Opinion ID: 2517745
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: exclusion of the medical bill write-offs

Text: ¶ 10 As is typical in the industry, Tschaggeny's health insurer negotiated a lower rate for health care services for its policy holders than any member of the uninsured general public is able to bargain for, resulting in a discounted medical bill. Thus, it is a perverse irony of our modern health care system that those who are least able to pay are typically billed at a significantly higher rate than insured individuals for the same services. In seeking to realize the benefits that she earned by paying premiums under her uninsured motorist policy, Tschaggeny argues that the benefit she received from the contractual arrangements between her health insurer and medical providers falls under the collateral source rule. Under that rule, she claims she is entitled to recover the amount that her health care providers charged uninsured individuals, rather than the discounted charges that were actually paid by her health insurer. ¶ 11 The trial court did not address the merits of Tschaggeny's argument because it concluded that the issue was not properly presented. Tschaggeny asserts that the trial court erred in this conclusion and asks us to review two separate rulings: (1) the trial court's initial decision to grant Milbank's motion in limine to exclude evidence of the written-off amounts, and (2) the trial court's denial of her motion to reconsider that ruling.
¶ 12 We will not review the trial court's order granting Milbank's motion in limine because Tschaggeny's counsel invited that result. The invited error doctrine prevents a party from taking `advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error.' State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ¶ 15, 128 P.3d 1171 (quoting State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ¶ 9, 86 P.3d 742). Affirmative representations that a party has no objection to the proceedings fall within the scope of the invited error doctrine because such representations reassure the trial court and encourage it to proceed without further consideration of the issues. Id. ¶ 16. ¶ 13 At the hearing on the motion in limine, Tschaggeny's counsel essentially stipulated that it be granted. While initially opposing the motion, counsel later conceded that he had no objection to the motion so long as the order was confined to only those amounts that had actually been written off: So we would ask even though  I think the way this has been presented by the defense makes sense and probably does not need an opposition in terms of there's binding [sic] write down. I think to avoid future complications with the health insurance overlayer we'd just ask the court to restrict the motion to what it has been brought rather than as a broad writeoff of any health insurance amounts. And on that basis we will submit it. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I'm going to grant the motion in limine and I am going to restrict it to precisely the terms of the motion. Thus, despite his initial opposition to the motion, in the end, counsel for Tschaggeny clearly communicated his agreement to the relief ordered. To the extent the trial judge committed any legal error in granting the motion, she was invited to do so by Tschaggeny's own counsel. Under the invited error doctrine, it would be inappropriate to reverse the trial court for a decision that it was invited to make by the party now attempting to renege on that invitation.
¶ 14 We next address Tschaggeny's claim that the trial court erred in denying her motion to reconsider its original ruling on the motion in limine. We hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the motion as untimely. And in any event, Tschaggeny failed to preserve the issue for appeal.
¶ 15 We begin our analysis by establishing the proper standard of review. Motions to reconsider are not recognized by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, ¶¶ 5, 7-8, 135 P.3d 861. Because trial courts are under no obligation to consider motions for reconsideration, any decision to address or not to address the merits of such a motion is highly discretionary. If Tschaggeny wanted to oppose the motion in limine, her proper course of action was to file a memorandum in opposition to the motion within ten days of its filing. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1). Any memoranda filed beyond this ten-day window would be untimely and could be considered only with leave of court. Id. In short, the decision to consider any late-filed opposition to the motion in limine was vested in the discretion of the trial court. ¶ 16 Although a trial court is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling, Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41-42, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984), a trial court may also exercise its discretion to disregard motions to reconsider prior in limine rulings when those motions do not conform to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, see Univ. of Utah v. Indus. Comm'n, 736 P.2d 630, 633 (Utah 1987) (A trial judge is accorded broad discretion in determining how a trial shall proceed in his or her courtroom.). Thus, we review the trial court's denial of the motion to reconsider under an abuse of discretion standard. Under this standard, the trial court's ruling may be overturned only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision. Langeland v. Monarch Motors, 952 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1998). ¶ 17 We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case because there was ample support for its decision to deny Tschaggeny's motion to reconsider for being untimely. Tschaggeny waited more than seven months after the initial motion in limine was filed and almost three months after it was granted to seek reconsideration. More significantly, Tschaggeny filed her motion to reconsider just minutes before trial was scheduled to begin. We have consistently held that a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it denies as untimely last minute motions on the eve of trial. Gerbich v. Numed Inc., 1999 UT 37, ¶ 17, 977 P.2d 1205 (Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it prevented the inspector from testifying as an expert based on the lateness of the designation and the fact that Numed's counsel did not have an opportunity to either prepare a cross-examination or call rebuttal witnesses.); Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152, 1157 (Utah 1989) (holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to suppress a stipulation of blood alcohol content on the eve of trial because it would prejudice the defendants, who had relied on the stipulation and had not prepared to put on any other evidence of intoxication); The Berkshires, L.L.C. v. Sykes, 2005 UT App 536, ¶ 15, 127 P.3d 1243 (holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend a pleading because requiring Plaintiffs to address an amended pleading on the eve of trial after over a year of litigation, including discovery and motion phases, would undoubtedly result in prejudice to them).
