Opinion ID: 1768458
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did defense counsel's misconduct prejudice appellant's right to a fair trial?

Text: The first error claimed to have prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial resulted from a bizarre occurrence, to wit: the misconduct of his assistant defense counsel in wrongfully taking from the Commonwealth's counsel table the notes of a prosecutor concerning the voir dire of the jury panel. The prosecutor brought to the Court's attention the fact that his notes of the voir dire of the jury were missing from his counsel table on the afternoon of March 25, 1991. The Court asked all trial participants whether anyone knew what happened to the notes, and no one responded. On the following morning, as the prosecutors were preparing to view videotapes of the previous afternoon's courtroom activities, counsel approached the bench outside the presence of the jury panel and the defendant, at which time the assistant defense counsel admitted that she took the prosecutor's notes off the Commonwealth's counsel table the previous day. She admitted that she was just being nosy and characterized her conduct as inexcusable. The trial judge agreed and asked whether the Commonwealth wished to make any motions regarding the matter. The Commonwealth's Attorney responded that he was in a Catch 22 situation but didn't want to do anything to cause the case to be continued, so he would make no motions. The Court asked lead defense counsel if he had any recommendations, but he replied in the negative. The Court concluded by commenting that he would later see what he would do about the matter. The jury selection process continued. Some nine or ten days later, after the prosecution had concluded its case in the guilt phase and during the defense's presentation, the same assistant defense counsel appeared before the bench outside the presence of the jury and complained about a news account of her having taken the prosecutor's notes. She expressed concern that the jury might have been contaminated and also claimed that this development had created a conflict of interest on the part of defense counsel. She moved for a mistrial, which was denied. The trial judge reminded counsel that the jurors had been admonished not to watch TV or read newspaper accounts of the trial. He offered to question the jurors as to whether they had done so. The Commonwealth's Attorney commented that he had not brought the incident to the attention of the news media and told his assistant not to do so. Counsel for the defense then asked the trial judge to recuse himself, which he declined to do. She then moved that she and lead defense counsel be permitted to withdraw from the case, citing a conflict of interest, and suggested that her attention had been distracted from the defense of her client because of the threat of further action being taken against her. The Court denied these motions and reiterated that he would delay any appropriate action until a later time. The offending assistant defense counsel moved to question the jurors as to their knowledge of the incident, and the Commonwealth and the court acceded to her request. The trial judge then questioned each of the fifteen jurors individually about any knowledge of a media report. Each responded that he or she had not seen or read any news accounts about the case. The appellant insists that defense counsel's misconduct kept her from being an aggressive and loyal advocate because . . . the specter of pending, unnamed sanctions loomed over the defense team. It is further stated that [t]hose threats divided counsels' loyalties between their own interests and appellant's  creating an actual, unwaivable conflict that required their removal from the case. The appellant's brief describes his counsel's situation as a conflict per se and opines that the responsibility of both defense counsel to vigorously defend him was chilled by the conflict. It is claimed that offending counsel was forced to choose between her interests and her client's, and that counsel had to avoid antagonizing the court any further. We find the attitude reflected or implied in the choice of these words to be very disturbing. We do not think the responsibility of counsel to vigorously defend a client is ever compromised by the professional, ethical conduct of a lawyer in relationships with the court. Furthermore, all ethical lawyers should at all times conduct themselves so as to avoid antagonizing the court. The appellant has no right to expect his trial counsel to do otherwise. We fail to understand how there was any actual conflict here between the best interests of counsel and those of the appellant. More importantly, the appellant seems to argue that prejudice to him must be presumed by the Court since he insists there was a per se conflict. We decline to indulge in any such presumption of prejudice. The U.S. Supreme Court in Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3120, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987), stated as follows: We have never held that the possibility of prejudice that inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation justifies the adoption of an inflexible rule that would presume prejudice in all such cases. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). Instead, we presume prejudice only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel `activiely represented conflicting interests' and that `an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.' Strickland [v. Washington], 466 U.S. [668], at 692, 104 S.Ct. [2052], at 2067 [80 L.Ed.2d 674] (citation omitted). See also Cuyler, 446 U.S., at 348, 350, 100 S.Ct., at 1719. After searching the record, the Burger Court concluded that counsel in that case had not actively represented conflicting interests nor was there proof that an actual conflict of interest had adversely affected counsel's performance in representing his client. The Court applied the Strickland test and commented: Petitioner has not established that `in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.' Strickland, Id., at 690, 104 S.Ct., at 2066. He `has made no showing that the justice of his sentence was rendered unreliable by a breakdown in the adversary process caused by deficiencies in counsel's assistance.' Id., at 700, 104 S.Ct., at 2071. 