Opinion ID: 669625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Bregantini

Text: 24 Bregantini contests the district court's finding for sentencing purposes that the loss attributable to the conspiracy was $455,000. The court arrived at that figure based on the following calculations. Approximately 750 credit card account numbers were found in Faries' jail cell. Inquiries were sent to each of those account holders, asking whether their account numbers had been used without authorization. Approximately 250 card holders responded, some indicating that their account numbers had been fraudulently used, others indicating that theirs had not. The total amount of fraudulent use on those 250 accounts was approximately $135,000. The court then multiplied that figure by three (to account for the fact that only 1/3 of the account holders had responded to the inquiry) to arrive at an estimated loss amount of $405,000 for the credit card fraud. The court then added $50,000 to reflect Federal Expense items and other losses incurred by a variety of other individuals in connection with the scheme. (Tr. V. 35 at 35.) 25 Guidelines section 2F1.1(b)(1), which applies to offenses involving fraud, provides for a base offense level of six, to be increased depending on the amount of probable or intended loss. Bregantini was sentenced under subsection (H) of the guideline, which provides for a seven-level increase for offenses involving a loss amount of $200,001-$500,000. 5 The district court's loss calculation is a factual finding that we review for clear error, although the meaning of loss for purposes of section 2F1.1 is a question of law that is subject to de novo review. United States v. Chevalier, 1 F.3d 581, 585 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Strozier, 981 F.2d 281, 283 (7th Cir.1992). 26 Here, Bregantini argues that the district court's calculation of loss amount is not supported by the record and was impermissibly based on pure speculation and gross estimates. (Bregantini brief at 12.) Application note 8 to section 2F1.1 provides: 27 The amount of loss need not be precise. The court is not expected to identify each victim and the loss he suffered to arrive at an exact figure. The court need only make a reasonable estimate of the range of loss, given the available information. The estimate may be based on the approximate number of victims and an estimate of the average loss to each victim, or on more general factors, such as the nature and duration of the fraud and the revenues generated by similar operations. 28 The district court did just that. The figure of $135,000 for the 250 cards is undisputed. 6 That figure provided a basis from which to estimate the average loss to each victim, which is precisely what the court did. 7 Even if the loss to the 500 non-respondents was not actual, it was certainly fair to calculate the intended loss to those accounts based on the known loss to the 250 accounts. 8 Bregantini's contention that the guideline does not apply to intended losses is simply without merit. See, e.g., United States v. Holiusa, 13 F.3d 1043 (7th Cir.1994). In addition, the application note requires only a calculation of the range of loss. Thus, although the district court did arrive at a specific figure, the relevant fact for sentencing purposes is only that Bregantini fell within the range of $200,001-$500,000. There is no doubt that the court's calculation of actual or intended loss was not clearly erroneous at least within that range. 29 Finally, Bregantini argues that he should not be sentenced based on the evidence relating to Faries, because not all of Faries' activity was reasonably foreseeable to Bregantini. In United States v. Edwards, 945 F.2d 1387, 1391 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1590 (1992), we held that there are two limiting factors on the use of conduct in calculating the sentence of a conspiracy defendant. The conduct must be 1) in furtherance of the conspiracy and 2) reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. Bregantini does not content that the conduct was not in furtherance of the conspiracy, but argues only that it was not reasonably foreseeable to him. A defendant need not have engaged in the conduct himself in order for the conduct to be reasonably foreseeable to him. Instead he may be held accountable for the conduct if he either knew or reasonably should have known of the conduct. Id. at 1394. We explained in Edwards that conduct of co-conspirators ... can be considered 'reasonably foreseeable' to a particular defendant if that defendant has demonstrated a substantial degree of commitment to the conspiracy's objective, either through his words or his conduct. Id. Here, the evidence clearly established that Bregantini demonstrated a substantial degree of commitment to the conspiracy's objectives. The intercepted telephone conversations between Bregantini and Faries make clear that the two were at the center of the conspiracy. Bregantini was involved in coordinating all aspects of the conspiracy--obtaining credit card numbers, coordinating the shipment and receipt of fraudulently obtained merchandise, and distributing telephone access codes. 30 The application notes to Guidelines section 1B1.3 provide further insight into the meaning of reasonable foreseeability. The following example sheds light on application of the requirement under the facts of this case: 31 Defendants F and G, working together, design and execute a scheme to sell fraudulent stocks by telephone. Defendant F fraudulently obtains $20,000. Defendant G fraudulently obtains $35,000. Each is convicted of mail fraud. Defendants F and G each are accountable for the entire amount ($55,000). Each defendant is accountable for the amount he personally obtained under subsection (a)(1)(A). Each defendant is accountable for the amount obtained by his accomplice under subsection (a)(1)(B) because the conduct of each was in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity and was reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity. 32 U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3, Application Note 2(c)(2). 9 As in that example, Bregantini was involved with Faries in designing and executing the scheme. He can therefore be sentenced based on the full loss amount attributable to the scheme, even though he may not have been aware of each of Faries' separate transactions.
