Opinion ID: 2367745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Intermediate Appellate Court's Opinion

Text: On appeal to the intermediate appellate court, Lancaster contended that the vague and conclusory allegations by the investigating detective that some witnesses had a concern about being involved in the case did not rise to the level of specific threat that warranted [a] protective order[.] He assert[ed] that the motion court abused its discretion. . . because the evidence [that] the State presented at the protective order hearing failed to establish the existence of a substantial risk of harm to any of its witnesses. In particular, he complain[ed that] the State did not produce any evidence of specific details of a perceived threat, how many and which witnesses expressed a fear of getting involved, what formed the basis for any of the witnesses' fears, or any of the witnesses' importance to the State's case. Thus, the protective order . . . den[ied] him his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by preventing him from making informed decisions about trial strategies[.] Id. at 26-27, 948 A.2d at 116. The State countered that the motion court did not abuse its discretion[,] because defense counsel received the names and statements of the protected witnesses on the day of the protective order hearing, nearly two months before trial; defense counsel had the opportunity to meet with all witnesses who chose to speak with them, and was free to investigate witnesses, as long as their identities and statements were not disclosed to the Lancasters before trial; and the motion court explicitly invited defense counsel to seek modification of the protective order if, after reviewing the statements of these witnesses, counsel believed it could be important to discuss the statement with his client. Id. at 27, 948 A.2d at 117. Affirming Lancaster's convictions, the intermediate appellate court held that a court does not abuse its discretion by imposing a protective order that delays disclosure of witness information to the defendants (but not defense counsel) when protected witnesses have a reasonable fear that the defendants or their associates will coerce the witnesses not to testify against them, by threatening harm to the witnesses or their loved ones[,] and that there was no abuse of discretion and no violation of constitutional rights in the circumstances presented here. Id. at 28-30, 948 A.2d at 118. [A]cknowledg[ing] that the record here is less specific as to the nature of the threats against the protected witnesses than the compelling [record] that warranted the protective [order] in Coleman[, supra, ] the intermediate appellate court found sufficient evidentiary grounds for the motion court's conclusion that there was enough risk of the protected witnesses being intimidated that nondisclosure of their identities, whereabouts, and statements to the Lancasters was warranted until trial began. Id. at 29-30, 948 A.2d at 118. The intermediate appellate court further concluded that, because the alleged harm in this situation might [have been] avoided or cured by a timely request for relief from the protective order[,] Lancaster was [not] denied access to counsel. Id. at 34, 948 A.2d at 121.