Opinion ID: 1461962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Errera's Case

Text: Errera, a computer consultant, was injured on December 7, 1993, when he was fifty-nine years old, in a fall at Dulles Airport. While leaving the terminal building Errera and his wife came to an area that was under construction. He encountered a set of barriers similar to, but lower than, the barriers commonly erected outside of supermarkets in order to confine carts to the premises. Errera described the accident to Judge Chapin as follows: At first glance you look and you can recognize that it's too low to get your suitcases underneath so you have to lift your suitcases over this barrier to get through. I found out later the barriers were not smooth. In going through the barriers, a bag which I was carrying caught on the barrier and then released, and the suitcase that was in my left arm came around, hit me in the chest, and as a result fractured four ribs and did a few other things to my internal organs. He went head over heels with the luggage. Judge Chapin made the following findings of fact: After unsuccessful attempts on his own to reach the airport and determine the responsible party, Errera [on December 20, 1993] engaged [Chasnoff] to file a claim against the responsible party. [Chasnoff] and Errera entered into a contingency fee arrangement, which provided that [Chasnoff] would receive 33 1/3% of any recovery if the matter was settled before [suit] and 40% if [suit were filed]. Because [Chasnoff] was not admitted to practice law in Virginia (the state where the accident occurred), he made arrangements with Paul Capello, a member of the Virginia Bar, to join him in representing Errera. [Chasnoff] told Errera during their first meeting that he would visit the scene of the accident, take photographs of the conditions as they existed at the time of the accident, and try to locate the sky cap that assisted him to his car on the night of the accident. [Chasnoff] did not even go to the scene to take pictures until May 1995, and he never attempted to locate the sky cap or any other possible witnesses. According to a letter written by Errera to [Chasnoff] in June 1994, the scene of the accident had already changed by that time. Errera's wife witnessed the accident, but [Chasnoff] never made any attempt to depose her or otherwise preserve her testimony. Mrs. Errera was taken ill in April of 1994, and she died soon after on June 24,1994. On the last possible day in December 1995 before the two-year statute of limitations would bar the claim, [Chasnoff] filed a suit in the Circuit Court for Fairfax County, Virginia. Although Errera was aware that Capello was also on the case, Errera dealt strictly with [Chasnoff], to whom he looked for advice and to protect his interests. Errera consulted with [Chasnoff] to provide discovery information when requested. However, [Chasnoff] failed to timely comply with the defendant's discovery requests on multiple occasions, which resulted in at least two Motions to Compel Discovery filed by opposing counsel. Capello warned [Chasnoff] numerous times that the case was in imminent danger of being dismissed due to failure to provide discovery, and he threatened to withdraw from the case. Capello also reminded [Chasnoff] about important upcoming dates, such as the deadline to identify experts, and he offered to assist [Chasnoff]. Unfortunately, [Chasnoff] did not take Capello up on his offer. In the months following the accident, Errera ... continued to be in pain. In March of 1994, he met with an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Thorp, who prescribed stronger medication, recommended exercises, and advised Errera that he could not pursue his normal job, because it required him to sit at a computer for long hours. By June of 1994, Errera's condition had improved to the extent that he could drive short distances, but he was still unable to sit at his computer for more than two hours at a time. On February 25, 1996, Errera found out that Dr. Thorp was moving to Oregon during a visit to the doctor for treatment of a shoulder problem. Shortly thereafter, Errera advised [Chasnoff] that Dr. Thorp was moving out of the area so that [Chasnoff] could obtain any necessary information from the doctor about Errera's injuries before he moved. [Chasnoff] took no action to preserve Dr. Thorp's testimony. In fact, [Chasnoff] did not propound a letter written by Dr. Thorp on March 10, 1994 to [Chasnoff] regarding Errera's condition to opposing counsel during the discovery period. Among other things, the letter confirmed that Errera was experiencing soreness in his neck in addition to pain from the contusion in his chest wall. The letter also documented Dr. Thorp's recommendation that Errera avoid sitting for prolonged periods at a computer terminal. Due to [Chasnoff's] failure to provide this letter in discovery, the defendant's doctor, Dr. Conant, did not have this information when he evaluated Errera in October of 1998. Dr. Conant found no causal relationship between the accident and Errera's condition. In 1997, [Chasnoff] suggested to Errera that he see Drs. Charles Mess and Francis Mayle, because Errera continued to be in pain. Prior to this time, Errera had x-rays, which showed an abnormality in his neck. However, since four years had lapsed since the accident, the doctors could not causally connect the abnormality to the accident. In addition to Drs. Mess and Mayle, [Chasnoff] named John Gooch as an expert who opined that the exit on the day of Errera's accident did not comply with legal standards. Gooch did not examine the scene until January 1996, after the scene had changed and the barriers involved were no longer present, but Gooch based his opinion from the markings on the pavement that indicated where the pipes had been. The defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude these experts from testifying at trial, since [Chasnoff] failed to provide their names in a timely manner and had not provided enough detail regarding Gooch's testimony. The motion in limine excluding the experts was granted on November 6, 1998. On November 20, 1998, [Chasnoff] and Capella recommended to Errera that he accept a $4,000 offer. His litigation costs alone exceeded $10,000, but he was warned by his counsel that if he did not settle, he could be forced to pay the costs of the opposing