Opinion ID: 1509747
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Eatons' title

Text: [¶ 19] The Town contends that none of the deeds or devises into the predecessors of William Eaton conveyed a 40-acre parcel near the subject parcel. They correctly contend that a person can convey only what is conveyed into them. See Calthorpe v. Abrahamson, 441 A.2d 284, 287 (Me.1982). Construction of the language of a deed, however, is a question of law. See id. at 286. The existence and nature of particular boundaries is a question of law and the location of those boundaries is a question of fact. See Tallwood Land & Dev. Co. v. Botka, 352 A.2d 753, 755 (Me.1976). [¶ 20] There is no dispute concerning the chain of title beginning with the deeds into William Eaton in 1891 and 1892 up to the plaintiffs. In 1891 Augustus T. Littlefield and George Chaney conveyed to William Eaton: three undivided eighths parts of a certain lot of salt marsh and beach hommocks situate in said Wells at Wells beach bounded in the whole thusBeginning at Marsh of the grantee and by Town Riverthence Easterly by said River to the Atlantic Oceanthence Southwesterly by the Ocean to Grantee's landthence Northwesterly by Grantee's land to the place of beginning, containing forty acres more or less .... (emphasis added). In 1892 Samuel S. Littlefield conveyed the remaining 5/8 interest in the same property. No other deeds or written documents used this description. Instead, the court based its findings concerning the source of title into Augustus Littlefield, George Chaney, and Samuel Littlefield on deeds and probate records with more generalized descriptions, through the assistance of the genealogical studies of Fred Boyle. [¶ 21] Mr. Boyle, a professional genealogist, traced the ownership to the subject premises through the ancestors of Samuel Littlefield's grandmother and Augustus Littlefield's great-grandmother, Elizabeth Storer Littlefield, beginning with a deed in 1645 from the proprietors John Wheelwright, Henry Boade, and Edward Rishworth to Ezekial Knights. Ezekial Knights, Jr., with the consent of his father Ezekial Knights, conveyed property to Samuel Storer in 1674 as follows: a Certen Tract of Prcell of sault Marsh, or Meddow Land, lijing & being between that part of the Webbhannet River Called the fishing Hoole, & the sea Wall, being a Certen Gurnet or Nose of Land compassed about with water, It lijing vpon the sayd River, on the Southermost side there of, abutting vpon the sea Wall contayneing the quantity of about seauen or 8 Acers bee It more or less, with a Certen skirt of vpland or sea Wall, wch lyeth Adioyneing thervnto, where wee vsed to set our hay ... (emphasis added). Lydia Storer, as widow and administratrix of the estate of Samuel Storer, conveyed to Samuel Storer's brother, Joseph Storer, and later, together with her children and their spouses, re-conveyed to Joseph Storer's son, John Storer, the following property: a Certain Island of Salt marsh lying on the South east side of the River of wells aforesaid formerly Known by the name of Knights Island and also a point of upland Joyning to Said Marsh bounded by the sea wall on the southeast Togeather with all the Rights Comon Rights Priviledges and appurtinancis whatsoever thereof and there to any wais belonging or may hereafter belong by any Manner of ways or means whatsoever or howeoever all which Land and Marsh did formerly belong to Samvel Storer Decea who was husband to Lydia Storer aboves.... (emphasis added). [¶ 22] Joseph Storer conveyed his interest in his homestead, [t]ogether with all the salt marsh and Thatch banks Joyning thereto ... between the Homestead and the Sea in 1720 to his son John Storer. John Storer died intestate and his estate was divided into specific properties for each child. Elizabeth Storer Littlefield, his daughter, acquired among other property 3 a of salt marsh in Wells called Trot's Island + 2 a of salt marsh in Wells called the Lower Hawk. Elizabeth Storer Littlefield was married to Jonathan Littlefield, who predeceased her, [4] and was the mother of Jonathan Littlefield, John Storer Littlefield, Samuel Littlefield, Clement Littlefield, and Elizabeth Littlefield. Elizabeth Storer Littlefield died in 1823 and her four sons acquired 1/4 interests in her property. [¶ 23] In 1821, Samuel Littlefield conveyed his interest to his brothers John Storer Littlefield and Clement Littlefield, so that John and Clement then had 3/8 interests each. John Storer Littlefield through his will conveyed his 3/8 interest to his son, Samuel Storer Littlefield. Samuel also acquired his uncle Jonathan Littlefield [II]'s 1/4 share through a deed giving Samuel his 5/8 interest. [¶ 24] Augustus T. Littlefield and George Chaney acquired the other 3/8 interest as follows: Clement Littlefield, Augustus's grandfather, by deed dated November, 1831, conveyed to his son Jonathan Littlefield [III]: one undivided moiety or half part of my home farm whereon I now dwell, lying in Wells aforesaid, being one-half part of all my share or interest in the real estate of my honored father, Jonathan Littlefield [I], late of said Wells deceased, now in my possession, consisting of upland and salt marsh, according to the reputed boundaries thereof.... (emphasis added.) He conveyed the other one half to his son Storer Littlefield. Jonathan Littlefield [III] conveyed his interest to his son, Augustus T. Littlefield. Storer Littlefield conveyed his interest to his son Joseph Littlefield, who conveyed it to George Chaney. [¶ 25] The trial court concluded that the language in the deed from Ezekial Knights to Samuel Storer in 1674 fairly described the 40-acre parcel as ultimately conveyed to William Eaton in 1892. In interpreting a deed, `a court should give words their general and ordinary meaning to see if they create any ambiguity.' Sylvan Properties Co. v. State Planning Office, 1998 ME 106, ¶ 8, 711 A.2d 138, 140 (citation omitted). Examination of extrinsic evidence surrounding execution of a deed is only proper when the language of the deed is ambiguous and the intention of the parties is in doubt. Id. In the absence of extrinsic evidence, the intent of the parties should be ascertained by resort to the rules of construction of deeds, such as the familiar rule that boundaries are established in descending order of control by monuments, courses, distances and quantity. Snyder v. Haagen, 679 A.2d 510, 513 (Me.1996). We find that the court's interpretation that the language in the Knights to Storer deed described the 40-acre parcel, both as to location and size, is sound, reasonable, and consistent with the extrinsic evidence and the rules of construction. In particular, we find that the court's explanation of the seemingly inconsistent number of acres of the lot was proper: [T]he grammatical construction suggests that more than a seven or eight acre salt marsh is being conveyed because there is also a skirt of upland or seawall. The terms upland, seawall, and beach are used with some imprecision in all of these documents, but it is reasonable to conclude that in 1674 the language must have been used in reference to the land in front of the marsh (on the seaward side) running to the ocean or intertidal zone. (Emphasis added.) Based on this rationale, the court correctly determined that even though the language in the deed from Knights to Storer referenced seven or eight acres of salt marsh, it conveyed forty acres because it included the skirt of upland, seawall and beach. [¶ 26] Moreover, we find the same analysis applies to the other seemingly inconsistent acreage amounts. Although the description of Elizabeth Storer's share from her father of the two salt marsh parcels only totalled five acres and made no reference to the upland, as the Ezekial Knights deed did, the subsequent deed from her son Clement to his sons. referred to a salt marsh and upland. Thus it can be inferred that the salt marsh included the upland skirt as well. Therefore, the court did not err in its interpretation of the deeds and its conclusion that they conveyed the subject premises.