Opinion ID: 4126184
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard to measure effectiveness

Text: Chapman finally argues the ordinary standard for granting habeas relief 9 Cf. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-60 (providing indigent PCR applicants with a right to counsel to pursue their PCR claims); Rule 71.1(d), (g), SCRCP (providing indigent PCR applicants with counsel if their application presents a question of law or fact that will require a hearing, or if their application for relief is denied). should not apply to ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from SVP proceedings.10 We agree, and hold the more appropriate standard in these instances is the two-prong Strickland standard used to vindicate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 117–18, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989) (describing the Strickland standard as requiring a PCR applicant to prove counsel's deficient performance, and the resulting prejudice). An SVP's right to counsel arises from a constitutional right to due process similar to the rights attendant to a criminal trial.11 Ontiberos, 287 P.3d at 867, 868; see also Jones v. State, 477 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (In considering what constitutes effective representation, it seems reasonable to look to criminal standards for guidance. Such an approach seems justified inasmuch as the allegedly mentally ill person's liberty is at stake.); Jenkins, 624 S.E.2d at 460. We further note a majority of jurisdictions use the Strickland standard in evaluating ineffective assistance claims in a civil commitment context, regardless of whether that court held that the person's right to effective counsel arose from statute or the constitution. Ontiberos, 287 P.3d at 867 (collecting cases). Thus, in our state and others, Strickland is a well-known standard applied in an extensive body of case law in the criminal and civil contexts. See In re Detention of T.A.H.-L., 97 P.3d 767, 771 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). Indeed, the Strickland standard is the one most familiar to judges and attorneys, and thus results in a more consistent application in our state courts. See Ontiberos, 287 P.3d at 867 (citing T.A.H.-L., 97 P.3d at 771). Accordingly, we find using the 10 See generally Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466, 468, 397 S.E.2d 87, 88 (1990) (stating a court will normally only issue a habeas writ under limited circumstances, when there has been a violation that constitutes a denial of fundamental fairness shocking to the universal sense of justice). 11 Justice Few would have us disregard both parties' recognition that habeas corpus is available to anyone, including Appellant, who wishes to challenge the legality of his or her confinement. The dissenting opinion mistakenly portrays the majority's actions as improperly invading the legislature's role. We would respectfully remind the dissent that this Court is tasked with interpreting and applying the law as adopted by the legislature. A necessary part of this duty is ensuring that the law comports with all constitutional requirements. Accordingly, we must avoid any application of law that does not pass constitutional muster. Were we to accept the dissent's contention that we are somehow encroaching on the legislature, we would be forced to adopt an interpretation of the law that does not satisfy due process. Strickland standard to evaluate ineffective assistance claims—regardless of the fact these claims must be asserted in habeas proceedings—will most consistently ensure an SVP's ability to exercise his right to the effective assistance of counsel.