Opinion ID: 2814134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: disparate treatment of patents

Text: Daiichi also contends that the PTO’s disparate treatment of patents issued on August 5, 2009 (the earliest day on which a patent could issue and still qualify for the optional procedure) and the previous day was arbitrary and capricious. According to Daiichi, the issuance of Wyeth is no less of an extraordinary circumstance for patents issued before August 5, 2009 than it is for patents issued on or after that day. Daiichi contends the PTO has treated similarly situated patentees differently because one has a remedy and the other does not. 14 DAIICHI SANKYO COMPANY v. LEE The government argues that Daiichi is not similarly situated with patentees whose patents issued during the period for which the Optional Interim Procedure was available. Rather, Daiichi was similarly situated with all patentees whose patents issued before the Interim Procedure’s cutoff date. The government asserts that since the PTO did not consider the petitions of any patentees like Daiichi who failed to show extraordinary circumstances, Daiichi’s disparate treatment argument fails. We conclude that Daiichi has not shown that the PTO treated any requests for reconsideration of patent term adjustments filed for patents issuing before August 5, 2009 differently than Daiichi’s petitions. All other similar requests were denied by the agency, showing that the PTO acted consistently with respect to similarly situated patentees. Accordingly, the PTO did not act arbitrarily or capriciously based on its treatment of reconsideration requests submitted by similarly situated patentees. Through post-argument submission, Daiichi points the court to Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Lee, No. 101110, 2014 WL 5775749 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2014). In Merck, the government conceded before the district court that the facts of the case justified equitably tolling the 180-day judicial review period for a patent issued prior to the availability of the Optional Interim Procedure. Submission of Supplemental Authority, Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Lee, No. 14-1280 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 16, 2015). Thereafter, the district court tolled the statute and remanded to the PTO to adjust the term of the patent. Daiichi argues that, under Merck, the government acts arbitrarily whenever it opposes a patentee that seeks recalculation under the agency’s new calculation method for patents issued prior to the Optional Interim Procedure’s earliest qualifying date. We disagree. In Merck, the government contested equitable tolling on legal grounds, when it should have done so on factual grounds. The Supreme Court has held that the government will “not be bound by the mistaken DAIICHI SANKYO COMPANY v. LEE 15 representations of an agent unless it were clear that the representations were within the scope of the agent’s authority.” Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 419–20 (1990) (collecting cases supporting holding) (citations omitted). There is no indication that the government, in Merck, intended its concession to have any effect beyond that particular case. Further, there is no indication that counsel was acting with authority to bind the government so as to prevent it from ever disputing that a patent issuing before the earliest qualifying date for the Optional Interim Procedure is not entitled to a recalculation under the new calculation method. We must also consider whether the agency’s choice to grant extensions of the administrative review period for some patents to match the judicial review period for all patents was arbitrary and capricious. As discussed above, the statute provides for the Director’s ability to prescribe the timeframe for a petition at the PTO. Daiichi was treated identically to all other patentees whose patents had issued more than 180-days prior to the deadline for filing a petition and who were unable to show extraordinary circumstances. Our decision in Wyeth did not obligate the PTO to create the Optional Interim Procedure. Indeed, all patentees who could take advantage of the Optional Interim Procedure could still challenge their patent term adjustment in the district court under the statute. The PTO simply provided an alternative, and more cost-effective, mechanism at the agency for attaining the same result. Choosing an administrative filing deadline that mirrors the judicial filing deadline, especially when it lengthens that deadline for some patentees, is neither arbitrary nor capricious. In sum, we do not find that the PTO’s consistent treatment of all patents issuing prior to the availability of the Optional Interim Procedure, the government’s concession in Merck, or its selection and use of the 180-day 16 DAIICHI SANKYO COMPANY v. LEE administrative review period amount to arbitrary and capricious action by the government.