Opinion ID: 4535738
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Directed Verdict/Summary Judgment

Text: 1. Directed verdict ¶52 The standard under which a directed verdict may be granted during a jury trial is set out in Wis. Stat. § 805.14(3), which provides: At the close of plaintiff's evidence in trials to the jury, any defendant may move for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. If the court determines that the defendant is entitled to dismissal, the court shall state with particularity on the record or in its order of dismissal the grounds upon which the dismissal was granted and shall render judgment against the plaintiff. In regard to the particularity for its decision, the circuit court's Order of January 26, 2018 provided: This Court does not find that Alderman's conduct was so obviously negligent as a matter of law, as such, expert testimony is necessary to ascertain whether Alderman's conduct fell within the scope of the usual care exercised by insurance professionals under the circumstances. . . .[14] In this case, Camper Corral has failed to produce any evidence that a policy was available or could have been available in the insurance market for the September 30, 2013-September 30, 2014 time period with a $1,000.00 per auto/camper deductible and a $5,000.00 aggregate for wind, hail, earthquake, and flood for Camper Corral. Further, Camper Corral has produced no evidence to demonstrate that Michael Alderman misrepresented the insurance coverage. . . . Based on the evidence provided, along with the fact that the cause of action pleaded by Camper Corral against 14 R. at 86, 3 6 No. 2018AP458.pdr Alderman for professional negligence requires expert testimony at the time of trial, and that Camper Corral has failed to provide any evidence where a reasonable jury could find that Alderman were a direct and proximate cause to the damages sustained by Camper Corral, and that expert testimony was needed to prove causation in this matter, the Court grants Alderman's motion. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: Judgment for the Defendant is GRANTED.[15] ¶53 The circuit court's decision that dismissal was required in part because Camper Corral did not provide expert testimony about standards applicable to insurance agents is without legal foundation and is clearly wrong in at least two respects. First, no expert testimony is necessary to prove that an insurance agent misrepresented the terms of the policy that he sold to an insured. All that is needed to reach the jury on misrepresentation is trial testimony showing Alderman made a representation of material fact; it was untrue; Rhonda Emer believed the representation to be true; and she reasonably relied on it to the damage of Camper Corral. Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis. 2d 166, 169, 168 N.W.2d 201 (1969). Benefit of the bargain is the legal measure of damages for detrimental reliance, i.e., the difference between the payment Camper Corral would have received for the 2014 hail damage if the deductible had been $1,000/$5,000 and what she actually was paid. Appleton Chinese Food Serv., Inc. v. Murken Ins., Inc., 185 Wis. 2d 791, 808, 519 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that damages are measured by the terms of the policy that the insurance agent failed to provide). Michael Alderman asserted he did not represent that the 2013-14 policy had hail damage deductible of 15 Id., 7. 7 No. 2018AP458.pdr $1,000/$5,000. This created a dispute of material fact that the jury should have decided and on which no expert testimony was required. ¶54 Second, Camper Corral's trial did produce evidence that a policy with a $1,000/$5,000 deductible for hail damage was commercially available and that Camper Corral was eligible to purchase it. The circuit court, the court of appeals and the majority opinion ignore Exhibits 103 and 10616 and Rhonda Emer's testimony, which is repeated above, that discusses the Western Heritage quote that Michael Alderman gave her shortly after August 6, 2013, which shows Camper Corral's eligibility for that policy (Exhibit 8).17 ¶55 Rhonda Emer's testimony points out differences in the quotes: the dates are different, the premiums for the year are different, and the statement about deductibles for hail damage are different. Exhibit 103's quote is dated August 2, 2013 and Exhibit 106's quote is dated September 12, 2013. Exhibit 103 has a $1,000/$5,000 deductible, without singling out hail damage, but its premium for this coverage was $7,493 per year. Exhibit 106 has a notation at the bottom that said, $5,000 DEDUCTIBLE APPLIES TO WIND, HAIL, EARTHQUAKE AND FLOOD.18 However, with that 16 Michael Alderman identified Exhibit 106. R. at 108, 86. Each of Western Heritage's quotes for Camper Corral is 17 titled Garage Premium Summary. Exhibits 8, 103 and 106 are quotes from Western Heritage. This statement about deductibles was not on exhibit 8, 18 which Michael Alderman gave to her in early August 2013. 