Opinion ID: 4026522
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment in Favor of Wal-Mart

Text: In the district court and on appeal, Plaintiff argues at length about the dispute of fact regarding the presence or absence of aggregate in the paint that Wal-Mart used for the crosswalk lines. In so doing, Plaintiff misapprehends both Wal-Mart’s argument and the basis for the district court’s summary judgment. Irrespective of whether there was aggregate in the paint, Plaintiff fails to offer evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the crosswalk lines were not slip resistant. portions of Kendzior’s testimony in which Kendzior considers and dispels other means by which Wal-Mart might have made the crosswalk lines slip resistant. Specifically, Plaintiff argues at length that Kendzior considered whether the crosswalk lines might have benefitted from the traction of the underlying asphalt in the Wal-Mart parking lot. According to Kendzior, because Wal-Mart painted layer upon layer without removing the underlying layer, the asphalt would not have gone through to the top layer. Because Plaintiff failed to make this argument to the district court and in fact did not raise this argument on appeal until the reply brief, we decline to consider whether this aspect of Kendzior’s testimony would cure the reliability issue argued by the parties and decided by the district court. See Sorrels v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 796 F.3d 1275, 1283 (11th Cir. 2015) (declining to consider an argument to exclude expert testimony first raised on appeal during oral argument); Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e do not address arguments raised for the first time in a . . . reply brief.”). 3 Plaintiff has not raised and we therefore do not consider whether the district court should have excluded only the portions of Kendzior’s testimony that are based upon an unreliable methodology. 10 Case: 15-15538 Date Filed: 08/19/2016 Page: 11 of 11 As we discuss above, aggregate is not an essential ingredient for a slipresistant surface. In fact, Plaintiff’s own expert concedes that he does not know whether the crosswalk lines met industry standards for slip resistance. Plaintiff identifies no lay testimony or circumstantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that the crosswalk lines were any more dangerous than a typical paved outdoor surface on a rainy day. See Terrell v. Warehouse Groceries, 364 So. 2d 675, 677 (Ala. 1978) (“When it rains, surfaces naturally become more slippery than usual a fact with which a customer is sufficiently familiar.”). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the crosswalk lines suffered from a “design, construction, or condition abnormality” or otherwise constituted an unreasonably dangerous condition. WalMart Stores, Inc. v. White, 476 So. 2d 614, 617 (Ala. 1985); see also Terrell, 364 So. 2d at 677. The district court correctly determined that Wal-Mart was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.