Opinion ID: 2610306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Constitutionality of Probate Code, Section 1026

Text: Claimants' contentions for unconstitutionality are numerous and somewhat interrelated. Perhaps the most difficult questions are posed by claimants' contention that the statutory scheme of which Probate Code, section 1026 is a part constitutes an invidious discrimination against nonresident aliens depriving them of equal protection of laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (11) It is well established that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to aliens within the territorial jurisdiction of a state ( Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 [60 L.Ed. 131, 134, 36 S.Ct. 7, 9-10]; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 [30 L.Ed. 220, 226, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1070]; Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of California, 71 Cal.2d 566, 578 [79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 456 P.2d 645].) We have been cited to no case, however, applying the equal protection clause to a nonresident alien. Indeed, the equal protection clause applies by its language only to any person within its [the state's] jurisdiction, and there is some indication in the cases that it is inapplicable to nonresident aliens. (See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 [94 L.Ed. 1255, 1262, 70 S.Ct. 936, 940]; Cermeno-Cerna v. Farrell, 291 F. Supp. 521, 528; Moody v. Hagen (1917) 36 N.D. 471 [162 N.W. 704, 706-707].) As has previously been noted, however, upon the death of the decedent, claimants succeeded to interests in the estate of the decedent subject to divestment ( Estate of Sorensen, supra, 44 Cal.2d 306, 308; Estate of Romaris, supra, 191 Cal. 740, 744; Estate of Pendergast, supra, 143 Cal. 135, 140; Estate of Laurence, supra, 84 Cal. App.2d 500, 505-506), and it is urged that the ownership of such property interests in the State constitutes claimants as persons within the jurisdiction. (See 51 Georgetown L.Rev. 470, 484-485; see also 47 Iowa L.Rev. 105, 114-115; and cf. 28 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1, 5-10.) Assuming, without deciding, the validity of the latter proposition, we are not persuaded that the statutory scheme constitutes an unconstitutional discrimination against nonresident aliens. The major contention is that by virtue of Probate Code, section 1026 and Code of Civil Procedure, section 1336 nonresident aliens must appear and demand within five years from the date of death, whereas, under Probate Code, section 1027 [and] Code of Civil Procedure, section 1441 all other persons may appear and demand within five years from the date of the decree making distribution. It is argued that there is no valid purpose for the state's imposing a shorter period for nonresident aliens than for other persons and that, even if such purpose can be divined, the imposition of the shorter period for nonresident aliens is irrational and contrary to logic and fairness in that, if anything, a nonresident alien, because of his remoteness, should be allowed a longer period in which to appear and demand. (12) There is no constitutional requirement of uniform treatment. ( In re Ricky H., 2 Cal.3d 513, 522 [86 Cal. Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204]; Whittaker v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.2d 357, 367 [66 Cal. Rptr. 710, 438 P.2d 358]; Bilyeu v. State Employees' Retirement System, 58 Cal.2d 618, 623 [24 Cal. Rptr. 562, 375 P.2d 442].) (13) Legislative classification is permissible when made for a lawful state purpose and when the classification bears a rational relationship to that purpose. ( McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426 [6 L.Ed.2d 393, 399, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104-1105]; Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 [64 L.Ed. 989, 990, 40 S.Ct. 560, 561]; Whittaker v. Superior Court, supra, 68 Cal.2d 357.) (14, 15) Wide discretion is vested in the Legislature in making the classification and every presumption is in favor of the validity of the statute; the decision of the Legislature as to what is a sufficient distinction to warrant the classification will not be overthrown by the courts unless it is palpably arbitrary.... [Citations.] A distinction in legislation is not arbitrary if any set of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it. ( Sacramento M.U. Dist. v. P.G. & E. Co., 20 Cal.2d 684, 693 [128 P.2d 529]; Bilyeu v. State Employees' Retirement System, supra, 58 Cal.2d 618, 623; McGowan v. Maryland, supra, 366 U.S. 420; In re