Opinion ID: 3002514
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Summary Judgment on the State Claims

Text: Having determined that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction, we consider whether the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the school district on the Hansens’ state claims. The claims can be separated into two categories: (1) claims directly against HSSC for its own negligence in hiring, supervising, or retaining Alano, and (2) assorted tort claims for which HSSC would be vicariously liable for Alano’s wrongful conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior. As stated above, we review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and consider all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Lucas, 539 F.3d at 666. The Hansens must present evidence 18 No. 08-1205 showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Keri, 458 F.3d 628.
The Hansens allege that HSSC acted negligently in hiring, supervising, and retaining Alano. The district court granted summary judgment in HSSC’s favor because it found there to be no evidence that the school district knew that Alano had engaged in inappropriate conduct with C.H. or any of his prior students. The Hansens assert that the district court erred by requiring them to demonstrate that HSSC had actual knowledge of Alano’s misconduct. They argue that they produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact under what they claim is the correct standard: whether HSSC should have known that Alano had engaged in a habit of misconduct. Indiana recognizes a cause of action against an employer for negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of an employee. Levinson v. Citizens Nat’l Bank of Evansville, 644 N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). Indiana has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 as the standard with regard to this tort, under which a court must determine if the employer exercised reasonable care in hiring, supervising, or retaining an employee. Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 454-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Indiana courts are somewhat unclear on the applicable standard for holding an employer liable for negligent No. 08-1205 19 hiring, retention, or supervision. Some decisions state that to be liable an employer must have actual knowledge of an employee’s habit of misconduct and fail to respond reasonably. See, e.g., Levinson, 644 N.E.2d at 1269 (“In order to prevail on this theory, the plaintiff must show that the defendant employer negligently retained an employee who the defendant knew was in the habit of misconducting himself.”(emphasis added)); Briggs v. Finley, 631 N.E.2d 959, 966-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that an employer may be liable for negligent retention “only if he knows the employee is in the habit of misconducting himself in a manner dangerous to others”(emphasis added)). Other decisions, however, state that an employer may be liable if it merely should have known or had reason to know of the misconduct. See, e.g., Grzan v. Charter Hosp. of Nw. Ind., 702 N.E.2d 786, 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a defendant must have known or “had reason to know” of the misconduct and failed to take appropriate action); Konkle, 672 N.E.2d at 460 (citing Levinson, which states an actual knowledge standard, but then stating that “[t]o prevail on her claim [of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, plaintiff] must show that the Church Defendants knew or had reason to know of [defendant’s] misconduct and failed to take appropriate action” (emphasis added)); Frye v. Am. Painting Co., 642 N.E.2d 995, 998 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that in an action for negligent retention of an employee, “evidence of prior similar actions committed by an employee are often admissible to establish the employer’s actual or constructive knowledge of the employee’s propensity to commit a later act of violence” (emphasis added)). 20 No. 08-1205 Based on our review of the record in this case, the Hansens presented no evidence that HSSC either knew, should have known, or had reason to know that Alano was in “the habit of misconducting himself.” Levinson, 644 N.E.2d at 1269. Thus, the Hansens failed to satisfy even the lesser standard, and we need not anticipate how the Indiana Supreme Court would resolve the question of whether actual knowledge of misconduct is required to hold an employer liable for negligent hiring, supervision, or retention. The Hansens base their negligent hiring claim on the fact that Alano allegedly engaged in relationships with two former students prior to his employment at HSE, one of whom had become Alano’s wife by the time HSSC hired him. They further assert that, while the school district may not have acquired knowledge about the prior relationships directly, it should have inquired whether Alano ever had a sexual or physical relationship with a student, and it chose to ignore “red flags.” However, the Hansens produced no evidence that HSSC failed to exercise reasonable care in hiring Alano or that it knew or should have known of any negative employ- ment information when it hired Alano. As detailed above, and taking the facts in the light most favorable to the Hansens, HSSC followed its established hiring procedure when it hired Alano. This required him to submit an application and related materials, provide references, and undergo a series of interviews with school