Opinion ID: 4118870
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Related to Factor (b) Evidence

Text: Section 190.3, factor (b) permits the jury to consider a defendant‘s criminal activity involving the use, threat, or attempt to use force or violence in deciding whether to impose the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole. Defendant raises several challenges to the factor (b) evidence admitted in his penalty trial. 68

Before trial, the prosecutor moved to admit evidence that defendant had sexually assaulted Julia P. In a tape-recorded statement, Julia alleged that defendant had exposed himself to her and requested oral sex, then displayed a gun and attempted to rape her. The defense challenged the truth of these claims, noting Julia did not file a police report and had not mentioned the incident in multiple conversations with the police about defendant. The court ruled the evidence admissible, noting the delayed report went to the weight of the evidence and could be explored on cross-examination. In addition, while the alleged conduct was violent and threatening, the court ruled it was not so inflammatory as to require an additional hearing. At the penalty phase, Julia described three incidents. Once, when she was sitting under a hair dryer, defendant approached with his pants down. He forcefully touched her breasts and neck, exposed his penis, and asked for oral sex. Another time, she was lying on a couch watching television with friends. Defendant suddenly pushed her down, straddled her, pinned her wrists, and tried to pull her pants down. When she resisted, defendant ordered his younger brother to remove her pants. The brother refused, telling defendant to leave her alone. On a third occasion, Julia went into her friend‘s bathroom to escape defendant when he was pestering her to have sex. Defendant followed her in, shut the door behind him, and turned off the light. He pulled a gun and held the barrel near his chin. Eventually the friend‘s mother came to the door, and defendant let her leave. Sometime later, to end the harassment, Julia did allow defendant to engage in intercourse.23 23 Julia also described two factor (b) incidents related to Patterson. In the first, she saw Patterson repeatedly slap and kick his girlfriend on a street corner. In the second, she was lying on a couch and Patterson touched her sexually. 69 Defendant now claims this evidence was insufficient to demonstrate he used or threatened to use force or violence. To the contrary, Julia P.‘s testimony clearly establishes that defendant used force when he groped her under the hair dryer and pinned her to the couch by her wrists. In the third incident, defendant prevented her from leaving the bathroom and brandished a firearm. These acts violated several penal statutes. They were sufficient to be admissible as aggravating evidence. (§ 190.3, factor (b).)
Defendant also complains the court erred in precluding him from crossexamining Julia about two false claims of rape. Counsel asked whether Julia had told her friend Nicole that she had sex with Nicole‘s boyfriend, ―Pie,‖ because he forced himself on her. Julia answered, ―no,‖ and the prosecutor objected when counsel tried to inquire further. The court sustained the objection under Evidence Code section 352, finding any probative value of this evidence would be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, undue consumption of time, and confusion of the issues. Defense counsel asserted the evidence was relevant as a false accusation of rape, but when pressed for a more specific offer of proof he conceded he had not been able to locate Nicole or her boyfriend. The court ruled that no further questioning on the subject would be permitted until defendant was prepared to produce either of these witnesses. During the chambers conference, defense counsel mentioned he also wanted to introduce evidence that Julia told ―various people‖ she had had sex with her friend‘s grandfather, Zeke. Counsel wanted to ask her about these statements and ―hopefully the witness will testify truthfully that she lied.‖ The prosecutor objected that this offer of proof did not even involve a false claim of rape, but only sexual activity. Remarking that the offer of proof was ―very vague‖ and the questioning sought appeared to be ―a fishing expedition,‖ the court ruled that this line of questioning would be prohibited unless the defense satisfied Evidence 70 Code section 782.24 In response, the defense requested a continuance, which was denied. The court observed that the defense had prior notice of these issues and could recall Julia once it had made the proper showing. Evidence may be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 ―if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.‖ An exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352 will be affirmed unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd and the ruling resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10.) The trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in prohibiting further cross-examination on the witness‘s sexual activity. A prior accusation of rape is relevant to the complaining witness‘s credibility, but only if the accusation is shown to be false. (People v. Tidwell (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1457.) In People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1097, after a witness testified the defendant threatened her with a gun when she refused his advances, the defendant sought to impeach with evidence that the witness had falsely accused two other men of sexual molestation. The trial court sustained an Evidence Code section 352 objection, and we affirmed. We explained: ―The value of the evidence as impeachment depends upon proof that the prior charges were false. This would in effect force the parties to present evidence concerning two long-past sexual incidents which never reached the point of formal charges. Such a proceeding would consume considerable time, and divert the attention of the jury from the case at hand.‖ (Bittaker, at p. 1097.) The same is true here. Julia denied accusing Pie of rape. For this line of questioning to have any relevance, then, the defense would have had to establish 24 This provision requires a written motion and sworn offer of proof, and a hearing, before a complaining witness‘s sexual activity may be used to attack credibility. (Evid. Code, § 782.) 71 both that the accusation was made and that it was false. (See People v. Tidwell, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1457-1458.) The trial court reasonably concluded this inquiry would consume undue amounts of time. Further, it appears that counsel could not establish adequate foundation in light of his admission that he had not located Pie or the person to whom Julia allegedly complained. Defendant‘s second proffered impeachment was even further afield. As the prosecutor observed, this alleged statement was not a claim of rape, but merely that the witness had sex with someone. It could conceivably have been relevant if the statement was false, but counsel merely ―hope[d]‖ this was the case and did not have ready proof. The court acted well within its discretion in preventing this fishing expedition from diverting undue time and attention from the trial. Nor did the court abuse its discretion in denying a continuance. A midtrial continuance may be granted only for good cause. ―A showing of good cause requires a demonstration that counsel and the defendant have prepared for trial with due diligence. [Citations.]‖ (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1037; see § 1050, subd. (e).) The record demonstrates that defense counsel had been aware of Julia‘s allegations for at least six months. Yet they gathered no further evidence to support their argument that she had made false accusations against other men. Given counsel‘s unsuccessful attempt to locate the key witnesses, the trial court acted well within its discretion in concluding an additional continuance with no proffered basis to expect success was unjustified. We note that the court left open an opportunity for the matter to be revisited later if counsel made an appropriate showing. No such showing was attempted.
