Opinion ID: 4556490
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Varnau’s testimony

Text: At the time of Goldson’s death, Dr. Varnau was responsible for investigating the mode, manner, and cause of his death, R. 74-15 (Varnau Dep. at 27) (Page ID #1460), and she personally responded to the jail upon notice that Goldson had died, id. at 82 (Page ID #1515). Much of her deposition testimony related to her official conclusion that Goldson did not hang himself, and specifically related to the implausibility of a suicide under the circumstances. For example, she said that it “didn’t seem to add up” that the officers had carried out CPR on Goldson while the noose was still tied around his neck. Id. at 219–20 (Page ID #152–63). She also confirmed that her analysis of Goldson’s death was based on her visual inspection of the body, her interviews and conversations with individuals on the death scene, the preliminary findings of the Montgomery County Coroner, the final autopsy of the coroner, the autopsy photographs, her own personal death-scene photographs, and various measurements taken of cell 15. Id. at 233–34 (Page ID #1666–67). Most critical to the issue on appeal are Dr. Varnau’s statements during her deposition that support the theory that Goldson’s death by strangulation involved a hobble strap around his neck. First, she stated that Officer Don Hency commented on the autopsy photographs that he had knowledge of individuals incarcerated in the jail being “led around by hobble straps in the jail. Put the straps around their necks and they lead them like on dog leashes.” Id. at 83–84 (Page ID #1516–17).12 Second, she confirmed that her statement that the marks may have been left from a 12Hency’s out-of-court statements may constitute inadmissible hearsay, but it is well-established that the party opposing summary judgment need not “produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Instead, a party opposing summary judgment who proffers evidence in a form not admissible at trial “must show that she can make good on the promise of the pleadings by laying out enough evidence that will be admissible at trial to demonstrate that a genuine issue on a material fact exists, and that a trial is necessary.” Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009). It is possible that Hency could testify at trial as to this neck-leashing practice, and if he did not have personal knowledge, another individual could lay this foundation. The dissent argues that introduction of the jail’s practice of placing inmates in neck restraints would constitute inadmissible character evidence, but does not specify how this evidence goes to anyone’s “character,” nor whom it impugns. J. Nalbandian Op. at 43. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) states that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Officer Hency’s observation, by contrast, does not pin the neck-leashing practice on any of the named defendants. It is not evidence that a particular named defendant “is the sort of person who would” place an inmate in a neck restraint—“[t]his is precisely the sort of propensity reasoning Rule 404(b) forbids.” Helfrich v. Lakeside Park Police Dep’t, 497 F. App’x 500, 507 (6th Cir. No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 22 hobble strap was based on observing photographs of Goldson’s body. Id. at 253 (Page ID #1686).13 Dr. Varnau also testified that, based on her review of the evidence, Goldson’s death was a homicide by strangulation. Id. at 214 (Page ID #1647). In support of this theory, she compared the marks on Goldson’s neck to those of a typical hanging. “When you look at the way that, a person that’s hung, there’s usually a V here on their neck,” Dr. Varnau explained. Id. at 222 (Page ID #1655). As for the marks on Goldson’s neck, she continued, “it seems that something was pulling him back this way. It was not something that was pulling up.” Id. at 223 (Page ID #1656). This testimony resembles that of an examining doctor in Ratcliff v. Daniel, 224 F.3d 766 (5th Cir. 2000) (unpublished), a summary-judgment appeal before the Fifth Circuit dealing with the same question that we consider here—whether an incarcerated decedent had, in fact, committed suicide by hanging. In Ratcliff, the examining doctor “noted that, in a hanging, the ligature mark usually runs in an upward ‘V’ pattern across the neck, whereas the mark on [the decedent]’s neck was horizontal-as if [he] had been strangled from behind.” Id. at . The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that the “[t]he testimony of [this doctor and another doctor] certainly produces an issue of material fact as to whether the Appellees negligently failed to protect Ratcliff from harm by others than himself.” Id. In similar fashion here, Dr. Varnau offered specific testimony in support of the theory that Goldson died by strangulation. Although the district court did not exclude Dr. Varnau’s testimony, at least four aspects of the district court’s evaluation of it were either questionable or erroneous. First, and most 2012) (emphasis added). Instead, evidence that the jail had a practice of leashing inmates by the neck is more akin to background evidence. “Proper background evidence has a causal, temporal or spatial connection with the charged offense.” United States v. Hardy, 228 F.3d 745, 748 (6th Cir. 2000). “Typically, such evidence is a prelude to the charged offense, is directly probative of the charged offense, arises from the same events as the charged offense, forms an integral part of a witness’s testimony, or completes the story of the charged offense.” Id. The jail’s general practice of leashing inmates—which does not even identify a “prior” specific “act” for Rule 404(b) purposes—would be directly probative of its employees following this practice in the instant case. We reject the proposition that this constitutes inadmissible character evidence. 