Opinion ID: 613237
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Danny Smith

Text: Danny Smith, one of the defendants (along with Raymond Smith) against whom Ronald Lally had been set to testify in connection with drug-trafficking charges just before he was killed, gave a recorded statement to police during custodial interrogation on January 7, 1995. Danny Smith told Elyria Police Detective Alan Leiby, investigating the Lally murder, that he never really suspected of [sic] Stan [Jalowiec] would do something like that until everything started coming in and people start [sic] bringing up his name. This statement was not disclosed to Jalowiec prior to or at the time of his trial. Although Danny Smith, as a suspected co-conspirator, was unavailable to testify at Jalowiec's trial, Jalowiec argues the statement should have been disclosed as Brady material because it tended to exonerate him, refuting the prosecution's theory that he was involved in a suspected conspiracy to kill Lally. The district court summarily held that Danny Smith's January 7, 1995 statement was material because, had it been disclosed prior to trial or at trial, the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Jalowiec, 2008 WL 312655, at . However, the court ultimately concluded that this  Brady violation, viewed in light of all the evidence implicating Jalowiec, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at . On appeal, Jalowiec correctly contends the district court's reasoning is self-contradictory. He contends the district court, having once found that the statement was material, and its nondisclosure a  Brady violation, was not at liberty to engage in harmless-error review to deny habeas relief. Indeed, the district court expressly recognized earlier in its opinion that once a Brady violation is found, there is no need for further harmless-error review[;] ... [a] Brady violation is never harmless. Id. at  (citations omitted). The Warden does not deny the facial inconsistency. However, in view of the court's unambiguous denial of habeas relief, the Warden contends the opinion should be construed as concluding that Danny Smith's statement was potentially exculpatory and should have been disclosed per Brady, but was not, ultimately, material. The Warden's position finds support not only in a common-sense reading of the opinion as a whole, but also in the Supreme Court's recognition that not every violation of [the prosecution's duty of disclosure] necessarily establishes that the outcome was unjust. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281, 119 S.Ct. 1936. As the Strickler Court further observed: [T]he term  Brady violation is sometimes used to refer to any breach of the broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidencethat is, to any suppression of so-called  Brady materialalthough, strictly speaking, there is never a real  Brady violation unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict. Id. Consistent with this observation, we read the district court's opinion, despite its misleading language, as concluding that the prosecution breached its duty of disclosure under Brady, but that the Danny Smith statement was not so material that its timely disclosure to the defense would have given rise to a reasonable probability of a different verdict. This is a conclusion that we also reach de novo. We find no error in the district court's determination that the January 7, 1995 statement should have been disclosed. Yet, the statement is arguably as incriminating as it is exculpatory. Jalowiec has not demonstratedeven assuming he could have found a way of introducing Danny Smith's hearsay opinion about a friend's characterthat he could have made such effective use of it as would put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Nor has he explained how the statement might have led to other admissible exculpatory evidence. The statement is therefore not material for Brady purposes, and its nondisclosure was not so prejudicial as to amount to a  Brady violation. In addition to the January 7, 1995 statement, the prosecution withheld recorded conversations between Danny Smith and prosecution witness Carl Hartman in which Danny attempted to bribe Hartman and influence him as a witness. Jalowiec contends that Danny's statements could have been used to cross-examine Hartman and to undermine the prosecution's theory that Jalowiec conspired to kill Lally by tending to show Danny Smith's greater involvement and culpability. The district court held this evidence was neither exculpatory nor material. Jalowiec, 2008 WL 312655 at . On appeal, Jalowiec has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in either respect. Jalowiec has not demonstrated how he could have effectively used such evidence of Danny Smith's efforts to influence Hartman to undermine confidence in the jury's assessment of the evidence against him.