Opinion ID: 2582638
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the state has a duty to place children with able foster parents

Text: ¶ 50 The majority characterizes foster parents as independent contractors whose actions do not impose vicarious liability on the State. Majority at 582. Fair enough. When the State places a child in its custody with a foster parent, the foster parent  not the State  occupies the in loco parentis relationship. See RCW 74.13.330. Cf. RCW 4.24.590 (In actions for personal injury or property damage commenced by foster children or their parents against foster parents..., the liability of foster parents for the care and supervision of foster children shall be the same as the liability of biological and adoptive parents for the care and supervision of their children.). Because the State lacks sufficient control over the foster parent-foster child relationship, it is not vicariously liable for a foster parent's negligence. See, e.g., Hennig v. Crosby Group, Inc., 116 Wash.2d 131, 802 P.2d 790 (1991). But it does have a duty to inform foster parents when a foster child is dangerous, see Taggart, 118 Wash.2d at 221, 822 P.2d 243 (citing Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782, 786, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal.Rptr. 240 (1968)), and an ongoing duty to control children after releasing them from its custody to their parents. See Taggart, 118 Wash.2d at 221, 822 P.2d 243 (citing Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985)). ¶ 51 And it also has a duty to place children in its custody with an able foster parent. Commensurate with the parental obligation to supervise a child's activities outside the home is a duty on the part of the state not to place one of its charges with an adult that it knows will not or cannot exercise that responsibility. Camp, 67 F.3d at 1296 (finding State assumes affirmative duty to intervene when foster parent incompetent ( id. at 1295)). See also Estate of Jones v. State, 107 Wash.App. 510, 521, 15 P.3d 180 (2000) (recognizing State's duty of careful placement). Like any general contractor, the State is directly liable for negligently supervising the work of an independent contractor. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965); Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 96 Wash.2d 274, 281, 635 P.2d 426 (1981) (An owner who employs an independent contractor is already liable to all third persons ... for negligence in the hiring of the independent contractor.). See also Kimberly Lionel King, Case Note, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 935, 941 (1985) (The negligent supervision theory is also based upon direct liability.). Thus, it is directly liable for negligently placing Pierre and Anderson with Daniels because it knew she was unable to control them. ¶ 52 This duty of careful placement is fully consistent with state law. DSHS must place foster children in the least restrictive, most family-like setting in the child's community, consistent with the child's best interests. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(A); RCW 74.13.065(2)(e), (f); RCW 13.34.136(1)(b)(iii). Obviously, a degree of supervision calculated to discourage criminal behavior is consistent with a child's best interests. ¶ 53 Oddly, the majority relies on precedents holding that the State has no duty to exercise authority it does not possess. Yes, the State has no duty to control children not in its custody. See Terrell C. v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 120 Wash.App. 20, 84 P.3d 899 (2004). And it has no duty to control parolees it lacks effective authority to monitor. Couch v. Dep't of Corr., 113 Wash.App. 556, 54 P.3d 197 (2002). Likewise, it has no duty of careful placement when it lacks authority to change a foster child's placement. Stenger v. State, 104 Wash.App. 393, 404, 16 P.3d 655 (2001). Unsurprisingly, in cases where there is no underlying statutory authority to control or take charge of the offender's behavior, no special relationship has been imposed. Terrell C., 120 Wash.App. at 28, 84 P.3d 899. ¶ 54 But the State did have the authority to place Pierre and Anderson with a different foster parent. As the majority itself recognizes, while the State cannot control the daily actions of the foster parent, majority at 581, it can remove foster children from the home and place them in an alternative setting as necessary, majority at 580. See also RCW 74.13.290-.300. The State knew Pierre and Anderson were dangerous. And it knew Daniels could not control them. It had the authority to place Pierre and Anderson with an able foster parent and a duty to do so. It chose not to exercise its authority and thereby breached its duty of careful placement. ¶ 55 Accordingly, I dissent.