Opinion ID: 678215
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Speeding Tickets

Text: 14 First, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in prohibiting her counsel from questioning Clark about his driving record. Plaintiff contends that she should have been allowed to delve into these speeding tickets during trial as evidence of habit, admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 406. That rule provides as follows: 15 Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice. 16 Fed.R.Evid. 406. 17 Prior to trial, defendants moved in limine for an order prohibiting plaintiff from questioning Clark about prior traffic tickets. The court held an evidentiary hearing on this motion in which Clark admitted that he had received approximately thirty-eight speeding tickets during the ten years prior to trial. Although six of the years were pre-accident, plaintiff never established how many tickets Clark received before the accident as opposed to after the accident. Nor did plaintiff establish exactly how many tickets Clark received. Clark testified that he drove 150,000 to 175,000 miles each year. Clark denied speeding at the time of the accident. 18 The magistrate judge considered the number of incidents involving speeding in contrast to the number of instances which did not involve speeding. He concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Clark had a habit of speeding; that is, that Clark regularly and automatically drove in excess of the speed limit. We find no error.