Opinion ID: 848860
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 750.530 provides:

Text: Any person who shall, by force and violence, or by assault or putting in fear, feloniously rob, steal and take from the person of another, or in his presence, any money or other property which may be the subject of larceny, such robber not being armed with a dangerous weapon, shall be guilty of a felony.... It is a settled rule of statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined in a statute, this Court will ascribe every statutory word or phrase its plain and ordinary meaning. See M.C.L. § 8.3a. Further, this Court shall ensure that words in a statute are not ignored, treated as surplusage, or rendered nugatory. Hoste v. Shanty Creek Mngt, Inc., 459 Mich. 561, 574, 592 N.W.2d 360 (1999). Here, to describe the element of force, the Legislature used the words by force and violence, or by assault or putting in fear. MCL 750.530. To describe the act that must be accomplished, the Legislature used the words rob, steal, and take, and to describe the allowable possession of the property that is subject to the robbery, the Legislature used the words in his presence. The majority argues that a robbery occurs only when a person, by force and violence, or by assault or putting in fear, uses that force initially to seize the property from the person of another, or in his presence. But, the statute plainly allows for more. A robbery occurs under the statute where, by force and violence or by assault, the perpetrator takes property from the person or in his presence. That is, where the robber initially seizes the property by force and violence or by assault. However, the statute also allows for a conviction of robbery where, by assault the perpetrator robs property that is in [the] presence of the victim. The phrase by assault cannot mean the same thing as by force and violence. Rather, assault is defined simply as a sudden violent attack. Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1991). The term is also defined more broadly as illegal force. Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.). Further, the word rob cannot encompass merely the taking of the property, because the term take is already used in the statute. The Legislature is not presumed to have used different terms to mean the same thing. Here, the Legislature used the words rob, steal, and take. Rob means to [u]nlawfully deprive (a person) of or of something, esp. by force or the threat of force. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993). Thus, the statute, summarized, provides: Any person who shall ... by assault ... rob ... [property] from the person of another or in his presence ... shall be guilty... That is, a person may be guilty of robbery if by assault he robs property that is in [the] presence of the victim. As the majority recognizes, the defendant in this case committed an assault upon the security guards. Because the security guards exercised protective custody and control over that property, it remained in their presence. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor, the assault was committed so that the defendant could remove the property from [the] presence of the security guards. Defendant's violent act of assault evidenced his intent to unlawfully and permanently deprive the guards of the property. The majority asserts that the dissent misapprehends the context of the statutory phrase in his presence. The majority emphasizes the words by force and violence, or by assault or putting in fear, op. at 548, 648 N.W.2d at 173, and assumes that these words apply only to the initial taking itself, and therefore, concludes: the statute identifies unarmed robbery as taking another's property in the other's presence `by force and violence, or by assault or putting in fear,' and [i]f the physical taking was accomplished without force, assault, or fear, the statute does not permit treating the larcenous crime as a robbery because of a subsequent forceful act. Id. However, as I have indicated, I believe that, although property may be in the actual and wrongful possession of the perpetrator, it may still be in [the] presence of the victim such that the perpetrator may still, by assault, rob the victim. MCL 750.530. While the statute provides that the act must be accomplished by force and violence, or by assault, the requisite act is more than a mere taking or initial larceny of the property as evidenced by the statute's employment of the word rob. As we have already indicated, rob means more broadly an unlawful deprivation of property by force. [5] Therefore, although a larceny may be complete when the perpetrator initially wrongfully takes and conceals the property, the statute encompasses not merely a larceny, but a rob[bing], steal[ing], and tak[ing] by force and violence, or by assault or putting in fear, of property, that is in [the] presence of the victim. MCL 750.530. Thus, while through an initial larceny the perpetrator may steal property, he may not yet have rob[bed] that same property. Thus, an assault to rob may occur after the initial seizure of the property. Further, the phrase from the person of another, or in his presence has been defined by this Court, in a manner consistent with this interpretation, to mean that the victim must merely maintain personal protection over the property for it to be considered in his presence. In Covelesky, supra at 97, 185 N.W. 770, this Court stated: [T]he words `taking from the person of another,' as used in connection with the common-law definition of robbery, are not restricted in application to those cases in which the property taken is in actual contact with the person of the one from whom it is taken, but include within in their meaning the taking by violence or intimidation from the person wronged, in his presence, of property which either belongs to him or which is under his personal protection and control. And where such words have been incorporated into statutes defining robbery, they have received the same