Opinion ID: 437450
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unwarranted Invasion of Privacy

Text: 28 Once we have determined that information satisfies the Exemption 7 threshold test, nondisclosure can be justified only if disclosure would cause one of the six harms enumerated within the statutory exemption. The FBI asserts that release of the names of the three employees would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy, the harm protected against under subsection (C) of Exemption 7. Since the FBI already has released publicly the three censure letters, except for the employees' names and other identifying information, we face only the narrow question of whether disclosure of the identities of the censured employees would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. This necessitates a balancing between each censured employee's interest in privacy and the public's interest in disclosure. Fund for Constitutional Government v. National Archives, 656 F.2d 856, 862 (D.C.Cir.1981); Lesar v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 486 (D.C.Cir.1980). Unlike exemption 6, which permits nondisclosure only when a document portends a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,' exemption 7(C) does not require a balance tilted emphatically in favor of disclosure. Bast, 665 F.2d at 1254. We find that, while the question is close, disclosure of the names of the two lower-level employees would constitute an unwarranted invasion of their privacy within the meaning of Exemption 7(C). As to the third employee, the Special Agent in Charge, we conclude that Exemption 7(C) does not permit the FBI to withhold his name. Because Exemption 7(C) places a greater emphasis on protecting personal privacy than does Exemption 6, it is clear that Exemption 6 also is no bar to disclosure of the SAC's identity. See Fund for Constitutional Government, 656 F.2d at 862-63. 29 The Exemption 7(C) balancing test must be applied to the specific facts of each case. Because the myriad of considerations involved in the Exemption 7(C) balance defy rigid compartmentalization, per se rules of nondisclosure based upon the type of document requested, the type of individual involved, or the type of activity inquired into, are generally disfavored. See, e.g., Bast, 665 F.2d at 1254. A particular record may be protected in one set of circumstances, but not in others. Because the circumstances associated with the three censure letters are substantially similar, we begin by identifying the interests to be balanced in all three cases. 30 Our first task in the balancing process is the identification of the privacy interests at stake. In determining these interests, court decisions regarding FOIA Exemption 6--the exemption that protects personnel ... and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy--are directly relevant. Because Exemption 7(C) provides protection for a somewhat broader range of privacy interests than Exemption 6, Fund for Constitutional Government, 656 F.2d at 862-63, privacy interests cognizable under Exemption 6 are cognizable under Exemption 7(C). U.S. Department of Justice, Attorney General's Memorandum on the 1974 Amendments to the FOIA 9 (February 1975). 31 We begin with the recognition that an employee has at least a minimal privacy interest in his or her employment history and job performance evaluations. See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976); Simpson v. Vance, 648 F.2d 10, 14 (D.C.Cir.1980); Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 575 (D.C.Cir.1980). That privacy interest arises in part from the presumed embarrassment or stigma wrought by negative disclosures. See Simpson, 648 F.2d at 14. But it also reflects the employee's more general interest in the nondisclosure of diverse bits and pieces of information, both positive and negative, that the government, acting as an employer, has obtained and kept in the employee's personnel file. 32 Second, and essential to our analysis here, individuals have a strong interest in not being associated unwarrantedly with alleged criminal activity. Protection of this privacy interest is a primary purpose of Exemption 7(C). [T]he 7(C) exemption recognizes the stigma potentially associated with law enforcement investigations and affords broader privacy rights to suspects, witnesses, and investigators. Bast, 665 F.2d at 1254. In our federal criminal justice system, the decision whether to prosecute an individual for a crime is entrusted to the prosecutor and is not subject to judicial review and rarely to public scrutiny. Fund for Constitutional Government, 656 F.2d 863-64. An ultimate decision not to prosecute does not always reflect the prosecutor's determination of the innocence of the accused. A FOIA disclosure that would announce to the world that ... certain individuals were targets of an FBI investigation, albeit never prosecuted, may make those persons the subjects of rumor and innuendo, possibly resulting in serious damage to their reputations. Id. at 864. Such disclosure should be allowed only if the public interest in the information outweighs the significant privacy interests implicated. 33 The next step in the balancing process is to identify the public interest in disclosure. Here, the public interest in the disclosure of the identities of the censured employees is only in knowing who the public servants are that were involved in the governmental wrongdoing, in order to hold the governors accountable to the governed. Baez v. Dept. of Justice, 647 F.2d 1328, 1339 (D.C.Cir.1980); see generally Washington Post Co., 690 F.2d at 264. This interest in knowing the identity of disciplined employees is distinguishable from other public interests that may arise in requests for disclosure of government investigatory records. For example, the public may have an interest in knowing that a government investigation itself is comprehensive, that the report of an investigation released publicly is accurate, that any disciplinary measures imposed are adequate, and that those who are accountable are dealt with in an appropriate manner. These other public interests do not enter into the determination of the case now before us, because they would not be satiated in any way by the release of the names of the censured employees. 34 Having identified the competing interests in this case, we must balance them. We begin with the two lower-level employees who were involved with the SWP litigation and with the congressional investigations into surreptitious entries conducted by the FBI against SWP and the Weather Underground fugitives.
