Opinion ID: 1309215
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: contentions affecting the guilt phase

Text: (1a) Defendant first contends that the evidence of premeditation and deliberation was too insubstantial to support the special circumstance finding. (2) Defendant relies upon the familiar tripartite test set forth in People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 [73 Cal. Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942], which requires us to focus upon evidence of (1) the defendant's planning activity prior to the killing; (2) his motive to kill, derived from his prior relationship or conduct with the victim, and (3) the manner of killing, indicating some preconceived design to kill in a certain way. Evidence of all three elements is not essential, however, to sustain a conviction. As we stated in Anderson, an appellate court will sustain a conviction where there exists evidence of all three elements, where there is extremely strong evidence of prior planning activity, or where there exists evidence of a motive to kill, coupled with evidence of either planning activity or a manner of killing which indicates a preconceived design to kill. ( Ibid. ) (1b) As will appear, in the present case the record contains substantial evidence of each of Anderson's three elements. Although the evidence was in some conflict on this point, the jury could conclude that defendant was armed with a knife or other weapon capable of stabbing. He kidnapped his young victim, tied and blindfolded her, and drove her to a place he considered secluded. Although not conclusive proof of a prior plan to kill, such evidence is certainly substantial evidence thereof. As we recently stated in a strikingly similar case involving the kidnapping/stabbing of a 12-year-old girl, [W]hen one plans a felony [kidnapping] against a far weaker victim, takes her by force or fear to an isolated location, and brings along a deadly weapon which he subsequently employs, it is reasonable to infer that he considered the possibility of homicide from the outset. [Citations.] Thus, there is substantial evidence of a `planned' killing  the most important prong of the Anderson test. ( People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 626-627 [205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126].) As for motive, the testimony of defendant's cellmates indicates that he killed Tina because her blindfold slipped and enabled her to view defendant adequately to identify him to the authorities. Once again, Alcala is pertinent: The evidence ... suggests that defendant had committed a serious felony, kidnaping, on the victim and believed she was the only person who could implicate him. `[H]ence he could [surmise] that by killing her ..., he would eliminate the only [witness] to his [crime].' [Citations.] ( Alcala, supra, at p. 627.) Finally, as for the manner of killing, the evidence indicated that defendant stabbed or beat Tina repeatedly in the head. As in Alcala, where the victim was all cut up, such a brutal method of injuring his victim, coupled with the foregoing evidence of planning and motive, supports the inference of a calculated design to ensure death, rather than an unconsidered `explosion' of violence. [Citation.] ( Alcala, supra, at p. 627; see also People v. Cruz (1980) 26 Cal.3d 233, 245 [162 Cal. Rptr. 1, 605 P.2d 830].) Defendant naturally views the evidence differently. Relying on the testimony of several doctors, defendant disputes the suggestion that Tina was stabbed with a knife, and he observes that the record does not show that defendant brought a knife or other weapon with him to the crime scene. (Both cellmates Hughes and Lee, however, stated that defendant admitted being armed with a knife.) But the jury was entitled to rely upon other medical testimony that Tina's wounds were consistent with a knife or other stabbing instrument, and upon the testimony of cellmate Lee that defendant admitted stabbing Tina with a knife. Similarly, the jury reasonably could infer that, in light of the nature of Tina's injuries and the location of the crime scene (a dead-end road), defendant was already armed before kidnapping her. With respect to the evidence of motive, defendant argues that Anderson requires proof of some prior relationship between defendant and his victim. To the contrary, Anderson speaks of a prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim  from which a motive could be inferred. (70 Cal.2d at p. 27, italics added.) Here, the relevant conduct was Tina's viewing defendant after her blindfold slipped. Defendant correctly observes that Alcala, supra, is factually distinguishable in certain respects. The fact remains, however, that the legal principles we applied in that case are fully applicable here and support the jury's conclusion that defendant committed a deliberate and premeditated murder.
