Opinion ID: 1256272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: forfeiture as an excessive fine

Text: ¶ 5 Cannon contends that the trial court-ordered forfeiture of her residence violated her state and federal constitutional protections against the imposition of excessive fines. However, because Cannon fails to support her state constitutional arguments with any substantive analysis, these arguments do not warrant separate analysis under the Utah Constitution. Accordingly, we decide this case on the basis of the United States Constitution alone. See State v. 392 South 600 East, 886 P.2d 534, 539 n. 7 (Utah 1994); State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 224 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1995). ¶ 6 Because the law in Utah is unsettled, our holding today sets forth the analysis for use in future forfeiture cases under the Excessive Fines Clause. In doing so, we draw upon the following cases: United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998); United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Road, 59 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1995); 392 South 600 East, 886 P.2d at 542 (quoting United States v. 9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d 327, 331 (8th Cir.1994)). ¶ 7 Before turning to Cannon's specific arguments, it is first necessary to examine the history of excessive fines analysis. The United States Constitution provides: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed.... U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The historical foundation and reasoning behind current excessive fines analysis has been well documented elsewhere; a brief history is sufficient for our purposes here. [5] ¶ 8 In Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause applied to drug-related forfeitures of property. Id. at 622, 113 S.Ct. 2801. The Court, however, declined to establish a specific test to determine when a forfeiture should be considered constitutionally excessive, deciding instead to allow the lower courts to consider that question in the first instance. Id. at 622-23, 113 S.Ct. 2801 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia proposed that the sole measure of excessiveness should be the relationship between the defendant property and the offense, i.e., the property's instrumentality. Id. at 627-28, 113 S.Ct. 2801 (Scalia, J., concurring). The majority considered Scalia's instrumentality test, but stated: We do not rule out the possibility that the connection between the property and the offense may be relevant, but our decision today in no way limits [lower courts] from considering other factors in determining whether the forfeiture of ... property was excessive. Id. at 623 n. 15, 113 S.Ct. 2801. ¶ 9 Since Austin, there has been little uniformity both within and between the circuits as to the appropriate test to determine excessiveness. In order to promote uniformity, it is desirable to standardize the analysis used to determine when specific forfeitures violate the Excessive Fines Clause. Caione, supra note 5 at 1095; see also United States v. 427 & 429 Hall St., 853 F.Supp. 1389, 1397-98 & nn.16-19 (M.D.Ala.1994) (noting existence of cases adopting each of following tests: pure instrumentality, pure proportionality, multifactor, and a combined instrumentality and proportionality test). In Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998), however, the United States Supreme Court clarified the requisite standard. Realizing the inherent subjectivity and imprecision in judicial determinations of the gravity of an offense, and examining how the legislature has treated constitutional excessiveness in other contexts, the Court rejected a strict proportionality test in favor of a gross disproportionality standard. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 329, 118 S.Ct. 2028. ¶ 10 We have addressed the issue of forfeitures as excessive fines on only a few occasions. In the most recent instance  pre- Bajakajian  we followed the suggestion in Austin that the connection between the defendant property and the offense is the beginning point, rather than the sole criterion, in determining whether a forfeiture is constitutionally excessive. 392 South 600 East, 886 P.2d at 542 (citation omitted). We declined to establish any further steps in the analysis, stating that as future situations arise in which an instrumentality analysis is not dispositive, we would address additional factors at that time. See id. at 542. ¶ 11 Now, the Bajakajian opinion provides us with the second prong to our excessive fines test merely hinted at in 392 South 600 East, namely, gross disproportionality. The Ninth Circuit prescribed a similar two-prong test in 6380 Little Canyon Road, 59 F.3d 974 (9th Cir.1995) ( 6380 Little Canyon Road ). There, the court indicated that instrumentality is a threshold test.... If the government succeeds in showing a substantial connection between the property ... and the offense, then the claimant has the burden to show that forfeiture of his property would be grossly disproportionate given the nature and extent of his criminal culpability. Id. at 985 (footnotes omitted). ¶ 12 We similarly hold that the threshold test in real property forfeitures [6] is whether the defendant property is an instrumentality of the offense. If instrumentality is proven, we must then examine whether the ordered forfeiture is grossly disproportionate to the offense. However, because in the instant case we rest our decision on gross disproportionality, we will assume for purposes of discussion, but not decide, that the instrumentality test has been satisfied. ¶ 13 We now examine whether the forfeiture is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. In 392 South 600 East, we stated: As future cases present situations in which the instrumentality analysis is not dispositive, we can address other factors that may be comprehended by an excessive fines analysis. 392 South 600 East, 886 P.2d at 542. One of the future cases we foresaw is now before us. Fortunately, because of Bajakajian, we are no longer left entirely to our own devices in addressing what these other factors may be. ¶ 14 The Bajakajian court clarified the excessiveness analysis, rejecting strict proportionality and adopting instead a gross disproportionality standard, declaring: In applying this standard, the district courts in the first instance, and the courts of appeals, reviewing the proportionality determination de novo, must compare the amount of the forfeiture to the gravity of the defendant's offense. If the amount of the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant's offense, it is unconstitutional. 524 U.S. at 331, 118 S.Ct. 2028 (footnotes omitted). This, then, provides the second prong for future excessiveness analyses.
¶ 15 The individual factors Bajakajian set forth to determine the gravity of a specific offense are those articulated in the United States Supreme Court's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause precedents. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 330-31, 118 S.Ct. 2028 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991); [7] Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980)). These precedents suggest that the proportionality prong of an excessiveness inquiry should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S.Ct. 3001. Upon review of the Solem test, the Bajakajian court has determined and this court now determines that it is adaptable for use in forfeiture cases. ¶ 16 Instead of applying a strict Solem test, however, both parties have focused on a sample list of factors we cited in Nephi. Cannon asserts that these factors show the forfeiture here was grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. The State uses the same factors to contend just the opposite. [8] ¶ 17 The factors that we suggested in Nephi were factors the Eighth Circuit used in its excessiveness analysis. Those factors included `the monetary value of the property, the extent of criminal activity associated with the property, the fact that the property was a residence, the effect of forfeiture on innocent occupants of the residence, including children, or any other factors that an excessive fines analysis might require.' 392 South 600 East, 886 P.2d at 542 (quoting United States v. 9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d 327, 331 (8th Cir.1994)). The Ninth Circuit, in 6380 Little Canyon Road, utilized a similar and somewhat more expansive analysis: once the government proves instrumentality, the claimant has the burden to show that forfeiture of his property would be grossly disproportionate given the nature and extent of his criminal culpability. 6380 Little Canyon Road, 59 F.3d at 985. To determine the forfeiture's harshness, the Ninth Circuit set forth three factors: (1) the fair market value of the property; (2) the intangible, subjective value of the property, e.g., whether it is the family home; and (3) the hardship to the defendant, including the effect of the forfeiture on defendant's family or financial condition. Id. To determine the defendant's culpability, that court looked at: (1) whether the owner was negligent or reckless in allowing the illegal use of his property; or (2) whether the owner was directly involved in the illegal activity, and to what extent; and (3) the harm caused by the illegal activity, including (a) (in the drug trafficking context) the amount of drugs and their value, (b) the duration of the illegal activity, and (c) the effect on the community. Id. at 986. ¶ 18 We believe these factors complement the Solem test. We realize that the judicial determination of the gravity of a particular offense, as the Bajakajian court indicated, is inherently subjective and imprecise. However, use of these factors in conjunction with the Solem test will lessen the subjectivity of the analysis, acting as effective gauges for the gravity of an offense. [9] Therefore, we hold that the Solem test, using the factors set forth above from 392 South 600 East and 6380 Little Canyon Road to complement the court's analysis, is the appropriate measure of excessiveness in this jurisdiction. [10] ¶ 19 One additional factor is necessary to complete an excessiveness analysis: the comparative punishment factor. In considering an offense's gravity, the other penalties that the Legislature has authorized are certainly relevant evidence. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 332 n. 14, 118 S.Ct. 2028. In Bajakajian, the defendant faced a maximum fine of $250,000.00 plus five years' imprisonment. See id. These figures suggest, as the Court stated, that Congress, in authorizing these punishments, did not view the offense as trivial. See id. The actual sentence the defendant received was three years' probation and a $5,000.00 fine. See id. at 324, 118 S.Ct. 2028. The Court continued, holding that the maximum fine and Guideline sentence to which respondent was subject were but a fraction of the penalties authorized ... undercuts any argument based solely on the statute, because they show that respondent's culpability relative to other potential violators of the ... provision  tax evaders, drug kingpins, or money launderers, for example  is small indeed. This disproportion is telling.... Id. at 332 n. 14, 118 S.Ct. 2028. Finding disproportionality, the Court held full forfeiture would violate the Excessive Fines clause, and thereby affirmed the lower courts' rulings and rejected the government's appeal. Id. at 335, 118 S.Ct. 2028 ¶ 20 Including this factor in the final test makes sense. After all, two separate individuals, convicted of an identical crime may receive vastly different sentences based on inherently individualized facts. During sentencing, the defendant's culpability is evaluated, and punitive measures are meted out accordingly. The harsher the sentence, fines, and penalties a defendant receives, the less likely it is that a forfeiture may be grossly disproportionate. If a defendant receives only a small percentage of the maximum possible penalty, it is more likely  although still not dispositive  that the forfeiture may be constitutionally excessive. ¶ 21 In short, a court must look at four main factors: (1) the gravity of the particular offense; (2) the harshness of the forfeiture; (3) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (4) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. In gauging the gravity of the offense (factor (1) above), a court should take into consideration: (a) the harm caused by the illegal activity, including (i) (in the drug trafficking context) the amount of drugs and their value, (ii) the duration of the illegal activity, and (iii) the effect on the community; and (b) the actual sentence the defendant received as a result of the offense compared to the maximum punishments authorized. In judging the harshness of the forfeiture (factor (2) above), a court should look at: (a) the fair market value of the property; (b) the intangible, subjective value of the property, e.g., whether it is the family home; and (c) the hardship to the defendant, including the effect of the forfeiture on defendant's family or financial condition.
¶ 22 Factual findings made by trial courts in conducting excessiveness inquiries must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 331 n. 10, 118 S.Ct. 2028 (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)). However, the question of whether a fine is constitutionally excessive requires the application of a constitutional standard to the facts of the individual case. In that context, de novo review of the question is appropriate. See id. (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). ¶ 23 The police seized from the defendant property less than two pounds of marijuana in three searches within eighteen months, with a street value of approximately $7,200.00. The trial court found that [f]orfeiture of this real property has served a remedial purpose of removing this drug house from the stream of narcotic commerce, thereby serving the public by removing a drug safehouse from its ongoing criminal use, and by cleansing the site of significant and ongoing drug distribution activities. The trial court concluded that the forfeiture is the result of extensive, serious conduct by the claimant [Cannon] which presented significant threat of harm and cost to society. ¶ 24 We do not condone any degree of drug trafficking; we recognize the great cost the State incurs in investigating, pursuing, and convicting offenders. We also understand the broad-scale effect of drug trafficking on society. As the trial court observed: The use and sale of controlled substances is one of the single most serious factors affecting and utilizing the resources of the courts and the criminal justice system, both on the state and federal level. However, these findings and conclusions are not sufficient to support this forfeiture in view of other factors. ¶ 25 Measured by any standard, Cannon's drug operation was small, involving possession of less than two pounds of marijuana for sale in an eighteen month span. The trial court apparently agreed with this assessment at the time of trial when Cannon was placed on probation, although a jury had found her guilty of three felonies and a misdemeanor on charges stemming from the first search of her home. See supra note 1. The court allowed her to remain on probation after being convicted of an additional felony resulting from the second search. Cannon's actual fines and surcharges imposed on charges arising out of the first and second searches [11] totaled only $4,625.00. Cannon was also subject to $5,035.10 as a tax or penalty for possessing nonstamped illegal drugs. In sum, the actual fines, surcharges, and penalties imposed amounted to $9,660.10. ¶ 26 The State argues that Cannon faced maximum possible penalties of approximately $130,425.00 and substantial prison time. It repeatedly stresses these maximum possible penalties, contending that these amounts should be used for measurement, as opposed to the actual penalties. The trial court also used these theoretical figures extensively in addressing the gravity of Cannon's offenses in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court on remand declared simply that the value of the property forfeited does not grossly exceed the potential fines and fees in this case. ¶ 27 The State argues that this fact alone shows that the forfeiture is not grossly disproportionate. However, the State does not provide any legal support for its comparison of theoretical maximum penalties with the value of the forfeited property. [12] While reference to the maximum penalties is helpful in determining the gravity of the offenses, it has limited relevance in determining proportionality. Here, the trial court placed too much reliance on the maximum penalties in its analysis of proportionality instead of focusing on the actual fines and penalties imposed. ¶ 28 When we compare the (1) gravity of Cannon's conduct; (2) the actual fines, surcharges, and penalties of $9,660.10 imposed; and (3) her probation on the prison and jail sentences, with the value of the forfeited real property at approximately $80,000.00, we must conclude that there is a gross disproportionality here under the standards set forth in Bajakajian, and the forfeiture cannot be sustained.