Opinion ID: 444031
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 16 Since Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), the scope of Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to those areas in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. 389 U.S. at 360-61, 88 S.Ct. at 516 (Harlan, J., concurring). See Oliver v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 1740, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984). Under the exclusionary rule, law enforcement officers may not use information obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to establish probable cause justifying a search. 4 17
18 Roberts argues that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 196th Ave. and that the observations of Yarborough and Foster, a product of their drive up 196th Ave., should have been excluded from the magistrate's probable cause determination. In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan stated that the Fourth Amendment protects those areas in which a person exhibits an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516 (Harlan, J., concurring). By posting the No Trespassing and Private Property Keep Out signs, Roberts and the other residents along the road exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy. We must decide whether that expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. 19 Recently, in Oliver v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 1741, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984), the Court reaffirmed the vitality of the open fields doctrine. The Court agreed with Justice Holmes' conclusion in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898 (1924), that the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common law. Id. 265 U.S. at 59, 44 S.Ct. at 446, quoted in Oliver, 104 S.Ct. at 1740. The Oliver Court followed Hester in holding that an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home. 104 S.Ct. at 1741. 20 The Oliver Court also reaffirmed the common law distinction between open fields and the curtilage. Defining the curtilage as the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,'  the Court approved the practice of extending Fourth Amendment protection of the house to the area immediately surrounding it. Id. at 1742 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 532, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886)). 21 The Court justified its refusal to extend the same protection to open fields by observing that, in contrast to a house and its curtilage, open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance and that, as a practical matter these lands usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home, an office or commercial structure would not be. Id. 104 S.Ct. at 1741. For these reasons, the Court concluded that the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not an expectation that 'society recognizes as reasonable.'  Id. (footnote omitted). 22 To determine whether the agents' entry onto the road was a search, we must decide whether the private road in this case is within the curtilage of Roberts's residence or belongs instead in the same category as an open field. We find that the unobstructed road, akin to an open field, is not within the curtilage and that Roberts's asserted expectation of privacy in the road is unreasonable by society's standards. 23 A shared unobstructed road is incongruent with the common law concept of the curtilage as the area around the home to which the activity of home life extends. Oliver, 104 S.Ct. at 1743 n. 12. Used in common with residents of five other houses, the private road is only a means to reach a public road. The private road does not provide the setting for intimate activities of home life. The activities conducted on a road--driving a car, riding a bike, or walking--are impersonal, public activities. Moreover, the road is easily accessible to utility companies and police and fire departments and it is reasonable to assume that the residents would expect these public agencies to use the road in performing their services. Finally, if the road were within the curtilage, the boundaries of the curtilage could conceivably extend indefinitely. For these reasons, the agents' conduct in driving up the road did not constitute a search. 24 Roberts attempts to distinguish the private road from an open field by two implausible arguments: (1) that the No Trespassing and Private Property Keep Out signs created a reasonable expectation of privacy, and (2) that the road is similar to the common areas--hallways, etc.--in an apartment building. We address each of these arguments in order. 25 First, the Supreme Court dismissed a similar argument as irrelevant in Oliver. The Court stated the defendants' conduct--planting marijuana on secluded land, erecting fences and posting no trespassing signs around the property--did not demonstrate that their expectation of privacy was legitimate in the sense the Fourth Amendment requires. 104 S.Ct. at 1743. The test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly 'private' activity, but whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id. (footnote omitted). In the circumstances presented, the no trespassing signs were not sufficient to turn an unobstructed private road into an area for protected intimate activities. 26 Second, although Roberts's analogy of the road to protected common areas of an apartment building is superficially appealing, it does not withstand close scrutiny. In cases holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallway of his apartment building, the common door to the building was locked and entry controlled solely by the defendant or by a very limited number of co-tenants. See e.g., United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 716 (9th Cir.1976) (the entry way was one to which access was clearly limited as a matter of right to the occupants of the two basement apartments, and it is undisputed that the outer doorway was always locked and that only the occupants of the two apartments and the landlord had keys thereto.). 27 Thus, even if we considered the private road in this case analogous to a hallway in an apartment building, precedent would not support finding Roberts's expectation of privacy reasonable because (1) there was no locked gate at the intersection of 196th Ave. and East Lake Sammamish Road and (2) the residents of the five other homes on 196th Ave. shared access to the road. Any person passing by could have easily driven up 196th Ave. Moreover, Roberts had no control over the five other homeowners: they could have invited anyone, including police officers, to drive up the road. 28 In short, the district court correctly denied Roberts's motion to suppress Yarborough and Foster's observations of the frost-free garage roof and covered windows. The magistrate properly considered those observations in determining that probable cause existed. 29
30 Here again, the question is whether Roberts's expectation of privacy in the area of government intrusion is one that society recognizes as reasonable. Unlike the intrusion onto the road, however, the agents' approach to Roberts's residence was within the curtilage of the house. Nevertheless, precedent on this issue indicates that their intrusion was not an impermissible one. 31 In United States v. Hersh, 464 F.2d 228 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1008, 93 S.Ct. 442, 34 L.Ed.2d 301 (1972), two deputy sheriffs, acting without a warrant, walked up to and knocked on the front door of the defendant's home. While standing on the front porch, they peered through a window and saw drugs and drug paraphernalia. On the basis of these observations, they arrested the defendant the next day and seized the drugs and paraphernalia as part of a search incident to the arrest. We held that the observations through the window did not violate the Fourth Amendment and quoted Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir.1964), for the proposition that anyone may openly and peaceably, at high noon ... walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof--whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law. Id. at 303, quoted in Hersh, 464 F.2d at 230. In the instant case, the agents approached Roberts's door at 12:15 in the afternoon to ask the occupant questions. Under Hersh, their observations properly contributed to establishing probable cause. 5 32 Our holding here does not conflict with Pendleton v. Nelson, 404 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir.1968) and United States v. Pacheco-Ruiz, 549 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir.1976). In both cases the officers not only made observations but at the same time seized evidence on the basis of those observations. 33 In each case we declined to address the issue whether a search took place and focused instead on the unreasonableness of the seizure when the officers could have obtained a warrant but did not do so. Pendleton, 404 F.2d at 1077; Pacheco-Ruiz, 549 F.2d at 1207. Here, however, the agents did obtain a warrant before entering the house and seizing evidence. 34 We therefore hold that the magistrate properly considered the agents' observations of the occupant's behavior in determining that probable cause existed, and the district court correctly denied Roberts's motion to suppress.