Opinion ID: 1908103
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Counterclaims Seventeen and Eighteen: Prima Facie Tort and Intentional Causing of Liability

Text: With regard to counterclaims seventeen and eighteen, prima facie tort and intentional causing of liability, the trial court stated that these claims were clearly not warranted by existing law and there was no good faith argument for an extension of law or, as Mrs. Meadows claims in her Reply, `adoption' of provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. (emphasis supplied). According to the court, the pleadings ... [were] devoid of any argument on behalf of Mrs. Meadows for an extension of the law regarding counts Seventeen and Eighteen[,] no legal support existed in the District for such counterclaims, and no case law from other jurisdictions was cited. Mrs. Meadows and her counsel apparently based counterclaims seventeen and eighteen on §§ 870 (liability for intended consequences), 871 (intentional harm to a property interest) and 871A (intentionally causing liability) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. However, the trial court found their reliance on the Restatement to be insufficient to withstand a Rule 11 motion. Rather, Mrs. Meadows and her counsel had to show either legal support for such claim in the District of Columbia, [or] ... provide case law from other jurisdictions in support of these claims. In particular, the trial court faulted Mrs. Meadows and her counsel for their one paragraph response [to the bank's motion to dismiss], including the applicable section of the Restatement and a conclusory statement indicating that the elements had been established. [2] We conclude that where there is no existing law in this jurisdiction, reliance on the Restatement, by itself, is sufficient to withstand the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. The Restatement is a recognized source of causes of action. As Professors Prosser and Keeton have noted: Some of the most eminent legal scholars have taken part in [the] work [of the Restatement of the Law of Torts], with the assistance of numerous judges and lawyers. .... ... [I]t unquestionably represents the most complete and thorough consideration which tort law has received. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 3, at 17 (5th ed.1984). Here, the trial court imposed sanctions in part because these claims were not warranted by existing law and there was no good faith argument for an extension of law or ... `adoption' of provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. However, in Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, et al., 710 A.2d 846, 849 (D.C.1998), we recently said: A plaintiff [or counterplaintiff] advancing a novel claim in this jurisdiction therefore will not necessarily be precluded from recovering. In Holmes, we referenced PROSSER AND KEETON, supra, in recognizing an independent action for negligent or reckless spoliation of evidence. Id. at 848-49. Similarly, in this case, we decline to uphold sanctions for the filing of counterclaims based upon sections of the Restatement where there is no case law in this jurisdiction regarding such counterclaims. [3] As we said in District of Columbia v. Fraternal Order of Police, 691 A.2d 115 (D.C.1997): Rule 11 makes sanctionable the filing of pleadings which are `legally unreasonable.' Id. at 119 (quoting Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir.1986)). One test of legal unreasonableness is whether [a] legal position... ignores relevant controlling authority. Id. Moreover, [i]t is fairly arguable that [where] there is no settled law on the precise question raised, ... any claim that sanctions are warranted [may be undercut]. Id. at 120 (referencing Black Hills Inst. v. South Dakota Sch. of Mines & Tech., 12 F.3d 737, 745 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 810, 115 S.Ct. 61, 130 L.Ed.2d 18 (1994)). The bank's claim for sanctions here is unwarranted. Furthermore, the fact that Mrs. Meadows responded to the bank's motion to dismiss with one paragraph containing a reference to the Restatement and a conclusory statement, is not dispositive on the issue of sanctions because the focus in Rule 11 sanctions' cases is whether there was a reasonable prefiling inquiry. Prior to filing, it was not patently clear that [counterclaims seventeen and eighteen had] absolutely no chance of success. Gray, supra, 612 A.2d at 842. Consequently, the trial court erred in imposing sanctions on Mrs. Meadows and her counsel for the filing of these counterclaims.