Opinion ID: 1859694
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Aggravating Circumstance of Especially Cruel or Depraved Manner

Text: For his first point for reversal, Jones argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the submission of the aggravating circumstance that the capital murder was committed in an especially cruel or depraved manner. He asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support such a finding. He also argues that despite trial counsel's failure to object, appellate counsel was ineffective for not pursuing the issue on appeal. See Bowen v. State, 322 Ark. 483, 911 S.W.2d 555 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1226, 116 S.Ct. 1861, 134 L.Ed.2d 960 (1996). Jones concedes that neither argument was raised in his Rule 37 petition. He nevertheless asserts that this point is not procedurally barred pursuant to this court's holding in Johnson v. State, 321 Ark. 117, 900 S.W.2d 940 (1995). In Johnson , the appellant raised an issue on appeal that he had not raised in his Rule 37 petition. Moreover, the issue was not argued during the postconviction hearing, nor did the trial court rule on it. Because the appellant had received the death penalty, however, this court determined that it was possible to reach the issue on appeal. This court explained: This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of the Rule 37 petition, and our general rule is that specific allegations of ineffectiveness of counsel must be pleaded, and specific issues of ineffectiveness of counsel cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Tisdale v. State, 311 Ark. 220, 227, 843 S.W.2d 803, 807 (1992). However, in death penalty cases we will consider errors argued for the first time on appeal where prejudice is conclusively shown by the record and this court would unquestionably require the trial court to grant relief under Rule 37. Hill v. State, 275 Ark. 71, 628 S.W.2d 284, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S.Ct. 180, 74 L.Ed.2d 147 (1982). In Sumlin v. State, 273 Ark. 185, 617 S.W.2d 372 (1981), we said an error may be argued for the first time on appeal in a death case only when it is of such magnitude that it would require us to take note of an error which involved a fundamental deprivation of the right to a fair trial.  Id. at 192, 617 S.W.2d at 376. Id. at 137, 900 S.W.2d at 951 (emphasis added). Accordingly, in death cases, this court may address issues raised for the first time on appeal from a denial of a Rule 37 petition, where prejudice is conclusively shown by the record. Such prejudice is shown only when there is an error of such magnitude that it deprived the defendant of the fundamental right to a fair trial. Conversely, where prejudice is not conclusively shown, the issue is procedurally barred and we may not reach the merits. After reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that it does not conclusively show that Jones was prejudiced by the submission of this aggravating circumstance to the jury. Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-4-604(8)(A) (Repl.1997) provides for the aggravating circumstance that the capital murder was committed in an especially cruel or depraved manner. Section 5-4-604(8) defines the relevant terms as follows: (B) For purposes of this subdivision (8), a capital murder is committed in an especially cruel manner when, as part of a course of conduct intended to inflict mental anguish, serious physical abuse, or torture upon the victim prior to the victim's death, mental anguish, serious physical abuse, or torture is inflicted. Mental anguish is defined as the victim's uncertainty as to his ultimate fate. Serious physical abuse is defined as physical abuse that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes protracted impairment of health, or loss or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. Torture is defined as the infliction of extreme physical pain for a prolonged period of time prior to the victim's death. (C) For purposes of this subdivision (8), a capital murder is committed in an especially depraved manner when the person relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion, or shows an indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a sense of pleasure in committing the murder [.] [Emphasis added.] This court has consistently held that whenever there is evidence of an aggravating or mitigating circumstance, however slight, the matter should be submitted to the jury for consideration. See Willett v. State, 335 Ark. 427, 983 S.W.2d 409 (1998); Kemp v. State, 324 Ark. 178, 919 S.W.2d 943, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 982, 117 S.Ct. 436, 136 L.Ed.2d 334 (1996); Dansby v. State, 319 Ark. 506, 893 S.W.2d 331 (1995). Once the jury has found that an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt, this court may affirm only if the State has presented substantial evidence in support of each element therein. McGehee v. State, 338 Ark. 152, 992 S.W.2d 110 (1999). To make this determination, we review the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. Kemp, 324 Ark. 178, 919 S.W.2d 943. Here, the evidence showed that Jones held Mary and her eleven-year-old daughter Lacy at gunpoint and took them to a back room. He told them to lie down on the floor, with Lacy on top of her mother. While they were on the floor, Jones took the money out of the business's cash register and asked if there was any more. Jones then tied up Mary with stereo-speaker wire and put her in a closet. Next, he tied Lacy to a chair in the bathroom. Jones left Lacy for some time and then returned to her. The intervening time is apparently when Jones raped and murdered Mary. The medical examiner testified that Mary died as a result of a combination of strangulation and blunt-force head wounds. He testified that the application of force to the neck was in all likelihood relatively prolonged, taking approximately four minutes. Additionally, the evidence indicated that Mary had a number of wounds that appeared defensive in nature and consistent with some type of struggle taking place. The evidence also indicated that the blunt-force injuries to Mary's head likely occurred prior to the time she was strangled, due to the amount of blood around the brain, and that it was possible that she could have sustained consciousness throughout much of her injuries. From these facts, there was substantial evidence that Jones committed the murder in an especially cruel manner. As she was bound with speaker wire, Mary was bludgeoned, anally raped, and strangled, while her young daughter sat, bound to a chair, in an adjoining room. Clearly, Mary was the victim of serious physical abuse. There was also substantial evidence that Mary suffered mental anguish at the hands of her killer, not only as the victim of the ordeal, but also as the mother of the next likely recipient of the same fate. Accordingly, the record does not show conclusively that trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to object to the submission of this aggravating circumstance to the jury. Nor does the record conclusively show that appellate counsel performed deficiently by not pursuing the issue on appeal. Indeed, from this record, it is not apparent that Jones was deprived of any right, much less the fundamental right to a fair trial.