Opinion ID: 2307522
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The 1995 Minnesota Arrearages Order

Text: In 1995, Ms. Toman filed a petition for arrears, current support, and medical and dental expenses in Minnesota. On April 20, 1995 and May 1, 1995, the Minnesota Court issued an order holding that Mr. Linn owed $30,458.00 in arrears, $4,731.05 in medical and dental expenses, and $750.00 per month in current support. [42] Mr. Linn contends that the 1995 Minnesota Arrearages Order was a modification of the 1983 order and that the Minnesota Court no longer had jurisdiction to modify its 1983 order because all of the parties had left Minnesota. Under UIFSA (1992), whether or not Minnesota retained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its 1983 Support Order, it clearly retained jurisdiction to enforce its original 1983 Support Order. [43] Section 205(b) of UIFSA (1992) provides the steps necessary to divest the issuing tribunal of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Section 205(c) of UIFSA (1992) explicitly provides that the original issuing state retains the power to enforce the collection of amounts accruing before a modification, to enforce nonmodifiable aspects of the order, and to provide for other appropriate relief for premodification violations of that order. [44] The official comment to section 205 states: nothing in this section is intended to deprive a court which has lost continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the power to enforce arrearages which have accrued during the existence of a valid order. [45] Clearly if an issuing tribunal does not lose jurisdiction to enforce its existing order when it has been modified in another state, the issuing tribunal retains jurisdiction to enforce its order if no modification has taken place and no other jurisdiction has assumed continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Modification is not defined in UIFSA (1992); therefore the ordinary meaning of the word applies. In Black's Law Dictionary modify is defined: [t]o alter; to change in incidental or subordinate features; enlarge, extend; amend; limit, reduce. Such alteration or change may be characterized, in quantitative sense, as either an increase or decrease. [46] Modification is also defined as [a] change; an alteration or amendment which introduces new elements into the details, or cancels some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect of the subject-matter intact. [47] Ms. Toman's 1995 petition in Minnesota requested arrears for unpaid support accruing as of April 1987 under the 1983 order that required payment by Mr. Linn of 30% of his salary and for 50% of accrued medical bills. In 1995, Ms. Toman was only seeking to enforce the 1983 order, not to modify it. Additionally, Ms. Toman sought a monetary calculation of the 1983 order to facilitate enforcement via a wage attachment. She requested that the Minnesota Court compute the sums due under the 1983 Order, whereby 30% of Mr. Linn's salary was to be paid, to arrive at an enforceable dollar figure. Ms. Toman did not seek to increase, decrease or change the amount of the 1983 order; therefore, the 1995 order was not a modification of the earlier order and Minnesota retained jurisdiction to enforce its 1983 order. We find that Mr. Linn's contention that a modification has been defined in Minnesota to include a percentage calculation is without merit. Mr. Linn asserts that the Minnesota Court in Allan v. Allan defined modification of a child support order to include substituting a fixed amount per month or a percentage of income. [48] Allan, however, is distinguishable. [49] When reading the entire opinion, it is clear that the Minnesota Court's use of the term modification was in reference to an increase or decrease in the amount of child support based on changing conditions or the discarding of the existing formula used to calculate the child support, not a simple calculation based on the existing formula and current salary. [50] The Court made this clear when it stated that a child support order may be modified upon a showing of [the statutory defined factors, such as] substantially increased or decreased earnings or needs of a party or the children that makes the terms of the existing order unreasonable and unfair. [51] The support modification in Allan was from an existing formula based on a percentage of the father's income to a lower fixed amount that was capped; it was not a mere calculation computation to determine an enforceable amount. [52] Mr. Linn's argument is therefore unpersuasive. It is clear from the Minnesota Court's 1995 Order that the $750.00 per month is based on 30% of Mr. Linn's salary and is not a modification of the 1983 Child Support Order. Mr. Linn's reliance on Ms. Toman's use of the word modify in her 1995 petition filed in Minnesota to support his argument that this is a modification is also unpersuasive. [53] Within the same documents, Ms. Toman requested that the court issue an order [s]etting a fixed amount for ongoing child support to be paid by wage withholding. [54] Ms. Toman explained that she had unsuccessfully and repeatedly tried to obtain information regarding Mr. Linn's income including serving him with Interrogatories and Request for Production of documents regarding his financial situation and that she was having trouble enforcing its 1983 support order without a calculation of the dollar amount owed. In its 1995 Arrearages Order the Minnesota Court based its calculation on the only evidence Ms. Toman had of Mr. Linn's income, his March 6, 1986 notarized statement that he was required to provide 30% of his net income for child support that at that time was approximately $9,000 per year. [55] Because we find that the 1995 Minnesota Arrearage Order was not a legal modification of its 1983 Support Order, it is unnecessary for us to decide if Minnesota had continuing jurisdiction to modify that order.