Opinion ID: 199007
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Advertising Requirements

Text: 91 Section 22.05 of the regulations makes it unlawful for any persons to advertise or cause to be advertised within Massachusetts any cigar or little cigar unless the advertising bears one of the warning statements . . . and the warning statement . . . comprises 20% of the area of the advertisement and is in the format required. As the district court, appellants, and the Attorney General all apparently agree, this language applies, on its face, to advertisements in national magazines sold in Massachusetts as well as to advertising on the Internet if viewed from an Internet terminal in Massachusetts. The district court, although recognizing the burden on interstate commerce that would result from a plain reading of the regulation, adopted a narrow interpretation under which § 22.05 did not apply to national magazines and Internet advertising, and upheld the regulation. While we agree with the district court's evaluation of the burden that would result from a facial application of the regulation, we think that the provision is not fairly susceptible to the narrowing construction, and we find that it unduly burdens interstate commerce. 92 The Supreme Court summarized the standard for evaluating nondiscriminatory state regulations on commerce in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970): Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. The warning requirements, as they apply to advertisements, satisfy the first inquiry of the Pike analysis uncontroversially: informing consumers of the health risks associated with cigar consumption is unquestionably a legitimate local public interest. However, even accepting the Attorney General's further position that any effect on interstate commerce is only incidental, the resulting burden on interstate commerce is clearly excessive, even in relation to the Commonwealth's strong interest in informing consumers of health risks. 93 The plain language of the regulations, which makes it unlawful to cause to be advertised cigar products in Massachusetts, imposes liability on manufacturers for advertising in national magazines that are distributed in the Commonwealth, as well as for advertising on the Internet which can be viewed from a terminal in Massachusetts. 14 As the district court recognized, this would place a great burden on interstate commerce since it would require the Massachusetts Warning to be carried by a national magazine in order to ensure that any copies ending up in Massachusetts carry the Warning. Lorillard II, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 203. The court also concluded that the Commonwealth's local interest in capturing national magazines [and Internet media] is outweighed by the burden it would place on interstate commerce. Id. We agree with this evaluation of the burden imposed by the regulations, and we similarly conclude that in this respect § 22.05 runs afoul of the Pike analysis. 94 The district court, however, endeavored to save the regulations from invalidation by adopting a narrow interpretative gloss to avoid the constitutional problems posed by a facial reading. With little if any support in the language of the regulations, the court held that they would not apply to magazines of truly national distribution, unless the magazine had a regional or Massachusetts version, nor to Internet media. Id. 95 Although federal courts may in some circumstances adopt a narrowing construction to which the law is fairly susceptible, Rhode Island Assoc. of Realtors, Inc. v. Whitehouse, 199 F.3d 26, 36 (1st Cir. 1999), the courts must also take care not to trample the legislative or executive province of state authorities by making unduly substantive additions or changes to laws and regulations. As the companies point out, the district court's interpretative gloss may pose its own problems and ambiguities, such as the determination of whether a magazine is truly national in scope. We also are skeptical of the court's reasoning that Internet advertisements are not within Massachusetts; although we understand the court's point, and appreciate the difficulties inherent in regulation of speech in cyberspace, the plain language of the regulations covers a person or entity that advertises on any Internet site viewable from a terminal in Massachusetts. Most important, there is simply no basis in the language or history of § 22.05 to support the narrow reading of the district court. See Erzoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975) (rejecting narrowing interpretation where, inter alia, the ordinance by its plain terms is not susceptible to a narrowing construction). In sum, although there can be no easily and brightly demarcated line between proper narrowing construction and judicial overreaching, we conclude that the regulations are simply not fairly susceptible to the district court's narrowing interpretation. Rhode Island Assoc. of Realtors, 199 F.3d at 36. 96 We therefore hold that the warnings requirements for advertising are unconstitutional. Although appropriate intrastate application of these or similar restrictions may be permissible, § 22.05 does not lend itself to judicial parsing, and we leave it to the Attorney General, if he so wishes, to craft a constitutional warnings requirement for media and other cigar advertising. 97