Opinion ID: 453326
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Instruct on Theory of Defense

Text: 88 Lastly, Hearn argues that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on his theory of defense. 89 Hearn's theory of defense is that he was merely safeguarding a sum of money and that he had no knowledge of the conspiracy instigated by co-defendant Baker and the DEA. 90 The district judge charged the jury very carefully and thoroughly on the elements of a conspiracy. Among other things, he stressed the importance of finding that each of the defendants were parties to an agreement to achieve an unlawful object, and that each defendant did it knowingly, did it wilfully, did it intentionally and not by ignorance, accident nor mistake. The court stressed: So, in order to find a person liable for the crime of conspiracy you would have to find that that person knew that a conspiracy existed and voluntarily entered into it with the intent of achieving the illegal object of the agreement. 91 We find that the instructions given were correct and covered the substance of Hearn's request. The trial judge did not deprive defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial trial. 92 The judgment is vacated as to co-defendant Porter and remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent hereof. As to the remaining co-defendants, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 93 LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Chief Judge (dubitante). 94 This court's ruling that the agents were required to stop questioning Porter after he tried unsuccessfully to call his attorney is not as obvious a proposition as the opinion suggests. 95 There are two hurdles that must be crossed before this result can be reached. First, without a finding by the court below that an agent actually overheard Porter's attempt to reach his lawyer, this court might be accused of engaging in unwarranted fact-finding by assuming such was the case. Second, even if the agent overheard the conversation, was the conversation by itself enough to constitute an invocation by Porter of the right to the presence of counsel, such as to trigger an Edwards analysis? 96 As to the first issue, while the question is very close, I think the court can properly infer, as it does, that the agents must have been aware that Porter was trying to telephone his attorney. The small size of the room, the admitted fact that an agent was present during the calls, the stipulation that a message was left for Attorney Stolzberg, and the judge's finding that Porter called information to secure the number of his attorney, all point to the obvious conclusion that the agent in the room overheard Porter's attempts to reach a lawyer. While a finding by the district court would have been desirable, we do not reach out unduly by making the finding ourselves. 97 The answer to the second question--whether Porter's mere telephone call, even if overheard by the police, constituted an invocation of the right to counsel for purposes of the Edwards rule--is more difficult. The Miranda line of cases provides little guidance on this specific issue because those cases involved situations where the defendant in some way affirmatively expressed a desire to the police to secure the presence of counsel before continuing to talk. See, e.g., Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) (I do want an attorney before [this questioning] goes much further); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 478, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1881, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (I want an attorney before making a deal); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 738, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1424, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (I think I had better get a lawyer before I talk any more. I am going to get into trouble more than I am in now.). 98 While the above cases do not shed light on whether the police's mere overhearing of an unsuccessful call to counsel is enough, they do suggest that a defendant should at least verbalize some desire that he receive the help of an attorney before he answers any further questions. See, e.g., Edwards, 454 U.S. at 482, 485, 101 S.Ct. at 1883, 1885 (Edwards rule applies where right to counsel clearly asserted or specifically invoked); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.... If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.) (emphasis added). 99 Only two lower courts seems to have addressed the issue of when efforts to contact an attorney, unaccompanied by any direct assertion to police of the desire to have counsel present, amount to an invocation of the right. In United States v. Lilla, 534 F.Supp. 1247 (N.D.N.Y.1982), the district court found that one defendant's request to his mother to reach his attorney by telephone was a specific[ ] exercis[e] of his right to counsel. Id. at 1279. The court then found that a second defendant had explicitly invoked his right to counsel by attempting to contact his attorney directly, and by arranging for his mechanic to reach his attorney. Id. at 1280. 100 By contrast, the district court in Gorel v. United States, 531 F.Supp. 368 (S.D.Tex.1981), found that, although the defendant apparently attempted to reach an attorney, and police officials knew of his attempts, the attempts were in no sense equivocal requests [for legal assistance] or efforts to obtain present assistance and thus Edwards was not applicable. Id. at 370. The court relied on earlier Fifth Circuit cases that founded the following rule for dealing with confusing or ambivalent requests for counsel: 101 whenever even an equivocal request for an attorney is made by a suspect during custodial interrogation, the scope of that interrogation is immediately narrowed to one subject and one only. Further questioning thereafter must be limited to clarifying that request until it is clarified. When and if it is clarified as a present desire for the assistance of legal counsel, all interrogation must cease until that is provided, just as in the case of an initial, unambiguous request for an attorney. And no statement taken after that request is made and before it is clarified as an effective waiver of the present assistance of counsel can clear the Miranda bar. Thus, by [this rule,] we avoid attributing a talismanic quality to the word attorney falling from a suspect's lips, while at the same time safeguarding his right to the assistance of counsel when he wants it and says so. 102 Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir.1979) (emphasis in original) (defendant announced that he wanted to make a statement but added that he first wanted to tell his story to an attorney). See also Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.1979) (defendant stated that he wanted to have a lawyer at some point but would rather talk to the officer immediately). The Gorel court concluded from these cases that any mention of an attorney is not necessarily an invocation of the right to counsel or even an equivocal request for present representation. It then held that although it would 103 indulge a presumption that any effort to contact an attorney is an invocation to the right of present representation by counsel, where conclusions drawn from the totality of the circumstances overwhelmingly rebut this presumption, the court will decline to find Miranda violated. 104 Gorel, 531 F.Supp. at 372. 105 I think the Gorel court's rule is only sensible, since there could be situations where the police act in complete good faith, without realization that the accused had any intention of asserting a right to the immediate presence of counsel. Were we to apply the Gorel rule to this case, we would be left with the issue of whether conclusions drawn from the totality of the circumstances here rebut the presumption that the defendant, by making abortive efforts to contact an attorney which the police overheard, had invoked the right of present representation by counsel. This would be essentially a factual issue, better resolved initially by the district court than de novo on appeal. I note that the district court found here that Porter, a college and business school graduate who had been well treated by the agents and whose rights had been explained to him, fully realized after failing to reach his attorney by telephone that he had a right to stop the questioning and nonetheless did not do so. The court said, 106 I'm sure he understood he had a right to stop questioning at any time, and if in fact he was disturbed by the fact that he couldn't have reached his lawyer he could have stopped talking until such time as his lawyer was available to him. 107 To me, this finding suggests a belief by the judge that Porter, in spite of making the call, never actually meant to invoke his right to counsel since he consciously and knowingly refrained from asserting the right to the police. And if Porter did not, in fact, mean to invoke his right to counsel, an Edwards analysis was not required, and the statements made by Porter should not be suppressed. 108 In sum, I trust this case will not be viewed as creating a per se rule that any time a defendant seeks to contact an attorney, no matter how surreptitiously and ambivalently, he automatically invokes his right to counsel. There surely will be some situations where an accused's failure to make any direct assertion of the right to the police will belie an invocation of the right.