Opinion ID: 3055099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the timeliness of fawcett’s appeal

Text: The government also moved to partially dismiss Fawcett’s appeal because his August 26 notice of appeal was untimely as to the underlying July 1 order and July 11 amended judgment. A party may appeal a judgment or order in a criminal case within 14 days of the entry of the judgment or order. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A). 9 Here, Fawcett’s time to appeal the July 11 amended judgment expired on July 25, 2011. See id. As noted above, the time to file a notice of appeal may be extended to a time not more than 30 days from the expiration of the 14-day time limit “[u]pon a 9 We note that while the deadlines in Rule 4(b) are not jurisdictional, we must apply Rule 4(b)’s time limits because the government has objected to the timeliness of Fawcett’s appeal. See United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309, 1311–14 (11th Cir. 2009). 11 Case: 11-14051 Date Filed: 06/24/2013 Page: 12 of 19 finding of excusable neglect or good cause.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4). Even using both the 14-day and 30-day periods, Fawcett’s time to file a notice of appeal from even the later July 11 amended judgment expired on August 24, 2011. See id. Fawcett’s notice of appeal was filed two days later, on August 26, and was not timely as to either the July 1 order or July 11 amended judgment unless some tolling occurred. Fawcett’s Motion for Reconsideration or Correction of Sentence, filed on July 19, is the only potential candidate for tolling. The government argues that Fawcett’s July 19 motion did not toll the appeal period because: (1) the motion expressly relied on Rule 35(a), which cannot toll the appeal period; (2) while motions for reconsideration may toll the appeal period, a party cannot evade the Rule 35(a) restrictions by characterizing a Rule 35(a) motion as seeking “reconsideration” of a sentence; and (3) Fawcett’s motion was cognizable, if at all, only under Rule 35. Fawcett’s August 26 notice of appeal was not timely as to the July 1 order or the July 11 amended judgment, and thus we must dismiss any appeal as to that order or amended judgment. Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(3), three motions will toll the time to appeal in a criminal case: (1) a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) a Rule 33 motion for new trial; and (3) a Rule 34 motion for arrest of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(3)(A). Although not expressly authorized by the Federal Rules of Criminal or Appellate Procedure, there is a fourth option 12 Case: 11-14051 Date Filed: 06/24/2013 Page: 13 of 19 recognized by case law: a motion for reconsideration of an appealable criminal order will toll the time for filing a notice of appeal, and the time will begin to run anew if such motion is filed within the appeal period. See United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 8–9, 97 S. Ct. 18, 19–20 (1976); United States v. Vicaria, 963 F.2d 1412, 1413–14 (11th Cir. 1992). This might help Fawcett except for the facts that: (1) Fawcett’s motion specifically invoked Rule 35(a) as a basis; and (2) the Federal Rules expressly provide that “[t]he filing of a motion under [Rule] 35(a) does not suspend the time for filing a notice of appeal from a judgment of conviction.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(5). Therefore, we conclude that Fawcett’s July 19 “Motion for Reconsideration or Correction of Sentence” is a Rule 35(a) motion that may not be used to toll the applicable appeal period. Importantly too, the sole relief sought in his July 19 motion was relief that may only be granted pursuant to Rule 35(a): modification of his imprisonment sentence from 35 to 30 months. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B); United States v. Phillips, 597 F.3d 1190, 1194–95 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The unambiguous language of § 3582(c)(1)(B) indicates that, absent other express statutory authority, modification of an imprisonment sentence can only be done pursuant to Rule 35.”). Fawcett cannot recast what is essentially a Rule 35(a) motion as a tolling motion for reconsideration in order to evade the strictures of 18 U.S.C. § 3582 and Rule 35. See Phillips, 597 F.3d at 1195; see also United States 13 Case: 11-14051 Date Filed: 06/24/2013 Page: 14 of 19 v. Dotz, 455 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting defendant’s “creative characterization” of his Rule 35(a) motion as a motion for reconsideration and concluding that “[i]n the sentencing context, there is simply no such thing as a ‘motion to reconsider’ an otherwise final sentence” given the limited circumstances under § 3582(c) in which a sentence can be modified). 10 The bottom line is Fawcett’s July 19 motion was not a tolling motion. As a result, even with an additional 30 days as provided in Rule 4(b)(4), his appeal of the July 1 order was due August 15 and his appeal of the July 11 amended judgment was due August 24. Fawcett’s August 26 notice of appeal was untimely and accordingly we grant the government’s motion to dismiss his appeal as to the July 1 order and July 11 amended judgment. 11