Opinion ID: 2551426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Commission's Authorization For Recovery Of Post-1993 DSM Expenditures Was Supported By Substantial Evidence.

Text: Appellants argue that the Commission's authorization of the Company's post-1993 DSM expenditures is not supported by substantial evidence. We hold that there is substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the Commission's findings and conclusions that the Company's post-1993 DSM expenditures were prudent. In reviewing findings of fact, this Court will sustain the Commission's determination unless it appears that the clear weight of the evidence is against its conclusion or that the evidence is strong and persuasive that the Commission abused its discretion. See Application of Hayden Pines Water Co., 111 Idaho 331, 335, 723 P.2d 875, 879 (1986); Utah-Idaho Sugar v. Intermountain Gas Co., 100 Idaho 368, 376, 597 P.2d 1058, 1066. Conversely, if the findings of the Commission are not supported by substantial and competent evidence, or the Commission clearly abused its discretion, then the Court must afford relief to the appellant. Id. The Commission's findings of fact are therefore entitled to a presumption of correctness, and the burden is on the appealing party to show that those findings are not supported by substantial evidence. See Rosebud Enterprises, Inc. v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm'n, 128 Idaho 624, 631, 917 P.2d 781, 788 (1996). In Idaho State Insurance Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927 (1985), this Court described the appropriate test for substantial competent evidence for the purposes of judicial review of an administrative agency's action as follows: The substantial evidence rule is said to be a middle position which precludes a de novo hearing but which nonetheless requires a serious review which goes beyond the mere ascertainment of procedural regularity. Such a review requires more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the agency's determination, though something less than the weight of the evidence. Put simply, we wrote, the substantial evidence rule requires a court to determine `whether [the agency's] findings of fact are reasonable.' 110 Idaho at 260, 715 P.2d at 930. (citations omitted). Under these circumstances, the Commission's findings are given a presumption of validity. The Commission determined, based upon its own expertise and evidence presented to it, that the Company had met its burden of proof with respect to the cost-effectiveness of its DSM expenditures. Beyond the assertion that the Commission did not conduct independent evaluations of select DSM programs, appellants have not come forward with any evidence to show that the Commission abused its discretion. The record shows, and appellants admit in their petition for rehearing, that the Commission did in fact evaluate the Company's reports on the cost-effectiveness of the programs in question. The Commission's staff witness, Anderson, stated that the Company consistently pre-evaluated its DSM programs as evidenced by the fact that it brought them to the Commission for its review and approval before actually implementing them. Moreover, after evaluation of the Company's Commercial Lighting Program (CLP), the Commission disallowed recovery of a portion of the Company's investment in that program. The weight of the evidence presented indicates that all but a portion of the Company's post-1993 DSM expenditures were cost-effective. Additionally, no evidence was presented indicating that any of the subject DSM programs were not cost-effective. Therefore, we find that the evidence presented afforded the Commission a reasonable basis upon which to authorize the Company's post-1993 expenditures and was therefore supported by substantial evidence.