Opinion ID: 2975264
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Flight Instruction Claim

Text: With respect to this issue, Petitioner claims that, at the time of his trial, the court knew he was an escapee when he was arrested for theft, and yet it nevertheless authorized a flight instruction. He argues that this “left him with two intolerable choices”: he could take the stand and explain that he had to flee because he was a prison escapee, thereby “forfeit[ing] his constitutional right against self-incrimination,” or he could allow the jury to infer guilt from his silence and his failure to explain his flight. Petitioner’s Br. 16. In support of his argument, Petitioner cites cases for the propositions that criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to remain silent, they will suffer no penalty for such silence, and neither the prosecution nor the court may comment that such silence is evidence of guilt. This argument fails. Our inquiry as to whether a flight instruction was properly given contains no per se exception in the case of a prison escapee, as Petitioner would have us now proclaim. In United States v. Smith, 27 F. App’x 577, 583 (6th Cir. 2001), we held that “[a] jury may consider flight in its deliberations if it may reasonably draw a four-part chain of inferences from the evidence: (1) from the defendant’s behavior, flight, (2) from the flight, consciousness - 10 - No. 05-6473 Drew v. Parker of guilt, (3) from consciousness of guilt, consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged, and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged, actual guilt of the crime charged.” Here, even Petitioner does not claim that he ran from the store after stealing the money due to his prison escapee status and not because of the theft. Furthermore, it defies logic that a criminal defendant could avoid a flight instruction simply by virtue of his prison escapee status at the time he commits a crime. Petitioner cites no authority for such a proposition. For these reasons, it cannot be said that the state court adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 41213.