Opinion ID: 1116553
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Obligation of the Legal Profession of Florida

Text: When an individual is admitted to practice law in Florida, he or she becomes an officer of its courts upon taking an oath expressly adopted by this Court. [8] The oath extensively sets forth the responsibilities and obligations of lawyers in Florida. The last sentence expressly states:  I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any person's cause for lucre or malice. Rules Relating to Ethics Governing Bench and Bar, 145 Fla. 763, 797 (1941) (emphasis added). This provision identifies one of the specific public responsibilities lawyers have as officers of the court. We recognized the historic obligation of the legal profession to represent the poor in our decision in In Interest of D.B. In that decision we explained the different means by which counsel can be provided where permanent termination of child custody is in issue. We also upheld the authority of the court to appoint counsel and the responsibility of the bar to provide representation. In that case, we noted: The common law obligation of the profession to represent the poor without compensation has been carried forward in contemporary practice by cases such as United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978, 86 S.Ct. 550, 15 L.Ed.2d 469 (1966), which endorse the historical concept that one who is allowed the privilege to practice law accepts a professional obligation to defend the poor. Some courts and commentators have expressed the contrary view that requiring court-appointed counsel to serve without compensation constitutes an unfair imposition upon the bar and an unfair taking of private property in violation of the due process clause. It is our view that the government has an obligation to provide legal representation when such appointment is required by the constitution, but lawyers should not be totally relieved of their professional obligation to provide legal services to the poor... . ... . When appointment of counsel is desirable but not constitutionally required, the judge should use all available legal aid services, and when these services are unavailable, he should request private counsel to provide the necessary services. Under these circumstances, no compensation is available, and the services are part of the lawyer's historical professional responsibility to represent the poor. 385 So.2d at 92 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). It is important to explain the historical basis for placing this obligation on lawyers. In our common law adversary system, the lawyer plays the role of an advocate. In the courtroom, lawyers present evidence and examine witnesses to aid the judge and the jury in their search for the truth. In other systems, such as the European continental system, lawyers have a limited role during court proceedings. In that system, the judge questions the witnesses and brings out the evidence. The role of the lawyer in this type of process has been described as passive. D. Rueschemeyer, Lawyers and Their Society (1973). Lawyers as advocates are essential to our common law adversary system. An adversarial system of justice requires legal representation on both sides in order for it to work properly. Without adversaries, the system would not work. Consequently, the obligation to represent the defenseless and oppressed is critical to our judicial system if it is to work properly for all segments of our society. Respondents argue that the United States Supreme Court decision in Mallard prohibits the mandatory appointment of counsel. We disagree. In that case, the Court was construing 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (d), which provides that federal courts may request an attorney to represent any person filing in forma pauperis. The Court found that the term request reflects Congress's intent not to provide for mandatory appointment of counsel. In its opinion, the Court stated: We emphasize that our decision today is limited to interpreting section 1915(d). We do not mean to question, let alone denigrate, lawyers' ethical obligation to assist those who are too poor to afford counsel, or to suggest that requests made pursuant to section 1915(d) may be lightly declined because they give rise to no ethical claim. On the contrary, in a time when the need for legal services among the poor is growing and public funding for such services has not kept pace, lawyers' ethical obligation to volunteer their time and skills pro bono publico is manifest. Nor do we express an opinion on the question whether the federal courts possess inherent authority to require lawyers to serve. Mallard, 109 S.Ct. at 1822-23 (emphasis added). The Mallard decision was based solely on congressional intent in enacting a federal statute. It is important to note that in Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 109 S.Ct. 1294, 103 L.Ed.2d 559 (1989), decided during the same term as Mallard, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that a state may require lawyers, as a condition of practicing law, to represent the poor when directed to do so by a court. We agree we have that authority. [9] We also reject respondents' claim that the thirteenth amendment, [10] which prohibits involuntary servitude, necessarily prohibits a court from appointing a lawyer without his consent. For the condition of servitude to be within the thirteenth amendment's prohibition, the person must be subjected to physical restraint or threat of legal confinement as an alternative to the service. We find that the amendment does not apply if the individual may choose freedom even though the consequences of that choice result in some diminution of economic earning power. This principle was reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 92 S.Ct. 2099, 32 L.Ed.2d 728 (1972). In that decision, the Court upheld baseball's famed reserve clause and rejected a thirteenth amendment attack because Flood was unable to show compulsory service. The fact that an individual such as Flood would suffer substantial economic loss is not sufficient to bring the cause within the thirteenth amendment. See Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 735, 770 (1980). While confinement for failure to comply with an order directing representation of an indigent might bring the issue under the thirteenth amendment, other appropriate sanctions, such as a fine, suspension, or disbarment, could be imposed without violating the thirteenth amendment. Numerous decisions have rejected similar thirteenth amendment claims concerning attorney appointments. [11] We agree with the majority view expressed in these opinions. We also reject respondents' fifth amendment claim that there is a taking when the court requires a lawyer to represent an indigent without compensation. The majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue agree that uncompensated representation of indigents under court order is an obligation that lawyers accept as a condition of their license to practice and a part of their public responsibility as officers of the court. We agree with that view and hold that this obligation, consented to and assumed when an individual becomes a lawyer, is an absolute defense to the contention that there is a fifth amendment taking. United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978, 86 S.Ct. 550, 15 L.Ed.2d 469 (1966). [12] While we find no constitutional violation, we do conclude that a lawyer may challenge a court appointment on the grounds of abuse of discretion, such as where a court takes a substantial portion of the lawyer's available services for such appointments. An appropriate means of avoiding appointments is set forth in rule 4-6.2, Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. [13] We note that the grounds contained in the rule are not intended to set forth all circumstances that would justify good cause to avoid court-ordered appointments. We hold that every lawyer of this state who is a member of The Florida Bar has an obligation to represent the poor when called upon by the courts and that each lawyer has agreed to that commitment when admitted to practice law in this state. Pro bono is a part of a lawyer's public responsibility as an officer of the court. At this time we find no need to further express an attorney's obligation as an officer of the court in the rules regulating the Bar.