35 We agree with the district court that the status of the individuals in this case as federal employees diminishes their privacy interests in the censure letters because of the corresponding public interest in knowing how public employees are performing their jobs. Bast, 665 F.2d at 1254-55; see Washington Post Co., 690 F.2d at 264; Fund for Constitutional Government, 656 F.2d at 865. Furthermore, we agree that the level of responsibility held by a federal employee, as well as the activity for which such an employee has been censured, are appropriate considerations for determining the extent of the public's interest in knowing the identity of that censured employee. See Bast, 665 F.2d at 1255. We conclude, however, that these and other factors tilt the balance against disclosure of the names of the two lower-level employees. Two factors in particular lead us to reverse the district court as to these employees. 36 First, the district court failed to give sufficient consideration to the FBI's conclusion that these two employees were not in any sense directly responsible for the cover-up, but rather were culpable only for inadvertence and negligence. The censure letters to these individuals indicate that their derelictions were acts of negligence--inadvertent failures to pursue leads and to become sufficiently familiar with pre-existing records. There was no element of intentional deception, or awareness of or acquiescence in, such deception. We must distinguish between the general import of an event and the roles specific individuals play in that event. While we agree with the district court that the public has a strong interest in the airing of the FBI's unlawful and improper activities, we find that the public interest in knowing the identities of employees who became entwined inadvertently in such activities is not as great. The public interest in scrutinizing the import of the role these employees played in the cover-up is not directly furthered by a request for the release of the employees' names. 37 Second, the district court failed to consider one of the concerns underlying congressional enactment of Exemption 7(C): release of the employees' names could result in those employees being associated with notorious, and much more serious, allegations of criminal wrongdoing. The FBI inquiry that culminated in the censure letters grew directly out of a massive criminal investigation by the DOJ. The FBI investigation itself explored potentially criminal activity and was controversial in its own right. It also followed on the tail of, and was closely associated with, the highly publicized criminal indictment of top FBI officials. That disclosure of the employees' identities would result in their being associated with widely-publicized criminal investigations cuts on both sides of the balancing equation, see Fund for Constitutional Government, 656 F.2d at 865; Congressional News Syndicate v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 438 F.Supp. 538, 543 (D.D.C.1977) (invalidating the per se aura of Watergate argument), but not equally in this case. The FBI investigation became notorious because of the public interest in the allegations of serious governmental wrongdoing. But this does not reflect a heightened interest in the identity of employees who played only an inadvertent role in the cover-up. Instead, the risk that such employees could be linked to serious criminal wrongdoing when, in fact, they were totally cleared of any such acts, increases the potential invasion of privacy that Exemption 7(C) was designed to protect. 38 This case is a close one and our reversal of the district court as to these two employees is based on the specific facts reflected in the record. We hold only that, where the release of the names of the two censured employees could cause them to become associated with notorious criminal investigations, where those employees were found to have contributed only inadvertently to the wrongdoing under investigation, and where the public interest in their identities is grounded only in a general notion of public servant accountability, the employees' privacy interest in nondisclosure is paramount and protects their identities from being revealed.
39 We reach a different conclusion, however, as to the SAC who was involved with the GAO audit of the FBI's domestic intelligence operations. He was a higher-level official than the other two employees, and he participated knowingly in the cover-up. His censure letter stated: 40 Although you were following instructions from a superior, you are culpable to the extent that you took part in an effort to withhold information from GAO. Your participation in acts that resulted in the FBI's not making a full and timely disclosure of surreptitious entries was a serious matter, and you should have been aware that the result of your action would be a misrepresentation to GAO. 41 The letter added that this type of action is intolerable for a senior bureau official. This censure reflects the FBI's conclusion that, although the SAC did not initiate the plan to withhold relevant information available in the New York office, he was aware of the plan, acquiesced in it, and helped carry it out. 42 The balancing we are required to make under Exemption 7 tips toward disclosure in the SAC's case. We conclude that it would not be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy to reveal his name, despite the potential association with notorious and serious allegations of criminal wrongdoing. He was a high-level employee who was found to have participated deliberately and knowingly in the withholding of damaging information in an important inquiry--an act that he should have known would lead to a misrepresentation by the FBI. The public has a great interest in being enlightened about that type of malfeasance by this senior FBI official--an action called intolerable by the FBI--an interest that is not outweighed by his own interest in personal privacy. There is a decided difference between knowing participation by a high-level officer in such deception and the negligent performance of particular duties by the two other lower-level employees. The excuse that the SAC was merely following orders should not prevent the public from being informed that a specific senior bureau official followed a deliberately-chosen course when placed, perhaps, between a hard rock and his conscience. One basic general assumption of the FOIA is that, in many important public matters, it is for the public to know and then to judge.