Opinion ID: 2002019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Shuman's prior statements

Text: Shuman first contends that the court erred in admitting, over his objection, the testimony of Ruest that Shuman threatened to shoot his wife and their children if he were arrested for the prior incident and in failing, sua sponte, to give a limiting instruction to the jury that it could not consider this evidence as indicative of Shuman's character. He argues that the statement was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial and should have been excluded pursuant to M.R.Evid. 403 and 404(b). Evidence of similar acts, although prejudicial, may be admitted for the limited purpose of establishing an essential element of the crime charged, including the element of intent. State v. Grant, 394 A.2d 274, 276 (Me.1978). Similar threats or acts against others are relevant if there is a sufficient nexus between the evidence sought to be introduced and the elements of the crime charged. State v. Gagne, 362 A.2d 166, 170 (Me.1976); State v. Wyman, 270 A.2d 460, 462 (Me.1970). Here, the trial court ruled that the statement was probative of Shuman's state of mind on the day of the shooting. To the extent that the statement demonstrated an unprovoked, knowing and intentional threat involving the use of a gun, in contrast to Shuman's later claim of self defense, it was properly admitted as relevant to Shuman's state of mind relating to his fear of criminal prosecution. Gagne, 362 A.2d at 170. Nor on this record can we say that the statement was unfairly prejudicial. The likelihood that the jury would draw from it an improper inference about Shuman's character and propensity to commit such a crime is ameliorated by the lack of evidence that Shuman made any effort to carry out his threat to his wife, the evidence of his later, non-threatening conversation with his wife, and the time lag between the statement and the assault on Ruest. State v. Forbes, 445 A.2d 8, 13 (Me.1982). Furthermore, we have repeatedly stated that it is not reversible error for the trial court to fail to give a limiting instruction to the jury when none was requested by the defendant. State v. Dube, 598 A.2d 742, 745 (Me.1991); State v. Glidden, 489 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Me.1985); State v. McDonough, 350 A.2d 556, 564 (Me.1976).