Opinion ID: 1937735
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Expert Testimony in the First Phase of Trial

Text: Mishne's trial took place on July 30-31, 1979, before this Court's decisions in State v. Burnham, Me., 406 A.2d 889 (1979), and State v. Sommer, Me., 409 A.2d 666 (1979). Mishne argues on appeal that the presiding justice did not apply the correct standard in excluding expert testimony concerning drug withdrawal offered by the defense in the first phase of the trial as evidence of either abnormal conditions of mind under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 58(1-A) or intoxication under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 58-A. Burnham held that under § 58(1-A) psychiatric evidence may be relevant to the question of whether the defendant is guilty of the crime, when the culpable state of mind ... is an element of the crime charged. 406 A.2d at 894. Sommer, supra, illustrates the point that evidence that a defendant may have been suffering from mental or emotional difficulties does not necessarily suggest that defendant's conduct was not intentional or knowing, as those terms are defined in the criminal code. 409 A.2d at 668-670. See also State v. Bridges, Me., 413 A.2d 937, 941-942 (1980). On the first day of trial, the presiding justice asked for argument on whether withdrawal could be considered either intoxication or abnormal condition of mind. He stated that if withdrawal was not intoxication, or being under the influence of drugs, then it must be in the area of mental diseases, in which case it has nothing to do with this part of the case. The next day the presiding justice ruled that drug withdrawal is not intoxication, either voluntary or involuntary. Defense objected, based on the definition of intoxication in § 58-A(3)(A). The presiding justice clarified his ruling, stating that the defendant's great desire for drugs . . . in a withdrawal stage would not be admissible to generate an issue of lack of intent or to generate an intoxication defense. The following exchange then occurred: MR. AMES: I'm still unclear, I have witnesses that are prepared to testify as to withdrawal, the compulsioness [ sic ] of an individual ... that is a drug addict that is in the process of withdrawal, and I've got witnesses to testify that he was in fact withdrawing  medical witnesses, psychiatric witnesses, that he was in fact withdrawing the day after, and I have witnesses that will testify to basically the same observations. The doctor decided it was withdrawal. There are a lot of witnesses, and I don't know which ones  THE COURT: I probably would exclude every single one of them but I will allow you to put it on the record. As you say, this case is important enough, and when it goes to the Law Court, the Law Court ought to have an opportunity to evaluate every bit of evidence. This is not going to go before the jury. What you are talking about, I would allow you to put it in on voir dire to allow me to examine and determine whether I'm going to admit any part of it or exclude it. After the defendant's own testimony, the defendant's attorney made an offer of proof, in which he described each of his medical witnesses and what they would say, without actually presenting them for voir dire. The offer included the following: There's also Jean Vahee whom I would introduce as a drug counselor at a residential drug rehabilitation center in Portland who has been  who is the assistant head of this particular operation, and has been in the drug rehabilitation counseling business for six and a half years, and has worked extensively out of state, and in the State of Maine for this field. He would testify to the fact that sometime in late January or early February, Jonathan Mishne came there seeking Methadone, seeking treatment, specifically Methadone treatment. And he told him there were no Methadone clinics in Maine, that he would have to go to Massachusetts. He would also, if allowed to testify, he would testify to withdrawal symptoms, drug addition, in general, the compulsion of Heroin addicts to obtain Opiates to get off on, to relieve any type of pain, be it emotional or physical. Basically he would testify to the fact that Heroin addicts will do most anything to get away from hurt, pain, or what have you. The other medical witnesses were offered to describe defendant's condition at the time of his arrest. The voir dire which the court offered to the defense never occurred. The State argues that the defense never did make an offer of proof which showed that the offered evidence was relevant to negation of intent, as opposed to the criminal responsibility issue to be decided in the second phase. It appears that the defense chose not to bring its witnesses in for extended testimony which would inevitably be excluded. Since Burnham had not yet been decided the defense could not have relied on it in objecting to the presiding justice's ruling. In State v. Bridges, supra , the trial was held before Burnham but we found that the trial justice properly applied 17-A M.R.S.A. § 58(1-A) and considered . . . the psychiatric and psychological testimony in determining whether there existed a reasonable doubt of the existence of a [culpable] state of mind. 413 A.2d at 942. In the present case, the presiding justice said