Opinion ID: 2382233
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Defamation Action

Text: The issues presented by appellant's action for defamation are (a) whether the statements about him, in particular, Professor Gluhman's evaluations, were defamatory; (b) if they were, whether their publication was either absolutely or qualifiedly privileged; and (c) if their publication was qualifiedly privileged, whether a jury could find that the College abused the privilege.
Whether a statement is defamatory is for the court. Beckman v. Dunn, 276 Pa.Super. 527, 534, 419 A.2d 583, 586 (1980). The test the court must apply is settled: A libel is a maliciously written or printed publication which tends to blacken a person's reputation or to expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to injure him in his business or profession. Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 441, 273 A.2d 899, 904 (1971); Volomino v. Messenger Publishing Co., 410 Pa. 611, 613, 189 A.2d 873, 874-75 (1963). A communication is defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of another so as to lower him in the estimation of the community or deter third persons from associating or dealing with him, Cosgrove Studio and Camera Shop, Inc. v. Pane, 408 Pa. 314, 182 A.2d 751 (1962), and necessarily involves the idea of disgrace. Vitteck v. Washington Broadcasting Co., 256 Pa.Super. 427, 389 A.2d 1197 (1978). `The test is the effect the [statement] is fairly calculated to produce, the impression it would naturally engender, in the minds of the average persons among whom it is intended to circulate.' Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., supra 441 Pa. at 447, 273 A.2d at 907, quoting, Boyer v. Pitt Publishing Co., 324 Pa. 154, 157, 188 A. 203, 204 (1936). Id., 276 Pa.Superior Ct. at 533-34, 419 A.2d at 586. By this test, Professor Gluhman's evaluations of appellant were without doubt defamatory, for they attacked appellant in virtually every aspect of his profession: his classroom presentation (unsystematic and unimaginative; absented himself from the class for long periods); his grading (confusing and arbitrary to the point of eccentricity); his supervision of advanced work (irresponsible; misunderstood the nature and seriousness of this advanced instructional option); and his professional relations (accusations [against the head of the Art Department] so absurd and demonstrably untrue that they would seem pathetic were they not so calculated and vicious). Such statements necessarily tend[ed] to blacken appellant's reputation, injure[d] him in his . . . profession, lower[ed] him in the estimate of the community, and deter[red] third persons from assisting or dealing with him. [3] For the same reasons that the Gluhman evaluations were defamatory, so too was the Pease evaluation. In one sense, indeed, the Pease evaluation was more aggravated than the Gluhman evaluations. Since its author, an Acting Dean of another institution, was reporting to Provost Sause as an outside consultant, a degree of impartiality was to be expected; and yet in substance the Gluhman evaluations were accepted, and many of them summarized, without any discussion with appellant. [4] A jury might find that appellant's reputation was more grievously harmed by the purportedly impartial evaluation of an outside consultant than by the Gluhman evaluations. The College, it may be added, was evidently of the same opinion, for as noted, the President wrote appellant that it had been concluded that the Pease evaluation should no longer be associated with your personnel records and that it had not been included in the material transmitted to the Appointments, Promotions and Dismissals Committee for its consideration.
With the conclusion that the Gluhman and Pease evaluations were defamatory, it becomes necessary to determine whether their publication was privileged. The majority holds that the Gluhman evaluations were absolutely privileged because, it says, appellant consented to [their] publication. Maj. op. at 74. This conclusion, I submit, is contrary both to the facts stated in appellant's complaint and in his reply to new matter, and to settled law. [5] In my view, the trial court erred in sustaining the College's preliminary objections to the Gluhman evaluations because, accepting as true all material facts set forth in the complaint, and in appellant's reply to new matter in which he denied that the Gluhman evaluations were absolutely privileged, the law [ does not ] say[] with certainty that no recovery is possible. Mahoney v. Furches, supra . My reasons for so concluding shall become apparent shortly. Since the trial court erred in sustaining the preliminary objections, however, and since therefore the Gluhman evaluations should have been considered by the court on the College's motion for summary judgment, I shall consider the Gluhman evaluations with the Pease evaluation, as on motion for summary judgment. The various absolute privileges that may be asserted in defending against an action for defamation are based upon policy that treats the ends to be gained by permitting defamatory statements as outweighing the harm that may be done to the reputation. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 584, Title B (1958). These absolute privileges are based chiefly upon a recognition of the necessity that certain persons, because of their special position or status, should be as free as possible from fear that their actions in that position might have an adverse effect upon their own personal interests. To accomplish this, it is necessary for them to be protected not only from civil liability but also from the danger of even an unsuccessful civil action. To this end, it is necessary that the propriety of their conduct not be inquired into indirectly by either court or jury in civil proceedings brought against them for misconduct in their position. Therefore the privilege, or immunity, is absolute and the protection that it affords is complete. It is not conditioned upon the honest and reasonable belief that the defamatory matter is true or upon the absence of ill will on the part of the actor. Id. See also Prosser and Keeton, Torts 815 (5th ed. 1984) ([the absolute privilege] rests upon the . . . idea that conduct which otherwise would be actionable is to escape liability because the defendant is acting in furtherance of some interest of social importance, which is entitled to protection, even at the expense of uncompensated harm to the plaintiff's reputation.). Thus, absolute privileges have been created for statements made in legislative proceedings, see, e.g., Jennings v. Cronin, 256 Pa.Super. 398, 389 A.2d 1183 (1978), and judicial proceedings, see, e.g., Binder v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 442 Pa. 319, 275 A.2d 53 (1971). With regard to cases in which the person defamed has consented to publication of the statement, the Restatement provides: Except as stated in § 584, [6] the consent of another to the publication of defamatory matter concerning him is a complete defense to his action for defamation. Restatement (Second) of Torts supra § 583. It is apparent that for Section 583 to be applicable  i.e., before the consent of another to the publication may be found  it must appear that the person alleged to have consented knew that the material to be published might be defamatory. As the Restatement comment puts the point: It is not necessary that the other know that the matter to the publication of which he consents is defamatory in character. It is enough that he knows the exact language of the publication or that he has reason to know that it may be defamatory. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 583, comment d. Here, as noted above in stating the facts, appellant, when he initiated his appeal, had not been shown the Gluhman and Pease evaluations, and indeed was not shown them even when he further appealed the President's decision to the board of trustees. Assuming  and the record is unclear on this  that appellant even knew of the existence of the evaluations when he initiated his appeal, [7] nothing in the record supports a finding that he had reason to know they might be defamatory. Especially is this so when it is borne in mind that this case arises on appeal from a summary judgment, so that we must examine the record in the light most favorable to appellant. Taylor v. Tukanowicz, supra . [8] In addition to these reasons, there is yet another reason why Section 583 is inapplicable. As comment d points out, [O]ne who agrees to submit his conduct to investigation knowing that its results will be published, consents to the publication of the honest findings of the investigators. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 585, comment d (emphasis added). The essence of appellant's claim is that the Gluhman [and Pease] evaluations, did not represent honest findings, and a great deal in the record supports that claim. The College itself acknowledged that the Pease evaluation was methodologically flawed and withdrew it from appellant's file. As for the Gluhman evaluations: The College manifested its doubts about Professor Gluhman's reliability by having appellant meet with the President, Provost, and Assistant Provost, to discuss Gluhman's behavior; the College psychiatrist was asked to speak with appellant regarding Gluhman's emotional stability (whether Gluhman was really letting his temper carry him away and whether he should cool off, calm down); Provost Sause engaged William Loerke specifically to evaluate Gluhman, including his competence in his field and the judgment he exercises regarding performance of teachers of studio and art history [which would include appellant]; Sause himself took some of the statements in the Gluhman evaluations with a grain of salt, frankly; and Gluhman was not granted tenure. Again, it must be emphasized that the case arises on appeal from a summary judgment. Perhaps at a trial a jury would find that the evaluations were honest. The issue at this point, however, is only whether, after examining the record in the light most favorable to appellant, and after resolving all doubts in appellant's favor, we can say that there is no genuine issue as to whether the evaluations were honest. Taylor v. Tukanowicz, supra . The majority, however, not only fails to acknowledge that this is the standard we must apply, it declines to apply, Maj. op. at 74, comment d's provision that while one may consent to publication of an evaluation of his conduct, the consent is to the publication of the honest findings of the investigators. The only reason the majority gives for declin[ing] to apply comment d is that it is inconsistent with Section 583. Maj. op. at 74. I do not understand this. I find no inconsistency. The comment simply recognizes that there are two situations in which one may consent to publication of a defamatory statement: One, where one knows that a statement exists, and one has reason to know that it may be defamatory, the other, where one does not know that a statement exists but does know that in the course of an investigation of one's conduct it may be made and published, in which case one's consent to publication is consent only to publication of honest findings. The case law on consent