Opinion ID: 453004
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Role of the Harmless Error Test

Text: 269 Generally, once there has been a showing of a constitutional violation, a habeas corpus petitioner may still not be entitled to relief in some instances if the error was harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); see also United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1986, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). Some errors because of their importance, such as the complete denial of the right to counsel at a critical stage of a proceeding, can never be harmless. United States v. Cronic, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657, 668, n. 25 (1984). 270 Other errors, however, can under certain circumstances be considered harmless. Those circumstances will vary depending on the nature and seriousness of the error, whether it was intentional or unintentional, and the extent to which a reviewing court can determine the impact of the error on the decision making body. In a harmless error inquiry, the Supreme Court has stated as the test: 271 We prefer the approach of this Court in deciding what was harmless error in our recent case of Fahy v. State of Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171. There we said: The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. Id., at 86-87, 84 S.Ct. at 230.... Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless. It is for that reason that the original common-law harmless-error rule put the burden on the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained judgment. There is little, if any, difference between our statement in Fahy v. State of Connecticut about whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction and requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.... 272 Applying the foregoing standard, we have no doubt that the error in these cases was not harmless to petitioners. To reach this conclusion one need only glance at the prosecutorial comments compiled from the record by petitioners' counsel and (with minor omissions) set forth in the Appendix. 273 Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at 23-24, 87 S.Ct. at 827-828 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). See also Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 103 S.Ct. 969, 975, 74 L.Ed.2d 823 (1983) (plurality opinion). 274 Chapman itself was a prosecutorial misconduct case. (comment by the prosecutor during closing argument on the defendant's failure to testify). The test articulated in Strickland, supra, cannot be invoked logically in a prosecutorial misconduct case. To do so is to place the burden of proof on the victim of the error to show that the prosecutor's argument affected his trial or sentencing hearing.