Opinion ID: 3002082
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Josiah Compton

Text: Compton was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(1)(C), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Compton’s PSR determined that he had an offense level of forty and a criminal history category of VI, resulting in an advisory Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. The PSR counted uncharged drug amounts in determining Compton’s relevant conduct to 12 Nos. 07-2505, 07-2506, 07-2507 and 07-3313 reach the offense level of forty. To support the inclusion of the uncharged drug amounts as relevant conduct, the Probation Department relied on statements from three individuals and a confidential source, all of whom had purchased drugs from Compton, as well as statements from Compton’s own proffer to the government. The criminal history calculation counted several prior convictions that dated from 1989 to 1999, which totaled thirteen criminal history points. Compton objected to the calculations in the PSR, arguing that the information regarding the uncharged drug amounts was unreliable and that facts from his proffer could not be used to calculate his relevant conduct. He also asserted that the district court incorrectly included prior convictions that resulted in three points being added to his base offense level. The district court rejected these arguments, and subsequently sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Compton makes four arguments: (1) that the district court erred in considering the uncharged drug quantity based on the various cooperators statements because those drugs were not part of the same course of conduct charged; (2) that the district court erred by using Compton’s proffer against him at sentencing; (3) that the district court miscalculated his criminal history score by including some of his prior convictions; and (4) that he is entitled to resentencing in light of Kimbrough v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 558 (2007). The government contends that Compton has waived his first argument regarding the use of uncharged drug Nos. 07-2505, 07-2506, 07-2507 and 07-3313 13 amounts in his sentencing calculation by failing to raise the argument below. In the district court, Compton challenged the reliability of the six sources of information as to his relevant conduct; he did not allege that the events to which those individuals implicated Compton were not part of the same course of conduct as the charged crimes, but the record does not reveal a knowing and intentional decision to forego any “same course of conduct” argument. See United States v. McClellan, 165 F.3d 535, 552-53 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Patel, 131 F.3d 1195, 2001 (7th Cir. 1997). Construing waiver principles liberally in favor of Compton, we find Compton merely forfeited the argument by failing to timely assert it. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848-49; United States v. Sumner, 265 F.3d 532, 539 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing McClellan, 165 F.3d at 552-53). Accordingly, we review for plain error. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848-49. We find no error in the district court’s inclusion of the various statements or calculation of uncharged drug quantities evidenced by the cooperators’ statements that increased Compton’s relevant conduct determination. See United States v. Artley, 489 F.3d 813, 822-23 (7th Cir. 2007). Giving broad discretion to the district court’s explicit determination that the statements were reliable, we credit the district court’s factual determinations regarding Compton’s relevant conduct. See United States v. Wilson, 502 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2007). Although the district court failed “to explicitly state and support its finding that uncharged drug quantities are sufficiently related to the offense of conviction[,] . . . [that] does not mean it failed to make the necessary finding.” Id. at 723 14 Nos. 07-2505, 07-2506, 07-2507 and 07-3313 (citing United States v. Arroyo, 406 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2005)). “Relevant conduct can be used to enhance a defendant’s sentence if it is part of the same course of action or common scheme or plan that gave rise to [his] conviction” and is established by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. McGowan, 478 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Johnson, 342 F.3d 731, 733 (7th Cir. 2003)). We consider significant similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity of the uncharged conduct with the convicted offense, as well as common victims, accomplices, purpose, or modus operandi. See McGowan, 478 F.3d at 802; United States v. Ortiz, 431 F.3d 1035, 1040 (7th Cir. 2005); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2), app. n.9. Where the defendant’s convicted offense was merely the latest drug sale in an unbroken series of deals regularly made, that is sufficient to find the defendant’s prior drug transactions were part of the same course of conduct as the offense of conviction. Wilson, 502 F.3d at 724. In this case, Compton was steadily involved in dealing crack and powder cocaine in the same area from 1998 until his arrest in 2004. The government’s sources confirmed this, documenting regular drug transactions between the sources and Compton from 2000 until 2004, totaling thirty-three ounces of crack cocaine. While the record lacks substantial evidence of Compton’s particular drug transactions from 1998 until March 2000, amounts for this period were not included in the relevant conduct calculation. But there was sufficient testimony to establish that the course of illegal conduct began back then for purposes of determining when the offense that led to the conviction began. For example, one of the govNos. 