construction. [6] In Covelesky, this Court further adopted the interpretation by the Iowa Supreme Court of the prepositional phrase from the person of another in the Iowa robbery statute, which closely resembles that of Michigan: The preposition `from' does not convey the idea of contact or propinquity of the person and property. It does not imply that the property is in the presence of the person. The thought of the statute, as expressed in the language, is that the property must be so in the possession or under the control of the individual robbed that violence or putting in fear was the means used by the robber to take it. [ Id. at 99, 185 N.W. 770, quoting State v. Calhoun, 72 Iowa 432, 34 N.W. 194, 196 (1887).] As evidenced by this analysis, the majority takes too narrow a view of the concept of possession when it states that this defendant did not did not use force, violence, assault or putting in fear to accomplish his taking of property. Op. at 551, 648 N.W.2d at 174. Neither the statute nor the common law requires that the victim be in actual possession of the property when the force is exercised. Although in the actual possession of the thief, the property may still be in the presence of the victim, because it is under his personal protection and control, Covelesky, supra at 97-99, 185 N.W. 770, and the use of force at the time the perpetrator attempts to ultimately remove the property from the presence of the victim, sufficiently establishes the force necessary to commit robbery. [7] For a thief does not obtain the complete, independent and absolute possession and control of money or property adverse to the rights of the owner where the taking is immediately resisted by the owner before the thief can remove it from the premises or from the owner's presence. State v. Long, 234 Kan. 580, 586, 675 P.2d 832 (1984), see also People v. Clark, 113 Mich.App. 477, 480, 317 N.W.2d 664 (1982); Newcomb, supra at 430-431, 476 N.W.2d 749. The dissent does not disagree that the crimes of larceny and robbery are distinct. [8] However, for the purpose of the crime of robbery, the relevant act encompasses a broader spectrum of time, and includes not simply an initial larcenous taking, by force and violence or by assault, but a robbing of the victim by assault when the property remains in the victim's presence. Thus, as long as the property is in the presence of the victim, that is, before the perpetrator reaches a place of temporary safety, a robbery can occur when the perpetrator with actual possession attempts to sever the property from the victim's presence by force and violence, or by assault or putting in fear. MCL 750.530. [9]
That the transactional view constitutes the proper view of robbery under the statute is reinforced, in my judgment, by the fact that the intent to permanently deprive element may occur after the initial taking. Unarmed robbery is a specific intent crime. People v. Dupie, 395 Mich. 483, 487, 236 N.W.2d 494 (1975), citing People v. McKeighan, 205 Mich. 367, 171 N.W. 500 (1919). The focus of the intent element of robbery is on the perpetrator's intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property. King, supra at 428, 534 N.W.2d 534. While, ordinarily, the taking and the use of force in a robbery are relatively contemporaneous so that the requisite intent may be readily inferred from these events, the act of force nonetheless may precede or follow the taking. People v. LeFlore, 96 Mich.App. 557, 561-562, 293 N.W.2d 628 (1980). For example, a typical robbery occurs when, by the threat or use of force, the robber forces the victim to turn over property directly to him. However, that the force occurs after the initial taking does nothing to negate the intent to permanently deprive element. In other words, when the perpetrator, by assault, intends still to permanently deprive the victim of property that remains in the victim's presence, a robbery can be said to have occurred. It is the perpetrator's intent at the time of the use of force-either to preserve his unlawful possession of the goods or to effect his escape (at least where these occur while the property remains in the presence of the victim)that completes the crime of robbery. [10] As long as there is a purposeful relationship between the elements of the crime of robbery: the act, whether that be robbing, stealing or taking, which establishes the intent to permanently deprive the victim of his property, and the force, which aggravates that crime into robbery, the robbery is complete. LeFlore, supra at 562, 293 N.W.2d 628, citing LaFave & Scott, Criminal (1972), Law, § 94, p. 701-702. The entire larcenous transaction should be reviewed to determine if there is a continuity of intent between the forceful act and the taking (or vice versa). Id. [11] To clarify, consider the perpetrator who is observed shoplifting and manages to escape from the store before being apprehended. In such a case, the only crime that occurs is a larceny. The larceny is complete upon the perpetrator's concealment of the item, for it is at that time that the intent to deprive the owner of the property merged with the actual taking. Next consider the perpetrator who is observed shoplifting and who is followed out into the parking lot. Before being confronted by the security guards, he drops the property onto the ground or he is apprehended. Again, the crime is larceny, for no further criminal intent may be inferred from his acts. Finally, consider the perpetrator who uses force in the parking lot, as in this case, while he is still in actual possession of the property. The perpetrator is still viewed under the robbery statute as having robbed the victim because the property was still in the victim's presence when the assault occurred. The property was at the time of the thief's initial taking of it, and is still at the time of the assault, in [the] presence of the victim. MCL 750.530. The security guards continued to exercise protective custody and control over the property. Covelesky, supra at 97-98, 185 N.W. 770.
