Opinion ID: 1997525
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: the majority misinterprets prior maryland cases

Text: Two illustrative cases that preceded our holding in Bruce and clearly do not support the majority's position in the instant case are the back to back opinions in State v. Kidd, supra , and State v. Franklin, 281 Md. 51, 375 A.2d 1116 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1018, 98 S.Ct. 739, 54 L.Ed.2d 764 (1978). I believe the majority misreads these two cases and the line of cases they follow when the majority states: The Harris/Kidd line of cases is mentioned principally for the sake of contrast, for they present a quite different situation. The stark contrast, of course, is that, in those situations, the State has a confession that it cannot use in its case-in-chief. 349 Md. at 347, 708 A.2d at 322-23. In the Kidd line of cases referred to by the majority, we said a defendant's confessions may be admissible in rebuttal to impeach the defendant's testimony even if we assume the confessions were obtained in violation of the defendant's Miranda rights. We certainly did not say confessions were admissible in rebuttal because they violated Miranda as the majority now seems to suggest. In Kidd, the defendant was charged with, and convicted of, the statutory offense of possessing heroin in sufficient quantity to indicate an intent to distribute. The State's case-in-chief showed Kidd was standing on a street corner and fled upon the arrival of police officers. Two officers who pursued Kidd testified that, during Kidd's flight, he discarded eighteen bags of heroin. In his defense, Kidd testified and denied having discarded the heroin. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Kidd [d]id you ever tell Officer Winkler that you were a one bag habit man? In response, Kidd denied the conversation. In rebuttal, the State called Officer Winkler who testified, over objection, that Kidd had admitted being a heroin user and having a one-bag-a-day habit. We reversed Kidd's conviction because the issue of whether Kidd was a user was irrelevant and prejudicial and could not be interjected by the State. We did, however, say a number of things involving the issue in the instant case because they were relevant to the companion case of State v. Franklin, In Kidd, we first noted: Prior to Miranda, the opinions of this Court reflected no distinction as to the rules regarding admissibility between confessions or admissions of a defendant offered by the prosecution to prove its case in chief and those offered to impeach a defendant's testimony at trial. (Emphasis added). Kidd, 281 Md. at 39, 375 A.2d at 1110. We further reiterated the general rules for impeaching the testimony of any witness and, by the context of the discussion, indicated what had always been the law of evidence that those rules were applicable to all witnesses including criminal defendants. We said: We observe that the general rule is that the credit to be given a witness may be impeached by showing that he has made statements which contradict his testimony in respect to material facts (but not in respect to facts which are collateral, irrelevant or immaterial), provided a proper foundation has been laid. The foundation is laid by interrogating the witness as to when, the place at which, and the person to whom such contradictory statements were made. This is but fair and just in order that the witness may be enabled to refresh his recollection in regard to such statements, and be afforded the opportunity of making such explanation as he may deem necessary and proper. If the witness denies making the designated statement or asserts that he does not remember whether he made it, the foundation contemplated by the general rule for the introduction of the statement has been satisfied. No question was raised in the case sub judice, below or on appeal, regarding the laying of the foundation for the introduction of the impeaching statement. (Emphasis added) (citations omitted). Kidd, 281 Md. at 46-47 n. 8, 375 A.2d at 1114 n. 8. In the companion case of State v. Franklin, supra , the defendant Stephen Franklin was convicted of attempted robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon. The alleged victim of the robbery was a cab driver who shot Franklin in the shoulder. Franklin went to a hospital emergency room for treatment of the gunshot wounds inflicted by the cab driver. When Officer Grimes responded to a call from the hospital emergency room, he interviewed Franklin who was dressed in hospital garb. At the defendant's trial, the officer was called as a witness in the State's case-in-chief and started to recount the defendant's admissions; there was an objection that the defendant was not given his Miranda warnings. Even though the defendant was apparently not in custody during the interview in the hospital emergency room, the prosecutor withdrew his attempt to introduce the defendant's statements to avoid the problem. There was no reason to believe that the defendant's admissions were inadmissible in the State's case-in-chief. Franklin testified in his own defense and denied that there was any attempted robbery; he also gave his own version of what he told the police. In rebuttal, the State called Officer Grimes who testified to the statements made by the defendant at the hospital. That testimony differed from the version given by the defendant. We characterized the question before the Court as follows: The issue for decision is the propriety of the admission of Franklin's extrajudicial statement[s] for the purpose of impeaching his credibility. 