Opinion ID: 2442697
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶ 7] Cook challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each of his nine convictions. Upon a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, [w]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether a fact-finder could rationally find beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged. Schmidt, 2008 ME 151, ¶ 19, 957 A.2d at 86 (quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Milliken, 2010 ME 1, ¶ 19, 985 A.2d 1152, 1158. Further, the credibility of a witness is within the exclusive province of the jury, and, as the fact-finder, the jury is permitted to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence presented and may selectively accept or reject the testimony of a witness. See Schmidt, 2008 ME 151, ¶ 19, 957 A.2d at 86; State v. Ricky G., 2000 ME 190, ¶ 5, 760 A.2d 1065, 1067. [¶ 8] Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence is sufficient to convince a rational fact-finder beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of Cook's convictions for Counts 2, 3, and 6 through 10, see Schmidt, 2008 ME 151, ¶ 19, 957 A.2d at 86; State v. Brown, 2000 ME 25, ¶ 15, 757 A.2d 768, 772, and we affirm those convictions without any further discussion. Cook's convictions on Counts 1 and 5 require further analysis.
[¶ 9] The charge in Count 1 concerns the break-in of the Cross property in Dedham. The elements of burglary are: (1) entering or surreptitiously remaining in a structure, (2) with the knowledge that the actor is not licensed or privileged to do so, and (3) with the intent to commit a crime within the structure. 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(A); State v. Crossman, 2002 ME 28, ¶ 11, 790 A.2d 603, 606. Cook was charged with burglary of a dwelling place, which is a Class B crime, and includes the lesser offense of burglary to a structure. See 17-A M.R.S. § 13-A(2)(A) (2009) (defining a lesser included offense as one that must necessarily be committed when the offense or alternative thereof actually charged, as legally defined, is committed); 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(B)(4) (requiring an actor to satisfy subsection (1)(A) to be guilty of Class B burglary to a dwelling place). [¶ 10] At trial, the jury verdict form required the jury to indicate whether Cook was guilty of burglary, and whether the structure was a dwelling place. The jury marked guilty on the question of burglary to a structure, but answered no as to whether the structure was a dwelling place. The entry of a guilty judgment on this count as a Class B burglary to a dwelling appears to be a scrivener's error. See 17-A M.R.S. § 2(10) (2009) (A dwelling place does not include garages. ...). Because the jury considered the issues separately, we may vacate the conviction for Class B burglary and remand with instructions for entry of a judgment of conviction for Class C burglary if there is sufficient evidence to support the Class C conviction. See 15 M.R.S. § 6 (2009). [4] [¶ 11] Here, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Christopher Cook and Lapointe entered a garage without the right to do so and with the intent to steal the garage owner's personal property. Cook assisted them in the commission of the crime by driving them and the stolen property from the garage to his residence and, therefore, is guilty as an accomplice. See 17-A M.R.S. § 57(3) (2009); State v. Nguyen, 2010 ME 14, ¶ 15, 989 A.2d 712, 715 (Accomplice liability may be found in any conduct promoting or facilitating, however slightly, the commission of the crime. (quotation marks omitted)). The intent of all three men may be inferred from the evidence. We therefore vacate Cook's conviction for Class B burglary and remand for entry of a judgment of conviction for Class C burglary.
[¶ 12] Cook's conviction for theft in Count 5 is based on the State's allegations that Cook exercised unauthorized control over copper pipe that had been taken from a camp with the intent to deprive the camp's owner of the copper pipe. A theft by unauthorized taking or transfer occurs when the defendant (1) obtained or exercised unauthorized control (2) over the property of another (3) with intent to deprive the owner of that property. Schmidt, 2008 ME 151, ¶ 20, 957 A.2d at 86 (quotation marks omitted); accord 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(A). [¶ 13] At trial, the parties stipulated that no one had permission to go under the camp or to take the copper pipes that were located there. The only other evidence the State presented regarding the theft at that camp was the testimony of Lapointe. Lapointe testified that he and Christopher Cook had gone under the seasonal home and cut copper pipes from underneath the house and that Daniel Cook picked them up and drove them back to the Cook residence. [¶ 14] The State contends that the evidence is sufficient to support Cook's conviction on Count 5 because the police recovered copper pipe, along with other items that had been stolen from seasonal camps, from the culvert in Ellsworth and because Cook knew his house was the hub of the crime spree and had assisted in these crimes by providing transportation. We disagree. To be persuaded that the facts have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a jury must be convinced that the facts are sufficient to convince [it] of the defendant's guilt and [] the degree of conviction which [it] must have is a conscientious belief that the charge is almost certainly true. Brown, 2000 ME 25, ¶ 15, 757 A.2d at 772 (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). The State presented no evidence showing that Cook had been present at the camp during the theft, nor did the State present any evidence that on this occasion Cook had assisted in the commission of the crime or even knew that this specific camp had been burglarized. Although we view the evidence and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the State, Schmidt, 2008 ME 151, ¶ 19, 957 A.2d at 86, the record before us is insufficient to persuade a rational fact-finder that it is almost certainly true that Cook either committed or assisted in the commission of this theft, see State v. Nugent, 2007 ME 44, ¶ 16, 917 A.2d 127, 131; Brown, 2000 ME 25, ¶¶ 15-16, 757 A.2d at 772. We therefore vacate the judgment of conviction on Count 5 of the indictment.