Opinion ID: 770834
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Merits of the Denial-of-Counsel Claim

Text: 40 Under §2254 as amended, a federal court may grant habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner only if the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). The terms of this section were interpreted by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). 41 [T]he phrase 'clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,' refers only to cases decided by the Supreme Court, as opposed to other courts, Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. at 1523, and refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision, id. 42 Under the contrary to clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the unreasonable application clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. 43 Id. 44 The Sixth Amendment, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. U.S. Const. amend. VI. This provision gives the accused the right to the effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding, including the pretrial stages, trial, and sentencing. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). That right includes the right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481 (1978). To protect the defendant's right to conflict-free counsel, the trial court must initiate an inquiry when the record suggests an actual conflict of interest by counsel. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 273-74. 45 Application of these principles leads us to affirm the decision of the district court dismissing Leslie's habeas petition. The state court's refusal to vacate Leslie's conviction was not contrary to clearly established Supreme Court jurisprudence, for no Supreme Court case has dealt with whether the rights of an accused were violated when he was represented at trial by both a bona fide attorney and a nonattorney. 46 Nor, in light of our own past interpretations of Supreme Court rulings on the right to counsel, can we conclude that the state court's decision was an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. This Court has concluded that an accused's rights are violated if he is represented at trial only by a person who has never been approved as competent to practice law, see, e.g., Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 1983), a conclusion we found to be required by the teachings of the Supreme Court, id. at 168. We have reached the same conclusion where the accused was represented by a person who gained admission to practice through a fraudulent representation as to his qualifications, see United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d at 886, or was represented only by a duly licensed attorney who had actual conflicts of interest that adversely affected his performance, see United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 155-58 (2d Cir. 1994). We have also indicated, however, that a person in circumstances similar to those of Leslie would not have been denied his Sixth Amendment right. In United States v. Novak, the defendant was represented not only by a person who had gained admission to the bar by means of fraud as to his qualifications, but also by a local attorney who was duly licensed to practice. We held that the right to counsel had been violated because the record revealed that local counsel had been excused from daily attendance during the trial and was absent during most of the trial, 903 F.2d at 891 (internal quotation marks omitted). But we also noted that [i]f [local counsel had] provided Novak with effective assistance at all critical stages of the proceedings, Novak's Sixth Amendment right would have been protected. Id. at 890. 47 Given this view of the teachings of the Supreme Court, and given the state court's unimpeached finding that the duly licensed White represented Leslie at all critical stages of the trial, the state court's conclusion that Leslie's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court jurisprudence. 48 Finally, we note that Leslie contends that White may have had a conflict of interest because he may have known that Green was not admitted to the bar; Leslie contends that the court could not properly find that White had no such knowledge without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Our review of the record persuades us that Leslie did not advance that theory in support of his petition, did not request a hearing as to White's knowledge, and made no showing that would have warranted a hearing on that question had he requested it. Further, the state court's finding that White had no such knowledge was a reasonable inference from statements that Leslie made in his petition. The petition made it clear that neither Green nor White was involved in the retention of the other. Leslie stated that, after his arrest, he had retained Green to represent him. 49 At the same time, [Leslie's] family felt he should be represented by counsel with whom they were familiar. Consequently, the services of Blaine A'mmon White, an[] attorney duly qualified and admitted to practice law in the District of Columbia 50 were enlisted. (Leslie's state-court petition to vacate judgment at 11.) Nothing in this description--or in any other part of the record--remotely suggested either that White knew or knew of Green before Leslie brought the two together, or that there was any basis for believing that White knew Green was not an attorney. The purely hypothetical argument that if White had had such knowledge he would have had a conflict of interest does not provide a sufficient basis to require the court to hold an evidentiary hearing.