Opinion ID: 2967649
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Severance or Mistrial

Text: Najjar first contends that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to grant Najjar’s several severance and alternative UNITED STATES v. NAJJAR 7 mistrial motions. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 provides for joinder of defendants when they are alleged to have participated in the same act or series of acts constituting an offense. Rule 14. There is no doubt that Najjar was properly joined as a defendant with officers White and Downing, and Tri-City Auto Outlet in this case. However, Najjar maintains that the district court should have granted him severance under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 before trial, during trial, or granted him a mistrial for failure to grant any of his several severance motions. We review the district court’s rulings on severance and mistrial claims for abuse of discretion, United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 287-88 (4th Cir. 1989), and factual findings made in conjunction with these claims for clear error, United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259, 1269 (4th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has indicated that [t]here is a preference in the federal system for joint trials of defendants who are indicted together. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993). Accordingly, severance under Rule 14 is only warranted when there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539. The defendant must establish that actual prejudice would result from a joint trial, . . . and not merely that a separate trial would offer a better chance of acquittal. United States v. Reavis, 48 F.3d 763, 767 (4th Cir. 1995). Najjar contends that the district court erred when it denied his motion to sever pre-trial. Najjar argued that the there would be evidence admitted against his co-defendants that would be inadmissible against him, and the spillover effect of the evidence would prejudice him. The district court found that Najjar had not articulated a theory that qualified as an irreconcilable defense sufficient to warrant severance at that time. Najjar’s contentions appeared purely speculative to the district court and we cannot say on the basis of the record before us that the district court abused its discretion in denying Najjar’s motion to sever. See United States v. Becker, 585 F.2d 703, 707 (4th Cir. 1978) (Speculative allegations as to possible prejudice do not meet the burden of showing an abuse of discretion in denying a motion for severance.). 8 UNITED STATES v. NAJJAR Najjar offers two bases for severance once the trial had commenced. First, Najjar states that his co-defendants pressed antagonistic and irreconcilable defenses resulting in an unfair trial. Secondly, Najjar claims that his joint trial violated his trial rights under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). We will address each of these claims in turn. Najjar points to several instances in the record where counsel for co-defendants White and Downing attacked his credibility or otherwise blamed the whole criminal enterprise on Najjar. These instances, so the argument goes, demonstrate that Najjar was deprived of a fair trial because the jury was confronted with the dilemma of either choosing to believe Najjar or White and Downing. For instance, Najjar identifies this question posed by White’s counsel on crossexamination of Najjar as the prime example of the conflicting defenses: Mr. Najjar, it serves your purpose to say that these vehicles were not ready when the salvage certificate was signed, doesn’t it? It would serve your purposes because you can’t explain in any legitimate way how you could have a vehicle put together in three days. There does appear to be some conflict in the presentation of defenses. The presence of conflicting or antagonistic defenses alone does not require severance, however. See Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538. We note that [t]he mere presence of hostility among defendants . . . or a desire of one to exculpate himself by inculpating another [are] insufficient grounds to require separate trials. United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1986) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). The rule requires more than finger pointing. There must be such a stark contrast presented by the defenses that the jury is presented with the proposition that to believe the core of one defense it must disbelieve the core of the other, see United States v. Romanello, 726 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1984), or that the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty. Becker, 585 F.2d at 707. We are presented with no such situation here. Co-defendant’s counsel indeed attempted to focus the jury’s attention on Najjar during cross-examination; however, this attention came only after Najjar testified that White and Downing came to Clinton and signed salvage certificates before the cars had been rebuilt. This testimony not only UNITED STATES v. NAJJAR 9 implicated Najjar, but White and Downing on the honest services prong of mail fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 1346. Once Najjar elected to testify, he was rightly subject to vigorous cross-examination by the government and his co-defendants. As noted, [t]he party moving for severance must establish that actual prejudice would result from a joint trial, . . . and not merely that a separate trial would offer a better chance of acquittal, United States v. Reavis, 48 F.3d at 767 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Perhaps Najjar would have fared better had his co-defendants not been there to cross-examine him. However, absent other circumstances not present here, we decline to adopt a rule that would allow a defendant to testify and then immunize himself from the consequences of that choice by limiting the ability of his co-defendants to test the veracity of that testimony, especially when that testimony implicates them. We are of opinion that the content of the cross-examination does not rise above mere finger pointing, which does not provide the stark conflict necessary for relief. Counsel’s statement focused on Najjar’s part in the criminal enterprise. It did not, however, present a situation where Najjar’s guilt was dictated by the asserted innocence of the codefendants. Najjar’s testimony implicated himself on the honest services prong of mail fraud. If, as counsel suggested, Najjar’s testimony was self-serving, and the jury discredited Najjar’s testimony, rather than dictate guilt, counsel’s tactic actually tended to exonerate Najjar as to that particular count. To the extent there was any actual prejudice suffered by Najjar by any conflict in the defenses, we think that the district judge cured such conflict by proper limiting instructions. See Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540-1 (quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987) ([J]uries are presumed to follow their instructions.). Therefore, we are of opinion that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Najjar’s motions to sever or grant him a mistrial for failure to do so.
Najjar also claims that the district court abused its discretion for failure to sever or grant a mistrial based on the admission of out of court statements made by White and Downing that allegedly incrimi10 UNITED STATES v. NAJJAR nated Najjar in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). A Bruton problem exists only where a co-defendant’s statement on its face implicates the defendant. United States v. Locklear, 24 F.3d 641, 646 (4th Cir. 1994). The admitted statements were redacted by the trial judge to eliminate any facial incrimination of Najjar. In fact, Najjar does not identify any facially incriminating statement. Additionally, the district court told the jury that the statements were admissible only as to White and Downing and not to any other defendant. Under these circumstances, we are of opinion that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Najjar’s motion to sever or grant a mistrial based on Bruton. 3. Denial of instruction regarding Co-defendant’s failure to testify Najjar argues that the district court erred in not allowing Najjar to comment on his co-defendant’s failure to testify. It is axiomatic that a defendant’s failure to testify cannot be used to draw an inference of guilt. Similarly, a co-defendant’s failure to testify cannot be used to draw an inference of innocence on behalf of the complaining defendant. See United States v. Marquez, 449 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1971). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Najjar’s motion.