Opinion ID: 52838
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discovery of Information Concerning the Identity and Location of Physical Evidence

Text: Reed also moved for the district court to compel the state to locate the remaining physical evidence in his case, identify the custodians who have control of it now, determine the chain of custody related to this evidence, and identify any items of physical evidence seized in connection with the Wadle murder that have been lost, destroyed, or are no longer in the custody or control of the state. Reed also sought this information with respect to evidence from the murders of three other women killed in Texas after his imprisonment. The district court granted Reed's discovery request solely with respect to fingerprint evidence; specifically, the court authorized that Reed obtain the production of (1) the fingerprint evidence collected from the scene of Wadle's murder that was not matched with Reed or any known person, and (2) the fingerprint evidence collected by the state of Texas from the scenes of the other three murders that has not been matched with any known person. Reed now argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying the remainder of his discovery request with respect to evidence pertaining to the Wadle murder; Reed does not appear to be appealing the denial of the remainder of his request with respect to the other three murders. The district court engaged in an extended analysis of Reed's discovery request. The court first noted the good cause requirement that a habeas petitioner seeking discovery must satisfy. Citing Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904, 117 S.Ct. 1793, the court explained that in order to determine whether Reed met that standard, it must identify the essential elements of Reed's claim for habeas relief. The district court identified the first ground of Reed's habeas claim presented to support his discovery request as an actual innocence claim. Citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), Robison v. Johnson, 151 F.3d 256, 267 (5th Cir.1998), and Lucas v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1069, 1074 (5th Cir.1998), the district court held that claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state court proceeding. The court therefore concluded that Reed's actual innocence claim, standing alone, was not sufficient to support his discovery request. The district court identified Reed's second ground as a claim that the requested information was necessary for the purpose of establishing a fundamental miscarriage of justice in response to an anticipated argument by the state that Reed's claim that the state knowingly used perjured testimony was procedurally barred. The court stated that [i]f Petitioner's allegations establish a prima facie claim for relief on habeas corpus, he will be allowed appropriate discovery of evidence that may be likely to show his actual innocence in order to provide the necessary facilities and procedures to allow an adequate opportunity in this Court to overcome such bar. The court therefore proceeded to discuss Reed's claim that the state knowingly used perjured testimony at his trial. The court first noted that Reed's federal habeas petition and the petition presented to the state habeas court did not include an allegation that the state knew of the falsity of McLean's testimony. The court stated, however, that Reed had submitted a declaration from a law school student assisting his case stating that McLean told him that prosecutors assisted him in fabricating testimony against Reed. The district court wrote that [a]ssuming that these material new factual allegations could be incorporated into the amended habeas petition in this Court, Reed would have failed to exhaust state remedies by not presenting the evidence in state court. Accordingly, the court determined that it cannot grant relief on this claim absent a sufficient justification under the law to excuse such failure to exhaust state remedies. The court stated, however, that [p]roof of actual innocence . . . can establish the kind of fundamental miscarriage necessary to overcome the imposition of the bar. The court therefore found that good cause existed for Reed to discover evidence of actual innocence. Having concluded that good cause existed, however, the district court held that the request stated in Petitioner's motion exceeds the proper scope of discovery in this proceeding. The court authorized the discovery of fingerprint evidence, but denied Reed's request for additional discovery of information regarding material evidence from the Wadle murder and the other three murders. The court explained that express representations to this Court from the Dallas County District Attorney's office and attorneys for Respondent indicate that there is presently no biological evidence from the investigation of the murder of Wanda Jean Wadle remaining in the possession of or subject to the control of prosecutorial agencies of the State of Texas other than (1) the victim's pubic hair cuttings which have not been shown to be capable of identifying a person other than the victim, and (2) evidence retained by the Dallas County Clerk from the trial which would be equally available to Petitioner's attorneys. Accordingly, the district court found sufficient justification for orders granting discovery of fingerprint evidence, but . . . insufficient justification for discovery orders regarding biological evidence for [DNA] testing since Petitioner has not shown that such evidence is likely to exist. In his request for a COA on this issue, Reed first disagrees with the district court's conclusion that actual innocence, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for federal habeas relief. Relying on the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in House v. Bell, No. 04-8990, since decided by the Supreme Court at ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006), Reed proposes that  Herrera does not foreclose all such freestanding `actual innocence' claims. We need not decide this question, nor address the Supreme Court's decision in Bell. As explained above, the district court found that good cause existed for the discovery of evidence that would support Reed's claim of actual innocence. The district court limited Reed's discovery regarding physical evidence not because Reed's habeas claims were deficient but because Reed had failed to demonstrate that there was any likelihood that the evidence he was seeking existed. Reed then addresses the district court's decision regarding the scope of discovery. Reed argues that courts have authorized the use of all of the federal civil discovery rules to facilitate forensic DNA testing in habeas corpus litigation. Reed cites Toney v. Gammon, 79 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir.1996), where the Eighth Circuit held that the petitioner was entitled to discovery of physical evidence for purposes of DNA testing. Toney is distinguishable from the instant case, however, because there the state acknowledged that the exhibits from Toney's state criminal trial remain in the custody of St. Louis County authorities and are available for testing if ordered by the court. Id. Reed also relies on Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir.1997), where the Ninth Circuit stated: Jones's motion for expansion of the record, which we treat as a discovery motion, sought a court order for the FBI laboratory to conduct tests on the clothes Jones was wearing the night of the murder as well as on blood samples from both Lee and himself. . . . Jones contended that he needed this material to argue effectively that his trial lawyer had rendered ineffective assistance. We believe this to be good cause, particularly given that there was never any hearing for the ineffective assistance claim at the state-court level. Unlike the petitioner in Jones, Reed cannot point to specific evidence that once existed and may continue to exist that holds the potential to exonerate him. Statements to the district court by the Dallas County district attorney's office and the state's attorneys strongly indicate there is no such evidence. Reed has not shown any likelihood that physical evidence exists that would render his request for information on chain of custody more than a fishing expedition. See Ward v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 1355, 1367 (5th Cir.1994). Accordingly, we conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Reed's discovery request for information regarding the location and custody of physical evidence. We therefore deny Reed's request for a COA on this issue.