Having established that the statute encompasses not merely an initial taking of property by force and violence or by assault, but rather, a robbing of the victim by assault, where property continues to be in the presence of the victim, the question next to be addressed is whether this Court should recognize the transactional view of robbery as it has hitherto been applied in Michigan.
While this Court has never expressly adopted the transactional view of robbery, Michigan jurisprudence on this issue is no tabula rasa. The Court of Appeals, including the panel in this case, has expressly applied this view to robbery for at least thirty years. [12] See, e.g., People v. Sanders, 28 Mich.App. 274, 277, 184 N.W.2d 269 (1970) (stating that, in the context of armed robbery, the incident of the taking must be viewed in its totality in order to ascertain the intent of the defendant when the assault occurs); People v. Beebe, 70 Mich.App. 154, 158, 245 N.W.2d 547 (1976) (stating that the view of the majority of other jurisdictions considers robbery as an ongoing transaction rather than one broken up into its component acts); LeFlore, supra at 562, 293 N.W.2d 628, (stating that the assault may follow the taking if that force is used to completely sever the victim's possession); Clark, supra at 480, 317 N.W.2d 664 (stating that Michigan employs the `transaction' test for armed robbery, which provides that a taking is not considered complete until the assailant has effected his escape because the victim is still considered in possession of his property); People v. Denny, 114 Mich.App. 320, 324, 319 N.W.2d 574 (1982); People v. Turner, 120 Mich.App. 23, 28, 328 N.W.2d 5 (1982); People v. Tinsley, 176 Mich.App. 119, 121, 439 N.W.2d 313 (1989); Newcomb, supra at 430-431, 476 N.W.2d 749; People v. Velasquez, 189 Mich.App. 14, 17, 472 N.W.2d 289 (1991). Thus, the Court of Appeals has consistently interpreted the statutes defining robbery and armed robbery as continuous offense[s], which [are] not complete until the perpetrator reaches a place of temporary safety. Tinsley, supra at 121, 439 N.W.2d 313. This line of precedent, with its attendant reasoning, provides considerable support for the proposition that the transactional view of robbery is consistent with Michigan jurisprudence. [13]
In addition to being consistent with the robbery statute, Michigan case law, and the common law, the transactional view of robbery has been implicitly accepted by this Court in other contexts. While the majority asserts, correctly, that this Court has never recognized the transactional approach in the specific context of robbery, op. at 541, 648 N.W.2d at 169, this Court has adopted a transactional view of robbery in the context of felony murder, where the murder occurs after commission of the robbery. People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 515-518, 52 N.W.2d 201 (1952). There, the Court stated that the robber may be said to be engaged in the commission of the crime while he is endeavoring to escape and make away with the goods taken. Id. at 518, 52 N.W.2d 201.In Podolski at 515-518, 52 N.W.2d 201, this Court expressly adopted the reasoning of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 190-191, 53 A.2d 736 (1947), which stated: It is equally consistent with reason and sound public policy to hold that when a felon's attempt to commit robbery or burglary sets in motion a chain of events which were or should have been within his contemplation when the motion was initiated, he should be held responsible for any death which by direct and almost inevitable sequence results from the initial criminal act.... Every robber or burglar knows that a likely later act in the chain of events he inaugurates will be the use of deadly force against him on the part of the selected victim. For whatever results follow from that natural and legal use of retaliating force, the felon must be held responsible. Further, the Podolski Court at 517-518 agreed with the reasoning asserted by the prosecutor, quoting from Wharton, Homicide (3d ed.), p. 186: Where a homicide is committed within the res gestae of a felony, however, it is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, a felony within the meaning of such statutes. That the attempt to commit the felony was not far advanced does not lessen the offense. And a burglar who breaks into a building, or who shoots a person who discovers him in an effort to escape, cannot avoid punishment for murder in the first degree, upon the theory that the burglary consisted in breaking in, and was consummated before the killing. A burglar may be said to be engaged in the commission of the crime of burglary while making away with the