Opinion ID: 160670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Free Speech Retaliation

Text: 3 We review de novo a district court's disposition of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, applying the same standard as the district court. Such a judgment is warranted only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting the party opposing the motion. See Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1241 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotations and citations omitted). 4 A trio of Supreme Court decisions fashions the four-step test that guides our inquiry. See Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). For a public employee to prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim against her employer, the employee must prove: (1) the employee's speech involved a matter of public concern, see Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; (2) the employee's interest in commenting upon matters of public concern is greater than the interest of the public employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees, Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; and (3) the speech was a substantial factor or a motivating factor in the adverse employment decision, Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. See also Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 1998); Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 811 (10th Cir. 1996). Finally, if the employee meets the requirements of these three prongs, the burden then shifts to the employer to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision . . . even in the absence of the protected conduct. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. 5 The Court explained the purpose of the fourth step of the inquiry: A borderline or marginal candidate . . . ought not to be able, by engaging in [constitutionally protected] conduct, to prevent his employer from assessing his performance record and reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of that record, simply because the protected conduct makes the employer more certain of the correctness of its decision. 6 Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 286. 7 In the instant action, Defendant demonstrated that Plaintiff's termination would have occurred solely as a result of her poor performance at the hospital. The district court noted: The verdict form . . . reflects the jury's finding that Defendant would have terminated Plaintiff even in the absence of the exercise of her right to free speech. (Br. Aplnt., App. A). Despite this finding, however, the court denied Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The only explanation offered by the court was that the jury's finding does not negate the constitutional violation which occurred, and according to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, . . . merely affects the Plaintiff's damages. (Br. Aplnt., App. A). 8 The district court's determination is contrary to established caselaw. The public employer's anyway defense--if established by a preponderance of the evidence--acts as an absolute bar to liability, not merely a factor in awarding damages. The Supreme Court has said that in First Amendment retaliation actions, the government can escape liability by showing that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the protected conduct. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Wabaunsee County, Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996) (emphasis added) (citing Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287). We have also stated that defendants would be relieved from liability if they can establish that they would have reached the same decision even in the absence of plaintiff's speech. Copp v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501, 882 F.2d 1547, 1554 (10th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). 9 In this case, the jury specifically found that Defendant would have terminated Plaintiff even in the absence of the exercise of her right to free speech. (Br. Aplnt., App. A). Thus, Defendant met its burden and is relieved from liability in terminating Plaintiff.