Opinion ID: 1427790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Funeral Protest Provision is Narrowly Tailored

Text: Next, we determine whether the Funeral Protest Provision is narrowly tailored to serve the important interest in the protection of funeral attendees. The district court held that the Funeral Protest Provision was narrowly tailored and not substantially overbroad. The district court reasoned that Phelps-Roper fail[ed] to demonstrate that the statute's purported overbreadth is either real or substantial and the fact that [she] can conceive of some potentially impermissible applications is not enough to render it unconstitutional. Phelps-Roper, 523 F.Supp.2d at 619. [1] Under the narrow tailoring requirement, the Supreme Court has emphasized that when a content-neutral regulation does not entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy the tailoring requirement even though it is not the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the statutory goal. Hill, 530 U.S. at 726, 120 S.Ct. 2480. [T]he requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (quotations marks, citation, and alteration omitted). Phelps-Roper contends that the Funeral Protest Provision is not narrowly tailored for three reasons. First, she argues that the provision is not narrowly tailored because it bans all speech within 300 feet of a funeral or burial service during the relevant time period, and that it covers more than just protests targeting a funeral or burial service. Thus, under her reading of the provision, any form of picketing within 300 feet of a funeral or burial service would run afoul of the Funeral Protest Provision. As a hypothetical example, she contends that PETA could effectively be completely banned from protesting a furrier located near a funeral home that holds multiple funeral services every day of the week. Respondents counter that the Funeral Protest Provision is narrow in scope, only affect[ing] those protest activities that recklessly or intentionally disrupt, or are undertaken to disrupt, funeral services. The Funeral Protest Provision only restricts picketing or other protest activities that are directed at a funeral or burial service. The Funeral Protest Provision is similar to the ordinance at issue in Frisby, which the Supreme Court held limited speech focused on a particular place. In Frisby, the Court found that the use of the singular form to designate the place from which picketing was proscribed suggests that the ordinance is intended to prohibit only picketing focused on, and taking place in front of, a particular residence. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 482, 108 S.Ct. 2495. Under the Court's construction, [g]eneral marching through residential neighborhoods, or even walking a route in front of an entire block of houses, is not prohibited. Id. at 483, 108 S.Ct. 2495. The Court further explained that this construction was supported by the representations of counsel for the town at oral argument indicating that the town takes ... a limited view of the `picketing' proscribed by the ordinance. Id. The Funeral Protest Provision similarly employs the singular form to designate the place from which its restrictions apply, given that it restricts protest activities within 300 feet from any residence, cemetery, funeral home, church, synagogue, or other establishment where an actual funeral or burial service is conduct[ed] ... at that place.  § 3767.30 (emphasis added). The Funeral Protest Provision's definition of other protest activities as any action that is disruptive or undertaken to disrupt or disturb a funeral or burial service,  further supports this reading. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, properly read, the Funeral Protest Provision restricts only the time and place of speech directed at a funeral or burial service. If a protestor's communication is not directed at a funeral or burial service, the mere fact that one holds a picket sign within 300 feet of a funeral or burial service during the relevant time period, without more, will not support a conviction under § 3767.30. By the same token, the subject matter of the sign is irrelevant given that the statute does not regulate speech based on its content. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 716, 120 S.Ct. 2480 ([I]t may not be the content of the speech, as much as the deliberate verbal or visual assault, that justifies proscription.) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Frisby, 487 U.S. at 498, 108 S.Ct. 2495 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Picketing is a form of speech that, by virtue of its repetition of message and often hostile presentation, may be disruptive of an environment irrespective of the substantive message conveyed.) Phelps-Roper also argues that the Funeral Protest Provision is not narrowly tailored because the 300-foot buffer zone is excessive. However, Frisby, Hill, and Madsen, read together, establish that the size of the buffer zone is context-sensitive, and that in this case, the 300-foot buffer zone is not too broad. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 772, 114 S.Ct. 2516 (We must, of course, take account of the place to which the regulations apply in determining whether these restrictions burden more speech than necessary.). In Frisby, the Court upheld as constitutional an ordinance that completely prohibited focused residential picketing before or about a residence. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483, 108 S.Ct. 2495 ([I]n order to fall within the scope of the ordinance the picketing must be directed at a single residence.). The ordinance did not specify a specific distance from which picketing was prohibited, and the Frisby Court did not further elaborate. See Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, 43 F.3d 1100, 1111 (6th Cir.1995) (Martin, J., dissenting) (If Frisby created a `zone,' we have no idea how large the `zone' is, i.e. how far back from the front of a house picketers must be, et cetera.); Veneklase v. City of Fargo, 78 F.3d 1264, 1269 (8th Cir.1996) ([U]pon a careful reading of Frisby, we do not find that its holding defined the outer parameters of `focused' residential picketing.). The Frisby Court observed that a complete ban can be narrowly tailored, but only if each activity within the proscription's scope is an appropriately targeted evil. Id. at 485, 108 S.Ct. 2495. The Court found that the `evil' of targeted residential picketing is created by the medium of expression itself, given that residents targeted by picketing are trapped within the home, and because of the unique and subtle impact of such picketing, residents are left with no ready means of avoiding the unwanted speech. Id. at 486-87, 108 S.Ct. 2495. Thus, the Court held that the ordinance was narrowly tailored because the picketing prohibited by the [] ordinance is speech directed primarily at those who are presumptively unwilling to receive it. Id. at 488, 108 S.Ct. 2495. In Hill, the Supreme Court upheld a statute that restricted speech activities within 100 feet of the entrance to any health care facility, prohibiting anyone within the regulated areas to knowingly approach within eight feet of another person, without that person's consent, for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person. Hill, 530 U.S. at 707, 120 S.Ct. 2480. The measure served the important interest of unimpeded access to health care facilities and the avoidance of potential trauma to patients associated with confrontational protests. Id. at 715, 120 S.Ct. 2480 (citing Madsen, 512 U.S. 753, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593). In finding the law narrowly tailored, the Court in Hill stressed that the state law did not overly burden the speaker's ability to communicate. The Court noted that the restriction providing for the eight-foot separation between the speaker and the audience should not have any adverse impact on the readers' ability to read signs displayed by demonstrators. Hill, 530 U.S. at 726, 120 S.Ct. 2480. The law also place[d] no limitations on the number, size, text, or images of the placards. Id. And although the distance requirement may increase the difficulty in a speaker's ability to be heard, the statute place[d] no limitation on the number of speakers or the noise level, including the use of amplification equipment. Id. In Madsen, the Supreme Court rejected a court-ordered injunction that banned, inter alia, residential picketing within 300 feet of the homes of persons employed by medical clinics performing abortions. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 774-75, 114 S.Ct. 2516. In contrast to Frisby, the Court found the 300-foot buffer zone around clinic employee residences too broad. The Court explained: [T]he 300-foot zone around the residences in this case is much larger than the zone provided for in the ordinance which we approved in Frisby. The ordinance at issue there made it unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual. The prohibition was limited to focused picketing taking place solely in front of a particular residence. By contrast, the 300-foot zone would ban general marching through residential neighborhoods, or even walking a route in front of an entire block of houses. The record before us does not contain sufficient justification for this broad a ban on picketing; it appears that a limitation on the time, duration of picketing, and number of pickets outside a smaller zone could have accomplished the desired result. Id. at 775, 114 S.Ct. 2516 (citations, alterations, and quotation markets omitted). Taking full account of the Funeral Protest Provision's time limitation, the provision is in certain senses narrower than the measures in Frisby, Hill, and Madsen. The lesson of Frisby is that a narrow class of speech can be prohibited to further a recognized privacy interest within a geographic scope that extended, at the very least, to the area before or about a residence. Because the Funeral Protest Provision furthers a governmental interest akin to that at issue in Frisby, Ohio may prescribe funeral picketing within some distance from the protected area, the funeral site. In one significant aspect, however, the Funeral Protest Provision is narrower than the measure in Frisby. While the ordinance in Frisby constituted a perpetual ban on picketing, the Funeral Protest Provision is only in effect for a limited time, within one hour of a funeral or burial service. Phelps-Roper seeks to distinguish Frisby by arguing that her speech is not directed exclusively at mourners, but also at the general public. But the Frisby Court recognized that the speech at issue in that case could still have a broader communicative purpose and still be proscribed by the ordinance. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486, 108 S.Ct. 2495 ([E]ven if some such picketers have a broader communicative purpose, their activity nonetheless inherently and offensively intrudes on residential privacy.) The State has an important interest in protecting funeral attendees from unwanted communication, even if the communication has a broader audience. The Funeral Protest Provision is in some respects as or more narrow in scope than the restrictions at issue in Hill. Similar to the law at issue in Hill, the Funeral Protest Provision does not place limitations on the number, size, text, or images of placards, and places no limitation on the number of speakers or the noise level, including the use of amplification equipment. Thus, it is conceivable that picketers outside of the 300-foot buffer zone can still communicate their message to funeral attendees. The Funeral Protest Provision is narrower than the restrictions in Hill in that it is in effect for a limited time. Granted, the buffer zone here is 200 feet greater than the 100-foot buffer zone upheld in Hill. But it serves a similar purpose, and here it protects a group of individuals who may arrive and depart from the funeral or burial service in a coordinated fashion. As for Madsen, although the residential speech restriction at issue in that case has an identical buffer zone, Madsen is nonetheless distinguishable on two principal grounds. First, unlike the ordinance at issue in Frisby, or the law at issue in Hill, the Madsen Court reviewed a court-ordered injunction rather than a legislatively-imposed time, place, and manner restriction on public fora. Ordinances represent a legislative choice regarding the promotion of particular societal interests. Injunctions, by contrast, are remedies imposed for violations (or threatened violations) of a legislative or judicial decree. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764, 114 S.Ct. 2516. The Court therefore applied a somewhat more stringent degree of scrutiny for evaluating injunctions, requiring that restrictions burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest. Id. at 765, 114 S.Ct. 2516. Although not as stringent as strict scrutiny, this heightened standard is more stringent than that for statutes, which must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. Id. at 766-67, 114 S.Ct. 2516. Madsen is not controlling because the Funeral Protest Provision was legislatively enacted, and therefore subject to a less stringent test. Second, unlike the ordinance at issue in Frisby and the Funeral Protest Provision in this case, the injunction construed by the Madsen Court did not prohibit only focused picketing. The Madsen Court found that the 300-foot zone would ban general marching through residential neighborhoods, or even walking a route in front of an entire block of houses. Id. at 775, 114 S.Ct. 2516 (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). The Frisby Court, in contrast, found that the ordinance at issue did not prohibit [g]eneral marching through residential neighborhoods, or even walking a route in front of an entire block of houses. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483, 108 S.Ct. 2495. The Funeral Protest Provision, by its terms, does not necessarily proscribe marching or walking within the 300-foot zone. And, unlike the residential speech restriction in Madsen, the Funeral Protest Provision limits the time in which the ban on picketing is in effect. Thus, in two significant ways the Funeral Protest Provision is less sweeping than the ordinance at issue in Madsen, which was stricken under a heightened standard of review. Thus, the Funeral Protest Provision is in certain aspects narrower than the analogous measures in Frisby, Hill, and Madsen. Phelps-Roper is not silenced during a funeral or burial service, but must merely stay 300 feet away within a brief window of time, [2] outside of which she may say what she wants, wherever she wants, and when she wants, with no limitation on the number of speakers or the noise level, including the use of amplification equipment, and no limitations on the number, size, text, or images of placards. At the same time, the interest at issue here requires a larger buffer zone than the interests in Frisby, Hill, and Madsen. Given that numerous mourners usually attend a funeral or burial service, the size of a buffer zone necessary to protect the privacy of an entire funeral gathering can be expected to be larger than that necessary to protect the privacy of a single residence, or a single individual entering a medical clinic. Moreover, a 300-foot buffer zone takes account of the logistical problems associated with moving large numbers of people from the site of a funeral to the burial site. The protection of access to a funeral or burial service is an important governmental interest. Cf. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768, 114 S.Ct. 2516 (upholding an injunctive measure prohibiting individuals from `congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering' any portion of the public right-of-way or private property within 36 feet of the property line of the clinic as a way of ensuring access to the clinic); see also Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 612, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968) (upholding a statute that prohibited interference with ingress or egress from any public premises). Thus, a 300-foot buffer zone does not render the Funeral Protest Provision invalid. As her third reason that the Funeral Protest Provision is not narrowly tailored, Phelps-Roper argues that Ohio already maintains laws that prohibit physically haranguing funeral goers, such that funeral attendees are thoroughly protected from all unwanted physical acts by existing Ohio law. [3] Phelps-Roper misses the point of the Funeral Protest Provision. Its purpose is not simply to protect funeral attendees from physical acts, but from the harmful psychological effects of unwanted communication when they are most captive and vulnerable. In sum, the Funeral Protest Provision, which restricts protest activities within 300 feet of a funeral or burial service, is narrowly tailored to meet Ohio's legitimate interest in protecting funeral attendees from unwanted communication.