Opinion ID: 1382112
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stallings Complaint

Text: The first complaint was that of Timothy Stallings, who testified that he was in the Arkansas Partnership Program at the State Hospital when he hired Price, on the recommendation of another patient, to help him move to a less-restrictive environment nearer his home in Hot Springs. Stallings' girlfriend, Summer Emley, sent Price $1,250 by Western Union on August 21, 2001, to get a doctor to testify at the hearing scheduled September 5, 2001. While Price attended the hearing, he brought no doctor, and, in fact, suggested that a public defender represent Stallings, which was done. After the hearing, Price said he would refund Emley's money, but failed to do so. Stallings did not hear from Price again until March 7, 2002, when Stallings called Price and told him he no longer needed his services. Later, on April 17, 2002, Stallings received a letter from Price stating that he had located a doctor. In this complaint, Price was alleged to have violated Model Rules 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 1.15(a), 1.16(d), 3.2, 5.5(a), 7.3(a), 8.4(a), and 8.4(d). Judge Lessenberry found Price violated these rules with the exception of Model Rules 5.5(a) and 7.3(a). Special Judge Lessenberry found that Price violated Rule 1.3, Diligence, which states: A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. Price argues that he acted with reasonable diligence and promptness, that Stallings' cross-examination and Price's own direct testimony reveal that he made diligent inquires, but that he had no success obtaining a psychiatrist. Price admitted delay, but claims he tried to contact approximately sixty (60) psychiatrists during a six (6) month period in an effort to find a forensic psychiatrist to evaluate his Arkansas Partnership Program clients. There is, however, no evidence in the record showing Price actually employed a doctor to examine Stallings. If he did, it was after Stallings had released him as his attorney. Therefore, the judge did not err in finding that Price failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing his clients. Rule 1.4(a), Communication, provides: (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. Judge Lessenberry concluded Price violated this rule because the record supports perhaps one visit of respondent [Price] with Stallings over a long period. The violation of Rule 1.4(a) is well-supported by the record, which indicates Price made no effort to contact Stallings between Price's brief non-appearance at the September 5, 2001 hearing, and Price's letter of April 17, 2002 letter saying he had located a doctor to evaluate Stallings. Under Model Rule 1.4(b): (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. Judge Lessenberry concluded that Stallings' appeared to have a good grasp of what was going on and what he expected of [Price]. Because Price failed to explain the delay in finding a doctor, or any other matter to Stallings, he violated this rule. Price admitted that he never had a trust account, so clearly, he violated Rule 1.15(a), Safekeeping of property, which provides in part: (a) All lawyers shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property. (1) Funds of a client shall be deposited and maintained in one or more identifiable trust accounts in the state where the lawyer's office is situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person. The lawyer or law firm may not deposit funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm in any account designated as the trust account, other than the amount necessary to cover bank charges, or comply with the minimum balance required for the waiver of bank charges. Price concedes that he did not have an IOLTA trust account, but that he maintained [a] separated, segregated account into which he deposited unearned flat fees in the cases like Stallings. Again, Price never hired a doctor to evaluate Stallings and never refunded any of the money Emley paid for that purpose. Therefore, the judge's findings are not clearly erroneous. Model Rule 1.16(d), Declining or terminating representation, states: (d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. Price violated Rule 1.16(d) in that once Stallings informed him that he no longer required his services, Price failed to refund the money that Emley paid him for a doctor to evaluate Stallings. Model Rule 3.2, Expediting litigation, states that: A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client. Price failed to make any efforts to expedite the Stallings' matter. Price's failure to timely locate a doctor to evaluate Stallings is obviously not in the interest of Stallings, who wanted to be transferred to a less-restrictive facility closer to home. Judge Lessenberry found no evidence to support the allegation that Price violated Rule 5.5(a), Unauthorized practice of law: A lawyer shall not: (a) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction. Ligon argues that the judge must have overlooked page 11 of Exhibit 4-A. This is a trial exhibit of pleadings from the Judge Wright/Vance complaint, containing . . . an affidavit from the Supreme Court Clerk's office showing Mr. Price failed to pay his 2002 law license fee by the March 1 deadline. His law license went into administrative suspension status then and remained there until May 13, 2002, when he paid his 2002 license fee. Ligon points to the testimony of Beti Gunter and Timothy Stallings, who testified Price dealt with Stallings as late as March 7, 2002, or April 17, 2002. However, Ligon directs this court to an affidavit on file in the Judge Wright complaint, not the Stallings' complaint. Judge Lessenberry's finding that there was no evidence to support the allegation of misconduct, is not clearly erroneous. [1] The judge also found no evidence that Price violated Model Rule 7.3(a), Direct contact with prospective clients: (a) A lawyer shall not solicit, by any form of direct contact, in-person or otherwise, professional employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain. The testimony of Stallings clearly indicated that he had heard of Price through Edward King, another resident at the Arkansas Partnership Program, not that Price had solicited Stallings as a client. The judge found that, cumulatively, Price is guilty of violating Model Rule 8.4(a), Misconduct, which states: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the rules of professional conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another. Price argues that there is insufficient evidence that he either attempted to violate any of the Model Rules or induced anyone else to do so. We disagree. Finally, Model Rule 8.4(d) states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Again, having been found to have violated other Model Rules, Price also becomes guilty of this violation.