Opinion ID: 4565900
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Special Condition Two

Text: Thomas argues that the district court erred in imposing Special Condition Two to the extent that this search condition applies not only to his “person, house, property, and residence,” but also 3 “requires the Defendant [to] submit his . . . computers []as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1), other electronic communications or data storage devices or media” to searches conducted by a United States Probation Officer on the basis of reasonable suspicion. Thomas argues that the condition, as applied to computers or other electronic devices, is not reasonably related to his criminal history and characteristics. For the following reasons, we disagree. We have frequently approved of such conditions where the conduct underlying a conviction or prior conviction has involved the use of computers or other electronic devices. See, e.g., United States v. Franco, 733 F. App’x 13, 16 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (upholding a computer search condition where the defendant’s prior convictions involved the use of a computer). Here, the district court noted that Thomas had used electronic devices in the conduct leading up to his instant conviction, likely referring to Thomas’s cellphone contacts with his New York Police Department handlers, and also reasoned that at least one of Thomas’s prior convictions involved an accomplice, justifying (upon reasonable suspicion) the potential search of these devices for communications with others. J.A. at 188–89. The court specifically noted that because of Thomas’s “current offense of conviction and his extensive history of possessing weapons and contraband,” the search condition “is warranted to protect the community and to deter further criminal activity.” Id. As such, the condition was supported by Thomas’s history and characteristics, did not work a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary, and was thus not an abuse of discretion for the district court to order. 3 3 Thomas further argues that the special condition is inconsistent with the relevant policy behind such conditions announced in U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(7)(C) because his instant conviction is not a sex offense. Section 5D1.3(d) does not restrict the search condition challenged here to sexual offenses, however, but instead explicitly provides that such conditions may be appropriate in other types of cases. For the reasons already noted, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that the condition was appropriate in this case. 4