Opinion ID: 2042487
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: The matter before us involves an issue of statutory interpretation, and our review is thus de novo. People v. Taylor, 221 Ill.2d 157, 162, 302 Ill.Dec. 697, 850 N.E.2d 134 (2006). The cardinal rule of statutory construction  the rule to which all other rules are subordinate  is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Jones, 223 Ill.2d at 580, 308 Ill. Dec. 402, 861 N.E.2d 967; In re Detention of Powell, 217 Ill.2d 123, 135, 298 Ill.Dec. 361, 839 N.E.2d 1008 (2005). The best indicator of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. In re R.L.S., 218 Ill.2d 428, 433, 300 Ill.Dec. 350, 844 N.E.2d 22 (2006). As he argued in the appellate court, defendant contends that the circuit court's imposition of a $20 penalty under section 10(c)(2) of the Act was erroneous because the circuit court also imposed a $4 fine pursuant to section 5-9-1(c-9) of the Code of Corrections, and the former provision is applicable only when no other fine is imposed. See 725 ILCS 240/10(c)(2) (West 2004). Defendant notes that this court, in Jones, held that the $4 penalty assessed under section 5-9-1(c-9) of the Code of Corrections was in fact a fine for purposes of applying presentence incarceration credit under section 110-14(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Jones, 223 Ill.2d at 580-87, 308 Ill.Dec. 402, 861 N.E.2d 967. He argues, since another fine was imposed in this case, section 10(c)(2) of the Act cannot, by its exclusive terms, apply. Defendant submits that the legislature has provided a comprehensive scheme for the imposition of violent crime victim assistance fines: section 10(b) of the Act applies in instances, such as this, when another fine is imposed; section 10(c) applies when no other fine is imposed. The State initially contends that defendant has forfeited the right to argue the applicability of section 10(b) of the Act because he heretofore failed to specifically raise that point; he argued only that section 10(c) was not applicable. On the merits, using the term surcharge instead of the statutory term penalty, the State argues that the $4 penalty of section 5-9-1(c-9), by its very language, is imposed above and beyond any other fine assessed by the court. The State observes that section 5-9-1(c-9) explicitly provided that the imposition of the $4 penalty shall not reduce or affect the distribution of any other fine, costs, fees, or penalties. Noting the legislature's repeated use of the phrases additional penalty and added to when describing the $4 penalty and its relation to other fine[s], costs, fees, and penalties, the State argues that this fine should be added onto or imposed after other fines, which the State terms primary fines, a phrase that does not appear in either of the statutes at issue. The State would apparently consider the violent crime victims assistance fines primary or basic fines. The State suggests that interpreting the violent crime victims assistance provisions as a comprehensive scheme  with section 10(b) applying when other fines are imposed, and section 10(c) applying when no other fine is imposed  would effectively render section 10(c)(2) meaningless and superfluous, because the imposition of the $4 surcharge would serve to preclude the imposition of the $20 [violent crime victims assistance] charge. At the outset, we will clarify the issue before this court. The question before us is not whether the $4 penalty of section 5-9-1(c-9) applies in addition to a penalty under section 10 of the Act  it clearly does. Rather, the issue is whether the $20 violent crime victims assistance penalty, which by its terms applies only when no other fine is imposed, was properly assessed in conjunction with the $4 fine. We hold it was not. In Jones, this court observed that the plain language of section 5-9-1(c-9) strongly suggests that the charge ought to be considered to be in the nature of a fine   . The statute repeatedly refers to the charge as a `penalty,' which connotes a fine. Jones, 223 Ill.2d at 583, 308 Ill.Dec. 402, 861 N.E.2d 967. We ultimately held that the $4 penalty of section 5-9-1(c-9) was in fact a fine. Jones, 223 Ill.2d at 580-87, 308 Ill.Dec. 402, 861 N.E.2d 967. We are not inclined to give a definition to the term penalty, as used in section 5-9-1(c-9), that differs depending upon context. If, as we held in Jones, the term penalty connotes a fine for purposes of the application of presentence-incarceration credit under section 110-14 of the Criminal Code, then it should be a fine when we consider its interface with section 10 of the Act. There is no basis for assigning a different meaning in this context. Having determined that the penalty of section 5-9-1(c-9) was in fact a fine, it is clear that section 10(b) was the operative provision for purposes of calculating the appropriate violent crime victims assistance penalty, as it, rather than section 10(c), applied when a fine was imposed under some other statutory provision. We would note that the analysis this court employed in Jones is equally applicable to the legislature's use of the term penalty in section 10 of the Act. Section 10(b) of the Act speaks of an additional penalty to be collected, one in addition to other fine[s] and costs of the case. Section 10(c) of the Act provides for a penalty to be collected when no other fine is imposed. 