Opinion ID: 1789805
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Education as a Fundamental Purpose of Government

Text: The majority opinion seems to reject the notion that education is a fundamental right, citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez [3] and this Court's supposed practice of following the federal approach to defining fundamental rights. [4] The practice of following the federal approach to individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights may make sense because of the parallel provision of both constitutions but on the subject of education this approach makes no sense. The federal constitution says nothing about education. The Missouri Constitution, on the other hand, has many provisions for education, a traditional role of the state government. The proper approach to these questionsas a matter of state, not federal lawis to inquire whether education of the children of Missouri is a fundamental purpose of state government. The Missouri Constitution makes education more than simply a major activity of government; education of children is one of the government's central purposes prescribed at length in our constitution. The fundamental purpose of government in American society, well understood by the founders and inherent in our souls, is to enhance and protect the opportunity of individuals to accrue wealth as their abilities and energies allow. [5] There is a fundamental belief that we Americans are guaranteed equality of opportunity, not equality of result, especially when it comes to the distribution of the government's benefits. Because of this belief, we are repulsed by governmental actions and policies that rig the distribution of government favors so that some citizens cannot access the advantages the government offers to others. Not every inequality of distribution is a denial of equal protection of the law. Some inequalities can be labeled as simply unfair. Unfairness can be addressed through the political process; it need not always be a concern of the courts to rectify by constitutional adjudication. Put another way, not every political problem needs to be expressed and solved as a legal problem. [6] Inequality is assured by the means the Missouri Constitution authorizes for the delivery of educationthat is, local school districts to set tax rates and provide education. This system by its local orientation produces inequalities of results in the money various districts spend on education. The disparities are stunning. The highest spending district spends $15,251 per pupil and the lowest-spending district spends $4,704 per pupil. [7] The Missouri Constitution is not blind to these inequalities. If anything, its structure produces them. The constitution authorizes the use of taxation of local property to produce money for schools, as well as for local governments. [8] This system produces unequal results and leaves it to the political process in the legislature to remedy or to mitigate the inequalities. These unequal results show the unfairness of the system established under the state constitution and set up by legislation. These unequal results pose a simple question that is hard to avoid and even harder to answer: What makes the children of one school district deserving of only about one-third of the education money available for the schools of the children in the highest-spending district? Because the state constitution seems to authorize this absurdly unequal structure, the question is one of policy, not law. [9] The gross disparities created or tolerated in the system, however, ought to make courts especially attentive to particular constitutional requirements such as taxation of property tax wealth. As to taxation, the constitution has specific requirements that are judicially enforceable. It requires the equalization of assessed valuations so that individual districts are not unduly disadvantaged in the ability to raise money, a disadvantage that results from unequalized and low assessments of the properties on which the taxes are imposed. Within the constitutional framework of local school districts supported by local property taxes, the people of this state in the years since statehood in 1821through constitutions adopted and through legislatures electedhave made education a fundamental purpose of their government. The specificity of the state constitution's provisions for education and taxation requires that the Court apply those provisions faithfully. [10] This appeal deals with two specific constitutional provisionsthe requirement that no less than 25 percent of state revenues be devoted to education and the requirement that the taxation of property wealth necessary to support education be equalized among counties. MO. CONST. art. IX, sec. 3(b); [11] MO. CONST. art. X, sec. 14 [12] . The majority opinion seems faithful to the 25 percent requirement for education but fails in its application of the taxation provisions that are a necessary part of the government's ability to perform this fundamental purpose. The Court's failure to enforce the specific provisions of the constitution rigs the system of education so that opportunities it provides are distributed inequitably and contrary to the manner and purposes set forth by the people who enacted the constitution.