Opinion ID: 674673
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Release Of Butterworth From Responsibility

Text: 30 Dean also appeals the district court's decision to amend its judgment, thereby releasing Butterworth from costs and from the responsibility for setting aside the conviction. He maintains that the Florida Attorney General has a constitutional, statutory, and common-law duty to represent the State in this action. We review the district court's decision to amend the judgment for abuse of discretion. Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods, Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 859 (11th Cir.1990). 31 We find no such abuse of discretion in the district court's decision. Dean confuses the Attorney General's mandatory duty to represent the State with its discretionary authority to intervene in lawsuits in which the State has an interest. The instant case does not come within the Attorney General's mandatory duty. 32 Florida statutory law requires the attorney General to appear in and attend to, in behalf of the state, all suits ... in which the state may be a party, or in anywise interested. Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 16.01(4). Although Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires that the state attorney general be served, the advisory committee notes to that rule make clear that the attorney general is not required to answer if it is more appropriate for some other agency to do so. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 Rule 4, advisory committee notes. Here, the habeas petition involved a conviction under a county ordinance. Redner was not a state prisoner, and no state statute or state official was involved. Thus, the State of Florida is neither a party nor does it have an interest in these proceedings. For these same reasons, this case does not require Butterworth to exercise his discretionary authority under the common law to intervene in cases where public interest requires. See generally Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1500 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 962, 104 S.Ct. 2180, 80 L.Ed.2d 562 (1984). Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in amending the judgment to release Butterworth from responsibility in this case.