plunder, and while engaged in securing it. So, a robbery within the meaning of a rule that a homicide committed in the perpetration of a robbery is murder in the first degree is not necessarily concluded by the removal of the goods from the presence of the owner; and it is not necessary that the homicide should be committed at the precise time and place of the robbery. [14] In my judgment, it is altogether reasonable to extend, by analogy, this reasoning with respect to felony murder for a killing committed after a burglary or after a robbery, to the case of an assault committed after an initial taking, but before the perpetrator's escape. In People v. Gimotty, 216 Mich.App. 254, 257-259, 549 N.W.2d 39 (1996), the Court of Appeals held that the defendant had not reached a place of temporary safety in his escape from the scene of retail fraud, defined in the chapter on larceny, M.C.L. § 750.356, and, thus, that the death of a child in a vehicle struck by the defendant's vehicle during a high-speed police chase from the store was sufficiently connected to the underlying offense to support felony murder. See also People v. Oliver, 63 Mich.App. 509, 523, 234 N.W.2d 679 (1975); People v. Smith, 55 Mich.App. 184, 189, 222 N.W.2d 172 (1974). Again, by analogy, these cases support the view that an assault following an ordinary larceny elevates the crime to robbery and that a perpetrator who uses that force at any time before reaching a place of temporary safety in an effort to retain the property or escape with the property can be charged with robbery. [15] Finally, we would observe that the transactional view of robbery is also consistent with the premises that underlie the greater culpability of the perpetrator who resorts to violence in an attempt to steal property. [16] It is not the victim, but the perpetrator who should bear the full responsibility for his actions. `Every robber or burglar knows that a likely later act in the chain of events he inaugurates will be the [attempted] use of deadly force against him on the part of the selected victim. For whatever results follow from that natural and legal use of retaliating force, the felon must be held responsible.'  Podolski, supra at 516, 52 N.W.2d 201 (citations omitted). The use of force by the perpetrator against the owner of property who discovers his deed is an act, the need for which should not take the perpetrator by surprise. The use of force in such a circumstance should not be viewed as unusual or uncommon, but rather as a typical incident of the crime of larceny. [17]
When analyzing whether sufficient evidence has been presented to sustain a criminal conviction, this Court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor and determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Nowack, 462 Mich. 392, 399-400, 614 N.W.2d 78 (2000). In that case, the Court articulated that this standard of review is deferential: a reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict. Id. at 400, 614 N.W.2d 78. The transactional view of robbery, as explained in this opinion, and in light of the facts and charges presented to the jury, supports defendant's conviction in the instant case. The record establishes that the Meijer security guards observed defendant commit a larceny when he concealed items that he had taken from a Meijer's department store and proceeded to leave the store without paying for them. The security guards continued to surveil defendant during this entire transaction, from the moment he took the property and concealed it until the altercation in the parking lot. During their observation of defendant, the security guards continued to exercise protective custody and control over the property. That is, the security guards had the authority and the right to take it back. Thus, the property was for all purposes in [the] presence of the guards. MCL 750.530. As security guards for the property's owner, Meijer's Inc. these guards had a right and the authority to regain possession of the property. In the moments prior to the confrontation, defendant had a choice either to surrender peacefully or to attempt to remove the property from their presence by force, in this particular case, by assault. He chose the latter, and his conduct thereby evidenced an intent to forcefully and permanently deprive Meijer's of its property. By assault, defendant robbed the security guards of property that was in their presence. It is at the moment when the defendant turned to force (which caused one of the guards to suffer a fractured bone in her face and two broken teeth) that his intent to deprive the owner of its property and the use of force merged to satisfy the elements of the crime of robbery.

