Opinion ID: 3016686
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Promote Based on Appellant’s Race

Text: The District Court concluded that Appellant had failed to put forth evidence that established a prima facie case for failure to promote due to race discrimination. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has adopted the methodology of the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), “as a starting point in actions brought under the [NJLAD].” Andersen v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 446 A.2d 486, 490 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1982). Under this methodology, a court must first determine whether or not a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that he (1) belongs to a protected class, (2) applied for and was qualified for a position for which the employer was seeking applicants, (3) was denied promotion, and (4) others with similar or lesser qualifications achieved promotion. 6 Dixon v. Rutgers, The State Univ. of New Jersey, 541 A.2d 1046, 1051-52 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1988). Appellant is clearly a member of a protected class, and the District Court presumed that he was qualified for the Senior Relay Technician position. Where his first claim stumbles is with regard to whether he was actually denied promotion. It is undisputed that Appellant’s promotion was delayed during the second 90-day probationary period following his failure of his qualification exam. However, it is also undisputed that, upon passing the second examination, he was in fact promoted to the position of a Senior Relay Technician, and received the pay raise commensurate with such a promotion that was applied retroactively to the end of his first probationary period. We fail to see how this situation can be described as a “denial of promotion.” At most it was, as the District Court described it, a “delayed promotion.” Contrary to Appellant’s suggestion that such a characterization is “absurd and offensive,” the fact remains that the particular position Appellant applied for was essentially reserved for him while he prepared to retake the qualification exam, since no other applicants were considered. Moreover, several courts have held that a delayed promotion with retroactive pay does not constitute an adverse employment action. See Pennington v. Huntsvile, 261 F.3d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 542, 545-46 (6th Cir. 1999); Benningfield v. The City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 377-78 (5th Cir. 1998). Finally, even if we were to construe this as denial within the meaning of the test, there is no evidence in 7 the record that any other applicant with similar or lesser qualifications was promoted in his place. We therefore conclude that the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees as Appellant did not establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination.