Opinion ID: 1209026
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: (1a) THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LIBEL.

Text: We turn first to appellant's attempt to state a cause of action for libel. Libel is defined by Civil Code section 45 as a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation. As appellant points out, the definition of libel has been held to include almost any language which, upon its face, has a natural tendency to injure a person's reputation. ( Schomberg v. Walker (1901) 132 Cal. 224, 227 [64 P. 290]; MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 536, 546 [343 P.2d 36]; Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 111, p. 739 et seq.) (2) In determining whether a statement is libelous we look to what is explicitly stated as well as what insinuation and implication can be reasonably drawn from the communication. ( Cameron v. Wernick (1967) 251 Cal. App.2d 890, 893 [60 Cal. Rptr. 102].) To constitute a libel it is not necessary that there be a direct and specific allegation of improper conduct, as in a pleading. The charge may be either expressly stated or implied; and in the latter case the implication may be either apparent from the language used, or of such a character as to require the statement and proof of extrinsic facts, ( inducement, colloquium, and innuendo ) to show its meaning. In the last case, proper allegations and proofs of the facts necessary to make the meaning of the language apparent will be required. ( Schomberg v. Walker, supra, 132 Cal. at pp. 227-228.) In this connection the expression used as well as the whole scope and apparent object of the writer must be considered. ( MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., supra, at p. 546.) (3) In determining the propriety of the trial court's ruling on the demurrer, this court's inquiry is not to determine if the communications may have an innocent meaning but rather to determine if the communication reasonably carries with it a defamatory meaning. ( Mullins v. Brando (1970) 13 Cal. App.3d 409, 414-415 [91 Cal. Rptr. 796], cert. den. Brando v. Coffman (1971) 403 U.S. 923 [29 L.Ed.2d 701, 91 S.Ct. 2231].) Just as the court must refrain from a hair-splitting analysis of what is said in an article to find an innocent meaning, so must it refrain from scrutinizing what is not said to find a defamatory meaning which the article does not convey to a lay reader. ( Mullins v. Thieriot (1971) 19 Cal. App.3d 302, 304 [97 Cal. Rptr. 27].) (1b) Appellant concedes, as he must, that there is no single statement in the book which, standing alone, could be said to libel appellant. Appellant's contention is that, when read in the context of the entire book, the cumulative impact ... implies that he was involved in the alleged murder [of Hughes] ... and associated with the Manson `family.' In this connection he details a series of statements from the book. Appellant notes that the book proclaims to be the never-before-told complete inside story of the Manson Family by the prosecutor who put the puzzle together. It suggests that retaliatory murders went on even after the the jailing of Manson, that the slaying of Hughes was the first of the proposed retaliatory murders and that Manson wanted Hughes dead. In addition, appellant claims that in examining the circumstances surrounding Hughes' disappearance, the book, describing appellant and Lauren Elder as teenagers, states that the two drove Hughes to a desolate camping spot; the book does not expressly state why they drove Hughes or what their connection with him was. Appellant further develops the claimed implication by noting the representations that appellant and Elder were living together at the time, that their stories were never checked out by the police, that the last three other people known to have seen Hughes alive after appellant's and Elder's departure were polygraphed, that the cause of Hughes' death was poison and that Lauren Willett and her husband James were killed because they knew too much about the slaying of Hughes. The book expressly rules out the probability of James Willett's being the appellant, James Forsher, because of an age differential. [4] However, the book states, But Lauren is a decidedly uncommon name. And, nineteen in 1972, she would have been seventeen in 1970. [¶] Coincidence? There have been far stranger ones in this case. The book further states that After Hughes disappeared, the couple were questioned but not polygraphed, the police being satisfied that when they left the flooded area Hughes was still alive. On the morning of the following day, the book recites, three other youths had seen Hughes, alone, but well and in no danger. Since Forsher and Elder had last seen Hughes a day earlier, they apparently were not polygraphed and their story was taken at face value. Under the circumstances depicted in the book it cannot be reasonably said a defamatory picture is painted of appellant. Although he and Elder had driven Hughes to the remote area, Hughes, according to the book, appears to have been left there by his choice, alive and well. There may be an inference that Lauren Elder and Lauren Willett, the latter clearly depicted as being involved in the Manson family, might have been one and the same. However, the book does not allow such an inference to be reasonably made that appellant was a member of the family. No reasonable imputation can be made that appellant was involved in Hughes' death other than being with Elder and driving Hughes to the camping area and at Hughes' election leaving him. The book's cast of characters lists the Manson family members and associates; included in this list are the names of James and Lauren Willett; absent is the name of appellant. Instead of placing responsibility for Hughes' death on Forsher, the book suggests that Hughes was killed by two Manson family members, Bruce Davis and Nancy Pitman, who while fugitives for some time, voluntarily surrendered to police five days after Hughes was last seen alive. The book does not place Davis or Pitman with appellant or Elder during the time the latter were at Sespe Hot Springs. In sum, the book simply establishes that appellant and Elder took Hughes to Sespe Hot Springs, that Hughes decided to stay, and that appellant and Elder left while Hughes was alive and in no danger. Possibly Lauren Willett may have been killed because she knew something of Hughes' death. Hughes may have been killed by Manson followers Pitman and Davis. However, the book neither expressly nor by fair implication charges appellant with killing or aiding or abetting the killing of Hughes. The defamatory meaning which appellant urges that this court discern in the context of the whole book must be one that can be reasonably inferred. If the defamatory character were open to reasonable debate we would agree with appellant's assessment of the book. Here, however, the claimed defamatory nature of the book insofar as it relates to appellant is so obscure and attenuated as to be beyond the realm of reasonableness. (See Yorty v. Chandler (1970) 13 Cal. App.3d 467, 475 [91 Cal. Rptr. 709]; Corman v. Blanchard (1962) 211 Cal. App.2d 126, 137-138 [27 Cal. Rptr. 327].) In determining the defamatory nature of written material, the fact that some person might, with extra sensitive perception, understand such a meaning cannot compel this court to establish liability at so low a threshold. Rather, the test as noted above is whether by reasonable implication a defamatory meaning may be found in the communication. To bolster his pleadings, and, apparently in an attempt to plead extrinsic circumstances giving meaning to the alleged offending passages, appellant alleged certain omitted facts [5] which did not find their way into the book. However, appellant's position is not appreciably improved thereby. Even if we consider these omitted facts, we still cannot discern a defamatory meaning reasonably inferable therefrom. The additional information does not reasonably contribute to a defamatory meaning. Moreover, there is also the problem of appellant's failure to allege any special damages. Civil Code section 45a provides: A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on its face. Defamatory language not libelous on its face is not actionable unless the plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered special damage as a proximate result thereof. Special damage is defined in Section 48a of this code. Appellant has not effectively pleaded that he has suffered any special damages. [6] To be sure, appellant has alleged he has suffered in an amount, which, as yet, cannot be ascertained and which will be proven at trial. Such an allegation is insufficient. Appellant should have been able to plead injury to property, business, trade, profession or occupation, if these interests have been injured even though the monetary extent might not have been ascertainable. Unless there is a special damage as defined by Civil Code section 48a, no cause of action arises. ( Mullins v. Thieriot, supra, 19 Cal. App.3d 302, 304.)