that he would not admit such evidence for any purpose. He did, however, anticipate Burnham by allowing defendant to make an offer of proof. A necessary element of all of the crimes charged against Mishne is intentional conduct as defined in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10(1): 1. Intentionally. A. A person acts intentionally with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious object to cause such a result. B. A person acts intentionally with respect to attendant circumstances when he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or believes that they exist. Defense counsel's offer of proof, quoted above, does not suggest that the evidence would have generated any doubt that Mishne's conduct was intentional. The offer stated only that the evidence would show that Mishne was in a state of withdrawal, and that an addict in this state suffers from a compulsion to obtain drugs. Existence of a compulsion, or a compelling need, does not tend to negate a conscious purpose to cause certain results. Nor does evidence of a compelling need tend to show that a defendant lacked conscious awareness of the attendant circumstances of his actions. See State v. Sommer, Me., 409 A.2d 666 (1979). In fact, evidence of a compelling need tends to confirm the conclusion that defendant acted with awareness and with the conscious object of fulfilling that need. The expert testimony might have been relevant to establish a lack of criminal responsibility under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 58(1), if defendant's compulsion tended to show a lack of substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. As we said in State v. Ellingwood, Me., 409 A.2d 641, 646 (1979), and again in State v. Page, Me., 415 A.2d 574, 577 (1980) (quoting Ellingwood ): Inability to control one's actions does not negate the existence of a culpable mental state; rather, it serves as an excuse. Under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 59(2)(B), evidence of a mental disease or defect which is offered to establish lack of criminal responsibility under section 58(1), is only admissible in the second phase of a bifurcated trial. We hold that the presiding justice did not err in excluding the evidence, as described in the defense's offer of proof, from the first phase of the trial. Although his general statement, that evidence of abnormal condition of mind would be entirely inadmissible in the first phase, was incorrect, we cannot say that he erred when no evidence was presented to him which was in fact admissible under section 58(1-A). [3] The same conclusion must be reached in respect to the admissibility of the evidence if offered to show intoxication under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 58-A. That section reads as follows: 1. Intoxication is not a defense unless it establishes a reasonable doubt as to the existence of an element of the offense. 2. When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he not been intoxicated, such unawareness is immaterial. 3. As used in this section: A. Intoxication means a disturbance of mental capacities resulting from the introduction of alcohol, drugs or similar substances into the body; and . . . . . Although the definition of element of the crime in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 5 contains several elements, the history and structure of section 58-A suggests that the words an element of the offense contained in subsection 1 refer only to those culpable states of mind defined in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 10. The criminal code originally provided that the existence of a reasonable doubt as to any culpable state of mind . . . may be established by any relevant evidence, including evidence of an abnormal condition of mind or intoxication. . . . Intoxication is otherwise no defense. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 5(4) (1975) (emphasis supplied). Subsection 4 was subsequently repealed, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 58(1-A) added to deal with abnormal condition of mind, and 17-A M.R.S.A. § 58-A added to deal with intoxication. P.L.1975, ch. 740, § 25. The original version of section 58-A commenced with the words: Intoxication is no defense, affirmative or otherwise except as follows: and then dealt with intentional or knowing conduct separately from reckless conduct. The present revision of section 58-A (P.L.1977, ch. 510, §§ 26, 27) deals with intentional or knowing conduct in subsection 1 and with reckless conduct in subsection 2. The separation is for the purpose of dealing differently with reckless conduct resulting from self-induced intoxication. We perceive no legislative purpose to extend the defense of intoxication beyond the element of culpable state of mind. This interpretation is reinforced by the definition of intoxication as a disturbance of mental capacities which continued in effect throughout these revisions. The question in this case is whether defense counsel's offer of proof was sufficient to show that his witnesses would testify that, as a result of the use of drugs, Mishne was suffering a disturbance of mental capacities which would tend to generate a reasonable doubt as to Mishne's intentional state of mind. The offer suggests that the evidence