Opinion ID: 2739669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion in Limine and Exclusion of Witness

Text: During the trial, the district court granted the government’s motion in limine, prohibiting Mr. Jones from presenting evidence involving his allegation the federal government should comply with Wyoming’s fence-out laws. Nonetheless, Mr. Jones attempted to proffer the testimony of the sheriff of Big Horn County, Wyoming, for the sole purpose of showing the sheriff’s support of his stance that Wyoming’s fence-out law should be applied to force the BLM to build fences. The district court excluded the sheriff’s testimony on grounds it would be: 1) in direct contravention with its ruling on the motion in limine concerning the relevancy and materiality of such evidence, and 2) prejudicial and -11- confusing to the jury. Mr. Jones now appeals this ruling on grounds the district court improperly granted the motion in limine and excluded his witness from testifying, thereby depriving him of a fair trial. The government claims the testimony was properly excluded as irrelevant and prejudicial and that federal law requires adjacent landowners to acquire a grazing permit or otherwise fence in their livestock to keep cattle off of public lands. We generally review a district court’s decision to exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. 4 See United States v. Spence, 721 F.3d 1224, 1227-28 (10 th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 660 (2013). While a defendant’s right to present a defense, including witnesses, is rooted in the Constitution, this right is not without limits. Id. at 1228. Instead, presentation of such evidence is constrained by relevancy and materiality. Id. Evidence is “relevant” if it tends to make a material fact “more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” United States v. Condrin, 473 F.3d 1283, 1285 (10 th Cir. 2007) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401). Whether a fact is “material” is determined by the substantive law which governs the action. See United States v. Shomo, 786 F.2d 981, 985 (10 th Cir. 1986). As previously noted, the substantive law here regards the elements for proving unauthorized use or occupation and unauthorized grazing under 43 C.F.R. § 4140.1(b)(1)(i) and 43 C.F.R. § 2920.1-2(a) and (e). 4 While the government contends the standard of review in this case is for “plain error,” we note that under either standard of review, Mr. Jones cannot prevail. -12- With regard to Mr. Jones’s argument on whether state fence-out laws apply to the BLM’s public lands, the Supreme Court has determined the government is no different than a private land owner entitled to protection against willful trespass, regardless of whether the public land is located in a state with fence-out laws. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537-38 (1911) (holding Colorado fence-out law did not apply to federal forest land where trespass of cattle on such land was willful rather than unintentional). See also Shannon v. United States, 160 F. 870, 876 (9 th Cir. 1908) (same with regard to Montana fence-out law and intentional trespass on forest land). In addition, it is generally understood and accepted that Congress has authority to regulate public lands, see Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 535 (1976), and while the states retain general police powers over public lands within their borders, the Supreme Court has held the Property Clause gives Congress power over public lands “to control their occupancy and use, to protect them from trespass and injury, and to prescribe the condition upon which others may obtain rights in them.” Id. at 540 (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on this authority, the Department of the Interior, through the BLM, has implemented the regulations at issue, providing civil and criminal penalties. Because Mr. Jones has not provided any statute, regulation, or other case law suggesting such substantive federal law does not apply, he has failed to show the issue of the state fence-out law is relevant or material to the criminal charges -13- brought against him. Similarly, the opinion of the local sheriff as to whether he believes Wyoming’s fence-out laws should apply is also irrelevant, as it was not offered for the purpose of showing whether Mr. Jones allowed his cattle to graze on public lands without authorization or knowingly and willfully used or occupied such land, as prohibited by federal regulation, or in conjunction with any other substantive federal law. While Mr. Jones complains another state employee–the branding inspector–was allowed to testify, the inspector testified on Mr. Jones’s history of unauthorized grazing, which was germane to the issues at hand, and not on his opinion as to the application of the state’s fence-out law. For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling such evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible under Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Even if the sheriff’s testimony was somehow relevant, the district court alternatively determined such evidence would prove prejudicial and confusing to the jury. We agree. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows a court to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed, in part, by the danger of confusing the issues or misleading a jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Here, the mere opinion of a law enforcement officer that Wyoming’s fence-out law should apply would most likely have confused and misled the jury, keeping them from concentrating on the applicable law or criminal elements required to convict or acquit Mr. Jones. Moreover, because overwhelming and -14- uncontroverted evidence established Mr. Jones’s guilt of the crimes charged, we conclude the exclusion of such testimony did not affect the fundamental fairness of his trial, as Mr. Jones claims on appeal.