Opinion ID: 2602055
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the cases for failure to comply with the autopsy requirement

Text: ¶21 Mrs. Kirkham and Mrs. Kilpatrick both argue that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing their claims as a sanction for their failures to obtain autopsies following their husbands' deaths absent evidence of willfulness, bad faith, or fault. On the other hand, defendants argue that the district court had broad discretion to dismiss and that the decision should only be overturned if abuse of discretion [is] clearly shown or there is no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling. [20] ¶22 Rule 37(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the district court to sanction a party who fails to obey an order of the court during discovery unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified. The court may take any action that is just, including onerous sanctions such as dismissing the action or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party. [21] ¶23 Our review of a district court's imposition of sanctions follows a two-step process. First, we ensure that the district court has made a factual finding that the party's behavior merits sanctions. Second, once the factual finding has been made, we will only disturb the sanction if abuse of discretion [is] clearly shown. [22] As a general rule, district courts are granted a great deal of deference in selecting discovery sanctions, and we overturn a sanction only in cases evidencing a clear abuse of discretion. [23] An abuse of discretion may be demonstrated by showing that the district court relied on an erroneous conclusion of law or that there was no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling. [24] Our deferential review recognizes that trial courts must deal first hand with the parties and the discovery process. [25] ¶24 We hold that the district court's order was an abuse of discretion because it lacked an evidentiary basis. It was improper for the district court to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims absent a factual finding that plaintiffs' failures to procure the autopsies were willful. The willfulness requirement cannot be satisfied by showing mere prejudice. Rather, there must be evidence that the noncompliance was the product of willful failure.
¶25 Sanctions are warranted when (1) the party's behavior was willful; (2) the party has acted in bad faith; (3) the court can attribute some fault to the party; or (4) the party has engaged in persistent dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the judicial process. [26] ¶26 In this case, the district court did not make the threshold factual finding as to whether plaintiffs' failures to procure autopsies were the result of willfulness, bad faith, fault or persistent dilatory tactics on the part of Mrs. Kilpatrick and Mrs. Kirkham. ¶27 In the Kilpatrick case, the district court implied fault simply because the CMO required an autopsy, Mrs. Kilpatrick failed to procure one, and her failure prejudiced defendants. This reasoning is illustrated by one of the trial judge's comments at the hearing: I think I have an understanding of the issues. It's not complicated. CMO said autopsy. There was no autopsy, motion to dismiss. Is that your motion? In dismissing Bullough, the district court did not make any factual inquiry into the willfulness of Mrs. Kilpatrick's failure. Notably, there is unchallenged evidence that Mrs. Kilpatrick's failure may not have been willful because when she cremated Mr. Kilpatrick, she was unaware of either the autopsy requirement or the fact that Mr. Kilpatrick had signed an agreement to have an autopsy performed. Her affidavit states, I was unaware that James signed an authorization consenting to an autopsy. He did not inform me of his wish to have an autopsy. ¶28 Similarly, in Mrs. Kirkham's case, the district court's minute entry made no finding of willfulness, bad faith, fault or dilatory tactics. The district court merely said that [a]fter reviewing the record in this matter, the Court is persuaded [that] dismissal of this action for failure to comply with the autopsy requirement is appropriate. The only evidence in the record, however, is Mrs. Kirkham's affidavit, in which she testifies that her failure to procure an autopsy was inadvertent, not willful. Her affidavit states, The failure to perform an autopsy . . . was not due to any purposeful violation of the agreement with our attorneys, but instead was the result of the fact that our family was grieving and was ill-prepared for [Mr. Kirkham's] sudden death. She explained that Mr. Kirkham's illness progressed extremely rapidly, and the expediency of his death took our family by surprise. She also explained that [a]lthough I had authorized an autopsy four months prior, at the time of my husband's death, I was very distraught and did not recall the agreement until after he was buried. ¶29 A failure to make factual findings regarding willfulness is not always grounds for reversal. In Amica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, the court of appeals held that the district court's failure to make a specific finding of willfulness, bad faith, or fault is not grounds for reversal if `a full understanding of the issues on appeal can nevertheless be determined by the appellate court.' [27] In Schettler, the court of appeals upheld the district court's dismissal of a case despite the absence of a finding of willfulness where the record clearly demonstrate[d] a pattern of aggravated misconduct in the form of willful and deliberate disobedience of discovery orders, fabricated testimony, and attempted witness tampering. [28] ¶30 In contrast, the record in this case does not demonstrate willful disobedience of the CMO. The district court's opinion is devoid of any discussion demonstrating either a pattern of misconduct or any willful or deliberate disobedience of the court's discovery orders.
¶31 [T]here are constitutional limitations upon the power of the courts . . . to dismiss an action without affording a party the opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his cause. [29] The Supreme Court has held that rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should not be construed to authorize dismissal . . . when it has been established that failure to comply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner. [30] ¶32 Defendants focus on the language in our cases stating that sanctions will be upheld on a showing of willfulness, bad faith, or fault, or persistent dilatory tactics [31] and argue that failure to obtain an autopsy demonstrates fault. We reject this strict liability approach. ¶33 The strict liability interpretation of fault ignores the principle that a general term included within a list of more specific terms should be given a meaning that is analogous to the other terms within the list. [32] In this list, willfulness, bad faith, and persistent dilatory tactics all involve intentional behavior. Thus, the meaning of fault should not be interpreted to include unintentional behavior. ¶34 This approach is consistent with case law that requires intentional behavior in order to satisfy the fault requirement when the sanction imposed is dismissal or a default judgment. As the Tenth Circuit has explained, Because a default judgment is a harsh sanction, due process requires that failure is a sufficient ground only when it is the result of willfulness, bad faith, or [some] fault of petitioner rather than inability to comply. [33] While this standard does not require wrongful intent, willful failure is `any intentional failure as distinguished from involuntary noncompliance.' [34] ¶35 In cases meriting sanctions, there is often a consistent pattern of behavior disregarding discovery requirements or court orders, as well as evidence that the sanctioned party is on notice that its pattern of behavior will result in sanctions if it continues. For example, in Osguthorpe, the district court found that Osguthorpe had received numerous notices, motions, and orders from the court and the opposing party during sixteen months of delay. [35] Moreover, Osguthorpe was on notice that this pattern would result in sanctions because he had received, and failed to respond to, a motion to compel and a motion to enter default as a discovery sanction. [36] In Schettler, the district court explained that the record clearly demonstrates a pattern of aggravated misconduct in the form of willful and deliberate disobedience of discovery orders, fabricated testimony, and witness tampering. [37] Moreover, the opposing party had filed a motion for sanctions for client and attorney misconduct and a motion to compel, and the court had entered an orderto which Schettler did not respondrequesting a more thorough response to the motions. [38] In Schamanek, the sanctioned party refused to respond to requests for admission, refused to produce documents, refused to answer deposition questions, and continued this pattern of refusal after the court entered an order compelling discovery. [39] In Hales v. Oldroyd, over the course of about three and one-half years, the sanctioned party failed to respond to two sets of interrogatories for several months, failed to return medical release forms, failed to respond to two separate motions to compel, failed to respond to an order to compel and sanctions for the costs of the motions to compel, and failed to respond to a motion to dismiss as a discovery sanction. [40] In Morton, the sanctioned party requested continuances twice, thereby delaying the trial for a year, failed to respond to interrogatories, failed to respond to a motion to compel or face dismissal, and failed to provide a timely response to a court order threatening dismissal if no response was received by a certain date. [41] In Marshall v. Marshall, the plaintiff listed thirteen instances of the defendant's failure to provide discovery documents, as well as other instances where the defendant failed to comply with court discovery orders, such as hiding $180,000 from the court over the course of two years, while claiming that he could not afford alimony and child support payments. [42] The defendant was on notice that this behavior could result in default because the plaintiff submitted two motions, six months apart, requesting that he be defaulted. [43] ¶36 Finally, our case law resists sanctioning a party whose noncompliance is due to someone else's failure. For example, in Depew v. Sullivan, a client failed to provide tax returns in satisfaction of a discovery request despite a court order compelling a response. [44] The district court ordered sanctions against the client and the attorney. The court of appeals remanded the sanctions against the attorney for a factual finding as to whether the attorney was actually to blame for the discovery violation. [45] The court of appeals explained, We believe that [a sanction] is unjust when it is imposed against a person who had absolutely no fault for the discovery violation at issue . . . . [46] ¶37 Similarly, in M.E.N. Co., the federal district court dismissed the case under rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [47] The defendants-appellants had failed to provide discovery or appear for noticed depositions, failed to obey a court order to appear for depositions, failed to file a pretrial memorandum, and failed to pay sanctions to the other party. [48] The defendants-appellants challenged the dismissal of their case by blaming their attorneys for the failure, arguing that their attorneys never notified them of their discovery obligations. The Tenth Circuit confirmed that the clients' knowledge was integral to imposing sanctions by remanding for factual findings as to whether the clients knew about their discovery obligations in order to determine whether their conduct satisfied the willful noncompliance standard. [49] ¶38 The willfulness requirement gives us particular concern in this case, where plaintiffs' failures to comply with the CMO may have been the result of inadequate communication between plaintiffs' attorneys and their clients. The circumstances surrounding an autopsy differ substantially from the circumstances surrounding a failure to produce tax returns or attend a deposition. In the Kilpatrick case, the party who signed the autopsy agreement was dead and incapable of reminding his survivors about the agreement. In Mrs. Kirkham's case, her affidavit states that the surprise and grief accompanying her husband's death caused her to forget about obtaining an autopsy. While we do not suggest that bereavement is an excuse for failure to comply with court orders, it would be unjust to ignore the reality of grief and surprise in determining whether the failure to procure an autopsy was willful. Careful counsel would be sure to avoid this situation by preparing their clients for this eventunderscoring and frequently reminding their clients about the importance of an autopsy upon the death of the plaintiff. This is particularly true in the case of a firm like Brayton Purcel, which holds itself out as an expert in asbestos litigation. [50] ¶39 We are not blind to the conceptual tension presented by application of the willful noncompliance standard in this case. We recognize that a party voluntarily chooses [his or] her attorney and therefore is generally bound by the acts or omissions of his or her attorney. [51] But, where discovery sanctions are concerned, if the fault lies with the attorneys, that is where the impact of the sanction should be lodged. [52] Moreover, even in the absence of a direct sanction against a client, the truth of the matter is that an attorney's failure will typically impact the client. [53] For example, even in cases where the failure to procure an autopsy is inadvertent, the only fair way to address the missing evidence is to direct the fact-finder that the defendants are entitled to a favorable inference in place of the missing evidence. [54] This remedy will serve the dual purpose of mitigating any prejudice experienced by the defendants and providing a sufficient deterrent to others who may be tempted to purposely destroy important evidence. [55] Indeed, in some cases, an unfavorable inference may, as a practical matter, preclude the plaintiff from pursuing his claims against the defendants. ¶40 In summary, while the plaintiffs may have to live with the consequences of their attorneys' failures, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' claims as a sanction for their failures to obtain autopsies, absent a factual determination that the failures were due to willful, rather than unintentional, noncompliance with the CMO.