Opinion ID: 1176325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Fox Murder

Text: Eileen Fox, a 65-year-old retired nurse, lived alone in her home on Circle Parkway, across the street from the E.J. Crawford park. [3] She died on June 29, 1980, apparently from heart failure precipitated by an attack and beating which caused multiple injuries on her face, ear and head. The injuries were inflicted by a blunt instrument such as a human fist or foot. The attack occurred at or about 5:30 p.m., apparently as the victim carried a grocery sack from her car into her house. A torn grocery sack and several grocery items were on the floor near the body. Her eyeglasses were broken; one half was found on the porch, the other half inside the house near the body. A pair of brown, plastic-framed sunglasses was also found on the floor a few inches from the victim's left hand. Her purse and automobile were missing when the body was found. The automobile belonging to Eileen Fox was found at 1:45 a.m. on June 30, in a parking lot of the Luther Burbank High School located on Luther Drive. The keys were in the ignition. Eileen Fox's purse was on the front floorboard on the passenger side. Her wallet was found nearby in an ivy bed between the parking area and a school building. About three weeks prior to the murder of Eileen Fox, her neighbor had seen defendant and another person in the park across the street from her home, sitting in the bushes. The neighbor had seen defendant in the park on two prior occasions. The park was a neighborhod park with trees, shrubbery, and grass, but only one picnic table. It was unusual to see persons back in the bushes. The children who regularly used the park were normally in the area by the swings. In late June 1980 defendant had been living with his sister Lorraine at her home on East Parkway, north of Florin Drive. A single fingerprint useful for identification purposes was found on the brown plastic-framed sunglasses. Several prosecution witnesses offered their opinions that even though it appeared that there had been two prints, one overlaid on the other, it was possible to use one of those prints, and identified it as that of defendant. Defense witnesses whose credentials were equally weighty, testified that the print was not useful, or was not that of defendant.
We reject defendant's claim that the evidence as to either count was insufficient. (1) An appellate court called upon to review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a judgment of conviction of a criminal offense must, after a review of the whole record, determine whether the evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576-577 [162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255]; Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573, 99 S.Ct. 2781].) The standard of appellate review is the same in cases in which the People rely primarily on circumstantial evidence. ( People v. Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105, 118 [181 Cal. Rptr. 391, 641 P.2d 1253].) Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence ( People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 174-175 [133 Cal. Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881]; People v. Yrigoyen (1955) 45 Cal.2d 46, 49 [286 P.2d 1]), it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. `If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.' ( People v. Hillery (1965) 62 Cal.2d 692, 702 [44 Cal. Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382]. Accord People v. Teale (1969) 70 Cal.2d 497, 505 [75 Cal. Rptr. 172, 450 P.2d 564]; People v. Newland (1940) 15 Cal.2d 678, 681 [104 P.2d 778].) Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199, 210 [155 Cal. Rptr. 657, 595 P.2d 91].) In this case there was no claim that the offenses charged in the Schatz matter had not been committed. (2) The only issue was the identity of the perpetrator. As to that, there is no question that a reasonable jury could conclude that the evidence established defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Although defendant offered an explanation for his fingerprint on the window screen and palm print on the sink counter of the Schatz home, the jury disbelieved him. That evidence, coupled with the evidence of his admissions, including details such as the near collision with the highway patrol car which could not have been known to and reported in the media, the shoe print, and the proximity of the Southwinds Mobile Home Estates to the homes of relatives with whom defendant often stayed, all point to defendant as the perpetrator of the Schatz offenses. (3) Less evidence linked defendant to the Fox murder. A pair of sunglasses bearing what the People's experts identified as defendant's fingerprints was found next to the body of Eileen Fox, [4] and the defendant admitted owning a pair of similar sunglasses. [5] In addition there was evidence that defendant had been seen, possibly observing the house, in the past; that he was living nearby with his sister; and that he was familiar with the shortcut from the location at which the automobile, purse, and wallet were discarded to the Florin Meadows apartments. We conclude that this evidence was such that a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant was the perpetrator of the assault which led to the death of Eileen Fox. Contrary to defendant's assertion this case is not governed by our decision in People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667 [217 Cal. Rptr. 652, 704 P.2d 719], in which we held the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. There, only a fingerprint of unknown vintage and highly speculative and equivocal identification testimony supported the verdict, evidence we concluded was not reasonable, credible and of solid value  such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (39 Cal.3d at p. 697.) Although circumstantial, the quantity of evidence linking this defendant to the offenses in this case was significantly greater. The evidence here cannot be deemed insufficient as a matter of law. Similarly, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that the murder was committed in the perpetration of a burglary and a robbery. The location of the victim's glasses, (half of which were found on the porch of her home, the other half having been found near her body), the partially open door, and the broken sack of groceries found inside the house all suggest that defendant assaulted the victim with the intent of committing robbery as she was entering her home, and that he actually entered the house to further that intent. The evidence also supports the verdict insofar as the jury concluded that an actual robbery occurred. It is possible that the victim had left her purse in the car and it was not on her person, but an equally, if not more, likely inference which the jury might permissibly have drawn is that she had her purse with her as she left the car to enter the house. (4) On review of the judgment this court must presume in support of the judgment the existence of any facts that the jury might reasonably infer from the evidence. ( People v. Vann (1974) 12 Cal.3d 220, 225 [115 Cal. Rptr. 352, 524 P.2d 824].) Having done so, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdicts as to each of the counts and special allegations.