Opinion ID: 1175367
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Illegal seizure.

Text: (1b), (3a) Defendant first urges that his statement must be suppressed because it is the fruit of an illegal arrest without a warrant or probable cause. We agree. (4) Because of the particular interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, a statement must be suppressed, even when knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, if it is the direct product of an illegal arrest or detention. ( Dunaway v. New York (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 216-217 [60 L.Ed.2d 824, 838-839, 99 S.Ct. 2248]; Brown v. Illinois (1975) 422 U.S. 590, 602-604 [45 L.Ed.2d 416, 426-428, 95 S.Ct. 2254].) (5) By proscribing searches and seizures without adequate cause or judicial authorization, the Fourth Amendment guards, among other things, against the police tactic of investigative detention. (E.g., Hayes v. Florida (1985) 470 U.S. 811, 815-816 [84 L.Ed.2d 705, 710, 105 S.Ct. 1643].) (3b) This case presents a classic example of such tactics. The People urge that the encounter between defendant and the police was consensual, and thus not a detention. (6) However, the test of detention under the Fourth Amendment is whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have felt free to leave. (E.g., Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 501-502 [75 L.Ed.2d 229, 239, 103 S.Ct. 1319].) (3c) Under this test, the instant facts suggest conclusively that defendant's interrogation occurred during an illegal, prolonged detention amounting to arrest. The People stress that defendant was contacted by plainclothes officers in unmarked cars, agreed to go to the police station, was never handcuffed or overtly restrained, and was questioned in an interview room not exclusively reserved for suspects under arrest. They emphasize that the officers never told defendant he was under arrest and had no intent to arrest him until he made the incriminating statement I did it. We agree with defendant, however, that many of the formal indicia of detention or arrest were present during the initial encounter with the officers, his transportation to the Fullerton station, and the ensuing interview. The manner in which the police arrived at defendant's home, accosted him, and secured his consent to accompany them suggested they did not intend to take no for an answer. Indeed, as previously noted, Lewis testified that the officers intended to detain defendant if he attempted to leave before speaking with them. Whatever defendant's status before arriving at the Fullerton station, however, the situation quickly ripened into a full-blown arrest inside the station house. Defendant was confronted by two officers in a small interrogation room. He was informed of his Miranda rights, an indication that the officers themselves believed the situation might be tantamount to custody. Thereafter, he was subjected to more than an hour of directly accusatory questioning, in which Lewis repeatedly told him  falsely  that the police knew he was the killer, had all the necessary evidence, intended to charge him with the crimes, and would prove his guilt in court. According to Lewis, they sought only to learn why he had done it, in order to establish the precise degree of culpability. While Lewis never expressly told defendant he was under arrest, his response to defendant's pointed inquiries on that issue furthered the impression of official restraint. Lewis first ignored defendant's questions about arrest. Then, in what appeared an immediate answer to another such question, Lewis said, That's where you're at right now. (See fn. 10, ante. ) [11] When defendant then asked if he could have a telephone call later  an obvious indication that he believed himself in custody  Lewis simply responded, Uh-huh. ( Ibid. ) Under such circumstances, a reasonable person could only conclude that the police deemed him their sole suspect in a double murder and would restrain and formally arrest him if he tried to leave. Thus, defendant was under illegal arrest during this period. (7a) The question remains whether his final statement was obtained by exploitation of the illegality and must therefore be suppressed. (8) The issue is whether intervening events break the causal connection between the illegal [detention] and the [incriminating statement] so that the [statement] is `sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.' [Citations.] ( Taylor v. Alabama (1982) 457 U.S. 687, 690 [73 L.Ed.2d 314, 319, 102 S.Ct. 2664], quoting Brown, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 602 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 426], which in turn quotes Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 486 [9 L.Ed.2d 441, 454, 83 S.Ct. 407].) The important considerations are [t]he temporal proximity of the [illegal seizure] and the [statement], the presence of intervening circumstances, ... and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. ( Taylor, supra, at p. 690 [73 L.Ed.2d at p. 690] quoting Brown, supra, at pp. 603-604 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 427].) (7b) The People suggest that defendant's statement was not the tainted product of the illegal arrest, since it occurred as a spontaneous outburst, long after coercive questioning had ceased, and at a time when defendant cannot have believed his liberty was restrained. They emphasize that in the interim between interrogation and statement, defendant consented to voluntary fingerprinting, was told he was not under arrest, and was allowed to speak by telephone with his girlfriend. Moreover, the People note, Detective Lewis was preparing to arrange defendant's transportation home when defendant called him back with the words, I did it. No such attenuation argument was raised below. In any event, we are not persuaded. As the record makes clear, defendant's statement occurred less than four hours after he left his home under police escort, and less than two hours after the commencement of a station house interrogation in which aggressive softening up tactics were employed. He remained in police facilities and police company up to the moment he decided to give his statement. Hence, there were no significant intervening events to break the chain of causation between the flagrant illegality of his custodial interrogation and his subsequent statement. (Compare, e.g., Dunaway, supra, 442 U.S. at pp. 218-219 [60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 839-840]; Brown, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 603-605 [45 L.Ed.2d at pp. 426-428].) Were there any remaining doubt, it is resolved by defendant's own words when he first blurted out his involvement in the killings. Defendant's concession that You're right, I can't live with it was a direct and obvious response to the interrogational techniques used by Detective Lewis during the earlier illegal interview. Again and again, Lewis had exhorted defendant to confess because he would not be able to live with his guilt. [12] Defendant's I did it statement led immediately to his agreement to give a complete statement under a new Miranda waiver. (1c) We could hardly have clearer proof that defendant's entire statement was the product of a will overborne during an illegal detention. For this reason alone, the statement should have been suppressed.