Opinion ID: 842331
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: why harper's sentence violates the sixth amendment

Text: As I explain in McCuller, [10] scoring the OVs can violate Blakely 's bright-line rule. The violation in Harper is particularly clear. Harper's case closely mirrors the situation in Cunningham. California's determinate sentencing law (DSL) created a three-tiered sentencing system for most crimes. The statute defining Cunningham's offense provided a lower, a middle, and an upper sentence. The California Penal Code mandated that the trial court impose the middle term, unless circumstances existed that mitigated or aggravated the offense. Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 861-863. The Supreme Court paid special attention to the fact that a defendant in California was entitled to the middle sentence unless the sentencing court made additional findings of fact: California's DSL, we note in this context, resembles pre- Booker federal sentencing in the same ways Washington's sentencing system did: The key California Penal Code provision states that the sentencing court  shall order imposition of the middle term absent circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime, [Cal. Penal Code] 1170(b) (emphasis added), and any move to the upper or lower term must be justified by a concise statement of the ultimate facts  on which the departure rests, [Cal. Ct. R.] 4.420(e) (emphasis added). [ Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 866 n. 10 (emphasis in original).] MCL 769.34(4)(a) contains similar mandatory language: [T]he court shall impose an intermediate sanction unless the court states on the record a substantial and compelling reason to sentence the individual to the jurisdiction of the department of corrections. (Emphasis added.) Therefore, just like a defendant in California, a defendant in Michigan is entitled to an intermediate sanction cell sentence. And the court is authorized to depart from the sentence only through judicial factfinding after the jury verdict. As in California, these findings of fact need be based only on a preponderance of the evidence. Hence, as in the California scheme, a sentence resulting from an intermediate sanction cell in Michigan constitutes a statutory maximum for purposes of Apprendi. Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 868. There is no meaningful difference between a Michigan court departing from an intermediate sanction cell and a California court imposing the upper term available under that state's penal code. It follows that reversal is mandated in this case. The majority effectively attempts to rewrite MCL 769.34(4)(a) to make it provide for no more than a minimum sentence. As I explain in McCuller, the attempt falls short of its goal. The language of the statute is not ambiguous. An intermediate sanction may include a jail term that does not exceed the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence range or 12 months, whichever is less.  MCL 769.34(4)(a) (emphasis added). The statute mandates that the sentencing court impose an intermediate sanction when a defendant falls into an appropriate cell, unless the court makes judicial findings of fact to support a departure. MCL 769.34(4)(a). It also defines the upper limit of an intermediate sanction cell sentence: 12 months in jail. Because this is the highest sentence a defendant may face, it is, in every sense, a maximum sentence. Absent judicial fact-finding, the trial court has no power to impose even a 13-month sentence. At most, Harper should have faced 12 months in jail. MCL 769.34(4)(a). [11] The majority tries to change this fact by turning to MCL 769.8(1). MCL 769.8(1) states that there are cases in which the sentencing court will not fix the minimum sentence and in which the absolute maximum sentence will not apply. It notes that other provisions in that chapter of the Code of Criminal Procedure state the exceptions to the general rule. MCL 769.34 is in the same chapter. And MCL 769.34(4)(a) provides that the sentencing court sets the maximum sentence. Therefore, these statutes, read together, show that intermediate sanction cells do not merely set minimum sentences. The Legislature intended that intermediate sanction cells set maximum sentences. MCL 769.34(4)(a); MCL 769.8(1). This Court has no right to change this fact. Hence, there are two possible maximum sentences for the offense in question, the absolute statutory maximum and the intermediate sanction cell statutory maximum. A defendant is entitled to whichever one is supported by his or her conviction, admissions, and criminal record. [A]nd by reason of the Sixth Amendment [any additional] facts bearing upon that entitlement must be found by a jury. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 309, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Therefore, if other facts are used to move the defendant to the higher of the two maximum sentences, they must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.