Opinion ID: 66148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claims Relating to the Fifteen-Month Delay

Text: A. Whether the Delay Violated Quinn’s Constitutional Rights Quinn asserts that the district court erred in holding that the fifteenmonth delay did not violate his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth 15 No. 08-40633 Amendment or his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The district court held that the fifteen-month delay did not violate Quinn’s right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment on the grounds that preindictment delay does not give rise to a speedy trial claim. Quinn asserts that this was error because the protection afforded by the Sixth Amendment attaches upon arrest, not only indictment. The Sixth Amendment protects the right of “the accused . . . to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. This protection “attaches at the time of arrest or indictment, whichever comes first.” Nelson v. Hargett, 989 F.2d 847, 851 (5th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) (citing Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975)) (“[T]he period between arrest and indictment must be considered in evaluating a Speedy Trial Clause claim.”). Speedy-trial claims are evaluated using a two-step process. At the first step, a court examines the length of the delay, which is “to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). “A delay of less than one year will rarely qualify as ‘presumptively prejudicial’ for purposes of triggering the Barker inquiry.” Cowart v. Hargett, 16 F.3d 642, 646 (5th Cir. 1994). If the delay raises a presumption of prejudice, a court moves to the second step, at which “the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, and defendant’s diligence in asserting his or her rights is weighed against the prejudice to the defendant.” United States v. Bergfeld, 280 F.3d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 2002). The only remedy for a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is dismissal of any criminal charges. See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 861 n.7 (1978) (citing Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973)) 16 No. 08-40633 (“[T]his Court has held dismissal of the indictment to be the proper remedy when the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated.”). Here, because Quinn was never indicted, this court lacks the ability to grant any relief for the alleged Sixth Amendment violation. Quinn therefore lacks standing to assert his Sixth Amendment claim.7 See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000) (stating that constitutional standing requires that the alleged injury be redressable by the courts, and that in order to demonstrate redressability, the plaintiff must show a “substantial likelihood that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“[I]t must be likely . . . that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court properly dismissed Quinn’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim.
For a preindictment delay to violate the due process clause it must not only cause the accused substantial, actual prejudice, but the delay must also have been intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage over the accused in the contemplated prosecution, or for some other impermissible, bad faith purpose. United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1514 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). To establish prejudice, the defendant must offer more than mere speculation of lost witnesses, faded 7 In any event, although the protection afforded by the Sixth Amendment attaches upon arrest, not only indictment, such that the period between arrest and indictment must be considered in evaluating a Speedy Trial Clause claim, preindictment delay alone cannot constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. There can be no violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial in the absence of a criminal indictment. See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) (“[N]o Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial arises until charges are pending.”); see also United States v. Carlock, 806 F.2d 535, 549 (5th Cir. 1986) (“There is no sixth amendment right to a timely indictment.”). 17 No. 08-40633 memories or misplaced documents; he must show an actual loss of evidence that would have aided the defense and that cannot be obtained from other sources. United States v. Gulley, 526 F.3d 809, 820 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1515). The due process prejudice standard is thus far more stringent than the speedy trial prejudice standard. This Court has underscored the difficulty of meeting this standard, noting that “it is difficult to imagine how a pretrial showing of prejudice would not in almost all cases be to some significant extent speculative and potential rather than actual and substantial.” Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1516. The burden is on the defendant to prove both prongs of the test. United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 441 (5th Cir. 2004). In this case, Quinn has failed to allege the sort of prejudice required to state a claim for a violation of his due process rights as a result of preindictment delay. B. Qualified Immunity The district court held that the District Attorney Defendants in their individual capacities were entitled to qualified immunity from Quinn’s federal claims on the grounds that Quinn had failed to allege facts that could establish a constitutional violation. As discussed above, we agree with the district court’s analysis on this point. The District Attorney Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Quinn’s federal claims. C. Prosecutorial Immunity The district court held that