Opinion ID: 2648924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Intent to Return

Text: Assuming the Spark Street property was once Paul’s homestead, the trustee contends the Spark Street property lost the character of a homestead when Paul moved out without maintaining an intent to return. Paul proposes South Dakota law requires neither occupation nor intent to return in order for a property to qualify as a homestead and he is entitled to the exemption because (1) he “has reserved the right to return to the Spark[] Street” property should his recent marriage encounter difficulties, (2) “nothing prohibits Paul from moving out of his wife’s house today -4- and into” the Spark Street property,5 and (3) “the act of marriage does not deprive a party of the rights he or she enjoyed as a single person.” In large part, Paul’s propositions appear to suffer from the misconception that ownership of a house automatically entails a “right” to its characterization as a homestead. On the contrary, [t]he homestead right consists of the “right of occupancy” and “when the need for protection for the family ceases, then there is no longer any reason for the homestead. The homestead exemption is therefore temporary and exists only so long as the conditions prevail under which it was allowed by the homestead law.” Feucht v. Pierce, 06 4080, 05 41178, 2006 WL 3354507, at  (D.S.D. Nov. 15, 2006) (quoting In re Clouse’s Estate, 257 N.W. 106, 108 (S.D. 1934)), aff’d, 280 F. App’x 553 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). “The main question” under South Dakota law “is the intent of the party who has ceased to occupy the homestead.” Yellowhair v. Pratt, 182 N.W. 702, 703 (S.D. 1921); accord Feucht, 2006 WL 3354507, at . “Actual removal without intention to return is a forfeiture of the homestead right.” Yellowhair, 182 N.W. at 703; accord Knittel v. G. Sommers & Co., 28 N.W.2d 878, 878-79 (S.D. 1947). The date of return need not be “‘fixed or definite,’” and the debtor need not intend “‘to return regardless of all possible contingencies.’” Hewitt v. Carlson, 244 N.W. 108, 109 (S.D. 1932) (quoting Yellowhair, 182 N.W. at 704); accord Feucht, 2006 WL 3354507, at . Still, there must be “‘an honest belief that at some time in the future the party will reoccupy the property as a home.’” Hewitt, 244 N.W. at 109 (quoting Yellowhair, 182 N.W. at 704). And it is not enough that the intent to return is “a mere possible, or at most probable, future purpose to do so, 5 Paul apparently assumes any renters living at the Spark Street property would not object to him reoccupying the property. -5- contingent upon the happening or not happening of a particular event.” Yellowhair, 182 N.W. at 703; accord Feucht, 2006 WL 3354507, at . Paul never asserted an intent to move back into the Spark Street property nor has he refuted his statement at the § 341 meeting that he did not expect to live at the Spark Street property at any point in the future.6 Without some genuine dispute of fact on this point, summary judgment is warranted.