Opinion ID: 1784514
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Walker's Assertion of Her Right

Text: An accused does not waive the right to a speedy trial simply by failing to assert it. Barker, 407 U.S. at 528, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Even so, courts applying the Barker factors are to consider in the weighing process whether and when the accused asserts the right to a speedy trial, 407 U.S. at 528-29, 92 S.Ct. 2182, and not every assertion of the right to a speedy trial is weighted equally. Compare Kelley v. State, 568 So.2d 405, 410 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990) (Repeated requests for a speedy trial weigh heavily in favor of an accused.), with Clancy v. State, 886 So.2d 166, 172 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (weighting third factor against an accused who asserted his right to a speedy trial two weeks before trial, and stating: `The fact that the appellant did not assert his right to a speedy trial sooner tends to suggest that he either acquiesced in the delays or suffered only minimal prejudice prior to that date.') (quoting Benefield v. State, 726 So.2d 286, 291 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), additional citations omitted), and Brown v. State, 392 So.2d 1248, 1254 (Ala.Crim.App. 1980) (no speedy-trial violation where defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial three days before trial). In this case, Walker asserted her right to a speedy trial one time  less than five months after she was arrested. The Court of Criminal Appeals did not explicitly weigh this factor against the State. But the trial court found  and the State conceded  that this factor weighs against the State. We also find that this factor weighs in Walker's favor. We note, however, that the record does not show whether Walker knew of the pendency of the indictment during the three years between her indictment and her arrest. [7] Although the accused has no obligation to bring herself to trial, Barker, 407 U.S. at 527, 92 S.Ct. 2182, Smith v. State, 409 So.2d 958, 962 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981), in determining whether to presume prejudice under the fourth Barker factor, courts have emphasized the accused's ignorance of outstanding charges during the period from indictment until arrest. See, e.g., Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653-54, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (holding that where there was unrebutted evidence that the accused was ignorant of the charges against him during the 8 1/2 years between his indictment and arrest, the accused was not to be taxed for invoking his speedy trial right only after his arrest); Clopton, 656 So.2d at 1244 (recognizing that before his arrest, the accused's ignorance of the indictment was undisputed). Accordingly, in a case involving delay caused by negligence on the part of the state, the third factor usually will weigh more heavily in the accused's favor when there is affirmative proof of the accused's ignorance of the charges against her during the delay. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653-54, 112 S.Ct. 2686; Clopton, 656 So.2d at 1244. In Walker's case, however, there is no conclusive proof one way or the other regarding her knowledge of the charges during the delay between her indictment and her arrest. Consequently, this factor weighs in Walker's favor, but not as heavily as it would if the record affirmatively showed that she did not know of the charges during the time from her indictment until her arrest. [8]