Opinion ID: 739142
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sheriff McPeak's Alleged Deliberate Indifference

Text: 51 Finally, Ms. Hollingsworth argues that Sheriff McPeak's failure to adopt a policy applicable to the circumstances presented in this case demonstrated deliberate indifference to Ms. Hollingsworth's constitutional rights. Where the official policy that forms the basis of a local government liability claim consists of a failure to act, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipality's inaction was the result of deliberate indifference to the rights of its inhabitants. Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir.1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A local government acts with deliberate indifference when the need to act is so obvious, and the inadequacy [of existing policy or custom] so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers ... can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. Harris, 489 U.S. at 390, 109 S.Ct. at 1205. Thus, a local government policymaker is deliberately indifferent when he deliberately or consciously fails to act when presented with an obvious risk of constitutional harm which will almost inevitably result in constitutional injury of the type experienced by the plaintiff. Id. at 389-90, 109 S.Ct. at 1205-06. 52 Ms. Hollingsworth argues that the McCurtain County Sheriff's Department failed to craft policies concerning the service of protective orders or the removal of juveniles from the custody and care of their parents. She contends that Sheriff McPeak admitted that the Department had no such policies. On the contrary, Sheriff McPeak testified merely that the Sheriff's Department manual of policies and procedures did not contain such policies. This fact alone, however, does not mean that the Sheriff's Department failed to craft any policy. 53 Sheriff McPeak testified that the Sheriff's Department had multiple policies applicable in circumstances similar to those faced by Deputy Hill. He testified that, in instances of child abuse or neglect, members of his department followed the process set out in Oklahoma law concerning dependent and neglected children. See Okla.Stat. tit. 10, §§ 1101-1149. In addition, Sheriff McPeak testified that he had ordered his deputies to make certain that they notified proper authorities in circumstances involving any court process that has a statutory hearing attached to it. Finally, Department policy required sheriff's deputies to seek legal advice from the District Attorney when the Department received a facially defective or otherwise questionable order or warrant. 54 Although these policies failed to prevent constitutional injury to Ms. Hollingsworth, no reasonable jury could conclude that the McCurtain County Sheriff was deliberately indifferent to her rights because of his failure to act. The policies in place were designed to ensure that sheriff's deputies followed relevant federal constitutional and Oklahoma state law. 55 In addition, the injury experienced by Ms. Hollingsworth did not result from an obvious risk of which Sheriff McPeak knew or should have known. In Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. at 390 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. at 1205-06 n. 10, the Supreme Court gave an example of the type of risk necessary to give rise to deliberate indifference. Hypothetical city policymakers who provide their police officers firearms to allow them to apprehend fleeing felons would exhibit deliberate indifference either by (1) failing to teach officers the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force, or (2) ignoring the frequent excessive use of force by its officers. Id. In both cases, the policymakers either knew or should have known that their officers were or would be presented with the deadly force issue, and that some officers inevitably would exercise excessive force. Id. 56 In this case, however, the risk of constitutional harm which resulted in Ms. Hollingsworth's injury was not an obvious risk that inevitably led to the harm she suffered. In many years of experience, neither Sheriff McPeak nor Deputy Hill had ever encountered an internally inconsistent Emergency Protective Order in which the plaintiffs were children in the defendant-parent's custody. Given the Sheriff's Department policies in place, the risk of constitutional harm was not obvious and Ms. Hollingsworth's injury was not inevitable. The circumstances faced by Deputy Hill did not present an obvious risk of harm that the Sheriff's Department should have anticipated through a policy specifically designed to avoid the harm inflicted upon Ms. Hollingsworth. 57 Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Ms. Hollingsworth, no rational trier of fact could conclude that Sheriff McPeak's lack of policy constituted deliberate indifference to Ms. Hollingsworth's right to procedural due process. We affirm the district court's decision granting Sheriff McPeak summary judgment.