Opinion ID: 2630606
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of Applicability and Legislative History of Section 63-30-10(18)(c)

Text: ¶ 19 Section 63-30-10(18)(c) retains immunity for governmental entities that cause injury while regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes. The District claims that the sewer vent pipe emissions contained hydrogen sulfide, an arguably hazardous waste under Utah law, and the District should be immune from any injuries arising from the disposal of hydrogen sulfide under section 63-30-10(18)(c). However, the District does not examine the legislative purpose behind section 63-30-10(18)(c) to support the application of that exception here. Rather, the District simply argues that the exceptions contained in section 63-30-10 apply to all governmental entities, and because the District is a governmental entity, the hazardous materials exception must apply.
¶ 20 The court has long held that [w]hen interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to evince the `true intent and purpose of the Legislature.' State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, ¶ 10, 44 P.3d 680 (citing Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)). Ascertaining the true intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting section 63-30-10(18)(c) is particularly important in this case. Adherence to the District's interpretation of section 63-30-10(18)(c) would effectively authorize all governmental entities in Utah, regardless of their mission or purpose, to dispose of hazardous materials and hazardous wastes and then claim immunity from any resulting liability. ¶ 21 `When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's meaning by first looking to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous.' Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, ¶ 14, 54 P.3d 1177 (quoting Blackner v. State Dep't of Transp., 2002 UT 44, ¶ 12, 48 P.3d 949); State Dep't of Natural Res. Div. of Wildlife Res. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75, ¶ 13, 52 P.3d 1257. Where the language of a statute is ambiguous, we may look to the statutory scheme to divine legislative intent. State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, ¶ 25, 4 P.3d 795 (holding that we need look beyond the plain language only if we find some ambiguity). ¶ 22 Justice Howe and I believe that the meaning of section 63-30-10(18)(c) is ambiguous because this subsection does not specifically mention the state agencies to which it applies. The preamble to section 63-30-10 states that [i]mmunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived ... except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from any of the nineteen governmental activities specifically listed. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1997). Justice Howe and I do not believe, however, that when the legislature carved out exceptions to the waiver of immunity that it intended all governmental entities to retain immunity for all of the activities listed therein. No doubt some of the exceptions in 63-30-10 do apply across the board and a plain language reading of the statute is reasonable as applied to such general exceptions as the exercise of discretionary functions, [5] or harms arising from intentional torts. [6] Such exceptions apply on their face to virtually every state agency, regardless of its specific mission. ¶ 23 The logical consequence of Associate Chief Justice Durrant's plain language reading of section 63-30-10, however, is to permit any governmental entity to escape liability for the conduct of its employees, should an employee negligently act beyond his/her statutory authority in breaking up riots and public demonstrations, [7] managing earthquakes and natural disasters, [8] fighting fire, [9] or intervening in dam emergencies. [10] ¶ 24 We believe that such a construction of the statute is unreasonable and requires us to look beyond the plain language of the statute for guidance. [I]n construing a statute, [we] must assume that `each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable.' County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County v. State Tax Comm'n, 944 P.2d 370, 373 (Utah 1997) (quoting Savage Indus., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991)). Our principal goal must be to give effect to the intent of the legislature. As such, we turn to the legislative history of section 63-30-10(18)(c) to determine what the legislature intended to accomplish when it enacted this provision.