On cross-examination, the defense stressed Julia‘s failure to tell the police about defendant‘s harassing conduct until shortly before trial and her spotty memory as to what she told the police at various times. In an attempt to rehabilitate her, the prosecutor asked about a tape-recorded statement she made while in the hospital after Patterson‘s attack. When asked if she remembered 72 telling officers how she learned defendant had murdered Beeson, Julia said she overheard someone named Charles say to her friend Lakeisha, ― ‗your cousin‘s crazy for killing that white girl.‘ ‖ The court allowed the statement but instructed the jury it could not be considered for the truth of the matter asserted but only for its bearing on the witness‘s ability to recall the day in question. Defendant raised another hearsay objection when Julia testified that Lakeisha told her defendant and Patterson had killed Beeson because ― ‗they were trying to rob her, and she wouldn‘t cooperate so they killed her.‘ ‖ The court overruled this objection as well and again told the jury the statement could not be considered for its truth. Defendant now complains the court violated his due process right to a fair penalty hearing by admitting ―highly inflammatory evidence.‖ He complains the probative value of the evidence was slight because there was no serious dispute about Julia‘s ability to recall the day in question, or the reasons why she failed to tell the police about defendant‘s assaultive conduct. The record belies this assertion. Defense cross-examination repeatedly challenged Julia‘s memory of details. Moreover, the statements were only prejudicial insofar as they implicated defendant in Beeson‘s murder. But they were admitted at the penalty phase of trial, after the jury had already convicted him. Accordingly, the statements concerned a crime that was no longer in dispute. Because defendant‘s authorities all concern the admission of hearsay statements at the guilt phase, they are inapposite to the question of prejudice here. Finally, to the extent defendant‘s reply brief suggests the statements violated Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, the claim fails. (See id. at p. 59.) The trial court carefully reminded jurors that the statements could not be considered for their truth. As nonhearsay, the statements fall outside the Crawford rule.
Over defendant‘s objection that they were too remote, the court admitted as factor (b) evidence testimony regarding several acts he committed as a juvenile. (See People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 586.) Defendant now challenges 73 both the direct admission of these juvenile offenses and his expert‘s testimony on cross-examination about additional incidents. The evidence was properly admitted.
When defendant was 12 years old, he and a companion approached a woman who had arrived home late at night and was sitting in her parked van. Defendant ordered her to open the door and give them her money. When she did not comply, he struck the van‘s windows with a pole, cracking the glass. Defendant‘s companion pointed a gun at her and threatened to shoot her. The victim started the ignition and drove off, swerving as she heard gunshots. Berkeley police officers detained defendant at age 13 after he appeared to throw something into bushes. During a pat search, they found a lump of rock cocaine. Defendant struggled and tried to run but was eventually handcuffed. When he was 14, defendant led police on a high-speed car chase through city streets for over 30 minutes. He eventually hit a patrol car and submitted to arrest. When read his Miranda warnings, defendant said, ―I shouldn‘t have run. I should have got out of my car and started shooting at you.‖ He then criticized the officer‘s gun and bragged that he had been shooting a .357 Magnum revolver earlier that night. Defendant said he threw away the gun and some drugs during the chase. A .357 Magnum revolver was found later that night in an area of the chase. At age 16, defendant was written up three times for being threatening and disrespectful to Juanita Ream, a teaching assistant at CYA. He called her a ―coward‖ and a ―bald-hair bitch‖ and had to be removed from the classroom by security. He was verbally abusive with the CYA officer and youth counselor who tried to talk with him, refused to cooperate in a search, and had to be physically restrained. When defendant was 17, a CYA officer overheard him tell his roommate: ― ‗You are going to be my pussy. You are going to give it to me. I‘ll make you 74 submit.‘ ‖ The roommate was lying on the bottom bunk and defendant was leaning over him. Defendant held a weapon fashioned from a toothbrush pointed at his roommate‘s throat. When defendant was removed from the room, he became physically combative and threatened to harm the officer. Later that year, defendant assaulted a smaller boy as they left the CYA showers. He chased the boy down the hall until two officers subdued him with Mace. The prosecutor mentioned several additional incidents in cross-examining defendant‘s expert, Dr. Jamie Candelaria-Greene, about material she read in defendant‘s juvenile records and discipline reports. For example, defendant‘s mother reported that he played with matches and at age eight had attempted to set fire to a neighbor‘s home. From age 10 to 13 defendant lived in a group home, where he had three fist fights with peers and threatened staff on three occasions. Dr. Candelaria-Greene denied seeing reports about armed robberies or auto thefts during this period but did see a juvenile hall report that he had threatened a judge. She also saw reports of defendant‘s violence against his mother and sister. The court instructed the jury that information referred to in these juvenile reports was not admitted for truth but only to show the basis of the expert‘s opinions.
Juvenile criminal activity involving force or threatened violence is admissible in aggravation under factor (b). (See, e.g., People v. Bivert (2011) 52 Cal.4th 96, 122; People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 653; People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 378.) ―We also have repeatedly held that the admission of such evidence passes constitutional muster. [Citations.]‖ (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 649.) These conclusions were not altered by the high court‘s decision in Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 barring execution of those who committed capital crimes when under age 18. Roper concerned the Eighth Amendment standard for imposing punishment, not the admissibility of evidence. ―It says nothing about the propriety of permitting a capital jury, trying an adult, to 75 consider evidence of violent offenses committed when the defendant was a juvenile.‖ (People v. Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1239.) Defendant urges us to reconsider our holdings based on the Supreme Court‘s extension of Roper v. Simmons in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. __ [132 S.Ct. 2455] to sentences of life imprisonment without parole. Yet there too the focus was on Eighth Amendment standards for punishing juvenile misconduct. Here, the question is what evidence may be considered when determining punishment for an adult‘s crime. The high court has never suggested that, in deciding that question, the jury may not consider qualifying criminal conduct the defendant committed as a juvenile. Even if defendant is correct that Roper and Miller treat juvenile misconduct as less blameworthy than adult misconduct, evidence of forceful or violent conduct is nevertheless relevant to penalty phase questions about character and future dangerousness. (See People v. Bivert, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 123.) Arguments about the offender‘s youth and immaturity go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. 25 Defendant also complains that the admission of his juvenile misconduct is inconsistent with section 26, which presumes that children under age 14 are incapable of committing a crime. However, the presumption of incapacity can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the minor knew the wrongfulness of his act. (People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 378.) Because defendant did not raise this objection below, the prosecutor did not present evidence and the trial court did not make findings on in this regard. To the extent defendant now argues there was insufficient foundation of his capacity, the claim has not been preserved for review. (See People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434-435.) 25 The same is true for defendant‘s assertion that it is ―unseemly‖ to base a death sentence on juvenile misconduct he committed while under the state‘s supervision. Defendant spent much of his youth in group homes and CYA because he was a violent, repeat offender. He was free to present evidence criticizing the services he received, but defendant‘s residence in state custody does not make his violent and threatening conduct as a juvenile any less admissible. 76
Factor (b) evidence ―must violate a penal statute and must be directed against a person or persons, not against property.‖ (People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1013; see People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 778 (Boyd).) The trial court conducted a lengthy pretrial hearing to determine if there was substantial evidence to prove the required elements of each factor (b) crime the prosecution sought to introduce. (See People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72 fn. 25.) The court admitted some incidents and excluded others. Defendant now claims some incidents the court allowed were not sufficiently violent or threatening to be admissible. The decision to admit factor (b) evidence is within the trial court‘s discretion, and no abuse of discretion will be found if substantial evidence was presented establishing the crimes. (Ibid.; see People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 587.)
