Opinion ID: 891791
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Presidential Communications Privilege

Text: {19} The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has succinctly described the difference between the presidential communications privilege and the deliberative process privilege: While the presidential communications privilege and the deliberative process privilege are closely affiliated, the two privileges are distinct and 8 have different scopes. Both are executive privileges designed to protect executive branch decisionmaking, but one applies to decisionmaking of executive officials generally, the other specifically to decisionmaking of the President. The presidential privilege is rooted in constitutional separation of powers principles and the President’s unique constitutional role; the deliberative process privilege is primarily a common law privilege. . . . In addition, unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 745 (citations omitted). {20} The presidential communications privilege was explicitly established by the United States Supreme Court in Nixon, 418 U.S. 683. In that case, President Nixon argued that he was not required to comply with a subpoena from the Watergate special prosecutor. Id. at 687-88. The Court agreed that communications between certain high-level advisers and the President are presumptively privileged because “[a] President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.” Id. at 708. The Court found such protection from public scrutiny to be justified in part by the “unique role” of the President under the United States Constitution, including the President’s authority to conduct foreign affairs. Id. at 715-16. This privilege, the Court determined, “is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.” Id. at 708. The same concern for separation of powers, however, required the Court to reject “an absolute, unqualified privilege” which would impair “the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions.” Id. at 707. In Nixon, the Court concluded that the assertion of executive privilege “cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.” Id. at 713; see also Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 448-49 (1977) (holding that a former President could also invoke the communications privilege, but that such a claim is given less weight than a claim of privilege asserted by a sitting President). {21} Two cases from the federal circuit court for the District of Columbia are instructive in considering the parameters of the presidential communications privilege. In re Sealed Case involved a subpoena duces tecum served on the White House Counsel by a grand jury that was investigating a cabinet secretary. 121 F.3d at 734-35. The White House identified responsive documents, producing some and withholding others, originally on the stated basis of the deliberative process privilege. Id. at 735. After the Office of the Independent Counsel moved to compel production, id. at 734-36, the White House later additionally invoked the presidential communications privilege with respect to the withheld documents, id. at 735 & n.2. In re Sealed Case reaffirmed that in Nixon “the existence of the presidential 9 [communications] privilege was definitively established as a necessary derivation from the President’s constitutional status in a separation of powers regime.” Id. at 739-40. The court then proceeded to consider the President’s invocation of the presidential communications privilege in the case at hand. Id. at 740. President Clinton had not viewed any of the reports or drafts for which the executive privilege was being asserted. Id. at 746. Noting that Nixon did not clarify whether the privilege applied only to communications directly with the President, or also included communications with advisers who assisted the President in making policy decisions, id. at 747, the court reviewed the reasons in favor of both a narrow and a broad construction of the privilege. A concern for separation of powers supported restricting the privilege to communications that directly included the President, as “the Constitution assigns [Article II] responsibilities to the President alone, arguably the privilege of confidentiality that derives from them also should be the President’s alone.” Id. at 748. A narrow construction of the privilege would also facilitate open government, especially “where the public’s ability to know how its government is being conducted is at stake.” Id. at 749. {22} The court concluded, however, that the “arguments for a limited extension of the privilege beyond the President to his immediate advisors [are] more convincing.” Id. Stating that “pre-decisional documents are usually highly revealing as to the evolution of advisers’ positions and as the different policy options considered along the way,” In re Sealed Case concluded that such documents should be covered by the presidential communications privilege because “[i]f these materials are not protected by the presidential privilege, the President’s access to candid and informed advice could well be significantly circumscribed.” Id. at 750. {23} Although concluding that the presidential communications privilege extended beyond communications made directly to the President, In re Sealed Case was careful not to interpret the privilege too broadly. “[T]he privilege should apply only to communications authored or solicited and received by those members of an immediate White House advisor’s staff who have broad and significant responsibility for investigating and formulating the advice to be given to the President on the particular matter to which the communications relate.” Id. at 752. The court then determined under this standard that the privilege applied to documents authored by the White House counsel, deputy counsel, chief of staff, and press secretary, notes at meetings attended by these advisers, documents prepared by associate counsel, and a memo prepared by a legal intern at the direction of counsel. Id. at 758. Ultimately, however, the court concluded that although these documents fell under the privilege, the Office of the Independent Counsel demonstrated sufficient need to overcome the assertion of privilege in most instances, and therefore the court of appeals remanded to the district court for further review. Id. at 762. {24} Another instructive case, Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice, confirmed the narrow scope of the presidential communications privilege in the context of a Freedom 10 of Information Act (FOIA)3 request for documents relating to the President’s exercise of his pardon power. 365 F.3d 1108, 1109-10 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The court of appeals refused to extend the presidential communications privilege to all officials whose duties included preparing documents for use in advising the President on the exercise of his pardon power. The Judicial Watch court relied on In re Sealed Case in reaching the conclusion that “the presidential communications privilege applies only to those pardon documents ‘solicited and received’ by the President or his immediate White House advisers who have ‘broad and significant responsibility for investigating and formulating the advice to be given the President.’” Id. at 1114 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 752) (emphases added). {25} Judicial Watch stated, correctly in our view, that “the demands of the privilege become more attenuated the further away the advisers are from the President operationally.” 365 F.3d at 1115. Judicial Watch determined that the privilege did not apply to documents obtained from other agencies, particularly when they were never submitted to the Office of the President, because “the same confidentiality and candor concerns calling for application of the presidential communications privilege in [the Nixon cases] and In re Sealed Case do not apply as forcefully.” Id. As a result, the court held that internal agency documents were not protected by the presidential communications privilege. Id. at 1118. “Extending the presidential communications privilege to cover such internal Department documents would be both contrary to executive privilege precedent and considerably undermine the purposed of FOIA to foster openness and accountability in government.” Id. The pardon attorney, a Department of Justice official who “is at least twice removed from the President,” was not permitted to invoke the presidential communications privilege, id. at 1120, nor were the deputy attorney general or his staff, id. at 1121. Extension of the privilege to such individuals who were not close advisers of the President, “with the attendant implication for expansion to other Cabinet officers and their staffs, would . . . ‘pose a significant risk of expanding to a large swath of the executive branch a privilege that is bottomed on a recognition of the unique role of the President.’” Id. (quoting In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 752).