Next, defendant contends that cellmate Donald Lee was a police agent/informant who obtained inculpatory statements from defendant in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. (Defendant has not challenged the admission of cellmate Hughes's similar testimony.) As will appear, the point lacks merit. 1. Facts. Defendant was incarcerated on unrelated criminal charges, and was represented by counsel on those charges. He was also deemed a prime suspect in the Salazar murder case, but he had not been charged with that offense. After his arrest, defendant had invoked his right to remain silent and had refused to talk with interrogating officers. Sergeant Dean Hess, in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain more incriminating information from defendant, monitored defendant's jail conversations, but learned nothing helpful. (The monitoring preceded our decision in De Lancie v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 865 [183 Cal. Rptr. 866, 647 P.2d 142], invalidating such practices.) Hess also attempted to find a suitable inmate to become defendant's cellmate and to report incriminating conversations. Hess eventually met with inmate Lee, who coincidentally was then sharing a cell with defendant. (Hess had met with Lee on a prior occasion when Lee had discussed an earlier assault upon him by other inmates and had requested protective custody, resulting in sharing a cell with defendant in a maximum security area.) Sergeant Hess and Lee each testified regarding this conversation. According to Hess, he explained to Lee that he hoped Lee would pass on information regarding defendant's statements, but he [Lee] was not instructed to do so. Hess advised Lee not to tell defendant that Lee had talked to Hess, who realized that legally he could not directly interrogate defendant nor could he use a police agent to initiate such conversations. Lee elaborated on the conversation with Hess. Lee was not directed to attempt to obtain information from defendant, but if I heard anything, that I might want to say later on, Lee was asked to inform Hess about it. Hess explained to Lee that he could not lawfully direct Lee to return to the cell and attempt to obtain any details, because that directive would be illegal. But Hess told Lee that if something important came up, Lee should decide whether or not to report it to Hess. Lee testified that he was never promised any reward or consideration for relating such information. He acknowledged, however, that informants frequently receive protection from assaults by other inmates. Lee himself, upon pleading guilty to an escape charge, received a two-year prison term with protective custody. But no evidence was introduced to show that such custody was granted in consideration of his cooperation with Hess. Lee eventually informed Sergeant Hess of several conversations with defendant regarding the Salazar killing. Lee explained that his sole motive for relating such information was to relieve my mind [of] what I heard. Lee testified at defendant's preliminary hearing that, among other things, defendant had admitted killing Tina Salazar with a knife because she had seen his face; defendant also admitted to Lee that he had molested other young girls. At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate denied defendant's motion to suppress Lee's testimony, finding that Lee was not a paid informant, that Lee was placed in defendant's cell accidentally, that Lee asked no questions of defendant nor forced any information from him, and that Lee's cooperation was given for his own conscious [conscience] sake and was not induced for any reason of police action. The magistrate further found that Lee was unsophisticated, direct, and honest in his answers. Lee disappeared following the preliminary hearing and was unavailable at trial. Accordingly, the prosecution was permitted to read Lee's preliminary examination testimony into the record. 2. No Sixth Amendment violation. (3a) A fair reading of the record indicates that, although Lee was not directed to initiate possible incriminating conversations with defendant, Lee was asked to listen to defendant's words and report to Hess any incriminating statements volunteered by defendant. Defendant contends that, accordingly, Lee was a police agent whose activities violated defendant's right to counsel and his privilege against self-incrimination. We disagree. The leading case regarding cellmate testimony is United States v. Henry (1980) 447 U.S. 264 [65 L.Ed.2d 115, 100 S.Ct. 2183], wherein a paid inmate-informant (Nichols) provided the government with information regarding defendant Henry's incriminating statements. As in the present case, the informant was told not to question defendant, but if defendant initiated any conversations, the informant was asked to pay attention to them. (P. 268 [65 L.Ed.2d at pp. 120-121].) Unlike the present case, however, the informant in Henry was not a mere passive listener or listening post, but instead made efforts to stimulate conversations with defendant, his cellmate. (See pp. 271 & fn. 9, 273 [65 L.Ed.2d at pp. 122-124].) Nichols's motive in eliciting incriminating