Opinion ID: 1194925
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ORS 9.527(1) (Conduct justifying denial of admission to the Bar).

Text: The trial panel found that the accused had violated ORS 9.527(1), which authorizes discipline if a lawyer commits an act that, if the lawyer were applying to the Bar, would justify denial of admission. ORS 9.220 provides in part: An applicant for admission as attorney must apply to the Supreme Court and show that the applicant:      (2)(a) Is a person of good moral character and fit to practice law. (b) For purposes of this section    the lack of `good moral character' may be established by reference to acts    which would cause a reasonable person to have substantial doubts about the individual's honesty, fairness and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of the state and the nation. The conduct or acts in question should be rationally connected to the applicant's fitness to practice law. Fitness to practice, as defined by the Rules for Admission of Attorneys, means that: an applicant demonstrates a level of conduct, mental health, judgment, and diligence that will result in adequate representation of the best interests of clients, including participation in the legal process according to the Disciplinary Rules of the Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 1.05(1). The trial panel concluded that the accused lacked good moral character because his conduct would cause a reasonable person to have substantial doubts about his respect for the laws of the state. The trial panel also concluded that the accused's conduct reflected adversely on his fitness to practice law. On review, the accused acknowledges that he is subject to discipline under ORS 9.527(1). However, he asserts that he has demonstrated that, notwithstanding the events of March 14, 1995, he has good moral character, he currently is fit to practice law, his criminal conduct was an aberration, and the sanction imposed by the trial panel, i.e., a one-year suspension, is excessive. On the basis of the accused's concession, we conclude that the accused's conduct on March 14, 1995, violated ORS 9.527(1). We also conclude that the accused's remaining arguments address factors that may mitigate any sanction for that violation. We address those arguments below in connection with our discussion of sanction. [7]