Opinion ID: 1998712
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prior Identification through an Interpreter

Text: Detective Hartnett's testimony recounting Palomo's identification of Simas forms the basis for defendant's last evidentiary challenge. During trial, Det. Hartnett testified that, when presented with a photo array at the police station the morning after the shooting, Palomo identified Simas as the individual responsible for the injury to his left arm. When asked how he orally communicated with Palomo, Det. Hartnett testified that a uniformed officer served as a Spanish interpreter during the identification. In Det. Hartnett's words, Palomo, in the presence of the interpreter, pointed to [the photo of Simas] and, then, after pointing to it wrote down on the sheet of paper in Spanish `this is the person who shot at the car.' The photo array, which bore Palomo's written assertion in Spanish below Simas's picture, then was introduced as a full exhibit without objection, after testimony that the police employed neutral, non-suggestive procedures for obtaining the identification. It is defendant's contention that Det. Hartnett's testimony about Palomo's written assertion is inadmissible hearsay. The defendant initially concedes that, if the witness understood Spanish, testimony about Palomo's written assertion would not have been objectionable because the detective would have his own first-hand understanding of the Spanish statement. However, because Det. Hartnett did not understand Spanish, the witness did not testify to what Palomo, as the declarant, actually wrote, but instead to what the interpreter said Palomo wrote, viz., this is the person who shot at the car. In this situation, defendant argues, the only way to legitimize the photo line-up as being completely non-suggestive and reliable, would have been to call the Spanish-speaking officer as a witness. Because the interpreter did not testify, and because, as defendant alleges without further elaboration, Palomo's identification of Simas carried great significance in defendant's conviction, defendant concludes that the trial justice's alleged abuse of discretion constitutes reversible error. To support his general assertion that Det. Hartnett's testimony was inadmissible hearsay, defendant relies upon two long-standing opinions of this Court in State v. Epstein, 25 R.I. 131, 140, 55 A. 204, 208 (1903) and State v. Terline, 23 R.I. 530, 539-40, 51 A. 204, 208 (1902). We decline the invitation to revisit substantively these holdings because defendant has not properly preserved the issue for appeal. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 871 A.2d 341, 345 (R.I.2005) (It is axiomatic that `this [C]ourt will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal that was not properly presented before the trial court.') (quoting State v. Saluter, 715 A.2d 1250, 1258 (R.I.1998)). When an issue for which sought-after appellate review is evidentiary, Rule 103(a)(1) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence explicitly provides that a finding of error must be predicated upon a timely objection or motion to strike    of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context. Our case law states with abundant clarity that issues that were not preserved by a specific objection at trial, `sufficiently focused so as to call the trial justice's attention to the basis for said objection, may not be considered on appeal.' State v. Bettencourt, 723 A.2d 1101, 1107 (R.I.1999) (quoting State v. Toole, 640 A.2d 965, 972-73 (R.I.1994)). General objections to the admissibility of evidence, when the context does not supply the specific ground for the objection, are thus insufficient to preserve the issue under Rule 103(a)(1). State v. Lassiter, 836 A.2d 1096, 1103-04 (R.I. 2003); cf. State v. Baptista, 894 A.2d 911, 914 n. 2 (R.I.2006) (holding that a motion in limine before trial seeking unsuccessfully to exclude the particular type of evidence, coupled with the trial justice's immediate cautionary instruction to the jury, made the specific ground for defendant's general objection apparent). In the instant case, the relevant portions of Det. Hartnett's testimony display the deficiency of defense counsel's objections: Q.    [I]n your presence did Mr. Palomo through the interpreter indicate to you he could identify the person? A. Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. THE COURT: Overruled.    Q. And in your presence through the interpreter what was Mr. Palomo's response? A. He pointed to [the photo of Simas] and, then, after pointing to it wrote down on the sheet of paper in Spanish `this is the person who shot at the car.' [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. THE COURT: Overruled. Even if we were to overlook the temporal insufficiency of defense counsel's objections, the general, rather than specific, character of the objections failed to adequately alert the trial justice to defendant's concern, articulated on appeal, that the translation of Palomo's written assertion, to which Det. Hartnett testified, was inadmissible hearsay. Indeed, the authority upon which defendant relies in advancing his appellate argument, which this Court has not addressed in more than 100 years, only amplifies the necessity for a specific, sufficiently focused objection to invite the trial justice's deliberate examination as a precursor to any meaningful review on appeal. Further, despite defendant's contention otherwise, the context surrounding defense counsel's general objections does not reveal the grounds on which those objections relied with the specificity that our case law requires. The residual question before us, therefore, is whether, notwithstanding defendant's failure to properly preserve a challenge to the alleged hearsay in Det. Hartnett's testimony, the circumstances of this case nevertheless warrant our review. This Court will review unpreserved assignments of error, as an exception to our raise-or-waive rule, when they implicate basic constitutional rights, State v. Donato, 592 A.2d 140, 141 (R.I.1991), and further satisfy three conjunctive elements: First, the error complained of must consist of more than harmless error. Second, the record must be sufficient to permit a determination of the issue.    Third, counsel's failure to raise the issue at trial must be due to the fact that the issue is based upon a novel rule of law of which counsel could not reasonably have known at the time of trial. State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1040 (R.I. 2004) (quoting State v. Ramsey, 844 A.2d 715, 719 (R.I.2004)). We need go no further than the first element above to dispose of defendant's argument. Palomo himself testified that he identified Simas from Det. Hartnett's photo array the morning after the shooting. During his testimony, Palomo acknowledged his handwriting on the photo array, from which a sworn court interpreter translated in court before the jury as follows: I don't know his name, but he was the one that shot at me on Bergen Street. We are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of Det. Hartnett's testimony about Palomo's written assertion, if error at all, was harmless. Consequently, because defendant's unpreserved claim fails to satisfy the first dispositive requirement to our exception, we deem defendant's argument waived.