Opinion ID: 736978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Breach of ERISA Plan

Text: 13 In Count I of his complaint, plaintiff claims that he is entitled to recover benefits from defendant. 4 Section 502(a)(1) of ERISA permits suits to recover benefits. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 5 However, we have explained that [t]he administrative scheme of ERISA requires a participant to exhaust his or her administrative remedies prior to commencing suit in federal court. Miller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 986 (6th Cir.1991); see also Baxter v. C.A. Muer Corp., 941 F.2d 451, 453 (6th Cir.1991). Although ERISA does not explicitly require exhaustion, the statute does require benefit plans to provide internal dispute resolution procedures. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2). 6 [T]he exhaustion requirement enables plan fiduciaries to 'efficiently manage their funds; correct their errors; interpret plan provisions; and assemble a factual record which will assist a court in reviewing the fiduciaries' actions.'  Baxter, 941 F.2d at 453 (quoting Makar v. Health Care Corp. of Mid-Atlantic, 872 F.2d 80, 83 (4th Cir.1989)). 14 The Malco Plan provides for an appeals process. According to the plan document, a claimant must first file a claim for benefits with the Claims Administrator, namely defendant. If the claim is denied, a claimant may seek review by the Plan Administrator, namely the employer/plan sponsor. The Plan Administrator shall render a full and fair review of the claim and its denial, and shall make a final decision. 15 Plaintiff appears to concede that he has not exhausted his administrative remedies under the plan. In his complaint, he states that he has not been advised whether the Plan contains an internal appeal procedure which, in any event, would be futile under the circumstances. Traditional exhaustion principles do include an exception for instances when resort to the administrative route is futile or the remedy inadequate. Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 974 (6th Cir.1994). 16 Here, the District Court did not dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to exhaust remedies nor did it even consider the issue, although defendant raised the defense in its motion. However, our review is de novo, and a decision of a district court must be affirmed if correct for any reason, including a reason not considered by the district court. See Russ' Kwik Car Wash, 772 F.2d at 216. We conclude that plaintiff should have exhausted the administrative remedies provided under the plans and, because he did not, dismissal of his action for recovery of benefits is proper. Although he contends that such exhaustion would be futile, he has not alleged any factual basis for this claim. Additionally, he has not alleged a cause of action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c), which permits suits against any plan administrator who fails or refuses to comply with a request for information. 17 Count I also states a claim for an injunction and other appropriate equitable relief under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), which provides a cause of action for statutory violations. 7 Although not expressly alleged in the complaint, plaintiff suggests in his brief that this relief is sought for violations of ERISA section 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106, which prohibits specific transactions between a plan and its parties in interest. Some circuits have held that the exhaustion requirement does not apply to alleged violations of the statute. See, e.g., Graphic Communications Union v. GCIU-Employer Retirement Benefit Plan, 917 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir.1990). We need not address that question here, however, because plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting that defendant engaged in any prohibited transactions. Indeed, plaintiff does not even mention section 406 in his complaint. Thus, we affirm the dismissal of Count I of plaintiff's complaint.