Opinion ID: 1155573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Port Packet Corporation v. Lewis, et al.

Text: In July of 1980, two articles and an editorial on the subject of child abuse were published in The Alexandria Port Packet, a weekly newspaper circulated in the Alexandria area. In April of 1981, appellees E. Grey Lewis and Carolyn G. Lewis, his wife, sued appellant Port Packet Corporation, publisher of the paper, for compensatory and punitive damages. In an amended motion for judgment, the plaintiffs alleged that defendant published untrue and defamatory statements concerning the plaintiffs, causing them to be exposed to public contempt and ridicule. The plaintiffs alleged they were embarrassed and humiliated, and that their reputations for honesty and integrity had been impaired. Following a four-day trial, a jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, fixing compensatory damages at $50,000 and punitive damages at $100,000. The trial court overruled defendant's motion to set aside the verdict and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, jointly, in the amounts fixed by the jury. We awarded defendant an appeal from the January 1983 final order. On June 10, 1980, about 8:00 a.m., Edward Grey Lewis, Jr., the nine-month-old son of the plaintiffs, was being fed by his mother from a bottle in a bedroom adjacent to the kitchen of the plaintiffs' home in Alexandria. Mrs. Lewis left the child momentarily against pillows on a bed while she stepped to the kitchen to assist Mr. Lewis, who was preparing a strawberry shortcake. Several minutes later, the plaintiffs heard a loud crash in the bedroom and discovered the child had fallen from the bed. The child appeared to be seriously injured. The Lewises rushed the baby to Alexandria Hospital where he died two days later from head injuries sustained in the fall. Subsequently, the Alexandria Child Protective Services Unit and the Alexandria Police Department investigated the child's death, which was ruled accidental. The police officially closed their investigation on July 28, 1980. In the meantime, the defendant published in its July 16 edition of The Packet the first of a series of two articles, as well as an editorial, on the subject of child abuse in Alexandria. The article, which is the main subject of this dispute, appeared under the by-line of reporter Adrian Higgins. The headline read: 2 TOTS DIE AS CHILD ABUSE CLIMBS. The first several paragraphs of the ten-column article stated: Early in June, nine-month-old Mark fought for his short life after receiving head injuries in what police believe was a vicious attack on the infant. Mark lost his fight. The same week two-year-old Robert also suffered a skull fracture in another suspected attack. Robert clung to life for two weeks. On April 28, a Monday, five year-old Asia Marie returned to a city day care center after a weekend spent with her teacher's aide displaying signs of a severe beating. Asia's two-year-old sister came back with lesser injuries. What all these frail victims are believed to have in common is exposure to one of Alexandria's fastest growing social problems: child beating. The next several paragraphs cited statistics on the incidence of child abuse in the City, commenting that many assaults on children go undetected in a society that has traditionally regarded the family home a shelter and sanctuary for young human beings.... The article then summarized an interview with a supervisor of the local social services department who indicated that a greater portion of maltreated children are of parents who have more money, but feel the economic pinch hard enough to become stressful and violent. The article then listed incidents of child abuse, without giving names of the individuals involved in the alleged offenses. That information preceded the following: Denied even the pains of childhood, nine-month-old Mark (not his real name) received a fractured skull during the first week of June and was taken to Alexandria Hospital where he died two days later. Detectives are treating his death as a homicide. The same week two-year-old Robert (not his real name) suffered similar injuries. At a time when other kids his age are curiously exploring life's trinkets, Robert was taken to Alexandria Hospital and then transferred to D.C. Children's Hospital to receive more specialized care. Hooked up to life support systems in a futile attempt to revive him, Robert was declared medically dead two weeks later. Based on autopsy reports, Alexandria police investigators are also treating Robert's death as a murder. The remainder of the article discussed the abuse of Asia Marie, referred to earlier, and her sister. The article concluded with statements made by Sergeant Ronald Uhrig of the Alexandria Police Department. Uhrig was quoted as pointing out the difficulties in obtaining convictions in child abuse cases, noting: `The biggest problem is you have two parents (of an abused child) and one won't testify against the other, and doesn't have to.' The editorial in the same edition was captioned CHILD ABUSE. The writer discussed the painful subject, pointed out difficulties of proving