Opinion ID: 2613976
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Review of Arbitrability

Text: (1) Although this court has not previously articulated a detailed standard for review of the remedies fashioned by an arbitrator, we have considered the related question how to review determinations of arbitrability, that is, whether an arbitrator exceeded his or her authority by deciding a particular issue. On that point, our decisions teach that courts should generally defer to an arbitrator's finding that determination of a particular question is within the scope of his or her contractual authority. Code of Civil Procedure section 1283.4 [7] provides the arbitrator's written award shall determine all submitted questions necessary in order to determine the controversy. Construing that section in Morris v. Zuckerman (1968) 69 Cal.2d 686, 690 [72 Cal. Rptr. 880, 446 P.2d 1000], this court held it is for the arbitrators to determine what issues are necessary to the ultimate decision. We continued: Likewise, any doubts as to the meaning or extent of an arbitration agreement are for the arbitrators and not the court to resolve. ( Ibid.; accord, Taylor v. Crane (1979) 24 Cal.3d 442, 450 [155 Cal. Rptr. 695, 595 P.2d 129]; Van Tassel v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 624, 627 [116 Cal. Rptr. 505, 526 P.2d 969].) Although section 1286.2 permits the court to vacate an award that exceeds the arbitrator's powers, the deference due an arbitrator's decision on the merits of the controversy requires a court to refrain from substituting its judgment for the arbitrator's in determining the contractual scope of those powers. ( Morris v. Zuckerman, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 691; see also O'Malley v. Wilshire Oil Co. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 482, 493 [30 Cal. Rptr. 452, 381 P.2d 188] [contractual clause precluding arbitrator from modifying contract did not permit court to reach merits of controversy in deciding limits of arbitrability]; Weiman v. Superior Court (1959) 51 Cal.2d 710, 714 [336 P.2d 489] [court's duty to determine if there was a disagreement to be arbitrated did not authorize prior judicial decision on merits of dispute].) Giving substantial deference to the arbitrators' own assessments of their contractual authority is consistent with the general rule of arbitral finality we recently reaffirmed in Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pages 8-13 (hereafter Moncharsh ). As we stated there, parties to private, nonjudicial arbitration typically expect `their dispute will be resolved without necessity for any contact with the courts.' ( Id. at p. 9, quoting Blanton v. Womancare, Inc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 396, 402, fn. 5 [212 Cal. Rptr. 151, 696 P.2d 645, 48 A.L.R.4th 109].) The decision to arbitrate disputes is motivated in part by the desire to avoid the delay and cost of judicial trials and appeals. Ensuring arbitral finality thus requires that judicial intervention in the arbitration process be minimized. ( Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 10.) A rule of judicial review under which courts would independently redetermine the scope of an arbitration agreement already interpreted by the arbitrator would invite frequent and protracted judicial proceedings, contravening the parties' expectations of finality. (See Van Tassel v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 627 [trial de novo of jurisdictional facts would defeat purposes of choosing arbitration].)