Opinion ID: 3009826
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: An appellate court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Beazer East, Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, Region III, 963 F.2d 603, 606 (3d Cir. 1992). This requires that we view the underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Judicial review over the Secretary's actions under the SMCRA uses the deferential standard applied to administrative actions. The Act provides: Any action of the Secretary to approve or disapprove a State program . . . pursuant to this chapter shall be subject to judicial review by the United States District Court for the District which includes the capital of the State whose program is at issue. . . . . . . . 12 Any action subject to judicial review under this subsection shall be affirmed unless the court concludes that such action is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise inconsistent with law. 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (emphasis added). In determining whether the Secretary's actions are arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise inconsistent with law, we look to the statute to determine whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). If the statute is silent or ambiguous, however, courts typically defer to the Secretary's reasonable interpretation. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute). Such deference is particularly appropriate when a court reviews the Secretary's interpretation of the Secretary's own regulations. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).