Opinion ID: 25026
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tribe

Text: 11 Citing Swint v. Chambers County Commission, 514 U.S. 35, 51, 115 S. Ct. 1203, 131 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1995), the oil companies contend that the district court's interlocutory order holding that the Tribe is immune from suit is inextricably intertwined with the tribal council members' appellate issues because they involve the same law and facts. Because the oil companies sought declaratory judgment against the Tribe and the tribal council members, they assert that TTEA is relevant to the resolution of both parties' inquiries. The oil companies argue that this court should, therefore, exercise its pendent jurisdiction to review their cross-appeals challenging the Tribe's sovereign immunity. 12 The Tribe counters that the analysis of its immunity as a sovereign entity is separate from any determination of whether the tribal council members are entitled to immunity based on having acted within the scope of their authority. It additionally asserts that this case does not present rare and unique circumstances sufficient to invoke this court's pendent jurisdiction. See Gros v. City of Grand Prairie, 209 F.3d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 2000)(Pendent appellate jurisdiction should be exercised only in 'rare and unique' circumstances.). Finally, the Tribe contends that the oil companies' cross-appeals are not in the interest of judicial economy and that this court lacks jurisdiction over them because a grant of sovereign immunity is capable of being fully and effectively reviewed upon final judgment. Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 467 (5th Cir. 1999). 13 We agree that the district court's tribal immunity ruling does not fit within the collateral order doctrine, 3 but find the oil companies' jurisdictional arguments compelling. Specifically, under TTEA, the appropriate question for both the Tribe and the tribal council members is whether the oil companies sought declaratory or injunctive relief. The record demonstrates an irrefutably affirmative response. Because the sovereign immunity challenges of the oil companies and the tribal council members stem from the same underlying lawsuit and involve overlapping issues of law and fact, we find that this case presents rare and unique circumstances sufficient for this court to exercise its pendent jurisdiction.
14 This Court reviews de novo the district court's conclusions about sovereign immunity. Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev., 213 F.3d 841, 845 (5th Cir. 2000). 15 The district court failed to address the Tribe's sovereign immunity claim pursuant to TTEA. Relying on Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 118 S. Ct. 1700, 140 L. Ed. 2d 981 (1998), it noted that: 'As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.' Comstock, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 592 (quoting Kiowa, 118 S.Ct. at 1702). The district court further reasoned that Kiowa stands for the proposition that tribal immunity is applicable to contracts, including mineral leases. Id. Finding neither Congressional authorization nor express tribal waiver of immunity, the district court held that the Tribe continued to enjoy sovereign immunity and, thus, could not be properly brought before the court. Id. 16 We note, however, that in TTEA, this court aptly distinguished Kiowa as an action for damages rather than one for injunctive or declaratory relief and reasoned that: This difference matters. TTEA, 181 F.3d at 680. Reviewing the district court's grant of the Tribe's motion to dismiss for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction, this court found that the Tribe ha[d] sovereign immunity from an award of damages only. Id. Accordingly, it concluded that, while the district court correctly dismissed the damages claim based on sovereign immunity, tribal immunity did not support its order dismissing the actions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 680-81. 17 In the case sub judice, the oil companies sought declaratory relief against the Tribe. TTEA is, therefore, dispositive on the issue of the tribe's asserted immunity. As such, we find that the district court erroneously concluded that the Tribe was entitled to sovereign immunity against the oil companies' claims for equitable relief. 4