Opinion ID: 2423415
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dying Declarations and the Confrontation Clause

Text: The trial court admitted Arrington's statements through Officer Ba'th as dying declarations, because there were: short bursts of words from the decedent. His eyes were closed as if he was going to sleep. ... [H]e was going in and out of consciousness. And the number of wounds that he observed at the time and location of those wounds specifically near the heart, the rib cage of the decedent's body. Johnson argues that the trial court erred in admitting the statements because (a) they did not fall under the dying declaration hearsay exception, and because (b) their admission violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.
To make out a dying declaration, the declarant must have spoken without hope of recovery and in the shadow of impending death. Lyons v. United States, 683 A.2d 1080, 1083 (D.C.1996) (quoting Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 99, 54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196 (1933)); see also Bell v. United States, 801 A.2d 117, 126 (D.C.2002). The declarant need not utter words acknowledging the certainty of death. Bell, supra, 801 A.2d at 126. Rather, [t]he court can infer the victim's sense of impending death from the circumstances  from the nature and extent of his wounds. McFadden v. United States, 395 A.2d 14, 16 (D.C.1978). That is, a `despair of recovery may indeed be gathered from the circumstances if the facts support the inference' that the decedent was conscious of his impending death. Jenkins v. United States, 617 A.2d 529, 531 (D.C.1992) (quoting Shepard, supra, 290 U.S. at 100, 54 S.Ct. 22). At the same time, the perception of impending death `must be exhibited in the evidence, and not left to conjecture.' Lyons, supra, 683 A.2d at 1084 n. 8 (quoting Shepard, supra, 290 U.S. at 100, 54 S.Ct. 22). We accord great deference to the trial judge's decision relating to `the preliminary fact question of consciousness of impending death where [it is] reasonably supported by the evidence.' Bell, supra, 801 A.2d at 126 (quoting Jenkins, supra, 617 A.2d at 530). In this case, Arrington was shot six times at close range. One bullet entered through his left chest, passed through his lung, and hit his spinal column. Another bullet entered the left side of his abdomen, piercing his spleen, renal vein, bowel, aorta, right ureter, and kidney. See Jenkins, supra, 617 A.2d at 530-31 (holding statements to be dying declarations where the victim had been stabbed ten times with a double-edged knife, penetrating both lungs, spleen, stomach, arms and back ... was bleeding profusely and staggering before he ultimately collapsed on the pavement and repeatedly emphasized that he was in pain). Arrington opened his car door, took a few steps, and then collapsed, apparently unable to get up. He made the statements in question to Officer Ba'th, the first person to respond to the emergency call, mere minutes after the shooting. When Officer Ba'th first asked Arrington his name, he only moaned. As Officer Ba'th continued to question Arrington about who had shot him and why, Arrington lapsed in and out of consciousness. He repeatedly closed his eyes as if he wanted to go to sleep, or as if a person was going to sleep, and died only a few hours after reaching the hospital. See Butler v. United States, 614 A.2d 875, 886 (D.C. 1992) (holding statements to be dying declarations where [a]t the time [the decedent] made the statement, [he] had just been shot, had struggled to his knees, and then had fallen back to the floor. ... [and] died a few hours later.). This evidence strongly supports a conclusion that Arrington was without hope of recovery and realized the gravity of his condition when he made his statements. Indeed, our decision in Lyons is practically indistinguishable in this regard. See 683 A.2d at 1083-84 n. 8 (The record support[ed] the trial court's conclusion ... that [the decedent] realized his `extreme circumstances even though [he did not] articulate' them where the decedent was groaning in pain and had been shot in the chest, and where, when those on the scene attempted to move him, he kind of went `Oh, no' and then he groaned ... [and] said `Don't move me. I have been shot too many times'). Accordingly, we perceive no error in admitting those statements as dying declarations.
Johnson further argues that, even if Arrington's statements were properly admitted as dying declarations, their admission violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Johnson's argument fails, however, because Arrington's statements were not testimonial and thus are not protected by the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause under Crawford. [S]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). In light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Michigan v. Bryant, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011), on facts functionally indistinguishable from those in this case, the Sixth Amendment issue is not a close one. See id. at 1163-67.