Opinion ID: 2722145
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Effect of Clayton’s Death

Text: Bennett presents three arguments that Clayton’s death necessitates reversal of Bennett’s convictions and sentence. We find that each of these arguments lacks merit. First, Bennett argues that Clayton’s death abated ab initio the entire criminal proceeding in this case, thereby invalidating the conviction against Bennett. As noted in Part II.A above, the criminal prosecution against Clayton was abated by his death on appeal. This rule rests on two rationales: first, that a criminal defendant should not be deprived of the right to challenge his conviction on appeal, even by death; and second, that the punitive purposes of a conviction and sentence cannot be served once the defendant has died. United States v. Wright, 160 F.3d 905, 908 (2d Cir. 1998). Obviously, neither of these rationales supports abating the criminal proceeding as to a deceased defendant’s living co-defendants. Thus, we decline to confer upon Bennett the inexplicable windfall that he seeks. Second, Bennett argues that he has been deprived of the opportunity to rely on the “rule of consistency.” Citing Getsy v. Mitchell, 495 F.3d 295, 307 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc), Bennett claims that his conspiracy conviction would be invalidated if Clayton’s conspiracy conviction had been invalidated on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds. But even if Bennett might have benefitted fortuitously from a favorable outcome in Clayton’s appeal, he has no right or entitlement to appellate review of his deceased co-defendant’s conviction. He still can challenge—and has challenged—the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him. Thus, we can see no reason why Bennett’s convictions are undermined by the fact that we no longer will consider Clayton’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument. Third, Bennett argues that Clayton’s death rendered invalid the district court’s application of a role-in-the-offense sentencing enhancement, see USSG § 3B1.1(a), which was premised on Bennett’s participation in “criminal activity [that] involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” Bennett argues that Clayton -12- cannot be considered for purposes of the enhancement now that he is deceased, thereby reducing the number of participants in the fraudulent scheme to four. However, the guidelines enhancement does not limit its application to participants in the scheme who are living at the time the sentence is reviewed on appeal. Clayton participated in the scheme, and his subsequent death simply does not alter that fact. Nor does Clayton’s death affect whether Bennett’s fraudulent scheme was “otherwise extensive” when perpetrated, which the presentence investigation report—adopted by the district court—identified as a basis for applying the enhancement to Bennett. Thus, we reject Bennett’s challenge to the application of § 3B1.1(a).