Opinion ID: 1912119
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Theft from a Person with Superior Right of Possession

Text: The theft statute under which Simion was charged provided that a person is guilty of theft if he or she, having a legal interest in movable property, intentionally and without consent, takes the property out of the possession of a    person having a superior right of possession, with intent thereby to deprive the    person permanently of the possession of the property. Minn.Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(2) (2004). [4] The State argues that jurisdiction was proper under both paragraphs 1 and 3 of section 609.025. Specifically, the State argues that jurisdiction exists because the captain seat belonged to PLI, a business located in Hennepin County; PLI withheld consent to the taking of the seat in Minnesota; the locus of PLI's superior right to possess was in Minnesota, where the business was located and where the truck was officially housed as part of PLI's fleet of vehicles; and Simion formed the intent to permanently deprive PLI of the captain seat while in Minnesota on September 21, and then returned the truck without the seat to PLI's office in Minnesota on September 23. We consider first whether jurisdiction existed under paragraph 1 of the statute. Unlike the damage to property crime, for which Simion committed all of the criminal behavior in Wisconsin, the record establishes that some operative event, a triggering event, for the crime of theft occurred in Minnesota. Smith, 421 N.W.2d at 319. Specifically, based on the evidence at trial, Simion determined that if his paycheck was not ready for him on September 23 when he returned to Minneapolis with the truck, he was going to leave his employment with PLI and keep the captain seat, which he had removed from the truck and left on his property in Wisconsin. When Simion removed the seat from the truck in Wisconsin, the crime cannot be said to have been complete because of Simion's plan to return to Minnesota, in essence, to give his employer another chance to pay him what he felt he was owed. As Simion told PLI when he was in Minnesota on September 23, PLI could either give him his money or he would take it out in trade. Simion's intent to permanently deprive PLI of the captain seat was formed at least in part in Minnesota. His conduct at PLI on September 23 provides a sufficient nexus to Minnesota to meet the plain terms of paragraph 1 of section 609.025 and the constitutionally-based nexus requirement we applied in Smith and McCormick. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that because of the employment relationship, Simion had the right to use PLI's truck with the captain seat in it. When that relationship ended in Minnesota on September 23, Simion's right to continue using the truck and the seat also ended. A triggering event then for the theft charge happened in Minnesota when Simion went to PLI headquarters on September 23 to pick up his check and it was not there for him. Smith, 421 N.W.2d at 319. When Simion's employment ended on September 23 so did his right to continue to use PLI's truck and the captain seat. An operative event for the theft crime then occurred when Simion's permission to continue to use the truck and the seat ended. According to the evidence, that event occurred on September 23 in Minnesota. Under the unique circumstances of this case, we hold that the district court had jurisdiction over the theft charge under paragraph 1 of section 609.025. [5] The conclusion that jurisdiction existed under paragraph 1 of section 609.025 makes it unnecessary for us to consider whether the district court also had jurisdiction under paragraph 3 of the statute. We affirm the conclusion of the court of appeals that the district court had jurisdiction over the theft charge.