Opinion ID: 3050316
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reliable Methodology

Text: Whirlpool next argues Giggy did not use any scientific methodology whatsoever in his investigation. Instead, he simply eyeballed three appliances he identified in the debris and concluded the most severely burned was the area of origin. This technique renders Giggy's testimony little more than lay opinion formulated merely upon general observations of the evidence and general scientific principles. Presley, 553 F.3d at 646. His testimony was therefore unreliable and the district court should have excluded it. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. It provides: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. Fed R. Evid. 702. The main purpose of Daubert exclusion is to prevent juries from being swayed by dubious scientific testimony. In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 613 (8th Cir. 2011). The district court plays the role of a gatekeeper to ensur[e] that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Kumho Tire Co. v. Charmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597). Although the district court is entitled -8- to great latitude in determining whether an expert meets these requirements, First Union Nat'l Bank v. Benham, 423 F.3d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 2005), the assumption of the gatekeeper role is mandatory, not discretionary. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. When making the reliability and relevancy determinations, a district court may consider: (1) whether the theory or technique can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review or publication; (3) whether the theory or technique has a known or potential error rate and standards controlling the technique's operation; and (4) whether the theory or technique is generally accepted in the scientific community. Id. at 593-94. This evidentiary inquiry is meant to be flexible and fact specific, and a court should use, adapt, or reject Daubert factors as the particular case demands. Unrein v. Timesavers, Inc., 394 F.3d 1008, 1011 (8th Cir. 2005). There is no single requirement for admissibility as long as the proffer indicates that the expert evidence is reliable and relevant. Id.; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one.). In the context of fire investigations, we have held expert opinions formed on the basis of observations and experience may meet this reliability threshold. Shuck v. CNH America, 498 F.3d 868, 875 (8th Cir. 2007); Hickerson v. Pride Mobility Prods. Corp., 470 F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th Cir. 2006). In Shuck, we affirmed the admissibility of the testimony of a fire causation expert and a mechanical expert who ruled out oil starvation as the cause of a combine fire. The experts based their testimony on an inspection of the combine and observation of a dismantling of the combine's engine. The defendants argued the experts' testimony was not based on a reliable methodology because they did not test damaged combine parts, exemplar combine parts, or oil from the combine. We rejected that argument and held the experts used reliable methods when they observed the relevant evidence, applied their specialized knowledge, and systematically included or excluded possible theories of causation. Shuck, 498 F.3d at 875. In Hickerson, the defendant challenged the plaintiff's expert's conclusion a motorized power scooter caused a -9- house fire as too speculative because the expert failed to eliminate other potential ignition sources. We found nothing unreliable in the expert's methodology, in which he considered burn patterns, identified a point of origin, and eliminated as many alternative causes of the fire as possible.2 Hickerson, 470 F.3d at 1257. We have found reliability in these cases without insisting upon rigid adherence to the Daubert factors. As our prior caselaw instructs, we have reached these conclusions by examining the facts of each individual case, considering the Daubert factors to the extent they fit the facts. See Jarequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., 173 F.3d 1076, 1083 (8th Cir. 1999) ([T]he district court must customize its [Daubert] inquiry to fit the facts of each particular case.). With this precedent in mind, we consider Giggy's methodology. As noted, Giggy interviewed Mr. Russell and eliminated alternative causes, documented the scene, and identified a suspect area by examining burn patterns on the studs in the portion of the wall that survived the fire. He reviewed the burn patterns on the kitchen appliances and confirmed with Mr. Russell the placement of the appliances in the kitchen before the fire. Based on the burn patterns on those appliances, the near-complete destruction of the refrigerator, its position at the bottom of the debris, and the metal thickness variation at the bottom part of the refrigerator frame, Giggy concluded the fire started in the refrigerator. We believe Giggy's methods are sufficiently similar to the methods we found reliable in Shuck and Hickerson. Giggy did more than simply eyeball three kitchen appliances. He 2 Whirlpool attempts to distinguish Hickerson by arguing experts for the plaintiff and defendant agreed on the area of origin in that case. It further argues unlike Giggy, the plaintiff's expert in Hickerson analyzed burn and smoke patterns to determine the fire's place of origin. We are not persuaded. The Hickerson court made no mention of consensus among the experts as a sign of reliability. Instead, it examined the actual methods used by the expert, as we do here. Moreover, although the fire in the Russells' home was a total burn, the record shows Giggy did examine burn patterns to the extent possible. -10- observed the relevant evidence, applied his specialized knowledge, excluded alternative causal theories, and reached a conclusion. These methods are more rigorous than the vague theorizing and ipse dixit logic we have rejected in the past. The analytical gap between the existing evidence and the opinion Giggy offered is not so great as to require exclusion. Whirlpool's arguments are better addressed to the jury regarding the weight to be afforded Giggy's opinion, rather than to the district court on the question of admissibility. The Supreme Court has emphasized the usual tools to expose flaws in evidence remain available: Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596; see also Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 481 F.3d 619, 626 (8th Cir. 2007). Whirlpool made good use of these tools. The jury weighed the conflicting evidence and credited Giggy's testimony, in spite of Whirlpool's challenges. We find no error in this exercise of the adversarial process. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the challenged testimony.