First, defendant argues that the incident in which he called the CYA teaching assistant a ―coward‖ and ―bald-hair bitch‖ (see ante, at pp. 74-75) did not violate a criminal statute or constitute an imminent threat. The evidence belies his claim. Ream testified that defendant was walking around the classroom, calling her a bitch, and saying he did not have to listen to her. He seemed to be inciting the other students against her. She felt threatened and called security to have him removed. Defendant was verbally abusive to the officer who removed him and the counselor who tried to talk to him. He repeatedly called them cowards and challenged each to ―settle things one-on-one.‖ He became physically agitated and had to be placed in a restraint hold. Ream reported the incident on a disciplinary form. When defendant returned to her class afterward, he walked straight to Ream and said, ―see, your write-up means nothing. I can do whatever.‖ Ream testified she felt threatened during the encounter. Defendant argues this evidence was inadmissible because there was no evidence he intended to threaten Ream or induced a reasonable belief that any 77 threats could be carried out. (See People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 580; Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 777.) However, Ream repeatedly testified that she felt threatened, both by defendant‘s insulting words and his menacing behavior. She could have reasonably understood his statement that her disciplinary write-up meant nothing and he could ―do whatever‖ as a threat of physical retaliation for her call to security. The crime of unlawful threats can be established even if the defendant had no present ability to act on the threat (People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1311), and the recipient need not perceive any immediate danger of the threat being carried out (People v. Iboa (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 111, 121). Moreover, even if defendant‘s verbal abuse of Ream did not rise to the level of criminal threats, evidence about the classroom encounter provided important context for testimony about his removal from the classroom, during which he forcibly struggled and made explicit threats against the security officer and counselor to ―settle things one-on-one.‖ Defendant does not dispute that evidence of this behavior was properly admitted. ― ‗[W]hen the prosecution has evidence of conduct by the defendant that [is admissible under section 190.3, factor (b)], evidence of the surrounding circumstances is admissible to give context to the episode, even though the surrounding circumstances include other criminal activity that would not be admissible by itself. [Citation.]‘ ‖ (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1081.) In People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 505, evidence that the defendant had called a witness‘s son ―names like ‗punk‘ and ‗sissy‘ ‖ was properly admitted as a surrounding circumstance of a factor (b) crime. The same is true here.
Next, defendant challenges the admission of several factor (b) incidents arising from his clashes with CYA deputies. All of the evidence was properly admitted. Deputy Tammy Wyatt reported defendant for passing hot water to another inmate, a rules violation. Angry about his limited access to hot water, defendant 78 warned a deputy that anyone who tried to enter his cell would be assaulted. When Deputy Wyatt brought him a food tray that week, he shoved it back at her. Defendant was interviewed about the disciplinary report and stated that ―if he wanted to get a write-up, he could get one for a much more severe incident.‖ He then repeated there would be ―trouble‖ if deputies entered his cell. When the interview ended and defendant‘s restraints were removed, he refused to step into the pod. Instead, he turned to Deputy Wyatt and told her she had ―better not come up to his cell.‖ Contrary to defendant‘s claim, this remark could only have been intended, and understood, as a threat. Defendant was visibly angry with Deputy Wyatt, had recently tried to hit her with a tray, and had repeatedly threatened to physically assault any deputy who visited his cell. Defendant‘s warning to Wyatt clearly implied that defendant planned to assault her if she came to a place where he was unrestrained. Defendant made a similar threat to Deputy William Humphries when the deputy had to tell him repeatedly to end a telephone call and return to his cell. Defendant yelled, ―You better check your attitude. You came in here with attitude today. You don‘t know who you are dealing with. I‘ll be here everyday, Humphries.‖ When the deputy began writing up a discipline report, defendant added, ―I don‘t care if you are writing me up. . . . I don‘t care where I get sent. You need to check your stuff. You still have to come in my room.‖ Although defendant now minimizes this incident as mere ―mouthing off,‖ his words clearly implied a threat to assault Deputy Humphries when the opportunity arose, and the deputy understood the statements as threatening. Defendant also challenges the admissibility of Humphries‘s testimony that this incident occurred when defendant was in an administrative segregation unit for high-profile or violent inmates. Rather than object, defense counsel chose to cross examine the deputy on procedures in the segregated unit. Absent an objection, defendant‘s current challenge to the testimony is forfeited. (See People 79 v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 434-435.)26 In any event, as defendant‘s reply brief concedes, this evidence was relevant context for Deputy Humphries‘s perception of defendant‘s statements as a threat. Finally, defendant argues a deputy impermissibly testified that he had a reputation for violence. (See People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1233.) Deputy Charles Foster testified briefly about a factor (b) incident involving Patterson. In cross-examination, defendant‘s attorney solicited the deputy‘s views about defendant‘s demeanor in prison. Deputy Foster recalled having no real problem with defendant, whom he considered no different than most other inmates. On redirect, the prosecutor asked whether defendant had a reputation in the sheriff‘s department as being excessively violent toward staff. The court allowed the question, finding that counsel‘s cross-examination had opened the door to inquiry about defendant‘s character. Foster answered ―yes‖ and confirmed hearing about defendant‘s reputation over many years from many different deputies. Evidence offered in rebuttal to defense mitigation evidence need not relate to any specific aggravating factor under section 190.3. (Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 109.) We have repeatedly held that impeachment is permissible in the penalty phase when a defense witness offers testimony bearing on the defendant‘s character. (People v. Payton (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1050, 1066; People v. Wagner (1975) 13 Cal.3d 612, 619.) Defense counsel elicited testimony from Deputy Foster suggesting defendant was no more violent than other inmates. The People were entitled to rebut that suggestion with evidence that, notwithstanding Deputy Foster‘s view, defendant was known to be an especially 26 Defendant also did not object when Patterson‘s attorney elicited testimony from Deputy Judith Miller-Thrower that defendant‘s administrative segregation status required that he be transported in chains, even inside the jail. His present challenge to this testimony was therefore not preserved. (People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 354; People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 434-435.) 80 violent inmate. ―A defendant has no right to mislead the jury through one-sided character testimony during either the guilt or penalty trial. We do not believe that defendant was entitled to elicit testimony suggesting that he was [nonviolent], and at the same time to preclude the People from introducing contrary evidence.‖ (People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 578.)
