Opinion ID: 2621432
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Right to Counsel During Questioning

Text: ś 90 On November 2, 1998, Gregory was in police custody after arraignment on the R.S. rape charges. Tacoma police detectives transported Gregory from the Pierce County jail to an interview room in a Tacoma police department building. The detectives read Gregory his Miranda [28] rights, questioned Gregory about an unrelated and still uncharged shooting, and then questioned him about the G.H. murder. At the time, Gregory was represented by counsel on the R.S. rape charges, but police did not contact counsel nor invite him to the interview. At trial, one of the detectives testified that during the interview, Gregory refused to be audiotaped, but stated that he thought DNA evidence was good evidence, and became sullen after he was accused of raping and murdering G.H. Gregory also denied ever having sex with G.H. or being in her house. Gregory now argues that the interrogation without his counsel present violated his constitutional rights. ś 91 In Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 149 L.Ed.2d 321 (2001), the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific, attaching only to charged offenses, which the Court defined to include any offenses that would amount to the same offense under the Blockburger test. Id. at 172-73, 121 S.Ct. 1335. [29] Gregory concedes that under this standard, police could interview him about the murder without violating the Sixth Amendment. ś 92 Employing a Gunwall [30] analysis, Gregory asserts that this court should interpret article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution to provide greater protection than the Sixth Amendment. Specifically, Gregory urges this court to adopt a standard suggested by the Cobb dissenters, which is based upon the federal courts' pre-Cobb test: [o]nce a charged defendant has requested counsel, he may not be interrogated about related matters without counsel's knowledge and consent. Appellant's Opening Br. at 101-02 (emphasis added). The Cobb dissent would have defined offense for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as criminal acts that are `closely related to' or `inextricably intertwined with' the particular crime set forth in the charging instrument. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 186, 121 S.Ct. 1335 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Prior to Cobb, courts had held that `closely related' offenses involved the same victim, set of acts, evidence, or motivation. Id. ś 93 Even if we were to adopt this closely related test as the Washington constitutional test, the R.S. rape and the G.H. rape/murder were not closely related. They involved different victims, they occurred two years apart, and they occurred in different locations. Other than the fact that they both involved rapes, the factual circumstances were distinct. Although Gregory claims that the cases involved the same evidence, namely his DNA, he does not point to a single pre- Cobb case in which the mere fact that the defendant's fingerprints or DNA were collected at both crime scenes rendered two crimes closely related. In fact, crimes that were deemed closely related, pre- Cobb, involved the same course of conduct, the same cast of characters, were closely related in time, and/or occurred at the same location. See, e.g., United States v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 1014 (4th Cir.1998); United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37, 42 (3d Cir.1997). Even if a Gunwall analysis were to lead to the adoption of the test suggested by the defendant, there would still be no constitutional violation. Therefore, in this case, we decline to address whether the Washington Constitution should require a different test than the one articulated by the majority in Cobb. [31]