would show both the physical and psychological condition of a drug addict in withdrawal. We assume arguendo that a disturbance of mental capacities could be interpreted broadly to include this physical and psychological condition. Disturbance is a relative word which can be applied to either mild or very serious conditions. To be relevant, however, the disturbance must tend to generate a doubt as to a culpable state of mind, and the defendant's evidence must be related to the mental state in question. As we have already discussed, however, the defense's offer of proof failed to show that any testimony would be offered which would generate any doubt as to Mishne's conscious awareness or that he acted intentionally. [4] We do not hold, and do not wish to imply, that evidence of addiction withdrawal or anything else which differs from the common forms of intoxication could never be shown to be a disturbance of mental capacities resulting from the introduction of alcohol, drugs or similar substances into the body. We hold only that the offer of proof in this case did not show that the evidence would generate any doubt that the defendant consciously knew and intended the consequences of his actions. The only doubt which might have been raised was as to the defendant's capacity to conform his conduct to the law. [5] Capacity to conform to the law is a form of mental capacity, and there is no doubt that it can be disturbed or lost by the ingestion of alcohol, drugs or similar substances. But the loss of capacity to conform does not establish a reasonable doubt as to any element of any offense, and therefore, if it is the only result of defendant's intoxication, that intoxication is not a defense under § 58-A. Indeed, if such a defense were available it would probably prevent conviction whenever a person acted under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Cf. State v. West, Me., 416 A.2d 5 (1980). We conclude, therefore, that the presiding justice did not err in refusing on the basis of Mishne's offer of proof to admit evidence of withdrawal as intoxication under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 58-A. [6] In addition to its offer of proof, the defense also submitted proposed jury instructions. The defendant relies in part on those instructions in his argument on appeal that he was not allowed to present fully to the jury the issue of withdrawal as intoxication. The first of these instructions reads: Under Maine law, a person is criminally liable for his acts only if he engages in voluntary conduct. The proposed instruction cites 17-A M.R.S.A. § 51, subsection (1), which reads: A person commits a crime only if he engages in voluntary conduct, including a voluntary act, or the voluntary omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable. The defendant's testimony suggested that his present addiction was involuntary, but he did not pursue a defense of involuntary intoxication. See State v. West, supra ; State v. Rice, Me., 379 A.2d 140 (1977). Nor has Mishne raised this argument on appeal. [7] He does argue that the jury should have been given his second proposed instruction, which reads: In considering what is and what is not voluntary conduct, you may consider if you feel it is relevant, the defendant's testimony as it relates to the effect [of] drugs and the withdrawal from drugs as they relate to voluntariness of his conduct. Section 51 does not provide a definition of voluntary. Its meaning can be determined from its place in the overall framework of the Criminal Code. We note first that section 51 does not describe a culpable state of mind which must be proven in addition to the state of mind, defined in section 10, required by the law defining crime. Section 11 expressly limits the states of mind required by the Code to those listed in section 10. We note secondly that section 51 does not create a defense of duress, which is treated separately under section 54 (defining duress as compulsion by threat or force). Nor is it necessary to rely on section 51 when evidence may be introduced to negate a culpable state of mind because of mental disease or defect under section 58 or intoxication under section 58-A. Section 51 could not have been intended to duplicate the provisions of these other sections. The Model Penal Code defines voluntary in terms of the meaning of involuntary actions: reflexes, convulsions, movements during unconsciousness or sleep, actions during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion. Model Penal Code § 2.01(2); see Model Penal Code § 2.01 Comment (Tent.Draft No. 4, 1955); see also Lafave and Scott, Criminal Law 179-181 (1972). In our view, the purpose of section 51 is to prevent punishment of such involuntary physical actions which are not the product of the actor's conscious will. The burden is on the state to prove that the defendant was not acting in an unconscious, involuntary way. The record discloses that the presiding justice instructed the jury in entirely correct terms: To be voluntary an act must be the result of an exercise of a defendant's conscious choice to perform them, and not the result of reflex, convulsion, or other act over which a person had no control. . . . There was no error in this instruction or in the refusal of the defendant's proposed instruction.