Ricky H., supra, 2 Cal.3d 513.) (16) We recognize that a stricter standard is applied in testing legislation involving suspect classifications such as classifications based on race, nationality or alienage or involving fundamental interests such as the right to vote, the right of interstate movement and the right to seek employment. ( Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of California, supra, 71 Cal.2d 566, 578-579 and authorities there cited.) However, the distinction in the statutory scheme in question is not, strictly speaking, based upon alienage. Resident aliens are treated the same as citizens. The point of distinction is residency as opposed to nonresidency. Nor is the distinction based on race or nationality. The statutory scheme applies to all nonresident aliens alike, regardless of their race or nationality. Neither can the interests here involved be classified as fundamental. (17) `Rights of succession to the property of a deceased, whether by will or by intestacy, are of statutory creation, and the dead hand rules succession only by sufferance. Nothing in the federal constitution forbids the legislature of a state to limit, condition or even abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property within its jurisdiction.' ( Irving Trust Co. v. Day (1942) 314 U.S. 556, 562 [86 L.Ed. 452, 457, 62 S.Ct. 398, 137 A.L.R. 1093].) `So broad is the power of the state to determine the devolution of title to the property of a person dying and leaving property within its boundaries that it may take the property itself and deny any right of anyone to succeed thereto either by will or by succession....' ( Estate of Zimmerman (1955) 132 Cal. App.2d 702, 704 [283 P.2d 68]; see also Estate of Bevilacqua (1948) 31 Cal.2d 580, 582 [191 P.2d 752]; Estate of Knutzen, supra, 31 Cal.2d 573, 578 [191 P.2d 747], and cases cited.) ( Estate of Larkin, supra, 65 Cal.2d 60, 80-81.) (18) There being no suspect classification or fundamental interest involved, the stricter standard discussed and applied in Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of California, supra , is not here applicable. (19) The statutory scheme of which Probate Code, section 1026 is a part appears to us to have two purposes, both of which constitute legitimate state governmental concerns. Obviously, the state has a legitimate concern that property within its borders should have an ascertainable title within a reasonable period of time so that it can be sold, developed and otherwise dealt with, and one purpose of the statutory scheme is to fix a time at which title can be definitely ascertained. A second purpose would appear to be the state's preferring itself over nonresident aliens, at least when they have not appeared and demanded within the five-year period. This, too, is a permissible exercise of the state's power. (Cf. United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87, 95 [94 L.Ed. 675, 682-683, 70 S.Ct. 503, 508]; see also Estate of Zimmerman, supra, 132 Cal. App.2d 702, 705.) (20) The distinction between nonresident aliens and other persons is rationally related to these purposes. We think the rational connection between the distinction and the purpose of the state's preferring itself to a potential heir is obvious. Citizens and resident aliens are likely to have substantial contacts and relationships with the state, directly or indirectly through the national government or other state governments, that nonresident aliens lack. (See, discussing such contacts and relationships, Moody v. Hagen, supra, 36 N.D. 471, 486.) In recognition of these connections and relationships, it is not unreasonable that the state should defer its power of escheat as to resident aliens and citizens for a longer period than as to nonresident aliens. These same considerations rationally connect the distinction to the other purpose of the statutory scheme. As already noted, the existence of unascertainable property titles constitutes a problem for and a burden to the state. Final escheat of the property to the state removes the problem and the burden. Once again, however, it is not unreasonable for the state, in deference to and recognition of its more probable relationship to and connections with citizens and resident aliens, to indulge such persons in a somewhat longer period prior to final escheat than that accorded nonresident aliens. Claimants' argument that, because of their remoteness, they should be accorded a longer period of time than others in which to appear and demand is not without logic. It must be recognized, however that this very remoteness serves to distinguish the nonresident alien and to support the