Opinion ID: 857574
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consolidation of Berg’s Charges in One Trial

Text: Berg first claims that his marijuana trafficking counts and his cocaine trafficking counts should have been tried separately. Because the jury heard both sets of charges at the same time, Berg argues, it may have inferred he was guilty because he had a propensity to commit crimes and not because of the strength of the evidence. As with any severance claim, this claim necessarily contains two distinct issues. See United States v. Windom, 19 F.3d 1190, 1196 (7th Cir. 1994). The first is joinder—whether the two sets of charges had enough in common to be tried in the same case. Id. The second is sever- ance—whether, despite being properly joined, the two sets of charges nevertheless should have been tried separately to avoid undue prejudice. Id. Berg did not raise either issue before or during trial. Instead, he raised both for the first time after trial in a motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of No. 12-2118 5 Criminal Procedure 33. As a result, the issues are forfeited.1 Recognizing this problem, Berg asks us to 1 The Supreme Court has explained that forfeiture and waiver are two different creatures; “forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right,” while “waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 458 n.13 (2004). Forfeited errors may still be reviewed for plain error, while waived errors are “extinguish[ed]” and cannot be reviewed on appeal. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733; accord United States v. Tichenor, 683 F.3d 358, 363 (7th Cir. 2012). We think that “forfeiture” more accurately describes what happened here. There is no evidence that Berg intentionally relinquished his rights. Furthermore, we frequently apply plain error review to joinder and severance claims not raised before trial. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 450 F.3d 294, 301 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Febus, 218 F.3d 784, 797-98 (7th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, we will use the term “forfeiture.” We note, however, that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(e) technically says that a party “waives” joinder and severance arguments by failing to raise them in a pretrial motion. But that is an odd sort of “waiver,” for, unlike true waiver, a “waiver” under Rule 12(e) is excusable for “good cause.” Compare Olano, 507 U.S. at 733-34, with Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e). In other words, a Rule 12(e) waiver actually functions more like a forfeiture. The Criminal Rules Advisory Committee has also flagged this issue as “a source of considerable confusion.” Criminal Rules Advisory Committee, May 2011 Report to Standing Committee, Agenda Action Item—Rule 12, at 3 available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ (continued...) 6 No. 12-2118 review his arguments for plain error, or, in the alternative, to hold that his trial counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective for failing to raise the arguments. To succeed under plain error review, Berg must show that (1) there was an error; (2) the error was plain; and, (3) the error affected his substantial rights. See United States v. Doyle, 693 F.3d 769, 771 (7th Cir. 2012). Alternatively, to show that his counsel was ineffective, Berg must demonstrate that (1) his counsel was objectively unreasonable for not moving to sever the charges; and, (2) Berg was prejudiced as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) provides that multiple offenses may be joined “if the offenses charged— whether felonies or misdemeanors or both—are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.” We interpret this rule broadly and “allow liberal joinder in order to enhance judicial efficiency.” United States v. Nettles, 476 F.3d 508, 516 (7th Cir. 2007). “Further, in assessing whether joinder was proper, we look solely to the face of the indictment and not to the evidence adduced later at 1 (...continued) RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CR05-2011.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2013). No. 12-2118 7 trial.” United States v. Lanas, 324 F.3d 894, 899 (7th Cir. 2003). Here, the government argues that the two sets of offenses—three of which related to marijuana trafficking and three of which related to cocaine trafficking—were properly joined because they were “of the same or similar character.” (Appellee’s Br. at 22.) We agree. The “same or similar character” requirement is a “clear directive to compare the offenses charged for categorical, not evidentiary, similarities.” United States v. Alexander, 135 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 1998); accord United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, Counts 1-3 of the indictment all related to a scheme to distribute marijuana, and Counts 4-6 all related to a scheme to distribute cocaine. We think that these charges—all of which involved drug deal- ing—were of the same general category of offense and therefore were “of the same or similar character” to each other. See Windom, 19 F.3d at 1196 (possession of heroin with intent to distribute and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute are offenses of “same or similar character”); cf. United States v. Janus Indus., 48 F.3d 1548, 1557 (10th Cir. 1995) (manufacturing marijuana and distributing drug paraphernalia are of “same or similar character” because both violate the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act); United States v. Fortenberry, 919 F.2d 923, 926 (5th Cir. 1990) (opinion denying petition for rehearing) (transportation of an undeclared firearm on a commercial airliner and possession of an unregistered firearm are of “same or similar character” because they are both weapons violations). 