Opinion ID: 1418014
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: dissemination

Text: If the primary question in this case was whether or not there is sufficient evidence of record upon which to predicate a closure of the pretrial proceeding, we would have little difficulty in declaring the respondent's closure null and void. See, Gannett Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, supra; and Keene Publishing v. Keene District Court, supra. The fact is that no record was made as to the basis for closure determination. But the pretrial proceedings were closed and they have already been held. Given these circumstances, it would serve no good purpose to order that a new bail-review hearing be conducted. It would also be inappropriate to remand the case to the lower court for an after-the-fact determination as to whether a failure to close the pretrial proceeding would have created a clear and present danger to the fairness of the defendant's trial. The problem here, then, is, not whether the closure order can be remedied, but, rather, whether we should now order the disclosure of the information which was adduced at the closed proceeding. Indeed, we envision that disclosure will, in all probability, be the primary, if not the only, question to be decided in similar future cases. It will arise in various ways. For instance, where a foundation has been laid for a closed pretrial hearing and the court goes on to close the proceeding, it may find that the evidence which is adduced does not in fact constitute a clear and present danger to the defendant's fair-trial rights. In such a case, the court would and should release the record of the proceedings to the public. Where, however, the evidence elicited at the closed hearing would, in the opinion of the court, jeopardize the fair-trial rights of the defendant under the standards herein established, then the lower court could and would properly order the record sealed until those rights have been determined to no longer be in jeopardy. When the record is sealed, and there is a challenge to the court's order by a representative of the public, then, subject to appellate review, the district court, if the proceeding had been held in a minor court, or this court, if the proceeding had been originally heard in the district court, must determine whether the originating court had abused its discretion when it ordered the record sealed. The resolving of this issue, when the defendant has yet to proceed to trial, involves the delicate balancing of the public's right of access to information, on the one hand, and the defendant's right to a fair trial on the other. We have discovered no other case which has been so directly confronted with this intricate balancing problem. In United States v. Cianfrani, 3 Cir., 573 F.2d 835 (1978), the court found there could be no prejudice to the defendant resulting from the release of the entire sealed transcript. In Cianfrani, however, the defendant had already pleaded either guilty or nolo contendere to the charges, and portions of the sealed record had already been placed in the public record. As a result, there was no occasion to consider whether the defendant's right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment might justify the sealing of portions of the pretrial proceedings. 573 F.2d at 860. See, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., v. Jerome, supra, 387 A.2d at 434, fn. 19. In another case not directly involving a defendant's right to a fair trial, it was suggested that defendants who were still in jeopardy could be protected and the public's right to access satisfied by affording access to transcripts redacted to exclude matters ruled inadmissible during a closed suppression hearing. Gannett Co., Inc., v. DePasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 372 N.E.2d 544 (N.Y.Ct.App. 1977), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 1006, 98 S.Ct. 1875, 56 L.Ed.2d 387 (orally argued November 7, 1978), citing Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976). We conclude that neither of these solutions is satisfactory in the instant matter because, as we have indicated above and again emphasize, the function of a reviewing court in dissemination cases is to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion, and, since no standards had been established when the Justice of the Peace acted in this case, it cannot, therefore, now be said that she abused her discretion. In short, when the Justice of the Peace rendered her closure decision, there were no extant standards to either guide her or against which we, as a reviewing court, can test her discretion. Because she had no guidance, the Justice of the Peace, understandably, made no record determination following the closed bailbond proceeding, to the effect that material presenting a clear and present danger to the fairness of the defendant's trial had been adduced. This being so, there is now no way that we can exercise proper appellate judgment on the issue of abuse of discretion. When questions of this nature arise in the future, this court should not and will not make the initial determination of whether there is or is not record material which presents a clear and present danger to a fair trial for the defendant. This task must be performed in the justice or district court  depending upon where the matter originates. Under the circumstances of this case of first impression, made unique by the lack of standards against which to test the Justice's discretion, we hold that the rights of the defendant here can be best protected by ordering the record to remain sealed until after the defendant's trial or until such earlier time as a release would be consistent with trial fairness. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., v. Jerome, supra, 387 A.2d at 433, citing McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 415 U.S. 970, 94 S.Ct. 1547, 39 L.Ed.2d 863 (1974), dismissing for want of substantial question, 453 Pa. 147, 308 A.2d 888 (1973). In this particular case, the public's right of access to the information in question is doubly insured by reason of the fact that this holding is consistent with the affirmative response of petitioners' counsel when he was asked at oral argument whether such a disposition as this would fairly respond to petitioners' basic demands. The peremptory order of this court, commanding the respondent to open the bail-review hearing records to the public, entered July 28, 1978, is vacated, and the relief requested by the petitioners is denied. In accordance with the standards established in this opinion, a complete record of the bail-review hearing shall be kept and made available to the public following the completion of trial, or sooner if the trial court were to find that earlier release is consistent with trial fairness.