Opinion ID: 172028
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Possession of an Unregistered Weapon as a Crime of Violence Under Section 924(c)(3)(B)

Text: Serafin contends the district court erred in concluding that possession of an unregistered weapon, a violation of the NFA, constituted a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(B). Serafin argues possession of the short-barrel, disassembled rifle, without a commensurate intent to use the weapon in the course of committing another crime, does not raise the requisite statutorily required risk of force during the course of the possession. We agree.
To resolve whether possession of an unregistered weapon is a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(B), we must parse several statutes defining crimes of violence and the case law analyzing them. Before turning to the statutory language itself, the Supreme Court requires that we employ a categorical approach. Munro, 394 F.3d at 870 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990)). Under the categorical approach, we look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense, and do not generally consider the particular facts disclosed by the record of conviction. That is, we consider whether the elements of the offense are of the type that would justify its inclusion ... [as a crime of violence], without inquiring into the specific conduct of this particular offender. United States v. West, 550 F.3d 952, 957 (10th Cir.2008) (citations and quotations omitted). Applying the categorical approach here, we are bound only to analyze the text of § 924(c)(3)(B) and 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Section 924(c)(1)(A) provides: any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence ... for which the person may be prosecuted ..., uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall ... be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years. (emphasis added). For the purposes of this section, a crime of violence is an offense that is a felony and ... that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.  [3] § 924(c)(3)(B) (emphasis added). Thus, our task is to determine whether receiv[ing] or possess[ing] a firearm which is not registered ... in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), constitutes a crime of violence. The crime of violence language of § 924(c)(3)(B) tracks identical language contained in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). [4] See § 16(b) (stating a crime of violence is an offense that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense ) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has yet to interpret the crime of violence language in § 924(c)(3)(B), but it has interpreted the language in § 16(b). In Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004), the Supreme Court limited the scope of § 16(b) to include only those offenses that naturally involve a person acting in disregard of the risk that physical force might be used against another in committing an offense. Id. at 10, 125 S.Ct. 377. The Court explained that the risk relates not to the general conduct or to the possibility that harm will result from a person's conduct, but to the risk that the use of physical force against another might be required in committing the crime.  Id. (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added). Further, the Court specifically noted that the ordinary meaning of § 16(b) suggests a category of violent, active crimes.  Id. at 11, 125 S.Ct. 377. Therefore, to qualify as a crime of violence the offense must proscribe conduct which not only (1) naturally involves a disregard of a substantial risk of force against another, but also (2) where such risk of force arises during the course of committing the offensea violent, active offense. Id. at 10-11, 125 S.Ct. 377. Two other provisions are noteworthy in this analysis. The first, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), defines a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)as burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. The Supreme Court interpreted this language in Begay v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 1586, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008), concluding that for an offense to qualify as a violent felony it must involve, among other things, purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct. (internal quotation marks omitted). The second, section 4B1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), is congruent with the ACCA definition. It too defines a crime of violence as burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. § 4B1.2(a)(2). While attempting to reach similar goalsdefining violent crimes for purposes of sentencing enhancements and mandatory minimum termseach provision has important differences in statutory text and penological objectives. While § 924(c)(1) addresses the use of firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence or drug trafficking, the ACCA and § 4B1.2 enhance the punishment imposed for repeat offenders. These differences help explain why courts have reached seemingly different conclusions about what conduct constitutes a crime of violence under each provision. Recognizing these differences, the Supreme Court has found that the definition of a crime of violence under § 16(b) is narrower than that in USSG § 4B1.2: The reckless disregard in § 16 relates not to the general conduct or to the possibility that harm will result from a person's conduct, but to the risk that the use of physical force against another might be required in committing a crime.... The substantial risk in § 16(b) relates to the use of force, not to the possible effect of a person's conduct. Compare § 16(b) (requiring a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used) with United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(2) (Nov.2003) (in the context of a career-offender sentencing enhancement, defining crime of violence as meaning, inter alia, conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.) Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10 & n. 7, 125 S.Ct. 377 (emphasis added, original italics omitted). [5] Thus, the Court noted the textual difference between § 16(b) and the Guidelines (and identical ACCA provision) that is relevant to our analysis below: for an offense to qualify as a § 16(b) crime of violence, the risk of force must arise in the course of committing the crime and not merely as a possible result.
