Opinion ID: 1318460
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did Cry Abuse the Conditional Privilege?

Text: The protection afforded by the employer/employee relationship is conditioned upon publication in a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose. See generally, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 599 (1977). This court has stated that a conditional privilege which is abused by the writer or speaker is lost and he must answer for the legal consequences of his publication. Fairbanks Publishing Co. v. Francisco, 390 P.2d 784, 793 (Alaska 1964). Ordinarily, once a defendant establishes the existence of a privilege the plaintiff has the burden of proving that it has been abused. W. Prosser, supra, § 115, at 796. Whether a defendant has abused a privilege is a question of fact for the jury unless the facts are such that only one conclusion can reasonably be drawn. W. Prosser, supra, § 115, at 796. By granting summary judgment against Schneider on the defamation claim, the trial court found that reasonable jurors could not differ in concluding that Cry did not abuse his privilege. The comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 599 provide that a conditional privilege may be abused because of: the publisher's knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity of the defamatory matter ...; because the defamatory matter is published for some purpose other than that for which the particular privilege is given ...; because the publication is made to some person not reasonably believed to be necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose of the particular privilege ...; or because the publication includes defamatory matter not reasonably believed to be necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the occasion is privileged. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 599 comment a (1977). We adopt these four bases of determinating whether a speaker or writer has abused a conditional privilege. The present case involves a suit between a non-media defendant and a private figure. Cry's statement involves no issue of public concern. This court has never addressed whether the actual malice standard from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), applies in a private party context. However, we do not decide this issue now since Cry's statement does not satisfy the lowest showing of fault necessary for liability. In cases involving private individuals and issues of private concern, liability attaches if the speaker or writer at the very least acted negligently in publishing the defamatory statement. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B and comments g, h (1977); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48, 94 S.Ct. 418-19, 41 L.Ed.2d at 809-10; cf. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985) (recovery of presumed and punitive damages in defamation cases involving private individuals and issues, absent showing of actual malice, does not violate first amendment). Here, the undisputed evidence establishes that Cry personally reviewed the detail tape and daily sales report from Schneider's register, found that Schneider failed to ring up certain sales and that her register was short. From this evidence, Cry could reasonably believe that Schneider had taken the money. Additionally, Cry acted reasonably in checking on the truth or falsity of the communication before publishing it. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B comment g (1977). We conclude that reasonable jurors could not disagree that Cry reasonably and not negligently published the statement. Second, Cry did not make the statement for an improper purpose. Pay'N Save hired Cry as their loss prevention manager to help protect its business from theft and the mishandling of money. Cry's statement that Schneider took the money was directly related to the purpose of protecting Pay'N Save from theft or mishandling of money. There is no evidence showing that Cry made the statement out of spite or ill will, which is an abuse of the privilege. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 603 comment a (1977). Indeed, Schneider admitted that Cry had always been polite to her. Third, there is no evidence that Cry excessively published his statement by speaking the defamatory words in the presence of persons whose knowledge of them was unnecessary to the protection of the interest in question. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 604 comment a (1977). The evidence shows that Cry made the statement to Schneider in a closed meeting, which only included Schneider, Cry, the store manager and a female member of Pay'N Save's management. [5] Each person had a legitimate interest in the subject matter of the meeting. Finally, we must decide whether Cry abused his privilege because his statement was unnecessary to accomplish the purpose that justified his privilege. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 605 comment a (1977). For example, one who is privileged to tell a police officer that the plaintiff committed a crime abuses the privilege if he makes charges against the plaintiff's moral character that have no reasonable bearing upon the offenses attributed to him. Id. As previously indicated, Cry's purpose at Pay'N Save was to protect it from theft of property or the mishandling of money. An accusation of theft has a reasonable bearing upon the offense with which Schneider was being investigated. Therefore, we conclude that reasonable jurors would agree Cry did not abuse the employer/employee privilege when he accused Schneider of theft.