must maintain a position of absolute impartiality, avoid any conduct which might be construed as indicating a belief on the part of the judge as to the guilt of the defendant and the court should not demonstrate hostility toward the defendant. We reaffirm this important principle, but we do not find in the record in this case evidence of such abuse by the trial court. We note that the defendant in his brief concedes that the written word (the record) completely fails to express the trial judge's hostile demeanor and obvious bias in favor of the state. Nevertheless, defendant asks us to act on faith in finding that the trial court exhibited bias and demonstrated hostility toward the defendant in front of the jury. In Davis we said, The standard for determining if the trial court has acted improperly is whether the trial court's conduct is such as to prejudice the minds of the jury against defendant thereby depriving defendant of a fair and impartial trial. Id. We do not find bias demonstrated in the record by the trial judge against the defendant, and we refuse, as we must, the defendant's invitation to make such a finding outside the record. Defendant's claim that the trial judge exhibited bias and hostility toward the defendant in the presence of the jury is rejected.