Opinion ID: 2114044
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Offer to plead guilty

Text: Having determined that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct, we now turn our attention to the underlying evidentiary issue. That is, whether the Minnesota Rules of Evidence render inadmissible Smallwood's statement that he would offer to plead guilty in exchange for a guidelines sentence. The trial court ruled on a motion in limine following opening statements that evidence of Smallwood's offer to plead guilty was inadmissible pursuant to Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.06. [4] The court of appeals agreed that the statement was inadmissible and concluded that because the prosecutor mentioned Smallwood's offer to plead guilty, reversible error occurred. We begin our exploration of this issue of first impression with the language of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. The admissibility of evidence of guilty pleas is governed by Rule 410, which provides: Evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime or of statements made in connection with any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil, criminal, or administrative action, case, or proceeding whether offered for or against the person who made the plea or offer. The state seeks a bright-line rule similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence that would limit the applicability to Rule 410 to discussions with an attorney for the government. Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was amended in 1979 to include the limitation that only those statements made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority are inadmissible. Fed.R.Evid. 410. The state asks us to read such a provision into our rules. We reject such an approach, as we did in our previous decision addressing a separate provision of Rule 410. See State v. Jackson, 325 N.W.2d 819, 822-23 (Minn.1982). In Jackson, we were asked to read into our Rule 410 a provision of Federal Rule 410 that provides that statements made in connection with a withdrawn guilty plea could be used for impeachment purposes. We declined to do so, stating it seems reasonable to conclude that our drafters decided not to provide for either an impeachment or perjury exception. 325 N.W.2d at 823. The same reasoning applies here. Because the drafters of our rule have chosen not to include language limiting plea discussions to situations where an attorney for the government is involved, we will not read such language into the rule. [5] We turn to earlier decisions of the federal courts for guidance because, until Federal Rule 410 was amended in 1979, the text of our current Rule 410 and the Federal Rule 410 were similar. [6] The Fifth Circuit considered offers to plead guilty to a police officer or other government agent by reviewing the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir.1978). In reviewing an offer to plead guilty to a police officer, the Fifth Circuit proposed a two-step process. The first step looks to whether the defendant exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion; the second step measures whether the defendant's expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances. Id. We are persuaded that the approach outlined by the Fifth Circuit will serve us well in analyzing whether offers to plead guilty are admissible, and we conclude on the record before us that Smallwood's offer to plead guilty was inadmissible under Minn. R. Evid. 410; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Smallwood's motion in limine barring the prosecution from introducing evidence of the offer to plead guilty. While the state concedes that the second statement given by Smallwood to Robideau is inadmissible because Smallwood had retained counsel and counsel was not present at the questioning, we cannot ignore the second conversation in determining whether Smallwood's expectation that he was engaged in plea bargaining was reasonable. A review of the record, including the second interview of Smallwood by Robideau, reveals the following chain of events: Smallwood initiated discussions with Sommers about making a deal while in the squad car shortly following his arrest, and Sommers told Smallwood that he was not in a position to make deals. After Sommers offered to take a statement from Smallwood, Smallwood said he had no interest in talking to anyone not in a position to negotiate a plea. Subsequently, Robideau came on the scene and questioned Smallwood. Robideau did not inform Smallwood that only the prosecutor could make a deal until after Smallwood made his offer to plead guilty. Robideau then agreed to communicate the offer to the prosecutor. Robideau talked to the prosecutor about the deal and reported back to Smallwood. In this second conversation, Robideau attempted to affirm Smallwood's intention to plead guilty in exchange for a guideline sentence by asking leading questions. Smallwood admitted that such a deal would produce a speedy result for him. Furthermore, Robideau indicated that the prosecutor might be interested in information from Smallwood regarding his knowledge of people involved with drugs. Eventually, Smallwood agreed to plead guilty, a plea that was later withdrawn when the sentencing judge rejected the 10-year sentencing cap in the plea agreement. These facts indicate that Smallwood offered to plead guilty in exchange for a guidelines sentence and that the police acted as agents in bringing this offer to the attention of the prosecutor and then relaying information back to Smallwood. The record demonstrates that Smallwood's subjective expectation was to negotiate a plea bargain. Further, by offering to accept a guideline sentence and offering to provide police with information regarding alleged drug dealers, Smallwood's actions satisfy the requirement that plea bargains seek a concession for a concession, a quid pro quo.  