Finally, an analysis of the common law supports the view that force used after an initial wrongful seizure of property, to prevent the victim's resistance or to escape with the property, is sufficient to satisfy the elements of the crime of robbery. The common-law crime of robbery was defined as the unlawful taking possession of the goods of another by means of violence or threats of violence, used with the object of obtaining those goods from the owner, without his consent and with the intention of depriving him permanently of all the benefits of his ownership. 1 Odgers, The Common Law of England (2d ed.), ch. VIII, p. 331. In this work, which is a compilation of all important statutes and decisions, the authors declare that where a person used any personal violence at the time of or immediately before or immediately after such robbery, he may be sentenced as a robber was at that time, to penal servitude for life. Id. The difference between larceny and robbery is further explained: If the only violence used occurs accidentally and unintentionally in the prisoner's efforts to obtain possession of the property, the offence is larceny from the person and not robbery. But if violence is necessary to enable the prisoner to obtain possession of the property, and the prisoner on discovering this intentionally resorts to violence with that object, this is robbery. Id. at 332. In an example that follows, the author sets out the distinction between the successful escape and the violent altercation before the robber completes the escape: Thus, the snatching of a purse from a prosecutor, who is unaware of what is happening until after the purse is gone from his possession, cannot amount to robbery; but it will be otherwise if the prisoner does something to put the prosecutor in bodily fear before snatching the purse, for here the fear precedes the taking. So, if the prisoner obtains possession of the property without actual violence or threats of violence, the crime is only larceny from the person, unless the prisoner immediately after taking possession of the property uses personal violence. [ Id. ] Finally, the common-law indictment for robbery was pled as follows: A.B., on the ___ day of _____, in the county of, robbed C.D. of a watch, and at the time of or immediately before or immediately after such robbery did use personal violence to the said C.D. [2 Odgers, at 1478.] Compare the view expressed by Rapalje in 1892, which also supports the view that the force element of robbery can occur after the initial seizure of the property: To constitute robbery, the force used must be either before or at the time of the taking and of such a nature as to show that it was intended to overpower the party robbed, or to prevent resistance on his part, and not merely to get possession of the property.  Rapalje, Larceny & Kindred Offenses (1892), § 446, p. 637 (emphasis added). These views are more precise with regard to the actual nature of the crime of robbery as one of force against the victim to remove property from his presence. It is the use of force not merely to get possession, but also, to prevent resistance that satisfies the elements of the crime. Id. [18] In my judgment, the majority errs in concluding that the common law of robbery would not support defendant's conviction in the instant case. The common law, which, as the majority acknowledges, has been incorporated into M.C.L. § 750.530, supported a conviction for robbery when a perpetrator used force against the victim even after the property had already been taken by the perpetrator, if the perpetrator used that force to prevent the victim's resistance or to escape with the property. This is what occurred in this case. [19]
In contending that the common law supports its view, the majority makes much of the quotation from Blackstone that if one privately steals sixpence from the person of another, and afterwards keeps it by putting him in fear, this is no robbery, for the fear is subsequent.... 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, Wrongs, ch. 17, p. 242. However, as pointed out by Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed.),p. 348 this quotation has been misapplied: If the two transactions are essentially distinct-if subsequent to the larceny the owner should come upon the thief and be prevented from retaking his property by force or violence  the thief would be guilty of larceny and assault, but not robbery. But if the violence or intimidation is part of the res gestae of the larceny the offense is generally held to be elevated to the category of robbery.... [ Id. at 349.] The majority attempts to distinguish this quotation from Perkins in three ways, all of which are unavailing. First, the majority states that the dissent fails to set forth the full quotation from Perkins and therefore misunderstands the point that Perkins was making. Op. at 542, n. 9, 648 N.W.2d at 170, n. 9. To demonstrate that the transactional view is not only consistent with the statute and Michigan case-law, but also consistent with the common law as reflected by Blackstone, we set forth the language from Perkins in full. Following the disputed quotation from Blackstone, Perkins writes: Occasionally this has been misapplied. For example, during a chance meeting D suggested he might be interested in buying the gun X was carrying and asked permission to examine it, which was granted. Finding the gun loaded D then pointed it at X and told him to run for his life. As X backed away, D ran off with the weapon. A conviction of robbery was reversed on the theory that the resort to intimidation was after the acquisition of the gun. [20] This completely overlooks the distinction between possession and custody. When D received the gun to examine momentarily in the presence of X, D had custody only. Had he run off with the gun without violence or intimidation