officials. Along with the application, Alano completed a questionnaire stating that he had never been No. 08-1205 21 investigated, charged with, or resigned because of any misconduct, including sexual abuse or contact. He received positive recommendations from the principal and an assistant principal at his previous school, and from Michael Niemiec, HSE’s band director. The school ensured that Alano possessed a valid teaching license, which the state issues only after completing a criminal background check, and also confirmed that Alano’s name was not on a list of known sex offenders. HSE’s principal, Glen Nelson, recommended Alano for employment after interviewing him, checking his references, and discussing his application with Niemiec. The assistant superintendent, Dr. Hogue, also interviewed Alano, contacted Niemiec, and agreed to recommend Alano for employment. During this process, HSSC received no information that Alano had a history of improper conduct with his students. Rather, the Hansens acknowledge that HSSC “may not have had ‘actual knowledge’ of the relationships” with Rhoades and Harker, but they assert that it “should have inquired” about past sexual relationships. As noted above, no one at HSE or Waldron knew about Alano’s improper conduct with Alicia Rhoades, his former student at Waldron, nor do the Hansens point to anything indicating that either school should have known. The Hansens presented no evidence that Alano’s relationship with Harker was improper while they were in a teacher-student relationship. The Hansens seek to impute knowledge to HSSC because Niemiec knew that Alano married a former student. But even if HSSC knew or should have known that Harker was Alano’s former student, the Hansens fail to demonstrate that this knowledge alone 22 No. 08-1205 would put the school district on notice that Alano’s relationship with Harker was improper, that he was in a habit of misconducting himself, or that he otherwise represented a threat to his students. The Hansens also argue that HSSC should have asked Alano directly whether he ever had a sexual or physical relationship with a former student, citing Interim Healthcare of Fort Wayne, Inc. v. Moyer ex rel. Moyer, 746 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). In Moyer, the plaintiffs alleged that a health care agency negligently hired a home health aide, who later injured a child patient. Id. at 430-31. Because there was no evidence that the employer actually contacted any of the aide’s previous employers, the court found an issue of fact for the jury that precluded the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 435. A concurring opinion added that to survive summary judgment, the plaintiffs also must demonstrate proximate cause, i.e., that had the employer contacted the aide’s former employers, it would have discovered negative employment information. Id. at 436-37 (Baker, J., concurring). Unlike the plaintiffs in Moyer, the Hansens have presented no evidence that HSSC acted unreasonably in contacting Alano’s references or former employers, nor have they presented evidence that any additional references would have revealed negative employment information had HSSC contacted them. Quite the opposite, all of the references that Alano provided spoke highly of him. The Hansens suggest that had the school officials asked Alano directly, he would have divulged his No. 08-1205 23 previous relationships, and Alano himself stated this to be true. HSSC, however, required Alano to complete a questionnaire that asked whether he had ever been investigated, charged with, or resigned because of any misconduct, including sexual abuse or contact. He responded that he had not, and he signed the statement. The failure to ask the specific question of whether he engaged in any prior relationships with a student was not unreasonable, particularly in light of the school district’s thorough hiring procedures and the information available. In sum, nothing in the record creates an inference that HSSC knew or should have known of any negative em- ployment information regarding Alano at the time it hired him. Furthermore, given the school district’s hiring process, no evidence indicates that it acted unreasonably in hiring him. The Hansens’ claim that HSSC negligently retained or supervised Alano fails for similar reasons. The Hansens rely on evidence of the same two prior relationships with former students, discussed above, to create an inference that Alano had a habit of misconduct and represented a risk of harm to his current students. For the same reasons, these two relationships do not establish that HSSC knew or should have known of any miscon- duct by Alano. The Hansens point to no additional evidence that suggests that school officials knew or should have known of misconduct during Alano’s tenure at the school or that he presented a risk of harm to his students after he began his employment. Nothing in the record demonstrates that HSSC was aware of Alano’s relationship 24 No. 08-1205 with C.H. while she was a student, a fact to which both parties agree. Nor is there any evidence that the school district acted unreasonably in supervising or retaining Alano in light of any information it may have had. In fact, HSSC promptly suspended Alano upon learning of the allegations. Thus, taking all inferences in the Hansens’ favor, no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether HSSC negligently hired, retained, or supervised Alano, and summary judgment in the school district’s favor was proper.