07-2505, 07-2506, 07-2507 and 07-3313 15 ernment’s sources testified that Compton was one of the largest crack cocaine dealers in the Newport, Illinois area in 2000, so Compton probably established himself as such through regular drug transactions prior to 2000. Another source explained that he began buying cocaine from Compton in late 1999. Compton’s PSR stated that he began receiving cocaine from one Marvin Williams in 1998, a fact to which Compton did not object. Based on this evidence, we find that Compton was engaged in continuous drug dealing, selling large quantities of powder and crack cocaine to regular customers at regular intervals in the same vicinity from 1998 until his arrest in 2004. Accordingly, we find no clear error in the district court’s crediting the cooperators’ statements for Compton’s relevant conduct calculation. So we turn to Compton’s second argument on ap- peal—that the district court improperly relied upon information obtained from Compton’s proffer to increase his base offense level. Compton complains that the government violated the terms of the proffer agreement by including 197 kilograms of cocaine in his relevant conduct calculation recommended by the PSR. Because the facts pertaining to the alleged breach are undisputed, we review the question of whether the government breached the proffer agreement de novo. See United States v. Schilling, 142 F.3d 388, 394 (7th Cir. 1998). We also review the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo since Compton preserved the argument below. United States v. Samuels, 521 F.3d 804, 815 (7th Cir. 2008). 16 Nos. 07-2505, 07-2506, 07-2507 and 07-3313 A proffer agreement is a binding contract, enforced according to its terms. See United States v. Cobblah, 118 F.3d 549, 551 (7th Cir. 1997). However, proffer agreements that are a part of ongoing criminal proceedings are “ ‘unique contracts and the ordinary contract principles are supplemented with a concern that the bargaining process not violate the defendant’s rights to fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause.’ ” United States v. $87,118.00 in United States Currency, 95 F.3d 511, 516-17 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Rourke, 74 F.3d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1996)). We hold the government to “the literal terms” of the agreement, as well as the “most meticulous standards of both promise and performance” to insure the integrity of the bargaining process involved in proffers. See Schilling, 142 F.3d at 395 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The fifth substantive paragraph of the proffer agreement provided that the government would not use any statements or other information provided by Compton against him in its case in chief, but that the government would “be free to provide any such information to any United States District Court in the event that [Compton] either pleads guilty or is found guilty later at trial [as is required to comply with Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for sentencing decisions].” Yet the sixth substantive paragraph states: [N]o self-incriminating information given by [Compton] will be used to enhance the Offense Level against [Compton] except as provided in [Section 1B1.8 of the Sentencing Guidelines]. The government may, Nos. 07-2505, 07-2506, 07-2507 and 07-3313 17 however, use any statements made or other information provided by [Compton] to rebut evidence or arguments at sentencing materially different from any statements made or other information provided by [Compton] during the “off-the record” proffer or discussion. The Probation Department, a division of the government bound by the terms of the proffer agreement, see United States v. Lezine, 166 F.3d 895, 904 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that probation officers are an extension of the government and officers of the court), recommended in the PSR that 197 kilograms of cocaine be used to increase his offense level as relevant conduct. The 197 kilograms of cocaine was evidenced solely by Compton’s proffer, and the district court adopted the PSR’s recommendation. The government asserts that it properly provided this information to the district court under paragraph five of the agreement. Indeed, the agreement allowed the government to “provide” the information to the court for sentencing purposes, but it was prohibited from “using” the information to enhance Compton’s offense level under paragraph six. Under the proffer agreement, the government could provide Compton’s proffer statements to the district court, but it could not per se recommend that the court increase Compton’s offense level based on that information. To do so constituted a “use” prohibited by paragraph six. By their very nature, paragraphs five and six of the agreement are almost irreconcilable; short of attaching the defendant’s proffer statements