he would have been guilty of larceny because this would have been a trespassory taking and carrying away with all the elements of that offense. And since he actually did this under a threat to kill he clearly committed robbery, as the same court had held earlier under an equivalent set of facts. And a motorist whose tank had been filled with gas at his request, after which he held off the attendant at gunpoint, under threat to shoot while he drove away without making payment, was properly convicted of robbery. Furthermore, if one snatches property from the hand of another and uses force or intimidation to prevent an immediate retaking by the other, this is all one transaction and constitutes robbery. If the two transactions are essentially distinct, if subsequent to the larceny the owner should come upon the thief and be prevented from retaking his property by force or violence, the thief would be guilty of larceny and assault, but not robbery. But if the violence or intimidation is part of the res gestae of the larceny the offense is generally held to be elevated to the category of robbery, although there is still some authority for the earlier view that force or intimidation used to retain possession of property taken without it, is not sufficient. [Perkins, supra at 348-349.] The majority concedes that, in the first example given by Perkins, the thief initially had mere custody of the weapon, but his possession of the weapon was secured by threat of force. Op. at 542, n.9, 648 N.W.2d at 170, n. 9. In this case, defendant, likewise, had mere custody of the items, and the attempt to gain complete possession of the items, that is, to remove the items from the presence of the security guards, was secured by the use of force. As explained elsewhere, the successful escape with the property, or the complete removal of the property from the presence of the victim, is not a necessary element of robbery. Rather, escape and such removal merely indicate the end point of the transaction. [21] Second, the majority states that Perkins' use of the words `res gestae' ... does not suggest an expansive `transactional' view of robbery. Rather it narrowly refers to the events occurring contemporaneously with the taking-precisely the time frame in which the application of force must occur. Op. at 542, n. 9, 648 N.W.2d at 170, n. 9. However, res gestae in terms of the law, and in the context in which Perkins used it, simply means [t]he whole of the transaction under investigation and every part of it. It means things or things happened. Indeed, a res gestae witness is defined as [a]n eyewitness to some event in the continuum of the criminal transaction and one whose testimony will aid in developing a full disclosure of the facts surrounding the alleged commission of the charged offense. Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.). Thus, that the use of force against the owner of property occurs after the latter observes the wrongful acts of the perpetrator would seem not to be particularly relevant to analyzing whether a robbery occurs because the conduct of the perpetrator occurs as part of an unbroken sequence of events. The concept of res gestae, in the context in which it is used by Perkins, is wholly consistent with the view that the perpetrator's use of force before, contemporaneously with, or immediately after he is observed taking property in the presence of the victim provides the requisite force required to convict the perpetrator of robbery. Third, the majority states that the quotation from Perkins supports, rather than contradicts, the interpretation of Blackstone's quotation. Op. at 542, n. 9, 648 N.W.2d at 170, n. 9. We do not disagree that Perkins' quotation supports Blackstone's concept of robbery. As Perkins notes, the quotation has been misapplied. And as explained in this dissent, it has been misapplied in the same manner that the majority seeks to apply it in their opinion. The quotation has been misapplied to mean that force used at any time after an initial seizure of property from the person or from his presence by the perpetrator cannot constitute the crime of robbery. However, a closer analysis of the common-law crime of robbery explains the misunderstanding. Blackstone's quotation contemplates a private stealing, one which is not discovered until the perpetrator and the property have left the presence of the victim. Use of the words private stealing is significant, because it specifies what, at common law, was a theft by stealth, or a theft completed without the victim's knowledge. Blackstone explicitly contemplates that force used by one after he privately steals is not considered a robbery. The quotation from Perkins likewise contemplates the distinction between a private stealing, and the use of force during the time that the property is being taken. Perkins states: If the two transactions are essentially distinct,  if subsequent to the larceny the owner should come upon the thief and be prevented from retaking his property by force or violence, the thief would be guilty of larceny and assault, but not robbery. Id. at 349. Blackstone's use of the phrase private stealing is perhaps better understood by the definition of the common-law crime of robbery given by Sir Edward Coke, the preeminent chief justice of England, and author of the comprehensive Institutes of the Laws of England. In defining the crime of robbery, Coke stated: Robbery is a felony by the common law, committed by a violent assault, upon the person of another, by putting him in fear, and taking from his person his money or other goods of any value whatsoever. [Coke, Institutes (1797), pt. 3, p. 68.] Coke explains the difference between the private stealing and the use of force by the robber by distinguishing between the cutpurse [22] and the robber. In this regard, he states that: both take [property] from