Opinion ID: 848804
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Hostile-Work-Environment Actions

Text: Although this Court has never before expressly analyzed the origin of nonsexual hostile-work-environment claims under our Civil Rights Act, our courts have recognized that such claims may be asserted on the basis of any ground enumerated in Michigan's Civil Rights Act in M.C.L. § 37.2202. Malan v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 212 Mich.App. 585, 587, 538 N.W.2d 76 (1995) (holding that a hostile-work-environment claim is actionable on the basis of any one of the enumerated classifications in M.C.L. § 37.2202), citing Rasheed v. Chrysler Corp., 445 Mich. 109, 517 N.W.2d 19 (1994) (religion-based harassment from coworkers and supervisors); Sumner, supra at 538, 398 N.W.2d 368 (race-based harassment from supervisors as a continuing violation); Meek v. Michigan Bell Co., 193 Mich.App. 340, 342-343, 483 N.W.2d 407 (1991) (sex-based and religion-based harassment from supervisors); see also Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647 (C.A.6, 1999) (recognizing race-based, hostileenvironment action under the Civil Rights Act); Downey v. Charlevoix Co. Bd. of Rd. Comm'rs, 227 Mich.App. 621, 576 N.W.2d 712 (1998) (recognizing disability-based, hostile-work-environment action). These rulings both identify and effectuate our Legislature's intent to prohibit prejudicial discrimination in the employment realm. Lamentably, the majority now eviscerates Michigan's hostile-work-environment jurisprudence with a perfunctory textual analysis that misconstrues our Legislature's intent. To clarify the errors present in the majority's reasoning, I will examine the text of the statute in light of its history and context.