Opinion ID: 204037
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prima facie prong four: Thermo King's continuing need for the services of Tool Crib Attendant

Text: The district court correctly accepted the magistrate judge's finding that plaintiff had met his prima facie burden of establishing that Thermo King had a continuing need for the work that he was performing prior to his termination. Vélez stated in his deposition that the company asked two other employeesRadamés Padró and Carlos Pérezto carry out the duties of the position after Vélez's departure. We previously have stated that [a] replacement need not be sought from outside the company ... nor need he be designated formally as such. Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1013 n. 11.
Thermo King proffered a non-discriminatory reason for firing Vélez, asserting that Vélez was fired for violating the company's Code of Conduct and profiting financially from the sale of Thermo King property. These are both legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing him. Thus, we reach the third stage of the analysis and assess whether Vélez has raised a genuine issue of material fact about whether Thermo King's stated reason is a pretext for age-based discrimination. The crucial issue is whether, upon examination of all the evidence, it can reasonably support a finding that the employer practiced age-based discrimination against Velez. We find several aspects of the evidence that, taken together, are more than sufficient to support a factfinder's conclusion that Thermo King was motivated by age-based discrimination, and which thus raise a genuine issue of material fact that defeats summary judgment. These include Thermo King's shifting explanations for its termination for Velez, the ambiguity of Thermo King's company policy and the resulting uncertainty as to whether Velez violated it, and, most importantly, the fact that in response to arguably similar conduct by younger employees, Thermo King took no disciplinary action.
In arguing that Thermo King's stated reason for discharging him was pretextual, Vélez first points to the company's shifting explanations for his termination. Thermo King did not initially provide Vélez with any reason for firing him. One month later, Soto told the ADU and the EEOC that Vélez had been fired for violating the company's policy on receiving gifts from suppliers. It was not until over a year later that Thermo King, responding to this lawsuit, first said that Vélez had been fired for stealing and selling company property. The fact that the employer gave different reasons at different times for its action surely supports a finding that the reason it ultimately settled on was fabricated.
Although Thermo King argues that Vélez's admitted acceptance of gifts from suppliers was a clear violation of Thermo King's company policy, the record permits a contrary finding. A rational jury could conclude that Vélez's admitted acceptance of pens, caps, and simple knives was by no means a clear violation of Thermo King's Code of Conduct, which reads in relevant part: Relationships with customers, vendors, and suppliers: ... If you are offered or receive any substantial gift or favor, it should not be accepted and your supervisor should be notified. This guideline does not apply to items of small value commonly exchanged in business relationships, but even in this case, discretion and common sense should be your guide. (Emphasis added.) By its terms, this provision does not apply to items of small value or even to selling gifted items. To be sure, a company is ordinarily in the best position to assess the meaning of its own Code of Conduct. We are not suggesting otherwise. Cf. Arroyo-Audifred, 527 F.3d at 221 ([C]ourts in employment discrimination cases may not act as `super personnel departments,' substituting judicial judgments for the business judgments of employers.). Nonetheless, in light of the shifting explanations given for Veléz's dismissal, the inescapable ambiguity about whether the Code of Conduct even precludes Vélez's admitted behavior in accepting and selling the small value gifts adds to the suspicion that the company's reliance on the policy may be pretextual. See Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 56 (a plaintiff can also establish pretext by showing weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons such that a factfinder could infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.) (quotation marks and citation omitted). [4]
While Thermo King's shifting explanations and ambiguous company policy support the conclusion that its explanations for Velez's discharge were pretextual, Velez needed evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that the true motivation was discrimination to defeat Thermo King's motion for summary judgment. Velez's evidence that Thermo King treated him differently from younger employees who were similarly situated is more than sufficient. Conceding only for the sake of argument that Thermo King's accusations about his theft and sale of company property are accurate, Velez asserts that younger Thermo King employees, including Trinidad, Figueroa, and Quiles, were not fired despite their complicity in the theft and/or sale of company property. [5] Based on the evidence in this case, a jury could find that such disparate treatment existed, exposing the pretextual nature of Thermo King's proffered explanation for firing Velez and revealing that Thermo King's true motivation was age discrimination. An employer's disparate treatment of employees in response to behavior that legitimately offends the employer can provide evidence of discriminatory animus. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976) (While Santa Fe may decide that participation in a theft of cargo may render an employee unqualified for employment, this criterion must be `applied[ ] alike to all members of all races....') (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817). But, in order to be probative of discriminatory animus, a claim of disparate treatment must rest on proof that the proposed analogue is similarly situated in material respects. Perkins v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., 78 F.3d 747, 752 (1st Cir.1996). We examine whether a prudent person, looking objectively at the incidents, would think them roughly equivalent and the protagonists similarly situated. While an exact correlation is not necessary, the proponent must demonstrate that the cases are fair congeners. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court rejected Vélez's disparate treatment argument on the ground that the other employees who had committed misconduct were not similarly situated because they had not been implicated in the sale of company property for their own pecuniary benefit. Elaborating on this point, Thermo King argues here, as it did below, that Vélez's behavior is distinguishable from those other employees because none of the employees that admitted taking tools or materials for their personal use at home, or that admitted receiving gifts from suppliers during the investigation conducted by CRI, profited from Thermo King's property or made a business out [of] the Company tools and materials. Thermo King describes this distinction as an objective criteria and a critical difference between Vélez and the non-fired employees. A rational jury could view this distinction as so meaningless that it masks a different purpose for distinguishing among the employeestheir ages. The summary judgment record established that Trinidad admitted to stealing tools from Thermo King and purchasing property he believed was stolen from Thermo King, and that he was accused by other employees of stealing tools from Thermo King. Figueroa admitted to purchasing property she believed was stolen from Thermo King, and Quiles admitted to stealing tools from Thermo King and failing to observe company rules when he was in charge of the tool warehouse. Although Vélez is the only employee who is alleged to have profited monetarily, the other employees stole for their own benefit, knowingly bought stolen Thermo King property, and facilitated the sale of stolen Thermo King property to others. Furthermore, Trinidad, Figueroa, and Quiles each admitted to taking part in illegal and unethical activities, whereas Vélez adamantly insisted from the beginning of the investigation that he did not. In light of the other employees' similarly culpable behavior, their admissions to wrongdoing, and the lack of any coherent explanation of why Vélez's alleged profits made him an unworthy employee while the others remained worthy, a jury might reasonably distrust Thermo King's monetary profit distinction and conclude that age was the true basis for distinguishing among them. [6] Of course, [i]n assessing pretext a court's focus must be on the perception of the decisionmaker, that is, whether the employer believed its stated reason to be credible. Azimi v. Jordan's Meats, Inc., 456 F.3d 228, 246 (1st Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We understand that [i]t is not enough for a plaintiff merely to impugn the veracity of the employer's justification; he must elucidate specific facts which would enable a jury to find that the reason given is not only a sham, but a sham intended to cover up the employer's real [and unlawful] motive of discrimination.' Azimi, 456 F.3d at 246 (quoting Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 824 (1st Cir.1991)). Here, plaintiff has made a showing that the situations of other employees are fair congeners, Perkins, 78 F.3d at 751, and that Thermo King's stated explanation for firing Vélez and not the others so lacks rationality that it supports the inference that the real reason for firing Vélez was his age. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (noting that a suspicion of mendacity may be particularly influential to a jury's determination of whether an employer seeks to cover up intentional discrimination).
The ultimate question on summary judgment in this ADEA case is whether or not the plaintiff has adduced minimally sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that he was fired because of his age. Dávila v. Corporación de P.R. Para La Difusión Pública, 498 F.3d 9, 16 (1st Cir.2007). Evidence establishing a prima facie case, in combination with evidence of pretext, can be sufficient to defeat summary judgment if a rational factfinder could conclude that unlawful age discrimination was the actual, but-for cause of the discrimination. Domínguez-Cruz, 202 F.3d at 430 n. 5 (quoting Rodriguez-Cuervos v. Wal-Mart Stores, 181 F.3d 15, 22 n. 5 (1st Cir.1999)). Here, the prima facie case, Thermo King's shifting explanations for firing Vélez, its reliance on an ambiguous company policy, and the unusually strong evidence of disparate treatment, viewed in the light most favorable to Vélez, would allow a rational factfinder to conclude that age discrimination was the determinative factor in Vélez's dismissal. Therefore, we must vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment on the ADEA claims. The district court based its dismissal of plaintiff's Puerto Rico Law 80 and Law 100 claims on the dismissal of the ADEA claims. [7] In light of our ruling that Vélez's ADEA claim must be reinstated, we must vacate the summary judgment on the Puerto Rico law claims as well. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Costs are awarded to Jóse Vêlez. So ordered.