Opinion ID: 1560501
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jones-Lowe as Cross-Movant

Text: The fact that SOLEXCO is not entitled to a summary judgment quieting title in it does not mean that Jones-Lowe is entitled to such a judgment on its cross-motion. In a quiet-title action, [i]f the complainant fails to make his proof of peaceful possession, he can not have title quieted in him .... [But] ... if the respondent has made an adequate answer and the proof shows that he has the better title and peaceful possession, then title should be quieted in the respondent .... Hinds v. Slack, 293 Ala. 25, 29, 299 So.2d 717, 720 (1974) (first emphasis added). See also Ala.Code 1975, § 6-6-543 (The court shall, upon the finding of the jury or upon [its own] consideration and determination [where it sits as the fact-finder], finally adjudge whether the defendant has any right, title, or interest in, or encumbrance upon, such lands, ... [and] what such right, title, interest, or encumbrance is and in or upon what part of the lands the same exits; and such judgment is binding and conclusive upon all the parties to the action.). Thus, as the summary-judgment cross-movant, Jones-Lowe bears the burden of showing more than the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to SOLEXCO's quiet-title claim. Jones-Lowe must affirmatively show that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on its own quiet-title claim. This it has not done. The motions and responses filed by Jones-Lowe in regard to the summary judgments sought by the respective sides contained no argument that Jones-Lowe Company has peaceful possession of the mineral rights, or that SOLEXCO does not have the requisite peaceful possession. They contain only two or three isolated, conclusory assertions that Jones-Lowe Company is in possession. Jones-Lowe did not, for example, attempt to inform the circuit court how Jones-Lowe Company has peaceful possession of minerals that have undisputedly never been severed from the land. The briefs Jones-Lowe filed in this Court are somewhat more enlightening in these respects. However, reversal of the circuit court's judgment predicated on the arguments in those briefs would, of necessity, be on a ground never argued in the circuit court. The same is true of the argument Jones-Lowe now makes in this Court that SOLEXCO's action is barred by the common-law rule of repose. In the circuit court, SOLEXCO argued that it was not `time-barred' from seeking a judicial declaration of its title, on the authority of Oehmig v. Johnson, 638 So.2d 846 (Ala. 1994), [2] which the circuit court cited in support of its judgment. Jones-Lowe did not respond to this argument but merely stated: Also, the doctrine of prescription and repose fit this case since more than 20 years have lapsed without action. The principle is well settled that, `on an appeal from a summary judgment, this Court cannot hold the trial court in error on the basis of arguments made for the first time on appeal.' Cain v. Howorth, 877 So.2d 566, 578 (Ala.2003) (quoting Ex parte Elba Gen. Hosp. & Nursing Home, Inc., 828 So.2d 308, 312 (Ala.2001)). See also Barnett v. Funding Plus of America, Inc., 740 So.2d 1069 (Ala.1999); West Town Plaza Assocs., Ltd. v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 619 So.2d 1290 (Ala. 1993). Thus, we do not consider Jones-Lowe's arguments regarding peaceful possession or the rule of repose. In the circuit court, Jones-Lowe presented only two arguments directed to the issue of Jones-Lowe Company's alleged superiority of title. Specifically, it argued for the application of (1) the doctrine of laches, and (2) Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-33, with its 10-year statute of limitations. However, neither of these arguments is made on appeal. Therefore, they are waived. Avis Rent A. Car Sys., Inc. v. Heilman, 876 So.2d 1111, 1124 n. 8 (Ala. 2003) (An argument not made on appeal is abandoned or waived.); Bettis v. Thornton, 662 So.2d 256, 257 (Ala.1995); Pardue v. Potter, 632 So.2d 470, 473 (Ala. 1994). For these reasons, the circuit court did not err in denying Jones-Lowe's motion for a summary judgment.