Opinion ID: 2624926
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Interpretation of Nevada's marriage consent statute

Text: In his petition, Kirkpatrick asserts that the district court manifestly abused its discretion when it failed to identify any extraordinary circumstances warranting Sierra's marriage to a forty-eight-year-old man, and when it failed to expressly consider Sierra's best interests. As explained previously, in Nevada, a child under the age of sixteen is legally incapable of contracting to marry without the consent of one parent or the legal guardian, and authorization from a district court; these requirements are set forth in NRS 122.025. [42] Under this statute, a two-tiered approach has been adopted. Specifically, the minor must obtain the consent of one parent or a guardian; then, [i]n extraordinary circumstances, a district court may authorize the marriage of a person less than 16 years of age if the court finds that ... [t]he marriage will serve the best interests of such person. [43] Moreover, pregnancy alone does not establish that the minor's best interests will be served by marriage, nor is pregnancy required by the court as a condition necessary for its marriage authorization. [44] Thus, under the statute, any judicial authorization must be based on the court's determination that extraordinary circumstances warranting the marriage exist, and that the minor's best interests will be served. The court cannot base these determinations on pregnancy alone. Kirkpatrick contends that the district court manifestly abused its discretion when it failed to independently inquire as to what extraordinary circumstances existed to warrant a fifteen-year-old marrying, and how it is in Sierra's best interest to marry a forty-eight-year-old man. Sierra argues that the district court complied with the statutory provision when it obtained Karay's consent for Sierra's marriage and subsequently authorized the marriage. We have not previously examined the language of the marriage consent statute. Our statutory construction rules are well established, however. When interpreting a statutory provision, the words in a statute should be given their plain meaning unless this violates the spirit of the act. [45] Thus, [w]here the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning clear and unmistakable, there is no room for construction, and the courts are not permitted to search for its meaning beyond the statute itself. [46] Ambiguity exists if reasonable persons can ascribe different meanings to a statute. [47] Once a statute is termed ambiguous, the plain meaning rule has no application, and [t]he leading rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. This intent will prevail over the literal sense of the words.... The entire subject matter and policy may be involved as an interpretive aid. [48] When interpreting an ambiguous statute, the provisions should be construed `in line with what reason and public policy' dictate. [49] Black's Law Dictionary defines extraordinary circumstances as out of the ordinary. [50] While the dictionary provides a clear definition of the term, the parties contend that the term as used in the statute can be read two ways and is therefore ambiguous. Specifically, Kirkpatrick asserts that the term extraordinary circumstances refers to something unusual arising that necessitates the marriage of someone under sixteen. Sierra maintains that extraordinary circumstances exist any time someone under the age of sixteen wishes to marry. As the parties point out, it is unclear from the language of the statute whether extraordinary circumstances exist merely because the minor is so young, or whether the term is intended to limit the district court's discretion in giving authorization. Thus, we turn to the statute's legislative history for guidance. In 1957, the Legislature originally adopted Nevada's marriage consent statute for persons less than sixteen years of age; it provided that the district court may authorize the marriage of females under the age of 16 years or males under the age of 18 years upon the written consent of the parents or guardian of any such person. [51] Although this version gave the district court discretion to authorize a marriage, it provided no express guidance to the district court in exercising its discretion. Nearly twenty years later, in 1975, the Legislature amended the statute. [52] The amendment eliminated the gender distinctions and specifically addressed the circumstances in which a minor under the age of sixteen could petition the court to marry. The statutory amendment expressly provided that in extraordinary circumstances the district court could, after considering the minor's best interests and obtaining parental consent, grant permission for the minor to marry. [53] The 1975 amended version of the statute read much like the current version, except that the earlier version required the consent of both parents, or the custodial parent if the minor was living with only one parent. [54] The legislative history reveals that the 1975 amendment was intended, in large part, to address the Legislature's concern with minors under the age of sixteen marrying. [55] During the hearings, one senator stated that the intent of the bill was that persons over 18 could be married; persons between the ages of 16 and 18 needed parental consent; and persons under 16 needed both parental consent and a decree from the district court, with the understanding that this would be given only under extraordinary circumstances. [56] At a subsequent hearing, another senator stated that he understood from the committee's discussion that the committee desired to restrict