Opinion ID: 867274
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refusal to Pose Juror Question

Text: ¶32 After redirect of the State's mental health expert in the sentencing phase, a juror submitted the following question to the trial judge: Given what you know about Mr. Villalobos, is it likely that he could be significantly reformed with the help of medications and or therapy? Over Villalobos's objection, the judge refused to ask the expert that question because talking about [a] speculative theoretical future environment ... doesn't seem to fall within the realm of what mitigation is about. ¶33 A trial judge may for good cause ... prohibit or limit the submission of [juror] questions to witnesses. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 18.6(e). We review the trial court's decision to exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. See State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 129 ¶ 42, 140 P.3d 899, 912 (2006); Davolt, 207 Ariz. at 210 ¶ 69, 84 P.3d at 475. ¶34 A penalty phase jury may not be precluded from considering relevant mitigating evidence. See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287, 124 S.Ct. 2562, 159 L.Ed.2d 384 (2004); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). Our statutes broadly define mitigating circumstances as including any aspect of the defendant's character, propensities or record. A.R.S. § 13-751(G). A defendant's potential for future rehabilitation falls squarely within this definition. State v. King, 180 Ariz. 268, 283, 883 P.2d 1024, 1039 (1994). The trial judge therefore incorrectly concluded that future dangerousness and potential for rehabilitation were not mitigating circumstances. ¶35 Nonetheless, we cannot conclude that the trial judge committed reversible error in declining to pose the juror's question to the State's expert. The witness had testified only as to the results of a personality test and Villalobos's I.Q. score; he did not diagnose the defendant for treatment, nor was his expertise on the effects of medication or therapy established. ¶36 More importantly, Villalobos made no offer of proof as to what the expert would have said if allowed to answer the question. A finding of error may not be predicated upon a ruling which ... excludes evidence unless ... the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context. Ariz. R. Evid. 103(a)(2); see State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 179, 920 P.2d 290, 301 (1996) (requiring, [a]t a minimum, an offer of proof stating with reasonable specificity what the evidence would have shown). Unlike cases in which no offer of proof is necessary because the content of the excluded evidence is obvious, e.g., State v. Kaiser, 109 Ariz. 244, 246, 508 P.2d 74, 76 (1973), nothing in this record hints at what the expert's response to the juror's question would have been. We therefore cannot conclude the judge's ruling was erroneous.