Opinion ID: 2624611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: S.A. 60-455 Evidence of Prior Sexual Abuse

Text: K.S.A. 60-455 provides: Subject to K.S.A. 60-447 evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his or her disposition to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that the person committed another crime or civil wrong on another specified occasion but, subject to K.S.A. 60-445 and 60-448 such evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact including motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. In State v. Vasquez, 287 Kan. 40, 194 P.3d 563 (2008), we review the current requirements for admission of evidence of prior crimes or civil wrongs under K.S.A. 60-455 and the standards of appellate review applicable to each facet of the analysis. Vasquez relies on our recent decision in State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, 503, 186 P.3d 713 (2008), stating: `[T]he K.S.A. 60-455 analysis requires several steps.... [T]he court must determine that the evidence is relevant to prove a material fact, e.g., motive, knowledge, and identity. The court must also determine that the material fact is disputed. Additionally, the court must determine that the probative value of the evidence outweighs the potential for producing undue prejudice. Finally, the court must give a limiting instruction informing the jury of the specific purpose for admission whenever 60-455 evidence comes in.' [Citations omitted.] Vasquez, 287 Kan. at 49, 194 P.3d 563. We observe in Vasquez that Reid refined and extended our earlier ruling in State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 47-48, 56-57, 144 P.3d 647 (2006): `While Gunby established that evidentiary rules may be applied either as a matter of law or in the exercise of the trial court's discretion, depending on the contours of the rule in question, this particular determination only occurs [o]nce relevance is established. 282 Kan. at 47[, 144 P.3d 647]. Gunby did not establish our standard of review for analyzing relevance of certain K.S.A. 60-455 evidence. `[T]he legislature has defined relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact. This statutory definition bears some resemblance to one found in Federal Rule of Evidence 401: `Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. `Several treatises have recognized that the federal rule contains both a probative, i.e., relevancy, element and a materiality element.' Reid, 286 Kan. at 504[, 186 P.3d 713]. Vasquez, 287 Kan. at 49[, 194 P.3d 563]. Vasquez then continues: Our Reid decision then observed that materiality merged into the federal rule on relevancy through inclusion of the `requirement that the fact proved must be `of consequence to the determination of the action.' ... Determining whether evidence is `consequential' depends on the applicable substantive law.' 286 Kan. at 504-05[, 186 P.3d 713] (quoting Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Evidence Practice Under the Rules § 4.2, pp. 228-29 [2d ed.1999]; citing 1 Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, § 401.02[2] [9th ed. 2006] ['Both traditional requirements of relevance analysisthat evidence must relate to issues that are properly in dispute and that it must shed some light on those issuesare combined into one rule. Whether an issue is properly in dispute is, of course, determined by the applicable substantive law.']). Vasquez, 287 Kan. at 50[, 194 P.3d 563]. Vasquez explicitly recognizes that Kansas law, K.S.A. 60-401(b), mirrors federal law on the two components of the relevance concept. See Vasquez, 287 Kan. at 50[, 194 P.3d 563] (As Reid stated: `Evidence having any tendency in reason to prove suggests the probative element, while any material fact suggests the materiality element.'); 286 Kan. at 505, 186 P.3d 713. Moreover, we say in Vasquez that both elements have a place under K.S.A. 60-455 because of the statute's references to both relevance i.e., probativenessand materiality. Reid, 286 Kan. at 505, 186 P.3d 713. In other words, the concept of relevance under Kansas law includes both whether evidence is probative and whether it is material. Vasquez, 287 Kan. at 50[, 194 P.3d 563]. Vasquez also addresses the applicable standards of review on appeal: On appeal, the question of whether evidence is probative is judged under an abuse of discretion standard; materiality is judged under a de novo standard. Reid, 286 Kan. at 507-09[, 186 P.3d 713]. With respect to relevance overall, Reid concluded: `Obviously, if either the probative or materiality element's standard is not met, then the evidence is inadmissible. If both standards are met, then the appellate court proceeds to the next step(s) in the [K.S.A.] 60-455 analysis established in Gunby. ' Reid, 286 Kan. at 509[, 186 P.3d 713]. The second step under K.S.A. 60-455, i.e., whether the fact was in issue at trial, is judged on appeal under a de novo standard. An appellate court is as capable of discerning whether a particular fact was in issue from a cold record. The third step, the district judge's weighing of probative value and prejudicial effect, is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion, a more deferential standard. See Reid, 286 Kan. at 512[, 186 P.3d 713]. If evidence qualifies for admission under K.S.A. 60-455 but no limiting instruction was given, the standard of review should match that applied to other jury instruction issues. If the defense requested a limiting instruction and was refused or it otherwise objected to its omission by the district judge, the standard on appeal is that set out in K.S.A. 60-261; to be reversible, the error must be inconsistent with substantial justice. See Gunby, 282 Kan. at 48, 57-59, 144 P.3d 647. If the defense did not request a limiting instruction and it failed to object to its omission, the absence of a limiting instruction is reviewed on appeal under the clearly erroneous standard of K.S.A. 22-3414(3). Reid, 286 Kan. at 513[, 186 P.3d 713]. `Instructions are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is firmly convinced there is a real possibility that the jury would have rendered a different verdict if the error had not occurred. [Citation omitted.]' State v. Shirley, 277 Kan. 659, 666, 89 P.3d 649 (2004). Vasquez, 287 Kan. at 50-51[, 194 P.3d 563]. Finally, Vasquez also notes our Gunby clarification of the role of harmless error analysis under K.S.A. 60-455: `[T]he admission of K.S.A. 60-455 evidence without the explicit relevance inquiries, particularized weighing of probative value and prejudicial effect, or prophylactic limiting instruction is not inevitably so prejudicial as to require automatic reversal. On the contrary it may be harmless.' Vasquez, 287 Kan. at 51[, 194 P.3d 563] (quoting Gunby, 282 Kan. at 57, 144 P.3d 647); see K.S.A. 60-261.