Opinion ID: 51679
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Continuous Possession

Text: Third, Ubele contends the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to establish he had dominion and control over the firearms alleged in the indictment 1 Ubele does not contest the third conviction used in determining his eligibility for the ACCA. 5 and he did not possess the firearms through January 27, 2005, or at any time reasonably near that date, as alleged in the indictment. “[W]e review de novo whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Ortiz, 318 F.3d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir. 2003). We will affirm the jury’s verdict “if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation omitted). On review, the evidence is viewed “in the light most favorable to the government, with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices made in the government’s favor.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for a felon to possess a firearm. Section 922(g)(1) required the government to prove ‘three distinct elements:’ (1) that [Ubele] was a convicted felon; (2) that [Ubele] knew he was in possession of a firearm; and (3) that the firearm affected or was in interstate commerce.” United States v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004). “Possession can be shown by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. . . . [and] . . . can be either actual or constructive[.]” United States v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1990). “A defendant has constructive possession if he exercises ownership, dominion, or control over the firearm. A defendant also has constructive possession if he has the power and intention to exercise dominion or control. The 6 defendant may exercise that dominion and control either directly or through others.” United States v. Gunn, 369 F.3d 1229, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Further, we have held that “possession is a course of conduct . . . . Proof of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon on one day within an alleged continuous possession is sufficient to support a conviction.” United States v. Rivera, 77 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted). At trial, Ubele stipulated that he was a convicted felon. Ubele and his cousin, Chadwick Graham, purchased two gun safes from the Bass Pro Shop in Savannah, Georgia for the purpose of storing their collected guns. Ubele possessed the combination to access at least one of these safes. Ubele originally stored the safes at Graham’s house and later moved the safes to a house belonging to his girlfriend’s mother. Ubele accessed the safes to check and clean the guns. Ubele also added another gun to the cache. None of the guns found in the safe were manufactured in Georgia and all of the guns had traveled in interstate or foreign commerce before Ubele took them into his possession. Further, the evidence demonstrates Ubele knew the combinations needed to open the safes through January 27, 2005, when he refused to disclose them to law enforcement authorities. Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to convict Ubele. 7