Opinion ID: 2173098
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ordinary-negligence claim

Text: For their second issue on appeal, the appellant contends that the judge erred in failing to declare a mistrial on the ordinary-negligence claim. As we noted earlier, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on that claim. Appellant suggests that, because the Resident's-Rights claim is a separate claim from the ordinary-negligence claim, the jury's response to an interrogatory finding no negligence in connection with the Resident's-Rights claim is not applicable to the ordinary-negligence claim. Furthermore, the appellant asserts that the jury understood the distinction between the two claims, as the distinction was established in the jury instructions. In fact, the jury instructions did include a separate instruction detailing the components of a Resident's-Rights claim under Ark.Code Ann. 20-10-1201 et seq. (Repl. 2000), which read: Resident's Rights Claim. The Estate of Geraldine Elizabeth Doss claims damages for injuries because of violation of Geraldine Elizabeth Doss's rights under Arkansas Code 20-10-1201. Under the Resident's Rights Act, Geraldine Elizabeth Doss, as a resident of a long term care facility, has certain rights including but not limited to: One, the right to receive adequate and appropriate health care and protective and support services, including social services, mental health services if available, planned recreational activities, and therapeutic and rehabilitative services consistent with the resident care plan with established and recognized practice standards within the community and with rules adopted by the agency. Two, the right to be treated courteously, fairly, and with the fullest measure of dignity. In contrast, the instruction on negligence read: The Estate of Geraldine Elizabeth Doss claims damages for ordinary negligence from Northport Health Services of Arkansas, LLC, doing business as Covington Court Health & Rehabilitation Center, and Northport Health Services, Incorporated, and has the burden of proving each of three essential propositions. First, that the plaintiff has sustained damages; Second that the defendants were negligent; and Third, that such negligence was a proximate cause of the damages. By reviewing these instructions, it is clear that the jury was informed of the difference in the two claims. Appellant argues that the trial judge could not apply the answers from the interrogatory dealing with Resident's Rights to the ordinary-negligence claim because the two claims were separate claims. Our decision in Leech v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 189 Ark. 161, 71 S.W.2d 467 (1934), is dispositive on this issue. In Leech , the appellant brought suit against Missouri Pacific Railroad for the death of her husband. In her suit, she alleged her husband's death was the result of the railroad's negligence. She sought damages in the amount of $45,000.00 for the benefit of herself and her son, as well as damages in the amount of $5,000.00 in her representative capacity for the benefit of her husband's estate. Id. The jury returned a verdict of $3,750.00 for damages for the benefit of the estate of the deceased. Id. at 162, 71 S.W.2d at 468. On appeal, the appellant contended that she was entitled to a verdict for the benefit of herself and her son as well because in order to find a verdict for the benefit of the estate it was necessary for the jury to find that appellee and Graham were negligent and that deceased was not. Id. We rejected this argument, stating: It does not follow, however, that because two separate and distinct causes of action are tried by the same jury that the finding of facts in one cause is binding on the jury in the other cause of action if there is a dispute in the testimony. Although there was evidence tending to show concurrent negligence on the part of Graham and appellee and no negligence on the part of deceased, yet there was evidence tending to show no negligence on the part of appellee, and the jury was at liberty to so find in the cause of action on behalf of appellant for the benefit of herself and son, as much so as if the two causes of action had been tried separately instead of together. Notwithstanding the causes of action may be tried together under the provisions of the statute, they are wholly independent of each other, and the finding of the jury in one is not binding upon the jury in the other if the facts are in dispute as they were in this case. Id. The above-quoted analysis in Leech suggests that, in a case involving more than one claim, a jury can properly reach different determinations on negligence for each claim. Similarly, the instant case involved two separate claims, an ordinary-negligence claim and a statutory claim, where the jury reached a different conclusion on the facts for the Resident's-Rights claim and the ordinary-negligence question. Because the Resident's-Rights claim is a statutory claim separate from the common-law claim of ordinary negligence, the jury was entitled to reach conflicting results in relation to those claims. Pursuant to our decision in Leech , the circuit court should have acknowledged and respected the jury's right to reach different determinations on the separate and distinct claims. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in failing to declare a mistrial on the ordinary-negligence claim, and we reverse and remand on this issue for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.