Opinion ID: 1129443
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Object and Move for Mistrial and Recusal of Trial Judge

Text: In his first issue on appeal, Morris asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt phase by failing to object to the trial court's decision to permit jurors to ask questions during trial and by failing to move for a mistrial and recusal of the trial judge. Morris contends that trial counsel should have moved for a mistrial because, according to Morris, the applicable rules of procedure and substantive law did not provide for jurors to ask questions during criminal trials. Morris also asserts as a basis for recusal that when the trial judge permitted jurors to ask questions he transcended his role as an impartial trier of fact and assumed the role of prosecutor. We conclude that counsel was not ineffective because there was no error in the procedure by which the trial court permitted jurors to ask questions during trial. In Ferrara v. State, 101 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1958), we stated that on appropriate occasions a juror, as a trier of fact, might be completely justified in propounding a question, and that a procedure that allows jurors to ask questions during trial should be ... controlled by the discretion of the trial judge. Id. at 801. Relying on Ferrara and other precedent, this Court has rejected a claim that the trial court violated the defendant's right to an impartial jury by allowing jurors to submit questions to witnesses during trial. See Watson v. State, 651 So.2d 1159, 1163 (Fla.1994). Under the procedure approved in Watson, the jury members would write down their question and give it to the trial judge, who would then consult with the State and the defense to determine whether the question was proper. See id. at 1163 n. 6. If it was determined that the question was proper, the trial judge would present the question to the witness for an answer. See id. We observed that the practice of questioning by jurors has been condoned as permissible trial procedure. Id. at 1163. The procedure we approved in Watson is nearly identical to the procedure implemented by the trial judge in this case. As in Watson, the jury in this case was instructed that all questions should be submitted in writing and that if it was determined that the questions were appropriate, they would be submitted to the witness for an answer at an appropriate time. Thus, the trial judge did not err in allowing jurors to ask questions during Morris's trial. Since the allegations of ineffectiveness in trial counsel's failure to object, move for a mistrial, and move for recusal are based on the incorrect assumption that the procedure followed by the trial judge was contrary to established law, we conclude that there was no deficient performance. Although our determination that counsel was not deficient obviates the need to address the prejudice prong under Strickland, see Waterhouse v. State, 792 So.2d 1176, 1182 (Fla.2001), we note that Morris has also failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel's performance. [10] Morris fails to identify any specific question that was asked and how either the question or its answer undermines confidence in the outcome of his trial. Because neither prong of Strickland has been met, we affirm the trial court's denial of relief as to this claim.