Opinion ID: 182452
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Claim Five - Wrongful Termination

Text: In Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 28–29 (Okla. 1989), the Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized an exception to the common-law employment-at-will doctrine for terminations in violation of public policy. The exception is “tightly circumscribed” and limited to cases “where an employee is discharged for (1) refusing to violate an established and well-defined public policy or (2) performing some act consistent with a clear and compelling public policy.” Darrow v. Integris Health, Inc., 176 P.3d 1204, 1210 (Okla. 2008). Further, Oklahoma public policy must be articulated in “a specific Oklahoma court decision, state legislative or constitutional provision, or a provision in the federal constitution that prescribes a norm of conduct for the state.” Id. at 1212 (emphasis omitted). -10- Mr. Matthews alleged that he had been fired for reporting federal statutory and regulatory violations. He also cited violations of Okla. Stat. tit. 71, § 1-501, which criminalizes fraudulent transfers of securities, and Okla. Stat. tit. 40, § 403, which addresses retaliatory conduct for safety complaints. The district court determined that the federal statutes and regulations could not provide a proper statement of Oklahoma public policy, and that the two Oklahoma statutes were inapplicable. In particular, the court ruled (1) that § 1-501 was inapplicable because there were no allegations connecting the alleged misconduct to an offer, sale or purchase of a security as required by the statute, and (2) that § 403 was inapplicable because it provided no basis to assert a Burk claim against a private employer like LaBarge. 3 We agree with the district court. To begin with, federal statutes and regulations cannot support Mr. Matthews’s public-policy claim. See Wilburn v. Mid-South Health Dev., Inc., 343 F.3d 1274, 1277 (10th Cir. 2003) (Under Oklahoma law, “[t]he clear and compelling public policy . . . must be articulated by state constitutional, statutory, regulatory or decisional law.”). Also, the cited state statutes do not help Mr. Matthews. He cannot rely on a violation of § 1-501 because he failed to allege any fraudulent activity “in 3 Mr. Matthews also cited Oklahoma Jury Instruction § 21.2 in the title of this claim. But he has not articulated any argument under this provision. His failure to develop the issue constitutes forfeiture. See Bronson, 500 F.3d at 1104. -11- connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of a security,” as required by that section. The second amended complaint alleges that LaBarge was overstating revenue, profits, and inventory; but there are no allegations pertaining to security transfers. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). Although Mr. Matthews elaborates on the factual basis of this claim in his appellate brief, he was obliged to include those facts in his second amended complaint. See Aspen Orthopaedics & Sports Med., LLC v. Aspen Valley Hosp. Dist., 353 F.3d 832, 840 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he ‘facts’ in the case are limited to the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint.”). And even the allegations in his brief and in the third amended complaint do not mention any transfers of securities. Likewise, § 403 does not apply because LaBarge is not a public employer. Section 403 is a provision of Oklahoma’s Occupational Health & Safety Standards Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 40, §§ 401 -435, which defines employer as “the state and all its political subdivisions which has in its employ one or more individuals performing services for it in employment,” id. § 402. Contrary to Mr. Matthews’s assertion, LaBarge’s status as a publicly traded company does not make it an employer under the Act. See Griffin v. Mullinix, 947 P.2d 177, 180 (Okla. 1997) (“[N]o Oklahoma articulation of public policy exists with regard to -12- the private employer under the Oklahoma Occupational Safety & Health Standards Act.”).