Opinion ID: 2301560
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of Changes to Title 33 During Litigation

Text: [¶ 19] When this litigation began, the statute governing fees for copies of recorded deeds provided only that the county commissioners were entitled to establish a reasonable fee to be charged for copies. 33 M.R.S. § 751(14) (2009). While the suit was pending, but before trial, the Legislature amended the statute to set forth factors that the county commissioners could consider when determining reasonable fees for paper copies, attested copies, online copies, or copies delivered through bulk transfers. See P.L.2009, ch. 575, § 2 (effective July 12, 2010) (codified at 33 M.R.S. § 751(14) (2010)). The 2010 legislation did not indicate that it was to be applied retroactively. See id. The parties proceeded to trial, and the court concluded that the statute in existence at the time that the original requests were made was applicable: 33 M.R.S. § 751(14) (2009). [¶ 20] After the Superior Court entered its judgment and the counties appealed from the court's decision, however, the Legislature enacted new legislation. P.L.2011, ch. 378 (effective June 16, 2011) (codified in part at 33 M.R.S. § 751(14-B), (14-C) (2011)). A portion of that legislation was explicitly enacted to apply retroactively to September 1, 2009, which encompasses the time within which the MacImage and Simpson requests were submitted. P.L.2011, ch. 378, § 3. In that section, the Legislature approved the imposition of fees of up to $1.50 per page for digital copies. P.L.2011, ch. 378, § 3. [¶ 21] We review de novo whether a statutory amendment will be applied retroactively or prospectively. See In re Guardianship of Jeremiah T., 2009 ME 74, ¶ 17, 976 A.2d 955. Regarding the particular legislation at issue here, the counties argue that the most recent legislationparticularly P.L.2011, ch. 378, § 3retroactively governs the fees chargeable to MacImage and Simpson to satisfy their requests. To determine whether the new statute applies, we will examine (1) whether the Legislature expressed the intent to make the statute retroactive in its application and (2) whether that retroactive application violates any provisions of the Maine Constitution.
[¶ 22] The Legislature has adopted a rule of construction that [a]ctions and proceedings pending at the time of the passage, amendment or repeal of an Act or ordinance are not affected thereby. 1 M.R.S. § 302 (2011). The general rule of statutory construction set forth in section 302 may be overcome, however, by [l]egislation expressly citing section 302, or explicitly stating an intent to apply a provision to pending proceedings. Bernier v. Data Gen. Corp., 2002 ME 2, ¶ 16, 787 A.2d 144; see Kittery Retail Ventures, LLC v. Town of Kittery, 2004 ME 65, ¶ 20, 856 A.2d 1183, cert. denied, 544 U.S. 906, 125 S.Ct. 1603, 161 L.Ed.2d 279 (2005); see also Sinclair v. Sinclair, 654 A.2d 438, 439-40 (Me.1995) (holding that legislative intentnot a classification of legislation as procedural or substantive determines the applicability of new legislation to a pending claim); Riley v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 639 A.2d 626, 628-29 (Me.1994) (distinguishing between the application of section 302 to pending claims and the application of the procedural-substantive distinction in determining the temporal application of legislation to preexisting, inchoate interests). [¶ 23] Thus, the Legislature may appropriately amend a statute and have it take effect immediately, and it may, within the bounds of the Maine Constitution, [10] make such a change retroactive and thereby undo what it perceives to be the undesirable past consequences of a misinterpretation of its work product. State v. L.V.I. Group, 1997 ME 25, ¶ 13, 690 A.2d 960 (quotation marks omitted). A pending proceeding may be affected if the Legislature has expressed an intention that the statute apply retroactively notwithstanding the general rule of construction set forth in section 302. Bernier, 2002 ME 2, ¶ 16, 787 A.2d 144. [¶ 24] Here, the Legislature determined that, for digital copies of registry records, fees of up to $1.50 per page were reasonable when charged between September 1, 2009, and the effective date of the legislation, June 16, 2011. P.L.2011, ch. 378, § 3. [11] The Legislature explicitly stated, Notwithstanding the Maine Revised Statutes, Title 1, section 302, this section applies retroactively to September 1, 2009. Id. [¶ 25] In the 2011 enactment, the Legislature unequivocally expressed an intent for the statute to apply retroactively, see Morrill v. Me. Tpk. Auth., 2009 ME 116, ¶ 5, 983 A.2d 1065, and the period of retroactivity includes the pending litigation regarding the September 2009 requests submitted by MacImage and Simpson. Thus, unless there is some constitutional impediment to its enforcement, the new legislation requires us to consider this matter based on the standard set forth in P.L.2011, ch. 378, § 3.
[¶ 26] If there is a reasonable interpretation of a statute that will satisfy constitutional requirements, we will avoid construing the statute in a way that renders it unconstitutional. Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 14, 728 A.2d 127. With this rule of construction in mind, we now consider whether the legislation violates (a) the constitutional separation of powers, (b) the Due Process Clause, (c) the Equal Protection Clause, (d) the Takings Clause, or (e) the Special Legislation Clause.
[¶ 27] The constitutional separation of powers is not always undermined when the Legislature passes legislation that affects cases that are pending in the judicial system. Bernier, 2002 ME 2, ¶ 17 n. 7, 787 A.2d 144; see Me. Const. art. III, § 2. Although MacImage and Simpson contend that P.L.2011, ch. 378, § 3 usurps the judicial function by retroactively interpreting the meaning of a repealed statute, 33 M.R.S. § 751(14) (2009), and attempting to overturn a decision in a private dispute, this argument underestimates the public interests at stake. [¶ 28] To determine whether conduct violates the constitutional separation of powers in Maine, we ask a narrow question: [H]as the power in issue been explicitly granted to one branch of state government, and to no other branch? State v. Hunter, 447 A.2d 797, 800 (Me.1982). The Maine Constitution vests in the Legislature the full power to make and establish all reasonable laws and regulations for the defense and benefit of the people of this State, not repugnant to this Constitution, nor to that of the United States. Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1. In exercising this power and authority, the Legislature may properly consider issues regarding the funding of county government services. [¶ 29] Although MacImage and Simpson argue that the Legislature's actions constitute an attempt to overturn a decision in a private dispute, the Public Law at issue served more broadly to balance the public and private interests involved in fee-setting for counties' electronic copying of registry land records and indexesa technological reality that was not addressed in preexisting legislation. P.L.2011, ch. 378, Emergency Preamble. The Legislature acted to balance competing interests by legislating the reasonableness of fees that could be charged during the time period when the county registries were acting without legislative guidance, enacting prospective legislation to set specific fees for a limited period of time, and finally requiring the county commissioners to establish fees by taking into account statutory criteria by August 1, 2012. P.L. 2011, ch. 378. The Legislature establish[ed]... reasonable laws and regulations for the defense and benefit of the people of this State, Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1, by establishing certain limits on fees in the short term to allow counties time to develop their fee schedules autonomously in compliance with 33 M.R.S. § 751(14-C) (2011) and by requiring the implementation of those fee schedules on August 1, 2012. The Legislature did not, by enacting this policy-based legislation, usurp the adjudicatory power of the courts. See Me. Const. art. III, § 2; Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1; Me. Const. art. VI, § 1.
