Opinion ID: 6107079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Trial Court's Failure To Discharge Counsel Because of Alleged Conflicts

Text: Defendant contends that his attorney labored under three actual conflicts of interest, any one of which obligated the trial court to discharge Hauser and appoint him new counsel. We disagree. The state and federal Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to representation free from conflicts of interest that may compromise the attorney's loyalty to the client and impair counsel's efforts on the client's behalf. ( People v. Mai , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 305 P.3d 1175 .) To establish a denial of that right, the defendant must show that counsel labored under an actual conflict that adversely affected counsel's performance and that, absent counsel's deficiencies, there is a reasonable probability the result would have been different. ( People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390 , 417, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 , 198 P.3d 11 .) In determining whether an actual conflict adversely affected counsel's performance, we ask  'whether counsel pulled his punches, i.e., whether counsel failed to represent defendant as vigorously as he might have, had there been no conflict. [Citation.] In undertaking such an inquiry, we are ... bound by the record. But where a conflict of interest causes an attorney not to do something, the record may not reflect such an omission. We must therefore examine the record to determine (i) whether arguments or actions omitted would likely have been made by counsel who did not have a conflict of interest, and (ii) whether there may have been a tactical reason (other than the asserted conflict of interest) that might have caused any such omission.'  ( Id . at p. 418, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 , 198 P.3d 11 .)  Defendant claims Hauser suffered from three disabling conflicts. He fails to demonstrate that any actual conflict existed. The first alleged conflict arose from defendant's attack on Hauser and subsequent threats against Hauser's family. Yet the court inquired about this potential conflict, and Hauser noted that he had represented difficult clients before. Hauser then assured the court the attack would not impair his ability to represent defendant: I honestly believe that I can represent Mr. Johnson with equal vigor as if this had never happened. In concluding that no conflict existed, the trial court could reasonably have credited Hauser's representations. (See People v. Hardy , supra , 2 Cal.4th at p. 137, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796 , 825 P.2d 781 .) The second alleged conflict occurred when the prosecutor decided to rely on evidence of the assault as aggravating evidence at the penalty phase. Defendant claims that Hauser ought to have realized that he needed to withdraw as counsel so that he could testify as a witness to the  assault on defendant's behalf. But an attorney must withdraw only when he or she knows or should know that he or she is or ought to be a material witness. (See People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861 , 915, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23 , 116 P.3d 494 .) Hauser's testimony was not necessary to establish the assault itself-and, indeed, the prosecution promised not to call Hauser to testify. Defendant suggests that Hauser, if called as a witness, might have testified that he did not fear defendant or that defendant was perhaps overcome by the emotion of beginning the trial at the time of the attack. But the latter is raw speculation: There is no evidence in the record that defendant was in emotional turmoil at the time he attacked Hauser, or that Hauser believed he was. As to the former, it is possible that Hauser, if called, might have testified that he did not fear defendant. But he could also reasonably believe that appearing as defendant's counsel,  notwithstanding the attack, was a more effective way of making the same point. Indeed, Hauser told the court, I can't think of a better advocate for Mr. Johnson than the victim of his own misdeed. And Hauser also sought to minimize the attack in his argument to the jury. Defendant alleges the existence of a third conflict. This arose, according to defendant, from Hauser's acquiescence to the court's ruling requiring him-if he remained defendant's counsel-to refrain from arguing, in the form of testimony or any other manner, certain mitigating aspects concerning the assault. 5 Defendant contends that Hauser thereby sold the right to argue mitigating circumstances relating to the assault for the lucrative opportunity  to continue to represent [defendant]. On this record, though, there is no indication that Hauser saw his discharge as a threat to [his] livelihood[ ], nor is there the slightest hint that thoughts of compensation, rather than sincere concern about protecting defendant's interest in avoiding a death judgment, influenced Hauser's decision to remain as counsel. ( People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988 , 1009-1010, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818 , 874 P.2d 248 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin , supra , 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 , 198 P.3d 11 .) Indeed, despite the court's ruling, Hauser showed the jury that he was able to continue as defendant's advocate. He then argued that the incident was not a serious factor in aggravation and demonstrated merely defendant's frustration and mental impairment. And, as explained in the preceding paragraph, Hauser would not have been a material witness for defendant at the penalty phase-so his inability to testify or otherwise offer more specific comment about the incident did not impair his ability to represent defendant. Even if defendant had established a conflict, he has not shown that the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. To the contrary, counsel's decisions may have been the result of legitimate strategic and tactical choices. (See People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421 , 437, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 303 , 411 P.3d 490 .) For example, Hauser could reasonably have believed that any objection to defendant's exclusion from the trial would have been futile; that defendant would have been unable to behave in front of the jury, to his detriment, if called to testify; that defendant's testimony from  the prior trial, if read into the record, would not have been helpful or credible; and that he could be more effective as defendant's advocate rather than as a witness on what was only a minor piece of the evidence in aggravation in comparison to the murders themselves. (See People v. Doolin , supra , 45 Cal.4th at p. 418, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 , 198 P.3d 11 .) Finally, defendant was not denied any constitutional or statutory right when the court inquired into Hauser's potential conflict in defendant's absence. As discussed earlier, defendant forfeited his right to be in the courtroom by his own misconduct. Defendant could have listened to the proceedings with a speaker, but he repeatedly declined to do so. Defendant cannot fairly complain that he lacked input into the discussions surrounding counsel's alleged conflicts, when it was defendant's own decision to separate himself from the proceedings that deprived him of the opportunity.