Opinion ID: 1669807
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Analysis of Present Case

Text: Although the 1990 amendment to section 201.02(1) added three nonexclusive definitions of consideration, as well as providing a means of assessing the value of nonmonetary consideration, we hold that there is nothing in the statute that indicates any intent or attempt to alter the interpretations of the statute in Palmer-Florida or De Maria. A determination of legislative intent is derived primarily from the language of the statute. State v. Bodden, 877 So.2d 680, 685 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 628, 160 L.Ed.2d 463 (2004). If statutory intent is unclear from the plain language of the statute, only then may we apply rules of statutory construction and explore legislative history to determine legislative intent. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So.2d 287, 289 (Fla.2003). In applying the plain language of the statute in Palmer-Florida and De Maria, we held that the tax is not applicable to transactions involving a conveyance of property between a corporation and its sole shareholders where nothing of value is exchanged for the property. Thus, a mere change in form of the stockholder's equity in the corporation is not sufficient consideration to meet the statute's requirements. De Maria, 338 So.2d at 840. Furthermore, since there is no consideration for such transfers and thus no exchange in value, there is no purchaser. Id. The plain language of section 201.02(1), even following the 1990 amendments, did not eliminate the requirements of consideration and purchaser that existed at the time of our decisions in Palmer-Florida and De Maria. The new language simply provided nonexclusive examples of consideration. None of these examples change our prior holdings that a change in the form of ownership of property, without any exchange of value, does not constitute consideration. While the last sentence added a means of determining the value assigned nonmonetary consideration, it did not change the requirement that consideration actually exist for the transfer. Thus, based on the plain language of the amendments, the statute does not recede from the statutory requirements employed by this Court to reach the results in Palmer-Florida and De Maria. Florida's well-settled rule of statutory construction [is] that the legislature is presumed to know the existing law when a statute is enacted, including `judicial decisions on the subject concerning which it subsequently enacts a statute.' Wood v. Fraser, 677 So.2d 15, 18 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (quoting Collins Inv. Co. v. Metro. Dade County, 164 So.2d 806, 809 (Fla.1964)). Without any clear express changes on the statute's face, the amendment did not recede from our decisions rendered prior to the amendment's enactment. The statute still covers only those situations in which property is exchanged for something of value. The Third District held in the present case that the conveyances in Palmer-Florida and De Maria could not be taxed under the statute prior to the 1990 amendment because the conveyances had neither reasonably determinable consideration nor a purchaser. Crescent, 857 So.2d at 907. Accordingly, the Third District implies that this situation has changed because the amendment provides a means by which to value the interests in the company that were exchanged and that the transfers in Palmer-Florida and De Maria could now be taxed under the amended statutory scheme. However, we objected to the tax being applied in these situations not because consideration was not reasonably determinable but, rather, because there was no consideration at all involved in the transactions. Hence, in the present case, the documentary stamp tax does not apply to the transfer because nothing was exchanged by CMC for the grant of property from Crescent Equities; thus, there was no consideration or purchaser in the transaction, just a mere change in form of the stockholder's equity in the corporation. De Maria, 338 So.2d at 840. The Third District and the DOR also rely on the rules promulgated by the DOR following the 1990 amendment to section 201.02(1). Those rules provide that a conveyance of realty to a corporation as a contribution to the capital of a corporation, is subject to tax. Fla. Admin. Code R. 12B-4.013(7). The Third District held that these agency rules are presumed valid and thus refused to deviate from them. Crescent, 857 So.2d at 908 n. 4. While administrative rules ... should be accorded considerable persuasive force, State ex rel. Szabo Food Services, Inc. v. Dickinson, 286 So.2d 529, 531 (Fla.1973), decisions of this Court interpreting the same statute have a much greater persuasive force. In the absence of any statutory amendment by the Legislature contrary to the holdings in Palmer-Florida and De Maria, those opinions are to be followed.