483 U.S. at 795-96, 107 S.Ct. at 3126. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently considered the question of whether there was an actual conflict of interest on the part of an attorney requiring withdrawal from representation of a defendant in a murder prosecution. In Beets v. Collins, 986 F.2d 1478 (1993), the petitioner Beets was convicted of the murder of her husband in Texas and was sentenced to death. Her appeals to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court were unsuccessful, as was her petition for habeas corpus in the state court. A U.S. District Court granted the writ, however, after finding that Beets' defense counsel at trial was a material witness who should have resigned and withdrawn from representation so as to testify in favor of Beets. Such testimony would have been in rebuttal of the prosecution's claim that she had killed her husband to receive insurance benefits, because defense counsel had in fact initially brought the matter of such insurance proceeds to the attention of Beets during a conversation. The Circuit Court reversed, finding that another witness had testified to the same effect and that there was no actual conflict of interest nor that any potential conflict actually adversely affected counsel's performance or Beets' defense. The Opinion stated in part, 986 F.2d at 1486: Even assuming Beets's factual allegations, she has failed to establish the `constitutional predicate' for her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflicting interest. Under Cuyler, Beets has not established a violation of the Sixth Amendment until she demonstrates that her counsel `actively represented conflicting interests.' This requirement that a defendant show counsel's active representation of conflicting interests stems from the concern that potential conflicts of interest will be dressed up as Sixth Amendment violations. In Cuyler, the Court recognized the constitutionalized concern that counsel not serve `two masters' is simply not implicated when a potential conflict of interest fails to develop into an actual conflict of interest. A theoretical or merely speculative conflict of interest will not invoke the protections of the Sixth Amendment. Indeed, as a threshold matter, the defendant must demonstrate that the defense attorney was required to make a choice advancing his own interests to the detriment of his client's interests. Beets's allegations set forth facts, which, if proven, indicate a potential conflict of interest. But that is as far as her allegations go. She never takes the critical step to allege and provide proof that the potential conflict of interest developed into an actual conflict of interest. . . . . . . Because Beets has not demonstrated that [attorney] Andrews was forced to make a choice between her interests and his own, her claim that Andrews `actively represented conflicting interests' must fail. [Citations omitted.] Here, as in Beets , there was no showing that the assistant defense counsel at any time was forced to make any kind of choice between her interests and those of Sanborn. Furthermore, the appellant has certainly not shown that in light of all the circumstances, [any] acts or omissions [of either defense counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Strickland, Id. 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. Sanborn has made no showing that the justice of his sentence was rendered unreliable by a breakdown in the adversary process caused by deficiencies in counsel's assistance. Id., at 700, 104 S.Ct. at 2071. As a collateral argument, the appellant insists that it was error for the trial court not to hold a hearing on this entire matter of whether counsel had a conflict of interest, with appellant being present in person. Further, it is argued that the conflict on the part of the offending attorney also amounted to a vicarious conflict on the part of lead defense counsel. We disagree. There was no necessity for the appellant to be present during the court's inquiry of counsel as to their knowledge of the prosecution's missing notes. No testimony was taken and there was accordingly no need for cross-examination. This was purely a matter between the trial judge and counsel. Moreover, when the court questioned the jurors as to whether they had heard or read any news reports concerning the trial, the appellant was present. We see no merit to the claim that the lead defense counsel was somehow vicariously burdened with an alleged conflict of interest even if we found such a conflict on the part of assistant defense counsel. There was no attempt to show any knowledge on his part of the actions of assistant defense counsel in taking the prosecution's notes. Consequently, lead defense counsel could not have had any impairment whatever in his representation of the appellant by reason of his colleague's misconduct. The Commonwealth has also pointed out that this Court, in Summit v. Mudd, Ky., 679 S.W.2d 225 (1984), modified, Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 1995 WL 63633 (Ky. February 16, 1995), rejected the vicarious disqualification rule for Kentucky prosecutors and that the same rationale should apply to public advocates, since neither government prosecutors nor government defenders have any personal stake in whether an office colleague or co-employee is successful in representing a client, unlike attorney-partners in private law firms.