Opinion ID: 2709717
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Extortion and blackmail”

Text: Hogan also argues he was defamed by three statements suggesting his actions amounted to extortion and blackmail. In particular, he argues the articles’ reports that he was “accused of extortion” falsely suggest that he was accused of a crime and are therefore either directly defamatory or defamatory by implication. False accusations of criminal conduct can be defamatory, of course, and the crime of extortion is on the books in most jurisdictions. For instance, Utah’s criminal code defines extortion as obtaining or exercising control over the property of another by making one of a list of specified threats, including threatening to “reveal any information sought to be concealed by the person threatened.” Utah Code. Ann. § 76-6-406. But accusations of extortion are a familiar rhetorical device. We all know of colloquial or hyperbolic uses of the term. Although the term has a derogatory meaning when used either way, we cannot assume that the term always refers to a crime or similarly heinous conduct. Like with other words, context matters. In this case, no reasonable reader would interpret the articles’ statement that Hogan was accused of extortion to mean that Hogan was being accused of a crime or even especially sharp behavior. Both articles accurately report that the 6 (...continued) because we have concluded that these statements cannot sustain defamatory meanings, we need not reach the issue of whether the statements are subject to the fair report privilege. -16- accusation was made by UTOPIA’s lawyer in a letter discussing the parties’ employment dispute. In the letter, UTOPIA objected to Hogan’s plans to go public with his allegations of favoritism, and that strategy “at least as he frames the matter and perceives UTOPIA’s interests and vulnerabilities, go[es] by the names of ‘blackmail’ and ‘extortion.’” App. 316. No objective reader would believe, after reading the word “extortion” in context, that Hogan had committed a crime. Instead, the reasonable reader would realize not only that the accusation was made in the heat of a nasty employment dispute but also that the objectionable terms were merely hyperbole and rhetorical flourish. “[E]ven the most careless reader must have perceived that the word [extortion] was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered [the plaintiff’s] negotiating position extremely unreasonable.” Greenbelt, 398 U.S. at 14 (discussing a similar use of the word “blackmail”). Hogan also argues the FierceTelecom article’s headline, “UTOPIA contractor faces extortion charges,” can be read to report that Hogan has been accused of committing a crime. Hogan further claims that, even if the body of the article clears up the matter, the headline is still defamatory. The Utah courts have not addressed whether a headline alone can be considered defamatory. The majority of jurisdictions hold that a headline cannot be severed from the body of the article when undertaking defamation analysis; the entire body of the article serves as the context for the headline and must be -17- considered in determining whether a headline has a defamatory meaning. See Salzano v. N. Jersey Media Grp., 993 A.2d 778, 793 (N.J. 2010)) (“[T]he headline is not to be considered in a vacuum but must be viewed on the backdrop of the entire report. . . . Indeed, we presume that the public reads the entire article when we assess its fairness and accuracy.” (citing Molin v. Trentonian, 687 A.2d 1022, 1023–24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (“[T]he majority of jurisdictions support the rule that headlines are to be construed in conjunction with their accompanying articles.”)); see also Donald M. Zupanec, Libel by Newspaper Headlines, 95 A.L.R.3d 660 (1979) (“[I]t generally has been held that a headline must be construed together with the article to which it refers. In following this rule of construction, it has at times been held that defamatory language in a headline was cured by language in the body of the accompanying article.”). Because, as we have described, the body of the article defuses any defamatory meaning the headline might have alone, Hogan cannot prevail under the majority rule. But Hogan asks us to instead apply the rule set forth in § 563 of the Restatement of Torts. Under this rule, “the text of a newspaper article is ordinarily not the context of the headline . . . because the public frequently reads only the headlines of a newspaper or reads the article itself so hastily or imperfectly as not to realize its full significance.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 563 cmt. d (1977); see also Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Franklin, 329 P.2d 867, 870 -18- (Nev. 1958) (“The text of a newspaper article is not ordinarily the context of its headline, since the public frequently reads only the headline.”); see also Burgess v. Reformer Publ’g Corp., 508 A.2d 1359, 1363 (Vt. 1986) (“[W]e cannot subscribe to the theory that a newspaper is entitled to a summary judgment where it prints a nonlibelous article under a libelous headline.