Opinion ID: 2639478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Excessive Train Speed Theory

Text: ¶ 18 Two of Pearl's four negligence theories are based upon the premise that the train in question was traveling at an excessive speed at the time of the accident. Pearl specifically claims that the train was exceeding the federally mandated speed limit at the crossing (hereinafter the excessive speed claim) and the Railroad was exceeding a safe speed in light of the specific, individualized hazard the Railroad had created at the crossing. ¶ 19 It is undisputed that the train at issue in this case was traveling 40 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Further, the record reflects that at the time of the accident, the track was classified pursuant to federal regulation as a Class 3 track, which has a maximum allowable speed of 40 miles per hour. [16] ¶ 20 Since the train was traveling within the speed limit established in the federal regulations, Pearl's common law negligence claims premised upon excessive train speed are therefore preempted by federal law. The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 421-447 expressly preempts all Pearl's claims based upon excessive train speed. Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the maximum allowable speeds codified at 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a) cover[ ] the subject matter of train speed with respect to track conditions, including conditions posed by grade crossings, and therefore, preempt common law tort claims asserting the train traveled at an excessive rate of speed. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 675, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). Thus, pursuant to the FRSA and the rule in Easterwood, all Pearl's excessive train speed claims are preempted. ¶ 21 Pearl has sought to circumvent federal preemption by arguing that the track should have been classified at a lower classification and therefore, a lower speed limit should have been applicable at the time of the accident. Pearl argued that the jury was entitled to determine the class of track and its corresponding speed limit. The trial court agreed and instructed the jury on this issue. The COCA held the trial court erred in giving this instruction and this Court agrees. The federal regulations explicitly place the responsibility of the determination whether to lower a track's classification (and the track's corresponding speed limit) upon either a Federal Railroad Administration Track Inspector or a State Track Inspector. 49 C.F.R. § 216.15(a). That regulation provides in pertinent part as follows: When an FRA Track Inspector or State Track Inspector determines that track does not comply with the requirements for the class at which the track is being operated... he notifies the railroad in writing that the track is being lowered in class and that operations over that track must comply with the speed limitations prescribed in part 213 of this chapter. 49 C.F.R. § 216.15(a). Pursuant to this federal authority, the determination of whether to lower the track classification and its corresponding speed limit is clearly for the FRA track inspector and/or State Track Inspector rather than a question of fact for the jury. Federal law provides ... the decision to downgrade a track belongs to the FRA track inspector. Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 110 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1092 (E.D.Ark. 2000). ¶ 22 In Stevenson, the plaintiffs argued that a track should have been downgraded and a corresponding lower speed limit should have been implemented prior to the motor vehicle-train accident at issue in that case due to a number of track conditions found in the area including the specific local hazard. Id. at 1091. The Stevenson court rejected this argument, reasoning that Plaintiffs are attempting to reclassify the track after the fact. This is an impermissible collateral attack on the regulatory process. Id. In this case, the record is absent any evidence of either a FRA Track Inspector and/or State Track Inspector's determination that the track in question did not meet the requirements of a class 3 track. Further, there is no evidence of any written notification to the Railroad of any federal or state inspector's determination in this case that a lowering in track classification was warranted. In fact, The Federal Railroad Administration inspection report of January 22, 1997 [17] indicates the FRA Inspector inspected the track in Mena, Arkansas at that time, noted the presence of defects, but expressly indicated there were no violations, and no reduction in track classification at that time. Just as the plaintiff's attempt in Stevenson failed, Pearl's attempt to re-classify the track after the fact in this case likewise fails as an impermissible collateral attack on the regulatory process.