Opinion ID: 399873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Target Area

Text: 17 Section 4 of the Clayton Act grants a cause of action to (a)ny person ... injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 15. It does not list the requirements of standing. See Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits, 71 Colum.L.Rev. 1, 24 (1971). Rather, standing is a judicially created doctrine designed to foreclose recovery to some plaintiffs who, although within the literal terms of § 4, have suffered injuries that are too remote or indirect. See Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1975). Simply because an element of a private antitrust claim can be traced to the language of § 4 does not, as defendants seem to believe, make that element a component of standing. The standing inquiry involves neither the violation issue nor the damages issue. Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1359-60 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094, 97 S.Ct. 1108, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977). 18 What standing does involve is the application of this circuit's test for standing, the target area test: 19 To attain standing a person (whether corporation or individual) must be one against whom the conspiracy is aimed. Or, put in plutonomic terms, the complainant must show that he is within that sector of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry. 20 Jeffrey, 518 F.2d at 1131. Standing is a preliminary (matter) to be answered only from an examination of the allegations of the complaint. Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 547 (5th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 427, 70 L.Ed.2d 236 (1981); accord, Yoder Bros., 537 F.2d at 1359. 9 21 Plaintiffs' allegations are clearly sufficient to give them standing. All three plaintiffs allege that they were to be direct participants in the harvesting and exporting of logs and lumber products from Indonesia, and the importing and marketing of such materials in several markets, primarily the United States. They allege that defendants destroyed plaintiff FPC's rights in the forestry concession in order to keep them out of harvesting, exporting, and marketing, businesses in which both defendants are allegedly engaged. Plaintiffs have also made detailed allegations concerning their intentions and preparations to enter these proposed businesses. See Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629, 633 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 991, 87 S.Ct. 600, 17 L.Ed.2d 451 (1966). 22 Thus, plaintiffs have alleged that they were attempting to enter that sector of the economy ... endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions; indeed, they were the very persons against whom the conspiracy (was) aimed. Jeffrey, 518 F.2d at 1131.