Opinion ID: 1297765
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Authority of a Municipal Court to Determine the Constitutionality of an Ordinance

Text: The city has argued at each stage of this litigation that the municipal court was without such authority. The city contends that a municipal court is a court of limited jurisdiction and, without an express grant of authority, it lacks the capacity to decide constitutional questions. The city points out that municipal courts are special courts with specifically enumerated authority. The city, while recognizing that municipal courts are referred to in the Wisconsin Constitution, article VII, sec. 2, [2] contends their powers, even if created by legislative action, are limited in their jurisdiction to that specified by article VII, sec. 14. [3] Further, the statutes, sec. 755.045, Stats., [4] distinguishes municipal courts from all other courts, because municipal courts, with exceptions for transfer to circuit court, have exclusive jurisdiction over actions to impose forfeitures for ordinance violations. The city convincingly establishes that a municipal court is not a court of record, but acknowledges that its exclusive jurisdiction in respect to ordinance enforcement exceeds that of all other courts. The city also asserts that a municipal court is different from other courts referred to in the Wisconsin Constitution because there are specific limitations on the exercise of equitable jurisdiction. The city, pointing out that a judge of municipal court need not be a lawyer, [5] argues that it is unreasonable to expect complicated constitutional questions to be decided by nonlawyer judges. The city most convincingly establishes that the authority of a municipal court is not identical with that of a circuit court and, therefore, reaches the conclusion that, because the circuit court has plenary jurisdiction, including the power to declare an ordinance unconstitutional, the municipal court, being different in many respects, cannot have that same power or authority. We do not believe that conclusion logically follows from the premises established by the city. The city does, however, demonstrate that the constitution, by article VII, sec. 2, divides the judicial power into segments: One supreme court A court of appeals A circuit court Such trial courts of general uniform statewide jurisdiction as the legislature may create by law A municipal court if authorized by the legislature This segmentation becomes an important component of the city's argument when it cites the holding in Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), that, in addition to the supreme court having the authority to declare legislation unconstitutional, trial courts also have that power; but the city argues that, under the classification of article VII, sec. 2, the municipal court provision is stated separately and, therefore, Just did not include municipal courts within the ambit of trial courts, whose power to determine constitutionality was ratified in that case. The city asserts that Just is authority that municipal courts, because they are not trial courts, cannot make determinations of constitutionality. [1-3] We believe that the City of Milwaukee relies on trivial verbal differences in Just where no significant distinction was intended. Just uses interchangeably the terms, lower court[s], 56 Wis. 2d at 24, inferior courts, id. at 24, and trial courts, id. at 25. It is apparent that there was no intention to limit the holding of Just that courts other than the supreme court could adjudicate constitutionalityto trial courts, as referred to in the constitution. Rather, the teaching of Just is that all courts in which constitutional questions are raised should decide them. The only meaningful distinction between court levels is the distinction between appellate courts, [6] id. at 25-26, and all other courts. The holding of Just is simply that determination of constitutionality reasonably cannot abide initial adjudication by the appellate court at a time long subsequent to the onerous imposition of the strictures of an unconstitutional legislative act. The teaching of Just is that, whenever a constitutional question is raised, it should be decided. Of course, questions of constitutionality, like other questions of law, cannot finally be laid to rest until decided by final appellate adjudicationsince 1978, either by the court of appeals by published opinion or by determination by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. [7] Just supports not the city's position, but Wroten's that optimum utilization of our court facilities requires that all courts have the authority to decide constitutionality. The city has yet another argument that must be addressedthat a municipal court is not a court at all but is a mere administrative agency, which this court has held does not have the authority to decide constitutionality because administrative agencies are a part of the legislative branch of government that created them and, by implication, are not clothed with the power to declare unconstitutional the laws of their creator. See Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake, 60 Wis. 2d 640, 646, 211 N.W.2d 471 (1973). The city asserts that the same reasoning and conclusion is applicable to a municipal court, for under the constitution municipal courts can only exist if authorized by the legislature. Moreover, the legislature has limited their jurisdiction to proceedings arising under ordinances of the municipality. Does it not then follow that such a tribunal, by reason of its legislative genesis, cannot question the constitutionality of its progenitorthe state and, indeed, the city which established the municipal court by appropriate municipal legislative action. We conclude that the constitutional structure