Opinion ID: 2068585
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Granting of Motion for Relief from Judgment

Text: At the outset, we note that the decision of whether to grant relief under T.R. 60(B) is left to the equitable discretion of the trial court. We will not reweigh the evidence, and will reverse only for an abuse of such discretion. Hoag v. Jeffers (1928) 201 Ind. 249, 159 N.E. 753. The statute pursuant to which service was attempted provides that a foreign corporation not authorized or licensed to do business in Indiana is deemed to have appointed the secretary of state as its agent for service of process and sets forth the method by which service is to be accomplished. One of the steps in the process required by the express terms of the statute is that the return receipt show delivery and acceptance or refusal of acceptance of the suit papers by the defendant. Here, the return receipts reveal that there was neither acceptance nor rejection of the suit papers. Therefore, by the express terms of the statute, service was not accomplished. The rule is well-established that to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, due process considerations require that a defendant must be given adequate notice of pending litigation. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950), 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865. We do not answer the question of whether IND. CODE § 23-3-3-1 would comply with the notice requirement if the statute were interpreted to mean, as was suggested by Shotwell and by the Court of Appeals, that neither acceptance nor rejection of the registered mail was required. Clearly, the statute as worded meets constitutional requirements. Shotwell would have us decide that the Hagan defendants have effectively rejected service by failing to keep their records updated with the secretary of state's office in Kentucky where the Hagan defendants were domiciled. We do not agree. Whatever are the laws in Kentucky pertaining to a corporation's obligation to supply the Kentucky secretary of state's office with current addresses, they are laws for those in the State of Kentucky to enforce, not the plaintiffs here. We also note that Shotwell does not argue, nor do the facts indicate, that the Hagan defendants in any way attempted to avoid receiving service of process by actively hiding their whereabouts. Moreover, Shotwell's argument ignores the fact that the requirements of the Indiana statute relied on for service were not met. We conclude that the trial court was correct in setting aside the judgment. Where there is no service of process, there can be no personal jurisdiction, and the default judgment issued by the court was void. In the proceeding to enforce the default judgment, the Hagan defendants filed appropriate objections to personal jurisdiction thus preserving this error. Therefore, the default judgment would be properly set aside pursuant to T.R. 60(B)(6). Motions brought under T.R. 60(B)(6) must be brought within a reasonable time, which we conclude was done in this case. The trial court concluded that the Hagan defendants were entitled to relief from judgment pursuant to T.R. 60(B)(8). Paragraph (8) is a catch-all portion of the rule permitting relief for any reason justifying relief from the operation of judgment other than the reasons set forth in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4), and is available if the motion is filed within a reasonable time. Apparently believing that the Hagan defendants were entitled to relief pursuant to subsection (1) (mistake, surprise or excusable neglect), but mindful that T.R. 60(B) places a one year limitation on relief under that subsection, the trial court concluded that it was within its discretion to award relief under paragraph (8). Having concluded that the default judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction, we need not decide whether the trial court has such discretion.