Opinion ID: 1548067
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Refusal to Excuse Juror Proper Exercise of Discretion

Text: The State called Raymond Evans as a rebuttal witness. Evans had provided information to the police which had led to Morrisey's arrest. Evans had not been included in the pre-trial witness list. Therefore, before Evans testified, the trial judge asked the jurors if any of them knew Raymond Evans. One juror responded affirmatively to that question. During an in camera hearing, the juror explained that she was employed as a bank teller. Several years before, Mr. Evans had made regular visits to the bank in which the juror worked to make commercial deposits for his mother, who owned a store. The juror's only contact with Evans had been in her capacity as a bank teller. The juror stated that she had not seen Evans for two or three years. In response to questioning by the trial judge, the juror stated that her previous contact with Evans would not affect her ability to remain impartial. Morrisey's defense attorney, out of an overabundance of caution, moved to have the juror excused from further participation in the trial. The Superior Court denied the motion. The Superior Court ruled that there was no indication the juror's previous contact with Evans would affect her impartiality. Morrisey submits that the Superior Court committed reversible error by failing to excuse the juror. The determination of a juror's impartiality is the responsibility of the trial judge who has an opportunity to question the juror, observe the juror's demeanor, and evaluate the juror's ability to render a fair verdict. Skinner v. State, Del.Supr., 575 A.2d 1108, 1120 (1990). See also Weber v. State, Del.Supr., 547 A.2d 948, 953 (1988). The mere fact that a juror is a casual acquaintance of a witness is not a basis for automatic disqualification. Id. (citing Weber v. State, 547 A.2d 948. In this case, the juror stated that her only contact with the witness, Evans, was through her employment as a bank teller. The juror had no contact with the witness for at least two years prior to Morrisey's trial. The juror stated that her previous contacts with the witness would not affect her ability to remain impartial. A trial judge's determination not to discharge a juror, following voir dire, will not be overturned by this Court in the absence of a demonstration of a prejudicial abuse of discretion. Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d at 1121, citing Williams v. State, Del. Supr., 494 A.2d 1237, 1243 (1985). In view of the casual nature of the contact between the juror and the witness, its remoteness in time, and the juror's response to questioning about her ability to render an impartial verdict, the record reflects that the trial judge's decision not to discharge the juror, following voir dire, did not constitute a prejudicial abuse of discretion. Id. This Court finds Morrisey's argument to the contrary is not supported by the record.