Opinion ID: 618702
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing, Ripeness, Mootness

Text: We begin with the jurisdictional issues, which we would examine independently even if the defendants had not raised them. See Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 602 F.3d 879, 10 No. 11-2623 883 (7th Cir. 2010). The defendants have identified three possible jurisdictional defects—lack of standing, unripeness, and mootness—but on each point they are mistaken.
First up is standing. Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power to “Cases” and “Controversies,” U.S. C ONST. art. III, § 2, a limitation that confines federal courts “to the traditional role of Anglo-American courts, which is to redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury to persons caused by private or official violation of law.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009). The doctrine of standing enforces this constitutional limitation. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 695 (7th Cir. 2011). To establish standing, a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). This is a pre-enforcement challenge; the Right to Life PAC need not risk prosecution or otherwise await enforcement of the statute in order to establish its standing to sue. See Schirmer v. Nagode, 621 F.3d 581, 586 (7th Cir. 2010). “Pre-enforcement challenges . . . are within No. 11-2623 11 Article III.” Brandt v. Vill. of Winnetka, Ill., 612 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir. 2010). The “existence of a statute implies a threat to prosecute, so pre-enforcement challenges are proper [under Article III], because a probability of future injury counts as ‘injury’ for purposes of standing.” Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 2010). Section 11.26(4) restricts political speech and may be challenged prior to enforcement based on the chill it places on the exercise of First Amendment rights and the corresponding risk of self-censorship. See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988); Bauer, 620 F.3d at 708-09. “ ‘The freedom of speech . . . guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.’ ” First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1946)). The defendants contend that because the Right to Life PAC does not itself make political contributions, section 11.26(4) does not apply to its conduct and therefore it does not have standing to sue. This argument is way off the mark. The statute imposes an aggregate $10,000 cap on the amount individuals may contribute to political candidates, parties, and political committees in any calendar year. Anyone who contributes to the Right to Life PAC is bound by this limitation, so section 11.26(4) operates to limit the contributions the committee may lawfully receive. To the extent that a contributor wants to donate more than the statute allows but refrains from doing so in order to avoid violating the statute, the committee itself is injured. 12 No. 11-2623 The Right to Life PAC has identified two contributors in this category and plausibly claims there are more. Terry and Mary Kohler filed declarations attesting to their continuing intention to contribute to the Right to Life PAC in amounts larger than the statutory aggregate limit—not just in 2010, when this lawsuit was filed, but also in the future. But for the operation of section 11.26(4), they would do so. These injuries are easily sufficient to give the Right to Life PAC standing to bring this preenforcement challenge to the statute.8 See EMILY’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 4-5 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Contribution limits can injure “contributee” organizations that are forbidden from receiving contributions in excess of the statutory limit.). 8 Section 11.60(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes subjects anyone who violates Wisconsin election laws to a civil penalty of up to $500. Section 11.60(3) provides that any person or group violating contribution limitations may be required to forfeit three times the amount of the contribution or three times the portion that was illegally contributed. Section 11.61(1)(b) provides that anyone who intentionally violates section 11.26 is guilty of a Class I felony if the amount is over $100. These statutes subject contributors to potential civil and criminal penalties for violating the contribution limit, and the Right to Life PAC may be subject to liability for conspiracy to violate Wisconsin’s election laws. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Chvala, 730 N.W.2d 648, 649-50 (Wis. 2007) (disciplinary proceeding involving attorney who previously pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to violate the contribution limitations in section 11.26). No. 11-2623 13 In addition to its own Article III injury, the Right to Life PAC has standing to sue to vindicate the politicalspeech rights of its contributors. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720-21 (1990) (allowing attorney to challenge fee restrictions based on black-lung claimants’ due-process right to legal representation); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976) (allowing beer vendor to challenge alcohol regulation based on patrons’ equal-protection rights); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925) (allowing private schools to assert parents’ rights to direct the education of their children); Ezell, 651 F.3d at 696 (allowing supplier of firingrange facilities to bring Second Amendment challenge to firing-range ban); Majors v. Abell, 317 F.3d 719, 722 (7th Cir. 2003) (candidate for public office may bring suit on behalf of the free-speech rights of his supporters).