party, $25,000 to $30,000. Errera took this advice and settled, despite the fact that at the onset of the litigation, [Chasnoff] demanded $350,000 from the putative defendants. By the time the $4,000 settlement offer was made, all of the defendants except the airport authority had been dismissed from the case. However, Errera was under the impression that the engineering and contracting companies responsible for the construction were still in the lawsuit at the time of the settlement. Errera received $1,024 from the settlement on July 9, 1999 along with a statement entitled Accounting, which listed the disbursements from the settlement proceeds. This statement also included a disclaimer, which purported to release [Chasnoff] from all liability. According to Errera, [Chasnoff] insisted that Errera sign this document without explaining this provision and without suggesting that Errera seek independent counsel. Obviously, proof of liability in Errera's case was problematic, an evaluation which Capello confirmed from the standpoint of Virginia law. Nevertheless, having determined to undertake the matter, Chasnoff had the duty to proceed competently and with diligence. In this regard Judge Chapin said: The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that [Chasnoff] did not act with the skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary to represent Errera. Indeed, [Chasnoff] did not even visit the scene of the accident until some two years after the fact. He did not attempt to locate the employee who assisted Errera on the night of the accident. He did not attempt to preserve the testimony of Mrs. Errera and Dr. Thorp. He did not see to it that Errera have his medical condition monitored in order to document that it was not improving. [Chasnoff] did not even act with the diligence necessary to ensure that the witnesses he did name were able to testify at trial. There is no question that [Chasnoff] violated both Rule 1.1 [duty to act with competence] and Rule 1.3 [duty to act diligently]. These findings are supported by the evidence. Chasnoff's exceptions to these findings are denied. Judge Chapin further found Chasnoff had failed to communicate with his client in violation of MRPC 1.4. Specifically, Judge Chapin found the following: Errera testified that he tried to communicate with [Chasnoff] about his case from May 1998 until late September 1998 but was unable to reach him. [Chasnoff] also failed to adequately explain the facts regarding his case to the extent necessary to allow Errera to make fully informed decisions, and [Chasnoff] failed to advise Errera that he maintain a medical record of his pain and inability to sit for prolonged periods of time. In fact, Errera was still under the impression that he would be awarded a large settlement, even after Drs. Mess and Mayle failed to find that Errera's medical problems were related to the accident. It was not until the eleventh hour that Errera was advised that he did not have a case and that if he insisted on going to trial, he was at risk of having to pay opposing counsel fees. Clearly, [Chasnoff] failed to keep Errera reasonably informed about the status of his case. In addition, [Chasnoff] did not explain the release clause he presented to Errera along with his share of the proceeds of the settlement. These findings are supported by the evidence. Chasnoff's exceptions to these findings are denied. The petition for disciplinary action also charged Chasnoff with a violation of MRPC 1.5(e) in the Errera matter. That subsection reads as follows: (e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if: (1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; (2) the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and (3) the total fee is reasonable. Judge Chapin reasoned that, inasmuch as there was no written agreement with the client whereby Chasnoff and Capello assumed joint responsibility, the division of the fee had to be in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer, but, because Chasnoff still provided the lion's share of services, it was impermissible to share the fee on a 50-50 basis. This fall-down case resulted in nothing but a loss for the plaintiff and his attorneys. From the $4,000 settlement, counsel each received $800, and Errera netted $1,042.69 after payment of open expenses totaling $1,357.31. This is not a factual situation to which MRPC 1.5(e)(1) was intended to apply. The purpose of the restrictions on fee splitting is to avoid brokering in clients. C. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 9.2.4, at 510 (1986). In Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (2000), the restrictions on fee splitting are found in § 47. [3] In comment b to § 47 the American Law Institute sets forth the following rationale for the restrictions. The traditional prohibition of fee-splitting among lawyers is justified primarily as preventing one lawyer from recommending another to a client on the basis of the referral fee that the recommended lawyer will pay, rather than that lawyer's qualifications. The prohibition has also been defended as preventing overcharging that may otherwise result when a client pays two lawyers and only one performs services. Beyond that, the prohibition reflects a general hostility to commercial methods of obtaining clients. In the instant matter the purported violation is that the referring lawyer did not receive a sufficiently high portion of the fee to be commensurate with the work he performed in relation to his Virginia colleague. The concern to which MRPC 1.5(e) is directed, however, is just the oppositethat the recommending lawyer will be paid for simply forwarding the business, without doing sufficient work to justify the fee split. Further, the $800 which each of the attorneys received in this case was exceedingly slim compensation if one considers only the time which each of the attorneys put into this contingent fee case. In any event, it was absolutely necessary for Chasnoff to have local counsel inasmuch as he was not admitted in Virginia. Contrary to Chasnoff's violating MRPC 1.5(e) by the equal division of $1,600, it would have been unprofessional for Chasnoff, in this loss situation, to attempt to foist a larger share of the loss on Capello by insisting that their relative services be calibrated. We sustain the exceptions to the finding of violation of MRPC 1.5(e).