Opinion ID: 1275734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Hearing on whether dogs should be destroyed

Text: Petitioner maintains that the procedures followed in determining that his dogs should be destroyed violated his due process rights. He claims he is entitled to a hearing on the issue whether the dogs should be destroyed. We agree that under the local ordinances petitioner should be heard on this question. As the Court of Appeals noted, the City does not dispute that petitioner is entitled to a hearing, but maintains the criminal trial provided the required hearing. However, a determination that an animal is vicious does not mandate destruction of the animal under the ordinances because nothing in the code requires the destruction of a vicious animal. SMC 9.25.030(A)(4) instead provides that the director of finance is authorized to direct immediate humane destruction of the animal if the owner is found guilty of owning a vicious animal. The director thus has discretion, including discretion not to order the animal destroyed. Because it is the director who makes the decision whether the animal is to be destroyed, and not the court in the criminal proceedings, we do not agree that petitioner has had a hearing where he can argue that the animals should not be destroyed. To the contrary, the ordinances contemplate that petitioner should be heard on that question. Provisions in the Seattle code indicate the importance of an owner providing information why the dogs should not be destroyed. A conviction of owning a vicious animal is not the only route leading to possible destruction of a vicious animal at the director's order. The director is also authorized, under SMC 9.25.030(A)(4), to order the immediate humane disposal of an animal which the director has determined to be vicious or dangerous under SMC 9.25.035. [5] Under SMC 9.25.035(B) an owner is entitled to meet with the director or director's designee and give, orally and/or in writing, any reasons or information as to why the animal should not be destroyed. SMC 9.25.035(B) does not, by its terms, apply directly in this case, but it is indicative of intent that the owner be heard. Even more telling are SMC 9.25.036(A)and SMC 9.25.037(B)(1), which provide that an owner has the right to appeal a determination of the Director ordering the humane disposal of a vicious ... animal[,] and that, upon review, the hearing examiner shall have the power to ... [w]ith the owner's consent, authorize an alternate disposition.... [6] Unlike SMC 9.25.035(B), these ordinances do, by their terms, directly apply in this case. SMC 9.25.036 and SMC 9.25.037 do not concern an appeal from a determination that an animal is vicious. Instead, they concern appeal from a determination that an animal is to be destroyed. While petitioner clearly is not entitled to contest the determination that his animals are vicious, he is entitled to contest the determination that they should be destroyed, regardless of whether the finding of viciousness was made by the director or necessarily made by the jury in finding him guilty of owning a vicious animal. The hearing, which is provided for by SMC 9.25.037, must be conducted according to SMC 3.02.090 and SMC 3.02.100. SMC 9.25.037(A). SMC 3.02.090 and SMC 3.02.100 address hearings in contested cases and provide, among other things, for submission of evidence, cross-examination of witnesses, arguments, and a written decision with findings, conclusions, and reasons for the decision. Upon this appeal, as noted, SMC 9.25.037 expressly provides that the hearing examiner has the power to authorize an alternate disposition of the animal. Plainly, because it is the owner who is entitled to appeal, the owner is entitled to provide evidence and argument as to why the animal should not be destroyed despite its being a vicious animal. We emphasize that the owner's right under the ordinances to be heard on this question does not allow the owner the right to challenge the determination that the animal is vicious. Because we find that petitioner has been denied a hearing provided for by the ordinances and that under the ordinances petitioner is entitled to present reasons why the dogs should not be destroyed, we do not reach the due process issue. Petitioner has a clear legal right at stake, and the preliminary injunction should have been granted. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. DURHAM, C.J., and DOLLIVER, SMITH, GUY, JOHNSON, ALEXANDER and TALLMADGE, JJ., concur.