Opinion ID: 765858
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Section 2384 to Rahman's Case

Text: 133 Rahman also argues that he was convicted not for entering into any conspiratorial agreement that Congress may properly forbid, but solely for his religious words and deeds which, he contends, are protected by the First Amendment. In support of this claim, Rahman cites the Government's use in evidence of his speeches and writings. 134 There are two answers to Rahman's contention. The first is that freedom of speech and of religion do not extend so far as to bar prosecution of one who uses a public speech or a religious ministry to commit crimes. Numerous crimes under the federal criminal code are, or can be, committed by speech alone. As examples: Section 2 makes it an offense to counsel[], command[], induce[] or procure[] the commission of an offense against the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). Section 371 makes it a crime to conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 371. Section 373, with which Rahman was charged, makes it a crime to solicit[], command[], induce[], or otherwise endeavor[] to persuade another person to commit a crime of violence. 18 U.S.C. § 373(a). Various other statutes, like Section 2384, criminalize conspiracies of specified objectives, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1751(d) (conspiracy to kidnap); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (conspiracy to interfere with commerce through robbery, extortion, or violence); 21 U.S.C. § 846 conspiracy to violate drug laws). All of these offenses are characteristically committed through speech. Notwithstanding that political speech and religious exercise are among the activities most jealously guarded by the First Amendment, one is not immunized from prosecution for such speech-based offenses merely because one commits them through the medium of political speech or religious preaching. Of course, courts must be vigilant to insure that prosecutions are not improperly based on the mere expression of unpopular ideas. But if the evidence shows that the speeches crossed the line into criminal solicitation, procurement of criminal activity, or conspiracy to violate the laws, the prosecution is permissible. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 169-71 (1st Cir. 1969). 135 The evidence justifying Rahman's conviction for conspiracy and solicitation showed beyond a reasonable doubt that he crossed this line. His speeches were not simply the expression of ideas; in some instances they constituted the crime of conspiracy to wage war on the United States under Section 2384 and solicitation of attack on the United States military installations, as well as of the murder of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak under Section 373. For example: 136 Rahman told Salem he should make up with God . . . by turning his rifle's barrel to President Mubarak's chest, and kill[ing] him. Tr. 4633. 137 On another occasion, speaking to Abdo Mohammed Haggag about murdering President Mubarak during his visit to the United States, Rahman told Haggag, Depend on God. Carry out this operation. It does not require a fatwa . . . You are ready in training, but do it. Go ahead. Tr. 10108. 138 The evidence further showed that Siddig Ali consulted with Rahman about the bombing of the United Nations Headquarters, and Rahman told him, Yes, it's a must, it's a duty. Tr. 5527-29. 139 On another occasion, when Rahman was asked by Salem about bombing the United Nations, he counseled against it on the ground that it would be bad for Muslims, Tr. 6029, but added that Salem should find a plan to destroy or to bomb or to . . . inflict damage to the American Army. Tr. 6029-30. 140 Words of this nature--ones that instruct, solicit, or persuade others to commit crimes of violence--violate the law and may be properly prosecuted regardless of whether they are uttered in private, or in a public speech, or in administering the duties of a religious ministry. The fact that his speech or conduct was religious does not immunize him from prosecution under generally-acceptable criminal statutes. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, reaffirmed in Boerne, 521 U.S. at 407. 141 Rahman also protests the Government's use in evidence of his speeches, writings, and preachings that did not in themselves constitute the crimes of solicitation or conspiracy. He is correct that the Government placed in evidence many instances of Rahman's writings and speeches in which Rahman expressed his opinions within the protection of the First Amendment. However, while the First Amendment fully protects Rahman's right to express hostility against the United States, and he may not be prosecuted for so speaking, it does not prevent the use of such speeches or writings in evidence when relevant to prove a pertinent fact in a criminal prosecution. The Government was free to demonstrate Rahman's resentment and hostility toward the United States in order to show his motive for soliciting and procuring illegal attacks against the United States and against President Mubarak of Egypt. See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487 (The First Amendment . . . does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.); United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 708-09 (7th Cir. 1986) (evidence of religious affiliation relevant to show defendant's motive to threaten President, because defendant leader of religious group was imprisoned by Government at time of threats). 142 Furthermore, Judge Mukasey properly protected against the danger that Rahman might be convicted because of his unpopular religious beliefs that were hostile to the United States. He explained to the jury the limited use it was entitled to make of the material received as evidence of motive. He instructed that a defendant could not be convicted on the basis of his beliefs or the expression of them--even if those beliefs favored violence. He properly instructed the jury that it could find a defendant guilty only if the evidence proved he committed a crime charged in the indictment. 143 We reject Rahman's claim that his conviction violated his rights under the First Amendment.