Opinion ID: 1265969
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: illegal search and seizure

Text: Although in this case no motion to suppress any of these exhibits was made prior to trial, under Rule 40(e)(1), W.R. Cr.P., nor was any objection made upon this basis to the admission of this evidence at the trial, appellant now contends that the court upon its own motion should have inquired of the witnesses and then suppressed Exhibits 1, 3, and 4; [1] and that the failure to do so constituted plain error as contemplated by Rule 49(b), W.R.Cr.P. No explanation is tendered by appellant for the failure to raise this. The general rule is as follows:    It ordinarily cannot be claimed on appeal that a search and seizure were illegal if there was neither a motion to suppress nor an objection to introduction of the evidence at the trial.    3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 678, pp. 141-142. In this connection see Sykes v. United States, 5 Cir., 373 F.2d 607, 612, certiorari denied 386 U.S. 977, 87 S.Ct. 1172, 18 L.Ed.2d 138; United States v. Meadows, 5 Cir., 523 F.2d 365, 368, certiorari denied 424 U.S. 970, 96 S.Ct. 1469, 47 L.Ed.2d 738; Williams v. United States, 10 Cir., 323 F.2d 90, 94, certiorari denied 376 U.S. 906, 84 S.Ct. 659, 11 L.Ed.2d 605; Bouchard v. United States, 9 Cir., 344 F.2d 872, 875; Matthews v. United States, 5 Cir., 407 F.2d 1371, 1382, certiorari denied 398 U.S. 968, 90 S.Ct. 2177, 26 L.Ed.2d 554. Although each case involving a claim of clear error must be decided upon its individual facts, such finding must be applied with caution, and even claims of error of constitutional dimension do not invoke this rule, Hays v. State, Wyo., 522 P.2d 1004, 1007; Hampton v. State, Wyo., 558 P.2d 504, 507-508. Appellant further has a definite burden to demonstrate the existence of a clear and unequivocal rule of law which the particular facts transgress in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way, Hampton v. State, supra, 558 P.2d at 507. The record is silent as to the facts upon which this court could determine the reasonableness of the searches and seizures. Thus appellant has not satisfied this burden, and particularly he has not demonstrated the particular facts necessary, Hampton v. State, supra. We can see no reason why the prosecution should now be penalized for its failure to introduce evidence which might be the basis of these searches and seizures when the defendant did not raise this question, which made such showing unnecessary, United States v. Meadows, supra. A clear expression of the reason for the caution in applying this doctrine would be that which appears in United States v. Smith, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 221, 490 F.2d 789, 794-795:    The rule requiring objection at trial is not lightly to be set aside and thus permit a defendant to let in evidence at trial as a hedge to insure reversal on an appeal if his client is convicted. Because of the factual distinctions, it would be improper to base our disposal hereof upon Blakely, supra. However, the authorities cited and the discussion appearing 542 P.2d on page 860 thereof could be utilized as sufficient authority for this disposal; and it is to be noted in that case that the defendant Blakely had taken affirmative action to raise this question, unlike Johnson. This case also expresses a concept applicable here when it is said:    defendant has the duty to protect himself and he should not be allowed to make his own rules of procedure. Additionally, because of the posture in which this appellant presents this proposition, we believe it proper to repeat the following:    We cannot allow defendant or his counsel to place the burden of the defense upon a trial judge. Gallup v. State, Wyo., 559 P.2d 1024, 1026. Nor is it proper that this court be forced to assume that burden.