Opinion ID: 2197150
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: comparative sentencing review in the appellate court

Text: I would also allow the appellate court to consider comparative sentencing arguments. I do not believe this court should dictate to the appellate court how to review sentences to determine if the trial court in a particular case abused its discretion, particularly when this court has itself exercised its discretion to consider comparative sentencing arguments. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 177 Ill.2d 53, 98-100, 226 Ill.Dec. 425, 685 N.E.2d 880 (1997); People v. Coleman, 166 Ill.2d 247, 261, 209 Ill.Dec. 782, 652 N.E.2d 322 (1995); People v. Palmer, 162 Ill.2d 465, 491, 205 Ill.Dec. 506, 643 N.E.2d 797 (1994). In Palmer, we recognized the discretionary nature of this type of review. The defendant argued that he should not have received the death penalty, and he supported his argument with cases in which appellate courts had vacated the death sentences of defendants who had committed more serious acts of violence. We first acknowledged that we were not required to engage in comparative proportionality review, but then exercised our discretion and chose to consider the cases defendant cited. After reviewing the cases, we determined that they did not support defendant's argument that his sentence should be vacated. Palmer, 162 Ill.2d at 491, 205 Ill.Dec. 506, 643 N.E.2d 797. The majority now forbids the appellate court from engaging in the exact analysis that this court has used when presented with comparative sentencing arguments.