Opinion ID: 2464236
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Instruction on Vicarious Liability

Text: The plaintiff's verdict directing instruction reads as follows: In your verdict you must assess a percentage of fault to defendants Tel-Elec and Gascosage, whether or not plaintiff Brent Ballinger was partly at fault, if you believe: First, the installation of new conductors near the energized conductor at the Iberia rephase was an inherently dangerous activity, and Second, during said installation, Eazy either: failed to maintain proper clearance between the hot phase and the B phase, or failed to keep the B phase under positive control, or failed to adequately ground the B phase, or failed to supply plaintiff Brent Ballinger with rubber gloves, and Third, in any one or more of the respects submitted in paragraph Second, Eazy was thereby negligent, and Fourth, such negligence directly caused or directly contributed to cause damage to plaintiff Brent Ballinger. The term inherently dangerous activity as used in this instruction means an activity which necessarily presents a substantial risk of damage unless adequate precautions are taken. In assessing any percentage of fault to Tel-Elec and Gascosage under this instruction, you must consider the fault of Eazy as the fault of both Tel-Elec and Gascosage. The defendants argue that this instruction is erroneous under our holding in Smith v. Inter-County Telephone Co., 559 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. banc 1977), in which a plaintiff had obtained a verdict on a theory of contractual assumption of liability. The opinion concluded that that theory was not supported by the evidence but that the plaintiff might be able to make a case under the inherently dangerous activity exception to the general rule that a person employing an independent contractor is not liable for the negligence of the contractor. The opinion set forth the elements of this possible claim as follows: (1) performance of the contract necessarily involves some inherently dangerous activity; (2) the activity which caused the damage was reasonably necessary to the performance of the contract and was inherently dangerous; (3) the one contracting with the independent contractor negligently failed to insure that adequate precautions were taken to avoid damage by reason of the inherently dangerous activity; and (4) plaintiff's damage was a direct result of such negligence. Inherently dangerous activity is that which necessarily presents a substantial risk of damage unless adequate precautions are taken. (Emphasis supplied). Id. at 523. The plaintiff contends that the third and fourth specifications departed from prior Missouri law in requiring a showing of continuing negligence on the part of the owner, following the employment of an independent contractor to perform an inherently dangerous activity. He adduces the Restatement (Second) of Torts, in the introductory note to § 416-429, reading as follows: The rules stated in the following §§ 416-429, unlike those stated in the preceding §§ 410-415, do not rest upon any personal negligence of the employer. They are rules of vicarious liability, making the employer liable for the negligence of the independent contractor, irrespective of whether the employer has himself been at fault. They arise in situations in which, for reasons of policy, the employer is not permitted to shift the responsibility for the proper conduct of the work to the contractor. The liability imposed is closely analogous to that of a master for the negligence of his servant. (Emphasis supplied). The plaintiff cites several earlier Missouri cases as being consistent with the Restatement view and inconsistent with Smith, as follows: Loth v. Columbia Theater Co., 197 Mo. 328, 94 S.W. 847, 854 (1906); Carson v. Blodgett Construction Co., 189 Mo.App. 120, 174 S.W. 447, 448 (1915), quoted with approval in Mallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice & Supply Co., 320 Mo. 95, 6 S.W.2d 617, 624 (banc 1928); Stubblefield v. Federal Reserve Bank, 356 Mo. 1018, 204 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Mo.1947); Barkley v. Mitchell, 411 S.W.2d 817, 826 (Mo. App.1967). As the court of appeals points out, the Smith opinion cited the last four of these cases as authentic exposition of the Missouri law, without any indication that it was imposing requirements not previously found in the case law. The court of appeals frankly stated that elements (3) and (4) of the Smith formulation are at war with earlier Missouri case law. It felt bound to follow Smith, but elected to certify the case here because of the importance of the question. The defendants understandably heap lavish praise on the Smith opinion. They recognize that the formulation of elements is inconsistent with the Restatement analysis, saying: Faced with the existence of different rules applicable to this class of cases, the court announced in Smith the rule that Missouri would follow. They find language in some of the Missouri cases suggesting that a plaintiff who relies on the inherently dangerous activity doctrine must demonstrate continuing negligence on the part of the owner. Our examination of the authorities persuades us that the analysis of the court of appeals is correct and that the Smith opinion listed elements not previously required by Missouri case law. That opinion wrote beyond the necessities of the case. The principal holding was that the plaintiff's contractual assumption submission was not warranted. The elements of a correct instruction were not argued by either party. In an attempt to provide guidance the opinion produced confusion. It is far better to make correction now than to perpetuate an erroneous rule of law. The plaintiff took a risk in requesting an instruction that conflicted with Smith, but we now conclude that the instruction was not erroneous. We believe that the Restatement correctly reflects Missouri law and that there was no purpose in Smith to change the governing law. Persons are usually held liable for negligence on the part of those they hire to accomplish their purposes. There is an exception for the hiring of independent contractors responsible to the employer for the result bargained for, but not subject to control as to the means of accomplishment. [4] The exception does not apply if the work contracted for is an inherently dangerous activity. [5] For activities of this kind the owner remains liable for the torts of the contractor, simply for commissioning the activity. The liability attaches without any need for showing that the employer is in any respect negligent. It is purely vicarious. Thus Gascosage is liable because it contracted for the work, and Tel-Elec is liable for procuring Eazy to perform the inherently dangerous activity unless it can establish the defense considered in Part 4. Gascosage takes issue with the definition of inherently dangerous in the plaintiff's verdict directing instruction, arguing that the definition should have included additional language submitted by it as follows: An activity is not inherently dangerous where the risk involved does not arise from the very nature of the activity itself but is a risk which could have been prevented by routine precautions of a kind which a careful contractor would be expected to take. The definition in the verdict director is taken from Smith and is similar in form to several definitions in MAI. [6] The addition suggested by Gascosage, even if it might have some application in other situations, is certainly not appropriate in this case, because the danger arose from the very nature of the activity, i.e., stringing new electrical conductors in close proximity to an energized, or hot, conductor. Tel-Elec raises the hoary argument of roving commission in the disjunctive submission of failed to keep the B phase under positive control. We believe that the submission is sufficiently narrow and that it is consistent with the MAI format. The witnesses explained the meaning of positive control. Evidence showed that the sagging in the new conductors allowed them to move about uncontrollably and that there were means of controlling the sag. The danger of a mobile line near to an energized line is patent. We entertain no doubt that the jury understood the submission. Nor do we perceive that the term installation is so vague as to be subject to the roving commission objection. Only one construction project was described in evidence.