Opinion ID: 2654518
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The denial of leave time

Text: Ms. Kramer also contends that Sergeant Benson’s denial of her previouslyapproved leave time should be considered a tangible employment action. The record contains evidence of three occasions on which such conduct took place. On the second and third occasions, Sergeant Benson himself failed to relieve Ms. Kramer as he had promised to do. If he had used his formal control over her schedule to officially deny her the leave, it would more likely have been “documented in official company records,” or “subject to review by higher level supervisors.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762. Failing to relieve Ms. Kramer per an informal, oral agreement is the same kind of injury that a co-worker could have inflicted. Accordingly, the second two denials of leave cannot rise to the level of -32- tangible employment actions. See id.; see also Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2448. While the first incident was more formal because Sergeant Benson retracted an officially-approved leave, there is no evidence to support an inference that the loss of one day’s leave time constituted a “significant” change in Ms. Kramer’s benefits, eligibility for promotion, or employment status. See Ellerth, 542 U.S. at 762. On the record here, none of the denials of leave constituted a tangible employment action. 4. Assigning Ms. Kramer to the magnetometer and denying her road training Finally, Ms. Kramer posits that Sergeant Benson’s denying her road experience and placing her on the magnetometer all day (which precluded road training) constituted a tangible employment action because, she claims, road experience was “necessary for promotion.” Aplt. Br. at 27. The County argues that being placed on the magnetometer cannot be a tangible employment action because “requiring [plaintiff] to perform an essential function of her job cannot be a reassignment with significantly different responsibilities.” Aple. Br. at 29. But Vance explained that requiring an employee to perform full time what may be a peripheral part of her job description, if it reduced the possibilities for advancement or otherwise had economic consequences, “might constitute a tangible employment action.” Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2447 n.9; see also EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by -33- Supervisors No. 915.002(IV)(B) (1999) (citing Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 152-53 (3d Cir. 1999)). Being placed on the magnetometer full time could not be a tangible employment action merely because it was unpleasant, however. See Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994). We consider together Ms. Kramer’s contentions regarding Sergeant Benson’s unfair magnetometer assignment and his failure to train her on the road because each could only be a tangible employment action if it had deleterious economic consequences or reduced her opportunities for advancement. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-62; Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2447 n.9. Unfortunately for Ms. Kramer, there is simply no evidence in the record to support that theory. Her brief asserts that road training was necessary for promotions. Yet in her deposition, Ms. Kramer stated that she was offered a “road officer” position before she even began working as a bailiff, but did not take it because she did not live in Wasatch County at the time, which was required. She also testified that promotions occurred on the basis of “the order you were hired.” Aple. App. at 4. No testimony or evidence supports Ms. Kramer’s claim that road training was necessary or even helpful for a promotion. To survive summary judgment, Ms. Kramer cannot rest upon the allegations in her brief but “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (internal -34- quotation marks omitted). “[S]he easily could have avoided [this problem] simply by testifying, if she was able to do so,” that road training was in fact somehow related to promotions. See Williams v. W.D. Sports, N.M., Inc., 497 F.3d 1079, 1087-88 (10th Cir. 2007). Without such evidence, there is no genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that no tangible employment action occurred.