Opinion ID: 3003387
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Taser Gun: De Minimis Application of Force?

Text: As one basis for his decision, the magistrate judge found that the use of the taser gun was a de minimis application of force. We disagree. It is undisputed that the taser sent an electric shock through Lewis’s body strong enough to cause him to fall from the bed and render him helpless while officers secured him and removed him from the cell. As the Supreme Court has said, pain, not injury, is the barometer by which we measure claims of excessive force, see id. at 9, and one need not have personally endured a taser jolt to know the pain that must accompany it, see Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[A] stun gun inflicts a painful and frightening blow [that] temporarily paralyzes the large muscles of the body, rendering the victim helpless.”); see also Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 256 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that a taser “sends an electric pulse through the body of the victim causing immobilization, disorientation, loss of balance, and weakness”). Thus, we hold, as the first rung in the ladder of our analysis, that the use of a taser gun against a prisoner is more than a de minimis application of force. Although such force against an inmate rises above the inconsequential and into the constitutional realm, we reiterate an obvious point: simply because a taser gun’s No. 08-2960 15 use is more than de minimis force does little, if anything, to alter its appropriate use within our detention system. See Hickey, 12 F.3d at 757 (finding a taser’s use more than de minimis only “if inflicted without legitimate reason” (emphasis added)). We remain cognizant of the important role that non-lethal, hands-off means—including taser guns—play in maintaining discipline and order within detention facilities. See Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1267-70 (7th Cir. 1984). Our conclusion merely shifts the focus of our inquiry away from the act and to the actor, away from the objective and to the subjective. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (distinguishing between the objective question of whether an act is “harmful enough” and the subjective question of whether an actor possessed a culpable state of mind); Hickey, 12 F.3d at 756-57. What matters—and what will generally be the decisive factor in cases such as this—is the mindset of the individual applying the force. That is the question to which we now turn.