Opinion ID: 807595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Innis and Elstad Arguments

Text: Jones argues first that the apparently informal discussion he had with Detective Stevenson over lunch was actually an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. He relies on Innis, in which the Supreme Court held that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. 446 U.S. at 300-01 (footnote omitted). 33 Whether or not any of Stevenson’s conversation with Jones preceding Jones’s apparently spontaneous statements that he didn’t kill anyone and that the police thought “it’s about the girl,” we can assume for purposes of the argument that Stevenson’s direct question to Jones whether he knew the victim Williams, which elicited the more incriminating statement that Williams “did not deserve . . . what I did to him,” constituted interrogation. None of these statements, however, were offered against Jones at trial. Rather, the prosecutor offered into evidence only the full oral and written confessions that were made after Stevenson advised Jones of his rights and began a formal interview. In Elstad, the Supreme Court held that even if a defendant is questioned without Miranda warnings, rendering any statement made during such questioning coerced and inadmissible, that violation does not automatically taint subsequent statements made after he is advised of his rights. 470 U.S. at 318. “The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made.” Id. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the pre-warning police conduct was “interrogation,” and that Jones’s pre-warning statements were therefore not admissible, Jones’s post-warning statements – the only ones received in evidence – were admissible unless they were involuntary. Here, the facts as reasonably found by the Connecticut Supreme Court – and which Jones does not contest in this proceeding – demonstrate that Jones’s confession was voluntary. See State v. Jones, 916 A.2d at 39-41. Indeed, the Connecticut Supreme Court noted that Jones “does not dispute that the evidence adduced by the state, if credited, was sufficient to establish that he confessed to the murder and revealed the 34 whereabouts of the murder weapon only after a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights.” Id. at 42. According to the facts as found by the state courts, Detective Stevenson advised Jones of his rights by reading aloud from a card and asked Jones if he understood; Jones replied that he did. Id. at 40. After making an oral confession, but before making a written one, Jones signed a card advising him of his rights, and two police witnesses verified that Jones had “read aloud from a voluntary statement rights form and initial[ed] each line.” Id. at 40-41. Later, Jones told the police that his brother would lead them to the murder weapon; after his brother initially refused to cooperate, Jones spoke to him on the phone, and his brother led officers to the weapon. Id. at 41. It is true that Jones disputed this version of events at his suppression hearing, but the court found the officers more credible, and the Connecticut Supreme Court found no clear error in that finding. Id. at 42. Even if Jones attempted to challenge this credibility determination, under the substantially more deferential standard of § 2254(d)(2) and (e),12 we cannot conclude that the findings of the state courts were unreasonable.