Opinion ID: 1247774
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Admissibility of Defendant's Statements to Experts.

Text: (18) Although he failed to object at trial, defendant asserts error in the admission in the prosecution's case-in-chief of expert testimony relating several statements he made in the course of psychiatric and psychological interviews. [9] He complains the evidence was irrelevant to the determination of penalty (e.g., People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 775-776 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782]) and violative of the principles of reliability ( People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 771 [175 Cal. Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446]) and guided discretion ( Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 302-303 [49 L.Ed.2d 944, 96 S.Ct. 2978]) applicable to capital sentencing. In Murtishaw, supra, this court noted that under the 1977 death penalty law evidence of defendant's character and mental condition may be admitted at the penalty phase even if not specifically linked to a statutory sentencing factor. (29 Cal.3d at p. 773; see People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 772.) As factors to consider, moreover, the 1977 statute, like the 1978 law, specifically listed whether or not the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and whether or not at the time of the offense he was suffering from diminished capacity as a result of mental disease. (See Murtishaw, supra, at p. 772, fn. 35.) Defendant's statements to the prosecution psychiatrists and psychologists  in particular, given the nature of the offenses, those relating to his sexual behavior  were relevant to their evaluation of his mental state, which in turn was directly relevant to the ultimate issue of appropriate penalty. Consequently, under the 1977 law, introduction of the evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief was not error. (Cf. People v. Mosher (1969) 1 Cal.3d 379, 399 [82 Cal. Rptr. 379, 461 P.2d 659].) Citing Murtishaw, supra, 29 Cal.3d at page 771, defendant argues the statements were unreliable because contradicted by himself and other witnesses. Murtishaw, relating to the general unreliability of psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness, is inapposite. Defendant's statements were offered not for their truth, but as part of the sum total of factors considered by the prosecution experts in evaluating defendant. Any contradiction in the statements goes not to their admissibility, but to the weight of the experts' opinions insofar as they relied on the statements.