responses from defendant Henry was heightened by a contingent-fee arrangement whereby the informant would be paid only if he produced useful information. (P. 270 [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 122].) The Henry court stated the Sixth Amendment issue was whether under the facts of this case a Government agent `deliberately elicited' incriminating statements from Henry within the meaning of Massiah [v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201 (12 L.Ed.2d 246, 84 S.Ct. 1199), proscribing postindictment monitoring of defendant's statements]. Three factors are important. First, Nichols was acting under instructions as a paid informant for the government; second, Nichols was ostensibly no more than a fellow inmate of Henry; and third, Henry was in custody and under indictment at the time he was engaged in conversation by Nichols. (P. 270 [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 122].) The court concluded that By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (P. 274, fn. omitted [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 125].) After Henry was decided, the high court reiterated its principles in Maine v. Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 159 [88 L.Ed.2d 481, 106 S.Ct. 477], additionally holding that incriminating evidence concerning an existing, charged offense, obtained by a secret police informant while investigating an uncharged offense, was inadmissible at the trial of the charged offense. In the present case, as discussed below, the evidence at issue pertained to, and was admitted as proof of, the Salazar murder of which defendant had not been charged when the evidence was obtained. Moulton is thus distinguishable. Following Moulton, the court decided Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986) 477 U.S. 436 [91 L.Ed.2d 364 [106 S.Ct. 2616], holding that Henry's principles did not apply where the police informant/cellmate merely listened to and reported the accused's incriminating statements, without engaging in questioning or other activity designed deliberately to elicit incriminating statements. In Kuhlmann, the prisoner previously had agreed with police to act as an informant, and had thereafter reported the accused's spontaneous and unsolicited incriminating statements to the police. The high court concluded that in order to make out a Sixth Amendment violation under Henry or Moulton, the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks. (Id., at p. 436 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 384-385, 106 S.Ct. at p. 2630].) Our court recently considered the scope of the Henry decision in People v. Whitt (1984) 36 Cal.3d 724 [205 Cal. Rptr. 810, 685 P.2d 1161], a case which preceded Kuhlmann. There, we stressed the importance of determining whether the state has created a situation likely to produce incriminating statements; in that regard we indicated that the state cannot avoid Henry's proscriptions merely by advising the informant to listen but don't ask. ( Id., at pp. 741-742.) On the other hand, we also observed that Henry is inapplicable to an informant who truly acts on his own initiative rather than on orders by the state. (Pp. 742-743.) Since in Whitt the investigating officer had no prior dealings with deLoach, the informant, who initially volunteered to relate the incriminating statements made by Whitt, Henry was deemed inapplicable even though the officer continued to accept deLoach's information after promising to talk to the prosecutor about deLoach's own sentence. (P. 744.) We observed that the foregoing promise was not conditioned upon the informant's continued assistance in providing such information, and that indeed no promise of leniency was obtained from the prosecutor. Thus, on these close facts it cannot be found that the police gave deLoach the incentive to obtain information from Whitt after July 8th, to such an extent that deLoach's conduct is attributable to the state. ( Ibid. ) Applying the principles of the foregoing cases, we conclude that the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress cellmate Lee's testimony. First, the information procured by Lee related to an offense other than the offense with which defendant had been charged. Defendant was originally arrested and confined in jail on an unrelated matter; no formal charges had yet been filed against him regarding the Salazar murder. (4), (3b) Although he was indeed a suspect in that murder, the prophylactic rules set forth in Massiah and Henry apply only to the attempt to gather incriminating information regarding the formal charges, because the defendant has a present right to counsel only as to those charges. As stated in Maine v. Moulton, supra , Incriminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth Amendment right has not yet attached, are, of course, admissible at a trial of those offenses. (474 U.S. at p. 180, fn. 16 [88 L.Ed.2d at p. 499].) In the present case, defendant was evidently represented by counsel with respect to the charged offense for which he had been incarcerated. Cellmate Lee's conversations, however, did not involve that offense, and defendant cites no case suggesting that once an accused has obtained counsel with respect to one offense, all further interrogation must cease regarding other possible offenses. Second, even were we to hold that defendant's Sixth Amendment right had attached as to both offenses, we would still conclude that no violation of that right occurred here. The magistrate expressly found that Lee asked no questions of defendant nor forced any information from him. That being so, Kuhlmann v. Wilson, supra , applies and defendant's volunteered statements to cellmate Lee were admissible because they were not deliberately elicited by a police agent. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that defendant's Sixth Amendment claim under Henry must be rejected. 3. No Fifth Amendment violation. (5) For similar reasons, we reject defendant's Fifth Amendment claim under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974]. In light of the principles expressed in Moulton and Kuhlmann, supra, cellmate Lee had no obligation to advise defendant of his constitutional rights prior to engaging in conversations with him. (See People v. Whitt, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 745.) 4. The prosecution exercised due diligence. (6a) Defendant also objected to the use of Lee's preliminary hearing testimony on the ground that the People failed to demonstrate due diligence in locating Lee and securing his testimony at trial. A witness's prior testimony may be introduced if, among other things, he is unavailable as a witness at trial. (Evid. Code, § 1291.) Unavailability may be established by showing that the declarant is `Absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has exercised reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his attendance by the court's process.' ([Evid. Code] at § 240, subd. (a)(5).) ( People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 311-312 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149].) The prosecution must make a good faith effort and exercise reasonable diligence to procure the witness's appearance. ( Id., at p. 312; see also Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 62-77 [65 L.Ed.2d 597, 605-615, 100 S.Ct. 2531] [good faith efforts involve taking reasonable steps to locate an absent witness, but do not include pursuing futile acts not likely to produce the witness for trial].) In the present case, Lee testified at the preliminary hearing in March and April 1979. Trial, however, did not commence until September 1981, a delay in part attributable to pretrial proceedings culminating in Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1 [168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301]. By that time, Lee had become unavailable and, accordingly, the People moved to use his preliminary hearing testimony. The trial court conducted an extensive hearing aimed at determining whether the People exercised due diligence in attempting to procure Lee as a trial witness. The court concluded that due diligence was shown, a finding supported by substantial evidence. Thus, the record discloses that, at some point during the two-and-one-half-year interval between the preliminary hearing and the trial, Lee's whereabouts became unknown. More than one month before Lee's trial testimony was needed, investigators from the district attorney's office attempted to locate him. Learning that Lee had been released on interstate parole to Oklahoma authorities, the investigators made further inquiries and learned that Lee's Oklahoma parole had terminated and that Oklahoma authorities were unaware of Lee's present location. Attempts to locate or call Lee's parents and in-laws were unsuccessful. Records from the Oklahoma police and Federal Bureau of Investigation were consulted to no avail. The Oklahoma officers cooperated in attempting to find Lee by following numerous leads, making various telephone calls and checking arrest and drivers' license records. The People's investigators made, by defendant's own count, approximately 17 telephone calls to various sources in a vain attempt to uncover Lee's whereabouts. This number does not include additional calls by local authorities in Oklahoma. On hearing the foregoing evidence regarding the prosecution's efforts to locate Lee, the trial court indicated that it would allow Lee's preliminary hearing testimony unless the defense could convince the court to disallow it. (I'm inclined to think the burden kind of is with you, Mr. Trudell, to show me why I shouldn't allow the testimony.) [3] Defense counsel then testified that at one point the district attorney had informed him that the People had located Lee, a remark which assertedly induced defense counsel to terminate his efforts to find Lee. The district attorney, however, testified in response that he simply told counsel he was hopeful of locating Lee. Following additional argument by counsel, the trial court granted the People's motion to read Lee's preliminary hearing testimony into the record, expressly finding that the People had exercised due diligence in attempting to locate Lee. The court, learning that defense counsel likewise had not been in contact with