Opinion ID: 1401004
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reasonable Strategic Judgment

Text: Counsel's mitigation emphasis during the penalty phase of trial is a classically strategic decision. See, e.g., Bell, 545 U.S. at 810, 125 S.Ct. 2825 (characterizing as strategic the decision, after a mental health evaluation, not to pursue a mitigation strategy based on mental illness); Young, 486 F.3d at 682 (noting counsel chose to pursue an alternative theory [of mitigation], making exactly the type of strategic decision the Supreme Court and this court have held is not ineffective assistance of counsel). Counsel chose to emphasize Wilson's intelligence and rehabilitative potential in the following manner: (1) Dr. Reynolds testified that because of Wilson's high intelligence and the excellent positive influence of his mother, Wilson's mental disorders could probably be successfully treated and Wilson would likely mature into a contributing member of society; (2) Dr. Reynolds testified Wilson excelled in structured environments and because of his intelligence could be particularly beneficial to others; (3) other character witnesses testified Wilson was an intelligent, helpful, and caring person who could turn his life around; (4) counsel argued in closing: There is some reason for him to live.... I submit to you that an intelligent person who has the capacity to do good can be of benefit to society.; and (5) counsel suggested in closing that even serving a life prison term Wilson could, because of his high intelligence and positive influences, mentor other young men in prison to help them become productive members of society when released. Trial Tr. (Feb. 20, 1997), at 42-44. Wilson has failed to demonstrate counsel's strategic focus was unreasonable. Wilson argues counsel should have discovered and used a diagnosis of schizophrenia to convey to the jury that Wilson was a mentally ill man deserving of sympathy and pity. But emphasizing Wilson's mental health could have undercut counsel's chosen strategy of focusing on Wilson's ability to grow into a useful role model for other young men in trouble. A schizophrenia diagnosis could have made Wilson's mental health problems appear more intractable and untreatable, and added ammunition to the prosecution's case that Wilson was a dangerously ill person. As with the evidence of Wilson's gang involvement, emphasizing Wilson's mental health issues was a two-edged sword. As the majority believes, the jury may have felt some sympathy for Wilson based on a diagnosis of schizophrenia. But, equally as likely, this diagnosis may have supported the prosecution's portrait of Wilson as a dangerous and continuing threat to society. See, e.g., Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1222 (recognizing counsel's legitimate concern that testimony about defendant's mental health might play into the prosecution's case that [defendant] was a continuing threat to society); Cannon, 259 F.3d at 1277-78 (noting certain neuropsychological evidence defendant's counsel did not present to the jury was far less beneficial than asserted by [defendant] ... and could have strengthened the prosecution's argument). In this case, counsel could reasonably conclude that additional mental health evidence would not help Wilson's case and might actually harm it. The majority presents a false dichotomy with regard to Dr. Reynolds's more recent mental health evaluation. The majority argues trial counsel had to either (1) go all the way in basing a mitigation defense on a schizophrenia diagnosis, or (2) not present any evidence of Wilson's mental health at all. Although the majority presents an all-or-nothing choice, trial counsel could have quite reasonably chosen a middle path: presenting enough mental health evidence to obtain the sympathy of some members of the jury without having to persuade more skeptical members Wilson's mental illness was severe. Neither Supreme Court precedent nor the ABA Guidelines foreclose such a middle ground. Commentators have recognized a mitigation defense based purely on the defendant's mental health can be risky. One commentator, for example, noted counsel may decide to limit mitigation evidence because it purportedly undermines residual doubt, because it has a double-edged effect of inspiring jury fears, or because it opens the door to unrevealed criminal history. Leona D. Jochnowitz, Missed Mitigation: Counsel's Evolving Duty to Assess and Present Mitigation at Death Penalty Sentencing, 43 Crim. L. Bull. 1 (2007). Another commentator suggested trial counsel faced a barrier of juror cynicism toward mental health issues in criminal cases. Russell Stetler, Mental Disabilities and Mitigation (rev.3/13/01), http:// www.nynd-fpd.org/articles.htm (follow Mental Health; then follow Mental Health Mitigation). See also Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 Va. L.Rev. 1109 (1997) (finding capital jurors were skeptical of mental health experts supplied by the defense); James M. Doyle, The Lawyers' Art: `Representation' in Capital Cases, 8 Yale J.L. & Human. 