Opinion ID: 2545693
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Judge Eriksson's Statements to the Investigative Panel

Text: Judge Eriksson next argues that both the Hearing Panel and this Court should be precluded from considering any evidence presented to the Investigative Panel because Article V, section 12(a)(4) of the Florida Constitution specifically provides that [u]ntil formal charges against a justice or judge are filed by the investigative panel with the clerk of the supreme court of Florida all proceedings by or before the commission shall be confidential.  (Emphasis supplied.) We reject this reading of the Florida Constitution because it is inconsistent with past practices of the JQC and the precedent of this Court. In Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975), the Supreme Court of the United States held: The contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication ... must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented. Id. at 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456. The JQC refers to Koehler v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 390 So.2d 711 (Fla.1980), to establish that this Court has applied the above-mentioned language to bifurcated hearings in Florida. Even though Koehler applied Withrow to the administrative law field, the same principles apply here in the context of judicial discipline. Koehler, through its adoption of Withrow, held that [t]he `mere exposure to evidence' in the investigative phase of a proceeding ... is `insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness' of board members when they later sit in judgment. Koehler, 390 So.2d at 713 (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 55, 95 S.Ct. 1456). The finding that someone involved in the investigation of an allegation may later adjudicate that same allegation and not violate due process applies to the judicial disciplinary context as it does to the administrative law framework. While this Court has not explicitly adopted Withrow in the judicial context, the analysis of Withrow from other jurisdictions is persuasive. In Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So.2d 929 (Miss.1997), the Supreme Court of Mississippi found that the state's bifurcated judicial disciplinary process presented no more evidence of bias or the risk of bias ... than inheres in the very fact that the Board had investigated and would now adjudicate. Id. at 946 (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 54, 95 S.Ct. 1456). In Mosely v. Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline, 117 Nev. 371, 22 P.3d 655 (Nev.2001), the Supreme Court of Nevada held that, [a]lthough the Court's ruling concerned an administrative agency and not, as here, a court of judicial performance, we conclude that Withrow is otherwise indistinguishable and therefore dispositive. Id. at 660. Further, this Court's justification for the confidentiality requirement in JQC investigations is inconsistent with Judge Eriksson's argument. In In re Graziano, 696 So.2d 744 (Fla.1997), this Court explained that confidentiality allows the JQC to efficiently process complaints from any and all sources while protecting the complainant from recriminations and the judicial officer from unsubstantiated charges. See id. (citing Forbes v. Earle, 298 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1974)). In Forbes, we clarified the justification for confidentiality in judicial discipline investigations: The need and reason for confidentiality is set forth by the American Bar Association Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration which recommends: Except in the most extreme situations, the requirements of verification and disclosure of identity stifle complaints and thereby frustrate the objective of securing public confidence in the courts' willingness to police themselves. The provision that investigations be confidential has proven to be abundant safeguard for the judge who has been unfairly accused. Forbes, 298 So.2d at 4. The confidentiality of the 6(b) hearings is thus aimed at protecting judges from unsubstantiated claims, not meritorious claims that advance to a hearing panel. See id. Judge Eriksson does not provide any authority to support his unique interpretation of article V, section 12 of the Florida Constitution. Further, this Court has upheld numerous cases in which findings from a hearing panel have relied on evidence presented during the investigative phase of a JQC proceeding. For example, in In re Ford-Kaus, 730 So.2d 269 (Fla.1999), a judge was accused of overbilling a client while running for office. The judge told an investigative panel that the overbilling was the fault of her secretary. See id. at 275. The Hearing Panel later discovered that the judge did not employ a secretary at the time the alleged overbilling occurred and, after probing the judge on her prior testimony, concluded that the judge had been untruthful. See id. This Court not only upheld the findings and recommendations of the hearing panel, it also factored dishonesty into its decision to remove the judge from office. See id. at 275-77. Accordingly, we find that the Hearing Panel was authorized to consider the testimony of Judge Eriksson that was presented during the investigative proceeding before the filing of the Notice of Formal Charges.