Opinion ID: 1734780
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The court erred in granting jury instruction 6 and jury instruction 9 (originally D-5 and D-6, respectively). The granting of both of these instructions overemphasized and duplicated the language relative to the owner's liability.

Text: ¶ 15. Barrett contends that the trial court erred in giving jury instruction 6, which said: The Court instructs the jury that the mere fact that the yearling escaped from its enclosure and that an accident occurred is not, of itself, evidence of negligence on the part of Harold Parker and you should not infer negligence from the escape of the yearling from its enclosure or the occurrence of the accident involving the plaintiff on Oloh-Purvis Road in Lamar County, Mississippi on June 24, 1996. In support of his argument against this instruction, Barrett claims that since there is no direct proof of how the cow got out, the only way to prove negligence is by inference. While this may be a generally correct statement on Barrett's part, it is not applicable to this particular issue. The jury could infer negligence on Parker's part from other evidence aside from the fact that his yearling was out on the road, such as if his fence was in fact proved to be in poor condition. Furthermore, it would not be impossible for a cow to escape and get onto a nearby road even though its owner was not negligent in any manner in his confinement of the cow. Therefore, allowing the jury to infer negligence by Parker simply because his yearling was loose on the road would not be appropriate. Therefore, the jury was properly instructed with this instruction. ¶ 16. Barrett also contends that the trial court erred in giving jury instruction 9, which stated: You are instructed that the owner of a cow, which has escaped its enclosure and has become located upon a county public road is not necessarily liable for injuries sustained by a motorist who collides with such cow on the roadway. Rather, before a motorist can recover on his claim against the owner of the cow, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the owner of the cow was negligent by proving that the owner: (1) failed to exercise reasonable care to keep the cow from being at large, and (2) that such failure, if any, resulted in the escape of the cow from its enclosure, and (3) that the cow owner's failure to exercise such reasonable care proximately caused injury to the motorist who collided with the cow. If you find that the plaintiff has failed to prove any of these three elements by a preponderance of the evidence, then your verdict must be for Harold Parker d/b/a H.P. Cattle Company. ¶ 17. This instruction correctly sets out the elements which a plaintiff must prove in order to prevail in a negligence action. Barrett claims that jury instructions 6 and 9 over-emphasized and duplicated the language relative to the owner's liability. However, these two instructions say different things. Jury instruction 6 says that negligence can not be inferred just because the yearling got out onto the road, and jury instruction 9 sets out just what Barrett must show in order to prove Parker's negligence. These two instructions are proper statements of the law, they are not in conflict with one another, and they are not repetitive. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting jury instructions 6 and 9 together, and the jury's verdict in favor of Parker should not be disturbed on this ground. VI. The restriction by the court on defendant's motion in limine limiting plaintiff's proof to instances of cows in the road to a period of one year prior to the accident, was erroneous. VII. The court's refusal to allow plaintiff to show previous accidents involving defendant's cows at times exceeding one year prior to the accident, was erroneous. ¶ 18. Admission or suppression of evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Sumrall v. Mississippi Power Co., 693 So.2d 359, 365 (Miss.1997). For a case to be reversed on the admission or exclusion of evidence, it must result in prejudice and harm or adversely affect a substantial right of a party. Terrain Enter., Inc. v. Mockbee, 654 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Miss.1995). Regarding the admission of evidence of prior accidents for the purpose of showing a dangerous condition and notice thereof, this Court has held that [i]n general, the admissibility is limited to conditions of permanency and the evidence must show that former accidents happened under substantially the same circumstances as those existing at the time of the accident. Massey, 216 So.2d at 417. ¶ 19. Rather than absolutely prohibiting all evidence of incidents involving Parker's cattle, the trial court allowed Barrett to introduce this type of evidence as long as these alleged events occurred no more than one (1) year prior to Barrett's accident. This one-year limitation is reasonable under the holding in Massey, as it is certainly possible that the circumstances surrounding any alleged incidents occurring more than one (1) year prior to Barrett's accident may not have existed when Barrett's accident happened. Furthermore, it is questionable whether Barrett could have even proved the incidents which he spoke of in his proffer, said incidents allegedly involving Parker's cattle more than one (1) year before Barrett's accident. He stated to the trial court that he [thought] the proof would show and that Mr. Parker would admit these alleged accidents. Barrett did not, however, purport to offer any evidence more concrete in nature, such as physical evidence, investigative reports of the alleged accidents, etc. Because Barrett was allowed to present some evidence of incidents allegedly involving Parker's cattle, and because it is questionable as to whether Barrett could have even proved the events he spoke of in his proffer, not allowing evidence of alleged incidents occurring more than one (1) year prior to the incident in question did not prejudice or harm Barrett. Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion with his Order in Limine, and that the jury's verdict in favor of Parker should not be disturbed on this ground. ¶ 20. Although Barrett did not specifically raise this as an assignment of error, he did argue in his brief that a change in the law regarding automobile-cattle collisions on county roads is needed. Barrett points out that had this incident occurred on a state or federal designated highway, he would have prevailed under Miss.Code Ann. § 69-13-111 (1991) unless Parker could have proved that he was not negligent in keeping his cattle. It is Barrett's contention that this Court should create a presumption of negligence on cattle owners involving accidents that occur on county roads in Mississippi, the same burden placed on cattle owners involving accidents that occur on federal or state designated highways in this state. However, the Mississippi Legislature, as the law making branch of our government, has declined to create such a presumption; and there is no reason for this Court to do otherwise. Even if we were to adopt Barrett's position, it would not apply retroactively, and therefore, would have no bearing on his case. If Barrett truly wants such a change in the law, he should approach the Legislature, not this Court. Accordingly, the jury's verdict in favor of Parker should not be disturbed based on Barrett's policy argument for a change in the law.