Opinion ID: 2972024
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Recorded Telephone Call.

Text: Moncivais contends that use of the recording of the conversation between him and Laurel with Anthony Davis on the line violates the Fourth Amendment and the Federal Wiretap Statute. 18 U.S.C. §2510 et. seq. bars the use of any illegally intercepted wire communication. An interception is not illegal if “one of the parties to the communication” gives prior consent. See 18 U.S.C. §2511(2)(c). While Davis clearly consented to the interception of the call made to him from Laurel, Moncivais argues that neither he nor Laurel consented to the interception of their conversation. Moncivais posits that the only reasonable interpretation of the transcript is that he was unaware of Davis’ presence “on the line” (as opposed to on “another” line or “holding” on “the” line) until Davis actually spoke up. Then, Moncivais posits, he was startled and surprised, and abruptly told Laurel that he didn’t want to talk to him anymore. The district court found that Moncivais had actual notice that Davis was “on the line” at the start of the Laurel-Moncivais conversation. The magistrate judge listened to the audio tape of the conversation a number of times. He rejected Moncivais’ interpretation of his statements. He concluded that Moncivais’ remark to Laurel, “You know what you have to do . . .” meant that Moncivais had “stated his position and there was nothing more to say.” The district court agreed, holding: The fact that Moncivais addressed his comments during the call to Laurel and ignored Davis is easily understood as a superior addressing his subordinate while studiously ignoring the bystander. His behavior in this regard does not alter the court’s conclusion. The presence of a third person was known to Moncivais and he thus is deemed to have consented to the possibility that the third person would record the conversation. The district court relied on Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 111 (1957), where the Supreme Court held: “Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes place there has been no violation of any privacy of which the parties may complain.” This principle was applied in United States v. Miller, 720 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983). There, three people were involved in a counterfeit bill distribution conspiracy. Party #1 was caught and agreed to cooperate with the authorities. With a recording device installed on her line, Party #1 called Party #2 and asked for more counterfeit bills. Party #2's phone had a conference ability, permitting him to connect a third person. Party #2 then called Party #3, said he had Party #1 “on the other line,” and asked Party #3 for more bills to be delivered. The exchange between Party #2 and #3 was recorded on Party #1's recording device. Relying on Rathbun, the First Circuit rejected Party #3's challenge to use of the recording, concluding that Party #2 had consented to Party #1, in effect, “listening in” on an extension telephone. Here, Laurel identified Davis’ presence much more directly than was done in Miller. Laurel told Moncivais “I have AD on the line,” not that AD was on “the other line” or was “holding on the line.” And, Laurel certainly consented to Davis listening to his conversation with Moncivais. Indeed it was Laurel who volunteered “Okay, hold on, hold on, hey, I’m gonna call him on three way you talk to him okay?” The district court rejected Moncivais’ attempt to create an ambiguity in the phrase “on the line” after listening to the tape and hearing the testimony of both the government’s witnesses and defendant’s expert translator. As was held in Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985), “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be No. 02-6457 United States v. Moncivais Page 5 clearly erroneous. This is so even when the district court’s findings do not rest on credibility determinations, but are based instead on physical or documentary evidence or inferences from other facts.” (citations omitted) Based upon our review of the record, the district court’s interpretation is both permissible and reasonable, and therefore not clearly erroneous. Use of the tape violates neither the Fourth Amendment nor the federal wiretap statute. In view of our conclusion, we decline to address the government’s alternate argument, that the “plain hearing exception” discussed in United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1990) applies to these facts. Moncivais also argues that the tape of the telephone call should have been disregarded entirely because the sound quality was too poor to meet minimum reliability standards. Moncivais relies on United States v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 872 (6th Cir. 1983), which held that recordings are inadmissible if the “unintelligible portions are so substantial as to render the recording as a whole untrustworthy.” Id. at 876 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As noted above, Moncivais hired his own expert translator. She testified at the suppression hearing that, while the tape was difficult to hear clearly, she was able to produce a transcript of substantially all of the conversation, as well as an English translation with which the government agreed. The district court found the tape was sufficiently trustworthy based on those facts. We review this determination for abuse of discretion, United States v. Scarborough, 43 F.3d 1021, 1024 (6th Cir. 1994), and find none.