Opinion ID: 2759187
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jackson Evaluation

Text: We find that Petitioners misconstrue the import of Jackson as they fail to focus on the express terms of section 28-2-510. As previously stated, section 28- 2-510(B)(1) authorizes the court to award reasonable litigation expenses to a prevailing landowner. Significantly, the statute also states: The court, in its discretion, may reduce the amount to be awarded pursuant to this section, or deny an award, to the extent that the landowner, during the course of the action, engaged in conduct which unduly and unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the action or to the extent the court finds that the position of the condemnor was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-510(B)(1) (2007) (emphasis added). Thus, although the court is authorized to award attorneys' fees, it is not required to do so as it may deny an award in its entirety if the circumstances surrounding the litigation do not support an award. If the court finds that an award is warranted, the court must then consider the itemized statement of the landowner's attorney that includes: (1) the fee charged; (2) the basis for the fee charged; (3) the actual time expended; and (4) all actual expenses for which recovery is sought. S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2- 510(B)(1) (2007). Additionally, as noted above, the court must evaluate the circumstances surrounding the litigation to determine whether the amount of the attorneys' fee award should be reduced. Therefore, the court's determination for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees is not relegated to a threshold determination of the reasonableness of an agreement between the landowner and his attorney. While we recognize that contingency fee agreements are common in condemnation actions and are binding on the parties, they are not binding on the court. After the court reviews the itemized statement, the court may then evaluate the amount of an award pursuant to Jackson. Although the Jackson factors are instructive in determining an award of reasonable attorneys' fees, the court is not statutorily required to conduct this evaluation as section 28-2-510 makes no reference to these factors. Given the statute's silence, we emphasize that a Jackson evaluation is neither required nor forbidden under section 28-2-510.8 8 We note that, in response to Layman, the General Assembly amended the state action statute to include a Jackson type evaluation. Act No. 125, 2010 S.C. Acts 1104. Specifically, subsection (B) was added to provide that: Attorney's fees allowed pursuant to subsection (A) must be limited to a reasonable time expended at a reasonable rate. Factors to be applied in determining a reasonable rate include: If the court chooses to conduct a Jackson evaluation, this Court has instructed a court to consider the following six factors: (1) the nature, extent, and difficulty of the case; (2) the time necessarily devoted to the case; (3) professional standing of counsel; (4) contingency of compensation; (5) beneficial results obtained; and (6) customary legal fees for similar services. Jackson, 326 S.C. at 308, 486 S.E.2d at 760. As part of this evaluation, the court must make specific findings of fact on the record for each of the factors. Blumberg v. Nealco, Inc., 310 S.C. 492, 494, 427 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1993) (When an award of attorney's fees is requested and authorized by contract or statute, the court should make specific findings of fact on the record for each factor. . . . On appeal, absent sufficient evidentiary support on the record for each factor, the award should be reversed and the issue remanded for the trial court to make specific findings of fact.). Thus, contrary to Petitioners' claim, a contingency fee agreement is part of the determination of reasonableness as it reflects the basis for the fee charged; however, it is neither the sole basis for the award nor the controlling factor in the determination. See 11A Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 32:116 (3d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2014) (In awarding attorney's fees in eminent domain proceedings, it is the reasonableness of the fee, and not the arrangement the attorney and his or her client may have agreed upon, which is controlling. (footnote omitted)); Jackson, 326 S.C. at 308, 486 S.E.2d at 759 (When determining the reasonableness of attorney's fees under a statute mandating the (1) the nature, extent, and difficulty of the case; (2) the time devoted; (3) the professional standing of counsel; (4) the beneficial results obtained; and (5) the customary legal fees for similar services. The judge must make specific written findings regarding each factor listed above in making the award of attorney's fees. However, in no event shall a prevailing party be allowed to shift attorney's fees pursuant to this section that exceed the fees the party has contracted to pay counsel personally for work on the litigation. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-77-300(B) (Supp. 2013). The factors identified in section 1577-300(B) are identical to those in Jackson with the exception of the fourth factor, which involves the contingency of compensation. Notably, the General Assembly did not amend the Act to include the Jackson factors. award of attorney fees, the contract between the client and his counsel does not control the determination of a reasonable hourly rate.). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals properly rejected Petitioners' claim that Jackson required the circuit court to make a threshold determination regarding the reasonableness of the contingency fee agreement. Applying our ruling to the facts of the instant case, we find the circuit court failed to conduct the proper statutory analysis. Consequently, we remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Additionally, given Petitioners' counsel failed to submit an itemized statement that identified the fee charged and the actual number of hours expended, we instruct Petitioners' counsel to submit this statement in compliance with section 28-2-510(B)(1).