Opinion ID: 2453550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Comments on Credibility

Text: Duong alleges that, during closing arguments, the prosecutor improperly commented on both the victim's and defendant's credibility and accused the defendant of lying. Generally, prosecutors cannot offer juries their personal opinions on the credibility of witnesses. State v. Stone, 291 Kan. 13, 19, 237 P.3d 1229 (2010). We prohibit the prosecutor from expressing personal opinions on the credibility of a witness because such comments are unsworn, unchecked testimony, not commentary on the evidence of the case. State v. Pabst, 268 Kan. 501, 510, 996 P.2d 321 (2000). We also have held that accusing a defendant of lying is outside the wide rhetorical latitude afforded prosecutors in closing argument. State v. Davis, 275 Kan. 107, 121, 61 P.3d 701 (2003). On the other hand, we permit lawyers to make statements during closing arguments that draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. Stone, 291 Kan. at 19, 237 P.3d 1229. Specifically, prosecutors may explain `to juries what they should look for in assessing witness credibility, especially when the defense has attacked the credibility of the State's witnesses.' Stone, 291 Kan. at 19, 237 P.3d 1229 (citing State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614, 623-24, 186 P.3d 755 [2008]). We recognize that it is proper for a prosecutor to assert reasonable inferences based on the evidence and that, when a case turns on which of two conflicting stories is true, certain testimony is not believable. Davis, 275 Kan. at 121, 61 P.3d 701. Nevertheless, the jury must be left to draw the ultimate conclusion regarding the credibility of a witness. 275 Kan. at 121, 61 P.3d 701. In Davis, the defendant challenged three statements by the prosecutor. First, the prosecutor argued that the victim's statements were more credible than the defendant's because the victim made his statements while in an emotional state to a police officer, and the defendant made his statements after 10 months with plenty of time for reflection and creation. 275 Kan. at 122, 61 P.3d 701. Second, the prosecutor argued that the evidence indicated that the victim should be believed. 275 Kan. at 122, 61 P.3d 701. Finally, the prosecutor claimed that the defendant's allegation that the victim set this whole thing up was not believable. 275 Kan. at 123, 61 P.3d 701. This court held that the prosecutor was within the latitude afforded to the State during closing argument because the prosecutor stated reasonable inferences based on the evidence, and the statements did not constitute vouching for the victim's credibility. 275 Kan. at 122-23, 61 P.3d 701. Conversely, in State v. Magallanez, 290 Kan. 906, 235 P.3d 460 (2010), we held that there was prosecutorial misconduct when the statements made were not based on any reasonable inference from the evidence. In that case, the prosecutor had told the jury that you trust children until you have a reason not to. We assume that. We assume we have taught them correctly. 290 Kan. at 912, 235 P.3d 460. This amounted to unsworn testimony about the truthfulness of children. 290 Kan. at 914, 235 P.3d 460. We do not view a prosecutor's statement in isolation but in context. See Stone, 291 Kan. at 19-20, 237 P.3d 1229. In Stone, the prosecutor had said, A.L. told [the jury] what happened, and, She is a credible witness. Stone, 291 Kan. at 19, 237 P.3d 1229. We observed: [T]hese comments were the brackets around an argument that detailed for the jury the factors that it could and should consider in determining the credibility of the witness. 291 Kan. at 19, 237 P.3d 1229. With this broader view, we held that the prosecutor's statements were within the latitude afforded the State. We saw them as attempts to summarize the conclusion the prosecutor wanted the jury to reach from the evidence rather than expressions of the prosecutor's own judgment on the credibility of the witness. 291 Kan. at 20, 237 P.3d 1229. With these cases as our foundation, we hold here that the prosecutor's statements about A.C.'s and Duong's credibility were within proper bounds. The prosecutor drew reasonable inferences based on the evidence presented at trial and merely directed the jury to specific testimony. For example, with regard to A.C., the prosecutor reminded the jury that A.C. disclosed his experience in the restroom immediately, that A.C. identified Duong immediately and consistently, and that Duong was a complete stranger. On Duong's credibility, the prosecutor pointed out that Duong first said that no one else was in the restroom and then changed his story. The prosecutor did not accuse Duong of lying but referenced evidence that rebutted Duong's statements to Mar. Each of the prosecutor's remarks fit within the context of an overarching evidence-based argument that A.C.'s story was more believable than Duong's.