Opinion ID: 1881162
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Summary Judgment Ruling.

Text: We review a district court grant of summary judgment for errors of law. Mewes v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 530 N.W.2d 718, 721 (Iowa 1995). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the entire record shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Fees v. Mutual Fire & Auto. Ins. Co., 490 N.W.2d 55, 57 (Iowa 1992). A fact is material only if it is outcome determinative. Id. In reviewing summary judgment rulings, we consider the record evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Mewes, 530 N.W.2d at 721. The record includes the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits. Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c).
(1) to balance the demands of the work-place with the needs of families, to promote the stability and economic security of families, and to promote national interests in preserving family integrity; (2) to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition; (3) to accomplish the purposes described in paragraphs (1) and (2) in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers; (4) to accomplish the purposes described in paragraphs (1) and (2) in a manner that, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, minimizes the potential for employment discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring generally that leave is available for eligible medical reasons (including maternity-related disability) and for compelling family reasons, on a gender-neutral basis; and (5) to promote the goal of equal employment opportunity for women and men, pursuant to such clause. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b). The FMLA pertinently provides that an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period for one or more of the following: .... (C) In order to care for ... a ... daughter... of the employee, if such ... daughter... has a serious health condition. Id. § 2612(a)(1). The pertinent prohibited acts provisions of the FMLA provide: (a) Interference with rights (1) Exercise of rights It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter. (2) Discrimination It shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter. Id. § 2615. B. Whether Sievers was eligible for leave under the FMLA. In its motion for summary judgment, Iowa Mutual alleged Sievers failed to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether she was eligible for leave under the FMLA. Although the district court did not base its ruling on this ground, we can address it. See Bensley v. State, 468 N.W.2d 444, 445 (Iowa 1991) (holding that appellate court can uphold a trial court's ruling on any ground appearing in the record, whether urged in the trial court or not). One ground of Iowa Mutual's eligibility challenge is the efficacy of chiropractic treatment for seizures. We view the challenge as one calling into question whether the FMLA covers chiropractic treatment under the circumstances of this case. To answer this question, we need to analyze several provisions of the Act. As mentioned, the FMLA provides qualified leave [i]n order to care for a family member (an adult daughter in this case) who has a serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). As relevant here, § 2611(11) of the Act defines a serious health condition as an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves .... (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider. Under § 2611(6) of the Act, [t]he term health care provider means (A) a doctor of medicine or osteopathy who is authorized to practice medicine or surgery (as appropriate) by the State in which the doctor practices; or (B) any other person determined by the Secretary to be capable of providing health care services. There is no record proof that the chiropractor who treated Sievers' daughter qualified under § 2611(6)(A) as a doctor of medicine or osteopathy. That leaves for our consideration whether the chiropractor qualified under § 2611(6)(B)any other person determined by the Secretary to be capable of providing health care services. A federal regulation defines capable of providing health care services: Others capable of providing health care services include only: ... (1) ... chiropractors (limited to treatment consisting of manual manipulation of the spine to correct a subluxation as demonstrated by X-ray to exist) authorized to practice in the State and performing within the scope of their practice as defined under State law. 29 C.F.R. § 825.118(b). Thus, for chiropractic treatment to qualify as health care services under the Act, an employee must establish the following: (1) the chiropractor performing the treatment is authorized to practice in the state in which the treatment is performed; (2) the treatment must be within the scope of the chiropractor's practice as defined under the law in the state where the chiropractor is practicing; (3) the treatment must consist of manual manipulation of the spine to correct a subluxation; and (4) X-rays must demonstrate the existence of the subluxation. A subluxation is a misalignment of spinal segments. For example, a vertebra is misaligned in relation to the vertebrae above and below it. 4 Roscoe N. Gray, M.D. & Louise J. Gordy, M.D., Attorney's Textbook of Medicine paras. 12.41, 12.41(1), at 12-20 (3d ed.1998). Contemporary chiropractic definitions of subluxation include three additional criteria: (1) occlusion of a foramen; (2) pressure on the nerves; and (3) interference with transmission of nerve impulses. Id. para. 12.41(1), at 12-20. The summary judgment record on the chiropractic treatment included only a handwritten note from Ernuna Ortman, the chiropractor who treated Sievers' daughter. The note states: I treated Debbie Diercks May 15, 16, 17, 18, 19. She has extreme tension in her cervical & upper dorsal area. She responded quite well to our manipulative therapy. I feel this condition produces fibro-myalgic symptoms but it is really more muscular tension & spasms. We think this note fails to generate a genuine issue of material fact on the requirements to qualify chiropractic treatment for FMLA coverage purposes. For example, there was no showing that the chiropractor who treated Sievers' daughter was authorized to practice in South Dakota. Nor was there any showing that South Dakota law allowed the chiropractor to treat neurological disorders like seizures. See Iowa Kemper Ins. Co. v. Cunningham, 305 N.W.2d 467, 469 (Iowa 1981) (holding that court will not take judicial notice of foreign law that is neither pleaded nor proven). The record contained no X-rays to show that Sievers' daughter even suffered from a subluxation. Given this record, we think the district court properly sustained Iowa Mutual's summary judgment motion on the FMLA claim. Sievers failed to generate a genuine issue of material fact on whether she was eligible for leave to care for an adult daughter with a serious health condition. In short, Sievers neglected to produce any evidence her daughter's chiropractor was qualified as one capable of providing health care services to the daughter under the circumstances of this case.