Although we too have not directly addressed the meaning of § 924(c)(3)(B)'s crime of violence language, several of our cases have analyzed similar provisions under other federal statutes. The government contends these cases stand for the proposition that possession of an unregistered weapon in violation of the NFA qualifies as a crime of violence. We disagree, for several reasons. First, the government points to United States v. Dwyer, 245 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir.2001), a case predating Leocal. In Dwyer, we held possession of an unregistered firearm constituted a crime of violence for the purposes of USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2). In applying § 4B1.2's serious potential risk of physical injury language we concluded that possession of an unregistered weapon [wa]s not akin to `simple' possession. Id. Rather, we concluded the NFA statute targets specific weapons deemed to be particularly dangerous and possession of such weapons is presumptive evidence of unlawful violent intentions and therefore involves the substantial risk of violence necessary to label the possession a crime of violence. Id. (citations omitted). The government relies heavily on Dwyer to argue the present case should be decided similarly under § 924(c)(3). We disagree. While superficially similar, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Leocal, crucially absent from the text of § 4B1.2 is that the risk of violence must arise during the course of committing an offense. See § 924(c)(3)(B). [F]ailure to recognize the difference between § 16 and § 4B1.2 would `collapse the distinction between these two differently-worded definitions.' United States v. Austin, 426 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Lucio-Lucio, 347 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir.2003)). Consequently, for an offense to qualify as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(B), we must ensure the statute proscribes conduct which not only (1) involves a disregard of a substantial risk of force against anotherwhich, by itself, would only satisfy the § 4B1.2(a)(2) definitionbut also (2) where such risk of force arises during the course of committing the offense. That did not occur here. The government also cites United States v. Rogers, 371 F.3d 1225, 1228 (10th Cir. 2004), where we held possession of a firearm by a defendant subject to a domestic protection order, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) and (9), was a crime of violence. In Rogers, we addressed 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(B)'s definition of a crime of violencenotably similar to §§ 16(b) and 924(c)(3)(B)providing that a qualifying offense is, any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. § 3156(a)(4)(B). Based on this language, we concluded possession of a gun by an individualespecially one having a history of or a propensity for physical violencegreatly increases the ability of that individual to inflict harm on others. Rogers, 371 F.3d at 1228-29. In explaining why a substantial risk of force arises in the course of committing the offense, we observed: If one uses a gun in an act of violence, that violence necessarily occurs during the possession of the gun. Whether the person has possession of the gun only for a few secondsthe seconds during which it is used for violent purposesor has possession for years, but uses it violently only for a few seconds, the violent use in either case necessarily occurs duringor in the course ofthe possession. Id. at 1230 (quoting United States v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88, 93-94 (2d Cir.2000)). It follows, then, that [i]f that possession is illegal because the possessor is a [prohibited person] who is forbidden from possessing a gun, the violent use will inevitably have occurred in the course of the commission of the offense of illegal possession. Id. We also noted in Rogers that unlike an ordinary citizen possessing a weapon, a person who has previously committed domestic violence and thereafter possesses a weapon is reckless with respect to the risk that he might use the weapon as a means to inflict intentional physical force. Id. at 1232. Finally, we reasoned that unlike felon-in-possession offenseswhich we recognized may not satisfy the § 3156(a)(4)(B) definition of a crime of violence because the risk posed is not necessarily substantial  §§ 922(g)(8) and (9) proscribe conduct necessarily involv[ing] actual violence or credible threats of violence and therefore all the definitional requirements for a crime of violence are satisfied. Id. at 1230-31. [6] The government's reliance on Rogers is misplaced. Possession of an unregistered weapon under § 5861 does not readily compare with possession of a weapon by an individual subject to a protective order. First, unlike §§ 922(g)(8) or (9), § 5861(d) does not address an individual's propensity for violence as an element of the offense. [7] It merely proscribes unregistered possession by any person, irrespective of their criminal history, whether they are subject to any protective order, or whether they have any propensity for violence whatsoever. Second, the NFA offense does not require the individual act intentionally or recklessly with respect to a risk that the unregistered weapon may by used to inflict harm to another. In sum, none of our prior cases answers the question of whether possession of an unregistered weapon is a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(B).