The Hansens also attempted to hold the school district vicariously liable for Alano’s tortious conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior, alleging that the trial court erred in determining that Alano’s acts were outside the scope of his employment.2 2 The Hansens allege that Alano’s actions were both within the scope of his employment (as is required for respondeat superior) and outside the scope of his employment (as is required for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention). As the district court noted in its Order on October 19, 2007, this is inconsistent with the Indiana Tort Claims Act, Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(b), which states that a plaintiff may not sue both a government employee in a personal capacity and the governmental employer for the employee’s acts committed within the scope of employment. See Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 471 (Ind. 2003); City of Gary v. Conat, 810 N.E.2d 1112, 1118 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). (continued...) No. 08-1205 25 Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for the wrongful or tortious acts of its employees that were committed within the course and scope of their employment. Barnett v. Clark, 889 N.E.2d 281, 283 (Ind. 2008). An employee is acting within the scope of his employment when the injurious act is incidental to the conduct authorized, or when it furthers, to an appreciable extent, the employer’s business. Id.; see also Shelby v. Truck & Bus Group Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 533 N.E.2d 1296, 1298 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (“In order to be within the scope of employment the employee must be in the ‘service of the employer.’ ”). Vicarious liability may even be imposed upon an employer for the criminal acts of an employee, Barnett, 889 N.E.2d at 284, but an employer is not liable for an employee’s acts committed outside the scope of his employment, “even though the particular injury could not have occurred without the facilities afforded by the relation of the servant to [the] master,” Gomez v. Adams, 462 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). An employer is not always immune from vicarious liability for an employee’s sexual misconduct. See Stropes ex rel. Taylor v. Heritage House Childrens Ctr. of Shelbyville, Inc., 547 N.E.2d 244, 249 (Ind. 1989); Southport Little League v. 2 (...continued) Despite the impropriety of the inconsistent pleadings, the district court determined that Alano was acting outside the scope of his employment as a matter of law. We therefore note the inconsistent pleadings and also consider whether the district court properly decided this issue. 26 No. 08-1205 Vaughan, 734 N.E.2d 261, 270-71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). But Indiana courts have found whether sexual misconduct is within the scope of one’s employment to be a genuine issue of fact only in circumstances where the employee’s job duties involved extensive physical contact with the alleged victim, such as undressing, bathing, measuring, or fitting. Compare Stropes, 547 N.E.2d at 249-50, and Southport Little League, 734 N.E.2d at 271, with Barnett, 889 N.E.2d at 286, Konkle, 672 N.E.2d at 457, and Doe v. Lafayette Sch. Corp., 846 N.E.2d 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jakupko, 856 N.E.2d 778, 782 & n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). In Stropes, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendant children’s center, holding that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether a nurse’s aide employed by the center acted within the scope of his employment when he sexually assaulted a mentally disabled fourteen-year-old patient. 547 N.E.2d at 250. The aide’s authorized job duties included physical contact with the victim when undressing him, bathing him, and changing his clothes—acts “unquestionably within the scope of his employment.” Id. at 249. The sexual assault occurred after the aide undressed the victim and before the aide completed his tasks of changing his bed and redressing him. Id. The court stated that the question of whether one’s conduct falls within the scope of employment does not turn solely upon the type of act committed, but “the focus must be on how the employment relates to the context in which the commission of the wrongful act arose.” Id. Therefore, the nature of the aide’s acts was “sufficiently associated” with No. 08-1205 27 the aide’s authorized duties to avoid dismissal on summary judgment. Id. at 250. Similarly, in Southport Little League, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict imposing vicarious liability on the defendant for an equipment manager who sexually molested youths participating in a summer baseball program. 734 N.E.2d at 273. The equipment manager’s authorized duties included measuring and fitting the boys with uniforms in an equipment shed near the baseball stadium, a task involving some physical contact. Id. at 266. The court cited Stropes and determined that the circumstances “raise the inference that some of [defendant’s] acts were authorized by the Little League” when he committed the wrongful acts of molestation, and that the trial court properly denied summary judgment. Id. at 269-70. Consistent with Stropes and Southport Little League, Indiana courts have declined to hold an employer vicariously liable for an employee’s sexual misconduct in the absence of some authorized duty requiring physical contact with the victim. In Konkle, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that church officials were not vicariously liable for sexual misconduct by a minister because the plaintiff produced no evidence that the church authorized the minister’s acts. 672 N.E.2d at 457. The minister sexually molested a child on church property on multiple occasions. Id. at 453. The court noted that the unauthorized acts were not similar to his authorized duties as a minister, and vicarious liability should not accrue simply because the minister had access to the victim because of his position. Id. at 457. 28 No. 08-1205 Similarly, in Lafayette School Corporation, the Indiana Court of Appeals declined to hold the defendant school district vicariously liable for a teacher’s sexual acts against a student. 846 N.E.2d at 702. The teacher in that case engaged in a physical relationship with one of his students, and the relationship involved school time and property. Id. at 695. The court affirmed summary judgment on the issue of respondeat superior liability because the teacher instigated the relationship on his own initiative, his actions were unrelated to any school function, and the acts were not incident to any service provided by the school corporation. Id. at 702. Instead, his acts were “fueled entirely by self-interest in a romantic relationship” with the victim, and the acts were therefore unauthorized. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court recently clarified the appropriate inquiry regarding the scope of one’s employment, particularly in cases involving sexual misconduct. See Barnett, 889 N.E.2d at 286. The plaintiff in Barnett sought public assistance from her local trustee’s office, and a male employee advised her that she would have to do some bookwork for him in order to receive assistance. Id. at 283. The trustee’s employee reviewed the plaintiff’s work with her in a back room, then locked the door and sexually assaulted her. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment to the trustee employer because the misconduct was outside the scope of the employee’s employment. Id. at 286. The Indiana Supreme court analyzed Stropes and stressed that the focus should be on “ ‘how the employment relates to the context in which the commission of the No. 08-1205 29 wrongful act arose.’ ” Id. at 285 (quoting Stropes, 547 N.E.2d at 249). In cases involving sexual misconduct, a court should examine the nature of the employee’s authorized duties and the extent to which they involve physical contact or duties similar to those of the nurse’s aide in Stropes. Id. at 285-86. The court clarified that a statement by the court in Konkle, which said that “[i]f some of the employee’s actions were authorized, the question of whether the unauthorized acts were within the scope of employment is one for the jury,” Konkle, 672 N.E.2d at 457, was not a premise stated in Stropes. Barnett, 889 N.E.2d at 285. Rather, the essential inquiry is whether the employee’s wrongful acts are “sufficiently associated” with the nature of that employee’s duties and authority. Id. (quotations omitted). The court concluded that the employee “was not explicitly or impliedly authorized to touch or confine applicants for assistance,” that his wrongful acts “were not incidental to nor sufficiently associated with” his authorized duties, that these acts did not “further his employer’s business,” and that “they were not motivated to any extent by his employer’s interests.” Id. Applying the above standards and taking the facts in the light most favorable to the Hansens, we find this case similar to Barnett, Konkle, and Lafayette School Corporation. We therefore agree with the district court that Alano’s sexual misconduct was not “sufficiently associated” with his duties as a band instructor so as to fall within the scope of his employment. Alano’s authorized duties did not include physical contact with his high school students similar to the employees’ duties in Stropes and Southport 30 No. 08-1205 Little League. Alano was not explicitly or impliedly authorized to touch students, and his acts of sexual abuse were not an extension of any authorized physical contact. His conduct did nothing to further HSSC’s business, nor were those acts motivated by the school district’s interests. Instead, his conduct was motivated by his own personal desire to engage in a sexual relationship. The Hansens asserted that because Alano was a music teacher and had access to “secluded but permitted access band practice rooms,” his conduct stemmed from an authorized activity. (Petr.’s Br. 17.) But the fact that “the particular injury could not have occurred without the facilities afforded by the relation of the servant to [the] master” does not render the act within the scope of one’s employment. Gomez, 462 N.E.2d at 223; see also Lafayette Sch. Corp., 846 N.E.2d at 702 (“[S]imply because [the teacher] used LSC’s equipment and facilities to initiate a relationship with [the victim], his acts did not necessarily fall within his scope of employment.”). Alano’s position as a teacher and the availability of the practice rooms merely provided access to his students, just as any teacher’s position provides him or her with access to a large number of students. To hold a school district vicariously liable for a teacher’s misconduct in such circumstances would require holding a school district liable for every instance of such misconduct occurring on school grounds or because the relationship originated at the school. Cf. Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry Twp., 128 F.3d at 1029-30 (“[I]n virtually every case in which a teacher harasses, seduces, or sexually abuses a student, the teacher’s status as a teacher often enables the teacher to abuse the student . . . .” (quotations omitted)). No. 08-1205 31 The Hansens produced no evidence that Alano’s duties as a music teacher involved physical contact with a student or were otherwise sufficiently related to his misconduct. Consequently, Alano’s acts did not fall within the scope of his employment as a matter of law, and the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the school district on the issue of respondeat superior.
Lastly, the Hansens argued that HSSC owed C.H. a nondelegable duty under Indiana law and should be liable for Alano’s misconduct, even if it was outside the scope of his employment. Indiana courts, however, have consistently refused to impose a non-delegable duty upon a school for the safe-keeping of its students, recognizing that schools “are not intended to be insurers of the safety of their pupils, nor are they strictly liable for any injuries that may occur to them.” Miller v. Griesel, 308 N.E.2d 701, 706 (Ind. 1974); see also Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Ind. Dep’t of Natural Res., 756 N.E.2d 970, 974 (Ind. 2001). Rather, schools and school personnel have a duty “to exercise ordinary and reasonable care for the safety of the children under their authority.” Miller, 308 N.E.2d at 706; see also Beckett v. Clinton Prairie Sch. Corp., 504 N.E.2d 552, 554 (Ind. 1987) (“[T]he appropriate standard is whether a defendant exercised his duty with the level of care of an ordinary prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.”). The Indiana Supreme Court stated that an “approach that focuses on rearticulating that duty based upon a given set of facts is misplaced in our view because 32 No. 08-1205 to do so presupposes that an issue which is thought to be settled must be revisited each time a party frames the duty issue a little differently.” Mangold, 756 N.E.2d at 974. Consequently, we find that well-settled Indiana law does not impose a non-delegable duty on HSSC for the safekeeping of its students, and the school district is not liable for Alano’s misconduct under such a duty.