Opinion ID: 852020
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Current Case

Text: In its first opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that ShepCo was not liable for attorney’s fees because it was not a “public agency” that denied access to public records. It reasoned, “The attorney’s fees provisions of APRA are directed toward public agencies. There is no corollary provision for assessment of attorney’s fees against a private party in the event of improper nondisclosure.” Shepherd Props. Co., 950 N.E.2d at 325. The Court of Appeals added a footnote acknowledging the existence of Indianapolis Newspapers but did not explain whether that case had an effect on the present one. Id. at 325 n.6. 7 The Court of Appeals then granted rehearing to expand upon the issue of “the propriety of an award of attorney’s fees under the Indiana Access to Public Records Act.” Shepherd Props. Co., 955 N.E.2d at 209. The Court of Appeals recognized the observation from Indianapolis Newspapers that the APRA “‘contemplates the involvement of third parties.’” Id. (quoting Indianapolis Newspapers, 739 N.E.2d at 156). It also acknowledged that Knightstown Banner held that “private parties ‘aligned with the Town of Knightstown’ upon having been named as defendants in a lawsuit, should share joint and several liability with the Town for attorney’s fees and costs.” Id. (quoting Knightstown Banner, 889 N.E.2d at 319). But the Court of Appeals distinguished this case on the grounds that ShepCo was an “intervenor” in the litigation: We do not disagree with . . . prior observations from this Court, that APRA does not include language explicitly precluding attorney’s fees from a third party. Conversely, APRA does not include language providing for payment of attorney’s fees by an intervenor, and we will not write into the statute such a provision. Id. On transfer, ShepCo urges us to adopt the logic of the Court of Appeals, arguing that its status as an intervenor sets it apart from the private-party defendants in Indianapolis Newspapers and Knightstown Banner. ShepCo maintains that this is a “critical distinction” that shields it from liability for attorney’s fees under the APRA. Union contends that ShepCo’s participation in this action as an intervenor is not distinguishable from the participation of GIE and GIM in Knightstown Banner because ShepCo is likewise aligned with the public agency and actively opposed disclosure of the public records. We agree with Union that there is no meaningful distinction between ShepCo as an intervenor in the APRA litigation and other private-party defendants who also oppose disclosure. “An intervenor is treated as if it was an original party and has equal standing with the parties.” Mercantile Nat’l Bank of Indiana v. Teamsters Union Local #142 Pension Fund, 668 N.E.2d 1269, 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). And because we agree with the reasoning behind Indianapolis Newspapers and Knightstown Banner, we hold that it was permissible for the trial court to hold ShepCo jointly and severally liable for Union’s attorney’s fees. The text of the APRA and public policy support this conclusion. 8 As stated earlier, the APRA’s purpose is to ensure that the public is provided “full and complete information” about government affairs. I.C. § 5-14-3-1. Importantly, the Act mandates that it “shall be liberally construed to implement this policy.” Id. Indiana public agencies are the gateways for public-record requests. But the APRA expressly permits private entities, like ShepCo, to intervene in any action to compel disclosure. Id. § 5-14-3-9(e). Specifically, whenever an action is filed under the APRA, the “public agency must notify each person who supplied any part of the public record at issue” and “[s]uch persons are entitled to intervene in any litigation.” Id. Thus, the legislature, in inserting this language, was aware that any action brought under the APRA could implicate the interests of both public agencies and private entities and that both could actively oppose disclosure of the public records at issue. The APRA mandates an award of attorney’s fees to a plaintiff who “substantially prevails” if that party has first sought an advisory opinion from the public access counselor. Id. § 5-14-3-9(i). That subsection, however, is silent as to who is liable for the attorney’s fees. As evidenced by the parties’ arguments on the issue, this silence leaves the statute open to at least two different interpretations—that only public agencies are liable for prevailing plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees or that both public agencies and private parties involved in the litigation may be liable. Because the provision is susceptible to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous and open to statutory construction. City of North Vernon v. Jennings Nw. Reg’l Utils., 829 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. 2005). In construing the APRA’s attorney’s fees provision, this Court’s primary task is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Id. We presume that the legislature intended the language used in the statute to be applied logically and consistently with the APRA’s underlying policy and goals. See Cooper Indus., LLC v. City of South Bend, 899 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Ind. 2009). To shield private entities from liability for attorney’s fees would thwart, rather than further, the public policy underlying the APRA. Here, the legislature has made it clear that the APRA must be “liberally construed to implement” the policy of full access to public records and transparency of government affairs. I.C. § 5-14-3-1. And the legislature clearly contemplated the involvement of private parties in APRA litigation. Removing from private entities any fear 9 of liability for attorney’s fees would deter persons seeking to inspect public records from filing APRA actions, as the private entities could assert non-meritorious defenses to avoid disclosure and drive up litigation costs. In light of the “liberal” construction mandate and the underlying policy of the APRA, we construe Indiana Code section 5-14-3-9(i) as permitting private-party liability for a prevailing plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.4 Now that we have determined that private parties may be liable for attorney’s fees under the APRA, the question remains of how courts should apportion liability. When determining the allocation of attorney’s fees liability between a public agency and a private entity, courts should consider various factors, such as whether a party acted in good or bad faith; whether a party played a nominal or active role; and whether a party was partisan or neutral in the cause of action. This is precisely what the trial court did in this case when evaluating the respective roles 4 As Union points out in its transfer brief, the “American Rule” is not applicable to this case. “Indiana common law generally follows the ‘American Rule,’ under which each party bears its own legal fees and expenses unless otherwise provided by statute.” Porter Dev., LLC v. First Nat. Bank of Valparaiso, 866 N.E.2d 775, 779 (Ind. 2007). But the APRA “explicitly provides for a variation from this general rule and thus modifies the common law as to attorney fees incurred in . . . actions that fall within the statute.” Id. 10 of ShepCo and Township in the litigation.5 Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the apportionment of attorney’s fees.6