Opinion ID: 3022466
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Title VII Retaliation Claim

Text: To establish retaliation under Title VII, Clegg must show that: “(1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) [Falcon] took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) there was a causal connection between her participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1299 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Nelson v. Upsala College, 51 F.3d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995)). Falcon argues, and the District Court found, that Clegg “failed to present evidence sufficient to establish an adverse 14 employment action.” (Id. at 15.) We agree and, indeed, have already found that no tangible employment action was taken against Clegg, much less one that was “adverse.”. A constructive discharge can count as an adverse employment action for retaliation purposes. See Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 156 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1999). Moreover, “harassment that is severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment” can count as the requisite adverse employment action. Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d at 449. Clegg has established neither. To find constructive discharge, we “need merely find that the employer knowingly permitted conditions of discrimination in employment so intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign.” Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984). In other words, Clegg was required to show that the discrimination she alleges surpassed a “threshold of intolerable conditions.” Duffy v. Paper Magic Group, Inc., 265 F.3d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). “Intolerability . . . is assessed by the objective standard of whether a ‘reasonable person’ in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign–that is, whether [she] would have had no choice but to resign.” Connors v. Chrysler Financial Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). The conduct alleged by Clegg would not compel a reasonable person to resign. “[We] note that [Clegg] cannot rely on many of the factors commonly cited by employees who claim to have been constructively discharged. [Clegg] was never threatened with 15 discharge;[9] nor did her employer ever urge or suggest that she resign or retire. . . . Similarly, [Clegg’s] employer did not demote her or reduce her pay or benefits. [Clegg] was not involuntarily transferred to a less desirable position . . . . She was not even given unsatisfactory job evaluations . . . .” Clowes v. Allegheny Valley Hosp., 991 F.2d 1159, 1161-62 (3d Cir. 1993). Furthermore, Clegg refused Falcon’s offer to transfer to another position and “never advised [her employer] that she would feel compelled to leave if changes [in her circumstances] were not made.” Id. In Clowes, we noted that “a reasonable employee will usually explore such alternative avenues thoroughly before coming to the conclusion that resignation is the only option.” Clowes, 991 F.2d at 1162. Nor was the alleged retaliatory harassment – the post-reporting conduct – sufficiently severe and pervasive to establish an adverse employment action. In Jensen, where we first recognized the possibility that retaliatory harassment could constitute an adverse employment action, we explained that such harassment has to be so severe and pervasive that it creates a hostile work environment. Jensen, 435 F.3d at 449. Put simply, the post-reporting conduct alleged by Clegg does not rise to this level. Accordingly, the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Falcon on Clegg’s retaliation claim will be affirmed. 9 Clegg did testify that Nugent once threatened to terminate her, but it does not appear that she took this as a serious threat, and she does not rely on it to support her constructive discharge claim. 16