Opinion ID: 576697
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: governmental search

Text: 56 Mr. Wright contends that the currency seized in the search of his quarters--particularly the bait money from the Denver robbery--should have been excluded from his trial because the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Mr. Wright contends that the involvement of state and federal law enforcement officials converted the search from a military search to a governmental 26 one requiring strict compliance with the Fourth Amendment. The district court agreed with Mr. Wright that the state and federal authorities participated in the search in a significant way. R.28 at 8-9. However, the district court held that the search met all Fourth Amendment requirements by virtue of the fact that it comported with Military Rule 315. In drawing this conclusion, the court relied upon United States v. Brown, 784 F.2d 1033 (10th Cir.1986), in which a similar conclusion was drawn. However, in Brown the search authorization not only met the requirements of Military Rule 315, it also was supported by an oath. 27 In this case, however, the request for search authorization was not supported by oath or affirmation. We cannot conclude, therefore, that Brown is directly on point. 57 On the other hand, we cannot accept Mr. Wright's argument that the situation before us is comparable to instances where federal law enforcement officers participate with state 28 or foreign country officials 29 or private entities 30 in a search that does not comport with standards embodied in the federal constitution, statutes or judicial rule. In those instances, the procedures followed did not provide the defendant with protections of the calibre contemplated by federal law. By contrast, the procedures followed here, while decidedly different from those employed by the federal government in the civilian community, are standards grounded in the federal constitution's Fourth Amendment and in the Congress' prerogative to make rules and regulations for the governance of the land and naval forces of the United States. See U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8 cl. 14 (The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces). 58 It is too late in the day to suggest that the Fourth Amendment's basic protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply to members of the armed forces. 31 Nevertheless, the military implementation of that guarantee is different from that employed in civilian matters. In civilian cases, the warrant requirement has been abrogated by judicial decision only in certain carefully described situations. 32 In the military situation, Congress has primary responsibility for the delicate task of balancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the military. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447, 107 S.Ct. 2924, 2931, 97 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987). Through delegation of authority to the President, 33 Congress has determined that an alternate procedure to a warrant issued by a magistrate is more compatible with the realities of military life. 59 The constitutional legitimacy of such military searches is hardly a novel proposition. 34 For instance, in United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652 (4th Cir.1964), Judge Haynsworth upheld the admissibility of evidence procured by a military search and admitted as evidence in a civilian prosecution of a servicemember. He wrote, 60 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches. Searches as authorized by a valid search warrant are not prohibited because not unreasonable. Searches reasonably incident to lawful arrests are also not prohibited, for they too are not unreasonable. And we can find no basis for holding that a search conducted by military authority, which was completely lawful and valid when made as a matter of military law, is unreasonable under the Constitution. 61 Grisby, 335 F.2d at 656. 62 Under Military Rule of Evidence 315, 35 an investigatory search of a member's person or quarters may only be undertaken (absent exigent circumstances) 36 when the investigator presents the military commander with information establishing that there is probable cause to believe that the area sought to be searched contains evidence of unlawful activity. The investigator may present that information orally or in writing. There is no explicit requirement that the person presenting the information be under oath, although it appears to be the preferred practice. 37 63 The United States Court of Military Appeals, the court recognized by both the Congress and the Supreme Court as having a particular expertise in this area, 38 has explained that the military search authorization procedure is a finely tuned accommodation of the servicemember's privacy interests grounded in the Fourth Amendment and the specific needs, dictated by military necessity, for good order and discipline in the armed forces. See United States v. Stuckey, 10 M.J. 347, 358-61 (C.M.A.1981). The relationship between a member of the armed forces and a commander is different from the relationship between a civilian and a magistrate. Members of the armed forces have considerably less of an expectation of privacy while living on a military installation, and a military commander has considerably more interest in being informed of all activities in the area under his command. As the Court of Military Appeals noted in Stuckey: A military commander has responsibilities for investigation and for law enforcement that a magistrate does not possess. Also, he has responsibilities for the welfare and combat readiness of the personnel under his command. 10 M.J. at 359. Continued the court, 64 Winthrop describes custom as a uniform, known practice of long standing, which is also certain and reasonable. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (1920 Reprint), 42. Military custom, so defined, has long granted military commanders broad powers of search and seizure. See United States v. Middleton, [10 M.J. 123 (C.M.A.1981) ]. The existence of that custom clearly imposes some limitation on a serviceperson's reasonable expectation of privacy. 