to materials provided to the court for sentencing purposes, any other mention of information obtained from the proffer 18 Nos. 07-2505, 07-2506, 07-2507 and 07-3313 will likely violate the agreement. Be that as it may, under the circumstances of this case, the government violated the terms of the proffer agreement by submitting to the district court protected statements made by Compton. The government also claims it properly used Compton’s proffer to rebut his assertion that the government’s sources were unreliable for purposes of calculating other relevant conduct drug quantities. This argument puts the cart before the horse, however, since Compton’s objection to the reliability of the government’s sources came after the PSR containing the information from Compton’s proffer. Compton was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. This sentence was at the bottom of his Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment, calculated by including the 197 kilograms of cocaine as relevant conduct. Had the district court not considered the 197 kilograms of cocaine as relevant conduct, the Guidelines range would have been 324-405 months. Although the Guidelines are advisory, a district court must accurately calculate and consult the defendant’s Guidelines range. United States v. Thomas, 520 F.3d 729, 736 (7th Cir. 2008). A sentencing based on an incorrect Guidelines range constitutes plain error and warrants a remand for resentencing, unless we have reason to believe that the error in no way affected the district court’s selection of a particular sentence. United States v. Garrett, 528 F.3d 525, 527 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Wallace, 32 F.3d 1171, 1174 (7th Cir. 1994). The fact that Compton’s sentence of 360 months is within his correct Guidelines range of 324-405 months is of no consequence. See Wallace, 32 F.3d at 1174 (“AlNos. 07-2505, 07-2506, 07-2507 and 07-3313 19 though the sentencing that the district court selected in this case is within the correct as well as the incorrect Guidelines range, we must remand unless we have reason to believe that the error did not affect the district court’s selection of a particular sentence.”). We have no reason to believe that the district court would not have selected an even lower sentence if given the opportunity to do so, thus, we must remand. See Wallace, 32 F.3d at 1174-75. Accordingly, Compton is entitled to be resentenced. Despite Compton’s entitlement to resentencing, we address his last argument to assist the district court upon resentencing.3 Compton argues that the district court erred in calculating his criminal history category by including prior convictions dating from 1989 to 1999. We review the district court’s fact-finding for clear error. United States v. Robinson, 435 F.3d 699, 701 (7th Cir. 2006). The government again argues that Compton has waived this argument since, at the district court, he elected to only challenge three points—two for committing the offenses of conviction while under a criminal justice sentence and one for a prior conviction from 1998. While we agree 3 Compton also filed a supplemental brief, arguing that he was entitled to resentencing in light of Kimbrough v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 558, 564 (2007), and United States v. Taylor, 520 F.3d 746, 748 (7th Cir. 2008). We need not address this argument since Compton is already entitled to be resentenced due to the government’s breach of the proffer agreement and we trust that the district court will adequately consider the appropriate impact of Kimbrough and Taylor on Compton’s sentence. 20 Nos. 07-2505, 07-2506, 07-2507 and 07-3313 that Compton did not previously argue that some of his prior convictions are too old to count, we do not find the arguments strategically intertwined in a way that suggests knowing and intentional waiver. See JaimesJaimes, 406 F.3d at 848. Accordingly, we give Compton the benefit of the doubt, and review the district court’s factfinding regarding when the offense of conviction began for plain/clear error. Id. at 848-49 (“Waiver principles should be construed liberally in favor of the defendant.”) (citations omitted). We need not dissect Compton’s criminal history, however, since his arguments operate under the mistaken assumption that the offense of conviction began in 2004, not in 1998, as the district court correctly found. Because we have already determined that the offense of conviction was properly determined to have begun in 1998 and continued until Compton’s arrest in 2004, all prior convictions challenged are proper under U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1(b) (calculating criminal history points) and 4A1.2(e)(2) (include prior sentences of imprisonment within ten years of the commencement of the instant offense). Additionally, the district court properly relied on information obtained from Compton’s proffer to determine that the instant offense began in 1998; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.8(b)(2) provides that proffers are not off-limits when used for information “concerning the existence of prior convictions and sentences in determining § 4A1.1 (Criminal History Category) and § 4B1.1 (Career Offender).” We find no error in the district court’s calculation of Compton’s criminal history category. Nos. 07-2505, 07-2506, 07-2507 and 07-3313 21