Opinion ID: 6356486
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consent to enter the premises

Text: We begin with the second issue, due both to its relative simplicity and to its reliance upon the appellate standard and scope of review. As noted, supra n.4, in framing the facts of this case, the Superior Court stated that, when Agent Finnegan knocked on the door, either Romero or Castro answered the door and permitted the authorities to enter the premises. Romero , 138 A.3d at 23 . Romero and Castro assert that the Superior Court erred because, although Agent Finnegan testified to that effect, Romero's testimony directly contradicted Agent Finnegan's account of his entry. Because Romero and Castro prevailed before the suppression court, they argue that a reviewing court may not rely upon Agent Finnegan's contradicted testimony. See Briefs for Romero & Castro at 28-29. Before this Court, the Commonwealth concedes that Romero and Castro did not provide consent to the entry into their home. See Brief for Commonwealth at 20. Instead, the Commonwealth contends that, [u]nder Payton , it was not necessary for [Romero or Castro] to consent because the agents had an arrest warrant for Moreno and reasonably believed he resided at the same dwelling as Romero and Castro. Id. We agree with Romero and Castro that the Superior Court erred. In this regard, the suppression court could not have been more clear, finding as a fact that the police officer did not have the expressed permission to search the property from the defendants. N.T., 2/20/2015, at 53. The only suggestion that Romero or Castro consented to the entry came from Agent Finnegan's testimony, which Romero's account of the events unquestionably contradicted. Because the Court of Common Pleas granted Romero's and Castro's motions to suppress, the Superior Court was not at liberty to consider any of the Commonwealth's contradicted evidence. See Mistler , 912 A.2d at 1268-69 . As such, the Superior Court's statement that either Romero or Castro permitted the authorities to enter the premises was unsupported by the record. Consequently, lacking any claim of consent to Agent Finnegan's entry, the Commonwealth can prevail herein only by establishing a lawful basis for a nonconsensual entry into Romero's and Castro's home.