13Elsewhere in her deposition testimony, Dr. Varnau stated that Investigator Newman had reviewed autopsy photographs and concluded that the marks on Goldson’s neck “could be like a hobble strap or something like that.” Id. at 78 (Page ID #1511). As we have already clarified, Newman’s testimony was inadmissible, so we do not consider this statement by Varnau as supportive of Bard’s opposition to summary judgment. No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 23 important, although it is true that Dr. Varnau did not specifically comment on the theory that Goldson died by accidental self-strangulation after struggling against a hobble strap around his neck, the district court’s conclusion that Dr. Varnau’s testimony “does not reasonably support that theory” is incorrect. Bard, 2019 WL 590357, at . Dr. Varnau’s testimony supports the general theory that Goldson was strangled to death with a hobble strap; the specific theory of self-strangulation with the hobble strap, placed by the relevant officers, is consistent with—and supported by—the more general theory. A jury could reasonably infer either that one or both of the officers strangled Goldson with a hobble strap or that one or both of them placed Goldson’s neck in a hobble strap, which led him to strangle himself after struggling against the restraint. Second, the district court improperly weighed the credibility of Dr. Varnau’s testimony, noting that she “offered inconsistent theories of how [Goldson] died.” See id. This was in error. “[P]roof that a party . . . has made prior inconsistent statements is not a rare event in our courts. Juries are regularly called upon to consider evidence of that sort, and we all know that prior inconsistency does not inexorably lead to defeat.” Hanson v. Madison Cty. Det. Ctr., 736 F. App’x 521, 537 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Norris v. Sysco Corp., 191 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 1999)). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether [s]he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 2009) (“In reviewing a summary judgment motion, credibility judgments and weighing of the evidence are prohibited.” (citation omitted)). To the extent the district court rejected Dr. Varnau’s testimony because it “offered inconsistent theories” of Goldson’s death, this was erroneous. Third, the district court questioned the significance of Dr. Varnau’s testimony because “she did not testify—nor could she testify since she was not present at the jail—as to which officer purportedly placed the never-seen hobble strap or ligature around Goldson’s neck.” Bard, 2019 WL 590357, at  (emphasis added). For the reasons discussed above, it was not necessary for Bard to submit evidence regarding which of the two officers placed the strap around Goldson’s neck. See Fazica, 926 F.3d at 289–90. Nor was Dr. Varnau’s testimony any less significant because she did not name a specific officer responsible for Goldson’s death. No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 24 Fourth, the district court stated that Dr. Varnau’s testimony about the hobble strap or leash was “based at least in part on Newman’s inadmissible opinion,” Bard, 2019 WL 590357, at , but ignored that Dr. Varnau also stated explicitly that her hobble-strap theory was “base[d] . . . on looking at the photographs,” R. 74-15 (Varnau Dep. at 253) (Page ID #1686). Although the district court did not deem Dr. Varnau’s testimony inadmissible, any discounting by the district court of this testimony because it was based, in part, on Newman’s inadmissible opinion was improper. On a related note, the dissent would have us extend our evidentiary analysis beyond assessing the district court’s rulings—and beyond what any of the parties have argued—and deem Dr. Varnau’s cause-of-death testimony wholly inadmissible because she was not at the scene when Goldson died and because she was not qualified as an expert. See J. Nalbandian Op. 44–45. We reiterate that the district court never concluded that Dr. Varnau’s deposition testimony was inadmissible, nor did the defendants-appellees seek such an evidentiary ruling. At the district court’s hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the district court raised the issue of “the legal or factual significance of Dr. Varnau’s determination that Mr. Goldson’s cause of death was a strangulation or homicide if she was not medically qualified to perform an autopsy,” but did not conclude—or even suggest—that Dr. Varnau’s testimony would be excluded as inadmissible evidence. R. 127 (Summary Judgment Hr’g Tr. at 3) (Page ID #4765). Moreover, the defendants-appellees have never argued—either in the district court, see generally R. 103 (Defs.’ Objections at 1–20) (Page ID #4302–21), or on appeal, see generally Appellee Br.—that Bard cannot rely in part on Dr. Varnau’s deposition testimony to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact. Indeed, the defendants-appellees themselves repeatedly cited her testimony in their motion for summary judgment, see R. 77 (MSJ at 10–11) (Page ID #3139– 40), and they did not ask the district court to exclude Dr. Varnau’s testimony during oral argument on the motion. Bard has consistently revealed to the defendants-appellees her reliance on Dr. Varnau’s testimony, see, e.g., R. 102 (Mem. in Opp. at 25) (Page ID #4266); R. 102-2 (Pl.’s Resp. to Proposed Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 70, 72, 74–75) (Page ID #4283–84); Appellant Br. at 18 (“It is for a jury to weigh the testimonial evidence of Dr. Judy Varnau, Dr. Susan Allen and Dr. Kent Harshbarger as well as their credibility to understand the official manner and cause of death.”), yet the defendants-appellees have never argued that this testimony is inadmissible. No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 25 For these reasons, the dissent’s proposed, sua sponte consideration of whether Dr. Varnau’s testimony should have been excluded runs contrary to a fundamental tenet of evidence law: “All evidence is admitted as a matter of course unless a valid ground of objection is interposed.” 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 303; see 88 C.J.S. Trial § 190 (“A party opposing the admission of evidence has the burden to persuade the judge to exclude it.”); United States v. Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515, 1525 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Assuming that Mr. Nordfelt’s testimony could properly be cast as that of an expert, Mr. Gomez did not object at trial to the admission of the expert testimony and, therefore, the issue is not properly before this court.”); United States v. Presley, 349 F. App’x 22, 28 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding no Confrontation Clause violation when “defense counsel likely made a strategic decision not to object to the admission of the hearsay testimony by [the government’s witness]”). In our adversarial system, “the common law made the parties the captains of their own litigious fate.” 21 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence 2d § 5032. It is therefore no surprise that all of the cases cited by the dissent for its argument that Dr. Varnau’s testimony is wholly inadmissible at trial involved one party objecting to or opposing the admission or consideration of such opinion evidence. See Harrison v. New York Life Ins. Co., 78 F.2d 421, 424 (6th Cir. 1935) (“Over strenuous objection, and under interrogation by the court itself, [a physician] was permitted to give an opinion that the causes contributing to the death of the insured were vertigo, nervous exhaustion, and indigestion with eruptions. This evidence was clearly inadmissible.”) (emphasis added); In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 227 F. Supp. 3d 452, 457, 463 (D.S.C. 2017) (noting the defendants’ “strenuous objections” to the court reopening expert discovery and other objections to evidentiary rulings); Hall v. Flannery, 840 F.3d 922, 925, 927–28 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that, upon the defendant’s “immediate[]” objection at trial to the testimony of an expert witness, the trial court should have applied the Rule 702/Daubert framework); Appellant Br. at 24 in Hicks v. Scott, 958 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2020) (opposing consideration of the testimony of a witness who was not present when decedent was shot by law enforcement; “[the witness] was not present when [the decedent] went downstairs to confront the officers and was never in a position to confirm or disconfirm the presence of a rifle pointed at [the law-enforcement officer]”). In stark contrast here, the defendants-appellees have never argued that Dr. Varnau’s No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 26 cause-of-death testimony should have been excluded. This is made doubly clear by the fact that the defendants-appellees specifically objected to Bard’s “improper use of certain fact witness deposition testimony as opinion testimony”—but Dr. Varnau was not one of these fact witnesses whose testimony the defendants-appellees challenged. R. 103 (Defs.’ Objections at 1) (Page ID #4302); see id. at 18 (Page ID #4319). We decline to consider an evidentiary objection that no party has made, and that the district court never considered. In sum, the district court erroneously discounted Dr. Varnau’s testimony at the summaryjudgment stage. Her testimony contributes to the genuine dispute of fact over whether Goldson strangled himself after the officers left him in a hobble strap.