Opinion ID: 2807850
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burden-Shifting Scheme

Text: Even though Wagner is unable to proceed under the direct method, he may still successfully mount an age discrimination claim under the MHRA applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme. This framework allocates the burden of producing evidence between the parties and establishes the order of presentation of proof. Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 724. Under this scheme: [a] plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discriminatory motive. If the plaintiff makes this showing, the burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. If the employer articulates such a reason, the plaintiff must then put forward sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the employer's proffered explanation was a pretext for discrimination. Id. This framework allows a plaintiff to prove his/her case by way of process of elimination, disprov[ing] the most obvious legitimate bases for the employment decision, thereby allowing the inference that the decision was motivated by discrimination. Friend, 771 N.W.2d at 37. It was under this framework that the district court analyzed Wagner's claim, determining that Wagner established a prima facie case but was unable to offer evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Gallup's proffered reasons were pretextual. We agree. -12- For purposes of this appeal, we assume Wagner established a prima facie case because in the end, we agree with the district court that Wagner is unable to prove that Gallup's proffered reason for his termination is a pretext for discrimination. Id.; Stewart v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 196, 481 F.3d 1034, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007) ([I]f an employer has articulated a legitimate reason for its actions, it is permissible for courts to presume the existence of a prima facie case and move directly to the issue of pretext.). [W]e need not indulge the parties' disputes about which material facts are in dispute or whether [Wagner] met his burden in establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas regardless of the 'threshold' we have set for such proof. Riser v. Target Corp., 458 F.3d 817, 820-21 (8th Cir. 2006). Even assuming all of the disputed facts are material, including Bogart's use of the words historically and old school in the October 6 phone conversation and the inferences derived therefrom favorable to Wagner, he falls short. Wagner has not generated a genuine issue for trial on the ultimate question of discrimination vel non. Id. at 821. Gallup met its burden of offering legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Wagner's dismissal. Gallup determined that Wagner was not meeting its reasonable expectations by October 2011, as evidenced by his diminished internal ratings, his low utilization rate, and Bogart's inability to integrate Wagner into a region due to Wagner's reputation for being self-oriented, difficult to work with and too focused on his own research interests at the expense of the needs of Gallup's clients. Accordingly, Bogart determined there was no way for Wagner to increase his hours and utilization to an acceptable level and that it was thus time for Gallup and Wagner to part ways. Under McDonnell Douglas, once the employer articulates a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, the burden shifts back to Wagner to establish pretext. Hamblin, 636 N.W.2d at 153. [I]n order to avoid summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas third step, the . . . plaintiff must put forth sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to infer that the employer's proffered legitimate -13- nondiscriminatory reason is not only pretext but that it is pretext for discrimination. . . . [A]t all times the . . . plaintiff retains the burden of establishing that the defendant's conduct was based on unlawful discrimination. Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortg. Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 546 (Minn. 2001). Wagner 'must prove more than the prima facie case to show pretext, because unlike evidence establishing the prima facie case, evidence of pretext and discrimination is viewed in light of the employer's justification.' Doucette v. Morrison Cnty., Minn., 763 F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Chappell v. Bilco Co., 675 F.3d 1110, 1117 (8th Cir. 2012)). Specifically as to pretext, Wagner argues the following evidence overcomes Gallup's legitimate reasons for his termination: 1) Gallup's proffered reasons have no basis in fact; 2) he had a strong employment history; 3) Gallup failed to identify any policy justifying Wagner's termination; and 4) similarly-situated younger employees were treated more leniently. However, Wagner is unable to meet his pretext burden. In briefing and at oral argument Wagner maintains an overarching argument that a jury could disbelieve Gallup's explanation. For example, Wagner claims a jury could disbelieve Bogart's statement that the regional managing partners reported to him that none of their teams wanted to work with Wagner and given that possibility of simple disbelief, summary judgment is inappropriate. That is only true, however, if there is a factual basis to support such disbelief beyond Wagner saying so. Too, Wagner offers no evidence that the regional managing partners were acting upon age animus other than his blanket allegation that Gallup maintained an ageist corporate culture generally. Evidence that is merely colorable, or that is not significantly probative cannot be the basis for a denial of summary judgment. Minnihan v. Mediacom Commc'ns Corp., 779 F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir. 2015); Gibson v. Am. Greetings Corp., 670 F.3d 844, 856 (8th Cir. 2012) ([G]eneral allegations are not sufficient, specific evidence of disparate treatment to survive summary judgment. (internal quotation omitted)). -14- Wagner's allegation that he believed Bogart treated other individuals for whom Bogart served as a Go-To better, or that Bogart had a better relationship with the others that reported to him, or that Bogart could have managed Wagner better, without more, is likewise of little consequence. In his deposition testimony Wagner points out that at the outset, specifically as to Wagner, Bogart did not provide the basic information, guidance, supervision, coaching, and advice that a manger ought to give an employee who reports to him. Wagner may have some concerns about Bogart's management style but he does not have a MHRA claim. Riser, 458 F.3d at 821 (acknowledging that the employment-discrimination laws have not vested in the federal courts the authority to sit as super-personnel departments reviewing the decisions made by employers except to the extent that those judgments involve intentional discrimination). Wagner likewise argues that in