Opinion ID: 1850441
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Intent to Restore Property as Element of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property and Sufficiency of Evidence

Text: Hubbard contends that under the theft statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-517 (Reissue 1995), a lack of intent to restore property to the owner is an essential element that must be charged in the information and proved by the prosecution. He argues that the element was not charged and that there was insufficient evidence to convict him. The State contends that the intent to restore the property is a defense. Section 28-517 provides: A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of stolen movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has been stolen, unless the property is received, retained, or disposed with the intention to restore it to the owner. This court has never addressed whether a lack of intent to restore the property to the owner is an element of theft by receiving stolen property. Section 28-517 is the same as A.L.I., Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 223.6 (1980), with the exception that additional definitions in the Model Penal Code were not adopted. The Model Penal Code comments to § 223.6 make clear that a lack of intent to restore property to the owner is intended to be an element of the crime of theft by receiving stolen property. In particular, comment 4(a) at 237 states: Theft convictions generally require a purpose to deprive another of his property. In terms, Section 223.6 does not require such a purpose for criminal receiving, but the net effect of its provisions is the same. First, the actor either must know that the property has been stolen or must believe that it probably has been stolen. Second, the actor's receipt, retention, or disposition of the property is criminal, unless his conduct is undertaken with purpose to restore it [the property] to the owner. Since a purpose to restore defeats conviction, and since the prosecution must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the actor did not have such a purpose, the culpability required under Section 223.6 can properly be assimilated to a purpose to deprive the victim of his property. As a practical matter, the absence of a purpose to restore will be proved by showing that it was part of the receiver's plan to avoid detection and to realize for himself the benefits of the property. [4] We determine that the adoption of a theft statute that is based on the Model Penal Code, along with the traditional elements of common-law theft, establishes that a lack of intent to restore the property is an element of the crime. Thus, it must be charged in the information and proved by the prosecution. Hubbard next argues that the lack of intent to restore the property was not charged or proved. The information alleged in part that Hubbard, with the intent to deprive the owner thereof, did receive, retain, or dispose of stolen movable property. Although the information did not charge the crime using the terms of the statute, it did include the allegation that Hubbard intended to deprive the owners of their property. [5,6] We have stated that where an information alleges the commission of a crime using language of the statute defining that crime or terms equivalent to such statutory definition, the charge is sufficient. State v. Bowen , 244 Neb. 204, 505 N.W.2d 682 (1993). But we have not required that a crime be charged using the exact statutory language. Instead, an information or complaint is sufficient unless it is so defective that by no construction can it be said to charge the offense of which the accused was convicted. Id .; State v. Laymon , 239 Neb. 80, 474 N.W.2d 458 (1991). Here, an equivalent term was used: The use of the term deprive encompassed a lack of intent to restore the property to the owners. [7] The lack of intent to restore the property was also proved at trial through evidence that Hubbard planned to avoid detection and realize benefits of the property. When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Leibhart , 266 Neb. 133, 662 N.W.2d 618 (2003). Here, there was testimony that Hubbard did not intend to restore the stolen property, that he got rid of some of the property, and that he benefited from the property, such as staying in a hotel room paid for with proceeds from the return of the figurine. There was also evidence that Hubbard received property by assisting with the unwrapping of gifts. Finally, because the digital camera was never located, there was circumstantial evidence that Hubbard disposed of it. The record supports a finding that the property was worth over $500. Under these circumstances, the absence of a purpose to restore the property was not only sufficiently charged, but there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Hubbard guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of theft by receiving stolen property.