Opinion ID: 1832218
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ability of the state to seek indemnification

Text: The State further challenges the Third District's statement that a decision to impose liability would not impose financial hardships because the management agreement contains an indemnification clause requiring the City to reimburse the State for any liability arising solely from ownership of the beach. See Garcia, 707 So.2d at 1160. According to the State, section 768.28(18), Florida Statutes (1999), precludes government entities from entering into indemnity agreements such as the management agreement. This section provides that: Neither the state nor any agency or subdivision of the state waives any defense of sovereign immunity, or increases the limits of its liability, upon entering into a contractual relationship with another agency or subdivision of the state. Such a contract must not contain any provision that requires one party to indemnify or insure the other party for the other party's negligence or to assume any liability for the other party's negligence. Id. (emphasis supplied). Although no courts have construed this provision, a plain reading of the statutory language reveals that government entities are only prohibited from entering into agreements to indemnify another government entity for the other entity's negligence, or to assume any liability for the other entity's negligence. In contrast, the agreement in this case was for the City to indemnify the State for the City's own negligence. Thus, an indemnification agreement is not prohibited by this statute. This interpretation of section 768.28(18) is also consistent with the common law right of indemnification. At common law, a nonnegligent party who is vicariously liable for the tortious actions of another can seek indemnification from the tortfeasor. See, e.g., Houdaille Indust., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So.2d 490 (Fla.1979). Therefore, at common law, the State would have been able to seek indemnity from the City if the State was without fault and held vicariously liable for the City's failure to keep South Beach reasonably safe. Finally, with regard to the issue of the nondelegable duty raised by the dissent, the State has not challenged the Third District's statement that the landowner's duty to invitees to keep the premises reasonably safe is nondelegable. See Garcia, 707 So.2d at 1159. In fact, the State concedes that if it had first designated South Beach as a public swimming area and then turned over the operation of South Beach to the City, it could be vicariously liable. Because this matter is being reversed and remanded and neither party has raised or briefed the correctness of the Third District's statement, we decline to address the issue of the vicarious liability of a landowner. Accordingly, we approve the Third District's decision on the grounds stated in this opinion and disapprove of the statement that common use by the public is the basis for imposing a common law duty of reasonable care on the State. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. SHAW, ANSTEAD, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur. WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which HARDING, C.J., concurs. WELLS, J., dissenting. I dissent from the majority's decision in this case because I conclude that the majority and the Third District Court of Appeal decided this case on the wrong basis. I can agree with the majority that the determination of whether a governmental unit is operating a swimming facility should not be based entirely upon whether there has been a formal designation as a public swimming area. However, the determination should have been made by a straightforward application of Avallone v. Board of County Commissioners, 493 So.2d 1002 (Fla.1986), in which this Court said: A government unit has the discretionary authority to operate or not operate swimming facilities and is immune from suit on that discretionary question. However, once the unit decides to operate the swimming facility, it assumes the common law duty to operate the facility safely, just as a private individual is obligated under like circumstances. Id. at 1005. The key phrase in the above quotation is decides to operate the swimming facility. In this case, it is undisputed that the State made a planning-level decision not to operate a public swimming facility at South Beach but rather to turn over operational control of this sovereignty land to the City. It is irrelevant that the State knew of, approved of, and shared in the revenues of the swimming facility. Under our holding in Avallone, the only salient fact here is that the State made an express decision not to operate a swimming facility and therefore did not waive sovereign immunity. In my view, this simple conclusion avoids policy concerns that would emerge if, under these facts, the State were held to have waived sovereign immunity. The majority opinion exposes the State to liability for injuries to swimmers, surfers, fishermen, and boaters along hundreds of miles of beaches that are held in trust for the people of Florida. This is an unacceptable policy decision. Moreover, I cannot agree that this factual situation is analogous to those in the cases relied upon by the Third District for the principle concerning a nondelegable duty. The concept of nondelegable duty is contrary to our distinction, for purposes of determining the existence of sovereign immunity, between governmental planning-level and operational-level decisions, upon which Commercial Carrier v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010 (Fla.1979), and its progeny are based. The proper analysis does not determine whether a governmental entity can or cannot delegate a function. Rather, the appropriate question is whether a governmental entity performed an operation itself and, if so, whether the entity exercised reasonable care. The decision as to whether to delegate control or whether to perform a particular operation is a discretionary, planning-level governmental decision into which the courts cannot intrude. Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d 912, 918 (Fla.1985). Moreover, in this instance, the State's role here is similar to that of an owner, and the City's role is similar to that of a nonowner possessor such as a lessee or an independent contractor. If premises liability law were applied, there would be no liability on the part of the State, as owner, even absent a sovereign immunity bar. The Fifth District in Bovis v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 505 So.2d 661 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), set forth the fundamental analysis of premises liability: An owner of real property is not an insurer of the safety of persons on such property, nor is he subject to strict liability or liable per se for injuries resulting from dangerous conditions on owned property. The crux of a cause of action for premises liability is not the ownership of the premises, but the failure of the possessor of the premises to use due care (negligence) in permitting licensees and invitees to come, unwarned, to an area where, foreseeably, they may be injured by a dangerous condition which to them is not readily apparent. This is why an owner of a dangerous premises is not liable to trespassers and yet one in possession of a premises with authority to control access thereto, such as a lessee, an independent contractor, or other non-owner possessor, may be liable to invitees and licensees for injuries from dangerous conditions created by the owner, or the possessor, or by others, such as other invitees and licensees. In this case, as in the usual lease arrangement, the lessor had no right to control access by third parties to the leased premises and the lessee had actual possession and the right to control access to the leased premises and the lessee was not the agent of the lessor-owner. Therefore, the lessee and not the lessor (owner) had the continuing legal duty to inspect the premises and, in permitting or denying access to others, to act according to the safety or danger then existing. A lessor (owner) may be liable in tort to the lessee and to third persons for injuries resulting from latent dangerous conditions of which the lessor (owner) knew or should have known and which existed on the leased premises when the lessor (owner) delivered possession of the leased premises to the lessee without appropriate warnings but such liability is not based on the fact that the lessor is owner but on the basis that the owner, as possessor, can be negligent in these particulars just as any other possessor. A lessor (owner) may also be liable contractually to the lessee for damages for breach of a lease provision requiring the lessor to maintain portions of a leased premises. Of course, the lessor (owner) is not liable for injuries caused solely by the lessee's operations and activities on the leased premises. On the other hand, the lessee may not only be liable to third parties for injuries resulting from the lessee's negligent operations and activities on the leased premises but, being in possession and controlling access by licensee and invitee, may also be liable in tort for injuries to third parties caused by a dangerous condition on the leased premises, whether the dangerous condition resulted from the act of the lessee, the act of the lessor (owner), some combination of the acts of both the lessee and the lessor (owner), or the act of a third person. In summary, the duty to protect others from injury resulting from a dangerous condition on a premises does not rest on legal ownership of the dangerous area but on the right to control access by third parties which right usually exists in the one in possession and control of the premises. The possessor (lessee) has the right and the duty to exclude licensees and invitees from an area that is dangerous because of dangerous operations or activities or because of a dangerous premises condition and has the duty to warn third persons of danger. Id. at 662-63 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). In Miller v. Sinclair Refining Co., 268 F.2d 114 (5th Cir.1959), the federal appellate court stated: In such a case, Florida law says that the lessor is not liable for injuries to the lessee or those upon the premises in the lessee's right unless the negligent condition which causes the injury is a violation of law, is a pre-existing defect in construction or is inherently dangerous, or unless the lessor undertakes to keep the premises in repair. Id. at 117. In this case, the record reveals that the State, as owner, had turned over to the City, the nonowner possessor, the control of the land. It was the City that operated the swimming facility and, as possessor of the land, had the duty of keeping the premises in repair. Thus, only the City could be found liable for any injuries its negligence might have caused. HARDING, C.J., concurs.