Opinion ID: 2639298
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Modifying Appointments of Guardians or Conservators

Text: The legislature adopted statutes that discuss removal of guardians and conservators. [12] These removal statutes do not purport to be exhaustive or comprehensive in describing the grounds for removal or the procedure to be followed when removal is sought. [13] Thus, AS 13.26.125 appears to deal with only some of the specific circumstances that might warrant removing a guardian and appointing a successor. This section does not contain a generally applicable substantive removal standard such as good cause. Alaska Statute 13.26.125(a) provides that a court may remove a guardian and appoint a successor if it determines that a less restrictive guardianship plan ... would assist the ward in meeting essential requirements for physical health and safety. [14] This subsection is inapplicable here, because H.C.S. is not proposing a less restrictive plan. Alaska Statute 13.26.125(e) addresses other specific reasons for removal, but they are equally inapplicable, because H.C.S. is not claiming that CAPA placed H.L.S.'s safety in imminent danger. Likewise, subsections .125(b) and (d) do not apply here because H.C.S. did not claim that H.L.S. is no longer incapacitated or had expressed a desire for a change in guardianship. [15] Because other circumstances that might justify a guardian's removal in a given case can be readily imagined, it is unlikely the legislature intended AS 13.26.125 to prescribe the exclusive grounds for removal. Alaska Statute 13.26.235 provides simply that conservators may be removed for good cause. [16] It does not elaborate further, and unlike section .125, does not list specific grounds for removal. We conclude that the two removal statutes did not prevent the superior court from removing and replacing CAPA as guardian and conservator.
Neither section .125 nor section .235 specifies any procedure for seeking removal. Nor do the Alaska Probate Rules. [17] We recognize the potential for disputes over appointing guardians and conservators and efforts to remove them. Litigation over such matters can be contentious and can disrupt family relationships already strained by the ward's circumstances. Extended or repeated litigation over removal is costly both emotionally and financially. We are reluctant to encourage serial disputes should applicants with successively higher priority under the appointment statutes petition to replace existing guardians and conservators. But we also recognize that families may have difficulty in dealing with a family member's incapacity, and that persons with statutory priority may not initially be able or willing to take on the responsibilities of guardian or conservator. In such cases, it may be essential to appoint a professional. That initial appointment should not altogether foreclose qualified family members from later asking the court to appoint them in place of the professional. The procedure for modifying child custody awards provides a useful analytical model. Child custody is awarded in accordance with the child's best interests. [18] Likewise, guardians for incapacitated persons are appointed to promote and protect the well-being of the person. [19] Conservators are appointed for the protection of those who, through incapacity, cannot manage their property and affairs effectively. [20] The legislature has adopted a two-part test for modifying child custody awards. Alaska Statute 25.20.110(a) provides that [a]n award of custody of a child ... may be modified if the court determines that a change in circumstances requires the modification of the award and the modification is in the best interests of the child. Thus, the non-custodial parent must first demonstrate that circumstances have changed significantly since entry of the prior custody order. [21] Requiring this threshold showing of changed circumstances has the purpose of `discourag[ing] discontented parents from continually renewing custody proceedings. [22] We think an equivalent requirement of changed circumstances is desirable when there is a dispute about changing a guardian or conservator, to minimize repeated guardianship or conservatorship contests. Therefore, in seeking a contested change of the guardian or conservator, a petitioner must first show that the circumstances of the ward, guardian, or conservator have changed materially since the guardian or conservator was appointed. [23] Once the petitioner demonstrates changed circumstances, the court must decide whether the existing appointment is in the ward's best interests. This best interests determination will require the court to take into account the closeness of the ward's relationships to the existing and prospective guardians and conservators. This inquiry gives weight to the substantive values that apparently underlie the statutory priorities for appointing guardians and conservators. [24] The length and quality of existing appointments will often also be relevant to the best interests determination. While the material circumstances in any given dispute will be case-specific, disrupting the ward's relationship with the existing guardian or conservator may raise concerns about continuity and stability analogous to equivalent concerns in the child custody context. [25] Likewise, if a change would likely affect the ward's physical placement, the extent to which the ward has formed relationships with caregivers or others in the ward's present living arrangement may be relevant. Other circumstances may also be relevant in particular cases.