Parole Officer Craig Jackson testified about defendant‘s good behavior leading up to his release from CYA. During his last year there, defendant had no serious disciplinary infractions, had a job, attended classes in victim awareness and anger management, and expressed understanding of the seriousness of his conduct. Defendant‘s maturity level increased. He demonstrated insight into the reasons for his actions and understood how he could avoid violence in the future. In the context of this testimony, Officer Jackson related that defendant told him ― ‗he often reacted aggressively in order to gain stature among his peers and to make himself feel good.‘ ‖ Defendant now argues this statement was inadmissible under factor (b). We disagree. The statement reflected defendant‘s insight into why he had committed the many factor (b) offenses presented over the preceding days. It was relevant context for these offenses and admissible as a surrounding circumstance. (See People v. Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) It was also relevant as a projection of defendant‘s state of mind with respect to the Beeson murder, and thus admissible as a circumstance of this crime under section 190.3, factor (a). (See People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 224.) Finally, ―[e]vidence of statements from defendant‘s own mouth demonstrating his attitude toward his victims was highly probative‖ on the issue of future dangerousness. (People v. Payton, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1063.) 3. Expert Testimony on Antisocial Personality Disorder and Future Dangerousness Defendant contends the court erred in allowing the prosecutor to crossexamine his expert witness about antisocial personality disorder and future 81 dangerousness. Given the scope of the expert‘s direct examination, these topics were properly raised for impeachment. The defense called Jamie Candelaria-Greene, Ph.D., an expert in learning disabilities and special education. At the outset of her testimony, the court read a standard instruction explaining that an expert‘s opinions should be assessed in light of the expert‘s qualifications and the supporting facts and reasons. Dr. Candelaria-Greene had reviewed defendant‘s school, medical, probation, and CYA records but had not met with defendant before the trial. Based on her record review, she testified that defendant suffered from ADHD. Defendant had never received medication or counseling for that condition. Defense counsel specifically asked if the expert was aware of studies examining the effects of giving prisoners ADHD medication, such as Ritalin. She described ―an excellent study‖ in which Colorado adult prisoners who showed classic signs of ADHD were given Ritalin and counseling. After six months, their recidivism rate ―plummeted‖ from the nationwide average of 50 to 60 percent down to 10 percent. Those still in prison were better able to participate in hobbies and vocational education, ―but most of all, there was a greater degree of safety associated with . . . the prisoners and those around‖ them. Defense counsel also asked her about the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV). She confirmed she was familiar with the DSM-IV and explained that it is used for diagnosing psychiatric conditions, including ADHD. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked about the DSM-IV requirements for diagnosing antisocial personality disorder. The expert eventually agreed that defendant had been repeatedly diagnosed with a conduct disorder and fit the other DSM-IV requirements for antisocial personality disorder. She did not actually give her own diagnosis that defendant had this disorder. Much of her testimony was based on hypothetical questions, and she repeatedly protested that she was not a psychologist. Defendant objected that Dr. Candelaria-Greene was not qualified to testify about the contents of the DSM-IV. The court found the 82 questioning proper because the expert testified on direct examination that she had relied on the DSM-IV in reaching her conclusions. At defendant‘s request, however, the court gave a limiting instruction explaining that any reports referenced or read during the expert‘s testimony were not admitted for truth but only to show the basis of her opinions. The prosecutor also asked about defendant‘s history of violent incidents in school and CYA. The expert agreed that, without a change in environmental conditions, past violence is the best predictor of future dangerousness. In particular, she testified that defendant‘s potential for future violence was high given his past behavior. Defendant objected at sidebar that the subject of future dangerousness was beyond her expertise. The court overruled this objection, observing that the ―linchpin‖ of her direct examination testimony was that defendant would be safe around others in prison if he were treated with Ritalin and counseling. Having raised the subject of defendant‘s future violence in prison, the court ruled the defense could not insulate it from cross-examination. (See People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1211, disapproved on another ground in People v. Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 459.) When the court later described its ruling on the record, defendant‘s attorney clarified his objection. He said, ―There is no question that we raised it and that it was proper to discuss future dangerousness.‖ Instead, he meant to object that questions about material in psychiatric reports were beyond her area of expertise. This concession fatally undermines defendant‘s challenge to the crossexamination on future dangerousness. (People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 434-435.) In any event, the claim lacks merit. ― ‗While the prosecution is prohibited from offering expert testimony predicting future dangerousness in its case-in-chief [citation], it may explore the issue on cross-examination or in rebuttal if defendant offers expert testimony predicting good prison behavior in the future. [Citations.]‖ (People v. Jones, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1260.) Defendant raised the issue when he elicited testimony that ADHD prisoners treated with 83 medication and counseling exhibited ―a greater degree of safety‖ than was otherwise expected of them. Having chosen to raise this subject, the defense could not reasonably insulate it from cross-examination. (People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1211.) Defendant‘s challenge to cross-examination based on the DSM-IV is similarly unavailing. We rejected this same claim in People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 679-680. There, after a defense expert testified that the defendant suffered an anxiety disorder and an atypical personality disorder, the prosecutor used the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual to demonstrate on cross-examination that defendant met the requirements for a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. (Id. at p. 679.) We held this questioning was within the bounds of appropriate impeachment. (Id. at pp. 679-680; see People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 207 [―Because the defense experts relied on the DSM-IV to reach their opinions, the prosecutor was permitted to explore their familiarity with the DSM-IV on cross-examination‖].) Defendant attempts to distinguish Seaton and Mills because those cases involved no dispute about the expert‘s qualification to render a psychiatric opinion. He argues Dr. Candelaria-Greene was not qualified to diagnose antisocial personality disorder. However, defendant himself offered her expert diagnosis of ADHD based on the criteria in the DSM-IV. ―When, as here, a mental health expert offers a diagnosis, this opens the door to rebuttal testimony questioning that diagnosis or suggesting an alternative diagnosis. [Citation.]‖ (People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 359; see People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 883.) We have never held that cross-examination must be confined to questions about the precise diagnosis an expert offers. Nor do our cases require that prosecutors present alternate diagnoses through rebuttal testimony, instead of cross-examination. Either way, the evidence is permissible as impeachment of the expert‘s opinion. (See People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 884.) Finally, it would be anomalous to hold that deficiencies in an expert‘s qualifications 84 somehow shield her opinions from vigorous testing on cross-examination. Indeed, those deficiencies were themselves an appropriate topic of cross-examination. (Evid. Code, § 721, subd. (a).)27 4. Prosecutorial Misconduct Defendant claims the prosecutor committed several acts of misconduct, violating his rights to a fair trial and penalty determination. ―Improper comments by a prosecutor require reversal of a resulting conviction when those comments so infect a trial with unfairness that they create a denial of due process. [Citations.] Conduct by a prosecutor that does not reach that level nevertheless constitutes misconduct under state law, but only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the court or jury. [Citation.]