Opinion ID: 2627593
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unlawful

Text: ¶ 13 This court has not previously determined the meaning of unlawful as it is used in the slayer statute. Hoge stipulated to the fact that he met the requirements for first degree murder when he killed Pamela and James. [6] However, Hoge argues that a person found not guilty by reason of insanity cannot have acted unlawfully because insanity is a complete defense that absolves a defendant of all criminal responsibility. See State v. Crenshaw, 98 Wash.2d 789, 793, 659 P.2d 488 (1983). Because the legislature used the phrase not guilty by reason of insanity rather than guilty but insane, Hoge argues his analysis follows legislative intent. But, a criminal conviction is not an indispensable requisite for determining that a person is a slayer under the statute. Leavy, 20 Wash.App. at 507, 581 P.2d 167. One can be determined to be a slayer without going through any criminal proceeding whatsoever. While a criminal conviction may be offered as evidence to establish that an individual is a slayer in a civil action, it does not follow that the lack of a criminal conviction forecloses the possibility that one acted unlawfully. ¶ 14 Black's Law Dictionary defines unlawful as [n]ot authorized by law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1574 (8th ed.2004). In order to establish an insanity defense, the defendant must show that, as a result of a mental disease or defect, he was unable to perceive the nature and quality of the act or that he was unable to tell right from wrong with reference to the particular act charged. RCW 9A.12.010(1)(a), (b). Importantly, the defendant does not argue that the unlawful act did not occur. The insanity statute does not make homicide lawful; it simply declines to punish a defendant who has committed an unlawful act but is found legally insane. ¶ 15 To better understand this issue, it is helpful to highlight the differences between an insanity defense and the defense of diminished capacity. When a defendant claims diminished capacity, the State has the burden of proving that the defendant had the required mental state when he committed the alleged acts. Brett C. Trowbridge, The New Diminished Capacity Defense in Washington: A Report from the Trowbridge Foundation, 36 GONZ. L.REV. 497, 497 (2001). A defendant defending on the basis of diminished capacity claims he did not intend the act. Id. at 499. If the State fails to meet its burden, the defendant will either be acquitted or convicted of a lesser offense. Id. at 498. In contrast, insanity is an affirmative defense, which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The defendant argues that he did intend his actions but was under the mistaken belief he was justified because of a delusion or inability to distinguish right from wrong. [7] Id. at 499. In an insanity defense, the defendant admits that he has committed an act the legislature has deemed unlawful but argues that he should not be criminally punished. ¶ 16 We have also contrasted the insanity defense with that of self-defense, and the comparison illuminates the distinction between a homicide authorized by law (lawful) and an act that we simply decline to criminally punish. State v. Box, 109 Wash.2d 320, 745 P.2d 23 (1987). In analyzing which party has the burden of proof when the defendant raises an insanity defense, we held that insanity is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the defendant and proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 322, 745 P.2d 23. Unlike self-defense, which is a lawful act despite the fact it may have lethal consequences, committing an act under an insane impulse does not make that act lawful. Id. at 329, 745 P.2d 23. We continued: [I]nsanity entitles a defendant to an acquittal not because it establishes innocence (i.e., state has failed to prove element of criminal intent) but because the state declines to convict or punish one shown to have committed the crime while mentally impaired. ... In other words, the mental state of insanity does not go to the elements of the crime but merely the ultimate culpability of the accused. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Gilcrist v. Kincheloe, 589 F.Supp. 291, 294 (E.D.Wash.1984), aff'd, 774 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir.1985)). We find the reasoning of the Box court applies to the slayer statute. The affirmative defense of insanity precludes criminal punishment, but it does not legally authorize a person to kill another human being. Nor does it negate a necessary element of the crime. We hold that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity does not make an otherwise unlawful act lawful for application of the slayer statute. Hoge admitted that he killed his mother and stepbrother, and we affirm the trial court [8] and Court of Appeals holding that the act was unlawful.