the charges of abuse, mentioned that it was necessary to learn of child abuse before it could be stopped, and stated that notoriety of such cases might be a solution to the problem. The editorial concluded: It may be that publicity is the main weapon against the child abuser. It is a shameful thing to be known as a child abuser. It might influence the abuser if he or she knew that the glare of news coverage and the probability of the neighbors knowing all about [sic] was part of the act. Could it work? The issues on appeal involve whether there was sufficient identification of the plaintiffs in the publication to form a basis for an action of libel; whether a negligence standard should be adopted for an award of compensatory damages; whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the damage awards; and whether the awards were excessive. Discussion of the identification question requires a summary of the evidence. James W. Coldsmith, publisher and editor of The Packet, and Adrian Higgins, one of the paper's two full-time reporters, became interested in the problem of child abuse in Alexandria. They decided to proceed with an article on the general subject and this effort eventually became the two-part series published in July of 1980. Police Sergeant Uhrig was among the individuals interviewed by Higgins in preparing the series. During the course of the mid-July interview, Uhrig told Higgins about several instances of suspected child abuse, including the death of a nine-month-old child. Without identifying the victim by name, Uhrig told the reporter that the child was a male who died from head injuries, including a skull fracture, which were not consistent with a normal fall. Actually, Uhrig was relating the bare facts of the death of the plaintiffs' child. He told Higgins that the child died in early June at Alexandria Hospital. He also told Higgins that the case was classified as a suspicious death and that it was being investigated procedurally as a homicide. Uhrig testified that he explained to Higgins that the final results of a police investigation determine the ultimate classification of a death, whether it be accidental, natural, or a homicide. Initially, he explained, a death that is not natural is classified by the police as a homicide. Uhrig testified that he did not tell Higgins that the police believed there had been a vicious attack on the infant, that the child was a victim of child beating, or that the police were treating the child's death as a murder. Uhrig further testified that, after publication of the article, he told Higgins that he objected to use of words in the article that were not Uhrig's words, especially the use of vicious attack. According to Uhrig, the reporter replied that he used the words to be very graphic. Higgins testified that because Uhrig did not identify the nine-month-old child, as well as the two-year-old which was discussed in the interview, he decided to give the children the fictitious names of Mark and Robert. The reporter stated this was a writing tool that provided a convenient way to refer to the children in the article. One expert witness testified that the journalistic term for such a device is anecdotal lead. In preparing the article, the reporter intended to inform the paper's readers, in general terms, of what he believed was a growing social problem in the Alexandria area. There was no intention to deal specifically with any of the cases mentioned in the publication, only to discuss the incidents as illustrative of the problem. Higgins did not seek further verification of the information he received about Mark because he assumed, mistakenly, that Uhrig was in charge of the investigation into the cause of the child's death. The reporter also decided that an attempt for additional verification, from anyone who was in a position to know the facts, would be futile because of the confidential nature of such information. At the time the article was published, neither Higgins nor Coldsmith, the publisher and editor, knew the identity of Mark or his parents. Coldsmith reviewed and edited the article prior to publication. He had confidence in Higgins, who was a British-trained, awardwinning reporter with considerable experience. Coldsmith knew that Higgins had interviewed Uhrig, an official source, and perceived no need for additional investigation about the facts of Mark's death. Coldsmith, who wrote the editorial, believed the article met the standard of a reasonably prudent journalist. The plaintiffs presented extensive evidence that members of the community who knew the Lewises, or knew of them, identified the plaintiffs as parents of the child named Mark in the article. This evidence came not only from the plaintiffs themselves but also from a relative, friends, officials involved in the investigation, and virtual strangers. Initially, the defendant argues on appeal the identification question. This was first raised in the trial court by demurrer. Emphasizing that the fictitious name Mark was used and that the article nowhere refers to the plaintiffs, the newspaper contends that the publication is not actionable because it contained no