Opinion ID: 2274894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: failure to give instructions on theft by unlawful taking and facilitation to robbery

Text: Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for instructions on theft by unlawful taking over $300 on each count as a lesser included offense of second-degree robbery. A trial court's rulings on instructions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258, 274 (Ky.2006). An instruction on a lesser included offense is required only if, considering the totality of the evidence, the jury might have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt of the greater offense and, yet, believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the lesser offense. Houston v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Ky.1998). The trial court has no duty to instruct on a theory not supported by the evidence. Payne v. Commonwealth, 656 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Ky.1983). The evidence does not support the giving of a theft instruction as to any of the counts. Second-degree robbery requires that a person uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person with intent to accomplish the theft. KRS 515.030(1). Theft by unlawful taking requires only control over movable property of another with intent to deprive him thereof. KRS 514.030(1)(a). Theft is generally considered a crime against property, whereas robbery is considered a crime against a person. Morgan v. Commonwealth, 730 S.W.2d 935, 937-38 (Ky.1987). Appellant argues that a juror could have reasonably believed that he took the money from the banks but that he used no physical force or threat of physical force, and therefore that theft instructions were warranted. We disagree. A threat does not have to be actual words, but can be communicated by conduct or a combination thereof. Lawless, 323 S.W.3d 676. As recognized previously, a person rushing into a bank, wearing a ski mask or otherwise disguised, and aggressively demanding money, carries with it an implied threat of physical force against the person(s) from whom the money is demanded if they do not comply. It is uncontroverted that all of the incidents at issue herein involved such facts. [5] In light of this evidence, we believe no reasonable juror could conclude, as to any of the incidents, that Appellant was not guilty of second-degree robbery, yet guilty of theft. See id. (theft instructions not warranted where robber kept hand in her pocket, but did not make any verbal threats). [6] Appellant further argues that the trial court erred in denying his request that the jury be instructed on facilitation to second-degree robbery on all the counts, on grounds that, based upon the evidence, the jury could have believed that Appellant was an indifferent getaway driver, or that he merely loaned Laverne Westin's car and Sharonda Sloss's car to his cousin Demond, which Demond then used to commit the robberies. The trial court granted Appellant's request for a facilitation instruction as to the October 23, 2006 (National City Bank) incident based on Appellant's testimony that he had loaned Sloss's car to Demond. The trial court denied the request as to the other counts, finding the evidence insufficient to support a facilitation theory. KRS 506.080(1) provides: A person is guilty of criminal facilitation, when, acting with knowledge that another person is committing or intends to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which knowingly provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission of the crime and which in fact aids such person to commit the crime. Facilitation reflects the mental state of one who is `wholly indifferent' to the actual completion of the crime. Perdue v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 148, 160 (Ky.1995). There was no evidence in this case to support a reasonable inference that Appellant was wholly indifferent to the completion of the April 17, 2006, May 1, 2006, and June 29, 2006 robberies. [7] Id.; Dixon v. Commonwealth, 263 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Ky.2008). Rather, the evidence as to these counts supported either the theory that Appellant was an active participant in these robberies (whether as the robber or as a getaway driver), or, if the jury chose to believe Appellant's trial testimony, that Appellant was not involved whatsoever. See White v. Commonwealth, 178 S.W.3d 470, 490-91 (Ky.2005). We further agree with the trial court that the evidence did not support a finding that Appellant was an indifferent getaway driver, in light of the fact that the getaway driver in this case (whoever it was), dropped off, and waited for, the individual who robbed the bank. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's request for a facilitation instruction as to the remaining counts.