Opinion ID: 2020959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: THE McMANUS FARM

Text: Sandra urges reversal of the circuit court's ruling that the Hofmanns' equity in the McManus farm was Roger's separate property. Her theory is that in making this ruling the circuit court failed to anticipate recent changes in the law concerning commingling of marital and nonmarital property and ruled on the erroneous assumption that the fact that Roger entered into the contract for purchase of the farm before the marriage controlled its designation. We agree with Sandra's contention. The trial court explicitly found that principal payments of $18,300 and interest payments of $8,793 were made on the McManus contract during the marriage but elect[ed] to treat the property as nonmarital. We note that Sandra worked to support the family throughout her marriage, and that in fact she worked for some time on the McManus farm itself, operating the tractor on at least one occasion and working in the fields on others. Roger testified at one point that she kept the farm books as well. In 1981, while this case was pending in this court, we decided In re Marriage of Smith (1981), 86 Ill.2d 518, in which we held that where a spouse who holds nonmarital property causes it to be commingled with marital property,    the commingled property is presumed to be marital property. (86 Ill.2d 518, 529.) [T]he failure of a nonmarital property holder to segregate that property will give rise to the rebuttable presumption that the nonmarital property has been transmuted [into marital property], regardless of the status of title. (86 Ill.2d 518, 531-32.) This was the first case in Illinois to deal with the commingling of marital and nonmarital property under section 503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. While we believe that Sandra's contributions of labor and earnings were enough to raise the presumption of marital property, we note again that the trial court did not have our decisions in Smith and In re Marriage of Lee (1981), 87 Ill.2d 64, for guidance in 1980 when it rendered its judgment. (See M. Kalcheim and I. Shapiro, Transmutation and Commingling: The Supreme Court's Rebuttable Presumption Of Marital Property, 71 Ill. B.J. 220 (1982).) Rather than rule on the issues ourselves, on the basis of a record which may be less than complete, we remand the case to the circuit court of Mercer County for determination of whether the presumption has been rebutted and, if not, for present valuation of the farm and for such distribution of it between the spouses as the court deems just.