Opinion ID: 746508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preemption under Garmon

Text: 12 The NLRA preempts any claim for relief based on conduct which is protected or prohibited by its provisions. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775. In Garmon, the Supreme Court pronounced a general rule concerning the preemptive effect of the NLRA and the parameters of the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB): 13 When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of interference with national labor policy is to be averted. 14 Id. at 245, 79 S.Ct. at 779; see also Hayden v. Reickerd, 957 F.2d 1506, 1512 (9th Cir.1991). Preemption under Garmon does not require that a plaintiff have a certain remedy before the NLRB, or even that the NLRB will hear the claim in the first place. Bassette v. Stone Container Corp., 25 F.3d 757, 759-60 (9th Cir.1994). Instead, once a court determines that a plaintiff's claim alleges conduct that is arguably or potentially subject to § 7 or § 8 of the NLRA, the court is required to defer to the exclusive competence of the NLRB. Id. at 760; Bud Antle, Inc. v. Barbosa, 35 F.3d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir.1994). 15 In this case, Plaintiffs allege that NASSCO has been utilizing the performance rating system to purposefully low rate handicapped and/or disabled workers which are then the first to be laid off in violation of the ADA. Plaintiffs do not expressly allege that NASSCO failed to bargain in good faith in implementing the PECP or that NASSCO otherwise violated any provision of the NLRA. While recognizing that NASSCO's unilateral adoption of the PECP could, under some circumstances, constitute an unfair labor practice, Plaintiffs urge that NASSCO's actions constitute independent violations of the ADA. 2 In Plaintiffs' words, their suit represents the exercise by twenty-four individual workers of their civil right not to be discriminated against by their employer because of their physical limitations. 16 NASSCO moved for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that the district court was without jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' claims. NASSCO insists that consideration of the ADA is not appropriate because the conduct Plaintiffs allege is arguably violative of the NLRA and therefore preempted under Garmon. In support of its position, NASSCO relies on cases where the Supreme Court has instructed that when considering Garmon preemption, [i]t is the conduct being regulated, not the formal description of governing legal standard, that is the proper focus of concern. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 292, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 1920, 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971). 17 In resolving NASSCO's motion, the district court applied traditional principles of Garmon preemption and found that, assuming the truth of Plaintiffs' allegations, NASSCO's conduct would arguably violate § 8 of the NLRA. The court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that the gravamen of their allegations was the violation of their civil rights. The court viewed Plaintiffs' claims as essentially seeking to remedy an unfair labor practice-the unilateral adoption of the PECP-rather than seeking to remedy a discriminatory practice. Thus, the district court concluded that Plaintiffs' state and federal claims were preempted by the NLRA and that NASSCO was entitled to judgment on the pleadings. 18