Opinion ID: 2486347
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to File Post-Trial Motions

Text: ¶ 16. Williams's second argument is that his trial attorneys rendered ineffective assistance by fail[ing] to file any post-trial motions on Williams'[s] behalf, which deprived Williams of the opportunity to effectively preserve his record for appeal. The State argues that Williams's attorneys did file post-trial motions, pointing to the following excerpts from Williams's notice of appeal and designation of record, respectively: 4. A Motion by trial counsel for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial was denied on the record by the [c]ourt on April 2, 2010. and NOTICE is hereby given ... that Algernon Williams has taken an appeal to the Supreme Court of Mississippi from the Final Judgment dated April 5, 2010, and the decision of the Circuit Court of Warren County, Mississippi, overruling the Defendant's Motion for New Trial or Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict dated April 2, 2010 and filed ore tenus. ¶ 17. But the transcript of the sentencing hearingwhich was conducted on April 2, 2010contains no indication that either of Williams's attorneys moved ore tenus for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or for a new trial. To the contrary, the transcript clearly indicates that Williams's attorneys had not filed any such motions by that point. The record is likewise devoid of any rulings on such post-trial motions. The State's position essentially is that it must have happened because trial counsel said it happened. ¶ 18. The record contains no indication that Williams's attorney madeor that the trial judge ruled onany post-trial motions for JNOV or new trial. But even assuming this constitutes objectively-deficient performance, Williams still must show that but for such deficient performance, the outcome at trial probably would have been different. ¶ 19. Williams cites this Court's opinion in Holland v. State , [6] and the Court of Appeals' opinion in Johnson v. State , [7] for the proposition that trial counsel's failure to file the requisite post-trial motions amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. In Holland, the defense attorney moved for directed verdict at the close of the State's case, but failed to renew his motion at the conclusion of trial, to request a peremptory instruction, or to move for JNOV. [8] This Court found that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction, but that the defendant was procedurally barred from raising insufficiency on appeal because his attorney had failed to raise it at trial: Counsel's failure to move for a directed verdict or request a peremptory instruction, or even file a single post-trial motion deprived the trial judge of the opportunity to review the evidence and reexamine possible errors at trial.... In light of the fact that counsel's strategy was to admit guilt to possession while arguing that the evidence was not sufficient to prove intent to distribute, counsel was deficient by failing to preserve any objection relating to the sufficiency or weight of the evidence. This deficiency was intensified by the resulting failure to preserve critical error on appeal. [9] ¶ 20. But Holland is distinguishable from today's case, because this Court's finding in Holland that the evidence was insufficient established the second prong of the Strickland test, which requires the defendant to show that, but for his attorney's objectively deficient performance, the outcome of the trial probably would have been different. In other words, in a case where the evidence was insufficient, the outcome of trial probably would have been different, had counsel put the issue before the court. ¶ 21. But here, Williams's only argument is that a motion for a new trial would have given the trial judge an opportunity to review his denial of Williams's request for a continuance. Williams offers nothing to suggest that, had his attorneys moved for a new trial and argued the continuance issue again, the trial judge probably would have granted the motion. ¶ 22. After the State's case in chief, the parties had an extended conversation with the trial judge in which Williams's attorneys strongly argued for a continuance, even after the judge denied the request. At one point, the judge even said, I've denied the request for continuance, and I'm not changing my mind about that part of it. Then, after the State objected to the defense's mention of Charlie Brown in its opening remarks, the defense again reminded the judgetwicethat it had requested a continuance to secure Brown's presence. ¶ 23. There is nothing in the record to suggest that, had Williams's attorneys moved for one, the judge likely would have ordered a new trial for his failure to grant a continuance. Moreover, Williams does not even argue that the trial court erred by failing to grant the continuance. So, even assuming that counsel was objectively deficient for failing to make any post-trial motions, Williams has not satisfied the second prong of Strickland. [10]