Opinion ID: 380054
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Liability of the International Union

Text: 72 While we affirm the finding of liability against the local union, we see no basis for the district court's finding of liability against the International. Throughout its opinion, the district court referred to both unions as if though they were one and the same. They are not. 73 The International Union is a separate body from the local. The acts of the local and its agents cannot automatically be imputed to the International. This is clear from the International Union of Operating Engineers' Constitution which defines the relationship between the International and its affiliated locals. Under the constitution, local unions govern themselves and transact business on their own behalf. 33 Local unions can call strikes on their own, except when a collective bargaining agreement is in existence or when the local union desires the International's help with strike benefits. 34 Local unions elect their own officers, pass their own by-laws, transact business and discipline members. 74 Plaintiff argues that the local is an agent of the International because of the International's retention of substantial regulatory and supervisory powers. 35 This ignores the local's substantial autonomy in handling its own affairs. The local is simply not an arm of the International for all purposes. 36 75 The dispute over which this case is about was a local matter. The record shows that dissident activities were directed to correct certain abuses of power by local union leaders, notably at the district level. According to the dissidents, the local union leadership did whatever it could to keep itself in power and reward its friends. The International Constitution left the running of day to day local affairs to locally elected union representatives (such as John Possehl) and their appointees (such as John Frank). The wrongful conduct of these local union leaders cannot be imputed to the International, absent proof of actual International participation or ratification. Any other holding would render the International Union of Operating Engineers liable for any misconduct of locally elected union officials. We decline to so expand union liability concepts. 37 Under some circumstances, a local union's officers or agents can be deemed to act on behalf of the International. We do not see how this can be true when dealing with a local controversy between locally elected union officials and a minority of the local membership. 76 In the alternative, plaintiff argues that John Possehl's conduct must be deemed to be that of the International. This is because Possehl was one of eleven general Vice-Presidents of the International, in addition to being Business Manager of the local. We do not agree. It is clear that any wrongful conduct by John Possehl was done in his capacity as Business Manager of Local 18. The fact that he was also an International Vice-President is, on these facts, irrelevant. It is an established principle of agency law that if an agent serves two masters, his conduct may be on behalf of one, the other, neither, or both masters, depending on the facts. 77 In this case, the fact that John Possehl was an International Vice-President was a coincidence. It was in his capacity as elected Business Manager of Local 18 that Possehl appointed John Frank to run District Two. The only reason why the dissidents had any dealings with Possehl at all was because Possehl was the business manager of the Local. In fact, dissident correspondence to Possehl always addressed him in his capacity as Business Manager and not as an International Vice-President. There is simply no evidence that anything Possehl did or did not do vis-a-vis the dissidents was done on behalf of the International. 78 Aside from John Possehl, there exists no connection between the International and the beating of John Shimman. John Frank was not an officer or employee of the International, nor was there any evidence that he ever acted on behalf of the International. The same thing is true of James and Terry Grothaus. Nor is there any evidence that the International ratified the beating or any of John Frank's anti-dissident activities. Under the International Constitution, only the general president or the general executive board could do that. Simply stated, there is no proof that anyone acting on behalf of the International in any way encouraged, participated in or ratified the beating of John Frank. 79 Plaintiff makes one final argument. He claims that the International was under a duty to oversee and correct the anti-dissident abuses which were going on within Local 18. He finds this duty in the Landrum-Griffin Act, 38 in the common law, 39 and in the International's Constitution. 40 Once again, plaintiff points his finger at John Possehl and accuses him of breaching these duties in his capacity as an International Vice-President. 80 We reject this argument. It is an attempt to find an international union vicariously liable for mere inaction on the part of its officers. 41 In the collective bargaining area, Congress favors arbitration and conciliation. Congress does not favor strikes which breach collective bargaining agreements. Yet, even if an illegal strike takes place, an international union is not liable if it fails to take steps to end the strike, so long as the union does not authorize, encourage or ratify the strike. Carbon Fuel Co., supra; North America Coal Co., supra. We think that the same law should apply here. An international union which does not authorize, encourage or ratify § 101 violations should not be held liable for them. Otherwise, International Unions could be destroyed by liability findings based on a hindsight analysis of what they should have done. Like the Supreme Court in Carbon Fuel Co., we will not imply an obligation to act from alleged general duties.