Opinion ID: 1642624
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instruction Regarding Telephonic Consent

Text: The defendants also argue that Cynthia and Andrews presented only one issue before the jury: whether Cynthia actually consented to the donation of Steven's corneas. They argue that the jury should not have been called on to consider whether Cynthia's consent, if given, was in the proper form. The defendants argue that Cynthia and Andrews distanced themselves from the issue whether consent was in the correct form and argued that the dispositive issue was whether Cynthia actually did consent. At trial, after the plaintiffs had rested their case, the hospital, Ivey, and Strength moved for a JML. In responding to this motion, Stanford Holliday, one of the counsel for the plaintiffs, stated: Judge, we want the record clear, please, sir, that this case boils down to the issue of whether or not Cynthia Shealey and Steven Andrews gave any consent for organ donation, not whether or not it was verbal and was it recorded properly.... We don't want this case to ever be reviewed on the issue of whether or not verbal consent is adequate. Based on this comment, defense counsel suggested that Cynthia and Andrews stipulate that the witnessed telephone consent [was] adequate if given. The parties did not agree to such a stipulation, however, and the court did not order such a stipulation. Consequently, the hospital, Ivey, and Strength proceeded to call and ask witnesses on direct examination whether Ivey and Strength obtained consent in the proper fashion. During closing arguments, in the plaintiffs' rebuttal, they again stated, We are not arguing if phone consent is okay, because they didn't consent by phone or otherwise. Intermittently in closing arguments, however, the plaintiffs implied that the method of obtaining consent was indeed an issue before the jury. Before the trial court instructed the jury, defense counsel referred to the statement in the plaintiffs' closing arguments and requested the court to change the jury charge to reflect that stipulation as opposed to giving them the options of which type of the various ways that consent could be taken. Plaintiffs' counsel responded, [Y]ou can argue the facts any way you want to and it is up to the jury to decide. The trial court denied the motion of the hospital, Ivey, and Strength and stated that it would be listing four statutory possibilities for consent, stating that the jury should determine the factual issue. The trial court then instructed the jury as follows: Under the law, as it applies to this case, either parent may give all or any part of the decedent child's body.... Any gift by a parent shall be made by, one, a document signed by the parent; two, by the parent's telegraphic message; three, by the parent's recorded telephonic message; or four, by the parent's other recorded message. (Emphasis added.) The defendants argue that by the previous statements made by Cynthia and Andrews's counsel, they removed from consideration the issue whether consent was obtained in the proper manner. They contend that Cynthia and Andrews effectively stipulated that whether consent was givennot the manner in which it was givenwas the sole issue, and that the jury should not have been called upon to consider the technical aspects of how such consent could be obtained. Further, the argument goes, the trial court's instructions, in specifying limited methods by which the defendants could obtain consent, inserted into the case an issue not germane to the case. The issue we confront is whether the plaintiffs' statements before both the trial court and the jury constituted a stipulation or a concession of the issue. We have explained that one must make a distinct, formal solemn admission made for the express purpose of relieving [the opposing party] from establishing an element of his claim or defense. Cook v. Morton, 254 Ala. 112, 116, 47 So.2d 471, 475 (1950). However, this Court has also found that where defense counsel in a criminal trial concedes that his client has previously been convicted of a crime, an element of the crime for which he is currently on trial, this admission relieved the State from the burden of proving any of the matters that ordinarily would attend establishing the prior conviction. Donahay v. State, 287 Ala. 716, 718, 255 So.2d 599, 601 (1971). The Court of Criminal Appeals has discussed these two cases and their correlation, holding that, as a general rule, such admissions must be distinct, formal, and unequivocal acts which rise to the level of an admission. Johnson v. State, 508 So.2d 1192, 1195 (Ala.Crim.App. 1986). On the record before us, we simply cannot conclude that Cynthia and Andrews's counsel made such a distinct, formal, and unequivocal act that could constitute an admission. Cynthia and Andrews did not expressly stipulate that only the issue of whether consent was given would be litigated. Rather, counsel for Cynthia and Andrews would suggest in one moment that the manner of consent was irrelevant, yet, moments later, suggest that consent had been improperly obtained. Because Cynthia and Andrews's actions simply did not rise to the level of an admission, the trial court could properly regard the issue as germane; thus it did not err to reversal in denying the defendants' motion for a new trial on this ground.