Opinion ID: 1351510
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Misener Error

Text: One day prior to the first day of testimony at the guilt phase, the prosecutor moved to compel defense counsel to give a copy of Dr. Maloney's report to the People. Defense counsel responded, Your Honor, I have indicated that I probably will call Dr. Maloney, but I have not made a final decision to call Dr. Maloney, and I don't believe it's necessary this early in the case on that basis to give the prosecution that kind of discovery. [¶] I would object to having to give him such discovery at this time. Acknowledging the motion was somewhat premature since all concerned anticipated Dr. Maloney would testify at the penalty phase only, the trial court ruled that defense counsel would have to turn over a copy of Dr. Maloney's report after the fourth day of testimony at the guilt phase, or the close of the People's case-in-chief, whichever came first. Defense counsel stated [f]or the record, the defendant objects, feels that's too early. (34) Defendant asserts we must reverse the penalty verdict because the trial court's decision to permit prosecutorial discovery was contrary to our decision in In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543 [213 Cal. Rptr. 569, 698 P.2d 637]. In Misener, supra, we were confronted with the constitutionality of section 1102.5, which permitted prosecutorial discovery of statements, oral or written, of any defense witness other than the defendant, after that witness had testified on direct examination. We invalidated the statute on the ground it contravened the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. ( People v. Robbins, supra, 45 Cal.3d 867, 882.) Defendant's trial took place prior to the effective date of section 1102.5, and nearly three years prior to the filing of Misener and our announcement of the principles discussed therein. Even assuming cognizable Misener error here, any such error was clearly not prejudicial to defendant. [19] The prosecutor's cross-examination of Dr. Maloney was a routine inquiry into the doctor's impressions of defendant, a discussion of defendant's low intelligence as evidenced by his scores on standardized intelligence tests, and whether defendant could be malingering. Our review of the record reveals only two instances in which it was apparent the prosecutor was aware of the basis of Dr. Maloney's opinions  since the prosecutor asked about specific reports which the doctor had apparently reviewed at defense counsel's request. However, Dr. Maloney explained that defense counsel provided a wealth of prior reports, and that he could not remember the conclusions of any particular report. In response, the prosecutor read the conclusions from two of these prior reports and asked Dr. Maloney whether he agreed with the statements. The first statement was, That the defendant does not suffer from mental retardation but rather from a long history of a calculated effort not to learn. Dr. Maloney agreed with the first part of that statement, and disagreed with the malingering conclusion. The second statement was, That the defendant attempts to sell his emotional disturbance as being the cause of his crime rather than accept the reality that his crime was more of an answer to economic need. Dr. Maloney testified, I don't think he did that with me. He certainly wasn't presenting himself as emotionally disturbed. In response to the prosecutor's further inquiry whether defendant was manipulative, Dr. Maloney replied, I think he certainly could be and may have been, but I would still say that his overall presentation to me is not similar to what I see when I know people are manipulative or malingering. As is apparent, the prosecutor's advance knowledge of Dr. Maloney's report did not result in prejudicial testimony on cross-examination. We conclude it is not reasonably possible the jury would have rendered a different penalty verdict had the Misener error not occurred. ( People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 448.)