Opinion ID: 1218704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the specific statute applies

Text: Specific statutes, rather than general ones, are to be used when conflicts between them arise. ORS 174.020 (when a general and particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former); Colby v. Larson, 208 Or. 121, 126-27, 297 P.2d 1073, 299 P.2d 1076 (1956); Ricker v. Ricker, Administratrix, 201 Or. 416, 424, 270 P.2d 150 (1954). The 1987 legislature enacted, as a new subsection 2 of ORS 163.150, the mandatory sentencing provisions upon which defendant relies to obtain a life sentence. Or. Laws 1987, ch. 557, § 1. That 1987 amendment provided: When the defendant is found guilty of aggravated murder upon a plea of guilty    prior to the introduction of evidence before the trier of fact and the state advises the court on the record that the state declines to present evidence for purposes of sentencing, the court shall not conduct a sentencing proceeding    but the court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment as prescribed by ORS 163.105. The original statute section amended was adopted by initiative in 1984 and became Oregon Laws 1985, chapter 3, section 3. The initiative dealt exclusively with aggravated murder, as does ORS 163.150 presently. Concerning the subject at issue, the statute with its 1987 amendment was in 1988 the complete scheme for dealing with guilty pleas to a charge of aggravated murder. The purpose of the amendment was to obviate any role for, or recourse to, a jury sentencing procedure in the event of a guilty plea to aggravated murder. No reference to earlier enacted statutes dealing in general terms with plea bargaining is required or authorized by the plain words of the specific statute. The specific statute prescribes in mandatory language the effect of a plea of guilty and a district attorney's statement that the state declines to present evidence for sentencing. The trial court does not have discretionary power to reject the plea to an aggravated murder bargain that it normally would have concerning other plea bargains under the more general provisions of ORS chapter 135. The legislation provides that the judge shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment. There is no office left for ORS 135.432(4) and its cross-reference to ORS 135.415 to fill. The specific provisions of ORS 163.150 provide what the judge shall do. In any event, ORS 135.415 and ORS 135.432(4) are addressed to different problems, stated in terms of whether the district attorney may engage in plea discussions for the purpose of reaching a plea agreement and whether the trial judge may reach an independent decision on whether to grant sentence concessions under the criteria set forth in ORS 135.415. They may authorize a district attorney to refuse to engage in plea discussions, but that is not this case. They may authorize a trial judge to override an overly generous concession made by a district attorney, but that is not this case. This is a case where the defendant agreed to plead guilty to the most significant charge, not some lesser offense, and to all charges made, not just some of them. While questions about voluntariness, defendant's understanding of the effect of his plea, and whether the facts confessed constitute the crime charged are still open to the trial court under the requirements of due process, the issue of whether the plea bargain is based on the 1973 general statute's discretionary considerations is not a matter for court review under the specific 1987 statute involving a plea of guilty to aggravated murder. The specific statute for aggravated murder pleas must be applied. [6]