Opinion ID: 6104374
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Actual Case Requirement

Text: Despite this apparent disconnect between RIGL § 31-9-1 and the Board's definition of theft offense, the Board in Da Graca's case determined that to prove the statute's overbreadth, the Petitioner was required to identify actual cases in which Rhode Island had enforced the statute against de minimis deprivations of ownership interests. Da Graca contests the Board's imposition of 1-2. But because RIGL § 31-9-1 does not have a mandatory minimum penalty, judges retain discretion to punish minor violations of the statute with the same penalties as if the statute were a misdemeanor. As a result, this change provides sentencing flexibility for more serious violations of the statute, rather than limiting the breadth of conduct encompassed by the statute. - 14 - an actual case requirement and argues that he need not necessarily proffer specific examples of Rhode Island prosecutions in order to establish a 'realistic probability' that the state would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime. We agree with Da Graca. This realistic probability language comes from Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007). In DuenasAlvarez, the Supreme Court cautioned that determining whether a state statute is overbroad requires more than the application of legal imagination to a state statute's language. It requires a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime. 549 U.S. at 193. In its decision affirming the immigration judge's denial of Da Graca's application for relief from removal, the Board appeared to read into the Duenas-Alvarez realistic probability test an actual case requirement, under which a petitioner must identify actual cases of enforcement against conduct outside the generic definition of a crime to show a statute is overbroad. The Board was in error. This court has already established that there is no actual case requirement where a statute is facially broader than its generic counterpart. In Swaby v. Yates, 847 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2017), we held that, at least where a state statute is plainly overbroad, a - 15 - petitioner need not produce an actual case to satisfy the realistic probability test. 8 847 F.3d at 66. While the Swaby court acknowledged Duenas-Alvarez's sensible caution against crediting speculative assertions regarding the potentially sweeping scope of ambiguous state law crimes, it maintained that such caution was inapplicable where [t]he state crime at issue clearly does apply more broadly than the federally defined offense. Id. The court explained that Duenas-Alvarez itself supported this approach, as the case made no reference to the state's enforcement practices but rather discussed only how broadly the state criminal statute applied. Id.; see also Gonzalez, 990 F.3d at 660 ([T]he focus of the realistic probability inquiry is on how a state statute might be applied.). Supreme Court cases decided since Duenas-Alvarez provide further support for Swaby's disavowal of an actual case requirement. In Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798 (2015), for 8 Several other circuits have also concluded that there is no actual case requirement where the statute itself is overbroad. See, e.g., Hylton v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Aparicio-Soria, 740 F.3d 152, 157-58 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc); Gonzalez, 990 F.3d at 660-61; Ramos v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 709 F.3d 1066, 1071-72 (11th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 853 F.3d 218, 241 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (Thus, the majority opinion's unqualified rule that a defendant must in all cases point to a state court decision to illustrate the state statute's breadth misconstrues Duenas-Alvarez, directly conflicts with Taylor, and ignores both our established circuit precedent and the holdings of several of our sister circuits.). - 16 - example, the Court held that a Kansas drug statute was overbroad on its face without requiring the petitioner to identify cases in which Kansas had actually prosecuted possession of drugs not listed in the federal schedules. See 575 U.S. at 798-813. Similarly, in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), the Court determined that an Iowa burglary statute was overbroad based solely on its text, without reference to any supporting state case law demonstrating that the statute had actually been enforced in an overbroad manner. See 136 S. Ct. at 2251. In Da Graca's case, the Board cited the Fourth Circuit's decision in Castillo as support for its conclusion that overbreadth can only be established through case law. But whether Castillo provides support for an actual case requirement is immaterial. Here, Swaby, not Castillo, is controlling. If RIGL § 31-9-1 is overbroad on its face, then Da Graca need not proffer an actual case to demonstrate a realistic probability of RIGL § 31-9-1's overbreadth.9 As we explained earlier, § 31-9-1 is plainly overbroad: de minimis conduct is not excluded from its scope, and it is thus not a categorical match to the generic definition of theft. See 9 We also note that it is unsurprising that there would be little case law involving prosecutions of minor instances of joyriding, particularly in a small state like Rhode Island. It seems manifestly unfair to have a petitioner's fate depend on such vagaries as a local prosecutor's charging decisions or how willing a state court judge is to write an opinion in a particular matter. - 17 - Gonzalez, 990 F.3d at 661 (finding that a statute was overbroad because it did not explicitly exempt conduct outside the federal definition); cf. Swaby, 847 F.3d at 66 (warning that a state criminal statute should not be treated as if it is narrower than it plainly is). Moreover, in contrast to Matter of V-Z-S and Burghardt,10 where separate statutory provisions covered conduct outside the scope of the federal generic definition of the offense, no other Rhode Island statute covers de minimis vehicle takings, like joyriding.11 We can properly infer from these facts, without relying on our legal imagination, Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193, that RIGL § 31-9-1 is overbroad. The text of RIGL § 31-9-1 does not exclude de minimis conduct, nor does another Rhode Island statute narrow the reach of the law to only more serious property offenses. 10 We acknowledge that, in Burghardt, we discussed the appellant's failure to cite an actual case to support his argument that N.H. Rev. Stat. § 318-B:2(I) covered mere offers. See 939 F.3d at 408–09. However, we did so only after concluding, based on its statutory text and its place in the broader statutory scheme, that the law was likely a categorical match. Id. Thus, in Burghardt, the actual case analysis was employed as a lastchance opportunity for Burghardt to resolve any lingering ambiguity about the statute's reach. It is unnecessary to take this added step in Da Graca's case, because--as already discussed--an analysis of the text and structure of § 31-9-1 demonstrates that it is plainly overbroad. 11 Furthermore, as explained earlier, Rhode Island's highest court has, at least in passing, identified a case in which RIGL § 31—9-1 was used to prosecute what that court characterized as joyriding. See Perry, 505 A.2d at 425. - 18 - Thus, Da Graca's conviction under RIGL § 31-9-1 does not constitute a categorical aggravated felony theft offense, and he need not identify actual Rhode Island case law to demonstrate the statute's overbreadth.