Lee at any time during the period in question, also denied defendant's motion for a continuance for the purpose of attempting to find Lee. Defendant now argues that the People's efforts failed to reflect due diligence. He contends that the People should have either attempted to subpoena Lee while he was still in this state, or pursued other investigative leads, including Lee's employers or state agencies that might be his means of support, and state mental hospitals where Lee, previously hospitalized for treatment, might be confined. (Defendant does not assert that pursuing those inquiries would have been successful.) Defendant argues that at least the People should have kept in periodic contact with Lee as soon as he was released from prison in California. (7) We have held that the question of due diligence is a factual one depending on the circumstances in each case, and that the trial court's determination of the issue will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Enriquez (1977) 19 Cal.3d 221, 235 [137 Cal. Rptr. 171, 561 P.2d 261, 3 A.L.R.4th 73]; see People v. Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 311-312.) In People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 984-989 [232 Cal. Rptr. 110, 728 P.2d 180], we suggested (but did not decide) that an appellate court should independently review the record on the due diligence issue. (6b) In any event, in the present case, whether the abuse of discretion or the independent review test is used, the trial court's finding of due diligence should be upheld. First, we could not properly impose upon the People an obligation to keep periodic tabs on every material witness in a criminal case, for the administrative burdens of doing so would be prohibitive. Moreover, it is unclear what effective and reasonable controls the People could impose upon a witness who plans to leave the state, or simply disappear, long before a trial date is set. Certainly, resort to the subpoena or material witness processes would have been premature in this case. In Louis, supra, we held that if a particular witness's testimony is deemed critical or vital to the prosecution's case, the People must take reasonable precautions to prevent the witness from disappearing. (42 Cal.3d at pp. 989-991.) There, the People honored witness Tolbert's own request for an own recognizance release on theft charges, knowing of a substantial risk that this important witness would flee. Because the People failed to take adequate preventative measures, such as holding Tolbert as a material witness pending defendant Louis's trial, no due diligence was shown. ( Id., at pp. 992-993, fn. 8.) In the present case, unlike Louis, witness Lee's probable trial testimony would not have been so vital to the prosecution's case, because it was largely cumulative of cellmate Hughes's testimony. More important, due process principles obviously would not have permitted holding Lee as a material witness during the two-and-one-half-year period that elapsed following his preliminary examination testimony. (The material witness provisions of the Penal Code are limited to requiring a bond to secure the witness's appearance, and a maximum 10 days in custody for failure to post such a bond. See also Cal. Const., art. I, § 10, forbidding the unreasonable detention of witnesses.) We conclude that the trial court's ruling should be sustained. (8) We similarly reject defendant's related argument that even if due diligence were shown, the admission of preliminary examination testimony of inherently unreliable cellmate testimony violates constitutional confrontation rights where the cellmate declarant becomes unavailable to testify at trial. Our prior cases make clear that (1) cellmate testimony is not inherently unreliable (see People v. Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 623-624), and (2) a criminal defendant's constitutional confrontation right is not absolute, and is not infringed by use of his prior testimony where the declarant is unavailable at trial and his prior testimony was subject to cross-examination by the defendant ( People v. Enriquez, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 235).
The trial court refused to permit defendant to introduce testimony, elicited at the preliminary examination, regarding attempts by Sergeant Hess to find other informants who would report defendant's incriminating statements. At trial, the prosecutor objected to such testimony as irrelevant and it was excluded. (9) Defendant now contends that such evidence would have helped impeach the incriminating testimony of informants Lee and Hughes, permitting the jury to infer from Hess's intense desire for such testimony that it would be worth their while to create the testimony that Hess wanted. The jury learned from Hess that he absolutely tried every possible way to secure a conviction of defendant for Tina's murder. The fact that Hess attempted to contact other informants before finding Lee and Hughes would have added very little to the defense's attempts to impeach those witnesses. The trial court had discretion to exclude evidence of such doubtful relevance and speculative nature.