8 No. 2018AP458.pdr additional clause limiting payment for hail damage, the annual premium was reduced to $4,399. ¶56 To explain more fully, the hail damage larger deductible shown on Exhibit 106 is not shown on Exhibit 103; the only notation about deductibles on Exhibit 103 is $1,000/$5,000 for Comp & Coll. Hail is not mentioned. The policy premium shown on Exhibit 103 is $7,493, which is the amount that Rhonda Emer testified Camper Corral paid. Therefore, Exhibit 10319 combined with Rhonda Emer's testimony about Exhibit 8 shows that the deductible limits that she thought Camper Corral had purchased were commercially available from Western Heritage and Camper Corral was eligible for them at the $7,493 premium she agreed to pay in early August 2013. ¶57 Michael Alderman testified that Camper Corral's premium and coverage are shown in Exhibit 106, which is a quote stating, $5,000 DEDUCTIBLE APPLIES TO WIND, HAIL, EARTHQUAKE AND FLOOD for an annual premium of $4,399. The increased deductible for hail damage and the lower premium on Exhibit 106 create a dispute of material fact, as Rhonda Emer testified that she paid $7,493 for her 2013-14 insurance that provided a $1,000/$5,000 deductible for hail damage. ¶58 In light of two previous hailstorms that each created damage in excess of $100,000, reducing the deductible for hail damage was a major concern for Rhonda Emer, but nevertheless, Michael Alderman increased the deductible for hail damage. A review of Rhonda Emer's testimony in regard to the $7,493 premium she believed she paid and the coverage afforded by Exhibit 8, as 19 Michael Alderman identified Exhibit 103. R. at 108, 77. 9 No. 2018AP458.pdr also shown on Exhibit 103, comes in sharp contrast to the lower premium of Exhibit 106, which has a higher hail damage deductible. ¶59 The majority opinion's response to Rhonda Emer's testimony is that Exhibit 103 is only a quote and therefore, it has nothing to do with what the policy's actual terms would be.20 However, an insurance quote is a proposal by an insurance company of the terms under which it will provide insurance and the cost thereof. Kimberly J. Winbush, Supplement, Validity, construction, and effect of assault and battery exclusion in liability insurance policey at issue, 44 A.L.R. 5th 91 (1996) (citing Regis Ins. Co. v. All American Rathskeller, Inc., 976 A.2d 1157, 1167 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (discussing a pre-insurance quote that identified subsequent limitations of the policy's coverage)). Accordingly, the quote given to Rhonda Emer has probative value in regard to the terms of the policy that she could expect would follow. ¶60 The majority opinion drifts into further error when it fails to recognize that there may be several substantial factors contributing to the same result. Blashaski v. Classified Risk Ins. Corp., 48 Wis. 2d 169, 175, 179 N.W.2d 924 (1970). As we have explained, [a]n injury may be produced by several substantial factors, acting in sequence or simultaneously, and responsibility need not be restricted to the last and most immediate factor. Stewart v. Wulf, 85 Wis. 2d 461, 469, 271 N.W.2d 79 (1978) (citation omitted). Cause is a question for the jury unless the facts are so clear that reasonable persons could not differ on the question. Id. (citation omitted). Michael Alderman's failure to 20 Majority op., ¶37, n.13. 10 No. 2018AP458.pdr provide the insurance policy he said he was providing is a substantial factor in causing Camper Corral's damage. ¶61 Furthermore, although Camper Corral provided proof sufficient to reach a jury on whether a policy with $1,000/$5,000 was commercially available and that Camper Corral was eligible to obtain it, I object to those requirements becoming legal requirements for causation in Wisconsin. The majority opinion is unnecessarily harsh on the consumer and, as it has in this case, will immunize misrepresentations by insurance agents who have superior knowledge of how to search the insurance industry to determine whether the insured was eligible for particularized insurance. ¶62 In addition, the majority opinion relies on Wallace v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 212 Wis. 346, 248 N.W. 436 (1933), to reason, we have hinted that availability of the insurance policy to the particular plaintiff is important, not just generalized commercial availability.21 However, Wallace addressed life insurance for a man with a known heart defect that permanently precluded his insurability. Stated otherwise, Wallace could not change the condition of his heart; it always would affect his insurability. Therefore, Wallace's reasoning that there is no evidence tending to show that the assured could have obtained other insurance of the same kind and character, id. at 350, has no relevance in regard to insuring for hail damage. This is so because in any given year, hail may not be a factor affecting property damage for Camper Corral, but Wallace's heart condition always would be a 21 Majority op., ¶34. 11 No. 2018AP458.pdr factor affecting his actuarial longevity. Also, Wallace distinguished Kukuska v. Home Mut. Hail-Tornado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 166, 235 N.W.403 (1931), which dealt with insurance coverage more analogous to the case-at-hand. ¶63 In Kukuska, a farmer applied for crop insurance against hail damage in early July of 1928. Id. at 167. On August 1, 1928, the farmer was notified that his application had been rejected. Id. at 168-69. That same day, a violent hailstorm damaged the farmer's crops. Id. at 169. We concluded that had [the farmer] been seasonably notified, other insurance could have been readily obtained and we affirmed the judgment in favor of the farmer. Id. at 173-74. We did not place the burden on Kukuska that the circuit court placed and the majority opinion now places on Camper Corral. Here there was no circuit court finding about whether insurance with a $1,000/$5,000 deductible for hail damage could, or could not, have been obtained. Rhonda Emer's testimony, quoted above, simply was ignored. ¶64 The majority opinion presumes that reliance provides an alternative theory for plaintiffs in insurance cases such as this, which is why it concludes that its decision is not harsh on consumers.22 It faults Rhonda Emer for not explaining what she would have done differently had she realized that Camper Corral was underinsured. But what she would have done would be speculation because she believed Camper Corral was properly insured until after the September 3, 2014 hail storm. Given the 22 Majority op., ¶36, n.11. 12 No. 2018AP458.pdr vigorous defense that counsel for the defendants provided, speculation would never have found its way to the jury. ¶65 And finally, were I writing for the majority, I would conclude that once general commercial availability in the insurance industry has been shown by the plaintiff, plaintiff has satisfied its burden in regard to causation. Johnson & Higgins of Alaska Inc. v. Blomfield, 907 P.2d 1371, 1374-75 (Alaska 1995); Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pete's Satire, Inc., 739 P.2d 239, 244 (Colo. 1987). If it is raised, uninsurability then becomes an affirmative defense for which the defendant bears the burden of proof. Id. In that manner, the entirety of causation for alleged negligence by an insurance agent can be placed before the finder of fact. 2. Summary Judgment ¶66 We also have said that summary judgment, which rests on a legal conclusion by the court, can rest on the same legal theory as a directed verdict. Gagliano, 355 Wis. 2d 258, ¶32 (citing Steven V. v. Kelly H., 2004 WI 47, ¶35, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sands v. Menard, 2017 WI 110, ¶28, 379 Wis. 2d 1, 904 N.W.2d 789; Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). ¶67 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.08(2) provides in relevant part: The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 13 No. 2018AP458.pdr When a motion for summary judgment is made before trial, we begin our review by determining whether the complaint and answer are sufficient to join issue. Schwegel v. Milwaukee Cty., 2015 WI 12, ¶20, 360 Wis. 2d 654, 859 N.W.2d 78. Then, we examine the moving party's affidavits that support the motion and affidavits that oppose the motion. Id. Here, summary judgment was granted during the course of a jury trial. Therefore, my starting point in this discussion differs from Schwegel; however, the ultimate test remains the same. Summary judgment can be granted only when there is no dispute of material fact. Id. ¶68 Here, the circuit court ignored disputes of material fact and, as a legal conclusion, held that judgment should be entered for Michael Alderman. As I pointed out above, and will not repeat here, there was credible evidence on disputes of material fact, e.g., what did Michael Alderman tell Rhonda Emer about the policy he sold to her. If the jury believed Rhonda Emer's testimony and the related trial exhibits, the jury would have ruled in her favor. Stated otherwise, taking all the testimony in the light most favorable to Camper Corral, there is no legal principle upon which Camper Corral's claim of negligent misrepresentation should have been taken from the jury and decided by a court in favor of Michael Alderman. ¶69 And finally, every court has jumped the gun on this case: First, the circuit court, who seemed to believe that everything an insurance agent says is ok unless there is an expert opinion saying that the agent's statement was not ok; second, the court of appeals, who decided the case by importing into Wisconsin 14 No. 2018AP458.pdr law a new and heavy evidentiary burden on causation for insureds who were told one thing by their insurance agents and found the policy they were sold contained something else; and third, the majority opinion of this court, that affirms the court of appeals new evidentiary burden for proof of causation, but ignores trial court exhibits and testimony that show the evidentiary burden it creates actually was met at trial. III. CONCLUSION ¶70 In conclusion, the majority opinion is wrong on the law and wrong on the facts. First, it creates a new and rigid evidentiary burden for causation that immunizes an insurance agent's misrepresentations about the insurance policy he said that he was providing and the policy he actually provided, all at the expense of the consumer.23 Second, even if I were to accept the new evidentiary burden the majority opinion places on insureds, Rhonda Emer's trial testimony and trial Exhibit 103 provide a factual basis to show that coverage with a $1,000/$5,000 deductible for hail damage was commercially available and that Camper Corral was eligible for that coverage during the 2013-14 policy term because those are the terms that were on the exhibit provided to Camper Corral. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 23 Majority op., ¶3. 15 No. 2018AP458.pdr 1