Opinion ID: 1789862
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the sample binder

Text: Standard Plan also argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a sample binder, which read as follows: The undersigned Company agrees to extend the following coverages as are indicated by the mark X as respects the described automobile for a period of 30 days from the effective date indicated, pending the issuance of an automobile insurance policy. This extension of insurance shall be in accordance with the terms of the Company's auto insurance policies and manual of rates and classifications applicable in the state on the effective date of this agreement. This agreement may be canceled by the Company by mailing written notice to the applicant stating when in accordance with any applicable statutes or policy terms such cancellation shall be effective. Standard Plan argues that this evidence was inadmissible because the document had no relationship to this case but was introduced as a `sample widely used by other insurance companies.' [8] The Tuckers called Ronald Gaiser as an insurance expert. Gaiser testified as to the industry standard regarding binders. In conjunction with this testimony, the Tuckers' attorney offered into evidence a sample binder, which Gaiser testified represented the industry standard regarding binders. The trial court admitted this sample binder into evidence over Standard Plan's objections. The record reveals that the sample binder was offered as demonstrative evidence of the expert's opinion as to the industry standard regarding binders. Demonstrative evidence is admissible so long as the proper foundation is laid. See, e.g., Griffin v. Gregory, 355 So.2d 691 (Ala.1978). The admissibility of such evidence is within the trial court's discretion and, absent an abuse of that discretion, the trial court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Payne v. Jones, 284 Ala. 196, 224 So.2d 230 (1969). Standard Plan has not shown that the evidence was inadmissible or that it was prejudiced by the admission of this evidence. Therefore, we hold that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.