Opinion ID: 2230068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Legislative History/Origin

Text: The Majority's references to legislative history and origin (majority opn, at 695, 696) undercut the tripartite system of governance, as well as sound constitutional theory. This approach implies that, because the Legislature has previously made mistakes, it cannot successfully cure its flaws. Under this novel postulate, initial legislative missteps will always emerge from buried stages to haunt legitimate, future efforts. We respectfully suggest that it is at least equally necessary for the courts to place history and origin, by whatever characterization, in context and to interpret a law as it is written. Instead, the Majority emphasizes that in its draft stages, the bill has been referred to as Kiryas Joel No. 3 (majority opn, at 695), as though that title carried a constitutional infirmity, rather than simply reflecting the current legislative practice of attaching easily recognizable names to bills for better and broader understanding. Here, the statute was, indeed, a direct response to Kiryas Joel II (majority opn, at 695). Considered from a neutral perspective, we view this fact as supportive, rather than destructive, of the legislative effort. This law, after all, is the result of a concept that has thrice received the deliberative action of both Houses of the State Legislature, two Governors of opposing political parties and has been shaped by decisions of the highest courts of this State and of the United States. Further, if this Court ever thought that the history of this matter would be a perpetual albatross carried through all later drafts and enactments, then it should not have opened the window of a possibly acceptable theory of constitutionality ( see, Grumet v Cuomo, 90 NY2d 57, 75, supra ). Naturally, the Legislature pointedly and respectfully responded; we believe it did so successfully and constitutionally. Ironically, the Majority's rejection of chapter 390 fosters a tautological chase that the more the Legislature tries to accommodate concerns adjudicated by the Courts, the more the legislative cause is doomed by its ontology. No matter how many times the other two Branches of State government try to eradicate the Judiciary's perceived and delineated constitutional impediments, the effort loses, rather than gains, ground.