Robertson, 582 F.2d at 1366. The second part of the inquiry involves determining whether the defendant's expectation was reasonable given the circumstances. It is apparent from Smallwood's request for a guidelines sentence that he was familiar with the workings of the criminal justice system. Robideau told Smallwood that while he did not have authority to make deals, he would relay the information to the prosecutor. Robideau pitched the deal to the prosecutor and reported back to Smallwood. We conclude that Smallwood's expectation that he was engaging in a plea bargain was reasonable under the circumstances. By acting as a go-between and by reporting that the prosecutor was balking at the deal, Robideau's actions gave Smallwood a reasonable expectation under the circumstances that he was engaged in plea bargaining. Therefore, Smallwood's offer to plead guilty in exchange for a guidelines sentence was inadmissible under Minn. R. Evid. 410, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered, following the prosecutor's opening statement, that evidence of Smallwood's offer to plead guilty was inadmissible. We are mindful that defendants may attempt to use Rule 410 and try to turn admissions into offers to plead guilty. However, if a defendant is aware that the officer or agent has no authority to plea bargain, the defendant will not be protected by the rule whether the defendant offers to plead guilty or makes statements that would otherwise fall under the rule. See United States v. Herman, 544 F.2d 791, 799 (5th Cir.1977). Furthermore, mere cooperation of a defendant in an attempt to receive favorable treatment by the authorities without a request for consideration is not sufficient to invoke Rule 410's protections. As noted by the Second Circuit: Plea bargaining implies an offer to plead guilty upon condition. The offer by the defendant must, in some way, express the hope that a concession to reduce the punishment will come to pass. A silent hope, if uncommunicated, gives the officer or prosecutor no chance to reject a confession he did not seek. A contrary rule would permit the accused to grant retrospectively to himself what is akin to a use immunity. Even statements voluntarily made after Miranda warnings would be later objected to on the purported ground that they were made in anticipation of a guilty plea since reconsidered. A balanced system of criminal justice should not be made to function in such a swampy terrain. United States v. Levy, 578 F.2d 896, 901 (2d Cir.1978). Having decided, first, that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by telling the jury of Smallwood's offer to plead guilty, and, second, that the exchange between Robideau and Smallwood was an inadmissible plea bargain, we turn our attention to whether the prosecutor's comments during opening statements require reversal of Smallwood's conviction. A conviction may be sustained when the error complained of is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Roberts, 296 Minn. 347, 353, 208 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn.1973). We have said that harmless-error review focuses on whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in a trial was surely unattributable to the error. State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn.1997). We look to the record as a whole to determine if the verdict is surely unattributable to the error. Id. Here, the evidence of Smallwood's guilt was overwhelming. The state submitted evidence showing: (1) that Smallwood was in the area of the burglary driving a car with its headlights off at 4:15 a.m.; (2) that no other vehicles were in the area; (3) Smallwood matched the general description of the black male suspect; (4) Smallwood admitted that he was in the area looking for open doors to homes so he could find money for drugs; (5) the amount of money found in Smallwood's car exactly matched the amount of money the victim reported missing; (6) police found a deposit slip with the victim's name, address, and account number on it in Smallwood's car; and (7) checks, deposit slips, and a credit card belonging to Smallwood were found two days later in the victim's back yard. These facts demonstrate that the verdict was surely unattributable to the prosecutor's comments during opening statements. Therefore, the decision of the court of appeals reversing Smallwood's conviction and ordering a new trial is reversed.