Opinion ID: 1094084
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claim of Bad Faith Destruction of Evidence

Text: Guzman next argues that he was deprived of due process by the State's bad faith destruction of a clump of hair found on the back of Colvin's thigh at the murder scene. Guzman asserts that the hair was potentially exculpatory evidence because, if DNA testing showed that the hair was not Guzman's or Colvin's, this would show that someone other than Guzman killed Colvin. Guzman argues that the State's bad faith is established by the destruction of evidence without a written request or court order, in violation of the Daytona Beach Police Department's rules and procedures, particularly in light of the fact that the hair evidence was destroyed by an officer who was subsequently convicted of stealing items from the evidence room. As alternatives to a bad faith claim based on these facts, Guzman asserts that the State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose the destruction of the hair evidence, and that Guzman's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to ascertain that the hair evidence was destroyed. The loss or destruction of evidence that is potentially useful to the defense violates due process only if the defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police or prosecution. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). Under Youngblood, bad faith exists only when police intentionally destroy evidence they believe would exonerate a defendant. Youngblood explained that the presence or absence of bad faith ... must necessarily turn on the police's knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed. Id. at 57 n. , 109 S.Ct. 333. Evidence that has not been examined or tested by government agents does not have apparent exculpatory value and thus cannot form the basis of a claim of bad faith destruction of evidence. See id. at 57, 109 S.Ct. 333 (rejecting a due process claim based on the government's failure to preserve evidence of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant); see also King v. State, 808 So.2d 1237, 1242 (Fla.2002) (holding that a defendant failed to show bad faith on the part of the State in destroying hair and tissue evidence, in part because the defendant failed to show the police made a conscious effort to prevent the defense from securing the evidence); Merck v. State, 664 So.2d 939, 942 (Fla.1995) (holding that the defendant failed to show bad faith in a police detective's failure to preserve a pair of pants found at a crime scene, because the detective believed they did not have evidentiary value). Guzman argues that bad faith exists because the police destroyed the hair evidence in violation of established practices and procedures. However, under Youngblood and this Court's precedent, the determination of bad faith does not turn on whether law enforcement officers followed established procedures. Instead, bad faith exists only when law enforcement officers intentionally destroy evidence they believe would exonerate a defendant. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57, 109 S.Ct. 333. Guzman has not shown that the hair sample from the murder scene would exonerate him, or that police officers ever believed it might. To the contrary, the evidence shows that police officers believed the hair evidence was irrelevant to solving the case. The lead detective testified at the rule 3.850 hearing that she believed the clump of hair was the victim's since the victim's skull had been cut multiple times, the clump of hair appeared to have been cut, the hair was bloody, and the clump of hair matched the victim's hair color. The detective stated that she believed the hair sample was not significant to the case. Thus, as in Merck, the police officers in this case believed that the destroyed evidence had no evidentiary value. Guzman has not shown that any State actor intentionally deprived him of evidence which the State actor believed to be exculpatory. Guzman asserts that if the hair sample had been tested, the result of the test might have exonerated him; however, the destruction of evidence that, if tested, might have exonerated Guzman is not sufficient under Youngblood to establish a due process violation. Guzman's claim of bad faith destruction of evidence must fail. Likewise, there is no merit in Guzman's claim that the State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose that the hair evidence had been destroyed. The first requisite element of a Brady violation is evidence favorable to the accused. Jennings v. State, 782 So.2d 853, 856 (Fla. 2001). Guzman has not shown that the hair was evidence favorable to him. As discussed above, contrary to Guzman's argument, the destruction of the hair evidence would not have enabled him to obtain a dismissal under Youngblood. Thus, Guzman fails to establish the first requisite element of a Brady violation. Similarly, Guzman has failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel based on his counsel's failure to discover the destruction of the hair evidence. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish deficient performance and prejudice. See Rutherford v. State, 727 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla.1998) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). We do not reach the prejudice prong of a Strickland analysis because we find that Guzman's counsel was not deficient in failing to pursue the hair evidence so as to discover its destruction before trial. Guzman's trial counsel testified at the rule 3.850 hearing that he thought the clump of hair was the victim's, based on the wounds to the victim's skull, the force of the blows and blood spatter indicating that hair could have been dislodged, and the fact that the hair was bloody. This was a reasonable conclusion; as stated above, it was the same conclusion reached by the lead detective on the case. Because Guzman's counsel reasonably discounted the evidentiary value of the hair sample, counsel was not constitutionally ineffective with regard to this issue.