Opinion ID: 737458
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Missing Witness Issue.

Text: 8 One week prior to the second trial, the government advised that Robert Kinney, the K-9 police officer who conducted the search of Johnson's car, was on vacation somewhere in Florida. Kinney had not been subpoenaed for the second trial, so the government moved for a continuance. The district court denied a continuance but over Johnson's objection ruled that Kinney was an unavailable witness and admitted his testimony from the first trial under Federal Rules of Evidence 804(a)(5) and 804(b)(1). Johnson challenges this evidentiary ruling on appeal. 9 Rule 804(a)(5) defines a witness as unavailable if the proponent of the testimony cannot procure the witness's presence by process or other reasonable means. Rule 804(b)(1) excepts from the hearsay rule former testimony by an unavailable witness who was cross examined at the earlier proceeding. In this case, Johnson concedes that he cross examined Officer Kinney at the first trial but contends that Kinney was not unavailable for the second because the Government purposefully and conveniently failed to make a good faith effort to find the K-9 officer and subpoena him for trial. We review the admission of former testimony for abuse of discretion. See Azalea Fleet, Inc. v. Dreyfus Supply & Mach. Corp., 782 F.2d 1455, 1461 (8th Cir.1986). 10 Like the inquiry under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, the availability inquiry under Rule 804(a)(5) turns on whether the proponent of the former testimony acted in good faith and made a reasonable effort to bring the declarant into court. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2543, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); United States v. Flenoid, 949 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir.1991). The issue is whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the government used reasonable means to procure Officer Kinney's presence when it failed to subpoena him, learned that he was on vacation in Florida, and moved for a continuance of the trial when he could not be located. The question of reasonable means cannot be divorced from the significance of the witness to the proceeding at hand, the reliability of the former testimony, and whether there is reason to believe that the opposing party's prior cross exam was inadequate. 11 Here, Officer Kinney's former testimony was given at a prior criminal trial, the most reliable form of former testimony. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213-14 & n. 3, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 2313-14 & n. 3, 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972). The same trial judge heard Kinney's testimony at the first trial, including Johnson's cross examination, and knew its relative unimportance to the case. In objecting to this use of former testimony, Johnson failed to note any specific need for additional cross examination. In these circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the former testimony rather than either excluding the testimony or continuing the trial. 12