Opinion ID: 2067279
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Errors in the State's Opening Statement

Text: Defendant next contends that statements by the prosecutor during opening statement to the jury improperly suggested that the trial was a mere formality. Specifically, defendant points to the following statement: Now, as you heard the charges read, no doubt they are serious, but the process that you as jurors go through is the same as if a man were spitting on a sidewalk. You still have the same process, that is, to take the evidence as presented by the witnesses, take the law as the judge instructs you, go back into the juryroom and deliberate and determine whether or not this defendant is guilty or not.       In our society, we have rules and we have regulations and we have trials and we have rights. Today, we are exercising our rights. We are taking a situation which happened in September, 1987 and presenting it in a methodical way. Presenting witnesses. We have rules of evidence. We don't take people out any more and throw the rope over a tree. We have you twelve people who come here and decide what happened on September 4, 1987. (Emphasis added by defendant.) Defendant asserts that these statements improperly and unfairly trivialized the case and diminished the presumption of innocence, in violation of defendant's due process rights under the Federal and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill.Const.1970, art. I, § 2). We note that defendant failed to object at trial to the prosecutor's statements and also failed to raise the alleged error in his post-trial motion. However, we consider the alleged error under the plain error doctrine (134 Ill.2d R. 615(a)). Supreme Court Rule 615(a) allows a reviewing court in a criminal case to review an error which has not been properly preserved for review where the evidence is closely balanced or the error is so fundamental and of such magnitude that the defendant was denied a fair trial. (See People v. Herrett (1990), 137 Ill.2d 195, 148 Ill.Dec. 695, 561 N.E.2d 1.) We do not find that the evidence of defendant's guilt is closely balanced here. However, we examine the issue raised to determine if error occurred and, if so, whether the alleged error constituted plain error. With regard to the first portion of the statements, defendant asserts that a capital case should not be equated with spitting on a sidewalk. Defendant argues that the statement does not take into account that an affirmative defense would be presented and must be considered by the jury. With regard to the second portion of the statements, defendant asserts that the prosecutor improperly disparaged the rights of the defendant as nothing but formalities before the inevitable conviction and hanging, which statement undercut the presumption of defendant's innocence. Defendant cites People v. Johnson (1986), 149 Ill.App.3d 465, 102 Ill.Dec. 835, 500 N.E.2d 728, People v. Harbold (1984), 124 Ill.App.3d 363, 79 Ill.Dec. 830, 464 N.E.2d 734, and People v. Starks (1983), 116 Ill.App.3d 384, 71 Ill. Dec. 931, 451 N.E.2d 1298. The State proposes that, with reference to the first portion of the statements, the prosecutor was attempting simply to ease the nerves of the jurors. Regarding the second portion of the statements, the State suggests, the prosecutor was reminding the jurors of the offensive consequences which might follow absent a system of justice founded upon respect for individual liberties. Further, the State contends that even if error, the statements did not repeat a theme by the prosecution and did not violate due process. We note that the purpose of an opening statement is to apprise the jury of what each party expects the evidence to prove. ( People v. Roberts (1981), 100 Ill.App.3d 469, 476, 55 Ill.Dec. 779, 426 N.E.2d 1104.) An opening statement may involve a discussion of the evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence. ( People v. Smith (1990), 141 Ill.2d 40, 63, 152 Ill.Dec. 218, 565 N.E.2d 900.) Remarks or argument by counsel which extend beyond the proper scope of opening statement constitute reversible error only where the remarks are attributable to deliberate misconduct of the prosecutor and result in substantial prejudice to the defendant. Smith, 141 Ill.2d at 64, 152 Ill.Dec. 218, 565 N.E.2d 900. In the instant case, we do not find prosecutorial misconduct or that the prosecutor's statements resulted in substantial prejudice to defendant in view of the totality of the evidence. With regard to the first portion of the statements, although it might have been preferable for the prosecutor, in discussing the jury's function in this capital case, to describe the jury's role in terms of other capital cases, or other murder cases, rather than a minor case of a person spitting, nevertheless, the statements, taken in their context, do not amount to prejudicial error. The context of the remarks indicates that the prosecutor was describing the legal process generally. The prosecutor then properly told the jury that it would be instructed by the court as to the law to be applied to the case. We cannot say that the jury was severely misled. Further, as noted above, the purpose of an opening statement is to give a brief summary of the evidence each party expects to show in the case, and the prosecutor is not required to set forth what he expects the defendant to prove. See People v. Roberts (1981), 100 Ill.App.3d 469, 476, 55 Ill.Dec. 779, 426 N.E.2d 1104. With regard to the second portion of the statements, we also do not find that the comments resulted in substantial prejudice to defendant. Johnson, Harbold, and Starks, cited by defendant, are factually distinguishable from the instant case and do not govern the result here. Arguably, a reasonable inference from the comments here, regarding throwing a rope over a tree, is that the prosecutor was attempting to belittle the presumption of innocence. To the extent that the comments attempted to disparage the presumption of innocence, they were improper. (See People v. Dukes (1957), 12 Ill.2d 334, 342-43, 146 N.E.2d 14; People v. Weller (1970), 123 Ill.App.2d 421, 428, 258 N.E.2d 806.) However, we do not find that the prosecutor deliberately misled the jury, and the statements, taken in the context of the entire opening statement and the trial as a whole, did not result in substantial prejudice to defendant. Therefore, we find no plain error.