Opinion ID: 2804713
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Defendant’s Jailhouse Letter

Text: Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted his jailhouse letter under the adoptive admission exception to the hearsay rule (Evid. Code, § 1221) and because the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody. Additionally, he asserts application of the newsperson‘s shield law (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (b); Evid. Code, § 1070) limited his ability to effectively challenge the testimony of Tony Saavedra, the Orange County Register reporter, which was the basis of the court‘s admission of the letter into evidence. Defendant contends the improper admission of the letter violated his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.4 We reject his claims. 4 ―As to this and virtually all other appellate claims, defendant contends that an issue raised and decided in the trial court resulted in constitutional violations, but he did not present those constitutional theories below. In such instances, it appears that (1) the appellate claim is the kind that required no trial court action to preserve it, or (2) the new arguments do not invoke facts or legal standards different from those the trial court was asked to apply, but merely assert that the trial court‘s act or omission, in addition to being wrong for reasons actually presented to that court, had the legal consequence of violating the United States and California Constitutions. To that extent, defendant‘s new constitutional arguments are not forfeited on appeal. [Citations.] In the latter case, no separate constitutional discussion is required or provided where rejection of a claim that the trial court erred on the issue presented to that court necessarily leads to rejection of any constitutional theory or ‗gloss‘ raised for the first time here.‖ (People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 139, fn. 17.) We apply this principle here and elsewhere where defendant asserts on appeal constitutional claims not advanced below. 14
Before trial, the court conducted a hearing on defendant‘s motion to exclude from evidence the jailhouse letter defendant allegedly wrote to his fellow inmate, Cezar Pincock, about which Tony Saavedra, the reporter for the Orange County Register, later questioned defendant. The prosecutor explained that at his request, Saavedra, who had become aware of the letter and some of its contents, had held off writing a story about it until after the police had investigated whether, as the letter suggested, a ―hit‖ had been planned against defendant‘s grandfather. In gratitude for his cooperation, the prosecutor gave Saavedra a copy of the letter. The prosecutor represented that Saavedra questioned defendant about the letter on his own and not at the prosecutor‘s instigation. Although, as noted, the author of the letter denied having killed Edward, Dolores and Danny Charles, he described his discovery of the bodies, the cleanup efforts and the attempted disposal of the bodies by burning them. These descriptions largely tallied with what defendant told Deputy Sheriff Hyatt.5 The issue at the pretrial hearing was not the content of the letter but, as defense counsel put it, ―whether [defendant] confessed to writing‖ the letter. At the outset of the hearing, the parties stipulated that the letter was received by Sergeant Royer from inmate Pincock as well as to the circumstances under which Saavedra obtained it. They stipulated further that the defense‘s handwriting 5 Hyatt did not testify at the hearing regarding admissibility of the letter. He had, however, testified at an earlier Evidence Code section 402 hearing on the defense motion to exclude defendant‘s statements to him. The court denied that motion in part, permitting admission of some statements that defendant had voluntarily made to Hyatt, but not later statements Hyatt solicited from defendant. In arguing the letter corroborated defendant‘s statements to Hyatt, the prosecutor referred to Hyatt‘s testimony at this earlier hearing. Defendant did not object to the consideration of Hyatt‘s testimony by the trial court. 15 expert, William Hatch, had he been called at the hearing, would have testified none of the writing was in defendant‘s hand. As he would at trial, Saavedra testified that he held up pages of the letter to the glass partition that separated him from defendant in the jail‘s visiting room and asked him questions about certain passages. In doing so, he used language like ―I have a letter that you wrote,‖ and ―You said here,‖ or ―well, you wrote here.‖ In questioning defendant he ―hopscotched‖ around the letter. Saavedra testified that at no point did defendant admit or deny he wrote the letter, but he responded to Saavedra‘s questions about specific passages. Saavedra testified he was ―waiting‖ for defendant ―to disagree with what was in the letter,‖ to say, for example, ―I didn‘t burn my parents,‖ but ―it was quite the opposite.‖ The prosecutor argued that, in addition to Saavedra‘s testimony, the similarities between what was in the letter and what defendant told Deputy Hyatt, which the deputy had testified to at an earlier Evidence Code section 402 hearing, provided further evidence defendant had written the letter. The defense argued that the dissimilarities outweighed the similarities and that the letter was disjointed, ―as though someone is getting police reports and getting more information and then writing more letters.‖ The trial court observed the entire letter appeared to have been written by a single person, a point defense counsel did not dispute. In admitting the document into evidence the court said, ―[T]here has been no suggestion of tampering, other than speculation. Certainly, you would expect that if it is in the same handwriting, if [defendant] is shown the first page and he doesn‘t deny it is his handwriting, that that would include the whole document.