Opinion ID: 2776052
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Remaining Assets 10

Text: The analysis regarding Williams’ standing to challenge the Nelsons’ use of undue influence to manipulate Reynolds’ other estate planning decisions follows the same path but reaches a different result. Reynolds gave Sandra joint ownership of the two American Century brokerage accounts, the remaining KCPCU account, and the UMB checking account. Like Reynolds’ gift to Sandra of joint ownership of UMB CD #1 and UMB CD #2, Reynolds’ decisions to give Sandra joint ownership of these remaining assets was not a “nonprobate transfer,” and it is not governed by section 461.054 and the other NPT statutes. Instead, joint ownership of the KCPCU and UMB accounts is governed by section 362.470, and joint ownership of the brokerage accounts is governed by the common law. See In re Estate of Hayes, 941 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Mo. App. 1997) (common law and not § 362.470 applies to brokerage accounts because statute is limited to “banks” and “trust companies”). It makes no practical difference which of these governs, however, because Reynolds’ decisions are void under any of these schemes to the extent they resulted from fraud or undue influence. But, unlike Reynolds’ decision to make Sandra joint owner of UMB CD #1 and UMB CD #2, or her decision to designate Sandra POD beneficiary on UMB CD #3, 10 Williams abandoned his arguments with respect to these remaining assets when he did not address them in his substitute brief. See Rule 83.03(b) (“material included in the court of appeals brief that is not included in the substitute brief is abandoned”). But, because the Court has stricken Williams’ substitute brief and limited its review to the claims raised in his brief to the court of appeals, it is not clear that his substitute brief should be effective for purposes of a Rule 83.03(b) waiver when the Court has found it ineffective for any other purpose. The Court need not resolve this question, however, because the issues Williams abandoned in his substitute brief (i.e., the issues regarding the “remaining assets”) are ruled against Williams here as they were in the court of appeals. 19 Reynolds’ decision to make Sandra a joint owner of these remaining assets was not her first and only estate planning decision concerning these assets. Instead, before Reynolds made Sandra a joint owner of these assets, she already had made Baughman a joint owner of them. To be clear, Reynolds’ subsequent designation of Sandra as the joint owner – if valid – was sufficient to divest Baughman of her prior joint ownership interest. Burkholder ex rel. Burkholder v. Burkholder, 48 S.W.3d 596, 598 (Mo. banc 2001) (under section 362.470, a “sole contributor can also terminate a joint tenancy by having the bank or savings association make physical changes on the certificate, or other tangible representation of the account, with corresponding changes in the institution’s records”). But, if Reynolds’ gifts to Sandra of joint ownership of these four accounts are void due to the Nelsons’ undue influence, then those transfers are of no legal effect. Not only are they not effective to make Sandra a joint owner of these accounts, but they are also not effective to divest Baughman of her joint ownership interests in the same accounts. Thus, the Nelsons rely on Crocker, 261 S.W.3d at 727 (prior valid beneficiary deed survives subsequent void beneficiary deed), and Skidmore v. Back, 512 S.W.2d 223, 231 (Mo. App. 1974) (prior valid joint owner of savings account survives subsequent void effort to terminate ownership interest), to claim that – even if Williams succeeded in proving that the Nelsons unduly influenced Reynolds to give Sandra joint ownership of these four remaining accounts – the accounts would have passed to Baughman and not to Reynolds’ probate estate. On those assets, the Nelsons are correct. 11 Baughman has 11 Because Crocker and Skidmore concern circumstances in which there is a prior valid declaration of joint ownership or designation of a POD beneficiary, these cases offer no support 20 standing to challenge the Nelsons’ actions with respect to these four remaining accounts, but Williams does not. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed Counts I, II, and III with respect to those assets.