(10) Defendant next contends that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct sua sponte that the testimony of jailhouse informants should be viewed with distrust. We rejected a similar argument in People v. Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 623-624, holding that the testimony of an informant need not be corroborated, thereby rejecting the argument that an informant is analogous to an accomplice, and is equally likely to give false or biased testimony. We observed that, but for certain specified testimony, an interested witness' `entitle[ment] to full credit' under [Evidence Code] section 411 is a matter for the trier of fact. [Citations.] ... The exception for accomplice testimony ... arises from the accomplice's overwhelming motive to shift blame to defendant.... Whatever consideration a jailhouse informant may expect for testifying, the direct, compelling motive to lie is absent. ( Ibid. ) No California case has imposed a sua sponte duty to give cautionary instructions as to the testimony of an informant. Two decisions have discussed whether such an instruction should be given on defendant's request. ( People v. Castro (1979) 99 Cal. App.3d 191 [160 Cal. Rptr. 156]; People v. Barnett (1976) 54 Cal. App.3d 1046 [127 Cal. Rptr. 88].) Both cases held that the trial court's rejection of the proffered instruction was at most harmless error, as the informant's testimony was not the sole basis for the conviction ( Castro ) or was amply corroborated ( Barnett ). Similarly, all but one of the federal cases which discuss the point involved instructions requested by the defendant. (See United States v. Patterson (9th Cir.1981) 648 F.2d 625; Guam v. Dela Rosa (9th Cir.1981) 644 F.2d 1257; United States v. Swiderski (2d Cir.1976) 539 F.2d 854; United States v. Kinnard (1972) 150 App.D.C. [465 F.2d 566]; Fletcher v. United States (1946) 81 App.D.C. [158 F.2d 321]; but see United States v. Garcia (5th Cir.1976) 528 F.2d 580 [reversal where conviction based entirely on informer's uncorroborated testimony].) Based on the Alcala rationale previously discussed, and the paucity of authority supporting defendant's position, we conclude that the trial judge had no duty to give sua sponte cautionary instructions regarding an informant's testimony.
For purposes of establishing defendant's identity as the kidnapper and killer of Tina Salazar, the People were prepared to introduce evidence of defendant's conviction of an offense involving the kidnapping in Albany of Michele G., a nine-year-old girl, occurring shortly after the Salazar incident. After receiving an unfavorable ruling from the trial court upholding the limited admissibility of the foregoing offense, defendant and his counsel agreed to stipulate to the issue of identity in order to foreclose the People from introducing at the guilt phase potentially prejudicial evidence regarding the Albany offense. The stipulation read as follows: I, Richard Adams Hovey, acknowledge taking possession of Tina Salazar against her will and driving her from the neighborhood. [¶] I, Richard Adams Hovey, acknowledge doing the act which caused injuries which ultimately lead [ sic ] to the death of Tina Salazar. Before accepting the stipulation, the trial court extensively examined defendant and his counsel regarding the scope and effect of the admissions contained therein, observing that although it would preclude the People from introducing any similar offenses, such as the Michele G. conviction, during the guilt phase of the trial, the stipulation also would incriminate defendant in two very serious crimes (i.e., murder and kidnapping), and would conclusively establish the issue of identity. The trial judge determined that defendant both understood the nature of the stipulation and realized that he was waiving certain constitutional rights by agreeing to its contents, including the right against self-incrimination, the right to a jury determination of the identity issue, and the right to confront witnesses on that issue. Defendant explained that My lawyer has advised me that it's a good course to follow and I agree with it. (11a) Defendant now contends that the court failed adequately to explain to him the potential penal consequences of the stipulation, namely, that he was in effect admitting to second degree murder, which would justify imposition of a prison term. (12) We have held that before a defendant may admit a prior conviction ( In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 864 [112 Cal. Rptr. 513, 519 P.2d 561]), submit a case on the preliminary hearing transcript ( Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 604 [119 Cal. Rptr. 302, 531 P.2d 1086]), or stipulate to ex-felon status ( People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 157, fn. 9 [167 Cal. Rptr. 844, 616 P.2d 826]), the court should assure that the defendant is aware of the nature and consequences of his actions. (See also In re Birch (1973) 10 Cal.3d 314, 321-322 [110 Cal. Rptr. 212, 515 P.2d 12] [guilty plea invalid where defendant not advised of sex registration requirement accompanying conviction].) (11b) We reject defendant's argument. First, his stipulation was not the legal equivalent of a guilty plea or other admission which necessarily would have definite penal consequences. The stipulation admitted his identity as the offender, but did not purport to deprive defendant of any affirmative defenses he might have, such as diminished capacity, insanity, lack of premeditation, deliberation or malice, killing upon provocation or heat of passion, or even