33 The district court departed upward from criminal history category I to category II to account for two instances of past criminal conduct that were not otherwise accounted for because they had not resulted in criminal charges or convictions. These included participation in a 1985 credit card fraud scheme and a 1986 nightclub arson. Although no charges had been brought in connection with these offenses, the government presented witnesses and other evidence implicating Bregantini. Bregantini presented no contrary evidence, and the court found that these past offenses had been established by a preponderance of the evidence. Bregantini's PSR included several additional past offenses that had resulted in arrest but not conviction, which the district court did not consider in determining Bregantini's criminal history category. Guidelines section 4A1.3 provides: 34 If reliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, the court may consider imposing a sentence departing from the otherwise applicable guideline range. 35 Bregantini argues that the court should not have considered the past offenses under that guideline, because they had not resulted in criminal charges or, of course, conviction. But conviction is not a necessary prerequisite to a section 4A1.3 departure. Included among the information the court may consider, for example, the guideline lists prior similar adult criminal conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.3(e). 10 Bregantini argues that even if conviction is not required, arrest should be a minimal prerequisite. But that distinction is not supported by the case law. Indeed, we have held that an arrest record alone does not constitute reliable information for purposes of section 4A1.3, but that the court must look to the facts that underlie it. United States v. Terry, 930 F.2d 542, 545-46 (7th Cir.1991). By the same token, the lack of an arrest is not particularly instructive, when the government has established the criminal conduct by a preponderance of the evidence. In United States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d 1330, 1332 (7th Cir.1990), we held that the court could depart even on the basis of conduct for which the defendant had been acquitted. We explained that the relevant question for sentencing purposes is whether the past conduct has been established by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1333. Because the government succeeded in meeting that standard here, the court's departure on the basis of the past conduct was appropriate. 36 Bregantini also argues that the departure was inappropriate because his criminal history is not comparable to that of defendants who belong in Category II. That argument is without merit. Category II applies to defendants who have two or three criminal history points. Two criminal history points requires only one prior sentence of incarceration of at least sixty days. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.1(b). Having determined that the court properly considered the two past offenses, it is clear that they are at least analogous to conduct that would produce two criminal history points. 37 Bregantini also objects to the district court's indication that the departure would have been alternatively warranted under section 5K2.5 because the amount of loss had been underassessed. The court stated, the loss that is assessed here is substantially greater than that that has been tabulated, and that in and of itself would in the court's judgment justify a departure upward in this case (Tr. V. 36 at 80.) and increasing it to category II ... also would address the 5K2.5 loss that the court determined was appropriate here (Id. at 83). But, we need not address the question of whether a 5K2.5 departure would have been appropriate because, despite the court's indication that section 5K2.5 would have provided an alternate ground for departure, the court did not in fact depart on that basis. The court's comments were therefore essentially gratuitous and not relevant to our review.
38 Finally, Bregantini argues that the district court engaged in impermissible double counting when it increased his offense level by two for more than minimal planning under Guidelines section 2F1.1(b)(2) and by four because he was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive pursuant to Guidelines section 3B1.1(a). 39 As Bregantini acknowledges, however, we have previously considered and rejected this argument in United States v. Boula, 932 F.2d 651, 654-55 (7th Cir.1991). As in Boula, the two increases in this case clearly account for two different aspects of Bregantini's offense. The section 2F1.1(b)(2) increase is justified to account for the more than minimal planning, which is deemed present in any case involving repeated acts over a period of time, unless it is clear that each instance was purely opportune. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 2F1.1, Application Note 2; U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.1, Application Note 1(f) (1988 Ed.). The section 3B1.1 increase, on the other hand, reflects Bregantini's leadership role in the scheme.