the marriage of persons under the age of 16 as much as possible. [57] In 1977, the Legislature again amended the statute, to its current form, which only requires the consent of one parent. [58] The amendment in no way affected the requirement that the district court find extraordinary circumstances and that the marriage is in the minor's best interest. Based on the Legislature's clear directive that minors under the age of sixteen be permitted to marry in only very limited situations, we conclude that the term extraordinary circumstances necessarily requires that the court find something out of the ordinary justifying the marriage of a minor under the age of sixteen. Although extraordinary circumstances must necessarily be determined on a case-by-case basis, some possibilities, though not exhaustive, include: (1) the prospective spouse is in the armed services or is relocating abroad for a career opportunity; (2) it is the common practice in the culture of the minor's family for minors under the age of sixteen to marry; (3) the minor is terminally ill and wishes to marry before dying; or (4) the minor is not supported physically, financially or emotionally by his or her parents and demonstrates the requisite maturity to engage in a marital relationship. Since the statute does not limit the youngest age at which a minor may seek judicial permission to marry, greater judicial protection is required for younger minors. Although the statute is silent as to whether the court must make express written findings that extraordinary circumstances exist, we conclude that the court may not authorize the marriage without first expressly finding such circumstances. [59] Here, it is unknown whether extraordinary circumstances existed to warrant Sierra's marriage to a forty-eight-year-old man. Because the district court failed to explain that anything out of the ordinary would justify Sierra's marriage, we conclude that the district court manifestly abused its discretion in authorizing it. Even after the district court makes a threshold determination that extraordinary circumstances exist, the court must find that the marriage is in the minor's best interests. Considerations of the minor's maturity, his or her family relationships, his or her future plans, the length and stability of the minor's relationship with the prospective spouse, the minor's ability and the prospective spouse's ability to provide care and support for the marital unit, the suitability and fitness of the prospective spouse, and whether the minor or prospective spouse is pregnant, as well as other pertinent factors, may assist the court in determining whether a proposed marriage is in the minor's best interests. In addition, the district court must consider input from the minor's parents or guardian, including any non-consenting parent with an established parent-child relationship. The parents or guardian can offer the court valuable insight, as they have firsthand knowledge about the minor's history, disposition, maturity, self-esteem and personality. [60] Information gathered by the district court from the parents or guardian of the minor child is necessary for the court to make an informed decision as to whether the marriage is in the minor's best interests. Even after considering the parents' or guardian's observations, however, the court must make an independent decision regarding the minor's best interests. Judicial oversight is required by the statute to ensure that the minor's parents or guardian act with the minor's best interests in mind, and that based upon the evidence, the minor's life will be enhanced by the marriage. [61] The district court's determination to permit a minor under sixteen years of age to marry is a substantive one to be made only after careful inquiry. Here, the district court made its decision without conducting a hearing, or even interviewing Sierra, Crow, Karay, or Kirkpatrick. The court only considered Karay's conclusory affidavit. The marriage consent statute is silent as to whether the district court must make express written findings that the marriage is in the minor's best interests. Nevertheless, the enormity of the decision to marry and the state's interest in ensuring that the marriage is in the minor's best interests necessitate that the district court make written findings to support its conclusion concerning whether the best interests of the child are served by permitting the child to marry. The child's best interests are too important and fundamental to countenance our approval of the district court's lack of inquiry in this case. The statute exists for the obvious reason that children under sixteen years of age are considered, absent extraordinary circumstances, to be too immature to make such a weighty decision in life without a parent's consent. Judicial oversight is required by the statute to ensure that the child's parent(s), who consent to the marriage, are acting with the child's best interests in mind. Here, the district court summarily, without a hearing, and with nothing but a deficient affidavit before it, found that good cause exists under the statute for the marriage and ordered the issuance of a marriage license so that Sierra could marry Crow. The district court did not indicate whether and why the marriage was in Sierra's best interests. In sum, the district court manifestly abused its discretion by failing to meaningfully inquire into and make express written findings as to whether the marriage was mandated by exceptional circumstances and in Sierra's best interests. The district court's failure to address in any meaningful way these issues amounted to an abrogation of its duties under the statute.