Opinion ID: 395320
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: transfer and promotions

Text: 14 The district court, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b), dismissed the transfer and promotion issue concerning the hourly positions at the plant. The district court ruled that the EEOC failed to make out a prima facie case that Ball Corporation's employment practices discriminated against women. The Court reached this conclusion because although 15 (t)he statistical evidence adduced in this case does indicate that female employees at Ball were not promoted as frequently as male employees, and that there were certain departments into which they did not transfer. This evidence, however, was not buttressed with evidence of specific acts of discrimination against women, as was the statistical data in Teamsters. 16 At the close of all of the evidence, the district court entered judgment for the defendant on the discrimination claim concerning the promotion of female employees from hourly positions to salaried positions. 17 In making this ruling, the district court did not have the benefit of our recent decision in Marsh v. Eaton Corporation, 639 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1981). In Marsh, the evidence at trial showed that sixty females were employed in the defendant's plant. Twenty-eight of these women were employed as machine tenders, the lowest position in the Springtite Department. Thirty were employed in the lowest position in the Ring Department. No men were employed in either position. As in the instant case, the low-paying positions occupied by the female employees were once explicitly termed female jobs. In Marsh, the explicit sex classification was removed in 1965, but statistical evidence showed that during 1974-1977, the four years prior to trial, tacit sex segregation remained. Of the 44 people hired with no previous experience, 27 were female and 17 were male. All 27 females were placed in the low-paying Springtite and Ring Department positions; only 9 of the 17 men were placed in these positions. The other eight males were placed in more attractive positions at the plant. This court found that this statistical showing was sufficient to make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment. Judge Merritt stated for the majority: 18 The evidence presented indicates that all females were channeled into two jobs. Although some males were also placed in these jobs, almost half of the inexperienced males were placed in higher paying positions. There was no evidence that the inexperienced males were qualified for jobs other than machine tender/junior inspector or that the inexperienced females were not so qualified. Id. at 330 (citations omitted). 19 We believe that the statistical showing made by the EEOC in this case was as strong as the showing made in Marsh. Before 1969, promotions and transfers at the Chardon plant were based on purely subjective criteria. Female transfers or promotions to higher-paying positions were negligible. After 1969, the plant instituted a new policy. Job vacancies were filled based on departmental seniority, then based on plant-wide seniority, and finally if the vacancy still remained, based on the recall of employees on layoff. After 1969, salaried positions at the plant continued to be filled on the basis of subjective criteria. Before 1975, no females held salaried positions at the Chardon plant. 20 The EEOC's statistical evidence showed that in 1968, the male promotion rate was almost ten times the female rate. In 1974, it was still more than twice the female rate. As the following table demonstrates, between 1966-75 the average male promotion rate was three times the average female promotion rate: 21 Percentage of Percentage of Total Male Total Female Workforce Workforce Year Promoted Promoted 1966 23.4 4.9 1967 31.9 10.7 1968 23.0 2.4 1969 33.0 7.1 1970 37.5 12.8 1971 29.8 11.8 1972 34.2 6.1 1973 21.0 7.0 1974 23.5 10.3 1975 32.9 9.0 Average 25.8 8.1 22 Under the facts and circumstances of this case, this showing of statistical disparity in the promotions and transfer practices was sufficient by itself to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1857, 53 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (the usefulness (of statistics) depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances); Marsh v. Eaton, supra at 329-31, Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611, 615 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 212, 66 L.Ed.2d 92 (1980). See also Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (statistical proof may alone be used, without presentation of specific instances of discrimination, to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 247 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954, 91 S.Ct. 972, 28 L.Ed.2d 237 (1971) (In racial discrimination cases, statistics often demonstrate more than the testimony of many witnesses, and they should be given proper effect by the courts). 23 However, the EEOC did not rely solely on statistical evidence below to establish disparate treatment. The EEOC introduced evidence showing that despite the existence of the facially neutral written promotions and transfer policies, female employees were, in practice, actively discouraged from applying for higher paying jobs. For example, Dorothy Yommer testified that in 1974 when she was the senior bid on a service labor job, her supervisor and plant superintendent actively attempted to discourage her from taking the job. 10 Carol Dimitroff testified that in 1978 she was the senior bid on a conventional press position. Ms. Dimitroff was not given the usual reasonable break-in period by the department supervisor. Instead of two to three weeks training time, she was given two days to learn the new job. She could not master all the required tasks in that time and had to give up the promotion. 11 Ettas Kramer testified that in 1974 she was the senior bid on a tube machine operator job. However, pursuant to the plant doctor and personnel office's orders, she was told to remove her name from the bid sheet because the tube machine operators job was deemed too strenuous. 24 Thus, the district court's finding that the EEOC's statistical evidence was not supported by specific acts of discrimination against women is clearly erroneous. We believe that even if the statistical evidence here was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, the testimony discussed above, contrary to the district court's finding, enabled the EEOC to carry its burden of establishing a prima facie case. Accordingly, the court's dismissals of the transfer and promotions issues were in error.