Opinion ID: 2830281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation

Text: Ali and Hassan raise two constitutional challenges to the procedure by which al Shabaab was designated a foreign terrorist organization. We review these issues de novo. McDermott v. Royal, 613 F.3d 1192, 1193 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Ali and Hassan first claim that their material-support convictions violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As relevant here, the material-support statute forbids “knowingly provid[ing] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempt[ing] or conspir[ing] to do so.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). The phrase “foreign terrorist organization” is a term of art that is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1). Under this provision, the Secretary of State may designate an organization a foreign terrorist organization if the Secretary finds that (1) the organization is a “foreign organization”; (2) the organization engages in “terrorist activity” or “terrorism” or “retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism”; and (3) “the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization -10- threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States.” Id. Section 1189 also provides a mechanism by which an organization can seek judicial review of its designation as a foreign terrorist organization in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. § 1189(c)(1). However, this ability to challenge a designation belongs to the organization, not a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Id. § 1189(a)(8). Ali and Hassan argue that prohibiting them from challenging the Secretary of State’s designation of al Shabaab as a foreign terrorist organization offends due process. Our sister circuits have rejected this argument. United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 331 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc), vacated on other grounds by 543 U.S. 1097 (2005), reinstated in all relevant parts, 405 F.3d 1034 (4th Cir. 2005) (order); United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1155-59 (9th Cir. 2005). For purposes of the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has stated that “in determining what facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt the . . . legislature’s definition of the elements of the offense is usually dispositive.” McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986). Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, “Congress has provided that the fact of an organization’s designation as [a foreign terrorist organization] is an element of [the crime], but the validity of the designation is not.” Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 331. Thus, like our sister circuits, we hold that it comports with due process to prohibit a criminal defendant from challenging the validity of the Secretary of State’s designation of a foreign terrorist organization. See id.; Afshari, 426 F.3d at 1155-59. In reaching this conclusion, we note that an organization’s designation as a foreign terrorist organization is not wholly immune from challenge. The statute provides a method by which an organization, rather than a criminal defendant, can contest the Secretary of State’s designation. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c); see Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 6567 (1980). Ali and Hassan next contend that allowing the Secretary of State to designate foreign terrorist organizations amounts to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative -11- power. The longstanding rule is that “Congress may delegate its legislative power if it ‘lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.’” South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 423 F.3d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 2005) (alterations in original) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). Congress has “wide latitude in meeting the intelligible principle requirement . . . [because] ‘Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.’” Id. (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)). “Congress fails to give sufficient guidance in its delegations only if it ‘would be impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed.’” Id. at 796 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944)). The statutory scheme governing the designation of foreign terrorist organizations provides an intelligible principle. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that § 1189(a) “does not grant the Secretary unfettered discretion in designating the groups to which giving material support is prohibited”). As outlined above, the statute permits the Secretary to make a designation only after making three discrete findings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A)- (C). As the Ninth Circuit has observed, “[t]he Secretary could not, under this standard, designate the International Red Cross or the International Olympic Committee as [foreign] terrorist organizations. Rather, the Secretary must have reasonable grounds to believe that an organization has engaged in terrorist acts—assassinations, bombings, hostage-taking and the like—before she can place it on the list.” Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1137. As such, two courts have upheld § 1189(a) against a non-delegation challenge. Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 331; United States v. Taleb-Jedi, 566 F. Supp. 2d 157, 172-73 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Congress has established detailed procedures to designate organizations as [foreign terrorist organizations] and it retains the power to revoke such a designation when made.”). -12- Ali and Hassan ask us to chart a different course primarily due to the requirement that the Secretary of State determine that an organization “threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(C). The term “national security,” Ali and Hassan argue, is “defined without meaning.” But the statute defines “national security” to mean “the national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States.” Id. § 1189(d)(2). That this definition is general and broad does not an unintelligible principle make. See South Dakota, 423 F.3d at 795. Moreover, “[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly underscored that the intelligible principle standard is relaxed for delegations in fields in which the Executive traditionally has wielded its own power.” Hepting v. AT&T Corp. (In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig.), 671 F.3d 881, 897-98 (9th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases); see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (“Congress—in giving the Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs—must of necessity paint with a brush broader than it customarily wields in domestic areas.”). For these reasons, we hold that granting the Secretary of State the ability to designate an organization a foreign terrorist organization does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.