8 No. 12-2118 Berg counters that his two sets of offenses were not of a similar character because (1) they involved different types of drugs; (2) they happened too far apart in time; (3) they involved some non-overlapping evidence; and, (4) one set of offenses involved firearms and the other did not. But Rule 8(a) does not require that joined offenses be “temporally or evidentially related”; all it requires is that they be “of like class.” Alexander, 135 F.3d at 476; see also United States v. Gooch, 665 F.3d 1318, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Rule 8(a) permits the joinder of offenses of the same or similar character, even if they are entirely unrelated to each other” as a factual matter) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the fact that both crimes involved drug dealing suffices to make them of like class. As for the factual differences between the marijuana charges and the cocaine charges, those differences inform whether the charges should have been severed because of undue prejudice (a question we will turn to in a moment). But they do not mean the charges were not of the same or similar character. Thus, Berg’s marijuana and cocaine trafficking offenses were properly joined. And, because it was not error for the cases to be joined, there was not plain error either, and Berg’s attorney was not ineffective for failing to object to the joinder. See United States v. Persfull, 660 F.3d 286, 296 (7th Cir. 2011) (where there was no error, neither an ineffective assistance claim nor a plain error claim will lie). No. 12-2118 9
That brings us to our next question: whether, despite being properly joined, the offenses should have been severed to avoid undue prejudice. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(a) provides that, if the joinder of offenses “appears to prejudice a defendant or the government,” the court may “order separate trials of counts” or “provide any other relief that justice requires.” That “prejudice” can take many forms, but “whatever the source of the purported prejudice, the defendant bears a heavy burden on appeal when arguing that the prejudice warranted severance.” United States v. Ervin, 540 F.3d 623, 629 (7th Cir. 2008). Thus, it is not enough merely to show that separate trials might have provided the defendant a better shot at acquittal. Id. “Instead, the defendant must establish that the denial of severance actually prejudiced him by preventing the jury from arriving at a reliable judgment as to guilt or innocence.” Id. Berg claims that, “if the counts had been severed, [he] may very well have chosen a trial strategy that did not include his taking the stand, and his alleged confession to cocaine distribution would not have been admissible in a guns for marijuana trial, and vice versa.” (Appellant’s Br. at 21.) But this claim alone does not entitle him to reversal of his conviction. True, joinder can be prejudicial if it improperly coerces a defendant into testifying about a count on which he wishes to remain silent. See Ervin, 540 F.3d at 628. But a defendant’s “general assertions about the testimony he seeks to offer will not suffice” to win on appeal; “he must proffer specific examples of 10 No. 12-2118 the exculpatory testimony that he would give but for the joinder of the counts.” Id. at 629 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nettles, 476 F.3d at 516-17 (defendant must make “a convincing showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other”). Berg has not done so here. Indeed, he claims that it is “impossible to know whether Mr. Berg would have remained silent or made the decision to testify in either, or both trials,” had the trials been severed. (Appellant’s Br. at 22.) That “general assertion” is not enough to carry his burden. Ervin, 540 F.3d at 629. Berg also claims that the lack of severance prejudiced him because it may have led the jury to decide the case based on improper evidence. Once again, we are not convinced. To be sure, trying multiple charges at the same time can sometimes be problematic; it runs the risk of producing a verdict based on bad acts and propensity evidence rather than on admissible evidence. See id. at 628. But severance is not always the best solution to that problem. Jury instructions can mitigate potential prejudice from trying multiple charges together, see Nettles, 476 F.3d at 516, and here, the jury was instructed to consider all of the counts separately, (R. 52 at 16). Moreover, the evidence against Berg was compelling on all counts. Berg twice confessed to dealing Canadian marijuana: once on June 23, 2010, and again in greater detail on July 16, 2010, when he admitted that he got his marijuana by swapping it for illegal guns. Canadian authorities later recovered firearms linked to Berg. Berg was recorded discussing illegal firearms deals on No. 12-2118 11 multiple occasions, and his dealers, the Elizondos, testified against him. As for the cocaine charges, the evidence against him included his June 23 confession and the testimony of LaRock, the undercover informant. Audio and video surveillance showed multiple instances of Peynetsa placing orders for cocaine, Berg meeting with Peynetsa, and Peynetsa delivering cocaine to LaRock, all in quick succession. Given this compelling evidence and the jury’s instructions to consider the counts separately, we cannot say that any plain error occurred here. For the same reason, Berg also cannot show that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move for severance. Under Strickland v. Washington’s familiar, two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel, Berg must demonstrate that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient; and, (2) that deficiency resulted in prejudice. 466 U.S. at 687. Here, that means Berg must show that, had his counsel successfully moved for severance, there was a “reasonable probability” that he would have been acquitted. Rastafari v. Anderson, 278 F.3d 673, 689 (7th Cir. 2002). Berg cannot make this showing. As discussed, the evidence against Berg was overwhelming. As a result, he cannot satisfy Strickland’s second prong, and he therefore cannot show that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move for severance.