any claims against the District Attorney Defendants in their individual capacities for their actions taken in the course of prosecuting Quinn are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Quinn argues that a prosecutor’s acts must occur at trial to fall within the ambit of prosecutorial immunity. Prosecutors are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits in their individual capacities for actions that are within the scope of their prosecutorial duties. Brooks v. George County, Miss., 84 F.3d 157, 168 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Imbler 18 No. 08-40633 v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–31 (1976)). Prosecutorial immunity has been extended to a prosecutor’s actions in initiating, investigating, and pursuing a criminal prosecution. McGruder v. Necaise, 733 F.2d 1146, 1148 (5th Cir. 1984); Cook v. Houston Post, 616 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1980). The decision to file or not file criminal charges is protected by prosecutorial immunity. Oliver v. Collins, 904 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1990). In this case, Quinn is suing the District Attorney Defendants for waiting fifteen months after he was arrested to seek an indictment. The alleged wrongful act concerns the decision of when and whether to file criminal charges, which clearly falls within the scope of the District Attorney Defendants’ prosecutorial duties. See Oliver, 904 F.2d at 281; McGruder, 733 F.2d at 1148; Cooke, 616 F.2d at 793. Quinn’s contention that prosecutors are only entitled to prosecutorial immunity when they are engaged in advocacy before a court has been clearly rejected by the Supreme Court. See Van De Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S.Ct. 855, 861–65 (2009) (holding that prosecutorial immunity applied to acts related to establishment of office administrative procedures regarding how and when to make impeachment information available at a trial); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33 (“We recognize that the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom.”). We agree with the district court that any claims against the District Attorney Defendants in their individual capacities for their actions taken in the course of prosecuting Quinn are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity D. Eleventh Amendment Immunity Quinn argues that the district court erred by finding that the county prosecutors were protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity from being sued in their official capacities for their actions in handling the criminal case against Quinn because they are county, not state, officials. This circuit has stated on 19 No. 08-40633 numerous occasions that district attorneys and assistant district attorneys in Texas are agents of the state when acting in their prosecutorial capacities. See, e.g., Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that a district attorney acted as a state official in using peremptory challenges during jury selection); Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the actions of a Texas district attorney within the scope of his prosecutorial function during a criminal proceeding do not constitute official policy for which a county can be held liable); Echols v. Parker, 909 F.2d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a Texas district attorney is a state official when instituting criminal proceedings to enforce state law); cf. Crane v. Texas, 766 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that Texas district attorney acted as county official in setting county policy for the authorization of misdemeanor warrants). The District Attorney Defendants in this case were clearly acting in their capacities as prosecutors in determining whether and when to bring charges against Quinn. See Echols, 909 F.2d at 801. The District Attorney Defendants are protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to their actions in handling the criminal case against Quinn. E. Injunctive Relief Quinn appeals the district court’s holding that he lacks standing to seek injunctive relief because he has failed to allege a likelihood of a future violation of his rights. Quinn asserts that he has standing to pursue an injunction against the County Defendants because they have asserted that they are capable of reurging the child-abuse charges against Quinn at any time through 2015. He also asserts that he has third-party standing in light of the fact that new charges in an unrelated matter were filed against him in August 2006 and the County Defendants may “drag out” the prosecution of that case and cases against other accused persons. 20 No. 08-40633 To satisfy the standing requirement, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged conduct. Armstrong v. Turner Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 554, 563 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983)). The injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate, not merely conjectural or hypothetical. Id. at 563 n.23 (citing Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102). The mere fact that the County Defendants have stated that they are capable of re-urging the child abuse charges does not constitute a direct threat, let alone an immediate one. Cf. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (holding that threats of prosecution were not imaginary or speculative when plaintiff had been twice warned to stop handbilling and was told by the police that if he handbilled again and disobeyed a warning to stop he would likely be prosecuted). Similarly, the asserted threat of Quinn’s or another person’s case being “dragged out” is vague, speculative, and not necessarily immediate. Quinn does not have standing to seek injunctive relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 21