Opinion ID: 2746353
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court’s Orders

Text: {¶ 40} On June 23, 2010, the trial court issued a sentencing opinion, as R.C. 2929.03(F) requires. In the opinion, the court sentenced Thompson to death on the capital count and also imposed sentences for the noncapital counts. That opinion was signed by the judge and journalized. The trial court also filed a separate entry on June 24, 2010, recording the jury’s verdict finding Thompson guilty of 26 counts and specifications. That entry was likewise signed by the judge and journalized. Together, those two documents comply with the requirements of Crim.R. 32(C) and thus constitute a final, appealable order. See Ketterer at ¶ 17. {¶ 41} Thompson does not dispute that these documents, if valid, satisfy the four requirements for a final, appealable order. Instead, he argues that we cannot even look to these documents to evaluate their compliance with Crim.R. 32(C) because (1) the entry filed on June 24 was replaced by a subsequent nunc pro tunc entry and (2) the sentencing opinion contained an error. Both arguments fail. {¶ 42} First, Thompson argues that when a nunc pro tunc entry corrects an earlier entry, it entirely replaces the original entry. In this case, the trial court’s June 24 entry mistakenly stated that Thompson’s “sentencing hearing commenced on June 10, 2006.” The sentencing hearing actually began on June 10, 2010. On July 1, 2010, the trial court entered a nunc pro tunc entry to change the erroneous date in the June 24 entry. Thompson says we can look only to the nunc pro tunc entry, and not to the June 24 entry, to evaluate compliance with Crim.R. 32(C). {¶ 43} Thompson’s argument misconstrues the nature of a nunc pro tunc entry. As we recently explained in Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, the phrase “ ‘[n]unc pro tunc’    is commonly defined as ‘[h]aving retroactive legal effect through a court’s inherent power.’ ” Id. at ¶ 19, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1174 (9th Ed.2009). Therefore, “a nunc pro tunc 10 January Term, 2014 entry by its very nature applies retrospectively to the judgment it corrects.” Id. But a nunc pro tunc entry does not replace the original judgment entry; it relates back to the original entry. Thus, we need not disregard the trial court’s June 24 entry. {¶ 44} Second, Thompson claims that there is no final, appealable order here because the trial court’s June 23 sentencing opinion contains an error. The opinion sentenced Thompson on Count 3 (third-degree felony escape), despite the fact that the court had previously dismissed that count. In the opinion, the court purported to merge Count 3 with Count 4 (fifth-degree felony escape) and then sentenced Thompson to five years on the two merged counts. This five-year sentence would have been appropriate for Count 3, but it exceeded the maximum 12-month punishment permitted for Count 4 alone. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(5) (authorizing a maximum sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment for a fifth-degree felony); R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) (authorizing a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment for a third-degree felony). Because Thompson should have been sentenced only on Count 4, not on Count 3, he could not have been sentenced to the five-year sentence the court imposed. {¶ 45} Contrary to Thompson’s claims, the trial court’s mistaken reference to a five-year sentence in the June 23 sentencing opinion does not deprive this court of jurisdiction over this appeal. “[S]entencing errors are not jurisdictional.” Manns v. Gansheimer, 117 Ohio St.3d 251, 2008-Ohio-851, 883 N.E.2d 431, ¶ 6 (holding that extraordinary writs are not available to remedy sentencing errors). Instead, sentencing errors can be remedied on appeal in the ordinary course of law. State ex. rel Davis v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 127 Ohio St.3d 29, 2010-Ohio-4728, 936 N.E.2d 41, ¶ 2 (the erroneous inclusion of postrelease control in a sentencing entry can be remedied on appeal). {¶ 46} To determine the appropriate remedy here, we need only look to the trial court’s entries. Although the June 23 sentencing opinion mistakenly 11 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO referred to Count 3 and a five-year sentence for escape, the trial court’s June 24 journal entry eliminated these erroneous references. The June 24 entry states that for the crime of escape, Thompson is sentenced to only 12 months, and only on Count 4. The entry removes any reference to a five-year sentence for escape and contains no sentence whatsoever for Count 3. The record therefore clearly indicates that for the crime of escape, the trial court intended to impose a 12month sentence on a single fifth-degree-felony count. Accordingly, this is the only escape sentence that applies to Thompson. {¶ 47} In sum, we may properly consider both the trial court’s June 24 entry and its sentencing opinion to evaluate compliance with Crim.R. 32(C). These two documents satisfy the requirements for a final, appealable order, and thus we do have jurisdiction over Thompson’s appeal. We also address the error in the June 23 sentencing opinion by clarifying that Thompson is subject to only a 12-month sentence for escape, in accordance with the trial court’s intent as expressed in its June 24 entry.