Opinion ID: 175285
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Snyder’s Federal Discrimination Claims5

Text: The District Court properly restricted the relevant period of alleged discrimination attributable to Baxter to November 10, 2006 (or 300 days prior to Snyder’s September 6, 2007 EEOC filing) to February 28, 2007 (the day on which Snyder and Baxter’s 5 Snyder’s brief on appeal does not specifically address his intention to appeal the District Court’s dismissal of his state law discrimination claims, or his state and federal retaliation claims. Indeed, Snyder conceded before the District Court, that any claims against Baxter that he . . . asserted under the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act . . . are time barred. The PHRA has a 180 [day] limitations period relating to a charging party's administrative filing, and it is undisputed that Snyder’s EEOC Charge, which was cross filed with the [Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission], was filed more than 180 days after Snyder ceased to be employed by Baxter. (Supplemental App. at 4 n.2.) The District Court noted Snyder’s concession and, in quick fashion, dismissed his state law claims. This Court agrees. The statute of limitations is shorter under the PHRA than under the ADA or ADEA; claims must be filed within 180 days after the alleged act of discrimination. See 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 959(h). Since Snyder cross-filed his EEOC Charge with the PHRC on September 10, 2007, the earliest date upon which he could assert a PHRA claim is March 10, 2007. Snyder was no longer employed by Baxter on that date. Thus, no state law claim can be maintained against Baxter. Further, the Complaint makes no allegation of retaliation preceding February 28, 2007, the day on which Snyder ceased to be employed by Baxter. Indeed, as even Snyder recognizes, the earliest date on which any complaint of retaliation could be asserted is September 6, 2007, the date Snyder filed his EEOC Charge. (See J.A. at 14 (“[Snyder] has been subject to ongoing and continuous age and disability/perceived disability harassment and discrimination since he filed his EEOC Charge. No corrective action has been made, this is in retaliation for his filing a complaint. . . . Fenwal has not addressed employment diversity issues under Title VII and in fact encourages and perpetuates retaliation against Plaintiff for filing a complaint.”) (emphases added).) Baxter cannot be held liable for retaliating against Snyder. Baxter ceased to have any employment relationship with Snyder several months prior to Snyder filing his EEOC Charge. The District Court properly dismissed Snyder’s state law claims and retaliation claims. 7 employment relationship ceased). The Complaint contains no specific allegations of discrimination within the relevant period. Nonetheless, Snyder contends that the District Court erred by failing to consider that the Complaint and the EEOC Charge established “a colorable statement of the facts and claims sought to be litigated.” (Appellant’s Br. at 11.) Snyder asserts that his Complaint described in general terms, “an atmosphere of age based jokes, cartoons, and innuendo which went unabated from 1990 to 2007.” (Id.) Despite Snyder’s vague allegations of unyielding discrimination and hostile work environment, he seeks to invoke the continuing violation doctrine to resurrect his now moribund claims. Under the continuing violation doctrine, “when a defendant’s conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period; in such an instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would otherwise be time barred.” Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir. 1991). Curiously, Snyder fails to allege any specific act of discrimination that occurred within the statute of limitations period. Snyder cannot revive his time-barred allegations of discrimination or hostile work environment without alleging at least one specific, timely violation.6 6 Before the District Court, however, Snyder, apparently understanding the deficiencies of his Complaint, submitted an affidavit containing three specific allegations of age and disability discrimination. Snyder claimed that in November 2006 and January 2007, a coworker made “statements that were negative and demeaning with respect to age.” (J.A. Vol II at 22.) Snyder also alleged that “because of my disability related to my back,” he 8 Upon review of the Complaint and the EEOC Charge, we agree with the District Court that Snyder has failed to allege sufficient facts to withstand Iqbal’s and Twombly’s plausibility standard.