Opinion ID: 2632220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Leavitt's testimony and the prosecutor's comments regarding DeChant's veracity

Text: DeChant first contends that the district court erred in allowing Leavitt to testify at trial because his testimony impermissibly stated an opinion concerning DeChant's truthfulness and the State improperly used it to infer DeChant's guilt. [1] We agree that this testimony and the prosecutor's comments during closing, constituted an impermissible comment on the veracity of DeChant's statement. Initially, we note that there is some dispute with respect to whether Leavitt's testimony was expert or lay opinion. The record reveals that the district court allowed Leavitt's testimony as lay opinion, despite the fact that the testimony essentially consisted of specialized knowledge obtained through experience as a police detective. Accordingly, we will treat Leavitt as a lay witness. See Johnson v. Egtedar, 112 Nev. 428, 436, 915 P.2d 271, 276 (1996) (The scope of a witness' testimony and whether a witness will be permitted to testify as an expert witness are within the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's ruling will not be disturbed unless there is an abuse of discretion.). In general, it is exclusively within the province of the trier of fact to weigh evidence and pass on the credibility of witnesses and their testimony. Lay v. State, 110 Nev. 1189, 1192, 886 P.2d 448, 450 (1994). Thus, a lay witness's opinion concerning the veracity of the statement of another is inadmissible. See Sterling v. State, 108 Nev. 391, 397, 834 P.2d 400, 404 (1992) (Lay opinion about the veracity of particular statements by another is inadmissible on that issue.) (quoting People v. Melton, 44 Cal.3d 713, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741, 758 (1988)). [2] In this case, the State did not question Leavitt solely about his experience with organized crime murders and then have him testify, based upon that experience, that mob contract murders have particular characteristics. In fact, the State conceded it was not proposing to qualify Leavitt as an expert for that purpose. Instead, the State asked Leavitt to review DeChant's statement and to form an opinion as to whether or not Ms. DeChant's story of a mob hit was credible. [3] Leavitt's testimony about his experiences with organized crime continuously referenced DeChant's contrary claims and had the ultimate effect of impermissibly attacking the veracity of DeChant's statement and the heart of her defense. Moreover, Leavitt made several comments directly stating his opinion of DeChant's statement. For instance, Leavitt commented that DeChant's claim that the mob committed the murder with DeChant at home was a fairy tale and that he did not believe it for a second. Further, when asked about DeChant's claim that she was later contacted by a mob individual warning her to keep silent, Leavitt stated I don't believe that either. Finally, the prosecutor adopted Leavitt's language during closing argument and concluded that DeChant's story was a fairy tale that was made up in her mind. Additionally, there were several other instances during the State's closing argument when the prosecutor argued that DeChant's story was a sham based upon the Leavitt testimony. The prosecution's combined comments served to highlight and re-emphasize Leavitt's opinion of DeChant's credibility, undermining the curative effect of the limiting instruction. We conclude that the district court erred in permitting Leavitt's testimony. Moreover, given the crucial nature of Leavitt's testimony and the prosecutor's paraphrasing of Leavitt's opinion during closing, we cannot say that the error was harmless.