Opinion ID: 3011044
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Before proceeding to the merits of Coss' ineffective counsel claim, we will first review whether the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas petition. Section 2254 confers jurisdiction on United States district courts to entertain petitions for habeas corpus relief only from persons who are in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. The Supreme Court has interpreted S 2254 as mandating that the petitioner be in custody pursuant to the conviction or sentence he seeks to attack at the time his petition is filed. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968). A habeas petitioner does not remain in custody under a conviction after the sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely because of the possibility that the prior conviction will be used to enhance the sentences imposed for any subsequent crimes of which he is convicted. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989) (per curiam). A petitioner does, however, satisfy the in custody requirement for federal habeas jurisdiction when he asserts a challenge to a sentence he is currently serving that has been enhanced by the allegedly invalid prior conviction. Id. at 493. Moreover, in United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972), the Supreme Court held that a prisoner could attack in a federal habeas proceeding an allegedly unconstitutional conviction, even if he has served in entirety the sentence resulting from the conviction, if that conviction had an effect on a present sentence. See also Young v. Vaughn, 83 F.3d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that a prisoner may attack his current sentence by a habeas challenge to the constitutionality of an expired conviction if that conviction was used to enhance his current sentence). 7 In this case, although Coss has already served the sentence resulting from the allegedly unconstitutional 1986 convictions, he is currently serving a sentence for an unrelated, 1990 conviction in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County for aggravated assault. Coss alleges that the sentence from his 1990 conviction was adversely affected by the 1986 assault conviction. The sentencing judge did, in fact, refer to Coss' 1986 conviction for assaulting a police officer in sentencing him to the top of the standard range for his 1990 conviction. Coss is thus attacking his prior conviction in an attempt to have his current sentence, which relied on his prior conviction, reevaluated. The District Court therefore appropriately construed Coss' petition as challenging the 1990 conviction for aggravated assault rather than his expired conviction, see id. at 73, and properly concluded that it had jurisdiction over his S 2254 motion petition. Id. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1291 & 2253.