an accidental killing. Although the stipulation came close to admitting that a felony-murder took place (a killing during the commission of a kidnapping), it was probably legally insufficient by itself to establish each of the technical legal requirements for either the offense of kidnapping or murder. At most, the stipulation relieved the prosecution of the burden of establishing that defendant was the person who abducted and killed Tina Salazar. The People were still required to prove (and in fact did prove) the essential legal elements of the various offenses with which defendant was charged. Defendant states that Even if appellant's stipulation was not technically an admission of second degree murder, it was certainly an admission of conduct subjecting him to serious criminal liability, and it required a knowing and voluntary waiver. We think that the trial court adequately advised defendant of the consequences of the stipulation by telling him that you will be incriminating yourself in two very serious crimes and lessening the burden of the district attorney of proving those particular elements. Defendant's response, I understand, undoubtedly included a realization that, having admitted taking and killing Tina, he faced a probable prison sentence (and possible death sentence). We decline to hold that the trial court in a capital case commits reversible error by failing to tell the defendant that his admission of committing a kidnapping and homicide might have serious penal consequences. (13a) In a supplemental brief, defendant raises the further contention that the stipulation was void because it was induced by the trial court's erroneous ruling that evidence of defendant's commission of a similar offense (the kidnapping of Michele G. in Albany) would be admissible for the limited issue of identity. The contention is without merit. First, although the parties have not cited pertinent authority, it is arguable that defendant waived the right to attack his stipulation on this basis, having voluntarily accepted it without attempting to reserve the right subsequently to challenge it as the tainted product of the trial court's erroneous ruling regarding the admissibility of the Michele G. evidence. (14) In a closely analogous situation, we have ruled that if a defendant wishes to preserve for appeal his claim of improper impeachment by a prior conviction, he must take the stand and actually suffer such impeachment. ( People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378, 383-388 [228 Cal. Rptr. 899, 722 P.2d 173]; see Luce v. United States (1984) 469 U.S. 38 [83 L.Ed.2d 443, 105 S.Ct. 460].) (13b) Here, rather than testify subject to such impeachment, defendant chose to stipulate to his identity as Tina's assailant. [4] His decision to do so arguably waived his right to raise the admissibility issue on appeal. On the merits, a close question is presented whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that evidence of the Michele G. incident would be admissible on the issue of identity. The People acknowledge that such other crimes evidence is admissible only where there exist common marks which, considered singly or in combination, support the strong inference that the current crime bears [defendant's] signature. ( People v. Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 632.) But the People point to 23 common marks which they claim support the trial court's ruling. The areas of similarity include the fact that both incidents occurred in Alameda County; both victims were Caucasian female children between the ages of eight and nine; both victims were walking home alone near a public school in their own neighborhood when abducted from the sidewalk and dragged into their assailant's car; both victims were tied hand and foot and their heads covered by a piece of cloth to hide their eyes; both victims' hands were tied in front of their bodies; both victims were driven from a public street to a more secluded area and, after being observed by third persons, both victims were thrown from the car with their hands and feet still bound. Finally, although the kidnapper did not remove his victims' clothes, some evidence was admitted indicating that he molested each girl. (Michele G. testified that defendant forced her to hold his penis; cellmate Donald Lee reported that defendant admitted playing with Tina Salazar and feeling her body.) On the other hand, defendant correctly observes that several of these common marks are likewise common to a substantial portion of the population of child molesters. ( Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 633.) Many child abductors who commit violent sex crimes against children attempt to conceal their identities and control their victims by blindfolding and binding them. If such an assailant is observed while his victim remains in the vehicle, it is logical to expect him to eject the still bound victim and attempt to escape. In addition, the two crimes bore some substantial dissimilarities, such as the materials used to bind the victims' hands, and the fact that Michele G. was released unharmed. Thus, the question whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling the Michele G. incident admissible is close. We conclude, however, that under the circumstances here any possible error in that ruling was harmless. In addition to defendant's stipulation, defendant's identity as Tina's killer was amply established by the other evidence in the case, including the testimony of witnesses Anderson and Irons and defendant's cellmates Lee and Hughes.
