Opinion ID: 2972882
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Young’s Witness Intimidation Claim

Text: Young next contends that his conviction should be reversed because his right to due process was violated when the prosecutor allegedly told Terry Gallagher’s counsel that Gallagher would be indicted for his role in the conspiracy if he testified on behalf of the defense. Included in a defendant’s right to establish a defense is his Sixth Amendment right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. “This right is a fundamental element of due process.” See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967). Prosecutorial actions “aimed at discouraging defense witnesses from testifying deprive a defendant of this right.” See United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 400 (6th Cir. 2001). We normally review a witness intimidation due process claim for harmless error. See id. In this case, however, the Government contends that Young waived this argument by failing to raise it before the district court and that the issue must therefore be reviewed for plain error. See United States v. Pierce, 62 F.3d 818, 831 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court’s attention.”). 12 The record establishes that Young’s counsel informed the district court that he wished to interview Gallagher as a potential witness, but that Gallagher’s counsel informed him that Gallagher would exercise his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination because he had allegedly been told that if he refused to cooperate with the government, then he would be indicted for the conspiracy. From the same colloquy with the district court, it is clear that the prosecutor insisted that Gallagher was never told that he would be indicted for his offenses, but only that it was a possibility. Young’s counsel never formally objected. Although the district court stated, “[W]e need to have [Gallagher’s counsel] here, and we need to make a record,” Young’s counsel apparently did not heed that advice at the time. It was not until after Young was convicted that his counsel raised the issue again in a motion for a new trial. Young’s counsel also submitted an affidavit from Gallagher’s counsel at that time stating that Gallagher had expressed a willingness to testify for the defense until his counsel was told by the government that Gallagher would be indicted if he did so. The prosecutor insists that Gallagher’s counsel’s affidavit is not an accurate reflection of their conversation. When asked whether the government intended to call Gallagher as a witness, the prosecutor stated, “No, Your Honor, and I would say that we never told him he would be indicted. It’s a possibility.” In its brief, the United States claims that “the government had not made a charging decision and [merely] advised 13 Gallagher’s attorney that should her client fail to testify honestly that might lead to an indictment.” In the memorandum in support of Young’s motion for a new trial, he sought an evidentiary hearing and a new trial on the basis that he was prevented from adequately presenting a defense because the prosecutor’s threat to Gallagher made a key defense witness “unavailable for testimony.” Young then proceeded under the legal theory that the district court should grant his motion for a new trial based on “newly discovered evidence.” Because Gallagher’s potential testimony was known to the defense before trial, the district court correctly ruled that it did not constitute newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial. The question thus becomes whether Young’s raising the factual issues surrounding the witness intimidation claim was sufficient to preserve the claim for appeal even when the specific legal theory asserted–due process violation–has clearly been raised for the first time on appeal. While this is a relatively close issue, we conclude that the argument has been waived. Young seeks a new trial based on a due process violation, an entirely different legal theory than the newly discovered evidence theory on which he proceeded below. The district court never considered the due process argument. Because Young’s counsel did not persist, therefore, a proper record was not made concerning the witness intimidation claim. As a general rule, we do not consider 14 arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Taft Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 243-44 (6th Cir. 1991). “Constitutional objections that appear for the first time on appeal are conclusively deemed to be waived.” United States v. Hall, 200 F.3d 962, 964 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). Although we have recognized certain limited circumstances justifying our review of issues raised for the first time on appeal, none seem to apply here, and waiver is particularly appropriate when, as here, the newly raised issue on appeal requires additional fact finding. See Taft, 929 F.2d at 244. Pursuant to Rule 52(b), an appellate court can correct an error not raised below only if there was an error which was plain and which affected the defendant’s substantial rights. The error must also “seriously affect[] the fundamental fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” See United States v. Trammel, 404 F.3d 397, 401 (6th Cir. 2005). A witness intimidation charge is a serious charge and, if proven, almost certainly warrants reversal. Based on the record before us, however, it does not appear that plain error can be established. While the affidavit submitted by Gallagher’s counsel is troubling, the prosecutor insists that he only told Gallagher’s counsel there was a possibility that Gallagher could be indicted if he perjured himself. The fact that a prosecutor merely advises a witness of the consequences of perjury, without more, does not warrant reversal. See United States 15 v. Pierce, 62 F.3d 818, 832 (6th Cir. 1995). “Where, however, the substance of what the prosecutor communicates to the witness is a threat over and above what the record indicates is necessary, and appropriate, the inference that the prosecutor sought to coerce a witness into silence is strong.” Id. (citation omitted). Basically, we are presented with two differing accounts as to what was said to Gallagher about testifying. Based on the record before us, we are unable to say that the government substantially interfered with Young’s fundamental right to call a witness in his defense so as to constitute plain error.