Opinion ID: 4521986
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Leal’s Retaliation Claim

Text: ¶16. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Leal had to adduce evidence demonstrating that “(1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected act and the adverse action.” Cohen, 557 F. App’x at 277–78 (footnote omitted); see also 28 C.F.R. § 42.503 (current through March 12, 2020), https://gov.ecfr.io/cgi-bin/text-idx? SID=c8b50b2a7db0f45824c0d9d5f667d0aa&mc=true&node=se28.1.42_1503&rgn=div8. 7 ¶17. Leal alleges that the adverse employment action was the denial of her application for tenure and promotion. Yet that denial preceded Leal’s engagement in a claimed protected activity, i.e., asking for accommodation for her rheumatoid arthritis. There is no evidence that Leal requested accommodation before the claim in her letter dated March 14, 2014. Leal freely admits she never asked for accommodations before March 14, 2014. By March 2014, Leal had already been notified that her department had voted not to recommend her for tenure and promotion on October 4, 2013. Similarly, the College Advisory Committee met and voted not to recommend her for tenure and promotion on November 8, 2013. This information was forwarded to the provost and president of USM for review on January 8, 2014, and the University Advisory Council voted not to recommend her for tenure and promotion on February 5, 2014. ¶18. Leal is correct that, as stated above, final employment decisions are reserved to the IHL. But Leal failed to provide the trial court with evidence of a causal connection between her request for accommodation and the denials of her application for tenure and promotion. The evidence in the record clearly demonstrates the opposite. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of USM and the IHL on Leal’s retaliation claims. II. Were material facts disputed regarding Leal’s claim that her employment contracts were breached and, if not, were the IHL and USM entitled to judgment as a matter of law on her contractual claims? ¶19. Leal next alleges that the IHL and USM breached her employment contract by discriminating against her, retaliating against her, and denying her application for promotion and tenure. To prove a breach-of-contract claim, Leal would have had to prove by a 8 preponderance of the evidence that “(1) a valid and binding contract exist[ed] and (2) that [the IHL and/or USM] has broken it or breached it without regard to the remedy sought or the actual damage sustained.” Norman v. Anderson Reg’l Med. Ctr., 262 So. 3d 520, 527 (Miss. 2019) (citing Bus. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Banks, 90 So. 3d 1221, 1225 (Miss. 2012)). Any material facts are facts related to these elements, and the IHL and USM were entitled to judgment as a matter of law if those elements were not met. Gulf Coast Hospice LLC v. LHC Grp., Inc., 273 So. 3d 721, 736 (Miss. 2019) (“[U]nless the party challenging summary judgment produces sufficient evidence demonstrating that a disputed material fact exists, summary judgment remains proper.”). ¶20. The parties do not dispute that Leal entered into several employment contracts over a seven year period with the IHL. USM was never a party to any of the contracts with Leal. The authority to enter into those contracts is expressly provided to the IHL, not USM. Miss. Code Ann. § 37–101–15(f) (Supp. 2019). Thus, all Leal’s contractual claims against USM fail as a matter of law. ¶21. Leal’s employment contracts with the IHL are single-page documents. There is no mention of guarantees of promotion, tenure, disability accommodation, or nonretaliation for requests of accommodation. Leal claims that the USM Employee and Faculty Handbooks were subsumed into her contracts with the IHL and provide these assurances. This Court has held that employee handbooks can become part of the contract of employment. See generally Bobbitt v. Orchard, Ltd., 603 So. 2d 356 (Miss. 1992). But, when the handbook expressly disclaims the existence of a contract, no contractual obligations arise between employers and 9 employees. Lee v. Golden Triangle Planning & Dev. Dist., Inc., 797 So. 2d 845, 848 (Miss. 2001); Byrd v. Imperial Palace of Miss., 807 So. 2d 433, 438 (Miss. 2001). ¶22. There are explicit disclaimers against guarantee of any contractual right associated with promotion in academic rank, tenure, or employment in general in the handbooks. Leal does not contest the existence of these disclaimers. As it is undisputed that the handbooks contain these disclaimers, the IHL was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on any claims arising from the handbooks. ¶23. Separately, Leal claims that the policies and bylaws of the IHL are incorporated into her contracts through the handbooks and that these guarantee accommodation of disabilities. This is erroneous. Her employment contracts, apart from the handbooks, were made explicitly subject to the policies and bylaws of the IHL. The policies of the IHL, as provided in the record, incorporate the standards of the Rehabilitation Act and state that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability as defined in [29 USCS Section 706(8)], shall, solely by reason of his\her disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” (second alteration in original) (emphasis added). ¶24. Leal notes correctly that her employment contract provided a guarantee against discrimination as defined in the Rehabilitation Act. But Leal has failed to present evidence supporting her contention that her condition was a disability under the Rehabilitation Act. As such, she has failed to offer evidence to support the second prong of her breach of contract claim, an actual breach of contract. Therefore, as the trial court held, the IHL was entitled to 10 judgment as a matter of law on her claims arising from her employment contracts. The IHL was appropriately granted summary judgment on Leal’s breach-of-contract claims. III. Were material facts disputed regarding Leal’s claims that she was equitably entitled to employment and promotion and, if not, are the IHL and USM entitled to judgment as a matter of law on her contractual claims? ¶25. Leal next argues that the IHL and USM are estopped from denying her tenure and from firing her. She claims that her annual reviews and her Third Year Review assured her she was completing the criteria necessary for tenure and that these assurances were guarantees of tenure and promotion. A. Leal’s Equitable-Estoppel Claim ¶26. Equitable estoppel requires (1) “proof of a belief,” (2) “reliance on some representation,” (3) “a change of position as a result of the representation,” and (4) “detriment or prejudice caused by the change of position.” Gulf Ins. Co. v. Neel-Schaffer, Inc., 904 So. 2d 1036, 1048 (Miss. 2004) (citing Mound Bayou Sch. Dist. v. Cleveland Sch. Dist., 817 So. 2d 578, 583 (Miss. 2002)). Leal argues that her Third Year Review provided “proof of a belief” that she was satisfying the criteria for tenure and promotion. The letter accompanying her Third Year Review only reads that she was “making progress toward meeting tenure requirements at The University of Southern Mississippi.” The same letter reads that “a favorable Third Year Review does not insure [sic] tenure and that you must persevere to attain excellence in scholarship.” ¶27. Leal fails to provide any evidentiary support that this review, or any other statements, were made by USM or the IHL regarding successful completion of the criteria for tenure and 11 promotion. Her argument asserts only that she “believed” she was in the “process of satisfying” the criteria for tenure, not that she already had. The evidence in the record demonstrates instead that Leal received communications from the IHL and USM detailing necessary progress and suggestions for improvement, including “publishing more than one paper a year.” ¶28. Leal has provided no evidence of a representation that she would receive promotion or that tenure was automatic or guaranteed. Therefore, Leal has failed to articulate any change in her position based on this nebulous belief. As such, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on her claim of equitable estoppel is affirmed. B. Leal’s Promissory-Estoppel Claims ¶29. Leal also alleges promissory-estoppel claims. Promissory estoppel arises when (1) a promise is made, (2) the promisor intended that the promise would be relied on, (3) the promise was in fact relied upon, (4) and a refusal to enforce the promise would contradict basic equitable principles. Miss. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality v. Pac. Chlorine, Inc., 100 So. 3d 432, 442 (Miss. 2012) (quoting C.E. Frazier Constr. Co. v. Campbell Roofing & Metal Works, Inc., 373 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Miss. 1979)). Again though, Leal has failed to identify a promise. We find no error in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment regarding the claims of promissory estoppel.