Opinion ID: 765124
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Substance of the Final Report

Text: 7 As a preliminary matter, we note that the plaintiffs contend that the release of the entire October report (including the overview section) and the police video were retaliatory in nature. Plaintiffs do not contend, nor could they, that the underlying investigation conducted by defendants is improper because those actions would be barred by the two-year statute of limitations. See J.A. at 40 (Mag. J. R&R at 9). But the report was released on October 12, 1993, and the plaintiffs filed suit on October 11, 1995. The complaint and plaintiffs' brief on appeal each make many references to the substance of the report and the private information disclosed about Holly by way of the report's release. Therefore, the report itself is also at issue in this appeal. 8 The magistrate Judge concluded otherwise. He wrote: 9 [T]he Police Department conducted a fair and proper investigation into issues of legitimate interest to the community of Forest Park. The facts presented in the October Report appear to be objective and correct, therefore the substance of the October Report is not at issue in this case. 10 J.A. at 54 (Mag. J. R&R at 23). Although the defendants filed objections to the magistrate Judge's report pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), 2 the plaintiffs did not. This court has used its supervisory power to hold that though the language of the rule is discretionary, a party shall file objections with the district court or else waive right to appeal. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 950 (6th Cir. 1981). The Walters court also made clear that a party shall be informed by the magistrate that objections must be filed within ten days or further appeal is waived. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed this court's application of the Walters rule in Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), explicitly holding that [s]uch a rule, at least when it incorporates clear notice to the litigants and an opportunity to seek an extension of time for filing objections, is a valid exercise of the supervisory power.... Id. at 155. The report and recommendation in this case, however, contains no such notice to the plaintiffs, and thereforedoes not comport with the Walters rule. We cannot presume that the plaintiffs have waived their argument that the substance of the report is still at issue as part of their retaliation claim. 11 Moreover, this situation is similar in some respects to Turpin v. Kassulke, 26 F.3d 1392 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1118 (1995), where the appellee neglected to object to a magistrate Judge's proposed adverse resolution of an evidentiary issue. The Turpin court wrote: 12 Although the magistrate Judge proposed that the secondary issue of the admissibility of the writings be resolved in [appellant's] favor, he nonetheless concluded that the [appellee] should prevail on its motion for summary judgment. If we were to require a party in the [appellee's] position to present objections to a magistrate Judge's proposed adverse resolution of a secondary issue, we would force that party to articulate objections to a recommendation that it prevail. Such a requirement would only frustrate the judicial economy and litigant expense policies that underlie the Walters rule. 13 Id. at 1399-1400. The plaintiffs in this case are responding to an appeal by the defendants on the issue of qualified immunity -- they are not entitled to cross-appeal. They did not receive notice that the failure to object to aspects of the magistrate Judge's report would waive appellate review of those aspects, and therefore we do not deem the issue waived. 14 We disagree with the magistrate Judge's reasoning on the nature of the report. The fact that the information comprising the bulk of the report appears to be objective and correct does not remove it from the purview of a First Amendment retaliation action. Accurate but irrelevant information about personal matters publicly aired by government officials intent on penalizing a citizen for exercising her First Amendment rights are cognizable under § 1983, as discussed below. We turn now to whether the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged such a claim.