(15) Officer Romero, who arrested defendant in June 1978 (presumably for kidnapping Michele G.), testified, over objection, that immediately following his arrest defendant asked me what incident this was about.... He asked me, you know, what it was about: the details of  why the arrest. Romero replied that another officer would be discussing the matter at the police station. Later in his testimony, Romero repeated that when first arrested, defendant said: Which one is this about? Defendant now suggests that Romero's reference to defendant's uncertainty regarding which charge the arrest was based on was an outrageous violation of the stipulation to exclude testimony regarding the Michele G. kidnapping. According to defendant, The prosecution's calling Romero and deliberately eliciting this reference to the [Michele G.] crime was indefensible. The point lacks merit  Romero's brief references to defendant's ambiguous comment could not possibly have led the jury to conclude that defendant had committed, or was acknowledging his commission of, another kidnapping.
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress certain incriminating evidence (defendant's ownership and sale of the kidnap vehicle) based on asserted illegality by the police following defendant's arrest. Defendant, arrested on an unrelated charge, was taken to the Hayward jail and an inventory was conducted of his belongings, including the contents of his wallet. The booking officer listed, among other items, a wrecking company's receipt for a 1961 Ford car. Defendant's property was placed in a locker where other inmates' property was stored. Thereafter, defendant was transferred to the Albany jail where, on booking, an Albany officer reinventoried defendant's property. The various papers in defendant's possession were examined by Sergeant Stirling, who was investigating the Albany kidnapping of Michele G., as previously discussed. Stirling, thinking that defendant and his 1961 Ford might match the suspect and vehicle described in the Salazar murder case, contacted Sergeant Hess of the Alameda Sheriff's Department, who was the investigating officer in that case. Shortly thereafter, witness Irons was brought to the wrecking company where he identified the 1961 Ford as the Salazar kidnap vehicle. (16) Defendant first contends that the officers exceeded the permissible scope of a routine warrantless booking search when they examined the papers contained in defendant's wallet. Defendant argues that jail security and other legitimate concerns can be adequately maintained by simply storing closed containers such as wallets, rather than opening and probing their contents. The United States Supreme Court recently rejected the argument advanced by defendant here, concluding that inventory searches into closed containers are constitutionally permissible if conducted as part of the booking process. ( Illinois v. Lafayette (1983) 462 U.S. 640, 643-648 [77 L.Ed.2d 65, 69-73, 103 S.Ct. 2605].) The high court observed that such a thorough inventory was supported by a range of governmental interests, including prevention of theft and false claims thereof, and detecting dangerous, concealable items such as drugs or weapons. The court declined to invalidate the search merely because the foregoing ends could have been achieved through less intrusive means. The Lafayette court concluded that the officers properly conducted a thorough inspection of the suspect's shoulder bag. We recently adopted Lafayette's holding in People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 80-82 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127], wherein we upheld a booking search of an envelope and its contents, found in defendant's pants pocket. Thus, both Lafayette and Miranda support the warrantless search of defendant's wallet in the present case. Likewise, we reject defendant's contention that the officers should not have read the papers discovered in defendant's wallet, after finding no weapons or contraband. A reasonably complete inventory would include identifying the document seized and, like the letter in Miranda, it was necessary to read the car receipt in order to properly identify and inventory it. Finally, defendant challenges the second look at defendant's papers which occurred when defendant was transferred to Albany jail. But we see no compelling reason for holding that, on transfer of a suspect to another facility, a second booking search may not be conducted. There is no indication that the transfer was made for purposes of conducting an additional search of defendant's papers.
(17) Defendant next contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting during the guilt phase a large photograph of victim Tina Salazar, taken two months before she was murdered. Defendant asserts that the sole reason this charming photo was admitted was to gain sympathy for Tina, an irrelevant concern during the guilt phase. (See People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 577-578 [180 Cal. Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908].) The photo was 12 by 14 inches in size and, as defendant acknowledges, it was just an ordinary head and shoulders portrait. Although admission of a photograph of the victim while alive may be considered error if irrelevant to any contested issue in the case, any error here was harmless. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]; see People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 594-595 [238 Cal. Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350]; People v. Allen (1987) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1256-1258 [232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115].) Tina's photo, though perhaps charming, was nonetheless an ordinary one not likely to produce a prejudicial impact. As indicated previously, in light of defendant's stipulation and his incriminating statements to his cellmates, this was not a close case on the issue of guilt.