addition to Bogart's own age animus, Gallup's culture was one that pushed out older employees in violation of the MHRA. In Minnesota, evidence of an ageist corporate atmosphere, along with other evidence, can be sufficient to support a reasonable inference of discrimination and is admissible to support the issue of disparate treatment at trial. Indeed, a prejudiced corporation cannot insulate itself by using front-end managers subject to executive pressures. Hamblin, 636 N.W.2d at 154. So, at times, the correct issue is not whether the firing agent had discriminatory intent, but whether the firing corporation had discriminatory intent. Id. at 154, 152 (reversing the grant of summary judgment given evidence that a company executive made an ageist remark, echoed by a written human resources document that described a retirement incentive program as targeting older employees, and a memorandum from the CEO instructing managers to hire younger talent). Wagner's evidence of Gallup's alleged ageist culture, however, is either inadmissible or insufficient to create a material issue as to whether such a culture exists at Gallup. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Wagner claims on appeal that Gallup routinely terminated employees in their 40s, 50s and 60s and engaged in a pattern of -15- replacing older employees with younger, less qualified, recent graduates. In support, he references his own testimony noting particular replacements, along with the sworn declarations of two former Gallup employees that personally share Wagner's belief regarding Gallup's ageist culture. But just alleging this pattern with such evidence, without more, is insufficient to create a question of fact. Too, Wagner claims that the fact that four SMEs terminated by Gallup (including Wagner) were over the age of 50 and one was age 42 proves it maintained an ageist workplace. Yet, Wagner already established that all SMEs are older by the nature of the job itself and so the fact that all of the SMEs fired were over a protected age does not necessarily establish a fact issue that age bias motivated those decisions. See Hilde v. City of Eveleth, 777 F.3d 998, 1004-07 (8th Cir. 2015) (discussing the critical distinction in age bias cases between employment decisions wholly motivated by factors other than age but that involve older employees and those prohibited decisions that perpetuate stigmatizing stereotypes based on age). Wagner still needs more. At bottom, and most importantly, Wagner falls short because he does not sufficiently substantiate his claims with probative evidence that would permit a finding in his favor as he must at summary judgment. A party's unsupported self-serving allegation that her employer's decision was based on [age discrimination] does not establish a genuine issue of material fact. Gibson, 670 F.3d at 857 (quotation omitted).4 4 Wagner claims the district court, in its affirmance of the magistrate judge's order, thwarted his efforts in obtaining the necessary evidence during discovery to establish his age discrimination claim. The magistrate judge allowed certain of Wagner's interrogatory and document requests now at issue but limited their breadth. Wagner requested information about reports or allegations of age discrimination by any Gallup employee from January 1, 2008, to the date of production. Gallup did respond, but limited its response to complaints from employees that worked in Minneapolis with Wagner, or had the same job title as Wagner. The district court held Gallup's interpretation and response to the request was reasonable. See Sallis v. Univ. of Minn., 408 F.3d 470, 478 (8th Cir. 2005) (discussing the enhanced control a district court has over discovery and the balancing that takes place in discrimination matters to narrow discovery). Wagner additionally sought information for every -16- Wagner additionally cites to his lengthy unblemished work history as another example that Gallup's reasons for his termination are pretextual. Indeed, in some cases, such evidence plays a role in a court's analysis of pretext. Strate v. Midwest Bankcentre, Inc., 398 F.3d 1011, 1020 (8th Cir. 2005) (considering an employee's eleven-year, stellar work history with no employment problems whatsoever as one relevant factor among many in its consideration in the pretext and discrimination context). Here, however, while we credit Wagner's unquestionable success at Gallup as evidenced by his many awards and accolades in the years preceding his termination, Gallup has established that at the time of his termination, Wagner's utilization rate was low, there was at least some confusion regarding the amount of time Wagner was dedicating to the preparation of a book on Gallup's behalf, his internal ICE scores were declining, and Bogart was unable to integrate Wagner on a team. In combination, even in the light most favorable to Wagner, there is no doubt that unlike the employee in Strate, for example, Wagner's work record was not without blemish. An impressive work history, while it does count for something, does not provide tenure in an at-will work environment. People change and an employee's performance can certainly change, for better or worse. So, in the instant Gallup employee since January 1, 2008, including identification information and information about any Gallup-approved discipline or termination, which Gallup claimed was overbroad and unduly burdensome. The district court again granted Wagner's motion to compel this request but only to the extent Wagner sought information of Gallup employees that (a) were terminated; (b) were 50 or more years old; (c) had a comparable employment function to Wagner; and (d) worked in the same region as Wagner. The district court expanded the magistrate judge's determination on this latter request to require Gallup to produce information regarding all terminated Subject Matter Experts in the United States. We have thoroughly reviewed these requests and Wagner's corresponding arguments, cognizant of the breadth of evidence necessary to establish this employment discrimination claim, as well as the district court's response thereto, and find that, given the allowances made, the court committed no gross abuse of discretion. See Elnashar, 484 F.3d at 1052 (standard of review). -17- analysis, Wagner's prior successes do not ultimately create a question of material fact in support of Wagner's ultimate burden of persuasion in this matter. Viewed in the light most favorable to Wagner, he is unable to establish that there is a question of fact as to Gallup's motives for his termination. The district court did not inappropriately make inferences in Gallup's favor contrary to the summary judgment standard, but rather plainly viewed the evidence in the appropriate light in conducting its analysis. On the evidence presented, there is no genuine issue for trial on the ultimate question of discrimination. We thus affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim.