Opinion ID: 4523574
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Navarrete argues that, because the evidence was insufficient, the district court erred by denying his motions for acquittal and for a new trial. We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Clark, 668 F.3d 568, 573 (8th Cir. 2012). “We must affirm a jury verdict if, taking all facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable juror could have found the defendant guilty of the charged conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Anwar, 880 F.3d 958, 969 (8th Cir. 2018). The district court “may grant a -5- new trial only if the evidence weighs so heavily against the verdict that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred.” Id. at 970 (cleaned up). To establish that a defendant conspired to distribute drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, “the government must prove: (1) that there was a conspiracy, i.e., an agreement to distribute the drugs; (2) that the defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) that the defendant intentionally joined the conspiracy.” United States v. Conway, 754 F.3d 580, 587 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). To establish that a defendant laundered money by concealment in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), the government must prove that: (1) [the] defendant conducted, or attempted to conduct a financial transaction which in any way or degree affected interstate commerce or foreign commerce; (2) the financial transaction involved proceeds of illegal activity; (3) [the] defendant knew the property represented proceeds of some form of unlawful activity; and (4) [the] defendant conducted or attempted to conduct the financial transaction knowing the transaction was designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. United States v. Slagg, 651 F.3d 832, 844 (8th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). To prove that a defendant conspired to launder money in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), the government must prove that “the defendant agreed with another person to violate the substantive provisions of the money-laundering statute.” Id. (cleaned up). There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that each element of these offenses was satisfied. Several witnesses testified that they were part of a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, that Navarrete supplied the methamphetamine, and that he profited from their sales. Their testimony was consistent with one another’s and corroborated by physical evidence. This provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that -6- Navarrete conspired to distribute methamphetamine. See Conway, 754 F.3d at 587–88 (“[E]vidence at trial that consists primarily of testimony from other members of the conspiracy may suffice to establish defendant’s guilt. . . . [E]vidence is sufficient to show a conspiracy where drugs are purchased for resale.”). There was also sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Navarrete conspired to and did use Karla Diaz’s Wells Fargo account to launder money by concealment. Karla Diaz testified that Navarrete told her to open the account in her name under false pretenses. Witness testimony, photographs, and documentary evidence showed that several people deposited methamphetamine proceeds into the account in Omaha at Navarrete’s direction and that corresponding withdrawals were made from the account in Arizona. Karla Diaz testified that she made these withdrawals at Navarrete’s request, and photographs showed that Navarrete was present for at least one of the transactions. This evidence was sufficient to support Navarrete’s convictions for conspiring to launder and laundering money via the Wells Fargo account. See United States v. Bowman, 235 F.3d 1113, 11116 (8th Cir. 2000) (The “pattern and timing” of transactions can support an inference of money laundering by concealment); United States v. Shoff, 151 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[A] common type of money laundering is the transfer of unlawful proceeds into an account in another person’s name.”). A reasonable juror could have likewise concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Navarrete conspired to launder money via the Corvette transaction. There was evidence that Navarrete had the car titled in Karla Diaz’s name without her knowledge, that he paid for the car in a series of cash transactions, and that he directed Maria Diaz to complete the sale with $4,000 in methamphetamine proceeds. Under these circumstances, we cannot agree with Navarrete that “there was nothing in the record to demonstrate that the Corvette transaction was anything other than a car purchase.” See United States v. Pizano, 421 F.3d 707, 725–26 (8th Cir. 2005) (discussing when a juror may infer that co-conspirators shared a “tacit understanding” -7- to conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of unlawful proceeds); Shoff, 151 F.3d at 892 (“Still another common type of money laundering is . . . the use of [unlawful] proceeds to buy assets in another person’s name.”).