Opinion ID: 414394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: defendants' motions for acquittal and a new trial

Text: 16 As to counts two and three, appellant Graham resurrects his variance claim in the context of his motions for acquittal. His argument is simple: there was no evidence showing that he transported a minor to Boston in January of 1980 or to Fall River in February of 1980, as charged in the indictment. As our discussion in Part I should make clear, this contention is frivolous. There was ample evidence that he transported minors to both locations in the 16-month period which includes those two months; the disparity between the dates charged and those proved is immaterial.
17 Graham asserts that the insufficiency of the evidence as to counts one, two, four, and seven required that he be granted a new trial. We must affirm the district court's denial of a motion for new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence unless the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, could not have persuaded any rational trier of fact that [Graham] was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241 (1st Cir.1982). The evidence here was more than sufficient to support the jury's verdict. 18 There was specific and adequate testimony as to each of the substantive counts. As to the charge of conspiracy, while each girl worked exclusively for one defendant or the other, the jury could have inferred from the evidence of close cooperation between Graham and Morris that they were in league together. The testimony indicated that the two usually transported the girls together in Graham's car; they introduced girls to each other; they waited together while the girls were on the streets and stayed together, with the girls, in hotels; and when one girl fled from Graham, it was Morris who found her and brought her back to him. This development and collocation of circumstances was sufficient to support a finding of agreement. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). 19
20 Both appellants challenge the district judge's denial of their motions for a new trial on a further ground. Pointing out that in denying these motions the judge referred back to his denials of their motions for acquittal, they contend that he mistakenly applied the same standard in considering both motions. 8 21 Appellants misread the court's order. While Graham's motion for a new trial alleged eight errors and Morris's seven, the memoranda in support thereof discussed only the variance issue. It was solely in response to this legal argument that the district judge referred to his earlier rulings, noting that the argument had been previously raised and rejected and that the Court stands by its previous rulings. Weighing the evidence and considerations of credibility have little to do with the variance issue. Thus, appellants' argument about the different standards is inapposite. 22 We assume that the district court considered and rejected defendants' other, unargued, assertions of error, most of which have been repeated before us. There is no indication that it applied an improper standard or abused its discretion in denying a new trial. See United States v. Wright, 625 F.2d 1017, 1019 (1st Cir.1980).