Opinion ID: 2025929
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: joint tortfeasor liability

Text: When defendants are found to be jointly and severally responsible for an injury, the plaintiff may elect to satisfy his entire judgment against any one of the defendants. ( Buehler v. Whalen (1977), 70 Ill.2d 51, 15 Ill.Dec. 852, 374 N.E.2d 460; W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 47, at 328 (5th ed. 1984).) The City contends that, if it alone must satisfy the whole judgment, the damages for which it is responsible should not exceed $5,091,160. Holding the City liable for the full $7,487,000 judgment makes it responsible not only for the damages caused by the joint tortfeasors, but for the contributory negligence of the plaintiff as well. The City argues that application of the comparative negligence principles adopted in Alvis should preclude such a result. We have already determined that Burke was properly held not to be contributorily negligent as to the City. Even without our conclusion that a plaintiff's negligence cannot be compared with the defendant's willful and wanton conduct, we would have been unable to find that Burke's instigation of the altercation at Rothschild's was a proximate cause of his mistreatment by the City. Burke's behavior was merely a condition which made possible but did not cause the injuries he received at the hands of the City's agents. (See Bonnier v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. (1954), 2 Ill.2d 606, 119 N.E.2d 254; Lerette v. Director General (1923), 306 Ill. 348, 137 N.E. 811.) Thus, there is no theory under which the City can claim an offset for Burke's contributory negligence as to the City's agents. The City argues, however, that, as a joint tortfeasor, it should benefit from the setoff available to its codefendant. We do not agree. Where one joint tortfeasor is protected against liability by a personal privilege, the liability of the other tortfeasor is not affected. (See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 880 (1965).) The same principle can be applied here. If Rothschild's had been immune to liability, the City, as codefendant, would have been responsible for 100% of the award to plaintiff. That Rothschild's was protected by the plaintiff's contributory negligence from liability for 32% of the award does not mean that the City's liability should be reduced as well. Our appellate court has distinguished the obligation between joint tortfeasors from the obligation of the tortfeasors to the plaintiff. In Holmes v. Sahara Coal Co. (1985), 131 Ill.App.3d 666, 86 Ill.Dec. 816, 475 N.E.2d 1383, the plaintiff, user of a tractor-scraper, brought suit against the machine's manufacturer (Caterpillar) under a theory of strict liability, and against the machine's owner (Sahara) in negligence. The jury entered a verdict against Caterpillar of $200,000, but offset the verdict in the same amount against Sahara by 8.5% to reflect the plaintiff's contributory negligence. Sahara was found liable for 60% of the damages, and for contribution to Caterpillar in the amount of $120,000, which did not include an offset. Sahara appealed, alleging that its contribution judgment as well as its liability to plaintiff should be reduced by the amount of plaintiff's negligence. The court rejected Sahara's argument, stating that the jury's attribution of 8.5% negligence to plaintiff affects neither Caterpillar's liability to plaintiff nor Sahara's liability to Caterpillar. ( Holmes, 131 Ill.App.3d at 676, 86 Ill.Dec. 816, 475 N.E.2d 1383.) Similarly, in the instant case the City's liability to Burke is unaffected by Burke's negligence as to Rothschild's. Accordingly, we hold that, in satisfying the judgment against it as a joint tortfeasor, the City is not entitled to a setoff for Burke's comparative negligence. For the above reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. Justice BILANDIC took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.