the person, [23] but [the cutpurse] takes it clam et secrete, [24] without assault or putting in fear, and the robber by violent assault, and putting in fear. [ Id. at 68.] Next, in defining the term taking, Coke describes the situation in which the cutpurse cuts the strings of the victim's purse and the purse then falls to the ground. In this situation, there is no robbery because the perpetrator never has possession. Id. However, if the perpetrator picks up the purse, and then, in striving... let[s] it fall and never [takes] it again, [25] this, according to Coke, is a taking within the meaning of common-law robbery, because he had it in his possession; the continuance of his possession is not required by the law and after it was secretly in his possession, the use of force occurred. Id. It is evident from this explanation by Coke, that the distinction between one who successfully privately steals, as referenced by Blackstone, and the one who, attempting to privately steal, is discovered in the process, and uses force in order to complete the taking, is the distinction between the cutpurse and the robber. It is also evident, from Coke's description, that force used after the initial taking of the property may still give rise to the crime of robbery. The common-law description of the crime of robbery is, as the dissent demonstrates, consistent with the above quotation from Perkins, and consistent with M.C.L. § 750.530. Clearly, the common-law description of robbery also supports a conviction in the present case. The defendant, like the cutpurse, first took the property in an attempt to secretly steal it. However, here there was no private stealing. After being observed taking the property and upon being confronted by the security guards, defendant assaulted them in an effort to remove the property from their presence. In striving with the guards, the property fell to the ground. [26] The perpetrator took possession of the property while it remained in the presence of the security guards, and there is no necessity that he used force to initially take the property, but only that he strove to keep it, however unsuccessfully. [27] Thus, both at common law, and consistent with the statute, there is no necessity that the force element of robbery occur before or contemporaneously with the initial taking. Force used after the initial taking, where the latter occurs under the observation of the victim, and while the property can be said to remain in the victim's presence, is sufficient to constitute the crime of robbery. Finally, I would point out that the transactional approach to robbery has the added practical advantage of being defined by a fixed beginning and end. Where does the majority draw this line? Can one never be convicted of robbery if he uses force to retain property or to escape simply because such force occurs after he has initially taken the property? When does the majority believe that a taking is completed? If a perpetrator does not use force at the moment he physically removes property from the shelf of a market and conceals it, would it be sufficient if he uses force when he is prevented from leaving the proximity of that shelf; when attempting to leave the particular aisle or department; when passing through the checkout area; or when attempting to leave the store itself? Is the fact that one purports to conceal the property beneath his clothes sufficient to find that he could not thereafter commit a robbery? In contrast to the lack of the majority's definition of contemporaneous, the transactional approach to robbery recognizes that the use of force that occurs at any time before the perpetrator of a larceny has reached a place of temporary safety transforms such larceny into a robbery. [28] Quite in addition to the fact that it is wrong in its understanding of the law of robbery in Michigan, the practical consequence of the majority's opinion is as follows: in every instance in which a person who has stolen property from a store in an amount less than $200, [29] as in this case, and who, before escaping with such property is confronted by and engages in violence against the victim, such person will be guilty merely of third-degree retail fraud and assault, rather than the greater crime of robbery. Instead of being subject to a potential 15-year sentence for robbery, M.C.L. § 750.530, the perpetrator will be subject to punishment of no more than 93 days in jail for the third degree retail fraud, M.C.L. § 750.356(5) and M.C.L. § 750.356d(4)(b), and no more than one year in jail if the subsequent assault is a serious assault under M.C.L. § 750.81 and M.C.L. § 750.81a. Further, the majority fails to take into account M.C.L. § 750.356d(5), which expressly prohibits prosecution under M.C.L. § 750.360, larceny from a building, where a person commits third-degree retail fraud. [30] See also People v. Ramsey, 218 Mich.App. 191, 195, 553 N.W.2d 360 (1996). If, as the majority holds, there can be no robbery under these circumstances, and there can be no independent prosecution of defendant for larceny from a building where the perpetrator commits second or third degree retail fraud as in the instant case, then the disparity in penalties between robbery and what the defendant here can be charged with is quite substantial. [31] We do not criticize the majority on account of this disparity, because it is their obligation to faithfully interpret the law as they see it, and they have done that here. It is not their obligation to correct what they might (or might not) view as inexplicable disparities in criminal punishments. We do suggest, however, that such a substantial disparity in punishments, based upon whether the violence occurred contemporaneously with the taking, or immediately thereafter as part of the same transaction, could never reasonably have been contemplated by the Legislature.