Opinion ID: 1923690
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: review of factual underpinnings

Text: The majority concludes that in order to determine whether the rule exceeds the Commissioner's statutory authority the court must look . . . into their factual underpinnings. ( Supra, p. 109) I agree with the majority that although rule making involves policy determination and is an act legislative in character, Peterson v. National Resources Board, 94 Wis.2d 587, 595, 288 N.W.2d 845 (1980), there are frequently factual components in rule-making  as there are in the adjudicative process. Misunderstanding of the facts is as dangerous in developing an administrative rule as in determining the outcome of an adjudicatory proceeding. Unfortunately the majority does not set forth the factual underpinnings which it is examining. I suggest that the basic factual underpinnings of the rule are that a substantial number of policies are lapsed or surrendered rather than terminated by death; that in a majority of instances whether the policy terminates by lapse, surrender or death, the SCI and the NCPI Indexes as cost comparison tools lead to the same result; that comparison of costs of insurance policies is complex; [14] that there is a need for disclosure of cost information; and that there is no single, agreed-upon technique for comparing costs of policies prior to purchase. I believe these factual predicates of the rule are undisputed and unchallenged by Aetna, the circuit court, or the majority opinion. The majority concludes there is another factual issue underlying the rule and sets it forth as follows: The question of whether the Buyer's Guide and the Policy Summary are misleading is a question of fact. ( Supra, p. 110) The majority's characterization of the question as one of fact is not supported by any citation to authority or by any reasoning of the court. Assume for the moment, as the majority does, that the question of whether the rule is misleading is one of fact. The issue which then must be decided is who decides this fact  the Commissioner or the circuit court. Considering that the legislature has empowered the Commissioner to determine what information should be disclosed to the consumer and that the legislature has authorized the court to review the Commissioner's rule as to disclosure to determine whether it is in excess of the Commissioner's statutory authority, I conclude that if the rule is predicated on the disputed factual issue whether the information is or is not misleading, the factual issue should be decided initially by the Commissioner (on the basis of the record presented to her), and her decision should then be reviewed by the circuit court  and this court  to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record. The issue comes back then to what should the record be. I shall not discuss this question further. I merely note that this court has applied the substantial evidence test to records made in legislative-type decisions, saying that the court in deciding whether there is substantial evidence to support a legislative-type decision, determines whether reasonable minds could arrive at the same conclusion as the agency. Ashwaubenon v. State Highway Comm., 17 Wis.2d 126, 131, 115 N.W.2d 498 (1962), quoted with approval in Westring v. James, 71 Wis.2d 462, 476, 238 N.W.2d 695 (1976). [15] Thus, if the majority is correct that the issue is one of fact, the majority errs in permitting the circuit court to determine the fact ab initio rather than requiring the circuit court to review the Commissioner's determination of the fact; and the majority further errs in reviewing the circuit court's determination rather than the Commissioner's determination.