Opinion ID: 108152
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Any discussion of the scope of this Court's authority under the Constitution must take as its point of departure Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), where the Court held that except in those instances specifically enumerated in Article III of the Constitution, [2] this Court may exercise only appellatenot originaljurisdiction. Because this suit is not cognizable as an original cause, the question initially to be faced is whether it is within our appellate jurisdiction. The Court was asked in Marbury to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to deliver to an appointed justice of the peace his previously signed commission. After noting that the suit did not fall within any of the enumerated heads of original jurisdiction, the Court, through Chief Justice Marshall, concluded: To enable this court, then, to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable [the Court] to exercise appellate jurisdiction. Id., at 175. The Court held that issuance of mandamus to a nonjudicial federal officer would not be an exercise of appellate, but of original, jurisdiction. Thus the statute that purported to authorize such action by the Supreme Court was ineffective. See 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1761 (5th ed. 1891). The Chief Justice stated, as the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause. 1 Cranch, at 175. Beyond cavil, the issuance of a writ of mandamus to an inferior court is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. In re Winn, 213 U. S. 458, 465-466 (1909). If the challenged orders of the Judicial Council in this instance were an exercise of judicial power, this Court is constitutionally vested with jurisdiction to review them, absent any statute curtailing such review. Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553, 566 (1933); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716, 723 (1929); In re Sanborn, 148 U. S. 222, 224 (1893). On the other hand, if they were not, Marbury alone is sufficient authority to support a conclusion that this suit is beyond this Court's power under Article III. An analysis of the nature of the Council's orders must begin with consideration of the statute by which the Council was created. The Judicial Councils of the circuits were brought into being by the Act of August 7, 1939, which was termed An act to provide for the administration of the United States courts, and for other purposes. 53 Stat. 1223. The major purposes of the Act were to free the federal courts from their previous reliance on the Justice Department in budgetary matters, and to furnish to the Federal courts the administrative machinery for self-improvement, through which those courts will be able to scrutinize their own work and develop efficiency and promptness in their administration of justice. H. R. Rep. No. 702, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1939). To this end the Act established the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, headed by a Director, to compile statistical data on the operation of the courts and to provide support services of a logistical nature. [3] The Act further established two new entities in each of the judicial circuits: the Judicial Council, composed of all the active circuit judges, and the Judicial Conference, composed of circuit and district judges along with participating members of the bar. The Council, in regular meetings, was to consider the reports of the Director and take such action . . . thereon as might be necessary; [4] the Conference was to meet annually for the purpose of considering the state of the business of the courts and advising ways and means of improving the administration of justice within the circuit. [5] As these statutory provisions indicate, Congress envisioned quite different functions for the three new bodies. The role of the Administrative Office, and its Director, was to be administrative in the narrowest sense of that term. The Director was entrusted with no authority over the performance of judicial businesshis role with respect to such business was, and is, merely to collect information for use by the courts themselves. Chief Justice Groner of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, who was chairman of the committee of circuit judges that participated in drafting the bill, stressed to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary that the bill would give the Director no supervision or control over the exercise of purely judicial duties, because to grant such power to an administrative officer would be to destroy the very fundamentals of our theory of government. The administrative officer [the Director] proposed in this bill is purely an administrative officer. Hearings on S. 188 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1939) (response to question by Senator Hatch). See also id., at 36 (statement of A. Holtzoff). The Judicial Conference for each circuit was given a complementary role, again divorced from direct involvement in the disposition by the courts of their judicial business. Patterned in large part after the voluntary conferences that had been held for years in the Fourth Circuit, the Conference was intended to provide an opportunity for friendly interchange among judges and between bench and bar, out of which might grow increased understanding of problems of judicial administration and enhanced cooperation toward their solution. Its function, as indicated by the statutory language quoted above, was to be purely advisory. See Hearings on H. R. 5999 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 11-12, 17, 23-24 (1939). The Judicial Council, on the other hand, was designed as an actual participant in the management of the judicial work of the circuit. The Act provided that, [t]o the end that the work of the district courts shall be effectively and expeditiously transacted, the circuit judges of each circuit were to meet as a council at least twice a year. After consideration of the statistical reports submitted by the Administrative Office, such action shall be taken thereon by the council as may be necessary. It shall be the duty of the district judges promptly to carry out the directions of the council as to the administration of the business of their respective courts. [6] This provision exists today as § 332 without relevant change, except that the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code added a declaration that [e]ach judicial council shall make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within its circuit, and correspondingly directed the district judges to carry out all such orders. The reviser's note explained this amendment as merely a change in phraseology, embodying in new words the original understanding of the powers of the councils. H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A46 (1947). The most helpful guide in determining the role envisaged for the Judicial Councils is the testimony of Chief Justice Groner, who shouldered most of the task of explaining the purposes of the bill to the committees of both Houses of Congress. He explained that under existing law the circuit judges had no authority to require a district judge to speed up his work or to admonish him that he is not bearing the full and fair burden that he is expected to bear, or to take action as to any other matter which is the subject of criticism, . . . for which he may be responsible. Hearings on S. 188, supra, at 11. In contrast, under the proposed bill the Administrative Office would observe and see that whatever is wrong in the administration of justice, from whatever sources it may arise, is brought to the attention of the judicial council that it may be corrected, by the courts themselves. Id., at 12-13. As examples of the kinds of action a Judicial Council might be expected to take under the proposed bill, Chief Justice Groner suggested that if the statistics showed a particular district court to be falling behind in its work, the Council would see to it, either that the particular judge who is behind in his work catches up with his work, or that assistance is given to him whereby the work may be made current. Id., at 11. If it appeared that a particular judge had been sick for 4 or 5 months and had been unable to hold any court, or had been unable, by reason of one thing or another, to transact any business, . . . immediate action could be taken to correct that situation. Hearings on H. R. 5999, supra, at 11. Asked by Representative Walter Chandler what power is given there to require a judge to decide a case that he has had under advisement for months and years, he responded that the Council, after considering the matter, could issue directions that would be final. Id., at 13. Any lazy judge's work would be reported to the council, [which] would take the correct action. Id., at 27. [7] Judge Parker stated his view that what we have done is this, up to this point: We have given to the Circuit Court of Appeals supervisory power over the decisions of the district judges, but we have given them no power whatever over administration by the district judges. If Judge Jones decides a case contrary to the views of the majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals, we can tell him so and reverse him. But if he holds a case under advisement for 2 years, instead of deciding it promptly, there is nothing that we are authorized by the law to do about it in the absence of an application for mandamus. Now, this [bill] authorizes us to do something about it; and I agree with you that something ought to be done about it. Id., at 21. In place of the inadequate extraordinary remedy of mandamus, which could correct only the extreme abuse in a particular case, the circuit judges, sitting as the Judicial Council, were given the authority for continuous supervision of the flow of work through the district courts. In short, the proposed Judicial Council was intended to fill the hiatus of authority that existed under the then-current arrangements, whereby the Attorney General collected data about the operation of the courts but had no power to take corrective action, except, perhaps, as a result of the moral suasion of his office. The proposed bill would allow compilation of more complete information, and would provide a method, a legitimate, valid, legal method, by which, if necessary, and when necessary, the courts may clean their own house; it would give a body, in which the authority is firmly lodged, the power to do that and to do it expeditiously. Id., at 8. See generally Report on the Powers and Responsibilities of the Judicial Councils, H. R. Doc. No. 201, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); Fish, The Circuit Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal Judicial Administration, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203 (1970). This legislative history lends support to a conclusion that, at least in the issuance of orders to district judges to regulate the exercise of their official duties, the Judicial Council acts as a judicial tribunal for purposes of this Court's appellate jurisdiction under Article III. It seems clear that the sponsors of the bill considered the power to give such orders something that could not be entrusted to any purely administrative agency not even to the Administrative Office, which was to be an arm of the judicial branch of government and under the direct control of the Supreme Court and the Judicial Conference of the United States. Chief Justice Groner, in the passage quoted above, stated that to give such power to an administrative agency would be to destroy the very fundamentals of our theory of government. Instead, any problems unearthed by the Director's studies were to be corrected, by the courts themselves. Hearings on S. 188, supra, at 12-13. See also Hearings on H. R. 5999, supra, at 8. There were further references throughout the hearings and committee reports to the fact that the corrective power would be exercised by the courts themselves. E. g., Hearings on S. 188, supra, at 16 (statement of A. Vanderbilt); id., at 31-32 (statement of Hon. Harold M. Stephens); id., at 36 (statement of A. Holtzoff); H. R. Rep. No. 702, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1939). The House report quoted with approval an endorsement of the bill by the American Judicature Society, stating that there is no way to fortify judicial independence equal to that of enabling the judges to perform their work under judicial supervision. Ibid. These statements indicate that the power to direct trial judges in the execution of their decision-making duties was regarded as a judicial power, one to be entrusted only to a judicial body. In this regard it is important to note that an earlier draft of the 1939 Act would have given responsibility for supervising the lower courts to the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice of the United States. The idea of devolving the authority to councils at the circuit level was suggested by Chief Justice Hughes, who believed that the supervision could be made most effective by concentration of responsibility in the various circuits . . . with power and authority to make the supervision all that is necessary to induce competence in the work of all of the judges of the various districts within the circuit. H. R. Doc. No. 201, supra, at 3. It is equally notable that, while the draftsmen did consider giving district judges some representation on the Councils, see id., at 4-5, there was apparently no thought given to including nonjudicial officers. These indications leave no doubt that the Councils' architects regarded the authority granted the Councils as closely bound up with the process of judging itself. [8] Because the legislative history shows Congress intended the Councils to act as judicial bodies in supervising the district judges, there is no need to decide whether placement of this authority in a nonjudicial body would violate the constitutional separation of powers, as Chief Justice Groner seems to have believed. It is sufficient to conclude from reason and analogy that this responsibility is of such a nature that it may be placed in the hands of Article III judges to be exercised as a judicial function. An order by the Council to a district judge, directing his handling of one or many cases in his court, is an integral step in the progress of those cases from initial filing to final adjudication. Like the district judge's own orders setting a time for discovery or trial, or transferring a case to another district pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1404 (a), such an order, even though concerned with a matter of judicial administration, is part of the official conduct of judicial business. Unlike the more common orders of the district court, the Council's orders involve supervision of a subordinate judicial officer. But in this regard they are not unlike the extraordinary writ of mandamus, which Judge Parker thought the Council's orders would supplement, or the orders entered by courts in proceedings for disbarment of an attorney. In short, the function of the Council in ordering the district judges to take certain measures related to the cases before them is, as the legislative history indicates Congress understood, judicial in nature. [9] To support a contrary conclusion, respondent points to the language of Justice Holmes in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 226 (1908), defining a judicial inquiry as one that investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist, as contrasted to legislation, which looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power. The Court in Prentis held that a ratemaking proceeding in the Virginia State Corporation Commission was legislative in character, despite the fact that the Commission was assumed to function as a court in performing other duties. Similarly, in United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40 (1852), this Court concluded that the act of a district judge in passing on claims under a treaty, subject to approval by the Secretary of the Treasury, was not a judicial one; the Court held that Congress, in giving this authority to judges, referred to them by their office merely as a designation of the persons to whom the authority is confided, and the territorial limits to which it extends. Id., at 47. See also Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. 561 (1865); In re Metzger, 5 How. 176 (1847); Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792). Respondent argues that the functions of the Judicial Council under § 332 are, under Justice Holmes' definitions, legislative, or administrative, rather than judicial; and that the statutory provision making the membership of the Council coextensive with that of the Court of Appeals for each circuit [10] is merely a means of designating the individual members by reference to their office. Certainly respondent is correct in urging that Congress' designation of circuit judges as the members of the Council does not in itself make the Council's function judicial. I think, however, that the Council's orders directing the official business of the district courts are judicial within the general definition of that term in Prentis. In urging that the Council's function merely looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule, respondent disregards the fact that each of the Council's orders, such as those challenged here, is rooted in the factual circumstances of the business of a particular judge or judges and the status of a particular case or cases in the district court; and each order, if properly entered, extends only as far as the circumstances that make it necessary . . . for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts. 28 U. S. C. § 332. As noted above, the Council's orders for the handling of cases in the district court serve as one step in the progress of those cases toward judgment. Those orders can be expected to apply commonly accepted notions of proper judicial administration to the special factual situations of particular cases or particular judges. As respondent points out, the power entrusted to the Councils by § 332, like those added by later enactments, see infra, at 109-110, necessarily involves a large amount of discretion; accordingly, review of the Councils' actions will usually be narrow in scope. But this does not mean that the Councils are left at large as planning agencies. United States v. First City National Bank, 386 U. S. 361, 369 (1967). In First City National Bank, we were faced with a federal statute directing the courts to determine whether the anticompetitive effect of a proposed bank merger was outweighed by considerations of community convenience and need. We ruled that the courts could accept this as a judicial task because, like the rule of reason, long prevalent in the antitrust field, the effect-on-competition standard was a familiar one within the area of judicial competence. See also United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U. S. 39 (1959). Judicial administration is a matter in which the courts even more clearly should have special competence. Within the framework of the statutes establishing the inferior federal courts and defining their jurisdiction, the Judicial Councils are charged with the duty to take such actions as are necessary for the expedition of the business of the courts in each circuit. Their discretion in this matter, while broad, does not seem to be of a different order from that possessed by district judges with respect to many matters of trial administration. In both instances, review can correct legal error or abuse of discretion where it occurs; that the scope of review will often be very narrow does not in itself establish that the exercise of such discretion is a nonjudicial act. [11] Respondent makes a further argument to avert a conclusion that the actions here drawn in question were judicial actions. It points out that Congress since 1939 has given the Judicial Councils many specific powers powers that respondent considers so clearly nonjudicial as to negate any inference that the Council serves as a judicial body within the purview of Article III. Those powers include the power to order a district judge, where circumstances require, to reside in a particular part of the district for which he is appointed, 28 U. S. C. § 134 (c); to make any necessary orders if the district judges in any district are unable to agree upon the division of business among them, 28 U. S. C. § 137; to consent to the pretermission of any regular session of a District Court for insufficient business or other good cause, 28 U. S. C. § 140 (a); to approve as necessary the provision of judicial accommodations for the courts by the General Services Administration, 28 U. S. C. § 142; to consent to the designation and assignment of circuit or district judges to sit on courts other than those for which they are appointed, 28 U. S. C. § 295; to certify to the President that a circuit or district judge is unable to discharge efficiently all the duties of his office by reason of permanent mental or physical disability, thus authorizing the President to appoint an additional judge, 28 U. S. C. § 372 (b); to direct where the records of the courts of appeals and district courts shall be kept, 28 U. S. C. § 457; to approve plans for furnishing representation for defendants under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U. S. C. § 3006A (a); and to take various actions in regard to referees in bankruptcy, including removal of a referee for cause, 11 U. S. C. §§ 62 (b), 65 (a), (b), 68 (a), (b), (c), 71 (b), (c). While many of these powers are trivial in comparison with the courts' basic responsibility for final adjudication of lawsuits, I am not persuaded that their possession is inconsistent with a conclusion that the Council, when performing its central responsibilities under 28 U. S. C. § 332, exercises judicial power granted under Article III. Cf. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 580-582 (1962) (opinion of HARLAN, J.). In the first place, the respondent concedes that at least one of these enumerated powersthe power to remove referees for causecan properly be regarded as judicial, and it is not at all clear that any of them is beyond the range of the permissible activities of an Article III court. In Textile Mills Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U. S. 326, 332 (1941), the Court noted the range of relatively minor responsibilities, other than the hearing of appeals, placed by statute in the courts of appeals. These included prescribing the form of writs and other process and the form and style of the courts' seals; making rules and regulations; appointing a clerk and approving the appointment and removal of deputy clerks; and fixing the times when court should be held. Each of these functions was to be performed by the court. While it is possible that the performance of some of them might never produce a case or controversy reviewable in this Court, they are reasonably ancillary to the primary, dispute-deciding function of the courts of appeals. Just as the Court in Textile Mills did not question the authority of Congress to grant such incidental powers to the courts of appeals, I see little reason to believe that any of the various supervisory tasks entrusted to the Judicial Council is beyond the capacities of a judicial body under Article III. In the second place, my conclusion about the nature of the Council's primary function under § 332 would stand even if it were determined that one or more of the Council's assorted incidental powers were incapable of being exercised by an Article III court. If I am correct in concluding that Congress' purpose in 1939 in creating the Judicial Councils was to vest in them, as an arm of the Article III judiciary, supervisory powers over the disposition of business in the district courts, that purpose is not undone by a subsequent congressional attempt to give them a minor nonjudicial task; it would be perverse to make the status of [the Councils] turn upon so minuscule a portion of their purported functions. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S., at 583.