Opinion ID: 3157591
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: âImmediately Apparentâ Means Probable Cause

Text: Â¶21Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Both Swietlicki and, to a lesser extent, the trial court emphasize the phrase âimmediately apparentâ in analyzing plain view. Thus, before turning to the merits, we take this opportunity to clarify the âimmediately apparentâ language first enunciated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (plurality opinion), and frequentlyÂ reiterated in our plain view cases. A naked reading of this phrase could fairly lead to the conclusion that, for the incriminating nature of an object to be âimmediately apparent,â the seizing officer must experience a split-second revelationâa product not of thought but of reflexâin which he knows, at the moment he lays eyes upon the object, that the object is incriminating. But more than three decades of jurisprudence conclusively forecloses such an interpretation. Â¶22Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Instead, the Supreme Court has long equated this language to probable cause. E.g., Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375. We have done the same. E.g., Herrera, Â¶ 26, 357 P.3d at 1231. More specifically, what has been required is that the seizing officer have âprobable cause to associate the item with criminal activity without conducting a further search.â People v. Glick, 250 P.3d 578, 585 (Colo. 2011); accord Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375; United States v. Gordon, 741 F.3d 64, 71 (10th Cir. 2014). See also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment Â§ 4.11(d), at 1028 (5th ed. 2012) (âIt must be emphasized that the âimmediately apparentâ requirement relates only to probable cause, not certainty. That is, if the police are able to establish probable cause that the object is a fruit, instrumentality or evidence of a crime without [searching it], this is all that is required . . . .â). Â¶23Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In Texas v. Brown, the Court explicitly disapproved contrary interpretations, noting first that âthe use of the phrase âimmediately apparentâ was very likely an unhappy choice of words, since it can be taken to imply that an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminatory character of evidence is necessary,â before holding that probable cause is all that the âimmediately apparentâ prong requires. 460 U.S. 730, 741â42 (1983) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted); id. at 748â50 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (agreeing that probable cause is the applicable standard). Â¶24Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Even before Brown was announced, this court arrived at the same conclusion, stating that the immediately apparent requirement âclearly implies that justification for the warrantless seizure is nothing more and nothing less than probable cause to believe that the article to be seized is connected with criminal behavior.â People v. Franklin, 640 P.2d 226, 229 (Colo. 1982). Over time, we have retained the âimmediately apparentâ language and added the interchangeable term âreasonable beliefâ to the mix. See, e.g., People v. Alameno, 193 P.3d 830, 834 (Colo. 2008) (â[P]olice must have had a reasonable belief that the evidence seized was incriminating. This . . . requirement is met if the incriminating nature was âimmediately apparentâ to the officer, which means that the officer had probable cause to associate the item with criminal activity without conducting a further search.â (citing People v. Pitts, 13 P.3d 1218, 1222 (Colo. 2000))). Nonetheless, the clear import of our plain view cases is that the âimmediately apparentâ requirement of the plain view exception means nothing more than the police must possess probable cause without conducting a further search. See, e.g., Herrera, Â¶ 26, 357 P.3d at 1231; People v. Brant, 252 P.3d 459, 464 (Colo. 2011); Glick, 250 P.3d at 585; People v. Smith, 13 P.3d 300, 308 (Colo. 2000); People v. Dumas, 955 P.2d 60, 64 n.9 (Colo. 1998). Â¶25Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In sum, the second prong of the plain view exception requires only that the seizing officer have probable cause to associate the object with criminal activity withoutÂ conducting a further search. Neither the âimmediately apparentâ nor âreasonable beliefâ phrasing carries independent meaning.