‖ The court questioned whether, as the defense contended, there was a ―problem with the chain of custody.‖ Defense counsel replied there was no evidence defendant had given the letter to Pincock or anyone else. Defense 16 counsel conceded, however, that the letter the prosecution gave Saavedra was the same letter Royer said Pincock had given him. The trial court rejected the chain of custody argument, concluding, ―If the handwriting is the same person for all the 18 pages and . . . the defendant is shown one page of it by the reporter, and doesn‘t deny it under circumstances where a person ordinarily would say that, ‗That not‘s true, I didn‘t write that,‘ or ‗that‘s not my handwriting,‘ it seems that it is an implied admission as to the other 18 pages. [¶] Unless, you know, there is some evidence that there has been some tampering with those 18 pages.‖ The court denied the motion to exclude the letter without prejudice to a further showing ―that would justify excluding it.‖
At the Evidence Code section 402 hearing, the admissibility of the jailhouse letter to Pincock hinged upon the preliminary factual question whether defendant authored the letter.6 In finding that defendant did, the trial court relied on the letter itself, which it concluded had been written by a single individual, similarities between defendant‘s statements to Deputy Hyatt and accounts in the letter regarding defendant‘s efforts to clean up the murder scene and dispose of the bodies, and the testimony of Tony Saavedra about defendant‘s conduct when Saavedra questioned him about the letter. In the court‘s opinion, defendant‘s conduct constituted an adoptive admission of authorship.7 6 As relevant here, Evidence Code section 402 provides for a hearing out of the presence of the jury ―[w]hen the existence of a preliminary fact is disputed . . . .‖ (Id., § 402, subd. (a).) Evidence Code section 403 places upon the proponent of the evidence the burden of proving ―the existence of the preliminary fact.‖ (Id., § 403, subd. (a).) 7 The court‘s finding of authorship was preliminary; the jury was the final arbiter of this issue. ― ‗[T]he judge‘s function on questions of this sort is merely to (footnote continued on next page) 17 Defendant challenges the trial court‘s conclusion that his conduct when questioned about the letter by Saavedra constituted an adoptive admission. ―We review the trial court‘s conclusions regarding foundational facts for substantial evidence. [Citation.] We review the trial court‘s ultimate ruling for an abuse of discretion [citations], reversing only if ‗ ―the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 132.) Because the adoptive admission issue involved only the authorship of the letter, not its contents, we are concerned only with whether the trial court ruled correctly that defendant‘s conduct in response to Saavedra‘s questioning constituted an adoptive admission that he wrote the letter. If so, then any incriminating statements in the body of the letter would become defendant‘s own statements and, as such, party admissions. (Evid. Code, § 1220.) ―In determining whether a statement is admissible as an adoptive admission, a trial court must first decide whether there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that: (a) the defendant heard and understood the statement under circumstances that normally would call for a response; and (b) by words or conduct, the defendant adopted the statement as true.‖ (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 535.) ―For the adoptive admission exception to the hearsay rule to apply, no ‗direct accusation in so many words‘ is necessary. [Citation.] Rather, it is enough that the evidence showed that the defendant participated in a private conversation in which the crime was discussed and the circumstances offered him (footnote continued from previous page) determine whether there is evidence sufficient to permit a jury to decide the question.‘ ‖ (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 467.) 18 the opportunity to deny responsibility or otherwise dissociate himself from the crime, but that he did not do so.‖ (Id. at p. 539.) In this case, Saavedra confronted defendant with the letter that, in part, described the author‘s efforts to clean up the murder scene and dispose of the bodies. While Saavedra did not directly ask defendant if he had written the letter, he showed him pages of the letter and queried him about it with language that plainly attributed the letter to defendant, e.g., ―You said here,‖ ―Well, you wrote here.‖ That defendant responded to Saavedra‘s queries is evidence defendant heard and understood Saavedra‘s remarks, thus fulfilling the first prerequisite for an adoptive admission. As to the second, that the defendant by words or conduct adopt the statement as true, defendant did not deny having written the letter or in any way dissociate himself from it and its incriminating contents. To the contrary, in response to Saavedra‘s questions, defendant explained or illuminated passages in the letter. Accordingly, substantial evidence showed defendant heard and understood Saavedra was implicitly asserting defendant had authored the letter and, by responding to Saavedra‘s substantive questions regarding the contents of the letter, implicitly admitted authorship. Moreover, in concluding defendant wrote the letter, the trial court did not rely solely on its conclusion defendant‘s conduct constituted an adoptive admission. The trial court also found the entire document had