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The reasoning underlying this approach is that, because we expect much of a newspaper’s readership to see only the headline, a newspaper cannot rely on the body of the article to clear up any defamatory misapprehensions. But we disagree that the headline should always be disassociated from the context of the entire article. We start with the fundamental principle requiring that a statement be read in context. The Restatement does not challenge this principle; it indicates simply that “the text of a newspaper article is ordinarily not the context of the headline.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 563 cmt. d (1977). But in this case, no reasonable reader would assume that the headline told the whole story and take it at face value. The reader instead would realize that the publisher was advertising a full article on a dispute and the body of the article would provide context for the headline. As one commentator put it, “[a] headline cannot, of course, set forth all the details of an article or capture completely its tone. It is not actionable for doing what it is supposed to: interest the reader in perusing the article proper. That it ‘teases’ the reader into reading further is not blameworthy, so long as the headline is not misleading.” Robert D. Sack, Sack -19- on Defamation § 2:4.6 (2013). What is more, in this case the headline’s context was readily accessible. With one mouse click, any reader could access the full story and would readily realize the nature of the accusation. In rejecting Hogan’s contention that the headline in this case should be read in isolation, we do not imply that a headline standing alone can never give rise to a defamation action. This would be a different case if the headline had been disloyal to the context of the article. 7 But Hogan does not contend that the headline is altogether out of step with the article; his objection to the headline is that it is ambiguous. The FierceTelecom headline could possibly mean that Hogan was being prosecuted for the crime of extortion or that a lay person had accused him of attempting to intimidate UTOPIA. 8 One meaning is false, and one meaning is true. Reasonable readers would identify this ambiguity and, before 7 See, e.g., Sprouse v. Clay Commc’n, Inc., 158 W. Va. 427, 441 (1975) (“Generally where the headline is of normal size and does not lead to a conclusion totally unsupported in the body of the story, both headlines and story should be considered together for their total impression. However, where oversized headlines are published which reasonably lead the average reader to an entirely different conclusion than the facts recited in the body of the story, and where the plaintiff can demonstrate that it was the intent of the publisher to use such misleading headlines to create a false impression on the normal reader, the headlines may be considered separately with regard to whether a known falsehood was published.”). 8 As we have discussed, “extortion” can be used colloquially or to refer to a crime. Similarly, “charged” can mean a person has been informally called to account for any sort of wrongdoing, or it can mean he was formally charged with a crime. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 307 (2002). -20- assuming they knew what had happened, would proceed to the text of the article for clarification. But, even if we were to apply strictly the Restatement’s instruction that a headline should stand alone, Hogan would not prevail here because he is not named in the headline. A curious reader would have to explore the body of the article to learn who had been accused of extortion, and, in doing so, would learn about the employment dispute and the nature of the accusation. See Crall v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 1992 WL 400713 at  (S.D. Ohio Nov. 6, 1992) (“Where the plaintiff’s name was not contained in the headline, the article and the headline must be construed together as one document to determine whether the newspaper article was libelous to the plaintiff.” (quoting Ledger–Enquirer Co. v. Brown, 105 S.E.2d 229, 230 (Ga. 1958)). But wait, Hogan says, he is named in the first paragraph of the article, so a busy reader would quickly find out he was the UTOPIA contractor facing extortion charges. He thus encourages us to read in isolation the headline and the article’s first sentence because FierceTelecom published that excerpt of the article on its homepage. He essentially argues this court should read a headline and any excerpt or teaser that a publisher features on a homepage in isolation, as if they constituted a standalone article. But reasonable readers would recognize that the short excerpt of the news article here does not tell the full story; and, if readers want the full story, they will scroll through the rest of the article. -21- Finally, Hogan complains of the articles’ descriptions of the behaviors that gave rise to UTOPIA’s extortion accusation. For instance, KSL reported that Hogan’s attorney “sent written notices to UTOPIA threatening to file a lawsuit and noting that Hogan would bring unfavorable public scrutiny to UTOPIA unless specific demands of Hogan’s were met.” App. 132. Hogan contends this misrepresents the intent of the letters. But the letters themselves refute this position; the articles’ characterizations of those letters are substantially true.9 Because none of the statements in the articles are defamatory or defamatory by implication, the district court correctly dismissed those claims.