Opinion ID: 185410
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court's Revelation of Its View of the Facts to the Jury

Text: 8 Stevenson's first challenge arises from a hypothetical question the district court asked a defense expert witness. After defense counsel had asked the witness several hypothetical questions, the district court interjected its own hypothetical. At a bench conference, Stevenson objected, claiming the court's hypothetical assumed as true the defendants' version of the facts. He requested that the court issue some sort of instruction to the jury [that] they're not to assume that's your opinion of the facts or those are the facts, JA 386, and also asked the court to ask the expert a hypothetical using Stevenson's version of the facts. The district court agreed to the first request and to consider a counter-hypothetical but instructed Stevenson to provide in writing the question he wanted asked. Immediately after the bench conference, the court charged the jury that hypotheticals assumed facts that may or may not be the facts of this case, that deciding the facts was the jury's task and what the lawyers say are the facts, what [the judge says] are the facts, is immaterial to your decision. JA 387-88. At the end of the expert's crossexamination, Stevenson failed to provide the court with any hypothetical questions. In fact, when the court inquired whether he wanted the court to give an additional instruction, Stevenson replied Your jury instructions were fine. JA 398. Now Stevenson contends the district court's questioning of the expert witness was reversible error. 9 We review the judicial questioning of a witness for abuse of discretion. United States v. Tilghman, 134 F.3d 414, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Rule 614(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly permits judges to question witnesses. 3 Tilghman, 134 F.3d at 416. Judges may do so repeatedly and aggressively to clear up confusion and manage trials or where testimony is inarticulately or reluctantly given. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover,  '[t]he precepts of fair trial and judicial objectivity do not require a judge to be inert. The trial judge is properly governed by the interest of justice and truth[ ] and is not compelled to act as if he were merely presiding at a sporting match.'  United States v. Norris, 873 F.2d 1519, 1526 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 911 (1975)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 835 (1989). 10 Although, as we have noted before, [d]istrict court authority to question witnesses and manage trials ... has limits, Tilghman, 134 F.3d at 416 (citing United States v. Wyatt, 442 F.2d 858, 859-61 (D.C. Cir. 1971)), our review of the record here convinces us the district court acted well within its discretion. Stevenson received the jury instruction he requested. Moreover, despite the district court's willingness to consider asking a hypothetical question on Stevenson's behalf, Stevenson failed to provide the court with such a question. Under these circumstances, we find no fault with the district court's action.