Opinion ID: 2763303
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: hannay: work-loss damages awarded

Text: Because we have concluded that damages for work loss are compensable under the motor vehicle exception, we must now address whether the facts as found were sufficient to satisfy the statutory language defining work-loss damages with respect to plaintiff’s claim of work loss as a dental hygienist. Damages in tort actions that are “[r]emote, contingent, or speculative” are not compensable because they are not in conformity with the general rule that a “tortfeasor is liable for all injuries resulting directly from his wrongful act,” as long as “the damages are the legal and natural consequences of the wrongful act, and are such as, according to common experience and the usual course of events, might reasonably have been anticipated.”95 This Court has elaborated on this point, stating: in a third-party tort action against a governmental entity, see Hardy, 461 Mich at 565, neither the no-fault act nor the GTLA requires this for a plaintiff to recover excess economic damages. Second, and relatedly, while a plaintiff must demonstrate “death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement” to recover noneconomic damages in a third-party tort action, whether that requirement has been met is a question of liability, not immunity. As discussed earlier, to demonstrate immunity has been waived as to a claim for such damages, the GTLA, by its plain language, requires a showing of “bodily injury.” Accordingly, while plaintiff Hunter’s path to recovery of noneconomic damages from defendant Flint requires him to demonstrate both a “bodily injury” under the GTLA and a “serious impairment of body function” under the no-fault act, he need only clear the first such hurdle in opposing defendant Flint’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). For these reasons, it was error for the Hunter panel to conclude that resolution of this motion with regard to excess economic damages would require an evidentiary hearing before the court to determine whether plaintiff Hunter suffered a “serious impairment of body function.” 95 Sutter, 377 Mich at 86. See also Price, 493 Mich at 254-255. For example, in Sutter, a medical malpractice case involving the wrongful excising of the plaintiff’s right fallopian tube, this Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that by the trial court refusing the plaintiff’s request for instructions pertaining to her claim of damages for the loss of the ability to bear children and resulting emotional suffering, “the jury was precluded by the 30 [T]o render a wrongdoer liable in damages in a tort action where the connection is not immediate between the injurious act and the consequences, such nearness in the order of events and closeness in the relation of cause and effect must subsist, so that the influence of the injurious act would predominate over that of other causes, and concur to produce the consequences or be traceable to those causes.96 This Court does not, however, “preclude recovery [of damages] for lack of precise proof” or “require a mathematical precision in situations of injury where, from the very nature of the circumstances, precision is unattainable,” particularly in circumstances in which the defendant’s actions created the uncertainty.97 The plaintiff bears the burden to prove the damages sought by a preponderance of the evidence.98 In addition to these overarching rules for recovery of damages in tort, we recognize that there is a distinction drawn between work loss and loss of earning capacity in the context of claims made under the no-fault act. This Court has made clear that while work-loss damages are compensable under the no-fault act, loss-of-earning- trial judge from considering her full measure of damages.” Id. at 83. This Court concluded, “[P]laintiff’s loss of ability to bear children was not a legal and natural consequence of defendant’s act, but, within the meaning of the rule, was contingent, that is, contingent upon the possibility that plaintiff could develop a cyst on her remaining tube which could require excision of the tube itself.” We concluded that “[a]t best, the damages are contingent and, therefore, barred . . . .” Sutter, 377 Mich at 87. 96 Sutter, 377 Mich at 86-87. 97 Fera v Village Plaza, Inc, 396 Mich 639, 648; 242 NW2d 372 (1976) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 98 Washington v Jones, 386 Mich 466, 472; 192 NW2d 234 (1971). 31 capacity damages are not.99 This distinction is derived from the statutory language of the no-fault act, specifically MCL 500.3107.100 MCL 500.3135(3)(c) allows for third-party tort actions for “[d]amages for allowable expenses, work loss, and survivor’s loss as defined in sections 3107 and 3110 in excess of the daily, monthly, and 3-year limitations contained in those sections.” (Emphasis added.) MCL 500.3107 defines “work loss” in the context of no-fault benefits, providing, in relevant part: (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), personal protection insurance benefits are payable for the following: