Opinion ID: 2520441
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Voluntary Petition Issues.

Text: [¶ 19] Ms. McNeel argues that the district court erred in determining Wyoming law does not require findings of competency prior to the appointment of a guardian and conservator. Essentially, she argues that no matter how well intentioned a person may be, that person cannot enter into agreements if that person is incapacitated. Accordingly, a voluntary petition for appointment of a guardian/conservator presupposes that the ward has capacity to consent to the appointment. In support of this argument, Ms. McNeel relies upon our holding in Thoeming v. District Court, 379 P.2d 543 (Wyo.1963). Ms. McNeel also contends the district court erred in holding that Mr. McNeel's competency was mooted by the parties' agreement at mediation. In essence, she again argues that Mr. McNeel did not have the capacity to enter into that agreement. [¶ 20] In response, Mr. McNeel contends that the district court correctly held that Wyoming law does not require findings of competency prior to the appointment of a guardian/conservator, upon a voluntary petition. He asserts that both Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-2-105 and 3-3-106 simply require the appointment of a guardian/conservator when the court finds that such would be in the best interest of the petitioner. Mr. McNeel further distinguishes our holding in Thoeming as merely interpreting Wyo. Stat. §3  2 (Michie 1957) and not the new voluntary procedures enacted by the legislature in 1985 through Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-2-105 and 3-2-106. Finally, Mr. McNeel argues the ruling made by the district court that the question of whether Mr. McNeel was competent is moot due to the parties' agreement at mediation does not constitute appealable error because the district court correctly ruled competency is not an issue in a voluntary petition proceeding. [¶ 21] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-105(a) (LexisNexis 2003) squarely sets forth (emphasis added): (a) A guardian may be appointed by the court upon the petition of the proposed ward, including a minor who has reached the age of fourteen (14) years, if the court determines that the appointment is in the best interest of the petitioner. Further, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-3-106(a) (LexisNexis 2003) clearly provides (emphasis added): (a) The court may appoint a conservator upon the petition by the proposed ward if: (i) The petitioner has reached the age of fourteen (14) years; and (ii) The court determines that the appointment of a conservator is in the best interest of the petitioner. Therefore, the plain wording used within these statutes leaves little doubt the legislature intended that a court may appoint a guardian/conservator for a ward through the defined voluntary process, upon the sole determination that such appointment is in the best interest of the ward. Nevertheless, as noted above, Ms. McNeel argues it is inherent a guardian may not be appointed until a court holds a competency hearing. In support of this proposition, Ms. McNeel cites the case of Thoeming v. District Court, 379 P.2d 543, 544 (Wyo.1963), wherein this Court stated: The basic question in the matter before us is the jurisdiction of the district court to enter the order for the guardianship of the person and estate of Thoeming. Although several matters pertaining thereto are argued, the case turns upon the authority of the district court to proceed under the provision of § 3-2, W.S.1957, with the appointment of a guardian for an adult person who had not been legally adjudged an incompetent or insane person under the provisions contained in §§ 25-1 to 25-13, W.S.1957, relating to insane persons. It is conceded by the respondents that there was no hearing regarding incompetency by a lunacy commission or jury and that there was no direct finding concerning the matter. It is the contention of respondents that the guardianship proceeding in district court was not adversary in nature, was taken solely for the protection of Thoeming who was not insane but incompetent, and that guardianship statutes must of necessity be summary in nature and have flexibility. Such position is entirely without merit. It is elementary that proceedings for adjudication of insanity or mental incompetency are required to be in strict compliance with statutory requirements. Hultquist v. People, 77 Colo. 310, 236 P. 995 [(1925)]; State ex rel. Leonidas v. Larson, 109 Mont. 70, 92 P.2d 774 [(1939)]. In the absence of such compliance a judgment declaring a person to be of unsound mind is void. McFarland v. Commonwealth, 249 Ky. 128, 60 S.W.2d 360 [(1933)]; Ex parte McLaughlin, Mo.App., 105 S.W.2d 1020 [(1937)]; In re Ellern, 23 Wash.2d 219, 160 P.2d 639 [(1945)]; 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 14. One court in this area has well expressed the rule in saying, If there is any class of cases which should be conducted with the utmost care to observe all of the requirements of the statute, it is the cases conducted for the purpose of determining the sanity of a citizen.    ( In re Wells' Estate, 133 Or. 155, 289 P. 511, 512 [(1930)].) The statute under which the district court acted, § 3-2, W.S.1957, reads: The district court of each county, or the judge thereof, when it appears necessary, may appoint guardians for the persons and estates, or either of them, of minors, incompetents or insane persons, who have no legally appointed guardian   . In its genesis (Laws 1890-1891, ch. 70, art. 21, § 1), the statute dealt only with minors. The revision contained in S.L. of Wyoming, 1931, ch. 73, § 145, added incompetents or insane persons to the category, but provided no means for adjudicating them to be such. Accordingly, we look to Title 25 of W.S.1957 for procedure. In that connection we observe that one of the definitions of an insane person under § 25-2, W.S.1957, is a person of unsound mind and incapable of managing his own affairs. The procedure for determining that a person is insane or mentally incompetent is definite and clear. It requires a finding either by a lunacy commission or by a jury and that only after various steps have been taken. Any attempt to adjudicate a person as an incompetent without compliance with the statutes contained in this chapter would be a deprivation of due process. Since there had been no adjudication of Thoeming's incompetence on July 13, 1962, the district court was without jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for him and such purported order is void. Ms. McNeel argues that an independent medical examination and a competency hearing are mandatory procedures that a court cannot ignore. Since the district court failed to comply with these requirements, Ms. McNeel asserts the district court did not have the jurisdiction to appoint Mr. Olmstead as guardian/conservator for Mr. McNeel. [¶ 22] A simple reading of the quoted language in Thoeming makes it evident our holding in that case is applicable only towards an interpretation of the statutory guidelines that were in place at that time, or at most, cases wherein a similar involuntary process is involved. Furthermore, the voluntary petition scheme, which is currently in place, was first enacted in 1985 without any statutory predecessors. Prior to 1985, Wyoming only authorized the appointment of guardians/conservators for minors, incompetents or insane persons. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §3  2 (1957). Accordingly, this Court did not even impliedly address the current voluntary petition statutes through its opinion in Thoeming. [¶ 23] This conclusion is also supported by review of Wyoming's current overall statutory makeup regarding the appointment of guardians/conservators. As indicated above, a court may appoint a guardian/conservator for a ward under the voluntary appointment process if the court finds that such would be in the best interest of the ward. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-2-105(a) and 3-3-106(a) (LexisNexis 2003). However, as noted previously, a voluntary petition must designate if notice of a petition for involuntary guardianship/conservatorship has been served upon a ward under Wyoming's involuntary appointment statutes. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-2-105(b) and 3-3-106(b) (LexisNexis 2003). Likewise, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-107 (LexisNexis 2003) mandates that if an involuntary petition has been filed prior to the time of hearing, on a voluntary petition, the court shall combine the hearings. [¶ 24] Therefore, if a third party has any inclination that the competency of a proposed ward is of concern upon the filing of a voluntary appointment petition, that third party need only file an involuntary petition pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-2-101 and 3-3-101 (LexisNexis 2003) prior to hearing on the voluntary petition. In making such an application, the competency of the proposed ward is placed directly at issue as both statutes require enumeration of the status of the proposed ward as a minor, an incompetent person or a mentally incompetent person and the reason for the petition. Likewise, it is mandatory for a court to state its findings, including the reasons why the ward is in need of a guardian/conservator. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-2-104(b)(i) and 3-3-104(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003). [¶ 25] Finally, we believe that common sense supports our determination that differing requisites must be shown in an involuntary, as opposed to a voluntary, petition for appointment of a guardian/conservator. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-101(a)(ix) and (xii) (LexisNexis 2003) together define an incompetent person as an individual who is unable unassisted to properly manage and take of himself or his property as a result of infirmities of advanced age, physical disability, disease, the use of alcohol or controlled substances, mental illness, mental deficiency, or mental retardation. In a voluntary situation, a proposed ward may be competent but desire assistance of a guardian/conservator in a particular realm of his life dealing with finances, real or personal property, health issues, or the like. Hence, it is probable that the legislature intended to allow the district court to appoint a guardian/conservator for a ward who voluntarily requests assistance, upon the limited showing that such appointment would be in the ward's best interest. Thereby, a proposed ward may make voluntary application for assistance, without the uncomfortable and daunting proposition of having to admit he is incompetent. [¶ 26] We, therefore, hold pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-2-105(a) and 3-3-106(a) that when an involuntary petition for appointment of a guardian/conservator is not filed prior to hearing on the voluntary petition, a court may appoint a guardian/conservator for a ward solely upon a finding that such appointment would be in the best interest of the ward. [¶ 27] Additionally, Ms. McNeel infers the district court was required to determine the competency of Mr. McNeel pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-107 (LexisNexis 2003) because 1) she had previously filed an involuntary petition for the appointment of a guardian/conservator for Mr. McNeel in Guardian/Conservator Action 1, and/or 2) she had directly requested the same through numerous motions filed in Guardian/Conservator Action 2. Under the circumstances in this case, we do not agree. [¶ 28] Ms. McNeel filed a petition for the appointment of a temporary guardian and conservator on behalf of Mr. McNeel in Guardian/Conservator Action 1. The district court continued the hearing on Ms. McNeel's petition and no further action occurred with respect to Guardian/Conservator Action 1. Therefore, Ms. McNeel effectively abandoned such effort. [¶ 29] Later, Ms. McNeel did not object to Mr. Olmstead being appointed as Mr. McNeel's guardian and conservator, but did object to Mr. McNeel's voluntary petition based on her belief that Mr. McNeel did not have the capacity to file the petition in Guardian/Conservator Action 2. Nevertheless, Ms. McNeel in her motion for a guardian and conservator subsequently indicated that 1) the parties and their attorneys had met with Mr. Olmstead, 2) that the parties had agreed that Mr. Olmstead should be appointed guardian and conservator for Mr. McNeel, and 3) that Mr. Olmstead had agreed to serve in such capacity. Thus, the pending objection to Mr. McNeel's voluntary petition was withdrawn by Ms. McNeel. Ms. McNeel further agreed to the appointment of Mr. Olmstead. [¶ 30] On September 3, 2003, the district court appointed Mr. Olmstead as guardian and conservator for Mr. McNeel in Guardian/Conservator Action 2. Nearly three months later, Ms. McNeel filed a petition for appointment of a professional guardian and conservator for Mr. McNeel. This petition was subsequently withdrawn by Ms. McNeel. [¶ 31] Ms. McNeel again filed a motion on March 1, 2004, requesting an independent medical examination for Mr. McNeel. A second motion was filed a week later, by Ms. McNeel, requesting a competency hearing. Both motions were filed months after the district court had already appointed a guardian and conservator for Mr. McNeel. [¶ 32] Ms. McNeel did not comply with the explicit parameters set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-107. An involuntary petition was not filed, or openly pending, prior to entry of the district court's order on Mr. McNeel's voluntary petition. Additionally, Ms. McNeel's last two motions requesting an independent medical examination and a competency hearing were well overdue. The district court was, therefore, under no requirement to make a competency ruling, as required under the involuntary appointment process pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-107. [¶ 33] In conclusion, we need not address those remaining issues brought forth by the parties in this appeal surrounding the voluntary petition of Mr. McNeel in Guardian/Conservator Action 2. Such issues are rendered moot by our dispositive holding detailed above.