Opinion ID: 1302329
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Respondent's Statements

Text: The State argues the Court of Appeals erred in finding Respondent's statements to police amounted to a confession. We agree. The legal definition of confession is restricted to acknowledgment of guilt and does not apply to mere statement[s] of fact from which guilt may be inferred. State v. Cunningham, 275 S.C. 189, 192, 268 S.E.2d 289, 291 (1980) (quoting State v. Miller, 211 S.C. 306, 45 S.E.2d 23 (1947)). See also 29A Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 709 (1994) (although every confession is an admission, not every admission is a confession). Respondent told police (1) his car was stolen, (2) he wrecked his car (retracting the stolen car claim), and (3) he did not have anything to drink after the wreck. [6] Section 56-5-2930 defines the crime of DUI: It is unlawful for ... any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquors ... or any other substance of like character ... to drive any vehicle within this State. See also State v. Sheppard, 248 S.C. 464, 465, 150 S.E.2d 916, 917 (1966) (The act of operating a motor vehicle with impaired faculties is the gravamen of the offense [of DUI]). We find Respondent's statements do not constitute an acknowledgment of guilt of DUI. They do not even acknowledge Respondent ever drank at all, much less that he was under the influence of alcohol. Rather, these statements are more in the nature of admissions. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 282 S.C. 409, 410-11, 319 S.E.2d 335, 336 (1984) (in reviewing DUI conviction, statements to police that defendant had been using alcohol and drugs, and was driver of car before it wrecked, did not amount to a confession of guilt; court specifically noted that defendant did not say that he was under the influence) [7] ; Cunningham, 275 S.C. at 189, 268 S.E.2d at 289 (defendant's statement she was the driver of car at time of wreck did not constitute a confession to reckless homicide because the defendant never stated she was driving recklessly). Therefore, the Court of Appeals incorrectly ruled Respondent's statements constituted a confession. The State argued to the Court of Appeals, and now argues here, that if Respondent's statements are not viewed as a confession, the corroboration rule does not apply. [8] We disagree, finding the corroboration rule should apply whether a statement amounts to a confession or merely constitutes an admission. We think that an accused's admissions of essential facts or elements of the crime, subsequent to the crime, are of the same character as confessions and that corroboration should be required. The need for corroboration extends beyond complete and conscious admission of guilta strict confession. Facts admitted that are immaterial as to guilt or innocence need no discussion. But statements of the accused out of court that show essential elements of the crime ... stand differently. Such admissions have the same possibilities for error as confessions. They, too, must be corroborated. Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 90, 75 S.Ct. 158, 163, 99 L.Ed. 101, 107 (1954) (internal citations omitted). See also State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d 878, 880 (1986) ([R]egardless of whether defendant's statements constitute an actual confession or only amount to an admission, our long established rule of corpus delicti requires that there be corroborative evidence, independent of the statements, before defendant may be found guilty of the crime); 29A Am.Jur.2d at § 753; E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Corroboration of Extrajudicial Confession or Admission, 45 A.L.R.2d 1316, 1323 (1956).