Opinion ID: 784134
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The May 25, 2000 Videotape

Text: 29 Lawrence argues that Hodge's response when shown the photo array on May 25 was admissible either as a dying declaration or under the residual hearsay exception. We disagree. 30 A declarant's statement identifying his/her assailant can be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule if the declarant believes that he/she is facing imminent death. However, in order for this dying declaration to be admissible, the declarant must have spoken with the consciousness of a swift and certain doom. Shepard v. U.S., 290 U.S. 96, 100, 54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196 (1933). Here, the district court concluded that Lawrence had not established that either of Hodge's identifications were made while Hodge believed death was imminent. The record supports that finding. Hodge's medical treatment was rigorous and undertaken with the expectation that he would survive. Hodge was never told by medical staff or police that he was going to die. Although Hodge had to realize that he had extremely serious injuries, doctors had been discussing the care he would need following his release from the hospital and the subsequent rehabilitation that everyone thought he would have to undergo. Moreover, when Hodge finally succumbed to his injuries on May 30, he had just recovered from major surgery and appeared on the way to recovery. 31 Moreover, he was shown the first array five days before he died. In addition, it is uncontested that not only did no one tell Hodge he was going to die because his death was not expected, the nursing staff purposely tried to manifest an upbeat attitude around him to help keep his spirits up. Thus, the court correctly concluded that the evidence simply did not allow the foundation necessary to admit Hodge's purported identification of Ogami as a dying declaration. 32 Similarly, the response Hodge gave on May 25 lacks the necessary indicia of credibility to be admitted under the residual exception to the hearsay rule embodied in Fed.R.Evid. 807. That Rule states: 33 A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. 34 We have stated that [t]he residual hearsay exception is to be used only rarely, and in exceptional circumstances, and is meant to apply only when certain exceptional guarantees of trustworthiness exist and when high degrees of probativeness and necessity are present. Bohler-Uddeholm America, Inc. v. Ellwood Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 112 (3d Cir.2001) (internal citations omitted). 35 The district court viewed the videotape and concluded that the blinks and nods Hodge allegedly made in response to the photo array were simply too ambiguous to constitute a meaningful statement. This means that Hodge's response to this array lacked the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness necessary to be equivalent to those categorized in the exceptions set forth in the hearsay exceptions specified in Rules 803 and 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, his response could not meet the requirements embodied in Rule 807. 36 Lawrence devotes a paragraph of his brief arguing that the refusal to admit defense evidence tending to inculpate a third party has been found to be reversible error as long as there is some connection between the suspected third party and the crime with which the defendant is charged. Appellant's Brief at 43. Lawrence cites United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1404-05 (3d Cir.1991); and Pettijohn v. Hall, 599 F.2d 476, 478 (1st Cir.1979) to support that proposition. Both Stevens and Pettijohn held that a district court's refusal to admit a second identification for the factfinder to compare with a prior identification was reversible error. However, it is not at all clear that Hodge was actually identifying his assailant here. The district court correctly concluded that it was just as likely that Hodge was trying to tell police that Ogami, whose photograph was included in the first array he was shown, was at the scene when the shooting occurred. Although it may have been preferable for the court to admit that evidence for the jury's consideration, we can not say that the court abused its discretion in not doing so given the strength of the identifications by Harrigan, Frederiksen and Martin, and the ambiguity of Hodge's response. 37