Opinion ID: 1454621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: The Erroneously Typed Penalty Instruction

Text: Defendant submitted a special instruction No. 60, requesting that the jury be charged as follows: If you have a reasonable doubt as to which penalty to impose, death or life in prison without the possibility of parole, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict fixing the penalty of life in prison with the possibility of parole. (Italics added.) The parties concede what is obvious on the face of the proposed instruction: the final clause contains a typographical error  the italicized word with should read without so that the penalties referred to are the same in both parts of the sentence, i.e., death or life in prison without the possibility of parole. Although the instruction was read to the jury in its correct form, i.e., the words without possibility of parole were included in both clauses, the typewritten version of the instruction taken into the jury room retained the error. When the jury asked the court about the consequences of its failure to agree on a penalty verdict (see discussion in pt. XXXIII, ante ), it also made a second request. It asked the court to Please explain the noted page of instructions. Although the jury's note as it appears in the record contains no reference or attachment showing a page of instructions, the trial court stated on the record without objection by counsel that the jury was referring to the typewritten version of special instruction No. 60. With the acquiescence of both sides, the court declined to explain the instruction, stating: [T]he instruction itself is self-explanatory. And we would hope with that in mind, that you might be able to reach a decision. Neither counsel nor the court appears to have been aware of the error in the typed version of the instruction at the time of the jury's question. (58) (See fn. 22.) The mistake was discovered after the jury was discharged. [22] (59a) Defendant claims he was denied a fair trial because the jury, erroneously believing from the mistyped instruction that defendant could be released on parole, might have returned a death verdict rather than one it would have preferred, i.e., life imprisonment without any possibility of parole. In order to determine the likelihood that the jury was misled in the manner suggested by defendant, we must examine the mistyped instuction in light of the other instructions and in the context of defendant's trial as a whole. ( California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 542 [93 L.Ed.2d at p. 940]; People v. Rivera (1984) 162 Cal. App.3d 141, 145 [207 Cal. Rptr. 756]; People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 215-216 [260 Cal. Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285].) In merely asking for an explanation, the jury did not specify its concerns, if any, about the instruction. The reason for its inquiry may or may not have been the typographical error. No juror expressed on the record any belief or concern that defendant might receive parole. The generally phrased request for an explanation did not necessarily signify that jurors espoused any particular belief as to sentencing options. To the contrary, an examination of the entire record reveals that the jury was fully cognizant that there were only two available sentencing options  death and life imprisonment without possibility of parole  and that its solemn responsibility was to choose between them. First, the language of the instruction and the verdict options suggest that the jury understood both the task at hand and its consequences. In the first part of the instruction, the two sentencing options were correctly stated as death and life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The jury was directed to give the defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt it might have as to which penalty to impose. Because of the typographical error, the balance of the instruction is both logically inconsistent and physically impossible. The inconsistency is patent: one cannot logically give defendant the benefit of a doubt arising between two specified penalties by imposing a third penalty that is obviously less severe than either of the first two. The physical impossibility arises because the jury was given two verdict forms and was directed to return only one of them as its penalty verdict. One form stated: We, the jury in the above-entitled cause, determine the appropriate penalty is LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE and we so fix the punishment. (Emphasis in original.) The other contained identical language except that the specified penalty was DEATH. (Emphasis in original.) Thus, the jury could not reasonably have understood the instruction as introducing the prospect of a third verdict  life with parole  as to which it had no directions, instructions, or verdict form. The jury's decision to return the DEATH form, properly signed and dated by the foreperson and attested to by all 12 jurors upon a poll, indicates that it had no reasonable doubt that death was the proper penalty to be imposed in defendant's case. Second, from the beginning of the trial to its end, the sentencing options of death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole were correctly and continually presented to the jury. In addition to individual voir dire, there were over 50 references to the sentencing options by the court and counsel. In each case, the option of life imprisonment without any possibility of parole was correctly stated to the jury. During individual voir dire, each prospective juror was asked whether he or she could consider the sentencing options of death and life imprisonment without possibility of parole. When the guilt phase began, the sentencing options were again correctly presented both in introductory instructions and in defense counsel's opening statement. At the penalty phase, two lawyers argued for defendant. Together they referred to life imprisonment without possibility of parole some 28 times. The defense argument focused on the devastating reality that defendant would never leave prison if the jury did not sentence him to death. Counsel stated: Let's take a look at the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. That sentence means exactly what it says. His Honor, Judge Giffen, will instruct you on that. He then graphically illustrated the prospect of a life without any possibility of freedom. Positing a series of decades  1990, 2000, 2010, 2020  he