been written by a single person and implicitly found, as the prosecutor argued, that statements in the letter regarding the aftermath of the murders largely corroborated defendant‘s statements to Deputy Hyatt to which Hyatt had testified at an earlier evidentiary hearing. We note further that at trial Kimberley Speare testified that the handwriting in the letter was defendant‘s. Thus authenticated as having been written by defendant, any inculpatory statements in the letter were admissible as party 19 admissions. (Evid. Code, § 1220 [―Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered against the declarant in an action to which he is a party . . . ‖].) Accordingly, even if the trial court had erred in admitting the letter as an adoptive admission—which it did not—it would have been admissible on this alternative ground. (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 582 [a trial court‘s ruling, if correct on any ground, will be affirmed].) Defendant challenges the trial court‘s ruling on four grounds. First, he claims ―the chain of custody was inadequate to show that the letter was genuine or authored by [defendant].‖ The trial court appropriately rejected this claim. The parties stipulated that the letter was the same letter Pincock had given Sergeant Royer and that the copy Saavedra showed defendant was a copy of that letter. There was no suggestion the letter was tampered with at any point in its passage from Pincock‘s hands to Royer to the hearing. Thus, as the trial court correctly observed, there is no chain of custody issue. (See People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 134.) Defendant‘s claim that Pincock forged the letter after obtaining access to police reports in defendant‘s possession goes to the question of authorship, not to chain of custody. As already explained, the evidence supports the conclusion that defendant wrote the letter. Second, defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the letter because Saavedra admitted he showed only parts, and not the entire document, to defendant. But as earlier noted, the trial court found the entire document was written by a single person and in a single hand. The trial court concluded that person was defendant. Third, defendant argues the letter did not constitute an adoptive admission because he did not admit he committed the crimes, but blamed them on a nameless third party. The argument is both forfeited and meritless. Defendant did not seek to exclude the letter because it did not constitute a confession; his sole argument 20 was that he did not write the letter at all.8 Accordingly, the argument is forfeited. His argument is meritless because it goes not to its admissibility, but to the evidentiary weight of the letter, a matter for the jury. In sum, substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s foundational finding of authorship, and it did not abuse its discretion in admitting the letter into evidence. Finally, defendant complains that Saavedra‘s invocation of the newsperson‘s shield law (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (b); Evid. Code, § 1070) prevented him from properly challenging the admission of the letter by thwarting his ability to confront and cross-examine Saavedra in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. The claim is meritless. Article I, section 2 of the California Constitution provides, as relevant to this case, that ―[a] . . . reporter . . . shall not be adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legislative, or administrative body, . . . for refusing to disclose any unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to the public.‖ The constitutional provision is incorporated in the language of section 1070 of the Evidence Code. Termed ―the newsperson‘s shield law‖ (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 792), these provisions protect ―a newsperson from being adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose either: (1) unpublished information, or (2) the source of 8 On a related note, defendant complains Saavedra‘s guilt phase trial testimony that in his opinion defendant wrote the letter usurped the jury‘s exclusive prerogative to determine that issue. Defendant did not advance this argument either at the pretrial evidentiary hearing or when Saavedra testified. Accordingly, the claim is forfeited. Even if it were not, the jury was instructed that it alone was to determine whether an admission had been made. ―We presume the jury understood and followed the instruction.‖ (People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 873.) 21 information, whether published or unpublished.‖ (Id. at p. 797.) The immunity is not absolute, however, and may in some instances yield to a criminal defendant‘s constitutional right to a fair trial. (Id. at p. 805.) The current case involves unpublished information. In Delaney, we defined the term ― ‗unpublished information‘ ‖ as encompassing ―a newsperson‘s nonconfidential, eyewitness observations of an occurrence in a public place.‖ (Delaney v. Superior Court, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 805.) We also set forth a number of factors to guide the trial court in balancing the interests of a criminal defendant seeking to overcome the immunity granted by the shield law with the newsperson‘s interests. Those factors are: (a) ―whether the unpublished information is confidential or sensitive‖; (b) whether ―the interests sought to be protected‖ by the law would be thwarted by disclosure; (c) ―the importance of the information to the criminal defendant‖; and (d) ―[w]hether there is an alternative source for the unpublished information.