Opinion ID: 2995647
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conlon, who entered a Uniform

Text: Scheduling Order immediately after the assignment of the case in August 2000. Three months later, upon a joint motion of the parties, Judge Conlon issued an amended scheduling order establishing January 22, 2001 as the deadline for completing all discovery and filing any dispositive motions. The order explicitly stated that NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS would be granted and that trial would commence during the March 2001 civil term. This case moved forward uneventfully until January 16, 2001, when Campania filed two separate motions a mere six days before the date for the close of discovery. In its first motion, Campania asked the district court to dismiss its counterclaim for monetary damages caused by Rooks’s alleged legal malpractice. In the second motion, Campania asked the district court for leave to amend its answer in order to: (1) deny retaining Rooks and argue that CGI--not Campania-- had hired Rooks to represent MRSI in the underlying state court suit; and (2) raise an affirmative defense that, in any event, Campania was not liable for damages because Rooks breached the contract by committing legal malpractice. Campania’s amended answer reflected a complete reversal in trial strategy, for Campania had previously admitted that it was the party that hired and agreed to reimburse Rooks for the costs of defending MRSI. Campania’s about-face was prompted by the fact that CGI had allegedly filed for bankruptcy in the State of Ohio on some date unspecified prior to January 16, 2001. The practical effect of CGI’s bankruptcy was that Campania could no longer anticipate reimbursement from CGI if the district court entered a judgment in Rooks’s favor. Thus, by moving to amend its pleadings, Campania was attempting to change its trial strategy and argue that it was acting merely as an agent for CGI and, thus, had no legal obligation to pay Rooks’s fees and expenses. Naturally, Rooks opposed the motion to amend, arguing that it would be prejudiced by Campania’s newly minted theory of defense because the discovery deadline was set to expire in six days and, thus, Rooks would have no opportunity to depose any witnesses who might have knowledge about CGI’s business relationship with Campania. After considering the parties’ respective arguments, the trial court entered a minute order stating that Campania fails to show good cause for its delay in asserting new theories of liability, while Plaintiffs demonstrate prejudice. The court granted Campania’s motion to dismiss its legal malpractice claim but denied Campania’s motion to amend its answer on file. B. Campania’s Proposed Counterclaim and Motion to Amend, Extend and Continue In the meantime, Mann commenced a new lawsuit against Campania in the Circuit Court of Cook County. This suit was filed January 25, 2001 and alleged that Campania failed to make more than the first two installment payments required in exchange for Mann’s dismissal of the case. On January 31, 2001, a full nine days after the expiration of the discovery date, Campania sought leave in federal court to file a counterclaim that repackaged and resurrected its earlier allegations against Rooks. That is to say, Campania alleged that it was liable for the damages caused by MRSI’s tortious conduct only because Rooks had negligently named Campania--rather than CGI--as a party to the settlement agreement. Campania further requested the district court to reopen discovery and stay the federal case pending the outcome of the state court lawsuit, which ostensibly would determine the exact extent of Campania’s liability to Mann. The court denied the motion and barred Campania from introducing any evidence at trial in support of its new theory of defense that CGI--and not Campania--was a party to Rooks’s contract to perform legal services for MRSI. The parties waived their right to a jury trial and went to trial before the bench March 19, 2001. After considering the testimony, documentary evidence, and applicable case law, the trial judge concluded that Campania--not CGI--was the party that hired the Rooks law firm to defend MRSI. The court determined that Rooks was acting within the scope of its authority when settling the case and that the settlement was fair and reasonable. The judge also ruled that Rooks billed Campania at a reasonable rate. In addition, the court credited the testimony of Frank Rowland, a partner at Rooks, who stated that as part of his normal course of business he regularly mailed invoices to Campania during the entirety of the representation between October 1994 and September 1999. Relying mainly on Rowland’s testimony, the trial judge thus found: (1) that Rooks had substantially complied with the contract’s monthly billing procedures; and (2) that any extent to which Rooks failed to do so consisted of only an immaterial breach of contract that failed to absolve Campania of its duty to pay Rooks for services rendered. Thus, the court ruled in favor of Rooks on its breach of contract claim and awarded $101,143 in compensatory damages plus $8,740 in statutory prejudgment interest.