Opinion ID: 1201664
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of Sitz to the present case

Text: (5b) Relying upon Sitz, the People contend that the United States Supreme Court has determined that, under the federal Constitution, advance publicity is not an essential element of a valid sobriety checkpoint. Arguing to the contrary, defendant urges that Sitz is not controlling authority for the narrow question posed in the present case, and that instead we should adopt the reasoning of People v. Morgan, supra, 221 Cal. App.3d Supp. 1, to conclude that a sobriety checkpoint is constitutionally invalid in the absence of advance publicity. We are persuaded by the People's argument. As noted above, in discussing the advance-publicity guideline in Ingersoll, we suggested that such publicity was significant in two respects  in reducing the intrusiveness of the sobriety checkpoint stop, and in increasing the deterrent value of the checkpoint itself. The reasoning of the Sitz majority makes it clear, however, that advance publicity is not a constitutional prerequisite to a valid sobriety checkpoint in either respect. In analyzing the question of intrusiveness, the high court in Sitz considered both the objective intrusion of a checkpoint stop upon motorists, and the subjective intrusion involved. ( Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 452 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 421].) With respect to the objective-intrusion criterion, that is, the duration of the seizure and the intensity of the investigation, the court in Sitz found that the objective intrusion occasioned by a sobriety checkpoint is no different from the intrusion involved in a border-control checkpoint, which the court previously had upheld. (496 U.S. at pp. 451-452 [110 L.Ed.2d at pp. 420-421] [citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976) 428 U.S. 543, 558 (49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 1128, 96 S.Ct. 3074)].) The presence or absence of advance publicity would appear to be irrelevant to the objective intrusion occasioned by a sobriety checkpoint, and defendant does not contend otherwise. With respect to the subjective-intrusion criterion, that is, a sobriety checkpoint's potential for generating fear and surprise in motorists, the high court rejected the lower courts' conclusion that the subjective intrusion posed by the sobriety checkpoints involved in that case was unreasonable because of the approaching motorists' unawareness of their option to avoid the impending detention. Explaining that [t]he `fear and surprise' to be considered are ... the fear and surprise engendered in law-abiding motorists by the nature of the stop, the court in Sitz contrasted sobriety checkpoints with the roving patrols considered in earlier cases, emphasizing that `[a]t traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.' [Citation.] ( Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 452-453 [110 L.Ed.2d at pp. 421-422].) Because sobriety checkpoints share these characteristics with the border-patrol checkpoints upheld in Martinez-Fuerte, the court in Sitz concluded that [t]he intrusion resulting from the brief stop at the sobriety checkpoint is for constitutional purposes indistinguishable from the checkpoint stops ... in Martinez-Fuerte.  (496 U.S. at p. 453 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 422].) Although Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall) argued vigorously in dissent that temporary sobriety checkpoints were more akin to roving patrols than to the permanent border-control checkpoint upheld in Martinez-Fuerte, because motorists were likely to be surprised upon encountering temporary sobriety checkpoints, the court in Sitz rejected that view, concluding that, for constitutional purposes, sobriety checkpoints are not impermissibly frightening or surprising  provided the motorist encountering the checkpoint `can see that other vehicles are being stopped, [and] ... can see visible signs of the officers' authority....' (496 U.S. at p. 453 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 422] [quoting United States v. Ortiz (1975) 422 U.S. 891, 894-895 (45 L.Ed.2d 623, 627-628, 95 S.Ct. 2585)].) Although publicizing in advance the location of a sobriety checkpoint may serve to minimize the surprise or inconvenience experienced by motorists alerted by the publicity, Sitz 's analysis of the subjective intrusion engendered by a sobriety checkpoint makes clear that advance publicity is not a constitutional prerequisite to ensuring that the subjective intrusion involved is confined to a reasonable level. Sitz also makes clear that, however persuaded a court may be that advance publicity will increase the deterrent value of the checkpoint and thereby increase the procedure's effectiveness, the constitutionality of the checkpoint does not hinge upon such judicial evaluation of its effectiveness. (9b) As we have seen, the high court in Sitz explained that the language contained in its prior decision in Brown, identifying `the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest' as one factor in the balancing process, was not meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the responsibility for making policy decisions among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques. In so concluding, the court emphasized that for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources.... ( Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 453-454 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 422].) (5c) Thus, Sitz establishes that a sobriety checkpoint may not be held violative of the federal Constitution simply because a court may believe that the law enforcement interests sought to be served by the checkpoint would more effectively be served by a level of advance publicity greater than that believed appropriate by politically accountable officials. The nature and degree of publicity sought or provided by law enforcement officials prior to the operation of sobriety checkpoints inevitably involve policy judgments reflecting not only the fiscal resources available to the agencies in question, but also a determination as to whether to attempt to achieve greater deterrence during a specified time period (e.g., a holiday weekend) or at a particular location (e.g., near a professional sports stadium), or whether, instead, to seek the more generalized deterrence arguably obtainable when motorists learn  through personal experience or by word of mouth  that sobriety checkpoints may be established without advance publicity. [7] Sitz establishes that the constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint should not hinge upon a court's evaluation of the wisdom of policy decisions made by accountable law enforcement officials. (10) Nonetheless, courts have recognized that the absence of advance publicity does not so lessen the deterrent effect of a sobriety checkpoint as to tip the scales in favor of the detained motorist who subsequently challenges the checkpoint. A sobriety checkpoint conducted without advance publicity is unlikely to be totally without deterrent effect, at least among those motorists who pass through, or by, the checkpoint. (See People v. Rister (Colo. 1990) 803 P.2d 483, 489 [[T]he announcement and establishment of a sobriety checkpoint undoubtedly had some effect on advancing the state's interest in preventing drunken driving. (Italics added.)].) If, in accordance with the Ingersoll guidelines, the checkpoint is established on a roadway having a high incidence of alcohol related accidents and/or arrests, the deterrent effect may be considerable. ( Ingersoll, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1343.) Also, if law enforcement agencies choose to publicize the number of arrests made at sobriety checkpoints, an additional deterrent effect may be realized. Thus, even in the absence of advance publicity, a sobriety checkpoint has the potential of substantially furthering the state's vital interest in deterring motorists from driving under the influence. (11) In arguing that Sitz must be read to establish advance publicity as a prerequisite to a constitutionally valid sobriety checkpoint program, defendant relies upon the circumstance that the statement of facts in Sitz indicates the sobriety checkpoint at issue in that case was established under guidelines providing for some form of unspecified publicity. (See Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 447 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 418].) Defendant maintains that, because the sobriety checkpoint program in Sitz contained advance publicity, the decision in that case cannot be relied upon as authority for the proposition that advance publicity is not constitutionally required. Defendant's claim is untenable. In analyzing the constitutionality of the sobriety checkpoint challenged in Sitz, the court's opinion placed no reliance upon, and indeed made no reference to, any advance publicity that might have been provided regarding the checkpoint. It is well settled that language contained in a judicial opinion is `to be understood in the light of the facts and issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered. [Citation.]' ( People v. Superior Court ( Marks ) (1991) 1 Cal.4th 56, 65-66 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 389, 820 P.2d 613], quoting Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [39 Cal. Rptr. 377, 393 P.2d 689].) The reasoning contained in the Sitz opinion indicates that the validity of a sobriety checkpoint turns upon the duration of the stop and the intensity of the investigation, and upon the adequacy of measures taken to apprise motorists who encounter the checkpoint that it is an official law enforcement operation and that other motorists also are being detained in regular fashion. Particularly in light of the high court's implicit rejection of Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion, which argued that the surprise nature of sobriety checkpoints rendered them unconstitutional, we conclude that the court's opinion in Sitz reasonably must be understood to hold that advance publicity is not a prerequisite to a constitutionally permissible sobriety checkpoint. (Accord, United States v. Ziegler (N.D.Cal. 1993) 831 F. Supp. 771.) [8]