Opinion ID: 1841280
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Vance

Text: In Vance v. Pekin Insurance Company , we held that where one spouse had intentionally set fire to the family home, an innocent coinsured spouse could not recover under a homeowners policy which clearly and unequivocally excluded coverage from losses resulting from the intentional acts of  an insured.  457 N.W.2d at 593 (emphasis added). In Vance, we adopted the so-called best reasoned rule, according to which recovery depends ... on a contract analysis of the insurance policy provisions. Id. (citing Leane E. Cerven, Note, The Problem of the Innocent Co-Insured Spouse: Three Theories of Recovery, 17 Val. U.L.Rev. 849, 867-68 (1983)). We explicitly noted this contract analysis followed the recent trend in other courts away from analyses centering upon property rationales or the marital status of the parties. See id. We have consistently applied this contract analysis ever since. See, e.g., Jensen v. Jefferson County Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 510 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Iowa 1994); Webb v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 493 N.W.2d 808, 812-13 (Iowa 1992). Other courts have followed suit. See, e.g., Watson v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 566 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Minn.1997) (The majority of courts use a contract-based theory which focuses on a contractual analysis of the insurance policy provisions ...; policies which contain an insured bar recovery to an innocent coinsured spouse); Noland v. Farmers Ins. Co., 319 Ark. 449, 892 S.W.2d 271, 272-73 (1995); Volquardson v. Hartford Ins. Co., 264 Neb. 337, 647 N.W.2d 599, 605-06 (2002); Wagner v. Midwestern Indem. Co., 83 Ohio St.3d 287, 699 N.E.2d 507, 511 (1998); McAllister v. Millville Mut. Ins. Co., 433 Pa.Super. 330, 640 A.2d 1283, 1289 (1994); Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook, 980 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1999). See generally 10 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance 3d § 149:49 (2003) (whether arson by one coinsured spouse bars innocent coinsured spouse from recovering under policy depends not on property rationales or marital rights and obligations, but on contract analysis of insurance policy provisions....). Vance contained an intentional loss exclusion similar to the case at bar. In Vance, we interpreted the phrase an insured in the policy to mean an unspecified insured who intentionally sets fire to the house. 457 N.W.2d at 593. That is, under the express terms of such a policy, if any insured sets fire to the house, all insureds are barred from recovering. Id. As a threshold matter, then, we find the provisions of the insurance contract at issue in this case bar Ramona's claim. As in Vance, the policy explicitly excludes coverage for any loss arising out of any act committed ... (1)[b]y or at the direction of an `insured' ... and (2)[w]ith the intent or expectation of causing a loss. (Emphasis added.) Applying a contract analysis, Robert's malfeasance plainly bars Ramona's right to recover.