Opinion ID: 2222381
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of the Guidelines

Text: [10] ¶ 19. The parties' briefs to this court raise the issue that Jorgensen was sentenced under Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a), not Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b). It appears that this issue was not raised before either the circuit court or the court of appeals. Instead, the record indicates that all parties appeared to rely upon the applicability of the guidelines until the appeal to this court. Jorgensen now attempts to use the argument to emphasize her point that application of these guidelines to her was inappropriate. Arguably, she has waived any complaint about the application of the wrong statute to her case. Nonetheless, we find it appropriate to discuss the issue because the State agrees that Jorgensen was sentenced under the wrong section of the statute and asserts that the error deprives Jorgensen of standing to argue the unconstitutionality of the guidelines. ¶ 20. The State asserts that Jorgensen lacks standing to raise a constitutional challenge to the sentencing guidelines because the guidelines are inapplicable to the section under which she was sentenced. The State acknowledges that the judge relied upon the guidelines, but suggests that only a person sentenced under the relevant section mentioned in Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a)Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b)has standing to make a constitutional challenge. The State argues that Jorgensen could, at best, claim that the court's reliance upon the guidelines was an erroneous exercise of discretion. ¶ 21. We do not agree with the State's argument on standing. In Mast v. Olsen, 89 Wis. 2d 12, 16, 278 N.W.2d 205 (1979), this court held: A party has standing to challenge a statute if that statute causes that party injury in fact and the party has a personal stake in the outcome of the action. We find that if the circuit court relied upon the local sentencing guidelines, then Jorgensen has arguably been injured and assuredly has a personal stake in whether or not the guidelines are constitutional. [11] ¶ 22. One of the reasons for the rule of standing is that courts should not adjudicate constitutional rights unnecessarily. State v. Fisher, 211 Wis. 2d 665, 668 n.2, 565 N.W.2d 565 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Mast, 89 Wis. 2d at 16). In Schwittay v. Sheboygan Falls Mutual Insurance Co., 2001 WI App 140, ¶ 16 n.3, 246 Wis. 2d 385, 630 N.W.2d 772, the court of appeals found that requiring standing also assures that [the court does] not decide a constitutional issue unless it is essential to the determination of the case before [it]. Here, the State has conceded that it was not necessarily inappropriate for the circuit court to refer to the sentencing guidelines. Circuit courts are allowed wide discretion in sentencing. See State v. McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d 116, 129, 452 N.W.2d 377 (1990); Anderson v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 361, 363, 251 N.W.2d 768 (1977); Eckola, 249 Wis. 2d 276, ¶ 4. This court has found that the circuit courts are in the best position to consider the factors relevant to sentencing. See Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d at 418. We agree with the State that a circuit court's reference to the sentencing guidelines is not necessarily inappropriate, but we cannot agree that Jorgensen is deprived of standing on the constitutional issue because she was sentenced under Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a). ¶ 23. Essentially, the issue of whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in this case may be determined by two considerations: (1) whether the judge actually relied upon the local guidelines in sentencing Jorgensen; and (2) if the judge relied upon the guidelines, whether it was error for the judge to do so. ¶ 24. The parties do not dispute the circuit court's reliance upon the sentencing guidelines. [5] We find the record indicates that the circuit court did, in fact, rely, at least to some extent, upon the Fifth Judicial District guidelines in sentencing Jorgensen. As noted, both parties made their sentencing arguments based on the guidelines. The circuit court then followed suit, noting at the outset of its sentencing determination that everybody apparently has the guidelines in front of them, so we all know what the Fifth Judicial District does consider as being an appropriate range of sentencing penalties for this type of an offense. The court then went on to note that Jorgensen's blood alcohol level meant that the relevant section was the highest level in the guideline table. As noted by the circuit court in its postconviction order, however, it did consider other relevant factors in addition to the range of penalties set out by the guidelines, including blood alcohol level, prior convictions for operating under the influence, and the fact that there was an accident. The circuit court indicated that its sentence was based upon the appropriate factors laid out by this court in McCleary: the gravity of the offense, the character of the offender, and protection of the public. See McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 276; State v. Harris, 119 Wis. 2d 612, 623, 350 N.W.2d 633 (1984) (noting the McCleary primary factors and listing other additional factors). ¶ 25. Our second consideration is whether reliance upon the guidelines was inappropriate under the relevant statutes. We have established that the circuit court relied, at least to some degree, upon the provisions of the guidelines. Section 346.65(2m)(a) of the Wisconsin Statutes authorized the creation of sentencing guidelines for certain offenses. That section provides, in its entirety: In imposing a sentence under sub. (2) for a violation of s. 346.63(1)(b) or (5) or a local ordinance in conformity therewith, the court shall review the record and consider the aggravating and mitigating factors in the matter. If the level of the person's blood alcohol level is known, the court shall consider that level as a factor in sentencing. The chief judge of each judicial administrative district shall adopt guidelines, under the chief judge's authority to adopt local rules under SCR 70.34, for the consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2m)(a) (emphasis added). The plain language of the statute makes clear that the sentencing guidelines are only applicable to convictions under Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b) or Wis. Stat. § 346.63(5). ¶ 26. The record here shows that Jorgensen was not sentenced under either § 346.63(1)(b) or Wis. Stat. § 346.64(5). She was sentenced under § 346.63(1)(a). Neither party has disputed that issue and, in fact, both relied upon it in making their arguments to this court. It is true that Jorgensen was charged with and found guilty by a jury of violating both §§ 346.63(1)(a) and (1)(b). Nevertheless, under the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(c), Jorgensen could only be convicted and sentenced under one of these subsections. The circuit court sentenced her under § 346.63(1)(a). [12, 13] ¶ 27. Since the legislature specified that guidelines were to be established for use in sentencing under § 346.63(1)(b), not § 346.63(1)(a), circuit courts should not apply the guidelines by rote to (1)(a) convictions. [6] We agree that in exercising its broad discretion in the area of sentencing, a court may refer to the sentencing guidelines for PAC offenses in sentencing a defendant convicted of OWI. These violations are similar and one cannot argue that the factors relevant to one offense are not a relevant consideration in sentencing for the other. As this court has noted: Wisconsin has a strong public policy that the sentencing court be provided with all relevant information. State v. Guzman, 166 Wis. 2d 577, 592, 480 N.W.2d 446 (1992). Although this policy typically comes up in the context of information about the defendant, we believe it applies with equal force to relevant law. Thus, it is not error for a circuit court to refer to the guidelines authorized under § 346.65(2m)(a) when sentencing a defendant under § 346.63(1)(a). However, because the legislature has specifically delineated the offense to which the guidelines apply, it is inappropriate for a circuit court to simply apply the guidelines as the sole basis for its sentence in a § 346.63(1)(a) case. [7]