provides the answer, No. Article VII of the constitution is captioned as the Judiciary Article. Section 2 of that article provides that the judicial power of this state shall be vested in a unified court system consisting of the supreme court, the court of appeals, the circuit court, trial courts that may be created by the legislature, and a municipal court if authorized by the legislature. [4, 5] Thus, under our organic law, once a municipal court is created, its power is not that of the legislature that has authorized it, but its power is judicial as a part of the unified court system. A municipal court under the constitution is a repository of judicial power even as are the supreme court, the court of appeals, and the circuit court. It is not inhibited as is an administrative agency, which can only be the repository of some of the attributes of its legislative creator. [8] Rather, by legislative action, specifically contemplated and authorized by the constitution, a municipal court is endowed by its creation with judicial powers. It is the constitution, the organic document of our sovereignty, that gives the legislature the power to create courts, which by enabling legislation are then endowed with the constitutionally bestowed attributes of judicial powers. The legislature is but a catalyst in this process of court creation.The municipal court is a court that is constitutionally a part of the court system. [9] Thus, the question is what powers inhere in any court in respect to determination of constitutionality. The answer is found in venerable constitutional law aptly and irrevocably stated by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803): It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. See also Lent v. Tillson, 140 U.S. 316, 330 (1891), which stated, [T]he power to [rule on a statute's constitutionality] is necessarily involved in the power of the court to act at all. [6] Thus, in conformity to the separation of powers doctrine, a municipal court, as a part of the judicial branch, must have the inherent authority to rule on constitutional issues affecting the municipal ordinance which is involved in the case before it. Marbury v. Madison is also the seminal rationale for making the judge's oath an important criterion or guideline for judicial conduct when a judge is faced with the prospect of proceeding with an action based upon an unconstitutional legislative act. The judicial oath, an oath taken by all Wisconsin judges, provides in part, I do solemnly swear that I will support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the state of Wisconsin. It is argued by the defendant, and it was asserted by the municipal judge, that this oath by its words obligated him to hold unconstitutional the ordinance that came before him. [7] While we agree with the conclusion of the municipal judge and the assertion of the defendant, we do not view the oath, per se, as conferring the power to declare an ordinance unconstitutional. As the city has pointed out, legislative, executive, and administrative officers take the same oath, but it cannot be argued that those officers thereby acquire the power to declare legislation unconstitutional. As we view the oath, it obligates the officer to adhere to constitutional principles in administering the public trust of the particular office. For an executive officer or for a legislative officer, this means he or she swears to perform those executive, legislative, or administrative duties in a constitutional manner. The oath taken by a judge has the same significance, and it includes the obligation to perform judicial duties in the manner prescribed by our constitution, including the exercise of the inherent authority and obligation so well stated in Marbury v. Madison . Thus, when judicial officers subscribe to the oath, they obligate themselves to determine the constitutionality of legislation when the legislation is challenged on that basis. Their power comes not from the oath, but from the constitution, as is explained in Marbury v. Madison . [8] Nowhere in the constitution is the power to declare a law unconstitutional expressly given to any court, whether it be the supreme court, the court of appeals, or the circuit court; but all of those courts have that power because they are courts, even as the municipal court has that power and for the same reason. No express constitutional delegation is appropriate or necessary. It is an inherent power that derives from the doctrine of separation of powers and the fact that the constitution is the supreme law of the land and of the state and only the courts can finally adjudicate that supremacy. [9] Nevertheless, the city, quoting article VII, sec. 14, of the constitution, states that the municipal court has jurisdiction limited to actions and proceedings arising under ordinances of the municipality in which established. How then can it have the awesome power to declare a matter unconstitutional? We conclude that, once a court, including a municipal court, appropriately invokes its jurisdiction, it has the power to exercise all of its constitutional powers within the framework of that conferred jurisdiction. Thus, in the exercise of its jurisdiction in the instant case in respect to the municipal ordinance, which is unquestioned, it could, in fulfillment of its jurisdictional mission, [10] invoke all judicial powers that are not specifically denied. [10, 11] Therefore, municipal courts, once created by the legislature and by appropriate municipal action, are courts endowed with all judicial powers not expressly denied them, which powers may be exercised in all cases that fall within their jurisdiction. We hold that the municipal court has the authority to determine the constitutionality of an ordinance that is the basis of an action brought before it. [11]