[¶ 30] When the State exercises its police power to regulate for the general welfare and a fundamental right is not at issue, statutes are subjected to rational basis review. State v. Haskell, 2008 ME 82, ¶ 5, 955 A.2d 737. We defer to the Legislature in its balancing of competing interests to regulate social and economic issues. Id. The party challenging a statute's constitutionality therefore bears the burden of proving a constitutional deficiency and must establish the complete absence of any state of facts that would support the need for [the statute's] enactment. Id. (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 31] When conducting this rational basis review, we review whether (1) the police powers [were] exercised to provide for the public welfare; (2) the legislative means employed [were] appropriate to achieve the ends sought; and (3) the manner of exercising the power [was] not ... unduly arbitrary or capricious. Id. ¶ 6 (quotation marks omitted). The Legislature need not provide the facts upon which its rationale rests, so long as some theoretical explanation exists. Id. [¶ 32] The requests made by MacImage and Simpson alerted the Legislature to the novel issue before the counties, and the resulting public law sought to bring legislatively established standards to an area of generally applicable law that lacked definition at the time of MacImage's and Simpson's requests. The Legislature was required to balance the public's interest in access to the records with the governmental costs of making those records available. It has done so in an area of evolving technology and varied fiscal considerations, and it has acknowledged the need for attention to the emerging issues through the sunset provision that will require the issues to be revisited by the counties' commissioners. We conclude that the Legislature had a rational basis for acting to resolve an issue of important public interest. See id. The means employed to address the issue may have resulted in reduced anticipated revenues for MacImage and Simpson, but the Legislature could have balanced their private interests with the counties' and the public's interests to design its legislative solution, and this type of exercise of its legislative power is neither arbitrary nor capricious. See id. There was no due process violation.
[¶ 33] To succeed in an equal protection challenge where, as here, the challenging party is not a member of a suspect class, a party challenging a statute must show (1) that similarly situated persons are not treated equally under the law, and (2) that the statute is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Town of Frye Island v. State, 2008 ME 27, ¶ 14, 940 A.2d 1065. When a statute is reviewed under the rational basis standard, it bears a strong presumption of validity. Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 28, 728 A.2d 127. It will be deemed unconstitutional on equal protection grounds only if the discriminatory legislative classification is arbitrary, unreasonable or irrational. McBreairty v. Comm'r of Admin. & Fin. Servs., 663 A.2d 50, 53 (Me.1995) (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 34] Regarding the first of the factors for our consideration, MacImage and Simpson have failed to establish that their situation differs from others similarly situated. See Town of Frye Island, 2008 ME 27, ¶ 14, 940 A.2d 1065. The maximum rates that may be charged to MacImage are no greater than the maximum rates that may be charged to others seeking either individual copies or bulk data during the same time period. [¶ 35] Moreover, in considering the second part of the equal protection analysis, the staggered timing of the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest in balancing the interests of the registers of deeds, the interests of the requestors, and the interests of the public. See id. There is a rational relationship between the provisions of P.L.2011, ch. 378, § 3 and the legislative purpose to provide guidance on how high a fee would have to be to be unreasonable within the meaning of title 33 during the time before the Legislature acted to clarify its intended meaning. Pursuant to section 3, all digital copy rates of $1.50 or less per page set between September 1, 2009, and the legislation's June 16, 2011, effective date are deemed reasonable. This portion of the legislation demonstrates an effort to provide some limited guidance regarding decisions made by counties when the statute provided only a vague reasonableness standard, and other portions of the Act give the counties direction for setting fees in the future. Because the legislation does not treat similarly situated parties differently and bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest, it does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Town of Frye Island, 2008 ME 27, ¶ 14, 940 A.2d 1065.
[¶ 36] The government may not take private property for public use without providing just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V; Me. Const. art. I, § 21. Although both tangible and intangible property may be the subject of an impermissible taking, there is no property right to potential or future profits. Me. Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass'n v. State, 619 A.2d 94, 97 (Me.1993). Thus, although MacImage and Simpson requested digital copies of the registry records, their planned commercial enterprise does not create an existing property interest in obtaining those records without paying a reasonable fee. Accordingly, no governmental taking has been effectuated through the enactment of P.L.2011, ch. 378.
[¶ 37] The Legislature shall, from time to time, provide, as far as practicable, by general laws, for all matters usually appertaining to special or private legislation. Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 13. The enacted legislation does not offend this Special Legislation Clause because the enacted law is not a private resolve singling out an individual for unique treatment; rather, the Legislature was attempting to address a newly developing issue that broadly affects the counties in the state and all entities who have requestedand will requestbulk digital information from the counties. Cf. Brann v. State, 424 A.2d 699, 704 (Me.1981) (stating that the Special Legislation Clause prohibits special legislation that exempts one individual from generally applicable legal requirements, with general legislation preferred as far as practicable). We discern no constitutional infirmity.