gave his own age and that of his children at the beginning of each decade and reminded the jury that defendant would still be in prison. He observed that defendant would receive a more severe sentence than Charles Manson or Sirhan Sirhan who, in contrast to defendant, were sentenced to life imprisonment with possibility of parole. He invited the jury to empathize with defendant who, regardless of the jury's verdict, would die in prison after spending the remainder of his life in a cell less than half the size of the jury box. The refrain was repeated again and again to dramatize the severity of the punishment defendant would inevitably receive even if the jury did not sentence him to death. The penalty phase instructions mentioned life imprisonment without possibility of parole 11 times, stating it correctly each time. For example, the trial judge not only informed the jury of its sentencing options and their effects, it admonished jurors to consider no other possibilities: You are instructed that life without parole, that verdict, means exactly what it says. That the defendant shall be imprisoned for the rest of his life. And you are instructed that a death verdict means exactly what it says. That the defendant will be executed. For you to conclude otherwise would be to rely upon speculation or conjecture and would be a violation of your oath as a juror.  (Italics added.) And: It is the law of this state that the penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be death or confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole in any case in which the special circumstance charged in this case has been specially found to be true. (Italics added.) And again: The choice you make is not simply between good and bad, but between the punishment of life imprisonment without possibility of parole and death. (Italics added.) And finally: To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating evidence is so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. (Italics added.) Thus, in all of the references to the possible penalties in this case by the court and counsel, only one  the mistyped instruction  incorrectly refers to life in prison with possibility of parole. Even that instruction stated the two alternative penalties correctly in its opening clause. There is no reasonable possibility that the jury ignored all 50 of these references in favor of a single exception which, as we have noted, was both an illogical and impossible verdict. Third, even the challenged instruction was correctly read to the jury, the error remained only on the typewritten copy. The jury was instructed that the text of the instructions as read to it controlled over delineations or modifications in any written copies of instructions it might request. As discussed above, all of the instructions read to the jury were correct and consistent as to the only two sentencing options. Focusing on the specific language of the erroneous instruction as a reasonable juror would and considering the context of defendant's trial ( California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 541 [93 L.Ed.2d at pp. 939-940]), we conclude that there was no reasonable likelihood the jury inferred that defendant might receive parole if he were not sentenced to death. ( Boyde v. California, supra, 494 U.S. at p.  [108 L.Ed.2d at pp. 329-330, 110 S.Ct. at p. 1198].) To bolster his claim of prejudice, defendant relies on the affidavit of a single juror presented to the trial court on his motion for new trial. The affiant reports his own confusion as to the instruction, but adds that two other jurors expressed the view that the reference to life with parole was a mistake. At the outset, defendant's reliance on the affidavit is misplaced. (60) [A] verdict may not be impeached by inquiry into the juror's mental or subjective reasoning processes, and evidence of what the juror `felt' or how he understood the trial court's instructions is not competent. ( People v. Sutter (1982) 134 Cal. App.3d 806, 819 [184 Cal. Rptr. 829]; see also Evid. Code, § 1150; Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 575-578 [224 Cal. Rptr. 664, 715 P.2d 624] (Mosk, J., conc.); Tanner v. United States (1987) 483 U.S. 107, 116-127 [97 L.Ed.2d 90, 103-110, 107 S.Ct. 2739].) (59b) The affidavit relied on by defendant refers principally to the mental processes of the jury, i.e., its understanding or lack of understanding of the sentencing options available to it under the instructions given by the court. To this extent, the affidavit contains inadmissible matter and should have been disregarded by the trial court. But even if the juror affidavit is considered, it does not provide convincing support for defendant's argument. The juror who signed the affidavit was highly equivocal. He reported some personal confusion about the instruction, but concluded only that clarification might have caused him to change his vote. As noted above, he admitted that two other jurors correctly discerned the error in the instruction and pointed it out to their colleagues. The balance of the affidavit reiterates events already apparent from the record, e.g., that jury stood ten to two for death at the time the clarification was sought and, after four hours of additional deliberation over two days, reached a unanimous verdict. It says nothing that would permit an inference that any vote change or the final verdict was probably attributable to the typographical error. Thus, even if the affidavit were admissible, it does not provide substantial support for defendant's argument that the penalty phase verdict was based on a misconception as to sentencing options. By denying the motion for new trial, the trial court effectively discounted the affidavit. We will do likewise. Although this particular defendant was not prejudiced by the erroneously typed instruction, we admonish trial lawyers and judges to take special care to avoid this kind of potentially serious mistake. First, typewritten instructions sent to the jury room should be checked and proofread carefully by counsel and the court. Second, when a jury requests an explanation of an instruction, the trial judge should ascertain the precise nature of the inquiry before simply referring the jury to the charge as given. If these procedures had been followed here, the typing mistake would undoubtedly have been detected at an earlier stage. For the reasons stated above, the typographical error in defendant's requested instruction did not deprive him of a fair trial at the penalty phase.