The defendants also contend that the First Amendment claim is unripe. Ripeness doctrine is based on the Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirements as well as discretionary prudential considerations. 13B C HARLES A LAN W RIGHT, A RTHUR R. M ILLER & E DWARD H. C OOPER, F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE § 3532, at 365 (3d ed. 2008). Ripeness concerns may arise when a case involves uncertain or contingent events that may not occur as anticipated, or not occur at all. Id.; see also Bauer, 620 F.3d at 708-09. Whether a claim is ripe for adjudication depends on “ ‘the fitness of the issues for judicial decision’ and ‘the hardship to the parties of withholding court 14 No. 11-2623 consideration.’ ” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)). Claims that present purely legal issues are normally fit for judicial decision. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149. And in challenges to laws that chill protected speech, the hardship of postponing judicial review weighs heavily in favor of hearing the case. Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 233 F.3d 981, 985-86 (7th Cir. 2000) (“CTS is . . . being chilled from engaging in speech . . . . Thus, the second part of the ripeness test is satisfied.” (internal citation omitted)); Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 149 F.3d 679, 689 (7th Cir. 1998) (“This kind of self-censorship is a substantial hardship within the meaning of the Abbott Laboratories test.”). This appeal focuses on a single merits question: Is the aggregate contribution cap in section 11.26(4) unconstitutional as applied to contributions to independentexpenditure committees? This is a legal issue and does not depend on contingent factual developments. As we explain in more detail later, the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United resolves the First Amendment question as a matter of law. And because section 11.26(4) limits political speech, delaying a decision would leave in place a law that strikes at the heart of the First Amendment free-speech right. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2817 (2011) (“[T]he First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political No. 11-2623 15 office.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 892 (“[P]olitical speech . . . is central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”). The defendants’ argument about unripeness goes something like this: Under the terms of the injunction pending appeal, the Kohlers were permitted to make unlimited contributions to the Right to Life PAC during the recall elections last summer; their generalized desire to continue to do so in the future is too remote a contingency to support a ripe claim. But “in the future” is fairly understood to include the next election cycle, which is a scant few months away. Indeed, the body politic in Wisconsin is experiencing something of a perpetual campaign; efforts are currently underway to force the governor and four state senators to stand in recall elections.9 And whether or not special recall elections are held, Wisconsin will hold general elections for state and local offices in April and November 2012. See generally W IS. C ONST. art. VII, § 1; W IS. S TAT. §§ 10.51 et seq. There is nothing uncertain or contingent about that. The First Amendment challenge to section 11.26(4) is ripe for judicial resolution. 9 See Jason Stein & Patrick Marley, Walker Recall Effort Kicks Off, M ILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 15, 2011, http://www.jsonline.com/ news/statepolitics/133810473.html; Patrick Marley, Elections Panel Estimates $650,000 State Cost for Recall Efforts, M ILWAUKEE J. S ENTINEL , Nov. 17, 2011, http://www.jsonline.com/news/ statepolitics/134087043.html. 16 No. 11-2623
Relatedly, the defendants contend that the claim is moot because the summer 2011 recall elections are over. Mootness doctrine is also premised on constitutional requirements and prudential considerations. 13B W RIGHT ET AL., supra, § 3533, at 716. A case must present a live controversy at the time of filing, contain a live dispute through all stages of litigation, and the parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit throughout its duration. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67-68 (1997); Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990). An established exception to mootness, often invoked in election-law cases, permits an otherwise moot claim to be heard if it is capable of repetition, yet evades review. The exception applies where: “ ‘(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.’ ” FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)); see also Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 736 (2008); Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 463; Lee v. Keith, 463 F.3d 763, 777 (7th Cir. 2006). We need not take up the exception here. The conclu- sion of the 2011 recall elections does not moot this claim. As we have explained, the Right to Life PAC has at least two contributors who want to make contributions in excess of the $10,000 aggregate annual limit on a continuing basis in future elections. That’s enough to support an ongoing live controversy. No. 11-2623 17