Opinion ID: 321107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Instruction on Reliance on One Truthful Witness

Text: 46 Defendant Payseur challenges the giving of one instruction as plain error. No objection was made to it below by any of the five defense attorneys. The instruction read: 47 'The testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every essential element of the offense charged if you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the witness is telling the truth.' 48 The instruction is similar to the example in Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, 12.17 (2nd ed. 1970). There the instruction read: 49 'The testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of an essential element of the offense charged, if you believe beyond reasonable doubt that the witness is telling the truth.' 50 Payseur's contention would apply both to the instruction given and the form instruction in 12.17. The contention of the defendant focuses on the word 'truth.' He argues that the instruction permits a jury to convict if it concludes that a witness believes he is telling the truth even though the jury thinks he is mistaken. 51 The argument is unpersuasive. The common sense interpretation of the instruction given is that the jury may convict on the basis of a single prosecution witness if it believes beyond a reasonable doubt that what the witness said happened is what in fact did happen. 52 We hold that the instruction as given did not constitute plain error, hence the failure to raise an objection before the trial court forecloses a challenge now. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 558, 61 S.Ct. 719, 85 L.Ed. 1037 (1941). 53 Although we do not find error, we disapprove of the challenged instruction. District judges would be well-advised to modify the instruction, if they use it, to read as follows after the word 'if': 54 '. . . if you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the witness is truthful; and believe that what the witness said happened is in fact what happened; and believe that the testimony of the witness covers each element of the offense charged.' 55 The form instruction in 12.17 is more limited in its scope than the one given in this case because of its reference to 'an essential element of the offense charged' as contrasted to 'every essential element of the offense charged' as appears in the instruction given. We prefer the more limited version. If 12.17 is used it should read: 56 'The testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of an essential element or elements of the offense charged, if you believe the witness has truthfully and accurately related what in fact occurred.'