725 ILCS 240/10(b), (c) (West 2004). Under the reasoning of Jones, the penalties referenced in section 10 of the Act are also fines, and the fine of subsection (b), like that of section 5-9-1(c-9), is supposed to be imposed in addition to other fines and costs in the case. The State argues that the penalty in section 5-9-1(c-9) should be regarded as a charge above and beyond any other fine, pointing to section 5-9-1(c-9)'s use of the phrases additional penalty and added to when describing the relationship of that fine to other fines, costs, fees, and penalties. However, the legislature used essentially the same language when describing section 10(b)'s relationship to other fine[s] and costs in the case. Since each statute contains additional penalty language, it seems a reasonable inference that the legislature intended a fine under each to be imposed. It is unclear how each fine could be imposed in addition to the other in a temporal sense, which is the sense the State seems to urge upon appeal. If we were called upon to decide which fine was to be imposed after the other, we could easily find ourselves entangled in a circular chicken and egg analysis, unable to determine which fine applies first or where the analysis begins. Fortunately, that semantic conundrum is never reached in this instance. The fine established in section 5-9-1(c-9) could be imposed without reference to whether any other fine, costs, fees or penalties applied, but the same is not true of a fine imposed under section 10 of the Act. In order to calculate the amount of a violent crime victims assistance fine, one first has to determine which subsection of section 10 applies, and that cannot be accomplished without first determining whether a fine has been imposed under another statutory provision. Section 10(b) of the Act specifically addresses an instance where another fine is imposed; section 10(c) clearly applies when no other fine is assessed. The two subsections, read together, are comprehensive. Notwithstanding the State's forfeiture argument, this court is at liberty to make that observation whether or not defendant argues the point. We have been asked to determine whether a fine was properly assessed under section 10(c) of the Act. In the course of that endeavor, this court must consider the entire statute and interpret relevant provisions together. People v. Pierce, 226 Ill.2d 470, 476, 315 Ill.Dec. 656, 877 N.E.2d 408 (2007). Subsections (b) and (c) of section 10 were obviously intended to cover any situation that might arise. In this instance, where another fine was imposed under section 5-9-1(c-9) of the Code of Corrections, section 10(b) is the applicable provision for determining the violent crime victims assistance fine. The fact that the legislature chose to establish a bifurcated system for purposes of determining which of two violent crime victims assistance penalty provisions applied does not mean that the imposition of the $4 fine under section 5-9-1(c-9) reduce[d] or affect[ed] the distribution of the violent crime victims assistance penalty. In our view, the assessment of a fine under some other statutory provision merely establishes which of two violent crime victims assistance penalty provisions is used to calculate the fine under the Act. Moreover, simply because section 10(c)(2) did not apply in this case, it does not necessarily follow that subsection (c)(2) would have never applied. Thus, our interpretation of the statute does not render subsection (c)(2) a nullity. There may well have been instances when the $4 fine was not assessed and subsection (c)(2) would then have applied. Though the statute provided that the $4 penalty shall be added to every fine imposed in sentencing, suggesting that its imposition was mandatory, the use of the term shall is not always determinative. See People v. Davis, 93 Ill.2d 155, 162, 66 Ill.Dec. 294, 442 N.E.2d 855 (1982); People v. Youngbey, 82 Ill.2d 556, 562, 45 Ill.Dec. 938, 413 N.E.2d 416 (1980). We are not called upon to address that issue here, as the parties do not argue that specific point. Having found that section 10(c)(2) does not apply, and that section 10(b) does, we must determine the appropriate amount to be assessed under the latter subsection. In their briefs, and in oral argument, the parties assume that subsection (b) of the Act requires an assessment of 10% of any other fine imposed. The statutory language does not support that assumption. Section 10(b) provides for an additional penalty of $4 for each $40, or fraction thereof, of fine imposed. 725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2004). The statute does not speak in terms of percent. The statute requires an additional penalty of $4 for each $40, or fraction thereof. Thus, if a defendant were to be assessed a fine up to $40 under another statutory provision, he would pay $4 under this section. For example, if he were assessed $30, he would pay $4, rather than $3, because $30 would be a fraction of $40. The term fraction follows immediately after, and modifies, the term $40. In this instance, defendant's $4 fine, assessed under section 5-9-1(c-9), is similarly a fraction of $40. Defendant will be assessed a $4 fine under section 10(b) of the Act, not 40 cents as the parties have assumed. The cause will be remanded to the circuit court for imposition of a $4 fine. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed in part, the $20 fine imposed by the circuit court under section 10(c)(2) of the Act is vacated, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for the imposition of a $4 fine pursuant to section 10(b) of the Act. Appellate court reversed in part; cause remanded to the circuit court.