Opinion ID: 2264023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the district court abuse its discretion in granting Bancroft's motion for mistrial and assessing costs against Dollarhide?

Text: [¶ 16] The gravamen of the mistrial motion, as well as the district court's rationale for granting the motion, was that Dollarhide's counsel had irrevocably tainted the jury by telling it, in effect, that Judge Guthrie had found Dollarhide to have a valid case against the defendants. The reason that we must affirm the district court is that it is impossible to show that the mistrial decision was unreasonable or arbitrary or capricious under these circumstances. While it is the law that [g]ranting a mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy that should be resorted to only in the face of an error so prejudicial that justice could not be served by proceeding with trial[,] it is also the law that [t]he trial court is also in the best position to assess the prejudicial impact of such error. Warner v. State, 897 P.2d 472, 474 (Wyo. 1995); see also Martin v. State, 2007 WY 2, ¶ 19, 149 P.3d 707, 712 (Wyo.2007). We are in no position to second-guess the trial court's on-site, real-time assessment. [5] Dollarhide argues that, even if the statement was improper, it could have been cured by an instruction. Obviously, we also are in no position to test the accuracy of that assumption. [¶ 17] Although not exactly the same, the facts of this case are similar to the facts in State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Resnick, 636 So.2d 75 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.3d Dist.1994), where the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of a mistrial motion where the plaintiff's counsel during opening statement told the jury that the judge has already determined that [the defendant] didn't have [proof of delivery of a notice]. Id. at 76. In reversing, the appellate court concluded that the remarks by [plaintiff's] counsel were such that an objection and instructions to disregard them could not cure the resulting prejudice. The trial judge is the dominant figure responsible for the management, direction, and control of the proceedings. In the adversary system, the jury looks to the trial judge for guidance. A comment of this nature, made at the beginning of the proceedings, can have a marked tendency to influence a jury in its analysis of the issue. We find the harm engendered by the comment made during opening statement is sufficiently pervasive and prejudicial to negate any curative value the judge's subsequent instructions might have had. Id. at 77 (internal citations omitted). The same can be said of the case sub judice. [¶ 18] As mentioned above, we also review the award or denial of costs and sanctions after a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. See supra ¶ 4. In the instant case, the district court ordered Dollarhide to pay $2,235.45 to Teton County for the jury costs attributable to the mistrial, but it denied the defendants' request for costs and attorney's fees in the amount of $29,044.31, likewise attributable to the mistrial. U.R.D.C. 503(b) provides as follows: (b) When a mistrial is caused by any party, the court may order that the party, or parties, reimburse the proper fund for fees and mileage paid to the witnesses, jurors and bailiffs for their attendance. In other words, the district court clearly had the authority to order Dollarhide to pay the jury costs. As to sanctions, Dollarhide certainly has no complaint that the district court did not also order him to pay the $29,044.31 sought by the defendants for his having caused the mistrial. Under these circumstances, we would be hard-pressed to find the district court's assessment to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. As with the mistrial decision itself, the decision as to costs is a matter for the trial court's discretion. We see no abuse of that discretion here.