Opinion ID: 2373395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Opinion Testimony from a Fact Witness

Text: On direct examination, Officer Nitz testified that what he had seen from his observation post led me to believe that a narcotic transaction had occurred involving Mr. Day and Mr. Carter and Mr. Dorsey. Although Carter did not object to this testimony at trial, he now contends that Nitz's opinion as to the nature of the transaction he had witnessed should not have been heard by the jury. He claims that the trial court committed plain error in allowing Officer Nitz to say what he said [10] because it enabled him to bolster his credibility by presenting himself as an expert and expressing an opinion on the ultimate issue in the case. We find no error, plain or otherwise. Modern rules of evidence permit nonexpert witnesses to express opinions as long as those opinions are based on the witness' own observation of events and are helpful to the jury. Fateh v. Rich, 481 A.2d 464, 470 (D.C.1984). [11] Whether an opinion is helpful to the jury and hence admissible is a question entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its admission of such testimony will not be overturned unless it constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 156 (1st Cir.1989) (admission of fact witness' opinion that substance she observed in defendant's shoe looked and tasted like cocaine was within trial court's discretion). We see no abuse of discretion here. Moreover, assuming that what Nitz said went to the ultimate issue, that fact would not make it inadmissible. Fateh v. Rich, supra, 481 A.2d at 470; see also FED.R.EVID. 704. [12] Nor is there any merit in Carter's contention that Officer Nitz's opinion testimony unfairly bolstered the credibility of his fact testimony in the minds of the jury. This case can be easily distinguished from Beach v. United States, 466 A.2d 862 (D.C. 1983), on which Carter bases his argument. Officer Nitz was not testifying as an expert in this case, unlike the witness who gave the testimony at issue in Beach. Nitz was a fact witness who had sufficient personal knowledge of the events at issue to support his opinion testimony. Moreover, the challenged testimony of Officer Nitz was essentially duplicated by that of Detective Di Domenico, who testified as an expert in drug trafficking. Thus Nitz's opinion was cumulative, and its admission cannot serve as a ground for reversal. See Hill v. United States, 541 A.2d 1285, 1288 (D.C.1988) (lay opinion evidence was cumulative and not prejudicial when expert later gave same opinion); United States v. Westbrook, 896 F.2d 330, 336 (8th Cir.1990). Appellant's conviction is therefore Affirmed.