‖ (People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1031.) None of the challenged incidents constitutes prejudicial misconduct. a. Epithets Defendant complains the prosecutor committed misconduct when he used two epithets. In opening statement, the prosecutor referred to defendant and Patterson as ―evil men.‖ Defendant objected the next day. The court sustained the objection and directed the prosecutor not to use that characterization in the remainder of his opening statement. The second epithet occurred during the crossexamination of Dr. Candelaria-Greene. The prosecutor asked a hypothetical question about assessing an unwilling subject, whom he referred to as a ―violent jerk.‖ The court sustained defense counsel‘s objection and told the prosecutor to rephrase the question. The prosecutor then described in detail all the personality 27 In his reply brief, defendant argues the court in its gatekeeper role has a duty to vet proffered expert opinions. (See Evid. Code, §§ 801-802; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 769.) Once again, defendant ignores that the challenged testimony was elicited on crossexamination. The prosecutor did not ―proffer‖ Dr. Candelaria-Greene‘s opinion. Rather, he impeached the opinions she offered on direct examination by demonstrating that the records she reviewed supported an alternative diagnosis. We need not further discuss defendant‘s analysis of the Sargon precedent. 85 attributes he was referring to with the shorthand ―jerk.‖ The defense raised no further objection. For a prosecutor‘s remarks to constitute misconduct, it must appear reasonably likely in the context of the whole argument and instructions that ― ‗the jury understood or applied the complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner.‘ ‖ (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 667.) To the extent defendant‘s objections were preserved, the mild and fleeting descriptions here do not rise to the level of misconduct. In People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1172, the prosecutor repeatedly called the defendant ― ‗evil‘ ‖ in closing argument. We found no misconduct, noting that several more derogatory epithets have been found within the range of permissible argument. (Ibid.; see e.g., People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 84 [defendant called an ― ‗insidious little bastard‘ ‖]; People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 537 [defendant called a ― ‗perverted murderous cancer‘ ‖].) Similarly, in People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at page 168, we concluded opening statement descriptions of the defendant as ― ‗monstrous,‘ ‖ ― ‗cold-blooded,‘ ‖ and a ― ‗predator‘ ‖ were fair comment on what the prosecutor expected the evidence would show. Moreover, the jury was instructed that opening statements are not evidence but merely reflect counsel‘s prediction of what the evidence will show. With respect to the hypothetical question that insinuated defendant was a ―jerk,‖ the jury was also instructed that questions of counsel are not evidence. Considering these admonitions, and the ample evidence of the murder‘s brutality and defendant‘s callous behavior afterward, it is not reasonably likely that the prosecutor‘s description of him as ―evil‖ or a ―violent jerk‖ improperly inflamed the jury. (See People v. Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 84.) b. Closing Argument Defendant claims the prosecutor committed misconduct three times in closing argument by referencing facts not in evidence. 86 First, the prosecutor challenged Dr. Candelaria-Greene‘s credibility by observing that her opinions contradicted those of many experts whose reports she had reviewed. The experts who had evaluated defendant in person all concluded his potential for future violence was high. In contrast, the prosecutor argued, Dr. Candelaria-Greene ―wouldn‘t even sit down with him face-to-face. Now[,] whether that‘s a [sleight]-of-hand legal strategy or she didn‘t want to be in the same room with him, don‘t know. But she wouldn‘t even sit in the same room with him.‖ Defendant did not object to this statement and therefore forfeited a claim of misconduct. ―As a general rule a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion—and on the same ground— the defendant made an assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety.‖ (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841.) The claim also fails on the merits. Defendant complains that the prosecutor‘s remarks about why Dr. Candelaria-Greene may have failed to meet with defendant were pure speculation. But the challenged remarks were not phrased as assertions. By expressly stating that he did not know why the expert failed to meet with defendant, the prosecutor conceded the reasons he was offering were merely reasonable possibilities. His point was that no conceivable reason justified offering an opinion without an in-person evaluation. In context, it is not reasonably likely the jury would have misunderstood his comments as asserting a definitive reason for the lack of a face-to-face meeting. Second, defendant contends the prosecutor implicitly attacked his character when he argued: ―Where are the family members? They‘re here in the community; they‘re local; they‘re around. Where are they? Why didn‘t they come in here and tell you something?‖ Because defendant did not object to these remarks, he forfeited any claim of error. (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 960.) Moreover, we have held that argument about the absence of a defendant‘s 87 family members from trial does not constitute misconduct, but permissible comment on the defendant‘s failure to call logical witnesses. (People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1173-1174.) The argument here was within appropriate bounds. Third, defendant complains the prosecutor‘s closing argument exaggerated the pleasures of prison life. After describing the trauma Beeson‘s family endured, the prosecutor compared the defendants‘ life in custody: ―They go on. They have their life in jail, their card games, their basketball games. . . . [¶] There‘s a social life, their jobs, schools, educational opportunities.‖ Defense counsel objected at sidebar that no evidence had been presented on the conditions in state prison. The court sustained the objection but allowed the prosecutor to argue about evidence that was presented on the conditions in CYA and county jail. When argument resumed, the prosecutor stated: ―You‘ve heard from evidence what life is like in jail and what life is like in the California Youth Authority. You get to play sports, basketball, card games, make home-made alcohol; there‘s marijuana, cookies, and enchiladas, canteen privileges. There are . . . telephones, there are letters, there are visits. There‘s sex. You‘ve heard evidence that a full life exists behind bars. Maybe not the life . . . you would like to think of, but . . . if you get yourself a life sentence out of this trial, you get to have that institutional life, and you‘ve heard evidence about jail and about the California Youth Authority, and that includes all those things, things to look forward to. Most of the same things that we all have in our lives now, although they‘re in a different form.‖ He then stressed that defendants had taken all of these joys of life from Beeson and destroyed her family. Although defendant objected, and his objection was sustained, he did not ask the court to admonish the jury to disregard the prosecutor‘s argument. Accordingly, he forfeited this challenge on appeal. (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 753.) In any event, it was unlikely the jury would have misunderstood the prosecutor‘s initial argument to be about state prison 88 conditions. After the sidebar, he repeatedly referenced specific evidence the jury had heard about conditions in both CYA and county jail. Moreover, defense counsel‘s final argument dispelled any prejudice that may have arisen. While not permitted to discuss any specific prison where defendant might be sent, defendant‘s attorney argued that the prosecutor‘s ―country club theory‖ of prison life ―never gives us any detail about such things as lack of freedom, lack of choice, even lack of basic privacy. With the toilet and wash basin in the cell, people have likened it to living their entire lives in a bathroom.‖ He also described the small size of the cell and the fact that defendant would have little contact with his family or the outside world. Separately, defendant claims the court erred in allowing the prosecutor to argue that there was no evidence of an emotional disturbance. Killing while under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance may be considered in mitigation under section 190.3, factor (d). In the course of discussing all mitigation factors, the prosecutor simply pointed out that no evidence had been presented in support of factor (d). Defendant does not dispute the truth of this point but claims the argument implicitly suggested jurors could consider absence of the mitigating factor as a factor in aggravation. It is true that ―the absence of this mitigating factor is not itself aggravating.‖ (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1223; see People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 289-290.) However, the prosecutor never invited the jury to draw this improper inference. On the contrary, after arguing that no mitigating evidence had been presented regarding defendant, the prosecutor stated: ―I want to be absolutely clear. I‘ve talked to you about evidence has to be used in categories . . . . I‘ve talked to you about aggravating factors. There is not an aggravating factor that in any way says lack of mitigation. So the fact that there‘s no mitigation for Norman Patterson, that is not an aggravating factor. Okay. It‘s important that you apply this evidence properly. . . . [¶] So the absence of mitigation is not an aggravating factor.‖ This argument was appropriate and the court did not err in allowing it. 89 c. Rebuttal Argument Defendant raises three complaints of misconduct in the prosecutor‘s rebuttal argument. Each of these claims was forfeited by lack of an objection and, on the merits, fails to establish prejudicial misconduct. First, defendant contends the prosecutor attacked the integrity of defense counsel by pointing out their positions throughout the trial. He reminded jurors that at the guilt phase defense counsel had argued defendant was innocent and had falsely confessed. The prosecutor then observed, ―Now you are being told by the same attorney for the same defendant, oh, well, he did do it. Okay. You guys are right. We tried to fool you last time.‖ Still speaking in the role of defense counsel, the prosecutor said, ―It‘s as though it is whatever we can say to try and fool you and beat you. Whatever we can say to try and trick you into making a mistake as a jury, to get you to make the wrong decision that will favor the defendants. [¶] We will say anything to you, anything whatsoever.‖ The prosecutor then briefly explained the concept of lingering doubt and stressed that it should not apply because, in saying they did not contest the guilt phase verdict, the defendants‘ lawyers were acknowledging their clients‘ guilt. He continued: ―So, to the extent that you heard arguments to the contrary at the end of the guilt phase, you were being intentionally misled.‖ The prosecutor then urged jurors to be skeptical of defense counsel‘s penalty phase arguments, contending they would say anything to persuade the jury to return the more lenient sentence. Defendant failed to raise a timely objection to this argument and therefore forfeited his claim of misconduct. (People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1215.) On the merits, the remarks did not result in prejudicial error. Personal attacks on the integrity of opposing counsel can constitute misconduct. (People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 820.) ―It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citations], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [citation]. Such attacks on counsel‘s credibility risk focusing the jury‘s attention on irrelevant 90 matters and diverting the prosecution from its proper role of commenting on the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom.‖ (People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846.) However, ―the prosecutor has wide latitude in describing the deficiencies in opposing counsel‘s tactics and factual account.‖ (Ibid.) The prosecutor‘s remarks here highlight the inconsistency in defense counsel‘s positions about the truth of the confession. Although counsel nominally accepted the jury‘s verdict that defendant gave a true confession, he argued the police had promised defendant he could avoid the death penalty by confessing and told the jury, ―You, in fact, are the only ones who can give Grayland the benefit of his bargain . . . .‖ We have upheld prosecutorial arguments suggesting defense counsel‘s ―job‖ is to confuse the jury and say anything necessary to obtain a favorable verdict. (See People v. Gionis, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 1216-1217; People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 538.) Although the remarks here were somewhat harsher, in that the prosecutor characterized counsel‘s arguments as intentionally misleading, he did not claim defense counsel had fabricated a defense or deceived the jury about the evidence they were to consider. (See People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 961.) In any event, even if the comments were unfair to defense counsel, they ―did not comprise a pattern of egregious misbehavior making the trial fundamentally unfair.‖ (People v. Espinoza, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 820.) Nor was it reasonably possible they affected the verdict. (See People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 804; People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 525-526.) Even though the remarks were directed against all of the defense lawyers,28 the jury reached different verdicts for defendant and Patterson. Next, defendant claims the prosecutor improperly asked jurors to place themselves in the victim‘s position and argued the facts of other cases. 28 Defendant and Patterson were each represented by two attorneys throughout the trial. 91 Defendant‘s attorney had argued Beeson‘s death was merely an impulsive murder and not ―the worst of the worst,‖ such as a terrorist bombing, sniper killing, or one involving kidnapping or sexual assault. In response, the prosecutor asked the jury to imagine the experience of someone murdered by a bomb or a sniper. Those victims are instantaneously killed and ―never knew what hit them.‖ Then he asked the jury to think about everything Beeson experienced: being held down on the floor, hit in the face with a shotgun, ―having a belt put around your neck . . . . having two men holding you down on the floor with their knees and each one has an end on that belt and they are pulling and yanking . . . . [¶] Think about fighting for your life because you want to live.‖ He then argued Beeson suffered more than the 167 people who died instantly in the Oklahoma City bombing. After the court sustained an objection to argument about other cases, the prosecutor rephrased his point only slightly, stating, ―She suffered more than a hundred victims suffered in a bomb blast . . . .‖ Finally, he asked the jury to think about how painful the stabbing must have been and how frightened Beeson must have felt. Defendant now argues it was misconduct for the prosecutor to suggest that jurors adopt Beeson‘s position. Because he did not object below, however, the trial court had no opportunity to consider the objection, admonish the jury, or curtail argument along these lines. (See People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 845-846.) A failure to object and request an admonition will be excused only if an objection would have been futile or an admonition would not have cured the harm. (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1201.) Defendant has shown neither; therefore the objection is forfeited on appeal. (People v. Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 753.) The claim also fails on the merits. Although it is inappropriate at the guilt phase for a prosecutor to appeal to sympathy by inviting the jury to view the case through the victim‘s eyes (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1406-1407), such appeals are entirely appropriate at the penalty phase. (People v. Wash, supra, 92 6 Cal.4th at p. 263.) The prosecutor encouraged jurors to think closely about the suffering Beeson endured during defendants‘ long and brutal attack in response to defense counsel‘s minimization of the murder as a ―rash, impulsive killing with weapons at hand.‖ ― ‗To the extent that the argument was inviting the jurors to put themselves in the shoes of the victim, we have found such an appeal appropriate at the penalty phase because there ―the jury decides a question the resolution of which turns not only on the facts, but on the jury‘s moral assessment of those facts as they reflect on whether defendant should be put to death. . . . In this process, one of the most significant considerations is the nature of the underlying crime. [Citation.] Hence assessment of the offense from the victim‘s viewpoint would appear germane to the task of sentencing.‖ ‘ ‖ (Id. at pp. 263-264; see People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 283-284.) Nor did the prosecutor‘s argument encourage the jury to subordinate their reason to emotion. (See Wash, at p. 264.) Finally, defendant complains the prosecutor ignored the court‘s ruling when he revised his comparison to the Oklahoma City bombing to describe a generic bombing with ―a hundred‖ victims. Defendant did not renew his objection, thus forfeiting his claim on appeal. (People v. Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 753.) In any event, this brief reference to bombing victims did not rise to the level of misconduct. Although the precise crime the prosecutor had in mind was clear from his previous statement, he technically complied with the court‘s ruling by rephrasing his remark to refer to a generic bombing. No misconduct occurred.