H.C.S. petitioned for removal of CAPA as guardian and conservator and sought his own appointment. We conclude that he demonstrated changed circumstances as a matter of law. H.C.S.'s petition and oral presentation alleged that CAPA's abrupt relocation of his father from Fairbanks to Sitka three days before Thanksgiving 1999 effectively cut off personal contact with his father's extended family in Fairbanks and other African-Americans generally. [26] This allegation might have permitted an inference that H.C.S. would have either avoided such a move, minimized its impact, or made quicker efforts than CAPA to resettle his father in Fairbanks (or Anchorage, where H.C.S. lives). H.C.S. also alleged that CAPA's services are draining H.L.S.'s modest estate, which was alleged to be on the edge of bankruptcy when this appeal was commenced. H.C.S., in contrast, claimed he would not charge the estate to perform the same services. We acknowledge that at least some of these assertions were in dispute. For example, had it reached the issue, the court might have found that, based on information offered at the May 12, 2000 hearing, H.C.S. could not have achieved a better placement than CAPA. But taken as a whole, H.C.S.'s allegations demonstrated a significant change of circumstances, and therefore entitled H.C.S. to an evidentiary hearing and a determination whether CAPA should remain the guardian and conservator. Moreover, H.C.S. is a statutorily preferred applicant who has significantly higher priority than CAPA under both appointment statutes. He correctly argues that, as his father's adult child, he has priority over CAPA under AS 13.26.145(d)(3) and AS 13.26.210(a)(4). [27] And before CAPA was appointed guardian and conservator, his father had expressed a preference to the court visitor and his physician that H.C.S. take care of him if needed and that H.C.S. manage his affairs. H.L.S.'s preference, if still valid, would also give H.C.S. priority under AS 13.26.145(d)(1) and AS 13.26.210(a)(2). Notwithstanding his priority, H.C.S. did not oppose CAPA's appointments, and CAPA's appointments were uncontested. H.C.S.'s present willingness to serve is a change in circumstances since the time CAPA was appointed without contest. This creates a dispute that did not exist when CAPA was appointed. The superior court was never previously asked to give effect to the statutory appointment priorities or decide whether to deviate from them. [28] Because H.C.S. demonstrated a material change of circumstances, it was necessary to consider whether it was in the ward's best interests to remove CAPA and replace it with H.C.S. The superior court promptly conducted a hearing at which all interested parties or persons were heard, although no formal testimony was offered. [29] We agree with H.C.S.'s argument on appeal that the hearing failed to address several unresolved factual disputes about CAPA's treatment of H.L.S. and his assets. The order denying H.C.S.'s petition found that CAPA has been proceeding in good faith to protect both [H.L.S.] personally and his assets. It is currently in [H.L.S.]'s best interests that CAPA continue in its role and continue its efforts to provide [H.L.S.] with long-term care. We think these findings are insufficient to resolve the best interests inquiry. First, the finding of CAPA's good faith is of little relevance here. We assume that a corporate professional guardian and conservator would be altogether disqualified if it were not acting in good faith toward the ward; this factor has little bearing on the ward's best interests or the statutory priorities. And the essence of H.C.S.'s petition was not that CAPA was acting in bad faith, but that CAPA was not caring for his father appropriately or efficiently. Second, the finding that it was in the ward's best interests that CAPA continue as his guardian and conservator is conclusory and does not allow meaningful review in light of H.C.S.'s specific allegations. It was certainly arguable from the information heard by the superior court at the May 12, 2000 hearing and at earlier hearings that CAPA was a better choice than H.C.S. But no findings discussed the relative capabilities of CAPA and H.C.S. to care for H.L.S. and be his guardian. No findings found that CAPA's capabilities sufficiently outweighed H.C.S.'s so as to justify the court's departure from the statutory preferences set out in AS 13.26.145. Likewise, no findings discussed their relative abilities to manage H.L.S.'s assets efficiently. Based on the arguments made at the May 12, 2000 hearing, there was a material and genuine dispute about whether it was necessary for H.L.S. to declare bankruptcy. The superior court seemingly concluded that it was necessary for H.L.S. to declare bankruptcy, but even if it were appropriate to sell H.L.S.'s real property to care for him, that would not mean that CAPA could provide that care more efficiently or less expensively than H.C.S. Finally, there is no indication the court considered the relative closeness of H.L.S.'s relationships with CAPA and his son in making its best interests finding. [30] We therefore remand for further findings consistent with this opinion. Because only H.C.S. has filed a brief on appeal and the parties did not seem to discuss in the superior court what factors might be relevant in deciding whether H.C.S. should replace CAPA, we decline to attempt to list all considerations that may be relevant on remand. Also, circumstances may have changed since this appeal was filed. But we do note one factor that is potentially relevant: the ward's need for continuity and stability. That factor may bear on who is best qualified to be guardian and whether there is good cause to have a conservator who is of lower priority than H.C.S. H.L.S. may have formed relationships with persons providing care to him or with whom he has come into contact in his present living arrangement. The record indicates his most recent placement was in the Sitka Pioneer Home. It may have changed since. H.C.S. satisfied his burden of demonstrating materially changed circumstances. But who bears the burden regarding the ward's best interests on remand? A motion to modify a child custody order again provides an apt model. We conclude that a party asking the court to modify an order appointing a guardian or conservator normally has the burden of demonstrating that the ward's best interests justify the modification. [31] Because there was no contest between CAPA and any other applicant when CAPA was appointed, the superior court made no best qualified or good cause findings bearing on the selection and justifying deviation from the statutory priorities. It could therefore be argued that CAPA should have the burden of demonstrating that the ward's best interests justify CAPA's retention. But the present dispute concerns removal of a guardian and conservator previously appointed, and we think placing the burden on the party seeking to maintain the status quo would unduly promote instability and encourage removal motions by persons with higher statutory priority. Placing the burden on movants will not prevent modification when it is in the ward's best interest. And if all other things are equal, it would seem that a movant like H.C.S., whose relationship to his father is much closer than CAPA's, can readily establish that modification is in the ward's best interests.