417 (1996) (noting difficulties of presenting mental illness as mitigation evidence). In the end, as Professor Sundby found: Severe mental illness in particular, although appearing to be a compelling mitigating circumstance, raises a number of collateral issues that may lead the jury to vote for a sentence of death rather than life. 83 Va. L.Rev. at 1165. Wilson also suggests his trial counsel was ineffective for not asking Dr. Reynolds to testify more completely about his diagnosis. Wilson claims, [Dr. Reynolds's] testimony was left completely out of context, and on cross-examination the prosecutor was able to turn him into a sounding board for the prosecutor's diagnosis of [Wilson] as a psychopath. Despite the fact that Dr. Reynolds had said [Wilson] was not a psychopath, on redirect counsel never gave Dr. Reynolds an opportunity to explain the meaning of the term psychopath, or to explain why his diagnosis indicated that [Wilson] was not a psychopath. This left the prosecutor free on closing argument to ridicule [Wilson] as a psychopath. Aplt. Br. 71-72. First of all, faulting counsel's questioning during witness examination is particularly vulnerable to the kind of hindsight second-guessing that Strickland warned against. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Undoubtedly, all witness examinations fall short of perfection, but this does not mean counsel's examination fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The failure to ask questions another counsel might have asked does not prove ineffective assistance. Secondly, it was reasonable for counsel not to revisit a point he wished to avoid. See, e.g., Bland v. Sirmons, 459 F.3d 999, 1032 (10th Cir.2006) (holding counsel was not deficient for failing to question [the expert] in such a way as to reveal the full extent of [defendant's] mental and substance-abuse problems when expert's testimony was reasonably well-developed). Dr. Reynolds had already testified on cross-examination that Wilson was not a psychopath. Counsel's decision to de-emphasize Wilson's mental illness supports his decision not to ask Dr. Reynolds for a more specific diagnosis, to describe Wilson's illness in greater detail, or to describe in more detail the characteristics of a psychopath. Once counsel decided a mitigation argument based on Wilson's mental illness would not strengthen his case, he had no reason to obtain a definitive diagnosis of schizophrenia from Dr. Reynolds. Wilson's chaotic family life, coupled with his mental health problems, meant he did not do well on the Tulsa streets. But in the structured environment of prisonas with his sister's home in North CarolinaWilson could succeed. Wilson's high IQ, religious faith, and well-mannered behavior could make him an asset to other troubled youths. The Supreme Court has concluded counsel was not ineffective for limiting the investigation into mitigating evidence under similar circumstances. See Bell, 545 U.S. at 810, 125 S.Ct. 2825 (suggesting reasonable counsel might end mental health investigation after initial evaluations were completed and counsel selected mitigation strategy not emphasizing mental illness); Burger, 483 U.S. at 795, 107 S.Ct. 3114 (holding counsel not ineffective for limiting investigation when counsel reasonably determined that additional evidence of a tragic childhood would not minimize[] the risk of the death penalty); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 186, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (holding counsel not ineffective for limiting mitigation strategy to simple plea for mercy when character evidence could be harmful). This court has reached similar conclusions. Compare Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1222 & n. 20 (holding counsel not ineffective for failing to present mental health evidence that would just more nearly accentuate the position of the State, that [defendant] was prone to be and could be a danger to society), with Hooper, 314 F.3d at 1170-71 (counsel had obligation to fully develop mental health evidence once he decided to rely on it at trial). Counsel's determination that additional mental health evidence would not strengthen his case that Wilson could be rehabilitated was thus a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Instead of focusing entirely on serious mental health problems, counsel reasonably pursued a strategy where Dr. Reynolds's limited mental health testimony would bolster a rehabilitation defense. Although counsel's chosen strategy was ultimately unsuccessful, a fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. If I consider counsel's decision without the benefit of hindsight, I cannot conclude the argument Wilson suggests based on his allegations of schizophrenia was so vastly superior to the argument counsel actually made that counsel's choice was not within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See id.