Opinion ID: 2518098
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: cause of action for deceptive trade practices must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence

Text: Respondents allege on cross-appeal that the district court failed to appropriately instruct the jury as to the correct burden of proof for a deceptive trade practices claim against them. They allege that the district court imprecisely instructed the jury that some deceptive trade practices must only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence while others require proof by clear and convincing evidence, and that the district court did not specify which burden of proof was required for which particular deceptive trade practice. While we agree that the district court improperly instructed the jury on both burdens of proof, reversal on this ground is unnecessary because deceptive trade practices must only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, which is a lesser evidentiary standard than clear and convincing evidence. Generally, a preponderance of the evidence is all that is needed to resolve a civil matter unless there is clear legislative intent to the contrary. See Mack v. Ashlock, 112 Nev. 1062, 1066, 921 P.2d 1258, 1261 (1996) ([A]bsent a clear legislative intent to the contrary . . . the standard of proof in [a] civil matter must be a preponderance of the evidence.). NRS Chapter 598 is silent as to the plaintiffs burden of proof for deceptive trade practices. See NRS 598.0903-.0999. Thus, while some deceptive trade practices defined in NRS Chapter 598 sound in fraud, see, e.g., NRS 598.0923(2), which, under common law, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, see Bulbman, Inc. v. Nevada Bell, 108 Nev. 105, 110-11, 825 P.2d 588, 592 (1992), we cannot conclude that deceptive trade practices claims are subject to a higher burden of proof absent a legislative directive. See Mack, 112 Nev. at 1066, 921 P.2d at 1261. This accords with the approach taken by many other jurisdictions that have enacted similar consumer protection statutes. See Hanson-Suminski v. Rohrman Motors, 386 Ill.App.3d 585, 325 Ill.Dec. 461, 898 N.E.2d 194, 203 (2008) ([T]he appropriate standard of proof for a statutory fraud claim [under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act] is preponderance of the evidence.); Dunlap v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 136 Ariz. 338, 666 P.2d 83, 88-89 (Ariz.Ct.App.1983); State ex rel. Spaeth v. Eddy Furniture Co., 386 N.W.2d 901, 903 (N.D.1986). [3] In Dunlap, the Arizona Court of Appeals recognized that a plaintiff has the burden of proving common law fraud by clear and convincing evidence. 666 P.2d at 88. However, because statutory fraud is separate and distinct from common law fraud, the Court stated that [t]he mere fact that the word `fraud' appears in the title of [Arizona's] consumer protection statute does not give rise to an inference that the legislature intended to require a higher degree of proof than that ordinarily required in civil cases. Id. at 89. The court further concluded that the purpose of the consumer protection statute was to provide consumers with a cause of action that was easier to establish than common law fraud, and therefore, statutory fraud must only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. We agree with the Arizona Court of Appeals' reasoning in Dunlap. Statutory offenses that sound in fraud are separate and distinct from common law fraud. Therefore, we conclude that deceptive trade practices, as defined under NRS Chapter 598, must only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Having concluded as such, we do not need to disturb the jury's verdict because the jury found all defendants liable for deceptive trade practices even though the district court improperly instructed the jury that some deceptive trade practices must be proven by the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment in this respect. [4]