defamatory imputation against any particular individual who is reasonably identifiable by the words of the article. In addition, the defendant urges that the evidence failed to show, under the pertinent instruction in the case, that the article was intended to refer to the plaintiffs. We disagree with both contentions. In Virginia, a libel plaintiff must show that the alleged libel was published of or concerning him. Cave v. Shelor, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 193 (1811). He need not show that he was mentioned by name in the publication. Instead, the plaintiff satisfies the of or concerning test if he shows that the publication was intended to refer to him and would be so understood by persons reading it who knew him. Powell v. Young, 151 Va. 985, 997-98, 144 S.E. 624, 627, rev'd on other grounds, 151 Va. 1002, 145 S.E. 731 (1928). In other words, the test is met if the plaintiff shows that the publication was in its description or identification such as to lead those who knew or knew of the plaintiff to believe that the article was intended to refer to [him]. Butler v. News-Leader Co., 104 Va. 1, 7, 51 S.E. 213, 215 (1905). But if the publication on its face does not show that it applies to the plaintiff, the publication is not actionable, unless the allegations and supporting contemporaneous facts connect the libelous words to the plaintiff. If the rule were otherwise, any plaintiff could adopt and apply to himself any libelous matter and obtain a recovery. Ewell v. Boutwell, 138 Va. 402, 413, 121 S.E. 912, 915 (1924). The Restatement comment is consistent with the rule in Virginia. It is not necessary that the plaintiff be designated by name; it is enough that there is such a description or reference to him that those who hear or read reasonably understand the plaintiff to be the person intended. Extrinsic facts may make it clear that a statement refers to a particular individual although the language used appears to defame nobody. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 564 comment b (1977). In the present case, even though the publication on its face did not refer to the Lewises by name, the contemporaneous facts sufficiently connected the publication to the plaintiffs to establish an issue for the jury. These facts included the extensive testimonial evidence that, immediately upon publication of the article, many individuals who knew the plaintiffs, or knew of them, identified the Lewises as the parents of Mark. The conclusions of those witnesses are amply supported by underlying facts which establish an interconnection from Mark to the Lewis child to the Lewises. The article recited specific details about the child's sex and age, the nature of his injuries, when he died, how he died, the hospital where he died, and how long he lived after sustaining the injuries. This was not simply a report stating that an infant recently died in a local hospital of head injuries in a case of suspected child abuse. Instead, the publication was explicit in detailing Mark's tragedy using the exact facts surrounding the death of the Lewis child. One of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses stated the obvious when he testified: The more identifying detail that is made available to you, the more you might tend to know who this person is, even though you never knew the person by name as such. The evidence supporting the connection to the plaintiffs, parents of Mark, is just as strong. The article and editorial pointedly focused on parents of abused children and tied those references to the cases documented. The editorial made specific reference to the article and suggested that publicity is the main weapon against the child abuser. Noting that being known as a child abuser is shameful, the writer opines that the glare of news coverage will alert the neighbors to the abuser's conduct, a reference that obviously includes parents as those to be in the glare of publicity. Moreover, there were repeated references in the article to the parents' role in the child abuse problem. For example, the family home which was formerly a shelter for children has been converted to a battlefield, according to the article. A cause of the increasing number of attacks on children is parental stress erupting in the homes of parents who have more money than poor families, the publication reported. Mr. Lewis is an attorney practicing in the District of Columbia. In addition, the article and editorial pointed out the difficulty in prosecuting cases of child abuse because often a mere infant is involved and neither of the parents will testify against the other. But see Code § 19.2-271.2. Consequently, we hold the trial court did not err in ruling that the question of identification was an issue of fact to be decided by the jury. The foregoing comments dispose of the defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to refer to the plaintiffs as required by the law of the case.... The following instruction was given without objection as to form: The newspaper article in issue does not name the plaintiffs. In order to recover, therefore, the plaintiffs must show by a preponderance of evidence that the article was published of and concerning them. In order so to find, you must determine that the article was intended to refer to the plaintiffs, directly or indirectly, and that it is reasonably probable that members of the public who read the article would understand it as referring to them. Defendant argues there was no evidentiary basis for the jury to have found that the article was intended to refer to the plaintiffs, either directly or indirectly. We do not agree. True, neither the reporter nor the editor knew the identity of the child named Mark, or that the plaintiffs were the parents of the child. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the defendant did not intend the article to refer to the Lewises indirectly. The Packet had embarked on a crusade against child abusers. This is clear from the editorial. As a part of this campaign, the newspaper intended that parents abusing children be identified. As the plaintiffs argue, the jury could reasonably conclude that the newspaper intended to refer directly to Mark's abusers, his parent or parents, and therefore, indirectly to the Lewises. Accordingly, the jury's finding is supported by sufficient evidence and is consistent with the pertinent instruction. Next, the defendant contends that a showing of more than simple negligence is necessary for an award of compensatory damages. This argument already has been considered and rejected. The trial court properly applied a negligence standard. The threshold question of facial defamatory potential was not an issue below. We conclude, nevertheless, that the content of the article should have warned a reasonably prudent editor of its defamatory potential. The publication categorically stated that the Alexandria Police were treating the death of Mark as a murder. In a paragraph devoted to Robert, the article noted that police are also treating Robert's death as a murder. The use of also clearly refers to the preceding paragraph about Mark's death. Furthermore, the clear implication from the headline and the content was that the murder occurred during an act of child abuse as the result of a vicious attack on the infant. These circumstances, viewed objectively, should have alerted an editor, who was exercising reasonable care, to the harmful potential of the words used, i.e., that the parents of the child dubbed Mark were charged with murder, a fact that was utterly false. The evidence showed that the reporter and the editor were not operating under the constraints of a deadline. Indeed, Coldsmith testified he realized that, with the use of the vicious attack line, very serious things and very serious events were being described. A command by the editor for simple verification with, for example, the police officer actually conducting the investigation of the death would have revealed the inaccuracy of the potentially defamatory language. Next, the defendant contends the trial court erred when it permitted the jury to award compensatory damages for injury to reputation when there was no evidence of such injury. The specific contention is that the trial court improperly included, as an item in the damage instruction, a direction for the jury to consider the effect of the defamation upon the plaintiffs' standing in the community in order to determine injury to reputation. The defendant says there was no evidence the article had any effect on the plaintiffs' standing in the community. We disagree. The plaintiffs, residents of the Old Towne section of Alexandria, presented evidence they feared that some of their neighbors, knowing they were accused of child abuse, would be on the lookout for further child abuse because the Lewises had other children living with them who survived their son. In addition, Mrs. Lewis related an incident in a local grocery store when, after the publication, a casual acquaintance, who had been cordial in the past, made a complete turn-about and walked the other direction. Also, a local realtor stated he had read the article, had discussed it with friends approximately six times, and, at a political meeting, had admonished Coldsmith regarding the publication. The realtor told the editor that he objected to the article and that he thought the paper had gone too far and was doing bad things to people that already suffered enough. This and other evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to consider whether the publication diminished the plaintiffs' standing in the community. We likewise reject defendant's argument that the compensatory-damage award of $50,000 was excessive. The newspaper contends the jury was influenced by passion and was misled. The defendant suggests there was an emotionally charged atmosphere during the trial generated by evidence surrounding the tragic death of the plaintiffs' son. It points out that the plaintiffs did not prove any monetary damage as the result of the publication and that the plaintiffs' mental suffering required no medical treatment. We conclude that this joint award to two plaintiffs was not excessive. Consistent with our decision in Fleming I, the trial court permitted the jury to assess compensatory damages for plaintiffs' pain, embarrassment, humiliation and mental suffering, and any injury to their reputation, according to the pertinent instruction. In addition, the jury was admonished to award damages that resulted only from the defendant's wrong, and not from other causes. The verdict was approved by the trial judge. There is no fixed standard for measuring compensatory damages, and the amount of the award is largely a matter of discretion with the jury to be based on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Unless the amount of the award is so excessive as to shock the conscience of the court, or to create the impression that the jury was influenced by passion or prejudice, a verdict approved by the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal. Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 36, 197 S.E.2d 214, 220 (1973). A study of this record convinces us that the compensatory-damage verdict is not excessive. For example, Mrs. Lewis was horrified, mortified, and humiliated by the article because, in part, she believed the police felt she and her husband had attacked their child. The publication, of course, appeared in the midst of the police investigation. She was scared to death and feared she was going to be put in prison the next day. She was so sensitive to the article that she believed individuals would think she had abused her child and gotten away with it and that they shouldn't associate with [her]. For about six months after the article was published, the plaintiffs isolated themselves from friends. In addition, Mrs. Lewis lost sleep and experienced stomach pains because she was just aware of public humiliation. Mr. Lewis was overwhelmed when he read the article. He expected to be indicted at any moment. He testified that he was not prepared to deal with the situation, in which the police may have believed I had viciously attacked and killed my little boy, Grey. He testified that his emotions upon reading the article the day after its publication were different from the emotions that he had been experiencing over the loss of his son. He felt tremendous humiliation, withdrew from his friends and associates in the community, and feared the information he was a child abuser would spread throughout the community and into Washington. A former public servant, Mr. Lewis had hoped to return to government service, but was concerned by the competition for posts to which he aspired due to his newly acquired baggage. Also, the Lewises became afraid to discipline their five-year-old daughter by spanking her. They feared somebody will hear about it, then will say, `Oh, God, there are the Lewises again.' Next, the defendant contends that the evidence failed to establish a basis for an award of punitive damages. The trial court submitted the punitive-damage issue to the jury with a requirement that New York Times malice must be established by the plaintiffs. This action would have been correct if there had been sufficient evidence to clearly and convincingly prove that the defendant made the statements knowing they were false or made them so recklessly as to amount to a willful disregard for the truth. But we have conducted an independent examination of the entire record, according to Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc ., and have determined that the evidence is not sufficient to support a finding of New York Times actual malice by clear and convincing proof. The conduct of the defendant was negligent, but not malicious in the New York Times sense. The record is devoid of evidence to show that the reporter or editor knew the defamatory statements were false. Therefore, the plaintiffs must recover punitive damages, if at all, upon evidence of reckless disregard of whether the words were false or not. The articles were researched in depth. In addition to Uhrig, Higgins talked with the supervisor of the Child Protective Services Unit of the Alexandria Department of Social Services, two assistant city prosecutors, the director of a local program dealing with abused children, and a social worker. The articles were edited in a deliberate fashion with consideration given to accuracy. Because the editor was aware that the reporter had used an official source for the serious portions of the article, no further verification was suggested. The editor approved the article for publication believing it complied with standards of proper journalism. In making an independent examination of the record on this issue, we must be certain that the judgment for punitive damages does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285, 84 S.Ct. at 729. With this mandate in mind, we cannot say that the record in this case establishes the required actual malice with convincing clarity. The defamatory statements were not made, under the evidence, with a high degree of awareness that they were probably false. Consequently, the judgment for punitive damages is erroneous and will be annulled. Accordingly, the judgment below will be affirmed as to the compensatory-damage award, reversed as to the punitive-damage award, and final judgment will be entered for the plaintiffs on the former award.