Opinion ID: 1265027
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Deference to State Court Factual Determinations

Text: Lewis first challenged his counsel's effectiveness at the penalty phase of his trial during his PCRA proceedings. The PCRA court denied relief on this claim and, on appeal from that decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed and rejected the claim on its merits. See Lewis II, 743 A.2d at 909-10. Therefore, under these circumstances, the role of a federal habeas court is to review the state court's disposition through the lens of § 2254. Although the District Court recognized as much when it stated that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached the merits of this claim and it was thus obligated to apply AEDPA's deferential standard of review, Lewis, 2006 WL 2338409, at  n. 6, the District Court nonetheless went on to determine the facts for itself and, in doing so, failed to give appropriate deference to the state court's decision. In Lewis II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that the record did not support Lewis's claim that he suffered from serious mental illness and brain damage. 743 A.2d at 909. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided the following analysis of this claim: In his PCRA petition, appellant contended that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, discover and present evidence at the penalty phase of appellant's trial that appellant was mentally ill. In support of this claim, appellant offered affidavits from a psychiatrist who examined him nearly fifteen years after the murder and concluded that he suffered from brain damage and mental illness at the time of the murder and from family members claiming that appellant was `different' as a child and that he suffered abuse at the hands of his father. Negating appellant's claim, however, is the presentencing mental health evaluation conducted on August 18, 1983, less than one year after the murder, in which the evaluator found that appellant did not manifest any major mental illness that could be a factor in the disposition of his case and that appellant appeared to be competent for sentencing. Appellant's claim that he suffers from brain damage or serious mental illness is also simply not supported by the record. Appellant played a very active role in his trial and in pre-trial proceedings. At a conference before the court on May 19, 1983, at which appellant's then-appointed counsel sought leave to withdraw, appellant stated that he was `legally astute and legally competent to represent' himself. N.T. 5/19/83 at 6. Throughout the conference, he spoke in a coherent and cogent manner, displaying a good command of language and vocabulary as well as knowledge of the legal process and his constitutional rights. Id. at 6-16. Further, appellant testified at a suppression hearing on July 27, 1983, where he also demonstrated clarity of thought and intelligence. N.T. 7/27/83 at 182-220. Appellant also testified at length at his trial regarding his alibi defense, once again showing no signs of brain damage or mental illness but rather appearing intelligent and well-spoken. N.T. 8/10/83 at 1054-1113. Because appellant gave no indication at the time of his trial that he suffered from brain damage or serious mental illness, his trial counsel and subsequent appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to investigate, discover and present evidence of such brain damage or mental illness. Id. at 909-10 (footnote omitted). As this passage makes clear, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court evaluated the evidence that Lewis presented in support of his claim that counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase of trial and compared it to the record as a whole in the course of determining that Lewis had not demonstrated that at the time of his trial he was suffering from brain damage or mental illness. However, when the District Court analyzed this claim, it stated that [t]he evidence that [Lewis] has presented, both in the PCRA courts and in his habeas proceedings, reveals that he does in fact suffer from a host of mental health issues, many of which may be attributable to his deeply troubled family background. Lewis, 2006 WL 2338409, at . The District Court reached this conclusion without mentioning the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's finding to the contrary. Under AEDPA, factual determinations made by state courts  such as the one at issue here  are entitled to deference: [A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. § 2254(e)(1). [12] This presumption of correctness applies to factual determinations of both state trial and appellate courts. See Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 671, 679 (3d Cir.2006); Duncan, 256 F.3d at 196. Implicit factual findings are entitled to § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness as well. Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 285-86 (3d Cir.2000). Additionally, while § 2254 does not condition deference to state court factual findings on whether the state court held a hearing, Fahy, 516 F.3d at 182, the procedures used in the state court's adjudication of a claim may impact whether the petitioner has rebutted the presumption of correctness, see Lambert, 387 F.3d at 239. Thus state fact-finding procedures may be relevant when deciding whether ... a petitioner has adequately rebutted a fact, but the procedures are not relevant in assessing whether deference applies to those facts. Rolan, 445 F.3d at 679. In light of this standard, the District Court was not free to determine anew the underlying facts of this claim; rather, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's factual determination that Lewis had not demonstrated that he suffered from mental illness or brain damage was entitled to a presumption of correctness and the burden was on Lewis to rebut this presumption with clear and convincing evidence. Because the District Court did not address whether Lewis rebutted the presumption of correctness that attached to the state court's factual determinations, and instead arrived at its own interpretation of the facts without conducting an evidentiary hearing, we will engage in a plenary review of this issue. See Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 378 (3d Cir.2004) ([O]ur review of the District Court's factual findings is ... plenary, because [the District] Court relied solely on the state court record, and did not conduct an evidentiary hearing.). Upon review of the evidence that Lewis provides in support of his claim that information was available to his trial counsel pertaining to his mental illness and brain damage, we cannot conclude that he has rebutted the presumption of correctness that attaches to the state court's factual determination. As even a brief summary of the mental health evaluations reveals, the evidence that Lewis relies on to establish his mental illness and brain damage is in large part contradictory. For example, in a psychiatric evaluation conducted shortly after trial in August 1983, Dr. Camiel reported that Lewis was more intelligent than previous testing had shown; that Lewis's thoughts progressed in a normal associative manner without evidence of an underlying thought disorder or rambling pattern of speech; and he diagnosed Lewis as having an Antisocial Personality Disorder, with his grandiose thoughts constituting a narcissistic component to his disorder. (App. at 2162-66.) Similarly, a psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Canals in 1993 provided the following information: Lewis appeared to be very intelligent; during the interview he did not show any symptoms of being psychotic, he appeared to be in good contact with reality, he was somewhat grandiose, admitted to episodes of feeling high without the use of chemicals and his conversation was well organized; he had Polysubstance Abuse Severe, Explosive Disorder, Antisocial Personality Disorder, Paranoid Personality Disorder, and Hypomanic Personality Disorder; and Lewis was not suffering from any major mental illness. (App. at 2156-61.) In contrast, a psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Wellman in 1984 revealed that tests placed Lewis's IQ at 77, considered borderline mentally retarded; mentioned brain damage and a head injury inflicted by his father; and described Lewis's self-image as inflated to the point of mild grandiosity, noting that those persons with this profile type often have paranoid mental activity and disordered thinking. (App. at 2168-69.) Likewise, Lewis was evaluated in 1997 by a forensic psychologist, Dr. Berland, who observed that a test put Lewis's IQ at 86, the bottom of the average range; testing indicated a serious psychotic disturbance involving delusional paranoid thinking, psychotic mood disturbance, and perceptual disturbance including hallucinations; testing suggested diffuse or widespread damage to Lewis's cerebral cortex, which may have been congenital; and Lewis suffered from brain damage and chronic, serious, mental illness. (App. at 2171-72, 2186.) In combination, this evidence is far from conclusive with respect to establishing that Lewis suffers from mental illness or brain damage. In addition to these professional evaluations, Lewis offers declarations from various family members and friends in support of his claim that evidence of his mental illness and brain damage was available to his trial counsel. For example, Lewis's mother stated that she drank turpentine while pregnant with Lewis and that he had suffered a head injury as a young boy when his father slammed Lewis's head into the bathtub. (App.1968-70.) But Lewis himself has never acknowledged any abuse  he informed Dr. Canals that he was raised by very good parents who were decent law-abiding citizens and that he was never abused (App.2156)  nor has he submitted reports from any doctors specializing in neurological issues. Other evidentiary problems include that Lewis has not submitted medical records of psychiatric treatment from before or during his incarceration, he has not submitted any school records showing learning or emotional problems, and he has not addressed the possibility that his allegedly delusional behavior was actually caused by his heavy drug use. Further undermining Lewis's attempt to show that he suffers from mental illness and brain damage is the affirmative evidence of his active and engaged conduct at trial and during pre-trial hearings. (App. at 739-772.) Therefore, at best, the evidence of record with respect to Lewis's mental health and brain damage is in conflict and we cannot conclude that Lewis rebutted, with clear and convincing evidence, the state court's factual determination that the record did not support his claim of mental illness or brain damage. Moreover, the District Court's mistake in disregarding the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's factual determinations in favor of its own infected the remainder of its analysis.