Defendant argues that even if individual acts of prosecutorial misconduct were not prejudicial, the incidents considered together were so cumulatively prejudicial as to require reversal. Although we observed that some statements in the prosecutor‘s rebuttal argument bordered on misconduct, they did not render the trial unfair or prejudice defendant. None of the other challenged statements constituted misconduct. Accordingly, there was no prejudice to accumulate. 93 5. Refusal to Modify Death Sentence Defendant claims the court erred in denying his automatic motion to modify the death verdict. (§ 190.4, subd. (e).) In ruling on such a motion, ―the trial court must reweigh independently the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and then determine whether, in its independent judgment, the weight of the evidence supports the jury‘s verdict. [Citations.] The trial court must ‗consider, take into account, and be guided by‘ the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in section 190.3.‖ (People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 150.) ―On appeal, we review the trial court‘s ruling independently, but it is not our role to redetermine the penalty in the first instance. [Citations.]‖ (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 403.) Defendant complains the court ―either minimized the mitigating factors or ignored them, while at the same time exaggerating the aggravating factors and giving them undue weight.‖ The assertion is meritless. The court‘s extensive ruling, spanning 46 pages of reporter‘s transcript, meticulously examines all the evidence presented on each relevant sentencing factor. The court discussed the evidence in an even-handed manner. It independently and reasonably concluded that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances and the jury‘s verdict was supported by ―the overwhelming weight of the evidence.‖ Defendant finds fault with only one specific sentence in this voluminous record. He notes that, when describing the facts leading up to the murder, the court stated that defendant ―coveted a gun to use in committing robberies, perhaps in committing murders.‖ Defendant asserts this statement included improper speculation because there was no evidence he wanted a gun to commit murder. The evidence was undisputed that defendant sought a gun to commit robberies. The court qualified its statement about murders by noting that ―perhaps‖ defendant wanted the gun for this purpose as well, and this was a reasonable inference to be drawn from testimony that defendant was not opposed to killing bystanders during robberies. This brief inference from the evidence does not undermine the court‘s 94 careful, independent, thorough review of the evidence, which we conclude is amply supported by the record. 6. Cumulative Error Defendant claims that even if the alleged errors were individually harmless, they were cumulatively prejudicial. We found that stationing a deputy at the witness stand during defendant‘s testimony unsupported by case-specific reasons was error, but harmless. In addition, while noting the claim was not preserved, we also found harmless any assumed misconduct arising from the prosecutor‘s rebuttal argument. There are no additional errors, assumed or otherwise, to accumulate. 7. Imposition of Death Penalty for Felony Murder Defendant was eligible for the death penalty because the jury found that he murdered Beeson in the course of a robbery. ―The felony-based special circumstances do not require that the defendant intend to kill. It is sufficient if the defendant is the actual killer or either intends to kill or ‗with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission‘ of the felony. [Citations.]‖ (People v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823, 854.) Defendant now argues capital punishment for felony murder violates the Eighth Amendment and international law. We have long held that the death penalty is constitutional when, as here, the defendant is the actual killer. (See, e.g., People v. Watkins, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 1033-1034; People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 661.) Furthermore, ―[i]mposition of the death penalty absent a finding of a culpable mental state for an actual killer does not violate international law because international law does not prohibit a sentence of death rendered in accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements.‖ (People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1333.) 95 8. Delay in Processing Death Penalty Appeals Defendant was sentenced to death in June 2003. Almost nine years later, after delays in the appointment of appellate counsel and correction of the record, he filed his opening brief on appeal. Defendant argues the delay in processing his appeal violates international norms as well his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. We have consistently rejected this claim, explaining that ―the automatic appeal process following judgments of death is a constitutional safeguard, not a constitutional defect [citations], because it assures careful review of the defendant‘s conviction and sentence [citation].‖ (People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 606.) Moreover, while we remain sensitive to the evolution of Eighth Amendment doctrine, we recently found no factual basis for concluding that systemic delays render California‘s capital punishment scheme arbitrary and capricious. (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1368-1375.) The record here is likewise insufficient to support such a claim. 9. Constitutionality of Death Penalty Law Defendant raises several challenges to the constitutionality of California‘s capital sentencing scheme, all of which this court has previously rejected. Defendant presents the claims to preserve them for federal review, but he does not persuade us to reconsider any of these settled decisions. Once again, we hold as follows: Section 190.2 adequately narrows the category of death-eligible defendants and is not impermissibly overbroad under the requirements of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 90; People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 85.) The various special circumstances are not unduly numerous or expansive. (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1214; People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 688; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 842-843.) 96 Section 190.3, factor (a), which directs the jury to consider circumstances of the crime, does not allow arbitrary and capricious sentencing in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 1214-1215.) ― ‗Defendant‘s argument that a seemingly inconsistent range of circumstances can be culled from death penalty decisions proves too much. What this reflects is that each case is judged on its facts, each defendant on the particulars of his offense. Contrary to defendant‘s position, a statutory scheme would violate constitutional limits if it did not allow such individualized assessment of the crimes but instead mandated death in specified circumstances.‘ (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 401.)‖ (People v. Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 688–689; see also Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976 [§190.3, factor (a) not unconstitutionally vague].) The use of unadjudicated criminal activity as an aggravating factor does not violate due process or the right to a jury trial, nor must the jury make a unanimous finding on this or any other evidence admitted under factor (b). (People v. Whalen, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 91; People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 221222.) There is no constitutional requirement that the jury unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of aggravating factors, that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, or that death is the appropriate penalty. (People v. Whalen, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 90; People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1007; People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 753.) ―The high court‘s decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial (Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584; Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466) do not require otherwise. [Citations.]‖ (Clark, at p. 1007; see People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 275.) Nor does any constitutional provision require an instruction on the reasonable doubt standard for determining penalty at a capital trial. (People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 1215-1216; Blair, at p. 753.) On the contrary, trial courts should not instruct on any burden of proof or persuasion at the penalty phase because 97 sentencing is an inherently moral and normative function, and not a factual one amenable to burden of proof calculations. (People v. Lee, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 655-656; People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 724; People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1136-1137; see Kansas v. Carr (2016) 577 U.S. __ [136 S.Ct. 633, 642] [penalty phase evaluation of mitigating circumstances is not susceptible to a standard of proof].) Because nothing in the penalty phase instructions would mislead a jury into believing mitigating factors had to be found unanimously, a specific instruction to this effect was not required. (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 466; People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 988.) ―Nor is an instruction on the absence of a burden of proof constitutionally required. [Citation.]