Opinion ID: 509534
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unlawful Gratuities as a Travel Act Predicate

Text: 75 Section 1952 of 18 U.S.C. makes it unlawful to travel[ ] in interstate or foreign commerce or use[ ] any facility in interstate or foreign commerce ... with intent to ... promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate ... carrying on, of any unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1952(a)(3). As used in Sec. 1952, unlawful activity is defined, in pertinent part, to mean bribery ... in violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of the United States. Id. Sec. 1952(b). In determining how to instruct the jury as to permissible predicates for a Travel Act conviction, the trial court noted, inter alia, that count 6 of the indictment referred simply to Sec. 201 as the Travel Act predicate, without distinguishing between the subsections that referred to corrupt[ ] intent to influence official action (Secs. 201(b) and (c)) and the subsections that prohibited gratuities without requiring proof of corrupt[ion] and intent to influence (Secs. 201(f) and (g)). It also noted that Sec. 201 as a whole is entitled Bribery of public officials and witnesses. Accordingly, the court instructed the jury, over defendants' objections, that it could base Travel Act convictions on violations of the gratuity provisions, Secs. 201(f) and (g), even if it found defendants not guilty of violating Secs. 201(b) and (c). Defendants contend that this instruction was erroneous and that, since the jury acquitted them of the charges under subsections (b) and (c), the court should have granted their posttrial motion to set aside the Travel Act convictions. We disagree. 76 In a well-reasoned posttrial opinion reported at 674 F.Supp. 86 (1987), the district court thoroughly explored the question whether Congress intended a violation of the gratuity provisions of Sec. 201 to suffice as a predicate for a Travel Act conviction, and we reject defendants' statutory construction challenge to the count 6 conviction substantially for the reasons set forth in that opinion. 77 As the district court noted, the crime of bribery eludes precise definition. While the term bribe traditionally carried a connotation of corrupt intent to influence official action, the trend among scholars, commentators, and legislators has been away from linking impermissible bribery ineluctably to corruption, see Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979), particularly where the thing of value is given to a public official. We think it undoubtedly true that a corrupt payment intended to influence an official act is more serious than a payment merely for or because of an official act without proof of corruption, and the penalties provided by Congress reflect such an assessment. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201 (1982) (possible penalties for violation of subsections (b) and (c), requiring proof of corrupt intent, included $20,000 fine and 15 years' imprisonment, whereas penalties for violations of subsections (f) and (g) were fines of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than two years, or both). Nonetheless, [t]here is no reason to infer that the policy and purpose behind the 'corrupt intent to influence' offenses [are] substantially different from [those] underlying the 'for or because of' offenses. All sections of the bribery statute are aimed at preventing the evil of allowing citizens with money to buy better public service than those without money.... '[e]ven if corruption is not intended by either the donor or the donee, there is still a tendency in such a situation to provide conscious or unconscious preferential treatment of the donor by the donee, or the inefficient management of public affairs.'  674 F.Supp. at 89 (quoting United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870, 99 S.Ct. 200, 58 L.Ed.2d 182 (1978)). 78 This substantial identity of the purposes behind the two levels of offense was evident prior to the enactment of Sec. 201, for certain of the bribery statutes that were predecessors of Sec. 201 conjoined the prohibitions against offering a thing of value because of an official act and against offering it with intent to influence that act. Thus, in the 1958 Criminal Code, Sec. 206 made it unlawful to offer a thing of value because of or with intent to influence a judge's decision, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 206 (1958); and Sec. 207 made it unlawful for the judge to receive a thing of value because of or with intent to be influenced, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 207 (1958). Accordingly, a defendant prosecuted under one of those sections could have been convicted of bribery without proof of corrupt intent. Although Sec. 201, enacted in 1962, grouped the corrupt intent offenses separately from the because of offenses and provided different penalties for the two groups, the legislative history indicates that Congress's purpose was simply to consolidate ... the various existing bribery statutes governing various officials into a single section. 108 Cong.Rec. 21,981 (1962) (statement of Senator Kefauver). As discussed in Part II.C.1. above, the legislative history of Sec. 201 stated that Congress intended no significant changes of substance. S.Rep. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1962 USCCAN at 3853; see also 108 Cong.Rec. 21,981 (1962) (consolidation makes no significant changes of substance and would not narrow the broad sweep of the current bribery laws) (statement of Senator Kefauver). 79 In sum, we agree with the district court that the policy, evolution, and legislative history of Sec. 201 indicate that Congress intended a violation of any portion of that section, which it entitled Bribery [of various persons] and viewed as a compilation of bribery offenses, to constitute a bribery offense within the meaning of Sec. 1952.