Opinion ID: 764213
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Passion and Prejudice

Text: 22 Prosecutors may not make comments calculated to arouse the passions or prejudices of the jury. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 247-48, 63 S.Ct. 561, 87 L.Ed. 734 (1943). We have previously adopted the D.C. Circuit's reasoning that 23 A prosecutor may not urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant in order to protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future lawbreaking. The evil lurking in such prosecutorial appeals is that the defendant will be convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to his own guilt or innocence. Jurors may be persuaded by such appeals to believe that, by convicting a defendant, they will assist in the solution of some pressing social problem. The amelioration of society's woes is far too heavy a burden for the individual criminal defendant to bear. 24 United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1443 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 1441 (D.C.Cir.1984)), rev'd on other grounds by 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). On the other hand, a prosecutor may ask the jury to act as a  'conscience of the community'  unless such a request is  'specifically designed to inflame the jury.'  United States v. Williams, 989 F.2d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1301 (9th Cir.1984)). Additionally, the Supreme Court instructs that a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through a lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974). 25 Leon-Reyes argues that in its closing, the prosecution placed the foundation of free society and the American justice system upon his case. In its closing, the prosecutor said 26 In this county, you have heard--we do everything--many, many things on oath. This is a free society.... It is a social compact amongst the people that we operate on the basis of truth. 27 We rely on our fellow citizens, our officials, our judges, our congressmen, our president; we rely on these, good faith, when they take an oath, be it an oath when you pay your taxes; be it an oath when you take the office of the presidency of the United States; be it the oath of a judge; be it the oath of a juror. It is actually what? 28 .... 29 Now, we know unfortunately that people have failings: Self interest, bias, prejudice, and always, always--it doesn't always work that way. We know that some people come in, swear to tell the truth, take an oath to an office, swear to follow the Constitution--police officers unfortunately can come in and swear to do this, attorneys, judges even, swear to follow their oath, and we know that this doesn't always occur. 30 .... 31 And when you think about it, every major issue in this county--social issue, legal issue--eventually comes into courtrooms like this where people are expected to--like you--to listen to people who take the oath and swear to tell the truth. And then, a free society of jurors from the community decide, based on the truth we hope, what is to happen, what is justice. 32 And when--and when persons come in and swear and look you in the eye and say: I swear to tell the truth, and then they lie, how can justice ever happen in a free society? 33 That is why this case, this little case is so important, because it attacks the very foundation, the very principals of why this country strives for greatness. That is why this case is important. 34 These statements were unnecessary and largely irrelevant. The prosecutor's personal belief in the importance of the oath does not tend to prove whether or not Leon-Reyes testified falsely at the Garcia trial. Indeed throughout this entire soliloquy, the prosecutor did not discuss Leon-Reyes or any of the evidence introduced in the trial. 35 Nevertheless, we do not believe that the prosecutor's argument was plain error requiring reversal in this case. The prosecutor's statements do not seem to have been made to inflame the jury, but rather to point out that our justice system relies on witnesses telling the truth. See Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 647 (holding that a court should not infer otherwise ambiguous statements to have their most damaging meaning). The prosecutor did not suggest the consequences of a particular verdict, cf. Koon, 34 F.3d at 1444, nor did the prosecutor point to a particular crisis in our society and ask the jury to make a statement, cf. Williams, 989 F.2d at 1072. Although the prosecutor explained the importance of the case in grandiose terms, such statements did not seem to be intended to appeal to the passions and prejudice of the jury. Moreover, as explained above, the evidence of Leon-Reyes's guilt was overwhelming and therefore the statements made by the prosecutor did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469-70 (internal quotation omitted).