Other circuits have struggled with the definition of a crime of violence under these provisions. Several have concluded that statutes proscribing mere possession of a weapon, without more, lack the necessary nexus to the risk of force as required by the definition. For example, the Third Circuit addressed whether possession of an unregistered pipe bomb qualified as a crime of violence under § 16(b) in United States v. Hull, 456 F.3d 133 (3d Cir.2006). The court recognized its analytic task was to determine whether simply `possessing' a pipe bomb is an `offense' that naturally involves a person acting in disregard of the risk that physical force might be used against another in committing the offense. Id. at 139 (quoting Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10, 125 S.Ct. 377). Although the court concluded there may be no legitimate uses for a pipe bomb, and mere possession of a pipe bomb involves the `substantial risk of physical force,' it noted that this was not the complete test. Id. Rather, the danger from a pipe bomb comes not from the offense of possession, but from the added factor of use.... To commit the offense of possession,... [defendant] merely had to exercise control or dominion over the pipe bomb. There is no risk that physical force might be used against another to commit the offense of possession, regardless of whether pipe bombs have a legitimate purpose or not. Id. (stating mere possession of a pipe-bomb was simply not an active crime and holds no [inherent] risk of the intentional use of force). As a consequence, the court held the relevant inquiry is not whether possession [of a pipe bomb] makes it more likely that a violent crime will be committed, but instead whether there is a risk that in committing the offense of possession, force will be used. Id. at 140 (citing United States v. Lane, 252 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir.2001)); see also United States v. Barnett, 426 F.Supp.2d 898 (N.D.Iowa 2006) (finding violation of NFA, in light of Leocal, was not a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(B) using a similar analysis). The court concluded there was no risk of force resulting from the offense of possession. Hull, 456 F.3d at 140. The Third Circuit, in a subsequent case, explained the difference between possession of an unregistered weapon and possession with an intent to use the weapon. In Henry v. Bureau of Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 493 F.3d 303 (3d Cir.2007), the court concluded that possession of an unregistered weapon and a commensurate intent to use the weapon did constitute a § 16(b) crime of violence. Possession alone of an unregistered weapon was insufficient to constitute a crime of violence because there was no risk that force might be used against another solely by virtue of possession. Id. at 309. And, moreover, the ultimate purpose of the weapon should not be consideredthe mere fact that an individual possesses a weapon does not permit an inference that he will use the weapon violently. Id. Nevertheless, the defendant had been convicted under a state statute proscribing possession and requiring proof not only of possession but also of intent to use a weapon unlawfully against another  as an element of the offense. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, according to the court, proof of the intent element creates the substantial risk that physical force will be used during the commission of the offense and thereby satisfies the § 16(b) requirements. Id. Several contrary cases are worth noting. For example, the Fifth Circuit in 1999 concluded that possession of a pipe bomb did qualify as a crime of violence under § 16(b) in United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795, 798 (5th Cir.1999). In describing pipe bombs, the court noted that it could not conceive of any nonviolent or lawful uses for a pipe bomb. Id. (citing with approval language from other courts stating that pipe bombs have no legitimate purpose and have the potential to kill indiscriminately). The court therefore concluded that there is a `substantial risk' that possession ... [of a pipe bomb] would produce violence or property damage. Id. at 798-99; see also id. at 799 ([T]he primary reason that unregistered possession of these particular weapons is a crime is the virtual inevitability that such possession will result in violence.). Several recent cases, however, have implicitly and explicitly questioned the logic in Jennings. [8] See Henry, 493 F.3d 303; Hull, 456 F.3d 133; Barnett, 426 F.Supp.2d 898. Most importantly, in 2003 the Fifth Circuitapparently reversing courseheld that mere possession of an unregistered short-barreled shotgun (rather than unregistered pipe bombs), is not a § 16(b) crime of violence. United States v. Diaz-Diaz, 327 F.3d 410, 413-14 (5th Cir.2003) (focusing on the in the course of committing language of the statutory definition). In Diaz-Diaz, the court recognized that to qualify as a crime of violence, the offense must present the substantial likelihood that the offender will intentionally employ force against the person or property of another in order to effectuate the commission of the offense.  Id. at 413 (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). However, the state registration statute involvedsimilar to the NFAonly required that a defendant knowingly possess, manufacture, transport, repair, or sell a short-barrel firearm. Id. at 414. Because physical force was not required to complete such a crimei.e., the crime was complete upon... mere knowing possession of the weapon, the court was convinced that possession of a short-barrel firearm is not a § 16(b) `crime of violence.' Id. (apparently reversing its contrary holding in United States v. Rivas-Palacios, 244 F.3d 396 (5th Cir.2001)). Two other circuit court cases decided prior to Leocal are likewise unpersuasive. See United States v. Dunn, 946 F.2d 615, 621 (9th Cir.1991) (noting that unregistered firearms are inherently dangerous and lack any lawful purpose and holding that possession of such weapons, by its nature, involves a blatant disregard for law and a substantial risk of improper physical force); United States v. Amparo, 68 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir.1995) (same). Neither of these cases considered the statutory requirement that the risk arise during the course of committing the offense and instead focused more on the by its nature language. Most pre- Leocal cases, like Jennings, [9] found the weapons subject to the NFA registration requirement were not used in sport, to hunt, or for target practice, and had no otherwise conceivable nonviolent or lawful purpose, and therefore, there was a virtual inevitability that such possession will result in violence. 195 F.3d at 798-99. But Leocal instructs us to focus not on whether possession will likely result in violence, but instead whether one possessing an unregistered weapon necessarily risks the need to employ force to commit possession. In sum, we are persuaded that, in light of Leocal, our analysis must not only focus on (1) whether an offense, by its nature, raises a substantial risk of physical force being employed, but also on (2) whether the risk of force actually arises in the course of committing the offense, and not merely as a probable, or even possible, result.