as a defense to defamation confirms this analysis. For the cases show that the basis, or rationale, of the principle that consent to publication of a defamatory statement will preclude recovery for defamation is that one may not, knowing or having reason to know that a statement is defamatory, at the same time consent to the publication and seek damages because of the publication. This rationale was clearly stated by the Supreme Court of Oregon in Lee v. Paulsen, 273 Or. 103, 106, 539 P.2d 1079, 1080-81 (1976): Shinglemeyer v. Wright, 124 Mich. 230, 82 N.W. 887, 890 (1900), illustrates this rationale. In a private conversation between the parties the defendant charged the plaintiff with stealing his wheel. Plaintiff called a policeman. When he came she told him that the defendant had accused her of stealing his wheel and, in effect, asked him to hear the defendant's version. Defendant told the officer that the plaintiff had stolen his wheel. Plaintiff brought a slander action based upon the defendant's statement to the officer. The court held for defendant, stating: In regard to the statement by defendant in the presence of the officer Henry, it was not a publication for which the law gives a remedy. She herself solicited the statement, and sent for the officer for the express purpose of having the defendant repeat the statement in his presence. It would not have been stated to him except by her invitation. Shinglemeyer v. Wright, supra [82 N.W.], at p. 890, starting at 3. The facts in Lee v. Paulsen, supra , were as follows. The plaintiff, a teacher, requested a statement of the reasons for his dismissal from employment. At a public hearing on his dismissal, after the plaintiff had been furnished with the statement, the plaintiff's counsel requested that the statement be read, and it was that reading that served as the basis of the plaintiff's action for defamation. In holding the statement absolutely privileged, the Supreme Court of Oregon recognized that knowledge that the statement would be defamatory was essential in order for the publication to be absolutely privileged. Id. at 107, 539 P.2d at 1081. The court also stated why, given such knowledge by the plaintiff, publication was absolutely privileged: The reason for the imposition of the privilege when the plaintiff consents or requests the publication is based upon the unwillingness of the courts to let the plaintiff `lay the foundation of a lawsuit for his own pecuniary gain.' Id., 539 P.2d at 1080 (quoting Harper and James, The Law of Torts 400 (1956), and Richardson v. Gundy, 88 Kan. 47, 54, 127 P. 533 536 (1912). See also Mick v. American Dental Association, 49 N.J.Super. 262, 275, 139 A.2d 570, 577 (1958) (It is offensive to an elementary sense of justice that after securing defendant's candid expression of plaintiff's views . . . [plaintiff] should be permitted to sue for the injury he thus invited.). Unlike the plaintiff in Lee v. Paulsen, supra , appellant knew neither the contents of the Gluhman and Pease evaluations nor that he would find statements in them defamatory. It may not be said of appellant, as it could be said of the plaintiff in Lee v. Paulsen , that he requested publication of the evaluations, knowing they were defamatory, to lay the foundation of a lawsuit against the College. This is therefore not a case like Lee v. Paulsen , in which the absolute privilege of consent was applicable. Neither is this a case in which the ends to be gained by permitting defamatory statements . . . outweigh[] the harm that may be done to the reputation. Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra § 584, Title B. The majority relies upon DeLuca v. Reader, 227 Pa.Super. 392, 323 A.2d 309 (1974), as support for its conclusion that by consenting to be evaluated, appellant consented to be defamed. DeLuca is not in point, as examination of its facts will disclose. DeLuca's employer informed him that he was discharged because of his failure to turn in money collected and his failure to note the cash collection on the company's receipt. Id., 227 Pa.Superior Ct. at 396, 323 A.2d at 311. The next day a manager of the employer wrote DeLuca a letter confirming the dismissal; DeLuca later alleged that this letter contained defamatory statements. Before suing his employer, DeLuca invoked the grievance procedures contained in the collective bargaining agreement of the union of which he was a member, and as a result, his job was reinstated. DeLuca then sued his employer for defamation. In holding that the employer's letter was privileged, we said: In express furtherance of this policy of private resolution of disputes between employers and employees and unions, the courts have held such remarks are absolutely privileged. Id., 227 Pa.Superior Ct. at 399, 323 A.2d at 313. Initially it should be noted, as the majority acknowledges, that the opinion may be read as applying the privilege solely to remarks made by an employer about a union member for the purpose of fostering private resolution of labor management disputes. The more important point, however, is that an examination of the opinion in DeLuca reveals that despite our use of the term absolutely privileged, we were applying a qualified privilege. Thus we observed that [t]he letter forming the basis of the action was not unusually published having been sent to the appellee, a vice president of the union, the union business agent and the union shop steward, all persons having an interest in this proceeding and in accordance with the written contract. Id., 227 Pa.Superior Ct. at 397, 323 A.2d at 312. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra § 596. If we were applying an absolute privilege, these facts would be without significance. Moreover, after concluding that the statements made in the letter were privileged, we went on to decide that there was no evidence of malice. As the majority acknowledges, consideration of malice is irrelevant when an absolute privilege is invoked. Maj. op. at 75 (The existence of malice, recklessness or negligence does not defeat a privilege based on consent, because such a privilege is absolute.). Finally, even if we had applied an absolute privilege in DeLuca, DeLuca is like Lee v. Paulsen, supra , for it was with knowledge of the contents of the alleged defamatory letter that DeLuca instituted action under the grievance procedures in his union contract. Here, appellant did not have knowledge of the contents of the alleged defamatory material at the time he exercised his right to appeal under the faculty handbook. The cases that the majority has cited from other jurisdictions likewise do not support the majority's position. Ernst v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Ind.App., 475 N.E.2d 351 (1985), is like DeLuca v. Reader, supra . Ernst was involved in an accident in a company vehicle; his employer claimed that the accident occurred when Ernst was off duty. As a result of injuries sustained in the accident Ernst was unable to work, and for a year he was paid under a company benefit plan. When his employment was terminated, Ernst filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement to which he was subject, challenging his employer's conclusion that his injuries had been sustained when he was off duty. The court concluded that the company's statement of its version of the facts was absolutely privileged because when Ernst invoked the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, he consented to the publication of the company's version of the matter. Id. 475 N.E.2d at 355. Thus, as in DeLuca v. Reader, supra , but not as in this case, when Ernst filed his grievance, he knew what the company's version was. Royer v. Steinberg, 90 Cal.App.3d 490, 153 Cal.Rptr. 499 (1979), and Johnson v. City of Buckner, 610 S.W.2d 406 (Mo.App. 1980), are absolute privilege cases and also demonstrate the principle of Lee v. Paulsen, supra . In each, the plaintiff expressly invited the defamatory comments, with knowledge of their contents, and the court held the statement not to be actionable. In addition it should be noted that while Royer v. Steinberg is not in point, another case, decided by the same court but not cited by the majority, is in point. In Slaughter v. Friedman, 127 Cal.App.3d 704, 179 Cal.Rptr. 722 (1982), patients of the plaintiff, a dentist, submitted claims to an insurance company. In response to some of the claims the company denied coverage and in its denial notices made statements concerning the plaintiff and his practice that he considered to be defamatory. In holding that the plaintiff had not consented to the publication of the statements, and that the statements were therefore not absolutely privileged, the court stated: Defendants contend that the communications involved are not actionable because plaintiff had consented to the publication of the defamation, if any. Unlike Royer v. Steinberg (1979)[,] 90 Cal.App.3d 490, 153 Cal.Rptr. 499, on which defendants rely, the plaintiff here had not, himself published the communications herein involved. Plaintiff's consent to have the claims evaluated by defendants did not extend to a consent to the making of the allegedly defamatory communications now before us. 179 Cal.Rptr. at 725. [9] Dominquez v. Babcock, Colo.App., 696 P.2d 338 (1984), cert. granted February 4, 1985, must be read as a qualified, not an absolute, privilege case. The issue was whether, when an employee requested accountability for alleged defamatory statements made by other faculty members, the employee had consented to their subsequent publication. On motion for summary judgment, the trial court found consent. The court of appeals held that there was a question of fact as to whether the request for accountability amounted to consent. The court of appeals further held, however, that even if there had been no consent, still summary judgment was proper because plaintiff failed to present any evidence which would sustain a factual finding that defendants had abused their qualified privilege. Id. 696 P.2d at 342. Finally, the majority cites Gengler v. Phelps, 92 N.M. 465, 589 P.2d 1056 (1978). There, plaintiff was given three months prior notice of the termination of employment as a nurse anesthetist at a hospital. During that period, in an application for employment at another hospital, the plaintiff stated that references could be sought from her present employer any time. In response to inquiries, her employer stated that the plaintiff lacked professional competence. The court held that the statement was absolutely privileged. It is not clear from the case report whether the plaintiff knew what kind of recommendation would be given but it does seem clear that the court's holding was based on public policy: In the business and professional world, public policy necessitates the disclosure of an employee's prior services when inquiry is made with the consent of the employee. Id. at 467. 589 P.2d at 1058. This generalization is at best imprecise and should not be taken literally, for to do so would obliterate the distinction between absolute privileges and qualified privileges: an employer may well have a privilege to make statements about an employee's prior services, but this privilege is not absolute; it is qualified, and as such, may be lost if abused.