¶ 18 We also reject Tschaggeny's challenge to the order denying her motion to reconsider because it was not preserved. Even though the trial judge was fully within her discretion to deny Tschaggeny's motion to reconsider outright, she offered Tschaggeny the opportunity to seek a continuance so that she could consider the issue. Tschaggeny's choice not to seek a continuance constituted a failure to preserve the issue for appeal. ¶ 19 The present case presents a somewhat unique application of our traditional preservation rule inasmuch as the issue under consideration was presented to the trial judge. Nevertheless, the policy considerations underlying the preservation rule make it clear that Tschaggeny waived the issue of medical bill write-offs because she did not take the necessary steps to allow the trial judge to consider the merits of the issue. ¶ 20 `[A]s a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal.' State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, ¶ 9, 46 P.3d 230 (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346). Two policy considerations underlie the preservation rule. First, the rule exists to give the trial court an opportunity to `address the claimed error, and if appropriate, correct it.' Id. ¶ 10 (quoting Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346). Second, requiring preservation of an issue prevents a party from avoiding the issue at trial for strategic reasons only to raise the issue on appeal if the strategy fails. Id. ¶ 21 After Tschaggeny filed her motion to reconsider on the morning of trial, the court ordered a continuance until the following day in order to consider the remaining motions and to allow counsel another opportunity to negotiate a settlement. The following morning, the trial judge explained that she would deny the motion as untimely unless Tschaggeny moved for a continuance: THE COURT: The problem, counsel, is the timeliness of this. You're asking me basically to make an extraordinarily all encompassing ruling that would change the course and direction of the totality. And you're asking me to do it at the last minute. It's not timely. I have a concern about the case law frankly. You have an option you can ask for a continuance of the trial and I'll look at it more closely, but perusing it as I did I just feel it's too late for me to meaningfully consider it on the eve of trial, it's not timely is the problem. And I'm not denying it because it's poorly taken, I'm denying it because it's not timely. You have a remedy and that remedy is you can move to continue the trial if you wish to. The trial court presented Tschaggeny with a clear choice. She could request a continuance, thereby giving the trial court adequate time to consider the merits of the motion, or she could abandon the motion and move forward with the trial as scheduled. Tschaggeny chose the latter option. ¶ 22 Because Tschaggeny did not move for a continuance at the judge's invitation, the issue was abandoned. In other words, by not allowing the trial judge an adequate opportunity to consider the issue, Tschaggeny waived the right to raise the issue on appeal. This result is consistent with the primary purpose of the preservation rule. Claimed errors should be raised before trial courts in such a manner that the trial courts have a meaningful opportunity to correct them. State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ¶ 46, 114 P.3d 551 ([T]he purpose of the preservation rule is to ensure that the trial court is first given an opportunity to decide if a mistake has been made before the appellate review becomes appropriate.). In this case, the trial court had no meaningful opportunity to correct any erroneous ruling on the motion in limine precisely because Tschaggeny chose not to pursue a determination on the merits. ¶ 23 The secondary policy consideration of disallowing strategic silence on an issue also militates against considering this matter on appeal. Tschaggeny was given a clear course of action to pursue if she wanted the trial judge to consider the merits of her objection to the motion in limine. Although the record does not reveal any concrete reasons why Tschaggeny chose not to seek a continuance, there are innumerable potential strategic and practical motivations for her decision not to do so. The expense of prolonging the litigation, the difficulty of rescheduling witnesses, and the necessity of preparing for trial again at an undetermined future date may all have influenced her decision not to seek a continuance. Were we to review the issue at this juncture, Tschaggeny would be afforded both the benefit of her decision not to seek a continuance and the benefit of review on appeal. Allowing this dual benefit is clearly contrary to the policy behind requiring issues to be litigated at trial before they are eligible for review. ¶ 24 Because Tschaggeny failed to preserve for appellate review the exclusion of the medical bill write-offs, we will not review it on appeal absent either plain error or exceptional circumstances. See State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ¶ 14, 128 P.3d 1171. Tschaggeny admits that the application of the collateral source rule to medical bill write-offs is a matter of first impression in Utah. Therefore, the trial court's decision to grant Milbank's motion in limine and deny Tschaggeny's motion for reconsideration does not rise to the level of plain error. Nor are there any exceptional circumstances that militate against applying the preservation requirement in this case. ¶ 25 In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tschaggeny's motion to reconsider, and Tschaggeny effectively waived the right to appeal this issue. We accordingly affirm the trial court's ruling.