Opinion ID: 6327870
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory and International Law Background

Text: Before turning to the specifics of this case, I start by discussing the mandates imposed by the Hague Convention and international and domestic asylum law. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction has the dual purposes of “secur[ing] the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State” and “ensur[ing] that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.” Hague Convention, art. 1, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (“Hague Convention”). Wrongful removals and retentions are those that are “in breach of rights of custody . . . under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention” if “those rights were actually exercised . . . or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.” Id. art. 3. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”), 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–11, implements the Hague Convention. ICARA provides that parents may petition a federal or state court to return children who have been wrongfully removed, id. § 9003(b), and the petitioner must show by a preponderance of evidence “that the child has been wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning of the Convention,” id. § 9003(e)(1)(A). “[A] court in the abductedto nation has jurisdiction to decide the merits of an abduction claim, but not the merits of the underlying custody dispute.” Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1063 (6th Cir. 1996). No. 20-5283 Salame Ajami v. Tescari Solano Page 14 The Hague Convention establishes various affirmative defenses for respondents who oppose children’s return. Two are relevant to this case. The first, found in Article 13(b), applies when “there is a grave risk that [the child’s] return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” The second, found in Article 20, is operative when “[t]he return of the child . . . would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” A respondent must establish these defenses by clear and convincing evidence. 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2). Although these exceptions are “narrow,” they are not insignificant. 22 U.S.C. § 9001(a)(4). This court has previously cautioned against “making the threshold so insurmountable that district courts will be unable to exercise any discretion in all but the most egregious cases.” Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 608 (6th Cir. 2007). These affirmative defenses are important because “the Convention’s mandate of return gives way before the primary interest of any person in not being exposed to physical or psychological danger.” Id. at 609 (internal quotation omitted). The affirmative defenses are implicated when a family has received asylum. To qualify for asylum, a person must have been persecuted or have “a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), incorporated by 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). “In the case of an alien granted asylum,” as is the case with Tescari and her children, “the Attorney General . . . shall not remove or return the alien to the alien’s country of nationality.” Id. § 1158(c)(1)(A). Recognizing the overlap between the Hague Convention’s affirmative defenses and the asylum inquiry, the Fifth Circuit held in Sanchez v. R.G.L., 761 F.3d 495, 510 (5th Cir. 2014), that “[t]he children’s asylum grant . . . is relevant to whether the Hague Convention exceptions to return should apply.” The Fifth Circuit recognized that “[t]he district court makes an independent finding of potential harm to the children,” in part because “the evidentiary burdens in the asylum proceedings and those under ICARA’s framework are different.” Id. Nonetheless, it concluded that “grants of asylum are relevant to any analysis of whether the Article 13(b) or 20 exception applies.” Id. at 511. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court “to No. 20-5283 Salame Ajami v. Tescari Solano Page 15 consider the asylum grants, assessments, and any related evidence not previously considered that relates to whether Article 13(b) or 20 applies.”1 Id. In short, although the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that an asylum grant does not control the outcome of a case brought pursuant to the Hague Convention, the asylum grant is relevant, and the district court should consider it. At least one court outside of the United States has considered the interplay between asylum and the Hague Convention. In A.M.R.I. v. K.E.R., [2011] O.N.C.A. 417 (Can. Ont. C.A.), the Court of Appeals for Ontario that held that the Hague Convention did not require the return of a child who had been granted refugee status. The Canadian court explained: [T]he principle of non-refoulement is directly implicated where the return of a refugee child under the Hague Convention is sought. Nothing in the [Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)] purports to exempt child refugees from the application of s. 115 in a Hague Convention case. Nor does the Hague Convention purport to elevate its mandatory return policy above the principle of non-refoulement. In our view, properly interpreted, the Hague Convention contemplates respect for and fulfillment of Canada’s non-refoulement obligations. Specifically, art. 13(b) of the Hague Convention permits the refusal of an order of return concerning a child, who would otherwise be automatically returnable under art. 12, if “there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” In addition, art. 20 provides for the denial of an order of return if it would not be permitted “by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” In accordance with the interpretive principles set out above, arts. 13(b) and 20 must be construed in a manner that takes account of the principle of non-refoulement. [2011] O.N.C.A. 417 ¶¶ 67–68. The court further explained that “[u]nder both s. 115 of the IRPA and its international human rights obligations, Canada is prohibited from engaging in the refoulement of Convention refugees, including refugee children.” Id. ¶ 71. “Consequently, the exception to return under art. 20 is engaged in cases involving refugee children.” Id. Likewise, “when a child has been recognized as a Convention refugee by the [Immigration and Refugee Board], a rebuttable presumption arises that there is a risk of persecution on return of the child,” 1 After the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the mother withdrew her request for the children’s return, so the district court never considered this issue. Sanchez v. Sanchez, No. SA-12-CA-568-XR, 2015 WL 3448009, at  (W.D. Tex. May 27, 2015). No. 20-5283 Salame Ajami v. Tescari Solano Page 16 which “clearly implicates the type of harm contemplated by art. 13(b) of the Hague Convention.” Id. ¶ 74. The Canadian court’s opinion is “entitled to considerable weight” because it comes from a “sister signatory.” Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 12 (2010) (quoting El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tesng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999)). “The principle applies with special force here, for Congress has directed that ‘uniform international interpretation of the Convention’ is part of the Convention’s framework.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601(b)(3)(B), now codified at 22 U.S.C. § 9001(b)(3)(B)). To summarize: the Hague Convention generally favors the return of children, but its affirmative defenses create exceptions. As both domestic and international courts have recognized, those defenses are implicated when a party has received asylum. With this as background, I turn to Article 13(b), Article 20, and their application in this case.