Opinion ID: 3009711
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trade Libel/Slander of Credit/Slander of

Text: Title With regard to the Bathgate defendants' claims that the default letters, complaints and alleged statements to the media issued by the Bank constitute trade slander of credit, and slander of title, the district court reached the following conclusions: (1) the default letters did not contain false statements since the clo date in the February letter had passed and thus Bathgate was actually in default; ( Bank's legal complaints were privileged from slander and defamation actions; and (3 Bathgate defendants failed to designate specific facts that raise a material issue trial regarding . . . [the Bank's] alleged republishing of the default letters and complaints to the press. FDIC v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 (consolidated) Memorandum and Order at 16 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 1993) (see Bathgate defendants' App. I insecure in this transaction. See Bathgate defendants' App. II at 641. However, party grounds its argument on this provision. 36 Based on these findings, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of th on the Bathgate defendants' claims of libel and slander.0 The torts of trade libel, slander of credit, and slander of title require publication, or communication to a third person, of false statements concerning the plaintiff, his property, or his business. Henry V. Vacaro Const. Co. v. A.J. DePa Inc., 349 A.2d 570, 572 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975); see also Wendy's of South Inc. v. Blanchard Management Corp., 406 A.2d 1337, 1338 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1 The Bathgate defendants maintain that they sufficiently have stated claims for trad libel, slander of credit, and slander of title to withstand summary judgment becaus Bank and Bank officers published and communicated to third parties that Bathgate wa default. See Bathgate defendants' Br. at 31-33. According to the Bathgate defenda the district court's conclusion that the Bathgate defendants were in default as of 1, 1991, required it to engage in improper weighing of the evidence presented by th and the Bathgate defendants on this issue. Id. at 32. We disagree. As the Bathgate defendants' defenses based on the February letter are bar must regard the Bathgate defendants as having been in default as of April 1, 1991. event, even if the defenses were not barred, the statement that the Bathgate defend were in default was accurate with respect to the preexisting notes, for the existen defenses to an action predicated on defaults merely excuses a defendant's failure t a payment, but the defenses do not constitute payment. Thus, there is no genuine i material fact regarding the veracity of statements by the Bank and its loan officer asserting that Bathgate was in default. 0 We apply New Jersey substantive law to the Bathgate defendants' counterclaims for libel, slander of credit, slander of title, and unlawful interference with prospect economic advantage because both the FDIC and the Bathgate defendants briefed the cl under New Jersey law, and no party asserts that federal law or the law of another s applicable. 37 Moreover, as the district court held, allegations made in pleadings filed action are privileged as long as they have some relation to the action. Wendy's of Jersey, Inc. v. Blanchard Management Corp., 406 A.2d at 1338-39. There is no doubt statements that Bathgate was in default on certain notes were related to the action collect on those notes. Thus, we will affirm the district court's order for summary judgment in favor of the FDIC on the Bathgate defendants' counterclaims for libel, of credit, and slander of title. 3. Unlawful Interference with Prospective Economic Ad With regard to the counterclaim for tortious interference, the district c held that the Bathgate defendants failed to raise an adequate response to the FDIC argument that the claim is barred under the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and § 1823(e). v. Bathgate et al., Civ. No. 91-2779 (consolidated), Memorandum and Order at 16 (D. Mar. 18, 1993) (see Bathgate defendants' App. I at 33). Under New Jersey law the five elements of a claim of tortious interferen a prospective or existing economic relationship are: (1) a plaintiff's existing or reasonable expectation of economic benefit or advantage; (2) the defendant's knowle that expectancy; (3) the defendant's wrongful, intentional interference with that expectancy; (4) the reasonable probability that the plaintiff would have received t anticipated economic benefit in the absence of interference; and (5) damages result from the defendant's interference. Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 186 ( 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1285 (1993); Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs Corp., 563 A.2d 31, 37 (N.J. 1989)). The Bathgate defendants allege that Bathgate reasonable expectation of selling his Collateral at full market prices, and that t intentionally and maliciously interfered by publishing false information through t Default Letters and statements to the media. See Bathgate defendants' Br. at 33-3 38 we have concluded that the Bathgate defendants have not created a genuine issue of material fact regarding the veracity of statements that Bathgate was in default, we that the Bathgate defendants failed to state a claim for unlawful interference with prospective economic advantage. Moreover, Bathgate's expectation of selling his collateral at full market prices was based on the alleged agreement contained in th February letter which, if implemented, would have at least delayed the Bank's recou the collateral and, inasmuch as that agreement is not enforceable, his claim of unl interference with prospective economic advantage also is barred by D'Oench Duhme an section 1823(e). See Bathgate defendants' Br. at 9 (stating that the February lett provided that the Commercial Notes would be repaid by Bathgate's execution of a ne and pledge of additional collateral. . . . In return, Bathgate was to repay the lo personally selling collateral, such as real estate and partnership interests, pledg security for the loans (the Collateral), over time, in order to achieve the great payment to the Bank, to protect Bathgate's equity in the Collateral, and to avoid publicity which would cause distress prices.). 4. Could the Bathgate defendants set off their alleged damages against their obligations under the notes a guaranty? The FDIC argues that even if D'Oench Duhme and section 1823(e) did not ba Bathgate's counterclaims or Bathgate otherwise . . . established a genuine issue o material fact, neither circumstance would bar the FDIC-Receiver from obtaining judg against Bathgate or from foreclosing on the collateral . . . [because] Bathgate mus obtain judgment on his unliquidated claims and then seek satisfaction of the judgme creditor of the failed institution, thereby entitling him to no more than a ratable distribution of the assets of the failed institution. See FDIC Br. at 34 (citing Beighley, 868 F.2d at 784 n.12). In light of our holdings regarding Bathgate's counterclaims, we need not reach this issue. 39