Opinion ID: 2009705
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petitioner's (Housing Provider's) Appeal

Text: Petitioner contends that it did not violate D.C.Code § 45-2520(e) because that provision was not intended to limit a housing provider's right to a rent adjustment; it was intended merely to limit the time within which RACD may act on a capital improvement petition. We must defer to an agency's interpretation of the statute which it administers ... so long as that interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the statutory language. Boer v. Rental Hous. Comm'n, 564 A.2d 54, 57 (D.C.1989). The agency's interpretation, therefore, is controlling unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the statute. Weaver Bros. v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 473 A.2d 384, 388 (D.C.1984). We conclude that RHC's interpretation of D.C.Code § 45-2520(e) is not unreasonable; it is consistent with the plain language and legislative history of the statute. Subsection (e)(2), supra note 1, clearly states that if the Rent Administrator fails to issue a decision within 60 days after receipt of a complete capital improvements petition, that failure shall operate to allow the petitioner to proceed with a capital improvement. D.C.Code § 45-2520(e)(2) (emphasis added). This language, therefore, can reasonably be interpreted to mean that, absent permission from the Rent Administrator, a capital improvements petitioner is not allow[ed] to proceed before expiration of the 60-day period. Moreover, as discussed in RHC's February 10, 1993 order, the legislative history of sub-section (e) supports RHC's interpretation: Subsection (e) requires the rent administrator to issue a decision on a capital improvement petition within 60 days after receiving the completed petition. If the administrator fails to meet this deadline, then the petitioner may proceed with the capital improvement. COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS FOR THE AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE FOR BILL 6-33, Section 210(e) (April 30, 1985) (emphasis added). This legislative history is consistent with RHC's interpretation that, unless the Rent Administrator issues an affirmative decision within the required 60 days, a housing provider may proceed with the capital improvement only [i]f  and thus only after  the administrator fails to meet this [60-day] deadline. Id. Finally, this interpretation of subsection (e) is reinforced by the inclusion of subsection (g), which authorizes a housing provider to make capital improvements before approval by the Rent Administrator when there is in an emergency, i.e., when the capital improvements are immediately necessary to maintain the health or safety of the tenants. See supra note 2. This provision, therefore, implies  consistent with RHC's interpretation of subsection (e)  that absent an emergency, capital improvements are not permitted without prior approval of the Rent Administrator.
We turn, therefore, to the question of the sanction to be imposed for § 45-2520(e) violation. In the RHC proceeding, both initially and on reconsideration, petitioner rested its case on two claims: (1) the statute was not intended to limit a housing provider's right to proceed with a capital improvement during the 60-day waiting, and in any event, (2) as a matter of fact and of law, petitioner had not proceeded with any of the capital improvements during the statutory 60-day waiting period. Implicitly, therefore, petitioner conceded that if it lost these arguments (which it did), RHC's sanction  no rent ceiling increase for the capital improvements  was not inappropriate. Petitioner now argues, for the first time in this litigation, that even if a housing provider violates § 45-2520(e), such a violation does not preclude a rent ceiling increase for capital improvements. Aside, however, from suggesting that the Rent Administrator has authority to impose a fine for a violation of the Rental Housing Act, petitioner offers no reason why a fine  and not denial of the capital improvements petition  would be the only appropriate remedy. In any event, [i]n the absence of exceptional circumstances, this court will not entertain contentions not raised before the agency. Glenbrook Rd. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 605 A.2d 22, 33 (D.C.1992); see Lundahl v. Department of Employment Servs., 596 A.2d 1001, 1003 (D.C.1991) (Ordinarily, failure to raise a claim at the agency level precludes its consideration on appeal.). We perceive no exceptional circumstances presented by the particular facts of this appeal that would warrant our consideration of petitioner's contention despite the failure to present it to RHC. We therefore do not disturb RHC's sanctions here. [6]