Opinion ID: 1403389
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cooperating with Assessment Procedure

Text: Parkman argues as his second point on appeal that he was unconstitutionally penalized for cooperating with the assessment procedure. He contends that the use of statements he made during the assessment process, under a grant of immunity, to assess him as a level four offender, violated his federal and state rights against self-incrimination. Parkman further avers that, because his convictions occurred before the effective date of the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), the punishment of assessing him as a level four offender and the restrictions resulting therefrom violated the ex post facto prohibitions of Article I, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution and Article 2, § 17 of the Arkansas Constitution. The Committee counters that offenders going through the assessment process are provided with use immunity, in that any statements made during assessment cannot be used against the offender in a criminal prosecution of past acts. It further contends that the assessment process is not criminal in nature and that residency requirements, public website notification, limitations on volunteer work, and limitations on the entrance to school campuses are not punishment; instead, it claims, they are regulatory and nonpunitive actions for the public's protection. Because such requirements are not punishment, the Committee avers, they cannot be considered violative of the right against self-incrimination or of ex post facto.
The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, which applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no person `shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.' Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 92 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986) (internal citation omitted). The Self-Incrimination Clause, therefore, is expressly limited to `any criminal case.' United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V). One's Fifth Amendment right may only be violated where one's own statements are used against one in a proceeding criminal in nature. See, e.g., Edwards v. Stills, 335 Ark. 470, 984 S.W.2d 366 (1998). Here, Parkman urges that a level four assessment constitutes punishment due to the fact that certain restrictions are placed upon him as a result of being classified at that level. He contends that because a level four assessment is punishment, the use of any of his statements to classify him as a level four offender violates his right against self-incrimination. Parkman's argument is without merit, however, as this court has previously held that the SORA is civil in nature. In Kellar v. Fayetteville Police Department, 339 Ark. 274, 5 S.W.3d 402 (1999), this court examined the effects of the SORA to see whether it `transform[s] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.' 339 Ark. at 282, 5 S.W.3d at 407 (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997)). To make its determination, this court looked to the factors set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), which had been used previously by multiple courts. [5] We then concluded that [g]iven the overall balance of the Kennedy factors, we are left with the conclusion that, while there may be some punitive characteristics inherent in the registration and notification statute, the Act is essentially regulatory and therefore non-punitive in nature. Id. at 287, 5 S.W.3d at 410. Notwithstanding our holding in Kellar , Parkman asserts that certain requirements for level four offenders render the assessment procedure and his assessment as a level four offender punishment, or criminal. Specifically, Parkman points to several statutes within our criminal code and one statute within the SORA, which he perceives as restrictions that render a level four assessment punishment and a deprivation of his liberties: (1) Ark.Code Ann. § 5-14-128(a) (Supp.2007), which renders it unlawful for a sex offender required to register under the SORA, and who has been assessed as a level three or level four offender, from residing within 2000 feet of any public or private elementary or secondary school, public park, youth center, or daycare facility; (2) Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-129(a) (Repl.2006), which renders it unlawful for a sex offender required to register under the SORA, and who has been assessed as a level three or level four offender, to engage in an occupation or participate in a volunteer position that requires the sex offender to work or interact primarily or directly with a child under sixteen years of age; (3) Ark.Code Ann. § 5-14-131(b)(1) (Supp. 2007), which renders it unlawful for a person who is required to register under the SORA, and who has been assessed as a level three or level four offender, to knowingly reside within 2000 feet of the residence of his or her victim; (4) Ark.Code Ann. § 5-14-132(b) (Supp.2007), which renders it unlawful for a person who is required to register under the SORA, and who has been assessed as a level three or level four offender, to knowingly enter upon the campus of a public school; and (5) Ark.Code Ann. § 12-12-913(j)(1)(A) (Supp.2007), which sets forth the information that shall be made public concerning a registered sex offender who is classified as a level three or level four offender. Claiming that these restrictions render assessment as a level four offender criminal in nature, Parkman urges that his right to self-incrimination was violated when he was forced to provide statements during the assessment process that were used to calculate his classification. Parkman's argument regarding the four criminal statutes cited is misplaced. We have already held that the SORA is not criminal in nature, including its assessment process. Parkman's ultimate claim is that his classification as a