‖ (People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1067.) The federal Constitution does not require that the court designate which factors are aggravating or mitigating, or instruct the jury that certain factors are relevant only in mitigation. (People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1216; People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1064.) The lack of written findings by the jury during the penalty phase does not violate the federal Constitution or deprive a capital defendant of meaningful appellate review. (People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1216; People v. Whalen, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 90-91.) Intercase proportionality review, comparing defendant‘s case to other murder cases to assess relative culpability, is not required by the due process, equal protection, fair trial, or cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the federal Constitution. (Whalen, at p. 91; People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 619.) Nor does the death penalty statute violate equal protection by providing capital defendants with different procedural safeguards than those given to noncapital defendants. (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 650; People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1008.) Finally, California‘s use of the death penalty does not violate international norms or evolving standards of decency in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Linton, at p. 1217; Whalen, at p. 92; Clark, at p. 1008.) 98 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. CORRIGAN, J. WE CONCUR: CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. WERDEGAR, J. CHIN, J. LIU, J. CUÉLLAR, J. KRUGER, J. 99 CONCURRING OPINION BY LIU, J. Today‘s opinion restates two aspects of our Batson/Wheeler jurisprudence that merit reexamination in an appropriate case. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson); People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).) First, with respect to comparative juror analysis, the court says: ―Pretext is established . . . when the compared jurors have expressed ‗a substantially similar combination of responses,‘ in all material respects, to the jurors excused. (People v. DeHoyos [(2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 107], italics added.)‖ (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 37.) This statement appears in tension with how the United States Supreme Court has conducted comparative juror analysis in three significant cases. (See Foster v. Chatman (2016) 578 U.S. __, __–__ [136 S.Ct. 1737, 1750–1754]; Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 483–484; Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 241–249.) In all three cases, the prosecutor gave more than one reason for each contested strike, and the high court, even when conducting comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal, drew inferences of discrimination by comparing struck and seated jurors with respect to one or more of the stated reasons considered individually. The high court has not required ― ‗a substantially similar combination of responses,‘ in all material respects‖ (maj. opn., ante, at p. 37), in order to find comparisons between excused and seated jurors on a particular characteristic to be probative of discrimination. Indeed, the dissent in Miller-El argued that ― ‗ ―[s]imilarly situated‖ does not mean matching any one of several reasons the prosecution gave for striking a potential juror — it means matching all of them‘ ‖ (Miller-El, at p. 291 (dis. opn. of Thomas, J.)), but the high court expressly rejected that view (id. at p. 247, fn. 6). On this point, as with earlier aspects of our case law on comparative juror analysis, our approach appears out of step with controlling authority and ripe for reconsideration. (Cf. People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 622 [abandoning, in light of Snyder and Miller-El, our rule in People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1324–1325, that a reviewing court should not conduct comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal].) Second, today‘s opinion includes dicta restating that a trial court, in ruling on a Batson motion, may ―take into account ‗the court‘s own experiences as a lawyer and bench officer in the community, and even the common practices of the advocate and the office that employs him or her. (See Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281.)‘ ‖ (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 26.) To the extent this statement authorizes trial judges to rely on personal knowledge of the prosecutor or experience with the prosecutor‘s office, I believe it may go too far. We have almost never relied on such a basis for upholding a trial court‘s Batson ruling (one minor exception is People v. DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th 79, 115), and there is good reason not to do so. Adkins v. Warden (11th Cir. 2013) 710 F.3d 1241 (Adkins) is instructive. The prosecutor in that case said he struck a black juror because the juror was a single man. A few weeks later, the trial court discovered the juror was married. The prosecutor submitted an affidavit explaining that he did not learn until ― ‗long after the trial and upon reading the transcript‘ ‖ that the juror was actually married. (Id. at p. 1245.) The trial court relied on its ―own personal experience with the prosecutor in other cases‖ to conclude that this explanation was credible: ―This Court having worked with District Attorney Davis on many other cases in the past, finds that he has never intentionally misrepresented any fact to this Court to gain an advantage in a criminal proceeding. He has many times admitted facts which 2 were to the detriment of his cases and accepted the consequences of facts that were against his case. This Court has never found District Attorney Davis to purposefully exclude blacks from juries in cases prosecuted by him. The Court finds his statement as to mistaken belief as to the marital status of jury [sic] Morris to be credible.‖ (Id. at p. 1246 & fn. 3.) The Eleventh Circuit rejected this approach. In addition to finding that the trial court erred in relying on the prosecutor‘s declaration because the defendant had no opportunity to rebut it, the appellate court disapproved of the trial court‘s ―reli[ance] . . . on non-record evidence which Mr. Adkins did not have an opportunity to rebut, such as the trial court‘s personal experience with and opinion about the reputation of the prosecutor.‖ (Adkins, supra, 710 F.3d at p. 1254.) ―[T]here was no evidence presented during the Batson hearing about the prosecutor‘s reputation, other than assertions of good faith by the prosecutor. Neither was there evidence of the prosecutor‘s use of peremptory strikes against blacks in other criminal proceedings. It was therefore not reasonable for the trial court to interject non-record facts into its Batson analysis. Importantly, as with the prosecutor‘s affidavit itself, Mr. Adkins did not have notice or an opportunity to be heard on these matters.‖ (Id. at p. 1254, fn. 11.) The Seventh Circuit has similarly rejected a trial court‘s reliance on such personal knowledge. (See Coulter v. McCann (7th Cir. 2007) 484 F.3d 459, 465 [―The Miller-El [v. Dretke, supra, 545 U.S. 231] Court also had before it evidence that the local prosecutor‘s office had used a particular process to manipulate the racial composition of the jury in the past. [Citation.] This is different, we note, from a judge‘s personal testimonial to the character of the state‘s attorney in a particular case, which seems to be what happened here. At no point in Batson, Miller-El [v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322], or Miller-El [v. Dretke] did the Court endorse anything like this. We realize that judges need to make credibility 3 determinations, but it is very troubling to base such decisions on personal relationships outside of the courtroom.‖].) Winbush does not question our precedent on the two points above, and they do not figure into our reasoning in this case. I therefore join today‘s opinion, with openness to reconsidering these aspects of our Batson jurisprudence in a future case. LIU, J. 4 See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion People v. Winbush __________________________________________________________________________________ Unpublished Opinion Original Appeal XXX Original Proceeding Review Granted Rehearing Granted __________________________________________________________________________________ Opinion No. S117489 Date Filed: January 26, 2017 __________________________________________________________________________________ Court: Superior County: Alameda Judge: Jeffrey W. Horner __________________________________________________________________________________ Counsel: Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Ronald S. Matthias, Assistant Attorney General, Glenn R. Pruden, Alice B. Lustre and Karen Z. Bovarnick, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): Richard Jay Moller So‘Hum Law Center of Richard Jay Moller P.O. Box 1669 Redway, CA 95560-1669 (707) 923-9199 Karen Z. Bovarnick Deputy Attorney General 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 (415) 703-5550