Opinion ID: 1790139
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Chambers County Sheriff's Department

Text: The Chambers County Sheriff's Department is not a legal entity subject to suit. Therefore, a cause of action may not be maintained against the Chambers County Sheriff's Department. The pleadings of both parties seem to indicate that the party meant to be named was Sheriff James C. Morgan. Sheriff Morgan was never properly added as a party to this action. In his brief in support of the motion to dismiss the Chambers County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Morgan requested that for purposes of final disposition of this matter, the suit be viewed as one against not only the Sheriff's Department, but also against the sheriff. Because the pleadings were not amended before appeal, Sheriff Morgan is not properly before this Court. However, in the interest of complete justice, we will address his potential liability. The sole claim of liability against the Sheriff's Department and, allegedly Sheriff Morgan, is respondeat superior. White alleges no personal involvement of Sheriff Morgan. In Parker, this Court held that a sheriff was a state officer and, therefore, was immune from suit based upon alleged negligence in executing his discretionary duties of hiring a jailer. Parker, 519 So.2d at 446. In Montiel v. Holcombe, 240 Ala. 352, 199 So. 245 (1940), a suit brought against the sheriff of Mobile County to enjoin a prosecution, the defendant sheriff argued that the suit was one essentially against the state, in that it [was] brought against the named officers whose official duties required them to perform the acts which the bill sought to enjoin. Id. at 354, 199 So. at 246. In affirming the trial court's dismissal of the action, this court stated: The state has a manifest interest in and concern for the observance and enforcement of its criminal laws, and in the freedom of its officers to perform their duty in the detection of offenses and offenders against its laws. To restrain the sheriff and his deputies in that regard impinges uponbrings into questionthe powers of the state itself. Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 19 S.Ct. 269, 43 L.Ed. 535. Id. (quoting Ex parte State ex rel. Martin, 200 Ala. 15, 75 So. 327 (1917)). We hold that Parker stands for the proposition that the sheriff cannot be held liable under the theory of respondeat superior for the actions of his jailer because he is an officer of the state and the hiring of the jailer is one of his official duties. Thus, he is immune from this type of suit under Article I, § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901. It follows that Sheriff Morgan is immune from liability based upon a theory of respondeat superior for the actions of his deputy, Birchfield. However, by this opinion, we are not to be understood as granting absolute immunity to a sheriff in all situations. Our caselaw has established several exceptions to the rule of absolute immunity: [A] state officer or employee is not protected by § 14 when he acts willfully, maliciously, illegally, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law. See Lumpkin v. Cofield, 536 So.2d 62, 65 (Ala.1988); Barnes [v. Dale, 530 So.2d 770 (Ala.1988)], at 782; DeStafney v. University of Alabama, 413 So.2d 391, 393 (Ala.1981); Gill v. Sewell, 356 So.2d 1196, 1198 (Ala.1978); Unzicker v. State, 346 So.2d 931, 933 (Ala.1977); St. Clair County v. Town of Riverside, 272 Ala. 294, 296, 128 So.2d 333, 334 (1961). In addition, a state official is not immune from a suit to compel the performance of a legal duty, a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an unconstitutional law, a suit to compel the performance of a ministerial act, or a suit brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act. See DeStafney, 413 So.2d at 393 (citing Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 229, 250 So.2d 677, 679 (1971)); Gill, 356 So.2d at 1198; and Milton v. Espey, 356 So.2d 1201, 1203 (Ala. 1978). Phillips, 555 So.2d at 83. A claim of respondeat superior does not fit into any of these special exceptions to the absolute immunity afforded to state officials when the action is, in essence, one against the state. White's claim against Sheriff Morgan, based not upon the sheriff's actions as an individual, but upon his official position as employer of Birchfield, is, in essence, a claim against the state; therefore, that claim is barred by the absolute immunity of Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. We hold that Birchfield is entitled to substantive immunity, and that the remaining defendants, Leak, Chambers County, and the Chambers County Sheriff's Department, the various alleged employers of Birchfield, have absolute immunity in this case. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed. AFFIRMED. HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.