‖ (Id. at p. 813; see id. at pp. 810–811.) The relative weight of these factors in a particular case is for the trial court to decide. (Id. at p. 813.) At the pretrial hearing and at trial, Saavedra was represented by counsel, Mr. Grossberg. Grossberg sought to invoke the shield law to prevent defense counsel from asking Saavedra about any information he obtained from defendant about the murders that did not appear in Saavedra‘s published article. For example, when defense counsel asked Saavedra at the hearing whether defendant denied authorship of the letter, Grossberg objected on the grounds that ―the article does not state anywhere, one way or the other, that [defendant] did or did not deny anything.‖ The trial court overruled the objection. At another point, Grossberg objected when defense counsel asked Saavedra at the hearing if he inquired of defendant when and where the letter was written. Grossberg again argued the answer called for information not published in the article. The trial court, 22 specifically referencing the Delaney factors, overruled the objection. Accordingly, the trial court was clearly attuned to its obligation to weigh the competing interests in ruling on Grossberg‘s objections that defense counsel‘s questions called for unpublished information in violation of the shield law. Defendant does not discuss the actual procedure used at the pretrial evidentiary hearing or the trial court‘s rulings regarding the shield law. He also fails to acknowledge that the trial court specifically referred to the Delaney factors in weighing Grossberg‘s objections to defense counsel‘s questioning, thus belying defendant‘s claim the court was unaware of its duty to balance the requirements of the shield law against defendant‘s right to disclosure. Instead, he globally claims Saavedra‘s invocation of the shield law prevented him from obtaining information that would have impeached Saavedra‘s credibility. He fails to direct us to a single question by defense counsel, as to which the trial court sustained an objection by Grossberg, that impeded defendant‘s ability to challenge Saavedra‘s credibility at the pretrial hearing. At oral argument, he directed us to two passages in the transcript of the hearing that he claims support his argument that invocation of the shield law thwarted his lawyer‘s cross-examination of Saavedra. Neither passage does so. The first passage involves a conversation between the court and counsel regarding the shield law in which the court said, ―I am trying to focus on what it is that the defense might want to ask [Saavedra] which would cause [the newspaper to invoke the shield law], if that‘s the case.‖ Defense counsel responded he was interested in ―how they approached each other, what was said . . . you know we are going to try to find out whether [defendant] confessed to writing or didn‘t, and how that came about and what that means.‖ He concluded by saying, ―So I am really not going outside the four corners of that document [e.g., the newspaper article], from what I can gather in my own mind.‖ Thus, far from restricting defense counsel‘s cross-examination, the trial court was simply soliciting defense 23 counsel‘s view of whether anything in his cross-examination might cause Grossberg to object under the shield law, to which defense counsel replied he did not believe so. The second passage follows two objections by Grossberg when defense counsel asked Saavedra whether defendant ―confirmed‖ writing the letter that the trial court overruled. Defense counsel then asked, ―[W]hat did you do right before he supposedly confirmed he wrote these things? Tell us what you did.‖ Grossberg objected ―that that question requests information what was not published, the question of ‗what did you do.‘ ‖ The trial court sustained the objection. Defense counsel made no argument or offer of proof. Defendant does not explain, nor is it at all self-evident, how this exchange violated his right to confront and cross-examine Saavedra or deprived him of evidence relevant to Saavedra‘s credibility. Defendant also cites a fragment of testimony by Saavedra during the first penalty trial as illustrative of the type of question that application of the shield law prevented him from asking at the pretrial hearing: ―the defense was able to elicit the fact that [defendant‘s] responses to Saavedra‘s questions did not show authorship of the letter, but were in fact just general comments completely independent of the letter.‖ But since defense counsel did not ask the same question at the pretrial hearing, we have no way of knowing whether Grossberg would have objected or how the court would have ruled. Tellingly, Grossberg did not object when the question was asked at the first penalty trial. Finally, defendant directs us to a passage of Saavedra‘s testimony during the third penalty trial when, he asserts, application of the shield law was relaxed. He argues this passage demonstrates how restricted his cross-examination of Saavedra was at the guilt phase. Defense counsel asked Saavedra, ―Can you distinguish in your mind whether or not the conversation you had with [defendant] 24 in January of 1995, can be split, if you will, into portions which related to this [letter] you brought with you and portions which did not relate to the [letter], but were just conversations about the case?‖ Grossberg, who was present, made no objection. Saavedra answered, ―I think so.‖ Saavedra then testified, ―It was all together. There wasn‘t a definitive talk about one and then talk about the other. It was all together.‖ Again, we fail to see, and defendant fails to explain, what bearing this exchange has on his claim that invocation of the shield law prevented him from effective cross-examination of Saavedra. Accordingly, we reject his claim.