Opinion ID: 1059512
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: closing argument of commonwealth's attorney

Text: During closing argument in the penalty phase of this case, the Commonwealth's Attorney argued that Cooley was a modest, private person who had an animal enter her life. At that point, Burns objected and the court stated, Hold on, Mr. Ebert [the Commonwealth's Attorney]. The following colloquy then occurred: MR. EBERT: Excuse me. A person acting like an animal. Excuse me. THE COURT: All right. MR. EBERT: A person acting with depravity of mind. MR. ALLEN [Burns' attorney]: I have a motion, Your Honor. And I will make the motion after he finishes. Note my objection at this time. THE COURT: All right. MR. EBERT: Excuse me, ladies and gentlemen. I don't mean to characterize him as an animal. But I will characterize him as a human being with a depravity of mind, a person who acted in a vile, horrible, inhumane way, to an innocent person. After the Commonwealth's Attorney concluded his closing argument, Burns argued that the reference to an animal was improper and prejudicial, and that a mistrial was required. He also complained because the court had not admonished the Commonwealth's Attorney at the time he made the statement. The court then explained that, although Burns had objected at the time, it had not admonished the Commonwealth's Attorney because he had corrected the statement. For the same reason, the court denied the motion for a mistrial. Burns assigns error to that ruling. Although the Commonwealth argues that Burns procedurally defaulted this assignment of error because he did not move for a mistrial at the moment when the objectionable words were spoken, Reid v. Baumgardner, 217 Va. 769, 774, 232 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1977), we are not inclined to agree. While Burns' counsel did not specifically move for a mistrial when the Commonwealth's Attorney said that an animal had entered Cooley's life, he did object and advised the court that he had a motion that he would make after the Commonwealth's Attorney finished his closing argument. While the better practice would have been to move for a mistrial at that very moment, we cannot say under the circumstances of this case that Burns' motion came too late. [15] Accordingly, we will address the merits of this assignment of error. In doing so, we are mindful of the principle that [a] trial court exercises its discretion when it determines whether it should grant a motion for mistrial. Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 280, 427 S.E.2d 411, 420, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859, 114 S.Ct. 171, 126 L.Ed.2d 130 (1993). When a motion for mistrial is made, based upon an allegedly prejudicial event, the trial court must make an initial factual determination, in the light of all the circumstances of the case, whether the defendant's rights are so `indelibly prejudiced' as to necessitate a new trial. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 95, 393 S.E.2d 609, 619, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908, 111 S.Ct. 281, 112 L.Ed.2d 235 (1990) (quoting LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 589, 304 S.E.2d 644, 657 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063, 104 S.Ct. 744, 79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984)). Unless we find that the trial court's denial of a mistrial is wrong as a matter of law, we will not disturb the court's decision on appeal. Spencer, 240 Va. at 95, 393 S.E.2d at 619. In the present case, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the circuit court erred in denying Burns' motion for a mistrial. By the time that Burns moved for a mistrial, the Commonwealth's Attorney had retracted the reference to Burns as an animal and had stated to the jury three times, Excuse me. Furthermore, despite the court's explanation why it did not admonish the Commonwealth's Attorney, we believe that the court's initial response to Burns' objection, i.e., Hold on, Mr. Ebert[,] was tantamount to an admonishment, which the jury heard. An admonition of [a] trial court in the presence of [a] jury [makes] it known to the jury that the court [is] not satisfied as to the propriety of [an] argument. Clanton v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 41, 54, 286 S.E.2d 172, 179 (1982). Thus, we conclude that Burns' rights were not indelibly prejudiced. LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 589, 304 S.E.2d at 657.