Opinion ID: 2641779
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to establish good cause for the delay

Text: Upon concluding that the case was subject to dismissal under Rule 41(b), the next step is to examine whether the Raabs showed good cause for their inactivity. We have previously discussed what a plaintiff must do to avoid dismissal for inactivity: “[B]efore a case may be dismissed under Rule 41(b), [a plaintiff may avoid dismissal by showing good cause for the delay in prosecuting the case.] . . . [T]he plaintiff bears the burden of going forward with evidence as to good cause for not dismissing the action; if the plaintiff does come forward with good cause, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show substantial prejudice to it in allowing the case to proceed; if the defendant does show substantial prejudice, then the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff to establish that the proffered good cause outweighs the prejudice to the defendant. . . . [T]he court, in weighing the evidence of good cause and substantial prejudice, should also consider (1) the actual amount of time involved in the dormancy of the case, (2) whether the plaintiff made any inquiries to his or her counsel about the status of the case during the period of dormancy, and (3) other relevant factors bearing on good cause and substantial prejudice. . . .” Syllabus Point 3, in part, Dimon v. Mansy, 198 W.Va. 40, 479 S.E.2d 339 (1996). Syl. Pt. 1, Caruso, 223 W.Va. at 546, 678 S.E.2d at 52. The Raabs’ “good cause” arguments are that settlement discussions were underway; that fundamental fairness and due process principles favor adjudication on the merits; and that Marshall would not suffer prejudice if the case were reinstated. After carefully considering the arguments and the circuit court’s orders, and in light of our analysis above, we do not find any abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s dismissal and refusal to reinstate the case. This lawsuit had been pending for four years when the Rule 41(b) motion was filed—and the companion litigation against Saville Construction had begun two years before that. The previous motion to exclude witnesses or to dismiss the case concerned the Raabs’ failure to identify an expert witness and to produce another expert witness for deposition, yet another year passed and the Raabs failed to address these issues. Now, after the delays, the 4 Raabs argue that they do not need an expert architect to prove their case, but this argument does not address their failure to complete discovery or take other action to prosecute the case. The Raabs argue that Marshall did not suffer substantial prejudice by the delay, but under Syllabus Point 3 of Dimon, a defendant does not have to prove substantial prejudice unless the plaintiff first comes forward with evidence of good cause for the delay. Id., 198 W.Va. at 546, 678 S.E.2d at 52. In this case, the Raabs have not presented evidence of good cause for the delay. Finally, the Raabs contend that the circuit court did not make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law in its orders. We disagree. The court cited the relevant law, explained how long the case had been pending, and explained plaintiffs’ inactivity. We find that the orders are sufficient for appellate review.