distinction and classification found in the legislation. Because of the remoteness of nonresident aliens and their probable total lack of contact with the state. it would not be unreasonable for the state to conclude that if no nonresident heir has appeared within five years from the death of the decedent, none is likely thereafter to be discovered. Moreover, this argument of claimants is misdirected. It is more appropriately addressed to the Legislature. (21) Courts do not sit as super-legislatures to determine the wisdom, desirability or propriety of statutes enacted by the Legislature. ( Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 [14 L.Ed.2d 510, 513, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1680]; People v. Hurd, 5 Cal. App.3d 865, 877 [85 Cal. Rptr. 718].) Having determined that the statutory scheme serves a legitimate state purpose and that the classification made has a rational relationship to that purpose, the court's function is at an end. Claimants also urge that the statutory scheme is unconstitutionally discriminatory as to nonresident aliens who have appeared and demanded within the prescribed time and, possibly, even as to citizens who might claim to inherit through a nonresident alien heir who had failed to appear and demand within the prescribed time. This argument is based upon the proposition that, where a nonresident alien heir exists but fails to appear and demand within the prescribed time, his portion of the estate does not revert to the residue of the estate to be distributed to other eligible heirs, but, instead, is escheated to the state ( Estate of Pendergast, supra, 143 Cal. 135, 140, Estate of Meyer, 107 Cal. App.2d 799, 809 [238 P.2d 597]), whereas when a resident alien or citizen fails to claim within the prescribed time, his portion reverts to the estate for distribution to other eligible heirs. No authority is cited to establish the second part of this proposition, [ ] [but assuming arguendo that claimants' statement may be correct, at least in some circumstances] it avails claimants nothing, for the discrimination charged is not against them. (22) To challenge the constitutionality of a statute on the ground that it is discriminatory, the party complaining must show that he is a party aggrieved or a member of the class discriminated against. ( In re Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 630 [12 P.2d 446]; DuBois v. Land, 212 Cal. App.2d 563, 567 [28 Cal. Rptr. 167].) (23a) Claimants next contend that Probate Code, section 1026 is unconstitutional in that it deprives claimants of a vested property right without due process of law and contrary to international standards of justice. (See Rest.2d Foreign Relations Law, §§ 165, 166 and 185.) As we understand it, the argument is that once the state recognizes a vested property interest in a nonresident alien, it cannot thereafter deprive him of that property interest unreasonably, arbitrarily and without compensation. The problem is aggravated, it is suggested, by the fact that, of all persons, the nonresident alien is least likely to obtain actual notice from the types of notification prescribed in Probate Code, sections 1080 and 1200. These contentions misconceive the nature of the rights of succession by a nonresident alien in California and are not meritorious. (24) Subject to the treaty-making power of the national government ( Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 [19 L.Ed.2d 683, 692, 88 S.Ct. 664, 671]; Estate of Meyer, supra, 107 Cal. App.2d 799, 804), and subject to the exclusive and paramount power of the federal government to deal with foreign affairs ( Zschernig v. Miller, supra, 389 U.S. 429; Estate of Kraemer, supra, 276 Cal. App.2d 715) and subject to the equal protection and privilege and immunity guaranties of the United States Constitution, the state has full power to regulate the matter of the descent and distribution of decedents' estates within its borders. ( Estate of Larkin, supra, 65 Cal.2d 60, 80-81 and authorities there cited.) California has seen fit to vest in nonresident alien heirs a conditional interest in a decedent's estate. (25) [T]he estate which vests in them upon the death of the ancestor is not an absolute or unconditional estate, as in the case of citizen heirs, subject only to be divested in the process of administration, but it is a conditional estate, upon the condition subsequent that if they fail to appear and claim the same within five years their right ceases and the property then vests in the state. ( Estate of Romaris, supra, 191 Cal. 740, 744; Estate of Sorensen, supra, 44 Cal.2d 306, 308; Estate of Pendergast, supra, 143 