65 Id. at 360. Consequently, while the authorization to search is sometimes referred to in casual parlance as a warrant and the commander is referred to as a magistrate, such terminology, noted the Court of Military Appeals, does not reflect the theoretical or practical reality of the situation. As that court wrote in Stuckey: 66 In our view servicepersons have never expected that, before authorizing a search, a military commander would comply with the warrant procedure required of a federal magistrate. Indeed, except to a literalistic and loyal reader of this Court's opinions, equating a military commander with a judicial officer would probably have seemed odd. Instead, the commander's long-recognized power to authorize searches within the area of his command is generally viewed as derived from and correlative with his position and responsibilities in the military community--which, of course, is a specialized society separate from civilian society. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2556, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974). Accordingly, a commander's authorization of a search has never been equated with the judicial-type procedure which comes within the contemplation of the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment. 67 10 M.J. at 360. 68 The oath requirement is no technical or trivial component of the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. It is designed to ensure the truthfulness of the information considered by the magistrate by inducing the supplier of that information to consider carefully his submission. Nevertheless, in the military environment, the Warrant Clause plays no part in the determination of probable cause. The alternate procedure, the Court of Military Appeals has noted, provides its own safeguards for insuring the accuracy of the information provided. As the court noted in Stuckey, unlike the civilian magistrate, the military commander oftentimes knows a good deal about the subject of the search prior to being presented with the investigator's information. The military commander can be expected to assess the investigator's information in light of that broader background. The commander may also rely on a wider variety of sources. Chief Judge Everett wrote: 69 Unlike a civilian magistrate, the military commander who is requested to authorize a search often will already have acquired information that is relevant to a determination of probable cause. He may have seen police reports concerning a suspect or know of his reputation, prior convictions, or nonjudicial punishments. Some of the commander's information may be of a hearsay nature and not admissible in court, but nevertheless of sufficient reliability so that, if properly presented in an affidavit, it would help support a search warrant. Cf. Jones v. United States, [362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960) ]; Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956); Brinegar v. United States, [338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) ]. Some of the evidence already in the commander's possession may consist of documents which are not prepared under oath but which--under hearsay exceptions for official records or business entries--would be admissible at a trial to establish guilt or innocence. 70 ... Must the commander who possesses this information, in turn, refer the request for search authority to a higher echelon and then submit to the superior commander his own sworn recitation of the information which he possesses? Further, if official records or business records contain information relevant to a probable cause decision, will it be necessary that someone swear before the commander that the documents say what they purport to say, rather than merely submitting the records to the commander for his consideration? 71 10 M.J. at 363. Moreover, there are significant additional safeguards, both legal and practical, to ensure that the information presented to the commander is true and that the commander considers the information carefully. As the district court noted, a servicemember who supplies false information to a commander is subject to court-martial. Moreover, the commander is subject to significant adverse consequences for sanctioning an unwarranted invasion of privacy. As Chief Judge Everett noted: 72 In promulgating paragraph 152 of the Manual the President may also have recognized that inherent in the command structure are some safeguards against a commander's indiscriminate invasion of the privacy of his subordinates. For one thing, combat readiness of troops depends in large part upon their motivation, but discipline and punishment cannot alone develop the necessary motivation. Leadership is also required, and one aspect of successful leadership is concern for the welfare of subordinates. Loyalty in a military unit, as in other organizations, is a two-way street. A commander who approves--or even tolerates--arbitrary invasions of the privacy of his subordinates is not demonstrating the brand of leadership likely to command the loyalty or produce the high morale associated with a combat-ready organization. Accordingly, a commander has some incentive to act reasonably and with sound judgment in acting on requests for searches and seizures which involve his personnel. Moreover, repeated failures by a commander to respect the Fourth Amendment rights of his troops might become a basis for a complaint of wrongs under Article 138 of the Uniform Code, 10 U.S.C. § 938, or, in the extreme case, even for a prosecution for dereliction of duties as a commander. See Article 92, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 892. 73 10 M.J. at 359-60. 74 We need not confront in this case a situation where there is no legitimate military interest in the search and the application to the commander is simply an effort to evade the Warrant Clause. Indeed, given the obvious military interest in all matters that occur on a military installation, such a situation may be hypothetical. In this case, there is no indication that the application for permission to search directed to the base commander was intended to circumvent the warrant requirement. Nor are we confronted with a situation in which the participation of military authorities in the investigation can be considered pro forma. While the record reflects that the investigation was a joint federal, state, and military enterprise, the record simply does not support a suggestion that there was no real military investigative interest. Common sense suggests the contrary. The commission of serious crimes of violence by military personnel who are members of a unit engaged in providing security to a base containing warplanes and in providing personal security to the Vice-President of the United States 39 is a matter of utmost concern to the cognizant commander. Because a procedure contemplated by the federal constitution was legitimately implemented by those permitted to use it, the civilian federal officers were under no obligation to engage in the duplicative effort of securing a warrant from a magistrate. 75