Opinion ID: 182845
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Clancy Was Barton's Employer

Text: Chapter 151B's definition of employer provides little guidance, stating that the term `employer' does not include a club exclusively social, or a fraternal association or corporation, if such club, association or corporation is not organized for private profit, nor does it include any employer with fewer than six persons in his employ, but shall include the commonwealth and all political subdivisions, boards, departments and commissions thereof. Id. § 1(5). The parties do not cite, and our research has not revealed, any Massachusetts decisions interpreting the term employer under ch. 151B in a context similar to this case. However, in interpreting ch. 151B, Massachusetts courts follow federal case law construing analogous provisions of federal antidiscrimination law. See Wheatley v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 418 Mass. 394, 636 N.E.2d 265, 268 (1994). Therefore, we look to federal decisions interpreting the term employer under federal antidiscrimination statutes. In Lopez v. Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69 (1st Cir.2009), we recently interpreted the term employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. We noted that Supreme Court precedent has established that when a statute contains the term `employee' but does not define it, a court must presume that Congress has incorporated traditional agency law principles for identifying `master-servant relationships.' Id. at 83. Under the common law test, `the relevant factors defining the master-servant relationship focus on the master's control over the servant.' Id. at 84 (quoting Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 448, 123 S.Ct. 1673, 155 L.Ed.2d 615 (2003)). As we explained in Lopez, we look to the guidelines in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Compliance Manual to address the question of whether an employment relationship exists. Id. at 85. The guidelines list a series of non-exhaustive factors that are indicative of an employment relationship: [t]he employer has the right to control when, where, and how the worker performs the job; [t]he work does not require a high level of skill or expertise; [t]he work is performed on the employer's premises; [t]here is a continuing relationship between the worker and the employer; [t]he employer has the right to assign additional projects to the worker; [t]he employer sets the hours of work and the duration of the job; [t]he worker is paid by the hour, week, or month rather than the agreed cost of performing a particular job; [t]he worker does not hire and pay assistants; [t]he work performed by the worker is part of the regular business of the employer; [t]he employer is in business; [t]he worker is not engaged in his/her own distinct occupation or business; [t]he employer provides the worker with benefits such as insurance, leave, or workers' compensation; [t]he worker is considered an employee of the employer for tax purposes; [t]he employer can discharge the worker; and [t]he worker and the employer believe that they are creating an employer-employee relationship. Id. (quoting 2 Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Compliance Manual, § 2-III, at 5716-17 (2008)) (alterations in original). Applying these factors in the instant case, we conclude that Clancy was not Barton's employer. One relevant factor, whether [t]he employer can discharge the worker, clearly militates against finding otherwise. See id. It is undisputed that the superintendent of Lynn's public school system, and not the mayor, had the ultimate authority to hire and fire school athletic coaches. The mayor's lack of hiring and firing authority is particularly clear in this case, where Clancy's letters strongly urged Superintendent Kostan and Principal Fila to rescind Barton's appointment, but Kostan and Fila rejected that suggestion and kept Barton employed. Barton has not attempted to demonstrate, and the record does not show, that any of the other factors listed in the EEOC guidelines support a finding that the City's public high school athletic coaches are employees of the mayor. Barton does not argue that Clancy qualified as his employer based on the factors listed in the EEOC guidelines. Instead, he relies on our decision in Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.1994), and argues that Clancy was his employer because Clancy had the ability to control significant aspects of Barton's employment. In Carparts, we stated that an entity would be an employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) if it exercised control over an important aspect of [the plaintiff's] employment, such as employee health care coverage. Id. at 17. In Lopez, however, we emphasized that the Supreme Court has restricted the definition of employer under Title VII to its meaning at common law. 588 F.3d at 84. We distinguished Carparts on the grounds that it involved two private entities, an unusual set of facts, and a particular procedural posture, and noted that in Carparts we ultimately concluded that we lacked sufficient facts to determine whether this test even applied to the case at hand. Id. at 88 (citing Carparts, 37 F.3d at 18). Even assuming, arguendo, that the standard suggested in Carparts is applicable here, Clancy did not exercise sufficient control over any important aspect of Barton's employment to qualify as his employer. Barton emphasizes ways in which the mayor exercised some indirect influence over the hiring and financing of high school basketball coaches. Under the Lynn City Charter and state law, the mayor sits as chairman of the School Committee; the School Committee in turn has the authority to elect the superintendent; and the superintendent, in consultation with high school principals, in turn has the authority to hire and fire school athletic coaches, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71 §§ 47A, 59B. The mayor also has some influence over public school funding. Under the City Charter, the mayor submits a proposed budget to the City Council for each fiscal year, which contains a complete financial plan for all city funds and activities. The City Council then adopts the budget, with or without amendments. However, as noted above, it is undisputed that the superintendent, not the mayor, has authority to hire and fire athletic coaches. The mayor's limited and indirect influence over public school athletic coaches does not indicate that Mayor Clancy exercised control over an important aspect of Barton's employment.