Opinion ID: 213950
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Polygraph Examination Evidence

Text: As set forth above, Montgomery confessed that she acted alone in killing Stinnett and in kidnapping the infant. In early 2007, however, Montgomery claimed that her brother, Tommy Kleiner, had accompanied her on December 16, 2004. She reiterated the allegations during interviews with psychiatrists for the government and for the defense. Accordingly, her attorneys commissioned a polygraph examination to test the veracity of the allegations. According to the polygraph report, the purpose of the examination was to determine the truthfulness of Montgomery's assertions that her brother accompanied her to Skidmore and that he was present when Stinnett was killed. During the examination, Montgomery was asked the following questions: (1) On that day, was Tommy with you at the house? (2) Was Tommy present in the house on that day? Montgomery answered yes to both questions. The polygraph examiner opined that Montgomery did not show a consistent and strong physiological reaction when responding to the relevant questions and concluded that her answers were not indicative of deception. The government was not notified of the polygraph examination and did not take part in it. After Montgomery's allegations regarding her brother came to light, the government investigated whether Kleiner was involved in the crime. It discovered that Kleiner had been meeting with his probation officer in Lyndon, Kansas, at the time of Stinnett's murder. Kleiner's probation officer and probation records confirmed the meeting. Lyndon is approximately three hours away from Skidmore. Montgomery's counsel shared the results of the polygraph examination with the government. Thereafter, the government moved to exclude any testimony related to the examination or its results, arguing that the questions were flawed, that the results were unreliable, and that any evidence related to the polygraph examination should be excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 403. Montgomery sought to use the evidence to impeach the government's expert's opinion that Montgomery's allegations against Kleiner were intentional and knowing fabrications and not the product of an unsound mind. The district court granted the motion to exclude. Montgomery contends that the exclusion of the polygraph evidence amounted to reversible error. We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Gianakos, 415 F.3d 912, 924 (8th Cir.2005); United States v. Jordan, 150 F.3d 895, 899 (8th Cir.1998). Although there is no per se ban on the use of polygraph evidence in this circuit, [o]ur cases make clear that polygraph evidence is disfavored. United States v. Gill, 513 F.3d 836, 846 (8th Cir.2008) (gathering cases). To be admissible, polygraph evidence must be relevant, and its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. [9] Fed.R.Evid. 403; see also Fed. R.Evid. 401. Results from a unilateral polygraph examinations have little probative value. See United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1217 (6th Cir.1995) (concluding that the defendant's privately commissioned polygraph test, which was unknown to the government until after its completion, is of extremely dubious probative value). The defendant has no adverse interest at stake because a polygraph examination administered without notice to and participation by the government carries no negative consequences, and probably won't see the light of day if a defendant flunks. United States v. Ross, 412 F.3d 771, 773 (7th Cir.2005). Applying the balancing test set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 403, courts have routinely deemed inadmissible evidence related to unilateral polygraph examinations. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Thomas, 167 F.3d 299, 308-09 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Gilliard, 133 F.3d 809, 815-16 (11th Cir.1998); Sherlin, 67 F.3d at 1217; see also United States v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723, 729-30 (8th Cir. 1996) (affirming the district court's exclusion of polygraph evidence on the basis that the evidence would be more prejudicial than probative). The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the polygraph evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Montgomery's polygraph evidence had minimal probative value. The test was administered without the government's knowledge and without the possibility that Montgomery might suffer negative consequences from a failed examination. The questions were vague, with the results establishing only that Montgomery did not show a consistent and strong physiological reaction when responding to questions regarding whether Kleiner was with [her] at the house and present in the house on that day. Moreover, the admission of the proposed evidence would have necessitated collateral proceedings regarding the validity of a unilateral polygraph examination. Accordingly, the polygraph evidence was properly excluded. For the same reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the polygraph test results at the penalty phase of the trial.