Opinion ID: 1450182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Substance Versus Procedure Distinction

Text: The majority concludes, after cursory analysis, that [a]pplying sections 16-11-801 and -802 retroactively so as to impose a death penalty would ... inflict a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed. Maj. op. at 339. In reaching this conclusion, the majority fails to employ the Dobbert testwhich we adopted in Thomas to the statutes revised and reenacted by the General Assembly. The Dobbert Court recounted the fundamental principle underlying the proscription against ex post facto legislation: `[t]he inhibition upon the passage of ex post facto laws does not give a criminal a right to be tried, in all respects, by the law in force when the crime charged was committed.' Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293, 97 S.Ct. at 2298 (quoting Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 590, 16 S.Ct. 904, 910, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896)). Thus the Ex Post Facto Clause `secure[s] substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation, and [does not] limit the legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance.'  Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925)). The Dobbert Court concluded that, while a law may work to an accused's disadvantage, a procedural change is not ex post facto.  Id. This principle accords the seminal Calder test as only substantive legislation will create new crimes, increase punishments, or take away existing defenses. Procedural changes, by definition, do not implicate any of Calder 's three prongs and thus pose no ex post facto violation. See Thomas, 834 P.2d at 222 (Lohr, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the Dobbert Court held that changes in the law that are procedural do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause). When Dobbert was accused of killing his children, the Florida death penalty statute provided a procedure whereby a sentence of death was presumed unless the jury, after exercising unfettered discretion, recommended mercy. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 294, 97 S.Ct. at 2299. Subsequent to the deaths of Dobbert's children, Florida's death penalty statute was judicially invalidated. In response, the Florida legislature enacted a new statute which created a substantially different procedure for determination of sentences. First, a defendant was allowed to present any relevant mitigating evidence. Secondly, the jury rendered an advisory opinion to the judge regarding its evaluation of the aggravating and mitigating factors. Lastly, the court was enabled to impose a sentence of death only after making a written determination that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. Id. at 295, 97 S.Ct. at 2299. Dobbert contended that the new statute's changes in the roles of the judge and jury in the imposition of the death sentence was an ex post facto violation as to him. Id. at 292, 97 S.Ct. at 2297. The Dobbert Court determined that [t]he new statute simply altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed; there was no change in the quantum of punishment attached to the crime.  Id. at 293-94, 97 S.Ct. at 2298 (emphasis added). The Dobbert Court concluded that the changes in the law are procedural, and on the whole ameliorative and thus posed no ex post facto violation. Id. at 292, 97 S.Ct. at 2298. [8] The case before us is no different. Since at least 1963, the quantum of punishment attached to class 1 felonies has been defined as a minimum of life imprisonment and a maximum of death. § 18-1-105, 8B C.R.S. (1986 & 1992 Supp); § 40-2-3, 3 C.R.S. (1963). The substantive definition of the possible punishment has thus remained constant. The 1991 sentencing procedure merely altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty [is] to be imposed. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293-94, 97 S.Ct. at 2298. Most notably, the 1991 sentencing procedure was reenacted to require the jury to employ a four-step procedure where the 1988 sentencing procedure had required only three steps. § 16-11-802, 8A C.R.S. (1992 Supp.); XX-XX-XXX, 8A C.R.S. (1988 Supp.). In Thomas, we examined the 1991 sentencing procedure as a whole, and found that the fourth step obviously benefits a defendant. Thomas, 834 P.2d at 201-02. In other words, by not revising section 18-1-105, the General Assembly never created new crimes, increased punishments for existing offenses, or removed existing defenses. By revising and reenacting sections 16-11-103 and 16-11-802, the General Assembly only altered the procedure by which authorized sentences are determined in class 1 felony cases. As such, the Dobbert test dictates that the prohibition against ex post facto legislation is not violated by application of the 1991 class 1 felony sentencing procedure to the defendants in this case. The majority averts this mandated conclusion by reasoning that section 18-1-105 mandates that, in the absence of sentencing procedures, the only penalty for a class 1 felony is life imprisonment. Maj. op. at 339. Were I to adopt the majority's reasoning I would find it incumbent on this court to reverse our decision in Thomas. We held in Thomas and its companion case [9] that the 1991 sentencing procedure could be applied retroactively to the defendants therein. Thomas, 834 P.2d at 202. Such a holding is necessarily premised on a determination that the changes to the 1991 sentencing procedure were not substantive and did not create a crime, increase a punishment, or remove an existing defense. Otherwise, retroactive application of the 1991 sentencing procedure would be impermissible. In the present case, however, the majority reasons that the 1991 sentencing procedure offends the substantive prong of the ex post facto test which forbids application of legislation which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission. Thomas, 834 P.2d at 195 (quoting Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 292, 97 S.Ct. at 2298). The majority premises this conclusion on the fact that there was no presumptively constitutional procedure in existence when the defendants in this case allegedly committed offenses. The ex post facto test articulated in Calder and refined in Dobbert does not turn on whether there is a presumptively constitutional procedure in place on the date of a charged offense. The test separately treats those changes which affect procedure from those which affect substance, or the quantum of punishment. Where a statutory change affects a mode of procedure, retroactive application is tolerated; where a change affects substance, it is not. Thus, the majority's reasoning, if carried to a logical conclusion, requires us to overrule Thomas. I am not, however, persuaded by the majority's reasoning and thus do not find cause to overrule Thomas. To the contrary, I find that application of the 1991 sentencing procedure to the defendants in this case no more increases the substantive punishment available than application of the 1991 sentencing procedure to the defendants in Thomas.