Opinion ID: 2052100
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: attorney's, appraiser's, and accountant's fees

Text: Finally, we address the last area of dispute: The trial court's award to Patti Rae of various fees incurred in this litigation. SDCL 25-4-38 provides that the court, in its discretion, may require one spouse to pay as alimony any money necessary to support the other spouse ... or to prosecute or defend the action. The award of appraiser's and accountant's fees were, pursuant thereto, left to the trial court's discretion. Similarly, the trial court may, at its discretion, allow attorney's fees in divorce cases. SDCL 15-17-7. Award of attorney's fees under SDCL 15-17-7 is a two-step process in that the trial court must determine what constitutes a reasonable fee in the case, then make the further decision of that portion of a party's attorney fees which should be allowed as costs and paid by the other party. Lien v. Lien, 278 N.W.2d 436, 443 (S.D.1979). See also Wallahan v. Wallahan, 284 N.W.2d 21, 27-28 (S.D.1979). In making its award, if any, the trial court should consider the following factors: The property owned by each party; their relative incomes; liquidity of the parties' assets; and whether a party has unreasonably increased the time spent on the case. Johnson v. Johnson, 300 N.W.2d 865, 870 (S.D.1980); Wallahan, 284 N.W.2d at 28. Additional factors to be considered are: The intricacy and importance of the litigation; labor and time involved; the skill required to draw the pleadings; discovery procedures utilized; existence of complicated legal problems; the time required to try the case; whether written briefs were required; and whether an appeal to the Supreme Court is involved. Garnos v. Garnos, 376 N.W.2d 571, 575 (S.D.1985) (citing Holforty v. Holforty, 272 N.W.2d 810 (S.D.1978)). As indicated by Lien and its progeny, the property held by the parties is an essential consideration in awarding attorney's fees. As we are remanding this case for inconsistencies in the property award, we determine that the trial court must likewise reconsider the attorney's fees and other fees awarded in this case. In addition, we note that the trial court's finding of fact regarding fees (No. XXVI) is clearly erroneous. The trial court's findings indicate that Patti Rae's request was for $12,480 in attorney's fees, appraiser's fees of $9,690 in addition to a retainer already paid, and additional accountant's fees of $2,150. The trial court found these fees to be reasonable, yet awarded Patti Rae only $6,500 of her requested attorney's fees, $4,000 in additional appraiser's fees, and no additional accountant's fees. Patti Rae, according to the exhibits at trial, actually requested $19,256 in attorney's fees. She submitted written objections to the erroneous finding, to no avail. Given Patti Rae's limited assets under the trial court's property division scheme, the extensive litigation involved, [3] and Larry's possession of all income-producing property, such inconsistent treatment of her claims was an abuse of discretion under Lien and Garnos. We reject Larry's arguments that the fees awarded were too generous and direct the second trial court to reaward reasonable fees. These would include any legal proceedings hereafter held in the trial court. Patti Rae has submitted a motion for appellate attorney's fees, supported by an itemized statement of services performed and costs. See Cole v. Cole, 384 N.W.2d 312, 317-18 (S.D.1986); Malcolm v. Malcolm, 365 N.W.2d 863, 866 (S.D.1985). We determine that $3,000 is a reasonable amount of attorney's fees for this appeal, and, considering the relative positions of the parties, allow her that amount. MORGAN and MILLER, JJ., concur. SABERS, J., specially concurs. WUEST, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.