Opinion ID: 1756872
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Distinction between First-Degree and Second-Degree Murder

Text: Appellant argues that the definition of deliberation in the first-degree murder jury instruction reduces the distinction between first-degree and second-degree murder and is unconstitutionally vague. Appellant objected during the instruction conference and raised the point in the motion for new trial. An instructional error is reviewed for an error in submitting the instruction and prejudice. State v. Zink, 181 S.W.3d 66, 74 (Mo. banc 2005). MAI instructions are presumed valid. Id. The Court has previously found first-degree murder is distinguished from second-degree murder by deliberation. [5] Strong, 142 S.W.3d at 717. Deliberation is defined as a cool reflection for any length of time no matter how brief. Section 565.002(3). The first-degree murder instruction [6] provided was based on MAI-CR3d 314.02, which included the statutory definition of deliberation. The instruction adequately sets out the additional element of deliberation to distinguish first-degree murder. There is also no evidence Appellant was prejudiced. The statutory definition of deliberation is not unconstitutionally vague. This Court has rejected the claim that first-degree murder is unconstitutionally vague for failing to distinguish first-degree and second-degree murder. See State v. Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 231 (Mo. banc 2006). The trial court did not err in submitting the instruction.