Opinion ID: 419956
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Scindia decision.

Text: 11 In Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 68 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981), the Supreme Court undertook to resolve the conflicting decisions of the circuits. There, a longshoreman was injured by sacks of wheat which fell from a pallet suspended by a defective ship's winch. The winch had been malfunctioning for two days prior to the accident, but the stevedore continued to use it. Because there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the owner had actual knowledge of the failure of the winch mechanism, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's granting of a summary judgment for the owner and remanded for a determination of whether the owner had a duty to intervene and stop the unloading process. 12 While the opinion itself does not address every issue of vessel owner liability under Sec. 905(b), 8 several principles do emerge. The most basic of these is that the primary responsibility for the safety of the longshoremen rests upon the stevedore: As a general matter, the shipowner may rely on the stevedore to avoid exposing the longshoremen to unreasonable hazards. The ship is not the common employer of the longshoremen and owes no such statutory duty to them. 101 S.Ct. at 1623. The opinion relieved the owner of an automatic duty to inspect or supervise stevedoring operations. Once the stevedore's cargo operations have begun, absent contract provision, positive law, or custom to the contrary, the owner has no general duty by way of supervision or inspection to discover dangerous conditions that develop in the area assigned to the stevedore. The Court explained that the owner is not liable to the longshoremen for injuries caused by dangers about which he had no duty to inform himself, but rather is entitled to rely on the stevedores, and owes no duty to the longshoremen to inspect or supervise the cargo operations. Id. 101 S.Ct. at 1624. 13 Despite these broad areas of immunity, however, there are circumstances where the owner cannot escape liability by reliance upon the stevedore. First, before turning over the ship to the stevedore, the owner has a duty to warn the longshoremen of hidden defects that would be known to the shipowner in the exercise of reasonable care. He must also exercise care to deliver to the stevedore a safe ship with respect to gear, equipment, tools, and work space. Second, the owner has a duty to avoid exposing the longshoremen to harm from hazards under the act or control of the vessel. Third, even though the owner is generally relieved of responsibility for accidents which occur once the unloading process has begun, if [the stevedore's] judgment ... was so obviously improvident that [the owner], if it knew of the defect and that [the stevedore] was continuing to use it, should have realized the [defect] presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the longshoremen, ... in such circumstances [the owner] had a duty to intervene and eliminate or neutralize the hazard. Id. 101 S.Ct. at 1626. 14 The impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Scindia upon the extent of a vessel's duty to longshoremen under 33 U.S.C. Sec. 905(b) as previously applied in this Circuit under the Restatement standard remains less than clear. The majority of the Court in Scindia specifically stated that it was unprepared to agree that the shipowner has precisely the duty described by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit [drawn from the Restatement (Second) of Torts], 101 S.Ct. at 1626, while Justice Powell stated in his concurrence that he did not consider the Restatement standard to be inconsistent with the majority's opinion. Id. 101 S.Ct. at 1628 n. 1. This Court has considered cases subsequent to Scindia which involve the relationship between jury instructions in Sec. 905(b) actions based on Scindia and those based on Sec. 343(A) of the Restatement. These cases provide general guidance but are not controlling. Each revolved around factual situations where there was no knowledge. Clearly, under these cases Scindia denied liability. 15 In Hill v. Texaco, Inc., 674 F.2d 447 (5th Cir.1982), we found that a vessel owner was not liable to the employee of an independent contractor for injuries sustained from a fall while the employee was inspecting a ship's oil tank even though the district court had applied land-based negligence standards to the ship. The owner had no knowledge that the contractor was permitting the employee to climb the tank without safety equipment. We found that in the absence of knowledge, Texaco was not negligent in failing to act. As Scindia said, owner liability for injuries which occur during the unloading process would result only [i]f the shipowner becomes aware during the stevedore's work that the ship or its gear poses a danger to the longshoremen, and if the shipowner also learns that the stevedore is acting unreasonably in failing to protect the longshoreman against the danger. Id. at 451. (Original emphasis). 16 In Duplantis v. Zigler Shipyards, Inc., 692 F.2d 372 (5th Cir.1982), we reiterated the interpretation of Scindia we first articulated in Hill. We found no duty on the part of the owner to intervene because [t]here is no evidence that [the owner] ever became aware of any defects developing during [the contractor's] repair operation. Id. at 376. In Moser v. Texas Trailer Corp., 694 F.2d 96 (5th Cir.1982), we affirmed a decision of the district court that a shipowner breached no duty to the employee of the independent contractor because his injury was caused by a transitory condition of which it had no knowledge. We explained that [s]ince Scindia, at all events, it is clear that this liability [under Sec. 905(b) ] is no more than, if as, extensive as that subsisting under 'the general law of torts.'  Id. at 98. (emphasis added). 17 Thus, we must decide today the question left open by our decisions in Hill, Duplantis, and Moser: Once unloading operations have begun, is the vessel's duty under Sec. 905(b) LSHWCA less extensive than under traditional tort rules?