Opinion ID: 2389455
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: grand juror discovery

Text: The next issue appellant raises concerns the refusal of the trial court to grant him discovery of the following information: 1. The names of the grand jurors who indicted [appellant]; 2. The ages and occupations of such grand jurors; 3. Whether such grand jurors had relatives or friends who worked for any law enforcement organization; 4. Whether any such grand jurors had been arrested or convicted of any felony and/or misdemeanor and what sentences had been received, if any; [and] 5. The names of any such grand jurors who had been victims of any criminal activity; the nature of that activity; the effect of that activity upon the victim, i. e., hospitalization, testimony in court; and whether any subjects had been apprehended, tried and convicted for such activity. [Brief for Appellant at 23.] On April 11, 1975, appellant and the government, inter alia, stipulated to the following: In the District of Columbia defense counsel does not have an opportunity to Voir Dire grand jurors deliberating on counsel's particular matters; In the District of Columbia neither the Chief Judge, any other member of the judiciary, the United States Attorney's Office nor any other person conducts a particularized Voir Dire of the grand jurors as a whole or as individual grand juries [ sic ] for the purpose of ascertaining possible prejudice by eliciting the type of information mentioned with the exception of the material sought on the postcards sent out to all potential jurors. In the District of Columbia neither the United States Attorney's Office nor the Superior Court judicial or administrative organs provide defense counsel with the information sought, supra. . . . Despite this acknowledgement of lack of precedent for access to the requested information, appellant assumes that contradictions exist between the purposes of the grand jury as reflected by the Constitution, and its current actual function. Accordingly he asserts, urgent measures are needed to reassert an accused's rights before the grand jury. He cites as foremost among such measures the opportunity for defense counsel to voir dire prospective grand jurors for their particular cases. The issue appellant raises was definitively dealt with in United States v. Knowles, 147 F.Supp. 19, 20-22 (D.D.C.1957), where the court stated in part: The qualifications of grand jurors are fixed by law. . . . The accused may attack the legal qualifications of a grand juror, either by challenging an individual juror on the ground that the jury is not legally qualified, or by motion to dismiss the indictment because of a lack of legal qualifications of an individual juror. [Emphasis in original; footnotes omitted.] Challenges for bias, or for any cause other than lack of legal qualifications, are unknown as concerns grand jurors. No provision is made for peremptory challenges of grand jurors and no such challenges are permitted. Likewise no voir dire examination exists in respect to grand jurors. In other words, the status of a member of a grand jury may not be questioned except for lack of legal qualifications. The basic theory of the functions of a grand jury does not require that grand jurors should be impartial and unbiased.. . . A grand jury does not pass on the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but merely determines whether he should be brought to trial. It is purely an accusatory body. . . . [ Id. at 20-21; emphasis supplied.] See also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973); Estes v. United States, 335 F.2d 609, 613 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 316 F.Supp. 411, 419 (E.D.Pa.1970); Weekley v. State, 222 A.2d 781, 785 (Del.Supr.1966). Appellant in effect argues that a grand jury must be convened as a petit juryonly after an offense is committed and when the accused may examine prospective members. No such right exists and we follow the holding in United States v. Knowles, supra .