Opinion ID: 2625
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Principles of Separation of Powers

Text: The doctrine of separation of powers is one of the organizing principles of our system of government. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 469, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977). It is. . . essential to the successful working of this system that the persons intrusted with power in any one of [the] branches [of government] shall not be permitted to encroach upon the powers confided to the others. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191, 26 L.Ed. 377 (1880). Article III of the Constitution establishes a `judicial department' with the `province and duty. . . to say what the law is' in particular cases and controversies. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)). Article III forbids legislatures from `prescrib[ing] rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before it.' Plaut , 514 U.S. at 218, 115 S.Ct. 1447 (quoting United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 80 U.S. 128, 147, 20 L.Ed. 519 (1871)); see also Town of Deerfield v. FCC, 992 F.2d 420, 428 (2d Cir.1993) (explaining that Congress may not `prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way' (quoting Klein, 80 U.S. at 146)). However, this prohibition does not take hold when Congress `amend[s] applicable law.' Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218, 115 S.Ct. 1447 (quoting Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429, 441, 112 S.Ct. 1407, 118 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992)). Here, the City claims that the Act's mandate of dismissal of pending actions against firearms manufacturers violates Klein by legislatively directing the outcome of specific cases without changing the applicable law. The government, however, argues that Klein does not prohibit Congress from enacting statutes that set forth new rules of law applicable to pending cases, provided the new rule of law is also made applicable prospectively to cases commenced after enactment. We agree with the government that the Act permissibly sets forth a new rule of law that is applicable both to pending actions and to future actions. The PLCAA bars qualified civil liability actions, as defined in the statute. The definition of qualified civil liability action permissibly sets forth a new legal standard to be applied to all actions. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 348-49, 120 S.Ct. 2246, 147 L.Ed.2d 326 (2000) (holding that the section of Prison Litigation Reform Act providing that a motion to terminate operates as an automatic stay of prospective relief did not violate separation of powers because the automatic stay provision simply imposes the consequences of the court's application of the new legal standard and does not simply direct decision in a pending case); Robertson, 503 U.S. at 438-39, 112 S.Ct. 1407 (holding that an amendment to governing law allowing timber harvesting in old growth forest under certain conditions and providing that compliance with those conditions would satisfy the statutory requirements at issue in two existing cases compelled changes in law, not findings or results under old law). Because the PLCAA does not merely direct the outcome of cases, but changes the applicable law, it does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers.