Opinion ID: 1058834
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Instruction T

Text: Here, the plaintiff was clearly entitled to be compensated in damages for any emotional distress she suffered as a consequence of the physical impact she sustained in the accident. Such distress might include shock and fright at being struck three times, turned over, left hanging upside down in her seatbelt and experiencing physical pain. It might also include anxiety as to the extent of her injuries, worry as to her future well-being, her ability to lead a normal life and to earn a living. It might include fear of disability, deformity, or death. Such factors were proper subjects for the jury's consideration because they might fairly be inferred from the physical impact of the collisions upon her person. They might also be taken into account as factors causing exacerbation of her pre-existing mental and physical conditions. Injury to, or loss of, a plaintiff's personal property, as a result of a defendant's negligence, stands upon a different footing. Damages for such losses are confined to the diminution in the value of the property resulting from the accident, plus reasonable and necessary expenses incurred. White Consolidated Industry v. Swiney, 237 Va. 23, 30, 376 S.E.2d 283, 287 (1989). It is beyond debate that animals, particularly dogs and cats, when kept as pets and companions, occupy a position in human affections far removed from livestock. Especially in the case of owners who are disabled, aged or lonely, an emotional bond may exist with a pet resembling that between parent and child, and the loss of such an animal may give rise to grief approaching that attending the loss of a family member. The fact remains, however, that the law in Virginia, as in most states that have decided the question, [4] regards animals, however beloved, as personal property. The General Assembly, in Code § 3.1-796.127, expressly declared: All dogs and cats shall be deemed personal property. . . . That section also provides the remedy for the injury of such an animal by allowing the owner to recover the value thereof or the damage done thereto in an appropriate action at law. . . . Our decisions have never approved an award of damages for emotional distress resulting from negligently inflicted injury to personal property, [5] and the General Assembly, having had such an opportunity when considering Code § 3.1-796.127, evidently declined to do so. We conclude that permitting such an award would amount to a sweeping change in the law of damages, a subject properly left to legislative consideration. It follows that the defendants' Instruction T correctly stated the existing law and that the trial court erred in refusing it.