Opinion ID: 2158865
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Prejudice to the Defendant from the Delay

Text: As everyone knows ... memories fade, evidence is lost, and the burden of anxiety upon any criminal defendant increases with the passing months and years. [41] Thus, the prejudice prong should be considered in light of three of defendants' interests that the speedy trial right was designed to protect: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. [42] Although Middlebrook raised only the third interest, impairment of his defense, as a claim of prejudice, we shall address all three. [43] First, lengthy pretrial incarceration has a destructive effect on human character and makes the rehabilitation of the individual offender much more difficult. [44] In addition, time spent in jail awaiting trial by one presumed innocent until proven guilty often means loss of a job, disrupts family life, and enforces idleness. [45] Imposing these consequences on anyone who has not yet been convicted is serious. [46] Second, even if an accused is not incarcerated prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged ... by living under a cloud of anxiety. [47] Although there is no clear record or finding on this issue, Middlebrook was presumptively prejudiced to at least some extent by anxiety and concern regarding the delay of his trial. Finally, we review whether Middlebrook's defense at trial was impaired by the delay. This type of prejudice, while not the only type recognized by the Sixth Amendment, is the most serious ... because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. [48] Not only is impairment of a defendant's defense the most serious type of prejudice, but also it is the most difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove because time's erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony `can rarely be shown.' [49] Furthermore, whether the delay has hurt the defense,... is not a point to be resolved with mathematical certainty. [50] The State claims that Middlebrook's defense was not prejudiced by the delay of almost four years because he has not demonstrated that the delay weakened his ability to raise specific defenses, elicit specific testimony, or produce specific items of evidence. But, the State ignores the fact that, during the inordinate delay, witnesses' memories presumptively faded, and Middlebrook lost contact with an alleged exculpatory witness who moved out-of-state. During this delay, Middlebrook also was convicted and sentenced to prison on a set of unrelated charges stemming from another shooting. Those sentences have been appealed on other grounds and are now pending review by this Court. Nevertheless, the conviction on those other charges was used against Middlebrook when he testified at trial in this case. Consequently, we find that Middlebrook's defense in this case was compromised by the egregious pretrial delay. Thus, the fourth factor of the Barker test, prejudice to the defendant, also weighs in favor of Middlebrook because of his disturbingly long pretrial incarceration, the attendant anxiety and concern, and the unrebutted presumption that his defense was impaired by the egregious pretrial delay of 1,312 days. Having found that each of the four Barker test factors weighs in favor of Middlebrook, we hold that the egregious pretrial delay of almost four years violated Middlebrook's right to a speedy trial guaranteed both by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution.