Opinion ID: 194678
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Verdict Inconsistency

Text: When a special verdict form results in apparently conflicting findings, a court has a duty under the Seventh Amendment to harmonize the answers if at all possible under a fair reading. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364 (1962); Santiago- Negron v. Castro-Davila, 865 F.2d 431, 443 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119 (1963)). Maritime contends that the jury's answers on the negligence and seaworthiness questions cannot be harmonized because both claims are grounded on the same underlying factual allegations -- that the crew was both inadequate and too inexperienced to accomplish the butterworthing task. By finding the Overseas Alaska to be seaworthy, Maritime argues that the jury necessarily rejected Toucet's inadequate and inexperienced assistance allegations. Maritime concludes, 6 therefore, that there was no basis for finding it negligent and that the verdict must be set aside as irreconcilably inconsistent. We need not address the merits of this argument because Maritime failed to make a timely objection to the alleged inconsistency. In this circuit, a party waives inconsistency if it fails to object after the verdict is read and before the jury is dismissed. Bonilla v. Yamaha Motors Corp., 955 F.2d 150, 155-56 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Austin v. Lincoln Equip. Assocs., 888 F.2d 934, 939 (1st Cir. 1989)); Peckham v. Continental Casualty Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 830, 836 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing McIsaac v. Didriksen Fishing Corp., 809 F.2d 129, 134 (1st Cir. 1987)). This is because the only efficient time to cure the problem is after the jury announces its results and before it is excused, and it is the responsibility of counsel to make timely objection. Austin v. Lincoln Equip. Assocs., 888 F.2d at 939. We have carefully reviewed the entire record in this case, including the clerk's minutes of the proceedings and the docket sheet.1 It is apparent from the record that 1 Under Rule 10, the record on appeal properly includes [t]he original papers and exhibits filed in the district court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, and a 7 Maritime failed to object to the verdict's asserted inconsistency prior to the jury's discharge. (Clerk's Minutes, Oct. 10, 1991; Docket Entry 71.) In fact, Maritime did not raise the inconsistency issue until filing its post trial motions on October 23, 1991 -- 13 days after the jury was discharged and long after the optimum time for curing any alleged defect. (Docket Entry 74.) While Maritime omitted the portion of the transcript relating to the reading of the verdict from its appendix,2 our review on appeal is not limited to the materials submitted by the parties. FED. R. APP. P. 30(a) (The fact that parts of the record are not included in the appendix, shall not prevent the parties or the court from relying on such parts.). Maritime's failure to object cannot be excused by its inability to anticipate the jury reaching potentially inconsistent findings. See McIsaac v. Didriksen Fishing certified copy of the docket entries prepared by the clerk of the district court . . . . FED. R. APP. P. 10(a). Rule 10's scope reaches 'all papers presented to the district court and filed in the record and all papers filed by the district court itself.' In re Arthur Andersen & Co., 621 F.2d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 1980) (quoting 9 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 210.04[1]). 2 Maritime's failure to include the October 10, 1991 transcript in its appendix is particularly surprising since the verdict, which was returned and read in open court on that day, is the primary focus of the present appeal. 8 Corp., 809 F.2d at 134 (rejecting appellant's argument that it could not have anticipated verdict inconsistency where jury instructions and special verdict form served as harbingers for inconsistency). The circumstances of this case indicate that Maritime had ample opportunity to portend possible verdict inconsistency. Austin v. Lincoln Equip. Assocs., 888 F.2d at 939. For instance, Maritime should have been alerted by the use of the special verdict form alone. See id. As we noted previously, '[t]he mere fact that the jury's verdict would be in the form of special answers should have been enough to alert counsel to potential inconsistency.' Id. (quoting McIsaac v. Didriksen Fishing Corp., 809 F.2d at 134). In addition to the special verdict form, Maritime should have been alerted to the potential inconsistency by the jury instructions. See McIsaac v. Didriksen Fishing Corp., 809 F.2d at 134. The court specifically instructed the jury that the negligence and unseaworthiness claims were separate and independent and that the plaintiff could recover on one or both. (Appellant's App. at 753a and 760a.) In fact, the jury requested additional instructions regarding the meaning of unseaworthiness. (Clerk's Minutes, Oct. 10, 1991; Docket Entry 71.); see McIsaac v. Didriksen 9 Fishing Corp., 809 F.2d at 134 (counsel on notice of potential inconsistency where jury interrupted deliberations to inquire into differences between negligence and breach of warranty claims). Despite these obvious warning beacons, Maritime remained silent while the verdict was read and the jury was discharged. We decline to condone this 'agreeable acquiescence to perceivable error as a weapon of appellate advocacy.' Id. (quoting Merchant v. Ruhle, 740 F.2d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 1984)). While the timeliness issue was not addressed by either party and consequently was not explored by the trial court, '[w]e are, of course, free to affirm a district court's decision on any ground supported by the record even if the issue was not pleaded, tried or otherwise referred to in the proceedings below.' Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 783 n.8 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Norris v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 1151-52 (1st Cir. 1989) (additional citations omitted)). This is particularly appropriate here because the parties have had sufficient opportunity to develop arguments relating to the verdict's alleged inconsistency before both the trial court and this court. See Papex Int'l Brokers, Ltd. v. Chase 10 Manhattan Bank, 821 F.2d 883, 885 (1st Cir. 1987). In addition, Maritime's untimely objection is apparent from the record and our determination can be made as a matter of law. See Watterson v. Page, No. 92-1224, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 2029, at  n.3 (1st Cir. Feb. 9, 1993). Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to affirm the trial court's decision, even though the precise issue was neither raised by the parties or addressed by the trial court. See id. Accordingly, we hold that Maritime waived any potential inconsistency in the jury's verdict as a basis for appeal by failing to object before the jury was discharged. In any case, there is no inconsistency between the verdicts in this case. It is well recognized that claims under the Jones Act and claims for unseaworthiness are discrete claims. See, e.g., Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 498 (1971). While the evidence is often congruent, or at least overlapping, this is not necessarily so, and a number of cases demonstrate that a single incident of negligence, such as the requirement that a seaman work when he has reported that he was too fatigued to do so, may occur without rendering the ship unseaworthy. Borras v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 586 F.2d 881, 888 (1st Cir. 1978); Merchant v. Ruhle, 740 F.2d at 91; Simeon v. T. Smith 11 & Son, Inc., 852 F.2d 1421, 1433 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Gosnell v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 782 F.2d 464, 467 (4th Cir. 1986); Kokesh v. American S.S. Co., 747 F.2d 1092, 1094 (6th Cir. 1984). We also find that sufficient evidence was established at trial to support the jury's finding of negligence. A plaintiff's burden of proving causation under the Jones Act is featherweight. Leonard v. Exxon, 581 F.2d 522, 524 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979). Liability exists if the employer's negligence contributed even in the slightest to the plaintiff's injury. Santana v. United States, 572 F.2d 331, 335 (1st Cir. 1977) (citing Rogers v. Missouri-Pacific R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957)). Here, sufficient evidence was introduced to support the jury's determination that Maritime was negligent in requiring Toucet to continue working despite his claims of exhaustion and inadequate assistance, and that this negligence contributed to Toucet's back injury. Perez v. Maritime Transport Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d 254, 254 (1st Cir. 1979) (employer negligent for not relieving the plaintiff from duty despite the plaintiff's complaints of overwork and inadequate assistance, and that negligence contributed to the plaintiff's injury). 12