¶ 25 The legislative history of section 63-30-10(18)(c) and this court's previous decisions interpreting the Governmental Immunity Act provide insight into the intent and purpose behind the hazardous materials exception. ¶ 26 In 1985, the Utah Legislature passed Senate Bill 58, adding a hazardous materials exception to the waiver of immunity provisions contained in the Governmental Immunity Act. 1985 Utah Laws ch. 169 § 1. Senate Bill 58 amended section 63-30-10 to retain immunity for injuries that arise[] out of the activities of providing emergency medical assistance, fighting fire, handling hazardous materials, or emergency evacuations. Id. ¶ 27 When the Utah Legislature added the hazardous materials exception to section 63-30-10 in 1985, the purpose was to protect firefighters from liability arising from the handling of hazardous materials in emergency situations. See Floor Debate, 46th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Jan. 28, 1985) (Senate Audiograph Disc no. 28) (statement of Sen. Haven J. Barlow) (hereinafter Barlow Statement). Indeed, the title of the bill was An Act ... Amending the Governmental Immunity Act to Extend Immunity to Fire Fighters Engaged in Providing Emergency Medical Services and Removing Hazardous Materials. S.B. No. 58, 46th Utah Leg., 1985. According to the bill's sponsor, Senator Barlow, the purpose of the bill was to ensure that firefighters were immune from liability when facing new hazards such as handling hazardous materials and emergency evacuations. See Barlow Statement; 1985 Utah Laws ch. 169, § 1. ¶ 28 Nothing in the legislative materials from 1985 suggests that the legislature contemplated that the new immunity for handling hazardous materials would be applied to any state activity other than firefighting. Accordingly, the legislative intent behind the 1985 law does not provide support for the District's application of the hazardous material exception to the Lovendahls' nuisance suit. ¶ 29 In 1989, the legislature amended the hazardous materials exception in section 63-30-10, giving the provision its current form. 1989 Utah Laws ch. 268, § 28; Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(18)(c) (1997). The 1989 amendments extended the 1985 language to include immunity for injuries arising from regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes. 1989 Utah Laws ch. 268, § 28. ¶ 30 The 1989 changes to section 63-30-10(18)(c) were also not intended to immunize the District's actions in this case. The 1989 amendments were part of the Underground Storage Tank Act (USTA), a law creating a state administered underground storage tank fund. 1989 Utah Laws ch. 268, § 28; Utah Code Ann. §§ 19-6-401, et seq. (1998). Aimed at dealing with the problem of leaking underground storage tanks, the USTA created a means of compensating persons injured by releases from underground storage tanks containing hazardous materials (such as petroleum). See Floor Debate, 48th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 16, 1989) (Senate Audiograph Disc no. 80) (statement of Sen. Finlinson). The statute establishes regulations with which [underground storage tank] owners and operators must comply to participate in the fund. Wendy M. Lewis, Recent Developments in Utah Law, Legislative Enactments, 1990 Utah L.Rev. 236, 243. ¶ 31 The legislative history of the USTA does not specifically address the amendments to section 63-30-10(18)(c). Nevertheless, the purpose behind the amendment to section 63-30-10(18)(c) is clear in light of the mandates of the USTA. In the event of a release from a petroleum storage tank, the USTA authorizes the Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board to undertake a number of remedial actions, including investigative, abatement, or corrective action, among others. [11] Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-420(2)(b)(i) (1998). Given that purpose, the expansion of section 63-30-10(18)(c) to provide immunity for injuries arising from regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes was logical. After all, the USTA authorizes the State to administer and conduct clean-up efforts following accidental releases of hazardous materials from underground storage tanks. The amendments to section 63-30-10(18)(c) simply ensure that the State will incur no liability when the Hazardous Waste Control Board authorizes or conducts such efforts. ¶ 32 Again, there is nothing in the legislative history of the 1989 amendments to section 63-30-10(18)(c) to suggest that the legislature intended to apply this specific immunity to any state agencies other than those with statutory responsibility for protecting the public from the harms of hazardous materials. ¶ 33 The narrow view Justice Howe and I take today of the applicability of the hazardous waste exception is consistent with previous decisions of this court interpreting other waiver exceptions in the Governmental Immunity Act. The District's immunity claim is highly analogous to previously unsuccessful arguments of other school districts that have acted beyond their limited area of responsibility and then invoked a waiver exception to immunize them from liability. We have previously held, that specific exceptions to the waiver provisions in the Governmental Immunity Act apply only to state agencies responsible for providing public services that specifically relate to those exceptions. ¶ 34 In Williams v. Carbon County Bd. of Ed., 780 P.2d 816, 817 (Utah 1989), a school district resurfaced an elementary school parking lot in a manner that caused surface waters to drain onto the property of a neighboring landowner, flooding and damaging his home. The school district had built a diversion curb on the border of the parking lot to retain surface watersbut this measure failed. Id. The property owner brought suit for damages and the school district claimed absolute immunity from suit under the flood waters management provision in section 63-30-3 of the Governmental Immunity Act. Id. at 817-18; Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1997). That section allows the state to retain immunity for the management of flood waters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by [a] governmental entity. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(3). The school district claimed that the installation of the diversion curb brought it under this provision. We rejected this argument, observing that the school district was engaged in resurfacing a parking lot, not in managing flood waters, for which the school district ha[d] no such statutory responsibility. Id. at 818. (quoting Branam v. Provo Sch. Dist., 780 P.2d 810, 811 (Utah 1989)). We held that in enacting section 63-30-3, the legislature did not intend to immunize the school district from liability for its negligence. Id. Rather, we noted that like private property owners, owners of public property must exercise reasonable care in controlling surface water runoff. Id. ¶ 35 The holding in Williams was supported by Branam v. Provo School District, 780 P.2d 810, (Utah 1989), a companion case to Williams. The plaintiff in Branam, the owner of a home next to an elementary school, filed an action for damages against a school district for its allegedly negligent conduct. Id. at 810. The plaintiff claimed that the school's efforts to remove flood waters from its basementby pumping the water onto a grassy field abutting her property had caused her own basement to flood. Id. at 810. In defense, the school district claimed that it was immune from suit for any injuries caused by its actions, again under the flood waters provision of section 63-30-3 of the Governmental Immunity Act. This court agreed with the plaintiff that the school district could not claim immunity under section 63-30-3 because the school district was acting beyond the scope of the statute. Id. at 812. We held that section 63-30-3 applies only to state agencies that are actually responsible for protecting the public from flood waters, whereas the school was simply pumping water out of its basement like any other property owner seeking to avoid damage to its property from percolating water. Id. at 812. ¶ 36 Our analysis of the legislative purpose behind section 63-30-3 in both Branam and Williams applies directly to the conclusions Justice Howe and I draw about the applicability of section 63-30-10(18)(c) today. It is worth quoting the dispositive portions of Branam at length to demonstrate the similarity in reasoning: [W]e cannot accept the district's argument that in removing water from its basement, the school was engaged as a governmental entity in the management of flood waters so as to confer immunity upon it. Nothing in the language of either section 63-30-3 or any other part of ... the comprehensive flood waters management bill that added [the flood waters provision] indicates that the legislature intended to entirely immunize any entity entitled to the label governmental from anything it might do in any capacity with what could be termed flood waters. In the present case, the district certainly does not fall within the intendment of the statute. It was not charged with the responsibility to deal with flood waters or to construct flood or storm systems, and the school did not act to protect the public at large from flood waters. Its actions were indistinguishable from those any other landowner might have taken to protect its property. As such, it enjoys no immunity from Branam's suit. Id. at 812-13. Similarly, Justice Howe and I cannot accept the argument that the District was engaged as a governmental entity in the act of mitigating or handling hazardous materials or wastes under section 63-30-10(18)(c) when it vented sewer gas out of the sewer line and pumped it onto the property of an adjoining landowner. Justice Howe and I conclude that the District was merely acting as a private landowner abating the presence of offensive odors caused by a defective sewer line. It was not acting as a governmental entity engaged in the authorized disposal of hazardous waste. The District was concerned with protecting only the interests of students and district employees, not with protecting the public at large from the risks associated with handling hazardous wastes. [12] Since its actions were indistinguishable from those of a private landowner, it is subject to the Lovendahls' suit for nuisance. See Sanford v. Univ. of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741, 745 (1971) (holding that waiver of immunity in section 63-30-10(9) permits cause of action for private nuisance based on dangerous or defective public improvement). ¶ 37 The District's attempts to distinguish Williams and Branam are not persuasive. The District suggests these cases are distinguishable because they involve flood waters and the Court relied heavily on the legislative history and the well-known events which prompted the inclusion of this provision in the governmental immunity act. However, both of those cases and the one before us similarly involve governmental entities claiming immunity for acts done in areas beyond their fields of expertise and statutory responsibility. Moreover, it is left unexplained why reliance upon legislative history and well known events distinguishes these cases. Justice Howe and I rely here on the legislative history of section 63-30-10(18)(c), just as we did in Branam and Williams. That events preceding those cases (the one-hundred-year-flood of 1983) were well-known is irrelevant. ¶ 38 The District further argues that it would be unreasonable to apply the requirement that government entities have some statutory responsibility authorizing them to act in the area for which they claim immunity before applying one of the exceptions listed in section 63-30-10. Justice Howe and I do not believe this requirement is unreasonable. In fact, it is only in unusual cases, such as the one at bar, where it will be unclear whether a governmental entity has statutory authority to act in an area to which the exceptions apply. Many of the exceptions apply on their face only to specifically named governmental entities. ¶ 39 Furthermore, in the hard cases, imposing a requirement of statutory responsibility makes for sound public policy. This is because section 63-30-10 includes several waiver of immunity exceptions for governmental functions needed to protect the public from harm. [13] Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1-19)(1997). Requiring that the governmental entity invoking an exception listed in section 63-30-10 actually have some statutory responsibility to act ensures that in a time of public need only those agencies with the training and qualifications required to protect the interests of the public from a particular harm will assume such obligations. Governmental entities that act outside the scope of their statutory responsibilities in their own interestswhich is not necessarily the public interestshould continue to risk legal liability for their conduct. ¶ 40 The District is asking this court to sanction, if not invite, the worst abuses of governmental immunity. Under the District's view, any governmental entity would be authorized to dispose of hazardous waste and claim immunity for any harm arising therefrom. For that matter, the District would have the court apply all of the exceptions listed in section 63-30-10 to all state agencies, without inquiring whether the agency has any mandate to act in those areas. This is not what the legislature intended.