Opinion ID: 7191
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Motion To Continue Summary Judgment Motion

Text: 29 Pavone complains that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to continue the hearing on the Riverboat Companies' motion for summary judgment until after the court ruled on his motion to remand. We review for abuse of discretion a district court's denial of a continuance. 19 30 We believe that the chronology of the motion practice puts the issue of Pavone's February 8, 1994 request for a continuance in clear perspective: 31 November 15, 1993, Pavone filed a motion to remand; 32 November 30, 1993, the Riverboat Companies filed a motion for summary judgment; 33 December 15, 1993, the court heard Pavone's remand motion; 34 December 20, 1993, the court denied Pavone's remand motion; 35 January 3, 1994, Pavone filed a motion for reconsideration; 36 January 26, 1994, the court heard Pavone's reconsideration motion; 37 February 8, 1994, Pavone filed a motion to continue the hearing on the Riverboat Companies' summary judgment motion; 38 February 16, 1994, Pavone's motion for reconsideration was denied; 39 February 22, 1994, the district court heard the Riverboat Companies' motion for summary judgment--which had been continued from December 15, 1993 to February 9, 1994 on Pavone's motion, and from February 9, 1994 to February 22, 1994 on the court's own motion. 40 As this makes clear, the district court ruled against Pavone on his motion to remand on December 20, 1993 and denied his motion for reconsideration of that decision on February 16, 1994--before the district court heard the Riverboat Companies' motion for summary judgment. 20 41 Pavone further insists that he was presented with a Catch-22 by the district court's failure to grant a continuance of the Riverboat Companies' motion for summary judgment until after the court had issued its final ruling on his motion to remand the case to state court. Pavone claims that he could not conduct discovery prior to obtaining a ruling on his motion to remand without risking the waiver of that right; but neither could he oppose the Riverboat Companies' motion for summary judgment without obtaining information that he could gather only through discovery. 42 In claiming that he would have risked his right to remand had he conducted discovery, Pavone relies on Roberts v. Vulcan Materials Company, 21 a 1983 decision from a Louisiana district court. In that decision, the district court noted that a plaintiff had actively participated in the discovery process and thereby acquiesced to federal jurisdiction, waiving any objection he might have otherwise had to procedural defects in the removal process. Pavone's reliance on Roberts is misplaced, however, as Sec. 1447 was amended in 1988, changing the determinative question from whether a plaintiff acquiesced in federal jurisdiction to whether the motion to remand was timely filed. Under the foregoing circumstances and analysis, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Pavone's motion to continue the hearing on the Riverboat Companies' motion for summary judgment. 43