Opinion ID: 1161092
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Finney governs this case

Text: The second issue is whether Finney applies here. Allstate argues Fisher did not comply with Finney for two reasons. First, Allstate argues Fisher failed to provide Allstate with sufficient notice of the arbitration with the tortfeasor. Second, Allstate contends Fisher did not reduce the arbitration award to a final judgment. Allstate contends it did not receive sufficient notice to be bound by the arbitration between Fisher and the tortfeasor. But Allstate misconstrues Finney. Notice of the arbitration is not required. Rather, an insured must inform the insurer when he or she files suit against the tortfeasor. See Finney, 21 Wash.App. at 618, 586 P.2d 519; Mencel, 86 Wash.App. at 486, 937 P.2d 627; Wear v. Farmers Ins. Co., 49 Wash.App. 655, 659, 745 P.2d 526 (1987). The inquiry in Finney was whether the insurer was fully apprised of plaintiffs' efforts to obtain recompense from the tortfeasor. Finney, 21 Wash.App. at 618, 586 P.2d 519. The court determined the insurer knew a suit was filed and that the insureds were attempting to prove liability. The court reasoned the insurer had to know that this determination [of the tortfeasor's liability] might be crucial to their liability under the uninsured motorist provisions of their policies. Id. Similarly, other jurisdictions hold to the same rule in other contexts such as settlements. Notice of a suit is required, rather than notice of a pending settlement. This is because the possibility of settlement or arbitration is implicit in the context of litigation. See, e.g., Southern Guar. Ins. Co. v. Welch, 570 So.2d 654 (Ala.1990) (insurer had sufficient notice of likelihood of settlement to be bound); Sutch v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 672 A.2d 17 (Del.Super.Ct.1995) (insured bound insurer to arbitration between insured and tortfeasor); Champion Ins. Co. v. Denney, 555 So.2d 137, 139 (Ala.1989) (default judgment obtained by insured against tortfeasor was conclusive as to liability and damages). Allstate concedes it had notice of the case against the tortfeasor months before it went to arbitration. [4] Allstate's counsel attended a deposition taken in the case and it was invited to participate in a second deposition. Sometime in September 1994 Allstate was notified the insured and tortfeasor were actually in arbitration. [5] Allstate stresses that Fisher filed suit against both Allstate and the tortfeasor in separate actions and that, originally, suit against Allstate was to proceed first to trial. As a result Allstate argues it justifiably declined to intervene. However, Finney and the majority of jurisdictions hold if suit is filed by the insured against the tortfeasor and the insurer declines to intervene, it will be bound by the resulting judgment. This rule is not qualified by reliance upon trial scheduling. See, e.g., Briggs, 833 P.2d at 864 (American argues, however, that it relied on the fact that Briggs brought a separate contract action against American to determine the amount of benefits and, thus, did not think it necessary to intervene in the tort action. Even if we assume that American did so rely, its asserted good faith is not relevant to the question of due process. Due process requires notice and an opportunity to intervene. Here, American had both.). Further, Allstate still had the opportunity to seek intervention after it realized its suit with Fisher would not be the first to proceed to trial. Allstate explains the trial date was changed around April 25, 1994 although the arbitration hearing did not begin until September 19, 1994. Allstate therefore had five months to seek intervention in the action. Even if Allstate had a defense based on trial scheduling, it must at least attempt to protect its interests once it realized the Idaho case would proceed first. Instead Allstate did nothing. Allstate received sufficient notice of Fisher's action against the tortfeasor to satisfy Finney. Allstate also argues the Finney rule should not apply because Fisher failed to reduce her arbitration award to a final judgment. Despite ample opportunity (almost four years of litigation), neither party to this case noticed the arbitration ruling hadn't ever been reduced to judgment until after the Court of Appeals opinion was published. Allstate only recently contested the issue in its petition for review. This court does not generally consider issues raised for the first time in a petition for review. State v. Halstien, 122 Wash.2d 109, 130, 857 P.2d 270 (1993). Allstate presents no compelling reason why the court should address the issue here. Had Allstate asserted this defense earlier, Fisher could have sought to reduce the arbitration award to judgment; however, we decline to consider an issue first raised in a petition for review. [6] Finney governs this case and we accordingly affirm the Court of Appeals decision on coverage, awarding costs on appeal plus reasonable attorney's fees to Fisher pursuant to Olympic S.S. Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 117 Wash.2d 37, 52, 811 P.2d 673 (1991). DURHAM, C.J., and DOLLIVER, SMITH, GUY, JOHNSON and TALMADGE, JJ., concur.