Without doubt, the College did have a qualified (or, in the Restatement's term, a conditional) privilege to publish defamatory evaluations of a member of its faculty: information regarding the competence of the faculty affect[ed] a sufficiently important interest of the College, and the recipient's knowledge of the defamatory matter [was] of service in the lawful protection of that interest. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 594; and see Banas v. Matthews International Corp., 348 Pa.Super. 464, 502 A.2d 637 (1985). The question to be decided, therefore, is whether the College abused its qualified privilege  more exactly, whether, viewing the record in the light most favorable to appellant, and resolving all doubts in appellant's favor, there is a genuine issue as to whether the College abused its qualified privilege. One who has a qualified privilege abuses the privilege if he knows the matter published to be false, or acts in reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity, or is negligent with regard to the truth or falsity of the matter. Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 506 Pa. 304, 485 A.2d 374 (1984), appeal pending ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 3496, 87 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985); Banas v. Matthews International Corp., supra ; Rutt v. Bethlehems' Globe Publishing Co., 335 Pa.Super. 163, 484 A.2d 72 (1984). And see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 600 (conditional privilege abused if statement made with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard as to its truth.) Applying this test, I find that there is indeed a genuine issue as to whether the College abused its qualified privilege to publish the Gluhman and Pease evaluations of appellant's conduct. The most obvious instance that a jury might find constituted an abuse of privilege was the College's publication of the Gluhman evaluations to Temple University, when after not being rehired by the College, appellant applied for a position at Temple. As already discussed, the record as it now stands includes ample evidence on the basis of which a jury could find that the College knew or should have known that the Gluhman evaluations were false, and that the College should therefore not have published their contents but should have removed them from appellant's file, as it had removed the Pease evaluation. Of course, at a trial the jury might find otherwise: given a fuller record, and with the benefit of observing the witnesses, the jury might find, for example, that contrary to appellant's testimony on deposition, the Gluhman evaluations were not published to Temple, or, even if they were, that they were not false. This possibility, however, is of no relevance to disposition of this appeal, arising as it does from summary judgment. Another, less obvious but by no means obscure, instance that a jury might find constituted an abuse of privilege was Provost Sause's publication of the Gluhman and Pease evaluations to the Appointments, Promotions and Dismissals Committee. The jury might find that Sause knew that Professor Gluhman was emotionally unstable; that Sause further knew, or at least should have surmised, that Gluhman's very negative evaluations of appellant were, or might be, motivated by Gluhman's anger upon learning of appellant's meeting with the President, Sause himself, and the Assistant Provost, at which Gluhman's conduct was discussed; and finally, that Sause made no effort to verify the accuracy of the statements in the Gluhman evaluations, even though he took the allegations (one of the most serious) that appellant had indulge[d] in slander, character defamation, and criminal allegations with a grain of salt, frankly. On the basis of these findings the jury might further find that Sause either knew that the Gluhman evaluations were false, recklessly disregarded or was negligent as to whether they were true or false, and that therefore, in publishing them to the committee, he abused the College's qualified privilege. The jury might make the same finding with respect to Sause's publication to the committee of the Pease evaluation, since that evaluation not only accepted Professor Gluhman's evaluation of appellant but did so without consulting appellant. The possibility that the jury might make these findings is, moreover, considerably enhanced by the fact that when, in response to appellant's appeal, an advisory committee examined the Gluhman and Pease evaluation, it rejected them both out of hand. As discussed more fully in stating the facts, Professors Norton and Miller concluded that Professor Gluhman was not capable of a fair evaluation of appellant. Professor Fanelli regarded the evaluations as invalid, and the Pease evaluation was dismissed as flawed (Norton), and clandestine and more or less predetermined. If, the jury might well ask, the advisory committee so regarded the Gluhman and Pease evaluations, how was it that Sause had considered them worthy of publication to the Appointments, Promotions and Dismissals Committee? The order of the trial court should therefore be reversed and the case remanded for trial on the issues whether the Gluhman and Pease evaluations were published (as noted, whether they were defamatory is an issue for the court, not for the jury, and they were defamatory); and if they were published, whether they were true, or if not true, whether in publishing them the College abused its qualified privilege to publish them.