Opinion ID: 2815840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Rejection of Two Statutory Mitigators

Text: - 30 - In Smith’s next penalty-phase claim, he asserts that the trial court erred in rejecting two statutory mitigators: (1) Smith committed the capital felony while he was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance; and (2) Smith’s ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. When a trial court is considering whether a mitigating circumstance is established, this Court has described the applicable standard as follows: Whenever a reasonable quantum of competent, uncontroverted evidence of mitigation has been presented, the trial court must find that the mitigating circumstance has been proved. A trial court may reject a defendant’s claim that a mitigating circumstance has been proved if the record contains substantial evidence to support the trial court’s rejection of the mitigating circumstance. Hoskins v. State, 965 So. 2d 1, 16 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Nelson v. State, 850 So. 2d 514, 529 (Fla. 2003)). However, with respect to expert psychological evaluations, “expert testimony alone does not require a finding of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.” Heyne v. State, 88 So. 3d 113, 125 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Foster v. State, 679 So. 2d 747, 755 (Fla. 1996)). “Instead, the trial court may disregard expert opinion where it determines that the opinion is unsupported by the facts or conflicts with other evidence.” Id. “A trial court has broad discretion in determining the applicability of a particular mitigating circumstance, and this Court will uphold the trial court’s determination of the applicability of a mitigator - 31 - when supported by competent substantial evidence.” Hoskins, 965 So. 2d at 17 (quoting Philmore v. State, 820 So. 2d 919, 936 (Fla. 2002)). The trial court’s sentencing order provided the following analysis regarding its rejection of the statutory mitigation at issue: 1. The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. During the penalty stage, the defense called Dr. Hyman Eisenstein, a licensed psychologist, to testify about defendant’s mental health. Dr. Eisenstein performed neuropsychological testing and conducted a clinical interview. After his examination, Dr. Eisenstein concluded that Mr. Smith has “unequivocal brain damage” and “brain impairment,” and as a result of these deficits Mr. Smith’s decisionmaking ability is profoundly impaired. While Dr. Eisenstein also suggested Mr. Smith has an Antisocial Personality Disorder, he believes that “brain pathology” better explains Mr. Smith’s behavior. Ultimately Dr. Eisenstein testified that Mr. Smith was under the influence of extreme mental and emotional disturbance and that he lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. To bolster the testimony of Dr. Eisenstein, the defense requested that an MRI and a PET scan be performed. To interpret the results of these tests the defense asked the court to appoint Dr. Ruben Gur to analyze the results. . . . At the Spencer hearing, Dr. Gur testified that the brain testing revealed the existence of frontal lobe damage which has major behavioral consequences for Mr. Smith, and Dr. Eisenstein repeated his previous conclusion that Mr. Smith lacks the ability to control himself in high pressure situations through his inability to control his “amygdala response.” In fact, Dr. Eisenstein testified that Mr. Smith was subject to “amygdala meltdown” in highly stressful situations. Both doctors testified that Mr. Smith’s brain damage inevitably led to disinhibited behavior; nevertheless, both doctors conceded that there was no current scientific consensus on the existence or degree of frontal lobe damage and the corresponding “disinhibited” behavior one might expect to see. To rebut the testimony of Eisenstein and Gur, the State called Dr. Wade Myers to testify at the penalty phase before the jury and Dr. - 32 - Helen Mayberg at the Spencer hearing. In brief, Dr. Myers opined that Mr. Smith had Antisocial Personality Disorder, and Dr. Mayberg opined that her review of the MRI and PET scan showed no brain damage whatsoever. This brief recitation reflects that the opinion of the experts conflicted radically. It is the burden of the defendant to establish the existence of mitigating factors; and it is within the discretion of the Court to reject a statutory mitigator where the defense expert’s testimony is rebutted by another expert. Since the Court finds the testimony of Dr. Myers and Dr. Mayberg more persuasive and convincing, the defendant failed to meet this burden. Even if frontal lobe damage exists (which the court does not find to be the case) there is simply no competent evidence to suggest that on August 3, 2009, Delmer Smith was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance. All of his behavior on the day of the murder and the days after appears cold, calculated, rational, and goal-directed. Based on this evidence, the Court is not reasonably convinced of the existence of this factor. 2. The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. For the reasons discussed in the preceding section the Court finds that the defendant did not meet his burden and this mitigator has not been proved. Smith asserts that the trial court erred in failing to find these two statutory mitigators based on the claim that “Dr. Eisenstein’s opinion was unequivocal and not refuted by another psychologist trained to interpret the neuropsychological testing.” Further, Smith criticizes the State’s expert, Dr. Myers, because Dr. Myers did not perform his own testing for brain damage. While Smith contends that a trial court cannot reject unrebutted mitigation, the cases upon which he relies are factually distinguishable because in those cases, - 33 - unlike here, the mitigation was, in fact, unrebutted. See Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1004-05 (Fla. 2006) (holding that the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigator because the defendant presented six defense mental health experts who testified that the defendant was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the murder, particularly as the State did not offer any expert witnesses to refute such testimony and there was no other rational basis to reject the testimony); Nibert v. State, 574 So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. 1990) (holding that the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigators that the defendant committed the murder while under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance and that his capacity to control his behavior was substantially impaired because (1) the defendant presented an expert who supported those conclusions with a battery of tests and interviews with family members; (2) the record also supported those conclusions; and (3) this evidence was not refuted by the State). In this case, Smith is merely attacking the appropriate weight of the experts’ testimony, and as the trial court recognized, the experts’ opinions varied wildly. In considering all of the evidence presented, the trial court found that the testimony of Dr. Myers and Dr. Mayberg was “more persuasive and convincing.” In addition, the trial court further noted that the evidence did not support that Smith committed the murder while under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance because “[a]ll of his behavior on the day of the murder and the days - 34 - after appears cold, calculated, rational, and goal-directed.” As this Court has held, “[f]inding or not finding a specific mitigating circumstance applicable is within the trial court’s domain, and reversal is not warranted simply because an appellant draws a different conclusion.” Cook v. State, 542 So. 2d 964, 971 (Fla. 1989) (quoting Stano v. State, 460 So. 2d 890, 894 (Fla. 1984)). Because the record provides competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings and the trial court rejected these mitigators based on credibility determinations, we reject this claim. VII. Constitutionality of Florida’s Death Penalty Scheme In his last claim, Smith contends that his death sentence is unconstitutional in light of Ring. However, because the trial court found the prior-violent-felony aggravator and because the jury unanimously recommended the sentence of death, Ring is not implicated. See Gonzalez, 136 So. 3d at 1168; Crain v. State, 894 So. 2d 59, 78 (Fla. 2004). This claim is therefore without merit and does not implicate the issues raised in Hurst v. State, 147 So. 3d 435 (Fla. 2014), which the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review. Hurst v. Florida, 135 S. Ct. 1531 (2015).