Opinion ID: 151187
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Similarity of the Owner's Mark and the Alleged Infringer's Mark

Text: Under the second step, we must consider the similarity between the Sensient Flavors and SensoryEffects Flavor Systems marks. Frosty Treats, 426 F.3d at 1008. Rather than consider the similarities between the component parts of the marks, we must evaluate the impression that each mark in its entirety is likely to have on a purchaser exercising the attention usually given by purchasers of such products. Duluth News-Tribune, 84 F.3d at 1097. The use of identical, even dominant, words in common does not automatically mean that two marks are similar. Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 627 (8th Cir.1987). We may consider the marks' visual, aural, and definitional attributes and compare the trade dress of the products in determining whether the total effect conveyed by the two marks is confusingly similar. Luigino's, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 830 (8th Cir.1999) (citing Gen. Mills, 824 F.2d at 627). The district court analyzed the evidence submitted by the parties related to the sophistication of the customer base and the collaborative process by which the products in the industry are sold. As a result of the sophisticated customers and the long, interactive purchasing process, the court determined it was highly unlikely buyers would confuse the marks, and thus the likelihood of confusion was diminished. The court also noted there was a distinct auditory difference between the marks. The court rejected Sensient's initial interest confusion argument, in which it contended SensoryEffects was able to use Sensient's name to gain access to customers and begin the collaborative process leading to sales, even if the customer's initial confusion over the two companies' names dissipates during the process. The court noted this theory has never been adopted by the Eighth Circuit, and even if it was, Sensient would still lose because it failed to show any evidence of customers experiencing such a phenomenon. Not only did SensoryEffects Flavor Systems have a distinct auditory difference from Sensient Flavors, the court held, but Sensient failed to introduce evidence showing SensoryEffects attempted to lure away Sensient's customer base by passing off its products as Sensient's. On appeal, Sensient contends the district court correctly recited the sight, sound, and meaning test to determine the similarity between the marks, see id., but it erroneously considered the purchasing conditions and evidence of actual confusion in assessing the similarity of the marks. Sensient asserts the court must independently determine whether the marks appear and sound similar and evoke a similar meaning, and then separately consider whether the purchasing conditions make those similarities more or less critical. Sensient also urges this court to formally adopt the initial interest confusion doctrine. We first consider the sight, sound, and meaning argument. We have continually held the use of identical dominant words does not automatically equate to similarity between marks. See Frosty Treats, Inc., 426 F.3d at 1008-09 (distinguishing the words frosty treats in the defendant's product from the plaintiff's Frosty Treats mark where the mark and trade dress were visually distinct); Luigino's, 170 F.3d at 830-31 (concluding Lean Cuisine and Lean `N Tasty are not confusingly similar); Duluth News-Tribune, 84 F.3d at 1097 (determining Duluth News-Tribune and Saturday Daily News & Tribune were distinct, despite the aural similarity between the two marks); Gen. Mills, 824 F.2d at 627 (holding the district court did not err in finding no confusing similarity between Oatmeal Raisin Crisp and Apple Raisin Crisp because the marks were different enough to avoid customer confusion). In this case, while each mark uses the word flavors and begins with the sens prefix, these features are components of longer product names with different auditory and visual depictions. See Everest Capital Ltd., 393 F.3d at 761 (Though each mark uses the dominant word `Everest,' that word is part of longer product names that employ different fonts and graphics.). First, there are significant visual differences between the marks. Sensient's mark consists of blue capital lettering with a yellow wave slightly above the lettering. The SensoryEffects mark, on the other hand, utilizes bold black lettering in different typeface on two lines, with a multicolor swirl symbol to the left of the first line. Based on these visual distinctions, the marks are sufficiently differentiated to prevent customer confusion. See Luigino's, 170 F.3d at 831 (The use of different colors and typefaces, as well as the prominent display of the house marks convey perceptible distinctions between the products.). In its reply brief, Sensient contends the visual appearance of the marks is irrelevant because the point of contact between the companies and the customers generally occurs via telephone, and thus the auditory similarities should be given priority. Sensient's suggestion to place particular emphasis on the verbal effect of the marks is not without merit. See 4 McCarthy § 23:22 (4th ed.) (Similarity of sound may be particularly important when the goods are of the type frequently purchased by verbal order.). However, we agree with the district court that the composite marks maintain a distinct auditory difference. See Duluth News-Tribune, 84 F.3d at 1097 (Although the [Duluth News-Tribune and Saturday Daily News & Tribune] marks are aurally similar, when pronounced in their entirety the word `Saturday' and the ampersand in defendants' paper make the two distinguishable.). While Sensient correctly notes the purchasing conditions, confusion among customers, and similarity between the marks are three separate factors considered by the court in its analysis, our precedent is clear that we evaluate the impression the entire mark is likely to have on a purchaser exercising the attention usually given by purchasers of such products. Id. See also Luigino's, 170 F.3d at 830-31 (analyzing whether an ordinary consumer would be likely to be confused between the two marks). The parties agree the ordinary customer of their products is sophisticated and any particular sale is the result of a long, collaborative process. Taking into consideration the sophistication of the customers and the nature of the purchasing process, the district court correctly determined the ordinary consumer would not find the marks confusingly similar under the sight, sound, and meaning test. Sensient further argues the district court erred in its application of the initial interest confusion doctrine. According to Sensient, most courts now recognize the doctrine, which arises when confusion creates an initial customer interest, even though no actual sale may be finally completed due to the confusion. 4 McCarthy § 23:6 (4th ed.). Sensient contends the doctrine may be applied to a purchasing process that is drawn out over a period of time, such as the collaborative buying process at issue here. Id. However, those courts acknowledging the doctrine recognize that [e]ven if the marks are almost identical, initial interest confusion is not assumed and must be proven by the evidence. Id. We decline Sensient's invitation to adopt the initial interest confusion doctrine in this case because, even if the doctrine applied generally in this circuit, it would not apply in this case. Under the doctrine, courts look to factors such as product relatedness and the level of care exercised by customers to determine whether initial interest confusion exists. Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 296 (3d Cir.2001). Here, although the products are similar, the parties agree the customers are sophisticated and exercise a relatively high degree of care in making their purchasing decisions. This sophistication makes it less likely customers will experience initial confusion, ultimately resulting in a benefit to the alleged infringer. Id. at 296-97. As a result, the district court correctly rejected the application of the doctrine under these facts. In sum, the district court did not err in concluding the second factor weighs in favor of SensoryEffects.