Cal. 135, 140; Estate of Laurence, supra, 84 Cal. App.2d 500, 505-506.) (23b) Since the state has the power to withhold absolutely the right of succession but has seen fit to bestow upon nonresident aliens a vested but conditional property interest, we fail to see how the divestment of that interest by nonoccurrence of the condition upon which it was granted constitutes a deprivation of property without due process of law or contrary to standards of international justice. Nor can we perceive how that conclusion is altered by the fact that nonresident aliens are not likely to obtain actual notice of the proceedings. (26) As noted in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 [94 L.Ed. 865, 875, 70 S.Ct. 652, 658], ... it has been recognized that, in the case of persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification is all that the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights. [Citations.] Estate of Poder, 274 Cal. App.2d 786 [79 Cal. Rptr. 484], relied on by claimants, has no applicability to the case at bench. Lastly, claimants, relying upon Zschernig v. Miller, supra, 389 U.S. 429, Estate of Kraemer, supra, 276 Cal. App.2d 715, and Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners, 276 Cal. App.2d 221 [80 Cal. Rptr. 800], contend that Probate Code, section 1026 constitutes an unconstitutional infringement on the exclusive and plenary power of the federal government to deal with foreign relations. The cases relied upon by claimants do not support the unconstitutionality of Probate Code, section 1026. Their rule is that state legislation is invalid as an infringement upon the federal power to deal with foreign relations when it has a direct impact upon foreign relations and may well adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with those problems. ( Zschernig v. Miller, supra, 389 U.S. at p. 441 [19 L.Ed.2d at p. 692, 88 S.Ct. at p. 671]; Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners, 276 Cal. App.2d at p. 229.) In both Zschernig (389 U.S. at pp. 434-435 [19 L.Ed.2d at pp. 688-689, 88 S.Ct. at p. 667]) and Bethlehem (276 Cal. App.2d at p. 228) it was expressly found that the state legislation had more than `some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries,' and ... great potential for disruption or embarrassment.... Kraemer involved a statute substantially identical to that in Zschernig, and the decision in Kraemer was completely controlled by Zschernig. The matter of concern to the high court in Zschernig is revealed in the opinion as follows: It now appears that in this reciprocity area under inheritance statutes, the probate courts of various States have launched inquiries into the type of governments that obtain in a particular foreign nation  whether aliens under their law have enforceable rights, whether the so-called `rights' are merely dispensations turning upon the whim or caprice of government officials, whether the representation of consuls, ambassadors, and other representatives of foreign nations is credible or made in good faith, whether there is in the actual administration in the particular foreign system of law any element of confiscation. (389 U.S. at pp. 433-434 [19 L.Ed.2d at p. 688, 88 S.Ct. at p. 667].) That kind of state involvement in foreign affairs and international relations  matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government  is not sanctioned by Clark v. Allen. (389 U.S. at p. 436 [19 L.Ed.2d at p. 689, 88 S.Ct. at p. 668].) Probate Code, section 1026 does not involve the state in any inquiry into foreign law, administration of foreign law, credibility of foreign governmental officials or any other matter condemned by Zschernig. All that is required by Probate Code, section 1026 is the computation of five years from the date of death of the decedent. The same time period applies to all nonresident aliens alike, regardless of their country of residence, its law or its policies. It is suggested that, since many foreign countries have reciprocity provisions in their law similar to section 259 of the California Probate Code, the distinction between nonresident aliens and other persons inherent in section 1026 might cause those foreign countries to deny inheritance to all United States citizens. This argument is spurious. By virtue of our federal system, the laws of our 50 states are undoubtedly diverse in respect to the right of succession by nonresident aliens. Indeed, it appears that New Hampshire affords nonresident aliens no right to succeed to real estate at all. ( Hanafin v. McCarthy (1948) 95 N.H. 36 [57 A.2d 148]; Lazarou v. Moraros (1958) 101 N.H. 383 [143 A.2d 669].) It has not