Opinion ID: 2631088
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficiency of Worwood's Suppression Motion

Text: ¶ 37 Before proceeding to our suppression analysis, we pause to consider the dissent's contention that Worwood's challenge below was so ill-defined that the State could not adequately address his suppression motion. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that Worwood made and preserved before the trial court the arguments that he later made on appeal. In his initial memorandum in support of his motion to suppress, Worwood established multiple bases for challenging the constitutionality of Wright's stop. First, Worwood argued that Wright's actions constituted a seizure. Second, after reciting the appropriate legal standard and the specific facts surrounding this stop, Worwood argued that the officer lacked sufficient objective facts to constitute reasonable suspicion or probable cause to arrest. Third, Worwood alternatively argued that if the court finds reasonable suspicion, the detention was unreasonable as to scope and length of time. Finally, Worwood argued that he was unconstitutionally arrested because he was taken into custody . . . and not free to leave at the scene of the police encounter. ¶ 38 Throughout its opposition to Worwood's suppression motion, the State never argued that Worwood's federal challenge was vague, incomplete, or lacking requisite specificity. Additionally, at the preliminary hearing on the suppression motion, the State and Worwood had equal opportunity to illicit relevant facts from both Kevin Wright and Korey Wright. We accordingly reject the dissent's suggestion that Worwood's suppression motion was inadequate or that the State viewed it as such. ¶ 39 It has long been the law that once a defendant adequately challenges a warrantless seizure, the State bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of law enforcement's action. In order to meet his initial burden of production, [50] a defendant seeking to suppress evidence must articulate how law enforcement's action infringed the Fourth Amendment. [51] On the basis of our review of the record, we find that Worwood's Fourth Amendment challenge was quite adequate. He clearly challenged the constitutionality of the initial stop, as well as the scope of the stop, and supported that challenge with factual references. ¶ 40 Once a valid constitutional challenge is made, the burden shifts to the State to prove that its warrantless action was justified. [52] And a dearth of evidence cannot be assumed to support the reasonableness of an officer's actions during an investigative detention. Such an assumption turns this well-established proof requirement on its head. The United States Supreme Court has long held that [i]t is the State's burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure. [53] Officers, and consequently the state, are burdened by the requirement of reasonableness throughout an investigative detention because of the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. [54] This burden is not contingent on what specific evidence is challenged in a defendant's suppression motion, but rather on the nature of the constitutional challenge.