Opinion ID: 164093
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Guideline

Text: 28 In this case, Mr. Robertson used the internet and e-mail to find and make arrangements with an undercover officer he believed to have access or control over young boys to travel from Pennsylvania to Colorado to meet two (fictitious) boys, aged thirteen and fourteen, for sex and drug use. This conduct falls within the plain language of subsection (b)(1)(B) of Guideline 2A3.2, which imposes a two-level sentence enhancement [i]f a computer or an Internet-access device was used to ... (B) facilitate transportation or travel, by the victim or a participant, to engage in prohibited sexual conduct. U.S.S.G § 2A3.2(b)(3). 29 This subsection applies when four conditions are met: (1) a computer or an Internet-access device must be used, (2) to facilitate transportation or travel, (3) by either a victim or a participant, (4) for the purpose of engaging in prohibited sexual conduct. The district court expressly found, and Mr. Robertson does not dispute, that a computer was used in the course of the offense. No one disputes that the intended conduct falls within the category of prohibited sexual conduct. According to Application Note 1, prohibited sexual conduct includes any sexual activity for which a person can be charged with a criminal offense. U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1, cmt. n.1 (cross-referenced in U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2, cmt. n.1). Mr. Robertson pled guilty to knowingly traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in a sexual act with a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), so his conduct clearly falls within this definition. 30 At the sentencing hearing and in his brief, Mr. Robertson disputed that he used the computer to facilitate transportation or travel. Application Note 5 makes clear that the computer use to which the Guideline applies does not include communications with a third party, such as use of an airline's internet site to purchase airline tickets. Mr. Robertson is therefore correct that his use of the internet to obtain airline tickets is irrelevant. But the plea agreement stipulates that Mr. Robertson and the undercover agent communicated via e-mail over the next several months coordinating the details of the tour and Defendant's travel plans. Plea Agreement at 4, App. 13. 1 The communication covered, at the very least, the date, time, and place of Mr. Robertson's arrival in Colorado; the price and method of payment; and plans regarding sexual activities and drug use. Moreover, it is undisputed that the entire trip was made possible by Mr. Robertson's use of the internet to search for, and locate, a fantasy tour to his liking. 31 Because the district court found that the enhancement did not apply in the absence of an actual victim, it did not reach the question of whether Mr. Robertson's computer use facilitated his travel. However, in a companion case to this one, involving almost identical facts and arising from the same sting operation, that question was answered affirmatively by the district court and briefed on appeal to this Court. See United States v. McGraw, 2003 WL 22854382, slip op. at 4-5 (10th Cir. Dec. 2, 2003) (published). Our opinion in McGraw holds that the defendant did use a computer to facilitate his travel, because the computer made it substantially easier for him to find and book a fantasy tour, as well as to negotiate the details of the trip. See id., slip op. at 7. That analysis applies equally to Mr. Robertson. 32 The final condition set forth in U.S.S.G § 2A3.2(b)(3)(B) is that the travel facilitated by use of the computer or internet must be by the victim or a participant. In interpreting this language, the district court placed great weight on Application Note 1, which defines victim as (A) an individual who, except as provided in subdivision (B), had not attained the age of 16 years; or (B) an undercover law enforcement officer who represented to a participant that the officer had not attained the age of 16 years. In this case, there was no actual minor victim, and the undercover law enforcement officer posed not as a minor but as a person with control of sexually pliant young boys. The court reasoned that the Guideline therefore does not apply: 33 Subsection B [of the application note definition of victim] appears to be an attempt to address a sting operation. Subsection A appears to be an attempt to address a situation where there is an actual victim not having attained the age of 16 years. 34 The situation which is completely left out is a situation where, as here, the undercover officer doesn't represent that the officer had not attained the 16 years, but, rather, represents that the officer has control of fictitious victims who have not attained the age of 16. 35 That situation is simply not addressed by the language of the Sentencing Commission. And therefore, I am satisfied the 2-level increase does not apply in this situation. 36 Tr. 26, App. 90. 37 The flaw in this analysis is that the only use of the term victim in subsection (B) of the Guideline is the reference to travel by the victim or a participant.  U.S.S.G § 2A3.2(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added). Thus, under the plain language of the Guideline, it does not matter whether there was a victim (meaning either an actual minor victim or an undercover officer posing as a minor); the Guideline applies if the computer or internet is used to facilitate travel by a participant. Application Note 1 defines participant as follows: 38 A participant is a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted. A person who is not criminally responsible for the commission of the offense (e.g., an undercover law enforcement officer) is not a participant. 39 U.S.S.G § 3B1.1, cmt. n.1 (cross-referenced in U.S.S.G § 2A3.2(b)(3), cmt. n.1). Under this definition, Mr. Robertson was a participant, and because it was his travel that was facilitated — not the victim's — the Guideline applies, notwithstanding the fact that there was no victim. 40 All four conditions set forth for application of the Guideline are therefore present. A computer or internet-access device was used to facilitate travel by a participant for prohibited purposes. Moreover, while it is not necessary to look beyond the plain language, we note that this interpretation is consistent with the purposes of the provision. The Guideline was intentionally crafted to include sting operations within its scope; that is an effective way to deter would-be predators from using the internet for these purposes. There is no reason to limit application of the Guideline to just one kind of sting operation, one in which the undercover officer poses as a child. That may be a sensible restriction on the scope of subsection (A), where the gravamen of the enhancement is use of the computer to entice a child, but it bears no logical relation to subsection (B), where the gravamen is use of the computer to facilitate travel by the participant himself. For that purpose, it matters not at all whether the undercover officer making the arrangements on the other end is a virtual victim or a virtual pimp. The evil is the same.