heretofore been suggested that the refusal of New Hampshire to accord such rights to non-resident aliens or the diverse laws of other states have deterred the finding that reciprocal rights of inheritance exist between California and the U.S.S.R. (See Estate of Larkin, supra, 65 Cal.2d 60.) It is also suggested that Probate Code, section 1026 constitutes an embarrassment to the conduct of foreign relations in that the federal government will find it difficult to explain why an heir who appears and demands within the five-year period is permitted to inherit while one who appears and demands shortly after the expiration of the five-year period is not. The burden of such explanation is inherent in any statutorily prescribed period and, in any event, presumably, such explanation will cause no more embarrassment than the explanation why a nonresident alien may inherit property in California but not in New Hampshire. Probate Code, section 1026 cannot be characterized as having a direct impact upon foreign relations, nor is it likely to adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with foreign relations. (27) At most, its effect upon foreign relations is incidental or indirect, and it does not unconstitutionally impinge upon the exclusive and plenary power of the federal government to deal with foreign affairs. ( Zschernig v. Miller, supra, 389 U.S. 429; Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners, supra, 276 Cal. App.2d 221.) As to claimants Uliana Andreevna Gumen, Evdokia Andreevna Lavrik, Anna Ivanovna Petlevany and Vera Ivanovna Vinichenko the judgment is reversed and the trial court is instructed to enter judgment that the State of California is entitled by escheat to the distribution of the interests to which those claimants would otherwise have been entitled. Pursuant to rule 26(a) of the Rules of Court, each party shall bear his own costs. Mosk, J., did not participate herein. PETERS, J. I dissent. The majority opinion holds that the interests of four claimants escheat to the State of California because of the provisions of Probate Code section 1026. In my opinion, under the facts of this case, this constitutes a great injustice to these four claimants. In the first place, the state contends that section 1026 is not a statute of limitations but is part of the substantive law of inheritance. This is a matter of semantics. As the majority opinion points out this case was tried and appealed at a time when section 1026 could apply but was not raised by the state. One day, before the second trial, the state attempted to amend by raising this section. The trial court held that section 1026 was tolled. In so holding, the trial court was clearly correct. The provisions of section 1026 are subject to tolling under proper circumstances. ( Estate of Caravas, 40 Cal.2d 33, 41-42 [250 P.2d 593]; Estate of Spinosa, 117 Cal. App.2d 364, 370-372 [255 P.2d 843].) This was a proper case to toll the statute. The Estate of Gogabashvele, 195 Cal. App.2d 503 [16 Cal. Rptr. 77], was decided on September 12, 1961. The Estate of Larkin, 65 Cal.2d 60 [52 Cal. Rptr. 441, 416 P.2d 473], disapproving the Gogabashvele case, was decided on August 2, 1966. This court had denied a hearing in the Gogabashvele case. What the majority opinion holds is that during this five-year period a reasonably competent attorney should pay no attention at all to the Gogabashvele case and the denial of hearing but should go to the Supreme Court and ask that court to disapprove. This is sheer nonsense. An attorney, reasonably competent, is entitled to rely on a district court opinion, in which a hearing by this court has been denied, and is entitled to consider that that opinion correctly states the law. For this reason, section 1026, which is a statute of limitations, was tolled during this five-year period. It is also the law that the statute of limitations is waived when it is not pleaded. ( Bliss v. Sneath, 119 Cal. 526, 528 [51 P. 848]; Taylor v. Sanford, 203 Cal. App.2d 330, 345 [21 Cal. Rptr. 697].) Here, the state not only failed to plead the provisions of section 1026 at a time after the five-year period prescribed by section 1026 had passed, but proceeded to trial and then to appeal without raising the question. Under such circumstances there was a clear waiver. It should also be mentioned that this is an escheat case. The state has no proper interest to escheat property that properly and legally belongs to someone else. Escheat statutes should be strictly construed. For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the four claimants involved in this proceeding are entitled to their proper share of the estate.