Opinion ID: 47916
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Texas Trial Court

Text: 24 As stated, [u]nder the AEDPA deference scheme, pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under § 2254(d)(1), and questions of facts are reviewed under § 2254(d)(2). Trevino v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 173, 181 (5th Cir.1999). Accordingly, Moody is not entitled to habeas relief unless the state court's decision is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. § 2254(d)(2). Further, a state court's factual findings are presumed to be correct unless contravened by clear and convincing evidence. § 2254(e)(1). With this standard of deference in mind, we consider Moody's equal protection claim. 25 From our review of the record, it is patently clear that the state trial court's ruling was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law. The trial court did not even consider Moody's request for a Batson hearing because it incorrectly concluded that Moody had no standing to challenge the prosecution's exclusion of Hightower. As noted above, the Supreme Court has held that defendants have standing to raise a prospective juror's equal protection claim by way of a Batson challenge, even if the prospective juror is of a different race. Powers, 499 U.S. at 415, 111 S.Ct. 1364. Because of the trial court's erroneous ruling in contravention of Powers, it did not broach the three-step analysis required to evaluate a defendant's Batson challenge. Given the Supreme Court's holding in Powers, we find that the state trial court's ruling was an unreasonable application of clearly-established Supreme Court law. As to AEDPA's requirement that this court defer to the state trial court's findings of fact, this directive is not applicable as to this state trial court because it failed to make any findings of fact relative to the heart of Moody's claim.