level four offender is punitive or criminal in nature; he merely argues this is so because he may become subject to certain criminal statutes by virtue of his classification. That may be true, but, still, the assessment process, as part of the SORA, is not criminal in nature. As this court has already determined, the requirements of the SORA, including assessment, are not criminal in nature, and Parkman's assertion to the contrary is without merit. Because, under Kellar , the assessment and ultimate classification of a sex offender pursuant to the SORA are not criminal in nature, Parkman's statements made during the assessment process were not subject to protection by the Self-Incrimination Clause by virtue of the criminal statutes relied on by Parkman. [6] Nor does the effect of Ark.Code Ann. § 12-12-913(j)(1)(A) render the SORA criminal in nature, as claimed by Parkman. In 2003, the General Assembly amended that section, setting forth specific information regarding a level three or level four sex offender that shall be public. See Act 330 of 2003, § 2. Section 12-12-913(j)(1)(A) currently provides that [t]he following information concerning a registered sex offender who is classified as a level 3 or level 4 offender by the Sex Offender Screening and Risk Assessment shall be made public: (i) The sex offender's complete name, as well as any alias; (ii) The sex offender's date of birth; (iii) Any sex offense to which the sex offender has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or of which the sex offender has been found guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction; (iv) The street name and block number, county, city, and zip code where the sex offender resides; (v) The sex offender's race and gender; (vi) The date of the last address verification of the sex offender provided to the Arkansas Crime Information Center; (vii) The most recent photograph of the sex offender that has been submitted to the center; and (viii) The sex offender's parole or probation office. Ark.Code Ann. § 12-12-913(j)(1)(A) (Supp.2007). We cannot say that this effect of the Act transforms what we have already found civil in nature to criminal or punitive. When enacted in 1997, [7] the SORA provided for the disclosure of relevant and necessary information regarding sex offenders to the public when the disclosure of such information is necessary for public protection. Ark.Code Ann. § 12-12-913(b)(1) (Supp.1997). At that time, the General Assembly directed and authorized the Child Abuse/Rape/Domestic Violence Commission [8] to promulgate guidelines and procedures for the disclosure of relevant and necessary information regarding sex offenders to the public when the release of the information is necessary for public protection. Ark.Code Ann. § 12-12-913(c)(1). The guidelines and procedures promulgated were to identify factors relevant to an offender's future dangerousness and likelihood of reoffense or threat to the community. The guidelines and procedures shall also address the extent of the information to be disclosed and the scope of the community to whom the disclosure shall be made as these factors relate to the level of the offender's dangerousness, the offender's pattern of offending behavior, and to the need of community members for information to enhance their individual and collective safety. Ark.Code Ann. § 12-12-913(c)(2) (Supp. 1997). In Kellar , this court examined the then three-tiered structure of the registration and notification rules for sex offenders. In doing so, the court described the system then in place, observing that the risk level assessment determined the type of information and amount of community notification released regarding a particular offender: For a Level I offender, only the offender, adult members of the offender's household, and local law enforcement agencies receive the information contained in the offender's fact sheet, which contains such data as the offender's assigned risk level; the name (and any aliases), birth date, social security number, and physical description of the offender; a recent photograph; and a description of the offense for which the offender was convicted, among other things. A Level II offender will be subject to the same scope of notification, but could also, at the discretion of local law enforcement, have the information subject to dissemination to any establishments and organizations that primarily serve individuals likely to be victimized by the offender. For a Level III offender, it is mandatory that notification be given to all of the above; in addition, subject to the discretion of law enforcement authorities, the same information may be released to any other members of the community the offender is likely to encounter. At this level, the community notification is essentially unlimited. In deciding whether or not to exercise their discretion in releasing this information to the public, law enforcement authorities may consider the offender's prior history, offense characteristics, employment, recreational, social or religious interests and the characteristics of likely victims. 339 Ark. at 286-87, 5 S.W.3d at 409-10 (emphasis added). We then held that those provisions strongly indicated that the SORA was tailored to address specific governmental interests and was not excessive in relation to its stated nonpunitive purpose. See id. A comparison of the current statute's notification rules for level three and level four offenders with the notification rules at issue in Kellar reveals that the information to be disseminated under both statutes is substantially similar. Just as such rules did not render the 1997 SORA punitive, the substantially similar, current provisions do not now render the SORA punitive. Accordingly, because the assessment process is civil in nature, Parkman's statements made therein may be used to calculate his assessment level, and Parkman's self-incrimination claim fails.
Parkman further argues that because his convictions occurred before the effective date of the registration act, any punishment, such as assessing him as a level four offender, violated the federal and state ex post facto prohibitions. However, in Kellar , this court rejected this precise argument. There, Kellar argued that the retroactive application of the SORA to his earlier convictions violated the federal and state ex post facto clauses. As already stated, this court explicitly held that because [the Act] is not a form of punishment, it therefore cannot be considered a violation of the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Arkansas Constitutions. 339 Ark. at 287, 5 S.W.3d at 410. Again notwithstanding our decision in Kellar , Parkman attempts to enhance his ex post facto argument, citing this court to the same criminal statutes he relies upon in his argument that his self-incrimination rights were violated, as well as Act 1743 of 2001, which amended Ark.Code Ann. § 12-12-904(a)(1). He asserts that the enaction of these subsequent statutes, which he describes as imposing criminal sanctions on a level four offender, supersedes any prior civil nature of the Act and gives a level four assessment a prohibited ex post facto effect. Our analysis of Parkman's ex post facto claim based upon the criminal statutes cited is the same as already set forth regarding his self-incrimination claim. Parkman was assessed by the Committee to be a level four offender, which he claims to be punishment. The SORA provides for assessment, and this court has explicitly held that the SORA is not punitive, but civil in nature. Merely because Parkman may become subject to additional criminal statutes by virtue of his status as a level four offender does not render the assessment process or his assessment level punishment, as that determination is clearly civil in nature. Accordingly, Parkman's ex post facto claim based on the cited criminal statutes must fail. Nor is Parkman's argument regarding Act 1743 of 2001 meritorious. In Act 1743, the General Assembly made numerous amendments to the SORA, which already set forth criminal sanctions for a sex offender's failure to register or failure to report a change of address. [9] Specifically, section 3 of that Act amended Ark.Code Ann. § 12-12-904(a)(1) to provide: (a)(1) A person who fails to register or who fails to report changes of address, employment, education, or training, or who refuses to cooperate with the assessment process as required under this subchapter shall be guilty of a Class D felony. Act 1743 of 2001, § 3. [10] While the amendment did make criminal the failure to cooperate with the assessment process, we simply cannot say that this effect of the Act transform[s] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Kellar, 339 Ark. at 282, 5 S.W.3d at 407 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488). It is our opinion that the SORA, as amended by Act 1743 of 2001, § 3, remained regulatory, or civil in nature, despite any possible punitive characteristic of the amendment. Accordingly, the Act, as amended, cannot be an ex post facto law, and Parkman's argument regarding the amendment fails. See, e.g., Kellar v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, supra (citing Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)). In sum, Parkman does not contend that the criminal statutes upon which he relies are punitive, or criminal, in nature and, therefore, render the rights against self-incrimination and ex post facto applicable to the assessment process. Cf. Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 453 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir.2006) (rejecting appellants' argument that the residency restriction set forth in Ark.Code Ann. § 5-14-128(a) was an unconstitutional ex post facto law, as it was not so punitive in effect as to negate the General Assembly's intent to create a civil, nonpunitive regulatory scheme when it enacted the residency restriction). Instead, his arguments regarding those two rights are premised on his assertion that his classification as a level four offender is rendered punitive by virtue of those statutes. Because the assessment process and the resulting assessment level are part and parcel of the SORA, and because this court has previously examined the effects of the SORA and determined that it is nonpunitive, or civil, in nature, neither right precludes the use of Parkman's statements in the assessment process and any resulting assessment level.