Opinion ID: 2975633
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retail Fraud

Text: Points assessed for a conviction for offenses committed prior to age 18 vary. Three points are added “[i]f the defendant was convicted as an adult and received a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month.” USSG § 4A1.2(d)(1). In other cases, (A) add 2 points under § 4A1.1(b) for each adult or juvenile sentence to confinement of at least sixty days if the defendant was released from such confinement within five years of his commencement of the instant offense; (B) add 1 point under § 4A1.1(c) for each adult or juvenile sentence imposed within five years of the defendant’s commencement of the instant offense not covered in (A). USSG § 4A1.2(d)(2). Defendant pleaded guilty to retail fraud and was sentenced to six months probation on September 5, 2000. Defendant asserts on appeal that the conviction should not have been counted because the sentence for retail fraud was imposed more than five years before the commencement of the instant offense. However, the application notes clarify that the term “commencement of the instant offense” includes any relevant conduct. USSG § 4A1.2 cmt. n.7. Because there is no question that the defendant was engaged in relevant conduct within five years of the sentence for retail fraud, it was not clearly erroneous to assess one point for this conviction.3 3 Defendant states that the sentence of probation for retail fraud was unlawful because it did not include any term of imprisonment. While the retail fraud statute does not include probation among the listed penalties, Michigan law provides that probation is an available sentence except when excluded by statute. See MICH . COM P . LAW S ANN . § 771.1 (except in certain prosecutions (i.e., murder, treason, criminal sexual conduct, armed robbery or major controlled substance offenses) a criminal defendant may be placed on probation if the court finds that he is not likely to engage again in offensive or criminal conduct and the public good does not require that the defendant suffer the penalty imposed by law). No. 06-1943 9 2. Attempted Assaulting, Resisting or Obstructing an Officer The district court overruled defendant’s objection to the addition of one point for his prior conviction under Michigan law for misdemeanor attempted assaulting, resisting, or obstructing an officer. Defendant argues, as he did at sentencing, that the conviction should have been excluded under USSG § 4A1.2(c)(1), which provides that certain offenses, including “Resisting Arrest” and “offenses similar to [resisting arrest] by whatever name they are known,” are not to be used to calculate a defendant’s criminal history unless the prior offense was similar to the instant offense, the defendant was given probation of at least one year, or the defendant was sentenced to a term of at least 30 days’ imprisonment. Since defendant’s prior sentence was for 10 days or $280 fine, and because the offense was not similar to the instant offense of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, the sentence may be excluded from defendant’s criminal history if it was for resisting arrest or an offense similar to resisting arrest. Although the judgment is not part of the record on appeal, there seems to be no dispute that defendant’s conviction was for misdemeanor attempted violation of § 750.81d(1), which makes it unlawful for one to assault, batter, wound, resist, obstruct, oppose or endanger a person who he knows or has reason to know is an officer performing his duties. M ICH. C OMP. L AWS A NN. § 750.92(3) (Attempt). Although misdemeanor resisting arrest would normally be excluded by USSG § 4A1.2(c)(1), in this case the PSR concluded that the conviction should be counted because a review of the court documents reflected that the conviction had the additional element of assault. The district judge counted No. 06-1943 10 the conviction, indicating that the charging document included assault. In determining the similarity of offenses under § 4A1.2(c), district courts should consider “the similarity between the ‘essential characteristics’ of the activity underlying the offense of prior conviction and those underlying the listed offenses.” United States v. Cole, 418 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 2005). While attempted assaulting, resisting, or obstructing an officer would seem to encompass both assault and resisting arrest, we need not resolve this issue because any error in counting this conviction would be harmless error. That is, whether defendant is assessed two or three criminal history points, his criminal history category would still be II. As a result, any error in counting this conviction would have no affect on the defendant’s sentencing guideline range. 3. Downward Departure A downward departure in criminal history category may be warranted under USSG § 4A1.3(b) “[i]f reliable information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially over-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes[.]” As defendant concedes, the refusal to grant a downward departure under the guidelines is not reviewable on appeal unless the record reflects that the district judge was not aware of or did not understand his discretion to make such a departure. United States v. Puckett, 422 F.3d 340, 345 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1122 (2006). Although a defendant remains free to argue that his sentence was unreasonable post-Booker, no such argument has been made in this case. Id. at 344-45. Rather, defendant argues that the following comments suggest that the district No. 06-1943 11 judge did not recognize his authority to depart downward: THE COURT: I think so. I think so. Your argument is preserved, Mr. Hills, but . . . the problem with these so-called guidelines, and they are socalled, is that they make me arrive at something, and obviously there’s a, Well, you can’t believe this person. Well, it’s not objected to. If it’s not objected to, according to the guidelines I have to conclude that it can be used. So your objection is noted, but it’s clearly overruled. I think if anything the benefit of the doubt was given to [the defendant], plus all this money plus the Lincoln Navigator. I mean, . . . this isn’t a close call. Even cursory examination of the transcript makes evident that these comments were directed to the question of what quantity of drugs would be attributed to the defendant from the facts set out in the PSR. Indeed, when defense counsel specifically asked for a downward departure, the district judge denied the motion with the following explanation: THE COURT: Well, a criminal history level of I, I think that’s where defense counsel wishes me to go in this matter, would be as though he had no record whatever or as though what he had was of no significance. And here’s a 22-year-old individual who has not only a series of driving offenses—some of which, I might add, have occurred since the guilty plea [and were still pending at the time of sentencing]—but we have certainly some criminal behavior here that’s of some note. This II does not overrepresent his record. If it were a III or IV, maybe we could look at it a little differently. But no, no, I think this criminal history level of II is appropriate under the circumstances. . . . [I]t might underrepresent, but it certainly doesn’t overrepresent Mr. Punschke’s record as he presently stands here. . . . It was not necessary for the district judge to explicitly state that he knew he had the authority to grant a departure. Puckett, 422 F.3d at 346; United States v. Byrd, 53 F.3d 144, 145 (6th Cir. 1995). Here, the district judge recognized his authority to depart downward, and concluded that a downward departure was not warranted in this case. Consequently, the No. 06-1943 12 refusal to depart downward under § 4A1.3(b) is unreviewable on appeal. AFFIRMED.