281 Md. at 57, 375 A.2d at 1119. We held that the defendant's statements to Officer Grimes were properly admitted on rebuttal. The majority somehow reads Franklin as permitting the rebuttal testimony of Officer Grimes only because the State had a confession that it could not use in its case-in-chief due to Miranda violations. This is incorrect. At the time the defendant made the admissions he was not under arrest, not taken into custody, and was in a hospital gown being treated at a hospital. The record reflects that there was no custodial interrogation and, thus, no Miranda violations; certainly there was no judicial finding that the confession was inadmissible in the State's case-in-chief. The State chose not to offer the confession in its case-in-chief to avoid any problem and waited to use it on rebuttal. What we said in Franklin was that, even if we assumed the facts in the light most favorable to Franklin, his statements were still admissible to impeach his credibility in rebuttal. We held that Franklin's admissions were admissible in rebuttal even if we assume there were Miranda violations; we did not hold that his admissions were admissible rebuttal because we found that there were Miranda violations. We said: For the purpose of decision here we make two assumptions consistent with Franklin's initial objection to the admission of his statements. First, we assume that Franklin's extrajudicial statement was obtained during a custodial interrogation within the contemplation of Miranda. Second, we assume that there was no compliance with the Miranda dictates. With these assumptions, we apply to the case before us the Harris-Hass limitation of Miranda with respect to the impeachment exception. Franklin's extrajudicial statements were offered and received for the purpose of impeaching his credibility specifically. There was a direct contradiction as to the circumstances of the shooting between his testimony at trial and the impeaching statements. The issue was initiated by Franklin during his direct examination when he gave his version of those circumstances. (Citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). Franklin, 281 Md. at 58-59, 375 A.2d at 1120. To misread Franklin 's clear holding that a defendant's prior inconsistent statements are admissible to impeach even assuming there are Miranda violations as somehow meaning a defendant's statements are admissible in rebuttal to impeach only if there are Miranda violations is to grossly distort that holding. Surely the Court must recognize that something we are willing to assume when reaching a decision is generally a factor that is irrelevant to the decision. What we held in Franklin is what we held in Bruce; that a defendant's prior inconsistent statement may be offered by the State in rebuttal, regardless of Miranda compliance or non-compliance, to impeach the defendant's credibility in the same manner that any other witness may be impeached by his or her prior inconsistent statements. We also recognized that the State pays a price for not admitting an oral confession in its case-in-chief because, if a defendant's confession is only offered in rebuttal to impeach the defendant's credibility, the confession is not admitted as substantive evidence and, upon the defendant's request, the jury should be so instructed. For over a century, this Court has consistently held that the evidentiary rules for impeachment of a defendant by extrinsic evidence of admissible prior inconsistent statements are the same as the rules regarding impeachment of any other witness or party by extrinsic evidence of admissible prior inconsistent statements. See Garlitz v. State, 71 Md. 293, 307, 18 A. 39, 43 (1889) (concluding that when the defendant testified at variance with former admissions or statements by him, such former admissions or statements were clearly admissible in rebuttal for the purpose of contradiction and impeachment). The Court of Special Appeals has reached the same conclusion. In Reed v. State, the Court of Special Appeals held that the defendant's statements to police after receiving Miranda warnings were proper to impeach an explanation subsequently offered by the defendant at trial. Writing for the Court of Special Appeals, Judge Karwacki stated: It is well settled that the credibility of the trial testimony of a witness, whether or not a party litigant, may always be challenged by confronting him with prior extra judicial statements he has made which are inconsistent with his testimony on an issue relevant to the trial. Reed, 68 Md.App. 320, 327, 511 A.2d 567, 570, cert. denied, 307 Md. 598, 516 A.2d 569 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1005, 107 S.Ct. 1627, 95 L.Ed.2d 201 (1987). Not one Maryland case is cited by the majority that holds a defendant's prior inconsistent statement cannot be used to impeach, and no Maryland case has held that if the defendant denies making a prior inconsistent statement, the prior inconsistent statement cannot be offered by the State on rebuttal.